

PREM 19/1642

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Relations with South Africa.

Policy on Arms Sales with Africa.

Internal situation. ECGD Credits.

Pm's Emissary | J. Hunt.

SOUTH AFRICA

Pt 1: June 1979

Pt 5: July 1985

(Buthe's memorandum, and briefing in at. folds)

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
1-7-85		23-8-85					
4/7/85		3-9-85					
5-7-85		10/9/85					
6-7-85		12/9/85					
8-7-85		31-8-85					
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7-8-85							
9-8-85							
12-8-85							
13-8-85							
16-8-85							
22-8-85							

PART 5 ends:-

Pretoria Tel 264 31.8.85

PART 6 begins:-

CDI 60 PM 2.9.85

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(85) 26 th Meeting minutes, item 2	25/07/1985
CC(85) 24 th Meeting minutes, item 2	11/07/1985
CC(85) 23 rd Meeting minutes, item 4	04/07/1985

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray

Date 16/6/2014

PREM Records Team

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GRS 450

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FM PRETORIA
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 264
OF 310720Z AUGUST 85
INFO ROUTINE JOHANNESBURG
INFO SAVING DURBAN, CAPE TOWN

MY TELNOS 251 AND 252: FORCED REMOVALS

SUMMARY

1. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT DECISION THAT BLACK COMMUNITIES AT KWANGEMA AND DRIEFONTEIN WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO MOVE IS WELCOME AND MERITS RECOGNITION.

DETAIL

2. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A FINAL DECISION ABOUT KWANGEMA AND DRIEFONTEIN HAS BEEN WELCOMED BY THE COMMUNITIES AND BY ORGANISATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA WHO HAVE SUPPORTED THEM WHILE THEY WERE UNDER THREAT OF REMOVAL. THEY MAY NOW REMAIN IN THEIR EXISTING AREAS. THOSE INHABITANTS WHOSE LAND IS BEING FLOODED DUE TO THE NEW DAM ARE TO BE COMPENSATED WITH LAND CLOSE BY.

3. AT A TIME WHEN WE ARE TRYING TO ENCOURAGE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TOWARDS CHANGE, THIS DEVELOPMENT CAN BE SEEN AS A SMALL STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO WELCOME THE DECISION PARTICULARLY SINCE WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY INTERVENED TO TRY TO STOP THE REMOVAL OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES. I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL INTERCESSION HAS CONTRIBUTED. ALTHOUGH I WOULD NOT RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD GO SO FAR AS TO CLAIM THE CREDIT OURSELVES FOR THE FINAL DECISION.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE LIKELY TO DENY THAT THEIR DECISION WAS BASED ON ANYTHING OTHER THAN THEIR OWN ASSESSMENT OF THE MERITS OF THE CASE. IN ANY PUBLIC COMMENT, YOU MIGHT ALSO WISH TO ADD THAT WE HOPE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO AGREE THAT OTHER COMMUNITIES UNDER THREAT OF FORCED REMOVAL WILL BE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN THEIR PRESENT HOMES.

4. THE MINISTER OF COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION, DR WILJOEN, ANNOUNCED A SUSPENSION OF FORCED REMOVALS EARLIER THIS YEAR PENDING A REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT POLICY. WHICH HE RECENTLY TOLD ME HAD STILL NOT BEEN COMPLETED. HOWEVER, DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE ON A NUMBER OF COMMUNITIES, THE LATEST BEING

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THE REPRIEVE OF KWANGEMA WND DRIE ONTEIN AND DUNCAN VILLAGE OUTSIDE EAST LOHABUON. IN PARTICULAR THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED EARLIER THIS YEAR THAT 58 BLACK URBAN COMMUNITIES ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR RE-LOCATION TO HOMELANDS WOULD NO LONGER BE REQUIRED TO MOVE.

5. WE RECENTLY HEARD THAT THE KRUGERSDROP WHITE COUNCIL HAD AGREED TO DROP DEMANDS THAT AN ADJACENT BLACK COMMUNITY SHOULD BE MOVED. WE KNOW THAT THIS WAS A DECISION FOR WHICH THE LOCAL MP (A 'LIBERAL' MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL PARTY) HAD BEEN PRESSING. DECISIONS SUCH AS THE AGREEMENT THAT SQUATTERS AT CROSSROADS IN THE WESTERN CRPE COULD REMAIN IN THE AREA FOR THE PRESENT, ABOLISHING THE COLOURED WORK PREFERENCE POLICY IN THE WESTERN CAPE WHICH PENALISED BLACKS AND CHANGING LEGISLATION TO MAKE IT A LITTLE EASIER FOR BLACKS TO MOVE FROM AREA TO AREA ALSO SUGGEST A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH.

6. THE THREAT OF REMOVAL NEVERTHELESS HANGS OVER MANY COMMUNITIES, BOTH URBAN AND RURAL, PENDING OUTCOME OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REVIEW. THE GREATEST UNCERTAINTY IS PROBABLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS TOWARDS THE CONSOLIDATION OF KWAZULU. ANOTHER PROMINENT CASE IS MATHOPESTAD (FCO TELNO 115 TO CAPE TOWN REFERS). EVEN IF THE POLICY OF FORCED REMOVALS REMAINS PERMANENTLY SUSPENDED, THE GOVERNMENT WILL DOUBTLESS OBLIGE INDIVIDUAL GROUPS TO MOVE IF CONSIDERED NECESSARY, EG. SQUATTER COMMUNITIES.

7. AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT THAT FORCED REMOVALS WERE NO LONGER NORMAL POLICY WOULD HOWEVER REMOVE THE UNCERTAINTY UNDER WHICH BLACKS IN AFFECTED AREAS HAVE BEEN LIVING FOR MANY YEARS.

**THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED**

MOBERLY

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FM **PRETORIA**
TO PRIORITY FCO
TEL NO 257
OF 30 AUGUST 85
INFO ROUTINE JOHANNESBURG
INFO SAVING DURBAN AND CAPE TOWN

MY TELNO 243: **SOUTH AFRICA: INTERNAL SITUATION**

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

1. THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE IN THE **BLACK AND COLOURED COMMUNITIES** HAS WORSENEO PARTICULARLY AFTER THE **INDISCRIMINATE DETENTIONS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN AT THE END OF LAST WEEK**, THE BANNING OF COSAS AND THE DETENTION OF OTHER BLACK PROMINENT LEADERS INCLUDING DR BOESAK. THE WIDESPREAD BITTERNESS AND INCREASING CONFRONTATION BETWEEN LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND THE POLICE IN THE WESTERN CAPE IS A SIGNIFICANT EXTENSION OF THE GENERAL PATTERN OF UNREST. ALTHOUGH THE **POLICE AND SADF** HAVE THE RESOURCES TO DEAL WITH LOCAL DISORDERS, THE EMERGENCY POWERS **HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED IN DAMPENING DOWN THE UNDERLYING TENSION**. THERE IS A GROWING FEELING AMONG YOUNG BLACKS THAT EVENTS ARE MOVING THEIR WAY AND THAT THEY MUST KEEP CONFRONTATION ALIVE. THE FAILURE TO RESTORE ORDER AS WELL AS WORRIES ABOUT THE GENERAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND THE RAND HAVE INCREASED CALLS BY THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY FOR MEANINGFUL REFORMS.

WESTERN CAPE

2. THE SITUATION IN THE COLOURED AND BLACK TOWNSHIPS AROUND CAPE TOWN REMAINS TENSE FOLLOWING MOUNTING UNREST IN THE AREA THROUGHOUT THE WEEK. THE LATEST REPORTS ARE OF 20 DEATHS AND ABOUT 150 PEOPLE INJURED INCLUDING 17 POLICE. MANY OF THOSE TREATED IN HOSPITAL ARE REPORTED TO HAVE HAD BIRD SHOT WOUNDS IN THEIR BACKS. INCIDENTS OF STONE THROWING, LOOTING, PETROL BOMBING AND ARSON IN BOTH COLOURED AND BLACK AREAS ARE STRETCHING THE POLICE AND THERE HAS BEEN CRITICISM IN CAPE TOWN OF POLICE TACTICS INCLUDING CLAIMS BY THE VICE CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN THAT STONE THROWING BY A SMALL GROUP OF STUDENTS FROM THE UNIVERSITY HAD BEEN PROVOKED BY THE WAY IN WHICH THE POLICE HAD SET ABOUT BREAKING UP A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION.

3. AS IN OTHER AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, INCIDENTS HAVE INCLUDED ATTACKS ON THE HOMES OF BLACK POLICE, SCHOOLS AND IN AT LEAST ONE CASE THE HOME OF STUDENTS WHO HAD DECLINED TO PARTICIPATE IN PROTESTS.

1 STUDENT

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STUDENT PROTEST

4. THE BANNING OF THE BLACK CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICAN STUDENTS (COSAS) HAS BEEN FOLLOWED BY WIDESPREAD STUDENT PROTEST INCLUDING MEETINGS AT UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES ORGANISED BY THE AZANIAN STUDENT ORGANISATION (AZASO) AND THE WHITE STUDENTS ORGANISATION, THE NATIONAL UNION OF SOUTH AFRICAN STUDENTS (NUSAS). BLACK SCHOOLTEACHERS HAVE TOLD US THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO A SPREAD IN THE BOYCOTT OF SCHOOLS IN VARIOUS AREAS INCLUDING PRETORIA WHERE STUDENTS IN ATTERIDGEVILLE WHO HAVE UP TO THIS WEEK BEEN ATTENDING SCHOOL ARE NOW JOINING WITH THE STUDENTS IN OTHER BLACK TOWNSHIPS IN A BOYCOTT THAT NOW APPEARS TO BE AFFECTING MOST OF THE BLACK HIGH SCHOOLS.

BUSINESS CRITICISM

5. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THIS WEEK'S INCREASED TENSION IN BLACK AND COLOURED AREAS AND THE SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE DEALINGS BUSINESS LEADERS HAVE RENEWED THEIR CALLS ON THE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE URGENT STEPS TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION. A STATEMENT ISSUED JOINTLY LAST NIGHT BY THE ASSOCIATION OF THE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE (ASSOCOM), THE FEDERATED CHAMBER OF INDUSTRIES (FCI), THE NATIONAL AFRICAN FEDERATED CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES (NAFCOC) AND THE URBAN FOUNDATION CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT TO NEGOTIATE WITH BLACK LEADERS, INCLUDING THOSE IN JAIL, AND TO TAKE SPECIFIC STEPS TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATION INCLUDING THE LIFTING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AS SOON AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, AN UNDERTAKING TO MOVE AWAY FROM DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION AND AN OPEN AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION. IN SEPARATE STATEMENTS THE CHAIRMAN OF ANGLO-AMERICAN, GAVIN RELLY, CALLED YESTERDAY FOR THE ACCELERATION OF THE REFORM PROGRAMME, PARTICULARLY REGARDING CITIZENSHIP, INFLUX CONTROL, A POSITIVE URBANISATION POLICY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A UNITARY EDUCATION SYSTEM AND THE CHAIRMAN OF REMBRANDT, ANTON RUPERT, CALLED FOR INDUSTRIAL PARTNERSHIP ON THE BASIS OF COOPERATION, REGARDLESS OF RACE OR COLOUR AND FOR THE RAPID DISMANTLING OF REGULATORY CONTROLS.

GENERAL LAW AND ORDER SITUATION

6. REPORTS REACHING US FROM BLACK CONTACTS IN THE TRANSVAAL AND CAPE SUGGEST THAT THE DEFENCE FORCE IS INCREASINGLY BEING DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF THE POLICE. A NUMBER OF THE INCIDENTS REPORTED THIS WEEK INVOLVED DETENTIONS AND CONFRONTATION BETWEEN CROWDS AND PATROLS HAVE INVOLVED SADF PERSONNEL. THE SADF WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE DETENTION OF SCHOOL STUDENTS AT THE END OF LAST WEEK. BLACKS TELL US THAT THE DETENTIONS, WHICH IN MANY CASES WERE CARRIED OUT IN AN INDISCRIMINATORY

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WAY, HAVE CONTRIBUTED CONSIDERABLY TO THE OVERALL FEELING OF BITTERNESS IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY.

BLACK ATTITUDES

7. THE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO CALM DOWN THE OVERALL SITUATION ARE NOT SUCCEEDING. BLACKS AND PARTICULARLY THE YOUNGER GENERATION IN THE TOWNSHIPS FEEL THAT THE UNREST IS SUCCEEDING AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF GROWING REPORTS OF CRITICAL WORLD REACTION AND WHAT BLACKS SEE AS SIGNS OF IRRESOLUTION BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. IN THIS SITUATION BLACKS NOT INVOLVED IN THE UNREST ARE BEING SUBJECTED TO INCREASING PRESSURES TO JOIN IN AND MANY ARE INFLUENCED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT THEY SHOULD NOT STAND BY UNCOMMITTED WHILE OTHERS SUFFER. THIS SEEMS TO BE AN ELEMENT IN WHAT HAS HAPPENED THIS WEEK IN THE WESTERN CAPE WHICH HAD HITHERTO BEEN RELATIVELY CALM. THE COLOURED COMMUNITY IN THE WESTERN CAPE HAS ALSO REACTED ANGILY TO THE DETENTION OF DR BOESAK.

8. A FEW OF THE OLDER GENERATION OF BLACKS ARE STILL URGING CALM. TOM BOYA, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EAST RAND URBAN COUNCILS ASSOCIATION, AND MAYOR OF DAVEYTON, BENONI, WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THIS WEEK THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ONLY LIFT THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS WHEN THE VIOLENCE IN THE TOWNSHIPS WAS OVER. BUT OTHER PROMINENT COMMUNITY LEADERS HAVE TOLD US THAT, IF THEY TOOK A SIMILAR LINE, THEIR STANDING IN THEIR COMMUNITIES WOULD BE DESTROYED. THE OVERWHELMING PRESSURE IN THE TOWNSHIPS IS FOR BLACK SOLIDARITY.

MOBERLY

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 August 1985

Dear Charles,

Discussion Paper on Policy Towards South Africa

In your letter of 17 June ^{PT 4 AH.} you commissioned an unclassified discussion paper for the Prime Minister's seminar on policy towards South Africa on 13 September. This I now enclose.

The paper incorporates advice from the DTI, the Treasury and (on the recommendation of the Treasury) the Bank of England. It has been seen and approved (save for Section III) by the Foreign Secretary. Section III has been approved by Mr Rifkind. It is designed for the use of all the participants in the seminar. The aim is that it should stimulate discussion but leave the seminar to decide on the policy implications of the issues raised.

~~copy~~ As you will see, it does not attempt to address options for future policy. These will be covered in a separate classified paper to be circulated only to Ministers and officials attending the seminar. I shall be sending this to you shortly after the Foreign Secretary returns from leave next week.

A copy of this letter and attachment goes to Christopher Roberts (DTI), Roger Lavelle (Treasury) and Paul Mayes (Bank of England).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 August 1985

Dear David,

Lord Rothschild: South Africa

/ As requested in your letter of 29 August I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Lord Rothschild's letter of 28 August. ^{attached}

We can only applaud Lord Rothschild's sentiments in writing to President Botha in this way. Privately, however, we are not particularly sanguine about its likely impact on the South African State President. The Chairman of the Urban Foundation in South Africa has recently given us a depressing account of President Botha's current attitudes and outlook, suggesting that in his present frame of mind the State President appears largely impervious to outside advice. The Urban Foundation is a private sector body in South Africa dedicated to improving living standards for the black community and maintaining links with them. Their Afrikaaner President, Judge Jan Steyn, has close contacts with National Party Ministers.

Yours Sincerely,
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

David Norgrove Esq
10 Downing Street

Please type.

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: **TEL. NO:**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Lord Rothschild GBE GM
23 St James's Place
London SW1A 1NH

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 28 August.

CAVEAT.....

I thought that your message to President Botha was both admirably succinct and helpful. As you know, we have been urging the South African Government for some time to take bold steps towards fundamental reforms. Until they do so I fear that there will be no early end to the serious difficulties which they are now facing.

Enclosures—flag(s).....



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 August 1985

LORD ROTHSCHILD: SOUTH AFRICA

I enclose a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Lord Rothschild. I should be grateful for advice and a draft reply. In the circumstances a swift reply would be useful, particularly if you intend to advise sending anything more than a simple acknowledgment.

I am copying this letter to John Bartlett (Bank of England) and Rachel Lomax (HM Treasury).

David Norgrove

Colin Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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CF

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

29 August 1985

I am writing to acknowledge your letter of today about the meeting which you and your cousin, Evelyn de Rothschild, had this morning with the South African Ambassador and Mr. de Kock.

I will draw your letter to the Prime Minister's attention at the earliest possible moment.

NW

The Lord Rothschild, G.B.E., G.M., F.R.S.

Rey

23 ST. JAMES'S PLACE
LONDON SW1A 1NH
01-493 4795

28th August 1985

Dear Prime Minister,

The South African Ambassador and Mr. de Kock, the Governor of their Central Bank, came to see Evelyn and me this morning. I made certain remarks which the Ambassador and Mr. de Kock asked me to transmit directly to President Botha. This I have done and I enclose a copy of what I said.

I hope you approve.

Yours
Victor

Lord Rothschild

Prime Minister

2

To see. FCO are
advising on a reply.

JRS
29/8

LORD ROTHSCHILD

Telephone: 01-280 5000

Telex: 888031

N.M. Rothschild & Sons Ltd.
New Court
St. Swithin's Lane
London EC4P 4DU

28th August 1985

Dear President,

Your Ambassador and Mr. de Kock came to have a talk with my cousin, Evelyn de Rothschild, and me this morning. They suggested that the views I expressed, on behalf of Evelyn and myself, should be transmitted to you by means of this letter.

Rothschilds and South Africa have been good friends for some hundred years and we hope that this friendship will continue. We feel, however, it is essential that you, President, should publicly state, as a matter of the greatest urgency, that you have decided (not "intend") to renounce apartheid, but in an orderly fashion. That is the end of the message to the world.

I believe that this message will be applauded throughout the world and will cause a relaxation of tension and of the associated technical problems.

My cousin Evelyn and I are very well aware of the problems associated with such an announcement: but it is essential and very urgent.

*Yes
Rothschild*

President Botha



South African Embassy

Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

B8/1/1

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Prime Minister
CDD
2/9.

28th August 1985

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
No. 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Charles,

During the course of the past twelve months the State President and your Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, have corresponded about the KwaNgema and Driefontein Communities.

A statement issued by the Deputy Minister of Development and Land Affairs has been received and I am sure you would be interested in seeing it. It is pleasing to learn that negotiations with the Communities have led to a satisfactory conclusion for all concerned.

I wonder if the content of the attached statement could be brought to the Prime Minister's attention.

Yours sincerely
Leo Evans

Leo H. Evans
MINISTER

Encl.

KWA-NGEMA AND DRIEFONTEIN

After negotiations with a delegation of the KwaNgema Black Community, the Government has decided that this Community will not be resettled, but will remain permanently on the land which they occupy, namely the farm Kaffirlokati in the district Wakkerstroom, Transvaal.

The KwaNgema Community has agreed to accept 1 112 hectares of state land adjacent to Kaffirlokati a partial compensation for 1 889 hectares of land belonging to the Community concerned which will be flooded because of the construction of the Heyshope Dam. As far as the remainder of the land is concerned, namely 886 hectares, it was agreed that the Community would be compensated on a cash basis.

After similar negotiations with a delegation with the Black Community of Driefontein, in the district of Wakkerstroom, Transvaal, the Government decided that this Community must not be resettled either, but will also remain permanently on the land which they occupy, namely the portion of the farm Driefontein. The Government's decisions were also discussed with the local White farming Community.

The Black Community of Driefontein has agreed to accept 212 hectares of state land - a portion of the farm Grootsspruit - as well as 403 hectares of the farm Roodekraal which was offered for sale by Lotshaba Forest to the South African Development Trust as compensatory land, instead of 615 hectares of Driefontein which will be flooded by the Heyshope Dam.

The decision of the Government is subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions by the Black Communities concerned, for example, respecting and maintaining border fences, prohibiting illegal squatting on the land concerned and that the agricultural potential of the land is not over utilized.

PRETORIA

27 August 1985

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Prime Minister

SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PUS

MR FERGUSSON

SIR J FREELAND

MR JOHNSON

MR O'NEILL

HD/SAFD

HD/CAFD

HD/UNB

HD/NEWS DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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FM NEW DELHI

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 973

OF 231320Z AUGUST 85

INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 956 : INDIA : SOUTH AFRICA

1. I CALLED ON SHUNKER (ADDITIONAL SECRETARY, MEA) TODAY TO GO OVER THE GROUND ON SOUTH AFRICA. IN THE COURSE OF A DISCUSSION (RECORD BY BAG) SHUNKER SET OUT WELL KNOWN INDIAN VIEWS ON SANCTIONS AND I REPLIED APPROPRIATELY.

2. SHUNKER LET DROP, HOWEVER, THAT RAJIV GANDHI HIMSELF FELT SO STRONGLY THAT HE WAS SENDING A LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER. SHUNKER ASKED THAT THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO HIM AND SHOULD BE TREATED WITH DISCRETION. NEVERTHELESS, THE FACT THAT THE ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED TO THE LEVEL OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PRIME MINISTERS INDICATED THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO IT

THE ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED TO THE LEVEL OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATION
BETWEEN PRIME MINISTERS INDICATED THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO IT
ON THE INDIAN SIDE. SHUNKER CONFIRMED THAT THE INDIANS WOULD BE
MAKING SANCTIONS A MAJOR POINT FOR DISCUSSION AT CHOGM.

BROOMFIELD

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IMMEDIATE

Lord Bethell

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

ack/22 August 1985

I enclose a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Lord Bethell.

I should be grateful for a suitable draft reply which the Prime Minister might send to Lord Bethell, to reach me by 5 September please.

(Timothy Flesher)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 August, 1985

The Prime Minister received the attached letter from the Indian Prime Minister about South Africa. I should be grateful for a draft reply as soon as possible for the Prime Minister's signature.

(Timothy Flesher)

C. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 August, 1985

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for conveying the message from His Excellency Shri Rajiv Gandhi. I shall ensure that this is brought to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

(Timothy Flesher)

His Excellency Shri P.C. Alexander.



PRIME MINISTER

New Delhi
August 19, 1985

ccpk
Top copy -
see file
T 152A/85 .

My dear Prime Minister,

The current disturbances in South Africa are undoubtedly engaging your attention. We in India are watching the developments with deep concern and dismay because of our historic association with the struggle against apartheid and because of the presence of the large community of people of Indian origin.

The Nonaligned Movement looks to all those countries which are in a position to do so to exert all pressure on the South African authorities to give up their racist policies. I abhor the politics of violence. Our strong preference is for the settlement of differences through peaceful political means. However, we have full sympathy for the oppressed non-white people of South Africa who obviously do not have avenues of democratic processes, peaceful protests and demonstrations open to them. They are convinced that they have no alternative but to intensify their struggle with all means at their disposal to make their voice heard.

Public opinion throughout the world has condemned apartheid. I believe that it may perhaps still be possible to avoid large scale violence if the South African Government is subjected to effective political and economic pressures.

.....2/-



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We have noted with appreciation the steps taken by many Governments, such as recall of their Ambassadors, the decision to ban further investments in South Africa, and so on. I know how strongly you personally and your people fight for human rights and disapprove of the racial discrimination practised in South Africa. I am sure that the UK Government, with its immense influence, can effectively intervene with the South African Government to listen to the voice of reason and, indeed, their own enlightened self interest. This would be greatly appreciated by the international community.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in brown ink, appearing to be 'M. Thatcher', written in a cursive style.

The Rt. Hon'ble Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of Britain
London



SUBJECT
cc Master
Ops

P.C. Alexander

INDIA HOUSE,
ALDWYCH,
LONDON WC2B 4NA

No. 202/HC/85

August 22, 1985

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**
SERIAL No. T152A/85

My dear Prime Minister,

I have been asked by our Prime Minister, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, to convey the following message to you:-

BEGINS

New Delhi
August 19, 1985

My dear Prime Minister,

The current disturbances in South Africa are undoubtedly engaging your attention. We in India are watching the developments with deep concern and dismay because of our historic association with the struggle against apartheid and because of the presence of the large community of people of Indian origin.

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...2/-

disapprove of the racial discrimination practised in South Africa. I am sure that the UK Government, with its immense influence, can effectively intervene with the South African Government to listen to the voice of reason and, indeed, their own enlightened self interest. This would be greatly appreciated by the international community.

Yours sincerely,

(RAJIV GANDHI)


ENDS

Yours sincerely

P.C. Alexander

(P.C. Alexander)

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1



FCO PRESS CONFERENCE : FRIDAY 16 AUGUST 1985

PRESIDENT BOTHA'S SPEECH

Spokesman issued the following statement:

"As Lady Young said last night, President Botha's speech is an important statement of South African Government policy. It deserves further careful study and requires clarification. But taken together with his earlier speeches, statements by other Ministers and changes introduced in recent months, the speech is further evidence that the South African Government are embarked on a process of reform.

"There are a number of positive features. He has stressed his willingness to negotiate with black leaders. He has called for co-operation and co-responsibility and for the participation of all South African communities on matters of common concern. He has confirmed that his government are reviewing the influx control system and that a solution will have to be found for the legitimate rights of urban blacks. He has said that if there was a reduction in violence, he would match that by an ending of the state of emergency.

"President Botha has described his speech as a manifesto. The speech laid down a number of general principles and we hope that he and his Government will now go on to implement specific reforms. We must continue to encourage them to do so, and to embark on a programme of 'positive action' to which he has referred.

"The aim must be early progress through a process of dialogue with genuine black leaders towards a system of government which commands the support of the people of South Africa as a whole."

/In

In response to a question about sanctions, Spokesman replied that HMG believed that the South African Government's moves owed more to internal than external pressures. Sanctions were a totally negative response. This was the wrong moment to disengage from South Africa. Britain must use its political and economic influence to best effect - not undermine it.

cc J
CWR
11(00)
R(OR) 71

LADY YOUNG'S INTERVIEW WITH JOHN OSMAN FOR 'WORLD TONIGHT'
15 AUGUST 1985

Q. What is your reaction to President Botha's speech?

A. It's obviously an important speech. In the short time since he has made it we have not of course had an opportunity to study it in any detail and so I cannot give a detailed commentary on it. It is a speech which is couched in general terms and it does not go into the detail that we would like to have seen, particularly on timing. But it does raise some important issues, for example, President Botha has talked about co-responsibility, he has said that if there is an end to violence then he can lift the state of emergency and that those affected need no longer be in detention. He has made a number of references to talks and negotiations with the blacks. He has talked of doing something on influx control and he has talked of doing something on the rights of urban blacks. These are all important issues, couched as I say in general terms, and we are disappointed in some aspects that he has not been more specific. I think particularly of the point that Geoffrey Howe made in his speech last July and has subsequently repeated, namely that we would have like to have seen the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela.

Q. Another omission I noted is another requirement which was advanced by the Foreign Secretary, namely an early end to the state of emergency. Does that disappoint you too?

A. As I said President Botha has talked in generalities. He said in effect that if there was an end to violence then he would lift the state of emergency. We have called for an early end of the state of emergency. A lot will depend of course how this is carried out and what steps the South African Government takes.

Q. Do you think the speech is likely to affect Britain's opposition to a policy of economic sanctions against South Africa?

A. I think our view on the whole question of sanctions has been stated on many times in the past. We believe that

sanctions are a negative way of dealing with this problem. We think that the way to get the changes in South Africa that we would all like to see is by a policy of political and economic dialogue conducted both privately and of course in statements by Geoffrey Howe and other Ministers which have been made over a number of years. And of course Helen Suzman this morning said that ~~she~~ doesn't believe that sanctions are the way to achieve the kind of changes which we want to see in South Africa.

Q. Your initial reaction would be that the speech would not affect that British policy?

A. That's right.

Q. Will Britain continue to be in step with our European Community partners on that?

A. There are going to be a number of meetings in the Community. Early next week the official experts on Africa from the Community countries will be meeting and at the end of the week there will be a meeting of Political Directors and Ambassadors who will be returning from Pretoria for that meeting. They will of course be looking at the statement and seeing what it means. That is the first and most important thing to do.

Q. The Ambassadors will include the British Ambassador?

A. The British Ambassador will be going to the meeting with the Community and then of course he will be returning to Pretoria.

Q. What is your guess as to what Commonwealth opinion might be on the President's speech, especially the opinion of Commonwealth African countries?

A. I think it's very difficult to predict what other people are going to say about the speech. I am sure that they will be doing what we will be doing. They will be studying it with care. I would think that we would all hope that the generalities, and there are some very good statements among those, will be translated into some specific action and I think we would all have hoped that the South African/^{Government}would have gone further and

faster than appears to be the case from the speech. But we shall have to study it and we shall have to see what steps the South African Government does in fact take as a result of this speech.

Q. One phrase which President Botha used was that tonight was crossing the Rubicon. This suggests that it might be a genuinely historical watershed type of speech. What is your personal assessment of that?

A. I think if I might use a very homely metaphor I think the proof of the pudding is in the eating and we shall have to see how far these general statements are translated into action. We want to see changes in South Africa. We have indicated, Geoffrey Howe indicated, a number of areas where we would like to see change. We wish that the speech would have gone further than it does but we must see how it works out and then we shall know whether or not it does in fact mark a watershed.

Distribution

Southern Africa Department
Mr Johnson
ECD(E)
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 August 1985

Dear Tim,

Substance passed
to PM on
Friday 16 August
W
9/14

PRESIDENT BOTHA'S SPEECH OF 15 AUGUST

In his letter to Mark Addison of 13 August, Stewart Eldon undertook to let you have an analysis of President Botha's speech to the Natal National Congress. The speech has, as expected, received wide-spread international media coverage. I enclose a copy of the advance text (from which Mr Botha departed only in some small respects) together with a summary of the salient points of this and other South African statements this year.

The speech was not as positive as we had been led to believe it would be. The expectations of advances raised by Pik Botha in his meeting with Ewen Fergusson on 8 August (Peter Rickett's letter to you of 9 August) were largely unfulfilled. Pik Botha had suggested that the emphasis of the speech would be on joint responsibility (ie including the blacks) for decisions affecting the country as a whole; common citizenship; and an "undivided South Africa". On joint responsibility, President Botha did say that he believed in participation of all communities in matters of common concern and that there should be structures to reach the goal of "co-responsibility". But he did not specify how this might be achieved and we shall need to seek clarification of what the South Africans intend on this point. On common citizenship, Botha was again less than clear, but seems to have gone no further than a re-statement of the existing position. The South African Embassy told us that it proved impossible to say anything more because

/he

T J Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street

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he could not get agreement to it from key leaders of the "independent" homelands. In a separate press conference earlier in the day, Pik Botha apparently said, however, that if the governments of the "independent" homelands should decide to negotiate with the South African Government on the confirmation of South African citizenship, they would be welcome to do so. There was no reference in last night's statement to an undivided South Africa.

The speech was a firm public reiteration that the Government would be sticking to the course which they had already charted in South Africa and would not be making concessions to the demands of others. Botha made clear, however, that he was prepared to continue with his programme of reform (he described his speech as "crossing the Rubicon"), but emphasised, that he would not be pushed by internal or external pressures. He reiterated his willingness for dialogue with black leaders. But he was not prepared to countenance one man, one vote or a fourth (ie black) chamber of Parliament. Nor was he prepared to issue a statement of intent for such dialogue (as Chief Buthelezi had been pressing him to do) or alter the existing conditions for Mandela's release. Botha confirmed that the South African Government was reviewing the influx control system and that a solution would have to be found for the legitimate rights of urban blacks. But the statement contained no new reforms to the structure of apartheid. And Botha emphasised that a reduction in violence was a pre-requisite to an end of the state of emergency.

Lady Young was interviewed shortly after the speech by television and radio news and emphasised that it had been an important speech which had set out general principles rather than specific proposals, but contained a number of positive points. She reiterated our position on sanctions and stressed that dialogue was the way to get the kind of reforms we all wanted to see in South Africa.

News Department made the enclosed statement at today's 1230 press briefing. Press interest today has been limited. We have since given an unattributable briefing for the Sunday papers and will in our further contacts with the press and other governments build

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on this line, emphasising the positive aspects of the speech and making clear our continued opposition to sanctions.

The international response to the speech is undoubtedly one of disappointment, not least as a result of its failure to fulfil the expectations raised by Pik Botha. International reactions will of course be strongly influenced by the response of black leaders in South Africa. So far Chief Buthelezi has apparently expressed his disappointment at the speech and Bishop Tutu has completely dismissed it.

The next steps will be the Africa Working Group meeting on 19-20 August and the Political Committee meeting on 23-25 August in Luxembourg. We are likely to come under pressure in these meetings to agree a further joint statement by the Ten. Some of our partners will undoubtedly wish this to be strongly critical of the speech. We will oppose any statement which runs counter to our national interest.

We will let you have a further note on this in the light of the two meetings and will include a summary of international reactions.

Yours sincerely,

Robert Barnett

R W Barnett
Assistant Private Secretary
to Baroness Young

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ADDRESS BY STATE PRESIDENT P W BOTHA DMS
AT THE OPENING OF THE N P NATAL CONGRESS
IN DURBAN ON 15 AUGUST 1985

DURING RECENT MONTHS AND PARTICULARLY THE LAST FEW WEEKS, I
HAVE RECEIVED A GREAT DEAL OF ADVICE.

MOST OF THE PERSONS AND INSTITUTIONS WHO OFFERED ADVICE AND
STILL OFFERS ADVICE HAVE GOOD AND WELL-MEANING INTENTIONS.
I THANK THEM AND WHERE THE ADVICE IS PRACTICAL, IT IS CON-
SIDERED.

-2-

I ALMOST DAILY RECEIVE HUNDREDS OF MESSAGES AND LETTERS OF
GOODWILL AND ENCOURAGEMENT FROM ALL OVER THE WESTERN WORLD
AND FROM PEOPLE IN OUR OWN COUNTRY, AS WELL AS ASSURANCES
THAT PEOPLE ARE PRAYING FOR ME. I SINCERELY APPRECIATE
THESE GESTURES OF GOODWILL.

BUT I ALSO RECEIVE ADVICE FROM SOME PEOPLE WHO WANT TO HELP
ME FROM THE FRYING-PAN INTO THE FIRE. TO PEOPLE SUCH AS
THESE I WOULD LIKE TO SAY - I GREW UP ON A FARM AND WE HAVE

- 3 -

AN AFRIKAANS SAYING WHICH GOES : I CAN RECOGNISE A SKUNK BY
ITS SMELL.

IF YOU DON'T ACCEPT ADVICE FROM THESE PEOPLE, THEY SLANDER
YOU AND YOUR COUNTRY.

LANGENHOVEN HAVE JUSTLY SAID THE FOLLOWING:

'APPRECIATE, OH DEFAMED, THE TRIBUTE OF YOUR SLANDER.
HE ADMITS THAT YOU ARE WORTH THE SLANDER. HE IS PRO-
BABLY NOT.' (TRANSLATED).

-4-

MOST OF THE MEDIA IN SOUTH AFRICA HAVE ALREADY INFORMED YOU
ON WHAT I WAS GOING TO SAY TONIGHT, OR WHAT I OUGHT TO SAY,
ACCORDING TO THEIR SUPERIOR JUDGMENT.

● ALL THE TRAGEDIES IN THE WORLD I THINK THE GREATEST IS THE FACT THAT OUR ELECTORATE REFRAINED SO FAR TO ELECT SOME OF THESE GENTLEMEN AS THEIR GOVERNMENT. THEY HAVE ALL THE ANSWERS TO ALL THE PROBLEMS. AND THESE ANSWERS DIFFER FROM DAY TO DAY AND FROM SUNDAY TO SUNDAY.

-5-

THE DILEMA OF RISING EXPECTATIONS

SELDOM IN OUR PAST HAS THERE BEEN A PARTY CONGRESS OF THE NATIONAL PARTY FOR WHICH SO MANY EXPECTATIONS WERE RAISED AS THIS CONGRESS IN NATAL. SOME OF THE REASONS FOR THIS ARE EVIDENT, FOR EXAMPLE THE PARTIAL EMERGENCY SITUATION IN LESS THAN 14 PERCENT OF THE MAGISTERIAL DISTRICTS OF THE RSA. OTHER REASONS ARE MORE SINISTER, SUCH AS THE MOTIVES OF THOSE WHO HAVE PUT WORDS IN MY MOUTH IN ADVANCE.

-6-

DURING RECENT WEEKS THERE WAS AN UNPARALLELED SCURRY FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES, WITHIN AND OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA, TO PREDICT AND PRESCRIBE WHAT IS TO BE ANNOUNCED AT THIS CONGRESS. IT WAS ALSO ENVISAGED THAT WORLDWIDE, PEOPLE ARE GOING TO BE DISSATISFIED IF CERTAIN THINGS ARE NOT ANNOUNCED AS WERE PREDICTED.

IT IS OF COURSE A WELL-KNOWN TACTIC IN NEGOTIATIONS TO LIMIT THE OTHER PERSON'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT ABOUT POSSIBLE

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DECISIONS, THUS FORCING HIM IN A DIRECTION WHERE HIS OPTIONS ARE INCREASINGLY RESTRICTED.

IT IS CALLED THE FORCE OF RISING EXPECTATIONS.

FIRSTLY, AN EXPECTATION IS RAISED THAT A PARTICULAR ANNOUNCEMENT IS TO BE MADE. THEN AN EXPECTATION IS RAISED ABOUT WHAT THE CONTENT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE.

-8-

THE TACTIC HAS TWO OBJECTIVES. FIRSTLY, THE TARGET IS SET SO HIGH THAT, EVEN IF AN ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE, IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO FULFIL THE PROPAGATED EXPECTATIONS. SECONDLY, IT IS ALSO AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE ONE PARTY INTO NEGOTIATIONS TO MAKE THE EXPECTED DECISION. IF THIS IS NOT DONE, PUBLIC OPINION IS ALREADY CONDITIONED TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THE RESULT IS WIDE-SPREAD DISSATISFACTION.

THIS IS WHAT HAS BEEN HAPPENING OVER RECENT WEEKS. I FIND

-9-

IT UNACCEPTABLE TO BE CONFRONTED IN THIS MANNER WITH AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT.

I THINK WE SHOULD FIRST RECONSIDER THE OBJECTIVE OF A PARTY CONGRESS.

THE NATIONAL PARTY

THE NATIONAL PARTY IN EACH PROVINCE IS CONNECTED TO THE PARTY IN THE OTHER PROVINCES ON A FEDERAL BASIS. THE PRO-

-10-

VINCIAL CONGRESS IS THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY OF THE PARTY IN EACH PROVINCE. ONE OF THE MAJOR ACTIVITIES OF THE CONGRESS IS TO DECIDE ON PARTY POLICY.

IT WOULD THUS BE UNWISE OF THE LEADER OF THE PARTY TO CONFRONT THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS WITH CERTAIN FINAL DECISIONS.

MOREOVER, THE SUBJECT OF MOST OF THE SPECULATIONS, NAMELY THE CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF THE BLACK PEOPLES IN SOUTH AFRICA, IS OF SUCH A NATURE THAT IT MUST BE DETERMINED IN

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CONSULTATION WITH THOSE CONCERNED. WE CANNOT CONFRONT THEM WITH CERTAIN FINAL DECISIONS. OVER THE YEARS, THAT WAS EXACTLY THE CRITICISM AGAINST OUR GOVERNMENT - THAT WE MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT PEOPLE AND NOT WITH THEM.

I FIND THE ATTEMPTS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES TO COMPROMISE ME AND THE GOVERNMENT VERY UNFORTUNATE. IT IS A VERY DANGEROUS GAME, AND IT DEFINITELY DOES NOT SERVE THE INTERESTS OF NEGOTIATION AND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA.

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TIME

I HAVE USED A QUOTATION OF LANGENHOVEN EARLIER. I WANT TO QUOTE HIM AGAIN. HE WROTE '

'IF WE ARE IN FRONT WE CAN WAIT FOR TIME. IF WE ARE BEHIND, IT DOES NOT WAIT FOR US.' (TRANSLATED).

-13-

'IF WE ARE AHEAD OF TIME, WE CAN WAIT FOR IT. IF WE ARE BEHIND TIME, IT DOES NOT WAIT FOR US.'

IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH OUR FELLOW-SOUTH AFRICANS AND IN OUR RELATIONSHIP AS A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA, NO SPIRIT OF DEFAITISM OR HYSTERICAL ACTIONS WILL HELP US TO BE ON TIME.

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WE MUST DEAL WITH OUR RELATIONSHIPS AND ACCEPT FUTURE CHALLENGES IN A BALANCED WAY AND WITH DEVOTION. YOU WILL FIND THAT BALANCE IN THINKING AND DEVOTION IN THE NATIONAL PARTY - THE ONLY POLITICAL PARTY WHICH IS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF WHITE SOUTH AFRICA.

THE PARTY STANDS FOR THE JUST AND EQUAL TREATMENT OF ALL PARTS OF SOUTH AFRICA, AND FOR THE IMPARTIAL MAINTENANCE OF THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF EVERY SECTION OF THE POPULATION.

-15-

WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE ANTIQUATED, SIMPLISTIC AND RACIST APPROACH THAT SOUTH AFRICA CONSISTS OF A WHITE MINORITY AND A BLACK MAJORITY.

WE CANNOT IGNORE THE FACT THAT THIS COUNTRY IS A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY - A COUNTRY OF MINORITIES - WHITE MINORITIES AS WELL AS BLACK MINORITIES.

WHILE THE NATIONAL PARTY ACCEPTS AND RESPECTS THE MULTICULTURAL AND POLY-ETHNIC NATURE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POPULATION,

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IT REJECTS ANY SYSTEM OF HORIZONTAL DIFFERENTIATION WHICH AMOUNTS TO ONE NATION OR GROUP IN OUR COUNTRY DOMINATING ANOTHER OR OTHERS.

WE BELIEVE IN AND UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE POPULATION GROUPS AS WELL AS THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPERLY PLANNED UTILISATION OF MANPOWER.

IN THIS REGARD WE HAVE ADVANCED VERY FAR THROUGH MODERNISING OUR LABOUR LAWS, THE CREATION OF A DEVELOPMENT BANK

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FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA, AS WELL AS A CORPORATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL BUSINESS ACTIVITIES. WE ALREADY CO-OPERATE IN VARIOUS WAYS THROUGH MULTI-NATIONAL MINISTERIAL COMMITTEES.

IT IS TRUE THAT AS A RESULT OF SERIOUS WORLD RECESSIONARY CIRCUMSTANCES, SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH WAS ALSO HIT BY RECESSIONARY CONDITIONS AND OVERSPENDING IN SOME FIELDS, COULD NOT MAKE PROGRESS AS WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED.

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ECONOMIC STRATEGY

BUT IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE BY NOW THAT THE OFFICIAL ECONOMIC STRATEGY APPLIED IN SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS HAS PRODUCED EXCELLENT RESULTS:

- OVERSPENDING BY THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS HAS BEEN ELIMINATED.

- THE MONEY SUPPLY IS UNDER CONTROL.

- GOVERNMENT SPENDING IS BEING EFFECTIVELY CURBED AND SOUNDLY FINANCED.

- THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT IS SHOWING A SURPLUS OF ABOUT R5 BILLION PER YEAR - MUCH LARGER THAN ANTICIPATED.

- THE BANKING SECTOR AND PRIVATE COMPANIES HAVE FOR MONTHS NOW BEEN REPAYING SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF FOREIGN DEBT.

-20-

- OUR NET GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES INCREASED BY R1,4 BILLION DURING THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1985.

- THE PRIME OVERDRAFT RATE OF THE BANKS HAS BEEN REDUCED FOUR TIMES SINCE MAY, FROM 25 TO 21 PER CENT. OTHER INTERESTS RATES HAVE ALSO DECLINED

THE RATE OF INFLATION IS STILL AROUND 16 PER CENT BUT SHOULD BEGIN TO DECLINE BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR.

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WITH EXPORTS RISING STRONGLY AND INTEREST RATES FALLING, THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY SHOULD MOVE INTO A NEW UPSWING IN 1986.

THE SO-CALLED 'ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS' ARE THEREFORE AT PRESENT VERY FAVOURABLE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

MANY OF THE PRESENT OVERSEAS PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION ARE, OF COURSE, QUITE ERRONEOUS. NOBODY WOULD DENY THAT WE FACE PROBLEMS THAT DEMAND SOLUTIONS.

BUT THE PERCEPTIONS OF MANY OVERSEAS OBSERVERS BEAR LITTLE RELATIONSHIP TO THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION.

-22-

LEADING COUNTRY

THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA STILL REMAINS THE LEADING COUNTRY IN THE SUB-CONTINENT OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. IF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA SUFFERS FROM ECONOMIC SETBACKS - THE WHOLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA WILL PAY A HEAVY PRICE. FOR INSTANCE, AT PRESENT 90% OF THE EXPORTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

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TAKES PLACE THROUGH THE TRANSPORT SYSTEMS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA.

WE IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AS WELL AS OUR NEIGHBOURS WILL IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE HAVE TO FIND SOLUTIONS FOR OUR FAST GROWING POPULATIONS AND THEIR RIGHTFUL DEMANDS. WE HAVE OUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN CONNECTION WITH PROPER FAMILY PLANNING, HEALTH SERVICES, THE PROVISION OF CLEAR AND FRESH WATER, TRAINING OF YOUNG PEOPLE AND THE CREATION OF WORK OPPORTUNITIES.

-24-

WE HAVE SUCH A VAST TASK AHEAD OF US AND SUCH GREAT CHALLENGES TO CREATE A BETTER FUTURE, THAT WE CAN ILLUSTRATE THE IRRESPONSIBILITIES AND DESTRUCTIVE ACTIONS OF BARBARIC COMMUNIST AGITATORS AND EVEN MURDERERS WHO PERPETRATE THE MOST CRUEL DEEDS AGAINST FELLOW SOUTH AFRICANS BECAUSE THEY ARE ON THE PAYROLL OF THEIR MASTERS FAR FROM THIS LOVELY COUNTRY OF OURS.

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THE FUTURE

NO GOVERNMENT IN THIS COUNTRY OR ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD CAN SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS IN ITS COUNTRY IN A GIVEN TIME.

BUT DESPITE OUR HUMAN WEAKNESSES AND OUR LIMITED POWERS AS HUMAN INSTRUMENTS, WE CAN ATTEMPT TO BE ON TIME. WE CAN MAKE SERIOUS ATTEMPTS NOT TO BE BEHIND TIME.

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WE ARE SUFFERING IN SOME PARTS OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM TWO BASIC PROBLEMS.

THE FIRST IS THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT - A PROBLEM OF THE ENTIRE WESTERN WORLD, WITH PERHAPS TO A LESSER EXTENT THE UNITED STATES.

THE SMALL BUSINESS CORPORATION IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE IN THIS CONNECTION.

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I AM OF THE OPINION THAT THERE ARE TOO MANY RULES AND REGULATIONS IN OUR COUNTRY SERVING AS STUMBLING BLOCKS IN THE WAY OF ENTREPRENEURS. THESE STUMBLING BLOCKS MUST BE REMOVED. WE ARE ALREADY SERIOUSLY ATTENDING TO THIS PROBLEM.

THE UNDERDEVELOPED PART OF THE ECONOMY IS MAINLY THAT OF DIFFERENT NON-WHITE COMMUNITIES. INSTEAD OF THE WHITE PATERNALISTICALLY TRYING TO DO EVERYTHING FOR THE BLACKS, THEY MUST RATHER BE ALLOWED TO HELP THEMSELVES - IN THE INFORMAL AS WELL AS THE FORMAL SECTOR.

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CONSEQUENTLY, I SHALL GO OUT OF MY WAY TO SEE TO IT THAT MORE SUBSTANTIAL FUNDS ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.

HOUSING

SECONDLY, I REFER TO THE PROBLEM OF HOUSING, CAUSED MAINLY BY OUR POPULATION EXPLOSION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

IT IS A FALLACIOUS BELIEF THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST DO

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EVERYTHING FOR ALL. WE MUST HELP THE PEOPLE TO HELP THEMSELVES, TO BUILD AND UPGRADE THEIR HOMES THROUGH THEIR OWN EFFORTS. WE HAVE DECIDED THAT LAND SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE WHERE POSSIBLE, AND SITE SERVICES SUPPLIED. WE HAVE ALREADY ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF OWNERSHIP RIGHTS FOR BLACKS IN THE URBAN AREAS OUTSIDE THE NATIONAL STATES. JUST AS IMPORTANT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF OWNERSHIP RIGHTS TO PEOPLE IN THE NATIONAL STATES.

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BUT THE STATE MUST MAINLY TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INFRASTRUCTURE SUCH AS FRESH DRINKING WATER, SANITATION AND ROADS.

THE GOVERNMENT INTENDS SETTING ASIDE ONE BILLION RAND DURING THE NEXT FIVE YEARS TO IMPROVE UNDERDEVELOPED TOWNS AND CITIES, NOT ONLY IN METROPOLITAN AREAS. OUR POLICY OF DECENTRALISATION WILL BE ACTIVELY CONTINUED WITH.

ON THE QUESTION OF INFLUX CONTROL - I CAN ONLY SAY THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS OUTDATED AND TOO COSTLY. THE PRESIDENT'S

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COUNCIL WILL PROBABLY REPORT ON THIS MATTER IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF IS ALSO AT PRESENT CONSIDERING IMPROVEMENTS.

BUT OF COURSE - WE SHALL NEED THE CLOSEST CO-OPERATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR. I HOPE THEY WILL STAND UP AND BE COUNTED AS THEY DID IN THE PAST WHEN I CALLED UPON THEM FOR THEIR CO-OPERATION.

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CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE

I NOW WISH TO DEAL WITH SOME OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR NATIONAL LIFE.

IT IS MY CONSIDERED OPINION THAT ANY FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL DISSENTATION PROVIDING FOR PARTICIPATION BY ALL SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENS, SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED.

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BUT LET ME POINT OUT AT ONCE THAT SINCE SOUTH AFRICA FREED ITSELF, FROM COLONIALISM DEMOCRACY HAS ALREADY BEEN BROADENED AND MILLIONS OF PEOPLE WHO NEVER HAD A SAY IN GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, UNDER THE BRITISH COLONIAL SYSTEM, HAVE IT TODAY.

STATEMENT OF INTENT

I AM PRESSED BY SOME WHO MEAN IT WELL AND THOSE WHO WISH TO

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DESTROY ORDERLY GOVERNMENT IN THIS COUNTRY, TO MAKE A STATEMENT OF INTENT.

I SAY IT WOULD BE WRONG TO BE PRESCRIPTIVE AS TO STRUCTURES WITHIN WHICH PARTICIPATION WILL HAVE TO TAKE PLACE IN FUTURE.

IT WOULD ALSO BE WRONG TO PLACE A TIME LIMIT ON NEGOTIATIONS.

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MUCH IN COMMON

HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT THE MAJORITY OF SOUTH AFRICANS AS WELL AS INDEPENDENT STATES, WHICH FORM OUR IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOURS HAVE MUCH IN COMMON APART FROM OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

WE BELIEVE IN THE SAME ALMIGHTY GOD AND THE REDEEMING GRACE OF HIS SON, JESUS CHRIST.

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WE BELIEVE AND WISH TO UPHOLD RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.

WE BELIEVE IN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT.

WE BELIEVE OUR GREAT WEALTH OF DIVERGENT POPULATION GROUPS MUST SPEAK TO EACH OTHER THROUGH THEIR ELECTED LEADERS.

WE BELIEVE THAT OUR PEACE AND PROSPERITY IS INDIVISIBLE.

WE BELIEVE IN THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.

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WE KNOW THAT IT IS THE HARD FACT OF SOUTH AFRICAN LIFE, THAT IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ACCOMMODATE THE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS OF OUR VARIOUS POPULATION GROUPS AND COMMUNITIES IN A KNOWN DEFINED POLITICAL SYSTEM.

WE HAVE OFTEN FOUND THAT OUR EFFORTS TO FIND SOLUTIONS HAVE BEEN IMPEDED AND FRUSTRATED BECAUSE OF DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TERMINOLOGY THAT WE USE TO DESCRIBE OUR PARTICULAR FORM OF DEMOCRATIC SOLUTIONS.

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SOME YEARS AGO, WITH THE BEST INTENTIONS ON MY PART, I ADVOCATED A CONFEDERATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES TO CO-OPERATE WITH ONE ANOTHER. THE IDEA WAS BELITTLED AND PREJUDICE WAS CREATED AGAINST IT.

NOW LET ME STATE EXPLICITLY - THAT I BELIEVE IN PARTICIPATION OF ALL THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNITIES ON MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN. I BELIEVE THERE SHOULD EXIST STRUCTURES TO REACH THIS GOAL OF CO-RESPONSIBILITY AND PARTICIPATION.

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I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE GRANTING AND ACCEPTANCE OF INDEPENDENCE BY VARIOUS BLACK PEOPLES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR OWN STATEHOOD, REPRESENT A MATERIAL PART OF THE SOLUTION. I WOULD, HOWEVER, LIKE TO RESTATE MY GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IN THIS REGARD, NAMELY THAT INDEPENDENCE CANNOT BE FORCED UPON ANY COMMUNITY. SHOULD ANY OF THE BLACK NATIONAL STATES THEREFOR PREFER NOT TO ACCEPT INDEPENDENCE, SUCH STATES OR COMMUNITIES WILL REMAIN A PART OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATION, ARE SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENS AND SHOULD BE ACCOMMODATED WITHIN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE

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BOUNDARIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA. THIS DOES NOT EXCLUDE THAT REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND THAT PROVISION BE MADE FOR PARTICIPATION IN INSTITUTIONS ON A REGIONAL AND/OR GROUP BASIS.

ONE-MAN-ONE-VOTE

BUT I KNOW FOR A FACT THAT MOST LEADERS IN THEIR OWN RIGHT IN SOUTH AFRICA AND REASONABLE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL NOT ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF ONE-MAN-ONE-VOTE IN A UNITARY SYS-

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TEM. THAT WOULD LEAD TO DOMINATION OF ONE OVER THE OTHERS AND IT WOULD LEAD TO CHAOS. CONSEQUENTLY, I REJECT IT AS A SOLUTION.

SECONDLY, A SO CALLED FOURTH CHAMBER OF PARLIAMENT IS NOT A PRACTICAL SOLUTION AND I DO NOT THINK RESPONSIBLE PEOPLE WILL ARGUE IN FAVOUR OF IT.

WE MUST RATHER SEEK OUR SOLUTIONS IN THE DEVOLUTION OF POWER.

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BUT I ADMIT THAT THE ACCEPTANCE BY MY GOVERNMENT OF THE PERMANENCE OF BLACK COMMUNITIES IN URBAN AREAS OUTSIDE THE NATIONAL STATES, MEANS THAT A SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO BE FOUND FOR THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS.

THE FUTURE OF THESE COMMUNITIES AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH LEADERS FROM THE NATIONAL STATES, AS WELL AS FROM THEIR OWN RANKS.

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UNREASONABLE DEMANDS

BUT LET ME BE QUITE FRANK WITH YOU. YOU MUST KNOW WHERE YOU STAND WITH ME.

IT IS THE RIGHT OF THE PARTY CONGRESSES TO STATE WHETHER THEY AGREE WITH THEIR LEADER OR NOT.

-44-

I AM NOT PREPARED TO LEAD WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS AND OTHER MINORITY GROUPS ON A ROAD TO ABDICATION AND SUICIDE.

DESTROY WHITE SOUTH AFRICA AND OUR INFLUENCE, AND THIS COUNTRY WILL DRIFT INTO FACTION STRIFE, CHAOS AND POVERTY.

MANIFESTO

TOGETHER WITH MY POLICY STATEMENTS EARLIER THIS YEAR IN PARLIAMENT, I SEE THIS SPEECH OF MINE AS MY MANIFESTO.

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IN MY POLICY STATEMENTS IN JANUARY AND JUNE OF THIS YEAR, I INDICATED THAT THERE WOULD BE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS WITH

REGARD TO THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF THE VARIOUS POPULATION GROUPS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. SINCE THEN WE HAVE HAD TO CONTEND WITH ESCALATING VIOLENCE WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA, AND PRESSURE FROM ABROAD IN THE FORM OF MEASURES DESIGNED TO COERCE THE GOVERNMENT INTO GIVING IN TO VARIOUS DEMANDS.

OUR ENEMIES - BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT - SEEK TO DIVIDE OUR PEOPLES. THEY SEEK TO CREATE UNBRIDGEABLE DIFFERENCES BE-

-46-

TWEEN US TO PREVENT US FROM NEGOTIATING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO OUR PROBLEMS. PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION IS THEIR ENEMY. PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION IS THEIR ENEMY BECAUSE IT WILL LEAD TO JOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY OF SOUTH AFRICA. THOSE WHOSE METHODS ARE VIOLENT DO NOT WANT TO PARTICIPATE. THEY WISH TO SEIZE AND MONOPOLIZE ALL POWER. LET THERE BE NO DOUBT ABOUT WHAT THEY WOULD DO WITH SUCH POWER.

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ONE HAS ONLY TO LOOK AT THEIR METHODS AND MEANS. VIOLENT AND BRUTAL MEANS CAN ONLY LEAD TO TOTALITARIAN AND TYRANNICAL ENDS.

THEIR ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN THEIR WORDS.

THEIR WORDS OFFER READY PANACEAS SUCH AS ONE-MAN-ONE-VOTE, FREEDOM AND JUSTICE FOR ALL. THEIR ACTIONS LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE FREEDOMS THAT WE ALREADY HAVE - TOGETHER WITH THE ONGOING EXTENSION OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA-ARE THE TRUE TARGETS OF THEIR VIOLENCE.

-48-

I HAVE A SPECIFIC QUESTION I WOULD LIKE TO PUT TO THE MEDIA IN SOUTH AFRICA: HOW DO THEY EXPLAIN THE FACT THAT THEY ARE ALWAYS PRESENT, WITH CAMERAS ET CETERA, AT PLACES WHERE VIOLENCE TAKES PLACE? ARE THERE PEOPLE FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS WHO INFORM THEM TO BE READY? OR ARE THERE PERHAPS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REACTIONARY GROUPS IN THE RANKS OF CERTAIN MEDIA? MY QUESTION TO YOU IS THIS: WHOSE INTERESTS DO YOU SERVE - THOSE OF SOUTH AFRICA OR THOSE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS?

NELSON MANDELA

FROM CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS LOCAL QUARTERS APPEALS ARE BEING MADE TO ME TO RELEASE MR NELSON MANDELA FROM JAIL.

I STATED IN PARLIAMENT THAT IF MR MANDELA GIVES A COMMITMENT THAT HE WILL NOT MAKE HIMSELF GUILTY OF PLANNING, INSTIGATING OR COMMITTING ACTS OF VIOLENCE FOR THE FURTHERANCE OF POLITICAL OBJECTIVES, I WILL, IN PRINCIPLE, BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER HIS RELEASE.

BUT LET ME REMIND THE PUBLIC OF THE REASONS WHY MR MANDELA IS IN JAIL.

DR YUTAR - THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AT THE TIME, SET OUT THE STATE'S CASE INTER ALIA AS FOLLOWS:

'AS THE INDICTMENT ALLEGES, THE ACCUSED DELIBERATELY AND MALICIOUSLY PLOTTED AND ENGINEERED THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY...

THE PLANNED PURPOSE THEREOF WAS TO BRING ABOUT IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA CHAOS, DISORDER AND TURMOIL...

THEY (MR MANDELA AND HIS FRIENDS) PLANNED VIOLENT INSURRECTION AND REBELLION.'

THE SABOTEURS HAD PLANNED THE MANUFACTURE OF AT LEAST SEVEN TYPES OF BOMBS: 48 000 ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES, 210 000 HAND

GRANADES, PETROL BOMBS, PIPE BOMBS, SYRINGE BOMBS AND BOTTLE BOMBS.

A DOCUMENT WAS PRODUCED DURING THE COURT CASE IN MANDELA'S OWN HANDWRITING IN WHICH HE STATED :-

'WE COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS ARE THE MOST ADVANCED REVOLUTIONARIES IN MODERN HISTORY THE ENEMY MUST BE COMPLETELY CRUSHED AND WIPED OUT FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH BEFORE A COMUNIST WORLD CAN BE REALISED.'

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IN PASSING SENTENCE AT THE TIME THE JUDGE, MR JUSTICE DE WET, REMARKED :-

'THE CRIME OF WHICH THE ACCUSED HAVE BEEN CONVICTED THAT IS THE MAIN CRIME, THE CRIME OF CONSPIRACY, IS IN ESSENCE ONE OF HIGH TREASON. THE STATE HAS DECIDED NOT TO CHARGE THE CRIME IN THIS FORM. BEARING THIS IN MIND AND GIVING THE MATTER VERY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION, I HAVE DECIDED NOT TO IMPOSE THE SUPREME PENALTY WHICH IN A CASE LIKE THIS WOULD USUALLY BE THE PROPER PENALTY FOR THE CRIME.'

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WARNING

THE VIOLENCE OF OUR ENEMIES IS A WARNING TO US. WE, WHO ARE COMMITTED TO PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION, ALSO HAVE A WARNING

TO THEM. OUR WARNING IS THAT OUR READINESS TO NEGOTIATE SHOULD NOT BE MISTAKEN FOR WEAKNESS. REFORM THROUGH PRO-

CESS OF NEGOTIATION IS NOT WEAKNESS. TALKING, CONSULTING, BARGAINING WITH ALL OUR PEOPLES' LEADERS IS NOT WEANESS. MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF AND JOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WELFARE AND STABILITY OF OUR COUNTRY IS NOT WEAKNESS. IT IS

OUR STRENGTH.

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OUR STRENGTH IS THE COURAGE TO FACE AND ACCOMMODATE THE PROBLEMS BEQUEATHED TO US BY HISTORY. THE REALITY OF OUR DIVERSITY IS A HARD REALITY. WE FACE IT - BECAUSE IT IS THERE. HOW DO WE ACCOMMODATE IT? HOW DO WE BUILD A BETTER FUTURE OUT OF CULTURES, VALUES, LANGUAGES WHICH ARE DEMONSTRABLY REAL IN OUR HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETY?

WE ARE RESOLVED - WE ARE COMMITTED - TO DO SO IN TWO FUNDAMENTAL WAYS.

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FIRSTLY - BY LETTING THE PEOPLE SPEAK. BY LETTING THE PEOPLE SPEAK THROUGH THEIR LEADERS. BY NEGOTIATION BETWEEN ALL THESE LEADERS. NEGOTIATION IN WHICH WE WILL ALL ENDEAVOUR TO IMPROVE OUR COMMON WELL-BEING. NEGOTIATION IN WHICH THERE WILL BE GIVE AND TAKE. WE WILL NOT PRESCRIBE AND WE WILL NOT DEMAND - TO DO SO WOULD BE TO TAKE ONLY. WE WILL GIVE SO THAT OTHERS CAN ALSO GIVE - TOWARDS A BETTER FUTURE FOR EACH AND EVERYONE.

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SECONDLY - THE OVER-RIDING COMMON DENOMINATOR IS OUR MUTUAL INTEREST IN EACH OTHER'S FREEDOMS AND WELL-BEING. OUR PEACE AND PROSPERITY IS INDIVISIBLE. THEREFORE, THE ONLY

WAY FORWARD IS THROUGH CO-OPERATION AND CO-RESPONSIBILITY.

IF WE IGNORE THE EXISTENCE OF MINORITIES: IF WE IGNORE THE INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE WITH OTHERS IN THE PRACTICE OF HIS BELIEFS AND THE PROPAGATION OF HIS VALUES: IF WE DENY THIS IN FAVOUR OF A SIMPLISTIC 'WINNER-TAKES-ALL' POLITICAL SYSTEM - THEN WE WILL DIMINISH AND NOT INCREASE

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THE FREEDOMS OF OUR PEOPLES. THEN WE WOULD DENY THE RIGHT

OF EACH AND EVERYONE TO SHARE IN THE DECISIONS WHICH SHAPE HIS DESTINY.

BETWEEN THE MANY AND VARIED LEADERS IN THIS COUNTRY, THERE ARE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES OF POLICY. I RECOGNIZE THIS - BUT I ALSO KNOW THAT THEIR LOVE OF SOUTH AFRICA IS AS INTENSE AS MY OWN. I AM, THEREFORE, IN NO DOUBT THAT, WORKING TOGETHER, WE SHALL SUCCEED IN FINDING THE WAY WHICH WILL SATISFY THE REASONABLE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS OF EVERYONE.

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THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL CABINET COMMITTEE IS BEARING FRUIT. AT THE CORRECT TIME I AND OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS, TOGETHER WITH OTHER LEADERS OF GOODWILL, WILL ALSO BE ABLE TO TAKE PART MORE DIRECTLY IN THIS PROCESS.

WE HAVE NEVER GIVEN IN TO OUTSIDE DEMANDS AND WE ARE NOT GOING TO DO SO. SOUTH AFRICA'S PROBLEMS WILL BE SOLVED BY X

SOUTH AFRICANS AND NOT BY FOREIGNERS. WE ARE NOT GOING TO BE DETERRED FROM DOING WHAT WE THINK BEST, NOR WILL WE BE FORCED INTO DOING WHAT WE DON'T WANT TO DO. THE TRAGEDY IS THAT HOSTILE PRESSURE AND AGITATION FROM ABROAD HAVE ACTED

AS AN ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE MILITANT REVOLUTIONARIES IN SOUTH AFRICA TO CONTINUE WITH THEIR VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION. THEY HAVE DERIVED COMFORT AND SUCCOUR FROM THIS PRESSURE.

MY GOVERNMENT AND I ARE DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH OUR REFORM PROGRAMME, AND TO THOSE WHO PREFER REVOLUTION TO REFORM, I SAY THEY WILL NOT SUCCEED NO MATTER HOW MUCH SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT THEY DERIVE FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES. WE CAN AND WE WILL RESOLVE OUR PROBLEMS BY PEACEFUL MEANS. DESPITE THE DISTURBANCES, DESPITE THE INTIMIDATION, THERE

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IS MORE THAN ENOUGH GOODWILL AMONG BLACKS, WHITES, COLOURED AND ASIANS TO ENSURE THAT WE SHALL JOINTLY FIND SOLUTIONS ACCEPTABLE TO US.

I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE GROWING NUMBER OF BLACK LEADERS WHO ARE COMING FORWARD TO DENOUNCE VIOLENCE. ANY REDUCTION OF VIOLENCE WILL BE MATCHED BY ACTION ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT TO LIFT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND RESTORE NORMALITY IN THE AREAS CONCERNED. MOREOVER, AS VIOLENCE DIMINISHES, AS CRIMINAL AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES CEASES,

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AND AS THE PROCESS OF DIALOGUE AND COMMUNICATION ACQUIRES GREATER MOMENTUM, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE NEED TO KEEP THOSE AFFECTED IN DETENTION OR PRISON.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLES I HAVE STATED TODAY CAN HAVE FAR-REACHING EFFECTS ON US ALL. I BELIEVE THAT WE ARE TODAY CROSSING THE RUBICON. THERE CAN BE NO TURNING BACK. WE NOW HAVE A MANIFESTO FOR THE FUTURE OF OUR COUNTRY, AND WE MUST EMBARK ON A PROGRAMME OF 'POSITIVE ACTION' IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS THAT LIE AHEAD. THE CHALLENGES WE

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FACE CALL FOR ALL CONCERNED TO NEGOTIATE IN A SPIRIT OF GIVE AND TAKE. WITH MUTUAL GOODWILL WE SHALL REACH OUR DESTINATION PEACEFULLY.

WE UNDERTAKE TO DO ALL THAT MAN CAN POSSIBLY DO. IN SO
SAYING, I PRAY THAT ALMIGHTY GOD WOULD GRANT US THE WISDOM
AND THE STRENGTH TO SEEK TO FULFIL HIS WILL.

ISSUED BY:

MINISTER (INFORMATION)
SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

15 AUGUST 1985

PRESIDENT BOTHA'S SPEECH, 15 AUGUST

SALIENT POINTS

Citizenship

"Should any of the Black national states therefore prefer not to accept independence, such states or communities will remain a part of the South African nation, are South African citizens and should be accommodated within political institutions within the boundaries of the Republic of South Africa."

Homelands

"I firmly believe that the granting and acceptance of independence by various black peoples within the context of their own statehood, represent a material part of the solution."

Black political rights

"I believe in participation of all the South African communities on matters of common concern. I believe there should exist structures to reach this goal of co-responsibility and participation."

"I know for a fact that most leaders in their own right in South Africa and reasonable South Africans will not accept the principle of one-man-one-vote in a unitary system."

"Secondly, a so called fourth chamber of parliament is not a practical solution."

"The only way forward is through co-operation and co-responsibility."

Negotiation with black leaders

"It is my considered opinion that any future constitutional dispensation providing for participation by all South African citizens should be negotiated."

"I am pressed by some who mean it well and those who wish to destroy orderly government in this country, to make a statement of intent. I am not prepared to make it, not now and not tomorrow."

"I admit that the acceptance by my government of the existence of black communities in urban areas outside the national states, means that a solution will have to be found for their legitimate rights. The future of these communities and their constitutional arrangements will have to be negotiated with leaders from the national states, as well as from their own ranks."

"I stated in Parliament that if Mr Mandela gives a commitemnt that he will not make himself guilty of planning, instigating or committing acts of violence for the furtherance of political objectives I will, in principle, be prepared to consider his release."

[We will build a better future] "By letting the people speak throgh their leaders. By negotiation between all these leaders. Negotiation in which we will all endeavour to improve our common well-being. Negotiation in which there will be give and take."

Influx Control

"On the question of influx control - I can only say that the present system is outdated and too costly. The President's council will probably report on this matter in the near future, while the Government itself is at present also considering improvements."

Outside Pressure

"During recent weeks there was an unparalleled scurry from different sources, within and outside South Africa, to predict and prescribe what is to be announced at this Congress. It was also envisaged that worldwide, people are going to be dissatisfied if certain things are not announced as were predicted"

"It is, of course, a well-known tactic in negotiations to limit the other person's freedom of movement about possible decisions, thus

forcing him in a direction where his options are increasingly restricted."

"We have never given in to outside demands and we are not going to do so. South Africa's problems will be solved by South Africans and not by foreigners. We are not going to be deterred from doing what we think best, nor will we be forced into doing what we don't want to do. The tragedy is that hostile pressure and agitation from abroad have acted as an encouragement to the militant revolutionaries in South Africa to continue with their violence and intimidation. They have derived comfort and succour from this pressure."

Manifesto

"Together with my policy statements earlier this year in Parliament, I see this speech of mine as my manifesto."

"The implementation of the principles I have stated today can have far-reaching effects on us all. I believe that we are today crossing the rubicon. There can be no turning back. We now have a manifesto for the future of our country, and we must embark on a programme of positive action in the months and years that lie ahead."

State of Emergency

"Any reduction of violence will be matched by action on the part of the Government to lift the State of Emergency."

PREVIOUS SAG STATEMENTS ON THE KEY ISSUES

Citizenship

P W Botha, 25 January - "The Special Cabinet Committee has been directed to submit a report and recommendations ... on the problems of terminology and content that surround the question of citizenship."

P W Botha, 19 April - loss of South African citizenship not a necessary consequence of Homeland independence.

Homelands

P W Botha, 25 January - "Independence will remain the goal ... the Government does not intend forcing this on anyone"

P W Botha, 19 June - "I maintain that the vast majority of South Africans and citizens of TBVC states do have (decision-making) structures at their disposal, either in this Parliament, or in the TBVC states or in the National States, and these structures can be extended."

Black political participation

P W Botha, 25 January - "The Government accepts the permanence in the RSA of large numbers of members of black population communities who find themselves outside the national states... The intensive promotion of the local government system for black communities and steps to increase the credibility of existing Black local authorities are vital ... Therefore structures must be developed for black communities outside the national states through which they can themselves decide on their own affairs up to the highest level."

Setting up of "informal, non-statutory forum". "There will be open discussion on a wide range of constitutional and related matters to improve communication between the government and black communities and to create a more favourable basis for negotiations aimed at arriving at mutually acceptable development steps in the constitutional field."

P W Botha, 19 June - "I do not believe in a so-called unitary system based on one-man one-vote ... I do believe however that we must continue to establish improved structures of government through discussion, so that everybody in South Africa can participate in decision making that concerns their own needs and interests ... The principle of self-determination to which the South African Government is committed leaves the way open for unlimited possibilities compatible with the choices which each population or community group may eventually wish to make."

Influx Control

P W Botha, 7 April - Government to take "steps to promote orderly urbanisation and to eliminate negative and discriminatory aspects of influx control.

Dr G Viljoen, 11 April - Government accepts influx of black urban population unavoidable. Government will introduce legislation on influx control later this year.

P W Botha, 19 April - Goal is planned urbanisation on principle of deconcentration away from principal metropolitan areas
[ie more dormitory townships like Khayelitsha]

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

For the record

13 August 1985

The gist of
the letter was transmitted
to the PM in Austria today

Dear Mark (14/8)

SOUTH AFRICA

J
14/8

Peter Ricketts' letter of 9 August reporting Mr Ewen Fergusson's meeting with Mr Pik Botha drew attention to the importance of international reaction to the speech that President Botha is to give in Durban on 15 August. A favourable reaction will greatly assist in the presentation of our policy towards South Africa. But a strong negative response is bound to increase the pressure for sanctions and to place us in an increasingly exposed position.

It is therefore important that we should continue to bring home to the South Africans and our partners the importance of the statement and of the reaction to it. As you know, Lady Young sent a message to the South African Foreign Minister on 12 August (copy enclosed for ease of reference). She emphasised our hope that President Botha's speech would include the sort of constructive and concrete steps set out by the Foreign Secretary in his address to the Royal Commonwealth Society on 23 July.

President Botha is expected to speak at 6.30 pm London time on 15 August. There are already indications of considerable media interest and it is likely that parts of the speech will be carried live on Channel 4 news. We have received requests from both television networks for Ministerial comment later in the evening.

The timing of the speech means that the US Administration may well make some substantive comment on it later that day. If we are to have any influence on the tenor of comment

/in

M J Addison Esq
No 10 Downing Street

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in the media here and on subsequent statements by other governments we shall need to make some initial comment on 15 August. In the absence of both Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr Rifkind Lady Young thinks it right to appear on the late evening television (and possibly radio) news that day. She will speak on the lines of the enclosed note. Her aim will be to underline the significance of President Botha's statement; to draw attention to its positive features; and to discourage over-hasty comment. We would then make no further comment until we have had a chance to make a more detailed study of what the speech contains. We shall aim to let you have this together with a recommendation for a more detailed line to take on the morning of 16 August.

On the international front we shall aim to co-ordinate our detailed public response to the speech as far as possible with the Americans and the Germans. It is clearly desirable that they and our other partners should be encouraged to give it a fair wind. We have accordingly sent instructions in this sense (copy enclosed) to our Embassies in Washington and Bonn. There is already pressure for a joint statement by the Ten in response to the speech and it is likely that some of our partners will wish to take a negative and unhelpful line. We are therefore asking our posts in Rome, Athens, Brussels, Luxembourg (as the Presidency), Ottawa, Canberra and Wellington, to urge their host governments to give the speech careful consideration and welcome such advances as it may contain. We have stressed that a considered and positive reaction would encourage the progressive elements in the South African Government to continue to work for fundamental reform.

yours ever

Stewart Eldon

S G Eldon
Private Secretary to
Baroness Young

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FM FCO 122000Z AUGUST 85
TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 129 OF 12 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN
SOUTH AFRICA: MR FERGUSSON'S MEETING IN VIENNA WITH THE
SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO PIK BOTHA
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BEGINS: I WRITE TO YOU IN GEOFFREY HOWE'S ABSENCE TO TELL
YOU THAT WE HAVE STUDIED WITH INTEREST THE REPORTS OF YOUR
MEETING WITH MR FERGUSSON IN VIENNA ON 8 AUGUST. IT WAS
USEFUL TO HAVE HAD THIS DISCUSSION AND WE WERE MOST INTERESTED
TO HEAR THAT THE PROPOSALS WHICH PRESIDENT BOTHA IS INTENDING
TO MAKE IN HIS FORTHCOMING SPEECH WILL REPRESENT, IN YOUR
VIEW, AN HISTORIC POLITICAL CHANGE FOR SOUTH AFRICA.

WE HAVE KEPT THE DETAILS OF YOUR DISCUSSION CONFIDENTIAL.
BUT REPORTS OF PRESIDENT BOTHA'S FORTHCOMING SPEECH AND ITS
LIKELY CONTENT ARE RECEIVING CONSIDERABLE ADVANCE PUBLICITY
IN THE PRESS BOTH HERE AND ELSEWHERE. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE
SPEECH WILL BE WIDELY REGARDED AS A KEY TEST OF YOUR
GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS FOR THE FUTURE.

AS SUCH, THE SPEECH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE A MOST IMPORTANT
INFLUENCE ON THE COURSE OF DELIBERATIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA,
BOTH IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND IN THE UNITED STATES.
IT IS LIKELY TO BE JUDGED BY THE REACTIONS WHICH IT
RECEIVES FROM THE NON-WHITE COMMUNITY INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA
AND BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT IS SEEN TO PUT FORWARD
CONCRETE PROPOSALS AND REFORMS. ON THE FIRST POINT, I AM
SURE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN

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1500 - 2

DIALOGUE WITH NON-WHITE LEADERS TO EXPLAIN THE PROPOSALS TO THEM AND BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

ON THE SECOND, I SHOULD LIKE PRIVATELY TO EMPHASISE AGAIN MY GOVERNMENT'S STRONG HOPE THAT THE SPEECH WILL CONTAIN CONCRETE STEPS ON THE LINES SET OUT BY GEOFFREY HOWE IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE ROYAL COMMONWEALTH SOCIETY ON 23 JULY. THE PARTICULAR STEPS WHICH HE MENTIONED THEN INCLUDED THE RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA, AN END TO FORCED REMOVALS, AN END TO DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL AND THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, THE PROGRESSIVE ABOLITION OF THE PASS LAWS AND THE GROUP AREAS ACT AND A COMMITMENT TO SOME FORM OF COMMON CITIZENSHIP FOR ALL SOUTH AFRICANS. THESE WOULD BE IMPORTANT, CONFIDENCE BUILDING STEPS TOWARDS WHAT WE SEE AS THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA COMMANDING THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE AS A WHOLE.

THE INCLUSION IN PRESIDENT BOTHA'S SPEECH OF SUCH CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS TOGETHER WITH A COMMITMENT IN SOME FORM TO THIS FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, DO A GREAT DEAL TO ASSIST THE CHANCES OF A FAVOURABLE INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SPEECH WILL INDEED BE AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR SOUTH AFRICA AND WE HOPE THAT IT WILL, AS THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IN HER MESSAGE OF 7 AUGUST TO PRESIDENT BOTHA, MARK A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD FOR ALL THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA AND MEET THE ASPIRATIONS OF BLACK LEADERS IN SOUTH AFRICA, AND GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS OUR OWN, FOR PEACEFUL EVOLUTION. ENDS.

YOUNG

NNNN

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Cape to No 10 Downing Street

ECD(E)

MR FERGUSSON

PLANNING STAFF

MR JOHNSON

New Dept.

-2-

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INITIAL REACTION TO PRESIDENT BOTHA'S SPEECH ON
15 AUGUST

Extremely important statement. We shall be studying it carefully before commenting in detail. But the speech clearly contains positive features which represent a significant move forward. [We welcome the confirmation of a common citizenship for all South Africans.] We hope that the proposals announced by President Botha will lead to the opening of a genuine dialogue with black leaders about the political rights of blacks in South Africa. The objective must be real progress towards a system of government which commands the support of the people of South Africa as a whole.

OO ROME

OO ATHENS

OO PRETORIA

GRS 843

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FM FCO 131100Z AUGUST 85

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1252 OF 13 AUG

AND IMMEDIATE BONN, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, OTTAWA,
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA

PRESIDENT BOTHA'S FORTHCOMING POLICY STATEMENT

1. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF WASHINGTON AND BONN COULD SPEAK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT RESPECTIVELY AS FOLLOWS.
2. PRESIDENT BOTHA'S 15 AUGUST POLICY STATEMENT IS ASSUMING INCREASING INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE AS A TEST OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS. IT IS VERY MUCH IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR THREE COUNTRIES THAT THE SPEECH SHOULD NOT PROVE TO BE A DISAPPOINTMENT SINCE THIS WOULD ONLY INCREASE THE PRESSURES ON US FOR ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AND REDUCE THE CHANCES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OPENING ITS MUCH NEEDED DIALOGUE WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NON-WHITE COMMUNITY WHICH ALONE CAN DEFUSE THE PRESENT CRISIS THERE.
3. WE HAVE THEREFORE MADE A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S THINKING IN THE FORM OF THE MINISTERIAL MESSAGE IN FCO TELNO 129 TO PRETORIA (YOU CAN GIVE THE GIST OF THIS MESSAGE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT). WE NOTE (WASHINGTON TELNO 2373) THAT THE AMERICANS ARE NOT CONSIDERING ANY ADDITIONAL ACTION BEFORE 15 AUGUST.
4. THE DESCRIPTION WHICH PIK BOTHA GAVE TO THE AMERICANS, THE GERMANS AND OURSELVES OF THE LIKELY CONTENT OF PRESIDENT

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/ BOTHA

BOTHA'S STATEMENT SUGGESTS THAT WHILE THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE SAYING THAT IT WILL REPRESENT A HISTORIC CHANGE IT IS LIKELY TO BE COUCHED IN GENERAL AND PERHAPS RATHER OBSCURE TERMS AND MAY THEREFORE NOT HAVE THE INTENDED IMPACT ON EITHER NON-WHITE OPINION WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA OR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THERE IS A SERIOUS RISK THEREFORE OF INITIAL DISAPPOINTMENT INSIDE AND OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA AT THE CONTENT OF THE SPEECH LEADING TO A BLANKET REJECTION OF IT BY WESTERN COUNTRIES. THIS WOULD IN OUR VIEW BE A GREAT MISTAKE. SUCH REJECTION WOULD UNDERMINE THE POSITION OF THOSE PROGRESSIVE ELEMENTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WHO ARE PUSHING FOR INTERNAL REFORM AND STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF THE MORE REACTIONARY ELEMENTS WHO WOULD BE ABLE TO ARGUE THAT WHATEVER SOUTH AFRICA DOES IT WILL GAIN NO CREDIT IN THE WEST AND SHOULD THEREFORE MAKE NO MORE CONCESSIONS. WIDESPREAD INTERNATIONAL REJECTION OF THE SPEECH WILL ALSO STEP UP PRESSURES ON ALL OF US FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AND LEA TO CRITICISM OF THE POLICY OF CONTACT AND DIALOGUE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND PERHAPS OF THE TALKS WHICH WE, THE AMERICANS AND THE GERMANS HAVE JUST HAD WITH PIK BOTHA.

5. WE THEREFORE THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT WE, THE US AND THE FRG, IN REACTING TO THE SPEECH, SHOULD GIVE CREDIT FOR ANY MOVES TOWARDS INTERNAL REFORM WHICH IT MAY CONTAIN AND ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO TAKE A BALANCED VIEW OF IT RATHER THAN MERELY CONCENTRATE ON ITS FAILINGS OR OMISSIONS. WE ARE THEREFORE LIKELY TO MAKE A SHORT INITIAL STATEMENT STRAIGHT AFTER THE SPEECH, UNDERLINING ITS IMPORTANCE, STRESSING THE NEED TO GIVE IT CAREFUL STUDY, AND SAYING (ASSUMING THAT WE REASONABLY CAN) THAT WE RECOGNISE THAT IT CONTAINS CERTAIN POSITIVE ELEMENTS.

6. FINALLY, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD STRESS TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT THE CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE CONTINUE TO ATTACH TO OUR THREE COUNTRIES KEEPING IN STEP ON THIS MATTER.

7. FOR LUXEMBOURG, ROME, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, WELLINGTON, OTTAWA (YOUR TELNO 456) AND CANBERRA (YOUR TELNO 541). WE ARE REPEATING TO

1704


YOU (AND HAVE ALREADY DONE SO TO CANBERRA WHO HAVE TAKEN PRELIMINARY ACTION WITH THE AUSTRALIANS) FCO TELNOS 123, 124 AND 129 TO PRETORIA, THE FIRST TWO OF WHICH GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF EWEN FERGUSSON'S MEETING IN VIENNA WITH PIK BOTHA ON 8 AUGUST. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD GIVE YOUR HOST GOVERNMENTS, IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, A BRIEF OUTLINE OF WHAT PIK BOTHA HAD TO SAY ABOUT THE LIKELY CONTENT OF PRESIDENT BOTHA'S SPEECH. YOU SHOULD ALSO GIVE THEM A SHORT ACCOUNT, DRAWING ON FCO TELNO 129, OF THE POINTS WE HAVE BEEN URGING ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. 8. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE FINAL CONTENT OF THE SPEECH WILL BE (THE SOUTH AFRICAN CABINET IS DUE TO MEET ON 14 AUGUST TO CONSIDER IT). WE BELIEVE HOWEVER THAT IT MAY WELL CONTAIN A SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO INTERNAL REFORMS BUT THAT THIS MAY BE COUCHED IN GENERAL TERMS AND CONTAIN FEWER CONCRETE STEPS THAN WE WOULD HAVE WISHED. NEVERTHELESS WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD STUDY THE SPEECH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS CAREFULLY AND GIVE CREDIT FOR SUCH ADVANCES AS IT MAY CONTAIN AND AVOID BEING STAMPEDED INTO REACTING IN PURELY NEGATIVE TERMS WHICH WOULD ONLY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO TAKE FURTHER POSITIVE STEPS. IN JUDGING THE SPEECH IT IS NECESSARY TO RECOGNISE THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL REALITIES AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT BY EXTREME RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES.

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Relations: South Africa
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 August, 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

Peter Ricketts wrote on 9 August to Tim Flesher, enclosing a report prepared by Ewen Fergusson following his meeting with Mr. Pik Botha on 8 August.

The Prime Minister has commented that the statement President Botha intends to make on 15 August represents a great advance. She believes the points at 3a, 3b and 3c in the record of the meeting amount to a fundamental change. She has, however, queried the absence of any reference to the state of emergency.

(Mark Addison)

27

S. Eldon, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister:

Very interesting.

You will be able to ask Michael Alexander for favour next week.

9 August 1985

Dear Tim,

South Africa

9/8

It is a great advance. ? nothing about the state of emergency?

I enclose a report prepared by Mr Ewen Fergusson following his meeting in Vienna with Mr Pik Botha on 8 August.

Mr Botha expressed his gratitude that an emissary had been sent; he went out of his way to show how closely the South African Government have been following statements on South African issues by the Prime Minister and other British Ministers. It was clear that they set very great store on maintaining their relations with us, as well as the Americans and Germans.

It is also evident that President Botha attaches the greatest importance to the statement he is to make on 15 August. The key passage is couched in general terms, though Pik Botha indicated that a major effort would be made to explain in advance to black leaders how much of a step forward it was intended to represent. Assuming that it is cleared through Cabinet, the essential point in the statement is likely to be that the homelands structure, which is the basis of the apartheid system, is to be frozen, if not actually dismantled, and that there is to be a common citizenship for all who wish it within a unitary state, leading to the exercise of political rights. But beyond this, the statement is likely to be deliberately vague as to how the blacks are to be given some measure of power, since the essence of the message is that blacks should participate in working out detailed plans. Nor is any time-frame mentioned.

We are making no public comment on the substance of Mr Botha's meeting with Mr Fergusson. But we shall clearly need to think very carefully about how we respond to the South African statement when it is made and its final terms are available. The acid test, in this respect, will be the reaction of moderate blacks within South Africa. Botha told Fergusson that there was increasing awareness among activists such as Tutu, Boesak and Beyers Naude about the spread of violence. He thought that we should expect the general black reaction to be cautious and non-committal though the more radical elements would doubtless attempt to brush the statement aside.

It is in our interests to give the South African statement a fair chance. We should therefore privately urge our partners and others who are not automatically disposed to condemn

/South

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South Africa to pause before they dismiss it as inadequate or worse. We also propose to coordinate our public reaction as far as possible with the Americans and Germans.

Subject to the terms of the statement, Ministers here consider that our initial public response will probably need to be along the lines that we are studying the statement carefully; if, as we hope, it does indeed represent a turning point in associating black people with the political process, then we warmly welcome it.

You will see from the enclosed note that Pik Botha also raised with Mr Fergusson the question of ANC activities in Lesotho. We are getting in touch with the Lesotho Government to encourage them to speak to the South Africans, while making it clear to the South Africans that we would not regard their evidence as in any way justifying military action against Lesotho.

Yr ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)

Tim Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street



Meeting in Vienna with the South African Foreign Minister

Summary

1. Pik Botha met Fergusson for two hours on Thursday 8 August after the Americans had had six hours with him. He welcomed the meeting, outlined the main proposals for further constitutional change in the President's forthcoming speech and plans for dialogue with black representatives, asking for British support for what he described as a historic change ("crossing the Rubicon"). He expressed concern about the possible impact of the forthcoming troika visit. He criticized the present US position on Cuban withdrawal from Angola. He remained obdurate over the Gaborone raid. He gave a warning on Lesotho. He was grateful for our policy on Mozambique. After a further meeting with Crocker on Namibia on 9 August, and a meeting with the Germans in Frankfurt, he would return to South Africa.

Detail

2. After MacFarlane, Crocker and Nickel had had six hours with Pik Botha in Vienna on Thursday 8 August, Fergusson, accompanied by HM Ambassador, Vienna, had two hours further talk with him. During a short debrief after the US/South African talks, Crocker said that MacFarlane had made a forceful but "friendly" statement, in the name of the President, emphasising the need for significant political change if US policy to South Africa was to be maintained.

South Africa: Internal

3. Botha said that the President's statement on 15 August would not be finally approved by Cabinet until 14 August. He described it as "the most historic ever to be made in South Africa" and as "crossing the Rubicon" (see separate Note for a rough translation of the statement given orally). The statement would emphasise three objectives:

- This is a fundamental change*
- (a) There would be joint responsibility (ie including the blacks) for decisions affecting the country as a whole. Botha commented that, although the Government could not use the term, this meant "power-sharing" at the top level.
 - (b) Common citizenship.
 - (c) An "undivided" South Africa.

However, it would never be possible to work on the basis one man one vote in a unitary state.

4. Botha's remarks indicated that the homelands policy would be scrapped, provided that the homelands leaders could be brought on board

/(in



- 2 -

(in effect, this means scrapping Grand Apartheid). Contact had already been made with Mangope (Bophutatswana) and Mpephu (Venda) and would be made with Transkei and Ciskei. Mangope had been reluctant; Botha expected the others to welcome the proposal. He added that he would be putting the proposals this weekend to a group of "radical" blacks including Bishop Tutu and representatives of black political organisations. The Government were working with Buthelezi. They recognised that visible support from blacks would be crucial both internally and for the international audience.

5. Botha commented that no South African Government had ever before offered to share authority with the blacks over major decisions. There would be a heavy political price on the white right wing with consequences for the forthcoming by-elections and a risk of white-inspired violence.

6. The proposals themselves were deliberately general, since the intention was that details should be worked out in collaboration with black leadership. Any premature blueprint would inevitably be rejected.

7. Botha appealed for our support. It would be exceptionally difficult to create the momentum to encourage "the intimidated" to participate in what would be difficult decisions, in particular because of the differences of view among the blacks. External understanding, especially from the UK, could be very helpful. The South African Government had been grateful for the policy pursued by HMG. They understood the pressures and hoped that next week's statement would not disappoint expectations.

8. Fergusson referred to the main difficulties which South African policies and the events of the past year had presented to HMG in maintaining a sensible working relationship with South Africa. He emphasised our wish to see a genuine dialogue with the black community. The crucial element in our response to the President's proposals would be the seriousness with which the speech was taken by the black community and their willingness to join in genuine discussions. We saw black involvement as indispensable for the fulfilment of our aspirations for stability and prosperity in the region. He referred to the Secretary of State's speech and the proposals in it, especially the release of Mandela. Botha said in terms that the South Africans saw the advantage of releasing Mandela if some way could be found of finessing the very real difficulties which his release might create (Mandela's failure to renounce violence, the encouragement of further disorder and the risk that Mandela might be forced by others in the ANC to implicate himself in violence so that the South African Government had no alternative but to arrest him again - that would be catastrophic). As for the ANC, while he spouted routine condemnation of the agents of Moscow, he did not exclude the possibility of co-opting ANC representatives into the forthcoming discussions. If, however, the South African Government mishandled the Mandela/ANC problem, it would undoubtedly fall.

/South Africa/EC



- 3 -

South Africa/EC

9. Botha claimed that the Luxembourg Foreign Minister had required clearance from all Ten before a meeting would be possible in Europe. Although the Italians had been willing to meet him, he was not now planning any meeting in Europe with the troika. He was indeed becoming increasingly nervous about the prospect of the troika visit to South Africa at the end of August. In the aftermath of the President's speech and in the prospect of very delicate negotiations with black leaders he feared that the activities of the three, especially the Netherlands Foreign Minister (he spoke very starkly of the present SA/Netherlands relationship), would risk adding an unwelcome extra complication. The speech would create a new situation. Could the UK not take the lead in looking at the question again? Fergusson said that the Ten had taken a collective decision and there would continue to be a strong EC interest in the visit's going ahead.

SA Regional

10. Botha tried at length to justify the raid on Gaborone along the lines of the President's message to the Prime Minister. He added that Mogwe had since then confirmed his support for the South African action. Fergusson repeated our strong condemnation of the South African action. Whatever excuse the South Africans might use to justify it, we could not accept a military incursion and the deaths of innocent civilians, as our Security Council vote had indicated. Moreover, that action and the Cabinda episode had made our task in resisting the pressures for action against South Africa immeasurably more difficult. Surely the penalty in international reaction outweighed any short term gain?

11. On Angola/Namibia Botha complained vociferously about present US policy, arguing that the Americans were reneging on firm written commitments over Cuban withdrawal. Fergusson emphasised the importance to us of getting forward movement started again towards the goal of an internationally recognized settlement, and emphasised our continuing support for US efforts.

12. Botha referred to ANC activity in Lesotho and to the pressure for military action, which he had countermanded (reported separately). Botha took a very gloomy view of the deterioration of the situation in Mozambique. The South Africans were doing what they could both to sustain Machel and Frelimo by military and civil help and to get some control over Renamo activities. He welcomed UK support for Mozambique and asked whether urgent humanitarian assistance could be given to help curtail the flood of refugees from Mozambique now entering the Transvaal.



Draft South African Constitutional Proposals

The President would refer to the continuing process of regular adjustment in internal political arrangements (the new constitution etc). Blacks had never been excluded from the process and the President had made clear in the past that the new constitution was not the end of the reform process.

The facts that had to be accommodated were:-

- (a) the "independent" states,
- (b) the self-governing states,
- (c) local management systems (presumably local authorities, tribal chiefs etc),
- (d) regional service councils.

It was now intended to have a common South African citizenship for all who wanted it, though close relations would continue with those independent states that did not take the offer.

In recent times there had been unnecessary confusion over the definition of particular concepts such as "unitary state", "federalism", "power sharing". It was essential now to look to the substance rather than the terminology. The Government were proposing the following guidelines and would enter into discussion about them with any responsible black leader who was willing to come forward:

- (a) The decision to take independence was the free choice of any self-governing territory. If that choice were not exercised, the state would remain part of the Republic of South Africa;
- (b) Because the states concerned would have to be accommodated within the RSA, their citizens concerned must remain citizens of the RSA;
- (c) Every individual would have the right to participate in decision-making procedures which affected his life as a SA citizen. This already applied at local level. The realisation of the right to participate at higher levels must now be negotiated.
- (d) There must be cooperation on general affairs in all constitutional entities, to include the independent states, so that there can be common responsibility for general affairs. The President looks forward to creating a system of government acceptable to all citizens.

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Prime Minister.

N
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[Handwritten mark]

MY TELNO 180: SOUTH AFRICA: SITUATION REPORT ON UNREST
SUMMARY

1. THE UNREST IN THE DURBAN TOWNSHIPS CONTINUED LAST NIGHT. REPORTS SUGGEST THAT IT INVOLVES A HIGH DEGREE OF HOOLIGANISM ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE UNDERLYING POLITICAL TENSIONS. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE GIVEN EXTENDED POWERS TO THE POLICE IN THE EASTERN CAPE AND EAST AND WEST RAND UNDER THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS TO CONTROL THE ISSUE OF PETROL AND ORGANISATION OF SCHOOL BOYCOTTS.

DURBAN TENSION

2. UNREST IN THE TOWNSHIP AREAS AROUND DURBAN CONTINUED LAST NIGHT, WITH GANGS OF YOUTHS ROAMING AT LARGE AND DAMAGING VEHICLES AND PROPERTY. INDIAN TRADERS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN A PARTICULAR TARGET AND HAVE MOVED OUT OF THE INANDA TOWNSHIP. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN INCIDENTS IN THE ADJOINING RESIDENTIAL AREA OF PHOENIX INVOLVING ATTACKS BY BLACKS ON INDIANS. 22 PEOPLE HAVE DIED. THE POLICE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT 8 HAVE DIED IN INCIDENTS INVOLVING POLICE INTERVENTION. 300 INDIAN FAMILIES HAVE BEEN MADE HOMELESS.

3. REPORTS SUGGEST THAT THERE IS A HIGH LEVEL OF CRIMINALITY WITH LOOTING. THE UNDERLYING TENSIONS BETWEEN UDF AND INKATHA SUPPORTERS HAVE NOT COME PROMINENTLY TO THE SURFACE BUT THEY ARE A FACTOR IN AREAS SUCH AS THE BLACK TOWNSHIP OF UMLAZI WHICH IS WITHIN KWAZULU. WE HAVE ALSO HAD REPORTS THIS MORNING OF ATTACKS ON THE HOMES OF PROMINENT UDF LEADERS WHICH ARE BEING ATTRIBUTED BY THEM TO INKATHA SUPPORTERS. AT THIS STAGE WE ARE RELUCTANT TO ATTRIBUTE THE TROUBLES TOO SPECIFICALLY TO POLITICAL OR RACIAL MOTIVATION E.G. TRADITIONAL ZULU-INDIAN ENMITY.

4. THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE HAVE DRAFTED REINFORCEMENTS INTO THE AREA AND THE SADF ARE BEING USED IN A SUPPORT ROLE. THE POLICE APPEAR TO BE GENERALLY IN CONTROL AND THE MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER HAS ANNOUNCED THAT HE IS NOT YET SEEKING EMERGENCY POWERS FOR THE AREA.

5. THE POLICE BELIEVE THAT THE TENSION, WHICH IS OF A DIFFERENT TYPE TO THAT WHICH HAS CHARACTERISED UNREST ELSEWHERE, WILL BE

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BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS BUT THESE ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WILL BE UNWELCOME TO THE GOVERNMENT AND THE POLICE WHO ARE ALREADY STRETCHED IN OTHER AREAS.

EXTRA POWERS FOR THE POLICE

6. POWERS OVER THE CONTROL OF PETROL SALES IN TOWNSHIPS AND MEASURES APPLICABLE TO CONTINUING SCHOOL BOYCOTTS WERE GRANTED TO THE POLICE BY A PROCLAMATION IN THE GOVERNMENT GAZETTE YESTERDAY (8 AUGUST)(COPY BY BAG). THE PROCLAMATION GIVES THE POLICE IN THE EASTERN CAPE AND EAST AND WEST RAND SPECIFIC POWERS TO IMPOSE CURFEWS, PRECLUDE ENTRY TO TOWNSHIPS BY NON-RESIDENTS, BAN THE POSSESSION OF PETROL IN SPECIFIC CASES, MAKE GATHERINGS OF PUPILS OUTSIDE CLASSROOMS ILLEGAL AND RESTRICT PUPILS ACTIVITIES TO THOSE APPROVED BY SCHOOL STAFF. THE INTENTION APPEARS TO BE TO REINFORCE POWERS TO PERMIT THE POLICE TO TAKE FIRMER ACTION DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY AT ENDING CONTINUING SCHOOL BOYCOTTS AND VIOLENCE.

MOBERLY

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B/F THURSDAY 15 AUGUST

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Having spoken to Peter Ricketts I rang Sir Laurens to explain that the Prime Minister thought it would be best to rely, after their long talks together, on his personal judgement in deciding what to say to the South African authorities later this month.

I said Sir Laurens would be aware that a major announcement by the South Africans was expected soon, perhaps next week. I said he might find it helpful, if there was time, to have a word with a Foreign Office official on the UK Government's reaction to the announcement. A Foreign Office official would contact him at the appropriate time.

told Lady Young's office 15/8/85
FCO will need to be approached on Thursday accordingly. Peter Ricketts agreed to let Lady Young's office know they could expect such an approach, *who* would then ask the appropriate official to ring Sir Laurens.

Mark Addison

Mark Addison
9 August 1985

BEMAWH

Tel: 042885-2260

Yumstones,

Aldeburgh,

Suffolk

Aug 5th 1985

18

Margaret Dear: This letter is deliberately short but it is long in chunks. Our home feels much the better for your visit - Margaret says even the furniture is smiling but above all Gatscha went back to his besieged kingdom much strengthened and encouraged and his faith in Britani, not to mention humanity, restored.

I am going to South Africa on August 21 and I shall have the occasion to raise in public the issues - national convention etc - the state of which I speak to 1200 civil engineers and architects at a special conference on Aug 23

But more, I can in private get
 at the government. Do there anything
 I can try to pass on and get done
 to help you all? If so would
 there be a warrant for us to talk
 about ~~that~~. I shall have a try
 of, my own, in any case but they
 will obviously heed more if I
 I have your moral backing. I
 can come to London at the draft
 of a hat: shall be up in
 any case next Monday and
 again from Aug: 18 until I
 leave on Aug 21.

again from all of
 us - Gotska most of all perhaps.
 to you and Denis our
 gratitude and devotion
 yours truly
 James

PRIME MINISTER

The attached thank you letter from Sir Laurens van der Post (though it was of course he who invited you to dinner) asks if you feel there are any specific points you would wish him to make to the South African Government when he goes to South Africa on 21 August.

I have had a word with the Foreign Office. Their advice is that it would be better to avoid giving the impression that Sir Laurens is a personal emissary, and the situation will ^{in any case} change after 15 August when the Government are expected to make a major announcement.

Would you like me to ring Sir Laurens and explain that you think it better to rely on his personal judgement, and on his knowledge of your general views about the situation in South Africa following your recent meetings with him?

after our long talks
but, as he has probably
seen from the press,
the President of S.A. is likely

Merv Adelson

MEA

8 August, 1985.

to make some pronouncement
about future policy sometime soon
because of the September 14th in Congress. We
do not know what he has in mind. If the
announcement comes before Sir Laurens goes - perhaps we can give him
our advice. not

do not know what he has in mind. If the
announcement comes before Sir Laurens goes - perhaps we can give him
our advice. not

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T148A/85

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TO FLASH PRETORIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 OF 7 AUG 85

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN , WASHINGTON,

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA

1. PLEASE PASS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA.

BEGINS. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR LETTER OF 5 AUGUST. I
WAS VERY INTERESTED TO LEARN THAT YOU WILL SHORTLY BE MAKING AN
ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS. I VERY
MUCH HOPE THAT YOUR STATEMENT WILL PROVE TO BE A SIGNIFICANT
STEP FORWARD FOR ALL THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA AND WILL MEET
THE ASPIRATIONS OF BLACK LEADERS IN SOUTH AFRICA, AND GOVERNMENTS
SUCH AS OURS, FOR PEACEFUL EVOLUTION.

I REGRET THAT I SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO MEET MR R F BOTHA DURING
HIS EUROPEAN TOUR TO HEAR MORE ABOUT YOUR PROPOSAL.

UNFORTUNATELY BOTH GEOFFREY HOWE AND I WILL BE AWAY. I
UNDERSTAND, IN ANY CASE, THAT MR BOTHA WILL BE VISITING VIENNA
TOMORROW AND I SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT I SHOULD SEND A SENIOR
OFFICIAL, MR EWEN FERGUSSON, AS MY PERSONAL EMISSARY TO MEET
MR BOTHA WHILE HE IS STILL THERE, IDEALLY ON FRIDAY 9 AUGUST.
FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN HOLDING SUCH
A MEETING SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. I SEE THAT THERE ARE ALREADY
PRESS REPORTS FORESHADOWING YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT. IN ANY CASE I
THINK IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE THAT WE SHOULD EXCHANGE OUR IDEAS
AS FAR IN ADVANCE OF YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT AS POSSIBLE AND
PREFERABLY WITHOUT ATTRACTING ATTENTION. PERHAPS YOU COULD LET
MR MOBERLY KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHETHER MR BOTHA CAN MANAGE
A MEETING IN VIENNA ON FRIDAY.

AS FAR AS THE VISIT OF THE THREE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY FOREIGN
MINISTERS IS CONCERNED, I AM SURE THAT THEY WILL UNDERSTAND YOUR

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REASONS FOR NOT WISHING TO RECEIVE THEM UNTIL AFTER YOU HAVE
MADE YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT. I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ARE NOT NOW
PROPOSING TO VISIT SOUTH AFRICA UNTIL THE END OF AUGUST.
FOR BONN AND WASHINGTON, THIS TELEGRAM IS REPEATED TO YOU
FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION ONLY AT THIS STAGE.

YOUNG

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From the Private Secretary

7 August 1985

Thank you for your letter of 7 August about the message which the Prime Minister has received from President Botha. Mrs. Thatcher was content with the approach set out in your letter and has agreed in particular that Mr. Ewen Fergusson should go to Vienna for a meeting with the South African Foreign Minister during his visit there on 8 or 9 August.

The Prime Minister was also content that the draft message to President Botha attached to your letter should be sent and I should be grateful if you could arrange for its transmission.

(Tim Flesher)

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 August, 1985

Dear Tim,

Message to the Prime Minister from President Botha

Ministers here have given careful thought to the proposal in President Botha's letter of 5 August that the Prime Minister should see Pik Botha to hear an explanation of the new internal political proposals that President Botha has said he is about to announce.

We know from the Americans (and also from the press) that President Botha is likely to make his statement on 15 August in Durban. We do not know its content but he clearly intends it to be seen as a main step towards overcoming South Africa's present crisis. But, however far-reaching his proposals, they will never satisfy the demands of those, inside and outside South Africa who are pressing for immediate and radical change.

We have just learned that the Americans are sending MacFarlane and Crocker to see Pik Botha in Vienna tomorrow and that the Germans are also trying to arrange a meeting at similar level with him either in Vienna or in Bonn.

There would be a number of advantages in our discussing the South African proposals in advance with Pik Botha. It would be first of all a demonstration that the UK's policy of continuing contact and dialogue with South Africa has enabled us to maintain influence with the South Africans and to play a positive role in encouraging fundamental reforms there. We would be able to argue subsequently that those, like the French, who had gone down the path of sanctions had cut themselves off from this means of influence and that this reinforced the arguments for the UK eschewing sanctions and using its links with South Africa to full advantage. Secondly, a meeting would give us an opportunity to make our views known forcefully to President Botha not only on the need for fundamental internal reforms in South Africa but also on the need for South Africa to facilitate rapid progress towards independence for Namibia and to refrain from any further attacks on her neighbours. Thirdly, a meeting would provide us with useful foreknowledge



of President Botha's new proposals and give us time to prepare our reaction to them.

There would, however, be serious disadvantage in agreeing to a Ministerial meeting on the basis proposed by President Botha - especially in this country. News of it would be very likely to leak and, given that public interest following press reports is likely to increase, we could well be criticised for agreeing to meet South African Ministers at this juncture. If President Botha's proposals subsequently turned out to be inadequate and were condemned as such internationally it would be argued that we had nothing to show for our attempts to influence him. There is also the practical difficulty that both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary will be away when Pik Botha is likely to want to come here.

Ministers here conclude that it would be best for the Prime Minister to respond to President Botha by immediately offering to send Mr Fergusson to meet Pik Botha in Vienna. I enclose a draft reply in this sense from the Prime Minister to President Botha.

You should also know that Pik Botha has written to the Foreign Ministers of Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands in response to the Ten's proposal to send a Ministerial Troika to South Africa to discuss the latest developments there. He has proposed that the Troika should first see him in Europe.

The South Africans have expressed concern to the Americans that the proposed Troika visit should not interfere with President Botha's forthcoming statement. As you know, Shultz has written to the Foreign Secretary saying that he thinks such a visit, especially in the first half of this month, would be a mistake.

But that is not now in the Ten's intention. The Luxembourg Presidency has sent a Coreu telegram (copy enclosed) to partners reporting the letter to them from Pik Botha and asking how they should respond. The Presidency has also proposed a timetable for political cooperation among the Ten on South Africa this month and next month. The plan is for a meeting of the Africa Working Group on 19/20 August; a special meeting of the political committee on 26/27 August with Ambassadors to Pretoria present; the despatch of the Troika mission from 29 August to 1 September and a Ministerial meeting on 10 September. We have replied that we can accept this timetable while taking a neutral line on the question of the meeting between Pik Botha and the Troika.

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If arrangements are to be made for Mr Fergusson to get to Vienna for a meeting with the South African Foreign Minister during his visit there (ie tomorrow or Friday) we shall need the Prime Minister's agreement as soon as possible. If the Prime Minister wanted to discuss this further, Sir Antony Acland and Mr Fergusson could come to No 10 for a word this afternoon.

Y
ever,
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,
Secret.
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Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:-

The Honourable P W Botha DMS MP
State President of the Republic of
South Africa

From

Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

Thank you very much for your letter of 5 August. I was ~~very~~ interested to learn that you will shortly be making an announcement about future constitutional developments. [REDACTED] I very much hope that your statement will prove to be a significant step forward for all the people of South Africa and will meet the aspirations of black leaders in South Africa, and governments such as ours, for peaceful evolution.

I regret that I shall not be able to meet Mr R F Botha during his European tour to hear more about your proposal. Unfortunately both Geoffrey Howe and I will be away. I understand, in any case, that Mr Botha will be visiting Vienna tomorrow and I suggest, therefore, that I should send a senior official, Mr Ewen Fergusson, as my personal emissary to meet Mr Botha while he is still there, ideally on Friday 9 August. From our point of view there would be advantage in holding such a meeting sooner rather than later. I see that there are already press reports foreshadowing your announcement. In any case I think it would be preferable that we should exchange our ideas as far in advance of your announcement as possible and preferably without attracting attention. Perhaps you could let Mr Moberly know as soon as possible whether Mr Botha can manage a meeting in Vienna on Friday.

As far as the visit of the three European Community Foreign Ministers is concerned, I am sure that they will understand your reasons

/for

for not wishing to receive them until after you have made your announcement. I understand that they are not now proposing to visit South Africa until the end of August.

GRS 520
CONFIDENTIAL
FM PRETORIA 061600Z AUGUST 1985
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO. 175 OF 6 AUGUST 1985
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING JOHANNESBURG

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister:

*A possible glimpse
of the South African
announcement*

MPT: SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

1. A NATIONAL PARTY M.P. HAS GIVEN US IN CONFIDENCE THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF GOVERNMENT THINKING. IT SEEMS AUTHENTIC ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT REPRESENT THE WHOLE PICTURE EVEN AT THIS STAGE.

2. IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE NATAL CONGRESS ON 15 AUGUST THE STATE PRESIDENT IS EXPECTED TO OUTLINE PROPOSALS ON WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WERE WORKING ON PRIOR TO THE STATE OF EMERGENCY: PLANS FOR BLACK URBAN ADVANCEMENT AND THE GRANTING OF SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENSHIP TO THOSE BLACKS AT PRESENT RESTRICTED ONLY TO HOMELANDS CITIZENSHIP. OTHER SUBJECTS WHICH MIGHT BE COVERED ARE POLICY ON FORCED REMOVALS WHICH HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF MINISTERIAL REVIEW SINCE EARLIER THIS YEAR, IMPROVEMENT IN THE EDUCATION FIELD AND DIALOGUE WITH THE BLACKS.

3. THE MINISTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING GAVE OUR MPT CONTACT AN OUTLINE OF THE PACKAGE HE HAD PUT TO THE STATE PRESIDENT. THIS INCLUDED THE RECOMMENDATION THAT THERE SHOULD BE ANNOUNCEMENTS ON BOTH INFLUX CONTROL AND CITIZENSHIP. INFLUX CONTROL WOULD BE PHASED OUT. NO PRECISE FORMULA WOULD BE ANNOUNCED BUT THE DEPARTMENT HAD IN MIND THAT RESIDENCE RIGHTS SHOULD DEPEND ON THE AVAILABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING. A COMPLICATING FACTOR IS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL HAS BEEN COMMISSIONED TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON INFLUX CONTROL AND HAS NOT YET REPORTED. IT HAS BEFORE IT A DRAFT WHICH RECOMMENDS THE COMPLETE ABOLITION OF INFLUX CONTROL OVER A SEVEN YEAR PERIOD AND UNTIL IT HAS REPORTED THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT WISH TO GIVE ANY PRECISION TO ITS INTENTIONS.

4. ACCORDING TO THE MP, A LOCAL ANC SYMPATHISER HAS APPROACHED THE GOVERNMENT WITH A MESSAGE FROM A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ANC WHOM HE HAD MET FOR DISCUSSIONS IN BOTSWANA. THE MESSAGE PROPOSED PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT CONDITIONS. IT APPEARED TO BE A PERSONAL INITIATIVE BUT HEUNIS WAS SATISFIED THAT IT WAS A GENUINE OFFER. HE HAD RECOMMENDED TO THE STATE PRESIDENT THAT THE OFFER SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BUT NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN.

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15.

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5. A SMALL GROUP OF NATIONAL PARTY MP'S HAS PUT A SUBMISSION TO MINISTERS RECOMMENDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PREPARE THE WAY FOR MANDELA'S EVENTUAL RELEASE BY ALLOWING GREATER ACCESS TO HIM. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOW TAKE THIS UP. HEUNIS SEEMED TO FAVOUR THE IDEA.
6. THE SAME MP ALSO TOLD US THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF BLACK RADICALS FROM SOWETO LINKED WITH THE UDF QUOTE MORE EXTREME THAN MOTLANA AND HIS COLLEAGUES UNQUOTE TO MEET GOVERNMENT MINISTERS INFORMALLY. ONE SUCH MEETING HAD TAKEN PLACE. THE BLACK MESSAGE HAD BEEN AN UNAMBIGUOUS DEMAND THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST DO BUSINESS WITH THE ANC IF THERE WAS TO BE ANY PROGRESS. OTHER MEETINGS HAD BEEN POSTPONED AFTER THE STATE PRESIDENT'S REFUSAL TO SEE TUTU. THE BLACKS IN QUESTION WERE OPPOSED TO THE UNREST BUT WERE NOT WILLING TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENT TO ABANDON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE.

MOBERLY

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MR J R J JOHNSON
CABINET OFFICE

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FROM PRETORIA 060800Z
 TO PRIORITY FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 170 OF 6 AUGUST 1985

INFO ROUTINE JOHANNESBURG

INFO SAVING CAPE TOWN (CONSULATE) AND DURBAN

MY TELNO 165: SOUTH AFRICA: SITUATION ROUND-UP

SUMMARY

1. A GENERALLY QUIET WEEKEND. FUNERALS IN THE EASTERN CAPE PASSED WITHOUT MAJOR INCIDENT. BOYCOTT OF WHITE SHOPS IN THE EASTERN CAPE AND SCHOOL STAY-AWAYS CONTINUE. AN EMERGENCY HAS BEEN DECLARED IN THE TRANSKEI.

GENERAL SITUATION

2. 31 MORE PEOPLE WERE DETAINED BRINGING THE TOTAL TO 1412. ALTOGETHER 114 DETAINEES HAVE NOW BEEN RELEASED. UNDER THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS THE MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER MUST RENEW DETENTION ORDERS AFTER 14 DAYS, AND THE FIRST OF THESE ARE NOW BEING SIGNED.

3. FUNERALS AT ZWIDE OUTSIDE PORT ELIZABETH WERE HELD INSIDE A CHURCH IN CONTRAST TO THE OPEN AIR SERVICES HELD BEFORE LAST WEEK'S RESTRICTIONS ON FUNERAL GATHERINGS. SEVEN PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED AFTER THE SERVICE. WITNESSES TEL US THAT THERE WAS A STRONG POLICE PRESENCE BUT THAT THE FUNERAL PASSED OFF WITHOUT ANY SERIOUS CLASH.

4. WE CONTINUE TO RECEIVE CONFIRMATION THAT THE NUMBERS OF INCIDENTS IN BOTH THE EASTERN CAPE AND EAST RAND ARE MUCH REDUCED. THIS SEEMS TO BE LARGELY BECAUSE OF REACTION TO EMERGENCY PROVISIONS. THE BLACK POPULATION APPEARS TO BE ACCEPTING A VOLUNTARY CURFEW. TOWNSHIPS IN THE EMERGENCY AREA HAVE BEEN QUIET AFTER DARK.

5. FEWER PEOPLE HAVE DIED IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE POLICE IN THE PAST WEEK. BUT UNEXPLAINED DEATHS OF BLACKS CONTINUE TO BE REPORTED. BLACKS ARE ALLEGING THAT NOT ALL SUCH DEATHS ARE APPEARING IN OFFICIAL STATISTICS. REPRISALS AGAINST SUSPECTED INFORMERS ARE ALSO CONTINUING. AN ALLEGED INFORMER WAS BURNT NEAR ADELAIDE IN THE EASTERN CAPE AND THE BODY OF A MAN WHO HAD BEEN STABBED AND BURNT WAS DISCOVERED NEAR CRADOCK.

RESTRICTED

Boycott

BOYCOTTS

6. THE BLACK CONSUMER BOYCOTT OF WHITE BUSINESSES IN MANY EASTERN CAPE TOWNS REMAINS IN FORCE WITH APPARENT SUCCESS. INTIMIDATION IS PROBABLY A FACTOR IN THE SPREAD OF THE BOYCOTT. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BLACKS ARE RELUCTANT TO RISK BREAKING RANKS.

NATIONAL UNION OF MINE WORKERS

7. IN ADDITION TO VOTING FOR STRIKE ACTION TO COMMENCE ON 25 AUGUST (ON WHICH WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY), THE NUM MEETING ON 3 AUGUST CALLED FOR AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE EMERGENCY AND THREATENED TO BOYCOTT WHITE SHOPS IN MINING AREAS AS PART OF A 'STRONG RESPONSE' IF THE EMERGENCY CONTINUED.

ATTACK ON MINISTER'S HOME

8. THE HOME OF THE LEADER OF THE MAJORITY PARTY IN THE (INDIAN) HOUSE OF DELEGATES, MR RAJBANSI, WAS DAMAGED BY AN EXPLOSION ON 4 AUGUST. IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THIS WAS CAUSED BY A GRENADE.

SCHOOLS

9. THE SCHOOLS STAY-AWAY IS CONTINUING BUT THE GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN TRYING TO PERSUADE STUDENTS LEADERS TO END STAY-AWAYS IN PARTICULAR AREAS, IN RETURN FOR AGREEMENT TO RELEASE DETAINED LOCAL STUDENT LEADERS.

TRANSKEI.

10. THE TRANSKEIAN GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED A STATE OF EMERGENCY IN THE TRANSKEI WHICH HAS BEEN TROUBLED BY SIMILAR UNREST TO THAT IN THE REST OF SOUTH AFRICA.

POLITICAL PROPOSALS

11. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ARE GIVING URGENT ATTENTION TO FUTURE ACTION. COMMENT ON THE SABC WHICH REFLECTS GOVERNMENT BRIEFING HAS BEEN EMPHASISING THE NEED FOR EARLY PROGRESS WITH LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS THAT WILL BENEFIT THE BLACK COMMUNITY. A SPEECH WHICH HE IS DUE TO MAKE TO THE PARTY MEETING ON 15 AUGUST WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PRESIDENT TO SET OUT THE GOVERNMENT'S THINKING.

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1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET 5422
TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-215
SWITCHBOARD 01-215 7877

PS/

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

6 August 1985

L V Appleyard Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AH

W Spur

Dear Len,

UK POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

You sent me a copy of your letter of 19 July to Charles Powell. I have also seen a copy of Charles' reply of 22 July.

2 The Secretary of State agrees that further studies should be made to assess the UK's policy towards South Africa, and that these should take account of the wider background, as the Prime Minister has proposed. My Secretary of State would like all options to be considered without prejudice to the final outcome of the studies. Officials here are ready to contribute to these studies.

3 I am sending copies of this letter to Charles Powell (No 10), Rachel Lomax (Treasury), John Bartlett (Bank) and Geoff Dart (DoEn).


Yours sincerely,

Maureen Dodsworth

MAUREEN DODSWORTH
Private Secretary

JH1CSF

South Africa; Rels; P+S



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GRS 700

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DESKBY 060900 F C O

FM WASHINGTON 060030Z AUGUST 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2325 DATED 5 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, ROME, PRETORIA

FCO TELNOS 1226-7 : MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. I RAISED THESE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS WITH CROCKER ON 5 AUGUST, JUST AS HE WAS GOING INTO A MEETING WITH SHULTZ AND MCFARLANE TO DISCUSS THE US ATTITUDE TO THEM. ON CROCKER'S INSTRUCTIONS, GELBARD SUBSEQUENTLY BRIEFED US AS FOLLOWS.

2. GELBARD SAID THAT PIK BOTHA HAD TELEPHONED WISNER ON 2 AUGUST TO SAY THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAD ON 1 AUGUST TAKEN A NUMBER OF FAR-REACHING DECISIONS, WHICH WOULD HELP MOVEMENT TOWARDS REAL AND GENUINE POWER-SHARING. AS A RESULT, PW BOTHA WAS PLANNING TO MAKE A NEW STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES AT THE NATAL PARTY CONFERENCE ON 15 AUGUST.

3. IT WAS CLEAR FROM WHAT PIK BOTHA HAD SAID THAT THE MAIN AIM OF THIS PROPOSED SOUTH AFRICAN MOVE WAS TO ENABLE THE US ADMINISTRATION TO STAND UP TO CONGRESS, AND TO HELP THE BRITISH AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS TO RESIST SIMILAR PRESSURES, AND THUS (PIK BOTHA HAD CLAIMED) TO WIN THE SOUTH AFRICANS ENOUGH TIME TO WORK OUT THEIR PROBLEMS WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. PIK BOTHA HAD STRESSED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WISHED TO MAKE SURE IN ADVANCE THAT THE MEASURES THEY WERE PROPOSING WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. THEY THEREFORE ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS, AND THEN WITH THE BRITISH AND GERMANS, BEFORE THE 15 AUGUST SPEECH. TO THIS END, PIK BOTHA WAS READY TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON, LONDON AND BONN. HE EXPECTED TO BE BRINGING WITH HIM AN ADDITIONAL MESSAGE OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE (WHICH THE AMERICANS SUSPECT MAY RELATE TO MANDELA).

4. PIK BOTHA HAD ALSO RAISED WITH WISNER THE PROPOSED VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA BY EC FOREIGN MINISTERS, AND HAD ASKED THE AMERICANS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO HAVE THIS DELAYED SO AS TO PRECLUDE ANY POSSIBILITY OF THE 15 AUGUST PROPOSALS BEING PERCEIVED AS THE RESULT OF FOREIGN PRESSURE.

5. GELBARD SAID THAT SHULTZ HAD ALREADY DECIDED THAT THE AMERICANS COULD NOT AFFORD TO SPURN THIS OPPORTUNITY, DESPITE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD SEEK TO CO-OPT THE US IN SOME WAY. FOR ONCE, THE AMERICANS SEEMED TO HAVE SOME LEVERAGE. THE SOUTH AFRICANS SEEMED TO BE FEELING THE FINANCIAL PRESSURE IN PARTICULAR. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF REAGAN SEEING PIK

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/ BOTHA.

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BOTHA. NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN MADE ON THE US REPRESENTATIVE, BUT HE SEEMED VERY LIKELY TO BE LOWER-LEVEL THAN SHULTZ. AS FOR THE VENUE, THE AMERICANS WOULD BE PROPOSING A THIRD COUNTRY (AS YET UNIDENTIFIED). AND IF THE MEETING DID INDEED TAKE PLACE, THE AMERICANS WOULD APPROACH IT WITH AN AGENDA OF THEIR OWN AS WELL, COVERING BOTH DOMESTIC SOUTH AFRICAN AND REGIONAL ISSUES.

6. GELBARD SAID THE AMERICANS WERE VERY WORRIED THAT NEWS OF THE PROPOSED MEETING WOULD LEAK. THEY WERE THEREFORE HOPING THAT IT COULD BE ARRANGED FOR THIS WEEK (WHICH WOULD HAVE THE ADDED ADVANTAGE OF ALLOWING THE SOUTH AFRICANS MORE TIME TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF US VIEWS BEFORE FINALISING THE 15 AUGUST TEXT). IF IT DID LEAK, THEY WOULD PROBABLY DEFEND THEIR DECISION BY SAYING THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD PROMISED DETAILS OF REFORMS AND THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE BEEN IRRESPONSIBLE TO REJECT SUCH A DISCUSSION.

7. THE AMERICANS HAVE YET TO DISCUSS THESE DEVELOPMENTS WITH THE GERMANS. WE ENCOURAGED THEM TO DO SO.

HANNAY

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cc PC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 August 1985

Dear Tim,

South Africa: Message from President Botha to the Prime Minister

You sent me earlier today a copy of the latest letter from President Botha to the Prime Minister.

I enclose a copy of a message of 3 August from George Shultz to the Foreign Secretary which the US Embassy delivered today. This appears to have been stimulated by the message from President Botha to the US Administration.

I also enclose a copy of a telegram which we have sent to Washington and Bonn instructing them to compare notes with their respective Foreign Ministries over the proposal that Pik Botha should visit the three capitals. We have suggested that it would be wise to await the substance of President Botha's message before taking a decision on whether to receive Pik Botha. There are practical difficulties (both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary will be away in mid-August) and unless any statement by President Botha was far-reaching in its substance, there would inevitably be strong criticism of such a visit here at that time.

I will be sending you a considered reply to President Botha's message once we have reactions from Washington and Bonn, and in any case before the end of this week.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)

Tim Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

August 3, 1985

Dear Geoffrey:

We have learned of the intended visit planned for sometime this month to South Africa of the Foreign Ministers of Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands representing the European Community. I think such a visit, especially in the first half of the month, would be a mistake. The South Africans have now been in contact with us and there are events developing which may be promising. I will be back in contact with you as soon as possible with more details as they develop, but in the meanwhile, we would greatly appreciate your help with this matter.

/S/

George Shultz

SECRET

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

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IMMEDIATE DESKBY 051800Z

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5 DESKBY 051800Z OR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
6 FM FCO 051700Z AUGUST 85
7 IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 AND IMMEDIATE BONN
10 REPEAT IMMEDIATE LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, ROME, PRETORIA
11 MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA TO THE PRIME MINISTER
12 1. President Botha has today sent a further message to the
13 Prime Minister. Text in MIFT.
14 2. Shultz has also sent the Secretary of State a message,
15 dated 3 August, text of which is in my second IFT.
16 2. Botha's message raises some awkward problems. We shall be
17 urgently considering our recommendation to No 10, but would
18 find it very helpful to have a prior indication of the
19 reaction of the US and German Governments. Shultz's message
20 suggests that the Americans may know more than we do about
21 what Botha may have in mind. We should be grateful therefore
22 if Washington and Bonn would consult the State Department/
23 Austwaertiges Amt and speak on the following lines:-
24 (i) We are told by the South African Embassy here that
25 President Botha's announcement will be made in the next few

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept SAFD	Distribution Southern African Standard
Drafted by (Block capitals) A Reeve		
Telephone number 233 5189		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE	Page 2
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<<<<

1 <<<<
 2 days and in any case before the visit of Pik Botha to Europe.
 3 (ii) That being the case, we are inclined to await the
 4 statement before taking any decisions on whether to receive
 5 Pik Botha.
 6 (iii) In any case, we would have practical difficulties over
 7 a visit by Pik Botha in August. Both the Prime Minister and
 8 the Secretary of State will be away.
 9 (iv) Our final decision on whether or not to receive
 10 Pik Botha will, of course, be influenced by the nature
 11 of the President's announcement. If this were to take the
 12 form of major concessions, it would clearly be easier to
 13 justify receiving Pik Botha though this would still
 14 provoke major criticism here. We hope in any case that
 15 the three governments would be able to act in concert
 16 over this proposal.
 17 4. Grateful if Luxembourg, Rome and The Hague could confirm
 18 that messages have been sent to the Foreign Ministries of
 19 these countries. It would be particularly helpful to know
 20 whether Luxembourg, as the Presidency, see any difficulty
 21 about a meeting of the Troika in Europe with Pik Botha.
 22 5. Grateful if Washington could reply by 060900Z and Bonn
 23 by 061200Z.

24 6. *See my two IFTs.*

25 HOWE
 26 NNNN

/// 31
 // 32
 / 33

34

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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B.P.

2

PRIME MINISTER


SOUTH AFRICA

We have now received a further message from President Botha which is attached. The letter does two things:-

- i) it foreshadows an announcement of "proposals which may have a profound influence on the political view of this country and which I believe will be welcomed by you and your Government".
- ii) It says that the South African Foreign Minister will be in Europe in the middle of August and asks if you would be interested in receiving him so that he could explain these proposals (whatever they are).

The South Africans are writing similarly to President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl.

We are taking soundings in Bonn and Washington about their likely response to the South African request but we will need to see the proposals themselves before we can respond properly. In any event, it would, I assume, not be right for you to delay your holiday in order to see Pik Botha. We should be able to reply before the end of the week.


mf

TIMOTHY FLESHER

5 August 1985

L03AJK



Fleisher

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 August 1985

Thank you for your letter of today's date with which you enclosed a message from the State President of the Republic of South Africa to the Prime Minister.

I shall, of course, place this before her at once.

TIMOTHY FLESHER

Mr. P. J. H. Cilliers:



South African Embassy
Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

cc Sir Kadook

SUBJECT
cc Master
ops

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 148/85

5 August 1985

Dear Prime Minister

As you are aware the Foreign Ministers of the 'Ten' and of Spain and Portugal decided on 1 August 1985 to send the Foreign Ministers of Luxemburg, Italy and The Netherlands to South Africa in order to discuss the latest developments in South Africa. My Foreign Minister indicated on behalf of the South African Government that the three Ministers would be welcome to visit South Africa on the basis that such a visit did not imply any right on the part of the 'Ten' to interfere in South Africa's internal affairs and on the assumption that the 'Ten' were genuinely interested in ascertaining the true facts.

You will recall that I established a special cabinet committee more than two years ago with the purpose of deliberating with Black leadership and recommending future constitutional developments which could satisfy the reasonable aspirations of all our peoples and communities. I can now tell you that this committee has submitted to me proposals which may have a profound influence on the political future of this country and which I believe will be welcomed by you and your Government. I am at present giving serious consideration to these proposals and intend to make an announcement on my Government's decision in the very near future. I must stress that my Government's decision will be taken on the basis of what we consider to be in the best interest of South and Southern Africa.

My Foreign Minister will be in Europe towards the middle of August in order to brief South African Ambassadors on the wider implications and magnitude of the envisaged developments. I see advantage in making my Foreign Minister available to explain these developments to you personally on a convenient date towards the middle of August. I should be glad if you could let me know whether you would be interested in receiving him for this purpose.

My Foreign Minister has sent a similar message at my request to President Reagan proposing a meeting for him with the President. He has also sent messages to the Foreign Ministers of Luxemburg, The Netherlands and Italy suggesting that the three Ministers meet him initially in Western Europe towards mid-August 1985. They would nevertheless be welcome to visit South Africa thereafter should they still feel that a useful purpose would be served by such a visit.

I have written a similar letter to Chancellor Kohl because I believe that you and the Chancellor would be personally interested in having these developments explained to you in greater detail.

Yours sincerely

P W Botha
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Subject cc Master
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T148/85



top copy - advance
text already received
File

Union Buildings
Pretoria

4 August 1985

Dear Prime Minister

As you are aware the Foreign Ministers of the 'Ten' and of Spain and Portugal decided on 1 August 1985 to send the Foreign Ministers of Luxemburg, Italy and the Netherlands to South Africa in order to discuss the latest developments in South Africa. My Foreign Minister indicated, on behalf of the South African Government, that the three Ministers would be welcome to visit South Africa on the basis that such a visit did not imply any right on the part of the 'Ten' to interfere in South Africa's internal affairs and on the assumption that the 'Ten' were genuinely interested in ascertaining the true facts.

You will recall that I established a Special Cabinet Committee more than two years ago with the purpose of deliberating with black leadership and recommending future constitutional developments which could satisfy the reasonable aspirations of all our peoples and communities. I can now tell you that this Committee has submitted to me proposals which may have a profound influence on the political future of this country and which I believe will be welcomed by you and your Government. I am at present giving serious consideration to these proposals and intend to make an announcement on my Government's decision in the very near future. I must stress that my Government's decision will be taken on the basis of what we consider to be in the best interests of South and southern Africa.


2/...

My Foreign Minister will be in Europe towards the middle of August in order to brief South African Ambassadors on the wider implications and magnitude of the envisaged developments. I see advantage in making my Foreign Minister available to explain these developments to you personally on a convenient date towards the middle of August. I should be glad if you could let me know whether you would be interested in receiving him for this purpose.

My Foreign Minister has sent a similar message at my request to President Reagan proposing a meeting for him with the President. He has also sent messages to the Foreign Ministers of Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Italy suggesting that the three Ministers meet him initially in western Europe towards mid-August 1985. They would nevertheless, be welcome to visit South Africa thereafter should they still feel that a useful purpose would be served by such a visit.

I have written a similar letter to Chancellor Kohl because I believe that you and the Chancellor would be personally interested in having these developments explained to you in greater detail.

Yours sincerely



P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP
LONDON





South African Embassy
Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

B8/6/1

5 August 1985

Mr T J Flesher
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Mr Flesher

It would be much appreciated if you could kindly hand the enclosed letter from the South African State President to the Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher.

Your assistance is much appreciated.

Yours sincerely

P. Lillier
✓ CHARGÉ d'AFFAIRES a.i.

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Optimum
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Mag



10 DOWNING STREET

Tim -

the draft that the attached letter was based on was sent to CAP on Friday. He did not like it, so changed it. The original had not however been approved by the FCS, so Charles asked that, when a formal submission arrives, both versions should be put in the FM's Box, with a note saying that CAP thought his redraft was better, and asking the FM to sign it.

The formal submission, which CAP thought might come at the w/e, has not so far arrived. Over to you! (AL said not to chase it)

CS 5/8/81



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

I have been following recent events in South Africa closely. While I recognise the need to preserve law and order, the imposition of a State of Emergency, together with the arrests and detentions which have followed it, have created great disquiet here. The international pressures for sanctions against South Africa are increasing steadily. They are unlikely to abate unless there are early signs of progress within your country along the lines foreshadowed in your speech of January this year.

You will know that I and Sir Geoffrey Howe have spoken out strongly against sanctions on many occasions. We have done so because we do not believe that a sanctions policy is the right course. But it is increasingly argued by those who favour sanctions that our present policy has produced few results; that the situation in South Africa is deteriorating and that the reforms undertaken so far are quite inadequate.

I can understand that this is not the easiest time for you to show flexibility. But some steps are, in my judgement, essential as an indication that you are determined to press on with the reforms which you outlined to me when we met at Chequers more than a year ago. The first such step would be to lift the State of Emergency, but

beyond that, I am convinced that the early release of Nelson Mandela would be seen as a gesture of great significance. It would certainly be viewed in the West as an important confidence-building measure which would encourage the ANC, and other black leaders, to embark on a dialogue with the South African Government.

The other step which I believe would be generally welcome is some statement of your Government's intention to enter into a serious political dialogue with black leaders about the major issues of concern to them, including common citizenship and a way for blacks to participate in central government.

The Security Council Resolution of 26 July, on which we and the Americans abstained, has increased the pressure within the European Community for measures of the sort listed in the Resolution. I expect the US Congress to revert to sanctions legislation in September. The Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in the autumn will increase the pressure further. Our belief in the rightness of our present policy will lead us to continue to resist these pressures, but I must frankly tell you that our ability to do so will depend crucially on your willingness and determination to create conditions which will permit a serious dialogue to begin with leaders of the black community. Progress in Namibia is a rather separate issue but one to which we attach equal importance since it is a problem that is bound to arise in the Security Council in the autumn. Here again the absence of any progress will increase the demand for sanctions.

I have tried to convey the difficulties as I see them. I do not underestimate yours. My great concern is that the absence of movement within South Africa and over Namibia will make it increasingly difficult to show that the policies which I believe to be sensible and right can

produce results. The next few weeks are crucial in this. This is why I am writing to you now. I do hope that you will feel able to respond positively.

The Honourable P.W. Botha, D.S.M., M.P.

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: The Honourable P W Botha DSM MP
State President

Your Reference
ATK

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I have been ^{following} ~~giving~~ much thought to recent events in South Africa. ^{closely} I am ~~sure~~ you will recognise that ~~the~~ imposition of a State of Emergency, together with the arrests and ^{which have followed it} ~~detentions~~, have created ~~much~~ ^{great} disquiet here. ~~These~~ developments have serious implications for all of us.

You ~~will know that~~ the international pressures for sanctions against South Africa are increasing steadily. They are unlikely to abate unless there are early signs of progress within ^{your country} South Africa along the lines foreshadowed in your speech of January this year.

[Insert from page 3].

I can understand that this is not the easiest time for you show flexibility. But some steps are, in my judgement, essential as an indication that you are determined to press on with the reforms which you outlined to me when we met at Chequers more than a year ago. The first such step would be to lift the State of Emergency, but

/beyond

While I recognize the need to preserve law and order,

Enclosures—flag(s).....

beyond that, I am convinced that the early release of Nelson Mandela would be seen as a gesture of great significance. It would certainly be viewed in the West as an important confidence-building measure which would encourage the ANC, and other black leaders, to embark on a dialogue with the South African Government.

~~(Some statement of your government's intention to enter into a serious political dialogue with black leaders, power sharing. This is a point which Chief Buthelezi mentioned when he called on me recently. Not surprisingly, he does not feel able to begin serious discussions while the State of Emergency remains and unless you are prepared to give some public assurance, however generally expressed, that the ultimate objective of such discussions is to find ways for blacks to participate in central government.~~

majority of
 a list of
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~~statement~~
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 and a way
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 for blacks to
 participate in
 central
 government.

~~Unless there is some forward movement along these lines,~~ We can expect rapidly increasing pressure for sanctions in the Autumn. The US Congress will no doubt revert to its sanctions Bill when it ~~resumes~~ ^{recommences} in September. There will certainly be calls for Security Council meetings. The Commonwealth Heads of Government will be holding their meeting in October and South Africa is bound to feature prominently on the agenda. You may be aware that the Australian Government which ~~fundamentally~~ ^{formally} supported us strongly in resisting

sanctions has recently changed its position and now seems likely to take some initiative in proposing measures against South Africa. The New Zealanders will certainly support them. The Canadian position is less clear though I believe Mr Mulroney is personally very concerned about the present situation in South Africa and believes that strong measures are needed.

You will know that ^{for} Geoffrey Howe and I ^{and Sir Geoffrey Howe} have spoken out strongly against sanctions on many occasions. ^{the} We have done so because ^{we} we do not believe that a sanctions policy is the right course. But it is increasingly argued by those who favour sanctions that our present policy has produced few results; that the situation in South Africa is deteriorating and that the reforms undertaken so far are quite inadequate.

The Security Council Resolution of 26 July, on which we and the Americans abstained, has increased the pressure within the European Community for measures of ~~the~~ sort listed in the Resolution. Our belief in the rightness of our present policy will lead us to continue to resist these pressures, but I must frankly tell you that our ability to do so will depend crucially on your willingness and determination to create conditions which will ~~promote~~ ^{permit} a serious dialogue to begin with leaders of the black community. Progress in Namibia is a rather separate issue but one to which we attach equal importance since it is a problem that is bound to arise in the Security Council in the Autumn. Here again /the

hasn't

I expect the US Congress to resist to sanctions legislation in the House. The Commonwealth Heads of Govt meeting is to start autumn. It will discuss the issue. I think

the absence of any progress will increase the ~~direct~~ ^{NP.} pressure for sanctions. I have tried to convey the difficulties as I see them. I do not underestimate yours. My ~~fear~~ ^{great concern} is that the absence of movement within South Africa and over Namibia will make it increasingly difficult to show that the policies which I believe to be sensible and right can produce results. This is why I am writing to you now. I do hope that you will feel able to respond positively.

~~Lead to absence~~
of any forward
movement we
shall face
marginalisation
in the international
community. That
is not a prospect
which I could
contemplate
indifferently.

The next few weeks are crucial in this



BLPC

10 DOWNING STREET

a MASTER SET

From the Private Secretary

2 August 1985


Dev Colin,

Prime Minister's meeting with Mrs. Helen Suzman on
2 August at 1500

The Prime Minister had a brief meeting with Mrs. Helen Suzman, Opposition Member of the South African Parliament, this afternoon.

The general burden of Mrs. Suzman's remarks was that the South African Government was much stronger than most people outside South Africa recognised. Moreover the majority of whites were not ready for one-man one-vote in a unitary state. Action to isolate South Africa or to impose economic sanctions would actually be counter-productive. But progress could be made by steady diplomatic pressure on the South African Government on issues such as forced removals, abolition of the pass laws and an end to attacks on neighbouring countries. She believed that the South African Government was ready to make "incremental changes" and Western governments should push for these. Progress would never be fast. But one should not underestimate the advances which had already been made. One should recognise, too, that economic and industrial progress were the strongest forces for breaking down apartheid.

Mrs. Suzman noted that radical blacks in South Africa increasingly identified apartheid with capitalism, and were thus turning to Marxism. She expected unrest to continue for some considerable time and the Government to respond with oppressive measures. But she did not think it was the beginning of revolution in South Africa, and returned several times to the theme of "incremental changes" as offering the best hope of progress, provided there was sustained pressure from outside to achieve them.

Yours sincerely,

 (Charles Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

a MASTER SET

From the Private Secretary

2 August 1985

Dear Colin,

Prime Minister's meeting with Chief Buthelezi
on 2 August at 1530

The Prime Minister had a brief meeting this afternoon with Chief Buthelezi following her talks with Mrs. Suzman.


The Prime Minister asked Chief Buthelezi's views on the way forward in South Africa. Chief Buthelezi said that he was a realist. He recognised that there was no prospect of toppling the South African Government. It was the most powerful and well-entrenched government in Africa. Measures to isolate South Africa would not help. He had been pleased when the Prime Minister had seen President Botha. He very much appreciated the Prime Minister's attitude on sanctions and her pronouncements on them during her recent visit to Washington. The majority of black people in South Africa were not asking for sanctions and disinvestment. Such measures would only damage the standard of living and the future of blacks. What was required was steady political pressure on the South African Government to end the state of emergency, to release Nelson Mandela and to issue a statement of intent about its plans for dialogue and power sharing with the black community. Chief Buthelezi handed over a memorandum covering these points to the Prime Minister.

Chief Buthelezi also gave a long account of his contacts with the ANC and his relations with President Botha, in the course of which he handed over the enclosed copy of a letter which he had sent the President last November. The only point he mentioned which appeared to me worth recording was that Botha had been close to releasing Nelson Mandela last autumn. Chief Buthelezi made clear that he was not prepared to meet President Botha while the state of emergency lasted. He confirmed his own commitment to non-violence.

dg

Chief Buthelezi subsequently repeated most of these points in talking to television and the press outside No.10.

The Prime Minister commented afterwards that while she had found Chief Buthelezi engaging, she wondered whether he was a strong enough character to provide real leadership.

Yours sincerely,


(Charles Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Chief Buthezi
memorandum in
the Pine Hunter,
Please file.

CD 2/2.



MEMORANDUM FOR PRESENTATION TO THE RT. HON. MRS. MARGARET THATCHER,
MP, PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN, DURING A VISIT TO LONDON
BY MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MINISTER KWAZULU, PRESIDENT OF
INKATHA AND CHAIRMAN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN BLACK ALLIANCE
AUGUST 1985

In June 1984, the State President, Mr. P.W. Botha - then Prime Minister - visited Britain and Europe and met with a number of Heads of Government. This trip of his followed on the Referendum held in South Africa in November the previous year in which White South Africa had given him a massive endorsement of the new constitution under which the present South African Tricameral Parliament now operates. At the time, various Western Heads of State and Foreign Offices expressed cautious optimism that at last the South African Government had taken a small step in the right direction by including Indian and Coloured people as junior partners in government. Mr. P.W. Botha's European trip was specifically designed to use his success in the Referendum campaign to buy time for South Africa, and to drive home the advantages which the cautious but positive responses by a number of Western Governments held for him.

I was deeply concerned about the misinterpretation of the constitutional developments in South Africa by people in so many quarters and I wrote a short Memorandum to the Heads of States whom Mr. Botha would be seeing, about the constitutional developments which were taking place. In that Memorandum I said:

"I believe it is important for Western Heads of State to know that the South African Government is continuing to pursue policies which must necessarily lead to disaster and that it is in Western national and international interests that Western Heads of State tax Mr. Botha on some issues.

Firstly, there is the new constitution. The new constitution permanently excludes Blacks from having any say in the government of 87 per cent of the land and therefore in the policies which determine how the country's national wealth, the country's internal policies, and the country's foreign policy are determined. The new constitution is based on repugnant racism and gives Whites a constitutionally entrenched right to rule over Blacks in their midst in perpetuity. So-called White South Africa now has, and will ever increasingly have, a population which is numerically dominated by Blacks. The White controlled new tricameral parliament will remain a minority government and will continue to violate the most fundamental of Western democratic

principles. Western Heads of State should know that the new constitution is a prescription for violence and that it pulls the rug from beneath the feet of responsible Black leaders such as myself..."

I believe that events in South Africa since mid-1984 have shown that my concerns expressed in this Memorandum were fully justified. Instead of buying time for progress towards normalising South Africa, the new constitution had bought time towards the evolution of violence. During the Referendum campaign, I did everything I could possibly do to warn White South Africa that a Yes vote in favour of the new constitution would deepen Black anger, and would widen the chasm between Black and White which successive apartheid Governments in South Africa had created. I warned that the new constitution was a prescription for violence and that nothing that the Government had done, and nothing in the new constitution, addressed the central questions in South Africa which revolve around the disenfranchisement of 72 per cent of the population and their exclusion from any meaningful participation in the Government of their country.

Those warnings were not heeded and today we have the tragic evidence that my fears were fully justified. Black anger has risen sharply across the length and breadth of South Africa and not only have the levels of violence and the spread of violence used for political purposes now risen to historically unprecedented heights, but the ugliness of violence being employed for political purposes, has deepened tragically. The vast range of repressive measures made available to the Government through Draconian laws which have been passed over decades of National Party rule, have proved insufficient to contain Black anger. The State President has now had to declare a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts which has resulted in between eight and nine million South Africans living in circumstances which characterise the worst of Police States.

The upward spiral of violence employed for political purposes in South Africa will only be broken if the South Africa now turns to address the fundamental issues which White South Africa needs to face up to. The Government needs to address the question of giving Blacks a say in the Government of their country. Unless this is done, and done boldly and soon, the forces working for non-violent, democratic solutions leading to politics of negotiation will suffer irreparable harm.

It is in these circumstances, Madam Prime Minister, that I so deeply appreciate the opportunity of meeting with you to talk about South and Southern Africa. Whatever happens in South Africa has ramifications for the whole of the sub-continent and for a very

wide range of Western interests in South and Southern Africa. The sense of gratitude that I am conveying is more than a sense of gratitude borne out of your recognition, Madam Prime Minister, that I and Inkatha are playing a positive role in South Africa. My gratitude runs deeper than that. My ancestors fought wars against British armies. We were subjugated by Great Britain, and the might of the Zulu empire was smashed by Britain and my forefathers and their people were handed to racist White political control by British action in South Africa which led to the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. I am indeed grateful that today you as head of the country which thus once subjugated my people and handed us over to be brutalised by racism, can meet in friendship and common concern about what is happening today. I am totally convinced that the lack of permanent enmity and hatred which could have characterised my attitude to you, and could be generalised as an attitude amongst the Zulu people towards Great Britain, could be equally apparent in future attitudes towards White South Africa, if the South African Government followed the wisdom of Britain and withdrew from racist policies.

I pursue policies of democratic opposition to apartheid, and I remain committed to non-violent tactics and strategies, because unless Black South Africa wins the struggle for liberation through these means, we will be left with an aftermath of bitterness and hatred which will take generations to dissipate.

Despite the upward spiralling of violence in South Africa, there remains even today the kind of goodwill among Black South Africans which has resulted in my leadership and Inkatha's aims and objectives being supported by a card-carrying membership of over a million people. Beyond these card-carrying members, there is a further vast Black South African support and sympathy amongst those who are not yet card-carrying members. No party political machine is capable of doing more than actually enrolling but a proportion of the total potential support for a political programme. Inkatha's membership makes it the largest Black political organisation ever to have emerged in the history of South Africa. It is a genuine voice of the people and Inkatha is a genuine cross-section of Black South Africa. It reflects demographic realities; it is dominated numerically by peasants and workers; it is representative of every class of Black South Africans and it is supported as much in the urban areas as it is in rural areas. Inkatha's aims and objectives and its statement of belief are compatible with the best principles of democratic government that have been evolved by the Western industrialised world.

I see South Africa locked into a north/south axis by history itself, and I see the natural destiny of the people of South Africa as a destiny within the international Western industrial sphere of interest. It is in this context that the value of Inkatha must be

seen. It is a mass movement which is truly democratic. Its policies and its tactics and strategies are in principle and in practice determined by Annual General Conferences which take place each year. It is a grass root political movement in which the people themselves elect to follow the courses they follow and elect leaders to pursue tactics and strategies they have determined to further the causes which revolve around their aspirations. I say nothing and I do nothing outside the mandate which is given to me by my massive Black constituency. Every point of view, Madam Prime Minister, that I express today is a point of view which is an Inkatha point of view and a point of view which has not only been endorsed by Inkatha's leadership and its Annual General Conferences, but which has also been endorsed by mass meetings I hold across the country.

There are other Black voices. Inkatha is not the only political group. There are other Black views about what should and should not happen, but there is no voice to equal Inkatha's voice in terms of being a voice determined by ordinary Black people.

I am now daily being made aware of the fact that unless the South African Government now takes very early and bold steps towards normalising South Africa, as a modern, industrialised, democratic state, there will be increased radicalisation in Black politics, and the upward spiral of violence for political purposes which we are now witnessing, will succeed in making South Africa ungovernable, not only for the National Party, but for any future Government - whether it be Black or White.

If South Africa has any future at all worth having, that future will have to be characterised by a constitution which enshrines genuine democratic principles and practices and which gives rise to genuine democratic government, and which will also have to be characterised by a real and continued increase in the quality of life for ordinary people. After the struggle for liberation in South Africa has been won, we will have to face the heritage of poverty and despair among the masses which apartheid has already bequeathed to the country. We as Black South Africans therefore dare not involve ourselves in tactics and strategies which undermine democracy and which destroy the productive capacity of the South African economy. This is a message I constantly deliver to my people. I say to them that there is no easy solution to the South African problem; I say to them that there will be no overnight victory; and I say to them that after the political victory, there will be continued poverty for a considerable time to follow and that they must accept there is no Utopian future. I argue that socialist and communist doctrines contain no magic which will solve South Africa's problems, and that the free enterprise system and enlightened capitalism, leading to a massive development of the South African economy, are things that Black South Africa

simply has to accept. In our circumstances, the free enterprise system is the most potent force of development available to us.

I am also deeply convinced that White South Africa would rather adopt a scorched earth policy, and destroy the future for everyone, than capitulate now immediately to a one-man-one-vote system of government in a unitary state. Black South Africa has cherished the ideal of a one-man-one-vote system in a unitary state for generations. I argue, I plead and I cajole with Black South Africans, that if we are to avoid destroying the foundations of the future, we must commit ourselves to the politics of negotiation and we must be prepared to compromises wherever compromises can possibly be made without them being self-defeating. I and millions of Black South Africans are prepared at this point in time to shelve our ideal of a one-man-one-vote system of government in a unitary state if negotiations between Blacks and Whites can begin to find a compromise solution acceptable to all population groups. One-man-one-vote in a unitary state will always be our cherished ideal. But I believe it can be shelved for now in order to make a start where a start is possible.

I have already gone as far as it is humanly possible for me to go towards establishing the basis of real negotiations in South Africa. I believe that it is vital for the future of South Africa for every leader, whether he or she be Black, White, Coloured or Indian to reduce the list of non-negotiables to the barest possible minimum, which they will have to take to the conference table. I and the vast majority of Black South Africans are prepared to negotiate, and we are prepared to limit our list of non-negotiables.

I insist only that whatever negotiations do take place recognises that South Africa is one country, with one people, who have together but a single destiny; and that negotiations should be directed at tangible progress towards normalising South Africa.

I have only had one single formal discussion with the State President of South Africa once in the last four and a half years, and I have only seen him once informally during that period of time. It was after my formal meeting with him in May this year, and it was after I had repeatedly offered to enter the politics of negotiation, that the State President in an interview with Mr. Brian Walden which was televised in Britain and South Africa, said that he would not accept a single South Africa, whether it be a unitary state, or whether it be a federal union. If the President is incapable of even entertaining thoughts of talking about one South Africa, with one people, under one government, then as far as I am concerned there is nothing left to talk about. If there are to be any negotiations in South Africa worth having, they must be negotiations to find feasible and practical ways and means of

giving constitutional expression to these very simple and basic demands.

The present parliamentary system locates the final deciding power over 87 per cent of the country, over all its wealth, and therefore over its fiscal policy and its internal and foreign policy, in the White Chamber of the Tricameral Parliament. On no single occasion has the State President given any evidence of his willingness to entertain a future in which this 87 per cent of the country, which Whites claim as their own domain, is sacrificed in favour of a shared future for all. I believe, Madam Prime Minister, that you and other Heads of Western Governments, should be made aware of the fact that whatever reforms are being introduced, and however meaningful those reforms are in fact in the daily lives of Black people, unless the Government of South Africa is prepared to begin meaningful negotiations with Blacks, there can only be an escalation of violence. As a Black leader, I ask you Madam Prime Minister, to exert every pressure on the South African Government available to you to begin formal negotiations with Black leaders who recognise the need for Whites to relinquish the monopoly of power they enjoy in South Africa.

There is in South Africa already a significant body of Black opinion which has already finally concluded that there are no prospects of bringing about change through negotiation and this has already resulted in South Africa having entered the first phase of civil war. The unprecedented current levels of violence used for political purposes is ever-increasingly expressing itself more in Black/Black confrontations than in Black/White confrontations or Black confrontations with the Government. The African National Congress' Mission-in-Exile is seeking to make South Africa ungovernable by encouraging Black South Africans, and particularly the youth, to kill any Black who opposes them and who is prepared to work towards compromise solutions. The ANC's Mission-in-Exile sees the armed struggle as the primary means of bringing about change, and it intends using the resources for violence at its disposal to further revolutionary aims which will in the end ensconce it as a post-liberation government. Those committed to the armed struggle and to the employment of violence for political purposes, will ever-increasingly become intolerant of any success in the politics of negotiation. The ANC's Mission-in-Exile is not seeking a compromise solution. It is driven by winner-takes-all revolutionary fires, and we face the tragic reality in South Africa that the destruction of the politics of compromise and negotiation is becoming of prime concern to the ANC's Mission-in-Exile.

It is in a very real sense of the concept that I say that South Africa has already entered the first phase of civil war, and that what was a struggle against apartheid is now becoming a struggle to thwart democratic opposition to apartheid. It is in this context

that I am asking you, Madam Prime Minister, to exert every possible pressure on Pretoria to strengthen the politics of negotiation by insisting that the State President declare his intention to negotiate with Blacks about the future of South Africa as one country, with one people who share one destiny. I believe that President Reagan has embarked on a course of action in his constructive engagement policy which could accumulate the kind of pressures which we so badly need in South Africa. Whether or not the American party political scene permits this policy of ever evolving into anything meaningful remains to be seen, and I am concerned about the fact that apartheid is being drawn into American party politics. I am also concerned about statements now increasingly being made by the Labour Party here in Britain. Some Democrats in the United States and some members of the British Labour Party are adopting stances and making statements which if continued will accumulate advantages for those committing South Africa to civil war, and to the solution of South Africa's problems through the armed struggle and through generalised violence.

I as a Black political leader in South Africa am aware of the role that the British Government played to end hostilities between Black and White in Zimbabwe. I am aware, Madam Prime Minister, that it was your Cabinet which pursued the diplomatic endeavours which led to the Lancaster House negotiations. Black South Africa regards it as a very considerable achievement, and it has encouraged us to think that British diplomacy, which has accumulated its own distinctive nature over the centuries, remains a vital force in the Western world which could yet play a distinctive role in South Africa. I do not draw naive parallels between what was required in Zimbabwe to bring about a cessation of hostilities and what is now required in South Africa to bring about the de-escalation of violence and the promotion of the politics of diplomacy. Nor am I ignoring the constitutional role, and the role in international law, within which British diplomacy brought about a settlement in Zimbabwe. I am simply referring to the value of Britain as an honest broker in international diplomacy and I am expressing faith that Britain could fulfill the role of an honest broker in South Africa and between South Africa and the West.

I have admired, Madam Prime Minister, the extent to which you and your Government have refused to bow to pressure to take indiscriminate action simply because apartheid is morally repugnant. In a sense, there may now be a ripeness of time in which diplomacy could be more effective than it was in the past.

Black South Africans have always seen the West as toothless when it came to dealing with apartheid. Apartheid under the National Party has grown vigorously and has thrived for over 37 years, despite all the moral and diplomatic pressure which has been exerted on successive National Party Governments. It would be tragic for

South Africa and the whole of Southern Africa, if Britain and its allies failed to make the combined weight of Western pressure on the South African Government an ever-increasingly positive factor in bringing about meaningful change in my country, now that there is greater fluidity in the South African situation.

Statesmanship demands that apartheid is condemned and that opposition to apartheid is strengthened in such a way that the politics of negotiation are furthered, and the democratic future of South Africa is assured. Apartheid is so abhorrent that just simply any measure against it is seen as justified by some in the West. I have no doubt that there are many in the British Labour Party, and even, Madam Prime Minister, amongst your rank and file party members, who are genuinely indignant about apartheid and in whom that indignation gives rise to irresponsible action in supporting the forces of destruction in South Africa.

This has become very apparent in the disinvestment debate in the United States, and it is very apparent in much of the activity of pressure groups in Great Britain and Western Europe. There is too much at stake, not only for millions in South Africa, but for the whole sub-continent of Southern Africa for Western indignation to give rise to indiscriminate action against apartheid.

The recent indignation by France which has led to the recalling of its Ambassador from South Africa will be applauded by many Black South Africans merely for its symbolic importance. This kind of European reaction to current events will send shock waves through White South Africa. When, however, the French associate their indignation with a high political symbolic value for those committed to the struggle for liberation, with the further action of prohibiting any further investment in South Africa, their action becomes a double-edged sword which hurts both Black and White, and which strengthens the revolutionary forces in the country working against democracy. I am pursuing a path of non-violent, democratic opposition to the Government precisely because I see this as the only way of preserving the future. Vast backlogs in Black housing, health services and welfare, and in such things as education, can only be wiped out some time in the future if the South African economy grows at its maximum possible rate. Any move against South Africa which damages its economy now, is a move which will damage the prospects of a worthwhile future. I am pursuing the politics of negotiation because I do not want to reduce South Africa to ungovernability, and this is what mass poverty will do some time in the future if the country's economic growth base is damaged now.

Inkatha holds an Annual General Conference every year and at every one of these Conferences, I inform delegates what I have said on their behalf on the question of disinvestment. I inform them that I tell the world:

- that ordinary Black South Africans still seek a negotiated settlement and seek to pursue non-violent tactics and strategies;
- they know the meaning of poverty and are aware of the fact that if they do not have work they suffer terrible deprivation and that therefore any strategy which results in a decrease in the number of jobs available to Blacks is rejected by Blacks;
- Blacks in South Africa who have jobs with foreign companies would never be persuaded to relinquish their jobs to further the aims and objectives of those who pursue the disinvestment lobby;
- that no membership-based Black organisation in South Africa has an executive with a mandate from its members to call for disinvestment;
- that Black protest politicians who are not involved in constituency politics but who are involved in voicing Black grievances in a manner calculated to gain media acclaim, are more prone to call for disinvestment than other leaders.
- that every leader of an organisation working to make this country ungovernable and who is prepared to use violence, whether it be mob violence or armed violence, to bring about political change, argues for disinvestment;
- that there is no prospect of the armed struggle succeeding within the foreseeable future and that we therefore will have to rely on the politics of negotiation; and that the politics of negotiation are favoured by what has now become a total dependence by White South Africa on Black South Africa;
- that Black bargaining power is increased by Black economic advancement and vertical mobility which accompanies it;
- that it is the responsibility of Black South Africans to liberate South Africa from apartheid oppression in such a way that we do not force on neighbouring Black States, and States further afield in Southern and Central Africa, to pay the costs of our struggle.
- I tell them that we respect the national choices of Black States in Southern Africa and that we have no quarrel with those who have opted for a socialist future under a one-Party state, but that that is not a viable option for us; and that the benefits we will derive from working within a race-free,

democratic state in which there will be equality for all, and in which the principles of the free enterprise system will dominate in government planning, will have a very significant spill-over benefit for other States in Southern Africa.

I will report to my constituency, Madam Prime Minister, what I have said to you today about disinvestment. I will do so at Inkatha's Central Committee; and I will do so at mass meetings I hold in various places in the country, including Soweto which is in South Africa's industrial heartland. Wherever I do so, I will receive mass acclaim for the sentiments I am expressing.

Western industrialised countries which are moving towards banning future investment in South Africa, or even worse to withdrawing existing investment, and which regard Black opinion among rank and file workers and peasants as irrelevant, stand in the very real danger of pursuing aims and objectives which conflict with what is beneficial in our struggle for liberation. And in this vein, I would like to make an additional point. I am beginning to hear more and more arguments in favour of selective disinvestment because many of the points I have made above are taken and it is naively believed that, for example, prohibition of further investment in capital intensive industries, is warranted. Every Western Government knows that economies are not maleable things and cannot be turned on or off at will, and can only be directed towards political ends with very limited success. The naivety of some who think they can damage one part of the economy without it having repercussions for another part of the economy, is to me alarming. I am most certainly open to persuasion that one or another form of disinvestment may put pressure on Pretoria without damaging the economy, or causing greater Black suffering. I argue against disinvestment because it has these negative effects. Any sanctions against South Africa which would not harm the growth of the economy, but which would exert pressure on Pretoria, would be welcome by every Black South African. I have always spoken against irresponsible exploitative capitalism, but that to me is another debate entirely.

There is also a ripeness of time in which blunders would lead to irrecoverable losses. The West should realise that the threat of violence, and the threat of economic sanctions has more utility than the employment of violence and the implementation of damaging sanctions. The West should also realise that as soon as sanctions do begin to bite, it is Black South Africa which will bear the brunt of the burden. The West should also realise that the South African Government is quite capable of taking retaliatory measures of the most despicable kind. If sanctions began to bite, and Blacks began to suffer the burden of those sanctions, Pretoria would have no scruples about repatriating more than a million workers in South Africa who come from neighbouring States.

President Kaunda and President Banda unilaterally took action to stop the recruitment of mine workers in Zambia and Malawi. The South African Government is quite capable of taking reciprocal action and repatriating foreign workers. More than a million families would suffer increased deprivation in impoverished neighbouring States. I plead with the West not to push the whole of South Africa into an abyss because they underestimate the brutality with which Pretoria could respond in a situation in which very real threats became unbearable realities.

Today, after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, our brothers in Mocambique are developing trade links with South Africa. Despite the admirable stand of Zimbabwe on the issue of apartheid, economic realities are such that she still has a trade mission in Johannesburg. I often wonder, when sanctions are advocated, what countries such as Zimbabwe are supposed to do. Would Zimbabwe's trade mission in Johannesburg be expected to be withdrawn from South Africa when sanctions are applied? What will the international community actually do for citizens of Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Mocambique, once Mr. Louis Nel's threat is carried out and citizens of these independent States in Southern Africa are actually deported out of South Africa? South Africa showed her claws recently when the Lesotho border was closed for a few days with resultant suffering of many Lesotho citizens and their families.

I am not saying that pressures should not be brought to bear on the South African polecat. All I am saying is that all of us who work for the destruction of the apartheid polecat should not be blinded by anger to the extent that we fail to examine carefully the consequences of every act we take in the process of doing so. I have become very skeptical on the issue of whether the West would come to the rescue of more than a million citizens of these independent States when the crunch comes, and South Africa decides to expel them as a retaliatory act. I have become skeptical because I have not seen a single Western country do anything to the rogue elephant, which the South African Defence Force has been, when they have killed our brothers and sisters in countries such as Lesotho, Mocambique, Angola and Botswana.

Madam Prime Minister, the position the British adopted in last week's Security Council debate must be applauded, and I plead with you to withstand all party political pressures which may be exerted on you to continue to protect the prospects of British diplomacy being employed to assist in the non-violent resolution of the South African problem.

I am fully aware of the fact that even the maximum possible growth rate of the South African economy will leave a great many Black South Africans jobless for a very considerable time into the

future. The Black birth rate in South Africa is approaching three per cent per annum, and already more than half of all Black South Africans are 15 years old and younger. This huge population bulge of millions of young people moving towards the market place, is going to create almost insoluble problems for whatever government rules South Africa. I am therefore aware that the development of an informal economy, and the development of self-help, schemes is vital for our future. I am also aware that the growth rate of the informal economy rises and falls as the growth rate of the formal economy rises and falls. Western governments should understand that the cause for which we all struggle for in South Africa demands the maximisation of the West's input into the South African economy. Millions of people now, and future generations, will benefit from a vast inflow of capital into South Africa, and the inflow of new technology and managerial skills which will come with it.

I believe that in part President Reagan's policy of constructive engagement holds some promise for South Africa, because it is objective-orientated. Slamming down the equivalent of an iron curtain between the West and South Africa, is not helpful to the causes I serve. If you, Madam Prime Minister, and other Western leaders, were to direct your opposition to apartheid and to seek to bring the State President to the point where he can make a declaration of intent which leaders like myself could co-sign with him, you will achieve something of historic significance.

I isolate the State President's unwillingness to make such a declaration of intent as by far the most negative aspect of his whole political career and his current leadership of the country. I have been pleading with Mr. P.W. Botha to make a declaration of intent since he first took office as Prime Minister. Until he declares his willingness to negotiate about the future with Blacks on terms they can accept - and which Whites will also accept - there is no hope of breaking the upward spiral of violence. For many years I have been loathe to put pen to paper and draft such a declaration of intent because ideally it should have come as a product of goodwill amongst Black and White leaders to enable them to get round a conference table. Because, however, the State President has so finally and clearly stated that he is not prepared to talk about one South Africa, I had reluctantly to succumb to pressures on me to draft such a declaration of intent. I have done so in order to produce a discussion document and to give content to the notion of a declaration of intent which could be debated and if necessary amended for acceptance. It reads as follows:

DECLARATION OF INTENT

We the undersigned hereby declare our commitment to serve God in obedience to His divine will for our country and together:

Recognise that:

- The history of mankind shows the need for adaptive change among all peoples and all nations.
- Nations grow in wisdom.
- Both mistakes and lessons not yet learned led to errors of judgement in the mainstream politics in both the Black and White sections of our society.
- The South African people are a family of mankind, seeking to live in harmony in the African community of nations and seeking to do so by expressing civilised ideals in the practical social, economic and political affairs of our country.
- The South African constitution as it is now written is by force of history and reality a first step in constitutional reform which urgently needs the second step to be taken of enriching the constitution to make it as acceptable to the broad mass of African opinion as it has been made acceptable to the broad mass of White opinion.
- The Westminster model of government was not ordained by God to be the only form of good government.

We therefore accept:

- The need to make the preamble to the South African constitution of equal value to all the groups and peoples of the country by enriching the clause: "To respect, to further and to protect the self-determination of population groups and peoples" to include the notion that this can best be done by sharing power in such a way that no one group can dictate to any other group how to express its own self-determination.
- The need to preserve the constitutionality of the adaptive democratic process on which we will jointly rely in being subservient to the divine will for our country.

We will therefore together seek:

- To negotiate as leaders to amend the South African constitution to make it acceptable to all groups.

- To find an alternative political system to that which the world at large understands by the word 'apartheid' and also to seek an alternative political system in which universal adult suffrage is expressed in constitutional terms acceptable to all the peoples of South Africa.
- To use the opportunities presented in practical politics at first, second and third tier levels of government to fashion national unity by deepening the democratic process, and to use the democratic process in explorations of what needs to be done to get the people to legitimise the instruments of government.

We therefore pledge ourselves:

- To express national pride and patriotism by insisting that South Africans will decide South Africa's future in the acceptance of each other as individuals and groups and the acceptance of each other's cultural rights to be who they are.
- To start where we find ourselves in history and to move from there to build on all that is positive and valuable and to change that which is negative and undesirable.
- Each to work in our own constituencies to develop a South African pride in managing our own South African affairs in harmony with internationally accepted standards of civilised decency without being dictated to from without.

Having thus declared we stand together to defend our right even with our lives to take the steps and the time needed to establish consensus between groups and to win support for our joint efforts in the South African family of nations.

And furthermore to stand together to defend South Africa from external onslaughts and to stand together to resist any use of violence which threatens the politics of negotiation aimed at national reconciliation.

It is my carefully considered judgement that all Black leaders committed to the politics of negotiation could sell such a declaration of intent to their supporters, and I am totally convinced that Mr. P.W. Botha could in fact sell this declaration

of intent to the White South African electorate. I ask you, Madam Prime Minister, to examine this declaration of intent, and I would find it a most valuable contribution if you would find it possible to endorse the kind of endeavours within which I found it necessary to draft the declaration. I am seeking to establish points of consensus across Black/White political chasms in South Africa. I believe it is the kind of document which, if signed by the State President, would make the West believe that he is serious about leading South Africa to reform. I am, Madam Prime Minister, not asking for an endorsement by your Government of this specific wording of a declaration of intent that is now needed. I am simply asking that the British encourage the emergence of a consensus document, as a compromise consensus document, which could be accepted by all population groups and which would encourage the West to believe that there is hope for the future.

MEMORANDUM PRESENTED TO THE MOST REVEREND AND RIGHT
HONOURABLE ROBERT RUNCIE, PC, MC, DD, 102ND ARCHBISHOP OF
CANTERBURY AND PRIMATE OF ALL ENGLAND AND METROPOLITAN

By Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi
Chief Minister of Kwazulu, President of Inkatha
and Chairman of The South African Black Alliance

LAMBETH PALACE

30TH JULY 1985

I deeply regret not being able to meet with you, my Lord Archbishop, the last time I was in England and I am most grateful for the opportunity of doing so today. As an Anglican I have longed to share my hopes and fears for my country with you, Your Grace, and I have long hoped for an opportunity to hear what your wisdom is for the kind of circumstances in which I exercise my role as a Black leader in the South African struggle for liberation.

When travelling abroad, I have often found myself in discussions with those who cannot understand why Blacks who have suffered so terribly under the yoke of apartheid are not drawn together in common cause by their shared political, social and economic deprivation. They do not understand that the intensity of suffering, and the anger which flows from it, heightens political debate among Blacks, and deepens differences of opinion and dramatises these differences in opposing political action. Blacks in South Africa who are politically involved have deep convictions about the merits of the various courses of action open to them. There are courses of action about life and death issues, and because there is so much at stake and because there is no consensus about what could and should be done, every dispute about alternative objectives, and every dispute about alternative tactics and strategies is intensified. Also, because every action of a political nature aimed at bringing about radical change is put under police surveillance, all Black leaders in the struggle for liberation experience one or another form of intimidation. Only those who believe fervently in what they are doing find the strength and resolve to carry on. The leadership which does rise up to meet oppression and to defy intimidation, is only found among those who have a single-minded purposefulness which is not always an asset for debate and the politics of reconciliation.

Not only are there stark issues to be faced in life and death issues in a complex situation in which there is little consensus about what could and should be done, but action on the part of the state continually disrupts the democratic process by which people select their leaders and exercise choices among options. The jailing and detention of leaders and the intimidation and the

banning of organisations destroys the whole process by which people eventually get together in positions in which there is a multitude of choices.

Action by successive National Party governments over the last 37 years has so disrupted the democratic process for so long in South Africa, that I fear for the future. This fear has driven me to be intensely democratic in my own approach, and has led me to do everything in my power to make Inkatha a democratic organisation.

After the banning of the ANC and PAC in 1961, there was widely felt despair in South Africa about the merits of constituency politics and the utility of membership-based organisations. After the massive crackdown and the jailing of hundreds of Black leaders, those who escaped the net either went underground or fled the country to act as leaders in exile. And it was only in the mid-1970's that the perceived failure of underground leadership and leadership in exile led ordinary Black South Africans to once again demand visible political organisations. It was in the years of the early seventies that both Inkatha and the Black People's Convention emerged to fill the vacuum which had been created by police brutality.

I established Inkatha to pursue the hallowed aims and objectives of the old ANC which was founded in 1912, but the Black People's Convention was established as a protest political movement which was not membership-based and this duality in Black politics has persisted ever since. Inkatha remains today the only membership-based Black political movement in the country.

That Black South Africans feel the need for a democratic membership-based organisation is shown by the fact that in the short space of ten years, Inkatha has grown to have a card-carrying membership of over one million people. It is, Your Grace, significant that when you look at the growth pattern of Inkatha, you find that its growth surges forward a space of time after protest politics has produced confrontations and violence which have been crushed by the police, and which leaves people counting the cost in terms of lives and property, and to assess these costs against gains made. During the 1976-77 period of violent unrest in South Africa, when Inkatha was but a year old, a great many friends warned me that I should abandon what I am doing because Inkatha had no future in an angry South Africa which demanded immediate political action for immediate gain. I was again and again told that if I was to survive as a political leader, I would have to relinquish my position as Chief Minister of KwaZulu and would have to join in with other leaders in the protest movement. It was during 1977-78 that Inkatha doubled its membership and this pattern of upward surges of Inkatha membership which has been evidenced ever since, after violent confrontations which did not achieve

anything.

Black people yearn to be organised politically. They yearn for viable political structures within which to act and they yearn for the opportunity of meaningful participation in the decision-making process in their country. All Inkatha's policies, all its tactics and strategies, and all its leaders are decided upon by the Movement's Annual General Conference which is the supreme body of Inkatha. I have been elected as President of Inkatha and each and every year I have to make myself accountable to the Annual General Conferences of Inkatha, and I lay before the people that which I have done, and I inform them of the stances I have taken. The current South African position is debated; tactics and strategies are reviewed and Inkatha's leadership is given a fresh mandate within which to act. I adopt no stance, either at home or abroad, which is not dictated by Inkatha's mass membership. Not only do I work strictly within the confines of the mandate I receive from Inkatha's members, but I test Inkatha's thinking at mass meetings in numerous parts of the country. No policy decision and none of Inkatha's tactics and strategies, and none of the positions it has adopted are untested in mass meetings, even in a place like Soweto in South Africa's industrial heartland.

It is therefore with a solid Black mandate, my Lord Archbishop, that I say that Black South Africa's first option is an option to pursue non-violent, democratic tactics and strategies in opposition to apartheid. Black South Africans are aware of the fact that the ANC's Mission-in-Exile has been pursuing an armed struggle for 25 years without any tangible evidence that they will ever succeed. Black South Africa is aware that the South African Government commands the mightiest police and army force on the continent of Africa and that it would not hesitate to use its full might, both within the country and across the length and breadth of Southern Africa. Black South Africans are aware that there is no area in South Africa which can be turned into liberated zones, and they are aware of the immense logistic problems which those who are committed to the armed struggle are faced with.

The fact that the majority of Black South Africans would only turn to violence if all else failed has always given me the courage to continue in my pursuit of non-violent solutions. As a Christian, I am deeply convinced that while in certain circumstances just wars may be fought, although I myself am incapable of defining those circumstances, my deepest conviction is that while there is as yet one stone left unturned in the pursuit of non-violent tactics and strategies, there is no Christian justification for the pursuit of objectives through violence. The fact that Inkatha, as a membership-based democratic organisation, has accumulated the massive support it has, justifies the statements I have just made. It is just not true that it is not possible to pursue aims and

objectives through non-violent tactics and strategies.

I am in daily contact with South Africa's suffering Black masses. Every day I am made intimately and deeply aware of Black suffering and the anguish it produces. I am deeply aware of the anger which has been generated by this suffering and as much as anybody else in the country, I understand the forces which are generating violent reactions to apartheid. For me you cannot claim that the Church has failed to be correctly involved in the process of bringing about change and in the same breath justify the violence which is consequent on that failure in theological terms. While there is one thing as yet left undone by the Church; if there is as yet one area in which the Church has under-achieved, and if there is but one thing the Church has left undone, there is for me no theological justification for violence.

There can be no just war as an easy out for the Churches. I have no problem in accepting that some churchmen feel constrained by their conscience and convictions to involve themselves in violence. I understand that God is with the oppressed and in an unjust war Christ is equally present on both sides of the firing lines. Those who feel personally constrained to support violence in South Africa should add courage to their convictions and cross the lines to administer to people in insurgent camps. They should venture out into the world and persuade international Christendom to support violence. For me there is something hypocritically dishonest about unstated commitments to violence and about conferring and negotiating with agents of violence beyond the sight and hearing of ordinary congregations. The Church's witness must be an open witness and if there is a partnership between some of our churchmen and, for example, the ANC's Mission-in-Exile, then that partnership must be an open and proclaimed partnership which is stripped of the hypocrisy which talks in terms of distinguishing between the spiritual needs of insurgents and the intent to kill for political purposes which directs them.

The Anglican Church in a particular sense has an historic role to play in South Africa. While the Church of the Province of South Africa is guided by God Almighty as a separate entity, it is nevertheless true that it has historic links with the British which in the Act of Union established apartheid South Africa after having ruled here as a colonial power. I think of such great historic figures as our Bishop Colenso. I think of other leading Christians such as Archbishop Clayton, Archbishop Joost de Blank, Dean French-Beytiah, Canon Collins, Bishop Trevor Huddleston and Bishop Colin Winter, to illustrate the point I am making.

I am not saying that Anglicans have privileged access to the reconciling powers of God, but I do say that all denominations have a living history of their commitment to justice and peace and the

Anglican commitment to justice and peace has for me a particular meaning.

Violence is spiralling upwards and in the current spiralling violence, we are witnessing evil faces of violence which were somewhat hidden before. There have been previous upsurges of violence in South Africa and, God forbid, I think we must be realistic and say that the current upswing of violence will not be the last. Violence will continue escalating until Blacks and Whites are reconciled one to the other, and Blacks and Blacks are reconciled to each other about Black/White relationships in South Africa. This reconciliation will only take place within a political framework which moves this country steadily towards becoming a just society.

We had an outburst of violence in the late fifties and we had another outburst of violence after June 16 1976. We are now living through a third explosion of Black violence. When one looks at the nature of these violent explosions one can discern a deepening ugliness in them. The violence of 1976 was a tone uglier than the violence of the late fifties. The violence we see now however, whether it be violence in Black/Black confrontations or whether it be violence in Black/White confrontations, is a great deal more than a tone uglier than the violence of 1976. As violence escalates the horror of it deepens. It is as though the bells of warning are pealing louder as time passes. Christians in South Africa need to hear these warnings and to recognise that the Church has a role to play in bringing to an end the use of violence for political purposes.

I am as aware as most that the question of violence has given rise to vexed theological and moral debate. I do not believe that one can make simplistic statements about it as a Christian. I myself deeply understand how Blacks so lose hope and so lose faith in the politics of negotiation and are so outraged by apartheid and so compassionate for their fellow Black South Africans, that they abandon the ways of peace and seek retribution through violence. I understand how Black South Africans' breasts are boiling with anger and with injustice. No matter how much I myself am totally committed to non-violence, I have an understanding compassion for those who no longer have the courage to pursue non-violent means of bringing about change and seek the easier option to hand of becoming violent.

I am aware that there is a body of theological opinion in Christendom which is beginning to look at violence as a necessary instrument of God in bringing about the downfall of unjust governments. The recent call by the Western Cape region of the South African Council of Churches for Christians to pray for the downfall of the Government on June 16th bears me out. As a

Christian, however, I remain totally convinced that if ever violence in this country is to be judged as just retributive violence, that judgement could only be made after every stone of non-violent action has been turned over, and after every Christian act of reconciliation has failed.

We certainly cannot say at this point in time that the Church has failed despite having turned over every stone. There are a great many stones yet to be turned over. There is still profound hope, born out of Christian commitment in my heart, that while we may be failing, we have not yet finally failed. There are things to do which we must do, which we and others before us have failed to do.

It is, Your Grace, in the context of this thinking that I have been so dismayed to find that the forces working for violent confrontation in South Africa, are so often rewarded with Christian acclaim in the Western world, while those of us struggling on the ground to salvage our country from a consuming fire of violence, and who are pursuing aims and objectives by popular Black demand, are stigmatized as sell-outs because we speak against the employment of violence and other tactics and strategies with which they are associated. Inkatha has received no encouragement from the British Council of Churches for the role it has played in fighting apartheid in arenas where other Black organisations have not dared venture. I am speaking here of the political differences between those who deny any possibility that constituency politics attempting to penetrate the institutional life of South Africa is anything other than collaboration. Non-participation as a principle leads to confronting apartheid society from without, and is the domain of those who employ violence. I believe that there is an urgent need now for international Christian agencies to look carefully at the implications of non-participation and to make assessments of the extent to which the Church in any society must necessarily be a participant in the institutions of that society if the spirit of Christ is to be spread across the fabric of society to work within it.

There may be times in a nation's history when denominational churches will stand aside for a confessional church to emerge, but I believe it is dangerous thinking to talk of a confessional church in South Africa today. It is only when the Church has done everything the Church could and should do that we can think in terms of abandoning working from within the Church to make the Church relevant to the process of liberation.

Your Grace, I share these few thoughts with you as a Christian perplexed by Western Christendom, but yearning for the fellowship of the Church.

MEMORANDUM FOR PRESENTATION TO SIR GEOFFREY HOWE,
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY
BY MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU, PRESIDENT OF
INKATHA AND CHAIRMAN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN BLACK ALLIANCE
LONDON. 2ND AUGUST 1985.

There has been a dramatic upward spiralling of violence in South Africa during the last year. Its spread and intensity has been such that the State President has deemed it necessary to declare a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts which have a combined population of over eight million people. The South African Government has a vast range of powers available to it without having to declare a state of emergency, and the fact that this has now been done at a time when the Government perceived a need to appease Western Governments, is one indication of the levels to which violence has risen. I would like, Mr. Secretary Sir, to take this opportunity of expressing a Black South African point of view about the circumstances in which there has been this escalation of violence.

Lawlessness and violence characterise people who suffer mass poverty and oppression wherever they are found. In part, the violence we are witnessing in South Africa today, is the kind of violence one could expect to emerge in Black South Africa at times in which there is a downturn of the economy, resulting massive retrenchment programmes across a number of industries, and at a time in which rising unemployment coincide with dramatic increases in the costs of the essentials of family life. In South Africa poverty is concentrated in Black townships and in Black rural areas, and experienced and perceived deprivation give rise to contagious anger. The fact that mob violence has given rise to the widespread destruction and looting of shops in Black areas is an indication of the extent to which poverty is one of the underlying causes of the violence we are not witnessing. Violent mob behaviour is rewarded with food, clothing and liquor.

It would, however, be a totally false analysis which traces poverty as a fundamental cause of the kind of violence we are witnessing. Poverty produces the circumstances in which violence is more prone to emerge, but the violence which we are now witnessing in South Africa is more directly traced to political anger and people being prey to those who encourage anger to erupt in violence for political purposes.

The West perhaps under-assesses the extent to which the use by Blacks of violence for political purposes is a concomitant of South Africa's new constitution and the Tricameral Parliament which has

in practical terms denationalised 22 million people and given constitutional expression to White claims to 87 per cent of the surface area of South Africa and therefore over its wealth, its fiscal policy and its domestic and foreign policy. Under the previous Westminster-type constitution, Blacks could aspire to the vote. Now, however, Blacks have to aspire to the re-writing of the constitution and the pendulum has thus swung further towards revolutionary options.

When the South African Government first announced the new constitution and there was a massive White endorsement for it, many Western observers saw this as a small step in the right direction because it included Coloured and Indian people as junior partners in the Government of the country. This they saw as the introduction of a new principle which they saw as a possible first step of the South African Government in moving away from exclusive White control. Some Western Governments expressed cautious optimism and the South African Government was left with the impression that it had bought time in which to make the kind of adjustments that it was prepared to make. In actual fact, the introduction of the new constitution has bought time for forces working towards the violent overthrow of the Government and dramatically shortened the time available to the South African Government within which to bring about reform.

I have no doubt at all that the National Party's break with many of its hitherto sacrosanct policy principles is highly significant for the future of the country. There is no doubt at all that the State President has accepted the need for reform and as a Black South African, I can say with conviction that there is no doubt at all that White South Africa is now more open to support reformist Government policies than it has ever been before. I have also no doubt that what reforms have been introduced are personally meaningful to millions of ordinary Black South Africans. The granting of freehold title rights to Blacks in urban areas; the increased mobility of Black workers who qualify to remain in urban areas; the recognition by the Government that its homeland policy has failed, and clear statements that Blacks in large numbers in so-called White urban areas are not only necessary but also desirable, are all meaningful to ordinary Black South Africans.

The voice of banking, mining, commerce and industry is a voice talking of the need for reform and while there remains a hard core of White right-wingers seeking to perpetuate White racist domination, opinion formers in White society recognise the need for reform.

Ironically, it is this Black perceived readiness on the part of Whites to move towards reform that has heightened Black expectations and dramatised the gross disparity between the aims of

the new constitution and talk of reform. Throughout the world, radical change has proved difficult to manage and the State President has to face this fact in South Africa. It is imperative that he faces the fact squarely and moves boldly towards power-sharing between Black and White.

Whatever economic factors underlie Black unrest in South Africa, the upward spiralling of violence is generated by political factors and will only be broken once Blacks perceive the South African Government as moving towards reforms which include steps towards the sharing of power. The State President has in no single utterance indicated that White South Africa is prepared to share power with Blacks. He confuses the division of power with the sharing of power. His vision is one in which Whites, who comprise something like 20 per cent of the total population of the country, will continue to occupy 87 per cent of the surface area of the land as their domain, and will continue to exercise final political control in it. The State President is prepared to divide power only in the sense that this entrenched White final power in 87 per cent of the country will concede the need to handle matters of common concern between Black and White states or councils in consultative machinery. He still today talks about a confederal future between so-called White South Africa on the one hand, and ten so-called homelands on the other hand, together with a number of as yet undefined intermediary political forums for Blacks in urban areas.

The State President has made it absolutely clear that those who read his statements about the Government's reform intentions as sharing power within the normal meaning of those words, is false. He has stated categorically that he is not prepared to entertain the notion of a one-man-one-vote system of government in a unitary state, nor is he prepared to entertain the notion of a single South Africa within the formula of a federal union. Any statement Mr. P.W. Botha makes now about reform will have no credibility in Black South Africa and should have no credibility in the West.

Politics in South Africa at core will remain gyrating around the central issue of power-sharing in a unified state. Whether that state be characterised by a unitary system of government, or whether it be characterised by a federal system of government, is a matter which can be negotiated. But what is for every relevant Black political group non-negotiable, is our insistence as Blacks that South Africa is one country, with one population, which history has decreed will share one destiny. For me and millions of other Blacks, politics has no meaning unless it is moving the country towards political, social and economic expressions of these non-negotiables. Black anger will continue to be stimulated by the persistent refusal of the National Party to proclaim their willingness to talk about a shared future.

It is so terribly tragic that the fluidity which is in fact there in South Africa is not being turned to advantage by the State President, and there are tragic indications that he will continue to under-achieve in that which he promised the world he will succeed in. There is now a total White dependence on Blacks and a reciprocal Black dependence on Whites, and it is this interdependence, perceived by both Black and White as never before, which is opening up real prospects for the politics of negotiation to succeed. The National Party Government is standing between Black and White South Africa, inhibiting in what could become an epoch-making decade of endeavour, borne out of goodwill and borne out of a realisation that Black and White South Africans have now to come to terms with the need to live with each other, constitutionally, economically and socially.

I have always refused to have anything to do with moves which give political recognition to White claims to a monopoly of power in 87 per cent of the country. When the State President first formed the President's Council to work on the blue-print of what is now the country's constitution, he sought to establish a Black Advisory Council which would be party to his constitutional manipulations. I refused to have anything to do with that Council, and my non-participation in fact made it impossible for him to get it off the ground. When the new constitution was put to the White electorate in a Referendum in 1983, I campaigned vigorously against it across the length and breadth of the country, and warned White South Africa that it was a prescription for the kind of violence which we are now witnessing. When the new constitution was made a reality, I refused to have anything to do with the Special Cabinet Committee which was established to investigate the development of Black political rights within the framework of the new constitution. This year the State President announced the establishment of an informal non-statutory negotiating forum within which he hoped to consult with Blacks about political developments within the four corners of apartheid. I have met the State President formally only once during the last four and a half years, and I could have left him in no doubt as to where I stood politically. After his rejection of South Africa as a single state, I said publicly that I have nothing left to discuss with the State President. An impasse has been reached which at this point in time would appear to be unbridgeable.

I have said again and again that constitutional reform must commence with looking at realities around us. There can and will be no Utopian leap into the future, and if we are to avoid a bloody racist confrontation in South Africa to which present levels of violence are leading us, we must accept the need for the politics of negotiation in which there are compromises on all sides. It is for us a matter of war or compromise. If it is war, it will be the

kind of war which leads to scorched earth policies on both sides, in which there will be no winners. If it is compromise, it will lead to a difficult road ahead in which there is at least some hope that Blacks and Whites will be able to find each other.

I have said that I am prepared temporarily to shelve my cherished ideal of one-man-one-vote in a unitary state, if Whites are prepared to sit down with Blacks and look at alternatives, and to examine the merits of federal or other solutions. There is a vast amount of Black goodwill which could still be mobilised to support compromise solutions and there is the equivalent goodwill amongst Whites.

One of the very harsh realities which Western Governments must accept has emerged in South Africa, is that the politics of negotiation are now no longer only threatened by the National Party. Ever-increasingly the politics of negotiation are being threatened by Black political groups, led by the ANC's Mission-in-Exile, who have no interest in compromises and who are seeking only a bloody and violent showdown in South Africa. Now that there is greater fluidity in the country; now that there is very widespread White recognition for the need for reform, and now while there is substantial Black goodwill which would support compromise solutions, the politics of negotiation could possibly lead to really meaningful change. This constitutes a very fundamental threat to those who seek to bring about change through violent revolution. The closer we come to compromise solutions, or even the closer we come to working meaningfully towards them, the more revolutionary ideologists feel threatened. Black revolutionary politics has turned to attempting to destroy the prospects of a negotiated future as much as it is attempting to oppose apartheid and racial domination. Blacks have turned to killing Blacks for political purposes and the ANC's Mission-in-Exile has encouraged internicine Black strife in the hope of destroying the negotiating bases of Black leaders who are capable of mobilising the kind of negotiating powers which would bring Whites to the negotiating table. In a very real sense the first phases of civil war have begun.

There can be no reform in states of anarchy and there can be no reform while the South African Government relies on the horrendous Draconian measures available to the State President once he has declared a state of emergency. The upward spiralling of violence in our Black townships, and the upward spiralling of Government violence in opposition to this violence, work to negate everything working towards the definition of compromises which would be acceptable to both Black and White.

The fact that the sentiments which I am expressing today, Sir, are sentiments supported by millions of Black South Africans, is

demonstrated by the fact that Inkatha has now over a million paid-up members. This makes it by far the largest Black political constituency ever to have been formed in the history of the country. Every political scientist knows that a political party can do no more than enrol but a proportion of potential members, and that for every card-carrying member of a political party, there are two or three supporters, and even more sympathisers. That the politics of negotiation is still possible, and that there is sufficient Black goodwill to back up leaders who are seeking compromise solutions, is illustrated by the massive support Inkatha enjoys.

There are other points of view than mine. There are political organisations which differ with Inkatha, but the voice of Inkatha must be heard by the West, not only because it is a de facto massive force, but because its aims and objectives embody aspirations and sentiments which are entirely commensurate with the best that Western democratic philosophy contains. Inkatha is not in politics to acquire power at all costs. In fact, I have chosen what has at times been controversial courses of action because my supporters demand that I do so. I am vehemently attacked by those who work within the philosophy of political violence. Inkatha refuses to do anything now which will destroy the tender hope of the politics of negotiation coming into its own; and it will do nothing now which destroys the prospects of reconstructing South Africa as an open, race-free democracy in the future. Inkatha will do nothing now by way of tactics and strategies which destroy the economic growth base of the country, because without vigorous continued growth of the country's central economy, mass poverty will continue to spread and present all future governments with insoluble problems. Inkatha recognises that South Africa has been locked by history into a north/south axis, and that the destiny of South Africa is a destiny which places it in the community of nations within the sphere of Western industrialised countries.

I believe that Western Governments should now do whatever they can do to strengthen the arm of those who are committed to the politics of negotiation, and I believe that Britain in particular has an international responsibility to do this. Britain withdrew from its colonial control over African countries, and in withdrawing, it did not abandon the people to whatever fate awaited them. British aid to the countries it had granted freedom was significant. Britain did not wash its hands of its previous colonial territories, and say: There you are, you wanted freedom, now get on with it. Britain has remained involved in what was previously colonial Africa. Perhaps Britain could have done more, and perhaps she could have done better than that which she did do, but for me the fact remains that it is to the credit of Great Britain that she did what she thought she could do to assist newly independent states reap more than political benefits from their independence. It is

the example of Great Britain in South Africa which I believe has stimulated the United States, as the leading industrial country in the West, into accepting a greater responsibility to do something to aid the Black South Africa. British aid is desperately needed in South Africa to strengthen the hand of those who work towards the politics of negotiation and the diplomatic prowess of Great Britain is desperately not only needed on the interface between Black and White in South Africa, but even more desperately needed on the interface between South Africa and the outside world.

I say this notwithstanding the fact that we highly appreciate the example which Britain, as our coloniser, has set by giving a limited amount of humanitarian aid to Black South Africa. I praise what Great Britain has done which has been emulated by the United States Administration. I wish that Western countries followed the British and the American example, for it is only in adopting a multi-strategy approach, as I have suggested, that they can stimulate and promote the process of change in South Africa.

I support constructive investment in South Africa because I believe that we should never conduct our liberation struggle in such a way that we destroy the foundations for the future in the process of doing so. It is a fact that for too long foreign investment has been exploitative in South Africa. The expose which was published in the British press about this exploitation pricked the consciences of the private sector, including those of captains of British industries. The authoring of Employment Codes was a product of this. I believe that it is much more important to ensure that signatories to these Codes do not cheat, than to pursue disinvestment. I have never suggested that investors must come to South Africa to exploit my people. I support conditional investment as I have always done. This is about the only leverage which foreign countries with investments have that they can use in order to influence the situation in South Africa.

With the recent establishment of trade unions for Blacks, our people are getting their economic muscle developed which I believe they will use not only to negotiate on the factory floor, but also to force White South Africa to negotiate with Black South Africa even about a shared future.

The interdependence between Blacks and Whites is increasing rather than diminishing. I believe that a negotiated future is possible purely because of this interdependence as well as the increasing dependence of the economy on Blacks. That is why I appreciated so much the attitude which Great Britain adopted in the Security Council debate last week on the proposed sanctions on South Africa. We as victims of apartheid would love to see White South Africa being forced to change. We have, however, grown to regard mere symbolic gestures which do not dent the granite apartheid wall with

a lot of skepticism. The Rhodesian experience, where so much cheating was done by the West and Russia (on chrome) is still too vivid in our minds. The South African economy with the measure of self-sufficiency it has reached, can survive for much longer than the Rhodesian economy did. We do not mind suffering for our freedom, but the people from my constituency have convinced me that they are not willing to suffer futilely for no returns. That is why we place so much faith in British diplomatic prowess in the interface that needs to take place between Black and White in South Africa.



KWAZULU

MINISTRY OF THE CHIEF MINISTER,
~~FINANCE~~, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
AND POLICE.

Private Bag X01
Ulundi
3838

~~X~~ STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

19th November 1984

The State President
Private Bag X83
Pretoria 0001

Mr. President,

As I took my pen to draft this letter to you, Mr. State President, I became poignantly aware how vital it is for you and I to be able to share thoughts about the South Africa we both love so much and attempt so earnestly to serve. I am mindful this morning of the slaying of Piet Retief by King Dingane. I am mindful of Blood River. I am mindful of the Boer participation in the Zulu strife which led to the defeat of King Dingane and the enthronement of King Mpande. I remember Boer attempts to establish Republics in Zulu domains. I remember the Boer dealings with the Swazis to limit the Zulu sphere of influence. I remember the encroachment of the South African Republic eastwards which led to the permanent alienation of Zulu people from large tracts of their land. I remember a century of blood and strife which characterised the relationship between your people and my people.

The memory of these things urges me to hope for reconciliation between your people and my people - not the reconciliation of alien people who recognise the need for the cessation of hostilities, but the kind of reconciliation which joins the full might of your people and my people as South Africans in conquests over present and future adversity.

I am writing to you, Mr. State President, privately on the eve of our informal discussions in Stellenbosch in a bold and historic attempt to share my inner thoughts privately with you, in the secure knowledge that you will read this letter and honour it as a confidential approach to you on issues which matter so very much for South Africa. We have met before, Sir, but we now meet in the knowledge that our discussions are closed and that we can sit down with each other in the presence of Christ to discover the real meaning of reconciliation which our country so urgently needs.

Mr. State President, I have never in my life indulged in double-dealing. I have never had private discussions with your predecessors and their colleagues behind my people's back, to say one thing in private and then to turn and say another thing in public. That is why I have always tabled aide memoire or memoranda for discussion which I have always felt free to publish as my document. This letter does not fall into that category and I am writing to you with the intention of sending it by hand to Dr. Anton Rupert for transmission to you, so that when we do meet, the precious time that will be available to us can be spent against what I hope will be a background of intimate knowledge about where I stand.

You are an older man than I am, Sir, and you have spent more years in politics than I have, but in the time that I have been in politics - that is virtually all my adult life - I have come to understand and accept the constraints under which important political leaders need to make public pronouncements. I think, Sir, I am aware of the restraints which surround you and how they may have prohibited you from talking about future Black/White political relationships in this country. Both your and my public pronouncements drive us apart to occupy hostile political camps. The political traditions of your people have rejected Black/White power-sharing and aspired to put Afrikaners first and also to put White South Africa in an unassailable position of political power in which political developments for Blacks could be dictated to them to suit White interests.

The political traditions of my people have sought a one-man-one-vote solution in a unitary State to this country's problems, and I must be honest and say that this political tradition envisages a majority government, which will necessarily be Black, ruling over a country in which Whites will have to toe the line as a minority group in a multi-racial State with no group safeguards. I believe that reality now confronts both your people and my people, and for the sake of both our peoples, and for the sake of South Africa, we need to move from these polar positions from which only strife, turmoil and the destruction of South Africa can flow.

I have ventured forth from hard-line Black political thinking, and I now say publicly to my people that they will have to think about abandoning their one-man-one-vote ideal and that they will have to seek political solutions through the politics of compromise and negotiation which will have to be as acceptable to Whites as they are to Blacks. I have done so not because I have ceased to believe that a one-man-one-vote solution in a unitary state could lead to a fair and just society, but because I perceived that Whites could adopt a scorched earth policy before entrusting their future, and the future of their children, to a Black majority government in which there are no effectively entrenched minority group rights.

This suggestion to move away from Black cherished political ideals has cost me very dearly. It has divided Black brother from Black brother. It has alienated me from so many whom history will yet show should be my allies. I have been spurned by the people I admire. I have been denigrated and villified and I live under threats to my life which are very real because I grasp reality and accept the need to walk out in a position of open vulnerability for the sake of South Africa.

As I do this, I do so in the final rejection of the kind of future which is foretold by the new constitution and the National Party's present insistence on moving towards a confederal future. I hope, Sir, that in the privacy of a sharing discussion, you will be able to assure me that the National Party's present position reflects a current compromise between divergent elements in Afrikanerdom more than it reflects the limits of your own commitments to the future. I cannot see how we can avoid tragedy if this country's White minority continues to insist on perpetuating the dominance of their political decision-making in 87 per cent of South Africa. Dr. Koornhof has again and again urged me to accept your role as a true reformer, and I long to hear something about a future you see beyond South Africa's present constitutional horizons.

We both place national reconciliation as our highest priority, and as a pragmatist, I believe that there will be no national reconciliation without Afrikaners and Zulus striving for it together. We have a history of conflict, and even enmity, which only we can resolve. Between us we share the power to salvage this country from turmoil. You Mr. President are the most powerful man in Africa. Your Government commands power and resources which puts you in a position in which you are unassailable from onslaughts beyond our borders. The power available to you also puts you in a position to dominate political events inside the country for some considerable time. Yours is the kind of power which could support political tyranny, should you so wish. It is also the kind of power which could step by step bring about real reform.

So many Blacks who see apartheid as tyranny describe the South African Government as an illegitimate regime, and urge their fellow Black South Africans to destroy you and your Government by violent revolution. I accept you, Sir, as my President. I accept your Government as my government, and I like you to see South Africa as a place that needs reform, not destruction. It cost me dearly to hail your elevation to the premiership of this country with a national and international plea for the world not to prejudge you and to give you time to show what you can do. It cost me dearly to recognise

you as my Prime Minister, as I did when you came to Ulundi. It has cost me dearly to condemn the violence which erupts in our townships from time to time. It has cost me dearly to withhold even indirect support for the armed struggle, and to condemn international quarters working for the isolation of South Africa and the destruction of apartheid through economic sanctions. It has not cost me dearly simply in terms of what people say about me, but it has cost me dearly in terms of Black grass roots support that I have had to forego in my search for national reconciliation within the bounds of reality.

I want to share the thought with you, Mr. President, that I would have no utility to my people, to you, or to South Africa if I did not command at least the political forces which are now at my disposal. I have endangered my utility to you, Mr. President. I have endangered my utility to South Africa by speaking with the voice of reason and by embracing you as my President, and recognising your Government to be my government. I hope that you will be able to see my pronouncements about you and your political programme within this context. That is why this coming meeting of ours is so very important. We are both sons of Africa whom fate has committed to an African future. Your whiteness and my blackness is not seen by the Christ we acclaim, and I long for the reconciliation between us which is made possible by the death of Christ on the cross.

To clear the air for fruitful discussions between you and I, Mr. President, I would like to mark the history of our political relationship with some observations. I have been grieved by you, Mr. President. I have been hurt by you. I have been disappointed and I have been angered, but I have the courage to say so simply. I approached you with an open heart when you first became Prime Minister. My hands were extended in friendship, and I sought with you a Statement of Intent which would recognise our different political positions but which would also give advance knowledge to the world that you and I were committed to reconciliation and to work with each other to dismantle the stumbling blocks in the path of reconciliation. My commitment to reconciliation was such that I submerged myself in a group of other leaders and sought to make my reconciliatory aspirations the aspirations of us all.

After we met you as a group in 1979 and in 1980, we returned to put our heads together to formulate a Statement of Intent which would be our offering to you in the politics of compromise and negotiation. When next we met, you insisted on meeting us as individuals. You denied our common striving and you did so in the knowledge that you had already committed yourself to the establishment of the President's Council which excluded every one of us, and attempted to rationalise that exclusion by creating the Black Advisory Council. This hurt me, Mr. President. I became disillusioned and my public pronouncements, and my adamant refusal to have anything to do with

the Black Advisory Council, expressed things deeply felt in the very soul of my being.

These steps were the preliminary steps you were taking towards leading Whites to accept the new constitution which from a Black point of view was a tragic and retrogressive step. Under the old constitution we were precluded in practice from having a role in Parliament. Under the new constitution we are precluded in principle from doing so. We are denationalised and are not even defined as a population group within the Act. My disappointment, hurt and anger grew as the reality of the new constitution was foisted on us without consultation. I opposed it vehemently; I campaigned for a No vote as a South African concerned about the future of South Africa. You, Mr. President, took umbrage at my participation in the referendum campaign. You, Sir, used the words of my enemies to describe me as a leader created by the Government and you used, Sir, the words of my enemies when you described Inkatha as a Zulu Broederbond. Mr. President, you went beyond this to publicly warn me not to try to instigate violence, as though my desperate and earnest warnings about the political implications of the new constitution were no more than a veiled threat that I myself would lead the violence which I predicted.

We now Mr. President have the kind of violence erupting in our townships which I predicted. In my own immediate domains, Mr. President, there is no violence. I have led KwaZulu and Natal through these difficult days along a non-violent and non-confrontationist path. This, Sir, justifies my deep hurt when you and others, such as the Hon. Mr. Pik Botha, reacted to my warnings about violence. I will leave the meeting we will have with each other, Mr. President, to go to Soweto to condemn the violence which is taking place, and to rally the people behind me in sanity and hope. What I would love beyond all else would be to leave our meeting and go to Soweto in the knowledge that my President and my Government support what I am doing and see me as an ally of justice and hope.

There are times, Mr. President, when national interests demand that one is not coy about oneself. Government political procedures and usages which make me less than the political peer and equal of Dr. Phatudi, Professor Ntsanwisi, Mr. Mabuza, Mr. Mopeli and Mr. Skosana, are deeply misguided, and for me to be put at the end of queues amongst leaders who are ranked in terms of the date in which they accepted Government dictates, I find humiliating and unacceptable to me. According to the policy of your Government, I represent the largest language group in South Africa, Black or White.

I was born to leadership responsibilities. I trace my descent through my mother to the founding fathers of the Zulu Kingdom, and I

trace my descent through my father to a long line of men who have served successive Zulu Kings as advisers, generals and prime ministers. I do not disdain other leaders, but in the affairs of State, I have my own position which is acclaimed by popular support and witnessed to by the Zulu people's insistence that I lead them in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, and by my election to the position of President of Inkatha which is the largest Black political organisation ever formed in the history of this country. I, Mr. President, cannot be coy about the way the Government has treated me and about the lack of its public recognition of the qualities of my leadership.

For you, Mr. President, to write the kind of letter to me that I am writing to you, you would also be able to raise issues which have caused you upset. What I have said has not been said in the manner of shaking a finger in your face. The points I have made, have been made to clear the air so that when we meet, we do so in circumstances most propitious for success. They are also made in the hope that circumstances could emerge following our discussion in which there could be a complete willingness on my part to leave the past to the past and to sit with you, Mr. President, to talk about the present and the future.

I vehemently opposed the new constitution, but it is now a reality and I must necessarily exercise my democratic rights to work for the kind of constitutional reforms which will permit me and millions of my fellow Black South Africans to participate in the decision-making process of our country. We need, Mr. President, to share thoughts on the direction which politics should take to make this possible. You, Sir, as I understand your position, see the present tricameral parliament as being sovereign in 87 per cent of our country. You see Blacks as developing along their own political lines in one or other of the ten national states, and with Blacks outside these national states at present occupying an undefined position which the Special Cabinet Committee is attempting to define.

What you, Sir, and the Special Cabinet Committee have in mind seems to accept the permanence of the tricameral parliament and 87 per cent of the country as its area of sovereignty, and hope for a political dispensation in which Black political structures will relate to this central tricameral parliament through consultative structures in which common interests can be discussed, and in which common problems can be resolved. As I understand the Government's position, the majority of the people living in so-called White South Africa who are Black, together with all other Blacks, will be permanently excluded from the democratic process on which the tricameral parliament rests. This amounts to a permanent alienation of Blacks from the country's mainstream politics. Were I to be party to making this political arrangement work, I would be endorsed

out of national Black politics in a very short space of time. We need, Mr. President, to move away from the need for the employment of the police and the country's other security forces to ensure stability in our Black townships and in our Black/White industrial relations. If I work for that stability, then I must necessarily work for the inclusion of Blacks in the decision-making process which would institutionalise Black political energy, and turn it away from revolutionary tendencies. My participation in Black local councils, or my participation in the Special Cabinet Committee, has thus far been precluded by the extent to which Government is publicly seen to regard them as participating in the endorsement of the denationalisation of Black South Africans.

I need to believe that these difficult constitutional days will pass and that you and your Government will finally accept a political formula in which there is Black/White power-sharing one day when the White electorate will accept a formula which embodies it. I need to believe that elements of the new constitution, which are so totally unacceptable to Black South Africa, are seen by you, Mr. President, as necessary but interim elements which buy you the time to be the kind of reformer which Dr. Koornhof has tried to persuade me you are.

I preach to my people that there is no easy victory in this country for them. I tell them that there are no overnight solutions. I tell them they must balance their political aspirations with their responsibility as South Africans to labour on the economic front and to help create the wealth upon which a just society can be made meaningful to them as citizens. I preach to my constituency that there will be no radical departure from the capitalist idiom of this country's politics. I preach to them that the beautiful socialist future some day-dream about are pipe-dreams. I preach that we are locked in a north/south global axis. I preach that Black South Africans must accept the free enterprise system as being inescapably the best system available to us. In my political commitments I accept all the Western notions of democratic decency. I preach to my people that tolerance and negotiation must replace bitterness and the politics of anger and violence. I strive with everything I have got to prepare my constituency to participate in a negotiated future which will be characterised by justice and the equitable distribution of wealth and political power. Because I am in opposition politics, Mr. President, I know that I can go further than you can go publicly, but I long to hear you say privately that I am not doing all this in vain, and that you value the efforts I am making to increase the prospects of your people negotiating with my people about our common future.

I see the need for consultation between Black leaders and the South African Government. I am not opposed in principle to participation in the deliberations of the Special Cabinet Committee. While,

however, its focus is on ensuring the permanence of the tricameral parliament and the sovereignty of that parliament over 87 per cent of the country of my birth, such a discussion would be fruitless. I have again and again taken public stands which endorse Black participation in anything which promises the possible movement away from the politics of confrontation and which leads to the emergence of a just and stable society. I participate in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. I am not against participation as a Black political strategy. I would gladly participate in Black urban political development and the political development of the national states; and I would gladly participate in negotiations with government at the level of the Special Cabinet Committee, if I was genuinely convinced that I would be furthering the interests of South Africa in doing so.

My own principles and my own perceptions do not permit me to lead KwaZulu into accepting the kind of independence which has been offered to us. My constituency would never permit me to do so, nor would they permit me to throw my full weight behind your Government's current political programme in the hope that one day things may be different. The weight that I have as a Black South African political leader is not being withheld from you, Mr. President, because you are White, because you lead the National Party, because you are an Afrikaner, or because I want one day to establish a Black racist government. There is goodwill in myself, among the Zulu people and among Black South Africans.

There is in us the desire to negotiate and to compromise, and to seek solutions which are mutually acceptable to both Black and White. I, however, have to deal with the broad masses of the people, whereas Mr. Heunis is in a position where he can consult with whom he chooses. I have to take support away from the External Mission of the African National Congress. I have to diminish whatever small support there is for the South African Communist Party. I have to meet the United Democratic Front in our Black townships and in our rural areas to counter the seductiveness of their politics of anger and their willingness to use violence for political purposes. I have to restrain my own youth and to lead them to reject COSAS. I have to counter the poison which comes from AZAPO and AZASM. I have to struggle in rural areas and in the townships to combat misguided Christian radicalism. I have to wage an unceasing battle to keep Black workers out of the clutches of the politically ambitious who would use them for their own purposes. I have to counter SACTU and those political trade unionists who are but fronts for revolutionary forces. Virtually every week I throw my weight behind every attempt to discredit those who want to destroy our country economically. I strive constantly to keep foreign political influences out of Black South African politics. I do all this as a South African who loves his country and who is committed to the same things you are committed to, Mr. President. I yearn for a workable political alliance with you.

When therefore I say I cannot accept the new constitution in its present form; when I say that I was unable to participate in the Black Advisory Council you wanted to establish; when I say I cannot accept independence for KwaZulu; when I say that I cannot participate in the Special Cabinet Committee's deliberations at this point in time, I am not being negative. Were I to do these things, I would be reduced to political impotence, and I would end up being in a position in which I would have no political clout, and I would be of no use to you sometime in the future when the chips are down and when Blacks and Whites will have to stand together to ensure the survival of democratic decency and Western civilised standards and norms. I have no illusions about the future, Mr. President, and I believe both you and I have yet to walk a very difficult road. We may have to walk that road separately for a while, but I pray God that after our meeting, we will be able to walk that road more secure in our trust of each other, and more hopeful of the utility of that trust to our country.

I have a tremendous admiration for you, Mr. President, for the way in which you allow your colleagues to get on with the important work of the State and to be seen to be doing so. I think here of the very great significance of the Nkomati Accord for you, Sir, and the Government. On no single occasion have I ever seen any evidence of you detracting from what the world sees as Mr. Pik Botha's great triumphs. I also have an admiration for him, Sir, because he always casts those triumphs in the light of South African triumphs. This is evidence of colleagues working in a team for the good of their country, entirely lacking in jealousy and entirely subjecting their successes to the good of the country. I plead that this idiom of yours, that this great political maturity you have, be extended to the realms of Black/White politics. I plead, Sir, that if there are any advances, if there is any progress, and if there is any movement which Black South Africans can endorse, that you make it possible for that endorsement to enhance the acceptability of those of us who strive for justice and peace.

I understand the need your Government may feel to enhance its image in the eyes of the world. South Africa is under moral siege. You and your Government spend great energies and devote large resources to combatting the negative image which the world has of South Africa. I can recall no occasions on which the advances which have been made in recent times have been accredited to Black leaders. There have been advances of significance. There have been great strides in this country's industrial relations. There are signs that the country's free enterprise system is being enhanced. The Physical Planning Act is being shelved. The Apprenticeship Act is a thing of the past and Blacks can now aspire to technical training as

artisans. You, Sir, are serious in your attempts to decentralise and it was your initiative given in the Conference of Good Hope which is leading to great strides in endorsing the reality of economic regions crossing apartheid's political boundaries. Blacks in the governments of national states have a freer hand than the enemies of apartheid would ever have dreamed would be the case. I want to convey to you, Mr. President, my great gratitude for that latitude which I have been able to claim so unexpectedly in apartheid South Africa.

Blacks and Whites are increasingly being left to determine their own relationships in places like theatres, parks, beaches and so on. The dismantling of what is called petty apartheid; the desegregation in public transport, and a host of other things are encouraging. These are the things that I and others like me have striven for, yet I must go back to my people after meeting with Government empty-handed, for them to be witness to Government claims that they are the bringers of these gifts. My people want to know what I am doing for them, and I plead with you, Mr. President, that in future you strengthen the hand of responsible Black South African leadership by laying at their door sufficient accolades for the fruits of their labours. I say this not because I am jealous of the accolades others get. I say this as a hard-headed politician. I say that there is a threat to the kind of things I do which comes from the people's perception of just how empty-handed I am when it comes to advances in their daily lives. Mr. President, I hope you see these observations as being politically important. As I strive against political filth; as I face the forces of anarchy; as I contend with those who are purveyors of violence and destruction, I need to take something back to my people as evidence that I am doing something for them, while yet they are not liberated; while yet this country is striving to find a formula for peaceful co-existence, and while yet people like you, Sir, and myself are politically opposed to each other.

Mr. President, this letter is already getting too long, but I must necessarily pray your indulgence a little longer to enable me to make a number of additional points which I sincerely believe will enhance the worthwhileness of our meeting. I would like, Mr. President, to raise the question of White interference in Black politics. If Whites are one day to accept Blacks as politically mature enough, and politically decent enough, to dare share power with them, the necessary sense of trust will have to be developed step by step. White South Africans do look to the north in horror, and become more committed to White racist exclusivity in this country. They are led by Government statement after Government statement into a sense of reliance of the country's security forces to maintain law and order. There is, Mr. President, insufficient endorsement of the good Black political sense which does in fact so dominate. I long for the day when you, Mr. President, and your colleagues in the Cabinet, will trust Black leaders like myself to manage Black South Africa's political affairs.

Mr. President, in all humility, and in all deference to your high position now so enhanced as the country's Executive State President, I would like to suggest that it would be an act of great statesmanship if you released Nelson Mandela and his colleagues from prison. Mr. President, you can trust me to deal with the Mandelas of this world. You can trust Black South Africans to deal with them. A great deal of political bite is given to the kind of forces now attempting to disrupt our townships by Mr. Mandela's continued incarceration in jail. The banning of the ANC and PAC thrust Black South African politics into decades of turmoil from which it has been extremely difficult for me to salvage Black political decency. The real Black political struggle in this country is between Inkatha and the ANC's Mission in Exile. I need my hand strengthened, Mr. President. I need it strengthened by the State I attempt to serve. I need to be freed to fight political evil in my own right. Should the State release Nelson Mandela, there is nothing that we could do, Sir, about which you would not be informed. Surely your Security forces have a proven ability on which you could rely to ensure that Mr. Mandela pursues whatever he may pursue within the ambit of South African law, just as I do. My plea, Mr. President, is a serious plea to release Nelson Mandela. Nothing the State could do would more enhance my power and increase my utility in the struggle for Black democratic decency. When Robert Sobukwe, the then President of PAC, was released, the heavens did not cave in, nor was there any chaos created on his release from incarceration.

Another plea I make, Mr. President, is for you and your Cabinet colleagues to find ways and means of withdrawing total rejection of the Buthelezi Commission findings. I am not naive enough to ask that you, Sir, withdraw what you and your Cabinet colleagues have already said. I ask simply whether it is now not within the bounds of political possibility that your Government recognises that the political scene is now different from what it was in 1980/81. If there are to be future negotiations, do we not now need to start giving evidence that we are prepared to listen to each other, and that sincere efforts by a cross-section of eminent South Africans is not pushed aside as irrelevant to the political thought process. Let there at least be debate between KwaZulu and the South African Government on the merits of the Buthelezi Commission findings. Such debate would not detract, Sir, from your eminence and would greatly assist me to persuade my people to pursue reason in the search for solutions to this country's problems. Could we not debate the relevance or irrelevance of the Buthelezi Commission's findings to the new political dispensation. You, Sir, will be free to reject any or all of its findings, but my plea is that that rejection, should you insist on it, be made after discussions with us about the findings which we so earnestly sought.

I ask, Mr. President, that you read this letter in the spirit in which it is written. Our discussions are to be informal and I hope wide-ranging. It would be a pity if time and circumstances did not permit us to discuss all the points I have raised in this letter to you. I am therefore sending it to you by hand in advance in the hope that it will make our discussions more fruitful.

Respectfully yours,

MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI
CHIEF MINISTER KWAZULU
PRESIDENT OF INKATHA

PRIME MINISTER

CP.

MEETING WITH CHIEF BUTHELEZI

You are seeing both Helen Suzman and Chief Buthelezi tomorrow afternoon.

Chief Buthelezi is here on a private visit. He will have seen the Archbishop of Canterbury and will be going to the Test Match. You will be having dinner with him at Laurens van der Post's home at the weekend.

The purpose of the meeting is to allow you to hear Buthelezi's views on the present situation in South Africa and what Britain can do to help encourage peaceful change. He has addressed a memorandum to you (attached) explaining his thinking. He wants South Africa to be seen as one country with one people and wants President Botha to make a Statement of Intent (also attached) to get talks going with the Black community. He takes the view that indiscriminate economic sanctions would damage South Africa. He will be looking to you to endorse his general approach. You could certainly give public support to the concept of dialogue, although if he tries to establish too many pre-conditions it won't get started.

I sent you earlier in the week the report of the Buthelezi Commission on Natal. I enclose a summary of its recommendations.

C.D.P.

Charles Powell

1 August 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM PRETORIA 311330Z
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 161 OF 31 JULY 1985

INFO ROUTINE JOHANNESBURG

INFO SAVING CAPE TOWN

SOUTH AFRICA: PROSPECTS FOR DIALOGUE

1. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT THEY WISH TO SEE DIALOGUE WITH MODERATE BLACK LEADERS. BUT THEY ARE PLAYING THEIR CARDS CLOSE TO THE CHEST AND SEEM IN NO HURRY TO MAKE ANY FRESH MOVE IN THE PRESENT EMERGENCY.
2. PRESIDENT BOTHA'S REFUSAL TO SEE BISHOP TUTU EXCEPT POSSIBLY AS PART OF A DELEGATION OF CHURCH LEADERS IN 3 WEEKS TIME IS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION NOT TO BE RUSHED OR BE SEEN AS MAKING CONCESSIONS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD VISITORS FROM LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL YESTERDAY (INCLUDING REX COLLINGS FROM THE UK) THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET TUTU AS A CHURCHMAN ALONG WITH OTHER CHURCH LEADERS BUT NOT AS A POLITICAL LEADER.
3. TUTU HIMSELF TOLD ME YESTERDAY AFTERNOON WHEN I SAW HIM WITH CONSUL GENERAL JOHANNESBURG THAT HE WAS SADDENED BY THE PRESIDENT'S NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO HIS REQUEST FOR A MEETING. HE DID NOT YET KNOW WHETHER HE WOULD ACCOMPANY THE ANGLICAN ARCHBISHOP OF CAPE TOWN ON 19 AUGUST. BUT IF THE PRESIDENT'S REMARK ABOUT ONLY SEEING PEOPLE WHO RENOUNCED VIOLENCE AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE WERE TAKEN LITERALLY THEN HE (TUTU) WOULD FEEL UNABLE TO GIVE AN ASSURANCE ABOUT CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, ONE OF THE FEW COURSES STILL OPEN TO BLACKS.
4. IN GENERAL TUTU WAS EXTREMELY CRITICAL OF THE PRESIDENT, WHOM HE CONCLUDED WAS NOT SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN DIALOGUE. IT WAS ALL TO REMINISCENT OF IAN SMITH: A CASE OF NARROWING OPTIONS AND TOO LITTLE TOO LATE. TUTU WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE BELIEVED BRITISH AND UNITED STATES POLICIES WERE FELT AS A DEEP HURT BY BLACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA. IN HIS VIEW WE WERE MOTIVATED PRIMARILY BY SELF-INTEREST (BUSINESS PROFITS, WHITE KITH AND KIN). IF WE REALLY HAD THE INTEREST OF BLACK PEOPLE AT HEART WE WOULD JOIN THE FRENCH AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN TAKING SPECIFIC ACTION WHICH WAS THE ONLY LANGUAGE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDERSTAND. WHEN I EXPLAINED THE REASONS FOR OUR HONESTLY HELD VIEW THAT SANCTIONS WOULD BE UNHELPFUL AND COUNTER PRODUCTIVE, INCLUDING GIVING HIM THE TEXT OF YOUR RECENT SPEECH AT THE COMMONWEALTH SOCIETY, TUTU BRUSHED THIS ASIDE WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT OUR POLICY WAS LIABLE TO ENDANGER THE LIVES OF WHITES. TUTU HAS OF COURSE CRITICISED US BEFORE, BUT ENDED ON THE RATHER CHILLING NOTE THAT IF WHITES BEGAN TO BE KILLED WE MIGHT TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW.

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5. WHEN PIK BOTHA SPOKE TO THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL GROUP EARLIER IN THE DAY HE INSISTED THAT PRIVATE TALKS WERE TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY. WHEN ASKED ABOUT COMMON CITIZENSHIP, HE MAINTAINED THAT ITS INTRODUCTION WAS ALREADY GOVERNMENT POLICY. HE TOOK THE SAME LINE OVER POWER-SHARING PROVIDED IT MEANT PARTICIPATION AND NOT DOMINATION. (PUBLICLY MINISTERS HAVE NOT BEEN PREPARED TO PROMISE POWER-SHARING IN TERMS, AS MEMBERS OF THE PROGRESSIVE FEDERAL PARTY WHO ACCOMPANIED THE LIBERAL GROUP WERE QUICK TO POINT OUT.) ON MANDELA, PIK BOTHA TOOK THE FAMILIAR LINE THAT EXTERNAL PRESSURE MADE IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO RELEASE HIM UNCONDITIONALLY, THOUGH HE DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROPOSALS FROM OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA AND THOSE OF BLACK LEADERS IN TOUCH WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

6. IT IS HARD TO KNOW HOW TO ASSESS THE GOVERNMENT'S CLAIM THAT MORE IS GOING ON QUIETLY IN CONTACTS WITH BLACKS THAN CAN BE REVEALED. IT IS A FACT THAT SUCH CONTACTS WOULD DRY UP IF HINTS BEGAN BEING DROPPED FROM THE GOVERNMENT SIDE ABOUT NAMES. ON THE OTHER HAND WHENEVER WE HAVE TRIED TO CHECK WITH INDIVIDUAL BLACKS WHO MIGHT BE CONSIDERED CREDIBLE CONTACTS THEY HAVE DISMISSED THE IDEA. WE KNOW THAT THERE WERE SOME INFORMAL EXCHANGES WITH A NUMBER OF MODERATES EARLIER THIS YEAR. BUT IT MUST BE DOUBTFUL IF ANYTHING WORTHWHILE IS GOING ON IN THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE, APART FROM CONTACTS WITH HOMELAND LEADERS WHICH ARE IN A DIFFERENT CATEGORY. AT A LOCAL LEVEL, THERE HAVE BEEN SOME EARLIER CONTACTS WITH LOCAL COMMUNITY GROUPS IN THE EASTERN CAPE. INDIVIDUAL MINISTERS TALKED TO REPRESENTATIVE BLACKS, E.G. IN CRADOCK ABOUT SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL QUESTIONS. IN PORT ALFRED BLACKS HAD SHOWN INTEREST IN WORKING WITH THE WHITE BUSINESS COMMUNITY TO PROPOSE A SINGLE COUNCIL WITH BOTH SIDES RUNNING A TOWN JOINTLY. THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND ARRESTS OF NUMBERS OF THE GRASS ROOTS LEADERSHIP OF BLACK GROUPS HAS PROBABLY PRECLUDED FURTHER PROGRESS WITH LOCAL DISCUSSIONS OF THIS KIND, AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT.

7. IT IS EARLY DAYS YET IN THE EMERGENCY, AND THE GOVERNMENT WILL WANT TO SEE HOW EFFECTIVELY THEIR MEASURES ARE WORKING. CABINET HAS RESUMED ITS REGULAR WEEKLY MEETINGS ONLY TODAY. WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT QUICK DECISIONS ABOUT POLITICAL DIALOGUE. BUT WE CANNOT BELIEVE TIME IS ON THE GOVERNMENT'S SIDE IN REGAINING BLACK CONFIDENCE.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 160 OF 31 JULY

INFO ROUTINE JOHANNESBURG

INFO SAVING CAPE TOWN

ms

YOUR TELNO 109 : SOUTH AFRICA : SITUATION ROUND UP.

SUMMARY

1. DETENTIONS CONTINUE AND IT HAS BEEN A QUIETER WEEK. MANY OF THOSE ROUNDED-UP ARE YOUNG PEOPLE SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL VIOLENCE. REPORTS FROM THE EASTERN CAPE SUGGEST THAT THE TOUGHEST POLICE ACTION IS TAKING PLACE THERE. THE GENERAL ASSUMPTION REMAINS THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S MEASURES WILL Dampen Down VIOLENCE. BUT THERE IS GREAT UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL THEN DO AS THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS REMAIN.

DETENTIONS

2. 1273 PEOPLE ARE NOW HELD IN DETENTION UNDER EMERGENCY REGULATIONS. 13 PREVIOUSLY HELD HAVE BEEN RELEASED.

OVERALL SITUATION

3. BOTH BLACK AND WHITE CONTACTS TELL US THAT THIS HAS SO FAR BEEN A QUIETER WEEK OVERALL. THE UNREST IS STILL MAINLY IN THE EASTERN CAPE AND EAST RAND AND IS CURRENTLY IN THE FORM OF SPORADIC INCIDENTS EG. STONING OF BUSES AND CARS AND SCHOOL STAY-AWAYS. OTHER AREAS ARE RELATIVELY QUIET. THE SCHOOLS ARE RE-OPENING IN SOWETO AND ELSEWHERE. AN EXCEPTION TO THIS GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT IS THE WESTERN CAPE WHERE COLOURED UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ARE STAGING A BOYCOTT OF CLASSES AND THERE HAVE BEEN SOME INCIDENTS IN THE BLACK TOWNSHIPS OUTSIDE CAPE TOWN.

4. THE POLICE ARE NOT RELEASING INFORMATION ABOUT THE TYPE OF PEOPLE BEING DETAINED BUT OUR ENQUIRIES INDICATE THAT THOSE BEING HELD IN CUSTODY, ALTHOUGH INCLUDING SOME COMMUNITY LEADERS, TRADE UNIONISTS AND A FEW CHURCHMEN, ARE MOSTLY STUDENTS WHO ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN PLAYING A ROLE IN ORGANISING LOCAL VIOLENCE. CONTACTS CLOSE TO THE POLICE TELL US THAT THE POLICE HAVE BEEN USING THEIR INFORMER NETWORK TO ROUND-UP ALL THOSE WHO THEY BELIEVE ARE PROLONGING COMMUNITY VIOLENCE.

5. THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAIN THAT THOSE BEING DETAINED ARE BEING TREATED PROPERLY. THE FACT THAT NAMES ARE BEING RELEASED IS PERHAPS SOME REASSURANCE. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO RELIABLE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US ABOUT WHAT IS ACTUALLY HAPPENING TO DETAINEES. THERE WILL BE A JUDICIAL REVIEW TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE SUBJECT TO THE SAME ADMINISTRATION AS ORDINARY PRISONERS.

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6. BEHAVIOUR OF THE POLICE APPEARS MOSTLY TO HAVE BEEN REASONABLE IN SOWETO AND WE HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF REPORTS SUGGESTING THAT THE POLICE ARE ACTING WITH RESTRAINT IN THE TOWNSHIPS AROUND PRETORIA. HOWEVER WE HAVE HEARD ALLEGATIONS OF TOUGH POLICE TREATMENT OF BLACKS BEING SEARCHED OR DETAINED IN THE EASTERN CAPE. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT MUCH DEPENDS ON THE LOCAL COMMANDERS AND TO SOME EXTENT ON THE TRAINING AND INTELLIGENCE OF LOCAL POLICE UNITS. FLAGGING POLICE MORALE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN BOOSTED BY THE GRANTING OF EMERGENCY POWERS AND THE POLICE ARE NOW HOPING THAT LOCAL STUDENT ACTIVISTS WILL THEMSELVES BE DISCOURAGED FROM PROLONGING CONFRONTATION. THE SADF ARE STILL BEING USED MAINLY IN A BACK-UP ROLE AND IN CORDON-AND-SEARCH OPERATIONS BUT THEY HAVE BEEN USED MORE PROMINENTLY IN A NUMBER OF AREAS AND THERE APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN SOME DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE SADF IN THE EASTERN CAPE. THE MORE THE POLICE ARE OVER-STRETCHED, THE MORE CLOSELY INVOLVED ARE THE SADF LIKELY TO BECOME.

7. THE GENERAL EXPECTATION IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S MEASURES WILL GRADUALLY HAVE A DAMPENING EFFECT ON THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE. A RETURN TO NORMALITY WILL BE GENERALLY WELCOME NOT ONLY TO THE WHITE COMMUNITY BUT PROBABLY TO THE MAJORITY OF BLACKS. THERE IS WIDE CONCERN NEVERTHELESS ABOUT WHAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL DO NEXT. REPRESENTATIVES OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING AND AFRIKANER TRADE AND INDUSTRY BODIES ARE TO SEE THE PRESIDENT LATER THIS WEEK. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THEY WILL URGE THE GOVERNMENT TO MOVE FORWARD WITH EFFECTIVE REFORMS. THE PROGRESSIVE FEDERAL PARTY ARE ALSO DEMANDING EARLY ACTION TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS FOR BLACKS AND TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE UNREST. WE HAVE AGREED TO SEE A DELEGATION FROM THE UDF AT THE EMBASSY ON 2 AUGUST.

8. LIBERAL-MINDED SOUTH AFRICANS ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE STATE PRESIDENT HAS FAILED TO TAKE UP THE OFFER BY BISHOP TUTU TO MEET HIM FOR IMMEDIATE TALKS. IT HAS BEEN NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE STATE PRESIDENT IS SEEING THE TRADE AND INDUSTRY DELEGATION THIS WEEK HE WILL NOT BE SEEING A DELEGATION OF CHURCHMEN TO BE LED BY THE ARCHBISHOP OF CAPE TOWN UNTIL 19 AUGUST. SEE ALSO MIFT.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 July, 1985

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Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi,

2 August 1985

in folder att. to file

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I enclose a brief and background note for this meeting.

I also enclose a memorandum which Chief Buthelezi has asked us to present to the Prime Minister. The main substance is set out in the "Declaration of Intent" of which a copy is at Annex B.

Chief Buthelezi arrived in London on his private visit on Monday, 29 July. He saw the Archbishop of Canterbury on 30 July. He also plans to visit the Test Match. He has sought no publicity for his visit and so far the press have not reported it.

*Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH CHIEF GATSHA BUTHELEZI:

2 AUGUST 85

Our Objectives

- (i) To give our support to Chief Buthelezi in working for non-violent change in South Africa.
- (ii) To encourage him to continue his efforts to open a dialogue with President Botha.
- (iii) To encourage him to continue to speak publicly against sanctions and disinvestment.

Points to Make

- (i) We remain wholeheartedly opposed to apartheid and in favour of non-violent change towards a system of government which commands the support of the people of South Africa as a whole.
- (ii) Fully support your efforts to enter into direct negotiations with South African Government. Dialogue essential if fundamental problems to be tackled.
- (iii) We appreciate your concern to obtain a "Statement of Intent" from President Botha to show your supporters that you are negotiating in good faith. But important not to spend too much time on preconditions rather than getting dialogue started.
- (iv) Firm opposition to sanctions. Would hinder reform and hurt the black community. Recent domestic and international pressure misguided. Your statements against disinvestment very helpful in educating people to realities of situation. Hope you will continue to make them.



- (v) What are the next steps you would like South African Government to take?
- (vi) What can we in Britain do to help encourage peaceful change in South Africa?

His objectives

- (i) To enhance his international and domestic status as leader of black opinion.
- (ii) To seek our goodwill and influence to get power-sharing negotiations started.
- (iii) To urge us to continue a policy of "constructive engagement".

Your response

- (i) No intention of reducing our involvement and influence in South Africa.
- (ii) Dialogue and reconciliation necessary not only with South African Government but between all various communities and factions in South Africa.

MEETINGS WITH CHIEF GATSHA BUTHELEZI 2 AUGUST 1985

BACKGROUND

References

- A LPR
- B Draft "Declaration of Intent"
- C Pretoria telno 154 of 29 July
- D Pretoria telno 156 of 29 July
- E Summary of the Buthelezi Commission's recommendations and findings

1. Chief Buthelezi is an important moderate Black leader in South Africa. Chief Minister of Kwazulu, a homeland which has refused to accept nominal "independence", and head of Inkatha, a political movement which claims a million members. His support comes almost entirely from the Zulus and is largely confined to the Zulu heartland of Kwazulu and Natal. Nevertheless, he will be a considerable factor in any future settlement.
2. Buthelezi is the only black leader with substantial support who is prepared to entertain the idea of negotiating with the government on the basis of a compromise short of one man one vote in a unitary state. However on 26 March he demanded that, before he will enter such negotiations the government must make a "Statement of Intent". "I asked Mr Botha to accept that we do not insist on a statement of intent which is a thinly disguised White capitulation to Black demands. All we require, Minister, is a commitment to search for acceptable ways of moving towards power-sharing".
3. However the South African Government has pointedly failed to make any response. On 4 July Dr Worrall told the PUS that the Government could not issue a Declaration of Intent. Buthelezi was seriously annoyed by President Botha's intransigence in his "Weekend World" interview with Brian Walden on 26 May and cancelled a planned

visit by Botha to Kwazulu. However he has since renewed his efforts to obtain a basis for negotiation and on 17 July stated in a conciliatory speech:

"We are willing to concede reasonable safeguards to white interests and go to considerable lengths to preserve the confidence of whites in the system of government because we realise that if whites were to withdraw their skills and experience, we, the blacks, would suffer dearly".

4. The failure of the South African Government to give any commitment makes Buthelezi's position increasingly difficult since he has nothing to show for his moderation and refusal to espouse a confrontationist approach.

5. Buthelezi cannot in any case be regarded as a spokesman for more than a minority of black South Africans. The majority of ^{urban} blacks in South Africa support the ANC and the UDF and there is considerable bad feeling between these organisations and Inkatha. The urban blacks tend to regard Buthelezi as an "Uncle Tom" and in so far as they would support any moderate leader not in prison would look to Bishop Tutu. (Buthelezi however is not on good terms with Tutu). His opposition to all forms of sanctions, and willingness to campaign abroad against them, have increased radical allegations of collaboration against him.

6. However, there is no doubt that Buthelezi is a staunch and genuine opponent of apartheid. Many whites see him as the "acceptable face" of black politics. The importance of his initiative in offering to join negotiations in return for a "Declaration of Intent" should not be underestimated. Particularly illuminating is the failure of the Government to respond; if it is not prepared to negotiate on easy terms with such a moderate as Buthelezi, this bodes ill for future prospects of genuine reform.

Natal/Kwazulu

7. The possibility of a regional experiment in a power-sharing administration in the Natal/Kwazulu area is one which exercises much interest in academic and occasionally press circles, as well as in

liberal circles extending to the more progressive wing of the National Party.

8. In 1982 the report of the Buthelezi Commission was published, advocating a single legislative chamber for Natal, with strong regional bodies beneath. The Commission was composed of a formidable list of academics, politicians (PFP, Inkatha, Labour Party), community representatives and business and industrial interests.

9. As the South African Government gropes for possible constitutional solutions, the idea of a Natal experiment, where there are no significant Afrikaaner votes at risk, may become increasingly attractive. We have received information that Mr Chris Heunis, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, has been making informal soundings in this direction.

10. While Buthelezi is extremely proud of the Commission report and keen to see its recommendation implemented, he sees this as a part of reformed South Africa and it is unlikely that he could be "bought off" his national objectives by a regional dispensation.

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 TO PRIORITY FCO
 TELNO. 156 OF 29 JULY 1985

VISIT OF CHIEF BUTHELEZI

1. WHEN I SAW HIM OFF AT THE AIRPORT LAST NIGHT BUTHELEZI TOLD ME HE WAS MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO CALLING ON THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF LATER THIS WEEK.
2. HIS VISIT TO LONDO TAKES PLACE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND DESCRIBED IN MY TELEGRAM NO 153. HE REGRETS THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY HERE. BUT HE ACCEPTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT WERE RIGHT TO ACT AGAINST THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAD BEEN GETTING OUT OF HAND. HE DEPLORES THE LATEST INTERNATIONAL MOVES TO INTRODUCE MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH IN HIS VIEW OVERLOOK THE ECONOMIC DAMAGE LIKELY TO BE CAUSED TO SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS.
3. AS YOU KNOW, HE IS A CONTROVERSIAL FIGURE HERE, BITTERLY CRITICISED BY A MAJORITY OF POLITICALLY-ACTIVE URBAN BLACKS, AT LOGGERHEADS WITH THE UDF AND WITH BISHOP TUTU, DISTRUSTFUL OF PRESIDENT BOTHA WITH WHOM HE GETS ON BADLY. NEVERTHELESS BUTHELEZI IS IMPORTANT FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS WHICH ARE SPECIALLY RELEVANT NOW. HE LEADS THE LARGEST OF THE MANY BLACK COMMUNITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA. HE IS ONE OF THE FEW OUTSPOKEN MODERATES AMONG INFLUENTIAL BLACKS. HE IS COMMITTED TO THE 'POLITICS OF NEGOTIATION' AND HAS SAID THAT HE IS PREPARED TO SEEK A COMPROMISE WITH THE GOVERNMENT. HE IS ESTEEMED BY MANY WHITES. ON TELEVISION HE COMES ACROSS NOT ONLY AS RATIONAL AND ARTICULATE BUT AS A CREDIBLE LEADER WITH WHOM WHITES COULD DO BUSINESS - A RARE PUBLIC IMAGE HERE. HIS ANTI-DISINVESTMENT VIEWS COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT (AS WELL AS OUR OWN) AND PROBABLY CARRY MORE WEIGHT INTERNATIONALLY THAN THEIRS. NATAL HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET DURING THE RECENT UNREST THANKS LARGELY TO HIS RESTRAINING HAND.
4. ABOVE ALL HE ADOCATES SOLUTION WHICH, WITH SUFFICIENT SKILL AND DETERMINATION, COULD PROVIDE THE GOVERNMENT WITH THE BASIS OF A WAY FORWARD FROM THE PRESENT IMPASSE. YET THE GOVERNMENT HAVE REFUSED TILL NOW TO CONTEMPLATE A FAIRLY VAGUE AND MODERATE STATEMENT OF INTENT SUCH AS BUTHELEZI INSISTS UPON. IN PRI BUTHELEZI HAS MET INDIVIDUAL MINISTERS INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT BUT NOT AS PART OF ANY ORGANISED FORUM. IN HIS VIEW THE KEY IS ONE FORM OF UNDERTAKING ABOUT POWER-SHARING BEFORE BLACK LEADERS LIKE HIMSELF WILL SPLIT DOWN AND NEGOTIATE ACROSS THE TABLE WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

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5. HE WILL TRY TO PERSUADE THE PRIME MINISTER TO ENDORSE HIS GENERAL APPROACH. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE GOVERNMENT AGREEING TO A DECLARATION OF INTENT MIGHT HAVE BEEN INCREASED BY THEIR NEED FOR A GESTURE AT THE END OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. BUTHELEZI AGREED THIS WAS POSSIBLE THOUGH HE HAD NO INDICATION OF IT YET FOR THE GOVERNMENT SIDE.

6. ANY DEAL WITH BUTHELEZI WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO ENCOMPASS TWO CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:

(A) SOUTH AFRICAN FEDERATION

A FEDERAL ARRANGEMENT IS BUTHELEZI'S SHORTHAND FOR SOME FORM OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT IN WHICH BLACKS SHARE POWER WITH WHITES ALBEIT ON A WEIGHTED BASIS INITIALLY. THIS IS OF COURSE ALSO THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PROGRESSIVE FEDERAL PARTY WHICH SLABBERT LEADS. THERE IS A CRUCIAL GAP BETWEEN THIS AND THE NATIONAL PARTY'S IDEA OF CONFEDERATION WHICH, IN BUTHELEZI'S EYES, WOULD MEAN THE DIFFERENT PARTS BEING INDEPENDENT BEFORE THEY CAME TOGETHER. A FURTHER STUMBLING BLOCK IS THE GOVERNMENT'S TOTAL REJECTION OF ONE MAN ONE VOTE IN A UNITARY STATE. ALTHOUGH THERE IS THE FAINTEST OF HINTS THAT ONE MAN ONE VOTE IN SOMETHING OTHER THAN A WESTMINSTER MODEL MIGHT ONE DAY BE CONSIDERED, THIS NEVERTHELESS SEEMS A SLIGHT AND DISTANT PROSPECT. IN ANY CASE IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR BUTHELEZI UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT CAN BRING THEMSELVES TO MAKE EVEN A LOOSELY-WORDED COMMITMENT.

(B) REGIONAL CO-OPERATION WITH KWAZULU.

BUTHELEZI'S IDEA IS FOR JOINT MANAGEMENT OF WHITE AND BLACK AREAS AT LOCAL AND REGIONAL LEVEL. IF THIS COULD WORK ANYWHERE IT IS PROBABLY BETWEEN WHITES IN NATAL AND THE ZULUS. A SUCCESSFUL EXPERIMENT THERE WOULD NOT ONLY BENEFIT THAT AREA BUT COULD POINT THE WAY TO A SIMILAR PATTERN ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. HITHERTO HOWEVER THE GOVERNMENT HAVE FOUGHT SHY OF GOING FAR WITH BUTHELEZI DOWN THIS ROAD, IF AT ALL.

7. GOVERNMENT MINISTERS ARE STILL PUTTING OUT LINES TO BUTHELEZI BUT WITHOUT OFFERING HIM ANY ADVANCE OVER THEIR PREVIOUS THINKING. IN LONDON I BELIEVE HE IS LIKELY TO TAKE THE LINE THAT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND ITS AFTERMATH REPRESENT ALMOST THE GOVERNMENT'S LAST CHANCE TO WIN OVER RESPONSIBLE BLACK LEADERSHIP AND THAT HIS OWN IDEAS ARE MORE RELEVANT AND URGENT THAN EVER.

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PS/MR RICKING

PS/PUS
MR FERGUSON
MR JOHNSON.

DECLARATION OF INTENT

We the undersigned hereby declare our commitment to serve God in obedience to His divine will for our country and together:

Recognise that:

- The history of mankind shows the need for adaptive change among all peoples and all nations.
- Nations which have managed to avoid the use of violence in the achievement of national objectives are the nations which have grown in wisdom.
- Both mistakes and lessons not yet learned led to errors of judgement in the mainstream politics in both the Black and White sections of our society.
- The South African people are a family of mankind, seeking to live in harmony in the African community of nations and seeking to do so by expressing civilised ideals in the practical social, economic and political affairs of our country.
- The South African constitution as it is now written is by force of history and reality a first step in constitutional reform which urgently needs the second step to be taken of enriching the constitution to make it as acceptable to the broad mass of African opinion as it has been made acceptable to the broad mass of White opinion.
- The Westminster model of government was not ordained by God to be the only form of good government.

We therefore accept:

- The need to make the preamble to the South African constitution of equal value to all the groups and peoples of the country by enriching the clause: "To respect, to further and to protect the self-determination of population groups and peoples" to include the notion that this can best be done by sharing power. We need to share power in such a way that no one group can dictate to any other group how to express its own self-determination, and we also need to share power in a formula within which the hallowed values of good government are not

compromised.

- The need to preserve the constitutionality of the adaptive democratic process on which we will jointly rely in being subservient to the divine will for our country.

We will therefore together seek:

- To negotiate as leaders to amend the South African constitution to make it acceptable to all groups.
- To find an alternative political system to that which the world at large understands by the word 'apartheid' and also to seek an alternative political system in which universal adult suffrage is expressed in constitutional terms acceptable to all the peoples of South Africa.
- To give expression to the common citizenship of all South Africa's peoples without qualifying the meaning of citizenship for any group.
- To use the opportunities presented in practical politics at first, second and third tier levels of government to fashion national unity by deepening the democratic process, and to use the democratic process in explorations of what needs to be done to get the people to legitimise the instruments of government.

We therefore pledge ourselves:

- To express national pride and patriotism by insisting that South Africans will decide South Africa's future in the acceptance of each other as individuals and groups and the acceptance of each other's cultural rights to be who they are.
- To start where we find ourselves in history and to move from there to build on all that is positive and valuable and to change that which is negative and undesirable.
- Each to work in our own constituencies to develop a South African pride in managing our own South African affairs in harmony with internationally accepted standards of civilised decency without being dictated to from without.

Having thus declared we stand together to defend our right even with our lives to take the steps and the time needed to

establish consensus between groups and to win support for our joint efforts in the South African family of nations.

And furthermore to stand together to defend South Africa from external onslaughts and to stand together to resist any use of violence which threatens the politics of negotiation aimed at national reconciliation."



BUTHELEZI COMMISSION: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS

CONSTITUTIONAL:

1. Recognising the socio-economic interdependence of Natal/KwaZulu, it considers the creation of an independent KwaZulu against the interests of the people in the Province and proposes instead a consociational form of regional government with enhanced powers. It suggests a multi-ethnic executive council chosen by a Chief Minister who would in turn be elected by a Legislative Assembly elected by universal adult suffrage with proportional representation. Protection for minority groups would be built-in and they would have assured representation. The Assembly's powers would be limited by a Bill of Individual and Group Rights together with a minority group right of veto which would be over-riding on certain issues, i.e. language, religion and education. Legislation would be tested by an independent judiciary.

2. As an interim measure, a multi-ethnic council is proposed consisting of the white Provincial Council, the KwaZulu Cabinet and representatives from the Indian and Coloured communities under the joint chairmanship of the Provincial Administrator and the Chief Minister of KwaZulu. This Council would establish a series of joint commissions and committees, a steering committee to oversee constitutional changes and a multi-racial executive and legislature for the Durban metropolitan area.

ECONOMIC:

3. The Commission proposes the improvement of agricultural techniques and financing, greater utilisation of Trust lands, and the extension of black urban freehold rights but warns against rural freehold tenure, and the government's consolidation proposals. It urges the removal of racial restrictions in business, a free market in labour (abolition of influx control), the encouragement of labour intensive industry, the fostering of a viable black trade union movement and the establishment of a free port at Richards Bay.

EDUCATION:

4. The wide disparities in quality of education are examined and it is proposed to upgrade black educational standards through the gradual integration of black, white and Indian educational systems by developing non-racial district education boards and a regional educational council. Among the options offered are open schools (open to all race groups) at selected sites.

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ADMINISTRATION:

5. Closer administrative co-ordination is urged through a number of newly-created regional bodies (in particular metropolitan councils and authorities for the major utilities) supervised by 'a congress of executives', a joint planning commission, a joint social and economic development commission and a joint education board.

HEALTH & WELFARE:

6. The integration of health services at district and regional level is proposed to maximise the use of rare resources with emphasis on total community development and flexibility of standards according to circumstances. The preventative rather than the curative is stressed. In rural areas, resources should be devoted to primary health care and third world medical techniques.

ATTITUDES:

7. Commenting on the evidence put before it, the Commission mentioned a high degree of tolerance between racial groups and a general acceptance that the moral position of the present regime was indefensible; a hardening of black attitudes in general but in particular among the educated urban youth; the recognition of white businessmen of the need to relax influx and other controls; that whites were more relaxed about integrating housing than education; that of all the minorities the Afrikaners expressed most concern about minority rights and that Indian attitudes towards blacks in power were ambivalent.

8. The survey of white, Indian and Coloured attitudes showed a majority were not confident about the future, expected instability and disturbances if there is no political reform, believed that KwaZulu cannot last as a separate identity, and rejected independence for KwaZulu which they see as destabilising the region. They also rejected universal suffrage (90%-whites and 60%-Coloured and Indian) and rejected extending the franchise to Indians and Coloureds only, instead supporting the gradual extension of black political rights (under 50% for whites). There was most support for the proposition that Natal/KwaZulu remains as at present with greater co-operation by blacks sharing in regional decision-making and joint government. A majority supported black representation on city and provincial councils and went as far as agreeing to allow blacks to enter white schools if they are able to pay the fees.

9. The survey of black attitudes shows 70% expressing



increased political discontent and anger and 30% espousing actual militancy and confrontation. A majority believe that ANC insurgents would receive sympathy and co-operation from many blacks; the ANC has most support on the Reef (37%) while in Natal most (67%) support Inkatha. Blacks generally express more political concern than whites and specifically compare their situation with that of whites. They reject territorial separation into black homelands; those living outside KwaZulu have no significant identification with it, and those living within have no pride of identity with it. 66% reveal no conscious tribal identity and reject KwaZulu and KwaZulu independence. 60% will however accept KwaZulu independence if it is allied to major concessions of land, urban and industrial resources and the right to live and work freely and permanently outside KwaZulu. Blacks strongly insist on black representation in South Africa's central affairs and demand universal franchise although they are prepared to accept gradual enfranchisement and regional non-racial political co-operation. They have beliefs which suggest they value democratic institutions and the principles of balance and moderation, they support the market economy rather than communal or socialist economies.

10. The Commission concludes that general black values make possible their integration into a more open political system if social and economic circumstances don't magnify racial feeling.

BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MANGOSUTHU GATSHA

Chief Minister of KwaZulu; President of Inkatha-Yenkululekho Yesizwe; Chairman of the South African Black Alliance (SABA).

Born 1928. Chief of the Buthelizi clan and uncle of, and hereditary Chief Indua (ie Adviser or Minister) to, the King of the Zulus. A prince of the royal house through the maternal line.

Began university at Fort Hare, from which he was expelled, and completed his history degree at the University of Natal.

1970: Chief Executive Councillor, Zulu Territorial Authority (from 1972 the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly); 1975: revived Inkatha (the National Cultural Liberation Movement); 1976: Chief Minister, KwaZulu Government.

Deeply rooted in, and knowledgeable about, tribal tradition and custom, Buthelezi – like the KwaZulu Government – is a curious product of feudal autocracy and modern collective Cabinet responsibility. His power base remains Inkatha (SABA has virtually ceased to exist with the withdrawal of the Coloured Labour Party and the demise of the Indian Reform Party) and the rigid control he exercises over it has brought him into sharp conflict with other organisations, such as the United Democratic Front (UDF), whose objectives of political change by peaceful means he professes to share. Buthelezi has repeatedly attacked the homelands policy and has refused to consider KwaZulu's taking "independence".

He can show great charm and humour and is seldom discourteous in public but he can be ruthless with Zulus who step out of line and the elaborate civility he adopts in dealing with whites can hide deep private contempt.

Detests being addressed, or referred to, as "Gatsha".

His public speaking is often wooden and stylised and in conversation his English is not absolutely sure (though extempore in Zulu he can be marvellously amusing). He inspires fanatical loyalty among many Zulus.

Has travelled extensively and recently spent four weeks in North America speaking against disinvestment. He has visited UK and spoken at Wilton Park. A devout Anglican. Suffers from diabetes which he controls by dieting. His wife, Princess Irene, suffers from hypertension and seldom accompanies him.

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FM PRETORIA 291330Z JULY 1985
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO. 154 OF 29 JULY 1985

MY TELNO 152: CHIEF BUTHELEZI'S MEMORANDA

1. THE MAIN POINTS IN THE TWO LENGTHY MEMORANDA FOR PRESENTATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE ARE:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

- A. THE UPWARD SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE HAS JUSTIFIED WARNINGS BUTHELEZI SENT TO WESTERN LEADERS IN 1984 ABOUT THE INADEQUACY OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION.
- B. UNLESS THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ACTS NOW BLACK POLITICS WILL BE INCREASINGLY RADICALISED.
- C. BUTHELEZI'S MINIMUM DEMAND IS THAT SOUTH AFRICA MUST BE RECOGNISED AS ONE COUNTRY WITH ONE PEOPLE. THE STATE PRESIDENT SEEMS TO HAVE RULED THIS OUT BUT BUTHELEZI HOPES THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL EXERT EVERY PRESSURE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO BEGIN FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS BASIS.
- D. UNDISCRIMINATE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD DAMAGE THE PROSPECTS FOR A WORTHWHILE FUTURE. BUTHELEZI WOULD ONLY SUPPORT THIS SORT OF PRESSURE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IF IT COULD BE SHOWN THAT IT WOULD NOT HURT BLACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT THE WEST WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO HELP THEM OUT IF THEY THEN GOT INTO DIFFICULTIES.
- E. THE STATE PRESIDENT'S REFUSAL TO MAKE A STATEMENT OF INTENT IS THE MOST NEGATIVE ASPECT OF HIS LEADERSHIP.
- F. BUTHELEZI QUOTES IN FULL THE TEXT OF, A POSSIBLE OUTLINE STATEMENT WHICH HE BELIEVES WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BLACKS AND WHITES. HE IS NOT LOOKING FOR ENDORSEMENT OF HIS DRAFT STATEMENT. BUT HE HOPES THE PRIME MINISTER CAN GIVE PUBLIC SUPPORT TO HIS EFFORTS BY THE EMERGENCE OF A COMPROMISE DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD COULD BE ACCEPTED BY ALL GROUPS.

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MEMORANDUM

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

A. THE CURRENT VIOLENCE IS DUE IN PART TO ECONOMIC RETRENCHMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT BUT THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE IS BLACK POLITICAL DISSATISFACTION.

B. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE BUT HAS NOT AGREED TO REAL POWER SHARING. THE STATE PRESIDENT HAS REJECTED THE IDEA OF A UNITARY STATE WITH ONE MAN ONE VOTE. NOR IS HE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A FEDERAL UNION.

C. THE GAP BETWEEN BUTHELEZI AND THE STATE PRESIDENT HAS LOOKED UNBRIDGEABLE BUT RECENT EVENTS IN HIGHLIGHTING BLACK/WHITE INTERDEPENDENCE MAY OPEN UP A PROSPECT OF REAL NEGOTIATION. BUTHELEZI WOULD NOT INSIST ON HIS PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE OF ONE MAN ONE VOTE IF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WERE PREPARED TO EXAMINE FEDERAL AND OTHER SOLUTIONS.

D. BUTHELEZI WELCOMES THE BRITISH STAND AGAINST DISINVESTMENT WHICH CANNOT HELP THE BLACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA BUT HE LOOKS TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS TO DO WHATEVER THEY CAN TO STRENGTHEN THE AIM OF THOSE COMMITTED TO THE POLITICS OF NEGOTIATION.

MOBERLY

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MEMORANDUM FOR PRESENTATION TO THE RT. HON. MRS. MARGARET THATCHER,
MP, PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN, DURING A VISIT TO LONDON
BY MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MINISTER KWAZULU, PRESIDENT OF
INKATHA AND CHAIRMAN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN BLACK ALLIANCE
AUGUST 1985

In June 1984, the State President, Mr. P.W. Botha - then Prime Minister - visited Britain and Europe and met with a number of Heads of Government. This trip of his followed on the Referendum held in South Africa in November the previous year in which White South Africa had given him a massive endorsement of the new constitution under which the present South African Tricameral Parliament now operates. At the time, various Western Heads of State and Foreign Offices expressed cautious optimism that at last the South African Government had taken a small step in the right direction by including Indian and Coloured people as junior partners in government. Mr. P.W. Botha's European trip was specifically designed to use his success in the Referendum campaign to buy time for South Africa, and to drive home the advantages which the cautious but positive responses by a number of Western Governments held for him.

I was deeply concerned about the misinterpretation of the constitutional developments in South Africa by people in so many quarters and I wrote a short Memorandum to the Heads of States whom Mr. Botha would be seeing, about the constitutional developments which were taking place. In that Memorandum I said:

"I believe it is important for Western Heads of State to know that the South African Government is continuing to pursue policies which must necessarily lead to disaster and that it is in Western national and international interests that Western Heads of State tax Mr. Botha on some issues.

Firstly, there is the new constitution. The new constitution permanently excludes Blacks from having any say in the government of 87 per cent of the land and therefore in the policies which determine how the country's national wealth, the country's internal policies, and the country's foreign policy are determined. The new constitution is based on repugnant racism and gives Whites a constitutionally entrenched right to rule over Blacks in their midst in perpetuity. So-called White South Africa now has, and will ever increasingly have, a population which is numerically dominated by Blacks. The White controlled new tricameral parliament will remain a minority government and will continue to violate the most fundamental of Western democratic

principles. Western Heads of State should know that the new constitution is a prescription for violence and that it pulls the rug from beneath the feet of responsible Black leaders such as myself..."

I believe that events in South Africa since mid-1984 have shown that my concerns expressed in this Memorandum were fully justified. Instead of buying time for progress towards normalising South Africa, the new constitution had bought time towards the evolution of violence. During the Referendum campaign, I did everything I could possibly do to warn White South Africa that a Yes vote in favour of the new constitution would deepen Black anger, and would widen the chasm between Black and White which successive apartheid Governments in South Africa had created. I warned that the new constitution was a prescription for violence and that nothing that the Government had done, and nothing in the new constitution, addressed the central questions in South Africa which revolve around the disenfranchisement of 72 per cent of the population and their exclusion from any meaningful participation in the Government of their country.

Those warnings were not heeded and today we have the tragic evidence that my fears were fully justified. Black anger has risen sharply across the length and breadth of South Africa and not only have the levels of violence and the spread of violence used for political purposes now risen to historically unprecedented heights, but the ugliness of violence being employed for political purposes, has deepened tragically. The vast range of repressive measures made available to the Government through Draconian laws which have been passed over decades of National Party rule, have proved insufficient to contain Black anger. The State President has now had to declare a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts which has resulted in between eight and nine million South Africans living in circumstances which characterise the worst of Police States.

The upward spiral of violence employed for political purposes in South Africa will only be broken if the South Africa now turns to address the fundamental issues which White South Africa needs to face up to. The Government needs to address the question of giving Blacks a say in the Government of their country. Unless this is done, and done boldly and soon, the forces working for non-violent, democratic solutions leading to politics of negotiation will suffer irreparable harm.

It is in these circumstances, Madam Prime Minister, that I so deeply appreciate the opportunity of meeting with you to talk about South and Southern Africa. Whatever happens in South Africa has ramifications for the whole of the sub-continent and for a very

wide range of Western interests in South and Southern Africa. The sense of gratitude that I am conveying is more than a sense of gratitude borne out of your recognition, Madam Prime Minister, that I and Inkatha are playing a positive role in South Africa. My gratitude runs deeper than that. My ancestors fought wars against British armies. We were subjugated by Great Britain, and the might of the Zulu empire was smashed by Britain and my forefathers and their people were handed to racist White political control by British action in South Africa which led to the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. I am indeed grateful that today you as head of the country which thus once subjugated my people and handed us over to be brutalised by racism, can meet in friendship and common concern about what is happening today. I am totally convinced that the lack of permanent enmity and hatred which could have characterised my attitude to you, and could be generalised as an attitude amongst the Zulu people towards Great Britain, could be equally apparent in future attitudes towards White South Africa, if the South African Government followed the wisdom of Britain and withdrew from racist policies.

I pursue policies of democratic opposition to apartheid, and I remain committed to non-violent tactics and strategies, because unless Black South Africa wins the struggle for liberation through these means, we will be left with an aftermath of bitterness and hatred which will take generations to dissipate.

Despite the upward spiralling of violence in South Africa, there remains even today the kind of goodwill among Black South Africans which has resulted in my leadership and Inkatha's aims and objectives being supported by a card-carrying membership of over a million people. Beyond these card-carrying members, there is a further vast Black South African support and sympathy amongst those who are not yet card-carrying members. No party political machine is capable of doing more than actually enrolling but a proportion of the total potential support for a political programme. Inkatha's membership makes it the largest Black political organisation ever to have emerged in the history of South Africa. It is a genuine voice of the people and Inkatha is a genuine cross-section of Black South Africa. It reflects demographic realities; it is dominated numerically by peasants and workers; it is representative of every class of Black South Africans and it is supported as much in the urban areas as it is in rural areas. Inkatha's aims and objectives and its statement of belief are compatible with the best principles of democratic government that have been evolved by the Western industrialised world.

I see South Africa locked into a north/south axis by history itself, and I see the natural destiny of the people of South Africa as a destiny within the international Western industrial sphere of interest. It is in this context that the value of Inkatha must be

seen. It is a mass movement which is truly democratic. Its policies and its tactics and strategies are in principle and in practice determined by Annual General Conferences which take place each year. It is a grass root political movement in which the people themselves elect to follow the courses they follow and elect leaders to pursue tactics and strategies they have determined to further the causes which revolve around their aspirations. I say nothing and I do nothing outside the mandate which is given to me by my massive Black constituency. Every point of view, Madam Prime Minister, that I express today is a point of view which is an Inkatha point of view and a point of view which has not only been endorsed by Inkatha's leadership and its Annual General Conferences, but which has also been endorsed by mass meetings I hold across the country.

There are other Black voices. Inkatha is not the only political group. There are other Black views about what should and should not happen, but there is no voice to equal Inkatha's voice in terms of being a voice determined by ordinary Black people.

I am now daily being made aware of the fact that unless the South African Government now takes very early and bold steps towards normalising South Africa, as a modern, industrialised, democratic state, there will be increased radicalisation in Black politics, and the upward spiral of violence for political purposes which we are now witnessing, will succeed in making South Africa ungovernable, not only for the National Party, but for any future Government - whether it be Black or White.

If South Africa has any future at all worth having, that future will have to be characterised by a constitution which enshrines genuine democratic principles and practices and which gives rise to genuine democratic government, and which will also have to be characterised by a real and continued increase in the quality of life for ordinary people. After the struggle for liberation in South Africa has been won, we will have to face the heritage of poverty and despair among the masses which apartheid has already bequeathed to the country. We as Black South Africans therefore dare not involve ourselves in tactics and strategies which undermine democracy and which destroy the productive capacity of the South African economy. This is a message I constantly deliver to my people. I say to them that there is no easy solution to the South African problem; I say to them that there will be no overnight victory; and I say to them that after the political victory, there will be continued poverty for a considerable time to follow and that they must accept there is no Utopian future. I argue that socialist and communist doctrines contain no magic which will solve South Africa's problems, and that the free enterprise system and enlightened capitalism, leading to a massive development of the South African economy, are things that Black South Africa

simply has to accept. In our circumstances, the free enterprise system is the most potent force of development available to us.

I am also deeply convinced that White South Africa would rather adopt a scorched earth policy, and destroy the future for everyone, than capitulate now immediately to a one-man-one-vote system of government in a unitary state. Black South Africa has cherished the ideal of a one-man-one-vote system in a unitary state for generations. I argue, I plead and I cajole with Black South Africans, that if we are to avoid destroying the foundations of the future, we must commit ourselves to the politics of negotiation and we must be prepared to compromises wherever compromises can possibly be made without them being self-defeating. I and millions of Black South Africans are prepared at this point in time to shelve our ideal of a one-man-one-vote system of government in a unitary state if negotiations between Blacks and Whites can begin to find a compromise solution acceptable to all population groups. One-man-one-vote in a unitary state will always be our cherished ideal. But I believe it can be shelved for now in order to make a start where a start is possible.

I have already gone as far as it is humanly possible for me to go towards establishing the basis of real negotiations in South Africa. I believe that it is vital for the future of South Africa for every leader, whether he or she be Black, White, Coloured or Indian to reduce the list of non-negotiables to the barest possible minimum, which they will have to take to the conference table. I and the vast majority of Black South Africans are prepared to negotiate, and we are prepared to limit our list of non-negotiables.

I insist only that whatever negotiations do take place recognises that South Africa is one country, with one people, who have together but a single destiny; and that negotiations should be directed at tangible progress towards normalising South Africa.

I have only had one single formal discussion with the State President of South Africa once in the last four and a half years, and I have only seen him once informally during that period of time. It was after my formal meeting with him in May this year, and it was after I had repeatedly offered to enter the politics of negotiation, that the State President in an interview with Mr. Brian Walden which was televised in Britain and South Africa, said that he would not accept a single South Africa, whether it be a unitary state, or whether it be a federal union. If the President is incapable of even entertaining thoughts of talking about one South Africa, with one people, under one government, then as far as I am concerned there is nothing left to talk about. If there are to be any negotiations in South Africa worth having, they must be negotiations to find feasible and practical ways and means of

giving constitutional expression to these very simple and basic demands.

The present parliamentary system locates the final deciding power over 87 per cent of the country, over all its wealth, and therefore over its fiscal policy and its internal and foreign policy, in the White Chamber of the Tricameral Parliament. On no single occasion has the State President given any evidence of his willingness to entertain a future in which this 87 per cent of the country, which Whites claim as their own domain, is sacrificed in favour of a shared future for all. I believe, Madam Prime Minister, that you and other Heads of Western Governments, should be made aware of the fact that whatever reforms are being introduced, and however meaningful those reforms are in fact in the daily lives of Black people, unless the Government of South Africa is prepared to begin meaningful negotiations with Blacks, there can only be an escalation of violence. As a Black leader, I ask you Madam Prime Minister, to exert every pressure on the South African Government available to you to begin formal negotiations with Black leaders who recognise the need for Whites to relinquish the monopoly of power they enjoy in South Africa.

There is in South Africa already a significant body of Black opinion which has already finally concluded that there are no prospects of bringing about change through negotiation and this has already resulted in South Africa having entered the first phase of civil war. The unprecedented current levels of violence used for political purposes is ever-increasingly expressing itself more in Black/Black confrontations than in Black/White confrontations or Black confrontations with the Government. The African National Congress' Mission-in-Exile is seeking to make South Africa ungovernable by encouraging Black South Africans, and particularly the youth, to kill any Black who opposes them and who is prepared to work towards compromise solutions. The ANC's Mission-in-Exile sees the armed struggle as the primary means of bringing about change, and it intends using the resources for violence at its disposal to further revolutionary aims which will in the end ensconce it as a post-liberation government. Those committed to the armed struggle and to the employment of violence for political purposes, will ever-increasingly become intolerant of any success in the politics of negotiation. The ANC's Mission-in-Exile is not seeking a compromise solution. It is driven by winner-takes-all revolutionary fires, and we face the tragic reality in South Africa that the destruction of the politics of compromise and negotiation is becoming of prime concern to the ANC's Mission-in-Exile.

It is in a very real sense of the concept that I say that South Africa has already entered the first phase of civil war, and that what was a struggle against apartheid is now becoming a struggle to thwart democratic opposition to apartheid. It is in this context

that I am asking you, Madam Prime Minister, to exert every possible pressure on Pretoria to strengthen the politics of negotiation by insisting that the State President declare his intention to negotiate with Blacks about the future of South Africa as one country, with one people who share one destiny. I believe that President Reagan has embarked on a course of action in his constructive engagement policy which could accumulate the kind of pressures which we so badly need in South Africa. Whether or not the American party political scene permits this policy of ever evolving into anything meaningful remains to be seen, and I am concerned about the fact that apartheid is being drawn into American party politics. I am also concerned about statements now increasingly being made by the Labour Party here in Britain. Some Democrats in the United States and some members of the British Labour Party are adopting stances and making statements which if continued will accumulate advantages for those committing South Africa to civil war, and to the solution of South Africa's problems through the armed struggle and through generalised violence.

I as a Black political leader in South Africa am aware of the role that the British Government played to end hostilities between Black and White in Zimbabwe. I am aware, Madam Prime Minister, that it was your Cabinet which pursued the diplomatic endeavours which led to the Lancaster House negotiations. Black South Africa regards it as a very considerable achievement, and it has encouraged us to think that British diplomacy, which has accumulated its own distinctive nature over the centuries, remains a vital force in the Western world which could yet play a distinctive role in South Africa. I do not draw naive parallels between what was required in Zimbabwe to bring about a cessation of hostilities and what is now required in South Africa to bring about the de-escalation of violence and the promotion of the politics of diplomacy. Nor am I ignoring the constitutional role, and the role in international law, within which British diplomacy brought about a settlement in Zimbabwe. I am simply referring to the value of Britain as an honest broker in international diplomacy and I am expressing faith that Britain could fulfill the role of an honest broker in South Africa and between South Africa and the West.

I have admired, Madam Prime Minister, the extent to which you and your Government have refused to bow to pressure to take indiscriminate action simply because apartheid is morally repugnant. In a sense, there may now be a ripeness of time in which diplomacy could be more effective than it was in the past.

Black South Africans have always seen the West as toothless when it came to dealing with apartheid. Apartheid under the National Party has grown vigorously and has thrived for over 37 years, despite all the moral and diplomatic pressure which has been exerted on successive National Party Governments. It would be tragic for

South Africa and the whole of Southern Africa, if Britain and its allies failed to make the combined weight of Western pressure on the South African Government an ever-increasingly positive factor in bringing about meaningful change in my country, now that there is greater fluidity in the South African situation.

Statesmanship demands that apartheid is condemned and that opposition to apartheid is strengthened in such a way that the politics of negotiation are furthered, and the democratic future of South Africa is assured. Apartheid is so abhorrent that just simply any measure against it is seen as justified by some in the West. I have no doubt that there are many in the British Labour Party, and even, Madam Prime Minister, amongst your rank and file party members, who are genuinely indignant about apartheid and in whom that indignation gives rise to irresponsible action in supporting the forces of destruction in South Africa.

This has become very apparent in the disinvestment debate in the United States, and it is very apparent in much of the activity of pressure groups in Great Britain and Western Europe. There is too much at stake, not only for millions in South Africa, but for the whole sub-continent of Southern Africa for Western indignation to give rise to indiscriminate action against apartheid.

The recent indignation by France which has led to the recalling of its Ambassador from South Africa will be applauded by many Black South Africans merely for its symbolic importance. This kind of European reaction to current events will send shock waves through White South Africa. When, however, the French associate their indignation with a high political symbolic value for those committed to the struggle for liberation, with the further action of prohibiting any further investment in South Africa, their action becomes a double-edged sword which hurts both Black and White, and which strengthens the revolutionary forces in the country working against democracy. I am pursuing a path of non-violent, democratic opposition to the Government precisely because I see this as the only way of preserving the future. Vast backlogs in Black housing, health services and welfare, and in such things as education, can only be wiped out some time in the future if the South African economy grows at its maximum possible rate. Any move against South Africa which damages its economy now, is a move which will damage the prospects of a worthwhile future. I am pursuing the politics of negotiation because I do not want to reduce South Africa to ungovernability, and this is what mass poverty will do some time in the future if the country's economic growth base is damaged now.

Inkatha holds an Annual General Conference every year and at every one of these Conferences, I inform delegates what I have said on their behalf on the question of disinvestment. I inform them that I tell the world:

- that ordinary Black South Africans still seek a negotiated settlement and seek to pursue non-violent tactics and strategies;
- they know the meaning of poverty and are aware of the fact that if they do not have work they suffer terrible deprivation and that therefore any strategy which results in a decrease in the number of jobs available to Blacks is rejected by Blacks;
- Blacks in South Africa who have jobs with foreign companies would never be persuaded to relinquish their jobs to further the aims and objectives of those who pursue the disinvestment lobby;
- that no membership-based Black organisation in South Africa has an executive with a mandate from its members to call for disinvestment;
- that Black protest politicians who are not involved in constituency politics but who are involved in voicing Black grievances in a manner calculated to gain media acclaim, are more prone to call for disinvestment than other leaders.
- that every leader of an organisation working to make this country ungovernable and who is prepared to use violence, whether it be mob violence or armed violence, to bring about political change, argues for disinvestment;
- that there is no prospect of the armed struggle succeeding within the foreseeable future and that we therefore will have to rely on the politics of negotiation; and that the politics of negotiation are favoured by what has now become a total dependence by White South Africa on Black South Africa;
- that Black bargaining power is increased by Black economic advancement and vertical mobility which accompanies it;
- that it is the responsibility of Black South Africans to liberate South Africa from apartheid oppression in such a way that we do not force on neighbouring Black States, and States further afield in Southern and Central Africa, to pay the costs of our struggle.
- I tell them that we respect the national choices of Black States in Southern Africa and that we have no quarrel with those who have opted for a socialist future under a one-Party state, but that that is not a viable option for us; and that the benefits we will derive from working within a race-free,

democratic state in which there will be equality for all, and in which the principles of the free enterprise system will dominate in government planning, will have a very significant spill-over benefit for other States in Southern Africa.

I will report to my constituency, Madam Prime Minister, what I have said to you today about disinvestment. I will do so at Inkatha's Central Committee; and I will do so at mass meetings I hold in various places in the country, including Soweto which is in South Africa's industrial heartland. Wherever I do so, I will receive mass acclaim for the sentiments I am expressing.

Western industrialised countries which are moving towards banning future investment in South Africa, or even worse to withdrawing existing investment, and which regard Black opinion among rank and file workers and peasants as irrelevant, stand in the very real danger of pursuing aims and objectives which conflict with what is beneficial in our struggle for liberation. And in this vein, I would like to make an additional point. I am beginning to hear more and more arguments in favour of selective disinvestment because many of the points I have made above are taken and it is naively believed that, for example, prohibition of further investment in capital intensive industries, is warranted. Every Western Government knows that economies are not maleable things and cannot be turned on or off at will, and can only be directed towards political ends with very limited success. The naivety of some who think they can damage one part of the economy without it having repercussions for another part of the economy, is to me alarming. I am most certainly open to persuasion that one or another form of disinvestment may put pressure on Pretoria without damaging the economy, or causing greater Black suffering. I argue against disinvestment because it has these negative effects. Any sanctions against South Africa which would not harm the growth of the economy, but which would exert pressure on Pretoria, would be welcome by every Black South African. I have always spoken against irresponsible exploitative capitalism, but that to me is another debate entirely.

There is also a ripeness of time in which blunders would lead to irrecoverable losses. The West should realise that the threat of violence, and the threat of economic sanctions has more utility than the employment of violence and the implementation of damaging sanctions. The West should also realise that as soon as sanctions do begin to bite, it is Black South Africa which will bear the brunt of the burden. The West should also realise that the South African Government is quite capable of taking retaliatory measures of the most despicable kind. If sanctions began to bite, and Blacks began to suffer the burden of those sanctions, Pretoria would have no scruples about repatriating more than a million workers in South Africa who come from neighbouring States.

President Kaunda and President Banda unilaterally took action to stop the recruitment of mine workers in Zambia and Malawi. The South African Government is quite capable of taking reciprocal action and repatriating foreign workers. More than a million families would suffer increased deprivation in impoverished neighbouring States. I plead with the West not to push the whole of South Africa into an abyss because they underestimate the brutality with which Pretoria could respond in a situation in which very real threats became unbearable realities.

Today, after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, our brothers in Mocambique are developing trade links with South Africa. Despite the admirable stand of Zimbabwe on the issue of apartheid, economic realities are such that she still has a trade mission in Johannesburg. I often wonder, when sanctions are advocated, what countries such as Zimbabwe are supposed to do. Would Zimbabwe's trade mission in Johannesburg be expected to be withdrawn from South Africa when sanctions are applied? What will the international community actually do for citizens of Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Mocambique, once Mr. Louis Nel's threat is carried out and citizens of these independent States in Southern Africa are actually deported out of South Africa? South Africa showed her claws recently when the Lesotho border was closed for a few days with resultant suffering of many Lesotho citizens and their families.

I am not saying that pressures should not be brought to bear on the South African polecat. All I am saying is that all of us who work for the destruction of the apartheid polecat should not be blinded by anger to the extent that we fail to examine carefully the consequences of every act we take in the process of doing so. I have become very skeptical on the issue of whether the West would come to the rescue of more than a million citizens of these independent States when the crunch comes, and South Africa decides to expel them as a retaliatory act. I have become skeptical because I have not seen a single Western country do anything to the rogue elephant, which the South African Defence Force has been, when they have killed our brothers and sisters in countries such as Lesotho, Mocambique, Angola and Botswana.

Madam Prime Minister, the position the British adopted in last week's Security Council debate must be applauded, and I plead with you to withstand all party political pressures which may be exerted on you to continue to protect the prospects of British diplomacy being employed to assist in the non-violent resolution of the South African problem.

I am fully aware of the fact that even the maximum possible growth rate of the South African economy will leave a great many Black South Africans jobless for a very considerable time into the

future. The Black birth rate in South Africa is approaching three per cent per annum, and already more than half of all Black South Africans are 15 years old and younger. This huge population bulge of millions of young people moving towards the market place, is going to create almost insoluble problems for whatever government rules South Africa. I am therefore aware that the development of an informal economy, and the development of self-help, schemes is vital for our future. I am also aware that the growth rate of the informal economy rises and falls as the growth rate of the formal economy rises and falls. Western governments should understand that the cause for which we all struggle for in South Africa demands the maximisation of the West's input into the South African economy. Millions of people now, and future generations, will benefit from a vast inflow of capital into South Africa, and the inflow of new technology and managerial skills which will come with it.

I believe that in part President Reagan's policy of constructive engagement holds some promise for South Africa, because it is objective-orientated. Slamming down the equivalent of an iron curtain between the West and South Africa, is not helpful to the causes I serve. If you, Madam Prime Minister, and other Western leaders, were to direct your opposition to apartheid and to seek to bring the State President to the point where he can make a declaration of intent which leaders like myself could co-sign with him, you will achieve something of historic significance.

I isolate the State President's unwillingness to make such a declaration of intent as by far the most negative aspect of his whole political career and his current leadership of the country. I have been pleading with Mr. P.W. Botha to make a declaration of intent since he first took office as Prime Minister. Until he declares his willingness to negotiate about the future with Blacks on terms they can accept - and which Whites will also accept - there is no hope of breaking the upward spiral of violence. For many years I have been loathe to put pen to paper and draft such a declaration of intent because ideally it should have come as a product of goodwill amongst Black and White leaders to enable them to get round a conference table. Because, however, the State President has so finally and clearly stated that he is not prepared to talk about one South Africa, I had reluctantly to succumb to pressures on me to draft such a declaration of intent. I have done so in order to produce a discussion document and to give content to the notion of a declaration of intent which could be debated and if necessary amended for acceptance. It reads as follows:

DECLARATION OF INTENT

We the undersigned hereby declare our commitment to serve God in obedience to His divine will for our country and together:

Recognise that:

- The history of mankind shows the need for adaptive change among all peoples and all nations.
- Nations grow in wisdom.
- Both mistakes and lessons not yet learned led to errors of judgement in the mainstream politics in both the Black and White sections of our society.
- The South African people are a family of mankind, seeking to live in harmony in the African community of nations and seeking to do so by expressing civilised ideals in the practical social, economic and political affairs of our country.
- The South African constitution as it is now written is by force of history and reality a first step in constitutional reform which urgently needs the second step to be taken of enriching the constitution to make it as acceptable to the broad mass of African opinion as it has been made acceptable to the broad mass of White opinion.
- The Westminster model of government was not ordained by God to be the only form of good government.

We therefore accept:

- The need to make the preamble to the South African constitution of equal value to all the groups and peoples of the country by enriching the clause: "To respect, to further and to protect the self-determination of population groups and peoples" to include the notion that this can best be done by sharing power in such a way that no one group can dictate to any other group how to express its own self-determination.
- The need to preserve the constitutionality of the adaptive democratic process on which we will jointly rely in being subservient to the divine will for our country.

We will therefore together seek:

- To negotiate as leaders to amend the South African constitution to make it acceptable to all groups.

- To find an alternative political system to that which the world at large understands by the word 'apartheid' and also to seek an alternative political system in which universal adult suffrage is expressed in constitutional terms acceptable to all the peoples of South Africa.
- To use the opportunities presented in practical politics at first, second and third tier levels of government to fashion national unity by deepening the democratic process, and to use the democratic process in explorations of what needs to be done to get the people to legitimise the instruments of government.

We therefore pledge ourselves:

- To express national pride and patriotism by insisting that South Africans will decide South Africa's future in the acceptance of each other as individuals and groups and the acceptance of each other's cultural rights to be who they are.
- To start where we find ourselves in history and to move from there to build on all that is positive and valuable and to change that which is negative and undesirable.
- Each to work in our own constituencies to develop a South African pride in managing our own South African affairs in harmony with internationally accepted standards of civilised decency without being dictated to from without.

Having thus declared we stand together to defend our right even with our lives to take the steps and the time needed to establish consensus between groups and to win support for our joint efforts in the South African family of nations.

And furthermore to stand together to defend South Africa from external onslaughts and to stand together to resist any use of violence which threatens the politics of negotiation aimed at national reconciliation.

It is my carefully considered judgement that all Black leaders committed to the politics of negotiation could sell such a declaration of intent to their supporters, and I am totally convinced that Mr. P.W. Botha could in fact sell this declaration

of intent to the White South African electorate. I ask you, Madam Prime Minister, to examine this declaration of intent, and I would find it a most valuable contribution if you would find it possible to endorse the kind of endeavours within which I found it necessary to draft the declaration. I am seeking to establish points of consensus across Black/White political chasms in South Africa. I believe it is the kind of document which, if signed by the State President, would make the West believe that he is serious about leading South Africa to reform. I am, Madam Prime Minister, not asking for an endorsement by your Government of this specific wording of a declaration of intent that is now needed. I am simply asking that the British encourage the emergence of a consensus document, as a compromise consensus document, which could be accepted by all population groups and which would encourage the West to believe that there is hope for the future.



BUTHELEZI COMMISSION: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS

CONSTITUTIONAL:

1. Recognising the socio-economic interdependence of Natal/KwaZulu, it considers the creation of an independent KwaZulu against the interests of the people in the Province and proposes instead a consociational form of regional government with enhanced powers. It suggests a multi-ethnic executive council chosen by a Chief Minister who would in turn be elected by a Legislative Assembly elected by universal adult suffrage with proportional representation. Protection for minority groups would be built-in and they would have assured representation. The Assembly's powers would be limited by a Bill of Individual and Group Rights together with a minority group right of veto which would be over-riding on certain issues, i.e. language, religion and education. Legislation would be tested by an independent judiciary.

2. As an interim measure, a multi-ethnic council is proposed consisting of the white Provincial Council, the KwaZulu Cabinet and representatives from the Indian and Coloured communities under the joint chairmanship of the Provincial Administrator and the Chief Minister of KwaZulu. This Council would establish a series of joint commissions and committees, a steering committee to oversee constitutional changes and a multi-racial executive and legislature for the Durban metropolitan area.

ECONOMIC:

3. The Commission proposes the improvement of agricultural techniques and financing, greater utilisation of Trust lands, and the extension of black urban freehold rights but warns against rural freehold tenure, and the government's consolidation proposals. It urges the removal of racial restrictions in business, a free market in labour (abolition of influx control), the encouragement of labour intensive industry, the fostering of a viable black trade union movement and the establishment of a free port at Richards Bay.

EDUCATION:

4. The wide disparities in quality of education are examined and it is proposed to upgrade black educational standards through the gradual integration of black, white and Indian educational systems by developing non-racial district education boards and a regional educational council. Among the options offered are open schools (open to all race groups) at selected sites.



ADMINISTRATION:

5. Closer administrative co-ordination is urged through a number of newly-created regional bodies (in particular metropolitan councils and authorities for the major utilities) supervised by 'a congress of executives', a joint planning commission, a joint social and economic development commission and a joint education board.

HEALTH & WELFARE:

6. The integration of health services at district and regional level is proposed to maximise the use of rare resources with emphasis on total community development and flexibility of standards according to circumstances. The preventative rather than the curative is stressed. In rural areas, resources should be devoted to primary health care and third world medical techniques.

ATTITUDES:

7. Commenting on the evidence put before it, the Commission mentioned a high degree of tolerance between racial groups and a general acceptance that the moral position of the present regime was indefensible; a hardening of black attitudes in general but in particular among the educated urban youth; the recognition of white businessmen of the need to relax influx and other controls; that whites were more relaxed about integrating housing than education; that of all the minorities the Afrikaners expressed most concern about minority rights and that Indian attitudes towards blacks in power were ambivalent.

8. The survey of white, Indian and Coloured attitudes showed a majority were not confident about the future, expected instability and disturbances if there is no political reform, believed that KwaZulu cannot last as a separate identity, and rejected independence for KwaZulu which they see as destabilising the region. They also rejected universal suffrage (90%-whites and 60%-Coloured and Indian) and rejected extending the franchise to Indians and Coloureds only, instead supporting the gradual extension of black political rights (under 50% for whites). There was most support for the proposition that Natal/KwaZulu remains as at present with greater co-operation by blacks sharing in regional decision-making and joint government. A majority supported black representation on city and provincial councils and went as far as agreeing to allow blacks to enter white schools if they are able to pay the fees.

9. The survey of black attitudes shows 70% expressing



increased political discontent and anger and 30% espousing actual militancy and confrontation. A majority believe that ANC insurgents would receive sympathy and co-operation from many blacks; the ANC has most support on the Reef (37%) while in Natal most (67%) support Inkatha. Blacks generally express more political concern than whites and specifically compare their situation with that of whites. They reject territorial separation into black homelands; those living outside KwaZulu have no significant identification with it, and those living within have no pride of identity with it. 66% reveal no conscious tribal identity and reject KwaZulu and KwaZulu independence. 60% will however accept KwaZulu independence if it is allied to major concessions of land, urban and industrial resources and the right to live and work freely and permanently outside KwaZulu. Blacks strongly insist on black representation in South Africa's central affairs and demand universal franchise although they are prepared to accept gradual enfranchisement and regional non-racial political co-operation. They have beliefs which suggest they value democratic institutions and the principles of balance and moderation, they support the market economy rather than communal or socialist economies.

10. The Commission concludes that general black values make possible their integration into a more open political system if social and economic circumstances don't magnify racial feeling.



BUTHELEZI COMMISSION REPORT: THE REPORT ON THE ATTITUDES SURVEYS

Sample

1. The survey (carried out in 1981) was based upon a "quota sample" of:
- | | | |
|----------------|---|----------|
| 525 whites | } | in Natal |
| 200 Indians | | |
| 100 Coloureds) | | |
| 2629 blacks | - mainly but not exclusively Zulus in KwaZulu and on the Witwatersrand. | |

This was supplemented by a postal sample of 2001 whites.

Black Attitudesa) Political Concerns

2. In general blacks rate political concerns high in their list of prominent life interests. Interest in politics and militancy increase with higher urbanisation, education and income. Inkatha members tend also to be militant particularly in the urban areas. (Comment: Inkatha has hitherto been thought to be a predominantly conservative organisation.) The report found a "growing climate of revolutionary ideology" amongst blacks.

3. Although many blacks recognise economic and social improvements in recent years, feelings of anger and frustration have increased dramatically since 1977, particularly amongst middle class men. (Comment: the white establishment has long sought to create a black middle class in the hope that it would divert demands for political reform.)

4. Mr Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe had a significant impact on black South African perceptions. It changed the old belief that white power was immutable and suggested that a violent overthrow of the existing government was possible.

b) Expectations and Aspirations

5. In general blacks expect increasing unrest (in the form of strikes, boycotts, demonstrations) if there is no reform within the next ten years. There is an "overwhelming consensus" that without reform revolution will take place.

6. Blacks aspire to equality with whites. In general they are in favour of integrated facilities. But only a small majority is in favour of integrated residential areas. (Comment: "swamping" by blacks is one of many whites' "primordial" fears. This finding perhaps indicates that there would be no great stampede of blacks to white areas if the Group Areas Act were removed.)

7. Labour issues and political issues are fairly separate in the minds of most blacks. As yet there is little sign of unions being

/perceived



perceived as vehicles for achieving political change. In general further labour disturbances are expected in the next few years over economic issues.

8. As may be expected, most migrant workers would prefer a job closer to their family. But only 39% of migrant workers (mainly the lower skilled and recently urbanised) would like to bring their family with them from rural areas to the town. Even amongst urban blacks there remains a strong attachment to the land, and a resistance to urban life. (Comment: according to the report, this indicates that a relaxation of influx control would not lead to a dramatic change in the rate and pattern of urbanisation.)

9. Even in rural areas the proportion of people wanting individual title to land is as high as 60%. (The exceptions are those who have land under the tribal system and do not have to pay rent or share.) (Comment: whites often claim that blacks are unused to owning or would not wish to own land.)

c) Leadership Trends and Organisations

10. Developments since 1977 (school boycotts, the Biko affair, Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe) have led to increased support for the African National Congress (ANC). On the Witwatersrand Buthelezi has recovered some support lost to Motlana and Black Consciousness leaders in 1979/80 but remains far behind the ANC leaders. Buthelezi is the most popular black leader in KwaZulu and Natal. Trade unions are not generally regarded as political organisations (see para 7).

d) Ethnicity

11. Blacks reject most aspects of separate development. The principle is acceptable to blacks only as regards marriage and to a lesser extent housing.

12. In general it is the mainly unskilled and poorly educated people who regard themselves as primarily Zulus (or Sothos, Xhosas etc) and accept KwaZulu (or whatever homeland) as their home. Most blacks have negative feelings towards their designated homeland as a "national state" and reject "independence". Nevertheless, black interest in ethnicity is fairly high. A third of blacks in metropolitan areas and a majority in rural areas have a strong Zulu identity although there is little feeling of superiority over other groups. Amongst non-Zulus substantial numbers feared "swamping" by other tribes. (Comment: the report works hard to water down indications of "tribalism" amongst blacks. But it remains clear that, particularly at the lower end of the social scale, many blacks have a strong attachment to their tribal origins. This may however be comparable with an Afrikaner's concept of the "volk".)

e) Political Values

13. As regards systems of government there is a slim majority of blacks who would accept representatives of the homelands sitting on

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an equal basis with whites in Parliament. A substantial minority support black majority rule. The concept of a minority veto is unattractive to most blacks. (Comment: the report claims that these findings indicate that blacks would not automatically demand one man one vote.)

14. Many blacks favour equal representation of groups in government. There is no great support for domination by one group. There is little enthusiasm for separate schools for whites and coloureds or for the retention of large white farms.

15. Few blacks favour the "winner takes all" Westminster system. Large majorities favour leaders being responsive to criticism and support the principle of Parliamentary opposition and independence of the courts. A large majority however is in favour of a strong leader and a one party state. (Comment: the report claims that these findings are not necessarily contradictory as opposition to the government can be expressed in a one party system. Moreover, according to the report, whites have strong leanings towards restrictions on the democratic process.)

16. In general blacks favour a mixed economy, with private enterprise to generate growth and a welfare system to protect the underprivileged.

17. The report concludes that blacks have not fallen for "shallow idealism", and that black attitudes are not incompatible with a modern and balanced system of government.

Population Minorities (Whites, Coloureds and Indians)

18. Although only between a third and a quarter of minority groups profess anxiety about their political future, there is equally not a great deal of confidence about the future. Whites tend to be politically more conservative than coloureds and Indians, but on many issues (eg private enterprise) are closer to black views. On political issues coloureds and Indians are closer to blacks, but all three minority groups fear the consequences of black majority rule. Universal suffrage is firmly rejected by all the minority groups but there is more support for a gradual extension of political rights to blacks.

19. There was "emphatic rejection" by coloureds and Indians of the exclusion of blacks from the franchise. Coloureds and Indians in particular fear the consequences of black resentment over exclusion.

20. A majority of whites support the principles of separate development but consider independent homelands to be a security threat. The majority prefer a federal or confederal system. Whites tend to have "primordial" fears about living in homelands (eg drop in standards, crime control, authoritarianism). The report claims that many whites have a strong emotional attachment to political separation which is not consistent when confronted with the implications of this policy. For example, present government policies towards Natal are not supported by the majority of whites, coloureds, Indians and Asians.

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SUMMARY

1. THE COMMISSION HAVE RELEASED A STRONGLY WORDED STATEMENT MAKING CLEAR THEIR VIEW THAT THE COMMUNITY MUST PREPARE FOR POSSIBLE ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. THE COMMISSION EXPLAINED TO COREPER THAT THEY WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, SUBMIT PROPOSALS FOR SUCH ACTION UNLESS THERE WAS CONSENSUS IN THE TEN.

DETAIL

2. UNDER OTHER BUSINESS KRENZLER (COMMISSION) REPORTED THAT THE COMMISSION HAD THIS MORNING AGREED A STATEMENT (RELEASED AS A PRESS NOTICE, TEXT IN MIFT). KRENZLER STRESSED THE COMMISSION'S BELIEF THAT ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BECOME INEVITABLE UNLESS THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT CHANGED ITS ATTITUDE VERY QUICKLY. THE COMMISSION APPEALED TO MEMBER STATES TO RESPOND COHERENTLY AT COMMUNITY LEVEL. A MODEST COMMUNITY ACTION WOULD HAVE FAR MORE IMPACT THAN SOMETHING MORE SPECTACULAR FROM A SINGLE MEMBER STATE. THE COMMISSION WERE PREPARED TO PROPOSE THE NECESSARY COMMUNITY MEASURES BUT ONLY IF THERE WAS CONSENSUS IN THE POCO FRAMEWORK. THE COMMISSION WOULD ALSO EXAMINE HOW IT COULD STRENGTHEN ITS SUPPORT FOR ORGANISATIONS ENGAGED IN PEACEFUL ACTION TO OPPOSE APARTHEID AND FOR VICTIMS OF THE REGIME.

TO OPPOSE APARTHEID AND FOR VICTIMS OF THE REGIME.

3. HERZ (FRG) RECALLED GERMANY'S OPPOSITION TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. ELLIOTT (UK) EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE COMMISSION HAD COME OUT IN FAVOUR OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WHEN THEY WERE WELL AWARE THAT MEMBER STATES WERE DIVIDED ON THIS ISSUE AND THAT IT WAS TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON 4-5 SEPTEMBER. BUT HE NOTED THAT THE COMMISSION DID NOT INTEND TO MAKE PROPOSALS FOR EC MEASURES UNLESS THERE WAS CONSENSUS AMONG THE TEN.

4. WE UNDERSTAND FROM CABINET SOURCES (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT THE COMMISSION STATEMENT REFLECTS AN APPROACH PROPOSED BY DELORS WHO ARGUED THAT IT WAS FOR THE COMMISSION TO GIVE A LEAD IN VIEW OF THE CONFUSION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY. BUT HE DID NOT THINK THE COMMISSION SHOULD PUT FORWARD SPECIFIC PROPOSALS SINCE THESE WOULD BE ATTACKED BY MEMBER STATES AND THE COMMISSION WOULD LOOK SILLY. THE COMMISSION SHOULD TELL THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR THAT IT WAS DRAWING UP A LIST OF POSSIBLE MEASURES. THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN LITTLE DISCUSSION.

FCO ADVANCE TO:

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South Africa: repression without confidence

No reader of the Letter should be surprised by South Africa's state of emergency, the first since the Sharpeville shootings in 1960.

In the last few months successive contributors, including Nadine Gordimer, Winnie Mandela and Chief Buthelezi, have warned of the polarization between blacks and whites. On March 3 the Letter specifically predicted that 'a new flare-up is likely on the 25th anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre in three weeks' time' - a flare-up which has blazed ever since. In my last Letter Oliver Tambo, the President of the ANC, reiterated his policy to 'make South Africa ungovernable'.

Many conservatives in the US, including Republican senators, have been convinced that South Africa was heading for a bloodbath. Which makes it more worrying that Britain, with far the biggest investment and longest historical links, has remained on the sidelines.

British diplomats in Pretoria have been advising that the violence is part of a cyclical pattern which will subside. But they have been much less closely in touch than the Americans with black leaders: they complain that blacks do not accept invitations to the British embassy; yet they have no representative in Soweto, the biggest black city.

British industrialists, taking their cue from diplomats, have seen no need to dissociate themselves further from apartheid. Three months ago (see Letter 13) chief executives from the US, Britain and South Africa were invited to a secret meeting in Leeds Castle. Reports now leaking out indicate that it was the British - including the chief executives of BP and Shell - who resisted any statement opposing apartheid.


British diplomats are now in danger of repeating their blunders six years ago in Iran - where they were so nervous

of offending the Shah that they did not notice the Shi-ite revolt until too late.

That catastrophe led to a full investigation of diplomats and intelligence sources; and the former head of MI6, Sir Maurice Oldfield, sadly explained to a colleague how short-term pressures of trade had overtaken any deeper study of political revolt.

BALANCE BETWEEN HOPE AND DESPAIR

If British diplomats repeat this mistake in South Africa, where they have so much experience, it will be unforgiveable - and very costly for business. The American and French denunciations of apartheid, including the withdrawal of



THE ECU ON THE MOVE

The emotional movements between currencies has boosted the European Currency Unit or ECU which has 'gone bananas' (p.6)

This Letter keeps closely in touch with the black opposition in South Africa under the emergency (p.2-3). It also includes:

- * A settlement for Ulster (p.4)
- * The lessons of Live Aid for the development industry (p.8)

ANTHONY SAMPSON

People and pointers

THE LONDON-DUBLIN AXIS

It now seems almost certain that Mrs Thatcher, after her ignominious failure to agree with other Europeans, will be able to pull off one major coup in the next few weeks - an agreement with Ireland over joint rule in Ulster.

The collaboration will include a council of ministers from both London and Dublin to agree on general policy; joint parliamentary debates; and new legal arrangements in which judges from both North and South will preside over trials of terrorists.

The agreement will probably be signed in September by Mrs Thatcher and the Irish prime minister Garret Fitzgerald. Though both are almost unstoppable talkers the two prime ministers have come much closer to understanding each other - particularly since the IRA's attempt to assassinate the British cabinet last autumn. Fitzgerald has held together the Irish negotiations, and the agreement may depend on his keeping his job.

For Mrs Thatcher it will represent a precious victory with which to restore her flagging followers at the Conservative party conference. She will be able to show her special friendship with President Reagan, and also with the European Community, who have both promised special funds to provide aid for North and South.

But will it compensate for Mrs Thatcher's fury at being snubbed by the Germans and French at the Milan summit?.

ARMS SPENDING AND ISLAM

The more radical Islamic thinkers are increasingly concerned with the implications of arms buying in the Middle East. The Islamic Council - which was set up three years ago by Salem Azzam, a former Saudi diplomat - has become one of the fiercest critics of the arms build-up, particularly in Saudi Arabia.

The council 'calls upon the Saudi people and the Muslim Ummah to wake up to the cruel waste and misuse of its wealth and prevail upon the Saudi authorities to use it as enjoined by Islam.'

Last week the Council held a seminar

in London on 'Arab petro-dollars: what happens to them', which heard papers by several speakers including myself. A recurring theme (as Altaf Gauhar of South magazine expressed it) was that the 'increase in military spending has little relationship to security needs.'

THE MODERN MAHDI

The most awaited speaker was the Sudanese leader Sadiq el-Mahdi, the great grandson of the Great Mahdi whose troops killed General Gordon in Khartoum in 1885. At the seminar he delivered a speech explaining how Islam stood for inalienable human rights and the reconciliation of passivity and change.

Sadiq looks exotic, with his lean shape swathed in white robes; but his background is very westernised. He went to Victoria College in Alexandria, the 'Arab Eton' whose alumni range from King Hussein to Adnan Khashoggi; and studied economics at both Khartoum and Oxford.

He has already been prime minister of the Sudan - one of the many casualties of President Nimeiri - but he still has political ambitions. He is now much talked-of as the next prime minister of Sudan, under the military president General Sowar el-Dahab.

FIDEL CASTRO ON DEBT: Continued

Fidel Castro's views on Latin American debt - which Arthur Schlesinger described in Letter 20 - are further elaborated in an unlikely setting - the current (August) issue of Playboy, which includes this extract from a twenty-five hour interview with Castro:

Even if they (the debtor countries) wanted to repay (their debts), it would be an economic impossibility, a political impossibility, a moral impossibility. You would practically have to kill the people to force them to make the sacrifices required to pay that debt. Any democratic process that tries to impose those restrictions and sacrifices by force will be ruined...

I am suggesting something very

FROM MONARCH TO CANDIDATE

In London earlier this month, Giscard d'Estaing, the former President of France, showed all the signs of running for office - anxious to please, he 'worked the room' American-style with few hints of his earlier hauteur.

He was even amazingly candid about his own failure. 'Politics isn't about being liked or being respected', he told one gathering: 'It's about doing what people want you to do. I wish I'd learnt that earlier.'

It now seems very likely that after the parliamentary elections in 1986 Giscard may become prime minister under President Mitterand - the real test for the workability of the French constitution - before he bids to be President again in 1988.

SECRETS OF SOUTH KOREA

The next annual meeting of the World Bank and the IMF will begin in Seoul on October 6, and the South Koreans are determined to make it an immaculate showplace.

They expect 9000 participants, compared to the 4,700 who came to Manila in 1976 or the 6,800 who came to Belgrade

simple: using a small percent of military expenditures - which wouldn't be more than 12 percent - so the governments of the creditor nations can assume the debts from their own banks. That way, neither the banks nor the depositors would lose; to the contrary, the banks would have that money guaranteed.

Castro is certainly making a determined bid to communicate with the West, through politicians, academics and journalists. And book publishers have also been wooing him. The journalist Tad Szulc is publishing an authorised biography, which William Morrow will publish shortly. And representatives from Simon & Schuster (I learn) have been secretly flying from New York to Cuba, to arrange for publication of Castro's autobiography.

in 1979. A brand-new convention centre has just been completed in the Seoul Hilton, which will connect with offices in the Dae Woo Foundation building - so that visitors need not walk in the streets during the day.

In the huge self-sufficient hotels of Seoul, the delegates will not have much opportunity to investigate the real causes of the Korean phenomenon, which so fascinates bankers; it has grown by an average of 8% over the last quarter-century.

But the luxury should not be allowed to conceal the fact that South Korea has not only grown much faster than Latin American countries, but on a far more egalitarian basis. As Anatole Kaletsky points out in the Financial Times, the average wage for Korean administrators and managers is only 2.5 times higher than those for all employees.

WHISKY VERSUS HIGH-TECH

What do the Japanese really want from abroad? My colleague in Tokyo Murray Sayle suggested in April (Letter 15) that the West may find it hard to sell more exports to Japan, even if import restrictions are lifted.

Some confirmation appears to come from a new study by the Economic Planning Agency in Tokyo of the souvenirs that Japanese tourists bring back from abroad, after the 'golden week' holiday at the end of April. The poll showed that:

79% brought whisky or brandy
63% brought chocolates
60% brought cigarettes
57% brought perfumes and cosmetics
29% brought leather accessories
27% brought jewellery

When asked what they would have liked to buy, the tourists put jewellery first, followed by wine, cameras etc.

The EPA says it will use the surveys for its programme to boost imports by lowering tariffs and improving distribution. The results may be good news for Cutty Sark, Suchard or Marlboro, but less encouraging for more sophisticated western technology.

Currencies, Giscard and the private life of the ECU

The behaviour of currencies has now become so emotional and unpredictable that few people care to be dogmatic about them. Each currency has its own insecurities.

The dollar looks much less certain, particularly in the face of American industrial problems. As one investment fund manager in New York, Jim Rogers, told me:

It's an Indian summer over here. The Fed is loosening up to save industries like steel, textiles, agriculture, but it's making a fool's paradise. There's lots of easy money sloshing around, but people are beginning to send it out of the country. The market may continue to go up, but then it could be the end for a long time. The dollar can collapse, and who will finance the deficits? There would have to be higher interest rates.

But the falling dollar also worries many European industrialists. This is how one correspondent in Scandinavia puts it:

Why don't we Europeans start worrying about what happens if the dollar falls further? What could we sell to the Americans? What would you British get for your oil? If we lose the US market, what other market will we find?

If the dollar comes right down it'll have a snowball effect on every European economy, because we still depend on other European markets - which the US would be able to take too, since they're the really low-cost producers. And that would be bound to lead to protection.

THE POUND AND OIL

The pound has gone up from \$1.05 in early February to over \$1.4 in mid-July, apparently contradicting theories that it is linked to the oil-price. A British analyst, Roger Nightingale, maintains that the pound is not a petro-currency at all, and often moves in an opposite direction to the oil-price when expressed in SDRs.

But the fact is that dealers will still think in terms of the link, if the oil-price falls abruptly; and few people are confident that the pound can remain so high, particularly against other

European currencies.

The lure of high interest-rates will only be temporary: 'people are selling dollars and dumping into sterling', says Richard Dale of Rothschild's, 'but the rate against the Deutschmark can't be sustained for very long.'

And in the meantime the sudden collapse of the Lira, which fell by 20% against the dollar in one day, has caused a new flutter within Europe - all the more since it was caused by an Italian nationalised industry, ENI, buying dollars, which the prime minister Craxi denounced as 'monetary terrorism'.

ENTER THE ECU

The violent swings between currencies have undermined any theories, like Milton Friedman's, that floating exchange rates would produce their own equilibrium. For capital flows, with all the speculation involved, have long ago eclipsed trade flows.

THE ECU BASKET: weightings as from May 20 1985

Deutsche mark	32.1%
French franc	19.2%
British pound	15.3%
Dutch guilder	10.1%
Italian lira	9.8%
Belgian franc	8.2%
Danish krone	2.7%
Greek drachma	1.2%
Irish punt	1.2%
Luxembourg franc	0.3%

Some advocates of free enterprise are now pressing for a return to the gold-standard as the natural safeguard of sane monetary policies. The Wall Street Journal has just run three articles by Paul Fabra, the French gold bug, on this theme, with some editorial support.

But a gold standard remains highly improbable; and a more practical aim is to consolidate the major currencies.

Europeans at last show signs of moving towards a common European currency, through the ECU or European Currency Unit - the basket of European currencies which was first put together in 1979 as part of the European Monetary System -

from which Britain stayed aloof.

Since then the Ecu has surprised many bankers by acquiring its own 'private life': apart from its official use, it is increasingly used by bankers, corporations and some individuals as a currency in its own right. While the SDR basket has never really taken off, the Ecu has become a useful counterweight to the dollar.

As the dollar has sunk, so the Ecu has become more popular; and IBM made history last week by issuing bonds in Ecus. 'The whole Ecu market has gone bananas,' said a Swiss banker.

Two weeks ago Giscard d'Estaing, the former French President, gave a lecture on the Ecu at Ditchley Park in Britain which was surprisingly unreported (copies available on request).

Giscard emphasised the growing fluctuations between currencies, which often vary by 2% in one day. The DM went down by 10% against the dollar in three weeks last September, and up by 14% in the five weeks from March 4.

He appealed for 'a bold European move toward a European currency, as a component of an international monetary system based on three poles - the dollar, the Ecu and the yen.'

He proposed the full development of the Ecu market ('as the fish needs the sea, a currency needs a market') through three steps:

* including the pound in the exchange rate agreement.

* accepting the Ecu as a private instrument of payment.

* dismantling exchange controls in France and Italy.

He also advocated the creation of a European central bank, the equivalent of the Fed, which could help to pool reserves by issuing Ecus to national central banks.

WILL BRITAIN JOIN?

Giscard's speech was well-received by his British audience - with some bickering about why Britain had not joined the EMS earlier. (James Callaghan, who was prime minister at the time, accused Lord Hunt, then cabinet secretary, of having wrongly advised him: in fact it was the Treasury, particularly Sir Kenneth Couzens, who were most resistant.)

The British government now shows some signs of thinking more seriously about joining the European Monetary System, and the oscillations of currencies hit

Britain more than any country. Mrs Thatcher appears hazy on the question, but Sir Geoffrey Howe has been dropping hints about impending developments; and the Treasury has some Ecu supporters.

INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES IN ECUS

	number	value in \$US m.
1981	8	152.9
1982	17	823.4
1983	44	2191.4
1984	63	2937.5
1985*	57	3197.9

* January-June. source: Lloyds Bank

The more international British banks are exerting some influence, notably Warburgs and Morgan Grenfell (or Morgan und Grenfell as it has been dubbed since the Deutsche Bank bought an interest). They are worried that London will lose some of its supremacy in Europe if it does not join the EMS. Only one of the big commercial banks, Lloyds, is among the ten most active dealers in Ecus.

'British banks are being left out of tombstones because they haven't dealt in Ecus,' says the Belgian banker Alain Camu 'which should be a warning to the City. The Belgian banks have played a role in Ecu because the man in the street feels involved in them, but the British don't. The City is still more interested in the Atlantic'.

There remain obstacles to the wider use of the Ecu, particularly in Germany, which insists that all domestic contracts must be in DMs, as protection against inflation. But the president of the Bundesbank, Karl Otto Poehl, suggested in Paris earlier this month that Germany might relent if other Europeans were steadfast against inflation.

The Italian experience is not altogether encouraging for the EMS which had to adjust its valuations after two years of calm. But the chaos produced by the falling dollar provides stronger arguments for a closer European monetary union, which must include Britain.

The market appears to be showing the way. 'We created a system operated by the central banks', said Giscard, 'and we have seen the emergence of day-to-day operations on financial markets'.

'Let us give a currency to Europe!', he concluded. 'We will thus give a new impetus to our common endeavour: how to ensure greater monetary stability in the world at large.'

PRIME MINISTER

c Mr Flesher

SOUTH AFRICA

You will recall that there are two papers on South Africa in preparation:

- (i) a background paper for your seminar on 13 September. I have agreed with Antony Acland that the aim should be to get this to you by the end of August so that it can be circulated to participants about ten days before the seminar. I do not think that we should aim any earlier because we want it to be up to date (and events are moving fast); and I don't like seminar papers being in the hands of outsiders for too long;
- (ii) the wider Whitehall study on policy towards South Africa. The intention is that this should take account of the outcome of your seminar and be ready in time for CHOGM. The aim will be to complete it by late September.

I hope that you are content with this timetable?

CJP

[Handwritten signature]

CHARLES POWELL

30 July 1985

SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PUS

MR FERGUSSON

SIR J FREELAND

MR JOHNSON

MR O'NEILL

ED/SAFD

ED/CAFD

ED/UND

ED/NEWS DEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET



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SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

1. AFTER TEN DAYS OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY I WOULD DESCRIBE
 THE BALANCE SHEET AS FOLLOWS:

- (A) BLACK UNREST IS BEING CONTAINED BUT NOT STIFLED
 DESPITE THE ARREST OF WELL OVER 1000 ACTIVISTS.
- (B) THEIR GRIEVANCES ARE FELT MORE KEENLY THAN EVER BY
 BLACKS THEMSELVES, AND NO LESS IMPORTANTLY HAVE BEEN
 BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE WHITES AS NEVER BEFORE.
- (C) MOST WHITES ARE EITHER PERPLEXED OR APPREHENSIVE BUT
 HAVE SCARCELY BEEN TOUCHED IN THEIR DAILY LIVES.
- (D) FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S POINT OF VIEW, REACTIONS ABROAD
 ARE VERY SERIOUS, INCLUDING THE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE
 ON VOLUNTARY MEASURES AND WORRYING SIGNS OF THE INTER-
 NATIONAL BANDWAGON AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA STILL GATHERING
 SPEED.
- (E) RESTORING ORDER IS THE GOVERNMENT'S FIRST PRIORITY.
 THEY APPEAR NOT TO HAVE DECIDED WHAT TO DO AFTER THAT,
 FOR WHICH THE PROSPECTS REMAIN UNCERTAIN.

2. ADVICE FROM MODERATES OF EVERY BACKGROUND IS UNMISTAKABLE:
 THE GOVERNMENT MUST FOLLOW THE EMERGENCY BY A FRESH ATTEMPT AT
 POLITICAL REFORM AND NEGOTIATION WITH THE BLACKS. THE GOVERN-
 MENT THEMSELVES SEEM TO BE THINKING IN THOSE TERMS. MINISTERS
 HAVE SPOKEN OF THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE ONCE ORDER IS RESTORED IN
 THE TOWNSHIPS

HAVE SPOKEN OF THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE ONCE ORDER IS RESTORED IN THE TOWNSHIPS.

3. MY GUESS IS THAT THEY ARE AGONISING OVER HOW TO RESTART THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND PREVENT MATTERS SLIPPING FURTHER OUT OF CONTROL. DOUBTLESS THERE ARE HAWKS AND DOVES, RELATIVELY SPEAKING, WITHIN THE CABINET. THE INTERNAL DEBATE WILL BE NOT ONLY HOW FAR BUT HOW FAST TO GO. ALSO WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO MAKE SOME DRAMATIC MOVE OR CONTINUE MOVING STEP BY STEP. VILJOEN, WHO DEALS WITH BLACK AFFAIRS, IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT ARE PRESSING ON WITH IDEAS FOR COMMON CITIZENSHIP AND CHANGES IN INFLUX CONTROL (I MAY LEARN MORE WHEN I SEE HIM SHORTLY).

4. THE DIFFICULTY TO PUT IT MILDLY IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAVE TO GRASP SEVERAL NETTLES AT THE SAME TIME. THE FIRST IS WHAT THEY MAY BE PREPARED TO OFFER THE BLACKS. HERE THE MOST CANVASSED OPTION IS A DECLARATION OF INTENT ABOUT POLITICAL RIGHTS. HOWEVER NOT ONLY HAVE THE GOVERNMENT TILL NOW REFUSED ANY SUCH STATEMENT AS AN OPENING GAMBIT BUT IT WOULD BE AN UNCHARACTERISTIC BOWING TO PRESURE FROM A LEADERSHIP WHOSE APPROACH TO REFORM HAS ALWAYS BEEN SLOW AND CAUTIOUS. SECONDLY, FAR MORE IS AT ISSUE THAN POLITICAL RIGHTS. THE UNREST AND VIOLENCE STEM LARGELY FROM PAST LAWS, INFERIOR EDUCATION, TOTALLY INADEQUATE HOUSING AND SO ON. EVERY GRIEVANCE IS LINKED TO A MULTITUDE OF OTHER GRIEVANCES. EVERY REFORM INCREASES THE APPETITE OF BLACKS FOR FURTHER REFORM. SUCH IS THE LEGACY OF THE PAST.

5. THIRDLY, NO PROMISES OR STATEMENTS WILL HELP UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT CAN FIND BLACKS WITH WHOM TO TALK. MINISTERS HAVE CLAIMED SOME PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE THROUGH PRIVATE CONTACTS WITH INDIVIDUAL LEADERS. NOBODY WHOM I HAVE CONSULTED PUTS MUCH FAITH IN THIS. MOREOVER, THE STATE OF EMERGENCY HAS ENORMOUSLY REDUCED WHATEVER HOPE THERE WAS OF A QUIET DIALOGUE ON THE GOVERNMENT'S TERMS. THERE IS NO CHANCE OF LEADING BLACKS COMING FORWARD UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT HOLD OUT GREATER HOPE OF ADVANCEMENT OVER POLITICAL RIGHTS AND IN OTHER WAYS. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE ONLY THEMSELVES TO BLAME FOR LOCKING UP MANY (BUT BY NO MEANS ALL) OF THOSE WHO CAN CLAIM TO BE AT ALL REPRESENTATIVE OF BLACK OPINION.

6. I WOULD NOT EXPECT TOO MUCH FROM A MEETING LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND BISHOP TUTU. THE MEETING NONETHELESS IS SIGNIFICANT IN ITSELF. IT WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED 3 MONTHS AGO. IMPROBABLE AS IT SEEMS, HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT MAY EVENTUALLY FIND THEY HAVE LITTLE ALTERNATIVE BUT TO TALK TO PEOPLE HITHERTO REGARDED AS UNACCEPTABLE, SUCH AS ANY MORE MODERATE UDF LEADERS AND, AT LOCAL LEVEL, CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS WHO SPEAK FOR BLACKS IN THE TOWNSHIPS.

7. THE BIGGEST SINGLE STEP THE GOVERNMENT COULD TAKE TO TRANSFORM THE SITUATION WOULD BE TO RELEASE MANDELA. THIS WOULD BE AN ENORMOUS LEAP IN THE DARK. IT MIGHT ONLY EXCITE THE TOWNSHIPS BEYOND ANYTHING YET SEEN. I WOULD NOT RULE IT OUT AS PART OF A PACKAGE ONCE THE GOVERNMENT CAN POINT TO DIALOGUE BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE HAVING STARTED. BUT PERSONALLY I WOULD BE SURPRISED TO SEE THE GOVERNMENT RELEASE MANDELA UNCONDITIONALLY AS A FIRST STEP.

8. THE HOPE MUST BE THAT HAVING TAKEN MEASURES AGAINST UNREST

8. THE HOPE MUST BE THAT HAVING TAKEN MEASURES AGAINST UNREST AT SUCH POLITICAL COST, THE GOVERNMENT WILL SEE THE EMERGENCY AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A NEW STEP FORWARD. THEY WILL HAVE REASSURED THEIR WHITE CONSTITUENTS BY HAVING ACTED DECISIVELY TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER. THERE ARE SOME SIGNS OF WHITE OPINION COMING TO ACCEPT THE NEED FOR MORE EXTENSIVE REFORM; THE RECENT REPORT ON APARTHEID BY A GOVERNMENT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, AN OPINION POLL SHOWING A MAJORITY OF WHITES IN FAVOUR OF A BLACK CHAMBER IN PARLIAMENT, LIBERAL VIEWS AMONG AFRIKANER STUDENTS AT STELLENBOSCH, URGINGS FROM THE BUSINESS SECTOR. SOME OF MY COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES AGREE WITH ME THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT EVEN BRING THEMSELVES TO ISSUE A STATEMENT OF INTENT WITHOUT APPEARING TO BACKTRACK ON THEIR PREVIOUS INSISTENCE THAT THIS CAN ONLY FOLLOW CONSULTATION WITH BLACKS. MINISTERS COULD MAKE A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY BY CLAIMING OR PRETENDING THAT ENOUGH HAS ALREADY EMERGED FROM PRIVATE EXCHANGES IN RECENT WEEKS TO JUSTIFY A STATEMENT DRESSED UP AS REFLECTING BLACK OPINION. WE SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE THIS POSSIBILITY, ALTHOUGH THE ODDS ARE STILL AGAINST IT.

9. IN ANY CASE THE FIRST STEP IS TO RE-ESTABLISH ORDER IN THE TOWNSHIPS. LITTLE IF ANYTHING CAN BE ACHIEVED UNTIL THE EMERGENCY POWERS ARE LIFTED.

MOBERLY

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AUSTRALIAN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

1. SPEAKING IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW ON 28 JULY THE AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, MR HAYDEN, SAID THAT HE AND THE TRADE MINISTER, MR DAWKINS, ARE CONDUCTING A REVIEW OF AUSTRALIA'S OFFICIAL LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA. HE SAID THAT AUSTRALIA WOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE PROSPECT OF GLOBAL SANCTIONS UNTIL IT COULD BE ESTABLISHED WHETHER THEY WOULD BE EFFECTIVE. IF THEY COULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE, AUSTRALIA WOULD REVIEW THE SITUATION TO SEE WHAT UNILATERAL ACTION COULD BE TAKEN. MR HAYDEN CONFIRMED THAT MR HAWKE WILL INTRODUCE PROPOSALS FOR A TRADE EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AT THE CHOGM.
2. ON 26 JULY MR HAYDEN HAD SAID THAT AUSTRALIA WOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY FRANCE IN THE UNSC, BUT HAD IMPLIED THAT AUSTRALIA FAVOURED MORE EXTENSIVE SANCTIONS. HE SAID THAT AUSTRALIA HAD "BEEN MAKING DISCREET CONTACT WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO SEE WHETHER A GLOBAL COMMERCIAL EMBARGO WAS PRACTICABLE" BUT THAT THESE MOVES HAD BEEN "OVERTAKEN BY THIS VERY SUDDEN DEVELOPMENT ON THE PART OF THE FRENCH".
3. PRESS COMMENTATORS SEE THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REVIEW AS THE CLOSURE OF THE AUSTRALIAN TRADE COMMISSION IN JOHANNESBURG. (AUSTRALIAN EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA IN 1983-84 WERE WORTH AUD 279 MILLION, WHILE IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA WERE WORTH AUD 132 MILLION). THE DEPUTY LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION HAS DESCRIBED THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS IN THE UNSC AS "MISTAKEN AND SHORT-SIGHTED". HE SAID THAT SANCTIONS WOULD HURT POOR BLACKS MORE THAN ANY SECTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNITY. EDITORIAL COMMENT HAS BEEN VERY MIXED, RANGING FROM "IRRESPONSIBLE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS THROUGH THEIR MINDLESS ADVOCACY OF SANCTIONS THREATEN TO PLUNGE THE COUNTRY INTO POVERTY AND A REVOLUTIONARY BLOODBATH" (THE AUSTRALIAN) TO "VOLUNTARY SANCTIONS ARE WORTH PURSUING AT THIS CRUCIAL MOMENT IN THE TRAGEDY OF SOUTH AFRICA" (THE AGE). THERE IS VERY LITTLE DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE UK POSITION, AND 'THE AGE' NOTES THAT THE ABSTENTION BY THE UK AND THE USA ON THE FRENCH RESOLUTION IS AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL TO SOUTH AFRICA.
4. SEE MIFT.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 2261 OF 29 JULY
INFO BONN, PARIS, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRETORIA,
INFO SAVING: LUANDA, MAPUTO,
WASHINGTON TELNO 2211: US/SOUTH AFRICA

SUMMARY

1. HOUSE/SENATE CONFERENCE ON SANCTIONS LEGISLATION TO MEET THIS WEEK. LUGAR IMPLYING THAT PRESIDENT WOULD ACCEPT THE SENATE VERSION, BUT STATE DEPARTMENT MAINTAINING THEIR PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO ANY SANCTIONS. NSC MEETING REAFFIRMS POLICY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT, BUT ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS SLOWLY BECOMING MORE CRITICAL OF SOUTH AFRICA.

DETAIL

2. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN LUGAR LET IT BE KNOWN ON 27 JULY THAT HE WAS NOW IN FAVOUR OF RAPID PROGRESS ON LEGISLATION TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. UNTIL 26 JULY HE HAD DELAYED NAMING SENATE PARTICIPANTS IN THE HOUSE/SENATE CONFERENCE, APPARENTLY IN THE HOPE OF PERSUADING HOUSE DEMOCRATS TO SETTLE FOR THE LESSER SANCTIONS CONTAINED IN THE SENATE PROPOSAL AND THUS AVOID THE NEED FOR ANY CONFERENCE AT ALL. BUT, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND NEW YORK, HE AND OTHERS ON THE HILL HAVE EVIDENTLY CONCLUDED THAT CONGRESS HAS TO BE SEEN TO BE TAKING ACTION. THE CONFERENCE WILL THEREFORE GET UNDER WAY ON 31 JULY. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE CLEARLY HOPING THAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WILL STILL PROVE TOO GREAT TO ENABLE AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED BEFORE THE 2 AUGUST RECESS.

3. AS PART OF HIS EFFORT TO WIN DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT, LUGAR HAS BEEN IMPLYING THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT VETO LEGISLATION ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED BY THE SENATE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT, HOWEVER, CONTINUED TO INSIST PUBLICLY TODAY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION REMAINED WHOLLY OPPOSED TO PUNITIVE MEASURES OF ANY KIND. PRIVATELY, SOME OF CROCKER'S OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THIS LINE IS BECOMING HARD TO SUSTAIN (AND IT APPEARS THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN HIMSELF STRAYED SOMEWHAT BEYOND THE AFRICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU GUIDANCE HE WAS DRAWING ON TODAY).

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4. THE ADMINISTRATION'S PUBLIC LINE ON EVENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA HAS, IN ANY CASE, ALREADY HARDENED. ON 26 JULY THE ADMINISTRATION FOR THE FIRST TIME DEMANDED AN EARLY END TO THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, AND CALLED ON THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO ACT WITH THE GREATEST RESTRAINT. BUT WHITE HOUSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMEN STILL REITERATE THE ADMINISTRATION'S FAITH IN CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENTS AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT A HIGH-LEVEL NSC MEETING HELD ON 26 JULY BROADLY REAFFIRMED THE THRUST OF THE PRESENT POLICY.

FCO PASS SAVING LUANDA AND MAPUTO

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 257 OF 27 JULY

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, HELSINKI

INFO ROUTINE ALL EC POSTS, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, OSLO
PRETORIA, LUANDA, LUSAKA, LILONGWE, MAPUTO, MBABANE,
DAR ES SALAAM, KINSHASA, KAMPALA, HARARE

INFO SAVING UKDEL STRASBOURG, ANKARA, LISBON, MADRID, TOKYO,
WELLINGTON, OTTAWA, MEXICO CITY, BERNE.

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: MEETING OF AFRICAN DIRECTORS:

LUXEMBOURG 27 JULY

SUMMARY

1. WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS ON POSSIBLE ECONOMIC ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. UK AND FRG FIRMLY OPPOSED. ITALY, BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG MODERATELY SO. FRANCE OPPOSED TO MANDATORY ACTION. OTHERS SUPPORT FRENCH PROPOSALS FOR VOLUNTARY ACTION ONLY AS SECOND BEST TO MANDATORY ACTION.

2. SIMILAR DIVERSITY OF APPROACH TO NONECONOMIC MEASURES. AGREED THAT AFRICA WORKING GROUP SHOULD COMPILE, FOR INTERNAL USE, INVENTORY OF EXISTING MEASURES.

3. PRESIDENCY TO EXPLORE FURTHER POSSIBILITY OF MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION IN HELSINKI.

DETAIL

4. WURTH (PRESIDENCY) OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY SUGGESTING AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE MEASURES PROPOSED BY FRANCE IN HER DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. NATIONAL POSITIONS, IN THE ORDER PRESENTED, WERE AS FOLLOWS SEMICOLON

AUSSEIL (FRANCE): RECENT PERIOD HAD SEEN RAPID DETERIORATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. FRENCH MINISTERS HAD MADE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS. PUBLIC AND THIRD WORLD OPINION DEMANDED A RESPONSE. FRENCH IDEAS INTENDED TO PROVIDE THIS. MEASURES PROPOSED WERE VOLUNTARY AND INDICATIVE. FRANCE REMAINED OPPOSED TO MANDATORY ECONOMIC ACTION.

JOHNSON (UK): SHARED ABHORRENCE OF APARTHEID. BUT VOLUNTARY MEASURES WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO MANDATORY ONES. WHAT WOULD THOSE ACHIEVE? WOULD THEY MAKE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT MORE FLEXIBLE? WHO WOULD THEY HURT? ANSWERS TO ALL THOSE QUESTIONS ARGUED FIRMLY AGAINST SUCH MEASURES. WOULD NOT BRING END TO APARTHEID ANY CLOSER, WOULD MAKE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT MORE RIGID, AND WOULD MOST HURT BLACK COMMUNITY AND SOUTH AFRICA'S BLACK NEIGHBOURS. MOST VIABLE ROUTE TO POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA REMAINED THROUGH ECONOMIC GROWTH. SHOULD ASSIST THIS EG THROUGH HELP TO TRAINING SCHEMES FOR BLACKS. MUST REMAIN ENGAGED WHILE PRESSING FOR NECESSARY REFORMS.

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SULIMMA (FRG): VERY SIMILAR VIEWS TO UK. ECONOMIC MEASURES WOULD NOT WORK AND WOULD AFFECT THE WRONG PEOPLE. BUT SOME RESPONSE WAS REQUIRED TO PUBLIC PRESSURE. FRG LOOKING AT POSSIBILITIES SUCH AS JOINT WITHDRAWAL OF AMBASSADORS. MINISTERS SHOULD DISCUSS IN HELSINKI.

HASLUND (DENMARK): DENMARK HAD SUPPORTED MANDATORY SANCTIONS FOR 20 YEARS. SUPPORTED FRENCH IDEAS AS SECOND BEST (DESPITE FEARS THAT PARLIAMENT WOULD REJECT THEM AS TOO WEAK) WORKING WITH OTHER NORDICS ON NEW RANGE OF NONECONOMIC MEASURES TO PRESENT TO NORDIC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING ON 17-18 OCTOBER.

KAPPEYNE VAN DE COPPELLO (NETHERLANDS): SIMILAR APPROACH TO DENMARK. SUPPORT FRENCH PROPOSALS AS SECOND BEST. WOULD HAVE APPRECIATED PRIOR CONSULTATION. PLANNING TO MAKE CODE OF CONDUCT MANDATORY

CORRIAS (ITALY): EQUIVOCAL OPPOSITION TO FRENCH IDEAS. SANCTIONS INEFFECTIVE AND MISDIRECTED. BUT PUBLIC OPINION REQUIRED SOME RESPONSE. MINISTERS IN HELSINKI SHOULD DISCUSS WHETHER FRENCH IDEAS MIGHT CONSTITUTE THIS.

VAN DEN MAAGDENBERG (BELGIUM): OPPOSED TO ECONOMIC MEASURES FOR SAME REASONS AS UK. BUT LOOKING AT OTHER POSSIBILITIES SUCH AS FREEZING CULTURAL LINKS, DISCOURAGING TRAVEL TO SOUTH AFRICA AND EXCLUDING SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ATTACHES.

BARRINGTON (IRELAND): SIMILAR APPROACH TO NETHERLANDS. REGRET WEAKNESS OF MINISTERIAL STATEMENT OF 22 JULY. NATIONALLY OBSERVING STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS EMBARGO AND BAN ON PUBLIC SECTOR IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA.

WURTH (LUXEMBOURG): SURPRISED BY FRENCH INITIATIVE. DO NOT BELIEVE THAT OBLIGATORY MEASURES WOULD BE EFFECTIVE. AND COULD ONLY SUPPORT VOLUNTARY MEASURES IF CONFIDENT THEY WOULD BE WIDELY IMPLEMENTED.

KARACASSIS (GREECE): CHIEF MOTIVE OF POLICY IS CONCERN FOR GREEK COMMUNITY IN SOUTH AFRICA. COULD ONLY SUPPORT FRENCH IDEAS IF IMPLEMENTED BY ALL THE TEN.

SERRANTIE (COMMISSION): (IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT QUESTION) COMMISSION WOULD NOT PROPOSE JOINT COMMUNITY ECONOMIC ACTION IN ABSENCE OF POLITICAL CONCENSUS AMONG TEN.

5. WURTH THEN PROPOSED THAT THE GROUP GO IN DETAIL THROUGH THE FRENCH AND OTHER IDEAS TO SEE WHICH WERE GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE. JOHNSON OBJECTED. THIS GROUP HAD NO MANDATE TO PROPOSE JOINT ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. TO DO SO WOULD BE TO PREJUDGE A MAJOR QUESTION OF POLITICAL PRINCIPLE. CORRIAS AND (SURPRISINLY) AUSSEIL AGREED. WURTH RESPONDED THAT THE GROUP MIGHT EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON THE VARIOUS IDEAS UNDER DISCUSSION, ALTHOUGH WITHOUT SEEKING TO REACH AGREED RECOMMENDATIONS. THIS WAS ACCEPTED.

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6. THE RESULTING TOUR DE TABLE LARGELY REITERATED POINTS ALREADY MADE. ALL THOSE WHO SPOKE SAID THEY DISCOURAGED SPORTING CONTACTS. SULIMMA SAID THE FRG WAS REFUSING TO ALLOW THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ATTACHE IN BONN TO BE REPLACED. HASLUND GAVE AN ENORMOUS LIST OF MEASURES AGREED BY THE NORDICS INTENDED SO FAR AS POSSIBLE TO EXCLUDE ANY ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC OR SPORTING CONTACT WITH SOUTH AFRICA (FULL LIST BY BAG TO DEPARTMENT). JOHNSON SAID THE CHIEF CRITERION FOR THE UK WAS WHETHER, IN OUR VIEW, A PARTICULAR ACTION WOULD EFFECTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA. KAPPEYNE VAN DE COPPELLO SAID THAT WHILE THE NETHERLANDS HAD TAKEN CERTAIN MEASURES TO REDUCE CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC AND SPORTING CONTACTS THEY HAD NO PLANS AT PRESENT TO WITHDRAW THEIR AMBASSADOR.

7. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS EXCHANGE IT WAS AGREED THAT THE AFRICA WORKING GROUP AT ITS NEXT MEETING SHOULD COMPILE, FOR INTERNAL USE, AN INVENTORY OF NATIONAL MEASURES ALREADY INTRODUCED BY MEMBERS OF THE TEN. VAN DEN MAAGDENBERG SUGGESTED THAT THE COMMON KERNEL OF THIS INVENTORY MIGHT BE EFFECTIVELY PRESENTABLE AS THE JOINT POSITION OF THE TEN. HASLUND NOTED THAT DISCOURAGEMENT OF SPORTING CONTACTS SEEMED TO FORM PART OF THAT COMMON KERNEL.

8. WURTH SUGGESTED THAT THE GROUP CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF WHAT MIGHT BE MEANT BY THE REFERENCE IN THE MINISTERIAL STATEMENT TO 'REASONABLE DELAY' WITHIN WHICH THE TEN WOULD RECONSIDER THEIR POSITIONS. SULIMMA, JOHNSON AND CORRIAS POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS A PREMATURE, AND VAGUE, QUESTION. AUSSEIL SUGGESTED THAT THE 'REASONABLE DELAY' MAY ALREADY HAVE ELAPSED.

9. FINALLY, WURTH SOUGHT AGREEMENT THAT MINISTERS, SHOULD TAKE DISCUSSION FURTHER IN HELSINKI. SULIMMA AND AUSSEIL SUPPORTED. CORRIAS PLEADED LACK OF INSTRUCTIONS. JOHNSON ASKED WHAT PURPOSE SUCH A DISCUSSION WAS LIKELY TO SERVE IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF CONSENSUS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL. OTHERS SEEMED TACITLY TO ACCEPT THAT MINISTERS SHOULD MEET. WURTH CONCLUDED THAT THE PRESIDENCY WOULD PURSUE THE IDEA. AMBASSADORS IN HELSINKI WOULD DISCUSS POSSIBLE DATES.

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 566 OF 26 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA PARIS WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE BONN OTTAWA COPENHAGEN CANBERRA DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA

LUSAKA HARARE GABORONE MAPUTO

INFO SAVING ADDIS ABABA MOSCOW LAGOS NEW DELHI DAKAR

YOUR TEL NO 261 (NOT TO ALL):

SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON SOUTH AFRICA: CONCLUSION.

SUMMARY.

1. AFTER 10 FURTHER SPEECHES OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE AND PROTRACTED NON-ALIGNED DELIBERATIONS, THE TWO DAY DEBATE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMERGENCY ENDS WITH:

(A) A NON-ALIGNED DRAFT AMENDMENT REFERRING TO CHAPTER VII MEASURES BEING VETOED BY THE UK AND THE US (FRANCE ABSTAINING, HAVING RENEGED ON A PROMISE TO VETO):

(B) THE PASSAGE OF SCR. 569 (TEXT IN MIFT) BY 13-0-2 (UK,US).

DETAIL

DEBATE

2. THE SPEAKERS DURING TWO FURTHER SESSIONS WERE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, MADAGASCAR, SENEGAL, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, ZAIRE, SYRIA, ETHIOPIA, GDR, YUGOSLAVIA AND THE UKRAINE. ZAIRE GAVE STRONG SUPPORT TO THE FRENCH INITIATIVE. SEVERAL OF THE OTHER SPEAKERS COMPLAINED THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH.

RESOLUTION

3. AFTER A DAY AND A HALF OF NEGOTIATION, THE FRENCH FAILED TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE NON-ALIGNED ON THE TEXT. THE NON-ALIGNED INSISTED ON A REFERENCE TO CHAPTER VII MEASURES, AND SAID THAT THE LEAST THEY COULD ACCEPT WOULD BE REPETITION OF OP 13 OF SCR 566 (THE NAMIBIA RESOLUTION ADOPTED LAST MONTH WITH BRITISH AND AMERICAN ABSTENTIONS AND FRANCE VOTING IN FAVOUR). THE FRENCH ARGUED THAT THIS LANGUAGE WAS INAPPROPRIATE TO A RESOLUTION ON APARTHEID AND WOULD BE VETOED. THEY LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE THREATENING TO CAST A VETO THEMSELVES, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER KEMOULARIA SAID THIS IN TERMS. THE FRENCH TERMINATED THE NEGOTIATIONS BY TABLING A VERSION OF THEIR ORIGINAL TEXT WHICH TOOK ON BOARD SOME OF THE Milder AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY THE NON-ALIGNED. THE NON-ALIGNED RESPONDED BY PUTTING FORWARD THE AMENDMENT IN MY SECOND IFT.

4. WHEN THE FRENCH INFORMED US OF THE OUTCOME OF THEIR NEGOTIATIONS, KEMOULARIA SAID CATEGORICALLY (TO CLARK OF THE US AND TO ME SIMULTANEOUSLY) THAT FRANCE WOULD VETO THE NON-ALIGNED AMENDMENT. HIS DEPUTY REPEATED THIS DURING THE AFTERNOON. HALF AN HOUR BEFORE THE VOTE, KEMOULARIA TOLD CLARK THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ABSTAIN. UNTIL WE TOOK THE MATTER UP WITH THE FRENCH DELEGATION, KEMOULARIA DID NOT HAVE THE COURTESY TO TELL ME DIRECTLY. WE MADE OUR FEELINGS CLEAR, WITH RESTRAINT. KEMOULARIA'S COUNSELLOR BLAMED THE DECISION ON THE MATIGNON, AND SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD DIRECT ANY COMPLAINTS TO THAT QUARTER. (HE LATER CALLED TO EXPRESS HIS PERSONAL APOLOGIES AND EMBARRASSMENT.)

EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE

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5. MY POV IS IN MY THIRD IFT.

6. KEMOULARIA CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE FRENCH INITIATIVE, AND EXPLAINED THE ABSTENTION ON THE AMENDMENT SIMPLY BY SAYING THAT IT DID NOT APPLY TO THE SUBJECT BEFORE THE COUNCIL. CLARK (US) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD MAINTAIN THE POLICY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT, AS A VOICE OF REASON SPEAKING TO SOUTH AFRICA, AND REPEATED HIS EARLIER STRICTURES ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF ISOLATION.

7. BURKINA FASO (FOR THE NON-ALIGNED) REGRETTED THAT THE RESOLUTION SUFFERED FROM A FUNDAMENTAL GAP BY CONTAINING NOT EVEN A VEILED REFERENCE TO CHAPTER VII, REGRETTED THE VETOES, AND DEPLORED FORMULATIONS WHICH APPEARED TO LEGITIMISE THE RACIST REGIME.

8. THE USSR CRITICISED THE US AND THE UK FOR THEIR VETOES AND ABSTENTIONS.

CONCLUSION

9. OUR VETOES SAVED THE DAY FOR FRANCE. THERE HAD BEEN WIDESPREAD SPECULATION ABOUT FRENCH MOTIVES IN CONVENING THE COUNCIL. IT WAS FELT THAT THE FRENCH HAD PROBABLY ACCOMPLISHED THEIR DOMESTIC OBJECTIVES THROUGH THEIR INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT (AND THE QUAI APPARENTLY SAID AS MUCH TO THE US EMBASSY ON 25 JULY, IMPLYING THAT SUCCESS AT THE UN WAS NO LONGER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE). THE RECALL OF THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BAN ON NEW INVESTMENT HAVING ALSO ACHIEVED A WIDE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT, IT IS HARD TO DIVINE WHY THE FRENCH EXPOSED THEIR MEASURES TO CRITICAL ATTENTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND RAN THE RISK OF AN UNSUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION. THEIR DRAFT WAS A GAMBLE, AS THEY WERE ASKING THE NON-ALIGNED TO ACCEPT MEASURES BELOW THE HIGH-WATER MARK OF SCR 566, AND TO ADDRESS THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMERGENCY ON THE COAT-TAILS OF A WESTERN PERMANENT MEMBER. LIKE THE DUTCH WITH THE ARMS IMPORT BAN LAST YEAR (SCR 558), THE FRENCH FOUND THAT GRATITUDE AT THEIR INITIATIVE DID NOT INHIBIT THE NON-ALIGNED FROM SEEKING AWKWARD AMENDMENTS. EVEN IF THEY HAD SUCCEEDED IN DRIVING THEIR ORIGINAL DRAFT THROUGH IN A SINGLE SESSION WITHOUT ARGUMENT, THE FRENCH WOULD HAVE CREATED A ROD FOR THEIR OWN BACKS ON THE NEXT OCCASION THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS ASKED TO CONSIDER SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. THEY HAD RAISED EXPECTATIONS HIGH, AND HAD A HARD TIME EXPLAINING WHY THEY COULD NOT GO BEYOND THEIR EXISTING TEXT. HAD THEY NOT COME TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THEIR STOCK AT THE UN WOULD STILL HAVE RISEN VERY HIGH. INSTEAD, THEY SUBMITTED THEMSELVES TO A LONG ARGUMENT WITH THE NON-ALIGNED, IN WHICH THE LIMITATIONS OF THEIR POSITION WERE EXPOSED. THIS THREATENED TO LEAVE THEM WITH A MESSY OUTCOME. HOWEVER, WHETHER BY ACCIDENT OR BY DESIGN (OR BOTH), THE FRENCH IN THE END WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR A SITUATION IN WHICH THE UK AND THE US ATTRACTED ODIUM BY VETOING A CHAPTER VII PROPOSAL, WHILE FRANCE APPEARED LESS INTRANSIGENT BY ABSTAINING AND GAINED CREDIT FOR CO-SPONSORING THE RESOLUTION.

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10. ALTHOUGH THE IMPLICATIONS OF SCR 569 MAY IN THE LONG RUN PROVE AWKWARD FOR FRANCE, IN THE SHORT TERM IT IS THE US AND THE UK WHOSE POSITION AT THE UN HAS SUSTAINED DAMAGE. IT WILL BE EVIDENT FROM OUR REPORTS THAT THE FRENCH, FROM START TO FINISH, MADE VERY LITTLE EFFORT TO CONSULT US OR TO KEEP US INFORMED. THE DANES WERE MUCH BETTER, AND DID THEIR BIT AS INOFFENSIVELY AS THEY COULD IN AN AWKWARD SITUATION. AUSTRALIA PLAYED VIRTUALLY NO PART. INDIA AND BURKINA FASO APPEARED TO DRIVE THE NON-ALIGNED PACK. COORDINATION WITH THE US WAS EXCELLENT THROUGHOUT.

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TELNO 227 OF 24 JULY

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MR KINNOCK'S VISIT.

1. MR KINNOCK CALLED ON PRESIDENT NYERERE ON 23 JULY. THE DISCUSSION LASTED 90 MINUTES.

SOUTH AFRICA:

2. NYERERE WELCOMED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA. RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA BY ITSELF WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH; SOUTH AFRICA MUST BE WILLING TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES. ALTHOUGH THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME APPEARED SOLID ON THE OUTSIDE, IT COULD WELL CRUMBLE QUICKLY NOW IT WAS UNDER PRESSURE.

3. KINNOCK SAID THAT THE RECENT US CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION ON SANCTIONS, AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WERE ENCOURAGING. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE BRITAIN TAKE A SIMILAR STAND ON SANCTIONS, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT IN FAVOUR OF A WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, WHO SHOULD BE USED TO INFLUENCE THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. BRITAIN HAD A LARGE INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, BUT WAS NOT YET EXERTING SUFFICIENT PRESSURE. BILATERAL ACTION MIGHT BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN COLLECTIVE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ACTION.

AFRICAN ECONOMIC CRISIS.

4. NYERERE HOPED THAT AFRICAN STATES WOULD TAKE THE OAU RESOLUTION ON ECONOMIC MATTERS SERIOUSLY. HE BELIEVED THAT SADCC WOULD DO SO AT THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT IN ARUSHA. ON DEBT, AFRICA WANTED TO PAY BUT SIMPLY COULD NOT. THE ANNUAL INTEREST BURDEN WAS NOW US.DOL. 17 BILLION ON A DEBT OF US.DOL. 170 BILLION.

5. KINNOCK AGREED THAT THE WEST SHOULD APPROACH AFRICA'S DEBT PROBLEM ON A DIFFERENT BASIS: AND THAT A JOINT MEETING OF ALL CREDITORS AND ALL DEBTORS WAS DESIRABLE - CONSULTATION, NOT CONFRONTATION.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

6. NYERERE SAID HE WAS IN FAVOUR OF EUROPEAN UNITY AND ASKED WHERE KINNOCK STOOD. KINNOCK REPLIED THAT, WHILE EUROPEAN UNITY WAS A FANTASY, HE AND HIS GENERATION HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN THINKING OF THEMSELVES AS EUROPEANS JUST AS TANZANIANS THOUGHT OF THEMSELVES AS AFRICANS. HOWEVER, THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY

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AND THE COMMUNITY'S APPROACH T TO THE THIRD WORLD WERE BASED ON THE ATTITUDES OF THE NINETEEN FIFTIES AND NEEDED UP-DATING. PUBLIC OPINION WAS AHEAD OF GOVERNMENT OPINION IN THIS RESPECT.

NYERERE'S FUTURE.

7. NYERERE HOPED THAT THE TANZANIAN ELECTORATE WOULD CHOOSE AN ACTIVE PRESIDENT FROM THE YOUNGER GENERATION AS HIS SUCCESSOR. HE PLANNED TO RETIRE TO HIS VILLAGE AFTER HE RESIGNED AS PARTY CHAIRMAN IN 1987.

8. KINNOCK SAID HE WAS SURE NYERERE WOULD MAINTAIN HIS INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS, SUCH AS THE SIX-NATION DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE. NYERERE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES (HIS STAFF LATER CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD NOT CONTINUE AS CHAIRMAN AFTER OCTOBER).

9. IMF NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOT DISCUSSED. HOWEVER, AT EARLIER MEETING FINANCE MINISTER MSUYA SAID THAT TANZAVIAPSTILL NEEDED IMF LOANS, BUT THE IMF HAD BEEN NEITHER REALISTIC NOR SYMPATHETIC. KINNOCK AGREED THAT THE IMF WAS WORKING ON THE WRONG PRINCIPLES.

10. KINNOCK LATER GAVE PUBLIC LECTURE AT UNIVERSITY IN WHICH HE CALLED FOR MANDATORY SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AND FOR URGENT ACTION BY THE WEST ON THE AFRICAN DEBT PROBLEMS. TEXT BY BAG TO EAD.

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10 DOWNING STREET

col

France are recalling their
ambassador from South
Africa.

(press office advice)

Margo

24/7/85.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

South Africa

Our glorious Trench allies, four
days after subscribing to a
statement by the Ten on South
Africa, have today:

- recalled their Ambassador;
- put a ban on new investment; and
- without a word of warning,
summoned a UN Security Council
meeting to discuss economic
measures against South Africa.

C.D.P.
24/7.

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15/PC
CDQ
25/7.

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

24 July 1985

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear Charles,

UK POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

Len Appleyard sent me a copy of his letter of 19 July, containing the Foreign Secretary's paper on this subject, to which you responded on 22 July.

The Chancellor agrees on the need for a comprehensive analysis of the sanctions issue. He welcomes the suggestion that this work should be put in hand as soon as possible, and assumes that Treasury officials (together with those from the Bank of England as necessary) will be closely involved in the further work now envisaged.

I am sending copies of this letter to Len Appleyard (FCO), John Mogg (DTI), Geoff Dart (DofEn) and John Bartlett (Bank).

*Yours ever
Rachel*

RACHEL LOMAX
Principal Private Secretary



COPIED

III



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 July 1985

late *SL*
SL3AKH
CCFCO
Sue G

I have been asked by the Prime Minister to enquire whether you would be prepared to join a small group of Ministers, Members of Parliament, businessmen, academic experts and officials at Chequers on Friday 13 September to discuss policy towards Southern Africa.

We propose that the group should assemble at Chequers at 1000 that day. The discussion would take up the whole of the morning and continue over lunch, ending at about 1400/1430.

Since Chequers is not altogether easy to reach by public transport, we shall arrange overnight accommodation at a nearby hotel for the night of 12/13 September for those participants who so wish. All accommodation and travel expenses will, of course, be reimbursed.

The Prime Minister would much appreciate it if you were able to take part. It would be helpful to know fairly soon whether you can do so. If you prefer to reply by telephone, the number to ring is (01) 930 4433. Please ask for Mrs. Goodchild. Further details about the meeting, together with a discussion paper, will follow in early September.

This letter is marked "PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL" because we should prefer knowledge of the meeting to be confined to the participants themselves.

CHARLES POWELL

Michael Hoffman, Esq.

16

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 July, 1985

Dear Charles,

GR
Please to me a letter
of invitation to Mr.
Hoffman.
COM

Seminar on Policy towards Southern Africa

Thank you for your letter of 12 July. We have consulted the DTI about replacements for Sir Trevor Holdsworth and Lord Barber and should like to suggest the following two names:-

Mr Michael Hoffman (Chief Executive and Managing Director, Babcock International)

Sir Timothy Bevan (Chairman, Barclays Bank International)

Both are very knowledgeable about South Africa. The DTI consider that Mr Michael Hoffman would be a better choice to represent the manufacturing industry than either the Chairman of Babcock's, Lord King, or the Deputy Chairman of Standard Chartered. This is because Mr Hoffman has lived in South Africa for a number of years, he is a young (47) rising star in Babcock's, and, in DTI's view, would make an effective contribution to the seminar.

A copy of this letter goes to John Mogg (DTI).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd


(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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Relations: South Africa

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GRS 520

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 232120Z JULY 85

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2211 OF 23 JULY

INFO ROUTINE BONN PARIS OTTAWA UKMIS NEW YORK PRETORIA

INFO SAVING LUANDA MAPUTO

US/SOUTH AFRICA: US REACTION TO STATE OF EMERGENCY

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION CLEARLY CONCERNED BY DETERIORATING SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, THOUGH 'CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT' IS STILL THE WATCHWORD.

DETAIL

2. ASKED ON 23 JULY ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY ON THE FUTURE OF 'CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT', THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT, SHULTZ AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS REMAINED FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE BASIC US POLICY OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, IE PROMOTING PEACEFUL CHANGE AWAY FROM APARTHEID, REDUCING CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE, AND BRINGING ABOUT THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA. THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT US INFLUENCE COULD AND SHOULD BE USED FOR POSITIVE CHANGE IN THE REGION. THE SPOKESMAN RESISTED BEING DRAWN INTO A DISCUSSION ON WHETHER THE US WAS AS ATTACHED TO THE MEANS IT HAS BEEN EMPLOYING IN PURSUIT OF THESE OBJECTIVES AS IT WAS TO THE OBJECTIVES THEMSELVES. HE SUMMED UP, HOWEVER, BY REITERATING THE US COMMITMENT TO CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND THE US OPPOSITION TO SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.

3. THE WHITE HOUSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMEN BOTH MADE CLEAR ON 22 JULY THE CONCERN WITH WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION REGARDED THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. THE TONE OF THE TWO STATEMENTS WAS SHARPER THAN THE ADMINISTRATION'S INITIAL REACTION OVER THE WEEKEND, BUT STOPPED SHORT OF EXPLICIT CRITICISM OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY ITSELF. THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN ARGUED THAT THE CURRENT VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA WAS IN NO-ONE'S INTEREST, AND CALLED ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO EXERCISE THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAW AND ORDER IN A QUOTE SCRUPULOUS MANNER UNQUOTE. THE US CONSIDERED APARTHEID LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CURRENT VIOLENCE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN, MEANWHILE, SYMPATHISED WITH THE VICTIMS OF THE VIOLENCE AND LOOKED TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO CONDUCT ITSELF QUOTE RESPONSIBLY, RESPECTING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF ALL ITS CITIZENS UNQUOTE. BOTH SPOKESMEN CALLED ON ALL SOUTH AFRICANS TO PUT VIOLENCE BEHIND THEM AND TO GET BACK TO THE TASK OF MOVING AWAY FROM APARTHEID.

1A

4. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT RESPOND TO QUESTIONS ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA DURING A BRIEF EXCHANGE WITH THE PRESS AT THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY, IN THE MARGINS OF HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT LI.

FCO PASS SAVING LUANDA AND MAPUTO

WRIGHT

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

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MR J R J JOHNSON
CABINET OFFICE

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PS/PES

MR FERGUSSON

SIR J FREELAND

MR JOHNSON

MR O'NEILL

HD/SAFD

HD/CAFD

HD/UND

HD/NEWS DEPT

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

MR CIG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

15.11.84

IMMEDIATE

RESTRICTED

FM PRETORIA 231145Z JULY 1985

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO. 141 OF 23 JULY 1985

INFO ROUTINE JOHANNESBURG

MY TEL NO 138: SOUTH AFRICA - INTERNAL

SUMMARY.

1. UNREST CONTINUES, DESPITE A CRACK-DOWN BY POLICE AND THE ARMY. THE NEXT FEW DAYS COULD BE CRUCIAL IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE AUTHORITIES HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CONTROLLING THE SITUATION.

DETAIL.

2. UNREST HAS CONTINUED IN VARIOUS PARTS OF SOUTH AFRICA DESPITE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. NINE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED IN DISTURBANCES SINCE THE EMERGENCY CAME INTO EFFECT AND BY SUNDAY NIGHT 139 PEOPLE HAD BEEN DETAINED. FURTHER DETENTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE THEN. THE POLICE HOWEVER SAY THAT DURING THE LAST 24 HOURS THE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS REPORTED HAS DECLINED.

3. WE THINK IT MUCH TOO EARLY TO SAY WHETHER THE EMERGENCY MEASURES HAVE HAD THE DESIRED EFFECT. THERE ARE REPORTS THAT FRESH TROUBLE IS BREWING, NOT ONLY IN THE TOWNSHIPS LISTED IN THE DECLARATION, BUT ALSO ELSEWHERE E.G. ATTERIDGEVILLE AND MAMELODI NEAR PRETORIA. THE WEEK-LONG CONSUMER BOYCOTT IS ALSO CAUSING SERIOUS CONCERN TO WHITE BUSINESSMEN IN PORT ELIZABETH.

4. THE STATE PRESIDENT, IN REJECTING A CALL BY THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION, DR SLABBERT, TO RECONVENE PARLIAMENT, INDICATED THAT ACTION AND NOT TALK WAS NOW NEEDED. A SPOKESMAN FOR THE STATE PRESIDENT SAID YESTERDAY THAT THE STATE PRESIDENT "BELIEVES THAT WHAT IS NECESSARY AT THE MOMENT IS NOT MORE DEBATE, BUT INSTEAD ACTION TO BRING THE UNREST SITUATION UNDER CONTROL". SABC COMMENT HAS, HOWEVER, DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE STATE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF 20 JULY THAT "IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE SITUATION BE NORMALISED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE CLIMATE FOR CONTINUED DIALOGUE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL PEOPLE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FIELDS IS ENSURED".

5. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN AND THE MEDIA CONTINUE TO PLAY DOWN ANC RESPONSIBILITY FOR RECENT EVENTS IN THE TOWNSHIPS WHICH LED TO THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO BLAME THE ANC WOULD CLEARLY BE TANTAMOUNT TO ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE ANC HAD ACHIEVED CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN THEIR DECLARED DETERMINATION TO MAKE THE TOWNSHIPS UNGOVERNABLE.

6. THE ADDITIONAL POWERS AVAILABLE TO THE AUTHORITIES (MY TUR) INCLUDE AN IMPORTANT PROVISION WHICH GRANTS THEM INDEMNITY FROM ANY CLAIMS MADE AGAINST THEM FOR WRONGFUL ARREST, UNJUSTIFIED SEIZURE OF PROPERTY ETC. IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR THE AUTHORITIES TO TAKE ACTION UNDER THE POWERS LISTED IN MY TUR IF THEY HAD TO CONTEND WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENTED THROUGH THE SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS.

7. THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY HAS SO FAR HAD LITTLE EFFECT ON THE VALUE OF THE RAND, WHICH DECLINED ONLY marginally YESTERDAY AGAINST OTHER CURRENCIES. THE JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCHANGE OVERALL INDEX RECEDED HOWEVER BY 3.6% AND THE INDUSTRIAL INDEX BY 2%. THE LATEST INFLATION FIGURE, ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY, INDICATED AN ANNUAL RATE OF 16.4%, BUT MOST ECONOMIC OBSERVERS SAY THAT THIS WAS AN EXPECTED PEAK AND THAT THE RATE SHOULD FROM NOW ON STEADILY DECLINE.

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10 DOWNING STREET

22 July 1985

From the Private Secretary

Dear Sir,

UK POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

Thank you for your letter of 19 July, enclosing the Foreign Secretary's paper on United Kingdom Policy towards South Africa.

The Prime Minister has read the paper. She agrees that it is prudent to have a clear idea of the costs of all possible courses of action. Work which has already been done on this should be kept up to date as a matter of course. But she sees a risk that the sort of Whitehall-wide exercise envisaged in your letter will create a presumption that we are prepared to take economic measures, when the Government has in fact set its face firmly against them, above all because of its effect on jobs in the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister also feels that the paper is defeatist in its approach. It would be senseless to ignore the growing international support for economic measures against South Africa. But she would like to see an equal effort put into analysing ways to rally support against measures which are so clearly against our interests and unlikely to achieve their aim. She would also like to see recommendations on how to deter the South African Government from the sort of actions most likely to increase pressure for sanctions, while encouraging them to press ahead internally with the sort of measures to improve the prospects for a dialogue with members of the non-white community envisaged in the draft EC Statement. Her preference would therefore be for a more comprehensive paper which gives full weight to these aspects. Such a study will need to take account of the Prime Minister's seminar on South Africa, to be held in September, before it arrives at any conclusions.

In short, while the Prime Minister agrees that further work should be done she would wish it to be put in a broader perspective.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the Secretary of State for Energy and the Governor of the Bank of England.

Yours sincerely,
C.D. POWELL

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 22 JULY
INFO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
INFO ROUTPNE JOHANNESBURG
SAVING CAPE TOWN (CONSULATE), DURBAN.

SOUTH AFRICA: INTERNAL

SUMMARY

1. THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY MUST BE SEEN AS A VERY SERIOUS TURN OF EVENTS. IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED DETERMINATION FIRST AND FOREMOST TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER. IN THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE OF BLACK UNREST IT IS A GAMBLE, BUT ONE WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAVE FELT OBLIGED TO TAKE. THE SITUATION HAD DETERIORATED TO A POINT WHERE THE GOVERNMENT'S ONLY COURSE WAS TO TAKE DRASTIC ACTION TO RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE.

DETAIL

2. THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY IN 36 MAGISTERIAL DISTRICTS IN AND AROUND JOHANNESBURG AND PORT ELIZABETH HAS COME AS NO SURPRISE IN VIEW OF THE STEADILY DETERIORATING SITUATION OF THE LAST FEW MONTHS AND THE ESCALATING VIOLENCE OF RECENT WEEKS. SPURIOUS UNREST IS STILL MAINLY LIMITED TO BLACK URBAN AREAS IN THE EASTERN CAPE AND THE EAST RAND AND THE STATE OF EMERGENCY APPLIES ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO THESE AREAS. THE GOVERNMENT ACTION HAS NONETHELESS BEEN PROMPTED BY INDICATIONS THAT THE UNREST WAS GROWING AND THERE HAS BEEN PARTICULAR CONCERN THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE VIOLENCE LAST WEEK IN SOWETO. THE GOVERNMENT MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN CONCERNED THAT A BOYVOTT OF WHITE BUSINESS IN THE EASTERN CAPE WAS SHOWING SIGNS OF SPREADING.

3. THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY REFLECTS THE GOVERNMENT'S CONVICTION THAT THEY COULD NOT AFFORD TO ALLOW THE TOWNSHIPS TO SLIDE INTO UNGOVERNABILITY AND THAT LAW AND ORDER MUST BE MAINTAINED AT ALL COSTS. IT IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVE TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE AMONGST THE WHITE COMMUNITY IN A SITUATION WHERE IT WAS BEGINNING TO APPEAR THAT THE GOVERNMENT WERE UNCERTAIN ABOUT HOW TO REACT.

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4. ANOTHER MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT IS A NEED TO CONTROL UNDESIRABLE PUBLICITY ABOUT THE UNREST, ESPECIALLY UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE POLICE AND LURID SENSATIONALISM. SOME LOCAL CENSORSHIP OF REPORTING SEEMS INEVITABLE. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT BEEN ALONE IN THINKING THAT EXCESSIVE MEDIA PUBLICITY HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE OF THE VIOLENCE.

5. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, GENERAL COETZEE, HAS CLAIMED THAT THE MAIN REASON FOR THE EMERGENCY IS THAT HIS FORCE NEED FURTHER POWERS AND HE IS MAINTAINING THAT POLICE STRENGTH IS ADEQUATE TO MAINTAIN THE SITUATION PROVIDED IT HAS THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY. I AM NOT ALTOGETHER CONVINCED BY HIS STATEMENT. WE KNOW THAT THE POLICE ARE UNDER STRENGTH AND THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT SAVAGE REPRISALS AGAINST BLACK INFORMERS HAVE LED TO A SERIOUS DISRUPTION IN THE FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE TO THE POLICE. IT NOW SEEMS MORE THAN LIKELY THAT THE SADF WILL BE USED TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE TOWNSHIPS.

6. A MAIN OBJECTIVE OF POLICE/SADF ACTION WILL NOW BE TO CLAMP DOWN ON STUDENTS AND SCHOOL CHILDREN WHO HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE AGITATION IN THE TOWNSHIPS. THIS HAS INCLUDED ATTACKS ON SCHOOLS, INTIMIDATION OF OTHER STUDENTS TO STAY AWAY FROM SCHOOLS, ATTACKS ON THE HOMES OF POLICE AND COMMUNITY COUNCILLORS AND THE STONING OF POLICE. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO BLAME UDF ORGANISATIONS FOR THE TROUBLE AND MAY WELL TRY TO IMPOSE FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR ACTIVITIES.

7. THERE IS NO WAY IN WHICH WE CAN JUDGE TO WHAT EXTENT THE ANC MAY HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MASTER-MINDING RECENT UNREST. WE ARE INCLINED TO THE VIEW THAT TOWNSHIP VIOLENCE HAS BEEN LARGELY OF SPONTANEOUS ORIGIN, REFLECTING A WHOLE RANGE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL GRIEVANCES. IT MAY ALSO BE SIGNIFICANT THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT SOUGHT TO BLAME EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AS THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE DISTURBANCES.

8. PRESS REACTIONS ARE UNANIMOUS THAT THE GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO TAKE A GRIP ON A DETERIORATING SITUATION, BUT THAT THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY CANNOT BY ITSELF HOPE TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION. 'IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S PACE OF REFORM BE QUICKENED' (CITIZEN 22 JULY). 'IT MUST NOT LAST A DAY LONGER THAN NECESSARY' (BEELD 22 JULY).

9. THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION APPEARS TO BE THAT THEY REMAIN COMMITTED TO LONG TERM REFORM AND A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE WITH BLACKS BUT THAT THIS WAS BECOMING INCREASING DIFFICULT AGAINST A BACKGROUND IN WHICH ANY MOVE BY BLACKS TO CO-OPERATE OR NEGOTIATE WAS LIKELY TO BE FOLLOWED BY ATTACKS ON THEIR HOUSES AND MORE VIOLENCE.

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10. IN PRACTICE I WOULD NOT EXPECT ANY REAL PROGRESS WHILE THE STATE OF EMERGENCY REMAINS IN FORCE. MUCH MUST DEPEND ON WHAT HAPPENS IN THE TOWNSHIPS IN COMING WEEKS. BUT SOONER OR LATER THE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO COME BACK TO THE DILEMMA WHICH THEY ALREADY FACED, NAMELY HOW TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE WITH LEADING BLACKS WHEN SO MANY OF THEM ARE EITHER UNDER ARREST OR FRIGHTENED AWAY BY FELLOW BLACKS. THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE AS DETERMINED AS EVER NOT TO APPEAR TO BE NEGOTIATING UNDER PRESSURE. BUT THEY MAY BE ABLE TO JUSTIFY A RENEWED EFFORT TO ESTABLISH THE CONDITIONS FOR DIALOGUE IF THEY CAN POINT TO THE LATEST EMERGENCY MEASURES HAVING BEEN AT LEAST MODERATELY SUCCESSFUL. THE PROSPECTS NEVERTHELESS REMAIN FAR FROM ENCOURAGING.

MOBERLY

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 July, 1985

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE TEN ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Thank you for your letter of 19 July enclosing a revised text for a possible statement by the Ten on Southern Africa.

The Prime Minister would be content for the Foreign Secretary to endorse this text though would not want it any further strengthened in the direction of consideration of economic measures against South Africa or of revisions to the Code of Conduct. If significant amendments are proposed in Brussels, the Prime Minister would want to be consulted.

(C.D. Powell)

L. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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CPK ①
CB1



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

The resulting text
is within the guidelines
which you agreed with
the Foreign Secretary.

19 July, 1985

Dear Charles, Content for him to endorse it next week?

CDP
19/7

Joint Statement by the Ten on Southern Africa

In your letter of 12 July you set out the Prime Minister's reactions to the proposed draft statement by the Ten on Southern Africa. This question was discussed at a meeting of the European Political Committee in Luxembourg on 17 July and you will wish to be aware of the outcome, reported in Luxembourg telegrams numbers 231-233.

As you will see, the Luxembourg Presidency took the view that it would be regrettable if the work which had been done at Milan on South Africa did not result in a statement by Foreign Ministers on the same lines. The Dutch and French representatives at the meeting had already told Derek Thomas that they would strongly favour a statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten next week on the lines of the Milan text, if the UK was in a position to lift its reservations. From the known positions of other member countries, it was clear that there would be overwhelming support from others for this position. When the Luxembourgers raised it, therefore, Derek Thomas indicated that provided a sufficiently balanced final text could be agreed, he would be able to go along with the rest of the text which others had been prepared to accept at Milan. He then proposed a number of amendments to bring the Milan text into line with the version enclosed with my letter of 8 July, as amended by yours of 12 July. It was unfortunately not possible to get the passage in square brackets at the end of paragraph 2 of the Milan text dropped, as the Prime Minister would have preferred. This was the absolute minimum that the others were prepared to accept. The French position in particular was governed by the commitment which M. Fabius has given in public to ban new investment in South Africa within 18 months in the absence of specific measures to end discrimination. (The French position on general economic sanctions is one of clear cut opposition. But they have recently ruled out participation by French companies in one important contract for South Africa). The only other sentence in our proposals which gave difficulties was the sentence at the beginning of the fifth paragraph which

Yes
no

/set



set out our belief that European companies which continued to operate in Southern Africa should play a positive role in promoting peaceful change. The Dutch Political Director explained that this would put his Foreign Minister in grave difficulties since it was in conflict with a position which he had taken up in the Dutch Parliament. Thomas therefore reluctantly agreed to let it fall, even though in our view it was a positive point.

[Attache] The revised text, which is to be submitted to the Ten Foreign Ministers at the Foreign Affairs Council on 22 July, is contained in Luxembourg telegram number 232. Although it is not exactly as we would wish, because of the inclusion of the sentence (already in square brackets in Milan) which he and the Prime Minister discussed on 2 July, the Foreign Secretary believes that this text taken as a whole will be of real value, without offering any new hostages to fortune, in our preparations for CHOGM and the UN General Assembly. He therefore proposes to endorse it at the Foreign Affairs Council on 22 July. He would not of course accept any amendments to it that would be damaging to the UK interest.

You will see from Luxembourg telegram number 233 that in a discussion restricted to Political Directors only on 17 July the Commission representative drew attention to what he described as a barrage of questions from the European Parliament about the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa by the Community. The Presidency representative did his best to short-circuit any detailed discussion of this. But the Italian Political Director took it up and suggested that in the light of proposals in Congress and recent decisions by the Canadians, the Ten would do well to start thinking about what selective economic pressures the Community might be able to apply if it had to.

Derek Thomas set out briefly the principal arguments against action of this kind. In order to head off possible consideration of a proposal for looking at selective sanctions, and to allow the case against this course to be fully considered, he also suggested that the Political Committee should look at the wider implications of economic measures in the context of South Africa and how to deal with the kind of pressures which were developing from the European Parliament. This suggestion was accepted, and there will be a general discussion of the subject in September. This will give us an opportunity to meet trouble half way in the Community and set out our arguments (for which there will be a good deal of support from the Germans and others) about the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions in any circumstances

/and

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and their particular undesirability in the case of South Africa. It will moreover be preferable to handle this question in the Political Committee rather than risk having the Commission go off on its own.

Yours ever,

L V Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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GRS 430

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SA

FM LUXEMBOURG 171819Z JUL 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 232 OF 17 JULY

INFO ROUTINE ALL EC POSTS, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO,

UKMIS NEW YORK, OSLO, PRETORIA

SAVING TO UKDEL STASBOURG, ANKARA, LISBON, MADRID, TOKYO,

WELLINGTON, OTTAWA, MEXICO CITY, BERNE

MIPT: EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION POLITICAL COMMITTEE,
LUXEMBOURG 16/17 JULY: SOUTH AFRICA

**FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT STATEMENT ON SITUATION IN SOUTH
AFRICA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA**

THE TEN FOREIGN MINISTERS EXPRESS THEIR PROFOUND CONCERN
OVER THE CONTINUING HUMAN SUFFERING CAUSED IN SOUTH AFRICA
BY THE APARTHEID SYSTEM WHICH THEY STRONGLY CONDEMN.

THEY DEPLORE ALL ACTS OF VIOLENCE. IN SOUTH AFRICA, VIOLENCE
AFFECTS THE BLACK POPULATION IN PARTICULAR, AND THE TEN CALL
FOR ITS RENUNCIATION BY ALL CONCERNED. THEY URGE THE GOVERNMENT IN
PRETORIA TO EMBARK WITH DETERMINATION ON A POLICY INVOLVING
SPECIFIC ACTIONS LEADING TO THE ABOLITION
OF THE APARTHEID SYSTEM AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHTFUL
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE BLACK POPULATION. **IN THE
ABSENCE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD
OF TIME, THE TEN RESERVE THE RIGHT TO RECONSIDER THEIR ATTITUDE.**

IN THEIR VIEW THE FIRST REQUIREMENT IS THE RAPID OPENING OF A
DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PRESENT SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE
GENUINE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NON-WHITE COMMUNITY, WITH THE
DECLARED AIM INTER ALIA OF GIVING PROPER REPRESENTATION TO THE
BLACK COMMUNITY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL.

TO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCH A DIALOGUE, THE TEN BELIEVE
THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD:

- **RELEASE IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY MR NELSON MANDELA:**
- END DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL:
- ABANDON THE PRACTICE OF FORCED REMOVALS:
- REMOVE DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION INCLUDING THE PASS LAWS
AND THE GROUP AREAS ACT.

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THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN FIRMS WITH SUBSIDIARIES IN SOUTH AFRICA HAS PROVED TO BE A USEFUL INSTRUMENT FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF BLACK WORKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANT CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE FIELD OF LABOUR RELATIONS THERE, THE TEN CONSIDER THAT THE ADAPTATION AND STRENGTHENING

OF THE

CODE WHICH THEY ARE URGENTLY TO UNDERTAKE SHOULD ALLOW IT TO CONTRIBUTE MORE EFFECTIVELY TO THE ABOLITION OF THE SYSTEM OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN FORCE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

THE TEN ALSO NOTE WITH DEEP CONCERN THE PERSISTENCE OF CONFLICTS, THE EXISTENCE OF SERIOUS THREATS TO THE SOVEREIGNTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF STATES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND, AS REGARDS THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA, CONTINUING OBSTACLES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435. THEY EARNESTLY HOPE THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE THROUGH A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE INVOLVING ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, WITH RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF ALL THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

LOCKTON

MEETINGS OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE

LIMITED

ECD(E)	SED	SIR W HARDING	
ECD(I)	MAED	MR EGERTON	
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MED	SEAD	MR JOHNSON	MR WILLIAMSON) CABINET
NENAD	DEF D	MR DAVID THOMAS	MR M JAY) OFFICE
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UND	FID	MR WILSON	
WED	NED	MR BRAITHWAITE	
S AF D	MCAD	MR FERGUSSON	
OADs	S AM D	MR BROWNING (ODA)	
EED	MR DEREK THOMAS		(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)
SCD	MR GOODALL		
PLANNING STAFF	SIR C TICKELL (ODA)		
SOV D	MR RENWICK		
	MR ADAM FERGUSSON		

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CCPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 July 1985

*Dear Charles,*UK Policy towards South Africa

In my letter to you of 2 July (not to others) on the question of a message to President Botha, I drew attention to the continuing problem of the growing build-up of international pressures for economic measures against South Africa. I mentioned that the Foreign Secretary was preparing a paper on the subject which he intended to forward to the Prime Minister.

I now enclose such a paper. Its objectives are to draw the Prime Minister's attention to the growing pressures on us to adopt at least limited economic measures against South Africa; to point out that there could be economic and political retaliation against us if we became isolated in resisting such measures; to suggest that in certain such circumstances proper concern for our interests might require us to consider adopting some such measures; to do this with reference to the possible measures involved; and finally to make proposals on how to carry the matter forward in Whitehall. The references in the paper to the possible costs to us of taking economic measures against South Africa are no more than illustrative, since an accurate estimate would only be possible after careful examination in Whitehall.

The Foreign Secretary believes that there is an urgent need for a coordinated Whitehall view on both the costs of any possible retaliation against us by other countries should we become isolated (eg by vetoing alone in the Security Council), and the potential costs to us of taking different economic measures against South Africa. He considers that Ministers might suddenly be faced by a need to take very rapid choices between these unpalatable alternatives and that it is important that the risks and costs in both directions should have been carefully weighed beforehand, if they are to reach the right decisions. The Foreign Secretary recommends that this work should be put in hand as soon as possible within Whitehall.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the Secretary of State for Energy and the Governor of the Bank of England.

*Yours ever,**Les Appleyard*
(L V Appleyard)
Private SecretaryC D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



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UK POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

1. The pressures for concerted international action against South Africa have grown sharply during 1985. The shootings at Uitenhage, the lack of progress on Namibia and the recent South African raids into Angola and Botswana have all helped to stimulate these pressures. But it is the dramatic change in US Congressional and domestic opinion in favour of active opposition to apartheid and limited economic sanctions which has given them their new force. For the first time the United States, which has always been seen as the main obstacle to sanctions, is now widely perceived as giving a lead in their adoption. As a result an international bandwagon has started to roll.

2. The strength of the support for legislation in both Houses of Congress has been remarkable. On 5 June the House of Representatives adopted by 295 votes to 127 the Anti-Apartheid Bill which would ban new US bank loans to the South African Government, new commercial investment in South Africa, the import of Krugerrands and the export to South Africa of computers and computer technology. On 11 July the Senate adopted by 80 votes to 12 the Lugar/Dole/Mathias Bill which would impose an immediate ban on bank loans to the South African Government, the sale of computers to South African agencies involved in enforcing apartheid and the export of nuclear goods and technology. Further measures would be imposed in 18 months unless there was "significant progress" towards dismantling apartheid.

3. In response to South African events and the US lead a growing majority of Western countries have now adopted or are considering adopting further measures against South Africa. The French Prime Minister has said that France would be prepared to ban investment in South Africa unless South Africa puts an end to discrimination within 18 months to 2 years and there is domestic political pressure for France to announce some measures as early as this autumn. The Nordic countries have recently banned flights by Scandinavian Airlines to South Africa and

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are considering a more far-reaching programme of action. The Australians have said publicly that they would be prepared to support a call for sanctions both in the Security Council of which they are currently a member and at CHOGM. New Zealand seems likely to go along with such action. The Canadians have just announced a tightening up of existing measures including the abrogation of the Canada-South Africa double taxation agreements with the possibility of further sanctions after a review of policy towards South Africa. In discussion at the Milan Summit we were isolated among the Ten in opposing references in the final communique to possible further measures and to strengthening the Code of Conduct.

4. At the UN in June there were three debates on South Africa in the Security Council. After the debate on Namibia the Council adopted Resolution 566 urging member states to take "voluntary measures" against South Africa and warning the South Africans that failure to implement SCR 435 would compel the Council to consider the adoption of mandatory sanctions. The resolution calls for the Secretary General to report by the first week of September and a further Council meeting is likely thereafter, though its timing is uncertain.

5. The South Africans appear so far to be undeterred by these growing pressures. We cannot be certain what if any effect they will have on South African policy. But on past form it is likely that in the short term at least they will continue with their present policies or if anything harden them. In particular, they have made it clear that they will continue to attack ANC terrorists wherever they are located. The likelihood is therefore that the situation will deteriorate further.

PROBLEM SCENARIOS

6. Expected or possible developments which will greatly increase the pressure on us to change our policy towards South Africa and adopt some form of measures include the following.

- (a) The passage of US legislation on economic measures. It is now expected that Congress will pass legislation possibly this month, but more probably after the summer recess. If it does, President Reagan may well not veto it and there

will be immediate international attention on whether others, like ourselves, are prepared to act similarly.

- (b) CHOGM. We can expect a concerted Commonwealth attempt to get us to agree a reference to some form of economic measures in the wording of the communique. We could well be alone in resisting this.
- (c) There is a continuing possibility of further South African raids against their neighbours or violent acts of internal suppression either of which would be followed by strong calls for specific UK action.
- (d) A further Security Council Resolution. This could be a response to (a) or (c) or a follow up to SCR 566 on Namibia. Namibia provides the UN with a continuing locus standi for action against South Africa aimed at compelling it to relinquish that territory. The Security Council can also treat any new South African attacks against its neighbours as a threat to international peace and security requiring Chapter VII action. Over apartheid the Council's legal position is less clear since it is dealing with the internal system of a member state. The context for Security Council action could thus vary considerably although the underlying motive would be much the same. In the most difficult case the Council would call for limited mandatory measures which other Western members could accept, or alternatively propose taking certain mandatory measures unless South Africa made certain specified changes within a specified time frame (eg 1-2 years). The State Department have assured us that the US Administration intend to veto any mandatory sanctions in the Security Council. However we cannot be sure that this position would hold for a very limited package or if some intervening South African provocation had changed the atmosphere in Washington. Ministerial decisions might suddenly be required on whether to veto alone (and risk facing the reality of political and economic retaliation by other countries) or go along (at some cost and possibly setting a most unwelcome precedent).
- (e) Growing pressure in the Ten. All our EC partners are likely to support some form of action against South Africa, particularly if the Americans take action. The pressure

would be for measures to be decided by the Ten in Political Co-operation on the economic/political but non-trade front (agreement on trade measures by the Community as a whole would be more difficult; Greece and Denmark, for example have in the past opposed retaliatory trade measures taken for political reasons).

ARGUMENT

7. We continue to believe and to argue publicly that economic measures are unlikely to be effective in getting the South Africans to change their policy. The South Africans have long prepared themselves both mentally and economically to withstand such pressures. Indeed, there are good arguments that such measures would be counter-productive and serve only to strengthen the influence of more reactionary elements in South Africa. They would moreover be difficult to enforce. They would hurt the black community and South Africa's black neighbours. And their economic impact might be to increase unemployment and so feed the cycle of violence. These arguments have considerable strength. But they are not likely to change the views of those, including some of our Western partners, who feel compelled for domestic or other reasons to take concrete action against South Africa. They are also challenged by some black leaders in South Africa and by the Front Line States both of which argue that they would be prepared to make the necessary sacrifices. The supporters of sanctions will point to the fact that it is impossible to say categorically that the South Africans would never be prepared to make some concessions in response to the threat or real prospect of increasing international isolation and a lowered standard of living. They are also likely to argue against us that we have no other positive short term solution to offer; that the point has been reached where "something" has to be done and that limited measures could have a salutary psychological impact. It will be pointed out that we accepted the mandatory arms embargo, that we endorsed mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia and that we argued strongly for sanctions against Iran, the Soviet Union and Argentina. In each case we subordinated our (and others) economic interests to the consideration that for political reasons some action had to be taken.



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8. Given the strength of the international pressure for at least limited economic measures there may be certain circumstances where it could be more costly to us politically and economically to stand out against these or any future consideration of them than to go along with them. It then becomes a question of weighing up the risks and costs in both directions taking into account the positions of other countries. This needs to be done in advance. We could be forced by circumstances to make very rapid decisions. These decisions will need to be as well informed as possible and co-ordinated beforehand within Whitehall. Sir J Thomson could be assisted at the UN in resisting a damaging new resolution by being given clear guidelines with which to negotiate an acceptable text.

ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RETALIATION AGAINST UK IF ISOLATED IN REFUSING TO TAKE ANY MEASURES

9. If Britain were the only major industrialised country to oppose the imposition of economic measures against South Africa, eg by vetoing alone, we should inevitably be identified by African and Non-Aligned leaders as the principal defenders of apartheid. We could also expect to be denounced by influential sections of opinion in Western Europe and North America. It would be impossible to insulate the effect of this from other international issues of importance to us. There would be a direct effect on our interests within the Commonwealth and at the UN (an example of this would be the likely loss of sympathy and support for our position on the Falklands). There would also be considerable domestic and Parliamentary criticism, particularly if our action was followed by active retaliation against our interests elsewhere in the world.

Extent and Scope of such retaliation

10. The immediate pressures for direct action against our interests would probably come from individual African countries. There could well be attempts to orchestrate such action in the Commonwealth, the OAU and the non-aligned movement. The extent and scope of such retaliation would depend on several factors: eg the particular nature of the South African offence for which sanctions was demanded; the nature of the sanctions demanded and vetoed; and the extent to which the UK was able to take alternative action such as other measures against South Africa which would reduce the

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criticism.

Countries taking retaliation against the UK

11. Within Black Africa, Nigeria is a natural pace-setter and its position would be crucial. The Nigerians know that our bilateral economic relations matter to us, and they have the means, eg through selective allocation of import licences, substantially to damage our interests there. UK visible exports were £768m last year (and £427m to April 1985); the book value of UK direct investment was about £700m when last measured in 1981 (and is now estimated to be over £2bn). This investment (other than in oil) yielded net earnings of almost £100m in 1983. ECGD cover totals £2.85 billion, and UK banks' exposure is \$2.5 billion. Logic and economic common sense shows that there would be considerable constraints on the Nigerians imposing sanctions: British-associated companies in Nigeria already have a majority of Nigerian shareholders; Shell (Nigeria) is needed to maintain oil output and sales; and Nigeria airways' determination to keep London as its centre for European operations will tend firmly to limit any attempt to retaliate against British Caledonian. The Nigerians also face acute balance of payments difficulties. Excessive discrimination, for example against new imports from the UK, would risk damaging the confidence of banks and others involved in negotiations over Nigeria's debt, and a suggestion of more extreme measures such as formally blocking remittances or expropriation of investments would seriously jeopardise Nigeria's prospects for attracting the finance it needs. However, opposition to apartheid has for Nigeria become akin to a crusade, and Nigerian reactions on Southern African issues will be determined by emotion, not logic. The Federal Military Government may well act first and think afterwards, and are quite capable of imposing economic sanctions over such an issue without regard to the consequences for themselves. There is the further risk that our commercial rivals will consider it in their own trading interests to mitigate Nigerian self-inflicted damage.

12. It is difficult to forecast how Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia would react. The two last, like Nigeria, are in profound economic crisis. Our aid is important to Zambia, and our policies over Zimbabwe and now Mozambique have earned us considerable goodwill

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among the Front Line States. But Tanzania will be quick to condemn us and could go as far as to break off diplomatic relations. In general the Front Line States (apart from Angola) might prefer to limit their action to some quick, symbolic gesture. But once others, eg Nigeria, had taken a strong lead, they would in time feel bound to join no matter how reluctantly.

13. Outside Black Africa the reactions of leading non-aligned countries such as India and Algeria would be important. Communist countries, including Communist members of the non-aligned movement such as Cuba, would no doubt exploit the situation as far as they could. There would also be the opportunity for other non-aligned countries, which have axes of their own to grind with us, to egg on the others. Argentina for example might seek to influence the non-aligned against us.

Nature and effectiveness of possible retaliation

14. Retaliation could take two forms - political or economic. If the political reaction gathered momentum there could be increasing calls for economic retaliation to "teach Britain a lesson." The more isolated we were from our Western partners the easier it would appear to others to confine such action to Britain and British interests.

15. On the economic side retaliation could range from discrimination against UK trade to blocking of remittances to the UK and expropriation of UK assets. Government supported action against UK exports and contractors is the most likely widespread response. Future contracts would probably be more at risk than existing ones but current contracts might also be affected. If many countries operated an effective embargo on trade with the UK the effects could be substantial. Sub-Saharan African countries other than South Africa itself, the group perhaps most likely to take concerted action, took £1816m of UK visible exports (2.6% of the total) last year and also provided a large but unquantified market for UK services. Countries of the non-aligned movement, who might also be prevailed upon to take action as a group, took £10.7bn of UK visible exports (15% of the total), and, similarly a large amount of services exports. This compares with £1.2bn of UK visible exports



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to South Africa last year. Really effective action by either of these groups could therefore have a significant effect on UK trade flows, sterling, and ultimately on UK living standards.

16. Recent experience provides some examples. In 1980 the Saudi Arabian Government discriminated strongly against UK suppliers for a period following the 'Death of a Princess' row. A major diplomatic effort had to be made to restore the situation and there was considerable anxiety in British business circles. The trade figures suggested however that UK visible exports were little affected over the year as a whole. In 1981-83 Malaysia's public sector 'buy British last' policy had a significant but still limited effect on UK trade, with business lost estimated at somewhere in the region of 10% of the value of UK exports to Malaysia. Indonesia's sanctions against the UK in 1980-81 demonstrated that economic retaliation can be made substantially more effective if the political will were there. Much would depend on how actively governments pursued the policy and whether any official reluctance to buy British was confined to the public sector or had to take account of difficulties and cost of replacing British suppliers. Discrimination against British suppliers would probably not affect all or even most British exports to a particular country. But any such discrimination would provoke considerable concern among British firms and receive widespread publicity. We should be under great pressure to get such discrimination removed.

17. On the political side we could expect very strong criticism from the Commonwealth. Nigeria, Tanzania and others might seek to promote specific action to condemn us. The Bahamas, who will be hosts of CHOGM, are also known to be especially tough towards South Africa and apartheid. The OAU would be likely to take political action and a number of countries could be expected to respond to an OAU proposal that member countries should ask for the recall of the British Ambassador or High Commissioner. There would be the possibility of violence against the British High Commission or Embassy in certain countries, eg Nigeria, Tanzania, Angola, Zimbabwe. The non-aligned could be expected to orchestrate denunciation of the UK at their regular meetings and in the UN. There would be renewed pressure on the UK's status as a Permanent

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Member of the Security Council. We should not be able to prevent the adoption of resolutions by the General Assembly condemning us and calling on member states to take action against us. This would be particularly the case if we were perceived as having frustrated action by the Security Council in relation to Namibia for reasons which did not relate to our own national security interests.

LIST OF ECONOMIC MEASURES AND THEIR COST

18 . It may be useful at this point to illustrate the sort of economic measures against South Africa which have been under active discussion elsewhere and their likely cost to us. The list is not exhaustive and the assessment of their cost is at this stage no more than an internal FCO estimate intended simply for illustration. It would be necessary to examine many of the measures listed in EC and GATT terms to consider the legal constraints in departing from the general principles of freedom of imports, common rules for exports or freedom of inter-Community trade. The measures in a rough ascending order of severity for us are the following:

i) Prohibition of imports of South African minted gold coins.

Comment: No significant effect.

ii) Observance of an oil embargo.

Comment: In practice we already operate a ban on the export to South Africa of North Sea oil. But formal observance of a wider ban would bring the loss of £7m of petroleum products exports.

iii) Withdrawal of some or all of our trade promotion support facilities (including export promotion staff in South Africa, general BOTB facilities, ECGD services).

Comment: The withdrawal of staff/BOTB facilities would have some cost to us depending in part on what our competitors did. The withdrawal of ECGD cover would be more damaging. The latter would run counter to ministerial assurances that the availability of ECGD cover would be governed by commercial, not political considerations. The withdrawal of such facilities in our 12th largest export market could inflict serious damage on our Balance of Payments and export opportunities. The market is proportionately more important to us than to any of our competitors. The possibility of South African retaliation, perhaps by restrictions of payments, could not be ruled out.

iv) Suspension of air services to South Africa.



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Comment: The ending of South African flights to the UK might be acceptable but the ending of British Airways flights to South Africa would be commercially very damaging. It would be difficult presentationally to limit ourselves to unilateral action against South African Airways and allow British Airways to go on flying; in any case it would be open to the South Africans to take reprisals.

v) Ban on sale of computers and computer parts.

Comment: Potential loss of £80m p.a.

vi) Prohibition of new loans or other forms of credit to South African Government.

and/or Prohibition of new investment in and bank loans to the South African private sector.

Comment: South African dependence on short term loans, especially from the banks, could make them particularly nervous of a halt to such debt being rolled over. This might provoke them in the worst case, to force a default on outstanding debts to banks and other creditors while aiming to continue trading on cash terms. Any halt on new direct investment would put at risk annual net income flows of some £200m per annum to the UK.

vii) Disinvestment.

Comment: This would intensify the pressure on the South Africans to repudiate debts and to block remittances of profits and dividends. They might also nationalise foreign assets. UK bank loans of £5.5bn and ECGD insurance cover of £3bn are involved. The book value of direct investment is £2.8bn.

19. Other measures which have been mentioned if only as theoretical possibilities, include the following.

- i) Refusal to refuel South African aircraft.
- ii) Ban on ships bunkering.
- iii) Introduction of visa requirements for South Africans.
- iv) Restrictions on South African imports, other than gold coins.
- v) Restrictions on imports from South Africa by increasing tariffs and/or imposing quotas.
- vi) Refusal to trade in Rands.
- vii) Withdrawal of double taxation relief and other uses of tax system to penalise South Africa.
- viii) Prohibition of all nuclear trade and contacts.
- ix) Ban on high technology exports.

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x) Ban on telecommunications.

CONCLUSIONS

- Our policy towards South Africa has always aimed to avoid our being placed in a position in which we had to choose between damaging our considerable interests in that country and damage to our interests elsewhere. This remains our objective.

- We have sought to promote this objective by encouraging Western solidarity in resisting economic measures, by supporting peaceful change in South Africa, by keeping on good terms with Black Africa, by remaining actively engaged in the search for a Namibian settlement, and by encouraging peaceful relations between South Africa and its neighbours.

- However recent events, notably the growing unrest in South Africa, the US Congressional moves towards sanctions, South African attacks on its neighbours and the stalemate in the Namibia negotiations have greatly increased the likelihood of our being faced with the sort of choice we have sought to avoid. The international bandwagon for sanctions is gathering momentum among Western countries.

- There is little we can do to prevent this happening. Britain's ability to influence events in Southern Africa and the tide of international opinion on the subject is quite limited.

- If Britain is isolated in resisting limited economic measures, eg by vetoing alone in the Security Council, there is a significant risk of retaliation from certain Black African and other Third World countries. The inevitable outburst of international criticism could escalate into direct political and economic action against British interests (paragraphs 9-17 above). Nigeria's reaction would be particularly crucial. But the OAU and the Non-Aligned might both take concerted action. The most likely form of economic retaliation would be discrimination against British exporters. This could hurt us significantly if applied with real political will.

- Given that Ministers might have to make very rapid decisions (eg

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at the UN), we need to weigh up in advance, as far as possible, the relative risks and costs both of adopting (or agreeing to consider adopting) economic measures against South Africa (paras 18-19 above) and conversely of refusing to adopt them and incurring the sort of economic (and political) retaliation mentioned above.


- In certain circumstances, where for example the economic measures were quite limited or deferred, and the risks of economic retaliation were judged to be serious, the adoption of some such measures could amount to the lesser of two evils.

- By acting earlier rather than later in this regard and in concert with our Western partners, we might be able to pre-empt both some of the criticism of us and calls for more far-reaching action. This could be particularly true in an EC context.

- It would seem that there is an urgent need for a coordinated Whitehall view on all this to which Ministers can refer as necessary if and when the occasion demands. This would not be the first time that such an exercise has been done in Whitehall. Considerable work was done on the matter both in 1978 and again in 1980. Much of this might only need updating.

- The Foreign Secretary recommends that such an exercise should be begun as soon as possible preferably chaired by the Cabinet Office and taking account of the views of all concerned Whitehall departments including the FCO, Treasury, DTI and Department of Energy as well as the Bank of England.

South Africa: Relations A5.



PRIME MINISTER

UK POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

*1 an scoop
Chief Butcher
soon - I understand
he is court records
- prof*

The Foreign Secretary's paper attached - which you will want to look at over the weekend - deals with growing pressures for economic measures against South Africa and the risk of retaliation against the United Kingdom if we hold out alone against them. He envisages circumstances in which we might need to consider adopting some such measures to avoid worse.

He proposes that work be put in hand on the likely costs to us of both economic sanctions themselves and of retaliatory measures against the UK if we are isolated in opposing economic sanctions.

It may be prudent to do such work, though equally there is a real risk of leaks to the effect that we are considering sanctions - which will in turn only increase pressure on us to adopt them. One could argue that most of the necessary information to enable Ministers to take decisions is already available.

Moreover, the FCO Paper is written from a rather negative and defeatist point of view. Can a number of Black African countries really afford to retaliate against us, with the risk that we would in turn cut off aid? Can Black African countries neighbouring South Africa actually afford to participate in economic measures against South Africa? If we are driven to contemplate some action ought we not to try to focus attention on political/administrative rather than economic measures? Should we not be working harder to consolidate an alliance against economic measures (NB the State Department's assurance that the US would veto UN measures, even if it takes some limited measures of its own)? And simultaneously to bring coordinated political pressure on South Africa to avoid further incursions into neighbouring countries, which are most likely to provoke calls for economic sanctions?

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There is also the consideration that your seminar in September may produce some options; we must not let the view get round Whitehall, let alone more widely, that we are resigned to economic sanctions.

You may like me to minute back on the lines of the attached.

Y
les mb

C.D.P.

C.D. POWELL

19 July 1985

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DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET
TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-215 5422
SWITCHBOARD 01-215 7877

PS/ Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

18 July 1985

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

What an incredibly
poor letter! WBM
GDM 19/7.

Dear Charles,

SEMINAR ON POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

I have seen Colin Budd's letter of 4 July and your reply of 9 July.

2 We were consulted at official level about the list of businessmen proposed by the FCO and confirm our endorsement of the names put forward. The numbers of academics and journalists at the Seminar are likely to equal, if not exceed, the number of businessmen. While the former will be able to offer important insights into the problems of South Africa, they represent only themselves and their own judgements and do not share the same commitment and responsibilities to workforces both in the UK and in South Africa as do the business participants. Given the primary importance of our trade and investment links with South Africa, we believe that it is important that appropriate weight should be given in the Seminar to the views of their spokesmen.

Yours sincerely,
Maureen Dodsworth.

MAUREEN DODSWORTH
Private Secretary

JF2APP

SOUTH AFRICA: Res Pte



GOVERNMENT



celk

Private Secretary

FROM: E A J Fergusson

DATE: 19 July 1985

cc PS/Mr Rifkind
PS/PUS
Mr Derek Thomas
Mr Johnson
WAD
Economic Advisers
NAD
Mr Reeve

UK POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

1. It is obviously right that we should prepare in Whitehall for the kind of difficult choices set out in SAfD's paper submitted by Mr Reeve, now sent to No.10.
2. Determining our policy towards South Africa is complicated because the course of conduct which we might follow if we were able to establish our policy purely on the basis of what would achieve our ends in South Africa itself without regard to other pressures on us could lead to different decisions from those determined by the need to safeguard our interests in our broader international relationships.
3. At present our assessment of the situation in South Africa is that external pressures have relatively little impact on the decisions of the South African Government; in their eyes, managing the internal situation is difficult enough without taking account of outside interests (wrong headed, misguided, ill-informed etc); moreover in the "partial democracy" of the South African system it is impossible for a South African government to allow itself to be seen to respond to external pressure. We do not believe therefore that we have a magic wand which can move society in the direction of the peaceful evolutionary change which we perceive as in our and South Africa's interest. We can of course exhort, and we can exploit the relatively open nature of South African society by making our own views known on what is wrong. Given the South African Government's constant espousal of "Christian values and civilised norms" we must make plain where our judgment of what that means is different from theirs. But rhetoric of this kind, important as it is, does not represent significant pressure on actual decision making by the Government.
4. In these circumstances our policy, in our own interest but also in that of South Africa and the Southern Africa region, has been to work with the broad underlying forces of economic development and to seek to foster the combination of economic, commercial, industrial and social changes which could gradually make political change easier to bring about. We have also supported efforts

/to

to reduce tension in the region, for the same general reasons. In pressing for changes of this kind we are working with a significant proportion of South African industrial and commercial leaders and, indeed, with many of the beneficiaries of the process. Without a speedier creation of skills, economic growth will not be possible. Without continuing rapid economic growth South Africa will be unable to sustain its growing (black) population, nor the growing populations of those neighbouring black countries which depend on the South African economy in one way or another.

5. It is on this basis that we argue for our continuing economic involvement and the opportunity for constructive change which that provides, eg through the activities of British firms and the Code of Conduct. Although there is an only-too-visible element of self-interest in it, I believe that this provides a coherent and credible case for seeking to maintain our present policy. It is of course inconsistent with the concept of mandatory economic sanctions. It is also inconsistent with the concept of lesser economic pressures, both because they are a start down a slippery slope and because, while they may have value as a signal, they are highly unlikely to be effective as levers on South African decision-making.

6. The argument against applying pressures elsewhere, eg on Namibia, is that they would be even less effective; even though Namibia may be of secondary significance to the South African Government and therefore something which could be "given up" there is an overwhelming case, from the South African view, for them not to be seen to respond to external pressure in Namibia because of the precedent which would be set. They know, and we know, that it would be hard to avoid pressure over Namibia spreading into pressure on South Africa's internal evolution.

7. Four countries' exports (FRG 15.8%, USA 15.7%, Japan 12.9% and the UK 11.1%) accounted in 1984 for 55.5% of South Africa's imports (I have submitted more detailed figures separately). Three of the four are known to be strongly opposed to mandatory economic sanctions and we can reasonably assume that the Japanese will be too. The French (3.8%) are also opposed on general grounds to mandatory economic sanctions. If, as seems probable, all these countries maintain these views the incredibility of mandatory sanctions must be manifest. Within the Community the FRG and the UK represent 27% of South Africa's imports, France and Italy together only 7.3% and the remaining six countries, including the Netherlands, not more than, say, 4.5% altogether. We must not let the tail wag the dog.


8. The French, however, (at least until the next French elections) have their own domestic political reasons for looking at partial economic measures. The Americans may be forced to

/adopt

adopt some very limited national measures, though Dr Crocker, for what that is worth, says that they are strongly opposed to their introduction in the UN. None believe that such measures would be effective in South Africa. We clearly need to know the potential costs of introducing them, or of opposing them in isolation. It is difficult to get the balance right.

9. Obviously one cannot, nor should, discount the build-up of pressure internationally, which could lead us to be forced to act in contradiction to the (intellectually coherent) strategy which I have outlined above. However, it reinforces my belief that we might think of going on the offensive rather more - to argue the positive case for our present policy with greater emphasis instead of leaving the running to our opponents. For instance, I strongly support the chance which Mr Thomas has opened up of a reasoned analysis of economic measures within the Political Cooperation machinery from September on.

10. I wonder too whether, whatever the frustration within Africa which leads to the prevalent OAU and Third World rhetoric with which South Africa is discussed and to the pressure for "action", there is not a body of sensible opinion, especially within Southern Africa, where self interest would not lead the countries concerned to oppose what are in essence punitive measures against South Africa, from which they would be the first to suffer. In that connection, it is important to have a clear picture of South Africa's regional economic dominance and I believe that more work needs to be done in the FCO and Whitehall in this respect. We are already doing what we can to explain the considerations behind our policy to the more moderate Africans and in the Third World at large. It would be helpful too to tackle the Commonwealth Secretary General again, perhaps at the level of Secretary of State.



Ewen Fergusson

5765
A765



020

Mr Powell

Private Secretary


FROM: E A J Fergusson

DATE: 19 July 1985

cc PS/Mr Rifkind
Mr Johnson
Mr Derek Thomas
SAfD
CAfD
Planning Staff

EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA IN 1984

... I attach a table which may be of general interest. Apart from its trade with the Western industrialised world covered in the table, a significant proportion of South Africa's remaining imports will come from within the Southern African region.



Ewen Fergusson

TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA: 1984

EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA AS A PERCENTAGE OF
SOUTH AFRICA'S TOTAL IMPORTS

	%
FRG	15.8
USA	15.7
Japan	12.9
UK	11.1
France	3.8
Italy	3.5
Netherlands	1.9
Belgium	1.8
Denmark	.5
Ireland	.4
Switzerland	1.8
Canada	2.5

FOUR LEADING SUPPLIERS
(FRG, USA, JAPAN, UK) 55.5

EC

FRG	15.8	
UK	11.1	
Remaining 8	11.9	38.8

CONTACT GROUP 5 48.9

ECONOMIC SUMMIT 7 65.3

CC OPS
Master

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINAL



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T135/A/85

Uniegebou
Pretoria

MB 5/1/2-SP
MB 10/1/5

12 July 1985

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 10 July 1985 and for the frankness and promptness of your reply. It is my opinion that it is only through an open and frank exchange of views that constructive dialogue can be conducted.

Regarding your reference to the problems with which you have to contend in connection with the terrorist activities of the IRA, I am bound to say that I cannot agree with the parallel which you draw. The question which arises is what your Government would do if, over a period of two years, you had directed repeated appeals to a neighbour to take steps to curtail the activities in its territory of a terrorist organisation whose aim is the violent overthrow of your Government and not just, as the IRA sees it, the unification of a separate island. And if, in addition, these appeals were accompanied by a detailed exposition of the activities of the terrorists including names, addresses and acts of terror for which they were responsible. Material obtained during the operation in Gaborone on 14 June 1985 has provided adequate confirmation that the planning and execution of acts of terror in South Africa were being carried out from bases inside Botswana.

I do nevertheless agree with you that it would be preferable if the Government of Botswana could be convinced through diplomatic means to curtail the terrorist activities of the ANC conducted from its territory and to respond seriously to the proposals for closer co-operation between the respective security forces. It is not for lack of effort on the part of my Government that diplomacy has not to-date proved successful and it is for this reason that I appealed to you in my letter of 5 July 1985 to use the not inconsiderable influence of the British Government to convince the Government of Botswana and other Governments that a serious effort should be made to put a stop to terrorism in southern Africa.

CONFIDENTIAL

I refer to the personal message which you received from President Masire. While not calling into doubt the seriousness of his message to you, I wish to quote from a report by an official of my Government on a conversation which he had with Vice-President Peter Mmusi on 22 June 1985:

Vice-President Mmusi "... laid no blame on the South African Government for having carried out the raid. At all times he seemed to accept the fact that those who had been killed in the raid were in fact ANC terrorists and did not claim that they were refugees ..."

Vice-President Mmusi "... appeared (to be) surprised that the South African Defence Force had not attacked all the bases which they knew existed in Botswana." To which the South African official responded that to his knowledge all the bases attacked were in the suburbs of Gaborone and that the South African Defence Force had not attacked those targets which could have put the lives of many civilians at risk.

Vice-President Mmusi said that "it was a pity that the ANC should 'come between' the prospect of improved relations between South Africa and Botswana." He also "spoke about the evolution of 'apartheid' in South Africa. He acknowledged the fact that the State President was risking losing support from the electorate by taking steps to move away from 'apartheid'".


I have conveyed these confidential remarks of Vice-President Mmusi to you in order that you might be aware of the attitudes and positions adopted by African leaders towards my Government and officials of my Government who are continuously in contact with political leaders at the highest level in Africa. I would, however, not wish that Vice-President Mmusi's remarks which were passed in confidence should in any way prejudice his position.

I trust, Prime Minister, that the foregoing and my letter of 5 July 1985 will shed greater light on the events which led up to the South African action in Gaborone on 14 June 1985 and the aftermath, in the African context, of those events.

It is my hope that the leaders of southern Africa will be able to work together, with the active support and encouragement of Western leaders, to eliminate the scourge of terrorism from our sub-continent. Terrorism is indivisible and should not only be condemned on a selective basis.


I have noted your resistance to economic measures against South Africa and wish to express my appreciation of your stand. We do not like being obliged to take actions which might make matters harder for you and damage our bilateral relations, but I do feel that the time has come for the realities of southern Africa to be recognised.

Yours sincerely,



P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON





South African Embassy
Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

cc ops
master

2

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T135/A/85.

12 July 1985

Prime Minister

I interpret this as
a considerable climb-
down. I suggest that
we end the exchange at
this point.

C.D.P. 12/7

mf

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 10 July 1985 and for the frankness and promptness of your reply. It is my opinion that it is only through an open and frank exchange of views that constructive dialogue can be conducted.

Regarding your reference to the problems with which you have to contend in connection with the terrorist activities of the IRA, I am bound to say that I cannot agree with the parallel which you draw. The question which arises is what your Government would do if, over a period of two years, you had directed repeated appeals to a neighbour to take steps to curtail the activities in its territory of a terrorist organisation whose aim is the violent overthrow of your Government and not just, as the IRA sees it, the unification of a separate island. And if, in addition, these appeals were accompanied by a detailed exposition of the activities of the terrorists including names, addresses and acts of terror for which they were responsible. Material obtained during the operation in Gaborone on 14 June 1985 has provided adequate confirmation that the planning and execution of acts of terror in South Africa were being carried out from bases inside Botswana.

[very weak argument]

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Botswana and other Governments that a serious effort should be made to put a stop to terrorism in Southern Africa.

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Vice-President Mmusi:

"... appeared (to be) surprised that the South African Defence Force had not attacked all the bases which they knew existed in Botswana."

To which the South African official responded that to his knowledge all the bases attacked were in the suburbs of Gaborone and that the South African Defence Force had not attacked those targets which could have put the lives of many civilians at risk.

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I have conveyed these confidential remarks of Vice-President Mmusi to you in order that you might be aware of the attitudes and positions adopted by African leaders towards my Government and officials of my Government who are continuously in contact with political leaders at the highest level in Africa. I would, however, not wish that Vice-President Mmusi's remarks which were passed in confidence should in any way prejudice his position.

I trust, Prime Minister, that the foregoing and my letter of 5 July 1985 will shed greater light on the events which led up to the South African action in Gaborone on 14 June 1985 and the aftermath, in the African context, of those events.

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I have taken note of your resistance to economic measures against South Africa and wish to express my appreciation of your stand. We do not like being obliged to take actions which might make matters harder for you and damage our bilateral relations, but I do feel that the time has come for the realities of Southern Africa to be recognised.

Yours sincerely,

P.W. Botha
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

CONFIDENTIAL



1
file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 July, 1985.

SOUTH AFRICA

I enclose a copy of a further letter from President Botha in reply to the Prime Minister's latest letter. I regard it as something of a climb-down, and see no need to pursue the correspondence.

(C.D. Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

6



Ref: B8/6/1

South African Embassy

Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

em 12/7.

12 July 1985

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Mr Powell

It would be much appreciated if you could kindly hand the enclosed letter from the South African State President to the Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher.

Your assistance is much appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

Denis Worrall

Dr Denis Worrall
AMBASSADOR



10 DOWNING STREET

file 6

From the Private Secretary

12 July 1985

Dear Edin,

SEMINAR ON POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA

Sir Trevor Holdsworth and Lord Barber have both told us that they are unable to attend this seminar. It would be helpful to have suggestions for replacements. You will no doubt wish to consult the DTI.

Lord Barber has suggested Mr Peter Graham, Deputy Chairman of Standard Chartered and Chairman of the Crown Agents. I have simply noted this.

I am copying this letter to John Mogg (Department of Trade and Industry).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Colin Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MR. POWELL

Meeting at Chequers on Friday,
13 September

The following have telephoned this morning
to say that they are unable to come.

Sir Trevor Holdsworth has Board meeting and
AGM of Thorn-EMI and
he is a director

Lord Barber will be in North America. Lord
Barber has suggested that Mr. Peter Graham,
the Deputy Chairman of Standard Chartered Bank
might represent him. Mr. Graham is also
Chairman of the Crown Agents, on the board
of Standard Chartered in South Africa,
Zimbabwe and other countries in Black Africa.

Agree to invite Mr. Graham?

Sue Goodchild

12 July 1985

SUBJECT
cc Master

CONFIDENTIAL



File VC
VC2 AC/A
bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 July 1985

Dear Colin,

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE TEN ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Thank you for your letter of 8 July with which you enclosed the draft of a possible statement by the Ten on Southern Africa. The Prime Minister discussed this with the Foreign Secretary this morning.

The Foreign Secretary said that the vote in the US Senate yesterday was a further sign of the increasing difficulty we were facing internationally over South Africa. At a recent Commonwealth meeting on Southern Africa our representative had found himself in a minority of one even more markedly than before. He thought it might be useful in due course if the Prime Minister herself were to speak to the Commonwealth Secretary General. Her bilateral meetings with African Heads of Government during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting would also have an important part to play in fending off pressure for sanctions. He thought that agreement by the Ten on a reasonable statement on South Africa would help us construct a defensible position at CHOGM.

The Prime Minister said that she did not like the revised draft statement. By identifying steps which we thought the South African government should take, there was a risk that we would be confronted with even more pressing demands for economic sanctions if the steps in question were not taken within a fairly short time. She also saw a risk that if we were to take the initiative in launching a text others would try to strengthen it in ways which would be unacceptable to us. However, she was prepared to agree that the Foreign Secretary should have a text in reserve to make such use of as he saw fit. This could be the revised text enclosed with your letter, taking into account the following points:

- (i) If possible, the reference to deploring acts of violence in paragraph 2 should be cast in such a way as to make clear that the Ten deplored the use of violence as a means of achieving political ends. The Prime Minister could, however, accept in the last resort the text as it is, omitting the passage in square brackets.

CONFIDENTIAL


8/1

CONFIDENTIAL

2

- (ii) While the Prime Minister would prefer to see the passage in square brackets at the end of paragraph 2 omitted, she recognises that it may be the only way to secure agreement on an otherwise acceptable text.
- (iii) The Prime Minister would wish the words "its rightful political" to be omitted in the last sentence of paragraph 3.
- (iv) The words "to create the conditions for such a dialogue" at the beginning of paragraph 4 should be replaced by "to improve the prospects for such a dialogue".
- (v) The last tirtet of paragraph 4 should be omitted altogether.
- (vi) The Prime Minister would prefer to see omitted the words "and other acknowledged political leaders" in the first tirtet of paragraph 4 though does not insist on this.

If in the course of discussion we come under pressure to accept a text significantly stronger than that now under discussion, the Prime Minister would wish to be consulted before a decision was taken to accept it.

Yours sincerely

C.D. POWELL

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NBPA
CDP 12/7.



DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET

TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-215 5422
SWITCHBOARD 01-215 7877

DW209

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

12 July 1985

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London
SW1

Dear Charles,

JOINT TEN STATEMENT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Colin Budd sent us a copy of his letter of 8 July to you. ^{In Pm's Box}

2. There is comparatively little which causes problems for us in the "improved" draft declaration which he enclosed. Some of the measures which the South African Government would be urged to take, especially those which would guarantee greater freedom of movement for black employees, would be positively welcomed by companies operating in South Africa.

3. The major concern for this Department is, of course, the EC Code of Conduct. Sir Geoffrey Howe wrote to my Secretary of State on 14 June about this. There is no basic disagreement between us and the FCO on the areas where we might, in the face of developments, seek to concentrate our and companies' efforts. We agree, for example, that education, training and social involvement are questions to which we could give greater emphasis and that, on the contrary, it would be undesirable to focus on pay levels. But my Secretary of State remains to be convinced that changes to the Code itself, as opposed to the way in which it is implemented, are desirable in principle to ensure that the Code remains an adequate and credible justification for British companies' involvement in South Africa. His view is that by admitting that changes are necessary to bring the Code up-to-date, we could be opening a Pandora's Box. It could then prove harder to resist proposals which would be quite unacceptable to ourselves, the FCO and British companies, such as making compliance with the Code obligatory.

CONFIDENTIAL



4. For this reason we were unhappy with the reference agreed between officials in Milan to an undertaking to adapt and strengthen the Code. Senior officials from this Department met their FCO counterparts this week and discussed the implications of this wording. It was agreed that the wording should not be interpreted as excluding the possibility of achieving this adaptation and strengthening by means other than by making changes to the actual Code as it at present stands (for example, by revising the explanatory guidance or the reporting requirements so as to focus attention on particular areas of current concern). Accordingly, the UK Political Director in accepting or supporting this wording should make a statement of our view that it should not be seen as creating preconditions for the review of the Code which a small group of EC "experts" is to undertake, that it neither commits us to, nor excludes the possibility of changes to the Code itself and that the group should not be constrained from considering other ways of strengthening the implementation and application of the Code.

5. Following the Political Directors' meeting, we intend to meet with FCO officials to discuss specific measures which could be submitted for Ministerial approval after consultation with industry.

6. I am copying this letter to Colin Budd.

*Yours sincerely,
Maureen Dodsworth*

MAUREEN DODSWORTH
Private Secretary



CD
11/7.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE
PRIME MINISTER

SEMINAR ON POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA

Thank you for your minute of 10 July. I shall be very glad to attend.

E A J FERGUSSON

11 July 1985

PRIME MINISTER

SOUTHERN AFRICA: STATEMENT BY THE TEN

As I understand this muddly letter:

- (i) no statement on South Africa was issued at Milan;
- (ii) the Foreign Secretary thinks that we should try to get a statement now, to hold the Ten to a consistent policy, and to give us a solid position at CHOGM;
- (iii) his preferred text is at A;
- (iv) his fallback is the Milan text at B;
- (v) in either of them he is prepared to drop reference to renunciation of violence by all concerned "including those opposed to apartheid";
- (v) he is prepared to accept the sentence "in the absence of any significant progress within a reasonable period of time, the Ten reserve the right to reconsider their attitude". He points out that this is less strong than the wording agreed at CHOGM in 1983;
- (vi) he is also prepared to speak of "adaptation and strengthening" of the Code of Conduct.

This all seems a bit removed from the real world. I can't see how one can derive much reassurance about holding to a common position of the Ten, when the statement specifically talks of 'reconsidering' their attitude. I doubt if CHOGM in October will be much impressed one way or the other by what the Ten say in July. And dropping the reference to violence by those opposed to apartheid is inconsistent with your letters to President Botha which speak of rejecting violence whoever is responsible.

In short I think we would be better off without any text; and now that the Milan meeting has passed, there seems no particular reason to issue one.

The Foreign Secretary may raise this at his bilateral tomorrow.

C.D.P.

(C. D. POWELL)

11 July 1985



10 DOWNING STREET

JE VC.

C-attached
Mrs Goodchild
fco.

From the Private Secretary

MR. APPLEYARD
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

SEMINAR ON POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA

The Prime Minister hopes that the Foreign Secretary will attend the seminar which she is proposing to hold at Chequers on 13 September to discuss policy towards Southern Africa.

It is envisaged that the seminar will begin at 1000 hours, with a plenary session which will last all morning and over lunch. After lunch there will be a restricted session limited to Ministers and officials, which is expected to continue to 1600/1630 hours.

C.D.P.

C.D. POWELL

10 July 1985

2

F. R.

Minutes identical to Mr Appleyard's sent to:

Mr Fergusson,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Sir Antony Acland
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Economic Secretary
HM Treasury

Minister for Trade

Minister of State (Mr Rifkind)
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

GE.

I think you need
this as a model.

COP.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

JE VC.
 c-attached
 Mrs Gorschild
 fco.
 10 July 1985

Dear Mr. Amery.

I have been asked by the Prime Minister to enquire whether you would be prepared to join a small group of Ministers, Members of Parliament, businessmen, academic experts and officials at Chequers on Friday 13 September to discuss policy towards Southern Africa.

We propose that the group should assemble at Chequers at 1000 that day. The discussion would take up the whole of the morning and continue over lunch, ending at about 1400/1430.

Since Chequers is not altogether easy to reach by public transport, we shall arrange overnight accommodation at a nearby hotel for the night of 12/13 September for those participants who so wish. All accommodation and travel expenses will, of course, be reimbursed.

The Prime Minister would much appreciate it if you were able to take part. It would be helpful to know fairly soon whether you can do so. If you prefer to reply by telephone, the number to ring is (01) 930 4433. Please ask for Mrs. Goodchild. Further details about the meeting, together with a discussion paper, will follow in early September.

This letter is marked "PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL" because we should prefer knowledge of the meeting to be confined to the participants themselves.

Yours sincerely,
 Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

The Right Honourable Julian Amery, MP.

LETTERS identical to Julian Amery's sent to:

Anthony Loehnis, Esq.,
Bank of England,
Threadneedle Street,
London EC2

The Right Honourable The Lord Barber, TD,
Standard Chartered Bank plc,
10 Clement's Lane,
London EC4.

Dr James Barber, JP,
Kingsgate House,
Bow Lane,
Durham,
DH1 3ER.

Patrick Gillam, Esq.,
Managing Director,
British Petroleum Company plc,
Britannic House,
Moore Lane,
London EC2Y 9BU.

Sir Trevor Holdsworth,
7 Cleveland Road,
St. James's,
London SW1A 1DB.

A.B. Marshall, Esq.,
Crest House,
Park View Road,
Woldingham,
Surrey.

Bowen Wells, Esq., MP,
House of Commons,
SW1.

Robert Jackson, Esq., M.P.,
House of Commons,
SW1.

~~Mrs Merle Lipton,
University of Sussex,
Brighton,
Sussex.~~

*Michael Hoffman
43 De Vere Gardens
London W8 5AW*

Mrs Merle Lipton,
15 Eton Place,
Kempton,
Brighton,
BN2 1EH.

TALK BY HELEN SUZMAN, OPPOSITION MP SOUTH AFRICAN
PARLIAMENT; TO MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC
GROUP, LUXEMBOURG, 10TH JULY 1985.

Prime Minister
Some cogent points
against
sanctions.

CDP
22/7

What can be done by the West to speed up the dismantling of apartheid? Many options are presently under consideration, with disinvestment and sanctions much to the fore: campaigns for such actions have indeed reached tidal wave proportions in the U.S.A. Let me say at once that if I thought these would work, they would have my unconditional support.

Not only do I not believe these campaigns would be effective - I believe they would be counter-productive.

I understand, respect and do not argue against the moral motivation for disinvestment and sanctions. But, once gone from the South African scene, any influence that may have been exercised has gone too: any good that may have resulted from quiet diplomacy, or Codes of Employment Conduct for Companies with Interests in South Africa (as adopted by the European Community) will go by the board.

The Sullivan and European Community Codes have certainly made businessmen more conscious of their social responsibilities, and have led not only to improvements in employment practices, but also to assistance in education and housing for employees and their families.

And more recently, perhaps because of the threat of disinvestment, organised business - Chambers of Commerce and Industry - have expressed their objections to the detention of trade unionists and are pressing for the repeal of influx control.

The vacuum left by the withdrawal of U.S. and European firms will be filled - if it is filled at all - by companies with less interest in the welfare of their black employees. Moreover, if it is fondly imagined that the South African Government will buckle under such pressures and abandon apartheid faster than it intends to do, this illusion should be immediately dispelled. Far more likely, far more in keeping with the temperament of the Government and of the majority of the white inhabitants, would be the development of a siege mentality.

Nor should the idea that economic hardship would lead to a successful Black revolution, followed by a Black majority socialist government to replace the white capitalist regime, be seriously entertained - it just is not on, as anyone acquainted with the ferocity and determination of the South African army and police will agree. Nor incidentally, is there any guarantee that the replacement would be any better or more democratic than the present regime, should a revolution succeed.

That disinvestment, lack of foreign capital and imposition of sanctions would be effective as a punitive measure is, of course, undeniable. But it would not be selective of its victims.

Indeed, although white South Africans would be affected, the major sufferers would be black - South African Blacks and also Blacks from neighbouring states in Southern Africa which are heavily dependent on South Africa for financial aid, grants, markets and jobs, some of which countries, like the B.S.L. countries, are also part of a customs union with South Africa, and are linked to the Rand monetary system. "Blacks don't care if there is mass unemployment" people say. And I say (who am on the receiving end of many requests from recent job losers for assistance in obtaining jobs) that Blacks who don't care are those whose jobs are not endangered or who have never had a job to lose.

ssroads.

The South African Government is more sensitive than you think. It does not enjoy being a pariah. It would like to be welcomed back into the Western community of nations.

But not at any cost.

Rather should you aim at attainable objectives than adopt measures that could reduce the country to economic chaos, with totally unpredictable consequences.



file d

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 July, 1985.

SOUTH AFRICA

I enclose a copy of a further letter from the Prime Minister to President Botha in reply to his of 5 July. I should be grateful if the text could be telegraphed to Capetown for early delivery.

(C.D. Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CST

SUBJECT
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CONFIDENTIAL

SHE 124

OO PRETORIA
PP GABORONE
RR LUSAKA
RR JOHANNESBURG
GRS 424

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 1344/85

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 110808Z JUL 85
TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 90 OF 11 JULY
INFO PRIORITY GABORONE, MASERU, MBABANE
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, MAPUTO, LUSAKA,
LUANDA, JOHANNESBURG
INFO SAVING CAPETOWN, DURBAN

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT BOTHA
OUR TELNO 88 OF 9 JULY

121
/
111

1. PLEASE PASS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE FOLLOWING TEXT OF A
REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA'S LETTER OF
5 JULY. SIGNED LETTER FOLLOWS BY BAG.
BEGINS THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 5 JULY. I SHALL REPLY WITH
EQUAL FRANKNESS.

YES, IT IS MY GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TO COMBAT TERRORISM WHEREVER
IT MAY OCCUR. MY LETTER TO YOU OF 4 JULY MADE CLEAR THAT WE
OPPOSE VIOLENCE WHOEVER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR IT. BUT THIS DOES
NOT LEAD US TO CONDONE AN ATTACK ON A NEIGHBOURING STATE, IN
WHICH INNOCENT PEOPLE, INCLUDING CHILDREN, WERE KILLED AND
INJURED.

YOU MENTION THE IRA. THERE HAS, AS YOU KNOW, BEEN A CONTINUING
SERIES OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN WHICH SOME
2000 SOLDIERS, POLICEMEN, PRISON WARDERS AND ORDINARY CITIZENS
HAVE LOST THEIR LIVES. WHAT WOULD THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
THINK IF BRITAIN RETALIATED BY LAUNCHING ATTACKS ACROSS THE
BORDER INTO THE IRISH REPUBLIC, WHERE MANY OF THE TERRORISTS ARE?
RATHER WE BELIEVE THAT CLOSE CO-OPERATION WITH THE IRISH
AUTHORITIES IS THE BEST WAY AND INDEED ESSENTIAL TO THE EVENTUAL
DEFEAT OF THE IRA.

AS FAR AS THE ATTITUDE OF BOTSWANA IS CONCERNED, I CAN ONLY SAY

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THAT PRESIDENT MASIRE, IN A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO ME, EXPRESSED HIS INDIGNATION AT THE ATTACK. HE ALSO ASKED FOR OUR SUPPORT AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND MORE WIDELY FOR WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS AN UNPROVOKED ACT OF AGGRESSION. THE FACT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN READY TO MEET WITH YOU AT REGULAR INTERVALS, AND IS EVEN NOW PREPARED TO RESUME THE DISCUSSIONS INTERRUPTED BY THE RAID, MERELY STRENGTHENS MY VIEW THAT THIS PROBLEM COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY DIPLOMACY RATHER THAN BY FORCE.

I HAVE TO SAY, THEREFORE, THAT YOUR PERCEPTION OF THIS EPISODE IS NOT SHARED IN THIS COUNTRY. THE IMPACT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY UNFORTUNATE AND THIS AT A TIME WHEN BRITAIN, BEGIN UNDERLINING ALMOST ALONE CEASE UNDERLINING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, IS ATTEMPTING TO RESIST PRESSURE FOR ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. THIS IS WHY I WAS DISMAYED BY YOUR ACTION AND WHY I SAID THAT ANY FURTHER ATTACK OF THIS KIND WOULD LEAVE US WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO TAKE SPECIFIC STEPS TO MARK OUR REPUDIATION OF IT. ENDS.

2. FOR INFORMATION ADDRESSEES ONLY. THE ABOVE IS STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION.

HOWE

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

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File RAMP
cc FCs
See T134A/85.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 July, 1985.

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 5 July. I shall reply with equal frankness.

Yes, it is my Government's policy to combat terrorism wherever it may occur. My letter to you of 4 July made clear that we oppose violence whoever is responsible for it. But this does not lead us to condone an attack on a neighbouring state, in which innocent people, including children, were killed and injured.

You mention the IRA. There has, as you know, been a continuing series of terrorist incidents in Northern Ireland in which some 2000 soldiers, policemen, prison wardens and ordinary citizens have lost their lives. What would the international community think if Britain retaliated by launching attacks across the border into the Irish Republic, where many of the terrorists are? Rather we believe that close co-operation with the Irish authorities is the best way and indeed essential to the eventual defeat of the IRA.

As far as the attitude of Botswana is concerned, I can only say that President Masire, in a personal message to me, expressed his indignation at the attack. He also asked for our support at the United Nations and more widely for what he described as an unprovoked act of aggression. The fact that his Government has been ready to meet with you at regular

lv

intervals, and is even now prepared to resume the discussions interrupted by the raid, merely strengthens my view that this problem could and should have been resolved by diplomacy rather than by force.

I have to say, therefore, that your perception of this episode is not shared in this country. The impact on our bilateral relations has been thoroughly unfortunate and this at a time when Britain, almost alone in the international community, is attempting to resist pressure for economic measures against South Africa. This is why I was dismayed by your action and why I said that any further attack of this kind would leave us with no choice but to take specific steps to mark our repudiation of it.

Yours sincerely

Rajiv Gandhi

The Honourable P.W. Botha, D.M.S.

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FM WASHINGTON 092330Z JUL 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2055 OF 9 JULY 85

INFORMATION ROUTINE PRETORIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN, PARIS, OTTAWA

US POLICY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

SUMMARY

1. CROCKER LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETINGS WITH UK AND WITH FIVE AFRICA DIRECTORS NEXT WEEK WHICH COME AT IMPORTANT MOMENT. AMERICANS WAITING FOR REQUESTED CLARIFICATIONS ON SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY AND WILL NOT SEND AMBASSADOR BACK IN NEAR FUTURE. WANT TO SEE A MORE CONCERTED WESTERN EFFORT ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY ISSUES BUT DO NOT WISH TO GET IN THE LEAD IN PROPOSING THIS AND RISK REBUFF. HOPE WE WILL MAKE SOME OF THE RUNNING. SLIGHTLY LESS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT OUTCOME IN CONGRESS.

DETAIL

2. MINISTER SAW CROCKER AND GELBARD (DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN AFRICA) ON 9 JULY. CROCKER SAID HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO BOTH THE BILATERAL US/UK MEETING AND THE MEETING WITH THE FIVE AFRICA DIRECTORS NEXT WEEK.

THE MEETINGS WERE WELL TIMED AND CAME AT A DIFFICULT MOMENT FOR THE WEST IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

3. CROCKER SAID THE US ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED TO PRESS THE SOUTH AFRICANS HARD FOR A COMPREHENSIVE CLARIFICATION OF THEIR POLICY ON ALL THE MAIN ISSUES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (THEIR UNACCEPTABLY NEGATIVE REACTION TO THE US SYNTHESIS PAPER ON NAMIBIA, THEIR TREATMENT OF THEIR SMALLER NEIGHBOURS, AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA). THEY WERE MAKING SURE THAT US DISSATISFACTION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL WITH SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY GOT TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS' EARS AND HOPED THAT THIS WOULD PRODUCE SOME EFFECT. MEANWHILE THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF SENDING THE US AMBASSADOR BACK. THAT WOULD ONLY OCCUR WHEN A REASONABLY SATISFACTORY SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE HAD BEEN PROFFERED. CROCKER WAS NOT PREPARED TO BE DRAWN FAR INTO SPECULATION ABOUT WHETHER THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD OPTED FIRMLY FOR A POLICY OF SULLEN NON-COOPERATION IN EFFORTS TO SETTLE THE NAMIBIAN ISSUE OR WHETHER THEY COULD, BY A MIXTURE OF CARROT AND STICK, BE BROUGHT BACK TO A MORE REASONABLE APPROACH.

4. CROCKER REITERATED HIS HOPE THAT NEXT WEEK'S MEETING OF THE FIVE WOULD NOT REVERT TO THE EARLIER PATTERN OF THE FOUR QUESTIONING THE US ABOUT IS POLICY AND THEN LEAVING THE AMERICANS TO MAKE ALL THE RUNNING. HE WAS VERY THAT, IF NEW TACTICAL APPROACHES WERE TO BE CONSIDERED, THEY COULD NOT COME FROM THE UNITED STATES. HIS RELUCTANCE SEEMED TO BE A COMBINATION OF A FEAR THAT ANYTHING THE UNITED STATES PUT FORWARD WOULD BE REBUFFED BY ONE OR SEVERAL OF THE OTHERS AND A CONCERN THAT EVEN THE SUGGESTION OF A TACTICAL MOVE BY THE AMERICANS WOULD BE INTERPRETED, IF IT GOT OUT, (ON THE HILL, IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND AT THE UNITED NATIONS), AS A MAJOR SHIFT FROM THE POLICY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT. HE

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/ HOPED

HOPED THEREFORE THAT THE US/UK MEETING ON 15 JULY COULD BE USED FOR A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE POSSIBILITIES AND THAT, IF SOME TACTICAL IDEAS SEEMED WORTH PURSUING THE NEXT DAY, WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO GIVE THEM A RUN.

5. CROCKER AND GELBARD ALSO SEEMED TO BE GROPING FOR SOME WAY OF RESUMING REGULAR MEETINGS OF SOMETHING LIKE THE CONTACT GROUP, BUT NOT NECESSARILY THE SAME MEMBERSHIP, AND WITH AN AGENDA COVERING ALL THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA RATHER THAN JUST NAMIBIA. WHEN HANNAY ASKED WHAT ADDITIONAL MEMBERSHIP THEY HAD IN MIND THEY MENTIONED JAPAN AND ITALY. IT MIGHT BE EASIER TO GET THE FRENCH BACK INTO THE FOLD IF WHAT THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO REJOIN WAS NOT SO OBVIOUSLY THE CONTACT GROUP BY ANOTHER NAME.

6. BOTH CROCKER AND GELBARD WERE SCATHING ABOUT THE RECENT CANADIAN POLICY STATEMENT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA BUT THOUGHT IT COULD HAVE BEEN WORSE.

THEIR CLEAR IMPRESSION WAS THAT CANADIAN OFFICIALS WERE THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM AND THAT THE NEW CANADIAN MINISTERS WERE BEING CARRIED ALONG RATHER UNWILLINGLY. THEY THEREFORE INTENDED TO CONCENTRATE FUTURE DISCUSSION AT THE SHULTZ/CLARK LEVEL. BOTH AMERICANS WERE GLOOMY ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF GETTING ANY HELP FROM THE FRENCH BUT WONDERED WHETHER EITHER THEY OR WE SHOULD MAKE AN EFFORT TO CONCERT WITH THE GERMANS IN ADVANCE OF THE MEETING OF THE FIVE.

7. ON THE CONGRESSIONAL PICTURE, CROCKER WAS A LITTLE LESS PESSIMISTIC THAN OF LATE. THE RIGHT (SENATOR HELMS) HAD NOW STARTED TO CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR THE PROPONENTS OF SANCTIONS IN THE SENATE, WITH DELAYING ACTION AND THE TABLING OF RAFTS OF AMENDMENTS. WITH ANY LUCK THE BILL MIGHT NOT COME OUT OF THE SENATE FOR SEVERAL WEEKS AND WHAT WOULD IN ANY CASE PROVE TO BE A COMPLICATED AND CONTENTIOUS HOUSE/SENATE CONFERENCE PROCESS WOULD NOT THEN BEGIN UNTIL AUTUMN AT THE EARLIEST. THE LONGER THE PROCESS GOT SPUN OUT THE BETTER THE CHANCE THAT OTHER ISSUES WOULD COME TO THE FORE.

8. CROCKER WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO UNDERLINE THE POINT IMPLICIT IN THE RECENT MESSAGE FROM SHULTZ TO YOU (FCO TELNO 1054 TO WASHINGTON), NAMELY THAT, EVEN IF US DOMESTIC LEGISLATION CONTAINING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA GOT ON TO THE STATUTE BOOK, THE UNITED STATES WOULD STILL BE LIKELY TO USE ITS VETO AGAINST CHAPTER SEVEN SANCTIONS IN NEW YORK. IT SHOULD NOT BE ASSUMED THAT EVEN THOSE IN CONGRESS WHO FAVOURED SANCTIONS WOULD WANT THE UNITED STATES TO ACCEPT UN SANCTIONS. THE UN WAS DEEPLY UNPOPULAR IN CONGRESS. AND WHILE THE UNITED STATES RETAINED CONTROL OVER ITS OWN SANCTIONS, THERE WOULD BE NO SUCH CONTROL OVER UN SANCTIONS.

WRIGHT

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PRIME MINISTER

SEMINAR ON POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

You commented that the list of participants for this seminar was more than we have had in the past and would make it difficult to structure the seminar.

I had envisaged that we would have a full session from 10-12.30 and over lunch; followed by a more restricted discussion, between Ministers and officials only, in the afternoon. If we do it this way, I think we could just manage 19 at the morning session; but if you prefer we could make one each of the MPs, businessmen and academics a reserve, reducing the total to 16.

Agree the format proposed above?

Agree the list of participants and reserves (attached)?

Agree the letter of invitation (also attached)?

C.D.P.

C.D. POWELL

9 July, 1985

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Government

1. The Prime Minister
2. ✓ Foreign Secretary
3. ✓ Mr. Rifkind
4. ✓ Mr. Channon
5. ✓ Mr. Stewart

MPs

6. ✓ Sir Julian Amery The Rt. Hon JA, MP
7. ✓ Robert Jackson MP?

7 A Reserve: Bowen Wells MP include

Businessmen

- not in who's who.
8. ✓ Sandy Marshall (UK/South African Trade Association)
 9. ✓ Sir Trevor Holdsworth (GKN)
 10. ✓ Lord Barber PC, TD

VOA Reserve: Patrick Gillam ^{ESOV} (BP) include.

Academics

- (P.93)
11. ✓ Dr. ^{James JP} Barber (Durham)
 12. ✓ Mrs. Lipton (Sussex)
- not in who's who

Who are these?

Speaker to PM who has agreed.
cos

Reserve

✓ Professor Spence (Leicester)

Officials

13. ✓ Sir A. Acland

14. ✓ Mr. Fergusson

15. ✓ Mr. Loehnis (Bank of England)

16. Mr. Powell



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

I have been asked by the Prime Minister to enquire whether you would be prepared to join a small group of Ministers, Members of Parliament, businessmen, academic experts and officials at Chequers on Friday 13 September to discuss policy towards South Africa.

We propose that the group should assemble at Chequers at 1000 that day. The discussion would take up the whole of the morning and continue over lunch, ending at about 1400/1430.

Since Chequers is not altogether easy to reach by public transport, we shall arrange overnight accommodation at a nearby hotel for the night of 12/13 September for those participants who so wish. All accommodation and travel expenses will, of course, be reimbursed.

The Prime Minister would much appreciate it if you were able to take part. It would be helpful to know fairly soon whether you can do so. If you prefer to reply by telephone, the number to rings is (01) 930 4433. Please ask for Mrs. Goodchild. Further details about the meeting, together with a discussion paper, will follow in early September.

This letter is marked "PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL" because we should prefer knowledge of the meeting to be confined to the participants themselves.

CHARLES POWELL

Le VL3AFW



10 DOWNING STREET

9 July 1985

From the Private Secretary

SEMINAR ON POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

Thank you for your letter of 4 July enclosing a list of suggested participants for the seminar on Policy towards South Africa. Since receiving your letter, we have had a bid from the Treasury and the Prime Minister has agreed to add Mr. Stewart, Economic Secretary. But apart from that, her inclination is to reduce rather than increase numbers. Some of those on your list have therefore been relegated to the reserves: and I fear that it will not be possible to include additional officials.

You mentioned the structure of the Seminar. We do indeed intend to follow the usual pattern of a morning session and lunch for all participants, and a restricted session in the afternoon for Ministers and officials only.

I am copying this letter to John Mogg (Department of Trade and Industry) and Adrian Ellis (HM Treasury).

CHARLES POWELL

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

LS

PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA

You will recall that you sent a fairly stiff letter to President Botha following the South African attack on Botswana. (Flag A). He replied the very next day in a letter which is both abrupt in tone and specious in argument. (Flag B).

I do not think that you should let this pass. It is in the South African's own interest that we should not be forced into a position where there is no alternative but to take some sort of measures (though not economic) against them. I suggest, therefore, that you send a further reply on the lines of the attached to make this point.

C.D.P.

9 July, 1985

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 July 1985

Dear Charles,

Correspondence between the Prime Minister and President Botha

With your letter of 6 July you attached one from President Botha to the Prime Minister.

The tone of President Botha's letter illustrates the very wide gap in perception which separates South Africa from the rest of the world. He appears to think that we can condone the invasion of a neighbouring state if this is done with the purpose of combating terrorism. He also seems to assume that his action would have little effect on our bilateral relations.

The Foreign Secretary considers that the Prime Minister should leave President Botha in no doubt that we disagree strongly with the basic premise that the ends justify the means; and that she stands by the statement in her earlier letter that any further South African raids will force us to take some (unspecified) concrete step to register our disapproval.

I attach a draft letter along these lines which the Prime Minister might send to President Botha. As suggested in your covering letter, the draft also incorporates some of the arguments which the Prime Minister put to Vice President Bush last week.

*Yours ever,
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: ~~minutes/letter/teleletter/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:
The Honourable P W Botha DMS MP
State President of the Republic of
South Africa

Your Reference

- ~~Top Secret~~
- ~~Secret~~
- ~~Confidential~~
- ~~Restricted~~
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 5 July. ~~Let me comment~~
with equal frankness.

CAVEAT.....

Yes, it is my Government's policy to combat terrorism wherever it may occur. My letter to you of 4 July made clear that we oppose violence whoever is responsible for it. But ~~we~~ cannot condone ~~your~~ ^{an} attack on a neighbouring state, in which innocent people, including children, were killed and injured.

not lead us to

You mention the IRA. There has, as you know, been a continuing series of terrorist incidents in Northern Ireland in which some 2000 soldiers, policemen, prison wardens and ordinary citizens have lost their lives. What would the international community think if Britain retaliated by launching attacks across the border into the Irish Republic, where many of the terrorists are? ~~In fact~~ ^{Rather} we believe that close cooperation with the Irish authorities is the best way and indeed essential to the eventual defeat of the IRA.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

As far as the attitude of Botswana is concerned, I can only say that President Masire, in a personal message to me, expressed his ~~shock~~ and indignation at the attack. He also

Relations: South Africa Pt 5.

asked for

requested our support at the United Nations and more widely, for what he described as an unprovoked act of aggression. The fact that his Government has been ready to meet with you at regular intervals, and is even now prepared to resume the discussions interrupted by the raid, merely strengthens my view that this problem could have been resolved by diplomacy rather than by force.

and should

I have to say, therefore,

~~I can only tell you that your perception of this episode is not shared either in this country or in the international community at large.~~ The impact on our bilateral relations has been ~~entirely negative,~~ ^{thoroughly unfortunate} and this at a time when Britain, almost alone in the international community, is attempting to resist pressure for economic measures against South Africa. This is why I was dismayed by your action. ~~And as I said in my earlier letter,~~ ^{and why!} any further attack of this kind would leave us with no choice but to take specific steps to mark our repudiation of it.

that

Mr Reeve

FROM: E A J Fergusson

DATE: 8 JULY 1985

cc PS/Mr Rifkind
Mr Johnson
Miss Neville-Jones

UK POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

1. The excellent draft paper circulated on 3 July lacks an assessment of what we think is a reasonable pace of internal change in South Africa, towards what goal. At present our policy is largely determined by our need to respond to the ferment of pressures in the world outside South Africa.
2. An informed observer with a sense of history and the ability to compare the situation in South Africa with the way in which other societies have handled or are handling the immensely complex problems arising from the inter-action of widely different cultures would accept two propositions:
 - (a) there is a process of change, even of accelerating change, in South Africa; and
 - (b) there is no model in the developed or under-developed world which offers a satisfactory paradigm for stable evolution in the South African context.
3. The dominant element in South African society (ie the whites) know that they are in the business of survival. They know that if there is to be a place for them in a future and stable South Africa it will require a continuing process of compromise among all parties, including themselves. While there are obvious divisions between Afrikaners and non-Afrikaners as to the degree of their determination for personal survival within South Africa, a large majority of the white population and very probably the coloured and Indian populations also do not see survival as lying within the framework of a unitary majoritarian state. They believe that the determination which they show now is likely to decide the extent to which future compromises take account of their interests. They also believe that one should not make parallels between their situation and that of the white minorities in the ex-colonial world (which were relatively transient elements in their local environments) or the problem of civil rights for non-white minorities in eg the US or Britain (which have never posed a serious threat to the values of the governing group).

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
4. The situation in Algeria may be thought to offer rather closer parallels; I do not believe that close study would bear that out.
5. Whatever its Dutch antecedents, the South Africa of today is very largely the product of British influence - two provinces were British colonies for over a century and the First World sector of the South African economy is very largely the creation of British capital, technology, skills, people and effort. So, too, is the legacy of constitutional rule, law, administration, press, etc. I say this without wanting to downplay the significance of the Afrikaner element in society nor the disastrous quarter of a century of Afrikaner ideology from 1948. The Afrikaners are, however, a convenient scape-goat. The collective values of white South African society in the period up to 1948 were more or less indistinguishable from the values of much of British society of the period. The difference is that attitudes in post-war Britain, in the special circumstances of the time, changed very rapidly. Attitudes in South Africa froze (in some aspects of course they turned back, though "apartheid" is more a matter of systematization - of Dutch tidy-mindedness - than a dramatic break with earlier racial attitudes). Although in the last ten years much of the more rigid ideology of apartheid has been got rid of, as Afrikaners have come to realize how unfitted it is for the modern world, and have recognised that it harms their own self-interest (as they too have evolved), the main reason why white South African attitudes have not evolved as quickly as attitudes elsewhere in the West and are not now broadly the same as liberal values in Britain or the US, is because in neither of the latter do white people face the potential threat of domination by different cultures.
6. Many of South Africa's detractors do not themselves have democratic regimes. Partial though the franchise is, the system in South Africa is nonetheless democratic. Any leader, Prime Minister or now President, can only move as fast as he can carry his constituency with him. How to do so - the detailed management of a domestic political situation - cannot easily be determined by outside observers.
7. The pace of internal political movement within South Africa is undoubtedly determined by the conflicting pressures of the domestic political scene. One of the reasons why pressure from outside on South Africa is ineffective or even counter-productive, in the eyes of the dominant group, is that it appears to have only very generalised answers to the question "where should it all end up?" and little or no answer to the questions "how should minority interests be safeguarded?" and "how should Western values be safeguarded?". Yet it is on the answers to those questions, and the reassurance which they need to provide to those who will have to relinquish power, that the vital issue of the pace of change depends. Events elsewhere in Africa, most recently in Zimbabwe, reinforce fear rather than confidence.

8. One answer is what one might call the Oppenheimer thesis. Put crudely, this is that if South Africa can remain stable and grow more prosperous it will in due course become a socially more homogeneous society with more and more blacks assimilating to white society and accepting white values. As they do so the forces of vested interest and stability will grow, and South Africa will increasingly be a class rather than a racially-based society. That is internationally a more normal basis for society. Of course, as - in much easier conditions - the US example shows, this is not an easy aspiration to fulfil. What however are the alternatives? One is some kind of federal/confederal structure, geographically or ethnically based, or both. However much we may dislike it, and however inconsistent at the margins, there was some logic to the notion of separate racial classification and separate development (its principal fault was the grotesque unfairness of its application). There are of course those who explicitly believe that only a unitary state with a majoritarian system will accord with modern notions of fairness. Many informed observers, however, would see that as a recipe for chaos. Some, of course, would not mind that as the price for equality. Many would.

9. These are immensely difficult issues which I have only sketched out in the barest outline. They need to be addressed, however, because if one is getting into the business of applying pressure (we know that this is a slippery slope) one needs to have some clearer notion of "pressure towards what" than I believe we have. What would our answer be to a specific question from the South African Government "What do you want us to do next?"

10. It is possible to take the detached view that our national interests require us to respond to the pressures on us, irrespective of how we view the reality of the situation in South Africa. On this hypothesis we may at some stage have to make a clear-cut choice against South Africa if the balance of our interests there and outside appears to shift decisively in favour of the latter and we look like risking serious damage. I believe nonetheless that there are many people in this country who would be unhappy, at the least, to see us make that choice purely in response to external pressures on us and would believe that our historical responsibility for the situation in South Africa and our continuing close human involvement there would require us, before we do so, to have done as much as we could to avoid such a decision by putting across the positive case for involvement in South Africa. It is, of course, very hard to assess how public opinion as a whole would respond were we faced with the need for a choice of Black rather than White Africa. We need to recognise, however, that UK opinion could be very divided.

11. I believe that Dr Crocker's approach shares some of the above line of reasoning. We might therefore aim to widen the discussion with him on Monday, 15 July, or perhaps over lunch - to consider these longer-term issues.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Ewen Fergusson', with a horizontal line underneath the name.

Ewen Fergusson





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 July, 1985

Dear Charles,

Joint Ten Statement on Southern Africa

We shall need to consider at POCO on 16/17 July what line to take on the question of a joint Ten statement on Southern Africa. The Italians have circulated the text which was prepared, with brackets on two passages, by Political Directors at Milan (COREU tel CPE/ROM 652 - copy enclosed). This text was never finally considered by Ministers.

The Foreign Secretary considers that we should aim to secure agreement on an improved text at POCO. I enclose a draft of a suggested text. As a fallback, if partners resist any further additions to the text discussed at Milan, we would settle instead for that text with the deletion of the first phrase in brackets ("including those opposed to apartheid") and the inclusion of the second ("in the absence of any significant progress within a reasonable period of time, the Ten reserve the right to reconsider their attitude"). This wording is, if anything, a little less strong than that which we accepted at CHOGM in 1983, admittedly in the context of Namibia, to the effect that "If South Africa continues to obstruct the implementation of Resolution 435, the adoption of appropriate uneasiness under the charter of the UN will have to be considered".

The Foreign Secretary makes this recommendation because an agreed text would enable us to hold the rest of the Ten to a common policy consistent with our own ideas and, to provide the Prime Minister with a document that would strengthen her position at CHOGM by showing that the UK has a forward looking policy on Southern Africa held in common with our European partners. An agreed Ten statement at this stage could be publicised not only at the Foreign Affairs Council but also used as the basis for the passage on Southern Africa in the Presidency speech at CHOGM in September. By contrast, it would add substantially to our difficulties at CHOGM and elsewhere if we were identified as the only European opponent of a text which went no further than one which we accepted two years ago.

The two passages in brackets should not cause us great difficulty. Partners are firm in resisting the first, and the point seems adequately covered by



the preceding words "all concerned". The second passage was a compromise between French insistence on some reference to possible future sanctions and our own insistence, as expressed directly by the Prime Minister, that there should be no such reference. The Prime Minister did not have an opportunity to consider the compromise passage now in brackets. The Foreign Secretary believes that we can accept it since it does not commit us to any specific action or time frame and stops well short of suggesting any sort of measures against South Africa.

By agreeing to delete the first passage in brackets and to include the second we might be able to get quick agreement on a final text in POCO. But this would still be a somewhat limited text in terms of its impact at CHOGM where it would be regarded as lacking real substance, apart from the important reference to adaptation and strengthening of the Code of Conduct. The Foreign Secretary, therefore, proposes that we should also seek the inclusion of the additional passages marked in yellow in the enclosed text. Our partners would certainly welcome the list of specific measures which would considerably strengthen the statement in the eyes of other Commonwealth countries at CHOGM. Of the five measures listed, the first three have been expressly accepted by the Prime Minister and the final two are uncontroversial.

If our partners were simply not prepared to consider any new wording at POCO, we could fall back on the minimal position indicated in the first sentence of paragraph 6 above. We envisage that, once agreed in POCO, the text would be considered and issued by Foreign Ministers at the Foreign Affairs Council on 23/24 July.

The Foreign Secretary suggests that he and the Prime Minister might have a word about this at their next bilateral on Friday.

I am copying this to John Mogg (DTI).

Yours ever,
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

The Heads of State or Government express their profound concern over the continuing human suffering caused in South Africa by the apartheid system which they strongly condemn.

They deplore all acts of violence, which affect the black population in particular, and call for its renunciation by all concerned, [including those opposed to apartheid]. They urge the Government in Pretoria to embark with determination on a policy involving specific actions leading to the abolition of the apartheid system and the implementation of the rightful political and civil rights of the black population. [In the absence of any significant progress within a reasonable period of time, the Ten reserve the right to reconsider their attitude].

In their view the first requirement is the rapid opening of a dialogue between the present South African Government and the genuine representatives of the non-white community, with the declared aim inter alia of giving the black community ~~its rightful political~~ representation at the national level.

To create the conditions for such a dialogue, the Ten believe that the South African Government should:

- release immediately and unconditionally Mr Nelson Mandela and other acknowledged political leaders;
- end detention without trial;
- abandon the practice of forced removals;
- progressively remove discriminatory legislation including the Pass Laws and the Group Areas Act;
- ~~give a commitment to a common citizenship for all South Africans.~~

The Ten believe that European companies which continue to operate in Southern Africa should play a positive role in promoting peaceful change. The Code of Conduct for European firms with subsidiaries in South Africa has proved to be a useful instrument for the emancipation of black workers in South Africa. In view of the important changes that have taken place in the field of labour relations there, the Ten consider that the adaptation and strengthening of the Code which they are urgently to undertake

should allow it to contribute more effectively to the abolition of the system of racial segregation in force in South Africa.

The Ten also note with deep concern the persistence of conflicts, the existence of serious threats to the sovereignty and economic development of states in South Africa, and, as regards the independence of Namibia, continuing obstacles to the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435. They earnestly hope that progress can be made through a process of dialogue involving all the parties concerned, with respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in the area^{and} the principle of non-interference in their internal affairs.

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OBJET: CONSEIL EUROPEEN DE MILAN (28-29 JUIN 1985) - THEMES
DE COOPERATION POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE.

POUR LE BON ORDRE, L'ITALIE TRANSMET CI-APRES LA VERSION
FRANCAISE ET ANGLAISE DES CONCLUSIONS DU CONSEIL EUROPEEN DE MILAN
SUR LES RAPPORTS CEE-COMECON (ANNEXE 1).

PARTI LES TEXTES SOUMIS AU CONSEIL EUROPEEN, ET QUE LES CHEFS
D'ETAT OU DE GOUVERNEMENT N'ONT PAS PU EXAMINER A CAUSE DE LA
PROLONGATION DES DISCUSSIONS SUR LES AUTRES SUJETS FIGURANT A
L'ORDRE DU JOUR DE LA REUNION, L'ITALIE TRANSMET EGALEMENT LE
TEXTE CONCERNANT LES RAPPORTS AVEC LE CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE (ANNEXE
2, VERSION FRANCAISE ET ANGLAISE). PUISQUE CE TEXTE GARDE, A SON
AVIS, TOUTE SA VALIDITE, ELLE LAISSE A LA PRESIDENCE
LUXEMBOUGEOISE LE SOIN D'EVALUER LES SUITES A LUI DONNER,
EVENTUELLEMENT EN VUE DE SON APPROBATION PAR LES MINISTRES DES
AFFAIRES ETRANGERES A L'OCCASION DE LA PROCHAINE REUNION DU
CONSEIL DE LA COMMUNAUTE.

A CETTE MEME FIN, L'ITALIE TRANSMET EGALEMENT LES AUTRES TEXTES
PREPARES PAR LE COMITE POLITIQUE: TERRORISME ET DETOURNEMENT
D'AVIONS (ANNEXE 3), SITUATION EN AFRIQUE DU SUD ET EN AFRIQUE
AUSTRALE (ANNEXE 4), AFGHANISTAN (ANNEXE 5).

POUR CE QUI CONCERNE LE TEXTE SUR LE MOYEN-ORIENT, L'ITALIE
RAPPELLE QUE M. LE PRESIDENT CRAXI A ETE CHARGE PAR SES COLLEGUES
DE MANIFESTER A LA PRESSE LES CONCLUSIONS DE LA DISCUSSION QUI A
EU LIEU SUR CE SUJET ENTRE LES CHEFS D'ETAT OU DE GOUVERNEMENT.

ANNEXE 1

CONSEIL EUROPEEN DE MILAN (28 - 29 JUIN 1985)

C.E.E. - COMECON

LE CONSEIL EUROPEEN A EU UN ECHANGE DE VUES SUR LA LETTRE
RECEMMENT ENVOYEE PAR LE COMECON A LA COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTES

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/ EUROPEENNES

EUROPEENNES EN VUE D'UNE REPRISE DES RELATIONS RECIPROQUES. IL A NOTE QU'UN MANDAT EXPLORATOIRE A ETE DONNE A LA COMMISSION. IL ESTIME QU'IL Y A LIEU MAINTENANT D'ATTENDRE LES RESULTATS DE CES CONTACTS.

D'UNE MANIERE PLUS GENERALE, LES CHEFS D'ETAT OU DE GOUVERNEMENT ONT AUSSI DISCUTE DE LA MANIFESTATION D'INTERET POUR LE ROLE POLITIQUE DES DIX OBSERVEE TOUTE DERNIEREMENT DANS DES DECLARATIONS DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL DU PCUS.

ILS ONT PRIS NOTE AVEC INTERET DE CES DEVELOPPEMENTS.

THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL HELD AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE RECENT LETTER FROM COMECON TO THE EEC COMMISSION PROPOSING THE RESUMPTION OF THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS. IT NOTED THAT AN EXPLORATORY MANDATE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THE COMMISSION. IT CONSIDERS THAT THE RESULTS OF THESE CONTACTS SHOULD NOW BE AWAITED.

MORE GENERALLY, THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT ALSO DISCUSSED THE INTEREST IN THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE TEN RECENTLY DEMONSTRATED IN STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CPSU.

THEY NOTED THESE DEVELOPMENTS WITH INTEREST.

ANNEXE 2

RAPPORTS AVEC LE CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

LES CHEFS D'ETAT OU DE GOUVERNEMENT ONT NOTE AVEC INTERET LE RAPPORT DE LA "COMMISSION COLOMBO", COMMISSION D'EMINENTES PERSONNALITES EUROPEENNES CHARGEE PAR LE CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE DE FORMULER DES PERSPECTIVES DE LA COOPERATION EUROPEENNE AU-DELA DE LA PRESENTE DECENNIE.

ILS CONFIRMENT LEUR VOLONTE D'INTENSIFIER LA COOPERATION ENTRE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ET LE CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE, DE FACON QUE L'ELARGISSEMENT GEOGRAPHIQUE DE LA COMMUNAUTE ET LE DEVELOPPEMENT PROGRESSIF DE SES COMPETENCES S'ACCOMPAGNENT D'UN RENFORCEMENT DE LA COOPERATION AU SEIN DES 21, C'EST-A-DIRE AU SEIN DE LA FAMILLE DES ETATS DEMOCRATIQUE DE L'EUROPE, POUR LA REAFFIRMATION DES VALEURS COMMUNES DU CONTINENT EUROPEEN.

RELATIONS WITH COUNCIL OF EUROPE

THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT WELCOME THE REPORT OF THE "COLOMBO COMMISSION", A COMMISSION OF PROMINENT EUROPEAN FIGURES, WHICH WAS ASKED BY THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE TO OUTLINE THE PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN COOPERATION BEYOND THE EN OF THIS DECADE.

THEY CONFIRM THEIR WILLINGNESS TO IMPROVE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, SO THAT THE GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY AND THE GRADUAL EXTENSION OF ITS ACTIVITIES WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE STRENGTHENING OF COOPERATION WITHIN THE 21, I.E. WITHIN THE FAMILY OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATES OF EUROPE, TO REAFFIRM THE COMMON VALUES OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT.

ANNEXE 3 TERRORISME ET DETOURNEMENT D'AVIONS

LES CHEFS D'ETAT OU DE GOUVERNEMENT ONT EXPRIME' LEUR PROFONDE PREOCCUPATION DEVANT LA RESURGENCE DU TERRORISME ET DU DETOURNEMENT D'AVIONS, QUI VIOLENT TOUTES LES REGLES DE COMPORTEMENT CIVILISE, AVANT TOUT PAR L'ATTENTEINTE PORTEE A LA VIE DE PERSONNES INNOCENTES. LES DIX CONDAMNENT AVEC FORCE LE DOTOURNEMENT D'AVIONS. EN EXPRIMANT LEUR SOULAGEMENT DEVANT LA CONCLUSION POSITIVE CONCERNANT LE DETOURNEMENT D'UN AVION AU LIBAN, LES DIX MAINTIENNENT LEUR DEMANDE QUE TOUS LES OTAGES ACTUELLEMENT DETENUS DANS CE PAYS, PARMIS LESQUELS FIGURENT PLUSIEURS RESSORTISSANTS DES PAYS DE LA COMMUNAUTE, SOIENT EGALEMENT LIBERES SANS CONDITION ET SANS DELAI.

LES CHEFS D'ÉTAT OU DE GOUVERNEMENT ONT CHARGE LESD MINISTRES DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES REUNIS LE CADRE DE LA COOPERATION POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE ET EN COLLABORATION AVEC LES AUTRES MINISTRES COMPETENTS EN LA MATIERE D'EXAMINER D'URGENCE LA POSSIBILITE' D'ETABLIR ET DE MAINTENIR DES NORMES INTERNATIONALES RENFORCEES CONCERNANT LA SECURITE' DES TRASPORTS AERIENS ET DES AEROPORTS EN VUE DE LA PREPARATION DE RECOMMANDATIONS CONCRETES DANS CE DOMAINE. CELA COMPRENDRAIT UNE ACTION CONCERTEE DES DIX EN FAVEUR DE LA REALISATION DE CET OBJECTIF AU SEIN DE L'OACI ET DANS LES PAYS TIETRS, NOTAMMENT CEUX QUI NE SONT PAS PARTIE AUX CONVENTIONS INTERNATIONASLES EXISTANTES.

ILS ONT PRIS NOTE AVEC SATISFACTION DES CONCLUSIONS ARRETEES PAR LES MINISTRES DE L'INTERIEUR OU DE LA JUSTICE, REUNIS, A ROME LES 20 ET 21 JUIN 1985.

TERRORISM AND HIJACKING

THE HEAS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT EMPHASIZED THEIR DEEP CONCERN AT THE RESURGENCE OF TERRORISM, AIR PIRACY AND HIJACKING WHICH OFFEND AGAINSTEVERY NORM OF CIVILISED BEHAVIOUR, PARTICULARLY THROUGH THE OUTRAGE AGAINST INNOCENT LIVES.

THE TEN STRONGLY CONDEMN THE HIJACKING OF AEROPLANES. IN EXPRESSING THEIR RELIEF AT THE POSITIVE CONCLUSION OF THE HIJACKING OF AN AEROPLANE TO LEBANON, THE TEN MAINTAIN THEIR DEMAND THAT ALL THE HOSTAGES AT PRESENT DETAINED IN LEBANON,WHO INCLUDE SEVERAL NATIONALS OF COMMUNITY COUNTRIES. SHOULD ALSO BE FREED UNCONDITIONALLY AND WITHOUT DELAY.

THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION AND IN COLLABORATION WITH OTHER MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE IN THIS FIELD, URGENTLY TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITIES OF ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING STRENGTHENED INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR AIRLINE AND AIRPORT SECURITY WITH A VIEW TO THE PREPARATION OF CONCRETE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS AREA. THIS WOULD INCLUDE CONCERTED ACTION BY THE TEN IN SUPPORT OF THIS OBJECTIVE IN THE ICAO AND IN THIRD COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE NOT PARTY TO THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS.

THEY TOOK NOTE WITH SATISFACTION OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINISTERS OF THE INTERIOR AND JUSTICE MEETING IN ROME ON 20 AND 21 JUNE.

ANNEXE 4 SITUATION EN AFRIQUE DU SUD ET EN AFRIQUE AUSTRALE

LES CHEFS D'ETAT OU DE GOUVERNEMENT EXPRIMENT LA PLUS VIVE PREOCCUPATION POUR LA PERSISTANCE DES SOUFFRANCES HUMAINES QUE PROVOQUE EN AFRIQUE DU SUD LE SYSTEME DE L'APARTHEIDM QU'ILS CONDAMNENT AVEC FORCE.

ILS DEPLORENT TOUS LES ACTES DE VIOLENCE, QUI AFFECTENT PARTICULIEREMENT LA POPULATION NOIRE, ET LANCENT UN APPEL A TOUS LES INTERESSES POUR QU'ILS Y RENONCENT, (Y COMPRIS CEUX QUI SONT APPOSES A L'APARTHEID) (I) ILS DEMANDENT AU GOUVERNEMENT DE PRETORIA D'ENTREPRENDRE AVEC DETERMINATION UNE POLITIQUE COMPORTANT DES ACTIONS SPECIFIQUES CONDUISANT A L'ABOLITION DU SYSTEME DE L'APARTHEID ET A L'APPLICATION DES DROITS POLITIQUES ET CIVILS LEGITIMES DE LA POPULATION NOIRE. (FAUTE DE PROGRES SENSIBLES DANS UN DELAI RAISONNABLE, LES DIX SE RESERVENT DE REEXAMINER LEUR ATTITUDE.) (II)

(I) INCLUSION DEMANDEE PAR UNE DELEGATION.
(II) INCLUSION REFUSEE PAR UNE DELEGATION.

LE CODE DE CONDUITE DES ENTREPRISES EUROPEENNES AYANT DES FILIALES EN AFRIQUE DU SUD S'EST REVELE UN INSTRUMENT UTILE POUR L'EMANCIPATION DES TRAVAILLEURS NOIRS EN AFRIQUE DU SUD. DEVANT LES CHANGEMENTS IMPORTANTS QUI S'Y SONT PRODUITS DANS LE DOMAINE DES RAPPORTS DE TRAVAIL, LES DIX CONSIDERENT QUE L'ADAPTATION ET LE RENFORCEMENT DU CODE QU'ILS VONT ENTREPRENDRE D'URGENCE PERMETTRA A CELUI-CI DE CONTRIBUER PLUS EFFICACEMENT A L'ABOLITION DE SYSTEME DE LA SEGREGATION RACIALE EN VIGUEUR EN AFRIQUE DU SUD.

LES DIX CONSTATENT EN OUTRE AVEC UNE VIVE PREOCCUPATION LA PERSISTANCE DE SITUATIONS DE CONFLIT AINSI QUE L'EXISTENCE DE GRAVES MENACES POUR LA SOUVERAINETE ET LE DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE DES ETATS EN AFRIQUE AUSTRALE ET, EN CE QUI CONCERNE L'INDEPENDANCE DE LA NAMIBIE, D'OBSTACLES QUI CONTINUENT A S'OPPOSER A L'APPLICATION DE LA RESOLUTION 435 DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE' DES NATIONS UNIES. ILS SOUHAITENT VIVEMENT QUE LA METHODE DU DIALOGUE S'AFFIRME, EN ENGLOBBANT TOUTES LES PARTIES INTERESSES, DANS LE RESPECT DE L'INTEGRITE' TERRITORIALE ET DE LA SOUVERAINETE' DE TOUS LES PAYS DE LA REGION, ET DU PRINCIPE DE NON-ENGERENCE DANS LEURS AFFAIRES ENTERIEURES.

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THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT EXPRESS THEIR PROFOUND CONCERN OVER THE CONTINUING HUMAN SUFFERING CAUSED IN SOUTH AFRICA BY THE APARTHEID SYSTEM WHICH THEY STRONGLY CONDEMN.

THEY DEPLORE ALL ACTS OF VIOLENCE, WHICH AFFECT THE BLACK POPULATION IN PARTICULAR, AND CALL FOR ITS RENUNCIATION BY ALL CONCERNED, (INCLUDING THOSE OPPOSED TO APARTHEID) (I). THEY URGE THE GOVERNMENT IN PRETORIA TO EMBARK WITH DETERMINATION ON A POLICY INVOLVING SPECIFIC ACTIONS LEADING TO THE ABOLITION OF THE APARTHEID SYSTEM AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHTFUL POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE BLACK POPULATION.

(IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME, THE TEN RESERVE THE RIGHT TO RECONSIDER THEIR ATTITUDE.) (II)

(I) INCLUSION ASKED FOR BY ONE DELEGATION

(II) INCLUSION OPPOSED BY ONE DELEGATION

THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN FIRMS WITH SUBSIDIARIES IN SOUTH AFRICA HAS PROVED TO BE A USEFUL INSTRUMENT FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF BLACK WORKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANT CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE FIELD OF LABOUR RELATIONS THERE, THE TEN CONSIDER THAT THE ADAPTATION AND STRENGTHENING OF THE CODE WHICH THEY ARE URGENTLY TO UNDERTAKE SHOULD ALLOW IT TO CONTRIBUTE MORE EFFECTIVELY TO THE ABOLITION OF THE SYSTEM OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN FORCE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

THE TEN ALSO NOTE WITH DEEP CONCERN THE PERSISTENCE OF CONFLICTS, THE EXISTENCE OF SERIOUS THREATS TO THE SOVEREIGNTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF STATES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND, AS REGARDS THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA, CONTINUING OBSTACLES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435. THEY EARNESTLY HOPE THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE THROUGH A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE INVOLVING ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, WITH RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF ALL THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRES.

ANNEXE 5

AFGHANISTAN

LES CHEFS D'ETAT OU DE GOUVERNEMENT ONT ENCORE UNE FOIS EXAMINE LA SITUATION EN AFGHANISTAN, OU L'INTERVENTION ET LA DURE REPRESSION MILITAIRE SOVIETIQUE QUI FRAPPENT UN PEUPLE ET SES ASPIRATIONS A LA LIBERTE ET A L'INDEPENDANCE SONT TOUJOURS EN COURS. LES DIX CONFIRMENT LEURS INQUIETUDE POUR LA SITUATION DES REFUGES AFGHANS EN NOMBRE CROISSANT EN PARTICULIER AU PAKISTAN, ET CONDAMNENT LES ATTAQUES

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DONT ILS SONT VICTIMES. LES DIX SOUTIENNENT L'ENGAGEMENT DES NATIONS UNIES DANS LA RECHERCHE D'UNE SOLUTION POLITIQUE A CETTE CRISE.

ILS ACCUEILLENENT FAVORABLEMENT LES ENTRETIENS RECENTS DE GENEVE, ET ILS SOUHAITENT QU'UNE PROCHAINE SESSION PERMETTREA D'ACCOMPLIR DES PROGRES RAPIDES, EN PARTICULIER EN CE QUI CONCERNE UN ACCORD SUR UN CALENDRIER POUR LE RETRAIT DES TROUPES SOVIETIQUES.

AFGHANISTAN

THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT EXAMINED AGAIN THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN WHERE SOVIET INTERVENTION AND HARSH MILITARY REPRESSION, WHICH ARE BEING DIRECTED AGAINST A PEOPLE AND ITS DESIRE FOR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE, ARE STILL UNDER WAY. THE TEN REAFFIRM CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION OF THE INCREASING NUMBER OF AFGHAN REFUGEES, IN PARTICULAR IN PAKISTAN, AND THEY CONDEMN THE ATTACKS TO WHICH THEY ARE SUBJET. THE TEN SUPPORT THE COMMITMENT BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO SEEK A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THIS CRISIS.

THEY WELCOME THE RECENT TALKS AT GENEVA, AND HOPE THAT A NEXT ROUND WILL SEE RAPID PROGRESS, IN PARTICULAR AGREEMENT ON A TIME-TABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS.

CPE/ROM

FIN DE TEXTE

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 July 1985

Dear Colin,

I enclose a copy of President Botha's reply to the Prime Minister's recent message. Although I have not yet had an opportunity to discuss it with the Prime Minister, my own view is that we ought to prepare an equally prompt and tart response. This might point out that the Prime Minister's letter specifically deplored violence from whatever quarter. It might also distance us from a policy of violent retaliation, using the arguments which the Prime Minister put to Vice President Bush in the slightly different context of Lebanon last week. It would be helpful to have a draft by the evening of Monday, 8 July.

Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 390 OF 8 JULY 1985

INFO ROUTINE TO NEW YORK PARIS BONN PRETORIA

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MY TELNO 387 (NOT TO ALL): CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA

SUMMARY

1. CANADA'S NEW RESTRICTIVE MEASURES WERE DULY ANNOUNCED BY MR CLARK ON 6 JULY. THEY AMOUNT MORE TO A SYMBOLIC GESTURE THAN AN IMPORTANT TIGHTENING OF THE SCREW, AND HAVE BEEN SEEN IN THAT LIGHT BY THE PRESS. FURTHER STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN DUE COURSE. FULL TEXT OF MR CLARK'S STATEMENT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

DETAIL

- 2. THE NEW MEASURES ARE AS FOLLOWS:-
 - A) STRENGTHEN THE VOLUNTARY CODE OF CONDUCT(EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES) FOR COMPANIES OPERATING IN SOUTH AFRICA. (APPOINTING AN INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE CODE: STANDARD REPORTING FORMAT: ALL CANADIAN COMPANIES OPERATING IN SOUTH AFRICA TO ISSUE ANNUAL REPORTS ON THEIR INVOLVEMENT).
 - B) TIGHTEN ARMS EXPORT EMBARGO BY RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORT OF SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS COMPUTERS, TO SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE, ARMED FORCES AND AGENCIES ENFORCING APARTHEID:
 - C) A BAN ON ARMS IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA:
 - D) ABROGATION OF THE CANADA-SOUTH AFRICA DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENTS:

D) ABROGATION OF THE CANADA-SOUTH AFRICA DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENTS:

E) THE PROGRAMME FOR EXPORT MARKET DEVELOPMENT WILL NO LONGER ASSIST CANADIAN COMPANIES SEEKING TO EXPAND THEIR MARKETS IN SOUTH AFRICA:

F) AN END TO INVESTMENT INSURANCE FROM OTTAWA'S EXPORT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FOR PROJECTS IN SOUTH AFRICA:

G) REAFFIRMATION OF BACKING FOR THE BOYCOTT ON SPORTING CONTACTS BETWEEN NATIONALLY-REPRESENTATIVE ATHLETES:

H) AN END TO ALL TOLL-PROCESSING OF NAMIBIAN URANIUM FOR THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES ONCE EXISTING CONTRACTS WITH THE CROWN CORPORATION, ELDORADO NUCLEAR LTD EXPIRE:

I) DISCOURAGING CANADIANS FROM BUYING AND SELLING KRUGERRANDS:

J) CLOSER MONITORING OF CONTACTS BETWEEN CANADIAN FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES AND THEIR SOUTH AFRICAN COUNTERPARTS:

K) THE APPOINTMENT OF AN OFFICER TO THE CANADIAN EMBASSY IN SOUTH AFRICA TO MONITOR LABOUR AFFAIRS:

L) A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN FEDERAL FUNDING FOR EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN SOUTH AFRICA AND CANADA FOR SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS. FIVE MILLION DOLLARS CANADIAN WILL BE AVAILABLE OVER FIVE YEARS.

3. MR CLARK SAID THAT THESE MEASURES WERE THE FIRST STEP OF A CONTINUING PROCESS. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD:

A) CONTINUE TO REVIEW CANADIAN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

B) DISCUSS CHOICES OF ACTION WITH CLOSE FRIENDS AND ALLIES EG IN THE CONTEXT OF CHOGM:

C) DETERMINE A COURSE OF ACTION ON THE BASIS OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE.

4. ANTI-APARTHEID GROUPS IN CANADA HAVE EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AND FIND THE MEASURES INSUFFICIENTLY SEVERE. ONE GROUP SEES THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS AN ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE INDEPENDENCE FROM THE US FOR DOMESTIC REASONS, RATHER THAN A SERIOUS STAND AGAINST APARTHEID.

DAY

NNNM



South African Embassy
Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

remember to PM
B8/6/1

5 July 1985

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Prime Minister

I am instructed by President P W Botha to convey to you the attached transcript of a telex containing the President's response to your letter of 5 July 1985. The letter itself, naturally, will be delivered to you at the earliest opportunity.

I have the honour, Prime Minister, to be

Yours faithfully

F. S. ...
f AMBASSADOR

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FM WASHINGTON 052222Z JUL 85
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2036 DATED 5 JULY
INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN, DTI (OT5)
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MY TELNO 1771:US/SOUTH AFRICA: SANCTIONS LEGISLATION

SUMMARY

1. THE SENATE WILL CONSIDER SANCTIONS LEGISLATION NEXT WEEK.
FINAL OUTCOME IN CONGRESS STILL UNCERTAIN.

DETAIL

2. THE BILL APPROVED IN THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE LAST MONTH (MY TUR) IS DUE TO BE TAKEN BY THE FULL SENATE ON 8 JULY WHEN CONGRESS RETURNS FROM THE INDEPENDENCE DAY RECESS. OUR CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS EXPECT THE BILL TO BE APPROVED BY THE SENATE IN SOMETHING LIKE ITS PRESENT FORM, IE INCLUDING SOME RELATIVELY MINOR IMMEDIATE SANCTIONS (PARA 2 OF TUR) BUT POSTPONING THE MORE SERIOUS SANCTIONS (EG A BAN ON NEW COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA) UNTIL THE PRESIDENT HAS REPORTED TO CONGRESS, PERHAPS IN 18 MONTHS TIME, ON PROGRESS TOWARDS ENDING APARTHEID.
3. ASSUMING THE SENATE ACTS AS ABOVE, THE KEY QUESTIONS WILL THEN BE (A) WHETHER A HOUSE-SENATE CONFERENCE CAN AGREE ON A COMPROMISE BILL, AND (B) IF SO, WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WILL BE PREPARED TO VETO IT. NONE OF OUR CONTACTS IS PREPARED TO HAZARD A FIRM GUESS ON (A) AT THIS STAGE, LET ALONE (B). ON (A), IT IS THOUGHT THAT THE SENATE CONFEREES WOULD BE LIKELY TO HOLD OUT FIRMLY AGAINST AN IMMEDIATE BAN ON NEW COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT. BUT THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED, IN ORDER TO REACH AN AGREEMENT, TO MOVE AT LEAST SOME OF THE POSTPONED SANCTIONS INTO THE IMMEDIATE CATEGORY, OR POSSIBLY TO SHORTEN THE PERIOD OF POSTPONEMENT FROM 18 MONTHS TO A YEAR. IF SO, A COMPROMISE BILL COULD POSSIBLY GO FORWARD TO THE WHITE HOUSE IN THE FEW REMAINING WEEKS BEFORE THE START OF THE CONGRESSIONAL SUMMER RECESS ON 2 AUGUST. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE EXPECTED DIFFICULTY IN RECONCILING THE HOUSE AND SENATE BILLS, MANY STAFFERS NOW THINK THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL HAVE TO RECONVENE IN SEPTEMBER, AND SOME ARE EVEN SAYING THAT THEY DOUBT WHETHER ANY AGREED CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSAL WILL EMERGE AT ALL.

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4. THE SITUATION IS THUS HIGHLY UNCERTAIN. BUT OUR BEST GUESS IS THAT SOME SORT OF CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSAL WILL EMERGE, POSSIBLY THIS MONTH, BUT MORE LIKELY AFTER THE SUMMER RECESS. AS FOR (B) ABOVE, IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO SAY. MUCH WILL DEPEND, OF COURSE, ON THE PRECISE SHAPE OF THE LEGISLATION, AND ON DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF (WHICH HAVE OFFERED LITTLE COMFORT RECENTLY TO THE DEFENDERS OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT - SEE MY TELNO 1966).

HANNAY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA

STANDARD(PALACE)

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MR J R J JOHNSON

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
SOUTHERN AFRICA

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RESTRICTED

cc Fgo

Prime Minister, 2.

This arrived today,

Duty Clerk
5/7/85



South African Embassy
Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

B8/6/1

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 130/85

via MASTER
OPS

5 July 1985

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Prime Minister

It was with considerable dismay that I received your message on 5 July 1985.

I would have thought that it would have been the policy of the British Government to wish to combat terrorism wherever it might occur and that your Government would by now have been in possession of the facts of ANC activities in Botswana which led to the South African action in Gaborone on 14 June 1985. The British Government must be aware that the ANC is controlled by the South African Communist Party and that it is therefore primarily marxists who are responsible for the violence in my country. I wish to add, in the utmost confidence, that in a discussion with an official of my Government on 25 June 1985, the Vice-President of Botswana displayed understanding for the South African action on 14 June 1985 and added that it was his view that the ANC should not be allowed to come between improved relations between South Africa and Botswana.

My Foreign Minister has, moreover, in this week received confirmation from the Botswana Foreign Minister that she is ready for bi-lateral ministerial talks with South Africa on 25 July 1985. In the light of the foregoing I must state quite frankly, Prime Minister, that I fail to understand the tenor of your message.

The South African Government unequivocally supports the British Government in its efforts to combat the planning and execution of violence by the Irish Republican Army. By the same token the South African Government would hope that the British Government supports the efforts of the South African Government to contain the violence perpetrated by the African National Congress.

President Reagan has made his attitude to terrorism, wherever it might occur, patently clear and I have sent a message of support to him. Our opposition to terrorist violence should be universal and there should be no selective application of this principle.

I therefore urge you, Prime Minister, to use your influence in the Commonwealth context and elsewhere to convince the States of Southern Africa not to allow their territories to be used for the planning and execution of terrorist violence in South Africa in which the vast majority of the victims are civilian, Black South Africans.

Yours sincerely

P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT



Already T'd

file

EDP

1977.

T 130/85

Union Buildings
Pretoria

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 130/85

MB 5/1/2-SP
MB 10/1/5
MB 10/1/3

5 July 1985

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
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Yours sincerely



P W BOTHA

STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON

CCP ①



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 July, 1985

If we divide the seminar into two parts, we could afford a slightly wider spread of opinion at the morning session. On the other hand we don't want the debate to become ideological. My inclination would be to include Mrs Lipton & Professor Spence but not Simon Jenkins or Johansen-Berg

Seminar on Policy towards South Africa

In your letter of 17 June you said that the Prime Minister would welcome suggestions for participation in the proposed seminar on policy towards South Africa. You thought that we should aim for a total of twenty drawn from Ministers, government backbenchers, businessmen, academic experts and officials.

Could you please tick or cross names as appropriate?

I now attach a list of suggested participants. You will see that it is divided into two sections: 'in-house' and 'outsiders'. The Foreign Secretary suggests that the seminar might take the same format as was used for the Soviet seminar in 1983: that is, that outsiders should be invited for the morning session and for lunch, but that only Ministers and officials should join in the afternoon discussion.

CDP 4/7.

As far as Ministerial participation is concerned, the Foreign Secretary suggests that Mr Rifkind be included and the DTI would like Mr Channon to be present. The Treasury have said that, although they wish to be consulted over the discussion paper, they do not believe that there is any need for one of their Ministers to attend the seminar.

This is more than we have worked before. It would be difficult

The backbenchers have been chosen to represent a reasonable spread of opinion on South Africa within the Party. We have taken account of advice from the DTI in selecting the businessmen. Commercial Union, Bestobell, BP, Standard Chartered and GKN all have sizeable investments in South Africa, as well as investments elsewhere in Africa. All five report under the EC Code of Conduct. On the academic side Dr Barber has written a number of important works on British foreign policy and on Southern Africa and has a high reputation as a speaker and a television commentator in South African matters. Mrs Merle Lipton is a South African-born British lecturer who put in a good performance at a recent FCO seminar on Southern Africa, as did Professor Spence. The views of these last two are slightly left of centre.

If the Prime Minister would be prepared to widen the categories of participants, a livelier debate would perhaps

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be stimulated by the inclusion of Simon Jenkins of 'The Economist', who has written some perceptive and well-informed articles on Southern Africa, and by a representative of the Church. Reverend John Johansen-Berg is probably the most articulate and sensible of the clerical lobbyists in favour of sanctions against South Africa.

The Treasury have advised us that the Bank of England should be consulted in the preparation of the discussion paper over the financial repercussions of some of the 'voluntary measures' against South Africa currently under consideration in the United States and elsewhere. It occurs to us that the Bank might also lend its expertise to the seminar (the Prime Minister may perhaps prefer that the Bank's representative should be present throughout the day rather than just in the morning).

I am copying this to John Mogg (DTI) and Mr A M Ellis (Economic Secretary, HM Treasury).


Yours ever,
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

PS We have just heard from the DTI that Mr. Tebbit feels strongly that Mr Channon should be accompanied by a DTI official. Their nominee would be Mr Christopher Roberts, Deputy Secretary.

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SEMINAR ON POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA


List of Suggested ParticipantsIn House Government

1. The Prime Minister
- ~~2. PS/No 10~~
2. The Foreign Secretary
3. Mr Rifkind
4. Mr Channon, Minister for Trade at the Department of Trade and Industry
5. ~~Mr Stewart~~, *Economic Secretary at the Treasury*
6. Sir A Acland
8. Mr Fergusson

Outsiders

9. The Rt Hon Julian Amery MP
10. Robert Jackson Esq MP
10. Bowen Wells Esq MP
12. Mr Anthony Loehnis (Bank of England: Executive Director Overseas Division)
13. Mr A B (Sandy) Marshall (Chairman UK/South Africa Trade Association; Chairman, Commercial Union; Chairman, Bestobell)
14. Mr Patrick Gillam (International Director, British Petroleum Co Ltd)
15. Lord Barber (Chairman, Standard Chartered Bank)
16. Sir Trevor Holdsworth (Chairman, GKN)
17. Dr James Barber (Master of Hatfield College, University of Durham)
18. Professor Jack Spence (Department of Politics, University of Leicester)
19. Mrs Merle Lipton (Lecturer, University of Sussex)
- ~~19. Mr Simon Jenkins (The Economist)~~
- ~~20. Reverend John Johansen-Berg (British Council of Churches)~~

Foreign Pol Pt 3
Strategy



Telegram copy
of T125/85.

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30048 - 1

PP PRETORIA

PP GABORONE

GRS 490

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FM FCO 41430Z JULY 85

TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 82 OF 4 JULY

PRIORITY INFO GABORONE, MASERU, MBABANE, MAPUTO, UKMIS NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON.

LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING TEXT OF A LETTER FROM
THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
SIGNED LETTER FOLLOWS BY BAG.

BEGINS ... IN OUR LAST EXCHANGE OF LETTERS I REFERRED TO A
NUMBER OF POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA EARLIER
THIS YEAR. I WAS MUCH ENCOURAGED BY THESE CLEAR SIGNS
THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE IN OVERCOMING SOME LONG STANDING
PROBLEMS.

I WAS THEREFORE GREATLY CONCERNED BY THE RECENT OPERATIONS
INVOLVING SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES IN ANGOLA AND EVEN MORE
SO BY THE RAID ON GABORONE ON 14 JUNE. SUCH AN ATTACK ON A
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRY MUST SURELY BE INCONSISTENT WITH YOUR
ATTEMPTS TO BUILD A BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR NEIGHBOURS.
OUR STRONG VIEWS ABOUT IT WERE MADE CLEAR BY THE UK DELEGATION
DURING THE RECENT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. THE
REACTION IN BRITAIN WAS ALL THE STRONGER BECAUSE THE TARGET
WAS A COMMONWEALTH PARTNER WHICH HAS ALWAYS PURSUED MODERATE
POLICIES.

I HAVE ALWAYS HELD STRONGLY TO THE VIEW THAT VIOLENCE
AND CONFRONTATION, WHOEVER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM, HAVE NO
ROLE IN RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. WE HAVE
INSTEAD LENT BRITAIN'S SUPPORT TO WHAT HAS BEEN DONE TO
IMPROVE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA, AND
HAVE IN PARTICULAR TRIED TO MAKE A HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION
THROUGH OUR MANY LINKS WITH YOUR COUNTRY. BUT THE RECENT
ACTIONS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT TO SUSTAIN

1

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30048 - 1

THE APPROACH WHICH WE HAVE ADOPTED HITHERTO: AND WERE THERE TO BE ANOTHER INCIDENT OF THE KIND WHICH WE SAW IN GABORONE, I DO NOT SEE HOW WE COULD AVOID TAKING SPECIFIC STEPS TO MARK OUR REPUDIATION OF IT. THIS WOULD CAUSE ME GREAT REGRET AND I SINCERELY HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE NO CAUSE FOR IT.

I SHOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 2 MAY AND FOR YOUR ACCOUNT OF SOUTH AFRICAN ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE. YOU SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST SHOULD BE DOING MORE TO HELP PRESIDENT MACHEL. AS YOU WILL KNOW, WE HAVE OFFERED, WITH THE AGREEMENT OF PRIME MINISTER MUGABE, TRAINING FOR MEMBERS OF THE MOZAMBIKAN ARMY UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE BRITISH MILITARY ADVISORY AND TRAINING TEAM IN ZIMBABWE. WE HAVE ALSO AGREED TO PROVIDE SOME MILITARY EQUIPMENT, FOR EXAMPLE RADIOS AND UNIFORMS. PRESIDENT MACHEL HAS WARMLY WELCOMED THIS OFFER, THE DETAILS OF WHICH HAVE STILL TO BE WORKED OUT. I HOPE THIS INITIATIVE WILL SERVE TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE WHICH MY GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO ATTACH TO THE NKOMATI PROCESS.

I HAVE CHOSEN TO SPEAK FRANKLY BECAUSE THE ISSUES AT STAKE COULD HAVE A VERY CONSIDERABLE EFFECT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. I DO SO IN THE SAME SPIRIT OF CANDOUR WHICH HAS CHARACTERIZED OUR EARLIER CORRESPONDENCE.ENDS.

2. PLEASE SEE MIFT

2. FOR INFORMATION ADDRESSEES ONLY. THE ABOVE IS STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION. SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW FOR PRETORIA AND WASHINGTON.

HOWE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA

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MR J R J JOHNSON
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
SOUTHERN AFRICA

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T125185



LL OPS
muster

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 July 1985

Dear Mr. President,

In our last exchange of letters I referred to a number of positive developments in Southern Africa earlier this year. I was much encouraged by these clear signs that progress was being made in overcoming some long standing problems.

I was therefore greatly concerned by the recent operations involving South African armed forces in Angola and even more so by the raid on Gaborone on 14 June. Such an attack on a neighbouring country must surely be inconsistent with your attempts to build a better relationship with your neighbours. Our strong views about it were made clear by the UK delegation during the recent United Nations Security Council Debate. The reaction in Britain was all the stronger because the target was a Commonwealth partner which has always pursued moderate policies.

I have always held strongly to the view that violence and confrontation, whoever is responsible for them, have no role in resolving the problems of Southern Africa. We have instead lent Britain's support to what has been done to improve co-operation between the countries of the area, and have in particular tried to make a helpful contribution through our many links with your country. But the recent actions of your Government make it very difficult to sustain the approach which we have adopted hitherto; and were there to be another incident of the kind which we saw in Gaborone,

I do not see how we could avoid taking specific steps to mark our repudiation of it. This would cause me great regret and I sincerely hope that there will be no cause for it.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank you for your letter of 2 May and for your account of South African assistance to Mozambique. You suggested that the West should be doing more to help President Machel. As you will know, we have offered, with the agreement of Prime Minister Mugabe, training for members of the Mozambican army under the auspices of the British Military Advisory and Training Team in Zimbabwe. We have also agreed to provide some military equipment, for example radios and uniforms. President Machel has warmly welcomed this offer, the details of which have still to be worked out. I hope this initiative will serve to underline the importance which my Government continues to attach to the Nkomati process.

I have chosen to speak frankly because the issues at stake could have a very considerable effect on our bilateral relations. I do so in the same spirit of candour which has characterized our earlier correspondence.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable P. W. Botha, DMS

July 3, 1985

②
Prime Minister
CDP
3/7.

Dear Sir Geoffrey:

You quite correctly pointed out in your message of 24 June that recent events in southern Africa have intensified the pressures to impose some form of sanctions on South Africa. We have long felt that it is essential for the Western nations to work together as a means both of exerting some influence on South Africa's policies and of resisting pressure at home. South Africa's recent actions in Namibia, in Cabinda and in Botswana reinforce this need.

Our view on Chapter VII sanctions remains unchanged. We will oppose them in the Council, with a veto if necessary. The legislative battle within the United States over sanctions against South Africa continues. We continue to oppose all mandatory sanctions, particularly disinvestment, and are working with Congress to produce the most reasonable possible legislation. We will consider further steps after we see what kind of legislation emerges. Disinvestment does not appear at this time to be one of the sanctions which has great support in Congress.

I have asked Chester Crocker to meet with your Foreign Office colleagues in London on July 15 for bilateral discussions preparatory to a meeting of the Contact Group Africa Directors. He has gone over the agenda with me, and I believe it covers our areas of mutual interest comprehensively.

We look forward to continuing to work closely with you to ensure that our policies in the southern Africa region reinforce one another.

Sincerely,

/s/

George P. Shultz



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 July 1985

MS 2454
file
cc PEV

UK POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

Thank you for your letter of 2 July about policy towards South Africa, enclosing a draft message for the Prime Minister to President Botha.

I enclose a signed version of the message changed in some respects from the draft. I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be delivered.

The Prime Minister notes the bilateral political measures which the Foreign Secretary identifies as options in the event of further South African attacks on neighbouring countries. It is useful to have these in reserve, but the Prime Minister would prefer to suspend any decision which to use until we know the precise circumstances with which we are dealing.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretary to State for Defence and to the Chancellor.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RM

PRIME MINISTER

SOUTHERN AFRICA

I attach a letter about policy towards Southern Africa. It recommends that you should send a message to President Botha intended to deter him from authorising further South African attacks on neighbouring countries. I have had it typed up for you to sign though I have slightly watered down the Foreign Office draft which seemed to me to be overdone. It is however attached in case you wish to see the changes I have made. // The letter also considers possible options for action which we would take against South Africa in the event of further attacks. I do not think that you need reach any conclusion on this now although it is useful to have an idea of the options. What we do will need to be linked fairly closely to the enormity of the South African action.

Agree to sign the letter?

C.P.

(Charles Powell)

2 July 1985



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 July 1985

Dear Charles.

UK Policy towards South Africa

The Prime Minister is aware of the effect which the recent South African raids on Cabinda and Gabarone have had in heightening increasing international pressure for measures against South Africa. The Foreign Secretary is concerned that South Africans are undeterred by the international reaction and could make further raids at any time against neighbouring states who they believe are harbouring members of the ANC responsible for the continuing violence within South Africa. This violence has continued with a further series of grenade/bomb incidents on the East Rand and Transkei on 26 June. Possible targets for South African retaliation are Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Zambia (where the ANC have just held their congress). You will have seen from Washington telno 1992 that the Americans are also concerned about the possibility of a further South African raid on Lesotho and that Crocker has asked us to support US diplomatic representations in Pretoria and Maseru. Over the weekend, the South African Defence Forces did in fact cross into Angola in pursuit of SWAPO infiltrators but we regard this action as in a different category of seriousness to the unprovoked attacks on Cabinda and Gabarone.

The result of any further South African raids could well be to plunge us back into the Security Council where there is likely to be a renewed call for sanctions. The pattern of discussion at Milan suggested that we might well find ourselves totally isolated in resisting proposals for a limited package of mandatory economic measures similar to those already supported in one form or another by both Houses of the US Congress. This would face us with disagreeable alternatives. Either we would have to veto alone and face the reality of political and economic retaliation by other countries. (We have already seen how sharply British trade in Commonwealth countries - India and Malaysia - can be damaged by a political steer from the top.) Or we would have to go along with the measures which (apart from their immediate cost) would set a most unwelcome precedent. Even if such a situation does not arise, we would face strong pressure at home for action going beyond verbal condemnation.

The Foreign Secretary therefore believes that there is an urgent need to dissuade the South Africans from any such further attacks. This would involve leaving them in no doubt that the next time they strike at their neighbours there will be a real cost to their relations with us. To have the greatest impact the warning would best be conveyed in a message from the Prime Minister to President Botha. A message at the highest level would be the most effective way of reinforcing American efforts to restrain the South Africans.



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THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Before sending such a message, however, we need to have cleared our minds on what action we would be prepared to take if a further attack were to take place. The Foreign Secretary has given this careful thought. We should not want to take any economic measures, even relatively cost-free ones, because of the precedent they would set. We have therefore concentrated on bilateral political measures which would have a significant adverse impact on the South Africans. The possibilities are obviously limited but of those we have been able to identify the following three seem least unattractive:

- (i) the withdrawal of our Ambassador and of Dr Worrall;
- (ii) the ending of the reciprocal exchange of Defence Attaches;
- (iii) the cancellation of Ministerial visits then pending.

The Foreign Secretary recommends that we should opt for (ii) and (iii). The withdrawal of our Ambassador and of Dr Worrall would clearly have the greatest public impact, but would carry a number of obvious disadvantages. Moreover, there might be little prospect in practice of restoring diplomatic relations to Ambassadorial level since there would never be a right moment to do this. It would also be regarded as merely being a step behind the Americans, who have already taken such action.

The cancellation of Ministerial visits then pending arises as a possible, and immediate, option because the South African Ministers for Finance and Budget are due to meet their Treasury counterparts later this week. It would have a certain symbolic effect, but would be unlikely to have much influence on South African policy. Nevertheless, it would be difficult not to cancel the visits if an attack had just taken place.

The end of the exchange of Defence Attaches seems particularly appropriate as a response to some new military action by the South Africans. The exchange is the last vestige of our military relationship with the South Africans. It provides us with information on the South African armed forces, keeps the door open to a wider relationship,

There are, of course, no defence sales to South Africa but there might be some modest penalty. The Foreign Secretary does not, however, think that the disadvantages are significant when compared with the disadvantages of the other options we have examined.

The Foreign Secretary believes that this is a matter which requires further careful assessment and at this stage would not wish to advance it as a possibility.

/The

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The Foreign Secretary hopes that in the light of the above, the Prime Minister will agree to sending an immediate message to President Botha in the terms of the attached draft. As you will see, the letter does not specify what action we would take in response to a South African action, but makes it clear that some concrete step would be taken. In response to the American request for diplomatic support in Maseru, we shall also be approaching the Government of Lesotho urging them to stay in close touch with the South Africans on matters of security.

The above recommendation is intended to deal solely with the immediate risk of a further South African raid. We will still face the continuing problem of the growing build-up of international pressure for economic measures against South Africa. The Foreign Secretary is preparing a paper on this subject which he intends forwarding to the Prime Minister shortly.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence, who will no doubt have views about this proposal, and also to the Private Secretary to the Chancellor.

Yours ever,

L V Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

The Honourable P W Botha DMS MP
State President of the Republic
of South Africa

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

In our last exchange of letters I referred to a number of positive developments in Southern Africa earlier this year. I was encouraged by these clear signs that progress was being made in overcoming some of the long-standing problems of the region.

I was therefore ~~deeply~~ dismayed by the recent operations involving South African armed forces in Angola and even more so by the raid on Gabarone on 14 June. This attack on a neighbouring country ~~came as a great shock to my colleagues and me especially since it~~ *must surely be* ~~appeared~~ inconsistent with your attempts to build a more fruitful relationship with your neighbours. Our ~~strongly-~~ *felt* disapproval was made clear by the UK delegation during the recent United Nations Security Council Debate. The wider ~~political~~ reaction in Britain was all the stronger given that the target was a Commonwealth partner which has ~~consistently~~ *always* pursued moderate policies.

~~It has always been my firm belief that the very real~~ *I have always taken the view* ~~problems of Southern Africa cannot be resolved by violence and confrontation.~~ *have therefore sought* ~~The British Government has consistently worked to promote cooperation and mutual respect between~~ *given the Government's support to all efforts* / the

Enclosures—flag(s).....

whoever is responsible

*To improve cooperation between the
countries of your area. We have in particular*
the peoples of Southern Africa. In particular we have
sought to make a positive contribution through our many
links with your country. I ~~fear~~ ^{have to say} however, that the
actions of your Government ~~are~~ ^{have} making it very difficult
to sustain the approach which we have ^{hitherto} adopted ~~in the~~
~~past~~. Another incident of the kind we have recently
seen will leave us no choice but to take specific
measures to ~~indicate our very clear condemnation of~~ ^{demonstrate our rejection of actions}
~~such actions~~ ^{of this sort}.

I think it important that you should be in no
doubt as to the severity of our reaction if there are
further violations of others' sovereignty.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank
you for your letter of 2 May and for your account of
South African assistance to Mozambique. You suggested
that the West should be doing more to help President
Machel. As you will know, we have offered, with the
agreement of Prime Minister Mugabe, training for
members of the Mozambican army under the auspices of
the British Military Advisory and Training Team in
Zimbabwe. We have also agreed to provide some military
equipment, for example radios and uniforms. President
Machel has warmly welcomed this offer, the details of
which have still to be worked out. I hope this
initiative will serve to underline the importance which
my Government continues to attach to the Nkomati process.

It is because of the hopes which I entertained as
a result of your commitment to this process that I
have been so disturbed by the latest actions by your
armed forces. I hope you will understand the need for
me to communicate frankly on ^{issues} matters which ^{are} ~~are~~ ^{likely} likely
to have a crucial effect on our bilateral relations.

I do so in the same spirit of candour which has informed our earlier correspondence.

MJ2 ASA



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 July 1985

SOUTH AFRICA/LESOTHO RELATIONS

The Prime Minister has seen Washington telegram 1992 about the danger of a South African raid on Maseru. She agrees that we should join the Americans in taking early diplomatic action in both Cape Town and Maseru to prevent an attack.

Charles Powell

Colin Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PART 4 ends:-

Washington TEL 1992. 29.6.85

PART 5 begins:-

CDP to FCO 1.7.85.

