

PREM 19/1644

SECRET

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Relations with South Africa.
Policy on arms sales.
Internal Situation.
ECGD credits.
PM's Emissary - J. Hunt.

SOUTH
AFRICA

Part 1: June 1979

Part 7: October 1981

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
4-10-85							
7-10-85							
11-10-85							
14-10-85							
16-10-85							
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24-10-85							
27-10-85							
28-10-85							
29-10-85							
31-10-85							
PREM 19/1644							
ENDS							

PART 7 ends:-

FCO to CDP 31-10-85

PART 8 begins:-

CDP to FCO 1-11-85



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 October 1985

Dear Charles,

EPG

Following the Foreign Secretary's discussions with the Prime Minister on this subject, Sir Geoffrey Howe has spoken to Lord Barber and the latter has agreed to take part in the Eminent Persons' Group as British nominee.

The Foreign Secretary saw Lord Barber this afternoon and the latter was subsequently briefed by officials.

I attach a copy of the suggested press announcement, together with supplementary material which has been cleared with Lord Barber. We suggest that the statement should be issued tomorrow by the No 10 Press Office. Lord Barber proposes to make a short factual statement of his own at the same time. He will clear this with us. But he will decline to answer questions until the other members of the Group have been formally announced.

The Foreign Secretary proposes to inform Ramphal and has asked him to call at 1500 tomorrow. We also intend to inform the South African Ambassador at the same time. Our posts in those countries which are involved in setting up the Eminent Persons' Group will also be asked to inform their host governments as a matter of courtesy. But we will tell the Canadian High Commissioner here in advance in view of our continuing contacts with the Canadians on this subject.

It would be helpful to know as soon as possible if the Prime Minister is content with the terms of the statement.

Yours ever,

Le Appleyard
(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

PRESS LINE FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT

NOMINATION OF LORD BARBER TO THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP

Line To Take

The Prime Minister has asked Lord Barber (Baron Barber of Wentbridge) to be the British nominee on the Eminent Persons Group established by the Commonwealth Heads of Government in Nassau. Lord Barber has agreed to undertake this role and the Commonwealth Secretary-General has been informed.

Supplementaries

Why Lord Barber?

Lord Barber is a Privy Counsellor and a former Chancellor of the Exchequer. He has had wide experience of government and of international affairs. He thus brings exceptional ability, experience and status to this task.

What about his position as Chairman of the Standard Chartered Bank?

Lord Barber has played a major role in expanding the activities of the Standard Chartered Bank worldwide. The Bank operates in a number of countries, many of them in Anglophone Africa, and in South Africa itself.

Who are the other nominees?

The Australians have announced that their nominee will be Mr Malcolm Fraser. The other Commonwealth governments have not yet announced their choices.

What will the Group do?

The Commonwealth Accord called for the Group to encourage through all practicable ways the process of political dialogue in South Africa. Detailed terms of reference have still to be worked out.

When will it begin work?

No date has been set, but we would expect it to have its first meeting within about one month.

Will Lord Barber act independently or be guided by HMG?

Lord Barber will be a member of the Group in his personal capacity as an eminent Commonwealth figure not as a representative of the British Government.

Prime Minister has given way to Mr Ramphal in not appointing Sir Geoffrey Howe?

It was clear to the Prime Minister that, bearing in mind the scope and importance of this task, Lord Barber would be an eminently suitable choice. Mr Ramphal did not try to influence the British decision. It was simply not practical for Sir Geoffrey Howe to combine membership of the Group, given all the possible time and travel this might require, with his duties as Foreign Secretary.

South African reaction to Eminent Persons initiative?

While President Botha has said that South Africa did not need a Commonwealth Committee to come to South Africa in order to facilitate change there, he has not specifically rejected the Group or said that he would not co-operate with it.



PRESS INFORMATION

Kinnock
Mr. Sheehane
Foreign Policy
Mr. Long

From the Office of
Rt. Hon Neil Kinnock MP
Leader of the Opposition

AP
PI *com* ① TF
② CDP
③ me

8.12/11

Press and Broadcasting Secretary: Patricia Hewitt 01-219 4151 01-267 2567 (home)

EMBARGO: For immediate release
REMARKS BY RT HON NEIL KINNOCK MP, LEADER OF THE
OPPOSITION, AT THE OPENING OF THE "MARITIME UNIONS AGAINST
APARTHEID" CONFERENCE, LONDON, OCTOBER 30, 1985

I am delighted to be with you this morning and to bring you the best wishes of my Party in your efforts to strengthen the pressures on apartheid.

For many years the United Nations and its Special Committee against Apartheid, the African National Congress, the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the international labour movement have been pressing for an effective oil embargo.

They know, as the people of South Africa know, that for apartheid to continue it is essential that it obtains from the outside world those vital items - oil, finance, high-technology goods, engineering equipment - that it cannot produce itself.

They help to keep the apartheid system in business and therefore in power.

Many countries have taken action and now even this British Tory Government is prepared to agree that cutting direct supplies from Britain constitutes "a legitimate and necessary signal to the South African government". But still the oil and the other items get through.

All speeches are issued on a check against delivery basis. Any portion of the speech not actually delivered should be regarded as private and confidential

And when they get through -

- * they enable the apartheid army's vehicles to operate in illegally occupied Namibia
- * they fuel the aircraft that attack neighbouring countries and
- * they fuel the police vehicles that bring havoc and brutal repression to the townships each day.

That is why this conference is important for all who are working for peace with justice in South Africa.

Our aim, of course, must be an effective oil ban as part of UN comprehensive economic sanctions under Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter.

Now when apartheid is starting to crumble as a result of pressures from within and without, the need to intensify sanctions is obvious.

They offer the only peaceful way of accelerating the shift in the position of the South African government that is essential if violence is to be brought to an end.

We all heard last week of the desire of the Commonwealth Heads of Government to promote dialogue in South Africa in an environment free of violence.

Everyone here will firmly endorse that ambition. But the awful fact is that the apartheid system is intrinsically violent and depends upon repression for its very life. Those who call for an end to violence are right.

But in that call there must be a very clear recognition that they are calling for the end of the apartheid system, since that is where all political violence in South Africa has its root.

Our Prime Minister in Britain seems not to understand that. She said yesterday that -

"I do not accept that apartheid is the root of violence, nor do most other people".

With that statement Mrs Thatcher betrayed either a hopeless ignorance or an astounding insensitivity to the nature, the operation and the effects of Apartheid on all races in South Africa.

No one, not even supporters of Apartheid themselves, believes that the system is not the root of violence. And people like the businessmen now mobilised in protest, the churches courageously sustaining the values of peace and many in the white community in South Africa want radical and speedy change towards democracy in the Republic because they know from the saddest experience that political violence was born, raised and is nourished by Apartheid.

That is why intensified sanctions are vital.

I wish you a successful two days discussions and I hope that the result will be to add to the pressures that are now rapidly building up to produce, as quickly as possible, a non-racial and democratic South Africa.

In those discussions I hope you will be guided by the words used by Nelson Mandela when three years ago he said in a message smuggled from Robben Island prison:

"Every effort to isolate apartheid adds strength to our struggle".

I wish you well in your efforts to infuse the campaign against apartheid with greater strength and in doing that shorten the agony of South Africa.

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of Telegram
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(T203/85)

DEDIP SECRET AND PERSONAL

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SECRET
DEDIP AND PERSONAL
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA
TELNO 253
OF 311100Z OCTOBER 85

FOLLOWING FROM REEVE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ARRANGE FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

2. KNOWLEDGE OF THIS MESSAGE IS BEING VERY SEVERELY RESTRICTED HERE. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD DEAL WITH IT SIMILARLY.

BEGINS

SECRET AND PERSONAL

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR THE MESSAGE WHICH YOU SENT ME ON 28 OCTOBER. NOW THAT I AM BACK IN LONDON, I SHOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU A FULLER ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSION OF SOUTH AFRICA AT THE RECENT COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN THE BAHAMAS AND TO PUT SOME IDEAS TO YOU ON THE WAY FORWARD. THESE COVER SOME OF THE POINTS RAISED IN YOUR MESSAGE. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD TREAT THIS LETTER VERY MUCH AS PERSONAL TO YOU.

THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING OPENED WITH FORTY-FIVE COUNTRIES SEEKING EXTENSIVE TRADE AND ECONOMIC SANCIONS AGAINST SOUTH

AFRICA. IN SOME CASES THIS AMOUNTED TO LIP-SERVICE ONLY: THE INTERESTS OF SOME COUNTRIES WOULD BE SEVERELY DAMAGED BY SANCTIONS IF THEY WERE APPLIED. BUT THE PLAIN FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT NOBODY ELSE IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING WAS PREPARED TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST THEM. IT WAS LEFT TO ME.

MY REBUTTAL OF THE CASE FOR SANCTIONS RESTED ON TWO MAIN PREMISES: THAT SANCTIONS DO NOT WORK, INDEED ARE LIKELY TO BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND DAMAGING TO THOSE THEY ARE INTENDED TO HELP: AND THAT IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE TO TAKE PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AT THE VERY MOMENT WHEN YOU ARE TAKING STEPS TO GET RID OF APARTHEID AND TO MAKE MAJOR CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA. I RECEIVED A GOOD DEAL OF ABUSE IN RESPONSE, BEING ACCUSED OF PREFERRING BRITISH JOBS TO AFRICAN LIVES, OF BEING CONCERNED WITH PENNIES RATHER THAN PRINCIPLES, OF LACK OF CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND MUCH MORE IN THE SAME VEIN. I IN TURN REMINDED THEM OF SOME OF THE LESS SATISFACTORY FEATURES OF THEIR OWN SOCIETIES AND POINTED TO THE INCONSISTENCY OF TRADING WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WITH ITS APPALLING HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, AND PUTTING TRADE SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA. IN SHORT, AS YOUR MESSAGE ACKNOWLEDGED, THE DEBATE WAS A HIGHLY UNPLEASANT AND BITTER ONE: AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE ISSUE OF SANCTIONS WILL NOT GO AWAY, DESPITE MY SUCCESS IN PREVENTING THE COMMONWEALTH FROM ADOPTING THEM AT THIS MEETING.

MY OTHER MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO SECURE COMMONWEALTH BACKING FOR DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE BY ALL SIDES. THE CONCEPT OF COURSE COMES FROM YOUR EARLIER LETTER TO ME: AND I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT IS NO SMALL ACHIEVEMENT TO HAVE PERSUADED THE COMMONWEALTH TO PUT ITS NAME TO A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE, THOUGH THERE ARE SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS WHO WILL NOT WISH TO SEE SUBSTANCE GIVEN TO THIS COMMITMENT IF THEY CAN AVOID IT.

LOOKING NOW TO THE FUTURE, ONE HAS TO DRAW THE TWO STRANDS TOGETHER. THE CASE FOR SANCTIONS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO BE PRESSED, AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND WHEN THE COMMONWEALTH CONSIDERS PROGRESS IN SIX MONTHS TIME. I AM RESOLVED TO CONTINUE TO RESIST THAT PRESSURE, AND I WAS ENCOURAGED TO FIND PRESIDENT REAGAN SIMILARLY DETERMINED WHEN WE DISCUSSED THE MATTER IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK. BUT I NEED YOUR HELP IN THIS TASK AND I NEED IT IN THREE WAYS:

I. OBVIOUSLY YOU CANNOT AND WILL NOT ALLOW OUTSIDERS TO DICTATE THE PACE AND THE SCOPE OF CHANGE WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA. THE COMMONWEALTH ACCORD LOOKS ONLY FOR QUOTE PROGRESS UNQUOTE WITHIN SIX MONTHS AND ACKNOWLEDGES IN TERMS THAT QUOTE THE FORMS OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ARE FOR THE PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY - ALL THE PEOPLE - TO DETERMINE UNQUOTE. BUT IT WOULD IN MY VIEW BE UNWISE NOT TO RECEIVE THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS, EXPLAIN PATIENTLY TO THEM WHAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS DONE AND IS INTENDING TO DO, AND ALLOW THEM TO MAKE CONTACTS AMONG THE VARIOUS COMMUNITIES. I CAN WELL IMAGINE THAT YOU WILL FIND THIS TIRESOME TO SAY THE LEAST. WHILE WE SHALL DO OUR BEST TO GUIDE THE GROUP IN A CONSTRUCTIVE DIRECTION, I AM UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT MUCH OF WHAT IT WILL SAY AND DO WILL BE DISTASTEFUL TO YOU. BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT IT WILL BE INFINITELY MORE DAMAGING TO SOUTH AFRICA'S STANDING AND TO THE HOPES OF SECURING A WIDER UNDERSTANDING FOR WHAT YOU ARE TRYING TO DO, WERE YOU TO REFUSE TO SEE THE GROUP OR TO LIMIT ITS ACTIVITIES UNREASONABLY. AT THIS STAGE I CANNOT TELL YOU HOW SOON THE COMPOSITION OF THE GROUP WILL BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, NOR HOW LONG IT WILL TAKE TO DECIDE ON HOW IT SHOULD TACKLE ITS TASK. MY BEST GUESS IS THAT IT WILL BE THREE TO FOUR WEEKS BEFORE ANY FIRM REQUEST WILL BE PUT TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT.

II. YOUR LETTER OF 4 OCTOBER TO ME SET OUT IN GREAT DETAIL WHAT YOU HAVE DONE AND WHAT YOU ARE PROPOSING TO DO BOTH IN TERMS OF REMOVING DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION AND PRACTICES AND OF DEVELOPING A POLITICAL ROLE FOR BLACK PEOPLE. IT SEEMS TO ME

THAT YOU WILL NEED TO HAVE AN EYE TO THE INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THE TIMING AND PRESENTATION OF YOUR DECISIONS. WHAT WAS EVENTUALLY SAID IN YOUR SPEECH IN AUGUST DID NOT MATCH THE EXPECTATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN CREATED NOR INDEED THE REALITY OF THE DECISIONS WHICH YOU WERE THEN CONSIDERING. I SHOULD LIKE TO SEE YOU PRESENT THE SORT OF PROPOSALS YOU MENTIONED TO ME AS A MAJOR INITIATIVE BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, AT WHATEVER YOU JUDGE THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT. THE INITIATIVE WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES: IT WOULD BE THE RESULT OF WHAT YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE IN TERMS OF YOUR COUNTRY'S NEEDS AND INTERESTS. BUT THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT WOULD BE VERY MUCH GREATER.

III. FINALLY - AND THIS IS THE MOST DIFFICULT SINCE IT INVOLVES AN OUTSIDER PRESUMING TO TRESPASS ON YOUR AFFAIRS - I DO VERY STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT YOU SHOULD BE AIMING TO TAKE FURTHER SPECIFIC MEASURES IN THE NEXT MONTH OR SO. I HAVE NOTED THE DECISION TO LIFT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN SIX DISTRICTS: BUT HAVE BEEN SAD TO SEE THAT VOILENCE IN THE WESTERN CAPE HAS FORCED A FURTHER EXTENSION ON YOU. PLEASE DO NOT UNDER-ESTIMATE THE IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL OPINION OF THE IMPOSITION OF STATES OF EMERGENCY AND THE GAIN FROM LIFTING THEM AS SOON AS YOU ARE ABLE. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE, AS I HAVE SAID TO YOU BEFORE, THAT THE RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA WOULD HAVE MORE IMPACT THAN ALMOST ANY SINGLE ACTION YOU COULD UNDERTAKE. A SPECIFIC INITIATIVE TO LAUNCH A POLITICAL DIALOGUE BEFORE THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP GETS FAR INTO ITS WORK WOULD ALSO BE A SKILFUL MOVE AND ONE IN LINE WITH THE INTENTIONS WHICH YOU EXPRESSED TO ME.

I HAVE SPOKEN FRANKLY ON THESE POINTS BECAUSE I WANT TO BE ABLE TO GO ON HELPING YOU END THE VIOLENCE AND BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE. BUT THERE ARE MANY MORE OTHERS WHO DO NOT SHARE THESE GOALS. I SHALL CONTINUE TO RESIST SANCTIONS BECAUSE I BELIEVE THEY ARE WRONG AND BECAUSE IT IS IN BRITAIN'S INTEREST TO DO SO. BUT IF MY EFFORTS ARE TO CARRY CONVICTION MORE WIDELY IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY,

THEN I NEED TO BE ABLE TO POINT TO CONCRETE RESULTS FROM THEM.
IT IS UP TO YOU TO DECIDE WHAT WEIGHT YOU ATTACH TO THESE EFFORTS.
I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONCLUDE THEY ARE WORTHWHILE AND
THAT WE CAN HELP EACH OTHER IN THIS WAY.

YOURS SINCERELY
MARGARET THATCHER
ENDS

HOWE

OCMIAN 2125
NNNN
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MR FERGUSSON
MR JOHNSON
HEAD SAFD



House of Lords

Box ②

I have asked.

CR

Prime Minister

CDP
↓

Prime Minister

I send notes on meetings
I had this week with Senator
Howard Baker & Dr. Tambo.

Lugh Thomas

October 31 1985

MT

MR OLIVER TAMBO

Anthony Kershaw asked me to have tea with Mr Tambo on Monday and I went along to a dining room of the Commons where some ten persons were gathered. All were Conservatives apart from Mr Tambo and his delegation. His English is impeccable, and he has a friendly, relaxed and attractive manner. He talked a good deal about the roots of the problem stretching back to 1910. Indeed, he dwelt on the past as much as the present. If he were solely in charge of the African National Congress I should guess there would be a chance of a humane outcome to its present policies. But it was difficult to see, in the context concerned, whether he is a real leader, or whether, as is often the case, he is merely an attractive front for more dangerous forces: one of his colleagues, Mr Mbeki, seemed a rougher character, though also courteous.

Mr Tambo said he was here to tell leaders of British opinion that apartheid must be ended in some way. He described how the situation in South Africa had, in his opinion, become "more and more violent" and how, at the beginning of the period of control by the African Nationalist Party in 1948, that Party had sought to provoke the Africans to violence in order to force an alliance between Anglo-Saxons and Dutch. The consequence was the African National Congress. At first, the ANC pursued its struggle without violence, though the South African government was becoming increasingly rough itself. Since the 1960s, the ANC had pursued a policy of "selective sabotage", e.g. against pylons, with "a special care to avoid injury to people". They had not been entirely successful in this attempt, though Mr Mandela had criticised the recent (?) bomb placed in Pretoria. The real "armed struggle" had not yet begun. The reason for the delay was that Mr Tambo and his friends know the damage which could be caused if it were to begin seriously.

Now matters had changed: not only because the South African government had become physically brutal, but because of the independence of Mozambique, Rhodesia and other places whose African population "we used to look down on as backward". The black South Africans see themselves as more advanced than the populations of those countries. Yet their present position is worse even than it was in 1910 when, after all, they had had four coloured members of parliament. Branch secretaries of the ANC had crossed the border to Bechuanaland and Swaziland to become ministers.

The South African people, he said, sought democracy. They did not want majority rule simply to become black majority rule. The ANC recognised that white South Africans belong in Africa and believe firmly that South Africa could become a country in which colour bar had no meaning. But

.../given

given the unyielding attitude of the South African government, Mr Tambo believed that they now had to embark upon the "armed struggle". In reply to a later question, he said "it's going to be brutal and many thousands are going to have to die". He added that, at "a certain level" (presumably, of violence) "we would expect to see the international community intervening, including this country" (i.e. Britain): "the responsibility for all this violence does not lie with us".

Tambo recognised that the South African army could not be defeated, but "we could cause a lot of chaos". He did not think that a truce was necessary in order to embark on talks with the South African government since, after all, such a truce had been found necessary neither in Rhodesia or Vietnam.

I asked Tambo what his attitude was to the proven inadequacy of sanctions in other instances, and the argument (e.g. of Helen Suzman) that economic development was more likely to produce change than a boycott. Tambo passed this question to Mbeki to answer. He did not at first do so, but on being pressed commented that maximum repression had coincided in the past with a period of economic development. He apparently saw sanctions as a way of dragging in other parts of the world. In reply to another question, he rejected any suggestion that there could be a federal solution in South Africa: "we cannot federate if federation means the continuance anywhere of white South African superiority".

In conclusion Tambo said "we cannot persist in cautious sabotage such as we have pursued for two decades": more was needed. In reply to a final question from Anthony Kershaw as to whether the African National Congress was a Marxist party, Tambo answered, after hesitating, "no".

October 31st, 1985

SENATOR HOWARD BAKER

[He already
announced
it publicly
months
ago]

At lunch with the American Minister yesterday Senator Howard Baker announced that he is going to run for President in 1988. The Senator said he already had 1¼ million dollars in his campaign fund. In order to run for the presidency he would need \$40-60 million. A similar figure would also be needed if he was a Democratic candidate, he added. (That does not include the \$25 million which will be made available to him if formally adopted as presidential candidate).

I do not know if you know Senator Baker; he struck me as a tough little man with a ready reply, in all circumstances, of no great depth. He was, as you will know, Republican leader in the Senate throughout President Reagan's first term. Although he stood against Reagan in the 1980 Republican contest he now looks on him as "the most presidential President" he can remember.

The most interesting thing he had to say was that he thought the President was taking his meeting with Mr Gorbachov extremely seriously, was really interested in a deal and was perhaps "too interested in a deal". The reasons for this attitude in the President were, in his view, not particularly novel though he expressed himself vigorously. Senator Baker is a strong supporter of the SDI and thought that Japan would, after the United States, be the most likely nation to make use of its potential.

November 1, 1985

SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS
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PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON
SIR J FREELAND
MR JOHNSON
MR O'NEILL
HD/SAFD
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HD/NEWS DEPT
RESIDENT CLERK

MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

15.11.84

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TELNO 443
OF 311025Z OCTOBER 1985
INFO ROUTINE JOHANNESBURG
INFO SAVING CAPE TOWN CONSULATE, DURBAN.

BY ELECTIONS

SUMMARY

1. THE GOVERNMENT HELD ON TO FOUR OUT OF THE FIVE SEATS CONTESTED IN BY-ELECTIONS ON 30 OCTOBER LOSING ONE TO THE EXTREME RIGHT-WING HERSTIGTE NASIONALE PARTY. THE OUTCOME COULD HAVE BEEN WORSE BUT THE STRONG RIGHT-WING VOTE IN ALL THE SEATS WILL NOT ENCOURAGE THE GOVERNMENT TO ACCELERATE THE PACE OF REFORM OR TO SOFTEN THEIR APPROACH TO LAW AND ORDER.

DETAIL

2. THE 30 OCTOBER BY-ELECTIONS WERE IN TWO RURAL SEATS, ONE IN THE ORANGE FREE STATE AND ONE IN NORTHERN CAPE (BETHLEHEM AND VRYBURG), AN INDUSTRIAL CONSTITUENCY IN THE NORTHERN FREE STATE (SASOLBURG), A CENTRAL DURBAN CONSTITUENCY (PORT NATAL), AND AN INDUSTRIAL SUBURB OF JOHANNESBURG (SPRINGS).
3. EARLIER IN THE YEAR THE NATIONAL PARTY (NP) HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY WORRIED THAT THEY MIGHT LOSE THE FIRST THREE SEATS. IN THE EVENT THEY HAVE WON FAIRLY EASILY IN THE TWO FARMING CONSTITUENCIES BEATING THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY (KP) IN A STRAIGHT FIGHT IN ONE AND HAVING ABSOLUTE MAJORITY AGAINST BOTH THE KP AND THE HERSTIGTE NASIONALE PARTY (HNP) IN THE OTHER. OF THESE TWO RIGHT WING PARTIES THE KP IS USUALLY REGARDED AS THE STRONGER. ALTHOUGH THE KP AND HNP HAVE NO FORMAL ALLIANCE, IN PRACTICE ONLY ONE OF THEM PUT UP A CANDIDATE IN EACH BY-ELECTION (EXCEPT IN ONE CASE). THE GOVERNMENT CANDIDATES THUS FACED A COMBINED RIGHT WING VOTE IN 4 OF THE 5 SEATS.
4. THE GOVERNMENT'S DEFEAT WAS IN SASOLBURG, A MAINLY INDUSTRIAL AREA IN THE NORTH OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE KP HAD WITHDRAWN TO GIVE THE HNP A CLEAR RUN AGAINST A STRONG LIBERALLY MINDED NP CANDIDATE

4. THE GOVERNMENT'S DEFEAT WAS IN SASOLBURG, A MAINLY INDUSTRIAL AREA IN THE NORTH OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE KP HAD WITHDRAWN TO GIVE THE HNP A CLEAR RUN AGAINST A STRONG LIBERALLY MINDED NP CANDIDATE WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN A NOMINATED MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT AND HAS WORKED HARD TO TRY TO ATTRACT NEW INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY IN THE STATE. THIS GIVES THE HNP THEIR FIRST SEAT IN PARLIAMENT.

5. THE HNP VICTORY WAS A SURPRISE AND REFLECTS A CLEAR SWING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. A MAJOR FACTOR WILL HAVE BEEN CONCERN ABOUT LAW AND ORDER SINCE BLACK UNREST HAS BEEN AFFECTING THE INDUSTRIAL REGIONS IN THE NORTH OF THE FREE STATE. BUT THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN HAS ALSO AFFECTED INDUSTRIAL AREAS MORE THAN FARMING CONSTITUENCIES.

6. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THERE WAS ALSO A STRONG SWING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN SPRINGS, ANOTHER SEAT WITH A CONSIDERABLE PROPORTION OF WHITE FACTORY WORKERS, SOME UNEMPLOYMENT AND NEARBY CENTRES OF BLACK UNREST.

7. THE OPPOSITION LIBERAL PROGRESSIVE FEDERAL PARTY (PFP) RAN A POOR THIRD IN SPRINGS DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE ENGLISH SPEAKING ELEMENT IN THE CONSTITUENCY. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT PFP VOTERS EITHER STAYED AWAY OR MOVED THEIR VOTE TO ONE OF THE MORE CONSERVATIVE PARTIES.

8. IN THE DURBAN SEAT WON BY THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS THE BIG LOSER WAS THE NEW REPUBLIC PARTY (NRP) WHOSE FUTURE MUST NOW BE SERIOUSLY IN QUESTION. THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN THE PFP IN PICKING UP SUPPORT FROM THE NRP AMONG THE ENGLISH SPEAKING COMMUNITY. RESULTS ALTOGETHER ARE DISAPPOINTING FOR THE PFP.

9. THE PERCENTAGE POLL IN ALL OF THE BY-ELECTIONS WAS LOWER THAN HAD BEEN PREDICTED. DETAILED RESULTS ARE IN MIFT.

10. A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE NP HAS TOLD US THAT THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDER THE RESULT NOT TOO BAD BUT THAT AS HAD BEEN EXPECTED THERE HAD BEEN A STRONG RIGHT-WING CHALLENGE. COMMENT FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA IS EXPECTED LATER TODAY.

11. OVERALL THE OUTCOME MAY BE SUFFICIENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO CLAIM IT AS A MANDATE FOR THEIR POLICIES. BUT THE CONTINUING EVIDENCE OF STRONG RIGHT-WING SUPPORT (IN ALL CASES UP ON THE 1981 FIGURES) WILL NOT ENCOURAGE THEM TO INCREASE THE PACE OF REFORM. NOT IS IT LIKELY TO SOFTEN THEIR ROBUST APPROACH TO TRYING TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER.

MOBERLY

YYYY

POHPAN 2450

NNNN

file to

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 October, 1985.

SOUTH AFRICA

I enclose the signed original of a message from the Prime Minister to President Botha.

Unless the Foreign Secretary sees any reason for delay as a result of the by-elections in South Africa, I should be grateful if the text could be telegraphed to Pretoria for immediate delivery.

(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SWA

SUBJECT cc ops
master,

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SECRET & PERSONAL



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 203/85

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 October, 1985.

Dear Mr. President.

Thank you for the message which you sent me on 28 October. Now that I am back in London, I should like to give you a fuller account of the discussion of South Africa at the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in the Bahamas and to put some ideas to you on the way forward. These cover some of the points raised in your message. I should be grateful if you would treat this letter very much as personal to you.

The Commonwealth meeting opened with forty-five countries seeking extensive trade and economic sanctions against South Africa. In some cases this amounted to lip-service only; the interests of some countries would be severely damaged by sanctions if they were applied. But the plain fact of the matter is that nobody else in the course of the meeting was prepared to speak out against them. It was left to me.

My rebuttal of the case for sanctions rested on two main premises: that sanctions do not work, indeed are likely to be counter-productive and damaging to those they are intended to help; and that it was inappropriate to take punitive action against South Africa at the very moment when you are taking

SECRET & PERSONAL

steps to get rid of apartheid and to make major changes in the system of government in South Africa. I received a good deal of abuse in response, being accused of preferring British jobs to African lives, of being concerned with pennies rather than principles, of lack of concern for human rights and much more in the same vein. I in turn reminded them of some of the less satisfactory features of their own societies and pointed to the inconsistency of trading with the Soviet Union, with its appalling human rights record, and putting trade sanctions on South Africa. In short, as your message acknowledged, the debate was a highly unpleasant and bitter one; and there is no doubt that the issue of sanctions will not go away, despite my success in preventing the Commonwealth from adopting them at this meeting.

My other main purpose was to secure Commonwealth backing for dialogue between the South African Government and representatives of the black community in the context of a suspension of violence by all sides. The concept of course comes from your earlier letter to me: and I hope you will agree that it is no small achievement to have persuaded the Commonwealth to put its name to a suspension of violence, though there are several governments who will not wish to see substance given to this commitment if they can avoid it.

Looking now to the future, one has to draw the two strands together. The case for sanctions will undoubtedly continue to be pressed, at the United Nations and when the Commonwealth considers progress in six months time. I am resolved to continue to resist that pressure, and I was encouraged to find President Reagan similarly determined when we discussed the matter in New York last week. But I need your help in this task and I need it in three ways:

- i. Obviously you cannot and will not allow outsiders to dictate the pace and the scope of change within South Africa. The Commonwealth Accord looks only for "progress" within six months and acknowledges in terms that "the forms of political settlement are for the

people of that country - all the people - to determine". But it would in my view be unwise not to receive the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons, explain patiently to them what your Government has done and is intending to do, and allow them to make contacts among the various communities. I can well imagine that you will find this tiresome to say the least. While we shall do our best to guide the Group in a constructive direction, I am under no illusion that much of what it will say and do will be distasteful to you. But I am convinced that it will be infinitely more damaging to South Africa's standing and to the hopes of securing a wider understanding for what you are trying to do, were you to refuse to see the Group or to limit its activities unreasonably. At this stage I cannot tell you how soon the composition of the Group will become public knowledge, nor how long it will take to decide on how it should tackle its task. My best guess is that it will be three to four weeks before any firm request will be put to the South African Government.

ii. Your letter of 4 October to me set out in great detail what you have done and what you are proposing to do both in terms of removing discriminatory legislation and practices and of developing a political role for black people. It seems to me that you will need to have an eye to the international repercussions of the timing and presentation of your decisions. What was eventually said in your speech in August did not match the expectations which had been created nor indeed the reality of the decisions which you were then considering. I should like to see you present the sort of proposals you mentioned to me as a major initiative by the South African Government, at whatever you judge the appropriate moment. The initiative would not be taken in response to international pressures: it would be the result of what you and your government considered appropriate in terms of your country's needs and interests. But the international impact would be very

much greater.

iii. Finally - and this is the most difficult since it involves an outsider presuming to trespass on your affairs - I do very strongly believe that you should be aiming to take further specific measures in the next month or so. I have noted the decision to lift the state of emergency in six districts: but have been sad to see that violence in the Western Cape has forced a further extension on you. Please do not under-estimate the impact on international opinion of the imposition of states of emergency and the gain from lifting them as soon as you are able. I continue to believe, as I have said to you before, that the release of Nelson Mandela would have more impact than almost any single action you could undertake. A specific initiative to launch a political dialogue before the Commonwealth Group gets far into its work would also be a skilful move and one in line with the intentions which you expressed to me.

I have spoken frankly on these points because I want to be able to go on helping you end the violence and bring about peaceful and fundamental change. But there are many more others who do not share these goals. I shall continue to resist sanctions because I believe they are wrong and because it is in Britain's interest to do so. But if my efforts are to carry conviction more widely in the international community, then I need to be able to point to concrete results from them. It is up to you to decide what weight you attach to these efforts. I very much hope that you will conclude they are worthwhile and that we can help each other in this way.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable P.W. Botha, DMS

SECRET

CC/PZ

3



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 October 1985

Dear Charles,

South Africa

Many thanks for your letter of 28 October.

The Foreign Secretary thought that the draft which was enclosed was extremely good, both in tone and content. I attach a retyped version, which includes some amendments designed to take account of President Botha's most recent message, and to ensure that if the letter were ever published it would not do us any great damage world wide.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

The Hon PW Botha, DMS

Type for
signature

M. LAUACZ

DEB T LETTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA

Thank you for the message which you sent me on 28 October. Now that I am back in London, I should like to give you a fuller account of the discussion of South Africa at the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in the Bahamas and to put some ideas to you on the way forward. These cover some of the points raised in your message. I should be grateful if you would treat this letter very much as personal to you.

The Commonwealth meeting opened with 45 countries seeking extensive trade and economic sanctions against South Africa. In some cases this amounted to lip-service only; the interests of some countries would be severely damaged by sanctions if they were applied.

But the plain fact of the matter is that nobody else in the course

~~(Kaugh Jayawardene of Sri Lanka was honest enough to admit that he agreed with it)~~
of the meeting was prepared to speak out against them. It was left

to me.

~~(South Africa for the purchase of U.S. was something he was not prepared to do)~~

My rebuttal of the case for sanctions rested on two main premises: that sanctions do not work, indeed are likely to be counter-productive and damaging to those they are intended to help; and that it was inappropriate to take punitive action against South Africa at the very moment when you are taking steps to get rid of apartheid and to make major changes in the system of government in South Africa. I received a good deal of abuse in response, being accused of preferring British jobs to African lives, of being concerned with pennies rather than principles, of lack of concern for human rights and much more in the same vein. I in turn reminded them of some of the less satisfactory features of their

/ own

own societies and pointed to the inconsistency of trading with the Soviet Union, with its appalling human rights record, and putting trade sanctions on South Africa. In short, as your message acknowledged, the debate was a highly unpleasant and bitter one; and there is no doubt that the issue of sanctions will not go away, despite my success in preventing the Commonwealth from adopting them at this meeting.

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Looking now to the future, one has to draw the two strands together. The case for sanctions will undoubtedly continue to be pressed, at the United Nations and when the Commonwealth considers progress in six months time. I am resolved to continue to resist that pressure, and I was encouraged to find President Reagan similarly determined when we discussed the matter in New York last week. But I need your help in this task and I need it in three ways:

- (i) Obviously you cannot and will not allow outsiders to dictate the pace and the scope of change within South Africa. The Commonwealth

/ Accord

Accord looks only for "progress" within six months and acknowledges in terms that "the forms of political settlement are for the people of that country - all the people - to determine". But it would in my view be unwise not to receive the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons, explain patiently to them what your Government has done and is intending to do, and allow them to make contacts among the various communities. I can well imagine that you will find this tiresome to say the least. While we shall do our best to guide the Group in a constructive direction, I am under no illusion that much of what it will say and do will be distasteful to you. But I am convinced that it will be infinitely more damaging to South Africa's standing and to the hopes of securing a wider understanding for what you are trying to do, were you to refuse to see the Group or to limit its activities unreasonably. At this stage I cannot tell you how soon the composition of the Group will become public knowledge, nor how long it will take to decide on how it should tackle its task. My best guess is that it will be three to four weeks before any firm request will be put to the South African Government.

/ (ii)

(ii) Your letter of 4 October to me set out in great detail what you have done and what you are proposing to do both in terms of removing discriminatory legislation and practices and of developing a political role for black people. It seems to me that you will need to have an eye to the international repercussions of the timing and presentation of your decisions. What was eventually said in your speech in August did not match the expectations which had been created nor indeed the reality of the decisions which you were then considering. I should like to see you present the sort of proposals you mentioned to me as a major initiative by the South African Government, at whatever you judge the appropriate moment. The initiative would not be taken in response to international pressures: it would be the result of what you and your government considered appropriate in terms of your country's needs and interests. But the international impact would be very much greater.

/(iii)

(iii) Finally - and this is the most difficult since it involves an outsider presuming to trespass on your affairs - I do very strongly believe that you should be aiming to take further specific measures in the next month or so. I have noted the decision to lift the state of emergency in six districts: but have been sad to see that violence in the Western Cape has forced a further extension on you. Please do not underestimate the impact on international opinion of the imposition of states of emergency and the gain from lifting them as soon as you are able. I continue to believe, as I have said to you before, that the release of Nelson Mandela would have more impact than almost any single action you could undertake. A specific initiative to launch a political dialogue before the Commonwealth Group gets far into its work would also be a skilful move and one in line with the intentions which you expressed to me.

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/because

because it is in Britain's interest to do so. But if my efforts are to carry conviction more widely in the international community, then I need to be able to point to concrete results from them. It is up to you to decide what weight you attach to these efforts. I very much hope that you will conclude they are worthwhile and that we can help each other in this way.

Copy

SOUTH AFRICA: Relations; Pt 7.



FILE

VC

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 October, 1985

Dear Christopher,

It was very thoughtful of you to write to offer your services as the British member of the Group of Eminent Persons agreed upon at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. I shall most certainly keep your name in mind. As you can imagine, the choice is a very difficult one.

It was good to hear from you.

Yours ever

Raymond

Christopher Tugendhat, Esq.

RM



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 October 1985

CHOGM: GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

I enclose a copy of a letter from the Commonwealth Secretary-General in which he proposes to extend by a week the deadline for nominations to the Group, while preferring responses before then if possible.

(Charles Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL
MARLBOROUGH HOUSE · PALL MALL · LONDON SW1Y 5HX

Prime Minister

*CDP
30x*


30 October, 1985

Dear Prime Minister,

mt

In informal discussion in Nassau it was agreed that the Heads of Government mentioned in paragraph 5 of the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa would aim to let me have their suggestions for membership of the Eminent Persons Group by the end of the present week. I have had some names; but it has become clear that it will take rather longer to have them all in. I am, therefore, proposing to all the Heads concerned, and hope you agree, that we look to an extension of one week as the target for letting me have your proposal. I need hardly say that it will be helpful to have your response before then if it is possible. I will, of course, consult with you on the list as it emerges.

With deep respect,



Shridath S. Ramphal

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister of Gt. Britain &
Northern Ireland,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

Text of a message from the Commonwealth Secretary-General,
Sonny Ramphal


Begins

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With deep respect,

Sonny Ramphal

ENDS





JEK

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 October 1985

CHOGM: Group of Eminent Persons

You will have seen UKMIS New York telegram number 950 conveying a message from Mr. Ramphal to the Prime Minister. I imagine it will be sufficient for the Prime Minister to reply once we have decided whom to nominate to this Group which I hope will be tomorrow. It is probably best to leave it till then to challenge some of Mr. Ramphal's contentious claims about what was and was not understood at Nassau.

(CHARLES POWELL)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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INFO SAVING JOHANNESBURG, CAPE TOWN (CONSULATE), DURBAN

MY TELNO 430: SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

SUMMARY

1. NO IMPROVEMENT IN THE DISTURBED SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. AUTHORITIES SEEM AT A LOSS HOW TO BREAK THE EVER-INCREASING CYCLE OF VIOLENCE EXCEPT BY STRONGARM METHODS. TOMORROW'S BY-ELECTIONS AN IMPORTANT TEST OF WHITE SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY OF CONTROLLED REFORM.

DETAIL

2. I CANNOT SEE MUCH HOPE OF ANY EARLY RETURN TO NORMALITY. DAILY CLASHES WITH THE POLICE ARE CONTINUING, AS IS A WIDESPREAD SCHOOL BOYCOTT IN BLACK URBAN AREAS AND A BLACK CONSUMER BOYCOTT IN THE EASTERN CAPE. A PERSON WHO SAT NEXT TO THE MINISTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL PLANNING AT A RECENT FUNCTION TOLD ME THAT HEUNIS ADMITTED TO THE EASTERN CAPE BEING IN A VIRTUAL STATE OF CIVIL WAR. THE SITUATION IN THE WESTERN CAPE HAS WORSENERED AND FORCED THE GOVERNMENT TO EXTEND EMERGENCY LAWS TO CAPE TOWN AND THE SURROUNDING AREA WHICH INCLUDES A BAN ON A HUNDRED NAMED ORGANISATIONS FROM HOLDING MEETINGS.
3. THE GOVERNMENT HOPE TO HOLD ON TO FIVE PARLIAMENTARY SEATS IN BY-ELECTIONS ON 30 OCTOBER. THE MAIN THREAT IS FROM THE RIGHT-WING CONSERVATIVE PARTY. THIS MAY HELP TO EXPLAIN SOME OF THE RECENT HARD LINE GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS INCLUDING OUTSPOKEN ATTACKS ON THE ANC, CRITICISM OF THE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVES, AND WARNINGS OF TIGHTER CONTROL ON FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS TO TRY AND PREVENT "IRRESPONSIBLE" REPORTING.
4. THERE ARE ALSO CLEAR SIGNS OF GOVERNMENT EXASPERATION AT LIBERAL ADVICE FROM THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY, NOT TO MENTION EXTERNAL PRESSURES. I WAS TOLD BY ONE BUSINESSMAN AMONG THOSE WHO RECENTLY MET TAMBO IN ZAMBIA THAT IN HIS OPINION THE GOVERNMENT WERE NOW CLOSE TO BRINGING DOWN THE SHUTTERS, BY WHICH HE MEANT TURNING THEIR BACKS ON THE WHOLE REFORM EFFORT. I DO NOT THINK SUCH A DECISION IS IMMINENT. BUT IT IS SYMPTOMATIC THAT WE CAN EVEN HEAR RUMOURS OF IT BEING CONTEMPLATED.
5. IF ALL GOES WELL FOR THE GOVERNMENT AT THE BY-ELECTIONS THEY WILL HAVE A MANDATE FOR THE PROGRAMME OF CHANGES ALREADY ANNOUNCED INCLUDING AMENDED CITIZENSHIP PROVISIONS AND PLANNING FOR BLACK URBAN GROWTH. CONVERSELY A STRONG SHOWING BY THE CONSERVATIVES AND THE CAPTURE OF ONE OR MORE SEATS WOULD BE A SEVERE SETBACK FOR THE GOVERNMENT. EVEN A SUCCESSFUL RESULT FOR THE GOVERNMENT HOWEVER IS UNLIKELY TO BE FOLLOWED BY A NEW EMPHASIS ON REFORM, RATHER THAN A STEADY CONTINUATION OF THE EXISTING STRATEGY.
6. AT THIS STAGE THE GOVERNMENT LOOK NO NEARER TO GETTING A REAL DIALOGUE OFF THE GROUND. MINISTERS SEE THE PRIORITY AS AN ENDING OF UNREST. AN OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO IS THAT, AS HAS HAPPENED DURING PREVIOUS OUTBREAKS OF UNREST, THE DISORDER WILL GRADUALLY DIE AWAY AFTER RUNNING ITS COURSE IN THE TRANSVAAL, EASTERN CAPE AND WESTERN CAPE.

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7. INCREASINGLY THIS LOOKS TO BE AN UNREAL EXPECTATION. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN BLAMING THE CONTINUED TENSION ON ORGANISED OPPOSITION WHICH THEY ATTRIBUTE PARTICULARLY TO THE INFLUENCE OF THE ANC ON STUDENTS AND SCHOOL CHILDREN. EMERGENCY MEASURES INCLUDE PROVISIONS MAKING IT ILLEGAL FOR YOUNG PEOPLE TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS OUTSIDE CLASSROOMS DURING SCHOOL HOURS. SUCH MEASURES APPEAR ONLY TO HAVE HEIGHTENED RESENTMENT.

8. A CONSIDERABLE SHARE OF THE BLAME FOR CONTINUED BITTERNESS AND TENSION IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE WAY IN WHICH FORCES OF LAW AND ORDER AND PARTICULARLY THE POLICE HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING THEMSELVES. THE POLICE HAVE HAD TO FACE SERIOUS PROVOCATION, INSULTS, STONE THROWING, DESTRUCTION OF HOMES OF BLACK POLICEMEN INVOLVED IN COMMANDO SQUADS AND THE DEATH OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE FORCE. HOWEVER, REPEATED OVER-REACTION HAS ONLY HEIGHTENED FEELING AGAINST THE POLICE WITHIN THE BLACK COMMUNITY AND ALIENATED THE HITHERTO QUIET COLOURED COMMUNITY IN CAPE TOWN.

9. A FEATURE OF THE VIOLENCE IS THAT IT IS STILL LARGELY CONFINED TO BLACK OR COLOURED AREAS. BUT A FEW RECENT INCIDENTS IN CENTRAL JOHANNESBURG AND CAPE TOWN HAVE BEGUN TO SHOW THAT WHITES ARE NOT IMMUNE: WHICH IS LIKELY TO RALLY WHITE SUPPORT BEHIND THE GOVERNMENT'S CRACKDOWN ON LAWLESSNESS BUT MAY ALSO OPEN THEIR EYES TO THE BRUTALITY OF POLICE METHODS. FOR THE FIRST TIME ALSO ENTIRE BLACK TOWNSHIPS ARE BEGINNING TO BECOME NO-GO AREAS FOR WHITES. ACCORDING TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE URBAN FOUNDATION HIS WHITE STAFF ARE NO LONGER ABLE TO VISIT SOME OF THE TOWNSHIPS NEAR CAPE TOWN FOR FEAR LITERALLY OF THEIR LIVES.

10. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT MANY MODERATE BLACK LEADERS LIST THE ENDING OF THE EMERGENCY, WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARMY AND SCALING DOWN OF POLICE ACTIVITY AS FUNDAMENTAL FOR ANY IMPROVEMENT IN THE OVER-ALL SITUATION.

11. SEE ALSO MIFT.

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INFO SAVING JOHANNESBURG, CAPE TOWN (CONSULATE), DURBAN

MIPT. SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

1. THE GENERAL PICTURE DESCRIBED IN MY PREVIOUS TELEGRAM IS ONE OF THE GOVERNMENT FINDING THEMSELVES UNABLE TO BREAK OUT OF A VICIOUS CIRCLE. THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO WITHDRAW POLICE AND ARMY FROM TOWNSHIPS WHICH WOULD THEN BE LEFT IN THE HANDS OF TROUBLEMAKERS. EQUALLY THEY CANNOT PERSUADE AUTHENTIC BLACK REPRESENTATIVES TO COME FORWARD AND TALK TO THE GOVERNMENT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THERE IS STILL TOO WIDE A GAP BETWEEN WHAT THE BLACKS SEE AS GOVERNMENT PROMISES OF REFORM AND ACTUAL CHANGES IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TERMS. SOMETIMES THE AUTHORITIES ARE PAINFULLY SLOW TO PUT PROMISES INTO EFFECT, AT OTHER TIMES TRADITIONAL-MINDED CIVIL SERVANTS FRUSTRATE MINISTERIAL GOOD INTENTIONS FROM BEING APPLIED MORE LIBERALLY IN PRACTICE. FOR BLACKS THE RESULT IS THE SAME.

2. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT, ASSUMING TOMORROW'S BY-ELECTIONS GO REASONABLY WELL FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S POINT OF VIEW, WE ARE UNLIKELY TO SEE MUCH FURTHER MOVEMENT ON REFORM OR DIALOGUE IN THE WEEKS UP TO THE END OF THE YEAR OR INDEED UNTIL PARLIAMENT RESUMES FOR ITS NEXT SESSION IN LATE JANUARY. EVEN THEN IT MAY BE UNREALISTIC TO SUPPOSE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL EMBARK ON COMPLETELY NEW MEASURES. THE PATTERN IS MORE LIKELY TO BE ONE IN WHICH LEGISLATION IS TABLED TO GIVE EFFECT TO PROMISES OR HALF PROMISES ALREADY GIVEN BY THE GOVERNMENT. THIS WOULD INCLUDE MATTERS LIKE FREEHOLD FOR BLACKS, RESTORATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENSHIP TO CITIZENS OF 'INDEPENDENT' HOMELANDS, AND ABOVE ALL REFORM OF INFLUX CONTROL AND URBANISATION. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT MOVE BY THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE TO ABOLISH THE PASS LAWS THOUGH WE HAVE YET TO SEE HOW FAR THEY WILL GO ON THIS.

3. IF THIS SCENARIO IS RIGHT, IT HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR ANY COMMONWEALTH MISSION. GIVEN THE EXISTING GAP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND BLACKS I DOUBT IF A COMMONWEALTH GROUP WILL GET FAR IN BRINGING THEM TOGETHER WITHIN THE NEXT TWO TO THREE MONTHS. THEY MIGHT HAVE MORE SUCCESS, IF ALL GOES WELL, TOWARDS THE LATTER PART OF THE SIX MONTH PERIOD ENVISAGED IN THE COMMONWEALTH ACCORD.

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4. AS SEEN FROM HERE THIS SUGGESTS THAT ANY EARLY VISIT BY A COMMONWEALTH GROUP SHOULD PERHAPS BE SEEN PRIMARILY AS A RECONNAISSANCE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRINCIPAL ORGANISATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED. A SUBSEQUENT VISIT OR VISITS IN THE FIRST MONTHS OF 1986 MIGHT HAVE MORE TO BUILD ON IN RESPECT OF SPECIFIC REFORMS ENACTED OR IN THE PIPELINE, AND THUS BE BETTER PLACED TO MAKE PROGRESS OVER DIALOGUE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND BLACKS.
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COMMONWEALTH MISSION ON SOUTH AFRICA

1. IN A SPEECH ON THE EVE OF THE 30 SEPTEMBER BY-ELECTIONS THE STATE PRESIDENT TOUCHED ON THE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE.

2. MR BOTHA SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA DID NOT NEED A COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE TO COME TO SOUTH AFRICA IN ORDER TO FACILITATE CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA. HE ASKED WHAT THE COMMONWEALTH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE WELLBEING OF SOUTH AFRICA. OF THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE 7 WERE ONE-PARTY STATES, 4 WERE DECTATORSHIPS AND ONE WAS A MONARCHY WITHOUT A CONSTITUTION. HE WISHED TO KNOW WHICH ONE OF THESE THE COMMONWEALTH PROPOSED OFFERING AS A MODEL FOR SOUTH AFRICA.

3. SOUTH AFRICA WOULD NOT BE DICTATED TO. HE DID NOT BELIEVE IN THE POLITICS OF BOYCOTT. SOUTH AFRICA TRADE WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAD PROVED THIS. DURING THE PAST 6 MONTHS THE VALUE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S EXPORTS TO THE REST OF THE CONTINENT HAD BEEN R900 MILLION MORE THAN THE FIGURE FOR THE PRVIOUS 6 MONTH PERIOD. THERE WERE TWO THINGS WHICH SOUTH AFRICA COULD NOT ACCEPT: PRESCRIPTIONS FROM OVERSEAS AND 'ANY SUGGESTION THAT ANYONE ESLE EXCEPT SOUTH AFRICA'S OWN PEOPLE SHOULD SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS'.

MOBERLY

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CHOGN: SOUTH AFRICA

1. I HAVE THIS EVENING RECEIVED A ONE SENTENCE LETTER FROM THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL ASKING ME TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

BEGIN QUOTE:

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

I AM ASKING SIR JOHN THOMSON TO PASS THIS MESSAGE TO YOU FROM NEW YORK OUT OF GENUINE DISTRESS AT WHAT I HEAR OF PRESS REPORTING IN LONDON ON THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP. THERE IS, OF COURSE, NO QUESTION OF ANY VETO BY ME OF SUGGESTIONS FROM THE GROUP OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WORKING WITH ME ON PUTTING THE GROUP TOGETHER. IT SEEMS THAT THERE MAY BE MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN THE PRESS REGARDING THE PROCESS INVOLVED IN ASSEMBLING THE TEAM. AS YOU WILL RECALL, WHAT WAS ENVISAGED IN NASSAU WAS A GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS WHO WOULD CARRY OUT THIS TASK NOT AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THEIR COUNTRIES OR GOVERNMENTS BUT ON BEHALF OF THE ENTIRE COMMONWEALTH. I HAD ACTUALLY TOLD PRIME MINISTER GANDHI, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT HE WOULD NEED TO LOOK BEYOND GOVERNMENT CIRCLES IN SUGGESTING A NAME FROM INDIA: AND I CONCLUDED FROM THE DISCUSSION IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MEETING ENDED THAT YOU YOURSELF WERE PROCEEDING ON THIS BASIS. I CAN CONFIRM THAT THIS IS THE APPROACH BEING FOLLOWED BY ALL THE OTHERS AS BEING CENTRAL TO THE CONCEPT OF THE GROUP. IN FACT, AS YOU KNOW, BOTH PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND PRIME MINISTER MUGABE ARE THINKING OF PERSONS FROM COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THEIR OWN, AND WE HAVE NOT SO FAR CANVASSED ANY NAME FROM PRIME MINISTER PINDLING. AFTER OUR EVENTUAL SUCCESS IN NASSAU, I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THE PROCESS OF ASSEMBLING THE GROUP CAN GO FORWARD SMOOTHLY. I AM SHORTENING MY OWN STAY IN NEW YORK TO RETURN TO LONDON TOMORROW, BUT I FELT I SHOULD TRY TO REACH YOU DIRECTLY WITHOUT DELAY WITH A VIEW TO AVOIDING ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

WITH DEEP RESPECT,
SONNY RAMPHAL

UNQUOTE ENDS.

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO NO.10.

THOMSON

YYYY

NFLNAN 1511

NNNN

SUBJECT
cc Master.



10 DOWNING STREET

29 October 1985

From the Private Secretary

Dear Len,

CHOGM: GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

The Prime Minister had a brief discussion this morning with the Foreign Secretary on whom we should nominate to the Commonwealth's Group of Eminent Persons on South Africa. The Prime Minister's continuing strong preference was that the Foreign Secretary himself should take it on. It was clear to her that several other members of the Group and Ramphal would not want it to succeed. We must put ourselves in a position where the blame for failure, if that was the outcome, was clearly attributed to them. We could only do so if we ourselves demonstrably tried to make a success of it. This would require the Foreign Secretary's authority and prestige. The Foreign Secretary explained the reasons why he hesitated, principally the extent to which the government would be exposed in the event of failure.

The Foreign Secretary reported that he had asked Lord Carrington whether he would accept nomination. But he had declined. A number of further names were canvassed in discussion but put aside for one reason or another. It was agreed however that the Foreign Secretary should approach Lord Barber and invite him to accept nomination. If he also declined the matter would need to be discussed again between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, with the Lord President and the Chief Whip, before a final decision was reached.

Yours sincerely
Charles Powell
Charles Powell

Len Appleyard Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

LP

010

Confederation of British Industry
Centre Point
103 New Oxford Street
London WC1A 1DU
Telephone 01-379 7400
Telex 21332

From
Sir James Cleminson MC DL
President

② CUP



Prime Minister
COP

29/10

28th October 1985

Dear Prime Minister,

MB

I have just returned to my office today and I do want to thank you very much indeed for your letter of 14th October about my speech in Cape Town.

However, the real reason for my writing is to express my personal admiration for the firm line which you were able to maintain so effectively during the Commonwealth Conference. It must have been extremely difficult and there will inevitably be some who believe that such a line only isolates us. All that I have seen in South Africa convinces me that you were totally right and deserve our congratulations on your great success in an extremely difficult situation.

I shall be having a word with Malcolm Rifkind in the near future.

In the meantime, best of luck.

Yours

James,

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, SW 1.

GRS 25

UNCLASSIFIED
FM CANBERRA
TO DESKBY 280930Z FCO
TELNO U/N
OF 280810Z OCTOBER 85

MY TELEGRAM 747

CHOGM: SOUTH AFRICA

MALCOLM FRASER'S APPOINTMENT TO BE THE AUSTRALIAN MEMBER OF THE
EMINENT PERSON'S COMMITTEE HAS JUST BEEN ANNOUNCED.

LEAHY

SOUTHERN AFRICA
STANDARD (PALACE)
SAFD
OADs
UND
NAD
ECDs
SOVIET D
MR JOHNSON
CABINET OFFICE

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS
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 MR O'NEILL
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 HD/CAFD
 HD/UND
 HD/NEWS DEPT
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

IMMEDIATE

15.11.84

200030Z OCT

GRS 290

0644

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA

TO DESKBY 280900Z FCO

TELNO 747

OF 280630Z OCTOBER 1985

CHOGM, SOUTH AFRICA: COMMITTEE OF EMINENT PERSONS.

1. THE MEDIA HERE ARE CARRYING REPORTS BASED ON ARTICLES IN THE BRITISH SUNDAY NEWSPAPERS THAT YOU ARE TO BE THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COMMITTEE OF EMINENT PERSONS. SOME REPORTS GO FURTHER AND SUGGEST THAT THE BRITISH INTENTION IS THAT YOU SHOULD BE THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE. THE RADIO VERSION ADDS FOR GOOD MEASURE THAT SONNY RAMPHAL HAS EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE IDEA AT CHOGM HAD BEEN TO APPOINT PEOPLE INDEPENDENT OF GOVERNMENT TO THE COMMITTEE.

2. AT THE END OF A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, MR HAWKE, THIS MORNING ON ANOTHER MATTER (HE TOOK SIR PETER GADSDEN TO DISCUSS THE AUSTRALIAN BICENTENARY) THERE WAS A BRIEF EXCHANGE BETWEEN MR HAWKE AND ME ABOUT THE PRESS REPORTS. HE SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS AWARE, THERE HAD BEEN NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF YOUR APPOINTMENT AND HE HAD CERTAINLY NOT HEARD ANYTHING TO THIS EFFECT MYSELF. THE PRESS REPORTS SHOULD THEREFORE, BE TREATED AS NO MORE THAN THAT AT THIS STAGE. MR HAWKE SAID HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR IT, SINCE HE BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE DISCUSSIONS IN NASSAU TO APPOINT SOMEONE CURRENTLY IN GOVERNMENT TO THE COMMITTEE. HE HASTENED TO ADD THAT HE MEANT NO REFLECTION ON YOU PERSONALLY. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A TELEPHONE CALL FROM RAMPHAL YESTERDAY (27 OCTOBER) ON THE SAME MATTER.

Ramphal is
 lobby in



Ref: B8/6/1

South African Embassy

LONDON

28th October 1985

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to
the Prime Minister
No. 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

*Detached for
submit to
PT
Cox w/x.*

Dear Charles,

LETTER FROM THE STATE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA TO THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER, MP

It would be appreciated if the enclosed letter from
President P.W. Botha could be delivered to the Prime
Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher.

*Yours sincerely
L.H. Evans*

L.H. Evans
MINISTER

Encl.

FILE
SECRET

DA



2

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 October 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

I enclose a draft of a message which the Prime Minister has in mind to send President Botha. It will need some amendment to take account of the inward message from him which we received this evening.

The Prime Minister would welcome any comments and advice which the Foreign Secretary might have, if possible in time to enable a message to be despatched on 30 October.

The Prime Minister would not want the contents of the proposed message to be seen too widely. I would hope you could keep knowledge of it to the Private Office and one official.

(Charles Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA

Now that I am back in London I should like to give you a fuller account of the discussion of South Africa at the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in the Bahamas and to put some ideas to you on the way forward. I should be grateful if you would treat this letter very much as personal to you.

The Commonwealth meeting opened with 45 countries seeking extensive trade and economic sanctions against South Africa. In some cases this amounted to lip-service only and the interests of countries like Swaziland would be severely damaged by sanctions if they were applied. But the plain fact of the matter is that nobody else in the course of the meeting was prepared to speak out against them. It was left to me.

My rebuttal of the case for sanctions rested on two main premises: that sanctions do not work, indeed are likely to be counter-productive and damaging to those they are intended to help; and that it was inappropriate to take punitive action against South Africa at the very moment when you are taking steps to get rid of the most objectionable elements of apartheid. I received a good deal of abuse in response, being accused of preferring British jobs to Black African lives, of being concerned with pennies rather than principles, of lack of concern for human rights and much more in the same vein. I in turn reminded them of some of the less satisfactory features of their own societies and pointed to the inconsistency of trading with the Soviet Union, with its appalling human rights record and putting trade sanctions on South Africa. In short the debate was a highly unpleasant and bitter one; and there is no doubt that the issue of sanctions will not go away, despite my success in prevent Commonwealth from adopting them at this meeting.

My other main purpose was to secure Commonwealth backing for dialogue between the South African Government and

representatives of the black community in the context of a suspension of violence by all sides. The concept of course comes from your own letter to me: and I hope you will agree that it is no small achievement to have persuaded the Commonwealth to put its name to a suspension of violence, though the Black African governments and indeed others will not wish to see substance given to this commitment if they can avoid it.

Looking now to the future, one has to draw the two strands together. The case for sanctions will undoubtedly continue to be pressed, at the United Nations and when the Commonwealth considers progress in six months time. I am resolved to continue to resist that pressure, and I was encouraged to find President Reagan similarly determined when we discussed the matter in New York last week. But I need your help in this task and I need it in three ways:

- i) obviously you cannot and will not allow outsiders to dictate the pace and the scope of change within South Africa. But you would in my view be foolish not to receive the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons, explain patiently to them what your Government has done and is intending to do, and allow them to make contacts among the various communities. I can well imagine that you will find this tiresome to say the least. While we shall do our best to exercise a restraining influence on the activities of the Group - and I am intending to nominate Sir Geoffrey Howe to it to inject some realism - I am under no illusion that much of what it will say and do will be distasteful to you. But I am convinced that it will be infinitely more damaging to South Africa's standing and to the hopes of securing a wider understanding for what you are trying to do, were you to refuse to see the Group or limit its activities unreasonably.

- ii) your letter of October to me set out in

considerable detail what you have done and what you are proposing to do both in terms of removing discriminatory legislation and practices and of developing a political role for black people. It seems to me that you will need to have an eye to the international repercussions in the timing and presentation of your decisions. What was eventually said in your speech in August bore no relation to the expectations which had been created nor indeed to the reality of the decisions which you were then considering. I should like to see you present the sort of proposals you mentioned to me as a major initiative by the South African Government, at whatever you judge the appropriate moment. The initiative would not be taken in response to international pressures: it would be the result of what you and your government considered appropriate in terms of your country's needs and interests. But the international impact would be very much greater if you were to do it in the way I suggest.

- iii) finally - and this is the most difficult, since it involves an outsider presuming to trespass on your affairs - I do very strongly believe that you should be aiming to take further concrete measures in the next month or so. I have noted the decision to lift the state of emergency in six districts: I do not know whether something more may be possible here. I continue to believe, as I have said to you before, that the release of Nelson Mandela would have more impact than almost any single action you could undertake. A specific initiative to launch a political dialogue before the Commonwealth Group gets far into its work would also be a skilful move and one in line with the intentions which you expressed to me.

I have spoken frankly on these points because I want to be able to go on helping you end the violence and bring about

peaceful and fundamental change. But there are many others who do not share these goals. I shall continue to resist sanctions because I believe they are wrong and because it is in Britain's interest to do so. But if my efforts are to carry conviction more widely in the international community, then I need to be able to point to concrete results from them. It is up to you to decide what weight you attach to these efforts. I very much hope that you will conclude they are worthwhile and that you should help me in my task.

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

I attach a draft of the sort of letter which I think you might send President Botha. It is direct in its approach but I think that's necessary. Subject to any comments you have, I ought also to show it to the Foreign Secretary.

C.D.P.

Draft on F.C.S.
for review
M.P.

(CHARLES POWELL)

28 October 1985

P.S. Since drafting
the attached, a
further message from
President Botha has
come in. You will

SECRET

find it behind this
draft. It deserves
attention & you will

want to refer
to it in your
own message.

C.D.P. 27/11

DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA

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- ii) your letter of October to me set out in

considerable detail what you have done and what you are proposing to do both in terms of removing discriminatory legislation and practices and of developing a political role for black people. ~~IF I~~ ^{It seems to} ~~may give you some frank advice as a friend,~~ ^{me that -} you need to have an eye to the international repercussions in the timing and presentation of your decisions. What was eventually said in your speech in August bore no relation to the expectations which had been created nor indeed to the reality of the decisions which you were then considering. I should like to see you present the sort of proposals you mentioned to me as a major initiative by the South African Government, at whatever you judge the appropriate moment. The initiative would not be taken in response to international pressures: it would be the result of what you and your government considered appropriate in terms of your country's needs and interests. But the international impact would be very much greater if you were to do it in the way I suggest.

- iii) finally - and this is the most difficult, since it involves an outsider presuming to trespass on your affairs - I do very strongly believe that you should be aiming to take further concrete measures in the next month or so. I have noted the decision to lift the state of emergency in six districts: I do not know whether something more may be possible here. I continue to believe, as I have said to you before, that the release of Nelson Mandela would have more impact than almost any single action you could undertake. A specific initiative to launch a political dialogue before the Commonwealth Group gets far into its work would also be a skilful move and one in line with the intentions which you expressed to me.

I have spoken frankly on these points because I want to be able to go on helping you end the violence and bring about

E. R.

peaceful and fundamental change. But there are many others who do not share these goals. I shall continue to resist sanctions because I believe they are wrong and because it is in Britain's interest to do so. But if my efforts are to carry conviction more widely in the international community, then I need to be able to point to concrete results from them. It is up to you to decide what weight you attach to these efforts. I very much hope that you will conclude they are worthwhile and that you should help me in my task.

~~I should be happy to send someone to discuss these matters further with you, if you think it useful.~~



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 October 1985

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Botha which was delivered to me by the South African Embassy this afternoon. By their standards, it is not unhelpful.

However, in a separate conversation with me the South African Ambassador said that the failure of the Commonwealth as such to communicate with his Government about the results of Nassau had caused offence; that he hoped that the Commonwealth would not move with unnecessary speed to put together the group of eminent persons and make requests to South Africa; that there was no way in which South Africa would respond positively to the Commonwealth Accord; and that his own assessment was that the South African Government were on the verge of opting for political isolation.

I said that his reactions were too dramatic. The Commonwealth would not as yet have much to communicate. The group of eminent persons had first to be selected and then to meet to discuss its task and how to carry it out. Until then there was little for the Commonwealth to say. My own guess was that this process might take three to four weeks. While we did not expect South Africa to welcome the proposed group with open arms we hoped that they would continue to show reasonable restraint in their reactions. The Prime Minister would be sending President Botha a further message in a few days' time and it would be better to wait for that before taking up a position.

The Prime Minister is indeed proposing to send a further message to President Botha. I have a fairly clear idea of what she wishes to say and will let you see a draft shortly.

(Charles Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT cc Master
ops.



South African Embassy

LONDON

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 201/85

28th October 1985

(Original letter dated 22/10/85)

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for the message which you sent to me from Nassau and which I received on 21 October 1985.

At the outset let me say that I understand the difficult position in which you were placed during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau and appreciate the particular efforts which you made to ameliorate the decisions which were taken there. I am fully aware of the emotional atmosphere which dominated the discussions on South Africa.

Nevertheless I trust that you will also understand the position of the South African Government. The discussions on South Africa amounted to blatant interference in our national affairs. I must point out that outsiders cannot resolve our problems for us. It is South Africans themselves who will have to find the solutions. I wish to re-iterate that we need to be left in peace so that we can all meet across the table, develop trust and confidence in each other and resolve our problems in our own way.

It is clear to me that our neighbours in Southern Africa who subscribe to the measures decided upon in Nassau will damage their economies much more severely than ours. It must be obvious that one of the very first results of punitive economic measures or sanctions against South Africa, will be a curb on the influx of foreign workers from neighbouring states who seek to escape the hardships of the economic retrogression in their own countries by finding employment in South Africa. I wish however, to make it very clear that such a situation would not be of our making and that we should not be blamed if we are forced to curtail our economic co-operation with and assistance to our neighbours.

Regarding the proposed visit by a group "eminent Commonwealth persons", I must state that it is difficult for me to reconcile the declared purpose of encouraging the process of political dialogue in South Africa with the content of the condemnatory statement issued in Nassau and the punitive measures decided upon. Furthermore, I cannot embark on negotiations with my own citizens on matters which are our national concern, under external threat and subject to the demands which the Commonwealth Heads of Government have written into their package of measures on South Africa. A headline on the front page of a local evening paper of October 21 states "six months or else, SA told". Quite frankly if my Government were to yield to this sort of pressure, it would be the clearest possible signal to others to join in the hunt. I cannot possibly place myself and my Government in that untenable position and I say this to you knowing full well that you stood virtually alone in resisting pressure for extensive punitive action against South Africa and that you rely on this initiative to keep further sanctions at bay. There is undoubtedly much at stake for you but there is more at stake for South Africans of all communities and political beliefs and I do not therefore adopt this position lightly.

You will recall that the South African Government indicated at the time of the visit of the three EEC Foreign Ministers that they were welcome to visit South Africa as long as they did not claim any right to interfere in South Africa's internal affairs. The South African Government also expressed the hope that their discussions would proceed in a manner which was consistent with the normal conduct of affairs between nations. I personally and members of my Government spoke to the EEC Ministers at length but I regret that on their return to Europe a decision was taken to proceed with punitive measures and sanctions against South Africa.

It is furthermore not clear to me what is meant by "suspension of violence on all sides" in the Nassau statement. If it is intended to mean that the South African Government is perpetrating violence in the current unrest in South Africa, then I must tell you quite frankly that a mission of this nature cannot play a positive role. It will merely exacerbate an already delicate situation.

I feel convinced that you will appreciate my Government's attitude on this point because Great Britain has a similar problem in combatting terrorism.

On the other hand, I would be prepared to entertain the possibility of emissaries of individual Governemnts visiting South Africa for discussions with representatives of the South African Governemnt as well as representatives of the various communities, the private sector and other interested bodies.

Yours sincerely,

P.W. BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
No. 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

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Buy

RESTRICTED

b. c. P. C. JDS ADL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 October, 1985.

SOUTH AFRICA

It has been suggested to the Prime Minister that she ought to see Enos Mabuza, the Chief Minister of Kangwane. The meeting would be part of the process by which she is getting to know representatives of quite a wide spectrum of political views on South Africa. Mabuza would be ready to come to London for the meeting. I don't know whether or not he would qualify as a Category I visitor.

11 Is there any objection to such a meeting?

C.D. Powell

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

JB

CF file

SKW (46)



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 October 1985

Dear Peter,

SOUTH AFRICA: STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE

I should be grateful for additional material on two points:

- (i) Mr. Tambo's statements at the end of last week in which he committed the ANC to continuing to practise violence in South Africa. It would be helpful to have verbatim quotes where possible.
- (ii) A fuller explanation of the precise steps which the DTI now believe are necessary to end the import of Krugerrands from South Africa.

Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SKW



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 October 1985

CHOGM: GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

The Prime Minister has considered the Foreign Secretary's minute of 27 October. She remains convinced that the Foreign Secretary should be our nominee for the group. She believes that otherwise the conclusion will be drawn that we are not trying and that the whole exercise will in consequence fail. Having said that, the Prime Minister sees no objection to the Foreign Secretary trying to persuade Lord Carrington to allow himself to be nominated. But she is in no doubt he will not be able to accept.

The Prime Minister has commented that we should keep up pressure on Mr. Mulroney to nominate Joe Clark in the event that Trudeau declines the invitation.

The Prime Minister does not consider that either Lord Barber or Sir Anthony Parsons would be suitable. She has of course told the Foreign Secretary this in Nassau.

The Prime Minister thinks that we must move very fast to settle this matter. I should be grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible the result of the Foreign Secretary's sounding of Lord Carrington.

(C. D. POWELL)

JB

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

7

SOUTH AFRICA : THE COMMONWEALTH ACCORD.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED HERE THIS EVENING FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS AMONG HEADS OF GOVERNMENT THROUGHOUT THE WEEKEND AT THE RETREAT BEGINS

1. WE CONSIDER THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S CONTINUEING REFUSAL TO DISMANTLE APARTHEID, ITS ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA, AND ITS AGGRESSION AGAINST ITS NEIGHBOURS CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE LAUES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMONWEALTH, A CHALLENGE WHICH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES CANNOT IGNORE. AT NEW DELHI WE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT QUOTE ONLY THE ERADICATION OF APARTHEID AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MAJORITY RULE ON THE BASIS OF FREE AND FAIR EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL ADULT SUFFRAGE BY ALL THE PEOPLE IN A UNITED AND NON-FRAGMENTED SOUTH AFRICA CAN LEAD TO A JUST AND LASTING SOLUTION OF THE EXPLOSIVE SITUATION PREVAILING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. UNQUOTE WE ARE UNITED IN THE BELIEF THAT RELIANCE ON THE RANGE OF PRESSURES ADOPTED SO FAR HAS NOT RESULTED IN THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES WE HAVE SOUGHT OVER MANY YEARS. THE GROWING CRISIS AND INTENSIFIED REPRESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA MEAN THAT APARTHEID MUST BE DISMANTLED NOW IF A GREATER TRAGEDY IS TO BE AVERTED AND THAT CONCERTED PRESSURE MUST BE BROUGHT TO BEAR TO ACHIEVE THAT END. WE CONSIDER THAT THE SITUATION CALLS FOR URGENT PRACTICAL STEPS.

2. WE, THEREFORE, CALL ON THE AUTHORITIES IN PRETORIA FOR THE FOLLOWING STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN A GENUINE MANNER AND AS A MATTER OF URGENCY:

/A.

- A. DECLARE THAT THE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID WILL BE DISMANTLED AND SPECIFIC AND MEANINGFUL ACTION TAKEN IN FULFILMENT OF THAT INTENT.
- B. TERMINATE THE EXISTING STATE OF EMERGENCY.
- C. RELEASE IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY NELSON MANDELA AND ALL OTHERS IMPRISONED AND DETAINED FOR THEIR OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID.
- D. ESTABLISH POLITICAL FREEDOM AND SPECIFICALLY LIFT THE EXISTING BAN ON THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES.
- E. INITIATE, IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES, A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE ACCROSS LINES OF COLOUR, POLITICS AND RELIGION, WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING A NON-RACIAL AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.

3. WE HAVE AGREED ON A NUMBER OF MEASURES WHICH HAVE AS THEIR RATIONALE IMPRESSING ON THE AUTHORITIES IN PRETORIA THE COMPELLING URGENCY OF DISMANTLING APARTHEID AND ERECTING THE STRUCTURES OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE LATTER, IN PARTICULAR, DEMANDS A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE INVOLVING THE TRUE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MAJORITY BLACK POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA. WE BELIEVE THAT WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO ASSIST THAT PROCESS, WHILE RECOGNISING THAT THE FORMS OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA ARE FOR THE PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY - ALL THE PEOPLE - TO DETERMINE.

4. TO THIS END, WE HAVE DECIDED TO ESTABLISH A SMALL GROUP OF EMINENT COMMONWEALTH PERSONS TO ENCOURAGE THROUGH ALL PRACTICABLE WAYS THE EVOLUTION OF THAT NECESSARY PROCESS OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE. WE ARE NOT UNMINDFUL OF THE DIFFICULTIES SUCH AN EFFORT WILL ENCOUNTER, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF INITIAL REJECTION BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES, BUT, WE BELIEVE IT TO BE OUR DUTY TO LEAVE NOTHING UNDONE THAT MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND AVOID THE DREADFUL PROSPECT OF VIOLENT CONFLICT THAT LOOMS OVER SOUTH AFRICA, THREATENING PEOPLE OF ALL RACES IN THE COUNTRY, AND THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE ENTIRE SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION.

5. WE ARE ASKING THE PRESIDENT OF ZAMBIA AND THE PRIME MINISTERS OF AUSTRALIA, BAHAMAS, CANADA, INDIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ZIMBABWE TO DEVELOP WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THE MODALITIES OF THIS EFFORT TO ASSIST THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE WOULD LOOK TO THE GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS TO SEEK TO FACILITATE THE PROCESSES OF DIALOGUE REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2(E) ABOVE AND BY ALL PRACTICABLE MEANS TO ADVANCE THE FULFILMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS ACCORD.

6. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE AS AN EARNEST OF OUR OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID REACHED ACCORD ON A PROGRAMME OF COMMON ACTION AS FOLLOWS:

- I) WE DECLARE THE COMMONWEALTH'S SUPPORT FOR THE STRICTEST ENFORCEMENT OF THE MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 415 AND 558 AND COMMIT OURSELVES TO PROSECUTE VIOLATORS TO THE FULLEST EXTENT OF THE LAW: I
- II) WE REAFFIRM THE GLENAGLES DECLARATION OF 1977, WHICH CALLED UPON COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS TO TAKE EVERY PRACTICAL STEP TO DISCOURAGE SPORTING CONTACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA:
- III) WE AGREE UPON, AND COMMEND TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOLLOWING FURTHER ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN ADOPTED BY A NUMBER OF MEMBER COUNTRIES:
 - (A) A BAN ON ALL NEW GOVERNMENT LOANS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS AGENCIES:
 - (B) A READINESS TO TAKE UNILATERALLY WHAT ACTION MAY BE POSSIBLE TO PRECLUDE THE IMPORT OF KRUGERFRANCS:
 - (C) NO GOVERNMENT FUNDING FOR TRADE MISSIONS TO SOUTH AFRICA OR FOR PARTICIPATION IN EXHIBITIONS AND TRADE FAIRS IN SOUTH AFRICA:
 - (D) A BAN ON THE SALE AND EXPORT OF COMPUTER EQUIPMENT CAPABLE OF USE BY SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY FORCES, POLICE OR SECURITY FORCES:
 - (E) A BAN ON NEW CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE AND EXPORT OF NUCLEAR GOODS, MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGY TO SOUTH AFRICA:
 - (F) A BAN ON THE SALE AND EXPORT OF OIL TO SOUTH AFRICA:
 - (G) A STRICT AND RIGOROUSLY CONTROLLED EMBARGO ON IMPORTS OF ARMS, AMMUNITION, MILITARY VEHICLES AND PARA-MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM SOUTH AFRICA:
 - (H) AN EMBARGO ON ALL MILITARY CO-OPERATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA: AND
 - (I) DISCOURAGEMENT OF ALL CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVENTS EXCEPT WHERE THESE CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS THE ENDING OF APARTHEID OR HAVE NO POSSIBLE ROLE IN PROMOTING IT.

7. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE PROCESS AND MEASURES WE HAVE AGREED UPON WILL HELP TO BRING ABOUT CONCRETE PROGRESS TOWARDS THE OBJECTIVES STATED ABOVE IN SIX MONTHS. THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE, OR THEIR REPRESENT-

7

ATIVES, WILL THEN MEET TO REVIEW THE SITUATION. IF IN THEIR OPINION ADEQUATE PROGRESS HAS NOT BEEN MADE WITHIN THIS PERIOD, WE AGREE TO CONSIDER THE ADOPTION OF FURTHER MEASURES. SOME OF US WOULD, IN THAT EVENT, CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING STEPS AMONG OTHERS:

- A. A BAN ON AIR LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA;
- B. A BAN ON NEW INVESTMENT OR REINVESTMENT OF PROFITS EARNED IN SOUTH AFRICA;
- C. A BAN ON THE IMPORT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA;
- D. THE TERMINATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA;
- E. THE TERMINATION OF ALL GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO INVESTMENT IN, AND TRADE WITH, SOUTH AFRICA;
- F. A BAN ON ALL GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA;
- G. A BAN ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS WITH MAJORITY OWNED SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANIES,
- H. A BAN ON THE PROMOTION OF TOURISM TO SOUTH AFRICA.

B. FINALLY, WE AGREE THAT SHOULD ALL OF THE ABOVE MEASURES FAIL TO PRODUCE THE DESIRED RESULTS WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD, FURTHER EFFECTIVE MEASURES WILL HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED. MANY OF US HAVE EITHER TAKEN OR ARE PREPARED TO TAKE MEASURES WHICH GO BEYOND THOSE LISTED ABOVE, AND EACH OF US WILL PURSUE THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS ACCORD IN ALL THE WAYS AND THROUGH ALL APPROPRIATE FORA OPEN TO US. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IN PURSUING THIS PROGRAMME JOINTLY, WE ENLARGE THE PROSPECTS OF AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION AS A WHOLE.

ENDS



Prime Minister

CHOGM: GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS (EPG)

1. We agreed that I would let you have some further ideas on the Group of Eminent Persons. I attach a short paper which sets out what I suggest should be our objectives, together with the main problems which the proposal presents. The paper gives some idea of the wide scope and nature of the work which will be involved; and I deal in this note with the choice of our own nominee.

Yes - I think we should

2. The first question which I think we need to answer is whether we should take the proposal seriously, in the sense that we hope that it will yield positive results, or whether we should simply regard it as a damage limitation exercise imposed on us as an inevitable consequence of the discussion at Nassau. *Nonna*

3. I believe we should approach the Group with the intention of trying to make it work. I very much agree with you that the outcome at Nassau demonstrates what can be achieved by a determined campaign against all the odds. The same may turn out to be true of the EPG. The initiative could act as a catalyst in helping the South African Government to overcome some of the very real difficulties it faces in negotiating with representative black leaders. Contact with the South African Government may in its turn help to induce a greater sense of realism among some members of the Group. You will recall that when the EC Troika went to South Africa they returned impressed by the complexity of the situation. If on the other hand the Group fails, then this would certainly increase the pressure for economic sanctions.

4. Paragraph 4 of the paper sets out our suggested objectives. These indicate how important it is that our own nominee should be capable of putting our arguments across forcefully or, if he

/finds



finds himself in a minority, dissociating himself firmly from the views of the others. I know that you think both these considerations suggest that I myself should be our representative.

5. While I understand the reasons behind this conclusion, I am sure we need to give further thought to the very serious disadvantages of my participation. In the first place, it is clear from the list of likely nominees that most, if not all, of the others will be bent on a very different outcome from the one we seek. The British representative on the Group may well be faced at the end by a choice between two alternatives: either to accept the conclusions of the Group, which would involve damaging compromises, or to enter a minority report. Clearly there should be no question of doing the first. There is also a high risk that the South African Government would refuse to receive the Group at all. When I saw the South African Ambassador on 24 October he hinted strongly at this. If so, this would make your useful dialogue with Botha that much more difficult to sustain on its present basis. There is also the point that if I were to take part myself we would be committing the Government directly in a way which would not be the case with any other non-Ministerial candidate. I can foresee a situation in which we would want to distance ourselves from the report from the very outset in order to retain the option of dissociating ourselves if the outcome is unacceptable to us. (All this is aside from the question of whether CHOGM thought in terms of a serving Minister being appointed to the Group).

6. These are reasons of substance. From a more personal standpoint I am concerned that the Group seems likely to consist mainly of former Heads of Government, no longer in office but with much time on their hands. Their instinct will be to manufacture a role for themselves by having the Group visit as many countries as possible in Africa and elsewhere. I could

/of course

That's why we must go.

to what?

No - For for for India



of course do my best to limit the ambitions of the other members. But I do not see how I could spare the time for even a restricted programme of visits on the scale which the rest of the Group would be prepared, indeed eager, to accept. South Africa is a very important issue for us, but we have other equally important issues over the next six months which must take up a great deal of the time of a British Foreign Secretary.

7. For these reasons we have been through a long list of other possible candidates. I am afraid that Brian Urquhart is a non-starter. He will be in harness at the UN until the end of this year and is then due to make a tour of the UN's peacekeeping operations with his successor. The list which we have looked at includes a range of senior or retired politicians (Lord Jellicoe, Lord Thorneycroft, Lord Soames, Lord Thomson of Monifieth, Lord Home and Francis Pym), some senior generals (Field-Marshal Bramall and Carver) and various ex-government servants (for example Lords Greenhill and Hunt).

8. By far the most impressive, for obvious reasons, is Peter Carrington. He, more than anyone else I can think of, would offer us the best chance of securing a constructive outcome. I know that he will not find it easy to make himself available, but I think that we should make a determined effort to recruit him.

9. A second possibility, not in the Carrington class but still very well-qualified and steady (as we know from the Franks Committee) is Tony Barber. I do not feel that his business experience of South Africa should be seen as disqualifying him. On the contrary, indeed; though it could make it difficult to persuade him to serve.

10. If neither of these can be made available, then I would suggest that we look again at Anthony Parsons. Though obviously not of

/the same



the same degree of eminence as the other two, he would certainly have the necessary diplomatic skills and tenacity to make him extremely effective - and the viewpoint which we would like to see put over.

11. Quite apart from this question of membership, I believe we need to move very quickly on influencing the terms of reference of the Group. I would like our officials to make early contact with the Commonwealth Secretariat, and I would be prepared to see Ramphal myself this week if necessary.

12. I should very much welcome a discussion on these points as soon as convenient for you.

27 October 1985

(Geoffrey Howe)



POSITION PAPER ON THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

Background

1. The Commonwealth Accord decided to establish "a small group of eminent Commonwealth persons" in order "to encourage, through all practicable ways," the evolution of the process of political dialogue in South Africa. The Group would "seek to facilitate the processes of dialogue referred to in paragraph 2(E) (of the Accord) and by all practicable means to advance fulfillment of the objectives of this Accord". Paragraph 3 of the Accord describes the process of dialogue as involving "the true representatives of the majority black population of South Africa" and paragraph 2 (E) states that it should be initiated "in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides" and "with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government". The President of Zambia and the Prime Ministers of Australia, Bahamas, Canada, India, the UK and Zimbabwe were asked to develop the modalities of the effort together with the Commonwealth Secretary-General.

2. Mr Powell's letter of 22 October records what was decided at CHOGM about the Group. It was agreed that the Governments concerned should let the Commonwealth Secretary-General have their nominees for the Group by the end of next week. The Group would then meet in London within a month. It was proposed that the chairman should be Nyerere. Other names mentioned as possible members were Obasanjo of Nigeria, Fraser or Whitlam from Australia and Singh from India. The Canadians were likely to propose either Stansfield or Trudeau. The Prime Minister mentioned Urquhart.

3. There are no further details of what the Group might do. But a note on the original Australian proposal for such a group is attached.

British Objectives

4. We see British objectives as the following:

- (i) to use this Commonwealth initiative to focus



international efforts on trying to promote dialogue within South Africa rather than on punitive measures

(ii) to ensure that the outcome of the initiative is not such as to increase the pressure on the UK to adopt additional sanctions and to keep the Group from recommending these

(iii) to have the Group set itself modest and sustainable terms of reference which increase the likelihood of securing the co-operation of the SAG and avoid a rebuff by them

(iv) to avoid the group making recommendations about the future constitutional structure of South Africa. (We need to steer away from the categorical reference in the Commonwealth Accord (extracted from the New Delhi communiqué) to "the establishment of majority rule on the basis of full and fair exercise of universal adult suffrage by all the people in a united and non-fragmented South Africa". This is close to saying one man, one vote in a unitary state and as such totally unacceptable to the SAG)

(v) to keep the group from promoting the interests of the ANC at the expense of other representative groups of black opinion in South Africa.

Points for Decision and suggested British position

5. (i) Membership

Each of the seven Commonwealth countries are expected to nominate one member. We should aim to transmit the name of a British nominee to Ramphal by 1 November.

(ii) Terms of Reference

More detailed terms of reference will need to be worked out for the group. These can either be agreed by the seven Governments in advance or left to the group itself to work out on the basis of what is in the Commonwealth Accord. In practice it is likely that the Commonwealth Secretariat will play a central role in their drafting. The Foreign Secretary

[Friday]



recommends that he should speak soon to Ramphal to suggest terms of reference on the lines indicated below. We should aim to have acceptable terms of reference agreed by governments before the Group begins to work. We would want to avoid any suggestion in the terms of reference that the Group would become involved in drawing up blueprints for a political solution in South Africa; in laying down firm pre-conditions for dialogue there; or in making recommendations for additional measures to bring pressure on the SAG.

Instead the terms of reference might be on the following lines.

- To identify representatives of all the different groups and shades of opinion in South Africa whose views need to be taken account in any process of political dialogue in South Africa. This would include not only those who would take part in any such dialogue, in particular the SAG and acknowledged representatives of the black population, but also those (eg Church leaders, businessmen, trade unionists, press etc) whose views are relevant to such a dialogue.
- To make contact with these representatives, to clarify their attitudes towards beginning political dialogue and to seek their views on ways of promoting it.
- To examine ways of bridging the gap between the various positions so as to enable political dialogue to begin.
- To seek to identify possible confidence building measures on both sides which would promote such convergence and which might form a package leading to the beginning of negotiations. (It would not be possible to say in advance what such a package might contain but the sort of elements which would obviously need to be considered are those mentioned in paragraph 2 of the Commonwealth Accord including most importantly a suspension of violence on all sides. The



Group might also look into the possibility of promoting exploratory meetings between those concerned with a minimum of pre-conditions.)

(iii) Who would the Group plan to see?

There would seem every advantage in encouraging the Group to seek the views of as wide a spectrum of opinion as possible. We should press them to adopt the very good list produced by the Ten's Embassies in South Africa for the EC Troika (COREU tel CPE/HAG 322 attached). The Group will undoubtedly insist also on contacts with the ANC. We should not resist this. One other group of opinion with which the EC Troika did not meet, but which should be included, are the leaders from the independent homelands which we, but not the SAG, regard as part of South Africa. We may find difficulties in persuading other members of the Group to agree to this. A further point of difficulty is that the Group is bound to want to see Mandela if it goes to South Africa. The SAG refused to let the EC Troika see him. But several members of the Group may be reluctant to go to South Africa unless they do see him.

(iv) How would they make contact?

There is likely to be a presumption that the Group will ask to visit South Africa as the EC Troika did. The credibility of the Group depends on their having contact with the widest possible range of opinion and especially with the SAG. It is not clear whether the SAG will agree. The composition of the Group and any statements which its members may make are likely to influence this. If the SAG refuses to allow the Group to visit South Africa, it will have to invite representatives of South African opinion to come and speak to it somewhere else. It would then have to seek through other means the views of those, eg the SAG, who declined to come. The UK could offer to clarify the position of the SAG through diplomatic channels and relay this to the Group. However, we should normally press for the Group to meet people as a Group.



(v) Duration and scope of travel?

The Group will need to do a much more thorough job than the EC Troika. This means (if permitted) a more extended visit to South Africa, one which would take in Pretoria, Capetown, Durban, and possible other parts of the country. They would probably also wish to visit Lusaka (to see the ANC) and possibly Dar es Salaam (to meet the PAC) and other front line state capitals. We should encourage them to use London as their working base. We should also offer the use of the British Embassy in Pretoria and of subordinate posts in Capetown, Durban, etc for any visit to South Africa.

(vi) Secretariat

The Commonwealth Secretariat will expect to provide the necessary secretariat assistance and is technically capable of doing so. Indeed Ramphal is bound to involve himself closely. The members of the Group may also need assistants to act in the role of private secretaries. We should insert a British official to act in this capacity for the British member of the Group. We should also look into the possibility of the Commonwealth Secretariat team including a British member.

(vii) Finance

The cost of the whole exercise will presumably be met from Commonwealth funds. This means that Britain will pay 30% of whatever it costs.

(viii) Namibia

We should be careful to exclude the question of Namibia from this exercise. To try to include it would lead the Group away from the central question of promoting dialogue within South Africa and would increase the potential difficulties with the SAG.

AUSTRALIA'S PROPOSAL FOR A GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS (as circulated
before CHOGM)

A stated Australian objective at CHOGM will be to seek endorsement of their initiative of 19 August proposing the establishment of an International Group to advance proposals for peaceful change in South Africa. They argue that the Commonwealth's shared constitutional and legal heritage, and its notable role in the transition of Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, place it in a strong position to "stimulate a peaceful transition to a democratic, humane society, ensuring that the process develops in a way in which secures for the West the respect and trust of black South Africans", carrying along "the white community whose involvement will be necessary for the emergence and development of a new South Africa".

The Group's report would go beyond broad formulations and propose a means for developing an agreed constitutional structure for South Africa and the steps needed to advance towards that end.

The Group would draw on the views of black South Africans - UDF, ANC and others such as Bishop Tutu. The acceptance of the Group by black leaders in South Africa and the FLS would be a critical element. It would also be necessary for the Group to have access to the views of representatives of the South African Government and of the white community.

The participants should be "eminent figures" of international renown, including an Australian. The various regions of the Commonwealth should be represented, but membership would not necessarily be restricted to the Commonwealth.

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FM LA HAYE COREU
TO LUXEMBOURG COREU. -IMMEDIAT DESKBY 13.00 Z
INFO ALL COREU -PRIORITE-
CPE/HAG 322
20 - 08 - 1985 12.00 HRS. L.T.

052 001/8

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DISTRIBUTION LIMITEE

OBJET: EPC-TROIKA VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA

REF. CPE/LUX/238

THE NETHERLANDS TRANSMIT HERewith THE PROPOSITIONS FOR THE COMING EPC-TROIKA VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA THAT WERE PREPARED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TEN AT PRETORIA AND WITH WHICH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL HAVE ALSO AGREED.

Q U O

VISIT OF THE THREE TROIKA-MINISTERS AND MR. WILLY DE CLERC OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA IN THE PERIOD 29TH AUGUST - 1ST SEPTEMBER 1985

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSALS

THE DURATION OF THE VISIT WILL BE VERY SHORT, PROBABLY NOT MORE THAN 2 AND A HALF DAYS. THE MINISTERS AND MR. DE CLERC WILL MOST LIKELY WISH TO SEE A WIDE CROSS-SECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATION, I.E. PEOPLE FROM VARIOUS RACE GROUPS AND PROFESSIONS.

IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THEIR TIME WILL BE USED AS ECONOMICALLY AS POSSIBLE, IT SEEMS ESSENTIAL THAT THE MINISTERS AND MR. DE CLERC STAY ON THE SAME SPOT AND THAT THE PEOPLE THEY WANT TO TALK TO, COME TO THEM.

IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE MEETINGS TAKE PLACE IN THE NEW CHANCERY OF THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY IN PRETORIA (ARCADIastreet 825, ARCADIA, TELEPHONE-NUMBERS 437738, 437739 AND 437740).

ALTHOUGH THE NEW PREMISES WILL STILL BE SOMEWHAT SPARTAN, THEY WILL BE FULLY OPERATIONAL AND PROVIDE ADEQUATE FACILITIES FOR THE PURPOSES REQUIRED.

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FOR INFORMATION

FURTHERMORE, THIS NEW CHANCERY IS SURROUNDED BY A HIGH GATE, THUS PROVIDING THE POSSIBILITY TO KEEP UNDESIRABLE PERSONS AWAY. IF THE MEETINGS TAKE PLACE IN A HOTEL THIS MIGHT PRESENT PROBLEMS. THERE IS A LARGE CONFERENCE ROOM WHERE THE TALKS CAN TAKE PLACE AND WHERE, IF NEEDED, A PRESS CONFERENCE CAN BE HELD.

STATE PRESIDENT AND CABINET MINISTERS

AS THE VISIT IS TAKING PLACE AT THE REQUEST OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, NAMELY TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE MINISTERS AND MR. DE CLERQ PAY CALLS ON THE HEAD OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, STATE PRESIDENT P.W. BOTHA AS WELL AS ON THE FOLLOWING CABINET-MEMBERS:

- MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PIK BOTHA
AS HE IS THEIR COUNTERPART IN SOUTH AFRICA
- MINISTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING,
CHRIS HEUNIS, WHO IS THE ARCHITECT OF REFORM
- MINISTER OF (BLACK) EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT AID,
GERRIT VILJOEN,
AS THE MINISTER WHO MORE THAN OTHERS IS RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE WELFARE OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY.

THE STATE PRESIDENT AND THE MINISTERS WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE VISITED ONE BY ONE. THIS WILL TAKE AT LEAST HALF A DAY OUT OF THE AVAILABLE TIME.

OTHERS TO BE MET

IT SEEMS A SUITABLE IDEA THAT THE OTHER PEOPLE THAT THE MINISTERS WANT TO SEE ARE MET IN GROUPS.

THE LEADERS OF THE FOLLOWING GROUPS SEEM THE MOST IMPORTANT:

- EMPLOYERS ORGANISATIONS
- TRADE UNIONS
- CHURCHES
- THE OFFICIAL OPPOSITION
- THE UNOFFICIAL OPPOSITION
- THE PRESS
- LOCAL BLACK COMMUNITIES.

TO ENABLE THE DISCUSSION WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE GROUPS TO BE FRUITFUL IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THEIR NUMBER BE LIMITED.

THIS MEANS THAT EACH GROUP SHOULD NOT BE REPRESENTED BY MORE THAN 4 OR 5 PEOPLE.

EMPLOYERS ORGANISATIONS

THEY ARE APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THEY HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO BRING ABOUT CHANGE. DURING THE VISIT OF US-SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY THEY PRESENTED THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES WITH IMPORTANT PROPOSALS FOR REFORM.

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THE MAJOR EMPLOYERS ORGANISATIONS ARE:

- THE ASSOCIATED CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (ASSOCOM)
- THE AFRIKAANSE HANDELSINSTITUUT (AHI)
- THE FEDERATED CHAMBER OF INDUSTRIES (FCI)
- THE NATIONAL AFRICAN FEDERATION OF CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE (NAFCOC)
- THE CHAMBER OF MINES.

THESE ORGANISATIONS COULD BE REPRESENTED BY THEIR PRESIDENTS OR THEIR CHIEF EXECUTIVES. THIS CHOICE SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE ORGANISATIONS THEMSELVES.

TRADE UNIONS

THE MOST IMPORTANT FEDERATIONS OF TRADE UNIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA ARE FOSATU (FEDERATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS) AND CUSA (COUNCIL OF UNIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA). THEY ARE IMPORTANT EMERGING FEDERATIONS WITH A LARGE BLACK FOLLOWING. THEY SHOULD BE REPRESENTED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE SECRETARIES-GENERAL JOE FOSTER AND PIROSHAW CAMAY.

IF MR. FOSTER IS NOT AVAILABLE (HE LIVES IN CAPE TOWN) THE FOSATU PRESIDENT CHRIS DLAMINI SHOULD BE INVITED, WHO LIVES IN THE JOHANNESBURG AREA.

THE PRESENCE OF TUCSA, AT PRESENT STILL THE LARGEST FEDERATION DOES NOT SEEM NECESSARY AS IT IS QUICKLY LOOSING CREDIBILITY AMONG NON-WHITE WORKERS.

OTHER IMPORTANT TRADE UNION LEADERS TO BE MET ARE CYRIL RAMAPHOSA, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF MINE-WORKERS AND A.J. VAN DER WALT OF THE SABS (SOUTH AFRICAN BOILERMAKERS SOCIETY).

CHURCH

THE GROUP OF IMPORTANT CHURCH LEADERS IS A LARGE ONE. IT IS ACCORDINGLY NECESSARY TO MAKE A CHOICE, THE FOLLOWING PERSONS ARE SUGGESTED.

- ARCHBISHOP DENNIS HURLEY, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SA ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS' CONFERENCE
- ARCHBISHOP PHILIP RUSSELL, HEAD OF THE SA ANGLICAN CHURCH
- PROF. JOHAN HEYNS, MODERATOR OF THE NORTHERN TRANSVAAL SYNOD OF THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH (REPRESENTS MODERATE THINKING IN HIS CHURCH)
- DS BEYERS NAUDE, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE SA COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (HAS BROKEN AWAY FROM THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH).

THE OFFICIAL OPPOSITION

THIS GROUP WOULD CONSIST OF THE MOST IMPORTANT LEADERS OF THE PROGRESSIVE FEDERAL PARTY SUGGESTED ARE:

- DR FREDERIK VAN ZIJL SLABBERT, LEADER OF THE OFFICIAL OPPOSITION
- HELEN SUZMAN, SPOKESWOMAN LAW AND ORDER AND HUMAN RIGHT

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-COLIN

- COLIN EGLIN, SPOKESMAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE UNOFFICIAL OPPOSITION

THIS GROUP REPRESENTS SOME PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS IT IS VERY HETEROGENEOUS AND SOME OF ITS REPRESENTATIVES ARE NOT ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH EACH OTHER. THEREFORE IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO SUBDIVIDE THIS GROUP INTO THE FOLLOWING "SUBGROUPS"

- THE UDF TO BE REPRESENTED BY REV. BOESAK, ADVOCATE JACOB AND TREVOR MANUEL. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT PRACTICALLY ALL IMPORTANT SPOKESMEN OF THE UDF ARE PRESENTLY IN DETENTION.
- AZAPO. REPRESENTATIVES COULD BE:
ISHMAEL MKHABELA, PRESIDENT
GEORGE WAUCHOPE, VICE PRESIDENT
REVEREND JOE SEOKA, PROMINENT MEMBER
- THE SOWETO CIVIC ASSOCIATION TO BE REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENTS DR. NTHATO MOTLANA AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT JOHN SEBEDE.
- BISHOP DESMOND TUTU (HE COULD BE INVITED TOGETHER WITH DR. MOTLANA)
- GATSHA BUTHELEZI. AS CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU HE DOES NOT FULLY BELONG IN THIS CATEGORY. HE IS, HOWEVER, A LEADER OF AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE BLACK POPULATION. IF HE IS PREPARED TO COME TO PRETORIA, HE WILL PROBABLY INSIST, THAT HE IS RECEIVED WITH SOME OF HIS AIDES AND GIVEN A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF TIME.

THE PRESS

IT SEEMS WORTHWILE TO HAVE AN "OFF THE RECORD" DISCUSSION WITH A LIMITED NUMBERS OF PRESS REPRESENTATIVES AS THEY ARE IMPORTANT OPINION MAKERS.

SUGGESTED ARE:

- WILLEM DE KLERK- EDITOR OF RAPPORT
- HARVEY TYSON : EDITOR OF STAR
- PERCY QOBOZA : ASSISTANT-EDITOR OF CITY PRESS
- TON VOSLOO : EDITOR OF BEELD
- TERTIUS MYBURGH: EDITOR OF SUNDAY TIMES
- JOE LATAKGOMO : EDITOR OF THE SOWETAN

LEADERS OF BLACK COMMUNITIES

THESE PEOPLE HAVE AGREED TO WORK WITHIN THE STRUCTURES PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT. THEY COULD PROVE TO BE INTERESTING BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH THE UNREST IN THE BLACK TOWNSHIPS.

SUGGESTED ARE:

- STEVE KGAME, PRESIDENT OF UCASA (URBAN COUNCIL ASSOCIATION OF SA)
- SAN BUTI, MAYOR OF ALEXANDRA
- EDWARD KUNENE, MAYOR OF SOWETO
- ALEX KEHANA, FORMER MAYOR OF MAMELODI.

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FINAL

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FINAL REMARKS

IT WILL BE NOTED THAT THERE ARE NO PROPOSALS CONCERNING MEETINGS WITH MEMBERS OF THE INDIAN AND COLOURED MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AND OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE REASON IS THAT IT MAY BE SAFELY ASSUMED THAT SUCH MEETINGS WILL BE PROPOSED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. THIS CATEGORY WILL IN ANY CASE PRONOUNCE VIEWS WHICH ARE CLOSE TO THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT.

THE SHORT STAY OF THE MINISTERS MAKE IT UNLIKELY THAT MEETINGS WITH ALL THE ABOVE DESCRIBED GROUPS CAN TAKE PLACE. THEREFORE, THE ABOVE SEQUENCE IS ACCORDINGLY INTENDED TO INDICATE CERTAIN PREFERENCES. AN ARRANGEMENT TO ENABLE AS MANY PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE TO MEET THE MINISTERS WOULD BE THAT SOME OF THEM BE ASKED TO ORGANISE A LUNCH OR A DINNER. THE EMPLOYERS ORGANISATIONS AND THE NEWSPAPER EDITORS COULD FOR INSTANCE BE ASKED TO DO SO. THIS WOULD, HOWEVER, LIMIT THE CONTROL OVER WHO WILL AND WHO WILL NOT BE PRESENT AND COULD POSSIBLY BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE QUALITY OF THE DISCUSSIONS. NATURALLY SUCH FUNCTIONS COULD ALSO BE ORGANISED IN THE VARIOUS TROIKA-EMBASSIES.

U N Q U O

LA HAYE COREY

LIMITED
SAFD
OAO'S
UVD
ECDCG)
NEWS D
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR FERGUSSON
MR JOHNSON
MR RENWICK

-5-
RESTRICTED



*Positivly G-4
to go for first visit
to go for first visit
later over
not*

PRIME MINISTER

CONFIDENTIAL

*We must get on
to Anthony - if Joe
Clark is free (or if he
has refused) we must
do it. - in our not
O'Brien - who
will part.*

SOUTH AFRICA: GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

The Foreign Secretary has minuted (attached) saying that he doesn't want to be on the Group and proposing instead Lord Carrington, Tony Barber or Tony Parsons. You had of course considered all three and decided they were impracticable (Lord Carrington) or unsuitable (the other two).

We shall never get through this exercise if we start by being faint-hearted. It is a pity that the Foreign Secretary is not ready to grasp the nettle: and the fact that the three people he suggests are ones whom you have considered and rejected only points the finger of suitability even more strongly at him. And we must not let Ramphal dictate whom we can and cannot nominate. CHOGM left it to Governments.

We have only a very few days in which to decide. A possible course would be:

to let the Foreign Secretary himself try to persuade Lord Carrington. You would of course add your support;

to explain again why Tony Barber and Tony Parsons would not be right in this case;

- to press the Foreign Secretary very hard to take it on if Lord Carrington declines. You have a bilateral on Wednesday;

- to consider fall-backs if the Foreign Secretary absolutely refuses. I have no suggestions tonight, but will try to assemble some ideas tomorrow.

You may also like to glance at the proposed terms of

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*He can't be
wishes - but
don't see how
hard c. can go
like with
Ref. on (a. b. c.)
at all.*

reference for the Group in paragraph 5 of the attached paper.

Agree to allow the Foreign Secretary to try Lord Carrington?

Yes
mr

CDP

CDP

27 October, 1985.

P.S. We should also get a fuller message ^{Yes mr} to President Botra spelling out just what you had to go through to obtain a reasonable outcome: and seeking his cooperation over the next six months. I will try to drop: or you may prefer an emissary (though I gather Laurens van der Post may not be available at present). C.D.P.

35 WESTBOURNE PARK ROAD
LONDON W2 5QD
01-727 3315

Prime Minister ②

He was unable to exert
much influence over the
European Commission. I
doubt he would act much
in this one.

26 October 1985

EDP
207x.

Arvey's counter
letter is reply
rather than third offer.
not

My dear Prime Minister

I wonder if you would care to consider me
as the British member of the Eminent Persons'
Committee agreed upon at Nassau. My book is
finished, and I could make the time available.

With best wishes

mt

Yours ever

Christopher

Christopher Tugendhat

From the Secretary

CHURCH COMMISSIONERS,
1 MILLBANK,
LONDON, SW1P 3JZ.
Telephone : 01-222 7010

Mr Powell CDP 28/10

You may like to see.
[It is sent to the PM because
she is ex officio a Church Commissioner.]

NFA.

RC
28/10

25 October 1985

To: ALL CHURCH COMMISSIONERS

INVESTMENT AND SOUTH AFRICA

The issue of Investment and South Africa is clearly one of great importance to the Commissioners at the present time of crisis in that country. Indeed, some of you will have received a letter from Frank Field MP inviting you to support him in seeking that this subject should be discussed at a General Meeting of Commissioners.

I thought, therefore, that you would like to know that, at the request of the Board of Governors, the Assets Committee, who are primarily responsible in this area, will shortly be reviewing this aspect of our investment policy and will then take the earliest opportunity of reporting to the Board. I will write to let you know the outcome of these discussions.

Meanwhile, I enclose a copy of a briefing note we have prepared elaborating on our policy.

MAIDA VALE


I wrote last month to Commissioners about the multiple occupied houses at Maida Vale. A copy of the press statement is enclosed for ease of reference. Since writing to you, anxiety has been expressed regarding the status of the Wimpole Housing Society. You will, therefore, be glad to know that, on further investigation, we remain wholly convinced that the interests of our tenants will be in good hands following the sale. In particular, we are reassured that the Rules of the Society provide, inter alia, that:

"2. The objects of the Association shall be to carry on for the benefit of the community the business of (a) providing housing and any associated amenities for persons in necessitous circumstances upon terms appropriate to their means; (b) providing for aged persons in need thereof housing and any associated amenities specially designed or adapted to meet the disabilities and requirements of such persons.

4. The Association shall not trade for profit.

55. (a) No portion of the income or property of the Association shall be paid or transferred either directly or indirectly by way of dividend, bonus or otherwise howsoever by way of profit to members of the Association."

I thought you would like to have this additional information.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J E Shelley". The signature is written in dark ink on a light-colored background.

J E Shelley

CHURCH COMMISSIONERS' INVESTMENTS AND SOUTH AFRICA

The Commissioners' responsibilities to their beneficiaries, the serving and retired clergy, require that financial considerations must be the major factor in all investment matters. In the case of investment and South Africa, the Commissioners follow a balanced policy which they believe also takes proper account of the social and ethical issues arising from the presence of foreign investment in that troubled country.

What is our policy? It has two aspects. First, we do not invest, and never have invested, directly in South Africa. In other words, we do not hold shares in South African companies or in other companies whose major activity takes place in South Africa.

It is not, however, practical for us to avoid some indirect involvement in that country. Because of South Africa's close historical links with this country, most of the larger United Kingdom companies, the sort that are bound to make up the bulk of any major institutional portfolio like ours, will have some South African stake, albeit a small one in relation to their total operation.

In these cases we expect British and US companies operating in South Africa to adopt enlightened employment and social policies. We believe that, by their example, they contribute, in however small a way, to the advancement of the black South African and the erosion of the abhorrent apartheid system. This is a powerful argument which we find convincing as do many influential and knowledgeable commentators, both black and white, whose views we respect.

Therefore the second part of our policy means for us the regular and careful monitoring of the activities of companies in our portfolio having any interest in South Africa to ensure that they operate employment and social policies in line with the relevant Codes of Conduct. These are the EEC Code for United Kingdom companies and the Sullivan Principles for United States companies. It was because of its non-compliance with the Sullivan Principles that we sold our shares in Carnation in 1984.

We realise that this is a complex issue on which Christians can sincerely hold differing views according to their differing outlook and responsibilities. Although we accept that there are wide ranging opinions within the Church, we believe that the balanced policy described above is the right and proper one for the Commissioners to follow given their particular financial responsibilities.

J E Shelley
Secretary

1 Millbank
London SW1P 3JZ
25 October 1985

EMBARGOED

CHURCH COMMISSIONERS

1, Millbank, London, SW1P 3JZ Telephone 01-222 7010

EMBARGOED : NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL 00.01 HRS FRIDAY 27 SEPTEMBER 1985

THE COMMISSIONERS RESIDENTIAL SALES PROGRAMME IN MAIDA VALE

Publicity was recently given to the Commissioners' decision to sell 34 multiply-occupied properties as part of the ongoing sales programme on the Maida Vale Estate. We are now able to announce that terms have been agreed, subject to contract, for the sale of 23 of these properties to the Wimpole Housing Society Limited. This leaves 11 properties out of the 34 originally offered for sale. Of these, 3 are being sold to the Paddington Churches Housing Association and one has been withdrawn. The remaining seven are the subject of negotiations with a tenant or number of tenants within the individual houses.

It was always the Commissioners' wish to sell these properties, wherever possible, to a Housing Association/Society. They have worked throughout to this end and are pleased that the objective has been fully achieved. Wimpole Housing Society is a non-profit making organisation registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965. It is run by a voluntary Committee and its chief officer, Mr Alan Silverman MBE JP is well-known for his work with various housing associations and in providing sheltered accommodation. The Society's sister organisations already manage a number of other rented properties. Both their past record, and the Commissioners recent discussions with them, give assurance that the properties and the current tenants will be in good hands.

The Society intends to retain Messrs Lewis and Tucker of 16 Hanover Square, London W1, as managing agents and propose to carry out repairs, maintenance and refurbishment, as necessary, dealing sympathetically with the needs of all tenants. The Commissioners' agents, Chestertons have written to all tenants concerned giving them information about the sale and reassuring them that their security of tenure under the 'fair rent' system remains unaffected.

For further information

John Reddington Extn 4290

David Long

Extn 4166

26 September 1985



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FM PRETORIA

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELNO 427

OF 251415Z OCTOBER 1985

INFO ROUTINE JOHANNESBURG

INFO SAVING DURBAN, CAPE TOWN CONSULATE.

SOUTH AFRICA - A RESPONSIBLE BLACK HOMELAND LEADER'S VIEW

SUMMARY

1. THE CHIEF MINISTER OF THE SELF-GOVERNING HOMELAND OF KANGWANE HAS BLAMED UNREST ON THE GOVERNMENT POLICIES OF INSTITUTIONALISED VIOLENCE AND CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH BLACK LEADERS TO INCLUDE THE ANC.

DETAIL

2. IN A KEY NOTE ADDRESS AT HIS PARTY'S ANNUAL CONGRESS IN KANGWANE ON 19 OCTOBER, ENOS MABUZA, THE KANGWANE CHIEF MINISTER, STRONGLY CRITICISED THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND CALLED FOR UNDERSTANDING OF THOSE INVOLVED IN THE UNREST. HE HAS REPEATED SOME OF HIS POINTS IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW.

3. KEY POINTS IN HIS SPEECH WERE:

- (A) THERE CAN NEVER BE A UNITED SOUTH AFRICA AS LONG AS THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT REGARDS THE HOMELANDS AND ESPECIALLY THEIR INDEPENDENCE AS BEING A MATERIAL PART OF THE POLITICAL SOLUTIONS NEEDED.
- (B) THOSE CRITICISING THE UNREST SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT IT IS IN ESSENCE THE BLACK PEOPLE'S ONLY MEANS OF EXPRESSING THEIR ANGER AT AND RESISTANCE TO THE OPPRESSION THEY HAVE SUFFERED FOR MANY GENERATIONS.
- (C) THOSE CALLING FOR AN END TO VIOLENCE SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT IT WAS THE INSTITUTIONALISED VIOLENCE OF APARTHEID WHICH HAD FORCED THE ANC TO RESORT TO THEIR ARMED STRUGGLE.
- (D) NEGOTIATIONS COULD ONLY BE MEANINGFUL AND SUCCESSFUL IF THEY INCLUDED THE BROADEST POSSIBLE SPECTRUM OF BLACK LEADERS. IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD RELEASE MANDELA AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS AND UNBAN THE ANC SO THAT IT COULD ONCE AGAIN BECOME A LEGAL POLITICAL ORGANISATION.
- (E) PARENTS MIGHT DISAGREE WITH CHILDREN JOINING THE ARMED STRUGGLE BUT THEY COULD NOT DISARM THEM. IT WOULD BE DISHONOURABLE FOR BLACKS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH EXCLUDED BROTHERS, SISTERS AND CHILDREN WHO WERE EITHER POLITICAL PRISONERS OR HAD BEEN FORCED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY.

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(F)

(F) WHATEVER THE DIFFERENCES IN FEELING ABOUT THE DEGREE OF VIOLENCE OF APARTHEID ON THE ONE HAND AND THAT OF ARMED STRUGGLE ON THE OTHER, HE BELIEVED THERE WAS AMPLE SCOPE FOR A CEASEFIRE FOLLOWED BY THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS EVEN IF IT MEANT THAT THE QUESTION OF VIOLENCE WAS TOP OF THE AGENDA.

(G) THE VOICES OF MODERATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, INCLUDING THOSE OPPOSED TO DISINVESTMENT WOULD ONLY BE HEARD BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IF AND WHEN STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION IS DONE AWAY WITH.

COMMENT

4. MABUZA'S SPEECH WAS SURPRISINGLY OUTSPOKEN FOR A HOMELAND MINISTER. HIS LINE ON THE ANC IS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO BUTHELEZI WHO IS INCREASINGLY CRITICISING THE ANC'S SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE AND IS IN MABUZA'S VIEW LOSING A LOT OF SUPPORT ESPECIALLY AMONG THE YOUNG.

5. IN A LONG PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH THE HEAD OF CHANCERY IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SPEECH MABUZA SAID THAT HIS CREDIBILITY AS A SO-CALLED MODERATE LEADER WAS ON THE LINE. YOUNGER BLACKS WERE CONTEMPTUOUS OF THE HOMELAND SYSTEM AND INDEED AS DEVELOPED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IT MADE NO SENSE. WHATEVER THE GOVERNMENT WERE SAYING, THERE WAS NO REAL EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE ABANDONING THE SYSTEM. HE EXPECTED TO BE PRESENTED SHORTLY WITH CONSOLIDATION PLANS FOR KANGWANE. HE WAS DETERMINED TO OPPOSE ANY PROPOSALS THAT WOULD INVOLVE REMOVALS. PLANNING FOR KANGWANE COULD NOT BE SEPARATE FROM THAT FOR THE REST OF THE LOWVELD THAT REMAINED IN THE TRANSVAAL.

6. HE HAD SAID WHAT HE HAD ABOUT THOSE WHO SUPPORTED VIOLENCE AND ABOUT THE ANC BECAUSE THE REASON FOR THEIR POSITIONS HAD TO BE UNDERSTOOD IF THERE WAS TO BE ANY HOPE OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA. HE WAS PERSONALLY URGING YOUNG PEOPLE TO STAY AT SCHOOL AND COMPLETE EXAMS BUT THEY HAD REAL AND LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES, AND THE POLICE WERE ACTING WITHOUT RESTRAINT. HIS OWN DAUGHTER HAD BEEN RECENTLY ARRESTED BY THE POLICE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE NORTH. HE HAD URGED DR VILJOEN RECENTLY TO MOVE TO AN INTEGRATED EDUCATION SYSTEM AS A START. IT WAS NO GOOD CONDEMNING THOSE INCLUDING THE ANC FOR FAVOURING VIOLENCE, IF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUED THE USE OF REPRESSIVE TACTICS AND REFUSED TO RESPOND SIGNIFICANTLY TO POPULAR AND LEGITIMATE DEMANDS.

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17. HE.

7. HE AND MANY OTHERS DID NOT FAVOUR DISINVESTMENT BUT THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF MODERATION WINNING THE DAY UNLESS THE EMERGENCY WAS ENDED, THOSE HELD WITHOUT TRIAL RELEASED AND ALL STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION ENDED. IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT NO PROGRESS TO A SANE SOLUTION WAS POSSIBLE. HE HOPED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD GET SOME OF THESE POINTS ACROSS TO ANY RECEPTIVE EARS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT.

MOBERLY

SOUTHERN AFRICA
STANDARD (PALACE)
SAFD
OADs
UND
NAD
ECDs
SOVIET D
MR JOHNSON
CABINET OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

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HL5

89

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 October, 1985

Already seen in
Queen's
com 25/10/85

I enclose a letter from the Acting High Commissioner at the Tanzanian High Commission, enclosing a copy of a letter from President Nyerere to the Prime Minister. Mr. Magere explains that the contents of the letter should already have been received by the Prime Minister via our High Commission in Dar-es-Salaam, but I can find no record of this in our files.

I should be grateful for a draft reply as soon as possible.

(Mark Addison)

C. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

VC



FILE

cy

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 October, 1985

Thank you for your letter of 23 October to Charles Powell, conveying a letter from President Nyerere.

I shall ensure that the Prime Minister sees this on her return from New York as soon as possible.

(Mark Addison)

Mr. A.V. Magere.



TANZANIA HIGH COMMISSION

Telephone: 01-499 8951
Telegrams: TANZANREP LONDON

43, Hertford Street,
London, W1Y 7TF.

*All OFFICIAL communications must be addressed
to His Excellency, The High Commissioner,
and NOT to individuals.*

In reply please quote our Ref. No. TZLC/C.170/25

23rd October, 1985.

Mr. C.D. Powell,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, SW1.

Dear Mr. Powell,

I am sending herewith a letter from my
President to the Prime Minister the The Right
Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P. regarding
the problem of apartheid in South Africa.

I understand, the contents of the attached
letter have already been communicated to the
Prime Minister through diplomatic channels by your
Mission in Dar es Salaam i.e. before the Prime
Minister left for the Commonwealth Conference. I
am sending you an extra copy for your perusal and
appropriate action.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Magere'.

A.V. Magere,
Ag. High Commissioner.

Encl.

SOUTH AFRICA CLUB.

Address by Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi
Chief Minister of KwaZulu, President of Inkatha and
Chairman, The South African Black Alliance

SAVOY HOTEL, LONDON

23 OCTOBER 1985

The South Africa Club is a prestigious organisation. It gathers together people of great significance who are important opinion-makers. Their perceptions, and their actions based on their perceptions, have far-reaching consequences. I speak tonight with this awareness and the theme of what I have to say will be woven around realities as I perceive them. I only have perceived realities. We all only have perceived realities and history itself is the final arbiter of whose perceptions are right and wrong. I make this point at the outset because so much of what is said about South Africa is said as a consequence of attempts to apply moral principles or political principles or philosophical principles to a very complex situation.

We have seen again and again how South African realities have scattered idealist perceptions or ideological perceptions to the four winds. The ideology of apartheid made assumptions which are now clearly shown to be untenable, and there is in some South African quarters, and some international quarters, the perception that this fact gives credibility to another set of ideological perceptions, namely those flowing from ideologies revolving around the use of violence for political purposes. In our situation the foremost protagonists of the ideologies of violence are the African National Congress Mission in exile, supported by the United Democratic Front in South Africa, who have committed themselves simply, publicly and openly, to making South Africa ungovernable.

Because the ideology of classical apartheid is untenable, and stated to be so by the South African Government itself, ever increasing credibility is being given to the programmes in which the ANC Mission in exile and the United Democratic Front promote the armed struggle and internal violence. The failure of apartheid is being perceived more and more to be the gain of the ANC Mission in exile and the gain of the United Democratic Front. More and more Church groups and semi-government agencies in the Western world are throwing their weight behind the UDF in South Africa and

giving the ANC Mission in exile the spin-off benefits of this moral support for what are in fact programmes of political violence in South Africa.

I would like to make some observations about the ANC Mission in exile/National Party political polarity, and I will argue that the South African alternatives are not monopolised by these two alternative poles. I will argue further that these two poles in fact establish the centre ground where political reality really is at work.

The media is painting a picture which looks something like the following. The forces of violence have spread. 23 South African Black townships are controlled by the forces of violence. States of emergency have been declared in 36 magisterial districts. The combined efforts of the South African Police and defence forces are unable to bring violence under control. Everywhere Black anger is unifying people in concerted action which is developing a momentum which will bring the South African Government to its knees in the foreseeable future. Time periods like five years and ten years are being bandied around as the limits of the South African Government's survival. The South African economy is in tatters. International pressure is mounting. Prospects of a real armed revolution in the face of Government unwillingness to hand over power to majority rule are becoming very real. There is a real need to talk to the ANC in brackets as the ultimate victors before it is too late.

This kind of picture, which has been dramatised by foreign correspondents, is given and TV viewers across the length and breadth of the Western world are given visual images to support this representation of South Africa. Everywhere Black forces working for the politics of negotiation are being downgraded in importance, and Western governments and governments of the Commonwealth, believe that combined punitive efforts against South Africa of varying degrees of intensity must now be made because changes, whether they result from these pressures or whether they result from internal developments, will prove them prophetic. President Reagan was manoeuvred into adopting limited sanctions against South Africa. Mrs. Thatcher found it necessary to join her EEC partners in limited sanctions. Heads of State like them are under pressure to increase the severity of the sanctions they have announced. The international banking fraternity have withdrawn their support for government actions and South African programmes. Everywhere the lack of confidence in the future of South Africa is being dramatised. Everywhere the forces of violence are being dramatised.

This is the media image. Let us now look at some of the realities which are being obscured in this dramatic reporting on South

Africa. One of the realities is that if the forces of violence end up overthrowing the South African Government, they will do so only after the South African Government and the whole of White South Africa, has resorted to scorched earth policies in the face of scorched earth policies of the forces of violence which will make any victory a horribly empty victory in a destitute South Africa. The image being created that the forces of violence in South Africa can lead to constructive change fly in the face of all realities.

If violence serves a political purpose, it has already served that purpose. If South Africa is to turn away from a violent future, there must now be no more violence. If the threat of violence has any value, its value has already been demonstrated. Violence beyond the present levels of violence will destroy all prospects of violence leading to constructive change. That is a harsh reality I face. Continued escalating violence will destroy the prospects of a negotiated future and anybody, any government, or any organisation in the world which now accepts the need for increasing violent pressure on South Africa, is tragically mistaken.

It is only political propaganda which states that Black South Africans are drawing together to make the country ungovernable and drawing together to use violence constructively. The truth of the matter is that Blacks employing violence are using violence against Blacks more than they are using violence against apartheid. Stay-always flop unless there is very substantial intimidation. This intimidation is ugly and in it people are stoned, their houses are burnt down and they are beaten and hacked to death with bush knives and axes. Violence is dividing Black South Africa. Blacks are not uniting under the banners of violence.

The media image represents Blacks as uniting in democratic action and being prepared to die for democratic ideals, and being prepared to use violence to sustain the movement towards a future democratic South Africa. This is a media lie. It is more than a distortion. The ANC Mission in exile is exhorting Black South Africa in radio broadcast after radio broadcast to kill Blacks who refuse to become party to the escalation of violence. Children are being exhorted to murder Black Town Councillors and to murder any whom the Mission in exile stigmatise as a collaborator - and they stigmatise all who are not working within their framework of violence as collaborators with the system. When a mob is informed that a particular Black in their midst is a collaborator, they indulge in acts of unspeakable brutality. They pour petrol over people with tyres tied round their necks and set them alight alive to run screaming and burning to death. Families of people stigmatised as collaborators have been barricaded in their houses and whole families have been incinerated. There is no room in the thinking of the ANC Mission in exile for Black democratic opposition to their tactics and strategies. Elements in the United Democratic

Front are the frontline actors of this ANC Mission in exile butchery of those who oppose them in their tactics and strategies. This butchery is glorified by the media. The repugnance of all this burns fiercely in my very soul.

The media paints a picture of the South African Government being incapable of ending the violence in South Africa. In this they may be telling the truth, but it is only a fraction of the truth. Only a fraction of the potential lethal power available to the South African Government has thus far been used against the perpetrators of mob violence. The killing capabilities which the South African police and army can unleash are awesome and are too horrible to contemplate. The ANC Mission in exile is driving towards a position in which this awesome White retaliation could become a reality. My soul revolts against a South Africa destroyed by South Africans brutally killing South Africans.

The media paints a picture in which the present levels of unrest could escalate and force the South African Government's hand to move towards opening South Africa's democracy to all. They paint a picture of democratic victories just around the corner. The ANC Mission in exile and the United Democratic Front are not interested in a democratic future South Africa. The Mission in exile regards itself as a government in exile. It is clearly intent upon doing everything in its power to return to South Africa to form a socialist/Marxist military government which will nationalise South Africa's industries and exercise total State control over the economy.

The ANC Mission in exile is not struggling to establish my right to compete with them at grass roots level for political support. They are not struggling to give every Black leader an open and equal opportunity to gather the support necessary to form a government. They are fighting for a socialist/Marxist future and as far as they are concerned, they have already written the script which democracy demands the people write. The media does not present these realities.

Successive National Party Governments have passed one Draconian law after another and executed one brutal act after another to destroy the development of Black democratic opposition to apartheid. Popular organisations have not been able to survive until recently. Many Black leaders have been banned or jailed. Apartheid has created a Black leadership vacuum in South Africa. It has created the circumstances in which self-acclaimed leaders, celebrity leaders, and media-acclaimed leaders have a field day in saying whatever they like in the name of Black South Africa. The image that the media paint, and this particularly applies to foreign correspondents in South Africa, is one in which Black South Africans favour the use of violence, favour the use of boycotts,

and favour the use of stay-aways and strikes. The media does not reflect Black realities. Successful strikes are not held unless there is Black on Black violence to support them. Millions of Black South Africans go to work every day because they need their jobs, even if it is for the minimal survival needs of their families. Every foreign company operating in South Africa has only to send the word out and dozens of jobless Blacks are at their factory gates clamouring for employment. In all the turbulent history of South Africa, on no single occasion has a genuine open mass meeting of Black South Africans endorsed disinvestment as a strategy that we as Blacks accept. There has in the whole turbulent history of South Africa been no successful national stay-away or strike. If intimidation stopped tomorrow, the boycott of White-owned businesses in places like Port Elizabeth, East London, Queenstown and elsewhere will come to an immediate end.

Inkatha is the largest Black political movement ever to have emerged in the history of South Africa. Tom Lodge of the University of the Witwatersrand has specialised in research into the old ANC and the ANC Mission in exile. I disagree a great deal with what he says because he says what he does say within the confines of his own political agenda, but he himself as a widely recognised scholar in his field, estimates that there is something like 2 000 members of the ANC in South Africa and he estimates that there are something like 9 000 Black South Africans outside of South Africa in ANC camps. Against this figure of something like 11 000, Inkatha has now over one million card-carrying paid-up members. No Black leader has ever gathered the constituency support in Black South Africa which I today enjoy. This massive membership of Inkatha is dominated numerically by peasants and workers. It has branches scattered across the length and breadth of the country and it is as representative of Blacks in urban areas as it is of Blacks in rural areas. It is as representative of the old as it is of the young. Inkatha's Youth Brigade is the largest youth organisation ever to have emerged in the history of the country. Its Women's Brigade is the largest women's brigade ever to have emerged in the history of the country.

Inkatha is intensely democratic. Its supreme authority is the Annual General Conference where policies are determined and where tactics and strategies are accepted and rejected. Inkatha's leadership is elected by its ordinary members. At branch, regional and national levels Inkatha's representatives are chosen by the people, and its Annual General Conference is a conference of representatives chosen to be there by the people. I never ever speak for myself on public issues. I reflect only that which Inkatha's membership has endorsed. There is nothing that I have said this evening which does not have the solid endorsement of Inkatha. The point I am making is that when Black South Africans are given the freedom to choose and are given democratic machinery

through which to exercise their choices, and through which to determine tactics and strategies in the Black struggle for liberation, choices are made which make a mockery of the media representation of South Africa.

Because Inkatha is the massive Black political reality that it is, it is vehemently opposed by the forces of violence. Every Black initiative which succeeds in Inkatha is an initiative which spells out just how wrong the ANC Mission in exile is to justify the armed struggle on the basis that democratic opposition cannot succeed. They claim to be exercising a Black South African last-resort option in which they have no alternative but to rely on violence. Every move towards success in the politics of negotiation is a threat to them. They and the UDF have declared war on Inkatha because it exercises real power in Black South Africa.

Never before in the history of South Africa has the country been nearer to a situation in which non-violent means of bringing about change and a situation in which the politics of negotiation can author really meaningful fundamental changes. This is what the media should be dramatising. Let us pause here and look at this statement. Mr. P.W. Botha, the State President, is tragically under-achieving in the business of bringing about meaningful reform. He spearheaded the new constitution which lies so deeply at the root of the current unrest in the country. He has pandered to the right wing. He refuses to sign a Declaration of Intent with Black leaders which would mobilise a massive force in favour of non-violent change. He has to be carried, struggling and kicking, to the point of bringing about really fundamental change. He continues to insist that racial divisions are fundamental political divisions which should be retained in South Africa. He continues to act as an Afrikaner leader and continues to regard Afrikaner communities-felt requirements as synonymous with what is good for the State. That and more is all true. My assessment, however, is that whether it be he, or whether it be another, the forces demanding non-violent negotiated change in South Africa will force the hand of the Government to make meaningful moves in the right direction. The State President has pointed his feet in the direction of statesmanship. Within the totally unacceptable limitations in which he has placed himself he has been bolder than any South African Prime Minister before him.

It is under his leadership that the ruling National Party has scrapped the Prohibition of Political Interference Act, has scrapped the Mixed Marriages Act, and has scrapped the racial provisions in the Immorality Act which prohibited sexual relations between Black and White. It is under his leadership that a minority of Blacks have been promised freehold title in urban areas in so-called White South Africa. It is he who has declared that

Blacks in urban areas are entitled to be there, and will be given freedom of movement. It is under his leadership that Blacks were given full trade union rights, and it is under his leadership that the Government has accepted that South Africa is one country, even if this acceptance is qualified by his insistence that the country cannot have a single electorate. It was he who announced common citizenship for all South Africans. It is under his leadership that Cabinet Minister after Cabinet Minister is now saying that if apartheid is what the Western world understands to be apartheid, it must be scrapped. They are saying that we must work towards Black participation in all levels of government, even though this participation is qualified by the continued insistence that the South African political system must be a system of minorities in which fundamental distinctions have to be made between own and general affairs. All these moves, all these attitudes would have been regarded as hideous National Party political heresy during the terms of office of all the Prime Ministers of the country who preceded him since 1948. Mr. P.W. Botha however nullifies these little glimmers of hope when in the same breath he says that the Group Areas Act will not go. In his effort to be all things to all shades of Nats, he makes even those of us who try to give him credit for the little steps which he has announced, quite skeptical when he talks of retaining one of the main pillars of apartheid, which is the Group Areas Act. There are people who find it fashionable to describe these small positive steps as no more than "cosmetic." Mr. Botha arms them to the hilt against himself when he talks of retaining the Group Areas Act in the same breath as he talks of "reform."

The State President is fighting a rear-guard action against the forces in the country which made these kind of moves imperative for Government. Firstly, there are forces which emanate from the total rejection of apartheid by Blacks. The attempt by National Party Government after National Party Government to get Blacks to agree to participate in their own oppression has failed. The South African Black body politic is now recognised as a reality, even if that recognition is still somewhat distorted. Reform which has been introduced has in large measure been introduced because of Black opposition, and they were introduced prior to the present levels of Black violence which now characterises South Africa.

Reform has also been necessitated by economic reality. The historical recognition that Blacks are irradicably present in so-called White South Africa as permanent citizens was demanded by economic reality. The mobility of Blacks was demanded by economic reality. Improved industrial relations demanded Black trade unionism. The need for skilled Black workers demanded that the Government stabilised urban Black society and accept that Blacks need to have unrestricted opportunities of developing skills and of climbing the ladder of job success. Economic realities determined

that regional economic planning no longer can take cognisance of apartheid's racial boundaries. More than anything else, economic realities have dictated that the South African Government can no longer follow economic policies aimed primarily at maintaining apartheid.

There is a vast array of potent economic forces at work demanding real change. That is why it is so important not to destroy South Africa's economic growth in such a way that the first levels of job creation are affected. In South Africa, half the Black population is 15 years and younger. Because of that population growth, we need to have a sustained economic growth to get anywhere near meeting the demand for jobs to cater for that kind of population bulge. The interdependence of Black and White in the economy is, for me, the soft under-belly. In the past we had job reservation in South Africa which reserved certain jobs for Whites only. Economic realities destroyed that completely and job reservation was shed because of these economic realities. Today both Government and industry accept that more and more Blacks need to be trained in order to service the growing South African economy. I believe that participation by Blacks in the trade union movement has been one concrete step which represents change which even the most cynical cannot describe as "cosmetic." Increased bargaining power on the factory floor means that such bargaining power, when fully developed, will be used by Blacks also for political bargaining. The increasing dependence of the economy on Blacks makes such political bargaining inevitable and just a matter of time. That is why I sincerely believe that any efforts to retard or destroy the economy of South Africa sets back the clocks of liberation by many decades.

I also wonder, taking into account the thoughtlessness that is so characteristic of the actions of those who advocate economic sanctions, whether they ever pause to think of what kind of society should emerge in South Africa after liberation. We are the last in Africa to be liberated from minority rule. I believe that this gives us an advantage of learning through the experience of Africa. We have learnt the hard way that we should not conduct our struggle in such a way that we destroy the foundations for the future development of the country. When I see how many countries in Africa have not got enough to eat for their populations, I often wonder whether those who advocate the destruction of the economy of the only country in Africa which has achieved such a measure of self-sufficiency, is aimed at reducing South Africa to a state of economic ruin so that we also can look forward to depending on crumbs of charity from the West after liberation.

Mining, commerce, industry and banking have now become politicised in a way in which they were never politicised before. The Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM) commissioned and accepted

a report which clearly spells out the disaster of apartheid and the need for fundamental change. The Human Sciences Research Council has produced a far-reaching report which, while it is rejected by Black hardliners and contains a great deal with which I myself cannot agree, fundamentally challenges the status quo and more recently, it has produced a report which in effect demands the movement towards a form of consociation in government. English and Afrikaans intellectuals are ever-increasingly giving weight to the arguments for power-sharing between Black and White. The South African White population seems to be in need of more bold leadership than the leadership they have at present at the helm of power.

I have been in correspondence with something like 6 000 prominent South Africans, included amongst whom are Afrikaner politicians, academics, clerics and leading industrialists. Their response to the need I spelt out for movement towards meaningful power-sharing between Black and White was overwhelmingly positive. The Churches of South Africa demand fundamental changes. There is a strong South African groundswell beyond the forces of violence working more strongly than the forces of violence demanding change, insisting that we change in the here and now; demanding that the State President effectively leads the country, and demanding that he does so in partnership with Blacks. That is what makes it so tragic that the State President seems more afraid of the lunatic fringe on the right than of his White constituency in the whole country.

This groundswell of demand for meaningful change is taking place in a current South Africa where there is now a total White dependence on Blacks in the economy. There is of course the reciprocal Black dependence on Whites. It is this reciprocity of dependence which is ever-increasingly creating Black bargaining advantages as Black bargaining power increases. Black advantages increase and the prospects of successfully negotiating fundamental change increase. The change process in South Africa is ever-increasingly becoming a people's thing, not a government thing. The State President will ever increasingly only be tolerated in the State's driving seat if he leads as South Africans want him to lead. The hey-day of yesteryears' dictator Prime Ministers is gone, unless of course violence escalates to the point where government becomes a military and police operation in scorched earth situations.

The international community must not be stampeded into precipitous action when the fate of South Africa hangs in delicate balance between the forces of violence and the forces of non-violence. South Africa's future must be decided by South Africans inside South Africa. The struggle for liberation must be won by forces at work on the ground in the country. Whatever else is done, the international community should support that which is positive; that

which is democratic; that which preserves the foundation of the future, and above all, that which maximises the country's productive base. Increased prosperity will accelerate the rate of change. Decreased prosperity will retard it. Prolong real depression could well destroy the politics of negotiation.

I hope no one misunderstands me to mean that there should be no pressures by the international community on South Africa. My message is that while pressures do serve a purpose in the liberation struggle, the international community should not apply just any pressures, regardless of how they affect the very victims of apartheid. Decreasing prosperity as a strategy does not increase the arm of the oppressed Blacks in South Africa. The reason why President Reagan's partial sanctions are plausible is that he has applied these with quite some restraint and he has further balanced this by giving increased humanitarian aid to Black South Africa. The strategy of decreasing prosperity can only be a good strategy for those who believe in the dictum of "The worst the better" because they have other agendas than only the liberation of Black South Africa from the shackles of oppression.

It is imperative that Blacks and Whites now talk to each other seriously about things that matter, and enjoin with each other in implementing real reform. Real reform cannot be foisted on the country by Whites only and if Black revolutionary forces had in the end to take over the country, they will also not introduce reform. We are faced either with reconstructing the country now in harmony or with reconstructing the country after revolution. This is why I applaud Mrs. Margaret Thatcher's wisdom in withstanding pressures at the Commonwealth Conference to join with the rest of the Commonwealth in mounting sanctions against South Africa. The notion which arose in the Commonwealth discussions of the need for a Council of Statesmen from the Commonwealth to play a constructive role in furthering negotiations between Black and White leaders in South Africa, is consonant with my views that the West should now use its considerable diplomatic clout to push the minority regime in South Africa to move towards meaningful negotiations to normalise South Africa.

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T 201/85
dated 28.10.85.



Union Buildings
Pretoria

22 October 1985

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for the message which you sent to me from Nassau and which I received on 21 October 1985.

At the outset let me say that I understand the difficult position in which you were placed during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau and appreciate the particular efforts which you made to ameliorate the decisions which were taken there. I am fully aware of the emotional atmosphere which dominated the discussions on South Africa.

Nevertheless I trust that you will also understand the position of the South African Government. The discussions on South Africa amounted to blatant interference in our national affairs. I must point out that outsiders cannot resolve our problems for us. It is South Africans themselves who will have to find the solutions. I wish to re-iterate that we need to be left in peace so that we can all meet across the table, develop trust and confidence in each other and resolve our problems in our own way.

It is clear to me that our neighbours in southern Africa who subscribe to the measures decided upon in Nassau will damage their economies much more severely than ours. It must be obvious that one of the very first results of punitive economic measures or sanctions against South Africa, will be a curb on the influx of foreign workers from neighbouring states who seek to escape the hardships of the economic retrogression in their own countries by finding employment in South Africa. I wish however to make it very clear that such a situation would not be of our making and that we should not be blamed if we are forced to curtail our economic co-operation with and assistance to our neighbours.

Regarding the proposed visit by a group of "eminent Commonwealth persons", I must state that it is difficult for me to reconcile the declared purpose of encouraging the process of political dialogue in South Africa with the content of the condemnatory statement issued in Nassau and the punitive measures decided upon. Furthermore, I cannot embark on negotiations with my own citizens on matters which are our national concern, under external threat and subject to the demands which the Commonwealth Heads of Government have written into their package of measures on South Africa. A headline on the front page of a local evening paper of October 21 states "Six months or else, SA told". Quite frankly if my Government were to yield to this sort of pressure, it would be the clearest possible signal to others to join in the hunt. I cannot possibly place myself and my Government in that untenable position and I say this to you knowing full well that you stood virtually alone in resisting pressure for extensive punitive action against South Africa and that you rely on this initiative to keep further sanctions at bay. There is undoubtedly much at stake for you but there is more at stake for South Africans of all communities and political beliefs and I do not therefore adopt this position lightly.


You will recall that the South African Government indicated at the time of the visit of the three EEC Foreign Ministers that they were welcome to visit South Africa as long as they did not claim any right to interfere in South Africa's internal affairs. The South African Government also expressed the hope that their discussions would proceed in a manner which was consistent with the normal conduct of affairs between nations. I personally and members of my Government spoke to the EEC Ministers at length but I regret that on their return to Europe a decision was taken to proceed with punitive measures and sanctions against South Africa.

It is furthermore not clear to me what is meant by "suspension of violence on all sides" in the Nassau Statement. If it is intended to mean that the South African Government is perpetrating violence in the current unrest in South Africa, then I must tell you quite frankly that a mission of this nature cannot play a positive role. It will merely exacerbate an already delicate situation.

I feel convinced that you will appreciate my Government's attitude on this point because Great Britain has a similar problem in combating terrorism.


On the other hand, I would be prepared to entertain the possibility of emissaries of individual Governments visiting South Africa for discussions with representatives of the South African Government as well as representatives of the various communities, the private sector and other interested bodies.

Yours sincerely



P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M P
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON



Prime Minister

Useful as an indication of points which the Government side might raise on your statement.

MINUTES OF CONSERVATIVE FOREIGN AFFAIRS BACKBENCH COMMITTEE
MEETING: TUESDAY 22 OCTOBERCAD
25/xSir John Biggs-Davison in the chair
15 MPs

1. Sir John Biggs-Davison said the purpose of the meeting was to hear reports from those who had visited foreign parts during the recess.

South Africa

2. Robert Adley reported on his visit to South Africa. He believed that a major explosion was imminent. The only way in which he thought we could respond to the urgency of the situation was by applying pressure on those who had economic power in the country, many of whom held British passports, to stop wringing their hands and to do something to really secure change. His suggestion, which he realised might seem radical to some, was that we should use the leverage given us by the attachment of many people to their British citizenship, saying that unless there had been certain fundamental changes in South Africa within two years we would legislate to end dual South African and British citizenship.

3. Mr Carlisle disagreed. He thought talk of an explosion only fuelled the flames. He was concerned that the Prime Minister's concessions at CHOGM had undermined her previously brave stand. Depending on the wording in the Commons debate, he might find it difficult to support the Government. Anthony Nelson said he too thought sanctions had never worked and never would. We had agreed to the EEC sanctions to avoid the need for further concessions at CHOGM. Nonetheless we had made further concessions. Soon more would be demanded. We were on the slippery slope. He thought the Prime Minister wrong in saying there was no trade in Krugerrands - there was a considerable off-shore business, and there would continue to be. He would find it difficult to support any motion which implicitly or explicitly supported sanctions. When it came to legislation on Krugerrands and the firearms part of the EC agreement, there would also be an opportunity for members to express a view on those precise points. He thought we were cutting off our nose to spite our face.

4. Ivor Stanbrook disagreed. He thought the South African Government had got its policies completely wrong and was heading for massive revolution and bloodshed. It was essential to find a way of bringing this home to them. He had changed his mind on sanctions. He now believed that sanctions had been an important part of the package which forced the Smith Government to embrace change. They had not been able to stand both comprehensive sanctions and terrorism at the same time. Those who opposed sanctions must say what the alternative was.

/5.

5. Andrew Mackay said he had some sympathy with the criticism of sanctions. But he wanted to report on US attitudes. He had visited Washington with a group of parliamentarians and met senior Congressional politicians and State Department officials. Three points had become very clear to him:

- a) initial US sanctions were cosmetic and more were likely;
- b) there was enormous constituency pressure on Congressmen;
- c) the White House had ambitions to establish a general peace in the region, which influenced their policy on South Africa.

He thought we should take these facts into account, since it would be unfortunate if we found ourselves out of tune with the US.

6. Cyril Townsend thought the Prime Minister had got it just right (though he regretted the "embarrassing bungle" during the EC discussion of sanctions when a decision had had to be delayed). Peter Temple-Morris also thought that the FCO for once had got it right. He thought trade sanctions would create more bloodshed, but the current level of pressure was just about right. He thought the idea of playing politics with nationality rights was wrong in principle and very dangerous.


7. Robert Jackson said that those opposed to sanctions could not have it both ways. They presently argued both that they were quite ineffective and that they would cause bloodshed in South Africa. We really ought to decide which point we were arguing. He drew attention to Robin Renwick's book on sanctions, and in particular three points which had struck him:

- a) the symbolic significance of sanctions - the only respect in which they worked;
- b) the multilateral nature of sanctions, and the danger of being left out of such a process if one wished to influence it;
- c) the need for carrots as well as sticks - and he thought we should think more about this regarding South Africa if we wished to recognize progress when it was made.

8. Mr Adley said he thought sanctions were now almost irrelevant. He did not think fundamental rights applied to the question of South Africans who had retained British citizenship as a safety net for when their policies failed. If when faced with the choice they left South Africa, then that itself would have enormous economic effects.

9. Julian Amery thought there had been significant reforms in South Africa. The duty of the government was not to seek popularity but to protect fundamental national interests, in particular the security of the Cape route and British jobs. Colin Moynihan agreed there had been substantial reforms. The way to further change was through the business community. Mr Adley said the reforms might seem significant to us but we looked at them through white eyes. As long as people in South Africa were classified according to their colour of skin, violence would continue. The only solution was the comprehensive dismantlement of such a government. Sir Michael Shaw said he opposed the idea of using nationality rights. He also opposed sanctions as ineffective. He was concerned at the six months review, which he thought would lead to renewed pressure. Mr Carlisle said the Prime Minister had made clear that she would not be going any further.

10. It was agreed that the next meeting would discuss Middle East questions.


J Houston
Special Adviser

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See T 176A/85. 9.10.85 *EB1*

*A further message
from President Botswana.
EBN.*

FOLLOWING FOR CHARLES POWELL, PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY, NEW YORK
FROM DUTY CLERK

MESSAGE BEGINS

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

YOU WOULD BY NOW HAVE RECEIVED MY LETTER OF 4 OCTOBER 1985 WHICH DEALS TO A LARGE EXTENT WITH MATTERS RAISED IN YOUR OWN LETTER OF 4 OCTOBER 1985.

I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN OF YOUR RECENT TALKS WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE AND IN PARTICULAR OF THE VARIOUS BRITISH AID PROGRAMMES. AS MENTIONED TO YOU BEFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE WILL YIELD POSITIVE RESULTS. SOUTH AFRICA IS READY, WITHIN ITS MEANS, TO CONTINUE ITS OWN PROGRAMMES OF ASSISTANCE, WHICH MAY, OF COURSE, BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE PUNITIVE ECONOMIC MEASURES DECIDED ON BY THE UNITED STATES, THE EEC COUNTRIES AND OTHERS. I TRUST THAT THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHICH SUBSCRIBE TO THE ANTI-SOUTH AFRICAN MEASURES WILL BE PREPARED TO FILL THE VACUUM SHOULD SOUTH AFRICA BE FORCED SUBSTANTIALLY TO REDUCE ITS ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS AND COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF LABOUR AND OTHER SPHERES.

AS REGARDS RECENT ANNOUNCEMENTS BY MAPUTO OF BREACHES OF THE ACCORD OF NKOMATI I WISH TO CONFIRM TO YOU THAT WE VIEW THESE DEVELOPMENTS IN A MOST SERIOUS LIGHT. I PERSONALLY GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO HAVE THESE ALLEGATIONS FULLY INVESTIGATED BY A TEAM OF INDEPENDENT PERSONS. CERTAIN TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS WERE INDEED DISCOVERED WHICH WE HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY ACKNOWLEDGED AND EXPLAINED TO THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME IT TRANSPIRED THAT THESE "VIOLATIONS" OCCURRED IN THE COURSE OF EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO BRING FRELIMO AND RENAMO TOGETHER AROUND THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN THE BELIEF THAT PEACE CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED IN MOZAMBIQUE BY BRINGING ABOUT DIRECT TALKS LEADING TO A CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN THESE TWO GROUPS. THESE EFFORTS I MAY ADD, HAD THE EXPLICIT APPROVAL OF THE MOZAMBIKAN AUTHORITIES AT THE TIME / AND

AND WERE NOT AIMED AT PROVIDING ANY ADVANTAGE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN MAPUTO.

I WISH TO CONFIRM SOUTH AFRICA'S CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO THE NKOMATI ACCORD. WE REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH THE MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT AND WILL UNDERTAKE ALL EFFORTS TO REMOVE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING IN THIS MATTER.

I AM AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH THE SWA/NAMIBIAN QUESTION CREATES FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I SHARE YOUR WISH TO SEE AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM.

HOWEVER, I THINK WE MUST ASK OURSELVES WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE IN THE SOUTH WESTERN PART OF AFRICA. DO WE REALLY WISH TO CONFIRM IN POWER IN LUANDA AN UNELECTED MARXIST GOVERNMENT THAT DEPENDS ALMOST ENTIRELY ON THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA TO ENABLE IT TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION? IS IT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES REALLY POSSIBLE TO WEAN THE MPLA FROM THE SOVIET UNION? AS FAR AS SWA/NAMIBIA IS CONCERNED, IS IT ENOUGH SIMPLY TO WANT TO REMOVE VEXATIOUS QUESTIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA? DO WE NOT HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE PEOPLES CONCERNED WHICH TRANSCEND THE THE RHETORIC OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS? DO WE REALLY WANT TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR A MARXIST TAKE-OVER HIN SWA/NAMIBIA AND TO DOOM THAT COUNTRY TO TOTALITARIANISM, INTER-GROUP CONFLICT AND ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION?.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE MINIMUM THAT WE CAN DO TO AVOID SUCH AN OUTCOME IS TO COUNTERACT THE GROWING THREAT POSED BY THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS TO THE SECURITY OF OUR REGION. AS YOU KNOW, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT UNSCR 435 CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED WHILE CUBAN FORCES REMAIN IN ANGOLA. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET AND CUBAN INFLUENCE IN ANGOLA WOULD BE A GRAVE THREAT THE THE SECURITY OF ALL OF THE COUNTRIES OF OUR REGION, INCLUDING A FUTURE INDEPENDENT SWA/NAMIBIA. OTHER COUNTRIES I AFRICA SHARE OUR CONCERNS IN THIS REGARD.

THE SITUATION IS MADE MORE CRITICAL BY THE ESCALATION OF DIRECT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA. SOVIET STAFF OFFICERS ARE DIRECTING OFFENSIVES, WHICH ALSO INCLUDE CUBAN AND SWAPO ELEMENTS, SOVIET ADVISERS ARE STIFFENING THE RESOLVE OF FAPLA UNITS, AND SOVIET AND CUBAN PILOTS ARE FLYING SOME OF ANGOLA'S MIG 23 AIRCRAFT

INVOLVEMENT "COULD BE A DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE CIVIL WAR. IF UNCONTESTED, IT MIGHT ULTIMATELY LEAD TO THE DESTRUCTION OF UNITA, A NATIONALIST MOVEMENT WHICH IS A LEGITIMATE HEIR OF THE ALVOR AGREEMENT, WHICH IS PRO-WESTERN AND WHICH PROBABLY ENJOYS THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF ANGOLA'S PEOPLE.

THESE DEVELOPMENTS CONFRONT SOUTH AFRICA WITH DIFFICULT DECISIONS. WE CANNOT STAND ASIDE WHILE SOVIET-DIRECTED OFFENSIVES THREATEN UNITA AND JEOPARDISE THE SECURITY OF OUR REGION. AT THE SAME TIME SOUTH AFRICA HAS NO DESIRE TO BECOME INVOLVED IN A DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

THE WEST MUST ALSO MAKE SOME DIFFICULT DECISIONS. IT MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S CURRENT PROJECTION OF WILL IN ANGOLA CANNOT BE STOPPED BY GOOD INTENTIONS AND DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES ALONE. IT MUST NOT ALLOW THE SITUATION TO DEVELOP IN WHICH MODERATE AFRICAN STATES WILL DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT WHEN IT COMES TO THE TEST, THEY ARE NOT ABLE TO RELY ON THE WEST.

ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE MADE IT MORE URGENT THAN EVER THAT A FIRM AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED ON THE GENUINE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA. SOUTH AFRICA IS AT PRESENT ENGAGED IN AN INITIATIVE TO RE-ENERGISE THE TALKS ON THIS QUESTION.

WE CERTAINLY HOPE THAT THIS INITIATIVE WILL LEAD TO THE GENUINE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS AND TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT PLAN. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS CONCERNING THE BENEFITS WHICH WE MIGHT EXPECT TO DERIVE FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE SWA QUESTION. IN THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE IT WOULD BRING US ONLY A BRIEF RESPITE.

/ REPORTS

REPORTS ARE REACHING US ON RACIAL UNREST IN PARTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. THE MEDIA IS PROBABLY MAKING THESE EVENTS APPEAR CONSIDERABLY WORSE THAT THEY REALLY ARE. NEVERTHELESS, WE IN THIS COUNTRY WHO HAVE EXPERIENCED DISRUPTIVE EVENTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE HAVE GREAT SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING FOR THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH CONFRONT YOUR GOVERNMENT IN THIS RESPECT.

YOURS SINCERELY

P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MESSAGE ENDS

HOWE

DIST: MR POWELL
CONFIDENTIAL

CDP

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RECD: 220910

FM UKDEL NASSAU
TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA
TELNO GUIDANCE 1

OF 220355Z OCTOBER 85

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTTAWA, BONN, BRUSSELS,
AND TO IMMEDIATE COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS,
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, ATHENS, ROME, PRETORIA,
AND TO IMMEDIATE MASERU, MBABANE, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, LAGOS
AND TO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI, NEW DELHI, LUSAKA, HARARE, ADDIS ABABA
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, HMY BRITANNIA

SOUTHERN AFRICA : THE COMMONWEALTH ACCORD.

INTRODUCTION.

1. THE PRIME MINISTER GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 20 OCTOBER AFTER AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BY COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT NASSAU ON THE COMMONWEALTH ACCORD (TEXT OF DOCUMENT IN MY TELNO 33 TO FCO).

LINE TO TAKE

2. THIS AGREEMENT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA IS A MAJOR COMMONWEALTH ACHIEVEMENT.

3. A VITAL PART OF THE ACCORD IS THE CALL ON ALL SIDES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONFLICT TO SUSPEND VIOLENCE. THIS IS UNPRECEDENTED AND CONSTITUTES A CONSIDERABLE STEP FORWARD. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE ARE CALLING UPON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO LIFT THE BAN ON THE ANC.

4. THE INTENTION IS TO URGE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT THE NEED TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS TOWARDS FUNDAMENTAL REFORM. THE FORMS WHICH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA WILL TAKE ARE FOR THE PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY TO DETERMINE.

5. THE URGENT PRIORITY IS TO PROMOTE A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE GENUINE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY. THE ACCORD IS DESIGNED TO FURTHER THAT PROGRESS.

6. A SMALL GROUP OF QUOTE EMINENT COMMONWEALTH PERSONS UNQUOTE WILL BE SET UP TO ASSIST THIS PROCESS. WHO THEY WILL BE AND HOW THEY WILL OPERATE HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED.

/7.

7. IT IS THE TASK OF THE PRESIDENT OF ZAMBIA AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, BAHAMAS, BRITAIN, CANADA, INDIA AND ZIMBABWE TO WORK OUT TOGETHER WITH THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL HOW THE DIALOGUE CAN BE ASSISTED.

8. THE LIST OF MEASURES COMPRISES A NUMBER WHICH BRITAIN IS ALREADY OBSERVING. TWO ADDITIONAL MEASURES ARE INCLUDED: ACTION TO PRECLUDE THE IMPORT OF KRUGERRANDS= AND NO FURTHER GOVERNMENT FUNDING FOR TRADE MISSIONS TO SOUTH AFRICA OR PARTICIPATION IN EXHIBITIONS AND TRADE FAIRS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

9. WE MAY BE ASKED HOW WE RECONCILE THESE 'ECONOMIC MEASURES' WITH HMG'S OPPOSITION TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO BE OPPOSED TO ECONOMIC AND TRADE BOYCOTTS THAT WOULD BE DAMAGING TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY AND HARM THOSE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES WHOM WE ARE TRYING TO HELP. THESE MEASURES WOULD NOT HAVE THAT EFFECT. BUT, LIKE THE LUXEMBOURG MEASURES, THEY REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SIGNAL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OF THE NEED FOR URGENT AND FUNDAMENTAL REFORM.

10. THE PROCESS OF DIALOGUE AND THE MEASURES AGREED IN THE ACCORD ARE INTENDED TO BRING ABOUT PROGRESS TOWARDS CHANGE WITHIN SIX MONTHS. AFTER THAT PERIOD THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DETAILED IN PARAGRAPH 7 OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES WILL MEET TO REVIEW THE POSITION. IF ADEQUATE PROGRESS HAS NOT BEEN MADE BY THAT TIME SOME GOVERNMENTS HAVE STATED THAT THEY WILL CONSIDER THE ADOPTION OF FURTHER MEASURES. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT BRITAIN IS NOT COMMITTED TO THE FURTHER STEPS SET OUT AT THE END OF THE ACCORD.

ADDITIONAL POINT

11. IF PRESSED ABOUT THE IMPACT ON UK INTERESTS, YOU CAN TAKE THE LINE THAT WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT THE WITHDRAWAL OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR TRADE MISSIONS AND PARTICIPATION IN FAIRS WILL NECESSARILY RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF NEW BUSINESS. BRITISH EXPORTERS REMAIN FREE TO EXERCISE THEIR COMMERCIAL JUDGEMENT ON TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA, MANY DO SO WITHOUT TAXPAYER'S SUPPORT.

BACKGROUND

12. DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS OPENED IN THE SECOND EXECUTIVE SESSION ON 17 OCTOBER BY KAUNDA AND CONTINUED TO THE END OF THE THIRD EXECUTIVE SESSION ON 18 OCTOBER. THE MAIN THRUST WAS UPON SOUTH AFRICA RATHER THAN NAMIBIA.

13. A NUMBER OF SPEAKERS PRESENTED THE CASE FOR A STRONG SIGNAL BASED ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS CALLING UPON SOUTH AFRICA TO DISMANTLE APARTHEID AND INSTITUTE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE. THE PRIME MINISTER SPOKE ON 18 OCTOBER. SHE POINTED FIRMLY TO THE NEED FOR A POSITIVE APPROACH. AND SHE REITERATED THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IN ACHIEVING THIS AIM. SHE IDENTIFIED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND BLACK SOUTH AFRICAN LEADERS AS THE FIRST PRIORITY. HER RINGING CONDEMNATION OF APARTHEID WAS WELCOMED. THE ISSUE OF SANCTIONS WAS, HOWEVER, NOT RESOLVED, AND IT WAS AGREED THAT DISCUSSION WOULD HAVE TO BE CARRIED FORWARD TO THE RETREAT.

14. THERE WERE INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA OVER THE WEEK-END. THE PRIME MINISTER RAISED FIRMLY THE NEED TO CALL FOR AN END TO VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA AS A CONDITION FOR DIALOGUE. A PROGRAMME OF COMMON ACTION WAS DRAWN UP AS A DEMONSTRATION OF THE OPPOSITION OF COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS TO APARTHEID. THE TEXT WAS AGREED UNCHANGED AT A PLENARY SESSION HELD AT LYFORD CAY ON THE EVENING OF 20 OCTOBER. THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONTRIBUTION WAS PRAISED AND THE MEETING ENDED WITH A ROUND OF APPLAUSE FOR HER.

HOWE

DIST:
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CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

21 October 1985

W
22/10.

MB

Dear Tim,

Message from President Machel of Mozambique to the
Prime Minister

I attach the translation of a letter to the Prime Minister from President Machel dated 15 October in which he expresses his appreciation for the reception accorded to him in London on 27 September (the original letter is following by bag). I also attach an account by our Ambassador at Maputo of a discussion with the Foreign Minister, Sr Chissano, who had been instructed to express President Machel's thanks orally in addition to the letter. As you will see, President Machel clearly views his call on the Prime Minister as a success ("they had achieved as much in London in one day as 2 weeks in the US"), and much appreciates the Prime Minister's readiness to receive him at such short notice.

We do not consider that President Machel's letter calls for any reply from the Prime Minister.


Yours Sincerely,
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street

1 of 100 and 2 (unintelligible)

London, 27th July





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 October 1985

Dear Tim,

IN DATE ORDER ON FILE

I enclose the signed original of the letter of 9 October from President Botha to the Prime Minister which our Embassy in Pretoria have now forwarded to us.

Yours Sincerely,


Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street

For sale and exchange only

London SW1Z 9AT



CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO DESKBY 212000Z UKDEL NASSAU (FOR PRIME MINISTERS PARTY)

TELNO 69

OF 211930Z OCTOBER 1985

INFO DESKBY 220745Z LUXEMBOURG, IMMEDIATE PRETORIA,

UKREP BRUSSELS, ATHENS,

AND TO BRUSSELS, BONN, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, PARIS, THE HAGUE,
AND TO ROME.

INFO PRIORITY, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.

AND TO UKNIS NEW YORK

SOUTH AFRICA: COMMONWEALTH ACCORD

1. WE ARE BEING GUIDED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S LINE AT HER PRESS CONFERENCE IN INTERPRETATION OF THE NASSAU AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF POINTS OF DETAIL ON WHICH IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE AN AGREED LINE TO TAKE IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH PRESS ENQUIRIES AND THE DEBATES ON NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA DUE IN THE LORDS AND COMMONS RESPECTIVELY ON 22 AND 23 OCTOBER.

2. MOST OF THESE POINTS REVOLVE AROUND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE FURTHER ECONOMIC MEASURES. THE LINE WHICH WE WOULD PROPOSE TO TAKE SUBJECT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S APPROVAL, IS AS FOLLOWS. (THE TREASURY AND DTI CONCUR.)

(A) A BAN ON ALL NEW GOVERNMENT LOANS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS AGENCIES.

PROPOSED LINE: THIS BAN CONTINUES EXISTING GOVERNMENT POLICY AS SET OUT IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER OF 3 SEPTEMBER TO MR KIMMOCK. THERE ARE NO OUTSTANDING GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT LOANS BETWEEN THE UK AND SOUTH AFRICA. (IF ASKED ABOUT ECGD COVER FOR EXPORT CREDIT TO SOUTH AFRICAN PARASTATALS EG ESCOM. ECGD COVER IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THIS MEASURE).

(3) A BAN ON IMPORT OF KRUGERRANDS PROPOSED LINE: DTI IS LOOKING INTO MODALITIES OF PRECLUDING THE IMPORT OF KRUGERRANDS.

(CONFIDENTIAL BACKGROUND NOT FOR USE: LEGAL ADVISERS CONSIDER THAT KRUGERRANDS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE TRADE PROVISIONS OF THE EEC TREATY. THE UK CAN THEREFORE IMPOSE A UNILATERAL BAN, SUBJECT ONLY TO ITS DUTY TO NOTIFY THE COMMISSION. THE GATT PROBLEM REMAINS BUT IF OTHERS EG THE US AND THE NORDICS ARE UNDETERRED BY IT, IT IS LIKELY TO BE MORE THEORETICAL THAN PRACTICAL. THERE MAY HOWEVER BE PROBLEMS FOR HONG KONG IN A BAN WHICH WE NEED TO CONSIDER).

(C) NO GOVERNMENT FUNDING FOR TRADE MISSIONS OR PARTICIPATION IN EXHIBITIONS OR TRADE FAIRS. PROPOSED LINE: THE DTI WILL BE HALTING NEW FUNDING FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES. (IF ASKED:) THERE ARE 11 TRADE MISSIONS CURRENTLY IN PROSPECT. DTI HAVE ALREADY GIVEN FINAL APPROVAL TO 3 TRADE MISSIONS DUE TO LEAVE WITHIN THE NEXT MONTH AND TO A VENTURE AT A TRADE FAIR DUE IN 3 WEEKS.

THEY PROPOSE TO HONOUR

THESE BINDING COMMITMENTS BUT WITHDRAW OFFERS IN PRINCIPLE, IN RESPECT OF SUBSEQUENT TRADE MISSIONS).

(D) BAN ON COMPUTER EQUIPMENT TO SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY, POLICE OR SECURITY FORCES. PROPOSED LINE: SUCH EXPORTS ARE ALREADY SUBJECT TO LICENCE IN THE UK UNDER THE TERMS OF THE EXPORT OF GOODS CONTROL ORDER. (CONFIDENTIAL BACKGROUND, NOT FOR USE: THE REFERENCE TO EQUIPMENT 'CAPABLE OF USE' BY SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES DIFFER FROM THE WORDING OF THE EQUIVALENT LUXEMBOURG MEASURE AND TAKEN LITERALLY WOULD PRECLUDE ALL COMPUTER SALES TO ANY SOUTH AFRICAN CUSTOMER. WE ASSUME HOWEVER THAT THE INTENTION IS THE SAME AS IN THE LUXEMBOURG MEASURE.

(E) BAN ON NEW CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE AND EXPORT OF NUCLEAR GOODS, MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGY TO SOUTH AFRICA. PROPOSED LINE: THIS IS SIMILAR TO THE LUXEMBOURG MEASURE CALLING FOR NO NEW NUCLEAR COLLABORATION. NUCLEAR EXPORTS ARE SUBJECT TO LICENCE IN THE UK UNDER THE TERMS OF THE EXPORT OF GOODS CONTROL ORDER. FOR SOME YEARS WE HAVE NOT SUPPLIED ANY NUCLEAR MATERIALS, NUCLEAR FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT AND RELATED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT. (CONFIDENTIAL BACKGROUND, NOT FOR USE: THERE IS A POSSIBLE GREY AREA OVER WHAT IS MEANT BY NUCLEAR GOODS. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN EXPORTS SUCH AS ISOTOPES FOR HOSPITALS WHICH WE WOULD NOT WISH TO BAN. CONTROL OF EXPORTS OF 'TECHNOLOGY' IS A DIFFICULT SUBJECT. WHILE WE CAN CONTROL DOCUMENTS ETC WE CANNOT CONTROL THE MOVEMENT OF EXPERTS.)

(F) (G), (H) BAN ON OIL EXPORTS: EMBARGO ON ARMS IMPORTS: EMBARGO ON MILITARY CO-OPERATION PROPOSED LINE: SAME AS FOR THE EQUIVALENT LUXEMBOURG MEASURES.

(I) DISCOURAGEMENT OF CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVENTS PROPOSED LINE: SAME AS FOR THE EQUIVALENT LUXEMBOURG MEASURE. DISCOURAGEMENT APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE EVENTS WHICH HAVE A POSSIBLE ROLE IN SUPPORTING APARTHEID. BRITISH COUNCIL'S ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA DIRECTED TOWARDS ASSISTANCE FOR BLACK EDUCATION. DO NOT CONSIDER NORMAL RUN OF SCIENTIFIC CONTACTS BETWEEN THE UK AND SOUTH AFRICA SUPPORTIVE OF APARTHEID.

3. ON THE GENERAL QUESTION OF HOW WE RECONCILE THESE 'ECONOMIC MEASURES' WITH HMG'S OPPOSITION TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO BE OPPOSED TO ECONOMIC AND TRADE BOYCOTTS THAT WOULD BE DAMAGING TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY AND HARM THOSE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES WHOM WE ARE TRYING TO HELP. WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THESE MEASURES WOULD HAVE THAT EFFECT. BUT, LIKE THE LUXEMBOURG MEASURES, THEY REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SIGNAL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OF THE NEED FOR URGENT AND FUNDAMENTAL REFORM.

4. IF PRESSED ABOUT THE IMPACT ON UK INTERESTS, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT THE WITHDRAWAL OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR TRADE MISSIONS AND FAIRS PARTICIPATION TO RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF NEW BUSINESS. BRITISH EXPORTERS REMAIN FREE TO EXERCISE THEIR COMMERCIAL JUDGMENT ON TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA, MANY DO SO WITHOUT TAXPAYERS' SUPPORT.

5. THERE IS CLEARLY A RISK THAT THE CHOGM PACKAGE AND THE NEW NORDIC PACKAGE IN WHICH THE DANES HAVE AGREED TO MORE EXTENDED LIST OF ADDITIONAL MEASURES WILL PROVOKE OUR PARTNERS TO REOPEN THE LUXEMBOURG PACKAGE. THERE MAY WELL BE PRESSURE FOR THIS AT THE INFORMAL FOREIGN MINISTERS' WEEKEND MEETING ON 25/27 OCTOBER.

6. FOR THE TIME BEING WE RECOMMEND THAT EC POSTS SHOULD TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE:

THE LUXEMBOURG PACKAGE WAS OF COURSE THE BASIS OF OUR POSITION WITH OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS. NATURALLY WE WOULD BE HAPPY IF OTHER PARTNERS TOOK THE SAME ACTION, BUT THIS REMAINS A MATTER FOR NATIONAL DECISION (AS WERE ALL THE LUXEMBOURG MEASURES).

THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF RE-OPENING THE LUXEMBOURG PACKAGE.

7. DONN WILL NEED TO TELL THE GERMANS THAT WE DO NOT REGARD THE MINIMAL CONCESSIONS MADE AT CHOGM AS BREACHING THE PRINCIPLE THAT WE OPPOSE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. THE PM MADE CLEAR AT HER PRESS CONFERENCE THAT SHE WAS NOT ONE OF THOSE WHO WANTED TO IMPOSE ADDITIONAL MEASURES AT THE END OF THE 6 MONTH PERIOD.

8. GREATFUL FOR INSTRUCTION BY IF POSSIBLE, DESKBY 220430Z REPEATED DESKBY TO LUXEMBOURG

HOWE

SUBJECT cc ops
master

cc ALSGS
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FM CHOGM TO PRETO
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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
CAFJ
MR WRIGHT DTI
MR KANE SA BUS

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NASSAU
TO FLASH PRETORIA
TELNO 1
OF 210432Z OCTOBER 85

SERIAL No. T 195A/85

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TODAY
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

FIRST LET ME THANK YOU FOR YOUR VERY FULL LETTER OF 4 OCTOBER
SETTING OUT YOUR GOVERNMENT'S REFORM PROGRAMME.
I FOUND IT HELPFUL TO HAVE THIS BEFORE OUR COMMONWEALTH HEADS
OF GOVERNMENT MEETING.

THAT MEETING IS JUST COMING TO AN END. IT HAS BEEN
DOMINATED BY THE ISSUE OF SOUTH AFRICA AND BY DEMANDS
FROM VIRTUALLY ALL THE PARTICIPANTS FOR EXTENSIVE TRADE AND
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST YOUR GOVERNMENT. I HAVE FOUND MYSELF
TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES ALONE IN RESISTING THESE. IN DOING SO,
I HAVE PLACED GREAT WEIGHT ON YOUR ASSURANCE TO ME THAT YOU
ARE TAKING STEPS TO END ALL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND TO GIVE
EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTICIPATION BY ALL COMMUNITIES
IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

THE OUTCOME OF OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE HAS BEEN A DECLARATION
SETTING OUT OUR APPROACH. THIS COMPRISES A FIRM CONDEMNATION OF
APARTHEID, A CALL FOR A POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOUTH
AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY
IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES,
AND A POLITICAL SIGNAL TO YOUR GOVERNMENT BY THE INTRODUCTION OF
SPECIFIC MEASURES. IN OUR CASE, THESE ARE THE MEASURES WHICH
WE ARE ALREADY TAKING WITH TWO VERY MINOR ADDITIONS:
ACTION TO PRECLUDE IMPORT OF KRUGERRANDS AND WITHDRAWAL OF
OFFICIAL SUPPORT FOR TRADE MISSIONS AND FAIRS. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE
VERY MINOR INDEED, I SHOULD FRANKLY HAVE PREFERRED NOT TO
TAKE THESE STEPS. BUT THEY WERE NECESSARY TO SECURE THE
REFERENCE TO AN END TO VIOLENCE AND SUPPORT FOR A DIALOGUE.

IT IS ALSO PROPOSED TO ESTABLISH A GROUP OF QUOTE
EMINENT COMMONWEALTH PERSONS UNQUOTE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH
YOUR GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL COMMUNITIES
TO ENCOURAGE THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN SOUTH AFRICA.
MAY I URGE YOU TO WELCOME THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GROUP AND
OFFER IN PRINCIPLE TO CO-OPERATE WITH IT. IT WOULD UNDERMINE
THE EFFORTS WHICH I HAVE MADE TO RESIST PRESSURE FOR TRADE AND
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA IF YOU WERE TO REJECT
THE PROPOSED MISSION. WE SHALL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF THE
DETAILS AS THEY EMERGE; AND SHALL DO OUR BEST TO IMPRESS ON
THE MEMBERS OF THE PROPOSED GROUP THE NEED TO AVOID PREJUDICIAL
STATEMENTS AND POSITIONS (THOUGH YOU WILL RECOGNISE
THAT SOME THINGS ARE BOUND TO BE SAID WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT
WILL FIND DISTASTEFUL).

I SINCERELY BELIEVE THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING
AS A WHOLE CAN BE REGARDED AS NOT UNHELPFUL FROM SOUTH AFRICA'S
POINT OF VIEW AND AS LENDING SUPPORT TO THE COURSE ON WHICH
YOUR GOVERNMENT IS EMBARKED.

YOURS SINCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER

HOWE

YYYY

UZLNAN 0048

NNNN

File No.
Department
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn.

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence FLASH
DESK BY Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time) Z	POST BY Z
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PREAMBLE *from NASSAU*

(Time of Origin) Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
 (Security Class.) **CONFIDENTIAL** (Caveat)
 (Codeword) (Privacy marking)
 (Desk by) Z

TO **FLASH** **PRETORIA** Tel. No. of
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND TO SAVING

INFO

INFO SAVING

Distribution:—

[TEXT]

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FROM
THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA

Dear Mr. President,

First let me thank you for your very full letter of
4 October setting out your government's reform programme.
I found it helpful to have this before our Commonwealth
Heads of Government Meeting.

That Meeting is just coming to an end. It has been
dominated by the issue of South Africa and by demands
from virtually all the participants for extensive trade
and economic sanctions against your government. I have
found myself to all intents and purposes alone in

/ resisting

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

resisting these. In doing so, I have placed great weight on your assurance to me that you are taking steps to end all racial discrimination and to give effect to the principle of participation by all communities in the political process.

The outcome of our discussions here has been a declaration setting out our approach. This comprises a firm condemnation of apartheid, a call for a political dialogue between the South African Government and representatives of the black community in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, and a political signal to your government by the introduction of specific measures. In our case, these are the measures which we are already taking with two very minor additions:: action to preclude import of Krugerrands and withdrawal of official support for trade missions and fairs. Although they are very minor indeed, I should frankly have preferred not to take these steps but they were necessary to secure the reference to an end to violence and support for a dialogue.

It is also proposed to establish a group of "eminent Commonwealth persons" to make contact with your government and representatives of all communities to encourage the process of political dialogue in South Africa. May I urge you to welcome the establishment of the group and offer in principle to co-operate with it. It would undermine the efforts which I have made to resist pressure for change and economic sanctions against South Africa if you were to reject the proposed mission. We shall keep you informed of the details as they emerge: and shall do our best to impress on the members of the proposed group the need to avoid prejudicial statements and positions (though you will recognise that some things are bound to be said which your government will find distasteful).

/ I sincerely

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

-3-

I sincerely believe that the outcome of the meeting as a whole can be regarded as not unhelpful from South Africa's point of view and as lending support to the course on which your government is embarked.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Telype Clark to

Belkica.

Please pass following message

as soon as possible from the Prime Minister to President Belkica.

Dear Mr. President

First let me thank you for your very full letter of 4 October setting out your government's reform programme. I found it helpful to have this before our Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

That Meeting is just coming to an end. It has been dominated by the issue of South Africa and by demands from virtually all the participants for extensive trade and economic sanctions against your government. I have found myself to all intents and purposes alone in resisting these. In doing so, I have placed great weight on your assurance to me that you are taking steps to end all racial discrimination and to give effect to the principle of participation by all communities in the political process.

The outcome of our discussions here ^{has been} ~~is likely to be~~ a declaration setting out ^{our} ~~a~~ ^{multiple} approach to ~~South Africa by the Commonwealth.~~ This ~~will~~ comprises a firm condemnation of apartheid, a call for a political dialogue between the South African government and representatives of the black community, ^{in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides.} ~~an appeal to both sides to end violence and seek a solution through negotiation,~~ and a firm political signal to your government by the introduction of specific measures. In our case, these are the measures which we are already taking with two very minor additions: affecting Krugerrands and ^{withdrawal of} official support for trade missions and fairs. ^{Frankly} ~~Frankly~~ I should ^{frankly} have preferred not to take these steps

action to preclude impact of Krugerrands

Although they are very minor indeed,

but they were necessary to secure the reference to an end to violence and support for a dialogue.

It is also proposed to establish a group of eminent Commonwealth persons^u to make contact with your government and representatives of all communities to encourage the process of political dialogue in South Africa. May I urge you to welcome the establishment of the group and offer in principle to co-operate with it. It would undermine the efforts which I have made to resist pressure for trade and economic sanctions against South Africa if you were to reject the proposed mission. We shall keep you informed of the ^{details} modalities as they emerge: and shall do our best to impress on the members of the proposed group the need to avoid prejudicial statements and positions (though you will recognise that some things are bound to be said which your government will find distasteful).

I sincerely believe that the outcome of the meeting as a whole can be regarded as not unhelpful from South Africa's point of view and as lending support to the course on which your government is embarked.

Yours sincerely,



Margaret Thatcher.

The Honourable P. W. Botha, DMS



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

I fought this on the grounds that you did not need any way to have a dialogue, indeed that was your intention you were already moving in this direction. But it is a price of security agreement.

First let me thank you for your very full letter of 4 October setting out your government's reform programme. I found it helpful to be ~~armed with~~ ^{have} this ^{before} at our Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

That Meeting is just coming to an end. It has been dominated by the issue of South Africa and by demands from virtually all the participants for extensive trade and economic sanctions against your government. I have found myself to all intents and purposes alone in resisting these. In doing so, I have placed great weight on your assurance to me that you are taking steps to end all racial discrimination and to give effect to the principle of participation by all communities in the political process.

The outcome of our discussions here is likely to be a declaration setting out a multiple approach to South Africa by the Commonwealth. This will comprise a firm condemnation of apartheid, a call for a political dialogue between the South African government and representatives of the black community, an appeal to ^{both sides} blacks to end violence and seek a solution through negotiation, ^{and} a firm political signal to your government by the introduction of specific measures ^{which in our case, are those} ~~which we are already taking~~ and additional assistance to training for the black community in South Africa.

to measure

~~with the addition of two~~ two very minor additions affecting Krugers and official support for trade missions & fairs. Frankly I should have preferred ^{It} not to take these steps ~~but~~ ^{they were necessary} to ~~prevent~~ ^{prevent} the ~~return~~ ^{return} to violence & support for a dialogue.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Rev report will be considered in six months time. A member of Commonwealth

It is also proposed to establish a group of eminent Commonwealth persons to make contact with your government and representatives of all communities to ~~assist~~ ^{exchange} the process of political dialogue in South Africa. ~~The intention is that this group should consist of the President of Zambia and the Prime Ministers of Australia, Canada, India and the United Kingdom.~~ May I urge you ~~most strongly~~ to welcome the establishment of the group and offer in principle to co-operate with it. It would undermine ~~all~~ the efforts which I have made to resist pressure for ~~additional measures~~ ^{take a secret sanction} against South Africa if you were to reject ~~or adopt a disobliging attitude towards~~ the proposed mission. ~~We~~ shall of ~~course~~ keep you informed of the modalities as they emerge: and shall do my best to impress on the ~~other~~ members of the proposed group the need to avoid prejudicial statements and positions (though you will recognise that some things are bound to be said which your government will find distasteful).

I sincerely believe that the outcome of the meeting as a whole can be regarded as not unhelpful from South Africa's point of view and as lending support to the course on which your government is embarked. ~~provided that course is pursued with vigour and through the implementation of concrete steps.~~

The Honourable P. W. Botha, DMS

CONFIDENTIAL

Robert Adley MP

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 October 1985

I attach self-explanatory correspondence between the Prime Minister and Robert Adley, M.P. As you will see, Mr. Adley has specifically asked that the Prime Minister should reply to his suggestion that the British Government should threaten to withdraw from South Africans holding any such rights to British citizenship unless there was progress in South Africa. You may know that Mr. Adley amplified this suggestion in an interview in the 'Today' programme earlier this week.

I should be grateful for a draft reply by Friday 1 November.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to Colin Budd (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

(Timothy Flesher)

Ms. Clare Pelham,
Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

FN MAPUTO

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 488

OF 160800Z OCTOBER 85

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PRETORIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

MIPT

MACHEL'S MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER.

1. WITHIN THE FORMALITY OF THANKS, THE LANGUAGE IS WARM. THE STYLE 'DEAR SENHORA PRIME MINISTER' IS UNUSUALLY INFORMAL FOR HERE AND INTENDED TO INDICATE FRIENDSHIP BEYOND THE POLITENESS OF PROTOCOL. THE PORTUGUESE OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH CARRIES TONES OF APPRECIATION FOR THE SCRUPULOUS WAY ('DILIGENCIA') IN WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ALWAYS FOLLOWED UP THEIR CONVERSATIONS, MOST RECENTLY BY WRITING TO PRESIDENT BOTHA. WHEN GIVING ME THE MESSAGE, CHISSANO DREW ATTENTION TO MACHEL'S GRATITUDE FOR THIS (MY TELNO 481).
2. CHISSANO SAID THAT, AS I KNEW (FROM STANDING BY AT SHORT NOTICE FOR AN INFORMAL AUDIENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT AT ONE OF HIS HOUSES), MACHEL HAD WANTED TO EXPRESS HIS THANKS PERSONALLY TO THE THREE GOVERNMENTS THROUGH THE AMBASSADORS. THIS HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE AT THE LAST MOMENT. HE HAD THEREFORE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONVEY MACHEL'S THANKS ORALLY INDIVIDUALLY AS WELL AS BY LETTER. OUR READINESS TO RECEIVE THE PRESIDENT WAS MUCH APPRECIATED. THE TALKS HAD BEEN USEFUL AND GOOD. THE ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN EXCELLENT. THANKING HIM I SAID THAT I HAD REPORTS NOT ONLY FROM THE OFFICIAL SIDE OF THE PROGRAMME. BUSINESSMEN PRESENT HAD SPOKEN OF THE IMPACT MACHEL'S PERSONALITY HAD MADE ON THEM AT THE LANCASTER HOUSE LUNCH. THIS WAS EQUALLY IMPORTANT. GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS WERE ONLY A PART OF THE STORY.
3. ON THE DETAIL OF THE DISCUSSIONS, CHISSANO SAID THEY HAD BEEN CONCERNED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD THOUGHT MACHEL WAS 'ANGRY' WITH HER OVER SANCTIONS. PERHAPS A MESSAGE FROM WASHINGTON OR ELSEWHERE HAD BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD. MACHEL RECOGNISED OUR DIFFICULTIES AND RESPECTED THE SINCERITY OF OUR VIEWS, EVEN THE VALIDITY IN OUR ARGUMENTS. THE QUESTION WAS DIFFICULT FOR BOTH OF US. BUT APARTHEID AND THE WEAPONS AGAINST IT WERE MORAL QUESTIONS FOR MOZAMBIQUE, IN WHICH ECONOMICS DID NOT ALWAYS HAVE THE PRIME CLAIM. THEY WERE NOT CALLING FOR DISINVESTMENT OR A FULL RANGE OF MANDATORY ECONOMIC SANCTIONS NOW. HE HAD HIMSELF INDICATED IN LONDON IN JULY AS OUR

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GUEST THE AREAS OF COMMON APPRECIATION OF THE PROBLEM AND THOSE ARGUMENTS THE MOZAMBICANS COULD APPRECIATE. THEY HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS ALSO THAT THEY WERE NOT SEEKING DISINVESTMENT BUT THE WEAPONS OF SANCTIONS COULD BE A POWERFUL ONE, WHICH AS THE PRESIDENT HAD EXPLAINED, MIGHT HAVE TO BE PURSUED. WHAT HAD WORRIED MACHEL IN WASHINGTON WAS THE DEGREE OR OUR ISOLATION ON THIS. THE REPORTS COMING IN FROM MUGABES AND OTHERS VISITS TO HAVANA HIGHLIGHTED THIS. THE PRESSURE FROM PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST AS WELL AS OTHER CONTINENTS FOR MOVEMENT ON APARTHEID WOULD NOT GO AWAY.

4. I REHEARSED OUR VIEWS AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE WERE AS MUCH AS OTHERS ALREADY LIMITING OUR CONTACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA. I ASSURED CHISSANO THAT THE RECORDS OF THE MEETINGS I HAD RECEIVED SHOWED THAT THE TALKS WERE FRANK AND CLEAR. I KNEW THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF MACHEL'S CLARIFICATION.

COMMENT

5. MOZAMBICANS CONTINUE TO LET THIRD PARTIES KNOW THAT THE LONDON VISIT WAS A SUCCESS. THE MOST INTERESTING COMMENT PASSED ON IS FROM CHISSANO TO THE UNHCR REPRESENTATIVE, A CAPE VERDIAN WITH LIBERATION MOVEMENT PROXIMITY TO THE LEADERSHIP OFTEN USED AS A LUSOPHONE MESSENGER. CHISSANO SAID THAT THEY HAD ACHIEVED AS MUCH IN LONDON IN ONE DAY AS TWO WEEKS IN THE U.S. THE BRITISH KNEW MACHEL'S BLEND OF FORMALITY AND INFORMALITY AND HOW TO WORK WITH THEM.

7. ONCE AGAIN I HAVE TO RECORD THE IMPORTANCE MACHEL AND CHISSANO ATTACH TO DIALOGUE WITH US. WITH SECURITY STILL SO DIFFICULT IT GIVES THEM REASSURANCE IN THEIR LONELY BALANCING ACT BETWEEN PRAGMATISM AND AFRICAN PACT FOLLOWING.

VINES

LIMITED
CFD
SDFD
PS
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/MS
MR FERGUSSON
MR JOHNSON

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DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET
TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-215 5422
SWITCHBOARD 01-215 7877

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

16 October 1985

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AL

WBM
L

Dr Geoffrey Howe,

SOUTH AFRICA: EC CODE OF CONDUCT

I have been considering whether we should accept the draft text of the revised Code of Conduct which was produced by the ad hoc group of EC Member States' officials in Luxembourg on 4 October.

2 My conclusion is that, while the text is not perfect, it represents about the best result we could realistically hope for.

3 As you know, my officials consulted the CBI and the UK-South Africa Trade Association (UKSATA) and several companies with major South African interests before we embarked on this exercise with our partners. In the light of the comments we received from industry, we drew up a list of objectives and proposals.

4 We firmly opposed proposals for making the Code mandatory and were determined to resist changes which would have jeopardised UK companies' existing high level of voluntary co-operation. The most objectionable of these would have entailed some form of official, public assessment of individual companies' performance under the Code; would have encouraged black South African trades unions to comment on individual company reports and would have increased companies' financial and other burdens at a time when their trading returns were diminished by the South African recession.

5 On the positive side, we wished to see the Code up-dated to focus on areas which are now of greater relevance and concern than when it was adopted in 1977. Education, training, black career development and wider community projects are examples of such areas, in all of which British companies are already active, as their Code reports show. You may also have noted that Sir James Cleminson, in the draft (which he sent to both of us) of the speech

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he was proposing to deliver in South Africa on 15 October, listed these as areas where the private sector must continue to be involved in a constructive and beneficial way.

6 We also aimed to use this revision to secure the adoption of procedures for implementing and monitoring the Code and of more precise wording in areas where the existing Code was decidedly vague, to bring our partners up to the standards of reporting and performance observed by the UK Government and the vast majority of British companies. We attached particular importance to all partners making their national and company reports publicly available, as ours and only three of our partners' national reports currently are.

7 All these objectives were achieved. We could, of course, press for further improvements to the text on points which we would prefer to see expressed differently. But to do so would make it harder to prevent others from seeking to do likewise, with a risk that issues of substance, as well as presentation, would be reopened.

8 There may be a particular risk of this in relation to the minimum pay requirements. The formulation in the revised text is now completely in line with the way in which we interpreted for British companies the requirements of the existing Code, in the 1978 Command Paper. But as your officials will no doubt have told you, the Dutch (and to a lesser extent, the Danes) were distinctly unhappy with this and pressed for a higher level, which would have increased the cost of complying with the Code's minimum pay provisions by around 15 per cent.

9 If we now notify our partners promptly that we can accept the draft text as circulated following the 4 October meeting, we may be able to wrong foot the Dutch. I propose that we do so.

10 Given the pace of the drafting process, we have been unable to consult the CBI or UKSATA on proposed textual amendments. But, as explained above, we agreed with them beforehand the objectives which have now been met. We have continued to keep in close touch and took advantage of the presence of representatives of both organisations for a meeting with Paul Channon on 2 October to brief them on how our discussions with our partners were proceeding. No company which is currently performing well under the existing Code should have difficulty in complying with the Code as amended by the present draft. I accordingly anticipate no significant complaints from British industry, although the revised text may of course come under fire from those of our opponents who feel that our companies should be doing more.

... 11 For ease of reference, I am enclosing a copy of the unofficial translation which my officials have prepared of the revised draft

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text of the Code. New or substantially altered passages have been sidelined. Our predecessors published the text of the 1977 Code in a Command Paper and we shall have to consider following suit, once the revised Code is agreed by all our partners.

12 I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Prime Minister, other members of OD and David Young.

LEON BRITTAN

Leon
LB

JF2AHV

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COMPANIES WITH SUBSIDIARIES, BRANCHES OR REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The present Code is addressed to European companies with subsidiaries, branches or representation in South Africa

The objective of this Code is to contribute to the abolition of apartheid.

None of the provisions of the Code can be interpreted as discriminating between the different racial communities in South Africa.

TEXT OF THE CODE

1. Relations within the Undertaking

(A) Companies should ensure that all their employees irrespective of racial or other distinction are allowed to choose freely and without any hindrance the type of organisation to represent them.

(B) Companies should pay particular attention to emerging black trade unions and be ready to recognise them.

(C) Companies should be ready to sign recognition agreements with representative black trade unions in the company itself and allow collective bargaining to develop, including the signature of collective agreements, in line with internationally recognised labour standards. Employers should regularly and unequivocally inform their employees that consultations and collective bargaining with organisations which are freely elected and representative of the employees are part of their company policy.

(D) Companies should do everything to inform their employees within the company of their social and union rights. Employers should do everything possible to ensure that black African employees are free to form or join a trade union of their choice. Steps should be taken in particular to permit trade union officials to explain to employees the aims of trade unions and the advantages of membership, to distribute and display trade union documentation on their premises, to have reasonable time off to carry out their union duties without loss of pay and to organise meetings. Employers should promote participation of union members in training programmes on union activities.

(E) Companies should do everything to establish a relationship of confidence with their employees, notably by putting at their disposal the text of the EC Code of Conduct and by informing them at an accessible place and in an appropriate language of the company's performance in implementing the Code.

(F) Where works or liaison committees operate, trade union officials should have representative status on these bodies, if employees so wish. The existence of these types of committees should not prejudice the development or status of trade unions or of their representatives.

2. MIGRANT LABOUR

(A) The policy of apartheid calls for a system of migrant labour which denies the individual the freedom for seeking and obtaining a job of his choice. It also causes grave social and family problems.

(B) Employers have the social responsibility to contribute towards ensuring freedom of movement for black African employees and making it possible for these employees to lead a family life.

(C) Employers should make it their concern to alleviate, as much as possible, certain effects of existing regulations, notably in facilitating the regular renewal of contracts of employment and the installation of the families of employees in the vicinity of the companies.

3. PAY AND WAGE STRUCTURE

(A)* Companies should assume a special responsibility as regards the pay and working conditions of black African employees. In this context they should refer to the data of the University of South Africa (UNISA). They should formulate specific policies aimed at improving their terms of employment. Pay based on the "Supplemented Living Level" for a family of average size should be considered as the absolutely necessary minimum. Companies should however strive to exceed this level in fixing pay levels. In their reports companies should provide the explanations required, and notably give details of the pay scales of their employees and of the possibilities of progress in this context.

* Certain delegations made a reservation on this paragraph.

(B) The principle of equal opportunities for all employees should be fully respected. The principle of equal pay for equal work means that all jobs should be open to any worker who possess suitable qualifications, irrespective of racial or other distinction, and that wages should be based on a qualitative job evaluation. The same pay scales should be applied to the same work.

4. TRAINING AND BLACK AFRICAN ADVANCEMENT

(A) The principle of equal pay for equal work would however be meaningless if black African employees were kept in inferior jobs. Employers should therefore draw up an appropriate range of training schemes of a suitable standard to provide training for their black workforce and should reduce their dependence on immigrant white labour.

(B) Companies should take steps to enable black employees to have access to supervisory, highly skilled and executive posts. Companies should, if possible, organise training programmes for their black workers. Black workers should be assisted by companies to take advantage of further educational schemes and of professional training outside the workplace. Where necessary, companies should establish or utilise educational facilities to permit their black employees to benefit from more specialised training.

(C) Companies will do their utmost to eliminate in practice de facto or customary restrictions on the apprenticeship of black workers. They should ensure that the participation of employees from different racial groups in training programmes takes place in a totally desegregated context.

5. FRINGE BENEFITS

(A) In view of their social responsibilities, companies should concern themselves with the living conditions of their employees and families.

(B) For this purpose funds could be set aside for use, complementary to provisions in force on the national scale:

- in providing complete programmes of insurance for employees and their families (health, accident, unemployment and old age assurance);
- in ensuring that their employees and their families benefit from adequate medical care;
- for the education of members of families;
- in the housing of black African personnel and their families, in particular encouraging home ownership;
- in transport from place of residence to place of work and back;
- in providing their employees with assistance in problems they encounter with the authorities over their movement from one place to another, their choice of residence and their employment;
- in providing leisure facilities.

(C) Companies should support projects which aim to improve the quality of life in the black communities from which they draw their workforce.

6. DESEGREGATION AT THE WORKPLACE

(A) Employers should do everything to eliminate any practice of segregation, notably at the workplace, in canteens, in the fields of education and professional training as well as in sporting activities. They should also ensure equal conditions of work for all their workforce.

(B) Besides the advancement of black employees, companies should directly encourage interpersonal contacts, better mutual understanding and closer integration between employees from different racial groups. Companies should encourage the sporting activities of their employees from different racial groups in mixed teams and mixed competitions.

7. ENCOURAGEMENT OF BLACK BUSINESSES

In the framework of their activities and as far as possible, companies should strive to encourage the creation and development of black businesses through sub-contracting, assisting the creation of firms by their black employees, and by giving preference and priority at the level of client-supplier relations.

PROCEDURE

1. CRITERIA FOR APPLICATION

(A) A detailed and well documented report should be prepared by all companies which have a controlling interest in a South African company which employs black African workers.

(B) Within other companies where there is European shareholding significant or otherwise, these shareholders should strive to encourage the application of the principles of the current code as well as the presentation of a report.

2. PREPARATION OF REPORTS

(A) Company reports will be drawn up according to uniform criteria, common to the countries of the EC. These reports will be addressed either through the Embassies in South Africa or directly to the national authorities in the country of origin and should be made public by companies.

(B) The reports will cover an annual period, from 1 July in the preceding year to 30 June in the current year. These reports should reach national authorities by the end of September. The latter will be charged with the preparation of national reports which should be available by the end of March the following year and which will be submitted for the attention of national Parliaments. An overall report will be prepared by the current EC Presidency and presented to the European Parliament as well as to the Economic and Social Committee of the European Community before the summer recess. National and ~~common~~ ^{Company} reports will be public.

3. COORDINATION ON APPLICATION OF THE CODE

Member states will regularly strive towards harmonisation on the application of the current Code, particularly through their representatives in South Africa. With this in mind, the latter will draw up an annual report which will be taken into account in the preparation of the overall report, also containing an evaluation of the impact of the Code of Conduct in the economic and social context of South Africa, and in particular of the positions of the union and management sectors who may be interested in its content and application.

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For S. Africa Rel's A8

Sec T 189A/85

REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE MOÇAMBIQUE
PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA

Maputo, 15 de Outubro de 1985

Para Seu Exo Primeiro-Ministro

Após a nossa breve estadia de trabalho na Grã-Bretanha, tenho o prazer de me dirigir a Vossa Excelência para manifestar o nosso apreço, em nome do povo e do governo moçambicanos, pela forma hospitaleira e amigável como fomos acolhidos em Londres.

As conversações que mantivemos permitiram aprofundar o nosso entendimento mútuo sobre a nossa cooperação bilateral e acerca

Sua Excelência
Margareth Thatcher
Primeiro Ministro do Governo da
Grã-Bretanha e Irlanda do Norte
Londres

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
dos problemas da paz na zona austral do continente africano.

Estamos particularmente sensibilizados pelos esforços do seu governo e particularmente de Vossa Excelência para trazer a paz tão necessária na nossa zona e especialmente no nosso país. A sua recente diligência junto do governo sul-africano chamando a atenção do perigo que constitui o rompimento do Acordo de Nkomati, testemunham este vosso esforço.

Reafirmando o empenho do governo moçambicano em continuar a trabalhar com o governo britânico na busca de paz na África Austral, e no aprofundamento da cooperação bilateral, queira aceitar, Senhora Primeiro-Ministro, os nossos sinceros e bons desejos de boa saúde e sucessos na acção governativa.

3.

Alta Consideração

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Samora Machel', with a large, stylized flourish above the name.

SAMORA MOISÉS MACHEL
Marechal da República
Presidente do Conselho de Ministros
Presidente da República Popular de
Moçambique

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC

Maputo, 15 October 1985

Dear Prime Minister,

After our brief working visit to Great Britain,
I have pleasure in writing to you to express, on
behalf of the people and Government of Mozambique,
our appreciation for the friendly and hospitable way
in which we were received in London.

The talks that we held enabled us to deepen our
mutual understanding on our bilateral
cooperation and on the problems of peace in

The Rt. Hon.
Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of the
Government of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, London

the Southern area of the African Continent.

We are particularly touched by the efforts by your Government and by yourself in particular to bring about the peace so necessary in our area and especially in our country. Your recent approaches to the South African Government, drawing attention to the dangers involved in breaking the Nkomati Accord, bear witness to your exertions.

Reaffirming the Mozambican Government's earnest intention of continuing to work with the British Government to seek peace in Southern Africa and to deepen bilateral cooperation, I should like you, Prime Minister, to accept our sincere good wishes for your good health and success in your Government action.

High consideration.

/signature/

SAMORA MOISÉS MACHEL
Marshal of the Republic
President of the Council of Ministers
President of the People's Republic
of Mozambique.

SUBJECT
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TRANSLATION OF PERSONAL LETTER FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM
PRESIDENT MACHEL DATED 15 OCTOBER

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 189 2/85

"Dear Senhora Prime Minister

After our brief working stay in Great Britain I have the pleasure to address your excellency to express our appreciation in the name of the people and Government of Mozambique for the hospitable and friendly way in which we were welcomed in London.

Our conversations enabled us to deepen our mutual understanding about bilateral cooperation and the problems of peace in the Southern part of the African continent.

We are particularly appreciative of the efforts of your government, and of your excellency in particular, to bring about the peace which is so necessary in our zone and in our country in particular, your recent intervention with the South African Government calling attention to the danger of breaking the Nkomati Accord is evidence of your efforts.

Reaffirming the commitment of the Mozambican Government in continuing to work with the British Government in pursuit of peace in Southern Africa, and to deepening bilateral cooperation, I should like you Prime Minister to accept our sincere good wishes of good health and success in Government.

High consideration,

Samora Moises Machel".

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From: A Reeve, SAFD
Date: 15 October 1985

ccs: PS/Mr Rifkind
PS/PUS
Mr Fergusson
CCD

Private Secretary

CHOGM

1. In his letter of 14 October to Mr Ricketts about the Prime Minister's briefing for CHOGM, Mr Powell reported the Prime Minister's interest in an article by Paul Johnson on the South African economy.
- / 2. I attach a copy of an article entitled "The Race For South Africa" by Paul Johnson which appeared in "Commentary" last month. From Mr Powell's description, I think this must be the article which the Prime Minister has in mind.

A Reeve
Southern African Dept

15 October 1985

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 188 A/85

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 October 1985

My dear Prime Minister.

It was good of you to write and let me have your thoughts about South Africa and how we should handle the matter at CHOGM. Geoffrey Howe has told me of the useful discussions he had with you and Joe Clark in Ottawa.

Like you, I loathe apartheid and want to see it abolished at the earliest possible moment. I have made this quite plain to President Botha. I have tried to avoid prescribing what system of government should take its place: that must be for the South African people themselves to decide. But whatever system is chosen will have to command the support of the people as a whole.

We thus agree as to the right objective: there must be urgent and fundamental reform. The question is how in practical terms is this goal to be achieved. There are elements of paradox in the present situation. On the one hand there is the violence and repression reflecting the pent-up pressures of years of black frustration. On the other hand, perhaps for the first time ever, we see the beginnings of a process of reform and a perceptible change in attitudes on the part of many in the white community, notably in business. That being so, I think it vital that any action taken by the international community should help to create both the political atmosphere and the mechanism which will bring the communities in South Africa together to begin work on finding a political solution.

Britain has for many years placed more restrictions on its relations with South Africa than many of its Western partners. We have no military co-operation, no arms trade,

da

no collaboration for nuclear development - military or civil, no exports of crude oil, and strict licensing controls on the export of sensitive equipment. We have now joined our European partners in agreeing a package of measures consolidating and adding to these restrictions, notably by recalling military attaches. We have thus sent the South African government a political signal of the need for reforms: and I know that they have received it loud and clear.

I hope therefore that you will join me at Nassau in pointing out to our colleagues the considerable scope of the measures which Britain and Canada have already taken against South Africa. As you yourself recognise, each Commonwealth government must choose for itself what means it thinks will be most effective.

I am firmly opposed to additional economic sanctions. I believe that such an approach is fundamentally mistaken and will not lead the South African government to make the changes which we all want to see. Indeed it is likely to be counter-productive with the white community, playing into the hands of the right wing and thus putting a stop to further significant reform. I see no point in creating unemployment in Britain in order to increase black unemployment in South Africa. We should only worsen the cycle of frustration, violence and repression there. Market forces are already exerting much more effective pressures than government-imposed sanctions ever will. Unlike such sanctions they cannot be dismissed as "foreign bullying" since they are seen to have been caused directly by the actions of the South African Government itself.

The question of subscribing to some "minimum additional measures" at Nassau, as you suggest, would depend entirely on what these measures might be. For the reasons given above, I would not be prepared to agree to additional economic sanctions, though it is obviously open to others to do so if they wish. But there might be measures in the sense of new practical political initiatives which Britain and other Commonwealth countries could take. I certainly believe that we ought to

have a realistic and open-minded discussion of what practical ways there may be for the Commonwealth to help bring about dialogue in South Africa. No other group of countries is better placed by virtue of its historical personal and geographical links, to play a constructive role. By all means let us explore the opportunities for constructive action which our various links to the different South African communities may offer.

I know from Geoffrey Howe that you too have been thinking about the possibilities of this. I hope that we shall be able to have an early talk in Nassau, as you suggest, to explore what might be done. If the Commonwealth can find ways of making some practical contribution to solving a major problem, as it did over Rhodesia, then it would set a useful and much needed example to the international community. I shall certainly do my best to try to achieve such a constructive outcome.

Warm regards

-- Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher



File
MT
cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 October 1985

Dear Dr. Barber.

Thank you for your letter of 20 September, outlining your excellent proposal for a Fellowship Programme for black South Africans. I am grateful for your very prompt and positive response to the discussions at Chequers. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who administer the Scholarships and Awards Scheme under which your proposal falls, would certainly want to help and are now looking into the possibilities. They will I know want to discuss with you more fully the details and funding of the programme you envisage.

Thank you again for your most helpful contribution to the seminar.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

Dr James Barber, JP.

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 188(11)/85

THE STATE HOUSE,
DAR ES SALAAM,
TANZANIA.

cc/pe

12th October 1985

Prime Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1,
U.K.

Dear Margaret,

Thank you for your prompt and frank reply to my letter of 10th October 1985; the personal relationship between us, and my confidence that we respect each other's intellect and views, encourages me to continue the discussion in writing as we shall not be able to do so in person at Nassau.- although I am glad that you will be talking with Ndugu Salim.

I certainly do recognise that apartheid is repugnant to you, and I have never questioned the sincerity of your feelings. The problem is, as you say, the means of achieving change. And there is also the problem of getting a united position in the Commonwealth on this issue.

The purpose of Tanzania and the other advocates of a sanctions Resolution by the Commonwealth - and I believe also of Britain - is to bring apartheid to an end. And we, like Britain, also want serious negotiations to bring the violence to an end as quickly as possible. But apartheid has been met by calls to negotiate with the Black majority since 1948; sabotage leading to an armed struggle was not even adopted as a policy by the African National Congress until 1960. It has still not got to any serious proportions; the unrest - and the lynchings - which have led to the intensified violence from the police and army are quite clearly spontaneous expressions of anger and frustration by a virtually unarmed people. Yet the South African authorities have for all these years consistently ignored the calls for talks; they are still not prepared to negotiate the 'how' and the 'where' of change with real representatives of the majority of the South African people.

Those Governments and peoples who call for sanctions do so in the recognition that they are a pressure for serious negotiations, and that without such pressures these are still not likely to take place before the offer to negotiate comes too late for any African leader to assert some kind of leadership and control over the angry young people. Indeed, it is already dangerously late; it will be very difficult indeed for any African leader - including Mandela - to get control of the situation which has been allowed to develop.

Sanctions are designed to make the South African Government face up to reality before the unrest and violence leads to ungovernable chaos, and still worse violence. And I believe that what has already happened - including the actions by the Bankers and Money Markets as well as the limited sanctions announced by President Reagan - indicate that sanctions can have a positive effect in promoting a movement towards change.

I also maintain my belief that without sanctions on the Smith Regime in Rhodesia, Mr. Smith would not have agreed to the Lancaster House negotiations. Sanctions had, unfortunately, to be bolstered by an Armed Struggle in that country, but it was these two combined pressures which led to the success of the Lusaka initiative in which you played such a vital role. For you will remember that Mr. Smith for a long time talked about African rule not coming in a thousand years. He had to be forced to negotiate.

Obviously, there are two ways in which Commonwealth unity can be achieved over South African apartheid at Nassau. The first is that all should apply sanctions; the second is that all reject sanctions - or at least the call for them from the Commonwealth. It is, however, quite clear that the vast majority - probably all except Britain - are very committed to there being a clear Commonwealth call for at least some minimum economic sanctions. Those I suggested in my last

letter are (as I explained) much less than most of us would like to see applied, and are an attempt to meet your own position and Britain's traditional economic links with South Africa; they are very little more than President Reagan has already announced and they would have the very minimum adverse effect on the British economy.

For I join with you in wanting to avoid a 'sterile wrangle over sanctions leading to serious divisions in the Commonwealth'; indeed, that was why I wrote to you. But it does seem more reasonable to ask Britain to join in a compromise position likely to be accepted by everyone else - albeit with some reluctance on the grounds that its measures are inadequate - than to ask all the other members of the Commonwealth to accept Britain's position of there being no call for any economic sanctions at all.

Forgive this long letter; I am necessarily writing in a hurry in the hope of reaching you before the Commonwealth Conference starts. For I do in truth write with goodwill, both towards yourself and towards Britain, and I am confident that you will at least consider these further arguments. My aim is to see all the prophets of doom, and all the hostile critics of Britain, proved wrong about what will happen at Nassau. And it seems to me that only you can now achieve that.

I send my personal good wishes to you, as always.

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Nyerere .

S. AFRICA

RELATIONS

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FM DAR ES SALAAM
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 338

OF 111100Z OCTOBER 85

INFO IMMEDIATE NASSAU

INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, HARARE, LUSAKA, GABORONE,
LILONGWE, MBABANE AND MASERU

YOUR TELNO 930 TO NEW DELHI : SOUTH AFRICA AT CHOGM.

SUMMARY

1. TANZANIA HOPES WE WILL TAKE SOME ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC MEASURES, SUCH AS A BAN ON THE SALE OF KRUGERRANDS. BUT PRIME MINISTER SALIM AGREES THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE REST OF THE COMMONWEALTH, AND MAY WELL BE WILLING TO WORK FOR A COMPROMISE SOLUTION.

DETAIL

2. I SAW PRIME MINISTER SALIM, WHO WILL BE LEADING THE TANZANIAN DELEGATION, THIS MORNING. I SPOKE ON THE LINES OF PARAS 6 AND 7 OF YOUR TUR AND LEFT A SPEAKING NOTE. I STRESSED THE NEED TO AVOID A DAMAGING SPLIT WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH, AND EMPHASISED THE STRENGTH OF OUR DESIRE TO SEE POLITICAL REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE HAD ALREADY TAKEN A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE SOUTH AFRICA IN THIS DIRECTION BUT BELIEVED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. WE WERE AWARE OF TANZANIA'S VIEWS AS EXPRESSED IN PRESIDENT NYERERE'S LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER (MY TELNO 331, NOT TO ALL. THIS PROPOSED A BAN ON THE SALE OF KRUGERRANDS: AND EMBARGO ON IMPORTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN WINES AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE: A CUT IN AIR LINKS: A BAN ON NEW INVESTMENTS: A BAN ON THE EXPORT OF COMPUTERS: AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT.) WE HOPED THAT TANZANIA WOULD WORK FOR A POSITIVE OUTCOME TO CHOGM.

3. SALIM SAID THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF TANZANIAN WANTING TO ISOLATE BRITAIN AT NASSAU. THE LAST THING ANYONE WANTED WAS A SPLIT IN THE COMMONWEALTH, AS THIS WOULD GIVE QUITE THE WRONG SIGNAL TO SOUTH AFRICA. TANZANIA WAS WELL AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE TO BRITAIN OF ITS ECONOMIC TIES WITH SOUTH AFRICA, BUT HE HOPED THAT BRITAIN WOULD BE SENSITIVE TO THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH ON THE NEED TO PUT FURTHER ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA. THESE WERE NOW THE VIEWS NOT JUST OF A FEW AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS BUT WERE FULLY SHARED BY COUNTRIES LIKE CANADA AND AUSTRALIA.

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4. SALIM AGREED THAT THE COMMONWEALTH COULD FIND MANY POINTS IN COMMON WITH REGARD TO SOUTH AFRICA, BEGINNING WITH TOTAL OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID AND A WISH TO SEE PEACEFUL POLITICAL CHANGE. TANZANIA CERTAINLY DID NOT WANT AN INTENSIFICATION OF CIVIL STRIFE IN SOUTH AFRICA, AND DREADED A CONFLAGRATION WHICH MIGHT EMBRACE OTHER NEIGHBOURING STATES. IT WAS PRECISELY TO AVOID THE SITUATION DETERIORATING IN THIS WAY THAT TANZANIAN AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WANTED TO SEE STRONGER PRESSURE PUT ON SOUTH AFRICA. THE COMMONWEALTH COULD NOT LAG BEHIND THE REST OF THE WORLD. EVEN THE UNITED STATES HAD NOW BANNED THE IMPORT OF KRUGERRANDE AND HE HOPED THAT BRITAIN WOULD FOLLOW SUIT. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR COMMONWEALTH LEADERS AT NASSAU TO REACH A WIDE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION, STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN THE VARIOUS FACTORS INVOLVED (SUCH AS THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF COUNTRIES LIKE SWAZILAND AND LESOTHO, AND THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF BRITAIN) AND COME UP WITH A PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD REPRESENT A POSITIVE PROGRAMME IN ACTION.

5. HE SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD THAT TANZANIA WISHED TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION AT CHOGM BETWEEN BRITAIN AND FELLOW COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES. HE EMPHASISED THAT WE DID NOT REGARD ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, WHETHER COMPREHENSIVE OR PARTIAL, AS BEING AN EFFECTIVE WAY OF PERSUADING SOUTH AFRICA TO INTRODUCE MUCH NEEDED REFORMS. HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DELIVER A REPLY TO PRESIDENT NYERERE'S LETTER BEFORE CHOGM BEGAN, AND HE KNOW THAT THE FRIENDLY TONE OF THE LETTER HAD BEEN APPRECIATED.

COMMENT

6. SALIM WAS EMPHATIC ABOUT HIS WISH TO AVOID A SPLIT AT NASSAU. AS AN OLD UNITED NATIONS HAND, HE NATURALLY PREFERS CONSENSUS TO CONFRONTATION, AND IS SKILLED AT FINDING COMPROMISE FORMULAS. HE IS LIKELY TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN THIS RESPECT THAN NYERERE WOULD HAVE BEEN. HE RECOMMEND THAT OUR DELEGATION SHOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HIM, AS HIS VIEWS ARE LIKELY TO CARRY WEIGHT WITH THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES DELEGATIONS.

7. SALIM WILL BE ARRIVING IN LONDON BY BRITISH AIRWAYS ON MONDAY EVENING AND TRAVELLING TO NASSAU BY SPECIAL BRITISH AIRWAYS FLIGHT ON TUESDAY MORNING. HE SHALL GIVE HIM A COPY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO NYERERE'S LETTER NOW RECEIVED (YOUR TELNO 216).

SANKEY

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

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MR J R J JOHNSON
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
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SUBJECT
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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE



SERIAL No. T 1880/85 REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA

THE STATE PRESIDENT

R16/10
Prime Minister
CDP 16/x
GABORONE

REF: PPO. 16/3 I (62)

11th October, 1985

The Rt. Hon. Prime Minister,

I acknowledge, with grateful thanks, receipt of your letter dated 10th October, 1985 concerning the discussion of Southern African issues at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

I have noted with appreciation the measures which Britain is prepared to take in order to put pressure on South Africa to dismantle apartheid. I also agree that we have to assist the South African government towards a meaningful dialogue with blacks and their authentic representative organisations. To this end more may be required from all of us in order to attain the objective.

The current situation in South Africa is dangerously explosive. For that reason, we are more afraid of the consequences of inaction and believe that we should do everything in our power to prevent an escalation of civil strife.

As you know Botswana is held hostage by South Africa. We have been threatened and attacked for no reason. Following such traumatic events, we cannot be expected to defend South Africa's position. This places us in a most difficult position. It is our hope that the Commonwealth would find ways to minimise the adverse effects on us of any measures that may be taken against South Africa. In addition, we hope that the Commonwealth will assist us to withstand any punitive measures South Africa may take against us.

I look forward to seeing you in Nassau. On my return from the Bahamas, I will spend a few days in London on a private visit.

With best wishes,

Q.K.J. Masire
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA



REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA

THE STATE PRESIDENT

GABORONE

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
The Rt. Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
LONDON
United Kingdom

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YOUR TELNO 399. PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.

1. I DELIVERED THE MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA AT 1730 TODAY. HE READ IT VERY CAREFULLY, UNDERLINING THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 3 (''OUR AIM SHOULD BE...''), THE SECOND AND THIRD SENTENCES OF PARA 5 (''ON THE CONTRARY...''), AND THE OPENING LINES OF THE NEXT PARAGRAPH.

2. KAUNDA THEN ASKED ME TO THANK THE PRIME MINISTER, AND TO SAY THAT ZAMBIA DID NOT DOUBT HER ABHORRENCE OF APARTHEID. THE NEED WAS TO READ CORRECTLY A DEVELOPING SITUATION AND THEN DETERMINE THE MOST LIKELY METHOD OF BRINGING ABOUT CHANGE WITH LESS LOSS OF LIFE. (''LESS'' SINCE NO LOSS WAS NOW AN IMPOSSIBILITY.) HERE GRZ AND HMG DIFFERED. OFTEN SUCH DIFFERENCES NEED NOT LOOM LARGE, BUT IN THIS EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION THE DIFFERENCE WAS VERY IMPORTANT.

3. KAUNDA NEXT REITERATED HIS USUAL ARGUMENTS, SAYING THAT ''REFORMS'' WERE NO LONGER AN ANSWER, AS INDEED THEY HAD BEEN NO ANSWER IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA. THE ISSUE WAS POLITICAL POWER. HE SPOKE WITH FEELING OF SOUTH AFRICAN BREACHES OF NKOMATI, AND ATTACKS ON HER NEIGHBOURS. BOTHA WAS NOW USING ANGOLA TO DELAY MAJOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA. HE APPEARED TO BRING HIMSELF TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS MOVING INEVITABLY TO AN EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION. SANCTIONS, LEADING TO A GENUINE DIALOGUE AT A CONFERENCE OF ''ALL IN SOUTH AFRICA'' OFFERED THE LAST CHANCE. OTHERWISE THE SURVIVORS OF THE EXPLOSION WOULD BLAME THE WEST FOR INACTION. KAUNDA REPEATED HIS THANKS AND SAID HE TOO HOPED FOR AN UNHEATED DISCUSSION AT NASSAU.

4. I THANKED THE PRESIDENT AND SAID WE WERE AGREED ON THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING COMMONWEALTH UNITY, AND ON THE AIM OF ENDING APARTHEID. BUT IT LOOKED AS IF WE WERE BOUND TO DISAGREE IF THE REFERED METHOD WERE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. WERE WE ALWAYS USING WORDS IN THE SAME WAY? I QUOTED SOME OF THE MEASURES LISTED IN PARA 4 OF THE MESSAGE AND ASKED WHETHER THOSE MIGHT NOT BE DEEMED ''SANCTIONS'' BY THOSE WHO CALLED FOR SANCTIONS. HE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD WANT TO CONSIDER THIS THOUGHT WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. AT MY PROMPTING HE THEN EXPANDED ON THE MFUWE MEETING.

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COMMENT

5. KAUNDA IS STILL WEDDED TO "ECONOMIC SANCTIONS" AS A POLITICAL CONCEPT, BUT HE MAY NOT BE HOSTILE TO WAYS OF AVOIDING THE PRACTICAL ECONOMIC EFFECT - THIS CAN BE DONE WHILST STILL RETAINING A POLITICAL IMPACT. HE THINKS MFUWE WAS A REAL SUCCESS ("WITH SOUTH AFRICANS TALKING TO SOUTH AFRICANS AND USING CHRISTIAN NAMES") AND IS THEREFORE COMMITTED TO DIALOGUES CONTACTS, ETC, DESIGNED TO FACILITATE POLITICAL PROGRESS. BUT HE REMAINS CONVINCED OF AN IMMINENT EXPLOSION, AND WILL NEED TO SEE REAL PROGRESS. I DO NOT THINK HE WILL BUY PROPOSALS FOR SUCH CONTACTS IF HE THINKS THE AIM IS TO DISGUISE THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS.

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From Charles

Prime Minister

NIGEL

S. Africa: Rels.

There are two more messages which the Prime Minister ought to cast an eye over, both to do with CHOGM. One is a reply to Nyerere; you will remember that he sent her a message proposing a list of selective sanctions. I sent this up to you earlier in the week. The other is to Pindling who has talked to our High Commissioner about the handling of South Africa at the meeting.

I will mufax up two texts on which it would be very helpful to have the Prime Minister's authority by tomorrow morning if possible.

Suzanne

10/10



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

*Agreed
M*

Thank you for your letter of 7 October about South Africa. I am glad that you have written to me so frankly about your views and I recognise your goodwill.

You know how much I personally detest apartheid. I have made this so clear over the years that I don't think anyone can any longer doubt where I stand or my resolve to do everything constructive and positive to help achieve fundamental reform in South Africa. Certainly President Botha knows exactly what I think.

So I am absolutely at one with you in wanting to end apartheid and end the cycle of violence. Where we differ is over the means. You mention our successful experience over Rhodesia. That was not achieved by sanctions: they only prolonged an unsatisfactory situation. It was achieved because we all got together to urge blacks and whites to talk and negotiate. We offered them the prospect of achieving peacefully what violence and repression was never going to bring about.

I recognise the need for clear political signals to the South African Government. That is why Britain recently joined its European partners in endorsing a number of

I am sorry that you will not be at Nassau. We shall miss your contributions; and I would like to have tried to persuade you in person that there are other approaches to solving this tragic problem than sanctions. But I shall look forward to discussing the issues with your delegation. Meanwhile I send you my warmest wishes.

His Excellency Mwalimu Dr. Julius K. Nyerere



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

*Agreed
mt*

Our High Commissioner has let me have a full account of his very useful talk with you on 8 October about the handling of the forthcoming Heads of Government Meeting.

When we met in June you told me that it would be your aim to keep the debate on South Africa short and moderate, avoiding a "backs to the wall" position over the question of sanctions, while nevertheless aiming at a clear conclusion from the meeting. I am sure this is right. There are several other important topics that we shall all wish to discuss.

I know that you personally and your Government detest apartheid. I share that detestation and have always seen apartheid as totally contrary to all British values and British ideals. I have left President Botha in no doubt of my views on this and on the need for fundamental reform. There is therefore no division between Britain and the Commonwealth over our aims for South Africa.

You mentioned to Mr. Heap that while other Commonwealth countries were clear about what Britain did not want, it was not clear what we did want. In a nutshell, what I hope we can achieve at CHOGM is agreement on positive steps by which

the Commonwealth can promote a dialogue between the South African Government and representatives of the black community on the latter's participation in the political process. There are some hopeful signs of movement in the situation, particularly in the attitude of business leaders. It seems to me that a dialogue of the sort I have described could be the watershed.

It is up to each of us to choose the means which are most appropriate to our particular circumstances and policies in contributing to this common end. Although we remain firmly opposed to economic sanctions, Britain has recently joined with its European partners in endorsing a number of restrictive and positive measures in relation to South Africa, reinforcing those which we have been implementing for a number of years. We believe these provide the necessary political signal to the South African Government of our concern at developments there.

I hope very much that with your chairmanship in which I have the fullest confidence we shall be able to discuss these issues in a positive way. It is particularly important that we should succeed in upholding Commonwealth unity. If the Commonwealth were seen to be seriously divided at Nassau, or our meeting to be given over to a sterile wrangle over sanctions, it would only give comfort to the South African regime and be a disappointment to those in all communities there who are looking to the Commonwealth for support and inspiration in helping to solve the problems that face them. I shall certainly do my best to try to achieve a constructive outcome.

Unfortunately I shall not be able to arrive in Nassau before noon on 16 October, so cannot take up your kind offer of a talk that morning. But I hope that you will find this letter helpful in explaining my views.

I am very much looking forward to my visit. I wish you every success as Chairman.

The Rt. Hon. Sir Lynden O. Pindling, K.C.M.G., M.P.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

SOUTH AFRICA : ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.

1. WE HAVE TODAY BEEN HANDED A LETTER, DATED 7 OCTOBER, FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE TO MRS THATCHER. TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:-

QUOTE

DEAR MARGARET,

I AM WRITING THIS LETTER WITH GREAT DIFFIDENCE, BUT WITH SINCERITY AND GOOD WILL. WE NEED YOUR HELP. AND WHEN I SAY 'WE', I MEAN THE WORLD IN GENERAL, AND AFRICA IN PARTICULAR.

YOU HELPED US TO END MINORITY RULE IN RHODESIA, AND BROUGHT YEARS OF VIOLENCE TO A VIRTUAL END. YOU CAN HELP US TO END APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA, AND TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE WHICH STEMS FROM IT.

I KNOW THAT BRITAIN IS NOT A COLONIAL POWER IN SOUTH AFRICA. BUT ITS IMMENSE INVESTMENTS IN THAT COUNTRY GIVE YOU A POWER WHICH NO OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADER HAS - AND INDEED WHICH IS POSSESSED BY NO OTHER LEADER IN THE WORLD, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE PURPOSE OF THIS LETTER IS TO PLEAD WITH YOU TO USE THAT POWER, ALBEIT THE POWER OF INFLUENCE, TO HELP US BRING APARTHEID TO AN END WITHOUT A CONTINUING AND INCREASINGLY INTOLERABLE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE.

WE ARE APPEALING TO YOU TO JOIN THE REST OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN APPLYING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. WE ARE NOT ASKING FOR COMPREHENSIVE MANDATORY SANCTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VIII OF THE U.N. CHARTER - MUCH AS WE WOULD LIKE THESE TO BE ADOPTED. AND THERE ARE TWO REASONS WHY WE ARE NOT ASKING SO MUCH.

FIRST, YOU ARE NOT READY FOR COMPREHENSIVE MANDATORY SANCTIONS. YOU MAY GENUINELY BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD DO UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE TO BRITISH INTERESTS AND THE BRITISH ECONOMY, AND CAUSE MORE UNEMPLOYMENT WHEN YOU ARE SEEKING TO REDUCE IT. SECONDLY, MANDATORY SANCTIONS WOULD REQUIRE A RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND IF YOU FEEL STRONGLY ENOUGH AGAINST THEM YOU WOULD BE FORCED TO USE THE BRITISH VETO. THAT WOULD GREATLY DAMAGE OUR CAUSE BY SENDING THE WRONG SIGNAL TO SOUTH AFRICA - AND MIGHT AT THE SAME TIME DO POLITICAL HARM TO BRITAIN'S STANDING IN THE WORLD. AND IN ANY CASE, EVEN IF YOU WERE READY FOR COMPREHENSIVE MANDATORY SANCTIONS, THE LIKELY VETO BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WOULD SEND THAT SAME MESSAGE OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE RULERS OF SOUTH AFRICA AND OF DESPAIR TO THE VICTIMS OF APARTHEID.

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WE ARE ASKING YOU TO JOIN US IN APPLYING A MEANINGFUL PACKAGE OF SELECTIVE SANCTIONS. I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DEVISE ANY SANCTIONS PACKAGE WHICH WOULD BE TOTALLY PAINLESS TO BRITAIN: SOME PRICE INEVITABLY HAS TO BE PAID IF WE ARE TO HASTEN THE END OF APARTHEID AND ITS VIOLENCE. BUT THERE ARE THINGS WHICH YOU COULD JOIN IN, WITHOUT INTOLERABLE DIFFICULTY. YOU COULD:-

- 1) STOP BUYING AND PROHIBIT THE SALE IN BRITAIN OF THE KRUGERAND.
- 2) STOP THE IMPORTATION INTO BRITAIN OR BRITISH TERRITORIES OF WINES OR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA.
- 3) CUT AIR TRAVEL LINKS.
- 4) BAN ALL NEW INVESTMENTS OR REINVESTMENTS IN APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA, AND TAKE ACTIONS TO ENCOURAGE INVESTMENTS IN THE SADC AREA.
- 5) BAN THE EXPORT OF ALL COMPUTERS AND OTHER MODERN TECHNOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND ANY OF ITS SUBSIDIARY ORGANISATIONS.
- 6) STRENGTHEN THE APPLICATION OF THE GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT.

A SANCTIONS PACKAGE OF THIS KIND, COMING FROM THE COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT CONFERENCE, WOULD SEND A MESSAGE TO BOTH THE LEADERS AND THE VICTIMS OF APARTHEID. IT WOULD DISCOURAGE THE FORMER, AND GIVE HEART TO THE LATTER. BUT WHETHER SUCH A POSITIVE MESSAGE GOES TO SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE COMMONWEALTH DEPENDS SOLELY ON BRITAIN, AND REALLY ON YOU PERSONALLY. I SAY THIS AFTER HEARING OF THE STAND OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND ON THIS ISSUE, AND AFTER MY RECENT VERY USEFUL AND ENCOURAGING TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY OF CANADA.

MARGARET: WE NEED YOUR HELP. HELP THE COMMONWEALTH TO SEND A MESSAGE OF HOPE, OF NON-RACIALISM, AND OF PEACE, TO THE VICTIMS OF APARTHEID.

AS ALWAYS, THIS LETTER COMES TO YOU WITH WARM REGARDS AND MY VERY BEST WISHES TO YOU PERSONALLY.

YOURS SINCERELY,

• JULIUS K NYERERE.

UNQUOTE.



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10 DOWNING STREET

10 October 1985

From the Private Secretary

Dear Sir,

I enclose messages from the Prime Minister to President Nyerere and to Mr. Pindling, in a form somewhat amended from the drafts you sent over. I should be grateful if they could be despatched by telegram as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely
Charles Powell

(Charles Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10.10.85

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MASTER
~~MASTER~~

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 188/85

SUBJECT CC OPS

MASTER

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT NYERERE

Dear Julius,

Thank you for your letter of 7 October about South Africa. I am glad that you have written to me so frankly about your views and I recognise your goodwill.

You know how much I personally detest apartheid. I have made this so clear over the years that I don't think anyone can any longer doubt where I stand or my resolve to do everything constructive and positive to help achieve fundamental reform in South Africa. Certainly President Botha knows exactly what I think.

So I am absolutely at one with you in wanting to end apartheid and end the cycle of violence. Where we differ is over the means. You mention our successful experience over Rhodesia. That was not achieved by sanctions: they only prolonged an unsatisfactory situation. It was achieved because we all got together to urge blacks and whites to talk and negotiate. We offered them the prospect of achieving peacefully what violence and repression was never going to bring about.

I recognise the need for clear political signals to the South African Government. That is why Britain recently joined its European partners in endorsing a number of restrictive measures in relation to South Africa, reinforcing those which we have been implementing for a number of years. But these measures were deliberately chosen so as not to damage the South African economy. I simply do not believe that hitting out and causing damage and disruption is the way

to make progress.

You are quite right that one of my reasons for opposing sanctions is the damage they would do to the British economy. I am certainly not prepared to create unemployment in Britain in order to create worse unemployment and disruption in South Africa. I do not argue that full-scale economic sanctions would not damage the South African economy. They certainly would. But I disagree with you over whether such damage would promote reform. My strong conviction is that it would have the opposite effect. It would put into reverse a process of economic growth which has done more than anything else to benefit black South Africans in recent years. It would weaken precisely those groups in South Africa which are most active in seeking political change. Ostracism and isolation are a sure way to harden resistance. Far from sanctions being a message of hope, they are likely to cause despair among those who support reform and progress.

What I should like to see the Commonwealth Conference achieve is agreement on practical ways to promote negotiations between the South African Government and representatives of the black community on the latter's participation in the political process. I see this as a much more positive outcome than sanctions, which are actually only a way of washing our hands of the situation. Also, a positive outcome will preserve Commonwealth unity, while a sterile wrangle over sanctions leading to serious divisions in the Commonwealth would give comfort to the South African regime and be a disappointment to those in South Africa who are looking to us for support and inspiration.

I am sorry that you will not be at Nassau. We shall miss your contributions; and I would like to have tried to persuade you in person that there are other approaches to solving this tragic problem than sanctions. But I shall look forward to discussing the issues with your delegation. Meanwhile I send you my warmest wishes.

Yours sincerely, Margaret Thatcher

SUBJECT CC OPS
MASTER

10.10.85

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T.187/85

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO SIR LYNDEN PINDLING

My dear Prime Minister,

Our High Commissioner has let me have a full account of his very useful talk with you on 8 October about the handling of the forthcoming Heads of Government Meeting.

When we met in June you told me that it would be your aim to keep the debate on South Africa short and moderate, avoiding a "backs to the wall" position over the question of sanctions, while nevertheless aiming at a clear conclusion from the meeting. I am sure this is right. There are several other important topics that we shall all wish to discuss.

I know that you personally and your Government detest apartheid. I share that detestation and have always seen apartheid as totally contrary to all British values and British ideals. I have left President Botha in no doubt of my views on this and on the need for fundamental reform. There is therefore no division between Britain and the Commonwealth over our aims for South Africa.

You mentioned to Mr. Heap that while other Commonwealth countries were clear about what Britain did not want, it was not clear what we did want. In a nutshell, what I hope we can achieve at CSOQM is agreement on positive steps by which the Commonwealth can promote a dialogue between the South African Government and representatives of the black community on the latter's participation in the political process. There are some hopeful signs of movement in the situation, particularly in the attitude of business leaders. It seems to me that a dialogue of the sort I have described could be the watershed.

It is up to each of us to choose the means which are most appropriate to our particular circumstances and policies in contributing to this common end. Although we remain firmly opposed to economic sanctions, Britain has recently joined with its European partners in endorsing a number of restrictive and positive measures in relation to South Africa, reinforcing those which we have been implementing for a number of years. We believe these provide the necessary political signal to the South African Government of our concern at developments there.

I hope very much that with your chairmanship in which I have the fullest confidence we shall be able to discuss these issues in a positive way. It is particularly important that we should succeed in upholding Commonwealth unity. If the Commonwealth were seen to be seriously divided at Nassau, or our meeting to be given over to a sterile wrangle over sanctions, it would only give comfort to the South African regime and be a disappointment to those in all communities there who are looking to the Commonwealth for support and inspiration in helping to solve the problems that face them. I shall certainly do my best to try to achieve a constructive outcome.

Unfortunately I shall not be able to arrive in Nassau before noon on 16 October, so cannot take up your kind offer of a talk that morning. But I hope that you will find this letter helpful in explaining my views.

I am very much looking forward to my visit. I wish you every success as Chairman.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

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CHOGM: MESSAGE TO SIR LYNDEN PINDLING

1. PLEASE PASS ASAP FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED 10 OCTOBER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO SIR L PINDLING:

QUOTE 'MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER, OUR HIGH COMMISSIONER HAS LET ME HAVE A FULL ACCOUNT OF HIS VERY USEFUL TALK WITH YOU ON 8 OCTOBER ABOUT THE HANDLING OF THE FORTHCOMING HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING.

WHEN WE MET IN JUNE YOU TOLD ME THAT IT WOULD BE YOUR AIM TO KEEP THE DEBATE ON SOUTH AFRICA SHORT AND MODERATE, AVOIDING A 'BACKS TO THE WALL' POSITION OVER THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS, WHILE NEVERTHELESS AIMING AT A CLEAR CONCLUSION FROM THE MEETING. I AM SURE THIS IS RIGHT. THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER IMPORTANT TOPICS THAT WE SHALL ALL WISH TO DISCUSS.

I KNOW THAT YOU PERSONALLY AND YOUR GOVERNMENT DETEST APARTHEID. I SHARE THAT DETESTATION AND HAVE ALWAYS SEEN APARTHEID AS TOTALLY CONTRARY TO ALL BRITISH VALUES AND BRITISH IDEALS. I HAVE LEFT PRESIDENT BOTHA IN NO DOUBT OF MY VIEWS ON THIS AN ON THE NEED FOR FUNDAMENTAL REFORM. THERE IS THEREFORE NO DIVISION BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH OVER OUR AIMS FOR SOUTH AFRICA.

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restrictive measures in relation to South Africa, reinforcing those which we have been implementing for a number of years. But these measures were deliberately chosen so as not to damage the South African economy. I simply do not believe that hitting out and causing damage and disruption is the way to make progress.

You are quite right that one of my reasons for opposing sanctions is the damage they would do to the British economy. I am certainly not prepared to create unemployment in Britain in order to create worse unemployment and disruption in South Africa. I do not argue that full-scale economic sanctions would not damage the South African economy. They certainly would. But I disagree with you over whether such damage would promote reform. My strong conviction is that it would have the opposite effect. It would put into reverse a process of economic growth which has done more than anything else to benefit black South Africans in recent years. It would weaken precisely those groups in South Africa which are most active in seeking political change. Ostracism and isolation are a sure way to harden resistance. Far from sanctions being a message of hope, they are likely to cause despair among those who support reform and progress.

What I should like to see the Commonwealth Conference achieve is agreement on practical ways to promote negotiations between the South African Government and representatives of the black community on the latter's participation in the political process. I see this as a much more positive outcome than sanctions, which are actually only a way of washing our hands of the situation. Also, a positive outcome will preserve Commonwealth unity, while a sterile wrangle over sanctions leading to serious divisions in the Commonwealth would give comfort to the South African regime and be a disappointment to those in South Africa who are looking to us for support and inspiration.

YOU MENTIONED TO MR HEAP THAT WHILE OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WERE CLEAR ABOUT WHAT BRITAIN DID NOT WANT, IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT WE DID WANT. IN A NUTSHELL, WHAT I HOPE WE CAN ACHIEVE AT CHOGM IS AGREEMENT ON POSITIVE STEPS BY WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH CAN PROMOTE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY ON THE LATTER'S PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THERE ARE SOME HOPEFUL SIGNS OF MOVEMENT IN THE SITUATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE ATTITUDE OF BUSINESS LEADERS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT A DIALOGUE OF THE SORT I HAVE DESCRIBED COULD BE THE WATERSHED.

IT IS UP TO EACH OF US TO CHOSE THE MEANS WHICH ARE MOST APPROPRIATE TO OUR PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AND POLICIES IN CONTRIBUTING TO THIS COMMON END. ALTHOUGH WE REMAIN FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, BRITAIN HAS RECENTLY JOINED WITH ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN ENDORSING A NUMBER OF RESTRICTIVE AND POSITIVE MEASURES IN RELATION TO SOUTH AFRICA, REINFORCING THOSE WHICH WE HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTING FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. WE BELIEVE THESE PROVIDE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL SIGNAL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OF OUR CONCERN AT DEVELOPMENTS THERE. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT WITH YOUR CHAIRMANSHIP IN WHICH I HAVE THE FULLEST CONFIDENCE WE SHALL BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES IN A POSITIVE WAY. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD SUCCEED IN UPHOLDING COMMONWEALTH UNITY. IF THE COMMONWEALTH WERE SEEN TO BE SERIOUSLY DIVIDED AT NASSAU, OR OUR MEETING TO BE GIVEN OVER TO A STERILE WRANGLE OVER SANCTIONS, IT WOULD ONLY GIVE COMFORT TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME AND BE A DISAPPOINTMENT TO THOSE IN ALL COMMUNITIES THERE WHO ARE LOOKING TO THE COMMONWEALTH FOR SUPPORT AND INSPIRATION IN HELPING TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS THAT FACE THEM. I SHALL CERTAINLY DO MY BEST TO ACHIEVE A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME.

UNFORTUNATELY I SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO ARRIVE IN NASSAU BEFORE NOON ON 16 OCTOBER, SO CANNOT TAKE UP YOUR KIND OFFER OF A TALK THAT MORNING. BUT I HOPE THAT YOU WILL FIND THIS LETTER HELPFUL IN EXPLAINING MY VIEWS.

I AM VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO MY VISIT. I WISH YOU EVERY SUCCESS AS CHAIRMAN.

YOURS SINCERELY, MARGARET THATCHER.' UNQUOTE.

2. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED VERSION TO FOLLOW.

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South Africa
Relations.

P47

10 DOWNING STREET

✓ Commonwealth
CHOGM P49

From the Private Secretary

10 October 1985

Dear Colin,

CHOGM: MESSAGES TO COMMONWEALTH
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

I enclose messages from the Prime Minister to Messrs. Mulroney, Hawke, Lange, Kaunda, Mugabe, Masire, Banda, Jonathan, Bhekimpi and Babangida as approved by the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely
Chris Powell

C D Powell

P.S. There are texts for telegraphing.
There will be no signed versions.
C. R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 October 1985

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T. 84/85

My dear Prime Minister,

In view of the considerable interest which has been expressed about how the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting will deal with the South Africa question, I thought that it might be useful to let you know my thoughts on the matter.

Like you, I abhor apartheid and want to see it abolished at the earliest possible moment. I have made this quite plain to President Botha. I have tried to avoid prescribing what system of government should take its place: that must be for the South African people themselves to decide. But whatever system is chosen will have to command the support of the people as a whole.

We thus agree as to the right objective: there must be urgent and fundamental reform. The question is how in practical terms is this goal to be achieved. There are elements of paradox in the present situation. On the one hand there is the violence and repression reflecting the pent-up pressures of years of black frustration. On the other hand, perhaps for the first time ever, we see the beginnings of a process of reform and a perceptible change in attitudes on the part of many in the white community, notably in business. That being so, I think it vital that any action taken by the international community should help to create

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both the political atmosphere and the mechanism which will bring the communities in South Africa together to begin work on finding a political solution.

Britain has for many years placed more restrictions on its relations with South Africa than many of its Western partners. We have no military co-operation, no arms trade, no collaboration for nuclear development - military or civil, no exports of crude oil, and strict licensing controls on the export of sensitive equipment. We have now joined our European partners in agreeing a package of measures consolidating and adding to these restrictions, notably by recalling military attaches. We have thus sent the South African government a political signal of the need for reforms: and I know that they have received it loud and clear.

But each Commonwealth government must choose for itself what means it thinks will be most effective. I am firmly opposed to additional economic sanctions. I believe that such an approach is fundamentally mistaken and will not lead the South African government to make the changes which we all want to see. Indeed it is likely to be counter-productive with the white community, playing into the hands of the right wing and thus putting a stop to further significant reform. I see no point in creating unemployment in Britain in order to increase black unemployment in South Africa. We should only worsen the cycle of frustration, violence and repression there. Market forces are already exerting much more effective pressures than government-imposed sanctions ever will. Unlike such sanctions they cannot be dismissed as "foreign bullying" since they are seen to have been caused directly by the actions of the South African Government itself.

I believe therefore that in Nassau the Commonwealth should avoid sterile confrontation on whether or not to

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impose economic sanctions. The latter would be of no help in resolving South African problems and the serious damage that they would do to Commonwealth unity would only detract from the influence which the Commonwealth might otherwise have. If others wish to take additional measures that is for them to decide. But our principal aim should in my view be to have a frank and realistic discussion of what practical ways there may be for the Commonwealth to help bring about dialogue in South Africa. No other group of countries is better placed to provide such assistance. Together our links to the different South African communities offer important opportunities for constructive action.

I hope that when we see each other in Nassau we can explore what might be done. If the Commonwealth can find ways of making some practical contribution to solving a major international problem, as it did over Rhodesia, then it would set a useful and much needed example to the international community. I shall certainly do my best to try to achieve such a constructive outcome.

Warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

The Rt. Hon. David Lange, M.P.
Prime Minister of New Zealand.

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OUR TELNO 321 : MR MULRONEY'S LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON
SOUTH AFRICA

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO MR MULRONEY IN REPLY TO HIS LETTER OF 2 OCTOBER.
BEGINS.

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER, IT WAS GOOD OF YOU TO WRITE AND
LET ME HAVE YOUR THOUGHTS ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA AND HOW WE SHOULD
HANDLE THE MATTER AT CHOGM. GEOFFREY HOWE HAS TOLD ME OF THE
USEFUL DISCUSSIONS HE HAD WITH YOU AND JOE CLARK IN OTTAWA.

LIKE YOU, I LOATHE APARTHEID AND WANT TO SEE IT ABOLISHED
AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS QUITE PLAIN
TO PRESIDENT BOTHA. I HAVE TRIED TO AVOID PRESCRIBING WHAT
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE ITS PLACE COLON THAT MUST BE
FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES TO DECIDE. BUT
WHATEVER SYSTEM IS CHOSEN WILL HAVE TO COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF
THE PEOPLE AS A WHOLE.

WE THUS AGREE AS TO THE RIGHT OBJECTIVE COLON THERE MUST
BE URGENT AND FUNDAMENTAL REFORM. THE QUESTION IS HOW IN
PRACTICAL TERMS IS THIS GOAL TO BE ACHIEVED. THERE ARE

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ELEMENTS OF PARADOX IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. ON THE ONE HAND THERE IS THE VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION REFLECTING THE PENT-UP PRESSURES OF YEARS OF BLACK FRUSTRATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER, WE SEE THE BEGINNINGS OF A PROCESS OF REFORM AND A PERCEPTIBLE CHANGE IN ATTITUDES ON THE PART OF MANY IN THE WHITE COMMUNITY, NOTABLY IN BUSINESS. THAT BEING SO, I THINK IT VITAL THAT ANY ACTION TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD HELP TO CREATE BOTH THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AND THE MECHANISM WHICH WILL BRING THE COMMUNITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA TOGETHER TO BEGIN WORK ON FINDING A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

BRITAIN HAS FOR MANY YEARS PLACED MORE RESTRICTIONS ON ITS RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA THAN MANY OF ITS WESTERN PARTNERS. WE HAVE NO MILITARY CO-OPERATION, NO ARMS TRADE, NO COLLABORATION FOR NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT - MILITARY OR CIVIL, NO EXPORTS OF CRUDE OIL, AND STRICT LICENSING CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT. WE HAVE NOW JOINED OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN AGREEING A PACKAGE OF MEASURES CONSOLIDATING AND ADDING TO THESE RESTRICTIONS, NOTABLY BY RECALLING MILITARY ATTACHES. WE HAVE THUS SENT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT A POLITICAL SIGNAL OF THE NEED FOR REFORMS COLON AND I KNOW THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED IT LOUD AND CLEAR.

I HOPE THEREFORE THAT YOU WILL JOIN ME AT NASSAU IN POINTING OUT TO OUR COLLEAGUES THE CONSIDERABLE SCOPE OF THE MEASURES WHICH BRITAIN AND CANADA HAVE ALREADY TAKEN AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. AS YOU YOURSELF RECOGNISE, EACH COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT MUST CHOOSE FOR ITSELF WHAT MEANS IT THINKS WILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE.

I AM FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT SUCH AN APPROACH IS FUNDAMENTALLY MISTAKEN AND WILL NOT LEAD THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO MAKE THE CHANGES WHICH WE ALL WANT TO SEE. INDEED IT IS LIKELY TO BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE WITH THE WHITE COMMUNITY, PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF THE RIGHT WING AND THUS PUTTING A STOP TO FURTHER SIGNIFICANT REFORM. I SEE NO POINT IN CREATING UNEMPLOYMENT IN BRITAIN IN ORDER TO INCREASE BLACK UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE

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SHOULD ONLY WORSEN THE CYCLE OF FRUSTRATION, VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION THERE. MARKET FORCES ARE ALREADY EXERTING MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE PRESSURES THAN GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED SANCTIONS EVER WILL. UNLIKE SUCH SANCTIONS THEY CANNOT BE DISMISSED AS QUOTE FOREIGN BULLYING UNQUOTE SINCE THEY ARE SEEN TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED DIRECTLY BY THE ACTIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ITSELF.

THE QUESTION OF SUBSCRIBING TO SOME QUOTE MINIMUM ADDITIONAL MEASURES UNQUOTE AT NASSAU, AS YOU SUGGEST, WOULD DEPEND ENTIRELY ON WHAT THESE MEASURES MIGHT BE. FOR THE REASONS GIVEN ABOVE, I WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, THOUGH IT IS OBVIOUSLY OPEN TO OTHERS TO DO SO IF THEY WISH. BUT THERE MIGHT BE MEASURES IN THE SENSE OF NEW PRACTICAL POLITICAL INITIATIVES WHICH BRITAIN AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES COULD TAKE. I CERTAINLY BELIEVE THAT WE OUGHT TO HAVE A REALISTIC AND OPEN-MINDED DISCUSSION OF WHAT PRACTICAL WAYS THERE MAY BE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH TO HELP BRING ABOUT DIALOGUE IN SOUTH AFRICA. NO OTHER GROUP OF COUNTRIES IS BETTER PLACED BY VIRTUE OF ITS HISTORICAL PERSONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL LINKS, TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. BY ALL MEANS LET US EXPLORE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION WHICH OUR VARIOUS LINKS TO THE DIFFERENT SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNITIES MAY OFFER.

I KNOW FROM GEOFFREY HOWE THAT YOU TOO HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF THIS. I HOPE THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO HAVE AN EARLY TALK IN NASSAU, AS YOU SUGGEST, TO EXPLORE WHAT MIGHT BE DONE. IF THE COMMONWEALTH CAN FIND WAYS OF MAKING SOME PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION TO SOLVING A MAJOR PROBLEM, AS IT DID OVER RHODESIA, THEN IT WOULD SET A USEFUL AND MUCH NEEDED EXAMPLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. I SHALL CERTAINLY DO MY BEST TO TRY TO ACHIEVE SUCH A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME.

WARM REGARDS, YOURS SINCERELY, MARGARET THATCHER. ENDS.
2. THERE WILL BE NO REPEAT NO SIGNED LETTER TO FOLLOW.

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MR EWAN FERGUSSON
SIR W HARDING
MR DAVID THOMAS
MR JOHNSON

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 7186/YS

10 October 1985

My dear Prime Minister,

It was good of you to write and let me have your thoughts about South Africa and how we should handle the matter at CHOGM. Geoffrey Howe has told me of the useful discussions he had with you and Joe Clark in Ottawa.

Like you, I loathe apartheid and want to see it abolished at the earliest possible moment. I have made this quite plain to President Botha. I have tried to avoid prescribing what system of government should take its place: that must be for the South African people themselves to decide. But whatever system is chosen will have to command the support of the people as a whole.

We thus agree as to the right objective: there must be urgent and fundamental reform. The question is how in practical terms is this goal to be achieved. There are elements of paradox in the present situation. On the one hand there is the violence and repression reflecting the pent-up pressures of years of black frustration. On the other hand, perhaps for the first time ever, we see the beginnings of a process of reform and a perceptible change in attitudes on the part of many in the white community, notably in business. That being so, I think it vital that any action taken by the international community should help to create both the political atmosphere and the mechanism which will bring the communities in South Africa together to begin work on finding a political solution.

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Britain has for many years placed more restrictions on its relations with South Africa than many of its Western partners. We have no military co-operation, no arms trade, no collaboration for nuclear development - military or civil, no exports of crude oil, and strict licensing controls on the export of sensitive equipment. We have now joined our European partners in agreeing a package of measures consolidating and adding to these restrictions, notably by recalling military attaches. We have thus sent the South African government a political signal of the need for reforms: and I know that they have received it loud and clear.

I hope therefore that you will join me at Nassau in pointing out to our colleagues the considerable scope of the measures which Britain and Canada have already taken against South Africa. As you yourself recognise, each Commonwealth government must choose for itself what means it thinks will be most effective.

I am firmly opposed to additional economic sanctions. I believe that such an approach is fundamentally mistaken and will not lead the South African government to make the changes which we all want to see. Indeed it is likely to be counter-productive with the white community, playing into the hands of the right wing and thus putting a stop to further significant reform. I see no point in creating unemployment in Britain in order to increase black unemployment in South Africa. We should only worsen the cycle of frustration, violence and repression there. Market forces are already exerting much more effective pressures than government-imposed sanctions ever will. Unlike such sanctions they cannot be dismissed as "foreign bullying" since they are seen to have been caused directly by the actions of the South African Government itself.

The question of subscribing to some "minimum additional measures" at Nassau, as you suggest, would depend entirely on what these measures might be. For the reasons given above, I

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would not be prepared to agree to additional economic sanctions, though it is obviously open to others to do so if they wish. But there might be measures in the sense of new practical political initiatives which Britain and other Commonwealth countries could take. I certainly believe that we ought to have a realistic and open-minded discussion of what practical ways there may be for the Commonwealth to help bring about dialogue in South Africa. No other group of countries is better placed by virtue of its historical personal and geographical links, to play a constructive role. By all means let us explore the opportunities for constructive action which our various links to the different South African communities may offer.

I know from Geoffrey Howe that you too have been thinking about the possibilities of this. I hope that we shall be able to have an early talk in Nassau, as you suggest, to explore what might be done. If the Commonwealth can find ways of making some practical contribution to solving a major problem, as it did over Rhodesia, then it would set a useful and much needed example to the international community. I shall certainly do my best to try to achieve such a constructive outcome.

Warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

The Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney, P.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada.

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FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA
TELNO 489
OF 101630Z OCTOBER 85
AND TO IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON

CHOGM: MESSAGE TO MR HAWKE AND MR LANGE

1. PLEASE PASS ASAP FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED 10 OCTOBER FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER TO PRIME MINISTERS HAWKE AND LANGE.

QUOTE MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

IN VIEW OF THE CONSIDERABLE INTEREST WHICH HAS BEEN EXPRESSED
ABOUT HOW THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING WILL
DEAL WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION, I THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT BE
USEFUL TO LET YOU KNOW MY THOUGHTS ON THE MATTER.

LIKE YOU, I ABHOR APARTHEID AND WANT TO SEE IT ABOLISHED AT THE
EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS QUITE PLAIN TO
PRESIDENT BOTHA. I HAVE TRIED TO AVOID PRESCRIBING WHAT SYSTEM
OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE ITS PLACE: THAT MUST BE FOR THE SOUTH
AFRICAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES TO DECIDE. BUT WHATEVER SYSTEM IS
CHOSEN WILL HAVE TO COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE AS A WHOLE.
WE THUS AGREE AS TO THE RIGHT OBJECTIVE: THERE MUST BE URGENT AND
FUNDAMENTAL REFORM. THE QUESTION IS HOW IN PRACTICAL TERMS IS
THIS GOAL TO BE ACHIEVED. THERE ARE ELEMENTS OF PARADOX IN THE
PRESENT SITUATION. ON THE ONE HAND THERE IS THE VIOLENCE AND
REPRESSION REFLECTING THE PENT-UP PRESSURES OF YEARS OF
BLACK FRUSTRATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME

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EVER, WE SEE THE BEGINNINGS OF A PROCESS OF REFORM AND A PERCEPTIBLE CHANGE IN ATTITUDES ON THE PART OF MANY IN THE WHITE COMMUNITY, NOTABLY IN BUSINESS. THAT BEING SO, I THINK IT VITAL THAT ANY ACTION TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD HELP TO CREATE BOTH THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AND THE MECHANISM WHICH WILL BRING THE COMMUNITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA TOGETHER TO BEGIN WORK ON FINDING A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

BRITAIN HAS FOR MANY YEARS PLACED MORE RESTRICTIONS ON ITS RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA THAN MANY OF ITS WESTERN PARTNERS. WE HAVE NO MILITARY CO-OPERATION, NO ARMS TRADE, NO COLLABORATION FOR NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT LONG HYPHEN MILITARY OR CIVIL, NO EXPORTS OF CRUDE OIL, AND STRICT LICENSING CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT. WE HAVE NOW JOINED OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN AGREEING A PACKAGE OF MEASURES CONSOLIDATING AND ADDING TO THESE RESTRICTIONS, NOTABLY BY RECALLING MILITARY ATTACHES. WE HAVE THUS SENT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT A POLITICAL SIGNAL OF THE NEED FOR REFORMS: AND I KNOW THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED IT LOUD AND CLEAR.

BUT EACH COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT MUST CHOOSE FOR ITSELF WHAT MEANS IT THINKS WILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE. I AM FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT SUCH AN APPROACH IS FUNDAMENTALLY MISTAKEN AND WILL NOT LEAD THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO MAKE THE CHANGES WHICH WE ALL WANT TO SEE. INDEED IT IS LIKELY TO BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE WITH THE WHITE COMMUNITY, PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF THE RIGHT WING AND THUS PUTTING A STOP TO FURTHER SIGNIFICANT REFORM. I SEE NO POINT IN CREATING UNEMPLOYMENT IN BRITAIN IN ORDER TO INCREASE BLACK UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE SHOULD ONLY WORSEN THE CYCLE OF FRUSTRATION, VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION THERE. MARKET FORCES ARE ALREADY EXERTING MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE PRESSURES THAN GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED SANCTIONS EVER WILL. UNLIKE SUCH SANCTIONS THEY CANNOT BE DISMISSED AS 'FOREIGN BULLYING' SINCE THEY ARE SEEN TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED DIRECTLY BY THE ACTIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ITSELF.

I BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT IN NASSAU THE COMMONWEALTH SHOULD AVOID STERILE CONFRONTATION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO IMPOSE ECONOMIC

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SANCTIONS. THE LATTER WOULD BE OF NO HELP IN RESOLVING SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEMS AND THE SERIOUS DAMAGE THAT THEY WOULD DO TO COMMONWEALTH UNITY WOULD ONLY DETRACT FROM THE INFLUENCE WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE. IF OTHERS WISH TO TAKE ADDITIONAL MEASURES THAT IS FOR THEM TO DECIDE. BUT OUR PRINCIPAL AIM SHOULD IN MY VIEW BE TO HAVE A FRANK AND REALISTIC DISCUSSION OF WHAT PRACTICAL WAYS THERE MAY BE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH TO HELP BRING ABOUT DIALOGUE IN SOUTH AFRICA. NO OTHER GROUP OF COUNTRIES IS BETTER PLACED TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE. TOGETHER OUR LINKS TO THE DIFFERENT SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNITIES OFFER IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION. I HOPE THAT WHEN WE SEE EACH OTHER IN NASSAU WE CAN EXPLORE WHAT MIGHT BE DONE. IF THE COMMONWEALTH CAN FIND WAYS OF MAKING SOME PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION TO SOLVING A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM, AS IT DID OVER RHODESIA, THEN IT WOULD SET A USEFUL AND MUCH NEEDED EXAMPLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. I SHALL CERTAINLY DO MY BEST TO TRY TO ACHIEVE SUCH A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME.

WARM REGARDS,

YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER UNQUOTE.

2. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED VERSION TO FOLLOW.
3. MESSAGES ARE ALSO BEING SENT TO MR MULRONEY AND TO CENTRAL/SOUTHERN AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 October 1985

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

My dear Prime Minister,

SERIAL No. T.85/85

I know that you are particularly concerned about the handling of the South Africa question at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. You have made it very clear publicly what you think the outcome should be. It might be useful to let you know my thoughts on the matter.

Like you, I abhor apartheid and want to see it abolished at the earliest possible moment. I have made this quite plain to President Botha. I have tried to avoid prescribing what system of government should take its place: that must be for the South African people themselves to decide. But whatever system is chosen will have to command the support of the people as a whole.

We thus agree as to the right objective: there must be urgent and fundamental reform. The question is how in practical terms is this goal to be achieved. There are elements of paradox in the present situation. On the one hand there is the violence and repression reflecting the pent-up pressures of years of black frustration. On the other hand, perhaps for the first time ever, we see the beginnings of a process of reform and a perceptible change in attitudes on the part of many in the white community, notably in business. That being so, I think it vital that any action taken by the international community should help to create

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Britain has for many years placed more restrictions on its relations with South Africa than many of its Western partners. We have no military co-operation, no arms trade, no collaboration for nuclear development - military or civil, no exports of crude oil, and strict licensing controls on the export of sensitive equipment. We have now joined our European partners in agreeing a package of measures consolidating and adding to these restrictions, notably by recalling military attaches. We have thus sent the South African government a political signal of the need for reforms: and I know that they have received it loud and clear.

But each Commonwealth government must choose for itself what means it thinks will be most effective. I am firmly opposed to additional economic sanctions. I believe that such an approach is fundamentally mistaken and will not lead the South African government to make the changes which we all want to see. Indeed it is likely to be counter-productive with the white community, playing into the hands of the right wing and thus putting a stop to further significant reform. I see no point in creating unemployment in Britain in order to increase black unemployment in South Africa. We should only worsen the cycle of frustration, violence and repression there. Market forces are already exerting much more effective pressures than government-imposed sanctions ever will. Unlike such sanctions they cannot be dismissed as "foreign bullying" since they are seen to have been caused directly by the actions of the South African Government itself.

I believe therefore that in Nassau the Commonwealth should avoid sterile confrontation on whether or not to

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impose economic sanctions. The latter would be of no help in resolving South African problems and the serious damage that they would do to Commonwealth unity would only detract from the influence which the Commonwealth might otherwise have. If others wish to take additional measures that is for them to decide. But our principal aim should in my view be to have a frank and realistic discussion of what practical ways there may be for the Commonwealth to help bring about dialogue in South Africa. No other group of countries is better placed to provide such assistance. Together our links to the different South African communities offer important opportunities for constructive action.

I hope that when we see each other in Nassau we can explore what might be done. If the Commonwealth can find ways of making some practical contribution to solving a major international problem, as it did over Rhodesia, then it would set a useful and much needed example to the international community. I shall certainly do my best to try to achieve such a constructive outcome.

Warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

The Hon. R.J.L. Hawke, A.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Australia.

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AND TO IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON

CHOGM: MESSAGE TO MR HAWKE AND MR LANGE

1. PLEASE PASS ASAP FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED 10 OCTOBER FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER TO PRIME MINISTERS HAWKE AND LANGE.

QUOTE MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

IN VIEW OF THE CONSIDERABLE INTEREST WHICH HAS BEEN EXPRESSED
ABOUT HOW THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING WILL
DEAL WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION, I THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT BE
USEFUL TO LET YOU KNOW MY THOUGHTS ON THE MATTER.

LIKE YOU, I ABHOR APARTHEID AND WANT TO SEE IT ABOLISHED AT THE
EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS QUITE PLAIN TO
PRESIDENT BOTHA. I HAVE TRIED TO AVOID PRESCRIBING WHAT SYSTEM
OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE ITS PLACE: THAT MUST BE FOR THE SOUTH
AFRICAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES TO DECIDE. BUT WHATEVER SYSTEM IS
CHOSEN WILL HAVE TO COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE AS A WHOLE.
WE THUS AGREE AS TO THE RIGHT OBJECTIVE: THERE MUST BE URGENT AND
FUNDAMENTAL REFORM. THE QUESTION IS HOW IN PRACTICAL TERMS IS
THIS GOAL TO BE ACHIEVED. THERE ARE ELEMENTS OF PARADOX IN THE
PRESENT SITUATION. ON THE ONE HAND THERE IS THE VIOLENCE AND
REPRESSION REFLECTING THE PENT-UP PRESSURES OF YEARS OF
BLACK FRUSTRATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME

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EVER, WE SEE THE BEGINNINGS OF A PROCESS OF REFORM AND A PERCEPTIBLE CHANGE IN ATTITUDES ON THE PART OF MANY IN THE WHITE COMMUNITY, NOTABLY IN BUSINESS. THAT BEING SO, I THINK IT VITAL THAT ANY ACTION TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD HELP TO CREATE BOTH THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AND THE MECHANISM WHICH WILL BRING THE COMMUNITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA TOGETHER TO BEGIN WORK ON FINDING A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

BRITAIN HAS FOR MANY YEARS PLACED MORE RESTRICTIONS ON ITS RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA THAN MANY OF ITS WESTERN PARTNERS. WE HAVE NO MILITARY CO-OPERATION, NO ARMS TRADE, NO COLLABORATION FOR NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT LONG HYPHEN MILITARY OR CIVIL, NO EXPORTS OF CRUDE OIL, AND STRICT LICENSING CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT. WE HAVE NOW JOINED OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN AGREEING A PACKAGE OF MEASURES CONSOLIDATING AND ADDING TO THESE RESTRICTIONS, NOTABLY BY RECALLING MILITARY ATTACHES. WE HAVE THUS SENT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT A POLITICAL SIGNAL OF THE NEED FOR REFORMS: AND I KNOW THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED IT LOUD AND CLEAR.

BUT EACH COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT MUST CHOOSE FOR ITSELF WHAT MEANS IT THINKS WILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE. I AM FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT SUCH AN APPROACH IS FUNDAMENTALLY MISTAKEN AND WILL NOT LEAD THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO MAKE THE CHANGES WHICH WE ALL WANT TO SEE. INDEED IT IS LIKELY TO BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE WITH THE WHITE COMMUNITY, PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF THE RIGHT WING AND THUS PUTTING A STOP TO FURTHER SIGNIFICANT REFORM. I SEE NO POINT IN CREATING UNEMPLOYMENT IN BRITAIN IN ORDER TO INCREASE BLACK UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE SHOULD ONLY WORSEN THE CYCLE OF FRUSTRATION, VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION THERE. MARKET FORCES ARE ALREADY EXERTING MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE PRESSURES THAN GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED SANCTIONS EVER WILL. UNLIKE SUCH SANCTIONS THEY CANNOT BE DISMISSED AS 'FOREIGN BULLYING' SINCE THEY ARE SEEN TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED DIRECTLY BY THE ACTIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ITSELF.

I BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT IN NASSAU THE COMMONWEALTH SHOULD AVOID STERILE CONFRONTATION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO IMPOSE ECONOMIC

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SANCTIONS. THE LATTER WOULD BE OF NO HELP IN RESOLVING SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEMS AND THE SERIOUS DAMAGE THAT THEY WOULD DO TO COMMONWEALTH UNITY WOULD ONLY DETRACT FROM THE INFLUENCE WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE. IF OTHERS WISH TO TAKE ADDITIONAL MEASURES THAT IS FOR THEM TO DECIDE. BUT OUR PRINCIPAL AIM SHOULD IN MY VIEW BE TO HAVE A FRANK AND REALISTIC DISCUSSION OF WHAT PRACTICAL WAYS THERE MAY BE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH TO HELP BRING ABOUT DIALOGUE IN SOUTH AFRICA. NO OTHER GROUP OF COUNTRIES IS BETTER PLACED TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE. TOGETHER OUR LINKS TO THE DIFFERENT SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNITIES OFFER IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION. I HOPE THAT WHEN WE SEE EACH OTHER IN NASSAU WE CAN EXPLORE WHAT MIGHT BE DONE. IF THE COMMONWEALTH CAN FIND WAYS OF MAKING SOME PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION TO SOLVING A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM, AS IT DID OVER RHODESIA, THEN IT WOULD SET A USEFUL AND MUCH NEEDED EXAMPLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. I SHALL CERTAINLY DO MY BEST TO TRY TO ACHIEVE SUCH A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME.

WARM REGARDS,

YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER UNQUOTE.

2. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED VERSION TO FOLLOW.
3. MESSAGES ARE ALSO BEING SENT TO MR MULRONEY AND TO CENTRAL/SOUTHERN AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
10 DOWNING STREET
SERIAL No. T/80/85

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 October 1985

Dear Mr. President,

I know the great importance which you and your Government attach to the discussion of Southern African issues at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau next week. I want to let you know in advance what my general approach will be.

I have always felt a deep abhorrence of the system of apartheid in South Africa as being utterly contrary to all British values and British ideals. I have made this plain to President Botha in strong terms. Britain is united with the Commonwealth in seeking an end to apartheid and its replacement by a system of government which commands the support of the people of South Africa as a whole.

I hope that in Nassau we can discuss practical ways in which each of our countries can help to promote the fundamental reforms which we all want to see in South Africa. Our aim should be to help create the political conditions and mechanisms for a dialogue between the Government and the black community on the latter's participation in the political process.

Each of us must choose those means which are most appropriate to our particular circumstances and policies in contributing to this common end. As you know, Britain has recently joined with its European partners in endorsing a number of restrictive and positive measures in relation to

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South Africa reinforcing those which we have been implementing for a number of years. We have no military co-operation, no arms trade, no collaboration for nuclear development, no exports of crude oil and licensing controls on the export of sensitive equipment. Frankly I doubt whether any country is doing more. Our measures give an unmistakable political signal to the South African Government of our determination to see change.

But they are not intended to damage the South African economy. I remain firmly opposed to economic sanctions because I do not believe that they would persuade the South African Government to implement the changes we all wish to see. On the contrary, I fear that they would play into the hands of the extremists and harden resistance to change at the very moment when it seems at last to be getting under way. Moreover by undermining prosperity in South Africa they would only harm those whom we should be trying to help.

As I see it, our most pressing task is to help bring about negotiations between the South African Government and representatives of the black population. I hope that in Nassau we can have a realistic and open-minded discussion on the scope for positive action by the Commonwealth to promote this.

I look forward to discussing these vital issues with you.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, G.C.B.

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CHOGM: MESSAGES TO COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

1. PLEASE PASS ASAP FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED 10 OCTOBER FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BANDA:

QUOTE

DEAR MR PRESIDENT

I KNOW THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WHICH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT ATTACH
TO THE DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES AT THE COMMONWEALTH
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN NASSAU NEXT WEEK. I WANT TO LET
YOU KNOW IN ADVANCE WHAT MY GENERAL APPROACH WILL BE.

I HAVE ALWAYS FELT A DEEP ABHORRENCE OF THE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID
IN SOUTH AFRICA AS BEING UTTERLY CONTRARY TO ALL BRITISH VALUES
AND BRITISH IDEALS. I HAVE MADE THIS PLAIN TO PRESIDENT BOTHA IN
STRONG TERMS. BRITAIN IS UNITED WITH THE COMMONWEALTH IN SEEKING
AN END TO APARTHEID AND ITS REPLACEMENT BY A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
WHICH COMMANDS THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A
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I HOPE THAT IN NASSAU WE CAN DISCUSS PRACTICAL WAYS IN WHICH EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES CAN HELP TO PROMOTE THE FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS WHICH WE ALL WANT TO SEE IN SOUTH AFRICA. OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO HELP CREATE THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY ON THE LATTER'S PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

EACH OF US MUST CHOOSE THOSE MEANS WHICH ARE MOST APPROPRIATE TO OUR PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AND POLICIES IN CONTRIBUTING TO THIS COMMON END. AS YOU KNOW, BRITAIN HAS RECENTLY JOINED WITH ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN ENDORSING A NUMBER OF RESTRICTIVE AND POSITIVE MEASURES IN RELATION TO SOUTH AFRICA REINFORCING THOSE WHICH WE HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTING FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. WE HAVE NO MILITARY CO-OPERATION, NO ARMS TRADE, NO COLLABORATION FOR NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT, NO EXPORTS OF CRUDE OIL AND LICENSING CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT. FRANKLY I DOUBT WHETHER ANY COUNTRY IS DOING MORE. OUR MEASURES GIVE AN UNMISTAKEABLE POLITICAL SIGNAL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OF OUR DETERMINATION TO SEE CHANGE.

BUT THEY ARE NOT INTENDED TO DAMAGE THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY. I REMAIN FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS BECAUSE I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD PERSUADE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE CHANGES WE ALL WISH TO SEE. ON THE CONTRARY, I FEAR THAT THEY WOULD PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE EXTREMISTS AND HARDEN RESISTANCE TO CHANGE AT THE VERY MOMENT WHEN IT SEEMS AT LAST TO BE GETTING UNDER WAY. MOREOVER BY UNDERMINING PROSPERITY IN SOUTH AFRICA THEY WOULD ONLY HARM THOSE WHOM WE SHOULD BE TRYING TO HELP.

AS I SEE IT, OUR MOST PRESSING TASK IS TO HELP BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BLACK POPULATION. I HOPE THAT IN NASSAU WE CAN HAVE A REALISTIC AND OPEN-MINDED DISCUSSION ON THE SCOPE FOR POSITIVE ACTION BY THE COMMONWEALTH TO PROMOTE THIS.

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I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE VITAL ISSUES WITH YOUR DELEGATION.

WITH BEST WISHES,
YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER
UNQUOTE

2. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED VERSION TO FOLLOW.
3. YOUR MEETING WITH BANDA TO HAND OVER THIS MESSAGE WILL GIVE YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO RUN OVER THE POINTS IN OUR TEL NO 930 TO NEW DELHI. YOU WILL WISH TO BEAR IN MIND THE IDEAS IN FCO TEL NO 221 TO PRETORIA (REF YOUR TEL 213) ALTHOUGH AT THIS STAGE WE CANNOT BE SURE WHETHER OR IN EXACTLY WHAT FORM THE PRIME MINISTER MAY MAKE USE OF THEM AT NASSAU.
4. SIMILAR MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO THE OTHER CENTRAL/SOUTHERN AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

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10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 09/85

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 October 1985

My dear Prime Minister,

I know the great importance which you and your Government attach to the discussion of Southern African issues at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau next week. I want to let you know in advance what my general approach will be.

I have always felt a deep abhorrence of the system of apartheid in South Africa as being utterly contrary to all British values and British ideals. I have made this plain to President Botha in strong terms. Britain is united with the Commonwealth in seeking an end to apartheid and its replacement by a system of government which commands the support of the people of South Africa as a whole.

I hope that in Nassau we can discuss practical ways in which each of our countries can help to promote the fundamental reforms which we all want to see in South Africa. Our aim should be to help create the political conditions and mechanisms for a dialogue between the Government and the black community on the latter's participation in the political process.

Each of us must choose those means which are most appropriate to our particular circumstances and policies in contributing to this common end. As you know, Britain has

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recently joined with its European partners in endorsing a number of restrictive and positive measures in relation to South Africa reinforcing those which we have been implementing for a number of years. We have no military co-operation, no arms trade, no collaboration for nuclear development, no exports of crude oil and licensing controls on the export of sensitive equipment. Frankly I doubt whether any country is doing more. Our measures give an unmistakable political signal to the South African Government of our determination to see change.

But they are not intended to damage the South African economy. I remain firmly opposed to economic sanctions because I do not believe that they would persuade the South African Government to implement the changes we all wish to see. On the contrary, I fear that they would play into the hands of the extremists and harden resistance to change at the very moment when it seems at last to be getting under way. Moreover by undermining prosperity in South Africa they would only harm those whom we should be trying to help.

As I see it, our most pressing task is to help bring about negotiations between the South African Government and representatives of the black population. I hope that in Nassau we can have a realistic and open-minded discussion on the scope for positive action by the Commonwealth to promote this.

I look forward to discussing these vital issues with your delegation.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

The Rt. Hon. Dr. Leabua Jonathan, K.C.O.M., M.P.

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CHOGM: MESSAGES TO COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

1. PLEASE PASS ASAP FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED 10 OCTOBER FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER TO MR JONATHON:

QUOTE
MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER

I KNOW THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WHICH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT ATTACH
TO THE DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES AT THE COMMONWEALTH
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN NASSAU NEXT WEEK. I WANT TO LET
YOU KNOW IN ADVANCE WHAT MY GENERAL APPROACH WILL BE.

I HAVE ALWAYS FELT A DEEP ABHORRENCE OF THE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID
IN SOUTH AFRICA AS BEING UTTERLY CONTRARY TO ALL BRITISH VALUES
AND BRITISH IDEALS. I HAVE MADE THIS PLAIN TO PRESIDENT BOTHA IN
STRONG TERMS. BRITAIN IS UNITED WITH THE COMMONWEALTH IN SEEKING
AN END TO APARTHEID AND ITS REPLACEMENT BY A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
WHICH COMMANDS THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A
WHOLE.

I HOPE THAT IN NASSAU WE CAN DISCUSS PRACTICAL WAYS IN WHICH
EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES CAN HELP TO PROMOTE THE FUNDAMENTAL

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REFORMS WHICH WE ALL WANT TO SEE IN SOUTH AFRICA. OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO HELP CREATE THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY ON THE LATTER'S PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

EACH OF US MUST CHOOSE THOSE MEANS WHICH ARE MOST APPROPRIATE TO OUR PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AND POLICIES IN CONTRIBUTING TO THIS COMMON END. AS YOU KNOW, BRITAIN HAS RECENTLY JOINED WITH ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN ENDORSING A NUMBER OF RESTRICTIVE AND POSITIVE MEASURES IN RELATION TO SOUTH AFRICA REINFORCING THOSE WHICH WE HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTING FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. WE HAVE NO MILITARY CO-OPERATION, NO ARMS TRADE, NO COLLABORATION FOR NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT, NO EXPORTS OF CRUDE OIL AND LICENSING CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT. FRANKLY I DOUBT WHETHER ANY COUNTRY IS DOING MORE. OUR MEASURES GIVE AN UNMISTAKEABLE POLITICAL SIGNAL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OF OUR DETERMINATION TO SEE CHANGE.

BUT THEY ARE NOT INTENDED TO DAMAGE THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY. I REMAIN FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS BECAUSE I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD PERSUADE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE CHANGES WE ALL WISH TO SEE. ON THE CONTRARY, I FEAR THAT THEY WOULD PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE EXTREMISTS AND HARDEN RESISTANCE TO CHANGE AT THE VERY MOMENT WHEN IT SEEMS AT LAST TO BE GETTING UNDER WAY. MOREOVER BY UNDERMINING PROSPERITY IN SOUTH AFRICA THEY WOULD ONLY HARM THOSE WHOM WE SHOULD BE TRYING TO HELP.

AS I SEE IT, OUR MOST PRESSING TASK IS TO HELP BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BLACK POPULATION. I HOPE THAT IN NASSAU WE CAN HAVE A REALISTIC AND OPEN-MINDED DISCUSSION ON THE SCOPE FOR POSITIVE ACTION BY THE COMMONWEALTH TO PROMOTE THIS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE VITAL ISSUES WITH YOUR DELEGATION.

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15765 - 1

WITH BEST WISHES,
YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER
UNQUOTE

2. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED VERSION TO FOLLOW.
3. SIMILAR MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO THE OTHER CENTRAL/SOUTHERN AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

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10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 178/85

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 October 1985

Your Excellency,

I know the great importance which you and your Government attach to the discussion of Southern African issues at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau next week. I want to let you know in advance what my general approach will be.

I have always felt a deep abhorrence of the system of apartheid in South Africa as being utterly contrary to all British values and British ideals. I have made this plain to President Botha in strong terms. Britain is united with the Commonwealth in seeking an end to apartheid and its replacement by a system of government which commands the support of the people of South Africa as a whole.

I hope that in Nassau we can discuss practical ways in which each of our countries can help to promote the fundamental reforms which we all want to see in South Africa. Our aim should be to help create the political conditions and mechanisms for a dialogue between the Government and the black community on the latter's participation in the political process.

Each of us must choose those means which are most appropriate to our particular circumstances and policies in contributing to this common end. As you know, Britain has recently joined with its European partners in endorsing a number of restrictive and positive measures in relation to

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South Africa reinforcing those which we have been implementing for a number of years. We have no military co-operation, no arms trade, no collaboration for nuclear development, no exports of crude oil and licensing controls on the export of sensitive equipment. Frankly I doubt whether any country is doing more. Our measures give an unmistakable political signal to the South African Government of our determination to see change.

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As I see it, our most pressing task is to help bring about negotiations between the South African Government and representatives of the black population. I hope that in Nassau we can have a realistic and open-minded discussion on the scope for positive action by the Commonwealth to promote this.

I look forward to discussing these vital issues with you.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency The Rt. Hon. Prince Bhekimpi

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CHOGM: MESSAGES TO COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

1. PLEASE PASS ASAP FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED 10 OCTOBER FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER TO PRINCE BHEKIMPI:

QUOTE
YOUR EXCELLENCY

I KNOW THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WHICH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT ATTACH
TO THE DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES AT THE COMMONWEALTH
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN NASSAU NEXT WEEK. I WANT TO LET
YOU KNOW IN ADVANCE WHAT MY GENERAL APPROACH WILL BE.

I HAVE ALWAYS FELT A DEEP ABHORRENCE OF THE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID
IN SOUTH AFRICA AS BEING UTTERLY CONTRARY TO ALL BRITISH VALUES
AND BRITISH IDEALS. I HAVE MADE THIS PLAIN TO PRESIDENT BOTHA IN
STRONG TERMS. BRITAIN IS UNITED WITH THE COMMONWEALTH IN SEEKING
AN END TO APARTHEID AND ITS REPLACEMENT BY A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
WHICH COMMANDS THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A
WHOLE.

I HOPE THAT IN NASSAU WE CAN DISCUSS PRACTICAL WAYS IN WHICH
EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES CAN HELP TO PROMOTE THE FUNDAMENTAL
REFORMS WHICH WE ALL WANT TO SEE IN SOUTH AFRICA. OUR AIM

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SHOULD BE TO HELP CREATE THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY ON THE LATTER'S PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

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I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE VITAL ISSUES WITH YOU.

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WITH BEST WISHES,
YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER
UNQUOTE

2. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED VERSION TO FOLLOW.
3. SIMILAR MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO THE OTHER CENTRAL/SOUTHERN AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

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10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 181/85

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 October 1985

Dear Mr. President,

I know the great importance which you and your Government attach to the discussion of Southern African issues at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau next week. I want to let you know in advance what my general approach will be.

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I look forward to discussing these vital issues with you.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency The Hon. Dr. Q.K.J. Masire, J.P., M.P.

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TO IMMEDIATE GABORONE
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OF 101600Z OCTOBER 85

CHOGM: MESSAGES TO COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

1. PLEASE PASS ASAP FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED 10 OCTOBER FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MASIRE:

QUOTE
DEAR MR PRESIDENT

I KNOW THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WHICH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT ATTACH
TO THE DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES AT THE COMMONWEALTH
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN NASSAU NEXT WEEK. I WANT TO LET
YOU KNOW IN ADVANCE WHAT MY GENERAL APPROACH WILL BE.

I HAVE ALWAYS FELT A DEEP ABHORRENCE OF THE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID
IN SOUTH AFRICA AS BEING UTTERLY CONTRARY TO ALL BRITISH VALUES
AND BRITISH IDEALS. I HAVE MADE THIS PLAIN TO PRESIDENT BOTHA IN
STRONG TERMS. BRITAIN IS UNITED WITH THE COMMONWEALTH IN SEEKING
AN END TO APARTHEID AND ITS REPLACEMENT BY A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
WHICH COMMANDS THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A
WHOLE.

I HOPE THAT IN NASSAU WE CAN DISCUSS PRACTICAL WAYS IN WHICH
EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES CAN HELP TO PROMOTE THE FUNDAMENTAL

1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

15777 - 1

REFORMS WHICH WE ALL WANT TO SEE IN SOUTH AFRICA. OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO HELP CREATE THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY ON THE LATTER'S PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

EACH OF US MUST CHOOSE THOSE MEANS WHICH ARE MOST APPROPRIATE TO OUR PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AND POLICIES IN CONTRIBUTING TO THIS COMMON END. AS YOU KNOW, BRITAIN HAS RECENTLY JOINED WITH ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN ENDORSING A NUMBER OF RESTRICTIVE AND POSITIVE MEASURES IN RELATION TO SOUTH AFRICA REINFORCING THOSE WHICH WE HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTING FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. WE HAVE NO MILITARY CO-OPERATION, NO ARMS TRADE, NO COLLABORATION FOR NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT, NO EXPORTS OF CRUDE OIL AND LICENSING CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT. FRANKLY I DOUBT WHETHER ANY COUNTRY IS DOING MORE. OUR MEASURES GIVE AN UNMISTAKEABLE POLITICAL SIGNAL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OF OUR DETERMINATION TO SEE CHANGE.

BUT THEY ARE NOT INTENDED TO DAMAGE THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY. I REMAIN FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS BECAUSE I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD PERSUADE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE CHANGES WE ALL WISH TO SEE. ON THE CONTRARY, I FEAR THAT THEY WOULD PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE EXTREMISTS AND HARDEN RESISTANCE TO CHANGE AT THE VERY MOMENT WHEN IT SEEMS AT LAST TO BE GETTING UNDER WAY. MOREOVER BY UNDERMINING PROSPERITY IN SOUTH AFRICA THEY WOULD ONLY HARM THOSE WHOM WE SHOULD BE TRYING TO HELP.

AS I SEE IT, OUR MOST PRESSING TASK IS TO HELP BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BLACK POPULATION. I HOPE THAT IN NASSAU WE CAN HAVE A REALISTIC AND OPEN-MINDED DISCUSSION ON THE SCOPE FOR POSITIVE ACTION BY THE COMMONWEALTH TO PROMOTE THIS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE VITAL ISSUES WITH YOU.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

15777 - 1

WITH BEST WISHES,
YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER
UNQUOTE

2. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED VERSION TO FOLLOW.
3. SIMILAR MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO THE OTHER CENTRAL/SOUTHERN AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

HOWE

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3

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SUBJECT CC OPS
MASTER

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DA



CFo

PRIME MINISTER'S
10 DOWNING STREET
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 182/85

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 October 1985

My dear Prime Minister,

I know the great importance which you and your Government attach to the discussion of Southern African issues at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau next week. I want to let you know in advance what my general approach will be.

I have always felt a deep abhorrence of the system of apartheid in South Africa as being utterly contrary to all British values and British ideals. I have made this plain to President Botha in strong terms. Britain is united with the Commonwealth in seeking an end to apartheid and its replacement by a system of government which commands the support of the people of South Africa as a whole.

I hope that in Nassau we can discuss practical ways in which each of our countries can help to promote the fundamental reforms which we all want to see in South Africa. Our aim should be to help create the political conditions and mechanisms for a dialogue between the Government and the black community on the latter's participation in the political process.

Each of us must choose those means which are most appropriate to our particular circumstances and policies in contributing to this common end. As you know, Britain has recently joined with its European partners in endorsing a number of restrictive and positive measures in relation to South Africa reinforcing those which we have been implementing for a number of years. We have no military

dg

co-operation, no arms trade, no collaboration for nuclear development, no exports of crude oil and licensing controls on the export of sensitive equipment. Frankly I doubt whether any country is doing more. Our measures give an unmistakable political signal to the South African Government of our determination to see change.

But they are not intended to damage the South African economy. I remain firmly opposed to economic sanctions because I do not believe that they would persuade the South African Government to implement the changes we all wish to see. On the contrary, I fear that they would play into the hands of the extremists and harden resistance to change at the very moment when it seems at last to be getting under way. Moreover by undermining prosperity in South Africa they would only harm those whom we should be trying to help.

As I see it, our most pressing task is to help bring about negotiations between the South African Government and representatives of the black population. I hope that in Nassau we can have a realistic and open-minded discussion on the scope for positive action by the Commonwealth to promote this.

I look forward to discussing these vital issues with you.

I also hope to hear your views on developments in Mozambique. I had a useful talk here with President Machel on 27 September and he spoke warmly of the excellent performance of the Zimbabwean Army.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

The Hon. R.G. Mugabe, M.P.

CONFIDENTIAL

15682 - 1

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE GEORGETOWN
TELNO 110
OF 101600Z OCTOBER 85
INFO PRIORITY HARARE

CHOGM: MESSAGES TO COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

1. PLEASE DELIVER ASAP TEXT OF LETTER DATED 10 OCTOBER FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER TO THE HON RG MUGABE MP, PRIME MINISTER OF
ZIMBABWE, AS FOLLOWS.

QUOTE

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER

I KNOW THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WHICH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT ATTACH
TO THE DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES AT THE COMMONWEALTH
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN NASSAU NEXT WEEK. I WANT TO LET
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AN END TO APARTHEID AND ITS REPLACEMENT BY A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
WHICH COMMANDS THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A
WHOLE.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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15682 - 1

I HOPE THAT IN NASSAU WE CAN DISCUSS PRACTICAL WAYS IN WHICH EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES CAN HELP TO PROMOTE THE FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS WHICH WE ALL WANT TO SEE IN SOUTH AFRICA. OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO HELP CREATE THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY ON THE LATTER'S PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

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2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

15682 - 1

I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE VITAL ISSUES WITH YOU.

I ALSO HOPE TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN MOZAMBIQUE. I HAD A USEFUL TALK HERE WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL ON 27 SEPTEMBER AND HE SPOKE WARMLY OF THE EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE OF THE ZIMBABWEAN ARMY.

WITH BEST WISHES,
YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER
UNQUOTE

2. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED VERSION TO FOLLOW.
3. SIMILAR MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO THE OTHER CENTRAL/SOUTHERN AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

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PS/PUS
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MR JOHNSON

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CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No: T 183/85



10 DOWNING STREET

SUBJECT CCOPS FILE
MASTER
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DA

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 October 1985

Dear Kenneth,

I know the great importance which you and your Government attach to the discussion of Southern African issues at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau next week. I want to let you know in advance what my general approach will be.

I have always felt a deep abhorrence of the system of apartheid in South Africa as being utterly contrary to all British values and British ideals. I have made this plain to President Botha in strong terms. Britain is united with the Commonwealth in seeking an end to apartheid and its replacement by a system of government which commands the support of the people of South Africa as a whole.

I hope that in Nassau we can discuss practical ways in which each of our countries can help to promote the fundamental reforms which we all want to see in South Africa. Our aim should be to help create the political conditions and mechanisms for a dialogue between the Government and the black community on the latter's participation in the political process.

Each of us must choose those means which are most appropriate to our particular circumstances and policies in contributing to this common end. As you know, Britain has recently joined with its European partners in endorsing a number of restrictive and positive measures in relation to South Africa reinforcing those which we have been implementing for a number of years. We have no military

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But they are not intended to damage the South African economy. I remain firmly opposed to economic sanctions because I do not believe that they would persuade the South African Government to implement the changes we all wish to see. On the contrary, I fear that they would play into the hands of the extremists and harden resistance to change at the very moment when it seems at last to be getting under way. Moreover by undermining prosperity in South Africa they would only harm those whom we should be trying to help.

As I see it, our most pressing task is to help bring about negotiations between the South African Government and representatives of the black population. I hope that in Nassau we can have a realistic and open-minded discussion on the scope for positive action by the Commonwealth to promote this.

I look forward to discussing these vital issues with you.

Please accept my warm congratulations at your election as Chairman of the Front Line States. I am delighted that the leading role you have long played in regional matters has been recognised in this way.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret

His Excellency Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda

- CONFIDENTIAL

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FM FCO
TO DESKBY 110900Z LUSAKA
TELNO 399
OF 101600Z OCTOBER 85

CHOGM

1. PLEASE PASS ASAP FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED 10 OCTOBER FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA:

QUOTE

DEAR KENNETH,

I KNOW THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WHICH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT ATTACH
TO THE DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES AT THE COMMONWEALTH
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN NASSAU NEXT WEEK. I WANT TO LET
YOU KNOW IN ADVANCE WHAT MY GENERAL APPROACH WILL BE.

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AND BRITISH IDEALS. I HAVE MADE THIS PLAIN TO PRESIDENT BOTHA IN
STRONG TERMS. BRITAIN IS UNITED WITH THE COMMONWEALTH IN SEEKING
AN END TO APARTHEID AND ITS REPLACEMENT BY A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
WHICH COMMANDS THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A
WHOLE.

I HOPE THAT IN NASSAU WE CAN DISCUSS PRACTICAL WAYS IN WHICH
EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES CAN HELP TO PROMOTE THE FUNDAMENTAL

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/REFORMS

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15637 - 1

REFORMS WHICH WE ALL WANT TO SEE IN SOUTH AFRICA. OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO HELP CREATE THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY ON THE LATTER'S PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

EACH OF US MUST CHOOSE THOSE MEANS WHICH ARE MOST APPROPRIATE TO OUR PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AND POLICIES IN CONTRIBUTING TO THIS COMMON END. AS YOU KNOW, BRITAIN HAS RECENTLY JOINED WITH ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN ENDORSING A NUMBER OF RESTRICTIVE AND POSITIVE MEASURES IN RELATION TO SOUTH AFRICA REINFORCING THOSE WHICH WE HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTING FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. WE HAVE NO MILITARY CO-OPERATION, NO ARMS TRADE, NO COLLABORATION FOR NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT, NO EXPORTS OF CRUDE OIL AND LICENSING CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT. FRANKLY I DOUBT WHETHER ANY COUNTRY IS DOING MORE. OUR MEASURES GIVE AN UNMISTAKEABLE POLITICAL SIGNAL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OF OUR DETERMINATION TO SEE CHANGE.

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I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE VITAL ISSUES WITH YOU.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

/PLEASE

CONFIDENTIAL

15637 - 1

PLEASE ACCEPT MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS AT YOUR ELECTION AS
CHAIRMAN OF THE FRONT LINE STATES. I AM DELIGHTED THAT THE
LEADING ROLE YOU HAVE LONG PLAYED IN REGIONAL MATTERS HAS BEEN
RECOGNISED IN THIS WAY.

WITH BEST WISHES,
YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET
UNQUOTE

2. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED VERSION TO FOLLOW.
3. SIMILAR MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO THE OTHER CENTRAL/SOUTHERN
AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

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MR JOHNSON

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SUBJECT CC OPS
MASTER

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

10 DOWNING STREET

SERIAL No. T.177/85

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 October 1985

Dear Mr. President,

I know the great importance which you and your Government attach to the discussion of Southern African issues at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau next week. I want to let you know in advance what my general approach will be.

I have always felt a deep abhorrence of the system of apartheid in South Africa as being utterly contrary to all British values and British ideals. I have made this plain to President Botha in strong terms. Britain is united with the Commonwealth in seeking an end to apartheid and its replacement by a system of government which commands the support of the people of South Africa as a whole.

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As I see it, our most pressing task is to help bring about negotiations between the South African Government and representatives of the black population. I hope that in Nassau we can have a realistic and open-minded discussion on the scope for positive action by the Commonwealth to promote this.

I look forward to discussing these vital issues with your delegation.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency President Ibrahim Babangida

CONFIDENTIAL

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FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS
TELNO 709
OF 101600Z OCTOBER 85

CHOGM: MESSAGES TO COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

1. PLEASE PASS ASAP FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED 10 OCTOBER FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BABANGIDA.

QUOTE

DEAR MR PRESIDENT

I KNOW THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WHICH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT ATTACH
TO THE DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES AT THE COMMONWEALTH
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN NASSAU NEXT WEEK. I WANT TO LET
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REFORMS WHICH WE ALL WANT TO SEE IN SOUTH AFRICA. OUR AIM

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15767 - 1

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I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE VITAL ISSUES WITH YOUR DELEGATION.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

15767 - 1

WITH BEST WISHES,
YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER
UNQUOTE

2. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED VERSION TO FOLLOW.

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AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

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MR FERGUSSON

MR JOHNSON

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CONFIDENTIAL



British High Commission
PO Box 9200 Dar es Salaam Tanzania

Sat D

PLU
15/10

P Gregory-Hood Esq
East African Department
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date 10 October 1985

Dear Peter,

- 1. Enclosed is the letter from President Nyerere to Mrs Thatcher, the text of which was transmitted in our telno 331 of 8 October.

*Yours on
Mike*

M E Cook

*Tim - just for info - presume Charles has acted on telegram
AF.*

010
CONFIDENTIAL

ccR



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 October 1985

Dear Charles,

CHOGM: South Africa: Message to Pindling

/ You will recall our discussion of Nassau telno 207 (copy enclosed). I now attach a draft message to Pindling.

Our intention is that the letter should be taken out to Nassau on Sunday by John Johnson, who would deliver it personally on Monday 14 October, if Sir L Pindling proves willing to find time to see him. Alternatively, if you prefer, we could of course telegraph the text as soon as it is available.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



cc/cp

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 October 1985

CDP.

Dear Charles,

CHOGM: Message to President Nyerere from the Prime Minister

/ I enclose a draft reply to President Nyerere's letter
/ to the Prime Minister of 7 October (Dar-Es-Salaam telno 331:
copy enclosed).

At least four of the measures he lists would be unacceptable to us. We believe that the right course is to reject the proposal in principle. The draft is couched accordingly.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 331
OF 080815Z OCTOBER 85

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

SOUTH AFRICA : ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.

1. WE HAVE TODAY BEEN HANDED A LETTER, DATED 7 OCTOBER, FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE TO MRS THATCHER. TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:-

QUOTE

DEAR MARGARET,

I AM WRITING THIS LETTER WITH GREAT DIFFIDENCE, BUT WITH SINCERITY AND GOOD WILL. WE NEED YOUR HELP. AND WHEN I SAY 'WE', I MEAN THE WORLD IN GENERAL, AND AFRICA IN PARTICULAR.

YOU HELPED US TO END MINORITY RULE IN RHODESIA, AND BROUGHT YEARS OF VIOLENCE TO A VIRTUAL END. YOU CAN HELP US TO END APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA, AND TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE WHICH STEMS FROM IT.

I KNOW THAT BRITAIN IS NOT A COLONIAL POWER IN SOUTH AFRICA. BUT ITS IMMENSE INVESTMENTS IN THAT COUNTRY GIVE YOU A POWER WHICH NO OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADER HAS - AND INDEED WHICH IS POSSESSED BY NO OTHER LEADER IN THE WORLD, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE PURPOSE OF THIS LETTER IS TO PLEAD WITH YOU TO USE THAT POWER, ALBEIT THE POWER OF INFLUENCE, TO HELP US BRING APARTHEID TO AN END WITHOUT A CONTINUING AND INCREASINGLY INTOLERABLE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE.

*but would
it?*

WE ARE APPEALING TO YOU TO JOIN THE REST OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN APPLYING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. WE ARE NOT ASKING FOR COMPREHENSIVE MANDATORY SANCTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VIII OF THE U.N. CHARTER - MUCH AS WE WOULD LIKE THESE TO BE ADOPTED. AND THERE ARE TWO REASONS WHY WE ARE NOT ASKING SO MUCH.

FIRST, YOU ARE NOT READY FOR COMPREHENSIVE MANDATORY SANCTIONS. YOU MAY GENUINELY BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD DO UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE TO BRITISH INTERESTS AND THE BRITISH ECONOMY, AND CAUSE MORE UNEMPLOYMENT WHEN YOU ARE SEEKING TO REDUCE IT.

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/SECONDLY

SECONDLY, MANDATORY SANCTIONS WOULD REQUIRE A RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND IF YOU FEEL STRONGLY ENOUGH AGAINST THEM YOU WOULD BE FORCED TO USE THE BRITISH VETO. THAT WOULD GREATLY DAMAGE OUR CAUSE BY SENDING THE WRONG SIGNAL TO SOUTH AFRICA - AND MIGHT AT THE SAME TIME DO POLITICAL HARM TO BRITAIN'S STANDING IN THE WORLD. AND IN ANY CASE, EVEN IF YOU WERE READY FOR COMPREHENSIVE MANDATORY SANCTIONS, THE LIKELY VETO BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WOULD SEND THAT SAME MESSAGE OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE RULERS OF SOUTH AFRICA AND OF DESPAIR TO THE VICTIMS OF APARTHEID.

WE ARE ASKING YOU TO JOIN US IN APPLYING A MEANINGFUL PACKAGE OF SELECTIVE SANCTIONS. I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DEVISE ANY SANCTIONS PACKAGE WHICH WOULD BE TOTALLY PAINLESS TO BRITAIN: SOME PRICE INEVITABLY HAS TO BE PAID IF WE ARE TO HASTEN THE END OF APARTHEID AND ITS VIOLENCE. BUT THERE ARE THINGS WHICH YOU COULD JOIN IN, WITHOUT INTOLERABLE DIFFICULTY. YOU COULD:-

The price is not the immediate issue

- 1) STOP BUYING AND PROHIBIT THE SALE IN BRITAIN OF THE KRUGERAND.
- 2) STOP THE IMPORTATION INTO BRITAIN OR BRITISH TERRITORIES OF WINES OR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA.
- 3) CUT AIR TRAVEL LINKS.
- 4) BAN ALL NEW INVESTMENTS OR REINVESTMENTS IN APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA, AND TAKE ACTIONS TO ENCOURAGE INVESTMENTS IN THE SADCC AREA.
- 5) BAN THE EXPORT OF ALL COMPUTERS AND OTHER MODERN TECHNOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND ANY OF ITS SUBSIDIARY ORGANISATIONS.
- 6) STRENGTHEN THE APPLICATION OF THE GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT.

Easy for a black man to say this - i would have the evidence!

A SANCTIONS PACKAGE OF THIS KIND, COMING FROM THE COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT CONFERENCE, WOULD SEND A MESSAGE TO BOTH THE LEADERS AND THE VICTIMS OF APARTHEID. IT WOULD DISCOURAGE THE FORMER, AND GIVE HEART TO THE LATTER. BUT WHETHER SUCH A POSITIVE MESSAGE GOES TO SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE COMMONWEALTH DEPENDS SOLELY ON BRITAIN, AND REALLY ON YOU PERSONALLY. I SAY THIS AFTER HEARING OF THE STAND OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND ON

Commonwealth expectations which would not be fulfilled

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/THIS

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THIS ISSUE, AND AFTER MY RECENT VERY USEFUL AND ENCOURAGING TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY OF CANADA.

no MARGARET: WE NEED YOUR HELP. HELP THE COMMONWEALTH TO SEND A MESSAGE OF HOPE, OF NON-RACIALISM, AND OF PEACE, TO THE VICTIMS OF APARTHEID.

AS ALWAYS, THIS LETTER COMES TO YOU WITH WARM REGARDS AND MY VERY BEST WISHES TO YOU PERSONALLY.

YOURS SINCERELY,

JULIUS K NYERERE.

UNQUOTE.

2. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

SANKEY

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 207

OF 091430Z OCTOBER 1985

INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA, NEW DELHI, ACCRA, CANBERRA, BRIDGETOWN, COLOMBO, DHAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, GEORGETOWN, HARARE, KINGSTON, LAGOS, NAIROBI, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS, PORT OF SPAIN, SINGAPORE, LILONGWE, LUSAKA, MASERU, MBABANE

YOUR TELNO 930 : SOUTH AFRICA AND CHOGM

1. I SOUGHT A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, SIR L PINDLING, TO MAKE THE POINTS IN YOUR TUR, ASSUMING THAT IT WOULD BE THE BAHAMIAN POSITION FROM THE CHOGM CHAIR RATHER THAN FROM THE BAHAMIAN DELEGATION SEAT THAT WOULD BE OF INTEREST. PINDLING SAW ME FOR ALMOST AN HOUR ON 8 OCTOBER. I LEFT WITH HIM A PAPER BASED ON YOUR PARA 8. HE WAS RELAXED AND AFFABLE THROUGHOUT.

2. HE SAID AFTER HEARING ME OUT, THAT WHILE OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WERE CLEAR ABOUT WHAT BRITAIN DID NOT WANT (THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS), IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT WE DID WANT. HE THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GET AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE, AND AS CHAIRMAN WOULD TRY TO FIND THE COMMON DENOMINATOR. IN RESPONSE TO MY HAVING TOLD HIM THAT MY APPROACH WAS ONE THAT WE WERE MAKING IN OTHER COMMONWEALTH CAPITALS, TO ENSURE THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF BRITAIN'S POSITION BEFORE THE CONFERENCE, HE SAID HE WAS SURE ALL OUR AFRICAN POSTS WOULD REPORT THAT THE ARGUMENTS I HAD ADVANCED AGAINST ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE REJECTED BY THOSE GOVERNMENTS. HE SAID THAT HIS OWN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES SHOWED THAT THOSE WHO BY OUR ARGUMENTS HAD MOST TO LOSE, EG BOTSWANA, WERE MOST STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF SANCTIONS. HE NAMED A STRING OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES, PLUS HINDIA AND SRI LANKA AS EXAMPLES OF OTHERS, WHO TOOK THIS VIEW. BUT, HE SAID, FROM HIS SOUNDINGS, INCLUDING AT THE COMMONWEALTH FINANCE MINISTERS MEETING IN MALE FROM WHICH HE HAD JUST RETURNED, HE BELIEVED THAT FEW OF THOSE COUNTRIES BELIEVED IN PUSHING BRITAIN TO THE WALL ON THIS ISSUE.

3. HE SAID HE HOPED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO PERSUADE BRITAIN TO TAKE QUOTE ONE OR TWO MORE LITTLE STEPS UNQUOTE. TALK OF A TOTAL ECONOMIC BAN WAS ONLY POLITICAL RHETORIC, BUT BRITAIN OUGHT TO SHOW SOME EVIDENCE OF A WILLINGNESS TO MAKE SOME MOVEMENT. HE SAID SOME ECONOMIC SANCTION OUGHT TO BE APPLIED, IF ONLY TO MAKE SOUTH AFRICA SEE THAT THEY WERE NOT TOTALLY IMMUNE TO THIS KIND OF ACTION AND THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S FRIENDS SHOULD FEEL OBLIGED TO HELP HER SAVE HER FROM HERSELF BY SUCH INDICATORS.

4. I QUOTED THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MEASURES AS EXISTING EXAMPLES OF MANIFESTATIONS OF OUR GOOD FAITH, AND WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THESE, GAVE HIM A LIST. AFTER EXAMINING THE

HE SAID THEY DID NOT MEAN MUCH EG ON ARMS SALES BANS HE SAID SOUTH AFRICA GOT ITS ARMS WITHOUT TROUBLE FROM ISRAEL, AND ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION SAID ISRAEL, AND INDIRECTLY THE US THROUGH ISRAEL, HAD HELPED SOUTH AFRICA IN THAT FIELD.

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5. SIR L PINDLING SAID HE WILL WANT TO GET THE CONFERENCE OFF THE HARD ISSUE OF SANCTIONS, BUT HOPES BRITAIN WILL BE ABLE TO OFFER SOMETHING OTHER THAN EXPRESSIONS OF CONDEMNATION OF APARTHEID ETC. FOR EXAMPLE SOME POSITIVE NEW MOVE OVER NAMIBIA AND ESPECIALLY TO GET SOUTH AFRICA TO ACCEPT THE UN POSITION ON NAMIBIA, OR GREATER ASSISTANCE TO BOTSWANA, SWAZILAND OR LESOTHO, EITHER ECONOMIC, OR MORE PARTICULARLY, PROTECTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA FOR THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, COULD MEAN A LOT TO THE AFRICAN STATES, AND MIGHT HAVE ALMOST AS MUCH PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT AS SANCTIONS. HE SAID THE RAIDS BY SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES INTO THE TERRITORY OF OTHERS WERE THEMSELVES EXPRESSIONS OF APARTHEID. HE HIMSELF STRONGLY FELT THAT BRITAIN COULD NOT JUST SAY NO TO EVERYTHING PROPOSED BY OTHERS, BUT SHOULD COME UP WITH ALTERNATIVES ALONG THESE LINES. HE FOR HIS PART SAID HE WOULD BE WILLING TO DO AL

L HE COULD TO TAKE THE DISCUSSION OFF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS SUCH, BUT WAS SURE OTHER PARTICIPANTS AT THE CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO LOOK FOR SOME ALTERNATIVE POSITIVE MEASURES FROM BRITAIN.

6. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OR SECRETARY OF STATE AT AN EARLY STAGE, AND HAD HAD IT IN MIND TO SEEK SUCH A MEETING ON 16 OCTOBER BEFORE THE CONFERENCE OPENED. HE POINTED OUT THE SHORTAGE OF TIME THEN. HE SAID HIS BEST SLOT WAS 10.30 OR 11.00 AM THAT MORNING, WHICH HAD THE ADVANTAGE THAT HE COULD ALTER HIS OPENING REMARKS FOR THAT AFTER-NOON IF NECESSARY UP TO THAT TIME TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR VIEWS. HE SAID HE PROPOSED TO SPEAK FOR ABOUT THREE MINUTES ON SOUTH AFRICA IN AN OPENING SPEECH OF ABOUT TWELVE MINUTES.

7. FINALLY HE SAID HE HOPED BRITAIN WOULD NOT APPEAR TOO INFLEXIBLE OR PROVOCATIVE ON THIS ISSUE. HE RESPONDED THAT THAT WAS NEVER OUR AIM, BUT HE HAD SOUGHT TO IMPRESS UPON HIM THE FIRMNESS OF OUR VIEWS ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THAT HE SHOULD TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT TOO IN HIS PREPARATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHERS.

HEAP

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MR. WICKS

Approved by M
CBE

The Canadian Prime Minister sent the Prime Minister a rather wet message a few days ago about South Africa and CHOGM. I think it is important to get in a reasoned reply in good time before CHOGM starts.

I am mufaxing a draft up to you. Could you please seek the Prime Minister's approval. We can then telegraph the text (amended as necessary) to Ottawa, and the signed version can follow later.

(C.D. Powell)

9 October 1985

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 October 1985

Dear Charles,

CHOGM: Messages to Commonwealth Heads of Government

In his minute of 4 October to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary said that he would be recommending personal messages from the Prime Minister to selected Commonwealth Heads of Government on the subject of South Africa.

You will have received earlier in the day a draft reply to Mr Mulroney's letter of 2 October to the Prime Minister.

I now enclose draft letters to the Heads of Government of Australia, New Zealand, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and Nigeria. In addition, we have just received a letter to the Prime Minister from President Nyerere and will be letting you have a draft reply shortly.

Mr Hawke has made unhelpful and critical public statements about British policy towards South Africa. He has also made it known that he intends to press for mandatory economic sanctions at CHOGM. There would be advantage in the Prime Minister seeking to dissuade him in advance from taking too confrontational an approach.

Mr Lange by contrast has tended to be cautious about South Africa, and apparently sees no mileage domestically in any sort of campaign on the subject. He could therefore be helpful to us at CHOGM, though he will be tempted to take a low profile.

Dr Kaunda would no doubt welcome a further letter from the Prime Minister as a follow up to their exchange earlier this year about Mr Fergusson's visit to Lusaka. Although Kaunda has recently stressed the need for Britain to adopt trade sanctions, his underlying moderation could be very important at Nassau. We therefore need to convince him that Britain, while opposed to economic sanctions, is genuinely concerned to find ways of promoting dialogue and reform in South Africa.

We also need to work in advance on the other Commonwealth Front Line States and neighbours of South Africa. Presidents Mugabe and Masire will be particularly important.

/Chief

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Chief Jonathan of Lesotho and President Banda of Malawi will not themselves be coming to Nassau but their delegations should still be encouraged to play a moderating role. Swaziland, in theory, should be the most helpful of all to us, though its "Uncle Tom" image reduces its effectiveness.

The other key Commonwealth countries are Nigeria, to whom a message would be a useful follow up to their positive response to our decision on the Luxembourg package, and India, to whom no message is needed - given that the Prime Minister will shortly be seeing Rajiv Gandhi here.

*Yours ever,
Colin Budd*

(C. R. Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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My Dear Prime Minister ^{DCAAUK} [Ningabe, ^{DCAAVL} Jonathan
 Dear Mr. President ^{DCAAMUN} [Babangida, ^{DCAATUN} Nwoire, ^{DCAAUO} Banda].
 [Please find out how to address ^{DCAATUQ} Prince Bhekimpisi]

I know the great importance which you and your Government attach to the discussion of Southern African issues at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau next week. I want to let you know in advance what my general approach will be.

I have always felt a deep abhorrence of the system of apartheid in South Africa as being utterly contrary to all British values and British ideals. I have made this plain to President Botha in strong terms. Britain is united with the Commonwealth in seeking an end to apartheid and its replacement by a system of government which commands the support of the people of South Africa as a whole.

I hope that in Nassau we can discuss practical ways in which each of our countries can help to promote the fundamental reforms which we all want to see in South Africa. Our aim should be to help create the political conditions and mechanisms for a dialogue between the Government and the black community on the latter's participation in the political process.

Each of us must choose those means which are most appropriate to our particular circumstances and policies in contributing to this common end. As you know, Britain has recently joined with its European partners in endorsing a number of restrictive and positive measures in relation to

South Africa reinforcing those which we have been implementing for a number of years. We have no military co-operation, no arms trade, no collaboration for nuclear development, no exports of crude oil and licensing controls on the export of sensitive equipment. Frankly I doubt whether any country is doing more. Our measures give an unmistakable political signal to the South African Government of our determination to see change.

But they are not intended to damage the South African economy. I remain firmly opposed to economic sanctions because I do not believe that they would persuade the South African Government to implement the changes we all wish to see. On the contrary, I fear that they would play into the hands of the extremists and harden resistance to change at the very moment when it seems at last to be getting under way. Moreover by undermining prosperity in South Africa they would only harm those whom we should be trying to help.

As I see it, our most pressing task is to help bring about negotiations between the South African Government and representatives of the black population. I hope that in Nassau we can have a realistic and open-minded discussion on the scope for positive action by the Commonwealth to promote this, ~~rather than descend into a sterile debate on sanctions.~~

I look forward to discussing these vital issues with you

[Please accept my warm congratulations at your election as Chairman of the Front Line States. I am delighted that the leading role you have long played in regional matters has been recognised in this way.]

[for Babangida & Dr. Jonathan: "with your delegation!"]

Kaunda

Mugabe

I also hope to hear your views on developments in Mozambique. I had a useful talk here with President Rached on 27 September and he spoke warmly of the excellent performance of the Zimbabwean Army.

All

With best wishes, yours sincerely Margaret Thatcher

nwfaxed 9/10

MR. WICKS

CHOGM: MESSAGES TO SELECTED HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

The Foreign Secretary is recommending messages on South Africa to selected Heads of Government in advance of CHOGM. This seems sensible.

One batch will be to the Heads of Government of the Front-Line States and Nigeria. While each message will be slightly different, if the Prime Minister could approve a core draft, I could top and tail them.

Others will be to the Old Commonwealth: to Hawke who has been unhelpful and critical about us: Lange who is rather cautious. You already have the reply to Lange.

We are working on a separate reply to Nyerere (who will not himself attend CHOGM).

It would be kind if you could show the drafts which I shall Mufax to the Prime Minister.

p.s. The FCO drafts need a lot of work. I am amending (and shortening them) before despatch to you.

(Charles Powell)

9 October 1985

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SOUTH AFRICA: EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES

1. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE TEXT FOR ONWARD TRANSMISSION OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA DATED 9 OCTOBER, IN REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S RECENT MESSAGE. FOLLOWING IS TEXT (ORIGINAL BY BAG):

BEGINS.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

YOU WOULD BY NOW HAVE RECEIVED MY LETTER OF 4 OCTOBER 1985 WHICH DEALS TO A LARGE EXTENT WITH MATTERS RAISED IN YOUR OWN LETTER OF 4 OCTOBER 1985.

I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN OF YOUR RECENT TALKS WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE AND IN PARTICULAR OF THE VARIOUS BRITISH AID PROGRAMMES. AS MENTIONED TO YOU BEFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE WILL YIELD POSITIVE RESULTS. SOUTH AFRICA IS READY, WITHIN ITS MEANS, TO CONTINUE ITS OWN PROGRAMMES OF ASSISTANCE, WHICH MAY, OF COURSE, BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE PUNITIVE ECONOMIC MEASURES DECIDED ON BY THE UNITED STATES, THE EEC COUNTRIES AND OTHERS. I TRUST THAT THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHICH SUBSCRIBE TO THE ANTI-SOUTH AFRICAN MEASURES WILL BE PREPARED TO FILL THE VACUUM SHOULD SOUTH AFRICA BE FORCED SUBSTANTIALLY TO REDUCE ITS ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS AND COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF LABOUR AND OTHER SPHERES.

AS REGARDS RECENT ANNOUNCEMENTS BY MAPUTO OF BREACHES OF THE ACCORD OF NKOMATI I WISH TO CONFIRM TO YOU THAT WE VIEW THESE DEVELOPMENTS IN A MOST SERIOUS LIGHT. I PERSONALLY GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO HAVE THESE ALLEGATIONS FULLY INVESTIGATED BY A TEAM OF INDEPENDENT PERSONS. CERTAIN TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS WERE INDEED DISCOVERED WHICH WE HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY ACKNOWLEDGED AND EXPLAINED TO THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME IT TRANSPIRED THAT THESE "VIOLATIONS" OCCURRED IN THE COURSE OF EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO BRING FRELIMO AND RENAMO TOGETHER AROUND THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN THE BELIEF THAT PEACE CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED IN MOZAMBIQUE BY BRINGING ABOUT DIRECT TALKS LEADING TO A CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN THESE TWO GROUPS. THESE EFFORTS I MAY ADD, HAD THE EXPLICIT APPROVAL OF THE MOZAMBIQUE AUTHORITIES AT THE TIME

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AND WERE NOT AIMED AT PROVIDING ANY ADVANTAGE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN MAPUTO.

I WISH TO CONFIRM SOUTH AFRICA'S CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO THE NKOMATI ACCORD. WE REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH THE MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT AND WILL UNDERTAKE ALL EFFORTS TO REMOVE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING IN THIS MATTER.

I AM AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH THE SWA/NAMIBIAN QUESTION CREATES FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I SHARE YOUR WISH TO SEE AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM.

HOWEVER, I THINK WE MUST ASK OURSELVES WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE IN THE SOUTH WESTERN PART OF AFRICA. DO WE REALLY WISH TO CONFIRM IN POWER IN LUANDA AN UNELECTED MARXIST GOVERNMENT THAT DEPENDS ALMOST ENTIRELY ON THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA TO ENABLE IT TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION? IS IT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES REALLY POSSIBLE TO WEAN THE MPLA FROM THE SOVIET UNION? AS FAR AS SWA/NAMIBIA IS CONCERNED, IS IT ENOUGH SIMPLY TO WANT TO REMOVE VEXATIOUS QUESTIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA? DO WE NOT HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE PEOPLES CONCERNED WHICH TRANSCEND THE RHETORIC OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS? DO WE REALLY WANT TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR A MARXIST TAKE-OVER IN SWA/NAMIBIA AND TO DOOM THAT COUNTRY TO TOTALITARIANISM, INTER-GROUP CONFLICT AND ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION?

WE BELIEVE THAT THE MINIMUM THAT WE CAN DO TO AVOID SUCH AN OUTCOME IS TO COUNTERACT THE GROWING THREAT POSED BY THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS TO THE SECURITY OF OUR REGION. AS YOU KNOW, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT UNSCR 435 CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED WHILE CUBAN FORCES REMAIN IN ANGOLA. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET AND CUBAN INFLUENCE IN ANGOLA WOULD BE A GRAVE THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF ALL OF THE COUNTRIES OF OUR REGION, INCLUDING A FUTURE INDEPENDENT SWA/NAMIBIA. OTHER COUNTRIES IN AFRICA SHARE OUR CONCERNS IN THIS REGARD.

THE SITUATION IS MADE MORE CRITICAL BY THE ESCALATION OF DIRECT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA. SOVIET STAFF OFFICERS ARE DIRECTING OFFENSIVES, WHICH ALSO INCLUDE CUBAN AND SWAPO ELEMENTS; SOVIET ADVISERS ARE STIFFENING THE RESOLVE OF FAPLA UNITS; AND SOVIET AND CUBAN PILOTS ARE FLYING SOME OF ANGOLA'S MIG 23 AIRCRAFT AND MI 25 HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS. THIS HEIGHTENED SOVIET INVOLVEMENT COULD BE A DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE CIVIL WAR. IF UNCONTESTED, IT MIGHT ULTIMATELY LEAD TO THE DESTRUCTION OF UMITA, A NATIONALIST MOVEMENT WHICH IS A LEGITIMATE HEIR OF THE ALVOR AGREEMENT, WHICH IS PRO-WESTERN AND WHICH PROBABLY ENJOYS THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF ANGOLA'S PEOPLE.

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THESE

THESE DEVELOPMENTS CONFRONT SOUTH AFRICA WITH DIFFICULT DECISIONS. WE CANNOT STAND ASIDE WHILE SOVIET-DIRECTED OFFENSIVES THREATEN UNIA AND JEOPARDISE THE SECURITY OF OUR REGION. AT THE SAME TIME SOUTH AFRICA HAS NO DESIRE TO BECOME INVOLVED IN A DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

THE WEST MUST ALSO MAKE SOME DIFFICULT DECISIONS. IT MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S CURRENT PROJECTION OF WILL IN ANGOLA CANNOT BE STOPPED BY GOOD INTENTIONS AND DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES ALONE. IT MUST NOT ALLOW THE SITUATION TO DEVELOP IN WHICH MODERATE AFRICAN STATES WILL DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT WHEN IT COMES TO THE TEST, THEY ARE NOT ABLE TO RELY ON THE WEST.

ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE MADE IT MORE URGENT THAN EVER THAT A FIRM AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED ON THE GENUINE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA. SOUTH AFRICA IS AT PRESENT ENGAGED IN AN INITIATIVE TO RE-ENERGISE THE TALKS ON THIS QUESTION.

WE CERTAINLY HOPE THAT THIS INITIATIVE WILL LEAD TO THE GENUINE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS AND TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT PLAN. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS CONCERNING THE BENEFITS WHICH WE MIGHT EXPECT TO DERIVE FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE SWA QUESTION. IN THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE IT WOULD BRING US ONLY A BRIEF RESPITE.

REPORTS ARE REACHING US ON RACIAL UNREST IN PARTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. THE MEDIA IS PROBABLY MAKING THESE EVENTS APPEAR CONSIDERABLY WORSE THAN THEY REALLY ARE. NEVERTHELESS, WE IN THIS COUNTRY WHO HAVE EXPERIENCED DISRUPTIVE EVENTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE HAVE GREAT SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING FOR THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH CONFRONT YOUR GOVERNMENT IN THIS RESPECT.

YOURS SINCERELY
SIGNED P W BOTHA

LIMITED

SAFD

PS

PS/PUS

MR FERGUSON

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR JOHNSON

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SUBJECT CC OPS

MASTER

Telegraphed to
party 22/10

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 176A/85



Union Buildings
Pretoria

9 October 1985

Dear Prime Minister

You would by now have received my letter of 4 October 1985 which deals to a large extent with matters raised in your own letter of 4 October 1985.

I was pleased to learn of your recent talks with President Machel of Mozambique and in particular of the various British aid programmes. As mentioned to you before, we believe that such assistance will yield positive results. South Africa is ready, within its means, to continue its own programmes of assistance, which may, of course, be adversely affected by the punitive economic measures decided on by the United States, the EEC countries and others. I trust that those Governments which subscribe to the anti-South African measures will be prepared to fill the vacuum should South Africa be forced substantially to reduce its economic commitments and cooperation in the field of labour and other spheres.

As regards recent announcements by Maputo of breaches of the Accord of Nkomati I wish to confirm to you that we view these developments in a most serious light. I personally gave instructions to have these allegations fully investigated by a team of independent persons. Certain technical violations were indeed discovered which we have subsequently acknowledged and explained to the Mozambique government. At the same time it transpired that these "violations" occurred in the course of efforts on the part of the South African military authorities to bring Frelimo and Renamo together around the negotiating table in the belief that peace can only be achieved in Mozambique by bringing about direct talks leading to a cease-fire between these two groups. These efforts I may add, had the explicit approval of the Mozambican authorities at the time and were not aimed at providing any advantage at the expense of the government in Maputo.

I wish to confirm South Africa's continued commitment to the Nkomati Accord. We remain in contact with the Mozambican government and will undertake all efforts to remove any misunderstanding in this matter.

I am aware of the problems which the SWA/Namibian question creates for your Government in the international community. I can assure you that I share your wish to see an early resolution of this problem.

However, I think we must ask ourselves what we are trying to achieve in the south western part of Africa. Do we really wish to confirm in power in Luanda an unelected Marxist Government that depends almost entirely on the Soviet Union and Cuba to enable it to maintain its position? Is it under these circumstances really possible to wean the MPLA from the Soviet Union? As far as SWA/Namibia is concerned, is it enough simply to want to remove vexatious questions from the international agenda? Do we not have responsibilities to the peoples concerned which transcend the rhetoric of international politics? Do we really want to create the conditions for a Marxist take-over in SWA/Namibia and to doom that country to totalitarianism, inter-group conflict and economic disintegration?.

We believe that the minimum that we can do to avoid such an outcome is to counteract the growing threat posed by the Soviets and the Cubans to the security of our region. As you know, we do not believe that UNSCR 435 can be successfully implemented while Cuban forces remain in Angola. We also believe that the consolidation of Soviet and Cuban influence in Angola would be a grave threat to the security of all of the countries of our region, including a future independent SWA/Namibia. Other countries in Africa share our concerns in this regard.

The situation is made more critical by the escalation of direct Soviet involvement in the civil war in Angola. Soviet staff officers are directing offensives, which also include Cuban and SWAPO elements; Soviet advisers are stiffening the resolve of FAPLA units; and Soviet and Cuban pilots are flying some of Angola's Mig 23 aircraft and MI 25 helicopter gunships. This heightened Soviet involvement could be a decisive factor in the civil war. If uncontested, it might ultimately lead to the destruction of UNITA, a nationalist movement which is a legitimate heir of the Alvor Agreement, which is pro-Western and which probably enjoys the support of the majority of Angola's people.

These developments confront South Africa with difficult decisions. We cannot stand aside while Soviet-directed offensives threaten UNITA and jeopardise the security of our region. At the same time South Africa has no desire to become involved in a direct conflict with the Soviet Union.


The West must also make some difficult decisions. It must understand that the Soviet Union's current projection of will in Angola cannot be stopped by good intentions and diplomatic initiatives alone. It must not allow the situation to develop in which moderate African States will draw the conclusion that when it comes to the test, they are not able to rely on the West.

All these developments have made it more urgent than ever that a firm agreement should be reached on the genuine withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. South Africa is at present engaged in an initiative to re-energise the talks on this question.

We certainly hope that this initiative will lead to the genuine withdrawal of the Cubans and to the implementation of the international settlement plan. However, we have no illusions concerning the benefits which we might expect to derive from the resolution of the SWA question. In the present international climate it would bring us only a brief respite.

Reports are reaching us on racial unrest in parts of the United Kingdom. The media is probably making these events appear considerably worse than they really are. Nevertheless, we in this country who have experienced disruptive events of a similar nature have great sympathy and understanding for the difficulties which confront your Government in this respect.

Yours sincerely


P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

ccp



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 October 1985

Dear Charles,

Letter to Mr Mulroney

Thank you for your letter of 3 October enclosing one from the Canadian Prime Minister to the Prime Minister.

I now enclose a suggested draft reply to Mr Mulroney. The draft broadly follows the approach set out in the Foreign Secretary's minute to the Prime Minister of 4 October and expresses the hope that the Prime Minister and Mr Mulroney can have an early discussion at Nassau with a view to exploring some constructive ideas.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

T 173 B/85

THE STATE HOUSE,
DAR ES SALAAM,
TANZANIA.

7th October 1985

Prime Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.
U.K.

Dear Margaret,

I am writing this letter with great diffidence, but with sincerity and good will. We need your help. And when I say 'we', I mean the world in general, and Africa in particular.

You helped us to end minority rule in Rhodesia, and brought years of violence to a virtual end. You can help us to end Apartheid in South Africa, and to break the cycle of violence which stems from it.

I know that Britain is not a colonial power in South Africa. But its immense investments in that country give you a power which no other Commonwealth leader has - and indeed which is possessed by no other leader in the world, with the possible exception of President Reagan. The purpose of this letter is to plead with you to use that power, albeit the power of influence, to help us bring apartheid to an end without a continuing and increasingly intolerable level of violence.

We are appealing to you to join the rest of the Commonwealth in applying economic sanctions against South Africa. We are not asking for comprehensive Mandatory Sanctions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter - much as we would like these to be adopted. And there are two reasons why we are not asking so much.

First, you are not ready for comprehensive Mandatory Sanctions. You may genuinely believe that they would do unacceptable damage to British interests and the British economy, and cause more unemployment when you are seeking to reduce it.

Secondly, Mandatory Sanctions would require a Resolution of the Security Council, and if you feel strongly enough against them you would be forced to use the British Veto. That would greatly damage our cause by sending the wrong signal to South Africa - and might at the same time do political harm to Britain's standing in the world. And in any case, even if you were ready for comprehensive Mandatory Sanctions, the likely veto by the United States of America would send that same message of encouragement to the rulers of South Africa and of despair to the victims of apartheid.

We are asking you to join us in applying a meaningful package of selective sanctions. I am not

suggesting that it is possible to devise any sanctions package which would be totally painless to Britain; some price inevitably has to be paid if we are to hasten the end of apartheid and its violence. But there are things which you could join in, without intolerable difficulty. You could:

1. Stop buying and prohibit the sale in Britain of the Krugerand.
2. Stop the importation into Britain or British territories of wines or agricultural products from South Africa.
3. Cut air travel links.
4. Ban all new investments or reinvestments in apartheid South Africa, and take actions to encourage investments in the SADCC area.
5. Ban the export of all computers and other modern technological equipment to the South African Government and any of its subsidiary organisations.
6. Strengthen the application of the Gleneagles Agreement.

A sanctions package of this kind, coming from the Commonwealth Summit Conference, would send a message to both the Leaders and the Victims of apartheid. It would discourage the former, and give heart to the latter. But whether such a positive message goes to South Africa from the Commonwealth depends solely on Britain, and really on you personally. I say this after hearing of the stand of Australia and New Zealand on this issue, and after my recent very useful and encouraging talks with Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada.

Margaret; we need your help. Help the Commonwealth to send a message of Hope, of non-racialism, and of peace, to the victims of apartheid.

As always, this letter comes to you with warm regards and my very best wishes to you personally.

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Nyerere

ADVANCE COPIES

15

SUBJECT cc OPS
MASTER

SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS
PS/MR RIPPIND
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSON
SIR J FREELAND
MR JOHNSON
MR O'NEILL
ED/SAFD
ED/CAFD
ED/UND
ED/NEWS DEPT
H. C. C.
~~RESIDENT OFFICE~~

MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY
SENT
8 OCT 1985
15-11-85

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 1730/85

CONFIDENTIAL
FM DAR ES SALAAM
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 331
OF 080815Z OCTOBER 85

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

SOUTH AFRICA : ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.

1. WE HAVE TODAY BEEN HANDED A LETTER, DATED 7 OCTOBER, FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE TO MRS THATCHER. TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:-

QUOTE

DEAR MARGARET,

I AM WRITING THIS LETTER WITH GREAT DIFFIDENCE, BUT WITH SINCERITY AND GOOD WILL. WE NEED YOUR HELP. AND WHEN I SAY 'WE', I MEAN THE WORLD IN GENERAL, AND AFRICA IN PARTICULAR.

YOU HELPED US TO END MINORITY RULE IN RHODESIA, AND BROUGHT YEARS OF VIOLENCE TO A VIRTUAL END. YOU CAN HELP US TO END APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA, AND TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE WHICH STEMS FROM IT.

I KNOW THAT BRITAIN IS NOT A COLONIAL POWER IN SOUTH AFRICA. BUT ITS IMMENSE INVESTMENTS IN THAT COUNTRY GIVE YOU A POWER WHICH NO OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADER HAS - AND INDEED WHICH IS POSSESSED BY NO OTHER LEADER IN THE WORLD, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE PURPOSE OF THIS LETTER IS TO PLEAD WITH YOU TO USE THAT POWER, ALBEIT THE POWER OF INFLUENCE, TO HELP US BRING APARTHEID TO AN END WITHOUT A CONTINUING AND INCREASINGLY INTOLERABLE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE.

WE ARE APPEALING TO YOU TO JOIN THE REST OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN APPLYING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. WE ARE NOT ASKING FOR COMPREHENSIVE MANDATORY SANCTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE U.N. CHARTER - MUCH AS WE WOULD LIKE THESE TO BE ADOPTED. AND THERE ARE TWO REASONS WHY WE ARE NOT ASKING SO MUCH.

FIRST, YOU ARE NOT READY FOR COMPREHENSIVE MANDATORY SANCTIONS. YOU MAY GENUINELY BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD DO UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE TO BRITISH INTERESTS AND THE BRITISH ECONOMY, AND CAUSE MORE UNEMPLOYMENT WHEN YOU ARE SEEKING TO REDUCE IT.

SECONDLY, MANDATORY SANCTIONS WOULD REQUIRE A RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND IF YOU FEEL STRONGLY ENOUGH AGAINST THEM YOU WOULD BE FORCED TO USE THE BRITISH VETO. THAT WOULD GREATLY DAMAGE OUR CAUSE BY HELPING THE WORLD BELIEVE THAT WE ARE

SECURITY COUNCIL, AND IF YOU FEEL STRONGLY ENOUGH AGAINST THEM YOU WOULD BE FORCED TO USE THE BRITISH VETO. THAT WOULD GREATLY DAMAGE OUR CAUSE BY SENDING THE WRONG SIGNAL TO SOUTH AFRICA - AND MIGHT AT THE SAME TIME DO POLITICAL HARM TO BRITAIN'S STANDING IN THE WORLD. AND IN ANY CASE, EVEN IF YOU WERE READY FOR COMPREHENSIVE MANDATORY SANCTIONS, THE LIKELY VETO BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WOULD SEND THAT SAME MESSAGE OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE RULERS OF SOUTH AFRICA AND OF DESPAIR TO THE VICTIMS OF APARTHEID.

WE ARE ASKING YOU TO JOIN US IN APPLYING A MEANINGFUL PACKAGE OF SELECTIVE SANCTIONS. I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DEVISE ANY SANCTIONS PACKAGE WHICH WOULD BE TOTALLY PAINLESS TO BRITAIN: SOME PRICE INEVITABLY HAS TO BE PAID IF WE ARE TO HASTEN THE END OF APARTHEID AND ITS VIOLENCE. BUT THERE ARE THINGS WHICH YOU COULD JOIN IN, WITHOUT INTOLERABLE DIFFICULTY. YOU COULD:-

- 1) STOP BUYING AND PROHIBIT THE SALE IN BRITAIN OF THE KRUGERAND.
- 2) STOP THE IMPORTATION INTO BRITAIN OR BRITISH TERRITORIES OF WINES OR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA.
- 3) CUT AIR TRAVEL LINKS.
- 4) BAN ALL NEW INVESTMENTS OR REINVESTMENTS IN APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA, AND TAKE ACTIONS TO ENCOURAGE INVESTMENTS IN THE SALCC AREA.
- 5) BAN THE EXPORT OF ALL COMPUTERS AND OTHER MODERN TECHNOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND ANY OF ITS SUBSIDIARY ORGANISATIONS.
- 6) STRENGTHEN THE APPLICATION OF THE GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT.

A SANCTIONS PACKAGE OF THIS KIND, COMING FROM THE COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT CONFERENCE, WOULD SEND A MESSAGE TO BOTH THE LEADERS AND THE VICTIMS OF APARTHEID. IT WOULD DISCOURAGE THE FORMER, AND GIVE HEART TO THE LATTER. BUT WHETHER SUCH A POSITIVE MESSAGE GOES TO SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE COMMONWEALTH DEPENDS SOLELY ON BRITAIN, AND REALLY ON YOU PERSONALLY. I SAY THIS AFTER HEARING OF THE STAND OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND ON THIS ISSUE, AND AFTER MY RECENT VERY USEFUL AND ENCOURAGING TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY OF CANADA.

MARGARET: WE NEED YOUR HELP. HELP THE COMMONWEALTH TO SEND A MESSAGE OF HOPE, OF NON-RACIALISM, AND OF PEACE, TO THE VICTIMS OF APARTHEID.

AS ALWAYS, THIS LETTER COMES TO YOU WITH WARM REGARDS AND MY VERY BEST WICHES TO YOU PERSONALLY.

YOURS SINCERELY,

JULIUS K NYERERE.

UNQUOTE.

2. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

SANKEY

YYYY

DSHPAN 0652



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 October 1985

Dear Mark,

Letter from Dr James Barber to the Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 20 September enclosing one dated 16 September from Dr James Barber, the Master of Hatfield College, Durham, who attended the Prime Minister's recent Seminar on South Africa.

Dr Barber's proposal is an excellent one and we would certainly wish to assist in setting up such a scheme. One problem is that we are now into the third year of the FCO Scholarships and Awards Scheme, under which Dr Barber's proposal would fall, and the funds are committed. To give more to South Africa - in this instance £30-35,000 - would mean taking money from other countries. But we are looking into the possibilities and I think in any case our reply to Dr Barber should be a positive one. I attach a draft reply.

Yours Sincerely,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

Mark Addison Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/~~teletype~~/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

~~PS/No 10~~ PM

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Dr James Barber JP MA PhD
Master
Hatfield College
Durham DH1 3RQ

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PS/Mr Rifkind
CRD

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter to the Prime Minister of 20 September, outlining your excellent proposal for a Fellowship Programme for black South Africans. ~~The Prime Minister has asked me to say how grateful she is to you for your prompt and very positive response to the discussions at Chequers. The Foreign & Commonwealth Office, who administer the Scholarships and Awards Scheme under which your proposal falls, would certainly want to help and are now looking into the possibilities. They will I know want to discuss with you more fully the details and funding of the programme you envisage.~~

CAVEAT.....

WPHH Thanks you again for your most contribution to the service.
CDP

Enclosures—flag(s).....

SKH





File

9

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 October, 1985

I write to thank you for sending down the message from President Botha to the Prime Minister on Friday evening. The Prime Minister read this over the weekend and found it very helpful. As you will know it crossed with a message that she had sent to President Botha, the text of which is now available to you.

(C.D. Powell)

His Excellency Dr. Denis Worrall.

Lo

FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

DA



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 October 1985

Dear Sir,

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Botha received late this evening. It has crossed with the Prime Minister's message to him. I do not think this matters. But we shall need to consider a reply in due course.

Yours sincerely,

(Charles Powell)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

da



South African Embassy

CDD

7/11.

With the Compliments
of the
Minister.

Original of letter
delivered to you on
Sunday, 5 October,

South Africa House,
Trafalgar Square,
London,

W 62N 5DP



Suid-Afrikaanse Ambassade

*Met die Komplimente
van die
Minister.*

*South Africa House,
Trafalgar Square,
London,*

W.C.N. 5DP

"original"

T 173/85



Union Buildings
Pretoria

4 October 1985

Dear Prime Minister

I have noted the debate within the European Community on the action supposedly required in order to accelerate reform in this country. It is also no doubt a subject which will feature prominently in the forthcoming meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government. It might be appropriate therefore if I share with you certain thoughts on the subject which I am also incorporating in a letter to President Reagan in response to a communication from him in which he too advocated an accelerated reform process in South Africa. You will be aware that he recently announced, as you have, certain action against South Africa apparently designed to produce a response in keeping with overseas perceptions of the requirements of the South African situation.

I should emphasize at the outset that internal considerations have provided far greater reason for reform in South Africa than any action which the outside world has already or could still generate against us. Indeed international punitive action is counter-productive. Even the action which your Government has taken and has defended as relatively mild has aggravated the problems which I face domestically in promoting reform.

Western leaders call for bold initiatives and decisive action. Internal circumstances have long since convinced me of the need for such action. It was this conviction which gave rise to my reform programme now approaching realisation. Whatever the perception of the outside world, in South African terms, the measures already adopted or announced are nothing short of dramatic; and yet the world at large still demands more of me and virtually overnight.

I do not deny that there is still much to be done but let us pause for a moment to review what we have already achieved:

We have publicly rejected

- political domination by any one community of any other;
- the exclusion of any community from the political decision-making process;
- injustice or inequality in the opportunities available for any community;
- racial discrimination and impairment of human dignity.

And we have already repealed or amended legislation which is not reconcilable with these ideals or given notice of intention to repeal or amend such legislation. We have launched investigations of other legislation or practices which might seem to us to be out of keeping with these principles.

May I list a few of the areas where reform, providing for the removal of discrimination, has taken place in recent years or is underway:

Sport	: opened to all races;
Labour	: modern, sophisticated trade union system opened to all races; : job reservation removed;
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act	: repealed;
Immorality Act	: Offensive racial provisions repealed;
Immigration	: Provisions providing for White immigration only to be repealed;
Influx Control and Pass Laws	: President's Council's recommendation for phasing out, under sympathetic consideration for action during the next Parliamentary Session;
Constitutional	: Asians and Coloureds represented in Parliament; : Asians and Coloureds holding Ministerial and Deputy-Ministerial positions in Government;

- Public Amenities : Many desegregated - e.g. hotels, restaurants, parks, trains, buses;
- Forced Resettlement : Discontinued;
- Property Rights for Blacks : Accepted as well as permanency of Black communities in urban areas;
- Local Government : Full participation of all population groups;
- Education : Parity for all population groups is the declared objective and action to this end underway.

This list is not exhaustive or in any specific order. I include it in this letter simply to indicate that we have not been dilatory in carrying our reform programme forward.

In addition we have also now announced our acceptance of the principle of political participation of all communities at all levels in matters of national or common concern. We have committed ourselves to the principle of joint decision-making and joint responsibility in respect of all matters of common or national concern coupled to the principle of the protection of the rights and interests of all minorities.

This means in practice that my Government is prepared to share the power of decision-making with all the other communities comprising the diverse South African society. For this purpose, all the groups and communities within the geographical area of the State of South Africa must obtain representation up to the highest level of government and in a manner which will ensure that there will be no political domination by any one community of any other. This presages the disappearance of white domination.

We have undertaken to create the structures required to give effect to the foregoing principles through negotiation with the leaders of all the communities of this country.

We have said that we shall not prescribe who may represent the other communities. The only condition we have stipulated is that those who participate in the

negotiations should renounce violence as a means of achieving political objectives. Traditional leaders, chosen leaders, political leaders, church leaders as well as leaders of specific interest groups such as business leaders, may join us in determining the future of this country.

As regards the envisaged negotiations, we shall not prescribe and we shall not make demands. Give and take will be the guiding principle. But we believe that any eventual constitutional dispensation satisfying the political aspirations of the different communities will have to take into consideration the multi-cultural nature of the composition of our population. Thus entities will have to be recognised on either a geographic or a group or community basis. Black urban communities would have to be recognised as political entities. Each entity or unit would have autonomy in matters directly affecting that entity or unit while joint management and responsibility in respect of matters of mutual concern would apply.

In the interim, if a need should exist among the leaders of the Black communities to participate within the President's Council (presently composed of White, Coloured and Indian representatives) in deliberations on matters that concern the Black communities with a view to submitting proposals to me as State President and to the Government, the structure and functions of the Council could be revised to provide for their participation. I have made this offer primarily to provide the Black leadership with an alternative forum through which they may establish their wishes and aspirations until such time as they may be accommodated in an agreed constitutional dispensation.

My Government and I are committed to the principle of a united South Africa, a single citizenship and a universal franchise within the structures chosen by South Africans jointly. The self-governing areas form part of South Africa. Independence will not be forced on them; the choice is theirs. By the same token, we shall respect the independence of the four states, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, which chose to detach themselves from South Africa and become sovereign independent states. Nevertheless we acknowledge the possibility of co-operation with them in an overall framework. Moreover, if any of these governments should wish to negotiate with us for the re-acquisition by their citizens of South African citizenship, we shall respond positively. Dual citizenship could eventuate. But I must make the point that none of the independent or self-governing states is prepared to relinquish their autonomy.

Have we not by these declarations and commitments some given as recently as my address before the Cape Congress of the National Party on 30 September 1985, made clear our intention to end inequality between South Africa's racial groups? I believe we have already in principle addressed most if not all the issues which the international community has considered important enough to raise with us, even to the extent of undertaking to release from prison those who are prepared to renounce violence.

While violence in South Africa continues, I earnestly request you not to call for the release of prisoners who refuse to renounce violence or, in the case of prisoners like Mr Mandela, have also specifically renounced negotiation as a process to pursue in the search for a solution to the problems of this country. Violence in South Africa is currently too emotional an issue and strikes too closely to the hearts and spirits of South Africans of all communities for me to take chances and toy with their lives and possessions by letting individuals who believe in and propagate violence lose on our society. I do not want to incarcerate them but while there is a civilised alternative to violence and they choose to reject that alternative, I have no alternative.

It has been further suggested that I should define the extent to which power will be shared in this country. We have long conceded the principle but the manner in which the different communities participate in the central government of this country in respect of matters of national concern, and the manner in which group or regional or ethnic autonomy can be guaranteed so as to protect the rights and interests of minorities must be the product of negotiation between the communities. We seek an agreed system not an imposed system of constitutional government.

Having clearly stated our ideals and intentions, we are now focusing our attention on providing impetus to the negotiation process. This is the key to the solution of our problems and it is the impact on this process of the international action against South Africa, which causes serious concern.

Consider the circumstances confronting South Africa at the present time:

- a government ready and committed to engage in negotiations with the various population groups with a view to meeting their political aspirations;

- a moderate majority of black people bound by a common will to seek a political solution by peaceful and constitutional means but embracing widely divergent political views and divided further by ethnic, cultural and other differences of a socio-economic nature;
- a group of revolutionaries and radicals opposed to negotiation and committed to a strategy of violence against the moderate black majority aimed at coercing them into backing away from negotiation and joining their ranks; their objective is total power.

As a consequence of this strategy, violence often of a revolting nature by Blacks against Blacks has broken out in many Black towns; there is general unrest, fear and uncertainty in these towns; Black schools are being boycotted and gutted; Black business premises are the target of arsonists and criminal opportunists are active.

These conditions are being deliberately instigated. By no stretch of the imagination can police action to counter the violence be described as responsible for it, an accusation which we frequently hear; and summarily to lift the State of Emergency would not contribute in any way to a de-escalation of the violence. Nonetheless I am conscious of the need to lift it, even if only partially or in certain areas, as soon as violence subsides sufficiently.

The point of my remarks is that the situation in South Africa at the moment is sensitive and delicate. The circumstances could hardly be less conducive to the process of negotiation which we urgently need to stimulate further. Black leaders across the political spectrum are reluctant to come forward and participate in the negotiations. To do so would place their lives, family and property at risk.


Any action which pushes up the temperature, undermines our economy or serves as an encouragement to any particular group in its opposition to others or as a symbol of solidarity with or support for their particular cause, thus further polarising opinion, further undermines the climate for negotiation. However well-intentioned Governments of the European Community might have been, I fear their recent action will have this negative effect. It will be seen or will be interpreted internally as a punitive measure; it will be seen as action against the Government and support for opposition groups; it must undermine overseas confidence in this country; it will certainly serve as an example for others to follow and the detrimental impact on the South African economy will escalate as others follow their lead; escalating unemployment and deprivation

leading to further unrest must ensue. Negotiations become more and more complicated.

I might add that even visits of Church groups, trade unionists, politicians and others are proving problematic. Some of them are ostensibly on fact-finding missions, others are less well-intentioned but all are seen as supportive of one or other faction in this country or simply as anti-government. This is not constructive in present circumstances. We need to be left in peace so that we can all meet across the table, develop trust and confidence in each other and resolve our problems in our own way. The world should promote reconciliation not greater divisions within this country.

It is a tragic feature of our times that situations are often judged and action determined not according to their merits but on the basis of considerations which have more relevance in other contexts. History will judge whether the international community best served the cause of justice and equality in South Africa by embarking on its present course of punitive action. It is not as if my Government is against equal opportunities or equal rights for all or against negotiation or the creation of constitutional structures which will serve to enshrine the guarantees required in this respect. Nor are we seeking to delay the process which has begun. We need no persuasion, inducement or coercion to become involved in the process. We are actively promoting it. It would be helpful if the international community would join us in removing the current obstacles instead of regarding us as an adversary.

Yours sincerely



P W BÖTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON



B8/6/1

(2)

cc PC
CDP

South African Embassy
Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

Prime Minister

A message from President Botha which has crossed with yours (though they are complementary). It contains some useful material which you could draw upon at CHOGM. What it lacks is a clear proposition on the mechanics for carrying forward discussions of power sharing & constitutional change.

4 October 1985

The Duty Clerk
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

It is a very helpful letter
M

Dear Sir

LETTER FROM THE STATE PRESIDENT OF SOUTH AFRICA
TO THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER, MP

CDP
4/11

It would be appreciated if the enclosed letter from President P W Botha could be delivered to the Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher.

Yours faithfully

P. Billiers
AMBASSADOR

[Faint handwritten notes and signatures]

SUBJECT of ops
master



South African Embassy
LONDON

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 73/85

4th October 1985

Dear Prime Minister,

I have noted the debate within the European Community on the action supposedly required in order to accelerate reform in this Country. It is also no doubt a subject which will feature prominently in the forthcoming Meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government. It might be appropriate therefore if I share with you certain thoughts on the subject which I am also incorporating in a letter to President Reagan in response to a communication from him in which he too advocated an accelerated reform process in South Africa. You will be aware that he recently announced, as you have, certain action against South Africa apparently designed to produce a response in keeping with overseas perceptions of the requirements of the South African situation.

I should emphasize at the outset that internal considerations have provided far greater reason for reform in South Africa than any action which the outside world has already or could still generate against us. Indeed, international punitive action is counter-productive, even the action which your Government has taken and has defended as relatively mild has aggravated the problems which I face domestically in promoting reform.

Western Leaders call for bold initiatives and decisive action. Internal circumstances have long since convinced me of the need for such action. It was this conviction which gave rise to my reform programme now approaching realisation. Whatever the perception of the outside world, in South African terms, the measures already adopted or announced are nothing short of dramatic, and yet the world at large still demands more of me and virtually overnight.

I do not deny that there is still much to be done but let us pause for a moment to review what we have already achieved:

We have publicly rejected

- Political domination by any one Community of any other;
- The exclusion of any Community from the political decision-making process;
- Injustice or inequality in the opportunities available for any Community;
- Racial discrimination and impairment of human dignity.

And we have already repealed or amended legislation which is not reconcilable with these ideals or given notice of intention to repeal or amend such legislation. We have launched investigations of other legislation or practices which might seem to us to be out of keeping with these principles.

May I list a few of the areas where reform, providing for the removal of discrimination, has taken place in recent years or is underway:

Sport	:	Opened to all races
Labour	:	Modern, sophisticated trade union system opened to all races
	:	Job reservation removed
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act	:	Repealed
Immorality Act	:	Offensive racial provisions repealed
Immigration	:	Provisions providing for White Immigration only to be repealed
Influx Control and Pass Laws	:	President's Council's recommendation for phasing out, under sympathetic consideration for action during the next Parliamentary Session
Constitutional	:	Asians and Coloureds represented in Parliament
	:	Asians and Coloureds holding Ministerial and Deputy-Ministerial positions in Government

Public Amenities	:	Many desegregated - e.g. Hotels, Restaurants, Parks, Trains, Buses
Forced Resettlement	:	Discontinued
Property Rights for Blacks:		Accepted as well as permanency of Black Communities in Urban Areas
Local Government	:	Full participation of all population groups
Education	:	Parity for all population groups is the declared objective and action to this end underway

This list is not exhaustive or in any specific order. I include it in this letter simply to indicate that we have not been dilatory in carrying our reform programme forward.

In addition we have also now announced our acceptance of the principle of political participation of all communities at all levels in matters of national or common concern. We have committed ourselves to the principle of joint decision-making and joint responsibility in respect of all matters of common or national concern coupled to the principle of the protection of the rights and interests of all minorities.

This means in practice that my Government is prepared to share the power of decision-making with all the other communities comprising the diverse South African Society. For this purpose, all the groups and communities within the geographical area of the state of South Africa must obtain representation up to the highest level of Government and in a manner which will ensure that there will be no political domination by any one Community of any other. This presages the disappearance of White domination.

We have undertaken to create the structures required to give effect to the foregoing principles through negotiation with the leaders of all the communities in this Country.

We have said that we shall not prescribe who may represent the other communities. The only condition we have stipulated is that those who participate in the negotiations should renounce violence as a means of achieving political objectives. Traditional leaders, chosen leaders, political leaders, church leaders as well as leaders of specific interest groups such as business leaders, may join us in determining the future of this Country.

As regards the envisaged negotiations, we shall not prescribe and we shall not make demands. Give and take will be the guiding principle. But we believe that any eventual constitutional dispensation satisfying the political aspirations of the different communities will have to take into consideration the multi-cultural nature of the composition of our population. Thus entities will have to be recognised on either a geographic or a group or community basis. Black urban communities would have to be recognised as political entities. Each entity or unit would have autonomy in matters directly affecting that entity or unit while joint management and responsibility in respect of matters of mutual concern would apply.

In the interim, if a need should exist among the leaders of the Black communities to participate within the President's Council (presently composed of White, Coloured and Indian representatives) in deliberations on matters that concern the Black communities with a view to submitting proposals to me as State President and to the Government, the structure and functions of the Council could be revised to provide for their participation. I have made this offer primarily to provide the Black leadership with an alternative forum through which they may establish their wishes and aspirations until such time as they may be accommodated in an agreed constitutional dispensation.

My Government and I are committed to the principle of a united South Africa, a single citizenship and a universal franchise within the structures chosen by South Africans jointly. The self-governing areas form part of South Africa. Independence will not be forced on them; the choice is theirs. By the same token, we shall respect the independence of the four states, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, which chose to detach themselves from South Africa and become sovereign independent states. Nevertheless we acknowledge the possibility of co-operation with them in an overall framework. Moreover, if any of these Governments should wish to negotiate with us for the re-acquisition by their citizens of South African citizenship, we shall respond positively. Dual citizenship could eventuate. But I must make the point that none of the independent or self-governing states is prepared to relinquish their autonomy.

Have we not by these declarations and commitments, some given as recently as my address before the Cape Congress of the National Party on 30 September 1985, made clear our intention to end inequality between South Africa's racial groups? I believe we have already in principle addressed most if not all the issues which the international community has considered important enough to raise with us, even to the extent of undertaking to release from prison those who are prepared to renounce violence.

While violence in South Africa continues, I earnestly request you not to call for the release of prisoners who refuse to renounce violence or, in the case of prisoners like Mr Mandela, have also specifically renounced negotiation as a process to pursue in the search for a solution to the problems of this Country. Violence in South Africa is currently too emotional an issue and strikes too closely to the hearts and spirits of South Africans of all communities for me to take chances and toy with their lives and possessions by letting individuals who believe in and propagate violence loose on our society. I do not want to incarcerate them, but while there is a civilised alternative to violence and they choose to reject that alternative, I have no alternative.

It has been further suggested that I should define the extent to which power will be shared in this country. We have long conceded the principle but the manner in which the different communities participate in the central Government of this Country in respect of matters of national concern, and the manner in which group or regional or ethnic autonomy can be guaranteed so as to protect the rights and interests of minorities, must be the product of negotiation between the communities. We seek an agreed system not an imposed system of constitutional Government.

Having clearly stated our ideals and intentions, we are now focusing our attention on providing impetus to the negotiation process. This is the key to the solution of our problems and it is the impact on this process of the international action against South Africa, which causes serious concern.

Consider the circumstances confronting South Africa at the present time:

- A Government ready and committed to engage in negotiations with the various population groups with a view to meeting their political aspirations;
- A moderate majority of Black people bound by a common will to seek a political solution by peaceful and constitutional means but embracing widely divergent political views and divided further by ethnic, cultural and other differences of a socio-economic nature;
- A group of revolutionaries and radicals opposed to negotiation and committed to a strategy of violence against the moderate Black majority aimed at coercing them into backing away from negotiation and joining their ranks; their objective is total power.

As a consequence of this strategy, violence often of a revolting nature by Blacks against Blacks has broken out in many Black Towns; there is general unrest, fear and uncertainty in these Towns; Black schools are being boycotted and gutted; Black business premises are the target of arsonists and criminal opportunists are active.

These conditions are being deliberately instigated. By no stretch of the imagination can Police action to counter the violence be described as responsible for it, an accusation which we frequently hear; and summarily to lift the State of Emergency would not contribute in any way to a de-escalation of the violence. Nonetheless I am conscious of the need to lift it, even if only partially or in certain areas, as soon as violence subsides sufficiently.

The point of my remarks is that the situation in South Africa at the moment is sensitive and delicate. The circumstances could hardly be less conducive to the process of negotiation which we urgently need to stimulate further. Black leaders across the political spectrum are reluctant to come forward and participate in the negotiations. To do so would place their lives, family and property at risk.

Any action which pushes up the temperature, undermines our economy or serves as an encouragement to any particular group in its opposition to others or as a symbol of solidarity with or support for their particular cause, thus further polarising opinion and further undermines the climate for negotiation. However well-intentioned Governments of the European Community might have been, I fear their recent action will have this negative effect. It will be seen or will be interpreted internally as a punitive measure; it will be seen as action against the Government and support for opposition groups; it must undermine overseas confidence in this Country; it will certainly serve as an example for others to follow and the detrimental impact on their lead; escalating unemployment and deprivation leading to further unrest must ensue. Negotiations become more and more complicated.

I might add that even visits of church groups, trade unionists, politicians and others are proving problematic. Some of them are ostensibly on fact-finding missions, others are less well-intentioned but all are seen as supportive of one or other faction in this Country or imply as anti-Government. This is not constructive in present circumstances. We need to be left in peace so that we can all meet across the table, develop trust and confidence

in each other and resolve our problems in our own way. The world should promote reconciliation, not greater divisions within this Country.

It is a tragic feature of our times that situations are often judged and action determined not according to their merits but on the basis of considerations which have more relevance in other contexts. History will judge whether the international community best served the cause of justice and equality in South Africa by embarking on its present course of punitive action. It is not as if my Government is against equal opportunities or equal rights for all or against negotiation or the creation of constitutional structures which will serve to enshrine the guarantees required in this respect. Nor are we seeking to delay the process which has begun. We need no persuasion, inducement or coercion to become involved in the process. We are actively promoting it. It would be helpful if the international community would join us in removing the current obstacles instead of regarding us as an adversary.

Yours sincerely,

P.W. Botha
State President of the Republic of South Africa

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
10, Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Communism
100%
1985

Master
J. P. BARBER
J.P., M.A., Ph.D.



HATFIELD COLLEGE
DURHAM DH1 3RQ
Telephone 64261-2

JPB/cac

4th October 1985

R8

Drop reply
to usual
CD

Mrs M. Thatcher,
The Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London W1

Dear Prime Minister,

Following the discussions at Chequers on policy towards South Africa, I sent you proposals about establishing Fellowships for black South African teachers of English. Since then I have pursued the scheme with major companies and have now received the first firm agreement of support. I enclose a copy of a letter from Mr. Adam of Barclays Bank which confirms this. I have hopes that other major companies will soon follow.

Obviously it would be a very great help if you were prepared to give your support to the scheme and also to provide direct government resources to fund some of the Fellowships.

Yours sincerely,
James Barber

Enc.

James Barber

CONFIDENTIAL



he ✓

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 October 1985

I enclose a signed message from the Prime Minister to President Botha, and should be grateful if it could be delivered as soon as possible.

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CST

SUBJECT cc Ops
Master BM



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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 October 1985

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 172/85

Dear Mr. President,

As you will know, President Machel visited London on 27 September on his way back from the United States of America. He was in good spirits and pleased with the way his meeting with President Reagan had gone.

He told me he was well content with the arrangements now being made for the British military advisory and training team in Zimbabwe to begin training Mozambican personnel early next year. I was also glad to be able to offer him a further 14,000 tonnes of food aid (which will be additional to the £1m of additional programme aid which we pledged recently). In the afternoon he and his party, which included Ministers Chissano and Veloso, received calls from a number of British companies with interests in Mozambique. I am sure you will agree that all this represents a significant contribution to the Western economic and military co-operation with Mozambique which you urged in your letter of 2 May.

When we discussed the security situation, he described the successes which the joint operations with the Zimbabweans had achieved, and then naturally went on to talk about the discovery of documents detailing contacts between South Africa and Renamo after the Nkomati accord. The Mozambicans'

views will, of course, be familiar to you and I know that you have prepared a full response to their complaints. He stressed, however, that he did not wish this development to lead to the end of the Nkomati accord, and that he remained convinced of your good faith and that of your Foreign Minister. His view was that your armed forces had acted on their own initiative.

However that may be, you will appreciate that this episode has been a further serious embarrassment, not only to Mozambique and President Machel personally, but also to those in the West who wish to maintain sensible policies towards your country and the region's problems. I know you are concerned that the terms of the Nkomati accord should be strictly observed, and I am confident you will do your utmost to avoid any action which might appear to put this in question.

You are no doubt also disturbed, as I am, about the increasing drift in the international community towards economic sanctions. The decision by the United States Administration last month to impose a series of measures against South Africa has increased the pressure on others to follow suit. You will know that Britain recently decided to endorse the Luxembourg Agreement of 10 September. The measures which this Agreement covers are non-economic and most of them had been part of our policy for a number of years. In any case, I believe it useful for Europe to be able to speak with one voice on questions of this kind, particularly when (as here) it has enabled us to argue for a more restrained position than some of our partners.

We nevertheless face a difficult period which will include the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau on 16 October and further sessions of the Security Council and General Assembly devoted to South Africa or Namibia. I remain firmly opposed to economic sanctions and trade boycotts, but the pressures for such measures are bound to go on increasing. Britain is by no means alone in holding

that view although we argue the case more firmly than others. In this situation, it is of the greatest importance, as I am sure you will recognise, that the South African Government should take no action which would undercut our efforts to resist these pressures.

I have, of course, followed very carefully the various reforms which you have announced in the past few months. I was particularly pleased to note your Government's decision to cancel the removal of black communities at Kwangema and Driefontein. The recommendation of the President's Council that steps should be taken to abolish the influx control laws also strikes me as very important and I hope that early action can be taken to implement this step.

One issue on which early progress would make a considerable impact on the international community is Namibia. When we discussed the subject during your last visit to London I was left with the impression that you too hoped for a swift settlement, not least for financial reasons. So the persistence of the stalemate has been all the more disappointing. I believe that the Americans remain ready to continue their efforts to promote an agreement on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. A decision by your Government to proceed on the basis of Resolution 435 could, of course, be expected to have a very significant impact on world opinion.

I would find it very helpful to know how you see future developments in South Africa. One of the problems is that many countries remain deeply sceptical that fundamental change in South Africa is truly under way. The more you can do to dispel this scepticism by taking concrete steps to implement your stated programme of reform, particularly as regards dialogue with black leaders about the involvement of the black community in the process of government, the more leading countries among the international community are

likely to be ready to reassess their attitude towards South Africa.

Yours sincerely

Rangachari

The Honourable P.W. Botha, D.M.S.

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FM PRETORIA

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 374

OF 031630Z OCTOBER 85

INFO ROUTINE HARARE, LUSAKA, GABORONE, MASERU, MBABANE,
MAPUTO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, JOHANNESBURG.
INFO SAVING CAPE TOWN CONSULATE, DURBAN.

SOUTH AFRICA: INTERNAL

SUMMARY

1. THE GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE REACHED A WATERSHED IN THEIR DRIVE TO INTRODUCE REFORM WITHOUT LOSING CONTROL. THEY HAVE NOW ADOPTED MUCH OF THE RIGHT LANGUAGE ABOUT CHANGE IN ADDITION TO HAVING ANNOUNCED SPECIFIC REFORMS. I DOUBT IF WE SHOULD EXPECT MORE STATEMENTS FOR THE TIME BEING. BUT BLACKS REMAIN UNCONVINCED AND FRUSTRATED, ALTHOUGH THE PROSPECTS ARE NOT WHOLLY NEGATIVE.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT BOTHA HAS NOW MADE FOUR MAJOR SPEECHES IN THE PAST SIX WEEKS AT PROVINCIAL CONGRESSES OF HIS NATIONAL PARTY. HE HAS PROBABLY SAID ALL HE USEFULLY CAN FOR THE MOMENT ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S GENERAL APPROACH TO REFORM. THE NEXT EVENT IN THE REGULAR POLITICAL CALENDAR IS THE REOPENING OF PARLIAMENT IN JANUARY. BETWEEN NOW AND THEN I WOULD EXPECT THE GOVERNMENT TO CONCENTRATE ON TRYING TO BUILD UPON THE FOUNDATIONS THEY FEEL THEY HAVE LAID FOR BRINGING BLACKS INTO NEGOTIATION ABOUT THE POLITICAL FUTURE.

3. THE ONLY NOTABLE CHANGES ACTUALLY PROPOSED IN THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT SPEECHES ARE COMMON CITIZENSHIP AND INCLUSION OF BLACKS IN THE ADVISORY PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL (IN THE LATTER CASE A PROMISE TO CONSIDER, ALTHOUGH IN AFRIKANER JARGON THAT MAKES IT A CERTAINTY). AFTER THE DISASTROUS AUGUST SPEECH AT DURBAN, HOWEVER, THIS WEEK'S SPEECH AT PORT ELIZABETH WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THE SERIES FOR WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD TO SAY ABOUT POWER-SHARING AND UNIVERSAL FRANCHISE IN SOME FORM, PHRASES WHICH WOULD HAVE MADE MORE IMPACT IF USED EARLIER.

4. IT REMAINS THE CASE THAT THE GOVERNMENT ARE LAMENTABLY POOR AT PRESENTING THEIR POLICY TO THE BLACKS. ONE HAS TO REMEMBER THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECHES ARE DESIGNED AT LEAST AS MUCH FOR WHITE CONSUMPTION. THE GOVERNMENT ARE OBSESSED WITH THE NEED TO EDUCATE THEIR OWN FOLLOWERS. THEY HAVE SUCCEEDED TO THE EXTENT THAT AT THE RECENT PARTY CONGRESSES THE RANK AND FILE MOOD HAS IF ANYTHING BEEN TO ENCOURAGE THE GOVERNMENT TO MOVE FASTER ON REFORM. FIVE BY-ELECTIONS ARE DUE AT THE END OF OCTOBER. PROVIDED THESE DO NOT GO TOO BADLY, THE GOVERNMENT MAY THEN FEEL A LITTLE LESS NERVOUS ABOUT LOOKING OVER THEIR OWN RIGHT SHOULDER AT WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THEIR SUPPORT AMONG THE WHITES.

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5. IT IS A SAD REFLECTION ON THE GOVERNMENT'S LOW CREDIBILITY WITH BLACKS THAT SO MUCH OF PRESIDENT BOTHA'S MORE FORTHCOMING APPROACH IS DISCOUNTED OR IGNORED. MUCH OF THE BLAME RESTS ON THE GOVERNMENT THEMSELVES FOR MISHANDLING THE SITUATION IN THE TOWNSHIPS. POLICE METHODS HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY MADE MATTERS WORSE. FEELINGS CONTINUE TO RUN HIGH. BLACK OPINION HAS NOT JUST BEEN POLARISED, IT HAS COLLECTIVELY MOVED FURTHER AWAY FROM THE GOVERNMENT. TOO OFTEN IT IS A CASE OF TWO MOVES FORWARD, ONE BACK. IN A WEEK WHEN THE PRESIDENT SAYS HE WANTS TO BRING A WIDER BLACK LEADERSHIP INTO NEGOTIATION, A LEADING MEMBER OF MOTLANAS CIVIC ASSOCIATION IN SOWETO HAS BEEN DETAINED, THUS PULLING THE RUG FROM UNDER PEOPLE WHOM THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE DOING THEIR BEST TO ATTRACT.

6. MINISTERS WHOM I MEET STILL EXPRESS CONFIDENCE THAT THEY ARE ON THE RIGHT ROAD OVER DIALOGUE WITH BLACKS. PRIVATELY I SUSPECT THEY ARE MORE UNCERTAIN THAN THEY ARE PREPARED TO ADMIT ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE AN EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX SITUATION. A SHARPER TONE IS CREEPING INTO THEIR PUBLIC REACTION TO WESTERN PRESSURE AND ADVICE. YET I DO NOT BELIEVE THE GOVERNMENT NOW FEEL THERE CAN BE ANY TURNING BACK FROM THE COURSE TO WHICH THEY ARE COMMITTED.

7. AS REGARDS THE BLACKS THERE IS LITTLE SIGN AT PRESENT, CERTAINLY NOT OUTWARDLY, OF INTEREST IN COMPROMISE. NEVERTHELESS RADICALS DO NOT HOLD ALL THE CARDS. SOME BLACKS ARE TIRED OF CONTINUED INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE, WHICH IN PLACES HAS OTRUN THE CONTROL EVEN OF ITS ORIGINAL INSTIGATORS. GO-BETWEENS SUCH AS THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY ARE BUSY TRYING TO FIND ENOUGH COMMON GROUND BEHIND THE SCENES AT LEAST TO MAKE A START ON DIALOGUE. DESPITE DEEP SUSPICION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTIVES, MORE REASONABLE BLACKS WILL AT SOME STAGE HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN DRIVING THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST A WALL OR EXPLORING A BETTER DEAL WITH THEM THAN SEEMED POSSIBLE ONLY A SHORT WHILE AGO. WE MAY BE NEAR THE MOMENT WHEN ALL CONCERNED PAUSE FOR REFLECTION.

8. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE ONE CARD UP THEIR SLEEVE WHICH THEY HAVE YET TO PLAY, NAMELY TO LIFT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. I ASKED THE MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER LAST NIGHT WHETHER HE SAW THIS HAPPENING SOON. LE GRANGE SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WOULD LIKE TO SEE A START BEING MADE WITH LIFTING THE EMERGENCY IN A NUMBER OF PLACES. ADVISERS WERE ALWAYS ASKING FOR ANOTHER WEEK OR TWO. BUT HE EXPECTED THE CABINET'S SECURITY COMMITTEE (WHICH NORMALLY MEETS FORTNIGHTLY) TO LOOK AGAIN AT THE SITUATION ON 7 OCTOBER.

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9. LE GRANGE ADDED THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN AND WOULD BE ANNOUNCED SOON TO ADD ANOTHER 20,000 POLICE TO THE EXISTING 60,000. HE REMARKED THAT THIS WOULD STILL BE A LOWER RATIO OF POLICE TO POPULATION THAN IN MOST WESTERN COUNTRIES.

MOBERLY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA
STANDARD(PALACE)
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KAD

MR J R J JOHNSON
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
SOUTHERN AFRICA

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

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CONFIDENTIAL

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SUBJECT
cc Master

JSAOR
CCIM



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 October 1985

Dear Colin,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH BISHOP TUTU

The Prime Minister met Bishop Tutu this afternoon. The Bishop was accompanied by Terry Waite. The Prime Minister commented afterwards that she had been favourably impressed by Bishop Tutu.

The Prime Minister opened the discussion by saying that she understood Bishop Tutu to be a man of peace who would not support violence. Bishop Tutu confirmed that this was indeed his position.

Bishop Tutu said that the Prime Minister had a crucial, indeed critical, role to play in the deepening crisis in South Africa. Britain's greatness lay in its capacity to provide moral leadership. This involved taking sides and he recognised that Britain was firmly on the side of those who opposed apartheid. He himself had spoken out against all forms of violence, but the primary source of violence in South Africa was apartheid itself. It was hard for outsiders to understand the indignities of the system. For example, he himself was a Bishop, aged 53, and a Nobel Laureate, but he could not vote in his own country while an 18 year old white could do so. Opposition to apartheid had for many years been peaceful, but the ANC had gradually been forced into a position of armed struggle as the only means to pursue its aims. Bishop Tutu traced the post-war history of South Africa in some detail, concluding that the country was on the brink of catastrophe. Only a miracle or (sic) the international community could change things. President Botha's speech in August had left everyone disillusioned. He still saw an outside chance of resolving the crisis peacefully. But it would need the exertion of considerable political, diplomatic and economic pressure by the international community. He believed this was the only means to secure movement towards negotiations between the Government and the black community. Britain had seen the use of sanctions over the Falklands, and the United States had applied them over Poland and Nicaragua. People were concerned that blacks would be the first to suffer from sanctions. But in fact it seemed that a majority of blacks were prepared to accept them.

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JSG

Bishop Tutu continued that he could understand why in the short term governments were reluctant to apply sanctions. But it would be better if they were to take a long term view and support those who had justice on their side. One day there would be black majority government in South Africa, and it was important to ensure by actions now that such a government looked to the democratic countries as its friends. He therefore wanted to appeal to the Prime Minister to consider the case for additional economic measures to bring pressure to bear on the South African Government, and at the same time to enter into contacts with the ANC. There was no doubt that this organisation had the support of the majority of blacks.

The Prime Minister said that there was no need to convince her that apartheid was wrong. She had been disappointed with President Botha's speech, although there had been more encouraging statements since then. She could understand what Bishop Tutu and people like him felt. She took a very practical approach to the situation in South Africa. The key question in the present situation was: what should be the next step? In her view it was for the South African Government to sit down and to talk to black representatives about how they should be represented in the structure of Government. There were various ways in which this could be achieved, for instance, through a constitutional convention. She recognised that certain prior steps were needed for this to take place, notably an end to the state of emergency and the release of Nelson Mandela. The question of which representatives of the black community should be involved in negotiations was more difficult. As for sanctions, she thought that the financial markets had already achieved more than formal government-backed sanctions ever would.

Bishop Tutu said that he agreed with much of what the Prime Minister had said. He did not want to see the South African economy destroyed, although he would argue that the evident effect of market developments strengthened the case for sanctions. At the least one needed the threat of international sanctions as a signal to the South African Government.

The Prime Minister said that economic developments had already brought about significant change in political communities in South Africa. She did not want to leave Bishop Tutu in any doubt about the fact that she would not introduce government-backed economic sanctions against South Africa. She was not interested in hitting out at South Africa. Rather, she was looking for a constructive move. The pressure was already there. Now was the time to be specific about the next steps. One needed a proposition. Bishop Tutu said that the single most important requirement was a firm statement by the South African Government of its intention to dismantle apartheid. The Prime Minister asked whether, if such a statement were made, Bishop Tutu and those who thought like him could guarantee that negotiations would take place without violence. Bishop Tutu said that he would certainly work for that provided the South African

Government did likewise. The Prime Minister concluded that negotiations to incorporate black South Africans into the process of Government seemed to her the essential next step, but a lot of thought was needed on the precise mechanism. She hoped that Bishop Tutu and his colleagues would focus on this.

The Prime Minister said that she would tell the press that she had a long, interesting and constructive talk with Bishop Tutu. Bishop Tutu said that he would add that he had found the discussion very helpful. I enclose a note by our Press Section recording the gist of Bishop Tutu's subsequent and rather helpful remarks to the press.

Yours sincerely
Charles Powell

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

VISIT BY BISHOP TUTU

The Bishop, accompanied by Terry Waite, spent about one hour with the Prime Minister. They had a long and constructive discussion.

Prime Minister

I think Bishop
Tutu played fair
C.D.D.

(On departure he spoke to the press in Downing Street. He said that he was calling on the PM to exert the kind of pressure that would dismantle apartheid, and referred to the meeting as very friendly, very amicable. PM was still firmly against sanctions, but she would certainly like to be able to see movement in South Africa and was asking what was the next step. He said he was "slightly more hopeful" than when he went in. He was not giving details of their conversation but "you can guess". He added that she was "very distressed" about the situation in South Africa, and that she does want to be able to be helpful, but in this regard she played her cards very close to her chest.

He did confirm that he had spoken about the position of the ANC.)

IRM

BARCLAYS BANK PLC
54 LOMBARD STREET
LONDON, EC3P 3AH

CONFIDENTIAL

3rd October 1985

Dr J P Barber JP MA PhD
Master
Hatfield College
Durham
DH1 3RQ

Dear James,

As promised in my letter of the 20th September, I have talked to Sir Timothy Bevan on his return. You will have gathered that we are already giving substantially towards overseas education in various directions, but the Chairman agrees that there is a case for our supporting something specifically directed at South Africa where there is a special need to improve the quality of black education.

In the hope that it will help you to get your proposals off the ground, we would be willing in principle to fund one (Barclays Bank?) Fellow at a cost of £6,500 a year for five years. I think it better to wait until you can come back to me with specific news before putting a formal request through the necessary machinery here.


With all best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Gordon.
GORDON ADAM

VISIT BY BISHOP TUTU

The Bishop, accompanied by Terry Waite, spent about one hour with the Prime Minister. They had a long and constructive discussion.



Prime Minister
I think Bishop
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He did confirm that he had spoken about the position of the ANC.)

IRM

From John Carlisle, MP



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

top copy
on:
BF 28/10 2

2 October 1985

Rt. Hon. Mrs M. Thatcher, MP
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Prime Minister:

We will get
advice on X after
CHOGM

Re. Prime Minister

I write to thank you for affording me the opportunity of outlining my concern at the possibility of an attempted strengthening of the Gleneagles Agreement by other Commonwealth leaders at the Bahamas Conference. I was much heartened by your response and determination to retain the absolute right of our citizens to play wherever they choose, and to offer similar hospitality to individuals from abroad. Although I have kept the content of our meeting confidential, I feel sure that your stand will earn the gratitude of all sportsmen throughout the world.

On another point, I have been asked by the Editor of Leadership (South Africa) to enquire whether you might offer an article in the near future. You will be aware that this magazine is widely circulated in South Africa and is managed by a group of business men who took the initiative in recent discussions with the ANC in Lusaka. If you can agree in principle I am sure that your staff could make further arrangement for your information. I enclose a recent copy which includes an interview with Bishop Tutu.

May I wish you a pleasant and constructive conference, as we look forward with confidence to the coming session of Parliament.

Yours sincerely,

Enc.

SOUTH AFRICAN



SPORTS OFFICE

'EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH SPORT'

EDDIE BARLOW
DIRECTOR

27A SMITH STREET
LONDON SW3
TELEPHONE NO: 01-351-2834

PRINCIPLES OF PARTICIPATION.

South African sport is totally committed to achieving Equal Opportunities through Sport.

The unequivocal rejection of apartheid as embodied in the Declaration of Intent clearly outlines this stance and sets out firmly the role sport has played, is playing, and intends to continue playing in the abolition of an unequal society.

To this end it is envisaged that any individual or team that wishes to play sport in South Africa will be strongly urged to support the principles as set out:-

1. Agreement in totality with the Declaration of Intent for South African Sport.
2. Agree to refuse to take part in any event which contravenes the Declaration.
3. Agree to contribute in an appropriate way in order to assist South African sport to bring about a harmonious society in which all communities can co-exist by:
 - A. Making a financial contribution or
 - B. Coaching or lecturing on their particular skill or
 - C. Participating in fund-raising or any other activity to assist sport in breaking down any barriers which might remain or
 - D. Promoting sport as a vehicle for understanding, respecting, and improving life chances for all communities.
4. Agree to report factually to any appropriate organisation or body any problems or contraventions of the Declaration.
5. Contribute in any other way he or she sees fit to assist sport in South Africa and generally in the world.

SOUTH AFRICAN



SPORTS OFFICE

'EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH SPORT'

EDDIE BARLOW
DIRECTOR

27A SMITH STREET
LONDON SW3
TELEPHONE NO: 01-351-2834

**SPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA
A DECLARATION OF INTENT**

We solemnly reiterate our **COMMITMENT** to:

1. Non-racial sport in South Africa.
2. Eradicate all forms of racism and statutory measures inhibiting racial equality in sporting practice and facilities.
3. Create equal opportunities for all sportsmen and women irrespective of race, colour or creed.

To this end we shall monitor the progress of all sporting bodies and organisations which pledge themselves to this declaration and assist them to realise the goal which we have set ourselves.

Therefore, we are irrevocably committed to the following **PRINCIPLES**:

1. No apartheid or racial discrimination in sport and related issues.
2. Equal opportunities for all in sport irrespective of race, colour or creed.
3. The upliftment and improvement of all communities so that everyone can compete on an equitable basis in all forms of sport.
4. Non-racial competition in sport from school to international level.
5. The provision of coaches and administrators to encourage sport at grass-roots level in all communities.

Accordingly all policies, principles and practices conducive to inequity and the denial of human rights and dignity are totally rejected.

To give effect to the abovenamed commitment and principles, we pledge ourselves to the following **STRATEGY**:

1. Each sport must spell out concretely how it intends to give effect to the above principles by means of specific timetables. This must refer to coaching, facility creation, grass-roots involvement and administration.
2. Sports complexes to be created and available for all sportsmen and women.
3. Maximum utilisation of existing facilities, including school facilities.
4. Academic and other incentive schemes for outstanding sportsmen of all races, colours and creeds.
5. All constitutions of sports bodies to reflect the commitments and principles as stated above.

Consequently sport is also to be used as a channel of mobility and achievement for people to improve their opportunities for advancement and their quality of life.

SOUTH AFRICAN



SPORTS OFFICE

'EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH SPORT'

EDDIE BARLOW
DIRECTOR

27A SMITH STREET
LONDON SW3
TELEPHONE NO: 01-351-2834

RESOLUTION ON SCHOOL SPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA.

At a meeting of the Presidents of South African sporting bodies at the Boksburg Congress on 13th. September 1985, it was unanimously accepted that there should be mixed sport at school level.

This decision was taken against the background of the announcement by the Minister of National Education that there were no restrictions, legal or otherwise, that inhibited Freedom of Association in Sport.

The congress stated that schools refusing to play against other communities were guilty of blatant discrimination, and this was totally indefensible and unacceptable.

All schools are urged to take an active role, in the spirit of sportsmanship, to use sport as a vehicle which is assisting all communities to greater understanding and harmony, and ultimately to an equitable society in which we may all happily co-exist.

SOUTH AFRICAN



SPORTS OFFICE

'EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH SPORT'

EDDIE BARLOW
DIRECTOR

27A SMITH STREET
LONDON SW3
TELEPHONE NO: 01-351-2834

*Letter sent to all Commonwealth
Games Federations.*

July 1st. 1985.

I am writing to you as Director of the South African Sports Office in London, which represents all 108 Sports Associations in South Africa and, as such, has no political affiliations. It represents the interests of all communities in South Africa, and rejects apartheid.

Our recent Declaration of Intent, which I attach and invite you to read, sets out our internal position very clearly and unequivocally. It has been very favourably received by a number of sports bodies in the United Kingdom and elsewhere and, although we are seeking as our priority to create Equal Opportunities through Sport within South Africa rather than the re-admission of South Africa into World Sport, several sports bodies have, on their own initiative, elected to lend us their support and to maintain sporting contacts with us as a means of helping us to achieve our internal objectives.

Naturally, we welcome such contacts and the assistance it provides us, in eliminating apartheid and achieving our goal of equal opportunities. However, we understand that those sports bodies who have elected to maintain contacts with us have in some cases met with political pressure and ill-informed criticism. It is because of this that we believe we have an obligation to explain their reasons for maintaining contact to those who are unaware of our goals and the success we are enjoying in meeting them.

In the light of our own goals and ideals, as set out in the Declaration of Intent, it goes without saying that all of us who believe in free, democratic and egalitarian societies are seeking the same end, and we have met no criticism of the Declaration from any quarter. I am very conscious of the concern felt throughout the Commonwealth for the rights and status of all South Africans, and appreciate the moral support, however expressed, you have given to the movement towards equal opportunities for all our citizens. I should like you to consider the progress we have made and our determination to achieve our goals in full and then to re-consider your own attitudes towards contact with us.


Firstly, and in part due to pressure by South African sportsmen and women, there are now no statutory barriers preventing South Africans of all races and colour from mixing at all levels in sport from school to international level. We can and do mix on the sporting field and in the sharing of all facilities, and on a social basis.

Secondly, we are pressing ahead to implement a full programme, through the Sports Associations, to ensure that the objectives of Equal Opportunities through Sport be fulfilled as quickly as possible. In this connection you will be interested to know the reaction of Nobel Peace Prizewinner Bishop Desmond Tutu, who has said, "High time. A fine realization of responsibilities to the people of this country. Splendid."

Those international sports bodies who have elected to play sport with us have done so because they recognise the assistance such support can give us in achieving our goals: links have and will continue to give us moral and practical help to expedite our programme. At this point, boycotts can only serve to deny us such help and to hinder our progress.

I hope, then, that I have been able to put you fully in the picture and that you will feel able to join those who are actively endorsing our initiative. If you would like clarification on any issue or further information please feel free to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Eddie Barlow". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name.

Eddie Barlow.
•Director.

1211

COMMONWEALTH STATEMENT ON APARTHEID IN SPORT

(Entebbe Agreement 12.6.77)

The member countries of the Commonwealth, embracing peoples of diverse races, colours, languages and faiths, have long recognised racial prejudice and discrimination as a dangerous sickness and an unmitigated evil and are pledged to use all their efforts to foster human dignity everywhere. At their London Meeting, the Heads of Government reaffirmed that apartheid in sports, as in other fields, is an abomination and runs directly counter to the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which they made at Singapore on 22 January 1971.

They were conscious that sport is an important means of developing and fostering understanding between the people, and especially between the young people, of all countries. But, they were also aware that, quite apart from other factors, sporting contacts between their nationals and the nationals of countries practising apartheid in sport tend to encourage the belief (however unwarranted) that they are prepared to condone this abhorrent policy or are less than totally committed to the Principles embodied in their Singapore Declaration. Regretting past misunderstandings and difficulties and recognising that these were partly the result of inadequate inter-governmental consultations, they agreed that they would seek to remedy this situation in the context of the increased level of understanding now achieved.

They reaffirmed their full support for the international campaign against apartheid and welcomed the efforts of the United Nations to reach universally accepted approaches to the question of sporting contacts within the framework of that campaign.

Mindful of these and other considerations, they accepted it as the urgent duty of each of their Governments vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by withholding any form of support for, and by taking every practical step to discourage, contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organised on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin.

They fully acknowledged that it was for each Government to determine in accordance with its laws the methods by which it might best discharge these commitments. But they recognised that the effective fulfilment of their commitments was essential to the harmonious development of Commonwealth sport hereafter.

They acknowledged also that the full realisation of their objectives involved the understanding, support and active participation of the nationals of their countries and of their national sporting organisations and authorities. As they drew a curtain across the past they issued a collective call for that understanding, support and participation with a view to ensuring that in this matter the peoples and Government of the Commonwealth might help to give a lead to the world.

Heads of Government specially welcomed the belief, unanimously expressed at their Meeting, that in the light of their consultations and accord there were unlikely to be future sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries or their nationals and South Africa while that country continues to pursue the detestable policy of apartheid. On that basis, and having regard to their commitments, they looked forward with satisfaction to the holding of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and to the continued strengthening of Commonwealth sport generally.

GLENEAGLES

June 12, 1977

copy

Subject filed on
COMMONWEALTH:
CHOGM: PE 9.

Prime Minister ~~CCBT~~ (2)

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 169A/85**

ms

A letter from Mr. Mulroney
feeling your views on the
handling of South Africa at
CHOGM. He expects minimum
additional measures against
South Africa to be necessary
October 2, 1985

SECRET

A draft reply is in
preparation.

CDP
3/x

Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London

Dear Margaret:

The whole issue of South Africa has been much in my thought during these past weeks. Your High Commissioner in Ottawa will no doubt have been reporting on the numerous measures our government has taken recently to impress upon the South African government how urgent it is to introduce basic changes to bring about an end to apartheid. I was extremely pleased, therefore, to have had the opportunity of a preliminary exchange of views with Geoffrey Howe last Friday afternoon. I explained to Sir Geoffrey our thinking and was grateful to have had his insight regarding your own government's position. Nevertheless, following our meeting I thought it would be useful if I were to share with you my perceptions.

Canadians cannot but consider unacceptable, a regime founded on racist principles. The maintenance of apartheid over thirty-five years in the face of the consistent opprobrium of the international community does not augur well for the South African government's willingness to bring significant changes within a reasonable time-frame. There are certain limited goals which we consider as indispensable to any process of peaceful change. They include the dismantling of the legal underpinning of apartheid and an opening of negotiations, involving black leaders who enjoy wide support, aimed at majority rule with some form of constitutional protection of minority rights.

It is vital, I believe, that the South Africans should realize that effective reform can no longer be delayed. Developments in their own country and internationally have greatly accelerated, and a failure to move more quickly will expose their

country to grave dangers now and in the future. For my part, I see no prospect of reversing the international momentum towards further economic measures against South Africa or reducing its isolation, unless the South African government introduces basic reforms.

I know that you too are reflecting on this question and its importance for the Commonwealth as we approach the Nassau meeting. I appreciate the measures which your government has recently announced and am certain that other Commonwealth members have taken careful note of them. We must expect, however, that most Commonwealth members will be looking for far more ambitious measures to reflect global condemnation of systematic racial discrimination in South Africa. In speaking for Canada I will be obliged to make clear our own support for the progressive application of economic and political pressure on South Africa.

Against this background, South Africa looms very large on our agenda for the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). I hope that we can remain in close touch on the question, in view of our joint commitment to the success of the Nassau meeting and its implications for the future of the Commonwealth. All participants will be deeply conscious of your own exceptional contribution to an equally critical CHOGM in 1979. It is my earnest hope that you will once again provide the Commonwealth with leadership that will enable all members to feel proud of their achievements.

At the end of the day, I realize that we may not have the same appreciation of what is an outcome acceptable to the Commonwealth as a whole. At the outset, however, I hope very much that we can maintain the frankest dialogue; in that expectation I very much hope we will be able to discuss this and other issues on the CHOGM agenda as early as possible following our arrival in Nassau. In the meantime, I hope you will let me have your views on how we can use the Bahamas meeting to encourage reasonable progress in South Africa while maintaining the integrity of the Commonwealth.

I would be particularly interested in learning whether your government could subscribe to some minimum additional measures which the Commonwealth could unanimously adopt in Nassau. Such a gesture would provide a sense of purpose and lend cohesion to our unique Commonwealth assembly. What is more, it could well be the only way of avoiding far more radical proposals. Obviously,

Right Honourable
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

-3-

SECRET

all states are free to take whatever steps they believe best fulfill their foreign policy objectives. However, the combination of a list of commonly agreed measures, coupled with additional measures unilaterally imposed by individual members, would appear to be a reasonable and effective way of expressing common purpose, while preserving maximum freedom of individual national action. I look forward to hearing from you in this regard.

Yours sincerely,

Brian

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH BISHOP TUTU

He is coming for thirty minutes. He will be accompanied by Terry Waite.

You will want to get clear at the beginning that he is opposed to violence.

He will probably tackle you on sanctions, on which he has criticised HMG.

The most useful subject to explore is the mechanics of a possible dialogue between the South African Government and blacks.

You might also touch on the role of South African business in breaking down apartheid. (Terry Waite is interested in this).

CDP

C.D. Powell

2 October 1985



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 October 1985

COG 2/16.

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Bishop Tutu, 3 October

/ Thank you for your letter of 25 September. I enclose
breifing for this meeting.

/ I also enclose a draft press line. It will be important
to avoid the meeting being portrayed in the press as simply
a disagreement about sanctions. The press line therefore
emphasises the extent to which our own views on the urgent
need for reform in South Africa coincide with those of
Bishop Tutu. This could be strengthened and made more
newsworthy by including the last sentence.

Yours ever,
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

PS The Bishop will be
preaching in the Foreign
Secretary's constituency
next Sunday.



PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH BISHOP TUTU, 3 OCTOBER

OUR OBJECTIVES

1. To convince Tutu of the sincerity of the British Government's opposition to apartheid and our desire to see a dialogue on peaceful change started in South Africa.
2. To sound out Tutu on the prospects and conditions for such a dialogue and seek his views on what more can be done politically/diplomatically to encourage one.
3. To persuade Tutu that there are good reasons for our opposition to economic sanctions and that it is not just a matter of self-interest.
4. To encourage Tutu to continue to oppose violence and remain committed to peaceful change.

POINTS TO MAKE

- i) Wholeheartedly opposed to apartheid and in favour of non-violent change towards a system of government which commands the support of the people of South Africa as a whole.
- ii) Dialogue essential if fundamental problems to be solved. How in practical terms could such a dialogue be brought about?
- iii) We have called for the release of Mandela, abolition of influx control, pass laws and group areas act, and end of state of emergency. What more can we usefully do through diplomatic channels? What can others do? What will bring black leaders to come forward?
- iv) Opposed to economic sanctions because genuinely believe they will not lead South African Government to make reforms. Market forces already exerting sufficient and more politically effective pressure.
- v) Condemn violence from all quarters. Polarisation and violence decrease chances of eventual successful settlement.



HIS OBJECTIVES

- i) To ask us to increase pressure on South Africa to end the state of emergency.

- ii) To urge us to agree to economic sanctions at CHOGM.

YOUR RESPONSE

- i) We will continue to exert our influence to press for reform.

- ii) Have for many years observed restrictions in our relationship with South Africa (Gleneagles Agreement, UN Arms Embargo). Recent EC package largely measures we already observe.

- iii) EC package sends clear political signal to Pretoria without damaging South African economy.

- iv) Constantly use diplomatic channels to express our view. Recent examples of representations in Pretoria:

19 September over invasion of Angola

27 September over detention without trial

- v) Firmly opposed to economic sanctions. Would strengthen the white right wing. By creating more unemployment and poverty in the townships would heighten violence and lead to increased polarisation and repression. Would also hurt South Africa's neighbours. To advocate economic sanctions is to seek a violent confrontation, not a peaceful settlement.



DRAFT PRESS LINE

The Prime Minister and Bishop Tutu had a full exchange of views on the current situation in South Africa.

The Prime Minister emphasized the Government's total opposition to apartheid. The Prime Minister and Bishop Tutu shared a desire for an early and peaceful transition to a system of government acceptable to the people of South Africa as a whole. They agreed on the urgent need for the South African Government to take concrete steps towards opening up a dialogue with credible leaders of the black community. These should include the lifting of the state of emergency and the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela.



BACKGROUND

References:

- A LPR
- B Budd-Powell letter 23 September
- C Article from the Times, 1 October
- D Archer-Reeve letter 16 September

1. Bishop Tutu is probably the most popular black leader in South Africa not in detention. In a recent Sunday Times/mori opinion poll among South African blacks, 24% said Tutu would make the best President, placing him a clear second behind Nelson Mandela (49%); (Chief Buthelezi got 6%).

2. Tutu's opinions have noticeably hardened during the past year as a result of the State of Emergency and increased government repression. Originally opposed to economic sanctions, he stated at his enthronement as Bishop of Johannesburg early this year that he would call for them after 18 months in the absence of real progress. However, after the disappointment of President Botha's speech of 15 August, Tutu decided to call for sanctions now. He has not made clear, however, exactly what kind of sanctions he has in mind.

3. He does not, however, call for the breaking off of diplomatic relations because he wishes diplomatic pressure to be brought to bear. He also supports the positive involvement of foreign companies in fields such as education and training and housing.

4. He has recently criticised the UK for, in his view, failing to put pressure on the South African government and helping to maintain the apartheid system by refusing to support economic sanctions. This criticism is widespread among South African blacks.

5. Bishop Tutu's presence has been effective in preventing several potentially violent incidents, but he has voiced concern that his non-violent stance will lose him support among an



increasingly frustrated black community.

6. Bishop Tutu claims he is not a leader but only a churchman thrust into the limelight by the forceable absence of the real leaders of the people; and that once his work towards securing their freedom and the basis of black rule is complete, he wishes to fade from the limelight. He appears genuine in this and his ambition is probably to become Archbishop rather than President in South Africa.

7. While opposed to violence, Tutu supports non violent civil disobedience. On 11 September Tutu threatened to call in October a week long strike if the government did not lift the State of Emergency, withdraw the SADF from the townships, release political detainees and talk to authentic black representatives.



FCO PRESS CONFERENCE: THURSDAY 19 SEPTEMBER 1985

SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION INTO ANGOLA ON 16 SEPTEMBER

Spokesman issued the following statement:

We strongly condemn this incursion into Angolan sovereign territory by South African Defence Forces. Such acts can only undermine the stability of the region and damage efforts to achieve Namibian independence. We urge South Africa to withdraw her forces at once.

The British Government believes that the longer term prospects for the security of the region depend on mutual respect for borders and on urgent progress towards implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 leading to internationally-recognised independence for Namibia.

We are making these views known to the South African Government through diplomatic channels.

FCO PRESS CONFERENCE : FRIDAY 27 SEPTEMBER 1985

SOUTH AFRICA : DETENTIONS

Spokesman issued the following statement: "Acting on instructions the British Ambassador in Pretoria, Mr Patrick Moberly, today called on the South African Foreign Minister to convey the British Government's deep concern at recent events in South Africa. In particular he urged that opposition leaders in detention should be charged or released without delay. The Ambassador made special reference to the case of Mr Oscar Mpetha, the veteran trade unionist re-arrested recently.

"The Ambassador made clear that the British Government welcomes certain positive recent developments in South Africa, such as the State President's decision to grant South African citizenship to blacks whose homelands have claimed independence; the recent announcement that the communities of KwaNgema and Driefontein will not now be moved; and the recommendation of the President's Council that the pass laws should be abolished.

"Such developments, however, can help establish peace and stability only if they presage the total abandonment of the concept of separate development; the dismantling of apartheid; and early progress, through negotiation with the real leaders of all communities, to a non-racial democratic South Africa."

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TUTU, THE RT. REV. BISHOP DESMOND MPIOLO

Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg.

Born 1931 in Klerksdorp. Educated on the Reef, where he came under the spell of Trevor Huddleston. Was a teacher for four years. Ordained an Anglican priest in 1961. Lived in England from 1962 to 1966 in Golders Green and was part-time curate at St Albans from 1962 to 1963. He took two theological degrees at King's College, London University during this period. After various ecclesiastical appointments in South Africa, he became Dean of Johannesburg from 1975 to 1976 and Bishop of Lesotho in 1976. He was a notable figure at the 1978 Lambeth Conference. Elected a Fellow of King's College, London in 1978. Was a well-supported candidate for election as Archbishop of Cape Town in 1981. He was General Secretary to the South African Council of Churches from 1978 until his appointment as Bishop of Johannesburg in December 1984. He has won a number of international awards including the Gold Medal of the Society for the Family of Man (1983) and Nobel Peace Prize (1984). He is the only non-American to be awarded an honorary degree by Columbia University. He also has honorary degrees from several other American universities as well as from Aberdeen and Sheffield Universities.

Tutu is an effective public speaker and writer and a forceful opponent of apartheid. He is probably the principal black leader active in South Africa. Bitterly opposed to Chief Buthelezi, his sympathies lie with the Black Consciousness movement. He treads skilfully a dangerous path involving continuous challenge to the Government's policies. Continually criticised in the pro-Government press, his appointment as Bishop of Johannesburg was a courageous one.

Married to an attractive and articulate lady, Leah, the director of the Domestic Workers Educational Project, who is a considerable personality in her own right. Four children of whom one, Trevor, was at King's College, London and then taught in North London before returning to South Africa.


 Foreign and Commonwealth Office
 JSS 226

London SW1A 2AH

See 20

Mr Humphrey ^{Case} 2/4

Mr Manning

Splendid quote.

23 September 1985

Dear Charles,

\$ 24.9

(17)

Call on the Prime Minister by Bishop Tutu

Thank you for your letter of 10 September on the subject of Bishop Tutu's attitude to violence. We believe that the Prime Minister can safely meet Bishop Tutu on the basis that he is a committed opponent of violence. His position has been made public on several occasions in recent months as he has used, and indeed risked, his influence in an attempt to stem the violence in the townships.

We do not have a record of the television interview to which you refer. There would, of course, be a distinction between having some sympathy for those who are tempted to violence and supporting or condoning their actions. The information which we have all suggests that while Tutu is prepared to support, or at least not disavow, "civil disobedience" he does not support violence. In a speech on 11 September to a church gathering in Pietermaritzburg he said that he would organise a week long nationwide stay away from work and schools if the Government did not agree to lift the state of emergency, withdraw the SADF from the townships, charge or release political detainees and sit down and talk to authentic representatives of the black communities. But this was not a call for violence. Indeed, as Len Appleyard mentioned in his letter of 2 September, Tutu has gone of out his way publicly to oppose violence. After a funeral in Duduza in mid-July Bishop Tutu showed great personal courage in physically intervening, together with Bishop Simeon Nkoane, to save a suspected "collaborator" from a mob set on beating him to death. This incident was filmed by newsmen and given very prominent coverage here.

In a further attempt to stem the violence Bishop Tutu spoke out violently against such killings at Kwathema on 23 July, threatening that if the violence did not stop he would leave the "struggle" and even leave South Africa.

His commitment appears to stem from his belief that he is enjoined to non-violence by the Christian faith. The following is an extract from an interview he gave to the June 1985

/edition

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edition of "Leadership SA":

"There are some things that our faith demands of us which I would much rather it didn't. When God says "Love P W Botha", I say to him, "You can't be serious, God". He then says "I am". The consequence of being a member of the body of Jesus Christ is that P W is your brother."

Bishop Tutu told our Ambassador on 30 July that he feared that young people of the black community would soon shake off his leadership and that of others like him "wishing to keep the peace". He contrasted his own position with that of those who wanted violent solutions.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

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SJS
PUS

BT

1 OCT 1985

cutting dated.....19

Tutu will seek sanctions at Thatcher meeting

By Nicholas Ashford, Diplomatic Correspondent

Bishop Desmond Tutu, the Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg and winner of the Nobel peace prize, is to hold talks on Thursday with Mrs Thatcher on the continuing racial crisis in South Africa.

The bishop, who will be in London to attend a planning session for the 1988 Lambeth Conference, will also have talks with Mr Neil Kinnock, the Labour Party leader.

He is also to have a private meeting with Mr Oliver Tambo, the leader of the banned African National Congress (ANC), who will be in London at the same time.

During his talks at Downing Street, Bishop Tutu will urge

Mrs Thatcher to join other Commonwealth countries in applying economic sanctions against South Africa.

Although Britain last week joined its European partners in approving political and military restrictive measures against Pretoria it has resolutely refused to apply economic sanctions.

Mrs Thatcher's failure to find time to see Bishop Tutu when he was in London a year ago caused offence to him and to many South African blacks, particularly as the Prime Minister had found time during the same year to see President Botha and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, the Zulu leader.

CONFIDENTIAL

(16)

British Embassy
6 Hill Street Pretoria

SS 027h

M. Murray

\$ 20-19

Telephone 43-3121 Telex 44641 (a/b PI-44-641-PR)

N. Murray

A Reeve Esq
Southern African Department
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date 16 September 1985

Dear Jony,

VISIT TO BRITAIN BY BISHOP TUTU

1. You may find it helpful to have some additional comments on Bishop Tutu for incorporation with any background briefing that you are preparing for the Bishop's call on the Prime Minister on 3 October to supplement the biographical information in the latest LPR.

2. Tutu has played a prominent role in recent developments in South Africa. His extended visit to the United States in 1984 undoubtedly contributed to increasing interest there in the situation in South Africa. Senator Kennedy's high profile visit to South Africa early this year was another direct consequence.

3. Within South Africa Tutu's position in the Church gives him both status and prominence. He has been personally present at many funerals of those killed in the unrest and his intervention has at least on one occasion saved lives that might otherwise have been forfeited in the heightened emotion on such occasions. He has been taking his responsibilities as Bishop seriously, is apparently anxious to justify his appointment and to demonstrate that it was merited. Not all of his preaching is politically charged but the unrest has left him deeply disturbed. He offered to meet the State President in August to discuss the situation but when asked to indicate opposition to civil disobedience refused and did not participate in an Anglican delegation that subsequently saw the President. His views on the role of the United States and Britain in South Africa are trenchant and critical. This is nothing new. He has described the American policy of constructive engagement as "evil, immoral and unchristian". He recently referred to President Reagan as a racist. It can be expected that during his visit to London he will express disappointment about British Government policies and in particular at the stand taken by the British Government on disinvestment.

/ 4.

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4. Tutu's views on investment have probably developed this year into a harder line attitude than he had at one time adopted. His view hitherto had been that he accepted the benefits of investment but felt that it should be conditional on the South African Government carrying through real change in a 18-24 month period. The changes which he had called for included socio-economic reforms such as the provision of housing for workers near their place of work and with their families, the abolition the migratory labour system, the scrapping of influx control and pass laws and support for unionisation of workers. He has also been insistent that investors should channel money into black education and training.
5. On 11 September, when addressing a three-day Church gathering in Pietermaritzburg, the Bishop said that he would organise a nationwide week long stay-away from work and schools if the Government did not respond positively to a four-part package of demands. The Bishop said that the Government should lift the state of emergency, withdraw the SADF from the townships, charge or release political detainees, and sit down to talk to authentic representatives of the black communities.
6. Tutu is bitterly opposed to Chief Buthelezi. He has been cool to the proposal put forward by the PFP and endorsed by Buthelezi to establish a Convention Alliance.
7. You will know from David White's teletype of 12 September to Terry Curran that Bishop Tutu's son, Trevor, was released from two weeks' detention on 9 September.

Yours ever
John
G R ARCHER



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

C L G Mallaby Esq, CMG
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
LONDON S W 1

1 October 1985

Dear Clive,

MISC 118: FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA

1. I am afraid that we are running a little behind on letting you have the contribution called for at our meeting on 26 September, bringing together the up-to-date ideas from our Embassy in Pretoria with our own contribution (my effort was very much off the cuff).
 2. Meanwhile, in an attempt to clear my own mind, I have written, very much as a personal contribution to the discussion, the attached "Introduction", which I hope brings out some of the factors which need to be taken into account in any serious analysis on "What might happen".
 3. In both the medium and the longer term, the growth of population/economic development issue is central. Then there is the question whether P W Botha can bring together any kind of moderate black constituency, which is linked to the problem of the homelands. Evolving Afrikaner attitudes and the risk of a white backlash are a complementary theme. Finally, there is the issue whether any constitutional system can be devised which will accommodate so many conflicting interests.
 4. In the slow, medium and longer term, a crucial issue will be whether the forces of law and order, whoever controls them, will be strong enough to allow social, economic and political development to proceed in a reasonably orderly manner.
- . The trouble with South Africa is that the closer one has been to it the more complicated the problems appear to become. As you know, I have been over-close to it all since early 1982!

*Yours ever,
E A J*

E A J Fergusson

CONFIDENTIAL

blind cc:
Mr Johnson
Mr Reeve
Mr Powell, No 10 for interest ✓

INTRODUCTION

Background

1. South Africa is not inherently rich; it is an arid country with limited water resources. It was not until the discovery of diamonds and gold in the latter part of the nineteenth century that its simple agrarian economy started to evolve towards the complicated mixture of first and third world economies of today. The first world economy developed on the basis of a continuing input of European, largely British, capital, technology, and human skills; the mining industry on which an industrial economy has since been based could not, however, have developed without unskilled labour, drawn largely from the black tribes throughout the region. From that process has evolved the phenomenon of the urban African; caught up in a Western-style world. However, the third world sector remains important; the black population as a whole still comprises a dominant proportion of rural dwellers, mainly peasant farmers farming by inefficient traditional methods.

2. The black population is growing at a rate of between 2.8% and 3% per annum. Rural poverty, as a result of population pressure and the progressive degradation of the land available to blacks (despite the concentration of black people in the areas of greatest rainfall), is getting worse and increasing migration to the towns is the direct consequence. The population of South Africa is

/likely

likely to double between now and 2010. That increase will be almost entirely among black people. In the long term, therefore, South Africa faces a similar threat of over-population to that of other areas of Black Africa. If this growing population is to be fed, given jobs and offered the maintenance of its existing, let alone an improving, standard of welfare, the economy will need to grow on average at about 5% per annum. Growth will have to be in industry, not on the land.

Economic Growth

3. Such a rate of growth is hypothetically possible, given South Africa's mineral resources, developed infrastructure and efficient (extensive, capital intensive/low labour utilizing) modern agricultural sector; the following are among the main factors:

no further increase in the rate of population growth;
reasonable political stability;
the maintenance of stable and/or increasing
commodity prices (especially gold);
the absence of prolonged drought;
the availability of skills;
continuing flow of external capital;
(there is no effective external threat at present).

/4.

4. The development of skills is crucial; the demand goes beyond what can be satisfied by traditional immigration patterns and can only be satisfied by increasing what is available from indigenous sources. Yet the creation of skills from the main untapped pool, the blacks, can only take place if there is massive social, economic and educational change. The extent to which that process is already underway is one of the factors in current political disturbances. It is inconceivable that the current widespread social change which the growth of the economy requires can occur without dramatic political change. But stable economic growth needs time.

Apartheid and the "group"

5. By South Africa we normally mean the territories given independence by the British in 1910. At that time, dominant power, as a result of the bargain which ended the Boer War, was given by Britain to the whites and, inevitably, to the majority element in the white population, the Afrikaner. Evolutionary change, that is change from within the established legal and constitutional system, can only occur if it has the support of the majority of the electorate. Since 1910 and above all since 1948, when the Afrikaner National Party took power, the attitudes of the Afrikaner majority have been the dominant aspect of the South African political process. No present South African leader can act as an autocrat. Afrikaner attitudes are changing; can they change fast and far enough?

6. The Afrikaner has a strong sense of group identity. Apartheid was based on the concept, which the South African Government still strongly adheres to, that in a very diverse society which brings together peoples of radically different cultural and historical background, stability could only be achieved by a recognition of the need to guarantee security to the group, with individuals subordinating their interests to the need of the group. On the basis of his own experience, the Afrikaner sees politics in group terms; other whites (mostly English speakers) are perceived to have a group identity, though an increasingly blurred one; Coloured and Indian people have their group loyalties and, now, a place, on a group basis, in the constitutional system. The Afrikaner both identifies the blacks (Bantu) collectively as being a non-European group and at the same time as forming a collection of tribally-based groups (Xhosa, Zulu, Tswana, Venda, Sotho etc). The notion that blurring group identity and mixing peoples of different culture leads only to tension is deeply imbued in Afrikaner attitudes. He believes that his survival can only be secured on the recognition of this "separateness" (apartheid). Although Western industrialized societies emphasize individual rights and have rejected the Afrikaner stress on the group, the problem of safeguarding minorities has to be addressed.

The "homelands"

7. Facing an inbuilt black majority, the Afrikaner, in

the 25 years after 1948, tried to finesse the threat of black domination by separating off as many as possible of the black people into "homelands". (This is Grand Apartheid). Some of them have taken independence (Bophutatswana, Venda, Transkei, Ciskei) and some a measure of administrative devolution (viz Kwa Zulu, Gazankulu, Lebowa, Kangware etc). There is as much historical and cultural justification for this process of devolution as there was for the creation and granting of independence to Botswana, Swaziland or Lesotho. Because it was associated with "apartheid", the process has not however been accepted either by most black "South Africans" or by the international community. Nonetheless these regions represent a major concentration of blacks living in "1910 South Africa" and any future dispensation has to take account of them. Recent events suggest that the South African Government has belatedly recognized that the process has worked against its own interests. It has not been possible, primarily for economic reasons, to get rid of the potential danger from urbanized blacks (increasingly prosperous, educated, articulate and dissatisfied as they are the balance has to be tilted back again. Recent measures (eg a return to common citizenship) suggest that the Government is looking for some way to counterbalance the de-stabilizing forces in the townships by giving a role to Homeland blacks, so as to increase the size of the moderate, and especially rural, black constituency. It is not at present clear whether the leaders of the Homelands (independent or self-governing) will play the same game as

the Government; and, given our limited knowledge of black attitudes in the independent black states (because our non-recognition means that we have little contact) it is impossible to tell at present what chance of success the Government has. Nevertheless, the larger (in numerical terms the moderate black constituency, the better the chances of reasonable dialogue and orderly reform.

Black political attitudes

8. At present, black political attitudes are hard to identify, in the absence of representative political mechanisms. Most black activism is urban-based. There are significant divisions between the ANC and the "black consciousness" PAC and AZAPO and between those and the Zulu-based Inkatha. The UDF brings together an inchoate coalition of forces opposed to the present system. Black opinion is almost certainly given a false homogeneity by the common sense of discrimination which all feel vis-a-vis the white dominated "system" - it is easier to know what black political groups are against than what they are for. With the exception of Inkatha, the opposition to the political "system" is linked with a rejection of capitalism, the white-dominated financial, commercial and industrial organization of society being seen as an extension of apartheid policies. Attitudes are changing, however, as blacks enter the middle class, as they too become entrepreneurs and restrictions on black enterprise are removed, but it is a slow process.

White attitudes

9. It can be regarded as axiomatic that the willingness of the whites to see the erosion of some of their special privileges in recent years has been facilitated by growing prosperity. In contrast, the economic depression since 1983 has not only been a direct stimulus for township violence but has made many whites more fearful of the threat to them of social and therefore political, change. In recent months, the Government's fear of "white backlash" appears to have grown.

The consequences of majority rule in a unitary South Africa

10. If there were rapid political change leading to the prospect of an early assumption of power by blacks, such as would come from the adoption of a one-man, one-vote system in a unitary South Africa, it is possible that black unity would be held together by the need to preserve a common front against the white. It is possible, too, that some unity would last after a transfer of power, while the dominant concern was a division of the spoils, ie inevitably a rapid transfer of economic resources from white to black. This would have profound consequences for the present economic organization of society, on which South Africa's prosperity is based. It seems likely, moreover, that the strains of the jockeying for power during and after the transitional process would lead to an exacerbation of divisions between black people, some ideological but more tribal. There is no dominant tribal grouping which would be accepted by others as the natural

leader. Moreover, given the close tribal links between the South African tribes and their neighbours (Tswana in Bophutatswana and Botswana, and cross border affiliations, among Sotho in Lesotho, Venda in the North and the Nguni tribes - Xhosa, Zulu, Ndebele and Swazi) tribal dissension in South Africa might spill over into neighbouring territories. The Coloured, Indian and White minorities could scarcely avoid being caught up in such dissension.

Options?

11. Black power (put crudely, the control of army and police by black people) is at present feared and rejected by the vast majority of white people, and less vociferously by the other minorities. Because the Government cannot or will not make any forecast of its long-term intentions, discussion of what other choices are on offer takes place in a vacuum, though an immense amount of paper has been generated on federal/confederal systems, consociational democracy (etc) group rights and individual rights. Outsiders cannot prescribe what will eventually emerge from a prolonged struggle for power. They can observe, however, that the most hopeful background for peaceful evolutionary change, such as would preserve the residual features of Western civilization which still distinguish South Africa from virtually all countries in Black Africa, would be the

accelerating development of a black middle class, with vested interests in the present economic system and the progressive adoption of Western values - the "whitification" of black society. This is, of course, the nub of the argument in favour of maintaining foreign economic involvement in South Africa.

Is there time?

12. Taking these and other strands of an extremely complicated situation into account, the crucial questions for any forward forecast of South African development are whether it is not already too late, whether the task of social transformation is beyond the resources of the South African economy and whether the legacy of bitterness and frustration among blacks is not now too strong for peaceful transformation still to be possible.



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
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