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CONFIDENTIAL FILING

PM's attendance at Mr. Andropov's funeral in Moscow  
13/14 February 1984 - Bligny.

SOVIET UNION

AND AT MR. CHERNENKO'S FUNERAL  
IN MOSCOW, 12/13 MARCH 1985

FEBRUARY 1984

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>21/2/84</del>							
<del>4.3.85</del>							
15.3.85							

**TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE**

**Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents**

Reference	Date
JIC(85)(WSI) 4 extract	24/01/1985

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed                                 J. Gray                                

Date                                 17/7/2014                                

**PREM Records Team**

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 March 1985

CDP  
15/3.

Dear Charles,

copy attached. attached

Prime Minister's Meeting with Mr Gorbachev

In your letter of 14 March you asked us to telegraph a full text to the Ambassador in Moscow for any comments or amendments he might have.

Sir Iain Sutherland has replied that he has no amendments or additions to propose to your admirably comprehensive record.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

SECRET

Soviet Union: PM's attendance @ Russian funerals;

POSTAGE AND TELEGRAPH OFFICE

POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE

15 MAR 1985



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 MR DEBEE THOMAS  
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 FROM MOSCOW 141140Z MARCH  
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 TELEGRAM NUMBER 350 OF 14 MARCH  
 INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO AND MODUK  
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 AND HELSINKI  
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*ms*

THE FUNERAL OF PRESIDENT CHERNENKO.

1. CHERNENKO WAS BURIED AT 1340 MOSCOW TIME ON 13 MARCH ON RED SQUARE BELOW THE KREMLIN WALL. THE FORMALITIES OF THE FUNERAL WERE IDENTICAL IN ALL ESSENTIAL RESPECTS TO THOSE AT THE INTERMENT OF HIS IMMEDIATE PREDECESSORS ANDROPOV AND BREZHNEV, AND DESCRIBED IN DETAIL IN MY DESPATCH OF 25 NOVEMBER 1982. THE CLIMAX WAS AN ARTILLERY SALUTE AND A THREE-MINUTE BLAST BY FACTORY SIRENS FOLLOWED BY THE TRADITIONAL MILITARY MARCH-PAST IN QUICK TIME.
2. ALL THE FULL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO, NOW NUMBERING ONLY TEN, WERE PRESENT ON RED SQUARE PLUS THE CANDIDATE MEMBERS AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIES. FIVE OF THE FULL MEMBERS INCLUDING MOSCOW PARTY LEADER GRISHIN FOLLOWED THE GUN CARRIAGE FROM THE HALL OF COLUMNS WHERE CHERNENKO HAD LAIN IN STATE BEFORE JOINING GORBACHEV AND THE OTHER LEADERS ON THE LENIN MAUSOLEUM. THE LINE-UP THERE AND AT THE LYING-IN-STATE SUGGESTS THAT THE CORE OF THE PARTY LEADERSHIP NOW CONSISTS OF GORBACHEV, TIKHONOV, GROMYKO, GRISHIN AND ROMANOV IN THAT ORDER OF PRECEDENCE.
3. GORBACHEV OPENED THE CEREMONY AND DELIVERED THE MAIN ORATION. THE OTHER SPEAKERS WERE GRISHIN, AN AGRICULTURAL ENGINEER FROM CHERNENKO'S HOME DISTRICT OF KRASNOYARSK, FEDOSEEV, AN ELDERLY IDEOLOGUE AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND THE KOMSOMOL LEADER, MISHIN. IN CONTRAST TO THE FUMBLER PERFORM-

VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND THE KOMSOMOL LEADER, MISHIN. IN CONTRAST TO THE FUMBLER PERFORMANCE BY CHERNENKO AT ANDROPOV'S FUNERAL 13 MONTHS PREVIOUSLY (MY TELNO 222 OF 15 FEBRUARY 1984) GORBACHEV SPOKE IN A CLEAR, CONFIDENT VOICE. FOR THE FIRST TIME FOR MANY YEARS THE SOVIET UNION HAS A LEADER WHO HAS A GOOD PHYSICAL PRESENCE, AND HIS BEARING MUST HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE SOVIET PUBLIC THAT HIS ACCESSION MARKS A NEW, BRISKER AND MORE DECISIVE ERA IN THE CONDUCT OF POLICY. HIS SPEECH WAS SUMMARISED IN MY TELNO 344. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT ALTHOUGH HE PAID TRIBUTE TO CHERNENKO'S ACHIEVEMENTS HE SINGLED OUT AS A LAND-MARK IN POLICY THE PLENUM OF NOVEMBER 1982 WHEN ANDROPOV LAUNCHED THE CAMPAIGN FOR GREATER DISCIPLINE AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY. THE EMPHASIS SUGGESTS CONTINUITY WITH ANDROPOV RATHER THAN HIS PREDECESSOR. ON FOREIGN POLICY, GORBACHEV STRESSED THE UNITY AND INFLUENCE OF THE SOCIALIST BLOC AND, IN CONTRAST TO HIS ACCEPTANCE SPEECH, SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE THIRD WORLD OR THE 'NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE'. FOR EAST / WEST RELATIONS HE AFFIRMED THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE AND SPOKE OF SOCIALISM PROVING ITS ADVANTAGES NOT BY FORCE OF ARMS BUT BY EXAMPLE.

4. AS IN 1982 AND 1984 THE FUNERAL WAS FOLLOWED BY A RECEPTION IN THE ST GEORGE'S HALL OF THE GREAT KREMLIN PALACE AT WHICH THE NEW SECRETARY GENERAL, WITH PRIME MINISTER TIKHONOV, GROMYKO AND FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT KUZNETSOV RECEIVED IN TURN ALL THE FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES, WITH THE LEADERS OF COMMUNIST STATES AND PARTIES TAKING PRECEDENCE. ACCORDING TO PRAVDA OF 14 MARCH SOME 160 FOREIGN DELEGATIONS CAME TO MOSCOW FOR THE FUNERAL. THE GOVERNMENT LEADERS INCLUDED, IN ADDITION TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF (ACCOMPANIED BY MR KINNOCK, MR STEEL AND DR OWEN), PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, CHANCELLOR KOHL, PRESIDENT PERTINI, VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH, PRESIDENT ZIA UL HAQ, RAJIV GANDHI AND ALL THE WARSAW PACT PARTY LEADERS.

5. FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF THE OTHER OFFICIAL ENGAGEMENTS

FOR THE DAY HAD INCLUDED, EARLY ON THE 13TH, A VISIT TO THE HALL OF COLUMNS WHERE I LAID A WREATH ON BEHALF OF HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN AND MRS THATCHER ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT. THERE WERE ALSO MEETINGS AFTER THE FUNERAL WITH PRESIDENT ZIA, PRESIDENT MACHEL OF MOZAMBIQUE, VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH AND MR SHULTZ, THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER MR MULRONEY, THE SPANISH PRIME MINISTER MR GONZALEZ AND RAJIV GANDHI. THE FINAL ENGAGEMENTS WERE THE 55 MINUTE CALL ON MR GORBACHEV IN THE KREMLIN AT 9.30. PM AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE, WHICH ARE BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY.

6. THIS WAS THE THIRD FUNERAL OF A SOVIET PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY I HAVE ATTENDED IN UNDER TWO AND A HALF YEARS. THE RITUAL WAS STILL IMPRESSIVE. THE ORGANISATION HAD IMPROVED WITH PRACTICE. BUT THIS TIME WE WERE ONLY GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS. THE PUBLIC DISTRESS OF CHERNENKO'S WIDOW AND FAMILY WAS A HUMAN AND A CRUELLY HARROWING ELEMENT. BUT THE LEADERSHIP AND THE PUBLIC ARE CLEARLY RELIEVED NOT ONLY THAT HE LINGERED NO LONGER BUT THAT THE PROLONGED PERIOD OF AN AILING AND UNDETERMINED LEADERSHIP DATING FROM THE LAST YEARS OF BREZHNEV HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO AN END.

7. THE SOVIET UNION NOW HAS A LEADER THAT CAN BE RELIED UPON TO APPEAR AT THE SYMBOLIC PUBLIC OCCASIONS SO IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIET SCHEMES OF THINGS, TO TRAVEL BOTH ABROAD AND WITHIN THE







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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

14 March 1985

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR GORBACHEV:  
BRIEFING OF THE TEN

I understand that we shall need to brief the Ten, either here or in Moscow, on the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Gorbachev.

As you know, the Prime Minister is never keen to divulge too much on these occasions. I have marked on the enclosed copy of the record what I regard as the maximum which could be drawn upon. A slightly fuller account could be given at the quadrilateral meeting of Ambassadors in Moscow.

C D POWELL

Len Appleyard Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

cc Master Set  
Subject as:  
USA: Relations  
Part 3.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary


14 March 1985

Dear Sir,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Vice-President Bush

I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's meeting with Vice-President Bush, while she was in Moscow for President Chernenko's funeral.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office). The section on Laker is copied to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry), Richard Allan (Department of Transport) and Rachel Lomax (HM Treasury).

Yours sincerely  
  
(C.D. Powell)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY MOSCOW ON 13 MARCH 1985

Prime Minister	Vice-President Bush
Sir G. Howe (for some of the time)	Secretary Shultz
Sir I. Sutherland	Ambassador Hartman
Mr. C.D. Powell	Assistant Secretary Burt
Mr. N. Broomfield (FCO)	Mr. Matlock (NSC)
	Mr. Gray (Deputy Chief of Staff to the Vice- President)
	Mr. Gregg (NSC Adviser to the Vice-President)
	Mr. Clark (US Embassy)

Mozambique: Nkomati Accord

The Prime Minister said she had just been talking to President Machel. He was in some difficulty. He thought that the South Africans were supporting Renamo and that the Nkomati Accords were in danger. Mr. Shultz said that the Americans had been in touch with the South Africans and thought that they had succeeded in getting the South African Government to see that it would not be in their interests for Nkomati to fail. The Prime Minister said that we would support this line with the South Africans.

Arms Control

The Prime Minister said she had been grateful for the President's message on the Strategic Defence Initiative. She expected Mr. Gorbachev to raise the matter with her and wanted to check the line which she intended to take with him. She had noted that the words used by Gorbachev in his acceptance speech on 12 March about the abolition of nuclear

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weapons were very close to those used by President Reagan. Her fear was that the Soviet Union might try to take the initiative at Geneva which so far had rested with President Reagan based on the resoluteness of the Alliance. Her basic approach would be that there was no way an agreement could be reached on research. When and if it came to deployment then this fell within the 1972 ABM Treaty. It seemed to her that the thing to do would be for both sides to reaffirm the ABM Treaty. She had noted the expression used in the President's recent letter about "stopping the erosion of the 1972 Treaty". She would also make it clear to Gorbachev that there was no possibility of dividing the UK from the US.

In commenting on the Geneva talks the Prime Minister asked whether the US would start by explaining their ideal of stopping the possibility of nuclear war and then go on to probe the Soviet position. Her fear was that the Russians might propose cuts on ICBMs and intermediate nuclear weapons and then make these hostage to some agreement on space. She did not yet know how the Americans intended to deal with this.

Mr. Shultz said that the ABM Treaty contained a provision in which either side could give notice if they were not satisfied with it. Saying that they were continuing to abide by the Treaty was not the same as saying that the US would never deploy defensive weapons unless all parties agreed to it. He thought that in speaking to Gorbachev the Prime Minister should stand on the four points she had agreed with the President. This was firm ground.

As far as the Geneva talks were concerned Mr. Shultz said that he expected some procedural wrangling. The Russians were saying that there should be five or six plenary sessions in which all the proposals should be put on the table before dividing into working groups. The US preference was to go straight into working groups. He expected the

sides to go round this problem for a while but hoped that it would be resolved without too much delay.

The Prime Minister asked how the US intended to tackle space at Geneva. Mr. Bush said there was much to talk about. Mr. Shultz added that he had taken some trouble at the first Geneva meeting to be precise on this point with Gromyko. Space included anything on the ground capable of being fired into space, for example the Soviet Galosh system. The US would talk about the erosion of the ABM Treaty. This would be going beyond the normal discussion in the ABM verification panel. Instead of simply drawing attention to a problem like the Krasnoyarsk radar, the Americans wanted to discuss with the Russians what should be done about it.

Mr. Bush reiterated the advice that in her discussions with Gorbachev the Prime Minister should stick to the principles of her common declaration with the President. Gromyko had been told that the Americans were not seeking superiority. (Mr. Burt interjected that the President had said this to Scherbitsky during his recent visit to Washington.) But thought needed to be given to the position if a greater element of defence was present in the US mix. The Prime Minister agreed that she would stick broadly to the Camp David statement. Both sides were doing research. If it came to deployment that would be the time to take decisions. Mr. Shultz said that the Russians were worried on two counts. There was a possibility of the US developing a defence system which the Russians did not have. They were also uncertain about what might happen if the US and other Western scientists and engineers turned their attention to defensive technology. The Prime Minister commented that the Russians judged everyone by their own standards. They could not understand that the Americans were sincere in what they said. Mr. Shultz said that the Prime Minister's speech to Congress had attracted a great deal of attention in the United States and had a ripple effect.

Lebanon

The Prime Minister said that things were going badly. Israel had retaliated too hard and there had been much criticism of her activities the previous day in Parliament. Mr. Shultz replied that Israel was trying to negotiate a withdrawal, but the Lebanese were refusing to negotiate. The Prime Minister said that the Israelis were clearly not responsible for the bomb explosion in Beirut. Mr. Shultz said that the US had appreciated the UK's efforts over the recent resolution in the UN. When terrorists tried to dictate how countries voted it was time to stand up to them firmly. The US had been revolted by France's last minute move. The Prime Minister agreed that it had been impossible to support the UN resolution. That was why we had abstained. The Israelis would now have to complete their withdrawal. The result would be that they would once again have to defend their northern villages. Mr. Shultz said that an unnegotiated withdrawal was a recipe for continued violence. But the Syrians were not prepared to negotiate and would not let the Lebanese negotiate. The Prime Minister added that, having let the terrorist genie out of the bottle the Syrians would not find it easy to get it back in again.

Egypt

Mr. Bush asked how the Prime Minister saw the latest Jordanian/Egyptian initiative. The Prime Minister replied that the critical point was for King Hussein to get agreement from the PLO on Resolution 242. But there was no evidence of this yet. There were even some contradictory statements. The only way forward was to get some non-PLO Palestinians to represent the West Bank.

Mr. Shultz said that President Mubarak had not, during the first part of his Washington visit, pressed the US Administration to receive a joint Jordanian/Palestinian

delegation. The US view was that President Mubarak's efforts were helpful in creating some movement towards Resolution 242. The Americans were trying to encourage this. Their tactics were to say that they would be glad to help but those on the spot had to show that there was something concrete to help with. The Prime Minister said that we were giving encouragement to King Hussein. That was where the key to a solution lay. Mr. Shultz suggested that the line to take with President Mubarak might be to say that to the extent that he was able to warm up Egypt's relations with Israel, he would be doing something for the peace process. He understood President Mubarak's difficulties about Taba, civil rights and his desire to see Israel out of Lebanon. But any encouragement for Egypt to improve relations with Israel would help the peace process.

Laker

The Prime Minister said that agreement had been reached with Exim over Laker, which she hoped would stick with other creditors. We were grateful to the Administration for their help. Mr. Shultz referred to his own and the President's personal interventions. He too hoped that the Exim agreement would hold. The best course was to go quietly about our business. If it all came out publicly, a number of other creditors might emerge from the woodwork. The object was to do the job quietly and then get on with liberalising the air services regime. The Prime Minister agreed that a quiet approach would be best. There remained the problem of the class actions. But once the problems in this area had been settled, she shared the aim of resuming negotiations on liberalisation.

Gorbachev

Mr. Bush asked for the Prime Minister's views on Gorbachev. The Prime Minister said she expected him to gain

ascendancy over the Politburo quite rapidly. He had the ability, the personality and the will. Nevertheless, the fundamental problem of Soviet society still remained. Gorbachev wanted more initiative but without any deviation from the system. He was formed by the system. He could not envisage other concepts. He would probably go the same way as Andropov in trying to make the existing system work better.

### Afghanistan

The Prime Minister said that both the US and UK were helping in Afghanistan. But the UK concealed it better. When she had seen President Zia earlier, he had expressed concern about the tougher measures being taken by the Russians against the resistance in Afghanistan. He had also noted that the public Western approach was not as forceful as it had been previously. We should all try and do more about this. President Zia had also mentioned the problem of drugs in Afghanistan which were being exported through Afghanistan. Mr. Bush said that the US had asked the Indians to consider whether they could do anything about Afghanistan. Indira Gandhi had always refrained from this. If Mr. Gandhi could publicly encourage the Russians to withdraw, it would be a big step forward. But this was probably too difficult for him. The Americans thought they might have opportunities for improving their relations with Rajiv Gandhi. They had stressed that US support for Pakistan was not to the detriment of India. The Prime Minister agreed that Pakistan would never attack India. They did not have the necessary means. Mr. Shultz thought there might be real prospects of India and Pakistan moving closer together.

### Exchange Rates

The Prime Minister noted that the gyrations between the dollar and the pound and other European currencies were



continuing. She thought that Congress would have a go at the US deficit and that the President might get about two-thirds of the reduction which he sought. Mr. Shultz thought that the Administration would succeed in making a real dent in the deficit. Mr. Bush commented that the first test on agriculture had not been hopeful. The Democrats were playing pure politics on this issue. But the President had stepped straight in with a veto.

US/Soviet Relations

Mr. Bush said that he would not wish to end the meeting without informing the Prime Minister that when he met Gorbachev later in the evening he would be conveying to him a letter from President Reagan with an invitation to visit the US. The Americans hoped this could be soon this year. The intention had been to keep this a private invitation but there had already been speculation in the US press. Sir G. Howe asked if the Americans intended to publicise the invitation. Mr. Shultz replied that this was not the intention. Mr. Bush added that unless the Russians wished to make it public, he would, at his press conference after meeting Gorbachev, refrain from confirming that an invitation had been extended. He would say only that the President would welcome a meeting with Gorbachev soon.

The meeting ended at 1715 hours.

CSP

14 March 1985

a Master Set

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject on:  
SPAIN:  
Relations 11/11/80



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c PC

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

14 March 1985

Dear Sir,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SPANISH PRIME MINISTER  
ON WEDNESDAY 13 MARCH 1985

I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's meeting with the Spanish Prime Minister, while in Moscow for President Chernenko's funeral.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

C.D. POWELL

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SPANISH  
PRIME MINISTER ON WEDNESDAY 13 MARCH 1985 AT THE BRITISH  
EMBASSY, MOSCOW

Present

Prime Minister  
Foreign Secretary  
Mr. C.D. Powell  
Mr. L.V. Appleyard

Senor Gonzalez  
Senor Westendorp  
Two officials

Senor Gonzalez said that he was very glad to be meeting at an important moment for Spain. When he had seen King Juan Carlos before he left, the King had insisted that he should press the Prime Minister to visit Spain. He very much hoped that this would be possible. The Prime Minister said she was grateful for this invitation and would see if dates could be found.

Senor Gonzalez said he was sure that both sides were very satisfied with the way the Gibraltar negotiating process had begun. The Prime Minister said she was very pleased. The Foreign Secretary said that he thought it helpful to work with Senor Moran since they understood and knew each other very well.

Senor Gonzalez said that his principal aim now was to express concern over the present state of the enlargement negotiations. He wanted to discuss the basic political issues, rather than to go into technical detail. 1985/86 would be key years for completing Spain's definition of its foreign policy, and for anchoring Spain to the West. His anxiety was that if a key element in this process, namely negotiations with the EC, fell away, it would be difficult to bring it to the right conclusion. He wanted Spain to be

integrated into the Community and into the Western system of defence. Spanish public opinion still rejected the idea that Spain should belong to the Atlantic Alliance while being enthusiastic about Spain's joining the EC. These issues were separate but psychologically linked in the minds of many people. It would be difficult if his Government had to propose that Spain should continue in the Alliance without being able to offer the other part of the process: integration into the Community. Public opinion in Spain was fluctuating. Before, 60% of the people were against joining the Alliance, with 15% in favour. But now both figures fluctuated between 30% and 40%.

Senor Gonzalez continued that he was particularly concerned over the recent figures produced by the Commission, which showed that Spain would be a substantial net contributor to the EC, up to a value of 1% of GDP. This would mean that Spain would be making a per capita contribution of £300 for the privilege of joining, while remaining one of the poorest countries in the Community. He did not want to agree to accession on any terms now and have to come back later to negotiate all the arrangements once again. He was convinced that there was no problem which was insoluble. Next week would be a very important period. It was not an electoral problem from his standpoint. It was a fundamental question of Spain's role in the future.

The Prime Minister said that we wanted Spain to come into the Community, for the sake of having Spain in the Community, which was an ideal in itself. We also wanted to have Spain in NATO. We had fully supported Spanish accession from the very start. We believed that it was important for Spanish democracy, which was important in its turn for Western democracy. It was a question of the future quality of life in Spain. If we could get the EC negotiations successfully completed, then the NATO issue would come out all right.

On the net contribution point, the Prime Minister said that it was ridiculous to have Spain as a net contributor.

But in fact Spain would need to negotiate the normal transitional arrangements to own resources. This had been foreseen. The Foreign Secretary said that the figures quoted by Senor Gonzalez were Commission calculations of the budgetary position for Spain without transitional arrangements. The latter would have to be negotiated in the usual way as the final component of the enlargement process. The Prime Minister added that, as the second largest net contributor to the Community, we had some sympathy for Spain's problems.

Senor Gonzalez said that he was not so much concerned with the purely budgetary aspect. The difficulty was that the Commission calculations represented what was on offer to Spain on the various substantive chapters of the accession negotiations. The budgetary calculation showed that the present offer did not take account of the realities of the Spanish economy. There would still have to be further negotiations on the CAP and fish. But it was clear that the Commission considered that the basic package involving all these issues would leave Spain as a net contributor, which showed that the impact of the package on Spain had not been properly calculated. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that Spain's budgetary position could not be finalised until all the substantive issues had been settled. But the figure produced by the Commission represented the calculations without the necessary corrective measures and without taking account of what would happen during the transitional period.

Senor Gonzalez repeated that the budgetary calculation nevertheless exposed the unfairness of the offer. On fish, Spain had 650 ships in EC waters in 1978. Seven years later they had only 329. They were being asked by the EC to reduce this figure still further. During these years Spain had increased its imports of fish from the Community by 700%. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that all Community countries had been obliged to undergo a major restructuring of their fishing industries. The Spanish fleet presented a particular problem, since it was 60% of the total of the Community fishing fleet.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the time for decision-making had arrived. We would like to see a settlement at the March Foreign Affairs Council. We could not renegotiate everything that had been negotiated so far. It was a time when fundamental political decisions would have to be taken. Delay would not work in Spain's favour, indeed it might well make things more difficult. Meanwhile it would be helpful if Senor Gonzalez could talk to Prime Minister Papandreou to try to make sure that the Greeks did not hold up the accession arrangements. The Community was basically valuable for the political advantages which it gave to Member States, both within Europe and internationally. She thought that most people understood this very well.

The meeting concluded with a brief discussion of Mr. Gorbachev. Senor Gonzalez asked the Prime Minister for her assessment. The Prime Minister said that he was intelligent, confident and open to discussion. But the fundamental problems of the Communist system had still not begun to be tackled. Essentially, the Soviet Government wanted economic development without providing the necessary economic incentives. Senor Gonzalez commented that they were scared to introduce greater economic incentives, since this could threaten the political system. The Prime Minister agreed, but pointed out that the Chinese had gone some way towards tackling this problem.

EDJ

14 March 1985

a Master Set

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject on:  
MOZAMBIQUE  
Relations August 79.



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

14 March 1985

Dear Len,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL OF  
MOZAMBIQUE

I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's meeting with President Machel of Mozambique, while in Moscow for President Chernenko's funeral.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. POWELL)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL  
OF MOZAMBIQUE ON 13 MARCH 1985 AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY, MOSCOW

Present:

Prime Minister  
Foreign Secretary  
Mr. C.D. Powell  
Mr. L.V. Appleyard

President Machel  
Advisers

The Prime Minister began by asking President Machel for his assessment of the present internal situation in Mozambique. President Machel said that since the last time they met in New Delhi the situation had deteriorated in Mozambique. This was due to interference both from South Africa and from Portugal, and even from Malawi, where the security and police forces were involved. There was no doubt that South Africa was failing to implement the Nkomati Agreement.

The Prime Minister asked whether this was due to activities by the South African Government or by individuals. President Machel said that it was hard to make a distinction between the two. The Government had overall responsibility for the activities of all the citizens on its soil. The Mozambique Government had just finished an important meeting to assess the situation. The meeting had concluded that South Africa had not abandoned its intention of forcing the Mozambique Government to negotiate direct with Renamo. He was not suggesting that the South African Prime Minister was involved, but it was obvious that individual members of the Government and the Army, including Cabinet members, were implicated. Their ultimate aim was to force the Mozambique Government to share power with Renamo. The Prime Minister asked whether the Mozambique Government was asking us to



contact the South African Government. President Machel said that he was.

At this point the Prime Minister had to leave for another meeting (President Machel having apologised for arriving very late). The discussion continued with the Foreign Secretary.

President Machel repeated that South Africa was still harbouring and supporting Renamo. The leaders of Renamo were exclusively Portuguese, so that South Africa was fundamentally supporting the interests of Portugal. The Mozambique Government had no intention of re-negotiating its independence after 10 years. The Foreign Secretary said that whenever we raised this issue with the South African or Portuguese Governments, they assured us that they were trying to put a stop to these activities, which were carried out by individuals. Had President Machel any firmer evidence of Government involvement?

President Machel repeated his earlier accusations that members of the South African Government and Army were involved, but not the South African Prime Minister. The Foreign Secretary said it was widely believed that Renamo had a large stock of weapons and equipment before the Nkomati Agreement was signed. He wondered whether they were not using up their old stock. President Machel replied that this showed that when South Africa signed the Nkomati Agreement they were preparing to violate it in advance. Besides, Renamo were still getting support from South Africa. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that the Cabora Bassa Dam contributed to the Mozambique and South African economies as well as to Portuguese investors. It was in the interests of none of the Governments for it to be damaged. President Machel simply repeated that he had evidence that the South Africans were well aware of who was involved in South Africa. The Foreign Secretary asked what steps had been made to integrate former members of Renamo in Mozambique society. President Machel said that 3,000 prisoners had been integrated, but there was no question of integrating the Portuguese leaders of Renamo.

The other members of Renamo were simply instruments of the Portuguese leadership. There were of course some British and German individuals involved as well. But of course neither Government was implicated. Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Mali, the Comoros and Malawi were all involved in one way or another, some as staging posts.

President Machel concluded by saying that the First anniversary of Nkomati would shortly take place. He could see no practical achievements which the Agreement had brought. But Mozambique was now getting more support from the African countries and far more support from socialist countries - more than during their war of liberation. The Foreign Secretary asked again whether President Machel wanted us to talk to the South Africans. President Machel assented.

C.D.P.

14 March 1985

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

14 March 1985

*Dear Len,*

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. MULRONEY

I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr. Mulroney while in Moscow for President Chernenko's funeral.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,  
C.D. Powell*

C.D. POWELL

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
PRIME MINISTER OF OF CANADA, MR. MULRONEY, AT THE BRITISH  
EMBASSY, MOSCOW ON 13 MARCH 1985 AT 1730

Present:

Prime Minister	Mr. Mulroney
Foreign Secretary	Mr. Smith
Mr. C.D. Powell	Mr. Fowler
Mr. B. Ingham	Mr. Fox
Mr. A. Turnbull	Mr. Pristanski
Mr. L.V. Appleyard	

The Prime Minister congratulated Mr. Mulroney on his spectacular election victory. Mr. Mulroney said he took particular satisfaction from the fact that the Conservatives had won 58% of the votes in the French speaking seats. The Government was maintaining its popularity, with a 53% approval rating.

Mr. Mulroney set out the priorities for his Government. First, there was the need to restore the alliance with the United States and the other allies. He detected that the Canadian people had had enough of posturing on peace questions and on the denigration of Canada's allies. Canada would shortly increase its forces in Europe by 1,200, bringing the total to 7,100. He would like to reach a total of 10,000. Canada would also be signing an agreement with the United States for the joint refurbishment of the North Warning System.

Secondly, it was essential to rebuild the economic relationship with the United States. 78% of Canada's trade was with the United States and 3 million jobs depended on it. The Foreign Investment Review Act had been scrapped.

Thirdly, his Government sought greater harmony between the Provinces and with the Federal Government. For example, an agreement had been reached on a formula which would allow Newfoundland to develop its substantial oil resources.

Fourthly, it was essential to reduce the budget deficit which stood at C\$35 billion. This was higher proportionately than the deficit in the United States. Expenditure cuts of C\$4½ billion had already been introduced and cuts of a further C\$3 billion were needed. The Prime Minister said she was particularly concerned at the growing burden of welfare expenditure. She reported that she had sought to get the Economic Summit to address this theme but without success.

Mr. Mulroney asked what line the Prime Minister was taking on SDI. The Prime Minister said that Britain sought to make two points. First, Russia was already carrying out substantial research in this area and was updating the anti-missile system around Moscow. It was necessary for the United States, therefore, to undertake research in this area. Secondly, it was not possible to verify research and therefore make it subject to international agreement. If the United States reached the point of testing or deployment, it would have to negotiate this under the terms of the ABM Treaty. The Prime Minister said that President Reagan had confirmed this position, both at Camp David in December and in Washington in February. The Prime Minister said the Soviet Union put forward the argument that once research had begun, it would develop an unstoppable momentum. Against this, the West should argue that testing and deployment were still subject to treaty obligations. The United States was unlikely to want to abrogate the Treaty and public opinion in the West would strongly resist this.

Mr. Mulroney asked the Prime Minister how Mr. Gorbachev had reacted to these arguments. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Gorbachev, though able, had been brought up entirely within the Soviet system. He still believed that the United

States was seeking to build up a first strike capability. She had sought to impress upon him that the West was a defensive alliance; while the United States would use its resources to develop its freedoms, it would not use them to seek more power.

The meeting ended at 1755.

C.D.P.

14 March 1985

Subject on  
INDIA: Relations  
Part 4



cc FC

cc Master Set 10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 March 1985

Dear Sir,

Meeting between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of  
India on 13 March at 1900

The Prime Minister met Mr. Rajiv Gandhi in the British Embassy, Moscow on 13 March. Mr. Gandhi was accompanied by Mr. G. Parthasarathi, Chairman of the Policy Planning Committee, Mr. Norul Hassan, Ambassador to the Soviet Union; Mr. Romesh Bhandari, Foreign Secretary; and Mr. C.R. Gharekhan, Additional Secretary, Prime Minister's Office. The Foreign Secretary was also present.

The Prime Minister congratulated Mr. Gandhi on the results of the national and local elections. Mr. Gandhi said that in the local elections his party had done well where it had good leadership.

Mr. Gandhi said that he faced two main problems: the Sikhs and Sri Lanka. On the Sikhs, his Government had taken some initiatives. They had released all the leaders except for two. He hoped they would be ready to be constructive. He recognised that they needed some concession from the Government to save their face. He would do his best to find something. The Prime Minister welcomed these steps, but said that it was essential never to give in to violence. She understood that the Sikhs responsible for hijacking an Indian aircraft were currently on trial in Pakistan. This should help.

Mr. Gandhi said that, as regards Sri Lanka, he had telephoned President Jayewardene after the Parliamentary elections and asked him to visit Delhi or send an emissary. The emissary, Mr. Atulathali, had visited Delhi about a month ago and they had had quite a good talk. It had been agreed to try to diffuse the situation by a series of steps to be taken by both India and Sri Lanka. Subsequently, the Sri Lankan Government had sent a message outlining the steps which they might take. The Indian Government was working on

theirs. President Jayewardene wanted the Indians to move first: Mr. Gandhi thought it better for both sides to move in parallel. But the real difficulties would come when the Sri Lankans had to reach a political settlement. Meanwhile, the situation was getting worse and some 16,000 refugees had arrived in India last month. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that he had seen the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister and Defence Minister recently. They had wanted the United Kingdom to help but we were not in a position to do more than give advice. It was clear to him that they would be very appreciative of any help which India could give. They had thought that they were getting on quite well with their efforts towards a political settlement before Christmas and had been disappointed when the Tamils had withdrawn from the talks. Mr. Gandhi said that it was not quite like that. President Jayewardene had made the mistake of presenting a cut and dried solution.

The Prime Minister asked what message she should take when she visited Sri Lanka next month.

So far as India was concerned he was as good as Mr. Bandaranaike or anyone else. The real problem was that the Sri Lankan army was not really under the Government control and that President Jayewardene was losing the confidence of his Ministers. The Prime Minister observed that there seemed to be at least some Tamils who did not want a solution. The risk was that they would intimidate the rest. Mr. Gandhi said that most Tamils wanted a solution. The Prime Minister said that we would do the best we could to help.

The Prime Minister said that she remained very concerned about the situation in Afghanistan. More Soviet troops had been sent in. Did Mr. Gandhi see the Soviet occupation as a de-stabilising factor for India? Mr. Gandhi replied that it was not directly de-stabilising, but it meant that Pakistan was able to acquire more weapons which India then had to match.

The Prime Minister said that she was pleased that Mr. Gandhi was going to the United States. She had urged the American Administration to make strenuous efforts to help him. She remembered that Mrs. Gandhi had complained that American words were not matched with practical help. She hoped that President Reagan would prove more generous.

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Gandhi's impressions of Mr. Gorbachev. Mr. Gandhi said that he had quite liked him. The Prime Minister gave an account of her talks at Chequers. One had to remember that Mr. Gorbachev had no concept of how a free society worked.



The Prime Minister said that she was glad to hear that Ministerial visits by her colleagues to India were going ahead. She understood, however, that there were still problems over Westland Helicopters. Mr. Gandhi said that the "technical chaps" were giving problems. They preferred a French helicopter. The Westland one was too big and consumed more fuel though it was cheaper to operate per seat. The real trouble was that it did not quite meet the particular needs and it was an untried model. But the matter was not settled yet. The Prime Minister said that this posed serious problems. She had thought that the technical difficulties had been overcome. She wished someone had been as frank with us before. We had assumed that signature was only days away. She would have another look at the project on her return to London. Mr. Gandhi said that he, too, would have another look. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that the view in London was that the Indian Government had accepted the purchase in principle and on this basis the helicopters had been manufactured. The only problem of which he had been aware was to get the signature of the contract before our financial year ended on 31 March to avoid a shortfall on this year's aid budget. Mr. Gandhi said that the Indian Government would look at the project before that and he would get back to our High Commissioner.

Mr. Gandhi asked whether the Prime Minister would go to New York for the 40th anniversary celebrations of the UN. The Prime Minister said that this would depend on timing in relation to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. But if the two events dovetailed she would be inclined to go. We should strengthen the UN. Mr. Gandhi agreed. The UN was going through a bad period.

Mr. Gandhi said how much he was looking forward to seeing the Prime Minister in Delhi at the end of her tour of South East Asia.

I am sending copies of this letter to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry), Rachel Lomax (HM Treasury), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Hugh Taylor (Home Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office). Could it please be given only a very limited distribution in each Department. The Prime Minister attaches particular importance to preserving the confidentiality of her exchanges with Mr. Gandhi.

*John Ruff*  
(C.D. Powell)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc Master Set  
Subject on:  
PAKISTAN  
Relations Sept. 79



JCC VC  
PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 March 1985

Dear Sir,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ  
ON WEDNESDAY 13 MARCH at 1045

The Prime Minister met President Zia in the British Embassy, Moscow this morning. The President was accompanied by his Foreign Minister and Private Secretary. The Foreign Secretary was also present.

Situation in Pakistan

The President gave an account of recent developments in Pakistan mentioning in particular the good turnout in the recent elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies. The election of the Senate was now in progress. The first meeting of the Senate and National Assembly would be on 23 March. Thereafter, he would wait for a few months for the new system to shake down and then lift martial law. He believed that a good basis would be established for five years of stability.

Bilateral Relations

President Zia said that the frigate deal was going well, thanks to the Prime Minister's intervention. Indeed, to all intents and purposes, it was settled. The Prime Minister asked whether there were any further steps to be completed. President Zia seemed slightly surprised that the Prime Minister did not know that it had all been settled.

President Zia said that he was grateful to us for providing the specialised military training which he had requested when he and the Prime Minister had met at the time of President Andropov's funeral. He was pleased, too, with the help which we had given Pakistan on narcotics detection. Pakistan had virtually eliminated the poppy crop which had declined from 800 tons to 40 tons. But there was still a major problem with drugs from Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

President Zia said that he was grateful for Britain's moral and political support over Afghanistan. Over the last twelve months, the Soviet Union had shown itself more aggressive and had sent in some 50,000 more troops, bringing the total up to 150,000. There had been a number of major

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offensives last year and he was concerned about what might happen this summer. Pakistan was unable to meet as much of the freedom fighters' requirements as he would like. He had seen Vice-President Bush the evening before and had urged the Americans to give more help to the Afghan resistance but, above all, to camouflage it more effectively. Otherwise, it just gave the Russians more cause for complaint against Pakistan, and made Pakistan look like an American puppet.

The Prime Minister asked about the situation of the refugees. We hoped to be able to provide some additional food and medical aid for those in the affected areas in Afghanistan. President Zia said that he wished more countries would follow Britain's lead over Afghanistan. He also hoped that we would do what we could to keep up press interest and publicity for what was going on there. It was important that the conflict there should not be forgotten or become a backwater for international opinion.

President Zia said that Pakistan had been trying to analyse the consequences for Soviet strategy in Afghanistan of Gorbachev's appointment as General Secretary. Their conclusion was that he would be bound to concentrate, at least for two or three years, on the Soviet Union's economic problems. The result would be that in foreign policy generally, and in Afghanistan in particular, the present strategy - which appeared to be set by Gromyko and the military - would continue and Gorbachev would not interfere. Indeed, there might well be further escalation by the Russians in an attempt to crush the resistance completely. Certainly, the Soviets were under no pressure to compromise. The Prime Minister said that she did not dispute President Zia's analysis. More generally, she was concerned about the isolation of Soviet leaders, even those of the younger generation such as Mr. Gorbachev himself. That was why she wanted to encourage as many as possible of them to travel to the West.

#### Pakistan/India

The Prime Minister asked about the development of Pakistan's relations with India. President Zia said that he would be meeting Mr. Gandhi immediately after seeing the Prime Minister. He had pinned considerable hopes for a more reasonable Indian attitude on Mr. Gandhi but had been disappointed by some of his recent remarks about the military equipment which Pakistan was procuring from the United States. It seemed that he did not want Pakistan to be armed at all. The trial of the Sikh hijackers was in progress and its conclusion should remove an irritant in Pakistan/India relations. He believed that Mr. Gandhi was basically more open-minded than his mother had been. His visit to the United States would be an important opportunity to influence him.


The Prime Minister remarked that India remained heavily dependent upon the Soviet Union for arms. President Zia said that he very much hoped that Britain would sell more

arms to India to reduce this dependence. The Prime Minister referred to Britain's problems with India stemming from the activities of Sikh extremists in the United Kingdom.

Commonwealth

President Zia said that with the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting coming up in the autumn, he hoped there could be renewed impetus towards Pakistan's re-entry into the Commonwealth. The Prime Minister asked what President Zia himself was doing to promote this. President Zia said that he thought it would be a mistake for Pakistan to be too active. Their policy was to mention it casually to a few key countries. There had been a positive response from Australia. He hoped that the matter could be discussed unofficially at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. The Prime Minister said that Pakistan would have to do some lobbying and would have to start now. She thought that President Zia would find New Zealand and Canada helpful. He should mention it to Mr. Mulroney.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely  


C.D. POWELL

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT

SECRET

FILE

JCA

1A

a. Master Set  
AND  
SOV. UNION  
Relations Pt. 4



cc B1

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

13 March 1985

Meeting between the Prime Minister and the General Secretary  
of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in  
St. Katherine's Hall of the Kremlin on 13 March at 2035 hours

The Prime Minister met Mr. Gorbachev this evening in St. Katherine's Hall in the Kremlin. On the Soviet side, Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Aleksandrov were present. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Foreign Secretary, HM Ambassador and me.

Mr. Gorbachev opened with a lengthy statement. He thanked the Prime Minister for coming to Moscow and regretted that it was a sad occasion which brought her. He was pleased to resume his contacts with her. He remembered very well their discussion during his stay in Britain. He welcomed the chance to continue it.

Mr. Gorbachev continued that he recalled that his earlier meeting with the Prime Minister had begun with his reading an oral message from President Chernenko. That message was an invitation to co-operation, by way of seeking jointly to resolve current international problems and expand bilateral relations. On his return to Moscow he had briefed the Politburo in detail on his important discussions. Mr. Gromyko interjected that the Politburo had assessed the results very favourably. Mr. Gorbachev went on that, on behalf of the entire Soviet leadership, he wanted to say that they were in favour of a political dialogue with the United Kingdom and of co-operation in scientific, technical, cultural and other fields. Following his meeting with the Prime Minister in Britain, ties in these fields had become more lively. He did not know whether the Ambassador in Moscow would confirm this. But in his view movement had started. In particular, the Foreign Trade Ministry had drawn up a plan aimed at co-operation in the long term. There was already at least oral agreement on the resumption of contacts in the scientific, cultural and technical fields and he welcomed that.

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Mr. Gorbachev continued that, after all, we all had to live together on the same planet. But this alone was not enough. The Soviet Union was in favour of broad co-operation with the United Kingdom. The possibilities available to both countries were big indeed. If the political will of the British and Soviet leaderships matched each other, then one could look forward to a substantial development of co-operation between the two countries.

Mr. Gorbachev repeated that the Prime Minister had come to Moscow on a sad occasion. But it also coincided with the opening of the arms control talks in Geneva. These marked the start of a new and very serious phase in international relations. The question was how and with what results would these negotiations be concluded. On the answer to this largely depended the future development of international relations. He recalled that he had discussed the prospects for the Geneva talks with the Prime Minister during their meeting at Chequers and he had emphasised that it had not been at all easy for the Soviet Union to go to them because it mistrusted the position taken by the United States. This position cancelled many of the useful achievements of preceding years. The Soviet Union had big doubts as to the true intentions of the United States Government. The Americans were forging ahead with their military plans, were increasing their armaments and military budget and were tightening discipline among their allies.

Mr. Gorbachev continued that he and the Prime Minister had emphasised the enormous danger inherent in the transfer of nuclear weapons into space. The opening statement of the US delegation in Geneva yesterday had confirmed these fears. Under the guise of defence, the United States was trying to drag the arms race into outer space. What then could be the result of the negotiations? For his part, he wished to say that the Soviet Union harboured serious intentions and wished the talks to end in positive results. When the Soviet Union had first actively raised and discussed the non-militarisation of outer space, many Western political leaders had spoken out in favour of this. But now there seemed to be certain nuances in their thinking. When the United States promised some Western countries that they could participate in some of the research work on President Reagan's so-called Strategic Defence Initiative the tone and mood seemed to change. The Soviet Union felt this was a mistake. If arms were transferred to outer space it would be very difficult indeed to find a way out of that situation. The Soviet Union would have to look for some response. That would mean an increase in nuclear weapons and the whipping up still further of the arms race. Surely we should all display far more wisdom and statesmanship at this point and a greater sense of responsibility. This responsibility rested primarily on the shoulders of the

leadership of the principal nations of the world.

Mr. Gorbachev said that he wanted to repeat that the Soviet Union wanted very much indeed to reach agreement in Geneva on large scale and mutually acceptable - he repeated mutually acceptable - measures. One-sided measures or concessions were something which the Soviet Union would not accept. In his discussions with the Prime Minister in Britain she had agreed in principle with this, and that relations should be based on equality and equal security. The Soviet Union recognised Britain's right to security and hoped that Britain recognised theirs. Indeed, all countries had the right. If we were all guided by this approach, he could say on behalf of the entire Soviet leadership, that agreement in Geneva was possible. He knew Britain's weight in international affairs and the particular role of the Prime Minister. He was counting on understanding of the Soviet position and looked forward to concrete steps from the United Kingdom, both to help agreement at Geneva and to expand dialogue.

The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Gorbachev for his statement. She had been very pleased that he and Mrs. Gorbachev had come to Britain. Their visit had been a tremendous success, one of the most successful ever. It had been both a personal success for Mr. Gorbachev as well as a success for restoring friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. The effect of the visit had been felt far beyond the United Kingdom. It had been reflected in newspapers and comments in the United States, Europe and the Far East. She wished to repeat that it had been an outstanding international success.

The Prime Minister continued that she had also enjoyed the talks she had held with Mr. Gorbachev. She believed that those talks would turn out to have influenced events. She had said publicly after their meeting that she felt that she and Mr. Gorbachev could do business together. This had been noted with particular interest in the United States. The British people were putting great faith in Mr. Gorbachev personally, in the prospect for a better dialogue with the Soviet Union and in hopes for success in the Geneva talks. She recalled very well the message which Mr. Gorbachev had brought from President Chernenko. When they had spoken about it, she had said that the generations which remembered the last war had a special duty to work for peace. She accepted Mr. Gorbachev's invitation to co-operation gladly. A lot more political dialogue was needed to establish confidence and trust between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Unless we had that trust, it would be much more difficult for the Geneva talks to succeed. So we said yes to more cultural, scientific and trade contacts. All these could help. This was particularly important in a year which

marked the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Agreement.

The Prime Minister continued that she would like to turn to a subject which was in everyone's mind, the arms control talks in Geneva. They must succeed. It was vital to find the political will and a way through. She had read Mr. Gorbachev's election and acceptance speeches very carefully. She had found in them language very similar to that which President Reagan and she had used at their meeting in Camp David. It seemed to her that both Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan shared the aim of the elimination of nuclear weapons and of nuclear war. She also wanted to stress a point on which she and President Reagan had agreed at Camp David and which had been embodied in the four points issued after that meeting, namely that neither side would seek superiority over the other, but rather balance.

Mr. Gromyko interjected that the need ultimately to eliminate nuclear weapons had appeared in the joint Soviet/American Communique at Geneva. The Prime Minister had cited evidence from separate statements, but the goal was formally established in a joint document. The problem was that the Americans were not acting in accordance with it. The Prime Minister said that this was precisely the point which she was trying to make. Both sides shared certain objectives and had declared them both separately and jointly.

The Prime Minister continued that there were already two Treaties which both the Soviet Union and the United States had signed affecting possible military developments in space: the Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty. The second of these, the ABM Treaty, permitted research by either signatory, for the very good reason that it was not possible to verify what research was being done. But if research should ever result in the possibility of deployment of new weapons, the Treaty required that deployment should be the subject of negotiation. In her talks with President Reagan they had both agreed that the aim should be balance and not superiority and that, while research on new defensive systems was permitted, deployment must be the subject of negotiation. They had also agreed that the overall objective remained deterrence. The agreement at Camp David had been important because it was the first time that the Americans had been persuaded to put publicly on record that any deployment would require negotiation. President Reagan had repeated this during her visit to Washington in February. She recognised that this was not the occasion to get into detailed discussions. Mr. Gromyko suggested sardonically that three or four hours would be enough to cover the particular point which the Prime Minister had just touched on.



The Prime Minister said that she would conclude by saying that she would do everything she could to promote the confidence to enable the Geneva talks to be a success. Public opinion wanted a success and had high expectations. It was vital to find the will to make them succeed. If Mr. Gorbachev ever wished to send a message to her, she would be very ready to receive it.

Mr. Gorbachev said that he would certainly take that into account. He would like to expand his dialogue with the Prime Minister and was perfectly willing to exchange information and hold consultations. On behalf of the entire leadership, he would like to emphasise that the general trend of his discussion with the Prime Minister and notably the remarks she had just made, was something which he took a liking to. The focus of their talks was joint efforts to expand co-operation, find points of contact and to promote a political dialogue. The present state of the world required such a dialogue. "We must continue to meet and talk to one another and have exchanges of views". Once again, he was grateful to the Prime Minister for coming to Moscow to pay tribute to President Chernenko.

The Prime Minister said that, in briefing the press, she would say that they had held positive and constructive talks and would then follow the line of Mr. Gorbachev's summing up. People in Britain took great pleasure in Mr. Gorbachev's appointment to his distinguished office. We would also be pleased to see Mr. Gromyko if he were to come to London, as he had promised. Mr. Gorbachev chuckled and said that Mr. Gromyko was waiting for the London fog to evaporate. Mr. Gromyko said it was really a question of finding the right timing.

The meeting ended at 2130.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office). It should have only a very limited distribution. I should be grateful if you could telegraph a full text, strictly personal, to the Ambassador in Moscow for any comments and amendments which he may have.

(C.D. Powell)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ZZ MOSCOW

GRS 483

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 131515Z MAR 85

TO FLASH MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 272 OF 13 MARCH

FOLLOWING FOR TURNBULL, PM'S PARTY FROM FLESHER, NO 10

1. THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE FOLLOWING FOR HER PRESS CONFERENCE.
2. THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS HAVE BEEN LARGELY QUIET, ALTHOUGH NERVOUS, THIS MORNING. THE DOLLAR HAS STRENGTHENED AGAINST THE DEUTSCHMARK TO 3.35 BUT STERLING HAS HELD ITS OWN, TRADING AT ABOUT 1.0850 DOLLARS. IT HAS ALSO STRENGTHENED MARGINALLY AGAINST THE DEUTSCHMARK TO JUST OVER 3.64. THE STERLING INDEX IS LEVEL ON THE DAY AT 71.7. IN THE DOMESTIC MONEY MARKETS, INTEREST RATES HAVE BEEN SLIGHTLY FIRMER TODAY AND THE THREE MONTH RATE IS AT ABOUT 13 AND THREE-QUARTERS. HOPES OF A CUT IN INTEREST RATES IN THE IMMEDIATE SHORT TERM SEEM TO HAVE BEEN DISPELLED.
3. THE MAJOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL NEWS HAS REMAINED THE INTERCEPTION BILL. IN THE HOUSE THE BILL HAD A RELATIVELY QUIET PASSAGE. PRESS COMMENT WAS NOT EXTENSIVE AND CONCENTRATED ON THE TWO ANNOUNCEMENTS MADE IN THE DEBATE. THE HOME SECRETARY ANNOUNCED THAT THE DPP HAD ASKED THE POLICE TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES MADE IN THE RECENT CHANNEL 4 PROGRAMME AND DAVID WADDINGTON IN SUMMING UP ANNOUNCED THAT A NEW DIRECTOR GENERAL HAD BEEN APPOINTED FROM OUTSIDE THE RANKS OF THE SECURITY SERVICE, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT NAME HIM. HOSTILE SPEECHES WERE MADE IN THE DEBATE BY MR KAUFMAN AND MR BENN WHOSE MAIN TARGET WAS THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD WILSON. MORE CONCILIATORY SPEECHES WERE MADE BY MR REES AND MR CALLAGHAN. THE GOVERNMENT HAD A MAJORITY OF 103 AGAINST THE OPPOSITION AMENDMENT AND THE SECOND READING WAS UNOPPOSED.
4. THERE WILL BE SOME PRESS INTEREST IN MR PONTING'S BOOK QUOTE THE RIGHT TO KNOW UNQUOTE WHICH IS BEING PUBLISHED THIS AFTERNOON. FROM A PRE-PUBLICATION INTERVIEW HE GAVE FOR THE TODAY PROGRAMME THIS MORNING IT IS CLEAR THAT THE TONE OF HIS BOOK WILL BE VERY CRITICAL OF BOTH MINISTERS AND THE CIVIL SERVICE.
5. SOME PRESS ATTENTION HAS BEEN FOCUSED ON YESTERDAY'S SPEECH BY MR HEATH ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE. SEVERAL NEWSPAPERS ARE CARRYING HIS ALTERNATIVE BUDGET TODAY: THIS ADVOCATES PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND BORROWING RATHER THAN TAX CUTS.
6. OTHER STORIES IN THE NEWS TODAY INCLUDE THE DISAPPOINTING CRIME FIGURES: THE REFURBISHMENT OF THE ROYAL TRAIN AT A COST OF POUNDS 7.5 MILLION, WHICH HAS BEEN CRITICISED IN SEVERAL OF THE PAPERS: AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE TITLE OF THE CIVIL COMMISSIONER IN THE FALKLANDS IS TO REVERT TO THAT OF GOVERNOR. THE PURCHASE OF HARRODS REMAINS IN THE NEWS BUT NO ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT ANY REFERENCE TO THE MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION WILL BE MADE BEFORE FRIDAY.
7. PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENTS TODAY INCLUDE A STATEMENT BY MR BUCHANAN SMITH ON THE FUTURE OF BNOC AND A DEBATE ON LOCAL AUTHORITY CAPITAL EXPENDITURE. I UNDERSTAND FROM THE CHIEF WHIP THAT THE POSITION ON THE LATTER REMAINS AS HE REPORTED IT TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON MONDAY.

HOWE

NNNN

TOP COPY  
MISSING  
(press)

13

Press Conference

- We have arranged the press conference for 8.15 p.m. and expect about 15 or so to attend. The Embassy would like to bring in journalists of other nationalities - notably American and a few European - with whom they have close relations. I have agreed. The list of those invited is at Annex I.
  
- Afterwards, I have arranged for you to give short 4-5 minute interviews with British broadcasters. As ITN have no crew here, it looks like 3 interviews -  
  
BBC Radio (Peter Ruff); BBC TV (if they can sort out their crew problems; and IRN (interviewer, Martin Walker, of The Guardian).
  
- At this time of night, the media will not be looking for a long press conference. I suggest we allow 20-25 minutes. This means you should be away from the Embassy at 9.15-9.30.

Substance

The media believes that you have the inside track with Gorbachev as a result of his visit to Chequers and that you consequently are not merely the most senior but the most important visitor.

Consequently, they will concentrate on your meeting with the new Soviet leader, and your further impressions of him, virtually to the exclusion of all else.

This approach can be summarised as follows: Do you think you can still do business with him?

/ And the

And the strongest reply to that would be to say, if an invitation materialises, that Gorbachev has invited you to visit the Soviet Union at an early date, and you have agreed to do so. I am sure the media will be looking for a further visit by you, as evidence of your developing relationship with Gorbachev, and news of one would be a major story overnight, overshadowed only by any news, hint or sign of a Reagan-Gorbachev Summit.

I would add that the Opposition leaders travelling with you will be seeking every bit of publicity they can get. News of a visit by you would put them in their place - and in the shade.

For the rest I think the main points to get over are:

- your desire for a developing dialogue with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe - and (implicitly) your value in such an exercise in view of your close relations with Reagan;
- your concern to assure the Russians of the West's (and not least America's) sincerity in wanting much lower levels of arms of all kinds on a balanced and verifiable basis;
- your position on SDI (which is particularly important both to American and Russian opinion, as well as your domestic audience); and
- your concern to develop economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union as further tangible evidence of your belief that you can do business with Gorbachev's Russia.

I attach at Annex II a draft opening statement for the press conference, the outline of which you may care to give to Mr. Gorbachev.

/The

The media will, of course, film and record your press conference. There is therefore much to be said for getting a crisp controlled statement on the record.

We shall, of course, keep you posted on events at home.

BERNARD INGHAM

13 March, 1985

PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS BRIEFING: 13 MARCH, 20.15

List of Correspondents Attending

British

Reuters (Charles Bremner)  
Times (Richard Owen)  
Sunday Times (Edmund Stevens)  
Guardian (Martin Walker)  
Daily Telegraph (Nigel Wade)  
Observer (Mark Frankland)  
Financial Times (Patrick Cockburn)  
Daily Express (Louise Branson)  
Morning Star (Kate Clark)  
Anglo-Soviet Journal (Robert Daglish)  
BBC (Radio - Peter Ruff, John Osman; TV - Tim Sebastian)

Others

US

ABC (Walt Rodgers)  
CNN (Geoff Martino)  
NBC (Steve Hurst)  
CBS (Mark Phillips)

AP (Alison Smale)  
UPI (Barry James)

France

AFP (Pierre Bocev)

FRG

DPA (Nikolaus Prede)

Copied to: Ambassador  
H of C  
Mr Carr  
Miss Heaton

PS/PM  
PS/S of S  
Mr Ingham

DRAFT OPENING STATEMENT - PRESS CONFERENCE

I have, of course, today been paying my respects to the late President Chernenko and his family, and I am pleased that I was able to express my sympathy personally to Mrs. Chernenko this morning.

I have just returned from a meeting this evening with Mr. Gorbachev with whom, as you know, I had about 5 hours of talks at Chequers in December.

I congratulated him on his election to the leadership of the Soviet Union and then I had a very good and useful talk with him on the major issues confronting the world.

We could, of course, have only a short time together - about half an hour - because he is seeing a large number of world leaders who are here for the funeral. But in that time we were able to pick up some of the threads of our discussions three months ago.

In doing so, I was able to give him my impressions of my two meetings with President Reagan just before Christmas and last month. I sought to explain the West's - and President Reagan's - deep and genuine desire to achieve security at a much lower level of armaments.

/ More specifically,

More specifically, we discussed the American Strategic Defence Initiative - the SDI. On this, I emphasised that President Reagan did not see the concept, to the extent it proves to be feasible, as a way of achieving advantage or superiority over the Soviet Union.

I also drew attention to the points of agreement which arose from my meeting with President Reagan at Camp David. Research into the possibility of a ballistic missile system in space is permitted by the ABM Treaty. But if that research led to the conclusion that an effective system could be deployed, any deployment would have to be negotiated under the terms of that Treaty. I told Mr. Gorbachev that that point was explicitly reaffirmed by President Reagan when I saw him in February.

Overall, I stressed to Mr. Gorbachev this evening my hope - and the hope of the British people - that the opportunity which the US/Soviet arms control talks present in Geneva will be seized. I believe the whole world would dearly love to see security maintained at a lower level of weaponry.

We briefly touched upon relations between our two countries and our wish to do more business with the Soviet Union. And also the need for us to develop our contacts in a wide variety of fields and at many different levels so that our two nations can achieve a better understanding.

/In this



In this context we look forward to a visit to Britain by Mr. Gromyko.

[ I am also delighted to say that Mr. Gorbachev extended to me an invitation to visit the Soviet Union at an early date. I indicated I would do so as soon as I was able. We shall be in touch shortly about dates. ]

Finally, as you are probably aware, I have had most useful bilateral discussions today with President Zia of Pakistan; Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain; the new Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Mulroney - my first meeting with him as Prime Minister though not as Party leader - and Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India whom I last saw on the sad occasion of his mother's funeral in New Delhi.

A great deal has happened - and much of it tragic - in the 12 months or so since I was in Moscow. But I now look forward to building on my frank and friendly relationship with Mr. Gorbachev with the aim of achieving a safer and securer world.

D. R.

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH MR. GORBACHEV: SPEAKING NOTE

Offer you my congratulations on your appointment to your high post. It has been received with great public interest in Britain following your successful visit. In a short time you became a very well-known figure to our people as did Madame Gorbachova. There is a very widespread desire in Britain to wish you well in your new tasks.

I hope, too, that you and I can build on the discussions which we had at Chequers and remain in touch. I found these talks very useful and particularly welcomed the frank and direct way in which we were able to speak to each other. I hope that this will continue. I know that today you have to receive many visitors. But I hope we can resume our talks at greater length on another occasion.

One part of our conversation which I remember vividly was what you said over lunch about economic management. I shall be following the Soviet leadership's decisions in this field with particular interest.

Since we met I have been able to talk twice and at length to President Reagan. On the first occasion, at Camp David, we talked almost entirely about the Strategic Defence Initiative. It is a subject on which he clearly feels very strongly although he looks at it in a long-term framework. As I said to you at Chequers, it is a dream which he has: and like all dreams no-one can know whether it is capable of being realised. Of one thing I am certain and that is, in his mind, the Strategic Defence Initiative is something which would offer an alternative to the present system of security based on deterrence and would replace the need for nuclear weapons in both East and West. He does not see it

(1)

as a way to achieve unilateral advantage and superiority over the Soviet Union. His desire to press ahead with efforts to achieve measures of arms control is deep and genuine.

②

*Research*

I put to President Reagan the importance of a very clear understanding of what could and could not be done in space under current international agreements. And at the end of our meeting in Camp David in December we agreed on four points of which I am sure your experts will have informed you. The essence of them is that <sup>a)</sup> research into the components of a possible Ballistic Missile Defence System should continue. Such research is permitted under the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and of course is being conducted by the Soviet Union no less than the United States. In any case there are no practical means to verify that research on either side. But should that research lead to the conclusion that a viable defensive system could one day be deployed, then any such deployment would have to be negotiated under the terms of the ABM Treaty. That crucial point was explicitly accepted by President Reagan at the time and he repeated his acceptance of it at our later meeting in February. I know that not all members of the US Administration subscribe to this position publicly and at all times but it has the President's full authority behind it.



③

*ABM Treaty*

In the light of this, I hope that at Geneva both the Soviet Union and the United States will be ready to engage in a very thorough and sober discussion of space issues and of the implications which new defensive technologies may have for strategic stability and arms control. President Reagan has told me in a recent message that this is his aim and that he also wants "to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty regime". I think that reaffirmation of this Treaty would be a positive point on which both sides could agree. It should also be possible to reach an understanding <sup>about what is and is not</sup> permitted under

the Treaty.

At the same time I would very much hope that negotiations would go forward in parallel on reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arms (SNA) and Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) which will lead us towards the goal on which you and I agreed at Chequers of finding security at a lower level of weapons and at lower cost. What I know of Americans intentions in this field convinces me of the seriousness of their purpose. We have to accept that nuclear weapons will continue for many, many years to provide the deterrence which has kept the peace since the 1940s, even though our long-term aim may be to remove them entirely. The stability given by deterrence must not lightly be tinkered with.

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My talks with President Reagan also covered the Middle East and Central America, both areas of great potential dangers. It would be helpful if our Foreign Ministers were to discuss these further.

Recall that this year will be the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Accords. I hope that when we come to review the progress made, we shall be able to reach some clear decisions on what more needs to be done to fulfil the ambitious aims established in Helsinki particularly in the field of freer movement of people. We also want to develop more regular and systematic bilateral discussions with your experts as a means to increase understanding. And of course we look forward to Mr. Gromyko's visit to London in May.

C.D.P. "New occasions teach new duties"

13.3.85

- development of principles to provide future needs

3rd world - raise standard of living  
rebuild of former etc

10th anniversary of Helsinki accords.

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00 MOSCOW

00 WASHINGTON

GRS 40

UNCLASSIFIED  
FROM PEKING 130324Z MAR 85  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 310 OF 13/3/85  
INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 302: CHERNENKO'S DEATH

1. WE HAVE LEARNT THAT MFA VICE MINISTER QIAN QICHEN HAS  
ACCOMPANIED LI PENG TO MOSCOW FOR CHERNENKO'S FUNERAL.  
THE PARTY LEFT LAST NIGHT.

EVANS

NNNN

6/13

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 March 1985

*Dear Charles,*

*GW  
13/3*

Meeting with Mr Gorbachev

/ I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Gorbachev on 13 March. We await confirmation of the timing from the Embassy in Moscow.

As the Prime Minister will recall, these meetings last about 30 minutes which, with interpretation, means effectively that the Prime Minister will have about 10-12 minutes to make her points.

We expect to receive very soon a full English translation of Gorbachev's speech in Moscow yesterday. We will send it across as soon as it arrives. The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to make suitable references to it when speaking to Gorbachev. These and any other points could be settled at this evening's briefing meeting at the Embassy in Moscow.

Briefs for possible bilateral meetings are in preparation and will be sent to you later.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*

*Le Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



BRIEF FOR PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR GORBACHEV ON  
13 MARCH 1985

Arms Control

1. Congratulations. Hope that it will be possible to build on exchange of views at Chequers in December.
2. Have been some hopeful developments since then. US/Soviet nuclear arms control talks restarted in Geneva. Have had two meetings with President Reagan since Chequers meeting. No doubt about US sincerity or Alliance unity.
3. Soviet criticism of UK attitude toward SDI misconceived. Position quite clear. Will support research permitted by ABM Treaty. But no question of deployment without negotiation. Intention to enhance deterrence and stability.
4. West must clearly take account of Soviet ASAT monopoly and existence of world's only ABM system around Moscow. Note that since mid-1970s you have conducted more space launches than rest of world put together.
5. Do not expect early breakthrough at Geneva negotiations. But convinced that substantial results are attainable. Of greatest importance that this should happen.

East/West Relations

6. UK wishes to see improving East/West confidence. Want agreement in all arms control fora. Whether conventional or nuclear, confidence building or chemical weapons.
7. Increasing confidence would be helped by increase in mutual understanding. Need to compliment arms control with discussions in other fields. Systems and political values wide apart. Do not see positions on many questions getting closer. But equally areas where we have common interests.

.../8.



8. Reaffirm UK commitment to broad range of contacts at all levels. Attach importance to discussing regional and other issues.

Bilateral Relations

9. Want better bilateral relations. Good opportunities in trade sector. Firms determined and efficient. Full support of government. Agree that Gorbachev's target of 40-50% increase should be attainable. [If necessary. Overriding national security reasons for prevention of CONSARC contract made clear at time.]

10. Look forward to Gromyko's visit to London if possible May.

11. Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons wishes to visit Moscow in April. Gorbachev will recall meeting the Committee in London in December. Hope arrangements can go ahead. Committee's work should be valuable contribution to better understanding between UK and Soviet Union.





12 MAR 1995

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FM CABINET OFFICE

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FOLLOWING FROM MOSCOW

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 339 OF 12 MARCH

YOUR TELNO 234 : CALL ON GORBACHEV.

THE MFA HAVE JUST INFORMED US THAT GORBACHEV WILL BE ABLE TO RECEIVE THE PRIME MINISTER AT 1940 MOSCOW TIME (1640 GMT) ON 13 MARCH, IN THE KREMLIN. BECAUSE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF VISITORS WHO HAVE ASKED TO CALL, HE REGRETS THAT HE WILL HAVE ONLY 15 MINUTES AT HIS DISPOSAL

SUTHERLAND

GPS 100

NNNN

RR PRAGUE

~~RR SOFIA~~

RR WARSAW

~~RR PEKING~~

~~RR TOKYO~~

RR HELSINKI

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

GR 550

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW 121145Z MAR 85

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 333 OF 12TH MAR 85

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK,  
ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, PEKING, TOKYO,  
HELSINKI, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 317: ELECTION OF GORBACHEV

SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV HAS BEEN INSTALLED RAPIDLY AND SMOOTHLY. CHERNENKO IS BEING DISPOSED OF ALMOST WITH IMPATIENCE. A LIVELY FIRST SPEECH BY GORBACHEV AS PARTY LEADER BUT EMPHASIS ON CONTINUITY AND NO INDICATION OF NEW POLICIES.

DETAIL

2. GORBACHEV HAS BEEN INSTALLED WITH RECORD SPEED AND IS ALREADY INTO HIS STRIDE. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS ELECTION CAME LESS THAN 24 HOURS AFTER CHERNENKO DIED AND 4 HOURS AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS DEATH. (THE GAP BETWEEN DEATH AND ELECTION WAS TWO AND A HALF DAYS IN THE CASE OF BREZHNEV AND ANDROPOV, AND 4 DAYS IN THE CASE OF ANDROPOV AND CHERNENKO).

3. CHERNENKO HAS RECEIVED THE STANDARD TRIBUTES AND HONOURS BUT HIS OBSEQUIES HAVE BEEN SO TELESCOPED AS TO PRODUCE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS BEING DISPOSED OF IN SOME HURRY AND WITH LITTLE REGRET. PRAYDA'S FRONT PAGE TODAY IS DOMINATED BY A PHOTOGRAPH AND BIOGRAPHY OF GORBACHEV, WHILE CHERNENKO'S PHOTOGRAPH AND OBITUARY ARE RELEGATED TO THE INSIDE PAGE. IT IS HARDLY NECESSARY TO SAY THAT NO SIGN OF PUBLIC GRIEF IS TO BE OBSERVED. EVEN OFFICIALS HAVE NOT TROUBLED TO CONCEAL THEIR INDIFFERENCE. DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS RYZHOV EXPRESSED NO REGRET WHEN HE ANNOUNCED THE DEATH OF 'CHERNENKO' AT HIS LUNCH FOR DEREK THOMAS YESTERDAY.

4. THIS RAPID AND EFFICIENT TRANSITION OF POWER MAY OWE SOMETHING TO THE FACT THAT PRACTICE, WITH TWO RECENT PRECEDENTS, MAKES PERFECT. BUT IT ALSO SUGGESTS THAT GORBACHEV'S ELECTION, IF NOT FORMALLY PRE-ARRANGED, REQUIRED VERY LITTLE DISCUSSION. THE DECISION WAS PRESUMABLY TAKEN BY THE POLITBURO BEFORE SHCHERBITSKY RETURNED FROM THE UNITED STATES. IT IS

**FLASH**

*(15)*

**ADVANCE COPY**

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*H/NEWS J*  
*H/INFO J*  
*H/PROTOCOL J*  
*PS*  
*PS/LEAT TOUNG*  
*PS/RENTON*  
*PS/REK.F.C.N.D*  
*PS/RELUCE*  
*PS/REASON*  
*PS/PUS*  
*UNDER THOMAS*  
*RE JENKINS*  
*PS/REID*  
*ASS STAFF: CAS OFF*

*M*

DISCUSSION. THE DECISION WAS PRESUMABLY TAKEN BY THE POLITBURO BEFORE SHCHERBITSKY RETURNED FROM THE UNITED STATES. IT IS, HOWEVER, ODD BOTH THAT GORBACHEV WAS NOMINATED BY GROMYKO, RATHER THAN THE NEXT SENIOR PARTY SECRETARY ROMANOV OR THE SENIOR POLITBURO MEMBER IN PROTOCOL TERMS, TIKHONOV SEMI COLON AND THAT GROMYKO'S NOMINATION SPEECH HAS NOT BEEN PUBLISHED (AS WERE THOSE OF CHERNENKO FOR ANDROPOV AND TIKHONOV FOR CHERNENKO).

5. GORBACHEV'S BRIEF ACCEPTANCE SPEECH WAS VIGOROUSLY PHRASED BUT GAVE NO REAL HINT OF NEW POLICY DIRECTIONS. HE STRESSED THE COLLECTIVITY IN LEADERSHIP TO WHICH CHERNENKO WAS DEDICATED (A POINT REPEATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE PLENUM), INVOKED THE SUPPORT AND HELP OF HIS POLITBURO COLLEAGUES AND DECLARED THAT THE PARTY LINE FORMULATED UNDER ANDROPOV AND CHERNENKO REMAINED UNCHANGED.

6. ON ECONOMIC POLICY, HIS WORDS WERE CAREFULLY BALANCED, AND CALCULATED NOT TO AROUSE HOPES OR FEARS OF RADICAL REFORMS. HE SPOKE OF THE PLANNED ECONOMY AND SOCIALIST OWNERSHIP, AS WELL AS THE RIGHTS AND INDEPENDENCE OF ENTERPRISES. HIS ANDROPOVIAN INVOCATION OF ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IS BY NOW STANDARD SEMI COLON BUT IT WAS INTERESTING THAT IN HIS FIRST SPEECH AS PARTY LEADER HE RAISED THE ISSUE OF GREATER 'OPENNESS' IN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES.

7. ON FOREIGN POLICY, GORBACHEV'S PRIORITIES WERE PREDICTABLE AND HE STRUCK NO NEW NOTE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS. HE INCLUDED REFERENCES TO DETENTE AND PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE AND REITERATED CHERNENKO'S IDEA FOR 'NEW STEPS' TO MARK THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF VICTORY. HE CHOSE FAIRLY STRONG LANGUAGE ABOUT MAINTAINING THE STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES AND ITS CAPABILITY TO DEAL A 'CRUSHING RETALIATORY BLOW' IF NECESSARY.

RATFORD

BT

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Handwritten notes and stamps at the bottom of the page, including a stamp that reads "H2A13" and several illegible handwritten signatures and dates.

UNCLASSIFIED

case

[H/Sou D]

FM MOSCOW 120921Z MAR 85

**FLASH**  
**ADVANCE COPY**

H/Protocol  
H/EEC

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 329 OF 12TH MAR 85

General THOMAS  
JENKINS

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

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PS  
PS/4 R.F.C. (N)

DEATH OF CHERNENKO: ATTENDANCE

~~PS/N 210~~ - ST  
AES Staff, CAS OFF

1. THE FOLLOWING IS INTERIM LIST OF THOSE ATTENDING THE FUNERAL:

- UNITED STATES VICE PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ
- FRANCE: PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS
- FRG: PRIME MINISTER KOHL AND MINISTER OC CHANCELLERY SHAUDLE
- ITALY: PRESIDENT PERTINI AND FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI
- SPAIN: PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ (AND POSSIBLY FOREIGN MINISTER MORAN)
- TURKEY: PRIME MINISTER OZAL AND FOREIGN MINISTER
- JAPAN: PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE AND FOREIGN MINISTER ABE
- INDIA : PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI
- PAKISTAN: PRESIDENT ZIA UL HAQ AND FOREIGN MINISTER KHAN
- JORDAN: PRIME MINISTER AHMED OBAIDAT AND FOREIGN MINISTER AL MASRI
- CANADA: PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY
- FINLAND: PRESIDENT KOIVISTO AND PRIME MINISTER SORSA
- IRELAND: PRESIDENT HILLERY AND MINISTER OF FISHERIES O'TOOLE
- SWEDEN: PRIME MINISTER AND CROWN PRINCE BERTHOLD
- AUSTRALIA: MINISTER OF INDUSTRY, SENATOR BUTTON
- NEW ZEALAND: HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON
- PORTUGAL: ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT AMARAL
- NETHERLANDS: FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DEN BORK
- AUSTRIA: PRESIDENT KIRSCHLAGER
- BELGIUM: FOREIGN MINISTER TINDEMANS AND POSSIBLY PRIME MINISTER MARTENS
- GREECE: FOREIGN MINISTER HARALAMBOPOULOS
- CHINA: VICE PREMIER LI PENG AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN
- EGYPT: PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT MENDOSSA (TO BE CONFIRMED)
- UN SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR

WE HAVE TWO REQUESTS FOR BILATERALS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT ZIA AND SPANISH PRIME MINISTER GONZALEZ.

RATFORD

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM MOSCOW 121025Z MARCH  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 332 OF 12 MARCH  
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
 INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN AND UKDEL NATO

POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS.  
 FOLLOWING FROM DEREK THOMAS.

1. I SPENT SEVERAL HOURS YESTERDAY TALKING TO RYZHOV ( ONE OF THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS). UNFORTUNATELY, OTHER CALLS WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN MORE USEFUL EG ON KORNIENKO HAD TO BE CANCELLED.
2. AT LEAST HALF THE TIME WAS SPENT REPEATING ESTABLISHED POSITIONS ON BOTH SIDES, PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE GENEVA TALKS. IN RESPONSE TO RYZHOV'S PREPARED STATEMENTS, I USED WHAT I HOPED WERE THOUGHT-PROVOKING ARGUMENTS. BUT THEY FAILED SIGNALLY TO PROVOKE MUCH THOUGHT BY RYZHOV.
3. IT EMERGED CLEARLY THAT THE OVERWHELMING CONCERN THAT THEY ARE STILL EMPHASISING IS SPACE. FOR THE MOMENT IT HAS ENTIRELY TAKEN OVER FROM OTHER CONCERNS, THOUGH MODERNISATION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT OF INF WEAPONS GET A PERIODIC MENTION.
4. ON OUR OWN APPROACH ON SDI, THEY ARE TAKING THE VIEW ( AS REPORTED IN MOSCOW TELNO 319) THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS MOVED RIGHT AWAY FROM THE POSITION SHE EXPOUNDED TO GORBACHEV IN DECEMBER, AND HAS NOW GIVEN HER OUTRIGHT SUPPORT TO THE SDI PLAN. THEY RESOLUTELY IGNORE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, SINCE THEY ASSUME THAT ONE WILL BE AN INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE OTHER. THEY ASSUME ALSO THAT THE REAL AMERICAN INTENTION IS TO DEPLOY IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE A SECURE FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY, AND THAT WE KNOW THIS.
5. IT FOLLOWS THAT AT PRESENT AND AT THIS LEVEL, THEY REJECT ABSOLUTELY ANY THOUGHT THAT, AS THE GENEVA TALKS PROCEED, THERE SHOULD BE DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS TO OVERALL DETERRENCE AS PART OF AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT. THE LOGIC OF THEIR POSITION IS THAT SUCH DISCUSSION WOULD SIMPLY BE PLAYING FOR TIME ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS WHILE THEIR PLANS FOR DEVELOPING NEW OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS GO AHEAD, IN ORDER TO PUT THEM IN A POSITION OF ABSOLUTE SUPERIORITY. RYZHOV SAID IN TERMS THAT ANY ATTEMPT BY THE AMERICANS TO LEAVE SPACE ON ONE SIDE, OR TO ENGAGE IN "FRUITLESS DISCUSSION" ABOUT IT WOULD HAVE THE MOST NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE GENEVA TALKS. ( AT ANOTHER POINT IN THIS CONTEXT, HE USED THE SAME WORD IN RUSSIAN (VZRYV) AS WAS USED OF THE SOVIET WALK-OUT FROM THE INF NEGOTIATIONS).

6. IF RYZHOV'S APPROACH REFLECTS THE KIND OF LINE BEING TAKEN IN BRIEFING PAPERS FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, THE PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH GORBACHEV TOMORROW WILL BE AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY GET THROUGH TO HIM DIRECT, BOTH ON THE REALITIES OF THE STRATEGIC DEBATE GOING ON IN WASHINGTON, AND ON THE DANGERS FOR ALL OF US IF THE RUSSIANS PAINT THEMSELVES INTO A CORNER AGAIN BY TAKING AN OGER-SIMPLISTIC LINE ON WHAT THEY REFER TO AS THE ' ' ORGANIC INTER-RELATIONSHIP' ' BETWEEN THE THREE ELEMENTS.

RATFORD

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
38/12

*Policy*

PS/Secretary of State

//// 1. As requested by Mr Broomfield, I attach copies of:

- (i) the full text of Gorbachev's speech following his election as General Secretary:
- (ii) Moscow telegram number 332 of 12 March summarising Mr Derek Thomas's discussions on 11 March with Vice-Minister Ryzhov:
- (iii) a consolidated list of known heads of visiting delegations:
- (iv) a first and incomplete account of Dumas's talks with Tikhonov and Gromyko on 11 March.



12 March 1985

D J E Ratford

cc: ✓ PS/Prime Minister  
N H R A Broomfield Esq



11/8 TASS U5-24

MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV'S SPEECH

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 1 (ONE) FIFTEEN TAKES

MOSCOW MARCH 11 TASS - FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF THE  
SPEECH BY GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE CPSU CENTRAL  
COMMITTEE:

DEAR COMRADES,

ALL OF US, ALL OUR PARTY AND COUNTRY ARE IN DEEP GRIEF.  
KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO, A TRUE LENINIST, AN OUTSTANDING  
FIGURE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOVIET  
STATE, OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, A PERSON WITH A  
RESPONSIVE HEART AND OF A BIG ORGANIZATIONAL TALENT, HAS PASSED  
AWAY.

KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH TRAVERSED A LONG AND GLORIOUS ROAD.  
EVERY POST, ASSIGNED TO HIM BY THE PARTY, EVER FULLER REVEALED  
HIS TALENT, ABILITY TO WORK WITH PEOPLE. AT THE POST OF THE  
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE  
PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET,  
KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO DEVOTED ALL HIS EFFORTS AND  
KNOWLEDGE TO DEVELOPING THE ECONOMY OF THE COUNTRY, RAISING THE  
WELL-BEING AND CULTURAL LEVEL OF THE PEOPLE, ENSURING THE  
SECURITY OF MOTHERLAND, PRESERVING AND CONSOLIDATING PEACE ON  
EARTH.

KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO GUARDED AS THE APPLE OF HIS  
EYE THE UNITY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE COLLECTIVE CHARACTER  
OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND ITS POLITICAL  
BUREAU. HE ALWAYS SOUGHT TO ACHIEVE THAT THE PARTY ACT AT ALL  
LEVELS AS A CLOSE-KNIT, WELL-ADJUSTED AND SPIRITED ORGANISM. HE  
REGARDED THE UNITY OF IDEAS AND DEEDS OF THE COMMUNISTS AS AN  
EARNEST OF SUCCESSES, OF OVERCOMING SHORTCOMINGS, AS AN EARNEST  
OF STEADY ADVANCE.

THE STRATEGIC LINE, WORKED OUT AT THE 26TH CONGRESS, AT THE  
SUBSEQUENT PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WITH  
VIGOROUS PARTICIPATION OF YURI VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV AND  
KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO, HAS BEEN AND REMAINS UNCHANGED.  
THIS IS THE LINE TOWARDS SPEEDING UP THE COUNTRY'S SOCIAL AND  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, TOWARDS PERFECTING ALL ASPECTS OF THE LIFE  
OF SOCIETY. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS RESTRUCTURING THE MATERIAL AND  
TECHNICAL BASE OF PRODUCTION.

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 3 (THREE)

THE POINT AT ISSUE IS THE PERFECTION OF THE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL RELATIONS, ABOVE ALL ECONOMIC ONES. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS ALSO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL, QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF THE MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF HIS LIFE AND WORK, OF HIS SPIRITUAL MAKEUP.

WE ARE TO ACHIEVE A DECISIVE TURN IN TRANSFERRING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY TO THE TRACKS OF INTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT. WE SHOULD, WE ARE BOUND TO ATTAIN WITHIN THE BRIEFEST PERIOD THE MOST ADVANCED SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL POSITIONS, THE HIGHEST WORLD LEVEL IN THE PRODUCTIVITY OF SOCIAL LABOUR.

IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THE TASK WITH GREATER SUCCESS AND SPEED, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE TO PERFECT PERSISTENTLY THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM AND THE ENTIRE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. BY TREADING THIS PATH, SELECTING OPTIMAL DECISIONS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO APPLY IN A CREATIVE WAY THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SOCIALIST ECONOMY. THIS MEANS INVARIABLY CARRYING OUT A PLANNED DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY, STRENGTHENING SOCIALIST OWNERSHIP, EXPANDING THE RIGHTS, ENHANCING THE INDEPENDENCE OF ENTERPRISES, RAISING THEIR INTEREST IN THE END PRODUCT OF THEIR WORK. THIS MEANS

SUBORDINATING ULTIMATELY ALL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TO THE INTERESTS OF SOVIET PEOPLE.

THE PARTY WILL INVARIABLY FOLLOW ITS SOCIAL POLICY. EVERYTHING IN THE NAME OF MAN, FOR THE BENEFIT OF MAN -- THE PROGRAMME PROVISION SHOULD BE FILLED WITH EVER DEEPER AND CONCRETE CONTENT. NATURALLY, THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING CONDITIONS OF PEOPLE SHOULD BE BASED ON THEIR GROWING CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMON CAUSE. WHEREVER DEVIATIONS FROM THIS PRINCIPLE OCCUR, SOCIAL JUSTICE, WHICH IS A MAJOR FACTOR OF THE UNITY AND STABILITY OF SOCIALIST SOCIETY, IS INVARIABLY - DISRUPTED.

THE PARTY REGARDS FURTHER PERFECTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY, OF THE ENTIRE SYSTEM OF SOCIALIST SELF-GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE AS ONE OF THE VITAL TASKS OF DOMESTIC POLICY.

/MORE/

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 5 (FIVE)

3

TASKS HERE ARE MULTIFACETED. A GREAT DEAL IS BEING DONE IN THIS RESPECT. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS ENHANCING THE ROLE OF SOVIET ACTIVISATION OF TRADE UNIONS, KOMSOMOL, PEOPLE'S CONTROL, WORKERS' COLLECTIVES. LYING AHEAD IS PERSISTENT WORK ALONG THE OUTLINED, AND NEW DIRECTIONS.

DEEPENING SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY IS INSEPARABLY LINKED WITH ENHANCING SOCIAL AWARENESS. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EDUCATIONAL WORK IS MANIFESTED IN HOW WORKERS, COLLECTIVE FARMERS AND INTELLECTUALS PARTICIPATE IN THE SOLUTION OF BIG AND SMALL PROBLEMS, HOW THEY WORK, HOW THEY COMBAT SHORTCOMINGS. RAISING LABOUR AND SOCIAL ACTIVITY OF SOVIET PEOPLE, STRENGTHENING DISCIPLINE, INCULCATING PATRIOTISM AND INTERNATIONALISM ARE BY WHAT THE RESULTS OF ALL OUR IDEOLOGICAL ACTIVITY ARE MEASURED.

/MORE/

112130 MAR 85

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ZCZC M08934

11/3 TASS U-5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 6 (SIX)

IN DOING SO RESOLUTE MEASURES WILL BE CONTINUED FURTHER TO SET THINGS IN GOOD ORDER, TO REMOVE FROM OUR LIFE ALL ALIEN PHENOMENA, ALL ENCROACHMENTS ON THE INTERESTS OF SOCIETY AND ITS CITIZENS, TO STRENGTHEN SOCIALIST LEGALITY.

WE MUST STILL FURTHER DEVELOP PUBLICITY IN THE WORK OF PARTY, STATE, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS. V.I. LENIN USED TO SAY THAT THE STATE IS STRONG BY THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE MASSES. OUR PRACTICE HAS FULLY CORROBORATED THAT CONCLUSION, THE BETTER INFORMED THE PEOPLE, THE MORE CONSCIOUSLY THEY ACT, THE MORE ACTIVELY THEY SUPPORT THE PARTY, ITS PLANS AND PROGRAMMATIC OBJECTIVES.

IN THE FOREIGN POLICY SPHERE OUR COURSE IS CLEAR AND CONSISTENT. THIS IS THE COURSE OF PEACE AND PROGRESS.

MORE

11/3 TASS U-5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 7 (SEVEN)

THE FIRST PRECEPT OF THE PARTY AND THE STATE IS TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN IN EVERY WAY THE FRATERNAL FRIENDSHIP WITH OUR CLOSEST FRIENDS AND ALLIES -- THE COUNTRIES OF THE GREAT SOCIALIST COMMUNITY. WE WILL DO EVERYTHING THAT DEPENDS ON US TO EXPAND COOPERATION WITH SOCIALIST STATES, TO ENHANCE THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF SOCIALISM IN WORLD AFFAIRS. WE WOULD LIKE A SERIOUS IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND BELIEVE THAT, GIVEN RECIPROCITY, THIS IS QUITE POSSIBLE.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE STRUGGLE OF PEOPLES FOR LIBERATION FROM COLONIAL OPPRESSION. AND TODAY OUR SYMPATHIES GO OUT TO THE COUNTRIES OF ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA WHICH ARE FOLLOWING THE ROAD OF CONSOLIDATING INDEPENDENCE AND SOCIAL RENOVATION. FOR US THEY ARE FRIENDS AND PARTNERS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR A DURABLE PEACE, FOR BETTER AND JUST RELATIONS BETWEEN PEOPLES.

MORE

112137 MAR 85

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ZCZC N08938

11/3 TASS U-5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 8 (EIGHT)

AS TO RELATIONS WITH CAPITALIST STATES, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THE FOLLOWING. WE WILL FIRMLY FOLLOW THE LENINIST COURSE OF PEACE AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. TO GOODWILL THE SOVIET UNION WILL ALWAYS RESPOND WITH GOODWILL, AS IT WILL RESPOND WITH TRUST TO TRUST. BUT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW THAT WE SHALL NEVER WAIVE THE INTERESTS OF OUR MOTHERLAND AND THOSE OF ITS ALLIES.

WE VALUE THE SUCCESSES OF THE RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS ACHIEVED IN THE 1970S AND ARE READY TO TAKE PART IN CARRYING ON WITH THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING PEACEFUL MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES ON THE BASIS OF PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY, MUTUAL RESPECT AND NON-INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS. NEW STEPS ALONG THESE LINES COULD DULY MARK THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT VICTORY OVER HITLER FASCISM AND JAPANESE MILITARISM.

MORE

11/3 TASS U-5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 9 (NINE)

5  
NEVER BEFORE HAS SO TERRIBLE A THREAT LOOKED SO LARGE AND DARK OVER MANKIND AS THESE DAYS. THE ONLY REASONABLE WAY OUT OF THE EXISTING SITUATION IS AGREEMENT OF THE CONFRONTING FORCES ON AN IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF THE RACE IN ARMS, ABOVE ALL, NUCLEAR ARMS, ON EARTH AND ITS PREVENTION IN SPACE. AN AGREEMENT ON AN HONEST AND EQUITABLE BASIS WITHOUT ATTEMPTS AT +OUTPLAYING+ THE OTHER SIDE AND DICTATING TERMS TO IT. AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD HELP ALL TO ADVANCE TOWARD THE CHERISHED GOAL -- THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION AND PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR GOOD, TOWARD THE COMPLETE REMOVAL OF THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. THIS IS OUR FIRM CONVICTION.

MORE

112139 MAR 85

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ZCZC MOS940

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11/3 TASS U-5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 10 (TEN)

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WILL OPEN IN GENEVA TOMORROW. THE APPROACH OF THE U.S.S.R. TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS WELL KNOWN. I CAN ONLY REAFFIRM THAT: WE DO NOT STRIVE TO ACQUIRE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES OVER THE UNITED STATES, OVER NATO COUNTRIES, FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THEM (SEMICOLON) WE WANT TERMINATION, AND NOT CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND, THEREFORE, OFFER A FREEZE OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS, AN END TO FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES (SEMICOLON) WE WANT A REAL AND MAJOR REDUCTION OF THE ARMS STOCKPILES, AND NOT THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVER NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS, BE IT IN SPACE OR ON EARTH.

WE WOULD LIKE OUR PARTNERS IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS TO UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET UNION'S POSITION AND RESPOND IN KIND. THEN AGREEMENT WILL BE POSSIBLE. THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD WOULD SIGH WITH RELIEF.

MORE

112140 MAR 85

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ZCZC #08941

11/3 TASS U5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 11 (ELEVEN)

THE CPSU IS AN INTERNATIONALIST PARTY IN ITS NATURE. PEOPLE ABROAD WHO HOLD THE SAME VIEWS AS WE MAY REST ASSURED: IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS THE PARTY OF LENIN WILL, AS ALWAYS, CLOSELY COOPERATE WITH FRATERNAL COMMUNIST, WORKERS' AND REVOLUTIONARY-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES, AND WILL CHAMPION THE UNITY

AND ACTIVE COOPERATION OF ALL REVOLUTIONARY FORCES.

COMRADES, THE SOLUTION OF THE COMPLEX TASKS WE ARE FACED WITH PRESUPPOSES A FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE PARTY AND A RISE IN ITS ORGANIZING AND GUIDING ROLE. THE CPSU HAS ALWAYS PROCEEDED AND PROCEEDS FROM LENIN'S IDEA THAT THE PRINCIPLED POLICY IS THE ONLY CORRECT ONE. SUCH A POLICY WHICH IS WORKED OUT COLLECTIVELY WILL BE IMPLEMENTED CONSISTENTLY AND UNDEVIATINGLY. THE PARTY IS PRECISELY THE FORCE WHICH WILL TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE INTERESTS OF ALL CLASSES AND SOCIAL GROUPS, ALL NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES OF THE COUNTRY, RALLY THEM CLOSE TOGETHER AND MOBILISE THE PEOPLE'S ENERGIES FOR THE COMMON CAUSE OF COMMUNIST CONSTRUCTION.

/MORE/

112144 MAR 85

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ZCZC #08942

11/3 TASS U5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 12 (TWELVE)

THE PARTY'S POLICY HAS BEEN AND WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARDS STRENGTHENING THE ALLIANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS, COLLECTIVE-FARM PEASANTRY AND INTELLIGENTSIA, AND TOWARDS STEADY STRENGTHENING OF FRIENDSHIP OF THE PEOPLES OF OUR GREAT MULTINATIONAL COUNTRY.

THE CPSU WILL IN EVERY WAY DEVELOP THE CREATIVE INITIATIVE OF THE YOUTH, SHOW CONCERN FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE WORKING AND LIVING CONDITIONS OF WOMEN, AND FOR THE NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS OF WAR VETERANS AND VETERAN WORKERS.

IN THE COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, IT IS OF IMPORTANCE AS NEVER BEFORE TO MAINTAIN THE DEFENSE CAPACITY OF OUR MOTHERLAND AT SUCH A LEVEL THAT POTENTIAL AGGRESSORS WOULD KNOW WELL: AN ENCROACHMENT UPON THE SECURITY OF THE LAND OF THE SOVIETS AND ITS ALLIES, UPON THE PEACEFUL LIFE OF SOVIET PEOPLE WILL MEET WITH A CRUSHING RETALIATORY STRIKE. OUR GLORIOUS ARMED FORCES WILL HAVE, IN FUTURE AS WELL, EVERYTHING NECESSARY FOR THAT.

153 MAR 85

11/3 TASS U5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 13 (THIRTEEN)

PREPARATIONS FOR THE 27TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU HAVE NOW BEGUN ON A LARGE SCALE. A NEW EDITION OF THE PARTY'S PROGRAMME IS TO BE CONSIDERED AT THE CONGRESS. AND PROSPECTS FOR THE COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT FOR THE NEXT FIVE-YEAR-PLAN PERIOD AND FOR THE PERIOD ENDING IN THE YEAR 2000 ARE TO BE DETERMINED.

TIME CALLS FOR INTENSE, CREATIVE WORK OF ALL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS FROM TOP TO BOTTOM. IN ALL SECTORS EVERYWHERE THE COMMUNISTS SHOULD BE AN EXAMPLE OF THE DISCHARGE OF CIVIC DUTY, OF CONSCIENTIOUS WORK FOR THE GOOD OF SOCIETY, AND OF STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE LENINIST STYLE OF WORK. THIS APPLIES FIRST OF ALL TO THE PARTY CADRES, TO PARTY AND STATE LEADERS. THE CPSU WILL UNDEVIATINGLY PURSUE THE LINE TOWARDS INCREASING INSISTENCE ON HIGH STANDARDS, AND TOWARDS RAISING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ENTRUSTED WORK.

/MORE/

112153 MAR 85

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ZCZC MOS945

11/3 TASS U5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 14 (FOURTEEN)

AFTER THE END OF THE PLENARY MEETING, THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE FIRST SECRETARIES OF REGIONAL COMMITTEES, AND ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE PLENARY MEETING WILL GO TO THEIR AREAS IN ORDER TO GET DOWN TO WORK WITH FRESH VIGOUR. A GOOD DEAL IS TO BE DONE. FIRST OF ALL, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE WORK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS OF THIS YEAR AND THEREBY TO ENSURE A CONFIDENT START OF THE NEXT FIVE-YEAR-PLAN PERIOD.

THE SEVERE WINTER HAS SOMEWHAT SLOWED DOWN THE ATTAINMENT OF PLANNED TARGETS IN A NUMBER OF SECTORS. IT MEANS THAT ONE SHOULD MUSTER ONE'S ENERGIES, TAP RESERVES AND MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MAKE UP FOR WHAT HAS NOT YET BEEN DONE AND TO ATTAIN THE PLANNED TARGETS BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

COMRADES, THESE DAYS WE FEEL STILL MORE KEENLY HOW MIGHTY AND MONOLITHIC THE RANKS OF THE COMMUNISTS ARE AND HOW UNITED OUR SOVIET PEOPLE IS. AT THE RECENT ELECTIONS SOVIET PEOPLE AGAIN EXPRESSED UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR THE COURSE OF OUR PARTY AND THE STATE. THIS SUPPORT IS BOTH INSPIRING AND BINDING.

/MORE/

112156 MAR 85

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ZCZC MOS946

11/3 TASS U5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 15 (FIFTEEN)

TODAY THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLACED UPON ME THE COMPLEX AND BIG DUTIES OF GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE. I AM WELL AWARE OF THE GREAT TRUST PUT IN ME AND OF THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITY CONNECTED WITH THIS. IN THE FORTHCOMING WORK I COUNT ON THE SUPPORT AND ACTIVE ASSISTANCE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU, ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU AND SECRETARIES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE AS A WHOLE. YOUR VERSATILE EXPERIENCE IS THE GIST OF THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF OUR PEOPLE. I PROMISE YOU, COMRADES, TO DO MY UTMOST TO FAITHFULLY SERVE OUR PARTY, OUR PEOPLE, AND THE GREAT LENINIST CAUSE.

ALLOW ME TO EXPRESS CONFIDENCE THAT, LOOKING AHEAD TO THE 27TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU, THE PEOPLE AND THE PARTY, RALLIED ROUND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, WILL DO EVERYTHING FOR OUR SOVIET MOTHERLAND TO BECOME STILL MORE RICH AND POWERFUL AND FOR THE CREATIVE FORCES OF SOCIALISM TO REVEAL THEMSELVES STILL MORE FULLY.

ITEM ENDS+++

112156 MAR 85



CONFIDENTIAL

FROM MOSCOW 121025Z MARCH .  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 332 OF 12 MARCH  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN AND UKDEL NATO

POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS.  
FOLLOWING FROM DEREK THOMAS.

1. I SPENT SEVERAL HOURS YESTERDAY TALKING TO RYZHOV ( ONE OF THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS). UNFORTUNATELY, OTHER CALLS WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN MORE USEFUL EG ON KORNIENKO HAD TO BE CANCELLED.
2. AT LEAST HALF THE TIME WAS SPENT REPEATING ESTABLISHED POSITIONS ON BOTH SIDES, PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE GENEVA TALKS. IN RESPONSE TO RYZHOV'S PREPARED STATEMENTS, I USED WHAT I HOPED WERE THOUGHT-PROVOKING ARGUMENTS. BUT THEY FAILED SIGNALLY TO PROVOKE MUCH THOUGHT BY RYZHOV.
3. IT EMERGED CLEARLY THAT THE OVERWHELMING CONCERN THAT THEY ARE STILL EMPHASISING IS SPACE. FOR THE MOMENT IT HAS ENTIRELY TAKEN OVER FROM OTHER CONCERNS, THOUGH MODERNISATION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT OF INF WEAPONS GET A PERIODIC MENTION.
4. ON OUR OWN APPROACH ON SDI, THEY ARE TAKING THE VIEW ( AS REPORTED IN MOSCOW TELNO 319) THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS MOVED RIGHT AWAY FROM THE POSITION SHE EXPOUNDED TO GORBACHEV IN DECEMBER, AND HAS NOW GIVEN HER OUTRIGHT SUPPORT TO THE SDI PLAN. THEY RESOLUTELY IGNORE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, SINCE THEY ASSUME THAT ONE WILL BE AN INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE OTHER. THEY ASSUME ALSO THAT THE REAL AMERICAN INTENTION IS TO DEPLOY IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE A SECURE FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY , AND THAT WE KNOW THIS.
5. IT FOLLOWS THAT AT PRESENT AND AT THIS LEVEL, THEY REJECT ABSOLUTELY ANY THOUGHT THAT, AS THE GENEVA TALKS PROCEED, THERE SHOULD BE DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS TO OVERALL DETERRENCE AS PART OF AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT. THE LOGIC OF THEIR POSITION IS THAT SUCH DISCUSSION WOULD SIMPLY BE PLAYING FOR TIME ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS WHILE THEIR PLANS FOR DEVELOPING NEW OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS GO AHEAD, IN ORDER TO PUT THEM IN A POSITION OF ABSOLUTE SUPERIORITY. RYZHOV SAID IN TERMS THAT ANY ATTEMPT BY THE AMERICANS TO LEAVE SPACE ON ONE SIDE, OR TO ENGAGE IN "FRUITLESS DISCUSSION" ABOUT IT WOULD HAVE THE MOST NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE GENEVA TALKS. ( AT ANOTHER POINT IN THIS CONTEXT, HE USED THE SAME WORD IN RUSSIAN (VZRYV) AS WAS USED OF THE SOVIET WALK-OUT FROM THE INF NEGOTIATIONS).

6. IF RYZHOV'S APPROACH REFLECTS THE KIND OF LINE BEING TAKEN IN BRIEFING PAPERS FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, THE PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH GORBACHEV TOMORROW WILL BE AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO GET THROUGH TO HIM DIRECT, BOTH ON THE REALITIES OF THE STRATEGIC BATTLE GOING ON IN WASHINGTON, AND ON THE DANGERS FOR ALL OF US IF THE RUSSIANS PAINT THEMSELVES INTO A CORNER AGAIN BY TAKING AN OGER-SIMPLISTIC LINE ON WHAT THEY REFER TO AS THE "ORGANIC INTER-RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN THE THREE ELEMENTS.

RATFORD

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38/12

FOREIGN DELEGATIONS ATTENDING PRESIDENT CHERNENKO'S FUNERAL

1. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND NATO COUNTRIES

BELGIUM: Foreign Minister Tindemans  
Chef de Cabinet Van Der Epst

CANADA: Prime Minister Mulroney

DENMARK: Prince Georg and Foreign Minister

FRANCE: President Mitterand and Foreign Minister Dumas

FRG: Prime Minister Kohl and Minister of Chancellery  
Shaudle

GREECE: Foreign Minister Haralambopoulos

ICELAND: HM Ambassador Moscow

IRELAND: President Hillery and Minister of Fisheries O'Toole

ITALY: President Pertini and Foreign Minister Andreotti

LUXEMBOURG: Minister of Health and Social Security

NETHERLANDS: Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Van Den Bor  
Den Bork

NORWAY: Crown Prince Harald and Prime Minister

PORTUGAL: Assembly President Amaral

SPAIN: Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez (and possibly Foreign  
Minister Moran)

TURKEY: Prime Minister Ozal and Foreign Minister

UNITED STATES: Vice President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz

2. OTHERS

JAPAN: Prime Minister Nakasone and Foreign Minister Abe

INDIA: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi

PAKISTAN: President Zia ul Haq and Foreign Minister Khan

JORDAN: Prime Minister Ahmed Obaidat and Foreign Minister  
Al Masri

CANADA: Prime Minister Mulroney

FINLAND: President Koivisto and Prime Minister Sorsa

SWEDEN: Prime Minister and Crown Prince Berthold

AUSTRALIA: Minister of Industry, Senator Button

NEW ZEALAND High Commissioner in London

AUSTRIA: President Kirschlager

CHINA: Vice Premier Li Peng and Deputy Foreign Minister Qian Qichen

TANZANIA: Secretary General of Party, Rashed M Kawawa (provisional Head of Delegation)

NIGERIA: Minister of Defence, Major General D Y Bali

LEBANON: President Gemayel

EGYPT: Dr Sophi Abdel Hakim, Speaker of Consultative Council and Secretary General of ruling party

ALGERIA: Politburo member and leader of Central Committee Secretariat, Mohammed Cherif Messadia

YAR: Abdul Aziz, Prime Minister

LIBYA: Prime Minister

MOROCCO: Prime Minister Al Karim Lamrani

PDRY: President Ali Nasser Mohammed

TUNISIA: Representative of President Al-Munji Al-Kaal

SYRIA: Abdullah El-Ahmar, Assistant Secretary General of Ba'ath party. Farouk Shara, Minister of Foreign Affairs

IRAQ: Abdul Aziz Aldouri, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. Tariz Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

KUWAIT: Abdul Rachman Salem Al Atiqui, Adviser of the Amir

PLO: Yasser Arafat, Farouk Abdoumi, Mahmoud Abbas

SUDAN: Second Vice-President Joseph Lagu

ZIMBABWE: President Canaan Banana

BANGLADESH: Deputy Marshal Law Administrator Sultan Ahmed

UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar

GR 69

# RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

FROM MOSCOW 121735Z MARCH  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
INFO TELEGRAM NUMBER 341 OF 12 MARCH  
PRIORITY PARIS, WASHINGTON, BONN AND UKDEL

Date of .....		
Received in registry		
NATO 12 MAR 1985		
Dist. Office		Priority
INDEX	PA	ACTION
	1	2
		NONE

MIPT : VISIT BY THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER.

1. DUMAS ARRIVED LATE ON 10 MARCH FOR WHAT WAS TO HAVE BEEN A TWO DAY PROGRAMME OF TALKS. DESPITE CHERNENKO'S DEATH, GROMYKO YESTERDAY GAVE HIM TWO SESSIONS TOTALLING SIX HOURS, PLUS LUNCH, AND HE HAD AN HOUR WITH TIKHONOV. NO COMMUNITY BRIEFING CAN BE ARRANGED UNTIL 15 MARCH BUT THE FRENCH EMBASSY GAVE US THE FOLLOWING BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS BY TELEPHONE.

2. THE MEETING WITH TIKHONOV WAS LARGELY DEVOTED TO BILATERAL ECONOMIC QUESTIONS AND BROUGHT NOTHING OF NOTE

3. THE MAIN WEIGHT OF DISCUSSION WITH GROMYKO WAS ON ARMS CONTROL AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS. DUMAS EVIDENTLY GAVE A NEW PUFF FOR THE FRENCH INITIATIVE OF JUNE 1984 ON SPACE (UKDIS GENEVA TELNO 72 OF 13 JUNE 1984). BUT THE FRENCH TELL US THAT IN SPEAKING IN SUPPORT OF THE GENEVA PROCESS HE ARGUED THAT SDI RESEARCH WOULD NOT (NOT) INEVITABLY LEAD TO DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT. GROMYKO FOLLOWED THE CURRENT STANDARD SOVIET LINE, QUESTIONING AMERICAN INTENTIONS AT GENEVA AND CRITICISING SDI. BUT ON INF HE MADE NO REFERENCE TO THE BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR DETERRENTS AND IT WAS DUMAS WHO TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN SETTING OUT FRENCH ARGUMENTS WHY THEIR SYSTEMS SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED IN.

4. OTHER SUBJECTS TOUCHED ON WERE :

(I) THE CDE, WHERE THE FRENCH APPARENTLY SAID THAT NON-FIRST USE OF FORCE WAS NOT IMPOSSIBLE IN PRINCIPLE, BUT THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD FIRST CONSIDER THE SPECIFIC MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE WEST :

(II) THE MIDDLE EAST, WHERE GROMYKO FISHED FOR FRENCH VIEWS ABOUT THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE PLO, AND CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN TRYING TO BRING ABOUT A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE PLO AND SYRIANS :

(III) GROMYKO WAS TOUGH ON THE AMERICANS OVER NICARAGUA. HIS ALLEGATIONS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS THERE GAVE DUMAS THE OPENING FOR RAISING KAMPUCHEA AND AFGHANISTAN :

(IV) HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DEALT WITH TETE-A-TETE.

5. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER ON 15 MARCH.

SUTHERLAND

70/12

# RESTRICTED

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85

FROM UKDIS GENEVA 131125Z JUNE 1984  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELNO 72 OF 13 JUNE  
 INFO PRIORITY PARIS, MODUK (DS 17),  
 INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONN, MOSCOW

Destroy after	
Register	2741 (19)
Received	14 JUN 1984 (21)
Desk	
PRIORITY	1 2 NONE

FROM GORDON

FRENCH STATEMENT TO THE CD ON ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE

1. AT FIRST PLENARY OF CD SUMMER SESSION ON 12 JUNE, LA GORCE (FRANCE) SPOKE ON ABM AND ASAT DEVELOPMENTS (TEXT BY FAX TO ACDD). MAIN POINTS AS FOLLOWS.
2. LA GORCE REVIEWED IN SOME DETAIL THE HISTORY OF ABM LIMITATIONS AND THE POTENTIALLY DESTABILISING EFFECTS OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND / OR DEPLOYMENT OF ABM'S AND PROPOSED THAT INTERESTED PARTIES AND IN PARTICULAR THE US AND USSR SHOULD BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TO VERIFIABLE LIMITATION OF NEW ABM TECHNOLOGY. THE CD WAS UNIVERSALLY FELT TO BE THE APPROPRIATE MULTILATERAL FORUM, BUT HE ALSO RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF BILATERAL US/USSR DIALOGUE. GIVEN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ABM AND ASAT SYSTEMS THESE TWO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SIMULTANEOUSLY AND IN DEPTH. DEMILITARISATION OF SPACE WAS NO LONGER FEASIBLE NOR DESIRABLE BUT AGREEMENTS COMPRISING THE FOLLOWING THREE UNDERTAKINGS WERE POSSIBLE AND DESIRABLE.
3. FIRST, THEY SHOULD PREVENT DESTABILISING MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS BUT NOT MILITARY ACTIVITY TENDING TO CONTRIBUTE TO STRATEGIC STABILITY AND VERIFICATION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.
4. SECOND, THEY SHOULD BE GRADUATED, AFFECTING FIRST DEVELOPMENTS TENDING TO HAVE AN IRREVERSIBLE EFFECT ON THE STRATEGIC BALANCE.
5. THIRDLY, THEY SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE.
6. ACCORDINGLY LA GORCE CALLED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON FOUR POINTS:
  - (A) STRICT LIMITATION OF ASAT SYSTEMS, ESPECIALLY HIGH ALTITUDE SYSTEMS
  - (B) A BAN INITIALLY FOR FIVE YEARS, ON DEPLOYMENT OF DIRECTED ENERGY (I.E. PARTICLE OR LASER) ABM OR ASAT WEAPONS AND ON THEIR TESTING.
  - (C) STRENGTHENING OF THE 1975 CONVENTION ON DECLARATION AND DESCRIPTION OF SATELLITES WITH A VIEW TO ENHANCING VERIFICATION
  - (D) THE USA AND USSR TO EXTEND BILATERALLY AGREED ASSURANCES OF NON-INTERFERENCE WITH SATELLITES TO THOSE OF THIRD PARTIES.
7. WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE FRENCH DELEGATION THAT THE TEXT OF LA GORCE'S SPEECH WAS RECEIVED AT VERY SHORT NOTICE FROM PARIS. IN THE ABSENCE OF WESTERN AMBASSADORS AT THE GERMAN CW WORKSHOP, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE REACTION SO FAR.

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM MOSCOW 121230Z MAR 85

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 335 OF 12TH MAR 85

MY TELNO 329 OF 12 MARCH: DEATH OF CHERNENKO: ATTENDANCE

1. DEPUTY MARSHAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR, MR SULTAN AHMAD (BANGLADESH) HAS ALSO MADE REQUEST FOR BILATERAL WITH PRIME MINISTER.

RATFORD

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[H/Sou 3]

(H/Protocol)

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W JENKINS

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ADVANCE COPY  
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PS

From: J S Wall

Date: 12 March 1985

cc: PS/Mr Rifkind

Mr Braithwaite

Mr Renwick

Mr Adam Fergusson

ECD(E)

WED

VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE TO MOSCOW:  
COMMUNITY ISSUES

1. I submit speaking notes on European Community issues for use by the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister in Moscow.
2. I also attach Mr Renwick's draft telegrams reporting on the outcome of the Anglo/German Economic talks which provide an update on the latest situation.
3. Sir Julian Bullard has recommended that the Prime Minister should try and have a word with Chancellor Kohl in Moscow if possible. We agree that this would be particularly helpful given the German blockage of own resources.

J S Wall

European Community Dept (Internal)

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VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
TO MOSCOW: SPEAKING NOTES ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ISSUES

A: Chancellor Kohl/Herr Genscher

Own Resources/UK Abatement

- Nine months after Fontainebleau own resources decision still not adopted. Must try and dispose of issue before European Council. We are no less committed than Germans to enlargement and understand German desire to keep up pressure on others.
  
- Fontainebleau must be implemented. This means writing own resources decision so that even if own resources generally are not made available until 1 January 1986, UK could receive 1000 mecu abatement in December 1985, thereby honouring Fontainebleau.
  
- Others unlikely to agree to German wish to make explicit linkage between availability of new own resources and ratification of Accession Treaties. Are likely, at very least to seek a provision to bring in own resources on 1 January (ie before instruments of accession are deposited) by unanimous decision of the



Council in the light of progress made over ratification of accession Treaties.

#### Enlargement

- Next weeks Foreign Affairs Council last chance to make successful European Council possible.
  
- German ideas for uncontrolled Spanish fishing after 10 years will not do - would prejudice future of painfully negotiated Common Fisheries Policy.
  
- If Five do not stick together, there will be no agreement, and enlargement itself may be at risk.
  
- Commission's proposals for transitional financing faithfully reflect Fontainebleau, and are only basis for solution.

#### Integrated Mediterranean Programmes

- Need to maintain common position on IMPs.
  
- Should be no further tilting of Structural Funds towards Mediterranean.



- Additional figure of 2 billion ecu for IMPs too high.
- Commission proposal not in accordance with Fontainebleau conclusions.
- Duration of IMPs should be five, not seven years. Must constitute definitive response to Greek Memorandum. Greece should have the lion's share of IMPs.
- We must have common position on IMPs at European Council.

#### Vehicle Emissions

- Progress made at Environment Council, on large and small cars.
- Outstanding issue remains emission levels for medium sized vehicles. UK cannot agree to standards for medium range which could only be met by catalytic converters.



- Prospect of Community agreement offers major benefits to environment, as well as preservation of internal market.
  
- Alternative is minimal short term environmental gain for Germany at cost of damage to internal market and less effective environmental approach in Community as a whole over longer term.



## SPEAKING NOTES ON EC ISSUES

B: Prime Minister Craxi/Signor Andreotti

### Own Resources/UK Abatement

- Must try to get this issue settled before European Council if agenda not to be overburdened.
  
- Hope Italian Presidency will make vigorous effort at next week's FAC to get settlement.
  
- Presidency proposal remains best available option since it permits our 1000 mecu to be made available, as agreed at Fontainebleau, before the end of 1985.
  
- Could not accept German amendment effectively making it impossible for us to get our abatement by the end of the year.
  
- If Presidency solution not possible then UK could accept double Inter-Governmental Agreement provided all other Member States could agree.

### Enlargement

- Final phase; must go for maximum progress at 17-20



March Foreign Affairs Council.

- Fisheries the crucial issue; bad deal would wreck the Common Fisheries Policy.
  
- On fisheries, Community must put clear position to Spaniards and impress on them that there is no further flexibility to come.
  
- Disarray in the Community will simply cause delay, and may put enlargement at risk.

Integrated Mediterranean Programmes

- Hope IMPs can be agreed at European Council though Greek domestic politics make this difficult.
  
- If agreement not possible should nonetheless aim for agreement that enlargement negotiation can be completed subject to overall Greek reserve on IMPs.
  
- UK remains ready to implement IMPs as agreed at Fontainebleau.
  
- Could not accept further tilting of Structural Funds



in favour of Mediterranean regions (commitments to Italy under Structural Funds already amount to 7 - 8.5 billion ecu over 5 years).

- Two billion ecu additional figure for IMPs also too high.

#### Vehicle Emissions

- Considerable progress made at 7 March Environment Council. Bottom line for us is that we could not agree to standards for medium range cars which could only be met by catalytic converters..

- If UK, France and Italy stick together, real prospect of agreement being reached.

#### GATT

- Community must put weight firmly behind the principle of new round at next weeks Foreign Affairs Council.

- Otherwise serious risk that US policy will start to move in directions bad for open trading system and dangerous for all of us.



## SPEAKING NOTES ON EC ISSUES

C: President Mitterrand/M Dumas

### Own Resources/UK Abatement

- Must avoid this coming to European Council if possible.
  
- German amendment to Presidency proposal not acceptable since would mean we could not get our abatement in 1985 as per Fontainebleau.
  
- Understand that French and German Governments accept that our abatement should be made in 1985.
  
- Community as a whole could not agree to other German condition, ie no own resources as a whole until Accession Treaties ratified.
  
- But might be possible to consider something on these lines provided provision was made for unanimous decision of Council to bring in own resources ahead of Accession Treaties depending on state of progress on ratification.





### Enlargement

- Very worried by disarray among Five fishing nations on fisheries.
  
- If France, UK and Ireland at least cannot hold firm on basis of jointly worked out position, omens for next weeks Foreign Affairs Council - and so for European Council - bleak.
  
- Time to stick together, not to produce radical new ideas which cannot command consensus and could only lead to protracted negotiations.

### Integrated Mediterranean Programmes

- Must not allow this issue to hold up completion of enlargement negotiations even if Greece maintains reserve.
  
- Commission proposals an improvement but cannot accept:
  - Further weighting of structural funds towards Mediterranean regions.
  - Additional figure of 2 billion ecu.



- Greece must have the lion's share of IMPs and IMPs should constitute definitive response to Green Memorandum.

#### Vehicle Emissions

- Both we and the French negotiated seriously at Environment Council.
- Agreement possible provided we stick together.
- Bottom line for us is that we could not accept standards for the medium range which could only be met by catalytic converters.

#### GATT

- Community must put weight firmly behind the principle of new round at next weeks Foreign Affairs Council.
- Otherwise serious risk that US policy will start to move in directions bad for open trading system and dangerous for all of us.

File No. ....

Department .....

Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) R W RENWICK

Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification	
CONFIDENTIAL	
Precedence	
IMMEDIATE	
DESKBY .....	Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date) .....	POSTBY .....	Z
		(Time) .....		Z

**PREAMBLE**

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy marking) .....

(Codeword) ..... (Deskby)..... Z

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AND TO (precedence/post) .....

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REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS  
PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

COMMUNITY BUDGET

1. During the meeting of the Anglo-German Economic Committee yesterday, Ungerer went through the four elements of the German position. He was told that we could agree that

- (a) new own resources generally should come into effect from 1. January 1986;
- (ii) the 1985 deficit should be covered by an inter-governmental agreement. This should not repeat not be reimbursable, as this would be an unnecessary additional charge on the 1986 budget.

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Copies to:-

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(2) our 1,000 mecu should be received immediately following ratification of the new own resources decision. The decision must be written in such a way as to permit this to happen, as agreed at Fontainebleau<sup>u</sup>, before the end of 1985.

2. Our difficulty arose with the fourth German point, namely that the own resources decision should enter into force only after ratification also of the Treaty of Accession. This would not be agreed by others in the Council and would make it practically impossible for us to receive our 1,000 mecu before the end of the year.

3. Ungerer acknowledged that at present German Ministers were linking our 1,000 mecu also to ratification of the Accession Treaty. He appeared to think, however, that ~~this position might be modified and that~~ the Germans might agree that our 1,000 mecu should be received immediately following ratification of the own resources decision, while own resources generally should only be made available following ratification of the Accession Treaty.

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## PRIME MINISTER'S BRIEFING

I GORBACHEV SPEECHES  
OF 20 FEB. AND  
11 MARCH

II PERSONALITY NOTES  
+ LIST OF THOSE ATTENDING

III BRIEFS FOR POSSIBLE BILATERALS

- Vice President Bush
  - Chancellor Kohl
  - Nakasone
  - Gonzales
  - General Zia
  - Rajiv Gandhi
  - Mitterrand
  - Craxi
  - Mulroney
- Nyerere
  - Nigerian
  - Botswana  
(for return trip)

## B. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### Gorbachev's RSFSR Supreme Soviet Election Speech in Moscow

'Pravda' 21 Feb 85

Text of "Tass report" on 20th February meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, member of Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and voters of Kiev constituency in Moscow, "Following the course of unity and cohesion":

The election campaign in our country is taking place in an atmosphere of great work and political activity. It graphically demonstrates the unbreakable unity of the Party and people and the firm determination of Soviet people to strengthen the country's economic and defence power through selfless work. This was discussed at a meeting between the voters of the Kiev constituency in Moscow and RSFSR Supreme Soviet Candidate deputy Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 20th February.

The Presidium included Comrades M.S. Gorbachev, V.V. Grishin, Ye.K. Ligachev, and N.I. Ryzhkov, leading production workers, Party and local government officials, scientists, and representatives of the public.

The meeting was opened by A.V. Korovitsyn, First Secretary of Kiev Rayon CPSU Committee.

An honorary presidium comprising the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee headed by Comrade K.U. Chernenko was elected with enthusiasm.

The candidate deputy's agent, I.N. Losev, adjuster at Moscow No. 1 tool-making works described M.S. Gorbachev's life and urged the voters unanimously to cast their votes on election day for the unbreakable bloc of communists and non-party people.

The meeting was addressed by V.N. Kudryavtsev, Director of the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences; L.A. Fedorova, teacher at No 5 school; and S.M. Bedin, Secretary of the Party Committee of the USSR Ministry of the Food Industry. They gave assurances that the rayon's working people would devote all their efforts, knowledge, and experience to a successful completion of the Five-Year Plan and giving a worthy welcome to the 27th CPSU Congress and the 40th anniversary of the great victory.

M.S. Gorbachev, who was warmly greeted by those present, delivered a speech. More than 60 years ago in his famous speech, "What is Soviet power", Vladimir Ilyich Lenin spoke words whose importance is still great even today: "Soviet power is the road to socialism which has been found by the working masses and is therefore correct and invincible."

By following this road, the speaker continued, our country has scaled tremendous heights in its economic, social and cultural development. And today Soviet power - the power of working people and for working people - is revealing its creative potential increasingly fully and successfully resolving the tasks of improving socialist society.

Precisely this determines the significance of the elections to the Soviets. In preparing for them the CPSU again and again checks its political course against the very rich experience of the people, which is a vital necessity and a law of activity for the ruling party in a socialist country. Service of the people is the summit of all the work of the CPSU, its Central Committee and the Soviet government.

The unity of the Party and people and working people's ardent support for the CPSU's internal and external policy have been displayed with renewed force in the course of the election campaign. It is the Party which elaborates the political line of our society's development and ensures its cohesion, the strength of the Soviet multinational state, and purposefulness in the work of state and public organisations. The basis of all our successes is the living creativity of the people, the unity of the Party's ranks, and the high responsibility and collectiveness of the work of the Central Committee and its Politburo, whose soul is Comrade K.U. Chernenko.

The nomination of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as candidate deputy to the supreme soviets of the union republics at numerous meetings is a vivid expression of this unbreakable link between the Party and people.

Soviet people rate highly Comrade K.U. Chernenko's multifaceted and fruitful activity in the highest posts in the Party and Soviet state and his great contribution to the elaboration of Marxist-Leninist theory and topical problems of building communism. Devotion to the cause of peace and communism, farsightedness and realism, a demanding attitude and sensitivity are distinctive features inherent in Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko as a leader of the Leninist type.

Work collectives in the capital, also in Kiev rayon, are among the collectives which nominated Comrade K.U. Chernenko as candidate deputy to the supreme body of state power in the RSFSR. Konstantin Ustinovich has asked that gratitude should be expressed to you for this confidence and that cordial greetings and best wishes should be conveyed to the communists and all working people of the rayon.

The election campaign is nearing its end. The best representatives of the working class, the collective farm peasantry, and the intelligentsia, people of different nationalities, ages, and vocations, have been nominated as candidate deputies. Their meetings with voters demonstrate working people's extremely profound interest in the affairs of their state and their readiness to continue to work selflessly for the good of their great homeland. Soviet man's characteristic sense of being the master of the country, a sense born of building socialism, is expressed in the vigorous and business-like nature of the election campaign.

It is both a great honour and a very great responsibility to be a people's deputy. I am well aware that I owe my nomination as candidate deputy to the prestige of the CPSU Central Committee and to the people's trust in the Party's policy. I am deeply grateful for the trust, the warm reception, and the business-like exhortations which have been heard in this auditorium today.

The entire heroic road of the Land of the Soviets is linked with the Party of communists. The CPSU's ability to approach social matters creatively and realistically from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism, to lead the masses confidently towards the achievement of new heights of social development, and to assume responsibility for the historical destiny of the country - all this makes the Communist Party the guarantee of socialist progress.

This ability has again been displayed with the utmost force during the present stage, during the implementation of the Party's political course formulated by the 26th Congress and the subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. The time since the congress has been a time of extremely crucial decisions, of major economic developments, and of the implementation of important measures to further develop socialist democracy and improve the style and methods of organisational, ideological and economic work.

On the Party's initiative, large-scale programmes such as the Food Programme and the Energy Programme have been formulated and are being implemented; the preparation of a comprehensive programme for the development of consumer goods production and the services sphere is being completed. Economic experiments are expanding, and collective forms of organising and providing incentives for work are being

developed. The school reform, which is a long-term social programme in the sphere of training and education, is being implemented. A number of important measures to improve the activity of the press, the films, and television and to strengthen the material base of culture have been taken.

Today it is possible to conclude with complete justification, M.S. Gorbachev emphasised, that the policy formulated by the Party is yielding fruitful results. In implementing the resolutions of the 26th Congress, the country has taken a significant step in economic, social and cultural development. In the light of the exacerbation of the international situation, the Soviet state's defence power has been maintained at the proper level.

The last two years have brought a marked acceleration of the country's socio-economic development. Thanks to the people's selfless work and the vigorous measures which have been taken, it has been possible to improve the situation in the national economy. Average annual production growth rates in industry have increased by one-third. Changes for the better have emerged in the economy's qualitative characteristics.

The working people of the RSFSR are making a weighty contribution to the country's achievements. National income increased by 19% in the period between elections. Last year the entire increase in national income, and also the increase in industrial output and in the volume of construction and installation work and railway transport were obtained by means of improved labour productivity. This shows that Russia's economy is on the right road - the road of intensification and efficiency.

The initial results of implementation of the Food Programme are encouraging. The average annual gross agricultural production increased by 9% in 1983-84, as compared with the preceding two years, and an upsurge of stock farming and certain other sectors of the agroindustrial complex has emerged.

The economic progress has had a beneficial effect on Soviet people's living standards. Real incomes have increased and the supply of many types of industrial and food products to the population has improved. The Five-Year Plan targets for the construction of housing and schools are being successfully implemented.

The development of the socio-economic sphere is inseparable from the improvement of the political system and the deepening of our society's democratic principles. In order to make fuller use of the soviets' tremendous potential, their powers have been expanded and the Leninist principle of the unity of legislation, management and monitoring is being implemented more consistently.

A characteristic feature of the past years is the greater attention paid to ideological and political education work and the further development of science and culture. These vital issues were discussed at the June (1983) plenum, of the Central Committee which demanded that Party committees should seek to ensure the unity of ideological, economic and organisational efforts and the organic combination of our ideology's transforming power with the solution of economic and social tasks.

In short, much has been accomplished, the speaker noted. Our successes are based on intense and selfless work by communists, our heroic working class, the glorious collective farm peasantry and the people's intelligentsia. But it is not part of the Party's traditions to flatter itself and rest on its laurels. Many unsolved problems remain.

The country has reached most responsible heights of socio-economic development. As K.U. Chernenko emphasised. "We can and must MOVE FORWARD, GUIDED BY THE SUPREME AND MOST DEMANDING IDEAS OF SOCIALISM ELABORATED BY SCIENTIFIC THEORY. This is the essence of the profound qualitative changes that are urgently needed in all spheres of our society's life."

This is the strategic aim which forms the basis of all the Party's work to prepare for the 27th Congress. It will be a congress of tremendous theoretical and political



importance. It has to adopt the new revised edition of the CPSU Programme and determine the main line of our long-term development.

Painstaking work is currently under way on the draft basic guidelines for the economic and social development of the USSR in 1986-1990 and in the period up to the year 2000. It is these studies which are laying the foundations for our country's future and outlining the scientific, technical, economic and social shape with which the country will enter the 21st century.

A special place in the plans is occupied by matters connected with further improving the people's well-being and their material and spiritual living conditions. In this connection we are faced with the task of dynamically boosting production forces, renewing the material and technical base, intensifying the economy and enhancing its efficiency.

[Note: The Soviet television version of Gorbachev's speech (1800 gmt 20 Feb 85) included the following passage at this point: It is a matter of bringing the national economy up to a foremost world level, in terms of equipment and technology, in a short space of time. Above all, it is necessary to give greater priority to the development of machine-building, which is the prime basis for the technological renewal of all sectors of the national economy, and to pay increased attention to the re-equipping of existing enterprises and capacities. Greater emphasis must be put on an economic use of raw materials and fuel, and a situation must be achieved whereby economies in them become a key factor for ensuring increased production.]

This is not a simple matter. It demands the maximum effort, the mobilisation of the people's creative potential, the utilisation of all social, ideological, and moral resources and the enhancement of the responsibility of cadres at all levels.

The improvement of the economic apparatus and the entire system of economic management and the implementation of a number of structural shifts in production are on the agenda. The solution of these tasks necessitates the faster development of science and technology and the introduction of their achievements into practice. To increase the pace of scientific and technical progress is an imperative command of the times. Something else is equally important - to make efficient and thrifty use of everything that already exists.

Life shows that right now, using the same machine tools, the same equipment and the same land it is possible to produce larger quantities of better quality goods with less expenditure. Even though this conclusion is not new, it has not lost its topicality. It is important to study carefully time and again all the factors and all the components which ensure highly productive work and to better think out the machinery for spreading advanced experience. The causes of poor work by lagging enterprises and building sites, state farms and collective farms, and planning and design organisations must be investigated with the utmost principledness. Tremendous reserves for our economy's development are contained here, and they must be brought into operation.

The main thing now, the candidate deputy stressed, is to be able to transfer the Party's aims into the channel of practical solutions and real actions and persistently ensure their implementation. People judge the results of economic, organisational and educational activity by the way major and minor problems are resolved and shortcomings are eliminated. This requires considerably greater organisation, competence and purposefulness.

It is a matter of all cadres profoundly mastering the work style which has gone down in our Party's history as Bolshevik professionalism - the antithesis of paper-pushing and sessionmania, waffle and formalism. Professionalism means initiative, responsibility and the ability to carry out one's duties conscientiously. But often these qualities are lacking. The present year has shown this particularly graphically.

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
In connection with the frosts the situation in the production and consumer spheres in a number of regions of the country became difficult and a number of telegrams

asking for help arrived at the centre. But a severe winter cannot be considered a surprise in our country. We prepare for it in good time. However, here and there people have become used to saying "maybe we shall manage" in order to get by. And if they do not manage, some superior will set things to rights. This dependence and negligence are intolerable.

The Party Central Committee recently examined in detail the work of passenger transport. Measures which must be implemented by central organisations were defined. At the same time many issues emerged which were the result of insufficient attention being given to matters locally and the inability to organise affairs, to ensure precision in bus, tram and trolleybus traffic, and to be concerned about cadres and strengthening the repair base. Yet this falls within the competence of local soviets, which are called on to carry out the duties entrusted to them and in a demanding way monitor and hold people responsible for the assigned task.

It is also apposite to return to the question of work discipline and order. A great deal has been done in this direction recently and the results are obvious. But discipline and order are not needed for one day alone. They constitute an indispensable condition for steady work and the precise organisation of production and leisure, which means the well being of all society.

Our laws, our morality and our ideology stand guard over this well-being. And if we encounter squandering of worktime and dereliction of professional and public duty all measures of moral, legal and economic influence must be used against this. Work collectives are called on to do a great deal here. There is no place better than the work collective to see who takes what attitude to the job and who needs to be called to account and in what way.

At the same time, leaders of enterprises, economic organisations and local soviets must be concerned to create the conditions for highly productive work and eliminate hold-ups and distractions from work. In particular, it is necessary to put a stop to the attempts by certain service establishments to return to the old practice whereby working people had to take time off work to deal with everyday matters.

In increasing the prestige of honest work it is important to conduct all management and education so that life itself is severe on those who would like to live better and work less, and sometimes even do nothing at all. Is this vital severity justified? Undoubtedly. It corresponds to the interests of all honest working people.

Describing the international situation, the candidate deputy noted that the past four decades without a world war are the result of major positive shifts in favour of socialism, freedom democracy and peace in the world arena and are to the historic credit of Soviet foreign policy and all peace-loving forces on Earth.

The Soviet Union, the socialist community and the international communist and workers' movement are making a decisive contribution to the cause of maintaining peace. All the large-scale initiatives aimed at removing the threat of war, expanding international co-operation and ending the arms race have proceeded and continue to proceed from them.

The Washington policy of confrontation clearly reveals the source of the war threat. It is being rejected increasingly actively by the peace-loving peoples as an alien and dangerous phenomenon. As Comrade K.U. Chernenko has stressed, "People are not just aware of the drama of our time, they realise more and more clearly where the watershed lies between the two main political courses - the policy of peace and the line of preparing for war." This inspires a sense of confidence and strengthens the conviction that mankind will succeed in curbing militarism.

Today the world's peoples are showing tremendous interest in the forthcoming Geneva talks on the entire range of space and nuclear arms. The Soviet Union is going into the talks with a sincere desire to achieve specific results.

Unfortunately, this cannot be said of the Washington administration's approach. On the eve of the talks the USA has embarked on activity which sows doubts as to the American side's true intentions in agreeing to hold the Geneva talks. What can we say about this? One thing only: calculations of this kind are mistaken, indeed its very approach is unacceptable if there is seriously to be any question of reaching agreements. The world public expects Washington to take a constructive attitude to the talks, based on unswerving observance of the principle of equality and equal security.

While attaching great importance to the normalisation of relations with the USA and to honest talks with it on all the topical issues of international life, we never forget for a minute that the world is not limited to that country alone but is a much bigger place. The Soviet Union has devoted and does devote great and constant attention to its relations with all states which desire peace and equal, mutually advantageous co-operation.

Discussing the matters of European detente, the speaker stressed that Soviet people believe in the good sense of West Europeans and in their interest in preventing Europe - our common home - from being turned into a theatre of military action and a firing range for testing Pentagon doctrines of "limited" nuclear war. We are pleased to note the desire of many West European states for political dialogue. For its part the USSR has been and remains attached to the policy of good-neighbourly relations among all European states.

The speaker went on to dwell on some issues concerning the work of work collectives in Moscow and in the capital's Kiev Rayon. Moscow is the cradle of many revolutionary, combat and work traditions. It was here in 1905, as Lenin observed, that the Moscow workers' never-to-be-forgotten heroism set an example of struggle for all Russia's working people. It was here, at the walls of the capital, that the dawn of our victory broke over the snow-covered fields of the Moscow region in the Great Fatherland.

The victory which we won was not just a victory for our arms. It was a victory for the socialist system, for our economic and political structure, for our ideology and morality. The war brought countless misfortunes, but it revealed with staggering strength the unparalleled tenacity of the Soviet people's revolutionary spirit and their patriotism, courage and mass heroism. The war showed what people defending a righteous cause, their homeland, and their socialist gains are capable of.

In the most difficult year - 1941 - when the capital was under siege, several large units of people's volunteer militia were formed on the territory of Kiev Rayon alone. Together with Soviet servicemen they barred the enemy's way at the point of his main strike and fought to the death in the most critical situations of the great battle for Moscow.

Some of those who took part in those memorable battles are present in this auditorium - Boris Mikhaylovich Vishnyakov and Sergey Vasilyevich Vasilyev. They have told me that they travelled the road of war from Moscow to Berlin and the Elbe in the ranks of the Kiev Rayon people's volunteer militia division, which later became a Guards division. In warmly welcoming them here, we honour the accomplishment of all Moscow veterans, front-line heroes and selfless workers in the rear - the accomplishment of all who held nothing back to help the country in that dreadful hour: neither energy nor life itself, overcoming everything and winning victory!

Today too Muscovites are the initiators of many glorious deeds. Preparing for the coming congress, the capital's working people are marching in the vanguard of competition to complete the 11th Five-Year Plan in a worthy fashion. They successfully

fulfilled the plan targets and socialist pledges for last year and for the first four years of the Five-Year Plan as a whole.

A lot of good and interesting things are being done in Kiev Rayon's industrial and transport enterprises, construction organisations, scientific institutes and cultural and educational establishments. Last year they successfully fulfilled the production targets, and industry achieved above-plan growth in labour productivity and reductions in production costs.

The militant vanguard of the capital's working people is its Party organisation. The Moscow Bolsheviks have written many glorious pages in the revolutionary biography of Lenin's Party. In wartime trials and peaceful socialist building they have always been and remain a reliable support for the Central Committee. Now the Party organisations of Moscow, including the 60,000 communists of Kiev Rayon, are rallying and mobilising the working people to resolve new tasks in the capital's economic, social and cultural development.

In conclusion, M.S. Gorbachev wished Muscovites new successes in their affairs, good health and great personal happiness.

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**ALISTAIR KERR**

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MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV'S SPEECH

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 1 (ONE) FIFTEEN TAKES

MOSCOW MARCH 11 TASS - FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF THE  
SPEECH BY GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE CPSU CENTRAL  
COMMITTEE:

DEAR COMRADES,

ALL OF US, ALL OUR PARTY AND COUNTRY ARE IN DEEP GRIEF.  
KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO, A TRUE LENINIST, AN OUTSTANDING  
FIGURE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOVIET  
STATE, OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, A PERSON WITH A  
RESPONSIVE HEART AND OF A BIG ORGANIZATIONAL TALENT, HAS PASSED  
AWAY.

KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH TRAVERSED A LONG AND GLORIOUS ROAD.  
EVERY POST, ASSIGNED TO HIM BY THE PARTY, EVER FULLER REVEALED  
HIS TALENT, ABILITY TO WORK WITH PEOPLE. AT THE POST OF THE  
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE  
PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET,  
KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO DEVOTED ALL HIS EFFORTS AND  
KNOWLEDGE TO DEVELOPING THE ECONOMY OF THE COUNTRY, RAISING THE  
WELL-BEING AND CULTURAL LEVEL OF THE PEOPLE, ENSURING THE  
SECURITY OF MOTHERLAND, PRESERVING AND CONSOLIDATING PEACE ON  
EARTH.

/MORE/

2124 11 03 85

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11/3 TASS V5-24

TASS ENGLISH

11 MAR 1985

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121

18.31  
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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 2 (TWO)

KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO GUARDED AS THE APPLE OF HIS EYE THE UNITY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE COLLECTIVE CHARACTER OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND ITS POLITICAL BUREAU. HE ALWAYS SOUGHT TO ACHIEVE THAT THE PARTY ACT AT ALL LEVELS AS A CLOSE-KNIT, WELL-ADJUSTED AND SPIRITED ORGANISM. HE REGARDED THE UNITY OF IDEAS AND DEEDS OF THE COMMUNISTS AS AN EARNEST OF SUCCESSES, OF OVERCOMING SHORTCOMINGS, AS AN EARNEST OF STEADY ADVANCE.

THE STRATEGIC LINE, WORKED OUT AT THE 26TH CONGRESS, AT THE SUBSEQUENT PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WITH VIGOROUS PARTICIPATION OF YURI VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV AND KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO, HAS BEEN AND REMAINS UNCHANGED. THIS IS THE LINE TOWARDS SPEEDING UP THE COUNTRY'S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, TOWARDS PERFECTING ALL ASPECTS OF THE LIFE OF SOCIETY. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS RESTRUCTURING THE MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL BASE OF PRODUCTION.

/MORE/

2126 11 03 85

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ZCZCM08156 1 V5- 1244 TASS 77792 E999 E

TASS ENGLISH

11 MAR 1985

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122

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 3 (THREE)

THE POINT AT ISSUE IS THE PERFECTION OF THE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL RELATIONS, ABOVE ALL ECONOMIC ONES. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS ALSO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL, QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF THE MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF HIS LIFE AND WORK, OF HIS SPIRITUAL MAKEUP.

WE ARE TO ACHIEVE A DECISIVE TURN IN TRANSFERRING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY TO THE TRACKS OF INTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT. WE SHOULD, WE ARE BOUND TO ATTAIN WITHIN THE BRIEFEST PERIOD THE MOST ADVANCED SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL POSITIONS, THE HIGHEST WORLD LEVEL IN THE PRODUCTIVITY OF SOCIAL LABOUR.

IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THE TASK WITH GREATER SUCCESS AND SPEED, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE TO PERFECT PERSISTENTLY THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM AND THE ENTIRE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. BY TREADING THIS PATH, SELECTING OPTIMAL DECISIONS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO APPLY IN A CREATIVE WAY THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SOCIALIST ECONOMY. THIS MEANS INVARIABLY CARRYING OUT A PLANNED DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY, STRENGTHENING SOCIALIST OWNERSHIP, EXPANDING THE RIGHTS, ENHANCING THE INDEPENDENCE OF ENTERPRISES, RAISING THEIR INTEREST IN THE END PRODUCT OF THEIR WORK. THIS MEANS SUBORDINATING ULTIMATELY ALL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TO THE INTERESTS OF SOVIET PEOPLE.

/MORE/

2128 11 03 85

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TASS ENGLISH

11 MAR 1985

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11/3 TASS V5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 4 (FOUR)

THE PARTY WILL INVARIABLY FOLLOW ITS SOCIAL POLICY.  
EVERYTHING IN THE NAME OF MAN, FOR THE BENEFIT OF MAN -- THE  
PROGRAMME PROVISION SHOULD BE FILLED WITH EVER DEEPER AND  
CONCRETE CONTENT. NATURALLY, THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING  
CONDITIONS OF PEOPLE SHOULD BE BASED ON THEIR GROWING  
CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMON CAUSE. WHEREVER DEVIATIONS FROM THIS  
PRINCIPLE OCCUR, SOCIAL JUSTICE, WHICH IS A MAJOR FACTOR OF THE  
UNITY AND STABILITY OF SOCIALIST SOCIETY, IS INVARIABLY  
DISRUPTED.

THE PARTY REGARDS FURTHER PERFECTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF  
DEMOCRACY, OF THE ENTIRE SYSTEM OF SOCIALIST SELF-GOVERNMENT OF  
THE PEOPLE AS ONE OF THE VITAL TASKS OF DOMESTIC POLICY.

/MORE/

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TASS ENGLISH

11 MAR 1985

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11/3 TASS V5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 5 (FIVE)

TASKS HERE ARE MULTIFACETED. A GREAT DEAL IS BEING DONE IN THIS RESPECT. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS ENHANCING THE ROLE OF SOVIETS; ACTIVISATION OF TRADE UNIONS; KOMBOMOL; PEOPLE'S CONTROL; WORKERS' COLLECTIVES. LYING AHEAD IS PERSISTENT WORK ALONG THE OUTLINED; AND NEW DIRECTIONS.

DEEPENING SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY IS INSEPARABLY LINKED WITH ENHANCING SOCIAL AWARENESS. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EDUCATIONAL WORK IS MANIFESTED IN HOW WORKERS, COLLECTIVE FARMERS AND INTELLECTUALS PARTICIPATE IN THE SOLUTION OF BIG AND SMALL PROBLEMS; HOW THEY WORK; HOW THEY COMBAT SHORTCOMINGS. RAISING LABOUR AND SOCIAL ACTIVITY OF SOVIET PEOPLE; STRENGTHENING DISCIPLINE; INCULCATING PATRIOTISM AND INTERNATIONALISM ARE BY WHAT THE RESULTS OF ALL OUR IDEOLOGICAL ACTIVITY ARE MEASURED.

/MORE/

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20ZC08159 1 V-5 0779 TASS 77806 E999 E

11/3 TASS V-5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV & (SIX)

TASS ENGLISH

11 MAR 1985

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IN DOING SO RESOLUTE MEASURES WILL BE CONTINUED FURTHER TO  
SET THINGS IN GOOD ORDER; TO REMOVE FROM OUR LIFE ALL ALIEN  
PHENOMENA; ALL ENCROACHMENTS ON THE INTERESTS OF SOCIETY AND ITS  
CITIZENS; TO STRENGTHEN SOCIALIST LEGALITY.

WE MUST STILL FURTHER DEVELOP PUBLICITY IN THE WORK OF  
PARTY, STATE, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS. V.I. LENIN  
USED TO SAY THAT THE STATE IS STRONG BY THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE  
MASSES. OUR PRACTICE HAS FULLY CORROBORATED THAT CONCLUSION. THE  
BETTER INFORMED THE PEOPLE, THE MORE CONSCIOUSLY THEY ACT, THE  
MORE ACTIVELY THEY SUPPORT THE PARTY, ITS PLANS AND PROGRAMMATIC  
OBJECTIVES.

IN THE FOREIGN POLICY SPHERE OUR COURSE IS CLEAR AND  
CONSISTENT. THIS IS THE COURSE OF PEACE AND PROGRESS.

MORE

# **SPECIAL NOTE**

**ITEM SCANNED AS SUPPLIED  
PAGINATION IS AS SEEN**

TASS ENGLISH

11 MAR 1985

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11/3 TASS V-5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 7 (SEVEN)

THE FIRST PRECEPT OF THE PARTY AND THE STATE IS TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN IN EVERY WAY THE FRATERNAL FRIENDSHIP WITH OUR CLOSEST FRIENDS AND ALLIES -- THE COUNTRIES OF THE GREAT SOCIALIST COMMUNITY. WE WILL DO EVERYTHING THAT DEPENDS ON US TO EXPAND COOPERATION WITH SOCIALIST STATES; TO ENHANCE THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF SOCIALISM IN WORLD AFFAIRS. WE WOULD LIKE A SERIOUS IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND BELIEVE THAT, GIVEN RECIPROCITY, THIS IS QUITE POSSIBLE.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE STRUGGLE OF PEOPLES FOR LIBERATION FROM COLONIAL OPPRESSION. AND TODAY OUR SYMPATHIES GO OUT TO THE COUNTRIES OF ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA WHICH ARE FOLLOWING THE ROAD OF CONSOLIDATING INDEPENDENCE AND SOCIAL RENOVATION. FOR US THEY ARE FRIENDS AND PARTNERS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR A DURABLE PEACE; FOR BETTER AND JUST RELATIONS BETWEEN PEOPLES.

MORE

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TASS ENGLISH

11 MAR 1985

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ZCZCM08162 1 V-5 0871 TASS 77828 E999 E

11/3 TASS V-5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV & (EIGHT)

AS TO RELATIONS WITH CAPITALIST STATES, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY  
THE FOLLOWING. WE WILL FIRMLY FOLLOW THE LENINIST COURSE OF  
PEACE AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. TO GOODWILL THE SOVIET UNION  
WILL ALWAYS RESPOND WITH GOODWILL, AS IT WILL RESPOND WITH  
TRUST TO TRUST. BUT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW THAT WE SHALL NEVER  
WAIVE THE INTERESTS OF OUR MOTHERLAND AND THOSE OF ITS ALLIES.

WE VALUE THE SUCCESSES OF THE RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL  
TENSIONS ACHIEVED IN THE 1970S AND ARE READY TO TAKE PART IN  
CARRYING ON WITH THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING PEACEFUL MUTUALLY  
BENEFICIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES ON THE BASIS OF PRINCIPLES  
OF EQUALITY, MUTUAL RESPECT AND NON-INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL  
AFFAIRS. NEW STEPS ALONG THESE LINES COULD DULY MARK THE 40TH  
ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT VICTORY OVER HITLER FASCISM AND  
JAPANESE MILITARISM.

MORE

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TASS ENGLISH

11 MAR 1985

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ZCZCMOS163 1 V-5 0706 TASS 77834 E999 E

11/3 TASS V-5-24.

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 9 (NINE)

NEVER BEFORE HAS SO TERRIBLE A THREAT LOOMED SO LARGE AND  
DARK OVER MANKIND. AS THESE DAYS, THE ONLY REASONABLE WAY OUT OF  
THE EXISTING SITUATION IS AGREEMENT OF THE CONFRONTING FORCES  
ON AN IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF THE RACE IN ARMS; ABOVE ALL,  
NUCLEAR ARMS; ON EARTH AND ITS PREVENTION IN SPACE. AN AGREEMENT  
ON AN HONEST AND EQUITABLE BASIS WITHOUT ATTEMPTS AT  
+OUTPLAYING+ THE OTHER SIDE AND DICTATING TERMS TO IT. AN  
AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD HELP ALL TO ADVANCE TOWARD THE CHERISHED  
GOAL -- THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION AND PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS FOR GOOD; TOWARD THE COMPLETE REMOVAL OF THE THREAT OF  
NUCLEAR WAR. THIS IS OUR FIRM CONVICTION.

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11 MAR 1985

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 10 (TEN)

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WILL OPEN IN GENEVA TOMORROW. THE APPROACH OF THE U.S.S.R. TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS WELL KNOWN. I CAN ONLY REAFFIRM THAT: WE DO NOT STRIVE TO ACQUIRE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES OVER THE UNITED STATES; OVER NATO COUNTRIES; FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THEM (SEMICOLON) WE WANT TERMINATION, AND NOT CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND, THEREFORE, OFFER A FREEZE OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS; AN END TO FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES (SEMICOLON) WE WANT A REAL AND MAJOR REDUCTION OF THE ARMS STOCKPILES; AND NOT THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVER NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS, BE IT IN SPACE OR ON EARTH.

WE WOULD LIKE OUR PARTNERS IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS TO UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET UNION'S POSITION AND RESPOND IN KIND. THEN AGREEMENT WILL BE POSSIBLE. THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD WOULD SIGH WITH RELIEF.

MORE

*Balance*

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TASS ENGLISH

11 MAR 1985

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 11 (ELEVEN)

THE CPSU IS AN INTERNATIONALIST PARTY IN ITS NATURE. PEOPLE  
ABROAD WHO HOLD THE SAME VIEWS AS WE MAY REST ASSURED: IN THE  
STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS THE PARTY OF LENIN WILL,  
AS ALWAYS, CLOSELY COOPERATE WITH FRATERNAL COMMUNIST, WORKERS'  
AND REVOLUTIONARY-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES, AND WILL CHAMPION THE  
UNITY

AND ACTIVE COOPERATION OF ALL REVOLUTIONARY FORCES.

COMRADES, THE SOLUTION OF THE COMPLEX TASKS WE ARE FACED  
WITH PRESUPPOSES A FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE PARTY AND A RISE  
IN ITS ORGANIZING AND GUIDING ROLE. THE CPSU HAS ALWAYS  
PROCEEDED AND PROCEEDS FROM LENIN'S IDEA THAT THE PRINCIPLED  
POLICY IS THE ONLY CORRECT ONE. SUCH A POLICY WHICH IS WORKED  
OUT COLLECTIVELY WILL BE IMPLEMENTED CONSISTENTLY AND  
UNDEVIATINGLY. THE PARTY IS PRECISELY THE FORCE WHICH WILL TAKE  
INTO CONSIDERATION THE INTERESTS OF ALL CLASSES AND SOCIAL  
GROUPS, ALL NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES OF THE COUNTRY, RALLY THEM  
CLOSE TOGETHER AND MOBILISE THE PEOPLE'S ENERGIES FOR THE COMMON  
CAUSE OF COMMUNIST CONSTRUCTION.

/MORE/



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11 MAR 1985  
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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 12 (TWELVE)

THE PARTY'S POLICY HAS BEEN AND WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARDS STRENGTHENING THE ALLIANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS, COLLECTIVE-FARM PEASANTRY AND INTELLIGENTSIA, AND TOWARDS STEADY STRENGTHENING OF FRIENDSHIP OF THE PEOPLES OF OUR GREAT MULTINATIONAL COUNTRY.

THE CPSU WILL IN EVERY WAY DEVELOP THE CREATIVE INITIATIVE OF THE YOUTH; SHOW CONCERN FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE WORKING AND LIVING CONDITIONS OF WOMEN; AND FOR THE NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS OF WAR VETERANS AND VETERAN WORKERS.

IN THE COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, IT IS OF IMPORTANCE AS NEVER BEFORE TO MAINTAIN THE DEFENSE CAPACITY OF OUR MOTHERLAND AT SUCH A LEVEL THAT POTENTIAL AGGRESSORS WOULD KNOW WELL: AN ENCROACHMENT UPON THE SECURITY OF THE LAND OF THE SOVIETS AND ITS ALLIES, UPON THE PEACEFUL LIFE OF SOVIET PEOPLE WILL MEET WITH A CRUSHING RETALIATORY STRIKE. OUR GLORIOUS ARMED FORCES WILL HAVE, IN FUTURE AS WELL, EVERYTHING NECESSARY FOR THAT.

/MORE/

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11 MAR 1985

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 13 (THIRTEEN)

PREPARATIONS FOR THE 27TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU HAVE NOW  
BEGUN ON A LARGE SCALE. A NEW EDITION OF THE PARTY'S PROGRAMME  
IS TO BE CONSIDERED AT THE CONGRESS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE  
COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT FOR THE NEXT FIVE-YEAR-PLAN PERIOD AND FOR  
THE PERIOD ENDING IN THE YEAR 2000 ARE TO BE DETERMINED.

TIME CALLS FOR INTENSE, CREATIVE WORK OF ALL PARTY  
ORGANIZATIONS FROM TOP TO BOTTOM. IN ALL SECTORS EVERYWHERE THE  
COMMUNISTS SHOULD BE AN EXAMPLE OF THE DISCHARGE OF CIVIC DUTY,  
OF CONSCIENTIOUS WORK FOR THE GOOD OF SOCIETY, AND OF STRICT  
OBSERVANCE OF THE LENINIST STYLE OF WORK. THIS APPLIES FIRST OF  
ALL TO THE PARTY CADRES, TO PARTY AND STATE LEADERS. THE CPSU  
WILL UNDEVIATINGLY PURSUE THE LINE TOWARDS INCREASING INSISTENCE  
ON HIGH STANDARDS, AND TOWARDS RAISING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE  
ENTRUSTED WORK.

/MORE/

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TASS ENGLISH

11 MAR 1985

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 14 (FOURTEEN)

AFTER THE END OF THE PLENARY MEETING, THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE FIRST SECRETARIES OF REGIONAL COMMITTEES, AND ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE PLENARY MEETING WILL GO TO THEIR AREAS IN ORDER TO GET DOWN TO WORK WITH FRESH VIGOUR. A GOOD DEAL IS TO BE DONE. FIRST OF ALL, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE WORK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS OF THIS YEAR AND THEREBY TO ENSURE A CONFIDENT START OF THE NEXT FIVE-YEAR-PLAN PERIOD. THE SEVERE WINTER HAS SOMEWHAT SLOWED DOWN THE ATTAINMENT OF PLANNED TARGETS IN A NUMBER OF SECTORS. IT MEANS THAT ONE SHOULD MUSTER ONE'S ENERGIES, TAP RESERVES AND MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MAKE UP FOR WHAT HAS NOT YET BEEN DONE AND TO ATTAIN THE PLANNED TARGETS BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

COMRADES, THESE DAYS WE FEEL STILL MORE KEENLY HOW MIGHTY AND MONOLITHIC THE RANKS OF THE COMMUNISTS ARE AND HOW UNITED OUR SOVIET PEOPLE IS. AT THE RECENT ELECTIONS SOVIET PEOPLE AGAIN EXPRESSED UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR THE COURSE OF OUR PARTY AND THE STATE. THIS SUPPORT IS BOTH INSPIRING AND BINDING.

/MORE/

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TASS ENGLISH

11 MAR 1985

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 15 (FIFTEEN)

TODAY THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLACED UPON ME THE COMPLEX AND BIG DUTIES OF GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE. I AM WELL AWARE OF THE GREAT TRUST PUT IN ME AND OF THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITY CONNECTED WITH THIS. IN THE FORTHCOMING WORK I COUNT ON THE SUPPORT AND ACTIVE ASSISTANCE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU, ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU AND SECRETARIES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE AS A WHOLE. YOUR VERSATILE EXPERIENCE IS THE GIST OF THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF OUR PEOPLE. I PROMISE YOU, COMRADES, TO DO MY UTMOST TO FAITHFULLY SERVE OUR PARTY, OUR PEOPLE, AND THE GREAT LENINIST CAUSE.

ALLOW ME TO EXPRESS CONFIDENCE THAT, LOOKING AHEAD TO THE 27TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU, THE PEOPLE AND THE PARTY, RALLIED ROUND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, WILL DO EVERYTHING FOR OUR SOVIET MOTHERLAND TO BECOME STILL MORE RICH AND POWERFUL AND FOR THE CREATIVE FORCES OF SOCIALISM TO REVEAL THEMSELVES STILL MORE FULLY.

ITEM ENDS+++

2201 11 03 85

MOSCOW 120921Z MAR 85

FLASH

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 329 OF 12TH MAR 85

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

ADVANCE COPY

DEATH OF CHERNENKO: ATTENDANCE

1. THE FOLLOWING IS INTERIM LIST OF THOSE ATTENDING THE FUNERAL:

UNITED STATES VICE PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ

FRANCE: PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS

FRG: PRIME MINISTER KOHL AND MINISTER OF CHANCELLERY SHAUBLE

ITALY: PRESIDENT PERTINI AND FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI

SPAIN: PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ (AND POSSIBLY FOREIGN MINISTER MORAN)

TURKEY: PRIME MINISTER OZAL AND FOREIGN MINISTER

JAPAN: PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE AND FOREIGN MINISTER ABE

INDIA: PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI

PAKISTAN: PRESIDENT ZIA UL HAQ AND FOREIGN MINISTER KHAN

JORDAN: PRIME MINISTER AHMED OBAIDAT AND FOREIGN MINISTER AL MASRI

CANADA: PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY

FINLAND: PRESIDENT KOIVISTO AND PRIME MINISTER SORSA

IRELAND: PRESIDENT HILLERY AND MINISTER OF FISHERIES O'TOOLE

SWEDEN: PRIME MINISTER AND CROWN PRINCE BERTHOLD

AUSTRALIA: MINISTER OF INDUSTRY, SENATOR BUTTON

NEW ZEALAND: HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON

PORTUGAL: ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT AMARAL

NETHERLANDS: FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DEN BORK

AUSTRIA: PRESIDENT KIRSCHLAGER

BELGIUM: FOREIGN MINISTER TINDEMANS AND POSSIBLY PRIME MINISTER MARTENS

GREECE: FOREIGN MINISTER HARALAMBOPOULOS

CHINA: VICE PREMIER LI PENG AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN

EGYPT: PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT MENDOSSA (TO BE CONFIRMED)

UN SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR

WE HAVE TWO REQUESTS FOR BILATERALS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER  
ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT ZIA AND SPANISH PRIME MINISTER GONZALEZ.

RATFORD

DEATH OF CHERNENKO: ATTENDANCE: FCO TELNO 251.

1. WE NOW HAVE THE FOLLOWING FURTHER DELEGATION DETAILS:

TANZANIA: SECRETARY - GENERAL OF PARTY, RASHED M KAWAWA  
(PROVISIONAL HEAD OF DELEGATION)

NIGERIA: MINISTER OF DEFENCE:

LEBANON: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL

NORWAY: CROWN PRINCE HARALD AND PRIME MINISTER

LUXEMBOURG: MINISTER OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY

DENMARK: PRINCE GEORG AND FOREIGN MINISTER

EGYPT: DR SOPHI ABDEL HAKIM, SPEAKER OF CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL AND  
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF RULING PARTY (NOT PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT,  
AS STATED IN OUR TELNO 329)

ALGERIA: POLITBURO MEMBER AND LEADER OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
SECRETARIAT, MOHAMMED CHERIF NESSADIA

YAR: ABDUL AZIZ, PRIME MINISTER

LIBYA: PRIME MINISTER

MOROCCO: PRIME MINISTER AL-KARIM LANRANI

SDRY: PRESIDENT ALI NASSER MOHAMMED

TUNISIA: REPRESENTATIVE OF PRESIDENT, AL-MUNJIB AL-KAAL

SYRIA: ABDULLAH EL-AHMAR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAATH  
PARTY. FAROUK SHARA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

IRAQ: ABDUL AZIZ ALDOURI, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY  
COUNCIL. TARIZ AZIZ, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

KUWAIT: ABDUL RACHMAN SALEM AL ATIQUI, ADVISER OF THE AMIR

PLO: YASSER ARAFAT, FAROUK ABDOUMI, MAHMOUD ABBAS

SUDAN: SECOND VICE-PRESIDENT JOSEPH LAGU.

2. CANADIANS HAVE ALSO ASKED FOR PRIME MINISTER BILATERAL WHICH  
THEY SAY THEY HAVE FED ON IN LONDON.

SUTHERLAND

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

M S GORBACHEV - A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Summary

I. Early years; 1931-1949

Gorbachev was born in 1931 into a peasant family in the agricultural area of Stavropol (North Caucasus), which was occupied by the Germans between August 1942 and January 1943. After working as an assistant to a combine harvester operator (probably part-time while he did his secondary education), Gorbachev entered Moscow University (paragraphs 1 to 4).

II. Moscow University, 1950-1955

Gorbachev studied law, but Moscow University was of decisive importance in his political career. He joined the Party in 1952 and was probably secretary of the University's Komsomol (the Party's youth wing) organisation (paragraphs 5 to 6).

III. Komsomol Work in Stavropol, 1956-1962

Immediately after university Gorbachev started his career as a Komsomol and Party official in his home region (paragraph 7).

IV. Party Work in Stavropol, 1962-1970

Gorbachev's first years as a Party official coincided with Khrushchev's last. He benefited from Khrushchev's numerous reorganisations of the Party apparatus, but also took a hand in returning the local Party organisation to its traditional form under Brezhnev (paragraph 8). He got an agricultural degree by correspondence (paragraph 9). He rose steadily in the Stavropol Party organisation, probably helped by the promotion to the centre of his former boss, Kulakov, and by the decline under Brezhnev of his immediate superior in the Stavropol regional party organisation (paragraphs 10 to 12).

V. First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom, 1970-1978

On election as First Secretary of the Stavropol Kraikom in 1970, Gorbachev became one of the regional Party Secretaries who are the backbone of the Party's control over the country as a whole (paragraph 13). Locally he supported schemes to improve incentives for farm workers and greater mechanisation of the harvesting process. Nationally, he became a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet and a

member of the Party's Central Committee. As such he began to lead Party delegations abroad (paragraphs 14 to 15).

#### VI. To Moscow as Central Committee Secretary, 1978

Gorbachev's crucial promotion to Party Secretary for Agriculture in 1978 probably came about through a mixture of luck (the sudden death of Kulakov), connections with the leadership (Suslov's interest in the region, and its resorts, frequented by the leadership) and ability (noted by Brezhnev). (Paragraphs 16 to 18.)

#### VII. Rise in the leadership under Brezhnev and Andropov, 1978-1984

At 47, Gorbachev was not exceptionally young to be made a Party Secretary, but his rise to full membership of the Politburo by 1980 was exceptionally rapid and was probably due in particular to Brezhnev's approval (paragraphs 19 to 20). Gorbachev's personal contribution to agricultural policies is hard to discern: this is probably to his advantage (paragraph 21). He rose steadily up the ranks of the Party Secretaries until he stood third after Andropov and Chernenko. With both sick in 1983, much of the burden of running Party affairs must have fallen on Gorbachev (paragraphs 22 to 23). In May 1983 he visited the West for the first time as a representative of the Soviet State (paragraph 24).

#### VIII. Under Chernenko as General Secretary, 1984

Gorbachev is unlikely to have challenged Chernenko for the leadership when Andropov died in February 1984. He retains the confidence of the rest of the leadership, as shown by the exceptional breadth of his current responsibilities as a Party Secretary: he supervises ideology and foreign policy, agriculture and general economic questions, and Party organisation. He is the natural choice as General Secretary when Chernenko dies, if his age (53) is not held against him (paragraphs 25 to 27).

#### IX. Personality, Family

Gorbachev is intelligent and urbane; nor is his wife a Soviet stereotype (paragraph 28).

#### X Conclusions

Gorbachev has had a successful Party career, a prerequisite for the highest political office, and one that is less narrow than it appears at first sight (paragraph 29). As the first Politburo member not old enough to have fought in the War or to have held political office under Stalin, and the first in recent history to have had a university education, Gorbachev belongs to a new generation. The generational gap should not be exaggerated:



Gorbachev has made his entire career in the Party apparatus, whose discipline and suspicion of individualism have not been relaxed. But he reached political maturity under Brezhnev, when the Party came to recognise the complexity of the issues it was dealing with, sought specialist advice and strove for solutions that satisfied all interests. Gorbachev has thrived in this atmosphere (paragraph 30). Gorbachev himself probably holds progressive views on economic management, but would have no interest in a radical dilution of Party control. If he were to become the Soviet leader he would be subject to the same constraints as his predecessors, though his youth would of itself affect the style of leadership. On external affairs he has so far reflected the Party line (paragraph 31).

## M S GORBACHEV - A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

I Early years; 1931-1949

1. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was born into a peasant family on 2 March 1931 in the village of Privolnoe in the Krasnogvardeisky district of Stavropol region. This is an important grain growing and sheep rearing area of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) in the North Caucasus. Gorbachev's birth place is in the north west of the region, bordering the neighbouring Rostov region.
2. Gorbachev was born after the forcible collectivisation of the peasants had largely been achieved, but just before one of its immediate consequences, the great famine of 1932-1934, which affected the north Caucasus as well as the Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
3. Gorbachev presumably went to school in his home village, but there is no record of what happened to him when the region was occupied by the Germans between August 1942 and January 1943.
4. Gorbachev's official biography maintains that he started work in 1946 (at the age of 15) as an assistant to a combine harvester operator in a Motor-tractor Station (these were state run enterprises which from 1930-1958 served as agricultural machinery pools for collective farms and also as centres of political control). But a local biography which was seen by a Western scholar indicates that he did this work only during the summer while he was going to secondary school. This seems more likely, both because work with the combine harvester would be largely confined to the summer months, and because it is difficult to see how without secondary education Gorbachev could have gained even the minimum qualifications to enter Moscow University.

II Moscow University, 1950-1955

5. Gorbachev entered the Law Faculty of Moscow University in 1950 (aged 19) and studied till 1955, the standard length of that course at the time. His elevation from the provinces to the most prestigious seat of learning in the Soviet Union was clearly of decisive importance for his later career, but there is no information about how it was achieved. Gorbachev may have benefited from the reconstitution and expansion of the Soviet higher education system after the war. Stalin's campaign against the Jews from 1949 to his death may also be relevant. A high proportion of Soviet lawyers were Jewish and there may have been a requirement to replace Jewish law students with Russians.
6. Gorbachev was evidently exempted from military service through being at university, though he will probably have done a reserve officer's course concurrently. Moscow University was the starting point of Gorbachev's political career. In 1952, at the age of 21, he joined the Communist Party. According to one Western scholar, Gorbachev was secretary of the Moscow University Komsomol (the Party's youth wing) from 1954 to 1955 (it is normal for leading Komsomol officials to be Party members).

III Komsomol Work in Stavropol, 1956-1962

7. It was evidently Gorbachev's Komsomol and Party credentials, rather than his degree in law, which determined his next steps, and indeed his whole subsequent career. From 1956 to 1962 he was a Komsomol official in his home region of Stavropol. He was First Secretary of the Stavropol Town Committee (Gorkom) from 1956 to 1958. He then moved upwards into the Regional Committee (Kraikom) of the Komsomol, where between 1958 and 1962 he was successively: Deputy Head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, Second and then First Secretary of the Kraikom Komsomol organisation. In 1961, as a Komsomol representative, he was a voting delegate to the 22nd Party Congress, a historic occasion, when it was decided to remove Stalin's body from the Mausoleum, following a further demunciation of the former dictator by Khrushchev.

IV. Party Work in Stavropol, 1962-1970

8. The start of Gorbachev's career as a Party official coincided with the last 2½ years of Khrushchev's regime, with its constant administrative reorganisations, which seem to have worked in Gorbachev's favour. In the spring of 1962 Khrushchev reorganised the administration of agriculture with the creation of "Territorial-Production Administrations", bodies which covered several districts and administered collective and state farms. This reorganisation gave Gorbachev his first Party post as Party Organiser of the Stavropol Territorial-Production Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz Administration. The end of that same year saw another reorganisation: the splitting of the Party into separate industrial and agricultural structures. This meant that there were now 2 Stavropol regional party organisations, one for industry and one for agriculture. As a result of the reorganisation, in December 1962, Gorbachev was advanced to the politically sensitive post of Head of the Department of Party Organs of the Stavropol Regional Party Committee (Kraikom). (This was presumably the agricultural Kraikom, which in Stavropol was the more important.) In this post, under the supervision of the second secretary of Stavropol Kraikom, Gorbachev will have been in charge of all the relevant party organisational matters and appointments throughout the region. Gorbachev's nomination for such a sensitive post could only have been made with the full approval, if not at the instigation of the then first secretary of the Kraikom, F D Kulakov (see paragraph 10 below). He remained in this job until September 1966 and thus will have been in charge of implementing in the Stavropol region the post-Khrushchev leadership's decision in November 1964 to restore a unitary party structure.

9. During these years Gorbachev was doing a correspondence course at the Stavropol Agricultural Institute, from which he graduated in 1967. The Party has always encouraged its officials to further their education. The purpose of Gorbachev's further qualification - in academic terms worth much less than his degree from Moscow University - will have been to enhance his authority as a Party official in a largely agricultural region.

10. Between 1966 and 1978 Gorbachev rose steadily as a local party official, mirroring his rise a decade earlier as a Komsomol official. From 1966 to 1968 he was First Secretary of Stavropol Town Party Committee (Gorkom), from August 1968 to April 1970 he was Second Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Party Committee (Kraikom) and from 1970 to 1978 First Secretary of the Stavropol Kraikom. While it is impossible to say whether his connections played a greater part in this rise than his talent, it is undoubtedly relevant that his former superior, Kulakov (see paragraph 8 above), was transferred to Moscow and promoted in late 1964 after the fall of Khrushchev first to Head of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee and then to Central Committee Secretary for Agriculture, from which position he could undoubtedly influence appointments in his former region.

11. It is also relevant that Kulakov's replacement as First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom was L N Efremov, a politician on a downward trend. He had been a Candidate Member of the Politburo under Khrushchev, but was shunted aside to Stavropol by the new leadership and lost his Politburo status in 1966. Thus Gorbachev as Second Secretary from 1968 was serving under someone who was politically doomed and whom he may already have been earmarked to succeed.

12. The timing of Gorbachev's promotion to First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom in April 1970, after less than 2 years as Second Secretary and at the early age of 39, may have been dictated by the approach of the elections to the Supreme Soviet in June 1970 and the 24th Party Congress in April 1971 and the leadership's wish to deprive Efremov of his status as a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet and full member of the Central Committee, to which he had the unspoken right as Party leader of an important region. At all events, it was Gorbachev who acquired this status (see paragraph 15 below).

#### V First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom, 1970-1978

13. Gorbachev thus became a significant political figure at local and national level. He was now one of the regional Party secretaries who are the backbone of the Party's control over the country as a whole. His own region of Stavropol ranks high in importance because of its agricultural potential. As a Krai it also ranks in status above most other regions (oblasts) because it includes within its borders one of the regions set aside for national minorities within the Russian Republic - the Karachaevo-Cherkesskaya Autonomous Oblast.

14. As the Party boss of a major agricultural area Gorbachev was in a position to put his weight behind various agricultural schemes which had proved successful in his own region. In 1976 he advocated the "link" system of farming (whereby small teams are allocated specific areas of farmland to cultivate round the year and paid by results), which has now won Politburo approval (see paragraph 21 below). He also supported the "Ipatovo method" of harvesting by highly mechanised harvesting columns complete with their own

transport, spare parts, canteens etc, which toured the farms completing the full harvesting and reploughing process in a single operation. Gorbachev acknowledged in a Pravda article in 1978 that this Ipatovo method (named after the district where it was evolved, which is also Gorbachev's Supreme Soviet constituency) cut across the link system and was not everywhere greeted with enthusiasm. It nonetheless met the Party's requirement for more intensive and mechanised cultivation and was recommended by a Central Committee decree and by a personal message from Brezhnev for wider application. As with so many similar initiatives, whatever its intrinsic local merits, its wider and frequently thoughtless application has led to the Ipatovo method being somewhat discredited.

15. Gorbachev's debut as a national figure came with his election in June 1970 as a Deputy to the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In 1970 he was also elected a member of its Environmental Protection Commission and in 1974 of its Youth Affairs Commission. More importantly, he was elected to full membership of the Central Committee of the CPSU at the 24th Party Congress in April 1971. This did not in itself confer any significant central decision making role on Gorbachev (there were 240 other full Central Committee members), but gave him status in the Party. It also gave him the opportunity to travel abroad as a leading Party representative. His first recorded trip abroad had been as a member of a Party delegation to Czechoslovakia in November 1969 to discuss youth work (a difficult assignment in the atmosphere following the Soviet invasion). As a member of the Central Committee he began to lead Party delegations: to Brussels in 1972, the FRG in 1975 and France in 1976.

#### VI To Moscow as Central Committee Secretary, 1978

16. In July 1978 Kulakov, by then a Full Member of the Politburo, died suddenly, aged 60. Gorbachev was one of the speakers at his funeral. At the next routine Party Plenum on 28 November 1978 Gorbachev (then 47) was elected a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. (Though, as is customary, his responsibilities were not disclosed, it was clear that he was to supervise agriculture in place of Kulakov.)

17. There was a large element of luck for Gorbachev in this crucial promotion. Had Kulakov lived, Gorbachev might well have stayed on in Stavropol until at least Brezhnev's death, since movement of Party officials was becoming more and more sluggish. The choice of Gorbachev was probably dictated partly by his connections with the top leadership and partly by his ability. Gorbachev's connections will have been enhanced by having his former chief, Kulakov, in the centre, but the latter could obviously not have contributed directly to his promotion to Secretary. Gorbachev also had an unusual advantage in that his region includes the famous spas of Kislovodsk and Pyatigorsk to which members of the leadership (Andropov regularly) repaired. Gorbachev will undoubtedly have seen to their comforts and visited them there. Gorbachev may also have had the backing of Suslov, who had been first secretary of the Stavropol

Kraikom during the war and whose continuing interest in Stavropol was signalled by his representing the Politburo at the 100th anniversary celebrations of the town of Stavropol in May 1978. Finally, Gorbachev seems to have enjoyed Brezhnev's confidence, and this confidence was probably based to a large extent on Brezhnev's assessment of Gorbachev's ability, since it was not in Brezhnev's interest to choose anyone less than competent for the difficult post of agricultural Secretary. There were other regional Party Secretaries closer to Brezhnev who could have been chosen. Brezhnev showed particular warmth when presenting Gorbachev with an award in December 1978 for "working in one of the main granaries in the country, Stavropol". Brezhnev hoped that "in his new, responsible post of Central Committee Secretary, Mikhail Sergeevich will display his characteristic qualities of initiative and selflessness".

18. Gorbachev inherited Kulakov's personal aide, A P Lushchikov (born 1917) a former Deputy Head of the Agriculture Department of the Central Committee, who remains with him to this day.

#### VII Rise in the leadership under Brezhnev and Andropov, 1978-1984

19. At 47, Gorbachev was not exceptionally young to be elected a Central Committee Secretary. Katushev had been made a Secretary in 1968 at the age of 41, Dolgikh in 1972 aged 48 and Ryabov in 1976 aged 44. But Katushev lost his place on the Secretariat after 9 years and Ryabov after 3, while Dolgikh spent 10 years as a junior Secretary before being promoted to candidate membership of the Politburo in 1982, where he remains. Gorbachev, by contrast, rose exceptionally quickly in the Party hierarchy. He was made a Candidate Member of the Politburo in November 1979, one year after becoming a Secretary, and a full member a year later in October 1980. He thus became one of the select group of Party Secretaries who are also members of the Party's top decision making body, the Politburo, and thus at the apex of the power structure of the Soviet Union.

20. Gorbachev's initial rise was not accompanied by any broadening of his responsibilities and must be attributed to his general acceptability to the rest of the Politburo and in particular to Brezhnev's desire to fill the gap in the Politburo left by Kulakov's death with a competent lieutenant overseeing the ever difficult agricultural sphere. This much can be deduced from Brezhnev's commendation of Gorbachev when presenting him in March 1981 with the Order of Lenin which he had (routinely) been awarded on his 50th birthday:

"This is an energetic and go-ahead man, who knows the economy. But the sector of the Party's management entrusted to him by the Politburo does indeed demand great energy, initiative and the search for effective solutions. I am talking about agriculture, the agro-industrial complex as a whole."

21. The nature and effect of Gorbachev's contribution to Soviet agricultural policy (and to other political matters) is hard to

discern. Under Brezhnev and since, all initiatives have been ascribed to the General Secretary and little room has been left for the public display of the political talents of other leaders. Gorbachev will undoubtedly have played a large part in formulating the major agricultural policy document of Brezhnev's latter years, the Food Programme, adopted in May 1982, but he is unlikely to have been equally involved in all aspects of this wide-ranging programme. In publicising the programme, he said little about the reorganisation of agriculture at the local level into agro-industrial associations (RAPO's), the organisation of which may have been left to Chernenko, then Brezhnev's Party Secretary in charge of Party and government administration. Gorbachev does seem to be an advocate of the "link", or "collective contract" system, as it is now called, which has always met with some reservation in Party circles because of the spectre of peasant private enterprise which it raises. It may be significant that the system was not endorsed at the May 1982 Plenum, but only by the Politburo after Brezhnev's death, and that it was Gorbachev who explained its advantages authoritatively and cogently at a provincial conference in March 1983. The fact that Gorbachev cannot be firmly identified with any particular agricultural (or other policy) is probably to his advantage, however. He will still be among the best known of the Party Secretaries in the country at large through his fairly frequent travels round the country's agricultural areas.

22. As Gorbachev has risen in the Party, so he has accumulated status in the Supreme Soviet. Having served as a member of 2 Commissions (Environmental Protection and Youth), he was made Chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission in 1979 (the only formal use that has been made of his legal training) and of the Foreign Affairs Commission in 1984 (see paragraph 26 below for the political significance of this move). In 1980, in common with the other Politburo members, he was also elected a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR for another, but less successful agricultural region, the Altai Krai in Southern Siberia.

23. Thanks to the death and retirement of his seniors, Gorbachev has risen steadily up the ranks of the Party Secretaries. From the beginning of 1982, with the successive departure of Suslov and Brezhnev through death, and Kirilenko through retirement, Gorbachev's position improved, although in May 1982 Andropov was brought in from the KGB and placed ahead of the other senior Secretaries (probably because of his having served in the Secretariat earlier). When Andropov took over as General Secretary in November 1982 Gorbachev was third in line after Chernenko. The latter was absent for much of the Summer of 1983, and though a new secretary (Romanov) was brought in in June, Gorbachev's status and the breadth of his responsibilities increased correspondingly. There were indications that he had taken on broader economic responsibilities and had some role in supervising Party organisation. Thus, whether or not stories that he enjoyed the particular confidence of the ailing Andropov are true, much of the burden of running the Party's affairs must have fallen on Gorbachev in the summer of 1983.

24. As a Senior Party Secretary, Gorbachev represented the CPSU at the Mongolian and Vietnamese Party Congresses in 1981 and 1982, at the Portuguese Communist Party Congress in 1983 and at the Italian Communist leader Berlinguer's funeral in 1984 (after which Gorbachev was received by President Pertini). More importantly, in May 1983 he visited Canada at the head of a Supreme Soviet delegation, his first visit to the West as a representative of the Soviet State, rather than Party. He had talks with Prime Minister Trudeau and toured Canadian agricultural enterprises, impressing his hosts with his detailed knowledge of the subject. He also appeared before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence of the Canadian House of Commons, at which he replied to questions, some hostile, while a verbatim record was taken. For a Soviet politician this is an unusual ordeal, and for Gorbachev to have agreed to submit to it reflects not only his own self-confidence but his knowledge of having the confidence of his Politburo colleagues.

#### VIII Under Chernenko as General Secretary, 1984

25. Andropov died in February in 1984, and Chernenko, the next in line of the Party Secretaries, succeeded him as General Secretary. This was a safe and, in terms of precedence and protocol, an uncontroversial choice. Nonetheless, it looked very much like the "old guard" choosing one of their own generation, an impression strengthened by the fact that Chernenko was proposed for the office by Prime Minister Tikhonov and not, as had been the case in the previous succession, by the next most senior Party Secretary, who on this occasion would have been Gorbachev. There were rumours of a disputed succession and indications of some dismay in Party circles that another elderly General Secretary had been chosen in preference to Gorbachev. The Plenum proceedings published in booklet form a few days later contained Gorbachev's previously unpublished speech closing the Plenum, in which he had duly supported the choice of Chernenko; this was presumably done to dispel such rumours within the Party.

26. It is in fact unlikely that Gorbachev would have squandered his accumulated political capital by mounting a premature challenge to Chernenko, and his subsequent rise indicates that he retains the confidence of the rest of the leadership. When Chernenko was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in April 1984 and thus relinquished his chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev was elected in his place. This post, which of itself accords Gorbachev status, not power, indicates that he has taken over the responsibility in the Party Secretariat for the broad area of ideology and foreign policy, particularly towards with the "Socialist" countries, exercised by Chernenko, Andropov and Suslov before him. (The fact that in the 2 previous successions this position has been the stepping stone to the General Secretaryship does not of itself provide any guarantee for the next succession.) In addition, Gorbachev has maintained his supervision of agriculture; of general economic questions (he is said to be Chairman of the Politburo Commission tasked with working out a plan for the improvement of the whole economic mechanism); and of Party



organisation. This is an exceptionally broad range of responsibilities, which is partly dictated by there being only 2 senior Party Secretaries, Gorbachev and Romanov, apart from the General Secretary himself.

27. In the Party Secretariat Gorbachev ranks immediately below Chernenko and is therefore the natural choice as successor when Chernenko dies, if his age (at 53 he is still the youngest member of the Politburo) is not held against him. In the hierarchy of the Politburo as a whole he still ranks below the "old guard" of Prime Minister Tikhonov, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defence Minister Ustinov. But none of these is a likely successor to Chernenko.

#### IX Personality, Family

28. Gorbachev is stocky and bald, with a prominent birthmark on his head, which is airbrushed out of his official photographs. He is not known to speak any foreign language. He has impressed his Western interlocutors with his intelligence and his urbanity. As with all the Soviet leadership, little has been revealed about Gorbachev's private life. His wife, however, was well to the fore at the Women's Day reception in March 1984, where she emerged as well dressed to the point of elegance, bejewelled and altogether unlike the Soviet stereotype. She is just under a year younger than her husband. They are thought to have a daughter and granddaughter.

#### X. Conclusions

29. In the Soviet Union a successful Party career is the prerequisite for the highest political office. Gorbachev has so far travelled this road extremely successfully. He has spent all his working life as a Komsomol and Party official. He rose steadily through the ranks as a local official to become an important regional First Party Secretary. He was transferred to Moscow as a Central Committee Secretary and he achieved early elevation to the Politburo. The relative narrowness of his experience is probably not a handicap. Since the upheavals of the Stalin and Khrushchev eras, and the war, Party officials have been moved around less energetically, and in future there will be few aspiring leaders who have had the varied experience of earlier generations. Nor is Gorbachev's close association with agriculture necessarily to his disadvantage, despite its continuing problems. In Party terms it is more important that Gorbachev has had broad experience as a Party manager at various levels. He has, however, no direct experience of military affairs, and his role as overlord of sector which absorbs a significant slice of capital investment would not seem to make him a natural ally of the military.

30. Much has been made of Gorbachev as a leader of the new generation. He became the first Politburo member who was not old enough to fight in the war and had not held political office under Stalin, and the first in recent history to have had a university degree rather than a technical education. This generational gap should not be exaggerated. If too young to fight in the war,

Gorbachev was certainly directly affected by it. If he did not hold political office under Stalin, his first political steps were taken in the last and most obscurantist years of Stalin. Most significantly, Gorbachev has made his entire career in the Party apparatus, whose tradition of strict discipline and suspicion of "individualism" has not been relaxed with the years. This said, Gorbachev does represent a new type among Soviet politicians. He reached political maturity in the Brezhnev years when, in contrast to the Stalin and Khrushchev years, the Party leadership recognised the complexity of the domestic and foreign issues it was dealing with, sought and listened to specialist advice and attempted to come up with solutions that as nearly as possible satisfied all the interests involved. Gorbachev has thrived in this atmosphere, where his intellectual capacity seems to have stood him in good stead. Moreover, after Brezhnev's death, the requirement for a Soviet leader to surround himself with his own coterie seems to have declined somewhat, again to the benefit of Gorbachev, who seems to have won broad respect in the Party for his ability. It may be a combination of these factors that has allowed Gorbachev to dispense with the hectoring manner characteristic of Soviet Party officials, particularly in the regions (and typified by his rival, Romanov).

31. It remains hard to discern whether Gorbachev has any far reaching political ideas which he would like to put into practice if he became Party leader. There is little doubt that in Western terms his views on the economy and agriculture tend towards the "progressive", ie more stress on economic stimuli and less on exhortation and campaigning. But this does not make him a radical. He would have no interest in a dilution of Party control over all spheres of Soviet life, and it seems almost inconceivable that he could be brought to concede, for example, that the forcible collectivisation of the peasants, which most Western observers consider still to be at the root of Soviet agricultural problems, was a mistake. If he were to become the Soviet leader he would be subject to the same constraints as his predecessors, at least for a number of years. But his youth and energy would be bound to affect his style of leadership and might do something to revivify the Party apparatus at all levels. As regards the Soviet Union's external policy, there is little evidence of his doing other than reflect the general Party line. Despite his newly acquired status as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union he has not hitherto been any more accessible to Western interlocutors in Moscow or particularly forthcoming when approached.

Soviet Section  
Research Department  
November 1984

## GORBACHEV'S UK VISIT

Biography

1. The following points were added to the generally known details of Gorbachev's biography:
  - a) His father fought in the war, was wounded at Kosice and treated in Cracow. His wounds eventually killed him. Gorbachev's mother is still alive.
  - b) As a child Gorbachev lived in his paternal grandparent's home. His grandfather was a communist and had been a pioneer in the organisation of the first collective farms. His grandmother, however, was an ardent believer and had Gorbachev baptised.
  - c) Gorbachev's leap from the provinces to Moscow University had been achieved, he claimed, simply by filling in the application and taking the exams (though he had partial exemption through gaining a silver medal on completing his secondary education). He had chosen law because there was some official interest in it at the time and because his grandfather had recommended it.

Wife's Biography and Personality

2. Raisa Maksimovna Gorbacheva is a year younger than her husband. Her father (a Ukrainian) was a railway official, and although she was born in the Altai Krai she had a very mobile childhood. Her mother is from Siberia. She gained a 'gold star' at secondary school and met her husband at Moscow University, where she was studying philosophy. She is now a Doctor of Philosophy and has lectured at higher educational institutes. She is proud of her wide reading, but her interest in much of what she saw and heard in the UK was genuine and not borne of a desire to please or impress. She is clearly accustomed to being in a position where she is offered the best and where her wishes and changes of mind are catered for without question. She had learnt some English at school and was keen to read it and try out a few phrases, but basically she is not an English speaker.

Family Life

3. The Gorbachev's are an extended family: the household includes a daughter (the only child, aged 27), who is a doctor, her husband (a cardio vascular surgeon) and their grand-daughter (4 years old), and also her parents for much of the time and his mother for some of the time.

.../Gorbachev's

Gorbachev's Responsibilities and Relations with the Rest of the Politico

4. All that Gorbachev could be induced to say about his responsibilities was to acknowledge that they went wider than agricultural and economic affairs. Zamyatin vouchsafed that in addition to agriculture, Gorbachev had a wide range of other responsibilities and an important coordinating role within the Party Secretariat. Apart from his constant references to Chernenko, Gorbachev scarcely mentioned his Politbureau colleagues. He spoke warmly of Ustinov when revealing the latter's death, but did not appear to be emotionally affected by it himself.

His Views

5. On agriculture Gorbachev acknowledged that this year's harvest was 'not good' and that a 'big drop' had been registered. Nonetheless, he asserted that they would solve the grain problem in just a few years. He said that while the USSR had pressed ahead vigorously with fertilizer production it was still behind requirements in pesticides.

6. On the economy in general, Gorbachev spoke in standard terms, though with evident conviction. His broad theme was that what could safely be decentralised would be decentralised, but that key decisions, such as price fixing, would be even more firmly centralised. There would be more elements of self-management introduced throughout the Soviet economy, but no mechanical borrowing of eg. Hungarian experience.

7. Gorbachev took pleasure in airing his knowledge not only of agricultural techniques but also (at the Cowley Motorworks) of the technical and economic problems of vehicle production. He spoke as a man at ease with the capabilities of robotics, computer technology and new management techniques. He was confident that modernisation - the application of advanced technology and better methods of organisation and management - would solve the Soviet Union's social and economic problems. In this context he mentioned current economic experiments. He said the process would be lengthy, and above all, progress had to proceed evenly. His confidence in the power of technology harnessed to sound organisation was several times expressed in terms of evident pride in Soviet power.

8. On international affairs, Gorbachev was less animated than when he spoke on the Soviet economic scene. But he was never lost for a reply, and the discussions had a liveliness normally absent at meetings with Gromyko or Chernenko.

9. Gorbachev revealed a strong strain of Russian/Slav nationalism, as did his wife. He told several people that

.../without

without the firm grip at the centre, the many races in the Soviet Union would have flown apart and produced chaos.

10. Gorbachev was well prepared for the inevitable questions on dissidents and Jewish immigration and was quick to move onto the counter attack. He gave no indication of having any 'liberal' thoughts on these subjects.

General

11. Gorbachev's behaviour was, above all, natural. He seemed unconcerned by the extensive press coverage of his visit and handled the British media well. In the talks, while he was able to use the appropriate dialectical terms, he avoided standard Pravda verbiage and showed facility in debate. His relations with his delegation were good. He not infrequently gave members of his team the floor to speak on subjects on which they were experts. Their attitude to him was one of natural deference and admiration, but not of awe. Throughout the visit Gorbachev gave no indication that he speaks or understands any English.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROMYKO, Andrei Andreevich

Minister of Foreign Affairs USSR 1957; First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR 1983; Member, CC CPSU 1956 and of its Politburo 1973.

Born 1909, Belorussia; officially described as "Russian".

1931            Joined Party.

1932            Graduated from an Economics Institute.

1936            Completed post-graduate course at All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Agricultural Economics.

1936-1939      Worked in Institute of Economics, Academy of Sciences, USSR.

1939            Began diplomatic work as Head, Department of American Countries of MFA.

1939-1943      Counsellor, Washington.

1943-1946      Ambassador, Washington and concurrently Envoy to Cuba.

1946-1948      Permanent Soviet Representative in UN Security Council.

1946-1949      Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

1946-1950      Deputy, Supreme Soviet USSR.

1949-1952      First Deputy Foreign Minister.

June 1952-     Ambassador, London.

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April 1953

1952-1956        Candidate Member, CC CPSU.  
1953-1957        First Deputy Foreign Minister.  
1956-            Member, CC CPSU  
1957-            Minister of Foreign Affairs USSR  
1958-            Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR  
1973-            Member, Politburo CC CPSU.  
1983-            First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers.

Gromyko led the Soviet delegation at Dumbarton Oaks, was present at the Potsdam and Crimea conferences, and has been Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union for over 25 years. In addition to this unrivalled experience, he has very considerable ability; a methodical and accurate mind; a good command of English; and rather more charm than is apparent on his greyer days. He is beginning to look his age, but at present he is in excellent health.

Gromyko is the author of works on international relations and is Chairman of the Commission for Publishing Diplomatic Documents; a book by Gromyko on capitalist economic relations was published in 1983. He has twice been awarded the title "Hero of Socialist Labour" and he has 6 Orders of Lenin.

Mrs Gromyko is friendly and on occasion indiscreet in her conversation. Their son, Anatoly, after a few years in diplomatic work became Director of the Africa Institute of the Academy of Sciences; Anatoly's son, Igor, is a post-graduate student at the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Relations.

CONFIDENTIAL

TIKHONOV, Nikolai Aleksandrovich

Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR 1980; Member of Politburo CC CPSU 1979; Member, CC CPSU 1966.

Born 1905, Kharkov, Ukrainian.

- 1924 graduated from Dnepropetrovsk Railway Technical School.
- 1924-1930 worked as an assistant to an engine driver and as a factory technician.
- 1930 graduated from Kharkov Metallurgical Institute.
- 1930-1940 engineer, section head, chief engineer at metallurgical plant in Dnepropetrovsk.
- 1940 joined the Party.
- 1940-1947 involved in evacuation of the plant in Dnepropetrovsk to Pervouralsk in Sverdlovsk oblast; continued to work in the plant as chief engineer, then deputy director.
- 1947-1950 Director, Southern Pipe Plant in Nikopol.
- 1950-1955 Head, Chief Administration for Pipe-rolling and Casting, Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy USSR.
- 1955-1957 Deputy Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy USSR.
- 1957-1960 Chairman of Dnepropetrovsk CNE.
- 1958- Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.
- 1960-1963 Deputy Chairman, State Scientific-Economic Council of USSR Council of Ministers – rank of USSR Minister.
- 1961 Dr Technical Sciences.
- 1961-1966 Candidate Member, CC CPSU.
- 1963-1965 Deputy Chairman of Gosplan – USSR Minister.
- 1965-1976 Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR.
- 1966- Member, CC CPSU.
- 1976-1980 First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR.
- Nov 1978-  
Nov 1979 Candidate Member of Politburo.



Nov 1979- Member of Politburo.

Oct 1980- Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR.

Tikhonov was awarded State Prizes in 1943 and 1951, on the latter occasion for developing production of large-diameter seamless pipes. He holds the title of Hero of Socialist Labour, 7 Orders of Lenin, 2 Orders of the Red Banner of Labour, the Order of the October Revolution, and the Red Star. He has travelled relatively widely, and accompanied Khrushchev to the USA in 1959 and Podgorny to Iran in 1970; he has also visited Austria (most recently in April 1981), Canada, Japan, and Finland. Before assuming his present post he travelled frequently to Berlin and Bonn as head of the Soviet sides of the Soviet-GDR and Soviet-FRG intergovernmental commissions for economic and scientific-technical cooperation. Speaks some German and some English. He was Chairman of the Soviet Commission for the International Year of the Child in 1979.

Tikhonov has a reputation as a dry and colourless technocrat. His association with Brezhnev dates back at least to the 1930s when both were working in Dnepropetrovsk. Tikhonov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers on Kosygin's retirement on health grounds. He had been under-studying Kosygin since 1976, and his promotion to full Politburo member in 1979 made him the obvious successor.

Tikhonov is said to have chaired the session of the Council of Ministers that authorised the decision to deprive Academician Sakharov of his titles and exile him to Gorky.

His wife died in October 1980.

ROMANOV, Grigory Vasilevich

Secretary, CC CPSU, 1983; Member of Politburo, CC CPSU 1976; Member, CC CPSU 1966.

Born 1923; Russian.

- 1938 student at a technical college.
- 1941-1945 in the Army.
- 1944 joined the Party.
- 1946-1954 designer; head of sector of Central Design Bureau at A A Zhdanov Shipbuilding Works (in Leningrad).
- 1953 graduated from Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute (by correspondence).
- 1954-1957 Secretary of Party Committee, then CC CPSU Party Organiser at the Zhdanov Works.
- 1957-1961 Secretary, then First Secretary, of Kirov raikom (Leningrad).
- 1961-1962 Secretary of Leningrad gorkom.
- 1962-1963 Secretary of Leningrad obkom.
- 1963-1970 Second Secretary, Leningrad obkom.
- 1966- Member, CC CPSU.  
1970-83 First Secretary, Leningrad Obkom  
1966- Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.
- 1971- Member of Presidium, Supreme Soviet USSR.
- April 1973- Candidate Member of Politburo.  
March 1976
- March 1976- Member of Politburo.
- 1983 - Secretary, CC CPSU

Romanov has two Orders of Lenin. His travels include China and Italy (1966), Norway (1967) and Finland, France and Cuba, which he has visited several times. He also led a delegation to Vietnam in 1978.

Romanov is popularly thought of as a hard liner in the arts but relatively adventurous in economic management; he has a high handed manner towards his subordinates, and overrode all opposition to holding his daughter's wedding reception at the Hermitage — an ostentatious affair at which priceless Tsarist porcelain is said to have been smashed. Despite reports that Romanov was sharply reprimanded by Suslov, his standing and authority do not appear to have suffered significant damage.

Western politicians who have met him in Leningrad have found him singularly unimpressive, never going beyond a prepared script even on local questions.

September 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

ALIEV Geidar Ali Rza ogly (Alievich) Major General

First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR 1982; Member, Central Committee CPSU 1971 and Member of Politburo CC CPSU 1982.

Born 1923 in Nakhichevan, Azerbaidzhani.

Graduated from Faculty of History, Azerbaidzhan State University.

1941-1949 held responsible positions in organs of State Security and internal affairs in Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.

1945- Member, CPSU.

1949-1950 studying.

1950-1964 administrative work in MGB, MVD and KGB in Azerbaidzhan.

1964-1967 Deputy Chairman of KGB, Azerbaidzhan.

1966-1969 Candidate Member, CC CP Azerbaidzhan.

1967-1969 Chairman, KGB Azerbaidzhan, with rank of Major General.

1969- First Secretary and Member of Buro, Azerbaidzhan Central Committee.

1970- Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.

1971- Member, CC CPSU.

1976- Candidate Member of Politburo CC CPSU.

1982- First Deputy Chairman Council of Ministers USSR.

1982- Member of Politburo.

Aliev holds 2 Orders of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star and other awards. In 1971 he accompanied Brezhnev to Berlin and he led CPSU and Supreme Soviet delegations to Syria (1972), Cairo (1973) India (1978) and Mexico (1982). He was a member of Ponomarev's delegation to Rome in 1974, and visited Romania with Kosygin later the same year. He went to Yugoslavia in July 1976 as a guest of the Yugoslav Central Committee. In 1970 he was said to have been the target of an assassination attempt following his sweeping purges in the Azerbaidzhan Party apparatus. Aliev is well known as one of Brezhnev's most sycophantic supporters, but he has impressed Western observers as a tough and self confident natural leader with a sense of humour.

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VOROTNIKOV, Vitali Ivanovich

Chairman, Council of Ministers, RSFSR 1983. Member of Politburo CC CPSU 1983; Member of CC CPSU 1971.

Born 1926, Voronezh, Russian.

1942 Began work as apprentice fitter in a locomotive repair works in Voronezh. Then moved to engineering and aviation works in Kuibyshev.

1947 Joined Party.

1954 Graduated from Kuibyshev Aviation Institute.

1955?1960 Secretary of factory Party Committee.

1960 Head of Industry Department in Kuibyshev obkom.

1961-1962 Secretary, Kuibyshev obkom.

1963-1967 Second Secretary, Kuibyshev obkom.

1967-1971 Chairman, Kuibyshev oblispolkom.

1970- Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.

1971-1975 First Secretary, Voronezh obkom.

1971- Member, CC CPSU.

1975-1979 First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers RSFSR.

1979-1982 Ambassador, Cuba.

1982-1983 First Secretary, Krasnodar kraikom.

June 1983- Candidate Member of Politburo CC CPSU  
Dec 1983

June 1983- Chairman, Council of Ministers RSFSR.

Aug. 1983- Deputy to Supreme Soviet RSFSR.

Dec 1983- Member, Politburo CC CPSU.

In 1976 Vorotnikov was noted as First Vice-President of the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Society, and was elected President of the Soviet-Angolan Friendship Society. He led a Friendship Society delegation to Luanda in 1978; he has also visited the FRG twice (1971, 1977). In 1976 he was awarded the Order of the October Revolution.

Vorotnikov was recalled from Cuba in mid-1982 in order to take over as First Party Secretary for the important Krasnodar kraikom after the previous Secretary (Medunov) had been dismissed for corruption. But he had been there for less than a year when he was further promoted to Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, taking over from Solomentsev, who had become Chairman of the Committee of Party Control following the death of Pelshe.

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GRISHIN, Viktor Vasilievich

First Secretary, Moscow gorkom 1967; Member, CC CPSU 1952 and of its Politburo 1971; Member, Presidium, Supreme Soviet USSR 1967.

Born 1914

1932 graduated from Moscow Geodesic Institute.

1932-1933 worked as land technician in Moscow oblast.

1937 graduated from Moscow Steam Engine Tekhnikum; worked as Deputy Head of Serpukhov Railway Depot and as the Depot's Komsomol Secretary.

1938-1940 in Army.

1939 joined Party. Studied at some time at Higher Party School attached to CC CPSU, by correspondence.

1940-1941 Party Secretary at Serpukhov Railway Depot.

1942-1950 Secretary, Second Secretary, First Secretary of Serpukhov gorkom.

1950-1952 Head of Machine-building Department of Moscow obkom.

1952- Member, CC CPSU

1952-1956 Second Secretary, Moscow obkom.

1953- Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.

1956-1967 Chairman, AUCCTU and Vice-President, WFTU.

1961-1971 Candidate Member, Politburo.

1962-1977 Member, Constitutional Commission.

1967- First Secretary, Moscow gorkom; Member, Presidium of Supreme Soviet USSR.

1971- Member, Politburo.

Grishin travelled widely in his Trade Union days, visiting Britain in 1956 with a Supreme Soviet delegation and again in 1961 for the Scottish Trade Union Congress. His most recent visit to the West was to Milan in 1972 for the Italian CP Congress.

Grishin has the title of Hero of Socialist Labour, three Orders of Lenin and various medals.

In recent public appearances Grishin has appeared relaxed and self-confident. He is thought to be intolerant of the politically unorthodox. His daughter Olga, head of English at Moscow University, was studying recently in London where her husband, V G Aleksandrov, was Counsellor.



PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR PRESIDENT CHERNENKO'S FUNERAL

CHECK LIST OF POINTS TO MAKE FOR MEETING WITH VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH  
(EXCLUDING EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL)

Middle East

- Report on Mubarak's visit to Washington?
- Prospects for US activity in response to Hussein/Arafat initiative. Need to keep up momentum
- Concern about deteriorating cycle of violence in Southern Lebanon. Hope Israelis will proceed with full withdrawal

Falklands/Argentina

- Hope US will urge realism on Argentina during Alfonsin's visit to Washington (begins 17 March)
- They must drop linkage between sovereignty and normalisation of bilateral relations

Laker

- Welcome agreement between BA and Eximbank
- Lot of work still remains to be done

US Economy

- Watching progress on Administration's attempts to reduce budget deficit with interest

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
NORTH AMERICA DEPARTMENT  
12 March 1985



PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH: ARMS CONTROL


POINTS TO MAKE

- Grateful for President's message of 10 March on US negotiating position.
- Welcome your readiness to keep in close touch as negotiations unfold.
- Glad to see US negotiators have good degree of flexibility.
- Need to resist Soviet attempts to make progress in one area dependent on progress in another.
- Welcome President's rejection of inclusion of third country systems in US/Soviet negotiations.

- [REDACTED]
- Hard road ahead; you have our full support.

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PRIME MINISTER'S CONTACTS WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS IN MOSCOW : 12/13 MARCH

<u>Country</u>	<u>Points to Make</u>	<u>Relevant Factors</u>
Federal Republic of Germany Chancellor Kohl	Congratulations on CDU Governing Mayor <u>Diepgen's</u> impressive performance with the FDP in holding Berlin in the 10 March Land Elections. Augurs well for further stability in Allied/Berlin relations over next 4 years.	The CDU/FDP coalition in Berlin strengthened their majority in the House of Representatives thanks to a collapse in the SPD vote. Land elections in the <u>Saarland</u> on <u>10 March</u> resulted in victory over the CDU for the SPD left-winger, <u>Oskar Lafontaine</u> .
Italy President Pertini	Impressions of mood in Buenos Aires during your visit last week. Congratulations on grant of honorary degree from Oxford University.	Pertini and Andreotti visited Argentina on 8/9 March.  Degree to be conferred on 26 June.
 Finland President Koivisto	Much enjoyed our useful exchange of views last November. [If raised] Grateful for invitation to visit Finland: will discuss with Prime Minister Sorsa in May	Koivisto visited UK 13-16 November 1984, and had talks with the Prime Minister. He has since invited her to visit Finland.
Mr Kalevi Sorsa, Prime Minister	Look forward to our meeting in May.	Sorsa to visit UK 21-22 May : talks with Prime Minister 21 May.

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Country

Austria  
President Kirschschrager

Points to Make

No points to make

Relevant Factors

Visit to UK by Austrian  
Defence Minister

This proposed visit by  
Frischenschlager is now off:  
The Austrians invited UK  
views - we have told them that  
postponement would be in our  
mutual interest. <sup>probably</sup>  
Kirschschrager will /not raise  
this.



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## PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, 12-13 MARCH 1985

## JAPAN

1. Last met Mr Nakasone at Mrs Gandhi's funeral in November 1984.
2. Domestic political situation in Japan confused by sudden illness of former Prime Minister Tanaka, Mr Nakasone's chief backer. Some uncertainty about Mr Nakasone's survival for full two-year term until November 1986.
3. Mr Tebbit visiting Japan 15-19 April. Foreign Minister Abe due to visit UK during 1985 for regular consultations.
4. First (unofficial) 2000 Group meeting in Japan 4-5 February successfully set pattern for future bilateral conferences. Participants led by Mr James Prior met Mr Nakasone, delivered message from Mrs Thatcher. Next conference probably January 1986 in UK.
5. Prince Hiro leaves Oxford this summer, returns to Japan in September.
6. UK/Japan visible trade imbalance up to £2.87 billion in 1984.
7. Seven-power Economic Summit (Bonn) 2-4 May.

**CHERNENKO'S FUNERAL: POSSIBLE MEETING SPANISH PRIME MINISTER**OUR OBJECTIVES

1. (a) to show our goodwill over enlargement
- (b) to remain non-committal about high level visits.
- (c) to avoid comment on Spanish proposals on sovereignty.
- (d) to press for action on Spanish Prohibited Airspace.

ARGUMENTS TO USEEC

2. 17/20 March Brussels Foreign Affairs Council most important. Wish to see Spain an EC member by 1 January 1986.

Gibraltar

- 3.(a) Welcome outcome of Geneva talks on 5 February
- (b) Want early action on Spanish Prohibited Airspace, as was agreed in Brussels Communiqué last November. Delay already risking accusations of bad faith.

High Level Visits

4. Geneva process and agreement on managing differences over Gibraltar opens the way for high level visit.

Spain/NATO

5. Glad to see Defence Minister (Narcis Serra) in London mid-February. Prospects for referendum? Hope you will leave way open for future integration to NATO's military structure.

THEIR OBJECTIVES

- 6.(a) To press for progress over enlargement negotiations.
- (b) (Possibly) to press for early Prime Ministerial visit to Spain.
- (c) (Possibly) to discuss Gibraltar sovereignty.

YOUR RESPONSE

7.(a) Terms on offer will not improve. Spain will get nothing by delay. On fisheries, UK has been taking lead in seeking solution taking account of Spanish concerns. Must protect balance of Common Fisheries Policy.

(b) Sir Geoffrey Howe due to visit Madrid at end of this year. We shall need to look at other opportunities in light of situation created by Geneva Agreement.

(c) Will study Spanish proposals on sovereignty against background of HMG's commitments to respect wishes of people of Gibraltar as in 1969 Constitution. Cannot consider fixed time-scales. First priority is practical cooperation. Should not try to force the pace.

ADVANCE PRESS LINE

8. Short meeting: discussed a range of issues of mutual interest.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
12 March 1985



PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, 12-13 MARCH:  
BILATERAL WITH PRESIDENT ZIA

POINTS TO MAKE

Elections

1. Congratulations on confirmation as President for further 5 years term. Welcome recent elections to new Assembly (to convene 23 March). Plans to lift martial law?

Afghanistan

2. Conscious of need not to expose Pakistan to greater Soviet military pressure. We propose to give £50,000 food aid for refugees inside Afghanistan. Hope you can concur.

UN Initiative

3. No indication of Soviet flexibility over troop withdrawal timetable: dates fixed in May for Geneva IV?

Bilateral

4. Hope sale of 3 frigates can be concluded soon.



PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, 12-13 MARCH:  
BILATERAL WITH MR RAJIV GANDHI

POINTS TO MAKE

Visit to India

1. Looking forward to seeing you in Delhi on 13 April.

Sikh Extremists

2. Share your concern about Sikh extremists in the UK. Have publicly stated our attitude, including support for the unity and territorial integrity of India. But can only act against Chauhan and his associates within the constraints of our law.
3. Welcome the assurances you gave that there is no obstacle to normal commercial relations. The Sikh extremist problem is one we both share. Should not allow it to distort our close relations.

Westlands Helicopters

4. Concerned that contract for supply of Westlands helicopters to Oil and Natural Gas Commission still not concluded, despite our offer of 100% aid. If downpayment not made before end of this financial year, danger of underspending aid this year and problem for management of aid programme in 1985/86.

Sri Lanka

5. Have urged Sri Lankan Government to resume negotiations with Tamils and establish dialogue with you. Will repeat this to President Jayewardene at Easter.

## FRENCH CANTONAL ELECTIONS

- First round of voting on 10 March.

Good result for UDF (Giscard)/RPR (Chirac) almost 50%.  
National Front (Le Pen) consolidated European election  
breakthrough (8.8%).

Socialists and Communists: slight improvement on very  
poor European election results.

- Second and final round on 17 March.
- Effect on possible introduction of proportional  
representation: slight PS revival and high NF vote  
could deprive UDF/RPR of overall majority in  
proportional system.



PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR PRESIDENT CHERNENKO'S FUNERAL

CHECK LIST OF POINTS TO MAKE FOR MEETING WITH MR MULRONEY  
(EXCLUDING EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL)

Defence

- Welcome Canada's commitment to NATO, and recent decision to increase level of Canadian forces in Europe
- Also welcome Canada's support for US research on SDI

Anglo-Canadian Relations

- Welcome close contacts and co-operation between our Governments

Foreign Policy

- Hope that Canada will maintain close relations with Britain and with Europe
- Pleased to hear of your continuing commitment to the Caribbean following your meeting with regional leaders in Jamaica. Important that we continue working together in the region

Visits

- Look forward to welcoming you to London

New High Commissioner

- Look forward to welcoming Mr McMurtrey to London





PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR PRESIDENT CHERNENKO'S  
FUNERAL

POSSIBLE BILATERAL MEETING WITH CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Defence

1. Canadian Government announced on 11 March that 4th Canadian Mechanised Brigade Group based at Lahr would be increased by 1200 personnel, and that an infantry battalion group in Canada would be designated to fulfil the Canadian commitment to the Allied Command Group Europe Mobile Force, Land.
2. Mr Eric Nielsen was appointed Minister of National Defence on 27 February, following resignation of Mr Coates after a visit to a nightclub in Lahr.
3. A green paper on defence is expected to be published shortly.
4. Mr Joe Clark announced in Parliament in January Canada's support for SDI research.

Foreign Policy

5. A review of foreign policy is being conducted. Mr Mulroney is committed to closer relations with the USA (President Reagan will visit Quebec City on 17 March). A special representative of Mr Clark is visiting Europe this week to study how this will affect Canada's relations with European countries. He will see Lady Young.
6. At the Commonwealth Caribbean and Canada Summit in Kingston on 25-26 February, Mr Mulroney announced he would honour his

/ predecessor's



- 2 -

predecessor's pledge to double Canadian aid to the Caribbean over the next five years to C\$350 million.

7. Mr Mulroney is very much concerned about the overall direction of UNESCO and is considering what should be done.

#### Visits

8. Mr Mulroney has not yet suggested new dates for a visit to the UK, but has asked for a bilateral meeting with the Prime Minister at the Bonn Summit.

#### High Commissioner

9. The Canadian High Commissioner, Mr Jamieson, leaves London at the beginning of April. He is to be replaced by Mr Roy McMurtrey, former Attorney-General of Ontario.

#### Economy

10. National Economic Conference to be held in Ottawa on 22-23 March. Keynote address to be delivered by Prime Minister of Australia. Budget expected in the spring. Budget deficit remains main problem. Indications are that Mr Mulroney is hoping that stimulating growth in the economy will reduce necessity for hard decisions over cutbacks in government spending.

North America Department

12 March 1985

From: S Rogerson (Mrs), NAD  
Date: 12 March 1985  
cc: Mr David Thomas

Private Secretary

MR CHERNENKO'S FUNERAL: CANADIAN REQUEST FOR A BILATERAL MEETING

1. The Canadian High Commission telephoned this morning on instructions from Mr Mulroney to ask for a bilateral meeting with Mrs Thatcher in Moscow. As agreed, we explained that the Prime Minister's bilateral meetings were to be arranged after her arrival in Moscow. The High Commission did, however, specifically ask that their request be made known to No 10, and I should be grateful if you could mention this on the telephone when convenient.
  
2. Briefing has been submitted separately through Soviet Department. I attach 2 copies of a Political and Economic Background Brief on Canada which the Private Secretaries may wish to hold. We recommend that the Prime Minister should see Mr Mulroney if at all possible. Although there are no particular points which need to be raised, it would be their first opportunity to meet since Mr Mulroney became Prime Minister last September.

*Susan Rogerson*

CANADA : POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

Political

1. The Progressive Conservative Party, led by Mr Brian Mulroney, won 211 out of 282 seats in the Canadian General Election on 4 September, the third largest majority in Canadian history. This overwhelming victory brought to an end 21 years of almost unbroken Liberal Government. The Liberals retained only 40 seats (15 of the 25 outgoing Cabinet lost their seats), not far ahead of the New Democratic Party who, despite the Conservative landslide, held on to 30 of their previous 31 seats.
2. Unexpectedly, and against the trend, Mr John Turner, the leader of the Liberal Party, won the riding of Vancouver Quadra where he had been running third in the polls. Probably the biggest upset for the Liberals took place in their traditional stronghold of Quebec, where the Progressive Conservatives won 58 of the 75 seats, (having previously held only one seat): Mr Mulroney overturned a 16,000 majority to win the riding of Manicouagan in Quebec, the district which encompasses Baie Comeau where he was born and brought up.
3. The election result reflects the Canadians' desire for a complete change from the years of Liberal rule under Mr Trudeau. Despite an early lead in the polls, Mr Turner came increasingly to be seen as too closely identified with the old regime and more ineffectual as a leader than had been expected. Mr Mulroney, by contrast, succeeded in catching the imagination of the electorate.
4. Mr Mulroney and his Cabinet were sworn in 17 September. The new Cabinet consists of 40 Ministers, which is the largest in Canadian history, and includes six women. By expanding the Cabinet, Mr Mulroney has made room for ample representation from the provinces. This gives the Government a national flavour, reflecting the national scope of the election result and sets the tone for improved federal-provincial relations.

5. The policies of Mr Mulroney's Government were presented in the Speech from the Throne on 5 November. They were couched in general terms. The major thrust in the speech was the need for national reconciliation and for national consensus through consultation and improvement in federal/provincial relations. Special emphasis was given to the need to bring Quebec into the constitutional framework. Economic renewal and social justice were the other two main goals of the Government. Other policies included the strengthening of the free market economy, the encouragement of foreign investment in Canada, the liberalisation of the National Energy Policy. The Speech from the Throne underlined the prime importance of closer relations with the United States, but otherwise made only a general commitment to "Canadian internationalism". Mr Mulroney has indicated that he intends to strengthen Canada's defence efforts, give more support to NATO, and to promote peace and nuclear disarmament.

#### Economic

6. In his Economic Statement to Parliament on 8 November, the Minister of Finance, Mr Michael Wilson, announced measures to reduce the budget deficit (C\$34.5 billion) and stimulate the economy. The measures included spending cuts of C\$4.2 billion, reductions in the budgets of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Via Rail, and Petro Canada, cancellation or delay of some capital projects, a cut in defence spending by C\$154 million, in overseas aid by C\$180 million, and a reduction in the size of the public service. There were also measures for increased revenues, and an additional expenditure of C\$1 billion for job creation. Canadian oil prices are to move to world levels. Legislation was introduced in the Canadian Parliament on 7 December to amend the Foreign Investment Review Act so that foreign investment can be encouraged. Consultations are currently being held with provincial, business and trade union leaders on economic policy. A National Economic Conference is to be held in Ottawa on 22-23 March. A full budget will be presented in the Spring.

7. The Canadian economy is very dependent on exports to the US. After falling sharply in 1982 it grew strongly all last year as the US economy recovered: Canadian GNP rose by more than a quarter. In the first two quarters of 1984, however, growth slowed down to an annual rate of around 3%, and a further slowdown is generally expected in 1985 as US growth lessens and high interest rates continue to depress activity.

8. Canada has not been nearly as successful as the US in reducing unemployment. Despite rapid growth in 1983 unemployment only fell from 12½ early in 1983 to just over 11% at the end of that year; it then started to rise again and was 11.3% in November, and is one of Mr Mulroney's main economic challenges.

9. Canada has a healthy surplus in merchandise trade, due almost exclusively to exports to the United States (C\$11 billion out of a total surplus of C\$12 billion). Canada's imports from the UK increased by 41% in the second quarter of 1984 compared with the first seven months of 1983. More than half of this growth was in crude petroleum sales, but there were also significant increases in Canadian imports of British transportation and high technology equipment.

North America Department

8 March 1985



FUNERAL OF PRESIDENT CHERNENKO IN MOSCOW: POSSIBLE MEETING  
WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Looking forward to seeing you in London next week and to having full discussions on bilateral and international issues, such as Southern Africa and economic relations between developed and developing countries.
  
2. How did you find the recent emergency food Conference in Geneva? We are doing what we can to help Ethiopia and other drought stricken countries in Africa. But African countries must seek agricultural policies, which will lead to increased food production.

Defensive

3. We warmly welcome the negotiations taking place in Geneva, between the US and USSR on nuclear and space arms.
  
4. Tanzania accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would make important contribution to regional security in Southern Africa and would increase moral pressure on South Africa to adhere to Treaty.

EAST AFRICAN DEPARTMENT  
12 MARCH 1985



PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

NIGERIA: POINTS TO MAKE

- Glad to see from Dr Gambari's message shared wish to get relations mended.
- Do not let Dikko damage very important mutual interests.
- Home Office processing asylum application and extradition request [REDACTED] could yet take some time. Understand your feelings but decisions legal not political.
- Continuing contact important. Hope Sir Geoffrey Howe can visit soon.





## ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND

## BILATERAL RELATIONS

1. Highly sensitive though contacts have helped avoid further deterioration. Risk to national interest from Nigerian reaction to decision over Dikko's future remains high. Response from Dr Gambari to Secretary of State's message just before Yusufu trial echoed the wish to get relations restored and promised a further reaction in due course to the possibility of an early meeting between Gambari and the Secretary of State.

## YUSUFU

2. No precipitate Nigerian reaction to sentence (12 years). Buhari at least may now see this as a lesser issue.

## DIKKO

3. Nigerian government continues to see his future status in the UK as a touch-stone of our relations. Nigerian retaliation against British interests if he is allowed to remain in the UK a fortiori granted political asylum could be seriously damaging. Home Office are alive to national interest but constrained by British and international law and practice. Joint FCO/Home Office meeting arranged for 15 March to finalise submission to Ministers of options available for Dikko's future. Home Secretary's decision (especially if favourable to British national interest) could be made within weeks. But tactically we may want to delay informing the Nigerians of any decision. May therefore not let the Nigerians know that decisions could be taken soon. (The Nigerians continue to believe and apparently largely accept that decisions over asylum and extradition normally take many months.)

/BRISTOWS

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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

## BRISTOWS ENGINEERS

4. Conditions of detention deteriorated badly on transfer from Police custody to Maximum Security Prison 15 February under Decree 2 (of military government which allows for indefinite detention).

5. Consular access 20-26 February: permission obtained 27 February for visits Tuesdays and Fridays, but access denied Tuesday 5 March.

6. Mr Rifkind called in Karfi, Nigerian Acting High Commissioner, on 5 March and protested vigorously at conditions and denial of access. Our Acting High Commissioner in Lagos has taken urgent parallel action at senior official level with the Nigerians and will also do so at Ministerial level as soon as possible.

7. A further attempt at consular access on 9 March was again blocked, though the Prison Governor said that a bed had been provided for Paterson and better food supplies arranged.

8. Meanwhile, press and parliamentary interest continues to mount. Nigerians are sensitive to their public image and increased media attention, if not excessive or unbalanced, not necessarily unhelpful.

9. Risk is that the Nigerians see the two engineers as hostages, though assurances \_\_\_\_\_ that NSO not involved suggest case not political. Also informal assurances from Police that Decree 2 in this case simply an administrative measure. If valid, these too suggest not seen as a political case. On the other hand, increasingly difficult to explain the case in "innocent" terms.

West African Department

12 March 1985

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

11 March, 1985.

Death of President Chernenko

Thank you for your letter of 11 March about President Chernenko's death.

The Prime Minister has approved the draft message from her to Mr. Tikhonov, which may now be despatched. She is content for the Foreign Secretary to advise the Palace that The Queen should send a message to the Acting Head of State.

The Prime Minister proposes to attend the funeral, and agrees that the Foreign Secretary should accompany her. We shall not, however, announce this publicly until there is some general indication from Moscow that Heads of Government are invited. I should be grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible when this happens, as we are under considerable pressure from the Press.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if the Foreign Secretary would sign the condolence book at the Soviet Embassy.

The Prime Minister has invited representatives of Opposition Parties to join the delegation. We understand that Mr. Kinnock, Mr. Steel and Dr. Owen will do so. Mr. Kinnock will be accompanied by Mr. Charles Clarke.

Administrative Arrangements

The Prime Minister will be accompanied from No.10 by me, Andrew Turnbull, Bernard Ingham, Miss Susan Chappell (Duty Clerk), Mrs. Stephanie Harris (Personal Secretary), Det. Superintendent Ray Parker, and Det. Inspector Roger Watson. We discussed the composition of the FCO delegation.

The Prime Minister will attend Questions in the House tomorrow, and will leave immediately after them by helicopter from Wellington Barracks. This would enable her to leave Heathrow at 1600. The Prime Minister would wish to dine on the aircraft. On arrival in Moscow she would welcome a short briefing meeting. Her departure time on

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- 2 -

13 March will depend on the time of her meeting with the new General Secretary.

We are offering places on the helicopter to Mr. Kinnock, Mr. Steel and Dr. Owen. Other passengers, apart from the Prime Minister, will be me, Andrew Turnbull, and a detective.

As regards accommodation in Moscow, the Prime Minister would wish as many as possible of me, Andrew Turnbull, Miss Chappell, Bernard Ingham, and Mrs. Harris to be with her in the Residence in that order.

The Prime Minister's highest priority in Moscow will be a meeting with the new General Secretary. This must be on 13 March because of her heavy commitments in London on 14 March. I should be grateful if the Embassy could press hard for this. Assuming it is Mr. Gorbachev, the Prime Minister would wish to be accompanied (as at Chequers) by the Foreign Secretary and me.

The question of bilaterals with other Heads of Government attending the funeral will need to wait until we have further news of who will be there and what time is available.

I assume that your Protocol Department will approach the Opposition Leaders' Offices to obtain passports etc.

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. *T46A/85*

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*Subject  
re Twister  
OP 5*

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DESKBY 112000Z

FROM FCO 111857Z MAR 85

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 243 OF 11 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

DEATH OF PRESIDENT CHERNENKO: MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS FROM THE  
PRIME MINISTER TO MR GORBACHEV

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO  
MR GORBACHEV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

BEGINS.

I SEND YOU MY CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ELECTION AS GENERAL  
SECRETARY OF THE CPSU. I VALUED OUR MEETING LAST DECEMBER WHICH  
CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING CLOSER CONTACTS  
BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES WITH THE AIM OF BUILDING CONFIDENCE BETWEEN  
EAST AND WEST AND TACKLING THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS THAT FACE  
US.

ENDS

2. PLEASE REPORT BY FLASH TELEGRAM AS SOON AS MESSAGE HAS BEEN  
DELIVERED. THE TEXT WILL THEN BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS.

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DD 112000Z MOSCOW

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FM FCO 111857Z MAR 85

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 239 OF 11 MARCH

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

DEATH OF PRESIDENT CHERNENKO

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MR  
TIKHONOV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

BEGINS.

ON BEHALF OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT, I EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE  
PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION, SINCERE CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF  
PRESIDENT CHERNENKO. I WELL RECALL MY MEETING WITH HIM IN  
MOSCOW IN FEBRUARY 1984. ALTHOUGH HE HELD HIS HIGH OFFICE FOR A  
RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD, HIS DEATH HAS DEPRIVED THE SOVIET UNION  
OF AN EXPERIENCED LEADER.

ENDS.

2. PLEASE REPORT BY FLASH TELEGRAM AS SOON AS MESSAGE HAS BEEN  
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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

11 March 1985

DEATH OF PRESIDENT CHERNENKO

Thank you for your letter of 11 March enclosing a draft message of congratulation from the Prime Minister to Mr Gorbachev on his election as General Secretary.

The Prime Minister has approved the message which may now be despatched.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

C D POWELL

Len Appleyard Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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CST.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 March 1985

*Dear Charles,*

Death of President Chernenko

It has now been announced that Gorbachev is to succeed Chernenko as the next General Secretary of the CPSU.

/ I enclose a draft public message of congratulation for the Prime Minister's consideration.

We will let you have later some briefing for the visit, together with the latest information on who will be attending from our closest allies. Our Embassy in Washington has just rung to say that they have been told that Vice President Bush and Mr Shultz will be representing the US. We have been asked to treat this information as confidential until it is released either later today or first thing tomorrow in Washington.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*

*Len Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



DEATH OF MR CHERNENKO: DRAFT PUBLIC MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATION  
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR GORBACHEV

---

I send you my congratulations on your election as General Secretary of the CPSU. I valued our meeting last December, which contributed to the process of establishing closer contacts between our countries with the aim of building confidence between East and West and tackling the most important problems that face us.

*M. Thatcher*

Covering  
UK SECRET  
UK EYES ONLY

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Jp.027

Mr Powell

CDP  
11/3.

President Chernenko

Tass has just announced that President Chernenko is dead. The return of three high-level delegations from abroad, including Shcherbitsky from the United States, suggests that a Central Committee Plenum has been convoked, probably for tomorrow. According to Victor Louis, who is usually correct, the funeral will be as soon as Wednesday. There is no reason to expect the opening of the Geneva arms talks to be appreciably delayed - it was business as usual when Brezhnev died.

2. The composition of the funeral commission is likely to be announced this afternoon; this will provide evidence (but not conclusive evidence) about the succession. I attach the last JIC piece on this; the only change is that Grishin's position has been given more prominence in the last few weeks.

PERCY CRADOCK

11 March 1985

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Note for file



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Extracted from undated submission files -  
Background on Chernenko.

Contains -

- (i) undated press cutting.
- (ii) CPSU central committee plenum 16/6/83
- (iii) 'Soviet News' extract 8/9/82.
- (iv) Chernenko's speech in Tbilisi 1/11/82.

CST  
21/2/84.

① ATC speaking note  
on Chernenko

---

~~~~~

② FCB





LEAVING WITH THE JOB UNFINISHED

# Soviet soliloquy

IN BRITAIN today the Soviet stance on various issues is often presented to the public in a distorted light, to put it mildly. The Soviet people and the Soviet Communist party harbour no secret intentions or malicious designs. We are open to the world.

Naturally, we are mainly concerned with our home affairs. We are concentrating on constructive tasks, such as advancing socialist democracy, developing industry, science and technology, agriculture and culture. Our progress in these fields is truly spectacular. Contrary to our ill-wishers' talk about a "decline of communism", we take a long stride forward every year. As far as its economic and intellectual potential is concerned the Soviet Union of the 1980 differs strikingly, not only from the young revolutionary Russia of the 1920s, but even from what it was 20 to 30 years ago.

This is not to say that we have no difficulties. They do exist, and the Communist party frankly admits them. This, incidentally, is what helps the Soviet Union to cope with them successfully and to scale one summit after another in its progress.

My country is getting richer and more advanced culturally, and its people have a higher standard of living than ever before. These are the fruits of the Soviet people's work for themselves and for society in conditions of freedom. In its foreign policy, the Soviet Union attaches top priority to safeguarding and strengthening peace and is determined to end the arms race.

We are in favour of an active and fruitful dialogue with nations living under a different social system to ours, the United States and Great Britain in



● KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO, now for the second time a leading contender for the most powerful job in the Soviet Union, wrote this article as an introduction to his collected speeches\*

particular. To work patiently so as to create a climate of trust and accord on earth is what my country is calling on other nations to do.

The bitter experience of wartime ideals has caused us to be vigilant. The Soviet Union has great military might. We are capable of meeting any challenge effectively. We hope, however, that nobody will be tempted to test the Soviet Union's strength again. We are not seeking military superiority, of course, but we will not concede to any nation gaining such superiority over us.

The USSR and the USA have much to divide them. They adhere to opposite ideological views. In the trying years of the Second World War, however, this fact did not prevent the Soviet, American and British peoples becoming staunch allies in the fight against the Axis powers. The Soviet-American dialogue in the 1970s was a major component of the process of détente. Whether the coming years will see co-operation or stiff confrontation between the two great powers is now up to the United States.

Our implicit faith in communist ideals is rooted in social reality. Of course, every Soviet citizen has a life path unmistakably his or her own. In one common area, however, the experience of millions of individuals

is identical: socialism, a dynamic and strong social system, is also a fair system, which brings education and culture within reach of all, offers everyone a job of his choice and excellent opportunities for advancement.

My own life story is an example in point. I was born into a large and poor peasant family in the Krasnoyarsk region of Siberia in 1911. I left my mother when I was a young boy. At 12 I went to work for a wealthy master to earn my living. New Soviet life was just coming into its own and I felt its fresh winds when I had joined the Young Communist League. That was back in 1926. We studied and held down our jobs at the same time. We were underfed and poorly clothed, but the dreams of a radiant future for all fascinated us and made us feel happy.

That was a time of tension. Now and then there were press reports about conflicts with foreign intruders raiding Soviet borders. So I volunteered to join the border guards. After some delay my request was granted. I joined the Communist party in 1931 during my term of service with border troops and was soon elected a party secretary. Nazi Germany's attack on my country found me in the post of secretary of the Krasnoyarsk territorial party committee.

Siberia became one of the nation's arsenals in wartime. Industrial plant evacuated from areas threatened by Nazi invasion had to be promptly brought back into production and geared to the war effort. Thousands of refugee families arrived in Siberia. All had to be accommodated, given jobs and encouragement. We made every effort to relieve their plight.

The year 1943 turned the tide of hostilities in the Soviet theatre of war. After the battle of Stalingrad, victory came into clearer view on the far horizon. It was time the party gave attention to peace-time problems, which were bound to be quite formidable in a country devastated by war. I was sent to advanced training courses for party functionaries under the CPSU central committee. Later I served as secretary of the Penza regional party committee and as chief of the propaganda department at the central committee of the Communist party of Moldavia.

For over two decades now I have served in top party and government jobs in Moscow.

What I wish to say in conclusion is an expression of not only my view, but the view of the Communist party and the entire Soviet people. Today it is more important than ever before to multiply our efforts towards mutual understanding. The imperative need to preserve peace and to guarantee every nation the right to free and independent development has priority over anything else.

I would like the people of the Soviet Union and Great Britain to be partners in making progress towards these goals.

\* To be published in Britain by Pergamon Press on March 5, price £5.

SWB

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(A1, B)

16 Jun 83

*Chernenko Speeches*

### C. CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

#### Communique on First Day's Proceedings of June 1983 Plenum

Tass in Russian for abroad 1445 (and in English 1442) gmt 14 Jun 83

Text of "Communique on the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee":

A regular plenum of the CPSU Central Committee began its work on 14th June, 1983. The meeting was opened by Yuriy Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

A report "Topical questions of the Party's ideological and mass-political work" was made at the plenum by Konstantin Chernenko, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The speakers in the discussion of the report were Comrades Viktor Grishin, First Secretary of Moscow City CPSU Committee; Dinmukhamed Kunayev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Kazakhstan; Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of the Ukraine; Eduard Shevardnadze, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Georgia; Petr Demichev, USSR Minister of Culture; Vladimir Chicherov, leader of a team of assembly workers of the "Leningradskiy metallicheskiy zavod" turbine-building production association; Midkhat Shakirov, First Secretary of Bashkir Oblast CPSU Committee; Aleksandr Filatov, First Secretary of Novosibirsk Oblast CPSU Committee; Georgiy Markov, First Secretary of the board of the USSR Writers' Union; Aleksey Yepishev, head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy; and Avgust Voss, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Latvia.

The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee continues its work.

#### Report by Chernenko

Tass in Russian for abroad and in English 1522 gmt 14 Jun (also Moscow home service 0100, 0300 and 0500 gmt 15 Jun and summaries in various foreign languages) 83

"Full text" of report, "Topical questions of the Party's ideological and mass-political work", delivered to the CPSU Central Committee on 14th June by Konstantin Chernenko (passages in bold type as indicated in Tass Russian version):

[Note: Tass announced on 15th June (in English 0801 gmt): "Tass apologizes to its subscribers for the delay in the transmission of Konstantin Chernenko's report on 14th June, 1983. The delay was due to faults in the computer system."]

The revolutionary transformation of society is impossible without changing man himself. And our Party proceeds from the premise that **the moulding of the new man is not only the most important aim but also an imperative condition of communist construction.**

Great October destroyed the social and spiritual fetters that shackled for centuries the creative energies of people of labour. The revolution placed the working class in the centre of the modern epoch and freed the gigantic creative energy of the working people. And it is here that the best features of the Soviet character are rooted.

Soviet man, a fiery patriot and internationalist convinced of the correctness of the ideals of communism, matured, hardened and grew in the course of revolutionary struggle and revolutionary creativity. He is distinguished by vigorous civic attitude, vital

interest in all state and public matters and imaginative, creative attitude to work. In short, comrades, we have every reason to believe that the new man is not just a remote ideal but also a reality of our time.

In this we see a result of the most profound social-economic and political changes effected under the guidance of the Party of Lenin and of its constant concern for the development of socialist democracy and for the growth of the consciousness, well-being and culture of working people.

We see in this a vivid testimony of the constantly growing influence of the Party among the masses and its strengthening ties with the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia, and of the inviolable unity of the Party and the people.

The decisions of the November (1982) plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, which continued the line of the 26th Party Congress and confirmed the continuity of its home and foreign policies, are supported by the entire people. The working people of the Soviet Union ardently approve the activity of the CPSU Central Committee and of its Politburo headed by Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee. It is directed at consistently improving the work of the entire state and economic mechanism, at raising the responsibility of cadres, organization and discipline, further building up the economic and defence might of our homeland and advancing the well-being of the Soviet people.

The Party possesses a powerful and most diverse arsenal of means of ideological influence, numerous well-trained cadres and everything necessary to ensure the high effectiveness and quality of propaganda and education. It should not be forgotten, however, that the process of the forming of the new man is just as continuous and complex as life itself is continuous and complex. The social and economic conditions of work and daily life are changing, and more and more new generations are entering the period of maturity. And this sets quite a number of new tasks which the Party is keeping at the centre of its attention. The main directions of improving ideological, political and educational work in present-day conditions are outlined in the 26th April 1979, resolution of the Central Committee, in the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress and other Party documents. The purpose of our plenum is to discuss the progress of implementation of these resolutions and to exchange views on how to carry on the work.

The socialist state, Lenin stressed, derives its strength from the consciousness of the masses. And the Party tirelessly sees to the perfection of the ideological, political, labour and moral upbringing of Soviet people. It constantly links this work with the concrete historical situation and with the internal and external conditions in which our development takes place.

Today the Party and the people are solving tasks of unprecedented scope. We are carrying out huge comprehensive socio-economic programmes, including the Food and Energy Programmes, we are pressing for the intensification of production and the acceleration of scientific and technological progress and we are changing the appearance of vast regions. We are persistently striving for the tremendous possibilities of our economy, science and culture and natural resources to be used as fully and as effectively as possible. And it stands to reason that ideological work must accord with all these tasks. The fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan, and pace of our advance and, of course, the strengthening of the country's defence capability depend in many ways on how we shall be able to mobilize the spiritual energy of the people and promote their labour and social activity.

You understand well, comrades, that in the present conditions the international situation exerts a noticeable influence on the nature of propaganda and educational work. The international situation has seriously deteriorated lately. The USA and its NATO allies are following an extremely dangerous course. Its class meaning is clear: to try to put the brake on progressive changes in the life of mankind and regain lost positions. Having suffered a number of major defeats in the world arena in the 1960s and 1970s, imperialism, above all American imperialism, is mounting ever more massive attacks of

precedented scope on our social system and on Marxist-Leninist ideology, trying to poison the minds of Soviet people, distort the aims of our foreign policy and block the growing influence of real socialism - the main bulwark of the cause of peace and the freedom of peoples. A tense and truly global struggle of two ideologies is taking place.

All this requires the renewing, enriching and making more relevant of the content of ideological and educational work and its forms and methods, and increasing the vigorous nature of our entire propaganda. Such phenomena as evading the acute issues of life, formalism and ostentatiousness must be resolutely overcome. Realism, truthfulness and efficiency, skilful presentation of our accomplishments and thoughtful analysis of questions causing people concern freshness of thought and clarity of presentation - it is towards this that the Central Committee orients ideological workers.

All ideological activity must facilitate the assertion everywhere of the Leninist style of work - a style that is businesslike, creative, innovative, imbued with lofty devotion to ideology and with implacability to everything that is inert and contradicts the norms of socialist morality and the collectivist way of life.

A special colouring is given to our plenum by the fact that it is taking place in a year that has been rightly called the year of Karl Marx, the founder of scientific communism and proletarian ideology. This ideology is scientific and democratic, revolutionary and humane, and this radically distinguishes it from bourgeois ideology which justifies and blesses the exploiter system and the aggressive policy of imperialism and preaches nationalism and chauvinism. Contrary to bourgeois ideology, communist ideology wins the minds and hearts of millions by its truthfulness and honesty, wholeness and optimism. This is the ideology of a class that is in the ascendancy, the ideology of a new society, the ideology of peace and friendship among peoples.

Comrades, the effectiveness of ideological work directly depends on how accurately the specific features of the period through which the country is living are taken into account. In general form this question is clear. **Soviet society has entered a historically lengthy stage of developed (Russian: razvitoy) socialism; to perfect it in every way is our strategic task.**

The dialectics of the present stage of our development are already patently expressed in these propositions. This is the stage of mature (Russian: zrelyy) socialism. But this is only the beginning of the stage. On the one hand, we are faced with major tasks of today and tomorrow while, on the other hand, there exist problems that remain, so to say, from yesterday.

Big successes have been achieved in solving many economic, social-political and cultural tasks of the first phase of communism. The shoots of the communist future are visibly growing stronger. At the same time our advance is being held up by shortcomings in the economic mechanism, by a labour productivity, especially in agriculture, that does not satisfy us and by the insufficient civic maturity and discipline of some people.

It is understandable that the views and sentiments of working people are formed under the influence not only of our achievements but also of shortcomings and difficulties. One must not fail to take this into consideration. We must strictly proceed from Lenin's instruction that it is a prime duty of the Party to "soberly follow the actual state of the class-consciousness and preparedness of the entire class (not only of its communist vanguard), and of the whole mass of the working people (not only of their advanced elements)". It is only on this condition that one can count on success in mass-political work and in the cause of communist construction.

All this sets before us a number of theoretical and practical tasks. Let us take the theoretical tasks.

We rightly regard the propositions and conclusions contained in the materials of the 24th-26th Congresses in the CPSU and the plenums of the Central Committee, and in the statements by Yu.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central

committee, as real achievements of Marxist-Leninist thought of recent times. The elaboration of the concept of developed socialism, of ways of raising the efficiency of production in conditions of the scientific-technological revolution, the posing of the question of the establishment of the classless structure of society within the historical framework of the first phase of communism, the deepening of our nations of the content of the nationalities question at the present stage, of the most important tendencies of international life, the development of Lenin's teaching on war and peace and on defence of the socialist homeland - these and other theoretical generalizations arm the Party with new ideas and with a scientifically substantiated and balanced approach to the pressing problems of our time.

It goes without saying that in its theoretical activity the CPSU relies on the best works of Soviet philosophers, economists, historians, sociologists, jurists and psychologists. All the same, assistance to the Party from scientific institutions could have been more substantive.

Let me give you a specific example. We expected much from the Institute of Sociological Studies and the Central Economic-Mathematical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences which were set up way back in the 1960s. But to this day we are still waiting for thorough specific studies of social phenomena and pressing economic problems. The activities of these institutes patently demonstrate shortcomings that are also typical, to one extent or another, of some other scientific institutions: isolation within their own "academic" (Russian: dissertatsionnyy) and group interests, triviality of subject matter and weakness of Party influence. The Department of Science and Educational Institutions of the Central Committee, the Presidium and the Department of Social Sciences of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Party organizations should devote more attention to questions of planning and organizing research and to the style and methods of work of scientific collectives.

The study of problems of mature socialism must be on the main route of development of the social sciences. It is a matter of setting out from already achieved truths and of advancing, expanding our theoretical horizon, deepening our notions of the most important patterns of the country's economic, social, political and spiritual progress. The point is also not to interpret the developed and mature nature of Soviet society as its full perfection and not to idealize what has been accomplished. The efforts of all social sciences must be concentrated on the constructive elaboration of methods and means of attaining our immediate and long-term aims.

The study of foreign policy factors and international relations is no less important. Obviously, the optimistic view of mankind's future which is inherent in communists cannot be based on a simplified and narrowly focused (Russian: pryamolineynyy) understanding of the historical process. This calls for a constant search into the correlation of class forces in the international arena and for taking into account and foreseeing their influence on the solution of the main questions of our time - that of war and peace. It is necessary to make a deeper analysis of the social-political processes in the countries of socialism, the ways of all-round strengthening of the world socialist community, the latest specific features of state-monopoly capitalism and the class struggle of the proletariat, the world communist and workers' movement, the development of countries of socialist orientation, and global issues of our time.

I believe there is no need to enumerate here all the specific problems that demand the attention of scholars. Let us put the question in a more generalized form: If we want a look at the principles involved, what should we want the studies in the field of social sciences to be like?

First, they must proceed from the existing reality, with all its pluses and minuses, and show more fully the objective laws of social development.

As is known, the question of contradictions as the motive force of social development is of substantial importance for theory and practice. It has been elaborated quite well as applied to the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. What is

needed today is an all-round study of the non-antagonistic contradictions inherent in mature socialism and of the specific features of their resolution in conditions of the strengthening social-political and ideological unity of Soviet society. Here, just as in any social organism, a struggle between the new and the old is taking place, and not only creative but also negative tendencies exist. These include, for example, parochialism and the narrow departmental approach, bureaucratism and conservatism. The causes of these and other such phenomena must be revealed and means of overcoming them found.

Second, the scientific institutions must work more purposefully (Russian: *operativno*) and flexibly. Life does not develop according to a once set pattern. Unexpected turns of events take place. Questions arise which are just as unexpected. And one must be able to concentrate scientific forces on them in good time.

Third, despite their importance, discussions about the laws and categories of science should not be of a self-sufficing, scholastic nature. The Party hopes that scientific research will result in the more frequent appearance of solid practical recommendations.

Fourth, scientific workers must act with greater orientation towards the future and must "detect" the ripening tendencies in good time. I am referring to reliable forecasting that would make it possible to see the future better and take well-founded decisions.

And the most important thing is that the social sciences are obliged to be guided undeviatingly by revolutionary theory and to make skilful use of the tested Marxist-Leninist methodology of scientific quest. Of course, new facts can lead to the need to supplement and refine existing views. But there are truths that are not subject to revision, problems that had been solved long ago and unequivocally. One should not, while remaining on the soil of science, "forget" about the fundamental principles of materialist dialectics.

One can hardly recognize as scientific the concepts that explain such qualities of man as, say, honesty, courage and decency by the presence of "positive" genes and actually deny that these qualities are formed by the social environment. For it has long been known how unproductive are attempts mechanically to transfer the notions and methods of natural and technical sciences to the field of social phenomena, and the simplified interpretation of the inter-relationships of nature and society, and that this, in effect, impedes the strengthening of fruitful co-operation of these sciences with social sciences. Correctly organized scientific criticism plays an important role in overcoming such erroneous views. It is, of course, impermissible to attach ideological "labels" during a theoretical polemic, but this does not at all exclude impartial evaluations of those works that deserve this. Precision of world outlook, if you like, methodological discipline of thought are an imperative condition of the successful development of social sciences.

Tens of thousands of industrious people loyal to the Party and people are working in our science. This is a big force. The Party is confident that Soviet scientists will further devote all their knowledge and all their talent to serving our socialist homeland.

**Comrades, the idea of perfecting developed socialism must be placed at the base not only of theoretical work but also of all propaganda and educational work.**

Why is it necessary to focus attention on this? First of all because during a certain period of time, as you know, there existed a light-weight perception of the ways and duration of transition to the highest phase of communism. In hastening our dream, so to speak, some theoreticians and propagandists tried to smooth out the roughness of the road taken by us and lost contact with the real conditions of life. But without a complete and conscious overcoming of the "flight" of propaganda from reality it is impossible to achieve unity of words and deeds, although this is a crucial source of our strength.

We have achieved much in attaining an aim which has never been set by anyone but communists - forming an ideologically convinced, harmoniously developed and spiritually rich individual building his life according to the laws of social justice and reason,

goodness and beauty. But we have no reason to be complacent. As we advance there is a constant growth not only of the possibilities for the all-round development of the personality but also of demands made on it by society.

Here the Party views as the most important task the education in every person of the requirement to work, of a clear awareness of the need for conscientious work for the common good. Both the social recognition and the material welfare of a person must be determined first of all by how he works. It is not just the economic side that is important here. The ideological and moral side is no less important. For in work man not only creates material values but also develops his best abilities, steels his will, fulfils his creative potential and asserts himself as a citizen, as an active builder of communism.

An honest, conscientious attitude to work is the prime foundation of the socialist way of life. But is this characteristic of all? Unfortunately it is not. The improvement of the organization and strengthening of the discipline of work in all sectors and at all levels - from the worker and collective farmer to the minister, with strict observance of contractual obligations to deliver produce as the Central Committee demands - this is a real reserve for raising the economy. This reserve can and, as we see, does produce without special outlay a weighty material result. The steps taken by the Party to strengthen labour discipline and order have shown that within a comparatively short period of time we have succeeded in making noticeable progress in overcoming in some people slackness and irresponsible attitudes to their work obligations. These efforts were received by the people with satisfaction.

This, for instance, is what Hero of Socialist Labour Vladimir Grigoryevich Komarov, a worker at the Sergo Ordzhonikidze machine-tool building works, wrote to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee: "It was not on impulse that I sat down to write this letter. Your warm meeting with workers of my plant was the reason for it. A worker of long standing and a war veteran, I have seen a lot in my life. And, honestly, the soul rejoices at how much we have accomplished. The changes for the better are immense indeed. But they could have been still greater.

"Most work honestly as their worker's conscience demands that they do. There are, however, some who work sloppily, who are not above skipping their work, but who on payday are the first in line at the cashier's and even complain about not being paid enough. So a man has lost his conscience. He wants to give less but take more. Take from whom? From the state, which means from us.

"The line of our Party's Central Committee on strengthening discipline and the organization of work is, so to speak, the frame on which the entire machine is mounted: labour productivity, the quality of output and, as the end result, our whole standard of living. I will tell you wholeheartedly that the line of the Party is fully and entirely consonant with our thoughts and feelings. This is our line of work."

I am confident, Comrades, that every honest working man would sign this letter.

The strengthening of discipline is not a short-lived campaign but implies painstaking daily work. Success is ensured when not only the management but all working people are taking direct part in it, when it relies on the experience, consciousness and civic activity of the masses.

Discipline and order are inalienable aspects of socialist democracy which gives our people broad possibilities for administering the state and society. The Party regards the further development and deepening of democracy as a mighty and effective means of the communist education of working people and the moulding of the new man.

The CPSU Central Committee attentively studies everything that is born of the creativity of the people and encourages in every way the development of democracy in the most diverse spheres of social life, including directly in production. For instance, such team work organization as single contract working has proved to be a form of truly

socialist self-management. The experience of enterprises in Moscow, Kaluga, Dnepropetrovsk, Sverdlovsk and other cities and a number of rural areas shows that productivity and labour discipline are usually higher in the collectives that have switched to this form of work, where each worker sees better the connection between his labour contribution and his earnings. Patently manifesting themselves here are the spirit of comradesly mutual assistance and the educational impact of highly organized socialist work.

It is the duty of Party committees to search constantly for ways to develop the initiative of the working man, raise his role in the management of production and educate in every Soviet citizen the feeling of being a full-fledged master of the country. New possibilities here will be opened by the Law on the Work Collective.

Accumulated experience confirms that where the rights and possibilities of work collectives are used in full measure not only do the production indicators rise but the moral atmosphere is also purer and there are fewer violations of law and order.

Comrades, the education of the new man is inseparable from the most vigorous struggle against drunkenness, hooliganism and sponging, speculation and theft of socialist property, bribe-taking and money-grubbing. It would be wrong to see in all these ugly phenomena, which give rise to the concern and rightful indignation of working people, only "vestiges of the past" in the consciousness and behaviour of people. The causes of many of these "sores" should be sought also in present-day practice, in the mistakes of some workers or others, in the real problems and difficulties of our development and in the shortcomings of educational activities. So the removal of negative phenomena requires not only constant propaganda efforts but also measures of an economic, organizational and legal nature.

We must create an atmosphere of intolerance of all violators of the norms of socialist community life, regardless of who they are, and mobilize public opinion against them. Of course, more vigorous and purposeful work to form the reasonable requirements and interests of the individual is also necessary.

Experience proves again and again that success in education is ensured only when it rests on the firm foundation of socio-economic policy. This provision of the 26th Congress is of fundamental importance. Party cadres must know well the socio-economic factors that influence the sentiments and behaviour of people, and link ideological work with the struggle to fulfil key economic and socio-political tasks.

The serious critical analysis that was made lately in the CPSU Central Committee of the activity of the Irkutsk, Tula, Khmel'nitskiy and some other oblast Party committees showed that one of the main causes of the lag of these oblasts in developing the economy was their underestimation of ideological and educational activity in work collectives and mistakes in the selection, placement and education of cadres. There is no doubt that ideological activity by itself cannot solve economic and social problems. The successes that are attained should not be ascribed to it alone, nor should it alone be rebuked for the existing shortcomings. The required effect is produced only by the merging of ideological and educational work with political, organizational and economic work. Both Party and economic leaders should always remember this.

This applies to any section of our activity and any branch of the national economy. Especially obvious is the need for a comprehensive approach to the solution of problems arising in the countryside where the working and living conditions are usually more complicated. It is necessary to switch agricultural work to an industrial basis more vigorously, enrich its content and raise its prestige. The countryside should be modernized everywhere, and housing, living and cultural conditions there should be improved. It is on this that the attention of Party organizations is concentrated by the May 1982 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the April conference at the Central Committee on questions of agriculture and implementation of the Food Programme. Without the solution of these problems it is difficult to achieve the strengthening of collective and state farms with skilled cadres and the creation in each farm of a stable collective.



Comrades, the struggle to raise the efficiency of production and the quality of output is the key element of our work. Socialist emulation, the movement for the communist attitude to work, the efforts of every collective, of scientists and specialists must be directed at this.

What contribution can be made here by the system of propaganda and education? A very substantial one, first of all actively to form the new type of economic thinking directed at initiative and socialist enterprise, at raising responsibility, at the creative search for ways leading to the best economic end result for the least outlay.

We know quite a few examples of a correct solution of these tasks. Take the collective of the Likhachev motor vehicle works in Moscow. Steady growth of labour productivity and improvement of output quality are characteristic of it. How is this achieved? First of all because the Party organization persistently asserts at the works the spirit of creativity and innovation and facilitates the introduction into practice of everything that is advanced. Also serving this end is the streamlined and effective system of personnel training which, incidentally, begins even outside the enterprise - with work in affiliated schools. Much attention is given to the education of young workers and the development of mentorship (Russian: *nastavnichestvo*) for young workers. Publicity, the open discussion of successes and failures and the participation of officials of every rank in political and educational work create the social climate in which people work well.

But it is far from everywhere that things are so organized. Much work still lies ahead of us to improve the propaganda of model methods of work and intensive methods of management. Delays and red tape in disseminating advanced experience are also economic losses, and quite tangible ones on a countrywide scale.

Economic propaganda, on the whole, is doing little to facilitate the study and utilization of such experience. Party committees are duty bound to ensure that this propaganda should concentrate on problems on which the fulfilment of the Party's economic policy and the performance of work collectives primarily depend. It would be expedient to include special themes, perhaps even courses, in the study programmes of the system of economic education with the purpose of improving the level of scientific and technical knowledge of workers, specialists and economic managers and substantially expanding the study of advanced experience.

Genuine efficiency and a thrifty attitude to the people's property and to the use of material, labour and financial resources are an inalienable feature of modern economic thinking. Numerous propaganda activities are being conducted on matters of economy and thrift. But it is not everywhere that they have the backing of effective practical measures. This is the result: the assignments for 1982 to save electricity and some other material resources were fulfilled in the country as a whole only by 50% or even less. There was particular slowness to save fuel and electricity, for instance, at enterprises of the USSR ministries of Power and Electrification, Heavy and Transport Machine Building and Mineral Fertilizers Production. The struggle for economy and thrift should be based on a well-considered system of material and moral incentives so that it really becomes a cause for the entire state and people.

Comrades, quite a number of tasks are being set ideological workers by life. But invariably among them, now as before, is the task of forming the scientific, Marxist-Leninist world outlook - the foundation of the communist upbringing of people. It is this world outlook that makes communists and working people into conscious political fighters capable of independently assessing social phenomena, seeing the connection of the current tasks with our ultimate aims and conducting a well-argued polemic with any ideological opponent. The Party is paying undiminished attention to instilling in communists essential theory, together with an interest in and a taste for them. Our system of Party education is also intended to achieve this. The bolder we rid ourselves of formalism, dogmatism, inertia and obsolete forms of education that produce little effect, the better will Party education perform its role, and the more accurately will we take into account the specifics of every category of communist. It is necessary consistently and

persistently to readjust our work here in line with the resolution adopted by the CPSU Central Committee after the 26th Party Congress.

The CPSU attaches prime importance to studying the ideological heritage of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and V.I. Lenin. A tremendous amount of work has been done to collect and publish their works. The fifth edition of the collected works of Lenin has been completed. The second edition of works by Marx and Engels, including some 1,500 items published for the first time, has been put out. The total printing of Marxist-Leninist classics in the years of Soviet power has exceeded 700,000,000 copies.

I would like, Comrades, to seek your advice on the following matter. We want a scientific world outlook to be an asset of all Soviet people, of every new generation. But do our books and teaching aids on the fundamentals of revolutionary theory, intended for the mass reader, always meet the known Leninist requirement of the propaganda of Marxism: to be as scientific and popularized as possible? There is a current need, it seems, to prepare a book in which an easily comprehensible presentation of the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism is organically combined with a striking narrative of the heroic road traversed by our Party and people.

*new  
History  
or  
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You will probably also agree that today the forming of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook has never been more closely connected with convincing and skilful propaganda of our historic accomplishments and the advantages of the new system. It is necessary to show more deeply the meaning of such fundamental values of socialism as the collectivist spirit, comradely mutual assistance, genuine power of the people, humanism, the fraternal friendship of peoples, the moral health of society and the confidence of everyone in the future. "In total," Yu.V. Andropov stresses in the article 'The teaching of Karl Marx and some questions of building socialism in the USSR', "this means a fundamentally new quality of life for the working masses which is by no means reduced to material comfort but absorbs the entire spectrum of full-blooded human existence".

It is important that an understanding of the true value of the historic achievements of Soviet society should not be smoothed over in the consciousness of people, and that the proud feeling of being a citizen of a new world should not be eroded, to quote Vladimir Mayakovskiy, by the most terrible type of depreciation - the depreciation on the heart and the soul. It is necessary to place the great attractive power of communist ideals more actively at the service of our educational aims.

## II

Comrades, Lenin regarded the press as a most mighty instrument of ideological influence and political guidance of society. The correctness of this thesis is confirmed by the entire experience of building socialism. **The mass information and propaganda media are an effective instrument of the communist education and organization of working people, of giving ideological backing to the Party's home and foreign policy, a real rostrum of the whole people.** It is their activity that in our days determines to a considerable extent the effectiveness of Party propaganda and the state of affairs in the other sectors of the ideological front.

Since the 26th CPSU Congress our press has increased the attention given by it to urgent tasks of building communism. The increased effectiveness and maturity of its publications is illustrated by the fact that many of the ideas and proposals outlined in them were taken into consideration during the drafting of important documents of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. I shall mention, for instance, the publications in 'Pravda' concerning matters of improving the management of the rayon echelon of the agro-industrial complex, in 'Izvestiya' concerning the manufacture of consumer goods, and in 'Trud' concerning the participation of workers in the management of production. In such splendid achievements of our time as the construction of the Baykal-Amur Railway, the development of Siberia and the Far East, the construction of the Urengoy - Pomary - Uzhgorod gas pipeline, the improvement of large tracts of land and the development of the non-black earth zone the mass media are manifesting themselves not as impassive chroniclers but as vigorous propagandists and organizers.

The abundant practice of our press shows that its work is effective only when attention is focused on the main directions of the people's creative activity, when pressing issues are raised and the working people are extensively drawn into discussing them. Letters from readers, the TV audience and radio listeners, and dispatches from worker and peasant newspaper contributors are a sensitive barometer of public opinion, a full-flowing source of the thoughts, experience and initiative of the masses. And the editorial offices should use them in full measure. In their turn the Party committees are obliged to see to it that each serious publication finds a live response, becomes an impulse to improve the state of affairs and to achieve new frontiers.

The growth of the educational and cultural standards of Soviet people makes new demands on our press, television and radio. The CPSU Central Committee and the editorial offices are getting letters from working people expressing dissatisfaction with the content, language and style of some publications and programmes. Criticism is directed against cliché dispatches and commentaries and also against leading articles in which you will not find either profound generalizations or original thoughts. The insufficient promptness and the insufficiency of information in television and radio programmes are also criticized with justification.

Editorial boards should work perseveringly to eliminate these shortcomings. Every publication, every article should fascinate and convince the readers by its grasp of life and principledness, keen thought and vivid style.

The structure of periodicals - newspapers and magazines - should be perfected. The demand for a number of publications for children, teenagers and other groups of society is insufficiently met. At the same time, quite a lot of purely departmental publications, especially journals, are put out although some of them, to be frank, are of little value.

I should also like to discuss with you the long-ripe problems of the town and rayon press. They account for almost a half of all newspapers, and do a great amount of work, but many of them often try only to copy the central and oblast newspapers, but do not satisfy the needs of the readers in all respects. At times people are better informed about events in a distant foreign country than about happenings in their town or rayon. It is worth noting the experience of those of them which change the periodicity and size of the issues, taking into consideration the conditions of work and the requests of the readers, certainly, within the limits of the fixed annual budget of the paper. The main efforts of the editorial boards should be aimed at covering local life, and this should be done thoroughly, at a good professional level. There is no doubt that the All-Union Institute for the advancement of the professional Skills of the Workers of the Press, which is being established, will contribute towards the resolution of these and other problems.

A good deal depends in this field also on the leadership of the local press exercised by the Party committees. Unfortunately, sometimes two extremes are observed: either town and rayon committees seem to forget their newspapers altogether or paralyze their initiative by petty tutelage, at times distracting the editors for a long time from their duties by charging them with various economic missions. The rayon and town newspapers have other problems too. They are short of skilled staff and the printing facilities are far from being at the required level. Obviously time has come to examine, specially at the CPSU Central Committee, matters pertaining to the development of the local press.

The effectiveness of propaganda is determined above all by such qualities as its being science-based, truthful and realistic. It goes without saying that these qualities are indispensable both for critical, problem articles and stories and for publications about our successes. "what, precisely, are these successes? Have they been verified? Are they not fables, boasting...? How have the successes been achieved? What must be done to extend them?" This is the way Lenin posed the question.

It is necessary to recall this because there are still plenty of boasters about. Take, for instance, our newspapers early in the year. They publish a profusion of assurances that all plans will be overfulfilled. But when the time comes to sum up the results, it is

impossible to get a word out of some people, while others will make a report, suggesting that they are worthy of an award, although the plan targets and commitments have not been met. In such cases journalists should be, as they say, more biting, and should uphold the interests of the state more boldly.

Criticism in the press is, most certainly, a sharp weapon, and one should be able to use it without departing from positions of principle and objectivity. To us a critical statement is no sensation but a signal whose sole aim is to eliminate shortcomings.

I shall also talk about the attitude to criticism. It is an open secret that attempts are sometimes made to prevent critical statements or to "reassure" an editorial board with a formal reply. We have also come across facts of persecution for criticism, and one cannot help thinking that the cases of suppression of criticism would be impossible if the Party and government bodies only punished the culprits.

The press exerts its main influence on the education of the masses by popularizing advanced experience and models in all spheres of life. It has rich opportunities possibilities to give an effective portrayal of the image of our contemporary - the working man - who embodies lofty ideological and moral qualities. We need vivid stories about heroes of the Five-Year Plan: workers, collective farmers and specialists, such films of TV journalism as "The tuner" - about the Leningrad innovator Ye. N. Moryakov, or "Yegor Ivanovich" - about the famous miners' team leader Ye. I. Drozdetskiy. Needless to say, TV films about the country's best people are very important in educating the younger generation of the working class.

The TV audience is also expecting more feature films and entertainment programmes in good taste. Of course, it is not easy to make every programme meaningful and interesting. But there is no other way to the minds and hearts of viewers.

Comrades, it is the most important mission of socialist culture to form and elevate the spiritual needs of man and actively influence the ideological, political and moral values of the individual. It is this that determines the measure of responsibility of the artist whose talent is highly appreciated by the Party and regarded by it as a most valuable asset of society. Most heartfelt words of gratitude are due to those men of letters, musicians, artists and workers in the theatre and cinema who are actively developing the great multinational culture of our homeland. Many works of art of the past few years have become good travelling companions to millions of people in their life. This, undoubtedly, is the effect of the multi faceted activity of our creative associations in promoting the links of literature and art with the practice of building communism.

The point of departure in the artist's work has always been his civic position. It is only a Party approach that helps understanding of the main trends of our time. genuine talent does not isolate itself from life or take the liberty of vulgarly idealizing reality or artificially emphasizing negative phenomena.

But it must be admitted that things happen differently sometimes. Certain film-makers and authors sometimes put to the forefront only unhappy lives, troubles in life, unstable and uncaring characters. But man, particularly a young man, needs an ideal embodying noble goal in life, ideological convictions, industry and fortitude. There is no need to invent such heroes because they are living among us.

It is worrying that some works of art permit departures from historical truth, for instance, in evaluating collectivization, and let in "God-seeking" motives and idealization of the patriarchal way of life. We also encounter instances of an author either getting discouraged by complex problems or trying to show off by interpreting them in an "unorthodox" way, thereby distorting our reality. Such phenomena could be avoided if the staff of all the journals and publishing houses stamped out more resolutely instances of unprincipledness, appeasement and subjectivist bias. This fully applies also to the formation of the repertory of theatres and cinemas.

Not everything satisfies us in such a popular art genre as variety either. One cannot fail to see, for instance, that the wave of popularity sometimes brings to the surface

music groups with programmes of doubtful value, which cause ideological and aesthetic harm.

A more careful approach should also be made to the selection of foreign and creative products which we are getting through cultural exchanges. It is common knowledge that, along with meaningful works of art, we are getting films, plays, publications and music which are noted for their lack of ideals, platitudes and lack of artistic substance. One should not forget, comrades, that here we should give priority to a political rather than a commercial approach.

The USSR Ministry of Culture, the USSR State Committee for Cinematography and the USSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Works and the Book Trade should improve the supervision of the development of those areas of creative life of society which come within their particular sphere of activity. There should be no room for either formalism or lack of control. The Department of Culture of the Central Committee, too, should be more active in helping creative organizations and establishments to organize their work in the spirit of high Party demands and principles.

Of course, the Leninist style of leadership of the development of culture is distinguished by a profound understanding of the specific features and complexities of artistic creative work and methods of command and lack of objectivity are alien to it.

Thousands upon thousands of communists work in creative associations and establishments of art and culture. They are the militant vanguard of our artistic intelligentsia and its political core. It is important that Party organizations should actively influence the ideological orientation of theatres and film studios, literary associations, journals and publishing houses and the education of cadres, create an atmosphere of good teamwork between recognized masters and young workers in art, and help them to master Marxism-Leninism and to perfect their skills.

Soviet culture, which is permeated with humanism, creative diversity and artistic wealth, is actively promoting the cause of mutual understanding between the peoples. Last year alone, about 400 Soviet art groups visited over 100 countries. Revolutionary solidarity leads our film-makers, journalists, writers and artistes to the "flash points" of the world where the battle for the freedom of the peoples and for social justice is going on. And it is heartening that talented works of journalism, political novels, plays and films, which often are created on the heels of actual events, are winning ever larger audiences in the country and abroad.

The scope of the spread of cultural values here is truly immense. But there also are certain difficulties. The growing demand for books, first and foremost fiction and art publications, is not yet met in full. The reasons for this are well-known, namely, lack of printing capacity and paper. Musical instruments, modern TV equipment, particularly filming and transmitting equipment, and dependable colour TV sets are not yet produced in sufficient quantities. The USSR State Planning Committee, the USSR Ministries of Communications Equipment and the Electronics Industries, the USSR Ministry of the Timber, Pulp and Paper and Wood Industry, the Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances and other departments do not approach with proper responsibility the strengthening of the technical base of propaganda. But it is time to understand that the delay in the provision of technical equipment is a brake on the efficient use of our propaganda potential.

Comrades, now over to our tasks which emanate from the present-day international situation. As you know, the USA and NATO countries are banking today mainly on achieving military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty organization and on the runaway arms race camouflaged with myths about the "Soviet military threat". Washington's adventurist policy, whipping up international tension to the utmost, is pushing mankind towards nuclear catastrophe.

Given all the complexity of international relations, the CPSU is still firmly convinced that nuclear madness can be stopped. And our Party knows of no more

important task than that of safeguarding and strengthening peace. We are consistently upholding the principles of peaceful coexistence and detente. The broad complex of initiatives advanced lately by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community shows that socialism is continuing its peace offensive.

Statements by Comrade Yu.V. Andropov are exerting a profound influence on the world public. Their argumentation, principledness and calm and confident tone stand in sharp contrast with the irresponsible and aggressive declarations of the White House. At the same time, these statements give our class adversaries an idea of the might of our state and of the futility of the hopes to force the USSR to make concessions which would jeopardize our security and the peaceful life of the Soviet people and of the working people of fraternal socialist countries. This position has been reiterated most forcefully in the recent statement by the Soviet government.

The major tasks of Tass, Novosti, the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and other departments concerned with foreign policy propaganda is perseveringly and convincingly to bring to the knowledge of the masses the truth about our foreign policy, to win over to its side public opinion and expose the plans of the imperialist circles. The Foreign Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee should co-ordinate all this work in the best possible way.

We have no reason to take a defensive stand on any question of principle. We cannot say, however, that our foreign policy propaganda always sufficiently actively and skillfully reveals the advantages of socialism and that it fully succeeds in overcoming the barrier of anti-socialist bias with which the Western ruling circles are surrounding the peoples. Let us not deceive ourselves: if we explain an event superficially or report on it belatedly, we shall then have to change people's convictions later, which is far more difficult than convincing them in the first place.

It is necessary to enhance the argumentation and effectiveness, appeal and journalistic qualities of material addressed to foreign audiences while explaining in an understandable way the specific content of our peaceful internationalist policy. Otherwise we cannot hope for success in foreign policy propaganda in the long term.

Priority should be given here to information about the activities of the CPSU and the Soviet state in the further development of relations among socialist countries. It is necessary to improve exchanges of experience in communist education and our ideological co-operation and to make better use of the available reserves for a joint struggle against imperialist propaganda and the attempts to sow the poisonous seeds of nationalism and revisionism. Likewise we must not relax attention to questions of strengthening solidarity with the liberated states and with the peoples who are fighting for their freedom and independence. The consistent efforts of the Party to establish mutually beneficial contacts with capitalist countries are a constant theme of our propaganda.

The class enemy are openly stating their intention to eliminate the socialist system. President Reagan has called for a new "crusade" against communism. Imperialism regards "psychological warfare" as one of the chief means of achieving its goal. It is being waged by the West at the highest possible, one may say an hysterical, anti-Soviet and anti-communist pitch. The adversary is practising veritable banditry over the air. We face attempts to organize against us a full-scale information and propaganda invasion and to turn radio and TV channels into a tool of interference in the internal affairs of states, a tool of subversive actions.

That is why it is necessary to launch a large-scale offensive of counterpropaganda work not only in the international arena but also within the country. Party committees should have a clear idea of what the enemy is trying to smuggle in, in what form and through what channels, and counter these rallies in a timely and effective way. In the same way one cannot leave without a principled evaluation in the Party spirit the actions of those persons who, consciously or unconsciously, are singing in foreign voices, so to speak, and spreading all sorts of gossip and rumours. No communist can ignore such phenomena.

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The CPSU Central Committee gave a positive appraisal of the practice of organizing counterpropaganda in the Maritime Kray. Interesting experience has been accumulated in Moscow, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Estonia. More extensive use should be made of it, naturally, with due account for local conditions. It is important that Party committees and primary Party organizations should in good time get material helping to expose the tricks of hostile propaganda. The appropriate departments of the Central Committee should always be working on this.

The ideological struggle in the international arena is going on without respite. We shall continue to wage it vigorously and with dignity, without falling for acts of provocation. The Soviet people can be confident that our Party will spare no effort in the struggle for ensuring peace on earth and for the social and national rights of the peoples.

### III

Comrades, our entire system of ideological work should operate as a well-adjusted orchestra in which every instrument has a distinctive voice and plays its own part while harmony is achieved by skilful conducting. The main demands on Party leadership of ideological work are constantly to check the tenor of propaganda against the goals of our policy and the interests of people and to ensure that "word becomes deed", as Lenin put it. Propaganda is called upon to embrace every aspect of social life and every social group and region and reach every individual. It is necessary here to co-ordinate better the educational efforts of our soviets, the truly mass bodies of state authority and also the trade unions, the Komsomol and all the other public organizations.

Since the CPSU Central Committee's resolution of 26th April 1979, Party committees have begun to concern themselves more actively with propaganda and show more initiative and creativity in increasing its effectiveness.

But has such a turn taken place everywhere? Frankly, no. Apparently, certain Party committees have taken a simplistic view of the Central Committee's demand for more attention to ideological work. The number of resolutions has increased while the situation has in effect remained the same. Education matters are often shifted onto the shoulders of ideological cadres alone, while the resolutions adopted are not backed by practical work. For instance, Leninabad Oblast Party Committee has examined matters concerning legal education and improvement of law enforcement on more than 40 occasions during the past three years but the number of offences in the oblast keeps on growing. This example shows again that directives alone cannot change the situation. It is important that the Party committees, all their departments and, of course, the first secretaries regularly concern themselves with matters of ideological work.

We say that ideological work is the affair of the entire Party and hence of every communist, who influences the views and moods of people not only by words but also by his attitude to work and by his conduct in everyday life. Communists are setting good examples of dedicated service to the interests of the people and the ideals of the Party.

It is a great honour to be a communist today. But it is also a great responsibility and a far from easy duty. That is why, while unfolding political propaganda amongst the broadest mass of the working people, **the Party committees must raise the level of ideological work within the Party itself and improve its forms and methods.** It is all the more important since hundreds of thousands of young workers, collective farmers and intellectuals are joining the Party every year. Today it has more than 3,000,000 members under 30 years old. It is necessary to help every new member to master in depth the Party's ideological and political heritage, Leninist traditions and Bolshevik ethics. The replenishment of Party ranks and the education of young communists links matters of the Party's organizational work and ideological work. Work should be organized here so that the non-Party people, in Lenin's words, should clearly see: "The communists admit new members of the Party not in order that they may enjoy the advantages connected with the position of a governing party, but that they set an example of real communist labour..."

The force of the moral example of a communist, particularly a communist in a position of leadership, is great. He is always in full view of the masses, and the higher his post the greater his responsibility. Those who forget this and catch "altitude sickness" can fall prey to serious dangers and setbacks. One also comes across cases of conceit, rudeness and red tape. There still are leaders who do not know the difference between their own pockets and those of the state and abuse their position. The Party resolutely gets rid of such people.

Ideological work should be conducted in a differentiated way, with due account for the diverse interests of different groups of the population. This should be said first and foremost because the make-up of social strata and social patterns are changing before our very eyes and because the multifaceted process of obliterating differences between classes is going on.

**These changes make themselves felt first and foremost in the social make-up of young people.** The younger generation who are the most literate in the country's history and particularly well prepared occupationally are now embarking on their independent roads in life. They have grown up under conditions of socialism, continuously rising living standards and peace. Loyal to communist ideals and revolutionary traditions, young people are working in the vanguard of the five-year plan period. The future of our system is in dependable hands.

But the Party also sees negative phenomena amongst young people. What is worrying is belated civic maturity, political naivety and sponging attitudes among certain young people, their unwillingness to work where society needs their work today. One cannot help being alarmed at the desire of some young people to make themselves noticeable not by their knowledge or industry but by expensive things bought with their parents' money. I mention this here not at all to carp about present-day young people, saying that they are not what young people used to be in the past. No, what I mean is something else. Those who are going to school today will tackle the most complex tasks of the coming 21st century. We want them to be in the prime of their talents and free from moral flaws when they tackle them.

The point also is that our enemy is trying to exploit for its ends specific features of the psychology of young people. Young people have not seen at first hand the grim trials of class struggle and war, when the true face of imperialism with its hatred for the peoples of our country and the socialist system was laid absolutely bare. That is why it is necessary to take constant care of the ideological, moral, class and work "hardening" of young people.

The schoolteacher has a great role to play in the accomplishment of these tasks. He is entrusted by society with raising our children and is a dependable bulwark of the Party in agitation, propaganda and ideological activity as a whole. The sources of many civic qualities and the knowledge which benefits man over the years are inseparable from the work of schoolteachers, of whom we have, Comrades, about 3,000,000. We should raise and safeguard in every way the prestige of the teacher and constantly take care to improve his working and living conditions and his ideological and professional training.

There is no need to prove the importance of early identification of the abilities and gifts of the individual and correct choice of profession or trade. Man's labour productivity, social activity and his destiny in life, if you wish, depend on this to a large extent. Our vocational training system has extensive possibilities in this sense. Regrettably, it is often regarded in schools as a way of getting rid of so-called problem teenagers. This attitude is harmful both to schools and to vocational training schools, contribute to their material basis and personnel, and improve training and educational processes in them. Thought should also be given to a system of more effective privileges to their graduates in enrolment in institutions of higher learning.



To be a patriot today means to strengthen tirelessly the economic and defence potentials of our homeland, enhance one's readiness to defend peace against any encroachments of the imperialist aggressor and approach one's military duties conscientiously. On the whole young people do military service well, perseveringly mastering modern technology. Rising to the demands of the homeland and their internationalist duty, they perform veritable feats worthy of the military glory of their fathers and forefathers.

The people by right call our army and navy a school of bravery, industry and lofty moral values. We must continue to enhance in every way the educational role of the Soviet armed forces.

Comrades, ideological work in the conditions of our country, uniting more than 100 nationalities and ethnic groups, is unthinkable without a **thorough study of their specific interests and particular features of national psychology and culture**. Indeed, the solution of the nationality question as we inherited it from the past does not at all mean that it has been removed from the agenda altogether. A well thought-out scientific nationalities policy is an intrinsic part of the activities of the Party in perfecting developed socialism. The key condition of their success is the raising of the working people in the spirit of proletarian socialist internationalism.

The key directions and tasks of these activities were defined in the materials of the 26th Congress and other Party documents. You are well aware of them. I would only like to remind you how important it is to notice in good time new positive developments in national relations, comprehensively analyse the tendencies of the nations which are flourishing and drawing closer together and devise forms of work which open even greater vistas for the cross-fertilization of the cultures of our peoples. It is important to identify in good time the problems and contradictions arising here and effectively resolve them. In short, internationalist education should be conducted on a large scale, perseveringly and in a businesslike way, without limiting ourselves to celebrations, ten-day festivals and jubilee campaigns. Truly Party principledness should be skilfully combined here with the utmost tactfulness.

The Soviet people's internationalism is always active. Hundreds of thousands of representatives of different nationalities are working on priority construction projects wherever their work is called for by the interests of the state as a whole.

Of course, all this is not done of its own accord. There are, for instance, reserves of labour resources in certain parts of the country. However, we are not yet quite successful in attracting them and sending them to those places where they are particularly needed today. All of us should think how better to cope with this problem.

Take such a progressive phenomenon which has come about here as the perfect command of Russian as the language of intercourse among nations in addition to a national language. It has become widespread. But there are quite a few cases when a poor knowledge of Russian limits a person's access to the wealth of international culture and narrows the range of his activity and intercourse. Recently the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on providing conditions to facilitate the study of Russian by the population of national republics. This resolution should be actively implemented.

I have touched upon only some of the problems arising in the sphere of relations among nationalities. All of them demand the attention of the Party committees, social scientists and activists in ideological work. We should work for an organic combination of patriotic and internationalist education and for the formation in everyone of high standards of intercourse among nationalities and a sense of pride in our Soviet homeland.

Work with such a specific group of the population as believers must not be slackened either. Part of the people - and, frankly, not a very insignificant part - are still under the influence of religion. Numerous ideological centres of imperialism are trying to support them and, moreover, inculcate religious sentiments and impart to them an anti-Soviet and nationalist bias. A special stake is made on religious extremists. At the same time allegations are spread about "violations of the freedom of conscience in the USSR".

What can be said in this context? Everyone knows about our constitutional guarantees of freedom of conscience. Communists are consistent atheists, but they do not impose their world outlook on anyone. Our method is education, conviction, propaganda. But when we come across facts of violations of socialist laws and subversive political activity which is only camouflaged by religion, we act in accordance with the demands of our Constitution.

Lasting results in educational work are achieved, as has been said above, when it embraces every aspect of the life and activity of people, including their everyday life, leisure and family relations. Leisure should be more meaningful and interesting and help in the development of human talents and relieve the psychological stresses caused by the pace of today's life.

A responsible role is played here by health care workers. There are among them quite a few really dedicated and knowledgeable people. They are doing a good deal to shield man from disease and extend his active lifespan. Naturally, this field of activity requires constant care and improvement and the removal of the existing shortcomings.

Of course, human health, vitality and mood do not depend on medicine alone. It is important that everyone, not only at work but also in leisure hours, should be aware of attention and care. A great role is to be played here, in particular, by the development of the mass physical culture movement. The Party organizations of production collectives, house management offices and deputies' groups have accumulated a wealth of experience in working with the population at places of residence. It is necessary to draw general conclusions from this experience, select all the best things and introduce them into practice more boldly. The press, for instance, has described on more than one occasion the establishment of rayon cultural and sports complexes, supervised by local soviets of people's deputies, integrating the work of community centres, sports facilities and libraries regardless of their departmental affiliation. The USSR Council of Ministers jointly with the AUCCTU should give thought to the more extensive propagation of this experience.

Problems of leisure are closely intertwined with problems of enforcing public order and dependably ensuring citizens' peace and quiet and personal safety. The Central Committee makes strict demands of those who have been entrusted with this responsible affair, first and foremost the militia, the courts and the procurator's office. The public, particularly the Komsomol, should not stay aloof from maintaining law and order either.

Let me touch upon the "technology" of ideological work, upon questions of its organization and planning. It is a good thing that comprehensive plans have begun to be used on a large scale and that the tasks of education are being more closely related to the solution of concrete socio-economic problems.

However, propaganda still is in need of consistency and a businesslike approach. Sometimes one wave of a propaganda campaign catches up with another, as it were dampening rather than enhancing its impact. Another shortcoming is that some ideological departments of Party committees spend an inordinate amount of time on drafting numerous plans which remain in the desks of their authors. At the same time an avalanche of all sorts of directives and demands for reports and memoranda chains secretaries of Party organizations to their desks, tearing them away, from work in direct contact with people. This bureaucratic style of work should be renounced, the sooner the better.

Today, when new structures of management of agricultural production are emerging, particular urgency is attached to matters of improving the style and methods of ideological and organizational work of the rural rayon Party committee.

The experience of the Talsi rayon Party Committee in Latvia, the Viljandi and Parnu Party committees in Estonia and the Abasha Party committee in Georgia is instructive. They have approached the establishment of agro-industrial associations

first and foremost as a problem of establishment of new relationships between people who are brought together by common objectives, a common interest, and responsibility for the end results of their common work. Socialist emulation, the activity of the local newspaper and radio network, and verbal agitation and propaganda are subordinated to the accomplishment of this task. Particular concern is shown for meeting the social and cultural needs of people and for the development of democratic principles in production management. This experience, tested by practice, should be turned to more often.

Everyone likes to see the fruit of his work and know how society evaluates it. Ideological workers are no exception. When all is said and done, their work is measured by the ideological maturity of people, their activity in work and the degree of their organization. But a good deal has to be done to work up to this point, so to speak. Fuss, harassing demands (Russian: *derganye*) on cadres and attempts to substitute reports on the lectures read and on the number of activities staged for actual results of education have nothing to do with this work. These weeds should be suppressed wherever they emerge. Party committees have every right to count on more active help from the propaganda department of the Central Committee in asserting a businesslike and creative style of work.

It is impossible to conduct ideological work efficiently without having a smoothly functioning feedback mechanism. Otherwise propaganda will miss its mark.

The Party has many channels of flexible and prompt communication enabling it sensitively to detect changes in the mood of the masses and study in depth their interests and needs. These include statements and letters of working people, questions to lecturers and propagandists and sociological studies. An interesting experience of such work has been accumulated in Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Georgia, Latvia, Uzbekistan and a number of oblast committees of the RSFSR and Ukraine. It should be developed. It is necessary to go over from appraisals of the condition of ideological processes to forecasting them, from occasional public opinion polls to systematic public opinion studies and even to the organization of a centre for studying public opinion.

The need has arisen to strengthen further the scientific and methodological base of political education and propaganda work as a whole. Work on sociological, psychological and pedagogical problems of this sphere of spiritual activity still lacks depth and a planned character. The very rich experience accumulated in this field is poorly generalized as well. I think it would be right for the plenum to instruct the Secretariat of the Central Committee to examine this question and adopt an appropriate resolution.

Noting the leading role of the contents of propaganda, we should not underestimate the importance of its forms. This was pointed out by the 26th CPSU Congress. We see that such forms of work as methodological seminars, "open letter days" and TV dialogues generate interest in propaganda and make it possible to conduct a frank dialogue with audiences.

However, there still exist long and boring didactic monologues. The appeal of permanent propaganda centres, let alone those which are in fact constantly inoperative, is markedly on the decline. A considerable part of the means of visual agitation which, incidentally, absorb a good deal of public funds as well as time, do not work in harmony. In short, the inertia of outdated forms still makes itself felt.

It is understandable that a propaganda form in itself does not yet guarantee success. For instance, integrated political education days have appeared to be a good form of mass political work. However, in a number of places their contents are patently watered down. Sometimes officials are replaced by lecturers and political observers and a lively discussion of outstanding problems gives way to news readings or recitals of texts on general political themes.

Why do some officials avoid this work? Merely because many questions raised by working people demand not only explanation and eloquence, but also practical measures. When they are constantly put off till tomorrow there emerge, on the one hand, discontent in the audience and, on the other, a certain "timidity", fear of public speeches.

One should not avoid frank discussions with people. One should be able not only to explain our policy and teach the masses, but also learn from them, one may say, get charged up by them. This should be not only a duty but a requirement of every official. Political speeches and regular business-like reports to working people are the touchstone, effectively testing the qualities of an official and his ability to organize people and lead them. That was how Lenin saw it. It is how our Party's Central Committee sees it.

The development of socialist democracy is unthinkable without large-scale publicity. You know what measures the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee has taken to provide fuller information about its activity. We will continue this line and ensure the maximum possible publicity on matters touching upon the interests of people. Obviously it is necessary to make it obligatory for the heads of ministries, departments and Party committees to appear on television and write in the press on a regular basis.

**Cadres are the key link in ideological work.** They are contributing great efforts and Bolshevik spiritedness to propaganda. The Party believes in its cadres and highly appreciates their noble and dedicated work. It supports their creative quests and shows constant concern for raising their knowledge of the theory of ideology and their professional skills and for keeping them informed of the latest developments. There has emerged a streamlined system of training and retraining for all groups of ideological workers. It is necessary to continue to improve it on the basis of those increased requirements which are made by the Central Committee today. I believe that the ideological cadres will do everything possible to demonstrate more graphically the greatness of our ideals and the unbreakable links of Party policy with the vital interests of people and promote even more the activity of working people.

Comrades our plenum has met on the eve of the 80th anniversary of the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party. The Bolshevik Party has travelled a glorious and arduous road. Equipped with Marxism-Leninism and relying on the working class and the support of all the working people, it spearheaded a revolutionary upheaval of world-wide historical importance and led our people to great victories.

One of the main results of the heroic road travelled by the Communist Party is the unbreakable unity of the Party ranks, the unity of the Central Committee and its leading nucleus (Russian: yadro). This unity, in Lenin's words, is "infinitely precious and infinitely important".

The November 1982 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee became a model of the cohesiveness of the Central Committee and its politburo and the unity of the Party and the people. In those difficult days the Central Committee addressed an appeal to communists and all Soviet people to close their ranks even tighter and implement calmly and confidently the course chartered by the 26th Party Congress. That appeal evoked a profound response from the hearts of millions.

The Politburo and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee are working efficiently and in concert, in an atmosphere of high principledness and full and genuine unity. Every condition has been created at their meetings for free discussion and evaluation of matters of domestic and foreign policy and for a comradely exchange of opinions.

Concluding my report, I would like to comment again on the complexity and multidimensional character of the tasks arising in every field of ideological work. There are not nor can there be any once and for all decisions which are good for all time. Short-lived campaigns and crash programmes (Russian: shturmovshchina) will yield no effect here either. It is necessary to attune oneself to systematic work without cease. We have everything necessary to make this work an even more efficient way of encouraging the initiative, energy and conscientiousness of the masses. We will certainly achieve it if every communist and every official consistently translated into practice the Leninist principle: Ideological work is a cause of the entire Party!

16 Jun 83

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There is not nor can that be a nobler task than that of putting within the people's reach the ideals of communism and the immortal ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin. There is not nor can there be a loftier task than that of raising everyone to the level of maker of his own destiny, maker of history.

Allow me on behalf of the Politburo to express the confidence that in the course of the plenum and in the speeches of comrades, urgent matters of ideological work and political education will be examined thoroughly and comprehensively; general conclusions will be drawn from accumulated experience; and what is most important, practical ways will be mapped out collectively to accomplish successfully the tasks facing us. This will be the tuning urged by Yu.V. Andropov, tuning up to deeds rather than to loud words.

**Communique on Concluding Day's Proceedings: "Organizational Matters"**

Moscow home service 1200 (also Tass in English 1216) gmt 15 Jun 83

Text of "Communique on the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee" (first names from Tass version):

Today [15th June] the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee continued discussion of the report "Topical questions of the Party's ideological and mass-political work" delivered by Konstantin Chernenko, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Comrade Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, made a lengthy speech at the plenum.

Taking part in the discussion of the report were Comrades [Sharaf] Rashidov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Uzbekistan; [Karl] Vaino, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Estonia; Petr Fedoseyev, Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Karen Demirchyan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia; Sergey Lapin, Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting; Mikhail Prokofyev, USSR Minister of Education; Lev Kulidzhanov, First Secretary of the Board of the USSR Union of Film-makers; Stepan Shalayev, Chairman of the AUCCTU; and Viktor Mishin, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Leninist Young Communist League.

The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee unanimously adopted a resolution on the matter discussed. The resolution is being published in the press.

The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee examined organizational matters.

The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee elected Grigoriy Romanov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, to be a Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee endorsed Mikhail Solomentsev, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, as Chairman of the Party Control Committee at the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee elected Vitaliy Vorotnikov candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee promoted to full membership the following candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee; Sergey Akhromeyev, First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; Boris Balmont, Minister

CHERNENKO  
SOVIET NEWS 8 SEPTEMBER 1982  
SPEECHES  
free

# Inviolable union of free nations

The following article by Konstantin Chernenko, member of the political bureau and secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was published in the September issue of Soviet Union magazine:

ON DECEMBER 30, 1922, the First All-Union Congress of Soviets, meeting in Moscow, adopted a declaration and treaty forming the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. By this treaty the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Transcaucasian Federation (consisting of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) united, on a voluntary and equal basis, to form an integral federal state.

The past six decades have been eventful ones for the Land of the Soviets. They have witnessed titanic, dedicated work to transform the towns and villages along socialist lines, a genuine cultural revolution, great martial feats of defence of the socialist homeland, the difficult period of post-war recovery and the creation of a developed socialist society.

The fact that the Soviet people were able to withstand all the trials that befell them, that today our country is a powerful socialist state, is due in an enormous degree to the correct and just solution of the nationalities question.

## Bitter legacy

After carrying out the victorious October Revolution, the communist party, headed by Lenin, inherited a bitter legacy from tsarism. In tsarist times the non-Russian nationalities, which comprised more than half of the country's population, were subjected to discrimination. Feudalism still held sway in the outlying ethnic regions—in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and many parts of Transcaucasia. The overwhelming majority of the people there never saw a schoolteacher or a doctor in all their lives. They groaned under a double yoke: oppression by local exploiters and by Russian landowners and capitalists.

Those outlying regions were at a cryingly low level of economic development. Industrialisation had passed them by. Transport arteries were practically nonexistent. The peasants farmed the land with primitive implements. Many of the nationalities inhabiting the regions led a nomadic

life. Millions upon millions of people lived in poverty and ignorance. There, as the Tajik author Aini put it, a person who could read and write was as much a rarity as a green sapling in a desert.

Tsarism had followed the principle of "divide and rule". It made no attempt to counteract discord among the nationalities but, on the contrary, deliberately fanned it. Just recall such disgraceful occurrences as the Jewish pogroms, the massacres in Transcaucasia, the humiliations poured on "aliens" in the Volga River area, and so on.

Lenin's description of tsarist Russia as "a prison of the nations" was bitter but exact. Old Russia was a prison for all its large and small nationalities.

However, the difficulties in resolving the nationalities question in a country where enmity among the nationalities had been cultivated for decades, for centuries, was not limited just to the objective state of affairs. Any perplexing problem can be solved easier if there is a tried and tested practical example to follow. But the world's history did not provide any examples of a positive approach to the nationalities question. There had been multinational states before, of course, in various periods of history, but their example was only negative. This applied to the Holy Roman Empire, to Austria-Hungary, to Great Britain and even to the United States of America, which arose in a war for national independence. Exploiter classes, whether feudal or bourgeois, are not interested in settling the nationalities question. Alienation and mistrust among the working people of various nationalities has always brought grist to the mill of the exploiters. Discord among nationalities weakens the working people, blinds them to their common fundamental interests, prevents them from seeing who their real enemy is.

In short, young Soviet Russia faced a host of difficulties, objective and subjective, in tackling the nationalities question. However, the nationalities policy of the Soviet communists has been successful and fruitful. This is illustrated by the historic birth and development of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

## Class struggle

At the dawn of their revolutionary activity Lenin and his associates paid close attention to the nationalities question. They clearly saw their goal: to unite the working people, irrespective of nationality, to oppose all forms of oppression and to fight for a new social system free from exploitation. They mapped the road to this goal with precision. As Leonid Brezhnev has noted, the communists have always examined the nationalities question through the prism of the class struggle and have subordinated its solution to the interests of the revolution, to the interests of socialism. It was precisely for this reason that the fighters for socialism made the keystone of their nationalities policy an alliance of working people, regardless of nationality, in a common battle against all oppression and for a new social system, that would free the working people from exploitation.

The communists staunchly advocated the un-

conditional right of every nation to decide its own destiny. While condemning nationalism they drew a distinction between the nationalism of an oppressor nation and the nationalism of an oppressed nation. In striving for a fraternal union of the workers and working masses of all nations, they completely excluded the use of any violence whatever. The union should, and could, be built only on the principle of voluntary association.

Incidentally, in the pre-revolutionary period, too, the communist party admitted people of various nationalities to membership. In 1905 Lenin wrote: "To dispel any idea of its being national in character, the party called itself 'Rossiiskaya' (of Russia) and not 'Russkaya' (Russian)."

From the very outset the Bolshevik Party was a party of internationalists. This had exceptional importance in the work to implement the programme goals of the party's nationalities policy after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In the pre-revolutionary years reliable and competent party activists of various nationalities rose up to carry out this correct policy.

## Self-determination

The Soviet government did not delay in putting its nationalities strategy into practice. One of its earliest historic acts, alongside the Decree on Peace and the Decree on Land, was the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia. The Declaration proclaimed that the peoples of Russia were equal and sovereign; that they had the right to free self-determination, including the right to secede and to form an independent state; that all the privileges and restrictions that had been granted or imposed on the basis of nationality or religion were abolished, and that voluntary and honest union of the peoples of Russia and complete mutual trust among them were essential.

The nationalities question was now moved from the realm of theory to the sphere of practical policy. Equality of the nations and nationalities became a law binding on one and all. Addressing the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets in January 1918, Lenin said: "We do not rule by dividing, as ancient Rome's harsh maxim required, but by uniting all the working people with the unbreakable bonds of living interests and a sense of class. This, our union, our new state, is stronger than power based on violence which keeps artificial state entities hammered together with lies and bayonets in the way the imperialists want."

Even then Lenin's words were backed by concrete actions. The October Revolution of 1917 gave all the peoples of the former tsarist empire an opportunity to decide their own destiny. Finland and Poland acquired independent statehood. This was a practical embodiment of the right of nations to self-determination, as proclaimed by the Soviet government. Independent Soviet republics also arose. The first of them, the Russian Republic, also became the first Soviet multinational state. It was constituted as a federation on the basis of a free alliance of free nations. Other independent republics arose: the Ukrainian and Byelorussian, and then the Azerbaijan, Armenian and Georgian republics. Soon after, the latter three republics united in a federation. Autonomous state entities of various nationalities also came into being.

## Readers abroad

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# DMITRY USTINOV'S SPEECH AT KUIBYSHEV AWARD CEREMONY

THE CITY OF KUIBYSHEV on the middle reaches of the Volga River, has been awarded The Order of Lenin for services to the Soviet land in revolution, war and labour effort.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitry Ustinov, a member of the political bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union central committee and USSR Defence Minister, spoke at the ceremony on behalf of the CPSU central committee, the Soviet government and President Leonid Brezhnev, cordially congratulating the working people of the city.

He recalled that it was in Kuibyshev, previously called Samara, that Lenin began his revolutionary activities. And he recalled the significant contribution of the city to the victory over nazism in the Second World War: over 30,000 Il-2 assault aircraft, considered the best combat aircraft at the time, were built in Kuibyshev during the war.

Today, the Defence Minister said, Kuibyshev's mills put out metal and engines, jet planes and sophisticated machine tools. The city's trade mark is known all over the USSR and in more than 80 other countries where Kuibyshev's products are exported.

"We have to solve our creative tasks in tough international conditions," Mr Ustinov went on. "The situation in the world is worsening because of the efforts of imperialist reaction, above all of the US leadership. There are many troubled areas in the world today, scenes of war and bloodshed.

Everywhere it is a consequence of the policy and aggressive actions of imperialism. Neither does the present course of the Peking leadership, aimed against the common interests of the socialist community, contribute to a lessening of world tensions.

"All their actions are accompanied by frenzied anti-Soviet, anti-socialist campaigns, and crude lies about a Soviet military threat.

"Washington has been forced by the USSR's consistent, firm and constructive foreign policy and by the pressure of the mounting peace movement in the USA and other Western countries to resort more and more to using the rhetoric of peace to camouflage its aggressive course. But this will hardly deceive anybody.

## Delaying tactics

"Talks have started, despite the American administration's lengthy delaying tactics, on the problems of limiting and reducing strategic weapons and on limiting nuclear weapons in Europe," the Defence Minister went on. "This in itself is undoubtedly a positive step.

"But the facts show that our partners in the talks are not prepared to reach agreements on terms of equality and equal security. They are continuing to stake everything on ensuring their military superiority. Clearly the Soviet Union cannot except an agreement that would allow the USA the opportunity to secure unilateral advantages. We have the right to expect that a

sense of realism will prevail in the USA and she will hold talks with due regard for other's legitimate interests.

"Our approach to the resolution of world problems, however intricate and acute they may be, is determined by the very peaceable nature of our socialist society. Its essence is that the sole sensible path in this nuclear age is that of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems.

"This is the path of settling disputes at the negotiation table. To advance on this path, it takes goodwill and not just a show of interest, but true interest in preserving peace. It takes every effort to promote the process of detente.

"Leonid Brezhnev and other leaders of the fraternal socialist countries have reiterated during their traditional August meetings in the Crimea their firm and consistent course for strengthening international security, curbing the arms race, and lessening the threat of military-political crises and a new world war," Marshal Ustinov pointed out.

"The USSR will continue to build her policy with due regard for present day international realities. We have to take into account the threat to socialism and universal peace stemming from imperialism and its accomplices. While making every effort to uphold peace, as was clearly stated by Leonid Brezhnev at the May 1982 plenary meeting of the CPSU central committee, we must maintain our country's defence capacity at the necessary level."

## UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ON SOVIET PEACE PROPOSALS

UNITED NATIONS secretary general Javier Perez de Cuellar has praised highly the Soviet Union's contribution to the activities of the United Nations Organisation in strengthening peace and international security and in developing co-operation between states, reports *Tass* correspondent Valentin Vasilets.

The secretary general granted an interview to the *Tass* correspondent in connection with his official visit to Moscow starting on September 8.

Mr Perez de Cuellar noted that the Soviet Union, as one of the founding members of the UN, had always played a leading role in the work of the organisation. "The participation of your country in the activities of the United Nations has been prompted by the desire to co-operate with other countries in the pursuit of the aims enshrined in the charter," he said.

"This attitude is reflected in the Soviet Union's participation in the activities of the Security Council. As you know, the Security Council has, over the last few months, dealt with a number of dangerous crises whose repercussions are being felt throughout the world. In this regard, I have witnessed the Soviet Union's interest in ways and means to strengthen the political role of the Security Council, and the USSR's constructive and responsible positions throughout the deliberations of that important organ."

Among the various peace proposals put forward in the UN and particularly at the UN General Assembly's Second Special Session on Disarmament, he said, "Of those I consider most significant, I would put the solemn declaration from President Brezhnev that the USSR was assuming an unequivocal obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons to the fore.

"That obligation," said the UN secretary

general, "indicates a broadening of the previous Soviet position, and, to use some of the words of your President, if all states that have nuclear weapons were to make such a pledge and were to adhere to it, 'this would be tantamount in practice to banning the use of nuclear weapons altogether'.

"I attach great importance to the talks between the USSR and the USA on strategic arms limitation and reduction, and in that connection I see as very important the Soviet Union's proposal at the Second Special Session that the two sides should freeze the strategic arms race quantitatively and that more modernisation be limited as far as possible. Such a limitation would be greatly served by the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, which is also a point that has been clearly made by the Soviet Union at the Special Session.

"It is, in my view, of great importance to take early steps to reduce as much as possible the risk of an outbreak of an armed conflict in Europe, where the concentration of weapons, both conventional and nuclear, is particularly high. The various proposals by the Soviet Union for curbing the arms race, and particularly for the gradual reduction and even the total renunciation of all types of medium-range nuclear weapons targeted in the European area, deserve the most serious consideration," Mr Perez de Cuellar continued.

"As was emphasised by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, at the Second Special Session, the Soviet Union believes that a nuclear disarmament programme should be adopted and implemented stage by stage, and now agrees that one of its initial stages could be the cessation of production of fissionable materials for manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons.

"I take great interest in that statement," the UN secretary general said. "In my view, the

cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons, particularly if combined with a comprehensive test ban, could be a decisive step towards halting the nuclear arms race. In this regard I also appreciate the announcement that your government is agreeable to placing a part of its peaceful nuclear installations under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency."

The UN secretary general also viewed as constructive the Soviet Union's proposal for stockpiling of chemical weapons, and on the destruction of those weapons. He added that he viewed with great interest the proposal's provisions for verification. "I believe that this initiative demonstrates that if there is good will on the part of all those involved in the negotiations, it should be possible to find acceptable solutions to problems that have been the subject of discussion for so long."

Outer space should not become a theatre of military operations, he added. "I am pleased that the Soviet Union agrees that a treaty to this effect should be concluded."

The United Nations Organisation plays an important role in nuclear disarmament and in reducing the risk of a nuclear conflict, Mr Perez de Cuellar noted. "In the first place, the UN provides a unique forum for deliberations in which all nations have an opportunity to state their case. Although the nuclear arms race primarily involves the major powers, it potentially affects all because a nuclear war would not leave a single state unharmed.

"All nations, therefore, have an interest in seeing that the risks of such a war are reduced," he said. "The United Nations provides a framework for international efforts for the limitation and reduction of armaments. In this respect countries might make better use of the United Nations than they have so far."

Even though revolutionary soviet government a working people of former tsarist Russia bringing them government wa capitalists and mills were be the land. Thousand and fact the nat The inte na

Even though the internal and external counter-revolutionary forces did not give the young Soviet government a lengthy spell of peace, the working people of the various nationalities of former tsarist Russia could see what it was bringing them. They saw that the Soviet government was wiping out oppression by the capitalists and landowners; that the factories and mills were being turned into public property; that the land was being given to the peasants. Thousands of examples showed them the tolerant and tactful approach taken by the communists to the national sensibilities of each nation.

The years of the civil war and of foreign armed intervention were a grim school of internationalism for the peoples of former tsarist Russia. It was, I repeat, a grim school. But it taught political knowledge quickly, and its lessons were perfectly clear. The country was being split on class lines and not on a basis of nationality. The working people saw, from their own political experience, that were it not for the strong government of the working people of all nationalities, who had voluntarily united, the landlords and capitalists would return to power the following day, bringing with them oppression and exploitation; they saw that in this case their hopes for a better future would be buried.

The civil war and foreign armed intervention did not bypass a single corner of our country. Sons and daughters of all the peoples of our Motherland fought shoulder to shoulder in support of the young Soviet government against the White Guards and foreign interventionists.

The years immediately following the Great October Revolution witnessed the formation of a military-political alliance of all the Soviet republics. Economic and other contacts among various regions of the country developed as much as circumstances at the time allowed.

The internationalist spirit of the Russian working class was undoubtedly a crucial factor in the birth of the multinational Soviet state. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Russian working class bore the brunt of the struggle in the civil war and in the period of intervention. The selfless heroism of the proletarians of Petrograd and Moscow, of Nizhny Novgorod, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and other industrial centres of Russia, and their uncompromising attitude towards all oppressors, convinced the working people of all the other nationalities that they could put their faith in the Russian worker, in his communist party, in Lenin, all of whom were dependable.

### Voluntary union

We, therefore, have every right to say that the groundwork for the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was laid by the entire course of the revolution. This historic act was a logical outcome of the free expression of the will of all the peoples inhabiting Russia. In the newspapers of those years we find reports of large rallies and meetings of Soviets at all levels: uyezds, regions, gubernias and republics. These were a kind of referendum in which the peoples stated a firm "Yes!" to the question of a voluntary union.

The establishment of an integral federal state was dictated both by internal and external factors. Without a close union it would have been impossible to heal the harsh wounds of war and it would have been impossible to preserve and strengthen Soviet government of, by and for the people and to defend it against the numerous threats from outside.

With the formation of the USSR (as noted above, in late 1922, at the end of the civil war and foreign armed intervention) Lenin's nationalities policy and its noble features began to reveal themselves in full.

"Our Party was well aware that overcoming the consequences of national oppression and inequality would require more than the adoption

of even the best and the most equitable laws," Leonid Brezhnev has said. "The economic and cultural backwardness of the once oppressed nations and nationalities also has to be eliminated. In other words, it was not enough to abolish the legal inequality of nations; it was also necessary to put an end to the actual inequality between them. Fulfilment of this task became one of the party's main political goals."

The party set our country on a course of accelerated economic, cultural and socio-political development in the outlying regions inhabited by various nationalities. In line with this policy a number of constituent republics received generous subsidies from the federal budget for many years.

### Creating industry

The nationalities policy was always taken into account, along with economic expediency, when deciding where to develop productive forces, where to carry out capital construction projects. I remember the geography of the construction projects of those years. Of course, giant industrial enterprises also arose in the country's traditional industrial regions. But the birth of modern industries in literally all the constituent republics was the salient feature of the times. No wonder the growth of industrial output in, say, the Soviet Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, in the years since the USSR was established, is now expressed in percentages of three, and in some cases four, digits.

Special attention was paid everywhere to wiping out illiteracy and to training highly qualified local personnel for various branches of the national economy. Thanks to intensive assistance from the central areas, that is, from the

Russian Federation, a successful cultural revolution was carried out in the constituent republics. It was not only a question of attaining general literacy but also of building up, in each republic, a system of secondary and higher education and a network of research centres. Today these are making an ever increasing contribution to the progress of Soviet science as a whole.

Or take the cultural sphere. Not a single one of the many attractive facets of the numerous ethnic cultures has been lost in the integral federal state. A genuine cultural rebirth has taken place. The close cultural contacts and, I should like to add, the spread of the Russian language, have brought about the flowering and enrichment of the cultures of the various nationalities.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had only 19 years of peaceful constructive work before the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. But the progress made in this brief period, under the guidance of the communists, in carrying out Lenin's plan for building socialism and Lenin's nationalities policy, brilliantly withstood the severe tests of the war. The course and outcome of the war reaffirmed that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a sturdy structure, built to last for ever. All of our nations and nationalities rose to its defence. The friendship of the peoples of the USSR was one of the main factors behind the Soviet victory in the mortal combat with fascism.

When the long-awaited peace came, this friendship helped the war-devastated Ukraine, Byelorussia, territories and regions of the Russian Federation, Moldavia and the Soviet Baltic Republics to rise up from the ruins and ashes.

We have full justification for saying that the correct nationalities policy was an excellent catalyst in the development of the Soviet Union as a whole. Today our country is a strong socialist power with a single policy, a united Soviet multinational culture, and an integrated economic mechanism founded on the common economic goals and on the interests of all our nations and nationalities. A new historical community, the Soviet people, has come into being.

However, the communist party does not say that the nationalities question has been taken off the agenda in the Soviet Union. The communists have, of course, solved it in the shape in which it came down to us from the past. Discord among the nationalities has disappeared. So has inequality in economic, cultural and social development. The constellation of the 15 constituent republics of the USSR is, as the 1977 Constitution declares, "a socialist state of the whole people, expressing the will and interests of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia, the working people of all the nations and nationalities of the country".

### Common interests

The party's present nationalities policy aims to strengthen and develop friendship among the peoples of the Soviet Union and to augment the material and cultural potential of each republic. This calls for a harmonious linking-up of each republic's development with that of the country as a whole, and for the fullest account to be taken of the common interests in building a communist society.

Today, as always, our party pays daily attention to the Soviet citizen's well-being. It has never singled out any special groups of people or separate nationalities, either in major matters or in minor ones. It focuses its attention on the interests of the entire Soviet people. The 26th CPSU Congress put forward a broad programme of further raising the people's living standards during the period of the 11th Five-Year Plan and in the 1980s as a whole. The programme covers all aspects of the life of the Soviet people, from consumer goods to housing, from cultural facilities to rest and recreation, and from working

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to the conditions of everyday life. At the 1982 plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee and the report presented there Leonid Brezhnev were a striking confirmation of the party's efforts along these lines. The plenary meeting laid down concrete guidelines for improving the people's living standards and endorsed a large-scale Food Programme. Today we possess the wherewithal to carry out such tremendous tasks. We are confident that the combined efforts of all the fraternal peoples of the Land of Soviets will bring to fruition everything that has been planned.

"The continued convergence of our country's nations and nationalities is an objective process," Leonid Brezhnev has emphasised. "The party is opposed to artificially speeding it up. There is no need for that. This process is dictated by the

## MINISTER REPORTS ON SOVIET CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

THE SOVIET chemical industry is now sufficiently advanced to make any product, Vladimir Listov, Soviet Minister of the Chemical Industry, told a *Tass* correspondent. "But this does not mean," he emphasised, "that we are against business co-operation with other countries in the chemical industry. On the contrary.

"We favour mutually beneficial partnership which ensures the solution of tasks in the shortest possible time and with the greatest possible economic efficiency.

"The diversity and vast potential of the Soviet chemical industry open up broad opportunities for economic co-operation with other states. Many major Western companies justifiably regard the Soviet Union as one of the most reliable trading partners."

"Compensation agreements have been used widely in recent times. They are a mutually advantageous and effective form of foreign trade. We have established and are continuing successfully to develop trade and science and technology between the USSR and the CMEA member-countries."

"We have formed broad business contacts in chemical production with Western firms, above all in West Germany, Japan, Italy, France and Britain. Not only brisk trade but also industrial co-operation have been maintained with some of them.

"At the current fifth international exhibition, 'Khimia-82', in Moscow, a number of companies are showing products developed as a result of their co-operation with the Soviet Union. The prototype samples of polycarbonates on show at the exhibition are a result of the joint work of scientists from the Italian firm Montedison and Soviet experts.

"The West German company Battenfeld is showing an extrusion line for the manufacture of polyethylene pipes with the use of Soviet raw materials.

"The Soviet Union is interested in broadening the scope of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations and contacts with businessmen in other countries. At 'Khimia-82' we hope to consolidate business relations even further with our partners and to establish them with those foreign firms with whom we do not yet have agreements.

"A representative scientific and technological symposium will be held," the minister said. "Combined with the exhibition of advances in the chemical industry, it will allow for a broader and more precise view of the countries' export possibilities and facilitate successful commercial activity."

entire course of our Soviet life. At the same time, the party regards as inadmissible any attempts whatever to hold back the convergence of the nations, on one pretext or another to hinder it, to artificially consolidate national exclusiveness, for this would run counter to the general direction of our society's development, to the internationalist ideals and ideology of the communists and to the interests of building communism."

## Constant attention

Various aspects of the nationalities policy receive constant attention from the party. They are examined, without fail, at party congresses and are taken into account in the work of plenary meetings of the CPSU central committee, and in laws and other decisions passed by state bodies. The party's consistent implementation of the Leninist nationalities policy is bearing rich fruit.

The Soviet people are celebrating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a holiday of all the nations and nationalities of our country. This is a festival of internationalism, a festival of the friendship of the peoples.

The communists have demonstrated, both in theory and in practice, that there is a real road to harmonious relations among people of different nationalities.

Lofty internationalist principles also underlie the foreign policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government. These principles have become the foundation of the socialist international relations established within the framework of the world socialist community. The basic rules which cement the friendship of the internationalist family of socialist nations are: genuine equality, respect for sovereignty, and close mutual assistance.

It is natural and logical that the bonds linking the fraternal socialist states in the political, economic and cultural spheres are multiplying. It can definitely be said that both national efforts and internationalist co-operation among the

socialist countries are behind the achievements of each socialist country today.

The Soviet Union's internationalist structural principles are also clearly manifested in our growing co-operation with developing countries. Today, as before, the Soviet Union regards as sacred the right of every nation to free and independent development. It strongly opposes any interference whatever in the internal affairs of other countries and it gives all possible assistance to peoples striving for political and economic independence.

The Soviet Union is prepared to develop good-neighbourly co-operation with all countries of the world. This is one of the goals of the Peace Programme for the 1980s adopted by the 26th Congress of the CPSU. All of the Soviet Union's international actions pursue this goal. Ending the arms race and international tension, and consolidating detente and carrying it further, would mean opening broad vistas for solving the many constructive problems each country and nation faces.

## Historic

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a young country. I think the readers of this magazine will agree when I say that 60 is not an old age for a system of government. But in these six decades the Soviet communists and the whole Soviet people have registered truly historic accomplishments equal to a whole epoch.

This makes us absolutely confident that we will also succeed in carrying out today's tasks, the tasks of building communism and of preserving and consolidating peace.

We will be able to do this because the CPSU and the Soviet government guide themselves by the people's interests; because co-operation among the working people of all countries is a supreme goal of the communists; because peace, peaceful labour and concord among people of different races and nations are indispensable conditions for a happy future for mankind.

## Los Angeles Olympics poorly prepared

PREPARATIONS for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, with only two years to go, are still suffering from serious shortcomings, says USSR National Olympic Committee member A. Yermakov in the newspaper *Trud*.

A major problem, he says, will be the heat. Los Angeles, especially in the summer, is blanketed by smog, making the air so polluted that doctors often advise the people of the city to stay indoors if they want to avoid a heart attack. Plans for combating smog have been drawn up but the indications are that nothing can be done before the Olympic Games.

The sportsmen and other guests will also suffer from long, tiring rides of up to an hour-and-a-half from the Olympic villages to the far-off sites of the competitions. And the establishment of two separate Olympic villages will also be a problem. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) gave way to the organisers on this and the villages are on old university campuses, with not very comfortable rooms, many of which do not have bathrooms. Sportsmen from different villages appearing in the same events will clearly be in unequal conditions.

The temptation to cash in on the Los Angeles Olympics has not been fought off. The guests' stay in the Olympic villages will cost nearly three times as much as at the Moscow games. On top of this the organisers have announced that national teams will have to foot the bill if any of their members are injured and have to be treated at a city hospital.

The Los Angeles Olympics organisers are not

only going to deny comfort and injury insurance arrangements to the competitors. They have not met the demands of various international federations over the reconstruction of Olympic facilities, either.

The national Olympic committees (NOCs) have also been waiting for a long time for the necessary technical information from Los Angeles, such as the competition schedule broken down into hours, data on training facilities, and types and trademarks of sports gear.

So far there has been little to smile about. One can only speak of the Los Angeles organisers' violations of the Olympic charter, refusals to comply with the just demands of the IOC, international federations and NOCs, and their unwillingness to sort out the worries of their future guests in the preparations for the games.

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
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**ENTRETIEN AVEC  
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# LA VOIX DE MOSCOU

## ENTRETIEN AVEC CONSTANTIN TCHERNENKO


Novembre 1981 : Leonid Brejnev accorde un entretien au magazine ouest-allemand *Der Spiegel*.

13 décembre, « l'état de guerre » est décrété en Pologne.

Février 1982 – premier dirigeant soviétique à s'exprimer dans la presse occidentale depuis – Constantin Tchernenko répond aux questions que nous lui avons soumises.

Ce Sibérien de 70 ans, membre du Secrétariat du Comité central et du bureau politique du Parti communiste d'Union soviétique (PCUS), est désigné par l'ensemble de la presse occidentale comme le successeur probable de Leonid Brejnev.

Constantin Tchernenko nous a reçus à l'Ambassade d'URSS à Paris. Un entretien capital dans le contexte



FABRICE ULMANN - *Vous êtes connu comme l'un des principaux dirigeants du PCUS. Pourriez-vous préciser pour nos lecteurs de quel secteur de l'activité du parti vous êtes responsable?*

CONSTANTIN TCHERNENKO - Ma réponse à cette question est liée au rôle et à la place qui sont dévolus à un parti dirigeant dans le système politique du socialisme développé. Le PCUS est précisément un tel parti. Dans l'intervalle entre les congrès - ceux-ci sont convoqués une fois tous les cinq ans - l'organe suprême de notre parti est son Comité central. Le plénum du CC se réunit deux fois par an et donne les orientations de l'activité du parti sur les questions fondamentales, les plus importantes. L'application pratique dans la vie des principales orientations formulées par les congrès du parti et les plénums du CC sont mises en œuvre quotidiennement par le Bureau politique et le Secrétariat du CC du PCUS. C'est de l'organisation du travail des organes suprêmes du parti entre les congrès que je m'occupe avec mes autres camarades.

Les problèmes qui sont exami-

nés lors des réunions hebdomadaires du Bureau politique et du Secrétariat du CC englobent le large éventail des activités du parti et de l'Etat. C'est pourquoi la manière, les procédés, les méthodes et les moyens utilisés par les organes suprêmes du parti pour diriger autrement dit le style de leur activité, ont ici une importance décisive.

Notre point de référence, c'est le style léniniste de travail au sein du parti et de l'Etat. C'est un style vivant, créateur, qui ne s'accommode pas des stéréotypes. Pour évoquer quelques traits du style léniniste, soulignons le caractère collégial de la direction, son approche scientifique des problèmes, sa compétence, l'observation précise du principe du centralisme démocratique, la mise en œuvre stricte du contrôle et de la vérification de l'exécution des tâches, le renforcement et l'extension des liens avec les masses laborieuses. C'est un organe de direction collégiale de ce type que constitue aujourd'hui le Bureau politique du CC du PCUS, placé sous la direction du camarade Leonid Brejnev.

J'ai déjà expliqué que le Bureau politique et le Secrétariat examinaient un large éventail de ques-

Ce Sibérien de 70 ans, membre du Secrétariat central et du bureau politique du Parti communiste d'Union soviétique (PCUS), est désigné par l'ensemble de la presse occidentale comme le successeur probable de Leonid Brejnev.

Constantin Tchernenko nous a reçus à l'Ambassade d'URSS à Paris. Un entretien capital dans le contexte international actuel : « jamais depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale la situation n'a été aussi sérieuse », selon Leonid Brejnev lui-même.

tions politiques, économiques et sociales afférentes au développement de notre société. Mais cela ne signifie nullement que le parti se substitue aux institutions de l'Etat et aux organisations sociales, prenne en charge leurs fonctions. Bien au contraire, l'art de la direction consiste chez nous à choisir l'orientation fondamentale, le maillon essentiel, à bien délimiter la place de tous ces organismes, à faire en sorte que chaque travailleur ait une responsabilité concrète. Les tâches avancées par le parti seront ainsi accomplies de manière efficace, en temps opportun et auront un bon niveau.

En bref, je peux assurer à vos lecteurs qu'il y a suffisamment de travail pour tous les membres du Bureau politique et du Secrétariat du PCUS.


F.U. - *La délégation que vous conduisez séjournera une semaine en France. Avec quelles pensées et quels sentiments arrivez-vous dans notre pays, au congrès du PCF? Qu'attendez-vous de votre séjour?*

C.T. - Si l'on veut être bref, disons que la délégation du PCUS assiste

au XXIV<sup>e</sup> congrès du PCF pour saluer les communistes français; nous amis sincères de longue date.

Nous sommes satisfaits de voir que les communistes de France avancent d'un pas ferme. Nous voyons que, dans le pays comme au gouvernement, ils défendent résolument les intérêts de la classe ouvrière, des masses travailleuses, que, pas à pas, ils gravissent de nouveaux échelons dans ce combat malaisé. Comme nous avons déjà pu nous en rendre compte au cours des travaux du XXIV<sup>e</sup> congrès, les communistes de France demeurent inlassablement, comme par le passé, attentifs au renforcement de leurs positions. C'est pour eux le gage du succès pour la cause de la démocratie et du socialisme. Pour nous, communistes soviétiques, notre présence au congrès du PCF est une manifestation concrète de notre solidarité internationale avec nos amis français, ce qui signifie que les liens et la coopération entre nos deux partis seront encore renforcés.

F.U. - *Vous avez participé aux travaux de la Conférence d'Helsinki. La situation en Europe est actuellement l'un des problèmes*



*principaux dans les rapports soviéto-américains. Croyez-vous à une reprise du dialogue entre ceux que nous appelons "les deux super-puissances"? Quand et comment peut-il commencer?*

C. T. - Avant toute chose, j'aimerais souligner que l'Union soviétique ne se sent pas concernée par le concept de "super-puissance", dans la mesure où celui-ci reflète une aspiration à une place particulière, disons-le franchement, une place dominante dans le monde ou tout du moins dans une certaine partie du monde. Or, ceci est absolument étranger à l'Union soviétique qui refuse le principe d'hégémonisme dans les relations internationales. A propos, nous avons justement été à l'initiative de l'adoption d'une résolution de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU qui condamnait l'hégémonisme.

En ce qui concerne le dialogue avec les Etats-Unis de même qu'avec n'importe quel autre pays du monde, y compris les pays d'Europe occidentale, comme vous devez déjà le savoir, nous ne sommes jamais intervenus pour la rupture de ce dialogue, et ce n'est pas nous qui avançons toutes sortes de conditions préalables à la reprise du dialogue.

L'Union soviétique ne demande rien à personne. Mais le peuple soviétique, comme tous les peuples du monde, voudrait que cessent les confrontations entre Etats, porteuses du danger de conflits militaires y compris d'une catastrophe nucléaire. Nous avons besoin de la paix, pour accomplir avec succès les tâches posées par la construction d'une société nouvelle. Toute la politique extérieure de l'Etat soviétique depuis le premier jour de son existence est marquée par un intérêt vital dans la paix et par un souci de paix. Et à présent,

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## 66 L'Union ne de rien à pe

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lorsqu'à la suite de l'action de certaines forces, bien connues de tous, avec à leur tête l'administration américaine et de certains gouvernements d'Europe occidentale dans leur sillage, la situation internationale s'est aggravée; lorsque le processus de détente a nettement été freiné; lorsque les tensions, artificiellement attisées sous n'importe quel prétexte, atteignent un seuil dangereux au-delà duquel commence un glissement dans l'abîme de la "guerre froide", comment, dans ces conditions si ce n'est par le dialogue amener le monde sur la voie de l'assainissement du climat politique dans les relations entre Etats des deux systèmes opposés? Comment, si ce n'est par le dialogue, peut-on à nouveau ouvrir les portes sur la confiance entre ces Etats afin de développer la compréhension mutuelle et la coopération entre eux? Il n'y a pas d'autre voie raisonnable que de s'asseoir à la table des négociations pour résoudre les problèmes qui ont surgi, qui surgissent et qui, probablement, surgiront encore entre nous pour différentes raisons.

Nous sommes pour un dialogue d'égal à égal, pour un dialogue, excluant la violation des droits souverains imprescriptibles des participants indépendamment de leur poids politique, de leur niveau de développement économique et

*Standard  
connaissent*

Poland  
Afghanistan  
- etc.

de leur puissance militaire. Nous sommes pour un dialogue, qui doit obligatoirement reposer sur le respect et la prise en compte des intérêts légitimes des uns et des autres. Un tel dialogue peut avoir lieu à tout moment avec les Etats-Unis et avec tous ceux qui seront disposés à respecter les règles de relations internationales admises par le monde entier et qui ne tenteront pas de nous imposer leurs exigences.

Bien entendu, nous n'accepterons aucun diktat. Comment devons-nous vivre chez nous, comment devons-nous établir nos relations avec nos amis, nous en décidons et continuerons d'en décider nous-mêmes. Nous ne sommes pas d'accord pour un dialogue sur ces questions. Les ultimatums, adressés par les Etats-Unis et quelques autres pays de l'OTAN à notre in-

dans la course aux armements, surtout nucléaires, mais pas uniquement nucléaires. Les Américains développent, par exemple, la production d'armes chimiques, notamment de gaz neuro-paralysant. Et pour justifier cela ils font circuler des élucubrations calomnieuses sur l'utilisation en Afghanistan et en Asie du Sud-Est d'armes chimiques de fabrication soviétique.

Nous avons déjà répondu à plusieurs reprises à ces accusations malhonnêtes ainsi qu'à d'autres que l'on nous adresse. De façon très argumentée elles ont été réfutées par Leonid Brejnev dans son interview à la revue *Der Spiegel* (novembre 1981). Des explications complémentaires ont été fournies dans toute une série de déclarations publiques des chefs militaires soviétiques, ainsi que dans la brochure récemment éditée par notre ministère de la Défense *Qui menace la paix?*

Avant tout, il convient de souligner un fait indiscutable : dans le monde entier, de même qu'en Europe, où se trouvent face à face les plus puissantes concentrations de forces armées, il s'est établi et il existe toujours un certain équilibre militaire : cet équilibre existe tant entre l'URSS et les USA, qu'entre le Traité de Varsovie et l'OTAN. Ceci on le sait, a été reconnu à plusieurs reprises par des dirigeants des Etats-Unis, y compris par des personnalités de l'actuelle administration. Un grand nombre de spécialistes occidentaux sérieux le reconnaissent aussi.

Il est important de le souligner : l'Union soviétique ne se fixe pas pour but de rompre l'équilibre établi, ni de parvenir à une supériorité militaire quelconque sur l'autre partie. Pour l'Union soviétique, le maintien de l'équilibre militaro-stratégique est le garant, dans les conditions existantes, de l'application du principe d'égalité et de seuil de sécurité égal entre les parties, il sert objectivement au maintien de la paix sur notre planète. Parallèlement, nous sommes sans aucun doute pour la diminution du niveau actuel de confrontation militaire aussi bien en Europe que dans le monde, pour la réduction des armements des deux côtés.

La politique que mènent les Etats-Unis est diamétralement opposée. Les milieux dirigeants de ce pays se sont fixés pour but - et ils le proclament ouvertement - de modifier, coûte que coûte, en leur faveur le rapport des forces sur l'arène mondiale et de s'assurer dans les années qui viennent une supériorité militaire. Pour parvenir à ce but, que l'administration Reagan a officiellement qualifié de primordial, on attribue des crédits

## on soviétique emande ersonne 99

attention et à celle de nos alliés, prouvent leur irresponsabilité vis-à-vis de la Charte de l'ONU et de l'Acte final de la Conférence d'Helsinki, car ils représentent une intervention ouverte dans les affaires intérieures d'Etats souverains et entraînent une aggravation de la tension.

Je répète, l'Union soviétique était et reste un partisan résolu du maintien du dialogue avec les USA et les autres pays. Nos portes sont toujours ouvertes à toute initiative pacifique.

**F.U. - Dans la presse française il est souvent question du surarmement de l'URSS. La partie soviétique déclare que le but de sa politique est le désarmement. Que faites-vous concrètement pour cela ?**

**C. T. -** Les propos sur le "surarmement" de l'URSS sont tenus par des personnes irresponsables ou par ceux qui ne connaissent pas l'état réel des choses. Dans tous les cas, ils se fondent sur des chiffres falsifiés, fournis outre-océan. La thèse entièrement fautive de la "menace militaire soviétique" est utilisée pour attiser des campagnes de propagande antisoviétique et pour justifier les propres efforts de l'administration américaine, qui a, en fait, entamé une nouvelle spirale

militaires dépassant largement les besoins de défense, on accélère le renforcement de capacités militaires des forces nucléaires stratégiques, on tend à "compléter l'armement" de l'Europe occidentale par de nouveaux missiles américains de moyenne portée et on a l'intention d'accroître considérablement la puissance de combat et le nombre des troupes américaines.

L'équilibre existe, il existe non pas sur le papier, mais dans la réalité. C'est ainsi que le chancelier de la RFA, H. Schmidt, a déclaré dans une interview télévisée le 21 août 1981 : "Les responsables politiques américains cherchent à donner l'impression qu'ils sont fermement décidés à rétablir à tout prix l'équilibre. A mon avis, l'équilibre dans la réalité n'a pas été, en principe, rompu." Les Etats-Unis n'ont aucune raison de "compléter leur armement", dans la mesure où ils n'ont pas de retard sur l'URSS. "Compléter son armement" pour atteindre soi-disant la parité cache en fait leur désir d'obtenir la supériorité militaire.

Que ceux qui comprennent en fassent leur profit. Mais si d'aucuns ne nous croient pas, qu'ils fassent eux-mêmes le compte (mais sans les soustractions auxquelles se livrent habituellement ceux qui parlent d'un "surarmement" de l'URSS) des divisions, des missiles, des avions, des sous-marins, des charges nucléaires dont disposent les deux parties.

Cela concerne aussi les armements nucléaires de moyenne portée installés en Europe : il suffit de recourir à une méthode simple de calcul, de poser sur le plateau de la balance, pour chaque partie, ce qui peut atteindre le territoire de l'autre partie; il apparaîtra alors immédiatement qu'il existe non seulement une parité approximative entre l'OTAN et l'organisation du Traité de Varsovie, mais même une certaine suprématie du côté de l'OTAN. Avec l'installation des Pershing-2 et des missiles de croisière, l'OTAN obtiendrait une supériorité d'environ 200% pour les charges nucléaires, sans même parler d'une modification notable de la situation stratégique en faveur des USA. Nous ne le permettrons pas et nous entendons naturellement réagir.

Mais l'Union soviétique ne souhaite pas donner un nouveau tour à la course aux armements. Nous refusons la logique de l'escalade dans l'esprit de la guerre froide. Nous refusons une logique tournée vers la perspective d'un réel conflit armé Est-Ouest, quelle que soit la façon dont l'envisagent les stratèges du Pentagone : limitée à l'Europe ou global. Nous nous

fondons sur la nécessité vitale de préserver et de renforcer, de consolider les perspectives pacifiques.

La politique extérieure de l'Union soviétique a toujours été et demeure axée sur la lutte pour la paix et la sécurité des peuples, la détente, le ralentissement de la course aux armements. "Défendre la paix, soulignait L. Brejnev, il n'existe pas actuellement de tâche plus importante sur le plan international pour notre parti, pour notre peuple comme pour tous les autres peuples de notre planète."

Ce n'est pas un hasard si la question du maintien de la paix, de la conjuration de la guerre est posée de façon aussi brutale. La situation que connaît le monde aujourd'hui est très dangereuse, c'est sans doute la plus dangereuse de toute la période de l'après-guerre.

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## “ Le maintien de stratégique garant du seuil

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Les grandes puissances possèdent des armements dont l'utilisation pourrait engendrer des tragédies innombrables pour l'humanité, causer des dommages irréparables à la civilisation. L'accroissement de la tension internationale par l'administration américaine, l'introduction, par cette dernière, d'éléments hystériques dans la politique mondiale, rapproche le danger de guerre, crée une atmosphère dans laquelle les aventuristes peuvent décider qu'ils ont les mains libres.

Le XXVI<sup>e</sup> congrès du PCUS a réaffirmé la ligne inébranlable de la politique extérieure soviétique tournée vers la paix, et a proposé un ensemble de mesures constructives pour tous les problèmes clefs de la vie internationale.

D'où la lutte inlassable que mène l'Union soviétique pour la cessation de la course aux armements, pour que soient réunies les conditions nécessaires à la limitation puis à la réduction des armements, nucléaires surtout, mais aussi conventionnels, bien entendu. Depuis la fin de la guerre, l'Union soviétique a proposé à la communauté internationale une centaine de mesures concrètes dans le domaine du désarmement. Parmi les dernières en date, citons l'interdiction d'installer des armes de tout type dans l'espace cosmique et l'interdiction de la bombe à

neutrons. Nombre d'entre elles ont été approuvées par l'ONU. Certaines ont été à la base de traités conclus. Nous sommes prêts à poursuivre des négociations, nous ne posons pas de préalable à l'exception d'un seul : l'entente est possible sur tous les sujets à condition de respecter le principe de l'égalité et de la sécurité identique.

En Europe également, nous sommes vraiment pour réduire à zéro les moyens nucléaires de moyenne portée. C'est ce qu'a rappelé, une nouvelle fois L. Brejnev lors de sa rencontre avec les représentants de l'Internationale socialiste, le 5 février dernier. La mise en œuvre de cette proposition créerait une situation qui offrirait à l'ensemble de l'Europe occidentale de très sérieuses garanties contre le danger nucléaire, celle-ci garan-

### *l'équilibre militaro- que est le ! de sécurité ?*

tissant en échange, naturellement, de ne pas déclencher d'attaque nucléaire contre le territoire de l'URSS et de ses alliés à partir du territoire des pays de l'Europe occidentale, des espaces maritimes et aériens jouxtant ce continent. N'est-ce pas une exigence juste ?

Nous considérons que c'est la seule issue juste, donc la seule voie réaliste pour résoudre le problème de la sécurité européenne. Ce faisant, nous avons maintes fois souligné notre désir de négocier également les problèmes relatifs aux armes conventionnelles.

Nous sommes prêts à nous entendre sur la création de zones dénucléarisées en Europe du Nord, dans les Balkans et dans d'autres régions du monde.

Nous sommes favorables à la constitution d'une zone de paix et de coopération dans le bassin de la Méditerranée.

Nous sommes intéressés; nous ne le cachons pas, à reprendre tous les pourparlers qui ont été interrompus ces derniers temps, cette interruption n'étant d'ailleurs pas le fait de la partie soviétique comme chacun le sait (sur l'interdiction totale et universelle des essais nucléaires, sur la limitation des ventes d'armes conventionnelles, sur la limitation puis la réduction de l'activité militaire dans l'océan Indien).

Nous sommes d'accord pour ne

pas mettre au point de nouveaux types d'armes et systèmes de destruction massive, pour renforcer les garanties de sécurité relatives aux Etats non nucléaires, pour consolider le régime de non-dissémination de l'arme nucléaire, pour diminuer les budgets militaires.

Nous estimons, enfin, qu'en décidant de convoquer une conférence sur la détente militaire et le désarmement en Europe, la conférence de Madrid servirait les intérêts des peuples de l'Europe et du monde entier.

Toutes ces propositions sont liées par une même aspiration : assainir le climat international, approfondir la détente, écarter la menace de guerre. Quand elle cherche à obtenir un assainissement radical de la situation, quand elle propose des initiatives concrètes, l'Union soviétique ne pose pas d'ultimatum. Ses offres sont une invitation au dialogue, à la négociation, qui peut et doit examiner toute mesure susceptible de faciliter la solution des problèmes internationaux actuels. Pourquoi donc l'Occident nous laisse-t-il sans réponse ?

F.U. - *Quelle place accordez-vous à la France dans le système des relations Est-Ouest ? A Paris, certains ont l'impression que la RFA est en train de devenir votre partenaire privilégié.*

C. T. - Nos deux peuples entretiennent une solide tradition historique : intérêt mutuel profond, respect de l'amitié. Cette tradition est déterminée par le fait que certains intérêts fondamentaux coïncident.

Il est un fait qui joue vraisemblablement un rôle non négligeable : l'Union soviétique a été et demeure sincèrement partisane d'une France forte et indépendante, capable d'être un partenaire sûr, non seulement au sein de la coopération économique et culturelle, mais encore dans la lutte pour prévenir la menace d'une guerre nucléaire, pour liquider les situations conflictuelles sur une base juste.

L'Union soviétique a maintes fois montré combien elle était attachée à la coopération soviéto-française. C'est une constante de la politique extérieure soviétique. Mais pour qu'il en soit toujours ainsi, il est indispensable que l'autre partie préserve la constante équivalente.

C'est que pour être bilatérales, les relations doivent être construites que des deux côtés, n'est-il pas vrai ?

Pour que des relations revêtent un caractère permanent, soient empreintes de confiance et prennent un caractère privilégié, il faut y mettre de la bonne volonté, il faut



un dialogue politique permanent. Ne proposons le dialogue sans l'imposer à personne. Il est indispensable, également, d'instaurer une atmosphère amicale dans l'opinion publique.

Pour ce qui nous concerne, nous nous en tenons fermement aux documents soviéto-français qui traduisent et consacrent le caractère privilégié de nos relations. Notamment pour ce qui est du développement des sentiments d'amitié entre les peuples de l'Union soviétique et de France.

Malheureusement, il n'en va pas de même en France où les campagnes allant dans un sens tout à fait différent ne sont pas un phénomène rare. Il nous semble que les intérêts mutuels seraient mieux servis par une politique d'amitié plutôt que de haine.

Et nous espérons que la compréhension de ce fait permettra de surmonter les obstacles artificiels que certains dressent sur la voie d'un développement fructueux des relations soviéto-françaises.

Avec la France, nous avons ouvert l'époque de la détente, qui a apporté beaucoup de choses bonnes et précieuses pour tous les peuples d'Europe. Nous sommes convaincus que la France peut jouer un rôle de premier plan dans l'assainissement des relations Est-Ouest, dans l'affaiblissement de la tension actuelle, dans le rétablissement du processus de détente, dans le développement de la coopération pacifique entre tous les pays et les peuples.

**F.U. - Pensez-vous que les relations entre l'URSS et la Chine puissent s'améliorer? À quelles conditions cela peut-il se produire?**

C.T. - Oui, nous le pensons, car nous sommes profondément convaincus que l'amélioration des relations entre l'URSS et la Chine répond aux intérêts profonds et durables des peuples tant soviétique que chinois, aux intérêts de la solution positive des problèmes posés par la construction du socialisme, aux intérêts du mouvement communiste mondial et de toutes les forces anti-impérialistes, aux intérêts du renforcement de la paix dans le monde entier. Le peuple soviétique n'a jamais éprouvé de sentiments d'animosité envers le peuple chinois. Le cœur des Soviétiques élevés dans l'esprit de l'internationalisme est ouvert à toutes les manifestations d'amitié émanant de tous nos partenaires étrangers et à fortiori de nos voisins.

L'Union soviétique souhaite-

rait développer ses relations avec la République populaire de Chine dans un esprit de bon voisinage, sur la base des principes de la coexistence pacifique. Cette ligne politique du PCUS et du Gouvernement soviétique revêt un caractère permanent; elle est invariablement approuvée par les congrès de notre parti et trouve sa traduction dans toute une série de propositions soviétiques qui ont pour but de normaliser les relations entre nos deux pays. Ces propositions conservent leur force. Et nous ne posons aucun préalable d'aucune sorte.

**F.U. - Le président égyptien Moubarak a parlé de la possibilité pour l'URSS, de participer au règlement global du problème**

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“ Personne ne peut  
à faire  
le socialisme ”

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**du Proche-Orient. Comment voyez-vous cette participation de l'URSS?**

C.T. - Je voudrais souligner avant tout que seul un règlement juste peut être durable, et que pour être juste, il doit prendre en compte les intérêts légitimes de tous les participants directement engagés dans le conflit; c'est pourquoi il ne peut être que global et tout embrasser. Tout le reste n'est que tromperie pour les peuples. Voilà de nombreuses années que l'on a entrepris d'effectuer des "petits pas". Parmi ces "pas", citons le marchandage séparé de Camp David et tout ce qui est fait pour lui donner une suite. Qu'ont-ils apporté à la principale victime de l'agression israélienne, au peuple arabe de Palestine? Rien, hormis de nouvelles souffrances que l'on a tenté de calmer par les promesses d'une pseudo-autonomie qui ont pour but, au fond, de rendre éternelle l'occupation israélienne des territoires palestiniens accaparés en 1967. Qu'est-ce que ces "pas" ont apporté au Liban épris de paix? Rien, sinon des raids dignes de bandits effectués en permanence par les militaires israéliens et la menace d'un effondrement de l'Etat libanais. Qu'a obtenu la Syrie? L'insolente décision d'Israël d'annexer les hauteurs du Golan. Enfin, qu'a obtenu l'Egypte? A la place de l'occupation israélienne du Sinaï la

création de ce que l'on appelle des forces multinationales, dont le but est de légitimer la présence militaropolitique dans cette région du principal patron des agresseurs et annexionnistes israéliens : les Etats-Unis. Mais globalement, la tension, le danger d'un nouveau conflit ouvert dans cette région n'a pas diminué ; au contraire, il a sérieusement augmenté.

Afin que le règlement soit véritablement solide et englobe tous les problèmes, il est indispensable de rassembler autour d'une table tous les participants au conflit et tous ceux qui, d'une manière ou d'une autre, y ont été entraînés en raison de son internationalisation. Le XXVI<sup>e</sup> congrès du PCUS a proposé de convoquer une conférence internationale à laquelle participeraient la Syrie, le Liban, la Jorda-

comprenant la création de son propre Etat, de garantir le droit de tous les Etats du Proche-Orient, y compris Israël, à une existence et un développement pacifiques.

Nous avons défendu, et continuerons invariablement de défendre ces principes, car seule leur application sera en mesure d'apporter une juste paix aux peuples du Proche-Orient et à leurs voisins.

**F.U. - Parmi les problèmes internationaux, la situation en Pologne et en Afghanistan occupe une place de choix dans la presse occidentale. Que pouvez-vous déclarer à nos lecteurs sur ces questions ?**

**C.T.** - Il convient de rappeler avant tout qu'il s'agit de pays différents. La Pologne est un pays socialiste, tandis que l'Afghanistan est un pays révolutionnaire démocratique, non aligné, en voie de développement. Il existe cependant bon nombre de points communs dans l'émergence de la situation qui s'est créée en Pologne et en Afghanistan. Ces points communs résident avant tout en ceci que les milieux impérialistes occidentaux ont déployé de sérieux efforts afin d'agir sur les processus intérieurs se déroulant dans ces pays en stimulant par leur travail de sape l'approfondissement des phénomènes de crise.


Toutes les tentatives de l'Occident visant à faire de la situation en Pologne ou en Afghanistan un objet de discussion sont inacceptables, car incompatibles avec le principe de non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures d'Etats souverains.

La Pologne a été et demeure un Etat populaire, et par conséquent socialiste, et personne ne parviendra jamais à faire reculer le socialisme en Europe.

Le soleil de la liberté s'est levé sur l'Afghanistan, et personne ne pourra le faire disparaître. □

## *arviendra jamais reculer en Europe 99*

nie, l'Egypte, l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine et Israël, l'Union soviétique et les Etats-Unis, ainsi que les pays représentant les régions liées au Proche-Orient - l'Europe Occidentale, l'Asie du Sud, l'Afrique du Nord. Nous sommes favorables à ce que cette conférence se déroule sous l'égide de l'ONU et de son secrétaire général. Naturellement, cette conférence ne doit avoir aucun lien avec des marchandages séparés du type Camp David. Le but de cette conférence doit être de parvenir à un retrait total des troupes israéliennes des territoires arabes qu'elles occupent, d'octroyer au peuple arabe de Palestine le droit à une existence indépendante



# L'URSS souhaite une relance des relations avec la France

Vadim Zagladine à France-Inter

Au cours d'une émission de *France-Inter*, hier soir, Vadim Zagladine, membre de la délégation du PCUS au 24<sup>e</sup> Congrès, a évoqué les relations d'Etat entre l'URSS et la France, regrettant la stagnation et même une certaine régression de ces rapports au plan politique, et approuvant la suggestion d'un journaliste au sujet d'une future rencontre franco-soviétique au sommet.

Vadim Zagladine (premier chef adjoint du département international au Comité central du PCUS) a fait remarquer que les dirigeants soviétiques se sont prononcés à maintes reprises pour des rencontres entre chefs d'Etat. Cela est vrai pour l'URSS et la France, et c'est toujours utile. Il n'y a pas eu encore de tel contact entre Léonide Brejnev et François Mitterrand ? « En effet, cela manque », répond. Zagladine, en souhaitant que les divergences idéologiques ne viennent pas perturber la coexistence pacifique.

Comme des journalistes lui demandaient si le chef de sa délégation envisageait des entretiens avec des représentants du gouvernement français, Vadim Zagladine a rappelé que Konstantin Tchernenko était venu pour assister au 24<sup>e</sup> Congrès du PCF et il a ajouté : « Si on veut avoir le contact avec nous, nous y sommes prêts. »

A propos de l'expédition spatiale commune du 16 juin prochain — un journaliste imaginant que ce pourrait être l'occasion d'une invitation à

François Mitterrand à Moscou — Vadim Zagladine s'est félicité de la « bonne coopération » qui s'est établie dans le cosmos, ainsi que dans plusieurs autres domaines, économiques notamment.

Et il a ajouté : « Il reste les problèmes de la guerre et de la paix. On a beaucoup à faire à ce sujet et nous devons travailler ensemble dans cette direction. »

Avec la France, nous avons des relations exceptionnelles, des rapports qui ont des racines historiques, des bases objectives pour les développer à l'avenir. »

Au début de l'entretien, Vadim Zagladine, qui était interrogé au sujet des relations entre les deux partis communistes, a souligné qu'il s'agissait de rapports d'amitié avec le PCF, « l'un des plus grands partis » ; il peut y avoir des divergences, mais cela n'empêche pas les relations fraternelles. Celles-ci se sont développées et on peut dire qu'elles sont plus riches qu'avant. »

Le délégué soviétique a rappelé que

le 26<sup>e</sup> Congrès du PCUS avait nettement déclaré qu'il n'y a pas de modèle du socialisme, et que les sociétés socialistes en construction sont toutes différentes. « Nous avons réalisé la première révolution socialiste et il est normal que d'autres étudient notre expérience, comme il est normal que nous étudions l'expérience des autres. Par exemple, nous étudions les méthodes du PCF, l'expérience extraordinaire de la participation des communistes au gouvernement. »

Interrogé au sujet de la Pologne, le délégué soviétique a estimé que la situation intérieure dans ce pays était en train de changer dans le bon sens, bien que la crise ne soit pas résolue.

## POLOGNE

### Des mesures d'exception levées fin février

Au cours d'un entretien de plus de deux heures avec la presse française, le ministre polonais des Affaires étrangères a confirmé hier à Paris que son gouvernement a l'intention de lever avant la fin de ce mois plusieurs des mesures d'urgence prises le 13 décembre et qui affectent directement la population. Cela ne signifie pas l'annulation de l'état d'urgence, a ajouté Jozef Czyrek, mais cela exprime notre volonté de réduire pour l'essentiel les restrictions que nous avons décidées parce que nous n'avions pas d'autre choix.

Evokant l'actuel séjour au Vatican du primat de Pologne, le ministre a formulé le souhait qu'il contribue à l'établissement du dialogue entre Rome et Varsovie, ainsi qu'aux relations entre le gouvernement et l'Eglise en Pologne ; où les contacts sont d'ailleurs maintenus jusqu'au plus haut niveau.

Interrogé au sujet de sa rencontre de mercredi avec le ministre français des Relations extérieures, Jozef Czyrek estime qu'elle était utile, comme tout ce qui contribue à une meilleure compréhension entre deux partenaires. On peut apprécier de manière diverse ce qui a été fait en Pologne depuis l'instauration de l'état d'urgence, mais dans son message au président Mitterrand, le général Jaruzelski avait dit son intention de poursuivre la politique de renouveau socialiste et celle des réformes ; bien entendu, il n'avait pas fixé de délais. Les activités du gouvernement sont allées dans ce sens et seront poursuivies, en tenant compte des réalités de la situation dans le pays.

Le ministre a dénoncé les ingérences américaines dans les affaires polonaises ; elles sont mises en œuvre par ceux-là mêmes qui disent protester contre les interventions étrangères

## EN BREF

● **CONSTANTIN TCHERENKO**, chef de la délégation soviétique au 24<sup>e</sup> congrès du PCF, sera reçu, à sa demande, dans les prochains jours par le premier ministre Pierre Mauroy.

● **LE BUREAU EXECUTIF DU PARTISOCIALISTE** a déclaré, hier, dans un communiqué évoquant la situation en Pologne et dans les autres pays socialistes, que « la nature de ces régimes ne s'apparente nullement au socialisme ».

● **ANDREAS PAPANDEOU**, premier ministre grec, a quitté Bonn jeudi en début d'après-midi, au terme d'une visite de quatre jours. Ses entretiens avec les dirigeants ouest-allemands n'ont d'ailleurs pas permis d'aplanir toutes les divergences entre les deux capitales.

Helmut Schmidt a confirmé à son interlocuteur son refus de voir la Grèce obtenir un statut spécial dans la Communauté européenne. D'autre part, le chef du gouvernement ouest-allemand n'a pas apporté à Andreas Papandeou le soutien que ce dernier attendait au sujet de la menace turque.

Les divergences sont également demeurées en ce qui concerne la place de la Grèce dans l'OTAN.

● **REGIS DEBRAY**, conseiller du président français François Mitterrand pour les Affaires étrangères, effectuera un voyage d'information en Asie du Sud-Est au cours du mois de février.

Il se rendra dans certaines capitales de l'Association des nations du Sud-Est asiatique (ANSEA, Indonésie, Malaisie, Philippines, Singapour et Thaïlande) et au Vietnam.

Son voyage sera particulièrement consacré au problème des réfugiés indochinois.

personnel. L'armée et la police assurent le fonctionnement d'un service minimum d'autobus.

● **A MADRID**, le procureur du Conseil suprême de la justice militaire a requis 30 ans de prison contre le lieutenant-général Jaime Milans Del Bosch, le général Alfonso Armada et le lieutenant-colonel Antonio Tejero, principaux



Milans del Bosch.

inculpés dans l'affaire du putsch manqué du 23 février 1981. Le magistrat a requis 20 ans de prison contre un autre inculpé, le général Luis Torres Rojas.

Le conseil de guerre, qui jugera les 32 militaires putschistes devrait avoir lieu le 18 février à Madrid.

● **LE GOUVERNEMENT POLONAIS** a augmenté d'un quart les prix des céréales à la production. Ces prix sont désormais de 1.200 zlotys au lieu de 950 pour 100 kilos de seigle, de blé, d'avoine ou d'orge, à partir du 1<sup>er</sup> février. Le gouvernement avait déjà augmenté les prix

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*Speeches*  
C. CHERNENKO'S SPEECH IN TBILISI

**Presentation of Order of Lenin**

(a) Moscow home service 1300 gmt 29 Oct 82

Excerpt from announcer-read report of speech:

A festive session of the City Party Committee and the City Soviet of People's Deputies held today in Tbilisi was devoted to the presentation of the Order of Lenin to the capital of Georgia. The participants in the session elected with great enthusiasm an honorary presidium comprising the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee headed by Comrade Brezhnev.

Comrade Chernenko, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who was given a warm welcome by those present, delivered a speech. He passed on to the working people of Tbilisi greetings and congratulations from Comrade Brezhnev on this great and notable event in the life of the city, which were greeted with tumultuous applause from those present.

We have a duty to the capital of Georgia, Tbilisi, Leonid Ilyich said to me the other day in conversation. The city has been awarded the Order of Lenin, the 65th anniversary of October is drawing near, and it would be a good thing to present the award [Soviet television 1600 gmt 29 Oct 82: before the holiday. I myself had hoped to have time to come and present the order to the city, but preparations for the session of the Supreme Soviet and for the plenum of the Party Central Committee and other urgent affairs just would not let me leave Moscow even for a short time. It would be a good thing if you (Russian: ty) were to just fly down to Georgia, Leonid Ilyich continued, and present the order to the city of Tbilisi. That republic, as you know, is an interesting one. The Party organizations work energetically and creatively. Eduard Amvrosyevich Shevardnadze gives a good lead in everything. Convey to him, and of course to all the other comrades, my best wishes and greetings. Tell them also that I well remember last year's meetings and visit to Tbilisi.] I firmly believe that both Tbilisi and the whole of Georgia in the coming years will gladden the homeland with fresh glorious accomplishments.

[Soviet television 1800 gmt 29 Oct 82: Permit me also, dear comrades, to associate myself with the warm words of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of our Party, and to congratulate you from the bottom of my heart on the high award.]

Tbilisi, like every city, has its own unique history, its own destiny, the speaker went on. Your city has since olden times been the native home not only of Georgians, but also Armenians, Russians, people of various nationalities. And national conceit of any kind was always alien to working Tbilisi. I do not wish to say that everything was plain sailing. Life is not free from difficulties, both objective and subjective ones. Indeed, you know as well as I what complicated political work you had to do after the well-known resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on the organizational and political work of Tbilisi City Committee of the CP of Georgia in carrying out the resolutions of the 24th CPSU Congress. That was a struggle for a healthy political climate in the republic, a struggle, if you like, for its good name, its honour. And the communists of Tbilisi and the whole of Georgia, led by Comrade Shevardnadze, coped well with the tasks set by the CPSU Central Committee.

Tbilisi, Comrade Chernenko noted, is confidently moving to greater heights. Since 1977, its industry has been working practically without lagging enterprises. The experience of the Tbilisi Party organization in improving the management of the socio-economic life of the city is instructive. Tbilisi's successes are undoubtedly the result of the great and positive changes which have taken place throughout Georgia over the last 10 years. From its example it is clear what a great role is played in the life of each Soviet

republic by the union-wide division of labour. All this convincingly shows the correctness of the course of the 26th CPSU Congress, a course of building up the material and spiritual potential of each republic and at the same time of the maximum utilization of this potential for the harmonic development of the whole country. This is vivid evidence of the fruitfulness of the Leninist friendship of the peoples of the USSR, whose 60th anniversary we are shortly to mark. In a word, you have something to be proud of. And it is no coincidence that the activity of your Party organization was given a high evaluation in the recently-adopted resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on the organizational and political work of Party organizations of the Georgian SSR in preparing for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.

I think it would not be superfluous, however, to recall that the republic has considerable reserves and potential which are not being used in full measure, and there is still plenty of unfinished work to be done. Your attention was drawn to this last year in a thoroughly principled way by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. The CPSU Central Committee knows that you are working persistently to act upon the remarks and directions of Leonid Ilyich.

On the development of the republic's agriculture, the speaker noted that attention is now focused on the tasks stemming from the Food Programme. It is good, he said, that you are trying to determine the specific place of each rayon and town, each state and collective farm, each works and factory, each institution and organization, each farmstead and each worker in fulfilling them. Indicative in this respect is the recent October plenum of the CP of Georgia Central Committee, at which there was a serious and impartial discussion of the untapped reserves and shortcomings in the production of grain and fodder. Such a self-critical and businesslike way of tackling the matter is the only correct one.

[Soviet television 1800 gmt 29 Oct 82: You have experience of the solution of major economic problems and the creative use of the immense capabilities of a collectivized economy. This experience is not bad. Evidence of this is, for example, the initiative of Abasha Rayon in improving the administration of agriculture, which has now been emulated throughout the country.]

All our practice shows that the decisive factor of success is skilful Party leadership, the ability of Party committees to select and place cadres correctly and motivate communists and all working people for self-sacrificing work. This is what characterizes the organizational and political activity of the CP of Georgia Central Committee. It (?attracts) a persistent search for new forms of work, the ability to organize it taking the future into account and relying on the broad masses of the working people, and implacability towards everything which runs counter to the nature of our system and our morality. This is the true, Leninist line.

Unfortunately, there are still leaders who feel uncomfortable on the rostrum in front of the masses, but if they are competent people, principled, honest communists, they have nothing to fear. Criticism from below, although unpleasant, is necessary and useful to everyone. One cannot lead the masses without being accountable to them. These are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin.

We should constantly strengthen discipline and organization everywhere. Of course, it is not a matter of blind and unthinking obedience. Our discipline presupposes consciousness, each person having a deep understanding of the nature of the issues being resolved, self-reliance and initiative in the fight to implement the plans which have been collectively drawn up and approved. And this fight needs monolithic ranks and unity of will.

A united will is needed, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin said: All must act as one on each practical matter. United will cannot be just a phrase or a symbol - we demand that it be in practice. The united will of our Party, Comrade Chernenko, said, is vividly expressed in the cohesion of communists around the CPSU Central Committee, headed by that faithful continuer of Lenin's great cause, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. This cohesion is the guarantee of the successful fulfilment of all our tasks.

More than 11,000 primary Party organizations in Georgia - that, comrades, is enormous strength. Here, as in all the parties, the report-back and election campaign is under way. It is important that it should take place in a demanding and Bolshevik-like atmosphere. Each just critical remark and each businesslike proposal by a communist should result in real action.

The rallying of the creative intelligentsia on Party positions and the skilful utilization of the enormous educational potential of the arts has been an important success of the CP of Georgia Central Committee.

Turning to work with young people, the speaker stressed that the CP of Georgia Central Committee, understanding the importance of these matters, strives to combine the enthusiasm and profound knowledge of young people with the wisdom and experience of mature cadres. Comrade Chernenko went on to deal briefly with international affairs, noting the two main trends and the clash between them, which determines the present political climate. [See below]

(b) Tass in Russian for abroad 1342 (and in English 1409) gmt 29 Oct 82

Excerpt from report of speech:

At one pole of world politics, he said, are all those who are for preventing nuclear war, ending the arms race and solving controversial problems through constructive negotiations; in other words, they favour the relaxation of international tension and peaceful coexistence. At the other pole are all those who would like to torpedo detente, whip up the arms race and return to cold-war times. Those politicians of yesterday are not numerous, but they are dangerous. They are particularly dangerous, because they have in their hands a huge military machine, above all that of the USA.

The US ruling class has not stood the test of detente, the test of peaceful co-operation. Indeed, detente is a process of many aspects and dimensions. Detente is undoubtedly the way to peace and co-operation. But not only that. The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that detente gives scope to the democratization of international life in general and enhances the political activity of the broadest masses of people. Detente is inseparable from recognition of each nation's right to decide its future independently, to choose a way of life and direction of social development.

For almost two years, the rulers of the USA have been "flexing their muscles". For almost two years, abuse against the Soviet Union and other socialist states has been heard from Washington. For almost two years, myths about a "Soviet threat" and the "hand of Moscow" have been serving as a kind of ideological foundation of US foreign policy. What has Washington achieved? The quantity of its nuclear bombs has surely grown; one military programme overtakes another, but the USA's international position has not become stronger because of that - on the contrary.

The US politicians' cynical talk of "limited", "protracted" or "rational" nuclear missile war, and the intention to localize such a war to the "European theatre of operations", "have resulted in the growth of nervousness and concern in Western Europe.

New lines of tension have emerged in relations between the USA and Latin America.

And the Middle East? It is clear to all that were it not for Washington's support and patronage, Israel would not have risked embarking upon the road of genocide against the Palestinian people and drowning in blood long-suffering Lebanon. Now the Americans are wriggling and writhing.

More cracks have appeared in Japanese-American relations. Incidentally, there has been no lessening in the number of cracks either in Japan's relations with a number of other countries, because of its turn in the direction of militarization, to which Washington is nudging it.

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To the one hundred billion budget deficit, record unemployment, a wave of bankruptcies and other crisis phenomena, the makers of American policy can certainly also add an enormous foreign policy deficit, the speaker continued. Things have gone so far that you can read the following statement in one American newspaper: If Moscow could manage to infiltrate its agents into the White House, the newspaper said, it could still hardly do more to undermine the authority of America than is being done by the present administration. This, it turns out, is where one should look for the "hand of Moscow".

To the bellicose, great power and boundlessly egocentric foreign policy course of the USA the Soviet Union responds with a confident and restrained policy free from any fluctuations dictated by expediency (Russian: konyunkturykh). "From the first legislative act of Soviet power - the Decree on Peace," Leonid Brezhnev said, "to the recent decision of exceptional importance - the commitment not to resort to first use of nuclear weapons - the whole policy of our Party and state has been imbued with a sincere desire to preserve peace. The Soviet Union is prepared to do and is doing everything possible to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, curb the arms race and strengthen the foundations of peace on earth."

Our country's European policy is based on the need to preserve the values of detente, and preserve and multiply what has been accomplished and laid down in Helsinki.

We sincerely want to normalize relations with our great Chinese neighbour, Konstantin Chernenko said, and we are convinced that this will benefit both China and the Soviet Union, as well as the cause of peace in the world.

The Soviet Union is opposed to the further growth of tension in Soviet-American relations. We are for their normalization and improvement, and we are ready for business-like and thorough negotiations which would be sure to take account of the interests of both sides.

If, however, Washington proves unable to rise above primitive anti-communism, and if it persists in its policy of threats and dictate, well then we are strong enough and we can wait. Neither sanctions nor bellicose posturing frighten us. We believe in reason. And we believe that sooner or later - and the sooner the better - reason will triumph and the danger of war will be averted.

Mankind deserves peace, and it will live in conditions of peace.

[Note: The Moscow home service 1300 gmt report said in conclusion that Chernenko had read out the decree awarding the Order of Lenin to Tbilisi, and that Shevardnadze had said in reply that the people of Tbilisi "who are responsive to kind words and consideration, address their joy and gratitude above all to the man whom they made an honorary citizen of Tbilisi in unforgettable May 1981 - that outstanding citizen of our age, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. He lives and works for the people and in the name of the people. He belongs entirely to the people, and devotes himself wholly and completely to the great Leninist cause." It was reported in the Moscow home service news bulletin at 1200 gmt on 29th October that Chernenko had been made an honorary citizen of Tbilisi. According to Soviet television the previous day (1800 gmt), Chernenko visited the Dimitrov aircraft factory in Tbilisi on the 28th.]

#### Meeting with Georgian Leaders

Moscow home service 1330 gmt 30 Oct 82

Text of report:

Comrade Chernenko, a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has had a talk with members of the Bureau of the Central Committee and Tbilisi City Committee of the CP of Georgia and leading Party and local government

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workers of the republic. Shevardnadze, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and First Secretary of the CP of Georgia Central Committee, described the progress of implementation of the resolutions of the 26th Party Congress and subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and the tasks set by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev during his visit to Georgia in May 1981. He noted that the republic's Party organization is consistently striving to further improve the standard of management, improve the use of production reserves and step up organizational and educational work. The Party organization of Georgia in recent years has done a great deal of work, socio-economic tasks and of working with the masses is becoming increasingly creative. Much attention is being focused on organizational and political ways of ensuring implementation of the tasks set. The demands on leading cadres are increasing, and ideological work is being reorganized actively.

During the talk it was noted that in recent years Georgia had achieved a significant increase in the rate of economic and social development. The growth of industrial and agricultural production and the rise in labour productivity in the current five-year period are higher than the planned targets. At the same time, there are a good many reserves for increasing the efficiency of production and reducing losses of working time. Much attention has been paid to the problems of the development of the light and food industries, improvement of product quality and implementation of plans for housing construction in the republic. It was pointed out that in the light of the resolutions of the May 1982 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, specific tasks had been outlined for the republic and each rayon and farm in the implementation of the country's Food Programme. More persistent work must be done on the intensification of agricultural production through the accelerated development of subsidiary farms of enterprises and establishments and increasing Georgia's contribution to implementation of the Food Programme.

The leadership of the republic expressed the determination of workers in industry and agriculture to fulfil the plans and socialist obligations of the jubilee year and the five-year period as a whole.

Comrade Chernenko stressed that in implementation of the resolutions of the 26th Party Congress, the chief and determining factor was unity of word and action, resolution and implementation. He expressed the certainty that the communists and working people of Georgia would meet the 60th anniversary of the USSR with new achievements. [Sight-seeing; departure for Moscow]



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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 February 1984

Visit by the Prime Minister to the Soviet Union

As you know, no Private Secretary from No. 10 was present at the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr. Chernenko in Moscow on 14 February. The usual record will therefore not be issued.

We propose to regard the draft record contained in Moscow telegram No. 217 as the authentic account of the meeting.

I enclose a copy of that telegram with this letter and am copying both to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 217 OF 14 FEB

MIPT PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY AND P.S. TO PRIME MINISTER.

THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR CHERNENKO 14 FEBRUARY.

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT RECORD:

1. CHERNENKO, READING RAPIDLY FROM A PREPARED TEXT, EXPRESSED GRATITUDE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THE RESPECT WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND SHE PERSONALLY HAD SHOWN BY COMING TO MOSCOW TO HONOUR MR ANDROPOV'S MEMORY. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE MEETING AND ITS NECESSARY BREVITY MADE A SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSION IMPOSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH IN PRINCIPLE THE SOVIET SIDE FAVOURED SUCH A DISCUSSION. NEVERTHELESS, HE COULD NOT FAIL TO REFER TO MATTERS OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN TO BOTH COUNTRIES, IE, THE DANGEROUS TURN OF EVENTS IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD GENERALLY. HE DID NOT PROPOSE TO GO INTO THE REASONS FOR THESE DEVELOPMENTS. THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT WAS WELL KNOWN. BUT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR HIM TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS READY TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE WORST HAPPENING, TO ARREST THE ARMS RACE, AND TO BRING ABOUT A MOVEMENT TOWARDS RELAXATION OF TENSION AND DETENTE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD REPEATEDLY CONFIRMED THIS READINESS BY A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL STEPS AND PROPOSALS. IT WAS SUFFICIENT TO RECALL, FOR EXAMPLE, THE OBLIGATION WHICH IT HAD UNILATERALLY ASSUMED NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IF THE WESTERN NUCLEAR POWERS HAD RESPONDED IN KIND, AND IF NATO HAD REACTED APPROPRIATELY TO THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS FOR AN AGREEMENT NOT TO USE MILITARY FORCE AT ALL AGAINST EACH OTHER, THAT WOULD GREATLY HELP TO STRENGTHEN MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD.

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2. THESE SOVIET PROPOSALS AND VARIOUS OTHERS REMAINED IN FORCE.

THE SOVIET UNION WAS AWAITING A POSITIVE RESPONSE, INCLUDING FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM. THE SOVIET UNION, AS BEFORE, WISHED THE QUESTION OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE AND OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS GENERALLY TO BE RESOLVED ON A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES AND IN STRICT CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. THEY WERE PREPARED FOR AGREEMENT ON THIS BASIS. BUT THEY COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WERE USED BY THE OTHER SIDE TO COVER UP ACTIONS DESIGNED TO BOOST THE ARMS RACE AND IN THE HOPE OF ACHIEVING MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

3. THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN FAVOUR OF "ACTIVE AND SERIOUS POLITICAL DIALOGUE". THEY NEEDED NO CONVINCING OF THE NEED FOR THIS. BUT THE DIALOGUE SHOULD BE BETWEEN EQUALS AND SHOULD BE CONDUCTED NOT FROM A "POSITION OF STRENGTH". ITS AIM SHOULD BE TO ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDINGS. IN RECENT DAYS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD ONCE AGAIN DECLARED QUITE CLEARLY THAT IT WAS IN FAVOUR OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPING ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. THE SOVIET UNION WISHED TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH ALL COUNTRIES AND ACTIVELY TO CO-OPERATE WITH THOSE GOVERNMENTS AND ORGANISATIONS WHICH WERE READY HONESTLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO WORK FOR PEACE.

4. AS REGARDS BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN, THESE COULD BECOME MORE SUBSTANTIVE AND MEANINGFUL IN VARIOUS FIELDS INCLUDING THOSE OF TRADE AND COMMERCE. OVER SIXTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP DEMONSTRATED THAT CO-OPERATION AND NOT CONFRONTATION WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH THE BRITISH AND SOVIET PEOPLES.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID SHE WISHED ONCE AGAIN TO CONVEY

CONDOLENCES TO THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION ON THE GREAT SORROW OF THIS OCCASION. SHE WAS GLAD TO BE IN MOSCOW IN ORDER TO PAY TRIBUTE TO MR ANDROPOV. SHE WAS GRATEFUL TO MR CHERNENKO FOR THIS BRIEF INTERVIEW ON A DAY WHICH MUST HAVE BEEN PHYSICALLY AND EMOTIONALLY TAXING.

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6. SHE SHARED SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT THE VARIOUS DANGEROUS EVENTS IN THE WORLD AND BELIEVED THAT THE PEOPLES OF BOTH COUNTRIES FELT MUCH DISQUIET ON ACCOUNT OF THOSE EVENTS. IN RESPONSE TO THE POINTS RAISED BY MR CHERNENKO, SHE SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO TACKLE THE PROBLEMS ON THREE FRONTS. FIRSTLY, SHE AGREED THAT ACTION MUST CONTINUE TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT AGREEMENT IN ALL THE DIFFERENT DISARMAMENT FORA, WHETHER ON CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN STOCKHOLM, OR ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THESE WERE ALL SEPARATE AND HIGHLY TECHNICAL NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD PERHAPS BE HELPFUL IF SHE INDICATED THE BRITISH APPROACH. SHE AND MR CHERNENKO WERE WELL AWARE THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD DIFFERENT POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND BELIEFS. THE APPROACH IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE SUCH THAT EACH GROUP OF COUNTRIES SHOULD RETAIN ITS SELF-RESPECT AND PRIDE, SHOULD NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY, AND SHOULD SEEK TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS IN A BALANCED WAY. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT EACH GROUP OF COUNTRIES SHOULD BE MADE CONFIDENT OF ITS OWN SECURITY AT EACH STAGE. SHE RECALLED THE UNDERTAKING OF THE NATO COUNTRIES IN THE BONN DECLARATION THAT NONE OF NATO'S WEAPONS OF ANY SORT WOULD EVER BE USED EXCEPT IN RESPONSE TO ATTACK.

7. IF DISARMAMENT WAS THE FIRST FRONT ON WHICH PROGRESS WAS NEEDED, THE SECOND - AND ONE WHICH WOULD MAKE DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS MORE LIKELY - WAS THAT OF ENSURING A BETTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S PROBLEMS, ATTITUDES, AND CONCERNS. SHE HAD READ MR CHERNENKO'S SPEECH AT A RECENT PLENUM. IT HAD BEEN OF GREAT INTEREST TO HER, BOTH AS A POLITICIAN AND A SCIENTIST.

MR CHERNENKO WOULD OF COURSE NOT EXPECT HER TO AGREE WITH ITS EVERY WORD. BUT A COLLECTION OF HIS SPEECHES HAD RECENTLY BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THIS TOO SHOULD MAKE FOR BETTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. DESPITE THE GREAT POLITICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, A BROADER UNDERSTANDING AND PROSPECTS OF AGREEMENT IN DISARMAMENT TALKS WERE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE WHICH BOTH OF THEM REPRESENTED. THE MATTER WAS ONE OF URGENCY BECAUSE THE GENERATION OF THOSE SEATED AROUND THE TABLE HAD EXPERIENCED THE LAST WAR, WITH ITS VIVID, BITTER AND DESOLATE MEMORIES. THIS MADE THEM LEAST LIKELY TO WANT TO REPEAT THE EXPERIENCE. THEY HAD A CHANCE, PERHAPS EVEN THE LAST CHANCE, OF SECURING FUNDAMENTAL DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS ENHANCING SECURITY.

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8. THE THIRD FRONT FOR DESIRED PROGRESS WAS THAT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING TRADE RELATIONS. THE UK CERTAINLY WANTED IMPROVED TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THEY ALSO WANTED MORE CONTACTS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, EITHER IN MOSCOW OR LONDON. PROGRESS ON ANY OF THESE FRONTS WOULD DOUBTLESS ASSIST PROGRESS IN THE OTHERS.

9. IN CONCLUSION THE PRIME MINISTER SAID SHE WISHED TO INFORM MR CHERNENKO THAT A SMALL GROUP OF JOURNALISTS, ALL OF THEM ACCREDITED IN MOSCOW, WOULD BE AWAITING HER ON HER RETURN TO THE EMBASSY. IN RESPONSE TO THEIR INEVITABLE QUESTIONS, SHE WOULD SAY THAT HER DISCUSSION WITH MR CHERNENKO HAD BEEN CONFIDENTIAL. IT SHOULD REMAIN SO, SINCE THIS WAS THE ONLY BASIS CONDUCTIVE TO IMPROVING TRUST. SHE WOULD ADD THAT THE MAIN SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION HAD BEEN EAST/WEST RELATIONS, BUT WOULD NOT ELABORATE FURTHER. SHE WOULD SAY ALSO THAT SHE HAD EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THIS FIRST MEETING WOULD LEAD TO OTHER CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. SHE WOULD OF COURSE OUTLINE HER OWN APPROACH TO THE FUTURE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. MR CHERNENKO SAID HE FOUND THIS PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE.

10. MR GROMYKO INTERJECTED THAT IN STOCKHOLM HE AND THE FOREIGN

SECRETARY HAD AGREED TO BE IN CONTACT ABOUT A MEETING AT THEIR LEVEL. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID SHE THOUGHT THAT IT HAD ALSO BEEN

AGREED THAT MR KORNIENKO WOULD BE VISITING LONDON FIRST.

MR GROMYKO SAID THAT FOR SOME REASON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD

REACTED TO MR KORNIENKO'S READINESS TO VISIT LONDON BY SAYING THAT HIS TRIP WAS UNTIMELY AND INAPPROPRIATE. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD THEREFORE POSTPONED IT INDEFINITELY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE

REMINDED MR GROMYKO THAT AT STOCKHOLM HE HAD AGREED TO GIVE IT CONSIDERATION. MR GROMYKO INDICATED THAT HE HAD NO MORE TO ADD.

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11. THE PRIME MINISTER, SUMMING UP, CALLED FOR MOVEMENT ON ALL

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THREE FRONTS WHICH SHE HAD MENTIONED. ONE PROBLEM ENCOUNTERED WITH PUBLIC OPINION HAD BEEN THAT DISARMAMENT WAS BECOMING FAR TOO TECHNICAL. PEOPLE WANTED TO FEEL THAT THERE WAS A BASIS OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN BRITAIN AND USSR SO THAT, IF EVENTS IN THE WORLD TOOK A BAD TURN, THE TWO SIDES WOULD IMMEDIATELY MAKE CONTACT AND SEEK TO PREVENT CATASTROPHE.

12. MR CHERNENKO THANKED THE PRIME MINISTER FOR FINDING THE TIME

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TO COME TO MOSCOW ON THE PRESENT SAD DAY FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE SHORT DISCUSSION THEY HAD HAD MIGHT PROVE TO BE QUITE SIGNIFICANT IF WHAT BOTH SIDES APPEARED TO WANT ACTUALLY CAME ABOUT. HE FAVOURED MOVEMENT ON ALL FRONTS. THERE WAS MUCH UNTAPPED POTENTIAL FOR REAL FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES AND FOR CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. HE FELT THAT A FRESH NEW CONTRIBUTION COULD INDEED BE MADE.

13. THE MEETING LASTED SOME FORTY MINUTES.

14. ADVANCE COPY TO RESIDENT CLERK NO 10 DOWNING STREET.

SUTHERLAND

(ADVANCED AS REQUESTED)

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PS  
PS/MR RIEKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR CARTLEDGE  
MR JENKINS

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## KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO

1. Chernenko was born in 1911, a Russian, in the countryside near Krasnoyarsk. Little is known of his early career, except that he was a Party official from 1929, serving briefly in the Party organisation of a frontier post in Kazakhstan.

2. During the war, Chernenko was a Party official in Siberia; unlike Brezhnev and Andropov, therefore, he was far removed from the action.

3. In 1948, Chernenko was appointed Head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Moldavian Communist Party. Here he met Brezhnev, who was First Secretary of the Moldavian Party from 1950-1952. Thereafter, Chernenko followed in Brezhnev's footsteps. He came to Moscow in 1956 to work in the Central Committee Department of Agitation and Propaganda. In 1960, when Brezhnev was moved to become Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet (ie, President), Chernenko followed him to be Head of the Secretariat of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet. When Brezhnev was made General Secretary of the Party, Chernenko followed him back into the Party apparatus, and in 1965 became Head of the Central Committee's General Department (which deals primarily with the flow of paper within the Party apparatus, and prepares eg the agendas for Politburo meetings).

4. In 1976, Chernenko was promoted to be a Central

/Committee



-2-

Committee Secretary. He continued to supervise the General Department, and took on broader responsibilities for ensuring the smooth running of the Party and Government machine as a whole. He was further promoted to Candidate Member of the Politburo in 1977, and to Full Member in 1978.

5. Chernenko accompanied Brezhnev on a number of trips abroad: to Helsinki in 1975 for the signing of the CSCE Final Act; to Bucharest in 1976, and to Sofia, Budapest and East Berlin in 1979. He also went with Brezhnev to Vienna for the Soviet/US Summit talks in June 1979, and the signing of SALT (but did not take much part in the discussions of substance). He has also led Communist Party delegations to Denmark, Greece, Cuba and France.

6. Following Brezhnev's death, Chernenko changed his responsibilities in the Secretariat to supervise ideology and international relations, particularly the World Communist Movement. He also acted as de facto Party Second Secretary in Andropov's absence.

7. We have always assessed that Chernenko's emergence to prominence in the mid-1970s reflected his close association with Brezhnev, rather than his own political weight. This was to a large extent confirmed when he was passed over as General Secretary in favour of Andropov following Brezhnev's death in November, 1982. In early

/1983





1983, Chernenko seemed to be going into political eclipse, compounded by health problems: he was away for two months in the spring of 1983, officially with influenza, but according to different Soviet sources, with either heart trouble or lung cancer. He did, however, give the main report to the Party's ideological Plenum in June 1983, and currently appears to be in good health.

8. Chernenko is a grey figure, and a notoriously poor public speaker. This can, however, be said of most of the Politburo, and may conceal a greater nimbleness in the inner councils of the Party.

## FUNERAL SPEECHES : MAIN POINTS AND TONE

### Chernenko

Characteristic difficulty over delivery.

Bulk of speech devoted to internal affairs. Accent on the changes outlined by Andropov as way towards greater efficiency and productivity.

Spoke of need for improved organisation of party work on the lines of his Plenum speech in June.

Touched briefly on foreign affairs. Main points were to stress continuity and that the Soviet Union "could not be intimidated".

### Gromyko

Main emphasis on foreign affairs, stressing continuity.

Justified recent increased Soviet deployments (presumably in GDR, Czechoslovakia and possibly of West Coast of America), by reference to increased threat to Soviet security.

Refrained from mentioning US by name but called upon "those responsible" for stepping up the arms race and increased interference in the internal affairs of others to renounce these policies and "pursue the path of peace".

Referred to recent Soviet confidence-building initiatives (as in his recent Stockholm speech) i.e. no first use of nuclear weapons and no first use of force.

"Soviet policy is one of peace and equal cooperation with all states.

### Ustinov

Praised Andropov for providing both Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces with all that they needed for their security.

The Soviet Union could not be intimidated. The Party would ensure that the armed forces had everything necessary for their task.

P.S. None of the three speakers mentioned "detente". Gromyko endorsed the policy of peaceful coexistence.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 208 OF 14 FEB

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FROM HICKS 1130 HRS LOCAL TIME MOSCOW TUESDAY

FOR FCO COMMUNICATIONS

PLEASE ONPASS FOLLOWING TO COI NEWSROOM (ATTN CHATTERIS),  
FCO NEWS DEPT (ATTN RIDGEWAY), FCO INFORMATION DEPT (ATTN  
DICKINSON), NO TEN PRESS OFFICE (ATTN MURRAY) WITH 0900 HRS  
DESKBY

ITEM: THATCHER-CHERNENKO TALKS IN MOSCOW

BY GARY HICKS LPS CHIEF DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT MOSCOW (LPS):

TOP LEVEL POLITICAL CONTACT BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND SOVIET  
LEADERSHIPS WAS RESUMED HERE TODAY TUESDAY FOURTEEN FEBRUARY  
WITH THE NEWS THAT BRITAIN'S PRIME MINISTER MRS MARGARET THATCHER  
WILL MEET THE NEW RUSSIAN LEADER MR. KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO  
AFTER THE FUNERAL OF PRESIDENT YURI ANDROPOV.

THE KREMLIN TALKS, SCHEDULED TO LAST ABOUT THIRTY MINUTES  
BEFORE HER RETURN TO LONDON TONIGHT, ARE ALSO EXPECTED TO BE  
ATTENDED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY SIR GEOFFREY  
HOWE, AND THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY MR. ANDREI GROMYKO.

OVER THE YEARS SUCCESSIVE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARIES HAVE  
HELD MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIET FOREIGN SECRETARY MR. ANDREI GROMYKO,  
USUALLY IN NEW YORK AT THE START OF NEW UNITED NATIONS GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY SESSIONS THERE BUT OCCASIONALLY ELSEWHERE SUCH AS AT THE  
RECENT 35-NATION CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) IN  
STOCKHOLM.

*/ CONTACT*

CONTACT AT A HIGHER POLITICAL LEVEL HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN VIRTUALLY LACKING SINCE HAROLD WILSON, PRIME MINISTER AT THAT TIME, VISITED MOSCOW IN 1975 FOR TALKS WITH THE LATE PRESIDENT LEONARD BREZHNEV. (MRS. THATCHER BRIEFLY MET SOVIET PRIME MINISTER MR. KOSYGIN IN MOSCOW IN 1979 ON HER WAY TO THE TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT).

THE 1975 TRIP, RESULTING AS IT DID IN JOINT COMMUNIQUEs RUNNING TO TENS OF THOUSANDS OF WORDS, WAS PORTRAYED AS USHERING IN A BRAVE NEW ERA OF BRITISH-SOVIET RELATIONS. SINCE THEN DISILLUSIONMENT HAS SET IN AS THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE HAS CHANGED RADICALLY WITH HOPES OF EAST-WEST ''DETENTE'', AS IT WAS THEN CALLED, DIMINISHED CONSIDERABLY AS A RESULT OF EVENTS LIKE THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.

NO-ONE HERE PRETENDS THAT MRS. THATCHER WILL TODAY SUDDENLY CHANGE THIS FROSTY CLIMATE. YET THE VERY FACT SHE IS HERE - AND SEEING MR. CHERNENKO - IS REGARDED AS SIGNIFICANT AND IMPORTANT AND ANOTHER STAGE ON THE LONG DIPLOMATIC ROAD TOWARD BETTER EAST-WEST RELATIONS OF WHICH SHE SPOKE ON HER RECENT HUNGARIAN VISIT.

TONIGHT'S TALKS ARE NOT SEEN AS AN OCCASION FOR DETAILED SCRUTINY OF SPECIFIC PROBLEMS SINCE THERE IS SCARCELY TIME. MRS. THATCHER IS EXPECTED TO REITERATE THAT DIFFERENCES EXIST BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT THOSE DIFFERENCES MUST BE RECOGNISED. SHE IS, TOO, LIKELY TO URGE THE NEW LEADER TO RETURN TO THE ARMS CONTROL TALKS NOW SUSPENDED AS SHE WILL ARGUE THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS EXCEPT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. (THE SOVIET UNION REACTED TO DEPLOYMENTS OF THE 16-NATION NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION DEPLOYMENTS OF CRUISE AND PERSHING MISSILES LAST DECEMBER BY BREAKING OFF THE INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCE TALKS AND ADJOURNING INDEFINITELY THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES.)

THE PRIME MINISTER SEEMS CERTAIN TO POINT OUT THAT THE WEST REMAINS COMPLETELY GENUINE IN ITS DESIRE FOR BALANCED AGREEMENTS AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMS, BUT THAT SUCH ARMS CONTROL IS NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT POLITICAL UNDERTAKINGS. CONSEQUENTLY THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE MUST BE BROADENED AND GIVEN MORE SUBSTANCE.

/SHORTLY

SHORTLY BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE KREMLIN MEETING, MRS THATCHER AND SIR GEOFFREY (REPRESENTING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE) AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR SIR IAIN SUTHERLAND (REPRESENTING THE ROYAL FAMILY) LAID WREATHS AT THE IMPOSING NEO-CLASSICAL HALL OF COLUMNS WHERE ANDROPOV'S BODY LIES IN STATE.

THEY STOOD FOR TWO MINUTES AS AN ORCHESTRA PLAYED SOLEMN CLASSICAL MUSIC AND AS THE PUBLIC, WHO HAD BEEN QUEUING IN THE SNOW IN TEMPERATURES MORE THAN TEN DEGREES BELOW FREEZING, CONTINUED TO FILE PAST THE OPEN COFFIN BANKED WITH COLOURFUL FLOWERS. THE BRITISH PARTY BOWED AND LEFT THE BUILDING, WHICH THE NOBILITY USED AS A CLUB UNTIL LENIN DECREED IT BE HANDED OVER TO THE TRADE UNIONS IN 1919.

ON HER RETURN TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY MRS. THATCHER, ACCOMPANIED BY SIR GEOFFREY, SAW PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ OF PAKISTAN THERE AT HIS REQUEST. THEY SPENT 45 MINUTES MAINLY DISCUSSING INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUT CONCENTRATING PARTICULARLY UPON THE AFGHAN SITUATION WHICH HAS RESULTED IN SOME 3.1 MILLION REFUGEES ON PAKISTAN SOIL. SOME BILATERAL ISSUES WERE ALSO APPARENTLY DISCUSSED BUT NO DETAILS WERE AVAILABLE AFTERWARDS.

THEN SHE WENT TO RED SQUARE FOR THE FUNERAL CEREMONY WITH SIR GEOFFREY, MR. DENIS HEALEY (LABOUR PARTY FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN), MR. DAVID STEEL (LIBERAL PARTY LEADER) AND DR. DAVID OWEN (LEADER OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS). AFTERWARDS MRS. THATCHER WAS DUE TO PAY HER CONDOLENCES TO POLITBURO MEMBERS IN ST. GEORGE'S HALL IN THE GREAT KREMLIN PALACE WHERE SHE WILL ALSO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR BRIEF, INFORMAL; CHATS WITH SOME OF THE SCORES OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT GATHERED HERE. (LSPS)

SUTHERLAND

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INFO D  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR JENKINS

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER'S OPENING STATEMENT

AT

AN UNRECORDED PRESS BRIEFING

IN THE

BRITISH EMBASSY, MOSCOW: 14 FEBRUARY

10 Downing Street  
Press Office  
Whitehall  
SW1

01-930 4433

My call on Mr Chernenko lasted for about half an hour.

I was accompanied by the Foreign Secretary and the British Ambassador. Mr Gromyko was present. You will not expect me to reveal the substance of our talk, if we are serious about promoting better

East/West dialogue then it has to be conducted on a confidential basis. So let me talk to you about my personal approach to East/West politics. There has been a tendency to portray my visit to Hungary and my decision to come to Moscow as a sudden and unexpected development.

That is just not true. It was plain to me and the Foreign Secretary last summer that the time had come for a serious review of relations with the East. The build-up of arms - the increasing number of SS20s - and the West's need to respond with Cruise and Pershing had created disquiet.

The various arms control negotiations were getting nowhere and contact between East and West were so limited that the risk of misunderstanding was grave. The matter of the Korean Airliner did nothing to help but nevertheless, when I visited the United States in September, the prospects for improving East/West relations were at the top of my agenda with President Reagan and we established a great deal of common-ground.

I made my Winston Churchill speech in Washington, but the key lines on my readiness to talk in the right circumstances were not then widely noticed although they were there in that speech. Then came the Foreign Secretary's speech to the United Nations General Assembly, my Blackpool speech and my Guildhall speech. Look at them again and you will find the common threads. It was in November not February that I decided to go to Hungary and few people have recalled that many months before that I had received the Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister in London.

So the policy has been evolved over time and it will be applied over time. I look for results over years and not months and I am under no illusions at all. I believe as strongly as ever in basic Western freedoms - and I make it plain to all in the East privately and publicly that I will defend them/anywhere any time. But we must avoid the

terrible dangers that could flow from misunderstandings.

That means establishing a new confidence between East and West. And that in turn means a recognition that we have a common interest in peace and security at a lower level of weapons. I believe that past East/West exchanges have been too narrowly focussed on arms control negotiations. If there is to be progress on arms control - which I devoutly want - it will come not through negotiating skill alone but because a broader understanding has been reached.

That will establish the confidence necessary on both sides for the negotiators to be given the right instructions.

The aim is that broad understanding. I do not know whether it can be achieved - I do know that we have to try. It will be at best a long slow task. There may be set-backs and interruptions. But I earnestly hope that the Soviet leadership will respond positively.

It will be some time before we can know. But I am absolutely sure that all Western leaders are prepared to work for this goal. I am not looking for instant and ephemeral success but steady and sustainable progress.



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TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS BRIEFING

AND

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

MOSCOW : 14 FEBRUARY 1984

Press Office  
10 Downing Street  
Whitehall, SW1

01-930 4433

Opening Statement at the Prime Minister's Press Conference - Moscow

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Q. YOUR PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW LEADER ?

A. I THINK THAT'S VERY DIFFICULT , TODAY, AND ON THE FIRST DAY, ON THE DAY OF THE FUNERAL . I CAN ONLY SAY THAT I THOUGHT THE FUNERAL CEREMONY WAS SOLEMN AND IMPRESSIVE AND THE ARRANGEMENTS WERE EXCELLENT. THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAS HAD BOTH A PHYSICALLY TIRING AND EMOTIONALLY EXHAUSTING DAY , AND I WAS VERY GRATEFUL TOWARDS THE END OF THE DAY FOR HIS RECEIVING US FOR AN INTERVIEW FOR ABOUT HALF AN HOUR. AND OF COURSE A NUMBER OF PREVIOUS INTERVIEWS HAD BEEN HELD WITH OTHER PEOPLE AS WELL.

Q. DID YOU INVITE MR CHERNENKO TO BRITAIN OR WAS THERE ANY SUGGESTION YOU SHOULD COME TO MOSCOW ?

/ A. WG

A. WE HAD NO SPECIAL DISCUSSION ABOUT VISITS. I DON'T THINK YOU WOULD EXPECT THAT , WHEN WE WERE TALKING ABOUT BROAD, GENERAL MATTERS. BUT WE DID SAY THAT WE HOPED THAT THIS FIRST MEETING WOULD LEAD TO OTHER CONTACTS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. I DON'T THINK YOU SHOULD LEAP TO EXPECTING BIG SUMMIT MEETINGS. THAT'S NOT THE KIND OF STEADY IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WHICH COMES IMMEDIATELY. YOU HAVE TO WORK FOR MANY CONTACTS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS. WE'RE WORKING FROM THE BOTTOM UP , WITH A PROGRAMME OF INCREASED CONTACTS.

Q. CAN I ASK YOU IF MR CHERNENKO APPEARS TO HAVE A GOOD GRASP OF ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND EAST-WEST ISSUES IN GENERAL?

A. I DON'T REALLY THINK THAT YOU'D EXPECT ME TO ANSWER PERSONAL QUESTIONS LIKE THAT , AT A TIME WHEN WHAT WE'RE REALLY TRYING TO DO IS SET THE TONE OF REPHRASED EAST -WEST RELATIONS. I WAS EXTREMELY COURTEOUSLY RECEIVED AND WAS VERY PLEASED WITH THE TALKS WE HAD .

Q. IN ST GEORGE'S HALL YOU WERE GRANTED MUCH MORE TIME WITH MR CHERNENKO THAN OTHER VISITORS. WHAT DID YOU DISCUSS ?

A. ONE JUST HAD A WORD. ONE WOULD ON SUCH AN OCCASION , AND ONE THEN ALSO TURNED TO HAVE A WORD WITH MR GROMYKO. REMARKS . OBVIOUSLY FLOWED FROM ONE'S DECISION TO COME.

Q. A MEETING OF MINDS ?

A. I BELIEVE THAT WE ARE ALL RECOGNISING THAT ALTHOUGH THERE ARE FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL DIFFERENCES , IT IS IN THE COMMON INTEREST OF PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE POLITICAL DIVIDE TO WORK FOR A BETTER UNDERSTANDING, TO WORK FOR DISARMAMENT SO THAT WE CAN KEEP SECURITY ON A BALANCED BASIS, AT A LOW LEVEL OF WEAPONS, AND , AS PART OF THAT BETTER UNDERSTANDING, WE CAN WORK FOR GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS AND INCREASED TRADE. I THINK THAT THE PHRASE THAT IS NOW BEING USED ON THE SOVIET SIDE IS PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE. THE PHRASE HAS BEEN USED ON OUR SIDE : WE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN SECURITY AND PEACE, AT A LOWER LEVEL OF WEAPORS, AND WE WISH BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND BETTER BILATERAL RELATIONS.

1Q. MR BUSH

Q. MR BUSH SAID THAT HIS MEETING HAD BEEN CONDUCTED IN A VERY GOOD MOOD AND THAT THEREFORE THERE WAS A DISTINCT PROSPECT OF IMPROVEMENT IN EAST -WEST RELATIONS . WOULD YOU GENERALLY AGREE ?

A. I WOULD BE HAPPY TO ADOPT THIS DESCRIPTION.

Q. COULD YOU TELL US WHO ELSE YOU MET TODAY, AND SAY SOMETHING BRIEFLY ABOUT THOSE OTHER DISCUSSIONS ?

V

A. YOU CAN'T OBVIOUSLY GET THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OUT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS IF YOU ARE GOING TO REVEAL EVERYTHING THAT WAS

SAID. WE MET LATER THIS AFTERNOON , DR SOARES OF PORTUGAL. I HAVE SEEN DURING THE COURSE OF THE DAY A NUMBER OF PEOPLE , BUT NOT TO DISCUSS DEEP AND SERIOUS THINGS - MRS GANDHI AND I ARRIVED TOGETHER AND I WAS VERY PLEASED TO SEE HER. WE HAVE SEEN A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF THE AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH AND ALSO SRI LANKA , A LOT OF OUR EUROPEAN COMMUNITY , AND REPRESENTATIVES OF SWEDEN AND NORWAY, AND JORDAN AND ALSO MR MACHEL FROM MOZAMBIQUE. OF COURSE THERE WERE QUITE A LOT MORE. YOU KNOW AS ONE GOES UP THE STAIRS TOO, WAITING TO BE RECEIVED , YOU MEET QUITE A LOT OF PEOPLE .

Q. WHAT WAS THE IMPRESSION MADE ON YOU PERSONALLY BY THE FUNERAL ?

A. WELL, IT WAS A VERY IMPRESSIVE CEREMONY. IT IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM ANYTHING WITHIN ONE'S OWN EXPERIENCE OF COURSE. IT WAS IMPRESSIVE, IT WAS EXTREMELY WELL ORGANISED. THE TIMING WAS PERFECT.

Q. DID YOU SEE ANYTHING IN MOSCOW THAT WOULD IN ANY WAY AFFECT YOUR VIEWS OF THE COUNTRY ?

A. WE'VE NOT HAD A CHANCE TO SEE A GREAT DEAL - I'M AFRAID.

WE WENT TO THE KREMLIN SLIGHTLY EARLIER TO SEE THE GREAT PALACE AND ONE OF THE PALACES AT THE BACK, AND I HAVE NOT, THIS TIME, GONE IN THE CHURCHES OF THE KREMLIN. I'VE BEEN THERE BEFORE. THEY VERY KINDLY SHOWED US AROUND PARTS OF THE PALACE WHICH OF COURSE ARE VERY, VERY BEAUTIFUL.

Q. AND THE MEETING WITH MR CHERNENKO WAS IN ST ELIZABETH'S HALL?

A. ST ELIZABETH'S HALL, YES.

Q. THE DESCRIPTION "IRON LADY": WOULD YOU NOW, IN MOSCOW, REPUDIATE IT?

A. NO. AT TIMES EVERYONE IN THE WESTERN WORLD AND EASTERN WORLD, VERY, VERY DIFFERENT POLITICAL SYSTEMS, AND IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL PEOPLES THAT WE WORK FOR PEACE AND SECURITY. YOU ONLY HAVE SECURITY IF YOU HAVE BALANCED REDUCTIONS IN ARMS SEMICLON BALANCED AND VERIFIED AT EVERY STAGE, SO THAT THE SECURITY OF EACH SIDE IS SAFEGUARDED IN THIS WAY. WE HAVE TO DO IT IN A SPIRIT OF SELF-RESPECT, MUTUAL RESPECT. I HAVE AN IRON RESOLVE TO WORK FOR A BETTER UNDERSTANDING.

Q. YOU'VE COME TO A COUNTRY, ONCE DESCRIBED AS ONE OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST TYRANNIES. DOES THIS SUGGEST THAT YOU HAVE CHANGED YOUR ATTITUDE TO THE SOVIET UNION?

A. I AM PREPARED TO HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING. I READ MR CHERNENKO'S SPEECH TO THE LAST PLENUM. I DISAGREE WITH A GREAT DEAL OF HIS SPEECH. DEMOCRACY IS A FAITH IN WHICH I BELIEVE AND WHICH I BELIEVE IS THE BEST FOR MANKIND. BUT WE DO NOT SEEK TO IMPOSE OUR VIEWS ON OTHERS BY FORCE. NATO IS ONLY A DEFENCE ORGANISATION. BUT WE BELIEVE PASSIONATELY IN OUR WAY OF LIFE AND WE'LL DEFEND IT.

PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVIEW

WITH

PETER RUFF, BBC RADIO

BRITISH EMBASSY, MOSCOW: 14 FEBRUARY

10 Downing Street  
Press Office  
Whitehall  
SW1

01-930 4433



INTERVIEWER: PRIME MINISTER, DID YOU RECEIVE WHAT YOU WOULD DESCRIBE AS A POSITIVE REACTION FROM THE NEW SOVIET LEADER?

MRS. THATCHER: YES, I THINK SO, WE WERE VERY COURTEOUSLY RECEIVED, I THINK THEY WERE PLEASED THAT WE HAD COME FOR THIS OCCASION OF THE FUNERAL OF MR. ANDROPOV AND THE TALKS WERE CONDUCTED IN A SPIRIT OF CO-OPERATION.

INTERVIEWER: WHEN I MEAN 'POSITIVE' I'M REALLY LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: DID YOU GET THE IMPRESSION THAT HE TOO IS LOOKING TO A NEW ERA, A CHANGE OF EMPHASIS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST?

MRS. THATCHER: I THINK THAT WE'RE ALL REALISING THAT THE STATE OF WEAPONRY THAT WE HAVE NOW IS VERY HIGH, THE PEOPLE ARE DISQUIETED ABOUT IT AND THAT WE WANT TO KEEP OUR SECURITY, KEEP OUR OWN FERVENT BELIEF IN OUR OWN POLITICAL SYSTEMS, AT A LOWER LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS AND WEAPONRY AND THE QUESTION IS HOW TO ACHIEVE THAT. THERE REALLY ARE THREE WAYS - YOU CAN DO IT BY THE SEVERAL DISARMAMENT TALKS, BUT SOMETIMES, AS YOU KNOW, THOSE GET A BIT TECHNICAL, AND THEN YOU CAN DO IT BY ACHIEVING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON A MUCH WIDER FRONT BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE SEVERAL COUNTRIES AND, THIRDLY, YOU CAN DO IT BY TRADING RELATIONS AND BETTER BILATERAL RELATIONS BUT YOU'RE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO GET SOMEWHERE ON THE DISARMAMENT TALKS IF YOU HAVE THE WIDER UNDERSTANDING AND THAT REALLY I THINK IS WHAT WE'RE WORKING FOR NOW.

INTERVIEWER: DID YOU PRESS HIM THEN ON THIS BUSINESS OF THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE MOMENT BEING TOO NARROW AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE WIDENED TO TAKE IN OTHER ISSUES?

MRS. THATCHER: DID ONE PRESS? ONE PUT ONE'S VIEW, LOOK, IT'S BEEN A VERY EMOTIONALLY EXHAUSTING DAY FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND A VERY PHYSICALLY TIRING DAY FOR SOME OF THE LEADERS. THEY'VE HAD THIS GREAT FUNERAL CEREMONY AND THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY IS SEEING A NUMBER OF PEOPLE. WHAT ONE WORKS THEREFORE FOR AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND IS THE BASIS FOR CREATING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND I THINK IT WAS ACCEPTED IN THAT SPIRIT, YOU CAN'T GET INTO DETAIL, BUT YOU PUT WITH ALL THE SINCERITY AND CONVICTION AT YOUR COMMAND, THAT ALTHOUGH WE ARE ON TWO DIFFERENT SIDES OF A POLITICAL DIVIDE, ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE PASSIONATELY AND FERVENTLY IN OUR VIEW AND WILL DEFEND IT AND DEFEND IT IN ARGUMENT AND WILL DEFEND IT IF IT'S ATTACKED - AND THEY BELIEVE THEIRS - IT'S IN OUR COMMON INTEREST TO ENSURE PEACE WITH SECURITY AND IN OUR CASE PEACE WITH FREEDOM AND JUSTICE, FOR AS FAR AS WE CAN SEE, AND THE TIME IS SHORT AND WE MUST GET ON WITH IT.

INTERVIEWER: IT WILL HAVE COME AS NO SURPRISE TO YOU, I KNOW, THAT PEOPLE WILL SEE YOUR VERY PRESENCE HERE, THE WOMAN WHO THE SOVIET MEDIA DESCRIBED AS 'THE IRON LADY' TO BE HERE AT ALL MUST SIGNIFY SOME SORT OF CHANGE OF ATTITUDE ON YOUR PART.

MRS. THATCHER: I THINK IT SIGNIFIES WHAT WE'VE BEEN WORKING FOR FOR THE LAST FIVE OR SIX MONTHS, THAT WE REALISE THAT THE DISARMAMENT TALKS AREN'T GOING AS WELL AS WE WOULD WISH, AND THAT IF THEY ARE TO GO BETTER WE NEED A WIDER AND BETTER UNDERSTANDING. I HAVE BEEN SIGNALLING THAT IN MY SPEECHES FOR SOME TIME. OF COURSE IN MY JOB YOU DO NEED A TOUCH OF IRON BUT YOU DO NEED OTHER THINGS AS WELL.

INTERVIEWER: DO YOU DISMISS THE IRON LADY NICKNAME COMPLETELY....

MRS. THATCHER: NO, NO, NO, OF COURSE I DON'T.

INTERVIEWER: YOU ACCEPT IT ...

MRS. THATCHER: .. I ACCEPT IT ....

INTERVIEWER: ... IN THE WAY IT WAS MEANT?

MRS. THATCHER: I DO INDEED.

INTERVIEWER: DO YOU SEE ANY CHANCE AT ALL NOW THAT THE WORDS SEEM TO BE BECOMING LESS ABRASIVE, OF TURNING THE SITUATION INTO MORE POSITIVE ACTION AND I'M THINKING PARTICULARLY PERHAPS OF SUMMIT MEETINGS?

MRS. THATCHER: I THINK YOU'RE GOING TOO FAST IF YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT A SUMMIT BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR. CHERNENKO. I THINK YOU'LL FIND WE HAVE TO GO STEP BY STEP, I THINK ONE OF THE PROBLEMS IS THAT WE'VE BEEN WORKING RATHER HARD FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS - WITHOUT GIVING ENOUGH ATTENTION TO THE WIDER UNDERSTANDING. NOW A WIDER UNDERSTANDING DOESN'T COME BY MAKING A GREAT LEAP TO THE TOP, IT COMES BY STEADILY BUILDING UP SOMETHING, BY LONG AND PATIENT TALKS, BY MANY PATIENT VISITS, BY UNDERSTANDING THE OTHER'S VIEWPOINT, NOT ANY ROSE TINTED SPECTACLES, NOTHING OF THAT, BY UNDERSTANDING BUT THEN SAYING - ALL RIGHT, WE HAVE OUR VIEW, IN WHICH WE FERVENTLY BELIEVE. THEY HAVE THEIR VIEW, IN WHICH THEY FERVENTLY BELIEVE. IT'S IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE POLITICAL DIVIDE TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY. LET'S START ON THAT BASIS AND TRY TO BUILD UP.

INTERVIEWER: YOU TALKED TO ME TONIGHT IN MOSCOW, NOT MANY PEOPLE I THINK BELIEVED THAT THEY WOULD SEE YOU HERE SO SOON, CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE MADE IT THUS, HAVE YOU CHANGED YOUR VIEW OVER THE LAST 24 HOURS IN ANY WAY THAN WHAT IT WAS BEFORE?

MRS. THATCHER: NO, I HAVE BEEN TALKING FOR FOUR OR FIVE MONTHS ABOUT THE NEED TO BUILD A WIDER UNDERSTANDING, WE STARTED WITH THE VISIT TO HUNGARY, THIS UNEXPECTED EVENT HAPPENED AND I DECIDED TO COME HERE. I'M VERY PLEASED I DID, WE WERE VERY COURTEOUSLY RECEIVED AND I VERY MUCH VALUED THE OPPORTUNITY OF HALF AN HOUR'S TALK WITH MR. CHERNENKO THIS EVENING, AND I BELIEVE THAT THAT IS THE FIRST STEP AND I BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE A LITTLE BIT EASIER TO GO FORWARD FROM THERE, THAT IS ALL. BUT IT IS SOMETHING.

INTERVIEWER: PRIME MINISTER, THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

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FROM MOSCOW 131300Z FEBRUARY

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 201 OF 13 FEBRUARY

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Ps

Ps / Mr. Kipling

Ps / Ross

Sir J. Bullard

Mr Jenkins

Cabinet Office

~~Ps / No 10 Ds~~



Mr Gles

A J.C. 4/2

f.a.

MY TELNO 200 : KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO.

1. CHERNENKO IS 72 YEARS OLD, STOCKY, SLIGHTLY HUNCHBACKED, WITH A SHOCK OF WHITE HAIR AND A RUDDY COMPLEXION. HE WAS SERIOUSLY ILL LAST YEAR WHEN HE WAS ABSENT FOR TWO MONTHS IN THE SPRING MISSING ENTER ALIA THE MAY DAY PARADE SEMICLN THERE WERE REPORTS THEN THAT HE WAS TERMINALLY ILL. BUT HE SEEMS TO HAVE MADE A GOOD RECOVERY AND IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROBABLY MORE ROBUST THAN WERE ANDROPOV OR BREZHNEV IN THEIR LATER YEARS.

2. HE IS ESSENTIALLY A MAN OF THE PARTY APPARATUS. FEW WESTERN POLITICIANS HAVE MET HIM AND HIS PERSONALITY AND ATTRIBUTES MUST BE SOMETHING OF A MYSTERY TO THE SOVIET PUBLIC AS WELL. HE IS A VERY POOR PUBLIC SPEAKER WITH A RAPID NERVOUS STUMBLING DELIVERY WHICH MAKES HIM AT TIMES BARELY COMPREHENSIBLE. HE IS ON THE FACE OF IT UNLIKELY TO BE AN IMPRESSIVE INTERLOCUTOR FOR WESTERN STATESMEN.

3. BORN IN 1911 OF A PEASANT FAMILY IN A VILLAGE IN KRASNOYARSK REGION HIS EDUCATION WAS PROBABLY LIMITED UNTIL HE GRADUATED IN HIS EARLY 40S FROM A PEDAGOGICAL INSTITUTE IN KISHINEV ( MOLDAVIA). HE BEGAN HIS PARTY CAREER EARLY AT THE AGE OF 18 AS HEAD OF THE PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT OF A DISTRICT KOMSOMOL

AS HEAD OF THE PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT OF A DISTRICT KOMSOMOL ORGANISATION. HE DID NOT SEE ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE WAR ( THOUGH OF AN AGE TO DO SO ) BUT WORKED AS A REGIONAL PARTY SECRETARY, THEN ATTENDED THE HIGHER PARTY SCHOOL. IN 1950 HE BEGAN A LONG AND CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH BREZHNEV WHEN HE WORKED IN MOLDAVIA AS HEAD OF THE PARTY PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT WHEN BREZHNEV WAS PARTY LEADER THERE. SUBSEQUENTLY HE WORKED AS HEAD OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDIUM WHEN BREZHNEV WAS PRESIDENT (1960-1964) AND HEAD OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE GENERAL DEPARTMENT (1965-1982) WHEN BREZHNEV WAS GENERAL SECRETARY. IN THOSE YEARS HE ACTED IN EFFECT AS SENIOR AIDE TO BREZHNEV AND IT WAS

ENTIRELY DUE TO THE LATTER'S INFLUENCE THAT HE WAS PROMOTED CANDIDATE (1977) AND THEN FULL MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO (1978).

4. WHEN BREZHNEV DIED IN NOVEMBER 1982 CHERNENKO WAS ANDROPOV'S MAIN RIVAL FOR THE SUCCESSION. WHEN CHERNENKO WAS REJECTED IT WAS GENERALLY EXPECTED THAT HIS POLITICAL CAREER WOULD NOT LONG SURVIVE THE DEATH OF HIS PATRON. HOWEVER ALTHOUGH CHERNENKO'S INFLUENCE DECLINED AND HE BECAME LESS ACTIVE HE EVIDENTLY RETAINED SUPPORT WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP AND WITH HIS RETURN TO BETTER HEALTH THERE WERE ALSO SMALL SIGNS THAT HIS POLITICAL FORTUNES WERE ALSO IMPROVING.

5. CHERNENKO IS A FAR LESS IMPRESSIVE FIGURE THAN ANY OF HIS PREDECESSORS AS SOVIET PARTY LEADER. HIS CAREER HAS BEEN LARGELY CONFINED TO ORGANISATION, ADMINISTRATION AND PROPAGANDA. HE HAS VIRTUALLY NO DIRECT EXPERIENCE OF THE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND VERY LITTLE EXPERIENCE OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT HE HAS BEEN CHOSEN ON GROUNDS OF SENIORITY RATHER THAN BECAUSE OF ANY QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP. THERE MAY BE OF COURSE MORE TO HIM THAN HAS SO FAR MET THE EYE.

6. LITTLE IS KNOWN OF CHERNENKO'S ATTITUDES AND VIEWS ON POLITICAL ISSUES. HE HAS PUBLISHED MANY ARTICLES AND SPEECHES BUT THEY ARE UNREVEALING AND SHOW NO SIGNS OF ORIGINALITY. HE IS CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE BREZHNEV ERA AND POLICIES OF ' ' DETENTE ' ' AND THE PEACE PROGRAMME. REFERENCES IN HIS SPEECHES TO EAST - WEST RELATIONS HAVE TENDED TO BE RELATIVELY RESTRAINED AND CONCILIATORY IN TONE. HE ATTENDED WITH BREZHNEV THE SIGNING OF THE FINAL ACT IN HELSINKI IN 1975 AND HAS WRITTEN A NUMBER OF ROUTINE ARTICLES ABOUT THE CSCE.

7. IN DOMESTIC POLICY HIS MAIN PREOCCUPATION HAS BEEN THE

7. IN DOMESTIC POLICY HIS MAIN PREOCCUPATION HAS BEEN THE FUNCTIONING OF THE STATE, PARTY AND PROPAGANDA MACHINE AND THE CLOSE MONITORING OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES, E G THROUGH CAREFUL STUDY OF LETTERS TO THE AUTHORITIES ( FOR WHICH PURPOSE HE SET UP A NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEPARTMENT ). SPEAKING ON ECONOMIC MATTERS HE HAS OFTEN STRESSED THE NEED TO SATISFY CONSUMER NEEDS BUT THIS MAY BE MORE A REFLECTION OF HIS CONCERN ABOUT PUBLIC MOODS THAN A GUIDE TO HIS VIEWS ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES. NOTHING IN HIS BACKGROUND OR WRITINGS SUGGESTS A STRONG INTEREST IN ECONOMIC REFORM ALTHOUGH HE HAS ECHOED THE ANDROPOV LINE ON THE NEED TO RESTRUCTURE THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM AND ENDORSED THE CURRENT ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT.

8. HE IS UNLIKELY TO ABANDON THE ANROPOVIAN LINE ON ORDER AND DISCIPLINE WHICH PRODUCED SOME IMPROVEMENT IN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. BUT CHERNENKO IS CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE COMFORTABLE BREZHNEV POLICY OF " STABILITY OF CADRES " AND IN ELECTING HIM GENERAL SECRETARY MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS WILL BE HOPING THAT THE RATE OF REMOVAL OF THE ELDERLY AND INEFFICIENT WILL NOW RESUME A MORE DECOROUS PACE.

SUTHERLAND

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MY TELNO 200. CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

1. THE COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCING THE ELECTION OF CHERNENKO AS GENERAL SECRETARY STATED THAT AN EXTRAORDINARY PLENARY MEETING OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD BEEN HELD EARLIER IN THE DAY. IT WAS OPENED BY CHERNENKO ON BEHALF OF THE POLITBURO.
2. THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE FIRST OBSERVED A MINUTE OF SILENCE IN MEMORY OF ANDROPOV. THE PLENUM PAID TRIBUTE TO HIS CHARACTER AND HIS ACHIEVEMENTS IN INTERNAL AND FOREIGN POLICY AS "AN OUTSTANDING LEADER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE SOVIET STATE, AN ARDENT PATRIOT AND LENINIST, A TIRELESS FIGHTER FOR PEACE."
3. PRIME MINISTER TIKHONOV THEN MADE A SPEECH, PROPOSING, "ON THE UNANIMOUS INSTRUCTION OF THE POLITBURO", CHERNENKO AS GENERAL SECRETARY. THIS WAS ACCORDINGLY ENDORSED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE PLENUM. CHERNENKO SPOKE IN REPLY.
4. MIFT CONTAINS SUMMARY OF POINTS ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS COVERED IN BOTH SPEECHES. FOLLOWING COVERS FOREIGN POLICY IN CHERNENKO'S SPEECH. TIKHONOV CONTRIBUTED NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS:
  - A. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WAS COMPLICATED AND TENSE. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT DEVIATE ONE INCH FROM ITS POLICY OF PURSUIT OF PEACE.
  - B. THE USSR WOULD REMAIN STEADFASTLY LOYAL TO THE POLICY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE BEQUEATHED BY LENIN. IN THE AGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SUPER-ACCURATE MISSILES, THIS WAS NECESSARY AS NEVER BEFORE ALTHOUGH, DEPLORABLY, SOME LEADERS OF CAPITALIST COUNTRIES APPARENTLY DID NOT CLEARLY UNDERSTAND OR WISH TO UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS AT ISSUE.
  - C. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT MILITARY SUPERIORITY, DID NOT INTEND TO DICTATE ITS WILL TO OTHERS, BUT WOULD NOT PERMIT THE MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM THAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED TO BE DESTROYED. "LET NOBODY HAVE THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT ABOUT THAT. WE SHALL FURTHER SEE TO IT THAT OUR COUNTRY'S DEFENCE CAPACITY IS STRENGTHENED, SO THAT WE HAVE ENOUGH MEANS TO COOL THE HOT HEADS OF MILITANT ADVENTURISTS. THIS IS A VERY SUBSTANTIAL PREREQUISITE FOR STRENGTHENING PEACE."
  - D. THE SOVIET UNION WAS OPEN TO PEACEFUL AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS COOPERATION WITH ALL STATES AND READY FOR SETTLEMENT OF ALL DISPUTES ON THE BASIS OF SERIOUS, EQUAL, CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS. IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE FULL USE SHOULD BE MADE OF ALL THE EXISTING LEVERS INCLUDING THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN CREATED PRECISELY FOR PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING THIS OBJECT.
  - E. THE EFFORT TO MAINTAIN PEACE DEPENDED IN LARGE MEASURE ON THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND HOW VIGOROUS, COORDINATED AND PURPOSEFUL THEIR ACTIONS WERE. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD SEEK TO BROADEN COOPERATION WITH ALL COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY IN ALL FIELDS INCLUDING ECONOMIC.
  - F. SOLIDARITY WITH FORMER COLONIAL COUNTRIES WHICH HAD EMBARKED ON THE PATH OF INDEPENDENCE AND PEOPLES SEEKING TO REPEL THE ATTACKS OF THE AGGRESSIVE FORCES OF IMPERIALISM WOULD REMAIN A FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT OF SOVIET POLICY.

SUTHERLAND

5/14

*Mr. Coles*  
*Deputy Prime Minister Marchuk and*  
*Deputy Foreign Minister Ryzhov will*  
*meet on arrival. Bottom of the aircraft*  
*rips on the right. No honours guard*  
*as far as is known.*

MARCHUK, Gury Ivanovich

Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR and Chairman, State Committee USSR for Science and Technology 1980; Member, CC CPSU 1981.

Born 1925, Orenburg oblast, Ukrainian.

*(Handwritten initials)*  
*13/2*

- 1943-1945 In Soviet army.
- 1947 Joined Party.
- 1949 Graduated from Leningrad State University.
- 1951 Completed postgraduate degree.
- 1953-1962 Worked at Obninsk Physico-Energetics Institute.
- 1956 Doctor of Physico-Mathematics.
- 1962 Elected Corresponding Member, Academy of Sciences (Siberian Department).
- 1962-1964 Deputy Director, Institute of Mathematics, Siberian Department Academy of Sciences.
- 1964-1980 Director of Computer Centre, Siberian Department, Academy of Sciences USSR.
- 1968 Elected Member, Academy of Sciences USSR for Department of Earth Sciences.
- 1969-1975 Deputy Chairman, Siberian Department, Academy of Sciences USSR.
- 1975-1980 Vice President, Academy of Sciences USSR and Chairman, Siberian Department.
- 1976- Member, CC CPSU.
- 1979- Deputy, USSR Supreme Soviet (1979-1980 Chairman, Commission for Science and Technology, Council of Nationalities).
- 1980- Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers, USSR and Chairman, State Committee USSR for Science and Technology (replacing V A Kirillin).

Marchuk is a Hero of Socialist Labour (1975) and holds the Order of Lenin. He visited the UK in 1969. As Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers he has travelled extensively in Eastern Europe and is Chairman of the CMEA Commission for Science and Technology.

Marchuk's scientific publications concentrate on the application of mathematics to nuclear energy studies, weather forecasting and the dynamics of the atmosphere and the oceans. He is an honorary Doctor of Toulouse University and speaks French fluently. He does not appear to speak much English. Controlled and modest in manner, he makes an impression of quiet confidence.

September 1982



CONFIDENTIAL

RYZHOV, NIKITA SEMENOVICH

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister since 1980; member, Central Revision Commission, CPSU since 1966.

Born 1907.

Textile Engineer by training, and long career in Soviet light industry, including several ministerial appointments. Following criticism of his Ministry and him personally, was appointed Ambassador to Turkey in 1957 and then, in 1966, Ambassador to Italy.

As Ambassador in Ankara and Rome gained high reputation with Turks and Italians, eg played a key role in setting up the deal with Fiat which led to the construction of the major Soviet car factory at Togliatti. Was well-informed about Italian politics, spoke dispassionately, sometimes contemptuously of PCI.

Returned in 1980 to Moscow as Deputy Minister. For a period his responsibilities covered Latin America, but since the death of Mr Zemskov in April 1982, he has supervised the Second European Department (old Commonwealth including UK, Ireland and Malta) and the First African Department (Northern Africa except Egypt). He admits that this is an odd combination but rumours of change have not been fulfilled.

One of the older Soviet Deputy Foreign Ministers, and now perhaps past his best. He describes himself as a diplomatic 'businessman' and prides himself on a practical approach to problems. Sir I Sutherland has found him courteous and amiable, but not over-communicative or given to originality or speculation. This may in part be due to lack of familiarity with the UK, which he has only visited twice very briefly.

/Ryzhov

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Ryzhov is a dapper and cultivated man. Reputation in Rome as a bon viveur. Expert on the Russian ballet and in architecture and interior decoration. Speaks French and Italian but has no English. Married. Son is a nuclear physicist.

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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: LIST OF BRIEFS

1. East/West relations.
2. London/Moscow Embassy Sites.
3. Hong Kong.
4. Middle East.
5. Japan.
6. Meeting with Mrs Gandhi, Prime Minister of India.
7. Meeting with Genral Zia Ul-Haq, President of Pakistan.



## PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW 13/14 FEBRUARY

## EAST/WEST RELATIONS

## POINTS TO MAKE

1. Sad occasion. But welcome chance to meet. Provides opportunity to look at some important questions in brief time available.
2. In world in which we live, overriding need to know and understand each other better. Minimise danger of misreading each other's intentions. Increasing level of armaments could lead to mutual destruction. All want to spend less on defence and use resources for other urgent needs. Why not aim for balance at lower levels? First requirement: greater trust and confidence based on mutual knowledge and respect for each others interests, in particular security interests. I am ready.
3. At time of rapid technological advance need for firm political control over both weapons programmes and arms control negotiations. In all our interests to reach really significant agreements in both conventional and nuclear fields. Our peoples expect nothing less.
4. Must restart talks now suspended. No other way to resolve problems except at negotiating table. Soviet Union must return. West completely genuine in its desire for balanced agreements at lower levels of arms. Spoken to President Reagan and recently to Vice President Bush. In no doubt what they want. They will not put obstacles in way of resumption of talks.
5. But arms control not possible without political understanding. Dialogue between East and West needs to be broadened and given more substance.
6. Need to discuss whole range of international and bilateral issues. Many areas of world where your and our interests engaged. Acute need for peace in Middle East, Lebanon needs period of calm and international assistance. UN could play an important role. Hope Soviet Union can agree to this and also exercise moderating influence on Syria.
7. Middle East only one example. Also Southern Africa,

/Afghanistan



-2-

Afghanistan, problems of developing countries. Many others. Glad that Mr Gromyko and Sir G Howe will hold substantive discussion this summer.

8. Critical element is confidence. International confidence no different from personal confidence. Easy to break, difficult to restore. Many elements. More contact and understanding between ordinary people. More trade: Deputy Prime Minister Kostandov spoke recently in London about doubling level in next few years: hope this can be achieved. More information. All these things were agreed in Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Opinion in UK affected more by down-to-earth events than by high sounding communique. Profoundly affected by way in which Soviet Union deals with small minority of people who don't conform with line approved by authorities even though their actions seem normal to ordinary people in the West. Names of Sakharov, Shcharansky, Orlov etc only the best known.

9. Hope it will be possible to improve our bilateral relations so that we can discuss frankly international and bilateral issues of importance to us. Don't expect either side to abandon its principles. Overnight results not to be expected. Problems are difficult and solutions long-term. But essential that we maintain contact so that even when we disagree we know each other's reasons and underlying interests more clearly. Realism and self interest make this necessary.

10. Want to leave you with message of desire for more peaceful and secure future. Better relations between East and West. Fully prepared to play our part. If you do the same, am sure more productive relationship possible.

## ESSENTIAL FACTS

East/West Relations

1. The likelihood is that Soviet policy will be marked by continuity in the field of East/West relations. The practice of collective decision making in the Politburo with an inner group comprising Ustinov (Defence Minister), Gromyko (Foreign Affairs), Tikhonov (Government Administration and Economy), Chernenko (Party), will continue.

2. The first indication of the new leader's line will come in the statement probably issued soon after the Central Committee Plenum to elect him, or in his own statement on assuming office. Andropov's first statement was notably hard line. The obituary on Andropov's death issued on 10 February was relatively moderate, and contains the statement that the Soviet Party and State would continue steadfastly to implement the principles of peaceful coexistence. 'We desire to live in peace with all countries, to cooperate actively with those governments and organisations which are ready honestly and constructively to work in the name of peace'.

Soviet Economy

3. One of the first priorities of the new leader will be to increase efficiency of the Soviet economy. Andropov made that and the elimination of corruption, which is widespread, his main priority. Limited measures of change in the economic system were announced at the Central Committee Plenum in December. The 1983 Economic Plan results published on 29 January confirm the improvement in Soviet economic performance over 1982 (a bad year) to more normal levels. National income grew by 3.1%, and industrial production by 4%. Notwithstanding the improvement in 1983, we forecast average national income growth of about 2% per annum for the second half of this decade. For the third year running, no figures for the grain harvest have been published. We estimate about 200 million tonnes, still below the figure set in the 5-year plan.

UK/Soviet Trade

4. The Soviet Union accounts for just under 1% of total UK world trade. In 1983 UK exports were £448 million (£356 million in 1982). UK imports in 1983 £742 million (£645 million in 1982). The

/balance

balance of trade in Soviet favour is mainly caused through UK imports of Soviet oil at competitive prices which is refined in the UK.

5. When he visited the UK in October 1983, as a guest of ICI, Deputy Prime Minister Kostandov said that he hoped it would be possible to double UK/Soviet trade 'in a relatively short period of time'. At present the UK is ninth on the list of Western industrial countries trading with the Soviet Union below inter alia FRG, France, Italy, and Belgium.

Political Contacts

6. Following Sir G Howe's meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm, on 19 January, we have informed the Russians that, as agreed at Stockholm, we would wish to arrange a more substantial meeting between Sir G Howe and Gromyko, in Moscow if that was convenient, in July. We have offered dates in March for a visit to London by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko for talks with Mr Rifkind in March. We await the Soviet response.

7. Mr Channon will be going to Moscow in May for the annual meeting of the Anglo-Soviet Joint Commission, which on the Soviet side is led by Yuri Brezhnev.

8. CVs for the following six members of the Politburo are attached: Chernenko, Gromyko, Tikhonov, Ustinov, Gorbachev, and Romanov. A list of those attending is also attached.

Soviet Department

FCO

13 February 1984



PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR PRESIDENT ANDROPOV'S  
FUNERAL

FOREIGN ATTENDANCE AT FUNERAL

(as at 1830 12 February)

FRG

Chancellor Kohl.

Herr Genscher, Foreign Minister.

CANADA

M. P Trudeau, Prime Minister.

M. de Montigny Marchand, Deputy Minister Foreign Policy.

JAPAN

Mr Abe, Foreign Minister.

Mr Nakajima, Deputy Foreign Minister.

CHINA

Mr Wan Li, Senior Vice Premier and Politburo Member.

Mr Qian Qizhen, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
(also leader of Chinese delegation to Sino-Soviet talks).

USA

Vice President Bush.

Senator Baker.

FRANCE

M. P Mauroy, Prime Minister.

M. Cheysson, Foreign Minister.

M. Estier, Chairman, Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.



ITALY

Mr Cossiga, President of the Senate.

Mr Andreotti, Foreign Minister.

NORWAY

HRH Crown Prince Harald.

Mr K Willoch, Prime Minister.

PAKISTAN

President Zia Ul Haq.

INDIA

Mrs Gandhi

Mr N Rao, Foreign Minister.

CYPRUS

President Kyprianou.

SPAIN

Sr. F Moran, Foreign Minister.

AUSTRALIA

Treasurer Keating.

SWEDEN

HRH Prince Bertil.

SRI LANKA

Mr A C S Hameed, Foreign Minister.





TURKEY

M. T Ozal, Prime Minister.

GREECE

Mr A Papandreou, Prime Minister.

Mr Haralambopoulos, Foreign Minister.

CONFIDENTIAL

CHERNENKO, Konstantin Ustinovich

Secretary, CC CPSU 1976 and Member of its Politburo 1978; Member CC CPSU 1971.

Born 1911; Russian.

- 1929-1941 Head of Agitation and Propaganda Department of a Komsomol raikom, Secretary (1930-1932) of the Party Organisation of a frontier post in Kazakhstan, Head of Department of two raikoms, then Deputy Head of a Department of Krasnoyarsk kraikom.
- 1931 Joined Party.
- 1941-1943 Secretary, Krasnoyarsk kraikom.
- 1945 graduated from Higher School of Party Organisers attached to CC CPSU.
- 1945-1948 Secretary, Penza obkom.
- 1948-1956 Head, Department of Propaganda and Agitation CC CP Moldavia.
- 1953 graduated from Kishinev Pedagogical Institute.
- 1956-1960 Head of Mass Agitation Sector of CC CPSU Department of Agitation and Propaganda.
- 1960-1965 Head of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR.
- 1965-1976 Head of the CC CPSU's General Department.
- 1966-1971 Candidate Member, CC CPSU.
- 1966- Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR and Member of the Mandate Commission of the Council of the Union.
- 1971- Member, CC CPSU.
- March 1976- Secretary, CC CPSU.
- Oct 1977- Candidate Member, Politburo.  
Nov 1978
- Nov 1978- Member of Politburo.
- Dec 1982 Chairman, Foreign Affairs Commission, Council of the Union  
Chernenko holds the title of Hero of Socialist Labour (twice) and three Orders of Lenin; a bronze bust was unveiled at his birth place in Krasnoyarsk in September 1982. He has also received a number of high awards from E European leaders. Chernenko accompanied Brezhnev to Helsinki in 1975 for the signing of the CSCE Final Act and went with him to Bucharest in 1976 and to Sofia, Budapest and East Berlin in 1979; he also went with Brezhnev to Vienna for the Soviet US summit talks in June 1979. In December 1979 he visited Sofia to be presented with the Order of Georgi Dimitrov. He led CPSU delegations to Denmark (1976), Greece (1978), Cuba (1980) and

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France (1982) for the local CP Congresses. He also accompanied Brezhnev (then President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) to Morocco, Guinea and Ghana in 1961. He was a member of the Soviet delegation at the meetings of the Warsaw Pact Consultative Committee in Bucharest (November 1976), Moscow (November 1978) and Warsaw (May 1980), and attended the UNGA Special Session in New York in April 1974.

As Party Secretary, Chernenko appears to carry overall responsibility for the efficient functioning of the Party and government machine. He evidently still also supervises the General Department which acts as the Secretariat for the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat.

Chernenko is a prolific writer, without, however, displaying any originality. He has written many articles on questions of Party and State work, and also several on the Helsinki conference and European security. His book "Soviet Democracy: Principles and Practice" was published (apparently at Soviet expense) in Washington in 1977. Other works include "Questions of creative development of style of Party and state work" (1977 and re-issued 1978), "Questions of work of the Party and State Apparatus" (1980 re-issued 1982), and "The CPSU and Human Rights" (1981 re-issued 1982). A number of other works have been published under Chernenko's general Editorship.

Chernenko has close links with Brezhnev, under whom he worked directly in Moldavia (1950-1952) and in the Supreme Soviet (1960-1964). He shares something of Brezhnev's vanity. Despite his increasing prominence in recent years he remains an enigmatic figure whose real authority is difficult to distinguish from that derived from his association with Brezhnev. He is a poor public speaker.

September 1982

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GORBACHEV, Mikhail Sergeevich

Secretary, CC CPSU 1978; Member of Politburo CC CPSU 1980; Member, CC CPSU 1971.

Born 1931, near Stavropol.

- 1946-1950      assistant combine-harvester operator in Stavropol krai.
- 1950-1955      studying law at Moscow State University; graduated 1955.
- 1952            joined Party.
- 1956-1958      First Secretary, Stavropol gorkom of VLKSM.
- 1958-1962      Deputy Head of a Department, then Second and First Secretary, Stavropol kraikom of VLKSM.
- 1962            Party organiser of a territorial-production kolkhoz-sovkhoz administration.
- 1963-1966      Head of a Department, Stavropol kraikom.
- 1966-1968      First Secretary, Stavropol gorkom.
- 1967            graduated (by correspondence) from Stavropol Agricultural Institute.
- 1968-1970      Second Secretary, Stavropol kraikom.
- 1970-1978      First Secretary, Stavropol kraikom.
- 1970-            Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR; Chairman of Legislative Proposals Commission, Council of the Union 1979.
- 1971-            Member CC CPSU.
- Nov 1978-       Secretary, CC CPSU.
- Nov 1979-       Candidate Member of Politburo.  
Oct 1980
- Oct 1980-       Member of Politburo.

Gorbachev has led Party delegations to Belgium 1972, West Germany 1975, France 1976 and Czechoslovakia 1979 and Hanoi 1982. He has 3 Orders of Lenin. In December 1978 he was presented by Brezhnev with the Order of the October Revolution for "his work in one of the country's main granaries, the Stavropol region". Gorbachev succeeded F D Kulakov as Central Committee Secretary for agriculture and the light and food industry, following the latter's death at the age of 60. He had served under him in the early 1960's when Kulakov was First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom.

September 1982

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GROMYKO, Andrei Andreevich

Minister of Foreign Affairs USSR 1957; Member, CC CPSU 1956 and of its Politburo 1973.  
First Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers, 1982  
Born 1909, Belorussia; officially described as "Russian".

- 1931            Joined Party.
- 1932            Graduated from an Economics Institute.
- 1936            Completed post-graduate course at All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Agricultural Economics.
- 1936-1939     Worked in Institute of Economics, Academy of Sciences, USSR.
- 1939            Began diplomatic work as Head, Department of American Countries of MFA.
- 1939-1943     Counsellor, Washington.
- 1943-1946     Ambassador, Washington and concurrently Envoy to Cuba.
- 1946-1948     Permanent Soviet Representative in UN Security Council.
- 1946-1949     Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- 1946-1950     Deputy, Supreme Soviet USSR.
- 1949-1952     First Deputy Foreign Minister.
- June 1952-  
April 1953     Ambassador, London
- 1952-1956     Candidate Member, CC CPSU.
- 1953-1957     First Deputy Foreign Minister.
- 1956-           Member, CC CPSU.
- 1957-           Minister of Foreign Affairs USSR.
- 1958-           Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.
- 1973-           Member, Politburo CC CPSU.

1982           First Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers  
Gromyko led the Soviet delegation at Dumbarton Oaks, was present at the Potsdam and Crimea conferences, and has been Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union for over 30 years. In addition to this unrivalled experience, he has very considerable ability; a methodical and accurate mind; a good

Command of English; and rather more charm than is apparent on his greyer days. He is beginning to look his age. But, since his elevation to the Politburo, he has appeared increasingly relaxed and confident. He has a close relationship with Brezhnev and considerable authority in his field.

Gromyko is the author of works on international relations and is Chairman of the Commission for Publishing Diplomatic Documents. Twice Hero of Socialist Labour; six Orders of Lenin.

Mrs Gromyko is friendly and on occasion indiscreet in her conversation. Their son Anatoly, after a few years in diplomatic work, has become Director of the Institute of Africa of the Academy of Sciences; Anatoly's son, Igor, is a post-graduate student at the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Relations.

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ROMANOV, Grigory Vasilevich

Secretary, CC CPSU, 1983; Member of Politburo, CC CPSU 1976; Member, CC CPSU 1966.

Born 1923; Russian.

- 1938 student at a technical college.
- 1941-1945 in the Army.
- 1944 joined the Party.
- 1946-1954 designer; head of sector of Central Design Bureau at A A Zhdanov Shipbuilding Works (in Leningrad).
- 1953 graduated from Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute (by correspondence).
- 1954-1957 Secretary of Party Committee, then CC CPSU Party Organiser at the Zhdanov Works.
- 1957-1961 Secretary, then First Secretary, of Kirov raikom (Leningrad).
- 1961-1962 Secretary of Leningrad gorkom.
- 1962-1963 Secretary of Leningrad obkom.
- 1963-1970 Second Secretary, Leningrad obkom.
- 1966- Member, CC CPSU.  
1970-83 First Secretary, Leningrad Obkom  
1966- Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.
- 1971- Member of Presidium, Supreme Soviet USSR.
- April 1973- Candidate Member of Politburo.  
March 1976
- March 1976- Member of Politburo.  
1983 - Secretary, CC CPSU
- Romanov has two Orders of Lenin. His travels include China and Italy (1966), Norway (1967) and Finland, France and Cuba, which he has visited several times. He also led a delegation to Vietnam in 1978.

Romanov is popularly thought of as a hard liner in the arts but relatively adventurous in economic management; he has a high handed manner towards his subordinates, and overrode all opposition to holding his daughter's wedding reception at the Hermitage - an ostentatious affair at which priceless Tsarist porcelain is said to have been smashed. Despite reports that Romanov was sharply reprimanded by Suslov, his standing and authority do not appear to have suffered significant damage.

Western politicians who have met him in Leningrad have found him singularly unimpressive, never going beyond a prepared script even on local questions.

September 1982

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TIKHONOV, Nikolai Aleksandrovich

Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR 1980; Member of Politburo CC CPSU 1979; Member, CC CPSU 1966.

Born 1905, Kharkov, Ukrainian.

1924 graduated from Dnepropetrovsk Railway Technical School.

1924-1930 worked as an assistant to an engine driver and as a factory technician.

1930 graduated from Kharkov Metallurgical Institute.

1930-1940 engineer, section head, chief engineer at metallurgical plant in Dnepropetrovsk.

1940 joined the Party.

1940-1947 involved in evacuation of the plant in Dnepropetrovsk to Pervouralsk in Sverdlovsk oblast; continued to work in the plant as chief engineer, then deputy director.

1947-1950 Director, Southern Pipe Plant in Nikopol.

1950-1955 Head, Chief Administration for Pipe-rolling and Casting, Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy USSR.

1955-1957 Deputy Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy USSR.

1957-1960 Chairman of Dnepropetrovsk CNE.

1958- Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.

1960-1963 Deputy Chairman, State Scientific-Economic Council of USSR Council of Ministers – rank of USSR Minister.

1961 Dr Technical Sciences.

1961-1966 Candidate Member, CC CPSU.

1963-1965 Deputy Chairman of Gosplan – USSR Minister.

1965-1976 Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR.

1966- Member, CC CPSU.

1976-1980 First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR.

Nov 1978-  
Nov 1979 Candidate Member of Politburo.

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Nov 1979- Member of Politburo.

Oct 1980- Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR.

Tikhonov was awarded State Prizes in 1943 and 1951, on the latter occasion for developing production of large-diameter seamless pipes. He holds the title of Hero of Socialist Labour, 7 Orders of Lenin, 2 Orders of the Red Banner of Labour, the Order of the October Revolution, and the Red Star. He has travelled relatively widely, and accompanied Khrushchev to the USA in 1959 and Podgorny to Iran in 1970; he has also visited Austria (most recently in April 1981), Canada, Japan, and Finland. Before assuming his present post he travelled frequently to Berlin and Bonn as head of the Soviet sides of the Soviet-GDR and Soviet-FRG intergovernmental commissions for economic and scientific-technical cooperation. Speaks some German and some English. He was Chairman of the Soviet Commission for the International Year of the Child in 1979.

Tikhonov has a reputation as a dry and colourless technocrat. His association with Brezhnev dates back at least to the 1930s when both were working in Dnepropetrovsk. Tikhonov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers on Kosygin's retirement on health grounds. He had been under-studying Kosygin since 1976, and his promotion to full Politburo member in 1979 made him the obvious successor.

Tikhonov is said to have chaired the session of the Council of Ministers that authorised the decision to deprive Academician Sakharov of his titles and exile him to Gorky.

His wife died in October 1980.

July 1981

**CONFIDENTIAL**

USTINOV, Dmitri Fedorovich

Minister of Defence USSR 1976; Member of Politburo CC CPSU 1976.

Born 1908; Russian.

- 1927 graduated from a professional-technical school; joined Party.
- 1927-1929 fitter at Paper Combine in Gorky oblast and at factory in Ivanovo-Voznesensk.
- 1934 graduated from Leningrad Military Technical Institute.
- 1934-1941 engineer in Artillery Research Naval Institute; head of experimental bureau in a factory; deputy chief designer, then Director, of "Bolshevik" factory in Leningrad.
- 1941-1946 People's Commissar for Armaments.
- 1944-1976 Colonel-General.
- 1946-1953 Minister of Armaments.
- 1946-1950 Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.
- 1952- Member CC CPSU.
- 1953-1957 Minister of Defence Industry.
- 1954- Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.
- 1957-1963 Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers.
- 1963-1965 First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers, and Chairman Supreme CNE.
- 1965-1976 Secretary, CC CPSU responsible for heavy industry and armaments.
- 1965-1976 Candidate Member of Presidium (from 1966 Politburo) CC CPSU.
- March 1976- Member of Politburo.
- April 1976- Minister of Defence and Army General.
- July 1976- Marshal of Soviet Union.

Apart from frequent travels within Eastern Europe, Ustinov has visited Vienna (for the Brezhnev-Carter summit in 1979) and India (on an official visit in March 1982). He holds ten Orders of Lenin and the titles of Hero of the Soviet Union (1978) and Hero of Socialist Labour (1942, 1961). He was awarded a State Prize in 1953.

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Ustinov has a reputation as an extremely hard worker with an unrivalled knowledge of his subject, but never anxious to push himself or his views forward. His health is generally fair although in spring 1980 he was ill (according to one report, with a bladder complaint) and made no public appearances for nearly 2½ months. Western observers have found him capable of displaying bonhomie.

His wife Taisiya died in 1975.

September 1982

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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR PRESIDENT ANDROPOV'S  
FUNERAL

LONDON/MOSCOW EMBASSY SITES

POINTS TO MAKE (DEFENSIVE)

1. Still find it difficult to see why Soviet authorities are insisting that we should leave present Embassy in Moscow.

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## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The Soviet authorities have wished for about 30 years to repossess the site which contains HM Ambassador's House, and most of our offices in Moscow, together with some staff accommodation, stores, and other accommodation. We cannot prevent them from doing so, and the evidence is now overwhelming that they will not be ridden off their demands. Our main lease for the Moscow building expired in 1970. The Russians have made clear to us that no further long-term leases on this site will be available, and we are living from year to year on an annual lease, on the renewal of which we cannot rely.
2. Negotiations for a move for our Embassy have been in train for some time and are linked with proposals for housing the Soviet Embassy in London. The Soviet team has been invited to London for the next round of talks in March.
3. The FCO will be putting costed proposals to the Treasury. These will involve construction in London and Moscow of offices and residential accommodation.
4. Nothing can usefully be said to the Russians in Moscow at the present time. But if they raise the question with either the Prime Minister or the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, it is important not to give any indication that we contemplate moving from the present Embassy site, whatever our own assessment may be.

Soviet Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

13 February 1984



PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR PRESIDENT ANDROPOV'S  
FUNERAL. [REDACTED]

HONG KONG (for use in bilateral discussion with Chinese  
leaders)

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Genuinely determined to cooperate in seeking to build on Chinese proposals. Understand this would involve no authoritative link with UK after 1997.
2. Keen to make progress. (Next talks 22/23 February.)  
Proceeding on basis of messages of March and October 1983.
3. We both want early agreement but it must command confidence in Hong Kong for Parliament to endorse it.
4. Agreed basis for present discussions would entirely satisfy Chinese objectives of principle. Points now under discussion do not threaten these principles but vital for future economic success of venture. Opportunity for major international achievement.
5. Much progress in talks already. Agreement on many points. Need for these to be included in BASIC LAW and reflected in our bilateral agreement. If satisfactory agreement reached, Chinese can be sure of full cooperation of British in implementation.

HONG KONG : ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. We do not yet know who will attend from China.\* But if an opportunity comes up it would be useful to make some general points.

2. It would be important to counter any Chinese accusations of footdragging and to emphasise that an agreement, and the Chinese Basic Law, must reflect the points agreed in negotiation.

The Chinese points of principle can be met, but they must understand the need to sustain confidence in Hong Kong. The conditional nature of our current approach can be covered by a reference to the Prime Minister's messages of March and October 1983. (These were the themes put by Sir P Cradock during his farewell call on Premier Zhao Ziyang on 20 December: Peking telno 1387 of 1983 at Annex A.)

\* We have now heard that the Chinese delegation will be Politburo member and Senior Vice Premier Wan Li and the leader of the Chinese delegation to the Sino/Soviet talks Qian Qizhen, neither of whom has any direct connection with the Hong Kong talks.

FCO

11 February 1984

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GR 2100  
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FM PEKING 210600Z DEC 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1387 OF 21 DECEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

FUTURE OF HONG KONG: MEETING WITH ZHAO ZIYANG

1. I HAD AN HOUR YESTERDAY AFTERNOON (20 DECEMBER ) WITH PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG. GALSORTHY AND PLUNT WERE ALSO PRESENT.
2. I CONVEYED TO ZHAO THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL GREETINGS AND ASKED THAT HE SHOULD PASS ON HER PERSONAL GOOD WISHES TO DENG XIAOPING. I SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD HOPED THAT BEFORE I LEFT I WOULD BE ABLE TO CALL ON CHINESE LEADERS FOR A DISCUSSION ON HONG KONG'S FUTURE AND WE WERE GRATEFUL THAT THESE CALLS HAD BEEN MADE POSSIBLE. IN RESPONSE ZHAO ASKED ME TO CONVEY GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES FROM HIMSELF AND CHINESE LEADERS TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO THANK HER FOR HER CONTRIBUTION TO SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS.
3. ZHAO ALSO ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS THANKS AND APPRECIATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR HER MESSAGE OF 14 OCTOBER. HE APPRECIATED THE EFFORTS SHE HAD MADE TO PROMOTE THE SMOOTH PROGRESS OF THE TALKS. THE CHINESE WERE SATISFIED WITH PROGRESS MADE. HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER: THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT THOUGHT THAT WITH REGARD TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE HONG KONG QUESTION, WITH THE REMOVAL OF THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS, IT WOULD NOW BE POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY TO EXPEDITE THE PACE OF DISCUSSIONS SO AS TO LEAD TO AGREEMENT AT AN EARLY DATE. THIS WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG AND THUS TO STABILITY AND PROSPERITY THERE. SO LONG AS BOTH SIDES HELD SINCERE AND COOPERATIVE ATTITUDES IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO SETTLE THE SPECIFIC PRACTICAL QUESTIONS. HE REMEMBERED THAT IN HER MESSAGE THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID THAT WITH STATESMANSHIP ON BOTH SIDES IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT. HE APPRECIATED THIS AND HOPED THAT THE BRITISH SIDE WOULD CONTINUE TO VIEW THE TALKS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL WORLD SITUATION AND FRIENDLY SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS. HE WAS SURE IT WAS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT.
4. I THANKED ZHAO FOR HIS REMARKS AND MESSAGE WHICH I UNDERTOOK TO PASS ON . I SAID THAT WE TOO BELIEVED IT TO BE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL INVOLVED TO SETTLE TO THE BENEFIT OF BOTH SIDES. OUR APPROACH TO THE TALKS WAS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. WE WERE TRYING TO BUILD ON THE CHINESE PLAN. IF A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION COULD BE REACHED, THE CHINESE SIDE COULD BE SURE OF OUR FULL COOPERATION.
5. I REFERRED TO THE USEFUL CONVERSATIONS I HAD HAD WITH WU ZUEQIAN AND JI PENGFEI. I SAID THAT IN BOTH THESE MEETINGS I HAD ELABORATED THE SAME THEME: THE AGREED BASIS OF OUR PRESENT DISCUSSIONS WOULD ENTIRELY SATISFY CHINESE OBJECTIVES

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/ OF PRINCIPLE.



OF PRINCIPLE. WHAT REMAINED WERE MATTERS NOT ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL TO THOSE PRINCIPLES BUT NEVERTHELESS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE ECONOMIC SUCCESS OR OTHERWISE OF THE SAR. WE THEREFORE HOPED THAT THE CHINESE SIDE WOULD LISTEN TO OUR PROPOSALS AND TAKE ACCOUNT OF THEM IN DRAWING UP THE BASIC LAW. I NOTED THAT AGREEMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN REACHED ON A NUMBER OF POINTS AND SAID THAT I ASSUMED THAT THESE WOULD BE INCORPORATED IN THE BASIC LAW.

6. I THEN REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUITY. CHANGES SHOULD NOT BE MADE EXCEPT WHERE THEY WERE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO MEET CHINESE PRINCIPLES. THERE SHOULD BE NO CHANGE FOR THE SAKE OF CHANGE. WE SHOULD BE AS PRECISE AS POSSIBLE IN STATEMENTS OF WHAT WAS TO BE ESTABLISHED. I DREW ATTENTION TO MY COMMENTS IN OTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THE NEED FOR CONTINUITY IN THE CIVIL SERVICE. WE HOPED THAT ALL CIVIL SERVANTS, WHETHER OF LOCAL OR OVERSEAS ORIGIN, WOULD BE ABLE TO STAY ON AND COMPLETE THEIR CAREERS IN THE NORMAL WAY. THEIR LOYALTIES WOULD NATURALLY BE TO THE SAR NOT TO ANYBODY ELSE. I SAID I HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED TO HEAR FROM JI PENGFEI THAT THOSE WHO HELD HONG KONG IDENTITY CARDS AS WELL AS UK PASSPORTS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO STAY ON AND RISE UP TO AND INTO THE MOST SENIOR CIVIL SERVICE POSTS.

I URGED HEWCAINESE SIDE TO BEAR IN MIND THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUITY, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO MEETING THEIR FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. I SAID THAT IT LAY IN THE TWO SIDES' HANDS TO MAKE THE FUTURE HONG KONG A GREAT SUCCESS. THIS WOULD ALSO BE AN INTERNATIONAL SUCCESS. IT WOULD COST THE CHINESE NOTHING BUT WOULD MEAN EVERYTHING TO HONG KONG. IT WAS A BIG OPPORTUNITY.

7. ZHAO SAID THAT AS ONE WHO HAD SERVED LONG IN CHINA I WOULD BE WELL AWARE OF CHINESE POLICIES. CHINA FOLLOWED PRINCIPLE BUT WAS ALSO VERY REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL. SO LONG AS FUNDAMENTAL CHINESE PRINCIPLES WERE NOT IMPAIRED, THE CHINESE SIDE WAS READY TO LISTEN TO WHATEVER SUGGESTIONS WE MIGHT HAVE CONCERNING THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN HONG KONG AND WOULD TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT. WE SHOULD SEE THAT CHINA WAS VERY FLEXIBLE AND OPEN-MINDED. CHINA AIMED TO RECOVER SOVEREIGNTY INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF ADMINISTRATION WHILST MAINTAINING STABILITY AND PROSPERITY. ZHAO POINTED OUT HOWEVER THAT THE RECOVERY OF SOVEREIGNTY WAS THE PREMISE. ON THAT BASIS CHINA WOULD DO WHATEVER WAS POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN STABILITY AND PROSPERITY. UNNECESSARY CHANGES WOULD NOT BE MADE SO LONG AS THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HONG KONG WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE CHINESE PREMISE AND CONDUCIVE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY AND PROSPERITY. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT OUR VIEWS WOULD DIFFER ON SPECIFIC QUESTIONS. THESE COULD BE DISCUSSED THROUGH NEGOTIATION. AS LONG AS BOTH SIDES ABIDED BY THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CHERISHED THE AIM OF MAINTAINING STABILITY AND PROSPERITY, AN AGREEMENT WOULD EVENTUALLY BE REACHED. ZHAO SAID THAT THE ISSUES OF GREATEST CONCERN TO THE CHINESE SIDE, NAMELY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHT OF ADMINISTRATION, WERE KNOWN TO US. HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD IDENTIFY OUR POINTS OF MAJOR CONCERN SOON IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD AND FRANK WAY.

<sup>2</sup>  
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/ THIS WOULD

THIS WOULD BENEFIT THE TALKS. . SO LONG AS OUR SUGGESTIONS DID NOT IMPAIR CHINESE PRINCIPLES IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO AGREE ALL OR PART OF SUCH SUGGESTIONS. THERE MIGHT OF COURSE ALSO BE AREAS WHERE WE DID NOT AGREE. MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND TRUST WOULD BE INCREASED. THE RATE OF TALKS WOULD BE ACCELERATED. ZHAO REFERRED TO OUR RECENT COMMENTS ON THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE ELECTION OF JUDGES: THE CHINESE SIDE WAS CONSIDERING THEM.

8. I REPLIED THAT WE WOULD TRY TO PUT THESE ISSUES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE CHINESE SIDE. I WAS ENCOURAGED BY ZHAO'S COMMENTS. IN THEIR SPIRIT THERE WAS ONE POINT WHICH, ALTHOUGH RAISED IN EARLIER DISCUSSIONS, I WISHED TO REPEAT. I REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CHINESE INTENDED TO STATION TROOPS IN HONG KONG. I SAID THAT WE DID NOT DISPUTE THE CHINESE RIGHT TO STATION TROOPS IN ANY PART OF CHINESE TERRITORY. THIS WAS NOT AT ISSUE. HOWEVER I ASKED ZHAO TO REFLECT VERY CAREFULLY ON THE EFFECT UPON THE INHABITANTS OF HONG KONG AND THE OUTSIDE WORLD OF A DECISION TO STATION THEM IN HONG KONG. IT WOULD DAMAGE THE SAR'S CREDIBILITY AS AN AUTONOMOUS REGION AND LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE HONG KONG ISSUE HAD BEEN SOLVED NOT THROUGH FRIENDLY RELATIONS BUT BY MILITARY MEANS. THIS WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING.

9. ZHAO SAID THAT ONE ASPECT OF CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER HONG KONG WOULD BE CHINA'S RIGHT TO STATION TROOPS THERE. IT WAS A CHINESE PRINCIPLE THAT HONG KONG'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE WOULD BE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY. HOWEVER, CONCRETE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE COULD BE CONDUCTED. IT WAS NOT NECESSARILY THE CASE THAT CHINESE TROOPS WOULD BE SENT TO HONG KONG ON THE DAY OF RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY. IT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR THAT DEFENCE WAS THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY, PUBLIC ORDER THAT OF THE SAR POLICE. TROOPS STATIONED IN HONG KONG FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE WOULD NOT INTERFERE IN THE SAR'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THEIR FUNCTION WOULD NOT BE THE SAME AS THE PLA ON THE MAINLAND.

10. ZHAO RECALLED THAT A FURTHER ISSUE OF CONCERN TO THE UK WAS WHETHER OUR AGREEMENT WOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE BASIC LAW. HE CONFIRMED THAT IT WOULD BE. ON THE METHOD OF DISCUSSIONS HE SAID THAT WE HELD DIFFERENT VIEWS. CHINA CONSIDERED THAT WE SHOULD JUST DISCUSS IMPORTANT QUESTIONS LEAVING ASIDE EXCESSIVE DETAIL. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD TAKE TOO MUCH TIME AND WOULD IMPINGE UPON THE SAR'S AUTONOMY. IF THE BASIC LAW CONTAINED MORE DETAIL, LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE AND FUNCTION OF THE FUTURE SAR WOULD BE SET. ON CONTINUITY, HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS WAS A QUESTION OF GREAT CONCERN. IN VIEW OF THE PROGRESS MADE, HE SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE BENEFICIAL IF WHILE DISCUSSING POST-1997 ARRANGEMENTS QUESTIONS AFFECTING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WERE ALSO DISCUSSED. COMBINING THESE TWO AREAS WOULD CREATE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CONTINUITY AND WOULD ALSO ENABLE DISCUSSION OF HOW THE TWO SIDES COULD BEST COOPERATE IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD TO MAINTAIN STABILITY AND PROSPERITY. HE HOPED THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD MAKE EFFORTS AND COOPERATE TO

MAINTAIN STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THIS PERIOD AND ALSO THAT THE UK WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IN HELPING HONG KONG'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

11. I SAID THERE WAS ONLY TIME LEFT FOR ME TO MAKE BRIEF COMMENTS, AS FOLLOWS:

(A) TROOPS: WE DID NOT DISPUTE CHINA'S RIGHT TO STATION TROOPS IN HONG KONG. IT WAS A QUESTION OF HOW THAT RIGHT MIGHT BE EXERCISED AND THE EFFECT OF EXERCISING IT. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT PUBLIC ORDER WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SAR POLICE. I NOTED THAT CHINESE TROOPS IN HONG KONG WOULD NOT HAVE THE SAME FUNCTION AS THE PLA. NEVERTHELESS I URGED THE CHINESE SIDE TO THINK VERY CAREFULLY ABOUT THE EFFECT OF STATIONING TROOPS:

(B) BASIC LAW: I WAS GRATEFUL FOR ZHAO CONFIRMATION THAT OUR AGREEMENT WOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE BASIC LAW:

(C) METHOD OF TALKS: I SAID THAT OUR WORKING PAPERS WERE CONCERNED ONLY WITH THE MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES IN EACH AREA. A CERTAIN DEGREE OF PRECISION WAS NECESSARY IF CONFIDENCE, AND THEREFORE PROSPERITY, WERE TO BE RETAINED. WE DID NOT DISPUTE THAT THE SAR SHOULD HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS OVER LARGE AREAS. BUT WE MUST BE SURE OF THE STARTING POINT OR CONFIDENCE WOULD NOT CONTINUE. THIS WOULD NOT PREVENT THE SAR MAKING CHANGES LATER:

(D) AGENDA ORDER: I ACCEPTED THAT A NUMBER OF ISSUES SEEMED TO OVERLAP. HOWEVER UNTIL WE KNEW WHAT HONG KONG WAS TRANSITING TO, WE COULD NOT DECIDE UPON TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS:

(E) UK INTERESTS: WE CONSIDERED IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT HONG KONG SHOULD FLOURISH. THERE WAS NO POINT IN HAVING INTERESTS IN A DEAD CITY. CONFIDENCE WAS ALL IMPORTANT.

12. SEE MIFT FOR COMMENT.

CRADOCK

FUTURE OF HONG KONG

LIMITED

ED/HKD

ED/FED

ED/PLANNING STAFF

ED/FUSD

D/ED/FUSD(MR FLOWER)

RESEARCH DEPT(MR WALKER)

LEGAL ADVISER(SIR IAN SINCLAIR)

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR DONALD

MR WRIGHT

SIR C TICKELL

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4  
SECRET

## PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

## MIDDLE EAST

Points to Make with Gromyko

## LEBANON

1. Valued our brief discussion in Stockholm.
2. Still great instability and tension. Urgent need to stop the fighting and reduce the level of violence. Recent events provide the opportunity for a fresh start towards reconciliation and (in parallel) withdrawal of foreign forces. Much must depend on the Lebanese themselves.
3. There is a pressing need for measures which can build confidence. A greater role for the UN would be one positive approach. We expect the UN to play a major role in Arab/Israel dispute: UN help in Lebanon would be an excellent start. How does the Soviet Union see the way forward in the Lebanon?

## ARAB/ISRAEL

5. This is not an area of East/West competition, but a regional dispute in which we all have a major interest; (among other things) to prevent it becoming a bone of contention.
6. The situation is stagnant and dangerous. Events in the Occupied Territories are discouraging and the Israeli settlement programme, of which we strongly disapprove, is causing despair among the population which may generate terrorism and other kinds of violence. The future of the PLO is obscure.
7. We agree on objectives: a comprehensive, just peace achieved by negotiation. The international community must play its part. An early international conference is not, however, practical politics at present.

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8. In this difficult situation we need to promote small steps to generate confidence. We welcomed Arafat/Mubarak meeting and we sympathise with King Hussein's interest to do something to reassure the population of the West Bank, though it must not be allowed to cause fresh tensions.

9. What chances does the Soviet Union see for progress? Let us stay in touch.

IRAN IRAQ

10. UK neutral; concerned to see an early end to conflict and will support any diplomatic efforts which may help in this. Mediation by the UN Secretary General may eventually offer best hope. What is Soviet view?

11. Recent heightening of tension and attacks on civilian targets by both sides. Iran may be preparing a large scale spring offensive. Immediate aim must be to prevent escalation of conflict. UK urging restraint on both sides. Can Soviet Union exact any influence?

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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, 13-14 FEBRUARY 1984

MIDDLE EAST

Points to Make with Arabs

LEBANON

1. Common objectives: stable, independent Lebanon with progress over national reconciliation and reform and the withdrawal of foreign forces. We supported the results of Geneva I. Much depends on the Lebanese themselves.
2. Recent events give an opportunity for progress, but great instability and tension persist. First need is to stop the fighting and reduce the level of violence.
3. The May 17 Agreement must not be allowed to become a stumbling block. Alternative arrangements which provide for the real security needs of all concerned should be worked out.
4. We see an important role for the UN in confidence-building. If the UN is to play a role in Arab/Israel, it would be a most useful start if it could contribute to the Lebanese problem. HMG ready to assist.

ARAB ISRAEL

5. Not an East/West dispute but a regional problem, albeit of great importance to Europe (and rest of world).
6. Recent stagnation highly dangerous. Events in the Occupied Territories breeding despair and fresh violence/terrorism. Palestinian and Arab disunity makes it hard to see a way forward.
7. Objectives are agreed: progress towards a comprehensive, just peace by negotiation. [Defensive] But an international conference, though we would not rule one out in principle, is not practical politics at this stage.

8. In these circumstances we favour any practical step that can generate confidence. Following with interest King Hussein's efforts to generate some movement; but these should not complicate matters.

IRAN/IRAQ

9. UK neutral; keen to see an early end to the conflict. Support mediation by UN Secretary General.

10. Concerned at increased threats and recent attacks on civilian targets. Urging restraint.

11. Iran preparing for spring offensive. Must prevent escalation of attacks on economic targets.

12. If conflict spreads, first recourse must be to diplomatic action.

13. Arms Sales [Defensive]

Strictly neutral: have not supplied lethal internsot equipment to either side.

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Essential Facts

## LEBANON

The Soviet Union supports the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, the withdrawal of the MNF and of the sixth fleet. The Russians will have been pleased by the US and UK decisions to redeploy their MNF contingents. The Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister, Aliyev was in Damascus last week, presumably to concert the Soviet and Syrian responses to redeployment. When the Secretary of State discussed with Gromyko in Stockholm on 19 January the possible replacement of the MNF with UN forces he did not rule out a UN role. He said that the key thing was to remove the MNF. The Russians will wish to extract a high price for agreeing to wider UN involvement, including the withdrawal of US naval forces from Lebanon.

A sitrep is attached.

## ARAB/ISRAEL

After his evacuation from North Lebanon, Arafat told President Mubarak in December 1983 that he intended to force a polarisation in the PLO; he said he needed time to put his house in order before joining in any new peace initiatives. Nevertheless he stated publicly that he intended to resume his dialogue with King Hussein (broken off in April 1983), and is now expected to go to Amman later this month after the King's return from the US. Arafat also played a prominent role at the Fourth Islamic Summit in January 1984, at which it was decided (with objections from Syria, Libya and South Yemen) to readmit Egypt to the Islamic Conference. Arafat's consolidation of his position in the PLO has, however, proceeded slowly. He had expelled party dissidents from Fatah, and various opponents from the Palestine Military Council. However, he appears to face criticism even within Fatah over the Mubarak meeting, the resumption of the dialogue with Jordan and more generally over his style of leadership. The Palestine National Council, which Arafat had hoped to convene in February to support his position, has now been postponed for this to three months. Reflecting this lull in

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momentum the Arab Summit, which had been scheduled for 31 March in Riyadh, has been postponed indefinitely, apparently because the Saudis were not prepared to host such a summit while differences between the Arabs are so acute.

#### Soviet Attitudes

The Soviet Union's main objectives are twofold:

(a) to regain a central role in negotiating a solution of the Arab/Israel dispute, and

(b) to prevent the US from scoring a diplomatic victory by engineering peace either in Lebanon or in the region.

Moscow remains committed to its proposal for an International Conference on the Middle East and Brezhnev's six-point plan of 15 September 1982 (modelled on the Fez Arab Summit proposals of 9 September, including the demand for a Palestinian state, but has the merit of a more explicit acceptance of the State of Israel). The Conference proposal calls for the PLO to attend on an equal footing with other participants. This makes it a non-starter with Israel and the US. The continuing failure of the US peace efforts in the region will no doubt encourage the Soviet Union and her allies to think (with some justification) that Arab States will increasingly turn to the Soviet Union for a solution. Moscow will have been discomfited by Syria's conflict with Arafat, and its bad relations with Iraq (both also supported by the Soviet Union), but Syria's policies and in particular its determination to spoil any peace moves which do not give Syria, and the Soviet Union, seats at the negotiating table, suit Moscow's book quite well.

#### IRAN/IRAQ

After a lull, Iraq launched on 11 February a missile attack against the Iranian town of Dezful. Iran has in turn shelled Basra Mandali and Khaniqin in Iraq and has mounted a land attack in Kurdistan. Iran is likely to mount a major offensive further south in the near future.

A dangerous period ahead, particularly if Iraqi reaction to a

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successful Iranian push involves attacks on Iranian oil installations and shipping. Iran's moves unpredictable but threat to close Straits of Hormuz remains. We remain in close touch with Americans and contingency preparations continue (increased readiness of UK mine counter measures forces at Omani request and message of support to Shaikh Zaid, UAE).

#### The Soviet Attitude

Soviet Union has been major arms supplier to Iraq and may now be concerned at signs of increased US support for Iraq. Soviet relations with Iran are cool as a result of trial of communist (Tudeh) party members but both sides have avoided a complete breakdown.

#### Arab Attitudes

|| Arabs are concerned about possible defeat of Iraq and spread of Iranian revolution. Several are giving economic and other aid to Iraq. Recent terrorist incidents a particular concern. Stories that UK has been supplying arms to Iran are untrue; we have supplied no lethal equipment to either side.

LEBANON: SITREP 13 FEBRUARY

MILITARY SITUATION

1. Following the major fighting of 3 - 7 February both East and West Beirut are much calmer, although there are still some minor clashes along the 'Green Line' dividing East (Christian) and West (Muslim) Beirut. The Lebanese Army (LAF) have been expelled from almost all parts of West Beirut, where the leader of the Shia Militia Amal, Mr Berri, has emerged as de facto civilian and military commander. The French, whose MNF headquarters is on the Green Line, succeeded in opening a crossing point for a few hours on 12 February. There has been no US shelling of Syrian/Druze positions in the mountains east of Beirut since 10 February; the Americans claim that the shelling has successfully reduced Syrian shelling of East Beirut.

2. Three Katusha rockets were fired from Southern Lebanon into the Israeli border town of Metullah on 9 February. No casualties or damage, but the resumption of rocket attacks despite the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon will have had a considerable psychological effect. On 10 February the Israelis responded with air strikes on alleged Palestinian positions in Bhandoun (east of Beirut). The Israeli Cabinet is actively considering a plan for a further partial Israeli withdrawal, possibly to the Zahrani River south of Sidon.

MNF

3. The Americans have decided that redeployment of US Marines off shore will be completed within 30 days and that US naval firepower will continue to be used as necessary in retaliation for any shelling of Beirut by Syrians/Druze. The French and Italians have said that they will maintain a presence in Beirut until the UN can take over, though the Italians intend to reduce their contingent (1400 men), leaving only enough men to guard the Palestinian refugee camps.

/POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

4. President Gemayel announced on 13 February a new 28 point plan of constitutional and administrative reforms to be discussed at a resumed national reconciliation conference in Geneva. This is unlikely to satisfy Walid Jumblatt (Druze) who has pressed for President Gemayel's resignation, or Berri (Amal), who has suggested that the Lebanese Parliament should pass a constitutional amendment shortening President Gemayel's term of office and calling new Presidential elections in summer 1984. Both are concentrating for the time being on consolidating their hold on West Beirut. They may be prepared to allow Gemayel to stay on if he is prepared to make genuine concessions. The Syrians have not so far endorsed calls for Gemayel's resignation, but are still insisting on abrogation of the 17 May Agreement as a pre-condition of any resumption of the reconciliation process. Two former Lebanese Prime Ministers (Takieddin Solh and Selim Al-Hoss) who might be asked to lead a new government were in Damascus on 9/10 February, together with ex-President Franjieh and another ex-Prime Minister Rashid Karame (both members of the National Salvation Front). The Saudi mediator Hariri is in Beirut. Rumfeld also remains in Beirut, but appears to have no immediate plans to visit Damascus.

5. The priorities remain the restoration of calm in Beirut and re-opening of crossing points between East and West, and US/Syrian agreement on the way forward. The 17 May Agreement remains the major sticking point: the US remain unwilling to abandon it (although they have told us that they would continue to support Gemayel if he felt obliged to do so), appear convinced that heavy shelling of Syrian positions has been helpful in persuading Syria to be flexible, and are opposed to wider UN involvement in the short-term (Gemayel has also rejected the idea of UN-manned crossing points in Beirut). The Israeli Prime Minister has also warned against abrogation of the 17 May Agreement, hinting that this would mean some Israeli forces remaining in South Lebanon indefinitely.



PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR PRESIDENT ANDROPOV'S  
FUNERAL

JAPAN

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Looking forward to Mr Nakasone's visit for Economic Summit in June and for bilateral visit thereafter. Other Ministers of course welcome at same time.
2. Consultations at Foreign Minister level now fixed for 25-27 April in Tokyo. Much to discuss in present situation, about East-West relations in particular.
3. Interested in any immediate thoughts from Japanese side on effects of Andropov's death and on the succession.
4. On economic side, signature of agreement for Nissan investment in Britain on 1 February a welcome resolution of longstanding discussions. Grateful for role played by Japanese Government. Naturally hope Nissan will decide in favour of full scale manufacturing operation in second phase.
5. Wish Mr Nakasone well in task of piloting budget through Diet in next two months.

## JAPAN : ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. No major points at issue with Japanese at present other than longstanding differences over Japanese trade surplus.
2. Mr Nakasone has been invited to stay on in London after the Economic Summit for bilateral visit including talks and lunch with Mrs Thatcher on Monday, 11 June. No formal answer yet but we are told he is likely to arrive early on 5 June so as to recover from jet-lag before the summit, and fly on to Bonn on the morning of 12 June. Other Summit Ministers will presumably stay here with him throughout.
3. Dates of Sir Geoffrey Howe's April visit to Far East have been confirmed to Japanese (and Koreans);(Seoul dates set for 23-25 April), but no decision has yet been taken on a visit to China at that time and this possibility has not been mentioned to Japanese.
4. Nissan agreement is for assembly in UK starting in 1985 of 24,000 cars a year, which will be counted as imports from Japan for purposes of voluntary restraint agreement. Decision on expanding to 100,000 cars a year will be taken in 1987, for production level to be reached in 1990 and local content level of 80% to be reached by mid-1991.
5. Crown Prince and Princess are to visit UK privately from 4-7 March to see their son Prince Hiro now at Oxford. They will lunch with The Queen but no engagements involving HMG are planned.

6. As of 12 February, Mr Nakasone is not intending to come to the funeral. Japan is likely to be represented by Foreign Minister Abe.

Far East Department

FCO

12 February 1984



BRIEF FOR MEETING WITH MRS GANDHI, PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA  
POINTS TO MAKE

Security

1. Deeply deplore tragic death of Mr Mhatre. Police doing everything possible to apprehend culprits. Fully aware need to give increased protection to Indian diplomatic community in Britain.
2. (If raised). Cannot curtail activities of Indian dissident groups in Britain unless they transgress the law.

Indo-Pakistan Relations

3. Concerned at heightened tension in Kashmir and possible deterioration in Indo-Pakistan relations. How can situation best be calmed?

IDA 7

4. Disappointed at fund level being set at \$9 billion. Decided to take part in supplementary fund. Hope that agreement will be reached on this as soon as possible.

Aid Programme

5. Understand talks progressing well on captive power plant for Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO) aluminium smelter. Hope agreement can be reached in time for aid to be allocated to this financial year.

Lady Young

6. Hope you will be able to have discussion with Lady Young who is visiting India in March.

South Asian Department

FCO

11 February 1984



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The Home Secretary has announced enhanced security protection for Indian diplomats in Britain following the abduction and murder of Mr Mhatre, the Indian Assistant Commissioner in Birmingham, on 5 February. The Indians seem content with the arrangements made. Police investigations are continuing but no arrests have yet been made. Indian diplomats in Britain also feel vulnerable to attack by various Indian extremist groups, such as Sikhs resident in this country. They do not always understand that the police cannot prevent demonstrations taking place, and even the burning of the Indian flag, unless an actual offence takes place under English law.
2. Background on the Indo-Pakistan situation is contained in the brief for a meeting with President Zia of Pakistan.
3. The Indians have been generally content with our position on IDA since Mrs Gandhi's visit to London in March 1982 when the Prime Minister agreed to waive the proportionality condition with regard to the replenishment of IDA 6. We have now made known our disappointment that the level of funding for IDA 7 has been set at \$9 billion rather than \$12 billion and have announced our decision to take part in a supplementary funding. At the same time, we have taken steps to bring our proportional contribution to IDA closer to our GDP share although it is still somewhat higher. The total sum available will not suffer.

4. There is a risk of a serious underspend of our bilateral aid programme for India of £110 million this financial year. One way of alleviating the position would be for the Indians to take an early decision on a captive power plant for the BALCO aluminium smelter. Talks are now taking place with some urgency but it would do no harm to bring the problem to Mrs Gandhi's attention.

5. Lady Young is visiting the Subcontinent from 4-18 March. It would be useful if she were to have a good discussion with Mrs Gandhi on foreign policy issues.

South Asian Department  
FCO

11 February 1984



BRIEF FOR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZIA UL HAQ OF PAKISTAN  
POINTS TO MAKE

Afghanistan

1. Unlikely that Soviet position over Afghanistan will change rapidly even when new leadership in place. Meanwhile important not to create false hopes in public.
2. UN-sponsored talks may provide best opportunity to test whether Russians any more prepared to contemplate withdrawal.
3. May therefore be advantage in Cordovez's next visit to region being postponed in order to allow time for Soviet position to evolve.
4. Hope refugee burden still manageable. We are continuing to help as much as possible.
5. (Only if conversation secure). Have heard indirectly of possible plans to exfiltrate small number of Soviet prisoners held by Mujahideen to West. What is Pakistani attitude?

Nuclear

6. Set great store by re-assurances that your nuclear programme only for peaceful purposes.
7. Therefore concerned at press reports of some remarks by Mr A Q Khan about Pakistan being able to enrich uranium and suggestions that she might also be in a position to develop a nuclear weapon.
8. If enrichment only for peaceful purposes, any objection to plant being placed under IAEA safeguards?
9. (If raised). No objection to UK firms tendering for Chasma reactor if it were placed under IAEA safeguards.

*Press  
interview  
in  
Pakistan*

Pakistan/India

10. Concerned at recent increase in tension. Any chance of matters getting out of hand?

Kashmir (If raised)

11. Do not intend to become involved in Kashmiri politics following tragic death of Mr Mhatre and its aftermath.

South Asian Department

FCO

11 February 1984

## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. There was widespread interest at the time of President Brezhnev's funeral at the possibility of President Andropov having hinted at a softening of the Soviet position over Afghanistan in conversation with President Zia. Those hopes proved illusory as subsequent Soviet statements made clear. It seems unlikely that there will be any grounds for similar speculation on this occasion but it would be as well to warn President Zia about the risks of giving rise to false hopes. The best tactics might be to give the Russians any opportunity to change their policy over Afghanistan and not to force the new leadership into any premature re-affirmation of a hard-line position. This might entail delaying the next visit to the region (due in April) of the UN Secretary-General's Personal Representative, Senor Cordovez, who is a notoriously unreliable interpreter of both the Soviet and Pakistani positions. Nevertheless, the UN-sponsored talks are the only negotiating process on Afghanistan currently in being, and they have produced the broad outline of a settlement. The key to further progress remains solid evidence of the Soviet Union's willingness to withdraw its troops. We are maintaining our previous level of support for the refugees (about £2 million a year).
2. There is pressure from Lord Bethell and others for the West to accept for re-settlement a number of Soviet prisoners currently held by the resistance in Afghanistan. It would be useful to know whether Zia would be in favour of this happening.

3. Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist, Mr A Q Khan, is reported to have said in a recent press interview in Pakistan that Pakistan had now broken the nuclear powers' monopoly in enriching uranium; he also hinted that it could produce a nuclear bomb if necessary. Enriched uranium is not required for Pakistan's one existing nuclear reactor, KANUPP, and even for its projected second reactor at Chasma, which will use lightly enriched uranium, it would be economically wasteful to have a domestic production facility. The obvious implication therefore is that the enriched uranium is intended for nuclear weapons as Khan clearly hinted. It would therefore be appropriate to express concern and to ask President Zia, in effect, how these reports square with his frequent assurances (mainly to the Americans) that Pakistan's nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes. American leaders in Moscow may tackle him along similar lines.

4. Relations between India and Pakistan are currently somewhat tense. Mrs Gandhi's remarks at the time of last year's riots in Sind were seen as interference in Pakistan's internal affairs and Rajiv Gandhi has spoken recently of the threat of a further Pakistani invasion probably through Kashmir. It would be interesting to know whether President Zia sees these remarks as being intended simply for an internal audience in India, where an election is pending.

5. Following the abduction and murder of the Indian diplomat in Birmingham, Mr Mhatre, and the execution in India on 11 February of Maqbool Butt, founder of the Kashmiri Liberation Front, tension is running high in Kashmir. There were appeals from Kashmiris in Pakistan for the British Government to intervene on Butt's behalf and an MP made the same request to Sir G Howe, who replied that it would not be appropriate.

South Asian Department  
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11 February 1984

