

PREM 19/1647



PART 4

TOP SECRET

MI

Confidential Filing

UK / Soviet Relations

SOVIET

UNION

PT 1: MAY 1979

PT 4: JANUARY 1985

| Referred to         | Date | Referred to         | Date | Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date |
|---------------------|------|---------------------|------|-------------|------|-------------|------|
| <del>4.1.85</del>   |      | <del>4.10.85</del>  |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>9.1.85</del>   |      | <del>25.10.85</del> |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>21.1.85</del>  |      | PT 4 ENDS<br>       |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>14.3.85</del>  |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>25.3.85</del>  |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>28.3.85</del>  |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>10.4.85</del>  |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>13.4.85</del>  |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>25.4.85</del>  |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>2.5.85</del>   |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>2.7.85</del>   |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>4.7.85</del>   |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>8.7.85</del>   |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>29.8.85</del>  |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>12.9.85</del>  |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>16.9.85</del>  |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>21.9.85</del>  |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>23.9.85</del>  |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |
| <del>18.10.85</del> |      |                     |      |             |      |             |      |



PART 4 ends:-

FCO to CDP 25.10.85

PART 5 begins:-

FCO to CDP 4.11.85



TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

| Reference                                       | Date       |
|---|------------|
| CC(85) 9 <sup>th</sup> Meeting minutes, item 2  | 14/03/1985 |
| CC(85) 12 <sup>th</sup> Meeting minutes, item 2 | 28/03/1985 |
| CC(85) 13 <sup>th</sup> Meeting minutes, item 2 | 18/04/1985 |
| CC(85) 14 <sup>th</sup> Meeting minutes, item 2 | 25/04/1985 |
| CC(85) 15 <sup>th</sup> Meeting minutes, item 2 | 02/05/1985 |
| CC(85) 27 <sup>th</sup> Meeting minutes, item 2 | 12/09/1985 |
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The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray

Date 15/7/2014

PREM Records Team



## Foreign and Commonwealth Office documents

Reference: DD 1985/3 DESPATCH

Description: The Visit of a Supreme Soviet Delegation led by Mr Gorbachev: Her Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Date: 3 January 1985

Reference: DD 1985/328 DESPATCH

Description: Gorbachev's First Four Months: Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Date: 18 July 1985

Reference: DD 1985/379 DESPATCH

Description: Third Impressions of The Soviet Union: Her Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Date: 16 October 1985

The above FCO documents, which were enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. When released they are available in the appropriate FCO CLASSES.

Signed

J. Gray

Date

15/7/2014

PREM Records Team



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CONFIDENTIAL

CC  
NW } Could you  
RC } please let  
MA } me know if you  
BI } get invitations.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH



25 October 1985

CDP  
25/x

Dear Charles,

Soviet National Day Reception

This year's reception to mark the 68th Anniversary of the October Revolution will be held at the Soviet Embassy on 5 November. Some Ministers will already have received invitations from the Soviet Ambassador.

Last year the Foreign Secretary, in a break with past practice, accepted Mr Popov's invitation. This year he is unable to attend. Mr Rifkind will do so.

The Foreign Secretary believes that the level of Ministerial representation at the Soviet reception should be consistent with our wish to conduct a realistic, businesslike dialogue with the Soviet Union. It is not a time for gestures of special warmth, which would come strangely after the recent expulsion of British officials from Moscow. But we do wish to show that we mean it when we say that business as usual should go on. It is also relevant that The Queen's Birthday Reception in Moscow was attended this year by very few senior Russians. The Russians will no doubt be watching with interest the level of attendance at their November reception, and will regard it as an indicator of our policy towards them.

I should therefore be grateful if colleagues would get in touch with this office when invitations are received which their Ministers would hope in principle to accept, before any reply is sent to the Soviet Embassy. In principle we believe that it will be right to limit attendance to those Junior Ministers who have genuine business to do with the Soviet Union.

I am copying this to Private Secretaries of all Ministers in charge of Departments with a request that they circulate it as necessary.

Yours ever,  
Le Appleyard  
(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

*Subject*  
*cc ops*  
*min car.*

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OCMIAN 7798  
CONFIDENTIAL  
OO MOSCO  
FM FCOLN TO MOSCO  
181635Z OCT  
GRS 160

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T193185

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO  
TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW  
TELNO 1630  
OF 181635 OCTOBER 1985

FCO TELNO 1002: MR GORBACHEV'S BIRTHDAY MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO MR GORBACHEV DATED 15 OCTOBER:

BEGINS 'THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THE MESSAGE WHICH YOU AND YOUR WIFE SENT ON THE OCCASION OF MY BIRTHDAY. IT WAS A KIND THOUGHT.

I, TOO, RECALL OUR VERY USEFUL TALKS AT CHEQUERS AND IN MOSCOW WHICH LED TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.. I HOPE THAT UNDERSTANDING CAN BE ENLARGED IN FUTURE, AND MEANWHILE THAT YOUR TALKS IN GENEVA WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL PROVE FRUITFUL.

MY HUSBAND JOINS ME IN SENDING BEST WISHES TO YOU AND TO MRS GORBACHEV.' ENDS.

2. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG. GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION OF DELIVERY.

3. WE ARE NOT INTENDING TO MAKE PUBLIC THIS EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES.

HOWE

LIMITED  
SOV D  
NEWS D  
PLANNING STAFF  
RES D  
PS  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR DAUNT  
MR SAMUEL

CONFIDENTIAL



Original in Gordon Rooms.

Subject  
ccops  
morder

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T.B188/85

Unofficial translation

re faxed 12/10.

Esteemed Madame Thatcher,

On the occasion of the remarkable date in Your life - please accept my congratulations. Raisa Maximovna joins me in our wishes to You of good health and well-being.

I recall our conversations at Chequers and in Moscow. Then, it seems, we took a correct political tone and gave our dialogue such an orientation that meets the demands of the present situation in the world. I would wish to believe that the understanding on the problems of priority that we reached then will remain in force. But for this to be so, apparently, much effort, political wisdom and goodwill will be needed.

Please convey our best wishes to Your husband, Mr. Dennis Thatcher.

Yours respectfully,

M. Gorbachyov

Moscow  
12 October, 1985



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 October 1985

EDP 4/x.

Dear Richard,

Invitations from the Soviet Ambassador

Thank you for your letter of 30 August drawing attention to the invitation Mr Heseltine received from the Soviet Embassy to lunch with Mr Popov in October. Subsequently, numbers of other similar invitations have come to our attention, and it is clear that we are faced with the same Soviet social overkill as last year (my letter to you of 4 October 1984).

In the wake of the expulsions, the Foreign Secretary has agreed the need for a return to business as usual, but he regards the stress as being on business. He is therefore asking colleagues to follow scrupulously the advice in Roger Bone's letter to John Coles of 16 April 1984, ie that purely social contacts with the Soviet Embassy should continue to be avoided.

The Foreign Secretary does not wish the Soviet Embassy to be ostracised following the expulsions, but equally he does not wish us to be seen as the demandeur for early contact in a way which might imply that we felt embarrassed about the expulsions. There is another aspect of this. As I wrote to you last year, an element of reciprocity in Moscow has to be a relevant factor, and the beginning of Sir Bryan Cartledge's ambassadorship is the right moment to get this message over to the Russians. Mr Popov should not feel he has carte blanche for access to any senior member of the Government he cares to invite without ensuring that Sir Bryan Cartledge at least has better access than his predecessor.

The Foreign Secretary would therefore be grateful if Mr Heseltine would agree to temporise with the Soviet Embassy, suggesting that the matter be looked at again later in the year. Sir Geoffrey Howe has replied in a similar sense to an invitation to him.

Lord Whitelaw, who is to lead the IPU delegation to the Soviet Union next May, will clearly need to get to know the Ambassador. However, unless he is already committed to a date in October, the Ambassador's lunch for him might better be deferred to later in the year, or in the New Year.

/ There

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There is a strong case for Mr Channon to accept his invitation for October, with the Anglo-Soviet Joint Commission coming up on 31 October, several major contracts in the pipeline, and so far no Soviet hint that the expulsions have poisoned business relations.

The Foreign Secretary would be grateful if for the time being other colleagues who receive invitations would consider accepting these only if they have current business to discuss with the Soviet Embassy (eg a forthcoming visit or a UK commercial interest). If there are signs that senior British visitors to Moscow and our Ambassador are getting better access, I shall write again to colleagues to suggest a relaxation of these guidelines.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell at No 10, to the Private Secretaries to all members of the Cabinet, the Private Secretary to Mr Channon at the DTI and to Michael Stark in the Cabinet Office.

*Yours ever,*


*L V Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

Richard Mottram Esq  
Ministry of Defence  
London SW1

CONFIDENTIAL







DG

16



Copy No: 5  
of 5 copies

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 October 1985

Dear Len,

GORDIEVSKY AND THE EAST EUROPEAN CONNECTION

Thank you for your letter of 2 October in which you asked what we should do about the East European intelligence officers in London who were identified by Gordievsky.

The Prime Minister agrees that we should not take action to expel them, but hopes that they are being very closely watched.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong, as well as to the Director General of the Security Service.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

TS

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SKW





Prime Minister  
Agree not to  
expel the bank  
Europeans? You have  
said that we are  
drawing a line.  
Dear Charles,

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 October 1985

Agreed - but hope  
they are being closely  
watched = not

Gordievsky and the East European Connection

One loose end which remains to be tied up is the question of what to do about the East European intelligence officers in London who were identified by Gordievsky. There were three. They were in the Czech, Bulgarian and East German Embassies.

It was agreed with Sir Robert Armstrong that we should delay a decision about these three diplomats until action had been taken against the Russians. In the event the Foreign Secretary thinks this decision was wise.

There would still, of course, be something to be said for expelling the three East Europeans - first to get rid of them and second to underline for those Governments also HMG's firm policy of not tolerating espionage in the UK.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

We have made public our intention to draw the line under the Gordievsky episode as far as the Russians are concerned. To expel three Eastern European diplomats now would open a new chapter with the Eastern Europeans. The Foreign Secretary thinks the British media would find this extremely difficult to understand.

For all these reasons, the Foreign Secretary recommends against expelling the three Eastern European diplomats concerned.

/ The



TOP SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL



The friends and the Security Service agree. If there is any press interest in the absence of action against Eastern European diplomats, we would explain on a non-attributable basis that, although Gordievsky may have given relevant information, this did not provide sufficiently clear-cut cases for expulsion, but that we are keeping a careful eye on matters.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong and to the Director General of the Security Service.

*Yours ever,*

*Le Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

TOP SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

30 September 1985

RETIREMENT OF PRIME MINISTER TIKHONOV

Thank you for your letter of 27 September enclosing a draft message of congratulation to Mr Ryzhkov on his appointment as Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

The Prime Minister thinks that in the present climate of relations a message would be out of place. She has decided not to send one.

C D POWELL

Colin Budd Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

VC





CC PL  
Duty  
VERE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 September 1985

Dear Charles,

Retirement of Prime Minister Tikhonov

We have had advance warning through the BBC Monitoring Service that it will shortly be announced that Prime Minister Tikhonov has retired on health grounds, and that the Soviet Praesidium have approved the proposal of Gorbachev and the Politburo that N I Ryzhkov should be his successor.

Tikhonov's retirement has come rather earlier than expected and confirms that Gorbachev is in a commanding position. At 55 Ryzhkov is one of the younger, more technocratic members of the Politburo. He served as deputy minister of Heavy Industry and First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet National Plan. Before his promotion to the Politburo in April this year, he served on the Secretariat of the Central Committee responsible for the economy in general.

The Prime Minister sent a message of congratulation to Tikhonov when he was appointed, on Kosygin's death, in October 1980. We recommend that she should also send such a message on this occasion. The 1980 message was mostly about Kosygin's career (the Prime Minister had of course met the latter in 1979). This time, we have suggested that a sentence about UK/Soviet relations might be timely, with a nod in Tikhonov's direction (as far as we can see from our records, the Prime Minister did no more than shake his hand at the Andropov and Chernenko funerals).

I attach a draft. This could be despatched any time tomorrow morning. The FCO Resident Clerk will arrange to send it by telegram to Moscow. We would be grateful to know at the same time whether the Prime Minister would wish the text of the message to be made public in London, or simply the fact of its existence. Either way, we would hope that the Embassy could be left enough time to deliver the message (i.e. until Saturday late afternoon, our time).

Yours ever,  
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

N I Ryzhkov

Chairman of the Council of Ministers

of the USSR

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I send you my congratulations on your appointment as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. among your many responsibilities I hope that /in this high post you will be able, with your Government, to join in the work of improving relations between our two countries, to which I and the British Government are firmly committed.

I would be grateful if you would transmit to Mr Tikhonov my hopes that his health will improve and my good wishes for his retirement after his long service to the Soviet Union.

Enclosures—flag(s).....



**TOP SECRET - TO BE OPENED ONLY BY**

**PRIVATE SECRETARY (FOREIGN AFFAIRS)**

Papers relating to the defection of  
Mr Gordievsky

Or, in his absence

delete  
(1) or (2)

- (1) by the person designated to open TOP SECRET documents on his behalf.
- (2) to be returned to sender.

From

opened to discern whether Thatcher biographer could see contents. Decided not appropriate. *MS* Jul 8/7/10  
Head of Histories

③





now attached  
CDP

Further brief  
to come  
on the  
new defectors  
CDP.

Prime Minister

CDP  
26/9

LONDON

C/6058

26 September 1985

Dear Charles,

MF

GORDIYEVSKIY

1. Mr William Casey, the US Director of Central Intelligence, is calling on the Prime Minister at 1025 on 27 September. The Prime Minister will wish to assure Mr Casey that we are taking all the necessary steps to ensure that Gordiyevskiy's information on US/Soviet relations and related subjects is made available to the Americans in advance of the forthcoming Reagan/Gorbachev Summit.

2. Both my Director of Counter Intelligence and Security and Director K of the Security Service visited Washington last week to discuss with their opposite numbers in the US agencies how best to handle Gordiyevskiy's material (and to ensure that the Americans make available to us comparable information from their recent defectors).

3. This week our principal Requirements Officer, the Service's expert on Gordiyevskiy's reports, is in Washington and is briefing US officials today on the available information of relevance to the Summit and for the renewed arms talks in Geneva.

4. You will wish to note that the Americans received a slightly abbreviated version of the introduction to Gordiyevskiy's reporting which was circulated to the Prime Minister on 12 September entitled 'Aspects of Soviet Foreign and Defence Policies'. However, during the briefings in Washington this week, documents are being handed over with the following titles (copies attached), covering those topics of most interest to the Americans:

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street





C/6058

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT



|  |                                    |
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| DEPARTMENT/SERIES<br>..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....<br>PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1647</i> .....<br>(one piece/item number) | Date and<br>sign                   |
| Extract/Item details:<br><br><i>Letter Wilkinson to Lowell dated<br/> 26 September 1985</i>                      |                                    |
| CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS<br>UNDER FOI EXEMPTION  |                                    |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)<br>OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958  | <i>14/7/2014</i><br><i>S. Gray</i> |
| TEMPORARILY RETAINED   |                                    |
| MISSING AT TRANSFER  |                                    |
| MISSING  |                                    |
| NUMBER NOT USED  |                                    |



**Instructions for completion of Dummy Card**

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Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Department, Series and Piece/Item references clearly  
e.g.

|  |
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| DEPARTMENT/SERIES<br>..... <i>GRA 168</i> .....                  |
| PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>49</i> .....<br>(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY) |

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If the document is Closed under a FOI exemption, enter the number of years closed. See the TNA guidance *Preparation of records for transfer to The National Archives*, section 18.2

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KK TO GO AHEAD KK

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

OCMIAN 0010  
TOP SECRET  
DD 182000Z AMMAN  
FM FCOLN TO AMMAN  
181900Z SEP  
GRS 455

TOP SECRET  
DEYOU (E-4)3-0923)), P3/PRIME MINISTER)  
RUFODSKBY 182000Z AMMAN  
TELNO 316

OF 181900Z SEPTEMBER 1985  
AND TO DESKBY 190530Z MOSCOW  
(PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR OR HOC)  
FOLLOWING STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR QP, PRIME MINISTER FROM APLEYARD  
MY TELNO 314 TO AMMAN AND MOSCOW TELTN 1211: GORDIEVSKY

1. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAS NOW LOOKED AT THE QUESTION OF  
RELEASE OF PUBLICITY IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECEPTION BY THE PRESS  
OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN CAIRO AND OF HIS OWN  
STATEMENT ISSUED AT 1230 TODAY. HE HAS ALSO CONSIDERED THE  
ARGUMENTS PUT BY SIR BRYAN CARTLEDGE IN MOSCOW TUR.

2. HE REGARDS THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET COUNTER-BLAST  
INCLUDING AND/OR  
ALLEGATIONS ABOUT THE EXFILTRATION AS SOMETHING WHICH, THOUGH  
STILL UNLIKELY, MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY FOR THE REASONS ADVANCED  
BY SIR BRYAN CARTLEDGE. HE SEES NO NEED IN TERMS OF THE SOMEWHAT  
MIXED MEDIA REACTION SO FAR TO MAKE EXTENSIVE REVELATIONS NOW,  
BUT PROPOSES TO ASSESS FURTHER MEDIA REACTIONS BEFORE DECIDING  
WHETHER TO MAKE SUCH REVELATIONS. HE HAS ALSO CONSIDERED THE  
LEAK TO SELECTED OUTLETS WITHOUT ATTRIBUTION.

3. AS REA... 5E3 098,5 4-8'3# 8, 3:9 53), 9 314 TO AMMAN,  
SIR GEOFFREY AGREES THAT IT WILL BE RIGHT FOR SIR BRYAN  
CARTLEDGE TO CONTINUE IN MOSCOW TO REBUT THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST  
HIS STAFF AS TOTALLY UNWARRANTED. IT WILL ALSO CLEARLY BE  
IMPORTANT THAT NOTHING SAID, EITHER HERE OR IN MOSCOW, IS  
INCONSISTENT WITH SIR BRYAN'S DENIAL. HE CONTINUES TO BELIEVE,  
HOWEVER, THAT OUR LINE ON THE RECORD IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT  
ALLEGATION OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS KIND SHOULD BE THAT WE NEVER  
COMMENT ON ALLEGATIONS OF THIS KIND. BUT WE WOULD MAKE IT  
UNEQUIVOCALLY CLEAR THAT GORDIEVSKY IS IN THE UK ENTIRELY OF HIS  
OWN FREE WILL AND BY HIS OWN EXPRESS DESIRE. THE EXACT FORM  
OF WORDS WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER SOVIET ALLEGATIONS WERE  
SUFFICIENTLY CIRCUMSTANTIAL FOR US TO HAVE TO ADMIT, AT LEAST  
BY IMPLICATION, THAT GORDIEVSKY'S DEFECTION TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE  
THE UNITED KINGDOM.

4. IN THE MEANTIME, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET  
AUTHORITIES' VINDICTIVE ACTION CAN BE LEFT WITHOUT A RESPONSE  
IN LONDON IN ADDITION TO THE VIGOROUS REBUTTAL ALREADY MADE BY  
THE AMBASSADOR. DEREK THOMAS WILL THEREFORE BE CALLING IN  
THE SOVIET CHARGE TO REINFORCE SIR BRYAN CARTLEDGE'S PROTEST  
AND READ HIM THE RIOT ACT, WHILE CONFIRMING NEED, DESPITE THE  
OBSTACLES PUT IN OUR WAY BY THE SOVIET ACTION, TO PUT AN END TO  
THIS... 9-3 59 95034 27'8,3''. WITH THIS, THE LINE  
WILL EFFECTIVELY HAVE BEEN DRAWN.

HOWE

OCMIAN 0010

NNNN



ZZ AMMAN  
FM MOSCO TO FCOLN  
181325Z SEP  
GRS 475

SECRET  
DEYOU  
FROM MOSCOW  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELNO 1211  
OF 181325Z SEPTEMBER 85  
AND TO FLASH AMMAN (DEYOU FOR CHARLES POLE PS/PM)

DEYOU FOR APLEYARD PS/3 OF 5

YOUR TELNO 314 TO AMMAN : GORDIYEVSKIY

1. I HAVE VERY STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE COURSE PROPOSED IN PARA ONE OF YTUR. IT IS OF COURSE FOR YOU TO JUDGE WHAT EFFECT MAKING THE REVELATIONS OF FURTHER DETAILS CONCERNING THE SOVIET EXPULSIONS MIGHT HAVE ON THE UK MEDIA. SEEN FROM HERE, REVELATIONS OF A MORE GENERAL NATURE CONCERNING PREVIOUS KGB ACTIVITY IN THE UK (RATHER THAN PERSONAL DOSSIERS) MIGHT BE MORE EFFECTIVE. IT WAS REVELATIONS OF THIS NATURE WHICH I HAD IN MIND IN MAKING THE RECOMMENDATION IN MY TELNO 1182 (NOT TO AMMAN).

2.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.

3. IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE CLEAR WISH OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO "DRAW A LINE" AND OUR OWN NOW PUBLICLY DECLARED INTENTION OF NOT PROCEEDING TO FURTHER COUNTER-EXPULSIONS, I THINK WE SHOULD LET MATTERS LIE EXCEPT FOR SUCH PRIVATE BRIEFING AS COULD BE DONE WITH THE MEDIA TO CONVEY THE KIND OF IMPRESSION WHICH YOU HAVE IN MIND IN PARA ONE OF YTUR - BUT WITHOUT OPEN OFFICIAL SANCTION.

4. SO FAR AS THE PUBLIC DENIAL OF SOVIET ALLEGATIONS IS CONCERNED I PROPOSE TO CONTINUE HERE IN THIS EMBASSY, TO DECLARE THE INNOCENCE OF ALL MY STAFF AS I HAVE DONE HITHERTO. IT IS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE NO USEABLE EVIDENCE WHICH THEY COULD PRODUCE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR ALLEGATIONS WHICH IN MY VIEW WE SHOULD CONTINUE ROBUSTLY TO DENY. MOREOVER ANYTHING LESS THAN TOTAL DENIAL OF SOVIET ACCUSATIONS PARTICULARLY IF ACCOMPANIED BY THE KIND OF RESPONSE PROPOSED AT THE END OF PARA 4 OF YTUR, WOULD ONLY FUEL SPECULATION AND ASSIST A SOVIET CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO REPRESENT THIS EMBASSY AS A NEST OF SPIES/KIDNAPPERS.

5.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

NNNN



|  |                                    |
|--|------------------------------------|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES<br>..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....<br>PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1647</i> .....<br>(one piece/item number) | Date and<br>sign                   |
| Extract/Item details:<br><br><i>Telno 314 dated 18 September 1985</i>  |                                    |
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by CDP.



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OF 2 COPIES

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 September 1985

Thank you for your letter C/6040 of 12 September with which you enclosed a paper summarising the material obtained from Mr. Gordiyevskiy. The Prime Minister has read this with interest and I now return it to you.

May I take the opportunity also of thanking you for your letters C/6039 of 11 September and C/6046 of 13 September both of which the Prime Minister found most useful.

(Charles Powell)

'C'



*Prime Minister  
EDP  
12/9.*



LONDON

C/6040

12 September 1985

*Dear Prime Minister,*

In the past few weeks we have been able to review at length with Mr Gordiyevskiy all the political and military reporting and documents which he provided during his years in London, and current intelligence he obtained during his recent visit to Moscow.

You may like to see the attached paper summarising that material. Like the full reports which will follow, it bears the codename "OVATION".

*[Handwritten signature]*

*Yours etc,  
'e'*

Att (1)

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP  
10 Downing Street





*Prime Minister  
puts it in  
perspective*

LONDON

*CDP 13/9.*

C/6046

13 September 1985

*Parlay on my mind  
ms*

*Dear Charles,*

HETMAN

1. The Prime Minister has asked for a note on the Danish Security Service involvement in the case. This is attached.

2. I am copying this letter and the note to Robert Armstrong, Tony Duff and David Goodall.

*Handwritten signature/initials*

Att (1)

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



|   |                                    |
|---|------------------------------------|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES<br>..... <i>PR05M 19</i> .....<br>PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1647</i> .....<br>(one piece/item number) | Date and<br>sign                   |
| Extract/Item details:<br><br><i>Attachment to C to Powell dated 13 September 1985</i>                             |                                    |
| CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS<br>UNDER FOI EXEMPTION   |                                    |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)<br>OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958   | <i>14/7/2014</i><br><i>S. Gray</i> |
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| DEPARTMENT/SERIES            | ..... <i>GRA 168</i> ..... |
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| (ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY) |                            |

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LONDON

C/6039

11 September 1985

Prime Minister

CDP

Answers to

the points you

asked me to

establish.

Dear Charles,

HETMAN

1. HETMAN was very moved by the Prime Minister's letter and was particularly appreciative of the sensitive understanding of his personal problems. The reassurance that his family would not be forgotten provided the help and support which he most needs at this difficult time. He also admired the Prime Minister's understanding of the nature of the Soviet system and of the need to demonstrate the strength of Western values to those living under it. HETMAN said that he felt honoured that the Prime Minister took the time and trouble to send him such a thoughtful and personal letter.
2. I need hardly add that this demonstration of the Prime Minister's care and concern has greatly assisted our dealings with HETMAN at this very difficult time.
3. With regard to the Prime Minister's particular concerns about HETMAN (your letter of 7 September), we are taking all necessary precautions for his safety, whilst trying to provide him with as normal an existence as is possible under the circumstances. A number of officers who worked with HETMAN in the past remain in constant contact with him and sufficiently close links of friendship have been established to enable HETMAN to speak frankly about personal and professional matters.
4. HETMAN is very anxious to get a message to his wife. One of his main worries is that she may not yet know that he is alive and well. We are therefore giving urgent attention to finding ways of getting such a message to her.

/5.

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street





C/6039

5. When the present, intensive phase of the case is over, I am sure the Prime Minister would find a meeting with HETMAN very worthwhile.

6. I am copying this letter to Robert Armstrong and to David Goodall (in the absence of Len Appleyard).

*Yours etc,*  
*C*



TOP SECRET AND STRICTLY  
PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

Prime Minister

HETMAN

Action will be taken at 1100 a.m.  
tomorrow Thursday. The press statement will  
be made at 1230. The messages to  
President Reagan & President Mitterrand will  
issue at 0900.

Robert Armstrong will do you  
a speaking note for Cabinet (which  
starts at 11.30).

The various documents have been  
amended to take account of your  
comments.

C D P 11/9



Ref. A085/2289

MR POWELL

---

HETMAN

At my meeting this morning we went through the texts enclosed with Len Appleyard's letter of 6 September to you, together with the amendments made by the Prime Minister and recorded in your latest letter (undated).

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had no comments on the text. The Home Secretary proposed one amendment to the first paragraph of the "on the record" press statement, to make clear HETMAN's position in the Soviet Embassy (as in Note 2 of the Notes for Supplementaries).

3. The Prime Minister's and Home Secretary's amendments have been carried through to the revised text of the press statement. We have agreed a number of other minor amendments, notably in the last three paragraphs of the Speaking Note and in Aide Memoire Number 2. There are also minor additions and changes in the Notes for Supplementaries.

--- 4. I attach a set of the revised documents. These are now regarded as agreed texts.

5. The plan is that at 9.00 am on Thursday 12 September Mr Parshin will be summoned to see Mr Goodall at 11.00 am that day. Mr Goodall will read the Speaking Note, and hand over copies both of that and of the two Aide Memoires. Sir Bryan Cartledge will seek an appointment with Mr Suslov in Moscow an hour later (3.00 pm Moscow time), and give him copies of all three documents.

6. The proposed statement will be issued at the Foreign Office news conference at 12,30 pm (3.30 pm Moscow time) that day.



7. Subject to the Prime Minister's agreement it is proposed that the messages to President Reagan and President Mitterrand should be sent at 9.00 am on the morning of Thursday 12 September. The message to President Reagan will thus reach the White House by about 5.00 am Washington time. I propose, if the Prime Minister agrees, to send a note in parallel to Mr MacFarlane, to tell him that the news is to be given to a press conference at 12.30 pm (7.30 am Washington time), and to express the hope that it may be possible for the President to receive the Prime Minister's message at if not shortly before that time, so that he does not hear the news for the first time on the radio or television.

8. We have agreed contingency arrangements to take action before Thursday if it should prove necessary to do so.

9. The most likely contingency is a summons to Sir Bryan Cartledge from Mr Gorbachev. Such a summons could give fairly short notice - only an hour or two. But it is unlikely to be sent outside working hours. On the other hand there are possible contingencies - an apparently well-informed leak here or in Copenhagen for instance - which might themselves lead the Russians to issue the summons to Sir Bryan Cartledge from Mr Gorbachev and might for this or some other reason require us to take immediate action. Such a contingency would not necessarily surface in working hours.

10. Sir Bryan Cartledge is being asked to let the Foreign and Commonwealth Office know immediately, by telephone or by flash telegram, if and as soon as he is summoned to see Mr Gorbachev. In that event, or in the event of some other contingency which Mr Goodall and I agreed made it necessary to act immediately:

- if the contingency occurred in working hours, Mr Parshin would be summoned immediately to come round as soon as possible - say, an hour later - and messages would be sent immediately to President Reagan and President Mitterrand.



If the contingency occurred early in the day, the news could be announced at the normal Foreign and Commonwealth Office press conference at 12.30 pm. If it occurred too late for that, a special news conference would be convened to take place shortly after Mr Parshin's call.

- if the contingency occurred during "silent" hours Mr Parshin would be summoned at the opening of business the following day. The sequence of events would then be as in the main plan, though some of the time intervals might have to be shortened.

11. Copies of the agreed texts of the Speaking Note and the two Aide Memoires are being sent by secure channels to Sir Bryan Cartledge in working hours tomorrow (in working hours so that the volume of traffic does not appear to the Russians to be abnormal). At the same time Sir Bryan Cartledge will be told of the main plan and of the contingency plan. He will be asked to let the Foreign and Commonwealth Office know immediately, if he receives a summons from Mr Gorbachev. He will be told to take no action until receiving a further telegram of final instructions: that would be the telegram included in the attached texts, and on the main plan it would be despatched on Wednesday afternoon, to reach Sir Bryan Cartledge before close of business that day.

12. Arrangements are being made to brief the three Secretaries of State with a close interest - the Secretaries of State for Trade and Industry, Defence and Scotland - in the latter part of Thursday morning, shortly before the Foreign and Commonwealth Office press conference. On the contingency plan this briefing is likely to have to fall by the wayside.

13. I am sending copies of this minute and the agreed texts to Mr Appleyard, Mr Taylor, Sir Antony Duff and 'C'.

*RIA*

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

9 September 1985



TOP SECRET

SPEAKING NOTE

1. The British Government attach great importance to Anglo-Soviet relations. As has been stressed repeatedly in meetings at the highest level, we see the development of a more constructive relationship between our two countries as serving our mutual political and commercial interests, and contributing to the building of confidence between East and West. The Prime Minister herself is firmly committed to this view.
2. One matter, however, has recurrently caused friction in our bilateral relations: the extent and scope of inadmissible intelligence activities by Soviet officials in the United Kingdom. Too often we have had to make clear that such activities will not be tolerated, and to take the necessary action to protect our national security.
3. I have to tell you that Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY, previously Counsellor at your Embassy, has applied for and been granted asylum in the UK. Mr GORDIEVSKY was a senior official in the KGB. He has provided us with a detailed picture of the extent and nature of Soviet intelligence activities in this country. It is quite clear from his account that despite action as recently as April, these activities have continued on a deplorably large scale.
4. I therefore have with regret to draw your attention to the cases of 25 members of the Soviet community in London, all of whom hold functions and have been concerned in activities incompatible with their positions in the UK. Six of these are diplomatic staff of the Soviet Embassy, three are non-diplomatic staff, seven are members of the Soviet Trade Delegation and nine are Soviet officials working for other organisations.
5. I must therefore ask you to arrange that the 25 persons listed in the Aide Memoire which I shall give you leave the United Kingdom within three weeks, that is not later than *Thursday 3 October*. Those who are present not in this country will not be permitted to return.

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6. The permitted overall number of staff of the Soviet Embassy, Soviet Trade Delegation and ancillary organisations will be correspondingly reduced by 23, since 23 out of these 25 fall under the ceilings arrangements for Soviet officials in Britain.
7. Some of the 25 persons I have referred to have no immunity from jurisdiction. The British authorities are nevertheless prepared to give them the opportunity to make their own arrangements to leave the country. But I must ask you to inform them that if any of them is still in this country in three weeks' time, that is on *Friday 4 October*, deportation proceedings will be instituted against him.
8. The press will be informed today of the action we have taken.
9. I would draw your attention to the fact that Mr GORDIEVSKY's wife and children remain in the Soviet Union. Naturally he is anxious that they should join him here in the UK. We hope that, on humanitarian grounds, the Soviet authorities will accede to this request.
10. I am instructed to hand you this Aide Memoire which is self-explanatory. When you have read it I have some additional points to make.
11. The action which we are obliged to take has been made unavoidable by the persistence of Soviet intelligence activities in this country. As in the past, so in the future we shall remain vigilant to detect such activities and determined to combat them. But the British Government have no desire for this action to obstruct the development of a productive dialogue between our two countries. I am instructed personally to convey this to you as the firm view of both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Both continue to desire the further constructive development of Anglo/Soviet relations.

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12. Guided by this desire the Government have given very careful consideration to the approach made by your Ambassador to Sir Geoffrey Howe on 4 June. They have decided to introduce new arrangements for the ceilings on numbers of Soviet officials in the UK. As I have said, following the departure of the 25 persons I have named to you, the overall permitted number of all categories of Soviet representatives in London will now be 211. This total will remain subject to the British Government's long-standing policy whereby the overall number will be reduced as appropriate in the event of expulsions for unacceptable activities. However, to meet the concerns expressed by your Ambassador on 4 June, it has been decided that within the overall total of 211 the number of Soviet diplomatic staff at the Soviet Embassy will be permitted to rise to 46.

13. Furthermore, there will henceforth be no separate ceilings on the numbers of Soviet non-diplomatic staff at the Embassy, officials at the Soviet Trade Delegation, and staff of ancillary Soviet organisations. These new arrangements are set out in a second Aide Memoire which I shall now ask you to read.

14. The constructive arrangement I have outlined whereby the ceiling on the number of diplomatic staff will be permitted to rise is designed to enable the Soviet Embassy to perform its proper functions, contributing to the positive development of Anglo/Soviet relations which, as I have emphasised, the British Government wishes to see.

15. We shall remain fully alert to any evidence of further abuse by Soviet officials of their position here whether diplomatic or otherwise. In such a case we should respond with firmness. These new and more flexible arrangements would have to be reconsidered and the permitted ceilings would be liable to be reduced as appropriate.

16. I wish also to make absolutely clear that any retaliatory action by the Soviet authorities against British personnel or interests in the Soviet Union will be totally unjustified and will meet with a commensurate response.

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17. The Soviet side should bear in mind that the new arrangements I have outlined are not immutable. It would be open to us to take further measures. Moreover we have information about other Soviet officials, in addition to the 25 persons I have named, whose activities are inconsistent with their declared functions.

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AIDE-MEMOIRE

The Soviet Embassy will be aware that intelligence activities by Soviet citizens in the United Kingdom are totally unacceptable to Her Majesty's Government. As has repeatedly been made clear to the Soviet authorities, the necessary action will be taken against Soviet citizens who engage in such activities.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office regrets to inform the Soviet Embassy that 25 members of the Soviet community in the UK have been identified as being concerned in unacceptable intelligence activities in this country. Their names are as follows:

1. Yuriy Vasilyevich YEZHOV  
First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
2. Vyacheslav Ivanovich KALITIN  
First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
3. Boris Aleksandrovich KORCHAGIN  
First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
4. Valeriy Grigoryevich TOKAR  
Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy
5. Anatoly Nikolayevich MERETIKOV  
Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy
6. Dmitriy Mikhaylovich VASILYEV  
Attache, Soviet Embassy
7. Aleksandr Timofeyevich GORELOV  
Soviet Embassy
8. Vyacheslav Dmitriyevich MISHUSTIN  
Soviet Embassy
9. Igor Fedorovich KHOMUTOV  
Soviet Embassy

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- 2 -

10. Yuriy Pavlovich KOMOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation
11. Oleg Pavlovich KRASAKOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation
12. Viktor Orestovich LOGUSH  
Soviet Trade Delegation
13. Vladimir Ivanovich LYUBENKO  
Soviet Trade Delegation
14. Viktor Viktorovich TIMOFEYEV  
Soviet Trade Delegation
15. Eduard Viktorovich PEREPELKIN  
Soviet Trade Delegation
16. Valeriy Vasilyevich PROKOPCHIK  
Soviet Trade Delegation
17. Valeriy Pavlovich IPATOV  
Moscow Narodny Bank
18. Valeriy Aleksandrovich KOTOV  
Razno
19. Mikhail Yuryevich BOGDANOV  
Correspondent, Socialist Industry
20. Aleksandr Anatolyevich KODINTSEV  
Correspondent, Novosti
21. Yuriy Aleksandrovich KUDIMOV  
Correspondent, Komsomolskaya Pravda
22. Viktor Ivanovich MUZALEV  
Correspondent, TASS

.../23.

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- 3 -

23. Sergey Ivanovich SAYENKO  
Correspondent, Radio Moscow
24. Yuriy Pavlovich ROZHKOV  
International Cocoa Organisation
25. Mikhail Dmitriyevich SAVVATEYEV  
International Wheat Council

The Soviet Embassy is requested to arrange for these 25 Soviet citizens to leave the UK within three weeks from the date of this Aide-Memoire, that is not later than                      October. Those of the above who are at present out of the country will not be permitted to return.

Of those named, the following have no immunity from jurisdiction:

1. Yuriy Pavlovich KOMOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation
2. Oleg Pavlovich KRASAKOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation
3. Viktor Orestovich LOGUSH  
Soviet Trade Delegation
4. Vladimir Ivanovich LYUBENKO  
Soviet Trade Delegation
5. Andrey Vladimirovich NOVIKOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation
6. Eduard Viktorovich PEREPELKIN  
Soviet Trade Delegation
7. Valeriy Vasilyevich PROKOPCHIK  
Soviet Trade Delegation

.../8.

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- 4 -

8. Valeriy Pavlovich IPATOV  
Moscow Narodny Bank
9. Valeriy Aleksandrovich KOTOV  
Razno
10. Mikhail Yuryevich BOGDANOV  
Correspondent, Socialist Industry
11. Aleksandr Anatolyevich KODINTSEV  
Correspondent, Novosti
12. Yuriy Aleksandrovich KUDIMOV  
Correspondent, Komsomolskaya Pravda
13. Viktor Ivanovich MUZALEV  
Correspondent, TASS
14. Sergey Ivanovich SAYENKO  
Correspondent, Radio Moscow

The Soviet Embassy is requested to inform these 14 persons that if any of them is still in this country in three weeks' time, that is on                      October deportation proceedings will be instituted against him.

Mr ROZHKOV of the International Cocoa Organisation and Mr SAVVATEYEV of the International Wheat Council do not have immunity from jurisdiction in respect of activities outside the scope of their official duties, as staff members of these international organisations. Nevertheless, we are prepared to give them the opportunity to make their own arrangements to leave this country. If either of them is still in this country on                      October, deportation proceedings will be instituted against him.

.../The

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- 5 -

The permitted overall level of staff of the Soviet Embassy, Soviet Trade Delegation and ancillary organisations will henceforth be reduced by 23 to 211.

The activities in which those named were concerned are an obstacle to the development of fruitful and constructive relations between our two countries. Both sides have stated that they desire such relations. For its part, the British Government, while determined to take the measures necessary for the protection of national security, will continue to work for a more constructive relationship with the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

September 1985

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

AIDE MEMOIRE

CEILINGS ON THE NUMBER OF SOVIET OFFICIALS IN LONDON

1. Most careful consideration has been given to the Soviet Ambassador's approach of 4 June 1985.
2. We shall as hitherto continue to refuse visas to officials nominated to Soviet establishments in the UK when the record of their previous activities indicates that they would not be acceptable. Second, Soviet officials working in this country at the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet Trade Delegation, or Soviet ancillary organisations here, who engage in unacceptable activities, will be required to leave.
3. In the light of the Soviet Ambassador's approach and our sincere desire for more constructive relations with the Soviet Union, it has been decided to modify the existing arrangements.
4. From a date three weeks from the date of this Aide Memoire that is *Friday 4 October*, the permitted overall number of Soviet officials and representatives in London will be 211. Within this overall total, the number of Soviet diplomats in London will now be permitted to rise to 46.
5. There will henceforth be no separate ceilings on the numbers of Soviet non-diplomatic staff at the Embassy, officials at the Soviet Trade Delegation, and staff of other ancillary Soviet organisations.
6. Any evidence of abuse by Soviet representatives of their position here, whether diplomatic or otherwise, would be liable to lead to further expulsions and could cause these new and more flexible arrangements to be reconsidered.

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TOP SECRET

DRAFT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Dear Ron,

I want to let you know of action we shall be taking later today as a result of a defection of a senior official of the KGB.

The official in question, Oleg GORDIEVSKY, who has applied for and been granted asylum here, was the Head of the KGB Residency at the Soviet Embassy in London.

He has been serving in London since 1982. Though we are holding the details very close, GORDIEVSKY had been working for us for some time. He has been the source of a great deal of invaluable information about the extent and nature of the Soviet intelligence effort in the UK and elsewhere; as well as significant political information on the Soviet Union. Much of this material has already been passed to your people on the usual channels, and there will of course now be more to come.

As a result of GORDIEVSKY's information, we shall be telling the Russians today, and announcing publicly, that we are expelling 25 Soviet diplomatic and other officials from London. All have been actively involved in intelligence activities. Their expulsion will inflict a very heavy blow to the Soviet intelligence capability in this country.

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We are making clear to the Russians, on my personal authority, that while we cannot tolerate the sort of intelligence actions which GORDIEVSKY has revealed, we continue to desire a constructive relationship with them.

At this critical time in East/West relations, with your meeting with Gorbachev and that of President Mitterrand approaching, there are crucial choices to be made by Gorbachev in Geneva and elsewhere which will influence the direction of East/West relations for the coming decade. It is vital that we should all speak with the same voice of our willingness to work patiently but firmly for dialogue and soundly based agreements between East and West. I shall be sending you separately some thoughts on your own meeting with Gorbachev, in which so many hopes are invested. In the meantime, I think it is no bad thing that he should have presented to him so starkly, early in his leadership, the price to be paid for the scale and nature of KGB activities in Western countries. I would hope that action of this kind by a country such as ourselves, coupled with repeated assurances of our sincere desire to build a productive dialogue with the Russians, will help to instil a greater sense of responsibility and realism in the Soviet leadership over their relations with the West.

With best wishes to you as ever

Margaret

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

CURRICULUM VITAE [to be released to the press]

OLEG ANTONOVICH GORDIEVSKY

Date of birth: 10 October 1938

Joined KGB in 1962 and, after a year at their training school in Moscow, spent much of the next 10 years dealing, both in Moscow and abroad, with Soviet "illegals". Subsequently engaged in KGB activities concerning Scandinavia and, later, the UK.

Posted as Counsellor in Soviet Embassy in London in 1982. At the time of his defection had just been appointed Head of the KGB Residency in London.

TOP SECRET



**TOP SECRET** AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

ZCZC

TOP SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

DEYOU

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELNO

OF

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

HETMAN: ACTION FOR EXPULSIONS

My 3 IFTs contain the final texts of a speaking note which David Goodall will use with the Soviet Charge, together with the two accompanying Aides Memoire which he will hand over. Parshin will be summoned at 120800Z and 121000Z. On the morning of 12 September you should put in for a call on Suslov, to take place at 121100Z, or as soon after as possible. However, you should not (not) leave for the MFA until we confirm by a telephone call and/or flash telegram with reference to these telegrams that the interview with Parshin is in progress, and that you should proceed.

2. You should take Suslov through these texts and leave copies of all three with him, explaining that you are acting in parallel because I wish the MFA to have the fullest and most immediate information about the action we are taking in London. Your main message should be that, though we have regrettably been obliged, as always, to act in defence of our security interests, you speak with the personal authority of the Prime Minister and myself in saying that we nonetheless wish the recent improvement in Anglo/Soviet relations to be maintained and indeed developed further. In this context you should draw particular attention

**TOP SECRET** AND STRICTLY PERSONAL



to our favourable response to Popov's demarche about the Soviet diplomatic ceiling.

3. The FCO spokesman will make a statement (text in my 4th IFT) to the press at 121130Z. If asked, you may confirm to the press that you have made a parallel demarche, but should refer all other questions to the FCO.



**TOP SECRET**

DRAFT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
FRENCH REPUBLIC

Dear Mr President

In April 1983 you very kindly sent a personal emissary to inform me of the magnificent French operation which had produced extremely important information concerning the acquisition by the Russians of advanced Western technology.

In a similar spirit, I would like to tell you that we now have in the United Kingdom an important KGB defector, Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY, latterly the Head of the KGB Residency in London, who has provided us over a period of time with significant political and counter intelligence information.

As a result of GORDIEVSKY's information, we shall be telling the Russians today, and announcing publicly, that we are expelling 25 Soviet diplomatic and other officials from London. All have been actively involved in intelligence activities. Their expulsion will inflict a very heavy blow to the Soviet intelligence capability in this country.

We are making clear to the Russians, on my personal authority, that while we cannot tolerate the sort of intelligence actions which GORDIEVSKY has revealed we continue to desire a constructive relationship with them.

**TOP SECRET**



TOP SECRET

At this critical time in East/West relations, with your meeting with Gorbachev and that of President Reagan approaching, there are crucial choices to be made by Gorbachev in Geneva and elsewhere which will influence the direction of East/West relations for the coming decade. It is vital that we should all speak with the same voice of our willingness to work patiently but firmly for dialogue and soundly based agreements between East and West. At the same time, I think it is no bad thing that he should have presented to him so starkly, early in his leadership, the price to be paid for the scale and nature of KGB activities in Western countries. I would hope that action of this kind by a country such as ourselves, coupled with repeated assurances of our sincere desire to build a productive dialogue with the Russians, will help to instil a greater sense of responsibility and realism in the Soviet leadership.

I believe that some of GORDIEVSKY's information will be of particular interest to you, and I have therefore asked that the appropriate officer in our Embassy should brief your Directeur de Cabinet and remain at his disposal for any questions which you may wish to put.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

TOP SECRET



25 copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

Public from  
12-30 on 12 September.

ON THE RECORD STATEMENT

The Soviet Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Mr Parshin, was asked to call at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office earlier today. He was informed that a senior member of the Soviet Embassy, Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY, had sought and been granted asylum in this country. Mr GORDIEVSKY was a Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy from June 1982. He was a senior official in the KGB, and had recently become Head of the KGB Residency in London. Mr GORDIEVSKY was in a position to know full details of Soviet intelligence activities and personnel in this country.

2. Mr Parshin was told that a significant number of Soviet representatives in London have been engaging in intelligence activities which are of course totally incompatible with their status and declared tasks. The nature and scale of the activities are completely unacceptable.

3. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires was therefore informed that 25 Soviet officials, of whom 6 belong to the diplomatic staff of the Soviet Embassy, must leave the country within three weeks.

4. The Government attach great importance to the development of a realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union which can contribute to mutual confidence between East and West. It was accordingly made clear to Mr Parshin that, although our action was necessary in the interests of national security, it remained our policy to work for an improvement in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.

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NOTE FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES (ON THE RECORD)

Who saw the Soviet Charge d'Affaires?

1. The senior available Deputy Under Secretary at the FCO, Mr David Goodall.

Great coup for intelligence/security services?

2. Yes, and the intelligence gained is of very great value to our security operations.

When and where did he defect? Was he in touch with the British authorities before he sought asylum? Has he worked as an agent for British intelligence?

3. No comment.

Where is he now?

4. In this country. I cannot give further details.

Have the Soviet Embassy requested access to him?

5. No. [or Yes, if by then they have]

Is he under protection?

6. I cannot comment on that.

Is he being held under duress?

7. No. His decision to seek asylum was entirely his own.

Why did he defect? Can we be sure he will stay?

8. He has told us that he wishes to become a citizen of a democratic country and live in a free society.

Will he see/speak to the media?

9. No present plans for him to do so.

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

Where is his family?

10. No comment.

When did he start giving information?

11. No comment.

How was this achieved?

12. No comment.

Are any more diplomats implicated by his information?

13. No comment.

Has his information been relevant to any other recent counter-espionage activity - Bettaney etc?

14. No comment.

Was there any prior knowledge of the unacceptable activities of any of the 25 persons now being expelled?

15. No comment.

Will there be prosecutions?

16. Any information that might be relevant to a prosecution would, as in the past, be made available to the prosecuting authorities.

How long have the Russians known about his defection?

17. No comment.

Why if he was KGB officer was he admitted to this country?

18. No comment.

Wrong signal at sensitive time for East/West relations?

19. The activities of these people were a serious threat to national security and a source of friction. They could not be tolerated. We have made it quite clear that we remain committed

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

to developing a more constructive relationship, but that this cannot be at the expense of national security.

Has Mrs Thatcher been in touch with Gorbachev about this?

(or Sir Geoffrey Howe with Shevardnadze?)

20. No.

Any further expulsions planned?

21. Our policy is that if Soviet officials engage in inadmissible activities, appropriate action will be taken.

Any relaxation on control of entry?

22. Our policy remains not to admit to the UK known intelligence officers. In this we will have the valuable help of information provided by Mr Gordievsky.

Effect on ceilings?

23. The permitted level of Soviet officials in London (ie diplomatic staff, Embassy non-diplomatic staff, Soviet Trade Delegation, and ancillary organisations) will be reduced by 23 to 211.

Why not the full 25?

24. Because two of those expelled have been working for international organisations in London and therefore do not count under the ceilings on the Soviet community.

What about the diplomatic ceiling?

25. Under modified arrangements now in force, the permitted number of Soviet diplomatic staff will be set at 46.

But why raise it from 39 to 46?

26. The major consideration is the overall ceiling, now reduced by 23 to 211. But within that ceiling it is very important

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

that each side should be able to maintain a viable Embassy in the other's capital. Our judgment is that 46 is the right figure.

Link between British Embassy Moscow and new Soviet diplomatic ceiling in London?

27. (Unattributable) Not directly. But we obviously had our needs in Moscow in mind when fixing the new ceiling in London for the Russians.

Will the ceilings be reduced in future in the event of expulsions?

28. The ceilings on Soviet representatives in London will be reduced as appropriate in the event of expulsions for unacceptable activities.

Why are those who are not diplomats not being subjected to the normal process of law?

29. The Government must decide how to deal with these cases bearing in mind the needs of our own security and all other relevant factors. In this instance it was decided that our objectives were best served by requiring the withdrawal of these persons.

What measures will be taken if they do not leave within three weeks?

30. We have no reason to expect that they will not leave before then.

Do you expect retaliation?

31. Any such action by the Soviet authorities would be entirely without justification. The Soviet authorities know that HM Government would take an extremely serious view of any retaliation.

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

What exactly did those expelled do?

32. Regret cannot give further details.

What damage have they done to national security?

33. Cannot comment.

TOP SECRET



**TOP SECRET - TO BE OPENED ONLY BY  
PRIVATE SECRETARY (FOREIGN AFFAIRS)**

Papers relating to the defection of  
Mr Gordievskiy

Or, in his absence

<sup>delete</sup>  
(1) or (2)

- (1) by the person designated to open TOP SECRET documents on his behalf.
- (2) to be returned to sender.

From: Opened to discern whether the Thatcher biography could  
see contents. Decided NOT appropriate. M. H. 8/7/10

Head of Histories

2



VC

Page 1 of 2 pages



Copy no <sup>6</sup>...  
of 6 copies

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

Dear An,

HETMAN

Thank you for your letter of 6 September with which you enclosed texts for the Prime Minister's approval relating to the action to be taken with the Russians next week.

Texts

In general the Prime Minister was well content with these. Her main comment relates to the on the record statement to the press (E). She does not want the statement to mince words. The Russians were caught redhanded in intelligence activities and HETMAN was in a position to know all about them, both personnel and activities. The end of the first paragraph should therefore read:

"... defection to the UK of a senior member of the Soviet Embassy, Mr. Oleg Gordievsky. Mr. Gordievsky was in a position to know full details of Soviet intelligence activities and personnel in this country. Mr. Parshin was told that he had provided information showing that a significant number of Soviet representatives in London have been engaging in intelligence activities which are of course totally incompatible with their status and declared tasks. The scale and nature of the activities are completely unacceptable."

There is a small drafting point in the last paragraph of the draft message to President Reagan. The first sentence should read: "At this critical time in East/West relations, with your meeting with Gorbachev and that of President Mitterrand approaching ..."

Incidentally two different spellings of Parshin appear in the texts.

Procedure

The Prime Minister agrees with the procedure proposed. But the messages for President Reagan and President Mitterrand should not be despatched without specific authority from me.



Line for Ministers

Your letter promises this for early next week. The Prime Minister is concerned that it should be a robust line which puts the need for firm action to deal with Soviet intelligence activities as the first priority, with our interest in not allowing this action to block the development of Anglo/Soviet relations in second place. We should not convey any hint of apology: the blame for any damage to Anglo/Soviet relations and wider East/West dialogue belongs and must be placed firmly on Russian shoulders.

Timing of Action

You wrote to me separately about this. The Prime Minister is distinctly uneasy about the Foreign Secretary's recommendation that action should be postponed until 12 September. She has no doubt that the Russians will register her own and the Foreign Secretary's absence from London and will calculate that this may delay action, with the risk that they will try to pre-empt us by summoning Sir Bryan Cartledge. But she recognises the force of the presentational points put by the Foreign Secretary and would reluctantly be prepared to agree to wait until 12 September on the condition that we have contingency arrangements which would allow us to act within a matter of an hour or two were we to receive news before then that HM Ambassador Moscow had been summoned by Mr. Gorbachev. I should be grateful if such arrangements could be considered at Sir Robert Armstrong's meeting on 9 September so that I can subsequently report them to the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor in the Home Office, to Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Antony Duff and to "C".

Yours sincerely  
Charles Powell

(CHARLES POWELL)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.





Copy no <sup>4</sup> ...  
of 4 copies

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 September 1985

Dear Min,

HETMAN


Thank you for your letter of 6 September enclosing a message to the Prime Minister from HETMAN. She was very touched by this and has decided to write back to him. I enclose her letter and should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be passed on.

The Prime Minister had three further thoughts:

- (i) she assumes that HETMAN is being kept under conditions of complete security with not the slightest risk that the Russians can find him. She does not wish to know details, simply to be assured that this is the case.
- (ii) She is struck by the troubled tone of HETMAN's message, particularly concerning his family. She wonders whether he has some sort of companion to talk to and confide in at what is obviously a very difficult time for him.
- (iii) She wonders whether thought is being given to the possibility of getting indirect messages to his family to assure them about his well-being.

On none of these points does the Prime Minister wish to be informed in any detail. But it would be helpful to have brief replies on each of them which I could pass on to her.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely  
  
(CHARLES POWELL)

C. McColl, Esq.





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

7<sup>th</sup> September 1951

Dear Mr. Gordievsky.

I was very touched by your message and by your understanding of how difficult the decision about your family was for us. It was entirely natural to do everything possible to enable your family life to continue. But we had to face up to the reality of the kind of people with whom we are dealing and the fact that their values are very different from ours.

Our anxiety for your family remains and we shall not forget them. Having children of my own, I know the kind of thoughts and feelings which are going through your mind each and every day. But just as your concern is about them, so their concern will be for your safety and well-being.



Please do not say that life has no meaning. There is always hope. And we shall do all we can to help you through these difficult days.

Perhaps when the immediate situation has passed we may meet and talk. I am very conscious of your personal courage and your stand for freedom and democracy. I should very much like to have the benefit personally of your unique experience and your thoughts on the way we can help those who have never known the things which we in the West take for granted.

You will be very much in my thoughts and I send you my best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

7<sup>th</sup> September 1951

Dear Mr. Gordiewsky.

I was very touched by your message and by your understanding of how difficult the decision about your family was for us. It was entirely natural to do everything possible to enable your family life to continue. But we had to face up to the reality of the kind of people with whom we are dealing and the fact that their values are very different from ours.

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You will be very much in my thoughts and I send you my best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher



● Prime Minister

It would be a very nice gesture if I could send a reply back on your behalf thanking him for the message & praising his fortitude.

London SE1

6 September 1985

Dear Charles

CJP  
6/9.

HETMAN

1. As I mentioned to you HETMAN was told on the evening of 4 September of the Prime Minister's decision not to pursue any further the attempt to secure the release of his family.

2. His response was amazingly robust. While obviously disappointed he has assured us that he fully understands the reasons behind the Prime Minister's decision. To prove the point, he has drafted a message to her, which I forward as an attachment to this letter.

3. I should perhaps explain the somewhat elliptical reasoning in his third paragraph. HETMAN has adapted his thinking to the reality of the situation and now hopes that a firm stance by HMG will, in the long run, work in his favour. His thought is that, faced with the disadvantages of a hard British line, the Soviet authorities will be prompted to offer up his family as part of some general package of measures aimed at improving Anglo-Soviet relations. It would of course be wrong to discourage him at this stage from clinging to this, admittedly slender, hope.

Yours ever  
Colin

Colin McColl

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing St.



MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER

I should like you to know how deeply grateful I am for the concern and effort which you and other Ministers and officials have given to the problem of trying to save my family. I also appreciate that to set aside normal procedures and to allow the unofficial approach to go forward was a unique act of great generosity and humanity.

Although I had prayed for an early reunion with my wife and children, I fully accept and understand the reasons for taking decisive action in response to the insulting statement passed through Mr Rubinski. Indeed, I am proud to have been able to work for a country which shows no fear in dealing resolutely with such threats and bullying tactics.

I must, however, go on hoping that some way can be found to secure the release of my family as, without them, my life has no meaning. The firmness and scale of the action which Britain is preparing to take and the increasing success of the West in exposing the activities and agents of Soviet and other Communist intelligence services may provide the means whereby my fervent hope can be fulfilled.

Meanwhile, I will continue to do everything I can to help in strengthening the cause of freedom and democracy and the security of Great Britain.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 September 1985

Dear Charles.

HETMAN: Timing of Action

At Sir Robert Armstrong's meeting yesterday morning to discuss the implementation of the decisions recorded in your minute of 4 September to Sir Robert, there was discussion of the timing of our action with the Russians. It was agreed that it was very important that all the necessary preparations (drafting of instructions, etc) should be absolutely right, and that this, together with the Prime Minister's wish to see the texts, ruled out action before the weekend. The consensus of the meeting was that in practice it was unrealistic to expect to be able to take action before next Tuesday.

This however raises a serious problem, in that both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and also Malcolm Rifkind, the Minister of State responsible for East/West relations, will be out of London. The Foreign Secretary returns from Nigeria on Wednesday night. Malcolm Rifkind will be attending the inter-governmental conference of the Ten on Monday, and a crucial Political Cooperation Ministerial Meeting of the Ten on South Africa on Tuesday, both in Luxembourg. He cannot be back in London until Tuesday night.

The Foreign Secretary believes that there would be serious disadvantages in our taking action in the absence of a senior Minister in London able to explain our decision authoritatively in the face of the enormous media interest which we can expect. Action in the absence from London of both the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary could well be construed by the Russians and by the public as distancing ourselves from action which will have major international and domestic political consequences. Every day's delay does of course increase the risk of some action by the Soviet Government (eg Gorbachev's meeting with Sir Bryan Cartledge) which could have the effect of putting us in baulk. But given the length of time which has already elapsed since HETMAN's arrival in London, 48 hours delay is unlikely to be critical. He therefore reluctantly concludes that the best answer, despite the evident undesirability of delay, is to hold over our action until Thursday 12 September, when the Prime Minister and he will be back in London.

.../Against





- 2 -

Against this background I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister is prepared for our action with the Soviet authorities in London and Moscow to be taken on Thursday.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Hatfield in the Cabinet Office.

*Yours ever,*

*Le Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 September 1985

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
 RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
 OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT <sup>Dear Charles</sup> HETMAN

I enclose texts for the Prime Minister's approval relating to the action to be taken with the Russians next week:

- ✓ A. Speaking Note to be used with the Soviet Charge d'Affaires by the senior available FCO official.
- ✓ B. Two aide memoires to be handed to the Soviet Charge
- ✓ C. Draft message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan
- ✓ D. Draft message from the Prime Minister to President Mitterrand
- ✓ E. Draft press statement and replies to supplementary questions
- ✓ F. Draft instructions to Sir Bryan Cartledge.

Speaking Note

We have included in this a reference to HETMAN's family in order to be able to say in public that we have asked that they should be allowed to join him. It is envisaged that both the aide memoires, and the less formal speaking note, would be handed to the Soviet Charge.

Messages to President Reagan and President Mitterrand

The Prime Minister asked for a message to President Reagan to be drafted. We have also prepared a draft message to President Mitterrand, which envisages a direct contact on the subject of HETMAN's defection between Mitterrand's Directeur de Cabinet, M. Colliard, [redacted]

Our Friends plan to pass to Colliard in the first instance a digest of HETMAN's most interesting political product.

.../Press





Press Line

We have prepared a composite set of answers to supplementaries for use as appropriate by the Foreign Office and Home Office spokesmen. We propose to add to it factual background notes to be drawn on by the spokesmen on forthcoming high level visits and contacts, and on Anglo/Soviet trade. We will prepare a line to take for Ministers as requested early next week.

Sir Bryan Cartledge has recommended that in the event of Soviet retaliation (eg expulsions of our Embassy staff) he should be authorised to deal with the press handling of this in the first instance with the local correspondents in Moscow. The main purpose of this is to ensure that all our staff who are directly affected have the opportunity to contact their relatives in the UK before any public announcement is made. This can best be done if the Ambassador's finger, rather than News Department's, is on the publicity button. We would agree in advance with Sir Bryan the statement which he would issue. After this initial statement, the ball would be passed back to FCO News Department.

We have given some thought to the briefing of allies on our action (besides the messages to President Reagan and President Mitterrand, which would not be revealed). We shall need to issue guidance to our posts immediately after action is taken with the Soviet Charge. We envisage the main briefing being done by our Permanent Representative to NATO, supplemented as necessary in capitals.

I wrote to you separately about the timing of our action. There are a number of gaps in the enclosed drafts which depend on the final decision on this.

Sir Robert Armstrong is to hold a meeting on Monday at 1030 am to review action in the light of the Prime Minister's comments and those of the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary on these papers. Sir Geoffrey Howe has not yet seen them.

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor (for the Home Secretary), Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Antony Duff and 'C'.

*Yours ever,*

*Len Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



## SPEAKING NOTE

1. The British Government attach great importance to Anglo-Soviet relations. As has been stressed repeatedly in meetings at the highest level, we see the development of a more constructive relationship between our two countries as serving our mutual political and commercial interests, and contributing to the building of confidence between East and West. The Prime Minister herself is firmly committed to this view.
2. One matter, however, has recurrently caused friction in our bilateral relations: the extent and scope of inadmissible intelligence activities by Soviet officials in the United Kingdom. Too often we have had to make clear that such activities will not be tolerated, and to take the necessary action to protect our national security.
3. I have to tell you that Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY, previously Counsellor at your Embassy, has applied for and been granted political asylum in the UK. Mr GORDIEVSKY was a senior official in the KGB. He has provided us with a detailed picture of the extent and nature of Soviet intelligence activities in this country. It is quite clear from his account that despite action as recently as April, these activities have continued on a deplorably large scale.
4. I therefore have with regret to draw your attention to the cases of 25 members of the Soviet community in London, all of whom hold functions and have been concerned in activities incompatible with their positions in the UK. Six of these are diplomatic staff of the Soviet Embassy,

.../3 are



3 are non-diplomatic staff, 7 are members of the Soviet Trade Delegation and 9 are Soviet officials working for other organisations.

5. I must therefore ask you to arrange that the 25 persons listed in the Aide Memoire which I shall give you leave the United Kingdom within three weeks, that is not later than .....

6. The permitted overall number of staff of the Soviet Embassy, Soviet Trade Delegation and ancilliary organisations will be correspondingly reduced by 23, since 23 out of these 25 fall under the ceilings arrangements for Soviet officials in Britain.

7. Some of the 25 persons I have referred to have no immunity from jurisdiction. The British authorities are nevertheless prepared to give them the opportunity to make their own arrangements to leave the country. But I must ask you to inform them that if any of them is still in this country in three weeks time, that is on ..... deportation proceedings will be instituted against him.

8. The press will be informed later today of the action we have taken.

9. I would draw your attention to the fact that Mr GORDIEVSKY's wife and children remain in the Soviet Union. Naturally he is anxious that they should join him here in the UK. We hope that, on humanitarian grounds, the Soviet authorities will accede to this request.

10. I am instructed to hand you this Aide Memoire which is self-explanatory. When you have read it I have some

(1)

.../additional



additional points to make.

11. The action which we are obliged to take has been made unavoidable by the persistence of Soviet intelligence activities in this country. As in the past, so in the future we shall remain vigilant to detect such activities and determined to combat them. But the British Government have no desire for this action to obstruct the development of a productive dialogue between our two countries. I am instructed personally to convey this to you as the firm view of both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Both continue to desire the further constructive development of Anglo/Soviet relations.

12. Guided by this desire the Government have given very careful consideration to the approach made by your Ambassador to Sir Geoffrey Howe on 4 June. They have decided to introduce new arrangements for the ceilings on numbers of Soviet officials in the UK. As I have said, following the departure of the 25 persons I have named to you, the overall permitted number of all categories of Soviet representatives in London will now be 211. This total will remain subject to the British Government's long-standing policy whereby the overall number will be reduced as appropriate in the event of expulsions for unacceptable activities. However, to meet the concerns expressed by your Ambassador on 4 June, it has been decided that within the overall total of 211 the number of Soviet diplomatic staff at the Soviet Embassy will be permitted to rise to 46.

13. Furthermore, there will henceforth be no separate  
e  
ceilings on the numbers of Soviet non-diplomatic staff at  
n



the Embassy, officials at the Soviet Trade Delegation, and staff of ancillary Soviet organisations. These new arrangements are set out in a second Aide Memoire<sup>(2)</sup> which I shall now ask you to read.

14. The constructive arrangement I have outlined whereby the ceiling on the number of diplomatic staff will be permitted to rise is designed to enable the Soviet Embassy to perform its proper functions, contributing to the positive development of Anglo/Soviet relations which, as I have emphasised, the British Government wishes to see.

15. I must make one thing very clear. We shall remain fully alert to any evidence of further abuse by Soviet officials of their position here whether diplomatic or otherwise.

In such a case we shall respond with firmness. These new and more flexible arrangements would have to be reconsidered and if appropriate the permitted ceilings <sup>would</sup> ~~may~~ have to be reduced.

16. I wish also to make absolutely clear that any retaliatory action by the Soviet authorities against British personnel or interests in the Soviet Union will be totally unjustified and will meet with a commensurate response. The Soviet side should bear in mind that the new arrangements I have outlined are not immutable, and that the information available to us about activities of Soviet officials which are inconsistent with their declared functions does not stop at the 25 persons I have named.



E.R.

IDE MEMOIRE (1)

1. The Soviet Embassy will be aware that intelligence activities by Soviet citizens in the United Kingdom are totally unacceptable to Her Majesty's Government. As has repeatedly been made clear to the Soviet authorities, the necessary action will be taken against Soviet citizens who engage in such activities.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office regrets to inform the Soviet Embassy that 25 members of the Soviet community in the UK have been identified as being concerned in unacceptable intelligence activities in this country. Their names are as follows:

1. Aleksandr Timofeyevich GORELOV  
Soviet Embassy
2. Vyacheslav Ivonovich KALITIN  
First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
3. Igor Fedorovich KHOMUTOV  
Soviet Embassy
4. Boris Aleksandrovich KORCHAGIN  
First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
5. Anatoly Nikolayevich MERETIKOV  
Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy
6. Vyacheslav Dmitriyevich MISHUSTIN  
Soviet Embassy
7. Valeriy Grigoryevich TOKAR  
Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy
8. Dmitriy Mikhaylovich VASILYEV  
Attache, Soviet Embassy
9. Yuriy Vasilyevich YEZHOV  
First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
10. Yuriy Pavlovich KOMOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation

.../11.



**E.R.**

11. Oleg Pavlovich KRASAKOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation
  12. Viktor Orestovich LOGUSH  
Soviet Trade Delegation
  13. Vladimir Ivanovich LYUBENKO  
Soviet Trade Delegation
  14. Andrey Vladimirovich NOVIKOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation
  15. Eduard Viktorovich PEREPELKIN  
Soviet Trade Delegation
  16. Valeriy Vasilyevich PROKOPCHIK  
Soviet Trade Delegation
  17. Mikhail Yuryevich BOGDANOV  
Correspondent, Socialist Industry
  18. Valeriy Pavlovich IPATOV  
Moscow Narodny Bank
  19. Alesksandr Anatolyevich KODINTSEV  
Correspondent, Novosti
  20. Valeriy Aleksandrovich KOTOV  
Razno
  21. Yuriy Aleksandrovich KUDIMOV  
Correspondent, Komsomolskaya Pravda
  22. Viktor Ivanovich MUZALEV  
Correspondent, TASS
  23. Yuriy Pavlovich ROZHKOV  
International Cocoa Organisation
  24. Mikhail Dmitriyevich SAVVATEYEV  
International Wheat Council
  25. Sergey Ivanovich SAYENKO  
Correspondent, Radio Moscow
3. The Soviet Embassy is requested to arrange for these 25 Soviet citizens to leave the UK within three weeks from the date

.../of



**E.R.**

of this Aide Memoire, that is not later than  
Those of the above who are at present out of the country will not  
be permitted to return.

4. Of those named, the following have no immunity from  
jurisdiction:

Yuriy Pavlovich KOMOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation

Oleg Pavlovich KRASAKOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation

Viktor Orestovich LOGUSH  
Soviet Trade Delegation

Vladimir Ivanovich LYUBENKO  
Soviet Trade Delegation

Andrey Vladimirovich NOVIKOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation

Eduard Viktorovich PEREPELKIN  
Soviet Trade Delegation

Valeriy Vasilyevich PROKOPCHIK  
Soviet Trade Delegation

Mikhail Yuryevich BOGDANOV  
Correspondent, Socialist Industry

Valeriy Pavlovich IPATOV  
Moscow Narodny Bank

Aleksandr Anatolyevich KODINTSEV  
Correspondent, Novosti

.../Valeriy



**E.R.**

Valeriy Aleksandrovich KOTOV

Ravno

Yuriy Aleksandrovich KUDIMOV

Correspondent Komsomolskaya Pravda

Viktor Ivanovich MUZALEV

Correspondent TASS

Yuriy Pavlovich ROZHKOV

International Cocoa Organisation

Mikhail Dmitriyevich SAVVATEYEV

International Wheat Council

Sergey Ivanovich SAYENKO

Correspondent, Radio Moscow

The Soviet Embassy is requested to inform these 16 persons that if any of them is still in this country in three weeks' time, that is on \_\_\_\_\_ deportation proceedings will be taken against him.

5. The permitted overall level for staff of the Soviet Embassy, Soviet Trade Delegation and ancillary organisations will henceforth be reduced by 23 to 211.

6. The activities in which those named were concerned are an obstacle to the development of fruitful and constructive relations between our two countries. Both sides have stated that they desire such relations. For its part, the British Government, while determined to take the measures necessary for the protection of national security, will continue to work for a more constructive relationship with the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.



**E.R.**

## AIDE MEMOIRE

## CEILINGS ON THE NUMBER OF SOVIET OFFICIALS IN LONDON

1. Most careful consideration has been given to the Soviet Ambassador's approach of 4 June 1985.
2. We shall as hitherto continue to refuse visas to officials nominated to Soviet establishments in the UK when the record of their previous activities indicates that they would not be acceptable. Second, Soviet officials working in this country at the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet Trade Delegation, or Soviet ancillary organisations here, who engage in unacceptable activities, will be required to leave.
3. In the light of the Soviet Ambassador's approach and our sincere desire for more constructive relations with the Soviet Union, it has been decided to modify the existing arrangements.
4. From a date three weeks from the date of this Aide Memoire, that is \_\_\_\_\_, the permitted overall number of Soviet officials and representatives in London will be 211. This overall number will be reduced as appropriate in the event of any expulsions for unacceptable activities. But within this overall total, the number of Soviet diplomats in London will now be permitted to rise to 46.
5. There will henceforth be no separate ceilings on the numbers of Soviet non-diplomatic staff at the Embassy, officials at the Soviet Trade Delegation, and staff of other ancillary Soviet organisations.
6. Any evidence of abuse by Soviet representatives of their position here, whether diplomatic or otherwise, may cause these new and more flexible arrangements to be reconsidered.



DSR 11 (Revised)

TOP SECRET

C

DRAFT: ~~XXXXX~~/letter/~~XXXXX~~/~~XXXXX~~/~~XXXXX~~/~~XXXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:  
PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:  
PRESIDENT REAGAN

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

I want to let you know of action we shall be taking later today as a result of a defection of a senior official of the KGB.

CAVEAT.....

The official in question, Oleg GORDIEVSKY, who has applied for political asylum here, was the Head of the KGB Residency at the Soviet Embassy in London.

He has been serving in London since 1982. Though we are holding the details very close, GORDIEVSKY had been working for us for some time. He has been the source of a great deal of invaluable information about the extent and nature of the Soviet intelligence effort in the UK and elsewhere; as well as significant political information on the Soviet Union. Much of this material has already been passed to your people on the usual channels, and there will of course now be more to come.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

As a result of GORDIEVSKY's information, we shall be telling the Russians today, and announcing publicly, that we are expelling 25 Soviet diplomatic and other officials from London. All have been actively involved



TOP SECRET

in agent-running. Their expulsion will inflict a very heavy blow to the Soviet intelligence capability in this country.

We are making clear to the Russians, on my personal authority, that while we cannot tolerate the sort of intelligence actions which GORDIEVSKY has revealed, we continue to desire a constructive relationship with them.

At this critical time in East/West relations, with your meeting and that of ~~Francis~~ <sup>President</sup> Mitterrand with Gorbachev approaching, there are crucial choices to be made by Gorbachev in Geneva and elsewhere which will influence the direction of East/West relations for the coming decade. It is vital that we should all speak with the same voice of our willingness to work patiently but firmly for dialogue and soundly based agreements between East and West. I shall be sending you separately some thoughts on your own meeting with Gorbachev, in which so many hopes are invested. In the meantime, I think it is no bad thing that he should have presented to him so starkly, early in his leadership, the price to be paid for the scale and nature of KGB activities in Western countries. I would hope that action of this kind by a country such as ourselves, coupled with repeated assurances of our sincere desire to build a productive dialogue with the Russians, will help to instil a greater sense of responsibility and realism in the Soviet leadership over their relations with the West.

TOP SECRET



DRAFT: ~~xxxx~~/letter/~~xxxx~~/~~xxxx~~/~~xxxx~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM  
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:  
President Mitterrand

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

1. In April 1983 you very kindly sent a personal emissary to inform me of the magnificent French operation which had produced extremely important information concerning the acquisition by the Russians of advanced Western technology.
2. In a similar spirit, I would like to tell you that we now have in the United Kingdom an important KGB defector, Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY, latterly the Head of the KGB Residency in London, who has provided us over a period of time with significant political and counter intelligence information.
3. As a result of GORDIEVSKY's information, we shall be telling the Russians today, and announcing publicly, that we are expelling 25 Soviet diplomatic and other officials from London. All have been actively involved in agent-running. Their expulsion will inflict a very heavy blow to the Soviet intelligence capability in this country.
4. We are making clear to the Russians, on my personal authority, that while we cannot tolerate the sort of

Enclosures-flag(s).....



intelligence actions which GORDIEVSKY has revealed we continue to desire a constructive relationship with them.

5. At this critical time in East/West relations, with your meeting and that of President Reagan with Gorbachev approaching, there are crucial choices to be made by Gorbachev in Geneva and elsewhere which will influence the direction of East/West relations for the coming decade. It is vital that we should all speak with the same voice of our willingness to work patiently but firmly for dialogue and soundly based agreements between East and West. At the same time, I think it is no bad thing that he should have presented to him so starkly, early in his leadership, the price to be paid for the scale and nature of KGB activities in Western countries. I would hope that action of this kind by a country such as ourselves, coupled with repeated assurances of our sincere desire to build a productive dialogue with the Russians, will help to instil a greater sense of responsibility and realism in the Soviet leadership.

6. I believe that some of GORDIEVSKY's information would be of particular interest to you and I have therefore asked that the appropriate officer in our Embassy should brief your Directeur de Cabinet and remain at his disposal for any questions which you may wish to put.



ON THE RECORD STATEMENT

1. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Mr Parshin, was asked to call at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office earlier today. He was informed of the defection to the UK of a senior member of the Soviet Embassy, Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY. Mr Parshin was told that the Soviet official had provided information showing that a significant number of Soviet representatives in London have been engaging in <sup>intelligence</sup> activities <sup>with use of cover totally</sup> incompatible with their status and declared <sup>tasks.</sup> ~~functions~~. The scale and nature of these activities are completely unacceptable.

→ (must X. (overpru))

2. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires was therefore informed that 25 Soviet officials, of whom 6 belong to the diplomatic staff of the Soviet Embassy, must leave the country within three weeks.

3. The Government attach great importance to the development of a realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union which can contribute to mutual confidence between East and West. It was accordingly made clear to Mr Parshin that although our action was necessary in the interests of national security, it remained our policy to work for an improvement in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.



NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES (ON THE RECORD)

Who saw the Soviet Charge d'Affaires ?

1. The senior available Deputy Under Secretary at the FCO, Mr David Goodall.

Who is the defector ?

2. Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY was a Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy from June 1982. He was a senior official in the KGB and had recently become Head of the KGB Residency in London.

Great coup for intelligence/security services

3. Yes, and the intelligence gained is of very great value to our security operations.

Has he requested asylum ?

4. Yes, and it has been granted.

and where  
When/did he defect ? Was he in touch with the British authorities before he sought asylum ? Has he worked as an agent for British intelligence ?

5. No comment.

Where is he now ?

6. In this country. I cannot give further details.

Have the Soviet Embassy requested access to him ?

7. No.

Is he under protection ?

8. I cannot comment on that.

Is he being held under duress ?

9. No. His decision to defect was entirely his own.

X must  
previous  
page.  
? Mr G.  
was in a  
position to  
know full  
details of  
Soviet intelligence  
activities &  
personnel  
in this  
country.



Why did he defect ? Can we be sure he will stay ?

10. He has told us that he wishes to become a citizen of a democratic country and live in a free society.

Will he see/speak to the media ?

11. No present plans for him to do so.

Where is his family ?

12. In the Soviet Union.

Will they be allowed to rejoin him here ?

13. That depends on the Soviet authorities.

Have you put a request to them ?

14. Yes.

When did he start giving information ?

15. No comment.

How was this achieved ?

16. No comment.

Are any more diplomats implicated by his information ?

17. No comment.

Has his information been relevant to any other recent counter-espionage activity - Bettaney etc ?

18. No comment.

How long have the Russians known about his defection ?

19. No comment.

Why if he was KGB officer was he admitted to this country ?

20. No comment.

Wrong signal at sensitive time for East/West relations ?

21. The activities of these people were a serious threat to



national security and a source of friction. They could not be tolerated. We have made it quite clear that we remain committed to developing a more constructive relationship, but that this cannot be at the expense of national security.

Has Mrs Thatcher been in touch with Gorbachev about this ?  
(or Sir Geoffrey Howe with Shevardnadze ?)

22. No.

Any further expulsions planned ?

23. Our policy is that if Soviet officials engage in inadmissible activities, appropriate action will be taken.

Any relaxation on control of entry ?

24. Our policy remains not to admit to the UK known intelligence officers. In this we will have the valuable help of information provided by Mr Gordievsky.

Effect on ceilings ?

25. The permitted level for Soviet officials in London (ie diplomatic staff, Embassy non-diplomatic staff, Soviet Trade Delegation, and ancillary organisations) will be reduced by 23 to 211.

Why not the full 25 ?

26. Because two of those expelled have been working for international organisations in London and therefore do not count under the ceilings on the Soviet community.

What about the diplomatic ceiling ?

27. Under modified arrangements now in force, the permitted number of Soviet diplomatic staff will be set at 46.



But why raise it from 39 to 46 ?

28. The major consideration is the overall ceiling, now reduced by 23 to 211. But within that ceiling it is very important that each side should be able to maintain a viable Embassy in the other's capital. Our judgement is that 46 is the right figure.

Link between British Embassy Moscow and new Soviet diplomatic ceiling in London ?

29. (Unattributable) Not directly. But we obviously had our needs in Moscow in mind when fixing the new ceiling in London for the Russians.

Will the ceilings be reduced in future in the event of expulsions ?

30. The ceilings on Soviet representatives in London will be reduced as appropriate in the event of expulsions for unacceptable activities.

Why are those who are not diplomats not being subjected to the normal process of law ?

31. The Government must decide how to deal with these cases bearing in mind the needs of our own security and all other relevant factors. In this instance it was decided that our objectives were best served by requiring the withdrawal of these persons.

What measures will be taken if they do not leave within three weeks ?

32. We have no reason to expect that they will not leave before then.

Do you expect retaliation ?

33. Any such action by the Soviet authorities would be entirely without justification. The Soviet authorities



know that HM Government would take an extremely serious view of any retaliation.

What exactly did those expelled do ?

34. Regret cannot give further details.

What damage have they done to national security ?

35. Cannot comment.



## CURRICULUM VITAE

OLEG ANTONOVICH GORDIEVSKY

Date of birth: 10 October 1938

Joined KGB in 1962 and, after a year at their training school in Moscow, spent much of the next 10 years dealing, both in Moscow and abroad, with Soviet "illegals". Subsequently engaged in KGB activities concerning Scandinavia and, later, the UK.

Posted as Counsellor in Soviet Embassy in London in 1982. At the time of his defection had just been appointed Head of the KGB Residency in London.



ZCZC

TOP SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

DEYOU

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELNO

OF

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

HETMAN: ACTION ON EXPULSIONS

1. My 3 IFTs contain the final texts of a speaking note which .....will use with the Soviet Charge, together with the two accompanying Aides Memoire which he will hand over. Parchine will be summoned at ..... for ..... You should now put in for a call on Suslov, to take place at ..... *or as soon after as possible.* ..... However, you should not (not) leave for the MFA until we confirm by a telephone call with reference to these telegrams that the interview with <sup>Parchine?</sup> Parchine is in progress, and that you should proceed.

2. You should take Suslov through these texts and leave copies of all three with him, explaining that you are acting in parallel because I wish the MFA to have the fullest and most immediate information about the action we are taking in London. Your main message should be that, though we have regrettably been obliged, as always, to act in defence of our security interests, you speak with the personal authority of the Prime Minister and myself in saying that we nonetheless wish the recent improvement in Anglo/Soviet relations to be maintained

.../and



and indeed developed further. In this context you should draw particular attention to our favourable response to Popov's demarche about the Soviet diplomatic ceiling.

3. The FCO spokesman will make a statement (text in my 4th IFT) to the press at .....

If asked, you may confirm to the press that you have made a parallel demarche, but should refer all other questions to the FCO.



**TOP SECRET - TO BE OPENED ONLY BY**

**PRIVATE SECRETARY (FOREIGN AFFAIRS)**

Papers relating to the defection of  
Mr Gordievskiy

Or, in his absence

- (1) by the person designated to open TOP SECRET documents on his behalf.
- (2) to be returned to sender.

From Opened to discern whether the Thatcher biographer could see contents  
 Decided NOT appropriate. MSH 8/7/10  
 Head of Histories

①



London SE1

6 September 1985

*Dear Charles,*

HETMAN

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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

2. Our representative will, in the first instance, hand over to Colliard a digest covering HETMAN's most significant political reporting to date. This will be translated into French and Colliard may well show it to Mitterand. Just in case the Prime Minister asks to see it I am enclosing for you a copy of the (I fear not completely clean) English draft.

*Yours ever,*  
*Colin*  
Colin McColl

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing St.



|  |                                    |
|--|------------------------------------|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES<br>..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....<br>PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1647</i> .....<br>(one piece/item number) | Date and sign                      |
| Extract/Item details:<br><br><i>Attachment to McColl to Powell dated<br/>6 September 1985</i>                    |                                    |
| CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS<br>UNDER FOI EXEMPTION  |                                    |
| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)<br>OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958  | <i>14/7/2014</i><br><i>G. Gray</i> |
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Use the card for one piece/item number only

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e.g.

|                              |                            |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|
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| PIECE/ITEM                   | ..... <i>GRA 168</i> ..... |
| (ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY) | ..... <i>49</i> .....      |

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The box described as 'Missing' is for TNA use only (it will apply to a document that is not in its proper place after it has been transferred to TNA)



Je Vc.



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

HETMAN

I should record briefly the conclusions of the meeting held this afternoon by the Prime Minister to discuss the minute of 3 September by the Foreign Secretary and the accompanying paper by officials on HETMAN. The Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary, Sir A. Duff and "C" were present in addition to yourself.

It was decided that:

- (i) there was no realistic prospect that the Soviet Union would release HETMAN's family and therefore no advantage in pursuing further discussion of this possibility with them, either officially or on unofficial channels;
- (ii) it was recognised that this would be hard for HETMAN to accept. It should be explained to him that we had already risked a lot by the delay involved in the approach on unofficial channels to try to secure release of his family; and that further delay in taking action to remove Soviet intelligence officers in London was unacceptable;
- (iii) the appropriate response to the information provided by HETMAN was the expulsion of the 25 identified Soviet intelligence officers. The possibility of further expulsions would be kept open, to be decided in the light of the Soviet response;



- (iv) the expulsion of the 25 should be accompanied by a reduction in the overall ceiling for Soviet officials in London to 211. But to mitigate the likely Soviet retaliation against our Embassy in Moscow, we should offer an increase in the ceiling for diplomatic staff at the Soviet Embassy in London to 46;
- (v) we should not, for the time being, reduce the free travel area for Soviet officials in London. But the possibility of such a reduction should be kept in reserve in the light of the Soviet reponse to the expulsion of the 25;
- (vi) the decision to expel 25 Soviet officials should be communicated to the Soviet Chargé in London by a senior FCO official (or possibly a junior Minister). Parallel action should be taken by HM Ambassador in Moscow with Mr. Suslov;
- (vii) action should be taken very soon, probably on 9 September;
- (viii) a strong ground for early action was to minimise the risk of a prior summons to HM Ambassador Moscow from Mr. Gorbachev. Such a meeting would be intended, and could have the effect, of inhibiting our decision on the expulsion of the Soviet intelligence officers. If nonetheless it took place before we could act, a further Ministerial meeting might be needed to examine the consequences;
- (ix) a decision on how to respond to a Soviet request for access to HETMAN would have to be taken in the light of circumstances. Any such interview must only take place in the presence of a senior British official;
- (x) a precise text of what should be said to the Soviet Chargé (and to the Soviet authorities in Moscow)



should be prepared as soon as possible;

- (xi) the text of a press statement should similarly be prepared. This should make clear that action to expel the 25 Soviet officials was being taken following the defection of a Soviet official who had been Head of the KGB's operations in the United Kingdom for three years and who had provided a great deal of information about Soviet intelligence activities. Nothing should be said about the circumstances of his defection;
- (xii) it would also be necessary to prepare a line for Ministers to take in response to questions;
- (xiii) a message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan, to be sent on the direct line to the White House, should also be prepared but should be despatched only a matter of hours before action was being taken with the Soviet Chargé;
- (xiv) the texts in (x)-(xiii) would need to be cleared with the Prime Minister and other Ministers;
- (xv) meanwhile the circle of those aware of HETMAN's defection and the proposed expulsion of Soviet officials should remain very restricted. Press Officers and those who would need to know should be briefed only shortly before action was taken.

I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Home Secretary, to Sir Antony Duff and to "C".

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

4 September 1985



TOP SECRET  
and STRICTLY  
PERSONAL

Private Secretary

The Ambassador's last word  
on the Family and  
Free Travel Area, just received.

Mrs Llewellyn-Smith

4/9

FM MOSCOW No 811 of 3 Sept 85

T O P S E C R E T ADDRESSEE ONLY ~~IS~~ DECYPHER YOURSELF  
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR LLEWELLYN-SMITH FROM HMA  
YOUR TELNO 761: HETMAN

1. THE FAMILY (PARA 3 OF YTUR). I SEE THE STRONGEST OBJECTIONS TO CONTINUING TO PURSUE WHAT WE KNOW TO BE A LOST CAUSE. IF CAN ONLY SIGNAL WEAKNESS TO THE RUSSIANS AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO ESCALATE THEIR COUNTER-THREATS: WE COULD RISK LOSING THE INITIATIVE IN THE ENTIRE OVERT EXCHANGE. HAVING MADE OUR ATTEMPT, ON THE APPROPRIATE (COVERT) CHANNEL, AND (AS WE EXPECTED) GOT NOWHERE, WE SHOULD LEAVE IT AT THAT. WE HAVE, AFTER ALL, OUR OWN PEOPLE AND OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS TO CONSIDER. FOR ALL THESE REASONS, AND ALSO BECAUSE I DO NOT WISH TO SEE OUR FORTHCOMING EXCHANGES HERE IN MOSCOW DAMAGED BY AN ESSENTIALLY EXTRANEIOUS FACTOR, I WOULD BE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO TAKING ANY ACTION HERE IN SUPPORT OF WHATEVER MORE MAY BE SAID IN LONDON ON THE FAMILY QUESTION (AS DISTINCT FROM OUR DEMARCHE ON EXPULSIONS AND WITHDRAWALS).

2. FREE TRAVEL AREA. (PARA 4 OF YTUR). I HAVE LITTLE TO ADD TO THE ARGUMENTS IN PARA 6 OF MY TELNO 806 EXCEPT TO POINT OUT THAT THE INEVITABLE RETALIATORY MEASURES HERE (UNIQUE TO THE UK) WOULD DAMAGE NOT ONLY OUR MILITARY

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT



PAGE TWO TS AO DY ~~TS~~

THE MAIN ARGUMENT, HOWEVER, REMAINS THE POTENTIAL EFFECT ON THE MORALE OF THE STAFF OF THIS EMBASSY, WHO WOULD PROBABLY BE EXCLUDED FROM RECREATIONAL FACILITIES OPEN TO THEIR WESTERN COLLEAGUES AND FRIENDS. IN LOCAL TERMS WE WOULD ACTUALLY BE HELPING THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE PARIAS OF US.

GRS000

NNNN

UDBVWQWOIGICZ-BA%

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

PRIME MINISTER

HETMAN

The following are the points for decision at your meeting this afternoon.

1. Do we continue to try to secure the release of his family ?  
Or, in the light of the Soviet response so far, do we give up ?

The Foreign Secretary wants to give up. Officials are agnostic but pessimistic about the chances of success.

2. How many Russians do we expel ? The Options are :

(a) 25

(b) 9 with 16 others required to leave

(c) 9 [This is Foreign Secretary's preference]

?

3. What effect should this have on the ceiling for Soviet staff ?  
Should we reduce the overall ceiling, but allow the ceiling for diplomatic staff to rise ?

4. Should we further restrict the free travel zone for Soviet diplomats (from 25 to 20 miles) ?

5. Should we take action against intelligence residents identified by HETMAN in East European Embassies ?

6. What should be the timing of any action against the Russians ?  
Should we wait to see if the Gorbachev/Cartledge encounter materialises ?

.../7.





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

Page 2

7. Should you send a message to Gorbachev once we have decided what action to take ?
8. How do we respond meanwhile to the Soviet request - unofficial so far - for access to HETMAN ?
9. How should publicity be handled ?

C.D.P.

4 September 1985

C D POWELL





PRIME MINISTER

HETMAN

1. Since we discussed the issues arising from HETMAN's defection on 2 August, officials have continued to work on the Options for action with the Russians. I attach as a basis for discussion at your meeting on 4 September a Memorandum, and Annex analysing the Options, prepared following discussion by the FCO, Home Office, Security Service and our Friends under the Chairmanship of Sir Robert Armstrong.

2. While all this immensely helpful analysis has been going on, I have of course been reflecting a good deal myself about the crucially important decisions that we have to take. So no doubt, have you. My own present instinct is that the official analysis somehow leads to a seemingly inevitable conclusion which does not at the end of the day make political sense. Let me try to explain why my own mind takes me in a different direction.

3. I have no doubt that the three objectives set out in the paper, on national security, foreign policy, and HETMAN's family, are the right ones. The first operational question we have to decide is whether the third objective is attainable, and whether we should proceed any further in the attempt to secure the release of the family. This is clearly a very important factor in the future handling of HETMAN. Looking at the situation objectively, I find it inconceivable that the Russians will release the family. All our experience shows that, in a vindictive and patient spirit, they will see the family as their only card with which eventually to lure HETMAN back to the Soviet Union. They cannot allow HETMAN to serve as an example of treachery rewarded in this

.../way.





way. No temporary gain in terms of expulsions or ceilings will weigh in the balance against this.

4. Again, looking objectively at the situation, I believe we have done what we should do for HETMAN. We owe him a great debt, and it was surely right to honour it by an attempt to get the family out. That attempt has been made, and on a straightforward reading of the Soviet answer it has failed. I see no realistic chance that the Russians will change their minds. This still leaves us with the difficult problem of handling HETMAN in the future. I am not convinced that it is right for us to offer the prospect, which I do not believe is practical, that we can achieve the return of his family. Without under-estimating the problems, I believe that we must now convince HETMAN that we have discharged our moral obligation, to the extent possible in reality.

5. Against this realistic background, we need to take a fresh look at the balance between the other two factors. It seems to me fundamental that we should retain the decisions in our own hands. I question whether the Memorandum prepared by officials strikes the right balance. The central question relates to the number of Soviet officials to be expelled from this country. On the basis that I have described I am very doubtful about the political judgement underlying the official paper that 25 Russian Intelligence Officers must leave the country as a minimum.

6. The numbers matter to the Russians. I question whether action on this scale, even with the incentive of raising the diplomatic ceiling (which I agree should be an essential part of our conclusion) could be taken without a very serious overall effect on our central policy objectives over the life of this Parliament. The judgement of the Memorandum is that with action of this order, the Russians would be likely to

.../freeze





freeze the Anglo/Soviet dialogue probably for as much as two or three years. This would effectively prevent us from playing a wider role of influence in the development of East/West relations - a role in which you and the Government have invested so much effort, and which is important not least in terms of our relations with the Americans. Moreover, I believe the domestic political consequences - except in the very short term - would be equally damaging. If these are the likely consequences of enforcing 25 departures, we should look at other Options.

7. I believe that the expulsion of the 9 Russians who top the list, as in the first stage of Option C, is and could be presented as a valid response in its own right to HETMAN's revelations. We would of course lower the overall ceiling correspondingly. Nine expulsions, on top of the 5 earlier this year, would be a substantial blow against the Soviet capability in this country. In addition, we should of course make it clear to the Russians that the remainder of the 25 were "busted". Their value as intelligence officers would be effectively neutralised. Finally, the revelation of HETMAN's defection would, in itself, be a substantial intelligence coup, which will greatly and rightly redound to the credit of our Agencies: we must see that it does.

8. This is of course essentially a matter of judgement on two separate questions. There is the political question about the importance of our not over-playing a dramatic security coup at the cost of jeopardising our key longer term objectives. I have no doubt about the political importance of that. It is much more difficult to judge the difference in impact on the Russians of expelling 25 rather than 9 of their Intelligence Officers. But my instinctive judgement is that that difference could be decisive.

.../9.





9. I think it essential, as Sir Bryan Cartledge has advised, to hold on to the proposal to raise the diplomatic ceiling in whatever approach we make to the Russians. The suggestion floated in the Memorandum that the free travel area for Soviet officials in London should be reduced is a largely extraneous measure to add to the package, as well as likely to damage our own interests in Moscow. I believe it should be set aside.

10. We should and will continue to deal firmly with Soviet intelligence activities in this country. In these terms I believe that the enforced departure of another 9 intelligence officers and the neutralisation of a further 16 would meet our security objectives. And for the reason I have given, I believe we should think very hard indeed before going further than that at the risk of damaging a central political objective.

11. I am copying this minute to the Home Secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Antony Duff and Colin McColl (for 'C').

*Approved by the Foreign Secretary  
and signed in his absence.*

*LVA,*

3 September 1985

G H



## M E M O R A N D U M

HETMAN

1. Officials have examined, in the light of the Prime Minister's meeting of 2 August with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the possibilities for action with the Russians as a result of HETMAN's defection. This paper sets out recommendations and points for decision by Ministers following discussion between representatives of the FCO, Home Office, Security Service and our Friends.

2. The following are annexed as background:

- A. Analysis of the available Options for action
- B. List of Russian Intelligence Service (RIS) Officers identified by HETMAN
- C. Speaking Note used on the unofficial channel, 16 August
- D. Soviet reply on the unofficial channel
- E. Draft FCO Memorandum on Ceilings: Expulsions Policy.
- F. Analysis of Soviet Reply of 28 August based on discussion with HETMAN
- G. Analysis by HM Ambassador Moscow of the Foreign Policy Implications.

Numbers and Definitions

3. The following is a brief guide to terms and numbers used.

Soviet Officials in London

Overall (global) Ceiling, on all Soviet officials and press/trade etc representatives: currently 234.

Diplomatic Ceiling, on Embassy staff with diplomatic cover; currently 39.

British Embassy in Moscow

No formal ceiling. 43 Diplomatic staff at present, with three vacant slots following April expulsions.



RIS Officers (list at Annex B)

The 25: 25 identified agent-running operatives. They include 7 diplomats.

The 25 divide into a "top Nine" including 4 diplomats, and a further 16.

The 20: this is the reserve list of 20 RIS coopted workers GRU Service Attaches, less important intelligence officers, and others (mainly cypher staff).

#### Introduction

4. We have three main objectives, relating to national security and intelligence, foreign policy, and to HETMAN's family:

##### (i) National Security

To use HETMAN's defection and information to inflict the maximum damage on the Russian Intelligence Services; to gain credit for the considerable intelligence coup and the work of our security and intelligence services;

##### (ii) Foreign Policy

To preserve our ability to develop a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union and thus to contribute to the East/West dialogue. This means acting in such a way as to minimise the likelihood of Soviet retaliation which would cripple the effective functioning of the British Embassy in Moscow;

##### (iii) Family

To do what we can to secure the release of HETMAN's wife and children.

.../ 5.



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6. At first sight this looks like a crude rejection. But HETMAN's own view (see Annex F) is that the message does not categorically rule out the release of the family under any circumstances, and may indeed indicate that the Russians, behind their initial bluster, are prepared to negotiate. HETMAN's interpretation, as he freely admits, is bound to be coloured by his personal involvement. Even if it is correct, and the Russians would be prepared to consider the release of the family, we have no means of knowing whether they would agree to it on the sort of terms that Ministers would have to insist on. They would be tempted to exploit the family to beat down the UK's terms - a tactic that we would have to resist by laying down a firm deadline and refusing to enter into a process of negotiation. The strongest argument in favour of making an attempt relates to the future management of HETMAN: it would show that we had done everything possible to secure the release of his family, and this in turn would reduce the risk that he might ultimately become disaffected. It remains our judgement that we are very unlikely indeed to be able to secure the release of the family. Nevertheless, however slender, this possibility should not be ignored. We have therefore included in Annex A an Option incorporating a further attempt to secure the release of the wife and children through action on the official channel.

.../7.



7. The Russians have created a further uncertainty in telling Sir Bryan Cartledge to stand by for a summons to call on Mr Gorbachev, which could come at any time. They have indicated that the subject is bilateral. This development could be coincidental, but we think this unlikely. A call by a British Ambassador on the General Secretary is virtually unprecedented. Given the timing, it seems probable that it is at least indirectly related to HETMAN. It could be that Gorbachev will offer a carrot in the form of an account of how productive the Anglo/Soviet dialogue could be in the absence of the temporary upsets which have plagued Anglo/Soviet relations. It could also be a way of buying time, since the Russians may calculate the British would be reluctant to take action against their intelligence officers while a call on Gorbachev is in the pipeline. As our Ambassador has argued, we should not allow ourselves to be put in baulk by this Soviet device, given the strong reasons for taking early action.

#### Access to HETMAN

8. It is probable that, following the Soviet demand to see HETMAN, we will receive an early official approach from the Soviet Embassy demanding consular access to him. HETMAN has said that he wants to see representatives of the Embassy. He believes that this is the best way of conveying the message to his family that he is alive and well, and that his arguments with Embassy representatives, whom he knows well, might have an influence on the outcome as regards his family. We do not believe that he would be susceptible to an attempt at such a meeting to turn him round. Given also our legal obligation (UK/Soviet Consular Convention) we are in any event bound to facilitate such a meeting, which should be arranged under Home Office auspices. It would be best for this to take place after Ministers have decided how to handle the issues raised by his defection. It would be possible for the FCO to play for time if an approach is made, but only for a limited period. FCO officials should therefore respond to any approach at this stage by saying that they are not in a position to give any information about HETMAN and his whereabouts, but that they will make enquiries and arrange to pass the Embassy's request to him.



The Options

9. The rest of this paper is written on the broad assumption that 25 RIS officers must leave the country but with minimum damage to our ability to maintain a political dialogue with the Soviet Union.

10. The problem lies in reconciling our national security objective of a vigorous action inflicting serious damage on the RIS, with our foreign policy objective of sustaining an ability to contribute to the East/West dialogue, and with the objective of being seen to respond adequately in terms of public opinion to the revelations of a major defector. A vigorous response would be appropriate on security grounds, both in order to inflict damage on the RIS and to secure credit for the success of the Agencies. Soviet counter-action is certain to follow. But the stronger our action, the more likely it will be that the Soviet reaction will be sharp and longlasting. Their reaction is likely to include retaliation against our Embassy in Moscow, and a freeze in Anglo/Soviet relations which will affect the timing of high level visits and events, eg Mr Shevardnadze to London (we are aiming for later this year); Mr Younger at the Head of a Scottish Trade Council delegation to Moscow on 15 September; and the Anglo/Soviet Joint Commission chaired by Mr Channon in London on 31 October-1 November. With action of the order of 25 enforced Soviet departures, the Russians would be likely to want to freeze the Anglo/Soviet dialogue for a substantial period, perhaps as much as two or three years. Britain could also be denied a fair share of the major export opportunities arising at the outset of the 1986-90 Soviet Five Year Plan. On the other hand, action on a scale less than say 25, would be more difficult to present publicly as an adequate response to HETMAN's disclosures.

11. The best hope of mitigating the Soviet response lies in offering the Russians an incentive, in the form of an increase in the ceiling for diplomatic staff at the Soviet Embassy in London. We know they attach great importance to securing

.../such an



such an increase which would be an earnest of our wish for a stable long-term relationship with them. But we have to recognise that even with such an incentive, the Russians would be bound to react to enforced withdrawals and the publicity that would go with them.

12. The various Options available, and supporting arguments, are set out in a Note at Annex A. Our approach will depend on whether Ministers decide that a further attempt should be made to secure the release of the family. If they decide against this, the choice will lie between Options A and B at paragraph 8 of Annex A, depending on a judgement about the likely severity of the Soviet reaction, and the public presentation of the package. If Ministers decide on a further attempt to secure the family, then an approach in two stages to the Russians will be appropriate, as set out at Option C in paragraphs 12-15. In the first stage we would tell the Russians officially that our reaction to HETMAN's disclosures would be mitigated, both as regards scale and arrangements for ceilings, if the family were released by a specified date; and we would tell them precisely what these arrangements would be, adding that if the family were not released much more severe consequences would automatically follow, involving the ceilings. In the second stage, following the expiry of the deadline, we would take more or less severe action depending on whether the Russians had released the family or not.

13. Under all these Options we should have to defend the decision to increase the diplomatic ceiling. This could readily be done by emphasising the disruption caused to the Soviet intelligence effort by the removal of RIS operatives, the lasting benefit of the reductions in the overall ceiling, and our ability (thanks to HETMAN) to identify and exclude any Soviet intelligence officers put forward as candidates to fill the vacant slots in the Soviet establishment (see paragraph 7 of Annex A).

.../14.



Publicity

14. The handling of publicity will be an important element in securing our objectives over national security, foreign policy and HETMAN's family, and is indeed an integral part of the political decisions to be made. We believe that the fact of HETMAN's defection must be made public, and that the expulsions/enforced withdrawals will in any case become public. They should therefore be made the subject of an announcement immediately after they are notified to the Soviet Embassy rather than limiting ourselves to defensive reaction. Beyond this, the publicity will require different handling depending on whether we pursue the Option of trying to secure the release of the family. If we were to succeed in this, our public exploitation of HETMAN's defection would to some extent be inhibited. (The Russians were told on the unofficial channel that if the family were released no publicity would be given to this. We cannot guarantee to prevent publicity, but should be ready to handle this aspect of the defection in low key.) If we do not attempt, or attempt and fail, to secure the family, we shall not be subject to the same constraint. It will be open to us, by exploitation of the information revealed by HETMAN, to increase the discomfiture of the RIS and to secure credit for the Agencies' intelligence achievement. But there is a timing point, and a question of balance, in that massive and public humiliation of the RIS could influence the Soviet reaction. We suggest that the main publicity themes should follow from our objective of preserving the national security while maintaining a productive Anglo/Soviet dialogue. We recommend that officials should work further on guidelines for publicity according to the Option which Ministers decide on.

15. As regards the machinery for handling publicity, the division of Ministerial responsibility imposes a joint effort by the Home Office (questions relating to HETMAN's request for asylum, removal of certain non-diplomatic Soviet personnel, and Security Service aspects) and the Foreign

.../Office



Office (effect on relations with the Soviet Union, expulsion of diplomatic, Soviet Trade Delegation, and certain other categories of personnel). Effective coordination is essential and would be assisted if for this purpose the two spokesmen were, with the agreement of the Home Secretary, to work jointly under the general direction of the Foreign Secretary.

16. All aspects of publicity about our action consequent on HETMAN's defection (viz, expulsions, ceilings, etc) should be handled in London. But Sir Bryan Cartledge has pointed out that difficulties have arisen in the past over publicity about Soviet retaliation against British personnel in Moscow. He recommends that the initial press briefing about this specific matter should be by our Embassy there, with local British press correspondents, to ensure that personnel concerned (and their families) are all informed before the story breaks. Once the Embassy has made the initial disclosure of any expulsions from Moscow, all further questions about these should be answered by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The closest liaison with the Embassy on content and timing would be necessary.

.../MODALITIES



## MODALITIES

17. We offer the following recommendations on the modalities of whatever official approach it is decided to make to the Russians.

Timing

18. The approach should be made as soon as possible after Ministers take the necessary decisions consistent with the need to be prepared and where necessary translate the necessary papers (speaking notes, instructions to Moscow, etc).

Level

19. Action should be taken in London either at Junior Ministerial or senior official level at the discretion of the Foreign Secretary. In the absence of Ambassador Popov on home leave until late September, the Charge d'Affaires at the Soviet Embassy is Mr Parchine, the Counsellor representing the International Department of the CPSU. We believe that he can be expected to transmit a message accurately to Moscow.

Supporting Action in Moscow

20. In the event of a decision by Ministers to move straight to Option A or B, without making a further attempt to secure the release of the family, we see advantage in supporting action being taken in Moscow by Sir Bryan Cartledge with Mr Suslov, Head of the Second European Department of the MFA, immediately after the action in London. Sir Bryan agrees. This would ensure that everything possible had been done to avert any distortion in the transmission of the message to the Soviet authorities (it is evident that the message transmitted to Moscow about the April expulsions was distorted). Suslov is an influential figure in the Soviet foreign policy establishment.

.../High



High Level Message

21. The case for or against a high level political message to the Soviet leadership depends in the first instance on which Option is adopted. It would be a mistake to involve Ministers directly in transactions concerning the family. We, therefore, recommend against such a message if Option C is followed. In case of Option A or B, a message, setting out the importance we attach to the continuing development of our dialogue with the Soviet Union, might help to tip the balance in Soviet consideration of counter-action. What Gorbachev says to our Ambassador may also have a bearing on this. We therefore, believe that the possibility of a message either from the Prime Minister to Gorbachev or from the Secretary of State to Mr Shevardnadze (whom he will be meeting in New York on 23 September) should be kept under review for possible use at the point at which our decisions concerning enforced withdrawals/ceilings are communicated to the Russians.

## OTHER POSSIBLE MEASURES

The Free Travel Area

22. Travel restrictions on the official Soviet community in the UK were introduced in 1954 as a reciprocal measure for the restrictions on UK citizens in the USSR. Foreigners in the Soviet Union are able to travel freely, without notification, only within a radius of 40 km (25 miles) of central Moscow, but this area is much reduced by restrictions on access to particular areas. Until 1982, the Free Travel Area permitted to the Russians was a 35 mile radius from Hyde Park Corner. Following the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981, the FTA was reduced in February 1982 to a 25 mile radius.

23. We know that the RIS carry out many intelligence activities on the fringes of the FTA, where the country lends itself to such operations and surveillance is particularly difficult. A reduction of the area to a 20 mile radius (ie by about 36%

.../including



including a wide swathe of green belt territory) would seriously inhibit the clandestine activities of the RIS, and would reduce the FTA to about the same size as its equivalent in Moscow.

24. There is a strong security case for taking this opportunity to make such a reduction. This would materially increase the chances of the Security Service detecting and thus limiting future activity by the RIS. It would also help presentationally in explaining publicly a response to HETMAN's revelations which in respect of the Ceilings might seem lenient. On the other hand, the addition of this measure would increase the risk of a strong Soviet reaction. Our Ambassador is strongly opposed because the probable Soviet counter-measures would inhibit our own intelligence gathering activities on the periphery of Moscow as well as adversely affecting the morale of the British diplomatic, business and journalists community.

The East Europeans: GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria

25. HETMAN has identified the Residents of the GDR, Czechoslovak and Bulgarian Intelligence Services in London. We believe that they should not be left to carry on their intelligence functions undisturbed. It is arguable that they should pay the penalty for identified intelligence activity against the UK, and for their close links with the RIS. On the other hand, we have no interest in a major row with these countries, with which we have been trying to establish a better relationship based on a differentiation between them and the Soviet Union and an appeal to their specific national interests and historical experience. Moreover, we have to weigh carefully the possibility of retaliation against our own Embassies. This will require consultation with our Ambassadors in East Berlin, Prague and Sofia after which separate advice will be submitted.

Need to Know: Widening the Circle

26. The circle of those who know about HETMAN should be widened

.../not



not less than 24 hours before action is taken with the Russians, so as to include those Ministers and officials who will need to know, viz:

Ministers

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry  
Secretary of State for Defence  
Ministers of State, FCO

Officials

Spokesmen at No 10, FCO, Home Office  
FCO Chief Clerk  
Heads of FCO Eastern European Department,  
Personnel Operations Department and  
Personnel Services Department  
Deputy Head of PUSD, FCO  
(responsible for liaison with the  
Security Service)  
Assistant Head of Soviet Department

It would also be essential for the FCO to have discretion, strictly within the need to know principle, to brief those others, (eg secretarial staff and translator) who will need to be operationally involved. Sir Bryan Cartledge has argued strongly that, if we are to avoid hiccups in handling the expulsions, the FCO Chief Clerk and Heads of News Department and the Personnel Departments should be briefed at the earliest possible stage.

.../RECOMMENDATIONS



## RECOMMENDATIONS AND POINTS FOR DECISION

1. Soviet request for access to HETMAN:

FCO to play for time, offering to pass on any message to HETMAN. Aim to delay a meeting between HETMAN and Soviet representatives.

2. Options for approach to the Russians.

Should a further attempt be made to secure release of wife and children ?

If not, then choice between

- A. (the less severe): Expel 9; reduce overall ceiling correspondingly; require withdrawal of further 16 in easier time, without effect on ceiling; raise diplomatic ceiling to 46.
- B. (the more severe): Expel 25; reduce overall ceiling correspondingly; raise diplomatic ceiling to 46.

If further attempt is to be made, then two-staged approach:

- C. Stage One : Offer, if family released by specified date, to require only withdrawal of 9, with no effect on ceilings; and to raise diplomatic ceiling to 46.  
Stage Two : If Russians release family, implement our offer. If they do not, move to Option A or B.

3. Publicity

Officials to work out guidelines according to the Option chosen. FCO and Home Office spokesmen to work in close coordination under general direction of Foreign Secretary.

4. Modalities

- (a) Action in London by FCO is recommended, with
- (b) Supporting action by HM Ambassador in Moscow (in case of Option A or B)

.../(c)



(c) High level message (Prime Minister to Gorbachev or Secretary of State to Shevardnadze) is for consideration also in case of Option A or B.

5. Reduction of Free Travel Area

For decision whether to include in the package of measures.

6. GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria - Residents

Consultation with our Ambassadors, followed by advice to Ministers.

7. Widening the Circle

Brief Ministers and officials who need to know, not less than 24 hours before taking action with Russians.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
LONDON

3 September 1985



HETMAN

## ANALYSIS OF THE AVAILABLE OPTIONS

1. The main problem in judging the appropriate response to HETMAN's presence and disclosures is the conflict between the requirements of national security, of public presentation and of foreign policy. The need to respond to the Soviet approach of 4 June about the Ceilings on Soviet Embassy staff is a further complicating factor.
2. There are three requirements which lead in different directions. The first is the protection of national security, which means firm action against the RIS. The second is to be seen to respond adequately to a major defection. The third, predating HETMAN's defection, is to preserve our ability to contribute to the East/West dialogue, which means reaching a satisfactory arrangement with the Russians governing the size of our respective Embassies in Moscow and London. Only such an arrangement will allow the effective conduct of bilateral business and the promotion of our East/West policy objectives.
3. Sir Bryan Cartledge has argued strongly that 46 diplomatic staff is his minimum requirement in Moscow for an effective Embassy. It is unlikely that we shall secure this unless we allow the Russians a similar number. We therefore judge that the right response to the Russians' approach of 4 June, which will preserve the effective functioning of our Embassy, is one which permits the Russians a limited increase in the diplomatic ceiling, to 46.
4. The need to react vigorously to HETMAN's revelations conflicts with this requirement. Such a reaction would entail large-scale expulsions or withdrawals, including both diplomatic and non-diplomatic staff and amounting to 25 people (of whom 7 are diplomats). Such expulsions would normally, under our existing ceilings policy, which is publicly known, entail a reduction in the diplomatic as well as the overall ceiling - rather than a rise in the diplomatic ceiling as required by our attempt to resolve the ceilings problem.
5. This suggests that there are in theory two alternative approaches:
  - (1) We attempt to combine our response to the two problems of dealing with the expulsions and reviewing the Ceilings Policy. The advantage of this approach is that by pitching our "offer" of a new diplomatic ceiling at the right level, we would have a reasonable chance of limiting Soviet retaliation and preserving the essentials of our working relationship with the Russians and our ability to contribute to the East/West dialogue. Although this might be portrayed as a weak and contradictory response, in allowing the Russians to introduce more Soviet intelligence officers under diplomatic cover than previously, we should be able to point to the major disruption inflicted on the RIS by the removal of their key intelligence officers and by the reduction of the Overall Ceiling.

/(2)



Page 2 of 5

(2) We set on one side for the time being our attempts to reach satisfactory arrangements over diplomatic ceilings, and deal separately with HETMAN's revelations and their consequences, making clear to the Russians that we would subsequently be reverting to the ceilings issue. The advantage of this approach is that our response to the HETMAN revelations would be consistent with our well tried Ceilings Policy and easy to defend in those terms (although there would come a point at which the undermining of the functioning of the British Embassy could itself incur criticism of the Government). The drawback of the approach is that by ratcheting down the diplomatic ceiling appropriately as a result of expulsions of Soviet intelligence officers, we risk inflicting severe damage on our working relationship with the Russians and more broadly on our ability to contribute to the development of the East/West dialogue.

6. Under this second approach, we would be obliged to reduce the diplomatic ceiling to a level at which the Russians would be bound to retaliate strongly. For example, even if we were to expel only 9, of whom 4 are diplomats, the diplomatic ceiling would be reduced from its present level of 39 to 35. The Russians would allege that this was intolerable and would probably reduce our numbers in Moscow to a level at which we could no longer function effectively. We therefore believe that there is no realistic alternative to the first approach, whereby we would combine action over expulsions with an offer of new arrangements for the ceilings.

7. A question for decision by Ministers is how to defend this approach in public. Such a defence would have to rest on the following points:

(1) At an important time in East/West relations, the UK has a role in developing the East/West dialogue. A productive Anglo/Soviet relationship is a necessary condition for playing this role. In developing a relationship capable of furthering such a dialogue, it is essential to have the necessary "diplomatic infrastructure" in the shape of effective Embassies in Moscow and London.

(2) We are therefore allowing a controlled increase in the ceiling on Soviet diplomatic staff subject to future good behaviour. But we will continue rigorously to exclude known intelligence officers (HETMAN's own information will be of enormous help in this) and expel those who are detected engaging in unacceptable activities.

(3) The overall numbers of Soviet officials in London will still be limited by a global ceiling which will continue to be reduced as appropriate if and when expulsions of Soviet intelligence officers make this necessary. This weapon of reduction in the global ceiling, together with the disruption caused by the expulsions/withdrawals which we are demanding as a result of HETMAN's revelations, will cause considerable

/organisational



organisational ~~organisational~~ problems for the Soviet authorities and will bite hard enough to ensure that any threat to our security is minimised.

THE OPTIONS

8. We have identified options under this first approach to cater for two possibilities:

- (i) that the Soviet reply to the message they received about the family on the unofficial channel is taken as a firm negative, ruling out any further attempt;
- (ii) that Ministers decide to make a further attempt to secure the family's release.

No further attempt to secure release of family

In this case there are two broad options:

A The less severe

We would expel the top 9 of the 25. The Russians would be told to withdraw the other 16. We would reduce the overall ceiling appropriately by 8 to 226 (one of the 9, being a member of an international organisation, does not fall under the ceilings).

We would raise the diplomatic ceiling to 46. If the Russians retaliated, we would have the options, depending on the scale of retaliation, of reducing the overall ceiling further, and/or expelling some of the reserve list of 20, or (in the event of a minimal reaction) of calling it a day. Our aim would be to respond in a measured way which would enable the Russians to draw a line under the expulsions without further counter-retaliation.

B The more severe

We would expel 25 and reduce the overall ceiling to 211. Raise the diplomatic ceiling to 46.

In the event of retaliation, we would, depending on the scale, be able to expel some of the remaining 20.

We could also consider combining with either option the reduction of the Free Travel Area.

9. It is possible to construct variants of greater or lesser severity. It would also be possible to threaten to reduce the newly established diplomatic ceiling of 46 in the event of retaliation, putting it back for example to its starting point of 39. The problem with this is that if we were forced to implement the threat, the ceilings 'problem' and its potential effects on our Embassy in Moscow would remain unsolved. But there would be advantage in leaving the Russians in uncertainty by telling them that in the event of retaliation the new ceilings would need to be reconsidered.



10. Further attempt to secure release of family

This option has advantages from the point of view of managing HETMAN, but would limit our freedom of manoeuvre in the probable event of the Russians refusing to release the family. We should first need to make a clear and attractive offer to the Russians, combined with the threat of what would follow if they rejected it. We would need to be clear in our own minds what these consequences would be. They would have to be substantially more severe than under the first offer. Otherwise, once they were made known to the Russians, in the likely event of their refusal to release the family, we would lose credibility. It would be essential to set an absolutely firm deadline by which, if the family had not arrived in the UK, the worse consequences would automatically follow.

11. If this further attempt is to be made, we suggest the following two staged approach:

Option C

In the first stage, the Soviet Charge would be summoned and officially told that HETMAN was in the UK and very ready to meet representatives of the Soviet Embassy. The Charge would be told that HETMAN's revelations of the scale of Soviet intelligence activity could not be passed over. The withdrawal of Soviet intelligence officers, and public announcement of HETMAN's presence and the withdrawals, would be unavoidable. The only chance of mitigating our action would be the release of the family.

12. The Charge would be told that if HETMAN's wife and children were released and reached the UK by a specified date (say one week later) we would require only the withdrawal of 9 RIS officers over a specified period of time (say three months). We would be prepared to leave the overall ceiling at 234 (subject to good behaviour on the Soviet side) and to allow the diplomatic ceiling to rise to 46. The Charge would be told that if the family were not in the UK by the specified date, we would be obliged immediately to take much more severe action (unspecified).

13. If by the deadline the family were released, we would faithfully implement the offer we had made. If they had not been released, the Charge would be told that the consequences which we had indicated would now follow. These would be as in Option A or B above.

14. In adopting this approach we should be doing, and be seen by HETMAN to be doing, all we possibly could for his family. This could have important implications later in the handling of HETMAN himself, in that he would see that the offer made on the unofficial channel had been specifically followed through officially. There are however potential disadvantages in this approach. If it succeeded, against expectation, there would be national security disadvantage in that we should be committed to minimal action only

/over



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over withdrawals and we should cramp our freedom of manoeuvre over public presentation. Moreover, we should be giving the Russians time to prepare their response, which would almost certainly include a clear threat of retaliation. Once made, it would be more difficult for them to back down from this. Finally, the Russians might take our approach as an opportunity, by returning a further ambiguous answer, to persuade us to negotiate further. In these ways Option C would complicate our approach in a way which could mean we ended up with a more damaging effect on our bilateral relations than Options A or B.

## CONCLUSION

15. There are clear advantages in foreign policy terms in combining the necessary expulsions with the offer of new arrangements for ceilings, provided Ministers are satisfied that action on these lines can be convincingly presented. Both Options A and B, by disposing of 25 RIS officers, advance the main national security interest. If it is decided not to pursue further the release of the family, Ministers are invited to choose between A and B according to their judgement of the probable severity of the Soviet reaction and the ease of public presentation in this country. We judge that there is only an outside chance of securing the release of the family. The main reason for making such an attempt would be to demonstrate to HETMAN that we have done all we can on his behalf. This is an important consideration; but there are some potential disadvantages on other grounds in pursuing this Option (C). If Ministers decide to do so, Option C provides an appropriate two stage approach.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

3 September 1985



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BOUT DE PAPIER (PAMIETNIK)

1. The message that I wish to convey is that the Soviet citizen, Mr Oleg Antonovich GORDIYEVSKIY, until recently the KGB Resident in London, officially Counsellor of the Embassy of the USSR in the UK, is now in our country and has asked for asylum. The fact of his presence in Britain is as yet known to very few people, although they include the highest political and administrative authorities. The authorities had been appalled to learn from Mr GORDIYEVSKIY the full scale of KGB and GRU activities against our country, and in other countries in Western Europe and certain English-speaking countries, and of the numbers and organisation of the intelligence officers involved. Remembering the 1971 expulsions, HMG's immediate reaction was to think in terms of large scale and public expulsions and to advise the Scandinavian and other Governments concerned that they should do the same.

2. However, there is one way in which the consequences of Mr GORDIYEVSKIY's revelations might be mitigated. If his wife and children, who remain in the USSR, were able quietly to join him in the UK, the British Government, who attach great importance to humanitarian issues, would be prepared to handle the situation in a different way. It would be acceptable for Soviet intelligence staff gradually to be withdrawn over a period of time, rather than expelling them, and the British attitude to the current problem of ceilings would be accommodatory, enabling the Soviet Embassy to operate normally. We would also request the Scandinavian and other countries to do likewise.

3. If the Soviet side agreed, we would undertake that no publicity would ever be given to the release of the family. It was in any event essential for the Soviet side to understand that any attempt to use the family to put pressure on Mr GORDIYEVSKIY would merely harden the resolve of the British authorities and exacerbate the situation.

4. If we were to be able to mitigate the effects of Mr

0 /.....



GORDIYEVSKIY's revelations in the way that we suggested, we would require an answer on, or before, August 30th. I would come to Paris to meet Mr RUBINSKI, or another delegated representative, on that day, but the Soviet side could call me to Paris at any time before that if they wished, by passing a message through Mr Wright's successor in Paris.



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~~TOP SECRET~~ MOSCOW No 807 of 28 Aug 85

B 5

TOP SECRET ADDRESSEE ONLY P5 DECRYPTER YOURSELF  
PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR LLEWELLYN-SMITH FROM HMA  
MIR: HETMAN: PAPER FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

ANNEX G

1. SINCE THE REVIEW OF POLICY CONDUCTED IN THE AUTUMN OF 1983, HMG HAVE INVESTED CONSIDERABLE EFFORT, WITH SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS, IN ESTABLISHING A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. WE HAVE BEEN IMPELLED BY 3 ARGUMENTS

- A) THE NEED FOR OPPORTUNITIES BOTH TO IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLICIES AND CONCERNS OF THE SECOND SUPER-POWER, AND ESPECIALLY TO IMPRESS OUR OWN UPON THEM
- B) DIRECT EXPOSURE TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN OUR CREDENTIALS IN THE INNER COUNSELS OF THE FREE WESTERN WORLD
- C) ANGLO-SOVIET TRADE, THOUGH NOT LARGE OVERALL, IS OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO CERTAIN BRITISH FIRMS AND IN CERTAIN GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS, AND THERE IS A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REQUIREMENT TO MAXIMISE OUR OPPORTUNITIES.

2. ALL THREE ARGUMENTS HAVE LONG-TERM VALIDITY BUT ARE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE NOW, AT THE OUTSET OF GORBACHEV'S REGIME, AND WHEN MAJOR IMPORT DECISIONS FOR THE 1986-1990 FIVE YEAR PLAN ARE PENDING. THE WORKING REALTIONSHIP ALREADY /ESTABLISHED



PAGE TWO TS AO DY P5

/ESTABLISHED AT THE TIME OF GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO THE UK IN DECEMBER 1984 GAVE US A FLYING START. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE THIS ADVANTAGE AND TO MAINTAIN THE POLICY OF DIALOGUE, IN PURSUIT OF THE LONG-TERM SECURITY (IN THE WIDER SENSE OF THE WORD) AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF THE UK.

3. NONE OF THIS MEANS THAT WE SHOULD AT ANY TIME BE PREPARED TO JEOPARDISE OUR SECURITY (IN THE NARROWER, 'INTELLIGENCES', SENSE): ON THE CONTRARY, OUR IMMEDIATE SECURITY INTERESTS MUST ALWAYS ENJOY PRIMACY IN ANY SITUATION WHERE THE 2 OBJECTIVES ARE POTENTIAL LY IN CONFLICT,, IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, THE AREAS AND OCCASIONS OF SUCH CONFLICT CAN BE LIMITED: IN PARTICULAR, BOTH SIDES CAN IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE AN INTEREST IN INSULATING THE PURSUIT OF THEIR LARGER OBJECTIVES FROM THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC QUARRELS OCCASIONED BY SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND OUR RESPONSE TO THEM. BUT THE EFFECTIVE MAINTENANCE OF THIS INSULATION REQUIRES A CONSCIOUS EFFORT BY BOTH SIDES.

4. IN THE PRESENT INSTANCE, THE RUSSIANS ARE REALIST ENOUGH TO EXPECT US TO TAKE VIGOROUS ACTION ON THE BASIS OF HETMAN'S REVELATIONS TO US. THE NATURE AND STRENGTH OF THEIR REACTION WILL DEPEND ON HOW FAR WE CAN CONVINCED THEM THAT WE NEVERTHELESS HAVE NOT ABANDONED THE LARGER OBJECTIVES OF A SUSTAINED DIALOGUE WITH THEM. HERE, THE QUESTION OF CEILINGS ON EMBASSY PERSONNEL IS OKF KEY SIGNIFICANCE: THE MAINTENANCE OF A VIABLE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LONDON (AS OF A VIABLE BRITISH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW) IS BOTH AN ESSENTIAL PIECE OF MACHINERY FOR THE CONDUCT OF THAT DIALOGUE, AND A SYMBOL OF OUR DESIRE FOR IT. THIS FACTOR GIVES US A POSSIBLE CHANCE TO RESOLVE THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN OUR IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENTS (ACTION ON HETMAN) AND OUR LONG-TERM REQUIREMENTS (PRESERVATION OF DIALOGUE): VIGOROUS, CLEAR-CUT, PUBLIC ACTION AGAINST /THE



PAGE THREE TS AO DY P5

/THE SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT IN LONDON - IE THE EXPULSION OF UP TO 25 - OFFSET BY A DECISION TO RAISE THE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC CEILING, ON A PERMANENT BASIS, TO 46 WHILE CONTINUING TO OPERATE THE DOWNWARD RATCHET ON THE OVERALL SOVIET CEILING.

5. CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE RATCHET WHICH HAS APPLIED SINCE 1971 ON THE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC CEILING WAS IN ANY CASE NOT A VIABLE OPTION SINCE IT WOULD HAVE LED INEXORABLY TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY WITHIN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE HETMAN CASE GIVES US THE OPPORTUNITY TO PLAY TO MAXIMUM EFFECT THE CARD OF GIVING UP THAT UNTENABLE OPTION: WHAT AT ANY OTHER TIME WOULD LOOK LIKE WEAKNESS, CANNOT BE SO DESCRIBED IF WE ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY EXPELLING 25: CONVERSELY, TO THE RUSSIANS IT WILL APPEAR AS A CLEAR SIGNAL OF OUR READINESS FOR A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM.

6. ACTION ON THE ABOVE LINES CONSTITUTES OUR BEST CHANCE OF MEETING ALL OUR OBJECTIVES. GORBACHEV MAY HAVE HIS OWN REASONS FOR MUTING THE SOVIET RESPONSE, IF HE CAN CONTAIN THE KGB. IN SO FAR AS HE HAS DEVELOPED A DISTINCTIVE LINE IN FOREIGN POLICY, IT CONSISTS IN A RELATIVELY EMOLLIENT LINE TOWARDS WESTERN EUROPE, WITH A VIEW TO WEDGE-DRIVING BETWEEN THE EUROPEANS AND THE UNITED STATES PARTICULARLY DURING THE RUN-UP TO THE NOVEMBER SUMMIT. GORBACHEV MAY CONSIDER THAT THESE OBJECTIVES REQUIRE HIM TO PLAY HIS PART IN INSULATING THIS OVERALL RELATIONSHIP WITH US FROM THE CURRENT STORM ON THE INTELLIGENCE FRONT. IF SO, HE MIGHT MINIMISE RETALIATORY ACTION IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE CHANCES THAT THE STORM WILL QUICKLY BLOW OVER AND DO AS LITTLE DAMAGE AS POSSIBLE TO THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE. IF THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT HE MIGHT REACT ON THESE LINES, THE CARROT AND STICK APPROACH RECOMMENDED ABOVE, /WOULD



PAGE FOUR TS AO DY P5

/WOULD, IN MY VIEW, MAXIMISE IT.

7. PAST EXPERIENCE AND PAST HISTORY NEVERTHELESS COMPEL ONE TO MAKE A LESS OPTIMISTIC PROGNOSIS. IT IS PRUDENT TO ASSUME THAT THERE WILL BE RETALIATION AGAINST THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN MOSCOW, ON A SCALE PROPORTIONATE TO THE SEVERITY OF THE ACTION TAKEN IN LONDON. HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGES NOW IN THE PIPE-LINE COULD BE CALLED OFF BY THE RUSSIANS. THE VISIT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SCOTLAND (15-19 SEPTEMBER) IS HIGHLY VULNERABLE, BECAUSE OF ITS TIMING AND BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS WILL CALCULATE THAT CANCELLATION WILL HURT US IN TRADE TERMS AS WELL AS BEING POLITICALLY SYMBOLIC.† SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO THE UK COULD BE FURTHER POSTPONED. EVEN THE IPU VISIT TO BE LED BY LORD WHITELAW NEXT SPRING COULD BE AT RISK, THOUGH THIS IS LESS LIKELY. MOST DAMAGING OF ALL, BRITISH BIDS FOR CONTRACTS WORTH HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF POUNDS COULD BE RULED OUT, CONDEMNING US TO A DISAPPOINTING EXPORT PERFORMANCE HERE THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD 1986-90. HMG COULD IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES BE VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM FOR APPEARING TO SCUTTLE THE BILATERAL SHIP JUST AS IT WAS GETTING UNDER WEIGH AFTER SUCH A SUCCESSFUL LAUNCH IN DECEMBER 1984. SUCH CRITICISM COULD MORE READILY BE REBUTTED IF THE DIPLOMATIC CEILING IS RAISED THAN IF THAT PRONG OF OUR APPROACH IS REMOVED.

GRS000

NNNN

† So is the Anglo-Soviet Joint Commission due to be held in London on 31 October - 1 November (chaired by Mr Channon).



|  |                               |
|--|-------------------------------|
| DEPARTMENT/SERIES<br>..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....<br>PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1647</i> .....<br>(one piece/item number) | Date and<br>sign              |
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ON THE RECORD STATEMENT

1. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Mr Lev Parshin, was summoned to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at 1730 today by Mr Derek Thomas the Political Director.
2. Mr Parshin was told that the Soviet action in expelling 25 British journalists, businessmen and Embassy staff was a totally unjustified response to the British Government's expulsion of Soviet personnel who had been actively engaged in intelligence activities designed to undermine the national security of the United Kingdom. He told Mr Parshin that the Government could only see the Soviet action as an unwarranted victimisation of innocent people, which the British Government were not prepared to accept.
3. Mr Parshin was therefore told that 6 Soviet citizens must leave the country by Monday 7 October. There was incontrovertible evidence provided by Mr Gordievsky that all these persons had been concerned in the unacceptable activities of the Soviet Intelligence Services in the UK. The overall ceiling on the number of Soviet officials in the UK would be correspondingly reduced from 211 to 205.
4. Mr Parshin was told that the British Government had worked hard to improve UK/Soviet political and commercial relations, and would continue to do so. But the unjustified Soviet action on Saturday afternoon could not but set back that process.



LIST OF THOSE EXPELLED

1. YEVGENIY ILICH SAFRONOV (37) Arrived UK 1.8.80  
FIRST SECRETARY, Soviet Embassy. Diplomat.  
Wife : Yelena Vasilyevna  
1 son (9)
  
2. Col VICTOR ALEKSANDROVICH MISHIN (42) Arrived UK 7.8.84  
ASSISTANT AIR ATTACHE, Soviet Embassy. Diplomat.  
Wife : Zhanna Ivanovna  
1 son (12)  
1 daughter (17)
  
3. VIKTOR VASILYEVICH DARANOV (40) Arrived UK 18.10.83  
CLERK, Soviet Embassy  
Wife : Tatyana Ivanovna  
1 son (14)
  
4. ALEKSANDR IVANOVICH YEROKHIN (40) Arrived UK 29.12.84  
CLERK, Service Attache's Office, Soviet Embassy  
Wife : Tatyana Alekseyevna  
1 daughter (11)
  
5. IVAN IVANOVICH VIKULOV (47) Arrived UK 11.9.84  
DIRECTOR, Anglo Soviet Shipping  
Wife : Lidiya Ivanovna
  
6. SERGEY ALEKSANDROVICH VOLOVETS (47) Arrived UK 7.2.83  
Correspondent for NOVOSTI  
Wife : Olga Vladimirovna  
1 daughter (25)  
Twin daughters (24)



C J R MEYER, NEWS

DATE: 16 SEPTEMBER 1985

Private Secretary

cc: PS/Mr Rifkind  
PS/PUS  
Mr Derek Thomas  
Mr Llewellyn-Smith  
Soviet Department

GORDIEVSKY: SECOND WAVE EXPULSIONS

1. The Secretary of State agreed earlier today to do interviews on the same basis as last week at the time of the expulsion of the 25, that is ITN, BBC TV, BBC Radio and IRN.
2. I recommend that the sequence of events might run as follows:
  - i) News Department releases the FCO statement between approximately 6.00 - 6.30 pm following the Soviet Chargé's call on Mr Thomas, now timed for 5.30 pm.
  - ii) The Secretary of State should give interviews in the Waiting Room from approximately 6.45 pm. An important consideration will be to catch the 7.00 News on Channel 4 which runs for a whole hour. I recommend, therefore, that the Secretary of State should run himself in with IRN and then do, in the following order:
    - Channel 4 Television (which, of course, doubles up for News at Ten);
    - BBC Radio;
    - BBC TV.
3. I submit points to make, cleared with Mr Thomas, together with the press pack which the Secretary of State had at hand for his interviews last Thursday. I will let you have, as soon as I get it from Soviet Department, a copy of the on-the-record statement that we will be making after Parshin's call.

*C.J.R. Meyer*

C J R Meyer



## EXPULSIONS: SECOND WAVE

### POINTS TO MAKE

#### Why more expulsions?

- When the Soviet Chargé was informed of our decision to expel 25 Russians on 12 September, it was made crystal clear that any Soviet retaliation would be totally unjustified and would be viewed extremely seriously by British Government.
- Russians have chosen to ignore this in the unwarranted and malicious expulsion of 25 innocent people from Moscow. We had no choice but to take the action announced today.
- We are therefore expelling a further Soviet officials. Firm evidence that all these concerned in the unacceptable activities of Soviet intelligence services.

#### Whither Anglo-Soviet relations?

- Obviously will be some time before relations can return to normal. But government will not lose sight of long-term objective of seeking more productive relationship with Soviet Union.
- Severe set-back, but not of our choosing. Did not lightly decide on expulsions, having invested so much time, effort in developing dialogue with Russians.
- But improved relations with Moscow cannot be bought at expense of national security. Activities of 25 expelled last week and expelled today presented direct threat which had to be removed.

#### Britain miscalculated, bit off more than could chew?

- Severe Soviet reaction always on the cards.
- But activities of 25 presented intolerable situation which had to be remedied. Evidence incontrovertible. Grossly irresponsible not to have acted when we did.



Just an elaborate game of chess/petty tit for tat?

- For Britain matter of defending vital national interests against intelligence activities designed to undermine the security of the UK. Such activities carried out by Soviet officials identified by senior KGB defector.
- For Soviet Union matter of vindictive retaliation against innocent Britons.
- No comparison between British action, Soviet response.

Possibility of further Soviet retaliation? Where will it end?

- No desire to prolong this episode.
- There should have been no retaliation in the first place and there should be none now.
- Hope they have more sense than to retaliate again, have long-term UK/Soviet interests at heart.
- [If pressed on possible third British round.] Cannot anticipate decision which will have to be taken in light of all circumstances at the time.

But why weren't today's expulsions announced last week?

- Last week's 25 were the most flagrant first line examples identified by Gordievsky. The names announced today also directly involved in Soviet intelligence activities and, given Saturday's response, their presence could no longer be tolerated.

British action too mild/too tough?

- Have given most urgent and careful consideration to Soviet retaliation. Today's action considered appropriate response in all the circumstances.



3.

FCO dither on counter-retaliation?

- Urgent, but not rushed consideration of next step. Decision has been given serious and careful thought which it required.

Why diplomatic ceiling still at 46?

- Important that each side should be able to maintain viable Embassy for legitimate activities in the other's capital.



File

XY 42

File No. ....  
Department .....  
Drafted by .....  
(Block Capitals) C D POWELL .....  
Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

|                                   |     |
|-----------------------------------|-----|
| Security Classification<br>SECRET | 12A |
| Precedence<br>IMMEDIATE           |     |
| DESK BY 190830..... Z             |     |

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| FOR<br>COMMS. DEPT.<br>USE | Despatched (Date) .....<br>(Time) ..... Z | POST BY ..... Z |
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) DEDIP  
(Security Class.) SECRET (Caveat)  
(Codeword) ..... (Privacy marking)  
(Desk by) ..... Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO (precedence) (post) Tel. No. .... of

AND TO (precedence/post) .....  
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Distribution:—

All copies  
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Private Secy

Copies to:—

[TEXT]

Personal for Private Secretary from Private Secretary  
to Prime Minister

Your telegrams 314 and 316 and Moscow tel no 1211 to  
you.

The Prime Minister is strongly opposed to the course  
of action outlined in paragraphs 1 and 2 in your tel.  
no. 314 and agrees with the comments made by Sir Bryan  
Cartledge. She has said publicly that we are drawing  
a line under the whole affair and does not want to  
continue guerilla warfare either overtly or through  
deliberate leaks. I do not think this would exclude,  
however, the proposed action by Mr. Thomas (para. 4  
of your tel. no. 316 refers).

CDP



File No. ....

OUTWARD

Security Classification

Department .....

TELEGRAM

Precedence

Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) .....

IMMEDIATE

Tel. Extn. ....

DESKBY .....Z

Duby  
cc Jan  
Murray  
(Soneska)

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

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(Date) .....

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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.).....

(Caveat/  
Privacy marking).....

(Codeword).....

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TO.....  
FCO (precedence) (post)

Tel. No. .... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post).....IMMEDIATE

TO FCO from PS/PM

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO.....

INFO SAVING.....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

Following is the text of a statement being issued to the press accompanying the Prime Minister's party by the Chief Press Secretary this evening;

"The Russians had no grounds whatsoever to expel 25 of our people from Moscow and they know it. It was a vindictive action taken because we had exposed their subversive and intelligence activities in the United Kingdom.

Copies to:-

Quite clearly we could not accept this: indeed we had warned the Russians in advance that retaliation would not go unanswered.

This is why we have had to remove a further six Soviet citizens all of whom were positively identified by Mr Gordievskiy as involved in unacceptable intelligence activities.

/ I hope



I hope we can now draw a line under this frustrating episode and get on with the vital task of restoring relations between the UK and the USSR. We are ready to take this positive approach and hope that we shall meet with a constructive response from the Soviet Union.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



12

Copy (4)

FLASH

ZCZC  
NIXHPAN 0569  
TOP SECRET  
ZZ FCOLN  
FM MOSCO TO FCOLN  
160900Z SEP  
GRS 1600

TOP SECRET  
FM MOSCOW  
DEYOU  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELNO 1185  
OF 160900Z SEPTEMBER 85

01107

FOR LLEWELLYN-SMITH, HEAD OF SOVIET DEPT.

YOUR TELNO 889:

COUNTER RETALIATION AGAINST MOSCOW EXPULSIONS

1. I AM NATURALLY DISAPPOINTED THAT MINISTERS HAVE FELT UNABLE TO ACCEPT THE RECOMMENDATION IN MY TELNO 1180. THAT TELEGRAM STILL REPRESENTS MY CONSIDERED AND INDEED RECONSIDERED VIEW AND REPRESENTS ONE "ALTERNATIVE COURSE" ON WHICH PARA 3 OF YTUR INVITES BY VILWS. TO THE ARGUMENTS WHICH IT CONTAINS, AS SUPPLEMENTED BY MY TELNO 1182, I CAN ADD BY WAY OF AMPLIFICATION ONLY TWO ADAGES. FIRST FROM THE POKER TABLE: "ALWAYS QUIT WHEN YOU ARE AHEAD" AND THE SECOND COINED BY LORD BRIMLOW WHEN FACED WITH A SIMILAR SITUATION WHILE SERVING AS MINISTER AT THIS EMBASSY: "NEVER ENGAGE IN A PISSING MATCH WITH A SKUNK: HE POSSESSES IMPORTANT NATURAL ADVANTAGES". I NEVERTHELESS FULLY APPRECIATE, OF COURSE, THAT THERE ARE POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE EQUATION WHICH I CANNOT ACCURATELY ASSESS FROM HERE AND ON WHICH IT IS NOT IN ANY CASE MY BUSINESS TO COMMENT.



AS ON THE UNPALATABLE CHOICE BETWEEN OPTIONS SET OUT IN YOUR I HAVE  
THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS. THE FIRST ISSUE TO ADDRESS IS THAT OF THE  
RELATIVE MERITS AND DE-MERITS OF SIX OR SEVEN (RATHER THAN FOUR)  
FURTHER EXPULSIONS FROM LONDON: AND THE IMPOSITION OF NEW TRAVEL  
RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET OFFICIALS IN LONDON. MY VERY RELUCTANT  
CONCLUSION IS THAT WE SHOULD GO FOR THE FORMER RATHER THAN FOR THE  
LATTER. ONCE AGAIN I AM TRYING TO LOOK AHEAD TO THE TIME, PROBABLY  
ABOUT ONE YEAR HENCE, WHEN OUR RELATIONS BEGIN TO RETURN TO  
SOMETHING APPROACHING NORMALITY. GIVEN THE COOPERATION FROM POD  
AND FROM THE GUARDIANS OF THE PURSE WHICH WILL, I TRUST, BE  
FORTHCOMING WE CAN EXPECT TO BUILD UP THE SURVIVING RUMP OF THIS  
EMBASSY, OVER A YEAR, INTO SOMETHING LIKE A GOING CONCERN. A  
REVISED TRAVEL REGIME, HOWEVER, WOULD BE QUITE ANOTHER MATTER.  
HOWEVER CONCLUSIVELY TRIGONOMETRY MAY PROVE THAT A REVISED REGIME  
IN LONDON EQUATED TO THE EXISTING REGIME IN MOSCOW THE RUSSIANS  
WOULD TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW. THEY WOULD CERTAINLY RETALIATE IN KIND  
AND ARE FORMIDABLY WELL EQUIPPED TO ENFORCE DISCRIMINATORY  
RESTRICTIONS (AS, INCIDENTALLY, WE IN LONDON ARE NOT). THE RESULT  
WOULD BE, AS I HAVE POINTED OUT MORE THAN ONCE IN OUR EARLIER  
EXCHANGES, THAT THE  
ALREADY MINIMAL POSSIBILITIES FOR LOCAL RECREATION FOR OUR  
REMAINING EMBASSY STAFF WOULD SUFFER SERIOUS DAMAGE. THE KEY POINT,  
HOWEVER, IS THAT OUR RESTRICTIONS, AND SOVIET COUNTER-RESTRICTIONS,  
WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REMAIN IN PLACE EVEN WHEN OUR RELATIONS  
RETURN TO NORMAL: I CANNOT IMAGINE ANY CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE  
SECURITY SERVICES MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO ABANDON OR RELAX OUR  
REVISED REGIME ONCE IT HAD BEEN PUT INTO OPERATION. WE SHOULD BE  
STUCK WITH IT. GIVEN THAT WE ARE APPARENTLY TO LOSE FOUR ADDITIONAL  
MEMBERS OF OUR STAFF, THROUGH SOVIET COUNTER-RETALIATION TO OUR  
COUNTER-RETALIATION, I SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE THIS FIGURE RISE  
BY A FURTHER TWO (I HOPE WE CAN HOLD IT TO THAT) RATHER THAN LOSE  
FOUR STAFF AND ADDITIONALLY SUFFER THE PERMANENT INCUBUS OF A  
DISCRIMINATORY TRAVEL REGIME HERE WHICH WOULD EFFECTIVELY CONFINE  
OUR STAFF TO THE CITY OF MOSCOW - AN ENVIRONMENT FROM WHICH, AS  
YOU WELL KNOW, IT IS DESIRABLE IF NOT ESSENTIAL TO ESCAPE FROM  
TIME TO TIME.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT



3. THIS RECOMMENDATION IS, HOWEVER, SUBJECT TO SOME IMPORTANT  
CAVEATS WHICH I SET OUT BELOW.

4. IT WILL NOT HAVE ESCAPED YOU THAT SOVIET TARGETTING IN THEIR  
CHOICE OF EXPELLEES FROM THIS EMBASSY HAS BEEN REMARKABLY PRECISE,  
PARTICULARLY AGAINST CHANCERY AND MOST NOTABLY AGAINST OUR  
TECHNICAL STAFF. IT HAS ALSO BEEN SPITEFUL - WITNESS THE CHOICE  
OF STAFF MEMBERS OF WORKING SPOUSES (MY TELNO 1177) WHICH  
HAS GIVEN THE RUSSIANS IN AT LEAST FOUR CASES TWO EXPULSIONS FOR  
THE PRICE OF ONE. WE MUST EXPECT A SIMILAR APPROACH TO CHARACTERISE  
SOVIET COUNTER-RETALIATION AGAINST FURTHER EXPULSIONS FROM LONDON.  
WE CANNOT ASSUME THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NECESSARILY RESPECT THE  
DISTINCTION WHICH YOU PROPOSE TO MAKE (YOUR TUR PARA 2) BETWEEN  
DIPLOMATIC AND NON-DIPLOMATIC STAFF. WHAT THE RUSSIANS WILL BE  
CONCERNED WITH IS FUNCTION RATHER THAN RANK, IN ORDER TO DISABLE  
THE FUNCTIONING OF THIS EMBASSY AS COMPREHENSIVELY AS POSSIBLE.  
I AGREE THAT WE FOR OUR PART SHOULD AVOID EXPELLING FURTHER  
SOVIET DIPLOMATS FROM LONDON: BUT WE SHOULD ALSO AVOID, IF AT ALL  
POSSIBLE, EXPELLING THE SOVIET FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENTS OF THOSE  
STAFF HERE WHOM WE CAN LEAST AFFORD TO LOSE.

5. MY MAIN CONCERNS ARE FIRSTLY OUR PHYSICAL SECURITY,  
SECONDLY OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS AND THIRDLY OUR  
RETENTION OF AT LEAST MINIMAL CAPACITIES IN REGISTRY AND  
SECRETARIAL STAFF.

6. THE EXPULSIONS OF ALL OUR TECHNICAL STAFF, APART FROM STIVEN  
WHO IS ABOUT TO RETURN FROM LEAVE, HAS LEFT US HIGHLY VULNERABLE  
TO TECHNICAL ATTACK. WE SHOULD THEREFORE BE CONCERNED TO  
AVOID TEMPTING THE RUSSIANS TO EXPEL STIVEN (NOTWITHSTANDING  
HIS DIPLOMATIC STATUS) OR TO DENY VISAS TO REPLACEMENT TECHNICAL  
STAFF. EQUALLY, ANY FURTHER REDUCTION IN OUR COMPLEMENT OF  
SECURITY OFFICERS WOULD LEAVE US HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO PHYSICAL  
AS WELL AS AS TECHNICAL ATTACK: IT FOLLOWS THAT, IF POSSIBLE,  
WE SHOULD NOT EXPEL FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY THOSE WITH  
EQUIVALENT DUTIES. THE SAME GOES FOR OUR SURVIVING  
COMMUNICATORS: WE NEED TO KEEP THEM. SO FAR AS SECRETARIAL  
STAFF ARE CONCERNED, WE HAVE FIVE LEFT. IT COULD BE ARGUED  
THAT WITH FEWER OFFICERS HERE TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL REPORTING  
THE DEMANDS ON OUR SECRETARIAL SERVICES WILL DECREASE. THIS IS  
TRUE BUT WE ARE ALREADY PRETTY WELL DOWN TO THE BONE.



7. TO SUM UP, LEAVING ASIDE (AS YOU PROPOSE TO DO) SERVICE ATTACHES AND SERVICE SUPPORT STAFF, WE HAVE HERE, AFTER DEDUCTING THOSE ALREADY EXPELLED, FOURTEEN NON-DIPLOMATIC STAFF. IF WE WERE TO LOSE SIX OF THESE AS A RESULT OF SOVIET COUNTER-EXPULSIONS OUR INFRA-STRUCTURE WOULD BE DAMAGED TO THE POINT AT WHICH THIS EMBASSY COULD BARELY OPERATE. THIS WOULD EQUALLY BE THE CASE IF THE RUSSIANS IGNORE THE DIPLOMATIC/NON-DIPLOMATIC DISTINCTION AND RETALIATE AGAINST NON-DIPLOMATIC EXPELLEES FROM LONDON BY EXPELLING E.G. STIVEN, PINBOROUGH/WALL

6. IT FOLLOWS THAT IF THERE HAVE TO BE SIX FURTHER EXPELLEES FROM LONDON, AND IN CONSEQUENCE SIX FURTHER EXPELLEES FROM MOSCOW, THE MORE THESE CAN BE CONCENTRATED ON AREAS OTHER THAN THOSE IDENTIFIED IN PARA 5 ABOVE, THE BETTER. I MUST, I AM AFRAID, DECLINE TO MAKE YOUR TASK EASIER BY OFFERING UP HOSTAGES: I AM SURE THAT YOU WOULD NOT EXPECT ME TO DO SO AND THAT YOU CAN DRAW THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS FROM WHAT I HAVE SAID ABOVE.

9. FINALLY, I AM SURE THAT MINISTERS WILL HAVE BORNE IN MIND THE FACT THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT MACHINERY, WITH ITS INFINITELY SUPERIOR RESOURCES OF MANPOWER AND MONEY, WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE GOOD ITS LOSSES IN LONDON VERY MUCH MORE QUICKLY AND EASILY THAN WE WITH OUR WELL-KNOWN CONSTRAINTS WILL BE ABLE TO DO HERE. DESPITE THIS, I HOPE VERY MUCH, AND STRONGLY RECOMMEND, THAT THE ONE IMPLIED ITEM OF GOOD NEWS IN YTUR, NAMELY THAT THERE HAS NOT AS YET BEEN AN APPARENT DISPOSITION TO WITHDRAW OR MODIFY OUR REVISED PROPOSALS ON CEILINGS WILL SURVIVE THIS FURTHER SPASM INTACT, DESPITE THE INEVITABLE SOVIET COUNTER-RETALIATION.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

HXHPAN 0569

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SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

16 September 1985

*Dear Sir,*

RETALIATION FOR EXPULSIONS FROM MOSCOW

The Prime Minister held a further meeting this morning to consider how we should react to the Soviet expulsion of British Embassy and other personnel from Moscow, in the light of the views expressed by HM Ambassador Moscow in Moscow telegram number 889.

It was agreed that we should go ahead with a further round of expulsions but should choose those to be expelled carefully so as to reduce the likelihood that any further Soviet retaliation would be directed against technical and security staff in the Embassy in Moscow. The aim should be six expulsions; but if this could not be done within the criteria above, the figure should be five.

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor (Home Office), Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir Antony Duff.

*Yours sincerely,*  
A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Charles Powell".

(CHARLES POWELL)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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TOP SECRET  
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TELNO 889  
OF 152150Z SEPTEMBER 85

YOUR TELNO 1180: RETALIATORY EXPULSIONS FROM MOSCOW.

1. MINISTERS HAVE DISCUSSED HOW WE SHOULD REACT TO THE RETALIATORY EXPULSIONS FROM MOSCOW. NO FINAL DECISION HAS YET BEEN REACHED. BUT THEY ARE CLEAR ON TWO POINTS: THAT THERE MUST BE SOME FURTHER EXPULSIONS FROM LONDON: AND THAT WE SHOULD AVOID GOING TO A THIRD ROUND WHICH WOULD RISK A DESCENT INTO THE RIDICULOUS.
2. THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF FURTHER EXPULSIONS FROM LONDON HAS BEEN SET AT FOUR, AVOIDING THOSE WITH DIPLOMATIC STATUS OR WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE'S STAFF. BUT THIS BY ITSELF IS NOT ENOUGH. ADDITIONAL OPTIONS ARE SEEN AS EITHER:
  - (A) TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL BY SOVIET OFFICIALS IN LONDON WHICH MATCH EXACTLY RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED IN MOSCOW I.E. TO CLOSE A NUMBER OF AREAS WITHIN THE 25 MILE LIMIT: OR
  - (B) TO GO FOR A HIGHER NUMBER OF EXPULSIONS (PERHAPS 6 OR 7).
3. MINISTERS WOULD WELCOME ANY VIEWS YOU MAY HAVE ON THESE OPTIONS OR ANY ALTERNATIVE COURSE OF ACTION TO (A) AND (B) ABOVE YOU WISH TO PROPOSE BY 0930Z ON 16 SEPTEMBER.

HOWE  
LIMITED  
HD/SOVIET DEPT.  
P S.  
~~PS~~ PUS.  
MR GOODALL  
MR DERET THOMAS.

COPIES TO.  
PS/No. 10. DOWNING STREET.  
PS/HOME SECRETARY.  
SIR R. ARMSTRONG, CABINET OFFICE

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Ref. A085/2343

PRIME MINISTER

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HETMAN

I shall not be able to attend your meetings this evening because I shall have departed for a short official visit to Canada. I am therefore sending you this note of my views in writing.

2. I had a meeting with those concerned this morning. The general view, with which I agree, is that, given the harshness of the Soviet response, and what was said to the Soviet Chargé and in public, it is not possible to make no further response: public opinion would not understand that.

3. On the other hand the Soviet response has been carefully planned to match our original action closely. In particular they have not expelled any of our Service people nor have they touched any of the Embassy's senior political staff. If we are to respond we can choose between further expulsions and other measures, for instance restricting the free travel area.

4. I should be against restricting the free travel area at this stage. That measure would change the category of the action in which we are engaged. The Russians would be bound to respond with a similar reduction in Moscow which would damage the morale of our remaining people there. We should therefore keep this in hand in case we are forced to a further stage. The Security Service is considering whether it might be possible to make partial rather than wholesale restrictions at the periphery of the free travel area in London so as to match exactly the Moscow pattern.



SECRET AND PERSONAL

5. If the response is to be expulsions my own conclusion would be that we should expel a further four people, none of whom have diplomatic status and would not therefore count against the diplomatic ceiling. These are two KGB cypher clerks in the Embassy; the London correspondent of Novosti and the Managing Director of the Soviet travel service CTC. The London Correspondent of Novosti is a co-opted KGB member.

6. The advantages of this course would be: none of the four would count against the diplomatic ceiling and we should not therefore have touched the position on that; we could justifiably claim that all four had intelligence-related functions though of a less important nature than of the 25 whom we expelled initially. We should make no further threats, and we should use whatever way is best to signal to the Russians that, provided there is no further response, as far as we are concerned that is the end of the matter.

7. Such a response would seem to me to be the best means of taking action without imposing further damage on our representation in Moscow and on Anglo-Soviet relations. If the Russians go for a further harsh response, we should be forced to consider further action on expulsions, ceilings and perhaps the free travel area; and this could deepen and prolong the freeze in Anglo-Soviet relations.

8. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Home Secretary.

*Michael Storch*

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

*Approved by Sir Robert and signed in his absence.*  
15 September 1985





10 DOWNING STREET

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

*From the Private Secretary*

15 September 1985

HETMAN

The Prime Minister held a meeting this evening with the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary to consider how we should react to the retaliatory expulsions by the Soviet Union of British Embassy personnel and others from Moscow.

The Foreign Secretary said that it was clear that we must make a further response. He thought this should take the form of the expulsion of four further people, chosen so as to avoid diplomatic or Service Attaché staff. This number would be sufficient to demonstrate firmness without necessarily provoking the Soviet Union to further retaliation. He was opposed to the introduction of further restrictions on the free travel area at this stage. But it might be possible to combine the four expulsions with disclosure of the activities for which the original 25 had been expelled.

In discussion it was suggested that four expulsions would not be seen by public opinion as an adequate response, and that the Soviet Union would draw the conclusion that it paid to be tough. We should not go to a third round of retaliation, which would risk ridicule. It was important therefore that our reaction at this stage should be and be seen to be sufficiently firm. Disclosure of details of the intelligence activities of the 25 who had already been expelled might rebound against

Further options identified were a higher number of expulsions; or combining four expulsions with further restrictions on the free travel area to bring it into line with the restrictions already in force in Moscow, i.e. by closing certain areas within the 25 mile limit. It was agreed that it would not be appropriate to go back on the concession which we had made on the ceiling for Soviet diplomatic staff.

The Prime Minister concluded that H.M. Ambassador Moscow's comments on the options should be sought urgently, and he should be given the opportunity to propose any alternative course which occurred to him. In view of the need to respond promptly, his comments should be sought by

*J.P.*

SECRET AND PERSONAL



mid-morning on 16 September. Her own view remained that a further four expulsions on their own did not constitute an adequate response.

I subsequently sent a telegram in the terms above to H.M. Ambassador Moscow.

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor (Home Office), to Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir Anthony Duff.

(Charles Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



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FM MOSCOW

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 1180

OF 141905Z SEPTEMBER 55

FOR LLEVELLYN-SMITH, HEAD OF SOVIET DEPARTMENT.

BY TELNO 1176 : RETALIATORY EXPULSION FROM MOSCOW

1. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A VIEW FROM  
HERE BEFORE 150600Z ON HOW WE SHOULD REACT TO TODAY'S  
RETALIATORY ACTION BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. IT IS NOT EASY TO  
BE DISPASSIONATE WITHIN HOURS OF TAKING DELIVERY OF AN ACT  
OF VICIOUS AND DISPROPORTIONATE REVENGE, BUT I SHALL DO MY BEST.  
MY VIEWS ARE AS FOLLOWS

2. THE MOST PESSIMISTIC FORECASTS WHICH WE HAVE MADE FROM HERE  
IN EXCHANGES ON THIS SUBJECT OVER THE LAST TWO MONTHS HAVE BEEN  
SUBSTANTIATED AND EVEN EXCEEDED. THE SAVAGE SCALE OF THE  
SOVIET RETALIATION CAN BE EXPLAINED, I THINK, ONLY BY THE FACT  
THAT THEY HAVE ESTABLISHED, BY A PROCESS OF ELIMINATION, THE  
MEANS BY WHICH GORDIYEVSKY REACHED THE WEST. TO THE RETALIATION  
WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED FROM THE EXPULSION OF 25 KGB AGENTS  
FROM LONDON HAS THUS BEEN ADDED THE RETALIATION WHICH WE MIGHT  
HAVE EXPECTED IF THE EXFILTRATION HAD MISFIRED. THIS IS A POTENT  
COMBINATION, EFFECTIVELY DISABLING THIS EMBASSY IN THE SHORT TERM  
AND CARRYING THE IMPLICATION THAT ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS WILL  
BE IN THE FREEZER FOR AT LEAST A YEAR AND POSSIBLY LONGER.



3. IT FOLLOWS THAT WE SHOULD BE CONCENTRATING NOT ON THE IMMEDIATE OR SHORT-TERM SITUATION BUT ON THE SITUATION ONE YEAR OR MORE HENCE. NOTHING WHICH WE MIGHT NOW DO BY WAY OF COUNTER-RETALIATION, THREATENED OR ACTUAL, COULD MAKE OUR SITUATION OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS ANY BETTER; IT COULD, HOWEVER, MAKE IT WORSE OR PROLONG BEYOND TWELVE MONTHS THE PERIOD OF FREEZE. THE NATURAL DESIRE FOR COUNTER-RETALIATION AND THE POLITICAL NEED 'NOT TO BE SEEN TO BE TAKING IT LYING DOWN' CAN PERHAPS BE ASSUAGED IN BOTH ITS PRIVATE AND ITS PUBLIC MANIFESTATIONS, BY THE FOLLOWING LINE OF THOUGHT. WE HAVE ACHIEVED AN EXTRAORDINARY VICTORY OVER THE MOST FORMIDABLE DIMENSIONS OF SOVIET POWER: WE HAVE BOTH TAPPED THE ARTERIES OF THE KGB'S EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATION AND, THROUGH ACTS OF REMARKABLE PERSONAL COURAGE AND PHYSICAL BRAVERY, THWARTED THE ENTIRE APPARATUS OF SOVIET INTERNAL SECURITY - KGB MILITIA, FRONTIER GUARDS, THE LOT. WE HAVE AS A RESULT, A COMPENDIUM OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB'S STRUCTURE AND MODUS OPERANDI SEMI COLON A DETAILED IDENTIKIT OF THE KGB'S OPERATIONS. IN THE UK, ENABLING US COMPREHENSIVELY TO FRUSTRATE THEM, PROBABLY FOR YEARS SEMI COLON AND THE MORAL SUCCESS REPRESENTED BY BRINGING OUR INFORMANT TO SAFETY AND FREEDOM WHEN HE HOISTED HIS STORM-CONE. FOR THIS, WE HAVE PAID A HEAVY BUT IN MY VIEW BY NO MEANS EXORBITANT PRICE. THE DAMAGE TO OUR EMBASSY CAN BE MADE GOOD OVER A PERIOD, DURING WHICH UK/SOVIET RELATIONS ARE IN ANY CASE LIKELY TO BE MORIBUND SEMI COLON THE DAMAGE TO OUR MEDIA REPRESENTATION IN MOSCOW IS LIKELY, IN THE END, TO HURT THE RUSSIANS MORE THAN US - BY FUELLING ANTI-SOVIET PREDISPOSITIONS. THE HEAVIEST PRICE WILL PROBABLY BE PAID BY BRITISH INDUSTRY: WE SHALL UNDOUBTEDLY LOSE CONTRACTS AND THEREFORE JOBS - EVEN SO, I WOULD THIS EVENING ASSESS THE SCORE-BOARD AS STANDING AT 3 - 1 IN FAVOUR OF THE UK. I AM CONFIDENT THAT AN OBJECTIVE SOVIET ASSESSMENT (IF THERE IS SUCH A THING) WOULD COME TO A VERY SIMILAR CONCLUSION.



4. IF THIS IS A VALID CALCULATION OF PROFIT AND LOSS, WE CAN IN MY VIEW DISPENSE WITH THE INDULGENCE OF COUNTER-RETALIATION. FURTHER IMPULSIONS WILL ONLY FIND THEIR ECHO HERE AND PERHAPS CRIPPLE THIS EMBASSY BEYOND EARLY REPAIR. MORE STRINGENT TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS IN LONDON WILL ALSO BE HATCHED HERE

AND UNFAIRLY STRAINING THE MORALE OF THE STAFF OF THIS EMBASSY DURING WHAT WILL IN ANY CASE BE A PERIOD OF STRESS AND DIFFICULTY. ABOVE ALL - AND I CANNOT EMPHASISE THIS POINT TOO STRONGLY - TO WITHDRAW OR DIMINISH OUR PROPOSALS ON CEILINGS WOULD SERVE ONLY TO ENSURE THAT WHEN WE EMERGE FROM THE FREEZER IN A YEAR OR SO'S TIME, WE SHALL EMERGE WITH A LARGE MILLSTONE ROUND OUR NECKS, A MILLSTONE OF OUR OWN MAKING - A RECIPROCAL LIMITATION ON DIPLOMATIC STAFF LEVELS WHICH WOULD PREVENT THIS EMBASSY FROM OPERATING EFFECTIVELY EVEN WHEN THE BILATERAL POLITICAL CLIMATE MAKES THIS FEASIBLE. I AM VERY FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD ALLOW THE OFFER OF AN INCREASE IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY'S DIPLOMATIC CEILING, TO 46, TO STAND: WE NEED NOT DO SO DEMONSTRATIVELY BUT SIMPLY LEAVE IT ON THE TABLE. THIS, IN ABOUT A YEAR'S TIME, WILL BE THE CRUCIAL INGREDIENT FOR A RETURN TO NORMALITY IN UK/SOVIET RELATIONS. IF WE WERE NOW TO REMOVE OR DILUTE THAT INGREDIENT, NORMALITY MIGHT WELL ELUDE US FOR A LONG TIME.

5. TO SUM UP, MY FIRM RECOMMENDATION - EVEN WITH SUSLOV'S VENOM STILL FRESH IN MY EARS - IS THAT WE SHOULD ALLOW MATTERS TO REST WHERE THEY ARE SEMI COLON AND TO CONCENTRATE ON THE GRADUAL RECONSTRUCTION OF OUR DIPLOMATIC ASSETS. I REALISE THAT IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS THIS MAY BE AN UNCOMFORTABLE RECOMMENDATION. BUT IT SHOULD, I BELIEVE, BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE A PUBLIC LINE WHICH, WITHOUT UNDUE GLOATING, MAXIMISES OUR SUCCESS WHILE MINIMISING THE PRICE WHICH HAS BEEN EXACTED FOR IT. IN THE EYES OF THE PUBLIC, DIPLOMATS ARE IN ANY CASE A PRETTY EXPENDIBLE COMMODITY.

CARTLEDGE

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PRIME MINISTER FROM CHARLES POWELL

SOVIET UNION: EXPULSIONS

As I told you earlier, officials will be meeting on Sunday morning to prepare recommendations on how we should respond. The Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary will subsequently meet with officials at about 6 to consider what recommendations to make to you. They would like to meet you later in the evening so that decisions can be reached. Would you be agreeable to a meeting at some time after, say, 8.30?

So

Yes ✓  
no

14.9.85



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M Power, N°10 J. St.

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM MOSCOW  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELNO 1176  
OF 141520Z SEPTEMBER 85

## RETALIATORY SOVIET EXPULSIONS FROM USSR

1. I WAS SUMMONED AT 141100Z BY THE HEAD OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT IN THE SOVIET MFA, SUSLOV. HEMANS ACCOMPANIED ME. SUSLOV READ OUT WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A 'REPRESENTATION' TO ME (COPY BY BAGLM UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION AS FOLLOWS:

'THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, IN THE MOST SERIOUS MANNER DRAWS THE ATTENTION OF THE BRITISH SIDE TO THE FACT THAT THE STATEMENTS OF ITS OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES ABOUT EFFORTS TO DEVELOP FRUITFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ARE IN CLEAR CONTRADICTION WITH ITS PRACTICAL ACTIVITIES. THE NEW CRUDE AND HOSTILE ACTION CARRIED OUT ON 12 SEPTEMBER IN RELATION TO SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN IS MALICIOUS AND COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIED AND DIRECTED TOWARDS A SINGLE GOAL - POISONING THE ATMOSPHERE OF SOVIET/ BRITISH RELATIONS, ATTEMPTING TO SOW DISTRUST AND HOSTILITY TOWARDS SOVIET PEOPLE AND BLACKENING THE PEACE-LOVING POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION.

STATING ITS DECISIVE PROTEST IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROVOCATIVE ACT, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR PLACES THE COMPLETE AND TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES ON THE BRITISH SIDE.

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ALREADY REPEATEDLY POINTED TO THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY OF BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES IN THE USSR, HAS TAKEN CORRESPONDING MEASURES, AND HAS ISSUED WARNINGS. NEVERTHELESS THE FACTS STATE THOZ SUCH ACTIVITY CONTINUES. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS UNDENIABLE EVIDENCE OF THE FACT THAT 25 BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES IN THE SOVIET UNION (LIST ATTACHED SEE MIFT) ARE ENGAGED ON ACTIVITIES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR OFFICIAL STATUS. IN THESE CONDITIONS THE SOVIET SIDE HAS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE BUT TO DEMAND THEIR DEPARTURE FROM THE SOVIET UNION WITHIN THREE WEEKS. EQUALLY WE CANNOT DO OTHER THAN PROTEST AT THE FACT THAT THE BRITISH SPECIAL SERVICES CARRIED OUT THE ILLEGAL REMOVAL FROM THE SOVIET UNION OF A SOVIET CITIZEN, AND THE BRITISH SIDE, REGARDLESS OF OUR REPEATED APPEALS, HAS NOT UP UNTIL NOW GIVEN EXPLANATIONS ABOUT HIS.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR IS COUNTING ON THE BRITISH SIDE FINALLY TO PUT A STOP TO UNFRIENDLY ACTIONS IN RELATION TO SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN, AND TO REMOVE THE ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLES CREATED BY IT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF STABLE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES''

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2. IN REPLY TO WHAT I DESCRIBED AS SUSLOV'S ASTONISHING STATEMENT, I CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT ANY OF MY STAFF HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN INAPPROPRIATE ACTIVITIES. THE ACCUSATIONS MADE WERE WHOLLY UNWARRENTED. I WISHED TO REGISTER THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE PROTEST AT THIS WHOLLY UNJUSTIFIED AND TOTALLY DISPROPORTIONATE ACTION. ON 12 SEPTEMBER BOTH MR GOODALL IN LONDON AND I IN MOSCOW HAD STRESSED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD ALWAYS TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THE UK. BUT WE WANTED TO DEVELOP A SOUND AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAD GIVEN CONCRETE

EVIDENCE OF THIS DESIRE IN PROPOSING NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEILINGS. I WAS PROFOUNDLY DISAPPOINTED AND SHOCKED BY THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO MEASURES WHICH HAD BEEN ESSENTIAL TO PROTECT OUR SECURITY. THE SOVIET RESPONSE WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE TWO SIDES TO REALIZE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS. SO LONG AS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SENT OFFICIALS TO LONDON WHOSE REAL FUNCTION WERE OTHER THAN THOSE DECLARED AND AUTHORISED THEIR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT PERIODICALLY THEY WOULD BE DISCOVERED, AS THE RESULT OF DETECTION OR DEFECTION. WHEN THIS HAPPENED, THE PEOPLE CONCERNED WOULD BE ASKED TO LEAVE. OUR NATIONAL SECURITY DEMANDED THIS THESE EPISODES NEVERTHELESS DID NOT PRECLUDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP IN OTHER DIMENSIONS. BUT GIVEN THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR RELATIONS OF THE PRESENT SOVIET ACTION, I WISHED TO STRESS THAT THE ONLY WAY TO PREVENT RECURRENT DAMAGE TO THEM WAS FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO STOP PVAUTHORISING THE PRESENCE IN THE UK OF INTELLIGENCE AGENTS. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE WAS ETHICALLY ASYMMETRICAL. DR SUSLOV AND I BOTH KNEW THAT THE 25 SOVIET OFFICIALS EXPELLED FROM LONDON HAD FUNCTIONS OTHER THAN THOSE DECLARED. EQUALLY, WE BOTH KNEW THAT THE 25 BRITISH CITIZENS NOW EXPELLED HAD NO FUNCTIONS OTHER THAN THEIR DECLARED AND RIGHTFUL ONES. THERE WAS THUS A TOTAL DISPARITY.

3. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT I WOULD BE RECOMMENDING TO MY GOVERNMENT THAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET ACTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS SHOULD BE URGENTLY CONSIDERED AND THAT THIS STUDY WOULD INEVITABLY INCLUDE ALL ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS INCLUDING THOSE COVERED IN THE STATEMENT MADE TO THE SOVIET CHARGE IN LONDON ON 12 SEPTEMBER. I REPEATED THAT THE SOVIET ACTION WAS WHOLLY UNJUSTIFIED AND UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT I WISHED TO RECORD THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE PROTEST.

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4.- WHILE MY REMARKS WERE BEING TRANSLATED I WAS ABLE TO DIGEST THE LIST OF NAMES. HAVING DONE SO, I ADDED THAT HAVING NOTED THE LIST INCLUDED BUSINESSMEN AND JOURNALISTS, IE NON-GOVERNMENTAL REPRESENTATIVES, I WISHED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE DENIAL I HAD ISSUED ON BEHALF OF MY STAFF COVERING THEIR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN INAPPROPRIATE ACTIVITIES APPLIED EQUALLY AND WITH FULL STRENGTH TO THOSE OTHERS ON THE LIST. SO DID MY STRONG PROTEST. TO TAKE SUCH ACTION AGAINST NON-GOVERNMENTAL REPRESENTATIVES, AND IN PARTICULAR THE PRESS, WAS NOT ONLY TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED BUT WHOLLY CONTRARY TO PROPOSITIONS BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES OF A DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS. THIS ACTION COULD ONLY IMPEDÉ SUCH RELATIONS AND OBSTRUCT THE DEVELOPMENT OF BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES.

5. IN REPLY, SUSLOV SAID THAT HE HAD NOT HAD IT IN MIND TO LAUNCH A DISCUSSION ON THIS TOPIC AS THE STATEMENT WAS CLEAR AND EACH WORD HAD BEEN CAREFULLY WEIGHED AND WAS JUSTIFIED. HOWEVER MY "EMOTIONAL" STATEMENT CAUSED HIM TO MAKE TWO OBSERVATIONS:

(A) I SHOULD CAREFULLY STUDY THE MFA STATEMENT  
(B) HE REPEATED THAT ACCUSATIONS AGAINST SOVIET OFFICIALS WERE ABSOLUTELY UNFOUNDED. AS FAR AS CONCERNED THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH SIDE WHOM I HAD SO STAUNCHLY DEFENDED, HE WISHED TO REFER TO THE FOLLOWING. HE THEN OPENED A SECOND FOLDER IN WHICH WAS A TYPED PREPARED STATEMENT, WHICH HE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO HAND TO ME. HE READ IT OUT. OUR SUMMARY IS AS FOLLOWS. BEGINS

THE DECISION OF THE SOVIET SIDE IN RELATION TO THE EXCLUSION OF BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT ADEQUATELY REFLECT SOVIET CONCERN AT THE BLATENT ACTIVITIES OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE EVIDENCE AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES SHOWS THAT THE ACT OF BRINGING GORDIEYEVSKY OUT OF THE SOVIET UNION HAD CLEARLY BEEN PLANNED BEFOREHAND. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES KNOW OF THE ROLE ASSIGNED IN THIS TO FIRST SECRETARIES GIBBS AND ASQUITH. THEY HAD PREPARED THE ACTION AND CAMOUFLAGED IT BY A TRIP TO FINLAND IN CARS EQUIPPED WITH DIPLOMATIC NUMBER PLATES. THEY HAD CARRIED OUT THIS ACTION IMMEDIATELY AFTER AN OFFICIAL RECEPTION AT THE BRITISH RESIDENCE ON 19 JULY. THEIR ACTION COULD ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS POLITICAL BANDITRY AND FLAGRANT MISUSE OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGE. ENDS.

6. SUSLOV WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS OF COURSE FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE WHAT IF ANY FURTHER ACTION TO TAKE. HE WISHED HOWEVER TO UNDERLINE ONCE AGAIN THAT THERE WERE DEEP

CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN BRITISH OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND BRITISH OFFICIAL'S PRACTICAL ACTIVITIES. THE SOVIET

POSITION AS FAR AS RELATIONS IN FUTURE WAS CONCERNED WAS SET OUT IN THE STATEMENT. THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY FOR FRUITFUL RELATIONS BUT ONLY IF THE UK WAS SIMILARLY PREPARED.



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7. TO THIS FURTHER STATEMENT I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT THAT EVEN IN HIS FIRST STATEMENT SUSLOV HAD DONE ENOUGH DAMAGE TO THE PROSPECTS FOR ANGLO / SOVIET RELATIONS AND CAST SUFFICIENT DOUBT ON THE SINCERITY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S PROFESSED DESIRE TO SEE THEM IMPROVE. HE HAD NOW ADDED AN ALLEGATION OF SUCH A PREPOSTEROUS NATURE THAT IT COULD ONLY MAKE THE DAMAGE WORSE. THE ALLEGATION WAS AN ABSURD PROVOCATION.

8. AS I ROSE TO LEAVE SUSLOV SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOW HAVE TO SEE WHAT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS THERE MIGHT BE. I DID NOT REPLY.

. SEE MY TWO IFTS.

CARTLEDGE

LIMITED

HD/ECU D

HD/NEWS D

PS

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR GOODALL

MR JENKINS

COPIES TO

MR WALLACE, PUSD.

MR POWELL PS/NO 10 DOWNING  
ST.

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG, CABINET  
OFFICE.



CONFIDENTIAL

M. Power, N°10 J. St.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 1176

OF 141520Z SEPTEMBER 85.

RETRIBUTORY SOVIET EXPULSIONS FROM USSR

1. I WAS SUMMONED AT 141100Z BY THE HEAD OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT IN THE SOVIET MFA, SUSLOV. HEMANS ACCOMPANIED ME. SUSLOV READ OUT WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A "REPRESENTATION" TO ME (COPY BY BAGLM UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION AS FOLLOWS:

"THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, IN THE MOST SERIOUS MANNER DRAWS THE ATTENTION OF THE BRITISH SIDE TO THE FACT THAT THE STATEMENTS OF ITS OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES ABOUT EFFORTS TO DEVELOP FRUITFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ARE IN CLEAR CONTRADICTION WITH ITS PRACTICAL ACTIVITIES. THE NEW CRUDE AND HOSTILE ACTION CARRIED OUT ON 12 SEPTEMBER IN RELATION TO SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN IS MALICIOUS AND COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIED AND DIRECTED TOWARDS A SINGLE GOAL - POISONING THE ATMOSPHERE OF SOVIET/ BRITISH RELATIONS, ATTEMPTING TO SOW DISTRUST AND HOSTILITY TOWARDS SOVIET PEOPLE AND BLACKENING THE PEACE-LOVING POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION.

STATING ITS DECISIVE PROTEST IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROVOCATIVE ACT, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR PLACES THE COMPLETE AND TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES ON THE BRITISH SIDE.

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ALREADY REPEATEDLY POINTED TO THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY OF BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES IN THE USSR, HAS TAKEN CORRESPONDING MEASURES, AND HAS ISSUED WARNINGS. NEVERTHELESS THE FACTS STATE THAT SUCH ACTIVITY CONTINUES. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS UNDENIABLE EVIDENCE OF THE FACT THAT 25 BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES IN THE SOVIET UNION (LIST ATTACHED SEE MIFT) ARE ENGAGED ON ACTIVITIES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR OFFICIAL STATUS. IN THESE CONDITIONS THE SOVIET SIDE HAS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE BUT TO DEMAND THEIR DEPARTURE FROM THE SOVIET UNION WITHIN THREE WEEKS. EQUALLY WE CANNOT DO OTHER THAN PROTEST AT THE FACT THAT THE BRITISH SPECIAL SERVICES CARRIED OUT THE ILLEGAL REMOVAL FROM THE SOVIET UNION OF A SOVIET CITIZEN, AND THE BRITISH SIDE, REGARDLESS OF OUR REPEATED APPEALS, HAS NOT UP UNTIL NOW GIVEN EXPLANATIONS ABOUT HIS.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR IS COUNTING ON THE BRITISH SIDE FINALLY TO PUT A STOP TO UNFRIENDLY ACTIONS IN RELATION TO SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN GREAT BRITAIN, AND TO REMOVE THE ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLES CREATED BY IT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF STABLE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES"

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## CONFIDENTIAL

2. IN REPLY TO WHAT I DESCRIBED AS SUSLOV'S ASTONISHING STATEMENT, I CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT ANY OF MY STAFF HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN INAPPROPRIATE ACTIVITIES. THE ACCUSATIONS MADE WERE WHOLLY UNWARRENTED. I WISHED TO REGISTER THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE PROTEST AT THIS WHOLLY UNJUSTIFIED AND TOTALLY DISPROPORTIONATE ACTION. ON 12 SEPTEMBER BOTH MR GOODALL IN LONDON AND I IN MOSCOW HAD STRESSED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD ALWAYS TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THE UK. BUT WE WANTED TO DEVELOP A SOUND AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAD GIVEN CONCRETE

EVIDENCE OF THIS DESIRE IN PROPOSING NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEILINGS. I WAS PROFOUNDLY DISAPPOINTED AND SHOCKED BY THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO MEASURES WHICH HAD BEEN ESSENTIAL TO PROTECT OUR SECURITY. THE SOVIET RESPONSE WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE TWO SIDES TO REALIZE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS. SO LONG AS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SENT OFFICIALS TO LONDON WHOSE REAL FUNCTION WERE OTHER THAN THOSE DECLARED AND AUTHORISED THEIR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT PERIODICALLY THEY WOULD BE DISCOVERED, AS THE RESULT OF DETECTION OR DEFECTION. WHEN THIS HAPPENED, THE PEOPLE CONCERNED WOULD BE ASKED TO LEAVE. OUR NATIONAL SECURITY DEMANDED THIS THESE EPISODES NEVERTHELESS DID NOT PRECLUDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP IN OTHER DIMENSIONS. BUT GIVEN THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR RELATIONS OF THE PRESENT SOVIET ACTION, I WISHED TO STRESS THAT THE ONLY WAY TO PREVENT RECURRENT DAMAGE TO THEM WAS FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO STOP PVAUTHORISING THE PRESENCE IN THE UK OF INTELLIGENCE AGENTS.

I WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE WAS ETHICALLY ASYMMETRICAL. DR SUSLOV AND I BOTH KNEW THAT THE 25 SOVIET OFFICIALS EXPELLED FROM LONDON HAD FUNCTIONS OTHER THAN THOSE DECLARED. EQUALLY, WE BOTH KNEW THAT THE 25 BRITISH CITIZENS NOW EXPELLED HAD NO FUNCTIONS OTHER THAN THEIR DECLARED AND RIGHTFUL ONES. THERE WAS THUS A TOTAL DISPARITY.

3. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT I WOULD BE RECOMMENDING TO MY GOVERNMENT THAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET ACTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS SHOULD BE URGENTLY CONSIDERED AND THAT THIS STUDY WOULD INEVITABLY INCLUDE ALL ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS INCLUDING THOSE COVERED IN THE STATEMENT MADE TO THE SOVIET CHARGE IN LONDON ON 12 SEPTEMBER. I REPEATED THAT THE SOVIET ACTION WAS WHOLLY UNJUSTIFIED AND UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT I WISHED TO RECORD THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE PROTEST.

CONFIDENTIAL -2-

4-



4.- WHILE MY REMARKS WERE BEING TRANSLATED I WAS ABLE TO DIGEST THE LIST OF NAMES. HAVING DONE SO, I ADDED THAT HAVING NOTED THE LIST INCLUDED BUSINESSMEN AND JOURNALISTS, THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL REPRESENTATIVES, I WISHED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE DENIAL I HAD ISSUED ON BEHALF OF MY STAFF COVERING THEIR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN INAPPROPRIATE ACTIVITIES APPLIED EQUALLY AND WITH FULL STRENGTH TO THOSE OTHERS ON THE LIST. SO DID MY STRONG PROTEST. TO TAKE SUCH ACTION AGAINST NON-GOVERNMENTAL REPRESENTATIVES, AND IN PARTICULAR THE PRESS, WAS NOT ONLY TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED BUT WHOLLY CONTRARY TO PROPOSITIONS BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES OF A DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS. THIS ACTION COULD ONLY IMPEDÉ SUCH RELATIONS AND OBSTRUCT THE DEVELOPMENT OF BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES.

5. IN REPLY, SUSLOV SAID THAT HE HAD NOT HAD IT IN MIND TO LAUNCH A DISCUSSION ON THIS TOPIC AS THE STATEMENT WAS CLEAR AND EACH WORD HAD BEEN CAREFULLY WEIGHED AND WAS JUSTIFIED. HOWEVER MY "EMOTIONAL" STATEMENT CAUSED HIM TO MAKE TWO OBSERVATIONS:

(A) I SHOULD CAREFULLY STUDY THE MFA STATEMENT

(B) HE REPEATED THAT ACCUSATIONS AGAINST SOVIET OFFICIALS WERE ABSOLUTELY UNFOUNDED. AS FAR AS CONCERNED THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH SIDE WHOM I HAD SO STAUNCHLY DEFENDED, HE WISHED TO REFER TO THE FOLLOWING. HE THEN OPENED A SECOND FOLDER IN WHICH WAS A TYPED PREPARED STATEMENT, WHICH HE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO HAND TO ME. HE READ IT OUT. OUR SUMMARY IS AS FOLLOWS. BEGINS

THE DECISION OF THE SOVIET SIDE IN RELATION TO THE EXCLUSION OF BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT ADEQUATELY REFLECT SOVIET CONCERN AT THE BLATENT ACTIVITIES OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE EVIDENCE AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES SHOWS THAT THE ACT OF BRINGING GORDIEVSKY OUT OF THE SOVIET UNION HAD CLEARLY BEEN PLANNED BEFOREHAND. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES KNOW OF THE ROLE ASSIGNED IN THIS TO FIRST SECRETARIES GIBBS AND ASQUITH. THEY HAD PREPARED THE ACTION AND CAMOUFLAGED IT BY A TRIP TO FINLAND IN CARS EQUIPPED WITH DIPLOMATIC NUMBER PLATES. THEY HAD CARRIED OUT THIS ACTION IMMEDIATELY AFTER AN OFFICIAL RECEPTION AT THE BRITISH RESIDENCE ON 19 JULY. THEIR ACTION COULD ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS POLITICAL BANDITRY AND FLAGRANT MISUSE OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGE. ENDS.

6. SUSLOV WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS OF COURSE FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE WHAT IF ANY FURTHER ACTION TO TAKE. HE WISHED HOWEVER TO UNDERLINE ONCE AGAIN THAT THERE WERE DEEP

CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN BRITISH OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND BRITISH OFFICIAL'S PRACTICAL ACTIVITIES. THE SOVIET

POSITION AS FAR AS RELATIONS IN FUTURE WAS CONCERNED WAS SET OUT IN THE STATEMENT. THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY FOR FRUITFUL RELATIONS BUT ONLY IF THE UK WAS SIMILARLY PREPARED.

CONFIDENTIAL-3-

17.



## CONFIDENTIAL

7. TO THIS FURTHER STATEMENT I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT THAT EVEN IN HIS FIRST STATEMENT SUSLOV HAD DONE ENOUGH DAMAGE TO THE PROSPECTS FOR ANGLO / SOVIET RELATIONS AND CAST SUFFICIENT DOUBT ON THE SINCERITY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S PROFESSED DESIRE TO SEE THEM IMPROVE. HE HAD NOW ADDED AN ALLEGATION OF SUCH A PREPOSTEROUS NATURE THAT IT COULD ONLY MAKE THE DAMAGE WORSE. THE ALLEGATION WAS AN ABSURD PROVOCATION.

8. AS I ROSE TO LEAVE SUSLOV SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOW HAVE TO SEE WHAT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS THERE MIGHT BE. I DID NOT REPLY.

. SEE MY TWO IFTS.

CARTLEDGE

LIMITED.

HD/ECU D

HD/NEWS D

PS

PS / PUS

MR. DEREK THOMAS

MR. GOODALL

MR. JENKINS

COPIES TO

MR WALLACE, PUS.

MR POWELL PS/ NO 10 DOWNING  
ST.

PS/ SIR R ARMSTRONG, CABINET  
OFFICE.

-4-  
CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW

TO FLASH FCC

TELNO 1179

OF 141800Z SEPTEMBER 85

FOR HEAD OF SOVIET DEPT

EXPULSIONS FROM MOSCOW

TASS IN ENGLISH HAVE BRIEFLY REPORTED MY SUMMONS TO THE MFA AND THE EXPULSIONS, BUT WITHOUT GIVING NAMES OR NUMBERS. THE REPORT REFERS TO A PROTEST HAVING BEEN MADE TO ME ABOUT A 'GROSS PROVOCATIVE ACTION' IN REGARD TO A NUMBER OF SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES WHO HAD BEEN REQUIRED TO LEAVE THE UK. THE TASS STATEMENT FOLLOWS CLOSELY THE WORDING OF SUSLOV'S STATEMENT BUT OMITTS:-

- A. ANY MENTION OF NUMBERS EXPELLED BY EITHER SIDE
- B. THE TIME SCALE OF WITHDRAWAL
- C. THE NAMES OF THOSE EXPELLED BY EITHER SIDE
- D. ALL REFERENCE TO THE 'BRITISH SPECIAL SERVICES' OR THE 'ILLEGAL REMOVAL OF A SOVIET CITIZEN'.

2. THE SAME STATEMENT WAS READ OUT ON THE VREMYA PROGRAMME ON TV THIS EVENING WITH NO FURTHER DETAILS

3. THE IMPLICATION FOR TASS READERS IS THAT A STRAIGHT TIT FOR TAT HAS TAKEN PLACE WITH SOME EMBARRASMENT ON THE SOVIET SIDE AT THE NUMBERS INVOLVED.

CARTLEDGE

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RUU-177

HPLNAN 6892 MXHPAN 0540


CONFIDENTIAL

ZZ FCOLN

FM MOSCO TO FCOLN

141450Z GCP

GRS 210



CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 1175

OF 141450Z SEPTEMBER 85

TELECON CARTLEDGE/LLEWELLYN-SMITH AT 141200Z : EXPULSIONS :  
MR YOUNGER'S VISIT

1. AS I EXPLAINED ON THE TELEPHONE ON MY RETURN FROM THE MFA TODAY,  
THE SEVERITY AND NATURE OF THE SOVIET RETALIATORY ACTION  
COMPELS ME TO REVISE THE RECOMMENDATION IN MY TELNO 1170 THAT  
MR YOUNGER'S VISIT SHOULD GO AHEAD AS PLANNED.

2. NOT ONLY IS THE SCALE OF THE RETALIATION SUCH AS TO MAKE  
THE DAY TO DAY CONDUCT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS DIFFICULT OR  
IMPOSSIBLE FOR SOME TIME; BUT THE LIST OF THOSE EXPELLED  
INCLUDES MY 2ND SECRETARY (COMMERCIAL), WHO HAS BEEN WORKING  
FLAT OUT ON THE SCOTTISH TRADE COUNCIL'S MISSION FOR SEVERAL  
WEEKS, AND TWO BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES IN MOSCOW OF UK FIRMS.

3. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND, WITH RELUCTANCE, THAT MR AND MRS  
YOUNGER SHOULD CANCEL THEIR VISIT AND THAT THE SOVIET EMBASSY  
IN LONDON SHOULD BE SO INFORMED.

4. SO FAR AS LORD CLYDESMUIR AND THE REMAINDER OF THE SCOTTISH  
TEAM ARE CONCERNED, I THINK THEY MUST MAKE THEIR OWN ASSESSMENT.  
SO FAR, NONE OF THE COMMERCIAL CALLS ON THEIR PROGRAMME HAVE  
BEEN CANCELLED (ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT BE ON MONDAY) SEMI COLON  
BUT I FEAR THAT, GIVEN THE WAY IN WHICH THIS MONOLITHIC  
SOCIETY OPERATES, THEY CANNOT EXPECT OTHER THAN A COLD RECEPTION  
AT ANY LEVEL.

5. PLEASE INFORM ME OF MR YOUNGER'S AND THE MISSION'S  
DECISION BY FLASH TELEGRAM.

[Mr. Younger has  
decided not to go]

CARTLEDGE



ZCZC

RUUFIT

HPLNAN 6892 MXHPAN 0540


CONFIDENTIAL

ZZ FCOLN

FM MOSCO TO FCOLN

141450Z SEP

GRS 210



CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 1175

OF 141450Z SEPTEMBER 85

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DECISION BY FLASH TELEGRAM.

[Mr. Younger has  
decided not to go]

CARTLEDGE



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HPLNAN 6894 MXHPAN 0542

CONFIDENTIAL

ZZ FCOLN

FM MOSCO TO FCOLN

141510Z SEP

GRS 130

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 1174

OF 141510Z SEPTEMBER 85

*ms*

MY FIRST IPT : EXPULSION FROM MOSCOW

1. I HAVE MADE NO REFERENCE IN BRIEFING THE PRESS HERE, TO SUSLOV'S ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING THE EXFILTRATION OF GORDIYEVSKY FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

2. IF THE RUSSIANS PUBLICISE THIS ASPECT (AS IS LIKELY) I WOULD CONFIRM (IF ASKED) THAT SUCH AN ALLEGATION WAS MADE AND REJECTED. BUT THIS DIMENSION IS, I SUGGEST, BEST HANDLED IN LONDON AND WE SHALL REFER ALL FURTHER QUESTIONS ARISING FROM IT TO YOU.

3. PLEASE TELEGRAPH URGENTLY THE LINE WHICH NEWS DEPT WILL TAKE IF THIS ASPECT SURFACES.

CARTLEDGE

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MXHPAN 0542

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HPLNAM 6894 MXHPAN 0542

CONFIDENTIAL

ZZ FCOLN

FM MOSCO TO FCOLN

141510Z SEP

GRS 130

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 1174

OF 141510Z SEPTEMBER 85

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CARTLEDGE

YYYY

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141500Z SEP

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM MOSCOW

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 1173

OF 141500Z SEPTEMBER 85

MIPT : EXPULSIONS FROM MOSCOW

THE FOLLOWING IS THE LIST OF NAMES ATTACHED TO THE STATEMENT  
READ TO ME BY SUSLOV: BEGINS

- RAYMOND ASQUITH, FIRST SECRETARY
- JANET GUNN, FIRST SECRETARY
- ANDREW GIBBS, FIRST SECRETARY
- FRASER WILSON, SECOND SECRETARY
- GEORGE EDGAR, SECOND SECRETARY
- KAREN VIVIAN, ATTACHE
- JAMES HANLON, ATTACHE
- IAN BLACK, ATTACHE
- GREGORY WILLIAMS, ATTACHE
- PETER SLEET, ATTACHE
- JAMES WINKS, ATTACHE
- SIMON CRACKNALL, OFFICIAL (SOTRUDNIK)
- VANESSA CHANDLER, OFFICIAL
- JEFFREY TAYLOR, OFFICIAL
- JOANNE FINNAMORE, OFFICIAL
- HELEN MATTHEWS, OFFICIAL
- PHILIP MAY, OFFICIAL
- DAVID SANDERS, OFFICIAL,
- SIMON PRIESTLY, REPRESENTATIVE OF QUEST AUTOMATION
- ROGER WOOD, REPRESENTATIVE OF GOLODETZ
- MARK FRANKLAND, CORRESPONDENT OF THE OBSERVER
- TIM SEBASTIAN, CORRESPONDENT OF THE BBC
- ROBIN GEDYE, CORRESPONDENT OF THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
- ALAN PHILPS, CORRESPONDENT OF REUTERS AGENCY
- DENNIS BLEWETT, CORRESPONDENT OF THE DAILY MAIL.

ENDS

CARTLEDGE



MU FAX

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1454

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HPLNAN 6891 MXHPAN 0539  
UNCLASSIFIED  
ZZ FCOLN  
FM MOSCO TO FCOLN  
141430Z SEP  
GRS 375

1171 days  
"Press informed -  
text follows"

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM MOSCOW  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELNO 1172  
OF 141430Z SEPTEMBER 85

MIPT : RETALIATORY EXPULSIONS FROM MOSCOW

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT TO RESIDENT BRITISH JOURNALISTS  
AT 1730 LOCAL TIME ON 14 SEPTEMBER

AT 3PM TODAY I WAS SUMMONED TO THE SOVIET MFA BY THE HEAD OF THE  
SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT, DR SUSLOV. HE READ OUT A  
STATEMENT IN WHICH HE DESCRIBED THE ACTION TAKEN IN LONDON ON  
12 SEPTEMBER AS MALICIOUS AND HOSTILE, AND DESIGNED TO POISON  
ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS. AFTER PROTESTING AGAINST THIS ACTION,  
HE ACCUSED A NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF MY STAFF, RESIDENT BRITISH  
BUSINESSMEN AND BRITISH JOURNALISTS OF ENGAGING IN ACTIVITIES  
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR OFFICIAL STATUS. HE GAVE ME A LIST OF  
THEIR NAMES, AS FOLLOWS (SEE MY TWO MFTS). HE SAID THAT THEY  
WERE REQUIRED TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION WITHIN THREE WEEKS.

2. I TOLD DR SUSLOV THAT THESE ACCUSATIONS WERE TOTALLY  
UNJUSTIFIED AND WHOLLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. I CATEGORICALLY  
DENIED THAT ANY MEMBER OF MY STAFF, OR ANY OF THE BRITISH  
REPRESENTATIVES NAMED IN HIS LIST, HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN IMPROPER  
ACTIVITIES OF ANY KIND. I REGISTERED A FORMAL PROTEST IN THE  
STRONGEST TERMS AGAINST THIS UNWARRANTED ACT.

3. ON RETURNING TO THE EMBASSY, I REPORTED THE SOVIET COMMUNICATION  
TO THE FCO IN LONDON. I THEN ARRANGED FOR AS MANY OF THOSE  
NAMED IN THE SOVIET LIST AS WE COULD CONTACT TO BE INFORMED OF  
THE SOVIET ACTION. I HAVE TOLD THE EMBASSY STAFF CONCERNED THAT  
THEY ARE EVIDENTLY THE VICTIMS OF A WHOLLY UNJUSTIFIED AND  
VINDICTIVE ACT OF RETALIATION BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES AGAINST  
THE MEASURES ANNOUNCED BY HMG ON 12 SEPTEMBER IN DEFENCE OF  
THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UK. I HAVE ASSURED THEM THAT NO  
BLAME OR STIGMA OF ANY KIND ATTACHES TO THEM; THEY WILL BE SADLY  
MISSED.

4. THOSE OF US WHO REMAIN WILL HAVE THE TASK OF ENDEAVOURING TO  
REBUILD, DESPITE THIS ENORMOUS SETBACK, A SOUND AND CONSTRUCTIVE  
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. OUR RELATIONS HAVE RECOVERED  
FROM SUCH SETBACKS BEFORE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT WITH HARD WORK  
AND A REALISTIC APPROACH THEY CAN DO SO AGAIN.

CARTLEDGE



MU FAX

XXX

1454

ZCZC  
HPLNAN 6891 MXHPAN 0539  
UNCLASSIFIED  
ZZ FCOLN  
FM MOSCO TO FCOLN  
141430Z SEP  
GRS 375

1171 Days

"Press informed -  
Text follows"

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM MOSCOW  
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4. THOSE OF US WHO REMAIN WILL HAVE THE TASK OF ENDEAVOURING TO  
REBUILD, DESPITE THIS ENORMOUS SETBACK, A SOUND AND CONSTRUCTIVE  
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. OUR RELATIONS HAVE RECOVERED  
FROM SUCH SETBACKS BEFORE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT WITH HARD WORK  
AND A REALISTIC APPROACH THEY CAN DO SO AGAIN.

CARTLEDGE



Mufaxed at 1030

Charles -  
from RTA's office.  
Cameron.

- Q. DID GORDIEVSKY DEFECT BECAUSE HE WAS BLOWN BY TIEDGE?
- A. (Unattributable) There is no connection between Gordievsky's defection and Tiedge: Gordievsky's defection took place some weeks before the Tiedge affair.

- Q. WAS IT A DANISH RATHER THAN A BRITISH SUCCESS AS DANISH MINISTER OF JUSTICE SEEMS TO HAVE SUGGESTED?

- A. I do not want to comment on statements by the Danish Minister of Justice.

(Unattributable) Any idea that the British simply took over a Danish agent is quite untrue. But as you know, Gordievsky belonged to the Third Department of the KGB which conducts operations against Scandinavia and Britain. There was therefore very close cooperation with the Danish Security Service from the very beginning.



CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW

TO FLASH F C O

TELNO 1163

OF 121340Z SEPTEMBER 85

Sub Rep

CFD

News Dept

POD

Res. Dept

YOUR TELNO. 872: EXPULSION OF SOVIET PERSONNEL FROM THE UK

1. I CALLED ON THE HEAD OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE SOVIET MFA, SUSLOV, AT 1430 MOSCOW TIME (1030Z) ON 12 SEPTEMBER AND CARRIED OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TUR. I TOLD SUSLOV THAT THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN LONDON HAD BEEN CALLED TO THE FCO IN THE LAST HOUR IN ORDER TO RECEIVE CERTAIN COMMUNICATIONS: MY SECRETARY OF STATE WISHED THE SOVIET MFA TO HAVE FULL AND IMMEDIATE INFORMATION CONCERNING THESE DEMARCHES AND I HAD THEREFORE BEEN INSTRUCTED, EXCEPTIONALLY, TO TAKE PARALLEL ACTION IN MOSCOW. THIS WAS THE PURPOSE OF MY CALL. I THEN READ OUT THE SPEAKING NOTE USED BY MR GOODALL WITH PARSHIN AND HANDED OVER TEXTS OF THE TWO AIDE MEMOIRES DEALING WITH THE EXPULSIONS AND THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEILINGS RESPECTIVELY. ms

2. AFTER READING FROM THE SPEAKING NOTE, I SAID THAT, SPEAKING AS HM AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, I WISHED TO ADD A FURTHER COMMENT. I SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD REGRETTABLY BEEN OBLIGED, AS ALWAYS, TO ACT IN DEFENCE OF THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM I HAD THE PERSONAL AUTHORITY BOTH OF MY PRIME MINISTER AND OF MY SECRETARY OF STATE TO SAY THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NEVERTHELESS WISHED THE RECENT IMPROVEMENT IN ANGLO/SOVIET RELATIONS TO BE MAINTAINED, AND INDEED, TO BE DEVELOPED FURTHER.

3. SUSLOV HEARD ME OUT IN GLOOMY SILENCE. FROM GLANCES WHICH WERE EXCHANGED BETWEEN HIM AND HIS COUNSELLOR, USPENSKY, WHILE I WAS SPEAKING IT WAS FAIRLY CLEAR THAT THE SUBJECT OF MY CALL CAME AS NO SURPRISE. WHEN I HAD FINISHED, AND AFTER A LENGTHY PAUSE, SUSLOV ASKED WHETHER HE WAS TO UNDERSTAND THAT EVERYTHING I HAD TOLD HIM DEPENDED ON THE WORD OF ONE MAN WHO WAS IN LONDON AND WHO MIGHT BE PSYCHOLOGICALLY DERANGED? I DECLINED TO COMMENT. SUSLOV THEN EXPRESSED HIS REGRET AT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S 'HASTY AND UNJUSTIFIED DECISION': THIS WAS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER WHICH COULD NOT BUT HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE WOULD, IF NECESSARY, ASK ME TO CALL ON HIM AGAIN FOR A FURTHER EXCHANGE.



4. I THEN SAID THAT I DID NOT WISH TO CONCLUDE OUR MEETING WITHOUT EMPHASISING ONCE AGAIN THE REMARKS WITH WHICH I HAD ENDED MY STATEMENT. I HAD PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SINCERITY AND DEPTH OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S AND YOUR WISH THAT THE RECENT IMPROVEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP. THE AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH I HAD HANDED OVER ON THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEILINGS SHOULD BE SEEN AS SERIOUS AND CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF THAT DESIRE. SUSLOV REPLIED THAT THIS AND EARLIER STATEMENTS BY THE BRITISH SIDE DID NOT TALLY WITH THEIR PRACTICAL ACTIONS. I SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S DECISION ON CEILINGS WAS PRECISELY A PRACTICAL ACTION WHICH FULLY REFLECTED OUR DECLARED ASPIRATION: IT WAS, IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES, A DECISION BY NO MEANS DEVOID OF POLITICAL DIFFICULTY. IT SHOULD IN NO WAY BE SEEN AS A COSMETIC ACT BUT AS A SERIOUS DEMONSTRATION OF THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE ATTACHED TO A SOUND BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. DR SUSLOV SHOULD GIVE FULL WEIGHT TO THAT. TO THIS SUSLOV REPLIED THAT THE AIDE MEMOIRE WOULD BE STUDIED, ADDING THAT "EVEN IN MEDICINE ONE DID NOT NOW ALWAYS PROCEED STRAIGHT TO SURGERY". HE REPEATED THAT HE CONCLUDED FROM WHAT I HAD SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE UNPROVEN WORDS OF ONE MAN WHO COULD SCARCELY BE TRUSTED, ACTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN WHICH COULD NOT BUT HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

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6. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SUSLOV'S REACTION WAS RESTRAINED AND HIS Demeanour WAS MORE SORROWFUL THAN ANGRY. ALTHOUGH OUR REVELATION OF GORDIYEVSKIY'S DEFECTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES CLEARLY CAME AS NO SURPRISE, I THINK THAT OUR CONCOMITANT AND POSITIVE DECISION ON CEILINGS WAS UNEXPECTED AND DID MAKE AN IMPRESSION. HOW MUCH IT WILL WEIGH IN THE BALANCE REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

CARTLEDGE



CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW

TO FLASH F C O

TELNO 1163

OF 121340Z SEPTEMBER 85

in J...  
Sub Dept  
EED  
News Dept  
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Res. Dept

YOUR TELNO. 872: EXPULSION OF SOVIET PERSONNEL FROM THE UK

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


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25 copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

Public from  
12-30 on 12 September.

ON THE RECORD STATEMENT

The Soviet Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Mr Parshin, was asked to call at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office earlier today. He was informed that a senior member of the Soviet Embassy, Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY, had sought and been granted asylum in this country. Mr GORDIEVSKY was a Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy from June 1982. He was a senior official in the KGB, and had recently become Head of the KGB Residency in London. Mr GORDIEVSKY was in a position to know full details of Soviet intelligence activities and personnel in this country.

2. Mr Parshin was told that a significant number of Soviet representatives in London have been engaging in intelligence activities which are of course totally incompatible with their status and declared tasks. The nature and scale of the activities are completely unacceptable.

3. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires was therefore informed that 25 Soviet officials, of whom 6 belong to the diplomatic staff of the Soviet Embassy, must leave the country within three weeks.

4. The Government attach great importance to the development of a realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union which can contribute to mutual confidence between East and West. It was accordingly made clear to Mr Parshin that, although our action was necessary in the interests of national security, it remained our policy to work for an improvement in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.

TOP SECRET



Ref. A085/2337

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister  
A speaking  
note for  
Cabinet.  
CDP  
11/9.

HETMAN

We have had no reason to put in hand the contingency plan, and we are therefore on course for the main plan.

2. At 9.00 am tomorrow morning, 12 September, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires will be summoned to see Mr Goodall at 11.00 am. Sir Bryan Cartledge will seek an appointment with Mr Suslov in Moscow for 2.30 pm Moscow time (11.30 am London time). Your messages to President Reagan and President Mitterrand will be despatched at 9.00 am. The news will break at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office regular news conference at 12.30 pm.

3. As the meeting of the Cabinet is relatively late, and the Soviet Chargé will have been seen by the time it begins, you will probably want to give the Cabinet advance notice.

4. You could tell your colleagues that it is to be announced later in the morning that an important official of the Soviet Embassy has sought asylum in this country. The official concerned was in fact Deputy Head of the KGB Residency in London from June 1982, and had recently become Head of it. This represents a great coup for our security and intelligence services, to whom he has given a very great deal of extremely valuable information about Soviet intelligence activities in this country and about the Soviet intelligence organisation generally.

5. The Soviet Chargé has been summoned to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to be formally told that the official concerned has sought asylum, that Her Majesty's Government had been greatly shocked and concerned by what he has had to tell them and the extent of unacceptable Soviet intelligence activities in this country, and that 25 Soviet intelligence officials



engaging in intelligence activities are to be expelled and must leave the country within three weeks. He will be further told that any retaliation by the Soviet Government on British personnel in Moscow would be entirely unacceptable, and could lead to further expulsions from here.

6. The American, French and other intelligence allies are being informed, and are of course being provided with relevant information made available by the defector.

7. The overall ceiling on the number of Soviet officials in London is being correspondingly reduced, from 234 to 211 (two of the Soviet officials concerned are staff members of international organisations). In order that the two Embassies in London and Moscow may be sufficiently well staffed to carry out their functions, the ceiling on Soviet diplomatic staff in London is being slightly increased (within this overall total) to 46. This should help to discourage reprisals against British diplomatic staff in Moscow.

8. This move may inevitably cast some shadow on Anglo/Soviet diplomatic relations, at any rate for a time; but in the face of this defection and of the information it has produced it would not have been right or understandable to respond less vigorously.

RIA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

11 September 1985





MO 14/10

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-~~987 7027~~ 218 2111/3

30th August 1985

*seen by me on 4 October*  
*EVA*

*Dear Gen.*

MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

You will wish to know that the Defence Secretary has been invited by the Soviet Ambassador to dinner or lunch at the Soviet Embassy once the Ambassador returns to London. The 16th or 28th October have been suggested as possible dates.

I will be putting this invitation to Mr Heseltine for him to consider, in accordance with the guidelines set out in Roger Bone's letter of 16th April to John Coles, but before doing so I would welcome any thoughts you might have on presentational or other aspects.


*Yours etc,*

*Richard Mottram*

(R C MOTTRAM)

L Appleyard Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office







CONFIDENTIAL

MS2 AZL



10 DOWNING STREET

29 August 1985

*From the Private Secretary*

CALL BY OUR AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW ON MR GORBACHEV

This is to confirm that the Prime Minister agreed the content of the draft telegram, providing speaking notes for the Ambassador, sent under cover of your letter of 28 August. She also agreed that Mr Rifkind should take receipt of the letter from Mr Gorbachev, from the Soviet Charge d'Affaires, at the earliest opportunity.

Mark Addison

Colin Budd Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



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do



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 August 1985

(2)

Prime Minister.

This is the letter the Charge d'Affaires passed to Mr. Rifkind yesterday. It is about the Soviet recognition of nuclear tests. FCO are providing a draft reply, in consultation with MOD.

— MEA 29/8

Dear Mark,

Message from Gorbachev

The Soviet Charge d'Affaires, Parchine, called on Mr Rifkind as planned yesterday afternoon. He handed over a message to the Prime Minister from Gorbachev. I enclose a copy of the unofficial translation which he handed over at the same time.

I will let you have our comments plus a draft reply as soon as possible.

Yours Sincerely,  
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

Mark Addison Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr Parkerham A (D) ✓  
News Dept  
Research Dept  
Defense Dept  
Mr Jenkins

Unofficial translation

Esteemed Mrs. Prime-Minister,

Handed to Mr  
Rifkin by  
Mr Parkerham  
(S. J. charge)  
at 1630 on  
28 August  
May 1985  
S. J. Dept  
28/8

I address You on a matter which is of quite big importance in the present situation. It is the problem of cessation of nuclear weapons' tests.

We gave to this problem, among others, a thorough consideration from the point of view of search for such solutions, which could be relatively simple and, simultaneously, sufficiently effective with the view to achieve the aim of stopping nuclear arms race. As a result came the decision by the Soviet Union to impose from August 6, 1985 a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions and the appeal to the American administration with the proposal to follow our example.

The main sense of cessation of nuclear weapons' tests, as we see it, is that it would raise a serious barrier on the way of creation of new and ever new kinds and types of these weapons of mass destruction. In essence, nuclear arms race would be hampered. Even more so, in the absence of tests the existing nuclear arsenals would be actually doomed to gradual moral and physical ageing. Putting it otherwise, a possibility would open up for practical progress on the way of deliverance of mankind from the nuclear threat.

Thus, it is certainly not the case of a desire to achieve a propagandist effect, as attributed to us by some. The fact that we, having imposed for ourselves the moratorium on nuclear explosions since August 6, offered the other side considerable time - till January 1, 1986 in order to measure with all seriousness our proposal and adopt appropriate constructive decision, speaks of the seriousness of our intentions. At the same time, the imposition of the above-mentioned specific time limit - is a natural warrant in the case if the American leadership does not show readiness to reciprocate. If the answer is positive, you can be assured that the USSR will stick to the moratorium further on, after January 1 of the next year. We would wish to hope that we will not have to revoke the declared moratorium on nuclear explosions.



To say frankly, Mrs. Prime Minister, it is not clear for us why cessation of nuclear weapons' tests by two major nuclear powers - the Soviet Union and the United States - could not impress the interests of all states, including Britain. That would practically mean a rejection by the USSR and the USA of further build up of their nuclear arsenals. By declaring the moratorium the Soviet Union has clearly spoken just in favour of that.

In our and not only in our opinion, the already existing technical means of many countries provide the necessary degree of confidence to check that the obligations not to exercise nuclear explosions are fulfilled. Incidentally, we came out for cessation of precisely all nuclear explosions - both for military and peaceful purposes - especially in order not to leave grounds for doubts whether nuclear weapons are tested under the cover of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Thus, control can become a problem only when a main thing is lacking - a wish to stop nuclear weapons tests.

Of course it is clear that the most effective and, I will add, the most right thing, would be a decision on total and universal nuclear weapons' test ban, to which all nuclear powers would be participants. We proceed from the fact that the Soviet-American moratorium on nuclear explosions - if the United States accept our proposal - would serve as a weighty incentive for achieving this goal.

We do not consider a moratorium as an end in itself, but as one of the effective means which opens a way to an agreement on a ban of nuclear weapons under an appropriate control.

Mrs. Prime Minister, since Britain was a direct participant to the tripartite talks on total and universal ban on nuclear weapons, which were held previously, I believe that You are well aware about how far did the sides advance then in working out of mutually acceptable decisions, including the issue of control. The resumption of these talks in order to finish the work, which had been started, would correspond, in our conviction, to the fundamental interests of all peoples.

We would like to hope that Britain will be able to take up such a political position which will contribute to a positive solution of this most important problem.

Sincerely yours,

M. GORBACHYOV

August 26, 1985





10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Sir Bryan Cartledge may be  
called to see Mr. Gerbachev at any  
time.

Agree

Yes  
No (i) the draft speaking note  
attached to the FCO letter?

Yes  
No (ii) that, in the light of this  
development, Mr Rittkuhl should  
take receipt of Mr. Gerbachev's  
letter asap?

MEA 25/8



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 August 1985

*Dear Mark,*

Call by our Ambassador in Moscow on Mr Gorbachev

Sir Bryan Cartledge has been told today by the Soviet Foreign Ministry that Mr Gorbachev would receive him. There has been no indication of the subject or the timing. Sir Bryan had requested a call on the General Secretary among a long list of initial calls put to the Soviet Ministry, but it is most unusual that one should be granted in this way and so quickly. Mr Gorbachev may have some specific message to deliver.

Clearly the Ambassador should take advantage of the call to reiterate the importance the Prime Minister attaches to her previous contacts with Mr Gorbachev and to the development of UK/Soviet relations generally. The speaking notes in the attached telegram reflect this, and also stress the importance we attach to the super-power Summit in November and to progress on arms control. I would be grateful for the earliest possible indication that the Prime Minister is content with the telegram. A call from Mr Gorbachev's office could come at any time.

I understand that before hearing of this development the Prime Minister had decided in principle that she would receive the Soviet Charge d'Affaires tomorrow evening at 1800. Mr Rifkind's advice is that, in the light of Mr Gorbachev's summons to Sir Bryan Cartledge, it would be better for the Prime Minister not to see Mr Parchine-given especially that if Mr Parchine could be received at the FCO today (Mr Rifkind stands ready to see him) we could then hope to inform Sir Bryan Cartledge of the outcome before he sees Gorbachev.

*Yours Sincerely,  
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

Mark Addison Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



File No. ....

OUTWARD

Security Classification  
CONFIDENTIAL

Department .....  
Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) .....

TELEGRAM

Precedence

Tel. Extn. ....

DESK BY ..... Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched (Date) .....  
(Time) ..... Z

POST BY ..... Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat) .....

(Codeword) ..... (Desk by) ..... Z

TO FLASH MOSCOW Tel. No. .... of .....  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

AND TO SAVING .....

INFO .....

INFO SAVING .....

Distribution:—

Soviet Dept  
PS

PS/Mr Rifkind  
Mr Goodall  
Mr Jenkins  
Def Dept  
ACDD  
News Dept  
Info Dept  
Research Dept

Copies to:—

Planning Staff

[TEXT]

Your tel 1109  
CALL ON GORBACHEV

1. When you call on Gorbachev you should tell him that the Prime Minister personally has asked you to convey her warm greetings and regards. She remembers the General Secretary's visit to the UK and the opportunity it offered for a constructive and detailed exchange of views between our two countries, and also the shorter meeting they had following Chernenko's funeral. The Prime Minister has been able to reflect the insights she gained of Soviet thinking through these conversations in talks with other world leaders, and she believes that this has made a significant  
/contribution



development  
contribution to the ~~beginnings of the~~ growth  
of East/West understanding. She believes,  
however, that we still have a long way to  
go, and that determination and good faith  
will be required on both sides if we are  
to succeed in the shared aim of making the  
world a safer place. It is in this context  
that the Prime Minister has reiterated the  
UK's strong wish to continue the course  
set by her conversation with Gorbachev last  
December and to work for better bilateral  
relations. As she said in Moscow on  
13 March, the British people have put great  
faith in Mr Gorbachev personally; they look  
to him to reflect the concern for stable  
peace ~~and the human face~~ that he showed in  
London in working for real and substantive  
progress in arms control negotiations.

2. We welcome Gorbachev's continuing  
efforts to get to know the West and its  
leaders better. The Summit meeting with  
President Reagan in November is regarded by  
us as of special importance. It offers  
the opportunity to put US/Soviet relations  
on a more stable basis. Our hope is that  
this will not prove simply an event in  
itself but the beginning of a series of  
exchanges between the super powers. And we  
hope that in this way impetus can be given  
to the Geneva nuclear arms talks. If

/Gorbachev

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



Gorbachev mentions the Soviet Unilateral Moratorium on nuclear explosions, you should draw appropriately on FCO guidance 119.

3. On bilateral relations, you should say that the past eighteen months have seen a considerable expansion in the level and frequency of UK/Soviet contacts. We are determined to work to fill out our relationship through a continuing programme. We hope that Shevardnadze will be able to accept Sir G Howe's invitation to London soon. We hope that other contacts with members of the Politburo will be possible. The suggestion was made last year to the Soviet Ambassador that Aliev might visit the UK at some stage. We shall be following this up. And we shall also be continuing our programme of contacts at other levels, official and unofficial.

4. If Gorbachev invites the Prime Minister to Moscow you should say that you will communicate this welcome invitation to her, <sup>and</sup> but that you are sure she will wish to accept in principle.

5. Grateful for any early indication as to whether the Russians intend to make the call public eg. through an announcement in <sup>the press</sup> Pravda. Unless it for some reason seems inappropriate, we would intend to take the line here that as the recently arrived British Ambassador you <sup>had requested</sup> made an initial courtesy call on the General Secretary, who had been a recent visitor to London, ~~and~~ that in the course of your conversation you touched on international and bilateral matters, and that you stressed importance that the  
/British



British Government attached to <sup>developing</sup> ~~working for better~~ UK/Soviet relations.




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GRS 130

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TO FLASH F C O  
TELNO 1109  
OF 280725Z AUGUST 85



PS

PS/RIFKIND

Hdy SOV D

M GOODALL

M JENKINS

7

PS NO DOWNING ST

M HATFIELD CAB OFF

CALL ON GORBACHEV

1. THE HEAD OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE SOVIET MFA, SUSLOV, TELEPHONED ME AT 0645Z ON 28 AUGUST TO SAY THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU MR M S GORBACHEV WOULD RECEIVE ME. HE DECLINED TO AMPLIFY THIS INFORMATION, EITHER WITH REGARD TO SUBJECT OR TO TIMING. THE ACTUAL SUMMONS FROM GORBACHEV'S OFFICE COULD FOLLOW VERY QUICKLY ON THIS PRELIMINARY WARNING. I SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL FOR VERY URGENT INSTRUCTIONS AS TO ANYTHING WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER OR YOU WOULD WISH ME TO USE THIS OCCASION TO CONVEY. YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT THE OPPORTUNITY IS UNLIKELY TO RECUR FOR SOME TIME.

CARTLEDGE





PRIME MINISTER

The Soviet Charge d'Affaires, Mr. Parchine, has a personal letter from Mr. Gorbachev for you. The Foreign Office have been told the letter is on a matter of major international importance, and that its content is urgent. The Soviet Embassy have not given any idea as to what it contains.

If you wish to receive the letter yourself, the first opportunity to do so would be Friday. But, as you know, this is a very difficult day indeed, even if the meeting needed to last only half an hour. One alternative would be for you to return from Scotney specially, perhaps coming back earlier on Thursday afternoon.

The Foreign Office see no difficulty in letting the Soviet Embassy know that your movements mean you could not receive the letter personally in the next day or two and to suggest that Mr. Rifkind takes receipt of it instead.

Do you wish to receive the letter from Mr. Parchine yourself? If so, would you prefer to try and slot this in on Friday (perhaps first thing in the morning) or to go for some time on Thursday afternoon?

Mark Addison

(MARK ADDISON)

27 August 1985

Will leave here at -

4p. - Thurs. afternoon.

Should be back to receive

letter by 6p. -


Fri - morning - need

have - sharp 10:00  
no



00

cell  
②



Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food  
Whitehall Place London SW1A 2HH

From the Minister's Private Office

Len Appleyard Esq  
Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Downing Street  
London SW1

Pine Linnet  
Fascinating evidence  
of a new style!

2 August 1985

CDP  
2/P.

ms

Dear Len

The Soviet Ambassador called on my Minister yesterday to deliver a letter from Mrs Gorbachev; he said that Mrs Gorbachev had asked him to hand the letter over personally. You may like to see a copy; it is about cooking potatoes, one of the topic of conversation between Mr Jopling and Mrs Gorbachev at the lunch at Chequers.

We have the book referred to in the letter, with its 500 ways of cooking potatoes; it is, naturally, in Russian. If you have anyone who reads Russian and has a fondness for potatoes, we would be happy to lend it.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Anthony Carey and Charles Powell.

Yours ever

C I LLEWELYN  
Private Secretary



Unofficial translation

Mr. Michael JOPLING,  
Minister of Agriculture  
of Great Britain

July 19, 1985

Esteemed Mr. Jopling,

When the Soviet parliamentary delegation headed by Mikhail S. Gorbachev was on a visit to your country, I told you at the luncheon at Chequers that in Byelorussia we have three hundred recipes to cook potatoes. It seemed to me that you were doubtful about it and I promised to send you a book containing information in this regard at a later date.

I am keeping my promise. My apologies for being somewhat inaccurate: in fact, there are five hundred, rather than three hundred, recipes to cook potatoes.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express once again appreciation for the attention and welcome accorded to us in Britain. We remember all the talks and meetings, and the atmosphere in which they were held. One would like to believe that all this will promote mutual understanding, confidence and co-operation between the peoples of our two countries.

With best wishes

Raisa GORBACHEVA



РРСМ 19/1647

МИНИСТРУ СЕЛЬСКОГО ХОЗЯЙСТВА ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ

МАЙКЛУ ДЖОПЛИНГУ

Уважаемый господин М.Джоплинг!

В дни, когда в Вашей стране находилась советская парламентская делегация во главе с М.С.Горбачевым, в разговоре с Вами на ланче в Чекерсе я сказала, что у нас в Белоруссии из картофеля готовят триста блюд. Мне показалось, что у Вас это вызвало сомнение, и я пообещала при случае прислать Вам книгу со сведениями на этот счет.

Выполняю свое обещание. Извиняюсь за некоторую неточность: оказалось, что из картофеля можно приготовить не триста, а пятьсот блюд.

Пользуясь случаем, хочу еще раз выразить признательность за оказанные нам внимание и прием в Англии. Мы помним все беседы, встречи, атмосферу, в которой они проходили. Хочется верить, что все это послужит делу взаимопонимания, доверия, сотрудничества между народами наших стран.



С наилучшими пожеланиями

*Р. Горбачева*

Раиса Горбачева

19 июля 1985 года







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GRS 1187

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FROM FCO 011716Z AUG 85

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 764 OF 1 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE HELSINKI, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO,  
INFO PRIORITY OTHER CSCE POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE:

HELSINKI 1 AUGUST

SUMMARY

1. SHEVARDNADZE'S MESSAGE WAS OF READINESS TO DEVELOP BILATERAL RELATIONS IN POLITICAL AND TRADE FIELDS. STRESS ON URGENCY OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, WITH PLUGS FOR GORBACHEV'S TEST MORATORIUM, AND FOR NOFUN. SERIOUS PREPARATION OF US-SOVIET SUMMIT NOW UNDERWAY. NO REFERENCE TO SOVIET CONCERN OVER CEILINGS ON SOVIET EMBASSY STAFF.

2. SECRETARY OF STATE SET OUT BASIS OF UK'S EAST/WEST POLICY AND RAISED FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES AND NEED FOR RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFERRING TO SAKHAROV AND SCHARANSKY. SHEVARDNADZE ACCEPTED INVITATION TO UK. NO DATES AS YET.

DETAIL

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD ALMOST AN HOUR'S TALK WITH SHEVARDNADZE ON THE MORNING OF 1 AUGUST.

4. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT UK-SOVIET RELATIONS HAD ENTERED A MORE ACTIVE PHASE AFTER A PERIOD OF STAGNATION. THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONTACT WITH GORBACHEV WAS THE MAIN IMPETUS FOR THIS. GORBACHEV RECALLED HIS VISIT TO THE UK WITH SATISFACTION. WE SHOULD NOW BUILD FURTHER ON EXISTING CONTACTS IN TRADE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE AND SPORT.

5. ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK WAS ARMS CONTROL AND THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE. HE COMMENDED THE GORBACHEV ANNOUNCEMENT OF A MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTS AND OTHER UNILATERAL SOVIET INITIATIVES, EG MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENT OF INF MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR, AND NOFUN UNDERTAKING. THE WEST SHOULD RESPOND. BRITAIN SHARED

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RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SATURATION OF EUROPE WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT WAS NECESSARY NOW TO FIND A WAY FORWARD SO AS TO AVOID DISASTER.

6. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HIS MEETING WITH SHULTZ (QUOTE BUSINESSLIKE UNQUOTE) WAS THE START OF PRACTICAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT. HE HAD STRESSED THE NEED FOR PRACTICAL RESULTS FROM THE SUMMIT IF EXPECTATIONS WERE TO BE MET.

7. AS GORBACHEV HAD SAID, THE RUSSIANS DID NOT LOOK AT EVERYTHING THROUGH THE PRISM OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE UK WITH ITS GREAT HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE HAD ITS OWN ROLE TO PLAY. UK-SOVIET COOPERATION COULD HELP ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESULTS AT THE CDE. THERE SHOULD BE CONTACTS ALSO OVER REGIONAL PROBLEMS (HE SPECIFIED THE MIDDLE EAST). THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO DEVELOP TRADE. THE EXISTING RESTRICTIONS WERE AN OBSTACLE TO THIS. WE SHOULD MAKE UP OUR OWN MINDS WHAT TO BUY AND SELL, AND NOT ALLOW OTHERS TO DICTATE. HE FAVOURED ALSO DEVELOPING EC-CMEA RELATIONS.

8. SHEVARDNADZE LOOKED FORWARD TO DEVELOPING A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE UK AT FURTHER MEETINGS. HE CITED, AS A MODEL OF PREVIOUS COOPERATION, THE TRIPARTITE CTB TALKS OF THE 1970S.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE OUTLINED THE UK'S CONSISTENT EFFORTS OVER TWO YEARS TO WORK FOR IMPROVEMENT IN EAST/WEST AND ANGLO SOVIET RELATIONS. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD MUCH VALUED GORBACHEV'S VISIT. DIALOGUE MUST BE FOUNDED NOT ON ILLUSIONS ABOUT EACH OTHER'S SOCIAL SYSTEMS BUT ON RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO LIVE TOGETHER AND REDUCE TENSION. BRITAIN WANTED IMPROVED RELATIONS AND MORE CONTACTS. HE WELCOMED SHEVARDNADZE'S INTEREST IN UK-SOVIET DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL QUESTIONS AND IN EXPANSION OF TRADE. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ACCEPTING DICTATION AS REGARDS TRADE. BUT WE HAD TO HAVE DUE REGARD FOR NATIONAL SECURITY WITHIN OUR ALLIANCE. WE LOOKED ALSO FOR AN EXPANSION OF CULTURAL RELATIONS.

10. SETTLEMENT OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES HAD A ECHOURABLE EFFECT ON BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE WOULD LEAVE WITH SHEVARDNADZE A

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LIST OF CASES ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEM (SHEVARDNADZE DID NOT DEMUR. BUT ONE OF HIS OFFICIALS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE LIST AFTER THE MEETING. IT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SENT TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY UNDER COVER OF A NOTE TO SHEVARDNADZE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE.)

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ENDORSED THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. SHEVARDNADZE HIMSELF HAD ADMITTED IN HIS CSCE SPEECH THAT THE GROWING BURDEN OF EXPENDITURE HAMPERED INTERNAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. BOTH SIDES COULD PRESERVE SECURITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS, GIVEN THE NECESSARY BASIS OF CONFIDENCE THROUGH VERIFICATION. WE SHOULD WORK PATIENTLY FOR AGREEMENT IN CDE AND MBFR, AND AT GENEVA FOR A GLOBAL CW BAN. WE WOULD CONSIDER SERIOUSLY GORBACHEV'S MORATORIUM ANNOUNCEMENT. BUT RHETORICAL GESTURES WERE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR NEGOTIATION OF VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS.

12. THE UK MADE ITS OWN CONTRIBUTION WITHIN NATO AND OUTSIDE IT. THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AT CAMP DAVID, COMING SO SOON AFTER HER TALKS WITH GORBACHEV, ILLUSTRATED THE POINT. WE WELCOMED THE CAREFUL PREPARATION FOR THE US-SOVIET SUMMIT, WHICH WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN ESTABLISHING CONFIDENCE.

13. THE SECRETARY OF STATE URGED A CHANGE IN SOVIET TREATMENT OF SAKAHOV, SCHARANSKY AND OTHERS, WHICH WOULD TRANSFORM THE ATMOSPHERE. RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WAS AN INTEGRAL FEATURE OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS WHOSE ANNIVERSARY WE WERE CELEBRATING.

14. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RENEWED THE INVITATION TO SHEVARDNADZE TO VISIT THE UK. SHEVARDNADZE ACCEPTED BUT WITHOUT NAMING DATES. HE RESPONDED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S POINTS -

(1) SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS WERE NOT JUST RHETORIC.

THE NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM PROPOSAL WAS A BOLD AND EVEN RISKY STEP. THEY AWAITED A REACTION TO IT. A NOFUN AGREEMENT WOULD BE OF BENEFIT TO ALL. THE SOVIET UNDER-TAKING NOT TO BE FIRST TO MILITARIZE SPACE WAS EQUALLY SERIOUS. IN THE PRESENT STATE OF THE ART RELIABLE VERIFICATION OF ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WAS POSSIBLE.

(2) THE NAMES MENTIONED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE WERE NOT

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FAMILIAR TO HIM. THOSE WHO BROKE SOVIET LAW WERE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO THE LAW. WHAT IF HE HAD HANDED OVER A LIST OF MINERS WHO HAD SUFFERED IN THE STRIKE AS A RESULT OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT ACTION ? WE SHOULD LOOK FOR THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN OUR RELATIONS AS A MEANS OF BUILDING UP CONFIDENCE.

COMMENT

15. THOUGH SHEVARDNADZE REACTED QUITE SHARPLY ON HUMAN RIGHTS (SAYING THAT AS A SOUTHERNER HE WAS QUOTE SHORT-TEMPERED UNQUOTE) THE TONE WAS GENERALLY RELAXED, AND THE MESSAGE ONE OF READINESS TO LOOK AT WAYS OF DEVELOPING RELATIONS. THERE WAS NO REFERENCE TO CEILINGS ON EMBASSY DIPLOMATS (OR TO EXCHANGE OF EMBASSY SITES).
16. SHEVARDNADZE COVERED A LOT OF GROUND COMPETENTLY. THOUGH NOT TO BE DRAWN ON DATES FOR HIS VISIT TO THE UK, HE SEEMED VERY READY FOR FURTHER CONTACTS, EXPLICITLY AS A MEANS OF BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATIONS LAID BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND GORBACHEV - TO WHO HE REFERRED REPEATEDLY DURING THE DISCUSSION.
17. NATO POSTS MAY DRAW ON THE ABOVE BUT SHOULD NOT (NOT) USE THE PASSAGES REFERRING SPECIFICALLY TO BILATERAL RELATIONS.
18. WASHINGTON. IN GOING THROUGH THE ABOVE WITH THE AMERICANS YOU SHOULD EXTRACT AS DETAILED A DESCRIPTION AS POSSIBLE OF THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING. SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY HAD TO LEAVE EARLY FROM THE NATO BRIEFING BREAKFAST THIS MORNING FOR THE SHEVARDNADZE MEETING AND WE WOULD WELCOME A FULL REPORT.

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cc PC  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 July 1985

Dear Paul,

NBAM  
CDP 4/7.

Cultural Relations between the UK and the Soviet Union

A few weeks back your Minister asked what our policy on this subject now was. His question has prompted a re-examination of that policy, and what follows represents the outcome.

The policy we decided on a year ago was to encourage a gradual and phased increase in cultural contacts. We recognised then that the Russians, with central control of the Arts, would be able to get high profile events off the ground much sooner than we could, but that after some initial disparity in their favour, it should be possible to achieve a very approximate balance between inward and outward visits. Our interest is of course mainly in the latter, for the Arts are one of the most effective ways of getting British and Western ideas and values over to a wider Soviet audience. Equally, the Soviet aim is to show Soviet achievements and the "reasonable" face of the Soviet Union to Western audiences.

Our policy involves seeking to encourage British events of high quality in the Soviet Union, focussing in particular on new artistic ideas in areas where Soviet policy is restrictive. The two main events in that category now being planned are an exhibition of 20th century British Art, for 1987/8, and a visit by the Royal Shakespeare Company, possible in late 1986. The British Council is also involved in organising a number of smaller scale events.

None of this is of direct relevance to Lord Gowrie's responsibilities, but he has as you will know recently offered to visit Moscow in support of a British cultural event there. The Foreign Secretary is grateful for this offer and in principle would like to take your Minister up on it, once a sufficiently prestigious manifestation has been arranged. At the moment, for this year, there is only a fairly small exhibition of ceramics in November or December. We are considering the possibility of Sir John Burgh making a visit to Moscow to coincide with the opening, but we do not think it sufficiently prestigious to be worth Ministerial support.

/Next

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Next year, however, two events are under discussion, either of which could appropriately be supported by Lord Gowrie; a British film week and the aforementioned visit of the Royal Shakespeare Company. We will be in touch again once it is clear whether these events will be going forward, and when they will take place.

Two final aspects of UK/Soviet cultural relations which may be of interest to Lord Gowrie are the use of UK public money to support events in which Soviet artists/groups are involved, and attendance by Ministers at Soviet cultural events in the UK. On the first, we have decided that it should no longer be necessary to seek political clearance before eg regional arts councils make arrangements for the sponsorship of such events. In other words decisions should be taken on the artistic merits of the case and the criteria applying to all other foreign artists applied. We would, however, be grateful to know when major events sponsored by the Arts Council and its offshoots and involving high profile Soviet groups are in the offing, so that we can offer advice on any defensive briefing, bearing in mind the particular political circumstances.

On the second point, the present guidelines are set out in Roger Bone's letter of 16 April 1984. They give Ministers with direct links with the arts discretion to attend Soviet events in the UK to which they are invited and which they see benefit in attending.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield, Cabinet Office, Charles Powell (No 10) and Neil Ward in the Northern Ireland Office.


*Yours Sincerely,*  
*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

Paul Thomas Esq  
Private Secretary to Lord Gowrie

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file  
cpc

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

2 July 1985

MESSAGE TO THE NEW SOVIET PRESIDENT

Thank you for your letter of 1 July proposing the text of a message from The Queen to the new Soviet President.

The Prime Minister is content with the message proposed.

(CHARLES POWELL)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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JB





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## Soviet Diplomats (Expulsion)

3.30 pm

**Mr. Denis Healey** (Leeds, East) (*by private notice*) asked the Foreign Secretary if he will make a statement on the expulsion of Soviet diplomats from London and the Soviet response.

**The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Geoffrey Howe):** Our policy towards the Soviet Union is consistent and clear, and has been made clear to the Russians on numerous occasions including most recently when informing them of the expulsions. We wish to improve relations with the Soviet Union. We have made considerable efforts in that direction which will be maintained, but they have been hampered by the unacceptable activities of certain Soviet officials in this country. In the circumstances, and in accordance with our long-established policy, we had no choice but to expel the officials concerned.

We deeply regret the retaliatory action taken against three members of the staff of our Moscow embassy. That was wholly unwarranted, and the accusations made against them without substance. We have protested strongly to the Soviet authorities.

There can be no relaxation of our policy where national security is concerned, but we shall continue our policy of seeking improved relations with the Soviet Union, and better relations between East and West.

**Mr. Healey:** The Foreign Secretary will recognise that the Opposition approve his attempt to improve relations with the Soviet Union and welcome the progress that he has made in recent weeks. That makes it all the more difficult to understand why he mishandled the case of the behaviour of Soviet diplomats. As I understand it, the Foreign Office made it clear last night that it was prepared to ask three of the Soviet diplomats engaged in illegitimate activities to leave without publicity, on condition that the Soviets did not expel British diplomats in retaliation. In that case, why did he not approach all five diplomats in the same way, when he might have received an acceptable response? He must recognise now that the way in which he mishandled the case—the fact that he has made a distinction between two expelled with publicity and three expelled with the promise of no publicity—is difficult not just for the Opposition but for foreign diplomatists in Moscow to understand.

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** I do not believe that the right hon. Gentleman can sustain that charge. When the Soviet ambassador was informed last Thursday, he was told that Captain Los, the assistant naval attache, who had been found to have engaged in activities incompatible with his status, should leave the country within seven days. He was further informed that Mr. Grigorov, a member of the staff of the Soviet airline Aeroflot, was also found to have engaged in unacceptable activities and that if he were still in the country in seven days, measures would be taken against him.

The ambassador was informed at the same time that we wished the Soviet authorities to withdraw a further three officials within one month for activities again incompatible with their status and presence in this country. The Soviet ambassador was also told that if, in response to the expulsion of Captain Los and Mr. Grigorov, the Soviet

authorities expelled any member of the British community in Moscow, we would then publicly expel the three named officials and reduce the Soviet embassy's ceiling accordingly. The Soviet authorities chose to disregard that warning and informed us last night of their requirement that three members of our embassy staff in Moscow should leave. It was in those circumstances that we informed the Soviet chargé d'affaires that three further named officials — Captain Zaikin, assistant naval attache, Colonel Cherkasov, assistant military attache, and Mr. Belaventsev, the third secretary, must also leave this country within seven days and that the appropriate embassy ceiling had been reduced.

In those circumstances, the way in which we handled the matter was consistent with our overall objective of wishing to diminish the impact of this incident on our search to improve East-West relations. We had also to take into account our intention to protect, as far as we could, the position of the British community in Moscow. It was on that basis that we gave the original information. It was as a result of the Soviet response that we found it necessary and right to follow through the original warning.

I must emphasise that this sort of incident arises because of unacceptable conduct by Soviet officials in this country. It is necessary to respond appropriately to such conduct and at the same time to underline the fact that we remain committed to improving relations between East and West. That fact was emphasised in each of the conversations with the Soviet ambassador and Soviet authorities during the past three days.

**Mr. Healey:** The Foreign Secretary has confirmed my suggestion that he mishandled the affair. He still has not explained why he drew a distinction between announcing the expulsion of two of the offending diplomats and being prepared to keep secret the expulsion of the other three. Is it not the case that his hand was forced by a quite impermissible leak in a British national newspaper of his intention to expel the first two diplomats?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** The right hon. Gentleman has failed to understand the position. We made it plain to the Soviet ambassador that we were requiring the withdrawal of five Soviet officials from this country. We intended to publicise the fact that two of them were required to withdraw within seven days, and we said that if the Soviet Union expelled any member of the British community in Moscow we would give publicity to the other three Soviet officials who were also required to withdraw.

It was handled in that way to give the Soviet Union the opportunity to avoid doing damage to the British community in Moscow and to give it the opportunity to withdraw five people, as we required, without publicity. It is because of the Soviet response that it has become undoubtedly necessary and right to give publicity, as we promised, to the three other people involved. The matter was handled throughout in a fashion entirely calculated to do the least damage to Anglo-Soviet relationships. The responsibility for what has happened rests upon the shoulders of those who have committed unacceptable activities in this country.

**Sir Anthony Kershaw** (Stroud): Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that the years of creeping and crawling by the right hon. Member for Leeds, South-East (Mr. Healey), to the Soviets — when the right hon. Gentleman had influence — were as barren as they were



it. It has a number of matters to consider. I hope that we shall be able to consider the rest before that one. There is still, of course, the doctors' and dentists' review body report to come. I am sure the hon. Gentleman understands that we must consider carefully how to find all the money that we decide must be found across the board, bearing in mind that it comes not from the Government but from taxpayers.

*Later—*

**Mr. John Heddle** (Mid-Staffordshire): On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. During education questions,

the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) caught your eye in order to ask a question about truancy. Was it not a gross abuse of Question Time for the hon. Gentleman to raise such a subject when 90 per cent. of the parliamentary Labour party were not in the Chamber, only one member of the Liberal party was present, and the Social Democratic party Member—

**Mr. Deputy Speaker:** Order. If there was an abuse, it is being repeated now. I do not propose to let it continue.



humiliating to this country? Is it not the position that Russia knew the rules, it broke them, it was caught, and it should now stop whining?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** My hon. Friend puts the matter very clearly. It is because of the activities of Soviet citizens that these actions have been necessary. They have been carefully judged to make them as consistent as possible with our long-term desire to see a continued improvement in our relations with the Soviet Union.

**Mr. James Callaghan** (Cardiff, South and Penarth): If the Foreign Secretary's intention was to safeguard the security of the country, to minimise damage to our relations with the Soviet Union and to protect the British community in Moscow, why did he give any publicity at all to the incident?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** Because if one is securing withdrawals in that way, accompanied by a reduction in ceilings, that inevitably leads to speculation about why that has happened. In addition, and in a wider sense, it is necessary in the case of conduct that threatens national security to demonstrate to all concerned, and not only the Soviet Union, that such activities cannot be tolerated.

**Mr. Patrick McNair-Wilson** (New Forest): I congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend on his action. Is there any truth in the report that at least one of those expelled was trying to obtain information about British laser technology? Are any proceedings likely against a United Kingdom citizen as a result of investigations by the security services?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** Action is taken in cases of this kind on the basis of irrefutable evidence, but the House would not expect me to give details about the background of this operation.

**Mr. Russell Johnston** (Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber): Is there any reason why the Secretary of State should not at least give us some idea what these diplomats were doing, which might help the House?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** The hon. Gentleman ignores the necessary, regular and prudent practice. It is not appropriate in places such as this to give any further details than I have given. I can assure him that the actions were based on irrefutable evidence.

**Mr. David Winnick** (Walsall, North): Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman recognise that it would be disastrous if these expulsions prevented the continuing improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations? While I recognise the need at all times to protect our national security against any country, would it not be right for the Foreign Secretary to make it clear to the Soviet authorities at the highest level that it is the wish of Her Majesty's Government to see a continued improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations? Should that not be made clear at the first opportunity?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** The position is entirely clear. We have to remain serious and vigilant in our protection of national security. We have to remain serious and realistic in our search for improved relations with the Soviet Union, and both those matters have to be considered alongside each other. I have made it plain, through the Soviet ambassador on Thursday, through the Soviet chargé d'affaires last night and through our ambassador to Moscow that we intend to sustain our policy of searching for improvement in East-West relations, and with the

Soviet Union. I shall take an early opportunity, I expect when I meet Mr. Gromyko in Vienna early next month, to make the same point to him.

**Mr. Nicholas Soames** (Crawley): I congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend on his handling of the affair. Does he agree that what is required in the handling of East-West relations is consistency? By undertaking this act, he has shown the Soviet Union that, unless it obeys the rules and behaves according to diplomatic circumstances, we shall not be prepared to forward our friendship with it, except on a proper basis?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** I agree. We have always made it clear to the Soviet Union that our search for improved relations would have to be conducted on the basis of realism and proper reconciliation of the interests of both sides, and that includes continuing to take proper account of national security.

**Mr. Gavin Strang** (Edinburgh, East): Presumably, the alleged offences of the three officials were less serious than those of the first two officials about whom we heard. Why did the Foreign Secretary think that restricting publicity to the first two would influence the Soviet response?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** It is customary in these cases to make a judgment of how far one publicises the action that one has taken, as has been pointed out. In this case, we judged that it was right to require the withdrawal of two Russians with publicity at the outset, to make it plain that such conduct would not be tolerated, while the withdrawal of the other three would not be accompanied by such publicity. We did so to try to limit the damage to the British community in Moscow. That was the intention and it is a matter of great regret that the Soviet Union chose not to respond to our suggestion in the way that we hoped.

**Mr. Jonathan Aitken** (Thanet, South): Has my right hon. and learned Friend noticed the interesting contrast between the noisy if unconvincing protest of the Soviet embassy spokesmen in London on this issue on the one hand, and on the other the uncharacteristic silence of the state-controlled media in Moscow on the subject? Does my right hon. and learned Friend conclude from this, as I do, that this may be a case of the Soviet authorities knowing that they are in the wrong and hoping that this incident will not damage our long-term relations?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** I certainly hope that the Soviet Union will draw that conclusion, and will recognise that such activities are bound to impair the process of improving relations. I hope that the Soviet Union recognises that we are serious in our intention to secure such an improvement.

**Several Hon. Members** *rose*—

**Mr. Deputy Speaker** (Mr. Harold Walker): Order. I have to protect the remainder of the day's business. I intend to take only two more questions from each side of the House.

**Mr. David Crouch** (Canterbury): Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that the great majority of hon. Members and of the people of this country appreciate his realistic and determined approach to improved relations with the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc countries, and



[Mr. David Crouch]

thank him for it? They also appreciate his determined, even gentle, approach to matters concerning our security, which are of equal importance, and thank him for that, too.

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** I am grateful to my hon. Friend.

**Mr. Barry Sheerman** (Huddersfield): Does this case have further ramifications? Will any British citizens be arrested under the Official Secrets Act? Is it true that, as has been rumoured, a spy network has been uncovered?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** I am not in a position to add to what I have said about the background to the case. In this as in every other case, the prosecuting authority will investigate the matter fully.

**Mr. Bill Walker** (Tayside, North): Will my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that Soviet diplomats in the United Kingdom are given freedoms that British diplomats in the Soviet Union do not enjoy? If so, are there any plans to advise the Soviet Union that we shall restrict the movement of Soviet diplomats to the level of that of our diplomats in the Soviet Union?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** I do not propose, at this time, in this case, to outline any of the steps that I may have in mind.

**Mr. Campbell-Savours:** Has not the Foreign Secretary bungled it? Could not all five Soviet diplomats have been expelled without publicity, in private, as was done in previous cases by Labour Governments? Were not the first two expulsions publicised simply because the Government wanted to do some Commie-bashing?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** The hon. Gentleman's question could not more clearly illustrate how completely he fails to understand the policy of Her Majesty's Government. We are not interested in Commie-bashing, as the hon.

Gentleman so crudely puts it. We are interested, and have been engaged on a sustained basis, in improving relations between East and West and between this country and the Soviet Union.

However, we must make it clear that that pursuit cannot be conducted at the expense of national security. In this case, it was necessary to give publicity to the initial expulsions to make it clear to all those who might be concerned in such activities that they will not be tolerated.

**Mr. Denis Healey** (Leeds, East): May I assure the Foreign Secretary that we share his suffering at the pompous congratulations that he has received from Conservative Members whose aim is to make relations between Britain and the Soviet Union more difficult, rather than less?

May I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman to bear in mind the damage that he has done to his major objective through his mishandling of this issue?

**Sir Geoffrey Howe:** I assure the right hon. Gentleman that the greater cause for dismay—not suffering—is the patronising inaccuracy of his own question.

#### STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, &c.

**Mr. Deputy Speaker:** By leave of the House, I will put together the motions relating to draft Statutory Instruments.

*Ordered,*

That the Building (Fourth Amendment) Regulations 1985 (S.I., 1985, No. 488) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.

That the Housing (Limits of Rateable Value for Improvement Grants and Repairs Grants) (Scotland) Order 1985 (S.I., 1985, No. 297) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.

That the Protected Tenancies and Part VII Contracts (Rateable Value Limits) (Scotland) Order 1985 (S.I., 1985, No. 314) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.—[Mr. Archie Hamilton.]



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FROM COMMCEN HSP

TO MODUK

Mr. Goodall

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DESKBY 221300Z

FM MOSCOW 221200Z APR 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 541 OF 22ND APR 85

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO,  
MODUK (FOR HAAL)

NY TELNO 539: EXPULSIONS



1. I HAVE INFORMED ALL MEMBERS OF MY STAFF NOW IN MOSCOW AND NAMED IN THE SOVIET COMMUNICATION. ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE PUT IN HAND FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE THREE REQUIRED TO LEAVE WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS. I HAVE CAUTIONED THOSE AGAINST WHOM ALLEGATIONS ONLY HAVE BEEN MADE TO KEEP THE INFORMATION TO THEMSELVES. OF THE FOUR IN THIS CATEGORY LT CDR HARDIE IS DUE TO RETURN TO MOSCOW FROM WARSAW LATER TODAY. SON LDR STACEY IS ON LEAVE IN THE UK AND WHEN THE MOB ADVISE HIM HE SHOULD BE SIMILARLY CAUTIONED. I ADVISE THAT NOTHING REPEAT NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID IN PUBLIC ABOUT THE NAMING OF THESE FOUR MEMBERS OF MY STAFF.

2. THE RUSSIANS HAVE CHOSEN TO ESCALATE IN THE FIRST ROUND AND TO CONFINE THEIR RETALIATION TO EMBASSY STAFF SEMI COLON ALSO TO GIVE US A LITTLE MORE TIME. THE REFERENCE IN THEIR PROTEST TO THE THREE OTHER ASSISTANT SERVICE ATTACHES AND EDGAR IS CLEARLY INTENDED AS A THREAT OF FURTHER RETALIATION IF WE PROCEED, AS WE HAVE STATED, TO THE EXPULSION OF ZAIKIN, CHERKASOV AND BELAVENTSEV. I AM NATURALLY CONCERNED THAT WE SHOULD MINIMIZE THE EXTENT OF FURTHER RETALIATION AND TO AVOID A SUCCESSION OF TIT-FOR-TAT ACTIONS IN WHICH, AS HAS ALWAYS BEEN RECOGNISED, THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE THE ULTIMATE ADVANTAGE GIVEN THE NATURE OF THEIR SOCIETY. WE MUST CLEARLY PROCEED TO TAKE THE ACTION AGAINST ZAIKIN, CHERKASOV AND BELAVENTSEV ANTICIPATED BY THOMAS (FCO TELNO 384). I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AS MUCH NOTICE AS POSSIBLE OF THE FURTHER STATEMENT TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LONDON.

3. HAVING ESCALATED IN THE FIRST ROUND IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL LET IT GO AT THAT. THE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE INCREASED IF WE DO NOT GIVE IMMEDIATE PUBLICITY TO THE EXPULSION OF THE THREE. BUT I THINK IT MUCH MORE LIKELY THAT THEY WILL GO FOR A SECOND ROUND AND PICK AT LEAST TWO OF THE FURTHER FOUR NAMED IN THE PROTEST NOTE, LEAVING IT AT FIVE-ALL EXPELLED ON BOTH SIDES. BUT GIVEN THE THREE FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY NAMED BY US, I CERTAINLY DO NOT EXCLUDE THE EXPULSION OF THREE OR EVEN FOUR OF THOSE NOW PUT ON WARNING.



THE CEILING

4. THERE IS NO IMPLICATION IN WHAT DR SUSLOV SAID THAT THE SOVIETS INTEND TO IMPOSE A CEILING ON THE EMBASSY IN MOSCOW. BUT THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THEY WILL NOT DO SO THEY MAY KEEP THIS UNTIL THE NEXT ROUND AND POSSIBLY UNTIL WE APPLY FOR VISAS FOR REPLACEMENTS.

PRESS LINE

5. EVEN IF I WAS NOT OBSERVED CALLING AT THE MFA, THE PRESS HERE WILL NO DOUBT CONTINUE TO ASK WHETHER I HAVE BEEN SUMMONED FOLLOWING THE ACTION ANNOUNCED IN LONDON ON 18 APRIL AND TO WHAT EFFECT. UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTED, I PROPOSE TO SAY THAT I HAVE BEEN SUMMONED BUT THAT THE NATURE OF MY COMMUNICATION WITH THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REMAINS FOR THE MOMENT CONFIDENTIAL. SUSLOV DID NOT SAY WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE GIVING PUBLICITY TO THE COUNTER EXPULSIONS AND INTENTIONALLY I DID NOT ENQUIRE. I THINK IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE FOR US TO GO PUBLIC FIRST ON THE EXPULSION OF THE THREE MEMBERS OF MY STAFF. GRATEFUL FOR EARLY INSTRUCTIONS.

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FM MOSCOW 220945Z APR 85

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 539 OF 22 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE : WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK (HAAL).

YOUR TELNO 391 (NOT TO ALL) : EXPULSIONS

1. THE HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT AT THE MFA SUSLOV SUMMONED ME AT 1130 LOCAL TIME TODAY, 22 APRIL, TO READ OUT A PROTEST (TRANSLATION OF FULL TEXT IN MIFT) WHICH ACCUSES THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES OF TAKING PROVOCATIVE ACTS OF A POLITICALLY MOTIVATED CHARACTER IN CONTRAST WITH OUR STATED DESIRE OF IMPROVING RELATIONS AND REQUESTS THE WITHDRAWAL OF MY NAVAL ATTACHE CAPT MARSHALL, THE ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE LT CDR LITTLEBOY AND SECOND SECRETARY AND SCIENTIFIC ATTACHE MISS ROBSON WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS. THE COMMUNICATION GOES ON TO ACCUSE FOUR OTHER MEMBERS OF MY STAFF OF ACTIVITIES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR STATUS, BUT IN THE INTERESTS OF ANGLO/SOVIET RELATIONS THE SOVIET SIDE WILL NOT NOW RAISE THE QUESTION OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL. THE ADDITIONAL FOUR NAMED ARE ASSISTANT AIR ATTACHE SQN LDR STACEY, ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE LT CDR HARDIE, ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE MAJOR HEPBURN AND SECOND SECRETARY GEORGE EDGAR.

2. IN REPLY I MADE THREE POINTS:

(1) IN CONTRAST TO WHAT DR SUSLOV HAD STATED, THE BRITISH SIDE HAD NO WISH TO SEE THE PRESENT INCIDENT AFFECT THE GENERALLY IMPROVING CLIMATE OF ANGLO/SOVIET RELATIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE WERE COMMITTED TO THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THOSE RELATIONS AND DID NOT WISH THE INCIDENT TO HINDER OR TO CAST A CLOUD ON THAT DEVELOPMENT. THIS HAD BEEN STATED ON 15 APRIL BY MR THOMAS TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. I WISHED TO RE-EMPHASISE THIS MOST STRONGLY.

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(II) MR THOMAS TOLD THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR THAT THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THOSE WE HAD EXPELLED FROM LONDON WAS IRREFUTABLE. I WAS SATISFIED THAT IT WAS SO. BUT THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST MEMBERS OF MY STAFF CONTAINED IN THE TEXT WHICH DR SUSLOV HAD READ OUT WERE WITHOUT FOUNDATION. THE RESPONSE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION.

(III) I WISHED IN TURN TO FORMALLY REGISTER A PROTEST IN THE STRONGEST TERMS AT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S ACTION.

3. DR SUSLOV REPLIED CURTLY THAT THE SOVIET TEXT SPOKE FOR ITSELF. I POINTED OUT THAT MR THOMAS HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR THAT THERE WOULD BE CERTAIN SPECIFIC CONSEQUENCES IN LONDON IF THE SOVIET UNION TOOK RETALIATORY ACTION BUT DID NOT ENUMERATE THE NAMES IN THE PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH OF THE SPEAKING NOTE IN YOUR TELNO. 384. SUSLOV SAID THAT I SURELY DID NOT SERIOUSLY EXPECT HIM TO BE FRIGHTENED BY THIS AND THERE WAS NO NEED TO CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION. I CONCLUDED BY RESTATING THE THREE POINTS I HAD ALREADY MADE.

4. FOR COMMENT SEE MY SECOND 17S.T.

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22 APR 1985

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DESKBY 221030Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 540 OF 22 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE : WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK (HAAL).

*File*

M I P T : EXPULSIONS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SOVIET COMMUNICATION MADE TO ME ON 22 APRIL.

BEGINS

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR MAKES A PROTEST IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROVOCATIVE ACT TAKEN BY THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES IN RELATION TO A NUMBER OF SOVIET OFFICIALS IN GREAT BRITAIN. THIS ENTIRELY UNJUSTIFIED ACT BEARS A CLEARLY INSPIRED POLITICAL CHARACTER AND IS IN CONTRADICTION WITH STATEMENTS BY THE BRITISH SIDE OF A WISH TO COOPERATE TOWARDS THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IT SHOULD BE WELL KNOWN TO THE BRITISH SIDE THAT ALL SOVIET OFFICIALS IN ENGLAND ARE OCCUPIED EXCLUSIVELY IN ACTIVITY DIRECTED TO THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET/BRITISH RELATIONS AND STRICTLY OBSERVE UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LAWS OF THE RECEIVING COUNTRY.

ALL THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS UNFRIENDLY ACT COMPLETELY AND TOTALLY RESTS WITH THE BRITISH SIDE.

THE ATTENTION OF THE BRITISH SIDE HAS ALREADY BEEN DRAWN MORE THAN ONCE TO THE FACT THAT SOME OF ITS OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW DO NOT OBSERVE THE RULES OF BEHAVIOUR FOR FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE USSR AND OCCUPY THEMSELVES WITH ACTIVITY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR STATUS. SUCH ILLICIT AND ILLEGAL ACTIVITY IS BEING CARRIED OUT BY NAVAL ATTACHE J MARSHALL, ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE M N LITTLEBOY AND SECOND SECRETARY OF THE EMBASSY E C ROBSON. ACCORDINGLY THE BRITISH SIDE ARE REQUIRED TO ENSURE THEIR DEPARTURE FROM THE SOVIET UNION WITH FOURTEEN (14) DAYS.



THE MFA OF THE USSR IS AWARE THAT ASSISTANT AIR ATTACHE C STACEY, ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE J HARDIE, ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE D HEPBURN AND SECOND SECRETARY OF THE EMBASSY C G EDGAR ALSO COMMIT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED INFRINGEMENTS, HOWEVER, GUIDED BY THE INTERESTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET/BRITISH RELATIONS, WE WILL NOT NOW RAISE THE QUESTION OF THEIR DEPARTURE FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

THE SOVIET UNION IS COUNTING ON THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES TO REFRAIN IN FUTURE FROM UNJUSTIFIED ACTIONS AGAINST SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON AND IN THE SAME MANNER NOT TO CREATE OBSTACLES TO THE NORMAL DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

ENDS

SUTHERLAND

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 April, 1985

Prime Minister

CDP  
24/4

NBPM  
in light of  
subsequent  
developments  
CDP  
24/4

Dear Charles,

Expulsion of Soviet Officials

In your letter of 17 April you gave the Prime Minister's agreement to the action proposed by the Foreign Secretary over the expulsion of certain Soviet officials. Action was duly taken on 18 April with the Soviet Ambassador. I enclose a copy of FCO telno 383 which gives an account of that meeting.

Popov's reaction was predictable but vigorous. What he said was followed up by a statement issued by the Soviet Embassy later in the day denying the charges and accusing the British Government of taking an action "of political character" which was "completely unjustified". Popov argued that, as a result of an article in the Daily Express on 18 April, the Soviet Embassy had already received a number of press enquiries about the expulsions before being informed officially.

Although the expulsions have received wide publicity in the British press the reports have generally been accurate rather than sensational. The majority have reflected the point in our On The Record Statement that we wished to improve our bilateral relations and expand contacts with the Soviet Union: but that improving our relations did not mean any relaxation of our policy on intelligence and security questions. At his meeting with Popov, Thomas stressed our strong commitment to the development of Anglo/Soviet relations and our wish that this incident should not hinder this.

The present position is therefore that we await a considered Soviet response. If the Russians decide to retaliate in Moscow, and we think that the premature leak of the news of the expulsion here will have probably increased the chances of this, then they are likely on past form to take action within the next two weeks. There has already been one indication of their dissatisfaction. A group of Soviet officials who were due to arrive for talks on 22 April with FCO and MOD

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/officials



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officials on arms control questions have just cancelled their visit. It remains to be seen whether other visits including that of Mr Listov, the Soviet Minister for the Chemical Industry, who is due here next week for discussions with Mr Channon and companies who are bidding for major contracts (ICI, John Brown, etc) will also be cancelled.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD), Hugh Taylor (Home Office) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*

*L V Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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*Parry 19/4*

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DESKBY 181500Z

FM FCO 181200Z APR 85

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 383 OF 18 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO AND OTTAWA  
MY TELNO 380 (NOT TO ALL): EXPULSION OF SOVIET OFFICIALS

1. MR DEREK THOMAS SUMMONED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT 1130 HOURS TODAY, 18 APRIL. THOMAS DREW ON THE SPEAKING NOTE IN MY FIRST IFT AND HANDED OVER THE AIDE MEMOIRE IN MY SECOND IFT.
2. IN REPLY POPOV WENT INTO A CHARACTERISTIC BLUSTER. HE ASSERTED THAT ALL THE ACCUSATIONS MADE ABOUT SOVIET OFFICIALS WERE ENTIRELY UNTRUE. NO SOVIET OFFICIAL IN BRITAIN HAD BEEN OR WAS ENGAGED IN IMPERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES. THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WAS NOT MERELY UNFRIENDLY BUT HOSTILE. IT WAS A POLITICAL ACT WITH ALL THE CONSEQUENCES THAT FLOWED FROM THAT. IT COULD NOT BUT HAVE A VERY NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE BRITISH ACTION CONTRADICTED THE STATEMENTS THAT HAD BEEN MADE NOW AND EARLIER THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WISHED TO DEVELOP BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WAS BOUND TO BE AFFECTED SINCE THIS UNFRIENDLY ACTION WAS BEING TAKEN AGAINST OFFICIALS CONCERNED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THOSE RELATIONS.
3. POPOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY WARNINGS ABOUT THE FURTHER BRITISH MOVES IF THE SOVIET SIDE WERE TO TAKE MEASURES IN RESPONSE. SUCH WARNINGS CONTRADICTED EVEN FURTHER THE STATEMENTS BY THE BRITISH SIDE OF THEIR DESIRE TO DEVELOP ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS. AS FOR THE QUESTION OF MAKING THE BRITISH ACTION PUBLIC, HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE BRITISH SIDE WERE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ATTRACT THE ATTENTION OF THE PRESS AND WORSEN THE ATMOSPHERE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. EVEN BEFORE HE HAD BEEN CALLED IN, THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED CALLS FROM THE PRESS ABOUT TWO OFFICIALS BEING EXPELLED AND OTHERS ALLEGED TO BE ENGAGED IN IMPERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES.



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4. POPOV SAID THAT THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS UNFRIENDLY ACTION TOWARDS THE SOVIET SIDE LAY WITH THE BRITISH SIDE. THE SOVIET SIDE NATURALLY CONSIDERED THAT IT HAD THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THIS MATTER IN DUE COURSE.
5. THOMAS REGRETTED THAT THE SOVIET EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED PRIOR CALLS FROM THE PRESS BUT HE STRESSED THAT THIS DECISION WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN HAD THE EVIDENCE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THOSE CONCERNED NOT BEEN OVERWHELMING. HE HAD LOOKED INTO THE MATTER PERSONALLY AND WAS IN NO DOUBT THAT THE OFFICIALS HE HAD NAMED HAD ENGAGED IN UNACCEPTABLE ACTIVITIES. HE COULD NOT THEREFORE ACCEPT THAT THIS WAS AN UNFRIENDLY OR HOSTILE ACT. THE DECISION NOT TO EXPEL PUBLICLY ALL THOSE CONCERNED NOR TO REDUCE THE CEILINGS IN RESPECT OF ALL OF THEM WAS A CLEAR SIGNAL OF OUR DETERMINATION TO TRY TO HANDLE THIS ISSUE WITHOUT AFFECTING THE WIDER RELATIONSHIP WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER AND I HAD MADE CLEAR WE WISHED TO DEVELOP. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HANDLE THE TWO ISSUES SEPARATELY.
6. IN RESPONSE POPOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE JUDGED THE INTENTIONS OF ANY GOVERNMENT NOT ONLY BY THEIR WORDS BUT BY THEIR DEEDS. NONE OF THE OFFICIALS NAMED HAD BEEN OR WERE ENGAGED IN ANY IMPERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES. THAT WAS WHY HE TOOK THE VIEW THAT THERE WERE OTHER REASONS FOR THIS ACTION WHICH WAS AIMED NOT AT IMPROVING BUT AT WORSENING BILATERAL RELATIONS.
7. PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY NEWS DEPARTMENT AT 1230 HOURS 18 APRIL IS CONTAINED IN MY THIRD IFT.

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MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR JENKINS

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Relations : SOVIET UNION.

Pt 4.

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PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTIONS: 18 APRIL

SOVIET EXPULSIONS  
LINE TO TAKE

Our policy is consistent and clear, and was reiterated to the Soviet Ambassador this morning: we wish to improve our bilateral relations, to expand trade and to increase contacts with the Soviet Union. This remains our firm intention. We shall remain serious and realistic, but vigilant, in our search for greater mutual security and confidence. But this does not mean any relaxation of our policy on the sort of activities for which we have had to request the removal of two Soviet officials today.

[On the record press statement and supplementaries attached]



EXPULSIONS: ON THE RECORD STATEMENT

- I. The Soviet Ambassador was asked to call at the FCO earlier today. He was informed that Captain O A Los, Assistant Naval Attaché, had been found to have engaged in activities incompatible with his status. Mr Popov was told that Captain Los should leave the country within seven days.
  
2. The Ambassador was further informed that Mr V A Grigorov, a member of the London staff of the Soviet airline Aeroflot, had also been found to have engaged in unacceptable activities and that if he was still in this country in seven days' time, appropriate measures would be taken against him.
  
3. The Ambassador was also told that, as the Foreign Secretary has made clear, we wished to improve our bilateral relations and expand contacts with the Soviet Union. Our policy is and remains serious and realistic but vigilant in the search for greater mutual security and confidence. The implication of this is clearly that while we wish to see an improvement in our relations this does not mean any relaxation of our policy on the sort of activities in which Captain Los and Mr Grigorov have engaged.



NOTE FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES (ON THE RECORD) [FOLLOWING STAGE 1]

Who saw the Soviet Ambassador?

1. Mr Derek Thomas, Political Director  
.....

Are any further expulsions planned?

2. Our policy is that if Soviet officials engage in inadmissible activities appropriate action will be taken.

Do these expulsions result from identification by defectors?

3. We cannot comment on such matters.

What exactly did they do?

4. Regret cannot give further details.

What damage have they done to national security?

5. Cannot comment.

Does this affect the ceiling on the number of Soviet officials in the United Kingdom?

6. Yes. The permitted level for diplomatic staff at the Soviet Embassy will be reduced by one to 42, and that for

/Soviet



Soviet ancillary organisations, which includes Aeroflot, by one, to 104.

What status does Grigorov have?

7. As a member of the London staff of Aeroflot, he has no special status in law.

Why is Grigorov not being subjected to the normal process of law?

8. The Government must decide how to deal with each case of this kind as it arises, bearing in mind the needs of our own security. In this case the decision taken was that our objectives were best served by requiring the immediate withdrawal of the person concerned and by lowering the ceiling.

What measures will be taken if Grigorov does not leave within seven days?

9. Hypothetical, but that would be a matter for the Home Office. We expect that he will leave before then.

Do you expect retaliation?

10. Any such action by the Soviet authorities would be entirely without justification. The Soviet authorities know that Her Majesty's Government would take an extremely serious view of any attempt to retaliate.

/Does ...



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(UNTIL USED)

Does this action reflect wider policy towards the Soviet Union?

11. No. Our policy is that if a Soviet official is detected in improper activities, we must ask for him to go. The consequences are of the Soviet authorities own making.

Wrong signal at sensitive moment for East/West relations?

12. The activities of these two had nothing to do with normal bilateral or international relations. Such activities are a source of friction and concern. The removal of those engaged in unacceptable activity should help, not hinder. It is the Soviet Union, not HMG, which is responsible for our having to take action at this time.

Personal details of those expelled?

13. Captain Oleg Alexandrovich LOS, Assistant Naval Attache.  
Married. In UK since November 1982.

Vyacheslav Anatolyevich GRIGOROV, Charter Manager,  
Aeroflot office, London. Married. In UK since May 1982.

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(UNTIL USED)



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COPIED TO:  
SECURITY:  
Leak about Expulsion  
of Soviet officials  
April 85

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

EXPULSION OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

The Prime Minister has noted your minute of 18 April. She agrees that the leak is very damaging particularly in the light of the reactions of the Soviet Ambassador when summoned to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. She would like to be kept informed of the progress of investigations into it.

I am copying this minute to Mr. Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

CHARLES POWELL

18 April 1985

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Copy No 1 of 3 Copies

Ref. A085/1124

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

no  
C.D.P. 10/74

Proposed Expulsion of Soviet Intelligence Officers

You asked me to discuss with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary yesterday evening the expulsions proposed in his minute of 17 April.

2. As I was able to tell you orally shortly after that discussion, I was able to make inquiries that persuaded me that there were well-based operational reasons why the matter had not reached a point of decision until recently, and why it was desirable and sensible to proceed with the two immediate expulsions and the slower-time withdrawals proposed. Apart from these operational reasons, there are good resource reasons for bringing these activities to an end: the surveillance of those concerned represents a considerable call on Security Service resources.

3. You asked whether the time limit for the proposed withdrawals need be as long as six weeks. That is a maximum, and the main reason for the length of period proposed is political. I doubt whether this will impose significant operational penalties: the capacity of those concerned to continue damaging activities is much reduced once they have been identified and the Russians know that we know.

4. There remain two causes for concern: the way in which this came up for decision at short notice, and the apparent leak to the BBC referred to in the last paragraph of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute.

5. On the first point, it is clearly important not to prejudice counter-espionage operations by requiring premature disclosure beyond those with a strict operational need to know. Nevertheless I think that it should be possible to devise some arrangement

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

whereby the Secretary of the Cabinet and the Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office are kept generally informed about current anti-Soviet/<sup>counter-</sup>espionage activities and operations, so as to be able to relate them as necessary to wider political considerations. I shall discuss this further with Sir Antony Acland and Sir Antony Duff.

6. The leak to the BBC was said to have come "from the British side". This is clearly a matter for concern, particularly given the small circle of people to whom the proposal was known. I shall discuss further with Sir Antony Duff how to investigate this.

7. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

18 April 1985

TOP SECRET



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RECEIVED

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10 DOWNING STREET

17 April 1985


*From the Private Secretary**Dear Len,*Proposed Expulsion of Soviet Intelligence Officers

The Prime Minister has discussed with the Foreign Secretary his minute PM/85/33 of today's date recommending the expulsion of a number of Soviet intelligence officers.

The Prime Minister is content with the action proposed in paragraph 3 of that minute, save that she thinks those mentioned in 3(b) should be withdrawn within one calendar month rather than six weeks.

The Prime Minister also thinks that action should be taken with the Soviet Ambassador as early as possible tomorrow, 18 April. The No.10 Press Office has already received an inquiry from the Daily Express as to whether expulsions are imminent. Speculation is likely to grow: and if there are stories in the press tomorrow the matter could be raised at Prime Minister's Questions.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Hugh Taylor (Home Office) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Yours sincerely,*  
  
Charles Powell

Len Appleyard Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.





COPY NO 1 OF 7 COPIES

PM/85/33

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister  
 The Foreign Secretary discussed  
 this with you this evening.  
 We shall have to move  
 quickly: the Daily Express have  
 telephoned Bernard to ask if it is  
 true that expulsions are imminent.

Proposed Expulsion of Soviet Intelligence Officers

1. You will wish to be aware of a serious problem that has arisen with the Russians, which could well be taken by them as a set back in our recent efforts to achieve a more worthwhile relationship. *Agree to these recommendations? C.D.P. 17/6.*
2. A number of present and former members of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service, the GRU, serving in London have been identified as having engaged in varying degrees in unacceptable intelligence activities in the UK, sufficient to amount in the Security Service's view to a powerful case for taking action against an unusually large number simultaneously. I would not dissent from that view. Nevertheless, while doing what is necessary to protect our national security, I think we must seek to handle this in a way which makes it clear to the Russians that our commitment to a political dialogue on important international questions remains strong.
3. I therefore propose that the following action be taken:
- (a) that we expel an Assistant Naval Attache (LOS) and the Charter Manager of Aeroflot (GRIGOROV) with publicity and reduce the ceilings by two;
  - (b) that we require the Soviet Ambassador to withdraw within six weeks two other Assistant Service Attaches (ZAIKIN and CHERKASOV) and a Third Secretary (BELAVENTSEV), without publicity or the reduction of ceilings (unless the Russians retaliate in Moscow);
  - (c) that we inform the Soviet Ambassador that had the three former Service Attaches still been en poste we would have taken similar action against them.

/ We would ...





We would do this without publicity, though we would inform our allies that we would not be permitting the three to return to the UK.

4. I intend that the Soviet Ambassador should be told that, provided the three at (b) are withdrawn discreetly, we will not initiate any publicity about them (though if we were asked a direct question or it became public knowledge in some other way we would have to confirm that we had asked for them to be withdrawn). However, if the Russians retaliate over the expulsion of LOS and GRIGOROV, this would be met by the immediate expulsion of the three still en poste (if they are still in the UK), publicity, and a further reduction of the ceilings (ie a total of five public expulsions and ceilings reduced correspondingly).

5. In taking this action, we would make it clear to the Russians that these activities are quite unacceptable and that our genuine desire for a better political relationship with the Soviet Union must not be taken as an indication that we are prepared to be lenient on security matters.

6. The evidence against those concerned is summarised in the annexe to this minute. It is clear from this that these GRU officers have been in varying degrees engaged in covert intelligence-gathering activities involving the clandestine running of agents, and the offer of personal inducements to obtain material which would not be available to the Soviet authorities by overt means. The Security Service have also reported evidence of increasingly aggressive behaviour by GRU officers operating in the UK. They believe that the picture is now clear enough for the present proposals to be fully justified. They have explained that the coincidence of so many cases is fortuitous: although some of the evidence has been accumulated for a number of years (since 1977 in one case) some significant evidence against those currently serving here has built up over the last few months. The Security Service

/ are particularly ..





are particularly concerned about the apparent close interest of GRU officers in our racial minorities in their search for spies to recruit. The Security Service have asked for early action in order that they can release their manpower resources from monitoring the individuals proposed for expulsion. In a couple of cases, they are also anticipating difficulty in maintaining their existing control of events.

7. I have considered whether we should expel all five intelligence officers with reduction of the ceilings and publicity; it is arguable that this could be justified on security grounds in isolation. But since the expulsion of the '105' in 1971, we have expelled more than one Russian at a time on only one occasion; three in March 1983. Five expulsions now, and the associated measures, would send what would risk being interpreted as a strong political signal to the Russians. We need not be unduly defensive: they are the ones who have misbehaved. But we have to recognise that there is likely to be a penalty to pay - in political terms and operational consequences for HM Embassy in Moscow - and I believe it would be higher if we proceeded immediately to maximalist action.

8. I have therefore concluded that the best means of meeting the twin objectives of protecting national security and minimising the damage to Anglo-Soviet relations would be to proceed as outlined in paragraphs 3 and 4 above. We would make clear to the Russians that we are suggesting a course designed to avoid a major public confrontation and that we hope the Soviet authorities will take careful note of this. But at the same time we would also make clear that we will always be ready to take such action as may be necessary to protect our national security. Such a modulated response would also stand the best chance of deterring the Russians from counter-retaliation against our Embassy in Moscow. I judge

/ it unlikely ...





it unlikely that we will in fact get away without retaliation, but the modulated approach suggested would still communicate a political message. It would not be my intention to threaten or carry out a third round of expulsions even if the Russians responded twice.

9. The timing of such action is always difficult. Soon after Gorbachev's assumption of power, your meeting with him and in the midst of wider efforts we are making to improve Anglo-Soviet relations, the timing is far from ideal. I have considered whether there would be merit in postponing action for some months. However, now that we know that Gromyko will not be coming here in May, and that the Foreign Affairs Committee will not be visiting Moscow until June or July at the earliest, I believe that the balance of advantage is to proceed without delay. I have also looked at the possibility of spacing out action against those concerned, but I think this would simply create a running sore over several months, which would be just as damaging.

10. I have also considered two subsidiary points:

- (a) Should we give publicity to the fact that we would not allow the three former Military Attaches to return either at the initial stage, or the second stage, if at all? On balance, I think it best to give no publicity. We should achieve our aim of 'blackballing' them from allied countries as well as from the UK by telling those countries confidentially what we have done; publicity would make the Russians more likely to retaliate (or re-retaliate) and could give rise to questions here as to why we had not expelled the Attaches while they were en poste (the reason is that the Security Service wished to develop the case in which all three were involved, but we would not wish to reveal this).

/ (b) ...





(b) If we are obliged, because of Soviet retaliation, to make all five expulsions public, how would we explain why we had not done this in the first place? I think we should say that we always take the steps that are necessary to protect national security, but the way in which this is done varies from case to case. In this instance we wished to minimise the risk of retaliation against the British community in Moscow and to make clear our continuing interest in constructing a more businesslike relationship with the Soviet Union while ensuring that those engaged in unacceptable activities no longer remained in the UK.

11. I am sending copies of this minute to Michael Heseltine, whose officials accept, I understand, the risk of retaliation and consequent damage to the Defence Attache's section in HM Embassy in Moscow; Leon Brittan, who is responsible for (and has, I understand, agreed to) the proposed action against the non-diplomat GRIGOROV, and to Sir Robert Armstrong and to Sir Antony Duff. Subject to any views you may have on these proposals, I would envisage that the Soviet Ambassador should be summoned by my officials as soon as possible. The reasons for acting as quickly as this, once we have decided on the action and its timing, are reinforced by the fact of a telephone call this morning from the BBC to my News Department that news of what we intend to do is beginning to get out.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
17 April 1985





# The National Archives

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

16 April 1985

UK/Soviet Parliamentary Contacts: IPU Return Visit

The Prime Minister has considered the Foreign Secretary's minute of 15 April about the arrangements for a return visit by the IPU to the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister agrees that it would be better to think in terms of a visit in 1986 rather than later this year.

The Prime Minister also agrees that we should try to arrange for the delegation to be led at a high level. Given that Mr. Gorbachev ranked as de facto number two in the Soviet hierarchy, she is inclined to think that the Lord President, as the second most senior member of the Government after her, would be the most appropriate person to lead the return delegation. This would be the clearest possible evidence of our wish to establish a pattern of high level contacts. The Foreign Secretary may wish to discuss this with the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter to David Morris (Lord Privy Seal's Office).

(C.D. Powell)

CK

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PM/85/28

PRIME MINISTERUK/Soviet Parliamentary Contacts: IPU Return Visit

1. In February this year, the Soviet Embassy approached the IPU to propose a visit to the Soviet Union by a British IPU delegation in return for that of Mr Gorbachev and his delegation last December. The Soviet side's suggestion was that such a visit would be welcome either this summer or next, and that they hoped it would be led at a high level.

2. I have spoken to Peter Temple-Morris about this, and he wishes to accept. But he has asked for advice on timing and leadership.

3. On the first point, I have suggested that he think in terms of 1986 rather than this year. The FAC will be pursuing their study of Anglo/Soviet relations in Moscow probably during this summer. It will be overloading the Parliamentary circuit to have yet another visit (albeit of a different character) to Moscow this year.

4. On the question of a leader, the Soviet side have floated a number of names, including senior figures in the Government. It is not our normal practice for a member of the Government to lead such a delegation. But in this case, I think there are good reasons to consider making an exception if this can be agreed with the Opposition parties. The impact of the visit will be enhanced. And they will get better access to the senior Soviet leadership. Conversely,

010  
cc bc  
Prime Minister  
Agree to a visit  
in 1986?  
And to suggest to the  
Opposition that Mr.  
Biffen should lead it?  
CDP  
15/4



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a delegation of back-benchers even if led by say Jim Callaghan would be less well received by the Russians.

5. The leader whom the IPU favour is John Biffen; as Leader of the House he would be more likely to be agreeable to Opposition parties than any other member of the Government. I support this suggestion. I gather that John has been approached, and would be willing to be leader provided this was acceptable to you and in Parliament.

6. We may at the end of the day end up with a selection of the great and the good from the back-benches at Opposition insistence, but I think it is worth trying for something different on this occasion. Such visits are rare enough, and Moscow sufficiently sui generis, for the precedent created in Soviet minds by what I have suggested to be manageable.

7. If you are content, I would therefore intend to let Peter Temple-Morris go ahead with his soundings of the Opposition. If he can obtain their clear agreement, the way would be clear for him to reply to the Russians on behalf of the IPU that a visit in mid-1986 would in principle be acceptable and that they were thinking in terms of John Biffen leading the delegation.

8. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Lord Privy Seal.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

15 April 1985

  
GEOFFREY HOWE

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

25 March 1985

MR. GORBACHEV'S VISIT

I enclose a volume of photographs of Mr. Gorbachev's visit to the United Kingdom which the Prime Minister has signed, together with a covering letter to him.

I should be grateful if it could be sent to HM Ambassador in Moscow for delivery by the most appropriate means.

(C.D. Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



GRS 135

UNCLASSIFIED

FM NEW DELHI 211115Z MAR 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 394 OF 21 MARCH 1985

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, ROUTINE WASHINGTON

SHOOTING OF SOVIET DIPLOMAT

SUMMARY

1. A SOVIET DIPLOMAT WAS SHOT IN A CAR DRIVING IN THE  
DIPLOMATIC QUARTER AT ABOUT 0630Z TODAY. ACCORDING TO AGENCY  
REPORTS HE IS DEAD.

DETAIL

2. PTI REPORTS NAME HIM AS V. KHITRICHENKO OF THE ECONOMIC  
DIVISION OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY. THEY REPORT THAT HE WAS SHOT  
DEAD BY TWO UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS ON A MOTORBIKE WHILE DRIVING  
IN A SOVIET DIPLOMATIC CAR NEAR THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION.  
HE RECEIVED 4 BULLETS TO THE HEAD AND WAS TAKEN TO HOSPITAL. HE  
HAS SINCE BEEN REPORTED DEAD.

3. A CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION EYE-WITNESS CONFIRMS THE INCIDENT,  
WITH SOME VARIANTS OF DETAIL.

4. NO EVIDENCE AS TO THE ASSAILANTS OR MOTIVATION.

WADE-GERY

[ COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST ]

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

LIMITED

SCD

MAED

SECURITY DEPT

PUSD

PROTOCOL DEPT.

INFO DEPT.

MR O'NEILL

SAD

SOV D.

SIR W HARDING

MR JENKINS.



PRIME MINISTER

Mr Gorbachev

A very fine volume of photographs of the Gorbachevs' visit to Britain has been assembled, for you to send him (sadly, it couldn't quite be finished for your visit to Moscow). It is suggested that you might sign the introductory panel (see instructions). I also attach a letter to Mr. Gorbachev.

C.D.P.

19 March 1985



SECRET

FILE

JZA

cc. Master Set



cc 31

①

Subject as:  
Sov. UNION:  
PM's attendance at  
funerals of Andropov  
+ of Chernenko  
Feb 84.

From the Private Secretary

10 DOWNING STREET

13 March 1985

Meeting between the Prime Minister and the General Secretary  
of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in  
St. Katherine's Hall of the Kremlin on 13 March at 2035 hours

The Prime Minister met Mr. Gorbachev this evening in St. Katherine's Hall in the Kremlin. On the Soviet side, Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Aleksandrov were present. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Foreign Secretary, HM Ambassador and me.

Mr. Gorbachev opened with a lengthy statement. He thanked the Prime Minister for coming to Moscow and regretted that it was a sad occasion which brought her. He was pleased to resume his contacts with her. He remembered very well their discussion during his stay in Britain. He welcomed the chance to continue it.

Mr. Gorbachev continued that he recalled that his earlier meeting with the Prime Minister had begun with his reading an oral message from President Chernenko. That message was an invitation to co-operation, by way of seeking jointly to resolve current international problems and expand bilateral relations. On his return to Moscow he had briefed the Politburo in detail on his important discussions. Mr. Gromyko interjected that the Politburo had assessed the results very favourably. Mr. Gorbachev went on that, on behalf of the entire Soviet leadership, he wanted to say that they were in favour of a political dialogue with the United Kingdom and of co-operation in scientific, technical, cultural and other fields. Following his meeting with the Prime Minister in Britain, ties in these fields had become more lively. He did not know whether the Ambassador in Moscow would confirm this. But in his view movement had started. In particular, the Foreign Trade Ministry had drawn up a plan aimed at co-operation in the long term. There was already at least oral agreement on the resumption of contacts in the scientific, cultural and technical fields and he welcomed that.

SECRET

MJ.



Mr. Gorbachev continued that, after all, we all had to live together on the same planet. But this alone was not enough. The Soviet Union was in favour of broad co-operation with the United Kingdom. The possibilities available to both countries were big indeed. If the political will of the British and Soviet leaderships matched each other, then one could look forward to a substantial development of co-operation between the two countries.

Mr. Gorbachev repeated that the Prime Minister had come to Moscow on a sad occasion. But it also coincided with the opening of the arms control talks in Geneva. These marked the start of a new and very serious phase in international relations. The question was how and with what results would these negotiations be concluded. On the answer to this largely depended the future development of international relations. He recalled that he had discussed the prospects for the Geneva talks with the Prime Minister during their meeting at Chequers and he had emphasised that it had not been at all easy for the Soviet Union to go to them because it mistrusted the position taken by the United States. This position cancelled many of the useful achievements of preceding years. The Soviet Union had big doubts as to the true intentions of the United States Government. The Americans were forging ahead with their military plans, were increasing their armaments and military budget and were tightening discipline among their allies.

Mr. Gorbachev continued that he and the Prime Minister had emphasised the enormous danger inherent in the transfer of nuclear weapons into space. The opening statement of the US delegation in Geneva yesterday had confirmed these fears. Under the guise of defence, the United States was trying to drag the arms race into outer space. What then could be the result of the negotiations? For his part, he wished to say that the Soviet Union harboured serious intentions and wished the talks to end in positive results. When the Soviet Union had first actively raised and discussed the non-militarisation of outer space, many Western political leaders had spoken out in favour of this. But now there seemed to be certain nuances in their thinking. When the United States promised some Western countries that they could participate in some of the research work on President Reagan's so-called Strategic Defence Initiative the tone and mood seemed to change. The Soviet Union felt this was a mistake. If arms were transferred to outer space it would be very difficult indeed to find a way out of that situation. The Soviet Union would have to look for some response. That would mean an increase in nuclear weapons and the whipping up still further of the arms race. Surely we should all display far more wisdom and statesmanship at this point and a greater sense of responsibility. This responsibility rested primarily on the shoulders of the



leadership of the principal nations of the world.

Mr. Gorbachev said that he wanted to repeat that the Soviet Union wanted very much indeed to reach agreement in Geneva on large scale and mutually acceptable - he repeated mutually acceptable - measures. One-sided measures or concessions were something which the Soviet Union would not accept. In his discussions with the Prime Minister in Britain she had agreed in principle with this, and that relations should be based on equality and equal security. The Soviet Union recognised Britain's right to security and hoped that Britain recognised theirs. Indeed, all countries had the right. If we were all guided by this approach, he could say on behalf of the entire Soviet leadership, that agreement in Geneva was possible. He knew Britain's weight in international affairs and the particular role of the Prime Minister. He was counting on understanding of the Soviet position and looked forward to concrete steps from the United Kingdom, both to help agreement at Geneva and to expand dialogue.

The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Gorbachev for his statement. She had been very pleased that he and Mrs. Gorbachev had come to Britain. Their visit had been a tremendous success, one of the most successful ever. It had been both a personal success for Mr. Gorbachev as well as a success for restoring friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. The effect of the visit had been felt far beyond the United Kingdom. It had been reflected in newspapers and comments in the United States, Europe and the Far East. She wished to repeat that it had been an outstanding international success.

The Prime Minister continued that she had also enjoyed the talks she had held with Mr. Gorbachev. She believed that those talks would turn out to have influenced events. She had said publicly after their meeting that she felt that she and Mr. Gorbachev could do business together. This had been noted with particular interest in the United States. The British people were putting great faith in Mr. Gorbachev personally, in the prospect for a better dialogue with the Soviet Union and in hopes for success in the Geneva talks. She recalled very well the message which Mr. Gorbachev had brought from President Chernenko. When they had spoken about it, she had said that the generations which remembered the last war had a special duty to work for peace. She accepted Mr. Gorbachev's invitation to co-operation gladly. A lot more political dialogue was needed to establish confidence and trust between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Unless we had that trust, it would be much more difficult for the Geneva talks to succeed. So we said yes to more cultural, scientific and trade contacts. All these could help. This was particularly important in a year which



marked the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Agreement.

The Prime Minister continued that she would like to turn to a subject which was in everyone's mind, the arms control talks in Geneva. They must succeed. It was vital to find the political will and a way through. She had read Mr. Gorbachev's election and acceptance speeches very carefully. She had found in them language very similar to that which President Reagan and she had used at their meeting in Camp David. It seemed to her that both Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan shared the aim of the elimination of nuclear weapons and of nuclear war. She also wanted to stress a point on which she and President Reagan had agreed at Camp David and which had been embodied in the four points issued after that meeting, namely that neither side would seek superiority over the other, but rather balance.

Mr. Gromyko interjected that the need ultimately to eliminate nuclear weapons had appeared in the joint Soviet/American Communique at Geneva. The Prime Minister had cited evidence from separate statements, but the goal was formally established in a joint document. The problem was that the Americans were not acting in accordance with it. The Prime Minister said that this was precisely the point which she was trying to make. Both sides shared certain objectives and had declared them both separately and jointly.

The Prime Minister continued that there were already two Treaties which both the Soviet Union and the United States had signed affecting possible military developments in space: the Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty. The second of these, the ABM Treaty, permitted research by either signatory, for the very good reason that it was not possible to verify what research was being done. But if research should ever result in the possibility of deployment of new weapons, the Treaty required that deployment should be the subject of negotiation. In her talks with President Reagan they had both agreed that the aim should be balance and not superiority and that, while research on new defensive systems was permitted, deployment must be the subject of negotiation. They had also agreed that the overall objective remained deterrence. The agreement at Camp David had been important because it was the first time that the Americans had been persuaded to put publicly on record that any deployment would require negotiation. President Reagan had repeated this during her visit to Washington in February. She recognised that this was not the occasion to get into detailed discussions. Mr. Gromyko suggested sardonically that three or four hours would be enough to cover the particular point which the Prime Minister had just touched on.



The Prime Minister said that she would conclude by saying that she would do everything she could to promote the confidence to enable the Geneva talks to be a success. Public opinion wanted a success and had high expectations. It was vital to find the will to make them succeed. If Mr. Gorbachev ever wished to send a message to her, she would be very ready to receive it.

Mr. Gorbachev said that he would certainly take that into account. He would like to expand his dialogue with the Prime Minister and was perfectly willing to exchange information and hold consultations. On behalf of the entire leadership, he would like to emphasise that the general trend of his discussion with the Prime Minister and notably the remarks she had just made, was something which he took a liking to. The focus of their talks was joint efforts to expand co-operation, find points of contact and to promote a political dialogue. The present state of the world required such a dialogue. "We must continue to meet and talk to one another and have exchanges of views". Once again, he was grateful to the Prime Minister for coming to Moscow to pay tribute to President Chernenko.

The Prime Minister said that, in briefing the press, she would say that they had held positive and constructive talks and would then follow the line of Mr. Gorbachev's summing up. People in Britain took great pleasure in Mr. Gorbachev's appointment to his distinguished office. We would also be pleased to see Mr. Gromyko if he were to come to London, as he had promised. Mr. Gorbachev chuckled and said that Mr. Gromyko was waiting for the London fog to evaporate. Mr. Gromyko said it was really a question of finding the right timing.

The meeting ended at 2130.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office). It should have only a very limited distribution. I should be grateful if you could telegraph a full text, strictly personal, to the Ambassador in Moscow for any comments and amendments which he may have.

(C.D. Powell)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



CONFIDENTIAL



010/4

SUMMARY

ESB 010/5.

RECORDED IN REGISTRY

24 APR 1985

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130

THE DEATH OF CHERNENKO AND GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSION

ke Joan Harris  
(SS) RD

1. Gorbachev's appointment as Chernenko's successor ends the transitional period in the Soviet leadership since Brezhnev's death in 1982. The funeral ceremonies (attended by 160 foreign delegations, including the Prime Minister and yourself) and Gorbachev's accession were arranged with extraordinary haste; there may be pockets of doubt among the old guard about a new General Secretary who is so young, and relatively untried (paragraphs 1 - 4).
2. Chernenko was a stop-gap who in personality and in policy was a left-over from the Brezhnev era. His one achievement may have been the decision to resume arms control negotiations with the United States. Otherwise he left little mark and departed unmourned (paragraphs 5 - 9).
3. Gorbachev is the Soviet Union's first essentially post-war leader, with a different educational background. Despite his pragmatic personal style, he is a dedicated communist. At home his primary problem will be the stagnant economy, but his freedom of manoeuvre will be limited by the political risks of change and by the inertia of the system. Abroad, there will be continuity of policy in East/West relations (paragraphs 10 - 19).
4. The funeral as diplomacy (paragraph 20).
5. Gorbachev's visit to Britain in December 1984 has given us a head start. We should build on this, in making our contribution to the improvement of East/West relations, by developing our political dialogue and commercial and cultural contacts with the Soviet Union. Gorbachev will prove a more adroit adversary, but it is safer that the Soviet Union should be led by a man with whom we can do business (paragraphs 21 - 22).

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



010/4

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP  
etc., etc.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SWIA 2AH

BRITISH EMBASSY

MOSCOW

21 March 1985

Sir

THE DEATH OF CHERNENKO AND GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSION

1. At 2.00 pm Moscow time on 11 March 1985, it was announced that Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko, the Soviet Party leader and President, had died the previous evening at the age of 73. Just over four hours later, it was announced that Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, aged 54, had been elected to replace him as General Secretary of the Party. Within two days, on 13 March, Chernenko was buried by the Kremlin wall in Red Square in a ceremony attended by the entire Soviet hierarchy and some 160 foreign delegations. This was the third change in the Soviet leadership within two and a half years, and it marks the true end of the transitional period brought about by Brezhnev's death in 1982.
2. The sequence of events and the ceremonial arrangements closely followed the precedents set by the deaths of Brezhnev and Andropov. The ceremonial, described in detail in my despatch of 2 December 1982 on Brezhnev's funeral, was almost identical. At Chernenko's funeral United Kingdom representation consisted of myself, representing The Queen; the Prime Minister and yourself, representing the

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government; and the leaders of the opposition parties, Mr Kinnock, Mr Steel and Dr Owen. Details of the programme and of the other foreign delegations which attended are set out in annexes to this despatch in which I have the honour to examine the circumstances of the transition of power, to give an assessment of Chernenko's short tenure and to consider the implications of Gorbachev's succession.

#### THE TRANSITION

3. When Andropov died thirteen months ago, the Politburo jibbed at selecting so young a man as Gorbachev and plumped instead for a safe elderly candidate. When Chernenko died in his turn, Gorbachev was installed with what appeared to be almost indecent haste. There are a number of straightforward reasons why this should have happened. The Soviet system abhors a power vacuum. A rapid transition underlines the stability and continuity of the régime. In this case it may also have reflected feelings of pent-up frustration and embarrassment in the Party and Government at the fact that the leadership of the country had been in the hands of elderly, ailing and constantly incapacitated men for more than four years. A third state funeral in so short a period was beginning to look like carelessness. Although never formally designated as such, Gorbachev had for some time been singled out as the number two in the Party hierarchy. Though I do not have conclusive evidence, I believe that the Politburo had agreed some time in advance that he should succeed on Chernenko's death.

.../4. All





4. All the same, there may have been more in this than meets the eye. It seems odd that the Central Committee met within three hours of the announcement of Chernenko's death, while one full member of the Politburo, Shcherbitsky, was still on his way back from the United States and very likely before all members of the Central Committee would have had time to reach Moscow from abroad or outlying areas of the USSR. Furthermore, the speech by Gromyko, in which he proposed Gorbachev to the Central Committee, was not published in the central press at the time. When it appeared a week later, in a specialised and limited edition, it was found to have overtones suggesting that Gromyko, who spoke in unusually direct and unstilted language, was making a deliberate effort to win over some doubting Thomases in the Central Committee, perhaps especially members from outside Moscow, and to sell the candidate as the right man for the job. In short, I do not exclude the possibility that the haste to install Gorbachev was partly dictated by a desire in the Politburo to forestall the possible development of any movement to block him; and, within the Politburo, it is possible that the prior decision to nominate him may have emerged after some bargaining with the old guard. In one sense these speculations - for such they are - may be thought academic now that Gorbachev has taken over. But they are of interest in suggesting that in some quarters he may have been only grudgingly accepted, and may therefore find his freedom of manoeuvre more restricted than he would wish.

CHERNENKO

5. Although the proper forms were observed on the announcement of

.../Chernenko's





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4.

Chernenko's passing, there was no sign of public grief or even of official regret. At 72 he had been the oldest man to assume the office of Party leader and his tenure proved to be the shortest. In my despatch of 23 February 1984, I described him as by some way the least impressive man to have been elected to the Party leadership and his subsequent performance did nothing to belie that judgement. He was an organizer and a committee man who had none of the obvious attributes of a leader. Even at his best he was an ineffectual public speaker and as his health declined his increasingly infrequent public appearances became painfully embarrassing. He had made his career entirely in the Party apparatus and had no previous direct experience at any level of running the economy or the conduct of foreign affairs. His basic credo was that problems could be solved and progress achieved by making the existing Party and State machine function more smoothly and efficiently and inspiring the workers by ideological work to more conscientious efforts. This comfortable philosophy must have appealed at the time to his more conservative colleagues and subordinates as a welcome relief after Andropov's more incisive and astringent approach.

6. Discipline, which had been the watchword of the Andropov interlude, continued to be emphasised under Chernenko. But although the campaign to root out corruption and abuse of office was pursued, it lost momentum as it had already begun to do during his predecessor's final illness, notwithstanding some sacrificial victims notably the former Minister of the Interior Shchelokov who is believed to have shot himself rather than face trial.

.../7. Chernenko

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7. Chernenko inherited an economy which during Andropov's term of office had produced a slight up-turn in performance, partly attributable to the one-off effects of the discipline and efficiency campaign. But its basic defects and problems had not been tackled and during the year of Chernenko a comparable improvement was not sustained. He himself injected no new ideas. He paid lip-service to the need for some adjustment to the system, an "overhaul of the economic mechanism", and strongly endorsed the current experiment involving a limited increase in enterprise autonomy, but showed no inclination for more radical measures. His one significant new initiative (which, it is worth recalling, appeared to run counter to ideas which Gorbachev had been expressing) was essentially a retrograde step in economic policy - the large-scale land-improvement measures approved at the 1984 October Plenum. In continuing and extending the Programme of irrigation and drainage launched as part of Brezhnev's Food Programme, Chernenko was attempting to solve the problems of agriculture by resorting to the old-fashioned remedy of extensive economic development, despite the failure of previous similar schemes to produce the hoped-for results.

8. In foreign affairs, Chernenko introduced no change of line, but adopted from the beginning a relatively conciliatory tone, calling for a resumption of East-West dialogue (on Soviet terms) and a return to detente. At times there was a contrast between his moderate and statesmanlike pronouncements and Gromyko's increasingly acerbic language but this probably reflected a tactical division of labour rather than evidence of any significant difference in views. While his health lasted, Chernenko was active in dealing with the backlog of foreign

.../visits





visits which had built up during the last six months of Andropov's tenure. But he did not even achieve the one visit abroad as Party leader which Andropov managed, and the Warsaw Pact summit due to take place in Sofia in January this year had to be postponed because of his inability to travel. Within the Soviet Union, he performed no official engagements outside Moscow. However, one crucial decision was taken and should be placed to his credit, although the extent to which he was personally responsible is not clear. The Soviet decision to resume the dialogue on arms control with the United States was perhaps inevitable once it became clear that President Reagan would be re-elected. But it came sooner than many had expected.

9. Chernenko was elected as a stop-gap and so he proved to be. Well before the end, the leadership and the Party at large must have recognised that his election had been a mistake. Soviet prestige abroad and morale at home has suffered during the past year. Although he affirmed continuity with the policies of Andropov, his accession brought a return to the sense of drift and stagnation of the Brezhnev era, to which he essentially belonged in background and in spirit. The sixty-five years from the Revolution to Brezhnev's death saw only four Soviet leaders. Barring accidents to Gorbachev, the two who so briefly held the stage after Brezhnev will surely come to be seen as no more than elements in the transition to a new phase in Soviet history.

#### GORBACHEV

10. Thirteen months ago the Politburo played safe and rejected Gorbachev, either because at that stage it was unable to choose between him and Romanov, or because of his youth and relative





inexperience in the senior ranks of the Party. Why should it now have acted so decisively to install him? The simplest explanation seems also the most likely. Despite the failures in Soviet agriculture over the years during which he bore responsibility for it, Gorbachev had not only become the senior Party Secretary and logical successor by process of attrition, but had demonstrated his competence in the acting role. Had Chernenko died suddenly some months earlier, it is just possible that we could have had another interim leader. But as Gromyko has now confirmed in his nomination speech, Gorbachev had already assumed some of the functions of a co-ordinator before Chernenko's death. It must have been pretty clear that the Party could not afford another elderly stop-gap such as Grishin, and there was therefore no serious alternative. There is some evidence that had Chernenko lingered on, he would in any case have been replaced by Gorbachev at an early Plenum.

11. Gorbachev's youth makes his biography very different from any of his predecessors as Party leader. He is the first who was not yet born when Lenin died. He was a child at the time of the Great Purge and during the Second World War. He had only just joined the Party and was still a student when Stalin died. His educational background is also unusual. He studied law at Moscow University (where he met his wife, a student and subsequently a lecturer in philosophy) as well as graduating subsequently from an Agricultural Institute in Stavropol. The first Party Congress he attended as a Komsomol delegate was the 20th in 1956 at which Khrushchev denounced Stalin in his celebrated "Secret speech".

12. The greater part of Gorbachev's career was spent as a provincial

.../Party





Party official in Stavropol Krai, one of the main grain-growing areas in the south of Russia. His rapid rise up the political ladder began seven years ago when at the age of 47 he was appointed a Secretary of the Central Committee responsible for agriculture. Two years later he was a full member of the Politburo. From 1982 on, the deaths of more senior Party Secretaries, Suslov, Brezhnev and Andropov and the departure of Kirilenko enhanced his seniority and led to a broadening of his responsibilities to include other aspects of the economy and foreign affairs. In May 1983 he visited Canada, the first time he had represented the Soviet State in the West, and in December last year he led the Supreme Soviet delegation which visited the United Kingdom.

13. That visit to Britain and his lengthy discussions with the Prime Minister and yourself have given us a special insight into Gorbachev's personality and style. But as yet we have limited evidence about his political attitudes and intentions. The popular image, based apparently on his energy, fluency and ease of manner is of a go-ahead, even a liberal reformer. It is an image which some Russians share with sections of the foreign press. We have learned enough about him to be sure that he is no liberal in any Western sense of the term, but the obvious toughness of his character does not necessarily lead to the opposite conclusion, that he is a "hard liner" in either domestic or foreign policy.

14. Gorbachev is evidently a leader of the Andropov rather than the Brezhnev-Chernenko school. In his funeral oration he cited as a principal source of authority for current policies since the last Party Congress the Central Committee Plenum of November 1982 held under Andropov, ignoring the three Plenums when the man he was supposed to be

.../eulogising





eulogising was in charge. He is at the same time a man of a different background and cast of mind to Andropov, being more pragmatic and practical (with direct experience of economic management) and, I believe, less intellectual and ideological in his approach. He is articulate and has an agile mind. Except for Andropov, during the brief period when he was active, he is the first Soviet leader since Khrushchev over twenty years ago who ventures to speak without text or notes.

15. The qualities of his style and the aspects of his background which distinguish Gorbachev from his predecessors are important but their significance especially in the short-term should not be exaggerated. He is a product of the same system and has been moulded by it. He has been little exposed to life outside the narrow world of the Party apparatus. He has been educated to the concepts and language of Marxism and Leninism and if, at least in addressing Western interlocutors, he does not preach or engage in ideological argument, this is not, I judge, because he has any doubts about their validity; on the contrary, although, as he demonstrated in London, he has a keen interest in Western methods and technology, he appears to believe implicitly in the superiority of the Soviet system.

16. In any event, the power of a Soviet General Secretary, especially one so new and young, to influence appointments and policies is more limited than is sometimes supposed. Any important change would require a consensus among the ten members of the Politburo, half of whom are over 70. Gorbachev is not only the

.../youngest





youngest member of the Politburo but one of the younger members of the Central Committee, the average age of whose 300 or so members is well over 60. Significant though his appointment is, it remains premature to speak yet of a "generational shift", in the Soviet leadership as a whole.

17. In his first public statements at the Extraordinary Plenum and at the funeral, Gorbachev, as is customary, stressed continuity with the existing Party line. There was a clear undertone of impatience to get on with the job but whatever his longer-term intentions, he is likely to proceed cautiously in the knowledge of the existing limits on his room for manoeuvre and the fact that time is on his side. The timing of the succession was fortunate for Gorbachev in that it gives him some time in which to put his own mark on the XXVII Party Congress, which will approve the 1986-90 Five Year Plan and a revised edition of the Party Programme and also elect a new Central Committee. It seems increasingly likely that the Congress will be held towards the end of this year. A Central Committee Plenum is expected to be held before long, perhaps already in April, which will set the date and the agenda. The Plenum will also provide an early opportunity to make some new appointments to the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat. But no dramatic changes in personnel are to be expected, at least until the Congress. The odds are that, like his three predecessors, Gorbachev will in due course be elected President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. But a decision about this may not be taken for some time. Nor do I expect major changes in policy in the short term. He will wish to get the right people in position first. He may have to consolidate

.../his





his own position vis-a-vis the armed forces which were conspicuously unrepresented at the top of Lenin's tomb for Chernenko's funeral. The back-room boys in the Institutes with blue-prints for new adventurous decrees may be disappointed.

18. Given his dedication to the system, there are no obvious ways forward for Gorbachev in tackling the main internal and external problems which confront the Soviet Union in the longer-term. The slight improvement in industrial performance during the past two years seems to be tailing off. It did not in any case derive from a solution of the underlying problems of the economy reflected in a succession of poor harvests, the beginning of a decline in the production of fuel, the inability to mass produce high quality goods or to develop and harness new technology fast enough. The central dilemma is that the economy is now growing at no more than about 2% per annum, i.e. less than is current in the Western industrialised countries even during the present high unemployment. With a public whose expectations will be further enhanced by the advent of a new leadership, the Soviet Union, which remains much less productive than the West in absolute per capita terms, will therefore fall still further behind unless ways can be found to galvanise the economy. Gorbachev's predecessors have for years hinted cautiously at the need for economic "reforms" (using various euphemisms for this dangerous word) but have balked at the political risks of tampering with the orthodox rigidly centralised system. A new leadership may surprise us all. A better economic performance is likely to be Gorbachev's highest priority and the natural<sup>and</sup>/human resources are not lacking. But he is not a Deng Xiaoping.

19. In international affairs, the key issue will continue to be a





more stable relationship with the United States and an agreement which would avert technological developments in the arms race which the Soviet Union could not match or could match only at severe economic cost. It is worth recalling that, in his speech in his RSFSR Supreme Soviet constituency on 20 February, Gorbachev also made a special point of the importance of political dialogue with Western Europe - to confound the Americans, no doubt, if the opportunity is offered but also, as exemplified in our meeting with him after the funeral, because this is a natural and essential element in East/West relations. Gorbachev's other main, perhaps his first, priority, as he made clear in his speeches at the Plenum and at the funeral, will be to strengthen the cohesion of the socialist bloc, some of whose members have been showing a growing tendency, encouraged by the lack of a strong leadership in Moscow, to look to their own national interests in domestic and foreign policy matters. He has also put the Chinese on notice that, if they are willing, he looks to an improvement in relations with Peking.

#### THE FUNERAL AS DIPLOMACY

20. Here I digress to touch on Chernenko's funeral as the occasion for yet another major unscheduled and extraordinary gathering of world statesmen and communist delegates. What brought the former to Moscow to stand in the cold for two hours on Red Square was not the pathetic figure in the coffin with its waxen features and the secular state ceremony with quasi-religious undertones which I have found progressively less impressive on the four occasions I have witnessed it. Nor was it only the opportunity to see and be seen by each other, although the 13th and 14th of March saw innumerable

.../bilateral





bilateral meetings, formal and informal. You and the Prime Minister had six useful discussions at the Embassy which are listed in the annexed chronology. Chancellor Kohl, who stayed longer, had many more. What brought the world to Moscow was primarily to encounter the new Soviet leader, to form an impression of the man and hopefully to make in turn an impression on him. Gorbachev held no less than twenty-nine meetings with visiting delegates, whether Heads of State or Government, Ministers or Party Leaders. Chernenko had last year managed only fourteen, and conducted most in a routine mechanical manner. In his meetings, Gorbachev has shown himself able to adjust his style to his audience and make his dialogue fit his customer. As I have separately reported, he was tough with Chancellor Kohl, encouraging with President Pertini, businesslike with Mrs Thatcher and President Mitterrand and firm but positive with Vice-President Bush. The leaders have gone away with food for thought. At the meeting with Bush, Gorbachev spoke with apparent sincerity of his wish to see not only a successful outcome to the Geneva negotiations but a new era in relations with Washington. But with Kohl he was sharply polemical about American intentions. A certain facile glibness may also be part of his style.

21. For the Prime Minister and yourself, the meeting with Gorbachev was of course an opportunity to resume the dialogue already well begun at Chequers and Hampton Court in December. This has now established a solid foundation of mutual awareness and even respect. We have a head start on our Western partners and the omens for Anglo-Soviet relations are good. We should build on the possibilities for furthering our commercial and cultural interest as well as the political. It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Union under Gorbachev will be

.../any





any more open to constructive influence than hitherto, and the main dynamic impulse can only come from the United States. But we should move quickly to make what contribution we can. I have separately made recommendations about a variety of ways in which our relations and contacts with the Soviet Union might be developed at this juncture, particularly in the commercial and cultural spheres. Gorbachev himself has already been a factor in the developing political dialogue. The opportunities for personal meetings with Ministers or Ambassadors being inevitably very infrequent, I hope that consideration can be given to more regular exchanges of messages with him, to keep up the momentum.

#### CONCLUSION

22. It may be questioned whether we should welcome the accession of a man who is likely to prove a more vigorous and adroit adversary than his immediate predecessors. But it is surely better and safer, whatever new challenges we may face, that the Soviet Union should no longer be adrift under an incapacitated leader and should have at the helm a man with whom it is possible to do business. We are a long way from any new era as we know little as yet of Gorbachev's intentions. But he is an intelligent man prepared to engage in genuine discussion and this offers at least the possibility of more constructive East/West relations.

23. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at NATO and East European posts, Dublin, Tokyo,

.../Peking



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15.



Peking, Helsinki, Stockholm and Vienna.

I am  
Sir  
Yours faithfully

*Iain Sutherland*

Iain Sutherland

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 January 1985

*CDD 2/11*

*Dear Charles,*

Supreme Soviet Visit: UK/Soviet Relations

*See PC 3*  
We have now had a chance to digest the numerous records, speeches and reports on various aspects of the supreme Soviet visit. Judged by our objectives, both general and specific set out in my letter of 19 November to you, our assessment is that the visit was a success.

The Russians will probably have come to the same conclusion. Gorbachev was well received. Press coverage was extensive and favourable. The Communist with the human face (and his wife) will have much improved the Soviet image in the UK. His message about the Soviet Union's desire for peace and progress on arms control was widely reported.

From our point of view Gorbachev was given a concentrated introduction to Parliamentary, government and commercial life in the UK.

The fact that the Prime Minister gave him some 6 hours of her time, as well as the direct but friendly way in which she spoke, made a real impression on Gorbachev. He referred to his meeting with the Prime Minister and his subsequent talks with Sir Geoffrey Howe on numerous occasions. If he succeeds Chernenko as General Secretary, it would be useful that he will have had personal contacts with the leaders of all the parliamentary parties in this country as well as a wide range of parliamentarians. Parliamentary contacts with Gorbachev may be continued when Sir Anthony Kershaw takes the Foreign Affairs Committee to Moscow for a visit, possibly in April.

The visit will have raised UK standing in Gorbachev's eyes. The coverage it was given in the Soviet media will also have raised the UK's profile more widely within the Soviet Union. Within the UK, the visit has also served to refocus attention on the Soviet Union. Hostility to Soviet policies, for example in Afghanistan and above all on human rights, will (rightly) continue. But informed public debate may also now take account of the timescale involved in any possible change within the Soviet Union and need for exploration of areas of common interest if the climate of East/West relations is to

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21 JAN 1985

Don Carter





improve.

On the fundamental question of security, the visit proved an important opportunity for straight talking. The Russians will have been impressed by the Prime Minister's acknowledgement of legitimate Soviet security interests and her view that we wanted security on both sides to be enhanced through balance at a lower level of weapons. Her emphasis on the importance of avoiding an arms race in space will have been registered. Gorbachev may have hoped that the distinction between research and deployment drawn by the Prime Minister might open a gap for some wedge-driving. He will have been disabused by the Prime Minister's agreement with President Reagan on this point, reflected in her statement 5 days later in Washington and subsequently in comments from the President and Secretary Shultz.

On the commercial front Gorbachev's visit will have refocused Soviet attention on what the UK has to offer. Through the presence in the delegation of Mr Komarov, effectively the Soviet Union's Foreign Trade Minister, the message would have been lodged where it really matters. Specifics will be followed up on the official side at an agro-industrial exhibition to be held in Moscow in February and attended by Mrs Fenner and in a series of framework talks with Soviet trade officials leading up to the next joint commission to be held at trade minister level in London in June. A number of visits by Soviet trade and economic Ministers and deputy Ministers are also planned. Individual British firms will continue their negotiations for small and large contracts (including two of the largest ever in the petrochemical field) in the knowledge that the bilateral political omens are more favourable than for a number of years.

We should be able to use the visit to build our contacts at all levels with the Soviet Union. Indeed, Mr Gorbachev himself said that what was needed now was "a process". As far as the leadership is concerned, Mr Gromyko's return visit to London is planned (but not yet confirmed) for May. Thereafter we will be looking to invite another member of the Politburo, from the new generation of Soviet leaders, possibly Aliev. Talks between experts on security and regional issues will continue. We will be looking to increase our programme of cultural events in the Soviet Union.

/ Finally, I enclose notes on Mr and Mrs Gorbachev from Mr Bishop and Miss Horner who accompanied them during the visit.

We are inclined to agree with Koivisto's remark to the Prime Minister just before the visit, that Gorbachev would have risen to the top of the political tree in most countries. His confidence and ability to debate points in a genuine argument are certainly unusual in the Soviet system. But for all that he is still very much a product of that system and one of the architects of current Soviet policy. He would not have achieved

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his position at his early age had he shown any real signs of heterodoxy. Mr Bishop's judgement that Gorbachev would, if necessary, be ruthless, confirms that together with a well-trained mind and a relative openness in debate there co-exists a tough nationalistic, Soviet Russian.

Five days before his visit to London, Pravda reported Gorbachev as saying in a major speech on ideology - "we uphold the historical correctness of the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism and come out together with all mankind's revolutionary and peace-loving forces for social progress, the cause of peace and security for all peoples." While most of the rest of the speech was about the need for economic improvement and incentives, it would be as well as remember the starting point from which these will be approached.

All this constitutes a development of the general policy of defence and dialogue. During the coming year the US-Soviet Geneva arms talks negotiations will be the central focus of interest. Alliance unity will be essential if they are to succeed. But on the basis of a firm and united Western stance we should also be able to pursue our policy of talking frankly to the Soviet leadership and, albeit even if in the very long-term, of influencing the Soviet people through the spread of Western ideas and values.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Callum McCarthy (DTI).

*Yours ever,*

*Len Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The attachments to

this are fascinating  
and worth reading in  
full when you have  
time: Mr. & Mrs

Gorbachev through  
their interpreters' eyes.

CDP 2111



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SUMMARY OF MISS HORNER'S MINUTE ON MRS GORBACHEVA

1. Mrs Gorbacheva's interest in much of what she saw and heard was genuine, and more than skin-deep. Though she had clearly set herself to please, her repeated request to sample things specifically British, whether cultural or culinary, was more than just a desire to ingratiate herself. For example, on several occasions she asked one of her entourage to note down for her the name of an artist or writer, so that she could follow them up later. On each gallery or museum visit, she made a point of asking what Russian, or even Soviet art was represented in the collection. The answer, on the whole was 'little if any', and this made her increasingly convinced that our knowledge of and access to the culture of her homeland was pitifully deficient. Her own knowledge of British writers was wide, from Shakespeare to Iris Murdoch.

2. It was clear that Mrs Gorbacheva was accustomed to having her wishes and changes of mind catered for without question. As the week went on, she in effect took charge of the programme and, increasingly, made the decisions about where she wished, and did not wish to go. She evidently enjoyed making several impromptu forays into shops, particularly on the hunt for some jewellery (see para 7 below), and relished the informality of this sort of activity. On the other hand, there were some kinds of informality to which she was plainly not accustomed, or had forgotten existed. The faintly stunned expression on her face, as several late and heavily-built theatregoers climbed over her to reach their seats for "Cats", was memorable.

3. Mrs Gorbacheva appeared to grow markedly more relaxed about the presence of photographers as the week went on. Early in the week she declared that she had 'decided to pay no attention to them', and on the same day rather crossly refused a request by the Daily Mail to interview her. And

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yet, two days later, at Stratford-upon-Avon, she posed contentedly in the front garden of Anne Hathaway's cottage.

4. Only once or twice Mrs Gorbacheva ventured onto political ground. During the journey home from the theatre, the illuminated facade of Harrods was pointed out to her, and the subject of terrorist bombings was raised, I think by Mrs Popova. Mrs Gorbacheva opined that such a threat could never be contained merely by increasing police patrols, and remarked on the way we "permitted" terrorism to exist. "Our democracy is not like that".

5. Lenin was mentioned only once in my hearing, in connection with the Gorbachevs' visit to the British Museum and Clerkenwell. She extolled his talents as a thinker, a linguist (the story was told of how he had learned English from listening to soap-box orators at Hyde Park Corner) and as a fighter for the people. Once she had said her piece and had it acknowledged, she seemed to prefer to steer well away from political waters. We discussed poetry, and T S Eliot, of whom she had not heard, in particular. Her own preference among the prominent Soviet modern poets, was for Rozhdestvensky: his "profound philosophy" moved her. She had seen the Voznesensky rock opera Juno and Avos and was interested to hear that it had been televised here. She freely admitted that it was not a genre she was used to, or felt she understood, but she had obviously taken some interest in the Voznesensky piece, perhaps encouraged by her daughter (who, she said, would envy her her newly acquired record of "Cats").

6. One of the high points of the visit for Mrs Gorbacheva herself was the visit to Stratford, and the Shakespeare Theatre in particular. We were given coffee on arrival, and she plied the theatre administrators with questions about their productions, and previous tours in Moscow. Of the productions of Richard III she had seen at home, she preferred the Rustaveli company's version to that of Mkhat.



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At the end of this conversation, she virtually invited the RSC to return to the USSR for a new tour, and said that she for one would attend each and every production they brought with them. There was no mistaking her enthusiasm for the idea.

7. It seemed to me that many of the outfits she wore were either imported or very good copies of Western clothes. Her shoes and boots (I did not see her wear any pair twice over) looked Italian; they were certainly of very high quality. She clearly enjoys dressing well, and looked as though such elegance had been an integral part of her way of life for a long time.

8. She spent parts of two afternoons hunting for a pair of jewelled drop earrings, and several detours were made en route to other engagements in search of something of the right quality. She made clear she was not interested in gold-plated or rolled gold settings. The final choice was made at Mappin and Webbs in the Cromwell Road, where she found a pair set with rubies and diamonds. I heard her tell her interpreter she was prepared to go "up to £1,000". In the end £750 was spent, after deducting VAT and discount.

It was striking not so much as an example of unusual extravagance, but because it revealed Mrs Gorbacheva herself as someone accustomed to living life on that level. She knew the quality she wanted, and the prices that went with it. She could scarcely have been unconscious of the questions her appearance would raise among avid Western observers, but in herself was unembarrassed (in contrast to the nervous twitchings of the Embassy over the press). I think this was due less to naivete than to her wish to give a good account of herself and her country to the West.

9. I was left, after four days, with a clear feeling that Mrs Gorbacheva was fully in command of herself and her position in life. She is a strong and quite volatile personality in her own right. At times during the visit she

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would retreat behind the facade of the grande dame, and could be distinctly magisterial if something displeased her. It was quite noticeable that she tended to treat Mrs Popova with scant respect. At other times, she was relaxed and would chat and joke happily. Given the competing demands on her attention, she was considerate towards her entourage.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

PRIME MINISTER

GORBACHEV

I don't know if you intend to make any sort of speech at lunch, but I attach some notes which might serve as a basis.

I'm not sure jokes will be appropriate. But in one of his letters to Engels (written in May 1868) Marx recalled that his mother once said: "If only Karl had made Capital ... instead of just writing about it".

C.D.P.



The Contacts

1) Their assessments of reasons  
for ~~for~~ position

Compton & Hargan

Palmer - no clear friends  
but clear interests

3rd world interests

World 70's - Palmer - 10 yrs

Salt ABM

Compton Ben Ben Andy

Brenner - NYG

Feb 24

Nuclear War

1) Trust? 2) No step forward  
in 4 years

3) End Asian war - Affghanistan

Chernobyl - not nuclear renew



PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR MR. GORBACHEV AT CHEQUERS ON  
SUNDAY 16 DECEMBER

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SPEAKING NOTE FOR LUNCHTIME REMARKS

Warmly welcome Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev and those accompanying them today to UK and to Chequers.

Sir Geoffrey Howe will formally and publicly welcome you on behalf of the Government tomorrow. For today, in this private forum, would like to make some more informal remarks.

Looking forward greatly to opportunity to have more detailed and thorough discussion with representatives of Soviet leadership than brief visit to Moscow in February allowed.



Glad it has been possible to arrange our meeting so soon after your arrival - before you make your mind up! Chance for me to steer you in the right direction.

You told our Ambassador the week before last you wanted to dispense with diplomatic formalities and get straight down to business. Share this view completely. Hope we can get down to some brass tacks.

Gone through a period when East/West relations poor. Things have not worked out as the optimists hoped in the 1970s. Instead of diminished tension, reduced levels of arms, constructive co-operation we have seen increase in



tension, no progress on arms control and the minimum of working together over the last few years.

Many reasons for this. Would not be honest of me if I did not say that certain Soviet actions have been among them. Not the moment for retrospection, but try to learn from the past and create a more stable future.

I decided Britain should do everything it could to try to move things back to more constructive path; embark on slow and painful business of rebuilding trust and confidence. No illusions that anything but long process requiring patience and persistence.



But how? First and most important, get to know each other. The confidence that comes from familiar faces, points of view fully understood if not necessarily agreed with. This means more contacts at all levels. Straightforward talking needed in all circumstances.

Personal experience important. See that wide-ranging programme has been arranged. Will enable you to see a real slice of British life.

Particularly glad that your wife could accompany you. Hope she will enjoy her programme. Her presence will add a special dimension to your visit.



Glad that you will be seeing something of our agriculture as well as industry. Could hardly be greater contrast between your homeland of northern Caucasus and Britain. You have rolling prairies; much of Britain still quite small fields bounded by hedgerows. As a result of scale on which we have to operate much ingenuity has gone into maximising production per acre, use of mechanisation.

Here and in other fields, scope for exploring whether there are things we can usefully learn from each other.

/ William



William Shakespeare, who knew most things, also knew of the Caucasus and in his Richard II wrote:

"O who can hold a fire in his hand  
By thinking on the frosty Caucasus?"

What he meant was that images are not enough, we must have reality. That is what we need and our peoples want in our relations: reality and substance not stereotypes and outdated images of each other. Let us start on that process today.



## MEETING WITH GORBACHEV

### Introduction

1. Want to set out general hopes for East/West and UK/Soviet relations.
2. End 1984 with more hope. Communication has been restored. Increase in high-level contact. Need to move on to better mutual understanding of each other's problems and attitudes. Look forward to Gromyko/Schultz meeting.
3. 1985 offers opportunities. Getting to know each other and building mutual confidence is first priority. My personal commitment and that of HMG to



search for better relations. Reagan also sincere in this.

4. Study of public statements by both sides shows interesting similarities : wish for peace and stability, desire for greater prosperity, help development in third world.

5. Don't hide behind old ideas. Want to convince you we are not threatening Soviet Union. Our weapons are defensive.

6. Suggest agenda of East/West, arms control and bilateral relations



2.

Eas West

1. Want more consultation between Ministers and experts. Purpose: to understand each other's intentions and interests: build confidence: and co-operate in solving problems.

2. Regional problems. Central America - avoid delivery of major new weapons systems. Afghanistan - need negotiation and timetable for withdrawal. Middle East - welcome our consultations: international conference premature.

Far East - prospects for Arkhipov's discussions in China.



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1972 ABM - Moson

no records.

Spec / Study copy

From now - order

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very important

Went to - Pony

Anna Porter, per



3.

Arm Control

1. Welcome renewed talks with US on nuclear weapons. Soviet objectives/priorities in Geneva? Case for interim agreements?
2. Genuine commitment to halt/reverse NATO INF deployments if right agreement. But moratorium on NATO programme unacceptable.
3. Impression that US/Soviet negotiating positions on strategic nuclear weapons far from irreconcilable.
4. Particular importance of discussion of weapons in space. Glad Soviets now recognise logical link



between space-based defensive weapons and offensive nuclear forces.

5. Total CW ban needed. Must be adequately verifiable.

Trade & Cultural Field - Down from  
↓ June  
Framework - 40-50%  
Planning - our Economy -  
CMERA → Wider context 5-10 years  
Ref - of Int. Agency & Control  
↳ Common Technology // Global // to CV



4.

NUM

1. Reports in British press of contacts between Scargill and other NUM officials and Soviet Embassy. Also reports from Swiss sources of Soviet activities to transfer funds to NUM through Swiss banking channels. Take a very serious view of such activities as unfriendly and unwarrantable interference in British affairs. Urge not to make or allow such transfers.



5.

UK/VIET

1. Welcome Ministerial and Parliamentary contacts, also in cultural/educational field. More freedom of travel for individuals.

2. Trade: Welcome upturn but we need substantial contracts in next 5-year plan if upward trend to be maintained. Discuss with Mr Channon.

3. Further moves on human rights would do immeasurable good to Soviet reputation. Affects climate of opinion for intergovernmental relations.



1) New York

North the Course

Planned if attended

Political Messages  
at the Year

Europe

Spec based on the  
delivered to the



PEREZ DE CUELLAR

1. Cyprus. Did our best to persuade Kyprianou to be realistic. How do you see the way ahead? How can UK best help in next phase?
2. Lebanon. Know Mr. Urquhart just back. Assessment of prospects for wider role for UNIFIL? For Israel/Lebanon talks?
3. Falklands/Argentine.
4. Afghanistan. Any prospects of progress with Soviet Union on timetable for withdrawal of troops? Would be wrong to press Pakistan to make any more concessions: have done everything which can reasonably be expected of them.
- /5. S.E.Asia.



5. S.E. Asia. Vietnamese behaving abominably in Cambodia. Hope Secretary-General will do all possible to bring pressure on them to withdraw.
6. UNESCO. Discussed this with you in April 1984. Regrettably little improvement since then. Our notice of intention to withdraw unlikely to be rescinded unless substantial improvement in areas we have identified: programme concentration, more action outside Paris, avoiding politicization, decentralization, less overlap.
7. Ethiopia. Grateful for your rapid appointment of Aid Co-ordinator for Ethiopia. Still scope to improve planning.





FILE 84

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

9 January, 1985

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your recent letter, reporting the account given in the Soviet press of the Politburo discussion of Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Britain. She was most interested to read this.

With best wishes.

C. D. POWELL

His Excellency Monsieur Victor I. Popov



570

ccft



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 January 1985

Dear Charles,

Visit of Mr Gorbachev

I enclose a letter from the Soviet Ambassador to the Prime Minister which records the account given in the Soviet press of the Politburo discussion of Mr Gorbachev's visit.

We suggest that you might simply acknowledge this letter.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



Dear Prime Minister,

I hope that you will find it of interest that the results of the visit to Great Britain of the Soviet Parliamentary Delegation headed by Mr.M.S.Gorbachev have been considered at the meeting of Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee. An official report of the Soviet press on this matter says the following.

"The information of M.S.Gorbachev about the visit of the delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet to Great Britain, the talks with the Prime Minister Mrs.M.Thatcher, parliamentarians and other British statesmen, representatives of the public and business circles has been considered and approved. It was specifically stressed that the ideas contained in the message of K.U.Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to the Prime Minister Mrs.M.Thatcher about the willingness of the Soviet Union to have serious political dialogue with Great Britain, broader mutual understanding and co-operation on the mutually beneficial basis, are in conformity with the aims of strengthening peace and security in Europe and all over the world.

The hope was expressed that the efforts of the Soviet Union to solve such fundamental problems as the prevention of arms race in space, radical reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear arsenals, removal of the threat of nuclear war would find realistic understanding and proper response from Great Britain".

Yours sincerely,

*V. Popov*  
V. POPOV

Ambassador of the USSR

Prime Minister  
The Rt.Hon.M.Thatcher, MP  
10, Downing Street,  
London





10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 January 1985

*Dear Peter*

Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Gorbachev

I enclose an approved record of the Prime Minister's discussion with Mr Gorbachev over lunch at Chequers on 16 December, which Mr Bishop kindly prepared from his notes.

I know that the Prime Minister regards this discussion as particularly sensitive and would wish knowledge of it restricted very closely indeed. Mr Bishop has already given his draft a distribution. It should certainly go no wider than that: indeed I suggest that copies should be numbered and accounted for, and no further copies distributed.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*C.D. Powell*

(C.D. Powell)

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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*cc MASTER 857*

*[Handwritten scribble]*



RECORD OF PRIVATE LUNCHTIME CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME  
MINISTER AND MR GORBACHEV AT CHEQUERS ON SUNDAY 16 DECEMBER  
1984

Mr Gorbachev said that he had spent a good morning at the Headquarters of John Brown. The First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade had been with him. Some of the proposals made by John Brown had been very interesting. This was an important time for considering possible lines of cooperation. He would be having further discussions during the week with British businessmen. The Prime Minister said that John Brown were doing well now. After a strike-prone period some years ago, they had been free of strikes for some 12 years now. Their orders were being produced on time and they had a very good record. Like other British companies, they honoured their contracts. Mr Gorbachev said that John Brown had good knowledge of Soviet conditions and problems. Certain points raised in their presentation that morning deserved further and immediate study, notably those for chemical plants, food processing and packaging systems etc. The Prime Minister said she understood that it was important for the Soviet Union to increase the shelf life of products. Mr Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union was losing or wasting a great deal because such infrastructure was lacking.

Mr Gorbachev said he would later be conveying to the Prime Minister a special message from Mr Chernenko. This would deal with arms control and space and with opportunities for extending the bilateral dialogue started in Moscow at the time of Mr Andropov's funeral.

In response to the Prime Minister's question about his previous visits, including his visit to Canada, Mr Gorbachev said that he had liked Canada a great deal. It was a very wealthy country in terms of both finances and resources. Canada and the Soviet Union had much in common as countries. It had therefore been rather difficult to find areas of cooperation for boosting bilateral trade. Several companies



in Canada which had expressed an interest in doing business with the Soviet Union were found to have their bosses in the United States. Some were 90% American.

The Prime Minister said that all countries had their own national feelings and pride. This applied very much to both parts of Europe. Mr Gorbachev said that to regard the interests of other countries as inferior to those of one's own was not a moral basis for policy. The national income of the CMEA countries was rising faster than that of the Soviet Union. This demonstrated the Soviet Union's selflessness. The Prime Minister asked whether the Soviet Union was well placed for hard currency. Mr Gorbachev said it was, though this was not true for all of the socialist countries. Hungary for example, was not in a particularly easy situation. Modernisation was now under way and if credits and finance were available on suitable terms, there should be no great problem. But intergovernmental organisations in the West, and the COCOM list, which was 90% governed by the United States, as well as EEC restrictions, caused some difficulty. The Prime Minister said that the IMF was a most useful organisation. What people wanted was to be able to raise their own standard of living by their own efforts. This was true for all countries. Politicians could help in this by the line that they took. But governments themselves had no money and needed to help people to earn more. How could this be achieved in a centralised and rigid economy? Mr Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union would be in an extremely difficult situation if it were unable to settle in a satisfactory way the key questions of social and economic levelling. When asked by the Prime Minister whether the Soviet Union would ever successfully achieve such a levelling out, Mr Gorbachev said that on the whole this had already been achieved. The problem of availability of jobs was already solved. The Soviet approach of course was very different from that of the West and of Britain in particular. In the Soviet Union, the numbers of workers were reduced before the workers themselves were retrained. The opposite simply would not work. They had already achieved a standard educational system. Things were



on the move. There was of course much to be taken into account, and running the country was no easy matter. The planners had to cater for all 15 Republics, and the Republics themselves had to consent. The birth rate in some of the Republics, particularly those in Central Asia, was much higher than elsewhere. The danger here was excessive working capacity. The problem however was now being overcome. Decisions had been taken over the last 10 years with the Southern Republics particularly in mind. There were complex programmes for the development of Azerbaijan, etc, where there was still a strong attachment to agriculture. Earlier ideas of providing large industrial plants there in order to attract the young had not been correct. They were now going for smaller enterprises, light industry and so forth in rural areas in order to absorb the numbers of young people. Hundreds of billions of roubles were being earmarked for irrigation schemes.

The Prime Minister wondered whether this might not all be easier if it were attempted on a free enterprise basis, with the provision of incentives and a free hand for local enterprises to run their own show, rather than being directed from the centre. Mr Gorbachev said he did not think she could really believe that everything in the USSR was run from the centre. Was it even feasible to try to do so? The Prime Minister said that Soviet 5-year plans were produced by a central agency and handed down to other governmental agencies. But unless people received incentives and could profit from their own efforts and raise their own standard of living, wealth would not be created and new products would not be generated. Under the Western system, everyone ultimately received more than they would from a system which depended simply on redistribution. In Britain we were attempting, through reduction in taxation, to increase incentives and stimulate new designs, new ventures, in order to raise wealth and to compete in world markets. She herself did not wish to have the power to direct everyone where he or she should work and what he or she should receive. That seemed a totally rigid system. It was better that people should be responsible



for their own actions.

*They referred*

Mr Gorbachev said that his own responsibilities increasingly centred in the economic field, which was also a hobby of his. He understood the British system, but the Soviet system was superior. He would not list all the arguments in favour of this view but believed that the history of the Soviet Union spoke volumes. Before the Revolution the country had been semi-colonial. Then a new approach had been tried and had revived the country. If there had been no World War II and if the Soviet Union had had a correspondingly developed industrial base, who knows what they would not have achieved by now. Churchill had said that it would take the Soviet Union a quarter of a century or more after the war to get back on its feet. In fact this had been achieved very much faster. Nor had the Soviet Union had the benefit of American help such as the Marshall Plan for Western Europe. They had had to do it by themselves, in a situation of virtual blockade. The Soviet Union's choice of system had not been accidental. It produced higher growth rates. Svetlana Alliluyeva had recently returned to Moscow after an absence of 17 years. She had been amazed at the changes in that time. Western Communists, including the Head of CPGB, often had reservations about the Soviet system. They were simply told to send their Communists to the USSR and see for themselves. British, West German and other Western Communists had come by the train load to the Soviet Union in the autumn. They had travelled about by train and had seen for themselves. He hoped that the Prime Minister too would "some day obtain a fuller first-hand view for herself". She would see how Soviet people lived - joyfully. Of course there were great problems, but they were being solved.

The Prime Minister asked why the Soviet authorities did not allow people to leave the Soviet Union as easily as they could leave Britain. She did not retain anyone who wished to leave. Svetlana had wished to leave and had been free to do so. So had the two Soviet soldiers who had come to Britain after fighting in Afghanistan. Their right to leave had been



entirely unrestricted, like everyone else's'. Britain's difficulty was perhaps that too many people wished to come and live here! But the Soviet authorities were placing great restrictions on people like Sakharov, Shcharansky, and numbers of Jews who wished to leave the Soviet Union. Their names were well known. Any Ukrainians, Georgians and so forth living in the UK were entirely free to leave. Why were they restricted in the Soviet Union?

Mr Gorbachev said that they had not completed their discussion of the two economic systems. The Soviet Union was undertaking a reform and giving incentives. It was envisaging more rights but also more responsibilities and independence for local enterprises and regional authorities. The matter was complex because there were 15 Republics as well as a number of autonomous areas. But the process was well under way. Centralisation would certainly continue and even be strengthened but only as regards certain key decision-making areas. The Prime Minister asked who decided what should be produced in the economy. Mr Gorbachev said that the central planning authorities gave instructions to the various outlying areas. The Prime Minister said that this differed markedly from the British system. She did not tell companies what to produce. They competed and did their own R and D.

The Prime Minister then spoke of the current miners' strike in Britain. More than one-third of miners were working hard. They had good wages, good conditions and good hours. The remainder were on strike. There was much intimidation of those who were working or wished to work - by force, violence, beatings-up, and even recently a murder. Communism was synonymous with getting one's way by violence. Its slogan was: "Brothers - when you are free, you will do as you are told". This was the ultimate socialist idea and explained the reputation which Communists, including those behind the miners' strike, enjoyed in the United Kingdom. People like Scargill and McGahey gave Soviet Communism a bad name.

Mr Gorbachev asked whether the Prime Minister really



believed that Soviet Communists were so strong as to be able to keep the British miners out on strike for over 10 months. The Prime Minister said that the miners' leaders had refused to conduct a ballot within their trade union. Where a ballot had been held, the vote had been to return to work. Some Communists and Communist sympathizers within the trade union leadership had not liked this and had thus approved intimidation to put workers willing to work back on strike. Mr Gorbachev said that the Prime Minister could speak to him in this way only because she placed such confidence in him. The problem was purely a British one. The Prime Minister said that in Britain, Communists could stand for election to Parliament but knew that they would never be elected. They had thus decided to try to take over trade unions, under Labour colours, and to infiltrate the Labour Party in the hope of getting elected. Mr Gorbachev said this was the first he had heard of this. Did the Prime Minister really think that the Soviet Union have such influence in other countries as to be able to manipulate local Communist Parties and public opinion? He could assure her that the Soviet leaders were not trying to do so and were not involved. The causes were entirely local. The Soviet Union had a firm policy: no export of Revolution and no export of Counter-Revolution. This was clear and a firm matter of principle for the Soviet Union. They should simply observe and see which system proved better. The Soviet Union did not refuse the right of the capitalist system to exist.

The Prime Minister said that such was the total freedom in Britain that Britain was open to propaganda for other alien systems. She did not seek to prevent this. She could prove that the British system was better. But the Soviet Union's fellow-Communists who could not get their own way through the ballot box were opting for violence. They were also being helped with finance from outside. Mr Gorbachev said it was not the Soviet Union who was helping in this way. The Soviet Union had transferred no funds to the NUM. (After a sideways glance from Mr Zamyatin, he amended this to: "as far as I am aware..."). The Prime Minister should blame Britain and not



foreign Communists for the situation. Das Kapital had been written in London. The Prime Minister interjected that in a free society it was entirely possible to do so and to get it published. Mr Gorbachev said that he was aware that the Prime Minister was capable of defending herself. But the Second Congress of the RSDRP had also been held in London. The Prime Minister asked when she might contemplate the holding of British Party Congresses in Moscow. Lenin had set a tragic example of resorting to violence when unable to win through the ballot box, when he had overthrown the people's representative Kerensky.

Mr Gorbachev appealed to the Prime Minister to deal with realities. He recalled that Mr Churchill, a "dye in the wool anti-communist", had nevertheless been sufficiently wise to join forces with the Soviet Union in certain historical circumstances. The Soviet Union's ideology was its own and was not being thrust on others. Perhaps the matter should be left there. He was not out to persuade the Prime Minister to his ideological views.

The Prime Minister said that she would doubtless be asked by several people what Mr Gorbachev's response had been about emigration possibilities for Jews, for Sakharov, Shcharansky and so forth. How should she reply? She would never restrain anyone in the United Kingdom by force. Mr Gorbachev expressed incredulity at this, adding that in other circumstances Britain certainly did use force. The Soviet Union simply abided by its own laws. It did not interfere with others and had no wish to do so, Britain should reciprocate. The Prime Minister said that she would answer press enquiries by saying that she had raised the question of people who wished to leave the Soviet Union and that Mr Gorbachev had referred to the differences between the two systems. Mr Gorbachev asked that she should reply that this was a matter within the competence of the Soviet authorities acting on the basis of Soviet laws. These matters were all governed by Soviet legislation. In fact, 89% of all who had expressed the wish to leave the Soviet Union over the last 10 years had done so. The number



of requests to leave was constantly falling, and this was natural. Sometimes, people who were initially not permitted to leave were later allowed to do so. The reason for initial refusal was generally that they had been working in areas affecting national security. Pressed further by the Prime Minister on the matter, Mr Gorbachev said it was up to her how she spoke to the press. He had explained the situation. Mr Gorbachev said that the present discussion was a private one. The Soviet position remained unchanged. She would be best to say that Mr Gorbachev "had added nothing new to the known Soviet position and had referred to existing Soviet laws".

The Prime Minister asked what she should say if asked about Mr Gorbachev's views concerning the miners' strike. Mr Gorbachev said this was entirely an internal UK matter and not relevant to inter-state relations. The Prime Minister said that some might point out that it was impossible to get money out of the Soviet Union without the agreement of the Soviet authorities. Mr Gorbachev said that he could state firmly that as far as he was aware no money had been transferred to the British miners from the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister said that the difficult part of their discussion was now over. Mr Gorbachev welcomed this and recalled good examples of cooperation between the two countries, including the honouring of contracts in the energy field.

In a brief toast at the end of the meal, Mr Gorbachev expressed "great satisfaction" at this opportunity for a discussion with the Prime Minister and her colleagues. He welcomed the "domestic ambience" and the good atmosphere prevailing around the table. He was indebted to the Prime Minister for this. The Soviet aim in accepting the invitation to Britain was to develop the dialogue between the two countries, extend mutual understanding and find points of contact and convergence on important international issues. Neither side should be obliged to renounce its own principles



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-9-

or act to the detriment of third countries. He referred briefly to the message he was carrying for the Prime Minister from Mr Chernenko, expressing as it did readiness to continue to act in the spirit of the meeting in Moscow at the time of Mr Andropov's funeral.

7 January 1985

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GR 170

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FM MOSCOW 041345Z JAN 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 12 OF 4TH JAN 85

YOUR TELNO 11: MESSAGE FOR CHERNENKO

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AT 12.30PM (LOCAL TIME) TODAY, 4 JANUARY, TO VICE-MINISTER RYZHOV. HAVING BEEN ADVISED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRANGE A CALL ON THE PRESIDENT OR ALEXANDROV, I SOUGHT A MEETING WITH GROMYKO. AFTER SOME DELAY I WAS INFORMED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO LEAVES EARLY TOMORROW FOR GENEVA, HAD INSTRUCTED RYZHOV TO SEE ME.

2. IN HANDING OVER THE MESSAGE I SAID THAT MR CHERNENKO WOULD WISH TO CONSIDER IT BEFORE THE GROMYKO/SHULTZ MEETING AND RYZHOV UNDERTOOK THAT IT WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO HIM IMMEDIATELY. HE SPOKE OF THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ATTACHED TO THE EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES AND THE GORBACHEV VISIT BUT MADE NO COMMENT OF SUBSTANCE.

3. I SAID THAT WE WOULD NOT BE PUBLISHING THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT MY CALL ON RYZHOV WILL BE REPORTED IN THE SOVIET PRESS. GRATEFUL TO KNOW IF ANY STATEMENT WILL BE MADE IN LONDON.

4. MIFT REPORTS SOME POINTS ON BILATERAL EXCHANGES ALSO COVERED AT THE MEETING.

SUTHERLAND  
LIMITED  
SOV D  
DEF D  
ACDD  
RES D  
NEWS D  
PS  
PS/MRLUCE  
PS/MRRIKIND  
PS/PUS  
MRGOODALL  
MRWESTON  
MRJENKINS

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

Mr C D Powell  
Private Secretary  
No.10 Downing Street

4 January 1985

VISIT OF USSR SUPREME SOVIET DELEGATION: LUNCH-TIME DISCUSSION  
BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR M S GORBACHEV, CHEQUERS,  
16 DECEMBER 1984.

*With CDP? Not on file*

/ At Chequers on 16 December I gave you a short note of the key  
points made in discussion at the lunch table that day between  
the Prime Minister and Mr Gorbachev. I now attach in draft  
form, for the record, my fuller account of that discussion.

*K. A. Bishop*

K A Bishop  
Soviet Section  
Research Department

cc: PS/Secretary of State  
PS/PUS  
PS/Mr Rifkind  
Mr Derek Thomas  
Mr Jenkins  
Mr Broomfield (Soviet Dept.)

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EL3ACC

## LUNCHTIME

RECORD OF PRIVATE/CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER  
AND MR GORBACHEV AT CHEQUERS ON SUNDAY 16 DECEMBER 1984

Mr Gorbachev said that he had spent a good morning at the Headquarters of John Brown. The First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade had been with him. Some of the proposals made by John Brown had been very interesting. This was an important time for considering possible lines of cooperation. He would be having further discussions during the week with British businessmen. The Prime Minister said that John Brown were doing well now. After a strike-prone period some years ago, they had been free of strikes for some 12 years now. Their orders were being produced on time and they had a very good record. Like other British companies, they honoured their contracts. Mr Gorbachev said that John Brown had good knowledge of Soviet conditions and problems. Certain points raised in their presentation that morning deserved further and immediate study, notably those for chemical plants, food processing and packaging systems etc. The Prime Minister said she understood that it was important for the Soviet Union to increase the shelf life of products. Mr Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union was losing or wasting a great deal because such infrastructure *was lacking.*

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/in



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in Canada which had expressed an interest in doing business with the Soviet Union were found to have their bosses in the United States. Some were 90% American.

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standard educational system. Things were on the move. There was of course much to be taken into account, and running the country was no easy matter. The planners had to cater for all 15 Republics, and the Republics themselves had to consent. The birth rate in some of the Republics, particularly those in Central Asia, was much higher than elsewhere. The danger here was excessive working capacity. The problem however was now being overcome. Decisions had been taken over the last 10 years with the Southern Republics particularly in mind. There were complex programmes for the development of Azerbaidjan, etc, where there was still a strong attachment to agriculture. Earlier ideas of providing large industrial plants <sup>there</sup> in order to attract the young had not been correct. They were now going for smaller enterprises, light industry and so forth in rural areas in order to absorb the numbers of young people. Hundreds of billions of roubles were being earmarked for irrigation schemes.

The Prime Minister wondered whether this might not all be easier if it were attempted on a free enterprise basis, with the provision of incentives and a free hand for local enterprises to run their own show, rather than being directed from the centre. Mr Gorbachev said he did not think she could really believe that everything <sup>in the USSR</sup> was run from the centre. Was it even feasible to try to do so? The Prime Minister said that Soviet 5-year plans were produced by a central agency and handed down to other governmental agencies. But unless people received incentives and could profit from their own efforts and raise their own standard of living, wealth would not be created and new products would not be generated. Under the Western system, everyone ultimately received more than they would from a system which depended simply on redistribution. In Britain we were attempting, through reduction in taxation, to increase incentives and stimulate <sup>new</sup> designs, new ventures, in order to raise wealth and to compete in world markets. She herself did not wish to have the power to direct everyone where he <sup>or she</sup> should work and what he <sup>or she</sup> should receive. That seemed a totally rigid system. It was better that people should be responsible for their own actions.

/Mr Gorbachev



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Mr Gorbachev said that his own responsibilities increasingly centred in the economic field, which was also a hobby of his. He understood the British system, but the Soviet system was superior. He would not list all the arguments in favour of this view but believed that the history of the Soviet Union spoke volumes. Before the Revolution the country had been semi-colonial. Then a new approach had been tried and had revived the country. If there had been no World War II and if the Soviet Union had had a correspondingly developed industrial base, who knows what they would not have achieved by now. Churchill had said that it would take the Soviet Union <sup>a</sup> quarter of a century <sup>or more</sup> after the war to get back on its feet. In fact this <sup>had been</sup> achieved very much faster. Nor had the Soviet Union had the benefit of American help <sup>such</sup> as the Marshall Plan for Western Europe. They had had to do it by themselves, in a situation of virtual blockade. The Soviet Union's choice of system had not been accidental. It produced higher growth rates. Svetlana Alliluyeva had recently returned to Moscow after an absence of 17 years. She had been amazed at the changes in that time. Western Communists, including the Head of CPGB, often had reservations about the Soviet system. They were simply told to send their Communists to the USSR and see for themselves. British, West German and other Western Communists had come by the train load to the Soviet Union in the autumn. They had travelled about by train and <sup>had</sup> seen for themselves. He hoped that the Prime Minister would "some day obtain a fuller first-hand view for herself". She would see how Soviet people lived - joyfully. Of course there were great problems, but they were being solved.

The Prime Minister asked why the Soviet authorities did not allow people to leave the Soviet Union as easily as they could leave Britain. She did not retain anyone who wished to leave. Svetlana had wished to leave and had been free to do so. So had the two Soviet soldiers who had come to Britain after fighting in Afghanistan. Their right to leave had been entirely <sup>un</sup>restricted, like everyone else's. Britain's <sup>difficulty</sup> was perhaps that too many /people

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people wished to come and live here! But the Soviet authorities were placing great restrictions on people like Sakharov, Shcharansky, and numbers of Jews who wished to leave the Soviet Union. Their names were well known. Any Ukrainians, Georgians and so forth living in the UK were entirely free to leave. Why were they restricted in the Soviet Union?

Mr Gorbachev said that they had not completed their discussion of the two economic systems. The Soviet Union was undertaking a reform and giving incentives. It was envisaging more rights but also more responsibilities and independence for local enterprises and regional authorities. The matter was complex because there were 15 Republics as well as a number of autonomous areas. But the process was well under way. Centralisation would certainly continue and even be strengthened but only as regards certain key decision-making areas. The Prime Minister asked who decided what should be produced in the economy. Mr Gorbachev said that the **C**entral **P**lanning **A**uthorities gave instructions to the various outlying areas. The Prime Minister said that this differed markedly from the British system. She did not tell companies what to produce. They competed and did their own <sup>and</sup> RD.

The Prime Minister then spoke of the current miners' strike<sup>in Britain</sup>. More than one-third of miners were working hard, **T**hey had good wages, good conditions and good hours. The remainder were on strike. There was much intimidation of those who <sup>or wished to work</sup> were working<sup>by</sup> -by force, violence, beatings-up, and even recently a murder. Communism was synonymous with getting one's way by violence. Its slogan was: "Brothers - when you are free, you will do as you are told". **T**his was the ultimate socialist idea and <sup>explained</sup> ~~was~~ the reputation which Communists, including those behind the miners' strike, enjoyed in the United Kingdom. People like Scargill and McGahey gave Soviet Communism a bad name.

Mr Gorbachev asked whether the Prime Minister really believed that Soviet Communists were so strong as to be able to keep the <sup>British</sup> miners out on strike for over 10 months.

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The Prime Minister said that the miners' leaders had refused to conduct a ballot within their trade union.

~~W~~here a ballot had been held, the vote had been to return to work. Some Communists and Communist sympathizers within the trade union leadership had not liked this and had thus approved intimidation to put workers willing to work back on strike. Mr Gorbachev said that the Prime Minister could speak to him in this way only because she placed such confidence in him. The problem was purely a British one. The Prime Minister said that in Britain, Communists could stand for election to Parliament but knew that they would never be elected. They had thus decided to try to take over trade unions, under Labour colours, and to infiltrate the Labour Party in the hope of getting elected. Mr Gorbachev said this was the first he had heard of this. Did the Prime Minister really think that the Soviet Union have such influence in other countries as to be able to manipulate local Communist Parties and public opinion? He could assure her that the Soviet leaders were not trying to do so and were not involved. The causes were entirely local. The Soviet Union had a firm policy: no export of Revolution and no export of Counter-Revolution. This was clear and a firm matter of principle for the Soviet Union. They should simply observe and see which system proved better. The Soviet Union did not refuse the right of the capitalist system to exist.

The Prime Minister said that such was the total freedom in Britain, <sup>that</sup> Britain was open to propaganda for other alien systems. She did not seek to prevent this. She could prove that the British system was better. But the



Soviet Union's fellow-Communists who could not get their own way through the ballot box were opting for violence. They were also being helped with finance from outside. Mr Gorbachev said it was not the Soviet Union who was helping in this way. The Soviet Union had transferred no funds to the NUM. (After a sideways glance from Mr Zamyatin, he amended this to: "as far as I am aware..."). The Prime Minister should blame Britain and not foreign Communists for the situation. Das Kapital had been written in London. The Prime Minister interjected that in a free society it was entirely possible to do so and to get it published. Mr Gorbachev said that he was aware that the Prime Minister was capable of defending herself. But the Second Congress of the RSDRP had also been held in London. The Prime Minister asked when she might contemplate the holding of British Party Congresses in Moscow. Lenin had set a tragic example of resorting to violence when unable to win through the ballot box, when he had overthrown the people's representative Kerensky.

Mr Gorbachev appealed to the Prime Minister to deal with realities. He recalled that Mr Churchill, a "dyed in the wool anti-communist", had nevertheless been sufficiently wise to join forces with the Soviet Union in certain historical circumstances. The Soviet Union's ideology was its own and was not being thrust on others. Perhaps the matter should be left there. He was not out to persuade the Prime Minister to his ideological views.

The Prime Minister said that she would doubtless be asked by several people what Mr Gorbachev's response had been

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about emigration possibilities for Jews, for Sakharov, Shcharansky and so forth. How should she reply? She would never restrain anyone in the United Kingdom by force. Mr Gorbachev expressed incredulity<sup>at this</sup>, adding that in other circumstances Britain<sup>certainly</sup> did use force. The Soviet Union simply abided by its own laws. It did not interfere with others and had no wish to do so, Britain should reciprocate. The Prime Minister said that she would answer press enquiries by saying that she had raised the question of people who wished to leave the Soviet Union and that Mr Gorbachev had referred to the differences between the two systems. Mr Gorbachev asked that she should reply that this was<sup>a</sup> matter within the competence of the Soviet authorities acting on the basis of Soviet laws. These matters were all governed by Soviet legislation. In fact, 89% of all who<sup>had</sup> expressed the wish to leave the Soviet Union had done so over the last 10 years. The number of requests to leave was constantly falling, and this was natural. Sometimes, people who were initially not permitted to leave were later allowed to do so. The reason for initial refusal was generally that they had been working in areas affecting national security. Pressed further by the Prime Minister on the matter, Mr Gorbachev said it was up to her how she spoke to the press. He had explained the situation. Mr Gorbachev said that the present discussion was a private one. The Soviet position remained unchanged. She would be best to say that Mr Gorbachev had added nothing new to the known Soviet position and had referred to existing Soviet laws.

The Prime Minister asked what she should say if asked /about

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about Mr Gorbachev's views concerning the miners' strike. Mr Gorbachev said this was entirely an internal UK matter and not relevant to inter-state relations. The Prime Minister said that some might point out that it was impossible to get money out of the Soviet Union without the agreement of the Soviet authorities. Mr Gorbachev said that he could state firmly that as far as he was aware no money had been transferred to the British miners from the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister said that the difficult part of their discussion was now over. Mr Gorbachev welcomed this and recalled good examples of cooperation between the two countries, including the honouring of contracts in the energy field.

In a brief toast at the end of the meal, Mr Gorbachev expressed "great satisfaction" at this opportunity for a discussion with the Prime Minister and her colleagues. He welcomed the domestic ambience and the good atmosphere prevailing around the table. He was indebted to the Prime Minister for this. The Soviet aim in accepting the invitation <sup>to Britain</sup> was to develop the dialogue between the two countries, extend mutual understanding and find points of contact and convergence on important international issues. Neither side should be obliged to renounce its own principles or act to the detriment of ~~third~~ countries. He referred briefly to the message he was carrying for the Prime Minister from Mr Chernenko, expressing as it did readiness to continue to act in the spirit of the meeting in Moscow at the time of Mr Andropov's funeral.



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MIKHAIL SERGEEVICH GORBACHEV: A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MAN DURING HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM, 15-21 DECEMBER 1984.

1. Gorbachev's performance in the UK will at least in part have been dictated by the political purpose of the visit. He described his underlying purpose in an aside to The Speaker after only five minutes on British soil - "We accept Britain as it is, and hope that you will accept us similarly; I have come to clear away the obstacles (razgrebat zavaly) in the way of improving Anglo/Soviet relations." It became ever clearer as the visit proceeded that fulfilment of this purpose required a man who could realistically sell optimism; appeal convincingly to British economic and political self-interest; sustain a long, diverse and very demanding programme; and show the acceptable face of Communism to a wide range of governmental, parliamentary, business and media representatives. (Success in this was necessary to him in his accompanying, unstated, purpose - that of exploiting the contacts and timing of the visit to the benefit of the Soviet position on the non-militarisation of outer space.)
2. My close observation of him as his interpreter throughout his official programme leaves me in no doubt that Gorbachev was eminently the right man for the job. Of course he fitted his face to the tasks in hand, refusing for example to let himself be provoked by persistent demonstrators, by the Prime Minister's challenging and probing examination of him, by the clamorous and potentially embarrassing attentions of the media, by speculative questions from Members of Parliament and others about his standing in the Soviet hierarchy. The man, however, proved not just equal to but bigger than the task, and left some strong impressions also of his real self. Also revealed were some new biographical details, including certain likes and dislikes and the intriguing fact that he was baptised (Annex B).
3. There was about his movements and his utterances an unaffected, self-assured and un-self-conscious air of competence and confidence. One was conscious of great resources of energy in him, well-harnessed. Although he joked about his heavy programme - "we'll fulfil it if it kills us" - he never flagged nor faltered. He spoke as a rule in simple, generally short and clear sentences. While showing on occasion that he could trade if necessary in the language of the dialectic, he kept his remarks throughout the week notably free of the familiar Marxist/Leninist jargon, bombast, "preachiness" or cliches.
4. He would listen, immobile, with concentration and great attentiveness, and would almost invariably answer all questions put to him - in his own time, of course, and only in the degree of detail which suited him. He had a knack of doing so in a disarmingly straightforward, unpolemical manner and of finding apt, often humorous turns of phrase to register his point or defuse unwanted tension. He was aided in this by a ready smile and occasional laughter. A roguish twinkle was never far from his eye (he even once winked at me over his shoulder as I interpreted a neat parry of his to one of the Prime Minister's verbal thrusts). He often spoke without notes, confidently, steadily, and in a manner

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which inspired confidence in his audience.

5. While not an intellectual, he clearly has a very good memory and a disciplined head. He was also thoroughly in control of his brief. I found him - especially for someone so little acquainted with the ways of the West - notably quick to size up a political situation or take a hint, indeed generally quick on the uptake. Even at 'Così Fan Tutte' he was much quicker than his more "intellectual" wife to get the point of an unfamiliar plot and to appreciate the spirit and humour of the production. His demeanour in addressing others, either singly or in large numbers, and regardless of whether they were British or Soviet, can be summed up in the word "naturalness". If, as occurred once or twice, he was less than totally fluent, that too seemed natural and bothered him not at all. He appeared at these times (when searching for a word or phrase) to prefer to be "sound" and to feel right with his answer before giving voice. If his message was unsurprising, even predictable, and rarely if ever strayed far from orthodox Soviet positions, the style was often lightened with a touch of humour, irony or with colloquialisms. It was refreshing for example to hear a Soviet leader (in conversation with the Secretary of State) use such words as chepukha (nonsense/twaddle) rather than some cant equivalent from Pravda. Such examples were far from infrequent. But the message remained, in Soviet terms, irreproachably sound, even if the style and lexicon had the ring of relative modernity.

6. Without ever for a moment suggesting ideological unsoundness or indifference (indeed, his conviction about the rightness and superiority of the Soviet system seemed heartfelt), he came across to many as a pragmatist. In official talks with the Prime Minister, Secretary of State, Mr Jopling and Mr Channon, as well as in the visits to industrial/agricultural companies and plants, he spoke as a man at ease with the capabilities of robotics, computer technology and new management techniques, and certainly not afraid of them. He regularly produced a stream of apt, often detailed comments, and of penetrating questions. His enthusiasm for airing his knowledge was marked, notably in his beloved fields of economic management and agriculture. Everywhere he seemed interested in and impressed by what our American cousins would call a "can do mentality". His unscheduled and unannounced visit to a 10 Downing Street empty of its principal resident was probably less a caprice and more an example of his confidence and decisiveness (of which there were several other instances) and his apparent conviction that problems exist to be solved. His confidence in the power of technology harnessed to sound organisation was several times expressed in terms of evident pride in Soviet power. He told one of his parliamentary hosts that the Soviet Union had told the Americans: "We can perfectly well nowadays live without you and you without us, though cooperation would be preferable"; he spoke with obvious pride to the Prime Minister about Soviet scientific and technological achievements; he showed (not for the first or last time during his visit) a strong streak of nationalistic pride, even touchiness, in telling Mr Channon that people who regarded the Russians as technological "backwoodsmen" were both arrogant and ignorant and would learn better. "Send us your smallest British flea and we'll make shoes for it!" This, though accompanied with a disarming chuckle, was said with deep feeling.



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7. The strain of Russian/Slav nationalism in him came through also in private conversation about art and music (with Mr Rifkind and Lord Gowrie), where Gorbachev sang the praises of several Soviet painters of the strongly Russian nationalist (and realist) school - notably Ilya Glazunov. He even suggested to Lord Gowrie that Britain should put on a Glazunov exhibition. At the same time he poured gentle ridicule on modernist paintings of the "nothing but a plain rectangle" variety and was amused at people who could stand in front of them for hours in rapt concentration and awe. In music, too, his pride in Russian national achievements was evident. It prompted him to recommend visitors to Moscow to go to a church in Fili, on the city's outskirts, (Sobor Svyatogo Pokrova), where 15th and 16th century Russian chants were "brilliantly" and "wonderfully" performed by an unaccompanied choir. Although the evidence is inconclusive (he guffawed at an anti-Polish bon mot by his host at a parliamentary dinner), I very much suspect that his Russian pride is tinged with racism or, at the very least, condescension towards other races. He told several people that without the firm grip at the centre in Moscow, the many races in the Soviet Union would have flown apart and produced chaos. He also remarked favourably on the pragmatic British approach towards his very demanding programme in the UK, remarking that with the Germans the programme ruled - it was "programme first, second and last". (He said he had learned some German in his youth but it was now broken and rusty). Taking an intelligent interest in everything around him, he seemed genuinely impressed both by the British sense of tradition and by examples of British technical innovation (automated insertion of windscreens in cars etc).

8. On two noteworthy occasions the unemotional mask slipped - in both cases on the issue of human rights. It slipped slightly when Mr St John-Stevas harried him, in the meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, about the Soviet Union's failure to honour its human rights commitments. Prevented from changing the subject, Gorbachev threatened retaliation by vigorous "exposure" of British sins in this field. The mask slipped badly at the Official Opposition lunch, when Mr Kinnock privately pressed the same issue. This provoked an intemperate outburst of obscenities and threats by Gorbachev against "turds" and spies like Shchavansky, who was in prison "and that is where he will stay". He warned, with appropriate gestures, that Britain would get it "right in the teeth" in a "merciless" denunciation of its human rights crimes if that was the game it wanted to play. With his usual adroitness, however, Gorbachev collected himself and told Mr Kinnock that he had never spoken so undiplomatically on the subject to anyone else during the visit, and that such frankness was possible only between people who referred to each other as "comrade"! He sought a no less disarming escape route from a sharp exchange of views in private with the Prime Minister by remarking that her candour was a mark of her confidence in him. Nimbleness of foot was a feature of Gorbachev's performance throughout his stay. But the chill impression left by these instances remains: we had glimpsed beneath the surface a man conscious of power and ready if need be to exploit it ruthlessly.



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9. As remarked above, Gorbachev came to the UK to present the acceptable face of Communism and was outwardly pretty successful in his mission. He repeatedly stated his satisfaction with his programme and was visibly gratified at the length and substantive nature of his talks, notably with the Prime Minister and Secretary of State. Without evidently trying too hard, indeed quite naturally and unemotionally, he evoked a sense of confidence in virtually all his interlocutors. He struck them as approachable and, because unaffected, as also sincere or least as someone with whom it was possible to have a rational dialogue. Members of his own Delegation also seemed to find him sympathetic and approachable. The Delegation's loquacious and self-conscious "card", the poet Isaev, spoke to me in terms of admiration, even adulation, for Gorbachev's "peasant simplicity, unaffectedness and closeness to people", his "wisdom even more than his brain". His Delegation as a whole seemed to have easy access to him and to be prepared to confide in him. Their attitude, though one of natural deference and admiration, was nothing approaching awe. He not infrequently gave members of his team the floor to speak on subjects close to themselves. He was never seen to give himself airs, "pull rank" or reprimand them (not even the embarrassingly florid Isaev nor the miner, Strelchenko, who worked himself into a shouting militaristic rage at the Speaker's dinner). He was attentive to others' needs (sympathising with his interpreters as they worked, un-fed, through his mealtime conversations).

10. Gorbachev displayed generally during the visit the kind of unostentatious personal magnetism and political soundness of touch which, were he a Western politician, would swing many voters behind him. He handled the British media like a "natural" - with patience, decisiveness and winning touches of humour. I saw no signs of vanity in him. There is certainly some steel behind the surface smoothness; some fire and deep convictions behind the "cool customer" exterior. There is a disarming directness in him, and some human sympathy along with evident drive, determination and national pride. He has strong nerves (and could even swap jokes just before his departure from Edinburgh, about doctors and death, though he had only just broken the news of Ustinov's demise to his hosts). I am sure he could be utterly ruthless if necessary.

11. What these qualities and the others described above will do for him in the Soviet political arena, it is hard to predict. If the Soviet Union one day needs the kind of leader who, like a General on the eve of battle, can put new heart into his troops simply by going quietly and reassuringly among them, then Gorbachev could be their man. In this event the West would need to recall not only Gorbachev's best behaviour but also those moments when the urbane mask slipped. The combination of cleverness, modern-mindedness, Slav nationalism, energy, charm, self-assurance and single-mindedness would make him at worst a formidable adversary and at best an interlocutor to be treated with the utmost respect and circumspection.

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K.A. Bishop  
3 January 1985



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Note for file

Chequers - Gorbachev's Visit

A.P. Khakhulin described in the programme as "senior aide" remained in Chequers during the visit of Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev. He accompanied them to their bedroom on arrival and also accompanied Mrs. Gorbachev when she visited the bedroom following her conducted tour of the house. During lunch he remained immediately outside the dining room.

He professed neither to speak nor to understand English. I was not entirely convinced that this was not a pose.

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PART 3 ends:-

fco to MOD 22/12/84

PART 4 begins:-

P. Joe: Note for file 3/1/85

Visit of Supreme Soviet Delegation.

3/1/85.



