


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PREM 19/1672

TOP SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

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FILE TITLE: Internal Situation		SERIES AFGHANISTAN
		PART: 6
PART BEGINS: September 1981	PART ENDS: 14 April 1986	CAB ONE: 

CLOSED.

PREM 19/1672

PART

CLOSED

MR WICKS

23 October 1985

AFGHANISTAN TALKS WITH REAGAN

During talks between President Zia, David Mellor and Hartley Booth last week, Zia reported that he has good evidence that Soviet authorities in Afghanistan, in particular the Russian Army, are involved directly in passing opium and heroin to the West from Afghanistan through Pakistan. He had evidence that a drug addiction problem existed in the Russian Army of occupation in Afghanistan. This was not directly substantiated by US authorities in Pakistan (DEA or Embassy). However, it was supported by all relevant calculations that between 400 and 600 tons of heroin (ie 70% of world production) now emanates from Afghanistan. This assessment came from the DEA (US Drugs Enforcement Agency) and the PNCB (Pakistan Narcotics Control Board), and was on the basis of aerial photography in Pakistan and known production from Pakistan. There have been repeated calls for Reagan to raise this with Gorbachev.

AScola
pp HARTLEY BOOTH

ES

/LADY YOUNG
 /MR EGGAR
 MR ~~WILSON~~ GOODALL
 MR DEREK THOMAS
 SIR W HARDING
 MR ~~WILSON~~
 MR SAMUEL
 MR ~~WILSON~~ O'NEILL

ED/SAD (2)
 DEP HD/ PUSD (2)

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SIC

MODUK FOR D14

KABUL SITREP 8-14 APRIL 1986

SUMMARY (NOT FOR PRESS)

1. BOMBINGS IN KABUL. REGIME CLAIMS BIG SUCCESS IN KHOST ON 11 APRIL. HAQQANI (HEZBE YUNES) PROBABLY WOUNDED. HEAVY FIGHTING ALSO IN SHOMALI, GHAZNI, KANDAHAR. ROCKET ATTACK ON HERAT.

2. BABRAK NOT YET RETURNED. KESHTMAND INVITED TO VISIT USSR IN SECOND HALF APRIL. DOST (FOREIGN MINISTER) TO DELHI FOR NAM MEETING, WHERE CORDOVEZ WILL REPORTEDLY GIVE HIM AND PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER UN PROPOSAL FOR FOURTH DOCUMENT OF SETTLEMENT. PAKISTANI CHARGE SUMMONED ABOUT BORDER VIOLATIONS. JIRGA OF FREE PUSHTUN TRIBES HELD. AAPSO CONFERENCE.

DETAIL

PAKISTAN CHARGE SUMMONED ABOUT BORDER VIOLATIONS. JIRGA OF FREE
PUSHTUN TRIBES HELD. AAPSO CONFERENCE.

DETAIL

SECURITY

3. KABUL: TENSION HIGH AND CONTINUED HEAVY HELICOPTER/CONVOY
MOVEMENT. DRA TROOPS SEARCHING VEHICLES AND HOUSES. PROBABLY IN
PREPARATION FOR 27 APRIL CELEBRATIONS. SMALL POCKETS OF DRA
TROOPS AND KHAD STATIONED ON ALL MAJOR ROADS AND ESPECIALLY
AROUND PALACE (THOUGH BABRAK STILL ABSENT). CIVILIAN CARS THOROUGHLY
SEARCHED, BUSES UNLOADED AND CHECKED INTERNALLY. 10 BOMBS REPORTEDLY
EXPLODED IN DARULAMAN AND FURTHER 20 BOMBS DISCOVERED IN MIKRORAYON
AND KARTE SEM. REPORT OF BOMB EXPLODING INSIDE RADIO AFGHANISTAN.
ON 6 APRIL, WOMAN KILLED A SOLDIER IN MIKRORAYON WHILE BEING
ARRESTED, POSSIBLY AS A BOMBER. TWO LARGE EXPLOSIONS ON 7 AND 9
APRIL AFTER CURFEW: FORMER 50 METRES BELOW SUMMIT OF TELEVISION
HILL (POSSIBLY A ROCKET, BUT MORE PROBABLY A MINE/BOMB).

4. HEAVY HELICOPTER ACTIVITY GOING NORTH AND SOUTH-WEST OF KABUL
TO ASSIST IN SHOMALI AND GHAZNI OPERATIONS, EG 22 HELICOPTERS
(20 SOVIET FLYING HIGH AND 2 AFGHAN TAILING ALONG LOW) RETURNED
FROM SOUTH-WEST AT 5.30 PM ON 8 APRIL. HEAVY ARMOURD CONVOY
WENT NORTH ALONG OLD SALANG ROAD PAST EMBASSY AT 6 PM ON 10
APRIL. AND 30 PLUS TRUCK CONVOY PASSED EMBASSY IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION
ON 11 APRIL. MANY WOUNDED SOVIET SOLDIERS RETURNED TO KABUL ON
10 APRIL: A WESTERN DIPLOMAT COUNTED 12 SOVIET MILITARY TRUCKS
WITH RED CROSSES FULL OF SOLDIERS WAITING TO ENTER SHAHRARA
HOSPITAL.

5. NORTH: 28/29 MARCH MUJAHEDDIN UNDER MOHAMMED HABI-BULLAH KILLED
40 KHAD AT QALE HADIE SOUTH-WEST OF QARABAGH IN RETALIATION FOR
KILLING OF MUJAHEDDIN COMMANDER ABDUL MAKIM BY KHAD IN QARABAGH
EARLIER IN MARCH. AT FAIZ IN SHAKADARA AREA, MUJAHEDDIN ATTACKED
DRA POST AND 30 SOLDIERS DEFFECTED WITH WEAPONS. VILLAGES IN AREA
BOMBARDED HEAVILY BY HELICOPTERS AND ARTILLERY WITH MANY CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES. ~~REF 6-15011916-13-10~~ ON 8 APRIL NORTH OF KABUL FOR
2 HOURS IN EARLY MORNING AND AT 0930 SOME 64 HELICOPTERS SEEN
RETURNING TO AIRPORT. ON 9 APRIL, MUJAHEDDIN CLASHED WITH DRA
FORCES AT KALAKAN IN SHOMALI: 18 MUJAHEDDIN AND 61 REGIME FIGHTERS
KILLED (LATTER POSSIBLY EX-MUJAHEDDIN). 20 AFGHAN MIGRANT WORKERS
RETURNING FROM IRAN WERE SPOTTED BY SOVIET FORCES WHILST CROSSING
RIVER AT CHARIKAR ABOUT 10 DAYS AGO: ALL CAUGHT AND HANGED FOR
POSSESSING MUJAHEDDIN TRAVEL CARDS.

6. EAST: 3 HELICOPTERS REPORTEDLY SHOT DOWN NEAR QALE KUH: 2
CRASHED ON SPOT AND THIRD CRASHED AT JALALABAD AIRPORT (NO DATE
GIVEN).

7. SOUTH: HEAVY FIGHTING CONTINUED ROUND KHOST AND KANDAHAR.
24 BODIES RETURNED FROM KHOST TO KABUL ON 9 APRIL. ALSO REPORTS
OF HEAVY FIGHTING SOUTH OF GHAZNI AND IN GARDEZ AREA INVOLVING
SOVIET AND DRA TROOPS: MAJORITY ARE SOVIETS IN FRONTLINE. ON
1 APRIL A HELICOPTER REPORTEDLY SHOT DOWN IN LOGAR: CREW OF
4 KILLED. MUJAHEDDIN COMMANDER HAJI ABDUL MALIK KILLED KANDAHAR
ABOUT 2 WEEKS AGO.

SOVIET AND DRA TROOPS; MAJORITY ARE SOVIETS IN FRONTLINE. ON 1 APRIL A HELICOPTER REPORTEDLY SHOT DOWN IN LOGAR; CREW OF 4 KILLED. MUJAHEDDIN COMMANDER NAJI ABDUL MALIK KILLED KANDAHAR ABOUT 2 WEEKS AGO.

8 REGIME CLAIMS; SUCCESSES IN KHOST WITH 120 AND SUBSEQUENTLY 700 MUJAHEDDIN CLAIMED ELIMINATED TOGETHER WITH ONE OF BIGGEST MUJAHEDDIN BASES. ALSO MADE-OUTS IN GARDEZ AND TANN DISTRICTS DESTROYED. SADEQ VISITS KHOST. HAQQANI RUMOURED KILLED. ROCKET ATTACK ON HERAT ON 12 APRIL ADMITTED; 3 KILLED, 18 SEVERLY WOUNDED.

POLITICS

9. INTERNAL; ANNOUNCEMENT THAT KESHMAND WILL VISIT USSR IN SECOND HALF OF APRIL. JIRGA OF FREE PUSHTUN TRIBES HELD 9-10 APRIL; 1750 PARTICIPANTS CLAIMED, INCLUDING 1545 REPRESENTATIVES OF 35 PUSHTUN AND BALUCH TRIBES FROM PAKISTAN PLUS 200 REPRESENTATIVES OF POLITICAL GROUPS, MAINLY ANTI-PAKISTANI. BUT IN MANY CASES TRIBAL CHIEFS OR HEADS OF GROUPS HAVE NOT COME THEMSELVES AND IN PARTICULAR MARRI (BALUCH LEADER IN EXILE IN KABUL (STEERED CLEAR. AS PART OF PREPARATION, NUR, WATANJAR, BARYALAI AND LAEQ MET DIFFERENT TRIBES. NAJIB TOOK PROMINENT PART AND MADE CONCLUDING SPEECH. MESSAGES PUBLISHED TO UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, RAJIV GANDHI, AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN ETC. MANY REFERENCES TO BRITISH COLONIALISM. ZAERY VISITS FARAH.

10. EXTERNAL; DOST TO DELHI FOR NAM FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING (WHERE IT IS RUMOURED CORDOVEZ WILL PASS NEW UN DRAFT OF FORTH DOCUMENT TO AFGHAN AND PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTERS). GOLDDAD (VICE PRIME MINISTER) TO USSR WITH DELEGATION FOR ANNIVERSARY OF SAUR REVOLUTION. VISIT BY POLISH DEPUTY PLAN ORGANISATION CHAIRMAN. DRA AMBASSADOR TO ETHIOPIA (NUR MOHAMMED KHORAMMI) PRESENTS CREDENTIALS TO MENGISTU.

11. AAPSO CONFERENCE ON NEW INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ORDER HELD ON 9-12 APRIL; SIMILAR CONFERENCE HELD IN KABUL IN 1984. PARTICIPANTS SHOWN JIRGA AND ATTACKED IMPERIALISM. A AMIER MOHAMMED, MEMBER OF NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF TANZANIA AND EDITOR IN CHIEF OF UHURU NEWSPAPER WHO WAS PARTICIPATING IN CONFERENCE, CALLED ON BARYALAI TO DISCUSS AFGHAN/TANZANIAN COMMON INTERESTS.

12. PAKISTANI CHARGE SUMMONED ABOUT BORDER VIOLATIONS ON 8 APRIL. DRA SENDS NOTE TO UN SECRETARY-GENERAL CLAIMING 100 KILLED AND WOUNDED BY PAKISTANI ATTACKS 10-23 MARCH. (COMMENT: PROTESTS MADE TO PAKISTANI CHARGE HERE ABOUT INCIDENTS DURING THAT PERIOD DO NOT BEAR OUT THIS TOTAL.)

MISCELLANEOUS

13 COMMANDER 17TH BRIGADE HERAT, JUMA ATSAK, PROMOTED BRIGADIER GENERAL.

NOT FOR MEDIA

14. REF PARA 8, PAKISTANIS SAY HAQQANI ONLY WOUNDED IN A

13 COMMANDER 17TH BRIGADE HERAT, JUMA ATSAK, PROMOTED BRIGADIER GENERAL.

NOT FOR MEDIA

14. REF PARA 8, PAKISTANIS SAY NAQQANI ONLY WOUNDED IN A WAPALM ATTACK. UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF BOMB EXPLODING IN POLYTECHNIC (WHERE JARGA WAS BEING HELD) AT 0530 ON 8 APRIL. POSSIBLE INCOMING ROCKET AT 2000 ON 11 APRIL. CHINESE CLAIM THAT 2 WEEKS AGO 9 HELICOPTERS/FIXED WING AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN ROUND KHOST AND 2 TOP SOVIET OFFICERS KILLED. THIS MAY BE CONNECTED WITH PAKISTANI STORY THAT 2 HELICOPTERS CARRYING NAZAR MOHAMMED (MINISTER OF DEFENCE) AND SOVIET OFFICERS WERE ATTACKED ON ROUTE TO KHOST AND HELICOPTER CARRYING SOVIETS DOWNED. (MEDIA CLAIM NAZAR MOHAMMED VISITED KHOST AREA ON 2 APRIL.) CHINESE ALSO CLAIM 2 TANKS ROCKETED AND 50 DRA KILLED BEGINNING APRIL IN HERAT AND 1 TANK DESTROYED. 30 DRA/SOLDIERS KILLED IN NIMRUZ AND 8 DRA SOLDIERS/3 OFFICIALS KILLED IN FARAH.

15. SOVIET DIPLOMATS PUTTING IT ABOUT THAT BABRAK'S VISIT TO MOSCOW WAS MEDICAL; HE WAS UNABLE TO GET TREATMENT DURING XXV-IVTH CONGRESS BECAUSE HE HAD TO HURRY BACK TO CORDOVEZ'S VISIT. IT IS TRUE THAT HE SPENT 3 WEEKS IN USSR THIS TIME LAST YEAR APPARENTLY FOR MEDICAL REASONS. DANESHJOU (CHIEF OF PROTOCOL) HAS FORECAST THAT GENEVA VII WILL LAST AT LEAST A MONTH.

16. ACCORDING TO KABUL NEW TIMES OF 12 APRIL, ICRC DELEGATION VISITED KABUL 6-11 APRIL, INCLUDING FIRST AID CENTRES OF AFGHAN RED CROSS, ORTHOPAEDIC UNIT OF WAZIR AKBAR KHAN HOSPITAL AND AVICENNA HOSPITAL AND PLEDGED MORE ASSISTANCE TO SECRETARY GENERAL OF AFGHAN RED CROSS. (I TRIED TO CONTACT DELEGATION BUT THEY WERE NOT AT INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL, WHICH WAS FULL OF AAPSO, AND I DID NOT WANT TO GO TO KABUL HOTEL BECAUSE OF BOMB; NONE OF MY "UNFRIENDLY" COLLEAGUES MET THEM.)

17. PAKISTANI ACTING CHARGE HAS COMPLAINED TO MFA ABOUT HARASSMENT, ESPECIALLY BUMPER-BUMPER PURSUIT BY SECRET POLICE CARS. HE THINKS THIS HARASSMENT MAY BE IN RETALIATION FOR HELICOPTER CRASH MENTIONED IN PARA 14 ABOVE OR BECAUSE AFGHANS BELIEVE PAKISTAN MAY HAVE HAD A HAND IN KABUL BOMB EXPLOSION.

DRACE-FRANCIS

YYYY

FCO PASS SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK, PEKING, RIYADH, BIS TEHRAN
FCO PASS SAVING TO EC POSTS, ADDIS ABABA, DAR ES SALAAM

KHPAN 0314

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

CCRC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Sir Antony Acland KCMG KCVO
Permanent Under-Secretary of State

21 January 1986

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

ms

Prime Minister
You may just like
to note this for
future reference.

Dear Charles,

AFGHANISTAN AND AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY

1. We had a word last Friday about the call on me on 10 January by the Austrian Ambassador. I enclose a copy of the Aide-Memoire left by Dr Thomas.

C.D.P.
23/1/86
Aide-Memoire
heavily
over-stated.

2. As I told you, Dr Thomas expressed concern at the comparison made by the Prime Minister during a TV interview on 27 December between the Austrian model of neutrality and the notion of an externally guaranteed neutrality as a solution to the problem of Afghanistan.

3. I pointed out to Dr Thomas that the Prime Minister's remarks, reflecting a proposal put forward by Lord Carrington in 1980, were made in the context of a free ranging discussion. The Prime Minister was drawing a comparison in broad political terms, and her remarks were not to be taken as a comment on the legal basis of Austria's neutrality. The United Kingdom did not at this stage intend to revive the Carrington proposals, although they still remained on the table as a possible basis for further discussion should the UN initiative founder.

4. The Ambassador's approach illustrates the Austrians' sensitivity about their neutral status, which, as the Aide-Memoire makes clear, does not derive from the Austrian State Treaty, but from a decision of the Austrian Parliament. We shall need to take care to observe this distinction if, in considering the Afghanistan question, what is in many ways an apposite parallel with Austria re-emerges.

Antony Acland

Antony Acland

CONFIDENTIAL

A i d e M e m o i r e

The status of permanent neutrality of the Republic of Austria is based on the Federal Constitutional Law of 26th October 1955 on the Neutrality of Austria which was adopted by a democratically elected parliament after the complete withdrawal of all foreign occupation forces.

Although this law was notified to all states with which Austria had diplomatic relations and the hope was expressed that this permanent neutrality would be accorded recognition, never were third countries requested to guarantee this neutrality, nor was such a guarantee given.


The State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria of 15th May 1955 does not contain any reference to the neutrality of the country.

Taking the foregoing into consideration, the status of permanent neutrality was not imposed upon Austria and there are no guarantor powers.

To give publicly the impression that Austria can serve as an example of a neutralised country with a neutrality guaranteed by foreign powers sheds a wrong light on her neutrality and her policy of neutrality, and is bound to weaken her international position. It is therefore not only detrimental to Austria's own interests, but likely to result also in lasting damaging effects for the whole of Europe.

London, 10th January 1986

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>REM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1672</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>letter from C.R. Budd to Mark Addison dated 27 August 1985 (Folio 9)</i>	
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
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This should be an indication of what the extract is,
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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <p style="text-align: center;"><i>PREM 19</i></p> <hr/> PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number) <p style="text-align: center;"><i>16 72</i></p>	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>letter from LV Appleyard to Charles Powell</i> <i>dated 26 July 1985</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<p style="text-align: right;"><i>28/11/77</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>M. King</i></p>
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
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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1672</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Letter and telegraphed copy of letter from the Prime Minister to President Zia ul Haq, dated 18 July 1985</i> <i>(Folios 4 and 5)</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>28/11/17</i> <i>Ni Niens</i>
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2.

GRS 200

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SECRET

FM ISLAMABAD 190900 Z FEB 85

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELNO 128 OF 19 FEB 85

AND TO INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BONN, OTTAWA, KABUL, MOSCOW
AND UKDEL NATO

OUR TELNOS 711 OF 12 NOVEMBER AND 724 OF 19 NOVEMBER 1984 :

SOVIET PRISONERS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE

1. THE CANADIAN COUNSELLOR STEPHENS HAS INFORMED US THAT OTTAWA HAS NOW REMOVED ALMOST ALL THE IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS (MAJOR INTERVIEWS, HEALTH CHECKS ETC) WHICH HAVE FOR SOME MONTHS BEDEVILLED THEIR EFFORTS (PUSHED BY MILLER) TO TAKE SOVIET PRISONERS TO CANADA. FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE WEST GERMANS, THE CANADIANS HAVE AGREED TO TAKE NOT ONLY THOSE ORIGINALLY DESTINED FOR CANADA BUT ALSO THOSE INTENDED FOR WEST GERMANY, NOW MAKING 6 IN ALL (I.E. THE 5 NAMED IN OUR FIRST TUR PLUS ONE, NAME UNKNOWN).
2. THE CANADIANS HAVE SO INFORMED THE MFA, SEEKING THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE EXFILTRATION, AND ASSISTANCE IN BRINGING THE SOLDIERS TO THE AIRCRAFT. THE MFA HAVE RESPONDED THAT IT IS NO LONGER CERTAIN THAT THE RESISTANCE IN PESHAWAR WILL AGREE TO RELEASE ANY MORE SOVIET PRISONERS FOR RESETTLEMENT IN THE WEST, BUT HAVE PROMISED TO FIND OUT.
3. STEPHENS BELIEVES THAT WHATEVER THE REASONS, THE PAKISTANIS WILL SAY THAT NOW IS NOT THE TIME FOR EXFILTRATION OF MORE SOVIET PRISONERS.

FYJIS-WALKER

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

AFGHANISTAN

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ECD(E)

SEAD

NAD

NENAD

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

COL. A KENNEDY D14) MOD

COL. R WILLIAMS D15)

SECRET

CF - your papers?
see 'X' on p. 2,

ECL



FILE

10 DOWNING STREET

cc: FCO
ODA

THE PRIME MINISTER

27 November 1984

My dear Nicholas,

Thank you so much for your letter of 23 November with your reflections on the unhappy stay of Igor Rykov and Oleg Khlan. It was kind of you to speak so generously of the help which you and they received from officials. We are all very grateful for the generous and honourable role which you played. Like you I have grave fears for the fate of the two young men. But I believe that we all did our best for them.

Yours

Margaret

The Lord Bethell

Ly

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Charles Powell, Esq.
10 Downing Street,
London

MR. JONES *Vb*
see
AM

27th November 1984.

Dear Mr. Powell,

Thank you for your letter of 26th November 1984. I have in fact written to the Home Secretary about the three defectors. I feel they are exceptional young men and they should be helped to find a foothold in the West.

My documentary "AFGHANISTAN: ALLAH AGAINST THE GUNSHIPS", which includes a long interview with Mr. Naumov, will be shown on Thames Television at 11.40 P.M. on Wednesday December 5th. It has already been shown on ITV in the rest of the country.

Yours sincerely,

Sandy Gall

AFGHANISTAN: Lt Sir

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M. J. H.
22
20

Charles Powell, Esq.
10 Downing Street,
London

27th November 1984

Dear Mr. Powell,

Thank you for your letter of 26th November 1984. I have in fact written to the Home Secretary about the above details. I feel that are exceptional young men and they should be helped to find a foothold in the West.

My documentary "AFGHANISTAN: ALAN AGAINST THE CURSHINS" which includes a long interview with Mr. Kamov, will be shown on Thames Television at 11.45 P.M. on Wednesday December 20th. It has already been shown on ITV in the rest of the country.

11 12 1
2 3 4
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29 NOV 1984

Yours sincerely

Charles Powell
Charles Powell



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 November, 1984.

In September you passed on to the Prime Minister a letter from three Soviet soldiers, Messrs. Naumov, Busov and Plotnikov, who are prisoners of the Afghan resistance, seeking asylum in the United Kingdom.

The letter has been passed to the Home Office, who are responsible for deciding such applications, and is being considered there. You will understand readily enough that the circumstances of the applicants raise a number of difficult issues. We also have to consider carefully whether it is possible to provide in this country the facilities and arrangements necessary to enable applicants, if admitted, to settle down here. These various factors need to be weighed carefully, and I understand that at this stage it is not possible to say when a decision will be reached.

Charles Powell

Sandy Gall, Esq.

ITN,
48 Wells Street,
SW1.



FROM

NICHOLAS
BETHELL

TELEPHONE
01-402-6877

73 SUSSEX SQUARE
LONDON W2 2SS

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street
London
SW1

23rd November 1984

Dear Margaret,

R24

IGOR RYKOV AND OLEG KHLAN

The dust seems to have settled a bit after Igor Rykov³ and Oleg Khlans return to the Soviet Union. I therefore thought that I would drop you a line with a few reflections on this rather sad episode. I am not looking for any substantial reply, only to share a few thoughts with you and with others who were involved in bringing the two boys to this country. I have sent copies of this letter to Geoffrey Howe and Leon Brittan.

I very much regret the trouble and inconvenience that arose from their presence in the United Kingdom. Senior administrators spent a lot of time on the case and I am sorry that their efforts may appear to have been wasted.

I am also sorry about all the inconvenience that was caused on November 11th, when the two boys actually flew back to the Soviet Union. It was Remembrance Sunday and a substantial team of senior officials - including Derek Thomas, Anthony Rawthorne (acting Head of Immigration at the Home Office) and Nigel Bloomfield (Head of FCO Soviet Department) - had to be assembled at very short notice so as to make sure that the two boys were travelling home of their own freewill. They did their job excellently and I am only sorry that their Sunday was spoiled.

The boys may now be put on show before the cameras in Moscow to make anti-Western propaganda, but I think it more likely that they will simply disappear. They deserted their units and they described the horrors of Soviet Afghanistan, including in one Radio Liberty interview even before I met them. The Soviet Authorities will not forgive them this.

The Soviet Union will not gain much in propaganda terms for the return of these two sad and confused young men. Nor will they be able to tell the Soviet Authorities very much. During their five months in Britain they had one short interview with a junior Home Office official here in my home. Otherwise they had no contact with any British officials whatever. They were not "debriefed" and they had no "minder" from the security service.



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ACT 2000

-2-

X

The decision to keep them away from British officials was obviously the right one. They were not defectors. They did not choose to come to the United Kingdom. They were being kept in a hole in the ground for nearly a year near the Afghan border, for some of the time in chains. They begged me to help them and their captors were anxious to get rid of them, so anxious that I concluded that they would probably be "got rid of" physically if something were not done. Igor Rykov wrote you a long and moving letter as a result of which you decided to help them for humanitarian reasons. I do not think any of us have anything to be ashamed of in this.

They were looked after entirely privately, by the European Liaison Group and other East European émigrés. In July-August, without my knowledge, they drew a total of £204 in social security benefit. This money has been repayed and as far as I know they received nothing out of public funds. Their travel here and their accommodation, maintenance, clothing and pocket money have all been paid for privately.

There is no doubt that the total lack of official backup made it hard to absorb two traumatised young men into British society. I well understood why it was decided to keep clear of them. Still, it is very difficult for people from the Soviet Union to adapt to life in the West and they were rather "thrown in the deep end".

They set their hearts on going on to Canada, where there are large Russian and Ukrainian farm communities. When Canada refused to take them, their hearts sagged even more and I wrote to Leon Brittan on October 4th (enclosed) expressing my anxieties about them. There is evidence to suggest that Soviet officials contacted them in a London restaurant shortly after this refusal. The letter to Igor Rykov from his mother, wife and brother was obviously expedited by the Soviet police and it was the last straw.

They went to the Soviet Embassy the day after the letter arrived, taking nothing with them and telling their hosts that they would merely inquire about their families and seek to clarify their personal positions. Once they were in the embassy, of course, that was it. They never even collected their belongings. They were in the embassy for 48 hours and they left it only to go to the Home Office and on to Heathrow airport.

We did what we could, but it was not enough. Maybe nothing would



-3-

have been enough in these two particular cases. I believe though that the damage caused to this country by their return to the "Motherland" will be minimal and I only hope that this case will not deter you from your policy of reacting sympathetically to requests for asylum from citizens of Soviet-bloc countries.

I would like to thank all those in the Home Office and FCO who worked on this complicated case. Their efforts were worthwhile, I believe, in spite of the story's sad ending.

Yours ever

Winston Churchill

CONQUEROR
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*See the
cc Sir P. C. Cook*

From the Private Secretary

20 November 1984

SOVIET PRISONERS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE

BF | The Prime Minister has seen a copy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 19 November to the Home Secretary on this subject. She would be content with the draft Private Secretary reply to Mr. Gall annexed to the minute, provided that the Home Secretary sees no objection. Could you please let me know whether we may now despatch it?

I am copying this letter to Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Hugh Taylor, Esq.,
Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



FCS/84/303

HOME SECRETARY

Prime Minister
 Agree to rather
 discouraging reply
 proposed on the
 application from the
 three further Soviet
 prisoners? CDP
 19/xi

Soviet Prisoners of the Afghan Resistance

1. Thank you for your letter of 18 October about the applications for asylum from three further Soviet prisoners forwarded to the Prime Minister by Mr Sandy Gall. I have delayed replying because I wanted to reflect on the implications for our policies of the recent return of Rykov and Khlan to the Soviet Union.
2. I believe that our experience with Rykov and Khlan underlines the need to look extremely carefully at any further applications for resettlement here. The admission of further Soviet prisoners offers little in the way of political advantage. Any propaganda value is likely to be limited and of short duration, and would rapidly be lost if the individuals concerned followed Rykov and Khlan's example. Nor is there much prospect of any intelligence gain. Above all, publicity generated by further admissions, which can only be arranged with the direct assistance of the Pakistan Government, could adversely affect our wider collaboration with the Pakistanis on policy towards Afghanistan.
3. I can well see that for wider reasons you would not want to change our public position that we consider applications for asylum on their individual merits and on a humanitarian basis. In addition to the need for consistency across the board, this puts us in a better position to encourage US, Canada and the Europeans to consider favourably the admission of future cases, in the interests of burden-sharing.
4. But the successive return to the Soviet Union in recent weeks of Bitov, Svetlana, Rykov and Khlan leads me to conclude that we should think very carefully indeed before accepting any /further



further applications from Soviet prisoners, including those forwarded by Mr Gall. It also reinforces the need to handle any future cases with as little direct involvement by HMG as possible.

5. One lesson of the Rykov and Khlan case is that, in the absence of a large Russian emigre community in the UK able to provide moral and practical assistance, asylees face major problems in settling down here. In political terms, both domestically and internationally, we have already demonstrated our goodwill by admitting Rykov and Khlan, albeit with disappointing results. I do not think that we should regard ourselves as under any political pressure to respond positively to further applications.

6. A further consequence of the Rykov and Khlan episode is that the Pakistan Government will now be more wary than ever of incurring Soviet hostility, given the intense diplomatic and military pressure to which they have recently been subjected. Nonetheless, a degree of Pakistan Government cooperation will continue to be essential if further Soviet prisoners are to be brought out of Afghanistan. We shall therefore need to keep in touch with their approach to this problem as part of our regular contacts with them, while avoiding as far as possible direct involvement with individual cases.

7. Mr Miller's associates have been pressing for an early decision on the cases put forward by Mr Gall. They have asserted that the three would be in immediate danger of their lives if arrangements were not made to extract them by 16 November, along with two other men who have been accepted for resettlement by the FRG. Our Ambassador in Islamabad believes that Mr Miller's assertion is probably an attempt to bounce the Government into a decision, and that there is nothing to suggest that the men are in imminent danger. We should not allow this approach to influence the timing of a decision on these cases.



8. The three men are also being considered by the Canadian Government for resettlement in Canada. The Canadians seem to be further advanced than us in considering these applications, and we should clearly not make any decision of our own while a chance remains that the Canadians might take them. All in all, I consider that we should give Mr Gall and Mr Miller no grounds to expect a positive response on the three men; that we should continue to take this in slow time and in any case not get ahead of the Canadians; and that unless there are very strong arguments the other way we should be prepared to refuse the applications in due course.

9. There is one further point. If we did decide for some reason to accept the applications, we would need to think very carefully about handling and timing, given the consequences for our relations with the Soviet Union, and bearing in mind the fact that there are likely to be two high level Soviet inward visits within the next six months.

10. In the circumstances, I think the draft of the reply from the Prime Minister's Private Secretary to Mr Gall should be somewhat more discouraging than the draft you proposed. I attach a form of words.

11. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
19 November 1984

P.M. saw briefly.



10 DOWNING STREET

11/11

P.M.

Two Russian Soldiers.

- 1) The F.O. are in touch with Russian Embassy.
- 2) The Russians seem to be responding positively to us seeing the two. (probably tomorrow).
- 3) Russians say the two 'want to go back'.
- 4) FO considering whether Lord Bethell can see them.
Duty Clerk.



QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

17 October 1984

Dear Geoffrey,

SOVIET PRISONERS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE

Thank you for your minute of 17 September outlining the efforts being made to foster co-operation on the resettlement of Soviet soldiers between our allies and EC partners.

I am sure it is right that co-operation should be pursued to encourage burden sharing on the resettlement of Soviet soldiers. As you know, however, the current efforts on that front are not the first and it seems likely that any agreement will take time to emerge. In the meantime we are faced with the applications recently lodged by Mr Sandy Gall which now have the support of Count Tolstoy's organisation. While we can defer consideration of those for some time, it is difficult to do so for a long period given our previous deferral of consideration of two cases raised by that organisation earlier this year, our stated concern for such cases on humanitarian grounds and our previously expressed readiness to examine them on their individual merits.

We have been in touch with Mr Miller, who has said that Naumov, one of the three Soviet prisoners put forward by Sandy Gall, is in fact one of the two he raised earlier this year. He believes that the other, Chukin, is almost certainly dead. We cannot, however, reasonably defer consideration on the pretext of urging him to make more efforts to seek resettlement for them in other Western countries since it is apparent from our conversation with him that considerable efforts have already been made. His group have been using the Russian emigre communities in North America in close co-operation with the Russian Orthodox Church to raise funds and provide sponsorship for Soviet prisoners. In addition, in June, Count Tolstoy wrote to all NATO Governments asking them to co-operate in relieving the plight of the soldiers. So far only the French and Italians have replied. Both have indicated a cautious willingness to accept Soviet prisoners on an individual basis. Miller himself has been to Europe on visits to Belgium, France, Germany and Holland to raise funds and stimulate interest amongst the Russian communities there.

As you know, a reply to Sandy Gall is still outstanding and against the background I have outlined I do not think we can offer, as you suggest, a reply which relies on the outcome of Western response to co-operation and the successful resettlement of Rykov and Khlan. In particular, it would not stand easy with our humanitarian stance and stated policy of considering applications on their individual merits. Even if we started to process the applications now it would take time before we were in a position to reach a decision, particularly given your understanding of the Pakistanis' current reluctance to co-operate. In consequence, to defer all action on the applications pending progress on Western co-operation would, whatever the outcome, leave us with a considerable delay to explain. I therefore think it important that we should take some preliminary steps to prepare the way for the processing of the applications and the first of these would be to obtain a clearer idea from the Pakistanis as to what their current attitude is to further cases. In the meantime we would explain to Mr Gall that, whilst the applications are being considered, it is not possible

AF
..... at this stage to say when the results will be known. I attach a copy of a draft reply for No 10 to send to Mr Gall.

As for Rykov and Khlan, I am sure that the sponsorship arrangements made in their cases have proved their value and that sponsorship should be a requirement in any future cases we agree to admit. For the reasons given in your minute I agree that Lord Bethell should be told frankly that we cannot support Rykov and Khlan's applications to the Canadians. In a recent letter to me Lord Bethell expressed considerable pessimism about the outcome of the applications.

I should in due course be grateful to know the outcome of your Department's approach to the Pakistanis.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister and Sir Robert Armstrong.

4
— uw,
len

DRAFT LETTER

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE

TO	ENCLOSURES	COPIES TO BE SENT TO
<p>S Gall Esq</p> <p>(FULL POSTAL ADDRESS)</p>	<p style="text-align: center; color: red;">DRAFT</p>	<p>1 Home Office</p> <p>2 Foreign & Commonwealth Office</p> <p>(FULL ADDRESSES, IF NECESSARY)</p>

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY C D Powell
 (NAME OF SIGNATORY)

Last month you passed the Prime Minister a letter from three Soviet soldiers, Mr Naumov, Mr Busov and Mr Plotnikov, who are prisoners of the Afghan Resistance and seek asylum in the United Kingdom.

The letter was passed to the Home Office, which has responsibility for deciding such applications, and is being considered there. As you will appreciate, however, the circumstances of the applicants raise a number of difficult issues and I understand that at this stage it is not possible to say when a decision will be reached.

Afghanistan: Internal Situation Pt 6.

DRAFT LETTER

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE

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(FULL ADDRESS, IF NECESSARY)		(FULL POSTAL ADDRESS)

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY C D Powell

(NAME OF SIGNATORY)

Last month you asked the Prime Minister a letter from the
 Soviet Embassy in London, Mr. Brown and Mr. Robinson, who
 are partners of the Afghan resistance and were active in the
 United Kingdom.

The letter was passed to the New Office, which has responsibility
 for dealing with applications, and is being considered there. As
 you will appreciate however, the circumstances of the application
 raise a number of difficult issues and I understand that at this
 stage it is not possible to say when a decision will be reached.

GRS 800

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FM WASHINGTON 152310Z OCT 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3079 OF 15 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD NEW DELHI MOSCOW ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK KABUL

YOUR TELNO 1769: AFGHANISTAN AIR ATTACKS ON PAKISTAN

SUMMARY

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT AGREE BROADLY WITH OUR ANALYSIS BUT ARE LESS CONCERNED THAT THERE WILL BE A SERIOUS ESCALATION OF ATTACKS AGAINST PAKISTANI TERRITORY. AIM 9-L AIR TO AIR MISSILES TO BE SUPPLIED TO PAKISTAN IN 1985. NO CHANGE OF SUBSTANCE IN US COMMITMENT TO PAKISTAN.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE DISCUSSED TUR WITH HAGERTY (STATE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR FOR PAKISTAN) AND INR. STATE DEPARTMENT AGREE BROADLY WITH OUR ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES. THERE HAD BEEN THE USUAL ATTACKS BEFORE THE LAST ROUND OF INDIRECT TALKS. THE RUSSIANS PROBABLY WANTED TO INCREASE POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE PAKISTANIS FOLLOWING THEIR RECENT DEMARCHE ABOUT PAKISTANI RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE KILLING OF SOVIET SOLDIERS. BUT A PRINCIPAL SOVIET PURPOSE MAY HAVE BEEN TACTICAL—TO RELIEVE MUJAHIDEEN PRESSURE ON GARRISONS IN THE IMMEDIATE BORDER AREA. THE RUSSIANS WERE NOW AUTHORIZING OPERATIONS UP TO 5KM FROM THE BORDER AND OCCASIONAL STRIKES AGAINST MUJAHIDEEN CONCENTRATIONS ON TRAILS AND ACCESS ROUTES ACROSS THE BORDER. HAGERTY NOTED THAT INCURSIONS INTO PAKISTAN HAD BEEN ONLY SHALLOW AND THAT RECENT INCIDENTS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN A RELATIVELY SMALL AREA. HE SPECULATED THAT THE RUSSIANS INTENDED THIS AS A SIGNAL TO THE PAKISTANIS.

3. BOTH HAGERTY AND INR EXPECTED CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS TO CONTINUE BUT DOUBTED WHETHER THEY WOULD ESCALATE TO THE EXTENT WE FEARED. IT WAS NOT IN THE SOVIET INTEREST TO PROVOKE THE PAKISTANIS TO SEEK MORE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE SERIOUSLY EMBARRASSED IF AN AFGHAN AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN OVER PAKISTAN (THE PAKISTAN AIR FORCE HAVE ORDERS TO SHOOT DOWN INTRUDERS ONLY IF THE DEBRIS FALLS WITHIN PAKISTAN). HAGERTY DOUBTED WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BACK DOWN IN THE EVENT OF PAKISTANI RETALIATION IF ONLY BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF FACE THIS WOULD ENTAIL. BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NO COLLATERAL FOR PAK'S CLAIM THAT RUSSIANS FIGHTERS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF AFGHAN AIR STRIKES.

4. STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT PAKISTAN AIR FORCE WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO INTERCEPT INTRUDERS UNTIL THEY ARE EQUIPPED WITH AIM 9-L AIR TO AIR MISSILES. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE CONSIDERED DELIVERING A SMALL QUANTITY OF THESE MISSILES UNDER EMERGENCY PROCEDURES, BUT CONCLUDED THAT PAKISTAN'S NEED WAS NOT SO URGENT AS TO JUSTIFY A CONFRONTATION ON THIS ISSUE WITH HER CRITICS IN CONGRESS. A PROPOSAL TO SELL 500 AIM 9-L WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE NEW CONGRESS WHEN IT ASSEMBLES IN JANUARY.

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5. NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN ON THE PROVISION OF EARLY WARNING AIRCRAFT. BUT THE PENTAGON HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT A CARRIER-BORNE E2C SHOULD VISIT PAKISTAN THIS MONTH OR IN JANUARY TO DEMONSTRATE ITS CAPABILITIES OVER MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN. THEIR PREFERRED SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR THE PAKISTANIS TO ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL C130S WITH APPROPRIATE RADAR EQUIPMENT, WHICH WOULD BE CHEAPER AND EASIER TO OPERATE.

6. HAGERTY AGREED THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO DIRECT COLLUSION BETWEEN THE INDIANS AND RUSSIANS BUT ADDED THAT SIMULTANEOUS ACTION ON TWO FRONTS WAS WHAT WORRIED THE PAKISTANIS. THE INDIANS WOULD BE UPSET BY GREATER US/PAKISTAN MILITARY COLLABORATION. THIS OF ITSELF WOULD NOT DETER THE AMERICANS FROM GOING AHEAD: AVAILABILITY AND COST OF THE REQUIRED AIRCRAFT WERE MORE IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATIONS. THE PAKISTANIS, TOO, HAD CAUSE FOR ANXIETY: FOR EXAMPLE ABOUT THE REPORTED DISCUSSION OF THE SUPPLY OF MIG 29S DURING THE INDIAN DEFENCE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

7. HAGERTY CONFIRMED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECENT MESSAGE TO ZIA (WASHINGTON TEL NO 2760 - NOT TO ALL) INCLUDED THE ASSURANCE MENTIONED BY NAIK THAT THE US WOULD NOT STAND IDLY BY IF PAKISTAN'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WERE THREATENED. THIS LANGUAGE WAS DELIBERATELY AMBIGUOUS, AND WAS NOT QUOTE FRONTIER-SPECIFIC UNQUOTE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT INTERPRETED IT AS IMPLYING A MORE ACTIVE COMMITMENT WITH REGARD TO PAKISTAN'S WESTERN FRONTIER, WHERE THE US AND PAKISTAN SHARED A COMMON ENEMY, THAN WITH REGARD TO INDIA. IT WAS NOT TO BE READ AS A COMMITMENT TO INTERVENE MILITARILY AGAINST INDIA OR INDEED TO SUGGEST ANYTHING MORE THAN THE OBLIGATIONS THE US HAD ASSUMED IN 1959 (ISLAMABAD TEL NO 641). IF PAKISTAN WERE THREATENED FROM INDIA THE US WOULD OF COURSE DO ALL IT COULD BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS TO PREVENT A CONFLICT AND, IF THAT FAILED, TO BRING IT TO AN REALY CONCLUSION.

WRIGHT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

AFGHANISTAN

STANDARD (PALACE) ECD(E)
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MED NENAD
FED MR BOYD
UND CABINET OFFICE

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COL. JURY D14 MODUK

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

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Prime Minister

You are at the

Palace that night. But
we shall record
it for you.

Ref. A084/2734

MR POWELL

mf

000
. '57a.

'C' thought that the Prime Minister
might like to know that Sandy Gall's new
full-length documentary about his adventures
in Afghanistan is to be screened on Independent
Television on 23 October at 10.30 pm.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

12 October 1984

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ACT 2000

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FM ISLAMABAD 110625Z OCT 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 634 OF 11 OCTOBER 1984

INFO ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, UKRMS, NEW YORK
AND KABUL

MY TELNO.614 : AFGHAN AIR ATTACKS ON PAKH-ISTAN

1. I DISCUSSED THE SITUATION YESTERDAY WITH ZIA ZIA, FOREIGN SECRETARY.

2. HE CONFIRMED THAT THESE ATTACKS WERE CAUSING THE PAKH-ISTAN GOVERNMENT CONSIDERABLE EMBARRASSMENT AND ANXIETY AND THAT PRESSURES WERE INCREASING FOR GOVERNMENT TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THEM. THE NEW FACTOR WAS THE LAST ATTACK CONSISTED OF BOMBING FROM HIGH ALTITUDE WHICH MADE IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE PAKH-ISTANS TO INTERVENE. IN ADDITION, THEY HAD EVIDENCE THAT A RUSSIAN AWACS WATCHED THESE ATTACKS FROM ACROSS THE FRONTIER AND THAT RUSSIAN FIGHTERS WERE SUITABLY DEPLOYED TO INTERVENE. THERE WERE PAKH-ISTAN SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES SCATTERED ALONG THE FRONTIER AND THEY MIGHT GET A RUSSIAN PLANE IF IT FLEW NEAR THEM BUT THEY COULD NOT DEAL WITH HIGH-LEVEL BOMBING ATTACKS.

3. HE TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT BECAUSE OF PAKH-ISTAN'S IMPOTENCE AGAINST THIS TYPE OF ATTACK, THEY HAD APPEALED TO THE AMERICANS TO HELP AND WERE DISCUSSING WITH THEM VARIOUS WEAPONS. THE AMERICANS WERE IN CONGRESSIONAL DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SUPPLY OF THESE, APART FROM SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS, BUT YAQUB KHAN WOULD BE DISCUSSING IT ALL WITH WEINBERGER.

4. THEY WERE ALSO SENDING A MISSION TO CHINA LED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL DEFENCE TO SEE WHAT THE CHINESE COULD DO TO HELP THEM.

5. MEANWHILE, THEY COULD ONLY GRIN AND BEAR IT. THEY HAD CONSIDERED COUNTER-BATTERY ACTION AGAINST THE SHELLING BUT HAD CONCLUDED THAT THIS WOULD BE LIKELY TO KILL INNOCENT AFGHANS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BORDER. ZIA HAD LAID DOWN THAT THERE WERE TO BE NO RETALIATORY ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT PROVOKE THE RUSSIANS.

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16.

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6. - HE DID NOT ASK FOR ANY HELP FROM US. HE WILL KEEP IN TOUCH
WITH PAKHISTAN THINKING ON THIS.

7. SEE MIFT FOR OUR DISCUSSION ON INDIA.
FORSTER

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

AFGHANISTAN

STANDARD(PALACE)

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SEAD

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NENAD

MR BOYD


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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Prem 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1672</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>letter from Lord Bethell to Leon Brittan dated 4 October 1964</i>	
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- 6. - HE DID NOT ASK FOR ANY HELP FROM US. HE WILL KEEP IN TOUCH WITH PAKHSTAN THINKING ON THIS.
- 7. SEE MIFT FOR OUR DISCUSSION ON INDIRA FORSTER

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AFGHANISTAN	
STANDAER(PALACE)	ECD(E)
SAD	SEAD
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MED	NENAD
FED	MR BOYD
UND	CABINET OFFICE

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2.
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.



FCS/84/250

HOME SECRETARYSoviet Prisoners of the Afghan Resistance

1. Thank you for your letter of 10 August agreeing to sound out George Miller about his exploring the possibility of resettling Naumov and Chukin in other Western countries. I should be interested to hear how he responded to this idea. In the meantime, you might like to have an account of the further discussions with our EC partners and allies, mentioned in my minute of 16 July.

2. These consultations have shown that, while some of our EC partners - the Italians and the Dutch - have been asked by private organisations for a statement of their attitude in principle to applications from Soviet soldiers, only the Americans and the Canadians have admitted Soviet soldiers or are actively considering doing so.

3. The Canadians have received applications on behalf of five Soviet soldiers; while the Americans have now resettled a total of six; two last November and four more in August this year.

4. The Americans seem to be thinking on similar lines to ourselves. In particular they share our concern to spread the burden between Western governments. To this end they recently made a demarche in a number of Western capitals, about which they kept us informed.

5. We have also discussed with the Americans possible mechanisms for future consultation between potential resettlement countries. The Americans seem to accept that it would be worth envisaging a form of discreet consultation between Embassies in Washington to help minimise problems in the handling of

Pr. 17/9.
 2/17/9.

copy ②
 Prime Minister

You earlier agreed that we should try to spread the burden provided that there was no risk of any prisoners being sent back to Russia.

ms

CDP
 17/9



future cases. For the time being, the Americans believe that the Pakistan Government, who have recently come under intense Soviet pressure, do not intend in the near future to exfiltrate further Soviet prisoners for resettlement in the West. The Americans have told us, however, that this breathing-space may not last indefinitely.

6. Looking to the future, we shall continue to make clear to the Americans and others that we should prefer to leave it to private organisations to make the running in bringing out Soviet soldiers - the Americans, for their part, appear to envisage a somewhat greater role for Governments than we should like - and that we should be very reluctant to consider further cases until it is clear that other Western Governments are prepared to take on a fair share of the burden.

7. The need for caution is reinforced, I believe, by the further three applications for asylum brought to the attention of the Prime Minister by Sandy Gall on Independent Television News. You will be considering, no doubt, how we should respond. My own preliminary view is that we should adopt a holding line similar to that which I suggested in my minute of 16 July might be used with George Miller, namely that any decision on further resettlement cases must take into account the willingness of other Western Governments to share the burden and the ability of Rykov and Khlan to settle down in Britain.

8. I note that the three men brought to the Prime Minister's attention by Gall do not assert that they are in any imminent danger of being sent back to the Soviet Union. There is also a possibility that there may be some duplication of effort. One of the men named by Gall, VLADISLAV NAUMOV, may be the VLADIMIR NAUMOV put forward by George Miller. And it is conceivable that some of these men are already being considered by the Americans or the Canadians. We are trying to clarify this. Early action with respect to Gall's three candidates is in any case made difficult by the Pakistan Government's



present attitude to which I have referred above.

9. You should also be aware of a further development relating to the two men already in this country, Rykov and Khlan. Lord Bethell has very recently telephoned officials in the FCO to say that both have applied for permanent residence in Canada, their papers having apparently been filed three weeks ago with the Canadian High Commission in London. Their sponsor is a Ukrainian organisation in Canada. Lord Bethell explained that in his view Khlan in particular was totally bewildered by life in the West and would benefit from settlement in Canada in an agricultural Ukrainian or Russian speaking community. Lord Bethell asked us to consider approaching the Canadian authorities in support of both applications, or at least that of Khlan. We have already been told by the Canadians that they would not be prepared to resettle Soviet soldiers already admitted to a third country. It seems highly unlikely therefore that the applications by Rykov and Khlan will be successful. Moreover, any approach to the Canadians by us on these lines would be inconsistent with our efforts to persuade other Western countries to share the burden of such cases. If you agree, I think it would be best to explain this frankly to Lord Bethell.

10. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
17 September, 1984

17 SEP 1984

12 1 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Afghanistan

PT6

Int-Sit

... You should also be aware of a further development relating to the two men already in this country, Ezzat and Ezzat, both of whom have very recently telephoned officials in the CIA to say that they have applied for permanent residence in Canada. Their papers having recently been filed three weeks ago with the Canadian High Commission in London. Their sponsor is a Canadian organization in London. Lord Bessell explained that in his view there is no reason why they should not be granted permanent residence in Canada in the past and would handle their residence in Canada in an appropriate manner on Afghan speaking committee. Lord Bessell asked us to consider approaching the Canadian authorities in support of both applications, or at least that of Ezzat, as have already been told by the Canadian that they would not be prepared to resettle Ezzat unless already granted to a third country. It seems highly unlikely therefore that the applications by Ezzat and Ezzat will be successful. However, any approach to the Canadian by us on these issues would be inconsistent with our efforts to persuade other Western countries to share the burden of such cases. If you agree, I think it would be best to explain this frankly to Lord Bessell.

16. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and Sir Robert Armstrong.

SECRETARY HOME

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

17 September 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

DS(L)2467

FSA 014/6

Departmental Series
South Asian Department

DS No 12/84

*Prime Minister
Quite an
interesting read.
CDD*

FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF KABUL

The British Charge d'Affaires at Kabul to the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

SUMMARY

1. Impressions restricted to Kabul (paragraph 1).
2. Key to the city is the airport. Massive array of Soviet aircraft and constant activity, tinged with Afghan farce (paragraphs 2-3).
3. Town is an overgrown mud-village with a few modern buildings. Signs of creeping Sovietization. Many Afghan and Soviet soldiers: latter mix openly with the population. Economically Kabul is surprisingly alive and non-Communist (paragraphs 4-6).
4. The Afghans are divided between those in turbans and those in trousers. The regime is trying to be all things to all men, but the emphasis is on youth and women. The foreign community divided between the Russians (who rule Kabul) and the Western camp, which includes the Chinese and Pakistanis. British Embassy in good shape (paragraphs 7-8).
5. The war, mainly aerial, is all pervasive: helicopters pitted against mountains. No signs of a Soviet withdrawal or change of Government. Force is what matters, but the Russians may have to pay more (paragraphs 9-10).

ms

Kabul
12 September 1984

Sir,

1. My impressions are confined to Kabul, since I cannot travel more than 20 km outside and have not visited the country before.

2. The key to the city is now the airport which is therefore worth describing in some detail. Although high up (6,200 feet), it is situated in a hollow surrounded by much higher mountains. Contrary to the clear plateau air I had expected, there is a layer of sullen monsoon cloud. This accentuates the sensation of descending into an abyss. A break in the clouds reveals first a military camp with jeeps and scurrying soldiers, and then the shining steel rooves of the infamous (for its liquidations) Pol-i-Charkhi prison, designed like an eight-spoked wheel within a rectangle of high fortifications. For anyone who has read Tolkien's Lord of the Rings this must be the Land of Mordor.

3. After a sharp turn at the end of the valley, offering a rather pleasant interlude of green trees and golden threshing circles, the aerial hosts of Mordor appear drawn up beside the runway: at least 36 Antonov transport planes and perhaps 50 or 60 helicopters. The Russian aircraft are parked on proper aprons, the Afghan ones on packed stones. Tents and soldiers, lots of soldiers, are everywhere. The ads suggesting that Heathrow is the busiest airport in the world are clearly wrong. It must be Kabul. There is an Antonov landing only 500 yards behind us as we turn off the runway and our star-board wing nearly touches another Antonov impatiently waiting to go. Everyone is hurrying, even an Afghan on a bicycle. The radar is military, surprisingly still on a mobile base, although a permanent tower is being constructed nearby. We are nearly run over by a taxi-ing Tupolev. A Russian tries ineffectually to impose order on Afghan chaos by waving us away. I discover the airport has been attacked last night by Mujaheddin. The runway closes at 10 am for repairs. The aeroplane I came on does not get away on time and after a row, during which the Afghans suggest that it takes off over a steaming patch of asphalt, it has to abandon its passengers. The effect is of action, urgency and massed Russian force, with a small amount of Afghan farce.

4. The rest of Kabul is not so Mordor-ish, more an overgrown mud village with some Soviet-style modern blocks, notably in Mikrorayon ("small district" in Russian), a futuristic brown marble Soviet House of Culture, and an Afghanised Intercontinental Hotel on the skyline behind this Embassy. (It houses half a dozen foreign guests and sometimes a few Party "jeunesse doree" in the restaurant). New buildings under construction include a large Ministry of Communications and a Blood Bank. There are a few Communist billboards with red flags, notably one including a minaret and some rather small, official graffiti saying "Long Live the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan" or "Up with Afghan-Soviet Friendship": rather tentative given the long mud walls which could lend themselves to vast scrawls like in Tehran. (In one case, I have seen the word "Soviet" defaced.) Other signs of Sovietization include shop advertisements in Russian, clearly on the increase, a lorry saying "Xleb" (bread) on the back, and a new postbox with the word for "post" in large Cyrillic letters above a smaller sign in Persian.

5. Everywhere there are soldiers. They come in three sorts:

- (a) the rough Afghan conscripts in a mid-khaki uniform;
- (b) smarter, taller and thuggier Afghans in dark mud-coloured uniforms, sometimes with red flashes and always with automatic weapons, visible particularly outside important installations;
- (c) young, hot-looking Russians in light mustardy uniforms and distinctive well-brimmed and high-peaked bush hats: an incongruous mark of colonialism. They mix a lot with the locals in shops and surrounded by boys outside the military hospital, always being sold something.

Sometimes one sees the Russians with helmets and flak-aprons. Those on top of tanks or personnel carriers look more Siegfriedish, blond and not Central Asian. Officers one seldom sees, although there are lots of junior Afghan officers visible in smartly pressed uniforms and highly polished pointed shoes.

6. Economically, Kabul seems to be humming - not surprisingly with the population having gone up from about 500,000 in 1978 to 1.5 or even 2 million now. (The peasants still flock in, but infant mortality is one of the highest in the world - mainly from diarrhoea.) Although there is no electricity for most of the day, there are plenty of portable Japanese generators all over the pavement outside the richer shops and offices. The telephone works but the water and sewage situation is dicey. There is plenty of traffic though much of it is military often with Soviet plates,

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billboards attract some popular attention, unlike those of the Indian Embassy - are a well-knit group of surprisingly high calibre and morale, although the UNDP and UNICEF sport some oddballs mainly out for the money and with little to do. I should add that this Embassy seems in excellent shape both in material and, more important, human terms, thanks to my predecessor.

9. Although the town seems to work, you cannot forget the airport. Every day as I sit down to breakfast, two flies appear in the distance and buzz towards me: they are helicopters on early morning patrol. And there are always Antonovs sweeping over to the south to support the fighting near the Pakistani border: mainly twin-engined, sometimes four-engined. Every window I look out of in the Residence frames two helicopters. It is a war of helicopters versus mountains: the air against the ground.

10. So who is winning? In the early morning, the mountains, especially the high ones behind the immediate range of hills, give one renewed hope, as does the muezzin calling the faithful to dawn prayers when the curfew ends at 4.00 am. But in the evening, as the dark closes in and after or even before the curfew begins at 10 pm, the sight of flares floating down and the rumble of tanks and often of gunfire and rockets, makes one much less sure. This is paradoxical given that these are signs of continuing Mujaheddin resistance. But, as my predecessor said in his last quarterly report, there are few people in Kabul today who see any prospect of a Soviet withdrawal or a change in the Government and those who remain are becoming increasingly dispirited (Mr Garner's letter of 9 July 1984 to Mr Cleghorn, South Asia Department, FCO). Nothing I have yet seen or heard here suggests the opposite. Indeed it would be odd if the view from Kabul suggested anything else. Force is what seems to matter here, e.g. one of the national monuments is a tank and a list of soldiers' duties which I recently read on a scrap of paper which had floated over the compound wall from the typical Afghan rubbish heap on the other side, ended up: "If he does not salute, he will be hanged". Unless the flow of arms and training to Mujaheddin, especially in anti-aerial warfare, increases, the Russian genocide tactics seem likely to enable the trousers to grind down the turbans. But external factors (Moscow, the US elections, Pakistan and its elections, China, Iran) will clearly play an important role; and the Russians may have to pay more to those who are left: the Afghans, especially the crucial Pathans, love their gold even more than the proverbial Scotsman. Meanwhile Kabul remains a rather beautiful, but grim place.

11. I am copying this despatch to HM representatives at Moscow, Islamabad, New Delhi, Peking, Tehran, Washington, UKDEL NATO and UKMIS New York.

I am Sir
Yours faithfully

C D S Drace-Francis

CONFIDENTIAL



FILE

RW

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 September, 1984

REQUEST FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM FROM RUSSIAN DEFECTORS
IN AFGHANISTAN

Sandy Gall of ITV has recently been in Afghanistan. He has passed to us a letter from three Russian defectors to the Prime Minister seeking political asylum in the United Kingdom. I enclose the letter together with a translation.

Mr. Gall will be referring to the letter in his programme about Afghanistan which will be broadcast on 11 September. We agreed that your press spokesman would be in touch with him to explain the procedures involved in seeking asylum.

BT
I should be grateful for advice and a draft reply in due course.


I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

(C.D. Powell)

H. Taylor, Esq.,
Home Office.

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A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES	Date and sign
..... <i>PREM 19</i>	
PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number)	
Extract details:	
<i>Minute from Ingham to Powell dated 10 September 1984, with attachment</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>27/3/18</i> <i>Wayland.</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
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NUMBER NOT USED	
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DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

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QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

10 August 1984

Dear Foreign Secretary,

Thank you for your minute of 16 July about Soviet prisoners of the Afghan Resistance.

I am grateful to you for agreeing to seek to co-ordinate action with our friends and allies on the resettlement of Soviet prisoners and I am content with the line proposed in your minute.

For our part, we shall as you suggest sound out George Miller about his exploring the possibility of resettlement of Naumov and Chukin in other Western countries. But we shall, of course, also need to bear in mind, as the Prime Minister has commented, that if no other friendly country is prepared to accept such prisoners we may need to take them in if there is a serious risk that otherwise they may be returned to the Soviet Union.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely,
Nigel Partridge

Approved by the Home Secretary and
signed in his absence

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC., MP.

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FILE

67

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 July, 1984

Dear Nicholas,

Thank you for your letter about the encouraging progress of the two former Soviet soldiers. I was interested to hear of this. Please also thank Mr. Rykov for his letter and convey my best wishes to both of them.

Yours ever

Margaret

The Lord Bethell, MEP.

67



FILE

67

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 July, 1984

Dear Nicholas,

Thank you for your letter about the encouraging progress of the two former Soviet soldiers. I was interested to hear of this. Please also thank Mr. Rykov for his letter and convey my best wishes to both of them.

Yours ever

Margaret

The Lord Bethell, MEP.

67

file BEMABB
bc : PC



10 DOWNING STREET

17 July 1984

From the Private Secretary

SOVIET PRISONERS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE

The Prime Minister has considered the Home Secretary's letter of 25 June to the Foreign Secretary and the latter's minute of 16 July about Soviet prisoners of the Afghan Resistance.

The Prime Minister agrees that we should try to get other friendly countries to share the burden of accepting some Soviet prisoners rather than take more ourselves at this stage. But she has commented that on no account can we let such prisoners be returned to the Soviet Union. You will wish to bear this in mind in considering any future cases in which it appears that no other friendly country is prepared to accept such prisoners and there is a serious risk that they might find themselves in consequence returned to the USSR.

I am sending copies of this letter to Colin Budd (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

C.D. POWELL

Hugh Taylor, Esq.,
Home Office

SM

ce PC¹

FCS/84/202

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Prime Minister

Yes - but we
cannot let
them be
returned to
the
USSR

Agree with FCS and HS
that we should try to
get other countries to
accept some Soviet prisoners,
rather than take more
ourselves at this stage?

CJD
16/7.

Soviet Prisoners of the Afghan Resistance

1. Thank you for your letter of 25 June about the admission of the Soviet soldiers, Igor Rykov and Oleg Khlan, and the further informal approach you have received on behalf of Vladimir Naumov and Nikolai Chukin.
2. I was very grateful for your help with the resettlement of Rykov and Khlan. The decision taken in their case raised difficult issues and I think is important we do not treat it as a precedent for the future. As you say, we do not wish to be regarded as the primary country of resettlement for Soviet prisoners of the Afghan resistance. Apart from the other groups for whom we might be held to be more directly responsible, we must, as you point out, bear in mind the Pakistan Government's sensitivities and the need to avoid damage to Anglo-Soviet relations.
3. The Pakistan Government remain concerned that the extraction of Soviet soldiers from Afghanistan through their country could provoke embarrassing publicity and Soviet retaliation. We cannot therefore assume that they would be willing to help with future cases, as they did with Rykov and Khlan.



4. As you may know, the Soviet authorities made a formal protest to our Ambassador in Moscow on 27 June. The matter was not raised during my subsequent visit to the Soviet Union. But the issue remains a potential source of friction and I would not wish it to impede our policy of pursuing a broad dialogue with the Soviet Union.

5. A decision to admit further applicants hard on the heels of the admission of Rykov and Khlan would almost certainly invite a succession of further appeals from Soviet soldiers for resettlement here. Apart from the political considerations, there might be practical advantage in postponing a decision on further cases until we have seen how Rykov and Khlan settle down and until we have had an opportunity to make a considered assessment of the public and parliamentary reaction to their presence here.

6. I was therefore encouraged to hear that you do not intend to take an immediate decision on Naumov and Chukin. I understand that George Miller's approach was informal and that you have not yet received a formal application on behalf of the two men. In these circumstances, I see merit in your suggesting informally to Miller, who has extensive contacts in West Germany, France and Switzerland, that he investigate the possibility of resettlement in other Western countries. As he is aware that we have already taken in Rykov and Khlan, you might explain to him that any decision on further resettlement cases would need to take account of two factors. The first would be the willingness of our allies and partners to share with us some of the burden of accepting Soviet prisoners from Afghanistan. The second would be our assessment of Rykov and Khlan's ability to settle down in the UK, a process which might take some time.



7. For our part, we intend to take up your suggestion that we make a further attempt to coordinate with our friends and allies. This will build on the discussions we have already had with our EC partners and with the Americans. We intend to remind them of the advantages of a joint approach to the problem. We shall make it clear that we do not wish to consider further requests until we have seen how Rykov and Khlan settle down in the UK. And we will seek an indication of our partners' readiness to consider applications for resettlement referred to them. I shall let you know the result of these approaches and, in particular, if there is any indication that another government might be willing to consider taking in cases referred to them. In that event, we shall need to consider whether to give our EC partners and other allies details of the Naumov and Chukin cases.

8. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', is centered on the page.


(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
16 July 1984

Afghanistan Pt 6

Int Sit

16 JUL 1984



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RESTRICTED



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 July, 1984.

Afghanistan

Lord Cranborne has been in touch with the Political Office here to ask whether the Prime Minister would agree to a brief meeting with Engineer Izaak Ses-Haq. Apparently, Ses-Haq is Masoud's No.2 in the Panchu Valley. Lord Cranborne recalls that the Prime Minister did meet Commander Masoud when he was in England.

BF-1

I should be grateful for urgent advice. Apparently, Ses-Haq is in London only this week, and Lord Cranborne wants him to see the Prime Minister after Questions on Tuesday or Thursday.

C.D. Powell

CST

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

Charles Powell

Robert Cranborne telephoned me on Friday.


He wondered whether the Prime Minister might agree to "shake the hand" of Engineer Izaak Ses-Haq. She did meet Commander Massud when he was in England - I think 2 summers ago - at the House of Commons after Questions. Apparently Ses-Haq is Massud's number two in the Panchu Valley.

He is in London this week. Would there be any chance of him seeing the PM after Questions? The contact I have been given is Mr Tim Cooper of the Afghan Support Committee - 379-7218, but Robert Cranborne would, of course, bring him along.

Jess

9.7.84

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1672</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Undated note (about 2 Soviet prisoners), assumed to be circa 9 July 1984</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
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Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

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GR 306

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FROM MOSCOW 271520Z JUNE

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 789 OF 27 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE OSLO (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD AND KABUL

INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS AND WASHINGTON

SOVIET SOLDIERS FROM AFGHANISTAN.

1. I WAS CALLED TO THE MFA ON 27 JUNE , TO HEAR FROM SUSLOV, HEAD OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT AT THE MFA, A PROTEST ABOUT THE ADMISSION TO THE UK OF THE TWO SOVIET SERVICEMEN. FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF SPEAKING NOTE OF WHICH HE HANDED ME A COPY .

BEGINS " ACCORDING TO REPORTS IN THE BRITISH PRESS, SOVIET SERVICEMEN RYKOV AND KHLAN (WHO SPENT NEARLY A YEAR IN THE HANDS OF AFGHAN AND INTERVENTIONIST BANDS WHERE THEY WERE SUBJECTED TO HEAVY DOSES OF NARCOTICS) HAVE BEEN FLOWN TO THE UK. CERTAIN PEOPLE AND ORGANISATIONS , INCLUDING A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS ,LORD BETHELL, WHO WAS AN INITIATOR OF THIS "OPERATION", ARE PREPARING A SERIES OF UNSAVOURY PROPAGANDISTIC ACTIONS, INCLUDING USE OF THE BBC, WITH THE AIM OF FANNING ANOTHER SLANDEROUS CAMPAIGN TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION.

ALL THIS CANNOT BUT PROVOKE STRONG OBJECTIONS FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

THE ACTIONS IN QUESTION, EVEN IF CONDUCTED BY PRIVATE ORGANISATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT THE DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF OFFICIAL BRITISH AUTHORITIES. EVEN THE BRITISH PRESS, REFERRING TO "HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS", REPORTED THAT RYKOV AND KHLAN HAVE BEEN ACCORDED THE RIGHT OF RESIDENCE IN THE COUNTRY WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT.

THE SOVIET UNION LODGES A RESOLUTE PROTEST AGAINST THE ABOVE ACTIONS BY THE BRITISH SIDE SEMICLN THESE HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH "HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS " EVEN LEAVING ASIDE THE FACT THAT THEY CONSTITUTE A CONSCIOUSLY UNFRIENDLY ACT TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION .

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11F

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IF THE BRITISH SIDE IS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, IT SHOULD STOP ANTI-HUMANITARIAN SPECULATION THE FATE OF SOVIET SERVICEMEN, WHO WERE VICTIMS OF THE BARBARIC ACTIONS OF THE BANDITS AND WERE DRIVEN TO A STATE OF ACUTE MENTAL DERANGEMENT SEMICLN THE BRITISH PRESS REPORTS THAT THEY DID NOT EVEN KNOW THAT THEY WERE BEING BROUGHT TO THE UK. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT EXPECTS THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LONDON INCLUDING THE EMBASSY DOCTOR, WILL IMMEDIATELY BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH THE ABOVE SOVIET SERVICEMEN AND THAT MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN TO PROTECT THEM FROM ANY FURTHER EXPLOITATION FOR UNSEEMLY PURPOSES AND RETURN THEM TO THEIR HOMELAND ". ENDS.

2. IN REPLY, DRAWING ON PARA 1 (A) 1 OF YOUR TELNO 545, I SAID THAT THE SOVIET PRISONERS HAD BEEN ADMITTED ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, THAT THEY HAD FREELY APPLIED TO ENTER THE UNITED KINGDOM AND HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO THE NORMAL ENTRY PROCEDURES. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT BRITISH POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN WAS WELL - KNOWN, CONTINUING IN THE TERMS OF PARA 1(A)IX OF YOUR TUR. I CONCLUDED BY STRESSING, WITH REFERENCE TO THE SOVIET STATEMENT, THAT THE ADMISSION OF THE TWO SOLDIERS IN NO WAY AFFECTED THE DESIRE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO SEEK BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SUSLOV REPEATED THAT THE ACTIONS REFERRED TO IN HIS SPEAKING NOTE COULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PLACE WITHOUT THE AID OF THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES AND DID NOT APPEAR TO REFLECT THE WILL TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. HE PREFERRED NOT TO DISCUSS THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN BUT TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE PRACTICAL POINTS IN THE NOTE. BUT HIS RESPONSE WAS BRIEF AND MILDLY SPOKEN.

FCC PLEASE PASS SAYING TO UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

SUTHERLAND

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

AFGHANISTAN

STANDARD(PALACE)
SAD
SOV D
MED
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UND

ECD(E)
SEAD
NAD
NENAD
MR WILSON
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
COL.JURY D14 MODUK

2
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cpc



1) Mr Powell ^{CDP}
2) Prime Minister

CF: Await FCS.

DWB 27/6

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

25 June 1984

Content to await FCS reply?

DWB 25/6

Yes
not

2 G...
S...

SOVIET PRISONERS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE

In the event the admission of Mr Rykov and Mr Khlan, the two Soviet soldiers, went off very smoothly, and I am very grateful for the efforts that your Department made, both here and in Islamabad, to achieve this. Press reaction seems to have been generally favourable.

We now need to consider what our attitude should be to further representations on behalf of Soviet soldiers wishing to come here. We have already been approached by Mr George Miller, who works for Count Tolstoy's Soviet Prisoners in Afghanistan Rescue Committee, on behalf of two further Soviet prisoners. I attach a brief note of the details that have been given to us about them. There was also a report in "The Times" last Monday that another two had written to the Prime Minister.

I have no wish to us to be regarded as the primary country of resettlement for Soviet prisoners in Afghanistan. There are several groups throughout the world (eg Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong and British overseas citizens in India) for whom we could be said to have a more direct responsibility. Further, it should not be assumed that the admission of a substantial number of Russians, some of whom are or were drug addicts, would be popular with the British people. For your part you will, I imagine, be concerned to avoid any damage to Anglo-Soviet relations that might result from the admission of further Soviet soldiers, particularly in the context of your forthcoming visit to Moscow; and I know that there are sensitivities in relation to the Pakistan Government.

All this, it seems to me, points to the desirability of our making a further attempt to involve our Western allies in a joint approach. If that could be achieved, I would be ready to admit a proportion of the prisoners. Otherwise there is a danger that many will look to us for resettlement. I am aware

/that so far

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC, MP

CONFIDENTIAL

that so far attempts to interest our partners in the Ten in a joint approach have failed to arouse any interest, but I think that it is important that a further effort should be made, at Ministerial level; and that we should also bring in the Americans.

I am prepared to hold off reaching a decision on Naumov and Chukin while such an exercise is mounted, and I would, of course, avoid taking action that might be embarrassing in connection with your visit to Moscow, but I expect that we shall soon come under pressure for a favourable decision, which it will be difficult to resist.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

W
con,
L
sa



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 June 1984

AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET PRISONERS

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 7 June.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Hugh Taylor (Home Office).

A. J. COLES

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 June 1984

Dear John,

Afghanistan: Soviet Prisoners

My letter of 4 June provided advice on Lord Bethell's request to make public the petitions to the Prime Minister from two Soviet prisoners held by the Afghan resistance, Igor Rykov and Oleg Khlan.

I understand that the Home Secretary has now agreed to admit the two men to the UK on humanitarian grounds. They will be given permission to remain here for an initial period of 12 months under sponsorship arrangements made by Lord Bethell. If they apply to stay at the end of that period, their applications will be sympathetically considered and in the normal course would be granted. In the light of the Home Secretary's decision, this letter sets out the arrangements that are being made to bring the two men to the UK and the line we will take thereafter with the press and with the Russians should they raise the matter with us.

The plan is that the two men should fly to the UK on 14 June. The Pakistan government will arrange for the two men to be transferred from their Afghan resistance captors to the airport, where our Embassy will hand over travel documents and tickets. These arrangements will be handled discreetly, mainly because the Pakistan government are extremely anxious to avoid any knowledge of their involvement leaking out. On the flight, the two Russians are expected to be accompanied by Lady Phillimore, a Russian emigre and personal friend of Lord Bethell, who has nominated her for this role. It is important that her role should not become public as she also works part-time for the BBC External Service.

Once the prisoners are in the UK they will become the responsibility of their principal sponsors, an emigre organisation, the European Liaison Group, and Lord Bethell. The Liaison Group and Lord Bethell have arranged accommodation

/for



for the two men and will provide for any additional needs they may have. The terms on which they are being admitted to the UK will allow them to seek employment and to receive some social security benefits including access to the National Health Service. Both men should be able to find work; Rykov is a trained carpenter and Khlan a garage mechanic.

As I pointed out in my letter of 4 June, once the two Russians have been admitted to the UK, there will be a great deal of publicity, given in particular the involvement of the "Mail on Sunday", which is paying the fares of the two men.

Our concern in responding to press enquiries will be to play down the extent of government involvement while making clear the government's position on Afghanistan and allowing the publicity generated to further our aim of maintaining critical public awareness of the Soviet occupation. In particular we would aim:

- (a) to avoid any damage to our relations with Pakistan which would result from any revelation of their role;
- (b) to avoid any impression that immigration rules had been circumvented at the behest of a newspaper;
- (c) to minimise the possibility of damage to UK/Soviet relations in the run-up to the Foreign Secretary's visit to Moscow by
 - (i) distancing HMG from the detailed arrangements;
 - (ii) in relation to the Soviet Union, to be able to maintain the formal position that the applications have been dealt with under provisions which allow appeals on humanitarian grounds for leave to enter the country.

As I mentioned in my letter of 4 June, the handling of this case will have implications for UK/Soviet relations. In the Foreign Secretary's view this suggests we should maintain great discretion about the government's role in the arrangements. The Russians can be expected to make a formal protest and probably to demand access to the soldiers. This is normal in asylum and similar cases involving Soviet

/citizens



citizens and can be handled so long as we can show that the soldiers came here of their own free will, that they formally applied to do so, and that they do not wish to have any further contacts with the Soviet authorities. But the Soviet reaction might go further than this (with implications for our policy of increasing contacts) if the government were seen to be seeking to take credit for the operation. In responding to any protest from the Russians we shall therefore stick carefully to the public line to be used by the Home Office and reject any suggestions that government involvement went beyond simply granting permission to stay, in accordance with Home Office procedures, to two individuals who have freely applied to do so.

With these objectives in mind we have prepared a detailed press line in collaboration with the Home Office. This is set out in the enclosed telegram to Islamabad.

The Foreign Secretary has considered whether we should alter the date of arrival, at present planned for 14 June, in view of the fact that the European elections are being held on that day. He has concluded that even if the men's arrival on that day became public (which the Mail on Sunday will try hard to avoid, so as to keep the publicity for themselves) this would not affect the elections. Any further slippage in the date of arrival of the two men in this country will increase the risk that the publicity will have an adverse effect on Sir Geoffrey's visit to Moscow, which begins on 2 July.

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor (Home Office).

L. V. Appleyard

Peter Ricketts

RP (L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

8

ZC
RS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL
4
5
6 FM FCO JUNE 84
7 TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 INFO IMMEDIATE KABUL, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, NEW DELHI, UKMIS NEW
10 YORK, GENEVA, BERNE, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS
11 MIPT: AFGHANISTAN SOVIET PRISONERS
12 1. In reply to any enquiries after the two prisoners have
13 arrived in UK, Home Office and FCO News Department will take the
14 following line:
15 A. Home Office (HO) will reply to the following questions on
16 asylum, refugee status, general immigration policy and procedures,
17 sponsorship and resettlement in UK:
18 (i) What is the position on the 2 Soviet soldiers? Mr Rykov,
19 aged 21, and Mr Khlan, aged 20, are Soviet soldiers who
20 deserted from the Russian Army occupying Afghanistan.
21 They have been admitted to the UK on humanitarian grounds
22 following their request to come here which was supported
23 by Lord Bethell. They have been given permission to
24 come here under sponsorship arrangements made by Lord
25 Bethell. They have been admitted for an initial period

///
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/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword of
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution Ltd PS/Mr Whitney SAD PS/PUS Soviet D Sir J Bullard UND Sir W Harding Info D Dr Wilson MVD Mr Jenkins WED PUSD News D copies to: Finance D Mr Montgomery- Pott, Home Office PS PS/Lady Young No 10 PS/Mr Rifkind
Drafted by (Block capitals) PETER RICKETTS		
Telephone number		
Authorised for dispatch <i>[Signature]</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats	Page
CONFIDENTIAL	2
	IMMEDIATE

1 <<<< they are not judged to meet the criteria for the

2 of 12 months but applications for extensions of stay will be

3 sympathetically considered at the end of that period.

4 (ii) How did the 2 men arrive in UK?

5 Not a matter we are prepared to discuss. Refer further enquiries

6 to FCO.

7 (iii) Was Pakistan Government involved? Not for us to answer

8 on behalf of another Government. Refer to FCO.

9 (iv) What are sponsorship arrangements? The sponsorship

10 arrangements?

11 The sponsorship arrangements provide for the sponsors to finance

12 the men's travel to the UK and arrange reception facilities and

13 accommodation for them for an initial period. In addition,

14 the sponsors will provide practical and financial support for

15 the men. The 2 sponsors are the European Liaison Group which

16 has arranged accommodation for the men and the "Mail on Sunday"

17 which is understood to have paid their fares.

18 (v) Will the men receive Social Security benefits?

19 The men will be eligible for social security benefits on a

20 similar basis to refugees and individuals granted asylum.

21 (vi) Does the HO propose to approve further sponsorship

22 by newspapers?

23 The admission of the men was made subject to the provision of

24 sponsorship to ensure that adequate practical and financial

25 support would be available until the men could stand on their

26 own. The sponsors put forward are able to meet these require-

27 ments and it is not part of the HO's role to deny a

28 humanitarian case for admission simply because one of the sponsors

29 is a newspaper.

30 (vii) Does the UK propose to admit further Soviet soldiers?

31 We have no plans to do so. Any application would be

32 considered on its individual merits and in the light of all the

33 circumstances.

34 (viii) Have men been granted asylum?

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword /No.
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 3
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1 No. They are not judged to meet the criteria for the grant of
 2 asylum. They have been admitted for twelve months in the first
 3 instance on humanitarian grounds.
 4 (ix) Were Ministers consulted?
 5 Decision was taken by Home Secretary. Other Ministers have been
 6 informed.
 7 (x) Was the Prime Minister consulted?
 8 Yes. Mr Rykov and Mr Khlan originally wrote to the Prime Minister.
 9 (xi) Where will the soldiers live? How will they support
 10 themselves?
 11 This is a matter for the sponsors.
 12 (xii) Aren't there more deserving cases for humanitarian cases?
 13 Aren't these men deserters/drug addicts?
 14 Any application is judged on its merits in the light of all the
 15 circumstances.
 16 (xiii) Has the Home Office received similar requests in the
 17 past? What response made?
 18 None.
 19
 20 B. The FCO will reply to the following questions:
 21 (i) How many Soviet prisoners are held by the Afghan
 22 Resistance? Precise numbers not known. Believe between 50-200.
 23 (ii) How were Rykov and Khlan selected? They appealed to us
 24 for resettlement in the UK.
 25 (iii) How were the appeals made? Their appeals were forwarded
 26 to the Prime Minister by Lord Bethell.
 27 (iv) Why Lord Bethell? For him to answer. Many governments/
 28 organisations in West are concerned about Soviet prisoners of
 29 Afghan Resistance.
 30 (v) How was appeal dealt with? It was passed to the Home
 31 Office for consideration in the usual way.
 32 (vi) Were Ministers consulted about the decision? Decision
 33 was taken by Home Secretary. Other Ministers have been informed.
 34 (viii) How did they get to the UK then? Not in a position to

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword provide
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE	Page 4
1	<<<<		
2	provide details; the arrangements were made by private		
3	organisations sponsoring them.		
4	(ix) Any change to HMG's policy on Afghanistan? None.		
5	Afghanistan issue of utmost concern. Deplore brutal impact		
6	of Soviet military presence. Full and early withdrawal of		
7	Soviet troops essential to any lasting solution. Have made		
8	our view clear in talks with Soviet representatives. Give		
9	full support to successive calls by UN General Assembly for		
10	immediate withdrawal of foreign troops so Afghan people can		
11	decide their own future. Look to Soviet Union to take genuine		
12	steps towards peaceful settlement. Support UN Secretary-General's		
13	efforts towards a settlement based on UN principles. Regret		
14	no sign of Soviet willingness to reach settlement.		
15	(x) Are other countries admitting Soviet prisoners? If not,		
16	why not? Were they approached?		
17	Not appropriate to comment on attitude/policy of other countries.		
18	(xi) How many Soviet prisoners brought to Switzerland under		
19	ICRC auspices? What arrangements made for their return to		
20	Soviet Union or resettlement in West? Questions shall be		
21	addressed to ICRC and Swiss authorities. Understand 11 prisoners		
22	brought to Switzerland by ICRC, who now hold 7. Believe one		
23	returned to Soviet Union at own choice. One in FRG seeking		
24	asylum. Two seeking asylum in Switzerland.		
25	(xii) HMG's policy on future requests from Soviet prisoners?		
26	Would examine each application for resettlement on merits. No		
27	blanket assurances. Admission of foreign nationals to UK a		
28	matter for Home Office.		
29	(xiii) Don't Afghan Resistance need more material support?		
30	What we doing to help apart from resettling Soviet prisoners?		
31	Great sympathy for Afghans' remarkable efforts to defend		
32	themselves against foreign invasion. Share widespread and strong		
33	feeling that they should receive every possible support. Clear		
34	from continuing resistance activities in Afghanistan that arms		
NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword are	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats		Page
	CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE	5

1 >>>>

2 are getting through. Not helpful to comment in detail.

3 (xiv) Evidence of Soviet use of CW? Gravely concerned by strong

4 indications of CW use in Afghanistan. Deplore increasingly

5 brutal tactics used by Soviet troops eg high-altitude bombing

6 in Panjshir Valley.

7 (xv) Situation in Panjshir?

8 Believe Soviet troops occupy part of Valley. But have failed to

9 defeat resistance or capture leader, Masoud. No substance to

10 Karmal regime claims to have captured Valley or established

11 permanent hold on strategic Valley.

12 (xvi) Have the Russians protested? (If appropriate). Not our

13 practice to comment on details of confidential contacts with

14 other Government.

15 (xvii) Implications for Anglo/Soviet relations? As far as

16 HMG is concerned, this in no way effects our desire to establish

17 better relations with the Soviet Union.

18 (xviii) Does decision to admit two prisoners represent

19 hardening of our attitude towards Soviet Union?

20 Our policy remains unchanged: It is to seek to increase contacts

21 with the Soviet Union at all levels and thereby to improve mutual

22 understanding. While we wish to identify common interests we

23 have made clear that this does not mean any compromise of

24 principles. Important points of disagreement such as Soviet

25 actions in Afghanistan will have to be addressed.

26 (xix) Will the Secretary of State still visit Moscow? Yes ⁷⁰

27

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Catchword

Classification and Control

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

Page

2

1

are getting through. Not helpful to comment in detail.

(xv) Evidence of Soviet use of CW is gravely concerned by strong

indications of CW use in Afghanistan. Before I possibly

initial tactics used by Soviet troops at high-altitude bombing

in Panjshir Valley.

(xv) Situation in Panjshir

Believe Soviet troops occupy part of valley. But we failed to

defeat resistance or capture leader. No evidence to

Karwal regime claim to have captured V. by a (xv) (xv)

Government hold on strategic Valley.

(xv) Have the Russians proceeded? (xv) (xv). Not our

practice to comment on details of confidential contacts with

other Government.

(xv) Implications for Anglo-Soviet relations. As far as

we are concerned, this in no way affects our desire to establish

better relations with the Soviet Union.

(xv) Does Britain go about the business of

hardening of our attitude towards Soviet Union?

Our policy remains unchanged. It is to seek to increase contacts

with the Soviet Union as all favors and thereby to improve mutual

understanding. While we wish to identify common interests we

have made clear that this does not mean any compromise of

principles. Important points of disagreement such as Soviet

actions in Afghanistan will have to be discussed.

(xv) Will the Secretary of State still visit Moscow? Yes.

28

29

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31

32

33

34

1984

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Country

Class

When sent

Reason

FILE SH

cc: FCO



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 June, 1984

IN CONFIDENCE

Thank you for your letter of 25 May. We have noted your assurance that you will not make public correspondence with the Prime Minister and Government Departments. We have no objection to your making public the existence and contents of the letters to the Prime Minister from Igor Rykov and Oleg Khlan, forwarded under cover of your letter of 15 February. This should not, of course, happen before the two men arrive in this country. It is important, as you recognise, to avoid publicising the arrangements to bring the two men to the United Kingdom, and in particular the rôle of the Pakistan Government.

A. J. COLES

The Lord Bethell, M.E.P.

NIR

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 June 1984

Dear John,

Type letter pl

AS 4/6

Afghanistan: Soviet Prisoners

Thank you for your letter of 29 May, enclosing one from Lord Bethell in which he asked whether there would be any objection to his making public the fact that the two Soviet soldiers had appealed to the Prime Minister and the content of their letters. I enclose copies of the latter.

We do not suggest that Lord Bethell's request be turned down although we are not particularly attracted by it because of the implications for our relations with the Soviet Union at an unfortunate moment (as discussed below). However once the two Russians have been admitted to the United Kingdom, there will of course be a great deal of publicity (given the involvement of the 'Mail on Sunday', which will pay the fares of the two men) and the fact that the two men appealed directly to the Prime Minister will no doubt emerge at some point, even if Lord Bethell does not himself make use of their petitions.

The content of the letters, supported no doubt by fact which will emerge from subsequent press interviews with the men themselves, will usefully serve our wider aim of maintaining critical public awareness of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. But the whole incident is bound to affect the Russians' perception of the Government's publicly stated wish to improve UK/Soviet relations and expand contacts. We have never pretended that we want to sweep contentious issues like Afghanistan under the carpet, but the fact that the arrival of the soldiers will follow - quite coincidentally - hard on the Bettaney and Skinner cases may risk provoking not only a counter propaganda campaign but a restriction of opportunities which would be of interest to us.

However since the Prime Minister's role in the Government's decision to admit the two soldiers is likely to be

/revealed

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revealed (eg by the soldiers themselves) and there is no plausible reason we could give Lord Bethell for asking him to suppress it, the Foreign Secretary accepts that he should be told we have no objection to his using the soldiers' petitions. But we shall need to be very careful generally in answering questions about the extent of the Government's involvement and the political implications. We are considering this aspect with the Home Office and will be writing to you on this point shortly.

I enclose a draft reply to Lord Bethell, which has been cleared with the Home Office.

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor (Home Office).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

IN CONFIDENCE

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

Reference

A J Coles Esq

DEPARTMENT:

TEL NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Lord Bethell MEP
73 Sussex Square
LONDON W2 2SS

Secret

Copies to:

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence


CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of 25 May. We have noted your assurance that you will not make public correspondence with the Prime Minister and Government Departments. We have no objection to your making public the existence and contents of the letters to the Prime Minister from Igor Rykov and Oleg Khlan, forwarded under cover of your letter of 15 February. This should not, of course, ^{be} before the two men arrive in this country. It is ~~of course~~ important, as you recognise, to avoid publicising the arrangements to bring the two men to the United Kingdom, and in particular the role of the Pakistan Government.

RA 4/6

Enclosures—flag(s).....

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES	PREM 19	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number)	1672	
Extract details:	Enclosures to letter from Ricketts to Coles dated 4 June 1984	
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DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)		

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,

eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.

Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.



da

epc

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 May 1984

Afghanistan: Soviet Prisoners

BT

I enclose a copy of a letter which I have received from Lord Bethell. You will see that when the two Soviet prisoners whose case has been under discussion have left Pakistan, he proposes to generate publicity on the need to "save other Soviet prisoners in the hands of the Afghan resistance". He asks whether he may make public the fact that the two men appealed to the Prime Minister for permission to come to this country. I see no objection to this myself, but should be grateful for your views - by the end of this week.

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor (Home Office).

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Bo



FROM
NICHOLAS
BETHELL

TELEPHONE
01-402-6877

73 SUSSEX SQUARE
LONDON W2 2SS

2/2

John Coles Esq.,
10 Downing Street,
London S.W.1.

25th May 1984

Dear John,

I went yesterday to see Michael Burton, head of the Foreign Office's South Asia Department, to talk about the transfer of the two former Soviet soldiers to the United Kingdom.

It seems as if the arrangements for bringing the two young men to England are going quite well. Our best guess now is that they will come here in about three weeks time.

I am of course saying nothing publicly about this business and I will say nothing until the two men have left Pakistan. However, when they arrive here I propose to generate some publicity on the need to save other Soviet prisoners in the hands of the Afghan resistance.

I do not propose to make public any of the correspondence that I received from the Prime Minister or from other Government departments. I would however like to make public the fact that the two men appealed to the Prime Minister for permission to come to this country. I would like to make known the contents of the two letters addressed to her.

I would not have thought that the Prime Minister would have any objection to this, but I thought that I ought to let you know that this is my intention. Please do not hesitate to tell me if there is any problem.

I would like once again to thank you very much for all the work you did to help this enterprise along to what promises to be a successful conclusion.

Yours ever

Nicholas

Lord Bethell

AW
A.S.C. 8/5.

v-a.

With the Compliments of
Nicholas Bethell

73 Sussex Square
London W.2
Tel 402-6877



FROM
NICHOLAS
BETHELL

TELEPHONE
01-402-6877

73 SUSSEX SQUARE
LONDON W2 2SS

The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC, MP,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London S.W.1.

16th May 1984

Dear Geoffrey,

I was sorry to see in The Times today that there is a short article about Mr Rykov and Mr Khlan, the two former Soviet soldiers who hope to come to the United Kingdom soon.

I telephoned Mr Burton of your South Asia department yesterday as soon as The Times telephoned me. I explained to him my view that Nikolai Tolstoy was acting on the advice of George Miller, who is a member of the anti-Soviet organisation NTS and who recently returned from Peshawar.

I was in no way involved with Mr Miller's visit to Pakistan. Obviously the NTS is trying to involve itself in the issue of Soviet prisoners. I wish that they would keep out of it. It only complicates the issue. And I think it irresponsible of Count Tolstoy to have revealed the two men's names in public print at this stage.

The problem is that it is nearly two months since the Prime Minister wrote to me agreeing to give sympathetic consideration to the two men's request to be allowed to enter this country. In order to obtain sponsorship for them, I had to talk to members of the European Liaison Group, who represent east European communities here and who have found a family who will look after them. And so the basic facts about what we are trying to do have been known to a number of people in London for many weeks. And some of them are not as discreet as they ought to be.

I did not realise when I received the Prime Minister's encouraging letter that it would take so long to go through the bureaucratic formalities of getting the two men out of Pakistan. And it seems that we are still quite a long way from getting a final green light, since the men have still not been interviewed by our consular representative in Islamabad and his report still has to be approved by the Home Office.

This is a little worrying. Not only does it prolong the two men's incarceration in very difficult circumstances, but it also makes it

..../



- 2 -

/.....

more likely as time passes that the detail of what is happening may become public.

I myself have scrupulously observed the Prime Minister's request to say nothing. But I cannot prevent other people from speaking to the press. And in the meantime of course other organisations and journalists can go to Pakistan and talk to the two men, thus creating further confusion.

I would be very grateful for anything that you can do to speed up the process. It would be a great shame if we were to fall at the last fence of such a long and complicated course.

Yours ever

Nicholas

Lord Bethell



With the Compliments
of the
PRIVATE SECRETARY

Home Office
Queen Anne's Gate
SW1H 9AT



QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

19 April 1984

R Nich,

nbpm
2nd
24/4

Thank you for your letter of 30 March about the cases of Mr Igor Rykov and Mr R C Oleg Khlan, two Soviet soldiers at present in Pakistan, in which you asked for clarification of the sponsorship requirement referred to by the Prime Minister in her letter of 27 March, and for your further letter of 3 April.

In the past when we have been able to agree to the admission of individuals with no connections here and no entitlement to come here, it has not been unusual for us to ask for a sponsor or sponsoring organisation who will undertake to assist the individuals in practical and financial ways for an initial period until they can stand on their own. This was one of the requirements that was made when we agreed to take some Polish refugees from Austria in 1982.

In requesting sponsorship we have in mind that private funds would be made available to bring Mr Rykov and Mr Khlan to this country and that arrangements would be made for their reception and accommodation for an initial period. Provided that they are personally acceptable we would envisage admission for an initial period of 12 months on an exceptional basis with no restrictions on their taking employment. This would enable them to receive some social benefits, including access to the National Health Service. But we would expect arrangements to be made for them to be accommodated privately for up to 12 months and for any additional needs that they may have to be met from private sources. Much, of course, will depend on how able and willing Mr Rykov and Mr Khlan are to adapt to their new life but we would not expect that the support required from the sponsors should extend for longer than 12 months.

I appreciate that making the arrangements for sponsorship is not easy, but I understand that you judge you have identified sponsors who will meet our requirements. I suggest that you also approach the British Refugee Council, which may be prepared to offer some assistance. The Council is, of course, a very responsible organisation and very experienced in matters of this kind. You may like to contact the Council through Bernard Braine, who is a member of their Executive Committee.

If you are content with the terms of sponsorship I have outlined, we will proceed to interview Mr Rykov and Mr Khlan.

I am grateful to you for treating the matter in confidence. I am sure that premature publicity at this stage would be unhelpful.

I would have no objection to your passing a copy of this letter to Mr Marcetic, which perhaps he would take as replying also to his letter to me of 4 April.

Law,
Law

Afghanistan

PTG Internal Situation

If you are content with the form of something I have outlined,
we will proceed to interview Mr. Blyden and Mr. Khatib.

I am grateful to you for treating the matter in confidence. I am
sure that pressure publicity at this stage would be unhelpful.

I would have no objection to your passing a copy of this letter to
Mr. Khatib, which perhaps he would take as reply to a letter
to me of 11 April.

4 APR 1984

11 12 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8 9

[Handwritten signature]



A.S.C. $\frac{2}{4}$

h-a.

FROM
NICHOLAS
BETHELL

TELEPHONE
01-402-6877

73 SUSSEX SQUARE
LONDON W2 2SS

John Coles Esq.,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON S.W.1.

30th March 1984

Dear John,

I want to thank you very much indeed for the efforts that you went to over the complicated matter of "my" two Soviet soldiers.

I know that you did your best to push this matter through as quickly as possible and I am very grateful to you.

I enclose, just for your information, a copy of the letter that I have sent Leon Brittan about this problem. I very much hope that something can be arranged soon.

Yours ever,

Nicholas

Lord Bethell



FROM
NICHOLAS
BETHELL

TELEPHONE
01-402-6877

73 SUSSEX SQUARE
LONDON W2 2SS

The Rt. Hon. Leon Brittan, QC, MP,
Home Office,
Queen Anne's Gate,
LONDON S.W.1.

30th March 1984

Dear Leon,

You may have seen the letter that the Prime Minister sent me on March 27th about Mr Igor Rykov and Mr Oleg Khlan, who are at present held by Afghan resistance fighters in Pakistan and wish to come to the United Kingdom.

I am very pleased that the PM has indicated the Government's willingness to look sympathetically at their applications. However, I must confess that I am rather bewildered by what her letter says about sponsorship.

The cost of bringing these two young men to Britain and integrating them into British life, accommodating them, feeding them and teaching them English until they are in a fit state to support themselves, will be quite considerable. I would imagine that it will be well over £10,000.

I appreciate that sponsorship can often be arranged for nationals of an existing community in this country. For instance, Jewish victims of Hitler's oppression were rescued from Europe under the sponsorship of Jewish communities.

Unfortunately, though, the Russian community in this country is very small and disorganised. It is politically split, so that by no means all Russians here wish to come to the aid of Soviet citizens. Furthermore, Mr Khlan, although a Soviet citizen, is not a Russian. He is an Uzbek.

I therefore feel in some difficulty over personally making the arrangements envisaged in the third paragraph of the Prime Minister's letter. I would be willing to help by trying to raise funds, but this is made more difficult by the Prime Minister's advice that the matter ought to be kept confidential until a final decision is reached.

I understand meanwhile that certain other western countries have agreed to share the burden of this problem with us, that other Soviet soldiers are on their way to western Europe or have arrived here. The scale of

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- 2 -

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the problem is not large. It appears that only a few dozen men are involved. However, they will certainly be taken back into Afghanistan and killed if something is not done soon.

Since it was I who originally raised this matter with the Government, I appreciate that I must do my best to help with the administrative details. I do nevertheless feel that I can hardly make a start without some advice from your Department on how to go about arranging the sponsorship that the Government sees as a prerequisite to any further action.

I hope therefore that you will be able to indicate to me how one might proceed. I realise that this is a complicated matter and I am very grateful for the Government's sympathetic approach to it. I hope that it will not prove too difficult to work out the details.

Yours ever

Richard Cross

Lord Bethell



FILE

LR

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FOO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

27 March, 1984

Dear Nicholas,

In my letter of 21 February, I said that I would let you have as soon as possible a substantive reply to your letter of 15 February enclosing letters from two Soviet soldiers whom you met in Pakistan. I have also seen your letter of 16 February to Leon Brittan.

We have looked most carefully at the soldiers' application to come to the UK. As you know, we cannot give any blanket assurances in advance about the resettlement of Soviet soldiers, any more than we would for other deserving groups who may seek resettlement here. However, we are prepared on humanitarian grounds to look sympathetically at the particular applications you have lodged on behalf of Mr. Rykov and Mr. Khlan, subject to evidence being produced of sponsorship by a private organisation or individual in this country and the satisfactory outcome of an interview by an official of our Embassy in Islamabad. As you will appreciate, the question of sponsorship is particularly important in cases where the applicant has no previous connections with the UK.

It would be most helpful therefore if you could let Leon Brittan have details of the financial and practical arrangements which you would propose for sponsorship of the two soldiers. These arrangements would of course have to cover their travel to the UK as well

/as resettlement here.

(w)

as resettlement here. We would then be in a position to instruct our Embassy in Islamabad to interview the two soldiers in the same way as all applicants for resettlement to confirm that their applications were made entirely of their own free will.

I hope that progress can be made soon. In the meantime, however, I am sure you would agree that it would be best if publicity about the applications could be avoided until the results are known. Given the international implications, it could easily jeopardise our ability to help if there were premature disclosure of the applications.

Please treat this letter as replying also to your letter of 16 February to Leon Brittan.

*Yours
Raymond*

The Lord Bethell, M.E.P.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 March 1984

Dear John,

Type letter pl.

A.F.C. 26/3.

Afghanistan: Resettlement of Soviet Prisoners

The Prime Minister sent an interim reply on 21 February to Lord Bethell's letter of 15 February enclosing applications for asylum in the UK from two Soviet soldiers held prisoner in Pakistan by the Afghan resistance. You will now have seen Nigel Pantling's letter of 13 March setting out the Home Secretary's views that a sympathetic approach would be right.

At the Political Committee Meeting in Paris on 21-22 February, we raised the question of Soviet prisoners. Although most of our partners indicated that, like us, they would be prepared to consider asylum applications on a case by case basis, there was no disposition to seek a coordinated approach among the Ten. It was agreed that partners should exchange information on any requests for asylum which they received, and we have therefore circulated copies of the two applications enclosed with Lord Bethell's letter of 15 February. I have suggested separately to Lord Bethell that he should encourage his MEP colleagues to interest their Governments in the problem.

We have also been keeping in close touch with the Americans. In general, the responses to their approach to a number of Western countries have been positive, with most willing to consider any asylum applications from Soviet soldiers. The State Department have also told us (in contrast to President Zia's claim to the Prime Minister in Moscow on 14 February that there are already 20-24 Soviet prisoners in the West) that they have no knowledge of any other soldiers in the pipeline or already in the West, apart from the two who were granted refugee status in the US last November and those interned in Switzerland. They said that they were not intending to move quickly and the US Administration had some way to go before reaching a final view on how to handle the issue, but they saw some merit in encouraging private organisations to play a role. Meanwhile, the US Ambassador in Islamabad is seeking clarification from the Pakistanis of the number of Soviet prisoners held by the Mujahideen and of Pakistan's attitude towards their exfiltration to the West through Pakistan. At present, therefore, it seems that the Americans will wish to keep a low profile and to be seen to be acting on humanitarian grounds so as to avoid complications in their relations with the Soviet Union and to minimise any embarrassment to Pakistan.

/On her



On her visit to Pakistan earlier this month, Lady Young discussed the question with President Zia and, more fully with Yaqub Khan, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, in particular to clarify whether, if we were to allow the two Soviet soldiers to come to the UK, the attendant publicity would cause difficulties for the Pakistan Government. You will remember that, in Moscow, President Zia seemed relaxed on this point. Lady Young's discussions were inconclusive. Both Zia and Yaqub Khan appeared to be rather more non-committal. Nonetheless, provided that the soldiers were brought out without any fanfare in Pakistan itself and that there was no general Western campaign to encourage Soviet defections, we would not expect the Pakistanis to raise serious objections, although they might feel it necessary to go through the motions of doing so in order to placate the Soviet Ambassador.

At the present stage, there is clearly no enthusiasm on the part of our Western friends to launch a concerted effort to resettle Soviet soldiers. But there are reasonable prospects that other countries would adopt a sympathetic attitude if they too received specific applications. In these circumstances, Sir Geoffrey Howe believes it would be right to be prepared to accept the applications forwarded by Lord Bethell, subject to the conditions set out in Nigel Pantling's letter of 13 March. The two soldiers clearly do not warrant defector status. As regards the UNHCR, it does not appear that any applications have been made on their behalf and we cannot tell whether they would be accepted as refugees under the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Lord Bethell has now written asking the UNHCR to explain its position and has put down a Question in the Lords.

We believe that we should put the onus on Lord Bethell to provide adequate sponsorship, given the soldiers' lack of any previous connection with the UK. This would help not only to ensure that the soldiers were properly looked after, but to guard against any demands that we should accept unlimited numbers of Soviet soldiers. In practice it should not be difficult for an official from our Embassy in Islamabad to make contact with the applicants who are apparently being held in Peshawar in order to conduct the interviews.

I enclose a draft letter to Lord Bethell accordingly. This has been cleared with Home Office officials.

I am copying this letter to Nigel Pantling (Home Office).

Y. ever,
Peter Ricketts
(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Afghanistan situation P16





10 DOWNING STREET

AJC AJC

ed your kindly
ring Nicholas
Bennell when the
draft comes in
rather than
waiting for P.M.
to 8-02.

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23/3.

WA 23/3

h.c.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 March 1984

Soviet Prisoners Held by Afghan Resistance

You wrote to me on 20 February and the Prime Minister duly wrote to Lord Bethell saying that we were looking into the question which he had raised urgently.

Lord Bethell has spoken to me on the telephone several times and has today written to me (I enclose a copy of his letter).

I recognise that this is a very complicated matter but, since it is a month since Mrs. Thatcher wrote to Lord Bethell, I hope that she will be able to write substantively in the next few days. Could you kindly let me know the position soon.

BF7

ALL COPIES

Peter Ricketts Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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NR.



please reply to: Lord Bethell, MEP,
73 Sussex Square,
London W2 2SS.

CF?

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PARLAMENTO EUROPEO

Europese Gemeenschappen
EUROPEES PARLEMENT

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A.S.C. 24/3

John Coles Esq.,
10 Downing Street,
London S.W.1.

Political Affairs Committee
Working Group on Human Rights

The Chairman

20th March 1984

Dear John,

I enclose a letter that I have just sent to Mr Jack Landau, the representative in UK of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

It seems to me clear now that most of the former Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan and the border areas are the responsibility of UNHCR. Legally speaking they are refugees not prisoners of war. Only those who wish to return home, or say they wish to return home, are prisoners of war.

I have put down a parliamentary question for written answer on this point and I very much hope that the Government will spur UNHCR to more vigorous action.

X | Meanwhile I am very pleased to learn that you may soon be able to let me have an answer to my request on behalf of Igor Rykov and Oleg Khlan. It is now more than a month since I sent the material to you and I very much hope to have some more news in a day or two.

Yours Ever

Richard

Lord Bethell



please reply to: Lord Bethell, MEP,
73 Sussex Square,
London W2 2SS.

De europaiske Fællesskaber
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EUROPEES PARLEMENT

Jack Landau Esq.,
United Nations High Commission for Refugees,
36 Westminster Palace Gardens,
Artillery Row,
London S.W.1.

Political Affairs Committee
Working Group on Human Rights

The Chairman

20th March 1984

Dear Mr Landau,

I enclose a document describing my meetings with former Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan and the border area last month. I would be grateful if you would communicate it to your head office.

Mr Alexander Hay of the Red Cross, with whom I have discussed this complicated and distressing matter, has made it clear that his organisation can only be concerned with three of the Russians: Valeri Kisyelev, Alesandr Zhurakovsky and Sergey Myashcheryakov. The ICRC, he says, can only become involved if a man wishes to return to the Soviet Union. They will not become a channel for defectors.

It seems clear to me now that the UNHCR is responsible for the safety and resettlement of the other Soviet soldiers held by the Afghan resistance. These are people who have said that they do not wish to return to the Soviet Union, that they wish to live instead in a western or Moslem country.

My feeling is that not enough has been done by UNHCR to help these people. Some of them, particularly those held in Afghanistan, are living in terrible conditions. They may well die soon of natural causes. Or they may be shot by the Afghan resistance.

I would be grateful if you or one of your colleagues in UNHCR could let me know as a matter of urgency what you propose doing in order to save the lives of these unhappy people.

Yours sincerely,

Lord Bethell

Afghanistan: Int Sit Pt 6

please reply to Lord Robell, 107, 111, Grosvenor Gardens, London W1 3UE.



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PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Working Group on Human Rights

30th March 1984

The Chairman

Dear Mr Langdon,

I enclose a document describing my feelings with former Soviet soldiers in
Afghanistan and the border area. I would be grateful if you would
communicate it to your head office.

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Mr Alexander Bay of the Red Cross, whom I have discussed this complicated
and distressing matter, has said it clear that his organization can only be
concerned with those of the Russian Armed Forces, Alexander Muravov
and Gennady Maslachenkov. The ICRC, he only became involved in a
man wishes to return to the Soviet Union they will not become a Channel for
detectors.

It seems clear to me now that the USSR is responsible for the safety and
resettlement of the other Soviet soldiers held by the Afghan resistance. These
are people who have said that they do not wish to return to the Soviet Union,
but they wish to live instead in a western or Islamic country.

My feeling is that not enough has been done by USSR to help these people.
Some of them particularly those held in Afghanistan, are living in terrible
conditions. They may wish the soon of natural causes, or they may be used by
the Afghan resistance.

I would be grateful if you or one of your colleagues in USSR could let me know
as a matter of urgency what you propose doing in order to save the lives of
these unhappy people.

Yours sincerely,

William Dobson

Lord Robell

cc: [handwritten initials]



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HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

Avail letter from F/C

13 March 1984

A.S.C. 14/3

Dear Peter

AFGHANISTAN: RESETTLEMENT OF SOVIET PRISONERS

Thank you for your letter of 20 February setting out Sir Geoffrey Howe's views on what our stance should be towards accepting Soviet soldiers for resettlement in the United Kingdom, in the light of Lord Bethell's letter to the Prime Minister. The Home Secretary agrees with Sir Geoffrey that the plight of these prisoners is such that a sympathetic approach is called for and that the initial propaganda impact of bringing some of them to the United Kingdom could be considerable.

The Home Secretary understands, from the report he has seen of the meeting of the Political Committee of the Ten in Paris on 21/22 February, that we are unlikely to persuade our European partners at present to accept prisoners as part of a general effort by Western countries. It looks, therefore, that although we might prefer for the United Kingdom not to be seen as taking the lead and encouraging the defection of Soviet soldiers, we shall have to decide the two applications for admission for asylum, and do so fairly soon if we are to avoid the risk of adverse publicity.

From the information Lord Bethell has provided on Mr Rykov and Mr Khlan they are unlikely to qualify for defector status. We shall, therefore, need to take into account whether they have applied of their own free will; whether they qualify as refugees under the terms of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; whether they are in need of resettlement; whether they have close ties with reputable organisations or people in the United Kingdom who would be prepared to sponsor them, and whether they are personally acceptable on security and criminal grounds.

Although Rykov and Khlan appear genuine in their desire to settle in the United Kingdom, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva has said that they would consider them to be prisoners of war and not refugees under the terms of the 1961 Convention. They are clearly in need of resettlement, but no mention is made in Lord Bethell's letters of sponsorship by private organisations or individuals. He does say that they may require medical

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treatment for drug addiction, although this in itself need not be a reason for refusing them entry to the United Kingdom.

The Home Secretary does not consider that it would be appropriate to give Lord Bethell reason to believe that the United Kingdom is prepared to adopt an "open door" policy towards Soviet soldiers given the many other deserving groups who unsuccessfully seek resettlement here. However, he would be content to suggest to the Prime Minister that she tells Lord Bethell that we are prepared to look sympathetically at the applications he has lodged on behalf of Rykov and Khlan, subject to evidence being produced of sponsorship by a private organisation or individual in this country and the satisfactory outcome of an interview by an official of our Embassy in Islamabad. He should also be asked to withhold publicity for his approach or our response until the results are known. The Home Secretary would be grateful to see the terms of the draft reply to Lord Bethell. The letter might make the point that it also serves as a reply to the separate letters which Lord Bethell has sent to the Home Secretary and to Sir Geoffrey Howe.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Coles (No 10).

Yours ever,
Nigel

N A PANTLING

Peter Ricketts, Esq.

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Afghanistan A6

Internal Six.

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FM PARIS 221035Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 221 OF 22 FEBRUARY

INFO ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, NEW DELHI, KABUL, MOSCOW
 INFO SAVING UKDEL STRASBOURG, ANKARA, OSLO, LISBON, MADRID, TOKYO,
 WELLINGTON, TEHRAN, ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN,
 THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS
 NEW YORK, OTTAWA, MEXICO CITY, BERNE

POLITICAL COOPERATION: POLITICAL COMMITTEE: 21/22 FEBRUARY 1984
 PARIS: AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET PRISONERS

1. BULLARD (UK) SAID THAT LORD BETHELL, MEP, HAD WRITTEN TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO YOU ABOUT THE SOVIET PRISONERS HELD BY AFGHAN RESISTANCE GROUPS. IT SEEMED THERE COULD BE AS MANY AS 200 SUCH PRISONERS, OF WHOM 20 - 30 WERE BEING HELD INSIDE PAKISTAN. LORD BETHELL'S LETTERS GAVE SOME NAMES AND ENCLOSED 2 WRITTEN APPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM. WE WERE CONSIDERING OUR REPLY. IF THERE WERE MORE SUCH CASES THE WHOLE SUBJECT COULD ATTRACT CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY. WE WOULD WANT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE HUMANITARIAN FACTORS, PAKISTANI SENSIBILITIES, PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR WIDER EAST/WEST RELATIONS. WE THEREFORE SUGGESTED THAT PARTNERS KEEP EACH OTHER INFORMED AND RESPOND TO THE US COMMUNICATION BY SUGGESTING THAT THE AMERICANS CALL AN OPEN-ENDED MEETING IN WASHINGTON TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION.

2. SEVERAL SPEAKERS EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE IDEA OF A MEETING WITH THE UNITED STATES AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM CASE BY CASE. THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE MADE:

(A) PROBABLY MOST OF THE 200 WOULD PREFER TO GO BACK TO THE USSR:
 THE PROBLEM OF THOSE WANTING TO GO TO THE WEST WAS LIKELY TO BE SMALL:

(B) THE UNHCR SHOULD BE INVOLVED:

(C) THE ICRC WAS INVOLVED ALREADY:

(D) THE QUESTION SHOULD BE HANDLED DISCREETLY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY FRICTION WITH THE USSR.

3. BULLARD REPLIED THAT:

(A) IT HAD NOT YET BEEN POSSIBLE EITHER TO ARRANGE FOR SOVIET PRISONERS TO RETURN TO THE USSR OR TO BE EXCHANGED. IF THE PRISONERS WERE FACED WITH THE CHOICE BETWEEN STAYING IN THE HANDS OF THE AFGHANS OR GOING TO THE WEST, MANY WERE LIKELY TO CHOOSE THE LATTER. MOREOVER, SEVERAL OF THOSE WHO HAD BEEN INTERNED IN SWITZERLAND WERE NEARING THE END OF THEIR TIME THERE AND MIGHT ALSO APPLY FOR ADMISSION TO WESTERN COUNTRIES:

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(CA)

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- (B) HE DOUBTED THAT THE UNHCR WOULD REGARD PRISONERS AS REFUGEES;
- (C) THE ICRC APPEARED TO BE SOMEWHAT DISCREDITED BECAUSE IT HAD TRIED AND FAILED TO ARRANGE AN EXCHANGE;
- (D) LORD BETHELL'S INTEREST RULED OUT ANY CHANCE OF HANDLING THIS DISCREETLY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

4. BULLARD NOTED HOWEVER THAT THERE WAS NO COMMON DISPOSITION TO SUGGEST TO THE US THAT THEY CALL A MEETING. ANDREANI CONCLUDED IN THIS SENSE TOO, BUT SAID THAT PARTNERS SHOULD EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON ANY REQUESTS FOR ASYLUM WHICH THEY RECEIVED.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

FRETWELL

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

AFGHANISTAN

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cc FEO
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JP

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 February 1984

Dear Nicholas,

Thank you for your letter of 15 February enclosing letters from two Soviet soldiers whom you met in Pakistan. As you say, this is a complicated matter. We are looking into it urgently and I will let you have a substantive reply as soon as possible.

Laura

Raymond

The Lord Bethell, MEP.

JP

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PP's



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 February 1984

The letter pl.

20/2

Dear John,

Soviet Prisoners held by Afghan Resistance

Your letter of 15 February asked for a draft reply to Lord Bethell's letter of 15 February to the Prime Minister.

The application from the two Soviet soldiers for political asylum in the UK raises difficult questions. Although decisions on asylum rest with the Home Office, we have a strong interest in the particular problem of Soviet soldiers. We are pursuing Lord Bethell's points urgently with them. I enclose a copy of a letter which we have sent to the Home Office setting out Sir Geoffrey Howe's views on how we should approach the problem.

In the meantime, we recommend that the Prime Minister should send Lord Bethell an interim reply. He acknowledges that his request is a complicated matter, and does not seem to expect an instant decision. I enclose a draft accordingly.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Hugh Taylor at the Home Office.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT: minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: Lord Bethell
73 Sussex Square
LONDON W 2

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 15 February enclosing letters from two Soviet soldiers whom you met in Pakistan. As you say, this is a complicated matter. We are looking into it urgently and I will let you have a substantive reply as soon as possible.

AD 2/2


CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 February 1984


Dear Hugh,Afghanistan: Resettlement of Soviet Prisoners

As you will have seen from John Coles' letter of 15 February, Lord Bethell has written to the Prime Minister forwarding applications for asylum in this country from two of the Soviet prisoners he met in Pakistan.

In addition, the US Embassy here have recently approached us to seek our agreement in principle to resettling some Soviet soldiers in the UK. As you will remember, two Soviet soldiers were granted refugee status in the USA last November, and the Embassy's approach indicates that the Americans may have further soldiers in the pipeline and are likely to seek our help in resettling at least some of them in order to spread the burden. It is also possible that the Swiss Government may approach us with a request to take in Soviet soldiers who are at present interned in Switzerland under ICRC auspices and who are due to be released shortly.

As you know, we have so far taken a cautious line about possible requests for resettlement in the UK from Soviet soldiers. We have maintained that any individual application for resettlement would be considered on its merits. The Prime Minister made clear in her letter of 6 December to Count Tolstoy that HMG could not give any blanket assurances in advance, but added that it would be wrong to assume that individual applications would be treated unsympathetically.

Sir Geoffrey Howe realises that decisions on resettlement in the UK are the responsibility of the Home Secretary. However, now that we are faced with actual applications from Soviet soldiers, he thinks that it would be useful to have his views on the problem.

The humanitarian case for accepting soldiers for resettlement here may be no stronger than for other deserving groups. Nonetheless, if it became clear that a number of Soviet soldiers do wish to come to the West, we can expect some domestic pressure for HMG to do something for them. This

/suggests



suggests that a sympathetic approach will be right. Furthermore, a major part of our policy on Afghanistan is to maintain public awareness, both here and overseas, of the Soviet occupation and to bring effective pressure to bear on the Soviet leadership to withdraw their troops. Lord Bethell's articles are helping to keep Afghanistan in the public mind. The initial propaganda impact of bringing soldiers to the UK could be considerable. However, there would be drawbacks as well, particularly if we act in isolation from other European countries, or are seen to be taking the lead in encouraging defections. The Soviet Union might then be tempted to take steps against us, at the expense possibly of our policy of developing a broader dialogue with the Soviet Union. If, on the other hand, there were a general effort on the part of Western countries, we would on balance see political advantage in the UK being seen to play its part.

Nevertheless, we recognise that HMG cannot take an open-ended commitment. We have no reliable estimate on the number of Soviet prisoners in the hands of Afghan resistance, but the Americans believe there are between 50 and 200, (not all of whom would of course wish to come to the West). In practice, we would expect few, if any, to qualify for formal defector status. This would mean that any soldier would have to qualify for resettlement on normal Home Office criteria. It would also obviously be desirable to limit any burden on the State. The best approach might therefore be to put the onus on to private organisations and individuals, who have an interest in the Soviet soldiers, to demonstrate that they are prepared to make the necessary arrangements and to meet the costs. We believe this, if it is possible, would effectively limit the numbers of soldiers which we would be asked to accept.

In short, Sir Geoffrey considers that we should be prepared in principle to play our part, together with some of our allies, in accepting the small number of Soviet prisoners which private organisations are themselves prepared to sponsor financially. But we should not reveal our willingness to do so in public until we know that some at least of our European partners will take a similar line: Sir Julian Bullard plans to discuss the subject at a meeting of the Political Committee of the Ten in Paris on 21/22 February. We would hope that there can be close consultation on what is sure to remain a highly sensitive subject.

/I am

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I am sending a copy of this letter to John Coles (No 10)

Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Hugh Taylor Esq
PS/Home Secretary
HOME OFFICE

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LORD BETHELL 21/2

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 February 1984

Soviet Prisoners held by Afghan Resistance Groups

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Lord Bethell.

He asks whether the Government will consider granting political asylum to two Soviet prisoners held by an Afghan resistance group in Peshawar.

Lord Bethell told me on the telephone that he does not propose to publicise, for the time being, the fact that he has written to the Prime Minister about these cases. But it is of course likely that he will do so at a later stage.

I should be grateful for a draft reply by 21 February for signature by the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Hugh Taylor (Home Office) (Lord Bethell says that he has already copied this correspondence to both the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Home Secretary).

A J COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

84



- 3 -

/.....

Soviet Union on BBC and Voice of America. I believe that this increases the pressure on the Soviet government to seek a negotiated solution, a way out of their Afghan adventure.

Therefore, while appreciating that this is a complicated matter, I very much hope that you will conclude that there are strong political as well as humanitarian grounds for considering favourably Mr Rykov's and Mr Khlan's applications to come to this country. I would be glad to give any further information about their cases, if this would help, and to make my tape available. I have sent copies of this letter and Mr Rykov's letter to Geoffrey Howe and Leon Brittan, since this is obviously something that will be of interest to their two departments.

Yours ever

Richard

Lord Bethell





FROM
**NICHOLAS
BETHELL**

TELEPHONE
01-402-6877

**73 SUSSEX SQUARE
LONDON W2 2SS**

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON S.W.1.

15th February 1984

Dear Margaret,

Last week, following a European Parliament visit to Pakistan to investigate the problem of Afghan refugees, I went independently into the Afghanistan border region and then across to a resistance base inside Afghanistan. My main aim was to interview former members of the Soviet army presently being held by Afghan resistance groups and I wrote about this in the Mail on Sunday on February 12th.

I went to see Janet Young before I left and, since she knew of my interest in the plight of these Soviet prisoners, she indicated to me that the Government might be ready to consider admitting some of them to the United Kingdom. She emphasized though that each case would have to be examined separately.

I am now writing to bring two such cases to your attention and to ask whether the Government will consider granting political asylum to Igor Fyodorovich Rykov and Oleg Grigoryevich Khlan. I met them both on February 3rd in Peshawar, where they are held by Dr Sibghatullah Mojaddidi's group, known as the National Liberation Front.

Mr Rykov is 21 years old. He was trained for six months after being conscripted into the Soviet army and he served as a sergeant in a tank unit. He describes some aspects of his military service in Afghanistan in the enclosed letter addressed to you, which I have translated into English. I also enclose a letter that Mr Rykov wrote on behalf of his friend Mr Khlan.

I spoke to Mr Rykov for about an hour in Peshawar and I have the conversation on tape. He struck me as an intelligent young man, bright and with a sense of humour. He is a trained mechanic and I feel that there is little doubt of his ability, after a period of rehabilitation, to earn his own living.

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Dr Mojadidi and his group are well known to the British Embassy in Islamabad, especially to Mr Peter Preece, First Secretary, who travels frequently to Peshawar. It would be possible for Mr Preece or another Embassy official to contact these two young men and interview them, if you were minded to consider their application favourably.

Dr Mojadidi's son, who presented the two prisoners to me in his father's absence abroad, told me that his group would be only too pleased to get the prisoners off their hands. These prisoners are now an embarrassment to the groups. The Red Cross is doing very little to help and, as I wrote in the Mail, it is distrusted for having failed to deliver an agreed deal.

The prisoners have to be guarded and fed. They are an embarrassment to the Pakistani authorities and cause much friction between these authorities and the resistance groups. The Pakistan government is worried by the idea of keeping Soviet prisoners for long periods on their territory. They are of course in Pakistan quite illegally.

Nevertheless we think it quite an achievement that the Afghan resistance fighters are now taking prisoners at all. Until recently they just killed the Soviet soldiers that fell into their hands. Vladimir Bukovsky has put a lot of work into this, sending emissaries to talk to the resistance groups, to persuade them of the propaganda value of keeping Soviet prisoners alive. I have been doing all I can to help Mr Bukovsky in this enterprise.

We achieved a certain success, I think, in arranging for two young Soviet prisoners, Nikolai Ryzkhov and Alexander Voronov, to get from Pakistan to the United States at the end of November 1983. This was widely reported in the press and the two young men broadcast about it in Russian to the

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SPARC

КОМИТЕТ СПАСЕНИЯ СОВЕТСКИХ ПЛЕННЫХ В АФГАНИСТАНЕ SOVIET PRISONERS IN AFGHANISTAN RESCUE COMMITTEE

Address: SPARC, 78 Beckenham road, Beckenham/Kent BR34RH, United Kingdom, Bank Account: Account No 91115758, Midland Bank Plc. 184, High Street, Bromley/Kent, BRI HL, United Kingdom

Court Close,
Southmoor,
nr. Abingdon,
Berks. OX13 5HS.

10th December 1983

Dear Mr. Cole,

Thank you for your letter of 6th December, regarding Red Army prisoners of war taken in Afghanistan.

My Committee greatly appreciates the Prime Minister's concern with this important problem, and fully accepts the good intentions of Government in the matter of offering asylum to individual prisoners where appropriate. Discretion is clearly all-important in every aspect, and we are only anxious to establish an atmosphere of goodwill towards these unfortunate men.

Yours sincerely,
Nikolai Tolstoy.

Please copy to F/C.O. (N. Bone)
and to Sir A. Parsons.

Then p.a.

A.S.C. 12/12

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CF Papers

File

c. Sir A. Larous
FO



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 December 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 23 October about Soviet prisoners captured by the Afghan resistance.

Since you wrote, the Prime Minister has seen the interesting publicity given by Nicholas Bethell to the two defectors from the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. His article in the Daily Mail of 25 November gives a vivid account of conditions in the Soviet Army and of the disillusionment amongst those involved in Afghanistan.

We fully understand your concern at the possible fate of Soviet prisoners in the hands of the Afghan resistance. You rightly point out some of the reasons why this question must be approached with tact and discretion.

We are, of course, also concerned for the fate of those Afghan resistance fighters who have been captured by the Babrak Karmal regime or by the Russians. As you no doubt know, the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross to arrange the release of these resistance prisoners have so far been blocked by the Karmal regime.

It is obviously important that nothing should be done to jeopardise the safety of prisoners on both sides. Discretion has been essential to the efforts of the ICRC. These efforts have been partially successful in that some Soviet soldiers have been transferred to internment in Switzerland. We have no reason to think that there is any question of Soviet prisoners being returned to the Soviet Union against their will. Hence, there is no parallel with the events of 1945 to which you refer.

As regards the question of asylum in Great Britain, neither we nor, I believe, any other government could give a blanket assurance. I am sure that you will understand this. However, it would be wrong to assume that individual applications would be treated unsympathetically.

ABC

Count Nikolai Tolstoy

289

PRIME MINISTER

SOVIET PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE
AFGHAN RESISTANCE

You were worried that an earlier draft
reply to Count Tolstoy was too
negative.

In our absence in New Delhi, Tony Parsons
produced the attached reply. Content?

A. J. C.

2 December 1983

CF GR

Parsons please.

Sub

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
CONFIDENTIAL

MR. COMES

SOVIET PRISONERS IN AFGHANISTAN

I attach a redraft of the letter to Count Tolstoy to take into account the FCO's latest letter of 1 December. I also attach copies of the Bethell articles in the Daily Mail. I saw one or two television programmes showing the two Russians giving a press conference.

My own feeling, a compression from my original minute, is that we should not be too discouraging. I doubt whether the presence, even with publicity, of one or two Soviet defectors in Britain would have a marked adverse effect on Anglo-Soviet relations. Equally, if we were faced with specific requests for political asylum, I cannot see our being able to refuse them. The main problem, which we cannot reveal to Count Tolstoy in a letter, is the Pakistanis. If the trickle became a flood and they felt themselves exposed, they would be unable to resist Soviet pressure. This would not only wreck the ICRC's efforts on behalf of prisoners on both sides, but would also lead to Soviet defection drying up. If Russian soldiers thought that, at best, they were likely to be handed back to their own authorities by the Pakistanis, they would think even harder about deserting.



A.D. PARSONS
1 December 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT LETTER TO COUNT NIKOLAI TOLSTOY FROM JOHN COLES

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 23 October about Soviet prisoners captured by the Afghan resistance.

Since you wrote, the Prime Minister has seen the interesting publicity given by Nicholas Bethell to the two defectors from the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. His article in the Daily Mail of 25 November gives a vivid account of conditions in the Soviet Army and of the disillusionment amongst those involved in Afghanistan.

We fully understand your concern at the possible fate of Soviet prisoners in the hands of the Afghan resistance. You rightly point out some of the reasons why this question must be approached with tact and discretion.

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As regards the question of asylum in Great Britain, neither we nor, I believe, any other government could give a blanket assurance. I am sure that you will understand this. However, it would be wrong to assume that individual applications would be treated unsympathetically.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 December, 1983

Dear John,

Soviet Prisoners in Afghanistan Rescue Committee

My letter of 18 November enclosed a draft reply to Count Nikolai Tolstoy's letter of 23 October to the Prime Minister.

Meanwhile, you will be aware of Lord Bethell's exclusive article in the Daily Mail of 25 November reporting his interview with two Soviet soldiers who had been brought to the West from Afghanistan where they had defected to the resistance. Both soldiers were granted refugee status by the US, and arrived in New Year on 28 November.

We were aware on other channels of American plans to exfiltrate two soldiers to Europe, but were not warned that they might be used for publicity purposes. Lord Bethell approached us on 23 November to ask if visas could be issued for the soldiers to visit the UK, but later that day informed us that they would be going elsewhere in Europe. He interviewed the soldiers in Brussels on 24 November. We do not know how Lord Bethell gained access to the soldiers.

We asked our Embassy in Islamabad to tell the Pakistani MFA about the article and to point out that it could give rise to press enquiries in Pakistan. As you will see from the enclosed telegram, the MFA did not believe that press enquiries would cause them difficulties, but added that they would feel obliged to hand back any would-be defectors on Pakistani soil of whom the Russians were aware. They also broadly confirmed our assessment that the Pakistani authorities would not welcome any publicity campaign which put the spotlight on Pakistan.

We also asked the Embassy in Washington to speak to the State Department to clarify their policy towards Soviet prisoners. As reported in the enclosed telegram, the State Department disclaimed US Government involvement in the exfiltration of the two soldiers (which seems to indicate that the State Department have been kept as much in the dark as ourselves). However, the Americans confirmed that their policy on asylum for Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan is similar to our own, namely that they would consider individual cases on their merits, but could not give a blanket assurance.

CONFIDENTIAL

/We

Letter from Richetto to Coles dated 1 December 1983

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AA





We see no need to amend the advice in my letter of 18 November in the light of these developments. However, you might wish to consider working into the Prime Minister's reply to Count Tolstoy a reference to the light which Lord Bethell's article shed on Soviet activities in Afghanistan, and the poor morale of the Soviet occupying forces.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 282359Z NOVEMBER, 1983
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3581 OF 28 NOVEMBER
INFO ISLAMABAD, KABUL, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 450 TO ISLAMABAD: SOVIET DEFECTORS FROM AFGHANISTAN

1. WE SPOKE TO KIRBY, DIRECTOR FOR PAKISTAN IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT TODAY. HE SAID THAT RYZHKOV AND VORONOV'S ESCAPE TO THE WEST APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN ORGANISED BY AN AFGHAN EMIGRE GROUP CONNECTED WITH THE FORMER RUSSIAN DISSIDENT NOW IN THE US, BUKOVSKY. THE US GOVERNMENT, ACCORDING TO KIRBY, HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED, AND HAD LEARNED OF THE TWO SOLDIERS' PRESENCE IN THE WEST ONLY AT THE END OF LAST WEEK. HOWEVER, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALISATION SERVICE HAD GRANTED THEM REFUGEE STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES, AND THEY WOULD BE ARRIVING IN NEW YORK TODAY, WHERE THEY WOULD BE LOOKED AFTER BY THE "INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE", A PRIVATE ORGANISATION WITH A LONG RECORD OF ASSISTING RE-SETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES, EXILES AND DEFECTORS FROM THE SOVIET BLOC.
2. KIRBY SAID THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN RECEIVING A SMALL FLOW OF LETTERS RECENTLY URGING THE US TO OFFER A BLANKET ASYLUM TO SOVIET SOLDIERS IN AFGHANISTAN. THEY HAD TAKEN THE SAME LINE AS OURSELVES, IE THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER INDIVIDUAL CASES ON THEIR MERITS BUT COULD NOT GIVE A BLANKET ASSURANCE. KIRBY THOUGHT THIS LINE WOULD CONTINUE. HOWEVER, FOLLOWING THE ARRIVAL OF RYZHKOV AND VORONOV IN NEW YORK, HE THOUGHT IT ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE THE ORGANISATIONS CONCERNED SOUGHT PUBLICITY AND POSSIBLY MEETINGS WITH SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION.
3. KIRBY SAID THE FIGURE OF SEVERAL HUNDRED SOVIET ARMY DEFECTORS QUOTED IN THE DAILY MAIL ARTICLE (PARA 2B OF YOUR TELNO 447 TO ISLAMABAD) WAS FAR HIGHER THAN THE ADMITTEDLY ROUGH AND UNCONFIRMED FIGURE OF APPROXIMATELY 100 ON WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN WORKING.
4. KIRBY ALSO SAID THAT THE SWISS HAD ASKED THE AMERICANS WHETHER THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE 7 OR 8 RUSSIAN SOLDIERS WHO ARE IN THEIR HANDS UNDER ICRC ARRANGEMENTS, AND WHOSE PERIOD OF DETENTION EXPIRES NEXT SPRING. THE SWISS WERE NOT PREPARED TO FORCE THEM BACK TO THE SOVIET UNION AGAINST THEIR WISHES. THE AMERICANS HAD TAKEN THE SAME LINE AS IN PARA 2 ABOVE. IN THIS CASE HE HOPED.

HAD TAKEN THE SAME LINE AS IN PARA 2 ABOVE. IN THIS CASE HE HOPED,
WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WOULD DO LIKEWISE.

5. KIRBY SAID THE PAKISTANIS HAD NOT WISHED TO TALK, EVEN IN
PRIVATE, ABOUT SOVIET DEFECTORS, BUT HE BELIEVED THEIR ATTITUDE TO
BE AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR. HE WAS FAIRLY RELAXED ABOUT
THE CONSEQUENCES FOR US POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN IN THE
HYPOTHETICAL CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE US TAKING IN ANY SIZEABLE NUMBER
OF SOVIET MILITARY DEFECTORS. THE RUSSIANS WOULD MAKE PREDICTABLE
NOISES, BUT IT WOULD NOT AFFECT THEIR PRACTICAL DECISIONS.

6. KIRBY SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT OUR RESPECTIVE MISSIONS IN
ISLAMABAD HAD RECENTLY DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE, AND HE SAW SOME MERIT
IN OUR KEEPING IN TOUCH AND, WITH OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTIES,
COORDINATING OUR POSITIONS AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. IN PRINCIPLE, HE
SAID, THERE WAS NO REASON WHY THE U.S. ALONE SHOULD BE THE PREFERRED
DESTINATION OF THESE DEFECTORS. HE WOULD BE CONSULTING THIS WEEK
WITH OTHERS IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AND IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO
KNOW WHAT POSITION WE WOULD BE TAKING.

WRIGHT

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RR ISLAMABAD

RR KABUL

RR MOSCOW

...AND THE SAME LINE AS IN PARA 2 ABOVE. IN THIS CASE HE HOPED
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MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. CLEGG
MR. GLAVIN
MR. LADD
MR. NICHOLS
MR. ROSEN
MR. TRACY
MR. WINTERROWD
TELE. ROOM
MR. HOLLOMAN
MISS GANDY

RUSSIA'S AFGHAN TROOPS DEFECT

BY NICHOLAS BETHELL

TWO defectors from the Soviet Army fighting in Afghanistan have reached safety in the West, travelling through a highly organised 'underground railway'.

They are the first of hundreds of Soviet troops who are said to have gone over to the Afghans.

Yesterday, Private Nikolai Ryzhkov and Private Alexander Voronov, who until this summer worked in Soviet Army headquarters in Kabul, arrived in Brussels on their way to a new life in the United States.

There I became the first Western journalist to interview them.

'We left the Soviet Army because we realised that we were not there to protect our own country. We realised that we were the invaders and the Afghans themselves, who fought so hard, were only defending their own country as we Russians did in 1941,' said Nikolai Ryzhkov.

He added: 'Many of our comrades came to the same decision. We are the first of a large number who are on their way to the West.'

Several hundred Soviet troops

have defected to the Afghans as the result of the guerilla fighters' decision not to shoot or kill prisoners. An equal number, or more, they said had converted or reaffirmed their Moslem faith and were now fighting with the guerillas against the Red Army.

The picture they painted of the Russian Army in Afghanistan was of a demoralised force, badly supplied, in which a majority—officers and men alike—were cynical about the war. Few thought it could ever be won.

They talked of Russian dead being shipped back to the Soviet Union in 'tin coffins'. They talked of helicopter gunship pilots talking in phrases which to Western ears have an uncanny echo of what American pilots were saying in Vietnam.

'We go back day after day wiping out villages and using all that ammunition... but we



Defectors Kolya and Sasha: 'We realised we were invaders' Picture: CLIVE LIMPIN

Turn to Page 2, Col. 1

Defectors

Continued from Page One

never kill any of the real enemy.

And they talked of the success of the guerillas who openly operate in the streets throughout the outskirts of Kabul.

The one thing they would not reveal was the cleverly organised system which had been set up to get them out of Afghanistan, then to Wester Europe and on to America. But set up it is. It took the two Russians I spoke to five months to get to Europe. Others are expected to follow more quickly.

This weekend, they fly to New York.

For Nikolai, known as Kolya, it is something he has dreamed about these last few months. 'I want to live there. It's my new world,' he said.

Kalya and Alexander, known as Sasha, have put their past behind them. Their thoughts now are about their new life, how they're going to learn English, go to college, get jobs and decent money, become Americans and eventually invite their families to join them.

Their parents, meanwhile, know nothing of what has happened. They live in small villages hundreds of miles from any big town and the only news they will have received since June (Kolya and Sasha assume) is the usual official notification: 'Your son has been reported missing, circumstances unknown.'

'I just wish my mother could see Sasha's and my picture in your newspaper,' said Kolya. 'Or I wish someone would show it to them. It will be the first news they get that I am still alive.'

'This wasn't our war—
Pages SIX and SEVEN

Weather

DISTRICT FORECASTS

1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 15: Mainly cloudy, rain, heavy in places. A few clear intervals. Wind S.W. fresh or strong. Max. 12c, 54f.

2, 4, 8, 9, 10: Cloudy, rain, heavy at times. Hill and coastal fog. Wind S.W., strong with gales. Max. 14c, 57f.

11, 12, 13, 14, 16: Mainly cloudy, rain or drizzle. Hill fog patches. A few bright intervals. Wind S.W., fresh or strong. Max. 12c, 54f.

17, 18, 19, 22, 23: Cloudy, occasional rain or drizzle. Bright intervals at first. Wind S.W..

AIR MAIL.—CHANNEL Is. 19p. BELGIUM 35

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Not really so third rate

THE Hindustan Times has pronounced Britain to be a 'relatively minor power'

We may ask relative to what? Britain has roughly 11 per cent of world population but her clout in world affairs far exceeds India's with about fifteen times as many.

As a military power we are amongst the select few with tanks, arms and with the undoubted capacity to deliver them.

In naval power, despite the disappearance long ago of the Grand Fleet, we are still the world's number three.

We play a major role in the world's seven-nation economic summit. It is relative to our glorious past, when we had a hand-start in the industrial revolution and when Britannia ruled the waves, that we look to some like an also-ran today.

Yet in today's world, more and more, it is relative to the quality that counts - the quality that gives us more Nobel prizes per head than any other nation. Besides the whole point of the Thatcher exercise is to rescue the country from decadence. The Hindustan Times should watch closely the budding British renaissance.

Leisure work

PEOPLE will increasingly become better known for what they do outside work than for what they do in it, according to the Henley Centre for Forecasting. It is quite right to drive home the message that leisure activities will more and more dominate the future.

Yet, up to a point, this has always been happening because top amateur sportsmen have long been more famed for what they do outside work.

The report seems, however, to take too little account of the next stage - where the leading amateur turns professional because the money is so good. The change goes wider than that, for it is in leisure industries that employment is manifestly growing.

Amusing as it may sound, land turned over to recreation employs more people than the same acreage used for farming.

Puritans may dislike this more frivolous shape of the economy. Yet it deserves to be cheerfully accepted as a change from a world of back-breaking toil to one where, due to microchip and other marvels, the lives of the mass of people have ever more in common with those of the elite rich.

Brent extravaganza

THE recent defection to the Tories of black councillor Mrs Ambrose Neil should have meant the immediate end of the control of the London Borough of Brent by Left-Wing extremists.

Tragically the failure of the local Tories and Liberals to agree leaves the old gang still in charge, not only continuing in their old spendthrift ways but engaging on council officials to spend still more.

The opposition need their heads banging together to stop them bickering. They should forthwith agree on minimum arrangements necessary for taking power.

The alternative is to lose popular confidence and to allow Labour to continue and even to reiterate their policy of taking Brent back into the Stone Age.

KOLYA and Sasha are just boys. They had never been out of Russia until, as 16-year-old conscripts, they were sent to Afghanistan just a few weeks after completing their basic training.

In a way they are like a previous generation of American kids who were sent patriotically and uncomprehendingly into South-East Asia 15 years ago to fight another unwinnable war.

What happened to Kolya and Sasha in Afghanistan made them desert to be here, meet their comrades.

Some changed sides and are fighting with the Afghan forces. Others will come out to the West.

Kolya and Sasha are the first two of a very long chain of Soviet military deserters from the Afghan front. This is their story.

We had a lecture. A political lecturer says Kolya and Sasha said, to defend the Motherland.

It was explained that the enemies of our country are the two great enemies, America and the Chinese - were working together building aggressive bases for the invasion of the Soviet Union.

The Red Army could not stand idly by while these plotters' plans were so blatantly carried out. The Motherland must take place in Afghanistan itself. We were among the honour troops charged with that mission.

We were inspired, he added. 'We wanted to serve our country. Together with hundreds of others, they were down South and the stiffs into Kabul. They arrived at night and were taken by convoy to the huge, ever-expanding Soviet Army HQ, dozens miles or so outside the city.'

Illusion

The headquarters is a heavily defended site with a fortified perimeter. In the days to follow many 'troops were assigned to different parts of the site.

Kolya and Sasha thought they were lucky. They were assigned to the HQ protection and development staff.

In reality, this meant that they were on guard duties and then put into construction squads to build further defence works and fortifications, and finally to build blocks of accommodation for officer arriving manning the helicopter gun ships - which as in Vietnam, are one of the principal ways the regular army fights the unrelentingly guerrillas.

In fact, as Kolya and Sasha were to explain, what seemed a very good posting was only an illusion of luck. The HQ, while its perimeter was like a tramp's quarters, was like a cramped Russian labour camp.

The Russian Army inmates soon realised that though they were only a few miles from the centre of the capital, with its Moscow-supporting and supported government, they were being held in a hell.

Alghan guerrillas operated right up to the fence wires and roamed openly through the streets and fields. One could leave the camp at any time in well-armed company.

The troops slept in tents, hunched and huddled. Kolya and Sasha's unit arrived early this year and was sent to camp. They froze in their tents all the summer, came they sweated and ran about of their own accord.

They were comatose four hours. Keville died at 2 a.m. and the working day ran from 7 a.m. to 1 p.m. with a one-hour dinner break.

They were paid nine roubles (about 20 p) a month. The 'special' members that had to be spent in the soldiers' club. Kolya and Sasha remember that the most of it on cleaning material.



Russian tanks, Russian foot soldiers in Afghanistan. They look formidable but the troops are demoralised.

This wasn't our war the communists said

by Nicholas Bethell EURO MP AND EXPERT ON RUSSIAN AFFAIRS

for their uniforms. A grubby belt meant a week in the guard house.

'What were the problems?' said Sasha. 'I'll tell you some of them. There wasn't enough water either for drinking or for washing.'

'There's a lot of disease, mainly typhoid and hepatitis. The doctors don't have the drugs and there's not much they can do.'

We were told that we must never surrender. For at least that meant death by shooting or even beheading, said Kolya.

But we had terrible stories of how the Afghans tortured the prisoners, cutting them into hundreds of pieces, beginning with the genital area.

And there were the casualties. Russian dead were shipped home in metal coffins. And the coffin count remained a subject of much speculation.

The main picture that emerged from them was the demoralisation of the Soviet troops. In Kabul troops were not allowed vodka. They could only get lemon or apple juice in their canteens.

'We did make drink out of water and brake fluid. But getting things on the black market would have cost six months wages for a bottle,' said Kolya.

The real black market was run by the supply troops and the technicians. The supply drivers would go back and forth to the Soviet Union in convoys, said Sasha. 'They would buy vodka, open

hans of cement they were bringing back for construction and put four or five bottles in each bag. They could make a fortune from them, selling to officers, civilians or other 'capitalists'.

'The other capitalists were the technical troops who conducted a thriving business selling off electrical, basic cement, petrol and spare parts.'

Cynicism and war weariness was everywhere, the two said. And their eyes were opened when working on construction and decorating work in the officers' quarters.

'We would hear the pilots - the helicopter pilots talk when they came back from their strikes,' said Sasha.

Prisoners

'They would get drunk and say "What's the use of going out and blasting a village out of existence each day. You only kill a few old men and women. The real enemies are in the caves, stand stilling it."

'The black market was run by the supply troops who went back and forth to the Soviet Union, said Sasha. They would buy vodka, concrete bags of cement they were bringing back for construction and put four or five bottles in each bag.'

'One soldier would say, "I need another would say, "I need ammunition today and all I killed were a few hundred sheep and

Maybe a shepherd. What a way to fight a war.'

'It was highly interesting to hear what these gentlemen were saying,' said Sasha. 'Because it was exactly what we common know. They were not fighting their gunbushes every day. They were fighting.'

'We weren't fighting. But we knew we were prisoners. Everyone knew if you went out of that camp, you got a bullet in you or your throat cut.'

'And we knew something else by now,' added Kolya. 'We were the backbone soldiers with no great education. But we knew that we were not fighting Americans or Chinese. What they had said to us was not true.'

'We knew that we were fighting the Afghan people. But even more important, we knew they were not going to invade the defending their country the way we in Russia did in 1941.'

'Some time in the high summer an amazing rumour spread the camp and every soldier began talking about it. It was dramatic and stark: the Afghans had had a change of policy.'

'They were no longer killing all prisoners. They were only killing the officers. Ordinary soldiers were being treated well.'

'The headquarters battalion at that time were suffering from an outbreak of shingles... some of which was fatal. In addition, boredom and war weariness was affecting many. One soldier shot himself, said Sasha. Another committed suicide by hanging. But the real topic was getting out by being captured. Some men talked about it on duty or in the

FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE REAL STORY OF THE RUSSIAN CONSCRIPTS IN



Kolya (left) and Sasha, safe in the West. They hope to become Americans

had lied

...ents: how to get out, remembers Kolya. "I never said a word, though. You start by telling one friend, he tells another friend and before you know what's happening, you've been denounced.

Discipline became harsher. Propaganda about horrific Afghan torture increased. In the Soviet Army, officers are allowed to strike their men if they are being punished.

The most usual punishment was to make us run 500 metres in a crouching position with our hips a few inches off the ground. Officers would run behind hitting and kicking us. At the end, if we hadn't done it fast enough, they'd give us another 500 metres.

Frightened

But not many officers are trusted to give uplifting propaganda about the war. That was done by a central propaganda unit back in Russia which made special films about the "heroic conflict".

Every so often troops were marched in to watch such films. It was in mid-June when they were watching just such a film that Kolya decided that he had had enough.

After the film, he got out and, still in his army fatigues, walked into Kabul. He knew he was taking a risk... but he was prepared for it.

"I heard a skirmish going on, metres away. I walked towards the noise of the shots. I knew there must be Afghans there."

"The fighting stopped and I saw a group of Mujahidin guerrilla fighters walking towards

me fully armed quite openly in a Kabul street. At first I was frightened and I ducked down a side street to avoid them.

These last few years plenty of Russian soldiers have had their throats cut with no questions asked.

"Then I reminded myself that nothing could be worse than what I had left behind. Anyway, it was too late to go back. They would have missed me already."

"So I walked out with my hands up and surrendered to the Afghan fighters."

They prodded him with their Kalashnikov rifles. He tried to communicate desperately that he wanted to surrender... fearful all the time that they would shoot him.

But they seemed to understand. And Kolya was later to realise why, he says, when in their camps he came across hundreds of other Russian soldiers who had done the same.

He was blindfolded and taken on a three-hour journey to the guerrilla camp. There he was questioned by a group of senior guerrillas who spoke Russian.

"They asked me if I wanted to embrace the faith of Islam and join in with them in the battle against Soviet imperialism," he said. "I told them no... what I really wanted to do was to go to the West."

He realises now that he was taking another serious risk with his life. Some of the extreme groups in Afghanistan would have been ready to kill him simply for that, for refusing to become a Muslim.

But the group respected his decision, though they kept him separate from their other dozen prisoners, all of whom had taken

the faith. Shortly afterwards he came together again with Sasha.

Sasha and Kolya were safe for the moment, but it was still a long way from a base in the Afghan hills to a house in Brussels where I talked to them yesterday.

But they were in danger for a long time. Afghan groups usually treat their prisoners exactly nowadays, but if a group is attacked and surrounded, they are liable to kill the prisoners, rather than let them fall into Soviet hands again and perhaps rejoin their enemy.

The two detectors say they have happy memories of life in the hills with their captors. There were no women, only fighting men, some of them very young, only 10 or 12 years old. It was five months before they could be magic carpeted from Afghanistan to Europe.

Sasha, who comes from a small village some 400 miles east of Moscow, and Kolya, who is from Kazakhstan, will be in New York next week. They hope to become Americans.

Hopeful

As I said, they are only boys. But their story is remarkable. It shows that products of Soviet social engineering can become disaffected, demoralised and indifferent to their country if exposed abroad to a cannon fodder to take part in an unpopular political war.

The American troops in Vietnam, and the American people themselves, were exposed to all the criticism that a few years could muster in their unwinable war. It is understandable that many of them turned against it.

It is hopeful that young Russians without any bombardment of counter-propaganda can make up their minds on their own with all the risks involved.

It is clear that many of the hearts and the minds that are being changed in Afghanistan are those of the Russians themselves.

© Daily Mail 1983

THE C THAT REMEMBERS YOUR FAVOURITE


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26 NOV 1983
DUPLICATES

OF LETTER
OF ENCLOSURES
LOCATION

OO ISLAMABAD
OO NEW DELHI
OO KABUL
OO MOSCOW

GRS

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 251250Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER 447 OF 25 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI (ALSO FOR PS NO 10 AND CHOQM DELEGATION), KABUL, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, BRUSSELS

SOVIET DEFECTORS FROM AFGHANISTAN: DAILY MAIL

1. DAILY MAIL OF 25 NOVEMBER CARRIED A FRONT PAGE QUOTE WORD EXCLUSIVE UNQUOTE ARTICLE BY LORD BETHELL ENTITLED QUOTE RUSSIA'S AFGHAN TROOPS DEFECT UNQUOTE.

2. ARTICLE IS BASED ON AN INTERVIEW CONDUCTED BY BETHELL IN BRUSSELS ON 24 NOVEMBER WITH NIKOLAI RYZHKOV AND ALEXANDER VORONOV, TWO PRIVATES FROM THE SOVIET ARMY IN AFGHANISTAN WHO HAVE BEEN EXTRUDED TO THE WEST AFTER DEFECTING TO THE RESISTANCE. THEY REPORTED TO BE FLYING TO NEW YORK THIS WEEKEND TO START QUOTE A NEW LIFE UNQUOTE, AND HOPE TO BECOME US CITIZENS.

2. MAIN POINTS MADE BY BETHELL ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A) RYZHKOV AND BORONOV REACHED THE WEST THROUGH A HIGHLY ORGANISED QUOTE UNDERGROUND RAILWAY UNQUOTE (BUT THEY WOULD NOT GIVE DETAILS):

B) THEY ARE ONLY THE FIRST OF QUOTE SEVERAL HUNDRED UNQUOTE SOVIET TROOPS WHO ARE SAID TO HAVE DEFECTED TO THE RESISTANCE.

C) THOUGH IT TOOK THE TWO SOLDIERS FIVE MONTHS TO REACH EUROPE, OTHERS ARE EXPECTED TO FOLLOW MORE QUICKLY.

3. REMAINDER OF ARTICLE IS A VIVID ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS FACING SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN: LOW MORALE, CORRUPTION, WAR WEARINESS, AND DISEASE. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

4. SEE MIFT.

HOWE

NNNNS

RESTRICTED

FM URMIS NEW YORK 240138Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 1435 OF 23 NOVEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD

INFO PRIORITY KABUL MOSCOW WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE LILONGWE BAGHDAD

INFO SAVING PEKING PARIS TEHRAN MAPUTO

MY TELNO 1418 (NOT TO ALL): UNGA DEBATE ON AFGHANISTAN:
CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

1. FOLLOWING A FURTHER 15 STATEMENTS, RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY 116-20-17, A RECORD MAJORITY OF 96 VOTES. DEFECTIONS BY IRAQ AND MALAWI.

DETAIL

2. THE RESUMED DEBATE ON AFGHANISTAN TOOK UP MOST OF 23 NOVEMBER. THE STATEMENTS LARGELY FOLLOWED THE PATTERN OF THE PREVIOUS TWO DAYS. THE GDR, VIETNAM AND LAOS SPOKE ON THE AFGHAN SIDE. IN AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, THE AFGHAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE REPEATED SALIENT POINTS FROM HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENT: ACCUSED OTHER SPEAKERS OF INFLATING THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES FRAUDULENTLY; AND DECLARED THAT THE RESOLUTION WOULD HAVE NO LEGAL VALIDITY.

3. THE INDIANS TRIED TO BALANCE THEIR CRITICISM OF EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND OF THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS. THEY ARGUED THAT THE ANNUAL RITUAL OF AN ACrimonious DEBATE MADE DIALOGUE MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE AND WAS THUS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. THE AFGHANS WERE PAWNS IN AN INTERNATIONAL POWER PLAY, WHICH CARRIED DANGERS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY. THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION WAS NOT NOW ON THE SEARCH FOR AN IMMEDIATE REMEDY BUT ON COMPLICATED STRATEGEMS OF CONTAINMENT. THE EXISTING SITUATION COULD SERVE AS A PRETEXT FOR THOSE WHO WISHED TO CREATE FURTHER INSTABILITY IN THE AREA. WE SHOULD NOT SIT IN JUDGEMENT BUT WORK FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION BASED ON A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PARTIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED. THE INDIANS QUOTED AT LENGTH FROM THE NEW DELHI NON-ALIGNED COMMUNIQUE: EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE SECRETARY GENERALS EFFORTS; AND DECLINED TO SUPPORT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION BECAUSE IT WAS ONCE AGAIN ONE SIDED. (THEY ABSTAINED AGAIN).

4. IN HIS EXPLANATION OF VOTE, THE IRANIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS NOT STRONG ENOUGH. IF THE CALL FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS WAS IMPLEMENTED, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION. HE REFERRED TO THE FUTILITY OF THE SECRETARY GENERALS EFFORTS.

5. THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MALAWI SAID IN AN EOY THAT MALAWI SUPPORTED THE PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN THE RESOLUTION. HOWEVER, THE RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY THE GA HAD NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE, AND THERE WAS NOW A STALEMATE. THERE SHOULD THEREFORE BE A CHANGE OF STRATEGY. MALAWI BELIEVED IN CONTACT AND DIALOGUE AS A MEANS OF SOLVING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND WOULD ACCORDINGLY ABSTAIN.

6. AT THE END OF THE DAY THERE WAS AN EXCHANGE OF RIGHTS OF REPLY BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN, CENTERING ON THE QUESTION OF DIRECT TALKS AND ON THE TRU NUMBER OF REFUGEES.

THE VOTE

7. THE MAJORITY OF 96 COMPARED WITH 93 IN THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS. THE POSITIVE VOTE OF 116 EQUALLED THE 1981 FIGURE (WHICH DROPPED TO 114 IN 1982). THIS WAS THEREFORE A VERY GOOD RESULT FOR THE PAKISTANIS AND THEIR FRIENDS.

8. THE PAKISTANIS LOST THE POSITIVE VOTES OF IRAQ, MALAWI AND UPPER VOLTA, (ALL OF THEM ABSTAINED). THEY WERE PARTICULARLY ANNOYED ABOUT THE FORMER WHICH THEY ATTRIBUTED TO PIQUE OVER THEIR OWN RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL ABSTENTION ON THE IRAN/IRAQ RESOLUTION (SCR 540). SHAS NAWAZ TOLD US THAT HIS IRAQI COLLEAGUE HAD RENEGED ON A PROMISE.

9. TO GENERAL BAFPLEMENT, THE MALAWIAN REVEALED ONLY FOUR HOURS BEFORE THE VOTE THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ABSTAIN. WE AND THE AMERICANS JOINED THE PAKISTANIS IN TRYING TO MOVE HIM BACK, BUT HIS INSTRUCTIONS LEFT HIM NO DISCRETION, AND IT WAS TOO LATE AT NIGHT TO OBTAIN A CHANGE FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL PARTY IN NEW DELHI. FROM THE MALAWIANS INCOHERENT ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN THIS DECISION TO US, IT APPEARED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO FOLLOW A CONSISTENT POLICY OF ABSTAINING ON CONTROVERSIAL ITEMS, INCLUDING RECENTLY GRENADA AND KAMPUCHEA. (THEIR ORIGINAL INTENTION WAS ALSO TO ABSTAIN ON THE FALKLANDS VOTE, AND AS IN THE PAST THEY WILL ABSTAIN ON PROPOSALS TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA).

10. ON THE PLUS SIDE, THE RESOLUTION ATTRACTED VOTES FROM BOLIVIA, MAURITIUS, BELIZE AND VANUATU (ABSENT IN 1982) AND FROM ST KITTS (NEW MEMBER).

11. WITH ONLY 20 NEGATIVE VOTES, THE AFGHANS AND RUSSIANS ARE DOWN TO THEIR HARD CORE (WHICH STILL INCLUDES MOZAMBIQUE, ETHIOPIA, ANGOLA, MADAGASCAR, SYRIA, LIBYA, AND PDRY IN ADDITION TO THE WARSAW PACT PLUS VIETNAM, LAOS AND CUBA). THEIR SOLE LOSS WAS GRENADA. NICARAGUA ABSTAINED AGAIN.

FCO PASS SAVING

THOMSON

NNNN

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1982
10
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Please release
attached papers

SIR ANTHONY PARSONS

Soviet Prisoners in Afghanistan

Please see the attached papers.

As you will see, the Prime Minister finds the draft reply too negative. My impression is that the Prime Minister is not questioning the policy but the way it is presented in this letter. I think I could redraft in a way which would obtain her approval but I shall not have time to do so before going to CHOGM. If you yourself wish to try your hand at this, do let me have a revised draft on return. Otherwise I shall deal with it then.

Would you be good enough to tell the FCO that we are holding this up?

A.P.C.

21 November 1983



Prime Minister.

There is also a minute by
Tony Parsons (attached).

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

2. The proposed reply to Count Tolstoy London SW1A 2AH

could lead to criticism of HMG.
but the Foreign Secretary has considered
it carefully.

18 November 1983

3. Agree the proposed reply?

Dear John,

A.J.C. 18/11

Soviet Prisoners in Afghanistan Rescue Committee

Your letter of 11 November to Roger Bone asked for advice on the letter of 23 October to the Prime Minister from Count Nikolai Tolstoy, President of the Soviet Prisoners in Afghanistan Rescue Committee (SPARC), a Russian emigre organisation established earlier this year. Count Tolstoy has written in similar terms to the Foreign Secretary.

The fate of Soviet prisoners held by the Afghan resistance has aroused interest in Britain over the past two years, although there is no specific British responsibility or obligation towards them. The arguments advanced by Count Tolstoy and others for HMG to do something on behalf of the prisoners fall into four categories. They argue on humanitarian grounds that we should do what we can to help the prisoners. They claim that an active British role in bringing Soviet defectors out could have both intelligence and propaganda value. Finally, they consider that it should be possible to encourage mass desertions from the Soviet Army in Afghanistan which would have a damaging effect on the capabilities of the Soviet forces there. Both Count Tolstoy and Mr Amery (in Part IV of the report enclosed with his letter of 7 November to the Prime Minister) have also drawn an analogy with the treatment of Soviet prisoners in 1945.

Let me take these arguments in turn. The humanitarian case is undeniable. However, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is best placed to deal with the problem at its present level. We believe that between 30 and 70 soldiers are held by the resistance in camps along the Afghan/Pakistan border. So far eight have been transferred under ICRC auspices to Switzerland where they are held in detention on the understanding that they will return in due course to the Soviet Union. The ICRC are apparently meeting increasing difficulty in persuading the resistance to release Soviet captives, particularly as plans for the parallel release of resistance prisoners have (not surprisingly) been blocked by the Karmal regime. The ICRC are most anxious to avoid any publicity which could jeopardise their efforts on behalf of both the Soviet and resistance prisoners. We have not been asked for any assistance, but we keep in touch with the ICRC and the Swiss Government, who have indicated that no Soviet soldier will be returned to the Soviet Union from



Switzerland against his will. There is therefore no question of any analogy with Yalta.

Turning to the intelligence argument, it is unlikely that any of the Soviet soldiers currently held by the resistance would have significant intelligence value. They are mostly young conscripts with little education. The propaganda value of any Soviet defectors brought to this country would probably be limited and short-lived. Exposure of prisoners to the media could help maintain awareness of Soviet actions in Afghanistan but could equally backfire if the soldiers were inarticulate or failed to settle down here and wanted to return to the Soviet Union.

A policy of encouraging widespread defections would conflict with humanitarian efforts such as those of the ICRC which require quiet negotiation out of the limelight; and, if successful, it would involve us in a potentially costly commitment to permanent resettlement in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, a successful effort in this field would be a serious blow to the Soviet Union and would therefore be very much worth considering if there were a reasonable prospect of success. The key point here is the position of Pakistan, without whose overt co-operation such a policy could not be conducted on any scale. The Russians would be very conscious of the dangers to them of sharply increased desertion and we would expect them to apply maximum pressure on Pakistan - including the threat and use of force, eg through retaliatory raids across the border - if they were to participate in such a Western campaign.

Although the Pakistani authorities have acquiesced in ICRC operations we believe that President Zia is very conscious of the risks described above and would not favour a Western campaign of the kind proposed. There would of course be no question of acting without the full agreement of the Pakistani Government.

Our present policy in these matters is in line with that of other Western Governments. We know that the Americans have recently exfiltrated two Soviet prisoners (without publicity) for debriefing purposes, but we have heard nothing to suggest that they are at present thinking of anything more ambitious.

The Foreign Secretary considers that the balance of advantage is against an initiative to encourage desertions by a general offer of resettlement to Soviet soldiers. He sees no case for the UK to take the lead, but believes that we should maintain our existing policy of leaving open the possibility of accepting individual soldiers who satisfy our normal criteria or who have intelligence and/or exceptional publicity value (a summary of the standard procedures covering defectors and the grant of asylum are at Annex).

/I enclose



/ I enclose a draft reply to Count Tolstoy which draws
/ on the Prime Minister's letter of 17 November 1981 to
Mr Bukovsky (copy enclosed), and the line we have been
following in reply to MPs and others since then, and which
has been agreed at official level with the Home Office.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Hugh Taylor
(Home Office).


Yours ever,

P F Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1672</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Annex to Letter from Ricketts to Coles dated 18 November 1983</i>	
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DS: (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: PS/Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: Count Nikolai Tolstoy
Count Close
Southmoor
Nr Abingdon
Berks
OX13 5HS

Your Reference

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

is *1. Under this letter*
is made to register
Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 23 October about Soviet prisoners captured by the Afghan resistance.

CAVEAT.....

feel
We understand your concern at the possible fate of these soldiers and have carefully considered the arguments you advanced for taking the initiative to bring them to the West. I should make clear that we have not received any application directly from individual Soviet soldiers.

We are of course equally concerned for the fate of those Afghan resistance fighters who have been captured by the Babrak Karmal regime or the Russians. Although some Soviet soldiers have been transferred to internment in Switzerland, the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to arrange the release of resistance prisoners have so far been blocked by the Karmal regime.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

We welcome these efforts to secure the safety of prisoners on both sides. The terms of the agreement /negotiated

negotiated by the ICRC are confidential, and, in our view, this discretion has been essential to even its partial success. The ICRC have not asked for our assistance in any way. We would not want to take any action which could jeopardise the ICRC's efforts to achieve the humanitarian objective of saving the lives of the prisoners on both sides. To encourage the escalation of desertion from the Soviet Army, as you suggest, would risk cutting across the ICRC's efforts.

Belkin not mentioned.

Incidentally we have no reason to think that there is any question of returning Soviet prisoners to the Soviet Union against their will. We do not therefore accept believe that there is any parallel ~~whatsoever~~ with the events of 1945 to which you refer.

As you appreciate, the question you raised must be approached with a good deal of caution. Applications for asylum require careful consideration, and there are well-established procedures for dealing with each case on its merits. Although we have not received any application directly from individual Soviet soldiers, we would, of course, look at any which were received to see whether re-settlement here was appropriate. ~~But~~ we could clearly not commit HMG in advance to the granting of asylum to one group of people, however unfortunate, without injustice to deserving cases in other countries.



FILE

107

cc: FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 November, 1983

Thank you for your letter of 11 November to the Prime Minister in which you ask for a meeting with the Prime Minister during the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in New Delhi.

Unfortunately the Prime Minister's programme will not allow any opportunity for a meeting. However, I am sure that a member of the British High Commission in New Delhi would be glad to discuss with you the Afghan Social Democrats' proposals and any other matters relating to Afghanistan.

A. L. COLES

Dr. M. Amin Wakman

CT

RESTRICTED

? cf



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Type letter pl.

17 November 1983

A.J.C. 11

Dear John,

Thank you for your letter of 15 November asking for advice on the letter of 11 November to the Prime Minister from Dr Wakman, Secretary-General of the Afghan Social Democratic Party. I enclose a draft reply declining Dr Wakman's request for a meeting with the Prime Minister during CHOGM.

The Afghan Social Democratic Party is a party of Pushtoon nationalists, some of whom may remain in touch with the Karmal regime. It exerted some influence in the 1960s and early 1970s but dispersed after the coup in April 1978 which installed the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

Dr Wakman met a member of the South Asian Department here last August to discuss his efforts to raise funds for medical and food supplies for the Afghan refugees, but he did not ask for HMG's assistance. It seems that his party has recently drawn closer to the so-called 'moderate' alliance of Afghan resistance groups. However, we do not consider Dr Wakman to be of sufficient importance to warrant an interview with the Prime Minister or with any member of the Prime Minister's party at CHOGM.

As you will see, the draft suggests that Dr Wakman might call instead on the High Commission in Delhi and once it has issued, we will copy the correspondence to Delhi.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

A J Coles Esq
No 10 Downing Street
DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

Dr M Amin Wakman
Secretary-General
Afghan Social Democratic Party
PO Box No 3813 Andrews Ganj
New Delhi 110049

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 11 November to the Prime Minister in which you ask for a meeting with the Prime Minister during the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in New Delhi.

CAVEAT.....

Unfortunately the Prime Minister's programme will not allow any opportunity for a meeting. However, I am sure that a member of the British High Commission in New Delhi would be glad to discuss with you the Afghan Social Democrats' proposals and any other matters relating to Afghanistan.

AM 15

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Afghanistan
Int. Sec.
P46

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INTEGRATION AND INSURANCE
TEL. NO. 4512

11/11/50
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file No
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 November 1983

AFGHANISTAN

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Secretary General of the Afghan Social Democratic Party. Dr. Wakman seeks a meeting with the Prime Minister or her representative in New Delhi during CHOGM.

BN | I should be grateful for advice and a draft reply for my signature as soon as possible please.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PR



Nikolai Tolstoy

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 November 1983

SOVIET PRISONERS IN AFGHANISTAN
RESCUE COMMITTEE

A copy of Count Nikolai Tolstoy's letter of 23 October to the Prime Minister was sent to you earlier, though there appears to have been some delay in transmission. I enclose a further copy for ease of reference.

I think it desirable that the writer should receive a reply from me, on the Prime Minister's behalf, before we leave for India on 21 November. I should accordingly be grateful for advice and a draft reply by the close of play on Wednesday, 16 November, at the latest.

BFI

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NK

We spoke
A.D.C. 17
"



10 DOWNING STREET

~~Sir A. Parsons.~~

J.C.
→

This has got into a muddle
through a mishandling here of
Cout Trolley's letter.

We need Sir G. Howe's
advice before we can do anything.
I have asked to it by Wednesday
at latest (so that we can refer
to Trolley before CHOGA).

Perhaps we could discuss

then.

A.D.C. 17



د افغانستان د سوسيال ديموکراتيک ټولګو پلار

AFGHAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

No. : ASDP/ND/387
Date : Nov. 11, 1983

Mrs Margareth Thatcher,
Prime Minister of U.K.
London.

۲۵/۱۱

Sub: Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting
(CHOQM) 83

Your Excellency: _____

We are working for the freedom of Afghanistan and
for a peaceful political solution of the Afghan problem.
Our work has been recognised and supported by the Socialist
International.

We shall appreciate if you will give us a chance to
meet you or your representative in New Delhi during the forthcoming
Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. We eagerly await
your positive reply so that we can acquaint you with the
proposals advanced by the Afghan Social Democrats and its
alliance partners as well as the guidelines given by ex King
Zahir Shah of Afghanistan from his exile in Rome.

With regards,

Sincerely yours,

Dr. M. Amin Wakman

Dr. M. Amin Wakman
Secretary General

Afghan Social Democratic Party

Representation for India:

P. O. Box No. 3813 Andrews Ganj, New Delhi-110049
Account No. 6873 Indian Bank, E-30 S. E. 2, New Delhi-110049

RESTRICTED

MR. COLES

SOVIET PRISONERS IN AFGHANISTAN

We discussed this subject last week, and I was going to talk to the Prime Minister about it. In the event, we were overtaken by more pressing matters.

The proposition, which is supported by some Members of Parliament and Russian emigre organisations, is that we should arrange to bring to Britain some of the Soviet deserters now in the hands of the Afghan rebels. The motive would be threefold. First, humanitarian: second, to encourage further defections: third, to publicise the horrors of service in the Red Army by putting the defectors on television.

The supporters of this plan have been complaining of the negative attitude of the FCO. Two of them called on me the other day (see copy of record attached): there have been one or two critical articles in the press: and Count Nikolai Tolstoy has now written to the Prime Minister and to the Foreign Secretary (copies of his letter also attached). Obviously we should coordinate the Prime Minister's and the Foreign Secretary's reply to Nikolai Tolstoy and to the organisations in question. This problem, if not handled correctly, could give the Prime Minister some trouble with her own supporters.

I am certainly not opposed in principle to the notion of embarrassing the Soviet Union over their performance in Afghanistan and encouraging further defection from their armed services. If some of the Russians came here, the emigre organisations would almost certainly look after them and they would not be a financial burden on the country. They would be unlikely to have any intelligence value. So far as I gathered from Mr. Miller, they are all other ranks.

I see two snags. The lesser one is that British Government involvement in such an exercise would run counter to our policy of trying to build a more businesslike relationship with the Soviet Union. This could be overcome to some extent by ourselves keeping out of it and leaving it to the emigre organisations to make all the arrangements. They would do so with a word of encouragement, I have no doubt.

RESTRICTED

/The second

RESTRICTED

The second snag, which is much greater, and which would apply equally to our involvement or to that of private organisations, is the attitude of the Pakistan Government. In practical terms, the Russians could only be brought out of Afghanistan to the West through Pakistan and with the connivance of the Pakistan Government. By the same token, if they were smuggled out without the knowledge of the Pakistan Government and subsequently appeared on British television, the Pakistanis would know what had happened. The last thing Pakistan wants is further trouble with the Soviet Union. From their track record as described to me by Mr. Miller, my guess is that, if we or the emigre organisations approach the Pakistan Government, their reaction might well be to stall and then to pass the word to the Afghan rebels to shoot all their prisoners so that the problem for them would go away. This would, apart from any humanitarian considerations, have the effect of drying up any further desertions from the Soviet armed forces.

A slightly less risky way of approaching the Pakistanis might be to use a Moslem Third World country, such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia, to sound them out. Even this would carry a degree of risk and I doubt if any such country would have the guts to stand up to the tempest from the Soviet Union if everything came out into the open.

The Prime Minister might wish to discuss when she has a moment. There are certain attractions in the idea, but the risks of it all going wrong are heavy.



A.D. PARSONS
8 November 1983

RESTRICTED

FROM: M STE BURTON, SAD
DATE: 28 OCTOBER 1983

Copies to: Private Secretary
PS/Lady Young
PS/PUS
Mr Giffard
Mr Donald
Soviet Department
PUSD
MVD
Sir A Parsons, No 10
Chancery, ISLAMABAD

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET PRISONERS

1. A Mr Peter Young of the Adam Smith Institute called at his own request on Sir Anthony Parsons at No 10 on 26 October to discuss the possibility of Soviet prisoners/deserters being exfiltrated to the West. He was accompanied by Mr George Miller of NTS, The Russian emigré organisation, who did most of the talking.
2. The essence of the case made by the visitors was that HMG should agree to provide political asylum for the Soviet deserters at present in the hands of the Mujahadeen, mainly in Afghanistan. They drew attention to the publicity advantages that could be gained, for example by television appearances. They admitted that most of the current potential deserters were of low calibre but argued that if a reliable channel of escape could be set up Soviet officers of greater importance might in time start to avail themselves of it. They said that previous approaches had been made through Lord Cranborne MP of the ASC and Sir Peter Blaker MP as well as during a call Mr Miller had made at our Embassy in Islamabad, but hitherto no action had been taken. They had therefore decided to approach the Prime Minister's office. Mr Miller left behind a memorandum addressed to Sir A Parsons (copy attached).
3. Mr Miller said that in the course of several visits to Pakistan and Afghanistan he had talked to six Soviet defectors as he described them (three of whom had deserted from the Soviet Army and three had fallen into Mujahadeen hands in other ways);

one had since been shot by the Mujahadeen. He thought that there were about 50 other Soviet prisoners in Mujahadeen hands who also wanted political asylum in the West; about half of them were Russians and the others Ukrainians and soldiers of mixed blood. Together he thought the total of Soviet prisoners amounted, according to a US estimate, to about 200. An early decision was essential ~~as~~^{or} more lives would be lost.

4. All these prisoners had poor prospects. All the fundamentalist groups tended to give prisoners short shrift although Hikmatyar was thought to hold a number for purposes of an eventual swop with the Soviet authorities for his own men in their hands. Younis Khalis had also taken some prisoners. The nationalist/moderate groups tended to have a better understanding of the propaganda benefits of holding prisoners and it was they who had handed over the Soviet soldiers currently in the custody of the Swiss authorities. But in general the Mujahadeen were cautious about bringing prisoners across the frontier into Pakistan out of regard for their relations with the Pakistan authorities. Indeed when they knew that the Pakistanis had discovered the whereabouts of one of the prisoners he was either shot or sent back across the border. As for the attitude of the Pakistan Government on the one occasion when one of the Soviet prisoners had fallen into their hands they had despatched him back to the Soviet Union where he had eventually, according to one account, been shot in front of his unit. In discussion Mr Miller acknowledged that the attitude of the Pakistan Government was crucial and that on past from it was unlikely to be favourable. He did not want to embarrass HMG with the Pakistan Government. Sir A Parsons pointed out that judging by what Mr Miller had said about the relationship between the Mujahadeen and the Pakistanis on this issue there must surely be a risk that if the Pakistan Government were formally approached and gave a negative answer, the survival prospects for those Soviet prisoners in Mujahadeen hands would become even worse than they already were.


5. Mr Miller thought that one way of reducing the possible /embarrassment

embarrassment for Western Governments of becoming too closely involved would be for camps to be set up, possibly only for transit purposes, in third countries who have less reservations about engaging in propaganda follow-up. He mentioned Morocco, Jordan and Oman. Sir A Parsons commented that any third world country would have to have strong nerves to withstand the fury of the Soviet response. He was surprised that Egypt had not been mentioned since, at least under Sadat, it might have been a good candidate. I questioned whether Jordan would be suitable in view of its concern for its relations with the Soviet Union.

6. There was also some discussion of the Soviet prisoners held in Switzerland as a result of the ICRC agreement with the Kabul regime. Mr Miller said that he understood that, as regards the prisoner who had escaped from Switzerland to West Germany, Herr Genscher had now agreed that he would not be returned to the Soviet Union. The visitors said that the main problem was that the agreement stipulated that the prisoners should be interned in Switzerland for two years (or for the duration of hostilities, whichever was the shorter) before being repatriated to the USSR. The prisoners had agreed in advance to the ICRC's terms, including the condition regarding repatriation. Sir A Parsons doubted whether the ICRC or the Swiss would nevertheless force any prisoners to return to the Soviet Union against their wishes.

7. There was a brief discussion on the usual lines about the importance of the Mujahadeen receiving modern arms.

8. The visitors asked when they might be told whether any action would be taken on their approach. They said that Count Nikolai Tolstoy had written to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State. Sir A Parsons said he would be in touch in due course.


M StE Burton
South Asian Department

SPARC

КОМИТЕТ СПАСЕНИЯ СОВЕТСКИХ ПЛЕННЫХ В АФГАНИСТАНЕ SOVIET PRISONERS IN AFGHANISTAN RESCUE COMMITTEE

Address: SPARC, 78 Beckenham road, Beckenham/Kent BR34RH, United Kingdom, Bank Account: Account No 91115758, Midland Bank Plc. 184, High Street, Bromley/Kent, BR1 HL, United Kingdom

23rd October 1983

Court Close,
Southmoor,
nr. Abingdon,
Berks. OX13 5HS.

Dear Prime Minister,

I am writing on behalf of this Committee, of which I am the Chairman, to place an urgent plea before the Government on behalf of Russian prisoners captured by Afghan liberation forces, who are now or are likely to request asylum in Great Britain.

I will not attempt to set out the factual background, which is no doubt well known to H.M. Government, but simply stress that while the numbers are small, the principle is great. These unfortunate men are in serious danger of being executed or otherwise maltreated by their sorely tried Afghan captors, and in view of Pakistan's understandably apprehensive attitude towards the whole question the only real chance of their survival appears to lie in their finding a refuge in the West.

There is also a considerable measure of political advantage in adopting a humane attitude. The one sure way - probably the only way - to ensure a Soviet withdrawal is to encourage in every way the escalation of desertion from the Red Army. I argue this point in an article to be published shortly in the WALL STREET JOURNAL. There would also be great gains in the field of intelligence, particularly if officers are encouraged to desert. There is at present scant incentive for them to do so.

We fully appreciate that it is a matter to be approached with the utmost tact and discretion, but cannot see any obstacle so serious as to be insuperable, especially when weighed against the enormous advantages. Unfortunately, the Foreign Office appears to be as little humane or robust in its attitude as it was when deciding the fate of Russians in the West in 1945. I have reason to understand that they have resolutely set their faces against any consideration of the policy we are advocating. We hope therefore that a Government which has proved itself to be so admirably forthright in its conduct of foreign affairs, particularly with regard to the Soviet threat, will not allow this matter to pass by default.

Yours faithfully,

Nikolai Tolstoy

Председатель — граф Николай Толстой-Милославский; Почетные члены: Пр. Антоний, Архиепископ Женевский и Западно-Европейский, Пр. Константин, Епископ Ричмондский и Британский, Пр. Марк, Епископ Берлинский и Германский, А.А. Авторханов, В.П. Аксенов, А.И. Гинзбург, П.Г. Григоренко, И.А. Иловайская-Альберти, О.А. Керенский, Л.З. Колпелев, Нгуэн Коржавин, В.Е. Максимов, Э.О. Неизвестный, В.П. Некрасов, Э.В. Оганянин, С.М. Поликанов, Андрей Седых, А.П. Столыпин, Я.А. Трушнович, Е.А. Якобсон.

PS

ADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

MR WRIGHT

SIR J. BULLARD

MR GIFFARD


MR DONALD

MR JAMES

MR ADAMS

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET

ASSESSMENT STAFF, CABINET OFFICE



/HD/SAD (4)

HD/FED

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/UND

HD/SEAD

HD/EESD

HD/NAD

HD/DEF D

HD/MED

HD/NEWAD

HD/NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

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FROM KABUL 151830Z SEPT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 146 OF 15/9/83,

INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON.

AFGHANISTAN: EXPULSION OF U S DIPLOMATS.

1. SECOND SECRETARY HUGH TURNER AND ATTACHE ROBERT BLACKBURN OF THE U S EMBASSY WERE DECLARED PNG THIS AFTERNOON FOR SPYING ACTIVITIES AND GIVEN 48 HOURS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. THEY WILL BOTH LEAVE BY INDIAN AIRLINES FLIGHT TO DELHI TOMORROW AFTERNOON.

2. EXPULSION FOLLOWED STATEMENT, WHICH WAS SHOWN ON AFGHAN TV THIS EVENING. BY SALES. THE PAKISTANI MANAGER OF THE U S EMBASSY

2. EXPULSION FOLLOWED STATEMENT, WHICH WAS SHOWN ON AFGHAN TV THIS EVENING, BY SALES, THE PAKISTANI MANAGER OF THE U S EMBASSY COMMISSARY WHO WAS ARRESTED LAST APRIL (MY TELNO 60) THAT HE PR7/1257 INFORMATION TO OFFICERS OF THE CIA IN THE U S EMBASSY. HE NAMED A NUMBER OF U S DIPLOMATS TO WHOM HE HAD REPORTED, ALL OF WHOM HAVE SINCE LEFT KABUL EXCEPT TURNER AND BLACKBURN. TALIBEE, AN AFGHAN EMPLOYEE OF THE U S EMBASSY WHO WAS ARRESTED LAST APRIL ALSO APPEARED ON AFGHAN TV THIS EVENING AND GAVE NAMES OF CIA OFFICERS IN THE EMBASSY INCLUDING TURNER AND BLACKBURN TO WHOM HE HAD PASSED INFORMATION.

3. MFA SUMMONED 1ST SECRETARY COLDREN, THE NO. 2 AT THE U S EMBASSY THIS AFTERNOON, BUT HE WAS UNAVAILABLE AND MFA ASKED THIRD SECRETARY VANDIVER TO CALL INSTEAD. VANDIVER WAS INFORMED OF DECISION TO EXPEL TURNER AND BLACKBURN AND WAS ALSO TOLD THAT BECAUSE OF HIGH LEVEL OF ANTI-U S FEELING IN KABUL THE SECURITY SERVICES COULD NOT GUARANTEE SAFETY OF THE U S EMBASSY OR ITS STAFF OVER THE THREE DAY EID HOLIDAY WHICH STARTS TOMORROW.

4. HURWITZ, U S CHARGE HAS SINCE BEEN TRYING TO CALL ON MFA TO PROTEST AT DECISION TO EXPEL TURNER AND BLACKBURN AND TO EXPRESS DISPLEASURE THAT HE WAS NOT PERSONNALLY INFORMED OF DECISION. HE WILL ALSO SEEK ASSURANCES FROM MFA THAT DRA GOVERNMENT WILL MEET THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO PROVIDE WHATEVER SECURITY IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE SAFETY OF HIS MISSION AND STAFF. HURWITZ SAYS IF HE FAILS TO RECEIVE THIS ASSURANCE HE MAY ASK HIS NATO COLEAGUES IN KABUL TO SUPPORT HIM BY MAKING DEMARCHES TO THE MFA. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS IF U S EMBASSY ASK ME TO MAKE SUPPORTING DEMARCHE.

5. NO OBJECTION TO PARAS 1 AND 2 ONLY BEING USED IN PRESS BRIEFING.

GARNER

NNNN

ref. your pps.

DO VC



bc John Astley
fco

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 July 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter informing her that the date of the ball which the Afghanistan Support Committee are holding at the Cafe Royal has been changed from 30 September to 6 October.

As I explained in my letter of 13 June, Mrs Thatcher regrets that she will not be able to attend the ball in person.

pl. attach.

A. J. COLES

Lord Michael Cecil


RW

Lord CRAWFORD

John COLES

AFGHANISTAN
Support Committee

Re
ppes below.



Dear Mrs Thatcher,

Due to unforeseen circumstances we have had to alter the date of the Afghan Ball from 30th September to Thursday 6th October.

I do hope that this change will not be inconvenient for you and that you will be able to come on the night.

Thank you again for all your support,

Yours sincerely,

Official (P)

AFGHANISTAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE. 18 CHARING CROSS ROAD, LONDON WC2N OHR. 01-379 7218.

PRESIDENT: THE RT. HON. THE LORD GLADWYN GCMG GCVO CB. VICE PRESIDENTS: THE RT. HON. ROLAND MOYLE M.P. THE RT. HON. GEOFFREY RIPPON M.P. THE RT. HON. WILLIAM RODGERS M.P. DIRECTOR: PEERS CARTER CMG. CHAIRMAN: PETER TEMPLE-MORRIS M.P. PATRONS: THE REVEREND ALAN BOOTH OBE. THE RT. HON. THE VISCOUNT BOYD OF MERTON CH PC. SIR RICHARD CAVE. FRANK J. CHAPPEL ESQ. THE RT. HON. JO GRIMOND M.P. THE REVEREND LESLIE H. HARDMAN. THE RT. HON. THE LORD HOME OF THE HIRSEL KT PC. THE RT. HON. THE EARL OF INCHCAPE. THE RT. REVEREND GRAHAM LEONARD, BISHOP OF LONDON. SHAIKH MUBARAK AHMAD. THE RT. HON. DAVID OWEN M.P. THE RT. HON. LORD RAWLINSON OF EWELL QC. THE RT. HON. LORD STEWART OF FULHAM CH PC. DR. MA. ZAKI BADAWI. TRUSTEES: HAMBROS BANK TRUSTEES DEPARTMENT. REGISTERED CHARITY No 282353.

MJ

29/7

Lord CRANBOURNE

c. Michael Alison

22 July 1983

Afghanistan Support Committee

I enclose a copy of a letter which we have received from Lord Cranbourne asking if the Prime Minister would send a short message to the Afghanistan Support Committee for incorporation in its programme for the fund raising appeal to be held at the Cafe Royal on 30 September.

I think that the Prime Minister will look favourably on the suggestion and should be grateful if you would provide a draft.

AJC

John Holmes Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

22 March 1983

AFGHANISTAN

Thank you for your letter of 18 March about Mr. Raison's decision that HMG should make a further contribution of £2 million in this financial year towards the cost of relief work for Afghanistan refugees in Pakistan. No suitable opportunity occurred for the Prime Minister to make use of this information at her Press Conference in Brussels today but she has noted the contents of your letter.

AJC

J.E. Holmes Esq,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 March 1983

ms

Prime Minister

AR 15/3

copy: Mr. Nicholls

ms

Dear John,

Afghanistan

The Prime Minister will wish to know that Mr Raison has decided that the ODA should make a further contribution of £2 m. in the current financial year towards the cost of relief work for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. This will be announced by Mr Raison in the House on 21 March. I enclose the proposed answer to a PQ from Mr Teddy Taylor.

It would be useful to secure as much publicity as possible for this decision to demonstrate our continuing concern for the refugees. The ODA will be preparing a press release. The purpose of my writing is to suggest that the Prime Minister may like to refer to our latest contribution if a suitable opportunity occurs at press conferences following the EC meeting in Brussels next week.

Your ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Mr Teddy Taylor (Southend East): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, if he will increase the aid commitments to Pakistan for 1983 to assist with the Afghan refugee problem; and if he will make a statement.

DRAFT ANSWER

As my right hon Friend the Prime Minister said, in a written reply to my hon Friend on 24 February, we remain deeply concerned about the plight of Afghan refugees. I am glad, therefore, to announce a further contribution of £2m to be paid to relief agencies working with the refugees. This brings the total value of our commitments since January 1980 to £13.7m. In addition we are providing aid costing over £16m for Pakistan's border provinces of North-West Frontier and Baluchistan which are the areas most seriously affected by the influx of refugees.

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES

1. Level of future aid to refugees

It is not normally the practice to provide advance details of how much we expect to spend on individual programmes in a given year. However, in addition to the £2m we expect to make further commitments of aid in 1983 both for the Pakistan programme and specifically for the Afghan refugees.

2. Agencies receiving the £2m refugee aid

UNHCR: £1.7m

International Committee of the Red Cross: £0.1m

League of Red Cross Societies: £0.2m

3. Previous aid to refugees

In 1981 we spent £20.6m on Pakistan and £3.25m (including our share of EC commitments) on Afghan refugee relief. In 1982 the figures were £12.6m on Pakistan and £4.1m on Afghan refugee relief. An additional £1m for Afghan refugees, which was announced by my right hon Friend the Minister of State (Mr Hurd) when he visited in November, has already been paid over to relief agencies in 1983.

4. Terms and channels of aid

The aid is a grant, not a loan. It is given mainly as cash and food contributions to the relief agencies, particularly the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and to the Pakistan Government.

5. Tying of aid

Our aid programme to Pakistan is largely tied, although there are two projects which provide money for local costs. Aid for refugee relief work is not tied, in order to allow relief authorities maximum flexibility.

6. Nature of programme in Pakistan

We are providing aid for railways, ports, irrigation, mining and a number of other sectors.

7. Illegal Narcotics

We are responding positively to a request by the Pakistan Government for advisory assistance in narcotics law enforcement. [Not for use: Pakistan is now the main source of illegal supplies of heroin to the UK].

Political

8. Why give aid to a military dictatorship?

We have enjoyed good relations with successive governments in Pakistan. Our aid is intended to benefit the people of Pakistan. We support the stand of the present government over Afghanistan, and admire in particular their help for the Afghan refugees.

9. Violations of Human Rights

HMG does not consider it would be either helpful or productive to make representations to the Government of Pakistan about alleged violations of human rights in Pakistan. Nevertheless, HMG will continue to use appropriate ways of making it clear that we deplore violations of human rights wherever they occur.

10. Corporal Punishment of Women

We have noted these reports. It would not be appropriate for HMG to comment on the internal regulations of Pakistan.

BACKGROUND NOTE

General

1. Close relations with Pakistan are important to the UK, especially since the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Ministers have visited regularly, including the Prime Minister in 1981 and Mr Hurd in November last year. Princess Anne will visit in May, in her capacity as Patron of the Save the Children Fund.

2. Afghan Refugees

Refugee numbers total nearly 3 million - almost 20% of 1979 population of Afghanistan. Strain on Pakistan economy is considerable but Pakistan Government is coping well. UK contributions to relief work made direct and through European Community since crisis began in January 1980 now total £13.7m. This figure includes the additional £2m to be announced by the Minister on 21 March.

3. Mr Taylor's visit to Pakistan

Mr Taylor visited Pakistan for a week from 30 January together with Sir Julian Ridsdale MP. They called on President Zia on 1 February. Mr Taylor visited a refugee camp near Peshawar and met the Governor of the North West Frontier Province. Later in his tour, he told the English Speaking Union in Karachi that he would do all he could to persuade the British Government and others to do more to help the refugees.

4. Mr Taylor's Recent PQs

Mr Taylor put down a PQ to the Prime Minister on 24 February about an international conference on Afghan refugees. (Flag A attached).

5. Human Rights in Pakistan

There is some public and Parliamentary concern about political persecution in Pakistan and about recent reports of severe /sentences,

sentences, including flogging, imposed on women. No representations have been made to the Pakistan Government.

Economic

6. Pakistan's economic growth record over last 5 years has been encouraging (GDP has been increasing at average of more than 6% per annum over last four years).

Aid Levels and Terms

7. In 1981 UK aid to Pakistan and Afghan refugees totalled £20.6m and £3.25m respectively. In 1982 the comparable figures were £12.6m and £4.1m. [Not for use: 1983/84 Aid Framework for Pakistan is £15m (rising to £21.5m in 1985/86). There is expected to be provision of £1m food aid for Afghan refugees in 1983/84 and cash and further food aid provision in subsequent years.] In addition we have written off official debt worth an extra £4m per annum to Pakistan under the RTA Agreement.

8. All aid is on grant terms. Main projects include assistance to Pakistan Railways (£29m) and Port Qasim (£14m). The Pakistan programme is largely tied to British goods and services, though two projects include provision for local costs in Pakistan (total £7m approx for local costs). Aid for Afghan refugees is untied to allow maximum flexibility to relief authorities.

Baluchistan and N W Frontier Tribal Areas

9. The Pakistan Government has published special development plans to improve the economic stability of areas bordering the Afghanistan frontier. We have given £10m programme aid which is generating local rupee (counterpart) funds for projects in these regions. We have also agreed direct project support worth over £6m for irrigation and mining projects in these areas. We are looking at other proposals.

CONFIDENTIAL

Afghanistan



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 March, 1983

Afghanistan

Thank you for your recent letter about the suggestion that the Prime Minister might see Mr. Mohammed Yahya.

The Prime Minister accepts your advice that she should not do so.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. GOW

Your minute attached.

I have consulted the Prime Minister. I should be grateful if you would tell Lord Cranborne that she regrets that she cannot see Mohammed Yahya. You might plead a particularly busy week with the European Council in Brussels and a state visit by President Kaunda.

For your own information, the Prime Minister does not want to receive the leader of a particular resistance group. The various groups quarrel greatly amongst themselves and any one of them would be delighted to receive high-level political recognition. Moreover, Yahya comes from one of the "fundamentalist" groups, whose philosophy is, to say the least, not exactly that of the Prime Minister.

A. J. COLES

16 March, 1983



Prime Minister

I am sure that the advice
is right.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

In addition, I doubt whether you
would approve of the fundamentalist resistance group.
They are not interested in restoring democracy in Afghanistan.
Agree that we should decline?

A.T.C. 15/3.

Yours truly

Dear John,

We spoke about the suggestion from Viscount Cranborne MP, the Chairman of the Afghanistan Support Committee, that the Prime Minister might see Mohammed Yahya, the brother of Masood, the Afghan resistance leader in the Panjshir Valley, during a visit which he is undertaking to this country from 21 - 24 March at the invitation of the Afghanistan Support Committee.

The Afghanistan Support Committee are arranging for Yahya to meet MPs and Ministers (Mr Hurd has agreed to see him). They also hope to attract some media coverage. Yahya acted as Mr Sandy Gall's interpreter during his filming trip to Afghanistan last year, and we understand that he will be helping over this. As a personality, we understand that he is somewhat colourless.

There is a particular problem over Yahya seeing the Prime Minister. His political master, Professor Rabbani, the leader of one of the fundamentalist groups based in Peshawar, is visiting the UK as a guest of HMG in late March and has also asked to see her. We would advise against this. Our policy to date has been to show no preference towards one or other of the Peshawar groups. If the Prime Minister saw Professor Rabbani, it would be widely taken as a gesture of political recognition. Other resistance leaders could resent this and would at least expect similar treatment. Perhaps more important, it could upset the Pakistan Government who are sensitive about the political status of the Peshawar groups. No Western Head of Government or Foreign Minister has, to the best of our knowledge, so far received any of the Peshawar leaders.

But if Yahya were to see the Prime Minister, and Professor Rabbani did not, this would be bound to sour the visit of the latter. It could also sow discord within Professor Rabbani's group, when we wish to promote unity among the resistance. Yahya is not of course in the same category as the six Afghan witnesses to Soviet atrocities whom the Prime Minister received on 20 January. This group was a representative cross-section with no political affiliation.

/We therefore



We therefore advise against the Prime Minister agreeing to see Yahya. Mr Pym will ~~be~~ abroad during the period and would not be able to see him in any case.

Yours ever
J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

John Coles

I have had a note from Robert Cranborne asking whether the Prime Minister would agree to meet Masaud's brother, Yahya, when he is over in England during the week beginning Monday 21st March.

How please, would you like me to reply to this request?

10.3.83

JCS

IAN GOW



D

Mr. Kydd.
P/A.

10 DOWNING STREET

[Handwritten mark]

PRIME MINISTER

COI FILM ON AFGHANISTAN

Attached is a video-cassette of the COI film on Afghanistan which you asked to see. It runs 27½ minutes.

[Handwritten initials]

IAN KYDD
3 March 1983

Mr. Kydd

I have not had a chance to put to the P.M. Could Mr. Pylam see at a media meeting?

A.S.C. 14/3

Central Office of Information
HERCULES ROAD, LONDON, SE1 7DU
01-928 2345

3rd March, 1983

Ian Kydd, Esq.,
Press Office,
10 Downing Street,
S.W.1.

Dear *Sam*


AFGHANISTAN - THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES

Attached is a note which provides background to the production and distribution of the most recent of the films on Afghanistan that we have made for FCO. A fourth film is planned for production later this year and we are already beginning to assemble material.

With this letter also comes a VHS copy of the long interview with President Zia which was filmed at the same time. Copies were distributed to major FCO posts overseas but television use has been slight.

I would of course be glad to know whether the Prime Minister sees the film and of any comments that are made.

Yours sincerely,



A. C. WHITE
DIRECTOR
FILMS AND TELEVISION DIVISION

"AFGHANISTAN: THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES"

This 27½ minute film is the third in a series of programmes written and produced by the Central Office of Information on behalf of the FCO dealing with the background and aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They have been designed to be shown primarily in Islamic and non-aligned countries; but the films have also been widely shown in Europe and North America.

"AFGHANISTAN: THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES", released in November 1982, deals with the problems of the exodus of Afghanistan refugees into Pakistan as a result of the Soviet invasion. The film contains an exclusive interview with President Zia in which he discusses his view of Soviet motives and intentions. A separate half-hour film of the whole of this interview was distributed widely overseas and extracts used within newsreels in the UK. The interviewer was David Bowen-Jones.

Unlike the first two films which were compiled from existing film footage - some from Soviet sources - this latest film contains a high proportion of original material shot in Pakistan by a camera team under the direction of the COI producer/script writer.

Copies in four language versions have been distributed by COI to 167 posts overseas for briefing influential audiences and for use by television. Fifteen countries have so far reported national transmissions of the film including Finland, whose services are received in Estonia (USSR), and two showings in 'prime time' by Egyptian Television. We expect eventual television usage to equal that of the earlier films in the series which achieved television showings in 35 countries.

Considerable interest has been shown in the film by the United States Information Agency based in Washington with whom discussions are currently taking place to include extracts from the film in a programme they are producing to mark "Afghanistan Day" - 21st March. The programme appears to be similar in concept to the "Let Poland be Poland" event staged last year.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Mr. Lloyd

It is in my office.
The P.M. wants to see it.
Can you pl. arrange?

24 February 1983

A-J.C. 24/2

Dear John,

COI Film on Afghanistan

Thank you for your letter of 21 February.

I enclose a VHS video cassette of the film 'Afghanistan - The Struggle Continues' for the Prime Minister, as requested. This does not need to be returned to us.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Carlisle Cheques.

The P.M. runs 25 mins.
Please would you find
a 30 min slot in the
diary. Bernard would like
the P.M. to see it in his
room.
Th. 24/2

AFGHANISTAN : INT CIT: Pt 6

INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN OFFICE

London SW1Z 2JH



*Copy Cf.
Return to me
A J m/2*

*FIE DA
cc: I gao (17/2)
FCO*



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 February, 1983

Dear Julian.

Thank you for your letter of 9 February about your recent visit to Pakistan.

I entirely agree with you about the need to support Pakistan on the Afghanistan issue. We have done much to help the international relief effort for the Afghan refugees. Since January 1980 we have given or pledged over £11 million in cash and food aid. We must not allow this grave humanitarian problem to be forgotten.

I also share your views about the need to keep Afghanistan in the news. This is one of the most effective ways to maintain pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops. We are doing a good deal ourselves. The COI has produced three films which have been shown widely on foreign television stations. The BBC Farsi and Pashto broadcasts and the World Service do much to maintain awareness of the Soviet occupation. Here at home, we cannot of course hope to achieve continuous news coverage. Much depends on the available material and the stories of the day. But we do seize whatever opportunities arise to keep the crisis in the public eye. For example, I recently received a delegation of Afghan witnesses of Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan, and was deeply shocked by the story they had to tell.

/ Finally,

fw

Finally, you may be aware of the all-party Afghanistan Support Committee, which has recently launched a programme to promote publicity and relief work for Afghanistan. I am sure that Robert Cranborne, the Chairman of the Committee, would welcome your support.

Y
Lansdown
Raymond

Sir Julian Ridsdale, C.B.E., M.P.

CONFIDENTIAL

JW



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 February 1983

COI FILM ON AFGHANISTAN

Thank you for your letter of 16 February.

The Prime Minister would like to see the new film. I should be grateful if you could, as you suggest, let me have a cassette copy.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 February, 1983

Dear Sir,

~~AE~~
re. 5m letter
WHL 1/2

Afghanistan/Pakistan

Thank you for your letter of 10 February enclosing a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Sir Julian Ridsdale MP about his recent visit to Pakistan.

Sir Julian visited Pakistan for six days from 30 January together with Mr Teddy Taylor MP. They met President Zia on 1 February. Since his return, Sir Julian has also written to the Daily Telegraph (copy enclosed) in terms similar to those of his letter to the Prime Minister.

* As regards Sir Julian's point about publicity, you will know from John Holme's letter of 23 December, Brian Fall's letter of 25 January, and my letter of today's date, that we have been doing what we can in this area. You should also know that Lord Cranborne, Chairman of the Afghanistan Support Committee, has some interesting ideas of his own about speeding up the flow of TV news reports from Afghanistan using satellites. He has discussed these with us but we have some doubts about their cost effectiveness and would not want to draw this aspect to Sir J Ridsdale's attention.

Yours
R B Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

* Brian Fall to ASE 25.2.83 is filed in Afghanistan: Aid to Afghan resistance movement (July '81) (Cab 2)

SECRET

DRAFT: minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Sir Julian Ridsdale CBE MP
House of Commons
London SW1A 0AA

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 9 February about your recent visit to Pakistan.

CAVEAT.....

sub
I agree with you about the need to support Pakistan ^h ~~over~~ the Afghanistan issue. We have ~~for example,~~ done ^{on} ~~a lot~~ to help the international relief effort for the Afghan refugees. Since January 1980 we have given or pledged over £11 million in cash and food aid. ^{We have} ~~It is~~ ^{must not allow} ~~most important that we do not lose sight of this~~ ^{grave} humanitarian problem. ~~to be forgotten~~

I also share your views about the need to keep Afghanistan in the news. This is one of the most effective ways to maintain pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops. We ^{are doing a good} ~~ourselves~~ do a great deal to ensure ~~that the world does not forget Afghanistan.~~ For ^{which have been} ~~example,~~ the COI has produced three films shown widely on foreign television stations, ^{and} ~~The BBC~~ with its Farsi and Pashto broadcasts, ^{and} ~~as well as~~ the World Service, does much to maintain awareness of the Soviet occupation.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Here at home, we cannot of course hope to achieve continuous news coverage. Much depends on the available material and the stories of the day. But we do seize whatever opportunities arise to keep the crisis in the public eye. For example, I recently received a delegation of Afghan witnesses of Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan, and was deeply shocked by the story they had to tell.

Finally, you may ~~like to~~ be aware of the all-party Afghanistan Support Committee, which has recently launched a programme to promote publicity and relief work for Afghanistan. ~~You might like to contact~~ Robert Cranborne, the Chairman of the Committee, ~~to find out more about~~ its work. I am sure they would welcome your support.

MR 1/2 .

cutting dated 14 FEB 1983 19

Message to Britain from Afghan refugees

From Sir JULIAN RIDSDALE, M P (Con.)

SIR—I have just returned from a visit to Pakistan where I met a number of the three million refugees from Afghanistan, not far from Peshawar, on the way to the Khyber Pass. There are another two million refugees, I am told, in Iran. That makes a total of five million out of the Afghan population of 15 million.

Nearly all these refugees were the elderly, women and children. Those of fighting age were left to battle for Afghanistan's freedom from their Russian oppressors; sturdy individuals fighting for their freedom.

I could not help but be moved by the refugees I met; they came from all walks of life, from High Court judges to sturdy peasants. All were living in mud huts, well wrapped up against the cold of winter. Yet far from being down-hearted their eyes sparkled. "When you get home," they said, "just tell as many as possible that we are fighting for our freedom."

A more experienced politician from Pakistan said it reminded him of the Spanish Civil War. Others who had been in Afghanistan and seen the fighting asked: "Can't you get them more modern arms to fight the helicopter gun-ships of the Russians?"

I visited the Save the Children Fund camps and the Red Cross and heard what a wonderful job the hospitals were doing to care for the wounded that came out of Afghanistan.

Yet, arriving home in the midst of the CND campaign I cannot help but wonder whether what is being organised here, largely from the political Left, is but a smokescreen to take our eyes, and the eyes of the Western World, off the British oppression of individual freedom being perpetrated by Russia in Afghanistan.

If only those ladies who camp out at Greenham Common could camp out instead outside the Soviet Embassy!

JULIAN RIDSDALE
House of Commons.

J.W.

1/P
Disarmament
USSR.

PW/Z
DWS/G
PWS/R

EN/B
RR/E/P
MOS/Z

PS/S
RR/S
GV
D. GOWAN

PB

(18)

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
Would you like to see the
film some time?

16 February, 1983

A.J.C. 17 1/2

Handwritten initials and scribbles

John T. ...

COI Film on Afghanistan

In his letter of 23 December 1982 about developments in Afghanistan, John Holmes mentioned that the COI had made a third film on Afghanistan.

This followed the success of the previous two, which were shown on public television in 42 and 26 countries respectively, as well as to many influential audiences worldwide. The new film was distributed in November to our posts. The response has been encouraging: it has so far been shown on television in 13 countries with several other showings likely.

The film is perhaps even more powerful in its message than its predecessors, with emphasis being laid on the refugee problem and the continuing widespread fighting in the country. Excerpts of an interview with President Zia of Pakistan (which had been distributed separately by COI) figure prominently. References are also made to the absorption of the Muslim Central Asian Republics into the USSR. Our aim is that the film should help ensure that the problem of Afghanistan is not forgotten. It was, for example, used to good effect at the well-attended AGM of the UK Afghanistan Support Committee on 8 February.

In contrast to previous years, a substantial amount of the footage used in the film was specially commissioned by the COI, but the rest, as before, came from commercially available newsreel material. There is no mention made of the film's originator, though certain television companies have used the wording 'Made on behalf of the British Government'. Neither of the previous two films provoked a direct response from the Russians.

Should the Prime Minister wish to see the new film we could arrange for a cassette copy to be provided.

Handwritten signature of R B Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



FILE
Sir Julian Ridsdale MP 17/2
R07

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 February, 1983

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN

I enclose a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Sir Julian Ridsdale, MP, about his recent visit to Pakistan.

In the last sentence, he refers to the possibility of securing a "continuous news coverage" of Afghanistan. I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature by Thursday, 17 February, dealing in particular with this point.

A. J. COLES

J. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

From Sir Julian Ridsdale, CBE., MP.,



Feb. 9th. 1982.

Dear Prime Minister

I hesitate to burden you with another account of my visits.

I have just spent six days in Pakistan with Paddy as a guest of the President, General Zia, following my visit to Japan. Once again we followed in some of your footsteps and saw your picture taken with the Khyber Rifles.

We dined with the Governor of the North West Frontier Province who spoke so warmly about you. Indeed our visit was one of warmth.

I met the President, I met the Afghan tribesmen, we visited the Save the Children Fund. What emerged was that the Afghans want something better than rifles to shoot down the Russians helicopter gun-ships. The Ministers compared the battle in Afghanistan to the Civil War in Spain. You know how much Pakistan is in the front line and that we need to give them all the encouragement that we can. Can we find some means of getting continuous news coverage on Afghanistan so as to keep the story alive and counter the smokescreen that the Left are deploying in their CND campaign?

Yours ever,

Julian

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP.,

FILE

MFJ



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 February 1983

Dear Winston,

Thank you for your letter of 22 January about my meeting on 20 January with the delegation of Afghans invited to London by Radio Free Kabul. It was a moving occasion and brought home once more the suffering of the civilian population in Afghanistan.

It is important that the international community should be made aware of Soviet atrocities towards Afghan civilians. Our delegation to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which is meeting in Geneva from 31 January to 11 March, has been briefed to draw special attention to the Logar massacre along with other violations of human rights in Afghanistan. We shall do our best both in the Commission and elsewhere to ensure that the issue receives all the attention which it certainly deserves.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Winston Churchill Esq MP

da

GPS 150
RESTRICTED
FM UKMIS GENEVA 041710Z FEB 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 27 OF 4 FEB

RESTRICTED

mt

SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: AFGHANISTAN

1. IN VIEW OF CURRENT PARLIAMENTARY INTEREST IN THE MASSACRE IN LOGAR PROVINCE IN AFGHANISTAN LAST SEPTEMBER, YOU WILL WISH TO KNOW THAT THE PASSAGE ON AFGHANISTAN IN THE STATEMENT DELIVERED ON 4 FEBRUARY BY LORD COLVILLE UNDER THE COMMISSION'S AGENDA ITEM ON SELF DETERMINATION INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES:

"IN ADDITION TO THIS, WE MUST REVERT TO THE THEME OF THE BASIC RIGHT OF LIFE. WE HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY APPALLED BY REPORTS OF THE MASSACRE OF 105 AFGHAN CIVILIANS BY SOVIET TROOPS IN A VILLAGE IN LOGAR PROVINCE ON 13 SEPTEMBER 1982. IN OUR VIEW THIS WANTON ACT DESERVES THE MOST WIDESPREAD AND VIGOROUS CONDEMNATION".

2. FULL TEXT OF STATEMENT HAS BEEN SENT BY FACSIMILE TO UND
3. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO ROBERTS UND.

FCO PASS SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK

MARSHALL

ADVANCED AS REQUESTED

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

AFGHANISTAN

STANDARD DISTRIBUTION

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

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SEAD
NAD
NENAD
MR DONALD
CABINET OFFICE

RESTRICTED

Afghanistan



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 February 1983

Dear John,

Afghanistan

Type letter p.

A.S.C. 1/2.

Thank you for your letter of 27 January enclosing a copy of a letter from Mr Winston Churchill MP to the Prime Minister about her meeting with the Afghan delegation on 20 January.

The UN Commission on Human Rights is meeting in Geneva from 31 January to 11 March. There is no specific agenda item on Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan will be discussed in public under an item on the rights of peoples to self-determination, and (confidentially) under an item on situations revealing a consistent pattern of gross human rights violations. Our delegation, led by Lord Colville, has been briefed to draw attention to the Logar massacre under the first of these items, where the debate is public and where resolutions on Afghanistan have been adopted in the past and UK statements on human rights in Afghanistan traditionally made. The Commission's resolutions on Afghanistan deal with the violation of the principle of self-determination, however, and a specific reference in the resolution to this atrocity is unlikely. The delegation will of course also be able to raise it in the confidential discussions under the second item, where our intention will be to ensure that the situation in Afghanistan is kept under review. But no resolutions are adopted under this item.

I enclose a draft reply to Mr Churchill.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Winston S Churchill MP
House of Commons
London SW1A OAA

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 22 January about my meeting on 20 January with the delegation of Afghans invited to London by Radio Free Kabul. It was a moving occasion and brought home once more the suffering of the civilian population in Afghanistan.

CAVEAT.....

It is important that the international community should be made aware of Soviet atrocities towards Afghan civilians. Our delegation to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, ^{which is} meeting in Geneva from 31 January to 11 March, has been briefed to draw special attention to the Logar massacre along with other violations of human rights in Afghanistan. We shall do our best both in the Commission and elsewhere to ensure that the issue is not forgotten. *receive all the attention which it certainly deserves.*

Enclosures—flag(s).....

RR 1/2.

*Afghanistan
Internal Situation
A/G*

51 FEB 1983

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9



Afghanistan
HL

31 January 1983

Visit by Witnesses of Soviet Atrocities
in Afghanistan

Thank you for your letter of 28 January describing the action that has been taken to bring to the attention of the UN Human Rights Commission the facts relating to the massacre in Logar Province and the other publicity measures which you have in hand. The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

28 January, 1983

Pace Mustafa

DT

MT

28/1

Dear John,

Visit by Witnesses of Soviet Atrocities in Afghanistan

Thank you for your letter of 20 January.

We have now taken steps to have the massacre in Logar Province raised at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, as requested by the Afghans during their meeting with the Prime Minister on 19 January. Afghanistan is already on the agenda for discussion at the 39th session of the UN Human Rights Commission (Geneva, 31 January-11 March), and we are briefing Lord Colville, leader of the UK delegation, to draw particular attention to the Logar massacre.

The Prime Minister may also be interested in the other steps being taken to encourage further publicity for the massacre (the story was of course fully reported at the time and the delegation's visit to London was well covered in the British press, including an interview on ITN News at Ten).

The Logar Committee, an umbrella organisation set up to arrange the delegation's visit last week, was responsible for the publicity arrangements and the constituent groups will presumably make the most of the story. For example, the Afghanistan Support Committee (to which we have just given a further £20,000 grant) will include it in their information material.

As for our own efforts, the COI have already sent to a wide selection of posts a photograph and cover story of the delegation's call on the Prime Minister. We plan to include information on the incident in our regular background briefing material. We have also briefed our CSCE delegation and will include reference to the incident in briefing material for inter-governmental discussions on Afghanistan.

We have asked our Embassy in Paris to obtain a copy of the Russell Tribunal's report. It would be preferable for non-governmental organisations to take the lead in publicising the report. But when it is available, we will consider how best to use it.

CONFIDENTIAL



I shall be writing separately with a draft reply to the follow-up letter from Mr Winston Churchill MP.

*Yours ever
for Holmes*

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Afghanistan: Internal Situation 1976





ls
Afghanistan

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 January, 1983.

Afghanistan

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Winston Churchill, M.P., about the delegation of Afghans who were recently received by the Prime Minister and who described to her the Logar Massacre.

Mr. Churchill now repeats the request made during the meeting that the Government should take up this matter with the UN Commission on Human Rights.

I should be grateful for advice and a draft reply from the Prime Minister by Tuesday, 1 February, please.

B.K. P.

W. U. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA
01-219 3405

John Cross

22 January 1983

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you very much indeed for so kindly sparing the time to receive the survivors of the Logan Massacre during their visit to Britain. They greatly appreciated the close interest you took in their terrible experiences and the warm concern you expressed for the sufferings of the civilian population.

Would there be any possibility of the Government taking up the massacre and the constant Soviet attacks upon the civilian population with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights? With renewed thanks,

Yours ever,

Winston

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 January 1983

CALL BY A GROUP OF AFGHANS

Thank you for your letter of 19 January. The Afghan delegation duly called on the Prime Minister in her Room at the House this afternoon. Mr. Winston Churchill MP was present.

The delegation produced a diagram to illustrate the massacre in Logar Province and described the events in some detail and with considerable emotion.

The Prime Minister said that she had rarely heard of a more terrible incident. She believed that it should be given the widest possible publicity.

The delegation asked Mrs. Thatcher to bring the facts to the attention of the United Nations, specifically mentioning the Commission on Human Rights. They also said that the Resistance still lacked the means to deal with Soviet aircraft and helicopter gunships, and their one request in their field of arms was for anti-aircraft weapons. In reply, the Prime Minister said that we would do everything we could to ensure that the facts as reported were widely known. We would continue to do all we could to support the Resistance.

The Prime Minister also recalled the help that we were giving for Afghan refugees.

A. J. COLES

CLOSED UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT 2000

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA
01 - 219 3405

MEETING OF THE SURVIVORS OF THE LOGAR MASSACRE WITH THE PRIME
MINISTER AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THURSDAY 20 JANUARY 1983
AT 3.30 PM

Composition of the Delegation:

1. OMAR BABRAKZAI - former Judge on the Kabul Supreme Court -
Leader of the Delegation.
2. HABIB-UR-RAHMAN HASHEMI - Mayor of Padkhwab-E shana.
3. SAYYED MORTAZA - village priest of Padkhwab-E shana.
4. GOL-MUHAMMAD - village elder of Padkhwab-E shana.
5. GHAFUR YUSUFZAI - a Resistance commander from Takhar
province (N-E Afghanistan).
6. MISS FARIDA AHMADI - medical student, member of Resistance
in Kabul, tortured by Security Police.

Interpreter:

MISS FATIMA GAILANI - daughter of Sayyed Ahmed Gailani, Leader
of one of the Afghan Resistance Movements.

Accompanied by:

WINSTON S CHURCHILL MP
VISCOUNT CRANBOURNE MP
MR MARK DIXON - escorting the Delegation while in London.

THE LOGAR MASSACRE

On 13 September, 1982 Soviet troops surrounded the village of Padkhwab-E shana in Logar province 36 miles south of Kabul. 105 unarmed civilians, including 11 children under the age of 13, took refuge in an underground irrigation tunnel, into which Soviet Forces proceeded to pour petrol together with some unknown chemical substance. They then opened fire with

/.....

2/.....

incendiary bullets setting the tunnel ablaze and burning alive all 105 civilians. These events have subsequently been corroborated by an international team, which included a Professor of Law McGill University, Canada.

WSC 20 January 1983

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

19 January 1983

Dear John,

Call by a Group of Afghans

I attach a background note for the Prime Minister for the meeting which I understand she may have later today with a group of Afghans who have witnessed Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan.

Our information about the Afghans' visit here has come mainly from Mr Winston Churchill MP, who has been making the arrangements for interviews and press conferences. We have not been officially involved, except to expedite the issue of visas to the Afghans by our Embassy in Paris. Their call on the Prime Minister should help to ensure good publicity, which we would of course welcome. There is no particular point which we need to make to them, other than to stress our continued opposition to the Soviet occupation and our concern for the sufferings of the Afghan people.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT TO UK BY WITNESSES OF SOVIET ATROCITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

1. The Russell Tribunal in Paris has been holding a series of hearings as part of its investigations into Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan.

2. A group of six Afghans, who have been giving evidence to the Tribunal, have been invited to visit this country under the auspices of Radio Free Kabul and other organisations to give a series of interviews and press conferences. Three of the group claim to have witnessed an incident at Padkhwab-e-Shana, a village in Logar province south of Kabul, in which 105 Afghans were burned to death in an underground water channel by Soviet soldiers. The others claim to be witnesses to other Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan.

3. We understand that the members of the group are:
Mr Habib-ur-Rahman Hashemi, the Mayor of Padkhwab-e-Shana;
Mr Sayyed Mortaza, the village mullah;
Mr Gol Muhammad, the village elder
Mr Omar Babrakzai, a former Supreme Court judge;
Mr Ghafur Yusufzai, a young commander from one of the north-east provinces of Afghanistan;
Farida Ahmadi, a woman who was tortured by security police in Kabul.

4. The massacre at Padkhwab-e-Shana was first reported in the press in December when Mr Michael Barry, an American working with the Russell Tribunal, returned to Pakistan from a fact-finding visit to Afghanistan. Apparently, the Afghan villagers took shelter in an underground canal from Soviet forces, who blocked up the entrance to the canal, poured in an inflammable liquid and then set fire to it. All 105 villagers, including old men, women and children, were killed. During his visit to the village, Mr Barry interviewed eye witnesses (including, we gather, the ^{four} three mentioned above),

/took

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took photographs and inspected the canal.

5. At the time, our Embassy in Islamabad also reported Mr Barry's findings. Although we have no independent evidence to confirm the story, there seems no reason to doubt its authenticity or the testimony of the witnesses.

6. Mr Barry was himself to have accompanied the group of Afghans to London but he had to remain in Paris because of a personal problem. The arrangements for the group's reception in London have been made by Mr Winston Churchill MP (Radio Free Kabul) and Lord Chalfont; the Afghanistan Support Committee (Chairman, Lord Cranborne MP) are also involved. The US Government helped with the arrangements to bring the group to Paris and the US Embassy was approached by Lord Chalfont to help in getting them over here.

7. We have so far made no statement on the incident. However, in answer to a PQ on 30 November, the Prime Minister expressed sympathy for the suffering people in Afghanistan. Attached is a proposed press line in answer to any inquiries.

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VISIT BY WITNESSES OF SOVIET ATROCITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

PROPOSED PRESS LINE TO TAKE

1. HMG has noted with horror reports of atrocities committed by the Soviet occupying forces in Afghanistan. The Prime Minister made clear our sympathy for the suffering people of Afghanistan on 30 November 1982 in answer to a Parliamentary Question on HMG's policy on Afghanistan.

Massacre in Logar Province

2. We have no reason to doubt the authenticity of these reports.

Visiting Afghans' Status (Defensive)

3. The Afghans are visiting the UK under the auspices of Radio Free Kabul, and not as guests of HMG.



1968 JUN 9



Alan CF.

John Coles

MR WINSTON S CHURCHIL MP - AFGHANISTAN

Mr Coles.

*He is not - He is
dreadful. el.*

1. WSC is a hero.
2. 105 Afghans were murdered by the Russians in an irrigation tunnel on 13th September 1982.
3. Six Afghans, including a survivor of the massacre, a priest, a Supreme Court Judge, and one of the Village Elders of the village to which those murdered belonged, are coming to London on the evening of Wednesday, 19th January.
4. Will you allow the Prime Minister to shake the hands of these valiant fighters for freedom and friends of the martyrs, in her room at the House at 3.35 p.m. on Thursday, 20th January, literally for 10 minutes only?
5. I suppose that the Foreign Office will say that this will upset the Russians - so what.

14.1.83

IAN GOW

cc. ✓ Caroline Stephens

15 JAN 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: [Illegible]

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

[Illegible text]

[Illegible text]

DATE: [Illegible]

BY: [Illegible]

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FM KABL 291100Z DEC 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 194 OF 29 DECEMBER 1982

AND TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD, PRIORITY DELHI.

MY TELNO 193: AFGHANISTAN: ANNIVERSARY OF SOVIET INVASION.

1. LEVEL OF SHOOTING IN KABUL AFTER CURFEW LAST NIGHT WAS MUCH ABOVE THAT OF RECENT WEEKS. IT INCLUDED ARTILLERY, MORTARS, HEAVY AND LIGHT MACHINE GUNS AND AUTOMATIC RIFLES. WE HAVE SO FAR RECEIVED NO INFORMATION ABOUT TARGETS BUT FIRING WAS HEARD THROUGHOUT THE CAPITAL. IT WAS REPORTED PARTICULARLY HEAVY IN DARULAMAN AND KHAIR KHANEH DISTRICTS OF KABUL AND IN AREA BETWEEN PULE CHARKE AND BALA HISSAR. DARULAMAN CONTAINS NUMBER OF RUSSIAN OFFICES AND RESIDENCES AND THERE IS SOVIET MILITARY BASE IN KHAIR KHANEH.

2. POWER SUPPLY TO KABUL IS STILL DISRUPTED AND SOME AREAS HAVE HAD NO ELECTRICITY SINCE EVENING OF 27 DECEMBER. THIS EMBASSY HAS BEEN WITHOUT MAINS SUPPLY SINCE 2245 HOURS YESTERDAY. THERE HAS STILL BEEN NO OFFICIAL EXPLANATION FOR DISRUPTION BUT WE HAVE RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT ONE OF THE TURBINES AT THE PULE CHARKE GENERATING STATION WAS PUT OUT OF ACTION BY MUJAHIDEEN ROCKET ATTACK FOUR DAYS AGO AND HYDRO-ELECTRIC STATION AT MAHIPAR IN THE KABUL GORGE HAS ALSO BEEN DAMAGED BY MUJAHIDEEN ATTACK.

3. BY DAY, KABUL IS COMPARATIVELY QUIET BUT CONTINUING HIGH LEVEL OF SECURITY IS EVIDENT.

GARNER

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FM KABUL 271015Z DEC 82

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 191 OF 27 DECEMBER 1982

AND TO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, DELHI, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO,
MODUK (DI4)SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS, JEDDA, UKMIS GENEVA,
PEKING, TEHRAN, TOKYO AND ALL EC POSTS.NY TELNO 187: AFGHANISTAN: SITREP. 

POLITICAL.

1. KARMAL AND KESHTMAND RETURNED TO KABUL FROM MOSCOW ON 26 DECEMBER (PARA 1 MTUR). BAKHTAR OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY (BONA) REPORTED THAT KARMAL AND ANDROPOV HAD "A COMRADELY CONVERSATION" ON 23 DECEMBER. THEY AFFIRMED THAT INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF DRA AND INTERVENTION FROM OUTSIDE WAS MAIN OBSTACLE TO PEACE

IN AFGHANISTAN. BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL AFGHAN/SOVIET RELATIONS AND PROCLAIMED FIRM INTENTION TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN ON BASIS OF THE WELL KNOWN PROPOSALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF DRA.

2. IN A TELEVISED SPEECH ON 18 DECEMBER, FOREIGN MINISTER DOST OUTLINED FOREIGN POLICY OF DRA. HE SAID NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY OF WORKING PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN COULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY BY DEVELOPMENT OF BROTHERLY RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. CONSOLIDATION OF RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION WAS A MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY PRINCIPLE AND A FUNDAMENTAL FACTOR IN DEFENCE OF THE REVOLUTION. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE DEVELOPING IN ALL SPHERES AND, ON BEHALF OF PDPA, REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN, DOST EXPRESSED "PROFOUND AND SINCERE GRATITUDE TO THE CPSU AND SOVIET GOVERNMENT FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT FOR THE DRA".

3. KABUL NEW TIMES (KNT) CARRIED IN FULL TASS REPORT OF PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY KARMAL IN MOSCOW ON 20 DECEMBER. IT ALSO REPRODUCED 60TH ANNIVERSARY MESSAGE SENT BY KARMAL AND KESSHTMAND TO SOVIET LEADERS. RALLIES WERE REPORTEDLY HELD IN DIFFERENT PARTS

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OF THE COUNTRY TO MARK THE ANNIVERSARY. A NUMBER IN THE CAPITAL WERE ADDRESSED BY MINISTERS WHO ALL STRESSED EXISTENCE OF FRIENDLY AND FRATERNAL RELATIONS BETWEEN DRA AND USSR. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS THAT ALL WORKERS IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD MARK THE ANNIVERSARY BY "VOLUNTARILY" WORKING FROM 8 AM TO 1230 PM ON FRIDAY 24 DECEMBER (NORMALLY A HOLIDAY).

4. EMPHASIS IN RECENT MINISTERIAL SPEECHES (INCLUDING DOST'S - PARA 2), AND IN ANNIVERSARY MESSAGE TO SOVIET LEADERS ON IMPORTANCE ATTACHED BY DRA TO RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION COULD BE INTENDED TO COUNTER SPECULATION (AND PERHAPS ALSO TO CONVEY MESSAGE TO MOSCOW) THAT, FOLLOWING DEATH OF BREZHNEV, THE REGIME EXPECTS NO CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN NOR IN LEVEL OF ITS SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME.

5. BONA ISSUED STATEMENT ON 23 DECEMBER ABOUT ATTEMPT OF US IMPERIALISM, TOGETHER WITH BRITISH, CHINESE AND PAKISTANI COLLABORATORS, TO DEFEAT AFGHAN REVOLUTION. IT CONTAINED "CONFESSIONS" OF A FORMER AFGHAN EMPLOYEE OF US EMBASSY IN KABUL WHO WAS SAID TO HAVE WORKED AS CIA SPY. IT SAID US EMBASSY IN KABUL ORGANISED INTELLIGENCE NETWORK IN AFGHANISTAN IN COLLABORATION WITH CRIMINAL BANDS OF GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR. THERE WAS ALSO GROUP IN US EMBASSY WHO WERE MEMBERS OF JAMIAT ISLAMI GROUP WHO RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS AND MONEY FROM THE EMBASSY. IT NAMED THREE FORMER MEMBERS OF US EMBASSY WHO HAVE NOW LEFT KABUL. IT CLAIMED THAT EVERY FORTNIGHT, MEMBERS OF US EMBASSY BROUGHT BACK FROM PAKISTAN REVOLVERS, HAND GRENADES AND MINES WHICH WERE DISTRIBUTED TO MEMBERS OF JAMIAT ISLAMI GROUP WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO BLOW UP RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS AND SHOPS IN DENSELY POPULATED CITY STREETS. STATEMENT SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO ACTIVITIES OF US EMBASSY "THE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN KABUL HAD BEEN EXPOSED BY THE BRITISH ARCHAEOLOGIST PINDER-WILSON".

6. SARWAL YURISH, FORMERLY HEAD OF SOUTH EAST SECURITY ZONE, HAS BEEN APPOINTED DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER. IN STATEMENT TO BONA HE SAID "IT IS UP TO THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY PAKISTAN AND IRAN TO SHOW POLITICAL WISDOM, TO REALIZE THE TRUTH OF THE IRREVERSIBLE SAUR REVOLUTION, TO RESPOND TO THE PEACEFUL PROPOSALS OF THE DRA AND NOT TO ALLOW ANY LONGER THEIR COUNTRIES TO BE USED AS BASES OF IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY AFGHANISTAN".

7. MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (MND) HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT REGISTRATION FOR MILITARY SERVICE OF GRADUATES OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN KABUL STARTED ON 14 DECEMBER. THERE HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND MND ABOUT MOBILISATION OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS. EDUCATION MINISTRY WANTED EXEMPTION FOR THOSE STUDENTS WHO WISHED TO GO ON TO UNIVERSITY WHILE MND INSISTED THAT THEY SHOULD FIRST DO THEIR MILITARY SERVICE. IT APPEARS THAT

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/BATTLE

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BATTLE HAS BEEN WON BY MND. EFFECT OF THIS ORDER WILL BE THAT THE ONLY FIRST YEAR STUDENTS AT KABUL UNIVERSITY NEXT YEAR (ACADEMIC YEAR STARTS IN FEBRUARY) WILL BE GIRLS OR MALE STUDENTS WHO HAVE COMPLETED THEIR MILITARY SERVICE.

8. MINISTER OF MINES AND INDUSTRY, DANESH, VISITED THE KARKAR COAL MINES ON 21 DECEMBER WHICH HAD BEEN HIT BY AN EARTHQUAKE LAST WEEK. THE PREVIOUS DAY HE HAD VISITED KUNDUZ. MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS AND POLITBURO MEMBER, WATANJAR, ALSO PAID A ONE DAY VISIT TO GHAZNI ON 22 DECEMBER. HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE ADDRESSED A LARGE RALLY IN GHAZNI CITY AND ALSO VISITED UNITS OF THE AFGHAN ARMY.

9. DRA HAVE SIGNED CONTRACT WITH BROWN BOVERI OF SWITZERLAND FOR SUPPLY OF TWO 54,000KW TURBINE THERMAL POWER GENERATORS AT COST OF US DOLLARS 22.39 MILLION. THE NEW UNITS WILL BE INSTALLED IN KABUL AND ARE DUE TO COME INTO OPERATION IN SEPTEMBER 1983 WHEN, ACCORDING TO BONA THE POWER NEEDS OF THE CAPITAL WILL BE LARGELY MET.

10. SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION HEADED BY VICE-PRESIDENT OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE DEPARTMENT WITH ASIAN COUNTRIES WAS IN KABUL LAST WEEK FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH AFGHAN MINISTRY OF COMMERCE ON EXCHANGE OF COMMODITIES DURING 1983. DISCUSSIONS ALSO TOOK PLACE ON LEVEL OF SOVIET CONSUMER GOODS TO BE DELIVERED TO AFGHANISTAN IN 1983 UNDER CONSUMER CREDIT AGREEMENT OR AS GRANT-IN-AID. CONTRACT HAS BEEN SIGNED FOR PURCHASE BY DRA FROM USSR DURING 1983 OF 450,000 TONS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS. OF THIS, 7,300 TONES OF DIESEL OIL AND 5,000 TONS OF PETROL WILL BE FINANCED BY A CONSUMER LOAN. THE SOVIET UNION HAS REPORTEDLY REDUCTED THE CURRENT YEAR'S PRICE OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS BY 4 PER CENT. BONA ALSO REPORTED RECENT SIGNING IN KABUL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN DRA AND USSR UNDER WHICH SOVIET UNION WILL PROVIDE 211,000 TONS OF GRAIN AND FLOUR TO DRA DURING 1983. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, THIS WILL MEET ALL THE FOOD NEEDS OF THE COUNTRY. UNDER THE AGREEMENT 100,000 TONS OF WHEAT AND 11,000 TONES OF FLOUR WILL BE PROVIDED AS GRANT-IN-AID AND 100,000 TONS OF FLOUR UNDER THE BARTER TRADE AGREEMENT.

11. AGREEMENT BETWEEN MINISTRY OF HIGHER VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND SOVIET STATE COMMITTEE FOR PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION ON DESIGN OF 3 NEW TECHNICAL SCHOOLS TO BE BUILT IN KABUL AND BALKH PROVINCES WAS SIGNED IN KABUL ON 25 DECEMBER.

SECURITY.

12. TODAY IS THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN BY SOVIET TROOPS. WE HAVE SO FAR RECEIVED NO REPORTS OF ANY MUJAHIDEEN OPERATIONS IN KABUL TO MARK THE OCCASION, BUT HIGH LEVEL OF SECURITY IS EVIDENT THROUGHOUT THE CAPITAL.

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13. WE HAVE RECEIVED VIA AN UNOFFICIAL AFGHAN SOURCE REPORT OF A MAJOR MUJAHIDEEN ATTACK ON BAGHRAM AIRFIELD LAST WEEK. SOURCE SAID THAT MUJAHIDEEN UNITS INFILTRATED THE AIRFIELD BY PASSING THROUGH THE PERIMETER MINEFIELDS WHICH HAD BEEN CLEARED FOR THEM BY PRE-ARRANGEMENTS WITH SOVIET TROOPS OF UZBEK ORIGIN WHO WERE ON GUARD DUTY AT BASE LAST WEEK. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, EXTENSIVE DAMAGE WAS INFLICTED ON PARKED AIRCRAFT AND AIRPORT BUILDINGS.

14. BONA REPORTS RECENT CRUSHING OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY BANDS IN HERAT AND SHINDAND AND CAPTURE OF LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS AMMUNITION AND DOCUMENTS PROVING CONNECTION BETWEEN THEM AND BANDITS OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY.

PRESS DISTRIBUTION.

15. PARA 4 NOT SUITABLE.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

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
10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 December 1982

Dear Tom,

This is just to record that the Prime Minister has seen and noted your letter of 23 December about the measures we are taking to help the Afghans. She was grateful for this summary.



Timothy Flesher

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

da



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Mr The Minister
JF

23/12

Dear John,

Afghanistan

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thinks the Prime Minister might find it useful to have a short survey of what we are doing to help the Afghans and prevent Afghanistan from being forgotten. He believes that this is important in itself, and also as a means of giving public opinion here an illustration of the nature of Soviet policy.

UK aid to Afghan refugees

The number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is now some 2.7m, with about a further 400,000 in Iran. This represents an exodus of approximately one fifth of the Afghan population. UK aid to the refugees exceeds £1m given or pledged since January 1980 (including £4.32 through the European Community). Mr Hurd announced the most recent allocation of £1m during his visit to a refugee camp near Peshawar on 14 November. The bulk of this grant will go to the UNHCR, ICRC and voluntary agencies working in Pakistan. We also intend to channel £50,000 of this money via the Afghanistan Support Committee (see below) to a Swedish voluntary agency in Peshawar (there being no suitable British relief agency on the spot) who will organise the supply of food into areas of need inside Afghanistan such as the Panjshir Valley, which have been devastated by recent Soviet/Afghan offensives. There are of course political and practical problems in getting relief into Afghanistan, but that is where the people are in the greatest need, and Mr Pym believes that we must try.

Afghanistan Support Committee (ASC)

We are supporting the all-party Afghanistan Support Committee (who brought a delegation to see the Prime Minister on the occasion of Afghanistan Day on 21 March). Mr Hurd is encouraging the new Chairman, Viscount Cranbourne MP. A new executive director was appointed in November, who has already put forward an ambitious programme to promote publicity and relief work for Afghanistan. So far we have supplied the ASC with a pump-primer of £20,000 and a further £15,000 from the supplementary reserve for 1983/84 to meet their administrative expenses. They are also raising money privately. The ASC have already stimulated some public and parliamentary interest in Afghanistan by tabling parliamentary questions and Early Day Motions and by writing to national newspapers such as the Times and the Daily Telegraph. Lord Cranborne and Mr Neville Sandelson MP also made a useful visit to Peshawar in November to look at the situation on the

/ground;



ground; the Labour member of the delegation had to drop out. The ASC should now prove a more effective body than hitherto.

Information effort

The COI have made a third film on Afghanistan for unattributable showing by foreign television stations. This includes a very effective interview with President Zia of Pakistan and was distributed just before the UNGA debate on Afghanistan last November. In Mr Hurd's view, this film is the best of the three.

At our suggestion the BBC will be increasing their Pashto service (for Afghanistan and Pakistan) from the present 15 minutes per day to half an hour (the Prime Minister may recall placards calling for an increase when she visited Pakistan last year). The service reaches an avid audience in Afghanistan and in the refugee camps of Pakistan. The increase will take effect from the New Year.

Diplomatic Initiatives

- a) We have reaffirmed on several occasions the validity of our initiative on Afghanistan calling for a two-stage conference. At our suggestion the latest communiqué of the European Council, 3-4 December, drew attention to these proposals again as a way forward if the Soviet Union ever demonstrated a genuine commitment to withdraw.
- b) At the same time we keep under consideration last year's proposal for a conference on Afghan refugees. The Pakistanis, whose lead in this is essential, were reluctant to go for a refugee conference in 1982, but they may wish to reconsider their position in 1983, when the problems of the refugees are likely to become more acute.
- c) At the latest debate on Afghanistan in the UNGA the Pakistanis and Islamic countries took the lead and tabled a further strong resolution on Afghanistan which secured overwhelming support (114-21-13). We and the Ten gave discreet lobbying support in the final stages. There were no major changes of position. This result serves as a forceful reminder that international concern on Afghanistan is undiminished.

We are doing much to keep the Afghan problem in the news and to maintain the pressure on the Soviet Union. We have written separately about our other activities. Meanwhile President Zia of Pakistan, during his visit to the United States, strongly reaffirmed his commitment to work for a Soviet withdrawal and to resist pressures to engage in direct talks with the Babrak Karmal regime. Early press

/speculation

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Early press speculation following Brezhnev's death that the Russians might be contemplating a change of policy on Afghanistan has proved unfounded; the latest unsigned Pravda article on the subject re-stated their previous hard line.

Yours ever
J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

23.12.82.

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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23 DEC 1982
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AFGHANISTAN

GRS 777

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MOSCOW 170756Z DEC 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 853 OF 17 DEC

INFO ROUTINE KABUL, ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING TO NEW DELHI, BIS TEHRAN, PEKING

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AFGHANISTAN

SUMMARY

1. THE FIRST AUTHORITYATIVE SOVIET STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN SINCE ANDROPOV'S ADVENT APPEARED AS AN UNSIGNED PRAVDA EDITORIAL ON 16 DECEMBER. IT WAS A RESOLUTE CONDEMNATION OF WESTERN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND MARKED NO CHANGE IN THE SOVIET POSITION. SOME STRONG WORDS WERE DIRECTED AT PAKISTAN.

DETAIL

2. THE ARTICLE WAS ENTITLED 'WHO OPPOSES A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM'. FOLLOWING IS AN ACCOUNT OF THE MAIN POINTS.

INTERFERENCE

3. THE EDITORIAL TOOK AS THE STARTING POINT FOR ITS INDIGNATION THE PASSAGE ON AFGHANISTAN IN THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' COMMUNIQUE. DESPITE THEIR CALL FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION THE US AND ITS ALLIES ONLY USED THE AFGHAN QUESTION TO JUSTIFY INTERFERENCE IN THAT COUNTRY'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. ALMOST HALF THE ARTICLE WAS THEN DEVOTED TO A HISTORY (BEGINNING IN THE MID-70S) OF 'IMPERIALISM'S INTERFERENCE', INTENDED TO PULL AFGHANISTAN INTO AN ANTI-SOVIET ORBIT. BY THE END OF 1979 (IE BEFORE THE SOVIET INTERVENTION) OVER 100,000 BANDITS HAD BEEN ARMED AND SUPPLIED, PARTICULARLY WITH SOVIET WEAPONRY FROM EGYPT CHANELLED BY THE US INTO PAKISTAN.

THE SOVIET POSITION

4. AFGHANISTAN HAD BECOME VICTIM OF AN UNDECLARED WAP. IN VIOLATION OF THE UN CHARTER THE US HAD IN EFFECT EMBARKED UPON AGGRESSION. THE SOVIET DECISION TO AID THE DRA GOVERNMENT WAS TAKEN WHEN THE VERY EXISTANCE OF THE AFGHAN STATE WAS THREATENED, AND IN THE INTERESTS ALSO OF THE SECURITY OF THE USSR'S SOUTHERN BORDERS. SOVIET MILITARY AID WAS LIMITED AND TEMPORARY. 'THE SOVIET UNION

/DID NOT

DID NOT AND DOES NOT INTEND TO CONVERT AFGHANISTAN INTO A BASE AGAINST OTHER COUNTRIES''. SOVIET TROOPS WERE READY TO WITHDRAW IN AGREEMENT WITH THE DRA GOVERNMENT WITHOUT DELAY UPON CESSATION OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND GUARANTEES THAT INTERFERENCE WOULD NOT BE RESUMED. ''THE SOVIET UNION IS INTERESTED IN AFGHANISTAN REMAINING A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATE AND ITS GOOD NEIGHBOUR'' NOTHING HAD CHANGED IN THIS PRINCIPLED SOVIET POSITION.

DRA POSITION

5. THE DRA GOVERNMENT WAS DISPLAYING RESTRAINT IN THE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS MILITARY MEASURES AGAINST INTERVENTIONIST BANDS. IT TOOK CARE TO PREVENT THE CRISIS SPREADING FURTHER. ''IT DOES NOT USE ITS LEGITIMATE RIGHT OF PURSUIT OF BANDIT FORMATIONS WHEN THEY RETURN TO THEIR FOREIGN OPERATIONAL BASES''. THE DRA DID NOT REACT TO PROVOCATIONS AND HELD OPEN THE PATH TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
6. ''THE REVOLUTION IS DEVELOPING AND THIS PROCESS IN AFGHANISTAN IS IRREVERSIBLE''. A FIRM REBUFF MET THOSE WHO FUTILELY SOUGHT TO DEPRIVE THE AFGHAN PEOPLE OF ITS ACHIEVEMENTS. AFGHANISTAN AND ITS FRIENDS COULD DEFEND ITS RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE AND INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT, AND TO SOCIAL PROGRESS. THE SOONER ITS ENEMIES UNDERSTOOD THIS THE BETTER.

THE US POSITION

7. USING THE EVENTS AROUND AFGHANISTAN THE US WANTED TO BIND PAKISTAN TO ITS AGGRESSIVE POLICY. THE US NEEDED TENSION AT ALL COSTS. HENCE THE ABUNDANT SUPPLY OF WEAPONS TO AFGHAN BANDITS (INCLUDING ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES AND CHEMICAL AMMUNITION) AND THE DAMAGE DONE IN AFGHANISTAN.

PAKISTAN.

8. THE HISTORY OF INTERFERENCE WAS WELL KNOWN TO THE US, OTHER NATO COUNTRIES ''AND THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN''.
9. WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY IT HAS PROVED POSSIBLE TO BEGIN AFGHAN-PAKISTANI NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WERE BEING TESTED THE TRUE INTENTIONS AND THE VALUE OF THE DECLARATION ON RESPECT FOR UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES. IF THE PROCESS OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WAS DEVELOPING EXTREMELY SLOWLY THIS WAS ABOVE ALL ''BECAUSE THE LEADERSHIP OF PAKISTAN BEHAVES INCONSISTENTLY''. JUDGING BY THE FACTS, ISLAMABAD WAS PRINCIPALLY

GUIDED BY CONSIDERATIONS OF EXPEDIENCY, BY A DESIRE TO SQUEEZE
MAXIMUM BENEFIT FROM THAT GENEROSITY DISPLAYED BY THE USA AND
CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES TOWARDS THE ANTI-AFGHAN FORCES.

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

10. THE WAY TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT LAY THROUGH AN EFFECTIVE
CESSATION OF EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE AND THROUGH THE ATTAINMENT OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF AFGHANHSTAN AND ITS NEIGHBOURS.
THE BASIS FOR SUCH A SETTLEMENT EXISTED. IT HAD BEEN LAYED DOWN
IN THE WELL-KNOWN PROPOSALS OF THE DRA GOVERNMENT OF MAY 1980 AND
AUGUST 1981 WHICH HAD GAINED THE BROAD SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC. IN THE CONTEXT OF SUCH A SETTLEMENT, THE QUESTION OF THE
WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET MILITARY CONTINGENT TEMPORARILY LOCATED IN
THE DRA'S COULD BE CONSIDERED.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

SUTHERLAND

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/MR HURD

MR WRIGHT

SIR J BULLARD

MR GOODISON

MR ADAMS

MR AUST (LEGAL ADV.)

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HD/PUSD (2)

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 300115Z NOV 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1965 OF 29 NOVEMBER

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PEKING, UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING JEDDA, UKMIS GENEVA, TOKYO, ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, UKREP
BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, PARIS, ROME, LUXEMBOURG.

MY TELNO 1957: AFGHANISTAN: UNGA 37 DEBATE

SUMMARY

1. THE RESULT OF THE VOTE ON THE AFGHANISTAN DRAFT RESOLUTION THIS MORNING (29 NOVEMBER) WAS 114 - 21 - 13. THIS WAS TWO FEWER VOTES BOTH FOR AND AGAINST COMPARED WITH LAST YEAR (116 - 23 - 12).

DETAIL

2. THERE WERE FOUR FURTHER SPEAKERS IN THE DEBATE THIS MORNING

(INCLUDING CHAIRMAN, FOREIGN MINISTER OF MALAYSIA AND A

2. THERE WERE FOUR FURTHER SPEAKERS IN THE DEBATE THIS MORNING (INCLUDING GHAZALI SHAFIE, FOREIGN MINISTER OF MALAYSIA), AND A HANDFUL OF EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE.

3. THE CHANGES FROM LAST YEAR'S VOTE WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) BELIZE, BOLIVIA, MAURITIUS AND VANUATU WHICH VOTED YES IN 1981 WERE ABSENT.

(B) EQUATORIAL GUINEA WHICH VOTED YES IN 1981 ABSTAINED.

(C) CHAD WHICH ABSTAINED IN 1981 VOTED YES.

(D) DOMINICA AND ST VINCENT WHICH WERE ABSENT IN 1981 VOTED YES.

(E) YEMEN WHICH WAS ABSENT IN 1981 ABSTAINED.

(F) SAO TOME AND SEYCHELLES WHICH VOTED NO IN 1981 WERE ABSENT.

4. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF BELIZE MISSED THE VOTE BECAUSE HIS PLANE FROM WASHINGTON WAS LATE. HE IS MOST APOLOGETIC AND IS NOTIFYING THE SECRETARIAT THAT HAD HE BEEN PRESENT HE WOULD HAVE VOTED YES. WE SUSPECT THAT VAN LIEROP, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF VANUATU, DELIBERATELY STAYED AWAY. THE AUSTRALIANS SPOKE TO HIM PERSONALLY ON FRIDAY ABOUT THE VOTE. HE HAS SINCE CLAIMED THAT HE WAS DETAINED BY AN IMPORTANT LAW CASE. (HE IS A RADICAL LAWYER WHO REPRESENTS VANUATU ON A PART-TIME BASIS). BOLIVIA'S ABSENCE WAS APPARENTLY A MISUNDERSTANDING SINCE IT HAD INTENDED TO VOTE YES, BUT THOSE OF MAURITIUS AND (MORE HELPFULLY) SEYCHELLES WERE PROBABLY DELIBERATE.
COMMENT

5. IT IS DISAPPOINTING THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME THE VOTE FOR THIS RESOLUTION FAILED TO MAINTAIN ITS UPWARD TREND. BUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE VOTES FOR AND AGAINST REMAINS UNCHANGED SO THE RUSSIANS HAVE NO GROUNDS FOR COMFORT. ONCE AGAIN THE RESOLUTION HAS BEEN CARRIED BY AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY.

6. THE DEBATE ITSELF WAS A DESULTORY AFFAIR AND ATTENDANCE WAS SPARSE ON THE SECOND DAY. WE BELIEVE THAT HOLLAI, THE HUNGARIAN PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SCHEDULED THE DEBATE ON THE EVE OF THE THANKSGIVING HOLIDAY WEEKEND IN THE HOPE THAT A FRIDAY EVENING VOTE WOULD FIND SEVERAL DELEGATIONS ABSENT. THE PAKISTANIS MANAGED, HOWEVER, TO DRUM UP ENOUGH SPEAKERS TO KEEP THE DEBATE GOING UNTIL THIS MORNING. BUT APART FROM THIS SLEIGHT OF HAND THE RUSSIANS PULLED NO TRICKS OUT OF THE BAG.

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[REPEATED SAVING AS REQUESTED]

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Afghanistan

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 666 OF 23 NOVEMBER
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

MT

YOUR TELNO 326 TO BRIDGETOWN ETC : AFGHANISTAN AT THE UNGA.

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY HAD A WORD WITH THE MFA TODAY. THE LATTER SAID ZIMBABWE WOULD VOTE AS IN 1981 IE FOR THE PAKISTANI RESOLUTION, DESPITE SOVIET LOBBYING HERE CITING THE CHANGE OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND THE OPENING OF 'PROXIMITY TALKS' UNDER PAKISTANI AEGIS BETWEEN THE EABRAK KARNAL REGIME AND THE AFGHAN 'REBELS' (?). ZIMBABWE CONTINUED TO DEPRECATE THE SOVIET MILITARY OCCUPATION, AND TO ADVOCATE AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT WITHOUT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE.

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FM FCO 191300Z NOV 82

TO PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 213 OF 19 NOVEMBER 1982

MT

AFGHANISTAN: TIME INTERVIEW WITH KUZICHKIN

1. TIME MAGAZINE OF 22 NOVEMBER PUBLISHES AN ACCOUNT OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN IN RECENT YEARS BY VLADIMIR KUZICHKIN, A FORMER KGB MAJOR WHOSE DEFECTION WAS ANNOUNCED IN LONDON IN OCTOBER. KUZICHKIN SERVED AS VICE-CONSUL IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN IRAN FROM 1977 TO 1982.

2. HIS ACCOUNT, PREPARED BEFORE BREZHNEV'S DEATH, MAKES THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS:

I) BREZHNEV PERSONALLY OVERRULED REPEATED KGB ADVICE NOT TO ESTABLISH A COMMUNIST REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN, AND IN PARTICULAR NOT TO BACK TARAKI IN 1978 AND AMIN IN SEPTEMBER 1979:

II) AMIN, KARMAL'S PREDECESSOR, WAS MURDERED IN HIS PALACE BY A SPECIALLY TRAINED SOVIET ASSAULT GROUP UNDER KGB LEADERSHIP:

III) THE SOVIET POLITBURO DECIDED TO INTERVENE BECAUSE THEY FEARED THAT A SUCCESSFUL MOSLEM REVOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD MEAN THE EXPULSION OF THE RUSSIANS FROM THE COUNTRY WITH SEVERE LOSS TO THEIR PRESTIGE,

IV) THE RUSSIANS ARE NOW BOGGED DOWN IN A WAR WHICH THEY CANNOT WIN AND CANNOT ABANDON. THEY OVERESTIMATED THE WILLINGNESS OF THE AFGHAN ARMY TO FIGHT AND UNDERESTIMATED AFGHAN RESISTANCE.

LINE TO TAKE

3. YOU SHOULD NOT DRAW ATTENTION TO THE INTERVIEW AS WE DO NOT WISH TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT IS INSPIRED BY HMG. THE

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INTRODUCTION TO THE ARTICLE MAKES NO REFERENCE TO HMG INVOLVEMENT IN ARRANGING THE INTERVIEW. HOWEVER, IF IT IS RAISED BY OFFICIAL OR OTHER CONTACTS, YOU MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING:

I) WE BELIEVE THE INTERVIEW TO BE AN AUTHORITATIVE ACCOUNT:

II) WE CANNOT COMMENT ON THE DETAIL PROVIDED BY KUZICHKIN, BUT HE WAS CERTAINLY WELL PLACED TO KNOW THE VIEWS OF THOSE INVOLVED IN SOVIET OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN,

III) HIS TESTIMONY DEMONSTRATES THE HIGH DEGREE OF SOVIET INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, EVEN BEFORE DECEMBER 1979, AND GIVES THE LIE TO SOVIET CLAIMS THAT THEY INTERVENED AT THE REQUEST OF THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES.

PYM

BY TELEGRAPH:

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AFGHANISTAN.

*Ad 2/4
f.*

1. MY FRG COLLEAGUE TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE RESPECT) OF A CONVERSATION WHICH THE FRG AMBASSADOR TO THE UN HAD WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR FOLLOWING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S RETURN FROM MOSCOW.
2. DE CUELLAR SAID THAT IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GROMYKO, HE HAD DISCERNED SOME CHANGE IN THE SOVIET ATTITUDE ON AFGHANISTAN: ~~FOR~~ THIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT. FOR THE FIRST TIME, GROMYKO HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UN HAD A ROLE TO PLAY AND SAID THEY WERE THE BEST HOPE OF REACHING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HE ALSO SEEMED CONCERNED THAT THE CONTINUED FAILURE TO FIND A SOLUTION WAS SERIOUSLY UNDERMINING DETENTE.
3. DE CUELLAR TOLD GROMYKO THAT TO REACH A SETTLEMENT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME GIVE ON THE PART OF BOTH SIDES AND HE WAS, ACCORDINGLY PREPARED TO MAKE GROMYKO AN OFFER. IF THE RUSSIANS WOULD AGREE TO A CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE REPLACEMENT OF KARMAL BY SOMEONE MORE LIKELY TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL UNITY, THEN THE PAKISTANIS COULD PROBABLY BE PERSUADED TO AGREE TO STOP THEIR TERRITORY FROM BEING USED AS A BASE FOR COUNTER-REVOLUTIONAIRES. DE CUELLAR SAID THAT GROMYKO DID NOT REJECT THE OFFER OUT OF HAND AND HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING IT FURTHER WITH HIM IN NEW YORK SHORTLY. SO FAR AS BAUCH KNOWS, DE CUELLAR'S OFFER WAS HIS OWN IDEA AND HE HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED IT WITH THE PAKISTANIS OR ANYONE ELSE.
4. THE DE CUELLAR PROPOSITION, IF CORRECTLY REPORTED, SUGGESTS NOT ONLY THE REMOVAL OF KARMAL BUT ALSO THE REPLACEMENT OF HIS ADMINISTRATION, OR PERHAPS ITS DILUTION, TO CREATE A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. THERE HAVE SO FAR AS I AM AWARE, BEEN NO INDICATIONS THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE YET REACHED THE POINT WHERE THEY FEEL IT NECESSARY OR ARE PREPARED TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS. SO FAR AS THE SOVIETS ARE CONCERNED, KARMAL IS PROBABLY EXPENDABLE, BUT IT HARDLY SEEMS CONCEIVABLE THAT THEY WOULD AGREE TO THE PDPA STANDING DOWN AS THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. SO FAR AS THEY ARE CONCERNED THE REVOLUTION IS IRREVERSIBLE. AS VIEWED FROM HERE, GROMYKO'S APPARENT REASONABLENESS, WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE IMPRESSED BOTH DE CUELLAR AND CORDOVEZ, IS MERELY PART OF THE USUAL SOVIET POSTURING IN THE RUN UP TO THE UNGA.

GARNER

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YOUR TELNO 358

AFGHANISTAN: GENEVA TALKS.

1. NIAZ NAIK, THE NEW FOREIGN SECRETARY, WHO WAS AT GENEVA GAVE ME A DETAILED ACCOUNT TODAY (HE APOLOGISED THAT HE HAD NOT HAD TIME TO BRIEF US IN GENEVA). IN GENERAL, THE PAKISTANIS WERE VERY SATISFIED. CONTRARY TO SOME OF THE PRESS REPORTS, THEY HAD MADE NO CONCESSIONS ON IMPORTANT MATTERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN SOME MOVEMENT ON THE AFGHAN SIDE AND THE PAKISTANIS HAD GAINED A NUMBER OF POINTS. THEIR INFORMATION WAS THAT THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE HAD PLAYED A HELPFUL ROLE THROUGHOUT IN PERSUADING THE AFGHANS TO BE FLEXIBLE. IF THIS WERE SO, THE RUSSIAN MOTIVES WERE NOT YET CLEAR TO THEM.

2. THE AFGHANS HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT TO START WITH AND HAD SIMPLY

2. THE AFGHANS HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT TO START WITH AND HAD SIMPLY TROTTED OUT ALL THE FAMILIAR ACCUSATIONS (TRAINING CAMPS, ETC). YAQUB HAD TOLD CORDOVEZ THAT IF THIS WAS TO BE THE PATTERN THEN THE TALKS NEED ONLY LAST TWO DAYS AND IT WAS HARDLY WORTH THEIR COMING. CORDOVEZ, APPARENTLY THROUGH THE RUSSIAN, PERSUADED THE AFGHANS TO TALK BUSINESS.

3. THE TWO INITIAL AFGHAN HURDLES TO OVERCOME WERE:

(I) THEIR VIEW THAT THE INDIRECT TALKS SHOULD DEAL ONLY WITH MODALITIES AND SHOULD PROCEED QUICKLY TO SUBSTANTIVE DIRECT TALKS. BUT AFTER A DAY OR SO THEY WERE DISCUSSING THE AGENDA ITEMS WITHOUT INSISTING THAT THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE DIRECTLY.

(II) THEIR INSISTENCE ON DEALING WITH INTERFERENCE AND GUARANTEES AS THE FIRST ITEMS. ACCORDING TO THEM THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS HAD TO BE END OF INTERFERENCE, GUARANTEES, WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS, RETURN OF REFUGEES. THE PAKISTANIS REPEATEDLY DENIED INTERFERENCE AND SAID THAT ALL THE ITEMS WERE INTER-LINKED. THIS VIEW THEY SAY WAS ACCEPTED.

4. ON THE SPECIFIC AGENDA ITEMS:

(A) WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF LINKAGE, THE IDEA OF A "TIME FRAME" WAS ACCEPTED. IT WOULD START WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS: THE RETURN OF REFUGEES WOULD START AFTER A SUITABLE INTERVAL AND AT THE RIGHT POINT THE GUARANTEES AGAINST INTERFERENCE WOULD BE GIVEN. CORDOVEZ INTENDS TO WORK OUT A TIME FRAME WITH SIX DATES MARKING THE BEGINNING AND END OF EACH OF THE THREE PROCESSES.

(B) RETURN OF REFUGEES. THE AFGHANS HAD AGREED THAT THE REFUGEES SHOULD BE CONSULTED AND HAD SLIGHTLY IMPROVED THEIR AMNESTY, ETC, OFFERS, BUT WERE ADAMANT THAT THE REFUGEE LEADERSHIP SHOULD NOT BE ASSOCIATED. A FORM OF WORDS HAD HOWEVER BEEN ACCEPTED TO THE EFFECT THAT A MECHANISM FOR CONSULTING THE REFUGEES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AND THE PAKISTANIS RECKONED THAT THIS GAVE THEM FREEDOM TO CONSULT THE REFUGEE LEADERSHIP. IF A MECHANISM REALLY WAS AGREED, THEN IT SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE UNHCR TO CARRY OUT THE CONSULTATION (THEY ARE STILL EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO DO SO).9

(C) INTERFERENCE AND GUARANTEES. THE AFGHANS WANTED BILATERAL GUARANTEES IN AN OBVIOUS BID TO SECURE RECOGNITION. THE PPAKISTANIS INSISTED ON UNILATERAL GUARANTEES AND NO IMPLICATION THAT THEY HAD IN FACT BEEN INTERFERING. THEY ALSO INSISTED THAT AS PART OF

GUARANTEES IN AN OBVIOUS BID TO SECURE RECOGNITION. THE PARTIES ~~INSISTED ON UNILATERAL GUARANTEES AND NO IMPLICATION THAT THEY HAD~~ IN FACT BEEN INTERFERING. THEY ALSO INSISTED THAT AS PART OF THIS PROCESS THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER SHOULD BE ACCEPTED, A QUESTION WHICH THE AFGHANS WANTED TO DISCUSS SEPARATELY. WHAT SEEMS TO HAVE EMERGED IS THAT THE PROCESS WILL CONSIST OF UNILATERAL GUARANTEES, WITH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL GUARANTEES TO FOLLOW. ON MULTILATERAL GUARANTEES, THE PAKISTANIS ENVISAGE A CONFERENCE MUCH ON THE LINES OF OUR PROPOSAL (PARTIES CONCERNED, PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND SOME OUTSIDERS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES), OR IT COULD BE DONE THROUGH THE UN MACHINERY.

5. CORDOVEZ WILL NOW DRAFT A DOCUMENT INCORPORATING WHAT HAS BEEN AGREED AND THE NEXT STEP WILL BE FURTHER INDIRECT TALKS IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER. I DREW ATTENTION TO THE OBVIOUS POSSIBILITY THAT ONE AT LEAST OF THE RUSSIAN MOTIVES IN BEING HELPFUL (IF INDEED THEY HAD BEEN) COULD BE TO AVOID ANOTHER UNGA RESOLUTION. NIAZ NAIK SAID THAT THEY WERE WELL AWARE OF THIS, BUT THERE SHOULD BE TIME FOR THE AFGHAN/RUSSIAN ATTITUDE TO BE FULLY TESTED BEFORE THE UNGA DEBATE. IF IT BECAME EVIDENT IN SEPTEMBER OR BEFORE THAT THE AFGHANS WERE STALLING, THEN CORDOVEZ WOULD HOPE TO FIT IN ANOTHER ROUND OF VISITS TO CAPITALS IN TIME TO PRESENT A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL BEFORE THE AFGHANISTAN ITEM CAME UP. APART FROM THIS OBVIOUS RUSSIAN MOTIVE, NIAZ NAIK COULD ONLY THINK THAT THE DISPLAY OF FLEXIBILITY MIGHT BE CONNECTED WITH A SUMMIT MEETING WITH THE AMERICANS.

6. I THINK THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE PAKISTANIS HAVE STUCK FIRMLY TO THEIR PRINCIPLES AND DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE GIVEN ANYTHING AWAY. HOWEVER, THEY DO SEEM TO THINK THAT THERE HAS BEEN FLEXIBILITY ON THE OTHER SIDE (AND NIAZ NAIK IS NOT A MAN EASILY CONNED) AND THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN BEHIND THIS, THOUGH NIAZ NAIK ADMITTED THAT THEY WERE RELYING ON WHAT CORDOVEZ HAD TOLD THEM. HE ADMITTED THAT THE AFGHANS HAD AT THE LAST MOMENT TRIED TO INTRODUCE UNACCEPTABLE POINTS INTO THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, E.G. SPELLING OUT THE STEPS PAKISTAN MUST TAKE TO END INTERFERENCE, AND THAT THE DETAILED DRAFTING MIGHT REVEAL THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL CHANGE OF HEART. I COMMENTED THAT IF THE AFGHANS/RUSSIANS HAD REALLY AGREED TO START WITHDRAWING TROOPS FIRST THEN THERE MIGHT BE INDEED A BREAKTHROUGH, BUT I WOULD BELIEVE IT WHEN I SAW IT AND EVEN SO THERE WOULD BE PLENTY OF SCOPE FOR DECEPTION. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER NIAZ NAIK'S RATHER OPTIMISTIC READING OF THE GENEVA TALKS IS BOGNE OUT BY EVENTS.

7. FINALLY, NIAK APOLOGISED FOR THE FACT THAT YAQUB HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GET TO LONDON. THEY HAD MADE GREAT EFFORTS TO FIT A QUICK LONDON

7. FINALLY, NIAK APOLOGISED FOR THE FACT THAT YAQUB HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GET TO LONDON. THEY HAD MADE GREAT EFFORTS TO FIT A QUICK LONDON VISIT IN, IF POSSIBLE AFTER THE TALKS, BUT YAQUB HAD HAD TO GO TO AMMAN (I THINK FROM WHAT HE SAID THAT CORDOVEZ HAD ALSO ADVISED AGAINST A VISIT AS GIVING THE OTHER SIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT PAKISTAN WAS ACTING ON WESTERN INSTRUCTIONS).

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FORSTER

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W Coles

8 April 1982

Policy Unit

PRIME MINISTER

The attached letter from Vladimir Bukovsky, together with an article which I sent him, to which the letter refers, is self-explanatory.

I am copying this minute to Francis Pym.

JOHN HOSKYNS

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Vladimir Bukovsky
240 King's College
CAMBRIDGE
CB2 1ST

2 April 1982

Dear Mr Hoskyns

Many thanks for sending me a copy of an article from the Spectator on Afghanistan. It so happened that I have met the author, shortly after he came back from Afghanistan and his excellent film was shown by ITN.

Unfortunately, the Western countries still do not appreciate the importance of this war. I have just come back from Washington where I tried in vain to persuade some people of influence that, in view of the developments in Poland (which is far from over, and a major crisis could be expected within a few months, with the military Government crumbling down and with Soviets replacing the Polish units with their own), and also in view of the current Soviet plans to instigate an internal feudal fight in Pakistan (there are indications that the Soviets formed a "provisional government of Baluchistan" seated in Kabul), the only thing we can do is to activate all the "hot points", thus overstraining the Soviet resources. Obvious points of such activation are: Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola. By doing so, the Americans could relieve the pressure from Central America as well.

Well, regrettably, the people in Washington are too much preoccupied with their careers and intrigues to think wider. I feel enormous frustration after talking with them.

So, that is how we lost our world, piece by piece, for the last 50 years.

All best wishes,

Yours sincerely

V Bukovsky

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are getting a little old for action.

The lesson has been learned in Europe that violence must be met with force. After the first terrorist successes governments pulled themselves together and improved police organisation and arrangements for sharing intelligence. Each country now has its own task force: the SAS in Britain, GSG 9 in West Germany, Marines in Holland, Gendarmes in France, and now special

forces in Italy and Spain. All have won battle honours against terrorists.

Yasser Arafat's decision to stop training other people's terrorists for a while may be a small step but it is a further encouragement to Europeans who have already put their enemies on the defensive. Any sign of conversion to the belief that diplomacy and lobbying are better than bombing and machine-gunning is welcome.

Afghanistan: no going back

Nick Downie

Afghanistan is, or rather was, a very beautiful country, and the road which leads to the Khyber pass from Kabul, the capital city, twists through spectacular gorges and along precipitous cliffs. I first made the journey in 1964 as a teenage hitchhiker, and was awed. Ten year later I travelled the same road, and was appalled.

In 1964 I had been a tourist, but by 1974 I had spent six years as a professional soldier and was on my way home after three years of operational duty in the Dhaufar campaign in Oman. The fighting there had mostly been in rough mountain country, and eventually it required nearly 10,000 men to subdue a handful of ill-armed Marxist guerrillas. From Kabul I wrote to a friend in Oman, saying that Afghanistan made Dhaufar look like Salisbury Plain. In short, Afghanistan is a regular soldier's nightmare, and a guerrilla paradise.

This is fairly obvious to anyone with a military background, including, I imagine, the Russian general staff. However, the official view of the US State Department and most Western governments is that the Soviet invasion was a monumental blunder, the implications of which are only now beginning to sink into the minds of Kremlin strategists. According to this theory, the Russians' aim is strictly limited and eventually they will be forced to withdraw, which is a comforting idea. Unfortunately, it seems to have been formulated by men who have little practical experience of either Afghanistan or guerrilla warfare.

The same shortcomings also apply to rather too many of the journalists who stagger about with the Afghan *mujahideen*, for periods ranging from three days to three weeks. Their reports on the effectiveness of the resistance sometimes seem to bear a direct relationship to the number of blisters collected en route. The overall reporting of the Afghan war has been rather misleading, and occasionally disgraceful.

The worst examples occurred just after the Russian invasion, when every newspaper and TV station was scrambling to get the most dramatic story. One headline read, 'First Girl in the War Zone' — which turned out to mean that an intrepid young lady had taken a bus to the

tourist observation point on the Pakistani side of the Afghan frontier. A TV report showed a tarmac road which purported to be in Afghanistan. In fact, the cameraman had filmed a main road in Pakistan.

However, the most spectacular example was an ITN news item which told us that the Afghan way of dealing with the Russian tanks was to pour petrol over some dedicated man, who would then set light to himself and dive into the open hatch of a passing armoured vehicle. Not a shred of evidence was produced to support this claim, but that is hardly surprising since the feat is physically impossible. But the story was widely believed, and it set the seal on the Kiplingque image of 'fearless fighters' — a myth which persists to this day.

The misconception that all malodorous, uneducated tribesmen are natural soldiers is shared not only by diplomats and journalists, but also by many army officers. In Oman I lived with bedouin irregulars for two and a half years, and became deeply attached to their eccentricities. By the end, the only noticeable difference between us was that I stank worse than they did, which may explain why I was given instructions only at quarterly intervals. My orders were invariably short, and sometimes impossible to execute.

On one occasion I was hauled in front of the Brigadier, who calmly outlined his plan for dealing with the main enemy stronghold — a mountainous death-trap which went by the unfortunate, but quite apt name of 'Sheershitti'. He wanted me to collect 100 men and sort the place out. His final words are engraved on my memory — 'I don't want to hear any requests for helicopters, or infantry companies in support. You are

to get in there, live like guerrillas, and kill the enemy.' The man had clearly gone mad, but I saluted and set off for the *souk* to break these tidings to the bedouin. Their reaction was predictable, so I pretended to negotiate for a month before returning to the Brigadier with the news that he would have to find an alternative way of ending the war. Neither he nor his battalion commanders ever really understood how to handle or employ the ragged, bloody-minded, Dhaufari tribesmen — which brings me back to Afghanistan.

The situation there was summed up by the cartoonist Giles with his customary acuity, a few days after the Russian invasion. His caption read, 'I see your old treacherous tribal riff-raff, enemies of the British Raj, are now your glorious allies, Colonel.' This switch of loyalties, combined with the wish for a bit of romantic colour, has tended to obscure the unpalatable truth — our new allies are *still* composed largely of treacherous riff-raff.

A few journalists have attempted to demonstrate the fact on film and in print, at the risk of a certain unpopularity with the pro-Afghan lobby. Similarly, this winter, a television reporter nearly wrecked his career by saying that the Zimbabwean guerrillas were devastatingly incompetent. Accusations of 'racist' and 'fascist' rang round the corridors of my industry. However, a tactical, military judgment does not imply any sort of political sympathy, or lack of it, nor does it necessarily predict the eventual outcome.

Guerrilla warfare is a complicated business, and the ability to shoot straight is only a part of it. Thus, the Zimbabwians won, the Kurds (who were good soldiers) lost, Polisario (who are superb) are winning, and the Eritreans (also very good) are losing. None of this detracts from the idea that treacherous riff-raff are entitled to free and fair elections. Most Englishmen seem to subscribe to this view, the Americans do in Afghanistan and Poland but not in El Salvador or Chile, and the Russians never have, anywhere.

The official Western explanation for the Soviet invasion is that the Afghan government was collapsing and the Kremlin thought that it could stop the rot by marching in with 85,000 men. This so irritated the populace that they set about the Russians with a blind fury, killing and injuring some 10,000 of them. The Russians, it is further claimed, have now realised their error, but are not sure what to do next. It seems that their intentions are basically peaceful and, surprised by the sudden strength of the resistance and the inadequacy of the Afghan army, they are desperately looking for a way out that will not leave the place in anarchy, or cost them too much 'face'. Anyway, this is the official blunder theory. I just wish I could believe it.

It is best to forget the Czars, the Great Game, warm water ports, and Lieutenant Flashman, because this story began a mere 60 years ago. Throughout that time the Russians have been beavering away in



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Afghanistan, building roads, running factories, teaching in schools, training the soldiers, studying the people, and mapping the place in detail. In 1965 I spent ten weeks tramping round the Hindu Kush mountains with four Tadjik porters. We travelled all over an area called Nuristan, and part of it, the Ashkun, was so remote that in places we were the first outsiders ever to clamber along its tracks. However, in several of the Ashkun villages the first question I was asked was whether I had a radio. Two Russians had been in there a couple of years earlier, and they were the first Europeans the people had ever seen. They had had a radio. It is often suggested that the Russians did not understand the Afghans before they invaded. I believe they knew the place and its people like the backs of their hands, and they still know exactly what they are doing. Eighteen years, almost to the day, before the Soviet invasion, an article appeared in the *Daily Telegraph*. It was written by a then Conservative MP, Neil McLean. A member of the wartime SOE, he fought in Albania alongside the resistance. Ever since then, guerrilla warfare has been one of his interests and he has spent time with active guerrilla armies in several far-off places, but 20 years ago he was writing about Afghanistan. His remarks were prophetic.

'The main external force pressing against Afghanistan to-day is the growing power of Russia in Asia. . . . Perhaps the most alarming result of Russian aid is that, although the Russians may at present have little direct political influence in Afghanistan, they will soon have established up-to-date air bases and road communications which they could take over with great ease whenever they might wish. . . . At this point, however, it seems unnecessary for the Russians to take over Afghanistan and, as one Russian diplomat put it, to become "responsible for looking after 12 million armed Afghans in smelly turbans" But if Afghanistan were to disrupt in anarchy, Russia would surely intervene and Pakistan might be faced with the Russians on her own frontiers.'

This warning was totally ignored, which in 1961 was perhaps forgivable. Twenty years later, after two years of Soviet occupation, we are still ignoring all the evidence, preferring to believe that the Russians will one day pack up and go home. It is no longer forgivable: it is irresponsible.

In 1979 I spent four months with the *Imjahideen*, in the foothills of the Hindu Kush. By sheer coincidence, I left Afghanistan four days before the Russians attacked, and I heard the news on the radio. I thought then that the Russians had arrived to do a thorough job, for which they would need at least 500,000 men. The first 85,000 I assumed to be a holding force. Eighteen months later it was still only 85,000 men and the reports which filtered out didn't quite make sense. So, very reluctantly, I decided to have another look.

I have just spent two months there — in Kandahar, the country's second largest

city, and in the mountains to the south-east of Kabul. The latter was useful because the area straddled several important supply routes, and I was able to spend hours chatting to men from all over Afghanistan, so building up a picture of events elsewhere. Without trying to offend the citadels of academia, I will outline what I believe is actually happening in the place.

First the Russians are conducting a holding operation, at minimum cost to themselves in both casualties and cash. They are holding most, but not all, of the main towns, and their supply route north to the frontier, and they are holding a string of useful military bases.

Second, the Afghan army is doing most of the fighting, and then only when it absolutely has to. It has been seriously depleted, but does not yet seem on the point of collapse; and, judging by the number of garrisons that it occupies, it must consist of more than the 25,000 men that Washington would have us believe.

Third, the guerrilla resistance is still badly fragmented by innumerable political and tribal divisions, which is an unmitigated disaster. It lacks effective leadership, and is very short on military expertise. It has neither the strength, the organisation nor the weapons seriously to affect the main garrisons or the Russian bases, but it can hold on to its mountainous territory indefinitely, particularly if no real effort is made to attack it.

Fourth, the cost to the Russians of trying to pacify the country would be enormous, because it is murderous terrain to fight in and they would be taking on almost the entire rural population. At the end of the war they would merely have gained one of the poorest countries in the world, whose only natural asset is gas, which they were buying anyway.

Fifth, the Russians are not military or political idiots. Unlike a large number of Western adventures, the Soviet moves seem to come off — Hungary, Czechoslovakia, South Yemen, Vietnam, Ethiopia (where they acted brilliantly in the Ogaden), Angola, and now Afghanistan. They are worried by Poland, but who isn't? They do not waste time on places like El Salvador.

Sixth, Afghanistan has absolutely no value whatsoever except as a strategic salient. It can be, and is being allowed to rot. So long as the Russians can hold on to their bases and the main roads, they have all they need. They should be able to do this for the next 20 years without any great difficulty. In purely military and economic terms, the cost of their presence in Afghanistan is less to them than is the cost of Northern Ireland to the British.

As to their long-term objective, they now have so many options open that it is difficult to pin down a single target. They can threaten Baluchistan, Pakistan, Iran, the Gulf, and the West's oil supply. A threat may be all they want, or they could, if necessary, move forward whenever it suits them. One thing, however, seems certain — they do not intend to go back.



Afghanistan

SUBJECT.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 March 1982

✓ cc. Harriet set.

AFGHANISTAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE

Thank you for your letter of 17 March. A delegation from the Afghanistan Support Committee duly called on the Prime Minister this evening. In the event, the only MP who appeared was Mr. Peter Temple-Morris. The rest of the delegation consisted of Lord Bethell, the three Afghans referred to in your letter, a further Afghan, Dr. Ghulam Farouq Azaz, and Mr. Peers Carter.

The delegation was photographed with the Prime Minister outside No. 10 Downing Street. The delegation then entered No. 10 and a brief discussion followed. Mr. Peter Temple-Morris explained the purpose of the Afghanistan Support Committee and stated that it had already raised £20,000 and had sent £4,500 of medicines to Afghanistan. Lord Bethell gave a brief account of the European Parliament's activities leading up to the designation of 21 March as Afghanistan Day. Then Dr. Azaz spoke in familiar terms about the efforts of the Resistance to maintain their struggle against Soviet forces. He claimed that the latter were using chemical weapons and argued that insufficient international pressure was being applied to the Soviet Union. Fatma Gailani and Karima Farani also spoke briefly. All expressed gratitude to the Prime Minister for the interest she had shown in the Afghanistan cause. Fatma Gailani asked that some of our official assistance should be channelled through the Afghanistan Support Committee, but it was explained that this proposition was being examined by the ODA. In conclusion, the Prime Minister promised that the Government would not forget the Afghanistan cause - this was one reason why we were supporting Afghanistan Day.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MR COLES

h.a. M 19/3

AFGHANISTAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE

The Prime Minister has agreed to receive the delegation at the front door.

Mr Peers Carter has given me the following details in respect of the delegation:-

Mr Peter Temple-Morris MP

Lord Bethell MEP

Mr Ian Wrigglesworth MP

Mr James Tinn MP

Mrs Fatima Nasser Zia (she is the daughter of an Afghan resistance leader. She lives in the UK.)

Mrs Karima Farani (she has been living in the UK since the Russian invasion. Her husband was a political prisoner in Afghanistan under the communist regime prior to the invasion. He has since managed to leave Afghanistan.)

Mr Mohammed Ebrahim (a Hazara from Kabul who has been living in this country for the past year.)

Mr Engineer Ghulam (not his full name as he wishes to protect his family. He is currently visiting Britain on a COI sponsored visit and represents the combined Fundamentalist resistance headquarters in Peshawar.)

All of the Afghans, except Mr Ebrahim, will be in national dress.

The Press Office is arranging for a photocall outside the front door.

M.

IAN KYDD
17 March 1982



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

This need not take very long - 15 minutes at the outside.

2. You have agreed to be photographed with the delegation outside No. 10.

3. We could then go to the White Drawing Room where Mr. Temple-Norris and Lord Sathall will give you a brief account of their activities. You can then comment briefly on our attitude towards Afghanistan.

A. J. C. $\frac{17}{3}$



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 March 1982

Dear John,

Call at No. 10 by the Afghanistan Support
Committee: 6pm on Thursday 18 March

We understand that Mr Temple-Morris MP will be bringing the following MPs with him: Mr James Tinn (Labour), Mr Ian Wrigglesworth (SDP) and one Liberal (yet to be chosen). Lord Bethell (who was the originator of the Afghanistan Day initiative) will also be in the party.

There will be at least three Afghans in the party:

- a. Fatma Gailani, a daughter of the Resistance leader, Syed Ahmed Gailani;
- b. Mrs Karima Farani, a leading member of the Afghan community in London; and
- c. Mr Mohammed Ibrahim, a Hazara from the central region of Afghanistan.

Mr Peers Carter (Director of the ASC and former Ambassador to Afghanistan) has assured us that the Afghans will not raise their political differences during the call on No. 10.

Mr Carter also hopes to include one of the Afghans who are currently on an official visit to the UK as guests of HMG. He is still discussing this with the London based Afghans. We shall let you know as soon as we hear. I am afraid that last minute changes cannot be ruled out.

Mr Temple-Morris may use the call as an opportunity to tell the Prime Minister about the work of the Afghanistan Support Committee (ASC). As I mentioned in my earlier letter, the ASC is giving help to an Austrian-run organisation in Peshawar which runs dispensaries in some of the refugee camps and also supplies a medical team which operates inside Afghanistan itself. Mr Carter has been active trying to raise support for this venture, and he has managed to arrange with a drug company for £4,500 worth of medicines to be sent to Peshawar (carried free of charge by British Airways). He has also obtained £18,000 from Oxfam. The ASC has however had little success in generating public interest within the UK. Its own direct fund raising operation has not yet got off the ground, possibly due to shortage of funds hitherto to prime the pump.

/The FCO



The FCO gave the ASC a grant of £20,000 in March 1981 towards administrative expenses. The Committee still have some £10,000 in the bank, but they may make a further request for additional financial help in the next financial year. We have made clear to the ASC that any request for further help must be judged in the light of the efforts which the committee itself makes to raise funds.

One idea which Mr Temple-Morris may raise with the Prime Minister is a suggestion that the ODA should channel part of its aid for the Afghan refugees through the ASC. This is an idea we have been considering with the ODA. Much will depend on whether the ASC successfully organise their own fund raising.

I enclose some suggested talking points for the Prime Minister.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



CALL AT NO. 10 BY THE AFGHAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE:
6pm ON THURSDAY 18 MARCH

Points to Make

1. Admire the courageous resistance of the Afghan people to the Soviet invasion. Sympathise with the suffering experienced by those who have been forced to leave their country, and by those who remain in Afghanistan.
2. We shall not allow Afghanistan to be forgotten. We have called repeatedly for complete Soviet withdrawal- have given our support to the UN General Assembly resolutions; have put forward practical proposals which would open the way to a political solution.
3. The refugees are a major humanitarian problem. Essential that the international community should help Pakistan provide support. We shall continue to play our part both bilaterally and through the European Community. Total British aid for the refugees since January 1980 amounts to some £8.7 million including a recent food aid donation of £750,000. We are also helping in other ways. The ODA has just announced a scheme for enabling Afghan refugees to come to the UK for higher education.
4. Welcome the initiative to designate 21 March as Afghanistan Day. Trust that there will be a world wide response.
5. Admire the work of Afghanistan Support Committee. What success in raising funds?

PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTION TIME: THURSDAY 18 MARCH 1982

PROPOSED VISIT TO UK BY AFGHAN MINISTERS

Line to take

1. The Government are not prepared to issue visas for Ministers of the Karmal regime to visit the UK. The Government does not have any substantive dealings with the Karmal regime which was installed by the Soviet invasion of 1979, and which is kept in power by the presence of some 90,000 Soviet troops.

PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTION TIME: THURSDAY 18 MARCH 1982

PROPOSED VISIT TO UK BY AFGHAN MINISTERS

Background

1. Mr Ron Brown, MP (Leith), wrote to the Home Secretary on 27 March 1981, asking whether a visa would be given to Dr Ratebzad, Minister of Education of the Karmal regime, to enable her to visit the UK. The Home Office replied that the Government are not prepared to issue visas for Ministers of the Karmal regime.

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TO ROUTINE ABIDJAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 43 OF 16 MARCH

AND TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

MY TELNO 38: AFGHANISTAN DAY: 21 MARCH

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE AFGHANISTAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE (AN ALL PARTY COMMITTEE OF MPS) ON THE OCCASION OF 21 MARCH:

IT IS NOW MORE THAN TWO YEARS SINCE THE SOVIET UNION INVADED AFGHANISTAN IN VIOLATION OF THE UN CHARTER AND AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED STATUS. DURING THAT TIME THE AFGHAN PEOPLE HAVE WAGED A BRAVE STRUGGLE AGAINST AN OCCUPYING FORCE OF OVER 90,000 SOVIET TROOPS. MANY HAVE SACRIFICED THEIR LIVES IN THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM, AND MANY CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, HAVE BEEN KILLED AND INJURED BY ATTACKS ON THEIR VILLAGES. WE MUST NOT FORGET THEM, NOR MUST WE FORGET THE THREE MILLION REFUGEES WHO HAVE FLED FROM THEIR HOMES TO PAKISTAN AND IRAN. THE HUMAN SUFFERING HAS BEEN COLOSSAL, AS I SAW FOR MYSELF WHEN I VISITED AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN LAST YEAR.

21 MARCH IS AFGHANISTAN DAY. FOR AFGHANS IT IS THE START OF THE TRADITIONAL NEW YEAR. FOR US IT IS THE BEGINNING OF SPRING. I HOPE THAT THE LONG WINTER OF SOVIET OCCUPATION WILL SOON END AND THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WILL TAKE HEART FROM TODAY'S ASSOCIATIONS WITH REBIRTH AND RENEWAL.

ON THIS DAY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT RENEWS ITS CALLS ON THE RUSSIANS TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN, AND TO ALLOW THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN FUTURE FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL ALSO BE RECEIVING A DELEGATION FROM THE AFGHANISTAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE (INCLUDING SOME AFGHANS)

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AT NO 10 ON THE EVENING OF 18 MARCH. WE HOPE THIS WILL BE GIVEN WIDESPREAD PUBLICITY IN THE UK AND ABROAD.

3. HMG HAVE INVITED TO THE UK FOUR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFGHANS CURRENTLY LIVING IN PAKISTAN. THEY ARE PROFESSOR BAHOUDDIN MAJROOH, DIRECTOR OF THE AFGHAN INFORMATION CENTRE OF PESHAWAR; AND MR SABAHUDDIN KUSHKAKI, DR GHULAM FAROUK AZAM AND ENGINEER GHULAM WHO ARE PEOPLE OF STANDING AMONG THE RESISTANCE GROUPS AT PESHAWAR. THE VISITORS WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET THE PRESS AND ADDRESS MEETINGS IN THE UK.

4. ON 18 MARCH THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE ANSWERING A PQ BY LORD BETHELL IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ABOUT THE MEASURES HMG WILL BE TAKING TO MARK AFGHANISTAN DAY. THE ANSWER WILL REFER TO THE EVENTS LISTED ABOVE, AND WILL ALSO SAY THAT:

- A) HMG RENEWS ITS CALL FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, AND FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNGA RESOLUTIONS OF JANUARY AND NOVEMBER 1980, AND NOVEMBER 1981; AND
- B) HMG'S AID TO THE AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN (NOW NUMBERING SOME 2.6 MILLION) NOW AMOUNTS TO SOME POUNDS STERLING 8.7 MILLION, INCLUDING A RECENT GRANT OF POUNDS STERLING 750,000 OF FOOD AID.

5. IF APPROPRIATE YOU MAY DRAW THE ABOVE TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. YOU SHOULD ALSO ISSUE THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT TO YOUR PRESS CONTACTS IN TIME FOR PUBLICATION ON 20 OR 21 MARCH.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

AFGHANISTAN STANDARD

<u>SAD</u>	<u>SEAD</u>
<u>RESD</u>	<u>NAD</u>
<u>MED</u>	<u>NENAD</u>
<u>FED</u>	
<u>UND</u>	
<u>ECD (E)</u>	
<u>CABINET OFFICE</u>	

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FROM LONDON COREU
TO BRUSSELS COREU PRIORITE
INFO ALL COREU PRIORITE AND UN MISSIONS NEW YORK
CPE/EIL/ETR 124
16/3 2100Z
CONFIDENTIEL

DISTRIBUTION GENERALE
AFGHANISTAN DAY

REFERENCE CPE/MUL/ETR/824 AND 915:

1. THE UK WOULD LIKE TO CONFIRM ITS EARLIER PROPOSAL (CPE/MUL/ETR 915) THAT THE DRAFT PRESIDENCY MESSAGE SHOULD INCLUDE A PASSAGE WELCOMING THE APPOINTMENT OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE ON AFGHANISTAN, AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVING A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNGA RESOLUTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN.
2. THE PURPOSE OF THIS REFERENCE SHOULD BE TO EMPHASISE THAT MEDIATION BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL MUST TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE REMIT OF THE UNGA RESOLUTIONS.
3. THE UK HAS NO OTHER COMMENTS ON THE TEXT PROPOSED BY THE PRESIDENCY.
4. THE UK WOULD LIKE TO INFORM THE PRESIDENCY AND ITS PARTNERS OF THE STEPS WHICH IT IS TAKING TO MARK AFGHANISTAN DAY:
 - A) THE PRIME MINISTER IS SENDING THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE AFGHANISTAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE (AN ALL PARTY COMMITTEE OF MEMBERS OF THE U K PARLIAMENT):

IT IS NOW MORE THAN TWO YEARS SINCE THE SOVIET UNION INVADED AFGHANISTAN IN VIOLATION OF THE UN CHARTER AND AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED STATUS. DURING THAT TIME THE AFGHAN PEOPLE HAVE WAGED A BRAVE STRUGGLE AGAINST AN OCCUPYING FORCE OF OVER 90,000 SOVIET TROOPS. MANY HAVE SACRIFICED THEIR LIVES IN THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM, AND MANY CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, HAVE BEEN KILLED AND INJURED BY

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ATTACKS ON THEIR VILLAGES. WE MUST NOT FORGET THEM: NOR MUST WE FORGET THE THREE MILLION REFUGEES WHO HAVE FLED FROM THEIR HOMES TO PAKISTAN AND IRAN. THE HUMAN SUFFERING HAS BEEN COLOSSAL, AS I SAW FOR MYSELF WHEN I VISITED AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN LAST YEAR.

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- B) THE PRIME MINISTER WILL ALSO BE RECEIVING A DELEGATION FROM THE AFGHANISTAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE (INCLUDING SOME AFGHANS) ON THE EVENING OF 18 MARCH. WE HOPE THAT THIS WILL BE GIVEN WIDESPREAD PUBLICITY IN THE UK AND ABROAD.
 - C) THE UK HAVE INVITED TO BRITAIN FOUR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WHO ARE NOW IN PAKISTAN. THEY ARE PROFESSOR BAHAOUDDIN MAJROOH, DIRECTOR OF THE AFGHAN INFORMATION CENTRE AT PESHAWAR, AND MR SABAHUDDIN KUSHKAKI, DR GHULAM FAROUZ AZAM AND ENGINEER GULAM, WHO ARE PEOPLE OF STANDING AMONG THE RESISTANCE GROUPS AT PESHAWAR. THE VISITORS WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITIES TO MEET THE PRESS AND ADDRESS MEETINGS IN THE UK.
5. AFGHANISTAN DAY HAS ALSO BEEN THE SUBJECT OF
- A) AN EARLY DAY MOTION (A PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTION) IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS WHICH NOW HAS 99 SIGNATURES: AND
 - B) A PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

FIN DE TEXTE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

AFGHANISTAN STANDARD

SAD	SEAD
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CONFIDENTIEL

Mr. C. S. S.
9K - 18/2

LORD CARRINGTON'S INTERVIEW FOR BBC 'WORLD THIS WEEKEND'
18 MARCH 1982 (TO BE BROADCAST 21 MARCH 1982)

Afghanistan Day

Q What is the point of Afghanistan Day today?

L.C I think we have all got to be very careful not to forget what happened in Afghanistan over two years ago now. So often something hits the headlines and then, after a period of time, it dies away and people forget the injustices and misery and the horrors that have been caused by actions which at the time seemed awful and have faded into insignificance.

Q Doesn't Afghanistan Day really demonstrate the impotence and ineffectiveness of the Western response to what happened two years ago in Afghanistan?

L.C Well, if you mean ineffectiveness in the sense that the Russians are still in Afghanistan and 90,000 of them are still in Afghanistan, it demonstrates that we haven't been successful so far in getting the Soviet Union to withdraw. But we have been successful in preventing it being forgotten. One of the things we have managed to do is to unite almost the entire world against the Soviet Union and this is terribly important because we, in Britain and France and the rest of us, are always the target of anti-Colonialism. The United Nations are always united against us. Now the United Nations is united against the Soviet Union. 116 countries voted against them last November. I think the Soviet Union find this uncomfortable. We have got to keep up the pressure.

Q It's a kind of a diplomatic unity that has been achieved. What in practical terms has that done for Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan?

L.C. Alas, it hasn't done very much for the people of Afghanistan because there are now I suppose, if you take into account

account the refugees in Iran, there must be well over 3 million refugees outside Afghanistan. This is an indictment. Over one-sixth of the Afghan population are now outside Afghanistan. They find life there insupportable. Being Afghans, after all we fought three Afghan wars, we know what brave people they are. They are not going to sit down and let the situation exist as it now is and the result is that there is still a bloody civil war going on in Afghanistan and a great many people have left. Short of ourselves going to war about this, there is nothing we can do except keep up the diplomatic pressure and this is what we are doing.

Help for the Resistance?

Q What about practical aid to the people who are resisting the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan? That's a practical step that could be taken is it not?

L.C ~~We'll~~ The freedom fighters are getting arms.

Q How much support are we giving them?

L.C ~~We'll~~ We have always very carefully never said, who is supporting, who is not supporting. What we have always said is that they are getting arms.

The Position on the ground

Q What is the latest position on the ground as you have it?

LC I think probably that the position is that the Soviet Union, the Russians, hold the towns and the key communications and not very much of the countryside. It is very uncomfortable for the Russian troops, after all they are increasing the number of troops there, they suffer casualties, probably not enough casualties in the context of the enormous size of the Russian army and the Russian economy generally, to make it necessary for them militarily to think of coming to a solution. It is important, not only that the Afghan freedom fighters go on but that political pressure, diplomatic pressure, from outside is kept up.

Q There have been American reports that the Soviets are actually using chemical weapons. Do you have any evidence to support that?

L.C We haven't personally any evidence to support that, no.

Afghanistan & Poland

Q Is there perhaps in a sense a strategic advantage in having the Russians bogged down in Afghanistan? They might be diverting their attention to other places otherwise. Is that a consideration?

L.C Well it's not a consideration for not getting a settlement. But, of course, there is no doubt that the Western response to what happened in Afghanistan has, I think, acted as a brake upon the Soviet Union. For example, in Poland. I do not believe but for the very sharp Western response to what happened in Afghanistan, you would have seen the restraint which the Soviet Union has used in relation to Soviet intervention in Poland. What has now happened in Poland is that with Russian complicity, the Poles have managed, for the time being at any rate, to repress their own people. I am quite sure that but for what had happened in Afghanistan, there would have been a very much greater likelihood of Soviet military intervention in Poland.

The European Proposals

Q You put all your stress obviously on the diplomatic pressure that can be applied yet your plan to guarantee the neutrality of Afghanistan seems de facto to have failed. Where do you go on the diplomatic front?

L.C Well it lies on the ~~plan~~^{table}: ~~Incidentally it is the only sensible plan.~~ Incidentally it is the only sensible plan that has been produced, which is to say no outside intervention in Afghanistan, and guarantee the non-alignment and neutrality of Afghanistan. Actually it's sensible and it's a way out for the Russians if they want to without losing face.

Q Well it's sensible, but it hasn't made progress.

L.C It hasn't made progress yet. It still lies on the table. If the pressures are kept up against the Soviet Union both diplomatic and the pressures of the Afghan resistance movement are imposing on them, there may come a time, I hope there will come a time, when the Russians will pick up what is a sensible plan, which saves their face and which suits everybody.

Q Are they not unlikely to want to do that unless the Americans can be brought more directly into this and the Americans certainly, at the moment, seem to have other preoccupations do they not?

L.C If you remember this proposal was a European plan and the Americans supported this very strongly and I have no doubt whatever that they will join in in any negotiations that brought about the sort of solution which the plan was designed to bring about.

Q Would you welcome a more direct and more positive pressure from the Americans on Afghanistan at the moment?

L.C I think the Americans are doing the same as we are about Afghanistan Day. Everybody is joining in on all this and the more diplomatic pressure the better. I don't think that I have any criticism about the Americans not doing enough, they are doing as much as we are.

Keep up the Pressure

Q Is it not time now to abandon really hope of changing the situation very much in Afghanistan that hasn't been achieved so far and rather to concentrate on rather bitter lessons that have to be learnt from the future from what's happened?

L.C One of the bitter lessons we have learnt from the past is / precisely not to do that. This is what happened in Czechoslovakia and this is what happened in Hungary when the Russians moved in and took them over. There was outrage for about six months and then everybody said Oh well, its a fait accompli, it's done, nothing more we can do about it /and


and everybody forgot about it and went back to normal. This is precisely the lesson that I think we ought to have learnt from that which is not to forget about it, but to go on and never to allow a situation in which the Soviet Union occupy Afghanistan to be regarded as acceptable or normal and however long it takes and however much effort we have to put into it, we must always bear in mind that this is unacceptable and we must go on doing what we can to turn it round.

Q But do you really think that what we are doing at the moment and what we can do on the diplomatic front is really going to change the situation in Afghanistan in the foreseeable future?

L.C I don't know. I think it's almost impossible to say because this will depend very much on the situation in the Soviet Union. After all the Soviet Union aren't in a very good situation, their economy is in fairly poor shape, they are spending a lot of money in Vietnam, they are spending a lot of money in Cuba, got themselves into this difficulty in Afghanistan. Nobody could say that Poland showed that the Soviet system was acceptable to people who have had it imposed upon them. They are in trouble. I think that if we go on pressing, sooner or later we may get some results.

Advance Copies: 1D - for V.S.
No 10 Press Office ✓
News Dept - copies all

Private Secretary
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PVS
Mr Griffith
SAD
Mr Garland
Mr Goodwin
E.G.S.D.


15/1



10 DOWNING STREET

Press Notice

AFGHANISTAN DAY

DELEGATION TO CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER

Later today (Thursday 18 March) the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP, will receive a delegation sponsored by the Afghanistan Support Committee. In the delegation will be four Afghans including Dr Ghulam Farouq Azaz who is currently visiting the UK and who is Secretary General of the Alliance of Non-Fundamentalist Resistance Groups in Peshawar. The delegation are calling in connection with Afghanistan Day on 21 March. A copy of the Prime Minister's message to the Afghanistan Support Committee is attached.

18 March 1982

Notes to Editors

The delegation members are:

Mr Peter Temple-Morris MP
Rt Hon Roland Moyle MP
Mr Ian Wrigglesworth MP
Lord Bethell MEP

Dr Ghulam Farouq Azaz (see above)
Mrs Fatima Nasser Zia (daughter
of a resistance leader)
Mrs Karima Farani (her husband
was a political prisoner in
Afghanistan)
Mr Mohammed Ebrahim (a Hazara
from Kabul)

Further details about the delegation are available from the Afghanistan Support Committee, Tel: 01-379 7218.

Photocall

There will be an open photocall outside No 10 at 6.00pm today, Thursday 18 March. Please inform the No 10 Press Office if you plan to send a representative.

Afghanistan Support Committee

The Afghanistan Support Committee was formed in late 1980 as an all-party British parliamentary group. They campaign for the rights of the people of Afghanistan to individual freedom and national self-determination. They also raise money for Afghans in need and particularly for Afghan refugees. For further information contact the Afghanistan Support Committee, Tel: 01-379 7218.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

It is now more than two years since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in violation of the UN Charter and Afghanistan's independent and non-aligned status. During that time the Afghan people have waged a brave struggle against an occupying force of over 90,000 Soviet troops. Many have sacrificed their lives in the cause of freedom, and many civilians, including women and children, have been killed and injured by attacks on their villages. We must not forget them; nor must we forget the three million refugees who have fled from their homes to Pakistan and Iran. The human suffering has been colossal, as I saw for myself when I visited Afghan refugees in Pakistan last year.

21 March is Afghanistan Day. For Afghans it is the start of the traditional New Year. For us it is the beginning of Spring. I hope that the long winter of Soviet occupation will soon end and that the Afghan people will take heart from today's associations with rebirth and renewal.

On this day the British Government renews its calls on the Russians to withdraw from Afghanistan, and to allow the Afghan people to choose their own future free from outside interference.

Margaret Thatcher

March, 1982.

PRIME MINISTER

AFGHAN DELEGATION: 1800 HOURS, THURSDAY

You are to receive a delegation organised by the all-Party Afghanistan Support Committee. This will include a representative from each Party and a number of Afghans. The purpose of the fifteen minute call is to encourage public interest in Afghanistan Day (Sunday 21 March) and re-affirm internationally the Government's concern over Afghanistan.

Yes
We plan to organise a photocall. In order to achieve maximum publicity would you be prepared, exceptionally, to meet the Afghans at the Front Door? This ^{SETTING} would be much more in keeping with the Afghans national dress than one of the State Rooms whilst providing an immediately recognisable back-drop. Agree?

We then envisage you will take the delegation (but no press or cameras) upstairs for no more than ten minutes. Peter Temple-Morris and Lord Bethell will say a few words and no doubt you will wish to respond. Content?

P. Temple-Morris

Yes mt.

16 March 1982



JD

CP

cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 March, 1982

A

Dear Peter,

Thank you for your letter of 25 February.

I shall be delighted to receive a deputation on the occasion of Afghanistan Day. A suitable time would be 1800 on 18 March. Perhaps you could be in touch with my office about the details. I had heard earlier from Lord Cranborne that it might be useful if I issued a message to your Committee on 21 March. I am happy to do this and enclose one now. Please feel free to publish this in connection with your activities.

Yours
Peter

Peter Temple-Morris, Esq., M.P.

RM



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

It is now more than two years since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in violation of the UN Charter and Afghanistan's independent and non-aligned status. During that time the Afghan people have waged a brave struggle against an occupying force of over 90,000 Soviet troops. Many have sacrificed their lives in the cause of freedom, and many civilians, including women and children, have been killed and injured by attacks on their villages. We must not forget them; nor must we forget the three million refugees who have fled from their homes to Pakistan and Iran. The human suffering has been colossal, as I saw for myself when I visited Afghan refugees in Pakistan last year.

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On this day the British Government renews its calls on the Russians to withdraw from Afghanistan, and to allow the Afghan people to choose their own future free from outside interference.

Margaret Thatcher

March, 1982.

file

BK

9 March 1982

I did ring you yesterday but I am afraid you had already left for Washington. You might well ring, but in case you don't I thought you would like to know that the Prime Minister has agreed to see Peter Temple-Morris and a delegation from the Afghanistan Support Committee on Thursday, 18 March at 1800 hours.

It will be quite in order for you to come along if Peter Temple-Morris has no objection.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

The Lord Bethell

288

cc CS
IG

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 March 1982

Afghanistan Support
Committee

Thank you for your letter of 4 March.

The Prime Minister agrees:

- (a) to send a message to the Committee on the lines of the draft you enclosed;
- (b) to receive a delegation led by Mr. Peter Temple-Morris, M.P. for 15 minutes at 1030 on 19 March.

Now 1800 on 18 March.

We shall now be writing to Peter Temple-Morris about both matters.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

EH



2/ps

FROM
**NICHOLAS
BETHELL**

TELEPHONE
01-402-6877

73 SUSSEX SQUARE
LONDON W2 2SS

John Coles Esq.,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON S.W.1.

4th March 1982

Dear Mr Coles,

MR 9/3
f.a.

I know that, as former head of the Foreign Office's South Asia desk, you will have taken on board the proposal that the Prime Minister should receive a group of Afghans, either from the London community or from the resistance groups in Pakistan, to mark the designation of March 21st as Afghanistan Day.

I just thought that I would let you know in this connection that, as the original mover of the Afghanistan Day resolution in the European Parliament, I have today received an invitation to attend a ceremony in Washington next Wednesday, when President Reagan will sign the United States Congress resolution on this matter.

I shall be flying to Washington on Monday with my colleagues Mr Egon Klepsch (Germany, Christian Democrat), Mr Gerard Israel (France, RPR) and Mr Carlo Ripa di Meana (Italy, Socialist).

It would be very nice indeed if I could take with me to Washington the news that the Prime Minister will in fact be receiving the Afghans to mark Afghanistan Day. I am sure that I shall be asked in Washington what the British Government is doing to mark this occasion.

Televised.
MR 8/3

With all best wishes,

Yours sincerely

Nicholas Bethell





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Red ink markings in the center-left area, including a circular stamp with numbers 1 through 9 and a date stamp (1961).

Faint mirrored text in the center of the page, likely bleed-through from the reverse side.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 March 1982

Prime Minister

Agree

Yes (1) To send message ?

(2) To receive later Temple-Morris's
delegation for 15 minutes at

Yes 10-30 on 19 March?

Dear John,

A.J.C. $\frac{5}{3}$ Afghanistan Support Committee

Thank you for your letters of 19 and 26 February.

Lord Bethell has been the driving force behind the idea of nominating 21 March (the Afghan New Year, Nowruz) as Afghanistan Day. A resolution which he tabled has been adopted by the European Parliament, and the MPs in the Afghanistan Support Committee now appear to have secured some 100 signatures for an Early Day Motion in the House of Commons. A resolution has also been tabled before Congress, which, we have been told by the US Embassy, President Reagan will sign at a ceremony on 10 March.

The Afghanistan Day initiative was discussed at Brussels by Foreign Ministers on 23 February. It was decided that the Presidency should make a statement on behalf of the Ten on 21 March, and should in the meanwhile approach friendly countries to make clear the Ten's support for the initiative.

Lord Cranborne's enquiry

A message from the Prime Minister to the Afghanistan Support Committee would help to encourage public interest in Afghanistan Day. The Committee (on which there is some background below) is having an uphill struggle in the face of a certain amount of public apathy. It would be an opportunity to reaffirm internationally the Government's concern over Afghanistan. We recommend that the Prime Minister should send a message. I enclose a draft.

Mr Temple-Morris's Proposal

The proposal by Mr Temple-Morris that an all-party Parliamentary delegation accompanied by some Afghans should call on No 10 would also be a very useful way of creating publicity. Afghanistan Day

/itself falls



itself falls on a Sunday but Mr Temple-Morris explains that the call need not be on that day and indeed that there could be some publicity advantage in doing it in advance. If the Prime Minister could fit this in we think it would be worthwhile.

The Afghanistan Support Committee has approached a number of Afghans resident in this country to suggest that they should take part in whatever sort of event is arranged to mark Afghanistan Day. The Committee does not at present know who will be willing to participate. Many of the Afghans in this country have affiliations with one or other of the resistance groups based in Peshawar, but if a delegation were arranged to call on the Prime Minister they could probably be relied upon to present a united front and not to raise their political differences.

If a call is made on No 10, it would be sensible to give prominence to the Afghans in the delegation rather than to the MPs. We expect the Afghanistan Support Committee would be willing to fit in with any guidance you wish to give them on this point. We should also be able to ensure that the party includes a reasonably presentable set of Afghans.

The Prime Minister will also of course be meeting Mrs Gandhi on Afghanistan Day. Indian policy is different from our own - they consider any public pressure on the Russians to withdraw their troops to be counter productive - and the co-incidence of the two events could be considered, by some Indian commentators, to be embarrassing to Mrs Gandhi. We do not however consider this rather remote possibility to be a serious impediment to the course proposed. The date of Afghanistan Day is not of our choosing. Indeed the Prime Minister could turn her reception of the delegation to advantage in her talks with Mrs Gandhi the following day by pointing to it as evidence of the genuineness of the Government's concern over the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Support Committee

The Afghanistan Support Committee was formed in late 1980 as an all party group whose aims were:

- a) to gain publicity for the people of Afghanistan;
 - b) to raise funds to help the Afghan refugees in Pakistan.
- Ministers have given the Committee a great deal of encouragement, and in March 1981 the FCO provided a grant in aid of £20,000 towards administrative expenses. The Committee's one full time employee is Mr Peers Carter, a former Ambassador in Kabul, who

/has put



has put a great deal of effort into establishing links with various Afghan emigre groups. He also visited Pakistan last autumn to examine the work of the voluntary aid giving agencies on the ground. The Committee decided on his recommendation to support the work of a team sponsored by the Austrian Relief Committee, which runs a dispensary in a number of refugee camps and also finances the supply of some medical assistance which is taken into Afghanistan itself.

The Committee has not however been particularly successful in generating public interest in the UK, and has not yet mounted any national fund raising campaign. A fund raising sub-committee has now been formed, chaired by Sir Ian Gilmour. Their first step has been to mount a fund-raising campaign directed at major companies. In the longer term they would like to advertise more widely, but before doing so they hope to build up the funds which would be needed.

The prospects for raising money do not seem good at the moment, but a message from the Prime Minister and a call on No 10 as proposed by Mr Temple-Morris would certainly help to boost their fund raising activities.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

The Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Lord Cranborne

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

It is now more than two years since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in violation of the UN Charter and Afghanistan's independent and non-aligned status. During that time the Afghan people have waged a brave struggle against an occupying force of over 90,000 Soviet troops. Many have sacrificed their lives in the cause of freedom, and many civilians, including women and children, have been killed and injured by attacks on their villages. We must not forget them; nor must we forget the three million refugees who have fled from their homes to Pakistan and Iran. The human suffering has been colossal, as I saw for myself when I visited Afghan refugees in Pakistan last year.


Enclosures—flag(s).....

21 March is Afghanistan Day. For Afghans it is the start of the traditional New Year. For us it is the beginning of Spring. I hope that the long winter of Soviet occupation will soon end and that the Afghan people will take heart from today's associations with rebirth and renewal.

On this day the British Government renews its calls on the Russians to withdraw from Afghanistan, and to allow the Afghan people to choose their own future free from outside interference.

M

- 4 MAR 1982





10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 February 1982

Afghanistan Support Committee

In my letter of 19 February I reported an approach from Lord Cranborne seeking a message from the Prime Minister on the occasion of Afghanistan Day (21 March).

I now enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Peter Temple-Morris MP, Chairman of the Afghanistan Support Committee. You will see from this that the earlier idea of a march or rally appears to have been abandoned and that the Committee are now requesting that the Prime Minister should receive an All Party Parliamentary deputation, together with some Afghan representatives.

I should be grateful for advice by 3 March. It would be helpful if this could include a brief account of the activities of the Afghanistan Support Committee to date and, if possible, some indication of who the Afghan representatives in any deputation to the Prime Minister might be.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

lo

25 February 1982

Home: House of Commons.

Dear Prime Minister,



Afghanistan Day - Sunday 21st March

I am writing as Chairman of the Afghanistan Support Committee which as you can see has wide all Party Support both within and outside Parliament as well as the full blessing of the Foreign Office. An Early Day Motion is on the Order Paper calling for the 21st March to be celebrated as Afghanistan Day and the idea is to arrange activities throughout the Western Alliance to keep the plight of Afghanistan alive.

As far as the USA is concerned, both Houses of Congress have passed a Resolution in similar terms of the Early Day Motion and on, or before, the 22nd March, I understand President Reagan will be having some sort of major publicised function to draw attention to the matter generally and the Resolution of Congress.

Incidentally, similar Resolutions have gone through the European Parliament with an overwhelming majority as well as I believe the Bundestag and possibly other European Parliaments.

We were wondering whether you might be prepared to briefly receive some sort of All Party Parliamentary deputation for a few minutes perhaps together with some Afghan representatives. We would naturally not wish to take up your time as we feel you are in complete agreement with us on this matter but if you were able to pose with us for a Press photograph it would be a marvellous boost for the cause. It will also coincide with at least what President Reagan is doing.

It doesn't have to be on the 21st March and in a way it would have been nice to have done it before then to have the chance of a photograph in the Sunday newspapers.

AFGHANISTAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE. 18 CHARING CROSS ROAD, LONDON WC2N 0HR, 01-379 7218.

PRESIDENT: THE RT. HON. THE LORD GLADWYN GCMG GCVO CB. **VICE PRESIDENTS:** THE RT. HON. ROLAND MOYLE M.P. THE RT. HON. GEOFFREY RIPPON M.P. THE RT. HON. WILLIAM RODGERS M.P. **DIRECTOR:** PEERS CARTER CMG. **CHAIRMAN:** PETER TEMPLE-MORRIS M.P. **PATRONS:** THE REVEREND ALAN BOOTH OBE. THE RT. HON. THE VISCOUNT BOYD OF MERTON CH PC. SIR RICHARD CAVE. FRANK J. CHAPPLE ESQ. THE RT. HON. JO GRIMOND M.P. THE REVEREND LESLIE H. HARDMAN. THE RT. HON. THE LORD HOME OF THE HIRSEL KT PC. THE RT. HON. THE EARL OF INCHCAPE. THE RT. REVEREND GRAHAM LEONARD, BISHOP OF LONDON. SHAIKH MUBARAK AHMAD. THE RT. HON. DAVID OWEN M.P. THE RT. HON. LORD RAWLINSON OF EWELL QC. THE RT. HON. LORD STEWART OF FULHAM CH PC. DR. MA. ZAKI BADAWI. **TRUSTEES:** HAMBROS BANK TRUSTEES DEPARTMENT. REGISTERED CHARITY No 282353.

The Early Day Motion has already been signed by around 100 MPs without trying too hard and by the 21st March will be signed by many more.

I do hope you might be able to manage this for us.

With all good wishes

*Am ready,
Peter.*

PETER TEMPLE-MORRIS
Chairman
Afghanistan Support Committee

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London

*Afghanistan**file*

19 February 1982

Afghan Support Committee

Lord Cranborne, who I believe has a connection with the above organisation, has enquired whether the Prime Minister would be willing to send a message of goodwill to the committee on 21 March when, I understand, it is organising a march.

I should be grateful for advice and, on the assumption that it is in the affirmative, for a draft of a possible message.

AJC

John Holmes Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PERSONAL

A J Coles Esq



~~John~~

T-a.

22/2

With the compliments of

SOUTH ASIAN DEPARTMENT

Richard P.

As discussed.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

SW1A 2AH

PERSONAL.

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MR DONALD

AFGHANISTAN

1. I returned recently from the first part of my familiarisation tour of the SAD area in the course of which I visited Pakistan (Islamabad and Peshawar), Delhi and Kabul. In Peshawar I was the first Western visitor to be received by the three moderate nationalist leaders collectively as a demonstration of their new-found unity; I also met some of the fundamentalist leaders and some of the few middle class Afghans in Peshawar, mainly doctors, who were able to give a rather more objective analysis. In Islamabad and New Delhi I spoke to government officials and journalists. Finally, during a three-day visit to Kabul I spoke to the senior members of all the non-Communist missions, plus the Chinese, as well as observing the very obvious signs of the Soviet presence for myself.

2. Having therefore discussed the Afghanistan problem with quite a large selection of people from all these different angles I thought it worth putting my impressions into a paper, which I attach. Although the conclusions I draw are entirely personal they are not significantly at variance with the reports from our posts in the area or with current intelligence assessments. I do not include any policy recommendations, which will be made separately.

M StE Burton

M StE Burton
South Asian Department

16 February 1982

cc PS/PUS
Sir A Acland
Mr Broomfield, EESD
Mr Miers, MED
Mr Moss, PUSD
Mr Mallaby, Planning Staff
Mr Longmire, Research Dept
Mr O'Neill, Cabinet Office
Mr P Wright JOS

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THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM 1982

Conclusions

1. The Soviet flag flies to-day over the Bala Hisar, the old fortress of Kabul, as the symbol of the Russian hold over Afghanistan. The question is how long it will remain there.
2. The Russians are most unlikely to leave Afghanistan until they can be certain of leaving behind a stable political situation in which their interests would be safeguarded. This point will not be reached in the foreseeable future. Furthermore Soviet strategic aims have to be taken into account, presumably relating to future developments in Iran and/or Pakistan. The Karmal regime is bitterly resented throughout most of the country and is unlikely to succeed in gaining wider internal support in the short term. The Pakistanis have made considerable capital out of their steadfast opposition to the Russian invasion hitherto, but the balance of advantage might in time appear to them to favour an accommodation with Kabul if this appeared to offer some prospect of leading to the refugees' return home; meanwhile their high posture in relation to the Russians is taxing their nerve and they are faced with the risk of it leading to an increase in internal subversion. India is highly uncomfortable over developments in Afghanistan but by a process of ex post facto reasoning continues to argue that attempts to pressure the Russians into withdrawal are bound to be counter-productive. The Iranians are beginning to take a somewhat greater interest in spite of their absorption with their own revolution. As for the West, there is a real concern in the region over any sign of a lessening of its interest due to the Polish crisis; the Indians on the other hand consider it evidence of the artificiality of the fuss hitherto made by the West.

The Russians

3. Two years after their military intervention in Afghanistan, the Russians are facing a dilemma. If their objectives are partly related to the internal situation and partly strategic - as they are generally thought to be - they are in trouble on both fronts.

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Internally they are committed to the irreversibility of the Afghan revolution, and yet if their troops were withdrawn the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the PDDPA, would almost certainly be extinguished, so unpopular has it now become.

Strategically their forces provide a jumping off point which would enable them to have a significant impact on events in Iran and/or Pakistan should the opportunity for their doing so arise. But their losses of men and equipment to the insurgents are sufficiently serious that Afghanistan must be reckoned in the Kremlin to be far from being a cost-free strategic gain. The financial drain must also be significant although there are compensating economic gains, particularly the acquisition of Afghan natural gas. In short, they cannot go back, for reasons both of substance and of prestige, and yet it must be difficult for them to see how to make the situation more satisfactory for their purposes.

4. Their political tactics for the present are to divide and rule and to play the game long. Current policy as announced by the Karmal regime is to divide the country up into regions which would enjoy a certain measure of local autonomy. Those regions are carefully drawn so as to subdivide some of the more powerful tribal groups, such as the Pushtuns. Some tribes, such as the Shinwaria (on the route from Jalalabad to the Khyber Pass) receive - according to the Pakistanis - sizeable direct payments to ensure their loyalty. One view is that there may also be a long term plan to assimilate the area of the north of the Hindu Kush adjoining the Soviet Union more closely into the Soviet system. Other areas, on the other hand, such as the predominantly Shi'ite Hazara region in the centre of the country, are said to be more or less left to their own devices. Large numbers of Afghans are taken off for training in the Soviet Union and the Russians must hope that in the long run these young people will provide the bedrock for a more permanent pro-Soviet alignment of the country.

The Karmal Regime

5. This has patently failed to gain control over the country or acceptance by the population. Nevertheless it should be remembered that no preceding Afghan Government has exercised more than loose

control over many areas and the preceding regimes of Taraki and Amin were scarcely more popular or accepted. The current policy of the Karmal regime (or rather the Russians) is to broaden its support by (a) uniting the PDPA by holding a conference in the spring for the purpose of healing the breach between the Parchami and Khalqi factions; (b) defusing religious opposition by making life easier for the mosques; and (c) building broad popular support for the regime through the mechanism of the National Fatherland Front, a body designed to bring together all factions and to unite the country. It is very doubtful whether this policy will have any success in the short term. If the Russians thought that Karmal was an obstacle in this process, they would probably not hesitate to replace him. Nevertheless if a replacement were to come up through some quasi democratic process, such as the NFF, Third World support for the robust Western line might be expected to waver, even if the replacement were (in Western eyes) transparently another puppet.

The Resistance

6. Since the Afghan Resistance is divided along regional, tribal, ethnic and even sectarian lines, it is hardly surprising that it does not present a united front. The main division is between the three Islamic fundamentalist groups and the three moderate nationalist groups. The groups on each side are linked in loose association. The fundamentalists (notably Hikmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami) reject the possibility of any political solution and claim that the struggle against the Russians is a Jihad, or Holy War; they are highly motivated and have had a number of military successes. The moderate nationalists on the other hand (Gailani, Mujadeddi and Nabi Mohammedi) do not believe that the Russians will be beaten militarily and accept the need for a parallel political operation, e.g. through the UN. They claim to receive less aid from Pakistan. They tend to deny that the struggle is a Jihad and point out that Afghanistan has never been an extreme Moslem country. In their view the West should recognise who its true friends are and compensate them for the relative lack of support they receive from Pakistan.

7. Prospects for the two groups working together are not good. The

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moderates claim that they have hitherto made the major effort and went to the lengths of allowing a fundamentalist to lead a joint fund-raising mission to the Gulf at the end of which the fundamentalist made off with the proceeds. Recently there have been some clashes on the ground and loss of life on both sides. It is difficult for an outside observer to be able to say with any confidence that one group or the other carries more weight within Afghanistan, although it is generally known which is stronger in any particular area.

8. Most of the resistance is organized on a local tribal basis, and some of the local leaders, for instance Massoud in the Panjshir valley, are not based in Pakistan and are autonomous although probably drawing support in equipment from the Peshawar-based groups. Overall the resistance have been successful in denying the countryside to the regime, attacking convoys, and tying up large numbers of Soviet troops; but they have recently been taking worrying casualties, particularly 'civilians' in unarmed villages from Soviet helicopters against which they have no effective answer.

Pakistan

9. For Pakistan the two year old Afghanistan crisis has presented both a problem and an opportunity. The main problem arises from the presence of more than 2.4 million registered refugees. Pakistan bears about 40% of the total cost which is an enormous burden for a poor country to sustain. The authorities are no longer permitting refugees to be registered in the North-West Frontier Province to the west of the Indus River; new refugees are being directed to the Hazara region to the east of the Indus. The presence of such a large influx from across the border with their herds has led to acute pressure on scarce grazing land and serious deforestation in some areas. Furthermore, although there have been few actual cases coming to court, there has been some increase in tension between the refugees and the local population, partly due to the superior commercial acumen of the refugees who have been particularly successful in taking over the transport sector. The help given the refugees by the UNHCR has been contrasted by some of the locals with their own subsistence level condition.

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10. Pakistan's policy in the support it gives the refugees appears to be to keep a firm grip over the situation, to help the fighters in Afghanistan, but to keep a curb on political activity in Pakistan. As regards refugee political activity, they probably fear that an unduly successful Pushtun-led resistance might in time give an unhealthy fillip to Pushtun nationalism with consequences within Pakistan. Furthermore their opposition to last year's attempt to hold a Loya Jirga, a sort of Afghan national tribal gathering, could have been due to apprehensions at the comparison which would have been drawn with the lack of permissible political activity in Pakistan.

11. On the other hand, Pakistan has been notably successful in seizing the opportunity presented by the Afghanistan problem to increase its support from the West, notably of course the United States. It has also been highly skilful in capitalising on the Soviet/Afghan threat, while at the same time enhancing its standing within the Third World and - up to now - keeping its relations with India on a fairly even keel. Nevertheless its problems are very real; the economic burden of the refugees could in the long run become difficult to support, and a threat to the regime from Soviet-backed dissidents (e.g. in Baluchistan) could also become serious. Already there are voices raised in Pakistan, for example in the recent restricted session of the Federal Council devoted to foreign affairs, calling for a less dangerously provocative attitude towards the Soviet Union and recognition of the Karmal regime. Indian pressure could be exerted in the same direction if the two sides get to the stage of making mutual concessions of substance in the interests of a genuine detente between them.

India

12. The essence of the Indian position on Afghanistan is their claim that it - alone - is based on a realistic assessment of the problem. The Russians, they say, will not be forced out of Afghanistan by overt pressure from the West - rather the reverse. Furthermore the Russians, as the adjoining super power, have legitimate interests in Afghanistan which have to be accommodated. The Karmal regime is no worse than its two immediate predecessors, and if anything rather better. The Indians dismiss the UN

/ Resolution

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Resolution, which they conspicuously failed to support, as an irrelevance. Nevertheless there are signs that the Indians are increasingly embarrassed by their idiosyncratic position on Afghanistan. They are at pains to point out that privately they do not fail to make their objections known to the Russians. It is true that Mrs Gandhi told Grómyko soon after she returned to power that she did not recognise their reasons for intervening militarily in Afghanistan. It is also true that the Russians have recently failed to dissuade the Indians from embarking on talks with China and Pakistan. The Indians probably realise that their position on Afghanistan has weakened their standing in the Non-Aligned Movement and made a rapprochement with the United States harder to achieve. But their feelings are probably both strong and genuine: that the real problem over Afghanistan is that it has introduced super-power rivalry more directly into the sub-continent - the syllogism is frequently used that Afghanistan is making the Russians bleed, the Americans are in favour of anything that makes the Russians bleed, and therefore the Americans are in favour of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan - coupled with acute irritation that the Pakistanis have been cleverer at exploiting the situation than they have.

Iran

13. There are no reliable figures for the number of Afghan refugees in Iran. The Iranians claim there are well over a million, but this figure probably includes Afghan immigrants who have always formed a proportion of the working population in Iran. The Iranians admit however that the refugees now constitute a real economic burden and that they are, for the first time, putting them in separate camps. They may also for the first time request the help of the UNHCR in dealing with the problem. It may be this growing perception of the economic problem which led the Iranian Government to produce its proposals last year which, although extreme, had the merit of identifying Soviet withdrawal as the necessary first step. Whatever the reason the new political fact is that the Iranians are taking an interest in Afghanistan. They are likely to receive the UN Secretary-General's personal representative, when appointed, on his next round of shuttle diplomacy in the area. They are also said to be training some of the / (Shia) mullahs

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hia) mullahs in Iran, presumably as a vehicle for establishing eventually a fundamentalist regime in Afghanistan, sympathetic to the Iranian revolution. However they are unlikely to have much practical influence on events in Afghanistan, which is mainly Sunni.

The West

14. Apart from our own residual mission, the United States, France, Italy, West Germany and Turkey all have small missions in Kabul headed by Chargés d'Affaires. The Indians have a full Ambassador, a competent diplomat who was formerly the government spokesman. Pakistan has a beleaguered but well-informed Chargé. So does Iran. Apart from the Indians, none of these missions has dealings with the Karmal regime. Although their access to information is therefore very limited they nevertheless perform a useful function: they are useful listening posts on the ground and they keep the flag flying. The UNDP keeps up a reduced aid programme. Hitherto this has been politically compromised under a Bulgarian Director (who, for example, sold off a number of UNICEF vehicles without removing the UN emblem which now provide perfectly camouflaged transport for the local secret police); under the new West German acting director, however, the programme now achieves a better balance. The cutting off of Western bilateral aid programmes, particularly in the educational field, although resented by the Afghans, cannot have been unwelcome to the Russians for whom it removed the main source of competition for their own efforts to swing Afghanistan irreversibly into their orbit.

GRS 1450

UNCLASSIFIED

FM ISLAMABAD 240615Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 581 OF 24TH NOVEMBER 81

INFO SAVING NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, DELHI, KABUL, MOSCOW UKMIS
GENEVA AND MODUK (D14)

MY TELNOS 564 AND 565: SOVIET PLASTIC MINES IN PARACHINAR.

FOR THE FIRST TIME THE PAKISTAN AUTHORITIES HAVE ALLOWED JOURNALISTS TO GIVE EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNTS OF SOVIET/AFGHAN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE-LAYING OPERATIONS AGAINST BOTH AFGHAN REFUGEES (IN MATAH SANGHAR UNHCR CAMP) AND PAKISTANI CIVILIANS. UNHCR CONFIRM THAT COAT VISITED THE AREA AND THAT REPORT IS CORRECT BUT THEY HAVE NOT YET HAD HIS WRITTEN REPORT. FOLLOWING IS ASSOCIATED PRESS PAKISTAN (APP) (THE OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY) REPORT:
REPORT:
BEGINS:

PARACHINAR, NOV. 23: A SPECTACLE OF HUMAN MISERY AND SUFFERING UNVEILS ITSELF IN THE AGENCY HEAD QUARTER HOSPITAL, PARACHINAR, WHERE LAY MORE THAN 12 YOUNG VICTIMS WITH THEIR FOOT BLOWN OFF BY THE IMPACT OF EXPLOSIONS OF MINES DROPPED BY THE AFGHAN HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS OVER THE PAKISTAN'S BORDER VILLAGES LAST WEEK. AN APP CORRESPONDENT, COVERING THE EVENTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE AFGHAN STRAFING AND MINING VISITED THE HOSPITAL: REPORTS THAT IT WAS THE MOST TOUCHING SCENE TO WITNESS IN A ROW 13 YOUNGMEN LYING IN THE HOSPITAL EACH WITH ONE FOOT BLOWN OFF BY MINE EXPLOSIONS. THEY ARE TURNED CRIPPLES FOR EVER IN CASE OF THEIR SURVIVAL. ANOTHER YOUNGMAN WAS SEEN WITH HIS BELLY RIPPED APART BY FALLING OVER A MINE WHILE RUNNING FOR SHELTER WHEN HE HAD HEARD FEARSOME ROARING OF HELICOPTERS ON THE DAY OF THE AFGHAN OPERATION. STILL ANOTHER YOUNGMAN, WHO HAD LOST HIS FOOT WAS SHIFTED THREE DAYS BACK TO A PESHAWAR HOSPITAL ON HIS REQUEST, THE HOSPITAL SOURCES SAID. ALL THE VICTIMS WHO ARE PAKISTANI NATIONALS GAVE AN IDENTICAL ACCOUNT THAT WHILE THEY WERE WALKING ABOUT THEIR FOOT TOUCHED A SOIL-COLOURED OBJECT, VISIBLY A TOY BIRD WHICH EXPLODED WITH VIOLENCE CHOPPING OFF THE FOOT. SOME OF THEM RECEIVED OTHER MINOR INJURIES TOO. THE MEDICAL OFFICER IN CHARGE TOLD THE APP CORRESPONDENT THAT SINCE NOV. 17 A TOTAL OF 21 PERSONS INJURED DUE TO THE MINE EXPLOSIONS HAD REPORTED OUT OF WHOM SEVEN WERE DISCHARGED AFTER PROVIDING THEM THE FIRST AID. HE SAID THAT STILL THE MINE VICTIMS WERE COMING TO THE HOSPITAL AND THE LATEST ENTRY ON SUNDAY WAS A YOUNGMAN WITH HIS HAND SEVERELY WOUNDED.
LIFE SAVING DRUGS: THE MEDICAL OFFICER SAID THAT THE HOSPITAL HAD SUFFICIENT STOCKS OF GENERAL MEDICINES TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION. HOWEVER, HE SAID, IT REQUIRED MORE LIFE SAVING DRUGS. COMMENTING ON THE NATURE OF THE WOUNDS CAUSED BY THE MINES,

/HE

HE POINTED OUT THAT THE WOUNDS WERE TAKING LONGER TIME IN HEALING AS COMPARED TO ORDINARY INJURIES. ASKED WHETHER THE CONTENTS OF THE EXPLOSIVES WERE POISONOUS HE SAID IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO SAY ANYTHING ON THAT COUNT. ONLY THE EXPERTS COULD ESTABLISH HOW MUCH DEADLY THE INGREDIENTS WERE. HE HOWEVER SAID THAT THE AUTHORITIES WERE CONSIDERING TO SEND THE CONTENTS TO THE LABORATORIES IN PESHAWAR FOR CHEMICAL ANALYSIS. HE SAID THAT THE FLESH OF THE VICTIMS WAS TORN OFF ON THE AFFECTED PART OF THE BODY WHICH TOOK LONGER PERIOD TO HEAL. INTERVIEWED, THE WOUNDED ALSO GAVE AN IDENTICAL ACCOUNT AND SAID THE OBJECTS TOUCHING THEIR FOOT WERE BROWN AND SOIL-COLOURED.

VILLAGES MINED: THESE HAD RESEMBLANCE WITH THE BIRDS, TOYS AND OTHER ATTRACTIVE ARTICLES. THEY FEARED THAT AN EXTENSIVE AREA OF SEVERAL BORDER VILLAGES HAD BEEN MINED BY THE AFGHAN HELICOPTERS WHICH PENETRATED INTO PAKISTAN'S BORDERS. THE LOCALS REPORTED THAT THE CLEARANCE OPERATION FOR REMOVING THE MINES WAS CONTINUING WITH THE HELP OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES. SOME OF THE LOCALS SAID THE PEOPLE IN THE BORDER VILLAGES NEAR HERE HAD BEEN ALERTED OF THE DANGER OF THE MINES. THE PEOPLE ON THEIR OWN WERE BUSY IN DESTROYING THE MINES BY STONE THROWING AND OTHER SIMPLE LOCAL DEVICES AVAILABLE TO THEM, THEY SAID. HUSSAIN GHULAM, 25 OF PEWAL VILLAGE WITH HIS CHOPPED OFF LEFT FOOT SAID THAT HE MOVED OUT OF HIS HOUSE IN THE DARK OF NIGHT SOMETHING TOUCHED HIS FOOT AND THE NEXT MOMENT HE LAY WITH HIS FOOT LOST. HE SAID THERE WERE SOME OTHER PERSONS WITH HIM WHO ALSO RECEIVED MINOR INJURIES AND DID NOT COME TO THE HOSPITAL. SABIT ALI, 40, OF SAHRA KILI VILLAGE, ABOUT THREE MILES FROM THE BORDER WHO HAS ALSO LOST HIS RIGHT FOOT, SAID THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF CHILDREN WHO TOUCHED THE MINES TAKING THEM TO BE TOYS AND WERE WOUNDED. THE NEWSMEN, ACCOMPANYING THE UNHCR REPRESENTATIVE, MR ALLAIN COAT DURING HIS SATURDAY'S VISIT TO AFGHAN REFUGEES TENTAGE VILLAGES AT MATAH SANGHAR AND BASSU 15 MILES TO THE SOUTH OF PARACHINAR, OBSERVED THE ROARING AFGHAN HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS OVERFLYING THE PAKISTAN BORDER CLOSE TO THE CAMPS. LATER THE BOOMING OF GUNSHOTS WAS ALSO HEARD.

MOTHER OF 12: THE APP CORRESPONDENT WAS TOLD BY THE REFUGEES THAT THE AFGHAN WOMAN KILLED BY THE HELICOPTER STRAFING ON NOV. 17 HAD LEFT BEHIND 12 CHILDREN SEVEN BOYS AND FIVE GIRLS BETWEEN THE AGES OF TWO AND 25 YEARS. SHE HAD MOVED OUT OF HER TENT HEARING THE ROARING OF THE HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS ALONG WITH HER THREE CHILDREN IN CURIOSITY WHEN SHE WAS HIT BY A BULLET AND WAS KILLED ON THE SPOT. HER THREE CHILDREN INCLUDING A GIRL RECEIVED MINOR INJURIES. THE INJURED CHILDREN INCLUDED HAWAB JAN 9, QADAR JAN 4, AND MULTANA 6. THE GRAVE OF ZARNAWA WAS SEEN FROM SOME DISTANCE BY THE NEWSMEN. CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF THE SAVAGE ACT OF THE AFGHAN INVADERS AN ORATOR AT THE REFUGEE CAMP BAGHDAD GUL 32 COMMENTING ON THE INCIDENT SAID THAT THESE WERE THE CHILDREN WHO WERE BORN ON THE SOIL OF AFGHANISTAN AND WERE BROUGHT UP THERE. THEY WERE NOT SPARED EVEN AT A TIME WHEN THEY HAD LEFT THEIR HOMES AND HEARTHES AND TOOK REFUGE IN THIS ISLAMIC STATE. NADIR KHAN 50 AN ELDER AT BASSU CAMP, SPEAKING TO THE NEWSMEN DECLARED THAT EACH AND EVERY MAN WOULD FIGHT FOR THE LIBERATION OF AFGHANISTAN TILL HIS DEATH, THEN THE WOMEN WOULD FOLLOW THEIR MENFOLK.

COAT'S VISIT: MR ALLAIN COAT, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES IN PESHAWAR, ON SATURDAY, VISITED THE TENTAGE VILLAGES AND ADJACENT AREAS OF WHICH WERE STRAFED BY THE AFGHAN HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS LAST WEEK. EYE-WITNESSES TOLD A PRESS PARTY ACCOMPANYING MR ALLAIN COAT THAT THE AFGHAN HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS HAD APPEARED FROM ACROSS THE BORDER FROM THE DIRECTION OF KHARLACHI EARLY AFTERNOON. AFTER CIRCLING OVER THE AFGHAN REFUGEE TENTAGE VILLAGES, THE GUNSHIPS PENETRATED ABOUT 10 MILES DEEP INTO THE PAKISTAN TERRITORY AND STRAFED THE NEARBY AREAS ON RETURN. EYE-WITNESSES SAID THAT A FEMALE REFUGEE, ZARNA, WIFE OF TONA FROM VILLAGE SAID KARAAM ULASWALI IN PAKTIA PROVINCE OF AFGHANISTAN, WAS KILLED INSTANTLY DUE TO THE STRAFING. TWELVE OTHER REFUGEES, MOSTLY CHILDREN WERE ALSO WOUNDED BESIDES 15 LOCAL PEOPLE. EYE-WITNESSES SAID THAT THE GUNSHIPS ALSO DROPPED MINES AT SHANGAK AND SEVERAL OTHER PLACES CLOSE TO THE REFUGEE CAMPS. MINES IN THE SHAPE OF TOYS, BIRDS AND OTHER ATTRACTIVE OBJECTS EXPLODED RESULTING IN INJURIES TO A NUMBER OF AFGHAN REFUGEES. THE NEWSMEN WERE ALSO SHOWN EMPTIES OF MACHINE GUN BULLETS AND RECOVERED UN-EXPLODED MINES FROM THE AFFECTED AREAS.

ENDS.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, DELHI, KABUL, MOSCOW
UKMIS GENEVA, MODUK (D14).

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 182314Z NOV 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1270 OF 18 NOVEMBER 1981
INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, KABUL, WASHINGTON, PARIS
INFO SAVING OTHER EC POSTS, MOSCOW, TEHRAN

ms

MY TELNO 1265: AFGHANISTAN AT THE UNGA

1. THE AFGHANISTAN DEBATE ENDED THIS MORNING (18 NOVEMBER) WITH THE FINAL SIX SPEAKERS AND THE VOTE. GA RESOLUTION 36/34 WAS ADOPTED 116-23-12. THIS COMPARES WITH 111-22-12 FOR LAST YEAR'S RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS IN TURN AN IMPROVEMENT ON THE 1979 VOTE.
2. THERE WERE SIX NEW POSITIVE VOTES: ANTIGUA-BARBUDA, BELIZE, VANUATU (NEW MEMBERS), BOLIVIA AND IRAQ (ABSENT IN 1980), AND ZIMBABWE (ABSTAINED LAST YEAR). UGANDA, WHO VOTED FOR LAST YEAR'S RESOLUTION, ABSTAINED THIS YEAR. THE ONE NEW NEGATIVE VOTE WAS LIBYA (ABSENT IN 1980).
3. THIS IS A SPLENDID RESULT FOR THE PAKISTANIS, AND VINDICATES THEIR DECISION TO DO VIRTUALLY ALL THE LOBBYING THEMSELVES SO AS TO MINIMISE THE EAST/WEST ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE. THEY BEAT OUT THE BUSHES VERY EFFECTIVELY AND MAY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO INCREASE THE VOTE AGAIN NEXT YEAR.
4. OF THE REMAINING SPEAKERS IN THE DEBATE, MRS KIRKPATRICK (UNITED STATES) DELIVERED A HARSH ATTACK ON THE SOVIET INVASION AND SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN. THE INVASION HAD ALTERED THE CLIMATE AND COURSE OF WORLD POLITICS. IT HAD IMPELLED A WIDESPREAD REASSESSMENT OF THE WORLD SITUATION BASED ON A NEW AND MORE SOBER APPRECIATION THAT THE POLICIES OF THE SOVIET UNION POSED A THREAT TO GLOBAL STABILITY AND WORLD PEACE. THE INVASION MARKED A WATERSHED IN THE POST-WAR ERA, BRINGING TO A DEFINITIVE CONCLUSION A PERIOD OF OPTIMISM CONCERNING THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET POLICY AND INTENTIONS.
5. MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN MANY ATTEMPTS IN THE PAST TO CONQUER AFGHANISTAN. WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE DEVASTATING ATTACKS BY GENGHIS KHAN, NONE OF THEM RESEMBLED THE DESTRUCTION WROUGHT IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE 1978. SOVIET PERSONNEL DIRECTED VIRTUALLY ALL ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE KABUL REGIME, INCLUDING COMMAND OF THE AFGHAN ARMY DOWN TO THE BRIGADE AND SOMETIMES COMPANY LEVEL. THERE WERE ONLY TWO REALITIES IN AFGHANISTAN TODAY: THE SOVIET OCCUPATION AND THE AFGHAN NATION, "AND NEITHER IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE OTHER".
6. THE DEBATE CONCLUDED WITH EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE, AND A SERIES OF RIGHTS OF REPLY BETWEEN IRAN, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. IN THE COURSE OF THE LATTER, AFGHANISTAN SAID THAT DOST HAD COME TO NEW YORK AFTER INDICATIONS FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT PAKISTAN WANTED TO CONTINUE INDIRECT EXCHANGES, ONLY TO FIND THAT AGHA SHAHI HAD ALREADY LEFT. THEY ACCUSED PAKISTAN OF BAD FAITH, WHICH NAIK DENIED. FOR BACKGROUND, SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

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7. THERE WAS NO MENTION IN TODAY'S DEBATE OF RECENT ATTACKS ON PAKISTAN TERRITORY (YOUR TELNO 937 TO UKREP BRUSSELS). MRS KIRKPATRICK DID HOWEVER REFER TO THE FACT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD SCATTERED LITTLE BOOBYTRAP MINES BY THE THOUSANDS, WHICH WERE OFTEN PICKED UP BY CHILDREN. THIS WAS AN EXAMPLE OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAD SIGNED ON 13 APRIL PROHIBITING THE USE OF ANTI-PERSONNEL WEAPONS.
9. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO SAD AND NEWS DEPARTMENT.
10. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS, MOSCOW AND TEHRAN.

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THE PRIME MINISTER

17 November 1981

Dear Mr. Bukovsky

Thank you for your letter of 15 October about Afghanistan and for the interesting memorandum which you enclosed.

We are determined that the problems caused by Soviet military intervention shall not be forgotten by world opinion. Any solution is unacceptable which does not involve Soviet military withdrawal, freedom for the Afghan people to determine their future and satisfactory arrangements for the return of the refugees, whose plight I saw at first hand on my visit to Pakistan last month.

You draw my attention in particular to the question of Soviet defectors who are in the hands of the Resistance inside Afghanistan. I note that you have had contacts with the Red Cross about their fate. Questions of political asylum necessarily require very careful consideration. If we were approached by the Red Cross about these cases we would naturally be willing to look into the facts and decide whether we could help, although I cannot commit HMG in advance to the granting of political asylum.

I wish you and your organisation all success in your efforts to promote the human rights of the Afghan people.

Yours sincerely
Raymond Thatcher

Mr. Vladimir Bukovsky

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Type for PM's signature

12 November 1981

RMJ

Dear Michael,

Afghanistan: Soviet Army Defectors

Your letter of 29 October enclosed a copy of a letter from Mr Vladimir Bukovsky to the Prime Minister.

He describes various measures which his Human Rights Committee is undertaking to mobilise opinion against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and, in particular, asks that the United Kingdom should grant political asylum to about ten Soviet army defectors now in the hands of the Afghan Resistance.

Without a good deal more knowledge of the facts, we think it would be unwise to make any commitment. In addition to the complexities which often surround political asylum cases, you will note from Mr Bukovsky's letter that the Pakistan Government, in their delicate situation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, have so far been unwilling to cooperate in allowing Soviet defectors to pass through Pakistan. We shall examine the matter further in cooperation with the several Whitehall Departments concerned, but meanwhile recommend that a reply be sent to Mr Bukovsky on the lines of the enclosed draft.

Yours etc
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT: ~~memo~~/letter/teletype/despatch/other

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
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Mr Vladimir Bukovsky
145 Gilbert Road
CAMBRIDGE CB4 3PA

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SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 15 October about Afghanistan and for the interesting memorandum which you enclosed.

CAVEAT.....

We are determined that the problems caused by Soviet military intervention shall not be forgotten by world opinion. Any solution is unacceptable which does not involve Soviet military withdrawal, freedom for the Afghan people to determine their future and satisfactory arrangements for the return of the refugees, whose plight I saw at first hand on my visit to Pakistan last month.

You draw my attention in particular to the question of Soviet defectors who are in the hands of the Resistance inside Afghanistan. I note that you have had contacts with the Red Cross about their fate. Questions of political asylum necessarily require very careful consideration. If we were approached by the Red Cross about these cases we would naturally be willing to look into the facts and decide whether we could help, although I cannot commit HMG in advance to the granting of political asylum.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/I wish

I wish you and your organisation all success in your efforts to promote the human rights of the Afghan people.

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FM KABUL 091000Z NOV 81

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 245 OF 9 NOVEMBER 1981

AND TO ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, UKDEL NATO
AND MODUK (D14)

SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS GENEVA, JEDDA,
PEKING, TEHERAN, TOKYO, ROME, BONN, THE HAGUE,
BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, DUBLIN, COPENHAGEN
AND ATHENS (FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL)

MY TELNO 242: AFGHANISTAN:

STIREP.

POLITICAL

See paras 9-11
mt

1. INDRAJIT GUPTA, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ALL INDIA TRADE UNION CONGRESS (AITUC), AND MEHENDRA, COMMITTEE MEMBER OF AITUC, VISITED AFGHANISTAN FROM 28 OCTOBER TO 4 NOVEMBER. THEY CALLED ON BABRAK KARMAL AND POLITIBURO MEMBER AND PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL FATHERLAND FRONT, DR. ZEARY. AT A FACTORY MEETING IN KABUL, MEHENDRA SPOKE OF THE NEED TO CONSOLIDATE SOLIDARITY BETWEEN THE WORKERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES AGAINST THE "FILTHY DEEDS OF IMPERIALISM AND REACTION". HE CONVEYED THE GOOD WISHES OF INDIAN WORKERS TO THE AFGHAN WORKING CLASS IN THEIR DEFENCE OF THE GAINS OF THE SAUR REVOLUTION AND IN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM AND REACTION.
2. IN A PRESS CONFERENCE BEFORE DEPARTURE, GUPTA CONDEMNED THE FALSE PROPAGANDA OF IMPERIALIST STATES. HE SAID IMPERIALIST COUNTRIES IN COLLUSION WITH CHINA AND PAKISTAN WIDELY CAPITALIZE ON TWO MATTERS, THE RELIGION OF ISLAM AND THE PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S LIMITED MILITARY CONTINGENT IN AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID THEY WERE FAMILIAR WITH IMPERIALIST PROPAGANDA AND THEIR EXPLOITATION OF ISLAM BECAUSE THEY HAVE 80 MILLION MUSLIM COMPATRIOTS. GUPTA SAID THEY MET A NUMBER OF AFGHAN CLERGYMEN DURING THEIR STAY WHO TOLD THEM OF THE CONCERN OF THE DRA GOVERNMENT IN BUILDING AND MAINTAINING MOSQUES AND HOLY PLACES. THIS CONFIRMED THE FALSE PROPAGANDA OF WESTERN SOURCES WHICH IS USED BY THE MILITARY REGIME OF PAKISTAN AS AN EXCUSE TO OBTAIN MODERN ARMS AND MONEY TO STRENGTHEN ITS REGIME AND TO THREATEN INDIA. GUPTA SAID ON HIS RETURN TO INDIA HE WOULD INFORM THE PEOPLE OF THE TRUTH OF THE SAUR REVOLUTION AND OF FACTS ABOUT THE LIFE OF WORKERS IN AFGHANISTAN.

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3. GUPTA'S REFERENCE TO ISLAM IS INTERESTING AND ACCORDS WITH DRA GOVERNMENT LINE. THE REGIME HAVE ALWAYS STRESSED THE ISLAMIC NATURE OF THE REVOLUTION AND THIS WAS SUBJECT OF EDITORIAL IN KABUL NEW TIMES (KNT) OF 3 NOVEMBER. KNT EDITORIAL OF 5 NOVEMBER ON MOSLEM HOLY DAY OF MUHARAM ALSO DWELT AT LENGTH ON THIS POINT. DRA POLICY SEEMS TO BE NOT TO ANTAGONIZE OLDER GENERATION, WHO ARE UNLIKELY EVER TO BE CONVERTED TO MARXISM, BUT TO CONCENTRATE ON POLITICAL EDUCATION OF THE YOUNG.
4. PRIME MINISTER KESHTMAND WHO LEFT AFGHANISTAN ON 28 OCTOBER FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO BULGARIAE(MY TELNO 236) HAS NOT YET RETURNED. WE HAVE HEARD FROM AN UNOFFICIAL (BUT RELIABLE SOURCE THAT HE IS NOW IN MOSCOW FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT.
5. ABDUL SATAR SHALIZI, WHO WAS MIPUTY PM TO MAYWANDWAL UNDER KING ZAEHER AND WHO HAS BEEN LIVING IN EXILE IN THE USA HAS, ACCORDING TO UNOFFICIAL BUT RELIABLE REPORTS, RECENTLY RETURNED TO AFGHANISTAN. THE REASONS FOR HIS RETURN ARE NOT KNOWN, BUT IT HAS GIVEN RISE TO SPECULATION THAT REGIME ARE HOPING TO PERSUADE HIM TO JOIN THEM.
6. A FORMER AFGHAN EMPLOYEE OF THE US EMBASSY IN KABUL, WHO WAS DISMISSED FOR DISHONESTY, APPEARED AT A TELEVISED PRESS CONFERENCE ON 5 NOVEMBER. HE GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF CIA ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN AND OF HOW US EMBASSY RECRUITS SPIES FOR ITS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. HE NAMED NAMES. KNT HAVE PROMISED TO PUBLISH LATER FULL DETAILS OF PRESS CONFERENCE.
7. NON-ATTENDANCE BY WESTERN GROUP AT SOVIET EMBASSY RECEPTION TO MARK OCTOBER REVOLUTION HAS CLEARLY IRKED THE RUSSIANS MY FRG COLLEAGUE, AFTER HAVING BEEN RPOMISED INFORMATION ABOUT SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO AFGHANISTAN, WAS TOLD BY MINISTER OF SOVIET EMBASSY THAT AS HE AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD BOYCOTTED THEIR RECEPTION, THEY SAW NO REASON WHY THEY SHOULD PROVIDE US WITH ANY INFORMATION.
8. A PROTOCOL FOR EDUCATIONAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE GDR AND DRA WAS SIGNED IN EAST BERLIN BY DR YAKUBI, MINISTER OF EDUCATION.
9. SHOOTING CAN STILL BE HEARD IN THE CAPITAL ON MOST NIGHTS AFTER THE CURFEW. ON THE NIGHT OF 7 NOVEMBER IT WAS PARTICULARLY WIDESPREAD AND HEAVY. EXTENSIVE FIRING AS WELL AS TANK MOVEMENTS WERE REPORTED IN THE EAZIR AKBAR KHAN AREA AND WE ALSO RECEIVED REPORTS OF HEAVY AND PROLONGED FIRING IN THE KHAIR KHANA, BINI HASSAR AND DARULAMAN DISTRICTS OF KABUL. THERE WAS A

SECURITY

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(REPORTED)

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REPORTED ROCKET ATTACK ON A BUILDING IN THE MACRO RAYON AREA ON NIGHT OF 4/5 NOVEMBER. KNT OF 8 NOVEMBER REPORTED A SERIES OF SUBVERSIVE AND TERRORIST ACTS ON A BUILDING IN THE AREA ON THE SAME NIGHT. MOST OF THE BUILDINGS IN THE MACRO RAYON AREA, WHICH

ARE ALMOST ENTIRELY SOVIET OF AFGHAN GOVERNMENT OCCUPIED, ARE NOW GUARDED BY APC'S.

10. THE MUJAHIDEEN RING AROUND KABUL SEEMS TO BE CLOSING. IN THE WEST, THE AREA BEYOND KARGA (ABOUT 8 KMS FROM KABUL) IS VIRTUALLY IN THE HANDS OF THE MUJAHIDEEN. IN THE SOUTH EAST THE ROAD TO LOGAR BEYOND THE VILLAGE OF CHIWAKI, ABOUT 10 KMS FROM KABUL, IS ALSO SAID NOW TO BE CONTROLLED BY MUJAHIDEEN AND UNSAFE FOR TRAVELLERS.

11. REPORTS FROM KHANDAHAR INDICATE THAT ALTHOUGH GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE STILL IN CONTROL THE MUJAHIDEEN ARE INFILTRATING BACK. (PARA 11 MYTELNO 240) .

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THIS TELEGRAM
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[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

Mr. Bukovsky

12/11

29 October 1981

I enclose, together with its attachments, a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Vladimir Bukovsky. I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply which the Prime Minister might send to Mr. Bukovsky. It would be helpful if your draft could reach me by Thursday 12 November.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

1/10

29 October 1981

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to your letter to her of 15 October. This is receiving attention and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Mr. V.K. Bukovsky

LB

10. 12.
Michael Alexander

1. Herewith original letter dated 15th October from Vladimir Bukovsky.
2. This letter was handed to me by John Stanley, now Minister for Housing, and formerly the Prime Minister's PPS.
3. Could as sympathetic a reply as possible, please, be sent to Mr Bukovsky? The Prime Minister herself should sign the reply.



Ian Gow
27/10/81

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 211700Z OCT 81

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1089 OF 21 OCTOBER 1981

INFO ISLAMABAD, KABUL, MOSCOW, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON.

INFO SAVING NEW DELHI, PEKING, PARIS, BONN.

AFGHANISTAN

1. WALDHEIM TOLD MR HURD ON 19 OCTOBER THAT DOST AND AGHA SHAH I HAD AGREED THAT THEIR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES HERE SHOULD START PROXIMITY TALKS THROUGH DIEGO CORDOVEZ ON TWO QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE, NAMELY REFUGEES AND NON-INTERFERENCE. WALDHEIM HAD NOMINATED CORDOVEZ IN DE CUELLAR'S ABSENCE. IF ALL WENT WELL, WALDHEIM WOULD SEND DE CUELLAR TO THE REGION AGAIN, PROBABLY IN NOVEMBER.

2. THE SECRETARIAT (PLEASE PROTECT) ARE A LITTLE EMBARRASSED BY WALDHEIM'S INDISCRETION IN REFERRING TO THIS CONTINUATION OF THE INDIRECT CONTACTS HERE AS "PROXIMITY TALKS". PICCO HAS TOLD US THAT THE AGENDA IS ALSO NOT AS CUT AND DRIED AS WALDHEIM INDICATED. THE PAKISTANIS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IF THE AFGHANS RAISE NON-INTERFERENCE THEN THEY WILL RAISE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. CORDOVEZ'S TACTICS WILL BE TO DRAW OUT BOTH PARTIES THEREBY GRADUALLY WIDENING THE SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION. (THE EARLIER ROUND OF CONTACTS HAD ALREADY, FOR EXAMPLE, BRIEFLY TOUCHED ON THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES).

3. MEANWHILE, WALDHEIM IS APPARENTLY SITTING ON HIS DRAFT REPORT AND THE SECRETARIAT DO NOT EXPECT HIM TO ISSUE IT BEFORE THE VOTING TAKES PLACE NEXT WEEK ON THE SECRETARY GENERALSHIP.

4. THE SECRETARIAT HAVE KEPT THE NEW IRANIAN REPRESENTATIVE HERE INFORMED OF THE PROGRESS OF THE INDIRECT CONTACTS. HE APPARENTLY REFERRED FAVOURABLY TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS THE FIRST TIME ACCORDING TO THE SECRETARIAT THAT ANY IRANIAN HAS DONE SO. THE SECRETARIAT DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS IN FACT REPRESENTS THE VIEW OF HIS GOVERNMENT. BUT THEY HAVE NOT GIVEN UP HOPES THAT DE CUELLAR MIGHT INCLUDE TEHRAN IN HIS VISIT TO THE REGION.

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO NEW DELHI, PEKING, PARIS, BONN.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

PARSONS

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FM KABUL 191000Z OCT 81

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 236 OF 19 OCT 81

RPTD FOR INFO TO ISLAMABAD , NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON
UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (DI4)

SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK (FCO PSE PASS)

MY TELNO 228: AFGHANISTAN: SITREP.

POLITICAL

1. LOCAL PRESS HAVE CONTINUED TO CRITICIZE IN STRONG AND DENIGRATORY TERMS MRS THATCHER'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN/AFGHAN BORDER. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN FURTHER GOVERNMENT AND PARTY COMMENT ON THE VISIT. IN A SPEECH AT JALALABAD ON 14 OCTOBER, ABDUL MAJID SARBULAND, MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE, SAID " BRITAIN IS THE NUMBER ONE ENEMY OF OUR BELOVED COUNTRY". THE WOMEN'S DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATION OF AFGHANISTAN (WDOA) ALSO ISSUED A STATEMENT ON 15 OCTOBER IN WHICH IT SAID, INTER ALIA, " BY COMMITTING THIS ACTION (SUPPORTING THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES) MRS THATCHER HAS DEPRIVED MANY BRITISHERS OF FOOD, SHELTER AND MEDICAL CARE. IN TODAY'S BRITAIN THOUSANDS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN ARE LIVING IN POVERTY, HUNGER, DISEASE AND HOMELESSNESS. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE POLICIES PURSUED BY THIS STUBBORN WOMAN HAVE MEANT FOR THOUSANDS OF IRISH MOTHERS MISERY, AND MOURNING FOR THE DEATH OF THEIR CHILDREN, WHILE SHE SHEDS CROCODILE TEARS FOR THE CONDITIONS OF AFGHAN EMIGRES. THE WDOA, ON BEHALF OF THE WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN, CALL UPON MRS THATCHER TO PONDER THE INHUMAN AND MISANTHROPIC NATURE OF HER REACTIONARY AND IMPERIALIST POLICIES IN THE FACE OF HUNGRY AND AILING BRITISH CHILDREN AND WEEPING ENGLISH WOMEN". THE WDOA ALSO SENT A MESSAGE TO THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATION, CONDEMNING MRS THATCHER'S VISIT AND HER PROMISE OF 'ENORMOUS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO PROFESSIONAL MURDERERS AND CRIMINALS' AND ASKED FO SUPPORT IN THEIR JUST STRUGGLE AGAINST REACTION AND IMPERIALISM.

2. PRIME MINISTER KESHTMAND ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION GULDAD LEFT FOR SOFIA ON 18 OCTOBER FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO BULGARIA. SARWAR MANGAL, DEPUTY MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION, LEFT KABUL ON 12 OCTOBER FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

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3. A GDR DELEGATION LED BY DEPUTY MINISTER OF HEALTH SPITZ VISITED KABUL FROM 13 TO 18 OCTOBER AND SIGNED AN AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN THE FIELD OF PUBLIC HEALTH. A GROUP OF GDR EDUCATIONALISTS IS NOW VISITING KABUL FOR WHAT IS DESCRIBED AS A STUDY TOUR.
4. A CONTRACT HAS BEEN SIGNED FOR THE EXPORT TO THE USSR OF 6000 TONS OF CITRUS FRUIT AND 1700 TONS OF CONSERVED OLIVES. THE VALUE OF THE CONTRACT IS REPORTED TO BE 3.84 MILLION DOLLARS.

SECURITY

5. ACCORDING TO INDIAN CONSUL IN KHANDAHAR THE CITY IS NOW VIRTUALLY UNDER MUJAHIDEEN CONTROL. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS COME INTO TOWN DURING DAY BUT WITHDRAW TO SAFETY OF SOVIET BARRACKS NEAR AIRPORT BY LATE AFTERNOON. THERE ARE SIMILAR REPORTS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN HERAT. THE TOWN IS SAID TO BE UNDER MUJAHIDEEN CONTROL DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS. WE HAVE RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT WHEN PM KESHTMAND PAID A ONE-DAY VISIT TO HERAT ON 1 OCTOBER HIS CAR AND THAT CONTAINING BAREQ SHAFIEE, CC MEMBER IN CHARGE OF NW ZONE, CAME UNDER FIRE BUT NEITHER WAS INJURED. NIGHT LETTERS HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED IN ADVANCE OF THE VISIT TELLING PEOPLE TO STAY AWAY FROM MEETINGS ADDRESSED BY KESHTMAND.
6. RECENT TASS REPORTS OF DEFEAT OF LARGE NUMBERS OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES IN HERAT PROVINCE, ADDS WEIGHT TO OTHER REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED OF RECENT EXTENSIVE FIGHTING IN THAT PROVINCE. WE HAVE ALSO RECEIVED REPORTS OF HEAVY FIGHTING IN LOGAR PROVINCE.
7. HELICOPTER ACTIVITY OUT OF KABUL AIRPORT, MOSTLY IN A SOUTHERN OR SOUTH-WESTERLY DIRECTION, HAS BEEN ABOVE NORMAL IN PAST WEEK.

PRESS DISTRIBUTION

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

8. NO RESTRICTION EXCEPT FOR ATTRIBUTION IN PARA 5.

GARNER

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

AFGHANISTAN STANDARD

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ECD (E)
CABINET OFFICE

Vladimir K. Bukovsky

145, Gilbert Road, Cambridge CB4 3PA.

Telephone: Cambridge 356486

15th October, 1981

Dear Prime Minister,

Enclosed is a copy of my memo describing a project we are working on at the moment.

Briefly speaking the main idea is to reach the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan through broadcasting and to encourage them to defect. In our judgement the response could be very high and even could help to solve the problem of Soviet involvement in the area, let alone any further advances they might plan. It could also make the Soviet occupation of Poland more difficult.

Before the project was started a couple of months ago there were many cases of Soviet defectors trying to cross the border with Pakistan. However, they were intercepted by Pakistani security forces, and returned to Soviet command. Currently there are about ten Soviet soldiers and officers kept by Afghani guerrillas inside of Afghanistan, awaiting safe-conduct to be arranged. The United States through its Ambassador to the U.N. is making separate efforts to persuade the Pakistan Government to change its attitude to the problem.

The top Red Cross officials approached by us on this subject, have expressed their willingness to take responsibility for these prisoners provided a government of a third country confirms in writing that it will allow these people into their territory. We hope that you will appreciate the importance and urgency of the situation.

Should you decide to help an official letter should be sent to the President of the INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, Mr. Alexandre Hay, or to Mr. Jean-Pierre Hocke, the Director of Operations. The address is: c/o Comite International de la Croix-Rouge, 17 Avenue de la Paix, 1211 GENEVA, Switzerland.

I would also appreciate it if a copy of such a letter could be sent to our Human Rights Committee at 152 Rue du Chateau, 75014 PARIS, France.

Needless to say, unless some arrangements can be made, the people in question will be killed either by the Soviets or by the guerrillas who are unable to keep them forever. It has taken us a great deal of time to persuade the guerrillas not to kill these prisoners who include politically motivated defectors.

I hope very much that these humanitarian considerations provide grounds for your Government to co-operate with the Red Cross in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

V. Bukovsky

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
10, Downing Street.

July, 1981

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Vladimir Bukovsky

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979-80 created a new political situation in the world. There are at least four aspects of the problem which should be taken into consideration: the USSR, Afghanistan, Western Europe, and the United States.

I. The USSR.

The intrusion of Soviet troops into Afghanistan is an extremely unpopular venture among the ordinary people in the Soviet Union. According to our information received from inside the Soviet Union, the objectives of this war are not accepted nor understood by the population, and the sacrifices are not felt to be justified.

Apart from critical statements made by Soviet intellectuals (such as Dr. Andrei Sakharov), members of Soviet Helsinki monitoring groups, feminist groups in Leningrad and Moscow, representatives of the Initiative Group for the Defense of the Rights of Invalids, and an endless number of individual Soviet citizens have expressed protests against the invasion of Afghanistan.

According to information made available to us, the number of conscientious objectors among national and religious minorities in the USSR has grown. Also, in accordance to Agence France Presse and other sources, there have been a number of unconfirmed cases of mutinies among the Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan and refusals on the part of Soviet soldiers to shoot at the civilian populace. Those who refused to shoot were executed on the spot, but the refusals have not stopped. In general, it is well known that the morale of Soviet occupation troops everywhere is rather low; in East Germany, for instance, the rate of attempted defections is as high as approximately 30 per day.

Until the end of last year, the arrival of zinc coffins containing the remains of Soviet soldiers killed in Afghanistan had provoked a number of spontaneous political manifestations in Kazakhstan and other areas of the Soviet Union. By the beginning of this year the practice of sending zinc coffins to the Soviet Union had been abandoned, which shows the degree of anxiety felt by the Soviet leadership. (Soviet soldiers killed in Afghanistan are now buried there.)

The morale of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the number of casualties are monitored by our friends inside the Soviet Union and a continuous flow of information is maintained. Up to now, more than 20,000 Soviet soldiers are reported to have been killed in Afghanistan.

The economic difficulties aggravated by this unpopular war have given rise to an additional source of discontent among the industrial workers of the Soviet Union. At this point it should perhaps also be pointed out that historically, socio-political changes in Russia have usually occurred after military defeats in local wars, i.e., in 1856, 1905, and in 1914.

II. Afghanistan.

Despite the well-publicized quarrels among the various groups of the Afghan resistance, we have found it to be quite easy to cooperate with most of the factions. Last year Russian-language leaflets were distributed by members of the Afghan resistance movement. An agreement had been reached between Soviet dissidents and the majority of resistance groups in Afghanistan to cooperate in their efforts.

In January of 1980 an alliance was formed by six principal Afghan resistance groups in Peshawar. (At this point I will not delve into the various groups, their leaders, and the interrelationships between them.) However, the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan /NIFA/ under the leadership of Sayed Ahmad Gailani seems to be the majority force among the resistance movement. We have been in touch with this group since 1979. In sum total, approximately 90 per cent of Afghanistan is under control of the resistance.

However, a main base of Afghan resistance is situated in Pakistan, where the government is hostile to the idea of Soviet prisoners of war being kept on its territory. In four known cases of defections to Pakistan, all of the Soviet soldiers were extradited back to the Soviet command. Pakistani authorities claim that they are not sufficiently safeguarded against possible Soviet retaliations, some of which have already taken place (such as violation of Pakistani air space.) The presence of Soviet prisoners of war on Pakistan territory could indeed exacerbate the relationship between the two countries in question.

III. Western Europe.

As we know from the past, the worsening of relations between East and West usually leads to a drastic increase in Soviet investments in so-called "peace movements." There is unconfirmed information that the Soviet Union has spent about \$700 million on the campaign against the placement of American missiles in West Germany, Belgium, Holland, and England. So far, this challenge has not been counteracted by the West.

Accordingly, in Great Britain the CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) enjoys the unchallenged privilege of influencing public opinion. The main opposition party in England, the Labor Party, has accepted the position of unilateral disarmament.

In Holland army spokesmen have expressed their support of the same idea. In West Germany the same kind of tendencies have prevailed in the ruling Social Democratic Party (through the influence of their youth organizations). Because of this, there are rumors that Chancellor Schmidt may be replaced by Willy Brandt by the end of this year.

In France the victory of the Socialists in the recent election and the inclusion of four members of the Communist Party in the Cabinet have cast a dubious light on France's role in the Nato Alliance, and may have dangerous repercussions on Italy and Spain. In the three above-mentioned countries pacifist tendencies are very strong.

IV. The United States.

Apart from certain powerful internal forces in the United States which are working against the foreign policy of the present administration, the

situation in Europe, as it was described here, makes it nearly impossible for the United States to maintain a strong posture against the Soviet Union.

SUGGESTIONS:

1. Organize safe escape routes for Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan who either wish to defect or are willing to be taken as prisoners of war.
2. Organize a massive European campaign against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, utilizing Soviet defectors from the Afghan occupation army.
3. Intensify efforts to transmit information about all such campaigns into the Soviet Union.
4. Organize the beaming of information into Afghanistan in both native languages and in Russian. In addition to the use of portable transmitters (a campaign already launched in Paris in July of this year under the title "Radio Free Kabul") the existing United States Navy transmitting facilities which are currently dormant in Oman should be activated for the same purpose.
5. Place greater diplomatic focus on the internal national problems in the USSR, particularly on the Muslim minorities.

OBJECTIVES:

I. The Soviet Union.

Strong Western public support of the current anti-Afghan war tendencies inside the Soviet Union could encourage these tendencies by raising the number of conscientious objectors in the USSR and instances of public protests. The growth of such a protest movement can endanger the very basis of Soviet power in the Soviet Union. Should that occur, further Soviet advances in Asia as well as Soviet intervention in Poland will become increasingly difficult. Together with the growing economic difficulties which are predicted to be at their worst at the end of the 1980's, the development of such a public movement and the influence of the Polish example will certainly boost the already existing nationalistic tendencies among the various different nations within the USSR, i.e., in the Baltic states, the Caucasus, the Ukraine, and particularly in Central Asia located close to the border of Afghanistan.

In view of this danger, the most probable Soviet official reaction will be that of internal reforms, after easily predictable initial attempts to crush the wave of protests.

II. Afghanistan.

The suggested public campaign (see Suggestions, cited above), will certainly be encouraging to Afghan freedom fighters and it will make it politically easier for Western countries to help them openly with arms supplies, which in turn will lead to an intensification of the popular resistance to the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.

In addition, the possibility for Soviet soldiers to defect or to surrender will further undermine the morale of the Soviet occupation army. The intensification of radio propaganda (including appeals broadcast by those who have already defected) beamed on frequencies used for communication between tanks, armored cars, and helicopters will further increase the rate of defection. The unreliability of Soviet troops may force the Soviet leadership to reconsider their presence in Afghanistan.

III. Western Europe.

The suggested campaign may effectively counteract the pro-Soviet and pacifist tendencies previously described. As the majority of those who are involved in anti-missile or unilateral disarmament movements are simply naive and confused individuals acting with good intentions, they could be easily attracted to a more reasonable anti-war campaign. The small politically motivated groups that control the peace movement at the moment can hardly find convincing arguments against supporting genuine fighters for peace who are imprisoned for their activities in the USSR. A steady flow of defecting Soviet soldiers from Afghanistan telling stories of atrocities committed in that country (gas, napalm, extermination of the civilian population) will serve as fuel for the public campaign.

Besides, the obvious parallel with the anti-war campaign in the 1960's and 70's makes it very difficult even for politically motivated groups to argue against the campaign on Afghanistan.

The above-cited line of argumentation has already been tried in private talks and in public discussions, and it proved to be successful. A well organized, wide-scale campaign on Afghanistan can change the current public mood in Europe for the better. The recent successful launching in Paris of the "Radio Free Kabul" project has elicited a considerable degree of public interest and support.

IV. Who Are Our Allies?

The recent 1978-80 campaign against the Moscow Olympics has helped us to develop a good working relationship with public and political forces across the world. Knowing their attitude to Soviet expansionism in general, and the occupation of Afghanistan in particular, we can count on their support.

Apart from a world-wide network of human-rights committees and East European Solidarity groups in different countries, Amnesty chapters which have adopted conscientious objectors imprisoned in the USSR, and numerous groups of refugees from Communist countries with whom good relations have been established, the following public forces in various countries can be utilized:

1. Great Britain:

An all-party parliamentary group ("Hands Off Afghanistan") organized by Raymond Whitney, M.P.; organizations of Young Conservatives and Young Liberals; Confederation of Conservative Students; the European Liaison Group (an organization of refugees from East European countries representing more than 250,000 people); also, three out of the four major political parties have indicated their sympathy on the Afghan question on numerous occasions.

2. France:

The number of organized refugees from Communist countries is especially large in this country (there are up to 1 million of them.) Recently their different organizations have discussed the possibility of creating a kind of International Committee, and in principle, they have agreed to do so.

The problem of Afghanistan is one of the key points in such a union.

The atmosphere in France is particularly favorable for such a campaign, since the Afghanistan issue played a prominent role in the recent elections. A bi-rally on human rights scheduled to take place on October 21st could be the starting point of the suggested plan.

3. West Germany:

Out of all the political parties, so far we can count only on the support of the Christian Democrats and their youth organizations. The various human-rights committees and refugee organizations could also be relied upon.

4. Italy:

The Christian Democrats and the mass youth organization "Movimento Popolare"; Socialist, Liberal and even Radical parties have already expressed their support for public action in behalf of Afghanistan.

5. Belgium:

The two wings of the Belgian Liberal Party.

6. Norway:

The Conservative and Social Democratic parties; human-rights groups such as the Norwegian Helsinki Committee.

7. Sweden:

OESK and FMSF will provide the nucleus for the campaign.

8. Holland:

The Liberal, Christian Democratic and partly the Social Democratic Party have been active in the campaign against the Moscow Olympics.

9. India:

Good working relations have been established with the influential newspaper "Himmat," edited by the grandson of Mahatma Gandhi.

For activating this potential force an International Committee as well as national committees in different countries should be created with the objective of coordinating the public campaign. A substantial number of prominent public figures have already indicated their consent to be included in such committees.

PRELIMINARY FINANCIAL ESTIMATES

- a. To complete the "Radio Free Kabul" project we need about \$250,000.
- b. Should the transmitting facilities in Oman be activated, the cost of operation and staff will need to be covered. At this stage it is impossible to give an accurate estimate.
- c. To handle the defectors and P.O.W.'s, initially at least five operatives in the field should be maintained, with an estimated annual expense budget of \$95,000.

d. The cost of the European campaign is very difficult to estimate. At least one part-time coordinator in each of the countries mentioned should be kept, costing about \$70,000 per year.

The cost of publishing printed materials should be estimated separately, as well as the cost of individual actions, which could be quite substantial. Roughly speaking, if we had at our disposal at least 1 per cent of what the Soviets had spent on their "peace movement," the entire plan may be implemented, provided that political assistance be given by the Pakistani authorities to solve the problem of safe conduct through Pakistan territory.

In summation, the current internal situation in the USSR, its involvement in Afghanistan, and developments in Poland have placed the USSR in a uniquely vulnerable position. It would be an unforgivable mistake not to make use of the possibilities described.


Contributions to the project may be sent to:

Droits de N'Homme
Radio Kabul Libre
Credit Lyonnais
Agence AH
18 Rue de Rivolea
75004 Paris
France

Konto No. 58656 J

Le Monde, Oct. 9, 1981, reduced from full page.

L'ARMÉE DES ONDES.



RADIO KABOUL LIBRE

Radio Kaboul Libre est opérationnelle. A la suite de notre premier appel, 3 émetteurs ont rejoint déjà les zones libérées de l'intérieur de l'Afghanistan.

Mais pour accroître son efficacité, pour qu'elle diffuse l'espoir dans l'ensemble du pays, il lui faut encore 30 émetteurs.

Cette radio de la liberté, permettez-lui d'émettre dans tout l'Afghanistan en répondant à l'appel lancé au nom du

Comité "Droits de l'Homme" par Marek Halter, Bernard-Henri Lévy, Vladimir Boukovski, Vladimir Jankevitch, Alfred Kastler, Edgar Morin, Renzo Rossellini.

M.

Adresse _____

vous adresse sa participation par chèque bancaire ou chèque C.C.P. à l'ordre de :

Comité "DROITS DE L'HOMME", 152, rue du Château, 75014 PARIS - C.C.P. 11 009 89 H Paris.

ENVOYEZ VOS DONS POUR QUE LES AFGHANS PARLENT AUX AFGHANS

Afghanistan

12 October 1981

Film on Afghanistan

Thank you for your letter of 30 September to Mike Pattison. The Prime Minister would indeed like to see the new film that the COI have made on Afghanistan, and I would be grateful if you could arrange for a cassette copy to be sent to us here.

WILLIAM RICKETT

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM KABUL 121000Z OCT 81

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 228 OF 12 OCTOBER 81

RPTD FOR INFO TO ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON,
UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (D14)

SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK (FCO PSE PASS)

MY TELNO 225: AFGHANISTAN: SITREP.

POLITICAL

1. KABUL MEDIA RESPONDED IN A PREDICTABLY FORTHRIGHT MANNER TO MRS THATCHER'S VISIT TO NW FRONTIER PROVINCE OF PAKISTAN. KABUL RADIO REFERRED TO BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN'S AFFAIRS FROM TIME OF ANGLO-AFGHAN WARS AND SAID BRITAIN WAS STILL INTERFERING IN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND IN HER RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. IT SAID WHILE AFGHANISTAN WAS SEEKING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OFF THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN, MRS THATCHER AND THE OTHER IMPERIALISTS WERE PREVENTING SUCH A SETTLEMENT FOR THEIR OWN BENEFIT AND SUGGESTED THAT, INSTEAD OF SPENDING TIME VISITING THE SO CALLED REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN, MRS THATCHER SHOULD VISIT IRELAND AND THE POOR PEOPLE OF HER OWN COUNTRY.

2. AN ARTICLE IN KABUL NEW TIMES (KNT) HEADED 'THAMES AND N POTOMAC MEET TO BID TO DROWN HOPE OF PEACE' SAID THE 'LADY'S' VISIT TO THE PAKISTANI/AFGHAN BORDER WAS HIGHLY PROVOCATIVE AND SLANDEROUS. SHE PUBLICLY VOWED TO WORK, HOPE AND PRAY FOR THE DOWNFALL OF THE LEGITIMATE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNTRY OF AFGHANISTAN. THE ARTICLE SAID THE DONATION OF £2 MILLION TO THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY RABBLE IN PAKISTAN MEANS THAT THE BRITISH PM, IN CONCERT WITH WASHINGTON, PEKING, ISLAMABAD AND CAIRO, IS GIVING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO OUTSIDE AGGRESSORS WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, SHE SHEDS CROCODILE TEARS OVER THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. THE INTENTIONS OF MRS THATCHER, AND THOSE LIKE HER, TO SINK THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN THE BLOOD OF ITS SONS WILL NEVER COME TRUE AND THE 24 AUGUST PROPOSALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRA ARE THE ONLY WAY TO NORMALIZE THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN.

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3. IN HIS EID-UL-ADHA MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN ON 7 OCTOBER, BABRAK KARMAL REPEATED THE AMNESTY OFFER TO ALL THOSE DECEIVED AFGHAN NATIONALS WHO ARE FIGHTING THE PEOPLE AND REVOLUTION, WHO VOLUNTARILY SURRENDER. HE ALSO REPEATED OFFER OF COMPLETE AND GENERAL AMNESTY TO ALL NOMADS AND CITIZENS WHO HAD BEEN COMPELLED TO LEAVE THEIR HOMETLAND UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF IMPERIALIST AND REACTIONARY PROPAGANDA OR DUE TO THE TERROR OF THE AMIN REGIME.

4. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ISSUED A FIRM DENIAL OF PAKISTANI ALLEGATION THAT TWO DRA AIRFORCE PLANES ATTACKED A BORDER POST IN PAKISTAN. IT SAID THE FALSE AND BASELESS CLAIMS WERE TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH EFFORTS AT THE UN TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE ISSUES AROUND AFGHANISTAN AND WERE INTENDED TO DIVERT THE ATTENTION OF WORLD OPINION WHICH WAS WAITING FOR A CLEAR AND EXPLICIT REPLY FROM THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT TO THE DRA PROPOSALS OF 24 AUGUST. THE ALLEGATIONS WERE ALSO AN ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY U.S. MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN WHICH ENDANGERED PEACE, STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE REGION.

5. FOREIGN MINISTER DOST RETURNED FROM NEW YORK ON 6 OCTOBER. POLITBURO MEMBER, MAHMOUD BARYLAI, LEFT KABUL ON 11 OCTOBER FOR A VISIT TO PDRY, AND ANAHITA RATEBZAD FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON 6 OCTOBER TO ATTEND CONGRESS OF WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION IN PRAGUE.

6. A PROTOCOL HAS BEEN SIGNED BETWEEN USSR AND DRA UNDER WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WILL HELP MODERNIZE AFGHANISTAN'S COMMUNICATIONS. THE AGREEMENT COVERS RADIO AND TELEVISION, A SURVEY OF THE POSTAGE SYSTEM AND APPLICATION OF MODERN TELEGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES.

SECURITY

7. THE RECENTLY FORMED NATIONAL DEFENCE COUNCIL (PARA 2 MYTELNO 203) WILL COMPRISE THE 8 POLITBURO MEMBERS, 8 ZONE GOVERNORS, GENERAL BABAJAN, GENERAL GULAKA, GENERAL NAZAR MOHAMMED, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE COLONEL HALLILULAH AND FOREIGN MINISTER DOST.

8. THERE WAS FURTHER FIGHTING IN THE PAGHMAN AREA LAST WEEK. THERE WAS SOME SHELLING AND BOMBING OF PAGHMAN ITSELF BY AFGHAN FORCES WHICH SUGGESTS THAT GOVERNMENT ARE NOT IN COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE TOWN. THERE WERE ALSO REPORTS OF HELICOPTER ATTACKS ON VILLAGES IN THE PARWAN PROVINCE.

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9. TURKISH MA HAS RECEIVED A REPORT THAT THE SINDAND AIRBASE HAS BEEN REINFORCED WITH TWO SQUADRONS OF SOVIET MIG 25'S OR 27'S . HE ADMITTED SOURCE WAS OF UNCONFIRMED RELIABILITY AND THE REPORT SHOULD THEREFORE BE TREATED WITH SOME CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF RESERVE. IF TRUE, IT WOULD OF COURSE MEAN A SIGNIFICANT QUALITATIVE INCREASE IN SOVIET AIRFORCE CAPABILITY.

10. COLONEL MOHAMED SEDIQ ZAHIR HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN APPOINTED DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE (TECHNICAL) (PARA 13 MY TELNO 221) .

PRESS DISTRIBUTION

11. PARA 9 NOT SUITABLE.

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Prime Minister

Would you like a cassette copy of this film?

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 September 1981

*Y
Would like to see new film*

Dear Mmes,

Film on Afghanistan

I wrote to you on 25 March 1981 about the success of the film on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office commissioned from the Central Office of Information. To date it has been shown on television in 42 countries. I said that we were thinking of producing a follow-up film.

A new film has been made and, following Ministerial approval, is now being distributed to our posts. It is similar to the original in that it gives a brief background to the Soviet invasion, shows the reality of the Soviet presence, the resistance to it and the suffering it has brought to the Afghan people. But most of the material the film contains is new, and it should once more dramatise the message we are trying to put across. Versions with the commentary in English, Arabic, French and Spanish have been produced.

As in the earlier version, the credits at the end of the film name the sources of the material used in it (including West German, Japanese and Soviet as well as British), though no reference is made to its British origin. Posts have been instructed to stress that all the footage is available commercially, and that none of the film was shot by or for HMG. While there may be some reaction from the Russians, the last film did not provoke any direct response from them. They have, after all, produced a film of their own on Afghanistan.

Should the Prime Minister wish to see the new film we could arrange, in conjunction with the COI, for a cassette copy to be provided for No 10.

*Yours ever,
Frederic Richards*
(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

Mike Pattison Esq
10 Downing St

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Faint, illegible text at the top of the page, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side.



1981 OCT 12
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Afghanistan
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~~FROM UKH NEW YORK~~ 21908Z SEPT 81

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 885 DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 81

INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW,

INFO SAVING BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

~~SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS OF PAKISTAN ON
22 SEPTEMBER 1981 AFGHANISTAN~~

1. AGHA SHAHI PREDICTED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD SEEK TO MAKE PROPAGANDA MILEAGE OUT OF PAKISTAN'S ALLEGED UNWILLINGNESS TO TALK. IN FACT, HE HAD MADE QUITE CLEAR TO WALDHEIM THAT THE PAKISTANIS WERE READY TO PUT FORWARD THEIR VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER AND TO COMMENT ON THE VIEWS OF OTHERS THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE. ON MATTERS CONCERNING THE REFUGEES, THEY WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT THE REFUGEE LEADERS (HE ACCEPTED THAT IT WOULD BE TOO MUCH TO ASK THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONSULT THEM DIRECTLY) AND THIS WOULD MAKE THEM TO SOME EXTENT PARTIES TO THE TALKS. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF PAKISTAN FORCING THEM TO RETURN, AND THEY WOULD NOT RETURN VOLUNTARILY BEFORE THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL: SO THE HEART OF THE QUESTION WOULD THUS BE REACHED. AGHA SHAHI EXPLAINED THAT THE PAKISTAN CABINET DECISION NOT TO ACCEPT THE EMPTY CHAIR FORMAT HAD BEEN INFLUENCED BY A CONCERN TO AVOID CRITICISM FROM IRAN AND FROM THE REFUGEES.

2. AGHA SHAHI SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE WORTH EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY HELD OUT IN THE 24 AUGUST PROPOSALS OF SIMULTANEOUS TALKS ON GUARANTEES. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE RUSSIANS WERE TO SPELL OUT WHAT GUARANTEES THEY HAD IN MIND, THOUGH THEY WOULD ALSO HAVE TO SPELL OUT THE CONDITIONS FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR THE RUSSIANS TO STAY PUT WHILE OTHERS PROCEEDED WITH GUARANTEES. LORD CARRINGTON REMARKED THAT THE 24 AUGUST PROPOSALS SEEMED TO EXCLUDE THE SOVIET PRESENCE FROM THEIR DEFINITION OF INTERFERENCE. AGHA SHAHI AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE FORMAL POSITION BUT THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT NEVERTHELESS BE WORTH PROBING FURTHER.

3. AGHA SHAHI WAS INCLINED TO BE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE AFRICANS AND ARABS FOR DIFFERENT REASONS WERE NOT WELL DISPOSED TO THE US ADMINISTRATION. NAIK ON THE OTHER HAND DREW AN ANALOGY WITH THE VOTE ON KAMPUCHEAN CREDENTIALS AND THOUGHT THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN AND PERHAPS EVEN SLIGHTLY INCREASE THE VOTE IF THE AFGHANISTAN RESOLUTION REMAINED SUBSTANTIALLY ON THE SAME LINES AS LAST YEAR'S.

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4. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PROBABLY NOT UNDER SUFFICIENT PRESSURE EITHER MILITARILY OR IN TERMS OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE NON-ALIGNED TO FEEL THE NEED FOR A SETTLEMENT. HE WONDERED WHETHER MORE COULD BE DONE TO EMPHASISE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM (THREE MILLION IN PAKISTAN AND IRAN OUT OF A POPULATION OF SEVENTEEN MILLION). AGHA SHAHI AGREED THAT THIS WAS WORTH THINKING FURTHER ABOUT.

5. ~~FINALLY AGHA SHAHI EMPHASISED THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT ANY~~

~~STATEMENT ABOUT AFGHANISTAN EMERGING FROM CHINA SHOULD~~

~~BE NO WEAKER THAN WHAT WAS PROPOSED IN THE DRAFT U.S.~~

~~RESOLUTION~~ HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE INDIANS WOULD MAKE SOME HEADWAY WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT THE PAKISTANIS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AS THEY SAW ADVANTAGE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IN TERMS OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH (AND SUPPLIES FROM) THE UNITED STATES.

FCO PASS SAVING BONN, PARIS

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 896 OF 22 SEPTEMBER 1981

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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

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SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO: AFGHANISTAN.

1. LORD CARRINGTON, FOLLOWING UP HIS EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH AGHA SHAHI (MY TELNO 885), ASKED GROMYKO TO EXPLAIN IN MORE DETAIL WHAT WAS MEANT BY THE REFERENCE TO GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE 24 AUGUST PROPOSALS. GROMYKO INTRODUCED HIS LENGTHY REPLY BY SAYING THAT THE PROPOSALS WHICH LORD CARRINGTON HAD PUT FORWARD IN MOSCOW IN JULY WERE UNREALISTIC AND THEREFORE UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT SOVIET VIEWS ON THIS HAD NOT CHANGED AND COULD NOT CHANGE ONE iota. HE AGREED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO FIND A SOLUTION AND PUT FORWARD FOUR POINTS:

- I. THE SOVIET UNION REGARDED AFGHANISTAN AS A NON-ALIGNED AND INDEPENDENT STATE. IT MUST HAVE THIS STATUS.
- II. THERE MUST BE AN END TO THE INTERVENTION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN FROM PAKISTAN (AND TO A LESSER EXTENT FROM IRAN) WHICH AMOUNTED TO AN UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AFGHANISTAN.
- III. THE END OF SUCH INTERVENTION MUST BE GUARANTEED AND CERTAIN PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE GUARANTEES.
- IV. THE LIMITED CONTINGENT OF SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS SOON AS INTERVENTION HAD ENDED AND THE GUARANTEES HAD COME EFFECTIVELY INTO FORCE. BUT THEY WOULD NOT BE WITHDRAWN BEFORE THAT: THE CART COULD NOT BE PUT BEFORE THE HORSE.

GROMYKO ADDED THAT AFGHANISTAN WOULD HAVE TO BE REPRESENTED AT ANY DISCUSSIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM (THE INTERNAL ASPECTS WERE PURELY A MATTER FOR THE AFGHANS) AND THAT NO-ONE BUT THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL COULD REPRESENT AFGHANISTAN. THE BEST PROCEDURE WOULD BE BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN, THOUGH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO TRIPARTITE TALKS IF THE PARTIES THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD BE "JOLLIER". HE CONCLUDED BY REPEATING THAT THE WAY TO GET WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS WAS TO PUT AND GUARANTEE AN END TO INTERVENTION. PARADOXICALLY, THOSE PUTTING FORWARD UNACCEPTABLE PROPOSALS WERE MAKING IT HARDER TO GET SOVIET TROOPS TO WITHDRAW.

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2. LORD CARRINGTON REPLIED THAT HE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF AFGHANISTAN BECAUSE HE SAW IT AS THE SINGLE GREATEST FACTOR OF DISTRUST BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THE LINE PROPOSED BY GROMYKO RAISED TWO DIFFICULT PROBLEMS:

- I. THERE WERE THREE MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN AND IRAN AND THE BORDER WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTROL. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO GUARANTEE NON-INTERFERENCE WITHOUT FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF AFGHANISTAN.
- II. AT THE MOMENT, IF SOVIET TROOPS WITHDREW, BABRAK KARMAL WOULD GET HIS THROAT CUT AND THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE FACED WITH PRECISELY THE PROBLEM THEY HAD INTERVENED TO PREVENT. IT WAS NECESSARY TO FIND A GOVERNMENT ACCEPTABLE BOTH TO THE SOVIET UNION AND TO THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN.

UNLESS THESE TWO PROBLEMS WERE FACED IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR ANYONE TO DELIVER WHAT GROMYKO HAD ASKED.

3. GROMYKO RESPONDED WITH A LENGTHY CRITICISM OF WESTERN NON-RECOGNITION OF BABRAK KARMAL AND A THOROUGHLY IMPLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. KARMAL WAS RUNNING AFGHANISTAN (SOVIET TROOPS WERE MERELY DOING WHAT THEY HAD BEEN SENT TO DO AND HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO LOOK FOR WAYS OF SETTLING DOWN IN AFGHANISTAN, GIVEN THE DELAYS IN FINDING A POLITICAL SOLUTION). MANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHO HAD COME TO POWER AS A RESULT OF EVENTS AS TEMPESTUOUS AS THOSE IN AFGHANISTAN HAD SURVIVED AND WERE GENERALLY RECOGNISED. "EMIGRATION" WAS ALSO A NATURAL PHENOMENON AFTER SUCH EVENTS (PEOPLE HAD LEFT ENGLAND FOR POLITICAL REASONS AND MANY HAD LEFT RUSSIA AFTER THE REVOLUTION) AND, BESIDES, ONE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NOMADIC AND TRIBAL FEATURES OF AFGHAN SOCIETY.

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