

PREM 19/1690




PUBLIC

PUBLIC OPINION & DEBATE

ON NUCLEAR WEAPON ISSUES

DEFENCE

OCTOBER 1982



Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>17.1.83</del>							
<del>20.1.83</del>							
<del>27.1.83</del>							
<del>2/2/83</del>							
<del>11.2.83</del>							
<del>15.2.83</del>							
<del>16.2.83</del>							
<del>24.2.83</del>							
<del>10.3.83</del>							
<del>23.3.83</del>							
<del>6.4.83</del>							
<del>19.4.83</del>							
<del>28.4.83</del>							
<del>20.5.83</del>							
<del>1.12.83</del>							
<del>8.12.83</del>							
<del>12.1.84</del>							
9.5.86							

PREM 19/1690



**TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE**

**Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents**

Reference	Date
CC(83) 36 <sup>th</sup> conclusions, item 1	08/12/1983
CC(83) 35 <sup>th</sup> conclusions, item 1	01/12/1983
CC(84) 14 <sup>th</sup> meeting, minute 4	28/04/1983
CC(83) 8 <sup>th</sup> meeting, item 1	10/03/1983
CC(83) 1 <sup>st</sup> meeting, item 2	20/01/1983

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed L JEWELL

Date 25/09/2024

**PREM Records Team**





10 DOWNING STREET

The King forward the  
for next birthday etc

Defense Security.

CDP  
12/5

~~CDP~~

- ① PC to CDP 9/5
- ② Viscount Trenchard to  
Sir PC + a.H.S. 17.4.86.



Prime Minister (9)

9 May 1986

I suggest that you read it

MR POWELL

cc Professor Griffiths

Mr Sherbourne

passages which

PUBLIC OPINION AND DEFENCE

I have underlined. It reveals a worrying state of affairs & you will want

1. The attached letter, reflecting a discussion I recently had with Lord Trenchard and Lady Olga Maitland, raises some interesting points.

No discuss with the defence secretary soon how to rally

2. First, the confused state of British opinion. There is still a healthy majority favouring retention of an effective nuclear deterrent, but that is accompanied by a disturbing indifference between the United States and the Soviet Union (America seen as as great a threat to peace as Russia), and an equally worrying ignorance of the basic facts on Soviet armaments. To that we should now add a strong strain of anti-American and anti-Reagan sentiment.

opinion in favour of defence (and fund some of

these organizations).

3. Secondly, the need, as Lord Trenchard sees it, to step up the Government campaigning effort on defence. I incline to agree. It is, I believe, received wisdom that in electoral terms defence is a Government strength. I think this is right; it reflects an underlying soundness on the part of public opinion. But this underlying soundness is at present buried under such strata of misconception and prejudice, particularly on the part of the young, that considerable excavation will be required before the seam is revealed. Not a job that can be left to the later stages of a campaign.

Chernobyl will only make matters more difficult.

CDP 9/5

4. Third, the importance that Families for Defence and the Foundation for Defence Studies continue to receive adequate private support.



5. Mr Loades' 'Journey through Russia' illustrates point 2 above - ignorance and pro-Soviet predisposition on the part of an intelligent man, readily dispersed by contact with reality. The Prime Minister should find it worth reading.

u  
-  
PERCY CRADOCK





THE VISCOUNT TRENCHARD, M.C.

17th April 1986

Sir Percy Craddock  
Foreign Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London S.W.1.

*Personal and Confidential*

Dear Sir Percy,

This letter is to confirm some of the things we discussed at lunch on 14th April. The letter will deal with the activities and needs of two quite separate organisations which both Olga Maitland and I fully support, and she of course is Chairman and moving spirit of the Families for Defence, whose membership is growing due to the efforts of her and her band of voluntary helpers in various parts of the country. *This letter comes from both of us.*

We both believe that public confusion on the essential elements of our defence situation has increased in the past two years. I send you a full copy of the Gallup Opinion Poll published by the Foundation for Defence Studies for its conference in December of last year. We say this not only because of the poll findings, but also because of the feel which Olga and others get at their many public meetings. It is not surprising that this should be so, bearing in mind, first that the Russians under Gorbachev are using our free society much more effectively than in the past to distribute their propoganda, and secondly that the Labour Party has more stridently than ever before departed from traditional British and NATO defence policy, and finally because anti-Americanism is doing far too well.

The worrying aspects of the Gallup Poll include the fact that only 30% are aware that the Warsaw Pact has a superiority of conventional arms over NATO; that only 29% are aware that Russia has more intermediate range missiles than the West. The figures for the under 25's are worse. The very high don't know percentage, over 40% in both cases, is thought to include a big element of people who "don't know what to believe". This reflects the contradictory statements being made by British political parties in addition to Russian propoganda.

Another aspect of the poll is the huge exaggeration of defence costs, and of the costs of nuclear defence shown in reply to questions 7 and 8. It is clear that the constant reiteration of "over £10 billion for Trident" has had an impact.

Of course one can take comfort from the relatively robust 68% who believe Britain should keep an effective nuclear deterrent (table 10), but this





would be much higher if they had the real conventional balance and the real costs of defence clear in their minds. Without giving too little credit to anti-Americanism, it is also quite easy to see that if you are a member of the public who believes NATO already has more strength than the Warsaw Pact, then it is not too difficult to wrongly believe that America is as great a threat to peace as Russia, which comes out in ~~question~~ in Table 9.

So, both Olga and I take the view that more understanding of the overall facts of the defence situation is very badly needed, and that the trends of public opinion are unhealthy. Previous nearly similar Gallup Poll questions showed less ignorance and confusion than came to light in our poll. We are trying to tackle this in two ways. The Families for Defence organisation is vigourously campaigning for British and NATO defence policy. With the current new Labour Party policy it is almost impossible to get leading Labour politicians to support this organisation. They do have grass root Labour members, but the regrettable lapse of any elements of bi-partisan defence policy has made her task harder. We were both, therefore, keen supporters for the establishment of the Foundation for Defence Studies, which has charitable status, and which came into being before the King's College conference, which conference was it's first main event. It's purpose is to provide high profile simple educational material and facts independent of Government. In this case it is hoped that we can provide a wider political balance and deeper expert credibility by forming a council for factual education. I am fairly sure now that we will be able to put together a council of defence experts of churchmen, academics and respected figures from more than one Party. The opinion poll had as one of it's objectives the making of otherwise boring factual education about what the real facts are into a more interesting subject for the media. The Foundation will probably repeat this using the same and different questions in opinion polls. It will probably also commission objective studies such as for instance the estimated costs of a non-nuclear defence policy.

We anticipate that the material produced by the Foundation will be found to be useful for campaigning organisations, including Families for Defence, who support NATO policy. The two organisations are entirely separate, but as individuals we support strongly the success of both of them. We believe that in the long term if a greater public awareness of the facts about the balance of arms is achieved, it will probably have the effect of forcing political parties to return to a greater degree of common British defence policy.

It is our view that the Government should step up it's own campaigning effort and that it was a pity that the policy unit in the M.O.D. was disbanded. Greater Government effort provides





a direct help to Families for Defence, but we think that private non-Government organisations can make that effort more effective, and on the education side we believe that the Foundation can help to underline the credibility and factual accuracy of Government and NATO policy.

Both organisations have far too little money. The Kings College conference and the Gallup Poll cost over £7000. The Foundation had a plan which would have cost up to £50,000 a year, but as a realistic target we are trying to raise £25,000 a year for the first two years. We do not want Government funding. The Foundation is independent, and must be seen to be independent, but we do need money. The Families for Defence organisation really needs £25,000 a year also, and with no charitable status on that side it is harder to find.

Finally I enclose a copy of Robert Loades' report on his journey through Russia. His simple observations will be no surprise to you, but I think they are pungently written, and one of the interests to me is that a highly intelligent 45 year old director found the conditions in Russia a real surprise to him. This reflects the fact that there is also far too little publicity about conditions in Russia, and particularly the apparent state of permanent mobilisation. I personally believe that the Prime Minister would like to glance at this short report, and I also venture to suggest that the opinion poll would be interesting to her.

It was nice to see you again.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Tom Trenchard".

Trenchard



# GALLUP

Attitudes towards defence  
and disarmament

30 October-4 November 1985

Conducted on behalf of:

Foundation for Defence Studies

# Omnibus Report



## INTRODUCTION

These tables show the results of an enquiry undertaken by the Gallup Poll.

The sample is representative of the population of Great Britain, aged 16 and over. It was stratified by region and town size.

Interviewers were given quotas for sex by age, class and employment of their respondents. Over 100 separate sampling points were covered.

At the tabulating stage the sample has been weighted where necessary to give the correct proportion by sex by class within region. Details of the sample obtained are given in Appendix.

## Notes on the Tables

All figures are percentages calculated on the weighted sample shown.

Regional analysis: inevitably, the number of sampling points covered in any one region is small - on average, one for every ten interviews. This fact should be taken into account when interpreting regional differences.

The sign 0 = less than 0.5 per cent.

These tables have been produced by a computer. The percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number and consequently, do not always add to 100 per cent exactly. To some questions contacts gave more than one reply. In such cases, therefore, the total of the replies exceeds 100 per cent.

The questions asked are shown at the head of each table.



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 1 WHICH MILITARY ALLIANCE - NATO OR THE WARSAW PACT - HAS MORE CONVENTIONAL FORCES (TANKS, AIRCRAFT, ARTILLERY, INFANTRY) DEPLOYED IN EUROPE?

	VOTING INTENTION					SEX			AGE					
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	DONT KNOW	MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65+
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200
NATO	23	19	29	22	20	15	21	26	20	26	25	21	25	18
WARSAW PACT	30	37	22	23	39	45	18	43	18	27	34	33	32	24
BOTH EQUAL	4	6	5	5	1	7	5	6	3	4	3	5	5	5
DON'T KNOW	43	38	44	49	40	34	57	25	58	43	37	42	38	53

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 1 WHICH MILITARY ALLIANCE - NATO OR THE WARSAW PACT - HAS MORE CONVENTIONAL FORCES (TANKS, AIRCRAFT, ARTILLERY, INFANTRY) DEPLOYED IN EUROPE?

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
NATO	23	16	24	25	24
WARSAW PACT	30	45	32	27	23
BOTH EQUAL	4	4	6	5	3
DON'T KNOW	43	35	37	43	50



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 2 IS THAT A LOT MORE OR A LITTLE MORE?

	VOTING INTENTION						SEX			AGE				
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	DONT KNOW	MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65+
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200
ALL SAYING NATO	23	19	29	22	20	15	21	26	20	26	25	21	25	18
LOT MORE	9	6	14	6	6	0	11	10	8	15	5	8	9	6
LITTLE MORE	10	10	11	14	10	11	5	12	8	8	15	9	11	6
DON'T KNOW	4	4	5	2	4	3	5	3	5	3	4	3	4	6
ALL SAYING WARSAW PACT	30	37	22	23	39	45	18	43	18	27	34	33	32	24
LOT MORE	22	31	15	18	27	22	13	34	11	19	27	22	24	17
LITTLE MORE	7	4	7	5	10	23	4	8	5	6	7	9	7	5
DON'T KNOW	1	2	1	0	2	0	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 2 IS THAT A LOT MORE OR A LITTLE MORE?

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
ALL SAYING NATO	23	16	24	25	24
LOT MORE	9	7	8	11	9
LITTLE MORE	10	5	11	11	11
DON'T KNOW	4	5	5	3	4
ALL SAYING WARSAW PACT	30	45	32	27	23
LOT MORE	22	36	23	21	15
LITTLE MORE	7	7	8	6	6
DON'T KNOW	1	2	1	1	2



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 3 AND WHICH MILITARY ALLIANCE - NATO OR THE WARSAW PACT - HAS DEPLOYED AND STILL HAS MOST MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS?

	VOTING INTENTION					SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	DONT KNOW	SEX		AGE				
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB					MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65+
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200	
NATO	21	19	25	17	16	26	23	25	17	23	25	24	20	13	
WARSAW PACT	29	37	22	25	36	26	12	40	19	26	28	25	33	29	
BOTH EQUAL	4	3	5	3	2	6	4	5	3	4	4	3	4	4	
DON'T KNOW	47	41	48	55	46	42	60	30	62	48	42	48	43	54	

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 3 AND WHICH MILITARY ALLIANCE - NATO OR THE WARSAW PACT - HAS DEPLOYED AND STILL HAS MOST MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS?

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
NATO	21	23	20	21	20
WARSAW PACT	29	36	33	25	25
BOTH EQUAL	4	3	3	4	5
DON'T KNOW	47	38	44	50	50



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 4 IS THAT A LOT MORE OR A LITTLE MORE?

	VOTING INTENTION						SEX			AGE				
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	DONT KNOW	MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65+
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200
ALL SAYING NATO	21	19	25	17	16	26	23	25	17	23	25	24	20	13
LOT MORE	8	7	9	4	5	19	9	7	8	12	9	10	7	2
LITTLE MORE	11	10	13	12	9	7	11	16	6	9	15	9	12	9
DON'T KNOW	2	2	3	2	2	0	3	2	2	2	2	5	2	2
ALL SAYING WARSAW PACT	29	37	22	25	36	26	12	40	19	26	28	25	33	29
LOT MORE	18	24	14	16	20	22	4	26	11	11	18	15	25	18
LITTLE MORE	8	8	8	6	12	4	8	12	5	14	9	7	5	9
DON'T KNOW	2	4	0	4	4	0	0	2	3	1	1	3	3	2

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 4 IS THAT A LOT MORE OR A LITTLE MORE?

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
ALL SAYING NATO	21	23	20	21	20
LOT MORE	8	7	6	8	9
LITTLE MORE	11	10	12	12	9
DON'T KNOW	2	5	2	1	2
ALL SAYING WARSAW PACT	29	36	33	25	25
LOT MORE	18	25	19	15	17
LITTLE MORE	8	7	12	9	7
DON'T KNOW	2	4	3	2	2



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 5 DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IS TRUE OR FALSE?  
BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF US CRUISE MISSILES IN BRITAIN IN 1983,  
THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
IN BRITAIN .

	VOTING INTENTION						SEX		AGE					
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	DONT KNOW	MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65+
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200
TRUE	31	28	37	30	24	27	29	37	26	39	30	27	29	29
FALSE	42	47	36	43	46	44	37	47	37	36	45	47	46	34
DON'T KNOW	27	25	27	28	30	29	34	17	37	24	25	26	25	37

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 5 DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IS TRUE OR FALSE?  
BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF US CRUISE MISSILES IN BRITAIN IN 1983,  
THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
IN BRITAIN .

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
TRUE	31	29	26	36	30
FALSE	42	51	51	39	32
DON'T KNOW	27	21	23	25	37



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 6 WHAT PROPORTION DO BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS REPRESENT OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

	VOTING INTENTION					SEX		AGE						
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	DONT KNOW	MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65+
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200
LESS THAN 5 PER CENT	21	18	20	18	26	39	22	30	13	19	26	18	26	13
5-9 PER CENT	12	14	9	18	14	7	11	15	10	14	14	16	11	8
10-19 PER CENT	11	13	11	9	10	26	4	13	9	11	14	10	11	9
20-29 PER CENT	6	7	6	10	5	3	3	8	5	8	5	8	6	6
30 PER CENT	6	6	6	3	6	2	6	6	6	8	6	6	5	5
DON'T KNOW	44	42	47	42	39	24	54	28	58	40	36	42	41	59

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 6 WHAT PROPORTION DO BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS REPRESENT OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
LESS THAN 5 PER CENT	21	28	24	19	16
5-9 PER CENT	12	17	14	12	9
10-19 PER CENT	11	10	10	14	10
20-29 PER CENT	6	8	7	6	5
30 PER CENT	6	4	5	7	6
DON'T KNOW	44	33	40	42	54



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 7 WHAT PERCENTAGE OF OUR ANNUAL DEFENCE BUDGET DO YOU THINK IS SPENT ON BRITAIN'S NUCLEAR FORCES?

	VOTING INTENTION					SEX			AGE					
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	DONT KNOW	MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65+
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200
LESS THAN 5 PER CENT	4	5	4	3	2	0	6	5	3	1	9	3	3	3
5-9 PER CENT	6	8	3	10	7	0	1	9	3	7	5	5	6	6
10-14 PER CENT	11	13	8	15	10	24	6	13	8	11	14	11	10	8
15-24 PER CENT	15	14	14	14	19	24	7	19	11	10	21	16	16	10
25-49 PER CENT	17	18	17	15	16	17	16	17	17	24	15	22	15	9
50 PER CENT OR MORE	11	6	16	5	10	16	8	12	10	18	9	9	9	8
DON'T KNOW	38	35	38	38	36	20	56	26	49	29	26	33	42	56

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 7 WHAT PERCENTAGE OF OUR ANNUAL DEFENCE BUDGET DO YOU THINK IS SPENT ON BRITAIN'S NUCLEAR FORCES?

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	A8	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
LESS THAN 5 PER CENT	4	5	4	5	1
5-9 PER CENT	6	9	6	6	3
10-14 PER CENT	11	10	13	12	7
15-24 PER CENT	15	13	14	13	18
25-49 PER CENT	17	24	17	18	11
50 PER CENT OR MORE	11	9	14	10	9
DON'T KNOW	38	30	32	35	50



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 8 WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS TAKEN UP BY BRITISH DEFENCE SPENDING?

	VOTING INTENTION					SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	SEX		AGE				
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	DONT KNOW			MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65+
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200
LESS THAN 5 PER CENT	3	3	2	1	3	0	3	4	1	2	5	1	4	2
5-10 PER CENT	10	12	7	12	11	14	7	14	6	11	13	7	11	8
11-15 PER CENT	9	11	6	9	8	17	9	12	6	7	10	13	7	8
16-20 PER CENT	12	11	13	18	12	21	5	16	9	13	18	14	11	6
21-30 PER CENT	13	12	15	6	16	8	9	14	12	16	13	14	12	10
OVER 30 PER CENT	10	7	11	11	11	23	5	10	10	13	10	8	11	6
DON'T KNOW	43	43	45	41	39	16	61	29	56	37	32	42	44	60

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 8 WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS TAKEN UP BY BRITISH DEFENCE SPENDING?

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
LESS THAN 5 PER CENT	3	4	2	3	2
5-10 PER CENT	10	18	14	8	5
11-15 PER CENT	9	12	10	10	5
16-20 PER CENT	12	14	13	13	10
21-30 PER CENT	13	10	13	14	13
OVER 30 PER CENT	10	11	12	9	8
DON'T KNOW	43	32	36	43	56



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 9 WHICH SUPERPOWER DO YOU BELIEVE POSES THE GREATER THREAT TO PEACE IN EUROPE - THE UNITED STATES OR THE SOVIET UNION?

	VOTING INTENTION					SDP/ ALLI- ANCE OTHER	DONT KNOW	SEX		AGE				
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	LIB			MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65+
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200
UNITED STATES	32	22	40	35	31	32	34	35	29	39	35	29	27	30
SOVIET UNION	33	41	26	36	32	32	32	31	35	33	31	33	33	34
BOTH EQUALLY	28	30	25	24	30	28	25	28	27	19	30	33	29	26
DON'T KNOW	7	7	8	4	6	8	9	6	9	8	3	5	11	9

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 9 WHICH SUPERPOWER DO YOU BELIEVE POSES THE GREATER THREAT TO PEACE IN EUROPE - THE UNITED STATES OR THE SOVIET UNION?

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
UNITED STATES	32	21	33	32	36
SOVIET UNION	33	37	31	34	32
BOTH EQUALLY	28	35	30	27	22
DON'T KNOW	7	7	7	7	9



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 10 DO YOU THINK THAT BRITAIN SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT KEEP AN UP-TO-DATE NUCLEAR DETERRENT AS LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

	VOTING INTENTION						SEX		AGE					
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	DONT KNOW	MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65+
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200
SHOULD	68	88	52	70	68	64	61	69	68	65	65	63	72	74
SHOULD NOT	23	6	38	22	22	28	25	28	19	25	27	31	19	17
DON'T KNOW	9	6	9	9	10	8	14	4	13	10	8	6	9	9

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 10 DO YOU THINK THAT BRITAIN SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT KEEP AN UP-TO-DATE NUCLEAR DETERRENT AS LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
SHOULD	68	70	68	70	65
SHOULD NOT	23	22	25	22	23
DON'T KNOW	9	7	7	7	12



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 11 BEFORE WE ENTER INTO ANY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, DO YOU THINK THAT THERE SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT ALWAYS BE A RELIABLE METHOD OF CHECKING THAT BOTH SIDES ARE NOT CHEATING ON THE CONDITIONS OF SUCH AGREEMENTS?

	VOTING INTENTION					SEX		AGE						
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	DONT KNOW	MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65+
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	155	179	265	200
SHOULD	88	93	85	88	90	94	77	90	87	90	87	81	92	90
SHOULD NOT	3	1	5	1	3	0	12	4	3	3	4	8	2	2
DON'T KNOW	8	6	10	10	7	6	11	6	10	8	8	12	6	9

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 11 BEFORE WE ENTER INTO ANY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, DO YOU THINK THAT THERE SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT ALWAYS BE A RELIABLE METHOD OF CHECKING THAT BOTH SIDES ARE NOT CHEATING ON THE CONDITIONS OF SUCH AGREEMENTS?

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
SHOULD	88	87	89	92	84
SHOULD NOT	3	4	4	2	4
DON'T KNOW	8	8	6	6	12



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 12 DO YOU BELIEVE THAT A COUNTRY WHICH REDUCES ITS DEFENCES:

	VOTING INTENTION					SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	DONT KNOW	SEX		AGE				
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	LIB				MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65+
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200	
IS LESS LIKELY TO BE ATTACKED BECAUSE IT POSES NO MILITARY THREAT TO OTHERS	27	14	38	29	26	29	29	28	26	31	30	28	23	26	
IS MORE LIKELY TO BE ATTACKED BECAUSE IT IS LESS ABLE TO DEFEND ITSELF	52	71	37	49	53	47	47	52	52	43	49	53	57	56	
DON'T KNOW	21	15	25	23	21	24	24	20	22	26	21	19	20	18	

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 12 DO YOU BELIEVE THAT A COUNTRY WHICH REDUCES ITS DEFENCES:

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
IS LESS LIKELY TO BE ATTACKED BECAUSE IT POSES NO MILITARY THREAT TO OTHERS	27	16	29	33	25
IS MORE LIKELY TO BE ATTACKED BECAUSE IT IS LESS ABLE TO DEFEND ITSELF	52	61	50	48	52
DON'T KNOW	21	23	20	19	22



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 13 A LARGE NUMBER OF LOCAL COUNCILS HAVE DECLARED THEIR AREAS TO BE 'NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES'. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT LIVING IN A 'NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE' MAKES BEING ATTACKED MORE LIKELY, LESS LIKELY, OR HAS NO EFFECT ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING ATTACKED?

	VOTING INTENTION							SEX		AGE				
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	DONT KNOW	MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65+
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200
MORE LIKELY	8	5	11	3	6	9	13	8	7	8	6	5	7	11
LESS LIKELY	8	3	10	9	10	17	4	10	6	13	8	11	3	5
NO EFFECT	76	84	70	79	76	64	65	78	73	70	79	77	79	73
DON'T KNOW	9	8	9	9	7	10	17	4	14	8	7	7	11	11

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 13 A LARGE NUMBER OF LOCAL COUNCILS HAVE DECLARED THEIR AREAS TO BE 'NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES'. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT LIVING IN A 'NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE' MAKES BEING ATTACKED MORE LIKELY, LESS LIKELY, OR HAS NO EFFECT ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING ATTACKED?

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
MORE LIKELY	8	7	3	8	11
LESS LIKELY	8	2	6	8	12
NO EFFECT	76	84	86	77	62
DON'T KNOW	9	7	5	7	16



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 14 HOW MANY ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS DO YOU THINK HAVE BEEN SIGNED BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST IN THE LAST 25 YEARS?

	VOTING INTENTION					SEX			AGE					
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	DONT KNOW	MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65+
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200
LESS THAN 5	14	13	14	15	15	10	12	19	9	13	18	9	15	13
5 - 10	19	20	17	23	20	24	13	21	16	21	23	21	17	12
11 - 15	11	12	10	9	12	16	8	12	10	16	10	10	11	8
16 OR MORE	10	11	11	2	10	14	5	13	7	6	10	14	10	9
DON'T KNOW	47	44	49	51	43	35	63	35	58	43	39	45	48	59

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 14 HOW MANY ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS DO YOU THINK HAVE BEEN SIGNED BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST IN THE LAST 25 YEARS?

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
LESS THAN 5	14	17	17	13	9
5 - 10	19	21	23	18	14
11 - 15	11	12	12	11	10
16 OR MORE	10	9	9	11	8
DON'T KNOW	47	40	38	47	59



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 15 WHICH SIDE DO YOU THINK HAS BEEN THE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE  
IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS - THE  
EAST OR THE WEST?

	VOTING INTENTION					SEX			AGE					
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	DONT KNOW	MEN	WOMEN	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65-
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200
EAST	14	10	21	8	11	14	12	17	11	19	13	10	13	14
WEST	36	43	31	37	34	32	29	37	34	31	36	34	41	34
NEITHER	25	25	21	27	28	44	24	30	20	23	30	31	22	21
DON'T KNOW	26	21	27	28	27	10	36	16	35	27	21	25	25	31

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

TABLE 15 WHICH SIDE DO YOU THINK HAS BEEN THE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE  
IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS - THE  
EAST OR THE WEST?

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
EAST	14	10	11	15	16
WEST	36	36	38	39	30
NEITHER	25	37	34	22	14
DON'T KNOW	26	16	17	24	39



CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

SAMPLE DETAILS

	VOTING INTENTION						SEX		AGE					
	TOTAL	CONS	LAB	LIB	SDP/ ALLI- ANCE	OTHER	DONT KNOW	MEN	WOMEN	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-64	65-
BASE	1021	311	347	90	177	25	72	490	531	193	185	179	265	200
UNWEIGHTED	1021	306	345	87	183	26	75	480	541	192	186	177	276	190

CQ990A - 30TH OCTOBER - 4TH NOVEMBER 1985

PERCENTAGES DOWN

SAMPLE DETAILS

	CLASS				
	TOTAL	AB	C1	C2	DE
BASE	1021	169	230	321	301
UNWEIGHTED	1021	172	253	292	304



25th June 1985.

A TWELVE DAY VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION

6TH - 17TH APRIL 1985

A PERSONAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT

My brother (A.E. Loades) and I decided that although we had been to Japan before, on industrial visits, we wanted to update ourselves on the latest machine tool technology. Particularly the flexible manufacturing systems for application to our aerospace and defence work. There was a secondary reason for the visit to Japan. A part of our business is prototype motor car body build. We trade internationally in this type of work and we wanted to visit Honda and Nissan, (who are setting up in England to manufacture), with a view to offering them our services. We had a week in Japan and every day was occupied visiting machine tool companies and at the end of it we had potentially fruitful discussions with both Nissan and Honda.

We are awaiting certain aircraft component and defence orders which would suit manufacture with F.M.S. systems. We learnt a very great deal. It does not necessarily mean we shall buy Japanese machine tools but certainly we saw the latest systems available.

Because we were visiting Japan for a week it had always been an ambition of both my brother and myself to travel on the Transiberian Express and we discovered that we could actually travel back from Japan on the Transiberian Express for 10 days for less than the cost of a first class return ticket by aeroplane from Japan. We therefore decided to make the best of the opportunity and visit Russia.

OUR ROUTE IN RUSSIA AND THE PLACES WE VISITED

After the week in Japan we flew from Niigata to Khabarovsk which is about 150 miles inland from the coast line of Eastern Russia. The journey was originally from Vladivostock by train which is on the coast but this was stopped because of the fact that Vladivostock is an important Naval base and for security reasons you fly into Khabarovsk and board the train there.



The basic plan was, of course, that we travel approximately 4,000 miles to Moscow from the area that the Russians call the Far East region, not Eastern Siberia, and then right across Siberia, then through and over the Urals and then finally across to Moscow. During that trip we had a full day in Khabarovsk; two days at Irkutsk which is on the huge 'Lake Baikal'. Then we had one day at the city of Novosibersk, which used to be called Novonicholi before the revolution. In the evening of our visit there we attended the Ballet at the famous Opera Building there. Finally we spent two days in Moscow.

The train journey without stops is a continuous six days and nights. We took twelve days including our stay-overs as previously described. Therefore in addition from the visits to the cities we had the opportunity of meeting and observing the Russian people. Also, we saw many interesting facets of the country both from the windows of the train and in the environs of the 90 plus stops at villages and towns.

To what extent was our visit representative of the Soviet Union? We were not seeing the south of the country, the whole mass of Georgia and the Southern Steppes. We travelled mainly through the Taiga and some Steppes and we were not seeing the areas West of Moscow which is more prosperous than parts of the East. We did not see the cities to the South of Moscow, Rostof, etc., and indeed we were not seeing Leningrad to the North of Moscow. Nevertheless we were seeing quite a lot of the country.

#### POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

I think it ought to be said (before I state some fairly strong opinions), what my feelings were prior to the visit of what I was likely to see in Russia. My views and outlook were and are as follows: I am a democrat and therefore I have anti-Communistic views. However, I always wanted to try and understand why the Soviet system existed and what were the causes of it's creation. I wanted to be sympathetic towards certain aspects of Russian life. I must say from reading articles in the West and seeing television programmes here about Russia I had a general feeling that the people were fairly well off and possibly reasonably content with their lot in life. Also I always felt that Russia would perhaps move slowly over the years into a more liberal state.

With regard to the standard of living for the people I imagined that perhaps it might be as ours was say in the early 60's in the U.K. or in Europe. As it turned out this was not the case in quite a startling way.

With regard to my feelings on our defence position in the West, in the United Kingdom, Eastern Europe and Nato Alliance,



my view has always been that we should have very strong defence forces and the nuclear deterrent. Although agreeing with the production of the new Trident missile, however, it's destructive power was so great that I had certain doubts as to whether we weren't overdoing it in the U.K. and the U.S. Certainly after what I had seen I have no doubts at all that we must have the strongest possible defence and Trident. I will now try and explain the experiences which we had and the ways in which they surprised me and changed my views.

First of all, however, a comment on the beauty and vastness of Siberia and the Soviet Union as a whole. Having read Tolstoy and Pasternak I always had a great feeling about the country in terms of it's people and geography. I always wanted to see it and I must admit I was certainly not disappointed in this respect. It is very difficult to describe it but the vastness of the country and it's lack of population in the East is amazing to experience and fascinating to actually witness it rather than read about it. Through such a vast country I suppose you cannot talk about the normal Russians or what an ordinary Russian is like, there are so many nationalities of course. There are a hundred plus nationalities in the Soviet Union. It is difficult to say what a Russian is, certainly we met some very kind Russian women and men on our trip. Mostly they were not anxious to enter into conversation, of course the vast majority did not speak any English anyway. They are probably discouraged from speaking to foreigners and sometimes we had trouble getting a 'good morning' or 'hello' out of people. Occasionally though, conversation does occur and friendships develop. For instance while we were on the train it was my 36th birthday and there was a lady Gynaecologist with her young daughter of 5 or 6 years of age in the same carriage. They got to hear about the celebration and the Gynaecologist persuaded her daughter to bring me a card and a small chocolate as a present.

What undoubtedly is evident is what appears to be a lack of fulfilment in people's lives. Very often they seem to be miserable not looking after themselves and their dress. The train stopped at the city of Omsk, for instance, which is a massive industrial city, many workers got on to the train and almost all seemed very miserable.

With regard to the standard of living of people I was shocked as to how extremely low it was. When I say this it must be said that everyone seemed to have sufficient money to clothe themselves quite well. They had leather boots, leather coats and of course the normal fur hat in the East. The temperature drops to minus 50 or 60 even, so a labourer would have a genuine fur hat to keep him warm and leather coat and leather boots. Also everybody looked well fed, very often apparently overfed but apart from that there is no sign of any luxury at all really outside of central Moscow. For instance, there are no



cameras; people look at you with astonishment if you have a camera.

For the vast majority of the trip between Khabarovsk and Moscow the typical village is described this way. It would be log cabins in a group or timber cabins, very small, sometimes attractive; but particularly in the extreme East, no evidence at all of what we would call normal civilized living, i.e. no made-up roads. Where it is frozen, the roads are hard, where it was not frozen (in low lands), the roads were deep mud. The scenes looked very like film sets for 'Fidler on the Roof'. No mains water to the houses; this was evident from seeing people going to wells. This rudimentary life was normal right the way through Russia.

In the extreme East there was no television and also for most of the Eastern parts no electricity either. This was evident because in the evening there were no bright lights in the villages that could be seen. Really the conditions were Dickensian without starvation.

With regard to the towns particularly in the East, Khabarovsk, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk. The accommodation is mainly apartments. High, concrete, ugly flats normally; they were very, very untidy and ill-kept. I acknowledge the fact that the roads and buildings are difficult to keep up because of the massive change in temperatures from Summer to Winter. The roads are in shocking condition even in the towns and cities.

We did not enter any of the personal dwellings but all the evidence outside generally was of grim, intensely inadequate housing for just about everybody. It really did seem very grim indeed and this was quite a shock to us.

There are almost no private vehicles at all, even in Moscow, but certainly outside of Moscow no private cars at all that I could see.

In each of the villages there are these little log huts but almost all with asbestos roofing. They perhaps have a small plot around the cabin but because of the length of the Winter and the severity of it they do not have any garden. What is often seen is perhaps one cow and a mound of hay around the cabin.

For the first thousand miles from East to West there is no agriculture at all mainly due to the severity of the Winter. It is certainly clear why they have to import a lot of their grain. Of course the first thousand miles is Taiga which is wooded marshlands, but there are some plains which look as if they could be developed for agriculture at least for one crop in the Summer, certainly they would not get more than one crop off the land.



Even in these areas the effort to develop agriculture appears inadequate.

After the Taiga you come to the Steppes and then Plains. There is then an opportunity of agriculture, there again only one crop a year. Where you come across this second stretch of country where agriculture can take place it is in evidence but it is unfenced. Probably largely the cutting of wild grasses for hay and for feeding of the cattle and beef herds. As you move further West (and Winter was just giving way to Spring) you start to see Hay Stocks certainly and as you get towards Moscow you then do start to see evidence of agriculture. Although in general there are very few mechanical implements in evidence. From West of the Urals onwards you then see much better organised agricultural land. However in general there is an apparent inefficient use of the land and very little mechanisation.

We visited quite a few shops in the towns and cities and apart from central Moscow the shops are very grim indeed. I would imagine that they are like those of the middle of last century in England. There was no imagination in the display and there were many queues for special items. What we would consider normal goods sometimes are very expensive, for instance televisions are very expensive and I particularly noticed a wafer thin electronic calculator which would probably cost at the most £3 - £4 here, as priced at £60 in one of the shops.

The next surprise was the impression of a war time economy (no doubt it has been this way since the Second World War). There was a terrific amount of military about and a lot of the labourers in the cities clearing the streets were in Army uniform who are called in to do menial tasks in the cities. An ordinary soldier is not smartly dressed; I noticed for instance their Great Coats which came right down to their ankles; the hem was just sheared off - it was not turned up to make a hem. I presume for economic reasons, they were just simply cut off to length. There was just the feeling of scruffiness about it and when one saw groups of soldiers they did not look smart, they did not look particularly disciplined either. (Senior Officers on the other hand very often did look well turned out).

As the world's second superpower the lasting impression was that it is fairly obvious the country's resources are going to a massive degree into weaponry and the military with very little resources going to the people of the country, conventional industry or agriculture.

There were servicemen in uniform everywhere; for instance when we went to the Ballet at Novosibersk there were very few foreigners there, it was almost all Russians, the place



took about 700/800 people, and I would think of the male section of the audience perhaps 40%/50% were in uniform. I was told later that they have to wear their uniforms anyway except during leave, so that would account for some of it but it was quite surprising to see officers everywhere.

Because of what we saw in terms of the low standard of living and the high militaristic evidence, it has completely reversed my view on one subject. I always considered it was wrong that the U.S. should supply grain to the Soviet Union. I now think it would be a drastic mistake not to do so. If the Russian system could not feed the people they would undoubtedly want to move West.

Regarding my own views as to our defence position in the West, having seen the very low standard of living, having had an impression about what would happen if they ceased to be able to feed their people, I am in no doubt that we must have very strong conventional and nuclear defences in place in the West. I am quite certain if we had not had the nuclear deterrent the Russians would have already moved West to gain agricultural land and additional resources. The Russian Government must be very aware of the fact that if they did reach the stage of not being able to feed their people and keep them at least at the level they are at now then there would be, without doubt, a second revolution.

Having said all that which sounds a bit grim I would make another point with regard to the current Geneva talks about limiting nuclear weapons between the two super powers. I now feel the Russians must be genuine in wanting to cut back on nuclear weapons. It is very, very clear that they simply cannot afford it or at least if they do afford it then they deprive the people of more and more resources. I would say that this is an optimistic note for the future in that sense. Especially they must be thinking that if the 'Star Wars' system goes ahead in America for them to compete in that; the effect on their available resources would be disastrous.

Then there is the propoganda which we expected, but which is frightening to experience. The time that we were out there was the 40 year celebration for them of the defeat of the Nazis. The Russians did suffer substantially more than anybody else in World War II. They talk about the Great Patriotic War not the Second World War. The essence of that being that in their view Russia was the principal agent of the destruction of the Nazis. (There was much literature on the train translated into English).

First of all the war started in 1941 it did not start in 1939 at all, and it was the fault of the Western Allies that the war took place i.e. that we did not resist Hitler sufficiently. There is no explanation incidently of why Russia did not resist Hitler's expansion themselves! And



they also do not happen to mention anything at all in their official history about the German/Soviet non-aggression pact. The war for them started in 1941 as a result of the French, English and American appeasement policy towards Hitler. And then of course there was very little military resistance (according to Russian history) in the West at all. They do not talk about the North African Campaign for instance. They actually say that the Normandy landings were almost unopposed and that the American and British advance through Western Europe was almost without resistance. Of course they talk a great deal about the 20 million Russians dead, the sacrifice we all know about.

Having seen all of this I understand much better the Russians attitude to the West if this is what they genuinely believe happened. In many ways I know it is an incorrect version of history but they seem to be certain that they were the ones that conquered the Germans and there was very little help from anyone else.

Of course there is no doubt that massive suffering did occur in Russia. The enormous destruction the Germans carried out on Russian soil in terms of people and property has left an indelible mark on the Russian people. Their whole policy really surrounds the events or emanates from the events, it seems to me, of World War II.

There were other examples of propoganda including their portrayal of President Reagan's refusal of Mr. Gorbachev's offer of a six month freeze on the production of nuclear weapons etc.

R.W. Loades  
Abbey Panels Investments P.L.C.  
Bodmin Road  
Wyken  
Coventry  
England.





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~230 7922~~ 218 6169

CCB 2

D/S of S/PS/10

12th January 1984

*mf*

- 1) Mr ~~Cole~~ A.J.C.  $\frac{12}{1}$
- 2) Pae Murkin

Dear Tim,

To note

*TR 12/1*

An article appeared in the "Morning Star" on 4th January, alleging that official papers for 1953, and recently released by the Public Record Office, show that the Prime Minister "deliberately tried to mislead the House of Commons" about cruise missiles. I enclose a copy of the article.

The story is based on the records of two meetings in March 1953, one between Mr Eden and Mr Dulles, and one subsequently between Mr Eden and President Eisenhower. (Copies of the relevant documents are attached). The discussions concerned two issues. One was the use of US bases in the United Kingdom, the second was the use of US nuclear weapons "generally", ie anywhere in the world. The 1952 communique formula was in fact not an issue. It was endorsed without either hesitation or discussion; the talks therefore all concerned the second issue. The records reveal the understandable reluctance of the United States, then as now, to make any binding public commitment; and their equal determination not to act irresponsibly in a matter which could have momentous consequences for others.

The short answer to the "Morning Star"'s accusation is that the President's remarks were made in the context of a discussion, not about the use of US bases in the UK, but about the use of US nuclear weapons generally. There is therefore no conflict between his comments and the entirely separate matter of the understanding on joint decision-making between the two Governments about any use of US bases in this country. Moreover the discussions recorded in these papers have long since been overtaken by the commitment to consultation "time and circumstances permitting" given by both the USA and the UK in the Athens Guidelines of 1962, to which Ministers have referred publicly (a 1980 Hansard extract is attached).





There would, perhaps, be some danger in encouraging detailed public scrutiny of the documents. The record of the 9th March meeting does not explicitly say that President Eisenhower's remarks were not intended also to refer to the 1952 understandings; a somewhat maladroit placing of the word "only" in the first paragraph of the second column of the 6th March discussion leaves scope for misinterpretation; and the use of the term "premeditated use" in the record of the 9th March discussion (penultimate sentence) will certainly be taken to imply that the United States was then (and by implication is now) plotting a "first strike" attack against the Soviet Union.

Mr Heseltine believes that, although more recent answers given by Ministers - particularly the Prime Minister's Written Answer to Sir Anthony Buck on 12th May last year - have clarified the position considerably, the Prime Minister should be aware of the earlier exchanges in case the matter is raised in Question Time. I attach a copy of a short line to take which might be suitable in such an event.

Yours sincerely,  
Barry Neale

(B P NEALE)  
Private Secretary



MORNING STAR

By THE EDITOR

**WE ACCUSE Mrs. Thatcher of deliberately misleading the British people over the Cruise missile. She has deliberately tried to mislead the House of Commons.**

The assurances she gave about the agreements on the use of the US bases in Britain are worthless. Official documents which have now been released show this to be so.

Mrs. Thatcher made a lot about those so-called agreements. According to her, those agreements gave Britain a veto on the use of the US bases for the launching of a nuclear war.

Therefore, she said, a dual-key arrangement was an unnecessary and expensive luxury as far as Cruise was concerned.

But the official documents that have now been released show that the so-called agreements are simply a sham.

They state quite clearly that President Eisenhower told Anthony Eden bluntly that it would be "treasonous" on his part to give a binding assurance that Britain would be consulted in all circumstances.

Never mind the qualification that it would only be in an "extreme emergency" that Britain would not be consulted. The US would decide in any case what constituted an "extreme emergency."

The fact is that those official documents make it clear that the US could launch its nuclear weapons from the US bases in Britain if it considered that this was necessary.

Furthermore they show that the US considers itself free to do so, and that all British governments since 1953 have accepted this.

If we are to talk about treason, then those

governments since 1953 must be condemned as treasonable governments.

They have been prepared to see this country reduced to a radioactive rubbish heap on the say-so of a US president who considered that he faced an "extreme emergency."

Just think of the "extreme emergency" we would then face.

But the treasonable character of these governments' actions is shown even more starkly in the official documents.

Anthony Eden pointed out that if the US were to use its nuclear weapons from bases in other countries, say Turkey, "the Soviet reaction might well be to attack the United Kingdom."

That is certainly a reasonable assumption, given the fact that Britain is bristling with US nuclear weapons targeted on the Soviet Union.

In other words, British governments have known all along that, by selling Britain to the US as a massive nuclear base, they have been putting us in danger of annihilation at the whim of the US president, whether he chooses to fire first from his bases in Britain or elsewhere.

We could have a cast-iron agreement on the use of bases in Britain. But we could still be wiped out because the US chose to launch its nuclear attack from one of its bases in another country.

That is of course, the nightmare reality of belonging to the US-dominated NATO alliance. That is the price of having anything whatsoever to do with nuclear weapons controlled by the US.

The Soviet Union has made it clear that it will guarantee not to target its missiles on any country which refuses to allow US nuclear weapons on its soil.

The official papers just released make it clear that the only sane path is to take up that offer.

We should become non-nuclear. That is the only way to take our fate out of the hands of the US president over whom we have no control.

DAILY TELEGRAPH

### GREENHAM CAR<sup>3</sup> DRIVER CHARGED

A man has been charged with causing actual bodily harm to a Ministry of Defence policeman after an incident at a main entrance to Greenham Common air base early yesterday when a yellow Morris Marina crashed through a security checkpoint.

A Ministry spokesman said it knocked the policeman into the barbed wire fencing.





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <b>PREM 19</b> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <b>1690</b> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <b>CONSULTATION ON THE USE OF THE ATOMIC WEAPON</b>  <b>FRIDAY 6TH MARCH 1953</b>  [Enclosure to letter Neale to Fletcher dated 12 January 1984]	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<b>dkj</b> <b>11/02/2015</b>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use **Black Pen** to complete form

Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Lettercode, Series and Piece/Item references clearly  
e.g.

LETTERCODE/SERIES	.....	GRA 168	.....
PIECE/ITEM	.....	49	.....
(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)			

Please Sign and Date in the box adjacent to the description that applies to the document being replaced by the Dummy Card

If the document is Closed under a FOI exemption, enter the number of years closed. See the TNA guidance *Preparation of records for transfer to The National Archives*, section 18.2

The box described as 'Missing' is for TNA use only (it will apply to a document that is not in it's proper place after it has been transferred to TNA)





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <b>PREM 19</b>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <b>1690</b> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <b>MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WHITE HOUSE IN WASHINGTON AT 10AM ON MONDAY 9TH MARCH 1953</b> [Enclosure to letter Neale to Fletcher dated 12 January 1984]	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<b>day</b> <b>11/02/2015</b>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use **Black Pen** to complete form

Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Lettercode, Series and Piece/Item references clearly  
e.g.

LETTERCODE/SERIES	.....	GRA 168	.....
PIECE/ITEM	.....	49	.....
(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)			

Please Sign and Date in the box adjacent to the description that applies to the document being replaced by the Dummy Card

If the document is Closed under a FOI exemption, enter the number of years closed. See the TNA guidance *Preparation of records for transfer to The National Archives*, section 18.2

The box described as 'Missing' is for TNA use only (it will apply to a document that is not in it's proper place after it has been transferred to TNA)



HOUSE OF COMMONS (HAWARD)

VOL 995 COL 588 PT II

12 December 1980

#### Cruise Missiles

Mr. Alton asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will explain the statement of the Under-Secretary of State for the Army on 13 June, *Official Report*, c. 1095, that the United States of America has committed itself to consult its allies about a decision on the use of cruise missiles, time and circumstances permitting; and if he will describe what will happen if time or circumstances do not permit, and specify who will decide whether or not time and circumstances permit.

Mr. Pym: At the North Atlantic Council meeting at Athens in 1962, both the United Kingdom and the United States specifically committed themselves to consult their allies, time and circumstances permitting, before releasing their nuclear weapons for use. The Council also adopted guidelines on the degree to which political consultation on such use might be possible. It would not be in the public interest to reveal the precise details of the arrangements.

The separate arrangements for joint decision over the use of United States bases in the United Kingdom were set out in the reply of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to the hon. Member for Harlow (Mr. Newens) on 20 December 1979.—[Vol. 976, c. 321.]

MS



HOUSE OF COMMONS (HANSARD)

Vol 42 Col 433

12 May 1983

#### Cruise Missiles

Mr. Buck asked the Prime Minister whether she will make a further statement with respect to the arrangements for joint control of cruise missiles in the event of their deployment in the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister: The existing understandings between the United Kingdom and the United States governing the use by the United States of nuclear weapons and bases in this country have been jointly reviewed in the light of the planned deployment of cruise missiles. We are satisfied that they are effective. The arrangements will apply to United States cruise missiles based in the United Kingdom whether on or off bases. The effect of the understandings and the arrangements for implementing them is that no nuclear weapon would be fired or launched from British territory without the agreement of the British Prime Minister.



LINE TO TAKE

- Absolutely no question of PM misleading anybody.
- Position on US bases in UK is as stated by PM. Not contradicted by anything in 1953 papers.
- Discussions recorded in the 1953 papers not concerned with US bases in UK; concerned with use of nuclear weapons anywhere in world.
- Discussions recorded in the 1953 papers long since overtaken by commitments to consultation with allies given by both US and UK and recorded in the Athens guidelines.





PM/83/100

PRIME MINISTERPrime Minister.A-J C. 9  
/12.

ms

European Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons

1. I have been impressed in recent months by the apparent disparity in public attitudes here and on the Continent towards nuclear weapons; according to most indicators, opinion in the Northern sphere (the FRG, Benelux and the UK) is considerably more hostile than in their Southern neighbours, particularly France and Italy.
- / 2. I attach a copy of a paper by FCO officials which describes the reasons for this anti-nuclear sentiment in Europe, and for the apparent differences in its extent in particular countries. The paper also suggests some lessons to be learned from these differences, and from the overall public attitude.
3. I am reluctant to add to the material already being prepared by officials for the meeting of OD(D) on 14 December. But since the present paper is relevant to our discussions about arms control and disarmament, I believe that it could provide some useful further background.
4. I am sending a copy of this minute (and its attachment) to Michael Heseltine, Richard Luce, John Stanley and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

9 December 1983



## EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

## Summary of FCO paper

1. Western Europe is neither neutralist nor anti-NATO. But public opposition to nuclear weapons has grown perceptibly in recent years, with differences of degree in individual countries.
2. In general, the growing opposition stems from a perception and therefore fear of the increased risk of a nuclear war; an increase in anti-American feeling; and the impact of the recession on public readiness to accept continued growth in defence spending. Public fears are related to misunderstandings about NATO's defence strategy, to misjudgements in Washington, to lack of results from arms control, and to the perceived decline in East-West relations.
3. Apart from general socio-political differences between Northern and Southern European countries, differences in the extent of anti-nuclear sentiment can be explained in terms of: political changes throughout Western Europe (with parties of the left going into Opposition in the North but into Government in the South); contrary effects of anti-American feeling in individual countries; and wider discrepancies in social and religious attitudes. Factors particular to each country are discussed in greater detail in the Annex to



the paper.

4. The lessons to be learned are more applicable to general trends than to specific differences:

(i) a strong and united Alliance can succeed in carrying its point with the electorate;

(ii) public opinion needs to be better educated in matters of defence policy;

(iii) we should trade more on the strong support for NATO membership and for multilateral disarmament. Our commitment to NATO is not a generous gesture to other Allies but the best way of preserving our own security;

(iv) practical and theoretical objections to the way in which the INF strategy developed over the period 1979-83 must be set against the immediate political arguments for the course that was pursued;

(v) the US Administration must be convinced of the need for greater consistency in their policies, and the Europeans must make greater efforts to ensure that their own views are taken into account in Washington;

(vi) public reassurance about the direction of defence policy, and confidence in US leadership must be re-established. The resumption of a realistic East-West dialogue would make a notable contribution to this;

(vii) success in arms control can also play a part.

Public opinion must not get the impression that the arms



CONFIDENTIAL



race is running out of control. But the arms control  
process cannot be a substitute for better East-West  
relations.

---

CONFIDENTIAL



## EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

I.Introduction

1. Western Europe is neither neutralist nor anti-NATO. Governments continue to support basic defence doctrines of the Alliance. But public opinion has shown a distinct increase in anti-nuclear sentiment since the mid-1970s. Stanley Kubrick's "Dr Strangelove" was subtitled: "How I learned to stop worrying and to love the Bomb". A generation later, some Europeans have forgotten or have still to learn that lesson. This anti-nuclear sentiment can be traced to a number of factors, general or particular to each country. These are discussed in paras. 2-5 below and in the Annex respectively. The paper also suggests (paras. 6-7) reasons for differences in the extent of anti-nuclear sentiment, and proposes (paras. 8-20) lessons to be learned from the present situation.

II.General Factors

2. The most important general factors are: a growing perception and therefore fear of the risk of a nuclear war; an increase in anti-American feeling; and the impact of the drawn-out recession on readiness to accept



continual growth in defence spending.

3. The increased fear of nuclear war coincided with public recognition of Soviet achievement of strategic parity, (although in logic the existence of parity, and the development of sophisticated devices against unintentional use, should make the prospects of nuclear war less rather than more likely). But the more important reasons for increased anxiety were:

(i) failure to understand, or the misunderstanding of complex concepts, particularly deterrence and flexible response, and of the necessary limits on defence spending which argued for nuclear rather than conventional forces. Governments did not do enough to explain these. But the task was in any case very difficult;

(ii) US hamhandedness and apparent lack of judgement (late Carter/early Reagan), in contrast to the impression of competence of the Nixon/Kissinger team. The handling of ERW and then SALT II, whose non-ratification increased public anxieties, contrasted with the fate of SALT I;

(iii) the decline in East-West relations. Stimulated by some maladroit rhetoric from Washington, governments in the West were thought to be now more interested in confrontation than in dialogue;

(iv) lack of results from arms control, casting doubts on its efficacy as a process to remove nuclear dangers,



and on Western good faith in the negotiations. (This reaction was partly the result of unrealistic expectations of what arms control could or should achieve.) Nuclear arsenals were believed (fallaciously) to be growing without pause or cause;

(v) the 1979 decision to deploy land-based missiles in Europe. This brought home the nuclear message (as it was intended to do), but also increased fear of retaliatory/pre-emptive strikes hitting civilian centres;

(vi) the impression among non-official defence experts that NATO was moving away from a focus on crisis stability to concentration on achieving a maximum (and therefore less stable) deterrent posture; and

(vii) exploitation by the Western media and anti-nuclear propagandists of the horrors of nuclear war (largely irrelevant to the real argument, but highly influential).

4. A separate but related factor was the rise in the late 1970s of anti-Americanism in Western Europe, stimulated by comments by leaders of the latter eg Schmidt and Giscard; and by wider US-European disputes eg over economic issues and the Middle East. Lack of confidence in the US leadership was accompanied by growing fears that any nuclear conflict would be limited to Europe and would leave the super-powers untouched.



These fears thus led to the coupling argument for basing US INF on European soil being turned on its head.

Anti-US sentiment allowed the Russians to make some play with the unfounded claim that new US missiles were being forced on unwilling Europeans. National (UK and French) deterrents posed fewer of the political problems which new US missiles for Europe presented.

5. Other general factors contributing to this antagonism have been:

(a) the length of the recession. In the 1970s defence spending rose in Western Europe in real terms by 2.7% per year. But by the end of the decade the European record had started to slip; tougher questions were being asked about defence spending, as new generations of weapons (eg Trident) became available;

(b) the knock-on effect of the greater readiness of European governments to debate nuclear strategy with Washington, and the demands for increased consultations. No longer do the Americans have a relatively free hand (nor do they wish one) in proposing and implementing the nuclear policies of the Alliance;

(c) the rise of ecology, anti-civil nuclear energy and feminist movements, providing an early base for anti-nuclear weapon activity. These efforts were assisted by the streak of pacifism in some parts of



Europe. Coupled with these social trends is the problem of the "successor generation" in the West: a disproportionately large element of the "peace movement" is composed of the better educated under 35's;

(d) the Soviet Union was able to exploit public anxieties with its own propaganda, although its impact even on the peace movements should not be over-stated;

(e) the sentiment, not confined to the political left, that despite its record the Soviet Union no longer presented a real political or military threat to Western Europe.

(f) the effect on European opinion of third world attitudes, generally hostile to the East-West balance of terror and particularly opposed to the continued presence of nuclear weapons. The ability of the developing countries to project their own views into the European debate, while having no discernible impact at all in Moscow, is of course a reflection on the relative openness and receptivity of all three political systems.

### III.

#### Differences

6. In general terms, there is a different social/political ethic in Europe as one moves South. The Northern countries tend to be more prosperous, literate, articulate and politically aware, with highly developed



social and political systems. In contrast, the Southern countries are poor and relatively undeveloped. The average Dane has the time, opportunity and inclination to reflect on nuclear issues; the average Sicilian does not. But why the specific differences in attitudes eg between France and the FRG? To a large extent these result from responses within individual countries to the general factors discussed earlier. Local circumstances are also important; these are discussed in the Annex. The present Government in Greece is a law unto itself. Largely for this reason public opinion there is subject to different influences, and does not fit neatly into a relatively simple analysis of European attitudes. (Differences in the West are mirrored to a lesser degree in the countries of Eastern Europe. There may be new opportunities in this context for developing our policy of differentiating between members of the Warsaw Pact; these go beyond the scope of the present paper.)

7. Four particular elements can be identified as reasons for the differences:

(i) political changes. In the North, between 1979 and 1982 governments of the left (UK, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway and the FRG) lost power, and subsequently adopted positions often rather different to those they had supported in government. In contrast, over this



period left-wing parties in France and Italy moved into power or at least association with the government. These political shifts gave political respectability and an organised base for anti-nuclear activity in the North to what before had been fringe groups. Recent figures estimate that of the anti-nuclear demonstrators 50% in the FRG adhered to the SPD and 50% to the Greens, 90% in Italy and Holland came from the left wing, and most of those in the UK did the same;

(ii) the contrary effects of anti-American feeling in each country. In the UK latent anti-Americanism has made the Government's policy less readily acceptable. The same feeling in France, because of different circumstances, has had nothing like the same impact. In the FRG, traditionally close ties to the US have not prevented anti-American elements having a disproportionately large influence. In Italy similar links have withstood the strain remarkably well;

(iii) the influence of the churches, with a particularly clear division between Catholic and Protestant feeling. It has been argued that Catholics tend to be more sceptical and/or fatalistic about the prospects of a nuclear conflict ever happening, and less concerned about their own eventual fate. In any case, there could be said to be a greater deference in Southern Europe -



whether based on religious learnings or levels of education - towards established authorities over complex issues, such as nuclear strategy;

(iv) the relative influence of ecology and other radical movements, especially in the FRG (the Greens). Such movements have had little support in France.

#### IV.

##### Lessons Learned

8. The key factors in European countries are not easily susceptible to external pressures. Social differences are largely ingrained. And domestic political shifts respond mainly to internal factors. To that extent, the lessons to be learned - for the handling of public opinion in Western Europe, and for relations with Washington - are more applicable to general trends, rather than specific differences.

9. The first lesson is that a strong and united Alliance, despite its domestic political problems and internal disputes in other areas, can succeed in carrying its point with the electorate. This has been done at a certain cost in the case of INF, with other foreign and defence policies having to be adjusted at times to take account of this overriding concern. But the extent of the Western political success, and Soviet failure, should not be overlooked. It will be essential to continue to



demonstrate to the Russians our determination to maintain a credible defence capability, and our solidarity in doing so. For this, the example of the admirable consultation over INF should be expanded to cover other areas of Alliance activity.

10. There is an evident need for a more educated public opinion in matters of defence. Well organised minorities in the "peace movements", despite the fallacies in their arguments and their misrepresentation of facts, have been able to exploit public ignorance (or unwillingness to learn). Lack of Government information and public debate in the 1960's and 1970's have contributed to the misperceptions and permitted mis-statements. In the words of Lord Carrington in 1981, a nuclear war that does not happen is preferable to a conventional war that does. But until the concept of extended deterrence is better understood, the arguments in favour of nuclear weapons will not carry their full weight.

11. We should trade more on the strong and widespread ~~and~~ support for membership of NATO, and for multilateral (as opposed to one-sided) disarmament. A different approach would be to adopt a more "national" attitude towards defence, which by implication would be less US-oriented or NATO-linked. France is the prime example



of where this attitude has retained public support. But France is not an INF-basing country; nor is she intergrated into the NATO military structure. It would be a cause for concern if other countries, such as the Greeks and particularly the FRG, began to move down this track. Instead, we should aim to emphasise to European public opinion that the commitment to NATO is not made out of some sense of altruism, but because we and our Allies believe that collective defence is the best way to ensure our own security.

12. This is not the time or place for a post-mortem on the INF dual-track approach. However, since the deployment element has become the focus of public opposition to nuclear weapons, three points may be relevant. In practical terms it was probably a mistake to site some of the new INF systems close to highly populated areas, and easily accessible to minority pressure groups (compare events at Comiso with those at Greenham Common). Land-based systems, on which the Germans at one time insisted, provided more hostages to fortune than other, admittedly less desirable options. The rationale for choosing Pershing 2's and GLCMs had perhaps as much to do with Pentagon politics as with strategic theory. Secondly, the negotiating strategy gave the Russians and anti-nuclear sentiment in the West



four years on which to build and a precise target at which to aim.

13. In addition, the original rationale for deployment was to strengthen the coupling link between US nuclear forces for the defence of Western Europe, and thus to enhance the credibility of the deterrent effect. But the negotiating strategy, on which the Germans in particular insisted, concentrated public attention on reductions as the prime aim. In the process, and especially with the adoption of the zero option, the coupling factor tended to be downplayed. The establishment of parity, at least in Europe, as the Western negotiating objective implicitly endorsed a Eurostrategic balance as acceptable, adding to the decoupling effect. This made it more difficult for governments to explain why a Soviet continuing monopoly in medium-range missiles was unacceptable, and to combat Soviet demands for account to be taken of British and French systems. More important, it failed to respond to the underlying European concern about the US commitment to their defence. The seminal comments in Schmidt's Alistair Buchan lecture in 1977 reflected his growing concern about the reliability of the US theatre nuclear umbrella and the imbalance in conventional forces at a time when parity in strategic forces had been achieved;



the increasing threat from the SS20 (which he did not mention) was only one element in this concern. Arguably, more emphasis on the coupling factor could have persuaded the Germans, increasingly nervous about their American defenders, to take the more relaxed view of the French and the Italians who for different reasons were less concerned about the US link.

14. But these theoretical considerations must be weighed against the immediate political arguments for a different course. The focus on the SS20 was needed for public consumption, to underline the continuing Soviet threat. The focus on reductions was needed to assuage those against deployment. And the zero option, despite its many flaws, was embraced by a German government desperate to find any arms control gesture by the US acceptable to their public opinion. Up to now, the anti-INF movement has not been able to divert Western governments from their chosen path. The argument for deployment has so far carried the day, largely because it is being conducted in terms of Alliance unity and determination, not NATO's nuclear doctrine.

15. As for relations with Washington, the first lesson is that the Europeans should do more to persuade the Americans of the merits of consistency (or Schmidt's "predictability") in their policies. The periodic bouts



of chest-thumping and radical changes of directions may satisfy domestic/emotional pressures, but they do real damage to the Alliance. However, just as domestic politics in each European country are not very susceptible to external pressure, so Washington will remain, to some degree and in some circumstances, unresponsive to the views of the Allies. But it is striking that the latter still maintain the influence they do with US leaders (Administration and Congress), at least where Alliance issues are concerned.

16. In addition, the INF saga demonstrates the same moral as the Siberian pipeline episode: that if we are to keep the Americans on track, we must inject our thinking, on presentation as well as substance, at all levels (including the Congress); that dealing with the State Department is no substitute for more widespread exchanges; and that views delivered early carry twice the weight of those that come later. These points are relevant to the 1984 Presidential campaign; a Democratic President might present us with new defence problems, albeit of a different nature.

17. Events of the past few years have also emphasised the need to maintain European confidence in US leadership and trust in US judgement. The prime contribution to this would be a demonstrated US readiness to re-engage in



a political dialogue with the Soviet Union, a readiness which could be best demonstrated in the form of a Summit (however unlikely this will be over the next year). But without a basic harmony between US and European governments the trust of European publics may increasingly be placed in national leaderships, as in the case of France. Demands for dual key arrangements are of course relevant to this point. National control provides some protection to governments against opposition based on genuine uncertainty about US intentions or straight anti-Americanism.

18. Mr Denis Healey used to say that 95 per cent of NATO's defence capability was to reassure the Europeans, and 5 per cent to deter the Russians. A prime requirement is to recreate in Western Europe that sense of reassurance about defence policy that the combination of rhetoric and misjudgement from Washington and opposition policies in Europe have disturbed. European governments will have to focus more directly on ways to improve the climate of East-West relations and to raise the nuclear threshold, which more than anything will provide the new reassurance.

19. Success in arms control will be an important element in restoring a more balanced public attitude towards nuclear weapons. On the other hand, such success



will continue to be elusive, at least until such time as the Russians are prepared to negotiate seriously in any one of the five or six areas in which they are now engaged. Arms control is caught in a vicious cricle: its promotion requires a better East-West climate; but it is one of the prime elements that should contribute to such an improvement. A further deterioration in East-West relations could not be offset by new success in arms control, which itself requires a restoration in the former dialogue between the superpowers.

20. Meanwhile, it will be important that we <sup>be</sup> seen to be making the effort, even if the results are fewer and slower than we would wish. The prime requirement is to prevent the public perception gaining ground that the arms race, once controlled by agreements with the Russians, is now running out of control. In this context, new US moves to develop military capabilities in space could have a damaging effect on European opinion. The merits of some form of arms control in this area require closer and more sympathetic examination if both strategic and political needs on the Western side are to be met.

6 December 1983

Foreign and Commonwealth Office



ANNEX

EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: SPECIFIC FACTORS

United Kingdom

1. The latest demonstration (22 October) involved over 100,000 people; CND membership has increased in 4 years from 3,000 to 70,000. These numbers are still relatively small in relation to the size of population.

2. Particular reasons for anti-nuclear sentiment are:

(i) the Labour Party move to unilateral disarmament in 1981;

(ii) the influence of some Protestant denominations.

The Anglican and Catholic churches in England and Wales remain in favour of deterrence and multilateral disarmament;

(iii) latent anti-Americanism, stimulated by the performances of Carter and Reagan; and

(iv) isolationist tendencies (Mr Enoch Powell etc) and uncomfortable links with Europe (EEC, but not NATO).

These stem in part from a failure to recognise that a medium-size power cannot continue to have permanent interests without having permanent friends.

FRG

3. Recent demonstrations have involved a total of some



half-a-million people but no single event has produced the same numbers as similar events in 1981 or 1982.

4. Specific factors relevant to the FRG are:

(i) the trauma of National Socialism and its legacy. This continues to exercise a powerful influence on West Germans, including the young. They are determined that German territory should never again become a battle-ground and they see the international community moving towards this fate, spurred by the rhetoric in East and West and the increasing pace of the arms race;

(ii) the belated recognition that the shift to a strategy of flexible response implies a greater risk of conflict, both conventional and nuclear, on German soil, coupled with the appreciation that the geographical position of the FRG and its strategic importance will always put it in the forefront of any battle. Public opinion was deeply affected when US readiness, implicit in NATO's long-established doctrine, to contemplate a limited nuclear war (in Germany, presumably) was made more explicit;

(iii) the decline in East-West relations. This affects the Germans more than any other member of NATO, in terms of the inner-German dialogue and their extensive links with and interests in Warsaw Pact countries;

(iv) the move into opposition of the SPD and the rise of



the Greens;

(v) renascent nationalist feeling, with the traditional deference to American leadership becoming harder to sustain, under pressure of declining confidence in US judgement and the influence of German economic interests.

France

5. Opposition in France has been declining and is now scarce. On 22 October only some 30,000 people went into the Paris streets to demonstrate.

6. Factors of particular importance are:

(i) the national French deterrent, dependent on no other nation for development, manufacture, control and targetting. There is no shortage of anti-Americanism in France but, unlike the UK and the FRG, it does not spill over into the nuclear debate. In addition, France is not an INF-basing country;

(ii) the entry to power of the left wing in 1981;

(iii) the major peace movement is organised by and equated with the pro-Moscow Communist party, a declining though still significant force in French politics (which supports the national deterrent);

(iv) the small ecology movement does not carry much political weight;

(v) the tradition of Gaullist patriotism remains



strong, and although anti-American, pro-nuclear;

(vi) the Catholic Church, and the Catholic mentality remain powerful influences on French psychology, despite the anti-clerical traditions;

(vii) the French dialogue with the East has continued throughout the lean years as detente collapsed. There is consequently less fear in France or less public perception that the decline in US-Soviet relations will have a direct effect on their own fate;

(viii) France's independent defence posture allows her a greater degree of freedom to take initiatives in arms control than is given to other members of the Alliance.

(The last two such initiatives were Giscard's CDE proposal in 1978, and Mitterand's conditional espousal in 1983 of a five-nation nuclear conference.) This in turn provides public opinion with the impression of greater control over their own destiny in the East-West struggle. The actual significance of the initiatives should not however be over-estimated.

#### Italy

7. The latest demonstration involved an unexpectedly large total of some 300,000. But this is not representative of Italian opinion, which remains less concerned about INF deployment and about nuclear weapons more generally than its Northern partners.



8. Italian attitudes can be explained in terms of:
- (i) the association of the Socialist left with the government in a number of areas including INF basing;
  - (ii) the reluctance of the Communist party, for electoral reasons, to exploit its full potential for opposition;
  - (iii) the lack of official Catholic Church support for the peace movement;
  - (iv) the relatively recent formation of the peace movement in its current form, dating from the decision to station Cruise missiles on Italian soil;
  - (v) the remoteness of the basing area from the centre, combined with local interest in jobs and construction contracts; and
  - (vi) the "historical cynicism" of the Italians towards the espousal of such causes as "peace", ecology, animal rights etc.

Holland

9. A hot bed of anti-nuclear sentiment, the 22 October demonstration put 400,000 people on the streets.
10. Opposition to nuclear weapons spreads across the political spectrum with considerable right-wing (CDA) opposition to INF deployment. Even if the left were not now in opposition, it is doubtful whether the political process in the Netherlands at present could produce



unequivocal and explicit support for NATO's nuclear doctrines. The churches, including the Catholic Church, continue to exercise a strong anti-nuclear influence.

#### Belgium

11. The latest events involved some 120,000 people.

12. Belgium is a classic case of a public uneducated in defence matters; the lack of a firm government, with the left in opposition; and widespread concern about the decline in East-West relations and the absence of a dialogue with the Soviet Union.

#### Denmark

13. A weak centre-right coalition government without a majority on security issues faces increasing anti-nuclear sentiment from the Social Democrats and the left.

Denmark, like Norway, has never permitted the stationing of nuclear weapons on her soil in peacetime. Although there is good public support for NATO membership, Danish public opinion, which reflects traditional Nordic attitudes of isolationism and neutralism, has never given defence spending a high priority especially in competition with social welfare requirements.

#### Norway

14. The Conservative Government which took office in 1981 (a Conservative/centre coalition since 1983) has maintained strong Norwegian support for NATO membership



and taken a robust line on nuclear issues. But this has been at the expense of the breakdown of the historic consensus on security issues in Norwegian politics, with the moderate opposition Labour Party now openly against the Alliance nuclear strategy and the growth of a considerable anti-nuclear movement. Soviet actions, eg in Afghanistan and submarine incidents in Northern waters have been a partial check to this. But Norwegian opinion also reacts unfavourably to American policy and the highly articulate views of the more anti-nuclear Sweden and Finland re-enforce this trend.

#### Greece

15. In contrast to the rest of Europe, where peace movements and anti-nuclear forces still reflect minority views, in Greece the Papandreou government "embraces" the peace movements (as he claimed recently to the Times). The Prime Minister espouses a nuclear freeze, a delay in INF deployments, and the creation of a nuclear free zone in the Balkans; he would prefer a Europe free of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact (but recognises that Greece's security needs require membership of NATO, not least because Turkey is a member). In all those respects, the Greek Government is unique in Western Europe; and anti-nuclear opinion, far from having to oppose Government policy, has a free run with Government backing.



16. Among the factors responsible for the Government's position are:

(i) widely-based anti-US sentiment, based on the belief that the US was in some measure responsible for the dictatorship of the Colonels and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. The Greeks believe the US takes the Turkish side in Greco-Turkish dispute. An anti-American stance also fits well with Papandreou's desire to present an independent, 'multi-dimensional' foreign policy (although this has not prevented the signing of an agreement for the continuation of the US bases in Greece for at least another five years);

(ii) the belief in Athens that Greek interests are not threatened from the Soviet Union but from their Eastern neighbours. To some extent, therefore, Greece is subject to the same influences as other European countries: anti-US feeling and "Southern" readiness to defer in complex issues to the Government's view. But, to a larger extent, it does not fit neatly into any analysis covering the rest of Europe.

#### Spain

17. There is little government backing for peace movements, which are widely perceived as Communist-inspired. However, there is strong anti-nuclear feeling, where the government is pledged not to allow the



stationing of nuclear weapons on Spanish soil. While the Socialist Government is committed to reconsider Spain's position in NATO, which is opposed by between 60-80 per cent of Spaniards, they are firmly committed to support Western defence. They have confirmed the renewal of a bases agreement with the US.






REC-10 DEC 1983



MF

45



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000  
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

MO 22/7(A)

5th December 1983

*Dear George*

"THE DAY AFTER".

I have now had an opportunity to see the film "The Day After". In my view its content and political direction provide an unbalanced portrayal of the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence. Nuclear deterrence is designed to prevent - and in fact has prevented for 40 years - events of the kind depicted in the film from ever happening in Europe.

I understand that Yorkshire Television have offered me the chance to take part in a discussion before an invited audience after the film. Those taking part will no doubt represent the spectrum of opinion on the issues raised in the film; and discussion of this sort will not balance the viewpoint of the film itself. I should therefore be grateful for your agreement that I should be given an opportunity to be interviewed immediately after the film has been shown next Saturday evening to present the Government's case and to provide a proper balance on this important issue.

*yes Sir*

Michael Heseltine

Lord Thomson of Monifieth KT PC





INDEPENDENT BROADCASTING AUTHORITY

70 Brompton Road London SW3 1EY Tel: 01-584 7011 Telex: 24345

47.

THE RT. HON. THE LORD THOMSON OF MONIFIETH, K.T.  
Chairman

7th December 1983

22/7(A)

Dear Michael,

45

Thank you for your letter of 5th December about the discussion programme to follow the transmission of "The Day After" on Saturday, 10th December.

I can assure you that I and my IBA colleagues are wholly committed to seeing that the treatment of discussion on nuclear strategy is conducted on a properly impartial basis, in accordance with the general rules of public broadcasting.

Yorkshire Television's invitation to you to take part in Saturday's programme was extended to you through your Department's officials last Wednesday, 30th November. I am sorry if there has been any misunderstanding. It was always Yorkshire's intention that you should be given the first opportunity to contribute immediately following "The Day After" and they propose a separate interview with you to be conducted by Robert Kee. This could be done either in Leeds or in another studio and would then be followed by a general studio discussion in which Yorkshire would hope you might play a part. You may on the other hand wish simply to be interviewed and then leave the studio. If so, there would be no suggestion that you had then abandoned the discussion.

Amongst other contributors who have been invited are Denis Healey, Robert MacNamara, General Rogers and Joan Ruddock.

...../Continued



I believe that Yorkshire Television's proposals will meet the IBA's requirements for due impartiality and also meet your own concerns that the Government's case should be fully presented.

Yours sincerely,  
Pearce.

The Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine, MP,  
Secretary of State for Defence,  
Ministry of Defence,  
Whitehall,  
London,  
SW1A 2HB.



910  
Copy to:

PS/Prime Minister  
PS/Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary



30/12

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000  
DIRECT DIALING 01-218 2111/3

MO 18/1/2

2nd December 1983

*Dr Morgan*

*H*  
*6/12*

Thank you for your letter of 24th November enclosing your policy statement "On Making Peace in a Nuclear World". *will request is required.*

I do not propose to comment on your statement. I should be happy to meet a small delegation from the British Council of Churches as soon as this can be arranged. Perhaps you could get in touch with my office about the timing of this meeting.


*Yours*  
*Michael Heseltine*

Michael Heseltine

The Reverend Dr Philip Morgan



= 5 DEC 1983





010  
F E R ~~Butler~~ Esq

Note for this file:



CABINET OFFICE

I told Sir R. Armstrong that I had not consulted the PM but agreed with his line. He later telephoned to say that he and Zuckerman had agreed not to take part.

With the compliments of  
Sir Robert Armstrong GCB, CVO  
*Secretary of the Cabinet  
and Permanent Secretary to the  
Management and Personnel Office*

FERB

20.5.

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS

Telephone: 01-233 8319



CONFIDENTIAL



70 WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AS

01-233 8319

*From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Permanent Secretary to the Management and Personnel Office*

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO

Ref.A083/1444

20 May 1983

Solly Zuckerman has been asked to contribute, as one of three "multilateralists" to a television discussion on the nuclear debate, to be screened during the Election campaign. The other two "multilateralists" would be Michael Howard and Neil Cameron. One of the "unilateralists" would be Jonathan Dimbleby. It would be a discussion only in so far as there would be one contribution from each side on three successive days; there would be some kind of summing up at the end of it.

Solly is still on the books of the Cabinet Office as a part-time scientific adviser. I have told him that, if he were a full-time adviser, I should instruct him to take no part in this debate. As a part-time adviser he is in a different position, and of course he has gone public with his views on nuclear issues on a number of occasions. They do not wholly coincide with Government policy. I have therefore advised him that he should not take part in this televised discussion, for fear that something he said could be taken up, possibly out of context, in the wider political debate and used to the embarrassment of the Government as a quotation from "one of the Government's own advisers".

Solly is clearly reluctant to take this advice, and has asked me to reconsider it, on the basis that what he would say would be wholly in accordance with Government policy and might have been written within Whitehall. He has sent me his draft of what he proposed to say; I attach a copy herewith.

Having read it, I feel inclined to say to Solly that it does not alter my advice: that whether or not the script is wholly consistent with Government policy (I doubt whether it is in fact), it would (given what is known of his views) certainly be combed for quotations which could be used to embarrass the Government, and that

/ it remains

C A Whitmore Esq CVO

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

it remains my view that he would be better advised, from the point of view of his relations with the Government and his position as a part-time adviser to withdraw from the discussion.

I think he will take the advice, but in talking to the producers he will certainly blame the Cabinet Office, and they may make some use of the allegation that he has been suppressed by the Government. I propose therefore to say that, as he is only a part-time adviser, I cannot instruct him, I can only advise him; and that my advice is irrespective of the content and based on the fact that as a part-time Government adviser he would do better not to get involved in matters of political controversy during an Election campaign.

I should be glad to know whether you, Sir Antony Acland and Robin Butler to whom I am sending copies of this letter and Solly's draft speech, agree. A word on the telephone during the course of the day would suffice; I ought to ring him before close of play on Friday 20 May.

**ROBERT ARMSTRONG**

CONFIDENTIAL



(17.5.83)

Channel Four

It has taken an awful long time for the nuclear debate to open up ~~in the way it has~~ - and in a way I am glad it has - but I now see a danger that the central issues could become obscured in tussles between those who argue for CND, or for unilateral, or for multilateral nuclear disarmament, or for or against cruise. I say this as one who has been professionally involved in the nuclear problem for well over twenty-five years.

In so far as I understand it, when the CND movement started in the 1950s, people knew that the build-up of nuclear armaments spelt danger, but were more worried ~~that~~ radioactive fall-out from the testing of nuclear warheads, ~~went~~ <sup>about the</sup> a real hazards to health ~~of~~ - particularly <sup>the risks</sup> to infants. The fall-out problem was, to a large extent, solved by the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

Today, it is the possibility of nuclear war that is causing concern, with the overriding <sup>fear</sup> ~~concern~~ that the uninterrupted build-up of nuclear armaments means that such a war could destroy the Western world. It is <sup>highly regrettable</sup> ~~regrettable~~ that the issue of survival has now become polarised in arguments between unilateralists and multilateralists, when both sides have the same objective in mind -- to curb the nuclear arms race, to reduce the size of nuclear armouries, and to prevent any kind of nuclear war from ever happening.



The real problem today is not whether the number of Soviet SS20s matches that of American cruise and Pershing II missiles but, as Lord Carrington said not so long ago in a magnificent speech, in the fact that "the West will make a major mistake if it reduces East/West diplomacy to nothing but nuclear accountancy".

We are surely going to confuse the problem if today's arguments therefore just focus on the numbers and deployment of different weapon systems, be they Soviet or Western, be they SS4s, SS5s, SS20s, or cruise, Pershing II, Polaris or Trident -- not that these things aren't the major symbols of public concern today.

Let me start with a word about that problem. People began worrying acutely about what is in the nuclear arsenals of the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers as a result of a speech given six years ago by Helmut Schmidt, then Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. That was in 1977, at a time when the Americans and Russians were trying to arrange a bilateral treaty to limit the multiplication of their so-called strategic weapons.

Schmidt was concerned lest a deal between the two superpowers, which would seemingly lessen the direct threat which both ~~countries~~ faced, might reduce American interest in the defence of Western Europe. He knew that many people believed that some Americans wouldn't mind if a war erupted on European soil, even if that war became nuclear, provided that America wasn't hit. As a token of assurance, he therefore asked the Americans whether it would not help if they deployed in Europe an additional nuclear weapon system - specifically mentioning the neutron bomb. The



Americans said, fine, if you need any additional assurance about our commitment to your defence, you can have it. But as soon as what was afoot came out into the open, the public reacted in hostile fashion in almost every European country ~~that belonged to~~<sup>9</sup> the Western alliance.

The idea of a neutron bomb was dropped. In its place the Americans offered to deploy cruise missiles and the new medium-range Pershing II ballistic missile, these being regarded as 'theatre' weapons, that is to say, they were American weapons which might be used in Europe if war ever broke out. The European NATO countries agreed only on condition that the two superpowers sat down in Geneva to consider how the nuclear threat to Europe could be reduced.

This led to President Reagan's 'zero option' proposal, a proposal which meant that the United States would not deploy any of its new weapons in Europe if the Russians dismantled all their SS20s which were targeted against European objectives. This proposal the Russians rejected, and they have gone on rejecting it. They regard it as a highly unfair gambit in the numbers game, since they would continue to be faced not only by the nuclear systems directly under NATO control - which include our own Polaris force and also the Polaris missiles that could be launched from American submarines - but also by the French nuclear armoury which is not under NATO control.

That, for all practical purposes, is where the argument stands today.

The French can quite legitimately protest that the argument



is not theirs. They are not part of NATO; they are not negotiating with the Russians. We haven't quite the same justification. I say "we haven't quite the same justification" because a condition of the Nassau agreement of 1962 which allowed us to buy Polaris missiles from the Americans was that they should come under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, with the proviso that they could be withdrawn from his control only in conditions of 'extreme national emergency', conditions which of course it is impossible to define. Anyhow, the Russians have given every indication that they are unprepared to exclude from the nuclear accountancy of launchers or warheads any which might be launched against them given an European conflict. Let us be honest. I doubt very much if the Americans or ourselves would be ready to exclude from such an exercise, say Polish or East German or Czech warheads if these countries had them and they were targeted against us.

Helmut Schmidt is clearly taken aback by all that has happened. In February of this year he wrote that his hope now is that "those who bear the responsibility in Moscow and Washington, having wasted too much time already, will finally discern the whole instead of the parts, so that they can break through prefabricated ideologies" and get on with the business of safeguarding peace. More recently he has said that while keeping up Western military strength, we should seek cooperation and detente with the Soviet Union. Yet, he writes, the hoped-for cooperation "has become a dirty word". Like Lord Carrington, he sees little hope for the future if whatever the differences in our political philosophies, the countries of the Western alliance and



those of the Warsaw Pact do not find a way of living in peace.

My own view is that the new weapon systems we are arguing about pose no novel threat either to the USSR or to Western Europe, or indeed to the USA, except in so far as they increase the chances of war by accident. There are already thousands of nuclear warheads on both sides of the iron curtain, all pre-targeted on cities or airfields or harbours. The deployment of SS20s does not constitute a new threat to London or to Birmingham or to Liverpool, to Paris or to Brussels, to Copenhagen or to Oslo. They, and all corresponding Soviet targets, are already in the computer programmes of hundreds, of thousands, of ~~missiles~~ <sup>launchers</sup>.

For SS20s and cruise and Pershings are not weapons which can be used like conventional artillery or bombs against targets of opportunity - for example, bridges, ammunition dumps, and railway centres. If they were ever directed at the other side's targets in a 'theatre of war', each of their warheads in a flash would cause as much destruction as the cumulative total which resulted from weeks of strategic bombing in the second world war. They simply cannot be treated as weapons whose effects could be controlled by generals or air marshals.

And that also goes for the so-called 'battlefield' or 'tactical' nuclear weapons which are deployed by the NATO forces, or which the Russians could bring up were war to break out in Europe. Some of these so-called 'tactical' weapons have a yield of a megaton or more, yields which imply the total destruction of a big city and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. The shorter-range battlefield weapons, which were deployed by the



military without any idea of how they could ever be used in a controlled way, were designed by specialists simply because of their destructive power. When I became Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence way back in 1960, I carried out a number of war games, all of which showed that were the other side to start a nuclear exchange, <sup>and we replied in kind</sup> chaos would immediately result. I was officially encouraged to publish the conclusions of these studies. I questioned the deployment of such weapons, arguing that while their existence could deter hostile action, they ~~use~~ <sup>cannot</sup> defend in war. ~~use~~.

Since then any number of war games and exercises have confirmed this conclusion. What is more, military leaders on both sides have become quite frank about the whole subject. They know that they couldn't control a war in which nuclear weapons were used. The present Supreme Allied Commander has recently admitted that "you don't have a defence against nuclear weapons used against you". Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Lewin, who was Chief of our Defence Staff at the time of the Falklands war, doesn't know - and I quote him - that any one of his fellow commanders in NATO believes that a nuclear war can be fought and won.

The Soviet and American military leaders also know that once nuclear weapons started to fly, the exchange would escalate to all-out nuclear war, with the virtual destruction of Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States. In short, nuclear weapons have no military utility as weapons of war.

But that realisation has neither stopped their further development nor their deployment. In consequence, it is just



conceivable that they might be used either by NATO or the Warsaw Pact, or both, regardless of the mutual disaster that would result; of the fact that the end would be mutual suicide, or that their use would be an act of posthumous revenge by the side that had suffered the first nuclear blow.

The doctrinal notion that they might be used by the NATO Command in an act of despair or as a last resort in a policy of so-called flexible response does not alter the facts. Such words are a mere parrot-cry made by NATO military commanders who, when they are posted to the High Command, find themselves the inheritors of what is little more than a slogan.

Mutual national hara-kiri is not a sensible objective for the professional military man.

Battlefield or tactical or theatre nuclear weapons ~~are simply~~ <sup>not</sup> ~~part of a spectrum of deterrence.~~ None will help solved political differences or disputes between the nuclear powers, or help one or other side gain an advantage. Their existence is a deterrent against the possibility that either side would threaten war or resort to war. This might happen if one or other threw down its nuclear arms - which is why I find the argument for unilateral disarmament so impossible to follow. Nuclear blackmail could indeed become an instrument of political blackmail.

But in saying this I realise that the situation is not the same in all countries, nuclear or non-nuclear. While I pray that sanity about the actual use of nuclear weapons will prevail between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, I'm not so optimistic when I think about what could happen - indeed would be likely to



happen - if certain other countries I can think of were to get even a small nuclear armoury. I am utterly convinced that every effort must continue to be made to prevent any further nuclear proliferation.

The fact that I am convinced that unilateral disarmament for NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be politically dangerous in the world as it is, in no way affects another conviction of mine *and one which is an objective government policy*, namely that the nuclear arms race must be stopped. The nuclear armouries of the major powers are already far too big to make political sense. Nor are tactical and so-called European theatre weapons necessary bands in what is called the spectrum of deterrence. It is a clear mark of their lack of military utility that so many of our top military authorities [say they] are prepared to reduce their number, or to get rid of them altogether. And far from being a necessary band in the spectrum of deterrence, the chances are overwhelming that tactical nuclear weapons, if ever used, would trigger all-out nuclear war.

Whoever said that suicide was an act of defence ?

Don't therefore let us focus too much on those single weapon systems which now attract the limelight. Both sides already have too many warheads for the maintenance of mutual deterrence -- kiloton warheads which would totally wipe out a village or a small town, megaton weapons which in a flash would turn a city like London into burning radioactive rubble in which the bodies of hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded would add fuel to the flames.

But if I am opposed to the idea of unilateral disarmament,



that does not mean that in my view both the United States and the USSR could not start reducing the size of their nuclear arsenals unilaterally without any detriment whatever to their national security. They could halve them, reduce them to, say, a quarter of their present size, without eroding the assurance they now have of an ability to retaliate if the other side ever used any of its own weapons. That was the situation at the time of the Cuban crisis of 1962, and it is no different now that both sides have added thousands of new warheads - and several new weapons systems. There is no conceivable defence against an onslaught of nuclear warheads which could ever provide the political leaders of either side with the assurance that at least one in ten <sup>nuclear strikes</sup> would not ~~get through~~ <sup>succeed</sup>. And one in ten would be more than enough to cause what is euphemistically called 'unacceptable damage'.

This piece of jargon came into the nuclear vocabulary in the early 1960s, when Robert McNamara, then the US Secretary for Defence, tried to halt the multiplication of American nuclear arms. At that time <sup>what</sup> the Americans <sup>were developing would have been enough</sup> ~~had it in their power~~ to kill outright a quarter of the Soviet population and to destroy half of its industrial capacity. That was the arbitrary standard of assured destruction that was then set. <sup>And since there were no secrets about the matter, no doubt the Russians were getting ready to do the same</sup> ~~was~~ If a hundred megaton warheads were launched at this country, and only ten got through, we would be finished; ten major cities in ruins and millions dead. And that goes for the USSR and the USA too. And remember, the use of any one nuclear weapon could trigger the lot, and technically there is no conceivable practicable defence against nuclear weapons.



Curbing the nuclear arms race is an absolutely prime necessity. The race goes on because there is an inner momentum in the modern world of technology to improve what already exists. It goes on because of inter-Service rivalry within countries. And it goes on because each side, being suspicious of the other's purposes, fear that it is secretly adding to its assumed military power. In my view, there may be point in a hostile and divided world for an arms race in conventional weapons. But there is absolutely none in a nuclear race between powers which already have more than is needed to maintain a state of deterrence. What is the point of a race to build new weapons when even a few would mean suicide for whichever side struck first ?

There is no meaning any longer in the idea of either West or East achieving nuclear superiority except in the ~~meaningless~~ <sup>futile</sup> exercise of nuclear accountancy - a nice term. Curbing the nuclear arms race does not mean unilateral disarmament. There is no finishing post to a nuclear arms race. The cost of either side trying to disarm the other in a first strike by force of nuclear arms would inevitably be suicide. But with the hostility that now prevails between East and West, I should be fearful if the present dangerous state of nuclear deterrence were exchanged for an equally dangerous one in which one side could apply nuclear blackmail to the other. The ideal now would be a steady reduction on both sides to the point where both have enough to provide them with the assurance that they could pose a retaliatory threat on each other, say to the level necessary to destroy utterly each side's ten major cities. Both sides could start destroying missile



systems and getting rid of nuclear warheads straight away - and that's not all too easy, - either unilaterally or bilaterally or mutually or multilaterally, call it what you will, without endangering their deterrent status.

One last word. Public pressure in the United States is at last making President Reagan more flexible. There is now talk in his circles of what they call a build-down of nuclear arms. Whatever ~~the supporters of the~~ <sup>he said</sup> may ~~say~~ about the supporters of CND, let us remind ourselves that the Catholic bishops of America who, after two years of close study, voted for a nuclear freeze, were not Soviet stooges. Nor is the Pope. Nor is the Archbishop of Canterbury. <sup>Nor is the American Congress,</sup> Nor is Cardinal Hume. Helmut Schmidt and Pierre Trudeau are not playing the Soviet game when they urge the President to be less strident and more constructive in his dealings with the Russians. ~~He should bow to the UK and find itself to the right of the present American line.~~ Do not let us be dupes of our own ignorance. <sup>In the end</sup> ~~For all~~, we all - Russians, Americans and Europeans - must learn to live together. The alternative is to die together.

It's not going to be easy to get agreement between the nuclear powers. Some twenty years ago, I had to negotiate on behalf of our Government a particular nuclear matter with the Russians, and had managed to get their agreement at the technical level as a preliminary to discussing the matter with our opposite numbers in America. At the end of our meeting, in a final toast, the leader of the Soviet team raised his glass and said, Remember that if you agree with us, the Americans won't (which is exactly



what happened). And if you agree with the Americans, we won't agree. And if we and the Americans agree, you won't.

If the Americans and the Russians can now agree in Geneva a cutback of any kind, I pray that in all our interests, we too shall agree.

Lord Zuckerman

May 1983



*Copy to Mr. John Miles*

*drawn attention to*

*7*

*e.g.*

*A. & C. 2/4*

*f.a.*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~4307822~~ 218 2111/3

MO 18/1/2

19th April 1983

*Dear Minister,*

NUCLEAR ISSUES

I enclose a note of the main points agreed at last Monday's meeting of the group.

Copies go to the Private Secretaries to the other Ministerial Members of the Group, and to Bernard Ingham (No 10) and Denis Brennen (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely  
Nick Evans*

(N H R EVANS)

A M Russell Esq



NUCLEAR POLICY AND PUBLIC OPINION: MINISTERIAL GROUP

1. At the meeting in the Ministry of Defence on 18 April, it was agreed that:-

- a. it would be unwise to take concerted central Government/local authority action to move against the Greenham Common peace camp. It would, however, be prudent for Mr Blaker to see Mr Gimblett and other local Conservatives to reassure them of the Government's understanding of their position.
- b. the Secretary of State would write to the General Secretary of the British Council of Churches, setting out the terms on which he would give evidence to them - and explaining why the format proposed for the May 23 hearing was unacceptable.
- c. Chapman Pincher's offer of help was, in general, to be welcomed. As a first step the Secretary of State would himself see Mr Pincher to discuss the options with him.
- d. It was worth proceeding with opinion poll questions of the kind proposed. The Secretary of State's office would explore the possibility of the Daily Mail funding the exercise; otherwise Conservative Central Office would undertake the task. When the answers were available, fresh consideration should be given to how they should be used; it might be advisable to avoid a "poll war" with CND.
- e. The Secretary of State would take the opportunity of his speech in Exeter on Saturday, 23 April to draw attention to CND's call for an attack on Conservative candidates in marginal constituencies. This initiative might usefully take the form



of an open letter to all such candidates.

f. Conservative Central Office, after discussion with the MOD, would proceed with the production of a pamphlet linking previous Labour Party advertisements on defence to the Labour party's current defence policy.

g. The opportunity should be taken of Chancellor Kohl's visit to the UK. at the end of the week to lay emphasis on the disarmament aspects of the NATO twin-track decision.



*Defence*

cc Mr Gow  
Mr Butler  
Mr Coles *WA 94.*  
Mr Shrimley, CCO

CANDIDATES' CONFERENCE

Mr Heseltine is thinking of dealing with the Defence/Disarmament and Cruise issues at the candidates' conference on Saturday and may make arrangements to get it fully covered to compete with a women's CND conference in Central Hall that day, to be attended, among others, by Julie Christie.

I mentioned at his meeting on Monday that the Prime Minister would be speaking the previous evening and was already thinking about what she might say, in view of election speculation.


It was agreed that it might be useful if the Prime Minister could get in a preemptive strike before the women's conference and MoD stand ready to help with copy. Although the conference is private I said consideration was being given to briefing about the Prime Minister's remarks.

Such briefing need not preclude a short, sharp press release on the disarmament issue.

I would recommend such a press release if it were to fit in with the Prime Minister's plans. Its release could be so arranged to catch the evening news bulletins as well as morning papers.

Consideration would of course have to be given as to whether a release on defence/disarmament at a candidates' conference would unduly project the issue into the election. But Mr Heseltine intends to deal with defence/disarmament substantively in any case.

Could I leave Mr Gow to pick this up in consultation with Private Office and MoD?



B. INGHAM

13 April 1983



R E S T R I C T E D

Mr Rickett



*Top Copy on PM Speeches,  
Disarmament Debate.*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

6 April 1983

DISARMAMENT DEBATE

As you know, there is to be a disarmament debate shortly after Parliament returns from the Easter Recess. The precise date is not yet fixed.

On the assumption that Mr. Foot opens for the Opposition, the Prime Minister is likely to open the debate for the Government. I should accordingly be grateful if you could let me have a draft opening speech, agreed with the Ministry of Defence, by close of play on Thursday, 13 April.

I have not yet been able to discuss with the Prime Minister the line she will wish to take in her speech. But I enclose as an annex to this letter an outline which I think she might be disposed to follow.

In the context of preparations for this speech, the Prime Minister would be grateful if Mr. Gilmour could give her another oral briefing to update her on nuclear issues. A convenient time would be 3 o'clock on Monday, 11 April.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



file

da

6 April 1983

Letters from the Public on Nuclear Disarmament

Thank you for your letter of 31 March enclosing an analysis of incoming letters from the public on nuclear disarmament. The Prime Minister read it with interest.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

JOHN COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



cc RS

2



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*ms*

31 March, 1983

Prime Minister

*This is quite interesting. I understand that letters received by the MOD reveal a similar pattern. A.D.C. 5/4*

*Your Hon.*

Letters from the Public on Nuclear Disarmament

The Department have recently prepared an analysis of incoming letters from the public in the last two months on nuclear disarmament.

You may find it of interest to have the enclosed brief summary.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

*Your own  
R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street





Letters from the Public on Nuclear Disarmament

1. In the period since 4 February Defence Department in the FCO have received 515 letters. This includes those addressed to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State and follow up letters addressed directly to this Department. The overall volume of letters is showing a downward trend. From the peak level of about 600 in January, it dropped to about 350 in February and the March total looks like being under the 300 mark.
2. The deployment of cruise missiles remains far and away the greatest area of public concern. Over 50% of the letters focussed primarily on the cruise issue, a large majority expressing opposition to the missiles being deployed. The objections tend to be based on one or more of the following beliefs: that cruise represent an escalation of the arms race; that they increase the risk of nuclear war; and that they make us more vulnerable to attack. The under-current of anti-Americanism still runs strong. The fact that we have joint political control over the use of the missiles has not been adequately grasped by the public or else is viewed with suspicion. The impression persists that Britain is acting as a sacrificial lamb for the Americans. 8% of the letters specifically raised the question of control over the missiles. The nuances of the dual physical key argument have yet to feature prominently in the public correspondence.
3. A high proportion (about 80%) of the anti-cruise letters complained that the missiles were being stationed here against the wishes of the British people. The fact that the decision to deploy cruise has been debated and approved by Parliament on several occasions appears not to be widely known: a point which should perhaps be borne in mind for future Ministerial speeches. A small but significant number of people call for a referendum on cruise deployment.
4. Calls on the Government to support a nuclear freeze have remained steady - about 8% of the correspondence. About 10% focus on the disarmament negotiations of which the major concerns have been that multilateralism does not work, or that Britain/NATO is being unreasonable in the negotiations. US personnel changes have not helped matters. We need to put over even more strongly (a) our commitment to arms control and (b) the merits of the Alliance's proposals over those of the Soviet Union.
5. Other small (1 - 2%) but significant topics of concern are the size of defence spending, the failure of NATO to give a declaration of 'no first use', the allegation that NATO's weapons (particularly cruise) are intended for first strike; criticism of the proposed Government 'anti-CND' advertising campaign and doubt about the reality of the Soviet threat. Trident has taken





very much a back seat - only about 1% have specifically talked about Trident and Polaris and a similar proportion have queried the exclusion of the British deterrent from the disarmament negotiations. Letters often start by stating opposition to cruise and Trident but then proceed to launch into arguments solely about cruise.

The remainder of the letters fall into a rather amorphous but nevertheless highly significant (about 15 - 20%) category of people who, without necessarily having a specific axe to grind, are nevertheless concerned about the arms race, and the fear of nuclear war. This category includes many letters from pensioners, children, mothers etc and remarks are frequently prefaced by a caveat such as 'I am not a communist/member of CND/unilateralist but ....'.

'Truth Game' attracted quite a response (though by no means the flood one might have expected). Parliamentary debates rarely attract much notice and Vice President Bush's visit prompted virtually no correspondence. There is little evidence of correspondence being directly inspired by CND propaganda with the notable exception of a particularly effective anti-cruise leafleting campaign in the Stevenage area.



SECRET



Prime Minister

A.J.C. 25.  
J

MO 14/3

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE DEFENCE SECRETARY  
AND DR MANFRED WOERNER IN VILAMOURA, PORTUGAL AT  
0900 A.M. ON WEDNESDAY 23RD MARCH 1983

Present:

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP  
Secretary of State for Defence

HE Dr Manfred Woerner  
Federal Minister of Defence

HE Sir John Graham Bt KCMG  
United Kingdom Permanent  
Representative on the  
North Atlantic Council

HE Dr Hans-George Wieck  
Ambassador, Permanent  
Representative to NATO

Mr J N Blelloch  
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy  
and Programmes

Dr Hans Ruehle  
Chief Planning Staff

Mr R C Mottram  
Private Secretary to the  
Secretary of State for Defence

Major General Peter Tandecki  
Assistant Chief of Staff for  
Politico-Military Affairs

The Nuclear Issue

1. Dr Woerner said that the German election had been dominated by the competence of each of the parties in handling the economy rather than by the INF issue. The majority of West Germans were, however, clearly against the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. The German peace movement consisted of some 1950 separate organisations, but the campaign was dominated by a small number of people. He understood that Mr Heseltine was taking the lead in the British Government's effort to deal with the peace campaign and he would be interested to know how this was being conducted.

2. The Secretary of State said that a Ministerial Group had been established bringing together the main Departments involved which met regularly to review the activities planned by Ministers in the





media, the events planned by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and how the Government might respond. The major preoccupation at present was how to deal with the large scale demonstrations planned for Easter. He had wondered about visiting Berlin which symbolised the divide between West and East and drawing attention to the absence of personal freedom and the right to demonstrate beyond the wall. He understood that this might be awkward for the German Government and the Berlin authorities at Easter and he wondered if Dr Woerner had any views. Dr Woerner said that Mr Heseltine would be very welcome. The proposal was a good idea but his visit should not be announced in advance to avoid provoking demonstrations in Berlin itself.

3. Dr Woerner asked if the British Government used advertising to put its message across. The Secretary of State said an advertising campaign had been in preparation when he had taken up his appointment. He would not be proceeding with it, though the Conservative Party might put out material used by an earlier Labour Government in the 1960s which would show how the Labour Party in opposition now took a very different line to that when it was in office.

#### INF Deployment

4. The Secretary of State said that it seemed unlikely that there would be an arms control agreement before the deployment date for cruise missiles. Dr Woerner agreed. The Secretary of State said that agreement had been reached with the US Administration on a timetable under which the sensitive items of equipment would not be deployed until the autumn. Dr Woerner said that his Government had been most concerned about the earlier deployment timetable and had raised the issue with both Mr Weinberger and the White House.

5. In response to a question from Dr Woerner, the Secretary of State explained the British Government's attitude towards an interim offer in the Geneva talks. Mr Bletloch said that we had suggested to the Americans that, if there was to be a further move, it might be on the basis of picking up the 300 systems figure and playing it back to the Russians as a limit of 300 warheads. Dr Woerner said that he favoured a proposal pitched as low as possible consistent with retaining Pershing II and shared deployment amongst a number of countries. The case for an interim offer was basically to show to public opinion that we were prepared to be flexible. He found it difficult to judge the likely US approach since there were clear divisions within the Administration.

#### US Speciality Metals Restrictions

6. The Secretary of State referred to Dr Woerner's letter to him about Speciality Metals Restrictions. He shared the German concern about US protectionism as Mr Pattie had made clear during his recent visit to the United States but he was not clear whether Dr Woerner wished us to take any specific action. Dr Woerner said that he had tackled





this problem by lobbying Congressmen and Senators and making it clear that the ultimate European response would have to be a refusal to purchase US defence equipment. His Government's loss of interest in a second generation US combat helicopter had been interpreted in America as the first step in this process and caused a good deal of concern. The Secretary of State referred to another aspect of the problem in the British case of restrictions placed on British subsidiary companies in the United States tendering for American defence business. Dr Woerner said that this was not a similar problem for the Germans since their companies did not tend to have US subsidiaries.

#### Air Defence

7. Dr Woerner referred to German concern over the failure of the Belgian Government to proceed with its contribution to the Alliance's air defence belt. This would undermine the effectiveness of the belt. His Government were anxious that each of the Members of the Alliance should have equal rights and treatment but they had hinted to the Belgians that they could not expect this and for others to shoulder their share of the defence burden. The German Government in any case had its own financial difficulties and could not take on others tasks. The Secretary of State said that we supported this German concern and were making this clear within NATO.

#### Equipment Collaboration

8. The Secretary of State said that he was keen to work closely with both the German and French Governments in order to maintain a technologically advanced European industrial base. His own interest in this area went back to the creation of the European Space Agency in which he had persuaded the British Government to take part. He hoped there could be a regular exchange of view on these issues. Dr Woerner said that, under the Franco-German treaty, a Steering Committee had been established which looked at strategic and operational questions, and as part of this at equipment collaboration. He considered it important to begin by looking at broader defence needs rather than fixing on individual projects, such as the Franco-German tank. He would be happy to have arrangements to exchange views with the British Government. The Secretary of State commented that there might be a role for trilateral discussion rather than bilateral approaches. Dr Woerner said that his first reaction was that there would be no objection; but he did wonder whether there might be a risk of offending other members of the Eurogroup who would view close trilateral co-operation with suspicion. He would give this further thought.

#### Defence Sales

9. The Secretary of State said that he was anxious to promote the sale of Tornado to Greece and to Oman. Dr Woerner said his Government were supporting the sale to Greece. But arms sales were



SECRET



a very sensitive issue in Germany where the argument of the need to sustain jobs was not so important. He would discreetly do what he could to be helpful, as he had done over the sale of the RB 199 to India. Sales to the Middle East were particularly sensitive because of the need to avoid offending Israel, with whom the Government had taken steps in recent months to strengthen its contacts. He was not aware of a formal request up until now for agreement to the sale to Oman. He would look at how this might best be handled and speak privately to the Chancellor.

10. The Secretary of State suggested that these difficulties might be avoided if agreement could be reached on the MOU covering responsibilities for sales applying to Tornado and FH 70. Dr Woerner said that this could be difficult for his Government. The first step was to review whether they would continue to apply the rules on sales applied by the previous coalition which had been retained on an interim basis until the election.

11. The meeting ended at 1005 a.m.

Ministry of Defence

25th March 1983

DISTRIBUTION:

PS/Prime Minister  
PS/Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary  
PS/Secretary of the Cabinet  
Sir J Taylor, British Embassy, Bonn  
Sir J Graham, UKDEL NATO





25 MAR 1985



SIR ANTHONY PARSONS

DEFENCE

"THE TRUTH GAME"

I watched John Pilger's programme "The Truth Game" last night. No doubt the experts will be preparing a proper critique, but I thought I would set down a few personal impressions and note a few points while they are still fresh in my mind.

My overall impression was that the programme was thin, self-evidently partial and prejudiced, and had difficulty sustaining its theme. I cannot think that it will have made much impression on objective and intelligent viewers, who would be the audience most likely to watch the programme and whose attention and confidence we would wish to retain. Nonetheless, it did raise a number of points which we should be prepared either to answer or exploit.

a. Trident - a first strike weapon

While Trident II has the accuracy to bust Soviet ICBM silos our Tridents will not have sufficient warheads to target all Soviet ICBMs, leaving aside their SS.20. Any first strike would, therefore, leave us open to retaliation from these systems and the Soviet SLBMs. It would be suicide. Trident mounted in submarines, and invulnerable to preemption, is ideally, and intended as, a retaliatory weapon.

b. Limited Nuclear War

It was claimed that the purpose of Cruise missiles, and the intention of the US Government, was to conduct a limited nuclear war confined to Europe which could be "won" given numerical and technical superiority of US nuclear weapons. This is certainly the most damaging allegation which was made in the programme, and which is current in the nuclear debate. It is true to this extent, that if NATO was forced to use nuclear weapons its initial use would be limited numerically, and confined geographically, with the purpose of confronting the other side with our willingness to cross the nuclear threshold rather than submit to conventional defeat, and so with the evidence of their miscalculation. It is a paradox that this concept should have become the object



of so much suspicion, while the alternative of massive retaliation with strategic nuclear weapons seems somehow to have acquired renewed respectability.

c. Cruise and Pershing can strike Russia, but the SS.20 can only strike Western Europe

CND Chairperson Ruddock made much of the fact that the SS.20, which is mobile and has three warheads compared to the one on Cruise and Pershing, is a defensive weapon which cannot threaten the United States, and to which Pershing and Cruise are, therefore, an inappropriate counter. This view discounts the fundamental commitment of NATO countries that an attack on one should be seen as an attack on all, ignores the presence in West Europe of some 180,000 US troops, and misrepresents the purpose of Cruise and Pershing deployments to bind the US more surely and more evidently to the defence of Western Europe. It also seems to suggest that it is understandable and respectable for the Soviet Union to target 370 multiple warhead ballistic nuclear weapons on Western Europe, to which there is no appropriate counter.

d. Hardened Silos at Greenham Common

Ms Ruddock also made much of the construction at Greenham Common of hardened silos, which proved to her satisfaction that Cruise missiles would be kept permanently armed and ready to fire from their permanent bases. There is, of course, no question of Cruise missiles being "permanently armed". As to their storage in hardened silos, would she prefer that nuclear warheads and their missiles were stored in tents?

e. Queen's Order II

Pilger asserted that the implementation of "Queen's Order II" would suspend democracy in the United Kingdom. His inference was that this would be a necessary condition to be established before a Government could proceed to wage a nuclear war, and that the need for such measures was uniquely the product of the nuclear age. Queen's Order II does not do what Pilger says it does, but in any event, the need for



Government to assume emergency powers in a time of crisis or war has been accepted in the past, and would be expected by the general public in a future crisis.

f. A Nuclear Warning Shot


The view was attributed to General Haig that NATO might "fire a nuclear warning shot across the bows of the Soviet Union" in a time of crisis. The way this comment was presented recalled to me the Naval Officer who argued quite seriously that the use of nuclear weapons at sea would be so much less objectionable than the use of nuclear weapons on land that Ministers might authorise it "before war had broken out"! Of course, the concept which Haig characteristically failed to articulate was the one referred to in (b) above.

g. 1960s Military Manual

Pilger made much of a section in a 20-year old military manual which set out to describe how a nuclear land battle might be conducted, and included the statement "large numbers of nuclear weapons will be used". Put in its proper context there was nothing remarkable about the statement which made clear that if a nuclear battle should develop in Europe, nuclear weapons would be used.

h. Soviet Intentions

Pilger made play of Admiral La Roque's statement that it would be "suicide for the Soviet Union to make a frontal attack in Europe". It would be suicide not because of the weight of NATO's conventional forces, but because those forces are backed by a formidable nuclear capability.

  
R.T. JACKLING  
1 March 1983



C Flo

24 February 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 14 February sending a copy of the main motion adopted by the General Synod and the various texts and amendments considered during the debate.

A J COLES

W.D. Pattinson, Esq.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 February 1983

*Gen John*

*Type letter pl.*

*A.J.C. 24/2.*

General Synod Debate: The Church and the Bomb

Thank you for your letter of 16 February about the General Synod debate.

/ Mr Pattinson has written in similar terms to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. In our reply (copy enclosed) we have said we are ready to do whatever we can to help the continuing debate within the Church, and we shall be making a point of maintaining the contacts we have developed with some of the leading churchmen involved. We doubt whether there is any need for your own reply to do / more than acknowledge receipt. I enclose a draft letter.

*Gen*

*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



Defence: Nuclear Issues & Public Opinion  
Oct '82



**DRAFT:** LETTER  
minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

**TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+

**FROM:**

Reference

A J COLES

**DEPARTMENT:**

**TEL. NO:**

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION**

**TO:**

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

W D Pattinson Esq  
 Secretary-General  
 General Synod of the Church of England  
 Church House  
 Dean's Yard  
 LONDON SW1P 3NZ

**Copies to:**

**PRIVACY MARKING**

**SUBJECT:**

.....In Confidence

**CAVEAT**.....

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 14 February sending a copy of the main motion adapted by the General Synod and the various texts and amendments considered during the debate.

*ADL 24. 2*

Enclosures—flag(s).....



Defence: Public Opinion  
& Debate on Nuclear

Weapon Issues  
Oct '82





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 February 1983

*Rev M. Robinson*

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has asked me to thank you for your letter of 14 February about the General Synod debate on 'The Church and the Bomb'. Mr Pym believes that the debate has done much to promote greater public understanding of nuclear deterrence and disarmament.

We were very grateful to receive the text and motion considered by the General Synod, and remain very ready to help in any way we can - for example through the International Affairs Committee of the Board of Social Responsibility - in the continuing debate within the Church on these very important issues.

*Very sincerely,  
R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

W D Pattinson Esq  
Secretary-General  
General Synod of the Church  
of England  
Church House  
Dean's Yard  
LONDON SW1P 3NZ



DeSance  
HU

MR. JACKLING

Nuclear weapons and public information

Thank you for your minute of 18 February.

I attach a copy of a recent minute by Mr. Butler which sets out the arrangements for major speeches by the Prime Minister in the period until the end of June. You will see that we have put down a marker that the Prime Minister may wish to make another speech on nuclear issues. But she is in fact most reluctant to take on any other major speaking engagements in this period. She has specifically turned down an earlier idea of an address at Chatham House on this matter.

I should be grateful if any ideas for a Prime Ministerial speech on this subject could be discussed with me before they are brought up in Mr. Heseltine's Committee - since that might avoid a good deal of time being wasted.

As to international meetings, none are envisaged between now and the end of June which would be an appropriate platform for comment on nuclear issues. We have two European Councils, on 21/22 March and on 6/7 June, but on past form it is most unlikely that our EC colleagues will want to discuss these questions. I would expect there to be some discussion in the margins of the Economic Summit from 28-30 May - and depending on the state of the debate at that time there may even be a reference in the Communiqué. But again the occasion is really inappropriate.

The Summit will be preceded by a short visit to Washington which will occasion a good deal of publicity. It may be that the speech which I am preparing for 27 May could include something on nuclear matters but that obviously should not be decided now. It is most unlikely to be an occasion for a major, heavy speech.

Finally there are two or three bilateral meetings which will end with the usual press conferences e.g. the Anglo/Italian Summit next week, the visit of the Netherlands Prime Minister



on 2 March and the Anglo/German Summit on 22 April. I shall be working out with the Foreign Office the policy issues which we shall aim to include in the press statements on each occasion. But I doubt if any of them will provide the scope for more than two or three sentences on nuclear matters.

JC

18 February 1983




CONFIDENTIAL

cc Mr. Ingham  
Miss Stephens

MR. COLES

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

The new arrangements for coordinating the Government's presentation of the case for NATO's approach to nuclear strategy and multilateral disarmament are now in place and operational. As part of these arrangements, it is intended to maintain a comprehensive calendar looking six months ahead of known future events, important speaking engagements, etc, which would be appropriate for the purpose of putting over the Government's message. The Prime Minister's activities will obviously be important in this context. I should be most grateful, therefore, if you could furnish me with a list of those international meetings, and speaking engagements, which are in the PM's diary for the next six months, and which could be relevant to this effort. Thereafter, I could update this calendar at periodic intervals in consultation with you and Miss Stephens. I should like to make No 10's input to the first calendar of events by noon on Tuesday, 22 February.



R.T. JACKLING  
18 February 1983

CONFIDENTIAL





DEFENCE

CC 17 CD

BU

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 February 1983

Who promised  
- was today?

General Synod: the Church and the Bomb

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Secretary General of the General Synod of the Church of England which in turn encloses the official texts of the motions and amendments considered by the Synod on 10 February, together with the voting figures.

I should be grateful for your advice on whether something more than a simple acknowledgment should be sent and, if so, for a draft for my signature on behalf of the Prime Minister. Could your advice kindly reach me by Tuesday 22 February.


Handwritten mark consisting of three vertical lines and a horizontal line pointing to the right.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Handwritten initials 'HLL'





10 DOWNING STREET

From the Press Secretary

15 February 1983

*John Brown,*

The attached cutting of Denis Healey's piece in the Observer at the weekend has prompted me to write the letter I had intended to pen last week in the context of the Secretary of State's Committee.

The Healey article is potentially very damaging. He says there is no military or political case for Cruise missiles in the UK; and that if deployed will make an arms agreement more difficult in view of their mobility and microscopic size.

These are points we need to answer. But this poses a wider question which already confronts me in my dealings with the Lobby. We undoubtedly hit the target last week; just how effectively was demonstrated by the Morning Star's wincing front page yesterday. But, quite apart from how we sustain the effort, we must also cope with the consequences of our success.

This manifests itself in the form of even more detailed questions about Cruise and its method of control. And given the enormous strength of opinion in favour of multilateralism, a nuclear deterrent and an independent one as well, the more the opposition will have to fall back on Cruise etc.

But how far do we wish to be driven into revealing even more detail about the joint decision arrangements? I feel that we are suffering from two things at the moment:

- a long slow slide into even more detailed revelations; and
- the impression which this creates of cover-up, shiftness, evasion, to use only a few of the terms in the propagandist armoury.

I would be much happier if I thought we were all clearer of the ground on which we are determined to stand and hold. I hope all this makes sense to you, and that you can get it considered urgently.

/.....



M. Cross.  
16.  
2

Defence



Meanwhile, could I please reinforce my concern about an MoD survey or monitor of public opinion? Any such exercise will almost certainly become public, with irresistible demands for publication which may, or may not, be helpful. I do hope we can 'plant' appropriate questions by buying into other surveys.

I am copying to Neville Taylor and Roger Jackling.



BERNARD INGHAM

Moray Stewart, Esq.,  
Assistant Under Secretary,  
Ministry of Defence.



# The Case against Cruise

NOT for the first time, the Atlantic Alliance finds itself deeply and dangerously divided over a proposal which was intended only to unite it. The crisis over the cruise and Pershing II missiles is a repeat performance of the crisis over the Multilateral Force 20 years ago and over the European Defence Community 10 years earlier still.

The international context of the present crisis is, however, far more menacing. If NATO takes the wrong decision now, the consequences could be disastrous not just for the Alliance but also for the prospects of halting an arms race which is just on the verge of accelerating beyond control.

The analogy with the MLF crisis is illuminating. In the later years of the Kennedy Administration Washington became alarmed by what it saw as a growing distrust in Europe of America's readiness to meet a Soviet attack on her allies by massive nuclear retaliation, which was then part of NATO strategy. With encouragement from some European governments it offered to meet this distrust by deploying American nuclear weapons in European waters on ships with mixed polyglot crews provided by its allies.

This proposal caused deep divisions among the Europeans. I described it at the time as 'artificial dissemination,' because the Americans would have controlled both the trigger and the safety catch of the weapons themselves. It did nothing to reassure Europe and was a military nonsense. My first act when I became Secretary for Defence in 1964 was to persuade Washington to scuttle the MLF before it left harbour. There was a row at the time; but everyone breathed a sigh of relief and no one on either side of the Atlantic has felt any less secure as a result.



**DENIS HEALEY, MP, explains why the latest proposed escalation in the arms race offers no strategic advantage either to Britain or to the Atlantic Alliance.**

The proposal to deploy cruise and Pershing II as a response to the Soviet SS-20 was similarly put to NATO at the end of 1979 as a reluctant American response to worries expressed by Helmut Schmidt in a speech to the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London in 1977. Ironically enough, the relevant sentences of the speech were only added at the last moment by one of his officials. For the following 18 months his allies tried in vain to find out precisely how Chancellor Schmidt proposed to meet his own worries.

The SS-20 was nothing fundamentally new. As a continental land power with very restricted access to the oceans, Russia had always relied on land-based nuclear forces rather than submarine-launched missiles. When in the 1960s the Kremlin deployed its SS-4 and SS-5 missiles against European targets NATO responded not by deploying similar missiles on land, but by allocating some of her missile submarines to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander



Europe. These 'NATO' submarines at present carry 400 warheads—enough by themselves to destroy Soviet society.

Of course, the SS-20 missiles with which Russia has been replacing her SS-4s and SS-5s over the last five years, are more formidable in every respect than her older missiles.

They represent a Soviet escalation of the arms race, and should be dismantled. But the American submarines already allocated to NATO are just as adequate to counter them. There is no more need now than there was in the 1960s to counter them with similar land-based missiles.


This is, in fact, precisely what the Callaghan Government argued persistently with its allies in its last 18 months of office. The inner group of Ministers which met continually over this period took the view that NATO strategy was explicitly incompatible with the idea of isolating one particular element of NATO's military strength, like land-based missiles, from all the others, and did not require the Alliance to match Soviet strength at every level. To borrow the phrase we often used at the time, if NATO had a sufficiency of nuclear strength it did not need equivalence. In other words, enough is enough.

Another argument against countering the SS-20 with similar land-based missiles in Europe also weighed heavily with the Callaghan Government. We believed that the whole concept of a nuclear balance limited to Europe would weaken the credibility of America's nuclear guarantee—that a separate Euro-strategic balance would decouple the United States from Europe. This argument has now assumed even greater weight since members of President Reagan's Administration have talked of

limiting a nuclear war to Europe alone.

The last Labour Government consistently took the view that there was no military or political case for cruise missiles in the United Kingdom. We rejected them even if the proposed arms talks should break down.

Like the MLF before it, the deployment of cruise and Pershing would be 'artificial dissemination,' since none of the allies would control either the trigger or the safety catch of the American missiles. But it would have enormous disadvantages even compared with the MLF—the missiles would not be far away at sea, but on land in heavily populated areas, where they would be sitting ducks for a surprise nuclear attack. The present Government plans to reduce this danger by moving the lorries which launch the cruise missiles from their bases at Greenham Common and Molesworth to prepared sites all over the



country in time of tension—a prospect which must be even less inviting for the British people, and which makes the Anglo-American agreement on joint decision about the use of bases irrelevant.

This case against cruise and Pershing is now enormously strengthened by their impact on the arms race. In December 1979 when NATO first agreed to deploy them if disarmament talks broke down, it was assumed that America would ratify the SALT II Treaty, which banned the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles until the end of 1981, and that by the time this ban expired it would have been replaced by a further ban in a SALT III Treaty.

In fact, the American Con-

gress refused to ratify SALT II and President Reagan resisted further talks with the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear weapons until after the ban expired. He also insisted that the talks on intermediate range nuclear weapons should be separated from the START talks, limited to American and Soviet ground based missiles like SS-20, cruise and Pershing II, ignoring both the American nuclear bombers based in Europe and the British and French strategic nuclear forces, which in range and destructive power pose a threat to Russia similar to that of the SS-20 to Western Europe. Ministers concerned with such matters in the Callaghan Government decided that all these so-called 'grey area' systems should be included in SALT III and that Britain should seek direct participation in the talks.

If cruise is once deployed, it will make an arms agreement enormously more difficult since its mobility and small size make it impossible to discover by satellite photography (which is the only method of verification Russia has so far allowed). Moreover, any land-based system is now vulnerable to a surprise attack. It is certain that if the West deploys cruise and Pershing, the Russians will reciprocate. The balance of power will then become much less stable than it is today. In a time of tension each side will be terrified of a pre-emptive attack by the other—even the movement of the first cruise launcher from Greenham Common could trigger off a nuclear war.

For all these reasons, NATO must now abandon its decision of December 1979. The Labour Party is determined that Britain shall not accept cruise missiles on her soil. I believe the Alliance will be as grateful to us for grasping this nettle now as it was when we sank the MLF in 1964.



# The Case against Cruise

NOT for the first time, the Atlantic Alliance finds itself deeply and dangerously divided over a proposal which was intended only to unite it. The crisis over the cruise and Pershing II missiles is a repeat performance of the crisis over the Multilateral Force 20 years ago and over the European Defence Community 10 years earlier still.

The international context of the present crisis is, however, far more menacing. If NATO takes the wrong decision now, the consequences could be disastrous not just for the Alliance but also for the prospects of halting an arms race which is just on the verge of accelerating beyond control.

The analogy with the MLF crisis is illuminating. In the later years of the Kennedy Administration Washington became alarmed by what it saw as a growing distrust in Europe of America's readiness to meet a Soviet attack on her allies by massive nuclear retaliation, which was then part of NATO strategy. With encouragement from some European governments it offered to meet this distrust by deploying American nuclear weapons in European waters on ships with mixed polyglot crews provided by its allies.

This proposal caused deep divisions among the Europeans. I described it at the time as 'artificial dissemination,' because the Americans would have controlled both the trigger and the safety catch of the weapons themselves. It did nothing to reassure Europe and was a military nonsense. My first act when I became Secretary for Defence in 1964 was to persuade Washington to scuttle the MLF before it left harbour. There was a row at the time; but everyone breathed a sigh of relief and no one on either side of the Atlantic has felt any less secure as a result.



**DENIS HEALEY, MP, explains why the latest proposed escalation in the arms race offers no strategic advantage either to Britain or to the Atlantic Alliance.**

The proposal to deploy cruise and Pershing II as a response to the Soviet SS-20 was similarly put to NATO at the end of 1979 as a reluctant American response to worries expressed by Helmut Schmidt in a speech to the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London in 1977. Ironically enough, the relevant sentences of the speech were only added at the last moment by one of his officials. For the following 18 months his allies tried in vain to find out precisely how Chancellor Schmidt proposed to meet his own worries.

The SS-20 was nothing fundamentally new. As a continental land power with very restricted access to the oceans, Russia had always relied on land-based nuclear forces rather than submarine-launched missiles. When in the 1960s the Kremlin deployed its SS-4 and SS-5 missiles against European targets NATO responded not by deploying similar missiles on land, but by allocating some of her missile submarines to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander



Europe. These 'NATO' submarines at present carry 400 warheads—enough by themselves to destroy Soviet society.

Of course, the SS-20 missiles with which Russia has been replacing her SS-4s and SS-5s over the last five years, are more formidable in every respect than her older missiles.

They represent a Soviet escalation of the arms race, and should be dismantled. But the American submarines already allocated to NATO are just as adequate to counter them. There is no more need now than there was in the 1960s to counter them with similar land-based missiles.


This is, in fact, precisely what the Callaghan Government argued persistently with its allies in its last 18 months of office. The inner group of Ministers which met continually over this period took the view that NATO strategy was explicitly incompatible with the idea of isolating one particular element of NATO's military strength, like land-based missiles, from all the others, and did not require the Alliance to match Soviet strength at every level. To borrow the phrase we often used at the time, if NATO had a sufficiency of nuclear strength it did not need equivalence. In other words, enough is enough.

Another argument against countering the SS-20 with similar land-based missiles in Europe also weighed heavily with the Callaghan Government. We believed that the whole concept of a nuclear balance limited to Europe would weaken the credibility of America's nuclear guarantee—that a separate Euro-strategic balance would decouple the United States from Europe. This argument has now assumed even greater weight since members of President Reagan's Administration have talked of

limiting a nuclear war to Europe alone.

The last Labour Government consistently took the view that there was no military or political case for cruise missiles in the United Kingdom. We rejected them even if the proposed arms talks should break down.

Like the MLF before it, the deployment of cruise and Pershing would be 'artificial dissemination,' since none of the allies would control either the trigger or the safety catch of the American missiles. But it would have enormous disadvantages even compared with the MLF—the missiles would not be far away at sea, but on land in heavily populated areas, where they would be sitting ducks for a surprise nuclear attack. The present Government plans to reduce this danger by moving the lorries which launch the cruise missiles from their bases at Greenham Common and Molesworth to prepared sites all over the



country in time of tension—a prospect which must be even less inviting for the British people, and which makes the Anglo-American agreement on joint decision about the use of bases irrelevant.

This case against cruise and Pershing is now enormously strengthened by their impact on the arms race. In December 1979 when NATO first agreed to deploy them if disarmament talks broke down, it was assumed that America would ratify the SALT II Treaty, which banned the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles until the end of 1981, and that by the time this ban expired it would have been replaced by a further ban in a SALT III Treaty.

In fact, the American Con-

gress refused to ratify SALT II, and President Reagan resisted further talks with the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear weapons until after the ban expired. He also insisted that the talks on intermediate range nuclear weapons should be separated from the START talks, limited to American and Soviet ground based missiles like SS-20, cruise and Pershing II, ignoring both the American nuclear bombers based in Europe and the British and French strategic nuclear forces, which in range and destructive power pose a threat to Russia similar to that of the SS-20 to Western Europe. Ministers concerned with such matters in the Callaghan Government decided that all these so-called 'grey area' systems should be included in SALT III and that Britain should seek direct participation in the talks.

If cruise is once deployed, it will make an arms agreement enormously more difficult since its mobility and small size make it impossible to discover by satellite photography (which is the only method of verification Russia has so far allowed). Moreover, any land-based system is now vulnerable to a surprise attack. It is certain that if the West deploys cruise and Pershing, the Russians will reciprocate. The balance of power will then become much less stable than it is today. In a time of tension each side will be terrified of a pre-emptive attack by the other—even the movement of the first cruise launcher from Greenham Common could trigger off a nuclear war.

For all these reasons, NATO must now abandon its decision of December 1979. The Labour Party is determined that Britain shall not accept cruise missiles on her soil. I believe the Alliance will be as grateful to us for grasping this nettle now as it was when we sank the MLF in 1964.



010

# THE GENERAL SYNOD OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

Church House Dean's Yard London SW1P 3NZ. Telephone 01-222 9011

14th February 1983

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
10, Downing Street,  
London SW1.

*Dear Prime Minister*

FEBRUARY 1983 GENERAL SYNOD : THE CHURCH AND THE BOMB

I am sending you herewith the official texts of the motions and amendments considered by the General Synod on Thursday, 10th February, together with the voting figures. As I think you know, the main motion which the Synod carried incorporated an amendment moved by the Bishop of Birmingham. The text of the motion as amended and finally approved is at paragraph 5 of the attached Extract from the Record.

*Yours sincerely*

*W.D. Pattinson*

W.D. Pattinson  
Secretary-General



The Church and the Bomb : A Report by the Board for Social Responsibility to which was appended the Report of a Working Party under the chairmanship of the Bishop of Salisbury.

Motion 1

1. The motion 'That this Report be received' was carried.

Motion 2

2. The motion 'That this Synod recognising -
  - (a) the urgency of the task of making and preserving peace;and (b) the extreme seriousness of the threat made to the world by contemporary nuclear weapons and the dangers in the present international situation,  
calls upon H.M. Government, together with our allies in NATO,
  - (i) to reduce progressively its dependence upon nuclear weapons in its programme for defence; and
  - (ii) to work to strengthen international treaties especially as they apply to the possession and use of such weapons'

was moved.

3. The Bishop of Salisbury moved as an amendment:

Leave out all words after "HM Government" and insert:

- "(a) to announce the UK's intention of carrying out, in consultation with its allies, a phased disengagement of the U.K. from active association with any form of nuclear weaponry, involving:
- (i) bringing to an end the Polaris strategic nuclear system, and cancelling the order for the proposed Trident replacement;
  - (ii) discontinuing all nuclear weapons wholly or mainly of British manufacture;
  - (iii) negotiating Britain's withdrawal from the manning of nuclear weapons systems manufactured by others;
  - (iv) negotiating an end to agreements for the present or future deployment of nuclear weapons systems on British soil;



- (b) to invite other governments to make positive responses to the British initiative by comparable measures either of renunciation or restraint;
- (c) to continue to prosecute vigorously disarmament negotiations of all kinds; and
- (d) to devote resources to positive programmes for the building of peace and the fostering of international confidence along the lines indicated in the remaining Recommendations of The Church and the Bomb (namely nos.2-17 and 21-22)"'

The amendment was lost. The voting was as follows:

<u>AYES</u>	<u>NOES</u>
100	338

4. The Bishop of Birmingham moved as an amendment:-

Leave out all words after 'international situation' and add:

and (c) that it is not the task of the Church to determine defence strategy but mindful of its duty to give a moral lead to the nation:

- (i) affirms that it is the duty of Her Majesty's Government and her allies to maintain adequate forces to guard against nuclear blackmail and to deter nuclear and non-nuclear aggressors;
- (ii) asserts that the tactics and strategies of this country and her NATO allies should be seen to be unmistakably defensive in respect of the countries of the Warsaw Pact;
- (iii) judges that even a small-scale first use of nuclear weapons could never be morally justified in view of the high risk that this would lead to full-scale nuclear warfare;
- (iv) believes that there is a moral obligation on all countries (including the members of NATO) publicly to forswear the first use of nuclear weapons in any form;
- (v) bearing in mind that many in Europe live in fear of nuclear catastrophe and that nuclear parity is not essential to deterrence, calls on Her Majesty's Government to take immediate steps in conjunction with her allies to further the principles embodied in this motion so as to reduce progressively NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons and to decrease nuclear arsenals throughout the world.

The amendment was carried after a division of the whole Synod. The voting was as follows:-

<u>AYES</u>	<u>NOES</u>
275	222



5. The motion amended to read 'That this Synod recognising -
- (a) the urgency of the task of making and preserving peace;
- and (b) the extreme seriousness of the threat made to the world by contemporary nuclear weapons and the dangers in the present international situation;
- and (c) that it is not the task of the Church to determine defence strategy but rather to give a moral lead to the nation;
- (i) affirms that it is the duty of Her Majesty's Government and her allies to maintain adequate forces to guard against nuclear blackmail and to deter nuclear and non-nuclear aggressors;
  - (ii) asserts that the tactics and strategies of this country and her NATO allies should be seen to be unmistakably defensive in respect of the countries of the Warsaw Pact;
  - (iii) judges that even a small-scale first use of nuclear weapons could never be morally justified in view of the high risk that this would lead to full-scale nuclear warfare;
  - (iv) believes that there is a moral obligation on all countries (including the members of NATO) publicly to forswear the first use of nuclear weapons in any form;
  - (v) bearing in mind that many in Europe live in fear of nuclear catastrophe and that nuclear parity is not essential to deterrence, calls on Her Majesty's Government to take immediate steps in conjunction with her allies to further the principles embodied in this motion so as to reduce progressively NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons and to decrease nuclear arsenals throughout the world'

was carried. The voting was as follows:-

<u>AYES</u>	<u>NOES</u>	<u>ABSTENTIONS</u>
387	49	29

Motion 3

6. After the main debate (on Motion 2), the Synod carried by show of hands after a short debate a motion in the following terms:

'That this Synod believes that indiscriminate mass destruction in war cannot be justified in the light of Christian teaching and calls upon the dioceses to study and pray about the issues raised in the report The Church and the Bomb, and in particular the theological and moral issues, so



as to enable Christian people to make a more informed and committed contribution to the making and preserving of peace and to search for ways of resolving conflicts other than by war.'

W.D. Pattinson  
Secretary-General

Church House, SW1.  
11th February 1983



as to which direction would be best to take...  
and to avoid any way of temporary conflict...  
war.

U.S. Embassy  
Washington, D.C.

1000...  
1000...

16 FEB 1983

11 12 1  
10 9 8  
7 6 5 4





**10 DOWNING STREET**

**With the compliments of**

**BERNARD INGHAM**





cc Mr Butler  
— Sir Robert Armstrong  
Sir Antony Acland

10 DOWNING STREET

11 February 1983

*Dear Clive,*

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

I hope you will agree that our interests in No 10 on Moray Stewart's Committee might be represented by Roger Jackling.

It is kind of you to suggest that we might have someone on the Committee from Press Office but my resources are very hard pressed. I am hoping that Roger Jackling will, in his own field, bridge the gap between policy and presentation just as John Vereker has done in the economic field.

If it is felt that there would also be advantage from time to time in a Press Officer attending Moray Stewart's meetings for a specific purpose, we will try to oblige. I shall of course discuss the agenda with Roger Jackling.

*John Ingham*  
*B Ingham*

B INGHAM

Clive Whitmore Esq  
Permanent Under Secretary of State  
Ministry of Defence







SATURDAY BRIEFING.

WASHINGTON: 29.1.83.

INTERVIEWEE: PAUL WARNKE

INTERVIEWERS: ELIZABETH DREW, NICHOLAS ASHFORD.

CHAIRMAN: RICHARD KERSEAW.

Kershaw:

Well good evening from Washington. 1983 has already been dubbed the year of the missile, it's the year in which new American Cruise and Pershing weapons will arrive in Britain, and other European countries, unless sufficient progress is made in arms limitation talks with the Russians. Well the Soviet Union now has a new leader, in Yuri Andropov, who has seemingly been winning a number of the propaganda battle, over nuclear disarmament. And the Peace Movements in Europe have strengthened very considerably, as we know.

Next week the American Vice President, George Bush, arrives in Britain, as part of America's reply to the Russian peace offensive. With me in Washington is Paul Warnke, the man who negotiated the last Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty - SALT Two - which was not, in the end, ratified here by the Senate. And to put questions to him, with me, are Elizabeth Drew, the Washington correspondent of the New Yorker, and Nicholas Ashford, chief Washington correspondent of The Times.

Well Paul Warnke, 1983 really does look like a critical year for the Western Alliance, and particularly on this subject of disarmament. There's a great deal of anxiety, as we know, in Europe, but also a lot of feeling that there's playing for high stakes between the superpowers. Now can I ask you, with all your great experience of negotiating with the Russians, what do you guess they are after, and up to, at the moment?

Warnke:

Well I think with regard to the INF talks, what they really are after is to prevent the deployment of the ground launch Cruise Missiles, and the Pershing Twos. Now at the same time I continue to feel that they are interested in working out some kind of effective control over nuclear arms, because they're afraid of nuclear war.

Ms. Drew:

There is a feeling, within our own government, that perhaps their priority is to split the Alliance, that that's really what this exercise is about. Do you share that view?

Warnke:

I think that splitting the Alliance would be in the nature of serendipity. I think that their primary objective is to prevent the deployment, particularly in West Germany, of the Pershing Two ballistic missiles, and the ground launch Cruise missiles. I think they see them as a potential pre-emptive strike weapon, and it concerns them. I know that in my negotiations with them they always referred to the ground launch Cruise missile as the German launch Cruise missile. And I think what it reflects is their particular concern about Germany.

Ashford:

There's been a tremendous amount of anti nuclear activity in Western Europe, can you think that the - this Administration, in preparing its - its negotiating position, on - on INF, is very conscious of - of the anti nuclear sentiment, which is building up in Europe?

Warnke:

I don't think that they understand the depth and the - really the gravity of the concern, that the Western European people feel. There's always a tendency, when you're in



government, to talk to other Ministers, and if you talk just to Defence Ministers in NATO, you get a very different view. I think also we have to recognise that very many of the people in the Reagan Administration have little familiarity with Europe. And as a consequence, I think that they discount the very broad base of the anti nuclear weapon movement, in Europe.

s. Drew: You did refer to different groups of people within our Administration.

Warnke: Yes.

s. Drew: As we know, there are deep splits, and there's a feeling that there's some people who don't really believe that you should have arms negot - arms agreements with the Soviet Union. Do you - how strong a group do you think that is? Maybe you should describe a bit of where you think they are, and what power you think they have.

Warnke: Well let's start, of course, with some of the statements that were made by the President himself, during his campaign, and immediately after he became President. He talked about the fact that he regarded the Soviet leaders as people who would lie, cheat, do anything to gain world control. During his campaign he talked about the fact that the way to get arms control was through an arms race. Now I think there are some in the Administration that reflect those views of the President. I like to think that the President, like all Presidents, has gone through a learning experience in office -

Ms. Drew: But do you think he has?

Warnke: And some of his more - some of his more recent statements would indicate that. Now nobody's talking any longer, as George Bush did during the campaign, about winning a limited nuclear war. The President has said he recognises there can be no winners in a nuclear war. Now that is the beginning of wisdom, as far as arms control is concerned.

Ms. Drew: Do you think that represents a real change in attitude, or the fact that perhaps some of their own people said that's not too good, to run around saying things like that, it scares people?

Warnke: Well to the best of my knowledge they are not applying a lie detector test to the Office of the President, as yet, so that I can't answer that question.

Ashford: As you said, I mean the rhetoric has changed somewhat, and in recent days we've seen signs of flexibility on the Administration's position for the zero-zero option, the total elimination of both lots of medium range missiles. And they're now saying that - well if the Russians come up with a reasonable proposal, then, you know, let's - let's talk about it, we're willing to negotiate. What would be, in your view, a reasonable Soviet proposal?

Warnke: Well in my opinion you can't get a durable lasting comprehensive agreement, on just INF, because of this artificial separation.

Dershaw: That's the SS20s and -

Warnke: That's the SS20s, SS4s and SS5s, on the Soviet side, and



our proposed ground launched Cruise missiles and Pershing Twos. Because as I say, it's just a small segment of the entire strategic balance, therefore it seems to me what we ought to be trying to get is an interim agreement, a temporary solution, something in which we would defer deployment, in exchange for significant reductions, in the Soviet SS20 force. And then move that entire issue into the overall START talks, where you then have the possibility of the kinds of trade-offs that could, in time, bring about a genuine elimination of the intermediate nuclear forces. But you can't do it just by saying that we want you to get rid of this entire category of nuclear weapons, and as a consequence we won't deploy 572 new missiles, that perhaps we can't deploy anyway,

Kershaw: But the Soviet offer that they made, the one saying that they would - might reduce the number of their intermediate weapons, to match the British and the French nuclear weapons.

Warnke: Yes.

Kershaw: This had the element - that looked like a splitting device again, it didn't look as if it was intended to be accepted.

Warnke: Well you never know until you try. The one thing that does encourage me, and leads me to feel that we will, in fact, get an agreement, is now there is no longer this insistence that Paul Nitze go over there and play mynah bird, and just say - zero option, zero option, zero option. Now, according to the public statements, he has been told he can listen to some other kind of proposal from the Soviets, and explore it.

Kershaw: But it turned out that behind the scenes he had been having other sorts of discussions anyway, hadn't he?

Warnke: Well anybody who is sent over as a negotiator isn't earning his keep, unless he tries to explore what the possibilities are.

Kershaw: But do you think that this - the possibility which he discussed, which was for a balance of about 75 missiles on either side - I mean is this on the right track for your - what you suggest should be an - an interim solution?

Warnke: I would prefer something that just deferred the entire deployment of the new American missiles, because I think that deploying part of them is still going to run into a lot of popular resentment, popular resistance, in Europe. In addition to that, I'm not a fan of the ground launch Cruise missile. It seems to me that if we deploy them, that in time that the Russians will also develop ground launch Cruise missiles.

Kershaw: But if you defer deployment, then doesn't that play right into the Russian's hands?

Warnke: I don't think it does, provided you get something for it. I mean what we're concerned about, or should be concerned about, is two things: decreasing the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe, and preserving Alliance cohesion. Now you aren't going to reduce the nuclear threat to Europe by deploying 572 American missiles in Western Europe, that won't take a single warhead out of the Soviet arsenal. Now wouldn't it be much better to eliminate, let's say, 100 Soviet SS20s, with 300 warheads, in return for a deferral of the deployment of these new weapons?



Drew:

As you know, there are important policy makers in our government, particularly in the Pentagon, who take the opposite view from what you've just said, and they argue that until the Soviet Union is convinced that we will deploy these weapons in Europe, they will not strike a deal, or any kind of an attractive deal. What's wrong with that reasoning?

Warnke:

I think what's wrong with that reasoning is that it ignores the possibilities of negotiation, unless you have an arms build-up actually taking place. My experience is that the Soviets are prepared to negotiate an arms control agreement. They are not the ones that walked away from the bargaining table, back in 1979, it was us. And I think that the flaw in the reasoning is that it assumes that the Soviets don't have a genuine interest in trying to reduce the risk of nuclear war. My experience is that they're far more sensitive to the consequences of modern war than we are. It's been a long time since a gun was fired in hostilities in the continent of the United States, it was the time of muskets and cannonballs.

Ms. Drew:

So what you're saying, and this goes back to an earlier question I asked you, is that this group, which is important and powerful and, as you know, tenacious, you believe will not prevail in the battle for the President's mind on the negotiations?

Warnke:

I like to think that particularly with George Shultz, as Secretary of State, there's going to be greater sensitivity to the European climate, and of the opinion of our European allies. How to me the eventual decision on deployment should be a European decision. I mean they're the ones that have to make up their minds. If we come up with a deal that's good enough for our Western European allies, it ought to be plenty good enough for us, and I think we can come up with a deal that's good enough for our Western European allies.

Hershaw:

You've talked about Russian perceptions of war, as against perhaps European countries' perceptions of war, but actually what has happened is that the Russians have modernised their intermediate force -

Warnke:

Yes.

Hershaw:

Which is targeted on places like where I live --

Warnke:

That's correct.

Hershaw:

And that we have not modernised it, so that - I mean you do accept that the change in the power factors was made by a Russian overt act.

Warnke:

Yeah, but you see that again assumes that there's some particular magic, in having an American warhead that the Americans can launch from West Germany, or from the United Kingdom. Now we decided back a long time ago that it made much more sense to put the warheads that can strike the Soviet Union on things like our ballistic missile submarines, or in the great plains of the United States, and that's what deters Soviet attack on Western Europe. There is no magic in putting the missiles in launch points in Western Europe. As a matter of fact, the logic of it is something that to me would be appalling if I were a Western European.

Ashford:

But there always remains the European finger on the trigger,



through the independent nuclear systems which France and Britain possess. I mean what is one going to do about this?

Warnke:

Well it certainly is something that the Soviets must take into account, and it's one of the reasons why the so-called zero option is not anything that would ever be appealing to them. I know that the argument that has been made is that after all the British and the French forces are not under the control of NATO, but neither, of course, are the American forces. The new Cruise missiles, and the Pershing Twos, at least under present plans, would not be controlled by NATO, they'd be controlled exclusively by the United States.

Kershaw:

But there is going to be a great deal of pressure, Mr. Warnke, at least public opinion pressure, to try and get dual key operation, or dual key control, of those weapons. Do you think that that would ever be acceptable to an American Administration?

Warnke:

Well as far as dual key operations are concerned, I don't believe that the Germans have any interest in that at all. As a matter of fact I think one of the conditions is that these would be weapons that are exclusively under American control. As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, you're the masters of your own fate, you can make that one of the conditions to any deployment of Cruise missiles.

Kershaw:

Or one could say the mistresses of our own fate, with our present government.

Warnke:

Yes.

Ms. Drew:

You've made a couple of mentions of the START talks - the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks - how far along do you think those are?

Warnke:

From what I have heard or read, they aren't very far along at all, because again it seems to me that what we're trying to do is to deal with only that part of the problem that concerns us, and not getting into some of the things that concern the Soviet Union. The other problem is that like the zero option, it's too big a step to take at one time. As I gather, the President's proposed that we shrink the number of ballistic missile warheads to 5000, of which no more than 2500 would be on the land-based ICBMs - a very desirable objective. You can't get there in a single step, it is like trying to get down from the top of the tree, if you do it branch you'll land intact, if you try and do it in one step, you're going to be one hell of a mess.

Ashford:

General Rowley, the other day, said that he thought, with reference to the START talks, that at least agreement on confidence building measures, proposed by President Reagan, could be reached this year. Could that be one of the steps to which you refer?

Warnke:

I don't really put a great deal of start in the so-called confidence building measures, as far as strategic arms are concerned. They've got a real place when it comes to conventional armaments. Something, for example, like the withdrawal of the heavy armoured divisions from the central front of Europe would be a genuine confidence building measure. But the only way you build confidence, in avoiding strategic nuclear war, is by limiting and reducing strategic nuclear weapons. No



kinds of pledges, as to the - I'm not going to use them, don't worry about them - is going to do any good.

Kershaw: Do those marvellous initials, MAD, mad - mutually assured destruction - do they still sit at the centre of American thinking on the strategic arms threat?

Warnke: I'm not sure whether they do, I am confident that they should. You see the difficulty is that some people think of mutual assured destruction as being a theory, as being some sort of a doctrine that you can repeal, or that you can change. It's not a theory, it's a fact. If there's a nuclear exchange, between the United States and the Soviet Union, we will destroy one another mutually. Now unless you start with that basic fact, you aren't going to be able to make any sense, out of either strategic doctrine, or nuclear arms control.

Ms. Drew: You did say earlier that Vice President Bush is no longer talking about a winnable nuclear war, but there's a lot of thinking here that the Pentagon continues to plan for one. Is it your impression that that is what they're doing, and that they do think that there can be such a thing?

Warnke: There has always been some planning for fighting and winning a nuclear war. I'd have to say, for example, that Presidential Directive 59, that was issued during the Carter Administration, talked about fighting a limited and protracted nuclear war. Now I think that the Reagan Administration documents that have been leaked, and that have been released, take that one step further. You recall the Defence Department Guidance, 1934 - 1938, that was leaked to the New York Times last Spring, talked about the fact that the United States must have the forces that can prevail, in case of nuclear war. Well if that's really what you think your forces have to be able to do, then forget about arms control.

Kershaw: You're back to mutually assured destruction.

Warnke: Oh no, what you're back to then is the idea that there will not be mutually assured destruction, there'll be kind of unilaterally assured destruction - you can destroy them and they can't destroy you. And that way madness lies.

Ms. Drew: Is it your impression that that is how our current strategic thinkers, and Secretary of Defence, his group think?

Warnke: There are very disturbing signs that at least some people in the Pentagon, principally civilians, think in those terms. If you read the Secretary of Defence's annual report to Congress, for the fiscal year 1973, it contains the statement that our forces -

Ms. Drew: You mean '33. ;

Warnke: 1933, sorry, that our nuclear forces must serve at least 4 purposes, and one of the purposes is in case of nuclear war, so we can end the war on terms favourable to ourselves and our allies. A commendable objective, but totally illusion.

Kershaw: Is there an argument, too, among American policy planners, that actually although it's very expensive to keep on running the race, that you are pushing the Russians even harder every time you notch it up a bit higher? The Russians can afford it



less well than can the Western allies.

Warnke:

Well there has been that theory expressed by people that should know better. The idea being that somehow, if we just up the ante a bit we're going to deal the Russians out of the game. I don't know of anybody who has dealt with the Soviet leadership who feels that way.

Kershaw:

Not deal them out of the game, but cause them an unacceptable and damaging cost.

Warnke:

Well you say an unacceptable and damaging - damaging yes, unacceptable, clearly no. The most recent CIA report indicates that if we think that the Soviet economy is on the verge of total collapse, that we're kidding ourselves. They will do whatever is necessary in order to keep pace. You have to recognise that they can screw down that standard of living, and not worry about getting voted out of office, and you also have to remember that for the average Soviet citizen, these are the good old days - this is as good as it's ever been.

Ashford:

But what about the cost factor here, in the United States? Isn't the growing demand in Congress, for cuts in defence spending, going to get through to the Administration, and this is going to be a factor in their thinking about arms control?

Warnke:

I would think that it's a surety, and I think probably it will. There are certainly some of the strategic programmes that are inordinately expensive, for example building two strategic bombers is not, in my opinion, something that will ever take place, given the budgetary constrictions that presently exist. I think the MX will finally go to its rightful place, which is on the shelf, just because of the cost.

Kershaw:

That's the new intercontinental missile.

Warnke:

That is correct.

Ms. Drew:

You were in the Administration that started this whole mess, I suppose, would be the word, about the intermediate weapons -

Warnke:

Yes.

Ms. Drew:

Missiles in Europe. Do you think they should be there at all?

Warnke:

In my opinion it's a very poor idea. I think if we had, at the present time, 572 American missiles, stationed in vulnerable Western European territory, then all of a sudden invented the Polaris submarine, if we would regard that, and our Western Europeans would - our friends would regard that as being just a tremendous tremendous development. We would still be able to target all of the Soviet targets, from an invulnerable platform, which is not located in Western Europe, where it can be blown up.

Ms. Drew:

Then why was it done?

Warnke:

Well it was done, I think, principally as a response to discomfort expressed by our Western European allies, most notably Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. He indicated concern about what was referred to then as the Duro strategic balance. That concept never really made any sense to me. It was - it's



sometimes theorised that this would be a coupling device, that somehow this would integrate American security with that of Western Europe, to a greater extent. It instead threatens to become one of the most effective decoupling devices that the Soviets could ever have devised. I see, as I've said, no magic in being able to hit the Soviet Union from territory of Western Europe. We already have almost 10,000 strategic warheads that can strike every target that these 572 could strike. And that, to me, is a very effective deterrent, it doesn't involve the political costs, it does not involve the disruption within the Alliance, that that decision presents. I regret it was made, I particularly regret it was made during a Democratic Administration.

Kershaw: You spoke earlier of perhaps some insensitivity towards the scale of European opinion here, and there's a popular response, including in some of the Press, seems to be that the Europeans are just being difficult in their response to receiving these new weapons. Are the counter feelings building up in the American polis, among the people, that could lead to a danger of new American isolationism, let's begin to think of pulling the troops out, the Mansfield Amendment being revived in thought?

Warrick: Well I think you have to recognise that some of the so-called hard-liners are basically isolationists, and that therefore they're perfectly prepared to make the threat, that unless the Europeans show that they love us, by accepting our missiles, we'll pull back our troops. That to me, of course, is an absurd way to deal with the problem. I don't think you'd terrify the Russians by shooting yourself in the foot, and I think we're much better off recognising that the principal coupling device, and the major guarantee of American participation, is the presence of American troops in Europe.

Kershaw: Coupling in the sense meaning keeping the two sides of the Atlantic joined.

Warrick: Absolutely, that is correct, because the -- the Soviets have to recognise that as long as we have 300,000, or something like that number, of American troops in Europe, that any attack on Western Europe would, in the words of the NATO Charter, be construed as an attack on the United States.

Ashford: It's not just a matter of isolationists in the Administration, I mean there's growing sentiment in Congress, for a withdrawal of troops, or to, you know, do something to show displeasure towards the Europeans.

Warrick: I don't think that it represents any wide segment of opinion. I think it's principally the extreme right wing Republican Senators that have been talking in those terms. I see nothing like the amount of support for a withdrawal of American troops that existed at the time of the Mansfield Resolution. At that time a lot of Liberals, a lot of genuine Atlanticists, were wondering whether we shouldn't cut back at least, on the number of American troops in Europe. It was not linked to any decisions about deployment of missiles.

Ms. Drew: I'm interested that you say that, because there was a point last year at which even some Democratic Senators were saying that they feared that if something like the Mansfield Amendment came up, it would pass, it would go through Congress like a shot. I wonder if you think that it's connected with other issues, or perceived issues, with Europe as well, it's



not just the arms issues, but trade, a whole set of issues and attitudes, which take a form of arguing over arms or troops, or whatever, but it's a broader set of concerns.

Warnke: Yeah, oh sure, there's always a knee-jerk reaction any time the Europeans do anything that displeases us, because we can say - well good Lord, we're taking care of their security, why aren't they grateful? I mean why don't they go along with the boycott against the Soviet pipeline? I think it's an irrational response, and I think that it would never actually be carried through. I think that most Americans believe, I think that even most Republican Senators believe, that our security is inextricably linked with that of Western Europe.

Ashford: What happens though if Chancellor Cole loses the election, on March the 6th, and the SPD take over? Isn't this - first of all you won't get your deployment, and this will set up a whole sort of chain reaction, in Europe, and this will also produce very negative reactions here, on this side of the Atlantic.

Warnke: Well I don't think that we can have any guarantee that whatever Party is in power in Germany will, in fact, be able to accept the American missiles. That's one of the reasons why it's so important to try and cut some sort of an interim deal at the present time, and why it's so important to point out to the Soviets that we still have plenty of bargaining leverage, even without a deployment decision for these 572 new missiles. We have, for example, the prospect of sea launch Cruise missiles. We could easily put 572 Cruise missiles on surface ships, on general purpose submarines, and they could strike the Soviet Union in the same limited time period. So that we aren't without bargaining cards. I think we've put far far too much emphasis on what essentially is a very very incremental kind of an issue, which is this issue of the European missiles.

Kershaw: You see in Britain, of course, you have a greater distinction, perhaps, between the two leading political parties, that where the Conservative Government is firmly behind retaining nuclear weapons and accepting American ones, you have the Labour Party which is committed to actual unilateral disarmament. Which does change very much the potential position of Britain within the NATO Alliance. Is that - I mean obviously that would be disturbing to people in the Pentagon, and this Administration, but do they discount it, because they see Mrs. Thatcher as leading in the opinion polls, or do they not recognise that that is a very serious threat for the future?

Warnke: I think that there is a feeling that if the Labour Party were to come into power, that probably that policy would not be implemented. Now whether that's a correct judgement or not is something that obviously you would know much better than I do. But I think there is a feeling that probably Mrs. Thatcher will survive, and that probably whoever got into power, whether Labour Party or what Tory, would reconsider the idea of unilateral disarmament.

Ashford: But isn't the United States justified in feeling a little bit peeved with the Europeans at the moment, because after all, as you pointed out, it was the Europeans who originally called for the deployment of these missiles, and now it is the Europeans who are beginning to turn round and say - well we're not quite so sure now?

Warnke: Well I think if you look back at that so-called NATO double



decision, of December 1979, you won't find anything in it about the zero-zero option. That what it said is that NATO will go ahead and deploy these 572 missiles, unless we can achieve some sort of an arms control agreement, that will render the deployment unnecessary. Now that's not zero option. In addition to that I point out that from December of 1979 till November of 1981, there were no negotiations, so it does seem to me that the Europeans are perfectly justified in saying - we need a reconsideration at this point, and we want some sort of a solution that possibly involves deferral.

Ms. Drew:

I'd like to know why, going back to where we started, why, other than the fact you think it'd be the rational thing to happen, you think the Reagan Administration will actually end up making some sort of a deal. If you could just take us through the processes of development of their thinking, that you expect to take place.

Warnke:

Well I think it's going to become obvious that this resistance in Western Europe is real, and that there is, in fact, a genuine question as to whether the deployment can take place. I'd be quite sure, for example, that we would not, by the end of 1983, or in 1984, be able to deploy any Cruise missiles, in Holland or in Belgium. Now possibly Italy, some people feel there's no way of destabilising an Italian Government, so perhaps the Italian Government can go ahead and deploy them. But at the same time there is a growing resistance. As far as Germany is concerned, if Mr. Cole wins, he is still faced with the fact that there are a lot of CDU members, who feel very strongly about the deployment of American Cruise missiles and Pershing Twos, and no politician is going to remain successful if he ignores the will of his constituents. I think also it's going to become increasingly clear that the maximum bargaining power that we have is by looking at the entire strategic complex, looking at things like the MX, in conjunction with the SS20, the sea launch Cruise missiles in conjunction with the SS20. And that therefore the rational thing is to combine the negotiations, so that we have the maximum number of trade-offs.

Ms. Drew:

Doesn't that make it more difficult to get an agreement on the intermediate range weapons, because of the difficulty of START that you described?

Warnke:

I don't think so, no, because what I'm talking about is the possibility of having some sort of a temporary agreement, something that involves a genuine reduction in the nuclear threat, to Western Europe, in exchange for postponing the deployment, let's say, for 2 years.

Kershaw:

In all of this there's a point I've seen you quoted upon before, but the - there's no point in just talking about deployment either, and moving perhaps Russian missiles back behind the Urals. There is a question of any realistic agreement has to talk about destruction, actual removal of weapon systems.

Warnke:

Oh no question about that. After all the SS20s are mounted on mobile launchers, so any proposal by the Soviets, just to move them East of the Urals, is, in my opinion, worse than nothing. Because then, at a time of crisis, the crisis would be intensified if we were to see those SS20s moving back West. In addition to which we have a mutual security treaty with Japan. Now is it consistent with that treaty to say to the Soviets - fine, move 100 SS20s, so they can hit Japan? Or



even China. So that I don't regard that as being any kind of a proposition at all. When I talk about reduction, I'm talking about actual dismantling and destruction.

Ashford: And that leads to the question of verification. How does one verify that these things have been destroyed, bearing in mind .....

Warnke: Well that really is very simple. With our photo reconnaissance satellites we have been verifying for quite some time, the destruction of a certain number of ICBM silos. You work out the rules, in the standing consultative committee in - in Geneva. For example with regard to strategic bombers. We require that they cut the strategic bomber in half, then exhibit it on an airstrip. Now these SS20 launchers are clearly identifiable, and we would have to see evidence of the physical destruction of that launcher.

Ashford: So you don't necessarily need on the spot verification.

Warnke: Oh, on the spot verification would be of very little use, under those circumstances, because how are you going to be able to tramp all over the wildernesses of Siberia, and make sure that you've detected all of the ones that there are. What you have to have is actual knowledge, that a certain number of them have been physically destroyed, and that's totally verifiable.

Ms. Drew: This may be true of the mobile missiles and the intermediate range weapons, but isn't it true that verification on some of the elements that would go into the larger talks, particularly Cruise missiles, is becoming extremely difficult, if not impossible?


Warnke: It's one of the reasons why I don't favour the idea of the limited deployment of ground launch Cruise missiles in Western Europe. Once we begin to deploy any Cruise missiles, it's going to become extraordinarily difficult for the other side to know how many have been deployed. With air launch Cruise missiles you've got an identifiable vehicle, the strategic bomber, and you know how many each strategic bomber can carry. But launch points for ground launch Cruise missiles are almost infinite.

Kershaw: Mr. Warnke, can I ask the final question from this side of the table? The image of Western technological superiority in defence seems to have been dented in Europe, together, and it's come at the same time as the idea of a natural and continuous economic growth by the West, perhaps the two senses of deficiency are related. But are they - is that doubt present in this country too? In the United States?

Warnke: I think that there has been some shaking of our view about our technological superiority, such things as the unsuccessful attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran, and the fact that the helicopters didn't work. Then the fact that we're having trouble, of course, with the Pershing Two. I mean all of that sort of thing does shake confidence to some extent. I'd say the prevailing view, though, is that technologically, however bad we are, the Russians are worse.

Kershaw: Well Mr. Warnke, from Elizabeth Drew, and Nicholas Ashford, and myself, thank you very much for being with us, and that's all from Saturday Briefing, in Washington. Good night.





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

2 February 1983

LR  
DEFENCE  
*Dear Lord Chalfont*

Thank you very much indeed for your letter of 10 January.

We have been giving a lot of thought recently to the question of policy formulation and presentation in the field of arms control and disarmament and it was most useful to have your own ideas available. We have just taken some steps to re-organise our arrangements for handling these matters. I have weighed carefully your suggestion that we should have a Special Adviser on arms control and disarmament in No. 10. I have concluded that this is not necessary at present but do now have a new Adviser on the whole field of defence questions.

I have noted your comments about the need for stronger representation in international negotiations.

It was very good of you to write.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Royal Arms*

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Chalfont, O.B.E., M.C.

6



Duty Clerk

Please now detailed  
letter.

Mr 3  
/ 2.

PRIME MINISTER

LORD CHALFONT

You will recall his private and personal letter (attached)  
of 10 January.

In the light of the decisions you have now taken about  
a new structure for dealing with nuclear issues, I doubt whether  
it will be worth your while to invite Lord Chalfont in for a  
talk. If you agree, you could sign a letter on the lines of the  
attached.

If you prefer to have a talk with Lord Chalfont, I will  
of course invite him in. Alternatively, he is coming to the  
dinner for President Mubarak tomorrow and you could have a quick  
word with him then. - I will do so.

A.S.C.

1 February 1983





10 DOWNING STREET

he 15

bc

B1.

Sir A Parsons  
Blackburn

SUBJECT

cc Mather

From the Private Secretary

31 January 1983

Dear Richard,

Nuclear Weapons and Public Opinion

The Prime Minister chaired an ad hoc Ministerial meeting on the above subject at No. 10 Downing Street today. The meeting was attended by the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Sir Robert Armstrong. The meeting had before it minutes of 7 January and 13 January by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and a minute of 12 January by the Secretary of State for Defence.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he believed it was desirable to establish a new structure for handling the preparation and public presentation of the Government's case on nuclear issues. He envisaged occasional meetings under the Prime Minister's chairmanship of the Ministers at today's meeting; a subsidiary group of Ministers which would consider day to day handling of issues; and a special unit of officials, directed by someone who was familiar with the media, which would devote full time attention to the issues, would think imaginatively about them and would maintain close contact with the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

There was also a need for greater activity through Party channels and in the constituencies. Opinion polls showed that 72% of the British public were against unilateralism. We needed to develop that feeling. It might also be useful to arrange a debate in the House of Commons on Government policy on nuclear issues.

The Home Secretary said that his Department had a major interest in these matters because of its involvement in civil defence policy. He agreed that a new structure was necessary. At present efforts to develop a civil defence policy were constrained by the argument that we should not provoke undue difficulties with the local authorities.

There was a need for new regulations laying on the local authorities an obligation to make plans for the contingencies of both nuclear and conventional war. Failure to impose such an obligation could open the Government to the charge of weakness.

/ It was



It was doubtful whether these regulations should impose a specific obligation on individuals who disapproved of Government policy to take part in the formulation of such plans.

The Prime Minister said that she believed that the Government would be wise to present its case in terms of nuclear deterrence. In any debate on the action to be taken in the case of nuclear war it would be much more difficult to win the argument. Thus she believed that the new regulations should seek to lay an obligation on local authorities to prepare for disasters of any kind.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that a reasonable civil defence policy could be regarded as an aid to our policy of deterrence in the sense that if the Soviet Union was under the impression that we were giving no thought to action in the event of nuclear war, the credibility of the deterrent would in their eyes be reduced.

The Defence Secretary warned that local authorities would seek to embarrass the Government by developing inflammatory scenarios as a response to their new obligation to prepare plans for emergencies.

The Home Secretary said that he believed the new regulations could be framed in such a way as to meet the point made by the Prime Minister. Their general sense would be to require local authorities to bring their regulations up to date for the purpose of emergencies of all kinds. He hoped that the regulations would be ready by March/April.

Reverting to the question of structure, the Defence Secretary said that he was not sympathetic to the idea of a Cabinet Office Committee at official level to coordinate action. The two lead Departments on these matters were the FCO and the MOD. He therefore thought that either the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary or he himself should chair the main Ministerial Committee. Within the Ministry of Defence the following action was planned. He hoped to deliver a speech at the Conference of Young Conservatives in two weeks' time setting out the Government's whole case on nuclear issues (it was agreed that the desirability of this would be looked at again in view of the Prime Minister's intention to devote part of her own speech at the Conference to nuclear matters). One full time official in the Ministry of Defence would be appointed to supervise work at official level. Detailed research would be carried out into the precise nature of the anxieties in British public opinion about nuclear policy. A comprehensive programme of speeches and articles would be drawn up, geared to particular events. He believed that the basic aim of the Government's publicity should be to exploit the general sentiment against one-sided disarmament to produce a better understanding of the case for Cruise and Trident.

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster expressed the view that what was needed was a steady, sustained campaign. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament had about 30 people who did nothing else but plan activity. This could not be matched by a part-time Committee.

/ Following further



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

Following further discussion, the Prime Minister concluded that a steady, sustained campaign was the right aim. There should be no sudden "launching".

With regard to structure, a Ministerial Committee should be established under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State for Defence. The Secretary of State for Scotland should be invited to take part as should the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Mr. Hurd, Mr. Mayhew and Mr. Gummer. Mr. Ingham from No. 10 would also sit on this Committee.

The Secretary of State for Defence would arrange for the establishment of a group of officials, under MOD chairmanship, which would support the work of the Ministerial Committee.

Finally, the Ministerial Committee should consider further the specific ideas in paragraph 3 of the minute of 7 January by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

I am copying this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Muir Russell (Scottish Office), Alex Galloway (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office), Emma Oxford (Mr. Gummer's Office, Department of Employment) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*you ever*

*fol Cole.*

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL



1. MR COLES ✓ AA 29/11.

2. PRIME MINISTER

### NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Your meeting on Monday should be directed at establishing quickly effective machinery for prosecuting a persuasive campaign to sell Government policy and to counter Russian propaganda and the CND campaign.

You should not get bogged down in the detail of a Government campaign.

#### Problem

The main problem remains divided responsibility and the lack of adequate campaigning resources. We have been - and to a large extent still are - fiddling while Rome burns.

We need machinery which brings together in working partnership predominantly the MoD and FCO. But over and above this we need machinery which marshals the resources of Government as a whole, and its friends outside, and provides not merely the message but also a plan of campaign, and then makes sure things happen.

All my experience teaches me that effective campaigns are seldom conducted in Government without Prime Ministerial endorsement and direct interest. You need therefore to find a way of identifying yourself closely with the campaign (without taking too much on yourself) and in such a way that Government believes you want action this day.

#### Ministerial Level

I agree with the Foreign Secretary's suggestion of January 13 that you need a group of senior Ministers, under your chairmanship, to take charge of the operation.

I see advantage of an executive team of Ministers, as proposed. This team would be responsible for making things happen and should report weekly to you. You will wish to consider whether the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, while otherwise a highly desirable chairman, is the right man as chairman of the Party with responsibility for fighting an election.



Official Level

The executive group of Ministers would need servicing. This cannot be achieved by putting either the MoD or FCO in the lead; we need to weld the two into one fighting force and to mobilise Government as a whole.

Again, I believe the Foreign Secretary is right in proposing a small unit of officials in Cabinet Office. I believe that unit should be a combination of administration and information specialists of equal weight and carefully selected for their positive approach to the presentation of policy.

The question is whether it should be chaired by me, as the co-ordinator of presentation at official level, or an outsider of Sir Donald Maitland's calibre.

Again for special efforts of this kind - and a major special effort is called for if we are to make up for lost time - I think we should make special arrangements and appoint an "outsider" of relevant experience.

But it will be of the utmost importance for that leader to keep in the closest touch with myself, and the Heads of Information in MoD, FCO and Home Office and to involve us in the planning of his campaign.

I would therefore see the following organisational structure:

1. Cabinet Group.
2. Executive Group of Ministers.
3. Cabinet Office Planning Group (ie. "Sir Donald Maitland", Chief Press Secretary and Head of Information of MoD, FCO and Home Office).
4. Cabinet Office Action Unit.


I should add that I am sure my colleagues in MoD, FCO and Home Office could work effectively with Sir Donald.



Campaign

Here the main requirements are:

1. Preparation of overall message on one side of paper; keep it simple;
2. speed of response to Russian or other propaganda;
3. building up of Government campaign and mobilisation of total resources;
4. devising ways of neutralising CND publicity and creating a positive impact of our own;
5. monitoring trends and results.



B. INGHAM

28 January 1983





10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Since this meeting will be attended by some who are not members of NSC 7, you will wish to avoid going into detail on the more delicate issues.

2. You may like to ask the Foreign Secretary to outline his ideas and then invite others to comment.

A. J. C.  $\frac{28}{1}$



DEFENCE



10 DOWNING STREET

Mr. Ingham

The pp. which you wished to see  
are on this file.

Would you please note that  
some of them are personal and  
private.

The meeting is on Tuesday.

A. J. C. <sup>27</sup>/<sub>11</sub>.





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)  
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

From: Private Secretary to  
MINISTER OF STATE FOR  
THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/PB/2/4

27 January 1983

*Dear John,*

SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

You wrote to me on December 20 regarding a suitable platform for a major speech by the Prime Minister on arms control and disarmament.

You will now have seen Stephen Lamport's letter suggesting that the Prime Minister might speak at Chatham House towards the end of February. Mr Heseltine and Mr Blaker support this suggestion. If the Prime Minister is content we will prepare a draft speech for her consideration.

*Yours ever*

*Peter Craine*

R P CRAINE

A J Coles Esq



28 JAN 1998

1234  
5678  
9012



JOHN SILKIN (LABOUR SHADOW DEFENCE SPOKESMAN)

Transcript from BBC Radio 4, Today Programme. 23 January 1983.

PRESENTER: PETER HOBDAV. Well earlier in the programme, Admiral Jean La Rock, former Planning Strategist in the Pentagon and now Director of the Centre for Defence Information in the United States, said that the decision to use American nuclear weapons in Europe would be a purely US decision. We then heard from Mr Heseltine, the Defence Secretary, that, in his view, since, in the British case, the US missiles (Cruise missiles, for example) in the future, were on British soil and in British Bases and, given the traditional consultation that exists between Downing Street and the White House, it is inconceivable that Cruise missiles, for example, could be fired without the consent of the British Prime Minister. Well with me in the studio is the Shadow Defence Secretary, John Silkin. Mr Silkin, whose right? Have the Americans got their finger on the trigger (and the Americans only) or do the British have the right of veto?

SILKIN: I think most Americans would believe that Admiral La<sup>2</sup> Rock is right and that, in fact, they do have the sole say in this; and I think most American Governments would take that point of view. I think that - as with all things - that there's a slight difference when you look at the reality. The truth is that, as far as Bases are concerned, we do have (Britain does have) a say in Bases on her own territory but the trouble with Cruise is that they're not necessarily fired from Bases but often from roads outside and then, I believe, the Americans would have undisputed control.

HOBDAV: So you see ..... really in Mr Heseltine's point that in a sense, since they're on British soil, since they're on British Bases with British personnel, that it's almost impossible



for the Americans - indeed it is impossible for the Americans - to do anything without the consent of the British and of the British Government and without prior consultation?

SILKIN: Well I think your almost might be more truthful than leaving that almost out. What he's really saying, surely, is that we would have so much influence we would be able to stop them if necessary. Well that's one of those questions that, frankly, I don't think is necessarily true at all. If one were in that position, I think the Admiral might very well be right: the Americans might fire 'em off and it wouldn't matter what we said.

HOBDAV: But if we give Mr Heseltine the benefit of the doubt and accept the Defence Secretary's word that we do have those guarantees .....?

SILKIN: I don't think guarantees - there are no guarantees, in my view - I don't think there ever have been. I think the guarantees apply to bases, they do not apply to the missiles themselves.

HOBDAV: Mr Heseltine seems to be saying, though, this morning, that we have got that right. ....

SILKIN: He's been in the job a very, very short time .....

HOBDAV: Going back to the water-workers' dispute and just talking about words. .... But, assuming that we have got some sort sort of guarantee .....?

SILKIN: Well I don't think we have such a guarantee. We have a guarantee over Bases, not over missiles and not over the use of missiles. These can be used not on Bases but on the roads outside and they probably would .....

HOBDAV: You're essentially saying, then, that Mr Heseltine is totally wrong to suggest that we have got - if you don't like the



word guarantee - safeguards over the deployment of .....

SILKIN: Neither. In fact, I pressed him on this in the House of Commons a few weeks ago but he wouldn't answer then: he can't answer. He's been in the job a months (longer or so now) perhaps after another month, he'll be agreeing with me.

HOBDAV: If he can come up with a satisfactory answer; if he can show, clearly and unequivocally, that there are a set of guarantees, a set of procedures which give the British the final word on the deployment of those US missiles: would that change the argument, then?

SILKIN: I think it'd change the argument to this extent: that the Americans would then say what on earth's the point of our having them any way? That the advantage to the Americans - as the Americans see it - is that they have got supreme control over them and, therefore, they can fire them whenever they wish. If you were to remove that control from them, I very much doubt whether they would see any advantage. So I don't think the argument is there at all. And, in any event, the Labour Party is dead against having Cruise missiles here, whatever happens, because it makes us a No 1 nuclear target for any enemy without giving us any advantage whatever.

HOBDAV: You're saying then that; even if the Americans were prepared to live with the British right to veto the deployment of those missiles .....


SILKIN: Which they wouldn't.

HOBDAV: But even if they did and the Labour Party came to power after the next election, you'd still get rid of the missiles?

SILKIN: We haven't yet got them. We would prevent them from coming here in the first place. That's the important thing.

HOBDAV: Mr Silkin, thank you.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 January 1983

Peter Craine Esq  
Private Secretary to the  
Minister of State for  
Armed Forces  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall


Dear Peter,

SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Our officials have discussed John Coles's letter of 20 December and the request for advice on a suitable platform for a major speech by the Prime Minister in the near future on arms control and disarmament.

One possibility that arises is that the Prime Minister might speak at Chatham House where Mr Jenkins (8 February) and Mr Foot (15 February) will respectively have spoken about defence and disarmament. The Chatham House programme for February and March is attached. If the Prime Minister took up this opportunity, she would enjoy the advantage of speaking after the leaders of the Social Democratic and Labour Parties.

Mr Hurd has discussed the Chatham House possibility with Mr Pym who agrees that it should be considered. Those concerned with the running of the Chatham House programme would welcome an early decision if the Prime Minister chose to speak there towards the end of February.

Yours ever,  
  
S M J Lamport  
Private Secretary to Mr Hurd

cc: A J Coles Esq ←  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street





**THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**  
Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, London SW1Y 4LE (Telephone: 01-930 2233)

**GENERAL MEETINGS FEBRUARY/MARCH 1983**

All the following meetings will be on the record

**SPECIAL  
BRIEFING ON  
COAL—SEE OVER!**

Date	Day	Time	Subject	Speaker	Notes
1 Feb.	TUE.	1.30	The international steel market as a reflection of world economic trends	IAN MACGREGOR	Mr MacGregor has been Chairman and Chief Executive, British Steel Corporation, since 1980.
3 Feb.	THU.	1.30	The Iranian revolution and the Arab world	EDWARD MORTIMER	Mr Mortimer, a leader writer on <i>The Times</i> , is author of <i>Faith and Power, the Politics of Islam</i> (1982).
* 8 Feb.	TUE.	1.30	Defence and Britain's role in the world	THE RT HON ROY JENKINS, MP	Mr Jenkins is leader of the Social Democratic Party. He was President of the European Commission, 1977-81.
* 15 Feb.	TUE.	6.00	Is disarmament a dream? <i>Lecture in memory of the late Lord Noel-Baker, who was an Honorary President of Chatham House, 1968-82.</i>	THE RT HON MICHAEL FOOT, MP	Mr Foot has been leader of the Labour Party since 1980.
* 24 Feb.	THU.	5.00	The UN and international security in the 1980s <i>Thirty-first Stevenson Memorial Lecture held in conjunction with the LSE. This lecture will be given at the LSE, Houghton Street, Aldwych, London WC2.</i>	SIR ANTONY PARSONS, KCMG, MVO, MC	From 1 January 1983 Sir Anthony Parsons has been Adviser to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs at 10 Downing Street. He was UK Permanent Representative to the UN, 1979-82.
* 1 Mar.	TUE.	1.30	The need for nuclear trade	IAN SMART	A consultant on international energy affairs, Mr Smart is editor of <i>World Nuclear Energy: Toward a Bargain of Confidence</i> to be published in February.
22 Mar.	TUE.	1.30	Trade policy in a time of recession	ARTHUR DUNKEL	Mr Dunkel has been Director-General of GATT since May 1980.
30 Mar.	WED.	1.30	East-West trade and technology transfer: the balance of economic power	JOHN PINDER, OBE	Mr Pinder is Director of the Policy Studies Institute.

A limited number of lunches will be available in the staff canteen up to 12.45 pm at £2.10 to members who order from the Meetings Department by 10.30 am on the previous working day.

In the event of cancellation of a General Meeting, an advertisement will be inserted in the personal columns of *The Times* under the heading "Announcements" on the previous working day.



1890  
1891  
1892  
1893  
1894  
1895  
1896  
1897  
1898  
1899  
1900

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  
CENTRAL MEETING'S FEBRUARY/MARCH 1933  
All the following meetings will be on the terms




Date	Day	Time	Subject	Speaker
1 Feb	TUE	1.30	The International Law Commission as a permanent body of experts	Mr. McNair
2 Feb	TUE	1.30	The International Law Commission and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
3 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
4 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
5 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
6 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
7 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
8 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
9 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
10 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
11 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
12 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
13 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
14 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
15 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
16 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
17 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
18 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
19 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
20 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
21 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
22 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
23 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
24 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
25 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
26 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
27 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
28 Feb	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
1 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
2 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
3 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
4 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
5 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
6 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
7 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
8 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
9 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
10 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
11 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
12 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
13 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
14 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
15 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
16 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
17 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
18 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
19 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
20 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
21 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
22 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
23 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
24 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
25 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
26 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
27 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
28 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
29 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
30 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair
31 Mar	TUE	1.30	International Law and the League of Nations	Mr. McNair

A list of speakers for the meetings will be published in the next few days. The meetings will be held in the Lecture Hall of the Royal Institute of International Law, 11, Bedford Square, London, W.C.1.

The Royal Institute of International Law was founded in 1874 and has since that time been engaged in the study and teaching of international law. It is the only international law organization in the world which has a permanent secretariat and a permanent library. The Institute's work is carried out through its various committees and commissions, which are entrusted with the study and preparation of reports on subjects of international law. The Institute also publishes a journal, the *Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International*, which is one of the most authoritative sources of information on international law.



B/P



FILE

RW

ble: Sir A. Parsons  
Mr Ingham  
Miss Stephens.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 January, 1983

① Mr. Coles ✓ A.S.C. 1/1  
14.30 - 15.30  
Monday 31st JAN  
② CF: To file

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

The Prime Minister was grateful for the minutes of 7 and 13 January by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on this subject. She has also seen the minute of 12 January by the Secretary of State for Defence.

Mrs Thatcher agrees that it is desirable to hold an early meeting under her chairmanship to discuss these questions. We shall be in touch separately about the timing but the Prime Minister would be grateful if, in addition to Mr Pym, the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Parkinson and Sir Robert Armstrong would attend. Sir Anthony Parsons and Mr Ingham will also be present.

The Prime Minister made no comment on the substance of Mr. Pym's minutes, except to express doubt about the wisdom of a round-table conference in the spring, including a number of representatives of the churches.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Alex Galloway (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office):

A. J. COLES

R. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



PRIME MINISTER

①

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BRITISH PUBLIC  
OPINION

I attach two minutes by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, a brief comment by the Defence Secretary and a minute by Sir Anthony Parsons.

---

I am sure that the time has come to re-organise our machinery for handling public opinion on the nuclear weapons debate. Some efforts have been made in the past but they have not been sufficiently effective. In particular, we are in some danger of losing the argument with public opinion about the deployment of Cruise.

---

The Foreign Secretary proposes an early meeting under your chairmanship, attended by the Defence Secretary and the Chairman of the Party, to take decisions on the machinery for handling these matters. I suggest that Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Anthony Parsons and Bernard Ingham should also attend.

---

Agree that we set up an early meeting on these lines?

A.J.C.

14 January, 1983





PM/83/4

PRIME MINISTER

Nuclear Weapons and Public Opinion

1. In my minute of 7 January I undertook to let you have suggestions about the organisation of a special unit in the Cabinet Office designed to improve our efforts to get across to the public at large the Government's approach.

2. I should like to propose an arrangement on the following lines:

(a) a group of senior Ministers, under your chairmanship, should take overall charge of this operation. You will want to consider which colleagues should attend. In my view we should include MISC 7 colleagues as well as Cecil Parkinson;

(b) for operational day to day supervision, I think we need a smaller Ministerial team, perhaps under Cecil Parkinson's chairmanship. Subject to your views I think this might subsume the existing steering group run by Douglas Hurd and Peter Blaker and which includes Patrick Mayhew from the Home Office. This team might report to the senior Ministerial group from time to time as appropriate.

(c) in support of the smaller Ministerial team we might establish a special unit of officials in the Cabinet Office. This would be tasked with keeping under constant review the main topics of current interest; with monitoring public opinion through regular polling; organising the preparation of papers, pamphlets and lines of argument in support of the Government's case; ensuring the distribution of documents, via existing channels in the FCO and MOD, to appropriate non-governmental organisations, to the COI, the Churches and, via the party organisation, to the constituencies. It would also have to ensure that our backbenchers receive a regular supply of up-to-date briefing on topical aspects of the debate. In my view





the special support unit should not supplant the existing arrangements for press handling in No 10 in the FCO or MOD; these should continue to be the main channel of communication. But the unit would have to ensure a thorough co-ordination of the Government line at all levels under the supervision of the Ministerial team.

(d) as I mentioned to you, as head of the unit or working very closely with it, I would envisage a senior figure with experience both of the Whitehall machine and of handling the media, who would be able to devote virtually the whole of his time to the task. One possibility which occurs to me is Sir D Maitland.

3. I understand that Cecil Parkinson intends to speak to you on the subject in the near future. I believe his ideas are very similar to my own.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to Michael Heseltine and Cecil Parkinson, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

13 January, 1983



MR. COLES

Prime Minister

②

A.J.C. 17.  
1

cc B1

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

1. I have seen a copy of the Foreign Secretary's note to the Prime Minister on this subject and think it contains excellent ideas. I have also seen a copy of the briefing for the Prime Minister for the LWT interview on 16 January (John Weston's minute of 11 January). The briefing seems fine, so far as it goes.
  
2. The Prime Minister might be interested in the following. During the six months of my retirement, I have been astonished at the preoccupation about the nuclear debate amongst a wide spectrum of personal friends of mine. These are not left wingers. They are sensible, middle of the road people who totally reject the unilateralist argument and also the craven suggestion that, while remaining in NATO, we should pass the buck of danger to the Italians and the Germans by refusing to accept the risk of having nuclear missiles based in the United Kingdom. These people are concerned about other questions, the following being the ones which have been most frequently directed at me:
  - i. Since it is the case that the Soviet Union have had SS20s deployed in large numbers for four or five years, thus creating a long and wide gap in deterrence between the two sides, why have they not already blackmailed the West with their possession of these weapons?
  
  - ii. We now have in the White House a President of lower intellectual calibre and less grasp of international issues than any incumbent since the Second World War. (This, in the view of my friends, lies at the heart of the recrudescence of the "peace debate" in this country and elsewhere.) This being so, we must have some kind of effective dual control over any American missiles which are sited in the United Kingdom.
  
  - iii. How do we answer Lord Carver's argument (his book has sold well) about the independent nuclear deterrent?


/His contention



His contention which has carried most conviction is that an independent nuclear deterrent which is so small as not to constitute a credible first strike threat is useless. If the adversary knows that it cannot be used as a first strike weapon, he will discount it and will feel free to resort to conventional blackmail without running the risk of a nuclear exchange. Hence, we are maintaining an expensive weapon which has no deterrent value simply for political reasons. The money would be better spent on building up our conventional forces.

iv. If we are to have an independent nuclear deterrent, it must be fully independent. The French have achieved this but we have not. On the assumption that we would only need it if the Americans were to go into isolation or be otherwise stalemated by the Russians, how would we expect to have freedom of action when our missile system depends on American maintenance? Could they not turn the tap off at the crucial moment if they so wished, as industrialised powers have done in the past with Third World countries to whom they are principal conventional arms suppliers?

3. The above list of questions is not comprehensive. But they represent some of the main preoccupations of intelligent people who are potential or actual supporters of the Government. They are likely to crop up as the public debate develops.



13 January 1983

A.D. PARSONS





MO 18/1/2

PRIME MINISTER

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PUBLIC OPINION


I read with interest the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute to you of 7th January about nuclear weapons and public opinion.

2. I agree with him that 1983 will be a crucial year and I am already looking at what more needs to be done in this area. A good deal of action is of course already in hand including in some of the areas referred to by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. I support many of his ideas, though I have reservations on some. Rather than detail them now could I strongly support his suggestion of a meeting - it would be very helpful for me if this could be held soon.

*WJH*

Ministry of Defence  
12th January 1983





PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE  
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

12 January 1983

Dr  
12/1

Dear Private Secretary

As part of the series of Ministerial guidance notes on policy presentation issued by the Lord President of the Council, I am today circulating to all Ministers a briefing pack on Nuclear Deterrence and Disarmament. It is hoped that Ministers will find opportunities to deploy the material in this pack as widely as possible in speeches and other appropriate occasions.

Yours faithfully

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Andrew Ward".

Andrew Ward



**NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND DISARMAMENT**

**BRIEFING NOTES**



NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND DISARMAMENTCONTENTS

	Page
I BRITAIN'S NUCLEAR POLICY - KEY POINTS	1
- GENERAL	
- DETERRENCE	
- UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT	
- TRIDENT	
- CRUISE MISSILES	
- CIVIL DEFENCE	
II SPEAKING NOTES	5
- DETERRENCE	
- INDEPENDENT BRITISH NUCLEAR DETERRENT	
- GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES	
- ARMS CONTROL	
- CIVIL DEFENCE	
III QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS	13
IV ETHICAL ASPECTS - A LETTER FROM JOHN NOTT TO A BACKBENCH MP	35
V THE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES	38
VI GOVERNMENT FACTSHEETS AND BROCHURES ABOUT NUCLEAR ISSUES	41



There has been much public discussion of late about the issues of nuclear deterrence and disarmament. The Government welcomes this discussion: it is right that everyone should be concerned about such vitally important questions. The attached notes are provided for those who want to understand more clearly the Government's policies. They cover not only nuclear deterrence, but also the closely related issues of arms control and disarmament (which are principally the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and civil defence (which is dealt with by the Home Office).

Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall SW1

3rd Edition

November 1982



# I - BRITAIN'S NUCLEAR POLICY: THE KEY POINTS TO MAKE

## 1. GENERAL

- a. The Government understands public concern about nuclear weapons; but they cannot be disinvented.
- b. The Government shares the same aim as the unilateral disarmers to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used; but we differ on the means to achieve this.
- c. We have avoided war in Europe for 37 years. Anyone who wants to tear up existing policy must show that their alternative will work as well.

## 2. THE CASE FOR DETERRENCE

- a. The aim of deterrence is to prevent war - nuclear or conventional - by persuading anyone thinking of attacking us that it would not be worth their while.
- b. As long as the Soviet Union possesses massive nuclear and non-nuclear forces, NATO needs sufficient of both to convince them that they could not hope to gain by using these forces.
- c. But deterrence is not the whole story: in parallel, whilst a military balance is maintained, we are constantly seeking lower levels of forces on both sides through arms control and disarmament.

## 3. THE CASE AGAINST UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT

- a. Unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain would destabilise NATO and thus reduce the West's ability to deter aggression or the threat of force.
- b. It would not make UK any less of a target for attack because Soviet systems would still be aimed at us as a member of the Alliance.



c. It takes no account of the existing Soviet conventional superiority (tanks, aircraft, guns) in Europe.

d. The Russians, who give such priority to their military power, would never follow our example: they have said as much.

e. It would cut no ice with countries thinking of acquiring nuclear weapons. Their actions will not be influenced by what the UK does, but by their own regional security interests.

f. It would undermine a number of important disarmament negotiations now in train aimed at reaching balanced multilateral force reductions and not merely limitations on growth. If the Russians believe that the West is going to disarm anyway this removes the incentive for them to negotiate seriously.

g. There is no moral merit in abandoning nuclear weapons yet remaining in NATO and relying on US nuclear forces.

#### 4. THE CASE FOR TRIDENT

a. If the Russians ever mistakenly believed that the USA would not come to the aid of Europe if the latter were attacked the United Kingdom's nuclear force under independent control would still deter such an attack. Our Polaris force and decision to acquire Trident are welcomed by all our NATO allies.

b. Polaris will need to be replaced by about 1995; the Trident decision has been taken to maintain this capability. Failure to replace Polaris would be unilateral disarmament. Submarine launched cruise missile alternative would be more expensive.

c. During the period when it is introduced into service Trident will account, on average, for only about 3% of the defence budget per year. Trident is a more advanced system than Polaris. Its extra capability gives us an insurance against any advances in Soviet ABM defences well into the next century.



5. THE CASE FOR NATO INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE (INF) MODERNISATION

- a. Imbalance of 4 to 1 in intermediate range nuclear forces in or targetted on Europe. Soviet SS20s already being deployed; NATO's comparable capability ageing and increasingly vulnerable.
- b. NATO needs cruise missiles to deter the Russians from threatening limited nuclear strikes on Europe in the expectation that the USA would stand aside. The need for them was pressed mainly by the Europeans to show that the USA is firmly committed to Europe's defence.
- c. The unanimous NATO decision to modernise its Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) was accompanied by a parallel offer to negotiate limitations with the Russians on these weapons. Negotiations have now begun. The NATO aim is to eliminate all INF land-based missiles on both sides.
- d. Cruise missiles are not:
  - an American plan to fight a limited nuclear war in Europe; they are to deter the Russians from thinking they could do so.
  - a new capability: US and UK aircraft based in Britain have been doing the same job for years.
  - first strike weapons: their long flight time makes them unsuitable and the SS20s are mobile anyway.
  - under sole US control. Matter for joint US/UK decision.

6. THE CASE FOR CIVIL DEFENCE

- a. Deterrence can prevent war, but as long as the Soviet Union poses a threat to our security, any humane Government must cater for the remotest possibility that war might come.



b. No civil defence measures could make nuclear war acceptable to the Government but it has a duty to help survivors if we were ever attacked.

c. Any form of attack short of thousands of nuclear bombs would leave many millions of survivors and their numbers could be increased by even elementary civil defence measures. Their survival and recovery would depend largely on the plans which had been made in peacetime and on the implementation of plans by the surviving agencies of government.

d. Our civil defence arrangements, while not so good at, say, public shelter provision, as some countries (Switzerland, Sweden) are in general as good if not superior to that of many other major nations. Warning of enemy attack, monitoring of intensity of fallout radiation, plans for continuation of government and essential services, and public information in a crisis, are all areas where our arrangements are at least as good as other countries. However we are constantly considering what improvements are needed in the light of the risk, and available finances.



## II - SPEAKING NOTES ON NUCLEAR POLICY

### 1. DETERRENCE

We in Britain belong to NATO, an organisation which was set up by the countries of Western Europe and North America after the Second World War, because of the fears caused by Russian expansion into Eastern Europe. NATO is a defensive Alliance; its members regard an attack on one as an attack on all, and are pledged to assist each other. The Alliance has no aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union or any other country. It is, however, the countries of the Warsaw Pact and in particular the Soviet Union, which present the greatest threat to our security. The Soviet Union has immense conventional and nuclear forces - far more than could reasonably be required for purely defensive purposes. The invasion of Afghanistan is only the most recent demonstration that the Soviet Union is prepared to use military strength to achieve its political objective. While, of course, NATO does not need to match the Warsaw Pact weapon for weapon, we do need a range of forces, nuclear and conventional, so as to be able to show that we can defend ourselves against attack at any level. By demonstrating this we aim to deter such an attack from ever being mounted against us in the first place.

Deterrence is not an attractive way of ensuring peace. But at least it has worked: it has helped to keep Europe at peace for over 30 years, despite circumstances that were often difficult. To abandon our security system now, in favour of some alternative which would be quite unproven would be immensely dangerous. Deterrence provides the necessary stability to enable us to negotiate international agreements on disarmament measures which will really give us a safer world if they are verifiable and apply equally to both sides. The possession of nuclear weapons is an essential fact of deterrence: in a world where such weapons exist the NATO alliance must be able to deter their use by an enemy or to resist blackmail based on the threat of nuclear attack.



## 2. THE CASE FOR AN INDEPENDENT BRITISH NUCLEAR DETERRENT

Britain's nuclear forces are fully committed to the NATO Alliance, but they remain ultimately under the control of the United Kingdom Government. It is this independent control which makes their contribution to deterrence so important. Even if the Russians, perhaps some time in the future, thought they could take the risk of attacking the Alliance in the mistaken belief that the United States would not be prepared to use its nuclear weapons, they would also have to take account of those weapons - with enormous destructive power - in European hands. The risks and uncertainties they would face in starting a war would be so much greater. So therefore would the likelihood that they would be deterred. We have made this unique contribution to Alliance deterrence for over twenty-five years. Our Allies have repeatedly and clearly recognised its importance. To give it up, or let it fade away, would be an act of folly at a time when Soviet military power is growing at an alarming rate, and the disparity between the forces of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact is continuing to widen.

### The Decision to Acquire Trident

Our Polaris submarines first came into service in the 1960s. They will continue to provide a formidable deterrent for the next decade or so. But it will become increasingly difficult and costly to maintain both submarines and missiles in service beyond the mid 1990s. In addition to being fully under United Kingdom control, any replacement system must be able to pose a convincing threat. In other words it must be able to inflict damage on the Soviet Union out of all proportion to any gains they might hope to make by attacking us. It must also be invulnerable to surprise attack. The choice of another nuclear-propelled submarine, like the Polaris boats, as the vehicle to carry the weapons was essentially dictated by this need for invulnerability. Unlike any land-based system these submarines are almost impossible to detect once deployed in the deep oceans.

The choice of missile lay between another ballistic missile like Polaris, or a cruise missile. Cruise missiles cost less each. But much larger numbers are needed to provide an equivalent deterrent threat, and they are much more



vulnerable to long-term improvements in Soviet defences. Because of the larger numbers, cruise missiles would need many more submarines, and these are the most expensive single component of a new force. A cruise missile force would therefore cost more. It would also be more uncertain than a ballistic missile force. For a deterrent capability intended to last well into the next century, Trident has clear advantages over any other ballistic missile system on both operational and cost grounds. Its purchase from the US, on very favourable terms, will allow us to continue the highly successful collaboration which we have over Polaris. The decision to go for the Trident II (D5) system rather than the previously announced Trident I (C4) system is to retain commonality with the US Navy and avoid problems of the UK having to operate a unique system. This will save money overall. It is not because we need the increased accuracy or capability of the D5 missile. The decision to process Trident missiles in the US is also to take advantage of commonality and save money. It will not lessen the independence of the UK deterrent.

#### The Cost of Trident

Trident will clearly be a major item in the defence programme. But it is similar to other major programmes like the Tornado aircraft, taking about 3% of the total defence budget on average during the period when it is introduced into service. Once in service it will, like Polaris, be very economical in running costs and its demand on skilled Service manpower. Over the last twenty-five years we have devoted between 2% and 10% of the defence budget to our strategic nuclear forces, so Trident does not represent any dramatic change. It should not be seen as an addition to the defence programme, but an integral part of it. The Trident programme will not prevent continued improvements in other areas of Britain's contribution to NATO. But it is hard to imagine any way in which this money could be spent on other defence uses which would make such a major contribution to the collective security of the Alliance. The most costly part of the system, the Trident submarines, will be built in the UK.



### 3. GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (GLCMs)

Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have had intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe for many years. For the last ten years NATO's forces have comprised F111 and Vulcan aircraft based in the UK. The Vulcans have left RAF service, leaving approximately 170 F111 aircraft. Over this period the Russians have been modernising and increasing their equivalent forces, so that they now have at least 850 INF missiles and aircraft deployed against Europe, including the formidable new SS-20 missile system. NATO's small force is ageing and becoming increasingly vulnerable to new Soviet weapons. For NATO to do nothing in these circumstances would result in a reduction in military capability and show a lack of resolve to maintain Alliance security. It could give the Russians the impression that they could somehow use their growing nuclear arsenal to threaten limited nuclear strikes against Western Europe from a sanctuary in the Soviet Union - strikes which they would judge as being not sufficiently devastating as to provoke an all-out response with strategic weapons. For all these reasons the Alliance judged that some modernisation of its capability was necessary to sustain deterrence. Therefore, in December 1979 NATO Ministers decided unanimously to introduce Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles in Europe, starting in 1983.

In parallel with this decision to deploy GLCMs and Pershings the Alliance also agreed that the United States should make an offer to the Soviet Union to negotiate about limiting the numbers of these intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe. As an indication that NATO was not seeking an arms race, the US unilaterally withdrew 1000 nuclear warheads from the European stockpile and have undertaken to withdraw further warheads on a one-for-one basis as the new missiles are deployed. In response to this offer, the Soviet Union initially refused to talk, but eventually they agreed to negotiations which began on 30 November 1981. Just before the start of these negotiations the US proposed a 'zero option' for discussion, ie they will cancel the planned Pershing II and cruise deployments if the Russians will dismantle all their equivalent SS4, 5 and 20 missiles. The limitations must be on all systems world-wide, since the SS20 has sufficient range to strike targets in Europe when based east of the Ural Mountains.



If it could be achieved such an agreement would increase confidence between East and West and pave the way for further negotiations on other systems.

The NATO decision of December 1979 underlines the American commitment to the defence of Europe. It is not part of some plot to ensure that a limited war can be fought on European soil which will not involve the super powers. Nor does it mean that Britain is made more of a target for nuclear attack. The Americans have never assumed that they could limit a nuclear war to Europe. It was in fact the Europeans themselves who wanted cruise missiles in Europe to deter the Russians from any belief that they could fight a nuclear war in Europe without putting Russian territory at risk. Cruise missiles do not give NATO a new capability. They simply modernise an existing capability hitherto provided by Vulcan and F111 aircraft.

#### 4. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Like all members of the United Nations, Britain is committed to the search for realistic and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament which will reduce the balance of forces while maintaining security, both national and international, at lower levels of risk and expense. Our aim is the prevention of war and the creation of conditions in which the world can move towards greater prosperity and co-operation.

We are working to achieve balanced disarmament in both nuclear and conventional forces, through a gradual step-by-step process. This follows closely the approach endorsed by the international community at the First UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. But as the Final Document of UNSSD I recognised, progress towards world disarmament will depend not on declarations of intent but on the successful negotiation of a number of specific arms control measures.

For example, we have given our strong support to the US objective of negotiating a 'zero level outcome' in the current talks with the Soviet Union on limiting intermediate range nuclear forces, such as the Cruise and SS20 missiles, and we are taking a full part in the NATO consultations on this



subject. We have also supported the efforts of the United States and Soviet Union to reach agreement on the limitation of strategic arms, and we have welcomed the intention to make these Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).

We support the objective of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and are taking part in discussions in the Committee on Disarmament to this end. As a depositary power for the Non-Proliferation Treaty we have worked to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and we have given the non-nuclear states an assurance about nuclear weapons not being used against them. We support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where nuclear weapons are not already deployed. We have signed an agreement with the Soviet Union on the prevention of accidental nuclear war.

Britain initiated the Biological Weapons Convention - the only genuine disarmament measure since World War II - and our proposals led to a satisfactory outcome of the review conference held in 1980. Our draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons in 1976 was a major contribution to the discussions which are continuing in Geneva. We also introduced the draft Convention on Inhumane Weapons which was adopted by a UN Conference in 1980. We have supported the proposal for a UN study on the limitation of conventional forces and weapons.

In the Madrid follow-up meeting to the Helsinki Agreement, which began in 1980, we and our allies have backed the French proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe to negotiate militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable confidence-building measures applicable to the whole continent of Europe, including the European part of the Soviet Union. We continue to work for agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe, where the West has recently tabled new proposals aimed at making progress.

Britain submitted proposals for a comprehensive programme of disarmament being discussed in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. This was discussed at the second UN Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982 where a World Disarmament Campaign was agreed. All this adds up to



considerable international activity in the field of disarmament, in which Britain is fully involved.

The ultimate goal of UN members is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. But universal disarmament will not be achieved overnight. It will be a long haul and there will be setbacks. Prospects at the moment are clouded by the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the persistent pressure on Poland. A further major problem lies in the closed nature of the Russian system, and their unwillingness to provide information or allow independent on-site inspections, as part of the process of verifying that disarmament agreements are being respected. But we believe negotiation is the best way forward, and we shall persevere with our efforts throughout the arms control and disarmament field, although it would be unrealistic to claim it could be done in six years, as some people have suggested.

Against this background of multilateral effort, the Government do not accept that unilateral disarmament is a rational policy. Britain and its allies maintain nuclear weapons as part of a wider defence effort to deter Soviet aggression. Any unilateral reduction by the West would weaken its ability to deter aggression and could therefore increase rather than decrease the risks of war. Nor would Britain be safer without nuclear weapons: our key geographical position in the alliance would still make us a tempting target in any war. Moreover, unilateral nuclear disarmament takes no account of conventional forces in Europe where the existing imbalance in favour of the Warsaw Pact without the restraint imposed by nuclear weapons, would be a source of great uncertainty and threat.

There is no evidence to suggest that unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain would persuade others to follow suit. The Russians have said quite clearly that they would not do so. It would not therefore be a significant step in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in Europe. Nor is there any reasons to think that it would help to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons elsewhere in the world. This must be done by other means. Above all, there is the danger that talk of unilateral moves will encourage the Russians to block any negotiations in the belief that if they wait long



enough the West will disarm on its own, damaging its security interests without obtaining Soviet concessions in return.

We believe the best hopes for progress lie in a measured approach by negotiation. We cannot hope to secure balanced agreements from a position of military weakness, and thus there is a fundamental link between progress towards disarmament and the maintenance of a satisfactory armed defence against aggression.

#### 5. CIVIL DEFENCE

NATO and the UK seek to avoid war through deterrence. That policy has succeeded and will continue to do so provided the Alliance maintains its unity and strength. But as long as we believe that the Soviet Union proves a real threat to our security any humane Government must cater for even the remotest possibility that deterrence might fail and that war might come. If that ever happened our basic civil defence arrangements could save millions from the effects of nuclear attack. These arrangements include an effective warning of attack and fallout radiation, practical advice to help people survive the attack, stockpiles of vital supplies, arrangements for medical care and the continuation of government at all levels to organise recovery. No civil defence arrangements could possibly reduce the consequences of a large scale nuclear attack to a level which would make nuclear war acceptable to the UK. But it is the Government's duty to be able to help survivors if we were ever attacked, remote as that possibility is.



III - QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT NUCLEAR POLICY

Q1. ISN'T HIGH EXPENDITURE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNACCEPTABLE AT A TIME WHEN SPENDING ON, FOR EXAMPLE, HEALTH, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE IS BEING DRASTICALLY REDUCED?

A1. The Government understands and sympathises with the feelings of those people who believe that money devoted to defence would, at a time of economic stringency, be better spent on other areas of public expenditure. However, the first responsibility of the Government must be the security of the nation, and if they were to put that security at risk by inadequate precautions they would inevitably endanger all the things such as health, education and social welfare, which we quite rightly value in our society. We, and a good many others, learnt that lesson the hard way in the 1930s and World War II.



Q2. ISN'T IT BETTER TO BE RED THAN DEAD?

A2. The question presents a false choice: these are not the only alternatives open to us. Indeed the central objective of the Government's defence policy is to ensure that we never have to face such a choice. We belong to NATO, and are committed with our Allies to the strategy of deterrence. The aim of this strategy is to make it clear to any potential aggressor that any attack on any NATO member would involve risks to himself out of all proportion to the advantages which he might hope to gain. We have had both peace and freedom in Western Europe for some 37 years now - our defence policies, including deterrence, have seen to that. As long as we maintain deterrence, we see no reason why the British people should ever have to decide whether to be "red or dead".



Q3. ISN'T 'DETERRENCE' AN OBSOLETE EXCUSE FOR THE ARMS RACE?

A3. We have to accept that nuclear weapons, including the knowledge, technology and materials necessary to make them, exist in both East and West. The policy of all British Governments in recent times, and all our Western Allies, is based on nuclear deterrence: to ensure that the Soviet leadership can never calculate that any possible gain from starting a war against us would be worth the risks. But that is not the end of it. No-one - especially from within the ethical traditions of the free world - can rest comfortably on such a policy alone as the basis of international peace for the rest of time. That is why we have to search unremittingly for better ways of ensuring a stable world. Vital amongst these is the Government's commitment to pursue effective measures of arms control and disarmament. But in the meantime, for deterrence to remain effective, we must from time to time modernise our equipment as existing systems become obsolete.



Q4. AREN'T YOU NOW PLANNING FOR A LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR?

A4. The West does not believe that nuclear weapons could be used to achieve a military victory in any meaningful sense; and once nuclear exchanges began there would be an appalling risk of escalation into all-out nuclear war. We and our Allies need no convincing of this.

But we also have to convince the Russians that they could not hope to win a limited nuclear war either. With the deployment of accurate modern weapons like the SS20 missile system, the Russians have greatly improved their ability to mount limited nuclear strikes on our military bases and war-ships. The purpose of, for example, mobile cruise missiles is to demonstrate that we have the means of responding to such attacks (and of evading them) without having to resort immediately to all-out retaliation.

We have no desire to fight a limited nuclear war and no belief that we could in any sense win one; our aim is simply to ensure that the Russians do not believe that they could win one.



Q5. WHY HAVE YOU DECIDED TO BUY TRIDENT AND IN PARTICULAR THE D5 MISSILE?

A5. The existing Polaris force entered service in the 1960s. By the 1990s it will be approaching the end of its useful life - in particular the submarine hulls and associated machinery will start wearing out. To fail to plan to replace it - which means taking decisions now because of the long time it takes to get defence equipment into service - would be to give up unilaterally our independent deterrent - which has helped keep the peace in Europe for over 30 years. It could make war more likely, not less. Trident, which is again a submarine based ballistic missile system, is the most effective way of ensuring the UK has a credible strategic deterrent until well into the 21st century.

It was originally intended to adopt the Trident I C4 system, which would be adequate to meet the UK's deterrent needs. However this will be phased out of US service earlier than expected. So as to retain commonality and avoid problems of the UK having to support a system which only it operates ("uniqueness") the Government has decided to go instead for the Trident II (D5) system. This will be cheaper in the longer run, and it will still only cost on average about 3% of the defence budget over the next 18 years. D5 was not chosen because of the increased accuracy or capability of the missile system.

Q5A. WHY DID YOU DECIDE TO PROCESS TRIDENT MISSILES IN THE US?

A5A. Again, to take advantage of commonality with the US Navy System and to save money (several hundred million pounds compared with earlier plans). This decision will not increase the UK's dependence on US facilities; modern technology means that the missiles will remain at sea in the submarines for much longer periods than is the case with Polaris.



Q6. CRUISE MISSILES ARE "FIRST STRIKE" WEAPONS - HOW DO YOU RECONCILE THIS WITH A POLICY OF DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE?

A6. A "first strike" means a surprise attack intended to destroy an opponent's nuclear weapons and, hence, remove his ability to retaliate. Cruise missiles are neither intended for a "first strike" role, nor are they capable of it.

NATO concepts of deterrence do not envisage any type of "first strike" - the main aim is to maintain the peace. But in any event, as the Soviet Union can see quite clearly, the West has not and is not developing the physical capability for a "first strike" strategy even if we wanted one.

Cruise missiles, because of their slow speed, would take 3-4 hours to reach the Soviet Union from the UK, and the target missiles could have been launched from their silos well before they arrived. The number to be deployed in Europe is much smaller than the number of Soviet missile silos, and in addition the Russians have now deployed over 300 mobile SS20 ballistic missiles, of which over two thirds face Western Europe, and those are invulnerable to attack once they have deployed away from their main bases. Like the West, the Soviet Union also has missilefiring submarines with nearly 1,000 ballistic missiles which provide the ultimate guarantee against any attempt to mount a first strike attack.



Q7. YOU SAY THAT NATO DOES NOT PLAN A FIRST NUCLEAR STRIKE, BUT SURELY THAT IS NOT WHAT MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAVE SAID?

A7. NATO's strategy of flexible response makes clear that, faced with the possibility of overwhelming defeat at the conventional level, the Alliance reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in its defence. The purpose of such use would not in any way be to attempt to fight so-called "limited nuclear war" - it would rather be to underline to the aggressor NATO's resolve to defend itself and make clear to him the appalling risks he would be running if he persisted in his aggression. In this way, NATO would seek to make him cease his aggression and withdraw. The fact that the Alliance has necessarily thought through all its possible courses of action in the worst possible case should not be interpreted to mean that such an outcome is regarded as probable or even likely; nor should it be allowed to obscure the fact that NATO's strategy remains essentially one of deterrence.

[Note: Essential for questioner to recognise 'first strike' and 'first use' are technical terms which often become confused. As explained in the answer to Q5 'first strike' means a surprise nuclear attack designed to destroy an opponent's nuclear weapons and hence its ability to retaliate. It forms no part of any NATO intentions. 'First use' means using nuclear weapons first in an existing conventional conflict. NATO recognises this is a course which cannot be ruled out in advance, for example, in a situation where the Alliance was facing defeat at the conventional level. This is not to say that it would not be a course involving a very great degree of risk.]



Q8. WHY SHOULD WE TRUST THE UNITED STATES WHEN THEY CLEARLY INTEND TO LIMIT ANY FUTURE WAR TO EUROPE?

A8. If the US wanted to limit any future war to Europe without themselves being involved, the last thing they should do would be to station their forces and their nuclear weapons in Europe. The decision to deploy US Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe enhances deterrence by demonstrating to the Russians that the US see the defence of Europe as indissoluble from the defence of their own country. The Russians would know very well that the US President had agreed to any decision to fire the missiles and in fact they have stated that they would regard any attack by US nuclear weapons in Europe as coming from the US itself. There can be no illusion therefore on either side that Europe can be fought over in a limited war, away from superpower sanctuaries.



Q9. WHY ARE CRUISE MISSILES UNDER SOLE US CONTROL?

A9. The use of the bases concerned in an emergency will be a matter for joint decision between the two Governments, in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. This is exactly the same arrangement under which US nuclear forces have been deployed in the UK for nearly 30 years. There is no point of principle involved here; the option of having a "dual-key" was open to us. We could have taken it up if we had purchased the missiles and supporting equipment and provided British servicemen to man them, with the United States providing only the nuclear warheads. But this would have cost hundreds of millions of pounds and required over 1,000 additional British servicemen. We judged this was not the best way to use our limited defence resources, especially as we are satisfied with the arrangements for joint decision that have existed for 30 years.



Q10. HAVEN'T CRUISE MISSILES TURNED THE UNITED KINGDOM, ESPECIALLY GREENHAM COMMON AND MOLESWORTH, INTO A PRIME SOVIET TARGET?

A10. If a war should break out our political, geographical and industrial importance would inevitably make the United Kingdom a primary target. But there is no reason to suppose that the cruise missile peacetime bases at Greenham Common and Molesworth would be priority targets. The missiles would be moved from their bases to secret locations in times of tension to prevent the enemy being able to make a direct attack on them. These dispersal locations do not need any advance preparation since the only requirement is for a reasonably level piece of ground with some concealment against air attack. Cruise missiles can be moved from one site to another at frequent intervals. However the key point is that the presence of cruise missiles will make a war less likely in the first place. Nuclear weapons have been based in the UK for more than 30 years with precisely this aim.



Q11. CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECENT 'ZERO OPTION' OFFER MEANS, AND WHY THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT ACCEPTED IT?

All. President Reagan - with the agreement of NATO - has offered to cancel the whole of the planned NATO deployments of Pershing II and cruise missiles if the Russians will dismantle all their equivalent missiles (the SS4s, 5s and 20s). This bold and imaginative proposal is the most important arms control offer since the start of the original SALT negotiations. Discussions between the US and the Soviet Union on reducing these intermediate range nuclear weapons started in Geneva on 30 November 1981. The United States has made it plain that it will consider any genuine and constructive proposals advanced by the Soviet Union during these negotiations.

The proposals put forward by the Soviet Union so far (a reduction to 300 'medium range systems' on each side by 1990) would merely perpetuate Soviet superiority in these types of systems and, if agreed, allow them to retain all their modern missiles while preventing NATO from introducing any similar systems. The freeze on SS20 deployments announced by President Brezhnev in March 1982 may appear a step in the right direction, but it does not go nearly far enough. It applies only to Europe which can still be threatened by missiles deployed well back in the Soviet Union, and comes after a period of sustained build up by the Russians who have now deployed a total of 300 SS 20s.



Q12. WHAT WERE THE OTHER PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY PRESIDENT REAGAN?

A12. In his speech on 18 November 1981, President Reagan put forward proposals covering four areas:

(1) Intermediate range nuclear forces targetted on Europe (the 'zero-option) - see previous Q.

(2) A resumption of talks on strategic weapons. To be rechristened START, (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), instead of SALT, (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), to signify a desire to seek substantial reductions as opposed to limitations on these weapons.

(3) Reducing conventional forces in Central Europe.

(4) Confidence building measures to strengthen arrangements for reducing the risk of war starting by accident or miscalculation.

Taken together, this set of proposals offers a major opportunity to make progress towards enhancing peace and security at lower levels of forces. It represents a genuine and constructive attempt to inject impetus into the arms control process.



Q13. ISN'T THE POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IMMORAL?

A13. The whole question of nuclear weapons raises grave and difficult ethical issues just as much for pacifists as for anyone else. The most central issue is whether it is morally wrong to threaten to use nuclear weapons in order to prevent others using them. The greater good is undoubtedly served by preventing nuclear war.

Whatever view one takes of this question, there is no moral justification for suggesting that Britain should refuse to allow nuclear weapons on its soil while remaining part of an Alliance which relies on them to deter an attack by the Warsaw Pact (which possesses a very considerable superiority in conventional forces). The only logical consequence of unilateral nuclear disarmament is neutrality, and without membership of NATO we would have no means of guaranteeing our security.

In addition, unilateral disarmament by Britain would not prevent others from using nuclear weapons against us; if it increased the risk of nuclear war, then many would argue that unilateral disarmament would be morally wrong itself. Nor is it likely to persuade any other nuclear weapon state to give up their weapons, or influence any non-nuclear weapon power determined to acquire a nuclear capability from doing so. [See also Chapter IV - The Ethical Aspects].



Q14. THE NEUTRON BOMB IS A PARTICULARLY HORRIFIC WEAPON WHICH KILLS PEOPLE AND LEAVES PROPERTY INTACT. SURELY WE SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT?

A14. The 'neutron bomb' which is more correctly known as the enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) differs from current nuclear warheads only in that a greater proportion of energy released is in the form of radiation, with correspondingly smaller effects from heat and blast. In other words, there is no difference in principle to nuclear weapons already deployed by both NATO and the Soviet Union. ERWs offer one way of deterring a massed armoured attack by the Warsaw Pact against Western Europe - they currently have an advantage over NATO in Central Europe of approaching three to one in main battle tanks. Of course, there are other ways - both nuclear and conventional - to deter such an attack, and the task of NATO is to find the most efficacious.

It is a gross distortion of the facts to claim that ERWs can destroy people but not property. The point is that they could knock out a Soviet tank attack on the territory of Western Europe without causing massive damage and civilian casualties nearby.

The US decision to proceed with the production of ERWs does not represent a change in the direction of US policy - indeed, when President Carter deferred a decision on the production of ERWs in 1978 he stated that his ultimate decision would be influenced by the degree to which the Soviet Union showed restraint in its own arms programmes, and his Administration continued the production and stockpiling of ERW components in advance of this.

No proposals have been made for the deployment of ERWs outside the United States, and the US Administration have made it clear that they will consult within the Alliance on any proposals of this kind.



Q15. WOULDN'T UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT?

A15. One-sided nuclear disarmament is not a step towards multilateral disarmament; it is a step away from it. The one is the enemy of the other. For Britain to give up its nuclear weapons unilaterally would do nothing to reduce the dangers of war. Indeed by undermining NATO's ability to deter aggression it might make war more likely. There is no evidence to suggest that any other country would follow our example. In particular the Russians have made it clear that they would not give up their nuclear weapons. Britain is the only nuclear power in Europe which is committed to the common defence of NATO countries. We are an integral part of the balance of power within Europe. The Government would certainly like to see a world in which nuclear weapons for deterrence were not needed. Our approach however is to work towards a steady reduction in both conventional and nuclear armaments on both sides.

Q15A. WHY DOES NATO NOT IMPLEMENT A BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONE AS SUGGESTED BY THE PALME COMMISSION AND OTHERS?

A15A. There are a number of difficulties with the Palme Commission's proposal of a 150km Battlefield Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (BNWFZ) in Central Europe.

Militarily a BNWFZ would be of little value, because targets inside it could still be attacked by accurate longer-range systems stationed outside it. Moreover, shorter range systems or warheads could easily be moved back into the zone in time of crisis. A BNWFZ would have no significant effect on the "nuclear threshold" which is primarily determined by the level of conventional forces.

Verification of a BNWFZ would be extremely difficult because the systems concerned are mobile and relatively small and because some are also "dual capable" - that is, aircraft and artillery which have nuclear roles as well as essential conventional ones. But without effective verification a BNWFZ could hardly be expected to build up mutual confidence: on the contrary an inadequately verifiable zone would only increase mutual suspicion.

NATO is concerned to maintain strong conventional forces in order to enhance deterrence and maintain the nuclear threshold as high as possible. That was the primary objective of the Long Term Defence Programme initiated in 1977. In addition NATO is currently studying its nuclear stockpile to see if any changes can be made. The unilateral establishment of a BNWFZ by NATO would do nothing to enhance deterrence, would imply that the territory concerned was less important to NATO than other areas, and would not help the multilateral force reductions which NATO regards as the best way of enhancing security at lower levels of forces.



Q16. WHAT IS THE GOVERNMENT DOING ABOUT ARMS CONTROL?

A16. The Government is committed to working for balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament measures as an integral part of Britain's national security policy. We pursue negotiated agreements because they enhance our security: we recognise that there are some security areas where both East and West have an interest in exercising mutual restraint. To that end the United Kingdom plays a full role in the work of the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and in negotiations such as those on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe and those aimed at agreeing a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

In addition we strongly support American and Soviet efforts to negotiate reductions in strategic and intermediate range nuclear weapons. The net result of NATO's modernisation programme will be a decrease in the number of warheads in Europe. The US have already withdrawn 1,000 warheads from Europe without seeking any direct reciprocation from the Soviet Union. As the new Pershing II and Cruise Missile systems are deployed, further warheads will be removed one-for-one.

Britain has in the past made a unique contribution to arms control and disarmament. We will continue our efforts to do so in the future.

The Prime Minister re-affirmed Britain's commitments to disarmament - the balanced and verifiable reduction of armaments in a manner which enhances peace and security - in her address to the UN Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982.



Q17. ISN'T THERE A DANGER THAT FAILURE OF WARNING SYSTEMS WILL PLUNGE US INTO ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR?

A17. All complex detection systems can produce ambiguous data, and early warning systems are no exception. However, highly trained personnel are constantly on watch to evaluate such data and cross checks would be made with other systems. Also, the decision to use nuclear weapons would have to be taken at the highest political level. They could never be used automatically in response to an early warning system alone.

There are agreements between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union (and between the United States and the USSR) specifically to prevent the outbreak of accidental nuclear war: there are also 'hot lines' for communication.

Neither the US or the UK has a policy of launching nuclear weapons purely on early warning evidence, nor do we need any such policy; this is one of the many advantages of having strategic deterrent weapons at sea in submarines.



Q18. WHY DON'T WE SPEND MORE ON CIVIL DEFENCE?

A18. The whole purpose of the Government's defence policy is to prevent war. So long as the NATO Alliance maintains a strong deterrent, the risk of a war in Europe at any level will remain a remote possibility. The Soviet leadership know that if they used nuclear weapons against us they would be running a very grave risk of massive retaliation against Soviet territory. But should such an attack take place, even though the consequences would be appalling, there would still be millions of survivors. No one pretends that survival is possible in the centre of a nuclear explosion. But the further away you are, the better would be your chances of survival with some form of shelter and basic precautions. It is therefore the duty of any humane Government to make some provision for such an eventuality, however remote it might be. However, the Government do not believe that it is necessary to spend large sums on civil defence as long as we maintain our deterrent policies. The purpose of civil defence is to enable our civil resources to respond if peace is broken and there is an enemy attack and the amount of money we spend on it reflects this aim. Of course, we must modernise our arrangements as the need arises and we will be spending about £45 million annually by next year.



Q19. HOW COULD ANYTHING BE DONE IF WE HAVE ONLY FOUR MINUTES WARNING?

A19. It is extremely unlikely that the first hint of Soviet aggression would be a few minutes warning from the Fylingdales Early Warning System. In such circumstances, it is true, we would have no time to activate our civil defence arrangements. But while a missile attack 'out of the blue' is theoretically conceivable, the Soviet Union would have to calculate that Western response to such an attack might be massive retaliation by an invulnerable submarine-launched strategic missile. There is no likelihood that war could start without some sort of political crisis and at least a short warning period of some days during which Soviet military preparations were apparent. Such a warning period might well be followed by a conventional conflict lasting for some days, possibly weeks, before the war either stopped or escalated to some level of nuclear exchange. During all this time the government would be implementing its plans for advice to and protection of the public, for the continuation of essential services, and for the continuity of organised government. If, during a period of conventional war, the Soviet Union attacked us with missiles, people would be prepared and ready to take the immediate selfprotective action necessary in response to broadcast public announcements and the sounding of the attack sirens.



Q20. BUT WHY NOT BUILD MORE SHELTERS?

A20. A public shelter building programme would cost billions of pounds. This has to be balanced against the very unlikely possibility of war in Europe. Our civil defence policy represents an insurance policy against such a risk, which will remain remote provided we maintain our policy of deterrence. Our major Allies follow a similar policy, including the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. However, we are by no means complacent and within the inevitable financial constraints ways of improving our arrangements are constantly under review.



Q21. SURELY THE ARRANGEMENTS MERELY ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF A GOVERNING AND MILITARY ELITE?

A21. Certainly not. Senior Ministers, officials and Service officers would remain in London should a war break out. The Ministers and staffs of regional government in emergency headquarters are essentially reserves in the event of a nuclear attack on Central London. The Armed Forces have similar arrangements. The aim would be for local authorities to continue to provide essential services, and for a form of regional government until central control could be resumed. But control would remain firmly in civilian hands and law and order would be administered under regulations approved by Parliament before an attack took place. The whole purpose of the surviving administrations would be to help the survivors by providing emergency services and information.



Q22. WHAT WILL THE GOVERNMENT DO IF LOCAL AUTHORITIES REFUSE TO CO-OPERATE IN CIVIL DEFENCE PLANNING?

A22. The Government is confident that the great majority of local authorities will continue to discharge their statutory obligations which, briefly, require them to plan in peacetime for the protection of the public and the continuation of essential services in war. The Government hopes that, in a matter so closely related to the nation's vital defence interest, of which the Government is elected to be the judge, local authorities will wish to follow the policy determined by central government and make use of the additional resources which central government has decided to allocate to local civil defence planning. However, the Government is considering the introduction of legislation which will compel local authorities to fulfil their civil defence responsibilities and to participate in associated activities.



#### IV - THE ETHICAL ASPECTS

The following is the text of a letter written by John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence, to Mr Michael Latham MP, on 2 March 1981.

"Thank you for your letter of 16th January with copies of the resolution carried by the British Council of Churches at their General Assembly on 24th November, and of the speeches by Dr Greet and the Archbishop of Canterbury.

I am most keenly aware of the grave ethical issues raised by nuclear weapons, with their appalling power. But we face these issues in a world where nuclear weapons inescapably exist. They cannot be disinvented. The Soviet Union is a huge power of totalitarian ideology, with a massive and growing military strength and a proven willingness to use that strength when it thinks it can get away with doing so. It makes no secret of its determination to impose its ideology and its political dominance upon others. In such a world Western Governments are not merely entitled but positively bound to protect their peoples' right to peace and freedom by something more substantial than just good motives and hoping for the best. As Christians, surely we are bound to uphold the essential dignity of individuals against the contempt of human rights demonstrated by the Russian leadership?

Deterrence has helped to keep Europe at peace for over thirty years, despite circumstances that were often difficult. It is still very stably keeping the peace, and the occasional speculation one hears that somehow nuclear war is closer upon us now seem to me quite baseless. To abandon our security system now, in favour of some alternative one which would be quite unproven and which indeed one seldom hears coherently or concretely described, would be immensely dangerous; and accordingly it is not obvious - to put matters mildly - that such abandonment would be of compelling ethical merit. I yield to no-one in my abhorrence of war, especially nuclear war; where I part company with the unilateralist is in my judgement of how war can be most surely prevented.



The hard truth is that without a nuclear capability the Alliance would be unable to deter attack or to resist blackmail based on the threat of attack. Given that, the possession of nuclear weapons by NATO as part of deterrence seems to me plainly justifiable. Its central desire and aim is that nuclear weapons should never again be used, by either side.

So far as the United Kingdom's own nuclear contribution is concerned I would see no integrity in any ethical position which demanded abandonment of our own weapons as fundamentally immoral, while remaining content to shelter under the nuclear umbrella of the United States through membership of NATO. I am, of course, aware of other sorts of arguments urged against British capability, like cost, or the non proliferation considerations which I believe may have underlain the view expressed in the British Council of Churches' resolution in December 1979; but these, with respect, are matters of practical judgement and political opinion, not ethical principle. I adhere to the view taken by all post-war British Governments and re-endorsed recently in public by our Allies, that our capability contributes valuably to the assurance of Western deterrence.

No-one can view these matters as easy, in ethical or any other terms. I note that in their recent statement the Roman Catholic Bishops were unable to reach a clear conclusion. I have much sympathy with the view put recently, in an article from a Quaker viewpoint, by Mr Sydney Bailey: 'Today there is no policy about the threat or use of nuclear weapons which does not pose appalling moral and practical dilemmas' - and he was speaking equally of unilateralism and of NATO deterrence. For myself, I come out where I see the Archbishop of Canterbury does on the fundamental issue: I cannot see unilateral renunciation as the right or responsible course. Like him, too, I look to arms control as a path of improvement. But in the real world, where business has to be done with the Russians, the West will not secure arms control by giving them what they want before negotiation starts.

I deplore, like the Archbishop and Dr Greet, the amount spent on arms. I would like to spend far less, if we could do so without making war more likely. But to ignore that condition - as so many people did in the 1930s - may bring



down on us costs, above all in human life and freedom, far exceeding those of any peacetime provision for defence.

Perhaps I could pick up one other point from Dr Greet's speech. He talks of 'a defence policy that envisages a pre-emptive first strike with nuclear weapons'. If by this is meant a policy that would attempt to disarm an adversary by destroying his nuclear capability, then I can assure Dr Greet that the West has no such policy; nor does it either possess or plan to acquire the sort of capability that could make disarming strikes a real option. Fears to the contrary can rest only on misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the nature of modern nuclear armouries and technical developments."

Ministry of Defence

2nd March 1981

---

In a message to the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982, Pope John Paul II said:

"In current conditions deterrence based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself, but as a step towards a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable ..... I reaffirm my confidence in the power of true negotiations to arrive at just and equitable solutions. Such negotiations demand patience and diligence and must notably lead to a reduction of armaments that is balanced, simultaneous and internationally controlled."



## V - THE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES

It is difficult to make a simple comparison between the nuclear forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Any numerical "balance" cannot take account of such factors as age, operational capability, and numbers and yields of warheads. Comparisons of warhead numbers are particularly difficult since many delivery systems can carry different numbers of warheads and neither side publishes figures about the total number of warheads in its stockpiles.

Moreover since there is plainly little sense in attaching the same weight to an inter-continental ballistic missile and a short-range howitzer, any attempt to draw up a nuclear balance must involve placing the systems into various categories, and these necessarily must to some extent be arbitrary. Overleaf is a diagram showing the total number of systems deployed at the end of 1981, broken down in strategic systems (those defined as such in the SALT agreements) and long, medium and short range "theatre" systems based in Europe. Although the presentation of the figures can be varied, it can be seen that the Soviet Union has a marked superiority both in the total number of systems and in almost every individual category.

Despite this the Russians have claimed that a broad parity already exists in "medium range" systems, and that NATO will be upsetting this balance by its programme to modernise its long-range theatre nuclear forces. However the figures they have produced to support this claim make it clear that their balance has been constructed by selective inclusion and exclusion of systems on either side. Thus they include NATO strategic systems (eg Polaris) but not Soviet equivalents; US aircraft based in the United States but not Soviet aircraft based in the Far East; shorter range NATO aircraft (F4, A6, A7) but not equivalent Soviet aircraft (Fitter, Flogger, Fencer). Although it is possible to argue about where the line should be drawn, any objective balance must include systems of approximately equivalent capability on both sides. If only the longer range land-based theatre systems on both sides are counted, the Soviet Union has a superiority of about 4:1. If shorter range systems of the type the Russians have included on the NATO side are added to both sides, the ratio rises to about 5:1.



It is also worth noting that the Soviet Union first made the claim that parity exists in 1979. Although since then they have withdrawn 150 of their older SS4 and SS5 missiles, each with one warhead, they have deployed a further 180 of their new and formidable SS20s, each with three warheads - an overall increase of 390 warheads. A total of over 300 SS20s is now in service. Meanwhile NATO has not made any increases in its own systems, so, if there was parity in 1979, it cannot exist now. Additionally the Soviet claims about the NATO modernisation programme ignore the fact that the US unilaterally withdrew 1,000 warheads from its European stockpile in 1980/ 81; that Pershing II will replace Pershing I on a one-for-one basis; and that NATO will withdraw a further warhead as each new cruise missile is deployed. Moreover the first of the new NATO missiles will not be deployed until the end of 1983; by which time some 350 SS20s can be expected to have been deployed.



THE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES - END 1981 (1)(2)

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS (3)

Soviet Union

818 MIRV	228 MIRV	
1398 ICBMs	950 SLBMs	

156 Heavy Bombers

NATO (excluding France)

550 MIRV	496 MIRV	
1052 ICBMs	640 SLBMs	

573 Heavy Bombers

EUROPEAN THEATRE (Land Based) (4)(5)

Soviet Union

LONG RANGE		MEDIUM RANGE		SHORT RANGE
190 MIRV				
490 Missiles	350 Aircraft	650 Missiles	2000 Aircraft	950 Missiles and Artillery

NATO (excluding France)

LONG RANGE	MEDIUM RANGE	SHORT RANGE
200 Aircraft	180 Missiles	650 Aircraft
		1150 Missiles and Artillery

NOTES: ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

SLBM = Submarine Launched Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

MIRV = Multiple Independently Targettable Re-entry Vehicles.

(1) French systems are not included in this diagram. They comprise 64 SLBM, 36 Mirage IV bombers, 18 S3 missiles and shorter range Mirage IIIA aircraft and Pluton missiles.

(2) The diagram does not include defensive systems such as ABM or air defence missiles and aircraft.

(3) The diagram of strategic forces covers strategic delivery systems of the types defined in SALT.

(4) The European theatre figures do not include some 250 aircraft of the Soviet Naval Air Forces or some 20 aircraft of NATO Air Forces which have an anti-ship capability; nor do they include sea-based nuclear capable systems on both sides which are normally deployed in the European theatre and which have a land attack capability, eg 18 SS-N-5 on Soviet Golf class submarines in the Baltic and 20 A6 and 48 A7 aircraft on US carriers in the Mediterranean.

(5) It is difficult to define precisely the exact ranges of many theatre systems particularly aircraft. These categories are therefore necessarily somewhat arbitrary. For the purpose of this diagram long range theatre systems have been taken as those with an approximate range exceeding 1000 kms; medium range theatre as those with an approximate range between 150 kms and 1000 kms; and short range theatre as less than 150 kms. (Note: some authorities refer to LRTNF as medium range systems to distinguish them from the longer range strategic systems.)



## VI - GOVERNMENT FACT SHEETS AND BROCHURES ON NUCLEAR POLICY ISSUES

Copies of MOD and FCO brochures are available on request. The following list describes some of them briefly.

DEFENCE FACT SHEET 1 - ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

DEFENCE FACT SHEET 2 - NATO

DEFENCE FACT SHEET 3 - DETERRENCE

DEFENCE FACT SHEET 4 - THE NUCLEAR BALANCE

The Defence Fact Sheets are designed for background information, rather than 'handout material'.

'NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENTING WAR' Essay on the deterrent philosophy which was first published in the Statement on Defence Estimates 1981.

'A NUCLEAR FREE EUROPE - Why it wouldn't work' This explains the fallacy of the European nuclear free zone proposal and includes a map showing how Russian SS20s can strike at the whole of Europe from behind the Ural Mountains.

'CRUISE MISSILES - Some Important Questions' Brief summary of the reasons behind the basing decision, whether Britain has become more of a nuclear target, safety and control aspects.

A further brochure entitled 'CRUISE MISSILES - Some Important Questions and Answers' which covers the same questions in more detail together with additional material on related arms control issues, cost and other matters is also available.



'ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY' - Essay reprinted from the Statement on Defence Estimates 1982 explaining the Government's attitude to arms control and disarmament.

'NUCLEAR DEFENCE: KEY POINTS' - Aide Memoire for speakers.

'THE FUTURE UNITED KINGDOM STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCE' Defence Open Government Document 80/23 July 1980. A memorandum setting out the rationale for an independent strategic deterrent and the reason for choosing Trident to replace Polaris. An additional Open Government Document 82/1 'THE UNITED KINGDOM TRIDENT PROGRAMME', dealing with the decision to purchase the Trident II D5 system, was published in March 1982.

Copies of the above material can be obtained from

Ministry of Defence (PR)  
Room 0366  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
SW1 2HB  
Tel 01-218 2386

---

The Balanced View - Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control  
Peace and Disarmament - a short guide to British Government Policy  
The Nuclear Debate - sets out the two schools of thought (unilateralism and multilateralism)

Copies of the above brochures, and further information, including a quarterly newsletter on arms control and disarmament can be obtained from

Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Downing Street  
SW1  
Tel 01-233-3907

---



A short audio-visual presentation of the deterrence strategy entitled 'A Better Road to Peace' is available to clubs, groups, etc from:

Central Film Library  
Central Office of Information  
Chalfont Grove  
Gerrards Cross  
Bucks SL9 8TN  
Tel: Chalfont St Giles (02407) 4111

A film entitled 'The Peace Game' and explaining how the West has kept the peace, is available from the same source.

---

Civil Defence is the responsibility of the Home Office and Scottish Home and Health Department. Copies of official background material on civil defence can be obtained from

Emergency Services (F6) Division  
Home Office  
50 Queen Anne's Gate  
SW1H 9AT  
Tel 01-213-4018.

---

The following civil defence publications are available from Her Majesty's Stationery Office (or through main booksellers):

'Nuclear Weapons'	£3.50 (net)
ISBN 0 11 340557X	
'Protect and Survive'	50p (net)
ISBN 0 11 3407289	
'Domestic Nuclear Shelters'	50p (net)
ISBN 0 11 3407378	
'Domestic Nuclear Shelters - Technical Guidance	£5.95 (net)
ISBN 0 11 3407777	





Prime Minister

I do not believe that the conflict he suggests exists. Would you like to reply saying you have noted his ideas?

A.T.C. 1/1

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

10 January 1983

Would it be worth having him in to talk. A letter might look like a bank. off? m.

Dear Prime Minister,

I know that you are aware of the concern which many of us feel at the apparent success being enjoyed by CND and other unilateralist and "peace" movements. The press seem to believe that your appointment of Mr Heseltine to the Ministry of Defence is designed partly to meet the threat posed by their activities. If this is so it is a welcome move. However, having studied this problem in a number of incarnations over the last 25 years, I have a feeling that it will not be enough to win the "debate" - as important as that may be.

There have always been, I believe, two areas of weakness in our approach to the arms control and disarmament aspects of national security - one of policy formulation and direction, and one of representation in the diplomatic field. I would like to put forward for your consideration a proposal designed to remedy these deficiencies.

So far as policy formulation and direction are concerned, I am convinced that it is a mistake to have the political responsibility for arms control and disarmament in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. My own experience as Minister of State charged specifically with these responsibilities was that there was a persistent conflict of interest between the FCO and the Ministry of Defence - and more specifically the Chiefs of Staff. Constructive arms control proposals, in these circumstances, are almost automatically resisted by the services; and quite sensible defence policies are often undermined by the Foreign Office.

continued.....



The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister

10 January 1983

Although in normal times, these interdepartmental tensions might be acceptable (and, in any case, susceptible of resolution in Cabinet or its committees) these are, as you would be the first to recognise, not normal times. My strong feeling is that there would now be great merit in having a special adviser on arms control and disarmament in No. 10, directly responsible to the Prime Minister. He should have a very small staff, including officials of reasonable seniority from the FCO and the MOD. Only in this way will policies aimed at multilateral disarmament receive the powerful political direction which they must have if the dangerous influence of the unilateralists is to be reduced and eventually eliminated.

Inextricably linked with this is the need for a more potent representation at the international negotiating table. During a recent visit to the Palais des Nations in Geneva (my first since I led the British delegation there in the 1960's) I was depressed at the decline in our status and influence. The British case now seems to be in the hands of bureaucrats who, however able, have no political weight and, indeed, no political motivation.

You have already given a valuable lead in the campaign against those who, often for mistakenly idealistic reasons but too often for less reputable motives, seek to undermine the defences of the West. I am convinced that the climate is now right for a serious attempt at certain multilateral agreements - especially in the fields of nuclear weapons testing, development of chemical weapons, levels of strategic and intermediate range missiles, as well as conventional force levels. All this can be achieved without any danger to western security; but it must have irresistible political impetus.


I would be ready at any time to discuss my ideas further with you. In the meantime may I congratulate you on your very successful and timely visit to the Falkland Islands and wish you continued success in 1983.

Yours sincerely,

Ann Chalper



~~SUBJECT~~  
cc Maber



## 10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

7 January 1983

Arms Control and Disarmament

When the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary called on the Prime Minister this morning, he expressed the view that we were in danger of losing the battle with public opinion about this subject. He thought, in particular, that current television coverage was not very favourable to the Government. A number of members of the Government had been tasked to take an interest in this matter but there appeared to be a need for a master-mind to handle the whole campaign. This would need to be somebody who could devote a good deal of time to the matter and should consequently probably be somebody who did not have departmental responsibilities.

The Prime Minister agreed that Mr. Pym should discuss this problem with Mr. Parkinson and also said that she would probably want to have a word about it herself with Mr. Parkinson and Mr. Biffen in the fairly near future.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



O/R

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



PM 83/1

PRIME MINISTER

Nuclear Weapons and Public Opinion

1. 1983 will be a crucial year in this debate. Following the useful work of the Liaison Office and Peter Blaker's two recent letters to you, I thought it would be useful to set out some of our own ideas for improving the Government's efforts.

2. We have been active, but our efforts have not matched the impact made by the opposition in its different manifestations e.g. the Greenham Common women or the Bishop of Salisbury's booklet. If the Government effort is too low key the parallel Party effort may sometimes run the risk of being in the wrong key. An energetic and outright attack on the peace movements heartens the faithful, but it does little to persuade the doubters that the Government is seriously working for a more secure peace through negotiated agreement. Thousands of people are coming into active politics for the first time through the peace movements.

3. The risk is two-fold:

- (a) the development of a mass movement of demonstrations and civil disobedience against Cruise in 1983 so widespread and powerful that deployment would actually become difficult or even impossible. I still would not rate this possibility very highly, but it is less inconceivable than it was six months ago;

/(b)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL





- (b) an intensification of public opinion against nuclear weapons so strong that large numbers determine their vote on this issue in favour of the Labour or Liberal Parties at the general election.

So both medium and message are crucial. I think our efforts need to concentrate sensitively and in simple terms on the primary issues rather than on the technicalities, namely peace, protection and realism. As to the mechanics for putting this across, I would suggest the following actions in addition to the work now in hand:

- (a) a small special unit in the Cabinet Office working to a small team of Ministers including the Chairman of the Party to inspire and direct the presentation of policy. I shall let you have shortly some more detailed suggestions about organisation;

- (b) a Round Table Conference in the spring which you yourself might chair including the Archbishops, the Cardinal, the Moderator, etc;

- (c) a series of rallies organised by the Party in each main city, to which representatives of the peace groups would be invited as well as our own folk, each to be addressed by a Minister. Each of these meetings should be linked to a special effort with the local media;

/(d)

Ford - 1  
would have thought





- (d) a special effort at and near Greenham Common e.g. a canvass by MPs, or one of us might address a meeting in Newbury.
- (e) an effort directed at making US servicemen here feel welcome e.g. a party at No 10.
- (f) a further Foreign Office pamphlet which would issue in my name.
- (g) a two-day debate in the Commons on Cruise ending in a vote on a motion approving the Government's policy.
- (h) if the Continental position on INF deployment holds, a joint declaration by the European governments (i.e. including us, excluding the Americans) explaining how deployment fits with our strategy for peace.
- (i) I have not specifically mentioned the Synod of the Church of England in February. This will be very important but open lobbying may produce the wrong result. We need to be sure that the Archbishops and the Bishop of London have the material they need.
- (j) last, but certainly not least, we need to find ways of making more impact on television which is devoting so much time to the other side.





4. No doubt there are other ideas. The above are concerned with imaginative presentation. They are not a substitute for sound policy to get us through 1983, which I think needs to include:

(i) some progress on a better definition of joint decision-taking on the US nuclear bases here.

(ii) a deft US response to Soviet ploys including a readiness at the right time to negotiate something other than the zero option.

? look at  
to the  
I had on  
then in  
meeting  
is in day  
not new?

5. I should welcome the chance to discuss these ideas further with you and with Michael Heseltine and Cecil Parkinson, to whom I am copying this minute.

*Amend*

*FP*

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

7 January 1983



*Defence*

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

*Defence*

(2)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)  
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MINISTER OF STATE FOR  
THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/PB/3/2

21 December 1982

*Prime Minister*

*Dear Prime Minister,*

*A.F.C. 27/12*

*S. R. Hylam*

NUCLEAR PUBLIC RELATIONS

I believe you may wish to know the progress that has been made on this front since our meeting on November 24 and to hear of a number of encouraging developments in our campaign.

Our plans for a finger-post advertising campaign are proceeding. We aim to place the first advertisement in the national press in early March which will contain an eye-catching message about nuclear deterrence and encourage the readers to send for a booklet on the subject of deterrence and disarmament. Two booklets are now in preparation, catering for the more and the less sophisticated readers. The analysis from the Opinion Poll which I drew to your attention yesterday will be valuable in helping us target the correct audiences.

Following my round of contacts with the Churches the interdenominational group mentioned in the Report we considered in November is due to have its first meeting in early January and plans a public launch later that month. The group will be making selective contact with members of the Church of England Synod before their important debate on the Church and the Bomb report in early February. I am in touch with John Gummer about the Synod.

With regard to the media, in January I will be making my fifth and sixth visits to meet groups of editors of regional and local newspapers and radio stations and plan to follow up with further visits in the subsequent months. We are also writing to a range of television and radio producers and editors stressing the importance of balance in their reporting of the nuclear debate and indicating the availability of Ministers to take part.

You have kindly agreed to consider making a major speech on deterrence and disarmament early in the New Year. I have written to a number of members of the Cabinet urging them to make similar speeches and offering the help of this Department in providing suitable drafts.

/Four ...

The Prime Minister

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL  
**CONFIDENTIAL**



Four films about nuclear deterrence are now in prospect. One, on the case for Cruise missiles, is being made for this Department by the COI. It will be ready for distribution in March before the major CND events planned for Easter. (Our existing film "The Peace Game" has now had several hundred showings since its launch two months ago.) A second new film, on NATO and the importance of nuclear deterrence, is being made privately with help from this Department as a supporting film for the next James Bond epic due for release next summer. A third is being made by Central Television, quite independently of this Department, to balance John Pilger's film "The Truth Game" and both will be shown in the New Year. Finally, I am discussing with Euan Lloyd, the producer of the film "Who Dares Wins", the making of a hard-hitting film about nuclear deterrence for release on the commercial circuit in support of a major feature film. This will probably have to be financed privately in order that Lloyd can have the freedom he requires to make his points with the necessary force. (He wishes this project to be treated as absolutely confidential.) These are all important projects and the films designed for the cinema circuit and for television stand to reach an enormous audience.

Finally, Douglas Hurd and I are encouraging the BAC to make greater efforts to explain NATO's policies. They are now working on plans for considerably expanded activities in 1983. I believe they need to concentrate on local activities although there is also a role for them in the debate at national level and to this end I am arranging for a number of their key people to have training in television techniques at our own facilities (on a repayment basis). Douglas and I shall be continuing to brief selected MPs.

While we are increasing the tempo I believe we must search constantly for new opportunities and means to put over our case. Our opponents will be making a major effort in 1983 and we will need a positive and vigorous approach to contain them and to win the debate.

I am copying this letter to John Nott, Francis Pym, John Biffen and Cecil Parkinson.

*Yours ever,  
Peter*

PETER BLAKER





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

20 December 1982

SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

In your letter of 16 December you advised that, rather than making a major speech on the above questions in the New Year, the Prime Minister should contribute a popular article to one of the major women's magazines and that, thereafter, we should consider an address by Mrs. Thatcher to one of the big annual conferences of women's organisations.

The Prime Minister has considered this advice but takes the view that, on an issue of this importance, it would be right for her to make a major speech quite early next year. She would therefore be grateful if you could suggest a suitable platform.

Mrs. Thatcher has not specifically commented on the idea of an article in one of the women's magazines. I suggest that we first take a firm decision about the timing and platform for her speech and then return to the idea of an article.

I am copying this letter to Roger Bone (FCO).

A. J. COLES

Peter Craine, Esq.



MR COLES ✓

Prime Minister  
I agree with Dr. Syham. I think you should  
make a major speech on this crucial issue by  
early next year. Agree? A.F.C. 12. 12. Yes, not

You invited my comments on the MoD letter of December 16 re. publicity by the Prime Minister for the Government's views of deterrence and Multilateral disarmament.

I am afraid I do not agree with the advice tendered in the letter.

The reality is that the multilateralist v unilateralist argument is one of the major central political issues which will dominate discussion next year. On that account alone the Prime Minister will repeatedly make her views known - and will feel a pressing need to do so. There is thus no question that the Prime Minister will pronounce on the issue.

Nor will she lack opportunities to do so - eg. Prime Minister's Questions. But that does not argue against a major speech. On the contrary it supports the case for one because the work of preparing a major speech against set objectives will inform the Prime Minister's whole presentation of the issue. The effect of a major speech is therefore wider than might be assumed and longer lasting.

The preparation of a major speech next year would also be a considerable exercise in political education and can therefore be calculated to produce a rounder, persuasive statement.

The fact that the Foreign Secretary's speech got little publicity is not necessarily an indication of that which a Prime Ministerial speech would generate. Nor is the lack of new information necessarily a guide to publicity either. Circumstances, timing, tone and content would all have a bearing on that.


But all these points must be viewed against the likely overriding need early next year for the Prime Minister to pronounce authoritatively and in a considered, marshalled way in support of the multilateralist cause. Her failure to do so would be misinterpreted.

To sum up: the choice is not between making a major speech and a lower key approach - eg. a direct appeal to women and young mothers. The Prime Minister will need to do both - and more, if only for political reasons.



But there is no substitute for ~~a basic text on which the multilatera-~~  
~~list movement can draw; nor is there any substitute for a persuasive~~  
direct appeal by the Prime Minister to the country.

The advice as given in the letter is timid and defeatist and does not  
set out to convert multilateralism's potentially greatest asset into just  
that.



B. INGHAM

17 December 1982





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)  
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

Private Secretary to  
MINISTER OF STATE FOR  
THE ARMED FORCES  
D/MIN(AF)/PB/3/2

16 December 1982

*Dear Coles,*

Thank you for your letter of 25 October. I am sorry to have taken so long to reply.

The question of whether the Prime Minister should make a speech on the subject of deterrence and multilateral disarmament has been considered by officials both here and in the FCO and their advice is that in the absence of any new information in the speech it is likely to generate only limited publicity for the Government's views. The Foreign Secretary recently made an excellent speech on deterrence and disarmament (in Leeds) and achieved only moderate coverage in the quality press.

As an alternative it has been suggested that a popular article on these subjects should be offered to one of the major women's magazines under the Prime Minister's signature, perhaps *Woman's Own*. This would have the following advantages:

- a. It would be a direct appeal to wives and mothers throughout the country (and opinion polls show that young mothers are particularly susceptible to the appeal of unilateralism);
- b. It would stand a good chance of being picked up by the national press, radio and television;
- c. It might lead to further requests for the Prime Minister to give her views on this subject.

As a follow-up, consideration could be given to the Prime Minister addressing one of the big annual conferences of women's organisations (for example, Towns Women's Guilds or Women's Institutes) which usually take place in May. We have naturally not yet approached any of these bodies.

These suggestions are strongly supported by both Mr Blaker and Mr Hurd.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Lamport.

*Yours sincerely*  
*P. Craine*

PETER CRAINE

A J Coles Esq



Speech file  
Poultly Speed 1983  
on Depue's Disarmament

11 12 13 14 15  
16 17 18 19 20  
21 22 23 24 25  
26 27 28 29 30  
31

16 DEC 1983



John

I have had a word with  
(Armed Forces <sup>Ministry</sup> Office).  
Mrs (Peter Crane) concerning  
a suitable platform for a  
speech by the P.M. on this subject.  
They now consider that it  
might be more appropriate  
for the P.M. to write an article  
for one of the better women's  
magazines and will be writing  
to us within the next week  
or so to this effect.

Logie  
8/12

Noted.

M  $\frac{13}{12}$



PREM 19/1690 2

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 October 1982

Prime Minister

JB

29/10

John Taylor

Thank you for sending us a copy of your letter of 26 October to Peter Craine. Mr Pym warmly welcomes the Prime Minister's willingness in principle to make a speech on defence and disarmament, probably in the New Year. We are consulting the MOD with a view to finding a suitable platform.

The Prime Minister may also wish to know that Mr Pym himself plans to make a speech on the Alliance and arms control in Leeds on 25 November. The year ahead will be of crucial importance to the Alliance as we move towards the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershings. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary therefore considers that regular ministerial statements about British policy on these issues will be of great significance. The timing of his own speech and that proposed by the Prime Minister seems well judged. Together, the two speeches will represent a sustained and co-ordinated attempt to explain the role of the Alliance in both defence and arms control through this crucial period.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram and Peter Craine.

See on



John Taylor

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED



11 12 1  
MK 1  
9 8 7  
5 4 3

17 JUL 1982





Defence  
Debate

FILE

RM



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 October, 1982

With your letter of 19 October you forwarded for the Prime Minister's information a report by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces on Support for the Government's Nuclear Policies. The Prime Minister read this report with interest.

With regard to the last sentence, Mrs Thatcher is willing in principle to make a speech on defence and disarmament, perhaps in the New Year. I think she would be grateful if, without making any commitment, the Minister of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office could consider a suitable platform for such a speech and make further recommendations.

of to be  
quarantined in  
speech file

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. L. COOPER

R.P. Craine, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence

A



①

PRIME MINISTER

SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S NUCLEAR  
POLICIES

You saw the attached report by  
Peter Blaker.

In his last sentence he says that a  
major speech by you on defence and dis-  
armament would be of great value to the  
Government's effort to counter the  
activities of the unilateralists.

Are you prepared to consider making  
such a speech, perhaps in the New Year?

Yes  
mb

A.D.C.

22 October 1982



①



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)  
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

Private Secretary to  
MINISTER OF STATE FOR  
THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/PB/3/2

19 October 1982

Prime Minister

With reading in full. See last line —  
would you consider making a major speech on defence  
and disarmament, perhaps in the New Year?

Dear Private Secretary,

A.J.C. 28/10

With the agreement of the Secretary of State I am forwarding for the Prime Minister's information a report by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces on support for the Government's nuclear policies.

Yours ever

R.P. Craine

R P CRAINE

Private Secretary to the  
Prime Minister



NOTE BY THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR THE ARMED FORCES

SUPPORT FOR OUR NUCLEAR POLICIES

I last prepared a report for you on this subject, which you forwarded to the Prime Minister, in February. I believe that you and she might now find it helpful to be updated.

The Last Eight Months

2. Although the Falklands crisis distracted both public and Ministerial attention from the debate about our nuclear policies, and industrial action at the COI held up work on our film, the last eight months have seen considerable progress. The FCO have produced a further leaflet about nuclear deterrence and multilateral disarmament (which sets out both sides of the argument, to make it more acceptable to schools), and the MOD have produced a pack of speakers notes, summarising key points, which have been distributed to supporting organisations and the Central Office. Our audio visual presentation "A Better Road to Peace" has been widely used (indeed it is the COI Central Film Library's most borrowed item), by such groups as Womens' Institute, Towns Womens' Guilds, Rotary Clubs, Schools, Universities and County Emergency Planning Officers. The 25 minute film "The Peace Game" which, like the audio visual, is designed to rebut the most common criticisms and doubts about our policies, is to be launched on the 28th of this month. You, and I think also the Prime Minister, have now had a chance to see this.

3. The British Atlantic Committee have a new Director, a retired Major General, who will take up his duty shortly. After a year of problems with their organisation and staffing I hope we will now see the Committee play a more energetic role in the nuclear debate, particularly at the national level. Locally they have been making steady progress building up their network of supporters, which I understand now numbers about 800. These people are being supplied with briefing material and encouraged to offer themselves as speakers at meetings and on local radio, and to write to local newspapers. Nevertheless, the BAC could be doing much more and I hope will now start to demonstrate a greater sense of purpose and urgency in their activities.

4. The Coalition for Peace Through Security remain active, although Councillor Tony Kerpel appears no longer closely involved. They favour direct action, taking on the CND's principal speakers at the CND's own meetings, both here and abroad, and issuing hard hitting leaflets raising questions about the CND leadership's motivation and sources of support. By contrast the Council for Arms Control, of which Ray Whitney is a leading member, concentrates on disarmament matters. They have produced a number of pamphlets and study papers and were one of the Non-Governmental Organisations chosen to address the UN's Special Session in June.



5. Winston Churchill has been active and formed the Coalition for Peace and Freedom to act as an umbrella organisation to help coordinate aspects of the work of the BAC, CPS and the YCs' Youth for Multilateral Disarmament.

The Year Ahead

6. In the last 8 months I believe substantial progress has been made in putting over our case and that the forward momentum of the unilateralists has been slowed, although I would hesitate to say it has been halted. 1983 will be crucial. The General Election is now not far away and in that campaign the policies of nuclear deterrence which have been pursued by governments of both parties for 30 years are likely to be a matter of controversy to an extent we have not witnessed before. Opinion polls suggest we still have support for the retention of an independent nuclear deterrent but only a minority support the acquisition of Trident. We have a lot more to do in explaining that Trident is the most cost-effective replacement for Polaris and that it does not represent an increase in our capability viz-a-viz the Soviet Union or a change to a first strike or war-fighting policy as some of the unilateralists suggest. In 1983 we face the deployment of the Cruise missiles at Greenham Common, the men and equipment from the summer and the missiles towards the end of the year. I am sure the unilateralists will see this deployment as a major rallying point and I expect them to make an effort to focus attention on Greenham Common with demonstrations, obstruction and even further physical attacks on the Camp. Again opinion polls suggest that this deployment is unpopular and we must do more to explain why the missiles are coming and how their deployment could be avoided (or they could be withdrawn after deployment) if the Soviet Union accept President Reagan's proposals in the INF talks.

7. A number of plans are in hand. I intend to commission a further 30 minute film. If this could be made in such a way that it combined instruction with entertainment it might reach a much wider audience. I have been in touch with Euan Lloyd, the producer of the film about the SAS 'Who Dares Wins', which is currently a major box office success. He is a supporter of our policies and is going to try to suggest a way in which this could be done. He has raised the possibility that if the film were sufficiently entertaining it might be adopted by distributors to accompany a major feature film on the cinema circuit, which would bring it to a huge audience. I also plan to commission one or two shorter films of about 15 minutes in length, one about the deployment of Cruise missiles.

8. The local and regional press are quite interested in the nuclear debate, stimulated by the declaration of nuclear free zones by many local authorities and by local campaigns against civil defence in general and exercise Hard Rock in particular. I have sent an article on nuclear free zones to the newspapers in all the areas covered by such zones and so far about 20 have published it. In addition, I will be making a series of visits to these areas to meet the editors of local newspapers and radio stations, starting in Yorkshire next month.



9. I am sure that Douglas Hurd would agree with me that disarmament will be an important subject in 1983. I believe we need to tell the public more about previous disarmament initiatives - that they succeeded because of Western determination and resolve or that they failed because of Russian intransigence - so that the public may better understand the factors at play in the current negotiations. There may be no progress at Geneva next year or it may be very slow and we will need to tell the public as much as we can without breaching confidentiality. We also need to stress just how much is at stake in terms of real arms reductions and how this could be jeopardised by unilateralist talk. We also need to develop our contacts with the Churches and in particular bolster the forces of common-sense in the Church of England to argue against the working party report "The Church and The Bomb".

Conclusion

10. In the year ahead we must devote even more of our time and energies to taking our case to the public, in order to halt the shift of opinion against our nuclear policies and to win back the many concerned people whose opposition I believe to be a product of their ignorance and fear which has been played upon by the emotional propaganda of the unilateralists. This effort needs to be widely supported. I shall be encouraging our colleagues in Parliament and the party and the various bodies such as the BAC to do as much as they can. There is now no shortage of good briefing material and speaking notes available, both at Central Office and in the MOD and FCO. I hope that other ministers will also help and in this context a major speech by the Prime Minister would be of great value to us.

*P.A.B.*

PETER BLAKER

18th October 1982





118007982

12 1 2 3  
4 5 6 7 8 9



