

PREM 19/1783

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CIVIL DISORDER.

HOME AFFAIRS

The Scarman Report

Part 1: April 1980

Part 3: October 1985

(In folder: Hausworth/Lozells. Sept 1985 Report)

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
23.10.85							
11.11.85							
15.11.85							
20.11.85							
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24.12.85							
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26.4.86							
18.9.86							
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PREM 19/1783

● PART 3 ends:-

CC(88)3bt. Item 3 18.9.86

PART 4 begins:-

HOMG SEC 10 PM 21.6.88

~~DRAFT CABINET PAPER 24.6.88~~

CF Pl. file with other

Broedwaker pgs. MEA 28/4

✓ Mark did

let me know!

have also told Central Office Agent. - who wants me det Murphy is a little out of control

Mark,

Has anything been done about this?

f 28/4.

Sue

26/4.

~~Sue~~

Re PM decided not to go.

I believe I referred SS. There

was conversation with the ITO about

this. Would you check that it is

correct.

MEA 28/4

B

MR. ADDISON

We spoke about the attached letter from Peter Murphy which I have acknowledged.

I understand Stephen Boys Smith is going to write to you before the end of this week advising about a possible visit by the Prime Minister to the Broadwater Farm Estate.

I suggest that these papers are seen by Nigel Wicks (and perhaps the Prime Minister in her weekend box).

I hope very much that this whole question can then be discussed by the Prime Minister and Home Secretary at their bilateral meeting next Monday afternoon, 24th March.

Sp.

STEPHEN SHERBOURNE

20.3.86

TOTTENHAM CONSERVATIVE ASSOCIATION

SURGERY

MONDAY AND THURSDAY

3.30 - 7.00 p.m.

5 Bruce Grove, Tottenham, N17

01-808 5074

(24 hour ansaphone)

Chairman:

Peter Murphy

Life Vice Presidents Ethel Donne
William Band

COUNCILLORS

Patricia Salim 802-5728

Phil Mandeville 801-0907

Dick Taylor 808-2443

Michael Coney 808-0254

Mr. S. Swinbourne.
Personal Secretary to Prime Minister.
10 Downing Street,
London S.W.1.

7th March 1986.

Dear Mr. Swinbourne,


Following the discussion on Saturday between myself, Councillor Mrs Patricia Salim and Mrs Diane Harwood I write to reiterate that we are very anxious that a member of the Government preferably the Home Secretary or the Environment Secretary, visits Tottenham to reassure local people of the Governments desire for peace on the Broadwater Farm Estate and also to show local people the Governments understanding of the great concern of the people living on and around the Estate in particular, as many of these people feel they have no representation other than the local Conservative Party and that many of them are still in a state of shock resulting from the events of that week in October.

Finally I must suggest that the Prime Minister finds sometime in the future to make a visit to the constituency in order that she can show local people that she to is as concerned as they can be that matters return to normal.

In conclusion I would add that we are quite happy to arrange a meeting to be addressed by either of the Cabinate Ministers or indeed the Prime Minister and in particular we would like to point out that such a visit may be sufficient to ensure a Conservative Victory at the local Council Elections which in Haringey were lost last time by four seats, a fifteen vote majority in one ward and a hundred and fifty vote majority in another, so perhaps you can stress how important such action would be for all concerned.

Thank you for taking such an interest on Saturday and I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely,


Peter Murphy.

CC MEA
D.S.
E.B. (realtor)
Corr.

Ack



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Dick Taylor 808-2443

Michael Coney 808-0254

Mr.S.Swinbourne.
Political Secretary to Prime Minister.
10 Downing Street,
London S.W.1.

17th March 1986.


Dear Mr.Swinbourne,

You will recall our discussion at the Wembley Conference and the Prime Minister's request that you consider our views on the situation in Tottenham.

I am now on the one hand delighted to know that the Home Secretary is visiting Tottenham on Tuesday week and on the other hand extremely disappointed to find that this is intended to be a private visit.

My Association and in particular the Councillors for the Broadwater Farm Estate have asked me to write to you to see if the Prime Minister could bring her influence to bear to make this a Party and police occasion. The residents of the Estate are still extremely upset by the events and a public show of sympathy and visit by Mr.Hurd would do a lot to reassure them.

Yours sincerely,



P.L.Murphy.

Rec'd 19/3.
Ack 20/3



DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1783</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Minute from Hartley Booth to Prime Minister dated 22 January 1986</i>	
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(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY) <i>49</i>

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

13 January 1986

Dear Mark,

POLICE REPORT ON THE TOTTENHAM RIOT

The Home Secretary has asked me to let you have the attached copy of the report prepared by the Metropolitan Police for the Haringey Police/Community Consultative Group on the riot at the Broadwater Farm Estate.

The police report attracted considerable coverage in the press over the week-end and this morning, much of it inaccurate. There is, for example, nothing in the police report to suggest that the riot was planned months in advance, as the stories in the "Mail on Sunday" and today's "Guardian" suggest. What the police report does say is that over a period of three weeks leading up to the riots there were a number of specific incidents as well as unconfirmed rumours of impending trouble (set out in paragraph 4 of the report) which led to an atmosphere of increased tension in the area. The story in the "Mail on Sunday" appears to have mistaken these indicators of tension as evidence of pre-planning. The police view remains that there is no evidence of long term planning of the riot.

The editorial in the "Mail on Sunday" was also misleading, in that in condemning "consultative committees" it confused the community/police consultative groups recommended in the Scarman Report, which Section 106 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act put on a statutory basis, with the so-called police committees set up by some Labour local authorities. Contrary to what the "Mail on Sunday" says, the police are very much in favour of consultative committees and, in London help to set them up. The police have produced reports on the Brixton and Tottenham riots for the consultative committees at Lambeth and Tottenham respectively. The Haringey Consultative Committee is as yet in its infancy but appears to have responded favourably to the police report, which it will debate fully at its next meeting. The Lambeth Consultative Committee is now well established and played a valuable role following the Brixton riots in playing down tensions in the area and attempting to ensure a quick return to normality.

We are attempting to correct the misleading impression which these press reports have given about the background to the Tottenham riot and the Haringey Consultative Committee. Mr Shaw appeared on "The World at One" today and will attempt to set the record straight in his winding up speech in the Second Reading of the Public Order Bill this evening.

Copies of this letter go to Joan MacNaughton (Lord President's Office), Alston Smith (Lord Privy Seal's Office) and Andrew Lansley (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office).

Yours,
Stephus

S W BOYS SMITH

Mark Addison, Esq.

To The Chairman and Members of
The Haringey Police/Community Consultative Group

This concise, factual report touching upon the events at the Broadwater Farm Estate, London, N17, on 6th and 7th October 1985, is presented in order that discussions currently taking place within the Consultative Group as to the most effective policing policies for a multi cultural society may be better informed. The report compliments the verbal presentation given by police to the Group on 31st October 1985.

The complaint investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Mrs. Cynthia Jarrett, headed by Assistant Chief Constable Simpson and supervised by the Independent Police Complaints Authority, continues. So, too, does the separate criminal inquiry being conducted into the murder of Police Constable Keith Blakelock and the riot. Great care, therefore, has had to be taken to ensure nothing written within this report can be construed as being prejudicial to the outcome of those inquiries.

My thanks are due to Chief Superintendent David Williams and his fellow team members who have undertaken the bulk of the work which has made the presentation of this report possible.



M.D. RICHARDS

Deputy Assistant Commissioner

SERIOUS PUBLIC DISORDER IN TOTTENHAM

6TH OCTOBER 1985

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The riot which occurred at Broadwater Farm Estate, Tottenham on the night of Sunday 6th October 1985, was similar in many respects to that which had occurred at Brixton a few days previously. Both were triggered by emotive incidents - the shooting of Mrs. Cherry GROCE in Brixton and the death of Mrs. Cynthia JARRETT in Tottenham - and each was preceded by a demonstration outside the local police station. The Tottenham riot was significantly different, however, in a number of respects: the unprecedented level of violence that was directed towards police, the death of a police officer as a result of this violence, the use of firearms to attack police and the deployment of officers trained in the use of baton rounds (plastic bullets). All this adds up to an unwelcome escalation which makes a return to "normality" much more difficult to achieve.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty what amounts to "normality" in the Broadwater Farm situation. The estate has earned an unenviable reputation over recent years as one where normal policing methods are resisted by a vociferous minority and where unprovoked attacks on police are all too common. To instance but a few of the more serious :

2.1.1 On 12th August 1982, P.C. HOLLAND, a Home Beat Officer, visited the Youth Association's Office by invitation with the local Police Community Liaison Officer. Whilst he was there and in conversation with Mrs. Dolly KIFFEN, he was struck over the head from behind with a bottle by an unidentified assailant.

2.1.2 On 2nd November 1982, two metal beer kegs were dropped from one of the high level walkways onto a police car driven by Inspector POULTER, who was fortunate to escape serious injury. Later the same day, P.C. STRATTON, one of the local Home Beat Officers, was ambushed by black youths and struck on the head with a billiard cue, as a result of which he suffered a serious injury.

2.1.3 On 4th August 1983, P.C. BETTS was standing alongside a police van that he had driven to the estate to collect other officers, when he was stabbed in the back by a black youth.

2.1.4 On 11th September 1985, P.Cs. NICHOLSON and MORLEY, both Home Beat Officers, were attacked with missiles by a gang of black youths. NICHOLSON was struck on the head and he sustained injuries which placed him on the sick list for several weeks.

2.2 In an effort to meet the policing needs of the estate in these circumstances it has been policed for some time by a team of dedicated officers, working in pairs, who have attempted to exercise their responsibilities towards all the residents whilst avoiding, as far as possible, confrontation with a minority.

3. PRESSURE OF OUTSIDE EVENTS

3.1 The recent disturbances at Toxteth, Handsworth and Brixton appear to have contributed to an escalation of tension on the Broadwater Farm Estate. In the two or three days that followed each of these incidents, there were reports of youths apparently emulating what they had seen on television by walking about wearing masks and balaclava helmets.

4. TENSION INDICATORS

4.1 This was followed in the week immediately preceding the riot by persistent rumours that there were plans afoot for a major disturbance and looting, Wood Green Shopping City being identified as the prime target. It is emphasised that these were only rumours, but there were a number of occurrences which tended to indicate that there may have been some substance in them :-

4.1.1 On 17th September 1985, and again on 19th September, unconfirmed reports were coming to the notice of police to the effect that petrol was being syphoned from the tanks of cars parked on the estate.

4.1.2 On 20th September 1985, the Asian-owned supermarket on the deck of Tangmere block was daubed with the following graffiti, "CURRY EATING BASTARDS. TANDORI SHIT GET OUT. NIGGERS RULE". The perpetrators of this offence are unknown to police (although they are believed to be known to a council officer) but it may be significant, as will be shown later, that this was one of only two Asian owned premises on the estate singled out by the rioters for looting and fire-bombing.

4.1.3 On 22nd September 1985, a black man was shot in the residents' club in Stapleford block. Another black man has been charged with this offence.

4.1.4 On 28th September 1985, the night of the Brixton riots, there were reports of large numbers of youths gathering in Wood Green wearing helmets and balaclavas. No disorder ensued however.

- 4.1.5 On 1st October 1985, at 4.30pm there was an emergency call to an alleged robbery in Gloucester Road. This was proved to be a false call, but at 5.08pm an actual robbery, involving 20 - 25 masked black youths, took place at a Post Office in Mount Pleasant Road about $\frac{1}{4}$ mile away.
- 4.1.6 Later the same day there was a call to Tottenham Police Station that 40 - 50 black youths armed with petrol bombs had gathered on the estate. This was followed by two further calls stating that petrol bombs had actually been thrown. Nothing was damaged. However, subsequent examination of the area failed to confirm such events had taken place.
- 4.1.7 On 2nd October 1985, a petrol bomb was found in a drain under one of the walkways of the estate.
- 4.1.8 On the same day information was received that bottles were being collected by youths in the area.
- 4.1.9 On 3rd October 1985, just after 10pm, a hoax "999" call was made claiming that two police officers were being attacked on the estate by 20 black youths. There were no officers in the vicinity at this time.
- 4.1.10 On 4th October 1985, Post Office officials reported to police that postmen delivering mail to the estate were being subjected to harassment by youths.

4.1.11 Later the same day a person who had been arrested for a drug offence told police that petrol bombs had been made and were being stored somewhere on the estate but the exact location was never determined.

4.2 Whilst it is accepted that some of these reports were based upon unconfirmed rumour, or may have been created by persons intent on provoking confrontation, many were a matter of record and were accepted by police as evidence of mounting tension and potential disorder.

5. POLICE CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS

5.1 As a result it was decided to set up a limited reserve of police officers at Wood Green during the weekend of October 5th - 6th, purely as a precaution against potential disorder. There were no incidents on Saturday 5th October, until the death of Mrs. JARRETT, about 6pm, which was the immediate trigger incident for the riot. It is a matter of conjecture what would have occurred had Mrs. JARRETT not died.

6. THE DEATH OF MRS. CYNTHIA JARRETT

6.1 The circumstances leading to the death of Mrs. JARRETT were fully aired in an inquest, at which a verdict of "accidental death" was recorded at its conclusion on 4th December 1985. The matter is still the subject of an investigation being conducted under the supervision of the Independent Police Complaints Authority and it would be improper to examine it further here.

7. POLICE ACTION FOLLOWING THE DEATH

7.1 In the hours immediately following the death, Superintendent BUCHAN, the duty senior officer, and Chief Superintendent STAINSBY, the acting Commander 'Y' District, visited the JARRETT household and spoke to members of the family. Chief Superintendent STAINSBY initiated the police complaints procedure under Part IX of

the Police and Criminal Evidence Act which provides an independent body, the Police Complaints Authority, to supervise allegations of the type made in this case. A senior officer from another force, Mr. P.J. SIMPSON, an Assistant Chief Constable from Essex, was appointed to conduct the enquiries, in order to ensure the impartiality of the investigation. In a police press release, sincere regrets were expressed at the unfortunate death of Mrs. JARRETT.

8. MINOR OUTBREAK OF DISORDER

8.1 At 1.45am on Sunday the 6th October, following a visit by the JARRETT family to Tottenham Police Station in furtherance of their complaint, a demonstration took place outside which resulted in 4 windows being smashed. No arrests were made and after a brief noisy protest the demonstrators, consisting of about 20 to 30 black people, were persuaded by the JARRETTs to leave the area. There was no further disorder.

9. MEETING WITH COMMUNITY LEADERS

9.1 Between 10am and 10.30am on the 6th October, the local police invited prominent members of the local community to meet them to discuss the growing problems resulting from the death of Mrs. JARRETT. As a result a meeting took place at Tottenham Police Station between 12.45pm and 1.50pm chaired by Deputy Assistant Commissioner RICHARDS in charge of 1 Area, who was accompanied by Chief Superintendent COUCH and Superintendent DORRICOFF.

9.2 Members of the community present were :-

Councillor Andreas MIKKEDES	- Deputy Mayor London Borough of Haringey
Councillor Eddie LARGE	- London Borough of Haringey
Mr. Roy LIMB	- Chief Executive
Mr. Eric CLARK	- Haringey Police Consultative Committee
Mr. Chris KAVALLARRES	- Chairman Haringey Community Relations Council

Mr. Jeffrey CRAWFORD	- Senior Community Relations Officer
Mrs. Hyacinth MOODY	- Haringey Community Relations Council - Police Liaison Committee
Mrs. Dolly KIFFEN	- Youth Leader
Mr. Floyd JARRETT)
Mr. Michael JARRETT) Sons of Mrs. Cynthia JARRETT

9.3 After considerable discussion it was agreed by those present that :

9.3.1 all parties would appeal for calm within the community

9.3.2 the enquiry into the death should be completed expeditiously

9.3.3 the Community Leaders would demand the report be made public and that DAC RICHARDS would pass this request to the Police Complaints Authority.

10. DISORDER OUTSIDE TOTTENHAM POLICE STATION

10.1 At just before 2pm about 100 black persons of both sexes and of varying ages congregated outside the police station displaying a variety of placards accusing police of murdering Mrs. JARRETT. The group succeeded in stopping all traffic in Tottenham High Road and diversions had to be introduced. Apart from two minor attacks on passing cars and one stone thrown through a station window (by a white youth), there was no violence and the demonstrators confined their action to shouting abuse at police officers positioned outside the station. The abuse from the crowd included threats to kill police officers and their families in revenge for the JARRETT death. There were also warnings of possible trouble later in the day.

10.2 Police officers who were present had differing conceptions of the intention of the demonstrators. Some thought that the threats that had been made were mere rhetoric arising from a release of anger and tension; others were quite convinced that there would be attacks on police and/or serious disorder later in the day.

11. ATTACK ON P.C. CATON

11.1 At 3.15pm, just before the demonstrators dispersed from outside the police station, P.Cs. CATON and HUGHES, both Home Beat officers, went to an address in The Avenue, N17, on the periphery of the estate, to investigate a complaint that someone had fired an airgun at the windows of a house. Whilst they were there, they noticed a crowd of black youths gathering outside, some of them armed with bricks. The demeanour of the youths was such that the officers feared for their own safety, so they left the house and hurried away. They were subjected to a barrage of missiles as they did so, one of which - apparently a section of broken paving stone - struck P.C. CATON in the back.

11.2 The full extent of CATON's injuries was not known until about two hours after the incident, when it was discovered he was suffering from internal bleeding. He underwent major surgery during which it was found that his spleen had been ruptured beyond repair.

11.3 In the meantime, in the hour that followed the attack on P.C. CATON, five "999" calls were made by residents of the Broadwater Farm concerning the movements of up to 100 youths, some of them wearing masks, who were alleged to be running through the estate banging on doors. Police did not respond to any of the calls, having first established by telephone to the various informants that, whilst the calls were genuine, no actual damage had been caused. It was felt that a police response at this time could have provoked confrontation and disorder.

11.4 There followed a period of absolute quiet, lasting nearly two hours, when no calls of any kind were made from the estate. It is now known that there was a meeting of youths being held during this period at the premises of the Broadwater Farm Youth Association. It has been claimed that a decision was made at the meeting to mount another "peaceful" demonstration outside Tottenham Police Station. Given the extent to which the youths were subsequently found to have armed themselves with petrol bombs, knives and machettes, doubt must exist about the validity of this claim.

12. IMMEDIATE BUILD UP TO RIOT

12.1 The peace was first broken at 6.09pm when a "999" call was received from an address in The Avenue, to alleged criminal damage to a window caused by 15 masked black youths. This was apparently a genuine call, but when police officers in a vehicle visited the scene at about 6.15pm, there were no youths in evidence, so they withdrew from the area.

12.2 The next call came at 6.25pm, again via the "999" system, when information was given that two youths had been detained at Willan Road (on the estate - see map at Appendix 'A') for car theft. This call could not be checked back to the informant and is now believed to have been a hoax, possibly to draw police into the estate.

12.3 In view of the doubts about this call, Inspector HUDSON decided to go from Tottenham Police Station to the vicinity himself to see what, if anything, was occurring. He was driving along The Avenue, about $\frac{1}{4}$ mile from the estate, when two black youths wearing helmets drew up alongside him on a motor cycle. One of them smashed a beer bottle into the window of the driver's door, which broke and scattered glass into his eyes. He managed to drive away and was taken to Moorfields Hospital for treatment. Fortunately he suffered no permanent eye damage.

13. POLICE MANPOWER SITUATION

- 13.1 It is relevant, at this stage, to examine the police manpower situation that was existing at this time. Following the JARRETT death and the subsequent demonstration outside the police station, there was a fear that there might be a similar escalation of violence to that which had occurred in Brixton following the GROCE incident. The reserve manpower for the area was, therefore, increased for Sunday to approximately 200, made up of some coach serials and some transits (District Support Units). Some of these were held at Wood Green and some at other nearby locations. It was necessary, in order to provide all day coverage, to have a 10am - 6pm shift and a 4pm - midnight shift, each of 200 men, the two hour overlap being required for briefing, feeding and change-over purposes.
- 13.2 The change-over was completed by 6.30pm and at 6.40pm all of the 10am - 6pm officers were dismissed. Many of them were at this time at the feeding centre in Northumberland Park, $\frac{1}{2}$ mile north of the estate. It appears that the progress of these off-duty officers southwards through Tottenham en route to their home Divisions was noticed by observers who formed the erroneous impression that they were making their way to the estate in order to "seal it off". This mistaken belief has been mentioned in the reports of both the GLC Police Committee and the Haringey Police Sub-Committee.
- 13.3 In fact at 6.40pm there were only two DSUs, both formed of local 'Y' District officers, in the vicinity of the estate, their brief being to respond to emergency calls only.
- 13.4 Understandably, following the attack on P.C. CATON and the ambush of Inspector HUDSON, it was now considered prudent to use only protected DSU vehicles to answer emergency

calls. At 6.49pm a "999" call was received to the effect that a large group of black youths were throwing stones at doors in The Avenue. As the informant was anonymous, there is no means of knowing whether this was a genuine call or a hoax. The DSUs made a brief visit to The Avenue where they saw some youths but no immediate disturbance, so they again withdrew. A further "999" call was made at 6.53pm, again to The Avenue, stating that police were "urgently required". No reason was given. A DSU (Y32) went to the scene to investigate but shortly after their arrival, at 7.05pm, they were subjected to a violent attack by a large group of black youths, who threw bricks and petrol bombs at their vehicle and struck at the bodywork with machetes. The ferocity of this attack was such that had the officers not been in a protected vehicle they would almost certainly have been killed or seriously injured.

14. THE RIOT

- 14.1 After being attacked, Y32 withdrew to a safe location in order to don their protective equipment (shields, overalls and helmets). Meanwhile the Control Room at Wood Green began to mobilise the men who were immediately available.
- 14.2 Units began to arrive at the scene from 7.10pm onwards. They found that barricades of blazing vehicles had been erected at all four vehicular entrances to the estate, (Gloucester Road, Willan Road, Griffin Road and Adams Road) and at each location they came under missile and petrol bomb fire as they approached.
- 14.3 It took only about twenty minutes from the start of the riot to the erection of barricades at locations that are several hundred yards apart. There can be little doubt that this was part of a pre-arranged plan, rather than a spontaneous reaction to police "surrounding" the estate as has been claimed by some people.

14.4 The experience of one family who were driving into the estate to visit a relative gives a dramatic picture of the nature of events. As they entered, they found their way blocked by a group of youths who had just overturned a car in the centre of the road. The youths attacked their vehicle with knives, slashing the tyres to immobilise it. They then threatened to petrol bomb the car with the people in it unless they got out. When they did so they were not harmed by the youths but were told to go away because "our war is not with you!" There were no police in the street where this occurred at this time and nothing to suggest that the estate was being "surrounded".

14.5 No senior officers were on duty in the vicinity of the estate when the riot broke out but as soon as the extent of the disorder became apparent Chief Superintendent COUCH and Superintendent SINCLAIR went to the scene from Tottenham Police Station, Superintendent FRENCH from Hornsey and Chief Inspector ROWE from Northumberland Park. One of these officers went to each of the four main locations, COUCH to Gloucester Road, SINCLAIR to Willan Road, FRENCH to Griffin Road and ROWE to Adams Road, where they took command. About two hours later when Chief Superintendent JEFFERS came on duty, he was sent to Griffin Road to take charge because this was the scene of the worst rioting as well as being the place where firearms had already been used on more than one occasion.

14.6 Police manpower built up fairly quickly, with all the immediate reserves being deployed within a few minutes of the riot breaking out. These were augmented by some of the transit serials that had been dismissed at 6.40pm who had heard what was going on on the radios in their vehicles and volunteered to return to the scene. This was followed by a general mobilisation of DSUs and other units from all over London.

14.7 By about 8pm a pattern of behaviour by the rioters had emerged. About 200 - 300 youths would emerge from under

the tower blocks and attack one or more of the barricaded locations with bricks and petrol bombs. There was evidence of a degree of organisation in this. Particular individuals were observed on several occasions giving directions to others by words or gestures. After each attack, when ammunition was exhausted, the rioters would withdraw to re-arm, and then attack again, either in the same location or at one of the others. The most ferocious attacks were made at Griffin Road and Adams Road, where the defended positions were so close to the overhead balconies and walkways that any attempt by the police to advance and repel the rioters could be met by a barrage of missiles from above.

14.8 Willan Road was also attacked with some ferocity, which included having blazing vehicles driven at the police line, but it was more easily defended because of its location at the top of a slope. Apart from the initial attack, when the barricades were erected, there was no assault upon the Gloucester Road location.

14.9 The first report of the use of a firearm came as early as 7.55pm when a member of a DSU (S32) deployed at Griffin Road found that he had sustained what appeared to be a bullet hole in his shield. Shortly afterwards it was discovered that P.C. PATT, who had been taken to hospital injured from Griffin Road, had, in fact, been struck in the body by a bullet. As a result of these two incidents officers from D11 Branch (the Force firearms unit) were alerted soon after 8pm and sent to Tottenham to stand by.

14.10 Following this, at least one shotgun was fired at police in Griffin Road and several officers and two BBC cameramen sustained pellet wounds, fortunately none serious. It was reported by one officer, experienced in the use of firearms, that he had heard a shotgun fired more than thirty times in the Griffin Road area during the evening.

14.11 In the light of the nature of the violence and the use of firearms, it was soon recognised that the police strategy for dealing with the riot could only be one of containment. Although a number of forward movements took place at different locations, any concerted effort to advance into the body of the estate (in which lakes of petrol were seen) could well have resulted in death or serious injury to police and/or members of the public, whilst a withdrawal from the defended locations would have permitted the rioters to spill out into the side streets around Mount Pleasant Road, where fires in the old terraced houses could have been easily started by petrol bombs and would very quickly have got out of control. It was not likely that this would happen on the estate, which is built of concrete and has no ground floor flats. In this context it is relevant to point out that as soon as police were forced to retreat part of the way along Adams Road, an occupied private house in that street outside the defended area was set on fire as the result of the actions of the rioters in petrol bombing the cars outside.

14.12 The "containment" strategy was misunderstood by many people, including some police officers, to mean that we were surrounding the estate in an attempt to prevent the rioters leaving. All we were doing, in effect, was containing the attack on police to a limited number of defensible locations. The strategy also allowed an attempt to be made to identify and arrest persons seen to be organising or controlling the actions of rioters. Had the rioters not been so contained that kind of action would not have been possible. Unlike most other recent riots, all of the energies of the rioters were directed to the attack on police. There was little gratuitous violence to the person or property of others - unlike Brixton where there was widespread looting and a number of assaults, including rapes, upon members of the public. It is perhaps significant in this respect that subsequent

enquiries revealed allegations that some basement garage areas on the estate had been flooded with petrol, for the alleged purpose of use in the event of an incursion by police.

14.13 As has already been mentioned, only two premises remote from the actual riot locations were fire bombed. They were the Asian-owned shops on the deck of Tangmere block. It is not clear why these shops were singled out for attack, but it has been rumoured that relationships between the owner of the supermarket and some of the black youths on the estate have not always been cordial.

14.14 It was the fire in the supermarket that led to the unfortunate death of P.C. BLAKELOCK. Just before 10pm Chief Superintendent COUCH had a discussion with members of the Fire Brigade, who were becoming concerned that the fire, which had been burning for some time, was getting so fierce that there was a danger that it would begin to spread to the occupied flats immediately above it. There had been no incident or attack at the Gloucester Road location for some hours and no observed movement in the vicinity of Tangmere of the rioters, who appeared to be pre-occupied with the attack upon the other three locations, about 400 yards away. COUCH therefore decided to send a small group of officers into Tangmere with the Fire Brigade, to protect them whilst they extinguished the fire. There was clearly some element of risk, given what had occurred so far during the evening, but it was a risk that had to be taken as the lives of members of the public were thought to be in danger.

14.15 The exact circumstances of BLAKELOCK's murder cannot be set out in detail here, pending the outcome of the trial of persons who have been charged with this offence. Suffice it to say that the officers concerned were the subject of a quite horrendous attack by a heavily armed gang who appear to have run from elsewhere on the estate when they realised that the officers were there.

14.16 About half-an-hour before the BLAKELOCK killing the scale of the attack in Griffin Road had become so ferocious that there was a real danger of many more serious injuries being caused unless something could be done to subdue the crowd. Deputy Assistant Commissioner RICHARDS, who was in overall charge, obtained authority from the Commissioner at 9.45pm for the use of baton rounds and/or CS Gas as a last resort should all else fail. In the event, by the time that the specially equipped team of officers from the Force's Firearms Branch (D11) had arrived at Griffin Road from Tottenham at about 10.20pm, the severity of the attack had lessened considerably, mainly it would appear because the BLAKELOCK incident had drawn some of the rioters away to the other side of the estate. The baton round trained officers were not, in fact, called to take action. The attacks continued to midnight but reduced in severity. In the meantime, groups of youths had built up outside the periphery of the estate in a number of locations. Many were merely spectators but some were apparently intent upon joining the rioters. Unable to do so because of the presence of police, they created minor disturbances, including some petrol bombing, in streets immediately to the east. A number of police units, led by Chief Inspector FREEBORN, were deployed during the evening to deal with this and the situation was largely contained.

14.17 As the evening progressed there were instances of shop window smashing and looting in Bruce Grove and Tottenham High Road. There were also burglaries and criminal damage committed in two schools and a day nursery which are situated just north of the estate (see Appendix 'B' for details of the reported crimes).

14.18 Whilst the attacks on police had largely abated by midnight, information had been received from a resident as late as 11.45pm that large groups of youths were still gathered in the darkness beneath the tower blocks, apparently lying in wait for police. It was, therefore,

decided, in the light of this information and the fact that firearms had been used against police on several occasions during the evening, that it would be ill-advised to enter at this stage. As a result, police did not go in until 4.30am on Monday morning when a planned operation was put into effect. Almost all the rioters had dispersed by this time and there was no disorder.

15. ARRESTS

15.1 Few arrests were effected on the night of the riot but many have been made since the event, as the result of enquiries, and the details of these are shown in Appendix 'C'. The criminal investigation into the murder of Police Constable BLAKELOCK and the riot is headed jointly by Detective Chief Superintendent GALLAHER and Detective Chief Superintendent MELVIN. The inquiry is exceedingly complex and is likely to continue for some time. Officers concerned in the inquiry who are charged with the responsibility of arresting suspects and searching premises are often armed and equipped with heavy implements which enable them to enter well protected properties. The need for such action must be seen in the context of the search for deadly weapons and the reluctance of some to admit police to premises albeit that search warrants authorising entry are in existence. The need for professionalism at every stage of the inquiry is paramount.

16. COMMENT

16.1 It will be seen that more than half of those charged are from the Tottenham area outside the Broadwater Farm Estate and that a substantial minority are white.

17. INJURIES

17.1 Details of reported injuries to police and public are shown in Appendix 'D'. It will be seen that almost all

the injuries inflicted were suffered by police officers rather than members of the public - confirmation of the fact that we were the main target for the rioters.

18. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

8.1 Since the riot the estate has been intensively policed but progressively numbers have been reduced. The need for high profile uniform policing has been necessary to maintain The Queens Peace, reduce the fear of crime and enhance the quality of life for the residents. Other considerations have been :

18.1.1 To afford protection to the patrolling uniform officers themselves who must still be seen to be under threat. (Prior to the events of 6th October 1985, four uniform officers had been assaulted, some seriously)

18.1.2 To give support to those residents both black and white, who have made statements to police and feel under threat.

18.1.3 To respond to the call of many who have articulated their need for a heavy police presence (they perceived the estate as "a no go area" although police officers never allowed it to reach that stage).

18.1.4 To give support to C.I.D. officers who are still making inquiries within the estate and are frequently executing search warrants and making arrests.

18.2 Police are anxious to establish normality of policing on the estate as soon as may be possible and consultations have taken place, and will continue, with groups who have an interest in the wellbeing of the residents.

Suggestions vary from the creation of a "no go" area to the imposition of high profile uniform policing, and from total demolition of the estate to amelioration and improvement. There is no easy solution but police and the community will continue to strive for the right one.

19. CONCLUSIONS

19.1 Naturally a great deal has been written and spoken about the riot since it occurred. There have been innumerable press, radio and TV analyses, pronouncements by politicians and lengthy reports by those employed by the GLC and Haringey Police Committees. Some police officers have publicly expressed anger and frustration at the tragic death of a colleague and the fact that they were placed in an "Aunt Sally" situation, not of their own making, where they had to stand for hours under attack without being able to take effective counter measures.

19.2 Some of the basic truths of the situation have been lost sight of in the welter of criticism and analysis of the disorders and need to be restated. The most important is that the police were most anxious to diffuse the situation following the untimely death of Mrs. JARRETT and everything that happened on the day was done with this in mind. In particular:-

19.2.1 A lengthy meeting of community leaders was called by police with the specific intention of enlisting their support in calming the situation.

19.2.2 Despite the fact that offences of criminal damage, obstruction and threatening behaviour were committed by identified individuals outside Tottenham Police Station, no arrests were made as a matter of policy in the hope that this might help to calm the situation.


- 19.2.3 A decision was made that no officers would enter the Broadwater Farm Estate in the ensuing period unless it was necessary to respond to emergency calls. In fact five such calls were received between 3.20pm and 4.20pm but on each occasion the matter was resolved by telephone and no officers were sent there.
- 19.2.4 It was decided to maintain a reserve of officers at police premises within the general area in light of threats that had been received and persistent rumours of potential disorder.
- 19.2.5 At 6.40pm when it is suggested that we were "sealing off" the estate half of our manpower was being dismissed and sent back to their own Districts.
- 19.2.6 When the riot erupted there were only two police units, both DSUs, in the vicinity of the estate. Their presence had become necessary only because of "999" calls from local residents about the behaviour of youths and because response to such calls by unprotected units had become inadvisable.
- 19.2.7 At no time was it our intention to enter the estate. It was made very clear by the senior officers on the ground in several radio transmissions that such an option was not viable. We were committed to maintaining a defensive, holding operation at four locations which had been chosen by the rioters as part of a clear pre-arranged plan. Indeed it was they who "sealed off"

the estate at a very early stage with their burning barricades. Our primary function of protection of life and property made withdrawal from these locations unthinkable.

19.3 In the context of the search for truth the activities of those employed by Local Authority Police Committees give cause for concern. They publish detailed reports giving what appear to be objective analyses of situations based upon careful evidence gathering. In fact, whether through naivety or disinterest in the truth, what they often produce is a gross distortion of it. It is they who have perpetrated the myth about police "sealing off" the estate. If, as they both claim, they were monitoring police radio transmissions during the evening, it is difficult to see how they could have come to the conclusion that this was actually the case.

19.4 No doubt this report will itself now come in for detailed analysis and criticism, particularly in those areas where it does not accord with other people's preconceived ideas. It is relevant to point out, therefore, that most of it is based upon matters of record rather than of opinion or speculation.

Plan of the BROADWATER FARM ESTATE. N.17



APPENDIX 'B'

CRIMES REPORTED

ROBBERY	4
MURDER	1
ARSON - Motor Vehicle	34
Dwelling	4
CRIMINAL DAMAGE	53
THEFT from motor vehicles	1
THEFT Cycle	1
ASSAULTS ON POLICE	232
ASSAULTS ON PUBLIC	7
BURGLARY	9

PRISONERS
STATISTICAL INFORMATION

<u>NUMBER OF ARRESTS (up to 6.12.85)</u>		186
<u>NUMBER OF PERSONS CHARGED</u>		84
<u>IDENTITY CODES</u>	IC1 (White)	- 23
	IC2 (Mediterranean)	- 2
	IC3 (Black)	- 58
<u>SEX</u>	Female	- 7
	Male	- 77
<u>OCCUPATION</u>	Employed	- 17
	Unemployed	- 44
	School	- 3
	Not known	- 10
<u>ADDRESSES</u>	Broadwater Farm Estate	- 19
	Tottenham Division	- 47
	Elsewhere	- 18
<u>AGES OF PERSONS CHARGED</u>	Between 12 - 16	- 19
	17 - 20	- 38
	21 - 25	- 15
	26 - 40	- 12

APPENDIX 'D'


INJURIES TO PUBLIC AND POLICE

<u>INJURIES TO PUBLIC</u>	7
<u>INJURIES TO POLICE</u>	248
	<hr/>
<u>TOTAL</u>	255
	<hr/>

OF THOSE PLACED SICK INJURIES ARE SHOWN AS FOLLOWS

<u>HEAD</u> including ONE Burn	42
FOUR Gunshot	
ONE Stab	
<u>CHEST</u>	8
<u>LEG</u> including One Gunshot	15
<u>SHOULDER</u> including ONE Gunshot	7
ONE Stab	
<u>ANKLE</u>	3
<u>BACK</u>	5
<u>ARM</u> including ONE Gunshot	3
<u>HAND</u>	3
	<hr/>
<u>TOTAL</u>	86
	<hr/>

9. without copy list
3 without —



DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1783</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Letter from Addison to Boys Smith dated 24 December 1985</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>31 March 2015</i> <i>Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use **Black Pen** to complete form

Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Department, Series and Piece/Item references clearly
e.g.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES
 <i>GRA 168</i>
PIECE/ITEM
(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY) <i>49</i>

Please Sign and Date in the box adjacent to the description that applies to the document being replaced by the Dummy Card

If the document is Closed under a FOI exemption, enter the number of years closed. See the TNA guidance *Preparation of records for transfer to The National Archives*, section 18.2

The box described as 'Missing' is for TNA use only (it will apply to a document that is not in its proper place after it has been transferred to TNA)

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1783</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Minute from Home Secretary to Prime Minister dated 20 December 1985.</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>31 March 2015</i> <i>Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
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DEPARTMENT/SERIES
 <i>GRA 168</i>
PIECE/ITEM
 <i>49</i>
(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)	

Please Sign and Date in the box adjacent to the description that applies to the document being replaced by the Dummy Card

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The box described as 'Missing' is for TNA use only (it will apply to a document that is not in its proper place after it has been transferred to TNA)

PRIME MINISTER

1.7.7.
2pc.

DAVID DIMBLEBY INTERVIEW WITH LORD SCARMAN AND GEOFFREY
DEAR ON "THIS WEEK, NEXT WEEK", BBC 1 ON 24 NOVEMBER

SEE
24/11/85 →

I attach the transcript which arrived just too late for
Questions today. You may be interested to glance through
it.

It does not in fact contain any reference by Lord Scarman
to the fact that the inner city problems cannot be resolved
by throwing money at them. It does, however, offer one
or two useful quotations on the following issues:

- (i) Lord Scarman says the recommendations in his Brixton
report for improving police relations with the Community
have been carried out;
- (ii) he emphasises that riot is itself criminal and that
the first priority is to re-establish law and order
when it breaks down;
- (iii) he says we should beware of drawing too sharp a distinction
between damage to property and risk to life. The
truth is that the first can lead to the second;
- (iv) Lord Scarman endorses the police request to have
plastic bullets available when riots get quite out
of hand;
- (v) Lord Scarman says the key difference between this
year and 1981 is the intrusion of organised crime,
making use of disaffected youth. "The police have
got to act vigorously to enforce the law against
these criminals, and the police have got to act firmly
if they do succeed in stirring up disorder and riot".

You will see, however, that Lord Scarman also makes much of the need to get the "underlying social ^{conditions} ~~trends~~" right. He says there must be some sort of link between social deprivation and the riots.

MLA

(Mark Addison)

5 December 1985

DA.09

PRIME MINISTER

HANDSWORTH ETC.

CF
The Handsworth report was touched on at the meeting with the Home Sec & Mr Mellor yesterday. The matter may come up again when the H/S comes in on 16/12. Nigel W should have these in his back up. MWA 5/12

Two things you may like to have a look at over the weekend.

i) a piece by Hartley Booth (Flag A) on Geoffrey Dear's report on the Handsworth riot.

ii) a record of a recent meeting between Lord Scarman and the Home Secretary (Flag B). This I think repays a careful look. Lord Scarman's remarks seem to me well balanced and perceptive. There is no hint that he believes the problems can be resolved by throwing money at them, and he seems determined not to let Handsworth, Tottenham etc. detract from the advances which have been made since 1981. Particularly interesting are his remarks on teachers, and the ill effects some of them have on their charges. I am sure he is also right to stress the importance of getting more black teachers into schools, and more black policemen onto the beat.

Lord Scarman must be right, as well, to point out the absence in this country of a significant black middle class as a key factor in making relationships between the races more difficult.

MWA

Mark Addison

29 November 1985

The Handsworth report is very worrying indeed. I should like to talk to the Home Secretary about it.

BEMBEW

ms

MR ADDISION

CF
PL by, + edit from Scarman,
22/29/11. 27 November 1985

HOME SECRETARY'S LETTER CONCERNING LORD SCARMAN

Although I cannot speak of the Lambeth Community Consultative Group, I agree with all nine of Lord Scarman's main points the other eight of which are summarised as follows:

1. The feeling of alienated black youth is a danger that Governments must address.
2. We each have a special responsibility to foster good relations with the black community.
3. Avoid judicial inquiries if possible.
4. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act should help community relations.
5. Education has a crucial role to play.
6. The situation could improve when a black middle class develops.
7. The Metropolitan Police often feel beleaguered.
8. The Chief Constable of the West Midlands (Geoffrey Dear) is outstanding.



HARTLEY BOOTH

26 November 1985

HANDSWORTH AND LOZELLES ROAD RIOT REPORT

No mere fictional drama could be as compelling as the parts of this report that describe the events of the 9-11 September this year (pages 18 onwards). The lack of police manpower and protective clothing in the right place at the right time is spotlighted. Forces hostile to public order can read of the police weaknesses. The public, who are entitled to protection, will feel aggrieved. A trader I spoke to in Lozelles road during that week said "I made six calls to the police for help that evening on the telephone and for three hours I was left unprotected. I am lucky to be alive, but look at my shop. Eight years' work and a lifetime's savings gone." His experience is confirmed by this police report. It is an irony that the supply of extra protective clothing, which would have allowed the police into Lozelles Road on that first evening much sooner, was due to be supplied shortly after the date of the riot.

The degree of organisation among the rioters is well documented in this report (pages 25 and 53). The report boldly concludes that the first riot was orchestrated by local drug dealers. This we suspected at the time, but had formerly been denied by the police.

The danger that officers had to experience should be brought to your attention (pages 30 and 64), and it should be

added that, although the report does complain that police resources had been cut back (page 56) it also says that even manpower reductions had not taken place then such a fuller compliment could not have dealt with the situation on their own (page 56). A formal request for more officers is made (page 73).

The following practical recommendations are made:

1. Police need a speedy ability to take out the ringleader (page 75). And suggests better equipment and training.
2. Further consideration in West Midlands should be given to the use of batton rounds or plastic bullets (page 75-6).
3. More vehicles with protective equipment, better radios, better photographic equipment should be supplied (page 77).

The report: is it adequate?

This is a balanced and good report which does cover some issues more widely than the events of early September. For example, it rejects the use in Britain of a paramilitary third force (page 74). However, it does not give any clue as to why the much-vaunted Police community relations had not spotted the emergence of trouble before the afternoon of 9 September 1985. The best we can discover from this report is that the police admit the shortcomings of their community relations

(page 72). It appears that community relations is limited to contact with group or ethnic leaders, and does not include contact with any of the alienated criminal minority who orchestrated the trouble. Our other criticism of the report is that it fails (page 33) to state frankly that the shops in Lozelles Road were destroyed according to the race of their owner. I walked along Lozelles Road with Indian traders who pointed out to me that the only shops not destroyed and which remain standing between the burnt out ashes of others, were those belonging to the West Indian black community. That this report omitted this appalling racial element is surprising. It may be that as the Brown/Black tensions were described fully elsewhere in the report, this was a deliberate omission. The Carribeans appear jealous of the profits made by the Indians for drug trading, but it appears West Indian traders make more than £3,000 in 2½ hours with Cannabis (page 16).

Conclusion

The Home Office is dealing with all the recommendations in this report. We recommend no action at present.

H. Booth

HARTLEY BOOTH

NB: THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS TYPED FROM A TELEDIPHONE RECORDING AND NOT COPIED FROM AN ORIGINAL SCRIPT: BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF MIS-HEARING AND THE DIFFICULTY, IN SOME CASES, OF IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS, THE BBC CANNOT VOUCH FOR ITS ACCURACY.

THIS WEEK, NEXT WEEK

cc/170

RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: 1300 **BBC-1** **DATE:** 24th November, 1985.

DAVID DIMBLEBY: Lord Scarman, are you satisfied that the recommendations you made in the Brixton report for improving police relations with the community, have been carried out, and if so, why did this rioting erupt ?

LORD SCARMAN: Myself I think they have been carried out. They have not been, of course, developed to a logical completeness which one expects and hopes for. But they have certainly been carried out. I don't think there is any *panacea* for the prevention of riot, I think you can have admirable community relations as indeed they have in Handsworth. You can have an admirably disciplined force, and you can still have, a tense situation, which is the creation, certainly not of the police. Something which can spark off a riot. I have always thought from 1981 onwards that the law and order situation in our inner cities is a fragile one, and it will remain fragile until the underlying social conditions are put right.

DIMBLEBY: ^{IN} Geoffrey Dear, you say, in your report, you stress it that you had a good relation between the police and the community, with no signs of tension, now do you think that Lord Scarman's view of this, that the things he suggested in his report are adequate or is this something which is quite different from social deprivation and from the relationship between the police ? You have a different argument about why the riots started ?

GEOFFREY DEAR: Not really. I think the riots start for a cause, they never occur And social deprivation of which there is a goodly measure, and I won't parade the reasons because we all know them, but there is a lot of it there. And there must be some sort of link or liason between the two. But what has happened in Handsworth which sets it apart significantly from Brixton in 1981 is that relationships were good, Lord Scarman knows it, he went there in '81, and we have developed it further since. What we failed to do and have consistently failed to do throughout the country, was to get to that very small number of disaffected, young, criminal afro-Carribeans. Small in number, by no way representative even of afro-Carribean youth, never mind afro-Carribeans as a whole. And the bridges that were sought to be built with them were never really built, we will continue to do it, but it was there that the trouble lay. You mentioned in the start that we had come down on drugs in the days, I think you said days, before the riot, in fact, the last action by the police for drugs in Handsworth was 2 month's before when warrants were executed on two premises where drugs were (INTERUPTED)

/2

DIMBLEBY: But hang on, you said it was drug dealers, protecting their patch that led to the riots ?

DEAR: Yes well I was going to go and finish if I may, and say that those dealers having been raided, then found that their supplies were getting less and less, that the screw was being turned on the supply route way up above them. And it was that frustration that caused them eventually to react. There, a very small group who were in no way representative and who therefore were operating in a way in which the news of what they were doing didn't leak out.

DIMBLEBY: But the key point is, are you saying that the people who rioted were criminal elements, entirely ? In other words it is not to do with the bulk of people in Handsworth, it was a now is that true of the riots in Tottenham. I mean Lord Scarman, do you think that is a reasonable way of looking at it, that it is just a small group of criminally intending people, does it spread wider once it happens ?

LORD SCARMAN: I think our discussion is getting bogged down in words. Of course there is a criminal element in any riot. Riot is itself, criminal. And then when you look at the story it doesn't matter what story you take, the Brixton story in '81 or any of the three stories in 1985. There is a criminal spark which sets it off. Then you have got in the inner cities, this comparatively small number; frustrated, alienated, bitter, young, black men. And they are there to be set alight through sheer frustration and with the way it goes, once it starts of course, a lot of other young blacks who are not alienated, join in, either for the excitement or out of sympathy and loyalty to their own people. And then the police taken by surprise, as they can be, and almost invariably will be if things are going well, have the effort, the very difficult effort of restoring law and order. I think it is on the restoration of law and order that perhaps we should concentrate.

DIMBLEBY: Geoffrey Dear, why do you say in your report, I mean you say it as a sort of - not an excuse - but explanation for how things have got as they have. If I can quote you, society as a whole has been persuaded to excuse patently criminal behaviour by groups that have set themselves apart from the consensus values of society, why do you say that and what is your evidence for saying that and how does it affect the way you as policemen have to deal with it ?

DEAR: I say ^{it;} as to evidence, I don't know, you would have to agree or disagree as you see fit. I believe it is a fact that in the early days, for very good reasons, people who were socially motivated and had a social conscience, developed to a high state, were trying to excuse the behaviour of that small group I talked about; by pointing to quite patently the things they were suffering from; deprivation in its broadest sense. And we are excusing it, and I think what has happened is that a small number of those, those criminals have used that as an umbrella or a shield, and have developed their activity to a point where they are now totally resistant to any form of criticism against them. Of course if a policeman comes onto

the scene he then automatically seems to be now, accused of harrassment whether harrassment is there or not. That's dangerous, it is dangerous for two reasons; it allows you have a group flourishing in society which is patently wrong, and it also has a shading off effect where the black community as a whole is in grave danger of being tarred with the same brush.

DIMBLEBY: Isn't there an almost irreconcilable conflict between the need to prevent crime happening and to pursue criminal acts when they have been committed, and the need for good relations in these inner cities with large numbers of disaffected blacks living in them. ?

LORD SCARMAN: There is a problem, it is not a problem without a solution, it is a problem which a civilised society such as ours' has to solve. And I believe we are on the way to solving it. Let me say that one can discuss at very great length exactly how this that or the other riot occurs in this that or the other, inner city. I don't think it gets you very far now. I think what we have now got to do is to lift our eyes and say what is it we are seeking to do, faced with this riot-prone society that we find in our inner cities, and the answer is two-fold. First and it is first, we have to re-establish law and order when law and order breaks down. Secondly, we have to understand the social conditions which creates the riot-prone society. That is something different from saying that social conditions causes riots, they don't. Riots are caused or brought about by men committing or seeking to commit criminal offences. You have to restore law and order. But at the same time, you have to be aware that you are going to continue with a riot-prone society unless you get the social conditions right. And therefore, what you have to pursue is double objective, although I would say there are aspects of the same objective, the rule of law in the sense of the maintenance of law and order and social justice.

DIMBLEBY: Well can we turn then to the first point you made, the methods of controlling riot. Now, Geoffrey Dear, in your report you argue that the police should have had plastic bullets for use in Handsworth and that way they could have controlled the rioting. Can you first of all explain why you want to see plastic bullets used and why you think had they had them ?

DEAR: Had we had them we probably would have cut the riot time at least.

DIMBLEBY: But you do believe you should have had them ?

DEAR: Yes I do, yes.

DIMBLEBY: Why do you think that ?

DEAR: I think that society holds to itself the right, or should hold to itself the right to protect itself in the final analysis. Years ago, Victorian, Georgian England before a police force were established, the military were called in and fired lead bullets and I would never, ever advocate that. But society there took a very severe sanction against those who were rioting. Now at the moment we have a little bit left to do in terms of the way in which, we organise ourselves, mobilise communicate, move our policemen about, using the conventional shields and batons that we have got. But if that fails and patently it did fail at Handsworth and as I understand it, it also failed at Brixton this year and certainly at Tottenham, then you have, are opposed with the situation where the police with shields can't cope and when you have exhausted everything else and you have started on this spectrum of saying we will try to remove social inequality and injustice, we will police in a sensitive way, we will enforce the law with discrimination, all the way through that spectrum, at the end of it all, I think we are left with the position as, where as we saw in Handsworth certainly, people were killed, a third of a mile of property was burnt to the ground, fifteen million pounds worth of property was destroyed, and in those circumstances and only that sort of very grave end of the opportunity, then I think we have got to move up one notch which is to baton rounds I believe rather than I said in the report to CS Gas or water cannon.

DIMBLEBY: Lord Scarman, in his report in Brixton says it should only be used when there is a real apprehension of loss of life, is that your view or would you use it sooner ?

DEAR: No, I thought I had just said exactly the same thing, that you had two people killed and fifteen million pounds of the property damaged, isn't that grave ?

DIMBLEBY: A real apprehension of loss of life is what Lord Scarman says, what about just damage to property, injury to people, what about a riot when you don't know, anybody, you can't tell if somebody is going to be killed in the riot ?

DEAR: Sitting here, academic circumstances are very difficult to draw a parallel. What I said and what I continue to say, and I repeat myself here is that in the grave..... and final analysis baton rounds should be used. I don't see them being used early I don't see them being used as some sort of flip option. But in the final analysis if you have got people who are being killed or certainly are likely to be killed, and a whole street on fire, then I would thought that most people would vote for them to be used.

DIMBLEBY: Do you believe it is possible, Lord Scarman, to have, in the hands of the police a weapon like that as a weapon of last resort, without it in the end becoming a weapon if not a first resort, at least of more regular use than was originally intended ?

LORD SCARMAN: I certainly think it is possible, it is a matter of police discipline, police training and of the exercise of responsible control by senior police officers. Let me say this; /5

It is so easy to draw a distinction as has just been drawn in our discussion, between damage to property and risk to life. The truth of the matter is, the damage to property can achieve such proportions that itself is a danger to life. And one of the tasks of the police when a riot develops is to prevent it becoming more and more intense. Not only must they contain the riot, they have got to diminish it to lower the temperature. Now, in the early stages of a riot, I would have thought there is no place for the use of plastic bullets, but a riot can develop portentous symptoms and then the police, not only for their own protection, not only for the protection of the public, and perhaps, not only for the protection of the rioters, may have to use plastic bullets, in order to secure that breathing space which is very well described in Mr. Dear's report which will enable them to diminish the intensity of the riot.

DIMBLEBY: Can the same community of police, who you urge in your report, should be building bridges with the inner city societies, with the black communities, can those same police be the people who fire these bullets in a riot situation or should it be somebody different ?

LORD SCARMAN: The answer is yes, do you want the army to enter every riot, the answer is the army must enter no riot at all. The police happens to be the civilian force available, and the only civilian force available. At the end of the day, if riots cannot be contained and their risk to the community reduced, without some weapon for which a plausible case is made on behalf of the police, that we would have to think a very long time before we denied the police that weapon.

DIMBLEBY: But why do you reject the idea of one sort of policeman for doing the community policing, and another to be used in the event of riot as a way of crushing insurrection ?

LORD SCARMAN: Quite frankly, that is a travesty of my thinking and I believe it is a travesty of Mr. Dear's thinking. It is one police force and all policemen must have the community relations aspect of their work as much in their mind as law enforcement aspect. Because it is part of a seamless, fabric of police responsibility and the truth of the matter is, if you have as we are beginning to have, good community relations you will find that you are getting responsible elements of the vocal community, black, brown or white, all of them, working with the police, and then they would begin to understand that a riot can arise in a fragile society by accident. However it arises, once it does arise, the riot has got to be suppressed and ultimately if it becomes really intense then you have to use very drastic measures.

DEAR: If I may follow on on that, you seemed Mr. Dimbleby, you were suggesting that if the same policeman was using a baton round then automatically there is a rift between him and society as a whole. I shall tell you that the Asian community, particularly the shop keepers have very grave doubts about the efficacy of policing, following Handsworth, because it was their property that was burnt down. And they were calling for very draconian measures indeed by the existing police. Now although some sections would nearly not have applauded the use of baton rounds, the rest of the society in Handsworth, ninety odd per cent of it, would have clapped to have seen it used, /6

because they wanted the riot stopping. So I think in fact, used properly and sensitively, you don't need a third force the CRS injected into the British system at all.

DIMBLEBY: But can you rely on your police force to handle, first of all, potentially a very dangerous weapon safely. And secondly, if there is an accident as there may well be if baton rounds are used and somebody gets killed, perhaps a child gets killed. Won't they effectively destroyed any of the connections they have made with the community, ... I put to Lord Scarman ?

DEAR: Yes of course they do, there are two points to that. Firstly you trust us with lead bullets with firearms. And although this perhaps, given one or two current events this year is not the best of analogies to draw. It is a very fair one I think because the record overall is one of immense discretion and maturity I think, in the use of police firearms overall. With one or two notable exceptions. I just thought the record was very good actually.

DIMBLEBY: You don't think there is a problem in exactly that point ?

DEAR: I can see a problem, I can see a problem in giving that sort of weapon to anyone. But I think our record in terms of maturity of handling even more potentially dangerous weapons is very good. So far as the risks are concerned, baton rounds are designed to hurt. It is said that the impact is much the same as being struck by a cricket ball, hit by a first class batsman as I said in the report. They are designed for that, they do occasionally kill, twelve times I think in Northern Ireland. But if you weigh that up against the hundreds and thousands of rounds that have been fired in that unfortunate province, the numerical chances are very slim, tragic though those twelve cases undoubtedly are, you should also I think, hedge in the issue and use of baton rounds with things like giving warnings over loud speakers or with flying placards, which ought to take away most chance of the child being involved in it. The innocent bystander, you can reduce your chances there.

DIMBLEBY: There is just one other point which I wanted to pick up with you in this report. You talk about leaflets, pamphlets being handed out in Handsworth, during the rioting, telling people how to make petrol bombs and with the heading on them, 'today's pigs', referring to the police, 'tomorrow's bacon'. And you say this isn't, in your view, an important factor, are you right to ignore a possible political element in the rioting that has been going on ?

DEAR: No, we didn't ignore it. But those leaflets didn't come out until the second day of the riots, and I don't think that they - I don't think that people needed to read them quite honestly. They knew very well how to make petrol bombs without that. We said that in that particular riot there wasn't a political dimension. Now in other riots, undoubtedly there are. But in Handsworth, on those two days in September, there was no political involvement, other than those who sought to involve and didn't actually mesh in with the society they were working with.

DIMBLEBY: Lord Scarman, would you, looking back on your report of '81 now in Brixton, in the light of what has happened in these riots, in the autumn of 1985, want to make any changes in what you put in that report, want to alter any of the suggestions you made or want to add proposals in the light of what's happened ?

LORD SCARMAN: I want to alter nothing, I would want to omit nothing, I would like to add really one comment. In 1981, we were not faced with the intrusion of organised crime, making use of disaffected youth. That is the new factor. It is a very dangerous factor and it has to be tackled in the two ways we have been discussing. The police have got to act vigorously to enforce the law against these criminals, and the police have got to act firmly if they do succeed in stirring up disorder and riot. Therefore that is an added factor, but basically, I remain of the view that the recommendations in the Brixton report, still require to be followed and developed and I wouldn't modify them in any way at all.

DIMBLEBY:
both very much indeed.

Lord Scarman, Geoffrey Dear, thank you

DIMBLEBY: That discussion was recorded yesterday afternoon at the King's School in Canterbury. Now, in Birmingham this afternoon the Rt Rev Hugh Montefiore, the Bishop of Birmingham, and with him there Anthony Beaumont-Dark, Conservative MP for Birmingham Sellyoak. And here in London with me, James Hunte, Chairman of Birmingham's Community Relations Council and a member of the Police Committee that would have to decide whether the Chief Constable could use plastic bullets or could be provided with plastic bullets. Mr Hunte, there have been reports this week in response to what Geoffrey Dear said that black youths have said if the police use plastic bullets they'll use guns. Do you believe that that is so and that is what'll happen?

CLLR JAMES HUNTE: Well first of all I'd like to say this to you that in the discussions which just took place the British public wouldn't believe that there were one hundred and twenty six people arrested that are not Afro-Caribbean or black and most of the Afro-Caribbean referred are to are black youths or youths who were born in this country. There is a sense of isolation from a substantial number of people who feel that the basic needs are not met and they are rebelling, not only in Handsworth but throughout the country and in all the recommendations made by Lord Scarman, I think that he needs to look back at it and add two single words - honest and meaningful - discussions or whatever is going to take place - honest endeavours to fulfill those obligations.

DIMBLEBY: But he did say, and I don't want to go into that side of it today, but he did say that that was his first point and Geoffrey Dear in his report says that the deprivation in the inner cities is clearly lies in the background to the rioting. But what about the point that they were discussing that I want to discuss with you about how riots, once they've happened, should be handled?

HUNTE: Well I would say this that I felt his suggestions on bullets would produce further bullets. I think it would produce retaliation. I think we've got to find a way of dealing with the social problems of the inner city instead of start talking about bullets.

DIMBLEBY: What do you do when, as in Handsworth, you have a riot in which, as you remember, two people were killed, when you have to control that. You are saying they should not use plastic bullets even though Mr Dear says it would be a way of preventing people getting killed?

HUNTE: When we had a previous riot whereby things came back to normality in a matter of minutes, the police attitude today is completely different to that one. I think ex-superintendent Webb is a model of the type of policing that is needed in a sense, so that can bring a sense of wanting to be a part of that community. We used to be one family and he had contact with every community leader and nearly every identifiable person that could be constructive in the community. That don't exist any more.

And since Mr Dear become Chief Constable, he never miss the opportunity of demonstrating his inbuilt and hate against the Afro-Carribeans identifiable community. So if you want the guns to use against the Afro-Carribean community, I think that he'll have a hell of a time now and in the future.

DIMBLEBY: Well what do you think will happen if he does decide that he must have plastic bullets and his police force is equipped with?

HUNTE: One, he won't have my support and I feel he won't get the support of the police authority. I think we've got to get down to the basic needs and problems of the community socially and I think most of us is willing to work with the police and to help deal with community involvement.

DIMBLEBY: But surely there is a basic problem when, as happened in Handsworth, according to the Dear Report, a group of drug dealers decide to set up the police, to ambush them, to set fire to a place, to start stoning them and throwing Molotov cocktails. That is his description of what happened.

HUNTE: I know that is not the case. I was at the police station before it happened. We had a idea of what was going to happen and it is not only drug dealers or anything. It didn't start by drugs. He can continue to mislead the public as much as he want to. We know what was the starting of the riots and we know that it was insensitive of arresting people which the people who were standing around feel a bit concerned about it. Yes, drug dealers might have capitalised on that and a number of other people as well.

DIMBLEBY: Well the court cases perhaps may reveal something about that and we obviously can't talk about it for that reason specifically. But let me ask you this - if it did happen that the police did use plastic bullets, do you say that young blacks in Handsworth would turn to guns?

HUNTE: Everybody, not only young blacks. The same kind of people who were arrested, blacks, Asians and local English and Irish, the whole lot.

DIMBLEBY: Are you saying that would be justified action by that community?

HUNTE: I am not justifying violence in any way at all. All I'm simply saying that violence breeds violence. And unfortunately at this moment that is what is happening to a community that needs social needs.

DIMBLEBY: Anthony Beaumont-Dark, you're the MP, one of the Birmingham MPs, what do you think of the proposal that the police should have plastic bullets that Geoffrey Dear put forward and the effects it would have that James Hunte has just described?

ANTHONY BEAUMONT-DARK MP: Can I first of all say that I thought James Hunte's comments were thoroughly inflammatory. And entirely unjust to Geoffrey Dear to say more or less that he has sought the confrontation with Afro Asians is the most sheer nonsense and one of the most dangerous statements that he could have made. That's the first point.

DIMBLEBY: He's just saying Afro-Caribbean is what he said.

BEAUMONT-DARK: As far as Afro-Caribbeans or anybody else, the Chief Constable does not seek confrontation. He had nothing to gain from the riots in Handsworth or anywhere else. He had many officers injured, same as lots of innocent people. As far as baton rounds are concerned I wish they weren't always called plastic bullets. Bullets are meant to kill. Baton rounds are meant to deter and if they stop because you will bear in mind one of the great changes that's taken place in the mob violence that is now growing up today under skilled agitators - is that they do throw projectiles and they throw them a very considerable way. What those projectiles do to police and other people is to maim and to kill. The baton round is meant to break up those mobs and keep those mobs from stone throwing distance. That in the end is a good thing. Now, of course some people get killed. There is not much need for innocent people to get killed because if people taught their young people to keep away from mob violence, innocent people would not get killed. To say that innocent people are picked out by the police, most people who go for mob violence get hurt because they've gone there either to watch it or to take part in it.

DIMBLEBY: But can I clarify one point. These riots take place in place where many people are living and going about their ordinary business until the time of the riot. Are you saying you'd take the risk of innocent people being killed. You would be prepared to see the police take that risk in order to prevent deaths and further damage to property.

BEAUMONT-DARK All these things are risks. I believe that in the end we should come down on the side of those innocent people who want to have law and order and we should come down on the side of the forces that will keep that law and order. You see one of the problems that comes about with some of the ethnic problems we have is the very understandable one. People choose and I would do the same if I lived in what was from ethnic origins a foreign land, they choose to live in areas together which is the most understandable thing in the world. But it is the assimilation into society, into the host society, that does cause the problem and until the Community Relations Councils and we of the host community get down to solving that problem, we are going to have disaffected groups because they feel strangers in what is now their land but feels like a foreign land.

DIMBLEBY: Hugh Montefiore, can you take us back to the actual problem of rioting in your city of Birmingham that happened in Handsworth. What is your reaction to what Geoffrey Dear said about the use of plastic bullets in extremist, in those circumstances? Are you for or against?

THE RIGHT REV HUGH MONTEFIORE: Well the people that I've talked to who saw what was happening with their own eyes, said that the police were put into an impossible position. And I think that this society must see that the police are sufficiently protected. On the other hand, I don't yet think that the situation has come, and I hope it won't come, when we need to use, or when we must or are forced to use, plastic bullets. Which I prefer to call them because bullets are there to hurt. And I think it might come but I hope rioting won't get to that stage.

DIMBLEBY: Even though it might have meant that the two Asian shop keepers in Handsworth didn't die?

MONTEFIORE: Even though it might have meant, because I fear, and this is my fear, that once you start using them, a lot more people are going to die because there is going to be an escalation of violence with lead bullets. Now, I fear that. I think it's rather like an arms race. Terrible to say this. But I can see that the situation may come when we must protect our police in that way and protect people and clear street.

DIMBLEBY: James Hunte. What do you say to those two comments?

HUNTE: Well I mean, Beaumont-Dark is usually a nice fellow but he's got this one wrong. The Bishop is absolutely right. I would agree with him, I think the time has come for me to get down to more serious talking like we had years before, four or five year before.

DIMBLEBY: You are on this Committee, the Police Committee, that as I understand it has to agree whether plastic bullets should be used or not and Geoffrey Dear says he wants them. Are you in a position to veto the use of them?

HUNTE: He wouldn't, I could say the present local authority is against that. I think they want to do something about the social problems and there is no way.

DIMBLEBY: Are you going to be able, sorry to stick to one point, are you going to be able to veto the use of plastic bullets from your police committee or are you, can the Home Office override you and go along with Geoffrey Dear and issue them regardless?

HUNTE: We won't be a party to any use at all.

DIMBLEBY: And you veto the use?

HUNTE: Oh, yes.

DIMBLEBY: Anthony Beaumont-Dark?

BEAUMONT-DARK: No, in the end with respect James, they cannot veto it because he can appeal to the Home Secretary that he cannot efficiently run his police force. But Geoffrey Dear may I

just say, he didn't say he wanted to use them. He thought that, had he had them available, they might have been helpful in stopping the violence. Surely, I'm sure James agrees with this, what we all want to do is to stop violence. But when violence has taken place and is escalating when that mob's growing and lots of local people told me they were more terrified than anybody else, isn't it better to have a short sharp stop of it than bluntly letting it go on and on, the stone-throwing and policemen were getting injured and I think, frankly, if it had gone on, policemen could have got killed. If they hadn't withdrawn. Now who wants police to withdraw, that has to be dangerous for police to have to withdraw. They have to keep that thin blue line or we'll have a thin red line and that red line is local people ...

DIMBLEBY:

Well, thank you very much Mr Beaumont-Dark. Let's leave that at this point because that's a debate that is going to continue now that Geoffrey Dear has made his point. And thank you very much James Hunte.

PRIME MINISTER

M

LAW AND ORDER: BRIXTON AND TOTTENHAM RIOTS

You will remember that Hartley Booth had come across very disturbing stories that petrol bombs were being manufactured in bulk in Tottenham, and that the ingredients to make Napalm had been sold by chemists in the same area. You were very concerned and asked for further enquiries to be made.

Hartley has now provided an up-date on these matters (his note is attached). The truth seems to be that after riots like the one in Tottenham, rumours are everywhere, and it is very difficult indeed to separate fact from fiction.

But, so far as the police are concerned, they do not think there is a case for taking further action on either of the reports at present.

Mark Addison

(Mark Addison)


20 November 1985

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

19 November 1985

CF
Civil Liberties
edit ppn plan
116A 19/11

CIVIL DISTURBANCE UPDATE

1. Theft of milk bottles for petrol bombs: The Home Office have now received a number of reports about large numbers of stolen milk bottles in Liverpool, North and South London, and even as far away as Buckinghamshire. Police are in touch with the situation, but have not yet confirmed that petrol bombs are in fact being manufactured in bulk. There is considerable rumour and innuendo rife. Home Office and police do not at the moment feel the situation is serious, as there is no confirming evidence of imminent disorder. The Chief Constable of Liverpool and the Commissioner's staff confirm the Home Office report.
2. Napalm: It has been confirmed that a chemist in North London reported someone buying small quantities of the rare ingredients that make napalm. There is little use for  so the report was taken seriously. Police have not apprehended anyone for questioning, nor has the purchase been repeated. Police are keeping the matter closely under review. They have not had further reports.
3. Water cannon: Home Office (Giles Shaw) announced yesterday that water cannons may be used against rioters. Your concern is having effect.

H. Booth

HARTLEY BOOTH

CONFIDENTIAL



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

18th
November 1985

Dear Mark,

Lord Scarman called at the Home Secretary's invitation on 13 November to discuss inner city policing and related matters. The Home Secretary thought that the Prime Minister might be interested to see what Lord Scarman had to say.

Lord Scarman prefaced his comments by saying that he was no longer very close to events, especially those outside the Brixton area. He had two main impressions:

- (i) he believed much of the ground that had been gained since 1981 was still held. Whereas in 1981 in Brixton there had been a stunning loss of confidence in the local police there were now responsible members of the black community who were appalled at what had happened and who had a sense of responsibility and energy to do something about it. The danger lay in the development of a pool of alienated young blacks with whom neither the police nor responsible black community leaders could effectively communicate. The situation had been complicated by the 'outrageous behaviour' of some local authorities. Mr Knight in Lambeth had actively undermined those seeking to improve local community relations. In general, therefore, though the situation was far from satisfactory it was better than before the 1981 riots, and the line had been held;
- (ii) the police had a special responsibility to foster good relations with the black community. He believed they had done well, though in some respects the relations were still fragile. Accidents of a kind which had precipitated the recent disorders might happen from time to time: officers might be frightened by sudden events however well trained and self-controlled they were. Such accidents had to be taken in the stride. Instead of full judicial enquiries (which were acceptable only at rare intervals) an added impetus should be given to discussion of problems through the local community relations machinery and to the development of police race relations training. Talking in these situations

/was vital and

Mark Addison, Esq

was vital and he particularly welcomed the way in which the Police and Criminal Evidence Act allowed the community relations machinery to be tailored to each locality. It was essential to maintain and improve black confidence in the police, for which purpose the recruitment of black officers must continue to be encouraged. Black policemen would have an impression on local opinion and in the long run would help the police to communicate effectively with the young. He strongly agreed with the Home Secretary that it would be wrong to lower standards in order to encourage the recruitment of black officers.

On inner cities generally, Lord Scarman said that the problems were too complicated for one Department. It was a question not just of resources but of their application and the effort of Government at all levels must be effectively co-ordinated. He agreed with the Home Secretary that education had a crucial role to play. He had been particularly depressed by his visits to some schools in 1981, and by the attitude he had encountered amongst some teachers he met. They were ready to ascribe the cause of problems to the racist attitudes of a social system which they did not wish to support, but did not seem interested in engaging in debate or encouraging their pupils in a way which would be of practical assistance to the young in their schools or the community more generally. Lord Scarman had been struck by one headmaster who had been willing to offer his views but had felt unable to receive him at the school. It was essential to educate the teaching profession in these matters. He believed few teachers seriously addressed questions of race relations, and of those that did, many probably adopted the negative attitudes to which he had referred. He agreed with Sir Brian Cubbon that it was important to attract more black people to be teachers. The role of the education service was therefore a particular problem which must be tackled.

Lord Scarman made the following further points:


- (i) things were made more difficult by the absence of a significant Afro-Caribbean middle-class. This was in complete contrast to the United States, where a black middle-class was now well established;
- (ii) he agreed with the Home Secretary that the Lambeth community consultative group had made an important contribution despite the disservice done to it by Mr Knight. He much admired the chairman, Mr Parkinson, and recognised the important role the Home Office had performed in establishing the group.
- (iii) he shared the Home Secretary's worry that recent events might have encouraged a beleaguered feeling amongst some members of the Metropolitan Police, with the result that the atmosphere in the force would be less well disposed towards fostering good relations with the community. After his report the police had found that discussion with community leaders did not hamper and often helped their work. It would be dangerous if things slipped back and it was essential that the police did not start to think that community relations undermined their position as a law enforcement agency.

(iv) He thought highly of the present Chief Constable of the West Midlands and looked forward to studying his report on the Handsworth disorders.

In conclusion Lord Scarman said that he believed the substance of the recommendations in his report still held good, particularly those on police community relations. Inner city problems must be tackled on a co-ordinated basis. He agreed with the Home Secretary on the importance of ensuring police morale was maintained at this difficult time.

Yours,
Supt

S W BOYS SMITH



MB



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

18th November 1985

Dear Mark

HANDSWORTH RIOT

Prime Minister (2)
This is an important report,
but the Home Office note plays up
the key issues. It is to be published
by the Chief Constable, tomorrow.

MEA 18/11

} in attached folder

Immediately after the rioting in the Lozells Road area of Birmingham in September the Home Secretary asked the Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police to prepare and publish a report. I enclose two copies of the report, which the chief constable will publish tomorrow, at a public meeting of his police authority. The chief constable intends to hold a press conference afterwards.

The Home Secretary will place copies of the report in the Parliamentary libraries. He will announce this in written answer to a Parliamentary Question (copy attached).

The report (which has been prepared in association with Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary) provides a useful account of the background to the rioting, and of the actual rioting. At the end of his report the chief constable looks at "the way ahead". You may wish to note the following points:

- (i) The chief constable says (page 53) that there is firm evidence (which he does not discuss in detail because criminal proceedings are outstanding) that the disorders were at the outset orchestrated by local drug dealers whose livelihoods were suffering at the hands of the Drugs Squad.
- (ii) He rejects allegations that the riots were due to a breakdown in police/community relations flowing from oppressive policing (pages 54 and 70), and emphasises (page 55) that the law must be enforced. (At pages 65-67 he rejects the allegations that the police subsequently agreed to "no go areas").
- (iii) He gives notice (page 73) of his intention to seek his police authority's agreement to recruit up to establishment, and then to seek an increase in establishment.
- (iv) He indicates (page 76) that he now favours the acquisition of plastic baton rounds by the force.


The Home Secretary regards this as a good report, which will help the police service and everyone else who is engaged in considering the lessons to be learned from the recent disorders.

/I am copying

Mark Addison, Esq

I am copying this to the Rob Smith at the Department of Education and Science,
Alan Davies at the Department of Environment, and Leigh Lewis at the
Department of Employment.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'W R Fittall', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

W R FITTALL

INSPIRED PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION FOR ANSWER ON TUESDAY 19 NOVEMBER

Question: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department when the Chief Constable of the West Midlands expects to publish his report on the rioting in the Lozells Road area of Handsworth in September this year.

Draft reply The Chief Constable is publishing his report today. I am placing copies in the Library. The report provides a clear account of the disorders and more generally is a most important and valuable contribution to consideration of the lessons to be learned from the recent disorders in Birmingham and elsewhere.

PA

BUSINESS ITEMS

1. I am sorry to trouble you again, but we are concerned about the strategic "green policy" note sent to the Prime Minister at the beginning of August. It is quite important to know the Prime Minister's attitude towards these issues. We are preparing material for the conservation lunch and it is highly relevant to see that note. I suggest CF look in the file that might contain John Redwood's note of 1 August 1985 on "Green Belt and Concrete Jungles" which may have covered, or been attached to the Green Policy note. If by some chance the Prime Minister still has it, could Joy Robilliard be asked to look in the flat?

HB to re-submit.

2. I have spoken to all relevant sources at the Home Office on Napalm. The point you may wish to make is that the Prime Minister's office are unlikely to hit upon a matter like the Napalm document again. It was a rare matter - probably a once in two year discovery.

copy note.
 HB will be away for a few days - full report for HQ a suggestion of date
 MCA 18/11

We are sure you will want to defend the Prime Minister's right to have eyes and ears on all crucial policy matters. We are aware that the milk bottle rumours are rife - it may interest you to know that our sources did warn us the week before Tottenham, that riots were likely the week-end when they occurred.

HARTLEY BOOTH



10 DOWNING STREET

Note for the file,

William Fittell (Ho) will
discuss HB's claims with
him & come back to us

(1) or whether they have any
substance and

(2) or whether Ho are
trying to help the police.

MUSA 11/11

Prime Minister - 1
for information. On para 2 there
have been a lot of such rumours
flying about, but the Home Office are
investigating these reports and will
8 November 1985 let us know
if they have any substance

SECRET

*This is most
disturbing
to everyone possible
to assist the
police in their
duties?*

PRIME MINISTER

LAW AND ORDER - WEEKEND UPDATE

MEA 8/11

1. Brixton and Tottenham Riots

a. We have heard this week from the receiver of the Metropolitan Police at Scotland Yard that the first claims for compensation have already been met under the Riot Damages Act, 1886, and compensation is proceeding smoothly.

b. The horrifying way in which PC Blakelock was killed is sending rumblings throughout the Police Service. The Police Federation have made representations to us privately that you be made aware of the details. (We believe unless you request this information that you should not be troubled.)

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

2. Future Trouble

Private reports from the police indicate further likely trouble in Tottenham. A milk float, complete with a very large number of bottles likely to be used in petrol bomb-making, has been abducted in the last fortnight. Also, there have been several reports since 25 October that the ingredients of Napalm have been supplied to individuals in the Tottenham area. If Napalm is used, the police will require a new form of

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- 2 -

protective clothing. In Northern Ireland, the only known defence against Napalm is the plastic bullet which kept the users of this deadly material beyond throwing distance.

3. I attach the internal memorandum from the Labour Party Private Office, disclosing that they will be launching a forceful attack on law and order.

Conclusion

We recommend no action at present. The Home Office are aware.

AScola

P HARTLEY BOOTH

SECRET

THE TORY CRIMINAL RECORD

CRIME UP: Mrs Thatcher was elected on a law and order ticket. However since 1979 crime has both increased and increased faster than the previous trend.

<u>England and Wales</u> (thousands)	1979	1984	% increase
Robbery	12.5	24.9	99
Burglary in a dwelling	252.8	467.7	89
Criminal damage of which arson	320.5 11.6	497.8 18.9	55 63
Violence against the person	95.0	114.2	20
<u>Scotland</u> (thousands)			
Robbery	3.8	4.5	18
Housebreaking	76.6	112.1	46
Vandalism	53.6	74.8	40
Fire-raising	2.6	4.2	63
Serious Assault	3.5	5.3	51

(Note: In general the increase in recorded crime has been less marked in Scotland - though serious crime in Scotland remains at a much higher incidence. The broad generalisations in the press release are based on the aggregate figures for Britain, but members may wish to amend it for themselves by substituting the appropriate national figures.)

THE VICTIMS: Crime hits the poor and the disadvantaged hardest. Unskilled workers are twice as likely to be burgled as professional workers. The incidence of burglary in the poorest council estates is four times greater than in suburbia. The British Crime Survey conducted by the Home Office in 1983 found that two out of five residents on the poorest estates are "very worried" about break ins and vandalism. Single women and ethnic minorities are vulnerable to much higher incidences of burglary and street crime than males and whites.

DETECTION DOWN: The Conservatives have substantially increased the numbers and pay of the police force. Total numbers of policemen have increased by over 7000 and expenditure on the police by 40% in real terms. Yet during the same period the efficiency of the police force in England and Wales as measured by the detection rate has uniformly deteriorated. (In Scotland detection rates have improved, except for housebreaking where the rate has dropped from 20% in 1979 to 18% in 1984.)

<u>England and Wales</u> clear up rates	1979	1984
Robbery	31%	22%
Burglary	31%	28%
Criminal Damage	30%	23%
Overall	41%	35%

PRISON NO CURE: The Tory knee jerk to their policing policy failure has been to pressurise the judiciary to give longer sentences. Yet Britain already puts more people in prison than any other major European country and still has a worst rate of crime. The Home Office has admitted that the "short sharp shock" approach to young offenders has had no effect on reconviction rates. Surprisingly real public opinion is not in favour of longer prison sentences for non violent crime. The British Crime Survey found that 80% want to see more alternative to prison for the non-violent. Even among the victims of burglaries only 1/3 demanded prison sentences for the offenders.

LABOUR'S ALTERNATIVE: Labour will concentrate on crime prevention and attack the social conditions in which it takes root. Labour will:

ensure that the police return to the beat and create a relationship of trust with local people.

improve and increase community involvement Community policing and accountability to the community are essential reforms in the fight against crime.

create a safer environment by improving the design of housing estates and street lighting on pedestrian ways.

help the victims of crime who are the forgotten casualties of present crime policy. Labour will extend and simplify the compensation scheme, and will provide funds for Victim Support Schemes, refuges for women and children at risk, and rape crisis centres.

LAWLESS WHITEHALL: Mrs Thatcher constantly exhorts everybody else, especially local councils, to observe the law. Yet her government has been caught out acting illegally on a scale for which there is no parallel. This year alone the judiciary have held the government to have acted illegally on the following eight separate occasions.

- | | |
|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Jan | The High Court ruled that Ridley had been "unlawful, irrational and procedurally improper" in withholding £281m grants to GLC. |
| Feb
Feb | The Chief Adjudication Officer ruled that it was against the law for Alan Clark (Employment) to prevent EEC students claiming their reciprocal right to benefit. |
| May | Justice Webster ruled that Fowler had failed in his statutory duty to consult over regulations denying housing benefit to joint tenancies. |
| June | The High Court ruled that Joseph has acted unlawfully in refusing to reduce ILEA's contribution to the national advanced education pool. |
| July | The High Court quashed the ban by Ridley on the GLC heavy lorry restrictions. |
| Aug | The High Court ruled that Fowler had acted unlawfully in placing time limits to the board and lodging payments of existing claimants. |
| Oct | The Appeal Court found Fowler had behaved with "identifiable illegality" in reducing opticians payments. |

(Note: In the entire five years of the last Labour government it lost only four cases brought against it)

KEY QUOTES: "If boys and girls do not obtain jobs when they leave school, they feel that society has no need of them. If they feel that, they do not see any reason why they should take part in that society and comply with its rules."

William Whitelaw as shadow Home Secretary. 27 2 78

"A Labour government will work in co-operation with the police and public to combat crime. The greatest need is to re-establish full confidence between the police and the community, and to give priority to the kind of community policing which the public wants."

Gerald Kaufman 17 10 85

"Capitalism gives to each and every one of us a great opportunity, if only we seize it with both hands."

Al Capone

Not submitted; pa

PRIME MINISTER

23 October 1985

INNER CITIES

Douglas Hurd's paper helpfully identifies money that could be redirected, and raises some interesting possibilities. But it does not put forward any fully worked out proposals for a new inner city package.

We agree with him that a proper Cabinet Committee is urgently needed to consider this issue. You may well want to be in the chair.

We recommend that you ask Robert Armstrong to set up the appropriate machinery.

Hartley Booth.

Oliver Letwin.

HARTLEY BOOTH

OLIVER LETWIN

Mr. Biffen: I believe that it is perfectly possible for these matters to be properly concluded when a Cabinet Minister representing the interests of that Department sits in this House.

Mr. David Alton (Liverpool, Mossley Hill): I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his statement on what the Prime Minister has been discussing at the Heads of Government Commonwealth conference. However, does he believe that the withering condescension with which the Prime Minister described the package of proposals for sanctions on the radio this morning will have done anything but comfort those in the Botha regime in South Africa?

Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that the effectiveness of the package, which many of us doubt, will be discussed again in the months ahead so that we can be sure that everything possible is being done to give support to those fighting for the right of the the majority in South Africa to have a say in the running of their country?

Mr. Biffen: I can say without any equivocation that the decisions reached at the conference will be debated in the House.

Mr. Douglas Hogg (Grantham): Does my right hon. Friend accept that his hon. Friends believe that the appointment of two Cabinet Ministers responsible for unemployment emphasises in a positive and dramatic way the emphasis that the Government place on that problem?

Mr. Biffen: Absolutely.

Dr. Jeremy Bray (Motherwell, South): Will the changes in business allow time for the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to come to the House to make a statement on the progress of negotiations on steel production quotas in the Steel Council of the European Community? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that at the beginning of the recess the Government announced major proposals, including the closure of the Gartcosh works, with its consequences for Ravenscraig and flat products generally in this country? Are not those decisions being taken without the necessary information being given to the House? Will he ensure that an early statement on that matter is made?

Mr. Biffen: I realise the importance of the subject generally, and specifically in relation to the hon. Gentleman's constituency. I shall certainly draw his remarks to the attention of my right hon. Friend.

Inner City Disorders

4.3 pm

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Douglas Hurd): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement on the recent disorders. During the past six weeks there have been three serious riots—in the Lozells road area of Birmingham, in Brixton, and Tottenham. Four people have died, one a police constable who was savagely killed. There have also been disorders in Liverpool, Leicester and Peckham in south London. Many police officers and others were injured. There were appalling attacks on the police with petrol bombs and other missiles, and especially in Birmingham and Brixton there was extensive looting of and attacks on shops and cars.

All responsible members of our society will condemn the disgraceful criminal behaviour which has occurred and all responsible members of our society will applaud the courage and dedication of the police in doing their job of maintaining and restoring order on the streets and the housing estates of our major cities. Public order is essential for the maintenance of a civilised way of life and for the safety of individual citizens—on that there can be no compromise. So far 700 people have been charged with offences arising from the disorders.

The riot in Brixton was triggered by the tragic shooting of Mrs. Groce, and the riot in Tottenham followed the death of Mrs. Jarrett after a search had been made at her home. These police operations are being investigated by senior officers from other police forces under the supervision of the independent Police Complaints Authority. These arrangements will ensure that they are fully investigated and that any necessary action is taken. In the case of the Lozells road riot, the chief constable of the west midlands is preparing a report which will be published. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary is being associated closely with the preparation of that report.

So far as police operations are concerned, although the other disorders were serious enough, the riot at Tottenham stands out for the problems which it presented to the police. In that riot, a police officer was killed, firearms were used and the police had to face a ferocious barrage of petrol bombs and other missiles. The design of housing estates like that at Tottenham poses particular difficulties in such circumstances. The Metropolitan police commissioner is urgently reviewing the tactics of the force on such occasions. There must be no no-go areas in any of our cities.

The riot at Tottenham was the first occasion in Great Britain when the chief officer of police gave authority for plastic baton rounds to be used if necessary, though in fact they were not used. Plastic baton rounds and CS gas were made available to the police in Great Britain for public order use following the riots in 1981. They may be used only in the last resort, where conventional methods of policing have been tried and failed, or must from the nature of the circumstances be unlikely to succeed if tried, and where the chief officer judges such action necessary because of the risk of loss of life, serious injury or widespread destruction of property. That threshold was reached at Tottenham. The commissioner had my full support in making it clear that such weapons would be deployed if similar circumstances arose in the future.

[Mr. Douglas Hurd]

Other matters need to be looked at. The defensive equipment introduced in recent years—helmets, shields and protective overalls—proved its worth. Without it there would have been more serious casualties. The Metropolitan police are acquiring more shields and other defensive equipment. We have to consider whether any further equipment is required, and that is being done. There may be lessons to be learnt in relation to police training and deployment. The commissioner is pursuing these matters and I am in close touch with him. I shall ensure that any lessons learnt are disseminated nationally.

This Government have done more to meet the needs of the police than any in recent history. Since 1979 the Metropolitan police have increased in strength by nearly 4,500 officers; and other forces in England and Wales are stronger by a similar number. Including civilians, strength has increased by some 12,000. Even after a welcome intake of recruits, the Metropolitan police still have scope to increase strength by about 300 within its present establishment of 27,165. I support the commissioner in his efforts to make good this shortfall as quickly as possible. The force's reorganisation should, in addition, release 200 officers for operational duties; and I have authorised an increase of nearly 50 in the civil staff ceiling next year for further civilianisation.

Following my predecessor's announcement in July on drugs, I have told the commissioner that I am prepared in principle to agree to an increase of 50 officers in the establishment next year specifically to strengthen his efforts against drug trafficking. Taken together, these steps mean that there will be a substantial strengthening of the Metropolitan police in the months ahead. Beyond that I have set urgent work in hand to assess where there are specific needs for further increases in the Metropolitan police establishment, and I shall consider applications from provincial police authorities on the same basis—namely, that the police should have what they need in the fight against crime.

In recent years, much effort has been put into establishing good liaison and consultation between the police and the community in inner city areas, particularly, for example, in Brixton and Handsworth. These disorders must be—I know that they are—deeply depressing for those community leaders and police officers who have put so much effort into establishing a better understanding. But it would be wrong to assume that these efforts were misplaced. On the contrary, they must be continued and redoubled if the police are to protect and serve the community efficiently.

More broadly, the Government will continue their strong commitment to urban regeneration. The urban programme has more than tripled, from £93 million in 1978-79 to £338 million in 1985-86, and there has been substantial expenditure in all the riot areas. The Department of Employment and the Manpower Services Commission are spending more than £100 million in the partnership areas, and my Department plans to spend some £90 million in 1985-86 through section 11 grants.

We must ensure that the very substantial sums that now go, and will continue to go, to inner city areas are spent to the best advantage and directed to the real needs of the people who live there. The city action teams have been set up to improve the co-ordination and targeting of

Government programmes in the partnership areas. We shall do everything to ensure that our objectives in the inner city areas are achieved.

These disorders are shocking events. It is of paramount interest of us all, young and old, people of all ethnic backgrounds, that public order should be maintained. I acknowledge—we all acknowledge—the social problems which exist in these areas, but it is no solution to loot and burn shops which serve the area or to attack the police. Mob violence must be dealt with firmly and effectively and criminal acts punished according to the criminal law. The police should have the support of all of us in striving to maintain order and uphold the law. It is their first priority. It is the Government's also.

Mr. Gerald Kaufman (Manchester, Gorton): I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on his appointment to his high office and I regret, as I am sure he does, that his first duty in that new office is to come to the House on such a wretched occasion.

Five people have died in sad and savage circumstances, and the first duty of the House today is to send sympathy to those who are mourning Mr. Kammalia Moliedina, Mr. Amir Moliedina, Mrs. Cynthia Jarrett, Police Constable Keith Blakelock and Mr. David Hodge. We send our concern and best wishes for a speedy and full recovery to Mrs. Cherry Groce, a tragic victim of these dreadful events, and to all others—police, firemen, ambulancemen and ordinary innocent citizens—who have suffered injury in disturbances which have included arson, looting and the dreadful crime of rape.

Many have undergone serious financial loss, and I must first ask the Home Secretary what action can be taken to speed up the payment of compensation under the Riot (Damages) Act 1886 and to expand that Act's scope to take account of loss of income after the riots.

The House will be debating these matters on Wednesday, and I must repeat the anger that is felt on this side at the failure of the Government to provide time, which has meant that the House will have only half a day on each occasion to debate this profound issue and the crisis in southern Africa.

Grave questions arise from these disorders and it is essential that the country receives answers on matters which have caused profound national concern. These relate to the nature of policing during riots, and such questions come from the populations of the affected areas and from the police themselves. What the Home Secretary said today will not allay any of these anxieties.

They relate to the relationship between the police and the community, in the inner cities and elsewhere. They include disquiet over the spreading use of firearms by the police, the background to the riots, mass unemployment, especially among teenagers, bad housing, environmental decay and dereliction and racial discrimination.

The Home Secretary boasted today about funds provided under the urban programme, but such sums are only a fraction of the money that has been taken away from these areas in abolished housing subsidy, reduced rate support grant and rate support grant penalties. It is an absurdity that the Home Secretary boasted at Handsworth of the money going to Handsworth when in this financial year alone more money is being taken away from the city of Birmingham in rate support grant penalty than all those sums given over a period of years.

TO BE CHECKED
AGAINST DELIVERY

INNER CITY DISORDERS: STATEMENT

21 October 1985

Mr Speaker, with permission I should like to make a statement on the recent serious disorders. In the past 6 weeks there have been three serious riots, in the Lozells Road area of Birmingham, in Brixton and at the Broadwater Farm Estate in Tottenham. Four people have died, one a police constable who was savagely killed. There have also been disorders in Liverpool, Leicester and Peckham in South London. Many police officers and others were injured. There were appalling attacks on the police with petrol bombs and other missiles, and particularly in Birmingham and Brixton there was extensive looting and attacks on shops and cars.

Mr Speaker, all responsible members of our society will condemn the disgraceful criminal behaviour which has occurred. All responsible members of our society will applaud the courage and dedication of the police in doing their job of maintaining and restoring order in the streets and on the housing estates of our major cities. Public order is essential for the maintenance of a civilised way of life and for the safety of individual citizens. On that there can be no compromise. So far over ⁷⁰⁰670 people have been charged with offences arising from these disorders.

The riot in Brixton was triggered by the tragic shooting of Mrs Groce, and the riot in Tottenham followed the death of Mrs Jarrett after a search had been made at her home. These police operations are being investigated by senior officers from other police forces under the supervision of the independent Police Complaints Authority. These arrangements will ensure that they are fully investigated and that any necessary action is taken as a result. In the case of the Lozells Road riot, the Chief Constable of the West Midlands is preparing a report which will be published. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary is being associated closely with the preparation of this report.

So far as police operations are concerned, though the other disorders were serious enough, the riot at Tottenham stands out for the problems it presented the police. In that riot a police officer was killed, firearms were used and the police had to face a ferocious barrage of petrol bombs and other missiles. The design of housing estates like that at Tottenham

pose particular difficulties in such circumstances. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner is urgently reviewing the tactics of the force in such occasions. There must be no no-go areas in any of our cities.

The riot at Tottenham was the first occasion in Great Britain when the chief officer of police gave authority for plastic baton rounds to be used if necessary, though in fact they were not used. Plastic baton rounds and CS gas were made available to the police in Great Britain for public order use following the riots in 1981. They may only be used in the last resort, where conventional methods of policing have been tried and failed, or must from the nature of the circumstances be unlikely to succeed if tried, and where the chief officer judges such action necessary because of the risk of loss of life or serious injury or widespread destruction of property. That threshold was reached at Tottenham. The Commissioner had my full support in making it clear that such weapons would be deployed if similar circumstances arose in the future.

Other matters need to be looked at in the light of police experience in these disorders. The defensive equipment introduced in recent years - helmets, shields and protective overalls - proved its worth. Without it there would have been more serious casualties. The Metropolitan Police are acquiring more shields and other defensive equipment. It is also right to consider whether any further equipment is required, and this is being done. Similarly there may be lessons to be learned in relation to police training and deployment. The Commissioner is pursuing these matters and I am in close touch with him. I shall ensure that any lessons learned are disseminated nationally.

From when it first came into office this Government has given tangible expression to its support for the police. That support continues unabated. The strength of the MP is now 26,681 compared with 22,225 in 1979. The Metropolitan Police still has scope to increase strength by more than 400 within its present establishment of 27,165. I support the Commissioner in his efforts to make good this shortfall as quickly as possible. The force's reorganisation should in addition release 200 officers for operational duties; and I have authorised an increase of nearly 50 in the civil staff ceiling next year for further civilianisation. I have also told the Commissioner that I am prepared in

principle to agree to an increase of 50 in the establishment next year, specifically to strengthen his efforts against drug trafficking. Beyond that I have set urgent work in hand to assess whether there is a proven need for further increases in the police establishment. Taken together these steps mean that there will be a substantial strengthening of the Metropolitan Police in the months ahead.

In recent years a great deal of effort has been put into establishing good liaison and consultation between the police and the community in inner city areas particularly, for example, in Brixton and Handsworth. These disorders must be deeply depressing for those community leaders and police officers who have put so much effort into establishing a better understanding. But it would be wrong to assume that these efforts were misplaced. On the contrary they must be continued and re-doubled if the police are to protect and serve the community efficiently.

More broadly, the Government will continue its strong commitment to urban regeneration. The Urban Programme has more than tripled from £93m in 1978/79 to £338m in 1985/86 and there has been substantial expenditure in all the riot areas. The Department of Employment and Manpower Services Commission is spending more than £100m in the Partnership areas and my Department plans to spend some £90m in 1985-86 through Section 11 grants. We must ensure that the very substantial sums that now go, and will continue to go, to inner city areas are spent to the best advantage and directed to the real needs of the people who live there. The City Action Teams have been set up to improve the co-ordination and targetting of Government programmes in the Partnership areas. We shall need to look at new ways of ensuring that this new objective is achieved.

These disorders are shocking events. It is a paramount interest of us all, young and old, people of all ethnic backgrounds that public order should be maintained. I acknowledge the social problems which exist in these areas, but it is no solution to loot and burn shops which serve the area, or to attack the police. Mob violence must be dealt with firmly and effectively and criminal acts punished according to the criminal law. The police should have the support of all of us in striving to maintain order and uphold the law. It is their first priority. It is the Government's also.

File No.

Department

Drafted by
(Block Capitals)

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[TEXT]

FOLLOWING FOR WICKS, PRIME MINISTER'S PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, FROM FLESHER, 10 DOWNING STREET

We have the text of the Home Secretary's statement this afternoon. I understand that the Prime Minister had doubts about whether there should be a statement at all. The Home Secretary's judgement (and I agree with him) is that if he does not offer a statement there will be a demand for one from the Opposition or a P.N. Q attempt from one of the constituency members, which the Speaker would allow. In these circumstances he thinks that there is little choice but to make a statement. If the Prime Minister is strongly of the view that he should not we will need to know by 12 noon our time. The statement is too long to transmit all of it and most is an account of the events themselves. The following are the "policy" paragraphs.

Copies to:-

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The riot at Tottenham was the first occasion in Great Britain when the chief officer of police gave authority for plastic baton rounds to be used if necessary, though in fact they were not used. Plastic baton rounds and CS gas were made available to the police in Great Britain for public order use following the riots in 1981. They may only be used in the last resort, where conventional methods of policing have been tried and failed, or must from the nature of the circumstances be unlikely to succeed if tried, and where the chief officer judges such action necessary because of the risk of loss of life or serious injury or widespread destruction of property. That threshold was reached at Tottenham. The Commissioner had my full support in making it clear that such weapons would be deployed if similar circumstances arose in the future.

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principle to agree to an increase of 50 in the establishment next year, specifically to strengthen his efforts against drug trafficking. Beyond that I have set urgent work in hand to assess whether there is a proven need for further increases in the police establishment. Taken together these

CONFIDENTIAL

You will wish to look closely at the last of these paragraphs which in my view continues the same tone as prompted adverse headlines in the press last week. I have told the Home Office that I think it likely that the Prime Minister will wish a sentence along the lines of "Whatever the police need in their fight against crime, they shall have". Or some other formula more closely based on the Prime Minister's Blackpool speech than the present text. Could I have your comments urgently.

R

CONFIDENTIAL



URGENT
DEPARTCH

DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB
01-212 3434

My ref:

Your ref:

15 October 1985

No Reply
This has been sent to the former
with reference 150,

Dear Sir

Sam Webb (letters, October 14) says that the Government ignored a report on Broadwater Farm Estate published by the Department of the Environment in 1980. Much of that report dealt with the problems, physical and social, that the estate faced at that time. In making an overall assessment the researchers concluded (as Sam Webb quotes) "... the possibility (my emphasis) of demolition is one that will have to be considered."

Demolition of recently-built housing stock is an option that can never be taken lightly. Much to the credit of all concerned, a different path was taken. The Department gave assistance in the form of urban aid grant and practical help through its Priority Estates Project. Before the recent tragic events, much had been achieved on the estate in the form of community development and improved management and repairs. It must now be the firm intention of everyone involved, as it is of Ministers, to see that these initiatives will survive and flourish, despite the recent severe set-back. Demolition sounds an easy option, but it is expensive in homes, money and failed endeavour.

SIR GEORGE YOUNG

The Editor
The Guardian



cc:Chancellor
 FST
 EST
 MST
 Sir P Middleton
 Mr Bailey
 Mr Anson
 Mr Gilmore
 Mr Gray
 Mr Revolta
 Mr Perfect

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd MP
 Secretary of State
 Home Office
 50 Queen Anne's Gate
 London
 SW1H 9AT

Mr Sutton
 Mr Cropper
 Mr Lord
 Mr Knight

Received 30/10
1. not taken.

DRS
30/10

14 October 1985

Dec Douglas,

HANDSWORTH

Thank you for copying me your letter of 26 September to Kenneth Baker. I have since seen his reply.

Before agreeing to special assistance we need to be satisfied that the costs arising are greater than could be expected to be allowed for contingencies by a prudent authority, and that the costs could be properly identified as genuine consequences of the immediate emergency.

If special assistance is to be given, I would favour the Special Financial Assistance rules outlined in Lord Bellwin's letter of 14 April 1983. The threshold, defined as an amount per head of population, should however be indexed as Leon Brittan proposed when Chief Secretary in his letter of 7 February 1983. My officials would need to consider with yours the procedure involved including any necessary Supplementary Estimates.

As far as disregard is concerned, providing it is concluded that the disturbances are properly identified as an emergency, I would in this case also be prepared to consider a disregard on expenditure in 1985-86.

Special assistance for costs above those allowed for in expenditure plans will imply a claim on the Reserve. It goes without saying that we should minimise such claims and I must urge you and Kenneth to do your best in looking for offsetting savings from your cash limited programmes, including cash limit offsetting from underspends, notwithstanding the other pressures especially on Home Office votes of which I am aware.

CONFIDENTIAL

Your letter referred only to Handsworth, and I have limited my reply to this. You will no doubt consider further how to handle the consequences of other recent disturbances, although I would assume that the same principles would apply, including the basic point that costs would be funded from contingencies as far as possible.

I am copying this letter to Kenneth Baker.

Yours ever,

JM

JOHN MacGREGOR

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Mr S Sherbourne

PRIME MINISTER

You will undoubtedly be besieged by the Press in Blackpool, not merely about your own security, but also for comment on the Tottenham riot.

We are taking the line that you have been kept in close touch with the situation; you have spoken to the Home Secretary; you are shocked at the policeman's death and the use of guns; you emphasise the support that all decent people must give ^{support} to the police.

Jean Caines,

JEAN CAINES
Deputy Press
Secretary

7 October 1985



file

10 DOWNING STREET

7 October, 1985

From the Principal Private Secretary

TOTTENHAM RIOTS

The Prime Minister spoke to the Home Secretary this morning on the telephone about the riots last night in Tottenham.

The Home Secretary reported that the Commissioner had given authority, of which he approved, to the local police for the use of plastic bullets, though in the event they had decided they were not necessary. The Commissioner would tell the press that similar authority would be given when petrol bombs were thrown at the police. The housing estate concerned could not have been worse designed for the maintenance of public order. The Home Secretary had discussed with the Commissioner the use of water cannon, but the Commissioner did not see much value in them in the present situation.

The Prime Minister said that the ferocity of the night's events and the weapons used was evidence of a new situation. Present tactics did not seem to be good enough to deal with it. The Home Secretary was right to make clear the Government's total support for the police. The police should be given all the equipment and personnel necessary. It was a great pity that so few arrests had been made in Tottenham, for example, compared to the 250 arrests which the Home Secretary reported in Brixton. There needed to be a thorough review of the police tactics necessary to deal with the new situation. It might even become necessary to demolish houses in difficult estates in order to help policing. Extra search lights might be employed. Above all, the Government should stand up for the police.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Joan MacNaughton (Lord President's Office).

H. Taylor, Esq.,
Home Office.

A handwritten signature in the bottom right corner of the page.



Mufared
to Blackpool
8/10.

CC 115

PRIME MINISTER

As you know, as well as seeing and hearing from the police in the areas affected by the recent riots, I have also had some frank, and on the whole, constructive discussion with responsible members of the ethnic minority communities. I am talking about people who, like members of the Lambeth Police/Community Liaison Group, have worked with determination, sometimes at great personal risk, to defuse tensions and promote better relationships.

In such discussion I have emphasised the point, not infrequently made in speeches by Home Office Ministers, that, as a Government, we are firmly opposed to racial discrimination in all its forms, that we are concerned to see that effective action is taken to deal with racial disadvantage where it can be shown to exist, and that for us there are no second class citizens. Even where there is discrimination or disadvantage there can of course be no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which we have seen on our streets in recent weeks. That must be a recurrent theme in our public statements. The horrendous events in Tottenham underscore this point. Regrettably the impression I have received in a number of different ways in recent days is that there is a belief among the ethnic minority groups - including the responsible, law abiding thinkers - that we do not care.

Nothing could more effectively deal with doubts about our commitment as a Government to the welfare of all our citizens or about our opposition to discrimination in all its forms than some words from you as Prime Minister. This point was put to me, in terms, only last week by ethnic minority representatives at a meeting of my Advisory Council on Race Relations. I wonder if you might find some opportunity to do this - perhaps even in your speech to the Party Conference this week. The theme is perhaps best put in a positive way - that the law and the police and all the agencies of Government are there to protect and serve everyone without distinction or discrimination because that is the only basis for a civilised and successful society.

You will remember David Waddingham's admirable speech on the Gallahad motion two years ago. He has put together the Enclosed to illustrate what you might perhaps say this time.

Doyle Ford.

4 October 1985

There must be few in this Hall who have not been greatly troubled by what has happened recently in the Lozells Road area of Handsworth, Brixton and most recently in Tottenham. Douglas Hurd has made it abundantly plain that riot and looting will not be tolerated and there can be no excuse for what occurred. But I want to take the opportunity to say this. Britain is now a country in which live people who have come here or whose parents have come here from all over the world. We have got to make sure that out of these different people we make One Nation - bound together by a common loyalty to Queen and Country. All these different people are equal before the law with the same rights and the same duties as everyone else: and each of these people, every man, woman and child is entitled to that equality of opportunity which is the hall-mark of Conservatism. That must mean - that does mean that our Party is wholly opposed to discrimination on grounds of colour, race or creed and where it exists we will fight it with all the energy in our beings.



Mufaxed
to Blackpool
8/10.

CC/AB

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PART 2 **ends:-**

Duty Clerk note 28.9.85

PART 3 **begins:-**

Home Sec. to PM 4.10.85

