PREM 19/1809/1

meetings with the Taoiseach.

Anglo - Irish Summit.

Anglo - Irish Relations. Part 12

INSIDE COVER: Copy of Anglo-Irish agreement

IRELAND

Part 1: May 1979

Part 12: 15 Nov. 1985.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~17.11.85~~							
~~20.11.85~~							
~~22.11.85~~							
~~26.11.85~~							
~~29/11/85~~							
~~3.12.85~~							
~~29.11.85~~							
~~30.11.85~~							
ENDS							

PREM 19/1809

Folder 1: FCO Briefs for PM's meeting with the Taioseach, Hillsborough Castle 15 Nov. 1985

Folder 2: PM's statement on Anglo-Irish summit. House of Commons. 18 Nov. 1985 & Supplementaries

Folder 3. Press ~~Digest~~ Comments on Anglo-Irish Agreement.

Transcript of Press Conference by the Prime minister & the Taiseach, Hillsborough Castle, 15 Nov 1985.

These papers are in PREM 19/1809, Part 2 of 2

PART 12 ends:-

~~CDP to PM 29.11.85~~

Anglican Consultative Council to RC 30/11/85

PART 13 begins:-

CDP to NIO 1.12.85

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC (85) 33rd Conclusions, Item 2	21.11.85
CC (85) 34th Conclusions, Item 2	28.11.85

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed C Wayland Date 24 March 2015

PREM Records Team

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

Cmnd. 9690: Treaty Series No. 62(1985)
Agreement between Government of UK and Government of Republic of Ireland, Hillsborough, 15 November 1985
HMSO, December 1985 [ISBN 0 10 196900 7]

Signed C Wayland Date 24 March 2015

PREM Records Team

ANGLICAN CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL

Anglican Consultative Council
14 Great Peter Street
London SW1P 3NQ

Telephone: 01-222 2851
Telex: 8950907 ANGCOM G
Cables: Compasrose London SW1

President
Archbishop of Canterbury

Chairman
The Ven. Yong Ping Chung

Secretary General
The Rev. Canon Samuel Van Culin

30 November 1985

Mr Powell
For you to deal with, please.
I have not acknowledged.
2/12

Robin Catford, Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear Mr Catford

I am informed by Mr Grenville-Grey that he made contact with you on behalf of the Archbishop of Canterbury to express the desire of the House of Bishops of the Church of Ireland for a meeting with the Prime Minister.

Mr Grenville-Grey has passed to me your suggestion that the House of Bishops should first contact the Minister for Northern Ireland, and seek his endorsement for such a meeting. I shall convey this advice to the Bishop of Clogher who is the Secretary of the Church of Ireland House of Bishops.

The matter which the bishops desire to discuss with the Prime Minister is related to the Anglo-Irish agreement. The Church of Ireland, as you know, covers both The Republic and Ulster. Within the Protestant community in Northern Ireland, the bishops are amongst the most moderate of spokes-persons and their contributions to the working out of the agreement will be important.

For your information I am enclosing a copy of the Bishops Statement issued following the announcement of the agreement.

Please accept my personal appreciation for your continued consideration of this request and for your advice.

Yours sincerely

The Revd Canon Samuel Van Culin
Secretary General

cc The Most Revd and Rt Hon
the Archbishop of Canterbury

enc

SVC/fg

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STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE CHURCH OF IRELAND HOUSE OF BISHOPS ON 20 NOVEMBER 1985

The House of Bishops of the Church of Ireland shares with all people of goodwill in this island, North and South, the desire to see peace and mutual understanding develop and strengthen.

We acknowledge that the purpose of those involved in the formulation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement is an attempt to deal with long-standing political and community divisions but we also recognize the anxieties and deep frustrations that many people feel concerning the eventual out-working of the Agreement and its potential repercussions.

We are accutely aware that many people feel that major decisions involving their vital interests have been made in secret without full and open consultation with those most directly affected. Such a process inevitably creates resentment and deepens division and mistrust. We would strongly urge the Political Leaders involved in the Agreement to take very seriously the sense of insecurity and lack of trust that arises for future relationships and structures.

In the coming weeks and months the Anglo-Irish Agreement will be the subject of searching scrutiny and earnest debate in many places and at many levels. This necessary debate should be carried out in a manner that refrains from inflammatory words or actions. Such words or actions can only have the effect of increasing bitterness, division and suffering in a land where during the past 16 years we have at a pastoral level ministered to so many people in their pain and grief.

As part of our pastoral responsibility as bishops of the Church of Ireland we intend to seek early meetings with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland, to express our views on the Agreement.

We pray, and ask others to join with us in praying, that all may have a sound judgement in this matter and contribute to a more peaceful, co-operative and stable relationship between all people of goodwill in this island.

+ + + + + + + + +

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE TAOISEACH

I enclose a speaking note for your meeting with the Taoiseach.

You will wish to consider whether the Unionist reaction does not justify going somewhat further with the Taoiseach than the speaking note suggests, though without giving the impression that you are backing out of the Agreement. Additional points which you might raise are:

(i) the way matters have turned out we have a much bigger problem than the Republic does. The prime need is to lean over backwards to reassure the Unionists, while leaving no impression of weakness or lack of determination to implement the Agreement;

(ii) you are grateful for the Taoiseach's helpful remarks in the debate, in the Times and on television;

(iii) an early and visible improvement in security cooperation would make a great impression. We need something eye-catching. An intensified effort to apprehend PIRA fugitives in the Republic?

(iv) it would also be helpful if the Irish Government could take very early action to start their parliamentary processes on accession to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism;

(v) we also need more from the SDLP. John Hume has made some helpful remarks but they have been rather vague and qualified. We really need a firm and specific offer by the SDLP on the steps which they are prepared to take towards devolution;

(vi) we must also ask the Republic to heed our advice on the location of meetings of the Intergovernmental Conference in the early stages. The first meeting may have to be in Aldergrove. The second meeting might be in London or the Republic. (It will probably be shortly before the by-elections.)

(vii) nothing would do more to cut the ground from under the Unionists' feet than some indication that the Republic would be prepared to consider amendment of Article 2 and 3 of its Constitution. (But you may feel that it is going too far to mention this to the Taoiseach now.)

C.D.P.

(C.D. POWELL)
29 November 1985

SRWALO

SPEAKING NOTE

Both the UK and Irish Parliaments have now approved the Agreement and we have exchanged notifications of their approval. The Agreement is therefore now in force. We must now see that it produces the peace and stability we hope for.

2. The reaction of the Unionists to the Agreement was more hostile than, perhaps, we expected. We have been obliged to defend the Agreement. We have repeated in particular that there is no derogation from our sovereignty and that we retain responsibility for decisions and administration of government in Northern Ireland. We have also emphasised the improvement in cross-border security which we hope will flow from the Agreement.

3. The Unionists clearly hope to wear down our commitment to the Agreement by a series of measures - by-elections first, which may be followed by boycotts and other forms of protest. They do not at present envisage unconstitutional action, which we should welcome. There is no reason to think that their opposition will be easily overcome.

4. It would not be right - constitutionally and politically - to intervene in the by-election process and, if all the resignations take place, the by-elections should take place in February (or even late January). But we will not accept that they amount to any kind of referendum.

5. All Ministers are to undertake a major effort to reassure Unionists - particularly moderate unionist opinion. We will make it clear that - so long as a majority wishes to stay in the United Kingdom - they are welcome and wanted. They will not have any special or ambivalent status.

6. But to gain Unionist support for the Agreement, we must also make sure that the Intergovernmental Conference has, and is seen to have, advantages for them as well as the minority. Improvements in security as a result of the Conference may not come overnight; but we must convince the Unionists that they will come. And the more the Unionists can be reassured about the security the more

successfully we can take the steps to accommodate the rights and identity of the minority. I am glad, that, as a small first step, Sir John Hermon and Commissioner Wren are meeting.

7. We also need to assure the Unionists that the work of the Conference will not go on behind their backs. We would like to consult them about the Conference's work although there can be no question of having a veto. We would also wish to report to Parliament. We know, however, that some of the matters discussed in the Conference will be confidential. We have not made any decision yet, and will inform you before we make any announcement. We would hope that we can agree a common approach to Northern Ireland politicians, and our Parliaments.

8. The first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference is likely to be on 11 December. We should keep the date confidential. This will be an opportunity (as our Communique indicated) to be seen to be making progress on security co-operation as well as the improvement of relations between the security forces and the minority community.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Prime Minister
Agree to a meeting with the three Church leaders before Christmas? 29th November 1985
I think this one should be a meeting rather than a lunch.
CDP 29/XI

C Powell Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON

Dear Charles,

The Presbyterian Church in Ireland have asked for a meeting with the Prime Minister to discuss the Anglo-Irish Agreement (your letter of 20 November refers). The President of the Methodist Church in Ireland telephoned the NIO last weekend to request a similar meeting.

The Presbyterians and the Methodists together with the Church of Ireland represent about three-quarters of Northern Ireland's unionist community. Between them, they exercise a considerable influence on unionist thinking and, through their public statements, are capable of making a major impact on people's attitudes. So far, they have each adopted a rather different approach to the agreement with the Presbyterian Church, as might have been expected, taking the hardest line. Leading members of the Church of Ireland and the Methodists, although concerned about the agreement, seem prepared to give it a chance.

The Secretary of State sees considerable advantage in a meeting between the Prime Minister and the three protestant church leaders. Such a meeting would demonstrate that, at the highest level, the Government understands the fears of the unionist community and is prepared to listen to their point of view, and would tie in with the thoughts expressed in your letter of 28 November.

Reassurances from her about the unionist position would help to allay these fears and would strengthen the hand of those church leaders who are prepared to wait and see how the agreement works. There can be little doubt that the churches will play a significant part in the development of unionist attitudes in the weeks and months ahead.

If the Prime Minister is prepared to undertake this meeting, perhaps as the first in the proposed series (about which I will write again shortly with further names), I would be happy to contact the people involved and to make the necessary arrangements.

Yours Sincerely

Neil Ward.

N D WARD

CONFIDENTIAL

Ireland: Anglo-Irish Summit Pt 12



copied to
Press
NIO

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH

PRESS STATEMENT

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach reviewed the position following the signature of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. They confirmed that the Agreement would be implemented as planned. They recognised the concern about the Agreement among the Unionist community. They hoped that the community would come to understand the reassurance on the status of Northern Ireland and other matters which the Agreement offers.

1/018

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

Peter Robinson Esq MP
House of Commons
LONDON
SW1

29 November 1985

Dear Peter Robinson

I write to acknowledge your letter of 27 November, a copy of which I am passing to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

I shall, of course, grant your application for appointment to the Stewardship of either the Three Hundreds of Chiltern or the Manor of Northstead in due course. I will effect it by Warrant on 1st January 1986, as you request.

Yours sincerely

NIGEL LAWSON

1/018

cc D. NORGROVE
MURDO MACLEAN
PPS/SoS NORTHERN IRL.
ALISON SMITH.

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

The Rev. Ian Paisley, MP
House of Commons
LONDON
SW1

29 November 1985

Dear Ian

I write to acknowledge your letter of 27 November, a copy of which I am passing to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

I shall, of course, grant your application for appointment to the Stewardship of either the Three Hundreds of Chiltern or the Manor of Northstead in due course. I will effect it by Warrant on 1st January 1986, as you request.

Yours sincerely

NIGEL LAWSON

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T225/85

Subject
Ops
Mortar.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

29 November 1985

Dear Prime Minister

It was good of you to write about the Anglo-Irish Agreement and I am grateful for your support. I look forward to seeing you next week in Luxembourg.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Onorevole Bettino Craxi

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

28 November 1985

Dear Charles,

I understand that at Cabinet it was agreed that the Prime Minister should be provided with a form of words on the indications given by Mr Hurd, during his term of office here, of the likely Irish role in Northern Ireland under the agreement. I attach the material as requested.

Yours Sincerely
Neil Ward.

N D WARD

KL

[redacted]R.

CONFIDENTIAL

Q: Should the Government not have made the Unionists aware during the negotiations that the Irish Government would be given a formal role in Northern Ireland's affairs?

A: The Government could not have made known the details of the negotiations. They could not have been successful if they were conducted in public. But Ministers made clear the basis of the negotiations while they were going on. Firstly that there could be no change in Northern Ireland's status without majority consent. And secondly that the Republic might have a more formal means to express its views to us on developments in Northern Ireland.

/If pressed: The Government did not brief the representatives of either community on the negotiations on the Agreement/.

(Annex A includes examples of occasions when Mr Hurd [redacted] made clear what role the Republic might have).

JLD

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A

[redacted].

CONFIDENTIAL

STATEMENTS BEFORE THE SUMMIT ON THE ROLE OF THE REPUBLIC IN THE EVENT OF AN AGREEMENT

a) Mr Hurd 21 November 1984
News Conference

"... I personally see no objection if the Irish Republic from time to time wish to warn or advise about particular aspects of our policy. I think we should take that and discuss calmly with them the consequences and then take our own decisions ..."

"... there are quite a number of things which the Irish Government raise with us and some of them are matters which Governments of bordering countries would raise anyway because they affect it in one way or another. Others are matters in which the Irish Government has an interest because of its links with the Nationalist community here. What I'm saying is that both Jim Prior and I are ready to listen and respond to the kind of points which are raised.

b) Mr Hurd 4 December 1984
Northern Ireland Assembly

"When Irish Ministers have views to express on events and policies in Northern Ireland, then we should be ready to listen carefully to those views and take them fully into account. Their interest and their concern for the Nationalist minority are natural and can be respected."

c) Mr Hurd 20 January 1985
Interview on RTE Radio

"I see the Irish Government free to articulate the views which I hope will be expressed in the interests of the whole of NI, not just on behalf of part of it, and I see that it will always be

/...

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

sensible for the people running the Province here to listen carefully to those views. Now that happens to some extent now rather sporadically. We've discussed some of the ways in which it happens. If that could be made rather more methodical then I think those views might carry greater weight and I think this is an area where serious work needs to be done within the constraints which have emerged from recent discussions ... There could be machinery for that but exactly what it is and what you call it and how it works and what its limits are, that is where I think the work needs to be done."

d) Mr Hurd 24 January 1985
Speech to European Atlantic Group

"For their part the constitutional representatives of the Nationalist community would be reassured if there were some greater recognition of the interest of the Irish Government in the affairs of the Province. I believe there is serious work to be done here. I hope this work can lead to a successful agreement."

e) Mr Hurd 6 March 1985
Speech to Parliamentary Press Gallery

"The Government has recognised the position of the Republic in relations to Northern Ireland. There is a great deal of merit in devising arrangements through which we can take full account of the Republic's views and co-operate on matters of mutual concern".

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

Subject
cc master

hle BM

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 November 1985

Dear Jim,

ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

The Prime Minister had a brief discussion with the Lord President and the Northern Ireland Secretary after Cabinet this morning about possible steps to influence majority opinion in Northern Ireland towards a more favourable, or at least less unfavourable, view of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

Your Secretary of State said that he was considering a major publicity campaign involving the placing of advertisements and other activities. He needed to get together a skilled team for this campaign, drawing fully on Whitehall resources and perhaps also going beyond.

In discussion it was suggested that the Prime Minister might invite groups of leading Northern Ireland citizens for a talk and lunch at 10 Downing Street. Particular groups mentioned were church leaders, civil servants and editors, as well as leading figures in the industrial and commercial life of Northern Ireland. Mention was also made of the President of the Ulster Farmers Union. It would be better to mix people from these various groups rather than invite them by category. I should be grateful if you could let me have some specific proposals for, say, two or three groups as soon as possible. I will then try to find space in the Prime Minister's diary when she could see them. We should aim to arrange for such groups to meet other leading members of the Government and of Parliament while in London.

The Prime Minister also stressed the importance of working out a number of key phrases about the Agreement and its consequences which Ministers should repeat over and over again. An example was: "We want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom". You will wish to collect a number of such phrases which will appeal to the majority and circulate them widely amongst Ministers.

I am copying this letter to Joan MacNaughton (Lord President's Office), Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely,

(C.D. Powell)

Jim Daniell, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

hlè

cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 November 1985

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you so much for your kind message about the Anglo-Irish Agreement. I am under no illusion about the difficulties which lie ahead. But it is very encouraging to have the support of such a close and valued friend for what we are trying to achieve.

With warm personal good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Signor Francesco Cossiga

EC

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

I don't think the points in paras. 3 & 4 need to be raised in Cabinet. In particular, the date of the first meeting of the IGC is sensitive.

You might however ask Mr Northern Ireland Secretary what help he needs from colleagues in working on Unionist opinion.

CDP 29/11

Ref. A085/3064

PRIME MINISTER

Cabinet: Anglo-Irish Agreement

Although this subject is not on the agenda of Cabinet - and most of the meeting may be devoted to social security - it is very likely that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will raise it under Parliamentary Affairs. Four aspects in particular may require discussion.

The debate and its repercussions

2. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will no doubt give his assessment of the situation following the debate. Unionist MPs could start resigning their seats tonight or tommorrow. The question of writs for by-elections may not come up until the New Year, but the Lord Privy Seal will be briefed to speak on this if necessary. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland may also wish to give an assessment of the position of the SDLP: Mr Hume in his speech made some remarks, but not very specific ones, about talking to Unionists on "how we shall administer the affairs of Northern Ireland in a manner that is acceptable to both traditions" and about support for the security forces.

Notification of acceptance of the Agreement

3. Paragraph 6 of the Summit communiqué said that the exchange of notifications, to bring the Agreement into effect, would not be completed until the Agreement had been approved by the British and Irish Parliaments. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be briefed to suggest when this should be done. Once the House of Commons has voted to approve the Agreement, the exchange can - and should - be completed, as the communiqué envisaged, without delay.

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIAAL

The first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference

4. Paragraph 6 of the communiqué said that the first meeting would take place as soon as possible after the exchange of notifications. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should be asked to suggest a date. I understand that he has a location in Belfast in mind. Paragraph 7 and 9 of the communiqué provide a good basis for making security co-operation a major subject for the first meeting. We should identify specific objectives in this field. It would be helpful, not least presentationally, if the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Commissioner of the Garda were present at the meeting. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will have views.

Contact with unionists about the work of the Intergovernmental Conference

5. Criticism of our failure to consult unionists during the negotiations has come from several directions. There is interest, also not confined to unionists, in the questions of informing Parliament and of informing unionists outside Parliament about the work of the Conference. Your reply to Mr McNair-Wilson's question yesterday about informing Parliament made clear that not everything said in the Conference would be made public but that you were giving urgent consideration to how meetings could be reported to the House. An announcement of arrangements for this will presumably be needed before the first meeting of the Conference, so that what happens at that meeting can be reported accordingly afterwards. (If unionist MPs are absent from Westminster at the time of the first meeting, there may be the further question of whether to inform the unionist parties separately). Especially given the statement in the communiqué that "the two Governments envisage that the meetings and agenda of the Conference will not normally be announced", it will be necessary to inform the Irish Government of the

arrangements we intend before we make them public. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Lord Privy Seal will wish to speak.

RCA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

27 November 1985

21th Nov 1985

Dear Nigel,

I ~~want~~ to give notice that I wish to apply for appointment to either the Chiltern Hundreds or the Manor of Northstead effective from 1st Jan 1986 as I must leave the House of Commons and present myself afresh to the electorate.

My reason for this action is that I believe that the Anglo/Irish Agreement is an Act of Treachery to the people of Ulster, a surrender to the IRA and Eire and destructive of the Union.

The people of Ulster have been refused their right to vote by the government and as a constitutionalist I intend to play my part in giving them the opportunity to decide their own destiny.

Sincerely

Ian Paisley

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

The Rt. Hon. Nigel Lawson, M.P.,
Chancellor of the Exchequer,
House of Commons,
London.

27th. November, 1985.

APPLICATION FOR EITHER THE CHILTERN HUNDREDS OR THE MANOR OF NORTHSTEAD

Dear Chancellor,

Tonight the House voted, against the advice of Ulster's unionist members, to approve an agreement which permits the Republic of Ireland a role in the Government of Northern Ireland. I am convinced that this agreement undermines the Union and charters a course towards an all-Ireland Republic.

Before and during the debate I urged the Government to recognise that any structure

affecting the government of a part of the United Kingdom could only be durable if those affected by it consented to it.

Ulster, not having been consulted beforehand, should at least have been given the opportunity afterwards to signal, through a referendum, whether it approved. The Government has not given Ulster that opportunity. It is therefore my wish to apply for one of the offices of profit under the Crown to enable a by-election to take place which I would seek to contest. This will enable my constituents to register their verdict upon this shabby agreement with the Irish Republic.

While from tonight I consider, for practical purposes my role in Parliament to be concluded unless and until returned in the

by-election I would be obliged if my request was, for prudent procedural reasons, to become effective on 1st January, 1986.

I am grateful for your assistance and only request it is necessary for me to take this action.

Sincerely,

Peter Robinson

PETER ROBINSON
EAST BELFAST

Subject

(COPS master.

NB. Original dated 22.11.85

27/11/85.

TEXT OF THE MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER, MP BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SIGNOR BETTINO CRAXI.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T223A/85

Caro Primo Ministro,

La notizia del raggiungimento dell'accordo fra il Regno Unito e quello della Repubblica d'Irlanda mi ha profondamente rallegrato. Esso pone termine ad una controversia che non aveva più ragione di esistere fra due paesi amici dell'Italia, che aveva provocato, attraverso incomprensioni e diffidenze, tanti lutti; esso è inoltre improntato a quello spirito di apertura, mutua comprensione e reciproco rispetto che costituisce il fondamento delle relazioni fra i popoli.

Da tale accordo trarrà certamebte beneficio anche l'ideale europeo che oggi siamo tutti impegnati a realizzare.

Nell'attesa di rivederLa presto a Lussemburgo per il prossimo Consiglio Europeo, Le invio i miei più cordiali e amichevoli saluti.

Bettino Craxi

ROUGH TRANSLATION

Dear Prime Minister,

The news of the agreement between the governments of Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland has pleased me immensely. It puts an end to a controversy between two countries, friends of Italy, which had no longer cause to exist and which had provoked, through misunderstandings and distrust, such a great loss of life. The agreement, moreover, is based on that spirit of understanding, mutual comprehension and reciprocal respect which are at the basis of relations among Peoples.

This accord will no doubt benefit the European ideal which today we are all striving to accomplish.

Looking forward to seeing you again soon at Luxembourg for the European Council, I send you my most cordial and friendly regards.

Bettino Craxi



The Ambassador

London, 27th November, 1985

Dear Mr. Powell,

I take pleasure in sending you herewith the text of a message addressed to the Prime Minister by the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, Signor Bettino Craxi, together with a rough translation of the same.

The original text will follow shortly.

Sincerely yours

Bruno Bottai

Enc.

Mr. Charles Powell,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
(Overseas Affairs),
10, Downing Street,
London S W 1

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

27th November 1985

Dear Charles,

LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM SIR ELDON GRIFFITHS

You asked for comments on the draft letter which the Prime Minister proposed to send to Sir Eldon Griffiths following his agreement not to intervene during the Prime Minister's speech during the Debate on the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

I have two points. The more important is that we fear that a meeting between the Police Federation and the Prime Minister would be open to misinterpretation, not least by the RUC Chief Constable, Sir John Hermon. His relations with the Federation in Northern Ireland are less than cordial and he is only too likely to regard such a meeting as undermining his own authority. It could also set an unfortunate precedent, not just in Northern Ireland but for GB more widely to suggest that bodies such as the Federation, or indeed other bodies such as the Prison Officers' Association in Northern Ireland, had such a right of access to the Prime Minister. Their GB colleagues would almost certainly want to follow suit sooner or later. If, however, you considered that there was no alternative to a meeting, might I suggest that it should be with our Secretary of State* (just as the Federation in England and Wales would most naturally look to voice their concerns to the Home Secretary)? Indeed the Secretary of State is currently considering a separate request from Sir Eldon for an early meeting with the NI Police Federation to discuss just the sort of issues they are likely to want to raise at any meeting with the Prime Minister.

On the responses to Sir Eldon's two points, Robert Andrew has suggested that sub-paragraph (ii) could be more happily worded as follows:

> "The RUC will, I am sure, continue to enforce the law even handedly (as they demonstrated at Portadown earlier this year); and any steps necessary to ensure their ability to do so will be taken."

* i.e. not with the PM.

CONFIDENTIAL

/.....

Incidentally, you may have seen that Sir Eldon intervened during the Secretary of State's speech this afternoon to ask the first of the two points he would have put to the Prime Minister yesterday, and he received suitable reassurances.

I am copying this to Stephen Boys Smith in the Home Office.

Yours Sincerely
Neil Ward.

N D WARD

Ireland/Anglo/Irish Agreement Pt 12

Revised

blind copy to Rt. Hon. Northern Ireland Secretary.

Rt. Hon. Sir Eldon Griffiths MP

DJ 21 Dec 90

PM

[Please type for PM's signature].

Thank you so much for your letter about the Ireland Debate. It was considerate of you not to have intervened during my speech with your two points: it would rather have broken up the argument. The answers to your two questions are:

(i) No, the Inter-Governmental Conference cannot interfere in the way in which the police enforce the law. This is made clear in Article 9(b) of the Agreement; and

(ii) The RUC will (I am sure, continue to) enforce the law and any steps necessary to ensure their ability to do so will be taken ~~(as at the time of Portadown earlier this year).~~

I ~~should be ready to receive a small delegation as you request and suggest you bring them to see me at 1100 hours on 18 December.~~

(even-handedly (as was demonstrated at Portadown earlier this year);

think it would be more appropriate for Tom King to see a delegation from the Northern Ireland Federation. But I would be happy to see you & listen to any points you wish to raise on their behalf.

Sir Eldon Griffiths, M.P.

Debate

[Mr. Robinson]

The *Belfast Telegraph*, never a close friend of the unionist community, said:

"Even those who, like this newspaper, can see benefit flowing from closer consultation with Dublin, must draw the line at such institutionalised links between the two countries."

I say again that it is not only the Ulster Unionists and the Democratic Unionists who believe that the deal goes too far. The ordinary citizens of Northern Ireland, never previously involved in politics, were present at the mass demonstration at the city hall in Belfast.

I was born a free citizen of the United Kingdom. I was brought up to respect the Union flag. At my father's knee I was taught the love that I should have for the monarchy, and throughout my life I have put that into practice. I was nurtured on the principle of the greatness of our British heritage. I have taught all that to my children. I now have to tell this House that over the last 17 cruel years, when Ulster has been confronted by a vicious campaign of terrorism, not one of the unionist community was prepared to allow that campaign to shatter his loyalty to the United Kingdom.

It is not a one-way street. It never has been for Ulster. We cheered with this country during the Falklands campaign. Ulster suffered its losses just as many did on this side of the Irish sea. During the second world war, we made sacrifices, just as many people in this part of the United Kingdom, and we did it without conscription. During the first world war, Ulster gave of its best for Britain. After watching the Ulster Volunteers on the Somme when 5,000 Ulstermen lost their lives at the enemy's hand, a great British general—General Spender—said, "I am not an Ulsterman but there is no one in the world whom I would rather be after seeng the Ulster Volunteers in action." In peace and in war Ulster stood by the kingdom. That has been the way of loyal Ulster.

I never believed that I would see a British Government who were prepared to damage Ulster's position in the United Kingdom. Our resolve has been hardened by the bitter times in past years when a terrorist campaign was aimed at undermining our position in the United Kingdom. There would never have been a Hillsborugh castle agreement if the IRA had not been bombing and shooting. That is a fact of life. Can one blame the people of Northern Ireland for thinking that violence works? It makes the task harder for those of us who chose the way of constitutional politics to tell people not to involve themselves in violence.

I wish that the House had a sense of the deep feeling of anger and betrayal in Northern Ireland. Yesterday, while I was waiting in an ante-room in No. 10 Downing street before meeting the Prime Minister I saw on the wall a portrait of Rudyard Kipling, who was a great patriot. I recall the words of his poem "Ulster 1912", which begins:

"The dark eleventh hour
Draws on and sees us sold
To every evil power
We fought against of old."

Later, it states:

"The blood our fathers split,
Our love, our toils, our pains,
Are counted us for guilt,
And only bind our chains.
Before an Empire's eyes
The traitor claims his price.
What need of further lies?
We are the sacrifice."

6.3 pm

Mr. John Hume (Foyle): Listening to some of the hon. Members who have spoken in the debate one could have been forgiven for thinking that we were not discussing a serious problem, but, after listening to the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson), one should not be in any doubt that we are discussing a serious problem.

I was glad to see a full House at the beginning of the debate. That is the first achievement of the Anglo-Irish conference. It shows that the serious human problem facing the peoples of these islands has at last been given the priority that it deserves. It has been put at the centre of the stage.

I was glad also that a meeting took place at the highest level between the British and the Irish Governments at which a framework for ongoing discussion was set up. In an excellent unionist speech, the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Gow) told us what we already knew—that he was a committed unionist and that he did not particularly like to associate with the loud-mouthed persons with whom I have to live. We did not learn from him of the problem in Northern Ireland—that we have a deeply divided society. The hon. Gentleman did not bother to analyse why we have a deeply divided society and the political instability and violence which the agreement seeks to address.

This is the first time that we have had a real framework within which to address the problem. The problem is not just about relationships with Northern Ireland. One need only listen to the speeches of Northern Ireland Members to know that it is about relationships in Ireland and between Ireland and Britain. Those interlocking relationships should be addressed within the framework of the problem. The framework of the problem can only be the framework of the solution, and that is the British-Irish framework. There is no road towards a solution to this problem that does not contain risks. The road that has been chosen by both Governments is the road of maximum consensus and is, therefore, the road of minimum risk. We should welcome that.

Our community has just gone through 15 years of the most serious violence that it has ever seen. Northern Ireland has a population of 1·5 million people. About 2,500 people have lost their lives in political violence—the equivalent of 86,000 people in Britain. Twenty thousand people have been seriously maimed. When I say "maimed", I mean maimed. That is the equivalent of 750,000 people on this island. About £11 billion worth of damage has been caused to the economies of Ireland—North and South. In 1969, public expenditure by the British Government in subsidy, subvention or whatever one calls it was £74 million; today it is £1·5 billion. Two new prisons have been built and a third is about to be opened—our only growth industry. There are 18-year-olds who have known nothing but violence and armed soldiers on their streets. Young people reach 18 and then face the highest unemployment we have ever had. Forty-four per cent. of the population is under 25.

If that is not a time bomb for the future what is? If that is not a problem that needs the serious attention of the House and the serious attention that the Prime Ministers of Britain and of the Republic of Ireland have given it in the past 18 months, what is? Is this not a subject that screams out for political leaders in Northern Ireland to take a good look at themselves, their parties and the leadership

that they have given? There is only one clear-cut lesson to be learnt from this tragedy—that our past attitudes have brought us where we are. Unless we agree to take a hard look at our past attitudes, we shall be going nowhere fast and we shall be committing ourselves to the dustbin of history, clutching our respective flagpoles.

We are being given some choices. The agreement gives us no more than an opportunity to begin the process of reconciliation. The choices offered to the people of Northern Ireland are the choices offered by hon. Members here present. The unionist parties have consistently sought to protect the integrity of their heritage in Ireland—the Protestant heritage — and no one should quarrel with that. A society is richer for its diversity. My quarrel with the unionist parties has been that they have sought to protect their heritage by holding all the power in their own hands and by basing that on sectarian solidarity. That is an exclusive use of power which is inherently violent because it permanently excludes a substantial section of the community from any say in its affairs.

That was spelt out clearly by the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Mr. Molyneaux) when he said that he offered an act of leadership. He was sincere. He said that the majority should assure the minority that they would be made part of society. He tells me that it is an act of leadership to make me and the people I represent part of our society 65 years after Northern Ireland was created.

We have been lectured about democracy and the democratic process by hon. Members from both unionist parties. They are practitioners of the democratic process. I do not want to spend too much time on examples of their practice, but they were the masters of gerrymander. Today their voices are somewhat muted, but they have not changed much.

In Belfast city council not one position on any board has gone to a minority representative. One council has even apologised to the electorate because it made a mistake in appointing a member of the SDLP to one position out of 105.

Mr. Patrick Nicholls (Teignbridge): The hon. Gentleman is complaining because his party cannot win elections. Many people here have to face the fact that their party cannot win elections. It is a fact of life, but it is not a reason for power sharing.

Mr. Hume: I thought that the hon. Gentleman's intervention might be intelligent. I shall not lecture him on how Northern Ireland was set up, how it was deliberately created and how from day one it has been run on a sectarian basis. The only way to break that down is through partnership.

Hon. Members from both unionist parties have lectured us about democracy. That brings us to the heart of the Irish problem. The sovereignty of this Parliament is the basis of the British system and of the rule of law. The sovereignty of Parliament has been defied only twice in this century—on both occasions by Ulster Unionists.

In 1912 the Ulster Unionists defied the sovereign wish of Parliament to grant home rule. That was only devolution within the United Kingdom. They objected and accepted instead home rule for themselves. That taught them a lesson which they have never forgotten—that if one threatens a British Government or British Parliament and produces crowds in the streets from the Orange lodges the British will back down. Others learnt from that that if one wins by the democratic process the British will back down to their loyalist friends and then they say, "Why not use force instead?" Those two forces are still at the heart of preventing a development in relationships within Ireland. Those who threaten violence are those who use it. The same two forces are opposing the agreement today.

Mr. Ken Maginnis (Fermanagh and South Tyrone): Does the hon. Gentleman recall that in 1969 he brought on to the streets of Ulster the hordes who, when he left them alone, fell into the hands of violent men? The hon. Gentleman says that he is not allowed to share responsibility in Northern Ireland, but I have told him before that the SDLP refused to put their names forward for membership of the council of which I am a member and tried to nominate Sinn Fein members. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will apply his mind to that.

Mr. Hume: I am applying my mind to the record of the unionist parties, the members of which have spoken today. I shall apply my mind to my own party later. I am expecting everyone to do a little rethinking.

The logic of the road down which the unionist leadership is taking its people is inescapable. Unionists once again are prepared to defy the sovereign will of this Parliament. When they come back after their elections and Parliament says that it refuses to back down, what will they do? Where will that lead us? They are going down the UDI road. That is their logic. They say that they are loyal to the United Kingdom. They are the loyalists and they must accept the sovereignty of Her Majesty's Parliament. But they do not.

What would happen if London Members resigned, were re-elected and returned saying that the majority in Greater London wanted to keep the Greater London council? That would lead to a complete breakdown of parliamentary sovereignty. That is where the unionists are leading us and they must know it.

It is sad in 1985 to meet people who are suspicious of everybody. They are suspicious of London, suspicious of Dublin and suspicious of the rest of the world. Worst of all, they are suspicious of the people with whom they share a little piece of land—their neighbours. It is sad that they never talk of the future except with fear. They talk always of the past. Their thoughts are encapsulated in that marvellous couplet

"To hell with the future and Long live the past.
May God in his mercy look down on Belfast."

That is more relevant than the words of Rudyard Kipling.

There has to be a better way. However grand we think we are, we are a small community. We cannot for ever live apart. Those sentiments were expressed in 1938 by Lord Craigavon, one of their own respected leaders. What are we sentencing our people to if we continue to live apart? People are entitled to live apart, but they are not entitled to ask everyone else to pay for it.

The other opposition to the agreement comes from the Provisional IRA and its political surrogates. They murder fellow Irishmen in the name of Irish unity. They murder members of the UDR and RUC — fellow Irishmen. Those members see themselves as protectors of their heritage, but the Provisional IRA brutally murder UDR and RUC members in the name of uniting the Irish people, the heritage with which we must unite if we are ever to unite Ireland.

The IRA's political wing is full of contradictions. I hope that no one in the House has any sympathy with it. Its members blow up factories and yet complain about unemployment. Its political spokesmen complain about cuts in public expenditure and in the same evening the military wing blows up £2 million of public expenditure in one street. A motion rightly condemns the execution of a young South African poet, but the IRA then shoots in the back of the head a young unemployed man and puts bullets in the head of a young man and his wife in west Belfast. The IRA complains about Diplock courts and yet runs kangaroo courts. What does that offer Ireland?

The hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson) asks about Irish unity. In the late 20th century it is nonsense that there should be divisions. If European nations which twice in this century alone have slaughtered one another by the millions can build institutions that allow them to grow together at their own speed, why cannot we do the same? He quoted me in an interview as saying that I was working for Irish unity, but I went on to say that those who think that Irish unity is round the corner are wired to the moon.

The divisions in Ireland go back well beyond partition. Centuries ago the leaders of Irish republicanism said that they wanted to unite Ireland by replacing the name of "Catholic-Protestant dissenter" with the common name of "Irishman". That was in 1795. Thirty years before partition Parnell said that Ireland could never be united or have its freedom until the fears of the Protestant minority in Ireland could be conciliated. This is a deep problem. It will not be solved in a week or in a fortnight. The agreement says that if Ireland is ever to be united it will be united only if those who want it to be united can persuade those who do not want it to be united. Sovereignty has nothing to do with maps but everything to do with people.

The people of Ireland are divided on sovereignty. They will be united only by a process of reconciliation in which both traditions in Ireland can take part and agree. If that happens, it will lead to the only unity that matters—a unity that accepts that the essence of unity is the acceptance of diversity.

Out third choice is the agreement. For the first time it sets up a framework that addresses the problem of the interlocking relationships between the people of both Irelands. It is the approach of maximum concensus. It is the way of minimum risk. For the first time—this is a positive element in the agreement—it respects the equal validity of both traditions. That is what the right hon. and hon. Members of the Unionist party are complaining about. It is not a concession to me or to the people whom I represent. It is an absolute right to the legitimate expression of our identity and of the people I represent. Nobody can take that from us. The recognition of the equal validity of both traditions removes for the first time every excuse for the use of violence by anybody in Ireland to achieve his objective. A framework for genuine reconciliation is provided. Both sections of our community can take part in it.

Several hon. Members have said that the SDLP has a double veto on devolution. I have already said several times to them in public, but let me say it again so that they may hear it, that I believe in the partnership between the different sections of the community in Northern Ireland. That is the best way to reconcile our differences. By working together to build our community we shall diminish the prejudices that divide us. The agreement means that I am prepared to sit down now and determine how we shall administer the affairs of Northern Ireland in a manner that is acceptable to both traditions.

Mr. Ivor Stanbrook (Orpington): Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Hume: No. [HON. MEMBERS: "Give way."] I noticed that the right hon. and hon. Members of the Unionist parties were allowed to speak without interruption. When they were interrupted, they did not agree to give way.

The second question that appears to excite people about my party's attitude relates to the security forces and to policing in Northern Ireland. Our position—this is not a policy but a statement of fact that applies to every democratic society—is that law and order are based upon political consensus. Where political consensus is absent there is an Achilles heel. Violent men in Northern Ireland take advantage of that Achilles heel. For the first time the Intergovernmental Conference will address that question. It has committed itself to addressing that question. It has also committed itself to addressing the relationship between the community and the security forces. I want to give every encouragement to the conference to do so at the earliest possible opportunity. If it does so, it will have our fullest co-operation. I want the people whom I represent to play the fullest possible part, as do any citizens in a democratic society, in the process of peace and order. While we await the outcome we shall continue to give our full and unqualified support to the police force in impartially seeking out anybody who commits a crime in Northern Ireland.

Mr. Dalyell: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) has a position to state in this argument. I may not happen to agree with him, but just as it was wrong——

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Paul Dean): Order. The hon. Gentleman has raised this point of order before. He knows that it is at the discretion of the hon. Member who has the floor to decide whether to give way.

Mr. Hume: What is the alternative to the process of reconciliation and the breaking down of barriers? Why should anybody be afraid of the process of reconciliation? Anybody who is afraid has no confidence in himself or herself. It means that they cannot engage in a process of reconciliation. If they cannot retain mutual respect for their own position as well as for that of somebody else, they have no self-confidence. Therefore, they should not be representatives of the people of Northern Ireland. The only alternative is the old one of hopelessness, tit-for-tat, revenge—the old doctrine of an eye for an eye which has left everybody blind in Northern Ireland.

This is well summed up by a better poet than Kipling, the good, honest voice of the North, Louis MacNeice. Describing the old hopelessness, which is what we are being offered by those who will not take this opportunity, he said:

"Why should I want to go back
To you, Ireland, my Ireland?
The blots on the page are so black
That they cannot be covered with shamrock

I hate your grandiose airs,
Your sob-stuff, your laugh and your swagger,
Your assumption that everyone cares
Who is the king of your castle.
Castles are out of date,
The tide flows round the children's sandy fancy,
Put up what flag you like, it is too late
To save your soul with bunting."

It is far too late for the people of Northern Ireland to save their souls with bunting or with flag waving. We should note that the followers of those who wave flags as though they were the upholders of the standards of those flags paint their colours on kerbstones for people to walk over. In other words, there is no leadership and no integrity in that approach and no respect. The alternative that we are offered is an opportunity which, like others, may fail. It poses great challenges and risks. The challenges are daunting and difficult, but the choices are not. There is no other choice. There is no other road.

6.28 pm

Mr. Adam Butler (Bosworth): I do not have in my voice today the power of the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson), but I hope that I can emulate my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Gow). Even if I speak quietly, I hope that I can speak as much sense as he did. So far there have been three contributions from those who represent different parties in Northern Ireland. They make me believe that I was right the other night to vote for the televising of the proceedings of this Chamber. If the television cameras had been here, the viewers, whether in Northern Ireland or in the remainder of the United Kingdom, would have obtained a much better appreciation of the problem and of the advocates of the various points of view.

I served as a Northern Ireland Minister for nearly four years. Since then I have had the opportunity for reflection. Perhaps my views are now a little more objective than they were then. Whatever my right hon. Friend the Member for Waveney (Mr. Prior) said, although there was mistrust of English Ministers when we first appeared, I hope that I and my colleagues and friends who served with me in Northern Ireland left the impression that we were seeking to do our bit and to make our contribution to the resolution of the problems of Northern Ireland. I know that my right hon. Friend did that.

I have already expressed my view, on the occasion of the statement made by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister last week. It is one of general welcome for the agreement. However, I cannot say that I like it, or necessarily welcome one of its fundamental points. Why should I, as a British citizen, automatically like and welcome the fact that advice can come from a Minister of a Government of a foreign state. That is the technical position of the Republic of Ireland, whatever history tells us.

However, I accept the agreement, for a reason that lies in what the hon. Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume) said. This is where I fall out with my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne and others who have spoken. This point is probably the fundamental point at issue in the Northern Ireland problem. Are we talking about a democratic system, or part of a democratic system, where a simple majority should sway, regardless, where first-past-the-post should rule and 50 per cent. plus should win the day? If so, life would be easy, but Stormont tried that for 50 years.

I believe the reason to be that stated by the hon. Member for Foyle, and that is the difference within Northern Ireland between the two communities. There is a division now that has been made worse by recent history. I do not need to lecture hon. Members about the position in Northern Ireland. However, one has to recognise certain basic facts. Two thirds, or less now, of the population are fundamentally unionists and loyalists, looking to London and Westminster, while the remainder of the population, on the whole, are nationalists, some republicans and nearly all Roman Catholic with a distinctive regard for the South and the Republic. It is with that that we have to concern ourselves, and that is what the agreement seeks to recognise.

It is no good saying to the poeple in the minority that, as they are in a minority in part of the United Kingdom, they must think like us, become totally British and prefer the Union flag, not the tricolour. Those people found themselves, because of a stroke of history, north of the border, thanks to the Boundary Commission of that time.

Mr. Harold McCusker (Upper Bann): If the right hon. Gentleman believes that a simple majority rule is not appropriate in Northern Ireland — I can understand arguments along those lines — why should I accept, through article 1 of the agreement, that a simple majority should take me out of my citizenship of the United Kingdom and into a united Ireland?

Mr. Butler: That point is somewhere among my notes to be dealt with later. If, by some magic, there were a 51 per cent. majority today, the position would be just as bad in terms of divided communities. The fact is that a majority in favour of leaving the United Kingdom—if such a situation should ever arise—is many years away. It is important to grasp this point because it is no good the Republic of Ireland saying that it has only to wait a little while longer, or for the minority in Northern Ireland to say that it has only to wait for a little while. It must be the greatest consolation to the unionist population that it is a question not of a few years but of many decades, if at all. Therefore, the imperative is on both sides to get together to work out their future.

Mr. Nicholas Budgen (Wolverhampton, South-West): Is not the advice of the Northern Ireland Office to all those who visit Northern Ireland that demographic changes within Northern Ireland will lead, perhaps within the next 20 years, to the nationalist population becoming the majority? Has that not been said? *[Interruption.]*

Mr. Butler: I am reinforced in what I believe—that there are no such official forecasts—by the remarks of other of my hon. Friends. There are those who see a trend that will lead that way, but I re-emphasise the point that nobody as far as I am aware, believes that a simple adverse majority — now I am a unionist — could arise within several decades, if at all.

In looking at the options that should be considered, I have in the past taken seriously the possibility of repartition, because that is the only other option if the two communities will not resolve the problems themselves. Frankly, it is not an option. Anybody who knows the demographic map of Northern Ireland knows that in every square mile of every part of the Province there is a significant minority population. The hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Mr. Maginnis) would

took place during the mining dispute, was not a crime? Will she condemn that disgraceful statement as an appalling example to our young people?

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend will understand when I say that that is a matter for the courts, not for the Government. What Opposition Members say about it must be judged by the British people rather than by the Government.

Q7. **Mr. James Hamilton** asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 26 November.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Hamilton: May I jolt the Prime Minister's conscience about the disastrous effects that her monetarist policies are having in Scotland and, in particular, in Lanarkshire? Is she aware that Scotland's steel industry is in a dreadful state and that there are to be 200 more redundancies at the Clydesdale works in my constituency? The men are already working short time, and those redundancies will add considerably to unemployment in Scotland. What does the right hon. Lady intend to do about it?

The Prime Minister: From the CBI survey and the figures, the hon. Gentleman will know that this year output is up for the fifth consecutive year. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that production capacity greatly exceeds orders for steel. There is no way in which we can continue to keep everything open in such circumstances. The previous Labour Government had to close some things, but held up many closures which should have taken place. This Government allocated £130 million in order to purchase quota to keep Ravenscraig open. That was this Government's earnest of good faith in the future of Ravenscraig.

Mr. Peter Bruinvels asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 26 November.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Bruinvels: As the Prime Minister of a country that abhors terrorism and all that it stands for, will my right hon. Friend explain why the Tanzanian terrorists who came to Stansted have been given an amnesty and are to be allowed to stay in this country for a year when they have served their terms of imprisonment?

Because of terrorist activity, is it possible to prevent airlines flying to Greece, where arms have been taken on to planes at Athens airport?

The Prime Minister: We must await the inquiry into the events at Athens airport before determining precisely where the fault lies and reaching any conclusion.

On my hon. Friend's point about the Tanzanian hijack in this country in 1982, those involved were tried in our courts, found guilty and given considerable prison sentences. Some of them are now out of prison. An undertaking given at the time has been interpreted as our saying that the terrorists would not be returned to Tanzania. They have been refused asylum in this country, but will be allowed to stay for 12 months.

Mr. McWilliam: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. During Question Time, I asked the Minister of State for Defence Procurement what assurances he had given Dennis Ferranti about the purchase of CNC lathes to manufacture mortar shells currently made by the royal ordnance factory on Tyneside. The Minister replied——

Mr. Speaker: Order. That is not a point of order for me. I cannot be responsible for what a Minister says.

Mr. McWilliam: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am not asking you to be responsible for what the Minister said, but to rule whether it is in order for anyone to mislead the House. The Minister said——

Mr. Speaker: Order. This is an extension of Question Time. There is a major debate ahead of us. I cannot be responsible for answers given from the Front Benches, any more than I can be responsible for the questions asked.

Mr. Dickens: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You will recall that during Question Time the shadow Secretary of State for Defence made a statement to the House——

Mr. Speaker: Order. What is the point of order for me?

Mr. Dickens: If I am upsetting you, Mr. Speaker, I will let it go.

Mr. McWilliam: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: I must tell the hon. Gentleman that I cannot deal with his point of order because the matter that he raises is not my responsibility. What is the point of order for me?

Mr. McWilliam: Is it in order for an hon. Member to ask another hon. Member to write to him about a subject on which he has already written to him and to which he has already replied?

Mr. Speaker: I think that the answer is yes.

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, &c.

Ordered,

That the draft Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963 (Schedule 4) (Amendment) Order 1985 be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.

That the draft Supplementary Benefit (Resources) Amendment (No. 3) Regulations 1985 be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.

That the draft Agricultural Holdings (Fee) Regulations 1985 be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.

That the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 (Variation of Fourth Schedule) Order 1985 be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.

That the draft Asbestos Products (Safety) Regulations 1985 be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.—*[Mr. Biffen.]*

Anglo-Irish Agreement

Mr. Speaker: We now come to the important debate on the Anglo-Irish agreement. I have not selected either of the amendments on the Order Paper.

3.33 pm

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): I beg to move,

That this House approves the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Cmnd. 9657) signed on 15th November by the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald.

Since 1969, nearly 2,500 people have lost their lives in Northern Ireland as a result of terrorism, more than 750 of them members of the security forces. As the House is only too well aware, there has also been further loss of life among the armed forces, police and civilians in the remainder of the United Kingdom, including three of our colleagues in this House.

That is the stark background to today's debate and it takes us immediately to the historic divisions between the two communities in Northern Ireland, which we cannot ignore.

Whatever the differences that may emerge in our debate, I believe that we shall all be united in our determination to end the violence and to bring to justice those who are guilty. We shall all be united in our deep sympathy for the thousands of families whose lives have been darkened by the shadow of the gunman and the bomber; and we shall all be united in our admiration and gratitude for the men and women of the security forces in Northern Ireland and, indeed, from all parts of Great Britain, so many of whom have paid the price of protecting us with their own lives.

But it is apparent that any initiative, however modest, to bring the people of Northern Ireland closer together to beat the terrorists raises emotions and fears rooted deep in the past. I understand those fears, although I do not believe them to be justified.

Faced with all that we have seen in the past 16 years, it was not enough for the Government to rely solely upon the security forces, valiant though they are, to contain and resist the tide of violence. Let me make it clear that there can be no such thing as an acceptable level of violence, whether in Northern Ireland or elsewhere in the United Kingdom. The Government owe a duty to the security forces and to all the law-abiding people of Northern Ireland, Protestant and Catholic alike, to do everything within their power to stamp out terrorism — not by giving in to the terrorist, not by giving him a single inch. Indeed, the fact that the terrorists have condemned the agreement is a demonstration that we have done no such thing.

The fight against terrorism is greatly weakened if the community is divided against itself, and it is greatly strengthened if all people committed to democracy and the rule of law can join together against the men of violence. That, the Government felt, required a further attempt to reconcile the two communities in Northern Ireland.

The Unionist community, firmly loyal to the Crown and to the United Kingdom, represent a proud tradition of devotion to the Union which everyone in these islands should respect, and which this agreement does respect. They have a right to feel secure about Northern Ireland's position as part of the United Kingdom. This agreement, by reinforcing the principle of consent, should make them feel more secure, not only today but in the future. Unionists have the assurance that neither an Irish Government, nor of course a British Government, will try to impose new constitutional arrangements upon them against their will.

The nationalist community think of themselves as Irish in terms of their identity, their social and cultural traditions and their political aspirations. The House can respect their identity too and acknowledge their aspirations, even though we may not see the prospect of their fulfilment.

The only lasting way to put an end to the violence and achieve the peace and stability in Northern Ireland is reconciliations between these two communities. That is the goal of this agreement.

I now draw the attention of the House to what I consider to be the most significant points of the agreement. The preamble sets out the commitment of the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic to work for reconciliation; our utter and total rejection of violence; our recognition and respect for the separate identities in Northern Ireland; and our acceptance of the right of each to pursue its aspirations by peaceful means. These principles reflect the hopes of both communities.

Article 1 of the agreement makes it abundantly clear that there is no threat whatsoever to Unionists' heartfelt desire to remain part of the United Kingdom. It provides, in a formally binding international accord, a recognition by the Irish Government that the status of Northern Ireland will remain unchanged as long as that is the wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. It recognises also that the present wish of a majority is for no change in that status. There can be no better reply to the fears that have been expressed in the House than this explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Unionist position.

Article 2 of the agreement acknowledges in a practical and strictly defined way the concern that the Irish Republic has with matters relating to Northern Ireland. In the past, that concern has sometimes been expressed in critical or negative terms which did not help the cause of harmony between the communities in Northern Ireland. Article 2, therefore, establishes an Intergovernmental Conference. This will have no executive authority either now or in the future. It will consider on a regular basis political, security and legal matters, including the administration of justice, as well as cross-border co-operation on security, economic and cultural matters.

This co-operation will not be a one-way street. The Irish Government will be able to put forward views and proposals on certain matters affecting Northern Ireland. We for our part shall be able to pursue issues of concern to all peace-loving people in Northern Ireland. Notably co-operation in the fight against Terrorism—co-operation which goes beyond the borders of Northern Ireland. The matters within the scope of the conference are spelled out in greater detail in articles 4 to 9 of the agreement. I should like to draw the House's attention to three particular points about these articles. First, if devolution is restored, those matters that become the responsibility of the devolved Government will no longer be within the purview of the intergovernmental conference. We hope that the agreement will encourage the constitutional representatives of both communities to come together to form a local administration acceptable to both. This hope has been specifically endorsed by the Irish Government. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Northern

Ireland will be exploring with the constitutional parties how best to make progress. Meantime, the Assembly continues in being, with all its statutory responsibilities.

Secondly, article 8, which deals with legal matters, says that consideration will be given to the possibility of establishing mixed courts. Let me say straightaway that we have absolute confidence in the judiciary in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the integrity and courage which they have shown in recent years in maintaining high standards of judicial impartiality have been outstanding.

We know the difficulties which would be involved in mixed courts both in Northern Ireland and in the republic. We recognise the reservations which are held by the legal profession. We see no easy or early way through these difficulties. That is why, although we are prepared to consider in good faith the possibility of them at some future time, we have made it clear that we are under no commitment to introduce them.

Thirdly, I draw the House's attention to the proposals for improved security co-operation in article 9. This provides for a programme of work to be undertaken by the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Commissioner of the Garda to improve co-operation in such matters as threat assessment, exchange of information, technical co-operation, training of personnel and operational resources.

The really vital element in this programme is fuller and faster exchange of information, especially pre-emptive intelligence which helps to prevent acts of terrorism.

These are specific measures which I believe will lead to real improvements in security—improvements which will be welcome above all to those men and women who live in the border areas and who have been subjected to so many merciless attacks designed to drive them from their homes and farms.

That improvement should be further reinforced by the Irish Government's intention to accede to the European convention on the suppression of terrorism.

The convention's purpose is to ensure that those who commit terrorist offences should be brought to justice and that any offences involving the use of explosives or firearms should not be regarded as political.

Irish accession should greatly increase our prospects of securing extradition from the republic of persons accused or convicted or terrorist crimes. This will be a major and a welcome step forward in the war against terrorism.

I draw the House's attention to the reference in article 12 to the possible establishment of an Anglo-Irish interparliamentary body. Both we and the Irish Government felt that this was a matter for our Parliaments themselves rather than for Governments to pursue. I hope that contacts will be established through the usual channels to consider how discussions on an interparliamentary body can most effectively be taken forward.

I have tried to explain to the House the most significant points of the agreement. In view of some of the mistaken claims about it, I want also to say something about what is not in the agreement. The agreement does not affect the status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. It does not set us on some imagined slippery slope to Irish unity, and it is nonsense to claim that it might.

The effect of article 1 is to confirm the provision in section 1 of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 that Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom as long as a majority there so wish. That again is a recognition of reality. The guarantee for the majority lies in the fact that it is a majority. That fundamental point is reinforced by this agreement.

Mr. Eric S. Heffer (Liverpool, Walton): I have listened carefully to the right hon. Lady. Can she explain why the Irish Government signed the agreement?

The Prime Minister: I believe that the Irish Government signed the agreement because they share with us its objectives: to try to defeat the men of violence and to try to achieve peace and stability for all the people who live, and who will continue to live, in Northern Ireland. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to read it, all of this is set out fully in the preamble to the agreement.

Second, I want to make it clear that the agreement does not detract from British sovereignty in Northern Ireland —or, for that matter, from Irish sovereignty in the republic. We, the United Kingdom Government, accountable to Parliament, remain responsible for the government of Northern Ireland. Yes, we will listen to the views of the Irish Government. Yes, we will make determined efforts to resolve differences. But at the end of the day decisions north of the border will continue to be made by the United Kingdom Government and south of the border by the Irish Government. This is a fundamental point. There can be no misunderstanding.

Third, I want to dispel the absurd notion that the Government will listen to the views of the republic on Northern Ireland matters, but not to the views of our own unionist community.

There are already many ways in which the majority community in Northern Ireland can and do put their views to the Government. The right hon. and hon. Members of this House who represent the unionist parties are themselves an important channel. Another is the Northern Ireland Assembly, an important and experienced body which could be used to improve the arrangements for consultation. Yet another is the many representations that unionists make to Ministers. The unionist voice is clearly heard and will continue to be heard.

If the Anglo-Irish agreement is to bring about a real improvement in the daily lives of the two communities in Northern Ireland, it must be matched by a determined effort on the part of all law-abiding citizens to defeat the men of violence. And that effort must rest on clear and consistent principles of justice, equity and fairness. For if democracy is the rule of the majority, the other side of the coin is fairness and respect for the minority, for all are citizens of the United Kingdom.

On the economic front, we will continue to pay special attention to Northern Ireland's needs. During direct rule, spending on economic and social programmes has risen since 1972-73 by 50 per cent. in real terms to £3,600 million last year. That amounts to nearly £2,500 a head, far more than in any other part of the United Kingdom. Spending on that scale shows the high priority given by successive Governments to the needs of Northern Ireland and its people. Our concern will continue.

On security, our efforts will also continue. Thanks to the magnificent work of our policemen and soldiers, we have already made some progress, but we still have much to do. I believe that our security forces can take new heart from the promise of greater security co-operation that will flow from the agreement.

In commending this agreement to the House, I should like first to pay tribute to Dr. Fitzgerald, who has worked

[The Prime Minister]

honestly and sincerely for an agreement to bring reassurance to both communities and a real prospect of peace and stability.

Second, I say to the members of both communities in Northern Ireland that, if Parliament approves the agreement, the Government will steadfastly implement it. This House represents all the people of the United Kingdom and its decisions are binding on all of them. We shall not give way to threats or to violence from any quarter. We shall look to the co-operation of all men and women of goodwill who want a better future for Northern Ireland and for their families.

Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson (Newbury): Before my right hon. Friend leaves the point about the accountability of Parliament, will she say whether there will be any opportunity for Parliament to know about the deliberations of the Anglo-Irish conference? Will its deliberations be made public anywhere, or debated?

The Prime Minister: It is not expected that everything that is said in the intergovernmental conference will be made public. I am giving consideration to how we can report to the House, for obvious reasons. We attend many intergovernmental conferences in Europe and elsewhere and usually report to the House about those that we attend. I am giving urgent consideration to this matter because I realise that there is concern about it.

Finally, I address myself once more to those among the unionist community who have openly expressed their fears and worries about this agreement. Far from representing any threat to the union of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, the agreement reinforces the union, and that should bring reassurance and confidence to the unionist majority. It clearly recognises—as it should—the validity of their great tradition, and it holds out the prospect of greater success in the struggle against terrorism from which the majority have suffered so much. As one who believes in the union. I urge the unionists to take advantage of the chance offered by the agreement.

We embarked on this agreement because we were not prepared to see the two communities for ever locked into the tragedies and antagonisms of the past. The younger generation, above all, has a right to expect more than that. The price of new hope is persistent endeavour. That is what we ask, and ask equally of all.

3.52 pm

Mr. Neil Kinnock (Islwyn): Today, as at all times when we discuss the affairs of Northern Ireland both inside and outside the House, we do so against a background of tragedy and atrocity. We think of those who have lost their lives, as the Prime Minister said, and we think of their loved ones and those whose lives have been devastated by sectarian killings and attacks. We remember those families who, when they felt the forces of violence, no matter what the status of those killed—soldiers, policemen, adults, relations or children — have always ended with a despairing question—"Why did it happen to us?" Many hon. Members have heard that question from grieving relations much too often, and, tragically those who represent Northern Ireland seats have heard it more often than the rest of us.

As we debate the accord, we remember too the courage and the fortitude of those who have lived and worked with and within the tortured community of Northern Ireland. We know that the problem of Northern Ireland, plainly, has spilled across the water and scarred Britain. We acknowledge the debt that we owe, both on the mainland and in Northern Ireland, to the civil servants, the police, Members of the House and so many ordinary men and women in Northern Ireland who have been willing to help in the search for peace and a way out of the sterile sectarian divisions.

As we think of these things, we have to remind ourselves yet again that there are matters other than security that are of importance to the people of Northern Ireland, and that there are issues worthy of report and debate other than the constant plague of conflict.

We are sometimes told that there is no solution to the historic problems of Northern Ireland, but, however difficult it may be, and however long it may take, we must never give up the search for a solution. That would be defeatism paid for in blood. If we give up the search for peace, we say to the people of Northern Ireland, "Your agony must endure for ever". In all conscience, we cannot and must not do that.

This House has a special duty to recall that the problems of Northern Ireland are a matter not just for the Province or for the Republic but, most definitely, for Britain as well. In addition to the tragedies and their irreparable costs, there is the price of conflict which the New Ireland Forum research team has reasonably estimated to be over £9,000 million between 1969 and 1982 and a further £1,500 million or so a year with the addition of the £120 million or so a year that we spend out of public coffers in maintaining the armed forces in Northern Ireland. It is not fitting for this House remorselessly to consign such sums to Northern Ireland without at least being able to demonstrate to the people of Wales, Scotland and England that we deliberately pursue all means of achieving an end to the conflict and the massive costs that go with it.

We must also recognise that many of the legislative and other changes that have come about as a result of our inability to find a political solution in Northern Ireland disfigure the democracy of our entire country. Courts without juries, strip searches in prisons, internment without trial and many other things can be said to have arisen from the circumstances of their time, but no democracy can or should bear such changes lightly or for long, because if it does it puts at risk the very liberty that it seeks to defend.

For all those reasons, the Opposition will do whatever they can to promote the chances of peace, and the prosperity that depends on that peace, in Northern Ireland.

The status quo offers absolutely no solution to anyone at all. For that reason we shall approve the Anglo-Irish agreement, which for reasons of accuracy and not affectation I wish had been called the British-Irish agreement.

The agreement is clearly a development from the New Ireland Forum set up in Dublin in 1983. That was a bold and visionary step taken by the major political parties in the Republic, together with the Social Democratic and Labour party. I pay tribute to those parties and their leaders, one of whom we are fortunate enough to have in this House. None of those leaders has given up his legitimate commitment to constitutional nationalism or his commitment to the reunification of Ireland. They have recognised that, just as they cannot be forced to relinquish their aspirations of getting rid of the border, neither can

a somewhat tricky run I had on an Unstarred Question one night in your Lordships' House. In fact, 36 scientific posts have been lost in the Welsh plant breeding station. Losses there, and in Wales generally, have been broadly the same as in England.

Lord Stodart of Leaston: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that there is anxiety not only in Wales but also in that other great country further north, Scotland? Can he say whether his figures include what I believe is a proposed 70 per cent. cut in the establishment of the agricultural research station, which many people would say has done even more valuable work, if that is possible, than its counterpart in England?

The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, I am not going to enter into battle on the relative merits between Wales and Scotland. The figures I gave were for past cuts and do not include future cuts.

Lord Mackie of Benshie: My Lords, does the noble Earl not agree that if one wants to cut a service then the way to do so is not by causing such anxiety that the best people leave? Is the noble Earl further aware that the same thing is happening in the advisory services in the colleges in Scotland, as well as in research? In the case of both the north college and the east college I know of several first-class people who have left to go to other jobs.

The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science accepted the advice of the Advisory Board for the Research Councils in 1982 that scientific priorities required a shift of funds towards work in areas such as information technology. That shift could be accomplished only by reducing the funds going to the AFRC from the science budget. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Mackie of Benshie, is right when he speaks about Scotland. I certainly would not argue with him on that matter.

The Earl of Halsbury: My Lords, is the noble Earl in a position to help the House to discriminate between job losses from the agricultural research front and job redistribution within the agricultural research front—that is, redistribution between the public and the private sectors?

The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, I think I shall have to write to the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, with that information.

Lord John-Mackie: My Lords, the noble Earl is very cagey about figures. Is he aware that the Institute of Professional Civil Servants, looking at the matter over a long period, is emphatic that there will be a 20 per cent. loss of scientists from the service? That is quite alarming. The noble Earl should take seriously what many of his noble friends obviously think of the situation and look into it more than he obviously has done.

The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, I do not think I was being at all cagey. I have not only said that there were 700 staff involved but have broken down how that figure of 700 arose. I do not know how I could be less cagey.

Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, will not the Government's proposals to charge farmers for the advisory services that they need aggravate the situation and the difficulties for farmers, and not only in West Wales?

The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, I think that is rather a different question.

Baroness Nicol: My Lords, will the Minister accept that the reply he gave to the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, could be amplified a little? What matters is the destruction of a team. The fact that the people involved are distributed among the private sector does not help matters. Does the Minister not appreciate that it is the destruction of a particular team that is so devastating to the plant breeding institute in particular?

The Earl of Swinton: Yes, my Lords; and, of course, when any Minister says during Question Time that he will write to a noble Lord, a copy of that reply is put into the Library for all those interested to see.

Lord Mackie of Benshie: My Lords, is the noble Earl aware that, while we deplore cuts in the establishment for agricultural advice and research, we greatly admire his personal efforts in the cutting of capacity?

The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, I think that is one area in which I can share a great achievement with the noble Lord who asked that question.

Personal Bills: Select Committee

3.7 p.m.

The Chairman of Committees (Lord Aberdare): My Lords, I beg to move the first Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

Moved, That a Select Committee on Personal Bills be appointed, to which all Petitions for Personal Bills shall stand referred; and that, as proposed by the Committee of Selection, the Lords following, with the Chairman of Committees, be named of the Committee:—

Banks, L.	Templeman, L.
Dilhorne, V.	Wilberforce, L.
Murton of Lindisfarne, L.	Willis, L.

—(*Lord Aberdare.*)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Leave of Absence and Lords' Expenses: Select Committee

Lord Aberdare: My Lords, I beg to move the second Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

Moved, That a Select Committee be appointed for the general supervision of arrangements relating to leave of absence and the reimbursement of Lords' expenses; and that, as proposed by the Committee of Selection, the Lords following, with the Chairman of Committees, be named of the Committee:—

Denham, L.	Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.
Hylton-Foster, B.	Tordoff, L.
Kilmarnock, L.	

—(*Lord Aberdare.*)

Lord Shinwell: My Lords, I am not opposing reference to a Select Committee of this very important subject of noble Lords' absences and reimbursements, but when I see the names of those who will be responsible for examining reimbursements I wonder—and I say this without any malice in my mind—what their reimbursements are. I ask this merely as a matter of enlightenment.

The situation is this, if I may be allowed to put it to your Lordships. A vast number of Members of this House do not attend, for one reason or another. There are various reasons why they cannot attend possibly complaints or illness or they have other work to do. After all, there is a great deal of voluntary work done outside this House by your Lordships. In those circumstances unless they attend they cannot claim for expenses incurred by them in the way of correspondence, transport, interviews, and research for information all over the place. Those are some of the activities that every Member of your Lordships' House has to undertake at one time or another.

In those circumstances, if I may put it in this fashion, these gentlemen—noble Lords, I should say, but I do not withdraw the term "gentlemen"—should take into account what I have just said. They should take into account the variety of activities which are undertaken by Members of your Lordships' House, apart from attendance, and pay them accordingly.

Lord Aberdare: My Lords, the committee actually has no particular powers in respect of the rules that exist for the claiming of expenses. It is appointed mainly to deal with individual claimants and difficulties that arise under the regulations as they exist. I am afraid that most of the suggestions made by the noble Lord would not be appropriate for this particular committee.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

European Communities (Spanish and Portuguese Accession) Bill [H.L.]

Read a third time, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement

3.9 p.m.

The Lord President of the Council (Viscount Whitelaw) rose to move, That this House approves the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Cmnd. 9657) signed on 15th November by the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald.

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, it is fatally easy for those who have had responsibility in Northern Ireland to live in the past rather than face the future. Today I intend to avoid that danger. But I cannot escape two personal reflections which are relevant to our consideration of this new Anglo-Irish Agreement.

The first is that, contrary to the unfortunate impression given by some politicians in the Province, there are many people there who only want to live in peace with their neighbours and to carry on a normal life in the beautiful country which is their home. Amidst all the trouble and difficulties no one should forget these friendly and warm-hearted people to whom we in the rest of the United Kingdom owe our understanding and help as their fellow citizens.

Secondly, it has become so dangerously easy to destroy, and equally so immensely difficult to construct, plans to end the conditions of violence and intimidation which lead to despair that the temptation just to keep going on becomes almost irresistible.

Yet no one here, in Northern Ireland, or outside, should be under any illusion. The *status quo* is not an acceptable option. No one in your Lordships' House needs reminding of the terrible toll taken by violence in Northern Ireland over the years, the appalling loss of life of young soldiers, policemen and civilians, the damage to property and the disruption of community and commerical life. Nor can we forget the tragedy and anxiety felt by families throughout the United Kingdom from events in Northern Ireland and, indeed, here also on the mainland. Surely, we all share responsibility to do all in our power to isolate and defeat the men of violence.

I am therefore seeking the approval of this House to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which I believe marks a usseful step in Anglo-Irish relations. It offers a substantial opportunity, a chance to build, to the people of Northern Ireland, both Unionist and Nationalist. It can contribute significantly to the aim, which we all share, of peace, stability and prosperity in Northern Ireland.

I want first to stress that it is not the agreement some have made it out to be. It is not "joint authority" by some other name; it does not give the Republic of Ireland a veto over the exercise of our powers and responsibilities in Northern Ireland; and, above all, it does not derogate from our sovereignty.

But neither is it, as some have argued, an agreement which will change nothing. Of course, it will not solve all Northern Ireland's problems. But we hope that it will change things in Northern Ireland, in a measured and responsible way, in the direction in which successive governments have wished to go.

Underlying the agreement is recognition by the two governments of the differing aspirations and cultures of the two communities in Northern Ireland. This is essential. Each of the two must be able to feel secure in its own identity and tolerant of the other's. The agreement offers important safeguards to both.

The majority in Northern Ireland wish to retain the link with Great Britain. We have never wavered from the position that a change in the status of Northern Ireland could come about only with the consent of a majority there. The present wish of a majority is against change.

Both governments accept all this and have affirmed it in a binding international agreement. There are no ambiguities; I do implore people who think that there may be to look at what the agreement actually says on this. It says that there will be no derogation from the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Government; responsibility for the government of Northern Ireland remains with United Kingdom Ministers accountable to Parliament.

Thus it is that Her Majesty's Government are seeking the approval of this House, and of another place, to an agreement which affirms the commitment of both governments to the principle of majority consent. It is entirely consistent with that commitment for us also to say, as we have done, that, if at some future date a majority of the people in Northern Ireland were to consent formally to a united Ireland, the government would introduce and support in Parliament legislation to that effect.

Contrary to what some may say and feel, that should give no cause for misapprehension or uncertainty among Unionists. Their loyalty is, absolutely properly, to the Crown in Parliament. Only by an Act of the Crown in Parliament could the status of Northern Ireland be changed. That position is not altered by the agreement, and I earnestly hope that all sections of the community will remember that in our system of parliamentary democracy the decisions of Parliament are binding and must be respected.

As well as reassurance for the majority, we also believe that we cannot make progress towards reconciliation in Northern Ireland unless we can also reflect, understand and take account of the minority viewpoint. We need to create conditions which will provide the minority with the confidence that they have a role to play in the affairs of Northern Ireland. It is here that the Irish Government have a vital contribution to make. Of course, they already raise with us many questions about events in Northern Ireland, particularly where they affect the minority community. What the agreement will do is to formalise this procedure so that the Irish Government's views and proposals can be taken into account in a more structured and methodical way.

I shall now explain briefly how the agreement sets out to achieve this. It provides in Article 2 for the establishment of an intergovernmental conference. This will extend and build upon the framework of the existing Anglo-Irish Inter-governmental Council. The conference will serve as a framework within which—I quote from the agreement itself—

"the United Kingdom Government and the Irish Government work together;

(i) for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions which exist in Northern Ireland; and

(ii) for peace, stability and prosperity throughout the island of Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights, co-operation against terrorism and the development of economic, social and cultural co-operation".

The conference will deal on a regular basis with matters relating mainly to Northern Ireland—on political issues, security and related matters, legal matters including the administration of justice and the promotion of cross-border co-operation. We are committed to consider carefully these views and to make determined efforts to resolve any differences. That means neither that we are obliged to accept the suggestions that are put to us by the Irish, nor that the Irish are granted a veto. It means simply that we will try our hardest to reach agreement. But we are realists. It will remain the clear responsibility of the British Government to take final decisions.

We welcome this arrangement on two accounts. First, it will enable the Government better to take account of the minority views. It creates conditions whereby the minority community can be confident that they have a vital role to play in the affairs of Northern Ireland; and we hope too that it will increase their confidence in the institutions of Northern Ireland.

Secondly, we welcome it because it provides a new framework for more effective co-operation in a wide range of economic, social, cultural and security matters. Our foremost priority in Northern Ireland must be the complete eradication of terrorism which has menaced both Northern Ireland and the Republic, and indeed the mainland of the United Kingdom for many years. This requires the closest co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Irish Goverments as spelt out in Article 9 of the agreement.

We therefore very much welcome the Irish Government's commitment in the agreement to work with us to ensure that those who adopt or support violence do not succeed. We hope to make early progress against terrorism which is to the benefit of all the people of Northern Ireland. We look forward to tackling this problem with the Irish; for the conference will help us to raise matters of concern too, such as the improvement of cross-border security. We also welcome the Irish Goverment's intention announced in the communique to accede as soon as possible to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

The confidence of all law-abiding citizens in the security forces and the courts is essential if they are to be wholly effective in upholding the law and in dealing with terrorism. The security forces in Northern Ireland are already highly esteemed throughout the United Kingdom for their dedication, bravery and professionalism, and I should like to take this opportunity of paying a special tribute to them.

Noble Lords: Hear, hear!

Viscount Whitelaw: My Lords, I should add also no less a tribute to the judiciary who have maintained the highest standards of impartiality and integrity of which we are proud. But we must never relax our efforts to secure the support of all sections of the community, including the minority, for the security forces and for the judicial system in Northern Ireland. Relations between the security forces and the minority, cross-border security co-operation and public confidence in the administration of justice are issues which will be for the intergovernmental conference to consider.

Article 8 also mentions, as one possible approach, the idea of mixed courts. We have made it clear, and I shall repeat now, that we cannot see any easy or early way round the very considerable difficulties in the way of that particular proposal. We have undertaken to consider this possibility entirely without commitment.

Let me now say something about the response to the agreement. It is clear that responsible opinion from many parts of the political spectrum accepts that the agreement is a constructive approach to the problems of Northern Ireland and offers hope of tackling the violence. I am one of those perhaps who can say with all honesty that I very well understand the anxieties and fears expressed from among the Unionist majority

[VISCOUNT WHITELAW.]

of the community in Northern Ireland itself. However, I believe these fears are not well-founded.

It is claimed that the agreement is unprecedented; and that it is in itself a breach of sovereignty. But there is nothing unprecedented, nor any breach of sovereignty, when neighbouring states set up machinery to work together for common security and well-being. How can there be a breach of sovereignty when the final decisions rest with us, as they must and will? I very much hope that as time goes on more and more people will see the agreement in its proper perspective and that it is well worth the effort to make it work. Of course this will be diflicult, but only in that way can progress be made towards peace, stability and prosperity in Northern Ireland. I hope those Unionists who are (in my judgment, understandably) voicing their grave doubts will carefully consider this aspect.

The arrangements set out in the agreement do not represent an alternative to the search for devolution: indeed the agreement reaffirms both governments' commitment to find an acceptable form of devolved administration in Northern Ireland—and that means one which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community. We want the people of Northern Ireland to take over responsibility for the every-day decisions which affect their lives, but there needs to be agreement across the community.

Both governments, however, recognise that devolution can be achieved only with the co-operation of constitutional representatives within Northern Ireland of both traditions there. We hope that the agreement will encourage the elected representatives of both communities to come together to discuss arrangements for forming a devolved structure acceptable to both. And should a devolved administration be established, the intergovernmental conference would cease to consider any matters which would become the responsibility of a new local administration.

No single agreement will solve all of Northern Ireland's problems. I know from firsthand experience the complexities of the situation in Northern Ireland, the depth of divisions and the magnitude of the task in trying to reach a solution. I have learnt the hard way through experience that progress can only be made slowly, one step at a time. I firmly believe that this agreement offers an important step in the right direction—it offers a real opportunity to make progress towards reconciliation between the two communities in Northern Ireland and to tackle cross-border terrorism in a determined way. It contains reassurances for both communities that their rights will be safeguarded. It will create an improved climate of friendship and co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. It is thus in the interests of all the people of Northern Ireland that we do not let this opportunity pass. The people within the rest of the United Kingdom will certainly expect them to work constructively for its success.

That is the reality of the circumstances in which we find ourselves and the circumstances in which we as a Government thought it right to seek an agreement of this kind. We did so in the full understanding that it would not, and could not, produce a solution at a stroke. No agreement could do that. What it does offer—and I very firmly believe this—is the chance to make progress in a situation where for some years progress has not seemed possible.

My Lords, I commend the Motion to this House.

Moved, That this House approves the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Cmnd. 9657) signed on 15th November by the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald.—(*Viscount Whitelaw.*)

3.30 p.m.

Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Viscount the Leader of the House for the speech with which he has opened this very important debate. The noble Viscount has at least two qualifications to speak in this debate and to be heard with care and with respect. First, he was, as he has reminded us, for a period the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland; and, secondly, he is completely sincere, I believe, in his desire to achieve a settlement or at least the practical beginnings of a settlement of this intractable problem.

My own credentials are less obvious. I can, however, see the Wicklow Mountains from my home on a clear day, and the nearest city to us is Dublin, 60 miles away; so that I know Ireland very well. It would be easier for me, logistically at least, to be a Member of the Dail than a Member of this Parliament! I have also known the leaders of Ireland, north and south, including Mr. de Valera, with whom I discussed these problems in years past. And although he remained passionately in favour of a united Ireland, he had come to recognise the realities of the position and that there is no simple solution to the island's problem.

The history of the past 70 years demonstrates very clearly—from the Curragh mutiny and the Easter Rising to the present day—that finding a peaceful and permanent solution to the Irish problem has been and remains the most difficult continuing task in British politics. Everyone wants the problem to be resolved, but on his own terms. The failure to resolve it is costly in terms of lives, in terms of suffering and in terms of resources. It is a running sore that saps the strength of Britain and of Ireland. It gives our critics both East and West the opportunity to cast doubt upon Britain's commitment to human rights and to the freedom of the individual. The central, most important, injunction of the Christian religion is that we should love one another. That people, including ministers and priests, should invoke their religion, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, encourage violence and kill and maim each other without mercy, in its name, makes a savage mockery of Christianity.

It is against this background that we must look at this agreement. If it gives hope that it will help, even in a small way, to bring an end to this senseless and evil conflict, then I believe strongly that we must give it our support. It makes no great fundamental changes, as the noble Viscount has indicated. Indeed, like all moderate compromises, it attracts criticism from one side because it goes too far and from the other because it does not go far enough. The press over the last few days has demonstrated this. For example, the *Spectator*, over the weekend, contained three successive articles that reflected three differing and

RESTRICTED

cc PC
BI

FROM: A D S GOODALL
DATE: 26 November 1985

Private Secretary

cc:- Mr Clark, RID
Mr Mallaby, Cabinet Office
Mr Brennan, NIO

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS: NORTHERN IRELAND

1. The Irish Ambassador telephoned me this afternoon to say that the Taoiseach had decided to write an article for The Times in response to the negative piece today by Conor Cruise O'Brien. He has just sent round the attached text, which seems broadly helpful.

2. Mr Dorr explained that it was not certain that the Taoiseach's piece would make tomorrow's Times but the Embassy were doing their best. Meanwhile the Taoiseach's office wanted us to be forewarned.

3. I do not think the text needs to be brought to the Prime Minister's attention: but you may like to mention it on the telephone to Charles Powell.

ADSG

A D S Goodall

Please copy to
Mr Powell in No 10
W Appleyard 26/11

RESTRICTED

THE HILLSBOROUGH AGREEMENT
by An Taoiseach Dr Garret FitzGerald TD

The arguments for doing nothing are always the most seductive in politics. They often have a mesmeric effect. Being mesmerised about the danger of action is not the same as being worried or fearful. Of the two persons in three in the Republic who support the Anglo-Irish Agreement, I am sure at least one is worried, maybe even fearful. But this worry or fear is accompanied by the realisation that the situation in Northern Ireland cannot be allowed to drift further and that, in this case, the situation would inevitably get worse if allowed to fester.

Among those who criticise the Agreement in the South, there are some who take the mesmerised position: Do nothing. There is a kind of fascination with the horror of the situation and with the possibilities for greater horror still. On those who now counsel retreat from Hillsbroough there is, in the face of the crisis and sufferings of the people of Northern Ireland, at least an obligation to offer some alternative to a passive fatalism. They have not done this.

The Hillsborough Agreement is not a magic cure. No sane person should be without some worry about Northern Ireland in the aftermath of the Agreement. The facts of the situation justify sober reflection: some 2,500 dead in the last sixteen years; some 25,000 maimed; some 45,000 incidents of shootings, bombings and arson. All this amongst a population of a million and a half.

Can this violence get worse? We should be under no illusion but that it can, because the Agreement threatens the merchants of violence. It is precisely for that reason, however, that the Agreement offers hope. It is a hope reflected in the recent MORI poll commissioned by The Sunday Times which showed 48% of Catholics in Northern Ireland expressing the view that the Agreement would lead to less support for the IRA and only 14% expressing the view that it would lead to more support. Despite prophecies of doom only one third of all the people of Northern Ireland believe the Agreement will lead to more support for the IRA. One third of Catholics and Protestants believe there will be less support and one third say neither or have no opinion.

People naturally have misgivings. But they also have hope. It was to give that hope to ordinary people that Margaret Thatcher and I signed the Hillsborough Agreement. We are both fully conscious of the risks of doing something to tackle violence at its political root. But we are firmly convinced that the riskiest path is to do nothing at all. This is one problem which will not solve itself.

It has been the great object of my political life to help to reconcile the two opposing traditions - Nationalist and Unionist - in Ireland. Not to make them the same. Not to subordinate one to the other. But to allow each to live with the other, each respecting and enriching the other. For all of that time I have believed that Unionists and Nationalists

must talk to each other and that an eventual solution will only come from that dialogue. It has been argued that the Hillsborough Agreement does the opposite: that it seeks to impose a solution, that it removes the incentive for Nationalists and Unionists to talk to each other and that it has been negotiated over the heads of the people of Northern Ireland. I see the Agreement differently.

The Agreement imposes no particular solution. On the contrary, its purpose is to provide a context in which a way forward can emerge. The Agreement addresses what has been obvious for some time, that Nationalists and Unionists within Northern Ireland have been incapable of agreeing a way forward by themselves. Both communities have deep problems of identity. Nationalists have not been able - nor have they been encouraged - to develop within structures which were alien to them in their own land. Unionists have been fearful - and their fear should be eased - of finding themselves in a similar position in their own land. The political arena of Northern Ireland needed to be widened to give more space to the Nationalist and Unionist parties. The lack of security of each side, which feeds off the other, needed the bolstering influence of both Governments. The political leaders of Northern Ireland needed to be given new opportunities for dialogue on a firmer base. This is the accomplishment of the Hillsborough Agreement. Unionists are now formally assured by both Governments in a solemn and binding international Agreement that there will be no change in the present status of

Northern Ireland without the freely given consent of the majority of its inhabitants; and are assured further that both Governments recognise that such consent does not at present exist. Nationalists are assured by both Governments that if in the future a majority decides in favour of Irish unity, the British and Irish Governments will take steps to give effect to that wish. Thus, both the Unionist and Nationalist positions are given equal legitimacy. On this there will be no change.

Nationalists in Northern Ireland look to Dublin for support of the legitimacy of the Nationalist position. We in Dublin will have a say in precisely those areas of the problems of Northern Ireland which touch on the issues of greatest sensitivity: political and security matters, legal matters including the administration of justice, matters of identity and cultural matters. The British Government will provide the same role - as the governing power - for Unionists while continuing to exercise responsibility, without any derogation of sovereignty, for all the affairs of Northern Ireland.

Both Governments want to see democracy at work in Northern Ireland. We want to see devolved structures set up on a basis of widespread acceptance across the two communities. The Agreement offers a solid basis for this to happen, not only by providing a firmer stage for the Unionist and Nationalist leaders but also by providing that the role of both Governments in devolved matters will cease when the political leaders get together and agree. We will gladly withdraw from the devolved areas in these circumstances.

The Hillsborough Agreement is the result of long and often difficult discussion between the two Governments. I believe the very length and difficulty of the discussion has helped us to get a better grasp of each other's position and a better understanding of the problems facing us in Northern Ireland. We need now to communicate our shared perception to the people of Northern Ireland whom I believe will see merit in this Agreement on better acquaintance.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 November 1985

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from President Cossiga about the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

I have prepared a brief draft reply.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Jim Daniell (Northern Ireland Office) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

E.R.

cc CDP
TF
NV
DJ

DRAFT SPEECH ON ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT FOR THE LORD PRESIDENT

My Lords,

1. It is fatally easy for those who have had responsibility in Northern Ireland to live in the past rather than face the future. Today I intend to avoid that danger. But I cannot escape two personal reflections which are relevant to our consideration of this new Anglo-Irish agreement. The first is that, contrary to the unfortunate impression given by some politicians in the province, there are many people there who only want to live in peace with their neighbours and to carry on a normal life in the beautiful country which is their home. Amidst all the trouble and difficulties, no-one should forget these friendly and warm-hearted people to whom we in the rest of the United Kingdom owe our understanding and help as their fellow citizens. Secondly, it has been so dangerously easy to destroy and equally so immensely difficult to construct plans to end the conditions of violence and intimidation which lead to despair that the temptation to just keep going becomes almost irresistible.

2. Yet no-one, either in Northern Ireland or outside, should be under any illusion. The status quo isnot an acceptable option, Your Lordships will not need me to remind them of what that is - of the many outrages that have occurred over recent years; of the tragic loss of life and the bombings of property in an attempt to stifle the normal community and commercial life which the rest of us enjoy.

3. But that is not to say that on the mainland we have been immune to events in Northern Ireland. Many people here have lost relatives and friends in terrorist incidents. All who admire the service given by the police and security forces are saddened when they are attacked. We all share responsibility to support any practicable step to isolate and defeat the men of violence.

4. It is clear that responsible opinion from many parts of the political spectrum accept that that is what the Agreement is designed to do. In the special conditions of Northern Ireland, reaction has been more deeply divided. We all think we know why. But I do hope people of good will will make every effort to see

E.R.

the Agreement in its proper perspective. I know it will be difficult; but only in that way can progress be made towards peace, stability and prosperity in Northern Ireland.

5. In seeking, therefore, the approval of your Lordships' House to the Agreement, I want first to stress that it is not the Agreement some have made it out to be. It is not "joint authority' by some other name; it does not give the Republic of Ireland a veto over the exercise of our powers and responsibilities in Northern Ireland; and above all it does not derogate from our sovereignty.

6. But neither is it, as some have argued, an Agreement which will change nothing. Of course, it will not solve all Northern Ireland's problems. But we hope that it will change things in Northern Ireland, in a measured and responsible way, in the direction which successive Governments have wished to go.

7. Underlying the Agreement is recognition by the two Governments of the differing identities and culture of the two communities in Northern Ireland. This is essential. Each of the two must be able to feel secure in its own identity and tolerant of the other's. The Agreement offers important safeguards to both.

8. The majority in Northern Ireland wish to retain the link with Great Britain. We have never wavered from the position that a change in the status of Northern Ireland could copme about only with the consent of a majority there. The present wish of a majority is against change. Both Governments know all this and havie affirmed it in a binding international Agreement. There are no ambiguities: I do implore people who think there may be to look at what the Agreement actually says onthis. It says that there is no derogation from the sovereignty of the United Kingdom and that the Government retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of Government with its own jurisdiction.

E.R.

9. Thus it is that Her Majesty's Government is seeking the approval of this House, and of another place, to an Agreement which combines this affirmation of the status of Northern Ireland with a commitment that, if at some future date a majority of the people in Northern Ireland were to consent formally to a united Ireland, the Government would introduce and support in Parliament legislation to that effect.

10. Contrary to what some may say and feel, that should give no cause for misapprehension or uncertainty among Unionists. Their loyalty is, absolutely properly, to the Crown in Parliament. Only by an Act of the Crown in Parliament could the status of Northern Ireland be changed. That position is <u>not</u> altered by the Agreemnt, and I do earnestly hope that all sections of the community will remember that in our system of Parliamentary democracy the decisions of Parliament are binding and must be respected.

11. As well as reassurance for the majority, we also believe that we cannot make progress towards reconciliation in Northern Ireland - and that is the main essence of the agreement - unless we can also reflect, understand and take account of the minority viewpoint. We need to create conditions which will provide the minority with the confidence that they have a role to play in the affairs of Northern Ireland. It is here that the Irish Government has a vital contribution to make. Of course, it already raises with us many questions about events in Northern Ireland, particularly where they affect the minority community. What the Agreement will do is formalise this procedure so that the Irish Government's views and proposals can be taken into account in a more structured and methodical way.

12. I will now explain briefly how the Agreement sets out to achieve this. It provides in Article 2 for the establishment of an Intergovernmental Conference. This will extend and build upon the framework of the existing Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council. The Conference will serve as a framework within which - I quote from the Agreement itself - "the United Kingdom Government and the Irish

Government work together for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions which exist in Northern Ireland; and for peace, stability and prosperity throughout Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights, co-operation against terrorism and the development of economic, social and cultural co-operation."

13. The Conference will deal on a regular basis with matters relating mainly to Northern Ireland - on political issues, security and related matters, legal matters including the administration of justice and the promotion of cross-border co-operation. We are committed to consider carefully these views and to make determined efforts to resolve any differences. That means neither that we are obliged to accept the suggestions that are put to us by the Irish, nor that the Irish are granted a veto. It means simply that we will try our hardest to reach agreement. But we are realists. It will remain the clear responsibility of the British Government to take final decisions.

14. We welcome this arrangement on two accounts. Firstly it will enable the Government better to take account of the minority views. It creates conditions whereby the minority community can be confident that they have a vital role to play in the affairs of Northern Ireland; and we hope too that it will increase their confidence in the institutions of Northern Ireland.

15. Secondly we welcome it because it provides a new framework for more effective co-operation in a wide range of economic, social, cultural and security matters. Our foremost priority in Northern Ireland must be the complete eradication of terrorism which has menaced both Northern Ireland and the Republic and indeed the mainland of the United Kingdom for many years. This requires the closest co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Irish Governments as spelt out in Article 9 of the Agreement. We therefore very much welcome the Irish Government's commitment in the

Agreement to work with us to ensure that those who adopt or support violence do not succeed. We hope to make early progress against terrorism which is to the benefit of all the people of Northern Ireland. We look forward to tackling this problem with the Irish. We also welcome the Irish Government's intention announced in the Communique to accede as soon as possible to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

16. The confidence of all law-abiding citizens in the security forces and the courts is essential if they are to be wholly effective in upholding the law and in dealing with terrorism. The security forces in Northern Ireland are already highly esteemed throughout the United Kingdom for their dedication, bravery and professionalism and I would like to take this opportunity of paying a special tribute to them. I should add also no less a tribute to the judiciary who, as we have come to expect, have maintained the standards of impartiality and integrity of which we are proud. But we must never relax our efforts to secure the support of <u>all</u> sections of the community, including the minority, for the security forces; and to enable them to have full confidence in the judicial system in Northern Ireland.

17. The Intergovernmental Conference will be one way in which we can do this. Article 8 mentions, as one possible approach, the idea of mixed courts. We have made it clear, and I will repeat now, that we cannot see any easy or early way round the very considerable difficulties in the way of that particular proposal. We have undertaken to consider this possibility but entirely without commitment.

18. Relations between the security forces and the minority, cross-border security co-operation and public confidence in the administration of justice are issues which will be considered in the first meeting of the Conference. I cannot say when that will be. But we hope for an early meeting.

E.R.

19. Let me now say something about the response to the Agreement from some Unionists. They have taken bitter exception to the granting of a role to the Irish Government in the consideration of the affairs of Northern Ireland. They claim that it is unprecedented. And that it is in itself a breach of sovereignty. But my Lords, there is nothing unprecedented nor any breach of sovereignty in two neighbouring states setting up machinery to work together for the security and well being of their people. How can there be a breach of sovereignty when the final decisions rest with us - as they must and will? It is of course true that the situation in Northern Ireland is in itself unprecedented with the divisions and conflicting aspirations there and the relationship that exists between the minority community and the Irish Government - all these are unprecedented.

20. The arrangements set out in the Agreement do not represent an alternative to the search for devolution: indeed the Agreement reaffirms both Governments' commitment to find an acceptable form of devolved administration in Northern Ireland - and that means one which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the Community. We want the people of Northern Ireland to take over responsibility for the everyday decisions which affect their lives but there needs to be agreement across the community.

21. Both Governments however recognise that devolution can be achieved only with the co-operation of constitutional representatives within Northern Ireland of both traditions there. We hope that the Agreement will encourage the elected representatives of both communities to come together to discuss arrangements for forming a devolved structure acceptable to both. And should a devolved administration be established, the Intergovernmental Conference would cease to consider any matters which would become the responsibility of a new local administration.

E.R.

22. My Lords, no single Agreement will solve all of Northern Ireland's problems. I know from first hand experience the complexities of the situation in Northern Ireland, the depth of divisions and the magnitude of the task in trying to reach a solution. I have learned the hard way through experience that progress can only be made slowly, one step at a time. I firmly believe that this agreement offers an important step in the right direction - it offers a real opportunity to make progress towards reconciliation between the two communities in Northern Ireland and to tackle cross-border terrorism in a determined way. It contains reassurances for both communities that their rights will be safeguarded. It will create an improved climate of friendship and co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. It is thus in the interests of all the people of Northern Ireland that we do not let this opportunity pass. They should also be under no illusion. The people within the rest of the United Kingdom will certainly expect them to work together constructively for its success.

23. That is the reality of the circumstances in which we find ourselves and the circumstances in which we as a Government thought it right to seek an agreement of this kind. We did so, my Lords, in the full understanding that it would not, and could not, produce a solution at a stroke. No agreement could do that. What it does offer - and I very firmly believe this - is the chance to make progress in a situation where for some years progress has not seemed possible.

My Lords, I commend the motion to this House.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 November 1985

The Prime Minister was very grateful for the Solicitor General's help over her speech in the Anglo-Irish Debate. I should be grateful if you could pass on her thanks to him for his contribution which was very helpful in settling her approach.

CHARLES POWELL

Henry Steel Esq CMG OBE
Law Officers' Department

DESCRIPTION OF PARTIES IN AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 1946 - 1973

914

Date/Place	Subject of Agreement	Terminology used in United Kingdom original	Terminology used in Irish original
April 1946 London	Air Services to, in & through their respective Territories	The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland & the Government of Ireland (Eire) --- Cmd.6793; State Papers Vol.156 P.534.	The Government of Ireland & the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland --- Irish T.S. No.1(1946) UN T.S. Vol.72(1950) P.57 No.928
1 July 1947 London	Double Income Tax	The United Kingdom Government & the Eire Government --- Cmd.7182	--- No Irish Treaty Series
1 July 1948 Dublin	Trade Agreement	The Government of the United Kingdom & the Government of Ireland --- Cmd.7504; UN T.S. Vol.86(1951) P.38 No.1151.	The Government of Ireland & the Government of the United Kingdom --- Irish T.S. No.12(1948)
8 May 1949 London	Reciprocal Relief of Double Taxation in respect of Irish Corporation Profits Tax and U K Profits Tax	The United Kingdom Government & the Government of the Republic of Ireland --- Original Text from PRO CRO No.67	The Government of the Republic of Ireland & the United Kingdom Government --- UN T.S. Vol.553(1966) P.209 No.8089
April 1954 London	Veterinary Surgeons	The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland & the Government of the Republic of Ireland --- Original Text from PRO CRO No.105	The Government of Ireland & the Government of the United Kingdom --- UN T.S. Vol.553(1966) P.197 No.8088

Date, Place	Subject of Agreement	Terminology used in United Kingdom original	Terminology used in Irish original
4 April 1959 London	Certain Exemptions from Tax	The Government of the United Kingdom & the Government of the Republic of Ireland ------ Cmnd.717	The Government of Ireland & the Government of the United Kingdom ------ Irish T.S. No.3 (1959)
13 April 1960 London	Trade Agreement	The Government of the United Kingdom & the Government of the Republic of Ireland ------ Cmnd.1019	The Government of Ireland & the Government of the United Kingdom ------ Irish T.S. No.4 (1960)
23 June 1960 London	Certain Exemptions from Tax	The Government of the United Kingdom & the Government of the Republic of Ireland ------ Cmnd.1089	The Government of Ireland & the Government of the United Kingdom ------ Irish T.S. No.12 (1960)
29 March 1960 London	Agreement on Social Security	The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland & the Government of the Republic of Ireland ------ Cmnd.1020; UN T.S. Vol.371 (1960) P.4 No.5267.	The Government of Ireland & the Government of the United Kingdom ------ Irish T.S. No.1 (1960)
14 December 1965 London	Establishing a Free Trade Area	The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland & the Government of the Republic of Ireland ------ T.S. No.31 (1966) Cmnd.3026.	The Government of Ireland & the Government of the United Kingdom ------ No Irish T.S. UN T.S. Vol.565 (1966) P.60 No.8235.

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Date/Place	Subject of Agreement	Terminology used in United Kingdom original	Terminology used in Irish original
28 February 1966 Dublin	Agreement on Social Security	The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland & the Government of the Republic of Ireland --- T.S.No.30 (1966) Cmnd.3002; UN T.S. Vol.565 (1966) P.33 No.8234	The Government of Ireland & the Government of the United Kingdom --- Irish T.S. No.2 (1966)
3 October 1968 Dublin	Social Security /Amendment to the 1966 Agreement/	The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland & the Government of the Republic of Ireland --- T.S.No.115(1968) Cmnd.3829; UN T.S. Vol.682 (1969) P.302 No.8234	--- No Irish T.S.
14 December 1965 London	Establishing a Free Trade Area between the two countries /Exchange of letters amending Agreement signed: Dublin 6 June 1966/	The Government of the United Kingdom & the Government of the Republic of Ireland --- T.S.No.31 (1966) Cmnd.3026	The Government of Ireland & the Government of the United Kingdom --- No Irish T.S. Wording from original text. UN T.S. Vol.565 (1966) P.60 No.8235.
14 September 1971 London	Social Security	The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland & the Government of the Republic of Ireland --- T.S.No.76 (1971) Cmnd.4796; UN T.S. No.8234	The Government of Ireland & the Government of the United Kingdom --- No Irish T.S. Wording from original text

Date & Place	Subject of Agreement	Terminology used in United Kingdom original	Terminology used in Irish original
1 December 1972 London	Veterinary Surgeons	The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland & the Government of the Republic of Ireland ------ T.S.No.124 (1973) Cmnd.5494	The Government of Ireland & the Government of the United Kingdom ------ No Irish T.S. Wording from original text.
2 May 1973 London	Certain Exemptions from Tax	The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland & the Government of the Republic of Ireland ------ T.S.No.117 (1973) Cmnd.5455	The Government of Ireland & the Government of the United Kingdom ------ No Irish T.S. Wording from original text.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 November 1985

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Sir Eldon Griffiths, M.P., which we received very shortly before the opening of the Debate on the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

We were not keen for Sir Eldon to intervene during the Prime Minister's speech to raise his points and managed to persuade him to desist by agreeing that the Prime Minister would see a small delegation from the RUC Police Federation as he requests.

I enclose a copy of a draft reply which the Prime Minister intends to send to Sir Eldon Griffiths. It follows the line which I discussed with Robert Andrew on the telephone at the stage when it seemed likely that Sir Eldon Griffiths might raise his points in the debate.

I should be grateful to know whether you are content with the draft. It would be helpful to know by tomorrow evening.

CHARLES POWELL

Jim Daniell, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

As An Amendment to the Prime Minister's Motion

SIR JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON
MR. JULIAN AMERY MR IVOR STANBROOK
VISCOUNT CRANBORNE
MR. NICK BUDGEN
MR. MICHAEL BROWN

MR. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY

Line 1, leave out all after "House" and insert

"takes note of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Cmnd 9657) signed on 15th November by the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald; but regrets that it is not based on reciprocity; fails to provide for the renunciation by the Irish Republic of its formal claim to sovereignty over Northern Ireland; gives the Government of the Irish Republic a formal role in matters within the domestic jurisidiction of the United Kingdom; and is unlikely to achieve the two Governments' stated purpose of peace and stability in Northern Ireland."

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SRW

10 DOWNING STREET

3

From the Private Secretary

Sir Robert Armstrong

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS: NORTHERN IRELAND

You minuted me on 25 November about arrangements for Ministerial and official consideration of Irish matters in the period ahead.

You should know that the Prime Minister is strongly of the view that it is for the Northern Ireland Office to lead on Northern Ireland matters in this period, and it is to the Northern Ireland Office to which she will look in the first instance for advice. She would wish this to be fully reflected in any arrangements made.

(C. D. POWELL)
26 November 1985

SECRET AND PERSONAL

JB

000

CCPC

Prime Minister

CDP 26/XI

Nice message about Ireland from President Cossiga.

09239

The Ambassador

London, 26th November, 1985

Dear Mr. Powell,

I take pleasure in enclosing herewith a letter addressed to the Prime Minister from the President of the Italian Republic, Signor Francesco Cossiga. I also enclose a rough translation of the same.

Sincerely yours

Bruno Bottai

Enc.

Mr. Charles Powell,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
(Overseas Affairs),
10, Downing Street,
London S W 1

ELDON GRIFFITHS.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Monday pm
25/11/85.

Dear Margaret -

IRELAND

I shall of course support you on Ireland but having spent much time with the RUC (and consulted them afresh over the weekend), I do hope that you and Tom will agree to meet their Police Federation, set up by law to represent them on all matters affecting the welfare and efficiency of the Force. May I please have this?

There is wide and deep unease over the Agreement, and I should like, during your speech, to mitigate will two questions that are at the heart of the RUC's worries:

(1) How the Government enforce

— by words or works if not by formal

instruction — in the way in which the police

enforce the law; and

(2) In the event, the RUC finds

itself enforcing the law, as passed in

the U.K. parliament, against the democratic

will of a majority in Northern Ireland (as

shown by the ballot box), will the Government

protect the wives and families, and homes, of

police thus against the retaliation they expect

from enraged members of the majority community,

as well as the IRA?

These are real anxieties. I am

doing everything I can to back the federation on your side, (the side of sanity); but it would be unwise not to recognize the degree of police anxiety.

Every good wish for the debate.

Truman Capote

Subject
cc ops master. cc FCO

DSG

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T222A/85

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

25 November 1985

Dear Brian.

Thank you for your very kind message about the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. I was also gratified by the statement which you issued welcoming the Agreement. No single Agreement can resolve the problem of Northern Ireland, but we believe that the Agreement is a significant step towards achieving lasting peace and stability. I value your support and encouragement in this endeavour.

I was pleased to see you, if only briefly, in Brussels.

Yours sincerely,
Margaret

The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, P.C., M.P.

CONFIDENTIAL

CC PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CDP 25 Xi

25 November 1985

Dear Charles,

Anglo-Irish Summit

Thank you for your letter of 15 November about the communication from Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley. We have discussed this with the Northern Ireland Office. We are all agreed that there is no need to send any reply whatsoever. The letter is abusive, and was composed primarily with the idea of making anti-Agreement publicity. There is no need for us to rise to the bait.

I am copying this letter to Jim Daniell in the Northern Ireland Office and to Michael Stark in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Ireland_Taoseach

Pt 12



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cc Master

DA

cpc

cc HMT

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 November 1985

Dear Jim,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH A DELEGATION FROM THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON MONDAY 25 NOVEMBER

The Prime Minister met a delegation from the Northern Ireland Assembly this afternoon led by the Speaker of the Assembly, Mr. James Kilfedder MP. The delegation consisted of Mr. Peter Robinson MP and Mr. Allister from the Democratic Unionist Party; and Mr. Millar and Mr. Allen from the Ulster Unionist Party. The Northern Ireland Secretary was also present. The delegation put its case civilly and without ranting.

The Prime Minister said that she wished Unionist representatives to feel that they had ready access to Ministers. She was grateful for the prompt manner in which the Assembly had responded to her invitation to send a delegation. Mr. Kilfedder apologised for the absence of Alliance representatives. He understood that they were explaining their reasons directly to the Prime Minister. He then invited the representatives of the two Unionist parties to make statements.

Mr. Robinson recalled that, while the minority in Northern Ireland had been consulted about the Anglo-Irish Agreement, indeed given a seat on the fringes of the negotiating table, representatives of the majority had been excluded. It was hardly surprising that the terms of the Agreement had come as an unpleasant shock to them. The massive demonstration by Unionists in Belfast on 23 November had made their repudiation of the Agreement very clear. It had recorded a verdict of unyielding opposition. Unionists shared the objectives stated by the Prime Minister of peace, stability, reconciliation and co-operation. But they did not believe that they could be achieved through the

Agreement. They could only be secured by bringing politicians in Northern Ireland together through the Assembly. The Unionists felt that they were being punished for their co-operation while the party which had thumbed its nose at the Assembly had been rewarded. The SDLP had achieved far more by withdrawing consent and refusing to participate in the Assembly than it ever could have done by co-operation. Mr. Robinson continued that it was unthinkable to have an agreement which affected the government of Northern Ireland without the consent of the Northern Ireland people to it. The Prime Minister had chided Mr. Scargill for not holding a ballot. Now the Unionists were entitled to say the same to her. The people of Northern Ireland were equal citizens of the United Kingdom and entitled to be governed in the same way as the rest of the United Kingdom. He wondered how the Prime Minister intended to make the Agreement work without the consent of the majority in Northern Ireland. He would say in conclusion that the present situation was the greatest constitutional crisis to face Northern Ireland this century. It was remarkable that there had been so little violence, thanks to the efforts of the leaders of the two Unionist parties to channel feelings into the institutional and democratic processes.

Mr. Millar recalled that the Prime Minister had once said that the people of Ulster were as British as the people of Finchley. If that was the case, they had the right to be governed in exactly the same way without the influence of a foreign power. If the Government proposed to govern Ulster separately then surely the arrangements must meet with the consent of the people to be governed. That consent did not exist. The Unionists bitterly resented their exclusion from consultation during the negotiation of the Agreement. Claims were already being made by politicians in the Republic that there were secret understandings to change the role and structure of the UDR and of the Northern Ireland judiciary. The Unionist parties had drawn up proposals for internal progress in Northern Ireland and had been keen to pursue them. The basic obstacle to progress was the boycott of the Northern Ireland Assembly by the SDLP. The Anglo-Irish Agreement would make it less not more likely that the SDLP would join in the political process. Nor would Sinn Fein's power be diminished. They were claiming the Agreement as a victory for IRA violence. Equally it was not realistic to expect any significant results from security co-operation with the Irish Republic. No Irish Government could survive politically if it took or defended the measures necessary to defeat terrorism. He therefore implored the Prime Minister to rethink and renegotiate the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

Mr. Allister said that the British Government had

always said that it would seek progress in Northern Ireland only in ways acceptable to the two communities. This had been confirmed in the Chequers communique. Yet now the Anglo-Irish Agreement proposed a new structure of government which amounted to radical change without the views of the majority community being sought. It had outraged every stratum of Unionist opinion. It was no good replacing alienation of the minority by alienation of the majority. The Agreement rewarded those who had obstructed poltical progress within Northern Ireland. It had also destroyed the confidence which Unionists had previously had in the Prime Minister.

Mr. Allen reiterated that the Agreement had destroyed the regard in which the Unionist community had traditionally held the Prime Minister. He feared that it would lead to more violence in Northern Ireland rather than a reduction in violence.

The Prime Minister recalled that at her press conference after the Chequers Summit she had made clear that there would be no federation, no joint sovereignty and no joint authority. The Agreement did not introduce any of these. The Chequers communique itself had indeed said that any arrangements for devolved government would need to be acceptable to both communities. But the Anglo-Irish Agreement proposed no particular structures for devolved government. Indeed the Agreement did not alter the structure of government or decision taking in Northern Ireland at all. There was no constitutional change. Decisions would remain with the United Kingdom Government. There was no case for a referendum. The members of the delegation had suggested that Unionists were excluded from consultation. But they already had a forum for making their views known in the Assembly, and of course through Unionist Members of the Westminster Parliament. The Anglo-Irish Agreement offered the Unionist community significant advantages: recognition of the status of Northern Ireland and the fact that the majority wished for no change; improved security co-operation which she believed would be forthcoming and which would be pursued vigorously through the Intergovernmental Conference; and a commitment to work for devolved government which, if fulfilled, would diminish the role of the Intergovernmental Conference. It was significant that the Irish Government was committed to work for devolution and thus in effect for a reduction in the role of the Conference. She wished to emphasise in particular that there were no secret side-agreements. The Prime Minister continued that the co-operation of the Nationalist community was needed if violence was to be defeated. She could not ignore the existence as British citizens of the minority in Northern Ireland. Nor could the Unionists ignore them. But a way had to be found to detach

them from the IRA. She recognised the Unionists' fear that the views of the Nationalist minority would be heard more than theirs. We were considering ways in which the Unionists' desire for consultation could be met. But the fact was that we did regularly hear the views of the Unionist majority already.

Mr. Robinson suggested there was a difference in the nature of consultation available to the Unionists through the Assembly and to the Nationalists from the Intergovernmental Conference. There was no obligation on the government to reach agreement with the Assembly. In the Intergovernmental Conference, on the other hand, the Government were committed to make determined efforts to reach agreement with the Republic. The Prime Minister said that this was not the case. We were committed to make determined efforts to resolve differences. If those efforts failed, we would decide. Nor was it true to say that the Agreement gave the Republic a right to be consulted. It recognised that the Republic could put forward views and proposals. That was a significant difference. Mr. Robinson asked whether the Prime Minister would say that the Agreement was more than consultative. The Prime Minister said that she would not choose any single word to characterise the Agreement. The key fact was that the Intergovernmental Conference had no executive authority and could not take decisions.

Mr. Millar said that the structure of the Intergovernmental Conference would offer a future British Government a mechanism to weaken Northern Ireland's links with the United Kingdom, indeed hand it over to the Republic. The Prime Minister said that, if any future British Government wished to do this, it would do it regardless of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Prime Minister continued that she was aware that the proposal which had featured at Sunningdale for a Council of Ireland was anathema to Unionists and she had gone out of her way to avoid any similar institution.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Unionist parties were specifically asking to have a mechanism by which they could feed in views on matters within the scope of the Intergovernmental Conference. Mr. Robinson and Mr. Millar denied this. The whole framework of the Intergovernmental Conference was anathema to them.

Mr. Robinson asked again whether the Prime Minister thought the Anglo-Irish Agreement could work without the consent of the majority in Northern Ireland. He recalled that Sunningdale had been accepted by Parliament but could not be made to work. The Prime Minister said that the Anglo-Irish Agreement was a modest and limited one. She was

amazed at the Unionist reaction. She would have thought that they would welcome a step whose main purpose was to defeat the men of violence. She hoped that people in Northern Ireland, as loyal citizens of the United Kingdom, would co-operate to defeat terrorism. She was not sure what withdrawal of consent meant and certainly could not see what useful purpose it would serve. From what she had heard it sounded likely to alienate many people in the rest of the United Kingdom and turn them against Northern Ireland. But to answer Mr. Robinson's question, the Government was determined to make the Agreement work.

I am sending copies of this letter to Len Appleyard (FCO) and Christopher Mallaby (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(Charles Powell)

Jim Daniell, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY DELEGATION

The following will attend:

Mr. Kilfedder - Speaker
Mr. Robinson) DUP
Mr. Allister)
Mr. Allen) UUP
Mr. Miller)

The Northern Ireland Secretary will also be present.

The Unionists have said that their only purpose in coming to the meeting is to discuss the terms of the Assembly's resolution (attached). You will want to make clear that you do not accept any such restriction.

You will want to make clear:

i) that the Government is not going to be deflected from the Agreement.

The Unionists should therefore focus on the benefits of the Agreement for them. They cannot expect people from all parts of the United Kingdom to go on giving their lives to defend the Union, if they refuse to co-operate with the Agreement which is likely to have the full backing of the people of the United Kingdom.

ii) that we are considering ways to take account of Unionist views.

But there are a lot of ways already available to the Unionists. And you will want to be careful not to imply that we shall always consult them about every aspect of the Intergovernmental Conference. This would apply a Unionist

veto: and is anyway contrary to the terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (the Communique says that the agendas and proceedings will not normally be made public).

iii) rebut very firmly charges that the Agreement is inconsistent with past Government commitments.

I attach briefs and a note by Sir Robert Armstrong.

C.D.P.

C.D. Powell
25 November 1985

NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY,
PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS,
STORMONT,
BELFAST BT4 3SY

FROM THE SPEAKER

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher FRS MP
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

16 November 1985

Dear Prime Minister

The following resolution was passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly at its sitting on Saturday 16 November 1985:-

"That this Assembly, recalling both the solemn pledge of Her Majesty's Government contained in the Downing Street Declaration of August 1969 that "the responsibility for the affairs of Northern Ireland is entirely a matter of domestic jurisdiction [and] the United Kingdom Government will take full responsibility for asserting this principle in all international relationships", and the Prime Minister's declaration in the House of Commons on the 22nd of May 1980 that "any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland is a matter for the people of Northern Ireland, this Government and this House", repudiates the Anglo-Irish Agreement of the 15th of November 1985 as a flagrant breach of the above-mentioned solemn undertakings; deprecates as an intolerable derogation of British sovereignty incompatible with the security of Northern Ireland's constitutional position, the involvement of the Ministers and civil servants of a foreign government in the structure and processes of internal administration and policy formation of this part of the United Kingdom; notes that, while Her Majesty's Government in the Chequers Communique of November 1984 committed itself to securing the acceptance of both communities in Northern Ireland to the structures and processes of the province, the unique arrangements now intended for Northern Ireland have been entered into without consultation with its people or their representatives, and demands that Her Majesty's Government seek forthwith the consent of the electorate of Northern Ireland to the measures now proposed; and accordingly instructs Mr Speaker to convey the contents of this resolution to Her Gracious Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, and to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and furthermore, to invite the Prime Minister as a matter of urgency to address the Assembly on this vital subject."

Accordingly I invite you to address the Assembly.

Yours Sincerely
Jim Kilfedder

JAMES KILFEDDER MP

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

CDP 26/11

Prime Minister

If when you see Unionists leaders they return to the charge that they were kept wholly in the dark about the Anglo-Irish negotiations I hope that you might gently remind them of the facts. I do not have the dates handy, but more than once I went over the principles involved with them. You will remember that I asked for, received and used authority to do this within certain limits. I recall in particular a conversation on a privy councillor basis with Jim Molyneaux and Enoch Powell, and (chancing my arm) a long private dinner at Hillsborough with Peter Robinson not long before I left. All three consistently objected to a consultative role for Dublin, but they cannot say that they were surprised by it. Details are of course another matter.

I am copying this minute to Tom King.

Douglas Hurd.

25th November 1985

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL



COVERING:- CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FCB/up
PC

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

25th November 1985

Dear Charles

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH ASSEMBLY DEPUTATION

Mr Kilfedder, as Speaker of the Assembly, is bringing a deputation of Assembly Members to see the Prime Minister at 3.15 pm today. The deputation will compromise Mr Kilfedder, Mr Peter Robinson MP (Deputy Leader, DUP), Mr Jim Allister (DUP Whip in the Assembly), Mr Jack Allen (UUP Whip in the Assembly) and Mr Frank Millar (UUP General Secretary). I .... attach a brief.

One additional point. In view of the invitation in the Assembly Resolution to the Prime Minister to address the Assembly, you should know that the Private Secretary to the Speaker of the Assembly wrote on 20 November to inform the Secretary of State's Office that, "in the circumstances which presently surround public affairs" no future invitations will be issued to the Secretary of State or Ministers to address the Assembly. In referring to the invitation to her the Prime Minister may wish to avoid any impression that the Assembly can pick and choose between Ministers to whom it issues invitations.

Yours Sincerely
Neil Ward

N D WARD

ssd

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BRIEF FOR MEETING WITH ASSEMBLY DEPUTATION

Purpose of meeting

1. The purpose of the meeting is to:

i. demonstrate HMG's determination to go through with the Anglo-Irish Agreement;

ii. give evidence of the Government's continuing concern to take account of Unionist views;

iii. rebut charges that the Agreement is inconsistent with past Government statements.

Government determination

2. The meeting will follow closely after the mass rally in Belfast on Saturday at which Unionists demonstrated their opposition to the Agreement. The deputation is likely to claim that public opinion in Northern Ireland is solidly against the Agreement.

3. Ministers will wish to make clear that the Government's responsibility is to the United Kingdom as a whole. The Agreement has been widely welcomed and is likely to be overwhelmingly endorsed by Parliament. There can be no question in these circumstances of it not being proceeded with. The Unionists must come to terms with that. They should also consider the benefits for them of a nationalist community with a commitment to, and a real stake in, Northern Ireland.

Unionist views

4. The aim of the Agreement is to persuade the nationalist community to have confidence in the institutions of government in Northern Ireland. For too long they have perceived their minority status to mean that their interests take second place to those of the majority. Although Ministers have always sought to ensure that decisions of government are taken fairly and

CONFIDENTIAL

in the interests of the community as a whole, the nationalist perception has been that unionists dominate the channels through which views reach Ministers. The Intergovernmental Conference is being established to redress the balance, not to tilt it in favour of the nationalists.

5. The Government will continue to take full account of unionist views. They flow to Government through a variety of channels:

i. parliamentary: of the 17 Westminster MPs 15 are Unionists;

ii. Assembly: the Unionists have a large majority in the Assembly - and would have even if the SDLP did take their sets (a background note on the role of the Assembly is attached);

iii. District Councils: Unionists control 18 of the 26 District Councils;

iv. non-governmental bodies: the membership of these bodies reflects the make-up of the community as a whole.

6. As a result there is no danger of Unionist views going by default. Nevertheless, the Government remains ready to consider ways of enhancing these arrangements if that would be sensible. The Government also recognises Unionist concern about the Intergovernmental Conference doing its business in secrecy. As the Prime Minister said in her letter to John Cushnahan, the Government is giving these questions serious consideration and hopes to be able to make some practical suggestions soon. The deputation's views would be welcome.

7. Ministers will, however, wish to bear in mind:

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i. that any new formal arrangements for consultation with the Unionists should not be such as to negate the special value of the Anglo-Irish Agreement for the Irish and the nationalists;

ii. that in the negotiations leading to the Agreement, the Irish were concerned to avoid publication of the detail of matters discussed in the Intergovernmental Conference, because that might lead to public perceptions of "success" or "failure" for specific Irish representations.

Rebuttal of charges of inconsistency

8. In the Assembly resolution passed on 16 November, it is alleged that the Agreement is in conflict with certain earlier commitments given by the Government.

9. First, it quotes the 1969 Downing Street Declaration (issued after a meeting between Mr. Wilson and the then Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Major Chichester-Clark) which stated that:

> "responsibility for affairs in Northern Ireland is entirely a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The United Kingdom Government will take full responsibility for asserting this principle in all international relationships."

The Anglo-Irish Agreement fully respects that principle, and indeed gives explicit expression to it. Article 2(b) provides that:

> "There is no derogation from the sovereignty of either the United Kingdom Government or the Irish Government, and each retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction."

10. The Assembly resolution then refers to an answer given in the House to Kevin McNamara on 22 May 1980, when the Prime Minister said:

> "Any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland is a matter for the people of Northern Ireland, this Government and this House."

Far from the Agreement being a "flagrant breach" of that undertaking, it reinforces it. Article 1(a) binds the Irish as well as the UK Government to acceptance of the principle of consent in respect of any change in the status of Northern Ireland; and Article 2(b), referred to above, makes clear that the UK Government, accountable to Parliament, retains responsibility for all decisions of government in the UK.

11. Finally, the resolution refers to last year's Chequers Communique which stated that the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed that:

> "the identities of both the majority and the minority communities in Northern Ireland should be recognised and respected, and reflected in the structures and processes of Northern Ireland in ways acceptable to both communities."

This passage of the communique was referring to possible new arrangements for devolved government in Northern Ireland. Recent past history has proved that if a system of devolved government is to endure, it must be acceptable to both communities (a system unacceptable to the minority fell in 1972; a system unacceptable to the majority fell in 1974). Relations with another sovereign state are another matter. They must be acceptable to the nation as a whole. It is the verdict of Parliament, representing the UK as a whole, that matters.

Future of the Assembly

12. The deputation may enquire about the Government's intentions with regard to the future of the Assembly. Its present four year term expires next October. No decision has yet been taken about holding new elections for a further term. The Government is still committed to seeking to restore devolved government on a basis acceptable to both communities. Article 4(b) of the Agreement formalises that commitment and declares Irish support for it. The future of the Assembly will depend on the willingness of its members to work constructively in it - both in its deliberative and scrutinising work and in seeking to assist progress towards the restoration of devolved government.

13. In that respect it is hoped that the Anglo-Irish Agreement will encourage the SDLP to take a more positive approach to internal political development. John Hume has already suggested that that will be the case. But the attitude of the Unionists will also be crucial. Political progress depends on both sides finding a way of working together.

THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY: BACKGROUND NOTE

Purpose of the Assembly

1. Under the Northern Ireland Act 1982 the Assembly's principal task is to reach agreement on how devolved functions could be exercised by the Assembly and an administration answerable to it. It was given a scrutinising, consultative and deliberative role on subjects for which it would be responsible in the event of devolution in order to involve members from the beginning in the conduct of current public business.

Classification of governmental responsibilities

2. The future devolution of powers is still based on the system of government set out in the NI Constitution Act 1973, which provided for the appointment of an Executive answerable to an elected Assembly with legislative powers, and the NI Act 1974. The 1973 scheme categorised the functions of government as follows:

a) "Excepted" matters, for which responsibility would remain permanently with Westminster - matters of national importance such as the Crown, foreign affairs, defence, and special powers for dealing with terrorism and subversion;

b) "Reserved" matters, for which initially responsibility would remain with Westminster but which could be transferred to local control at a future date - eg the criminal law, prisons, and the establishment of the RUC;

c) "Transferred" matters, immediately available for devolution, which comprise all other matters not covered under categories (a) and (b) above - in practice, they are the subjects administered by the NI Departments of Agriculture, Economic Development, Environment, Education, Finance & Personnel, Health & Social Services.

The Assembly's consultative functions

3. The Northern Ireland Act 1982 obliged the Assembly to set up committees to "shadow" the NI Departments. Through them the Assembly monitors and reports on transferred matters at its own initiative and at the request of the Secretary of State. In particular, proposals for draft Orders in Council (primary legislation for Northern Ireland) are referred to it before they

are laid before Parliament. The Assembly's views on these proposals are also laid before Parliament.

4. But the NI Act 1982 (section 3) allows the Assembly to discuss any matter affecting Northern Ireland which is not an "excepted" matter: although it must consider any matter (whether or not "excepted") which is referred to it by the Secretary of State. This provision was designed to discourage divisive and sectarian debate on, for example, security policy or incidents; in practice, it has not been observed. But the Secretary of State treats the Security & Home Affairs Committee, established by the Assembly of its own volition, differently from the Departmental committees. He has had informal discussions with them about security policy at Stormont Castle, and has not referred any issues to it. Similarly, although the Assembly has gone outside its remit and discussed Anglo-Irish developments, the Government has not given any formal recognition to these debates.

Devolution Report Committee

5. This was set up in June 1984 to consider proposals for devolution. It has produced two reports. The first suggested ways of enhancing the Assembly's consultative role and the second collected together the submissions of the DUP, UUP and Alliance members of the Committee, as well as other evidence received. The third report, published on 29 October, presented a plan drawn up by Sir Frederick Catherwood, MEP, as a basis for discussion between the Secretary of State and the committee. During the Assembly debate on that report, all three parties indicated that they were not committed to any of the plan's details and the DUP said that it would fall by the wayside in the event of an Anglo-Irish Agreement. The SDLP also rejected the proposals as a basis for making progress. If, however, there were real inter-party interest in the proposals, they might then form the starting point for some discussion.

NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY,
PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS,
STORMONT,
BELFAST BT4 3SY

FROM THE SPEAKER

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher FRS MP
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

16 November 1985

Dear Prime Minister

The following resolution was passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly at its sitting on Saturday 16 November 1985:-

"That this Assembly, recalling both the solemn pledge of Her Majesty's Government contained in the Downing Street Declaration of August 1969 that "the responsibility for the affairs of Northern Ireland is entirely a matter of domestic jurisdiction [and] the United Kingdom Government will take full responsibility for asserting this principle in all international relationships", and the Prime Minister's declaration in the House of Commons on the 22nd of May 1980 that "any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland is a matter for the people of Northern Ireland, this Government and this House", repudiates the Anglo-Irish Agreement of the 15th of November 1985 as a flagrant breach of the above-mentioned solemn undertakings; deprecates as an intolerable derogation of British sovereignty incompatible with the security of Northern Ireland's constitutional position, the involvement of the Ministers and civil servants of a foreign government in the structure and processes of internal administration and policy formation of this part of the United Kingdom; notes that, while Her Majesty's Government in the Chequers Communique of November 1984 committed itself to securing the acceptance of both communities in Northern Ireland to the structures and processes of the province, the unique arrangements now intended for Northern Ireland have been entered into without consultation with its people or their representatives, and demands that Her Majesty's Government seek forthwith the consent of the electorate of Northern Ireland to the measures now proposed; and accordingly instructs Mr Speaker to convey the contents of this resolution to Her Gracious Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, and to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and furthermore, to invite the Prime Minister as a matter of urgency to address the Assembly on this vital subject."

Accordingly I invite you to address the Assembly.

Yours sincerely

Jim Kilfedder

JAMES KILFEDDER MP

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 November 1985

You requested a meeting with me urgently and I gladly agreed. At our meeting today you asked me for a clear assurance that the Inter-Governmental Conference to be established under the Anglo-Irish Agreement would have no executive authority, and that there was no intention to give it such authority in future. I gladly give you an unqualified assurance on this point.

You also raised your misgivings about the absence of any mechanism for the traditional majority in Northern Ireland to make its views known on the matters within the scope of the Inter-Governmental Conference, and the lack of clear arrangements for keeping them informed about the Conference's discussions. As I told you, the Government is giving these questions serious consideration and I hope to be able to be in a position to make some practical suggestions soon.

With best wishes,

John Cushnahan, Esq.

Ref. A085/3036

PRIME MINISTER

EDS 26/11

Anglo-Irish Agreement: Consultation with Unionists

You will no doubt wish, at your meeting today with members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, to discuss the idea of establishing new arrangements for Unionist leaders to put views to the Government, which was mentioned in your letter of 22 November to Mr Cushnahan.

Fly A

2. The Lord Privy Seal is minuting about the various ideas for new or upgraded Committees at Westminster. Given the need for consultation with the Opposition, the ground for moves on this front could not be prepared in time for the debate on the Anglo-Irish Agreement. But the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland could offer in the debate to consider means whereby Unionist MPs could be given opportunities to put forward views and proposals on affairs in Northern Ireland.

3. It would be compatible with this for you in the debate, or when you see the group from the Assembly, to offer to consider the idea of regular meetings between the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and leading politicians in the Province to discuss current issues in Northern Ireland.

4. Whatever is proposed, whether for Westminster or Belfast, will need to avoid giving any impression that the Unionists are to be given some kind of power of veto, or a right to monitor everything that is said or done in the new Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. It may therefore be advisable to avoid any suggestion that such meetings would be specifically to enable the Government to discuss with Unionist politicians matters that had been or were to be discussed in the Intergovernmental Conference. It could be said that the meetings were to enable the Unionists to put forward views and proposals on affairs in Northern Ireland: this would not exclude matters discussed in the Intergovernmental

Conference, but it would not impose on the Secretary of State any obligation to tell or consult Unionists about such matters.

5. If we planned to consult leading politicians in Northern Ireland specifically about the work of the Intergovernmental Conference, the Irish Government would have to be consulted before any announcement. Indeed, Mr Lillis telephoned Mr Mallaby on the evening of 22 November to express surprise that the Irish Government had not known in advance about your letter of that day to Mr Cushnahan.

6. Various possible objections could be raised to the idea of regular meetings between the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and leading (Unionist) politicians in Belfast:

a. A conciliatory move may be seen by Unionists as a sign of weakness.

This would be a telling argument against a more significant gesture. But I do not think it will apply to the moves described above, since your speech will be firm in tone and will involve no change of line on any point concerning the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

b. Some matters discussed in the Intergovernmental Conference will have to be confidential; and the communique of 15 November said that the agenda of the meetings would not normally be announced.

Leading politicians in Northern Ireland could not in any case be consulted on <u>all</u> subjects (eg security matters) discussed in the Intergovernmental Conference; but this objection is weakened if the offer of meetings with leading politicians is not related specifically or explicitly to matters discussed in the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference.

c. Unionists already have many means for putting views to the Government.

This need not outweigh the case for making a small gesture this week.

d. Unionists will not be impressed by such a small gesture.

This is of course the crucial political judgment. But such a gesture would provide some response to the complaint that the Government did not (and of course could not) consult them during the negotiations, and it could possibly reduce the sympathy among moderate Unionists for Dr Paisley's extreme line against the Agreement.

e. It is too soon for a gesture, which could better be made in some weeks' time.

This is again very much a matter of political judgment. Unionist opponents of the Agreement are indeed planning a long campaign. We have yet to see how successful they will be. If they succeed in sustaining the strength of the campaign, a small gesture could be too little, too late if it came during by-election campaigns or if there was widespread disruption of public order. If the campaign showed signs of running out of steam, a small gesture might be enough to bring it to an end.

7. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

RJA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

25 November 1985

POINTS RAISED BY THE ULSTER UNIONISTS

1. THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT ACTUALLY DEFINE THE PRESENT STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

2. THE ULSTER PEOPLE WERE NOT CONSULTED IN ADVANCE ABOUT THE AGREEMENT.

3. THE CHEQUERS COMMUNIQUE PROMISED THAT THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES OF NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD REFLECT THE TWO TRADITIONS IN WAYS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH COMMUNITIES. THERE SHOULD THEREFORE BE A REFERENDUM.

4. PEOPLE IN ULSTER WANT TO BE GOVERNED IN THE SAME WAY AS PEOPLE IN THE REST OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. THAT'S WHAT UNION MEANS.

5. THE AGREEMENT GIVES A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT A RIGHT OF CONSULTATION WHICH IS DENIED TO THE MAJORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

6. THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE WILL ALLOW THE NATIONALISTS A PRIVILEGED VOICE. IN EFFECT THEY WILL BE CONSULTED MORE FULLY THAN THE UNIONISTS.

7. THE SDLP WILL CONTINUE TO EXERCISE A VETO OVER DEVOLUTION.

8. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ARE INCAPABLE OF DELIVERING IMPROVED SECURITY.

9. THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS IN EFFECT ACCEPTED A LEGAL OBLIGATION TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE REPUBLIC ON ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE.

10. THE AGREEMENT WILL BE USED BY A FUTURE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO WEAKEN NORTHERN IRELAND'S LINKS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM.

11. THERE MAY BE SOME SIDE-AGREEMENTS.

RESOLUTION

WE, THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLED AT BELFAST THIS 23RD OF NOVEMBER 1985 SOLEMLY DECLARE OUR UNYIELDING OPPOSITION TO THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT BEING A VIOLATION OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS CITIZENS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

WE CALL UPON OUR PARLIAMENT NOT TO ENDORSE THIS AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE PEOPLE OF ULSTER EXPRESSED THROUGH THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

PASSED UNANIMOUSLY ETC....

James H Molyneaux

JAMES H MOLYNEAUX

Ian R.K. Paisley

IAN R K PAISLEY

"IN SURE CONFIDENCE THAT GOD WILL DEFEND THE RIGHT"

H SAMUEL
Britains Largest Jeweller
for good Watches and fine Jewellery

PREM 19/1809 (Pt 1 of 2)

RESTRICTED

B.07223

MR POWELL

c Mr Stark

Anglo-Irish Agreement: Prime Minister's Speech in the House

I suggest that the first paragraph on page 12 could seem critical of the Irish Government in the past. The second sentence could be amended:

> "In the absence of a mechanism for conveying it, that concern has sometimes been expressed in critical or negative form. Systematic arrangements should help the cause...".

2. The Prime Minister might wish to use a sentence from the Taoiseach's speech to the Dail about the Agreement:

> "We shall fight the battle against these terrorists to the utmost of our power, for ultimately our survival as a democracy is at stake as well as peace in Northern Ireland."

3. The Northern Ireland Office will comment separately.

C L G Mallaby

25 November 1985

RESTRICTED

Ref. A085/3025

MR POWELL

Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

On return I have been catching up with developments in the situation, and particularly in unionist reactions.

2. I have not seen the very latest draft of the Prime Minister's speech for opening the debate on 26 November. But I should like to suggest (in case you have not already thought of it) a possible line for inclusion in this speech. I attach a note accordingly.

3. I am sending copies of this minute and the note to the Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and for Northern Ireland.

for ROBERT ARMSTRONG

25 November 1985

NOIABM

Mr Speaker, I should like to say this to the unionists in Northern Ireland, speaking as a unionist and a loyalist myself. This Agreement poses no threat to them, or to the union, or to the sovereignty and authority of the United Kingdom Government in Northern Ireland. It is not the first step in a process of creeping surrender of sovereignty, and no-one who reads the text can believe that it is.

My record on these matters entitles me to say to the unionists that my position, and the position of the British Government, is that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and that that will not change unless a majority of the people of Northern Ireland want and formally consent to a change.

That is not just the Government's position. It is the law of the land.

Now that is reinforced, not weakened, by the formal recognition on the part of the Irish Government that the status of Northern Ireland will not change unless and until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland want a change, and that they do not want it now.

If there is a threat to the unionists, it comes not from this Agreement, or from the United Kingdom Government, or from the Irish Government. It comes from the men of violence, whose methods, whose calculated inhumanity, are no less abhorrent to the Irish Government than to the unionists in Northern Ireland and to the United Kingdom Government.

The unionists look to the Government of the United Kingdom to maintain law and order, to combat the terrorism of the men of violence. That is a duty which, on behalf of all the people of the United Kingdom, this Government accepts.

NOIABN

But the fulfilment of that duty is not a matter of words or promises; it is a matter of deeds, of resources, and above all of the readiness of the men and women in the security forces to put their lives at risk.

Over 2,000 men and women have lost their lives in the fulfilment of this duty over the last fifteen years: men and women from every part of the United Kingdom.

I say to the unionists that, if we, the Government, accept the obligation to protect them against the men of violence, we must be entitled to take measures which we believe in good faith will in the long run diminish the threat of terrorism and reduce the cost of security in terms of the lives lost in pursuit of it.

We believe that this Agreement will have such results, both because it will give nationalists in Northern Ireland greater confidence that the institutions of government there are aware of and sensitive to their legitimate needs and concerns, and because it will lead to closer and sustained co-operation with the Irish Government on security, particularly in the border ares.

I ask the unionists to give us a chance to achieve these aims by means of this Agreement. I ask them to consider: do they not owe it to those who put their lives at risk to defend them, to the families all over the United Kingdom - not just in Northern Ireland - with husbands, sons or brothers serving in the security forces in Northern Ireland, to join in grasping the opportunity which this Agreement offers of saving their lives, and of making life easier and safer for everybody in Northern Ireland?

NOIABN

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 November 1985

Dear Charles,

Anglo-Irish Agreement: Debate in the Irish Dail

In preparing for the debate in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister may find it helpful to glance through the enclosed extracts from the speeches made by Dr FitzGerald and Mr Barry during the debate on the Anglo-Irish Agreement in the Dail last week.

The Prime Minister will be aware that on 21 November after a three-day debate, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was approved decisively in the Dail by 88 votes to 75. The Taoiseach, and the other Ministers who spoke in the debate, delivered low-key and conciliatory speeches. They stuck very closely to the agreed language in describing the contents of the Agreement and its purposes. The quotations contained in the enclosed note illustrate this clearly.

Mr Haughey opened the debate for the Opposition with a strong denunciation of the Agreement. He said that his party could not accept "the abandonment of our claim to Irish unity or the recognition of British sovereignty over the North of Ireland which is involved in the Agreement". The Agreement was, he argued, in conflict with the Irish constitution. He warned that "since neither the Government of the day, nor the Oireachtas (Parliament) have any authority to act in conflict with Articles 2 and 3 of the constitution, no future Irish Government need, unless it so wishes, be bound by the provisions of any international agreement which are incompatible with those of the constitution". But Mr Haughey took care not to tie his hands in any way.

Mr Haughey's uncompromising initial line clearly caused disquiet in some parts of Fianna Fail, no doubt because Irish public opinion appears to be generally in favour of giving the Agreement a chance. Following intense discussion within his party throughout 20 November, Mr Haughey signalled an important softening of his position. He declared publicly that if those committed to the Intergovernmental Conference could use it "to ameliorate the condition of the nationalist community in Northern Ireland, we could and would

/not

not wish to put any difficulties in their way". This shift in Fianna Fail's position was reflected in a rather tame speech by Mr Lenihan (Deputy Leader) when he wound up for the Opposition on 21 November.

In the final vote, the Government were joined by the former Fianna Fail Cabinet Minister, Mr Desmond O'Malley, and one Fianna Fail backbench dissident. The two members of the Marxist Workers Party also voted with the Government, giving it one of the largest majorities it has achieved during its term of office.

I also enclose for reference purposes a checklist of all the statements and messages of support for the Agreement which we have received from foreign governments and international organisations.

I am copying this letter with its enclosures to Jim Daniell (Northern Ireland Office) and to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

KEY EXTRACTS FROM SPEECHES MADE DURING THE DAIL DEBATE ON THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT BY IRISH MINISTERS

Status of Northern Ireland

Dr FitzGerald:

"It is on these twin pillars - the maintenance of the aspiration to Irish unity, as a legitimate objective of Irish nationalism on the one hand, and the acceptance of the need for the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland for any change in the status of that area on the other - that progress had been made."

"The process that has led to this Agreement was started 5½ years ago at a meeting between the then Taoiseach ... Deputy Charles J Haughey, and the British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher. The starting point for this Agreement has been the section of the Communiqué issued after that meeting, in which the then Taoiseach declared that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. This affirmation in a formal communiqué issued jointly on behalf of the two Governments had, as I recall, the assent of all Parties in this House. It provides one of the cornerstones of what has now been agreed, even though the word "constitutional" has been omitted from this phrase in the text of the Agreement before the House. I support most strongly this affirmation .... I believe that no sane person would wish to attempt to change the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority of its people. That would be a recipe for disaster and could, I believe, lead only to a civil war that would be destructive of the life of people throughout our island."

Mr Barry:

"These agreed propositions, taken together, are of importance to Unionists because they make it crystal clear that Irish unity will come about only if and when consent to unity should emerge."

Reassurance to the Unionists

Dr FitzGerald:

"The people of Northern Ireland must be at the centre of our thoughts - nationalists and unionists alike."

"It is our task, and we now, perhaps, have an opportunity to undertake it in a way that had not hitherto been thought possible, to attempt to heal these divisions, to remove the alienation of one community, and to still the fears of the other."

"The Agreement and the Communiqué stand on their merits. There are no secret agreements and no hidden agendas .... The transparency of the Agreement is an essential prerequisite to its future acceptance by the parties most intimately affected."

Mr Barry:

"The Irish Government has no designs on the North. We have no desire to have dominion over the unionist people .... We recognise the identity of the unionists: their Britishness, their ethos, their sense of being threatened by Irish unity .... We are committed to Irish unity by consent and only by consent. Article 1 now makes that unambiguously clear."

Role for the Irish Government

Dr FitzGerald:

"The British Government accept that the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland .... This provision, going beyond a consultative role, but necessarily because of the sovereignty issue falling short of an executive role, provides, in the Government's view the most effective method by which to ensure the existence of structures capable of eroding the alienation of the nationalist minority."

Mr Barry:

"It is, as the Taoiseach said, essential that we be clear that the Agreement does not confer a formal role of executive decision-making on the Irish Government."

Devolution

Dr FitzGerald:

"Both Governments support the policy of devolution of certain matters within the powers of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community .... To the extent that devolution on this basis proves practicable, the Conference will obviously not have to concern itself with these matters."

Mr Barry:

"The Agreement, in its provisions on devolution, is not envisaging a "solution" within the confines of Northern Ireland. The Agreement does, however, aim at providing every possible reassuring incentive to both sets of constitutional politicians to take a hand in real politics."

Secretariat

Dr FitzGerald:

"The Conference will, of course, be serviced on a continuing basis by a Secretariat to be established by the two Governments, in Belfast, where the Conference itself will normally meet."

UDR/RUC

Dr FitzGerald:

"At its very first meeting the Conference will be considering the application of the principle that the armed forces, which include the Ulster Defence Regiment, operate only in support of the civil power, with the particular objective of ensuring as rapidly as possible that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, there is a police presence in all operations which involve direct contact with the community. The Conference will also at this first meeting consider ways of underlining the policy that the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the armed forces in Northern Ireland, discharge their duties even-handedly, and with equal respect for the unionist and nationalist identities and traditions."

Legal Matters

Dr FitzGerald:

"A possible harmonisation of the criminal law applying in the North and in the South respectively and measures to give substantial expression to the aim of ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice, considering inter alia the possibility of mixed courts in both jurisdictions for the trial of certain offences, will be the responsibility of the Conference."

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism

Dr FitzGerald:

"It is the intention of my Government to accede as soon as possible to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism."

Cross-border Cooperation

Dr FitzGerald:

"Also included is the whole area of cross-border cooperation, not merely in relation to security, but also in relation to promoting the economic and social development of those areas of both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely from the consequences of the instability of recent years. Provision is made for the two Governments to consider the possibility of securing international support for this work, and this aspect of the Agreement has already attracted interest and a promise of tangible support from the Government and Congress of the United States. Other indications of similar interest have come from a number of other Governments in Europe - both in the Community and elsewhere in Western Europe - and from other countries overseas."

Republic of Ireland Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
25 November 1985

ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

MESSAGES AND STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

The United States

- statement by President Reagan
- statement by Speaker O'Neill
- statement by the 'Congressional Friends of Ireland'; signators include Majority and Minority leaders of both Houses of Congress, Speaker O'Neill, Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senators Kennedy and Moynihan.

European Community

Federal Republic of Germany
- message to Prime Minister from Chancellor Kohl
- message to Foreign Secretary from Foreign Minister Genscher
- Government statement.

Italy
- message to HM Queen from President Cossiga
- Government statement.

France
- Government statement.

Belgium
- Government statement.

Netherlands
- Government statement.

Denmark
- Government statement.

Luxembourg
- Government statement.

Greece
- Government statement.

Spain
- Government statement.

Portugal - Government statement.

European Commission - Statement by President Delors.

Commonwealth

Canada - statement by Prime Minister Mulroney

Australia - Government statement

New Zealand - statement by Prime Minister Lange

United Nations

- statement by Secretary General

Council of Europe

- statement by Committee of Ministers.

Sweden - statement by Prime Minister Palme

Japan - Government statement

Republic of Ireland Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
25 November 1985

10 DOWNING STREET

Charles,

Since 1969 91
people have been killed
in Great Britain by
Irish terrorist activity,
of which 29 were
service personnel and
6 were policemen.

JP.

25/x1.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

(2)

PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND

Sir Robert Armstrong's minute attached suggests:

(a) a small group of Ministers should be on constant standby, to give a political steer on problems which may arise. This would include the Lord President, Lord Privy Seal, Northern Ireland Secretary, Home Secretary and Chief Whip;

(b) this would be underpinned by a group of officials chaired by Robert Armstrong and including David Goodall and Robert Andrew. This would be the main source of advice to Ministers.

This is in effect a bid by RTA to keep control of advice on Northern Ireland matters firmly in his hands. It therefore cuts heavily into the Northern Ireland Office's responsibilities and you would want to consult Mr. King before agreeing it. (RTA's minute is carefully not copied to other departments). I think I also detect another reason: a worry that the Northern Ireland Office will be too anxious to reassure the Unionists and will not be sufficiently alive to Irish sensibilities or sufficiently loyal to the letter of the Agreement. It is therefore a matter of political balance.

These points are not exactly explicit in RTA's minute. But I think they are there and you should consider carefully before agreeing to what is made to look like a straightforward machinery of government decision.

C.D.P.

(CHARLES POWELL)
25 November 1985
SRWALJ

SECRET AND PERSONAL

(1)

No — This is for the N.I. Office and me. We will only [illegible] for [illegible] necessary MB

Ref. A085/3024

MR POWELL

Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

During the coming weeks we shall clearly need to be able to respond quickly and sensitively to developments in the situation in Northern Ireland. For instance, we need now to work out, as a matter of urgency, what measures or actions are open to us which may help to allay unionist suspicions and (in particular) to respond to their feeling that they have not been consulted and that the nationalists (through the Irish Government) are being given an "inside track" denied to them; but which will not give the Irish Government the impression that the unionists are being given a power of veto or a right to monitor everything that is said, or all the views and proposals that are put forward, in the Intergovernmental Conference. The Taoiseach and his colleagues have on the whole had an easier ride than they expected in the Dail, and are at present disposed to be understanding and constructive about our problems in handling the unionists. We need, however, to get it right with them, as well as with the unionists, and to keep them informed about what we are doing and propose to do, so that they are not taken by surprise and will give whatever support and assistance we need to ask of them.

2. I understand that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has expressed some concern lest we may put all that we have gained or hope to gain from the Anglo-Irish Agreement at risk, if we do not get the balance of the handling right in this period.

3. I believe that, in terms of machinery, this may require us to be able during the coming weeks to work hardly less quickly and flexibly than we did during the South Atlantic War.

NOIABL

4. This will require a strong and continuous political steer. This will mean a readiness to hold meetings of the Ministers concerned at short notice and as often as need be. The Ministers concerned are obviously mainly the Prime Minister and the two Secretaries of State; the Prime Minister may also wish to involve other Ministers who were present for the informal meeting on 21 November (the Lord President, the Home Secretary, the Lord Privy Seal and the Chief Whip). I do not suggest setting up a new Committee for this purpose, or even setting aside a regular time for meetings; but I should like to warn the Private Offices of the Ministers concerned to be ready to respond positively to calls for urgent meetings. If the Prime Minister is content, I will so proceed.

[Surely they would anyway]

5. Because the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is so much away, and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland needs (and will certainly need during this time) to spend a good deal of time in Belfast, I would propose to support this arrangement with regular and frequent meetings myself with Mr Goodall and Mr Andrew (or in his absence a senior representative of the Northern Ireland Office) to maintain an up-to-date assessment of the situation and provide advice to the Prime Minister and her colleagues in forthcoming problems likely to require Ministerial decisions and on how they might be handled.

6. For the present, and so long as unionist reactions are basically political, it should not be necessary to involve the Secretary of State for Defence or the Ministry of Defence at official or military level; but we must be ready to do so if the situation seems likely to evolve in a direction where that might be necessary.

for ROBERT ARMSTRONG

25 November 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

(2)

CC/81

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

25 November 1985

Dear Charles

Mr John Hume MP called to see the Secretary of State in London on 21 November at Mr King's request.

The Secretary of State began by saying that the recent Anglo-Irish Agreement represented a major achievement for the SDLP but had been badly received by the Unionists. It was necessary to seek to reassure moderate Unionist opinion. He intended to meet the criticism that the Agreement was one-sided by pointing to the other means available to Unionists to express their views to the Government; but a gesture was needed from the SDLP. He hoped that Mr Hume would be prepared in next week's Parliamentary debate to encourage nationalists in the North to support the security forces (on the lines of remarks already made by Mr Peter Barry), and to be forthcoming about SDLP participation in the internal government of the Province by indicating a readiness to engage in discussion on devolution and possibly by joining the Assembly. Other specific steps might include the nomination of SDLP members to the Police Authority.

Mr Hume replied that he was receptive to these suggestions but could not commit political suicide. He had to represent the nationalist point of view. He would indicate support for the security forces, as he had in the past, provided that they operated in accordance with the law. He would be prepared to put forward names for the Police Authority, but if this were publicised the lives of the individuals would be at risk. There was no way in which the SDLP could join the present Assembly in advance of another election; but he was ready to talk to the Unionists about devolution provided that it was on the basis of power-sharing. He believed that if the Government faced down the Unionists they would be prepared within 6 months to talk about power-sharing. Mr Hume added that he welcomed the Unionist intention to seek by-elections and believed that the SDLP could achieve some success against both the Unionists and Sinn Fein. In particular he believed that they would win the Newry-Armagh seat.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Secretary of State said that it was not enough simply to repeat previous SDLP positions. The Agreement had created a new situation which called for new initiatives. There was a great prize to be gained, but it was necessary to win the support of moderate Unionists and for this a gesture from the SDLP was needed. After further discussion Mr Hume agreed that in his speech on Tuesday he would encourage support for the security forces and urge his supporters to take positive steps (eg by providing information in confidence) to prevent fellow citizens being murdered or to bring the murderers to justice. He would also indicate his willingness to take part in discussion on devolution, avoiding reference to power-sharing and using instead some formulation such as all parties contributing to the government of the Province. He offered to let the Secretary of State see the speech in draft. Mr Hume added that he was willing to do anything else in his power to help sell the Agreement. He would be prepared to talk to Unionist leaders about it and even to address a public meeting on the Shankill Road.

In view of Mr Hume's positive response to his suggestions the Secretary of State judges that it is unnecessary (and might well be counter-productive) for the Prime Minister to seek the Taoiseach's assistance in putting pressure on the SDLP leader.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Lord President of the Council, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Lord Privy Seal, the Home Secretary, the Chief Whip and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

John Daniell

J A DANIELL

SP

Ref. A085/3022

MR POWELL

Mr Edward Heath's Private Secretary rang me to give me over the telephone the advance text of a statement which Mr Heath has issued today, embargoed for 6.00 pm on 23 November.

2. The statement is generally supportive of the Hillsborough Agreement, but says that it is not a historic novelty, since the Sunningdale Agreement too contained specific ackowledgments, in an international agreement, of the status of Northern Ireland by the Republic of Ireland.

3. Mr Heath's statement concludes that recognition of this fact should strengthen rather than weaken the Hillsborough Agreement.

4. The full text will be available from this office from 25 November and I will be happy to supply copies as necessary.

5. I am copying this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Lord President, the Foreign and Commowealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Chief Whip.

M C STARK

25 November 1985

NOIABK

22.XI. PM 85

NORTHERN IRELAND

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/PUS
MR GOODALL

HD/RID
Dep. HD/PUSD (2).
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/ S of S
PS/MR R ANDREW, OAB 1/56
MR BRENNAN
MR BURNS
MR PN BELL
} NIO

SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO
MR MALLABY
PS/ NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)
} CABINET OFFICE

14.11.



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IRISH OPINION POLL

SUMMARY

1. AN OPINION POLL SHOWS 2-1 IN FAVOUR OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT. THE OPPOSITION'S LEAD OVER THE COALITION PARTIES HAS BEEN CUT BACK TO 8%, AND DR FITZGERALD IS AHEAD OF MR HAUGHEY FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE JULY 1984.

DETAIL

2. AN IRISH TIMES/MRBI POLL CONDUCTED ON 19/20 NOVEMBER INCLUDED QUESTIONS ON THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT, ON SATISFACTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND ON VOTING PREFERENCES.

ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

3. THE FIRST QUESTION ASKED FOR REACTIONS TO THE AGREEMENT:

GENERALLY APPROVE	59%
GENERALLY DISAPPROVE	29%
NO OPINION	12%

IN PARTY TERMS, 50% OF FINE GAEL SUPPORTERS, 67% OF LABOUR AND 43% OF FIANNA FAIL WERE BROADLY IN FAVOUR OF THE AGREEMENT.

4. THE SECOND QUESTION ASKED ABOUT THE IMPACT THE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE:

WOULD IT IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN:	YES	NO	D/K
- THE REPUBLIC AND GB ?	66%	26%	8%
- NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE REPUBLIC ?	50%	43%	7%
- THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND ?	M42%	5%	8%

WOULD IT REDUCE VIOLENCE ? YES NO D/K

IRELAND ?	MA2%	5%	8%
WOULD IT REDUCE VIOLENCE ?	YES	NO	D/K
- IMPROVE LIFE FOR NATIONALISTS ?	49%	39%	12%
- IMPROVE LIFE FOR UNIONISTS ?	31%	52%	17%

5. THE THIRD QUESTION ASKED WHETHER, AS A RESULT OF THE AGREEMENT, A UNITED IRELAND WAS:

CLOSER	30%
FURTHER AWAY	13%
NO DIFFERENCE	53%
NO OPINION	4%

6. THE FINAL QUESTION IN THIS SECTION ASKED WHETHER MR HAUGHEY WAS RIGHT IN THE STAND HE HAD TAKEN:

MR HAUGHEY WAS RIGHT	32%
MR HAUGHEY WAS WRONG	56%
NO OPINION	12%

IT IS INTERESTING THAT MR HAUGHEY GETS RATHER MORE SUPPORT THAN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF (PARA 3), BUT THIS IS EXPLAINED BY RELUCTANCE AMONG HIS SUPPORTERS TO CONDEMN HIM. A BREAKDOWN BY PARTY SHOWS THAT 80% OF FINE GAEL, 69% OF LABOUR, BUT ONLY 34% OF FIANNA FAIL SUPPORTERS DISAGREED WITH HIS POSITION. AMONG FIANNA FAIL SUPPORTERS A MAJORITY (52%) AGREED WITH HIS STAND.

POLITICAL PREFERENCES

7. ON VOTING PREFERENCES THE POLL SHOWED A REMARKABLE IMPROVEMENT IN THE COALITION'S STANDING OVER OTHER RECENT POLLS:

	NOV (MRBI)	OCT (RSI)	SEPT (INDO)	JULY (MRBI)
FINE GAEL	37%	30%	30%	33%
LABOUR	6%	6%	7%	5%
FIANNA FAIL	51%	55%	55%	52%
WORKERS PARTY	2%	3%	5%	5%

8. DR FITZGERALD'S PERSONAL RATING HAS IMPROVED EVEN MORE DRAMATICALLY:

	NOV	JULY
DR FITZGERALD	51%	41%
MR HAUGHEY	43%	47%
MR SPRING	36%	25%

COMMENT

9. THIS POLL WILL BE VERY HEARTENING FOR THE GOVERNMENT. THEIR ADVISERS HAVE BEEN TELLING THEM THAT THEY MUST BREAK THE INEXORABLEREND OF DECLINING SUPPORT IN OPINION POLLS NOW IF THEY ARE TO HAVE ANY HOPE OF BLOCKING A FIANNA FAIL SWEEP TO VICTORY IN THE NEXT ELECTION. THE SIZE OF THE SWING IN THIS POLL WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON SUPPORTERS AND ACTIVISTS ALIKE.

10. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO BELL, NIO (L).

GOODISON

STATEMENT BY THE RT. HON. EDWARD HEATH MBE MP

RELEASE TIME: NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR BROADCAST BEFORE 1800 SATURDAY 23 NOVEMBER 1985

As I have stated publicly in the Country during the past week I welcome the Anglo-Irish Agreement concluded at Hillsborough. I hope to be able to elaborate on this if I catch the Speaker's eye during the debate on the Agreement next week.

In fairness however to the members of the then government of the Republic of Ireland, the political parties who formed the Power Sharing Executive in Northern Ireland, to the members of the then British Government and to their officials and advisors who worked tirelessly to bring about the Sunningdale Agreement in December 1973 between London, Belfast and Dublin I must now make the following points.

The Hillsborough Agreement is not an historic agreement between the two countries. It is not "the most formal commitment to the principle of consent made by any Irish Government". Nor is it "the first time we have had a recognition of that in writing from the Republic of Ireland". Nor is it "the first time in a formal international agreement that the Republic has recognised this position in Northern Ireland and has recognised that it cannot be changed except with the consent of the majority". All of these claims were made by the Prime Minister in her statement and in answers to questions in the House of Commons last Monday.

I must point out that in the Sunningdale Agreement of 9 December 1983 the Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland stated at the end of paragraph 3 "the only unity they wanted to see was a unity established by consent".

/continued...

Paragraph 5 reads "the Irish Government fully accepted and solemnly declared that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland desired a change in that status".

Paragraph 5 continues "the British Government solemnly declared that it was, and would remain, their policy to support the wishes of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The present status of Northern Ireland is that it is part of the United Kingdom. If in the future the majority of the people of Northern Ireland should indicate a wish to become part of a united Ireland, the British Government would support that wish."

Paragraph 6 runs "the conference agreed that a formal agreement incorporating the decisions of the British and Irish Governments would be signed at the formal stage of the conference and registered at the United Nations."

The Sunningdale Agreement would therefore become a fully international agreement setting out the present status of Northern Ireland and containing recognition by the governments of both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland that it could only ever be changed by consent.

The fact that this situation has been fully accepted in both London and Dublin for the past twelve years should help to strengthen the Hillsborough Agreement, not weaken it.

Entered as T223A/85
27.11.85.

Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri

Roma, 22 novembre 1985

Signora Primo Ministro,

la notizia del raggiungimento dell'accordo fra il Governo britannico e quello della Repubblica d'Irlanda mi ha profondamente rallegrato. Esso pone termine ad una controversia che non aveva più ragione di esistere fra due Paesi amici dell'Italia, che aveva provocato attraverso incomprensioni e diffidenze tanti lutti; esso è inoltre improntato a quello spirito di apertura, mutua comprensione e reciproco rispetto che costituisce il fondamento delle relazioni fra i popoli.

Da tale accordo trarrà certamente beneficio anche l'ideale europeo che oggi siamo tutti impegnati a realizzare.

Nell'attesa di rivederLa presto in Lussemburgo per il prossimo Consiglio Europeo, Le invio i miei più cordiali e amichevoli saluti.

S.E. la Signora ~~Margaret~~ THATCHER
Primo Ministro del Regno Unito di
Gran Bretagna e Irlanda del Nord
L O N D R A

NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY,
PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS,
STORMONT,
BELFAST BT4 3SY

FROM THE SPEAKER

22 November 1985

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister.

Dear Prime Minister

I wish to thank you for your letter, which I placed before the Business Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly today.

The Assembly has expressed its opinion on the Anglo-Eire Agreement in the Resolution, which I forwarded to you. The Alliance Party tabled an Amendment and voted against the Resolution.

The deputation - which will consist of members of the three Parties attending the Assembly - will discuss with you the terms of that Resolution.

I have been asked to make it clear to you that in no way can the Assembly deputation enter into any negotiation with you as they have no authority from the Assembly.

Yours Sincerely

Jim Kilfedder

James Kilfedder, M.P.

The Speaker.

No 205

NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY

ORDER PAPER

SATURDAY 16 NOVEMBER 1985

The Assembly will meet at 10.30 am.

Prayers.

BUSINESS

Mr Molyneaux, Dr Paisley, Mr McCusker, Mr Robinson, Mr Millar, Mr Foster

Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985. That this Assembly, recalling both the solemn pledge of Her Majesty's Government contained in the Downing Street Declaration of August 1969 that "the responsibility for the affairs of Northern Ireland is entirely a matter of domestic jurisdiction [and] the United Kingdom Government will take full responsibility for asserting this principle in all international relationships", and the Prime Minister's declaration in the House of Commons on the 22nd of May 1980 that "any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland is a matter for the people of Northern Ireland, this Government and this House", repudiates the Anglo-Irish Agreement of the 15th of November 1985 as a flagrant breach of the above-mentioned solemn undertakings; deprecates as an intolerable derogation of British sovereignty incompatible with the security of Northern Ireland's constitutional position, the involvement of the Ministers and civil servants of a foreign government in the structure and processes of internal administration and policy formation of this part of the United Kingdom; notes that, while Her Majesty's Government in the Chequers Communique of November 1984 committed itself to securing the acceptance of both communities in Northern Ireland to the structures and processes of the province, the unique arrangements now intended for Northern Ireland have been entered into without consultation with its people or their representatives, and demands that Her Majesty's Government seek forthwith the consent of the electorate of Northern Ireland to the measures now proposed; and accordingly instructs Mr Speaker to convey the contents of this resolution to Her Gracious Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, and to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and furthermore, to invite the Prime Minister as a matter of urgency to address the Assembly on this vital subject.

AMENDMENT

To be moved by **Mr Cushnahan, Mr Morrow, Mr Mawhinney, Mr Close, Mr Cook, Lord Dunleath, Mr Glendinning, Mr Maguire, Sir Oliver Napier, Mr Neeson**

To leave out from "Assembly" in line 1, to the end, and add -

"criticise both the total veil of secrecy which surrounded the Anglo-Irish talks, and the inordinate length of time it took to complete them, as being factors which greatly exacerbated tensions within the Northern Ireland community; believes that the document signed by the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland on 15 November 1985 is a lengthy and complex statement which merits detailed and serious study by all democratic political parties throughout the British Isles; further believes that the proposals contained therein, along with the

Catherwood proposals for devolved government in Northern Ireland (and indeed other proposals for devolution and sensible Anglo-Irish relations) should form the basis for discussion between political parties in Northern Ireland, and between those parties and the Secretary of State to assess how best political progress can be made in a way which recognises the legitimate rights and aspirations of both the unionist and nationalist traditions within the community."

SOLICITOR GENERAL

ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE
LONDON, WC2A 2LL

~~01-405-7641 Extn~~

22 Nov 85

Prime Minister.

Herewith my thoughts for the opening of your speech.

I will try to contribute further later in the day.

Patrick Mayhew

GRS 880

UNCLASSIFIED
FM DUBLIN
TO DESKBY 221130Z FCOLN
TELNO 808
OF 221010Z NOVEMBER 85
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BIS NEW YORK, NIO (B)

MY TELNO 804: ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT : DAIL DEBATE: MR BARRY'S SPEECH

1. WINDING UP FOR THE GOVERNMENT , MR BARRY PAID TRIBUTE TO THE QUALITY OF THE DEBATE, TO THE TAOISEACH, AND MR HAUGHEY 'FOR THE CONCILIATORY TONE OF HIS REMARKS, EVEN IF WE FIND OURSELVES IN DISAGREEMENT WITH MUCH OF WHAT HE SAID IN TERMS OF SUBSTANCE'.

2. THE DEBATE HAD SHOWN HIM THAT THE COMPLEXITY OF WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED ('OF A HIGH ORDER OF INGENUITY') WAS SUCH THAT THE AGREEMENT COULD BE MISCONSTRUED OR 'AS HAS HAPPENED PARTICULARLY IN THE NORTH, EXTENSIVELY MISREPRESENTED'. A NUMBER OF 'ASSURANCES AND CLARIFICATIONS' TO BOTH NATIONALIST AND UNIONIST CONCERNS WERE IN ORDER.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF ARTICLE 1

3. 'THE AGREEMENT IS ... TOTALLY CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION ... OUR CONVICTION IS BASED ON THE MOST DETAILED CONSIDERATION BY THOSE AUTHORISED TO ADVISE US AND WE ARE CONFIDENT OF OUR POSITION'. FOR THE OPPOSITION TO CRITICISE THE AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT AND NOT TO EXERCISE THEPR LEGAL PREROGATIVE IN THE MATTER DID NOT SEEM 'LOGICAL ... MATURE OR RESPONSIBLE'. ARTICLE 1 PROVIDED 'A SOUND SET OF GUARANTEES BOTH TO NATIONALISTS AND TO UNIONISTS, BASED RIGOROUSLY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT'. UNIONIST FEARS THAT IRISH UNITY WOULD BE IMPOSED AGAINST THE WISHES OF A MAJORITY HAD LED TO 'DISCRIMINATION , DOMINATION , POLITICAL EXCLUSION AND THE DENIAL OF THE IDENTITY' OF NATIONALISTS. BRITISH ATTEMPTS TO REASSURE UNIONISTS HAD REINFORCED DIVISIONS: 'LONDON FAILED TO UNDERSTAND THAT MEASURES SUCH AS BORDER POLLS, WHICH WERE INTENDED TO COMFORT UNIONISTS ALONE, ONLY CREATED GREATER UNCERTAINTY THAN EVER'. ARTICLE 1 WAS A PRODUCT OF THE SHARED DESIRE OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO MEET THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM OF UNCERTAINTY OVER THE FUTURE, WITH NATIONALISTS FEARING NO CHANGE AND UNIONISTS FEARING CHANGE: 'FAR FROM BEING A BETRAYAL OF NATIONALISTS OR OF UNIONISTS, ARTICLE 1 IS IN FACT AN EXERCISE IN INGENIOUS AND BENIGN DRAFTSMANSHIP, LHICH BETRAYS NO-ONE AND GUARANTEES FOR THE FIRST TIME BOTH SETS OF CONCERNS.

DEVOLUTION

4. REFERRING TO OPPOSITION CONCERN THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVOLUTION MIGHT CUT OUT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S ROLE POINTED
THAT , IN SUCH A CASE THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MATTERS WITH WHICH THE CONFERENCE WOULD SEASE TO DEAL 'WOULD BE DEALT WITH ... BY A DEVOLVED ADMINISTRATION INVOLVING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES'. IF THAT DEVOLUTION BROK DOWN, THE CONFERENCE 'WOULD ONCE AGAIN HAVE A ROLE ON THE ISSUES...'

ROLE OF THE CONFERENCE

5. MR BARRY REPLIED TO CONCERN EXPRESSED ABOUT THE ABSENCE OF THE WORD 'CONSULTATION' BY SAYING 'CANDIDLY THAT THE
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

6. MR BARRY MADE TWO FUTHER POINTS ON THE ROLE OF THE CONFERENCE FIRST, THE AGREEMENT MADE IT CLEAR (A.2(B))THAT THERE WAS NO DEROGATION FROM THE SOVEREIGNTY OF EITHER STATE, AND IT DID 'NOT CONFER A FORMAL ROLE OF EXECUTIVE DECISION MAKING ON THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. BUT SEVOND, THE AGREEMENT DID CREATE 'A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE' FOR THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, CREATING 'A SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT SITUATION FROM 1969 AND 1972 WHEN OUR RIGHT T
EVEN TO 'CONSULTATION' WAS FORMALLY DENIED ... REPEATED WITH EMPHASIS .. ON 30 JULY 1982' BY MRS THATCHER.O

7. BOTH GOVERNMENTS WERE COMMITTED TO MAKING THE AGREEMENT WORK: 'WE WILL EXPECT THE BRITISH TO BE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION AS WE WILL HAVE TO BE OF THEIRS. BOTH GOVERNMENTS - NOT JUST THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, NOT JUST THE IRISH GOVERNMENT - MUST MAKE DETERMINED EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ANY DIFFERENCES'. BUT 'THERE WILL BE NO QUESTION OF EITHER GOVERNMENT HIDING BEHIND THE CONFERENCE TO EVADE DIFFICULTIES, WHETHER IN THE FIELDS OF SECURITY, WHETHER THOSE DIFFICULTIES ARISE IN THE NATIONALIST OR UNIONIST SIDES OR IN THE FIELD OF COOPERATION'. HE WOULD NOT LESSEN HIS EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY BUT HE WAS 'DEEPLY CONVINCED THAT THERE EXISITS A MECHANISM FOR MAKING REAL PROGRESS, PROGRESS WHICH WILL PRODUCE FAR MORE SATISFACTORY RESULTS THAN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE PROTESTS'.

APPLICATION OF MEASURES IN THE REPUBLIC

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8. MR BARRY POINTED TO THE CONDITIONAL NATURE OF REFERENCES TO THE RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF MEASURES IN THE REPUBLIC, AND SAID: 'THERE IS OF COURSE NO OBLIGATION ON US TO DO ANYTHING, BUT IT WOULD BE NOTHING SHORT OF A SHEER INSULT TO GO INTO THIS ENTERPRISE AS THOUGH WE HAD NOTHING TO LEARN FROM THE EXPERIENCE'. HE ADDED: 'SURELY BOTH SIDES OF THIS HOUSE SHARE THE DESIRE TO SEE, WHEREVER APPROPRIATE THE SAME POLICIES BEING APPLIED IN THE TWO PARTS OF IRELAND, ESPECIALLY IF WE HAVE AN INPUT INTO THOSE BEING APPLIED IN THE NORTH'.

SDLP AND FIANNA FAIL

9. MR BARRY DENIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD AT ANY POINT SOUGHT TO PUT ANY PRESSURE ON THE SDLP, EITHER ABOUT THE AGREEMENT OR ABOUT THEIR ROLE IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. TURNING TO FIANNA FAIL HE SAID: 'WE SHOULD ALL ADMIT THAT NO PARTY ON THE NATIONALIST SIDE HAS A MONOPOLY ON REPROLICANISM ... THE PEOPLE ARE THE MORAL FORCE OF THIS LAND'.

UNIONISTS

10. MR BARRY SAID HE WAS VERY CONCERNED TO SEE THAT MANY IN THE UNIONIST COMMUNITY 'ARE NOW REACTING PRIMARILY IN EMOTIONAL TERMS'. HE ADDED: 'LET ME SAY THIS CLEARLY. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS NO DESIRE TO HAVE DOMINION OVER THE UNIONIST PEOPLE. THIS AGREEMENT DOES NOT CONFER SUCH A POWER ON US, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. WE RECOGNISE THE IDENTITY OF THE UNIONISTS: THEIR BRITISHNESS, THEIR ETHICS, THEIR SENSE OF BEING THREATENED BY IRISH UNITY'. IN THEIR HEARTS, UNIONISTS 'MUST KNOW THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT THINGS SHOULD STAY THE SAME: THEY MUST KNOW THAT 'NO CHANGE' WOULD ONLY MEAN 'MORE OF THE SAME'.' THE AGREEMENT ATTEMPTED TO PROVIDE A SYSTEM 'WITH WHICH BOTH SIDES CAN IDENTIFY'. HE APPEALED TO MR MOLYNEAUX AND MR PAISLEY 'TO ACCEPT THAT DUBLIN HAS NO DESIRE WHATEVER TO UNDERMINE THEIR RIGHTS ON THEIR POSITION'. THE IRISH INPUT INTO THE PROCESSES OF GOVERNMENT WAS INTENDED 'ONLY TO EASE THE DIVISIONS IN THE COMMUNITY IN THE NORTH ... TO BRING PEACE AND STABILTY'.

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

11. MR BARRY PAID TRIBUTE TO 'THE COURAGE, DETERMINATION AND IMAGINATION SHOWN ON THIS OCCASION BY MRS THATCHER, SIR G HOWE, TOM KING AND HIS PREDECESSOR DOUGLAS HURD'. HE HAD COME 'TO KNOW TOM KING AND TO APPRECIATE HIS QUALITIES IN RECENT MONTHS. HE IS A STRAIGHT-TALKING, SENSIBLE MAN'. MR BARRY HOPED THAT 'IN THE IRISH PERMANENT MINISTERIAL REPRESENTATIVE' HE WOULD FIND ANOTHER, AND THAT THEIR WORK TOGETHER WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO 'PEACE AND STABILITY ... TO RECONCILIATION, ... TO PROSPERITY AND TO THE GREATER FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND IRISH PEOPLES'.

GOODISON

YYYY

NORTHERN IRELAND
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PS
PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
SIR W HARDING
MR GOODALL
MR BARRINGTON
MR O'NEILL
MR SAMUEL
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YOUR TELNO 287: PRIME MINNISTER'S LETTER TO MR CUSHNAHAN

1. I HANDED THIS TEXT TO DONLON ON 22 NOVEMBER. HE SAID THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT COULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO ITS CONTENT. HE HOPED HOWEVER THAT WE SHOULD CONSULT THEM BEFORE MAKING ANY FURTHER COMMUNICATION ON THE BASIS OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH TO NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICIANS. LILLIS SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD FIND ITSELF IN CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES IF WE PROMISED TO REVEAL WHAT HAPPENED IN THE CONFERENCE, SINCE THE IRISH WOULD BE RAISING DELICATE QUESTIONS FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. PUBLICITY FOR THESE QUESTIONS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY EMBARRASS THE IRISH SO MUCH.

GOODISON

LIMITED
RID
PS
PS/PUS
MR GOODALL

COPIES TO:
SIR R ARMSTRONG, CABINET OFFICE
MR BRENNAN, NIO (H)
PS/No 10 DOWNING ST.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

Charles

WIO rany:-

① Since 1969, 2460 people have been killed, of which 753 were members of the security forces. If the figures change over the w.end they will phone you.

② Contacts over the w.end are D. Chesterton - Under Sec.
0491 577031
PIO

or
T. Branon - Dep. Sec.

~~6491~~ 642 280.

22/x1.

010

RESTRICTED

CDP

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 November 1985

CM.

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Speech in the Debate on the Anglo-Irish Agreement

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 21 November to Jim Daniell enclosing the latest version of the Prime Minister's draft speech. Sir Geoffrey Howe thinks that the draft is very much on the right lines and has only one or two suggestions to make on it.

with CDP

In the second paragraph on page 4, it would be worth adding "all" before "the law abiding people of Northern Ireland" to make it clear that this refers to those in both communities in Northern Ireland who are opposed to violence.

On page 13, add a new sentence at the end of the second line to read: "It commits both governments to make determined efforts to resolve any differences". It is true that this provision is referred to on page 24 of the draft; but it is such an important part of Article 2 that its omission here would look disingenuous.

On page 17, insert "in good faith" after "consider" in the third line from the end of the first paragraph.

At the top of page 18, "Gardai" should read "Garda Siochana" (pronounced Shockarna).

On page 20, second line, substitute "this will be" for "this is" (we are dealing with an intention on the part of the Irish Government rather than a decision).

At the bottom of page 22, it is not literally correct that Article 1 "echoes the provision of Section 1 of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act .....". It would be better to say: "The effect of Article 1 is to confirm the provision in Section 1 of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act ....".

/Sir Geoffrey

RESTRICTED

Sir Geoffrey Howe notes that the final paragraph on page 16 of the draft enclosed with Christopher Mallaby's minute to you of 15 November has disappeared from the later version. This seems a pity, since it sets the whole Agreement in a wider perspective. Sir Geoffrey thinks that something on those lines would be worth including.

Sir Geoffrey Howe also welcomes the inclusion on page 30 of the tribute to Dr FitzGerald. This will be particularly well received in Dublin in the light of the care Dr FitzGerald has taken in the Dail debate to present the agreement along the lines agreed between us and to avoid any attempt at over-selling it to his nationalist constituency. You may like to consider adding the words "great tenacity and" at the end of the second line on page 30.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Jim Daniell (NIO).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

PS One other thought.

On p. 7 we would favour the omission of the clause "even though.... being fulfilled".

PLO SRWALB
CCPCV

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 November 1985

Dear Jim,

PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO MR. KILFEDDER

The Clerk of the Ulster Assembly rang me this afternoon to say that the Assembly had decided to accept the Prime Minister's invitation to send a delegation to see her. The delegation would consist of three representatives from the Democratic Unionist Party, three from the Ulster Unionist Party and two from the Alliance. It would be led by Mr. Kilfedder himself. The delegation would very much prefer to see the Prime Minister before next Tuesday's debate in the House of Commons.

After consulting the Prime Minister, I rang back to offer the time of 3.15 on the afternoon of Monday, 25 November. This was accepted by Mr Kilfedder to whom I subsequently spoke several times in the course of the afternoon. The upshot of it was that the delegation would consist of Frank Millar (General Secretary) and Jack Allen (Chief Whip) of the Ulster Unionist Party; Peter Robinson (Deputy Leader) and Tim Allister (Chief Whip) of the Democratic Unionist Party; two unidentified members of the Alliance Party, and Mr Kilfedder. Mr Kilfedder himself will be there in an entirely neutral role. They will be sending an official reply to the Prime Minister's letter which will say that the delegation's task will be to discuss with the Prime Minister the terms of the Assembly's Resolution and that it will not be authorised to enter into negotiations. I made clear in reply that we had no intention of negotiating. Mr Kilfedder said rather apologetically that Mr Paisley had insisted on this last point.

I am copying this letter to Colin Budd (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Mr Mallaby (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

C D POWELL

Jim Daniell, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

file Bembdz BM

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 November 1985

You requested a meeting with me urgently and I gladly agreed. At our meeting today you asked me for a clear assurance that the Inter-Governmental Conference to be established under the Anglo-Irish Agreement would have no executive authority, and that there was no intention to give it such authority in future. I gladly give you an unqualified assurance on this point.

You also raised your misgivings about the absence of any mechanism for the traditional majority in Northern Ireland to make its views known on the matters within the scope of the Inter-Governmental Conference, and the lack of clear arrangements for keeping them informed about the Conference's discussions. As I told you, the Government is giving these questions serious consideration and I hope to be able to be in a position to make some practical suggestions soon.

With best wishes,

John Cushnahan, Esq.

BM

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 November 1985

Dear Dr. Paisley.

I should like to send you the enclosed copy of a letter which I have addressed today to Mr. Cushnahan after he came to see me at his own request. I hope you will let me have your views on the matters raised in it.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Reverend Ian Paisley, M.P.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 November 1985

Dear Jim,

I should like to send you the enclosed copy of a letter which I have addressed today to Mr. Cushnahan after he came to see me at his own request. I hope you will let me have your views on the matters raised in it.

Yours ever

Margaret

The Rt. Hon. James Molyneaux, J.P., M.P.

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PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND

1. I was invited at Cabinet on 21 November (CC/85) 33rd Conclusions Item 2) to consider, in conjunction with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, what changes in Parliamentary arrangements at Westminster would be feasible and suitable as means of providing reassurance to Unionists. I have since discussed the various possibilities of procedural change with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Chief Whip.

2. At present the Unionist parties have only a half 'Opposition Day' annually, but there are numerous other opportunities for them to raise Northern Irish matters on the Floor of the House. There is virtually no primary legislation relating exclusively to Northern Ireland. Such measures take the form of Orders in Council. These may be either taken on the Floor of the House or in Standing Committee. In practice any Order which the Unionists want taken on the Floor is so taken.

3. There is no Select Committee on Northern Ireland, although the various Departmental Select Committees can examine Northern Irish aspects of their respective remits. There is, however, a Standing Committee, known as the 'Northern Ireland Committee' which is empowered to consider any matter related exclusively to Northern Ireland referred to it by the House. It is a debating not an investigative, body and can only report that a matter 'has been considered'. Its membership comprises all Members for Northern Irish constituencies, plus up to 25 other Members nominated by the House of Commons Committee of Selection. This Standing Committee can debate Northern Ireland Orders in Council in their preliminary or 'proposal' form, but in practice the Committee is largely moribund.

4. There are various ways of increasing the opportunities of Unionist Members to raise Northern Irish matters at Westminster:

Prime Minister
Re possibilities for giving the Unionists a bigger voice at Westminster are there. But they need careful discussion through the usual channels. Not much can be said in the debate.
CDP 22/11

(i) More 'Opposition Days': Further time beyond the present annual half-day could not be taken from the other Opposition Parties without their agreement, and would almost certainly have to come from Government time. An amendment to Standing Orders would be required.

(ii) Using primary legislation instead of Northern Ireland Orders in Council. This might take two forms:

(a) embodying present 'Northern Ireland Orders in Council' matters in general United Kingdom legislation;

(b) Northern Irish Bills dealing exclusively with matters relating to Northern Ireland. This would not require amendment of the procedures of the House, but would complicate the drafting of United Kingdom legislation. How far it would place additional burdens on the legislative programme would depend on how far Northern Ireland Bills could be dealt with in Committees.

(iii) More powers for the Northern Ireland Standing Committee: This Committee, which meets infrequently at present, might be given wider powers. In particular it might, if appropriate, be given Powers to take the Second Readings, and possibly the Report stage, of Northern Irish Bills if these were introduced. This might be linked with the elevation of the Committee to Grand Committee status, comparable with the Scottish and Welsh Grand Committee.

(iv) The establishment of a Northern Ireland Select Committee, or increased Northern Irish representation on the existing Departmental Select Committees. Such a Select Committee would be an investigating, evidence-taking body which could, if wished, seek oral and written evidence from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Its recommendations would be advisory only. All the present Departmental Select Committees have 11 Members, except the Scottish Affairs Committee which has 13. Unless special provision were made a Committee of this size would contain only one Member of the minor parties: it would normally need 22 Members for two minor party representatives to be included.

An alternative way of providing an increased 'investigative' role for Northern Irish Members would be to increase their representation on existing Departmental Select Committees. But their present representation is in accordance with their numbers in the House.

5. We have so far confined the consideration of our remit to the procedural feasibility of the various initiatives that might be taken. We have not addressed the question of the likely acceptability of any of them to Northern Irish Members, or the wider implications in terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The timing of any further Parliamentary initiative designed to placate Unionist opinion will be of crucial importance. A number of the proposals would, however, if pursued, give Northern Irish Members of the House a role disproportionate to their numbers, and would require agreement not only between the Government and the Unionists, but also with the other parties through the usual channels.

6. In these circumstances the Chief Whip and I have agreed the following with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. In his speech opening the debate on Wednesday 27 November, he would say no more than that the Government fully recognises that there is a need to devise means of keeping Parliament informed about meetings of the Anglo-Irish inter-governmental conference, and that the Government would welcome discussions through the usual channels as to how this can best be achieved. These would then provide an opportunity in due course for ventilating any of the procedural possibilities outlined above which we decide to pursue. I shall report further on this.

I am copying this minute to Cabinet colleagues, the Chief Whip and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

D.A. Maxwell
(Private Secretary)

WJB
[Approved by the Lord Privy Seal and signed in his absence.]

22 November 1985

22. XI.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 November 1985

Dear Charles,

Anglo-Irish Agreement: Message to the Prime Minister from the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr Mulroney

The Canadian High Commission delivered to the FCO on 21 November an advance text of a personal message of congratulations addressed to the Prime Minister from Mr Mulroney on the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

I now enclose this together with a draft reply for the Prime Minister's consideration.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11C

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR BRIAN MULRONEY, PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA

1. Thank you for your very kind message about the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. I was also ~~touched~~ strikingly by the statement which you issued welcoming the Agreement. No single Agreement can resolve the problem of Northern Ireland but we believe that the Agreement is a significant step towards achieving lasting peace and stability. I value your support and encouragement in this endeavour.

I was pleased to see you, if only briefly, in Brussels.

CBy

DSy (62)


22. XI. 85
AM PM

SUBJECT
cc Master

RESTRICTED

CF file
SRWAK 2

cc PC
RJA

10 DOWNING STREET

22 November 1985

From the Private Secretary

Dear Jim,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. JOHN CUSHNAHAN

The Prime Minister had a talk this morning with Mr. Cushnahan, leader of the Alliance Party in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Secretary was also present.

Mr. Cushnahan made plain that he did not agree with the Anglo-Irish Agreement. He thought it was one-sided. But he could see that the Government had been forced into it by the crass stupidity of the Unionists. Now that it was there, he understood that it was his duty to run with it even though this caused problems in his Party. He had put his leadership on the line.

Mr. Cushnahan continued that he thought much of the very strong concern in the Protestant community stemmed from the secrecy which had accompanied the negotiations and the lack of consultation with the Protestant majority. He thought it important that the Government should now take action to counteract the feeling on the part of the majority that they were being excluded. He had a number of suggestions.

Firstly, he would find it very valuable if the Prime Minister could give him a clear assurance that the intergovernmental conference would have no executive authority and that there was no intention to give it such authority in the future. It must be clear that the Agreement was not simply preparing the ground for joint authority. Secondly, he thought that the Government should publish the agendas of the intergovernmental conference and make some sort of statement afterwards. This would give the Assembly a chance to make comments. The Assembly could have a useful role and to some extent act as a counter-balance to the conference. Thirdly, he hoped that the question of mixed courts could be dealt with at the first meeting of the intergovernmental conference with further discussion in effect postponed sine die. This would make clear that there was no likelihood of any early progress towards such courts. Fourthly, pressure should be brought on the SDLP to give some assurances to the Protestant community of their readiness to take an active part in moves towards establishing devolved government. It was time for the SDLP to be generous. Finally, it would be very valuable indeed if the intergovernmental conference could come up with early agreement between the Government and the Republic on joint

measures against Sinn Fein. This would be an all-Ireland approach.

The Prime Minister said that she found all Mr. Cushnahan's points of interest. She could give him an unqualified assurance about the role of the intergovernmental conference. She could also say that the Government were considering the question of providing reassurance to the Protestant community that their concerns would be taken into account. She hoped to be in a position to make some practical suggestions quite soon. Mr. Cushnahan asked whether the Prime Minister could record these points in a letter to him. The Prime Minister agreed to do so and handed Mr. Cushnahan the enclosed letter. It was agreed that it would be made public at 3 pm this afternoon.

The Prime Minister has sent copies of her letter to Mr. Cushnahan to Mr. Molyneaux and to Dr. Paisley inviting them to make suggestions on the subjects mentioned. She would also like the Irish Government to be shown a copy of the letter as soon as possible. I should be grateful if the Foreign Office could arrange for it to be telegraphed to Dublin.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretaries to the Lord President, the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Lord Privy Seal and the Chief Whip.

yours sincerely,

(C.D. POWELL)

Jim Daniell, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 November 1985

You requested a meeting with me urgently and I gladly agreed. At our meeting today you asked me for a clear assurance that the Inter-Governmental Conference to be established under the Anglo-Irish Agreement would have no executive authority, and that there was no intention to give it such authority in future. I gladly give you an unqualified assurance on this point.

You also raised your misgivings about the absence of any mechanism for the traditional majority in Northern Ireland to make its views known on the matters within the scope of the Inter-Governmental Conference, and the lack of clear arrangements for keeping them informed about the Conference's discussions. As I told you, the Government is giving these questions serious consideration and I hope to be able to be in a position to make some practical suggestions soon.

With best wishes,

John Cushnahan, Esq.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 November 1985

Dear Mr. Kilfedder,

Thank you for your letter of 16 November, with the text of the Resolution passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly on that day.

I recognise that there is genuine concern among Unionists in Northern Ireland about the Agreement, although I am sure you will understand that I do not accept the interpretation contained in the Resolution.

I am not able for the time being to accept your invitation to address the Assembly. But it would be a great help to me if I were able to meet some of the members of the Assembly and hear their views at first hand. I should therefore like to invite a representative delegation from the Assembly to 10 Downing Street for a talk next week. If you agree, my office will be in touch about a date and time. I do hope that Assembly members will find this suggestion both welcome and of benefit to them.

I am arranging for the text of this letter to be released to be press.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

J.A. Kilfedder, Esq., M.P.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Miss Joan McNaughton
PS/Lord President of the
Council
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
LONDON SW1A

21 November 1985

Dear Joan

I attach a draft speech for the Lord President in next Tuesday's debate in the Lords.

As you know events are moving rapidly and we may well advise the Lord President to amend the speech before it is made. We have taken account of your suggestions for the opening paragraph of the speech. We hold the speech on a word processor and we would be happy to amend it in the light of the Lord President's comments.

I am copying this letter and attachment to Charles Powell (10 Downing Street), Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Michael Stark.

Yours sincerely

Jim

J A DANIELL

E.R.

DRAFT SPEECH ON ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT FOR THE LORD PRESIDENT

[My Lords, it would be easy for me to look back, to recount my experiences as the first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, instead of looking to the future. But it would be wrong. We must look to the future. We must build and not destroy. Neither the people of Great Britain nor the people of Northern Ireland can afford the luxury of destroying, or living in the past.] I am therefore pleased to seek the approval of this House to the Anglo-Irish Agreement which was signed on Friday 15 November by the Prime Minister and the Irish Taoiseach. I believe that this Agreement marks a useful step in Anglo-Irish relations, it offers a substantial opportunity, a chance to build, to the people of Northern Ireland, both Unionist and Nationalist. It can contribute significantly to the aim which we all share of peace, stability and prosperity in Northern Ireland.

I am sure Noble Lords will by now have had an opportunity to read this Agreement and to consider it in some depth. If so it will be clear that it is not the Agreement some have made it out to be. It is not "joint authority' by some other name; it does not give the Republic of Ireland a veto over the exercise of our powers and responsibilities in Northern Ireland; and above all it does not derogate from our sovereignty.

But neither is it, as some have argued, an Agreement which will change nothing. Of course it will not solve all Northern Ireland's problems. But we hope that it will change things in Northern Ireland, in a measured and responsible way, in the direction which successive Governments have wished to go.

E.R.

In that direction lies, in the words of the Agreement, a "society in Northern Ireland in which all may live in peace, free from discrimination and tolerance and with the opportunity for both communities to participate in the structures and processes of government".

Underlying this Agreement is a commitment by both Governments to recognise and acknowledge the rights and identities of the two traditions which exist in Northern Ireland; on the one hand the Unionist community, the majority, who consider themselves British and wish to retain the link with Great Britain; on the other hand the Nationalist community, who think of themselves as Irish in identity, and aspire to eventual Irish unity. The present Agreement offers important safeguards to both these traditions.

The two Governments have affirmed that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland, and that the present wish of a majority there is for no change. Sovereignty remains with the Westminster Parliament and responsibility for the government of Northern Ireland remains with United Kingdom Ministers accountable to Parliament. This Government has always been firmly committed to that and the Agreement only reinforces it. For what we have for the first time from the Irish Government in a binding international agreement is a clear statement on the status of Northern Ireland, an acceptance of the principle of consent; and a recognition of the present view of the majority. This is clearly set out in Article 1. There are no ambiguities. We have not wavered over our commitment - there need be no further misapprehension or uncertainty among Unionists.

E.R.

On the other hand, if at some future date a majority of the people in Northern Ireland were to consent formally to a united Ireland, the Agreement makes clear that the Government would introduce and support legislation in Parliament to that effect. Against this background Unionists should have the confidence - in the words of the "Way Forward" published last year by the Ulster Unionist Party - to persuade the minority that the Province is also theirs.

But we cannot make progress towards reconciliation in Northern Ireland - and that is the main essence of the agreement - unless we can also reflect, understand and take account of the minority viewpoint. We cannot ignore the voice of the minority community any more than the voice of the majority. We need to create conditions which will provide the minority with the confidence that they have a role to play in the affairs of Northern Ireland. It is here that the Irish Government has a vital contribution to make.

The Irish Government has an interest in the affairs of Northern Ireland. It shares a border with the United Kingdom. But more importantly many in Northern Ireland feel part of a wider Irish community, and Irish politicians naturally share their concerns and reflect their views. Indeed the Irish Government already raises with us many questions about events in Northern Ireland, particularly where they affect the minority community. What the Agreement will do is that it will formalise this procedure so that the Irish Government's views and proposals can be taken into account in a more structured and methodical way. It is not new, therefore, for us to recieve Irish views. What is new is that they will be put to us - and we will listen to them - in a more constructive way.

E.R.

I will now explain briefly how the Agreement sets out to achieve this. It provides in Article 2 for the establishment of an Intergovernmental Conference. This will extend and build upon the framework of the existing Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council. The Conference will serve as a framework within which - I quote from the Agreement itself - "the United Kingdom Government and the Irish Government work together for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions which exist in Northern Ireland; and for peace, stability and prosperity throughout Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights, co-operation against terrorism and the development of economic, social and cultural co-operation."

The Conference will deal on a regular basis with matters relating mainly to Northern Ireland - on political issues, security and related matters, legal matters including the administration of justice and the promotion of cross-border co-operation. We are committed to consider carefully these views and to make determined efforts to resolve any differences. That means neither that we are obliged to accept the suggestions that are put to us by the Irish, nor that the Irish are granted a veto. It means simply that we will try are hardest to reach agreement. But we are realists. If there are differences, it will remain the clear responsibility of the British Government to take the final decision.

We welcome this arrangement on two accounts. Firstly it will enable the Government better to take account of the minority views. It creates conditions whereby the minority community can be confident that they have a vital role to play in the affairs of Northern Ireland; and we hope too that it will increase their confidence in the institutions of Northern Ireland.

E.R.

Secondly we welcome it because it provides a new framework for more effective co-operation in a wide range of economic, social, cultural and security matters. Our foremost priority in Northern Ireland must be the complete eradication of terrorism which has menaced both islands now for many years. Cooperation with the Irish Government is good. But there are areas, spelt out in Article 9 of the Agreement, where it can be enhanced. We therefore very much welcome the Irish Government's commitment in the Agreement to work with us to ensure that those who adopt or support violence do not succeed. We hope to make early progress against terrorism which is to the benefit of all the people of Northern Ireland. We look forward to tackling this problem with the Irish. We also welcome the Irish Government's intention announced in the Communique to accede as soon as possible to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

In addition to improving security co-operation we also need to make greater efforts to improve relations between the minority community and the security forces and to enable the minority community to have full confidence in the judicial system in Northern Ireland. The confidence of all law-abiding citizens in the security forces and the courts is essential if they are to be wholly effective in upholding the law and in dealing with terrorism. The security forces in Northern Ireland are already highly esteemed throughout the United Kingdom for their dedication, bravery and professionalism and I would like to take this opportunity of paying a special tribute to them. I should add also no less a tribute to the judiciary who in the most difficult circumstances have maintained the standards of impartiality and integrity of which we are proud. But there remains a problem of confidence amongst the minority community. It cannot be wished away and must be tackled.

E.R.

The Intergovernmental Conference will be one way in which we can do this. Article 8 mentions, as one possible approach, the idea of mixed courts. We have undertaken to consider this possibility without commitment. But we have made it clear, and I will repeat now, that we cannot see any easy or early way round the very considerable difficulties in the way of that particular proposal.

Relations between the security forces and the minority, cross-border security co-operation and other aspects of security are issues which will be considered in the first meeting of the Conference. I cannot say when that will be. But we hope for an early meeting.

Let me now say something about the response to the Agreement from some Unionists. They have taken bitter exception to the granting of a role to the Irish Government in the consideration of the affairs of Northern Ireland. The claim that it is unprecedented. And that is in itself a breach of sovereignty. But my Lords, the situation in Northern Ireland, the divisions and conflicting aspirations there, and the relationship that exists between the minority community there and the Irish Government - all these are unprecedented. There is no breach of sovereignty because the final decisions rest with us. Indeed there is no threat in the Agreement. What there is is the opportunity to extend and deepen our relationship with Dublin. For only if there is mutual support and understanding can we ever hope to solve the problems of Northern Ireland that have caused so much agony over the years. I repeat to the Unionists, there is not a threat. It is unique, yes. But it is also essential if we are to solve the unique problems that we face.

E.R.

The Agreement is not a complete solution to the problem of Northern Ireland. The arrangements set out in the Agreement do not represent an alternative to the search for devolution: indeed the Agreement reaffirms both Governments' commitment to find an acceptable form of devolved administration in Northern Ireland - and that means one which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the Community. We want the people of Northern Ireland to take over responsibility for the everyday decisions which affect their lives but there needs to be agreement across the community.

Both Governments however recognise that devolution can be achieved only with the co-operation of constitutional representatives within Northern Ireland of both traditions there. We hope that the Agreement will encourage the elected representatives of both communities to come together to discuss arrangements for forming a devolved structure acceptable to both. And should a devolved administration be established, the Intergovernmental Conference would cease to consider any matters which would become the responsibility of a new local administration.

My Lords, no single Agreement will solve all of Northern Ireland's problems. I know from first hand experience the complexities of the situation in Northern Ireland, the depth of divisions and the magnitude of the task in trying to reach a solution. I have learned that progress can only be made slowly, one step at a time. I firmly believe that this agreement offers an important step in the right direction - it offers a unique opportunity to make real progress towards reconciliation between the two communities in Northern

E.R.

Ireland and to tackle cross-border terrorism in an unprecedented and determined way. It contains reassurances for both communities that their rights will be safeguarded and we would hope that their identities can be mutually respected. It will create an improved climate of friendship and co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. It is thus in the interests of the people of Northern Ireland that we do not let this opportunity pass.

My Lords, I commend the motion to this House.

LLOYD GRIFFITHS

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

2 Nov.

Dear Michael

Northern Ireland

You may wish to see this.

I strongly back what the D.P.P. is doing — but she may wish to see this note as some of the problems it poses for the Rule

Yours Ever
Lloyd

Extract from a Speech by Sir Eldon Griffiths, M.P.
to Party Workers at Nowton, Bury St. Edmunds,
8 pm. Saturday, 23rd November.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

POLICE ANXIETIES OVER THE ANGLO IRISH AGREEMENT

No group has more to gain than the Royal Ulster Constabulary - who have taken the casualties - from any turning down of the graph of violence in Northern Ireland. But none has more to lose than the RUC if, as could transpire, the consequences of the Anglo Irish agreement were to include a reintroduction of political policing into Northern Ireland, and the loss of policing by consent.

The men and women of the RUC will view with dismay - and contempt- the sight of self proclaimed loyalist politicians whooping up violence against the British Government's attempts to bring peace in N. Ireeland. But what happens to the concept of "policing by consent" if the Unionists and Ian Paisley procure, via the ballot box, a demonstration that a majority of the electors of N. Ireland is opposed to the Anglo Irish agreement? The prospect of the police being asked to enforce the will of a democratic majority in Westminster against the will of a democratic majority in Ulster, to put it mildly is a daunting one. Professionally this would lay an impossible load on the police. Personally it could present individual police officers with impossible dilemmas when - as could well happen - their wives and children are ostrasized and even victimized solely because their men folk are required to enforce a United Kingdom dispensation that is rejected by the local community!

If "policing by consent" is put at risk by these new arrangements, so too is the concept of non-political policing. The most significant

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

reform of the RUC since the bad old days of Stormont (when the police inthe eyes of most Catholics too often appeared to be the arm of the Orange Order) is that the Force has now become politically independent. Its Chief Constable respects their policies, but takes no order from political ministers. Its men and women of all ranks are the servants of the Queen, not the Government; literally the limbs of the law, as distinct from the agents of politicians.

The question that now arises is whether the new Anglo Irish conference will interfere in this type of policing. The temptations, I fear, will be great.

Suppose, for example, that Ministers and civil servants from either or both sides of the border were to decide that Anglo Irish harmony would best be served by banning a parade or overlooking a crime, or not pressing some politically sensitive charges. Would the Conference not be tempted to bring pressure on the police to apply the law in a manner that best suited its members? Their reasons might be impeccable. But where would the duty of the policeman lie? To uphold the law and account to the Courts? Or to bend the law at the behest of his political masters?

It has always been the practice and the duty of the British police to hold the delicate balance between enforcing the law and upholding the Queen's peace. But this judgement is theirs to make, and always they must account for their decisions and their actions to the courts. Not so if politicians, no matter how worthy their reasons, interfere in police operations. Once Minister and bureacrats start telling the police what to do, politics prevail and the rule of law is devalued. The police become the agents of whichever

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

group of politicians happens to be in power.

There is nothing in the White Paper that of itself confirms that this risk of politicizing the Royal Ulster Constabulary necessarily will arise from the new Standing Conference. But the police are right to be anxious and fully entitled tolook to the Prime Minister for safeguards. Vague assurances will not be enough. If police morale is to be maintained Ministers need todemonstrate first that they understand and second that they are prepared to meet these genuine police anxieties. For without an independent and fully committed civilian police force - no agreements, however promising, can, or will, succeed.

Canadian High Commission

Haut Commissariat du Canada

Note No. 549

The Canadian High Commission presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to request that the attached message from the Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, be transmitted to the Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

The Canadian High Commission avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurances of its highest consideration.

London,
21 November 1985

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MR MACLABY.
} CABINET OFFICE

PS/ NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

CONFIDENTIAL
FM DUBLIN
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TELNO 803
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IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

MY TELNOS 798-800: ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: DAIL DEBATE

SUMMARY

1. UNDER PRESSURE FROM HIS PARTY MR HAUGHEY IS ADOPTING A MORE CONCILIATORY LINE ON THE AGREEMENT. THE TAOISEACH IS VERY CHEERFUL AND EXPECTS A MAJORITY OF 14 FOR THE AGREEMENT.

[actually 13]

DETAIL

2. I MET DR FITZGERALD AT A SOCIAL OCCASION LAST NIGHT. HE WAS IN EBULLIENT FORM. HE SAID THAT THE FIANNA FAIL PARTY MEETING THAT MORNING HAD PUT CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON MR HAUGHEY TO MODERATE HIS LINE OVER THE AGREEMENT. A PROPOSAL THAT AFTER THE DEFEAT OF THEIR AMENDMENT FIANNA FAIL SHOULD ABSTAIN ON THE MOTION ENDORSING THE AGREEMENT RATHER THAN VOTE AGAINST IT HAD SOME SUPPORT, AND MR HAUGHEY HAD ONLY BEEN ABLE TO BRING THE DISCUSSION TO A HALT BY INSISTING THAT THE DECISION BE TAKEN BY THE FRONT BENCH GROUP AND NOT BY THE PARTY AS A WHOLE. (THIS GROUP, WHO ARE ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON HIM, SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED TO VOTE AGAINST THE MOTION.) DR FITZGERALD WAS VERY HAPPY AT THE DEFECTION OF MISS MARY HARNEY FROM FIANNA FAIL. HIS PARTY HAD BEEN TRYING TO EVADE THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE DAIL TO ENABLE HER TO SPEAK BUT THE PLOT HAD GOT OUT AND HAD FAILED. NEVERTHELESS, HE BELIEVED THAT WITH HER DEFECTION THE GOVERNMENT MAJORITY WOULD BE 14, WHICH I BELIEVE TO BE THE HIGHEST SINCE HE TOOK OFFICE AT THE END OF 1982.

3. THE PRESS PUBLISHES SOME ACCOUNT OF THIS INTENSE PARTY ACTIVITY YESTERDAY, WHICH ENDED WITH MR HAUGHEY DECLARING PUBLICLY THAT IF THOSE WHO WERE COMMITTED TO THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE COULD USE IT ''TO AMELIORATE THE CONDITION OF THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND, WE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT WISH TO PUT ANY DIFFICULTIES IN THEIR WAY.''

GOODISON

YYYY

DLLNAN 0524

RESTRICTED

JR

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 Novmeber 1985

Dear Jim.

PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

I enclose a further revise of the Prime Minister's speech in the Debate on the Anglo-Irish Agreement next week. Further revision will be needed to take acount of discussion at Cabinet this morning and at the subsequent informal meeting of Ministers. It would be helpful to have comments and contributions by lunch-time on Saturday.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Len Appleyard.

Yours sincerely

(C.D. Powell)

Jim Daniell, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

SRW

UNCLASSIFIED
FM DUBLIN
TO DESKBY 221400Z FCO
TELNO 809
OF 211200Z NOVEMBER 85
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON BIS NEW YORK NIO BELFAST

ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: DAIL DEBATE

SUMMARY

1. AT THE END OF THE LOW KEY DAIL DEBATE LAST NIGHT THE GOVERNMENT MOTION ENDORSING THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT WAS APPROVED BY 88 VOTES TO 75. FIANNA FAIL SPEECHES ON THE LAST DAY WERE MORE CONCILATORY THAN HITHERTO.

DETAIL

2. THE LAST DAY OF THE DAIL DEBATE ON THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT SAY A MORE CONCILATORY MOOD AMONG FIANNA FAIL TDS. MARY O'ROURKE (FIANNA FAIL FRONT BENCH SPOKESMAN ON EDUCATION) SPOKE SORROWFULLY OF DIFFERENCES WITH THE SDLP AS 'JUST A FALLING OUT BETWEEN FRIENDS'. SHE WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE WAS A DANGER THAT THE BRITISH WOULD NOW FEEL 'THAT IS THE END OF THE IRISH PROBLEM'. SEAMUS BRENNAN (FIANNA FAIL DISSIDENT WING) WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT THERE WERE 'POSITIVE DETAILED ASPEVTS' IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD HELP TO CALM FEARS WITHIN THE MINORITY IN THE NORTH, BUT THE DOCUMENT COULD NOT BE SAID TO BE THE FINAL WORD AND THERE WAS LEGITIMATE SCOPE FOR GENUINE RESERVATIONS WHICH SHOULD BE STATED IN THE DAIL. HE 'DID NOT THINK THERE WAS ANYBODY WHO WOULD WANT TO OBSTRUCT WHAT WAS AN EXPERIMENT'. HE CALLED FOR AN END TO DIVISIONS AMONGST NATIONALISTS. BOBBY MOLLOY (FIANNA FAIL) SAID THAT WHILST THERE WERE PARTS OF THE AGREEMENT THAT COULD IMPORVE THE SITUATION OF THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY, TO WHICH HE WOULD GIVE 'QUALIFIED SUPPORT', THE GOVERNMENT WAS SEEKING SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT AS A WHOLE, INCLUDING ARTICLE 1 WHICH GAVE A VETO TO UNIONISTS. HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT, BUT WISHED MR BARRY WELL IN HIS WORK IN THE NEW CONFERENCE.

3. WINDING UP FOR FIANNA FAIL, BRIAN LENIHAN SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS A SIGNED TREATY AND NOT JUST A STATEMENT OF INTENT OR A COMMUNIQUE. UNLESS ARTICLE 1. WAS RENEGOTIATED THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THE ISSUE OF IRISH UNITY ATANY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OR JUDICIAL TRIBUNAL. BY VOTING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT MOTION FIANNA FAIL WISHED TO OPPOSE THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE THAT IT HAD BROUGHT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION BUT ''WE ARE NOT REJECTING ANY MEASURES OR ATTEMPTS UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE AGREEMENT TO IMPORVE THE SITUATION OF THOSE WHO LIVE IN THE TORTURED NORTH OF IRELAND''. FIANNA FAIL COULD NOT ACCEPT THE LEGITIMISATION OF PARTITION, OF BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY OR OF THE BRITISH PRESENCE IN IRELAND: ''OUR WHOLE PURPOSE OF A POLITICAL MOVEMENT IS THE PURSUIT OF A UNITED IRELAND BY POLITICAL MEANS'' THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE WAS NEITHER EXECUTIVE NOR CONSULTATIVE, BUT SOMETHING LESS. HE CALLED FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

4. IN HIS CONTRIBUTION, DES O'MALLEY, INDEPENDENT (EX-FF) SAID THAT THE HILLSBOROUGH AGREEMENT WAS NO LESS IMPORTANT THAN SUNNINGDALE AND HE HOPED IT WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL. HE UNDERSTOOD WHY UNIONISTS FELT BETRAYED, BUT IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THEM THAT THE LACK OF CONSULTATION WAS NO-ONE'S FAULT BUT THEIR OWN. AT THE HEART OF THE UNIONIST FEARS WAS THE ANXIETY THAT OTHERS MIGHT ACT TOWARDS THEM AS THEY HAD ACTED IN THE LAST 50 YEARS. THE DAIL SHOULD REASSURE THEM THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. LIKE MANY OTHER SPEAKERS O'MALLEY CALLED UP THE SPIRIT OF DE VALERA, SAYING THAT IF HE AND OTHER FOUNDER MEMBERS OF FIANNA FAIL HAD BEEN ASKED TO VOTE FOR THE AGREEMENT ''DOES ANYBODY THINK THAT THEY WOULD NOT SUPPORT IT ?''. THE AGREEMENT WAS, O'MALLEY SAID, CONSISTENT WITH THE FORUM REPORT AND HE WOULD SUPPORT IT ''BECAUSE IT IS RIGHT ... BECAUSE FOR THIS HOUSE TO REJECT IT WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE''. THE AGREEMENT REPRESENTED A WHOLE NEW CONCEPT IN ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS.

5. COALITION DEPUTIES MAINTAINED THEIR POSITION OF CAUTIOUS SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT. MERVYN TAYLOR, THE LABOUR CHIEF WHIP, SAID THAT HE HAD FEARS ABOUT IT, BUT THESE WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE SERIOUS IF THE SDLP'S POSITION HAD BEEN DIFFERENT. THE FACT THAT THEY FOUND THERE WAS HOPE AND PROMISE IN THE AGREEMENT WAS THE MAJOR FACTOR IN GOING ALONG WITH IT, WITHOUT DEROGATION FROM THE ASPIRATION TO NATIONAL UNITY. MINISTER FOR LABOUR RUAIRI QUINN (LAB) SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT REPRESENTED A POSITIVE BASIS FOR FRUITFUL DIALOGUE AND ACTION BETWEEN THE TWO TRADITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. IN ESTABLISHING THE REPUBLIC'S RIGHT TO REGULAR FORMAL PARTICIPATION IN THE AFFAIRS OF NORTHERN IRELAND IT CONSTITUTED AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS BREAKING THE POLITICAL DEADLOCK WHICH HAD CHARACTERISED NORTHERN POLITICS SINCE 1920. MR BARRY'S SPEECH, WINDING UP FOR THE GOVERNMENT, (MY TELNO 808) FOCUSSED ON POINTS RAISED BY DEPUTIES DURING THE DEBATE.

6. THE DAIL DIVIDED ON THE FIANNA FAIL AMENDMENT TO THE MOTION (PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 797). THIS WAS DEFEATED BY 88 VOTES TO 75. THE GOVERNMENT MOTION WAS THEN APPROVED BY THE SAME MARGIN. MARY HARNEY TD (FF) WAS THE ONLY DEPUTY TO BREAK PARTY RANKS. FINE GAEL AND LABOUR TD'S WERE ALSO JOINED BY DES O'MALLEY (INDEPENDENT) AND THE 2 WORKERS PARTY DEPUTIES. FIANNA FAIL RECEIVED THE VOTES OF NEIL BLANEY (IND FF) AND TONY GREGORY (IND). EDDIE COLLINS (FF) WAS ABSENT ON A VISIT OVERSEAS AND WAS PAIRED.

GOODISON

NORTHERN IRELAND
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PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR EGGAR
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MR DEREK THOMAS
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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 16 November, with the text of the Resolution passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly on that day.

I recognise that there is genuine concern among Unionists in Northern Ireland about the Agreement, though ~~you will not expect me to~~ accept the interpretation ~~placed on the Agreement in~~ the Resolution.

I am not able for the time being to accept your invitation to address the Assembly. But ~~I am sure it~~ would ~~be useful~~ if I were able to meet some of the members of the Assembly and hear their views at first hand. I should like ~~to suggest, therefore, that~~ a representative delegation from the Assembly ~~should come~~ to 10 Downing Street for a talk next week. If you agree, my office will be in touch about a date and time.

I am arranging for the text of this letter to be released to be press.

J.A. Kilfedder, Esq., M.P.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

(1)

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Prime Minister

I have recast the letter on the lines you wanted.

Agree to sign the letter attached?

Agree that it should be delivered tomorrow?

Please note the passage about John Hume. Mr. King now recommends against a message to the Taoiseach.

C.D.P.
21/11

CONFIDENTIAL

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

21 November 1985

Dear Charles

NORTHERN IRELAND

Thank you for your letter of today's date recording decisions taken at the informal meeting after Cabinet this morning.

I attach a draft letter for the Prime Minister to send to Mr Kilfedder. The Secretary of State feels that we should not, at this stage, issue a point by point rebuttal of the Assembly resolution. He would prefer to save the detailed argumentation for next week's debate, while making the point now that the thrust of the Assembly's arguments are not accepted. Thus the draft is considerably shorter than had been envisaged at this morning's meeting.

As for timing of issue of the letter, Mr King, on reflection, thinks it important that the Government should not appear to be acting hastily in the light of yesterday's events. Moreover, he does not think that issuing the letter before Saturday would have any significant impact on the size or mood of the demonstration due to take place that afternoon. His preferred time of delivery would be around 6.00pm on the afternoon of Saturday 23 November; the text would be released to the press at the same time. This would ensure that the letter received good coverage before the debate and might reduce the impact of reporting on the demonstration.

If the Prime Minister is content with the approach outlined above, my office will take responsibility for ensuring that the letter is delivered. Perhaps our Press Offices could liaise over arrangements for releasing the text of the letter.

As for the SDLP, the Secretary of State met Mr Hume this afternoon to discuss a range of matters, including the possibility of his party returning to the Assembly. In the light of Mr Hume's generally positive response, the Secretary of State no longer considers it desirable to raise the matter with the Taoiseach.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Lord President of the Council, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Lord Privy Seal, the Home Secretary, the Chief Whip and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever
Jean Daniell

J A DANIELL

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE

To	Enclosures	Copies to be sent to
J A Kilfedder Esq MP Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly Parliament Buildings Stormont BELFAST BT4 3SY (Full Postal Address)		(Full Address, if Necessary)

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY THE PRIME MINISTER

(Name of Signatory)

Thank you for your letter of 16 November, with the text of the resolution passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly on that day. I cannot accept your interpretation of the Agreement. But nonetheless I recognise that there is genuine concern among unionists in Northern Ireland about it.

While I am unable to take up your invitation for me to address the Assembly immediately, I shall give it careful consideration. In the meantime, I suggest that a representative delegation from the Assembly should come to 10 Downing Street for a talk with me and with Tom King. Perhaps you would suggest a time. The debate in the House of Commons next week about the Anglo-Irish Agreement will, of course, provide an opportunity for Unionist Members to express their views about the Agreement. But a meeting at 10 Downing Street would offer an opportunity for a wider group from the Assembly to do the same.

I am arranging for the text of this letter to be released to the press.

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

CONFIDENTIAL

CDP

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

21 November 1985

Dear Charles

MEETING WITH JOHN CUSHNAHAN

I attach a short briefing note for the Prime Minister's meeting with John Cushnahan at 10.00am tomorrow. The Secretary of State will attend.

Yours sincerely

Jon Daniell

J A DANIELL

~~PM~~ PM's Box

21/11

CONFIDENTIAL

E.R.

MEETING WITH JOHN CUSHNAHAN - LEADER OF THE ALLIANCE PARTY OF NORTHERN IRELAND

Since the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, Mr Cushnahan has adopted a responsible public attitude, urging people to study the document carefully before jumping to conclusions. In private, however, he is deeply concerned not least because the Agreement has split his party. A number of his colleagues are still angry at the secrecy which surrounded the negotiations and the lack of prior consultation; they are worried that the Irish Government has been given more than just a consultative role; and they fear that the Agreement will reduce the prospects for devolution and threaten the continued existence of the Assembly. Alliance have invested considerable time and energy in the Assembly and several senior party members now rely entirely on Assembly pay for their livelihoods.

2. Mr Cushnahan has always argued for an internal political settlement which will allow both the majority and the minority to play a part. He relies for electoral support on moderate elements within both communities and knows that such support will be quickly undermined if the Agreement serves to further polarise political opinion. He now believes that Alliance will fall apart unless:-

(a) The Irish Government's role is purely consultative;

(b) The Agreement leads to a definite improvement in security;

(c) A role is found for unionist politicians;

(d) The SDLP show early interest in devolution and make some gesture towards supporting the security forces.

3. Mr Cushnahan will be looking for re-assurance on these points and an opportunity to explain his party's position. Without such re-assurance, it will be increasingly difficult for him to maintain his helpful public stance and to preserve the devolution option. The Prime Minister may wish to stress the importance which the Government continues to place on devolution and to emphasise the positive role which the Agreement can play in this respect. She may also want to explain that the Intergovernmental Conference will have no executive powers and will not derogate, therefore, from the sovereignty of HMG.

CHARLES

Mike Hall has been asked by Ulster TV who are interviewing James Molyneaux MP this evening, if they can ask the following question:

They understand that it is usual for PCs to be briefed on these occasions ie. the visit to N.I. and to ask him if he was briefed.

Press Office want to know whether they can release the fact that James Molyneaux was briefed, to Ulster T.V.

As far as Tim is concerned, James Molyneaux was briefed, but is this so?

The Prime Minister has been re-elected Leader of the Tory Party and no other nominations were received.
It is being declared at 1800 tonight.

Sally

21.11.85

SUBJECT
cc Master.

SRWAKY

CONFIDENTIAL

file
cPC
ceRTA.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November 1985

Dear Jim,

NORTHERN IRELAND

The Prime Minister held an informal meeting of Ministers following Cabinet this morning to discuss ways in which more reassurance could be offered to the Unionists following the recent Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Lord President, the Foreign Secretary, the Northern Ireland Secretary, the Lord Privy Seal, the Home Secretary and the Chief Whip were present.

The Prime Minister said that the Unionists had fastened on to the lack of consultation with them in the negotiations of the Agreement with the Irish Republic as a major grievance. They were also making a point of the fact that, while the Nationalists would have the Republic Government to put forward their concerns in the intergovernmental committee, the Unionists would have no channel for their views. Ministers concerned should give very early consideration to ways to deal with these perceived grievances. In particular, the Government should set out clearly the steps for consulting the Unionists which were already available through the Northern Ireland Assembly. Consideration should be given as to how this consultation could be reinforced and also to arrangements at Westminster which would provide the focus for Unionists to put forward their views.

More immediately it was essential to send a very early reply to the letter from Mr. James Kilfedder, M.P., in which he had conveyed a Resolution of the Assembly inviting the Prime Minister to address them. The reply should express the Prime Minister's willingness to see the Speaker of the Assembly and a representative delegation of members at Downing Street at an early date. This reply should issue early on 22 November so that it could be made public before the planned Unionist demonstration on 23 November.

Consideration was also needed as to how the SDLP could be encouraged to return to the Assembly. It was agreed that an early message from the Prime Minister to the Taoiseach asking his help in persuading the SDLP to take some positive steps was desirable.

SRW

CONFIDENTIAL

I should be grateful for a draft reply to Mr. Kilfedder by 2030 hours this evening.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to those present at the meeting.

yours sincerely

Charles Powell

(C.D. POWELL)

Jim Daniell, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

B.07221

MR POWELL

Anglo-Irish Agreement: Parliamentary Debate

The Northern Ireland Office will provide the four items requested in paragraph 3 of your letter of 19 November to Jim Daniell.

2. Meanwhile, I have looked again with NIO officials at the draft for the Prime Minister's speech, enclosed with your letter, in the light of very recent events. We feel that, since the Unionists seem to be so isolated in Parliament, the tone of the speech need not be critical of them. That causes us to suggest deletions on page 2 and pages 27-28. We also think that the speech should specify the benefits which we see for the unionists in the Agreement and appeal to them to reflect fully on these. In line with this, we suggest expansion of a passage on page 9 of the draft, set out in Annex A to this minute, and a new passage to come before the final paragraph of the speech, set out in Annex B to this minute. We also suggest a number of lesser amendments which, with the deletions mentioned above, are shown in manuscript on the attached copy of your draft. I should explain that the suggested transfer of the material on page 19 to a position after the last full paragraph on page 17 is designed to improve the sequence by separating, as "the first of the benefits", the things that will happen between the two governments from the second benefit, which relates to the two communities.

3. I am sending copies of this minute and the attachments to Jim Daniell (NIO), Len Appleyard (FCO) and Michael Stark.

C L G Mallaby

20 November 1985

RESTRICTED

2

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The Chief Constable of Northern Ireland has instituted a full enquiry into the events leading up to the manhandling of Mr King at Lurgethan.

N. L. W.
20 Nov.

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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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MR BRENNAN
MR BURNS
MR PN BELL
NIO

SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO
MR MALLABY
CABINET OFFICE

PS/ NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

14.11

IMMEDIATE

SENT 19 NOV 1985

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MIPT: ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: DAIL DEBATE: TAOISEACH'S SPEECH

1. THE TAOISEACH BEGAN HIS 50 MINUTE SPEECH BY APPEALING FOR THE DEBATE TO BE CONDUCTED ''IN A CALM AND SERIOUS WAY'', AVOIDING ''PARTISAN OR PARTY POLITICAL COMMENTS'' AND ESPECIALLY ANYTHING WHICH ''COULD IN ANY WAY EXACERBATE FEARS OR AROUSE PASSIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND''. HE DISPOSED OF FIANNA FAIL'S AMENDMENT (PARA 2 OF MY TLNO 792) BY QUOTING DE VALERA AGAINST A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. HE SPOKE OF THE ''TRAUMA'' OF NORTHERN NATIONALISTS FROM 1920 ONWARDS (''PART OF A STATE WITH WHICH THEY COULD NOT IDENTIFY'': ''SECOND-CLASS CITIZENSHIP''), BUT ALSO OF THE SUFFERING OF UNIONISTS (''A SENSE OF FEAR LEADING TO A SIEGE MENTALITY''). THE TASK WAS ''TO HEAL THESE DIVISIONS, TO REMOVE THE ALIENATION OF ONE COMMUNITY, AND TO STILL THE FEARS OF THE OTHER''.

2. DR FITZGERALD THANKED MRS THATCHER ''WHO, ONCE SHE BECAME CONVINCED THAT THE DIRECTION AND PATH SET OUT IN THIS AGREEMENT WAS THE RIGHT ONE TO FOLLOW, ENGAGED HERSELF COURAGEOUSLY AND WITH SUCH FULL COMMITMENT TOWARDS ITS SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION'', SIR GEOFFREY HOWE AND ''SUCCESSIVE SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND''. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO THE RUC FOR ''THE COURTEOUS AND EFFECTIVE SECURITY'' AT HILLSBOROUGH AND THANKED FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR SUPPORT.

3. DR FITZGERALD GAVE CREDIT TO MR HAUGHEY FOR FORMULATING THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACH TO BREAKING THE POST-SUNNINGDALE DEADLOCK AND INITIATING ''THE ANGLO-IRISH PROCESS WHICH HAS

THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACH TO BREAKING THE POST-SUNNINGDALE DEADLOCK AND INITIATING ''THE ANGLO-IRISH PROCESS WHICH HAS CULMINATED IN THE AGREEMENT''. HE DESCRIBED THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 2(B) AS ''GOING BEYOND A CONSULTATIVE ROLE, BUT NECESSARILY BECAUSE OF THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE FALLING SHORT OF AN EXECUTIVE ROLE''. HE SAID THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS SUPPORTED ''THE POLICY OF DEVOLUTION OF CERTAIN MATTERS .... ON A BASIS OF POWER SHARING OR PARTICIPATION AT EXECUTIVE LEVEL'', BUT THAT ''EVEN IN THE EVENT OF DEVOLUTION THE CONFERENCE WILL STILL HAVE A WIDE RANGE OF FUNCTIONS CONCERNING MATTERS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE NATIONALIST MINORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND''. HAVING GONE THROUGH THE PROVISIONS OF BOTH THE AGREEMENT AND THE COMMUNIQUE, DR FITZGERALD STATED THAT THEY MUST ''STAND ON THEIR MERITS. THERE ARE NO SECRET AGREEMENTS AND NO HIDDEN AGENDAS. WHEN WE STARTED THIS NEGOTIATION BOTH SIDES INSISTED THAT THIS WAS THE PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THEY WERE ACTING .... THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE AGREEMENT IS AN ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE TO ITS FUTURE ACCEPTANCE BY THE PARTIES MOST ULTIMATELY AFFECTED''. EMPHASISING THAT BOTH SIDES ''ARE DETERMINED THAT THE AGREEMENT WILL WORK'', DR FITZGERALD SAID THAT IT WAS ''NOT AN END IN ITSELF'', BUT ''A FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRESS .... THE BEGINNING OF A DIFFICULT, AND - LET US FACE IT - EVEN DANGEROUS, PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION''.

4. REVERTING TO ARTICLE 1 OF THE AGREEMENT, DR FITZGERALD AGAIN POINTED TO MR HAUGHEY'S 1980 COMMUNIQUE AS ''THE STARTING POINT FOR THIS AGREEMENT'' AND SAID: ''THIS AFFIRMATION INVOLVES NO DIMINUTION OF THE NATIONALIST ASPIRATION'' AND SO ''OF ITS VERY NATURE CANNOT AFFECT OUR CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION''. THE TAOISEACH DREW ATTENTION TO THE ABSENCE OF UNILATERAL STATEMENTS IN THE AGREEMENT, AND WENT ON TO DEMONSTRATE THE CAUSAL CONNECTION WITH THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN THE FORUM REPORT. IT HAD BEEN THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S TASK TO SEEK HMG'S AGREEMENT ''TO ONE OR OTHER OF THE STRUCTURES SET OUT IN PARAS 5.7 - 5.9 OF THE FORUM REPORT'' OR, FAILING THAT, TO DISCUSS OTHER VIEWS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 5.10: ''THE GOVERNMENT ADHERED LOYALLY TO THIS BRIEF''. THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN LONG AND HIGH-LEVEL, REFLECTING ''THE EXTREME COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUES AT STAKE''. HE HOPED THAT THE DEBATE WOULD NOT OPEN OUT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NATIONALISTS, AND URGED DEPUTIES TO ''AVOID ANY WORD THAT MIGHT ENDANGER THE LIVES OF PEOPLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND BY CLAIMING THAT ANY KIND OF ADVANTAGE HAS BEEN OBTAINED THROUGH THIS AGREEMENT VIS-A-VIS THE UNIONIST POPULATION''.

5. ADDRESSING UNIONISTS, THE TAOISEACH SAID THAT THEY WOULD SEE THAT IN ARTICLE 1 ''WE REPUDIATE FORMALLY .... ANY QUESTION OF SEEKING THE UNITY OF THIS ISLAND OTHERWISE THAN WITH THE CONSENT OF A MAJORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND''. THE IRISH MOTIVATION IN SEEKING THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN THE ENDING OF THE ALIENATION OF THE MINORITY BOTH FOR ITS OWN SAKE AND BECAUSE THIS WOULD LEAD TO ''PROFOUND REJECTION'' OF THE IRA. IT HAD ''ONE PURPOSE ALONE: TO BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO NORTHERN IRELAND AND TO PRESERVE PEACE THROUGHOUT THESE ISLEANDS''.

GOODISON

YYYY

JA

FILE

cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 November, 1985

Dear Mr. Speaker,

I should like to thank you for the statement you made at your joint press conference with President Reagan on 15 November in support of the Anglo-Irish Agreement which Garret Fitzgerald and I had signed only a few minutes earlier.

It will be a great help in establishing solid and widespread support for the agreement to be able to point to your own commendation of it, and that of many prominent members of Congress.

I noted your generous reference to the possibility of financial and economic assistance for Northern Ireland and the Republic. I of course welcome what you said. We shall be in touch with the Administration to hear more of the possibilities for this.

With warm good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

Mr. Thomas P. O'Neill Jnr.

R17.

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M I P T: ANGLO/IRISH AGREEMENT: STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

1. I AM DELIGHTED TO JOIN WITH SPEAKER O'NEILL IN WELCOMING THE IMPORTANT ANGLO-IRISH ACCORD ANNOUNCED TODAY BY MRS THATCHER AND DR FITZGERALD. WE APPLAUD ITS PROMISE OF PEACE AND A NEW DAWN FOR THE TROUBLED COMMUNITIES OF NORTHERN IRELAND. I WISH TO CONGRATULATE MY TWO GOOD FRIENDS - AND OUTSTANDING PRIME MINISTERS -WHO HAVE DEMONSTRATED SUCH STATESMANSHIP, VISION AND COURAGE.

2. THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND OF IRELAND HAVE MADE A GREAT CONTRIBUTION TO THE POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO OUR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.

3. WE ARE PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT THESE TWO NEIGHBOURS, FAITHFUL FRIENDS OF AMERICA, SO CLOSE TO THE UNITED STATES IN THEIR TIES OF HISTORY, KINSHIP, AND COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES, HAVE JOINED ON A COMMON CAUSEWAY TOWARD HOPE AND HARMONY IN NORTHERN IRELAND. ALL AMERICANS - AND ABOVE ALL THOSE OF IRISH DESCENT WHO HAVE PRAYED FOR AN END TO VIOLENCE IN THE LAND OF THEIR ANCESTRY - CAN TAKE PRIDE IN THIS IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD.

4. WE VIEW THIS AGREEMENT AS A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF BRITISH AND IRISH DETERMINATION TO MAKE PROGRESS CONCERNING NORTHERN IRELAND AND IN THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS. GIVEN THE COMPLEX SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND, ALL MAY NOT APPLAUD THIS AGREEMENT.

5. BUT LET ME STATE THAT THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY SUPPORTS THIS INITIATIVE, WHICH PLEDGES TO BOTH COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND RESPECT FOR THEIR RIGHTS AND TRADITIONS, WITHIN A SOCIETY FREE FROM VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION.

6. ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WE HAVE JOINED THE IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS IN CONDEMNING VIOLENCE AND DISCORD IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND CALLING ON ALL AMERICANS NOT TO ASSIST, EITHER WITH MONEY OR MORAL SUPPORT, THOSE MISGUIDED EFFORTS THAT PROLONG THE NIGHTMARE OF TERRORISM AND HATRED. OUR CALL IS EVEN MORE COMPELLING NOW THAT A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE HAS BEEN AGREED UPON. I WISH TO RECONFIRM AND REINFORCE OUR CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISM WHEREVER IT MAY TAKE PLACE.

7. NOW THAT A FRAMEWORK HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, THE WORK OF CONSTRUCTING A DURABLE PEACE MUST PROCEED. THIS WILL INVOLVE REBUILDING WHAT HAS BEEN DESTROYED BY HATRED AND VIOLENCE AND GIVING HOPE TO THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN TEMPTED BY DESPAIR. WE HAVE OFTEN ENCOURAGED AMERICANS TO LET THEIR FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND VACATION DOLLARS, AND THE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES THAT ACCOMPANY SUCH SPENDING, FIND THEIR WAY TO THE EMERALD ISLE. I AM PROUD THAT NORTHERN IRELAND ENTERPRISE IN WHICH AMERICAN MONEY IS INVOLVED ARE AMONG THE MOST PROGRESSIVE IN PROMOTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL.

/8 THC.

8. THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS HAVE PLEDGED THEIR COOPERATION IN PROMOTING THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THOSE AREAS, IN BOTH PARTS OF IRELAND, WHICH HAVE SUFFERED FROM THE INSTABILITY OF RECENT YEARS.

9. IT IS ENTIRELY FITTING THAT THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS JOIN THIS IMPORTANT ENDEAVOUR. AS PRESIDENT CARTER SAID ON AUGUST 30 1977, QUOTE IN THE EVENT OF A SETTLEMENT, THE U S GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO JOIN WITH OTHERS TO SEE HOW ADDITION JOB-CREATING INVESTMENT COUD BE ENCOURAGED, TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND UNQUOTE.

10. THERE ARE MANY IN CONGRESS WHO HAVE SHOWN THEIR CONCERN AND SYMPATHY FOR THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. AND I WILL BE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE CONGRESS IN A BIPARTISAN EFFORT TO FIND TANGIBLE WAYS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO LEND PRACTICAL SUPPORT TO THIS IMPORTANT AGREEMENT. THE SPEAKER - WHO HAS KINDLY JOINED ME AT THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY - AND I HAVE ALREADY DISCUSSED HOW THE UNITED STATES COULD ASSIST IN PROMOTING PEACE, FRIENDSHIP, AND HARMONY BETWEEN THE TWO GREAT IRISH TRADITIONS.

11. IN CLOSING, PERMIT ME TO UNDERSCORE OUR HEARTFELT SUPPORT FOR THIS COURAGEOUS AND DETERMINED EFFORT TO PROMOTE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

12. AND NOW I UNDERSTAND THE SPEAKER WOULD LIKE TO SAY A FEW WORDS.

WRIGHT

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PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
SIR W HARDING
MR GOODALL
MR BARRINGTON
MR O'NEILL
MR SAMUEL
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MY TELNOS 3164-5: ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SPEAKER'S STATEMENT ON WHICH HE DREW IN HIS REMARKS AT THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS CONFERENCE:

BEGINS: THANK YOU MR PRESIDENT FOR INVITING ME TO JOIN YOU IN EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE HISTORIC ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT REACHED TODAY. I AM DELIGHTED TO BE HERE.

I CONGRATULATE THE LEADERS OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRELAND AND GREAT BRITAIN FOR TAKING THIS IMPORTANT AND COURAGEOUS STEP OF CONSTRUCTING A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE AGREEMENT TODAY DEMONSTRATES IN UNMISTAKABLE FASHION THAT THE WAY FORWARD IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS NOT THROUGH THE BULLET AND THE BOMB BUT RATHER THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE FREELY ELECTED LEADERS OF TWO GREAT WESTERN DEMOCRACIES.

I AM HOPEFUL THAT THIS AGREEMENT WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR BUILDING A BRIDGE OF HOPE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO GREAT TRADITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. WE KNOW FROM OUR EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA THAT DIVERSITY CAN BE A SOURCE OF STRENGTH IN A SOCIETY RATHER THAN A SOURCE OF DIVISION.

BEGINNING TODAY MUCH MUST BE DONE TO BUILD A LASTING PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. BECAUSE OF THIS, I AM PLEASED TO HEAR THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRM THE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO HELP PROMOTE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN A CONCRETE WAY.

I CAN ASSURE THE PRESIDENT THAT AS SPEAKER I WILL DO EVERY-THING IN MY POWER TO SEE THAT SUCH A COMMITMENT, INCLUDING APPROPRIATE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, IS HONORED BY THE CONGRESS AS SWIFTLY AND AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE. I AM SURE THAT MY COLLEAGUES SENATORS KENNEDY AND MOYNIHAN AND CONGRESSMEN BOB MICHEL, TOM FOLEY AND JOE MCDADE WILL JOIN WITH ME AND THE MANY FRIENDS OF IRELAND ON CAPITOL HILL TO HELP MAKE THIS IMPORTANT AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. ENDS

2. TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE FOLOWS BY BAG.

WRIGHT

NORTHERN IRELAND	PS/MR EGGAR	
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RID	MR DEREK THOMAS	ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
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SCD	MR LONG	
RES D	BUCKINGHAM PALACE	
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INFO SAVING CG'S IN USA.
ANGLO/IRISH AGREEMENT.

1. THE PRESIDENT AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GAVE A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE WHITE HOUSE THIS MORNING, WITHIN MINUTES OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT, EXPRESSING THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT, CONDEMNING THE CONTINUATION OF VIOLENCE AND URGING AMERICANS NOT TO SUPPORT IT, AND ADVOCATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT AND FORE-SHADOWING AMERICAN HELP. THE IRISH AMBASSADOR AND I WERE PRESENT WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ, CHIEF OF STAFF REGAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER MCFARLANE. MY IRISH COLLEAGUE TOLD ME THAT THE IRISH TIMES CORRESPONDENT PRESENT WAS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE IRA IN THE 50'S.

2. AFTER THE CEREMONY I THANKED BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND SPEAKER MOST WARMLY ON BEHALF OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT, AND SAID THAT THEIR PROMPT AND UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED IN LONDON. THE SPEAKER RECALLED WITH PLEASURE THE PRIME MINISTER'S SESSION WITH HIM IN HIS ROOM ON THE HILL WITH THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN LEADERS OF THE HOUSE LAST FEBRUARY AND SENT HIS WARM GOOD WISHES. ''SHE'S A GREAT LADY'' HE SAID.

3. WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID BEFORE THE TELEVISION CAMERAS AND WRITING PRESS WAS A REDUCED VERSION OF THE OFFICIAL STATEMENT (SEE MIFT, WHICH CONTAINS PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT. TRANSCRIPTS, INCLUDING SPEAKER'S REMARKS, WILL FOLLOW.)

4.. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE CERTAINLY COME GOOD ON THEIR UNDERTAKING TO SUPPORT TO THE AGREEMENT SIGNED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND TAIOSEACH. YOU MAY THEREFORE WISH TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT SHE SEND A BRIEF MESSAGE OF APPRECIATION TO THE PRESIDENT AND INDEED TO THE SPEAKER AS WELL. IN VIEW OF PAST AND LIKELY FUTURE ROWS, WE MIGHT AS WELL MAKE THE BEST USE WE CAN OF HARMONY ON THIS ISSUE.

WRIGHT

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T220A/85

November 19, 1985

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear Prime Minister Thatcher:

My warmest congratulations on your success in producing an agreement on Northern Ireland with your colleague, Prime Minister Fitzgerald. I am aware of your personal involvement in negotiating this important agreement and the opposition you face on this highly emotional and complex issue. I believe you have created a framework for peace which Canadians, along with all those who oppose violence, strongly endorse. We in Canada applaud your bold initiative and wish to assure you of our support of this effort to achieve a durable and lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Best personal regards,

Brian Mulroney

file JD

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 November 1985

Dear Jeremy,

Thank you for your letter of 17 November. It was kind of you to write about Ireland.

I am much looking forward to meeting Olwen Carey Evans at the 250th Anniversary Dinner.

Yours ever,

Margaret

The Rt. Hon. Jeremy Thorpe

BM

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Charles

I'm trying to focus on all the pitfalls of the Statement. I never acknowledged your kind note about my various media efforts. Much appreciated!

Many thanks, and for helping back to Hillsborough & H of C to go so well

Peter

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MIPT: ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: STATEMENT BY IRISH CATHOLIC BISHOPS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT ISSUED YESTERDAY ON BEHALF OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE EPISCOPAL CONFERENCE OF IRELAND:

''SIXTEEN YEARS OF VIOLENCE HAVE BROUGHT MUCH TRIBULATION AND HEARTBREAK TO BOTH PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THERE IS IN BOTH COMMUNITIES A GREAT AND WIDESPREAD LONGING FOR AN END TO THE TROUBLES. IT IS OUR SINCERE HOPE THAT THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT WILL MAKE A GENUINE CONTRIBUTION TOWARD RECONCILIATION. WE ASK OUR PEOPLE TO CONTINUE THEIR PRAYERS FOR PEACE''.

GOODISON

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UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 190900Z FCO
TELNO 3188
OF 190050Z NOVEMBER 85
INFO IMMEDIATE NIO(L), NIO(B),
PRIORITY DUBLIN, BIS NEW YORK
ROUTINE US CONSULATES GENERAL

THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: U S PRESS REACTIONS.

SUMMARY

ALTHOUGH SANDWICHED BETWEEN THE COLOMBIAN VOLCANO DISASTER AND THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT, THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT STILL GENERATED EXTENSIVE POSITIVE COVERAGE IN THE PRESS AND ON TELEVISION. GENERAL REACTION IS ONE OF GUARDED OPTIMISM. EDITORIAL REACTION: VERY FAVOURABLE. TELEVISION NEWS REPORTING: MORE EQUIVOCAL.

DETAIL

2. IN AMERICAN NEWS TERMS THE SIGNING OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT WAS A ONE DAY WONDER, GENERATING EXTENSIVE COVERAGE DURING THE TWENTY FOUR HOURS FOLLOWING THE HILLSBOROUGH SUMMIT. THE MAIN THEME IN THE NEWS REPORTING HAS BEEN THE ASSESSMENT OF THE HARD LINE UNIONIST REACTION. THE PRINCIPAL SUB-THEMES INCLUDE THE FAVOURABLE RESPONSE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, HOUSE SPEAKER O'NEILL AND THE QUOTE FRIENDS OF IRELAND UNQUOTE. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE SPECULATION ON THE NEXT POLITICAL MOVES BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, WHILE THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT IN THE REPUBLIC HAS GONE VIRTUALLY UNREMARKED. WIRE SERVICE NEWS ANALYSES IN THE PROVINCIAL SMALL TOWN PRESS HAVE DWELT UPON THE QUOTE SHAKY AND FRAGILE UNQUOTE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT: DR FITZGERALD AND MR HUME WERE TAKING THE MAJOR POLITICAL RISKS IN A DELICATE SITUATION WHERE A PROTESTANT BACKLASH COULD DESTROY THE PACT.

3. THE NETWORK EVENING TELEVISION NEWSCASTS REPORTED THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT FAIRLY, BUT DIFFERED IN THEIR EVALUATION OF ITS IMPORTANCE. NBC SUGGESTED THAT THE AGREEMENT USHERED IN AN ERA OF QUOTE NEW HOPES AND NEW FEARS UNQUOTE, WHILE CBS AND CNN HIGHLIGHTED THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNIONIST BACKLASH. IN CONTRAST, ABC SAW THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT AS AN QUOTE HISTORIC MOMENT UNQUOTE WHICH OFFERED HOPE TO THE CATHOLIC MINORITY. PBS'S MCNEILL-LEHRER NEWSHOUR DESCRIBED THE AGREEMENT AS QUOTE THE MOST FAR-REACHING INITIATIVE SINCE 1921 UNQUOTE AND RAN A HELPFUL DISCUSSION WHERE IRISH JUSTICE MINISTER, NOONAN, SKILFULLY OUT-MANEOUVRED CONGRESSMAN MARIO BIAGGI. UNFORTUNATELY, CNN FEATURED MARTIN GALVIN IN A CURIOUSLY ONE-SIDED ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN RESPONSE WHICH IGNORED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S AND SPEAKER O'NEILL'S JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE.

PREDICTABLY, THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA TELEVISION STATIONS WERE LESS THAN HELPFUL, WITH THEIR NEWS EDITORS FEELING COMPELLED TO OFFER MARTIN GALVIN AS A QUOTE REPRESENTATIVE UNQUOTE IRISH-AMERICAN VOICE TO CHALLENGE THAT OF MR NOONAN.

/4

4. IN SHARP CONTRAST, U S EDITORIAL REACTION HAS BEEN VERY SUPPORTIVE ECHOING COMMENT IN THE IRISH REPUBLIC. IN GENERAL, U S EDITORIAL WRITERS HAVE ADOPTED AN ATTITUDE OF GUARDED OPTIMISM: PRAISING THE COURAGE OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND DR FITZGERALD, WHILE EXPRESSING A SOBER UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFICULTIES THAT LIE AHEAD. THE NEW YORK TIMES GAVE THE AGREEMENT A ROUSING QUOTE THREE CHEERS UNQUOTE, CONCLUDING THAT THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS HAD QUOTE FASHIONED AN INGENIOUS EXPERIMENT THAT DESERVES A GOOD FAITH TEST UNQUOTE. THE TIMES ADDED A WARNING TO PROTESTANTS NOT TO TRY TO STRANGLE THE AGREEMENT LEST THEY WISH TO BENEFIT THE IRA. THE WASHINGTON POST TOO WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT ASSURING BOTH GOVERNMENTS THAT AMERICANS APPLAUDED QUOTE THEIR STEP TOWARDS PEACE UNQUOTE. THE NEW YORK TABLOIDS, ALWAYS IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THEIR IRISH-AMERICAN READERSHIP, AGREED THAT THE ANGLO-IRISH PACT OFFERED GENUINE HOPE OF ESTABLISHING INSTITUTIONAL SANITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE MORE IMPORTANT REGIONAL NEWSPAPERS - THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, THE BOSTON GLOBE, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, THE HARTFORD COURANT, THE PHILADELPHIA ENQUIRER AND NEWSDAY, THE LONG ISLAND DAILY, WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT WITH CONSIDERABLE ENTHUSIASM. THE HARTFORD COURANT CAPTURED THE FLAVOUR OF THE REGIONAL COMMENT IN DESCRIBING THE AGREEMENT AS QUOTE A REMARKABLE PIECE OF STATECRAFT UNQUOTE.

5. IN SUM, US PRESS/MEDIA REACTION IS ONE OF GUARDED OPTIMISM, REVEALING UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING NORTHERN IRELAND AND GENUINE ADMIRATION FOR THE SKILL AND STEADFASTNESS OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS.

6. F C O PLEASE PASS TO N I O AND TO MR NICHOLAS SCOTT (BY 190900Z).

WRIGHT

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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR EGGAR
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MR DEREK THOMAS
SIR W HARDING
MR GOODALL
MR BARRINGTON
MR O'NEILL
MR SAMUEL
MR D C THOMAS
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PS/MR R ANDREW, OAB 1/56
MR BRENNAN
MR BURNS
MR PN BELL
} NIO

SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO
} CABINET OFFICE

PS/ NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

14.11.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

Helpful at least in showing what the Agreement does not do.
CDP.

FM DUBLIN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 792
OF 191150Z NOVEMBER 85
INFO IMMEDIATE NIO (B), WASHINGTON AND BIS NEW YORK

ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: DAIL DEBATE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT MOTION TO BE DEBATED IN A THREE-DAY DEBATE BEGINNING THIS AFTERNOON:

''THAT DAIL EIREANN HEREBY APPROVES THE TERMS OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT, 1985, BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM WHICH WAS SIGNED AT HILLSBOROUGH, CO DOWN, ON 15TH NOVEMBER 1985 AND COPIES OF WHICH HAVE BEEN LAID BEFORE DAIL EIREANN''.

2. FIANNA FAIL HAS PUT DOWN AN AMENDEMENT, PROPOSING:

''TO DELETE ALL WORDS AFTER DAIL EIREANN AND SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING:

''HAVING REGARD TO ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND:

''RECALLING THE UNANIMOUS DECLARATION OF DAIL EIREANN ADOPTED ON THE JOINT PROPOSITION OF AN TAOISEACH, JOHN A COSTELLO AND THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION, EAMON DE VALERA, ON 10 MAY 1949 SOLEMNLY REASSERTING THE INDEFEASIBLE RIGHT OF THE IRISH NATION TO THE UNITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE NATIONAL TERRITORY:

''RECALLING THAT ALL THE PARTIES IN THE NEW IRELAND FORUM WERE CONVINCED THAT A UNITED IRELAND IN THE FORM OF A SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENT STATE WOULD [illegible]

''RECALLING THAT ALL THE PARTIES IN THE NEW IRELAND FORUM WERE CONVINCED THAT A UNITED IRELAND IN THE FORM OF A SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENT STATE WOULD OFFER THE BEST AND MOST DURABLE BASIS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY:

''REAFFIRMING THE UNANIMOUS CONCLUSION OF THE REPORT OF THE NEW IRELAND FORUM THAT THE PARTICULAR STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL UNITY WHICH THE FORUM WOULD WISH TO SEE ESTABLISHED IS A UNITARY STATE ACHIEVED BY AGREEMENT AND CONSENT, EMBRACING THE WHOLE ISLAND OF IRELAND AND PROVIDING IRREVOCABLE GUARANTEES FOR THE PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION OF BOTH THE UNIONIST AND NATIONALIST IDENTITIES:

''WHILE RECOGNISING THE URGENT NEED THAT EXISITS FOR SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE NATIONALIST SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY IN THE NORTH OF IRELAND AND APPROVING ANY EFFECTIVE MEASURES WHICH MAY BE UNDERTAKEN FOR THAT PURPOSE, REFUSES TO ACCEPT ANY RECOGNITION OF BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY OVER ANY PART OF THE NATIONAL TERRITORY:

''AND REQUESTS THE GOVERNMENT TO CALL UPON THE BRITISH GVOERNMENT TO JOIN IN CONVENING UNDER THE JOINT AUSPICES OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL THE TRADITIONS IN IRELAND TO FORMULATE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO UNITING ALL THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND IN PEACE AND HARMONY.''

GOODISON

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Chequers,

I enclose a short letter of congratulation and encouragement to the Prime Ministers on the Anglo-Irish agreement.

Perhaps you would pass it on. You are very welcome to read it.

Nancy

c.c. R. J. Andrew, Esq., CB.
N. Wicks, Esq., CBE.

19th November, 1985.

Thank you for your letter of 16th November 1985 with the text of the resolution passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly on Saturday 16th November 1985. Your letter has been laid before The Queen and in accordance with constitutional practice it has been referred to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

SIR PHILIP MOORE

James Kilfedder, Esq., MP.

PERSONAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 November 1985

As you know, the Prime Minister is opening the Debate on the Anglo/Irish Agreement in the House next week. She has asked me to send you a copy of the current draft of her speech, which I enclose. She would be most grateful if, on a personal basis, you were able to let her have any suggestions, particularly on constitutional or institutional aspects of the Agreement which would help present it in ways which will re-assure the Unionist community.

It would be particularly helpful if we could have your suggestions by the morning of Friday 22 November.

(C.D. Powell)

Sir Patrick Mayhew, Q.C., M.P.

PERSONAL

RESTRICTED

10 DOWNING STREET

19 November 1985

From the Private Secretary

ANGLO/IRISH AGREEMENT: PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE

I enclose a copy of the current draft of the Prime Minister's speech opening the Debate on the Anglo/Irish Agreement next week. I am about to begin on further revision taking account of the Prime Minister's comments.

I should be grateful for any further comments which you, or Christopher Mallaby, to whom I am copying this letter and enclosure, have at this stage.

I should also welcome your advice on the following points:-

I The Prime Minister would like some good quotes from both the "Way Ahead" and the "New Irish Forum Report" on the rejection of violence and the need to take account of the hopes and fears of other communities.

II The Prime Minister recalls some document or study group report in which Peter Utley played a prominent part. I am afraid that I cannot identify it more specifically. But I daresay that it will ring a bell with someone. Could you please let me have a copy.

III The Prime Minister is considering citing examples of what we hope to achieve from improved security co-operation. It may be that we cannot go beyond Article 9a of the Agreement. But if it were possible to say more it would be helpful to have some suggested lines.

IV The Prime Minister is considering saying rather more than in the present draft about the Government's record in getting rid of discrimination and observing a fair balance between the communities in the appointments to public bodies. Could you provide me with a short paragraph on this please?

/I am not

JB

I am not sure how you will wish to divide these tasks between yourself and the Cabinet Office. Could I please leave it to you to discuss with Christopher Mallaby? As always, I have to say that we need the material in rather a hurry in the hope of being able to put a new version of the speech to the Prime Minister on Thursday night.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Christopher Mallaby (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Jim Daniell, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

DRAFT SPEECH FOR THE PRIME MINISTER SP1AEZ

TO OPEN THE DEBATE ON NORTHERN IRELAND

MR. SPEAKER, AS I INFORMED THE HOUSE LAST WEEK, DR. GARRET FITZGERALD, THE TAOISEACH, AND I MET IN NORTHERN IRELAND ON 15 NOVEMBER TO SIGN AN ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT.

I TOLD THE HOUSE THEN OF MY HOPE THAT, BY GIVING THE UNIONIST POSITION A WIDER AND FIRMER RECOGNITION THAN EVER BEFORE AND BY ENABLING THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY TO FEEL THAT THEIR CONCERNS WOULD BE FULLY HEEDED, THE AGREEMENT WOULD HELP TOWARDS RECONCILIATION, STABILITY AND PEACE.

MR. SPEAKER, I WANT FIRST TO DESCRIBE WHAT THE AGREEMENT DOES.

THEN, IN VIEW OF SOME OF THE WILDER CLAIMS THAT WE HAVE HEARD - MANY OF THEM MADE BEFORE THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT WERE KNOWN - I SHALL MAKE CLEAR WHAT IT DOES NOT DO.

FIRST, THE AGREEMENT INCORPORATES IN A FORMALLY BINDING INTERNATIONAL ACCORD A RECOGNITION BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT THAT THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED AS LONG AS THAT IS THE WISH OF A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

ALSO FOR THE FIRST TIME, IT INCORPORATES FORMAL IRISH RECOGNITION THAT THE PRESENT

WISH OF A MAJORITY IS FOR NO CHANGE IN THAT STATUS.

THE AGREEMENT ALSO ACKNOWLEDGES THE INTEREST OF THE IRISH REPUBLIC IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE NORTH.

THAT INTEREST IS NOT NEW.

THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE LONG LOOKED TO DUBLIN TO LEND SUPPORT TO THEIR VIEWS.

THAT IS A REALITY.

IT IS NOT GOING TO CHANGE AND WE CANNOT PRETEND IT DOES NOT EXIST.

IN THIS AGREEMENT WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT REALITY.

AND WE SEEK TO CHANNEL IT IN A WAY THAT WILL HELP BOTH OUR COUNTRIES.

FOR IN THE PAST THE IRISH INTEREST HAS OFTEN BEEN EXPRESSED IN CRITICAL OR NEGATIVE TERMS.

THAT DOES NOT HELP US.

IT DOES NOT HELP OUR RELATIONS WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT.

IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT HELP HARMONY BETWEEN THE COMMUNITIES OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

SO THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES MACHINERY FOR THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO ADVANCE VIEWS AND PROPOSALS ON MATTERS RELATING TO NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTRUCTIVELY AND METHODICALLY.

AND IT COMMITS BOTH GOVERNMENTS WHEN

DIFFERENCES DO ARISE TO MAKE DETERMINED EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THEM.

FINALLY, IT ALSO COMMITS OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS TO WORK CLOSER TOGETHER ON A WIDE RANGE OF SECURITY, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MATTERS.

I SHALL LOOK AT THE AGREEMENT IN MORE DETAIL IN A MOMENT.

BUT FIRST I MUST SAY SOMETHING ABOUT WHAT IS NOT IN THE AGREEMENT.

IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT SET US ON SOME IMAGINED SLIPPERY SLOPE TO IRISH UNITY.

I REGARD IT AS ABSOLUTE NONSENSE TO CLAIM

THAT IT DOES.

ARTICLE 1 ECHOES THE PROVISION IN SECTION 1 OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTITUTION ACT - THAT NORTHERN IRELAND REMAINS PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AS LONG AS A MAJORITY THERE SO WISH.

THAT AGAIN IS A RECOGNITION OF REALITY.

THE GUARANTEE FOR THE MAJORITY LIES IN THE FACT THT THEY ARE A MAJORITY.

THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT MUST PREVAIL IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

IT IS A PRINCIPLE THAT NEITHER I NOR ANY GOVERNMENT LED BY ME WILL FORSAKE.

THE SECOND THING I WANT TO MAKE CLEAR IS THAT THE

AGREEMENT DOES NOT DETRACT FROM BRITISH - OR FOR THAT MATTER IRISH - SOVEREIGNTY.

HOWEVER THIS AGREEMENT IS INTERPRETED, IT CANNOT BE HELD TO UNDERMINE OUR SOVEREIGNTY.

WE, THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE TO PARLIAMENT, REMAIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

YES, WE WILL LISTEN TO THE VIEWS OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT.

YES, WE WILL MAKE DETERMINED EFFORTS TO ACCOMMODATE THOSE VIEWS.

INDEED WE WELCOME IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS PARTICULARLY FROM A COUNTRY WITH WHICH WE HAVE UNIQUELY CLOSE RELATIONS.

BUT AT THE END OF THE DAY DECISIONS NORTH OF

THE BORDER WILL CONTINUE TO BE MADE BY US AND SOUTH OF THE BORDER BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. SOVEREIGNTY IS FULLY PRESERVED.

THIS AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ONLY AFTER LONG AND CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF HOW TO MOVE FORWARD IN NORTHERN IRELAND, WHERE FOR TOO MANY YEARS WE HAVE FAILED TO LIGHT THE BEACON OF HOPE FOR THE FUTURE.

AT THE HEART OF THAT FAILURE HAS BEEN A FAILURE TO RECONCILE THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

ON THE ONE HAND THE UNIONIST COMMUNITY, FIRMLY LOYAL BOTH TO THE CROWN AND TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.

THEY REPRESENT A PROUD TRADITION OF DEVOTION TO THE UNION WHICH EVERYONE IN THESE ISLANDS SHOULD RESPECT - AND WHICH THIS AGREEMENT DOES RESPECT.

THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO OUR SUPPORT.

THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO BE SECURE IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE WILL NOT TRY TO FORCE THEM INTO NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AGAINST THEIR WILL.

THE AGREEMENT CONFIRMS THAT SECURITY.

ON THE OTHER HAND IS THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY, WHO THINK OF THEMSELVES AS IRISH IN TERMS OF THEIR IDENTITY, THEIR SOCIAL AND CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND THEIR POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS.

THIS HOUSE CAN RESPECT THEIR IDENTITY TOO - AND THEIR ASPIRATIONS, EVEN THOUGH WE MAY NOT SEE THE PROSPECT OF THEIR BEING FULFILLED.

IT IS RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THESE TWO COMMUNITIES AND THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE TWO MAJOR TRADITIONS THAT IS THE GOAL OF THIS AGREEMENT.

AND IT IS A GOAL THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE IRISH REPUBLIC - WHO HAVE TOGETHER WATCHED WITH SORROW AND HORROR THE AGONIES OF NORTHERN IRELAND OVER THE PAST ONE-AND-A-HALF DECADES - WILL, I AM SURE, WHOLE-HEARTEDLY SUPPORT.

THE AGREEMENT

MR. SPEAKER, MUCH OF WHAT I HAVE JUST SAID IS SUMMED UP IN THE PREAMBLE TO THE AGREEMENT.

IT SETS OUT THE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE IRISH REPUBLIC TO WORK FOR RECONCILIATION; OUR UTTER AND TOTAL REJECTION OF VIOLENCE; OUR RECOGNITION AND RESPECT FOR THE SEPARATE IDENTITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND; OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHT OF EACH TO PURSUE ITS ASPIRATIONS BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

ARTICLE 1 OF THE AGREEMENT MAKES IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT THIS AGREEMENT PRESENTS NO THREAT WHATSOEVER TO UNIONISTS' HEARTFELT DESIRE TO REMAIN PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, FOR THE

REASONS I HAVE EXPLAINED.

ARTICLE 2 BUILDS UPON THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL THAT WAS SET UP AFTER MY SUMMIT IN NOVEMBER 1981 WITH MR. HAUGHEY AND HAS BEEN DEVELOPED SINCE DR. FITZGERALD BECAME TAOISEACH.

IT ESTABLISHES AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE CONCERNED WITH ASPECTS OF NORTHERN IRELAND AFFAIRS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION.

THIS CONFERENCE WILL CONSIDER ON A REGULAR BASIS POLITICAL, SECURITY AND LEGAL MATTERS, INCLUDING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

SECURITY MATTERS WILL BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER

WITH CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION.

THE MATTERS OF CONCERN TO THE CONFERENCE ARE SPELT OUT IN ARTICLES 4 TO 10.

THIS HOUSE, MR. SPEAKER, IS SUFFICIENTLY AWARE OF THE METTLE OF THIS GOVERNMENT TO KNOW THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE CONSENTED TO ANY ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD GIVE ANOTHER COUNTRY AUTHORITY OVER ANY PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISIONS AND ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO REST WITH HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WHO WILL REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE TO PARLIAMENT.

THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL POINT.

THERE CAN BY NO MISUNDERSTANDING.

MOREOVER CO-OPERATION IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE WILL BE A TWO-WAY STREET. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO PUT ITS VIEWS AND PROPOSALS ON MATTERS AFFECTING NORTHERN IRELAND. WE FOR OUR PART SHALL BE ABLE TO PURSUE ISSUES OF CONCERN TO NORTHERN IRELAND, NOTABLY CO-OPERATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM.

ONE POINT IN THE AGREEMENT IS WORTH A SPECIAL MENTION. THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE WILL CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE MATTERS SET OUT IN THE AGREEMENT AS LONG AS THERE IS NO RETURN TO

DEVOLUTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

IF DEVOLUTION IS RESTORED - AND IN THE AGREEMENT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS OUR COMMITMENT TO SEEK AN ACCEPTABLE FORM OF DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT - THEN THOSE MATTERS THAT BECOME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT WILL NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE.

WE HOPE THAT THE AGREEMENT WILL ENCOURAGE THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH COMMUNITIES TO COME TOGETHER TO FORM A LOCAL ADMINISTRATION ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH.

THIS HOPE HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT.

AND BEFORE I LEAVE THE AGREEMENT I SHOULD DRAW THE PARTICULAR ATTENTION OF THE HOUSE TO ARTICLES 9 AND 10 WHICH PROMOTE CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION.

NO-ONE IN THIS HOUSE WILL, I BELIEVE, QUESTION THE DESIRABILITY OF EXPLORING WAYS OF IMPROVING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS - PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY - OR THE PRIORITY WHICH WILL BE GIVEN TO THIS ASPECT OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE.

FINALLY, ARTICLE 10 RECORDS OUR INTENTION TO CO-OPERATE ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.

IT ALSO REFERS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SECURING

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THIS WORK.

THE BENEFITS

MR. SPEAKER, I BELIEVE THAT THIS AGREEMENT HOLDS OUT TWO MAIN BENEFITS.

BOTH ARE VALUABLE.

THE FIRST OF THE BENEFITS IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REPUBLIC.

I HAVE ALREADY REFERRED TO THAT.

THE PROCESS BEGUN IN 1981 HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY EXTENDED.

BOTH OUR COUNTRIES WILL BENEFIT.

BUT ALSO THERE IS THE BENEFIT FOR THE TWO COMMUNITIES

IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

I BELIEVE THAT ANY OBJECTIVE OBSERVER WILL COME TO SEE THE AGREEMENT NOT AS FAVOURING ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER, BUT AS BENEFITING NORTHERN IRELAND AS A WHOLE - AND THEREFORE ALL THE PEOPLE OF THESE ISLANDS.

IT CONFIRMS AND CLARIFIES THE ATTITUDE OF <u>BOTH</u> GOVERNMENTS TO NORTHERN IRELAND'S PRESENT STATUS.

THERE CAN BE NO GROUNDS FOR UNCERTAINTY NOW. THAT MUST BE IN THE INTERESTS OF STABILITY.

IT PROMISES CLOSER CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

THAT MUST BE HELPFUL.

IN THE SECURITY FIELD, ENHANCED CO-OPERATION CAN HELP US TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS IN RIDDING NORTHERN IRELAND OF THE MENACE OF TERRORISM.

IT ENSURES THAT IRISH VIEWS CAN BE PUT TO US IN A CONSTRUCTIVE, ORDERLY WAY, AVOIDING WHAT HAS SOMETIMES HAPPENED IN THE PAST, NAMELY CRITICAL RESPONSES TO EVENTS WITH NEITHER SIDE PROPERLY UNDERSTANDING THE POSITION OF THE OTHER.

THAT CAN ONLY BE AN IMPROVEMENT.

IT RECOGNISES THE IDENTITY, RIGHTS AND ASPIRATIONS OF BOTH COMMUNITIES.

IT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE CAN BE DIFFERENCES IN WHAT EACH COMMUNITY WANTS IN THE LONG TERM.

AND IT COMMITS US TO SEEKING AN APPROACH THAT ACCOMMODATES THOSE DIFFERENCES, RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING TO STEAMROLLER ONE SIDE INTO ACCEPTANCE OF THE OTHER'S VIEW.

CAN ANYONE FIND FAULT IN THAT?

FINALLY, THE AGREEMENT OFFERS A GUARANTEE TO THE MINORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND THAT THEIR VIEWS WILL BE HEARD, THEIR RIGHTS WILL BE RESPECTED AND THAT THEY HAVE A VITAL ROLE TO PLAY.

I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE WAY TO ASSURE THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY THAT GOVERNMENT DESERVES THEIR SUPPORT, TO BRING THEM TO PLAY THEIR PART IN CONFRONTING AND DEALING WITH THE HOST OF DIFFICULT ISSUES THAT EXIST IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

AND IF WE SUCCEED IN THAT AIM, IT IS NOT JUST THE MINORITY WHO BENEFIT.

ALL IN NORTHERN IRELAND BENEFIT FROM THE SEA-CHANGE THAT WILL OCCUR IN INTER-COMMUNAL RELATIONS AS THE TWO COMMUNITIES WORK TOGETHER FOR A MORE STABLE, PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS SOCIETY.

IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, THAT IS THE GREATEST PRIZE TO BE WON.

GENERAL POLICY

BUT, MR. SPEAKER, AS I SAID EARLIER, THIS AGREEMENT CANNOT WORK MIRACLES.

IT IS NOT ON ITS OWN GOING TO BE ENOUGH.

I MAKE NO SUCH CLAIMS FOR IT.

NOR, I KNOW, WOULD THE TAOISEACH.

NO, IT MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A CONSIDERED, DETERMINED AND CO-ORDINATED DRIVE TO DEAL WITH THE OTHER ISSUES THAT FACE US IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

AND THAT DRIVE MUST REST ON CLEAR AND CONSISTENT PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND FAIRNESS.

IN ALL WE DO, WE MUST INSIST ON OBSERVANCE OF THE RULE OF LAW, PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL

RIGHTS, AND RESPECT FOR THE NEEDS OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

CERTAINLY THERE MUST BE NO SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

SO, ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT, WE MUST CONTINUE TO PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO NORTHERN IRELAND'S NEEDS.

DURING DIRECT RULE, SPENDING ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRAMMES HAS RISEN FROM £590 MILLION IN 1972-73 TO £3,600 MILLION LAST YEAR - AN INCREASE OF OVER 50 PER CENT IN REAL TERMS.

THESE RESOURCES HAVE BEEN USED TO SECURE MUCH NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES AND THE FABRIC OF SOCIETY IN

NORTHERN IRELAND.

THERE COULD BE NO MORE EFFECTIVE WAY OF GIVING THE LIE TO THOSE WHO SAY THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT DOES NOT CARE ABOUT THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND ITS PEOPLE.

OUR CONCERN WILL CONTINUE.

IN THE SECURITY FIELD OUR EFFORTS WILL ALSO CONTINUE.

AND HERE, OF COURSE, WE EXPECT THE NEW AGREEMENT TO BEAR FRUIT.

THANKS TO THE MAGNIFICENT WORK OF OUR POLICEMEN AND SOLDIERS, WE HAVE ALREADY MADE GREAT STRIDES.

THOSE WHO GO TO NORTHERN IRELAND TODAY FIND IT UNRECOGNISABLE FROM THE DARK DAYS OF THE

EARLY SEVENTIES.

THE SECURITY STATISTICS TELL THEIR OWN STORY.

WE STILL HAVE MUCH TO DO.

WE CANNOT REST UNTIL TERRORISM IS ELIMINATED FROM NORTHERN IRELAND.

BUT OUR SECURITY FORCES CAN TAKE NEW HEART FROM THE PROMISE OF A GREATER SECURITY CO-OPERATION THAT WILL FLOW FROM THE AGREEMENT.

AS FOR <u>POLITICAL</u> DEVELOPMENT WITHIN NORTHERN IRELAND, THAT IS WHERE WE HAVE LITTLE TO SHOW.

THIS GOVERNMENT, LIKE ITS PREDECESSORS, SEEKS A RETURN TO DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IN A FORM THAT IS BROADLY ACCEPTABLE ACROSS THE TWO

COMMUNITIES.

THAT PRINCIPLE OF ACCEPTABILITY IS INESCAPABLE IF ANY NEW SYSTEM OF DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IS TO BE WORKABLE.

AND IT IS ENDORSED IN THE AGREEMENT.

WE ARE THEREFORE EVEN MORE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THAT PATH AND WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK A WAY OF BRINGING THE PARTIES TOGETHER SO THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE.

WE HOPE THAT ALL THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND WILL JOIN US IN THIS ENDEAVOUR.

PERORATION

I HAVE EXPLAINED, MR. SPEAKER, THE REASONS WHY WE HAVE

ENTERED UPON THIS ENTERPRISE, AND THE BENEFITS THAT I BELIEVE IT CAN BRING.

I HOPE THAT THE MEMBERS OF BOTH COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND WILL COME TO SHARE MY VIEW OF THOSE BENEFITS.

OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE IS PEACE AND PROGRESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

I HAVE HEARD STATEMENTS MADE BY SOME PEOPLE ABOUT THIS AGREEMENT WHICH BEAR NO RELATION TO WHAT IS IN IT.

I BELIEVE THAT THOSE STATEMENTS WERE MADE BECAUSE THOSE CONCERNED HAD DECIDED TO FIND FAULT WITH THE AGREEMENT REGARDLESS OF WHAT WAS IN IT.

SO NOW, EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY HAVE FOUND THAT IT DID NOT MATCH THEIR OWN ADVANCE SCARE-STORIES OR LIVE UP TO THEIR CHERISHED MYTHS, THEY FIND THEMSELVES LOCKED INTO OPPOSITION IRRESPECTIVE OF THE AGREEMENT'S MERITS.

I CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THEY WILL RECONSIDER, NOW THAT THEY KNOW THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION.

I HAVE ALSO HEARD THE DEMANDS THAT WE SHOULD SUBMIT THIS INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT TO SOME TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

MR. SPEAKER, RELATIONS BETWEEN SOVEREIGN STATES ARE A MATTER FOR THE GOVERNMENTS OF

THOSE STATES, ACCOUNTABLE TO THEIR PARLIAMENTS.

NORTHERN IRELAND IS PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THIS HOUSE REPRESENTS ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND MUST ACCEPT WHAT FLOWS FROM THAT.

THAT INCLUDES ACCEPTANCE OF THE POLICIES OF FREELY ELECTED GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, ENDORSED BY PARLIAMENT, IN RESPECT OF RELATIONS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS - INCLUDING THE IRISH REPUBLIC.

MR. SPEAKER, THE AGREEMENT OFFERS TO THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND A REAL HOPE OF MAKING

PROGRESS TOWARDS LASTING PEACE AND POLITICAL STABILITY - IF MEN AND WOMEN OF GOODWILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CHANCE IT OFFERS.

I BEG TO MOVE.

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ORRIN G. HATCH
UTAH

November 19, 1985

The Right Honorable
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

Dear Madam Prime Minister:

I have been monitoring the recent developments in Anglo-Irish relations with great interest. You and Irish Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald are to be congratulated for co-authoring the recent historic agreement between your two countries. Although no one can reasonably expect an instant reconciliation between the Nationalist and Unionist communities in Northern Ireland, the establishment of an Intergovernmental Conference is a significant, bold step in the right direction. It is a beacon of hope to all those who seek a fair and peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Respectfully,

Orrin G. Hatch
United States Senator

Statement

[The Prime Minister]

Government has been that the armed forces should operate in aid of the civil power. We have been trying to make arrangement progressively to bring that into effect. The only difference about the Ulster Defence Regiment relates not to the agreement itself but to the particular matter which I read out from the communiqúe. It says that the conference will consider the objective of ensuring

"as rapidly as possible that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, there is a police presence in all operations which involve direct contact with the community."

That is in pursuance of the general policy that in a democracy the armed forces act in aid of the civil power.

Mr. John Hume (Foyle): Does the Prime Minister agree that a great deal will depend upon the implementation of the agreement? Can she assure the House that it will be implemented in the same spirit of good faith as was evident on Friday between the two Prime Ministers? Despite the ill-judged and prejudged reaction from certain quarters, my party believes that this agreement is an opportunity to make progress towards peace and reconciliation. We shall offer our fullest co-operation to the new institution. That includes willingness to enter into discussion and dialogue with anybody in Northern Ireland, particularly those who represent Northern Ireland, in this House, about any matter that will lead to peace and reconciliation, including the sharing of responsibility for certain matters in Northern Ireland. Recognition of the validity of both traditions, which was explicit in this agreement, is the only true basis for reconciliation. My party and those who support me do not believe that there will be any resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland which involves in any way the crushing or the defeat of the Protestant heritage there. Not only would that be unthinkable; it would be impossible.

The Prime Minister: May I most warmly thank the hon. Gentleman for what he has said? I believe that his constructive contribution will help greatly to defeat the men of violence and to bring peace and stability to both traditions in Northern Ireland. Whenever there is a change, obviously hopes and fears are raised on both sides. It is for us in this House and those who take the lead in all communities in Northern Ireland to quell those fears and to bring forward those hopes so that we may move forward to the peace and stability that we all want.

Mr. Ian Gow (Eastbourne) *rose——*

Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Gow: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in these coming months, and whatever view we take about the Anglo-Irish agreement, restraint in public utterance will assist, and intemperate and inflammatory public utterance will injure the true cause of Ulster?

Is my right hon. Friend further aware that charges of treachery levelled against her, whether within or without this House, are resented deeply by me and will be repudiated totally by me?

The Prime Minister: I warmly agree with my hon. Friend about restraint in public utterance. His objectives for peace and stability and for defeating the men of violence are the same as mine. I am very grateful to him for what he said in the latter part of his question.

Mr. Merlyn Rees (Morley and Leeds, South): No one who has had any responsibility for Ulster—for Northern Ireland—could do aught else than wish the Government well in their endeavours. I was especially pleased to hear the words of the hon. Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume).

Is the right hon. Lady aware that I regret the reports in the weekend newspapers that, in the light of the response of the Unionists, there is talk of sending 9.000 soldiers and two batallions of paras — [AN HON. MEMBER :"Rubbish."] I am referring to what has been reported.

I have noted that, unlike in 1974, the Unionists on these Benches have not had any truck with paramilitaries and are not talking about an Ulster workers' strike; They are talking about standing again for election and of going to the High Court. At least in the short run, we should give them credit for that. We must fight their arguments, if that is necessary, with the spoken word and not with threats, because that would be counter-productive to Northern Ireland.

The crisis is likely to come next year. If the Ulster Unionists win through overwhelmingly in their communities, the Orange card will no longer be able to be played over here—the Orange card will no longer be a trump card. I simply say to the Government that it is about that time that they should be thinking, because it is my view that the union is at risk not from this part of the United Kingdom but from within Northern Ireland.

The Prime Minister: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for raising the matter of that report. I know of no such plans as those referred to in that report, and we have issued a statement from No. 10 Downing street to that effect. I do not see any need to increase the security forces in Northern Ireland as a result of the agreement. I hope that any views that are to be put will be put in the customary way, through representatives in this House or through representatives in the Assembly or elsewhere in Northern Ireland. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for allowing me to make that clear.

Sir Peter Blaker (Blackpool, South): Should not those who are most vocal in their wish that Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom bear in mind the fact that it follows logically from their position that the acceptability of this agreement is a matter for the United Kingdom as a whole, and that the United Kingdom will warmly applaud the agreement and wish it success?

The Prime Minister: Yes, my right hon. Friend is correct. Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and will remain so unless the majority wish the contrary and the house endorses their wish. Decisions are a matter for the United Kingdom as a whole.

Mr. Robert Maclennan (Caithness and Sutherland): On behalf of my right hon. and hon. Friends, I join in expressing the hope that this agreement assists the process of peace and security. Is it the Prime Minister's intention to table a motion and allow a free vote on the proposal that there should be an Anglo-Irish parliamentary tier?

The Prime Minister: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the first part of his question. There will be a motion, subject to the approval of my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal. We hope to have a debate next week and we shall table a motion to approve the agreement. I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the answer that he wishes to receive on the voting. The parliamentary tier is a matter for the House and for the Dail.

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MOOD IN DUBLIN AFTER THE SUMMIT

SUMMARY

1. SOBER SATISFACTION IN DUBLIN THAT DOMESTIC, INTERNATIONAL AND MEDIA REACTION TO ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT HAS SO FAR GONE AS WELL AS COULD BE EXPECTED. NO DISPOSITION TO CROW OVER THE UNIONISTS.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE REPORTED (MY TELNOS 783, 784 AND 786) THE IMMEDIATE MEDIA REACTION TO THE SIGNATURE OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT. THE MOOD IN OFFICIAL CIRCLES IS ONE OF SUBDUED SATISFACTION. THERE IS NO SENSE OF EUPHORIA NOR ANY DESIRE TO CRACK OPEN MAGNUMS OF CHAMPAGNE. RATHER THERE IS A FEELING THAT AFTER MANY MONTHS OF DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS THE STAGE IS AT LAST SET: THE PLAY NOW BEGINS.

3. OFFICIALS WERE ANXIOUS ABOUT THE JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE TAOISEACH AND THE PRIME MINISTER. THERE WAS A SENSE OF RELIEF THAT IT WENT WELL. THERE WAS NO ADVERSE REACTION TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S DESCRIPTION OF HERSELF AS A UNIONIST AND A LOYALIST. THE PRESS CONFERENCE CAME OVER AS A SUCCESSFUL, EVEN-HANDED DOUBLE ACT. THE TAOISEACH WAS SEEN TO HAVE THE LAST WORD AND USED IT TO UNDERLINE HIS CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO IRISH UNITY AND TO REITERATE HIS PLEA THAT THE UNIONISTS SHOULD NOT PREJUDGE THE AGREEMENT, BUT JUDGE IT FOR WHAT IT IS.

4. MR HAUGHEY'S FIRST REACTION CAME ON THE LOCAL MEDIA DURING THE AFTERNOON OF FRIDAY 15 NOVEMBER. THERE WAS DISAPPOINTMENT AT HIS USE OF THE PHRASE ''THIS IS A SAD DAY FOR IRISH NATIONALISM''. BUT THERE WAS SATISFACTION LATER IN THE DAY WHEN, AS A RESULT OF FAST FOOTWORK BY DFA SECRETARY DONLON, THE TAOISEACH WAS BRIEFED TO REMIND MR HAUGHEY ON TELEVISION THAT EVENING OF THE AGREEMENT'S REFLECTION OF THE WORDS WHICH HE HIMSELF HAD USED IN HIS JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH MRS THATCHER IN MAY

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MAY 1980, WHEN HE AGREED THAT THERE COULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND WITHOUT MAJORITY CONSENT. ON A SPECIAL EDITION OF ''TODAY TONIGHT'', THE IRISH TELEVISION CURRENT AFFAIRS PROGRAMME, MR HAUGHEY WAS EXTREMELY DEFENSIVE AS HE TRIED TO EXPLAIN WHY HE PROPOSED TO OPPOSE AN AGREEMENT WHICH HAD THE SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, SENATOR KENNEDY, TIP O'NEILL, EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, ALL THE MAIN BRITISH POLITICAL PARTIES, MR HUME AND MR MALLON. THERE IS A FEELING IN OFFICIAL CIRCLES THAT MR HAUGHEY MAY HAVE BOXED HIMSELF INTO A CORNER WITH ONLY SINN FEIN AND MR PAISLEY FOR COMPANY.

5. MR HAUGHEY HAS BEEN SILENT OVER THE WEEKEND, WHILE HIS DEPUTY, MR LENIHAN, HAD AN AWKWARD TIME ON LUNCHTIME TELEVISION YESTERDAY ATTEMPTING TO ASSERT THAT FIANNA FAIL SPOKE FOR IRISH NATIONALISM: SEAMUS MALLON PUT HIM FIRMLY IN HIS PLACE. AT THE SAME TIME, ON THE MAIN POLITICAL AFFAIRS RADIO PROGRAMME, THE TAOISEACH, AND MR NOONAN REPORTING FROM NEW YORK, EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE HIGH LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT EXPRESSED FOR THE AGREEMENT AND IN PARTICULAR FOR THE GENEROUS COVERAGE, AND SUPPORTIVE EDITORIAL COVER, IN THE RESPONSIBLE US PRESS. THE TAOISEACH EXPRESSED HIMSELF GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY A MEETING WITH COALITION BACKBENCHERS WHO ARE DISPOSED TO GIVE HIM THEIR FULL BACKING. (THEY HAVE IN THE PAST BEEN FIERCELY CRITICAL OF HIM). MEANWHILE THE ONLY DISSIDENT VOICE IN THE SDLP WHICH RTE REPORTERS COULD LOCATE YESTERDAY WAS THAT OF PASCHAL O'HARE, WHO HINTED HE MAY SHORTLY RESIGN.

Y6. THE TAOISEACH HAS PLEADED FOR AN ORDERLY DEBATE IN THE DAIL TOMORROW, AND UNDERTAKEN NOT TO USE THE OCCASION TO SCORE POINTS OFF THE OPPOSITION. I VERY MUCH DOUBT WHETHER FIANNA FAIL WILL RESPOND IN KIND.

7. NEVERTHELESS, TO SUM UP, REACTION INTERNATIONALLY, IN THE US, IN THE SDLP AND DOMESTICALLY (MR HAUGHEY EXCEPTED) HAS BEEN SO FAR AS GOOD AS THE TAOISEACH COULD HAVE HOPED FOR. THERE IS NO DISPOSITION TO GLOAT OVER THE DISCOMFITURE OF THE UNIONISTS.

18. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO THE PRIVATE SECRETARY, TO NUMBER 10 AND TO BELL NIO(L).

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MR POWELL

Anglo-Irish Agreement: the Reactions of President Reagan and the Speaker of the House of Representatives

A and B C

President Reagan and Speaker O'Neill gave a joint press conference within minutes of the signature of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and made warm statements of welcome. Sir Oliver Wright has recommended that the Prime Minister should send brief messages of appreciation to the President and to the Speaker.

2. I attach drafts for such messages, which have been prepared in co-operation with FCO and NIO officials and the Embassy in Washington.

C L G Mallaby

18 November 1985

Copy:

Mr Stark
Mr Appleyard, FCO
Mr Daniell, NIO

CONFIDENTIAL

Draft message from the Prime Minister to the President of the United States

I want to thank you most warmly for the generous statement you made on 15 November about the new Anglo-Irish Agreement. I was very grateful that you spoke in such warm terms, and within minutes of the ceremony when Garret FitzGerald and I had signed the Agreement. Your joint press conference with Speaker O'Neill was widely featured in the media here, including the first televised reports on the Agreement.

It is a great source of strength for me to have your public support for our efforts to promote stability in Northern Ireland through democracy, dialogue and reconciliation and for our determination to defeat those who cause suffering through violence.

I believe that the Anglo-Irish Agreement has the support of a very large majority in Parliament and in the public in the United Kingdom. My major purpose now will be to bring home to unionists that the Agreement can do good for all the people of Northern Ireland.

I noted in particular ~~the~~ your remark ~~in your statement~~ about the United States lending practical support to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. ~~I~~ also ~~noted~~ the Speaker's reference ~~in the Speaker's statement~~ to financial and economic assistance. We are in contact with the Irish Government about the possible establishment of a fund to ~~handle~~ manage any contributions which might be made by the United States and other countries. We shall make contact soon with your officials about arranging trilateral discussions.

You will be very much in all our thoughts during your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. ~~As always you have my full support~~ I look forward to seeing you in Brussels on Monday.

With warm regards.

JAIADG

CONFIDENTIAL

Draft message from the Prime Minister
to Speaker O'Neill

I should like to ~~express my appreciation~~ thank you for the statement you made at your joint press conference with President Reagan on 15 November in support of the Anglo-Irish Agreement which Garret FitzGerald and I had signed only a few minutes earlier.

~~It is a great source of strength to know that many prominent members of the Congress of the United States, and in particular you personally, support the efforts which Dr FitzGerald and I are making to achieve progress towards peace through dialogue and reconciliation, and in total rejection of the bullet and the bomb.~~ It will be a great help in establishing wide and widespread support for the Agreement if we can be able to point to your own commendation of it and that of many prominent members of Congress.

I noted your generous reference to the possibility of financial and economic assistance for ~~Ireland North~~ Northern Ireland and ~~South~~ the Republic. I of course welcome what you said. We shall be in touch with the Administration to ~~arrange discussions on this aspect~~ hear more of the possibilities for this.

With warm good wishes.

CONFIDENTIAL

Thomas P. O'Neill JNR
Speaker of the House of
Representatives

CCOPS + Master:

file

DCA

cc: FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

18 November 1985

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T218/85

Dear Helmut,

Thank you so much for your kind telegram about the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. It is very valuable to have the support of such a close ally and friend. Like you, I hope that the agreement helps achieve the peace and stability which Northern Ireland deserves.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Herr Dr. Helmut Kohl

DSG

CONFIDENTIAL

Suppression of Terrorism

B.07216

MR FLESHER

Anglo-Irish Agreement: Prime Minister's Statement

Mr Powell's minute of 17 November to Sir Robert Armstrong requested additional information for the Prime Minister on two matters. The information about the steps open to Unionist MPs in resigning their Parliamentary seats is being provided direct to you by the Northern Ireland Office. I attach the information about the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, with a suggested reply to any supplementary question.

2. There are three particular points which the Prime Minister may wish to seek to get across to Unionists by including them, if appropriate, in her replies to supplementaries:

(a) the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Conference, like the Conference which it will serve, will have no executive functions; it will be very small.

(b) The Anglo-Irish Agreement is not the beginning of a process in which increasing involvement of the Irish Republic in Northern Ireland's affairs is envisaged: on the contrary, the Agreement commits the Irish Government to acknowledging the rights and identity of Unionists, and Article 1 is the most formal and far reaching commitment by an Irish Government to the vital principle that the status of Northern Ireland would only change with the consent of a majority there.

(c) Both the Agreement and the Communique give particular attention to the enhancement of cross-border co-operation against terrorism. Article 9(a) of the Agreement foresees a programme of work by the Chief

Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Commissioner of the Garda in such areas as threat assess ments, exchange of information, liaison structures, technical co-operation, training, and operational resources. And paragraph 9 of the Communique states that the Intergovernmental Conference will pay particular attention at its first meeting to action under Article 9(a).

3. I am sending copies of this minute and attachment to the Private Secretaries to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Lord President, the Lord Privy Seal, the Attorney General, the Chief Whip and Sir Robert Armstrong.

C L G Mallaby

18 November 1985

THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM

Note for Supplementary

Q. What is the advantage to the United Kingdom of accession by the Republic of Ireland to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism?

A. Accession by the Irish Republic to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism should greatly increase our prospects of securing extradition from the Republic of persons accused or convicted of terrorist crimes. Article 1 of the Convention requires contracting states not to consider offences involving the use of explosives or firearms, if these endanger persons, as political offences.

Background (may be used)

1. The European Convention entered into force in 1978. The United Kingdom is a party. So are 20 other member states of the Council of Europe. The exceptions, apart from the Irish Republic, are Belgium, France, Greece and Italy which have signed but not ratifided, and Malta which has not signed.

2. The Convention is intended to ensure that perpetrators of terrorist offences should be brought to justice and not escape by crossing national frontiers. Article 1 requires contracting states not to consider as political offences: offences involving the use of explosives or firearms if these endanger persons, hijacking or other offences against aircraft, serious attacks on internationally protected persons, kidnapping and taking of hostages. Article 2 provides states with the additional option to treat

similarly: serious crimes of violance against a person, or against property if collective danger to persons is created. Article 7 provides that, if a state does not extradite, it will submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.

3. The United Kingdom view has always been that extradition is a particularly effective measure against terrorism. But many states are unwilling to extradite where the offence or motive is considered to be political in character. This has long caused obstacles to securuing extradition of suspected terrorists from the Irish Republic.

Background (not for use)

4. Recently the Irish courts have been more helpful; so far three persons involved in crimes connected with terrorism have been extradited. If the Republic accedes to the Convention, there should be a further major improvement.

5. The Taoiseach intends to introduce legislation into the Dail, to pave the way for accession to the Convention. The Summit Communique indicated that the ultimate decision on accession would depend in part on what had happened meanwhile regarding relations between the security forces and the minority and regarding public confidence in the administration of justice. The Irish officials in the Armstrong/Nally negotiations also indicated that it was possible that, during debate on the Convention in the Dail, the suggestion would be made that extradition in the future should become subject to a prima facie case being made. They indicated that the Irish Government would not favour such a requirement.

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ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: PRESS REVIEW 18 NOVEMBER

SUMMARY

1. THE 3 MAIN THEMES OF THE CONTINUING EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT IN TODAY'S IRISH PAPERS ARE: IRISH POLITICAL REACTIONS, SPECULATION ON THE NEXT MOVES, AND ASSESSMENT OF THE UNIONIST REACTION AND HMG'S PLANS FOR DEALING WITH IT.

DETAIL

2. THE IRISH TIMES LEADS WITH A REPORT OF A SPEECH MADE BY MR BARRY IN CORK YESTERDAY, HEADED 'BARRY APPEALS TO UNIONISTS AND HAUGHEY', IN WHICH THE MINISTER APPEALED TO FIANNA FAIL TO 'LOOK AGAIN' AT THE AGREEMENT. SAYING HE WAS ''SADDENED'' BY THE FIANNA FAIL REACTION, WHICH SAID HE BELIEVED HAD BEEN 'BASED ON A MIS-APPREHENSION'', MR BARRY SAID: ''FIANNA FAIL WOULD HAVE TO BE VERY CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD DO BETTER THAN THE PRESENT AGREEMENT'' BEFORE THEY ABANDONED IT. ADDRESSING UNIONISTS, MR BARRY SAID ''THEIR LEADERS ARE ABSOLUTELY WRONG AND THEY ARE TRAGICALLY MISTAKEN TO REGARD THE AGREEMENT AS A HUMILIATION. IT OFFERS A CHANCE FOR PEACE AND A CHANCE FOR PROSPERITY''. REMARKS BY THE TAOISEACH ON RTE RADIO YESTERDAY ARE ALSO WIDELY REPORTED. AMONGST OTHER THINGS, DR FITZGERALD SAID THAT ONE AIM OF THE AGREEMENT WAS TO MAKE IT LESS EASY FOR THE PIRA TO OPERATE.

3. TODAY'S PAPERS CARRY FURTHER REPORTS OF THE JOINT FINE GAEL AND LABOUR PARLIAMENTARY PARTY MEETINGS ON SATURDAY, FOLLOWING WHICH THE IRISH TIMES SAYS THE GOVERNMENT IS ''CONFIDENT OF SECURING A COMFORTABLE MAJORITY IN THE DAIL DEBATE''. THE IRISH TIMES SPECULATES THAT FIANNA FAIL ''MAY SWITCH TACTICS FOLLOWING A WEEKEND ASSESSMENT OF MR HAUGHEY THAT PUBLIC OPINION HAS REACTED UNFAVOURABLY TO HIS INITIAL STATEMENTS. SIMILAR REPORTS IN OTHER PAPERS ARE BASED ON THE FACT THAT MR HAUGHEY PULLED OUT OF AN INTERVIEW ON RTE, RADIO YESTERDAY. BUT A SPOKESMAN FOR FIANNA FAIL HAS DENIED THAT THERE WAS ANY SIGNIFICANCE IN THIS. THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT ''THERE WERE GOOD, SOLID, POLITICAL, LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE AGREEMENT.... WE WILL OPPOSE THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE IT OFFENDS THE FORUM DOCUMENT''. NEVERTHELESS, ALL THE PAPERS REPORT THAT MR HAUGHEY HAS BEEN TAKEN

NEVERTHELESS, ALL THE PAPERS REPORT THAT MR HAUGHEY HAS BEEN TAKEN ABACK BY MR MALLON'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT, WHICH HAS DEALT ''A SEVERE BLOW TO THE CREDIBILTY OF FIANNA FAIL'S OPPOSITION''. THE IRISH PRESS COMMENTS THAT MALLON HAS 'DONE THE BEST SALES JOB OF ALL AMONG CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISTS''. A CRITICAL IRISH TIMES EDITORIAL SAID THAT ''MEWLINGS ABOUT SMALL PRINT, WHICH TO THE MAN OR WOMAN IN THE STREET DIFFERS INFINITESIMALLY FROM THAT OF THE 1980 HAUGHEY/THATCHER COMMUNIQUE WILL BE DEALT WITH IMPATIENTLY, PARTICULARLY BY THE YOUNG, WHO THINK OF TOMORROW AND NOT YESTERDAY.''

4. THE IRISH INDEPENDENT LEADS WITH A REPORT HEADED 'FURTHER CHANGES ON WAY IN NORTH' WHICH, HOWEVER, DOES NOT STATE WHAT THESE ARE TO BE. THE IRISH TIMES PICKS UP REMARKS MADE ON BBC TV YESTERDAY BY DEPUTY MAURICE MANNING, THAT HE SUSPECTED THAT ''DECISIONS ON MAJOR THINGS'' HAD BEEN TAKEN IN ADVANCE OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE. MR KING'S REMARKS IN THE SAME PROGRAMME, THAT IT WOULD NOT BE AT ALL EASY TO SET UP MIXED COURTS, AND THAT THERE WERE NO PROPOSALS AT ALL TO REDUCE THE UDR, ARE ALSO REPORTED.

5. ON THE IRISH SIDE, MEASURES TO FOLLOW UP THE AGREEMENT ARE ALREADY BEING REPORTED. THE IRISH INDEPENDENT CARRIES ONE FRONT PAGE REPORT THAT EXTRA GARDAI ARE BEING SENT ON BORDER DUTY FOR THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, TO BE ON THE ALERT FOR ANY TROUBLE ACCOMPANYING ANY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT, AND ANOTHER STATING THAT NEW LEGISLATION TO ENABLE THE REPUBLIC TO RATIFY THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM IS TO BE INTRODUCED BY THE GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, THE LEGISLATION WILL MAKE CLEAR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 'POLITICAL' AND 'TERRORIST' AS ESTABLISHED IN RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS. ANOTHER FRONT PAGE REPORT IN THE IRISH INDEPENDENT REPORTS THAT THE NEW SECRETARIAT WILL BE ON 24 HOUR DUTY, WITH A STAFF OF 10 OPERATING A DOUBLE ROSTER SYSTEM. THE IRISH TEAM IS NOW EXPECTING TO CONSIST OF LILLIS, O'CEALLAIGH AND OTHER OFFICIALS FROM THE DFA AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

6. UNIONIST REACTION IS THE LEAD STORY IN THE IRISHPRESS AND THE CORK EXAMINER. UNDER THE HEADLINE 'BACKLASH PLAN READY: BRITIAIN TO RESIST THREAT OF LOYALIST', THE IRISH PRESS REPORTS THAT A SPECIAL UNIT HAS BEEN SET UP IN THE CABINET OFFICE HEADED BY DAVID GOODALL, TO DEAL WITH A CAMPAIGN OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE ''SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENTS WILL BE STOPPED FOR PEOPLE WHO TAKE PART IN LOYALIST STRIKES AND GRANTS TO AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY WILL BE FROZEN''. THE CORK EXAMINER COMMENTS EDITORIALLY ''PERHAPS AT LONG LAST HERE IS A BRITSH PRIME MINISTER WHO WILL TRUMP THE ORANGE CARD'', WHILST THE IRISH PRESS SAYS: ''THE UNIONISTS ARE THE ONES WHO ALWAYS WANTED BRITISH RULE. NOW THEY HAVE GOT IT AND THEY HAVE FOUND OUT WHAT IT IS TO BE A TINY MINORITY INSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM. BIN A UNITED IRELAND, THEIR INFLUENCE WOULD BE GIGANTIC BY COMPARISION''.

GOODISON

YYYY

DLLNAN 0494

James KILFEDDER MP

2/12

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 November, 1985.

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr. James Kilfedder, M.P., which passes on a resolution of the Northern Ireland Assembly. As you will see, it includes an invitation to the Prime Minister to address the Assembly. I should be grateful for a draft reply.

(C.D. Powell)

J.A. Daniell, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

Personal

FROM: The Rt. Hon. JEREMY THORPE

2 ORME SQUARE
LONDON
W2 4RS

November 7. 1985

Dear Prime Minister,

Forgive a hand written note.
May I be allowed to send warmest congratulations and good wishes on your Irish initiative? The agreement is as imaginative as it is courageous. If You can succeed in pacifying Ireland you will have won a prize which has eluded every British Prime Minister for the past 50 years — Some would say 100 years!

Since I am writing may I say how happy I am that you are going to entertain Olwen Carey Evans next week. She is an "Honorary" Aunt (as was Megan) & You will find her a fascinating little well history. I was at her 90th. birthday celebrations which fell on the day of the Falklands invasion. She immediately remarked "This reminds me of Agadir in 1911!" She went with Lloyd George (and many of his Budget, when he made the speech, which he first cleared with Asquith at No. 10, warning the Germans that if they landed on the N. African coast it would be treated as an act of war. She remembers the 1909 Budget. The passage of the 1911 National Insurance Act, & Armistice in 1918 from in Downing St. No. 10.

No reply of course.

Yours very sincerely

Jeremy Thorpe

RESTRICTED

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT

I enclose a copy of the Prime Minister's statement for the House tomorrow. Since she will be entirely occupied with the Anglo-French Summit until 1450 tomorrow, there is effectively no scope for changes to the text.

The Prime Minister has asked for additional information on two points:

(i) the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. She would like a short background note explaining the main provisions of this and the advantages for the United Kingdom of Irish accession to it;

(ii) the steps open to the Unionists to pursue their announced course of resigning their parliamentary seats. The BBC today suggested that there could be practical difficulties in implementing a mass resignation.

I should be grateful if information on these points and any additional supplementaries could be sent to Mr. Flesher by 1400 on 18 November.

I am copying this minute and enclosure to the Private Secretaries to the Northern Ireland Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Lord President, the Lord Privy Seal, the Attorney-General and the Chief Whip.

C.D.P.

(Charles Powell)

17 November 1985

RESTRICTED

SP1AEX

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT:

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER

IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

WITH PERMISSION, MR. SPEAKER, I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT THE MEETING WHICH I HAD WITH THE TAOISEACH ON 15 NOVEMBER.

I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MY RT. HON. AND LEARNED FRIEND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND MY RT. HON. FRIEND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND. DR. FITZGERALD WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MR. SPRING, THE TANAISTE, AND BY MR. BARRY, THE IRISH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE TAOISEACH AND I SIGNED AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, WHICH HAS BEEN PUBLISHED IN A COMMAND PAPER.

THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE, ISSUED AFTER THE MEETING, IS ALSO INCLUDED IN THE COMMAND PAPER.

THE PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT IS TO PROMOTE PEACE AND STABILITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND; TO ENCOURAGE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES THERE; TO CREATE AN IMPROVED CLIMATE OF FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND; AND TO STRENGTHEN CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN COMBATING TERRORISM.

THE AGREEMENT WILL NOT COME INTO FORCE UNTIL IT HAS

BEEN APPROVED BY PARLIAMENT AND BY THE IRISH DAIL.

THE HOUSE WILL HAVE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY FOR A FULL DEBATE.

THE AGREEMENT HAS TWO PRINCIPAL FEATURES.

THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS AFFIRMED IN A BINDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT THAT THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND WILL REMAIN UNCHANAGED SO LONG AS THAT IS THE WISH OF THE MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE.

IT HAS ALSO RECOGNISED THAT THE PRESENT WISH OF A MAJORITY IS TO REMAIN PART OF THE UNITED

KINGDOM.

THIS IS THE MOST FORMAL COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT MADE BY ANY IRISH GOVERNMENT.

THE SECOND MAIN FEATURE OF THE AGREEMENT IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EXISTING ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL.

THE CONFERENCE WILL BE SERVICED BY A SECRETARIAT ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

IN THIS CONFERENCE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT MAY PUT FORWARD VIEWS AND PROPOSALS ON CERTAIN

ASPECTS OF NORTHERN IRELAND AFFAIRS.

IF DEVOLUTION IS RESTORED - AND BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE COMMITTED TO SUPPORT THIS - THEN THOSE MATTERS WHICH BECOME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT WILL BE TAKEN OUT OF THE HANDS OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE.

THE CONFERENCE WILL ALSO DISCUSS CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION, INCLUDING IMPROVED SECURITY CO-OPERATION.

THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO MAKE DETERMINED EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ANY DIFFERENCES THAT MAY ARISE.

BUT THE CONFERENCE WILL NOT BE A DECISION-MAKING BODY:

FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISIONS AND ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT WILL REMAIN WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT NORTH OF THE BORDER AND WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT SOUTH OF THE BORDER.

THE FIRST MEETING OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE WILL TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER THE AGREEMENT ENTERS INTO FORCE.

PARTICULAR SUBJECTS ON WHICH THE CONFERENCE WILL CONCENTRATE AT ITS INITIAL MEETINGS ARE:

- WAYS OF IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE

SECURITY FORCES AND THE MINORITY COMMUNITY

IN NORTHERN IRELAND:

- ACTION TO IMPROVE SECURTY CO-OPERATION

  BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS;

- AND WAYS TO HELP TO UNDERLINE THE

  IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE

  ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

THE AGREEMENT RECOGNISES THAT IT WOULD BE FOR

PARLIAMENTARY DECISION IN WESTMINSTER AND

DUBLIN WHETHER TO ESTABLISH AN ANGLO-IRISH

PARLIAMENTARY BODY OF THE KIND DESCRIBED IN

THE ANGLO-IRISH STUDIES REPORT OF NOVEMBER

1981.

THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED IN THE COMMUNIQUE ITS INTENTION TO ACCEDE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM.

WE WELCOME THIS.

MR. SPEAKER, NO SINGLE AGREEMENT CAN RESOLVE THE DEEPROOTED AND COMPLEX PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND DELIVER THE PEACE FOR WHICH THE GREAT MAJORITY OF PEOPLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND LONG.

BUT I BELIEVE THE PRESENT AGREEMENT WILL MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION:

- IT MAINTAINS AND CONFIRMS THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND AS PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND RECOGNISES THE LEGITIMACY OF THE UNIONIST POSITION.
- IT PROVIDES FOR CO-OPERATION IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE TO BE A TWO-WAY STREET.

  WE SHALL WISH TO PURSUE MATTERS AFFECTING THE REPUBLIC IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND FOR INSTANCE IMPROVED SECURITY AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION.
- IT ENCOURAGES THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AN ACCEPTABLE FORM OF DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT.
- IT OFFERS HOPE TO ALL THOSE IN BOTH

COMMUNITIES WHO WANT TO DEFEAT THE MEN OF VIOLENCE AND WANT TO WORK TOGETHER PEACEFULLY FOR A BETTER FUTURE FOR THEIR CHILDREN.

THAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT.

IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I COMMEND IT TO THE HOUSE.

FILE

PRIME MINISTER

ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: POINTS FOR ANSWERS

Some points to make in the House:

(1) Following the Chequers Summit last year, I made clear that unification, joint sovereignty and joint authority were not solutions for Northern Ireland. My statement was widely welcomed by Unionists at the time. Nothing has happened in the meantime which changes in any way the position on those three points. I cannot see what the hon. Gentleman is so exercised about.

(2) When I hear some hon. Gentlemen's comments, I have the feeling that his problem lies not with the Agreement, but with the fact that he had decided to find fault with the Agreement regardless of what was in it. So now, even though they may have found that it did not match their own advance scare-stories, they find themselves locked into opposition regardless of the Agreement's merits.

(3) The security forces including the RUC and the UDR have by their courage and dedication done a great deal to reduce the level of violence. But we cannot leave it all to them. There is no such thing as an "acceptable" level of violence; and if we are to bring the violence to an end, it will only be by reconciliation of the two communities. That is what this Agreement sets out to achieve.

(4) Co-operation under the Agreement is a two-way street. The spirit of the Agreement is not one of each interfering in the other's affairs: it is one of both sides working together on problems which affect Northern Ireland and the Republic.

(5) The Agreement is a positive incentive to devolution because if an acceptable basis for devolved government can be found, then the Intergovernmental Conference ceases to deal with the matters transferred to the devolved government. In

our joint press conference, the Taoiseach undertook that his government will do everything it can to promote devolution.

CHARLES POWELL
17 November 1985

MJ2BIZ

MR. INGHAM

cc Mr. Flesher

ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: STATEMENT

The Prime Minister would be grateful if you could flag up for her tomorrow a selection of principal press comment on the Anglo-Irish Agreement. She wants to go through this at 1500 as part of the preparations for her Statement. Perhaps you could let Tim Flesher have it.

(Charles Powell)

17 November 1985

Il Presidente della Repubblica Italiana

Roma, 16 novembre 1985

Cara Margaret,

la notizia dell'accordo intervenuto fra il Regno Unito e la Repubblica d'Irlanda è stata occasione per me di profondo rallegramento e motivo di fiduciosa speranza in un prossimo avvenire che veda definitivamente ricomposti i contrasti che hanno lacerato da tanto tempo la convivenza fra le due comunità nelle contee dell'Irlanda del Nord.

L'opinione pubblica italiana condivide il senso di sollievo e di attesa che all'annuncio della conclusione dell'accordo si è diffuso nel Regno Unito: tanto più che lo stillicidio di lutti, che ha segnato la storia degli ultimi decenni, è stato vissuto sempre più in Italia, anch'essa colpita negli anni recenti da assurde forme di lacerazione interna, quale dramma collettivo di una Europa che avverte la sua profonda unità non solo nella costruzione comunitaria, ma , prima ancora, nella sua cultura e nel suo patrimonio indivisibile di esperienze e di progetti per il futuro.

L'esito degli sforzi negoziali perseguiti con tanta tenacia dai due Governi è, pertanto, di buon auspicio

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The Rt.Hon.Mrs.Margaret THATCHER M.P.
Primo Ministro del Regno Unito

L O N D R A

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anche per il proseguimento di quella intrapresa europea che ci vede tutti coinvolti e, sia pure talvolta con ottiche diverse, tutti egualmente protesi ad assicurare a questa nostra Europa strumenti ed istituzioni tali da poter far fronte ai problemi e alle sfide dei prossimi decenni.

L'accordo raggiunto è, inoltre, significativa testimonianza della insostituibilità della via negoziale e del metodo pacifico nel componimento delle controversie e, come tale, incoraggiamento ad intraprendere il cammino del dialogo per quanti si trovano a reggere le sorti di popoli confrontati da situazioni conflittuali. Esso è, infine, la dimostrazione che, nel superamento di posizioni di incomprensione cristallizzate da tanto tempo, essenziale è il ruolo della "leadership" politica, da cui i popoli si attendono perseveranza e saggezza, ma anche coraggio. E al raggiungimento di tale storica intesa Ella ha dato, ancora una volta con il Suo impulso e la Sua visione, contributo determinante.

Sono tutti questi motivi che hanno rallegrato il mio animo nel dischiudersi di una prospettiva di vera pace e solidale collaborazione da cui trarrà vantaggio l'amico ed alleato popolo britannico.

Con rinnovati sentimenti di rallegramento e fervidi auspici per il futuro, colgo l'occasione per manifestarLe i sensi della mia sincera amicizia e del mio personale ricordo.

Cordialmente, affezionatissimo

Francesco Cossiga

ROUGH TRANSLATION

Dear Margaret,

The news of the agreement reached by the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland has been for me cause of deep satisfaction and a source of confident hope in a near future when the contrasts that have for so long thorn the two communities of Northern Ireland will be definitively resolved.

Italian public opinion shares the sense of relief and expectation that on the announcement of the stipulation of the accord, has spread through the United Kingdom: more so since the constant trickle of losses which has marred the history of these last decades, has been felt evermore in Italy, herself hit in recent years by absurd forms of internal lacerations, part of the collective drama of a Europe which perceives its deep unity not only in its European construction, but, before that, in its culture, its indivisible heritage of experiences and prospects for the future.

The result of the negotiating efforts pursued with such tenacity by the two governments is therefore a good omen, also for the continuation of that European enterprise which involves us all and, even if at times with different viewpoints, sees us all equally eager to ensure that this Europe of ours is equipped with the instruments and institutions capable of tackling the problems and the challenges of future decades.

The agreement reached, moreover, is a significant testimony that negotiations and the peaceful method of resolving controversies are irreplaceable and, as such, as encouragement to undertake the path of the dialogue to those who find themselves holding the destiny of Peoples faced with situations of conflict. Finally, the accord is the demonstration that, in overcoming stances of incomprehension crystallized for years, the role of the political leadership is essential. Peoples expect from their leaders perseverance and wisdom, but also courage. And to the accomplishment of such an historical understanding you have, once more, with your impulse and vision, given the determining contribution.

These are the considerations which have cheered my heart in the opening-up of prospects for true peace, solidarity and collaboration from which the friend and allied people of Britain will benefit.

With renewed sentiments of felicitation and fervent best wishes for the future, I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to you the expressions of my sincere friendship and personal memory.

Sincerely, Yours very affectionately,

Francesco Cossiga

from HUGH DYKES, M.P.

Q2

16th November 85

R18

PRESS RELEASE HUGH DYKES SENDS TELEGRAMS ON ANGLO-IRISH ACCORD.

Hugh Dykes has this morning sent the following telegrams from his Westminster office to the Prime Minister and the Irish Premier.

To Mrs Thatcher

"Hearty congratulations on your tenacity and determination in securing the Anglo-Irish agreement announced yesterday. This will surely enhance peace in that troubled province and should be supported by men and women of wisdom and goodwill everywhere. I send my best wishes for the lasting success of this historic agreement."

To the Taoiseach, Garrett Fitzgerald.

"May I as a British MP send you hearty congratulations in showing the resolve and courage needed to come together with HMG in the Anglo-Irish Agreement announced yesterday. All people of goodwill will earnestly pray for its durability and success.

In Harrow East we have a large Irish community of whom we are proud, relations are excellent all round and they will surely rejoice too in this first vital step in bringing our two countries together"

Hugh Dykes

ADVANCE COPIES 25

NORTHERN IRELAND

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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/PUS
MR GOODALL

HD/RID
HD/FUSD (2)
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT

[RESIDENT CLERK]

PS/ S of S
PS/MR R ANDREW, OAB 1/56
MR BRENNAN
MR BURNS
MR PN BELL
} NIO

SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO
} CABINET OFFICE

PS/ NO 10 DOWNING STREET (3)

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ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: PRESS REVIEW 16 NOVEMBER

SUMMARY

1. MASSIVE COVERAGE OF THE SUMMIT AND THE AGREEMENT REFLECTS MIXED REACTIONS IN THE REPUBLIC. EDITORIAL OPINION GENERALLY FAVOURABLE.

DETAIL

2. THERE HAS BEEN MASSIVE PRESS AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT IN THE LAST 24 HOURS, AND IRISH MINISTERS HAVE GONE ALL OUT TO PERSUADE THE IRISH PUBLIC OF ITS MERITS IN THE FACE OF SULLEN OPPOSITION FROM MR HAUGHEY. IN ADDITION TO LIVE COVERAGE OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE AND IMMEDIATE REACTION, RTE TV DEVOTED MOST OF ITS EVENING TO THE SUMMIT AND AGREEMENT INCLUDING INTERVIEWS WITH THE TAOISEACH, MR ING, MR HAUGHEY AND BRITISH, IRISH AND NORTHERN IRISH POLITICIANS ON ALL SIDES (EXCEPT UNIONISTS WHO PRESUMABLY WOULD NOT SPEAK TO RTE).

3. THE HEADLINES IN TODAY'S IRISH PAPERS APE MIXED. THE IRISH INDEPENDENT SAYS 'DEAL OF COURAGE: ANGLO-IRISH PAVT HAILED AT HOME AND APROAD'. THE IRISH TIMES SAYS 'ROLE IN NORTH FOR REPUBLIC AGREED'. PUT THE CORK EXAMINER SAYS 'NI AGREEMENT SIGNALS END OF BIPARTISANSHIP', AND THE IRISH PRESS HEADLINE IS : 'NATION SPLIT ON DEAL'. ALL THE PAPERS CARRY THE FULL TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT AND ALL PUBLISH EXTENSIVE SUPPLEMENTS ON THE EVENTS AND REAVTIONS OF THE DAY.

4. EDITORIAL REACTION MIRRORS THE MAIN HEADLINES. THE INDEPENDENT PUTS ITS COMMENT AT THE TOP OF ITS FRONT PAGE UNDER THE HEADING 'WE MUST BACK THIS ACCORD FOR A BETTER TOMORROW'. THE COR EXAMINER COMMENTS THAT THE AGREEMENT IS 'ONE SMALL MOVE TO SANITY AND PEACE WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE SEEMED POSSIBLE A YEAR AGO, WHEN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION WAS BEGUN'. THE IRISH TIMES HEADS ITS

COMMENT 'IN WITH A CHANCE' . THE AGREEMENT 'IS A REASONABLE DEAL. IT IS NOT A SOLUTION: IT IS A BEGINNING'.

5. THE IRISH PRESS WHICH IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE CLOSEST TO FIANNA FAIL POSITIONS AVOIDS GIVING ITS OWN VIEW. NOTING T A COMMON THREAD IN UNIONIST AND CONSERVATIVE OPINION WAS THAT THE AGREEMENT 'WAS IN FACT THE INTRODUCTION OF ... JOINT AUTHORITY UNDER ANOTHER NAME' THE IRISH PRESS COMMENTS THAT 'THERE WILL NEVER BE PEACE IN THIS COUNTRY UNTIL IRISH UNITY FINALLY COMES ABOUT' AND ALLEGES THAT DESPITE FAVOURABLE ' OPTICS', 'THERE WERE SERIOUS DIFFERENCES IN EMPHASIS' BETWEEN THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE. THE MAIN BENEFICIARIES IN THE NORTH ARE THE SDLP ' AND IN PARTICULAR MR JOHN HUME WHO NOW HAS THE BIGGEST ADVICE CENTRE OF THEM ALL SET UP TO COUNTER SINN FEIN CENTRES' . FOR THE SDLP THE AGREEMENT REPRESENTS 'A TANGIBLE ADVANCE': IT WILL BE 'AN ADVANCE FOR THE WHOLE ISLAND IF THE UNIONIST BACKLASH THREAT IS AT LAST CONFRONTED AND PUT DOWN'. THE IRISH PRESS CONCEDES THAT 'CERTAINLY ONE COULD ARGUE THAT 'TOTALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS DO INDEED COME WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THIS AGREEMENT', BUT WARNS THAT IF THE AGREEMENT IS NOT TO FULFIL MR HAUGHEY'S PREDICTIONS

,

'FROM TODAY, DAY 1 OF HILLSBOROUGH, THE ANGLO-IRISH PROCESS MUST BE SEEN TO WORK TOWARDS GIVING TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF MRS THATCHER'S DESCRIPTION OF DR FITZGERALD (AS A NATIONALIST AND REPUBLICAN)'.

6. THE QUESTION OF THE LOCATION AND NATURE OF THE SECRETARIAT IS EXAMINED IN THE PAPERS. THE IRISH INDEPENDENT REPORTS THAT IT WILL BE BASED IN BELFAST, CLOSE TO STORMONT CASTLE, AND SAYS THAT 'THE PESONNEL HAVE ALREADY BEEN CHOSEN - THERE WILL BE 18 - 20 AT THE MOST - BUT THEIR IDENTITIES HAVE NOT YET BEEN FORMALLY DISCLOSED - THIS IS PURELY FOR SECURITY REASONS'. NEVERTHELESS, THE IRISH PRESS REPORTS THAT THE IRISH TEAM WILL BE HEADED BY DAITHI O'CEALLAIGH, OF WHOM IT GIVES A SHORT BIOGRAPHY.

7. THE REACTIONS OF THE UNIONISTS AR E EXTENSIVELY REPORTED. THEIR THREAT TO RESIGN THEIR COMMONS' SEATS IS NOTED, AS IS MR KING'S STATEMENT LAST NIGHT THAT UNIONIST REACTIONS WERE V 'AN ABSOLUTE ABDICATION OF LEADERSHIP'. IN THE IRISH TIMES, JOHN HEALEY COMMENTS THAT THE WRITING IS ON THE WALL FOR UNIONISM', AND IN THE INDEPENDENT THE NORTHERN EDITOR SAYS 'THE UNIONISTS COULD BE HEADED DOWN THE ROAD OF UDI AND WILL HAVE NEITHER THE BRAIN NOR THE POLITICAL SKILL TO ALTER COURSE'.

8. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE REACTIONS OF FIANNA FIAL, AND IN PARTICULAR MR HAUGHEY ARE PROMINENTLY REPORTED AND DISCUSSED. HIS PERFORMANCE ON TELEVISION LAST NIGHT SEEMED DEFENSIVE AND UNCONVINCING, AND THE IRISH PRESS'S REPORT: 'RTE ATTACKED BY HAUGHEY OVER INTERVIEW' SUGGESTS THAT MR HAUGHEY THOUGHT SO TOO. THE IRISH TIMES HAS A FRONT PAGE REPORT HEADED 'FIANNA FAIL WILL REPUDIATE AGREEMENT', BUT THIS IS NOT IN FACT DEMONSTRATED BY THE TEXT, IN WHICH, ASKED IF HIS PARTY WOULD RENEGOTIATE THE AGREEMENT WHEN RETURNED TO GOVERNMENT, MR HAUGHEY IS QUOTED AS SAYING 'WE WILL CERTAINLY NOT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT IT IN ITS PRESENT FORM'. THIS TALLIES WITH OUR OWN UNDERSTANDING OF THE POSITION HE AND OTHER FIANNA FAIL SPOKESMEN ADOPTED IN INTERVIEWS. THE CORK EXAMINER HEADS ITS REPORT OF FIANNA FAIL'S POSITION 'IT GIVES EVERYTHING AWAY - HAUGHEY' AND THE INDEPENDENT HAS 'HAUGHEY : WE WILL FIGHT IT - AGREEMENT TERMS 'BREACH CONSTITUTION''. HOWEVER JACK LYNCH (FORMER FIANNA FAIL TAOISEACH) SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS POSITIVIE AND CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESERVED A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM PEOPLE OF GOODWILL ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER. THE CORK EXAMINER ALSO REPORTS THAT DES O'MALLEY HAS WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT AS A STEP FORWARD.

GOODISON

NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY,
PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS,
STORMONT,
BELFAST BT4 3SY

FROM THE SPEAKER

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher FRS MP
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

16 November 1985

Dear Prime Minister

The following resolution was passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly at its sitting on Saturday 16 November 1985:-

"That this Assembly, recalling both the solemn pledge of Her Majesty's Government contained in the Downing Street Declaration of August 1969 that "the responsibility for the affairs of Northern Ireland is entirely a matter of domestic jurisdiction [and] the United Kingdom Government will take full responsibility for asserting this principle in all international relationships", and the Prime Minister's declaration in the House of Commons on the 22nd of May 1980 that "any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland is a matter for the people of Northern Ireland, this Government and this House", repudiates the Anglo-Irish Agreement of the 15th of November 1985 as a flagrant breach of the above-mentioned solemn undertakings; deprecates as an intolerable derogation of British sovereignty incompatible with the security of Northern Ireland's constitutional position, the involvement of the Ministers and civil servants of a foreign government in the structure and processes of internal administration and policy formation of this part of the United Kingdom; notes that, while Her Majesty's Government in the Chequers Communique of November 1984 committed itself to securing the acceptance of both communities in Northern Ireland to the structures and processes of the province, the unique arrangements now intended for Northern Ireland have been entered into without consultation with its people or their representatives, and demands that Her Majesty's Government seek forthwith the consent of the electorate of Northern Ireland to the measures now proposed; and accordingly instructs Mr Speaker to convey the contents of this resolution to Her Gracious Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, and to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and furthermore, to invite the Prime Minister as a matter of urgency to address the Assembly on this vital subject."

Accordingly I invite you to address the Assembly.

Yours Sincerely
Jim Kilfedder

JAMES KILFEDDER MP

BUCKINGHAM PALACE

With the Compliments of

Sir Philip Moore

NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY,
PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS,
STORMONT,
BELFAST BT4 3SY

FROM THE SPEAKER

The Private Secretary
to Her Majesty The Queen
Buckingham Palace
LONDON SW1

16 November 1985

Dear Sir

I should be grateful if Her Majesty's attention might be directed to the following resolution which was passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly at its sitting on Saturday 16 November 1985:-

"That this Assembly, recalling both the solemn pledge of Her Majesty's Government contained in the Downing Street Declaration of August 1969 that "the responsibility for the affairs of Northern Ireland is entirely a matter of domestic jurisdiction [and] the United Kingdom Government will take full responsibility for asserting this principle in all international relationships", and the Prime Minister's declaration in the House of Commons on the 22nd of May 1980 that "any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland is a matter for the people of Northern Ireland, this Government and this House", repudiates the Anglo-Irish Agreement of the 15th of November 1985 as a flagrant breach of the above-mentioned solemn undertakings; deprecates as an intolerable derogation of British sovereignty incompatible with the security of Northern Ireland's constitutional position, the involvement of the Ministers and civil servants of a foreign government in the structure and processes of internal administration and policy formation of this part of the United Kingdom; notes that, while Her Majesty's Government in the Chequers Communique of November 1984 committed itself to securing the acceptance of both communities in Northern Ireland to the structures and processes of the province, the unique arrangements now intended for Northern Ireland have been entered into without consultation with its people or their representatives, and demands that Her Majesty's Government seek forthwith the consent of the electorate of Northern Ireland to the measures now proposed; and accordingly instructs Mr Speaker to convey the contents of this resolution to Her Gracious Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, and to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and furthermore, to invite the Prime Minister as a matter of urgency to address the Assembly on this vital subject."

Yours faithfully

James Kilfedder

JAMES KILFEDDER MP

ADVANCE COPIES 21

NORTHERN IRELAND

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/PUS
MR GOODALL

HD/RID
Dep. HD/PUSD (2)
HD/INFO DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

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PS/MR R ANDREW, OAB 1/56
MR BRENNAN
MR BURNS
MR PN BELL
} NIO

SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO
} CABINET OFFICE

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14.11

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
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OF 151836Z NOVEMBER 85
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ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT.

1. THE QUAI THIS AFTERNOON PUT OUT THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT (OUR TRANSLATION):-

BEGINS. FRANCE WARMLY WELCOMES THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS SO IMPORTANT FOR THE RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO OF HER FRIENDS, BOTH MEMBERS OF THE EC. THE AGREEMENT OFFERS THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, WHO HAVE PARTICULARLY SUFFERED FROM VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY.

IN CONGRATULATING THE TWO GOVERNMENTS FOR THE DETERMINATION AND COURAGE WHICH HAVE ALLOWED THEM TO REACH THIS HISTORIC STAGE, FRANCE EXPRESSES ITS MOST FERVENT HOPE THAT THESE EFFORTS WILL BRING A NEW ERA OF PEACE AND TRANQUILITY FOR THE COMMUNITIES CONCERNED. ENDS.

2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WILL BE SENDING MESSAGES IN SIMILAR TERMS TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR FITZGERALD.

FRETWELL

YYYY
PCLNAN 1370

NNNN

CCOPS4 Master.

15.11.85

CCPC

Telegram
from
Herr Helmut Kohl
Federal Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany

to

Her Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Her Majesty's Prime Minister and
First Lord of the Treasury of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T216A/85

Dear Margaret,

Today on the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement I wish to convey my respect for the statesmanlike achievement it reflects.

I hope that the agreement will pave the way for lasting peace and reconciliation among the two sections of the population in Northern Ireland and prove to be a step of historical significance.

Yours sincerely,
Helmut Kohl
Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

T e l e g r a m m

von

Herrn Helmut Kohl

Bundeskanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

an

Ihre Exzellenz

Frau Margaret Thatcher

Premierminister des Vereinigten Königreichs

Großbritannien und Nordirland

Liebe Margaret,

heute am Tage der Unterzeichnung des anglo-irischen Abkommens möchte ich Ihnen meine Hochachtung vor der staatsmännischen Leistung bezeugen, die in dem Abkommensabschluss zum Ausdruck kommt.

Ich hoffe, dass das Abkommen den Weg zu einer dauerhaften Befriedung und einer Versöhnung unter den Bevölkerungsgruppen in Nordirland ebnen und sich als ein Schritt von historischer Bedeutung erweisen wird.

Mit freundlichen Grüssen

Helmut Kohl

Bundeskanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

CCPC

Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
~~DER BOTSCHAFTER~~
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
Baron Hans von Stein

15 November 1985

Dear Prime Minister,

I have been instructed to transmit to you the enclosed message from Herr Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

A courtesy translation is attached.

I am, dear Prime Minister,

Yours sincerely,

Hans Stein

Her Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Her Majesty's Prime Minister and
First Lord of the Treasury
L o n d o n

SUBJECT
cc master

file
bc Sir PC

D.A
5/

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 November 1985

Dear Len,

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

I should record that the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach met for 45 minutes before the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement at Hillsborough Castle on 15 November. Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr. Nally were also present.

As it turned out, the meeting was devoted exclusively to practising answers to likely questions at the subsequent press conference. There was no discussion of substance. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach decided to forego the Plenary Session altogether.

While the Prime Minister was at Hillsborough, a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley was delivered (I do not have a copy to hand but David Goodall has one). You will wish to consider with the Northern Ireland Office whether a reply is appropriate and if so from whom it should issue. I am inclined to think that it would be best for the Northern Ireland Secretary to reply.

I am copying this letter to Jim Daniell (Northern Ireland Office) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

(Charles Powell)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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NORTHERN IRELAND

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PS/PUS
MR GOODALL

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MR BRENNAN
MR BURNS
MR PN BELL
} NIO

SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO
} CABINET OFFICE

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TELNO 498
OF 151505Z NOVEMBER 85

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ADVANCE COPY

MY TELNO 497: ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

1. TEXT OF GREEK STATEMENT OF SUPPORT (WHICH IS NOT REPEAT NOT TO BE MADE PUBLIC UNTIL MIDNIGHT ON SATURDAY 16 NOVEMBER) IS AS FOLLOWS:

''THE GREEK GOVERNMENT GREETS WITH SATISFACTION THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND WHICH AIMS AT THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

THIS AGREEMENT IS EXPECTED TO PUT AN END TO A SITUATION WHICH FOR SO MANY YEARS HAS CAUSED SUFFERING AND HUMAN VICTIMS. THE GREEK PEOPLE, WHO ARE BOUND BY CLOSE TIES OF FRIENDSHIP TO THE PEOPLES OF BRITAIN AND IRELAND, HOPE THAT NORMALITY AND PEACE WILL BE RESTORED IN THE REGION AND THAT THE DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND WILL BE CONSOLIDATED.

IT IS A DEVELOPMENT WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO EFFORTS FOR THE ERADICATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM AND AT THE SAME TIME WILL POSITIVELY INFLUENCE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES AND PARTNERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY''.

T H O M A S

YYYY

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NORTHERN IRELAND

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MR GOODALL
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TO DESKBY 151630Z FCO
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OF 151530Z NOVEMBER 85
INFO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN
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INFO PRIORITY LUXEMBOURG ATHENS LISBON MADRID STRASBOURG
INFO PRIORITY UK MIS NEW YORK

MY TEL 3848:- ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESS STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT DELORS IN NAME OF COMMISSION AT 1600 LOCAL ON 15 NOVEMBER:

ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION I CONGRATULATE THE IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS ON THE AGREEMENT ANNOUNCED TODAY ON THE FUTURE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS DEVELOPMENT IS CLEARLY OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FIRSTLY TO THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, SECONDLY TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF TWO MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMUNITY, AND THIRDLY TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE.

UNDERLYING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WAS THE DETERMINATION TO CREATE A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK OF COMMON INTEREST: ''RESOLVED TO SUBSTITUTE FOR AGE-OLD RIVALRIES THE MERGING OF THEIR ESSENTIAL INTERESTS: TO CREATE, BY ESTABLISHING AN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, THE BASIS FOR A BROADER AND DEEPER COMMUNITY AMONG PEOPLES LONG DIVIDED BY BLOODY CONFLICTS: AND TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS WHICH WILL GIVE DIRECTION TO A DESTINY HENCEFORWARD SHARED''.

EUROPE HAS LEARNT FROM ITS PAST THAT VIOLENCE IS NOT THE ANSWER TO DIFFICULT PROBLEMS: IT WREAKS DEATH AND DESTRUCTION: IT DRIVES COMMUNITIES APART: AND IT NEGATES EFFORTS TO CREATE JOBS AND IMPROVE LIVING STANDARDS. VIOLENCE FROM WHATEVER SOURCE IS AGAINST ALL WE STAND FOR AND MUST BE CONDEMNED. THE CREATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT A CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE EXISTS IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC STATES AND THAT IT CAN LEAD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES IN WHICH DIFFERING IDENTITIES AND LOYALTIES CAN BE ACCOMMODATED. IT HAS THUS SHOWN THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO GUARANTEE TO EACH AND EVERY ONE, THE CHANCE TO SHARE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR HOMELAND AND THAT THIS

CHANCE TO SHARE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR HOMELAND AND THAT THIS CAN BE DONE IN A CLIMATE OF TOLERANCE WHILE RESPECTING THE BELIEFS AND CONVICTIONS OF ALL.

THE IRISH/BRITISH AGREEMENT IS TRUE TO THAT GOAL OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. I SALUTE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WHO, IN THEIR LENGTHY NEGOTIATIONS, HAVE DEMONSTRATED INITIATIVE, COURAGE AND IMAGINATION IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND STABILITY.

IN THE PAST, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY - THE COMMISSION, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT - HAVE GIVEN CONCRETE EXPRESSION TO THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND. THE COMMISSION'S COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN NOVEMBER 1984, SUMMARISED THE IMPACT OF PRESENT COMMUNITY POLICIES AND ACTIONS. I PLEDGE THE CONTINUED WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND TO EFFECTIVE CROSS BORDER CO-OPERATION. I THUS SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVES UNDERLYING THE AGREEMENT ANNOUNCED TODAY.

HANNAY

YYYY
FCO ADVANCE TO:-
FCO - RENWICK WALL RICHARDSON GOODALL CLARK(RID)

UCLNAN 1134

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NORTHERN IRELAND

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MR BRENNAN
MR BURNS
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SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO
CABINET OFFICE

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14.11.85

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OF 151600Z NOVEMBER 85

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STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS:

'' IT IS EXTREMELY GOOD NEWS THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN CARRIED ON FOR SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME BETWEEN BRITAIN AND IRELAND ON A SOLUTION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND HAVE SUCCEEDED. THIS CALLS FOR CONGRATULATIONS TO BOTH COUNTRIES AND GREAT ADMIRATION FOR THE EFFORTS BEHIND IT.

THE AGREEMENT SIGNIFIES AN ENTIRELY NEW WAY OF SOLVING THE PROBLEMS AND IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO NORTHERN IRELAND. IT ESTABLISHES A STRUCTURE WHICH ENSURES THAT THE IDENTITIES OF THE MAJORITY AS WELL AS THE MINORITY ARE RESPECTED AND ACKNOWLEDGED. THUS IT SHOULD INDUCE CONFIDENCE IN BOTH GROUPS THAT THEIR RIGHTS WILL BE SAFEGUARDED.

AT THE SAME TIME THE AGREEMNT IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND IRELAND AND TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WHOSE OBJECTIVE IT IS TO FURTHER CO-OPERATION AMONG MEMBER COUNTRIES.

WE HAVE ALWAYS FOLLOWED DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND ATTENTIVELY AND WITH SINCERE COMPASSION TOWARDS THE POPULATION WHICH HAS SUFFERED SO MUCH.

IT IS THE HOPE OF THE DANISH GOVERNMENT THAT WE HAVE REACHED A DECISIVE TURNING POINT IN DEVELOPMENTS AWAY FROM PROLONGED VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM AND THAT THE AGREEMENT MAY CREATE THE BASIS FOR A PEACEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE CO-OPERATION AND COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS OF PEOPLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.''

MELLON

YYYY

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NORTHERN IRELAND

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PS/PUS
MR GOODALL

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ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

1. THE CONGRESSIONAL FRIENDS OF IRELAND ISSUED A STATEMENT ON THE ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT ON THE MORNING OF 15 NOVEMBER. IT HAS ALREADY BEEN SIGNED BY 40 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, INCLUDING SENATORS DOLE (MAJORITY LEADER), LUGAR (CHAIRMAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE), BYRD (MINORITY LEADER), KENNEDY AND MOYNIHAN, AND SPEAKER O'NEILL, CONGRESSMEN WRIGHT (MAJORITY LEADER), FOLEY (MAJORITY WHIP), MICHEL (MINORITY LEADER) AND FASCELL (CHAIRMAN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE). THE LIST IS EXPECTED TO GROW.

2. TEXT OF STATEMENT AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE

AS FRIENDS OF IRELAND IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT REACHED TODAY BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRELAND AND GREAT BRITAIN IN THEIR HISTORIC JOINT EFFORT TO END THE VIOLENCE AND ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

THE NEW AGREEMENT IS NOT A FINAL ANSWER, BUT IT IS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE NATIONALIST AND UNIONIST TRADITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND AMONG ALL THE PEOPLES OF IRELAND. IT ALSO FAIRLY REFLECTS THE SPIRIT OF FAR-REACHING PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE REPORT OF THE NEW IRELAND FORUM IN 1984.

WE ARE PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S ACCEPTANCE OF AN UNPRECEDENTED OFFICIAL ROLE FOR THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IN THE DAY TO DAY AFFAIRS OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

AT THIS HOPEFUL TIME, WE RENEW OUR UNEQUIVOCAL CONDEMNATION OF THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. IN THE WEEKS AHEAD, WE STAND READY TO WORK IN CONGRESS AND WITH THE PRESIDENT TO PROVIDE ALL APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT BY THE UNITED STATES TO HELP IMPLEMENT THE NEW AGREEMENT.

UNQUOTE

WRIGHT

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MR GOODALL

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MR PN BELL
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} CABINET OFFICE

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14.11.85

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OF 151655Z NOVEMBER 85
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INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA
INFO SAVING CG'S IN USA.
ANGLO/IRISH AGREEMENT.

1. THE PRESIDENT AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GAVE A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE WHITE HOUSE THIS MORNING, WITHIN MINUTES OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT, EXPRESSING THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT, CONDEMNING THE CONTINUATION OF VIOLENCE AND URGING AMERICANS NOT TO SUPPORT IT, AND ADVOCATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT AND FORE-SHADOWING AMERICAN HELP. THE IRISH AMBASSADOR AND I WERE PRESENT WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ, CHIEF OF STAFF REGAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER MCFARLANE. MY IRISH COLLEAGUE TOLD ME THAT THE IRISH TIMES CORRESPONDENT PRESENT WAS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE IRA IN THE 50'S.

2. AFTER THE CEREMONY I THANKED BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND SPEAKER MOST WARMLY ON BEHALF OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT, AND SAID THAT THEIR PROMPT AND UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED IN LONDON. THE SPEAKER RECALLED WITH PLEASURE THE PRIME MINISTER'S SESSION WITH HIM IN HIS ROOM ON THE HILL WITH THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN LEADERS OF THE HOUSE LAST FEBRUARY AND SENT HIS WARM GOOD WISHES. ''SHE'S A GREAT LADY'' HE SAID.

3. WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID BEFORE THE TELEVISION CAMERAS AND WRITING PRESS WAS A REDUCED VERSION OF THE OFFICIAL STATEMENT (SEE MIFT, WHICH CONTAINS PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT. TRANSCRIPTS, INCLUDING SPEAKER'S REMARKS, WILL FOLLOW.)

4.. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE CERTAINLY COME GOOD ON THEIR UNDERTAKING TO SUPPORT TO THE AGREEMENT SIGNED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND TAOISEACH. YOU MAY THEREFORE WISH TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT SHE SEND A BRIEF MESSAGE OF APPRECIATION TO THE PRESIDENT AND INDEED TO THE SPEAKER AS WELL. IN VIEW OF PAST AND LIKELY FUTURE ROWS, WE MIGHT AS WELL MAKE THE BEST USE WE CAN OF HARMONY ON THIS ISSUE.

WRIGHT

YYYY

ORWBAN 3705

NI6928 4 XXX 144

ANGLO-IRISH DEAL SIGNED

THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND WAS FORMALLY SIGNED INTO EXISTENCE AT EXACTLY 2PM TODAY.

MRS MARGARET THATCHER AND IRISH PREMIER DR GARRET FITZGERALD SEALED THE PACT WITH A HANDSHAKE AND A SMILE IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS.

THE SIGNING TOOK PLACE BEFORE A HOST OF PHOTOGRAPHERS, TELEVISION CAMERAMEN AND JOURNALISTS IN HILLSBOROUGH CASTLE, 12 MILES FROM BELFAST.

THE PRIME MINISTERS WERE SEATED AT A POLISHED WOODEN TABLE FOR THE CEREMONY, WHICH WAS COMPLETED IN SECONDS.

BEHIND THEM STOOD SENIOR MINISTERS FROM THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ATTENDING THE HILLSBOROUGH SUMMIT - FOREIGN SECRETARY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE AND NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY TOM KING AS WELL AS IRELAND'S DEPUTY PREMIER DICK SPRING AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER PETER BARRY.

LATER, THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS WERE HOLDING A PRESS CONFERENCE.

--

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PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS,
STORMONT,
BELFAST BT4 3SY

15 November 1985

PRIME MINISTER

On behalf of the Unionist people of Northern Ireland we protest most vehemently that you are negotiating the affairs and future of Northern Ireland with a foreign government which not only claims our territory but harbours the murderers of our people and likely some of those who attempted to murder you last year.

As citizens of the U.K. we find it intolerable that behind our backs such nefarious dealings should proceed, particularly insofar as they seek to involve the Ministers and Civil Servants of the Republic of Ireland in the internal administration and policy formation of part of the United Kingdom.

This amounts to a derogation from British Sovereignty, is wholly incompatible with Northern Ireland being part of the United Kingdom and flies in the face of your repeated assurance of Ulster's right to self-determination.

The "Joint Authority" which you rightly declared as "out" last November has come in under another guise. Northern Ireland which you once declared to be as "BRITISH AS FINCHLEY" cannot tolerate this. Ulster is British and DESPITE your treachery is resolved to remain so.

In the Chequers Communique of November 1984 you agreed that "the structures and processes" of Northern Ireland must be acceptable to both communities. Yet you are proceeding to alter these structures and processes with no regard to the acceptability or otherwise of your proposals. We therefore demand that you live

by your own declared yardstick and thus to test at the ballot in Northern Ireland the acceptability of that which you have agreed with Dublin. Why do you fear the democratic process? Surely you are realistic enough to know that you cannot govern Northern Ireland or any other part of the U.K. without the consent of its people.

Live then by your own rules and proceed only with an agreement which is acceptable to both communities.

James A. Molyneaux

Ian R.K. Paisley

File

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 November 1985

Dear Mr. Utley,

I had hoped to find time to have a word with you myself immediately before the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, but there is so much else to do that it sadly will not be possible. I have, therefore, asked Tom King to speak to you and fill you in on the main points. What he says has my full support.

Kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

Peter Utley, Esq.

DA

PART 11 ends:-

CC(85) 32nd Item 3 14.11.85

PART 12 begins:-

PM to Mr Utley 15.11.85


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Centimeters
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