PREM 19/1809/2

SP1AEX

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT:

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER

IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

WITH PERMISSION, MR. SPEAKER, I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT THE MEETING WHICH I ATTENDED WITH THE TAOISEACH ON 15 NOVEMBER.

I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MY RT. HON. AND LEARNED FRIEND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND MY RT. HON. FRIEND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND. DR. FITZGERALD WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MR. SPRING, THE TANAISTE, AND BY MR. BARRY, THE IRISH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

AN AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, WHICH HAS BEEN PUBLISHED IN A COMMAND PAPER.

THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE, ISSUED AFTER THE MEETING, IS ALSO INCLUDED IN THE COMMAND PAPER.

THE PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT IS TO PROMOTE PEACE AND STABILITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND; TO ENCOURAGE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES THERE; TO CREATE AN IMPROVED CLIMATE OF FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND; AND TO STRENGTHEN CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN COMBATING TERRORISM.

THE AGREEMENT WILL NOT COME INTO FORCE UNTIL IT HAS

BEEN APPROVED BY PARLIAMENT AND BY THE IRISH DAIL.

THE HOUSE WILL HAVE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY FOR A FULL DEBATE.

THE AGREEMENT HAS TWO PRINCIPAL FEATURES.

THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS AFFIRMED IN A BINDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT THAT THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND WILL REMAIN UNCHANAGED SO LONG AS THAT IS THE WISH OF THE MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE.

IT HAS ALSO RECOGNISED THAT THE PRESENT WISH OF A MAJORITY IS TO REMAIN PART OF THE UNITED

KINGDOM.

THIS IS THE MOST FORMAL COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT MADE BY ANY IRISH GOVERNMENT.

THE SECOND MAIN FEATURE OF THE AGREEMENT IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EXISTING ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL.

THE CONFERENCE WILL BE SERVICED BY A SECRETARIAT ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

IN THIS CONFERENCE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT MAY PUT FORWARD VIEWS AND PROPOSALS ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF NORTHERN IRELAND AFFAIRS.

IF DEVOLUTION IS RESTORED - AND BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE COMMITTED TO SUPPORT THIS - THEN THOSE MATTERS WHICH BECOME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT WILL BE TAKEN OUT OF THE HANDS OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE.

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WE WELCOME THIS.

MR. SPEAKER, NO SINGLE AGREEMENT CAN RESOLVE THE DEEPROOTED AND COMPLEX PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND DELIVER THE PEACE FOR WHICH THE GREAT MAJORITY OF PEOPLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND LONG.

BUT I BELIEVE THE PRESENT AGREEMENT WILL MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION:

- IT MAINTAINS AND CONFIRMS THE STATUS OF

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Latest Version
17/11

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Draft.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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~~THE AGREEMENT GIVES.~~

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

MR. INGHAM cc Mr. Flesher

**ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: STATEMENT**

The Prime Minister would be grateful if you could flag up for her tomorrow a selection of principal press comment on the Anglo-Irish Agreement. She wants to go through this at 1500 as part of the preparations for her Statement. Perhaps you could let Tim Flesher have it.

CDP

(Charles Powell)

17 November 1985

PRESS DIGEST MONDAY 18 NOVEMBER 1985

NORTHERN IRELAND

- You tell Unionists you will resolutely press ahead to implement agreemen
- Mail says you are standing resolute; confident of isolating Tory rebels.
- Sun says the agreement will be challenged in the courts.
- Mirror says the deal with Ireland has been ludicrously "over-sold"; Keith Waterhouse says it seems a dreadful mistake to him to allow the flying of the Irish tricolour in Northern Ireland. As red rags are to bulls so are flags to the Irish.
- Express says Paisley brands you as "a wicked Jezebel" from his pulpit; a "perfidious woman". Asks congregation to pray for him in his clash with you today (Mail).
- Mail leader, headed "Now Dublin must deliver" says the threat by Loyalis leaders to reduce the administration to anarchy must delight the men of violence. You and Dr FitzGerald are surely prepared for this. Neither blarney nor money will shift the Loyalist leaders from outright confrontation towards sullen acquiescence, but in time improved security could.
- Telegraph leads with a tough line on Unionist defiance and paras on standby for violence. Fewer than 20 Tory MPs likely to support Ian Gow.
- Dr FitzGerald says the agreement could, in the short term, produce an upturn of violence.
- T.E. Utley, in Telegraph, thinks Ian Gow's resignation has done something to improve the moral health of public life. He is essentially right about the agreement - it will prolong the agony of Ulster; whole concept is little short of madness. But you are the best Prime Minister we are likely to get.
- Guardian says Tory whips predict minimal revolt against the agreement. Also reports split in Fianna Fail over the agreement; leader says the more drastic the Unionist threats the more they will alienate not only the nationalist minority but mainland Britain as well. If that happens, the IRA will take courage. The time has come when the Unionists have to be talked down - with every sympathy but with every firmness.
- Ian Aitken, in Guardian, finds something irresistably comic about Ian Gow's resignation, since he has given a degree of practical significance to the agreement. Dublin officials on hearing of it reached for champagne.
- Times says Cabinet is ready to defy Ulster threats.
- FT says the Anglo-Irish pact is expected to be endorsed quickly by Parliament.
- FT describes the Agreement as civilised, realistic, in many ways even modest. It would help if Haughey could bring himself to support the agreement and if the leaders of Ulster Unionists would grow up.

PRIME MINISTER

In view of the Brian Walden programme tomorrow I have prepared you the following digest of today's newspapers.

PRESS DIGEST

Northern Ireland

Neither the Daily Star nor Mirror put the story on their front page. No comment from the Star, Mirror or FT. Telegraph hostile. Sun, Express, Mail, Times and Guardian constructive.

John Hume pledges full cooperation. Labour, Liberals and SDP pledge support.

President Reagan hails the Agreement as a framework for peace.

But Haughey will ask the Dail to refuse to ratify the Agreement.

Gerry Adams says there is nothing in it which will lead the IRA to give up the violence. NORAID says it's more to do with public relations than alleviating the plight of victims in Ulster.

One policeman killed, another seriously injured, near Crossmaglen.

Ulster Freedom Fighters threaten to kill Catholic "enemies" and Civil Servants assigned to the new Inter-Government Conference.

Telegraph, Guardian and Times print the Agreement in full and the FT a substantial summary of it.

Daily Star goes on about Ian Gow's resignation and the reaction of men of terror in Northern Ireland.

/Sun

Sun: Minister quits in fury at sell out; leader says Powell is monstrously unfair to accuse you of treachery. No Prime Minister since the days of Churchill has stood up so well for Britain and you would never enter any deal that would sell British citizens down the Liffey.

Mirror: Thatcher aide quits over pact on Ulster.

Express: page 1 lead - Reagan cash backs Ulster peace gamble. Historic deal gives Irish Republic more influence. Ian Gow's resignation relegated to a panel. Leader says anyone with the best interests of the people of Northern Ireland at heart will wish the Agreement well, but there are dangers and both you and FitzGerald are gambling.

Mail: page 1 - Maggie's man quits in Ulster protest. News report says Agreement goes far beyond what had been forecast. Leader, under heading "a brave and historic deal". Says it should be judged by whether it brings a era of stability and peace. To most people in this country it does not look like a formula for betrayal; rather a brave attempt to bury ancient concrete and unite reasonable people.

Telegraph: page 1 lead -"Ulster pact for peace" - Dublin given voice in Belfast; Unionist MPs may resign. Leader headed "Irish ambiguities". Says the Agreement does not amount to treachery but it is an extraordinarily dangerous document. FitzGerald has achieved a conspicuous success in the form of the conference which should not have been permitted. North Unionists will see this Agreement as giving the Republic an effective, though not a theoretical, veto on British policy towards Ulster and who can blame them? Whether it is to be time for disaster, or just another filled initiative, depends chiefly on the courage and imagination of FitzGerald.

Guardian: page 1 lead - Dublin gets a voice in running Ulster; most radical Irish deal since partition brings Unionists sell out gibes and protest resignation by Thatcher aide (which is treated separately down page). Leader on "a unique way to find some wider reality". Says the changes are not cosmetic but potentially full of substance. In effect the Governments have agreed on a

/power-sharing

power-sharing scheme for Northern Ireland. Legally and constitutionally Unionists are on weak ground in opposing the Agreement.

Times: page 1 lead - Thatcher aims for Ulster peace in historic deal; Minister quits in protest (a separate story). Prints exchange of resignation letters. Julian Haviland says Ian Gow's resignation is the most convincing demonstration of how far you have moved over Northern Ireland.

Times leader says risks abound and the most serious defect is the absence of ~~resources~~ references to provincial self-government. But creeping betrayal it is not and clarity of vision on either side of the sectarian divide would identify their advantage to make it work.

Financial Times: page 1 lead - Thatcher signs deal giving Dublin a rule in Northern Ireland; separate reaction story includes Ian Gow's resignation.

Malcolm Rutherford says the Agreement is no more than an opportunity to end the violence and disputes. There would never have been one had you not put it to the top of the agenda.

Other news

Massive coverage still of the Colombian volcano tragedy. Express fears 50,000 dead. Warnings of new danger.

Economy

Inflation down to its lowest level this year - 5.4%.

8,000 jobs will be available at the Wembley Job 85 Exhibition next week.

TSB sell postponed from February, next summer at the earliest because of court ruling; Mail says it may never go ahead.

NEDO to call for curb on mortgage tax relief to release resources for housing repair.

FT leader says your's has always been a pretty pragmatic

/Government

Government and the Autumn Statement is not the first time you have tried reflation (modest and thinly disguised) but we have adopted considerably tighter monetary policy which looks a good deal likelier to work.

Industry

Speed control devices to be fitted to motor coaches to stop them exceeding 77 miles per hour.

Still no solution to International Tin Council's crisis because of difficulties over bank guarantees.

Government drops the idea of a Nationalised Industries Consolidation Bill which, the Times says, would have facilitated privatisation.

UK industry has spent twice as much on computerisation as on machine tools.

FT says Sir Nicholas Goodison has written to you to urge tougher Government action against city fraud.

Unions

Some claims Cabinet Ministers are to study its dossier on how communists took over the TGWU and are likely to order the debate on ballot rigging.

NUM angry over Scargill's use of 'planes to switch money around Europe to avoid sequestration (Sun).

Express reports an all out war between NUM and UDM for membership.

Education

Teachers name 35 areas for strikes next week, including Barnet.

Local government

Liverpool Council, running out of money on Thursday, finds neither teachers nor general workers will go on strike in protest against the Government.

Sun leader says that if Liverpool shuts down next week one man - Hatton - should take most of the blame because of mad-cap economic policies.

Professor of Local Government at Nottingham says left-wing councils have concentrated more than £10 million on nuclear free zones and propaganda.

Newham Council give Tottenham's Bernie Grant a new £10,000 job after admitting he can no longer fulfil his duties as District Housing Officer.

Media

Press Council says readers playing bingo in national newspapers have been misled into joining one sort of game when they thought they were playing another.

Several previews of your Miriam Stoppard interview to be broadcast on Tuesday.

Law and order

Police said to be frustrated with DPP's two months delay in dealing with cases of 32 fans arrested after Brussels soccer disaster.

Express leader, reporting Lord Scarman's opposition to the new offence of disorderly conduct, says no wonder; he is the leading propoundant of community policing which, stripped of verbiage, means turning a blind eye.

Tough new attitude to illegal parking by diplomats has paid off - big drop in cases.

Mail says there are indications that rape is a grossly under-reported crime.

People

Julia Morley's (Miss World contest) daughter, 17, dies.

Terry Waite makes contact with terror group holding four American hostages in Beirut.

Lord Matthews announces his retirement.

East-West Relations

Telegraph says British officials are encouraged by a degree of convergence and overlap in the USA and Russian arms control proposals.

35 Senators urge Reagan to stand firm on SDI.

South Africa

Expected to extend its standstill on payment of overseas debts.

BERNARD INGHAM
16 November 1985

17 November 1985

PRIME MINISTER

PRESS DIGEST

NORTHERN IRELAND

- Unionist MPs may resign en bloc if they don't get a referendum; could mark the end of Powell's career.

- Threaten campaign of civil disobedience; Paisley prophesies tidal wave of violence.

- Tom King says we shall see it through; you are very determined lady.

- News of the World, Mail say 9000 troops on standby to head off chaos; Mail: Blueprint for chaos. Irresponsible.

- Powell says there have been two occasions when he has been deeply ashamed of his country - Munich and now.

- Alliance leader thinks the document was worthy of serious evaluation; urges SDLP to end boycott of Assembly.

- Observer - Thatcher's battle plan to beat rebel Unionists; two spearhead battalions on standby. You are being widely praised across the political spectrum.

- Haughey says Fianna Fail will repudiate agreement if returned to power.

- Sunday Times emphasises Anglo-Irish drive to defeat IRA.

- People - Give peace a chance; Geneva, Ulster.

- Express - One quality above all shines out of Ulster agreement - courage; both leaders deserve every good fortune.

- Mail - You are showing you are a woman of quite exceptional political courage and vision.

- Telegraph: Foolish to hold out high hopes of success, but a brave agreement if also a gamble and on which deserves general support.

R10ABY

LAW AND ORDER

- Woodrow Wyatt wants return of National Service.

- New laws to stop barristers doing back door deals to secure the type of jury they want.

INNER CITIES

- You are taking personal charge of improvement.

- Kinnock claims Government has brought the worst of Harlem to our housing estates.

POLITICS

- Lady Falkender thinks you are cranking up for an election next year.

ECONOMY

- Woodrow Wyatt wants priority for thresholds.

- Chancellor tells NOW he hopes we can look forward to a succession of tax cutting budgets.

- Mounting concern over City fraud; Goodison writes to you.

- BP finds another £1.5bn of oil in Forties.

RATES

- You are to drop reform until after the General Election and possibly for good (Mail).

LIVERPOOL

- Union leaders want meeting with City councillors today over crisis; tell Hatton to raise rates.

PENSIONS

- Meacher says pensioners will be mugged by Government next year of £120m when they get a pittance rise.

R10ABY

EAST-WEST

- Reagan arrives in Geneva.
- Marplan says almost 75% of British public favour world wide freeze on nuclear weapons.

PEOPLE

- Methodist, non-Pacifist elected chairman of CND.
- Tebbits have been guests of Princess Diana.
- John Junor wants OBE for Eric Sykes.
- Your doubts about Commons TV - Telegraph thinks TV won't make much difference to Commons.

BERNARD INGHAM
17 November 1985

R10ABY

FRANK
FEARLESS
FREE

Sunday People

NOVEMBER 17, 1985. No. 5411 FORWARD WITH BRITAIN 28p

# GIVE PEACE A CHANCE

**IN a world battered by bloodshed, terrorism and disaster, there is now a passionate craving for peace.**

Not the pious wishes of the politicians but the real and desperate desire of ordinary people.

This weekend there are faint grounds for hope on two fronts.

The summit between President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev is about to start in Geneva.

## VOICE OF THE PEOPLE

Already the Americans have begun a public-relations offensive and the Soviets are using the most cunning propaganda skills. Their games-playing will never be forgiven if there is no genuine attempt to control the arms race.

Nearer home, Mrs Thatcher and Ireland's Dr Garret FitzGerald have signed an agreement over Ulster.

**There are too many men of ill-will for it to have much chance of success. But after all the years of suffering, no straw is too slight to be grasped.**

The overwhelming yearning for a better world has grown enormously this year. Not just in reaction to the terrible acts of terrorism, but because of the plight of millions of Africans threatened by drought and famine.

The spirit of Live Aid and the song "We Are The World" have united people round the globe. But it is another song, written 16 years ago by John Lennon, which best sums up the message this weekend:

*All we are saying . . . is give peace a chance.*

SUNDAY EXPRESS
NOVEMBER 17 1985 **** PRICE 35p

SUNDAY EXPRESS

# Let it work

ONE quality above all shines out of the Anglo-Irish agreement signed on Friday.

Courage.

Mrs Margaret Thatcher knows well that Ireland has always been a graveyard for the reputations of British politicians. She knows that any deal with the Republic is likely to provoke fury among her friends and colleagues in the Ulster Unionist Party.

She has shown once again that she is willing to accept any risk in the pursuit of what she believes to be right.

Dr Garret FitzGerald is venturing his reputation and his political future on this great gamble. He is surrounded by enemies willing to damn him for allegedly selling out the cause of Irish unity.

Both leaders deserve all the good fortune and all the good will that is going.

For these are not petty politicians conspiring to create a petty triumph.

They are leaders sickened by the blood and pain and waste which have characterised the years of Ulster's crisis. Leaders genuinely trying to create new relationships which could help the Province back to normality.

We should pray their effort succeeds. For it will be only evil which profits if they fail.

The Mail ON SUNDAY
NOVEMBER 17, 1985
40p

# Ulster must take courage from Maggie

THIS newspaper has not been Margaret Thatcher's warmest admirer in recent months. However, once again, our Prime Minister is showing that she is a woman of quite exceptional political courage and vision.

Mrs Thatcher knew full well when she first entered into talks with the Irish Government that even the most minor shift from the status quo in Northern Ireland would win her the enmity of Irish Protestants and, unless she capitulated entirely, the continued hostility of the IRA.

It would have been easier to let the matter rest, stand on the sidelines and watch the Province slowly bleed to death. She decided instead to take history by the arm and seek to nudge this most intractable of Provinces towards territory where one day at least the bones of some kind of solution may be found.

In truth the Anglo-Irish agreement on Ulster does not go terribly far. But then it could not. Mrs Thatcher has honoured her commitment to the Protestant majority by not permitting sovereignty to be an issue. She has given something to the Republic by recognising that it is almost inconceivable there should not be some structure allowing its voice to be heard on what happens in the North.

Alas, Irish politicians of both North and South have operated with such disregard to the welfare of the people and played on their emotions for so long that they no longer really understand how cynically they have manipulated those feelings or spoken against their better interest.

Protestants in Northern Ireland have the right to expect our support for the notion that there can be no change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom without the consent of the majority.

But they must surely now understand that in return the minority community of the Province needs to be assured that its interests, too, are being safeguarded. If the Protestants have irrational fears then so do the Catholics.

The question now, of course, is whether the people of Northern Ireland, so wearied of the long, bloody and useless struggle will now tell their politicians that Mrs Thatcher's word is to be trusted and that this is a deal which they can all accept with honour.

It may be a difficult pill to swallow but the Parliament of the United Kingdom will insist that it must. Let not more lives be lost or innocent people maimed.

The real champion of the people of Ulster is Mrs Thatcher, not Mr Enoch Powell, not Mr James Molyneaux not the Rev Ian Paisley and certainly not Mr Gerry Adams.

Let those in Ulster take courage from her and come out in the open with their support. Only if the people speak will the fighting finally stop.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH

No. 1278 November 17, 1985 Price 40p

# A brave plan, if a risky one

FOR an Ulster Unionist and loyalist, as Mrs Thatcher was still describing herself last Friday after the signing of the Anglo-Irish agreement, the temptation to avoid political initiatives is strong. The status quo is one that, basically satisfies Unionist and loyalist aspirations, so why change it? Attempts in the past to accommodate the aspirations of the province's large Roman Catholic minority have always failed: the temptation for a British Conservative and Unionist Government is to stand straightforwardly on the side of the Protestant majority and to continue the battle against terrorism by conventional means. Why, therefore, did the Prime Minister decide to embark on the risky course which resulted in last week's historic agreement with the Irish Government?

The main reason is certainly the persistence of Irish terrorism despite all efforts to destroy it. An important feature of the agreement, which Ulster loyalists should not ignore, is the prospect of closer practical co-operation between Britain and Ireland in this vital battle. A key element is Dr FitzGerald's promise to accede to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, a major concession which will make it easier to extradite suspected IRA terrorists from the Republic to Britain or Northern Ireland.

But in addition to practical measures of this nature, the agreement seeks to undermine the IRA by more controversial means. By giving Dublin a consultative role in the Government of Northern Ireland, it aims to increase the confidence in that Government of the large Roman Catholic minority, without whose support IRA terrorism would slowly wither and die. This involves considerable risks to both Britain and Ireland, who are already accused of betraying their own causes—in the first case Unionism, and in the second Irish nationalism.

But neither accusation can really be justified. The Irish Government has for the first time formally recognised that Ulster should remain part of the United Kingdom until such time as a majority of its people wish to secede, while Britain has promised to accept the will of the majority if that moment ever comes. Both, in other words, are committed to the principal of no change in the status quo without the support of a democratic majority.

It would be foolish to hold out high hopes of success. But this is a brave agreement, if also a gamble, and one which deserves general support. That is, of course, a rare commodity in Northern Ireland.

DAILY EXPRESS
Monday November 18 1985 • 20p • TV Pages 22 and 23 THE VOICE OF BRITAIN



# Maggie branded 'wicked Jezebel' in new Ulster storm

By JOHN LEY
and JOHN WARDEN

**THE Rev Ian Paisley took the Ulster peace pact row into the pulpit last night and branded Mrs Thatcher as "a wicked Jezebel."**

He made his sensational attack on the Prime Minister hours after she had made it clear the Anglo-Irish agreement would go ahead.

Mr Paisley, addressing 2,000 people in his Martyr's Memorial Church in Belfast's Ravenhill Road, described her as "a perfidious woman."

The Loyalist leader told his hushed audience: "The only character in the Bible I can liken her to is Jezebel."

In a sermon entitled "Summits, somersaults and sell-outs" he accused her of "using the blood of Ulster's dead as a smokescreen to cover her terrible treason."

He claimed that after the signing of the agreement on Friday Mrs Thatcher said: "Do we not owe it to the gallant men who have died to go ahead and support this document?"

## Blasphemy

"Tell me," said Mr Paisley, "what did these men die for? They died to keep us from under Dublin rule? They died in order that Dublin would have no say and no role in the government of Ulster."

Mr Paisley said the day the agreement was signed was a day of blasphemy.

He went on: "God never sent me as a preacher if this woman prospers. This woman Thatcher.

"I will tell you this woman will not prosper. You mark her career and I tell you before many days you will see what God will do to this lying woman who has betrayed this province.

"Only God knows the unchartered waters we will have to sail through and how many graves will be dug and how many Ulster homes will have vacant chairs.

"How many mothers hearts will be broken and how many bitter tears we will have to shed in the awful reaping of the treasonable act of this wicked Jezebel who came to our country to sell us down the river and tried to tell us as she did it, that she was doing a good turn and preserving our province."

Earlier the Ulster Secretary Tom King denied the pact was paving the way for a united Ireland and added: "It is a clear acceptance by Dublin that Northern Ireland is not for sale."

The Government is ready to use force gainst the Ulster Loyalists.

Northern Ireland Minister Nicholas Scott said: "If anybody imagines that the Prime Minister, having put her signature to an agreement, is going to be bullied out of it by para-military activity or action in the streets they just don't understand Mrs Thatcher."

There will be lively scenes in the House of Commons today when the Prime Minister reports on the pact that will give the Irish Government in Dublin a say in running Northern Ireland.

Daily Mail
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1985
20p

# Jezebel Thatcher—by Paisley

**THE Rev Ian Paisley launched a bizarre attack on Mrs Thatcher during a sermon last night, predicting 'divine vengeance' on 'this Jezebel' for her 'base betrayal' of Ulster.**

**He called on the 1,000-strong congregation at evening service in his Belfast church to pray for the Prime Minister's downfall for defying the loyalist majority.**

**'The Lord never sent me as a preacher if this woman prospers,' he said. 'You mark her career and I tell you, before many days, you will see what He will do to this lying woman who has betrayed this province.'**

**There were cries of 'hallelujah' and 'amen' as he compared Mrs Thatcher to Jezebel for betraying the memory of British soldiers who died in Northern Ireland.**

**The Democratic Unionist leader's most astonishing words came in a prayer shouted above the hushed benches of his Martyrs Memorial Free Presbyterian church: 'We beseech tonight that Thou will deal with the Prime Minister of our country. In the name of the Father, Son and the Holy Ghost, we hand this woman Margaret Thatcher over to the devil that she might learn not to blaspheme. We pray that the world will learn a lesson through her fall and the ignominy to which she shall be brought.'**

**During the 1½ hour service Mr Paisley also asked the congregation to pray for him in his Commons clash with the Prime Minister today.**

# Maggie confident over crackdown

MRS Thatcher stood resolute on Ulster last night.

She will tell MPs today that neither threat nor violence will deflect her from the historic Anglo-Irish agreement.

She is confident of isolating the 20 or so Right-Wing Tory MPs who will rebel against the Government.

And she is certain of overwhelming support from Labour and Alliance MPs when the Commons votes on the deal.

The first meeting of the new Anglo-Irish conference, the joint body which has enraged Unionist leaders because Dublin is represented on it, is now likely before Christmas. Cross-border security is high on the agenda.

**By ROBERT PORTER**
**Political Correspondent**

In her statement, the Prime Minister will stress that much closer co-operation over security will herald a tough, new crackdown on terrorists with security forces on both sides of the border benefiting.

She is not deterred by the threatened resignation of all 15 Ulster Unionist MPs, nor is she willing to accede to their demands for an Ulster referendum.

Northern Ireland Secretary Tom King appealed to the Unionist MPs to stay until many existing 'misunderstandings' had been cleared up. 'If they then decide after that to resign that is a matter for them,' he said dismissively.

In fact several could lose their seats in by-elections. Enoch Powell holds South Down by 458 votes against the moderate Catholic Social Democratic and Labour Party. Mid-Ulster MP William McCrea has a paper-thin majority of 78 over Sinn Fein.

Last night Mr Powell compared the Anglo-Irish deal with the notorious Munich Agreement with Hitler in 1938. These were the only two events which had made him 'deeply ashamed' of his own country, he said.

He confirmed reports that unionist leaders would challenge the agreement's legality in the courts. 'I personally do not believe this can be done without Parliamentary authority,' he said.

Irish Premier Dr Garret FitzGerald stressed that unity could only come with the consent of the Ulster Unionist majority.

Daily Mail
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1985
20p

# Now Dublin must deliver

A MINI-GENERAL ELECTION in Ulster is a menacing prospect. If 15 Loyalist MPs resign their seats to whip up Protestant feelings in the Province to fever pitch, what a bonus that will be for the IRA and its political front, Sinn Fein. The more lurid the scene in Northern Ireland, the more it suits their murderous activities.

The threat by Loyalist leaders to reduce administration there to anarchy must also delight the men of violence.

Both Margaret Thatcher and Dr Fitz-Gerald were surely prepared for this.

No conceivable accord between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland could have been signed which did not make things worse in Northern Ireland before there was a chance that they would get better.

That is the manic-depressive rhythm of the place.

For 63 years the Protestant majority in the North have vetoed any role for the Dublin Government in helping to defuse the Ulster Catholics' sense of grievance.

They can be allowed to veto it no longer.

If any vote is needed on the present agreement between Ireland and the United Kingdom, it should be a referendum of all electors in the UK.

Can anything be done to assuage the mounting bitterness of the Loyalists?

It not only can, it must. All the energies, the resources, the doggedly husbanded good will between Dublin and London must initially be staked on achieving one end:

To step up cross-border security; to deny the IRA safe haven in the republic; to prove that two nations can do better than one in combating terror.

It would—to pick the most provocative example—be utterly disastrous for the Dublin Government now so much as to lay a consultative fingertip on the future role of the Ulster Defence Regiment BEFORE the politicians of the republic can deliver demonstrable results in helping to smash the IRA.

Neither blarney nor money will shift the Loyalist leaders from outright confrontation towards sullen acquiescence. But, in time, improved security could.

Daily Telegraph

No. 40563. LONDON, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1985 Printed in LONDON and MANCHESTER

## COMMENTARY

### T. E. Utley

I THINK it can be said (with no more pomposity than the occasion justifies) that Ian Gow's resignation has done something to improve the moral health of public life in Britain. It is, of course, not unprecedented for a junior Minister to resign on an issue which does not affect his Departmental responsibilities; but, under Mrs Thatcher, even the doctrine of collective *Cabinet* responsibility has been much eroded.

The normal procedure has been that dissident Ministers remain firmly in their offices, persistently leak their objections and cheek the Prime Minister at party conference fringe meetings. This goes on until Mrs Thatcher judges that the time to strike has come. They are then either summarily sacked or deported to Northern Ireland for a short period of corrective training.

Not so with Mr Gow. He is the most loyal man who ever lived; he has risked his own reputation by the fanaticism of his devotion to his leader, and the genuine affection with which they regard each other is palpable. Even now he warmly objects (as I do) to Mr Powell's accusation against her of treachery.

I think he is essentially right about the Anglo-Irish Agreement. That Agreement will, as he puts it, "prolong and not diminish the agony of Ulster". How can it be otherwise? Will it encourage reconciliation there to invite the Nationalist population to look to the Republic as their protector? It seems to me (and I can cite the Roman Catholic Nationalist Lord Fitt in support) that the whole concept is little short of madness.

But there are wider issues than Northern Ireland involved in Ian Gow's resignation. The Lord chasteneth those whom He loves; let Mrs Thatcher be no exception. She seems to me to have consistently undervalued the support she gets from those traditional, "high" Right-wing Tories like Mr Gow. Their principal preoccupations are national defence, the preservation of law and order and, in general, the maintenance of the nation. They believe in her free enterprise policies and broadly share her economic philosophy, but they think that public order, in the widest meaning of the words, comes first and they have the electorate on their side.

This, however, is not the way to her heart. What she really admires are converted Socialists, converted Marxists and unregenerate Gladstonian Liberals masquerading as Tories.

Yes, of course, there was the Falklands; but what alternative had she in view of the Labour party's sudden though fleeting conversion to British imperialism? She had, the guts to carry it through, but she has the guts to carry anything through.

On this kind of issue her heart is in the right place; but what really possesses her attention is an economic doctrine which the people find obscure, in spite of her homely attempts to expound it.

Ian Gow's resignation may send a chill down Mrs Thatcher's spine; that could do her no harm. I once said that she was my last bet for Britain; that was unpatriotic: my last bet for Britain is Britain itself; however, she is the best Prime Minister we are likely to get.

THE GUARDIAN

Printed in London and Manchester Monday November 18 1985 25p

# What it needs now is Unionist consent

In the wake of the Anglo-Irish agreement the Unionists can have one, and only one, legitimate fear. It is that the security situation will become worse and not better. Since the overriding purpose of the transaction was to restore peace that would be a deeply ironical outcome, but it is one which the Unionists themselves have it in their power to influence and even to decide. The more drastic their threats the more they will alienate not only the nationalist minority among them but the people of mainland Britain as well. If that happens the IRA will certainly take courage.

The overwhelming response to the agreement on this side of the water has been of approval and encouragement. That is not, as Unionists might maintain, because the mainland is unfamiliar with the difficulties of governing Northern Ireland but because it is all too familiar with them. It knows that the province cannot be governed without a degree of nationalist consent. One way to secure that consent would have been in a power-sharing government. That solution has been repeatedly blocked by Unionists — for understandable reasons, be it said. A system in which the electoral losers are guaranteed cabinet seats alongside the winners is so artificial as to be unworkable. Nevertheless there are expedients which the Unionists could have tried. Failing a local system of power-sharing the only recourse is to involve the Irish government as guarantor of the minority.

That has been done. It has been done at the expense, too high for the opposition in the Republic, of removing partition from the agenda for as long as the Unionist majority wishes. It is not surprising that so pragmatic a way of recognising both minority and majority claims at one stroke should be highly commended at Westminster. The only Unionist sacrifice is a feeling of supremacy. (" This is our country. It is not his," Mr Paisley said on Saturday of Mr Tom King.) That is the very characteristic which has exasperated the rest of the UK during that long period in which the other Ulster qualities have been not only admired but defended.

Of course the Unionists are correct in the long run to say that their consent is necessary. too. They therefore have to be persuaded of the benefits. Ireland has a key position here as well as all the major parties in Britain. Unfortunately Mr Haughey's role — and he did have a 19-point lead in the polls, of wholly different origin, before the Hillsborough agreement — has been to judge the agreement not by its likely effect on the peace of the North but by other criteria. He is a victim of what might be called the Begin syndrome : Mr Begin in Israel would have obstructed to the last the very agreement to make peace with Egypt and hand back the Sinai which he himself triumphantly delivered.

That is Dr FitzGerald's uncomfortable problem, one which so honest and far-sighted a man does not deserve. Mrs Thatcher's is slightly less formidable in that she will have almost universal support within Britain. The logic of Mr Molyneaux's and Mr Paisley's position is UDI — and then what ? The time has come at last when the Unionists have to be talked down — with every sympathy, of course, but with every firmness.

THE GUARDIAN
Printed in London and Manchester
Monday November 18 1985 25p

# Fianna Fail split over accord may surface in Dail

From Joe Joyce
in Dublin

Disagreements within the opposition Fianna Fail party over the Anglo-Irish agreement may surface in Dublin on Thursday, when the Prime Minister, Dr Garret FitzGerald, will insist on a formal vote in the Dail. A three-day debate opening tomorrow will precede formal ratification.

Some members of Fianna Fail are known to be upset by the outright rejection of the deal by their leader, Mr Charles Haughey.

Amid the euphoria among government supporters at the outcome of the talks, ministers are devoting most of their efforts to try to assuage Unionist fears and to challenging Mr Haughey's view that the agreement is a sell-out for Irish nationalism.

These two themes—along with the gains for northern nationalists—will be the government's main message in the Dail. Dr FitzGerald said that a joint meeting of his Fine Gael party and the Labour Party decided on Saturday that they must avoid provocation and point-scoring and make every effort to persuade Unionists that the agreement was not a threat.

Mr Haughey has committed his party to rejecting the agreement, but some of his shadow cabinet members privately question his vehement tactics, while several backbenchers are more fundamentally opposed.

One said yesterday: "I feel this agreement is a step in the right direction and we shouldn't take the line we're taking. The problem is that the personal animosity between Haughey and FitzGerald is clouding everything."

Fianna Fail is expected to debate the issue at a private meeting of its parliamentary party on Wednesday but there was no sign yesterday of an organised revolt.

Two former senior members of the party made no secret of their support for the agreement, Mr Jack Lynch, Mr Haughey's predecessor as leader and taoiseach said it deserved a positive and constructive response. Mr Desmond O'Malley, expelled from the party for his opposition to Mr Haughey, said he would support the agreement in the Dail.

Government supporters gleefully pointed out that the aspect of the agreement to which Mr Haughey objected most was taken verbatim from a communique which he and Mrs Thatcher issued after a meeting in 1980.

It says that "any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of people in Northern Ireland." Dr FitzGerald added that the wording had been lifted directly from Mr Haughey's document, including its split infinitive.

Mr Haughey insists that it is a recognition of Unionist rights and undermines the nationalist case for unity. He explained that the words used by him in 1980 meant that Unionists had a right to consent to constitutional arrangements for a united Ireland, not the right to consent to unity itself.

Daily Mail
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER, 16, 1985
20p

Daily Mail
COMMENT

# A brave and historic deal

YESTERDAY, Mrs Thatcher and Eire's Prime Minister Dr Garret FitzGerald signed an agreement intended to usher in for Ulster an era of stability and peace.

It is on its success in fulfilling that aim that it ought to be judged.

Its method is to set up constitutional bodies, the main one being an inter-governmental conference, for permanent and constant Anglo-Irish co-operation.

The boon for the Irish Government is that it will have a consultative voice on the treatment of the Nationalist two-fifths of the Ulster population which will give that minority some guarantee against discrimination in jobs, housing and education.

The gain to the British Government will be increased collaboration in defeating the common enemy, the terrorists of the IRA. Security forces should be working together more closely, especially in the border area, and IRA criminals should be more readily extradited to the North or tried in mixed courts.

As icing on the cake there should be millions of dollars of American aid to boost Northern Irish employment.

To most people in this country this does not look like a formula for betrayal despite the shrill cries of the Ulster Unionists.

It is rather a brave attempt to bury an ancient conflict and to unite reasonable folk on either side of the border in the war against the IRA murderers.

It deserves all the luck that Anglo-Irish relations have for so long been denied.

THE Sun

Saturday, November 16, 1985 18p SPORT STARTS ON PAGE 26

## THE SUN SAYS

# Ulster's chance

**EVEN before the Ulster deal was signed yesterday Enoch Powell was accusing Mrs Thatcher of treachery.**

That's monstrously unfair.

No Prime Minister since the days of Churchill has stood up so well for Britain.

**She would never enter into any deal that would sell British citizens in Ulster down the Liffey.**

In fact, the agreement is a sensible step to getting the two communities in the North to live peacefully together after 700 years of bitterness and bloodshed.

And it should now be easier for the security forces on both sides to work together to isolate the evil men of violence.

**That's why the deal must be given a chance.**

THE TOP TV GUIDE

DAILY EXPRESS

Saturday November 16 1985 ● 20p ● TV starts on Page 15

THE VOICE OF BRITAIN

EXPRESS OPINION

# Treaty that seeks peace

ANYONE with the best interests of the people of Northern Ireland at heart will wish the Anglo-Irish agreement well.

But there are dangers, and it would be dishonest and irresponsible to ignore them.

For instance, involving Dublin in the affairs of Northern Ireland—through the Inter-Governmental Conference and its permanent secretariat—could encourage the nationalist population to believe that their interests were being looked after by the Irish rather than the British Government.

How would that help forge the sense of community that the province so tragically lacks? It would not. It could pull the Loyalists and Republicans even further apart.

In signing the agreement both Mrs Thatcher and Dr FitzGerald are gambling.

The Irish Premier has accepted proposals that his opponents say do not give Dublin enough involvement in Ulster affairs.

The Ulster Unionists say that Mrs Thatcher has "sold out." They vow to resist what they see as a threat to their place under the British Crown.

We must hope this gamble pays off. For if it does not, the people of Northern Ireland will be the real losers.

Daily Telegraph

FINAL

No. 40562. LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1985 Printed in LONDON and MANCHESTER 25p

# IRISH AMBIGUITIES

YESTERDAY'S Anglo-Irish Agreement does not amount to treachery; but it is an extraordinarily dangerous document. Its tortured language bears the marks of many months of tough negotiation which could have no other conclusion than calculated ambiguity. The merits of that quality in relation to Irish affairs are much exaggerated by British statesmen though not, it seems, by Mr IAN Gow.

Plainly, the British team knew what they wanted—an agreement based on the concept of close co-operation between the United Kingdom as a whole and the Irish Republic, purely consultative in character and tactfully including in its general embrace the future of Northern Ireland. Equally, Dr FITZGERALD knew what he wanted—an agreement which focused on Ulster and gave some sort of recognition to the Republic as the legitimate protector of the rights of the Nationalist minority in the North. Ignoring for the moment the pious platitude on the lips of both parties to the effect that neither has won or lost, one may ask "Who really has won?"

In one respect, Dr FITZGERALD has achieved a conspicuous success, which he should not have been permitted. Within the framework of the existing machinery for Anglo-Irish intergovernmental co-operation, there is to be established a special and continuing Conference, principally concerned with Northern Irish affairs, served by a small secretariat and (probably) meeting in Belfast. Its function will be purely consultative, but the range of its concerns virtually limitless. The Southern Government will be able to make recommendations on all aspects of British policy in the North; but the British Government will have no such clearly defined right in relation to the South. All the Agreement says about that is that "Some of the proposals considered in respect of Northern Ireland may also be found to have application by the Irish Government". Dr FITZGERALD would have been wiser, with his eyes on the possibility of Unionist acquiescence in the Agreement, to have allowed a clearer note of reciprocity to have been struck at this point. He was also silly to insist on a rather weak clause committing the British to consider the absurd idea of joint courts for terrorist offences: the British will not consider it, the Unionists in the North would probably fight to stop it and it is more than likely that the Southern Irish judiciary would also refuse to have anything to do with it. But Dr FITZGERALD has been concerned chiefly to prove himself to be a more effective champion of Irish unity than Mr HAUGHEY and in that respect he has chalked up several Brownie points.

★

What has he given? A clear-cut assertion (now to be embodied in a treaty deposited at the United Nations) that Northern Ireland must remain part of the United Kingdom so long as she wants to, and an admission that she at present does want to. This, it is true, is balanced by an undertaking that if a majority in Ulster should ever clearly express a wish for Irish unity, both Governments will take immediate steps to gratify that wish—a promise which, in the future, could be productive of as much confusion and misery as the Balfour Declaration on a "National Home for the Jews". It must be added, however, that Dr FITZGERALD has also declared his intention to accede to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. In relation to extradition, that is a welcome commitment of immense importance.

The Northern Unionists will see this Agreement as giving the Republic an effective, though not a theoretical veto on British policy towards Ulster—and who can blame them? If, however, Dr FITZGERALD had the imagination to follow it up by some dramatic action—an agreement with Britain, for instance, to do something effective to suppress Sinn Fein—the exercise might not end in disaster. Let us remember one of the chief aims: it is to convince the world (particularly the United States and our European allies) that London and Dublin are equally opposed to the I R A and that what is going on in Ulster is not just the death agony of British imperialism. To plant that conviction is a worthy object, for which some risks are justified. Whether it is to be triumph or disaster, or just another failed initiative, now depends chiefly on the courage and imagination of Dr FITZGERALD.

THE TIMES
SATURDAY NOVEMBER 16 1985

# SHIP OF HOPE

On board are the British government, the Irish government, the SDLP representing non-violent Irish nationalism in Ulster, and the opposition parties at Westminster. Waving dollar bills from the quay are the occupants of the White House, and members of the US Congress. Half overboard is Mr Haughey, who is more than likely to be prime minister of Ireland in two years' time. Not on board are Provisional IRA/Sinn Fein, today's vehicle for the tradition of Irish insurrectionary violence, and the Ulster unionist parties, which have over half of the active voters in the province – two groups that between them do most to make the political condition of Ulster what it is. Will she sail or sink?

The accord signed yesterday has been made possible because the FitzGerald Irish know that unification of Ireland is not on unless Ulster Protestants become reconciled to the thing, and that the only (far distant or illusory) hope of that is via reconciliation between unionist and nationalist within Northern Ireland. Meanwhile they want to improve the position of the Catholic community in the North, not least in order to save non-violent nationalism from being eaten away by Sinn Fein; and they are alarmed at what North-generated violence is doing to society south of the border.

And the accord has been made possible because the British believe that the Provisional movement subsists in the disaffection of a significant part of the nationalist community in Northern Ireland. It is argued that it cannot be seen off, under constraints imposed by liberal democracy, without redressing the civil balance in favour of the Catholic minority, and without proper backing from that community for the agencies of law enforcement, which it is hoped these arrangements will help to secure.

The novel element in the agreement is the recruitment, or admission, of Dublin as a second guarantor, and the formal endorsement by both governments of the validity and right to recognition of the two competing traditions in Ulster, unionist and nationalist. Never since partition in 1922 has Dublin's interest in the condition of Northern Ireland been so explicitly provided for; and never since that time has an Irish government placed, by such close implication, its seal of authenticity on the province of Northern Ireland as now constituted.

Risks abound. On Dr FitzGerald's side is his exposure to Mr Haughey's taunts that he is betraying the "national aspiration" by underwriting partition; and the longer-term risk that the Irish government will be found to have put itself in a position of responsibility without power vis-a-vis the minority in the North, with disenchantment all round.

The risk Mrs Thatcher is taking is of Ulster Protestants being stirred to one of their grand refusals, as in 1913 with the Ulster Volunteers and in 1974 with the strike against the Sunningdale agreement. That would bring in a longish period of political turbulence in the province, intensified paramilitary activity, and likely recrimination between London and Dublin. These are politicians' risks. At higher hazard are the lives and fortunes of the Ulster people.

The two prime ministers addressed their audiences, which need different kinds of reassurance, through a joint press conference yesterday. They held together well – better than last year when they performed separately. But will it last when the pressures mount and the other's eye is not upon them? What will become of the "determined efforts to resolve differences" clause, which governs proceedings of the joint ministerial meetings? It suits the Irish maximalist position, but modifies – in a way to make a unionist jump – the line hitherto taken in Whitehall that the thing is merely consultative? And have we reached a new position, or are we beginning a process, as Mr John Hume will insist? The agreement engenders contrary fears and hopes, a cause of fragility.

Why court these risks? Ulster jogs along, just, under a dispensation that suits most parties second best. Political crime is held down to an almost tolerable level. The economy is stirring. Social life is nearer to normal now especially where, as in central Belfast, it was farthest from it. Time may achieve an equilibrium. Why turn up the temperature?

Neither government sees a policy of leave-well-alone as serving for long. The new framework has been designed to cope with a society divided 60:40 at the deepest of all political levels, at the roots of loyalty and allegiance. Left to their own devices societies in that predicament resort to the arbitrament of civil war followed sometimes by secession. Ulster is restrained from that by superior British force and British statecraft, fully justified in respect of casualties, expense and weariness by the horrors of the alternative.

The exercise of that responsibility calls for policies to contain and exhaust hostility generated by contradictory loyalties. That is what this agreement seeks to do. It deserves to be supported, even though its benefits will be slow to appear, and even though it carries no guarantee of success.

One defect of the agreement is the secrecy with which it has been negotiated, necessary to its conclusion no doubt but ruinous of unionist confidence.

Another defect is that articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution remain in place. They lay juridical claim to the territory of Northern Ireland, which the Provos cite in justification of their atrocities and which colour with suspicion the unionist view of all the Republic's acts of state. It has to be accepted that Dr FitzGerald cannot be reasonably sure of carrying the appropriate constitutional amendment by referendum, not with Fianna Fail 19 per cent ahead of his coalition in the opinion polls. That is a flaw in the Republic's sense of political reality which has communicated itself to this agreement.

The most serious defect is the absence of reference to provincial self-government. Not only would that give Ulster politicians something constructive to do, now lacking. It would compensate unionists a bit, the evident losers in status from the new arrangements. Mrs Thatcher placed emphasis yesterday on the provision that as and when responsibilities are devolved on a provincial administration they will be withdrawn from the purview of the joint ministerial conference.

She held that out as an incentive to unionists to agree a scheme of devolved government. By the same token it looks like a disincentive to the nationalists, who may not want to see the scope of the conference reduced. In exchange for the visible Dublin role that the SDLP was looking for and is given, the price should have been exacted from them of participation in provincial government on terms short of executive power sharing which is quite unrealistic. The agreement is unbalanced to the disfavour of unionists.

It was evidently difficult to shape the details of the agreement. It will be even more difficult to make it stick. Firmness and patience will be required of both governments, also tact – a quality not conspicuous in the choice of Hillsborough, seat of the governors of Northern Ireland before the office was abolished to the dismay of unionists, now made the place for signature of the instrument of creeping betrayal, as Mr Paisley would put it.

Creeping betrayal it is not. If clarity of political vision were higher among the many public virtues of Ulstermen, unionists would see that whereas their former paramountcy is not to be available again, their liberties, the practice of their religion, their culture and their place as full citizens of the United Kingdom are made secure on the terms of self-determination. They would notice that security is first business for the new machinery and that yesterday the Irish government announced its intention to ratify the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, which blocks the "political" bolt-hole in extradition proceedings. That is an earnest of the benefits in security to be had from a more co-operative attitude on the part of Dublin, and – a condition essential to the survival of the agreement – on the part of Northern nationalists too. Unionists would also be aware of the unwisdom of their setting out, as a small, loyal part of the body politic of the kingdom, to wreck an agreement that will be endorsed by the parliament at Westminster.

A matching clarity of political vision on the part of nationalists would bring the SDLP to the view that their interest lies in working to the agreement in a spirit of co-operation and compromise, not in using it as a ratchet to win one concession after another. It would also cause republicans to see, some even in the Ballymurphy and Creggan estates, that a British province, concerning the affairs of which Irish ministers are afforded a regular opportunity to put forward their views and warn, is a better place to belong to, and take some responsibility for, than a battlefield dedicated to the impossibility of beating Protestant Ulster into submission by the bullet and the bomb.

THE GUARDIAN

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# A unique way to find some wider reality

Henceforward Britain will take the Irish Republic fully into its confidence in the government of Northern Ireland. That is the effect of the accord signed yesterday after more than a year of preparation. The risks accepted by both parties are obvious and serious: on the British side that Unionists will try to rubbish the accord in the courts, the councils, and the streets; on the Republic's side that it will both be accused of accepting partition and held responsible for future events in the North which are outside its control.

The accord is a wholly novel departure in the relations between states. There is no reciprocity in it, as there is when allies sign treaties or was when the Benelux or Scandinavian countries formed associations between them. Certainly the final executive power remains with the UK if agreement cannot be reached in the Inter-Governmental Conference now to be created, but the influence which the Republic acquires in that conference is real, wide-ranging, and institutionalised. It allows the Irish Government to propose measures affecting the politics, economy, and security policy of the North and to review jointly with the British such sensitive matters as the administration of justice. These changes are not superficial or cosmetic. They are potentially full of substance. The aim may now, indeed, be achieved of giving to Nationalists without taking away from Unionists. If so the Anglo-Irish agreement will be something of a constitutional landmark.

In effect the governments have agreed on a power-sharing system for Northern Ireland in which they, rather than the local parties, share the power, though with Britain remaining the final arbiter. The system falls short of the joint authority which was proposed by the New Irleand Forum report in Dublin but it goes further towards granting Ireland's legitimate interest in the North than any government has been inclined to go hitherto. The aim of both governments, as stated in yesterday's communique, is to reintroduce devolved government on terms acceptable to both Nationalists and Unionists. When that happens a new Stormont will take over functions from the Inter-Governmental Conference. A strong inducement is therefore offered to Unionists to work out a devolution settlement which the minority finds attractive enough to join: i.e., one with an element of power-sharing. But it seems likely that whatever functions the devolved government takes over, some will remain. They will include security and the courts. The Irish Government therefore has a permanent interest in those aspects of public policy, North of the Border.

For its part the Irish Government makes two important moves. It acknowledges that the consent of the majority is needed for Irish unity to come about and that the consent is missing. Unity remains an aspiration but it is not on the foreseeable agenda. That, of course, is not enough for Republicans. The majority in the North is, in the Republican view, a contrived majority and its wishes cannot override the rest of the country's. Dr FitzGerald, not for the first time, has rejected that extreme proposition and thus put himself at the mercy of Fianna Fail in the Dail. By Mr Charles Haughey's definition, the North is a "failed political entity," and to shore up such a ruin will be seen by him as what Mr Powell might call an act of treachery. Nevertheless there are those in Ireland who see that piecemeal improvement is better than none and it is to such people that yesterday's communique ought to be dedicated. It is a monument to Irish realism rather than to the Irish mythology in which some of the island's political leaders, North and South, have their being.

The second Irish concession is to agree to sign the European Convention Against Terrorism. Mr Prior, during his term, used to appeal to Dublin to do this, as it ostentatiously failed to do in 1976. But this promise also will be open to challenge. Dr FitzGerald maintains that the courts have removed the constitutional bar on extradition (which the convention makes obligatory) in cases where the alleged crime is political. That is unlikely, however, to prevent a constitutional test case by the Opposition.

Legally and constitutionally the Unionists are on weak ground in opposing the agreement. Only one authority in the state can make agreements with another state and that power rests at Westminster. Both the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach made clear at their press conference that the North's status within the UK remains unquestioned. It is wholly within the power of Parliament to decide what administrative methods are appropriate to any part of the country. The context must be set, for any part of the United Kingdom, at Westminster, the elected heart of that Kingdom. But it cannot be denied that the agreement is a body blow, not to anything Unionists legitimately hold dear but to a series of assumptions they have made about the seclusion of their Province from the realities of Irish nationalism, assumptions which cannot be sustained.

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POLITICS TODAY: THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

# Hands across the Irish Sea

By Malcolm Rutherford

THE agreement reached between Mrs Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, and Dr Garret FitzGerald, her Irish counterpart, yesterday is an opportunity to end the violence and disputes that have intermittently divided the British and Irish peoples for decades and, if one takes the historical view, for centuries.

It is no more than that: an opportunity. It is also no less. The agreement leaves a great deal open. All sorts of matters have still to be settled. And it is not quite the agreement that had been widely leaked in advance in both the British and the Irish press.

The two countries have not yet remotely agreed on the establishment of mixed courts in Ulster, whereby judges from the Republic would be able to have a say in the justice administered in the north.

It is by no means certain that the political parties in Northern Ireland will agree to work together in an Assembly that respects the rights of the Catholic or nationalist minority: which ever word you choose to describe the 40 per cent or so of Northern Irish who, in varying degrees, have no love for the present Ulster set-up.

The full reactions from some of the main parties affected by the agreement have still to come: from the Official and Democratic Unionists in the north, from the mainly Catholic Social and Democratic Labour Party led by Mr John Hume which had so far declined to participate in the workings of the Northern Ireland Assembly, from the Provisional IRA and its offshoots, from some British politicians, and not least from Mr Charles Haughey, the leader of the opposition in the Irish Parliament.

What matters, however, is that the principals have acted. They are Dr FitzGerald and Mrs Thatcher. It is tempting to give special praise to Dr FitzGerald, but Mrs Thatcher must come first.

Without a British Prime Minister putting the Irish question at the top of the political agenda, there was never the slightest chance of a settlement. Mrs Thatcher has done it. Others have tried before her: Mr Edward Heath with the attempted Sunningdale deal in 1973, or you can go back to Gladstone and Asquith But always something else got in the way, whether it was the outbreak of the First World War or the miners' strike and Mr Heath's premature general election in 1974.

Mrs Thatcher had no obvious incentives to try anything very much. As a politician she does not believe in miracles and tends to steer clear of high-risk areas which might be regarded as peripheral. She burnt her fingers with Mr Haughey when he was Irish Prime Minister during her first administration.

She might very well have stayed out of it as one Northern Ireland Secretary succeeded another: Mr James Prior, Mr Douglas Hurd, and now Mr Tom King. Who even remembers Sir Humphrey Atkins, her first appointment, who came away from the province saying that nothing could be done for a generation? Other Conservatives, like the late Reginald Maudling, had reached similar conclusions along the lines that the situation was insoluble.

Dr Garret FitzGerald and Mrs Margaret Thatcher exchange documents after signing the Anglo-Irish agreement at Hillsborough House, Northern Ireland, yesterday. Behind them are Mr Tom King (centre) and Sir Geoffrey Howe

Yet Mrs Thatcher did have some personal motivations. Ireland very nearly killed her. Mr Airey Neave, one of her closest advisers and the man who had most to do with her campaign for the Tory Party leadership in 1975, was assassinated by an Irish bomb in the precincts of Westminster just before the 1979 general election. She herself was very nearly destroyed by the explosion at the Conservative Party Conference in Brighton last year.

It was the persistence of Irish terrorism that helped to persuade her that something might and could be done. It was also the relentlessly uncompromising attitude of some of the Ulster Unionists, some of whom would have no truck with the Irish Republic and proclaimed themselves more British than the British, though not in a very British way. Perhaps above all, there was her growing trust in Dr FitzGerald and his readiness to reach an accommodation that falls far short of Irish unity, at least for the foreseeable future, probably until the next century.

"Dr FitzGerald and I" became one of her stock phrases, to be used in the United States as well as Britain, and was repeated again in their joint Press conference in Northern Ireland yesterday.

The moment when one became absolutely convinced of Mrs Thatcher's seriousness and determination came in the House of Commons on Thursday afternoon.

There had already been some Tory and Ulster Unionist sniping about the idea of an Irish settlement or "sell-out." The protestors were firmly put down by Mr King. Then, during questions to the Prime Minister, Mr Enoch Powell intervened: "Does the Right Hon Lady understand—if she does not yet understand she soon will—that the penalty for treachery is to fall into public contempt?"

It was reminiscent of a previous intervention by Mr Powell when Britain was going to war to recover the Falklands. He had said then the metal of the "Iron Lady" was being tested, and congratulated her afterwards for having come through.

In 1981 Mrs Thatcher listened to him with the greatest respect and admiration. On Thursday she was crushing: "I think that the Right Hon Gentleman will understand that I find his remarks deeply offensive."

One of the side effects of the Irish agreement may be that Mr Powell has ceased to be a serious parliamentary figure. He is expected to make a devastating speech when the agreement is debated in about two weeks' time, but that, says a senior Cabinet Minister, should be his last great swan song. It will be the end of a House of Commons epoch and of the curious influence which Mr Powell has exerted over the Tory Party.

At the same time, Mr Neil Kinnock, the leader of the Labour Party, gave the Prime Minister his basic support. "Twice in the last 20 minutes," he said, "we have heard talk of treachery. Will the Right Hon Lady accept from me and the Labour Benches that such talk is inflammatory, irresponsible and should have no place in this democratic Assembly."

A minister in the Northern Ireland Office said yesterday that the number of Tories voting against the agreement would be no more than 20. It could be less, for what has happened is that there is a widespread feeling — extending across political parties and across the Irish Sea — that the situation in Ulster cannot be allowed to go on as it has. Enough is enough. There is no point in the endless violence. Nobody wins.

One wonders, however, if events would have moved as quickly had the Irish politicians not come together to produce the report of the New Ireland Forum in May last year. That was the fundamental turning point. It should be remembered that it was signed not only by Dr FitzGerald, but also by Mr Haughey for the Irish opposition and by Mr Hume and some of his less moderate supporters for the SDLP in the north.

It was that document which laid down that Irish unity was more of a distant aspiration than an immediate objective. It also acknowledged that there would have to be some reconciliation between the communities in the north before there could be full reconciliation between the two parts of Ireland.

It went out of its way to accept the obstacles in the way of unification. A key paragraph went as follows: "The unionist identity and ethos comprise a sense of Britishness, allied to their particular sense of Irishness and a set of values comprising a Protestant ethos which they believe to be under threat from a Catholic ethos, perceived as reflecting different and often opposing values."

The report went on to say: "Agreement means that the political arrangements for a new and sovereign Ireland would have to be freely negotiated to and agreed to by the people of the North and by the people of the South." That describes almost exactly the British position and certainly the one that has been held by Mrs Thatcher throughout.

What the participants in the Forum wanted was a new momentum. "Britain has a duty to respond *now*," they wrote, "in order to ensure that the people of Northern Ireland are not condemned to yet another generation of violence and sterility.

"The parties in the Forum by their participation in its work have already committed themselves to join in a process directed towards that end."

That last sentence will be in many people's minds as the full reaction of Mr Haughey to the agreement is awaited.

The first real evidence that something was up at the British end came in the House of Commons debate on the Forum report on July 2 1984. Mr Prior was making almost his last appearance as Secretary of State. The Prime Minister sat by his side and everyone knew that there had not been a happy relationship between them.

Yet, particularly in retrospect, he made a dominant contribution. "I have to tell the House," he said in the debate, "that I have changed my view over the years. At one time, I felt that a major, strong and effective political response would in itself prevent terror. Now I am of the belief that in the short run political progress may increase terrorism, for a short time before things improve."

That fear of an increase in violence is ever-present in Northern Ireland Secretaries of State. Mr Hurd said when he took over from Mr Prior that he could hardly bring himself to believe that the IRA had become so sophisticated in its methods, and the warning about an upsurge in terrorism is probably prescient now that a settlement has been reached.

The essence of Mr Prior's statement, however, was still to come. "The dangers for the people of Northern Ireland of sitting back and doing nothing are greater than the obvious risks of seeking to make some political advance." Mrs Thatcher firmly nodded her assent in a gesture that revealed her own change of attitude.

Some of the other speeches in that debate are worth recalling, too. For instance, Mr Ian Paisley said: "There is a real desire for peace . . . Ulster is saying to the South: 'Please let us alone and let us remain within the United Kingdom. Let us develop in the way that we wish and you can develop in the way that you wish.'

"I believe that if both parts of Ireland took that road the time would come again when Government Departments in both North and South could get together as they did in the old Stormont days on matters from which both could benefit."

Mr Paisley's tone was distinctly conciliatory, as was that of Mr James Molyneaux, the leader of the Official Unionists, who said that the people of Northern Ireland were in the mood to begin the work of repair.

Those words should not be forgotten in the heat of the moment now that an agreement has been reached.

Dublin has been frequently disappointed by the way British interest in the Irish question has gone up and down. It was especially upset—at least briefly—by the way Mr Hurd was succeeded as Secretary of State by Mr King after having held the office for barely a year.

Yet there is perhaps something new in British politics. There is a group of senior ministers from Mrs Thatcher downwards who know and care about the subject and who are determined to deal with it. They include Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Secretary, as well as those who serve or have served in Ulster.

The agreement signed yesterday is only a framework, but it has come at the right time. If the British Government keeps Ireland high on the agenda, it should be able to show that, along with the government in Dublin, it is more powerful than the IRA and any Unionist extremists who want to take to the streets or worse. It is a matter, as the joint communique says, of determination and imagination.

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# PM pledges to defy Loyalist challenge

**From Paul Johnson in Belfast and John Carvel, Political Correspondent**

The Government said yesterday that it is determined to go to any lengths to see the Anglo-Irish agreement through, no matter how bellicose the Unionist threats to plunge Ulster into disorder and even anarchy.

Mrs Thatcher confirmed the impression she conveyed at the signing ceremony last week that the furious Loyalist reaction now emerging to the deal had been anticipated.

Speaking on the independent television programme, Weekend World, she said that the aim of her policy was to mobilise everyone against the men of violence.

"And we are trying to do it against a background which will reassure the people in Northern Ireland that they will stay a part of the United Kingdom, unless they vote otherwise. That is just a clear example of policy we have thought through, we have announced and now we shall carry resolutely through," she said.

**Fianna Fail split, page 2; Leader comment, page 12; Ian Aitken, Unionists' options, page 13.**

The Prime Minister knows she can count on overwhelming support from the House of Commons when she makes her statement on the agreement today.

Conservative Party managers believe that no more than 15 to 20 Tory backbenchers support the line expressed by Mr Ian Gow, the Treasury minis-

**Tom King: to address backbenchers on accord**

ter and former Thatcher aide who resigned his post on Friday night. Mr Gow said that "the involvement of a foreign power in a consultative role in the administration of Northern Ireland would merely prolong its agony."

The virulence of the Unionist MPs' attacks on Mrs Thatcher's "treachery" is likely to consolidate the Government's position, even in the minds of many Tory doubters. Labour, Liberal and SDP support is also guaranteed, in spite of the view of many of their MPs that the agreement does not go far enough.

The Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, and the Northern Ireland Secretary, Mr Tom King, is to address a meeting of the relevant Tory backbench committees immediately after Mrs Thatcher's statement to the House. But the Government is delaying a week before holding a two-day debate on the agreement next Monday and Tuesday.

The Unionist Camp was saying yesterday that it is Mrs Thatcher who is challenging them by imposing the pact upon the province and that they are in a fight they did not initiate.

Mr King has been equally happy to personalise the issue, saying repeatedly that Mrs Thatcher, whom he described as a determined lady, would "see it through."

To threats from Mr Ian Paisley that the province would be made ungovernable, he said: "If it is suggested that the Government gives in to anarchy, there can be no question of that at all."

The Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald, yesterday reiterated his faith in the determination of the British Government. He said that the froth of opposition might die down once Unionists have absorbed the document, which gives Dublin a role in the affairs of the North for the first time.

In an implicit criticism of Mr Paisley, the Irish Prime Minister said in a radio interview: "I think the political leaders are out of touch with a significant part of Unionist opinion."

The Unionists are demanding a referendum within the province to decide whether the agreement should be accepted.

Since this has no chance of succeeding, they may attempt to resign all 15 Unionist seats at Westminster, possibly next week after the vote on the agreement.

The idea is to force 15 by-elections on the same day and then claim that the poll is the equivalent of a referendum. Armed with a mandate to fight the deal, they would then re-enter the House and step up opposition on the streets back in the province.

However, only two MPs can resign at one time by applying for the Chiltern Hundreds or the Manor or Northstead, technical offices of profit under the Crown.

Unionists believe that having taken those offices, MPs can resign a second time, enabling the next pair to follow. The aim would be to get all 15 MPs through the hoop and then have the by-election writs moved for the same day.

The Unionist leaderships have still, however, to convince at least two MPs to agree to the resignation tactic. It is thought that the combined Unionist front might lose up to four seats to nationalists in by-elections. One of these is Mr Enoch Powell's South Down seat, with a majority of only 548.

Unionists withdrew from all advisory boards in the province over the weekend, affecting health and education and official bodies such as the housing executive and the police authority.

But there will be no resignations from the Stormont Assembly because they believe it can be used as the main public platform for opposition inside the province.

Unionist leaders hope to retain the initiative throughout a long campaign and so keep out the paramilitaries. There is already talk in Ulster that the eventual aim will be to force a renegotiation of the province's position within the UK. But talk of a unilateral declaration of independence is regarded as extreme and ill-considered.

Downing Street sources yesterday denied that contingency plans had been put in train to cope with outbreaks of violence in Northern Ireland. The placing of two Spearhead battalions of the Parachute Regiment on stand-by was said to be a routine arrangement.

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Monday November 18 1985

# A civilised agreement

THE Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 signed by the British and Irish Prime Ministers at the end of last week is precisely what it says it is: an agreement, not a settlement.

The only comparable pact in Anglo-Irish relations in recent history was the Sunningdale agreement of 1973. That foundered upon the vagaries of British politics: a miners' strike, a change of secretary of state in Northern Ireland, a premature British general election and — not least — the determined resistance of the Ulster Unionists which the British Government was too feeble to stand up to.

The Sunningdale agreement was more ambitious. It proposed the establishment of a Council of Ireland to be made up of representatives from north and south. It can be seen in retrospect that that was going too far, too fast, for the climate of the time, and would be probably going too far even now.

The agreement signed last week is realistic, in many ways even modest. It does not diminish either British sovereignty in Ulster or Irish sovereignty in the Republic. It is a civilised acknowledgement that the two governments most affected by the Irish troubles should work together to resolve a common problem.

There were two concessions: one British and one Irish. The British have accepted, in a way that Mrs Thatcher would not when first she became Prime Minister, that Dublin has a role to play — even if it is only an advisory and consultative role — in the affairs of the North. The Irish concession is to place on record that there can be no question of the unification of Ireland without the consent of the majority of the population in Ulster. To that end, there will have to be a reconciliation between the communities in the North before there can be any serious consideration of Irish unity.

## *Destructive*

That is what the agreement is about: there must be peace and stability in Northern Ireland before there can be peace and stability in all Ireland. The present British and Irish Governments will work jointly to create the conditions. It would be exceedingly foolish of either of them to backtrack now: having put the Irish question at the top of the political agenda, they must ensure that it stays there until the agreement begins to turn into a settlement.

There are, however, two other prerequisites. It would help if Mr Charles Haughey, the leader of the opposition in the Irish parliament, could bring himself to support the agreement. He did, after all, put his name to the report of the New Ireland Forum last year which was an important factor in the accommodation now reached between London and Dublin. Mr Haughey is a clever man, but one capable of being devastatingly destructive in opposition. He needs to think very carefully about how far to oppose an agreement that is certainly the best, and perhaps the only one, to be got out of the British Government.

It would also help if the leaders of the Ulster Unionists could grow up. There have been calls over the weekend for a referendum before even the present modest proposals can be accepted by the people of Northern Ireland. It has been suggested that Unionist politicians should boycott British institutions in protest, and all the interests of keeping Ulster British.

## *Excessive*

That is not so much a paradox as manifest nonsense. If there is to be a referendum— and there is absolutely no reason why there should be— it should include the people of Britain who might like to give their own view of what they think of Mr Ian Paisley and his colleagues. However Mr Paisley's behaviour may be described, it is not traditionally British. The British have a history, sometimes slow to emerge but usually there in the end, of tolerance for minorities. That cannot be said of the extreme Ulster Unionists and their attitude to the Catholic community in the North.

Some other questions might be asked in Britain: for instance, how long should the country tolerate an excessive level of public expenditure in Northern Ireland for no obvious benefit, and is a Unionist extremist who uses violence to frustrate the agreement by force really so different from a member of the Provisional IRA?

None of that questioning will be necessary if the majority of the people of Ireland dissociate themselves from extremist leaders and accept that the agreement is the best available. They should note that that is what the bulk of British politicians has already done. All British parties will be voting for reason, not violence.

SECRET PERSONAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

em

C D Powell
10 Dowing Street
London
SW1

14th November 1985

Dear Charles,

SUPPLEMENTARIES FOR THE PM'S STATEMENT

... I attach supplementaries for the Prime Minister's use when she makes her statement next Monday 18 November. They are largely the same as those submittted by Mr Mallaby to you on 7 November, with some additions to meet further points. We suspect that new questions will be thrown up by events and we stand ready to provide any new supplementaries that may be required.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard and Michael Stark.

Yours Sincerely
Neil Ward.

N D WARD

SECRET PERSONAL

KI

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10) The International Dimension

a) Possible International Fund

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a) Review arrangements

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B) More General Questions on the Agreement

1) Effect of the Agreement

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   e) Damage of confidentiality

6) First meeting of Intergovernmental Conference

   a) Date of first meeting

   b) Agenda for first meeting

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A) THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

**E.R.**

) Status of Northern Ireland

a) Q: Article 1 is ambiguous/imprecise about the status of Northern Ireland, says less that the Chequers Communique, etc. What does it mean?

A: Of course the two Governments approach this aspect of the matter from differing historical perceptions and from within differing constitutional frameworks. The Agreement does not change that.

The position is clear. Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom.

What Article 1 does is to look to the future and set out - for the first time in a binding international agreement - what is common ground between us: that there will be no change in the present status of Northern Ireland without the freely given consent of the majority of its inhabitants; and that both Governments recognise that such consent does not at present exist.

b) Q: Why has Her Majesty's Government failed to secure the abolition of Article 2 of the Irish Constitution?

A: Questions about the Irish Constitution should be put to the Irish Government. The agreement is the outcome of a thorough process of negotiation in which each side had to take account of the constraints on the other. What is significant is that Article 1 formally commits the Irish Government, like the British Government, to the position

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that the status of Northern Ireland will remain as it is so long as a majority there so wishes.

c) Q: <u>The agreement represents a betrayal of the nationalist cause and the abandonment of the goal of unity</u>.

A: This is more a question for the Irish Government. But as the agreement makes clear, if at any time in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland formally consent to unity, then the two Governments will take the necessary steps to bring it about.

**E.R.**

2) The Intergovernmental Conference

a i) Q: <u>What does the Intergovernmental Conference do?</u>

A: The IC provides a framework, more systematic than anything that has hitherto existed, within which the two Governments will work together for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland and for peace, stability and prosperity throughout Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights, co-operation against terrorism, and the development of economic, social and cultural co-operation.

The Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on matters specified in the Agreement.

This will make it easier both to avoid misunderstandings and profit by the views of a neighbour who shares our goal of peace, stability and reconciliation within the Province.

a ii) Q: <u>In what areas will the Intergovernmental Conference have a role</u>?

A: These areas are clearly set out in the Agreement. It will deal on a regular basis with political matters, security and related matters, including the administration of justice and the promotion of cross-border co-operation (including security). Should it prove impossible to achieve and sustain devolution, the Irish Government would be able to put forward views on <u>major</u> legislation and <u>major</u> policy

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issues where the interests of the minority community are especially or significantly affected.

b) Q: <u>What role does the Agreement give the Irish Government in relation to Northern Ireland?</u>

A: The Agreement incorporates formal UK recognition that the Irish Government may advance views and proposals on aspects of Northern Ireland affairs defined in the Agreement which are not the responsibility of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland. It commits both Governments to make a determined effort to resolve any differences between them. It promotes thereby the development of closer and more systematic co-operation between the two Governments - without affecting the position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom - in a way that benefits all the inhabitants of those islands. The Agreement therefore gives, also for the first time, institutional recognition to the reality that a substantial minority in Northern Ireland aspires to a united Ireland and regards the Irish Government as reflecting the concerns of the Nationalist community.

c) Q: <u>By giving the Irish Government a role in relation to Northern Ireland affairs, surely the agreement infringes sovereignty?</u>

A: No. There is no derogation from sovereignty and the agreement makes this clear.

**E.R.**

d) Q: So is the Irish role merely "consultative"?

A: The Intergovernmental Conference will be a unique mechanism. There is no single word to describe its role. It will not have executive functions: Article 2(b) of the agreement makes clear that there will be no derogation from sovereignty and that each Government retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its jurisdiction.

But the Conference will be more than just consultative in that the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on its own initiative (as well as being invited to do so); there is an obligation on both sides in the Conference to make determined efforts to resolve any differences; and one of the Conference's functions will be to promote cross-border co-operation between North and South in Ireland.

[Note: It is accepted by both sides that the words "consultative" or "consultation" should not be used to describe the agreement.]

e) Q: So the Irish will after all share in the decision-making?

A: As Article 2(b) of the agreement makes clear, each Government retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction. On matters covered by the agreement, however, the British Government is reaching its decisions will take full account of any views and proposals put forward by the Irish side,

**E.R.**

and also on the obligation on both sides to make determined efforts to resolve any differences.

f) Q: Is the Agreement not setting Northern Ireland apart from the rest of the United Kingdom by giving another country a part in government there?

A: There is a unique situation in Northern Ireland because of the division within the community. The agreement reaffirms the present status of Northern Ireland and makes clear that Her Majesty's Government remain responsible for the decisions and administration of government there.

g) Q: Is the concession of a major role for Dublin not an admission of the failure of British and unionist policy in Northern Ireland over the past sixty years?

A: No. I am concerned with the future, not the past. The agreement shows that the two Governments are determined to work together in seeking peace and reconciliation in Ireland.

h) iQ: The agreement says in Article 2(b) that "Determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to resolve any differences". In the context, these are differences relating to views and proposals which the Irish Government have put forward on matters relating to Northern Ireland. What does this provision mean?

A: Let me start by emphasising the desire of both Governments to implement the agreement in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill. That being so, we are not starting off in the

**E.R.**

belief that we shall continually confront differences; the whole point of meeting together will be to find common ground, bearing in mind that the sentence you quote speaks of serving "the interest of promoting peace and stability". But if there are differences, both sides will work hard to resolve them, recognising that each Government retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its jurisdiction.

ii Q: What happens when differences cannot be resolved in the Intergovernmental Conference?

A: Article 2(b) makes it clear that each Government retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction. But a key point of the agreement is that we are both committing ourselves to determined efforts to resolve differences. Morever the agreement reflects the careful consideration that the two Governments have given to minimising differences: it envisages for example a variety of levels at which matters can be considered and also provides for the convening of special meetings up to Ministerial level when required by either side.

**E.R.**

3) Secretariat

a) Q: What is the role of the Secretariat?

A: The Secretariat will service on a continuing basis the Intergovernmental Conference and will act between meetings as a channel of communication between the two Governments. It will have no executive functions. In order to carry out its duties effectively it will be located in Belfast.

b) Q: Where will the Secretariat be located and how will it be staffed?

A: The Secretariat will be very small. Its function will be to service the Intergovernmental Conference which will normally meet in Belfast and to act between meetings as a channel of communication between the two Governments when the Conference is not in session.

c) Q: Will the permanent Irish Ministerial representative have direct contact with the nationalist community in Northern Ireland?

A: The role of the permanent Irish Ministerial representative will be to implement the agreement on behalf of the Irish Government, as joint chairman of the Conference. This will not alter the Irish Government's freedom to maintain contact with the people in Northern Ireland.

**E.R.**

4) Devolution

a) Q: <u>How does the Agreement affect the Government's commitment to finding a form of devolved government acceptable to both sides of the community</u>?

A: The Government remains committed to a return to devolved government in Northern Ireland on a basis widely acceptable throughout the community. That policy is supported by the Irish Government. We hope that the parties in Northern Ireland will respond constructively to the opportunities this Agreement offers and help work out satisfactory proposals for a newly devolved administration. If a devolved administration were set up, devolved matters would not be considered in the Intergovernmental Conference.

b) Q: <u>What proposals does the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland have for encouraging a return to devolved government in Northern Ireland?</u>

A: The Government remain committed to a return to devolved government in Northern Ireland as the best basis for political stability. We will do all we can to identify a scheme of administration acceptable to both sides of the community. We hope that the political parties in Northern Ireland will respond constructively to the opportunities this agreement offers, and will help to work out satisfactory proposals for a newly devolved administration.

c)i)Q: <u>Do you expect the SDLP to support this agreement and to participate more in the political life of Northern Ireland</u>?

**E.R.**

A: We hope that the nationalist community as a whole will see this agreement as evidence that progress can be made by constitutional means.

ii Q: Do you now expect the SDLP to enter the Assembly?

A: The agreement makes it clear that both Governments support a policy of devolution which would command widespread acceptance throughout Northern Ireland. The question of whether the SDLP should enter this or any future Assembly is a matter for that party to decide.



TW.

**E.R.**

5) Role of Intergovernmental Conference on Political matters

a) Q: <u>What will the role of the Conference be on political matters</u>?

A: It will concern itself with measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland: to protect human rights and to prevent discrimination. These will include measures to foster the cultural heritage of both traditions, changes in electoral arrangements, the use of flags and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social discrimination and the advantages and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights in some form. Although discussion of these matters will be mainly concerned with Northern Ireland their application to the Republic would not be excluded.

The Irish Government will also be able to put forward views on the role and composition of public bodies in Northern Ireland including the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, Fair Employment Agency, Equal Opportunities Commission, Police Authority and Police Complaints Board.

The Conference will also provide a framework within which the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals on ways of bringing about devolution in so far as they concern the interests of the minority.

b) Q: <u>How will the agreement improve the human rights situation in Northern Ireland</u>?

A: The Government has introduced many major improvements in recent years to ensure that human rights in Northern Ireland

**E.R.**

are protected as effectively as possible. The answer to your question is in the agreement. Article 5 in particular provides that the Conference will discuss measures in this field.

c) Q: Do you propose to introduce legislation:

a) giving the vote at local elections to Irish citizens resident in Northern Ireland;

b) permitting the use of Irish as an official language;

c) enabling the Irish tricolour to be flown from City Hall, Belfast and other public buildings in Northern Ireland?

A: All these matters are among those for consideration by the Conference. I should not anticipate that discussion.



TW.

**E.R.**

6. Appointments to Bodies

Q: Are you not in Article 6 giving Dublin a right of veto on matters fundamentally affecting the security and well-being of the people of Ulster?

A: No. As Article 6 makes clear, the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals on the role and composition of various bodies appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and his Departments. It does not give the Irish Government a veto but every effort will be made by both sides to resolve any differences which may emerge.

JLD

**E.R.**

7) Security and Related Matters

a) Q: What is the role of the Conference on security matters?

A: The Conference will consider security policy, relationships between the Security Forces and the community and prisons policy.

The Conference will not have any operational responsibility.

b) Q: How does the Agreement affect the Government's security policy?

A: The Government remains committed to defeating terrorism. As a result of the Agreement, the UK and Irish Governments will further strengthen their co-operation in the fight against terrorism. The Intergovernmental Conference will set in hand a programme of work to this end.

c) Q: The Agreement means that the Irish Government will be able to interfere with the work of the security forces in Northern Ireland. This will greatly undermine their morale and efficiency.

A: There is no question of interference, and the Intergovernmental Conference will have no operational responsibilities. It will be to everyone's advantage to establish a systematic means of taking account of the Irish Government's views about security matters. I very much hope that this will reassure the minority community. The co-operation foreseen in the agreement will not be

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**E.R.**

all one way. The agreement will intensify security co-operation between the authorities in both parts of Ireland and this should be greatly welcomed by all who wish to defeat terrorism.

d) Q: Are the SDLP now expected to support the RUC and to encourage Catholics to join the force?

A: Everyone should support the security forces. It has long been the wish of HMG to see more members of the minority community joining the RUC. We hope, following the agreement, that this will happen more and that the SDLP will feel able to encourage Roman Catholics to join.

e) Q: The clear implication of this agreement is that the RUC has failed to discharge its duties fairly and even-handedly in the past. Are you not, therefore, accepting nationalist criticism as valid?

A: We have always had full confidence in the RUC. I hope that following the agreement the minority community will increasingly share that confidence.

f) Q: The UDR are a particular reassurance to unionists in a minority position in border areas. Will you guarantee that the role of the UDR as a bulwark against IRA assassins be maintained in these areas?

A: The UDR will not be disbanded. They are brave and dedicated people who have a major role in providing security in Northern Ireland. I recognise that there are difficulties in the Regiment's

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relations with the minority community. The Government keep the role of the security forces including the UDR under review in the light of community relations as well as operational needs. Improvements will continue to be made.

g) Q: Will you now move towards a general amnesty in Northern Ireland? Will prisoners with indeterminate sentences now be given a definite date for release?

A: Those possibilities do not arise from the agreement itself. Any question of speeding up release from indeterminate sentences, if the agreement led to a real reduction in violence, would be for the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

**E.R.**

8) Legal Matters, Including the Administration of Justice

a) Q: What is the role of the Conference on legal matters?

A: Both Governments recognise the importance of ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland. The Conference will look at ways of giving substantial expression to that aim. It will also look at harmonising the criminal law in both parts of Ireland and the policy aspects of extradition and extra-territorial legislation between North and South.

b) Q: Article 8 represents an intolerable intrusion on the independence of the Northern Ireland judiciary?

A: Nonsense. There is no threat to the independence of the judiciary anywhere in Ireland. The agreement says in Article 8 that the two Governments agree on the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice and that the Conference will seek measures which would give substantial expression to this aim. Surely nobody can quarrel with that. The Government are willing in the Conference to consider the possibility of mixed courts among other things, and we do not exclude the possibility becoming feasible and acceptable at some future time. But we cannot see any easy or early way round the political and other difficulties that would be involved.

c)i) Q: Why are mixed courts highlighted in the agreement?

A: Other ideas, such as extradition and the harmonisation of the criminal law, are also mentioned in the same Article of the Agreement.

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**E.R.**

c)ii) Q: <u>Surely if mixed courts are mentioned in the agreement, the Government is seriously contemplating introducing them?</u>

A: We are prepared to consider the possibility of introducing them, but without commitment. We do not exclude the possibility of mixed courts being feasible and acceptable at some future time but we cannot see any easy or early way round or through the political and other difficulties which would be involved.

JLD

**E.R.**

9) Cross-border Co-operation on Security, Economic, Social and Cultural Matters

Q: What role will the Conference have on cross-border co-operation

A: It will look at ways of enhancing cross-border security co-operation; and at ways of promoting the economic and social development of those areas in both parts of Ireland which have suffered most/severely from recent instability.

Q: What guarantees have you got from Dr FitzGerald that the South will cease to provide a haven for IRA fugitive terrorists?

A: No doubt there are fugitive terrorists in the South, as in the North. On both sides of the border strenuous efforts are made to catch them. One of the main purposes of the agreement will be to enhance the co-operation against terrorism which already takes place between North and South.

Article 8 of the agreement foresees further consideration by the two Governments in the Intergovernmental Conference of the question of fugitive offenders. Moreover, the Taoiseach has announced his Government's intention to accede to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

**E.R.**

1. The International Dimension

a) Q: Fund

The reports that the United States Government will offer a large sum for expenditure in Ireland suggest that Her Majesty's Government entered into the agreement in order to obtain US financial support.

A: The agreement has been concluded on its merits. We naturally hope that friendly states, including the United States, will welcome it.

[NB: Article 10(a) says that the two Governments will consider the possibility of securing international support for the promotion of economic and social developments in Ireland. It is preferable not to be drawn on the meaning of this until US offers of money have been made].

JLD

**E.R.**

11) Arrangements for Review

a) Q: What scope is there for reviewing the working of the IC?

A: After three years (or earlier if required) the two Governments will review the working of the Conference to see whether any changes are desirable.

JLD

**E.R.**

12) Interparliamentary Relations

a) Q: Will there be an Anglo-Irish Inter-Parliamentary body?

A: That decision is for the Westminster and Dublin Parliaments. But the two Governments have undertaken to support any body which may be established.

E.R.

B) MORE GENERAL QUESTIONS ON THE AGREEMENT

**E.R.**

1) Effect of the Agreement

a) Q: Will the Agreement solve Northern Ireland's problems?

A: No single Agreement can resolve the problems of Northern Ireland. But this one is a useful step forward, designed to benefit both Communities. Dr FitzGerald and I have committed ourselves to implementing the Agreement with determination and imagination.

b) Q: Will the agreement not encourage the Provisional IRA in their muderous campaign?

A: One of the main effects of the agreement will be that the British and Irish Governments will strengthen their co-operation in the fight against the men of violence.

(The Provisionals have already denounced the agreement, which

**E.R.**

hardly suggests that they feel encouraged by it].

c)i) Q: <u>What do the majority community in Northern Ireland stand to gain from the Agreement</u>?

A: The majority will gain from the Agreement in several ways. First, there is the Irish Government's internationally binding recognition that the status of Northern Ireland will remain unchanged as long as that is the wish of a majority of its people <u>and</u> that the present wish of the majority is for no change in that status. That must help to promote stability. Secondly, the Agreement provides for closer co-operation between the two Governments in various fields including security. That must produce practical benefits for the people of both Northern Ireland and the Republic. Thirdly, the Agreement provides a better framework than we have had before for the peaceful, constructive expression of minority views. That must promote reconciliation between the two communities in Northern Ireland and be to the good of the majority as well as the minority.

c)ii) Q: <u>The agreement establishes special channels for conveying the nationalist minority's views to the British Government. Why is nothing comparable proposed for the unionist majority?</u>

A: The question is not comparing like with like. The unique arrangement we have made with the Irish Government reflects the position of a minority which looks to Dublin to express its aspirations. The unionists by definition identify with the United Kingdom; they have, and will continue to have, ready means of access to the British

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**E.R.**

Government, including unionist Members of Parliament in Westminster; and the Government pays close attention to their views.

c)iii) Q: <u>This agreement seems to have something for everybody in Ireland except Ulster Unionists. Are there any concessions at all to fundamental unionist concerns in this agreement?</u>

A: The agreement is designed to promote peace and stability to the benefit of <u>all</u> of the people in North and South. There is also much in it which should be of especial value to unionists. For instance, Article 1 confirming the status of Northern Ireland; the intensified security co-operation provided for in the agreement and already beginning to take place; and the Irish Govenment's acceptance of the validity of the unionist tradition in Ireland. The Taoiseach has also stated his Government's intention to accede to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism .

JLD

**E.R.**

2) Possible Legal Challenge to the Agreement

a) Q: Is such an agreement possible without legislation?

A: Yes. We believe the Agreement is fully consistent with statute law relating to Northern Ireland. Any legal challenge is a matter for the courts.

b)i) Q: What is your attitude towards the threat of legal challenge in the Irish Courts?

A: That is a matter for the Irish Courts and Irish Government.

**E.R.**

3) The Forum Report

a) Q. The agreement falls far short of the options in the New Ireland Forum Report.

A. Let us concentrate on what the two Governments have agreed. The agreement represents the outcome of prolonged and serious negotiations. The arrangements it embodies are unique, reflecting both the closeness of the Anglo-Irish relationship and the special problems of Northern Ireland. The New Ireland Forum's meetings and reports helped to create the climate in which these negotiations became possible. The new agreement accords with the spirit of conciliation which characterised much of the Forum Report.

b) Q. Do you still reject the Forum Report?

A. The British Government welcomed many positive elements in the Forum Report. We welcomed such principles as the clear acceptance that political change requires consent, the commitment to the politics of peaceful persuasion, and unqualified opposition to violence and those who support violence. We welcomed the recognition and respect which the Report gave, on the part of nationalists, to the distinctive identity of Northern Ireland unionists including their loyalty to the United Kingdom.

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**E.R.**

(If pressed again on the "three illustrative models"): I have already said that I welcome many of the innovative features of the Report. But I do not think anyone would expect the British Government to endorse it in its entirety.

**E.R.**

4) A Referendum in Northern Ireland

a) Q: In November 1984 in the communique issued after their Summit the Prime Minister and Taoiseach agreed "that the identities of both the majority and minority communities in Northern Ireland should be recognised and respected, and reflected in the structures and processes of Northern Ireland in ways acceptable to both communities". How will the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach test the acceptability of the agreement to the unionist community?

A: The identity of the majority community is already recognised and respected, in the way the majority desire, by virtue of Northern Ireland being and remaining part of the United Kingdom. Article 1 of the Agreement confirms that position. This agreement also provides means for the expression of the identity of the minority. The agreement thus furthers the aim of making the structures and processes in Northern Ireland acceptable to both communities.

The elected representatatives of the people of the United Kingdom as a whole will have the opportunity to express their views when Parliament debates the agreement shortly.

JLD

**E.R.**

Q: Why does the Government not hold a referendum to test the acceptability of the Agreement as it did with the Border Poll in 1973; and the Scottish and Welsh Referendums

A: The Government has no intention of holding a referendum in Northern Ireland on the Anglo-Irish Agreement. It would be quite inappropriate for an international agreement to be voted on in this way - even more so in just one part of the United Kingdom.

(If pressed)

The NI Border Poll held in 1973 provides no precedent. That poll was intended to ascertain whether the people of Northern Ireland wished to remain within the United Kingdom. That is not at issue. Indeed, one of the main features of the Agreement is that it incorporates formally binding recognition by the Irish Government that there will be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority of the people there and that the present wish of a majority is for no change in that status.

The devolution referendums held in Scotland and Wales provide no precedent either. These referendums dealt with arrangements for regional government, not with relations between two Governments.

**E.R.**

5) General Political Questions

a) Q. Twelve years ago, the loyalists in Northern Ireland defeated an Anglo-Irish agreement based on power-sharing and a Council for Ireland. Won't they do the same this time?

A. I believe that the great majority in Northern Ireland have a deep longing for peace. The Government have made a decision that action is necessary to support the democratic process in Northern Ireland and that it would be damaging and even dangerous to do nothing. Indeed, the two major unionist parties recognise in their policy documents that it is necessary to take action to accommodate the nationalist tradition. This agreement tries to accomodate both traditions. I am determined that it should work, and work to the benefit of all.

b) Q. Is the agreement not the first step on the slippery slope to Irish unity?

No. The agreement commits the Irish Government to acknowledging the rights and identity of unionists. It commits the two Governments to the view that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would* only come about with the consent of a majority of

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*Note:- The agreement says "would" not "could".

**E.R.**

6) First Meeting of Intergovernmental Conference

a) Q: When will the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference be?

A: If Parliament approves the Agreement the first meeting will be as soon as possible after that. It would not be appropriate to announce any date in advance.

b) Q: Does not the Communique indicate that the first Meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference will be concerned with the Republic's view of security (ie security force relations with the minority, public confidence in the administration of justice)?

A: The Conference will look at ways of enhancing security co-operation But good relations with all law-abiding citizens and public confidence are also essential ingredients if we are to defeat terrorism.

JLD

**E.R.**

the people of Northern Ireland; and that the present wish of a majority is for no change. This is the most formal commitment to the principle of consent made by an Irish Government, and should provide reassurance to unionists.

c) Q. Will you now accept that the electoral success of Sinn Fein and the PIRA's campaign of violence including attacks on British cities, have brought both of you together in this agreement today? Is this not confirmation of the success of the ballot box/ armalite strategy?

A. Absolutely not. This agreement is a rejection of terrorism. We are seeking to build up hope for the future, where the IRA have sought only to destroy. We are seeking peace and reconciliation, where the IRA have brought only strife, turmoil and tragedy. This agreement will reinforce the position of all who seek peace and stability by constitutional means.

d) Q: Why were the SDLP and not the Unionists briefed about the Anglo-Irish talks?

A: The Government made no secret of the basis on which the talks are being held. But the details of the negotiations were kept confidential.

e) Q: Is confidentiality not damaging in that it creates uncertainty?

A: The need for confidentiality created some uncertainty. But public negotiations would have been far more damaging, not least because they could not have been successful.

[If pressed: Negotiations inevitably require explaining why certain courses of action would be impossible and exploring possibilities which are ultimately rejected. This process can only be done in private; but it in no way detracts from Parliament's responsibility to reject or accept any proposals which it must now exercise.

TRANSCRIPT OF A PRESS CONFERENCE

GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER

THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER FRS MP

AND DR GARRET FITZGERALD THE TAOISEACH

AT HILLSBOROUGH CASTLE

ON

FRIDAY 15 NOVEMBER 1985

Press Office
10 Downing Street
Whitehall
London SW1
01-930 4433

Transcript by
JAMES LEE of:

PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MRS. THATCHER, AND DR. GARRETT FITZGERALD, IRISH PRIME MINISTER, AT HILLSBOROUGH CASTLE, NORTHERN IRELAND, ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1985

PRIME MINISTER

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Dr. FitzGerald and I have today signed a serious and solemn agreement, which signifies the way ahead in relations between our two countries and towards peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

The Agreement has three main elements:

a preamble which includes our total rejection of violence and our recognition of the validity of both traditions in Northern Ireland;

an article in which the two governments affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of people of Northern Ireland, which recognises that the present wish of a majority is for no change and declares that if in the future a majority formally consent to a united Ireland, the two governments will support legislation accordingly;

and the third element: articles establishing a new intergovernmental conference concerned both with Northern Ireland and with relations between the two parts of Ireland.

The Irish Republic will be able to put forward views and

PRIME MINISTER (CONTD.)

proposals in the conference on stated aspects of Northern Ireland affairs, and determined efforts will be made to resolve any differences.

We shall also be putting forward views, in particular on cross-border cooperation and security, but also on economic, social and cultural matters, including the enhancement of cross-border cooperation in combatting terrorism.

Full responsibility for the decisions and administration of government will remain with the United Kingdom north of the border and with the Republic south of the border.

The conference will be serviced by a secretariat on a continuing basis.

We have also issued today a communique on our meeting which says that the new intergovernmental conference will concentrate in its initial meetings on relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland, on ways of improving security cooperation between the two governments, and on seeking measures which would underline the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice.

By promoting peace and stability and by enhancing our cooperation against terrorism, the agreement will bring benefits to all the people of Northern Ireland. I hope that it will also open the way for moves towards devolution in Northern Ireland.

On behalf of the United Kingdom, I went into this agreement because I was not prepared to tolerate a situation of continuing violence. I want to offer hope to young people particularly that the cycle of violence and conflict can be broken.

PRIME MINISTER (CONTD.)

I believe in the Union and that it will last as long as the majority so wish. I point out that the legitimacy of the Unionist position has been recognised by the Republic in a formal international agreement.

Cooperation in the intergovernmental conference is a two-way street. We shall wish to pursue matters affecting the Republic in the interests of the people of Northern Ireland, for instance, improved security cooperation and economic cooperation. The spirit of the agreement is not one of each interfering in the other's affairs; it is of both sides working together on problems which affect both the North and the Republic.

The agreement is a positive incentive to devolve government in Northern Ireland, because if a system of devolved government acceptable to both communities can be devised, then the matters with which the devolved government deals will be taken out of the hands of the intergovernmental conference. We shall be doing our utmost to achieve that devolved government.

To sum up: we entered into this agreement to defeat the men of violence and to bring peace and stability. We enter into this agreement in good faith. We shall do everything to make it succeed. Whether it works will depend also on the will of the people and I hope that they will seize the chance which the agreement gives. Indeed, we call on all people of good will to join us in building peace and stability in Northern Ireland.

Thank you!

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DR. FITZGERALD

I would like, at the outset, to echo those concluding words of the Prime Minister.

Throughout these negotiations, the Irish Government's approach has been to seek ways of securing recognition of and respect for the rights and aspirations of both traditions in this island; a process which must of its nature contribute also to better relations between the peoples of Ireland and Britain.

A majority of Irish people share the aspiration to Irish unit to be achieved peacefully and by agreement. That is the Nationalist position. It is obvious that the British Prime Minister and I have come to these negotiations with different historical perspectives and as it were, with different title deeds, but we have been able to agree about what would and what would not happen in the future.

The agreement affirms clearly that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The agreement recognises that the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland is for no change. The agreement goes on to say that, if in the future, a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the fulfilment of the nationalist aspiration, the two governments will act to implement that wish by introducing and supporting legislation in their parliaments.

The agreement thus makes provision for the nationalist aspiration to unity in the only conditions in which the nationalist people of Ireland, the constitutional nationalists, seek or would accept this fulfilment - without violence and with the consent

DR. FITZGERALD (CONTD.)

of a majority in Northern Ireland. The corollary of this is that the Northern Unionist have for the first time a commitment in the form of an international agreement that a change in the status of Northern Ireland such as would be involved in a move to Irish political unity would not take place without the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland.

On the Irish side, these negotiations were preceded by a process of consultation involving a review of traditional attitudes by the constitutional nationalist parties of this island through the New Ireland Forum. The Forum's Report provided a basis for the Irish Government's approach to this negotiation. The agreement, as it has now emerged, is fully consistent with the principles proposed in Chapter 5, paragraph 2, of that Report.

(Irish)

As I have just said in Irish, our purpose to secure equal recognition and respect for the two identities in Northern Ireland. Nationalists can now raise their heads knowing that their position is - and is seen to be - on an equal footing with that of members of the Unionist community.

As the result, we will be creating conditions in which the Nationalist community in the north can more readily identify with the structures of government in a way that will help peace and stability to emerge in this island. For the Unionist community, who have suffered the most tragic and repulsive onslaught on their right to life and wellbeing, this agreement offers a way forward toward the restoration of normal life without

DR. FITZGERALD (CONTD.)

violence or fear. This agreement thus involves no abandonment of nationalist aspirations, nor any threat to unionist rights, but it does offer a prospect for progress toward peace and justice for northern nationalists and of peace and stability for northern unionists.

There are no victors nor any losers, but if what has been agreed is implemented in full good faith - as I believe and know it will be - all of the people of Northern Ireland will gain; so indeed will the peoples of the rest of Ireland and Great Britain who, though not on the scale of Northern Ireland, have suffered from terrorism and who for many years have had to carry together a heavy burden of security costs and in the case of my state, have also suffered economic losses.

As a person with close friendships on the nationalist side and close family bonds on the unionist side, I want to address myself directly to the people of Northern Ireland. To nationalists and unionists alike, I appeal: look at and evaluate this agreement, not as some people in both communities who are committed to maintaining divisions and hatreds will attempt to portray it, but for what it is!

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JOHN SIMPSON (BBC TELEVISION NEWS, LONDON)

May I ask both the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister: in the past, it has only been possible to get a form of words, an agreement, by being ambiguous about some of the central elements about where these agreements go to. Do you think this time you have managed to avoid ambiguity, or are there all sorts of things which both of you, and both your governments, and both your oppositions perhaps, will interpret in different ways?

DR. FITZGERALD

I cannot speak for anything other than my Government, but I believe that what we have here is clear and unambiguous. We have tried to avoid any question of ambiguity, because I think it is important - if people are to have security, if they are to feel safe - they must know with certainty what is involved, and I believe this agreement has that particular characteristic, which I think is of great importance.

PRIME MINISTER

We have tried to make it clear. If you have any questions on ambiguity, perhaps you would ask them now and we might be able to resolve them, but it is meant to be clear.

QUESTION

The agreement talks about the devolving of powers within Northern Ireland. To whom will the powers be devolved?

PRIME MINISTER

But as you know, it has been the tradition in Northern Ireland that they have their own devolved Assembly. So far, we have not been able to reach agreement between the two communities as to an acceptable form of devolution. We hope that that will come about. When it comes about, they will deal with most of the matters under the agreement. As they take over the matters at present dealt with under the intergovernmental conference, so the intergovernmental conference will have fewer matters to deal with and gradually, the people of Northern Ireland will be responsible for their own future under the devolved arrangement. We have not yet been able to agree to the kind of devolved arrangement. We hope that this agreement will gradually lead to such a devolved arrangement.

BRIAN FARROW ("TODAY, TONIGHT", RTE)

Could I ask a three-part question to the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister:

First, in terms of the nationalist population, and particularly those who feel oppressed, for instance, by the special court system, what is here in this agreement in the short-term for them?

For the unionist population, particularly for their leaders, some of whom were protesting out here this morning, what is there for them?

And in terms of the obligation of the conference to make determined efforts to resolve differences, how binding is that obligation?

DR. FITZGERALD

Perhaps I will try and answer that first.

So far as the courts are concerned, the communique makes clear what is in fact in the agreement, that we will be seeking measures at the initial meeting, indeed, of the conference; we shall give substantial expression to the aim of underlining the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice. How that is to be done will be a matter for the conference.

With regard to the unionist population, I think - and I hope I have made it clear - it is clear in the agreement - that it is set out here in a binding way that Irish political unity would come about only with the consent of a majority; and that ought to be reassurance, just as the recognition of and the maintenance of the aspiration to unity and the commitment of both governments, including the British Government, to the introduction and support of legislation for Irish unity if a majority in its favour emerges, should be a reassurance to everybody of the nationalist tradition in this island.

The obligation to resolve differences is one that both governments, in good faith, will take with the utmost seriousness. We recognise that any failure to do that would be immensely damaging and our commitment is total and I believe the good faith on both sides is total.

PRIME MINISTER

I think perhaps I could add to that reply, you asked especially what was in it for the unionists, and I would like to respond to your question. First, the assurance of no

PRIME MINISTER (CONTD.)

change in the status of Northern Ireland without their consent. And secondly, this is the first time the legitimacy of the unionist position has been recognised by the Republic in a formal international agreement. Third, increased cooperation with the South on security and other matters. Fourth, support for devolution from both governments, and as that becomes more and more effective, so the intergovernmental conference becomes less and less significant and the peoples of Northern Ireland together make the decisions about their future; and you will have noticed that in the communique it is the intention of the Republic to accede to the European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. That matter has, of course, to go before their Dail. So there is a great deal in it, in addition to the hope of breaking the violence and therefore living lives in peace and stability, which is perhaps the most important thing of all.

And I would just like to take this opportunity, particularly on what has been a rather sad day for the security forces, to pay tribute to their most excellent work and their abiding loyalty.

EAMONN MALLEY (DOWNTOWN RADIO, BELFAST)

Prime Minister Thatcher, can you put your hand on your heart and say that there is no diminution of sovereignty in this document?

And secondly, should the loyalist population - the unionist population - vent their anger on the Irish Republic, given that they say they have no target in Northern Ireland against which they can vent that anger, will you make this deal

EAMONN MALLEY (CONTD.)

stick? In other words, will you stand up to the unionist population if they vent their anger in this way?

PRIME MINISTER

The honourable member of the press has not sort of disappointed me! (laughter) Has not disappointed me in the kind of question which he asks.

There is no derogation of sovereignty. That is made clear in the agreement. It is made clear that we will strive to resolve differences, but in the last resort, the decisions and responsibility for administration of affairs north of the border remain with the United Kingdom. Responsibility and decisions south of the border, remain with the Republic. I do hope that the honourable member of the press will take a very constructive view towards this agreement, because honestly and earnestly believe it is in the interests of all of the people who reside in Northern Ireland and I do not want talk of the difficulties. I know there will be those, but I just hope that the overwhelming majority of people who believe in freedom, democracy and justice will combine together to make this agreement work - including honourable members of the press!

JOHN COONEY ("IRISH TIMES")

Can I put three clarifications to you and one possible ambiguity; the three points of clarification:

Firstly, will the secretariat be based in Belfast?

Secondly, will the agreement go to the United Nations and does it then have a treaty status? and,

thirdly, the economic assistance, does this involve an aid package of a Marshall Aid scale from President Reagan?

The point of ambiguity is on page 4 of the communique, at the very bottom, where you say that determined efforts will be made to resolve any differences between the two governments. What happens in a situation where your determined efforts have not resolved the differences? Who resolves the differences in those cases? Does it go to the UN or who?

PRIME MINISTER

Oh no! Look at the agreement!

Can I just answer the first three questions first, and then the fourth one that you put.

First, it is expected that the secretariat will sit in Belfast. It is expected. Of course, we are subject to security advice. It is expected the secretariat will sit in Belfast.

It is expected, because it is normal, that agreements reached between two sovereign powers tend to be registered at the United Nations.

Your third point, should the United States see fit, because it is pleased that we have come to an arrangement, to give economic help, that of course would be very welcome. It is, of course, no part - and never was any part - of the agreement.

With regard to your last point. With respect to you, the agreement is clear. Of course we try the level best we can to resolve differences. That is in the spirit of cooperation of the whole agreement, because we are both anxious to end

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violence. If we are not able to, then each of us is responsible for reaching our own decision on the matter, and that is clear from the agreement. So it is the two who then resolve into their positions and make their own decisions. There is no such thing as an arbitrator. It is an agreement between the two of us and we act in accordance with the terms of the agreement which you have.

DR. FITZGERALD

Could I just add that there may be other countries in Europe or elsewhere which might also wish to show their support and solidarity with what we are seeking to achieve by adding their contribution to any aid that might come from the United States.

NORMAN STOCKTON (ULSTER TELEVISION, BELFAST)

Mrs. Thatcher, having conceded through the conference what the unionists have always resisted - a direct influence for Dublin in the running of this part of the United Kingdom - Enoch Powell will doubtless consider his accusation of treachery made yesterday to have been fulfilled, and so will a great many people in Northern Ireland.

PRIME MINISTER

I hope that they will look at the agreement accurately. The Republic, of course, has always been able to put forward its views. It now has a regular means of doing so. That is with the purpose of trying to bring to an end the violence which we have all suffered in Northern Ireland and in trying to get peace and stability, which will be to the advantage of all people,

PRIME MINISTER (CONTD.)

especially including the unionists in Northern Ireland, as well as to the nationalists.

It is quite clear from the agreement that decisions remain north of the border with the Government of the United Kingdom. Decisions south of the border remain with the Republic. So there is no derogation from sovereignty, and I want to say this to the people who have the viewpoint which you indicated:

First, do you not wish to join in trying to end the violence, and second, do you not think that you owe it to the bravery of all those young men and women in the security forces who put their lives at risk in order to defend us? Do you not think you owe it to them positively to help in bringing this agreement to a successful conclusion?

DAVID ROSE (ITN)

You say what the priorities will be for the new conference, but may I ask the Prime Minister in a little more detail to say how she believes it can help to improve security and ask the Taoiseach how he believes it can help to improve and reflect the aspirations of the nationalist minority?

PRIME MINISTER

I believe that it will help security through the very declaration of closer cooperation and we shall transfer it from a declaration into deeds. We shall be in close contact on these matters and we are both resolved to take every step to end violence in Northern Ireland and to make provision for views to be known through democratic means, first by closer cooperation,

PRIME MINISTER (CONTD.)

leading to successful devolved government in which both traditions will be represented. Please do not lose sight of that objective: that if this works, the intergovernmental conference and secretariat is in a way an interim to getting acceptable devolved government in which the peoples of Northern Ireland will take over the decisions. Until that comes, it is cooperation with ultimate decisions being made by the United Kingdom and the Republic.

DR. FITZGERALD

The conference will reflect the aspirations of the nationalist minority first in the spirit of the agreement. The agreement sets out, in the preamble, the acknowledgement by both governments - British as well as Irish - of the rights of those who aspire to a sovereign united Ireland achieved by peaceful means and through agreement. It recognises and respects the identities of the two communities in Northern Ireland, and involves a commitment to a society free from discrimination and intolerance; the opportunity for both communities to participate fully in the structures and processes of government. That is the basis on which the agreement is built, set out in the preamble.

The structures established, the ones through which the minority community can have the opportunity of identifying with the structures of government, as they have not felt able to do hitherto, and within those structures of government, the Irish Government will be playing a role of putting forward views and proposals with the commitment of the British Government to make every effort to reach agreement - determined efforts to reach

DR. FITZGERALD (CONTD.)

agreement - on these issues, and through the conference, problems, difficulties, ways in which the identity or rights of the minority community may hitherto not have been given full reflection can be be dealt with through a process totally new. At the same time, the aspiration to Irish unit remains, and has indeed been given a degree of recognition not hitherto given by a British Government, including the commitment not merely to support the necessary measures if a majority in favour of a united Ireland emerges, but in fact, a commitment to introduce them in their parliament - something not hitherto included in any declaration or statement by the British Government.

JIM DOUGALL (RTE)

I wonder to what extent the Taoiseach, on one side, on the nationalist side, and the Prime Minister on the other, will be trying to exert influence on the two communities in Northern Ireland to actually participate in devolved government?

DR. FITZGERALD

Yes, the agreement sets out that both our governments support devolved government, on the kind of basis, and the only kind of basis, which the British Government has been willing to contemplate since 1972 - one that would have cross-community support, one that would involve the minority as well as the majority. We not only support it, but we will do anything we can to promote that, and as the Prime Minister has pointed out, it is a very important and relevant part of this agreement that the agreement provides that if such devolved government can be

DR. FITZGERALD (CONTD.)

brought about and if unionists and nationalists can find means of working together in a process of devolved government, then in those areas the conference will no longer have a role to play. I believe that that is an important and constructive part of the agreement, offering an incentive to the unionist community to move towards devolved government and one which I think is very constructive.

PRIME MINISTER

I cannot offer you a sudden recipe for devolved government. It will not be easy to find. I hope that this agreement will make it less difficult than it has been in the past. Its purpose is to try to bring together and to support all of those people in Northern Ireland who wish to end violence and to proceed in a democratic way. That is its purpose. We really entered this agreement in good faith, earnestly to bring that about. The Taoiseach, as a nationalist and republican, myself as a unionist and a loyalist. If we can enter this agreement in that spirit, I hope that many other people will be able to do so and follow our lead as well.

DAVID PAGE (NBC, UNITED STATES)

Prime Minister, speaking to unionists over the past few days, even before they had seen the agreement, a number have referred to it as a potential sell-out and have raised the spectre of average folks - unionists who never previously took up weapons - of average unionists taking to the streets and producing violence. Could you address that issue and tell us what you would wish the

DAVID PAGE (CONTD.)

average unionist to take out of this agreement and do?

PRIME MINISTER

What I wish the average unionist - and I am a unionist and a loyalist myself - is to accept that we entered into this agreement in good faith to end violence. Violence is totally incompatible with proceeding by political democracy. To end violence, which will be in their interests more than in the interests of anyone else, because they have an assurance in the agreement that there will be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without their consent. And yes, we do call upon moderate people who wish to proceed by democracy everywhere to say violence is no way and just join with us in trying to make this agreement work.

It gives a fresh opportunity and I hope that people will seize it.

DR. FITZGERALD

May I just add to that and remind you of the closing words of what I said at the outset, when I asked nationalists and unionists alike to look at and evaluate this agreement, not as some people in both communities committed to maintaining divisions and hatreds will attempt to portray it, but for what it is. Not for what it has been and speculated to be, but for what it is.

SIAN O'ROURKE (THE IRISH PRESS, DUBLIN)

Taoiseach, would it be fair to categorise this conference as being something which transcends the confines of Northern

SIAN O'ROURKE (CONTD.)

Ireland but which is aimed at bringing about an internal set of arrangements which will subsequently become more important than the conference itself?

DR. FITZGERALD

It transcends the boundaries of Northern Ireland because it involves both our governments in seeking to resolve the problem in Northern Ireland and bringing peace and stability to Northern Ireland.

SIAN O'ROURKE

But is it aimed at bringing about an internal system of government in the north?

DR. FITZGERALD

It is certainly aimed at - and it would be part of our objective to encourage the development of devolved government in which both sides participate. It also, on the one hand, assures unionists that Irish political unity would /not be brought about save with the consent of the majority of Northern Ireland. On the other hand, it shows nationalists that if that consent is there, the British Government and our Government, will introduce and support the necessary legislation.

I think it is the case that there have always been Irish nationalists who have felt that Britain had an interest in Northern Ireland that transcended the question of the views and wishes of the people there, and that even if a majority in

DR. FITZGERALD (CONTD.)

Northern Ireland wished to join a united Ireland, that Britain might have a continuing interest and might wish to hang on to Northern Ireland in those circumstances; but the agreement makes it clear that Britain has no such interest.

QUESTION

But is it the hope of the two governments that the conference will become less and less important and that devolved government would come about and that would be the primary form of the administration of Northern Ireland?

DR. FITZGERALD

It is our hope that devolved government will come about. If that happens, then the conference would no longer have a role to play in the areas for which devolved government would be responsible, but it would continue to be concerned with other areas such as security, human rights, questions of identity.

PAT COX (TODAY, TONIGHT, RTE)

Prime Minister, if I can put a question to you on the issue of devolution. You talk about seeking devolution in Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community. We recently heard a member of your party, a member of the European Parliament, who helped the Assembly to evolve the devolution report, in that Catherwood Report the unionists suggested that it would be acceptable to them as a formula or a recipe for devolution, but two-thirds support from that Assembly would be a fair and reasonable basis and a

QUESTION (CONTD.)

democratic basis on which to proceed. Is that an acceptable recipe for you for devolution here and I would like to have a comment also from the Taoiseach as to his government's view of the Catherwood Report and its recipe for devolution.

PRIME MINISTER

No, I cannot give a sudden recipe. The whole nature of this agreement is that we have to reach a conclusion, first by discussion and cooperation - and we would have to work with both communities to get an agreement which is acceptable to them both. We cannot come to a conclusion before the discussions have taken place and indeed, I do not know when discussions will start. But the opportunity is there for both the unionists and for the non-violent nationalists to say: "We now want to work together in a devolved Assembly?" What that recipe would be, I do not know. It would not be in the spirit of the agreement to try to impose one, but to try to reach one by discussion.

DR. FITZGERALD

We will try to help that process and indeed, the agreement provides that our government can make proposals and put forward views with regard to this process of devolution, but as the Prime Minister has said, ultimately the question of securing the participation of representatives of both communities in devolved government has to be one for them.

SIAN DUGGAN (RT NEWS, DUBLIN)

Still on devolution - I address this to Taoiseach and Prime Minister - on page 11 of this agreement, it states that should it prove impossible to achieve devolution, the conference shall be a framework within wich the Irish Government may put forward views on proposals for major legislation, major policy issues, which at present are within the perview of the Northern Ireland Departments and which remain the responsibility, at the moment, of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Now, does that imply that should they fail to reach agreement on devolution, Dublin will be given an even greater input into the running of the north?

DR. FITZGERALD

The procedure of the conference is that its responsibilities extend to these areas also until such time as - and we hope it will be soon - agreement is reached on devolved government. Until that time, yes, we will be putting forward views and proposals on questions of policy and legislation in Northern Ireland. If devolved government is agreed, the conference will no longer have that role to play. It will fall back on playing a role in relation to the matters which will continue to be the responsibility of the British Government.

PRIME MINISTER

They can always put forward views. Obviously, there is now a regular arrangement during which views are put forward, and an effort to reach agreement. You will notice that the last

PRIME MINISTER (CONTD.)

part of that particular sub-paragraph is in keeping with the rest of the agreement about decisions and that it says: "Within the perview of Northern Ireland Departments and which remain the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland" so it is all in keeping with the tone of the agreement as a whole.

DAVID DAVENPOWER (OTE NEWS)

Could I ask the Taoiseach, given that this agreement recognises the legitimacy of the unionist position, how he reconciles that with the constitutional claim to the island of Ireland being the territory of the Republic? And could I ask the Prime Minister how it is intended that the majority of the people of Northern Ireland could be ascertained?

PRIME MINISTER

With a border poll.

DR. FITZGERALD

As far as the first question is concerned, what is there represents the view of the Forum, which recognised the legitimacy of the sense of Britishness and indeed of Protestantism, of the unionist majority in Northern Ireland. It is an echo of the Forum Report, in which all the nationalist parties recognised these rights and aspirations, just as they sought to have recognised the rights and aspirations of the minority nationalist community in Northern Ireland to be part of the greater nationalist community in the island as a whole.

PRIME MINISTER

As you know, there is at present provision in law for a poll to be held from time to time about the views of the people in Northern Ireland. That provision remains, unless we were ever to substitute it by an improved one. At the moment, that provision remains and is expected to remain.

QUESTION

Would the conference take the decision on whether to hold such a poll?

PRIME MINISTER

No, that is a matter for the Government of the United Kingdom, as is every other decision finally, if we cannot reach agreement.

JOHN COLE (BBC)

One question for the Prime Minister on mixed courts, please, and one for the Taoiseach on extradition.

We have had references to mixed courts at these conferences for some years now. When does the Prime Minister expect that they will exist?

What does the Taoiseach think the European Convention.... what implications does it have for extradition and particularly for the problems that has always explained to us about the Irish constitution in that respect?

PRIME MINISTER

We agreed in good faith to consider the possibility of mixed courts without commitment. We know from past experience the difficulties, and cannot yet see our way around them, but we agreed in good faith to consider this matter among others, as one possibility which may bring greater confidence and faith of all of the people of Northern Ireland in the system of administration of law and justice.

DR. FITZGERALD

On extradition, I said it is the intention of the Irish Government to accede as soon as possible to the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism. There did exist a constitutional impediment to this in the form of the decisions taken by a High Court in a series of extradition cases. Decisions of the Supreme Court in a number of cases have removed the constitutional impediment. What the communique says is that both sides are committed to work for early progress in relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland, ways of improving security cooperation between the two governments, and seeking measures which will give substantial expression to the aim that there is public confidence in the administration of justice. It is against this background that the Irish Government has announced its intention to accede as soon as possible to the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism.

CANDY YOUNG (WASHINGTON POST)

Clarifying the question as to how the agreement contributes to a lessening of violence, in addition to increased

CANDY YOUNG (CONTD.)

cooperation between the security forces, is it also fair to assume that both parties hope that the agreement will lessen support for paramilitary groups and for those political groups, specifically Sinn Fein, that advocate the use of violence for a change?

DR. FITZGERALD

Yes, a primary purpose of the agreement is to provide means by which the minority community may be enabled to identify with the structures of government in Northern Ireland and to feel themselves to be full first-class citizens of Northern Ireland so that whatever basis there may be - whatever emotional basis there may be - for either support of or tolerance of the IRA will be eroded and in that way peace and stability brought closer.

QUESTION

I would like to ask both Prime Ministers, if they feel the people of Northern Ireland will feel any less British after today and might I ask Dr. FitzGerald in particular if he will be taking any steps to have reflected in the constitution of the Republic the aspiration to Irish unity to which he has referred, rather than the claim to jurisdiction over Northern Ireland which, as is known,is offensive to the unionist population?

PRIME MINISTER

The latter part of your question is a matter for the Taoiseach and the people of the Republic of Ireland, in accordance with the agreement under which decisions south of the border are made by the Republic of Ireland and decisions north of the border

PRIME MINISTER (CONTD.)

are made by the United Kingdom.

With regard to the people of Northern Ireland, I hope that they feel that the Taoiseach and I have reached agreement which tries to end violence, which is in their interests above all, and that we have come to an agreement which recognises the legitimacy of the unionist position for the first time in an international agreement, and that it cannot be changed without their consent.

I think if they look at the agreement dispassionately, if that is possible in these matters, that they should take great reassurance from it, and realise that it represents an opportunity for us all to work together to try to bring violence to an end, which would be the greatest prize of all.

DR. FITZGERALD

May I add to that, the agreement, as I said earlier, recognises also on the part of the British as well as Irish Government, the legitimacy of the aspiration to Irish unity in a sovereign Irish state. That is clearly set out there.

On the point about the constitution, there is no proposal to change our constitution and that is not something that arises from this agreement, which is the undertaking within the framework of our existing constitution, but in good faith and looking to the future with the objectives of securing peace and stability in Northern Ireland.

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END

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Tim Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

18th November 1985

CDP 18/XI

Dear Tim,

ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

... I attach some further supplementaries for today's debate to be included with those I sent with my letter of 14 November. We have now had some experience of the questions likely to be asked, and these supplementaries take account of some additional points which have been raised. Each supplementary or set of supplementaries is marked according to where it should be inserted in the existing supplementaries. I have also prepared
... a revised index, which is attached.

In addition Charles Powell asked in his letter of 17 November for advice on the implications of any move by the unionist parties to resign their seats in Parliament. There has been a good deal of confusion in recent weeks both on the part of the press and amongst the unionist themselves as to whether more than two Members can resign at the same time by means of applications for the Stewardships of the Chiltern Hundreds and of the Manor of Northstead. It is clear, in fact, that there is no procedural obstacle to this. Nor is there any difficulty in moving the writs for several by-elections on the same day, though there is more doubt about who might move the writs in the absence of other members of the parties directly concerned.

... I attach a short background note for possible use in connection with this afternoon's statement. As you will see from the note, we do not think that there is any scope for useful intervention on the Government's part in relation either to possible resignations, or to the subsequent movement of the writs.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard, Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Lord Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Lord Privy Seal and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours Sincerely

Neil Ward.

N D WARD

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1) Status of Northern Ireland

a)i) Q: Article 1 is ambiguous/imprecise about the status of Northern Ireland, says less that the Chequers Communique, etc. What does it mean?

A: Of course the two Governments approach this aspect of the matter from differing historical perceptions and from within differing constititutional frameworks. The Agreement does not change that.

The position is clear. Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom.

What Article 1 does is to look to the future and set out - for the first time in a binding international agreement - what is common ground between us: that there will be no change in the present status of Northern Ireland without the freely given consent of the majority of its inhabitants; and that both Governments recognise that such consent does not at present exist.

a)ii) Q: Much emphasis has been given to Article 1 but it contains nothing new

A: The Agreement is the first formally binding international agreement in which the Irish Government has recognised that the status of Northern Ireland will remain unchanged

as long as that is the wish of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland and that the present wish of the majority is for no change in that status.

b) Q: Why has Her Majesty's Government failed to secure the abolition of Article 2 of the Irish Constitution?

A: Questions about the Irish Constitution should be put to the Irish Government. The agreement is the outcome of a thorough process of negotiation in which each side had to take account of the constraints on the other. What is significant is that Article 1 formally commits the Irish Government, like the British Government, to the position that the status of Northern Ireland will remain as it is so long as a majority there so wishes.

c) Q: The agreement represents a betrayal of the nationalist cause and the abandonment of the goal of unity.

A: This is more a question for the Irish Government. But as the agreement makes clear, if at any time in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland formally consent to unity, then the two Governments will take the necessary steps to bring it about.

d) Q: Does the Government still stand by the Downing Street Declaration of 1969?

A: Yes. As the Agreement makes clear, the United Kingdom Government retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of Government within its own jurisdiction.

(Note: The Downing Street declaration was that: "The United Kingdom Government again affirm that responsibility for affairs in Northern Ireland is entirely a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The United Kingdom Government will take full responsibility for asserting this principle in all international relationships").

e) Q: Why has the Government conceded in the Agreement that they will support the establishment of a United Ireland if that is what the majority wish?

A: Both Governments are committed to the principle of consent. We and the Irish Government have therefore said that if at anytime in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland formally consent to unity, then we will take the necessary steps to bring it about. That is no more than we have said before and is fully in accordance with our belief in the right of the majority in Northern Ireland to determine whether the status of Northern Ireland remains as it is. However, both Governments have accepted that the present wish of the majority is for no change.

f) Q: Why does the Agreement make no provision for Northern Ireland to 'go it alone' in the event of the majority voting to leave the United Kingdom?

A: Any such prospect would be outside the scope of this Agreement. We do not believe that independence for Northern Ireland is either practical, or an acceptable way of dealing with the Province's problems.

2) The Intergovernmental Conference

a)i) Q: <u>What does the Intergovernmental Conference do</u>?

A: The IC provides a framework, more systematic than anything that has hitherto existed, within which the two Governments will work together for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland and for peace, stability and prosperity throughout Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights, co-operation against terrorism, and the development of economic, social and cultural co-operation.

The Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on matters specified in the Agreement. This will make it easier both to avoid misunderstandings and profit by the views of a neighbour who shares our goal of peace, stability and reconciliation within the Province.

a)ii) Q: <u>In what areas will the Intergovernmental Conference have a role</u>?

A: These areas are clearly set out in the Agreement. It will deal on a regular basis with political matters, security and related matters, including the administration of justice and the promotion of cross-border co-operation (including security). Should it prove impossible to

achieve and sustain devolution, the Irish Government would be able to put forward views on major legislation and major policy issues where the interests of the minority community are especially or significantly affected.

a)iii) Q: What issues will fall outside the remit of the Intergovernmental Conference?

A: The Agreement sets out the areas in which the IC has a role rather than those in which it has not: it will deal on a regular basis with political matters, security and related matters, legal matters including the administration of justice, and the promotion of cross-border co-operation (including security). The Irish Government would also be able to put forward views on major legislation and major policy issues where the interests of the minority community are significantly or especially affected, so long as devolution has not been achieved. If a devolved administration were set up, devolved matters would not be considered in the IC.

a)iv) Q: Will the Intergovernmental Conference merely be ratifying decisions already taken during the negotiations (as suggested by Maurice Manning TD on 'This Week Next Week', 17.11.85)

A: No. Naturally, some of the matters which will be for

consideration by the Conference were discussed during the negotiations which led to the Agreement, but decisions on these matters will be for the British Government to take in the light of any views and proposals put forward by the Irish Government in the Conference.

a) v) Q: The wording of the Agreement suggests that the Intergovernment Conference will have an executive role (eg 'setting in hand a programme of work' on security co-operation; 'seeking measures' to give substantial expression to the aim of ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice).

A: We hope that the Conference will enable the two Governments to agree on various measures which will promote reconciliation, peace and stability. But the Agreement is clear: the decisions and administration of government in Northern Ireland remain the responsibility of the UK Government.

b) Q: What role does the Agreement give the Irish Government in relation to Northern Ireland?

A: The Agreement incorporates formal UK recognition that the Irish Government may advance views and proposals on aspects of Northern Ireland affairs defined in the Agreement which are not the responsibililty of a devolved

administration in Northern Ireland. It commits both Governments to make a determined effort to resolve any differences between them. It promotes thereby the development of closer and more systematic co-operation between the two Governments - without affecting the position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom - in a way that benefits all the inhabitants of those islands. The Agreement therefore gives, also for the first time, institutional recognition to the reality that a substantial minority in Northern Ireland aspires to a united Ireland and regards the Irish Government as reflecting the concerns of the Nationalist community.

c) Q: By giving the Irish Government a role in relation to Northern Ireland affairs, surely the agreement infringes sovereignty?

A: No. There is no derogation from sovereignty and the agreement makes this clear.

d) Q: So is the Irish role merely "consultative"?

A: The Intergovernmental Conference will be a unique mechanism. There is no single word to describe its role. It will not have executive functions: Article 2(b)

of the agreement makes clear that there will be no derogation from sovereignty and that each Government retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its jurisdiction.

But the Conference will be more than just consultative in that the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on its own initiative (as well as being invited to do so); there is an obligation on both sides in the Conference to make determined efforts to resolve any differences; and one of the Conference's functions will be to promote cross-border co-operation between North and South in Ireland.

[Note: It is accepted by both sides tha the words "consultative" or "consultation" should <u>not</u> be used to describe the agreement.]

e) Q: <u>So the Irish will after all share in the decision-making</u>?

A: As Article 2(b) of the agreement makes clear, each Government retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jursidiction. On matters covered by the agreement, however, the British Government in reaching its decisions will take full account of any views and proposals put forward by the Irish side, and also on the obligation on both sides to

make determined efforts to resolve any differences.

f) Q: Is the Agreement not setting Northern Ireland apart from the rest of the United Kingdom by giving another country a part in government there?

A: There is a unique situation in Northern Ireland because of the division within the community. The agreement reaffirms the present status of Northern Ireland and makes clear that Her Majesty's Government remain responsible for the decisions and administration of government there.

g) Q: Is the concession of a major role for Dublin not an admission of the failure of British and Unionist policy in Northern Ireland over the past sixty years?

A: No. I am concerned with the future, not the past. The agreement shows that the two Governments are determined to work together in seeking peace and reconciliation in Ireland.

h)i) Q: The agreement says in Article 2(b) that "Determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to resolve any differences". In the context, these are differences relating to views and proposals which the Irish Government have put forward on matters relating to Northern Ireland. What does this provision mean?

A: Let me start by emphasising the desire of both Governments to implement the agreement in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill. That being so, we are not starting off in the belief that we shall continually confront differences; the whole point of meeting together will be to find common ground, bearing in mind that the sentence you quote speaks of serving "the interest of promoting peace and stability". But if there are differences, both sides will work hard to resolve them, recognising that each Government retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its jurisdiction.

h)ii)Q: What happens when differences cannot be resolved in the Intergovernmental Conference?

A: Article 2(b) makes it clear that each Government retains responsibility for the decisins and administration of government within its own jurisdiction. But a key point of the agreement is that we are both committing ourselves to determined efforts to resolve differences. Moreover the agreement reflects the careful consideration that the two Governments have given to minimishing differences: it envisages for example a variety of levels at which matters can be considered and also provides for the convening of special meetings up to Ministerial level when required by either side.

i)i) Q: Why is the Intergovernmental Conference/Secretariat to be located in Northern Ireland? Will this not create a focus of protest?

A: A Northern Ireland location will best enable the Conference/Secretariat to carry out its functions efficiently and effectively. As the benefits and opportunities which this Agreement will bring become more widely apparent, I believe the people of Northern Ireland will appreciate the continuation made by the Conference/ Secretariat

i)ii)Q: Where will the Conference/Secretariat be located?

A: It would not be appropriate to give the proposed location of the Conference/Secretariat at this stage.

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j) Q: How can the interests of the majority community in Northern Ireland be reflected in the Intergovernmental Conference when it is proposed that the proceedings should normally be conducted in secret?

A: The two Governments envisage that the meetings and agenda of the Conference will not normally be announced as there are certain matters such as security co-operation which need to be kept confidential. But, of course, it is essential that the interest of all law-abiding citizens in Northern Ireland should be reflected in the Conference and we are currently considering ways in which this might be done.

But final decisions on all aspects of policy in Northern Ireland shall remain with the United Kingdom Government accountable to Parliament.

If pressed - the Unionists already have a channel for consultation on Northern Ireland affairs in the Assembly and in Westminster.

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3) Secretariat

a) Q: What is the role of the Secretariat?

A: The Secretariat will service on a continuing basis the Intergovernmental Conference and will act between meetings as a channel of communication between the two Governments. It will have no executive functions. In order to carry out its duties effectively it will be located in Belfast.

b) Q: Where will the Secretariat be located and how will it be staffed?

A: The Secretariat will be very small. Its function will be to service the Intergovernmental Conference which will normally meet in Belfast and to act between meetings as a channel of communciation between the two Governments when the Conference is not in session.

c) Q: Will the permanent Irish Ministerial representative have direct contact with the nationalist community in Northern Ireland?

A: The role of the permanent Irish Ministerial representative will be to implement the agreement on behalf of the Irish Government, as joint chairman of the Conference. This will not alter the Irish Government's freedom to maintain contact with the people in Northern Ireland.

d)i) Q: How much will the Conference cost?

A: Around £2m per annum but the costs are not finalized. Both Governments will contribute.

ii) Q: How will the additional expenditure be financed?

A: From within the existing financial resources under the control of my rt hon Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

iii) Q: Will the Secretariat be staffed by Home Civil Servants and Northern Ireland civil servants and, if so, how many?

A: Yes. Initially about 8 UK Civil Servants will service the Joint Secretariat as the UK element of the Secretariat. If pressed: It would not be appropriate to conclude our consideration of staffing matters before the Agreement has been approved by Parliament.

4) Devolution

a) Q: <u>How does the Agreement affect the Government's commitment to finding a form of devolved government acceptable to both sides of the community</u>?

A: The Government remains committed to a return to devolved government in Northern Ireland on a basis widely acceptable throughout the community. That policy is supported by the Irish Government. We hope that the parties in Northern Ireland will respond constructively to the opportunities this Agreement offers and help work out satisfatory proposals for a newly devolved administration. If a devolved adminstration were set up, devolved matters would not be considered in the Inter-governmental Conference.

b) Q: <u>What proposals does the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland have for encouraging a return to devolved government in Northern Ireland</u>?

A: The Government remain committed to a return to devolved government in Northern Ireland as the best basis for political stability. We will do all we can to identify a scheme of administration acceptable to both sides of the community. We hope that the political parties in Northern Ireland will respond constructively to the opportunities

this agreement offers, and will help to work out satisfactory proposals for a newly devolved administration.

c)i) Q: Is the Agreement a disincentive to the SDLP to talk about the devolved government?

A: The leader of the SDLP has said that he will talk to the parties about sharing responsibility for the administration of Northern Ireland in a devolved government. It is for all the parties together to work out a new system which would be mutually acceptable.

c)ii) Q: Do you now expect the SDLP to enter the Assembly?

A: The agreement makes it clear that both Governments support a policy of devolution which would command widespread acceptance throughout Northern Ireland. The question of whether the SDLP should enter this or any future Assembly is a matter for the party to decide.

d) Q: What does the Secretary of State intend to do to bring about agreement on devolved government?

A: My rt hon Friend will be exploring with the constitutional parties how best to make progress in the near future. [If pressed: the timing must depend on the political climate in Northern Ireland.]

e)i) Q: <u>What about the Assembly? Will there be fresh elections</u>?

A: We shall have to decide the Assembly's future during the coming months.

e)ii) Q: <u>Does the government continue to give the Northern Ireland Assembly its full backing</u>?

A: We have to recognise that the constitutional representatives of the minority have not taken up their seats in the Assembly. We recognise the constructive role the Assembly has played. We shall have to consider the Assembly's future during the coming months.

5) Role of Intergovernmental Conference on Political matters

a) Q: <u>What will the role of the Conference be on political matters</u>?

A: It will concern itself with measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland: to protect human rights and to prevent discrimination. These will include measures to foster the cultural heritage of both traditions, changes in electoral arrangements, the use of flags and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social discrimination and the advantages and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights in some form. Although discussion of these matters will be mainly concerned with Northern Ireland their application to the Republic would not be excluded.

The Irish Government will also be able to put forward views on the role and composition of public bodies in Northern Ireland including the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, Fair Employment Agency, Equal Opportunities Commission, Police Authority and Police Complaints Board.

The Conference will also provide a framework within which the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals on ways of bringing about devolution in so far as they concern the interests of the minority.

b) Q: How will the agreement improve the human rights situation in Northern Ireland?

A: The Government has introduced many major improvements in recent years to ensure that human rights in Northern Ireland are protected as effectively as possible. The answer to your question is in the agreement. Article 5 in particular provides that the Conference will discuss measures in this field.

c) Q: Do you propose to introduce legislation;

a) giving the vote at local elections to Irish citizens resident in Northern Ireland;

b) permitting the use of Irish as an official language;

c) enabling the Irish tricolour to be flown from City Hall, Belfast and other public buildings in Northern Ireland?

A: All these matters are among those for consideration by the Conference. I should not anticipate that discussion.

d) Q: How will the Intergovernmental Conference affect legislative procedures? Will it reduce the influence of Northern Ireland's MPs?

A: In the absence of devolution Article 5 enables the Irish Government to put forward views on proposals for major legislation and on major policy issues within the purview of the Northern Ireland Departments which are under the Secretary of State's direction and control. In drawing up draft Orders in Council the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will also continue his normal practice of consulting MPs, the Northern Ireland Assembly, and other interested groups. The Government will decide the content of draft Orders. Parliament will decide whether they should be approved or rejected.

6) Appointments to Bodies

Q: Are you not in Article 6 giving Dublin a right of veto on matters fundamentally affecting the security and well-being of the people of Ulster?

A: No. As Article 6 makes clear, the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals on the role and composition of various bodies appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and his Departments. It does not give the Irish Government a veto but every effort will be made by both sides to resolve any differences which may emerge.

7) Security and Related Matters

a) Q: What is the role of the Conference on security matters?

A: The Conference will consider security policy, relationships between the Security Forces and the community and prisons policy.

The Conference will not have any operational responsibility.

b) Q: How does the Agreement affect the Government's security policy?

A: The Government remains committed to defeating terrorism. As a result of the Agreement, the UK and Irish Governments will further strengthen their co-operation in the fight against terrorism. The Intergovernmental Conference will enable the two Governments to cooperate in setting in hand a programme of work to this end.

c) Q: The Agreement means that the Irish Government will be able to interfere with the work of the security forces in Northern Ireland. This will greatly undermine their morale and efficiency.

A: There is no question of interference, and the

Intergovernmental Conferemce will have no operational responsibilities. It will be to everyone's advantage to establish a systematic means of taking account of the Irish Government's views about security matters. I very much hope that this will reassure the minority community. The co-operation foreseen in the agreement will not be all one way. The agreement will intensify security co-operation between the authorities in both parts of Ireland and this should be greatly welcomed by all who wish to defeat terrorism.

d) Q: Are the SDLP now expected to support the RUC and to encourage Catholics to join the force?

A: Everyone should support the security forces. It has long been the wish of HMG to see more members of the minority community joining the RUC. We hope, following the agreement, that this will happen more and that the SDLP will feel able to encourage Roman Catholics to join.

e) Q: The clear implication of this agreement is that the RUC has failed to disicharge its duties fairly and even-handedly in the past. Are you not, therefore, accepting nationalist criticism as valid?

A: We have always had full confidence in the RUC. I hope that following the agreement the minority community will increasingly share that confidence.

f) Q: The UDR are a particular reassurance to unionists in a minority position in border areas. Will you quarantee that the role of the UDR as a bulwark against IRA assassins be maintained in these areas?

A: The UDR will not be disbanded. They are brave and dedicated people who have a major role in providing security in Northern Ireland. I recognise that there are difficulties in the Regiment's relations with the relations with the minority community. The Government keep the role of the security forces including the UDR under review in the light of community relations as well as operational needs. Improvements will continue to be made.

g) Q: Will now move towards a general amnesty in Northern Ireland? will prisoners with indeterminate sentences now be given a definite date for release?

A: Those possibilities do not arise from the agreement itself. Any question of speeding up release from indeterminate sentences, if the agreement led to a real reduction in violence, would be for the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

h) Q: Why did the Irish not co-operate sufficiently on security matters without an Agreement?

A: The UK and Irish Governments already co-operate in the fight against terrorism. The Agreement will provide us with a more systematic basis for still closer and more effective border co-operation in future.

i) Q: Accounting to the Communique the Conference's first meeting will consider ways of ensuring a police presence in all Armed Forces operations which involve direct contact with the Community. Is this the result of Irish Government pressure?

A: No. It has been an element of our security policy for some time that when an Army patrol in a sensitive area seems likely to come into contact with members of the public it should, wherever practicable, be accompanied by a member of the RUC.

[Note: Army patrols have the same powers whether or not they are accompanied by police officers.]

8) Legal Matters, Including the Administration of Justice

a)i) Q: What is the role of the Conference on legal matters?

A: Both Governments recognise the importance of ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland. The Conference will look at ways of giving substantial expression to that aim. It will also look at harmonising the criminal law in both parts of Ireland and the policy aspects of extradition and extra-territorial legislation between North and South.

a)ii) Q: What aspects of the criminal law may the Intergovernmental Conference seek to harmonise in accordance with Article 8?

A: It will be for the IC to consider whether there are any areas of the criminal law applying in the North and in the South respectively which might with benefit be harmonised.

b) Q: Article 8 represents an intolerable intrusion on the independence of the Northern Ireland judiciary?

A: Nonsense. There is no threat to the imdependence of the judiciary anywhere in Ireland. The agreement says in Article 8 that the two Governments agree on the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice and that the Conference will seek measures which would give substantial expression to this aim. Surely nobody can quarrel with that. The Government are willing in the Conference to consider the possibility of mixed courts among other things, and we do not exclude the possibility becoming feasible and acceptable at some future time. But we cannot see any easy or early way round the political and other difficulties that would be involved.

c)i) Q: <u>why are mixed courts highlighted in the agreement?</u>

A: Other ideas, such as extradition and the harmonisation of the criminal law, are also mentioned in the same Article of the Agreement.

c)ii) Q: <u>Surely if mixed courts are mentioned in the agreement, the Government is seriously contemplating introducing them?</u>

A: We are prepared to consider the possibility of introducing them, but without commitment. We do not exclude the possibility of mixed courts being feasible and acceptable at some future time but we cannot see any easy or early way round or through the political and other difficulties which would be involved.

c)iii) Q: What offences would be triable in mixed courts?

A: We have made it very clear that we see no easy or early way round the difficulties mixed courts would involve. We are prepared to consider them, (together with associated practical questions) but without commitment.

d) Q: Does not the commitment to seek measures to give substantial expression to the aim of public confidence in the administration of justice indicate a lack of confidence in the judiciary?

A: We have absolute confidence in the judiciary in Northern Ireland. Indeed the integrity and courage that they have shown in recent years in maintaining the highest standards of judicial impartiality have been beyond praise. In the face of violence, threats and intimidation they have stuck to their task and ensured that justice has been done.

9) Cross-border Co-operation on Security, Economic, Social and Cultural Matters

a)i) Q: What role will the Conference have on cross-border co-operation

A: It will look at ways of enhancing cross-border security co-operation; and at ways of promoting the economic and social development of those areas in both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely from recent instability.

a)ii) Q: How can the Conference's right to set in hand a programme of work in areas including operational resources be reconciled with the statement that it has no operational responsibilities?

A: Article 9 is clear: the programme of work which the Conference may initiate will be carried out by the Chief Constable of the RUC and the Commissioner of the Garda and, where appropriate, groups of officials. It may cover the question of operational resources, but responsibilities for police operations remain with the heads of the respective police forces.

a)iii) Q: Will RUC training be under the direction and authority of the Intergovernmental Conference?

A: No. The Agreement sets out to encourage cross-border co-operation in areas which may include police training, but training remains the responsibility of the Chief Constable.

b)i) Q: What guarantees have you got from Dr FitzGerald that the South will cease to provide a haven for IRA fugitive terrorists?

A: No doubt there are fugitive terrorists in the South, as in the North. On both sides of the border strenuous efforts are made to catch them. One of the main purposes of the agreement will be to enhance the co-operation against terrorism which already takes place between North and South. Article 8 of the agreement foresees further consideration by the two Governments in the Intergovernmental Conference of the question of fugitive offenders. Moreover,the Taoiseach has announced his Government's intention to accede to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

b)ii) Q: Will the Government withdraw from the Agreement if it does not get better co-operation on security?

A: If either side falls short of its commitments, efforts will initially be made through the conference to resolve the problem; but both Governments have entered into the Agreement in good faith, and we do not expect that to happen.

b)iii) Q: Why is the Republic of Ireland, alone among EC countries, not already a signatory to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism?

A: That is a question for the Government of the Republic of Ireland, but we welcome the fact that they have decided to accede to the Convention.

10) The International Dimension

a)i) Q: Fund

The reports that the United States Government will offer a large sum for expenditure in Ireland suggest that Her Majesty's Government entered into the agreement in order to obtain US Financial support.

A: The agreement has been concluded on its merits. But I am glad to note that the President of the United States, has welcomed it.

[NB:Article 10 (a) says that the two Governments will consider the possibility of securing international support for the promotion of economic and social developments in Ireland. It is preferable not to be drawn on the meaning of this until US offers of money have been made].

a)ii)Q: Will the Government accept US support? What form will it take?

A: President Reagan and Speaker O'Neill, in their warm statements of support for the Agreement on 15 November referred to the possibility of practical or financial

support. We are considering with the Irish Government how to respond to these remarks.

b) Q: Did the US Government apply pressure for the Agreement to be reached?

A: No. We informed the United States Government that we were negotiating and we believed that they hoped for an Agreement. They have since welcomed the Agreement and we welcome their support, but at no stage have they put pressure on us.

11) Arrangements for Review

a) Q: What scope is there for reviewing the working of the IC?

A: After three years (or earlier if required) the two Governments will review the working of the Conference to see whether any changes are desirable.

12) Interparliamentary Relations

a) Q: Will there be an Anglo-Irish Inter-Parliamentary body?

A: That decision is for the Westminster and Dublin Parliaments. But the two Governments have undertaken to support any body which may be established.

13) Prime Ministerial Signatures.

a) Q: Why did the Prime Minister sign a copy of the Agreement which described her as the Prime Minister of United Kingdom rather than of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Dr Garret FitzGerald as the Prime Minister of Ireland rather than of the Republic of Ireland?

A: This nomenclature has been standard diplomatic practice in Agreements between our two countries since 1946. What is important is the substance of the Agreement. Both Governments have affirmed that there will be no change in the present status of Northern Ireland without the freely given consent of the majority of its inhabitants and have recognised that such consent does not at present exist.

B) MORE GENERAL QUESTIONS ON THE AGREEMENT

1) Effect of the Agreement

a) Q: Will the Agreement solve Northern Ireland's problems?

A: No single Agreement can reslove the problems of Northern Ireland. But this one is a useful step forward, designed to benefit both Communities. Dr FitzGerald and I have committed ourselves to implementing the Agreement with determination and imagination.

b) Q: Will the agreement not encourage the Provisional IRA in their murderous campaign?

A: One of the main effects of the agreement will be that the British and Irish Governments will strengthen their co-operation in the fight against the men of violence.

[The Provisionals have already denounced the agreement, which hardly suggests that they feel encouraged by it]

c)i) Q: What do the majority community in Northern Ireland stand to gain from the Agreement

A: The majority will gain from the Agreement in several ways. First, there is the Irish Government's internationally

binding recognition that the status of Northern Ireland will remain unchanged as long as that is the wish of a majority of its people and that the present wish of the majority is for the majority is for no change in that status. That must help to promote stability. Secondly, the Agreement provides for closer co-operation between the two Governments in various fields including security. That must produce practical benefits for the people of both Northern Ireland and the Republic. Thirdly, the Agreement provides a better framework than we have had before for the peaceful, constructive expression of minority views. That must promote reconciliation between the two communities in Northern Ireland and be to the good of the majority as well as the minority.

c)ii) Q: The agreement establishes special channels for conveying the nationalist minority's views to the British Government. Why is nothing comparable proposed for the unionist majority?

A: The question is not comparing like with like. The unique arrangement we have made with the Irish Government reflects the position of a minority which looks to Dublin to express its aspirations. The unionists by definition identify with the United Kingdom; they have, and will continue to have, ready means of access to the British Government, including unionist Members of Parliament in

Westminster; and the Government pays close attention to their views.

c)iii) Q: <u>This agreement seems to have something for everybody in Ireland except Ulster Unionists. Are there any concessions at all to fundamental unionist concerns in this agreement?</u>

A: The agreement is designed to promote peace and stability to the benefit of <u>all</u> of the people in North and South. There is also much in it which should be of special value to unionists. For instance, Article 1 confirming the status of Northern Ireland; the intensified security co-operation provided for in the agreement and already beginning to take place; and the Irish Government's acceptance of the validity of the unionist tradition in Ireland. The Taoiseach has also stated his Government's intention to accede to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

2) Possible Legal Challenge to the Agreement

a) Q: Is such an agreement possible without legislation?

A: Yes. We believe the Agreement is fully consistent with statute law relating to Northern Ireland. Any legal challenge is a matter for the courts.

b) (i) Q: Unionist High Court Challenge of the Anglo-Irish Agreement?

A: The Government believes that the Anglo-Irish Agreement is entirely consistent with the law. I understand that the High Court last week refused an application from the Unionists for a judicial review. [If a further case is brought to the courts it will again be a matter for the courts to decide.]

b) (ii) Q: Will the Agreement enter into force if a case challenging its legality is still pending in the courts?

A: The Agreement shall enter into force once the two Governments exchange notification of their acceptance of the Agreement. This shall be completed once Parliament approves it. The Agreement has already been approved in the Irish Dail

b)(iii) Q: <u>Will the Government implement the Agreement once it has entered into force if a legal case against it is still pending?</u>

A: Once the Agreement enters into force the two Governments stand ready to implement it as soon as possible thereafter. We would of course take account of any proceedings there might be pending.

NB [If a case is pending at the time of debate, the Government should be ready to give an assurance that, in the event of that case succeeding, it would not proceed with the Agreement].

b) (iv) Q: <u>Will the Government proceed with this debate if it coincides with a further application questioning legality in the courts?</u>

A: This is a matter for the Speaker to determine.

NB [There is a possibility that a further application to the High Court will be under consideration during the days of the debate - the Unionists have 10 days from their original application to renew

it. The Solicitor General feels that the Speaker ought to decide that it would be proper for the debate to continue. It is considered that the subjudice rule would not be appropriate in this case.]

c) Q: <u>What is your attitude towards the threat of legal challenge in the Irish Courts?</u>

A: That is a matter for the Irish Courts and Irish Government.

d) Q: <u>Can the Agreement be regarded as binding since in the UK only the Queen has treaty-making power and no Government can bind its successors</u>?

A: The practice of drafting treaties between states in inter-governmental form is well-established. Such inter-governmental agreements, because they are concluded on behalf of the State, also bind successive Governments.

3) The Forum Report

a) Q: The agreement falls far short of the options in the New Ireland Forum Report.

A: Let us concentrate on what the two Governments have agreed. The agreement represents the outcome of prolonged and serious negotiations. The arrangements it embodies are unique, reflecting both the closeness of the anglo-Irish relationship and the special problems of Northern Ireland. The New Ireland Forum's meetings and reports helped to creeate the climate in which these negotiations became possible. The new agreement accords with the spirit of conciliation which characterised much of the Forum Report.

b) Q: Do you still reject the Forum Report?

A: The British Government welcomed many positive elements in the Forum Report. We welcomed such principles as the clear acceptance that political change requires consent the commitment to the politics of peaceful persuasion, and unqualified opposition to violence and those who support violence. We welcomed the recognition and respect which the Report gave, on the part of nationalists, to the distinctive identity on Northern Ireland unionists including their loyalty to the United Kingdom.

(if pressed again on the "three illustrative models"):
I have already said that I welcome many of the innovative features of the Report. But I do not think anyone would expect the British Government to endorse it in its entirety.

4) A Referendum in Northern Ireland

a) Q: In November 1984 in the communique issued after their Summit the Prime Minister and Taoiseach agreed "that the identities of both the majority and minority communities in Northern Ireland should be recognised and respected, and reflected in the structures and processes of Northern Ireland in ways acceptable to both communities". How will the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach test the acceptability of the agreement to the unionist community?

A: The identity of the majority community is already recognised and respected, in the way the majority desire, by virtue of Northern Ireland being and remaining part of the United Kingdom. Article 1 of the Agreement confirms that position. This agreement also provides means for the expression of the identity of the minority. The agreement thus furthers the aim of making the structures and processes in Northern Ireland acceptable to both communities.

The elected representatives of the people of the United Kingdom as a whole will have the opportunity to express their views when Parliament debates the agreement shortly.

b) Q: Why does the Government not hold a referendum to test the acceptability of the Agreement as it did with the Border Poll in 1973; and the Scottish and Welsh Rerendums

A: The Government has no intention of holding a referendum in Northern Ireland on the Anglo-Irish Agreement. It would be quite inappropriate for an international agreement to be voted on in this way - even more so in just one part of the United Kingdom.

(If pressed)

The NI Border Poll held in 1973 provides no precedent. That poll was intended to ascertain whether the people of Northern Ireland wished to remain within the United Kingdom. That is not at issue. Indeed, one of the main features of the Agreement is that it incorporates formally binding recognition by the Irish Government that there will be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority of the people there and that the present wish of a majority is for no change in that status

The devolution referendums held in Scotland and Wales provided no precedent either. These referendums dealt with arrangements for regional government, not with relations between two governments

c) Q: Why not have a referendum in the UK as a whole?

A: The Government has no intention of holding any referendum, in Northern Ireland or in the UK as a whole on the Anglo-Irish Agreement. It would be quite inappropriate for an Agreement dealing with relations between two Governments to be voted on in this way.

5) General Political Questions

a)i) Q: Twelve years ago, the loyalists in Northern Ireland defeated an Anglo-Irish agreement based on power-sharing and a Council for Ireland. Won't they do the same this year?

A: I believe that the great majority in Northern Ireland have a deep longing for peace. The Government have made a decision that action is necessary to support the democratic process in Northern Ireland and that it would be damaging and even dangerous to do nothing. Indeed, the two major unionist parties recognise in their policy documents that it is necessary to take action to accommodate the nationalist tradition. This agreement tries to accommodate both traditions. I am determined that it should work, and work to the benefit of all.

a)ii) Q: What is the Government's reaction to calls for Unionist defiance?

A: We believe that the vast majority of Unionists will accept the decisions of the Parliament of the UK. We hope that their leaders will think very carefully before they ask people to defy decisions democratically arrived at by what, as Unionists, they accept as their Parliament.

b) Q: Is the agreement not the first step on the slippery slope to Irish unity?

No. The agreement commits the Irish Government to acknowledging the rights and identity of unionists. It commits the two Governments to the view that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would* only come about with the consent of a majority of

*Note:- The agreement says "would" not "could".

The people of Northern Ireland; and that the present wish of a majority is for no change. This is the most formal commitment to the principle of consent made by an Irish Government, and should provide reassurance to unionists.

c) Q: Will you now accept that the electoral success of Sinn Fein and the PIRA's campaign of violence including attacks on British cities, have brought both of you together in this agreement today? Is this not confirmation of the success of the ballot box/armalite strategy?

A: Absolutely not. This agreement is a rejection of terrorism. We are seeking to build up hope for the future, where the IRA have sought only to destroy. We are seeking peace and reconciliation, where the IRA have brought only strife, turmoil and tragedy. This agreement will reinforce the position of all who seek peace and stability by constitutional means.

d) Q: Why were the SDLP and not the Unionists briefed about the Anglo-Irish talks?

A: The Government made no secret of the basis on which the talks are being held. But the details of the negotiations were kept confidential.

e) Q: Is confidentiality not damaging in that it creates uncertainty?

A: The need for confidentiality created some uncertainty. But public negotiations would have been far more damaging, not least because they could not have been successful.

[If pressed: Negotiations inevitably require explaining why certain courses of action would be impossible and exploring possibilities which are ultimately rejected. This process can only be done in private; but it in no way detracts from Parliament's responsibility to reject or accept any proposals which it must now exercise.

f) Q: What is the Prime Minister's view of the inclusion of the Irish delegation of a senior Irish policeman?

A: The membership of the Irish delegation was a matter for the Irish Government.

g) Q: Why were [Unionist MPs] given copies of the Agreement only after its release to the press?

A: The Agreement and associated documents were made available as widely as possible as soon as the Summit concluded.

h) Q: Why believe the Irish will adhere to this Agreement when history suggests they cannot be trusted?

A: Too great a concentration on history can be dangerous. Both Prime Ministers have committed themselves to implementing and sustaining the measures set out in the Agreement with determination and imagination. We do not doubt the good faith of the Irish Government in entering into this Agreement and they have no cause to doubt ours.

i) Q: Is there any truth in allegations of an MI6 influenced conspiracy to bring about a betrayal of Ulster?

A: Such fantastic assertions do not merit rebuttal. We utterly reject the suggestion that this is anthing other than an Agreement entered into in good faith by both Governments for the benefit of all the people in Northern Ireland which stands on its own merits.

j) Q: Why did the talks which led to the Agreement take so long?

A: The Agreement covers many complex issues and it was important to find the right balance.

k) Q: Why has the Secretary of State not addressed the NI Assembly on the Agreement?

A: The Prime Minister has invited the Assembly's Speaker and a representative delegation of members to discuss the Agreement.

l) Q: Why did the Union Jack not fly above Hillsborough on the day of the Summit?

A: In the interests of peace and reconciliation, we decided that the most sensible course would be to fly no national flag at Hillsborough.

6) First Meeting of Intergovernmental Conference

a) Q: When will the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference be?

A: If Parliament approves the Agreement the first meeting will be as soon as possible after that. It would not be appropriate to announce any date in advance.

b) Q: Does not the Communique indicate that the first Meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference will be concerned with the Republic's view of security (ie security force relations with the minority, public confidence in the administration of justice)?

A: The Conference will look at ways of enhancing security co-operation but good relations with all law-abiding citizens and public confidence are also essential ingredients if we are to defeat terrorism.

7) Q: Irish attitude to the Security Forces/UDR?

A: The Irish Government has reaffirmed its commitment to the fight against terrorism and recognises the essential contribution made to this by all sections of the Security Forces in difficult and dangerous circumstances. They are however concerned - as are we - that care should be taken over relations between the security forces and the minority community.

b) Q: Was the UDR discussed in the talks?

A: The UDR came up in the discussions on various aspects of security.

c) Q: Changes to the UDR

A: The Agreement does not involve any change to the structure or role of the UDR. Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate that the UDR is progressively improving its training and its relationship with the minority community, the GOC is introducing improvements to UDR training. [An example is the establishment of a Lt Col post in HQ UDR with specific responsibility for training; and arrangements for officers to go to Sandhurst from May 1986 if they have potential for the permanent cadre.]

d) Q: How will the UDR react?

A: The UDR are a disciplined force who will carry out their duties as before, as professionally and responsibly as they can.

e) Q: What changes will the Irish be seeking in the new machinery?

A: The Irish Government have made clear they attach particular importance to relations between the Security Forces and the minority community and this is one of the subjects which the Conference will be discussing. We would increase the support from the minority community for the Security Forces in the fight against terrorism. [If pressed for detailed examples: No doubt the Irish will have detailed suggestions to make but these will be a matter for the Conference].

f) Q: Terrorist/Unionist backlash - can you cope?

A: Any increase in violence will be tackled resolutely. The Army is confident that it can supply any assistance for which the RUC might ask.

g) Q: Force Levels?

A: Force levels in Northern Ireland have remained constant for some time (some 9,000 Regular Army and 6,500 UDR) and there are no plans to change this. However, should circumstances require an increase to meet a specific need the Army are confident that they can provide any further support which might be called for. Equally, if there were to be a significant decrease in terrorism we would consider further reductions in force levels.

h) Q: As the Irish have not given sufficient security co-operation in the past what reason is there to expect they will give it in the future?

A: I do not agree that security co-operation has not been good in the past. Co-operation has been good, particularly at a local level. The Agreement is intended to enhance that co-operation in new ways. Both Dr FitzGerald and I are committed to implementing it with determination and imagination.

E8.

Conference will be discussing. We would welcome improvements which increase the support from the minority community for the Security Forces in the fight against terrorism. [If pressed for detailed examples: No doubt the Irish will have detailed suggestions to make but these will be a matter for the Conference].

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JLD

E&R.

d) Q. Does not the commitment to seek measures to give substantial expression to the aim of public confidence in the administration of justice indicate a lack of confidence in the judiciary?

A. We have absolute confidence in the judiciary in Northern Ireland. Indeed the integrity and courage that they have shown in recent years in maintaining the highest standards of judicial impartiality have been beyond praise. In the face of violence, threats and intimidation they have stuck to their task and ensured that justice has been done.

CAM

To be included on B7: Security Forces and UDR

E&R.

a) Q: Irish attitude to the Security Forces/UDR?

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e) Q: What changes will the Irish be seeking in the new machinery?

A: The Irish Government have made clear they attach particular importance to relations between the Security Forces and the minority community and this is one of the subjects which the

/...

E[redacted]

10. The International Dimension

a) Q: Fund

The Reports that the United States Government will offer a large sum for expenditure in Ireland suggest that Her Majesty's Government entered into the agreement in order to obtain US financial support.

A: The agreement has been concluded on its merits. But I am glad to note that the President of the United States has welcomed it.

[NB: Atricle 10(a) says that the two Governments will consider the possibility of securing international support for the promotion of economic and social developments in Ireland. It is preferable not to be drawn on the meaning of this until US offers of money have been made].

Confidential

JLD

E8R.

To be included under B5:
General Political Question

f) Q: What is the Prime Minister's view of the inclusion in the Irish delegation of a senior Irish policeman?

A: The membership of the Irish delegation was a matter for the Irish Government.

CAM

MIXED COURTS

"We have all along made it clear to you that we could go no further than undertaking to consider the possibility of mixed courts. We remain prepared to undertake to consider the possibility, but in all honesty it has to be without commitment, since, though we do not exclude the possibility of mixed courts being feasible and acceptable at some future time, we cannot see any easy or early way round or through the political and other difficulties which would be involved."

MIXED COURTS

And see overpage

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 November 1985

Dear Charles,

Anglo-Irish Summit

I enclose the following briefing material for use with the Taoiseach on Friday 15 November. There are sufficient copies for all the participants.

(a) Briefs:

i) General
ii) Internal Political Scene in the Republic
iii) Continental Shelf Delimitation
iv) The Irish Sea
v) European Community Intergovernmental Conference
vi) Birmingham Bombings 1974
vii) Cross Border Security: Special Irish Complaints
viii) Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council

(b) Copies of:

The Agreement
The Joint Communique
Press Release
Question and Answer Brief

(c) Personality Reports on:

i) Dr Garret FitzGerald
ii) Mr Dick Spring
iii) Mr Peter Barry
iv) Mr Dermot Nally
v) Mr Michael Lillis
vi) Mr Sean Donlon
vii) Mr Noel Dorr
viii) Mr Peter Prendergast
ix) Mr Declan Quigley
x) Mr Andy Ward

A copy of the Prime Minister's press statement will follow when it has been agreed.

I am copying this letter with enclosures to Jim Daniell in the Northern Ireland Office and to Michael Stark in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,
Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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13 November 1985

COPY NO 1

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT
NOVEMBER 1985

GENERAL BRIEF

Introduction

The first of the current annual Summit meetings with the Irish was held in December 1980 when Mr Haughey was Taoiseach. This will be the 5th such Summit and the 4th with Dr FitzGerald as Taoiseach.

AIIC

2. At the Summit with Mr Haughey a series of five Anglo-Irish Joint Studies was commissioned. They considered citizenship rights; security matters; economic co-operation; and possible new institutional structures and measures to encourage mutual understanding. Discussion of these Joint Studies at the Summit in 1981 with the present Taoiseach resulted in the establishment of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council (AIIC) to provide a framework to facilitate more regular and frequent contacts between Ministers and officials. Although there was a hiatus for most of 1982 because of the Falklands conflict, there have been 61 meetings of British and Irish Ministers since then, 21 of them since the last Summit in November 1984 (in addition to those taking place in the margins of Community and other multilateral meetings). There was no Summit in 1982; this will be the third specifically in the AIIC framework. Further details of the work of the AIIC are provided in separate briefing.

3. The Communique issued after the November 1984 Summit at Chequers acknowledged that "the identities of both the majority and minority communities in Northern Ireland should be recognised and respected and reflected in the structures and processes of Northern Ireland in ways acceptable to both communities". It was agreed that there should be close and continuing discussion between the two governments to bring this about.

THE FORUM REPORT

4. In 1983 Dr Fitzgerald launched the New Ireland Forum designed to promote more realistic debate among the Irish political parties about the future of Ireland. With the exception of those advocating violence (who were not invited) all the main political parties in the Republic, together with the SDLP, took part. The Forum presented its Report in April 1984. Although none of the three illustrative options contained in it (unity, federation, joint authority) was acceptable to the United Kingdom, the Report contained a number of helpful elements including a clear condemnation of violence and a recognition of the rights of the Unionists in Northern Ireland. The Report has formed an important part of the background to the current Anglo-Irish negotiations on the Irish side and they will wish to present the Agreement as being, in part at least, a consequence of the Forum process.

THE AGREEMENT

5. At the final session before the Summit of the Armstrong/Nally talks, agreement was reached on the last details in the texts to be issued by the Summit, namely the Anglo-Irish Agreement itself, the Summit Communique and the Press Release summarising the Agreement. There appear to be no outstanding issues for the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach to resolve at the Summit. Suggestions of matters to raise, for instance concerning public presentation of the Agreement and the handling of the press conference following the Summit, will be submitted by Sir Robert Armstrong to the Prime Minister.

Cabinet Office
13 November 1985

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11 November 1985

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

NOVEMBER 1985

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# INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE IN THE REPUBLIC

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1. Dr FitzGerald's Coalition Government badly needs a political success. After nearly three years in office it is trailing the opposition by some 15% in the polls. Following defections over family planning reform it no longer has an overall majority in the Dail, although in practice the defectors generally support Government policy.

2. The Coalition has held together well, despite tensions caused by its deteriorating position in the opinion polls, and in particular by the Labour Party's declining fortunes. Unpopular economic policies have been introduced and adhered to, but little has been achieved in the way of social reform

and disagreements between the parties have led to lengthy delays in introducing legislation.

ECONOMY

3. The long wet summer of 1985 contributed to a mood of gloom and despondency. Farmers, who suffered extensive crop losses are particularly angry at what they see as low levels of Government aid. Elsewhere there are positive trends in the economy: a three year economic plan introduced last year is fairly well on target, with inflation and interest rates both below UK levels. The 1985 trade balance is expected to be in surplus for the first time. But the Government still faces formidable problems. Unemployment has been contained at a painful 17%, but there is no sign that it can be brought lower than this. The current budget deficit will exceed 8% of GNP (the highest ever experienced), and cannot be reduced without increasing the already high level of personal taxation or further cutting public expenditure. Neither option is politically acceptable.

SOCIAL REFORMS

4. Dr FitzGerald's constitutional crusade ran into the sands early on with the 1984 Referendum on abortion (not an issue of his own choosing). New legislation earlier this year to increase the availability of family planning only just scraped through the Dail, and the Taoiseach is not anxious to repeat the experiment. His hand may, however, be forced on divorce. Dr FitzGerald believes that a referendum on the subject now would fail, and do more harm than good. But the Labour Party has decided to introduce a Bill this session to

give the Dail the right to legislate on divorce. An attempt by Labour to secure Cabinet endorsement of the Bill and to have it considered during a general debate on divorce due to begin on 14 November has been rejected, and it will have to wait its turn as a Private Members Bill. Although many in Fine Gael are unhappy at the Party's failure to live up to its promises in the field of social reforms, the Government believes that it is important to await a national consensus on the need for reform.

NORTHERN IRELAND

5. Whether as cause or effect of the Government's perceived failure to deliver on other fronts, the Anglo-Irish process has come to occupy a dominant place in Dr FitzGerald's priorities, and hence in his own standing in the country. A successful agreement will be presented as vindication of his efforts, and as a triumph of constitutional democratic methods over terrorism and subversion. The main impact of a successful agreement is likely to be in rallying his own troops around him, rather than in any immediate upsurge of public support in the Republic. But if the agreement is not generally seen as a success this would be the beginning of the end for the Taoiseach personally. Much will depend on the SDLP's position in the aftermath of an agreement.

FIANNA FAIL

6. Fianna Fail is playing a waiting game. Riding high in the polls it seems to have accepted that an early election is unlikely. Mr Haughey's policy now is to let the Government sink in its own unpopularity, keeping as quiet as possible

about his own future intentions. The rest of the Party toes the line. Mr Haughey's interventions on the Anglo-Irish process so far have been carefully worded. Whilst indicating his intention to stick firmly to traditional Fianna Fail aspirations and policy in a Dail debate on the agreement it looks as if he will stop short of threatening to repudiate the agreement if returned to office.

CONCLUSIONS

7. The political mood in Dublin is distinctly edgy. But there is no expectation of an early election. A Government reshuffle is expected later this year, and the successful conclusion of the uncomfortably prolonged Anglo-Irish talks should help calm the atmosphere. But there is no doubt in political circles that the Government's presentation of the Anglo-Irish agreement will be a testing time, on which its fate may ultimately turn.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 November 1985

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HMV(85)
11 November 1985

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT
NOVEMBER 1985

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CONTINENTAL SHELF DELIMITATION (Defensive)

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

OBJECTIVE

1. To encourage Irish to work with us in resisting Danish and Icelandic claims but without commitment at this stage as to our readiness to proceed to arbitration.

POINTS TO MAKE (if raised)

2. We share Irish wish to resolve differences over the continental shelf amicably so as not to disturb wider relations between out two governments and to facilitate work for offshore industries. Need to work together to resist claims made by Denmark and Iceland to Hatton Rockall plateau.

/BACKGROUND

BACKGROUND

3. Efforts to reach agreement by negotiation on delimitation of the continental shelf (SW approaches, West of Scotland, Irish Sea) broke down in 1976. It was subsequently agreed (and made public) that the issues would be submitted to some form of ad hoc arbitration subject to agreement on its nature and modalities.

4. Negotiations at official level regarding the modalities of the Arbitration and the establishment of the tribunal took place between 1979-1982. The Irish General Election in 1983 and subsequent Irish reluctance to resume discussions left matters in a state of limbo. (We also had our own reasons for going slow as we wanted to complete the Ninth Licensing Round before the conclusion of the draft Arbitration Agreement, which at present, once signed, would prevent the issue of new production licences in the relevant areas pending the Tribunal's decision. The Ninth Round is now complete).

5. Claims made earlier this year by Denmark and Iceland (which we and the Irish have both rejected) to the Hatton-Rockall area appear to have revived Irish interest in UK/Irish arbitration. We await Law Officers' Opinion as to the best tactics of how to react to action taken by Denmark and Iceland and whether it would still be to our advantage to press ahead first with arbitration with Irish. Ministers will then be invited to decide on future course of action.

/6.

6. The Irish recently protested that advice given officially to Enterprise Oil (a British company) had led them to refuse the Irish offer of two blocks in the Irish Third Round, one of which straddles the line claimed by the UK as the boundary in the earlier negotiations. We subsequently clarified the position with the Irish and at their request spoke to the company. In the event they decided not to take up the offer because of uncertainty.

7. The results of the Irish Third Round were announced on 22 October; one block which also straddles the UK claim line is included. A protest is called for but will be postponed so as not to affect wider Anglo/Irish relations at this delicate stage. In line with the Irish reaction to the UK's Ninth Licensing Round (which included two blocks straddling the line claimed by the Irish in the negotiations) we would propose to do so in a low key manner.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 November 1985

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HMV(85)

11 November 1985

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

NOVEMBER 1985

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# THE IRISH SEA

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

OBJECTIVE

1. To resist any Irish attempt to revert to their original idea of a major conference on the Irish Sea and to reassure them about radioactive discharges from Sellafield.

POINTS TO MAKE

2. Welcome Irish proposal for a bilateral meeting of officials to discuss co-operation and co-ordination in environment work on the Irish Sea.

3. Understand final text of an agreement (revised to take account of Irish comments) on the notification of radiological incidents which might affect the Republic will be available very shortly.



/BACKGROUND

BACKGROUND

Irish Sea Conference

4. The Irish Minister of Environment pressed earlier this year for an Anglo-Irish conference of experts in Dublin in 1986 under the patronage of both Governments but including other interested parties.

5. Mr Jenkins told him that other commitments prevented a conference before 1988. He suggested meanwhile continuing contact at official level. The Irish took up this suggestion proposing a bilateral meeting of officials this autumn. DOE officials are in touch with their Irish counterparts about dates for the meeting.

Sellafield

6. Radioactive discharges from Sellafield have to comply with conditions set by the Department of Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, under the Radioactive Substances Act 1960. The radiological impact of Sellafield in the immediate vicinity of the plant is within the limits recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection. Further afield, the impact is considerably less, and Irish research itself confirms that the radiological impact on the Irish population is negligible.

/7. New

8. New liaison arrangements between the UK authorising departments and the Irish Department of Energy were set up last year. Meetings take place approximately every six months ; next meeting will be in Dublin on 19 November. These contacts are working well and the Irish officials concerned seem satisfied with them.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 November 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

8 November 1985

**ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT**

**NOVEMBER 1985**

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INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE (IF RAISED)

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

OBJECTIVES

1. To reserve our position until a clear package is visible.

2. To elicit what the Irish will settle for.

POINTS TO MAKE

3. What shape of package do you expect to come before us for discussion at Luxembourg European Council?

4. Hope European Council will be in a position to take decisions. Conference must not drag on.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Will take a view on basis of whatever precise proposals are put before European Council, not before.

6. Consider changes only if convinced they will lead to completing common market and faster and more effective decision taking.

[If necessary]

7. All of us will benefit from opening up of internal market. Regional and social policy already catered for by existing funds. Cohesion should be a question of convergence of economic policy.

BACKGROUND

8. The Presidency are starting to try to put together a package as a basis for agreement at European Council. The key issues are decision-making, the European Parliament, new articles on technology and environment, and cohesion. The Benelux and Italy are still hankering after maximalist positions. The French and Germans and ourselves have been taking a similar line on substance. They are likely to want to try to reach agreement on a limited package in December.

9. The Irish have not played a leading role. They can agree to a limited extension of majority voting, increased power for the Parliament, and new articles on technology and environment (provided unanimity is maintained for the latter). Their main interest is to promote a text on cohesion which would encourage new resource transfers to the poorer member states. This has been firmly resisted by the French, Germans and Dutch as well as by the Danes and ourselves.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

8 November 1985

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MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

11 November 1985

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT
NOVEMBER 1985

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# THE BIRMINGHAM BOMBINGS 1974:
# REPRESENTATIONS BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT
## Brief by the Home Office

OBJECTIVE

1. To ensure, if the Irish raise the subject, that the Irish understand the nature of the Home Secretary 's powers in a case of this kind, and to reassure them that if the new material warrants it, he will not hesitate to refer it to the Court of Appeal.

POINTS TO MAKE

2. HMG has noted the Irish Government's concern. The Home Secretary has statutory power to refer a criminal case to the Court of Appeal. He is considering very carefully whether, on the basis of new material presented to him, it would be appropriate to refer the case of the Birmingham bombers to the Court of Appeal.

3. Cannot say when a decision will be reached. But if after examination evidence warrants, he will not hesitate to refer it.

BACKGROUND

4. In November 1974 two public houses in Birmingham were destroyed by PIRA bombs, 21 people killed and 162 injured. Six Irish men - Patrick Hill, John Walker, Richard McIlkenny, William Power, Hugh Callaghan and Gerrard Hunter - were subsequently convicted of murder (21 counts). Their convictions were upheld on appeal. The 6 have always protested their innocence and claimed that their confessions (2 did not make written statements) were obtained by violence and threats.

5. On 28 October 1985 the "World in Action" programme, "In the Interests of Justice", presented alleged new evidence relating to the forensic tests and the accuseds' confessions, which purported to cast doubt on the convictions. The papers relating to the material presented in the programme were sent to the Home Secretary by Sir John Farr, MP.

6. On 29 October the Irish Government expressed its concern to HMG and formally asked that the Home Secretary look carefully at the new evidence. HMG replied formally on 5 November, acknowledging that the Home Secretary had been presented with new material, and that he was considering very carefully whether it would be appropriate to refer the case to the Court of Appeal.

Home Office

11 November 1985

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11 November 1985

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

NOVEMBER 1985

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CROSS BORDER SECURITY: SPECIAL IRISH COMPLAINTS

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

OBJECTIVE (if raised)

1. To avoid discussion of specific complaints.

POINT TO MAKE

2. These are the sort of matters which the new machinery (the Intergovernmental Conference) has been set up to deal with. Let us leave them for it.

BACKGROUND

3. The Irish Government make frequent complaints through HM Embassy in Dublin about specific incidents related to the operation of our Security Forces in the border areas of Northern Ireland.

4. These concern brief and mostly inadvertent incursions into the Republic, the closure of a number of cross-border roads and bridges (generally resented by the inhabitants of the border areas of the Republic) and alleged arbitrary searches and discourtesy by Security Forces personnel operating in the border areas of the North. (There have been several such complaints in recent months: most have been answered satisfactorily but some are still under investigation by the RUC.)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 November 1985

CDP

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

14 November 1985

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

NOVEMBER 1985

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ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL (AIIC)

Brief by the Cabinet Office

Paragraph 10 of the Joint Communique refers to "the wide range of work being done under the auspices of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council". The attached Report of the Steering Committee of the AIIC (Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Nally) to Heads of Government gives an account of that work.

2. It is not for publication.

Cabinet Office

14 November 1985

RESTRICTED

REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL (AIIC) ON ANGLO-IRISH CONTACTS AND CO-OPERATION: 1985

1. The present report covers the period since the Anglo-Irish Summit on 19 November 1984. The very wide range of cooperation and contact between the two countries continued to develop. The present report focusses on some notable examples which are divided into activities of a general nature and activities where the Coordinating Committee has, at some stage, played a direct role.

General

2. 21 formal Ministerial meetings have taken place since November 1984. A full list, stating the topics discussed, is annexed to this report.

3. The principal focus of discussion between the two Governments since 1984 has been the development of Anglo-Irish relations with particular reference to Northern Ireland.

4. The Electoral Amendment Act enacted by the Oireachtas in July 1985, granted inter alia voting rights at Dail elections to British citizens resident in the Republic. The extended voting register will be ready in April 1986.

5. The Committee noted that cooperation on security matters continues to be given a high priority.

6. Anglo-Irish Encounter held its second conference, on "promoting amongst the young a greater respect for religious and cultural diversity", in Dublin in November 1984. The third conference on "increasing the appreciation of our Cultural Heritage" was held in London in March 1985. Encounter funded an Irish Studies Conference in Oxford in September 1985. This resulted in the launching of a new academic society, the British Association for Irish Studies.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

The Coordinating Committee

7. Agreement was reached in the Working Group on Education on a curriculum development project in schools in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Republic entitled "The European Studies (Ireland and Great Britain) Project". This will be concerned with the cultural and historical inter-relationships within and between the islands of Great Britain and Ireland. Over the period 1986-90 the project will involve at least 1600 pupils aged between 11 and 14 in 6 schools in Great Britain, 6 schools in Northern Ireland and 6 schools in the Republic. It will aim to encourage pupils to explore the common roots and rich diversity of their heritage. Initially the project will concentrate on history and geography and develop the skills of pupils by way of individual and group research. Total costs of about £1m will be shared equally by the three education authorities. The materials used by the project will later be made available to other schools.

8. It has been agreed that the series of teachers' conferences organised by the three Inspectorates of Schools on the teaching of Irish and British history which took place in the early to mid-1970s will be revived. Special attention will be paid to disseminating the conclusions reached at these seminars to a wider audience. The first conference will be held in Northern Ireland in 1986. Thereafter the conferences will take place every two years, the location rotating between Great Britain, the Republic and Northern Ireland.

9. The work on scholarships and academic links initiated by the Working Group on Cultural Exchanges in 1984 was also completed in the Working Group on Education. Two candidates each from the Republic and the United Kingdom have been selected under a new scientific scholarship scheme for postgraduates and have begun their studies. It is expected that the numbers under this scheme will increase in future years. In addition, the studies in the United Kingdom of 11 other Irish postgraduates will be funded from British official sources during the academic year 1985/86.

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10. Following the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding on exchanges of civil servants in October 1984, one Irish civil servant has been placed with the British Department of the Environment and arrangements are in hand for two to work in the Scottish Office, one in the Department of Health and Social Security and one with the Forestry Commission. It is expected that three UK civil servants - from the Scottish Office, the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Health and Social Security - will be placed in Irish Government Departments in the near future.

11. Discussions have taken place on the broadcast of RTE television into Northern Ireland, with useful work being done in refining and evaluating the technical aspects of the proposals. The discussions are continuing.

12. Agreement on the future funding of the Commissioners of Irish Lights was reached in principle between the Irish Departments of Communications and the British Department of Transport in March 1985. It will begin to be implemented in 1987 covering the 1986 Irish financial year and the 1986/87 British financial year.

14 November 1985

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| NO. | DATE | PARTICIPANTS | SUBJECT | VENUE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 41 | 28 November 1984 | Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office and Minister for the Environment | Transport | Belfast |
| 42 | 5 December 1984 | Minister for Health & Social Affairs and Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Security | Social Affairs | Dublin |
| 43 | 12 December 1984 | Secretary of State for Transport and Minister of Communications | Transport | London |
| 44 | 28 January 1985 | Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries & Food and Minister for Agriculture | Fisheries | London |
| 45 | 4 February 1985 | Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Minister for Foreign Affairs | Anglo-Irish Relations | London |
| 46 | 28 February 1985 | Secretary of State for Employment and Minister of Labour | Employment issues | London |
| 47 | 15 March 1985 | Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office and Minister of Agriculture | Agricultural cooperation | Belfast |

RIDAAW

| NO. | DATE | PARTICIPANTS | SUBJECT | VENUE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 48 | 15 March 1985 | Under-Secretary of State, Department of Environment and Minister of State, Department of the Environment | Environmental matters | London |
| 49 | 22 March 1985 | Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Minister for Foreign Affairs | Anglo-Irish relations | Dublin |
| 50 | 26 March 1985 | Minister for Education and Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office | Education | Dublin |
| 51 | 1 May 1985 | Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Dept of Trade and Industry and Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce and Tourism | Commerce | London |
| 52 | 16 May 1985 | Secretary of State for the Environment, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment and the Minister for the Environment | Environmental matters | London |
| 53 | 23 May 1985 | Minister of State for Trade & Industry and Minister for Industry, Trade, Commerce & Tourism | Industry | London |

RIDAAW

| NO. | DATE | PARTICIPANTS | SUBJECT | VENUE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 54 | 30 May 1985 | Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs | Anglo-Irish relations | London |
| 55 | 30 May 1985 | Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Minister for Foreign Affairs | Anglo-Irish relations | London |
| 56 | 4 July 1985 | Minister for Labour and Minister of State for Employment | Employment issues | Dublin |
| 57 | 7 August 1985 | Minister for Health and Social Welfare, and Under Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office | Health and Social Welfare | Dublin |
| 58 | 11 September 1985 | Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Northern Ireland, and the Minister of Fisheries & Foresty | Fishery matters | Londonderry |
| 59 | 17 September 1985 | Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland | Introductory discussion on Anglo-Irish relations | Dublin |

[redacted]AAW

| NO. | DATE | PARTICIPANTS | SUBJECT | VENUE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 60 | 7 October 1985 | Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Affairs | Anglo-Irish relations | London |
| 61 | 6 November 1985 | Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Affairs | Anglo-Irish relations | London |

ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT 1985



NOIABE

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND.

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland:

Wishing further to develop the unique relationship between their peoples and the close co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European Community;

Recognising the major interest of both their countries and, above all, of the people of Northern Ireland in diminishing the divisions there and achieving lasting peace and stability;

Recognising the need for continuing efforts to reconcile and to acknowledge the rights of the two major traditions that exist in Ireland, represented on the one hand by those who wish for no change in the present status of Northern Ireland and on the other hand by those who aspire to a sovereign united Ireland achieved by peaceful means and through agreement;

Reaffirming their total rejection of any attempt to promote political objectives by violence or the threat of violence and their determination to work together to ensure that those who adopt or support such methods do not succeed;

Recognising that a condition of genuine reconciliation and dialogue between unionists and nationalists is mutual recognition and acceptance of each other's rights;

Recognising and respecting the identities of the two communities in Northern Ireland, and the right of each to pursue its aspirations by peaceful and constitutional means;

Reaffirming their commitment to a society in Northern Ireland in which all may live in peace, free from discrimination and intolerance, and with the opportunity for both communities to participate fully in the structures and processes of government;
Have accordingly agreed as follows:

A

STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND

ARTICLE 1

The two Governments

(a) affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland;

(b) recognise that the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland is for no change in the status of Northern Ireland;

(c) declare that, if in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and support in the respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish.

B

## THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE

### ARTICLE 2

(a) There is hereby established, within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council set up after the meeting between the two Heads of Government on 6 November 1981, an Intergovernmental Conference (hereinafter referred to as "the Conference"), concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations between the two parts of the island of Ireland, to deal, as set out in this Agreement, on a regular basis with

(i) political matters;

(ii) security and related matters;

(iii) legal matters, including the administration of justice;

(iv) the promotion of cross-border co-operation.

(b) The United Kingdom Government accept that the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland within the field of activity of the Conference in so far as those matters are not the responsibility of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland. In the interest of promoting peace and stability, determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to resolve any differences. The Conference will be mainly concerned with Northern Ireland; but some of the matters under consideration will involve co-operative action in both parts of the island of Ireland, and possibly also in Great Britain. Some of the proposals considered in respect of

Northern Ireland may also be found to have application by the Irish Government. There is no derogation from the sovereignty of either the United Kingdom Government or the Irish Government, and each retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 3

The Conference shall meet at Ministerial or official level, as required. The business of the Conference will thus receive attention at the highest level. Regular and frequent Ministerial meetings shall be held; and in particular special meetings shall be convened at the request of either side. Officials may meet in subordinate groups. Membership of the Conference and of sub-groups shall be small and flexible. When the Conference meets at Ministerial level the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and an Irish Minister designated as the Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative shall be joint Chairmen. Within the framework of the Conference other British and Irish Ministers may hold or attend meetings as appropriate: when legal matters are under consideration the Attorneys General may attend. Ministers may be accompanied by their officials and their professional advisers: for example, when questions of security policy or security co-operation are being discussed, they may be accompanied by the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Commissioner of the Garda Siochana; or when questions of economic or social policy or co-operation are being discussed, they may be accompanied by officials of the relevant Departments. A Secretariat shall be established by the two Governments to service the Conference on a continuing basis in the discharge of its functions as set out in this Agreement.





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ARTICLE 4

(a) In relation to matters coming within its field of activity, the Conference shall be a framework within which the United Kingdom Government and the Irish Government work together

(i) for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions which exist in Northern Ireland; and

(ii) for peace, stability and prosperity throughout the island of Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights, co-operation against terrorism and the development of economic, social and cultural co-operation.

(b) It is the declared policy of the United Kingdom Government that responsibility in respect of certain matters within the powers of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should be devolved within Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community. The Irish Government support that policy.

(c) Both Governments recognise that devolution can be achieved only with the co-operation of constitutional representatives within Northern Ireland of both traditions there. The Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals on the modalities of bringing about devolution in Northern Ireland, in so far as they relate to the interests of the minority community.

C

POLITICAL MATTERS

ARTICLE 5

(a) The Conference shall concern itself with measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland, to protect human rights and to prevent discrimination. Matters to be considered in this area include measures to foster the cultural heritage of both traditions, changes in electoral arrangements, the use of flags and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social discrimination and the advantages and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights in some form in Northern Ireland.

(b) The discussion of these matters shall be mainly concerned with Northern Ireland, but the possible application of any measures pursuant to this Article by the Irish Government in their jurisdiction shall not be excluded.

(c) If it should prove impossible to achieve and sustain devolution on a basis which secures widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland, the Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government may, where the interests of the minority community are significantly or especially affected, put forward views on proposals for major legislation and on major policy issues, which are within the purview of the Northern Ireland Departments and which remain the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

ARTICLE 6

The Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals on the role and composition of bodies appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or by Departments subject to his direction and control including

the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights;

the Fair Employment Agency;

the Equal Opportunities Commission;

the Police Authority for Northern Ireland;

the Police Complaints Board.

D

## SECURITY AND RELATED MATTERS

### ARTICLE 7

(a) The Conference shall consider

(i) security policy;

(ii) relations between the security forces and the community;

(iii) prisons policy.

(b) The Conference shall consider the security situation at its regular meetings and thus provide an opportunity to address policy issues, serious incidents and forthcoming events.

(c) The two Governments agree that there is a need for a programme of special measures in Northern Ireland to improve relations between the security forces and the community, with the object in particular of making the security forces more readily accepted by the nationalist community. Such a programme shall be developed, for the Conference's consideration, and may include the establishment of local consultative machinery, training in community relations, crime prevention schemes involving the community, improvements in arrangements for handling complaints, and action to increase the proportion of members of the minority in the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Elements of the programme may be considered by the Irish Government suitable for application within their jurisdiction.

(d) The Conference may consider policy issues relating to prisons. Individual cases may be raised as appropriate, so that information can be provided or inquiries instituted.





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## LEGAL MATTERS, INCLUDING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

### ARTICLE 8

The Conference shall deal with issues of concern to both countries relating to the enforcement of the criminal law. In particular it shall consider whether there are areas of the criminal law applying in the North and in the South respectively which might with benefit be harmonised. The two Governments agree on the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice. The Conference shall seek, with the help of advice from experts as appropriate, measures which would give substantial expression to this aim, considering inter alia the possibility of mixed courts in both jurisdictions for the trial of certain offences. The Conference shall also be concerned with policy aspects of extradition and extra-territorial jurisdiction as between North and South.

F

## CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION ON SECURITY, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL MATTERS

### ARTICLE 9

(a) With a view to enhancing cross-border co-operation on security matters, the Conference shall set in hand a programme of work to be undertaken by the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Commissioner of the Garda Siochana and, where appropriate, groups of officials, in such areas as threat assessments, exchange of information, liaison structures, technical co-operation, training of personnel, and operational resources.

(b) The Conference shall have no operational responsibilities; responsibility for police operations shall remain with the heads of the respective police forces, the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary maintaining his links with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Commissioner of the Garda Siochana his links with the Minister for Justice.

ARTICLE 10

(a) The two Governments shall co-operate to promote the economic and social development of those areas of both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely from the consequences of the instability of recent years, and shall consider the possibility of securing international support for this work.

(b) If it should prove impossible to achieve and sustain devolution on a basis which secures widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland, the Conference shall be a framework for the promotion of co-operation between the two parts of Ireland concerning cross-border aspects of economic, social and cultural matters in relation to which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland continues to exercise authority.

(c) If responsibility is devolved in respect of certain matters in the economic, social or cultural areas currently within the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, machinery will need to be established by the responsible authorities in the North and South for practical co-operation in respect of cross-border aspects of these issues.

G

## ARRANGEMENTS FOR REVIEW

### ARTICLE 11

At the end of three years from signature of this Agreement, or earlier if requested by either Government, the working of the Conference shall be reviewed by the two Governments to see whether any changes in the scope and nature of its activities are desirable.





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H

INTERPARLIAMENTARY RELATIONS

ARTICLE 12

It will be for Parliamentary decision in Westminster and in Dublin whether to establish an Anglo-Irish Parliamentary body of the kind adumbrated in the Anglo-Irish Studies Report of November 1981. The two Governments agree that they would give support as appropriate to such a body, if it were to be established.

I

FINAL CLAUSES

ARTICLE 13

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the two Governments exchange notifications of their acceptance of this Agreement.





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In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

Done in two originals at on the day of November 1985

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

For the Government of the Republic of Ireland





NOIABE

Anglo-Irish Summit Meeting

Joint Communiqué

1. The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher FRS MP, and the Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald TD, met at on . It was the third meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council to be held at the level of Heads of Government.

2. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP, and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Rt Hon Tom King MP. The Taoiseach was accompanied by the Tanaiste, Mr Dick Spring TD, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Peter Barry TD.

3. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach signed a formal and binding Agreement between their two Governments, which will enter into force as soon as each Government has notified the other of acceptance. The Agreement has the aims of promoting peace and stability in Northern Ireland; helping to reconcile the two major traditions in Ireland; creating a new climate of friendship and co-operation between the people of the two countries; and improving co-operation in combatting terrorism.

4. The Agreement deals in particular with the status of Northern Ireland and the establishment of an Intergovernmental Conference in which the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals concerning stated aspects of Northern Ireland affairs; in which the promotion of cross-border co-operation will be discussed; and in which determined efforts will be made to resolve any differences between the two Governments.

5. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach committed themselves to implementing and sustaining the measures set out in the Agreement

with determination and imagination and undertook to encourage people of both the unionist and nationalist traditions in Ireland to make new efforts to understand and respect each other's concerns with a view to promoting reconciliation.

6. The exchange of notifications of acceptance will not be completed until the Agreement has been approved by the British Parliament and by Dail Eireann. The two Governments intend that action to implement the provisions of the Agreement should begin once the exchange of notifications has been completed. The first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference will take place as soon as possible thereafter. The British side will be led by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Irish side by the Minister designated as the Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative.

7. The two Governments envisage that the meetings and agenda of the Conference will not normally be announced. But they wish it to be known that, at its first meeting, the Conference will consider its future programme of work in all the fields - political, security, legal, economic, social and cultural - assigned to it under the Agreement. It will concentrate at its initial meetings on:

- relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland;

- ways of enhancing security co-operation between the two Governments; and

- seeking measures which would give substantial expression to the aim of underlining the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice.

In the interests of all the people of Northern Ireland the two sides are committed to work for early progress in these matters. Against this background, the Taoiseach said that it was the intention of his Government to accede as soon as possible to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

8. In addressing the improvement of relations between the security forces and the minority community, the Conference at its first meeting will consider:

a. the application of the principle that the Armed Forces (which include the Ulster Defence Regiment) operate only in support of the civil power, with the particular objective of ensuring as rapidly as possible that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, there is a police presence in all operations which involve direct contact with the community;

b. ways of underlining the policy of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and of the Armed Forces in Northern Ireland that they discharge their duties even-handedly and with equal respect for the unionist and nationalist identities and traditions.

9. In its discussion of the enhancement of cross-border co-operation on security, the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference will give particular attention to the importance of continuing and enhanced co-operation, as envisaged in Article 9(a) of the Agreement, in the policing of border areas.

10. In addition to concluding the new Agreement, the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach reviewed the wide range of work being done under the auspices of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council to develop further the unique relationship between the two countries. The fact that in the past year there have been more than twenty meetings between Ministers of the two

Governments demonstrates the closeness of co-operation. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach decided that this work should be actively continued, in the interests of friendship between all the people of both countries.

11. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed to meet again at an appropriate time to take stock of the development of relations between the two countries and of the implementation of the Agreement which they have signed.



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# Summary of the Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985

## Joint Press Release

(Note: This summary has no legal status)

1. The Agreement begins with a preamble incorporating a joint statement of objectives.

## The Status of Northern Ireland

2. The two Governments affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland; recognise that the present wish of a majority there is for no change in that status; and declare that, if in the future a majority there clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, the two Governments will introduce and support legislation in the respective Parliaments to give effect to this. (Article 1)

## Framework and Objectives of the Intergovernmental Conference

3. The Agreement establishes, within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council, an Intergovernmental Conference concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations between the two parts of the island of Ireland which, subject to the terms of the Agreement, will deal on a regular basis with:

- political matters;

- security and related matters;

- legal matters, including the administration of justice;





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- the promotion of cross-border co-operation. (Article 2(a))

The Agreement provides for a review of the working of the Conference after three years, or earlier if either side desires. (Article 11)

4. The Conference will proceed on the basis that:

- the United Kingdom Government accept that the Irish Government will put forward within the Conference views and proposals on certain matters relating to Northern Ireland as provided for in the Agreement;

- in the interest of promoting peace and stability, determined efforts will be made in the Conference to resolve any differences;

- there will be no derogation from the sovereignty of either Government, and each retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction. (Article 2(b))

5. The Conference will be a framework within which the two Governments work together for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland and for peace, stability and prosperity throughout Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights, co-operation against terrorism and the development of economic, social and cultural co-operation. (Article 4(a))

Procedures and Membership of the Intergovernmental Conference

6. There will be regular and frequent meetings of the Conference at Ministerial level as well as meetings at official level, and special meetings may be convened at the request of

either side. The joint Chairmen at Ministerial level will be on the Irish side a Minister designated as the Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative and on the United Kingdom side the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Other Ministers and advisers will participate as appropriate. There will be a Secretariat to service the Conference on a continuing basis. (Article 3)

7. The Irish Government declare their support for the United Kingdom Government's policy of seeking devolution in Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community. (Article 4(b)). The Conference will be a framework in which the Irish Government can put forward views and proposals on the modalities of devolution, in so far as they relate to the interests of the minority community. (Article 4(c)). Should a devolved administration be established, the devolved matters would not be for consideration by the Conference. (Article 2)

Political Matters

8. The Conference will concern itself with measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of both traditions in Northern Ireland in such areas as cultural heritage, electoral arrangements, use of flags and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social discrimination and the advantages and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. (Article 5(a))

9. Should it prove impossible to achieve and sustain devolution, proposals for major legislation and major policy issues where the interests of the minority community are significantly or especially affected and which come within the administrative responsibility of the Northern Ireland Departments will be for consideration by the Conference. (Article 5(c))

10. The Conference will be a framework within which the Irish Government may put forward views on the role and composition of bodies appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or his Departments. (Article 6)

Security and Related Matters within Northern Ireland

11. The Conference will consider security policy issues as well as serious incidents and forthcoming events. A programme of action will be developed with the particular object of improving the relations between the security forces and the nationalist community. Elements of the programme may be considered by the Irish Government for application in the South. The Conference may also consider policy issues relating to prisons, and individual cases may be raised. (Article 7)

Legal Matters including the Administration of Justice

12. Both Governments recognise the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice. The Conference will seek measures that would give substantial expression to this aim, considering among other things the possibility of mixed courts in both jurisdictions for the trial of certain offences. The Conference will also consider whether there are areas of the criminal law in both jurisdictions which might with benefit be harmonised and will be concerned with policy aspects of extradition and extra-territorial jurisdiction as between North and South.
(Article 8)

Cross-border Co-operation on Security, Economic, Social and Cultural Matters

13. The Conference will set in hand a programme of work to be undertaken by the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Commissioner of the Garda Siochana with a

view to enhancing co-operation between the security forces of the two Governments in such areas as threat assessments, exchange of information, liaison structures, technical co-operation, training of personnel and operational resources. The Conference will have no operational responsibilities. (Article 9)

14. The two Governments undertake to co-operate to promote the economic and social development of those areas in both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely as a result of the instability of recent years. The two Governments will consider the possibility of securing international support for this work. (Article 10(a))

15. The Conference will, in the absence of devolution, be the framework for the promotion of cross-border economic, social and cultural co-operation. In the event of devolution, machinery would be needed to deal with co-operation in respect of cross-border aspects of devolved matters. (Article 10(b) and (c))

Interparliamentary Body

16. The two Governments agree that they would give appropriate support to any Anglo-Irish Interparliamentary body established by the two Parliaments. (Article 12)

PART I: THE MORE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. By giving the Irish Government a role in relation to Northern Irish affairs, surely the agreement infringes sovereignty?

Answer No. There is no derogation from sovereignty and the agreement makes this clear.

2. (Also for the Taoiseach) So is the Irish role merely "consultative?"

Answer The Intergovernmental Conference will be a unique mechanism. There is no single word to describe its role. It will not have executive functions: Article 2(b) of the agreement makes clear that there will be no derogation from sovereignty and that each Government retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its jurisdiction.

But the Conference will be more than just consultative in that the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on its own initiative (as well as being invited to do so); there is an obligation on both sides in the Conference to make determined efforts to resolve any differences; and one of the Conference's functions will be to promote cross-border co-operation between North and South in Ireland.

Note: It is accepted by both sides that the words "consultative" or "consultation" should not be used to describe the agreement.

3. So the Irish will after all share in decision-making ?

Answer As Article 2(b) of the agreement makes clear, each Government retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction. On matters covered by



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the agreement, however, the British Government in reaching its decisions will take full account of any views and proposals put forward by the Irish side, and also of the obligation on both sides to make determined efforts to resolve any differences.

4. (Also for the Taoiseach) What happens when differences cannot be resolved in the Intergovernmental Conference?

Answer Article 2(b) makes it clear that each Government retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction. But a key point of the agreement is that we are both committing ourselves to determined efforts to resolve differences. Moreover the agreement reflects the careful consideration that the two Governments have given to minimising differences: it envisages for example a variety of levels at which matters can be considered and also provides for the convening of special meetings up to Ministerial level when required by either side.

5. In November 1984 in the communiqué issued after their Summit the Prime Minister and Taoiseach agreed "that the identities of both the majority and minority communities in Northern Ireland should be recognised and respected, and reflected in the structures and processes of Northern Ireland in ways acceptable to both communities". How will the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach test the the acceptability of the agreement to unionist community?

Answer The identity of the majority community is already recognised and respected, in the way the majority desire, by virtue of Northern Ireland being and remaining part of the United Kingdom. Article 1 of the agreement confirms that position. This agreement also provides means for the expression of the

identity of the minority. The agreement thus furthers the aim of making the structures and processes in Northern Ireland acceptable to both communities.

The elected representatives of the people of the United Kingdom as a whole will have the opportunity to express their views when Parliament debates the agreement shortly.

6. Is the agreement not the first step on the slippery slope to Irish unity?

Answer No. The agreement commits the Irish Government to acknowledging the rights and identity of unionists. It commit the two Governments to the view that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would* only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland; and that the present wish of a majority is for no change. This is the most formal commitment to the principle of consent made by an Irish Government, and should provide reassurance to unionists.

[Note: *The agreement says "would" not "could".]

7. The agreement establishes special channels for conveying the nationalist minority's views to the British Government. Why i nothing comparable proposed for the unionist majority?

Answer The question is not comparing like with like. The unique arrangement we have made with the Irish Government reflects th position of a minority which looks to Dublin to express its aspirations. The unionists by definition identify with the United Kingdom; they have, and will continue to have, ready means of access to the British Government, including unionist Members of Parliament in Westminster; and the Government pays close attention to their views.



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8. Why has Her Majesty's Government failed to secure the abolition of Article 2 of the Irish Constitution?

Answer Questions about the Irish Constitution should be put to the Irish Government. The agreement is the outcome of a thorough process of negotiation in which each side to had to take account of the constraints on the other. What is significant is that Article 1 formally commits the Irish Government, like the British Government, to the position that the status of Northern Ireland will remain as it is so long as a majority there so wishes.

9. This agreement seems to have something for everybody in Ireland except Ulster Unionists. Are there any concessions at all to fundamental unionist concerns in this agreement?

Answer The agreement is designed to promote peace and stability, to the benefit of all of the people in North and South. There is also much in it which should be especial value to unionists. For instance, Article 1 confirming the status of Northern Ireland; the intensified security co-operation provided for in the agreement and already beginning to take place; and the Irish Government's acceptance of the validity of the unionist tradition in Ireland. [The Taoiseach has also stated his Government's intention to accede to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism].

10. Twelve years ago, the loyalists in Northern Ireland defeated a Anglo-Irish agreement based on power-sharing and a Council for Ireland. Won't they do the same this time?

Answer I believe that the great majority in Northern Ireland have a deep longing for peace. The Government have made a decision that action is necessary to support the democratic process in Northern Irealnd and that it would be damaging and even dangerous to do nothing. Indeed, the two major unionist

parties recognise in their policy documents that it is necessary to take action to accommodate the nationalist tradition. This agreement tries to accommodate both traditions. I am determined that it should work, and work to the benefit of all.

11. The clear implication of this agreement is that the RUC has failed to discharge its duties fairly and even-handedly in the past. Are you not, therefore, accepting nationalist criticisms as valid?

Answer We have always had full confidence in the RUC and all the security forces. I hope that following the agreement the minority community will increasingly share that confidence.

12. The UDR are a particular reassurance to unionists in a minority position in border areas. Will you guarantee that the role of the UDR as a bulwark against IRA assassins be maintained in these areas?

Answer The UDR will not be disbanded. They are brave and dedicated people who have a major role in providing security in Northern Ireland. I recognise that there are difficulties in the Regiment's relations with the minority the community. The Government keep the role of security forces including the UDR under review in the light of community relations as well as operational needs. Improvements will continue to be made.

13. What guarantees have you got from Dr FitzGerald that the South will cease to provide a haven for IRA fugitive terrorists?

Answer No doubt there are fugitive terrorists in the South, as in the North. On both sides of the border strenuous efforts are made to catch them. One of the main purposes of the agreement will be to enhance the co-operation against terrorism which already takes place between North and South. Article 8 of the

agreement foresees further consideration by the two Government in the Intergovernmental Conference of the question of fugitive offenders. [Moreover, the Taoiseach has announced his Government's intention to accede to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.]

14. What proposals does the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland have for encouraging a return to devolved government in Northern Ireland?

Answer The Government remain committed to a return to devolved government in Northern Ireland as the best basis for political stability. We will do all we can to identify a scheme of administration acceptable to both sides of the community. We hope that the political parties in Northern Ireland will respond constructively to the opportunities this agreement offers, and will help to work out satisfactory proposals for a newly devolved administration.

15. Do you still reject the Forum Report?

Answer The British Government welcomed many positive elements in the Forum Report. We welcomed such principles as the clear acceptance that political change requires consent, the commitment to the politics of peaceful persuasion, and unqualified opposition to violence and those who support violence. We welcomed the recognition and respect which the Report gave, on the part of nationalists, to the distinctive identity of Northern Ireland unionists including their loyalty to the United Kingdom.

(If pressed again on the "three illustrative models"): I have already said that I welcome many of the innovative features of the Report. But I do not think anyone would expect the Britis Government to endorse it in its entirety.



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16. The agreement falls far short of the options in the New Ireland Forum Report

Answer Let us concentrate on what the two Governments have agreed. The agreement represents the outcome of prolonged and serious negotiations. The arrangements it embodies are unique, reflecting both the closeness of the Anglo-Irish relationship and the special problems of Northern Ireland. The New Ireland Forum's meetings and reports helped to create the climate in which these negotiations became possible. The new agreement accords with the spirit of conciliation which characterised much of the Forum Report.

PART II: Other Questions

1. Question to the Prime Minister — Is this agreement not meaningless?

Answer — No single agreement is going to resolve the problems of Northern Ireland. This one is a useful step forward. It promotes the development of closer and more systematic co-operation between the British and Irish Governments without affecting the position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. The agreement is also a useful step on the road to reconciliation between the two communities in Northern Ireland.

The essence of the agreement is in two elements. It incorporates formal Irish recognition that the status of Northern Ireland will remain as it is so long as a majority of the people there so wish, and that the present wish of a majority is for no change. It also incorporates formal British recognition that the Irish Government may advance views and proposals on aspects of Northern Ireland affairs and commits both Governments to make determined efforts to resolve any differences between them.

2. Question to the Taoiseach — This is all promises. It is full of commitments "to study" and "to consider" etc but it is short of actual concrete measures to end alienation. After months of build-up to this Summit aren't the results really an anti-climax?

Answer — No. This agreement marks a new stage in the development of the Anglo-Irish dialogue, giving the Irish Government for the first time a formal role in relation to Northern Ireland, involving systematic arrangements for resolving



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differences on the problems of Northern Ireland and a new level of co-operation between North and South. It will make a real difference to nationalists in Northern Ireland by providing new means for the expression of their identity and giving new scope for the expression of their aspirations. It would be selfish and irresponsible of us to withhold the progress involved here for the minority in Northern Ireland, merely for the sake of ideological concerns.

As to alienation, the problems of nationalists in Northern Ireland have been focussed on politics, security, human rights and the law. All of these problem areas have been provided for in this agreement, and of course the very first meeting of the Conference will address all of these areas, notably the especially difficult area of relations between the minority community and the security forces, on which progress is already taking place.

Obviously this agreement cannot resolve all the problems of Northern Ireland. But the agreement is an important stage in the search for peace and stability. What it does is to provide within a new context the basic legal and institutional machinery through which the two Governments can fulfil their commitment of November 1984 to work together for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland. The new arrangements established today are, so far as I know, unique. This reflects the special nature of the Northern Ireland problem.

3. Question to the Taoiseach

<u>Can you really say that this agreement is based on the Forum Report? Does it not fall substantially short of joint authority, the least of the options proposed by the Forum</u>?

Answer

The Irish side throughout these negotiations based their approach on the Forum Report. The necessary elements for progress proposed in Chapter 5, paragraph 2 of the Forum Report are all accommodated in today's agreement. I believe above all that they are reflected in the commitment of the two Governments to work together for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland on the basis of the new arrangements and the shared priorities established by this agreement. You will recall, moreover, that the Forum Report indicated the openness of the participants to discuss all other views which would contribute to political development, ie views other than the three particular options set out in the Report. The purpose of any negotiation is to reach an accommodation of views and the British and Irish Governments have achieved that in this agreement.

4. Question to the Prime Minister

Is the Agreement not setting Northern Ireland apart from the rest of the United Kingdom by giving another country a part in government there?

Answer

There is a unique situation in Northern Ireland because of the division within the community. The agreement reaffirms the present status of Northern Ireland and makes clear that Her Majesty's Government remain responsible for the decisions and administration of government there.

5. Question to the Prime Minister

The agreement says in Article 2(b) that "Determined efforts shall be made through the Committee to resolve any differences". In the context, these are difference relating to views and proposals which the Irish Government have put forward on matters relating to Northern Ireland. What does this provision mean?

Answer

Let me start by emphasising the desire of both Governments to implement the agreement in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill. That being so, we are not starting off in the belief that we shall continually confront differences; the whole point of meeting together will be to find common ground, bearing in mind that the sentence you quote speaks of serving "the interest of promoting peace and stability". But if there are differences, both sides will work hard to resolve them, recognising that each Government retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its jurisdiction.

6. Question to the Taoiseach

Will you now hold a referendum on Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution?

Answer

The changing of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution is not a part of this arrangement. I would again draw your attention to Article 1 of this agreement. That provision involves a formal, solemn and joint reaffirmation by the two Governments of the principle of consent. It will be perfectly obvious that the overwhelming majority of Irish nationalists determinedly reject the use of force or threat of force in seeking to realise the aspiration of Irish unity. This was a basic principle of the Forum Report and a point strongly emphasised at the time. This agreement puts the principle of consent beyond question and therefore gives a clear reassurance to unionists.

7. Question to the Taoiseach

Is this agreement the first step on the road to British disengagement and a united Ireland?

Answer

Article 1 explains that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland. It also recognises

that consent does not at present exist. If in the future a majority wished for and formally consented to a united Ireland, the two Governments would introduce and support legislation in the respective Parliaments to give effect to this.

8. Question to the Taoiseach

Doesn't the agreement maintain all the ambiguities in the Irish nationalist approach to Northern Ireland. Haven't you and Mrs Thatcher simply agreed to differ on this point so that there is no real concession to unionist concerns?

Answer

This agreement involves a formal, solemn and joint reaffirmation by the two Governments of the principle of consent. That is something new - something special - and something which I am sure unionists will welcome. That principle is now clearly beyond question.

Furthermore the agreement makes clear the rejection by both Governments of any attempt to promote political objectives by violence or the threat of violence: this is a concern basic to constitutional nationalism in Ireland and it was a concern highlighted in the Report of the New Ireland Forum.

What both sides must do, and this is also explicitly recognised in the agreement, is to continue their efforts to reconcile and to acknowledge the rights of the two major traditions that exist in Ireland. For our part we have made it clear that we have no designs on the rights of unionists. We accept and acknowledge their Britishness. While we shall by dialogue seek to persuade, we respect and will respect their reasons for opposing Irish unity.

Perhaps most important of all, this agreement offers both communities in Northern Ireland a new opportunity to rebuild society - free from the tensions, the turmoil and animosities of the past - and to participate fully in the structures of government. I believe that unionists, no less than nationalists, fervently seek in Northern Ireland just such an opportunity.

9. Question to the Prime Minister

Is the concession of a major role for Dublin not an admission of the failure of British and unionist policy in Northern Ireland over the past sixty years?

Answer

No. I am concerned with the future, not the past. The agreement shows that the two Governments are determined to work together in seeking peace and reconciliation in Ireland.

10. Question to the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister

The agreement represents a betrayal of the nationalist cause and the abandonment of the goal of unity.

Answer

This is more a question for the Irish Government. But as the agreement makes clear, if at any time in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland formally consent to unity, then the two Governments will take the necessary steps to bring it about.
[Additional points for the Taoiseach: This means that other considerations would not constitute obstacles to Irish unity if the principle of consent was satisfied. There is no abandonment of the aspiration to Irish unity, to be achieved peacefully and by democratic means.]

11. Question to the Taiseach — The Preamble speaks about diminishing the divisions in Northern Ireland? Isn't the real division the division of Ireland? What does this agreement do to end partition?

Answer — It is not the division of the territory of Ireland in my view which is the fundamental problem. Unity cannot be achieved and partition ended by erasing a line on a map. The basic division which we face is that arising from the competing identities and conflicting loyalties of nationalists and unionists in Ireland. That means that we can only proceed through persuasion and agreement as the Forum Report emphasises.

The immediate priority must be to improve conditions on the ground for the nationalist minority in Northern Ireland; this has been a fundamental concern of my Government and it is a concern which is overriding in this agreement.

It is very important to note that this is the first formal agreement in which the British Government commits itself to introduce and support legislation to give effect to their desire for Irish unity, if a majority of the people of Northern Ireland should formally consent to this.

12. Question to the Taoiseach — Is this not yet another effort to make Northern Ireland work on the basis of a purely internal solution?

Answer — No. This agreement gives the Irish Government for the first time an important role in relation to Northern Ireland. In the agreement, the British Government accepts that the Irish Government will put forward within the new Conference views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland and, in the interest of

peace and stability, undertakes with us to make determined efforts to resolve differences. By providing these practical arrangements through which the two Governments can work together for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions, the agreement acknowledges the obvious reality that the Irish Government is involved in efforts to promote peace and stability in Northern Ireland.

13. Question to the Taoiseach — The Leader of the Opposition in Dublin has called Northern Ireland a failed political entity. Is this agreement not propping up this failed political entity?

Answer — So far as I am concerned we are talking about new political structures in Ireland; measures which accommodate the identity of Northern nationalists; measures which provide for the first time an important role for the Irish Government in the affairs of Northern Ireland; measures which put unionists and nationalists on an equal footing. I am interested in working for peace and stability. I am not interested in the question of whether Northern Ireland has or has not been a failure. So far as I am concerned these arrangements meet the requirement of the Forum. They transcend the context of Northern Ireland. They will benefit people in both North and South.

14. Question to the Taoiseach — Why should the rights of unionists be placed on a par with those of nationalists given that nationalists represent the overwhelming majority of the people of the island of Ireland?

Answer — My immediate concern is to ensure that the rights of the nationalist minority in Northern Ireland are respected; this is an essential feature of the agreement and of the Chequers Communiqué of last year. Article 1

reiterates the principle of consent in relation to unity. In this we have acknowledged a fundamental political reality; unity - true unity between all the people of Ireland - cannot be achieved by force, or coercion or subjection. Each of the two traditions must acknowledge and accommodate the concerns and the rights of the other; were the Irish nationalist tradition to seek supremacy or domination over unionists, the result would be even greater division and turmoil in Ireland.

15. Question to the Taoiseach — Some of the proposals under consideration by the Conference may have application in the Republic. What does this mean?

Answer — It simply means that certain measures taken in Northern Ireland - eg those designed to improve relations betwee local communities and the police force - may be found t have relevance and value outside the strict context of Northern Ireland. They might for example, be seen to b of value in the South and indeed in Britain and be applied, as the case may be, in either jurisdiction.

16. Question to the Prime Minister — How will the agreement improve the human rights situation in Northern Ireland?

Answer — The Government has introduced many major improvements i recent years to ensure that human rights in Northern Ireland are protected as effectively as possible. The answer to your question is in the agreement. Article 5 in particular provides that the Conference will discuss measures in this field.

17. Question to the Prime Minister — Do you now propose to introduce legislation:

a. giving the vote at local elections to Irish citizens resident in Northern Ireland;

b. permitting the use of Irish as an official language;

c. enabling the Irish tricolour to be flown from City Hall, Belfast and other public buildings in Northern Ireland?

Answer — All these matters are among those for consideration by the Conference. I should not anticipate that discussion.

18. Question to the Prime Minister — The agreement means that the Irish Government will be able to interfere with the work of the security forces in Northern Ireland. This will greatly undermine their morale and efficiency.

Answer — There is no question of interference, and the Intergovernmental Conference will have no operational responsibilities. It will be to everyone's advantage to establish a systematic means of taking account of the Irish Government's views about security matters. I very much hope that this will reassure the minority community. The co-operation foreseen in the agreement will not be all one way. The agreement will intensify security co-operation between the authorities in both parts of Ireland and this should be greatly welcomed by all who wish to defeat terrorism.

19. Question to the Prime Minister — Are you not in Article 6 giving Dublin a right of veto on matters fundamentally affecting the security and well-being of the people of Ulster?

Answer — No. As Article 6 makes clear, the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals on the role and composition of various bodies appointed by the Secretary

of State for Northern Ireland and his Departments. It does not give the Irish Government a veto but every effort will be made by both sides to resolve any differences which may emerge.

20. Question to the Taoiseach — What concrete commitments have you got in relation to changes in RUC policy, practice and structure? What concrete changes do you believe are necessary to ensure minority confidence in the RUC?

Answer — This agreement (Art 7) indicates that the Conference will address matters relating to RUC policy issues as well as serious security incidents and forthcoming events. This would include, for example, parades and processions.

The two Governments see the need for a programme of special measures to improve relations between the security forces and the nationalist people. The Conference will also consider the composition and role of the Police Authority. The first meeting of the Conference will consider measures which would underline respect for the rights and identity of nationalists as well as unionists on the part of the police.

21. Question to the Taoiseach — In the context of this agreement, would you be free to criticise the RUC as you have done in the past or would you not be obliged to bear some of the blame in the event of another tragedy?

Answer — The commitment of the Irish Government and of the British Government is to make this Agreement work in relation to all matters within its scope and that very much includes the police.



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22. Question to the Prime Minister — Are the SDLP now expected to support the RUC and to encourage Catholics to join the force?

Answer — Everyone should support the security forces. It has long been the wish of HMG to see more members of the minority community joining the RUC. We hope, following the agreement, that this will happen more and that the SDLP will feel able to encourage Roman Catholics to join.

23. Question to the Taoiseach — What concrete commitments have you got on the disbandment of the UDR? Is the regiment going to be phased out?

Answer — The UDR is a major concern to us and to the nationalist community in Northern Ireland, who have often seen it more as a focus of division than of harmony between themselves and the unionists. At the same time, it has considerable importance to unionists, particularly in isolated rural areas. I recognise that there are many honourable men and women in the UDR and I condemn without reservation the campaign of murder against them. Changes have already begun in relation to the UDR's contact with the public, which is where the main problems have arisen. The first meeting of the Conference will review progress. In particular it will consider the application of the principle that the UDR operate only in support of the civil power, with the particular objective of ensuring as rapidly as possible that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, there is a police presence in all operations which involve direct contact with the community. The Conference will furthermore consider ways of underlining the policy that the UDR discharge their duties evenhandedly and with equal respect for the unionist and nationalist identities and traditions.

24. Question to the Prime Minister — Will you now move towards a general amnesty in Northern Ireland? Will prisoners with indeterminate sentences now be given a definite date for release?

Answer — Those possibilities do not arise from the agreement itself. Any question of speeding up release from indeterminate sentences, if the agreement led to a real reduction in violence, would be for the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

25. Question to the Prime Minister — Why are mixed courts highlighted in the agreement?

Answer — Other ideas, such as extradition and the harmonisation of the criminal law, are also mentioned in the same Article of the agreement.

26. Question to the Taoiseach — Do you contemplate new legislation to facilitate extradition of IRA offenders? Will you accede to the European Convention?

Answer — I have said that it is the Irish Government's intention to accede as soon as possible to the European Convention. The communiqué has committed the two sides to work for early progress in relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland, ways of improving security co-operation between the two Governments and seeking measures which would give substantial expression to the aim of underlining the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice. It is against this background that the Irish Government has announced its intention to accede as soon as possible to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

27. Question to the Prime Minister — Will the agreement not encourage the Provisional IRA in their murderous campaign?

Answer — One of the main effects of the agreement will be that the British and Irish Governments will strengthen their co-operation in the fight against the men of violence. [The Provisionals have already denounced the agreement, which hardly suggests that they feel encouraged by it.]

28. Question to the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach — Will you now accept that the electoral success of Sinn Fein and the PIRA's campaign of violence including attacks on British cities, have brought both of you together in this agreement today. Is this not confirmation of the success of the ballot box/armalite strategy?

Answer — Absolutely not. This agreement is a rejection of terrorism. We are seeking to build up hope for the future, where the IRA have sought only to destroy. We are seeking peace and reconciliation, where the IRA have brought only strife, turmoil and tragedy. This agreement will reinforce the position of all who seek peace and stability by constitutional means.

29, Question to the Prime Minister — Where will the Secretariat be located and how will it be staffed?

Answer — The Secretariat will be very small. Its function will be to service the Intergovernmental Conference which will [normally] meet in Belfast, and to act between meetings as a channel of communication. [The Secretariat will be located in Belfast.]

[Note: this answer is subject to the outcome of continuing negotiation with the Irish.]



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30. Question to the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach — Will the permanent Irish Ministerial representative have direct contact with the nationalist community in Northern Ireland?

Answer — The role of the Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative will be to implement the agreement on behalf of the Irish Government, as joint chairman of the Conference. This will not alter the Irish Government's freedom to maintain contact with people in Northern Ireland.

31. Question to the Taoiseach — There are four vacancies still outstanding on the Police Authority? Are these to be your nominations? Is this marginal number of vacancies which has been set aside for your views an indication of what consultation will mean in practice?

Answer — The Irish Government will be putting forward views in relation to all present vacancies on the Police Authority for Northern Ireland as well as in relation t any vacancies which may arise in future. The precise number of vacancies which may happen to exist at the present time is less important than the Agreement's recognition that the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals on the role and composition of this body and that there is an obligation on the two sides t make determined efforts to resolve any differences in the interest of peace and stability.

32. Question to the Taoiseach — You have a say in appointments to a number of bodies in Northern Ireland. Are Northern nationalists now expected to co-operate with these bodies as they are currently structured and to accept their legitimacy?

Answer — In presenting views on appointments and other matters relating to these bodies, the Irish Government will

naturally be taking account of nationalist concerns and priorities. But my objective will be to ensure that all of these bodies adequately reflect the concerns of the entire community.

33. Question to the Prime Minister — Do you expect the SDLP to support this agreement and to participate more in the political life of Northern Ireland?

Answer — We hope that the nationalist community as a whole will see this agreement as evidence that progress can be made by constitutional means.

34. Question to the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach — Do you now expect the SDLP to enter the Assembly?

The agreement makes it clear that both Governments support a policy of devolution which would command widespread acceptance throughout Northern Ireland. The question of whether the SDLP should enter this or any future Assembly is a matter for that party to decide.

35. Question to the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach — The reports that the United States Government will offer a large sum for expenditure in Ireland suggest that Her Majesty's Government entered into the agreement in order to obtain US financial support.

Answer — The agreement has been concluded on its merits. We naturally hope that friendly states, including the United States, will welcome it.

[N.B. Article 10(a) says that the two Governments will consider the possibility of securing international support for the promotion of economic and social development in Ireland. It is preferable not to be drawn on the meaning of this until US offers of money have been made.]

36. Question to the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach — Is it part of the package that the Irish Republic will modify its policy of neutrality?

Answer — No.

NB: The next two questions would arise after a United States announcement

37. Question to the Taoiseach — Will contributions from America (and Europe) be matched by a contribution from the Dail?

Answer — Any funds made available by the United States and the member states of the European Community are intended to be specifically international expressions of support for the work of promoting reconstruction and reconciliation in Ireland. This is separate from the efforts of the Irish and British Governments, so that the question of my Government contributing to the Fund, as such, does not arise.

38. Question to the Prime Minister — Why is the British Government not contributing to the Fund when the United States Government is offering $.... million?

Answer — The British Government already makes a massive annual contribution to the Province which is now running at around £1.5 billion per annum.

39. Question to the Taoiseach — Since the review provision applies only to the operations of the Conference and not to the declaration on status, have we not recognised Northern Ireland without obtaining a corresponding guarantee that future British Governments will continue to accept that we have a policy role in Northern Ireland?

Answer

Article 1 of this agreement incorporates the principle of consent enshrined in the Report of the Forum and accepted in communiqués by successive Heads of Government in both countries. It also incorporates the agreement of the two Governments to support Irish unity in the event there is consent to that aim.

The two Governments have entered into this agreement determined to make it work, but experience may show that ajdustments are desirable to the role and nature of the Conference's activities. The Review Clause will enable the two Governments to make such adjustments.

40. Question to the Prime Minister: Is such an agreement possible without legislation?

Answer

Yes. The agreement is fully consistent with statute la relating to Northern Ireland.

[Note: This answer is subject to the further consideration being given by the Law Officers Departmen to the question whether the agreement could be subject to judicial review.]



NOIAAI

FITZGERALD, DR GARRET MICHAEL DESMOND TD

An Taoiseach (elected 14 December 1982). Leader of Fine Gael.

Born: 6 February 1926 in Dublin. Education: Belvedere College, Dublin; University College Dublin (BA in History and French, PhD in Economics); King's Inns Dublin (called to bar in 1947 but never practised).

Worked 1947-58 for Aer Lingus, mainly as economic planner. Journalist from 1953 (has been Irish correspondent of the BBC, the Financial Times and the Economist). Lecturer in Economics, UCD, 1959-73. Managing Director, Economist Intelligence Unit of Ireland, 1961-72. Joined Fine Gael 1964; Fine Gael Senator 1965-69. Fine Gael Deputy for Dublin South-East since 1969; spokesman on Education 1969-72; Finance 1972-73. Minister for Foreign Affairs 1973-77; Leader of Fine Gael since 1977. Taoiseach June 1981 - March 1982.

Dr Garret FitzGerald's family background gives him a special interest in and insight into the conflicting traditions in Ireland. His parents took part in the 1916 Rising. His mother, Mabel McConville, was a Presbyterian from Belfast; his father, Desmond FitzGerald, was a Roman Catholic, born and brought up in London, who was Minister for External Affairs and then Defence in the 1922-32 Governments.

Dr FitzGerald contributed greatly to the policies which reshaped Fine Gael in the 1960s. In 1972 his book "Towards a New Ireland" argued that reconciliation required radical changes in the Republic as well as in Northern Ireland. These ideas were elaborated in his (uncompleted) "crusade", launched in 1981 during his first short spell as Taoiseach, to amend the Republic's Constitution in a non-confessional direction. His ideas were spelt out in his Dimbleby Lecture "Irish Identities" delivered on BBC TV in May 1982. He is committed publicly and personally to seeking agreement with HMG on Northern Ireland.

He was elected unopposed to lead Fine Gael following Mr Cosgrave's resignation in July 1977. Since then the party has benefitted electorally from the widespread popularity which he has enjoyed (in particular contrast to Mr Haughey) as an honest and unselfish politician ("Garret the Good"). He is also widely respected overseas and was an impressive Minister for Foreign Affairs during the Republic's first spell in the Presidency. He is a committed European.

He sees himself as a social democrat and his front-bench appointments in 1981 and again in 1982 have given the party a less conservative image than in the past. But his reforming instincts are subject to current financial constraints and the

/conservative

conservative instincts of some of his own party. In general he is happier adumbrating reforms than pushing them through. At times he will use Labour's weight in Coalition to offset his own right-wing. He is a devout Catholic but has clear views on the separation of Church and State and pushed through a liberalisation of the law governing access to contraceptives despite the opposition of the Hierarchy.

He is an intelligent and fluent speaker whose fluency sometimes leads him to get bogged down in detail. Personally easy and approachable, he is quick to respond and to engage in debate. He is most at home with journalists and with theologians and other academics. A degree of self-righteousness, reinforced by impetuosity and reliance on a coterie of advisers, can lead him into major errors of judgement. His intervention with HMG over the H-Block hunger strike in 1981; his tough but insensitive 1982 budget (which brought down his first Government) and his proposed all-Ireland courts and police force in the November 1982 campaign were all own goals. But his personal appeal, his intellect, energy and sense of mission make him a formidable, if unorthodox, political leader. There is talk of his resigning before the next election, perhaps to enter academic life. If an Anglo-Irish agreement were to go well he might feel he had done as much as he could for his country. But his party probably needs him if it is to have any chance of electoral success.

He is deeply devoted to his wife Joan (nee O'Farrell) who has a strong personality and exercises substantial influence on him. In recent years she has been crippled by severe disease. They have two sons and one daughter, who lives in England.

November 1985

SPRING, DICK TD

Tanaiste (Tawn-ish-ta) - Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Energy.

Leader of the Labour Party

Born 1950, Tralee, Co Kerry

Education: Christian Brothers Tralee, St Joseph's Roscrea, Trinity College Dublin; the King's Inns (called to the bar 1975). Played Gaelic football and hurling for Kerry and won three rugby caps for Ireland in 1979 (though he dropped the ball disastrously on one famous occasion). Elected to the Dail 1981 taking over his father's seat. Minister of State in the Department of Justice 1981-82. Elected Leader of the Labour Party on 1 November 1982 following the resignation of Michael O'Leary.

Mr Spring comes from a family notable in politics and sport. His election as leader of his party, when it was in disarray and only three weeks before a general election, helped it to maintain a reasonable level of success, but in the Coalition he has been unable to prevent Dr FitzGerald treating him as very much the junior partner, and keeping him for instance on the fringe of Anglo-Irish relations. His party lost all its seats in the 1984 European Parliament elections, but the consequent mutterings against the policy of coalition have not been directed against his leadership. It is occasionally rumoured that he may leave politics to practise law in the United States. But he is justifiably proud of what he has achieved in politics in a mere 35 years.

A strikingly handsome man, he moves with decision and energy, despite the pain he still suffers from a serious back injury. His serious manner is balanced by the twinkle often to be seen in his blue eyes.

His young and attractive wife Kristi (Hutcheson) is American: one son, one daughter.

November 1985

BARRY, PETER TD

Minister for Foreign Affairs since December 1982

Born 8 August 1928: Cork. Education: Christian Brothers School Cork. First elected to the Dail for Fine Gael in 1969 in Cork City South-East. Lord Mayor of Cork 1970-71. Opposition spokesman on Labour 1972-73; Minister for Transport and Power 1973-76; Minister for Education 1976-77. Fine Gael spokesman on Economic Affairs and the Public Service 1977 - January 1981. Minister for the Environment in the 1981-82 Coalition. Deputy Leader Fine Gael since 1977.

Peter Barry is a tea importer and wholesaler and is very much the successful businessman; straightforward, approachable, and likeable, he does not pull his punches. Has held a number of ministerial jobs competently, neither attracting nor inviting controversy. In opposition he was less impressive, possibly reflecting a temperamental preference for quiet constructive activity. Deeply opposed to violence in Northern Ireland, but more anxious to stress his nationalism both in public and in his confidential conduct of Anglo-Irish relations, he has been inclined to pursue with vigour the smallest of complaints against us, while maintaining good personal relations with British Ministers. He is regarded as the most nationalist of Fine Gael leaders.

He was nearly a candidate for the leadership when Liam Cosgrave resigned in 1977 but settled for the job of deputy to Dr Fitzgerald. He commands wide respect in the party and is replacing former Taoiseach Jack Lynch (Fianna Fail) as the dominant political figure in the Cork area. He will remain a major candidate for the succession should Dr FitzGerald go over the next few years. Meanwhile, he is active in liaison with the Labour Party to maintain the Coalition.

Married 1958 to a charming and distinguished woman (Margaret O'Mullane) who spends most of her time in Cork; four sons, two daughters.

November 1985

NALLY, DERMOT

Secretary to the Government. Born 1927

Dermot Nally was educated at Synge Street Schools, Dublin. He was awarded a scholarship in science by the National University of Ireland and a post-graduate studentship in modern languages at London University, from which he gained his MA.

After working for the Electricity Supply Board, Nally joined the civil service in 1947 as an Executive Officer in the Office of Public Works. Promoted to Administrative Officer in 1952, he transferred to the Department of Local Government where he worked on systems of local government and taxation. In 1960 he was promoted to Assistant Principal in the section dealing with national and local elections. In 1965 he became a Principal Officer with responsibility for housing. In 1973 he transferred to the Department of the Taoiseach with the rank of Assistant Secretary, becoming Deputy Secretary in June 1978. During this time, he reported directly to the Taoiseach on matters affecting the European Economic Community and Northern Ireland. He also kept an eye on foreign affairs in general and was involved in economic policy, both domestic and external. He was appointed to his present position on 2 July 1980 and has been closely involved in the AIIC and the Anglo-Irish negotiations.

Nally is an excellent civil servant, discreet, loyal and sensible. He is pleasant socially but is capable of taking a very robust line on instructions.

Nally is married with several children. His wife, who is from West Cork, is a native Irish speaker and teacher of the language. Mr Nally's interests are golf, reading and gardening.

November 1985

DONLON, SEAN

Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs

Born: 1940 in Co Meath

Educated at St Finian's College, Mullingar, and originally studied for the priesthood (with Mr John Hume) at Maynooth; thence to University College Dublin.

Mr Donlon started his career in the Department of Finance, entering Foreign Affairs in 1963. Bonn from 1964 to 1969, being promoted to First Secretary (Economic Affairs) in 1968. 1969 Consul-General, Boston, and member of the Delegation to UN General Assembly. 1971-78 Anglo-Irish Section, DFA, initially as Counsellor and later as Head. October 1978 - October 1981, Irish Ambassador to the USA (and Mexico).

Donlon made his name in the Anglo-Irish Section and travelled extensively in Northern Ireland. While in Washington, he was a helpful ally in opposing NORAID and other PIRA influences; although also effective in pursuing Irish interests. He formed a close relationship with the "Four Horsemen" (Kennedy, Moynihan, O'Neill and Carey), but his opposition to Congressman Biaggi caused him some difficulties. Mr Haughey wished to remove him in 1980, but Donlon rallied his American supporters and beat off the threat. He was recalled as Secretary by Dr FitzGerald's Government in 1981 and is said to have received an assurance that he would not be moved on if Fianna Fail returned to power. Despite this, it is difficult to see where his career goes from here. He is still only 45. It is not easy to imagine Mr Haughey enjoying working with him, or sending him as Ambassador to London, about the only job worth his mettle, after his spell in Washington. If Fianna Fail are returned to power, Donlon seems likely to get a job in the private sector.

As Secretary he has been frank and helpful in difficult times and in good. He is a very able operator, and his earlier combative approach to Britain has mellowed. He has found the administrative burden of his present job distasteful. A rival with Lillis for Dr FitzGerald's friendship and patronage, which he continues to enjoy. A keen poker-player, fond of night clubs, drink, and playing light music on the piano, he nevertheless keeps himself in good physical shape.

Married with two children.

November 1985

LILLIS, MICHAEL

Head of Anglo-Irish, Information, Political and Cultural Division in the Department of Foreign Affairs since March 1983.

Born about 1945. Michael Lillis claims to come from a fairly humble and traditionally Republican background. He was brought up for his first four years in West Cork, speaking Irish only. Educated at the Christian Brothers' School, Synge Street, Dublin, and UCD.

His appointments have been:

Third Secretary, Madrid

Consul, Irish Consulate-General, Boston, Mass.

First Secretary, later Counsellor (?), Washington

Counsellor, Political Division, DFA (handling US and UN matters)

1981: promoted Assistant Secretary and seconded to Taoiseach's Department as Foreign Affairs Adviser

1982: Seconded to Cabinet of EC Commissioner Dick Burke in Brussels

March 1983: Returned to DFA as Head of Anglo-Irish Division

Michael Lillis is of smallish build with a round, boyish face and spectacles; florid cheeks (especially after drink, for which he has a remarkable capacity). His manner is lively, friendly and agreeable, but he makes sure he gets his point of view across; and, on occasion, he can be sharply combative: he is also an attentive listener, generally very alert to sensitive points when he knows his subject well. His colleagues consider him a "workaholic" and he can often be found at his desk at weekends.

He is ambitious and successful in reaching his present position so young: and thus competitive. While in the Irish Embassy in Washington he had (and was proud of) a wide range of political contacts, but the use he made of them and his own views on Irish policy in the US sometimes clashed with his even more patently high-flying Ambassador, Sean Donlon. His promotion in 1981 was political and he was obliged to move to Brussels when Mr Haughey returned to power in 1982. He is regarded with some suspicion by other DFA officials as too highly politicised. In his present job he and Donlon are rivals both for Dr FitzGerald's attention and for that of Mr John Hume. But they seem to get on well both with their patrons and with one another.

/He

He is a strong nationalist who repudiates any use of violence and is concerned about the threat to the stability of the Republic posed by terrorism in Northern Ireland, and in particular by Sinn Fein. He speaks with authority, no doubt derived from his regular contacts with Dr FitzGerald, and is not afraid of bold moves or, sometimes, immoderate language. He does not entirely trust British intentions, but he clearly realises that, if he is to succeed in his present job, he has to convince British officials of his goodwill, and he is willing to go to considerable lengths to do so. He is inventive in his approach to Anglo-Irish relations. In the event of an Anglo-Irish agreement, he is expected to receive further promotion and to play a major role in implementing it.

His attractive wife was born in England of Irish parents. She has chosen to be Irish but some of her brothers and sisters have chosen to remain British. He claims his wife's English background helps him to understand British values and political attitudes. They have three young daughters.

November 1985

DORR, NOEL

Irish Ambassador in London

Born Limerick 1933

Education: St Nathy's College, Ballaghaderreen, Co Roscommon; University College Galway and Georgetown University, Washington DC.

Entered civil service as Assistant Inspector of Taxes 1958; Third Secretary DFA 1960; Third Secretary Brussels 1962; First Secretary Washington 1964; First Secretary then Counsellor (Press and Information) DFA 1970-74; Assistant Secretary and Political Director, then Deputy Secretary DFA 1974-80. Ambassador to the UN 1980-83. Ambassador in London since 1983.

Dorr is respected by his colleagues in the DFA and by politicians of all parties. Widely read and very intelligent, he is a very skilful draftsman and considerate chairman. His Security Council speeches during the Falklands War were determined by Mr Haughey's Government, but within that constraint he tried to minimise wider damage to Anglo-Irish relations. However, his attempts to be helpful were sometimes ill-judged, reflecting general Irish optimism about what can and should be achieved within the UN framework, and about Ireland's role as a mediator between the West and the Third World. He is working very hard and successfully in London, where his personality as a very serious, teetotal, hard-working public servant is in strong contrast to the unintellectual bonhomie of his predecessor.

Married 1982 to a charming woman (Catriona) who had to have a cancer operation in 1984, reported to be completely successful.

November 1985

PRENDERGAST, PETER

Government Press Secretary

Born 1939 Galway. Education: Clongowes Wood College; UCD.

His commerce degree at UCD was followed by two years management training in West Germany. Joined Unilever in 1965. Always interested in politics: joined Fine Gael in 1967, attracted by the "just society" group around Dr FitzGerald and Mr Declan Costello. 1969, Chairman Fine Gael National Council.

Responsible as General Secretary for the thorough reorganisation of the party after the 1977 debacle; retired in January 1982 (working as consultant for Stokes Kennedy Crowley Ltd) but returned for the February and November 1982 elections. Appointed Government Press Secretary 1982.

Extremely able with an easy charm and generally well-disposed. Sceptical about desirability of a united Ireland.

Married (Madeleine) with a boy and two girls. He is keen on golf and horse-racing and bred greyhounds in his youth. Close to Dr Fitzgerald.

November 1985

QUIGLEY, DECLAN

Legal adviser to the Irish delegation to the Anglo-Irish negotiations

About 66, Declan Quigley practised as a barrister on circuit for his first nine years or so after being called to the bar. He then joined the Attorney General's office and became his principal official in about 1970. He retired in 1983 or '84 and was re-employed specifically as legal adviser to the Irish delegation to the Anglo-Irish negotiations.

He suffers from high blood pressure and is a heavy smoker. Of a retiring disposition, he has not spoken up much in the presence of the British delegation.

November 1985

WARD, ANDREW

Secretary (PUS), Department of Justice

Born 1926

Educated St Colman's College, Cork and University College, Cork.

A career civil servant who joined the Department of Justice in 1950, becoming Secretary in 1971, Ward maintains a low public profile but has a reputation as an effective and fair-minded administrator and a man of unquestionable integrity. He is very courteous, considerate, and quiet, with a sense of humour. He has been a regular figure at the Anglo-Irish talks without saying very much.

Married to Beavon Quinlan, a talented amateur artist; three children.

November 1985

## Anglo-Irish Summit Meeting

## Joint Communiqué

1. The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher FRS MP and the Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald TD, met at ..... on ..... It was the third meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council to be held at the level of Heads of Government.

2. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP, and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Rt Hon Tom King MP. The Taoiseach was accompanied by the Tanaiste, Mr Dick Spring TD, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Peter Barry TD.

3. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach signed a formal and binding Agreement between their two Governments, which will enter into force as soon as each Government has notified the other of acceptance. The Agreement has the aims of promoting peace and stability in Northern Ireland; helping to reconcile the two major traditions in Ireland; creating a new climate of friendship and co-operation between the people of the two countries; and improving co-operation in combating terrorism.

4. The Agreement deals in particular with the status of Northern Ireland and the establishment of an Intergovernmental Conference in which the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals concerning stated aspects of Northern Ireland affairs; in which the promotion of cross-border co-operation will be discussed; and in which determined efforts will be made to resolve any differences between the two Governments.

5. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach committed themselves to implementing and sustaining the measures set out in the Agreement

with determination and imagination and undertook to encourage people of both the unionist and nationalist traditions in Ireland to make new efforts to understand and respect each other's concerns with a view to promoting reconciliation.

6. The exchange of notifications of acceptance will not be completed until the Agreement has been approved by the British Parliament and by Dail Eireann. The two Governments intend that action to implement the provisions of the Agreement should begin once the exchange of notifications has been completed. The first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference will take place as soon as possible thereafter. The British side will be led by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Irish side by the Minister designated as the Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative.

7. The two Governments envisage that the meetings and agenda of the Conference will not normally be announced. But they wish it to be known that, at its first meeting, the Conference will consider its future programme of work in all the fields - political, security, legal, economic, social and cultural - assigned to it under the Agreement. It will concentrate at its initial meetings on:

- relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland;

- ways of enhancing security co-operation between the two Governments; and

- seeking measures which would give substantial expression to the aim of underlining the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice.

In the interests of all the people of Northern Ireland the two sides are committed to work for early progress in these matters. Against this background, the Taoiseach said that it was the intention of his Government to accede as soon as possible to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

8. In addressing the improvement of relations between the security forces and the minority community, the Conference at its first meeting will consider:

a. the application of the principle that the Armed Forces (which include the Ulster Defence Regiment) operate only in support of the civil power, with the particular objective of ensuring as rapidly as possible that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, there is a police presence in all operations which involve direct contact with the community;

b. ways of underlining the policy of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and of the Armed Forces in Northern Ireland that they discharge their duties even-handedly and with equal respect for the unionist and nationalist identities and traditions.

9. In its discussion of the enhancement of cross-border co-operation on security, the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference will give particular attention to the importance of continuing and enhanced co-operation, as envisaged in Article 9(a) of the Agreement, in the policing of border areas.

10. In addition to concluding the new Agreement, the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach reviewed the wide range of work being done under the auspices of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council to develop further the unique relationship between the two countries. The fact that in the past year there have been more than twenty meetings between Ministers of the two

Governments demonstrates the closeness of co-operation. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach decided that this work should be actively continued, in the interests of friendship between all the people of both countries.

11. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed to meet again at an appropriate time to take stock of the development of relations between the two countries and of the implementation of the Agreement which they have signed.



NOIABF

# Summary of the Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985

## Joint Press Release

(Note: This summary has no legal status)

1. The Agreement begins with a preamble incorporating a joint statement of objectives.

## The Status of Northern Ireland

2. The two Governments affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland; recognise that the present wish of a majority there is for no change in that status; and declare that, if in the future a majority there clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, the two Governments will introduce and support legislation in the respective Parliaments to give effect to this. (Article 1)

## Framework and Objectives of the Intergovernmental Conference

3. The Agreement establishes, within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council, an Intergovernmental Conference concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations between the two parts of the island of Ireland which, subject to the terms of the Agreement, will deal on a regular basis with:

- political matters;

- security and related matters;

- legal matters, including the administration of justice;

- the promotion of cross-border co-operation. (Article 2(a))

The Agreement provides for a review of the working of the Conference after three years, or earlier if either side desires. (Article 11)

4. The Conference will proceed on the basis that:

- the United Kingdom Government accept that the Irish Government will put forward within the Conference views and proposals on certain matters relating to Northern Ireland as provided for in the Agreement;

- in the interest of promoting peace and stability, determined efforts will be made in the Conference to resolve any differences;

- there will be no derogation from the sovereignty of either Government, and each retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction. (Article 2(b))

5. The Conference will be a framework within which the two Governments work together for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland and for peace, stability and prosperity throughout Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights, co-operation against terrorism and the development of economic, social and cultural co-operation. (Article 4(a))

Procedures and Membership of the Intergovernmental Conference

6. There will be regular and frequent meetings of the Conference at Ministerial level as well as meetings at official level, and special meetings may be convened at the request of

either side. The joint Chairmen at Ministerial level will be on the Irish side a Minister designated as the Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative and on the United Kingdom side the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Other Ministers and advisers will participate as appropriate. There will be a Secretariat to service the Conference on a continuing basis. (Article 3)

7. The Irish Government declare their support for the United Kingdom Government's policy of seeking devolution in Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community. (Article 4(b)). The Conference will be a framework in which the Irish Government can put forward views and proposals on the modalities of devolution, in so far as they relate to the interests of the minority community. (Article 4(c)). Should a devolved administration be established, the devolved matters would not be for consideration by the Conference. (Article 2)

Political Matters

8. The Conference will concern itself with measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of both traditions in Northern Ireland in such areas as cultural heritage, electoral arrangements, use of flags and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social discrimination and the advantages and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. (Article 5(a))

9. Should it prove impossible to achieve and sustain devolution, proposals for major legislation and major policy issues where the interests of the minority community are significantly or especially affected and which come within the administrative responsibility of the Northern Ireland Departments will be for consideration by the Conference. (Article 5(c))

10. The Conference will be a framework within which the Irish Government may put forward views on the role and composition of bodies appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or his Departments. (Article 6)

Security and Related Matters within Northern Ireland

11. The Conference will consider security policy issues as well as serious incidents and forthcoming events. A programme of action will be developed with the particular object of improving the relations between the security forces and the nationalist community. Elements of the programme may be considered by the Irish Government for application in the South. The Conference may also consider policy issues relating to prisons, and individual cases may be raised. (Article 7)

Legal Matters including the Administration of Justice

12. Both Governments recognise the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice. The Conference will seek measures that would give substantial expression to this aim, considering among other things the possibility of mixed courts in both jurisdictions for the trial of certain offences. The Conference will also consider whether there are areas of the criminal law in both jurisdictions which might with benefit be harmonised and will be concerned with policy aspects of extradition and extra-territorial jurisdiction as between North and South.
(Article 8)

Cross-border Co-operation on Security, Economic, Social and Cultural Matters

13. The Conference will set in hand a programme of work to be undertaken by the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Commissioner of the Garda Siochana with a

view to enhancing co-operation between the security forces of the two Governments in such areas as threat assessments, exchange of information, liaison structures, technical co-operation, training of personnel and operational resources. The Conference will have no operational responsibilities. (Article 9)

14. The two Governments undertake to co-operate to promote the economic and social development of those areas in both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely as a result of the instability of recent years. The two Governments will consider the possibility of securing international support for this work. (Article 10(a))

15. The Conference will, in the absence of devolution, be the framework for the promotion of cross-border economic, social and cultural co-operation. In the event of devolution, machinery would be needed to deal with co-operation in respect of cross-border aspects of devolved matters. (Article 10(b) and (c))

Interparliamentary Body

16. The two Governments agree that they would give appropriate support to any Anglo-Irish Interparliamentary body established by the two Parliaments. (Article 12)

Amended

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SP1AEX

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT:

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER

IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

WITH PERMISSION, MR. SPEAKER, I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT THE MEETING WHICH I HAD WITH THE TAOISEACH ON [ ].

I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MY RT. HON. AND LEARNED FRIEND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND MY RT. HON. FRIEND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND. DR. FITZGERALD WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MR. SPRING, THE TANAISTE, AND BY MR. BARRY, THE IRISH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE TAOISEACH AND I SIGNED AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, WHICH HAS BEEN PUBLISHED IN A COMMAND PAPER.

THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE, ISSUED AFTER THE MEETING, IS ALSO INCLUDED IN THE COMMAND PAPER.

THE PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT IS TO PROMOTE PEACE AND STABILITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND; TO ENCOURAGE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES THERE; TO CREATE AN IMPROVED CLIMATE OF FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND; AND TO STRENGTHEN CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN COMBATING TERRORISM.

THE AGREEMENT WILL NOT COME INTO FORCE UNTIL IT HAS

BEEN APPROVED BY PARLIAMENT AND BY THE IRISH DAIL.

THE HOUSE WILL HAVE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY FOR A FULL DEBATE.

THE AGREEMENT HAS TWO PRINCIPAL FEATURES.

THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A BINDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, HAS AFFIRMED THAT THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND WILL REMAIN UNCHANAGED SO LONG AS THAT IS THE WISH OF THE MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE.

IT HAS ALSO RECOGNISED THAT THE PRESENT WISH OF A MAJORITY IS TO REMAIN PART OF THE UNITED

KINGDOM.

THIS IS THE MOST FORMAL COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT MADE BY ANY IRISH GOVERNMENT.

THE SECOND PRINCIPAL FEATURE OF THE AGREEMENT IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EXISTING ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL.

IN THIS CONFERENCE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT MAY PUT FORWARD VIEWS AND PROPOSALS ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF NORTHERN IRELAND AFFAIRS.

IF DEVOLUTION IS RESTORED - AND BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE COMMITTED TO SUPPORT THIS - THEN THOSE MATTERS WHICH BECOME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT WILL NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE.

THE CONFERENCE WILL ALSO DISCUSS CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION, INCLUDING IMPROVED SECURITY CO-OPERATION.

THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO MAKE DETERMINED EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ANY DIFFERENCES THAT MAY ARISE.

BUT THE CONFERENCE WILL NOT BE A DECISION-MAKING BODY:

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISIONS AND

ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT REMAINS EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT NORTH OF THE BORDER AND WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT SOUTH OF THE BORDER.

THE FIRST MEETING OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE WILL TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE AGREEMENT ENTERS INTO FORCE, AND WILL DISCUSS THE FUTURE PROGRAMME OF WORK IN ALL THE FIELDS WITH WHICH THE CONFERENCE WILL DEAL.

PARTICULAR SUBJECTS ON WHICH THE CONFERENCE WILL CONCENTRATE AT ITS INITIAL MEETINGS ARE:

- WAYS OF IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SECURITY FORCES AND THE MINORITY COMMUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
- ACTION TO IMPROVE SECURTY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS;
- AND WAYS TO HELP TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

THE AGREEMENT RECOGNISES THAT IT WOULD BE FOR PARLIAMENTARY DECISION IN WESTMINSTER AND DUBLIN WHETHER TO ESTABLISH AN ANGLO-IRISH PARLIAMENTARY BODY OF THE KIND DESCRIBED IN THE ANGLO-IRISH STUDIES REPORT OF NOVEMBER

1981.

THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED IN THE COMMUNIQUE ITS INTENTION TO ACCEDE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE EURUOPEAN CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM.

WE WELCOME THIS.

MR. SPEAKER, NO SINGLE AGREEMENT CAN RESOLVE THE DEEPROOTED AND COMPLEX PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND DELIVER THE PEACE FOR WHICH THE GREAT MAJORITY OF PEOPLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND LONG.

BUT I BELIEVE THE PRESENT AGREEMENT WILL MAKE

AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION.

IT MAINTAINS AND CONFIRMS THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND AS PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

IT ACKNOWLEDGES THE INTEREST OF THE REPUBLIC IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE NORTH AND THROUGH THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE PROVIDES A SYSTEMATIC MEANS FOR IRISH VIEWS TO BE PUT FORWARD AND CONSIDERED.

IT STRENGTHENS THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AS A WHOLE AND THE REPUBLIC.

AND IT OFFERS HOPE AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO ALL THOSE IN BOTH COMMUNITIES WHO REJECT VIOLENCE

AND WANT TO WORK TOGETHER PEACEFULLY FOR A

BETTER FUTURE FOR THEIR CHILDREN.

I COMMEND IT TO THE HOUSE.

## Possible Answers to Questions about the Status of Northern Ireland

1. Question to the Prime Minister

Article 1 is ambiguous/imprecise about the status of Northern Ireland, says less than the Chequers Communique, etc. What does it mean?

Answer

Of course the two Governments approach this aspect of the matter from differing historical perceptions and from within differing constitutional frameworks. The Agreement does not change that.

The position is clear. Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom.

What Article 1 does is to look to the future and set out - for the first time in a binding international agreement - what is common ground between us: that there will be no change in the present status of Northern Ireland without the freely given consent of the majority of its inhabitants; and that both Governments recognise that such consent does not at present exist.

2. Question to the Taoiseach

Do you agree with the Prime Minister?

Answer

As the Prime Minister has said, the two Governments approach this matter from differing historical perceptions and from within differing constitutional frameworks, and the Agreement does not change that.

It is of course a fact that Ireland is not united politically and that the British Government is responsible for the government of Northern Ireland.

What is important is what we have now agreed about the future.

12.11.85

9.05pm.

DRAFT SPEECH OF SIGNING OF ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

By the Taoiseach
at the Press Conference

Throughout these negotiations, the Irish Government approach has been to find solutions which would end the [alienation] of [Wont to be avoided] nationalists in Northern Ireland and recognise and respect the rights of unionists about whose anxieties we have been at all times deeply concerned.

A majority of ~~our~~ Irish people share the aspiration to ~~Irish~~ unity to be achieved peacefully and by agreement. That is the nationalist position. It is obvious that the British Prime Minister and I have come to these negotiations with different historical perspectives and, as it were, with different title deeds. But we have been able to agree about what would and what would not happen in the future.

The Agreement affirms clearly that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The Agreement recognises that the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland is for no change. The Agreement goes on to say that if in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the fulfilment of the nationalist aspiration, the two Governments will act to implement that wish.

/...

The Agreement thus makes provision for ~~the fulfilment of~~ the nationalist aspiration to unity in the only conditions in which constitutional nationalists seek, or would accept, its fulfilment - without violence and with the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland.

The corollary of this is that the Northern Unionist community has for the first time a commitment in the form of international agreement that a change in the status of Northern Ireland, such as would be involved in a move to Irish political unity, would not take place without the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland.

On the Irish side these negotiations were preceded by a process of consultation involving a review of traditional attitudes by the constitutional nationalist parties of the island, through the New Ireland Forum.

The Forum's Report provided the basis for the Irish Government's approach to this negotiation. The Agreement as it has now emerged is fully consistent ~~in all respects with the proposals for a Framework for a New Ireland within which to tackle this problem that are set out~~ with the principles proposed in Chapter 5 Paragraph 2 of that Report.

/...

Our purpose is to ~~create after 65 years conditions in Northern Ireland that will~~ secure equal recognition and respect for the ~~Irish nationalist~~ identities in Northern Ireland ~~there~~. Nationalists can now raise their heads knowing their position is, and is seen to be, on an equal footing with that of members of the majority Community.

As a result we will be creating conditions in which the nationalist community in the North, can more readily identify with the structures of Northern Ireland in a way that will help peace and stability to emerge.

For the unionist community, who have suffered the most tragic and repulsive onslaught on their right to life and to well-being, this Agreement offers a way forward towards the restoration of normal ~~civilised~~ life without violence or fear.

This Agreement thus involves no abandonment of nationalist aspirations, nor any threat to unionist rights; but it does offer a prospect of progress towards peace and justice for Northern nationalists, and of peace and stability for Northern unionists.

There are no victors: nor any losers. But if what has been agreed is implemented in full good faith, as I believe it will be, all of the people of Northern Ireland will gain. So indeed will the peoples of the rest of Ireland and of Great Britain,

/...

both for many years have had to carry together a heavy burden of security costs, and ~~[in the case of my State]~~ have also ~~suffered~~ paid a severe economic ~~losses~~, price.

As a person with close family bonds on the unionist side and ~~by~~ close personal friendships on the nationalist side I want to address myself directly to the people of Northern Ireland.

To unionists and nationalists alike I appeal:

> Look at and evaluate this Agreement <u>for what it is</u> - not for what some people in both communities committed to maintaining divisions and hatreds, will attempt to portray it to be.

Draft Opening Statement for the Prime Minister at the Press Conference following an Anglo-Irish Summit

Dr FitzGerald and I have today signed an Agreement which marks a significant step forward in relations betwen our two countries and towards peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

2. The Agreement has three main elements:

- A Preamble in which various important principles, including our total rejection of violence and our recognition of the validity of both traditions in Northern Ireland, are set out.

- An Article in which the two Governments affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland; recognise that the present wish of a majority is for no change; and declare that, if in the future a majority formally consent to a united Ireland, the two Governments will support legislation accordingly.





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- Articles establishing, within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council, a new Intergovernmental Conference concerned both with Northern Ireland and with relations between the two parts of Ireland. The Irish Republic will be able to put forward views and proposals in the Conference on stated aspects of Northern Ireland affairs; and determined efforts will be made to resolve any differences. The Conference will also deal with cross-border co-operation on security, economic, social and cultural matters, including the enhancement of cross-border co-operation in combating terrorism. Full responsibility for the decisions and administration of government will remain with the United Kingdom north of the border and with the Republic south of the border.

3. We have also issued today a communiqué on our meeting, which says that the new Intergovernmental Conference will concentrate in its initial meetings on relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland, on ways of improving security co-operation between the two



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Governments, and on seeking measures which would underline the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice.

4. I shall be making a statement to Parliament about the Agreement on Monday. A full debate will take place shortly afterwards. The Agreement will enter into force only after both Parliaments have approved it.

5. By promoting peace and stability and by enhancing our co-operation against terrorism, the Agreement will bring benefits to all the people of Northern Ireland. I hope that it will also open the way for moves towards devolution in Northern Ireland.

6. I believe that this Agreement represents a positive contribution to progress on this long-standing and difficult problem. The two Governments are committed to implementing it fully and effectively. We call on all people of goodwill to join us in promoting peace.

Grey Scale #13

C Y M

A 1 2 3 4 5 6 M 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 B 17 18 19

Blue Cyan Green Yellow

Colour Chart #13

Centimeters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Inches 1 2 3