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SECRET

Confidential filing

Meetings with the Taoiseach

Analo-Irish Summit

Analo-Irish Relations

IRELAND

Part 1: May 1979

Part 15: March 1986

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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PART 15 ends:-

NIO to CDP 30.4.86

PART 16 begins:-

CDP to PM 8.5.86







SECRET

PERSONAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

14



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

WHITEHALL

LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Prime Minister  
CDP  
30/4

Charles Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

30<sup>th</sup> April 1986

mf

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 28 April.

Our view is that it would be better not to send a written reply to the Molyneux-Paisley letter of 23 April. As you point out, this means letting their point about the parameters of any future dialogue pass unchallenged. On the other hand, to take issue with them on this would bring a note of controversy into the correspondence which we would prefer to avoid at the present delicate stage. The important thing, as we see it, now is to get the "talks about talks" started: it will be one of the purposes of these talks to explore the matters to be covered in any subsequent substantive negotiations and I do not think we need be limited by the terms of the resolutions referred to in the Molyneux-Paisley letter.

You should know that there has been a hold-up in arranging the meeting with officials, which we had hoped to hold on 29 April, because Mr Molyneux is unwell. We judge his presence to be highly desirable and would therefore prefer to await his recovery. We hope that the delay will not be more than a few days.

Yours sincerely  
Neil Ward

N D WARD

SECRET  
PERSONAL



SECRET AND PERSONAL



(13) file ECL  
a Sir P Cadogan

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary



28 April 1986

Dear Neil,

Thank you for your letter of 25 April reporting the tentative arrangements which have been made for a meeting to take place on 29 April between Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley on the one hand and Sir Robert Andrew and Mr. Bloomfield on the other. The Prime Minister is content with this.

Am I right to assume that you do not at this stage envisage any written reply from the Prime Minister to the latest letter from Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley? Failure to reply would of course mean letting their point about the parameters of discussions pass unchallenged.

I am copying this letter to Joan MacNaughton (Lord President's Office), Tony Galsworthy (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office), David Morris (Lord Privy Seal's Office), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

yes surely.  
 

(Charles Powell)

Neil Ward, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL



SECRET

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

PERSONAL

(12) ①



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

WHITEHALL

LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Charles Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

25 April 1986

Dear Charles,

*Yes*

*Prime Minister*

*Content for these*

*talks to take place?*

*CDP 27/4*

The Molyneaux and Paisley letter of 23 April is not as positive as we would have wished; but it seems to be intended to open the way to further dialogue. As the Secretary of State explained to the Prime Minister on Wednesday evening, he believes that the next step should be "talks about talks" with senior officials to explore the Unionist position and the prospect of moving on to more substantive negotiations at Ministerial level. Tentative arrangements have now been made for a meeting to take place on Tuesday 29 April between Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley on the one hand and Sir Robert Andrew and Mr Bloomfield on the other. If the Prime Minister is content, we will confirm these arrangements on Monday when the Secretary of State will be discussing with officials the line they are to take. If the outcome of his preliminary meeting is encouraging the next step might be a meeting with the Secretary of State himself. We will of course keep you informed of developments.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Lord President, the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Home Office, the Lord Privy Seal, the Chief Whip and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Yours Sincerely  
Nerd Ward*

N D WARD

SECRET

PERSONAL



SUBJECT  
cc Master

CONFIDENTIAL



file

DG

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 April 1986

Dear Jim,

The Prime Minister had a brief meeting this afternoon with Sir Eldon Griffiths, at his request, to discuss a number of police matters in relation to Northern Ireland.

Sir Eldon said that he and the Federation had two objectives: to keep the RUC together and to keep them out of politics. With these aims in mind, he wanted to bring four problems to the Prime Minister's attention.

The first concerned the role of the RUC. They had four different jobs to do: conventional policing, counter-insurgency, coping with a massive public order problem and providing an armed frontier guard. This was too much, and he felt that the last task, that of frontier work, was of little value. The RUC were not able to carry out regular police duties in the frontier area such as serving warrants. Most of the time they sat in police stations which were in effect fortresses. Now that their families were under attack at home, they were becoming restive. He thought therefore that the Army should take over this task. The Prime Minister observed that this was an operational matter on which it would not be right for her to take a view. But she recalled having heard that the RUC themselves were content to continue carrying out duties along the frontier.

The second problem identified by Sir Eldon was that of parades. Given the scale of the opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement among the Protestant community, the RUC often found themselves having to confront their own friends and relations in parades. Mr. Wright of the Police Federation had summed up the problem by saying: we can't give them a tanning on the streets and then meet to drink with them in the evening. This conflict of loyalties was putting the RUC under intense pressure. The best way to defuse the situation was to allow as many parades as possible to take place while dealing firmly with any violent incidents, and regard banning of them as a last resort. In his view, the Chief Constable had been precipitate in banning the parade in Portadown at Easter. The Prime Minister said that this was once again a matter for the Chief Constable.

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


Sir Eldon turned next to the role of the Federation itself. There was no doubt that it had been infiltrated to some degree by supporters of Dr. Paisley, and the Chief Constable was quite properly concerned about this. But he had made a great mistake in trying to impose a gag on the Federation. They were a statutory body and had the right, given to them by Parliament, to deal with legitimate matters of interest to their members, in particular welfare. It was essential that the Chief Constable should remove the gag as soon as possible. Otherwise he would only succeed in alienating the Force.

Lastly, Sir Eldon suggested it would be a good idea for the Prime Minister to visit Northern Ireland when the security situation permitted it, to unveil a plaque to the members of the RUC who had lost their lives, to talk to their widows and to deliver a firm speech about terrorism. He believed that such a visit and speech would give heart to the moderates. The Prime Minister said that she took note of the advice. She was concerned that such a visit might be boycotted by Unionists which would undermine its value. Sir Eldon disagreed. The speech might be made to a police audience and he could guarantee a good turnout.

The meeting had to end at this point. The Prime Minister said in conclusion that she would reflect on the points which Sir Eldon had made.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely  


Charles Powell

Jim Daniell, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.



ER.

Prime Minister (2)  
This is the reply which  
Mr. Molyneux & Dr.

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM JIM MOLYNEAUX AND IAN PAISLEY TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
DATED 23 APRIL 1986

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 16 April. Your readiness to arrange discussions for establishing a basis for future dialogue is appreciated. We are conscious that a clear understanding of our respective positions is necessary if such discussions are not themselves to prove abortive and therefore prejudicial to any future progress.

Paisley will probably  
send. X might cause  
some difficulty. We shall

have to  
make  
clear

X | We have already made known to you the parameters of any future dialogue as set out in the resolutions attached to our letter to you dated 7 March.

but we  
are not

We enclose for the record the statement which we issued on receipt of your letter of 16 April.

bound  
by

Perhaps through the usual channels we could reach agreement about a first meeting.

their

Yours sincerely

'parameters'

CDP  
L3/4

JIM MOLYNEAUX  
IAN R K PAISLEY



Statement from:

The Rt Hon James H Molyneaux JP MP  
The Reverend Ian K Paisley MP

We note the Prime Minister's recognition that an impasse exists - which impasse results from the fact that consent for the Anglo-Irish Agreement simply does not exist.

On 7 March 1986, we wrote to the Prime Minister enclosing separate resolutions from our respective parties, both of which reiterated our opposition to the Agreement and our rejection of joint London/Dublin authority over Northern Ireland. It follows that we could not enter into negotiations about structures of Government for Northern Ireland within the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

In our letters to the Prime Minister we expressed a willingness to assist in designing a different framework for talks and we welcome the Prime Minister's willingness to arrange discussions to see if such a framework can be established.

It is our belief that the road to peace and stability lies in subsequent negotiations under an acceptable framework to find an alternative to and a replacement of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

It is therefore imperative that the framework be designed to enable us to submit proposals to that end for consideration by the Prime Minister. It would be essential that during the period of those negotiations, the Anglo-Irish Agreement should not be implemented.

We shall be replying to the Prime Minister, and, in the meantime, we shall have no further comment to make.

16 April 1986

IAN PAISLEY

JIM MOLYNEAUX





PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS,  
STORMONT,  
BELFAST BT4 3SY

23rd April, 1986.

*CDP  
20/4*

*Dear Prime Minister*

Thank you for your letter of 16th April. Your readiness to arrange discussions for establishing a basis for future dialogue is appreciated. We are conscious that a clear understanding of our respective positions is necessary if such discussions are not themselves to prove abortive and therefore prejudicial to any future progress.


We have already made known to you the parameters of any future dialogue as set out in the resolutions attached to our letter to you dated 7th March.

We enclose for the record the statement which we issued on receipt of your letter of 16th April.

Perhaps through the usual channels we could reach agreement about a first meeting.

*Yours sincerely  
Jim Holyman  
Ken R. K. Paisley*





HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Statement from:

The Rt. Hon. James H. Molyneux, JP., MP.  
The Reverend Ian K. Paisley, MP.

We note the Prime Minister's recognition that an impasse exists - which impasse results from the fact that consent for the Anglo-Irish Agreement simply does not exist.

On 7 March, 1986, we wrote to the Prime Minister enclosing separate Resolutions from our respective Parties, both of which reiterated our opposition to the Agreement and our rejection of joint London/Dublin authority over Northern Ireland. It follows that we could not enter into negotiations about structures of Government for Northern Ireland within the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

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It is therefore imperative that the framework be designed to enable us to submit proposals to that end for consideration by the Prime Minister. It would be essential that during the period of those negotiations, the Anglo-Irish Agreement should not be implemented.

We shall be replying to the Prime Minister, and, in the meantime, we shall have no further comment to make.

16 April, 1986.

*Ian Paisley*

*Jim Molyneux*



From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

*Handwritten initials*



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
WHITEHALL  
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

23 April 1986

*Dear Charles*

... As agreed on the telephone, I enclose the text of the letter which the Unionist leaders have sent to the Prime Minister. Dr Paisley particularly wanted the Secretary of State to see it in advance of an interview which he is giving this evening. Its contents have not yet been made public.

*Your sincerely*  
*J A Daniell*

J A DANIELL

Encl

JLD



Subject  
C. Master

CONFIDENTIAL



Ali DA  
adi Krakak

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 April 1986

Dear Jim,

NORTHERN IRELAND

The Prime Minister had a talk with the Northern Ireland Secretary this evening about the situation in the Province.

The Northern Ireland Secretary said that Mr. Molyneux and Dr. Paisley were likely to reply to the Prime Minister's latest letter shortly (they have of course since done so). Assuming their reply was reasonably positive, his intention was to propose discussions in the first place at senior official level leading on to his own involvement. He did not think that either Mr. Molyneux or Dr. Paisley would want to hold further discussions with the Prime Minister until they had a clear idea of the possible outcome.

The Northern Ireland Secretary said that the security situation in the Province remained very difficult. There was a threat of major trouble in Portadown on 5 May if a planned march went ahead. His assessment was that the RUC were holding up well to the strain.

If talks with the Unionist leaders could be started, this might lead to some diminution in the violence. The Northern Ireland Secretary referred to the unsatisfactory part being played in Northern Ireland affairs at present by Mr. John Hume. He seemed to spend scarcely any time in the Province and was not making any helpful contribution to relations between the communities.

The Northern Ireland Secretary noted that the Irish Government were at pains to avoid any unhelpful comment on or intervention in the affairs of the North. A decision would be needed shortly on when to hold the next meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference. There was something to be

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
KP



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- 2 -

said for an early meeting followed by a longish interval to allow talks with Northern Ireland party leaders to take place. At present the Irish Government were insisting that the next meeting should be in Belfast. His own firm view was that this would only inflame an already very difficult situation and could jeopardise the planned talks with Unionist Party leaders. The Prime Minister agreed.

Yours sincerely  


(Charles Powell)

Jim Daniell, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



PRIME MINISTER

21 April 1986

POLICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

MEETING WITH SIR ELDON GRIFFITHS, 22 MARCH 1986

The Police Service in Northern Ireland, which currently consists of 8,250 regulars and 3,000 full and part-time reserves, feel extremely vulnerable at the moment, following the wave of protestant attacks on their homes. Temporarily, there is a lull but in the last months there have been, altogether, 248 attacks on the families and homes of 226 serving police officers and reserve officers. Officers are naturally worried while they are on duty. Attacks, as you know, have ranged from stoning (106 incidents) and daubing (71 incidents) to shooting (10 incidents), petrol bombing (29 incidents) and threats (71 incidents). In 45 cases, rehousing is urgently needed to allow officers and their families to escape further attacks.

There arise three difficulties: firstly, the question of where these officers should move; secondly, the loss of value of the home sold in these circumstances; and thirdly, if the house had been a public sector tenanted house where the officer had earned a rebate on the purchase value, the loss of this rebate.




The Financial Implications of the Federation's Case

On occasion, the new house to be purchased may cost much more than the one sold. Worse than this is the second problem, namely, that under the special purchase of evacuated houses arrangement, the valuer brought in by the administration frequently awards a price £2,000 or more below what is said to be the true value of the house. And worse still, the loss of housing rebate may amount to a loss of £5-6,000 to the police officer. If the Government was to compensate the loss of rebate alone, the total revenue implications in the short-term will amount to about £100-150,000, but in the course of the year, if the problem continued, it might amount to about £1 million.

Proposal

The Police Federation will say that an ex gratia payment should be paid by the Government to cover the loss of housing rebate for the handful of police who have lost it by being forced to move. It appears critical to the morale and support for the RUC that we assist in this way. However, it seems that the other two points need no help from you. The valuation point and the question of where to move, can either be resolved without your help or will be accepted by the RUC.



HARTLEY BOOTH



MR POWELL

21 April 1986

POLICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

We understand that, although Sir Eldon may be taking up some points concerning policing near Mildenhall and Lakenheath in Suffolk, his principal point relates to attacks on the Ulster Police Force. Our contacts in the RUC have provided the following briefing material which I have addressed to the Prime Minister.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of stylized, overlapping letters that appear to be 'H' and 'B'.

HARTLEY BOOTH



CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH SIR ELDON GRIFFITHS

He is coming to see you tomorrow about the RUC. The Northern Ireland Secretary is very sensitive about this meeting (he will not be present).

On the basis of his earlier letters he is likely to argue:

- that the attacks on the RUC should have been foreseen and preventitive action taken,
- that more needs to be done now to protect them;
- that you should see the Police Federation;
- that the Chief Constable is subject to political direction;
- that the RUC should be taken off border security duties.

You will want to make clear that the Government are very concerned about the welfare of the RUC and are doing a great deal to alleviate the problems (please see paragraph 7 of the brief). The measures taken will ensure that no member of the RUC is financially disadvantaged as a result of being intimidated. You will also want to rebut the allegation that the Chief Constable is subject to political direction in operational matters, and express full confidence in him (and indeed in Northern Ireland Office Ministers).

You might agree in principle to see the Federation but keep the timing open. They have just seen Northern Ireland Ministers and you don't want to seem a Court of Appeal from them.

Sir Eldon may also raise Libya. The main US bases are in his area.

C.P.

Charles Powell

21 April 1986

CONFIDENTIAL

JALAPZ



From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CC B/UP



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
WHITEHALL  
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Charles Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

21 April 1986

CJP

Dear Charles,

MEETING WITH SIR ELDON GRIFFITHS MP

... I attach, as discussed earlier, briefing material prepared by colleagues in Northern Ireland for the meeting tomorrow with Sir Eldon Griffiths MP. Unfortunately on this occasion due to other immoveable committments in Northern Ireland the Secretary of State will not be able to attend in support of the Prime Minister.

Yours Sincerely  
Neil Ward.

N D WARD

Encl

JLD



REPORTED INTIMIDATION/ATTACKS ON POLICE FAMILIES  
(from 3 March to 18 April 1986)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number attacked</u>	<u>No evacuated</u>
RUC (Regular)	76	16
Full-time Reserve	79	17
Part-time Reserve	44	6
Ex-members	14	1
Families	35	5
	Totals	45
	248	45

<u>Nature of Attack</u>	<u>Number</u>
Petrol Bombing	29
Shooting	10
Stoning	106
Threats	71
Slogans	8
Others	24
	Total
	248







# CONFIDENTIAL

## SIR ELDON GRIFFITHS - ATTACKS ON RUC

### Line to take

1. The Prime Minister could take the opportunity to underscore the Government's concern for the welfare and security of RUC members and their families and its full support for everything the Chief Constable and the Police Authority are doing to provide reassurance, financial assistance and added protection.
2. The opportunity could also be taken to re-emphasise that there is no question of the Chief Constable being subject to political control or direction in relation to his operational responsibilities; and perhaps also to suggest that it is of no less importance for those who have the interests of the RUC at heart to avoid any word or action which might call into question the Force's impartiality in enforcing the law.
3. Sir Eldon could be advised that Ministers have assured the Police Federation on 2 occasions recently that everything that can be done will be done to restore confidence in the political process in Northern Ireland - to isolate the extremists and to assist the Forces of law and order.
4. /If pressed - while responsibility for providing reassurance and direct support to the RUC must remain with the Secretary of State I would be content to meet the Police Federation if that would be helpful at some stage. Timing is important and I am concerned not to be seen to be involved in a way that might give rise to misconceptions/.

### Background

5. Since the "Day of Action" on 3 March 1986, there have been 246 attacks on the homes of RUC members and their families - by "Loyalist" extremists. As a result, 45 families have been evacuated (at 18 April) - details are attached at the Annex.



6. To counter the risk of attack from Republican terrorists many police families have chosen to live in or close to housing estates where Protestants are in a majority. Ironically it is in such areas that they are now most vulnerable to attack by the hooligan element. This makes it particularly difficult to relocate RUC families in "safe" areas - which may explain why most families have so far decided to stay put. But this only serves to add to the strain and pressure on RUC members and their families.

7. Following the events on 31 March in Portadown, the Chief Constable has tasked a special committee to examine all measures for alleviating the problems of police officers arising out of intimidation; to provide quick and effective assistance to families; and to ensure that communications within the Force are effective in countering rumours and misinformation about police operations and policy. The Police Staff Associations - the Police Federation, Superintendents' Association and ACPO - are each represented on the Committee. With the full support of the Police Authority and the NIO, the Committee has established procedures for providing tactical and financial assistance to intimidated families. These include:

- (i) purchase of owner occupied houses by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive under the SPED Scheme (special purchase of evacuated dwellings). RUC members are being given priority treatment.
- (ii) Ex-gratia payments to cover the full amount of any discount which has to be repaid to the NIHE in respect of the sale of houses previously purchased from the NIHE.



# CONFIDENTIAL

- (iii) Interest free loans to meet the cost of deposits for the purchase of new houses.
- (iv) Emergency cash advances up to £250.00 to RUC members who have to vacate; or where the home or personal property has been damaged.
- (v) Provision of leased furnished accommodation - at no additional cost to the officers while permanent accommodation is being sought.
- (vi) Immediate removal to emergency accommodation where necessary (police accommodation, hotels, rented/leased housing is available for this purpose).
- (vii) Special home security measures where the family intends to remain, this includes the immediate provision of special protective covering for windows and doors and, in the slightly longer term, a full range of security measures under the VIP Protection Scheme - average cost £8,000-£10,000.

8. These arrangements extend to all serving members of the Force, including the Part-time Reserve (who do not normally qualify for removal expenses as they are not liable to transfer). Their purpose is to ensure that no RUC members are financially disadvantaged as a result of being intimidated. The RUC Emergency Housing Unit will also provide advice and practical assistance to ex-members and police families.

9. Sir Eldon Griffiths can be expected to rehearse the points he has made in his recent correspondence with the Prime Minister and in various statements to the media about the



# CONFIDENTIAL

cause and effect of the current campaign of intimidation and attacks on the RUC: that the Chief Constable and/or the Government must take steps to convince the Force and the majority community that the Chief Constable is not subject to political direction in the context of the AI Conference, particularly in the handling of Loyalist parades; that the RUC should be relieved of border security responsibilities; that there is a crisis of morale in the RUC; and that more needs to be done to protect and reassure police officers and their families. He may also return to the theme that the Chief Constable should be replaced because he no longer has the confidence of his Force.

10. In most respects Sir Eldon's views reflect those of the Police Federation; and the rather strained relationship which has existed between that body and the Chief Constable for some years. Similar points were made by the Federation delegation which met the Secretary of State and Mr Scott on 15 April. Essentially they are preoccupied with the RUC's role in relation to the AI Agreement and the policing of parades. It is clear that they are under considerable pressure from hard liners in the Federated ranks to press for changes in the operational policy. However while the Federation are anxious that there should be some movement in the current political impasse between Unionists and the Government, they would not wish this to be perceived to have been brought about by the actions of extremists.

11. The Police Federation has also discussed their concerns with the Chief Constable. The special Committee on intimidation was established in response to these concerns. The Chief Constable has also assured the Staff Associations that whenever practicable they will be consulted in advance about the handling of controversial parades.

12. Sir Eldon is likely to press for a meeting between the Federation and the Prime Minister in the near future. The



**CONFIDENTIAL**

justification for this - in terms of providing further reassurance and underscoring the Government's support for the RUC - will need to be considered in the light of developments, on both the public order and political fronts.



*Pl. add to meeting folder on*

MR. POWELL

cc. Mr. Alison

As the Prime Minister is seeing Eldon Griffiths tomorrow Tuesday, 22nd April I thought I should report his telephone conversation to me last Friday afternoon.

1. Labour groups on those County Councils with US air bases were trying procedural devices in the hope that they could request a meeting at Westminster to complain of the action against Libya. The Labour Group in Suffolk was trying this but would fail because Conservatives were in control. But he had heard of moves afoot in Oxfordshire and Gloucestershire. Eldon hoped that any request for these County Councils to see the Prime Minister or the Environment Secretary would be turned down. I told him they would be and passed his message to the Special Adviser at the Department of the Environment. (I spoke to you about this point on Friday).
2. He expressed concern in case the annual air show at Mildenhall may be cancelled for security reasons because of over caution.
3. He told me (which you may know) that General Gabriel flew into the US air base after the action against Libya.

*S.S.*

STEPHEN SHERBOURNE

21.4.86



COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CC/R  
CC/BUP



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

WHITEHALL

LONDON SW1A 2AZ

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

18 April 1986

COP 21/4.

Dear Charles

Thank you for your letter of 10 April covering Sir Eldon Griffiths' letter urging the Prime Minister to see a delegation from the Police Federation for Northern Ireland. I attach a draft reply in the sense suggested by the Prime Minister.

I should mention that since the Prime Minister wrote to Mr Wright NIO Ministers have had 2 meetings with the Federation - Mr Scott met a Federation delegation on 11 April, and the Secretary of State and Mr Scott met a further delegation on 15 April. These meetings were well received by the Federation and will have helped to reassure them about the Government's concern for the plight of their members, and buttressed the position of the elected officials within the Federation, who are under considerable pressure from hard liners. While the meetings were ostensibly about the welfare of police officers and their families in the wake of the continuing campaign of intimidation, the Federation's main preoccupations were the effects of the impact of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Chief Constable's policy on parades. The attached copy minutes will give you some idea of the flavour.

We think there might also be some merit in Sir Eldon's suggestion that the Prime Minister might dedicate a plaque, or meet some police widows at Garnerville, the Federation's HQ, during her next visit, but we would need to ensure that the Chief Constable was associated with this and was fully on side. This is perhaps best left to another day and need not be covered in the draft reply.

I understand that the Prime Minister has now arranged to meet Sir Eldon on Tuesday next; separate briefing will be provided for this.

Yours sincerely  
J A Daniell

J A DANIELL

Enc

ji

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE POLICE FEDERATION  
HELD ON 15 APRIL.

Present:	Secretary of State	Mr Wright
	Mr Scott	Mr Elder
	Mr Radcliffe	Mr Milliken
	Mr McVeigh	Mr Beattie
	Mr Daniell	

1. Mr Wright said that the Federation was grateful for the speed with which the Secretary of State had issued an invitation to a meeting. The RUC were being alienated from the majority community, which put particular pressure on the wives and families of police officers. Families, left at home while policemen were at work, were the RUC's weak point; certain politicians saw the RUC as the Achilles heel of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. While the Federation welcomed the efforts being made to look after officers who had had to leave their homes, it had to act as a safety valve for the Force. Indeed, Mr Wright's public statement last week had helped defuse a crisis of confidence in the RUC. The Federation would resist pressures to take a stand against the Agreement; its role was not political. While the police would stand firm, they could reasonably look to others to make progress in the political field and thus help alleviate the pressures in the Force.
2. The Secretary of State welcomed the frank way in which these points had been put and recognised the pressures which the RUC were under. The Government would not make concessions on the Agreement which could be construed as a victory for loyalist terrorism; rather the aim would be to get talks going and encourage dialogue, rather than confrontation. Violence and intimidation against police families was a cause for legitimate concern on the part of the Federation. There were signs that



the level of such behaviour was reducing in the face of public condemnation and that much of it was now born of hooliganism as opposed to orchestrated political violence. Mr Milliken confirmed that for the present disturbances in his operational area, the Shankill, were not orchestrated but this was because the paramilitaries were holding back for the moment. There were a large number of paramilitaries armed and looking for an excuse to use their guns. These people were going through extensive training and would be supported by the local community if they shot policemen. In the country areas there was a real fear of civil war; this could be stopped but time was running out. Despite all of this, morale was good, especially "at the coal face" in those areas where the police had a real job to do in countering the threat.

3. Mr Wright said that statements made by Seamus Mallon could be very damaging, in that they fostered the impression of political influence on the RUC. Also it was very hurtful to hear suggestions that the Force needed to get through the present difficulties in order to prove its impartiality. He hoped that such ideas were not behind the present policy on marches. The Secretary of State gave an assurance that Ministers did not issue directives to the RUC on operational matters. He had complete confidence in the Chief Constable's operational role and the RUC could expect the Secretary of State's full support, not his interference.
  
4. Mr Milliken asked how the Secretary of State would define his role in relation to the RUC. He believed that Ministers could advise and give general directions and from what he had read it appeared entirely wrong to suggest that the Chief Constable had complete operational independence. Mr Scott said that Ministers provided administrative support, and the policy framework within which the security forces acted; but the Chief Constable was responsible only to the law for his operational judgements. The Secretary of State said that while inevitably such matters as the level of available resources had implications



for operational decisions, within that framework the Chief Constable was his own man in operational terms.

5. Mr Elder reiterated the concern that the RUC was being drawn into politics. While there were entrenched attitudes in the community, his members also saw such entrenchment at the political level. There should be no climb down on the part of the Government or the Unionists in order to allow for talks to take place; but perhaps it might prove possible for the Conference not to meet for a number of weeks in order to facilitate talks. It needed to be recognised that loyalist paramilitaries were opening up on a number of fronts - not just attacks on policemen, but also sectarian attacks, attacks on policemen's families, intimidation of the business community, etc. The log jam had to be broken soon.
  
6. Mr Milliken said that in 1970 there had been big changes in the RUC with Sir Arthur Young seeking to transform it into a modern, non-aggressive, unarmed and civilian force. Recruits wanted to join a civilian force. Yet the RUC, with its armed deployment, especially in border areas, was becoming a paramilitary organisation. It was not right that youngsters should be trained as policemen, given weapon training and then sent to the border areas as commandos. When there was a terrorist threat the Army should be used to the full. Also, Sir Arthur Young ordered that all references to a man's religion be removed from his records; yet this anti-discriminatory principle had been compromised by the Agreement which talked of improving recruitment from the minority community. How could this be done when ostensibly there was no means of monitoring religion<sup>us</sup> affiliation within the RUC. The Secretary of State replied that the RUC had evolved to meet the ever-changing circumstances of the Province. Mr Scott noted that in the early seventies the RUC had been essentially a "civilian" body while the Army carried out security duties. This approach was modified in 1976 by a policy of police primacy in which the RUC took the



lead in dealing with terrorist crime; this was an important step forward towards normality. It would be a retrograde step, leading to claims of victory on the part of the PIRA, if the Army were to re-assume responsibility for security matters. But the RUC had to be equipped to meet the threat.

7. Mr Wright expressed concern about reaction to the death of Kevin White. The Government should play a calming role in these circumstances. He went on to say that the Federation had had a useful meeting with the Chief Constable to discuss marches and had urged him to consult the staff association before recommending any bans. He had accepted this point which was an important step forward; it would not result in the staff association negotiating with the Chief Constable on operational issues.
8. Summing up the Secretary of State said he appreciated the professional way in which the RUC had continued to carry out their duties in the face of all the current difficulties. Government would continue to give the Force the backing that it required. The RUC's role was critical in that if violence succeeded it would be catastrophic; loyalist terrorism needed to be defeated before it could constitute a threat to the union. The RUC could not be expected to take all of the strain and the Government would play its part in seeking to get talks under way.
9. Mr Wright said that if the Prime Minister felt able to accept the Federation's request for a meeting, that would contribute significantly towards easing the pressure. The Secretary of State replied that he had told the Prime Minister of his meeting with the Federation and she took the view that his meeting should proceed in the first instance; but that did not rule out a meeting between the Federation and the Prime Minister at a later stage.





fo JA  
CNSW

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

18 April 1986

Dear Archbishop,

Thank you for your letter of 8 April and for your kind remarks about our recent conversations.

I entirely agree with you that, in the present difficult situation in Northern Ireland, dialogue rather than confrontation must be our aim. That is why Tom King and I are continuing to urge the Unionist leaders to resume discussions with the Government and I have recently written again to them.

I am most grateful for your offer of assistance, coming as it does from someone who is uniquely placed with contacts both North and South of the border. Tom King has told me of the positive way in which you have responded in your discussions with him. I shall certainly have very much in mind your kind and welcome offer of assistance.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

The Most Reverend The Archbishop of Armagh

nk



MR POWELL

We have received this further  
letter from Sir Eldon Griffiths  
which relates to his meeting with  
the Prime Minister to take place  
next Tuesday.

-154.86.

SHANA HOLE  
18.4.86



PERSONAL CONFIDENTIAL  
From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
WHITEHALL  
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

16 April 1986

*Dear Charles*

You wrote to me on 12 April forwarding a copy of a Private and Confidential letter to the Prime Minister from the Archbishop of Armagh. I enclose a draft reply.

Although his public utterances about the Anglo-Irish Agreement have not always been helpful, the Archbishop now seems genuine in his desire to assist us. But in the present delicate state of negotiations with the Unionist leaders we do not think there is anything more which we could usefully ask him to do at the present time. The draft reply therefore simply thanks him for his offer and says that we will take it up if and when we think it would be helpful to do so.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Yours sincerely  
Jim Daniels*

J A DANIELL

Enc

PERSONAL CONFIDENTIAL



ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE .....

<p>To</p> <p>The Most Reverend The Archbishop of Armagh The See House 32 Knockdene Park South BELFAST BT5 7AB</p> <p>(Full Postal Address)</p>	<p>Enclosures</p>	<p>Copies to be sent to</p> <p><i>To Home</i></p> <p><i>DAIAPP</i></p> <p><i>Dear Archbishop</i></p> <p>(Full Address, if Necessary)</p>
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LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY THE PRIME MINISTER  
(Name of Signatory)

Thank you for your letter of 8 April and for your kind remarks about our recent conversations.

I entirely agree with you that, in the present difficult situation in Northern Ireland, dialogue rather than confrontation must be our aim. That is why Tom King and I are continuing to urge the Unionist leaders to resume discussions with the Government. *and have really written again to them.*

I am most grateful for your offer of assistance, coming as it does from someone who is uniquely placed with contacts both North and South of the border. Tom King has told me of the positive way in which you have responded in your discussions with him, and we *will* certainly have very much in mind your *kind* welcome offer of assistance, ~~if the right moment arises.~~

*CP2*



PA



10 DOWNING STREET

Je VK  
C Press of  
NIO  
FC

THE PRIME MINISTER

16 April 1986

of F  
you have previous  
Pps. JF 17/4

Dear Mr. Paisley

Thank you for the letter which you and Mr. Molyneux sent to me on 2 April. I welcome your wish to find a way out of the present impasse. You told me in your letter of 7 March that your purpose was to create a framework within which dialogue can take place. For my part I am ready to arrange discussions to try and see whether such a framework can be established. May I say how much I hope that it can and that it will lead on to a constructive dialogue.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

The Reverend Ian Paisley, M.P.





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

16 April 1986

*Dear Jim,*

Thank you for the letter which you and Dr. Paisley sent to me on 2 April. I welcome your wish to find a way out of the present impasse. You told me in your letter of 7 March that your purpose was to create a framework within which dialogue can take place. For my part I am ready to arrange discussions to try and see whether such a framework can be established. May I say how much I hope that it can and that it will lead on to a constructive dialogue.

*Yours*

*Raymond*

The Right Honourable James Molyneux, M.P.

*JE VC  
Cress H  
MO  
FCO*





HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Personal &  
Confidential  
15 April 1986

Dear Michael,

RUC

Though overshadowed by Libya, the situation in N.I. continues to be fraught with difficulties within the RUC.

I attach a letter from a senior police figure which I hope you will read, and convey - at least in brief to the P. I.

For obvious reasons, I cannot allow him to be identified: but he is a far better figure than anyone in the P. I.

I begin to think that John Hermon is soon going to be more at risk to his own men, than he is to either the IRA or the ~~UDF~~ UDF.

Yours  
—



Dear Eldon,

DATE: 7. 4. 1986.

Further to my recent letter to you, it is with regret that I must inform you that the situation has deteriorated, to the extent that the Boss Man is not now taking into his confidence, not only his deputy, but also his Assistants. I can give instances of this if necessary. The situation with the Supers is one of suspicion, & I need not tell you the position with regard to the other people whom you met recently is now one of mistrust and a feeling of "who the hell cares".

I know it must be frustrating to people like yourself, who may not understand the Ulsterman, simply because one must live here & be a part of society to come to terms with the past & the present. It is very difficult to make sense of the citizen who relies on the policeman to protect him & his property one minute, & then clobber him the next, but in view of recent happenings, let me assure you that had the R.U.C., been given leadership & guidance, this would not have happened. It is no good for the Boss to say we shall not allow this or that, & then give no details as to his reason. As you know the Ulsterman does not like to be kept in the dark about his future, but let me assure you that if he is given a full and



and outrage. so what I am saying why do the S.O.S., & his ministers not have a little more thought for the police, & before embarking on one of their "talking missions" or whatever, think and say "Is journey really necessary".

I personally think that what is needed, is not more talking, or police or troops, but let everyone examine himself and ask himself, what can I personally do to help in the present situation ?

As far as the police are concerned, we urgently need leadership, cooperation with ALL ranks, like Gen. Montgomery, explain to the men what is happening dont keep them in the dark, unless you have something to hide. As for the politicians, well all I can say is, like the Miners Strike, when politicians require to get their own way, throw in the police, alas this will not work in Ulster.

Although I did ~~not~~ get a reply to my last letter, nor were my telephone calls returned, not that I am unduly worried as I know only too well how desperately busy you are, I do beg you to please read what I have said very carefully, and as you know, I am neither in any political organisation, Orange Order or the Masons, & for that reason, I must consider myself an ordinary man in the street.



Ref. A086/1125

MR POWELL

Thank you for your minute of <sup>at Har.</sup> 8 April concerning the Taoiseach's indirect contact with Mr James Molyneux.

2. The Irish Ambassador called on me again on 11 April, to say that, through that contact, Mr Molyneux had now proposed a meeting with the Taoiseach. He said that the Taoiseach would wish to keep closely in touch with the Prime Minister on this, and asked what I thought the Government's views were likely to be.

3. I said that I thought that the Prime Minister would want to leave it to the Taoiseach to decide whether to see Mr Molyneux. I did not think that we should want to advise the Taoiseach definitely not to do so. That would suggest that the Irish Government had no interest in encouraging political dialogue in Northern Ireland, and could be misrepresented by Mr Molyneux. Nevertheless I thought that there was merit in taking an extremely cautious attitude toward and in any such contacts. It did not seem to be in Mr Molyneux's interests for him to disclose any direct contacts with the Dublin Government; but the contacts ought to be conducted on the basis that he might do so, and that in doing so he might misrepresent what the Taoiseach said. It would be particularly important that nothing should be said that might be taken or misrepresented as meaning that the Irish Government were ready (or readier than the British Government) to abandon, modify or suspend the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

4. The Irish Ambassador said that that was very much the Irish Government's own view. They had been impressed by the firmness which the Prime Minister and other British Ministers had shown,





especially in Parliamentary exchanges on 10 April, in standing squarely by the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Taoiseach would wish to be no whit less firm himself. No final decision had been taken about a meeting with Mr Molyneaux. If the Taoiseach did decide to proceed with the idea, he would keep us informed.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

14 April 1986



IRISH AND MALTA ATIS



Faint, illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 APR 1956

SECRET AND PERSONAL

NOIAR





In confidence

(Not conveyed to Barrett)

(Re return)

Michael

The situation in NI is

deteriorating — despite appearances to  
the contrary, For your information

(and P.T.'s only):

(1) 80 policemen met last night in  
Dungannon and demanded of the PF

(a) No more policing of bans on  
majority parades.

(b) Vote of no confidence in bluff  
Barrett.

(c) Rebel Federation to be formed if  
TCC did not act as at (a) & (b).

MO



② Attached is the list of points

Alan Wright is mandated by JCO

to convey to the Chief and Tom King.

— please write 1, 2, and 5.

③ Credibility of NIO is at rock bottom

with police, due to

(1) broken promise our "protection" of  
their homes

(2) rejection of their advice on parades

(as conveyed by me to S & S many months ago)

(3) Support for Hermon's "gag".

---

I do BEG you to try to get breakfast  
to see them — at least me! — Ted



C LES

Would you like  
this letter  
acknowledged?

Sally  
12.4.86

Better to wait  
until we can give  
a substantive reply  
em



file  
CCPC



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 April 1986

I enclose for your Secretary of State's information a copy of a strictly private and confidential letter to the Prime Minister from the Archbishop of Armagh. Knowledge of it should be restricted as closely as possible. -8.4.86

BF 11

I should be grateful for advice and an early draft reply.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Sir Robert Armstrong.

of F to  
D/f

C D POWELL

J A Daniell Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

881



Ireland, Situation

PERSONAL

PRIME MINISTER

You agreed to see Eldon Griffiths to talk about police matters in Northern Ireland. We are arranging this for Tuesday week.

Tom King knows (from Michael Alison) that Eldon wants to see you, and takes the view that he should be present. This is constitutionally correct. But it will be an unhappy meeting; and anyway you regard Eldon as a friend, entitled to see you alone.

I think that you should tell Tom King that you will see Eldon alone; but ask him to let you have a really good brief on the basis of which you can deal with Eldon's complaints.

Agree? *Yes*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*CDP*

C D POWELL

11 April 1986

SL3APD

*Spoken to NIO.  
By all means a  
speaking note for BF  
the PM.  
CDP. 14L*

PERSONAL



PC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 April 1986

Dear Charles,

Letter from James Molyneux MP and Ian Paisley MP

The Foreign Secretary has seen the proposed draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature to send to Messrs Molyneux and Paisley in response to their letter of 2 April, contained in Daniell's letter to you of 8 April, and is content with it.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office) and to Jim Daniell (NIO).

Yours ever,  
*A C Galsworthy*


(A C Galsworthy)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AA





CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

10 April 1986

The Prime Minister and the Northern Ireland Secretary had a word this evening about the proposed reply to Mr. Molyneux and Dr. Paisley, to which both of them had some amendments to propose. I enclose a copy of the text as it emerged. If your Secretary of State is content, I shall get the Prime Minister to sign it but hold it here until you confirm that you are content for it to be despatched.

C.D. POWELL

J.A. Daniell, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

NC3AMZ

fee

EC





NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

WHITEHALL

LONDON SW1A 2AZ

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

*I have spoken  
to Mr. Kilfedder  
who insists that  
he does not  
want a formal  
reply. So please suspend.*

10<sup>th</sup> April 1986

*CDP 1074.*

*Dear Charles,*

Thank you for your letter of 26 March in which you requested a draft reply to Mr James Kilfedder's letter of 26 March to the Prime Minister.

Mr Kilfedder suggests that The Queen might be invited to call a conference on devolved government for Northern Ireland. He recalls that in 1914 King George V summoned Irish political leaders and the Government to a conference at Buckingham Palace. The King did indeed bring together the leaders of all the British and Irish parties to discuss an amending Bill, dealing separately with Ulster, to the Home Rule Bill. Although he was instrumental in setting up the conference, he did not take part in it himself. He had already been brought personally into the dispute by calls that he should dismiss the Liberal Government. There had been a near mutiny at the Curragh and both unionists and nationalists were openly arming themselves. However, the conference failed to achieve agreement.

It would be a mistake to compare circumstances then and now in reply to Mr Kilfedder. But in 1914 they were fundamentally different. The King was already involved and the matter seriously divided the two main parties at Westminster. There was also a threatening international situation. Mr Kilfedder's suggestion, on the other hand, would bring Her Majesty, for the first time into the politics of devolution and the Anglo-Irish Agreement. It would be wholly undesirable to associate The Queen with such a politically controversial issue in breach of the convention that she stands apart from political activity. Thus the draft reply to Mr Kilfedder rejects his idea, but acknowledges the helpful motive - that is his desire to find a way of encouraging the Ulster Unionist and Democratic Unionist Parties to start talking about their concerns with the Government.

*Yours Sincerely  
Neil Ward*

N D WARD








idea publicly. But I am grateful to you for seeking to find ways of encouraging the leaders of the Official Unionist and Democratic Unionist Parties to take the constructive path of discussion.





IRELAND Relations PT13





PRIME MINISTER

CDJ  
15/4

REPLY TO MR MOLYNEAUX AND DR PAISLEY

Tim King has produced the attached very brief reply to the recent letter from Mr Molyneux and Dr Paisley. You will recall that he said this afternoon that he thought it would be a mistake ~~at~~ this time for you to reply at any length.

You were keen to establish a firm agenda for any talks with Mr Molyneux <sup>and</sup> ~~Dr Paisley~~ though this could be followed up orally rather than put in the letter where it might smack of a pre-condition.

Are you content to write to Mr Molyneux and Dr Paisley in these terms?

CDP

Charles Powell

9 April 1986



Please file

CM



Charles Towell Esq

with the  
compliments of

Michael Alton

(Lord Brookeborough  
left this Memo.)

HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA



(13)

AIDE-MEMOIRE

1. "NO COMMITMENTS EXIST ON HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO CONSULT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON MATTERS AFFECTING NORTHERN IRELAND. THAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN OUR POSITION. WE REITERATE AND EMPHASISE IT, SO THAT EVERYONE IS CLEAR ABOUT IT".

(THE PRIME MINISTER, HANSARD,  
29TH JULY 1982, COLUMN 1226).

2. "WE TRY TO WORK WITH THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND, BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND TO DO SO. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF NORTHERN IRELAND IS A MATTER FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND THIS PARLIAMENT, AND FOR NO ONE ELSE"

(THE PRIME MINISTER, HANSARD  
17TH MAY 1984, COLUMN 503).

3. ARTICLE 1 OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT AFFIRMS "THAT ANY CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD ONLY COME ABOUT WITH THE CONSENT OF A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND". BUT THE AGREEMENT ITSELF DOES BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND, AND WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF A MAJORITY.

4. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD NEVER HAVE ENTERED INTO THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT UNLESS IT BELIEVED THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE MINORITY. WHY DID IT ENTER INTO THE AGREEMENT KNOWING THAT IT WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE MAJORITY?

5. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, THE MAJORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND SEES THE REPUBLIC AS A HOSTILE POWER. HOSTILE IN THE SENSE THAT ARTICLE



2

2 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC LAYS CLAIM TO THE TERRITORY OF NORTHERN IRELAND. ARTICLE 2 OF THE REPUBLIC'S CONSTITUTION HAS NOT BEEN REMOVED FOLLOWING THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT. FURTHERMORE, THE MAJORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND SEES THE REPUBLIC AS A COUNTRY FROM WHOSE TERRITORY MURDEROUS ASSAULTS HAVE BEEN MADE UPON THE INNOCENT IN ULSTER, AND TO WHOSE TERRITORY THE GUILTY HAVE RETURNED AND IN WHICH, TOO OFTEN, THE GUILTY HAVE FOUND SANCTUARY.

6. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CLAIMS THAT THERE ARE TWO GREAT ADVANTAGES WHICH FLOW FROM THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT:-

- (a) THAT THE REPUBLIC AFFIRMS "THAT ANY CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD ONLY COME ABOUT WITH THE CONSENT OF A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND". HOWEVER, THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON 9TH DECEMBER 1973 AFTER THE SUNNINGDALE CONFERENCE ASSERTS: "THE IRISH GOVERNMENT FULLY ACCEPTED AND SOLEMNLY DECLARED THAT THERE COULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND UNTIL A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND DESIRED A CHANGE IN THAT STATUS". FURTHERMORE, THE COMMUNIQUE WENT ON: "THE CONFERENCE AGREED THAT A FORMAL AGREEMENT INCORPORATING THE DECLARATIONS OF THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE SIGNED AT THE FORMAL STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE AND REGISTERED AT THE UNITED NATIONS".
- (b) THAT THE REPUBLIC AGREES THAT THERE WILL BE CLOSER CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION IN THE DEFEAT OF TERRORISM. HOWEVER, FOLLOWING EACH MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM SINCE MAY 1979, EACH



COMMUNIQUE HAS STATED THE COMMITMENT OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO CLOSER CO-OPERATION IN THE DEFEAT OF TERRORISM.

7. UNDER THE AGREEMENT, THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY IN THE PROVINCE HAS AS ITS SPOKESMAN NOT THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY, BUT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS TO PUT FORWARD VIEWS AND PROPOSALS ON POLITICAL, SECURITY AND LEGAL MATTERS, INCLUDING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. WHERE THERE ARE DIFFERENCES, "DETERMINED EFFORTS SHALL BE MADE THROUGH THE CONFERENCE TO RESOLVE ANY DIFFERENCES". THUS A SPECIAL AND PRIVILEGED ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVINCE IS GIVEN TO THE REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS NOT ACCOUNTABLE TO ANYONE IN THE PROVINCE, AND WHERE THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN THE IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS DETERMINED EFFORTS HAVE TO BE MADE TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CLAIMS THAT THE AGREEMENT IS CONSULTATIVE ONLY. BUT THE IRISH INTERPRETATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT. THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF THE IRISH REPUBLIC, IN A FORMAL DOCUMENT ISSUED ON 15TH NOVEMBER 1985 HAS SAID:-

- (a) "THE ROLE OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, AND INDEED OF THE CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH NOT EXECUTIVE, IS THUS OBVIOUSLY MORE THAN CONSULTATIVE".
- (b) "IT IS NOT MERELY CONSULTATIVE. IT INVOLVES MUCH MORE THAN A MERE OBLIGATION ON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO ASK THE IRISH GOVERNMENT FOR ITS VIEWS ON CERTAIN MATTERS. IT GIVES TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT THE RIGHT TO PUT FORWARD ITS VIEWS AND PROPOSALS OVER THE WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES AND IMPOSES A LEGAL OBLIGATION ON THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE



4

DETERMINED EFFORTS THROUGH THE CONFERENCE TO RESOLVE ANY DIFFERENCES".

8. IT WAS A MAJOR ERROR TO HAVE SIGNED THE AGREEMENT AT HILLSBOROUGH. THAT CANNOT BE UNDONE. HOWEVER, NOTHING IN THE AGREEMENT REQUIRES THAT THE SECRETARIAT SHOULD BE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, NOR THAT MEETINGS OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL SHOULD BE HELD IN THE PROVINCE. THE SECRETARIAT SHOULD BE MOVED TO LONDON. FUTURE MEETINGS OF MINISTERS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN LONDON OR IN DUBLIN.

9. ARTICLE 4 REFERS TO DEVOLUTION "ON A BASIS WHICH WOULD SECURE WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY". ARTICLE 10 REFERS TO "DEVOLUTION ON A BASIS WHICH SECURES WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND". IT IS TOTALLY INCONSISTENT TO REFER TO "WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE" IN ARTICLES 4 and 10, BUT TO PROCEED WITH THE AGREEMENT ITSELF EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE.

10. UNFORTUNATELY, MANY PEOPLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND BELIEVE THAT THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN SIGNED UNLESS IT HAD BEEN PRECEDED BY A PROLONGED CAMPAIGN OF TERROR; THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IGNORED THE WARNINGS GIVEN BY ELECTED UNIONIST LEADERS BEFORE THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED; THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS IGNORED THE CLEAR VERDICT OF THE FIFTEEN BY-ELECTIONS OF 23RD JANUARY 1986, WHICH IN EFFECT, CONSTITUTED A REFERENDUM ON THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT IN FIFTEEN OUT OF SEVENTEEN NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTITUENCIES; THAT ALL THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERS OF UNIONISM HAVE ACHIEVED AT THE END OF SEVENTEEN YEARS OF TERROR IS THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT; THAT ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT SAYS THAT IT WILL



HEED ONLY THE BALLOT BOX AND NOT THE BULLET AND THE BOMB, THE BALLOT BOX HAS BEEN IGNORED IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THAT THE BULLET AND THE BOMB HAVE WON THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT; THAT THEIR OWN POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE BEEN DOWNGRADED AND DISCREDITED BECAUSE THEIR ADVICE HAS NOT BEEN HEEDDED; AND THAT THE ONLY WAY NOW IN WHICH TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR DEEP HOSTILITY TO THE AGREEMENT IS THROUGH UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND UNLAWFUL METHODS.

11. DESPITE ATTEMPTS BY GOVERNMENT MINISTERS DURING THE PAST FIVE MONTHS TO PERSUADE THE MAJORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND THAT "THE AGREEMENT IS GOOD FOR THEM", HOSTILITY TO THE AGREEMENT IS MORE WIDESPREAD IN APRIL 1986 THAN IN NOVEMBER 1985.

12. THE WAY FORWARD

- (a) TALKS WITH THE UNIONIST POLITICAL LEADERS MUST BE RESUMED.
- (b) IF THE UNIONIST LEADERS WERE TO AGREE TO RENEW TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WITH THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL ~~CONFERENCE~~ CONFERENCE STILL MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF UNIONISM WOULD BE REPUDIATED BY THE RANK AND FILE.
- (c) THUS, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ANNOUNCE THAT NO MEETINGS OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL WILL TAKE PLACE, FOR SAY, THREE MONTHS.



6

(a) FOR FURTHER TALKS BETWEEN THE UNIONIST LEADERS AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO FAIL, WOULD BE A DISASTER. THUS, ANY FRESH TALKS WOULD NEED TO BE PRECEDED BY INFORMAL CONTACTS, SO AS TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR THOSE FORMAL TALKS.

9th April 1986



Ref. A086/1078

PRIME MINISTER

---

Cabinet: Northern Ireland

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will wish to report on the security situation in Northern Ireland, notably the events of Easter Monday and the attacks by loyalist elements on members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, which have continued since then. He will no doubt also cover the increasing polarisation in the unionist community and the question whether Mr Molyneux and other politicians will wish in due course to start a dialogue with the Government. (The draft reply to the latest letter to you from Messrs Molyneux and Paisley, enclosed with Mr Daniell's letter of 8 April to Mr Powell, is relevant; so is my minute of 7 April about secret contact between Mr Molyneux and the Taoiseach, of which only the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Chief Whip are informed.)

2. You may wish to ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland whether the attacks on members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary are likely to continue and more generally about the prospects for public order. There is information that a loyalist march is planned on 5 May in Portadown, organised by the same people and using the same route as was foreseen for the march banned on Easter Monday.

3. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was invited by OD(I) on 4 March to review contingency plans for dealing with major disruption in Northern Ireland. I understand that he is reviewing the plans and may write to colleagues within a couple of weeks. In view of the importance of the subject - especially



SECRET

given the long period which the Government has had to prepare for a major crisis - you may wish in Cabinet to ask the Secretary of State to circulate his views as soon as possible.

RIA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

9 April 1986





NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
WHITEHALL  
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

*c - Mr. Mallaby*

CABINET OFFICE	
<b>A</b>	3598
8 APR 1986	
FILING INSTRUCTIONS	
FILE No.	.....

8 April 1986

*Dear Charles,*

I am replying to Tim Flesher's letter of 3 April asking for a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Messrs Molyneux and Paisley in response to their letter of 2 April.

... The Secretary of State feels that the attached short draft is the most likely way to achieve the aim of drawing a positive response from the unionist leaders. The draft does not contain anything to which they are likely to take exception and nor does it give them anything which they might interpret as a concession. The Secretary of State would like to consider further the question of when the letter should issue and I will be in touch about this.

/ I am copying this letter to Colin Budd (FCO) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely  
Neil Ward*

J A DANIELL



RESTRICTED

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

<p>To</p> <p>The Rt Hon James Molyneaux JP MP</p> <p>Rev Ian Paisley MP</p> <p>(Full Postal Address)</p>	<p>Enclosures</p>	<p>Copies to be sent to</p> <p>(Full Address, if Necessary)</p>
--	-------------------	---

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY PRIME MINISTER  
(Name of Signatory)

Thank you for the letter which you and [Dr Paisley] [Mr Molyneaux] sent to me on 2 April. I welcome your wish to find a way out of the present impasse. For my part, I am ready to discuss with you ~~all~~ the issues you have raised with me, including the contents of the resolutions which you sent to me with your letter of 7 March.

*not the original record*

We have both said that we prefer consultation to confrontation. You told me in your letter of 7 March that your purpose was to create a framework within which dialogue can take place. I believe that we should now meet to see whether such a framework can be established.

*MT*

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED



file

8/4/86

SUBJECT CC MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 April 1986

Dear Jim,


**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH LORD MOYOLA AND LORD BROOKEBOROUGH**

The Prime Minister had a talk this afternoon with Lord Moyola and Lord Brookeborough about the situation in Northern Ireland. The Lord President and Northern Ireland Secretary were also present. I do not propose to record the discussion in any detail because most of it was in familiar terms.

The Prime Minister spoke forcefully of the need for moderates in Northern Ireland to stop wringing their hands and to come forward with practical proposals. She lay particular stress on the need for support for the RUC and suggested that companies, groups and organisations might, for instance, take steps to place advertisements declaring their support for the police.

Lord Brookeborough and Lord Moyola for their part placed particular emphasis on the need to persuade Mr. Molyneaux to resume discussions with the Government. They thought it essential to detach the UUP from the DUP. There were many in the UUP who were keen to see negotiations take place between their party and the Government. They thought that once Mr. Molyneaux was engaged in the process, he would receive steadily growing support for continuing it. The Prime Minister said that she would be replying shortly to the most recent letter from Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley. She was certainly open to further discussions though it was important to have a specific agenda which made clear where such discussions were headed. Otherwise they would rapidly reach deadlock on all the issues which had prevented progress for years.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office) and Colin Budd (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Yours sincerely  
  
(C. D. POWELL)

Jim Daniell, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

RESTRICTED

8/4/86



Charles

CRB/14

J. KILFEDDER, MP.

at flap

He wrote to PM

5-10 days ago & received  
an acknowledgement.

He doesn't want a  
formal reply but would  
appreciate an informal  
reply from you on the  
'phone.

He's at his London  
Flat, you may call him  
either tonight or  
tomorrow.

405 6226

8

CRP telephoned  
20.00 9/4/86

Julie

9.4.86





NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
WHITEHALL  
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

8 April 1986

*Dear Charles,*

I am replying to Tim Flesher's letter of 3 April asking for a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Messrs Molyneux and Paisley in response to their letter of 2 April.

... The Secretary of State feels that the attached short draft is the most likely way to achieve the aim of drawing a positive response from the unionist leaders. The draft does not contain anything to which they are likely to take exception and nor does it give them anything which they might interpret as a concession. The Secretary of State would like to consider further the question of when the letter should issue and I will be in touch about this.

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*Yours sincerely  
Neil Wand*

J A DANIELL



RESTRICTED

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

To	Enclosures	Copies to be sent to
<p>The Rt Hon James Molyneaux JP MP</p> <p>Rev Ian Paisley MP</p> <p>(Full Postal Address)</p>		<p>(Full Address, if Necessary)</p>

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY PRIME MINISTER  
(Name of Signatory)


Thank you for the letter which you and [Dr Paisley] [Mr Molyneaux] sent to me on 2 April. I welcome your wish to find a way out of the present impasse. For my part, I am ready to discuss with you all the issues you have raised with me, including the contents of the resolutions which you sent to me with your letter of 7 March.

We have both said that we prefer consultation to confrontation. You told me in your letter of 7 March that your purpose was to create a framework within which dialogue can take place. I believe that we should now meet to see whether such a framework can be established.

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED





The Most Reverend  
THE ARCHBISHOP OF ARMAGH,

The See House  
Cathedral Close  
ARMAGH BT61 7EE  
Telephone: Armagh 522851

8 April 1986

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

The Right Honourable the Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

Prime Minister  
Agree that I may show  
this on a strictly  
personal basis to  
Yes Mr. King & RTA? You will  
no doubt want to discuss  
it with them. CDP 11/4

My dear Prime Minister,

You will recall that on two occasions I had the pleasure and privilege of talking with you in Downing Street regarding the situation in Northern Ireland. I would like you to know how valuable I found these conversations to be.

Since those meetings took place I have been in confidential contact with several of the main political leaders involved in the Irish situation, both north and south. These contacts are continuing and I believe are based now on mutual trust. I understand from Dublin that your office was informed of my involvement in this regard yesterday.

I write to you at this juncture in strictest confidence to assure you of my willingness to consider any request or suggestion which you may feel you would like to make should you see a role I could play in the light of the growing seriousness of the situation in Northern Ireland. I am extremely concerned at recent trends in our situation and I believe that dialogue is the only way forward. I am equally aware of the opportunities open to you to engage in contacts with the leaders of the political parties in the Province at this time. However it may be that you would see some aspect of the problem with which someone in my position could be of assistance.





The Most Reverend  
THE ARCHBISHOP OF ARMAGH,

The See House  
Cathedral Close  
ARMAGH BT61 7EE  
Telephone: Armagh 522851

continued/

Should this occasion arise may I again assure you of my willingness to consider any request and to use the position I now hold on an all-Ireland basis to extend further the contacts I have fostered.

I realise that you are as aware as I am of the seriousness of the situation in Northern Ireland over the past few weeks. I fear that unless political progress can be made soon in terms of dialogue then we shall find ourselves facing an almost total erosion of constitutional politics. Given our conditions the road back from the politics of the street to that of the constitutional representative will be long and dangerous.

Within the spirit of our previous conversations at Downing Street I write to assure you of my continuing concern and prayers in the difficult task which faces you in Ireland. Please be assured of my sincerity in making the above offer at this time.

Perhaps you would be kind enough to address any correspondence on this subject to me at the following address:

The See House, 32 Knockdene Park South, Belfast BT5 7AB (653973).

Should you at any time wish to talk to me in confidence I am prepared to fly over to London for that purpose.





The Most Reverend  
THE ARCHBISHOP OF ARMAGH, \_\_\_\_\_

The See House  
Cathedral Close  
ARMAGH BT61 7EE  
Telephone: Armagh 522851

continued/

Thank you again for the opportunity of meeting for discussions at  
Downing Street.

With kindest personal regards,

Yours very sincerely,

+ Arch. Armagh.



9 JD



## 10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

The Prime Minister has noted the Irish Ambassador's approach to you yesterday to report on the Taoiseach's indirect contact with Mr. James Molyneaux. She is a little puzzled about some of the dates given for the contacts since she is under the impression that we knew about them in general terms before Easter. That is my recollection too.

The Prime Minister has also commented that we cannot undertake to keep the Irish Government informed in detail of our own contacts with Unionist leaders since that is an internal United Kingdom matter.

The Taoiseach's reported reply to Mr. Molyneaux does of course go beyond anything which we have said to the Unionist leaders, in stating explicitly a readiness to give priority to talks on devolution vis-a-vis the Intergovernmental Conference for a period of two months. We shall need to consider to what extent this affects our reply to the recent letter from Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley: or whether it is a point which should be renewed for discussion with Mr. Molyneaux alone.

The Prime Minister would be content for your minute and the note attached to it to be copied on a personal basis to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Northern Ireland Secretary and the Chief Whip together with a copy of this minute.

C.D.P.

C.D. Powell

8 April, 1986.

SMA



ALC  
BUP.



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
WHITEHALL  
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

7<sup>th</sup> April 1986

Prime Minister  
The Lord President &  
Northern Ireland Secretary  
will also be present for  
this meeting.

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 21 March, requesting briefing for Lord Brookeborough's and Lord Moyola's call on the Prime Minister on Wednesday 9 April to discuss the current political scene in Northern Ireland and in particular the Anglo-Irish Agreement and devolution.

copy 4.

I attach a short brief at Annex A and personality notes on Lords Brookeborough and Moyola at Annex B.

I am copying this letter to Joan MacNaughton.

Yours Sincerely  
Neil Ward

N D WARD



MEETING WITH LORDS BROOKEBOROUGH AND MOYOLA ON 9 APRIL

Objectives

The Prime Minister may wish to use the meeting to:

- (a) convince the two Lords that neither the Anglo-Irish Agreement nor meetings of the Intergovernmental Conference can be suspended;
- (b) persuade them to use their influence to get the Unionists to resume their dialogue with the Government about devolution, improved arrangements for Unionists to put forward views and proposals to Ministers and the handling of Northern Ireland business in Parliament;
- (c) listen to their concerns.

Background

Lord Moyola is a former Prime Minister of Northern Ireland and Lord Brookeborough a former Stormont Minister. Both are traditional 'moderate' Unionists (although Brookeborough injected a particularly sour note in the Lords debate on the Statement following the Day of Action suggesting the violence was the predictable consequence of the Agreement). Neither has a great public following but they can be regarded as elder statesmen. Both are anxious that a way should be found out of the present impasse between Government and the Unionists. Indeed, both spoke on this theme during the recent Lords debate on the Northern Ireland Appropriation Order:

Lord Brookeborough (H of L 20/4 Col 1072)

"I beg the Government that, having misjudged the reaction of the Unionists - and my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said that they had misjudged the reaction - they must do all that they can to help the Unionists back



to the table. They must be magnanimous. I also appeal to the Ulster Unionist Party to find a formula which leads back to Downing Street. To fail to talk will lead to bloodshed and independence."

Lord Moyola (H of L 20/4 Col 1077):

"I think it should be borne in mind when entering into the talks that a lot of people have got themselves into positions which they cannot get out of at the moment without drastic loss of face. Great efforts to try to resolve this particular difficulty must be made on both sides. I say "both sides" because I honestly suspect that Her Majesty's Government had no realisation at all of what a storm this agreement was going to create."

It is likely that the two Lords will seek some concession from Government such as the suspension of meetings of the Intergovernmental Conference to enable the dialogue to resume.

It is possible that the meeting may take on more than usual significance because the reply from Mr Molyneux and Dr Paisley to the Prime Minister's letter of 21 March is likely to have been made public. It rejected the Prime Minister's offers in her letter, on the grounds that it did not offer enough flexibility. In her letter the Prime Minister had made it clear that the Agreement could not be suspended but that the Government was prepared to take part in a Round Table Conference (suggested by Mr Molyneux and Dr Paisley) and that the Government's offer of dialogue on improved methods of hearing Unionist views and of handling of Northern Ireland Parliamentary business remained on the table.

Suggested Points to Make:

- (a) agree with Lord Brookeborough's remarks in the House of Lords that the Government should do all it can to help the Unionists back to the table. My letter of 21 March was intended to do that. There is much in the Government's offers that should attract them.



- (b) The Government would like to take part in a Round Table Conference on devolution. If there was agreement on devolution, under the terms of the Agreement the subjects devolved would no longer be within the scope of the Intergovernmental Conference. We should in these circumstances need to review the implications of any devolution proposals for the working of the Intergovernmental Conference.
- (c) We have also offered to discuss improved arrangements for Unionists to put forward views and proposals to Ministers and for the handling of Northern Ireland business in Parliament.
- (d) I would hope you could use your influence to think further about the offers. I am disappointed by Jim Molyneaux's and Ian Paisley's response. But the offers remain open. We want to work with them.
- (e) The alternative of confrontation would be disastrous for Northern Ireland. The Province's image would be damaged further along with existing and possible future employment. The people in Great Britain may lose patience with the Union.
- (f) The Government remains committed to implementing the Agreement. We will do so sensitively and in the best interests of the people of Northern Ireland. But we cannot give up an Agreement overwhelmingly approved by Parliament, which offers benefits to all the people of Northern Ireland. It has put the principle of consent to any change in Northern Ireland's status in a binding international agreement. That should be of immense value to those who cherish the Union. It provides a basis for us to get the security co-ordination with the Republic we need. It reassures the minority and, we hope, will get them to accept the institutions of Northern Ireland. And it is not joint authority - we continue to take the decisions.



VISCOUNT BROOKEBOROUGH

Independent Unionist (formerly UPNI)

Background

Born in Brookeborough in Co Fermanagh in 1922, John Brooks was the second son of the first Lord Brookeborough, third Prime Minister of Northern Ireland 1943-63. He was educated at Eton, served in the 10th Royal Hussars during World War II and was aide-de-camp to Field Marshal Alexander in Italy and later to the Viceroy of India, Field Marshal Lord Wavell. He returned to NI in 1947 and was elected to Fermanagh County Council on which he served until reorganisation in 1973. In 1968 he succeeded his father at the Stormont Parliament as Unionist member for Lisnaskea. He held various posts rising to Minister of State in the Ministry of Finance and Government Chief Whip from 1971-72. In 1973 his constituency party decided to run only anti-White Paper candidates in the Assembly election, and he did not seek nomination in Fermanagh. Instead he became the successful pro-Assembly Unionist candidate for North Down, coming second to Kilfedder. He was not given office in the power-sharing Executive but represented the now defunct UPNI in the 1975 Constitutional Convention as Member for North Down, on this occasion only just scraping in. When his father died in 1973, he succeeded to the title (his elder brother having been killed in the war).

While describing himself as a Conservative he was the UPNI spokesman on Northern Ireland matters, especially security, in the House of Lords until that Party's demise in October 1981. In June 1976 he unsuccessfully introduced a Bill designed to provide for the better protection of witnesses.

He is married with 5 children, and his wife (Rosemary) was a strong advocate of the formation of the Royal Ulster Constabulary Women's Reserve, of which she and her daughter are now members. The family's 2 sons have both served in the Army and one is in the part-time UDR. He takes a close personal interest in the running of his estate and various other business interests.

Personality and political views

An energetic and forceful man, Lord Brookeborough was a reluctant politician at the outset of his career, but nevertheless felt himself obliged to continue the family tradition in politics. A Unionist of fairly moderate hue, he followed Faulkner when he founded UPNI and supported the 1974 powersharing experiment. Living not too far from the border with the Irish Republic his major concern is security. He believes in sterner anti-terrorist measures and has in the past called for the reinstatement of the B-Specials. On constitutional issues he is believed to favour some form of integration.



LORD MOYOLA (MAJOR JAMES CHICHESTER-CLARK)

Prime Minister of Northern Ireland 1969- 1971

Background:

Born on 12 February 1923, to a famous NI political family, he was educated at Eton, and served with the Irish Guards from 1942-1960, attained the rank of Major and served a period at the Army's Staff College. He resigned from the Army to stand for Stormont and was elected unopposed in June 1960 to the NI Parliament as Unionist member for South Derry, a seat previously held by his grandmother, Dame Debra Parker (NI's only female minister), and by his father. In 1963, he was appointed by Terence O'Neill, his cousin and fellow old-Etonian, to be Chief Whip, a post he retained until 1967. In 1966-67 he was also appointed Leader of the House of Commons, and in 1967 he was appointed to the Agriculture post. When O'Neill resigned in 1969 Chichester-Clark was selected Prime Minister beating his only opponent Brian Faulkner by one vote; O'Neill used his vote to support his cousin.

Major Chichester-Clark's 22 months of office (1 May 1969 - 23 March 1971) were aggravated by major security problems - civil rights demonstrations, street riots and the slow revival of terrorist activity, and characterised by the increasing intervention of HMG into NI affairs. His was the time of the Cameron Report, the Hunt Report, the disbandment of the Ulster Special Constabulary, the 'B' Specials, the appointment of an Ombudsman, and creation of the Ministry of Community Relations and of the Housing Executive. Security was the major issue and Major Chichester-Clark was constantly under attack in the NI Parliament for his apparent failure to persuade the British Government to take firm steps to deal with the crisis. On 16 March 1971 Major Chichester-Clark flew to London for a meeting with the British Cabinet, when he demanded positive action by the British Government and threatened to resign if this was not forthcoming; he resigned on 23 March 1971 and Brian Faulkner took over the premiership.

On his retirement, he was created a life peer (Lord Moyola) and has since concentrated on the running of his farm at Castledawson in Co Derry. He is married (1959 to Moyra) with 2 daughters and one stepson (by his wife's first marriage). He is deaf in the right ear.

Personality and Political Views:

Quiet, courteous and affable, he has been described as a big man with a big heart. He was somewhat of a reluctant politician and in other circumstances, would probably never have entered politics. As a Prime Minister at a time of crisis and of considerable political disturbance he is generally considered to have been an ineffectual leader (although he weathered many storms). During his premiership he even had to suffer the embarrassment of being removed from the Vice-Chairmanship of his local constituency association. His attempts at reform under pressure from the British Government came in for considerable popular criticism. Nevertheless, when he beat Brian Faulkner for the Leadership, it was said that the Party had chosen "a decent man you could trust rather than a clever man you couldn't", and certainly his sincerity and desire to do his duty was as widely acknowledged as his unsuitability for the position. Although he no longer takes an active part in politics apart from a few appearances in the Lords, Moyola is to some extent representative of the views of upper-class moderate unionists, although he is still perhaps slightly tainted by his past. He is no friend of Paisley, having suffered from a "Chi Chi must go" campaign inspired by the DUP leader.



In recent years he has remained largely politically inactive, though contributes to Northern Ireland debates in the Lords and has attended occasional meetings with Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland.



Prime Minister 8 (1)

Ref. A086/1051

MR POWELL

I have two comments on this: (i) we knew the information in this minute before Easter. It is disingenuous of the Irish to present it as new; (ii) I do not think that we can possibly undertake to keep the Irish government informed of our contacts with Unionist leaders.

The Irish Ambassador came to see me this afternoon, on the instructions of the Taoiseach, to report an indirect approach which the Taoiseach had received from Mr James Molyneux MP, and to let the Prime Minister know without delay the message the Taoiseach had sent to Mr Molyneux through that contact.

That is an internal UK matter.

2. It was evident from what the Irish Ambassador said that both the Taoiseach and he were under the impression that the Prime Minister was in direct touch with Mr Molyneux herself, as well as through the Chief Whip. If indications given are to be relied upon, it seems likely that Mr Molyneux will be making an approach to the Chief Whip, perhaps with a view to talking directly to the Prime Minister, very soon.

Agreed that this minute should be shown to Northern Ireland Secretary & Chief Whip?

CDP 7/4

3. There is no reason to think that Mr Paisley knows about this contact between Mr Molyneux and the Taoiseach, but the Irish Ambassador emphasised that it was not part of the Taoiseach's wish to try to divide Mr Molyneux and Mr Paisley.

4. The Irish Ambassador said that the Taoiseach was very anxious that the Prime Minister should know as soon as possible about this contact and about what he had said; and hoped that the Prime Minister and he could keep each other closely informed about developments.

5. The Ambassador asked what view the British Government took about the possibility of making political progress in Northern Ireland before the marching season. I said that there would be no objection on our part to starting political contacts before the marching season began: indeed, it could be advantageous that such contacts should have begun but should not be completed





when the marching season began. But it would have to be on the right terms: in particular, on terms which the unionists could not colourably claim as some kind of "victory" in relation to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. I thought that we were probably sceptical about the prospect of getting contacts on that basis started ahead of the marching season.

6. The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to consider how the Chief Whip should be invited to respond, if and when he receives an approach from Mr Molyneaux. It may be that this calls for a meeting at an early date. I have not, however, copied this --- minute or the attached note to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Northern Ireland Office or the Chief Whip, though I should of course be perfectly ready to do so, if so instructed by the Prime Minister.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

7 April 1986



SECRET

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

The Irish Ambassador called at his own request on Sir Robert Armstrong at 1700 on 7 April. Mr Mallaby was present.

2. The Ambassador said that he had been instructed by the Taoiseach, whom he had seen in Dublin that morning, to convey some information as soon as possible to the Prime Minister. He then read from a speaking note. The speaking note said -

A senior "clerical source" (by implication a leading figure of the Church of Ireland) had approached the Taoiseach after the latter's return from holiday on Saturday, 5 April, and said the he was making contact on behalf of Mr Molyneaux. Mr Molyneaux, having been re-elected as leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, felt strong enough to make contact with the Taoiseach and was in contact with the Prime Minister and the Chief Whip; he might later contact the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland too. The Taoiseach had responded by making the following points, to be passed to Mr Molyneaux.

1. The Taoiseach recognised that it was desirable in principle to make early political progress, before the marching season got going in earnest.

2. It would, however, be imprudent to embark on a process unless both Governments were convinced that the unionist leaders who would be involved would be able to deliver on the results.

3. Both Governments needed to be satisfied that any opening given at this stage would not be such as to encourage the hard liners to continue their present tactics.



SECRET

4. In view of the great dangers that would be involved in failure in such discussions - giving the initiative back to the men of violence before the marching season - the outcome of the discussions should in effect be pre-determined.

5. It would be necessary as a minimum to know in advance that the unionists would be willing in a devolved government to share executive power with the SDLP, though not necessarily in a Cabinet-style structure.

6. If all the above conditions could be met, the Taoiseach thought that it should be possible to give priority to talks on devolution vis-a-vis the Inter-governmental Conference for a period of up to 2 months; under no circumstances, however, could the Agreement be suspended or tampered with; the Taoiseach had added, in reply to a question, that the work of the Secretariat also could not be tampered with.

7. The Taoiseach understood the wish of the unionists to be associated with and informed about the work of the Intergovernmental Conference.

3. The Irish Ambassador said that the first two of the points above had also been conveyed by the Taoiseach to Dr Paisley via Sir Fred Catherwood.

4. Mr Dorr said that the Taoiseach wished the Prime Minister to be aware of what had passed, and hoped to be kept informed of the British Government's contacts with unionist leaders.

5. In discussion, Sir Robert Armstrong wondered whether Mr Molyneux was seeking contacts which would not involve Dr Paisley. The Irish Ambassador said that his Government would prefer discussions on devolution to include both the unionist parties. He said that Mr Hume of the SDLP had not



SECRET

been told of the indirect contact that had been established between the Taoiseach and Mr Molyneaux but knew that the numbered points above represented the present position of the Taoiseach. Mr Dorr said, in reply to questions, that the numbered points above did not imply that the Irish Government would expect to be involved in talks about devolution; the contribution of the Irish Government would be willingness to give priority for a limited period to those talks vis-a-vis the Intergovernmental Conference.

6. Sir Robert Armstrong undertook to report what Mr Dorr had said to the Prime Minister immediately.

7. In a brief discussion of other matters, Mr Dorr agreed that the performance of the Royal Ulster Constabulary on Easter Monday had been most commendable. He pointed out that Irish Ministers, notably Mr Barry, had recently been careful to abstain from public comment on events in Northern Ireland. It was agreed between Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Dorr that an Armstrong/Nally meeting should take place in late April, perhaps on 28 or 29 April.

Cabinet Office  
7 April 1986

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MR PETER ARCHER (WARLEY WEST): To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he will make a statement on the safety of members of the RUC and their families.

MR KING

In the last month there have been 138 attacks on off duty members of the RUC and RUC Reserve, and their homes and families. The vast majority have taken place in predominantly Protestant areas. The whole House will wish to join me in condemning utterly these cowardly and disgraceful attacks on the men and women of the Royal Ulster Constabulary who have given such loyal and courageous service to defend the Province against terrorism and to uphold law and order.

The Chief Constable, with the full support of the Police Authority for Northern Ireland and of the Superintendents Association and the Police Federation, has put arrangements in hand to provide quick and effective assistance to police officers and their families who are subject to attack or other forms of intimidation. Extra patrols are being mounted in vulnerable areas and steps have been taken to provide suitable alternative accommodation for those unfortunate enough to have to move from their homes. In addition, the police are making strenuous efforts to bring the people responsible for this criminal behaviour to justice, and a considerable number have already been charged with serious offences associated with it.



I welcome the fact that the Churches and the more responsible political leaders have condemned without any qualification these outrages.

I look to the whole community to join together to defeat these acts of terrorism against its own Police Force, and to give every possible support to bring those responsible to justice.



file

SRWABW

CONFIDENTIAL

clp



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

7 April 1986

NORTHERN IRELAND

The Prime Minister had a discussion of recent developments with the Northern Ireland Secretary this evening.

Mr. King reported that the Chief Constable of the RUC was in a robust and positive frame of mind. He had agreed that the army should take over some RUC duties in West Belfast, so that the RUC could increase their efforts against intimidation of their own members. They would also be stepping up CID work on this front. The Chief Constable had made clear that he was not asking for additional troops.

The Prime Minister and Mr. King agreed on the importance of continuing the Government's efforts to engage Unionist leaders in talks. A number of feelers had been put out on the Unionist side. Tensions between the UUP and DUP were increasing and might lead to a split.

(C. D. POWELL)

J. A. Daniell, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

JB



James Molyneux MP



10/4,

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Acc/ 3 April 1986

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from James Molyneux MP and Ian Paisley MP.

I should be grateful if you would provide a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature, to reach this office as soon as possible.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Colin Budd (FCO) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

(Timothy Flesher)

Neil Ward, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

JA



*CP 2*  
*MA*



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

*Prime Minister*

*N*  
*3/4*

*2 April 1986*

*CDP*  
*CDP 2/1*

*I have*  
*announced*  
*a draft reply*  
*N*

Dear Prime Minister

It is apparent that there are profound differences in our perceptions of the functions and purpose of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. No useful purpose would be served at this time by detailed discussion of our respective views.

Your assertion that you are committed to and will not suspend the operation of the Agreement precludes the requisite degree of flexibility necessary in the circumstances.

We are disappointed that you have studiously avoided addressing the substance of the proposals placed before you. The request for reasons why the quality of our British Citizenship should be different from that enjoyed in the rest of the United Kingdom is not answered by alleging that to protest about such inequality is to deny the sovereignty of Parliament. We find no acknowledgement of the positive suggestions for a two stage conference to discuss both devolved government and the future relationship of any devolved government with the Governments in London and Dublin.

We have difficulty in appreciating how a conference on devolved government entered into with the Agreement still in operation cannot be seen as other than conforming with the devolution provision in the Agreement itself. A conference on those terms would be nothing less than acceptance of the Agreement. The SDLP has of course a pre-condition for discussing devolution - it is the continued operation of the Agreement about whose terms they were closely consulted.

We are of course anxious to find a way out of the present impasse, but the terms of your letter and the presumptive statements of some of your Cabinet colleagues sadly rejects consultation in favour of confrontation.

We are still even at this stage anxious to have your views on our positive proposals which remain unanswered.

*Yours ever*

*Jim Molyneux*

*John R. K. Paisley*






OFFICE OF THE  
LONDON



CONDITIO





Prime Minister  
CDP  
4/4.  
mb

- 1. MR POWELL
- 2. MR WICKS
- 3. PRIME MINISTER

Attached is an H paper by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland proposing that candidates at Northern Ireland Assembly and District Council elections should be asked to sign a declaration that they do not support terrorist methods in furthering their cause. He is proposing to proceed by way of a consultation paper "at the right political moment". The paper is due to be taken at H on 10 April.

The Lord President is intending to have a word with you about this proposal during his regular bilateral next Tuesday, before H has discussed the paper. The proposal has obvious attractions but there are implications for electoral law in general in imposing "loyalty oaths" as a requirement for seeking election. There will also be problems in making the requirement stick without mobilising more support for Sinn Fein e.g. it would be argued that, having urged everyone concerned to use the democratic process, the Government is moving the goal-posts to ensure that support for Sinn Fein cannot be expressed through the ballot box.

Tim Flesher

2 April 1986

NW ro hel  
CDP  
6/4.



PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND

Jim Molyneaux has suggested to the Chief Whip that a meeting might be convened involving you, himself, Enoch Powell, Tom King and the Chief Whip. The meeting would be on Privy Counsellor terms and the purpose would be to have a general discussion. The Chief Whip's advice is that we should approach this cautiously. It would be a bit of a soft option for Jim Molyneaux who gets a meeting with you on privileged terms but remains at liberty to go on being uncooperative in public. The Chief Whip's advice is that he and Tom King should have a preliminary session to try to establish what the outcome of such a meeting might be. This seems sensible. But you may like to discuss it when the House reassembles.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL  
27 March 1986

EL3AZU





B(2A11)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

ack

26 March 1986

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr. Kilfedder, received late this evening.

I should be grateful for a draft reply.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Colin Budd (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Col telephoned Mr Kilfedder on 9.4.86 - no need for written reply.

(C.D. Powell)

C/F  
For yr to b/F

Jim Daniell, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office

PA



CONFIDENTIAL



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

CCP/AV  
Prime Minister. (2)  
A curious idea.  
CDP  
26/3

26 March 1986

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

This would be highly  
embarrassing for the Queen.  
I hope the IC will not  
pursue it. The situation  
did not exactly improve after  
the previous conference!

Dear Prime Minister

In the midst of our present difficulties we have to look for fresh means of opening up discussions, which we both agree are essential for progress.

I have been turning the problem over in my mind.

It is quite clear that the Leaders of the Official Unionist and Democratic Unionist Parties cannot enter into further talks without the "suspension" of the London-Dublin Agreement, and you have stated publicly - and to me privately - that you cannot suspend the Agreement or arrange for a respite in its operation.

Since there is a deadlock, which may soon lead to a dangerous situation for the two communities in the Province, may I suggest to you a formula for attempting to resolve the crisis.

In 1914 King George V summoned the Leaders of the Irish political parties and HMG to a Conference at Buckingham Palace to discuss the grave situation which had arisen over the Home Rule Bill. The King welcomed the representatives and then left them to try to find a settlement under the Chairmanship of the Speaker of the House of Commons.

I am prepared to test the reaction of the Official Unionist Party and Democratic Unionist Party and the Ulster people in general by a public announcement of my intention to write to Her Majesty - or that I had written - asking her to call such a Conference on devolved Government for Northern Ireland.

I believe that my intervention could be helpful, but I appreciate that the Queen can only act on your advice.

I am fearful of embarrassing Her Majesty by making such an announcement before she has an opportunity of considering that advice, and I would not proceed with such an appeal to the Monarch without knowing that she would not be embarrassed.

/I am



CONFIDENTIAL



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

26 March 1986

I am making this suggestion on my own initiative, and if I wrote to Her Majesty it would be either as Leader of the Ulster Popular Unionist Party or as the Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Jim Kilfedder*

JAMES KILFEDDER MP

CLOSED UNDER THE  
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION  
ACT 2000



SKW

abc

21 March 1986

B  
P

The Prime Minister has agreed to see Lord Brookeborough and Lord Moyola at the request of the Lord President on 9 April. I should be grateful for briefing by Friday, 4 April.

I am copying this letter to Joan MacNaughton (Lord President's Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Neil Ward, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

VC





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 March 1986

Dear Jim,

Thank you for the letter which you and Dr. Paisley sent to me on 7 March.

At our meeting on 25 February you both made clear that you fully maintained your opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and that any subsequent talks would be without prejudice to that position. We agreed to reflect on the various suggestions that had been made and to meet again shortly.

Having now received your letter, I am glad to hear that it remains your purpose to create a framework within which dialogue can take place. For our part we certainly wish to enter into talks with you on any or all of the matters I mentioned when we met, including matters on which the Agreement has no bearing, such as improved arrangements for unionists to put forward views and proposals to Ministers and the handling of Northern Ireland business in Parliament. There is also the issue of the future of the Assembly and the proposal, to which I will return, for a round table Conference on devolution.

I made clear at our meeting that I recognised the strength of your feelings about the Anglo-Irish Agreement; but I must take issue with some of the interpretations placed on it in the resolutions enclosed with your letter. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in its resolution, reaffirms its determination 'never to submit or consent to joint London - Dublin authority over Northern Ireland'. I can readily

file

SPW

cc NIO  
FCO  
CO  
CWO

SPW



understand this position, indeed I share it. The Anglo-Irish Agreement does not provide for, create or envisage such joint authority. On the contrary the Agreement makes it clear that the Intergovernmental Conference has no executive authority and that the Irish Government's role is limited to putting forward views and proposals. It is expressly stated in the Agreement that there is no derogation from the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Government, which remains solely responsible for decisions in relation to the affairs of Northern Ireland. There is consequently no question of 'joint authority', nor does the Agreement in any way threaten the union: I should not have been a party to it if it did. On the contrary, the guarantee of successive United Kingdom Governments and Parliaments that the status of Northern Ireland cannot and will not be changed without the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland, is explicitly recognised and accepted by the Government of the Republic.

The UUP resolution also talks about 'equality of citizenship within the United Kingdom' and the 'fundamental right to be governed in accordance with the principles, procedures and practises which obtain in the United Kingdom as a whole'. One of those principles is surely the acceptance of the sovereign authority of the United Kingdom Parliament: indeed this must be a corollary of your rejection, which I share, of any dilution of that authority. While I made absolutely clear to you that we are committed to, and will not suspend, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which has been approved by such a significant Parliamentary majority, I told you when we met that we were ready to approach the working of the Agreement in a sensitive way.

You suggested that there should be a round table Conference with the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland to consider proposals for devolution. Mr. Hume has made it clear that the Social Democratic and Labour Party would be prepared to participate in immediate discussions on devolution without pre-conditions. I can confirm that the Government is ready to take part in such a Conference and to



discuss with you how best to set it up as quickly as possible. If, as a result, there were agreement upon proposals for devolved government, then subjects which thereafter became the responsibility of the devolved administration would no longer come within the scope of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. In that event, we should of course need to review the implications of any such proposals for the working of the Intergovernmental Conference, as its ambit would be significantly affected by the devolution of matters to democratic institutions in Northern Ireland.

You will, I am sure, share my view that the approach of constructive discussion on the matters covered above must be preferable to a repetition of the sort of events that took place in Northern Ireland on 3 March. The important thing now is that we should work together to spare Northern Ireland the consequences of a confrontation that could only damage all of its people. We believe that consultation and not confrontation must be the way to proceed. I do not think our fellow citizens throughout the United Kingdom will understand why, if that is what we all say we want to do, we do not proceed with it.

My office stands ready to discuss with yours dates for another meeting between us.

I am writing in similar terms to Dr. Paisley.

*Yours  
James Molyneux*

The Rt. Hon. James Molyneux, J.P., M.P.





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 March 1986

*John D. Paisley*

Thank you for the letter which you and Mr. Molyneaux sent to me on 7 March.

At our meeting on 25 February you both made clear that you fully maintained your opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and that any subsequent talks would be without prejudice to that position. We agreed to reflect on the various suggestions that had been made and to meet again shortly.

Having now received your letter, I am glad to hear that it remains your purpose to create a framework within which dialogue can take place. For our part we certainly wish to enter into talks with you on any or all of the matters I mentioned when we met, including matters on which the Agreement has no bearing, such as improved arrangements for unionists to put forward views and proposals to Ministers and the handling of Northern Ireland business in Parliament. There is also the issue of the future of the Assembly and the proposal, to which I will return, for a round table Conference on devolution.

I made clear at our meeting that I recognised the strength of your feelings about the Anglo-Irish Agreement; but I must take issue with some of the interpretations placed on it in the resolutions enclosed with your letter. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in its resolution, reaffirms its determination 'never to submit or consent to joint London - Dublin authority over Northern Ireland'. I can readily



understand this position, indeed I share it. The Anglo-Irish Agreement does not provide for, create or envisage such joint authority. On the contrary the Agreement makes it clear that the Intergovernmental Conference has no executive authority and that the Irish Government's role is limited to putting forward views and proposals. It is expressly stated in the Agreement that there is no derogation from the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Government, which remains solely responsible for decisions in relation to the affairs of Northern Ireland. There is consequently no question of 'joint authority', nor does the Agreement in any way threaten the union: I should not have been a party to it if it did. On the contrary, the guarantee of successive United Kingdom Governments and Parliaments that the status of Northern Ireland cannot and will not be changed without the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland, is explicitly recognised and accepted by the Government of the Republic.

The UUP resolution also talks about 'equality of citizenship within the United Kingdom' and the 'fundamental right to be governed in accordance with the principles, procedures and practises which obtain in the United Kingdom as a whole'. One of those principles is surely the acceptance of the sovereign authority of the United Kingdom Parliament: indeed this must be a corollary of your rejection, which I share, of any dilution of that authority. While I made absolutely clear to you that we are committed to, and will not suspend, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which has been approved by such a significant Parliamentary majority, I told you when we met that we were ready to approach the working of the Agreement in a sensitive way.

You suggested that there should be a round table Conference with the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland to consider proposals for devolution. Mr. Hume has made it clear that the Social Democratic and Labour Party would be prepared to participate in immediate discussions on devolution without pre-conditions. I can confirm that the Government is ready to take part in such a Conference and to



discuss with you how best to set it up as quickly as possible. If, as a result, there were agreement upon proposals for devolved government, then subjects which thereafter became the responsibility of the devolved administration would no longer come within the scope of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. In that event, we should of course need to review the implications of any such proposals for the working of the Intergovernmental Conference, as its ambit would be significantly affected by the devolution of matters to democratic institutions in Northern Ireland.

You will, I am sure, share my view that the approach of constructive discussion on the matters covered above must be preferable to a repetition of the sort of events that took place in Northern Ireland on 3 March. The important thing now is that we should work together to spare Northern Ireland the consequences of a confrontation that could only damage all of its people. We believe that consultation and not confrontation must be the way to proceed. I do not think our fellow citizens throughout the United Kingdom will understand why, if that is what we all say we want to do, we do not proceed with it.

My office stands ready to discuss with yours dates for another meeting between us.

I am writing in similar terms to Mr. Molyneux.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Margaret Thatcher*

The Reverend Ian Paisley, M.P., M.E.P.





## 10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 March 1986

*file* *8/11*  
*(54)*

*cc/c*

Dear Neil.

The Prime Minister has now signed letters to Dr. Paisley and Mr. Molyneaux and I enclose the originals. You will see that we have made a last-minute change in the order of the sentences in paragraph 2. This reflects a conversation which I had with your Secretary of State this morning.

*8/11*

May I please leave it to you to arrange delivery of the letters. I have had a clear indication from Mr. Molyneaux's office that he would be content for delivery to take place on Monday when he will be in London. Your Secretary of State said that he would be arranging delivery direct to Dr. Paisley rather than through the DUP office. I imagine this will be on Monday as well.

*8/11*

The intention is to keep the text of these letters confidential. Nonetheless, in view of all the publicity there has been surrounding them, I think that we shall have to confirm that replies have been sent once delivery has been made. You will no doubt wish to ensure that both Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley are aware that we do not ourselves propose to do more than confirm that the Prime Minister has written and shall not be releasing any texts. Could you also please ensure that you inform No.10 as soon as delivery has been made so that we can announce it.

I am copying this letter, with copies of the enclosure, to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,*  
*C. D. Powell*  
(C. D. POWELL)

Neil Ward, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.





Government Chief Whip

12 Downing Street, London SW1

20-iii-1986

Charles Powell <sup>CPW</sup> 21/3.

The Chief Whip has seen Jim Daniell's letter of today's date about the PM's letters to Jim Molyneux and Ian Paisley. He wanted to reiterate that Jim Molyneux's advice was for the letters to arrive after Ian Paisley's deadline of Friday. This conflicts somewhat with Jim Daniell's comment about the letters reaching addressees at the earliest opportunity.

Genevieve Robinson





7

Ref. A086/926

COP  
273MR POWELL

I have seen Mr Dalyell's letter of 20 March and the draft letter to Mr Molyneaux and Mr Paisley.

2. I think that the draft is fine, though I have three minor draft changes to offer:

- On page 2 line 16, the words "or authorise" read a little oddly. I suggest that the sentence might read:  
"The Anglo-Irish Agreement does not provide for, create or envisage such joint authority".
- On page 3 line 9, it would be possible to give additional emphasis by making the first part of the sentence read  
"While I made absolutely clear to you that we are committed to, and will not abrogate or suspend, the Anglo-Irish Agreement..."
- On page 3 line 23, it might be helpful to add, after the words "In that event", the words (between commas)  
"as the Agreement itself recognises".

3. I agree that we should not initially release the text of the letters to the press. But we need to be ready to issue them very smartly, if Mr Molyneaux and Mr Paisley start to quote from them selectively.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Chief Whip.

MS

for

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

20 March 1986





COMPTON

1986





NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
WHITEHALL  
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

20 March 1986

*Dear Charles*

... In response to your letter of 11 March I attach a draft reply from the Prime Minister to the letter from Mr Molyneux and Dr Paisley dated 7 March. The draft restates our position in terms which my Secretary of State believes might appeal to Mr Molyneux, while taking the opportunity to refute some of the Unionist misrepresentations of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

Mr King feels that, initially at least, we should not release the text of the letters to the press. He believes that Mr Molyneux and Dr Paisley are more likely to respond positively if they can consider the terms of the letters, free of the pressures that are likely to arise if there is publicity. All that need be said to the media, by way of background briefing, is that the letters have issued and that the opportunity for talks has been offered.

My office is of course ready to assist in seeking to ensure that the letters, or copies, reach the addressees at the earliest opportunity.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Murdo MacClean (Chief Whip's Office) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).



*Yours sincerely  
J A Daniell*

J A DANIELL



Ireland; Rels; part 15

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR  
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY





SECRET

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

<p>To</p> <p>The Rt Hon James Molyneaux JP MP</p> <p>AND</p> <p>Rev Ian Paisley MP</p> <p>(Full Postal Address)</p>	<p>Enclosures</p>	<p>Copies to be sent to</p> <p>SRWAAAY</p> <p>(Full Address, if Necessary)</p>
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LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY PRIME MINISTER (Name of Signatory)

Thank you for the letter which you and [Ian Paisley] [Jim Molyneaux] sent to me on 7 March.

At our meeting on 25 February we agreed to reflect on the various suggestions that had been made and to meet again shortly. Of course neither side was committed in the statement issued after the meeting to firm acceptance of any of the proposals made, and you both made clear that you fully maintained your opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and that any subsequent talks would be without prejudice to that position.

Having now received your letter, I am glad to hear that it remains your purpose to create a framework within which dialogue can take place. For our part we certainly wish to enter into talks with you on any or all of the matters I mentioned when we met, including matters on which the Agreement has no bearing, such as improved arrangements for

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/.....



SECRET

E.R.

unionists to put forward views and proposals to Ministers and the handling of Northern Ireland business in Parliament. There is also the issue of the future of the Assembly and the proposal, to which I will return, for a round table Conference on devolution.

I made clear at our meeting that I recognised the strength of your feelings about the Anglo-Irish Agreement; but I must take issue with some of the interpretations placed on it in the resolutions enclosed with your letter. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in its resolution, reaffirms its determination 'never to submit or consent to joint London - Dublin authority over Northern Ireland'. I can readily understand this position, indeed I share it. I have consistently made it clear that I would not agree to any diminution in the United Kingdom Government's authority over Northern Ireland while it remains, by the wish of the majority of its people, a part of the United Kingdom. The Anglo-Irish Agreement does not provide for or authorise such joint authority. On the contrary the Agreement makes it clear that the Intergovernmental Conference has no executive authority and that the Irish Government's role is limited to putting forward views and proposals. It is expressly stated in the Agreement that there is no derogation from the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Government, which remains solely responsible for decisions in relation to the affairs of Northern Ireland. There is consequently no question of 'joint authority', nor does the Agreement in any way threaten the union: I should not have been a party to it if it did. On the contrary, the guarantee of successive United Kingdom Governments and Parliaments that the status of Northern Ireland cannot and will not be changed without the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland, is explicitly recognised and accepted by

SECRET



E.R.

SECRET

the Government of the Republic.

The UUP resolution also talks about 'equality of citizenship within the United Kingdom' and the 'fundamental right to be governed in accordance with the principle, procedures and practices which obtain in the United Kingdom as a whole'. One of those principles is surely the acceptance of the sovereign authority of the United Kingdom Parliament: indeed this must be a corollary of your rejection, which I share, of any dilution of that authority. While I made absolutely clear to you our commitment to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which has been approved by such a significant Parliamentary majority, I told you when we met that we were ready to approach the working of the Agreement in a sensitive way.

You suggested that there should be a round table Conference with the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland to consider proposals for devolution. <sup>Mr.</sup> John Hume has made it clear that the Social Democratic and Labour Party would be prepared to participate in immediate discussions on devolution without pre-conditions. I can confirm that the Government is ready to take part in such a Conference and to discuss with you how best to set it up and to give it the necessary priority. If as a result, there were agreement upon proposals for devolved government, then subjects which thereafter became the responsibility of the devolved administration would no longer come within the scope of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. In that event we should of course need to review the implications of any such proposals for the working of the Intergovernmental Conference, as its ambit would be significantly affected by the devolution of matters to democratic institutions in Northern Ireland.

SECRET



SECRET

E.R.

You will, I am sure, share my view that the approach of constructive discussion on the matters covered above must be preferable to a repetition of the sort of events that took place in Northern Ireland on 3 March. The important thing now is that we should work together to spare Northern Ireland the consequences of a confrontation that could only damage all of its people. We believe that consultation and not confrontation must be the way to proceed. I do not think our fellow citizens throughout the United Kingdom will understand why, if that is what we all say we want to do, we do not ~~get on~~ <sup>proceed</sup> with it.

My office stands ready to discuss with yours dates for another meeting between us. ~~You might contact~~

I am writing in similar terms to [<sup>Dr</sup> ~~Jan~~ Paisley] [<sup>Mr.</sup> ~~Jim~~ Molyneaux].

SECRET



SUBJECT CC MASTER

EL3AYS.



bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

18 March 1986

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS: NORTHERN IRELAND

The Prime Minister and the Northern Ireland Secretary had a brief discussion this morning of the line which Mr. King should take in further meetings with Mr. Molyneaux.

Mr. King said that he would be seeing Mr. Molyneaux again later today. He saw the purpose as being to help responsible Unionists get back to a position where they could accept the Government's offer of talks. The Prime Minister said that the right course was to stand by the agreement reached on 25 February when she had seen Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley. The Government was ready to take up the Unionist leaders' suggestion of round table discussions on devolution, was ready to operate the Anglo-Irish Agreement sensitively meanwhile and recognised that we should need to consider what the outcome of successful round table discussions would mean for the work of the Inter-Governmental Conference. In short Mr. King should make clear that everything which had been on offer on 25 February remained on offer, but no more.

Mr. King said that the Prime Minister would need to reply shortly to the letter which she had received from Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley. There seemed to him to be two alternative approaches. The first would be to reply exactly on the lines just set out by the Prime Minister. The second would be to indicate that if the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland agreed to enter any round table discussions on devolution, so far as the Anglo-Irish Inter-Governmental Conference was concerned, he would need to make arrangements which ensured that the round table discussions on devolution were given first priority. This would be a broad hint to the effect that the Conference might not meet for a period during which discussions on devolution were taking place. The Prime Minister said that it was essential not to give any indication of weakening in the Government's position. She would therefore wish to reply along the lines of the first of the two alternatives.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Jim Daniell, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.



Prime Minister

Mr King will raise this with you immediately after Budget cabinet tomorrow.

It's a very tricky area, & you will probably want Mr. King to err on the side of caution.

Ref. A086/893

MR POWELL

Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland

I understand that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is coming to see the Prime Minister tomorrow morning, to seek her agreement to the line which he proposes to take in a further meeting with Mr Molyneaux, at which the Chief Whip will be present.

CDD 17/3

2. He will, if the Prime Minister agrees, reiterate the Government's willingness to enter without delay into "round table" talks about the possibilities of devolution.

3. The question is what he should say about the operations of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. It seems that, in a recent private conversation with the Secretary of State, Mr Molyneaux indicated some readiness to enter into round table discussions on devolution, provided that the Anglo-Irish Agreement was suspended. When the Secretary of State said that there could be no question of that, Mr Molyneaux used the phrase "informally suspended", which he has apparently used before. The Secretary of State therefore has in mind, and will seek the Prime Minister's agreement, that he should say to Mr Molyneaux at 12.30 tomorrow that, if the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland agreed to enter into round table discussions on devolution, so far as the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference was concerned, he would want to make arrangements which ensured that the round table discussions on devolution were given first priority.





4. This would be an oblique way of promising a "pause" in the Intergovernmental Conference while the round table discussions went ahead. We have reason to think that the Taoiseach would understand and accept something like that, though it would be as well for the Prime Minister to speak to the Taoiseach (or me to speak to Mr Nally) if the Secretary of State was going to say something on the lines proposed to Mr Molyneux.

5. The danger would be that the Unionists would try to secure indefinite suspension of the Intergovernmental Conference, by entering into discussions and continuing them for six weeks, and then saying that some progress had been made and they would like to continue the process for a further period, of course on the understanding that there would be no meetings of the Intergovernmental Conference in the meantime. I think that it would be important for Mr King to guard against this possibility, by making it clear that, while he would want to be able to give priority to the round table discussions in the first instance, he could not preclude the possibility of needing to hold a meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference at some stage, if the round table discussions were at all long drawn out.

6. This is obviously a very delicate area: there is a great danger that, whatever the Secretary of State says to Mr Molyneux and however carefully it is edged about, Mr Molyneux will go back to Northern Ireland and claim that he has persuaded the Government to suspend the Anglo-Irish Agreement. It would therefore be very important that whatever form of words was used was put on paper and agreed with Mr Molyneux, so that matters could be clarified if there was any attempt to misinterpret what had been said.

MS

for


ROBERT ARMSTRONG

17 March 1986





COMPTON





PRIME MINISTER

Cardize  
C.D. you please arrange  
this for some time  
after Easter - CDP

14/3

The Lord President has recently seen Lord Brookeborough and Lord Moyola about the situation in Northern Ireland. He feels that it would be useful if he could bring them to see you, perhaps after Easter.

Agree to see them?

y  
as not

CDP

CDP

C D POWELL  
13 March 1986

Wednesday  
9 April  
1600 - 1700.  
H.A. 10.  
CR 14/3.

CDP  
CONFIRMED.

CR  
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Prime Minister  
CDP  
12/3.

Ref. A086/812

PRIME MINISTER

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*[Handwritten signature]*

Anglo-Irish Relations: Armstrong/Nally Meeting

As agreed when the Taoiseach telephoned you on 7 March, Mr Nally and I, supported by other officials, held a meeting in London on 10 March. The discussion was mainly about the questions raised with you by the Taoiseach on the telephone, the so-called Day of Action in Northern Ireland on 3 March and the policies the two Governments should adopt in the coming months.

2. We told the Irish in no uncertain terms that we had made no attempt to suggest to the United States Administration that the Taoiseach's current visit to Washington should be handled in a low-profile way. We explained to Mr Nally and his team that we had merely pointed out to the Americans, as we also had to the Irish, that it would be inappropriate for United States money for Northern Ireland as well as the Republic to be announced in the exclusively United States-Irish nationalist context of St Patrick's Day and the Taoiseach's visit.

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3. We also pointed out, with regard to the highly misleading advertisement placed in the Belfast Newsletter on 7 March by Mr Molyneaux and Mr Paisley, that an article in the Belfast Telegraph the same evening had demolished the key arguments in the advertisement. The Irish Government will be now be aware that the Northern Ireland Police Authority have also published a notice effectively countering the advertisement placed by Mr Molyneaux and Mr Paisley.

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4. In explaining the Government's present policy, I stressed that the Government's commitment to the Anglo-Irish Agreement remained absolutely unqualified and that you had made this clear



in your talks with Messrs Molyneaux and Paisley and with Mr Hume, Mr Kilfedder and Mr Cushnahan. I said that the furthest you had been willing to go with Messrs Molyneaux and Paisley had been to say that you would operate the Agreement sensitively.

5. Mr Nally and I agreed that the unionist community was very divided about its future course of action. Mr Nally found it difficult to judge whether the revulsion among many unionists against the more extreme tactics used on 3 March would cause a reduction in the support for hard men like Mr Robinson. Mr Nally commented that, if such a tendency existed, it might diminish as the weeks went by; but he and his colleagues were not inclined to see Mr Peter Robinson as a serious challenge to Mr Paisley's leadership of the Democratic Unionist Party. I said that our present assessment was that for us to call a Round Table Conference on devolution in the near future would be premature, since the unionists would be most unlikely to participate (except on conditions about the Agreement which there could be no question of accepting), even if privately Mr Molyneaux and Mr Paisley might wish otherwise. Mr Nally was inclined to agree. He and I agreed that a time might come when the calling of a Round Table Conference, or lesser moves by the Government, might encourage the emergence of moderate unionist leaders who would seek to oppose the Anglo-Irish Agreement by political means alone. We should need to be alert to the possibility of a "window" appearing for some such move in the next few weeks, though it might well not emerge until the autumn, after the marching season - unwelcome though the prospect was of several months of continuing protest action. It would be important that the two Governments should stay in close contact on this subject. Mr Nally spoke of the possibility of a pause of, say, six weeks between meetings of the Intergovernmental Conference, during which an effort might be made to mount a Round Table Conference on devolution. During such a pause, sub-groups of the Intergovernmental Conference would continue to meet. The pause might be publicly declared,



by announcing at the end of one meeting of the Conference that the next one would be on a fixed date, which would be about six weeks later. At one point, Mr Nally said that the meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference on 11 March might be followed by another in two weeks' time, after which the six weeks' pause might follow. But the sense of his remarks was that the timing of a pause should be dependent on the two Governments' assessment of the best time for the British Government to call a Round Table Conference.

6. The keynote of the Irish officials' assessment of the events on 3 March was that our overall handling of a potentially very dangerous situation could not be criticised; but that the feelings of the minority about apparent fraternisation in certain places between the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and loyalist protesters had set back the recent progress in relations between the minority and the security forces in Northern Ireland. The Irish side mentioned, however, as an example of how Mr Hume was now asserting himself in the SDLP, that his deputy, Mr Seamus Mallon MP, had wanted to issue a statement on behalf of the Party criticising the conduct of the RUC on 3 March and that Mr Hume had had no difficulty in over-ruling this. They said that at recent meetings with the Taoiseach Mr Hume's position had seemed to be more open-minded and flexible.

7. In a discussion of cross-border security co-operation, we stressed to the Irish team the need to achieve concrete results. Both sides agreed that the sub-group of the Intergovernmental Conference which comprises the two police chiefs and senior officials was the right forum for an effort to overcome the misunderstandings which have long been endemic in this area. Mr Nally, quoting from an internal Irish paper, said that the Garda had come to the view, following your recent meeting with the Taoiseach, that it was desirable that they should undertake some form of special surveillance and that they had asked the RUC for



views on this. I said that we would be glad to provide training or ~~technical~~ assistance. The Irish response was that this might be easier as between Great Britain and the Irish Republic than on a north/south basis, and if technical assistance was paid for by the Irish side. I said that we should have no objection to accepting payment.

8. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

12 March 1986



IRELAND

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Ref. A086/809

MR POWELL *copy*

*attached*

The Northern Ireland Office will be advising on the reply to the letter of 7 March from Mr Molyneux and Mr Paisley.

2. As you say, the letter does not amount to very much; but a reply would provide the Prime Minister with the opportunity of correcting some misapprehensions in the resolution attached to the letter and reiterating her willingness to embark upon a round table conference. It would also avoid any appearance of seeming to take the initiative in breaking all contact.

--- 3. Such a reply might be on the lines of the draft attached.

*REA*

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

11 March 1986

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DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE RT HON  
JAMES MOLYNEAUX MP AND THE REVEREND IAN PAISLEY MP

Thank you for the letter which you and Ian Paisley sent to me on 7 March.

I was of course glad to hear that it remains your purpose to create a framework within which dialogue can take place. You will, I know, share my view that dialogue would be preferable to a repetition of the sort of events that took place in Northern Ireland on 3 March. For our part we remain ready to enter into talks with representatives of your parties on all the matters I mentioned when we met: about arrangements for consultation about affairs in Northern Ireland, about the Assembly, and about the handling of Northern Ireland business in Parliament at Westminster.

The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), in its resolution, reaffirms its determination "never to submit or consent to joint London-Dublin authority over Northern Ireland". If that is intended to be a description of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, it is wrong and misleading. It is simply not the case

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that the Agreement gives the Irish Government "joint authority" in Northern Ireland. On the contrary, the Agreement makes it clear that the Intergovernmental Conference has no executive authority, and that the United Kingdom Government remains sovereign in Northern Ireland and solely responsible for decisions in relation to the affairs of Northern Ireland. The Agreement in no way threatens the union: I should not have been party to it if I had thought it did. On the contrary, it reinforces and entrenches the guarantee that the status of Northern Ireland cannot and will not be changed without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.

The UUP resolution talks about "equality of citizenship within the United Kingdom" and the "fundamental right to be governed in accordance with the principles, procedures and practices which obtain in the Kingdom as a whole". One of those principles is surely the acceptance of the sovereign power of the United Kingdom Parliament. As I told you when we met, the Government is not prepared to abandon or suspend the Anglo-Irish

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Agreement, which has been approved by large majorities in both Houses of Parliament, though I am (as I told you when we met) ready to operate it sensitively.

You suggest that there should be a round table conference with the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland to consider proposals for devolution. The Government remains ready to enter into such a conference as soon as may be - next week, if you wish. I would hope that the proposals to be considered by such a conference would not be confined to proposals put forward by the Government.

If there were agreement upon proposals for devolved government, then subjects which thereafter became the responsibility of the devolved administration would no longer come within the scope of the Intergovernmental Conference set up under the Anglo-Irish Agreement. That is clearly recognised by the Agreement itself. In that event we should of course need to review with the Irish Government, the implications of any such proposals for the working of the Intergovernmental Conference, as indicated in the Agreement; and



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in relation to matters devolved to it the devolved administration would take over responsibility for co-operation with the Irish Government.

The Unionist parties have proposed a round table conference on devolution. John Hume has made it clear that the Social Democratic and Labour Party is prepared to come into such a conference without pre-conditions. The Government is ready to take part in such a conference. It seems so unnecessary and so wrong that Northern Ireland should be condemned, because of misplaced and groundless fears, to the sort of events we saw on 3 March, when we could all be meeting and seeking constructive solutions in discussion round a table. I appeal to you and your colleagues, as citizens of the United Kingdom, to follow that sensible and responsible course. I do not think our fellow citizens will understand why, if that is what we all say we want to do, we do not put other differences on one side and get down to doing it.

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12, DOWNING STREET,  
S.W.1.

~~Charles Powell~~

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The attached  
are from the  
Chief Whip with  
his compliments.

Teresa Norton

11-3-86

Please file on  
Norton related to  
(Exchange of letters between  
PT & M. by Stan drafted  
by Enoch Powell. NOT used) (C)



I thought I should write to you following the meeting on 25th February and subsequent events.

I am afraid that in the existing circumstances your suggestions, as set out in para 2 of the Press Statement, were bound to be read in the context of the Anglo-Irish Agreement continuing in force and as thus implying on the Unionist side some degree of acceptance of that Agreement and willingness to assist in making it viable.

However, after studying what the Secretary of State said in answer to certain supplementary questions on 4th March, it occurs to me that the reference in the Statement to "consultations about the arrangements for handling N.I. business in Parliament at Westminster" could be held to cover discussions on bringing the legislative and administrative government of Northern Ireland into line with that in the rest of the kingdom and that, though not strictly incompatible with the Agreement, this could be explored without prejudice to the Ulster Unionist Party's fundamental objection to the Agreement and determination not to acquiesce in it.

If so, the possibility of consultation in some form continuing confidentially need not, I feel, be necessarily ruled out. In this connection I may draw to your attention the enclosed passage in a binding resolution on policy adopted by the Party's Executive on 28th February.



Thank you for your letter and enclosure of  
I am glad you wrote as you did, and I look forward to our being able  
to make some progress.

It may help if I say that the Government has no objection in principle to Northern Ireland sharing the same form of parliamentary government and legislation as the rest of the United Kingdom - with two provisos. First, there would have to be some transitional provision to cover problems in moving over from the present arrangements. Secondly, we would like to see the devolution to an elected body or bodies in Northern Ireland of the matters which in Great Britain are administered by local authorities and in this context to consider a possible future for the Assembly.

It seems to me that none of this would conflict with your Party's Executive's resolution of 22nd February which you let me see. So I hope we can now move forward.



RESTRICTED



*File*  
*CCMA*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

*ack/* 11 March 1986

I enclose a copy of the much-heralded letter to the Prime Minister from Mr. Molyneux and Dr. Paisley. It does not amount to very much.

*BF 11*

I should be grateful for a draft reply by 18 March.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Murdo MacLean (Chief Whip's Office), and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

C D POWELL

Jim Daniell, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office

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CCR



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 March 1986

EDP  
12/3

Dear Charles,

European Community: Northern Ireland

Thank you for your letter of 10 March.

Following the discussion in OD(I), we had already made clear to the Irish Government that we were not prepared to seek a special EC measure in support of the Anglo/Irish Agreement. The Foreign Secretary explained the position to the Irish Foreign Minister yesterday in Brussels (see FCO telno 56 to Dublin - copy enclosed). Sir Geoffrey Howe impressed on Mr Barry the serious public expenditure difficulties for us, when we are already spending £1.6 billion per annum in Northern Ireland; and that any public disagreement on this matter would be damaging to our efforts to secure support from the United States.

Sir Geoffrey Howe made quite clear that there is no question of our going back on that decision. We attached importance to Community support for the Agreement. But this should take the form of action through the Structural Funds which provided an accepted and proven framework for Community involvement. We should use the new treaty provisions agreed at the Luxembourg European Council to maximise the effectiveness of the contribution that could be made through the coordinated use of the Structural Funds.

Mr Barry was reluctant to accept this, and the Irish have not yet abandoned their position. But they agreed that with the press we should take the line that both Governments welcome the international support expressed for the Agreement; that it is important that it should be underpinned by such support; and that we will be concerting with the Commission ways in which the Community can help.

/As the Irish





As the Irish said that Dr Fitzgerald was liable to be asked about EC aid during his current visit to Washington, we gave them figures demonstrating that over the past five years Northern Ireland has been allocated £460 million in EC aid through the Regional, Social and Agricultural Guidance Funds and the Belfast Urban Renewal Programme; and will continue to receive major EC aid flows over the next five years. The province has also received £130 million in EIB lending since 1979. These are far larger figures than those being discussed in Congress for US aid.

I am copying this letter to Jim Daniel (Northern Ireland Office) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,  
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street



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NIO BELFAST FOR PS  
FRAME STRUCTURAL  
EC/NORTHERN IRELAND

1. I MET MR BARRY IN BRUSSELS AT NOON TODAY. SIR D HANNAY, RENWICK, FOGARTY AND O'ROURKE WERE PRESENT.
2. BARRY EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT AT OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PROPOSED JOINT APPROACH TO THE COMMISSION. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TOO HAD FACED PROBLEMS OF ADDITIONALITY BUT HAD BEEN DETERMINED TO OVERCOME THEM IN ORDER TO ATTRACT COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT AND TO SECURE NEW FUNDS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND IRELAND.
3. I SAID WE WANTED TO MAINTAIN A COMMON APPROACH TO SECURE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT BUT HAD FACED FORMIDABLE PROBLEMS ON ADDITIONALITY. I EXPLAINED THE COMPLICATIONS. UK MINISTERS HAD DECIDED THAT IT WOULD SIMPLY NOT BE WORTH ADDING TO UK PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN THIS WAY WHEN THE RESULT WOULD BE ONLY A VERY SMALL REAL ADDITION TO THE FUNDS GOING TO NORTHERN IRELAND.
4. I ARGUED THAT COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT SHOULD NOW TAKE

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THE FORM OF A CONTINUED EFFORT THROUGH THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS. THIS WOULD NOT REQUIRE ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES AND COULD DRAW ON THE PROVISIONS FOR COORDINATING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FUNDS SET OUT IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT. BARRY DOUBTED IF THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE. THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS COULD NOT BE USED FOR BRIDGE BUILDING BETWEEN THE TWO COMMITTEES IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND SUCH A LOW KEY PROPOSAL MIGHT HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE US GOVERNMENT.

HE WAS ALSO SCEPTICAL ON WHETHER THE NEW TREATY PROVISIONS WOULD BE OF ANY USE. SIR D HANNAY NOTED THAT THE COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTION WOULD COVER DIFFERENT AREAS FROM THOSE DUE TO BE TACKLED BY THE AMERICANS AND THAT THE COMMISSION WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO HELP NORTHERN IRELAND THROUGH BETTER AND MORE COORDINATED USE OF THE THREE FUNDS.

5. MR BARRY AND HIS OFFICIALS RAISED THE QUESTION OF A COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL FUND ON THREE OCCASIONS DURING THE MEETING. WE POINTED OUT THAT THIS WOULD RUN UP AGAINST THE SAME ADDITIONALITY PROBLEMS AS A SPECIAL MEASURE: THAT OTHER MEMBER STATES WOULD ARGUE THAT THE PURPOSE OF A DIRECT CONTRIBUTION WAS ALREADY MET BY THE EXISTING FUNDS: THAT FROM THE US POINT OF VIEW, WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS THAT THE COMMUNITY SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE TAKING ACTION: AND THAT THE WORST OF ALL OUTCOMES VIS-A-VIS THE US WOULD BE FOR THE COMMUNITY TO CONSIDER A CONTRIBUTION TO THE FUND AND THEN REJECT IT.

6. BARRY RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE LINE TO TAKE IN PUBLIC IN THE LIGHT OF THE TAOISEACH'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 12 MARCH. I IDENTIFIED THREE COMMON OBJECTIVES: TO HALT THE DECLINE IN EC MONEY GOING TO NORTHERN IRELAND AND EIRE, TO PORTRAY THIS AS EC SUPPORT FOR THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT, AND TO AVOID A ROW. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DIRECT COMMISSION THINKING TO WHAT WAS POSSIBLE RATHER THAN TO ALLOW EXPECTATIONS TO GROW UNREALISTICALLY. THE UK COULD NOT ACCEPT A COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL FUND OR AN ADDITIONAL LINE IN THE BUDGET. WHILE THE REMAINING OPTIONS MIGHT NOT BE DUBLIN'S FIRST CHOICE IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PRESENT THEM JOINTLY AND POSITIVELY.

7. WE SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED THE FOLLOWING LINE TO TAKE WITH THE

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PRESS:

BEGINS

· ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT OF 15 NOVEMBER 1985 REPRESENTS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO MAJOR TRADITIONS IN IRELAND.

UK AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT WHICH HAS BEEN EXPRESSED BY THE OTHER MEMBER STATES AND BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE AGREEMENT.

IMPORTANT THAT THE AGREEMENT IS UNDERPINNED BY INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE NEIGHBOURING PARTS OF IRELAND.

THE UK AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS WILL BE CONCERTING WITH THE COMMISSION WAYS IN WHICH THE COMMUNITY CAN BEST LEND ITS SUPPORT TO THE AGREEMENT.

ENDS

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MAIN

FRAME STRUCTURAL

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COPIES TO:

MR COWLING, NIO

MR SPENCE, CENTRAL SECTION, NI

MR SMALL, DFP, NI.

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
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IRELAND

RELATIONS

PT 75





Prime Minister  
CDP 12/3.  
mf

Ref. A086/792

PRIME MINISTER  

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I shall be reporting separately on the main part of my conversation with Mr Nally today.

2. I had some time with him tête-à-tête before other people joined us, in the course of which he made four points:

1. Mr James Molyneux is seeking to contact the Taoiseach. Mr Nally had no idea what Mr Molyneux wanted to talk to the Taoiseach about. I said that, following the rebuff from his followers after his meeting with you, we were not sure how strong Mr Molyneux's position was or what his intentions were. He might wish to sound out the Taoiseach about the possibility of the Irish Government being willing to agree to some kind of suspension of the Anglo-Irish Agreement or the Intergovernmental Conference. I reminded Mr Nally that you had said to Mr Molyneux that there was no question of suspending, modifying or departing from the Agreement; you had said that you could say no more than that we should be prepared to operate the Agreement sensitively, and I suggested that the Taoiseach might take the same sort of line.

2. Mr Paisley is due to talk privately to Mr Hume in Strasbourg tomorrow (11 March). This meeting was at Mr Paisley's request, and it was not known what Mr Paisley wanted. It is apparently not unusual for them to meet privately in Strasbourg.

3. The Taoiseach wanted you to know that, if at some point it would be convenient that there should be a slightly longer than usual interval between the meetings of



the Intergovernmental Conference - in order (for instance) to enable a round table conference on devolution to get started - he would understand and accept that; indeed, if it would help, he would be prepared to suggest it. It would be important that the Secretariat should continue to work, and that meetings between other Ministers than Mr Barry and Mr King (for instance the Attorney General and the Minister of Justice) and the work of the various special groups that had been set up should continue.

4. Mr Nally referred to the suggestion that we had asked the White House to give the Taoiseach's visit "a low profile". I said, with some emphasis, that that was absolutely without foundation, and there had been no contact with the White House on Irish matters, to this effect or any other. I suggested that this might perhaps be a misunderstanding (possibly mischievously motivated) of attempts which (as the Irish Government knew) we had made to ensure that any public announcement by the United States Administration of their proposed contribution to a Fund took full account of unionist sensitivity.
3. I have not sent copies of this minute to anyone else.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

10 March 1986







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FM FCO  
TO DESKBY 110900Z DUBLIN  
TELNO 55  
OF 101600Z MARCH 86  
AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND MR BARRY IN BRUSSELS  
ON 10 MARCH : NORTHERN IRELAND

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A BILATERAL MEETING WITH MR BARRY ON 10 MARCH IN THE MARGINS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL IN BRUSSELS. THE FOLLOWING IS A RECORD OF THEIR DISCUSSION ON NON-EC MATTERS.
2. MR BARRY BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT NEWS OF HIS PLANNED MEETING WITH MR KING ON 11 MARCH HAD LEAKED TO THE PRESS. TURNING TO THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND, HE COMMENTED THAT WHILE THE UNIONIST OPPOSITION TO THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SHARPER THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE RECENT STRIKE HAD FRIGHTENED MANY MODERATES IN THE UNIONIST CAMP. IT HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN 'A BIG TURN-OFF' IN THE UK. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THIS WAS SO, BUT NOTED THAT THE RESULT OF THE STRIKE MIGHT WELL BE TO FEED BOTH SIDES OF THE ARGUMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND, SINCE THE EXTREMISTS COULD BE ENCOURAGED TO FEEL THEY NEEDED TO TAKE EVEN MORE VIOLENT ACTION NEXT TIME TO MAKE THEIR POINT MORE PLAINLY. A FURTHER PROBLEM WAS THAT IT WAS STILL NOT CLEAR WHO WAS GOING TO EMERGE TO LEAD THE MODERATES.
3. MR BARRY SAID THE IRISH GOVERNMENT THOUGHT IT CRUCIAL THAT

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BOTH DUBLIN AND LONDON SHOULD CONTINUE TO SHOW THEMSELVES FULLY COMMITTED TO THE AGREEMENT, NOT BENDING AN INCH. WAYS DID HOWEVER NEED TO BE FOUND OF ENCOURAGING MOLYNEAUX (AND IF POSSIBLE PAISLEY) TO SIT DOWN WITH HUME AND TALK DEVOLUTION. HE THOUGHT THE SDLP HAD BEEN BEHAVING QUITE WELL, GIVEN THE TENUOUS GRIP THEY HAD ON THE VOTES WHICH THEY HAD BORROWED FROM SINN FEIN.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID IT WAS OF COURSE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FOR ALL CONCERNED TO AVOID MAKING STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD INFLAME THE UNIONISTS. EXAMPLES OF UNHELPFUL STATEMENTS FROM DUBLIN HAD BEEN ATTACHED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S LATEST MESSAGE TO THE TAOISEACH, DELIVERED OVER THE WEEKEND. MR BARRY SAID HE HAD SEEN A COPY OF THE LETTER: THE STATEMENTS REFERRED TO IN IT HAD ALL BEEN MADE SOME TIME AGO.

5. MR BARRY THEN RAISED THE POINT WHICH THE TAOISEACH HAD PUT TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN THEIR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION ON 7 MARCH, CONCERNING PRESSURE WHICH THE UK HAD ALLEGEDLY PUT ON THE WHITE HOUSE TO GET THE AMERICANS TO PLAY DOWN THE TAOISEACH'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER REGRETTED THAT THE TAOISEACH HAD FELT IT RIGHT TO SPEAK AS HE HAD, AND THAT HE HAD GIVEN IMPLICIT CREDENCE TO THE IDEA. IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT NO REPRESENTATIONS HAD BEEN MADE TO THE WHITE HOUSE. MR BARRY SAID THEY HAD PERHAPS BEEN MADE THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SET OUT CLEARLY THE BACKGROUND, STRESSING THE NEED TO AVOID LAUNCHING THE US CONTRIBUTION IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CAUSE TROUBLE WITH UNIONISTS. OUR AIM HAD BEEN TO AVOID LINKING THE LAUNCH TO THE ST PATRICK'S DAY CELEBRATIONS. MR BARRY SAID HE SAW THE FORCE OF THIS, THOUGH IT WAS RELEVANT THAT IT HAD BEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN HIMSELF WHO HAD CHOSEN TO ARRANGE THE CEREMONY FOR ST PATRICK'S DAY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN DISMAYED THAT THE TAOISEACH HAD INTERPRETED WHAT HAD BEEN MEANT TO BE AN ENTIRELY BENIGN UK INTERVENTION IN A QUITE DIFFERENT WAY. MR BARRY SAID THE TROUBLE HAD BEEN THAT IT HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO HIM IN THIS WAY. THE TAOISEACH HAD HOWEVER BEEN VERY WELL SATISFIED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S REACTION.

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6. IN DISCUSSION IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WAS HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO ESTABLISH A PATTERN OF REGULARITY FOR MEETINGS OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE (IGC). MR BARRY SAID IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO DESIGNATE ONE DAY A MONTH FOR SUCH A MEETING, THOUGH OBVIOUSLY THE SECURITY ANGLE WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE PRIME AIM SHOULD BE TO MAKE MEETINGS OF THE IGC ROUTINE AFFAIRS, AND TO DE-DRAMATISE THE ENTIRE PROCESS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MADE PLAIN THAT HE VERY MUCH AGREED.

7. REVERTING TO THE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES WITH THE UNIONIST COMMUNITY, MR BARRY POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD BEFORE LONG BE RENEWED PROBLEMS WITH THE NATIONALISTS AS WELL. HE POINTED TO A RECENT SPEECH HAUGHEY HAD MADE IN THE US, SAYING THAT THE AGREEMENT PROVIDED NOTHING FOR THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY.

HOWE

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R/D

NAIS

RS

RS/LADY YOUNG

RS/RUS

MR GOODALL

MR HOUSTON

COPIES TO

MR BELL, NIO (L)

MR CHESTERTON, NIO (L)

MR BRENNAN, NIO (L)

SIR R ARMSTRONG, CAB OFF

MR MALLABY, CAB OFF

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

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10 DOWNING STREET

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*From the Private Secretary*

10 March 1986

**EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: NORTHERN IRELAND**

The Prime Minister has seen a copy of Dublin telegram No. 147 reporting that Mr. Barry is likely to press the Foreign Secretary to think again about a special European Community measure in support of the Anglo-Irish agreement. The Prime Minister recalls that there was no significant support for such a measure at the meeting of OD(I) and assumes that the Foreign Secretary will therefore stand firm against Irish attempts to reopen the issue.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

**C D POWELL**

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

10 March 1986

**NORTHERN IRELAND: TAOISEACH'S TELEPHONE CALL TO THE  
PRIME MINISTER**

Thank you for your letter of 7 March explaining the background to Dr. FitzGerald's complaint to the Prime Minister that United Kingdom officials had asked the White House to treat his visit to the United States in a low profile way.

The Prime Minister was most grateful to have this explanation. It is clear to her that the Taoiseach totally misrepresented the situation and she wishes this to be brought home to him in no uncertain way. She would be grateful, I am sure, if the Foreign Secretary could leave Mr. Barry in no doubt of her regret that the Taoiseach should have chosen to raise the issue in this way and to give credence to the notion that we were in some way trying to undermine his visit. She hopes that Sir Robert Armstrong will speak equally firmly today to Mr. Nally. The Prime Minister is considering telephoning Dr. FitzGerald in the United States. I shall let you know if she proceeds with this.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

C D POWELL

Len Appleyard, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO MR FITZGERALD

1. FOLLOWING ARE ATTACHMENTS TO MRS THATCHER'S LETTER:

MR SPRING QUOTED IN THE IRISH ADVOCATE ON 7.12.85  
'WE HAVE REACHED A POINT WHERE THE CONFERENCE IS GOING TO BECOME  
AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MACHINERY OF ADMINISTRATION IN NORTHERN  
IRELAND ....WHO COULD HAVE ENVISAGED A DECADE OR MORE AGO THAT WE'D  
NOW HAVE PEOPLE FROM THE REPUBLIC LIVING AND WORKING IN BELFAST  
WITH A SAY IN HOW THE NORTH IS RUN.'

MR BARRY AT FINE-GAEL DUBLIN-LEINSTER CONFERENCE ON 8.12.85  
'IT IS THIS CONFERENCE WHICH GIVES TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ITS  
DIRECT, INSTITUTIONAL, AUTHORITATIVE ROLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.'

FINE-GAEL BRIEFING DOCUMENT ON THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT  
' ..... THE EXTENSIVE INVOLVEMENT OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IN  
THE PROCESSES OF GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND .....

(NEW PAGE) STATEMENT 4 MARCH 1986  
WITH PERMISSION MR SPEAKER, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT

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/ABOUT



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ABOUT THE EVENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND YESTERDAY.

2. AS THE HOUSE WILL BE AWARE, THE LEADERS OF THE TWO MAIN UNIONIST PARTIES HAD CALLED FOR A DAY OF ACTION AND PROTEST. THEY INVITED EVERYBODY TO STAY AWAY FROM WORK AND STATED THAT IT SHOULD BE A PASSIVE AND VOLUNTARY DEMONSTRATION AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO ROADBLOCKS OR INTIMIDATION OF THOSE GOING TO WORK.

3. IN THE EVENT, THERE WAS WIDESPREAD OBSTRUCTION, INTIMIDATION, AND SOME VIOLENCE DURING THE DAY CULMINATING IN SERIOUS DISORDER IN EAST AND NORTH BELFAST LAST NIGHT. THE FIRST INCIDENTS OCCURRED BEFORE MIDNIGHT ON SUNDAY AND DISTURBANCES CONTINUED UNTIL THE EARLY HOURS OF THIS MORNING.

4. IN SPITE OF THESE DIFFICULTIES A VERY CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF PEOPLE SUCCEEDED IN GETTING TO WORK: PARTICULARLY IN THE COMMERCIAL OFFICES AND PUBLIC SERVICES, BUT MANY FACTORIES WERE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED.

5. I PAY TRIBUTE TO THE DETERMINATION OF ALL THOSE WHO REFUSED TO BE INTIMIDATED AND EXERCISED THEIR RIGHT TO GO TO WORK. I ALSO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE MEN OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND PARTICULARLY THE RUC FOR ALL THE WORK THAT THEY DID TO SEEK TO KEEP ROADS OPEN FOR PEOPLE TO BE ABLE TO GET TO WORK. HOWEVER THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN A NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS WHEN IT IS ALLEGED THAT THE POLICE DID NOT TAKE ACTION WHEN IT WAS REQUIRED. THE CHIEF CONSTABLE IS PREPARING A FULL REPORT ON ALL POLICING ASPECTS OF THE PAST 24 HOURS. TO GIVE THE HOUSE SOME INDICATION OF THE SCALE OF THE WORKLOAD THAT THE RUC FACED, ON THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE THERE WERE SOME 655 ROADBLOCKS IN THE PROVINCE OVER THE PERIOD OF WHICH 441 WERE CLEARED. THERE WERE IN ADDITION SOME 80 CAVALCADES AND DEMONSTRATIONS, WHICH CAUSED CONSIDERABLE DISTUPTION IN A NUMBER OF TOWNS MAINLY AROUND MIDDAY. THERE WERE 57 ARRESTS AND THE NAMES OF 184 PEOPLE NOTED TO PROCEED BY WAY OF SUMMONS. 65 PLASTIC BATON ROUNDS WERE FIRED, 47 POLICEMEN WERE INJURED. LAST NIGHT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PETROL BOMBS THROWN, AND THERE WERE OVER 20 SHOTS FIRED IN 3 FIREARMS ATTACKS ON THE POLICE DURING THE DISTURBANCES IN THE LOYALIST AREAS.

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6. THE FIGURES LISTED ABOVE GIVE THE DETAILS OF A TRAGIC DAY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND. MANY MEMBERS WILL HAVE SEEN SOME OF THE DISGRACEFUL INCIDENTS ON TELEVISION LAST NIGHT. THESE PICTURES HAVE BEEN SHOWN ALL OVER THE WORLD AND WILL DO GREAT DAMAGE TO THE REPUTATION OF THE PROVINCE. THE HOUSE WILL ALSO HAVE SEEN ELECTED MEMBERS OF THIS HOUSE MAKING COMMON CAUSE WITH PEOPLE IN PARAMILITARY DRESS.

7. THE GOVERNMENT IS WELL AWARE OF THE STRENGTH OF FEELING AMONG MANY UNIONISTS ABOUT ASPECTS OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT. THE HOUSE WILL BE AWARE THAT MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND THE PRIME MINISTER AND I MET THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MEMBER FOR LAGAN VALLEY AND THE MEMBER FOR NORTH ANTRIM LAST TUESDAY. DURING A LONG MEETING MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND PUT FORWARD A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS TO HELP MEET THEIR MAIN CONCERNS AND AGREED TO CONSIDER POSITIVELY THEIR SUGGESTIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD CALL ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS DEVOLUTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND: IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD ALL REFLECT ON THE VARIOUS SUGGESTIONS THAT HAD BEEN MADE AND WOULD MEET AGAIN SHORTLY. THE PROSPECTS OF CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS INSTEAD OF CONFRONTATION WERE GREETED WITH WIDESPREAD RELIEF IN THE PROVINCE, ONLY FOR THAT TO BE DESTROYED BY THEIR ABRUPT REPUDIATION OF THIS COURSE FOLLOWING A MEETING IN BELFAST LATE THAT NIGHT. THEY THEN DECIDED TO PROCEED WITH THE DAY OF PROTEST.

8. THE WHOLE COUNTRY CAN NOW SEE HOW TRAGIC AND TOTALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE YESTERDAY'S ACTION HAS BEEN. IT IS NOW URGENT THAT THE UNIONIST LEADERS RECOGNISE AGAIN THAT THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH THE CONCERNS OF THOSE THEY SEEK TO REPRESENT CAN BE ADDRESSED IS BY CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION AND NOT BY THREATS AND VIOLENCE. THE DEGREE OF INTIMIDATION EVIDENT YESTERDAY SHOWED HOW LITTLE CONFIDENCE MANY OF THE ORGANISERS HAD IN BEING ABLE PEACEFULLY TO PERSUADE THEIR FELLOW CITIZENS TO JOIN THEIR DAY OF PROTEST. I MAKE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THIS GOVERNMENT, THIS PARLIAMENT WILL NOT BE INTIMIDATED EITHER BY THE SORT OF VIOLENT ACTIONS THAT TOOK PLACE YESTERDAY. I BELIEVE THAT AN INCREASING NUMBER OF UNIONISTS WHILE DISLIKING MANY ASPECTS OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT WISH TO LOOK FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY



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FORWARD. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE QUITE CLEAR OUR WILLINGNESS TO SIT DOWN AND DISCUSS SERIOUSLY THE UNIONISTS' CONCERNS. IN OUR PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, IN THIS UNITED KINGDOM, THAT CAN BE THE ONLY WAY.

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OF 081100Z MARCH 86  
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKREP BRUSSELS, BIS NEW YORK

PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO MR FITZGERALD

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MRS THATCHER'S LETTER OF 7 MARCH TO THE TAOISEACH. GRATEFUL YOU ARRANGE TO DELIVER IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DEAR GARRET,  
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 24 FEBRUARY FOLLOWING OUR EARLIER MEETING. EVENTS HAVE MOVED ON SINCE THEN, AND IT MAY HELP TO GIVE YOU MY PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF HOW MATTERS STAND FOLLOWING THE TALKS I HAVE HAD WITH THE UNIONIST LEADERS, WITH JOHN HUME AND WITH JOHN CUSHNAHAN, AND MOST RECENTLY THE UNIONIST 'DAY OF ACTION' ON 3 MARCH.  
WHEN I MET THE UNIONISTS THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF PLAIN TALKING: I REFUSED TO COUNTENANCE ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE AGREEMENT COULD BE ABANDONED OR SUSPENDED. THE FURTHEREST THAT I WAS PREPARED TO GO ON THIS CENTRAL ISSUE WAS TO UNDERTAKE TO OPERATE THE AGREEMENT SENSITIVELY - AND I SHALL RETURN TO THAT POINT BELOW. I DID, HOWEVER, TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE STRENGTH OF UNIONIST FEELING AGAINST ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT. I LAID STRESS ON THE FACT THAT, AS YOU YOURSELF HAVE SUGGESTED, THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES

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OF AVOIDING TRIUMPHALISM: AND MR HUME'S RECENT DECLARATION OF READINESS TO TALK ABOUT DEVOLUTION WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS WAS ALSO HELPFUL. HE TOLD ME THAT I WOULD FIND THE SDLP 'CONSTRUCTIVE'. I HOPE THAT, WITH YOUR HELP, THIS WILL INDEED PROVE TO BE SO, AND THAT THEY WILL ALSO SHOW DISCRETION. (MR MALLON'S WIDELY REPORTED REMARKS ON RUC CONDUCT ON MONDAY WERE, AS SO OFTEN, THE REVERSE OF HELPFUL, AND I APPRECIATED THE WAY YOU TOOK THE STING OUT OF WHAT HE SAID). IN THE COMING WEEKS, THE UNIONIST LEADERS WILL BE LOOKING FOR ANY ACTION OR STATEMENTS FROM THE SDLP - OR INDEED FROM THE REPUBLIC - THAT THEY CAN USE TO CONFIRM THEIR SUPPORTERS' FEARS OF THE AGREEMENT. IT REMAINS VITAL TO DEPRIVE THEM OF SUCH AMMUNITION, AND THAT IS ANOTHER REASON WHY I SO MUCH WELCOMED YOUR SIGNATURE, WITHOUT RESERVATION, OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM.

IT IS NO LESS IMPERATIVE THAT WE CAN DEMONSTRATE THE BENEFITS FOR (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) ALL THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND THAT THE AGREEMENT IS CAPABLE OF BRINGING. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE MAKING PROGRESS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE IN THOSE AREAS WHICH, WHILE SERVING OUR COMMON INTEREST, WILL BE WELCOME TO UNIONISTS. I HAVE IN MIND, IN PARTICULAR, THE NEED FOR VISIBLE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN ENHANCING SECURITY COOPERATION AT ALL LEVELS AND IN ALL THE AREAS COVERED IN ARTICLE 9(A) OF THE AGREEMENT. IT WAS THE PURSUIT OF SUCH OBJECTIVES, COMBINED WITH RESTRAINT IN MAKING CLAIMS FOR THE CONFERENCE AND CARE IN AVOIDING PRECIPITATE ACTION WHICH WOULD OFFEND UNIONISTS' SENSITIVITIES THAT I HAD IN MIND WHEN I REFERRED TO OPERATING THE AGREEMENT 'SENSITIVELY'. I HAVE NOT GIVEN UP HOPE OF BRINGING THE UNIONISTS BACK TO THE PATH OF CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE THAT, FOR A MOMENT, THEY SEEMED READY TO FOLLOW LAST WEEK. THE OFFERS I MADE TO THEM REMAIN ON THE TABLE. TO THAT END I KNOW I CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING. I HOPE THAT THE SDLP WILL PLAY THEIR PART. WHAT THEY NEVERTHELESS MANAGED TO ACHIEVE. I SHOULD ALSO TELL YOU, IN CONFIDENCE, THAT TOM KING HAS ASKED THE CHIEF CONSTABLE FOR AN URGENT REPORT ON THE POLICING ASPECTS OF THE 'DAY OF

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ACTION'. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING FACTS AND FIGURES, ETC., THE CHIEF CONSTABLE HAS ALSO BEEN ASKED TO DEAL WITH THE ALLEGATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE THAT THE POLICE DID NOT DO ENOUGH TO PREVENT THE INTIMIDATION OF THOSE WHO WERE SEEKING TO GET TO WORK.

HOWEVER, AS A RESULT OF MY MEETING WITH MR MOLYNEAUX AND DR PAISLEY, THE UNIONISTS CAN BE IN NO DOUBT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE DEFLECTED FROM ITS DETERMINATION TO IMPLEMENT THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT, AND THAT THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF ASKING PARLIAMENT TO REPUDIATE A MEASURE TO WHICH BARELY THREE MONTHS AGO IT GAVE MASSIVE ENDORSEMENT. THE EVENTS OF LAST MONDAY HAVE IN NO WAY WEAKENED THAT DETERMINATION, NOR WILL RECOURSE TO SIMILAR ACTION IN FUTURE.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE TO RECOGNISE THAT MORE THAN DETERMINATION ON OUR PART WILL BE NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO GET THROUGH WHAT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE SOME VERY DIFFICULT MONTHS AHEAD. I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE MY VIEW THAT IT IS IMPORTANT AT THE PRESENT TIME TO AVOID EXACERBATING UNIONISTS SENSITIVITIES, AND THE EVENTS OF THE 'DAY OF ACTION' UNDERLINE JUST HOW ESSENTIAL THIS CONTINUES TO BE. WE ALSO NEED TO FIND ALL POSSIBLE WAYS OF COMMENDING THE AGREEMENT TO MODERATE AND REASONABLE UNIONISTS WHO MUST, I AM SURE, BE DISMAYED BY THE RECENT TURN OF EVENTS. I REGARD IT, THEREFORE, AS VITAL THAT THE SDLP ADOPTS A GENEROUS AND STATESMANLIKE APPROACH DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD. I LEFT MR HUME IN NO DOUBT THAT IT IS NOT ENOUGH NOW TO SIT BACK AND LEAVE IT TO US TO DEAL WITH UNIONIST OPPOSITION. NONE OF US WILL BENEFIT IF WE SIMPLY EXCHANGE AN ESTRANGED MINORITY FOR A NON-COOPERATIVE MAJORITY. THE UNIONISTS CANNOT MAKE ME ABANDON THE AGREEMENT. BUT THEIR PROLONGED HOSTILITY CAN PREVENT IT FROM ACHIEVING THE RECONCILIATION AND STABILITY THAT WE BOTH SEEK. I WELCOME WHAT THE SDLP HAVE ALREADY DONE BY WAY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT ANY MATTERS DEVOLVED TO A NORTHERN IRELAND ADMINISTRATION WOULD NO LONGER FALL FOR DISCUSSION IN THE CONFERENCE - A POINT WHICH WE SHALL BE WORKING HARD TO GET ACROSS IN NORTHERN IRELAND WHERE IT SEEMS AS YET TO BE IMPERFECTLY UNDERSTOOD. I READILY AGREED, THEREFORE, TO CONSIDER MR MOLYNEAUX'S AND DR PAISLEY'S

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SUGGESTION OF A ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE (WHICH MR HUME AND MR CUSHNAHAN WERE ALSO WILLING TO ENDORSE) AT WHICH DEVOLUTION MIGHT BE DISCUSSED. I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT SENSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEVOLUTION WHICH COMMAND WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY OFFER THE BEST LONG TERM HOPE FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE PROVINCE.

I ALSO, AS YOU WILL KNOW, MADE OTHER SUGGESTIONS WHICH WERE DESIGNED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF LEGITIMATE UNIONIST CONCERNS AND TO COUNTER THEIR FEELING THAT THEY ARE EXCLUDED FROM INFLUENCE ON DECISION MAKING IN NORTHERN IRELAND. I ACCORDINGLY OFFERED THEM NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSULTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT ABOUT AFFAIRS IN NORTHERN IRELAND INCLUDING SECURITY. I ALSO OFFERED THEM CONSULTATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY AND ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH NORTHERN IRELAND MATTERS ARE HANDLED AT WESTMINSTER.

AT THE END OF OUR MEETING THE UNIONIST LEADERS APPEARED TO BE WILLING TO TALK CONSTRUCTIVELY ABOUT THE FUTURE WITHOUT PRESSING THEIR DEMAND THAT THE AGREEMENT BE SUSPENDED. BUT AS WE SAW, ON THEIR RETURN TO BELFAST, THEY WERE UNABLE TO CARRY THEIR SUPPORTERS WITH THEM. IN THE LIGHT BOTH OF THAT TURNAROUND AND STILL MORE OF WHAT HAPPENED ON 3 MARCH, NO ONE CAN BE IN ANY DOUBT EITHER ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF UNIONIST FEELINGS NOR OF THE FRMIDABLE DIFFICULTIES WITH WHICH WE ARE FACED IN THE PROVINCE. AS FOR THE EVENTS OF 3 MARCH THEMSELVES, I DO NOT THINK I CAN DO BETTER THAN SEND YOU A COPY OF WHAT TOM KING SAID IN THE HOUSE ON TUESDAY. I SCARCELY NEED TO SAY HOW MUCH I DEPLORE THE DISGRACEFUL TACTICS ADOPTED BY OPPONENTS OF OUR AGREEMENT. YOU WILL ALSO SEE FROM THAT STATEMENT JUST HOW GREAT WERE THE ADDITIONAL PRESSURES IMPOSED ON THE RUC BY THE STRIKERS, AND YOU RAISED A NUMBER OF MORE DETAILED MATTERS IN YOUR LETTER. YOU ASKED, FOR INSTANCE, ABOUT ACTUAL STATEMENTS THAT WE HAD FOUND UNHELPFUL: I AM ARRANGING FOR THESE TO BE FOLLOWED UP BY OFFICIALS, THOUGH I ENCLOSE THREE EXAMPLES OF STATEMENTS WHICH INEVITABLY RAISE HACKLES IN THE NORTH. YOU ALSO PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO SECURITY ON THE BORDER: I NOTE THAT THE COMPARISONS ARE GENERALLY WITH

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1969 RATHER THAN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE AGREEMENT.  
FOR THE PRESENT AT LEAST, THIS SUBJECT MIGHT BE PURSUED BY THE  
NEW QUADRIpartite GROUP OF POLICEMEN AND OFFICIALS FROM BOTH  
SIDES WHICH HELD ITS FIRST MEETING IN BELFAST LAST WEEK. BUT I  
THINK WE BOTH AGREE THAT OUR FIRST PRIORITY NOW MUST BE TO BE  
SEEN TO MAKE PROGRESS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE IN A WAY THAT WILL  
HELP THE MAJORITY IN THE NORTH, HOWEVER RELUCTANTLY IN MANY  
CASES, TO ACCEPT THAT THE AGREEMENT IS NOT ONLY HERE TO STAY,  
BUT CAN FURTHER, RATHER THAN DAMAGE, THEIR OWN INTERESTS.  
YOURS SINCERELY,  
MARGARET.

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MR HOUSTON

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:

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TO DESKBY 071430Z FCO

TELNO 147

OF 071350Z MARCH 86

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS AND WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 50: EC: NORTHERN IRELAND

SUMMARY

1. MR BARRY WILL PRESS YOU IN BRUSSELS ON MONDAY TO THINK AGAIN ABOUT A SPECIAL EC MEASURE IN SUPPORT OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT.

DETAIL

2. STIMSON CALLED ON FOGARTY (DFA) THIS MORNING AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN PARA 2 OF YOUR TUR, HANDING OVER A PIECE OF PAPER IN THE TERMS OF PARA 1 OF TUR. FOGARTY UNDERTOOK IMMEDIATELY TO PASS THIS TO MR BARRY AND TO MR NALLY, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT IMPRESSED BY IT, HAVING EXPECTED A RATHER FULLER EXPLANATION.

3. FOGARTY SAID THAT NOT ONLY MR BARRY BUT ALSO THE TAOISEACH HAD BEEN VERY TAKEN ABACK THAT WE WERE NO LONGER WILLING TO SUPPORT THE PLANNED JOINT MINISTERIAL APPROACH TO THE COMMISSION IN THE MARGINS OF THE FAC ON MONDAY. THE IRISH WERE WORRIED THAT THE FACT THAT WE HAD BEEN BUT NO LONGER WERE PLANNING TO PROCEED IN THIS WAY WOULD LEAK IN BRUSSELS, AND THAT THIS COULD CAUSE ADVERSE REACTIONS IN WASHINGTON WHERE THE IRISH ARE STILL HOPEFUL, WITH TIP O'NEILL'S HELP, OF GETTING MORE THAN US DOLLARS 250 M IN THE END. MR NALLY HAD AGREED ON WEDNESDAY EVENING WITH SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD VOLUNTEER ANYTHING TO THE PRESS, BUT THAT, IF PRESSED, WE SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WERE STILL IN DISCUSSION WITH A VIEW TO FINDING THE BEST WAY OF GETTING COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT. THIS IS VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH THE LAST POINT OF PARA 2 OF YOUR TELNO 46 AND WILL BE USED IF NECESSARY BY MR BIRMINGHAM, THE NEW MINISTER OF STATE AT THE DFA, WHEN HE LUNCHES WITH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENTS TODAY.

4. FOGARTY SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT YET SPOKEN TO MR BARRY ABOUT THE LINE HE WOULD TAKE WITH YOU ON MONDAY, HE THOUGHT IT HIGHLY LIKELY THAT MR BARRY WILL URGE YOU TO OVERCOME THE ADDITIONALITY PROBLEMS STANDING IN THE WAY OF A SPECIAL MEASURE. THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT WAS A UNIQUE POLITICAL STRUCTURE WHICH SEEMED TO THE IRISH TO REQUIRE COMMENSURATE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL IMAGINATION. FOR HIS PART, THE TAOISEACH WAS DETERMINED THAT NO IRISH PROBLEMS OVER ADDITIONALITY WOULD STAND IN THE WAY OF THEIR FINDING THE NECESSARY EXTRA MONEY.

*I imagine that you will want me to tell the Foreign Secretary to stand firm - yes not COP.*

*There aren't any!*



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5. FOGARTY, VOLUNTEERED THAT HE HAD DONE SOME SUMS FOR THE TAOISEACH ON THE BACK OF AN ENVELOPE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT 100 MILLION ECU'S MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING FROM THE COMMUNITY OVER EACH OF THE NEXT FIVE YEARS (HE SAID COMMISSION OFFICIALS HAD BEEN TALKING IN TERMS OF THIS SORT OF SUM - MORE THAN THE US ARE AT PRESENT PROPOSING TO GIVE). ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT 70% OF THIS WOULD BE SPENT NORTH OF THE BORDER AND THAT A 70% INTERVENTION RATE WAS AGREED, THEN THE UK WOULD FIND ITSELF MAKING A NET CONTRIBUTION OF SOME 30 MILLION ECU'S OR £20 MILLION A YEAR FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, WHICH DID NOT SEEM TO HIM, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, A GREAT DEAL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT.

6. FOGARTY SAID THAT HE INTERPRETED THE PIECE OF PAPER STIMSON HANDED HIM AS IMPLYING THAT WE WERE THINKING ONLY IN TERMS OF BETTER USE OF THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS: NEW MONEY THROUGH THE FUNDS WOULD ALSO RAISE ADDITIONALITY PROBLEMS. HE THEREFORE VERY MUCH HOPED WE COULD LOOK AGAIN AT A SPECIAL MEASURE. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO TALKING TO RENWICK ON MONDAY MORNING IN BRUSSELS BEFORE THE BILATERAL BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS. STIMSON WAS CAREFUL NOT TO MENTION THE FONTAINEBLEAU MECHANISM, BUT FOGARTY HIMSELF RAISED IT AND CLEARLY BELIEVES THAT ITS OPERATION IS A FACTOR IN OUR THINKING, DESPITE RENWICK'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH HIM YESTERDAY AND STIMSON'S INSISTENCE THAT THE REAL POINT AT ISSUE IS THAT EXPENDITURE SHOULD NOT BE SKEWED TOWARDS LOW PRIORITY PROJECTS.

7. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO CABINET OFFICE FOR PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG.

GOODISON

(ADVANCED AS REQUESTED)

FRAME STRUCTURAL  
ECD(1)  
RID  
MR GOODALL

COPIES TO:-  
MR COWLING NIO  
MR SMALL DFP NIO

-2-

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# CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 400  
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FM WASHINGTON

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 565

OF 072030Z MAR 86

AND TO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS (PS/SECRETARY OF STATE)

AND TO NIO(L) AND NIO(B)

MIPT: ANGLO/IRISH AGREEMENT: PROPOSED US ASSISTANCE

1. FOLLOWING UK/IRISH/US TALKS IN WASHINGTON ON 6/7 MARCH, PRESENTATION OF AN ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL TO CONGRESS ON 4 MARCH AND ADOPTION BY THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF A DIFFERENT PROPOSAL ON 6 MARCH, THE POSITION NOW IS AS FOLLOWS:-

(A) THE ADMINISTRATION IS STICKING TO ITS PROPOSAL FOR A US CONTRIBUTION OF DOLLARS 250M OVER 5 YEARS, OF WHICH ONLY DOLLARS 20M PER YEAR WOULD BE IN CASH. IN THE TRILATERAL TALKS THE IRISH ARGUED, MORE STRONGLY THAN US, FOR A LARGER CASH ELEMENT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT NOW REALISE THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO TAKE UP SOME OF THE NON-CASH PROGRAMMES IN THEIR PROPOSAL. BUT WITH GRAMM RUDMAN PRESSURES, ETC, THEY MAINTAIN THAT THEY DO NOT SEE WHERE MORE CASH CAN BE FOUND.

(B) THE HOUSE PROPOSAL, WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY SPEAKER O'NEILL AND OTHER IRISH INTERESTS IN CONGRESS, WOULD PROVIDE DOLLARS 50M PER YEAR IN CASH FOR 5 YEARS. THIS PROPOSAL IS EXPECTED TO BE APPROVED ON THE HOUSE FLOOR ON 11 MARCH. THE HOUSE THINK THAT COMPENSATING SAVINGS CAN BE FOUND ELSEWHERE IN THE AID PROGRAMME.

(C) THERE ARE 2 PROPOSALS IN THE SENATE: THE ADMINISTRATION'S BILL (WHICH HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD BY SENATOR LUGAR, CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE) AND THE HOUSE PROPOSAL (PUT FORWARD BY SENATOR KENNEDY AND OTHERS). ACTION IS LIKELY TO PROCEED MORE SLOWLY THAN IN THE HOUSE, AND NO COMMITTEE HEARING IS EXPECTED BEFORE THE WEEK OF 17 MARCH. A VOTE IN THE FULL SENATE BEFORE EASTER LOOKS HIGHLY UNLIKELY.

(D) UNLESS THE ADMINISTRATION SWITCHES TO SUPPORT THE HOUSE/ KENNEDY PROPOSAL (WHICH IS UNLIKELY), THE FINAL SENATE POSITION IS LIKELY TO BE A COMPROMISE, WITH A CASH ELEMENT SOMEWHERE

/BETWEEN

# CONFIDENTIAL







Prime Minister  
This is the advertisement  
of which he has  
complained. CDP. 7/3

...give in on it because... unionists want talks about talks we are agreeable... terms.

...agreement... he claimed.

## Special Message from Ulster's Elected Leaders to all Members of the R.U.C.

"These are trying times for us all. None of us can run away from making a choice. We realise the pressures on you but we cannot sit back and allow you to be misled by false assurances that the Anglo-Irish Agreement does not interfere with the integrity of the R.U.C. or involve a foreign power in directing your affairs. Article 9 of the Agreement says of the Intergovernmental Council, jointly chaired by Mr. Barry and Mr. King, that it shall 'set in hand a programme of work to be undertaken by the Chief Constable of the R.U.C.'. Nothing could be clearer. Patently the Chief Constable, and thus every serving officer, is no longer subject solely to internal U.K. direction. The Dublin Government now have an equal say in 'setting in hand' the work of the Chief Constable. This radically alters the role of R.U.C. officers, who were employed and who took an oath to 'truly serve' our Sovereign. Now you are being asked to serve a second master — the Government of an Irish Republic which spawned the Provisional IRA and which still harbours the murderers of so many of your gallant colleagues — and all this within the framework of a code of conduct to be dictated by Dublin.



"Our thoughts and prayers are with you as you face up to the challenge posed by the Anglo-Irish deal. We are confident that you will make it plain through your professional organisation that you will not yield to pressure to do other than that which you have pledged to do."



Signed:  
**DR. IAN R. K. PAISLEY, MEP, MP**  
**RT. HON. JAMES H. MOLYNEAUX,**  
**JP, MP**



CCF

CONFIDENTIAL

(2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 March 1986

Prime Minister  
 It seems that the intervention which we made was justified. The Unionists would be really angry if the US contribution to an all-Ireland fund was handed over to the Taoiseach.  
 Dear Charles, RTA will explain on Monday what we did - and did not - do.

Northern Ireland: Taoiseach's Telephone Call to the Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 7 March in which you recorded, among other things, that Dr Fitzgerald had complained to the Prime Minister that UK officials had made a request to the White House that his forthcoming visit to the United States should be handled in a low profile way.

COP  
 7/3  
 Then I shall phone the Taoiseach - all good things on the grounds that he is totally misrepresented in the media? no

Having made enquiries, we conclude that the Taoiseach's telephone call must reflect a misunderstanding arising from our attempts to ensure that the US contribution to the Fund should not be conspicuously "handed over" to the Taoiseach at the dinner which he is attending at the White House on St Patrick's Day. I enclose copies of FCO telno 252 to Washington and Washington telno 358, which set out the story in detail. As you will see, there was never any question of attempting to undermine the Taoiseach in any way. Nor did we make any direct approach to the White House. Our sole concern was that any public announcement by the US Administration of their proposed contribution to the Fund should take full account of Unionist sensitivities. David Goodall subsequently spoke in similar terms to Sean Donlon and encouraged him to make sure that the American side exercised appropriate restraint.

You mentioned that Sir Robert Armstrong would be having a private meeting with Dermot Nally on 10 March, and suggested that this would provide a good opportunity to set the record straight. We agree. You will want to be aware that the Foreign Secretary will be meeting Mr Barry in Brussels in the margins of the Foreign Affairs Council on the same day: the subject may well arise then too.

Yes - in no uncertain way

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,  
 Len Appleyard  
 (L V Appleyard)  
 Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
 PS/10 Downing Street

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INFO SAVING CONSULS GENERAL IN THE USA

PUS'S CALL ON ARMACOST, 12 FEBRUARY: NORTHERN IRELAND

1. THE PUS REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE HILLSBOROUGH AGREEMENT. SOME ENCOURAGEMENT HAD BEEN DRAWN IN PARTICULAR FROM THE BY-ELECTION RESULTS. BUT A WAY HAD TO BE FOUND TO CONVINCE MODERATE UNIONISTS OF THE ADVANTAGES OF THE AGREEMENT. RESULTS IN THE SECURITY FIELD, PARTICULARLY IN CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION, WOULD HELP. SO OF COURSE WOULD IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF NORTHERN IRELAND, AND HERE THE UNITED STATES COULD PLAY AN VERY IMPORTANT PART HERE THROUGH FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THE US CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL FUND WAS THE KEY WHICH WOULD UNLOCK OTHER COUNTRIES' DOORS.

2. ARMACOST REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THIS BY THE ADMINISTRATION: IT WAS BEING GIVEN AN URGENT PUSH. BUT IT HAD PROVED HARDER THAN EXPECTED TO IDENTIFY SOURCES OF FUNDS. SHULTZ HAD INDICATED ON THE HILL THAT DOLLARS 45-50 MILLION A YEAR OVER 5 YEARS WOULD BE REASONABLE. BUT COMPENSATING SAVINGS HAD TO BE FOUND FROM ELSEWHERE. ARMACOST PROMISED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD COMPLETE ITS WORK AS SWIFTLY AS POSSIBLE. THE PUS RECALLED THAT THREE QUARTERS OF THE FUND WOULD GO TO NORTHERN IRELAND, THE REMAINDER TO THE REPUBLIC. IN PLANNING DR FITZGERALD'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN MARCH, HE WAS SURE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BEAR IN MIND THE PUBLIC PRESENTATIONAL SENSITIVITY IN UK TERMS OF THE TAOISEACH APPEARING TO ACCEPT A US PACKAGE ON BEHALF OF BOTH PARTS OF IRELAND. WILKINSON (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS) SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE WELL AWARE OF THE POINT. SOMETHING WOULD HAVE TO BE SAID AT A ST PATRICK'S DAY DINNER HONOURING SPEAKER O'NEILL. IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY FOR THE US AND UK TO LEAN JOINTLY ON THE IRISH TO TONE DOWN THEIR PROSE. STATE WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH US.

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3. SIR A ACLAND INQUIRED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE US-UK SUPPLEMENTARY EXTRADITION TREATY. ARMACOST SAID THAT THE NEXT QUESTION WAS TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE SOME 'REFINEMENT' OF THE LANGUAGE. WILKINSON REFERRED TO THE HELPFUL AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION VOTE TO SUPPORT RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE TAKING SOME SOUNDINGS ON THE HILL NEXT WEEK TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF THE ABA DECISION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR GETTING AN AMENDED VERSION OF THE TREATY APPROVED. THE PUS SAID THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER MINOR AMENDMENTS IN ORDER TO SECURE EARLY SENATE APPROVAL, PROVIDED THAT THEY DID NOT EMASCULATE THE TREATY.

WRIGHT

NORTHERN IRELAND  
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NAD  
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NEWS DEPT.  
PUSD  
RESEARCH DEPT.  
PLANNING STAFF  
PS  
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PS/MR EGGAR  
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MR GOODALL  
MR HOUSTON

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PERSONAL FOR PUS FROM GOODALLO  
INTERNATIONAL FUND

1. YOU HAVE SEEN THE PERSONAL MESSAGE WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS SENT TO SHULTZ ON THE FUND. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL NOT HAVE HAD TIME TO DIGEST THIS BEFORE YOU SEE ARMACOST AND MRS RIDGEWAY, BUT I THINK IT WORTH YOUR REFERRING TO IT, AND MENTIONING THAT A SUNDAY TIMES ARTICLE OF 9 FEBRUARY REPORTED THE POSSIBILITY THAT FITZGERALD WOULD BE INVITED TO THE WHITE HOUSE DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON ST PATRICK'S DAY SO THAT THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS CAN MAKE A FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FUND. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD DRAW TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S ATTENTION THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH IT WOULD CAUSE IN NORTHERN IRELAND IF, WHEN 75 PER CENT OF THE FUND IS TO COME TO NORTHERN IRELAND, IT WERE TO BE CONSPICUOUSLY 'HANDLED OVER' TO THE TAOISEACH AT WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY AN IRISH NATIONALIST CEREMONY IN WASHINGTON WITH THE UK PLAYING SECOND FIDDLE. IF (AS MAY WELL BE THE CASE) AGREEMENT HAS NOT BEEN REACHED ON THE MODALITIES OF THE FUND BY THAT TIME, THE PROBLEM WILL NOT ARISE. BUT OUR PREFERENCE WOULD IN ANY CASE BE FOR THE FUND TO BE LAUNCHED WITHOUT TOO MUCH POMP. IF THERE IS TO BE A CEREMONY, WE SHOULD WANT THE UK TO PLAY AT LEAST AN EQUAL PART IN IT WITH THE IRISH.

HONE


LIMITED  
RID  
MR GOODALL

CURTIS  
MR BENJAMIN WIC  
MR MALLAS/CABOC

CONFIDENTIAL



IRELAND — Anglo-Irish Relations  
pt 15







10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

7 March 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE TAOISEACH

Neil Ward's letter of 6 March to me enclosed a draft message from the Prime Minister to the Taoiseach.

The Prime Minister has now signed this with some amendments which you and the North Ireland Office will wish to check carefully. She has decided that she does wish to make some reference herself to unhelpful statements by the Irish side and enclose some examples. I have therefore amended the last paragraph of page 4 to reflect this and enclose what seem to me the three most telling examples. She also wished to point out the comparisons given in the Taoiseach's own message about the numbers of police and army on the border appear to relate to 1969 rather than the more recent past. I have similarly taken this into account in the last paragraph of page 4.

Provided you and the Northern Ireland Office are satisfied the letter stands on the facts, I should be grateful if it could be sent to HM Ambassador in Dublin for delivery.

Charles Powell

Colin Budd Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JK



SUBJECT

CCOPS  
Master



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

7 March 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T47/86

Dear Garet,

Thank you for your letter of 24 February following our earlier meeting. Events have moved on since then, and it may help to give you my personal impressions of how matters stand following the talks I have had with the Unionist leaders, with John Hume and with John Cushnahan, and most recently the Unionist "day of action" on 3 March.

When I met the Unionists there was a good deal of plain talking: I refused to countenance any suggestion that the Agreement could be abandoned or suspended. The furthest that I was prepared to go on this central issue was to undertake to operate the Agreement sensitively - and I shall return to that point below. I did, however, take full account of the strength of Unionist feeling against aspects of the Agreement. I laid stress on the fact that, as you yourself have suggested, the Agreement provides that any matters devolved to a Northern Ireland administration would no longer fall for discussion in the Conference - a point which we shall be working hard to get across in Northern Ireland where it seems as yet to be imperfectly understood. I readily agreed, therefore, to consider Mr. Molyneaux's and Dr. Paisley's suggestion of a round table Conference (which Mr. Hume and Mr. Cushnahan were also willing to endorse) at which devolution might be discussed. I remain convinced that sensible arrangements for devolution which command widespread acceptance throughout the community offer the best long term



hope for peace and stability in the Province.

I also, as you will know, made other suggestions which were designed to take account of legitimate Unionist concerns and to counter their feeling that they are excluded from influence on decision making in Northern Ireland. I accordingly offered them new arrangements for consultation with the Government about affairs in Northern Ireland including security. I also offered them consultations about the future of the Northern Ireland Assembly and about the way in which Northern Ireland matters are handled at Westminster.

At the end of our meeting the Unionist leaders appeared to be willing to talk constructively about the future without pressing their demand that the Agreement be suspended. But as we saw, on their return to Belfast, they were unable to carry their supporters with them. In the light both of that turnround and still more of what happened on 3 March, no one can be in any doubt either about the strength of Unionist feelings nor of the formidable difficulties with which we are faced in the Province. As for the events of 3 March themselves, I do not think that I can do better than send you a copy of what Tom King said in the House on Tuesday. I scarcely need to say how much I deplore the disgraceful tactics adopted by opponents of our Agreement. You will also see from that statement just how great were the additional pressures imposed on the RUC by the strikers, and what they nevertheless managed to achieve. I should also tell you, in confidence, that Tom King has asked the Chief Constable for an urgent report on the policing aspects of the "day of action". In addition to providing facts and figures, etc., the Chief Constable has also been asked to deal with the allegations which have been made that the police did not do enough to prevent the intimidation of those who were seeking to get to work.

However, as a result of my meeting with Mr. Molyneux and Dr. Paisley, the Unionists can be in no doubt that the British Government will not be deflected from its



determination to implement the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and that there can be no question of asking Parliament to repudiate a measure to which barely three months ago it gave massive endorsement. The events of last Monday have in no way weakened that determination, nor will recourse to similar action in future.

At the same time, we have to recognise that more than determination on our part will be necessary if we are to get through what will undoubtedly be some very difficult months ahead. I know that you share my view that it is important at the present time to avoid exacerbating Unionists sensitivities, and the events of the "day of action" underline just how essential this continues to be. We also need to find all possible ways of commending the Agreement to moderate and reasonable Unionists who must, I am sure, be dismayed by the recent turn of events. I regard it, therefore, as vital that the SDLP adopts a generous and statesmanlike approach during this critical period. I left Mr. Hume in no doubt that it is not enough now to sit back and leave it to us to deal with Unionist opposition. None of us will benefit if we simply exchange an estranged minority for a non-cooperative majority. The Unionists cannot make me abandon the Agreement. But their prolonged hostility can prevent it from achieving the reconciliation and stability that we both seek. I welcome what the SDLP have already done by way, for example, of avoiding triumphalism; and Mr. Hume's recent declaration of readiness to talk about devolution without preconditions was also helpful. He told me that I would find the SDLP "constructive". I hope that, with your help, this will indeed prove so, and that they will also show discretion. (Mr. Mallon's widely reported remarks on RUC conduct on Monday were, as so often, the reverse of helpful, and I appreciated the way you took the sting out of what he said). In the coming weeks, the Unionist leaders will be looking for any action or statements from the SDLP - or indeed from the Republic - that they can use to confirm their supporters' fears of the agreement. It remains vital to deprive them of such ammunition, and that is another



reason why I so much welcomed your signature, without reservation, of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

It is no less imperative that we can demonstrate the benefits for all the people of Northern Ireland that the Agreement is capable of bringing. It is essential that we should be seen to be making progress in the Intergovernmental Conference in those areas which, while serving our common interest, will be welcome to Unionists. I have in mind, in particular, the need for visible and substantial progress in enhancing security cooperation at all levels and in all the areas covered in Article 9(a) of the Agreement. It was the pursuit of such objectives, combined with restraint in making claims for the Conference and care in avoiding precipitate action which would offend Unionists' sensitivities that I had in mind when I referred to operating the Agreement "sensitively". I have not given up hope of bringing the Unionists back to the path of constructive dialogue that, for a moment, they seemed ready to follow last week. The offers I then made to them remain on the table. To that end I know I can count on your support and understanding. I hope that the SDLP will play their part.

You raised a number of more detailed matters in your letter. You asked, for instance, about actual statements that we had found unhelpful: I am arranging for these to be followed up by officials, though I enclose three examples of statements which inevitably raise hackles in the North. You also provided information about your Government's commitment to security on the border: I note that the comparisons are generally with 1969 rather than the period immediately before the Agreement. For the present at least, this subject might be pursued by the new quadripartite group of policemen and officials from both sides which held its first meeting in Belfast last week. But I think that we both agree that our first priority now must be to be seen to make progress as rapidly as possible in a way that will help the majority in



the North, however reluctantly in many cases, to accept that the Agreement is not only here to stay, but can further, rather than damage, their own interests.

Yours sincerely

Nargant

---

Dr. Garret FitzGerald, T.D.



Mr. Spring quoted in the Irish Advocate on 7.12.85

"We have reached a point where the Conference is going to become an integral part of the machinery of administration in Northern Ireland ..... Who could have envisaged a decade or more ago that we'd now have people from the Republic living and working in Belfast with a say in how the North is run".

Mr. Barry at Fine-Gael Dublin-Leinster Conference on 8.12.85

"It is this Conference which gives to the Irish Government its direct, institutional, authoritative role in Northern Ireland."

Fine-Gael Briefing Document on the Anglo-Irish Agreement

"..... the extensive involvement of the Irish Government in the processes of Government in Northern Ireland ....."



## STATEMENT 4 MARCH 1986

With permission Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement about the events in Northern Ireland yesterday.

2. As the House will be aware, the leaders of the two main Unionists parties had called for a day of action and protest. They invited everybody to stay away from work and stated that it was to be a passive and voluntary demonstration and that there should be no roadblocks or intimidation of those going to work.

3. In the event, there was widespread obstruction, intimidation and some violence during the day culminating in serious disorder in East and North Belfast last night. The first incidents occurred before midnight on Sunday and disturbances continued until the early hours of this morning.

4. In spite of these difficulties a very considerable number of people succeeded in getting to work; particularly in the commercial offices and public services, but many factories were seriously affected.

5. I pay tribute to the determination of all those who refused to be intimidated and exercised their right to go to work. I also pay tribute to the men of the security forces and particularly the RUC for all the work that they did to seek to keep roads open for people to be able to get to work. However there have also been a number of complaints when it is alleged that the police did not take action when it was required. The Chief Constable is preparing



a full report on all the policing aspects of the past 24 hours. To give the House some indication of the scale of the workload that the RUC faced, on the latest information available there were some 655 roadblocks in the Province over the period of which 441 were cleared. There were in addition some 80 cavalcades and demonstrations, which caused considerable disruption in a number of towns mainly around midday. There were 57 arrests and the names of 184 people noted to proceed by way of summons. 65 Plastic Baton Rounds were fired, 47 policemen were injured. Last night there were a number of petrol bombs thrown, and there were over 20 shots fired in 3 firearms attacks on the police during the disturbances in the Loyalist areas.

6. The figures listed above give the details of a tragic day for Northern Ireland. Many Members will have seen some of the disgraceful incidents on television last night. These pictures have been shown all over the world and will do great damage to the reputation of the Province. The House will also have seen elected members of this House making common cause with people in paramilitary dress.

7. The Government is well aware of the strength of feeling among many Unionists about aspects of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The House will be aware that My Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister and I met the Right Honourable Member for Lagan Valley and the Member for North Antrim last Tuesday. During a long meeting My Right Honourable Friend put forward a number of proposals to help meet their main concerns and agreed to consider positively their suggestions that the Government should call Round Table Conference to discuss devolution in Northern Ireland; it was



agreed that we would all reflect on the various suggestions that had been made and would meet again shortly. The prospects of constructive discussions instead of confrontation were greeted with widespread relief in the Province, only for that to be destroyed by their abrupt repudiation of this course following a meeting in Belfast late that night. They then decided to proceed with the day of protest.

8. The whole country can now see how tragic and totally counterproductive yesterday's action has been. It is now urgent that the Unionists leaders recognise again that the only way in which the concerns of those they seek to represent can be addressed is by constructive discussion and not by threats and violence. The degree of intimidation evident yesterday showed how little confidence many of the organisers had in being able peacefully to persuade their fellow citizens to join their day of protest. I make it quite clear that this Government, this Parliament will not be intimidated either by the sort of violent actions that took place yesterday. I believe that an increasing number of Unionists while disliking many aspects of the Anglo-Irish Agreement wish to look for a constructive way forward. The Government has made quite clear our willingness to sit down and discuss seriously the Unionists concerns. In our Parliamentary democracy, in this United Kingdom, that can be the only way.





BF  
SUBJECT CC MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

7 March 1986

**ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS  
PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE TAOISEACH**

The Taoiseach telephoned the Prime Minister this morning shortly before his departure for a visit to the United States. Because of a technical failure I was only able to hear one side of the conversation but have reconstructed the remainder from the Prime Minister's subsequent account.

The Taoiseach expressed concern about an advertisement in the Belfast Newsletter today placed by Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley saying some very damaging things about the RUC. The Irish Government were not proposing to make any comment. The Prime Minister said that she was not aware of this but welcomed the Irish Government's restraint.

The Taoiseach then went on to express rather greater concern about remarks made by the Northern Ireland Secretary in a television interview on 6 March in which he had apparently said words to the effect that the Anglo-Irish Agreement was a bulwark against a united Ireland. This was causing a considerable furore in the Republic. The Taoiseach said that such remarks caused him difficulty. He recalled that both sides had earlier agreed to avoid any references to Irish reunification. However he would once again show restraint and decline to make any comment. The Prime Minister said that the form of words which she normally adopted was that she hoped and expected the Union to continue. The fact of the matter was that the Unionists at present desperately needed reassurance. She was grateful for the Taoiseach's restraint in avoiding a public dispute about this.

The Taoiseach then said that he was much exercised by a request apparently made to the White House by "your people" to treat his forthcoming visit to the United States, and in particular to the White House itself, in a low profile way. Mr. Haughey was apparently also in the United States and had made a damaging speech to which the Taoiseach wanted an opportunity to reply. He could hardly do this if we were telling the Americans to treat his visit in a low key. The Prime Minister said that she was not aware of any such request to the White House. She had not instructed that any such message should be sent and wondered whether there had been a misunderstanding. She would look into the matter.



Naturally she hoped that the Taoiseach would avoid saying anything while in the United States which would cause further difficulties with the Unionists. She thought that both Governments should convey an impression of calm and determination. The Agreement had been signed, approved by both Parliaments and would be implemented.

The Taoiseach started to say something about the next meeting of the Inter-Governmental Conference. The Prime Minister urged him not to mention this on the telephone. The Taoiseach proposed that there might be a meeting between Mr. Nally and Sir Robert Armstrong on 10 March. The Prime Minister agreed to this.

I should be grateful to know whether you are able to throw any light on the alleged representations to the White House. Perhaps Sir Robert Armstrong could provide any necessary explanation to Mr. Nally on Monday. It would also be helpful to have from the Northern Ireland Office a note on what the Belfast Newsletter carries by the Unionist Party leaders about the RUC.

I am copying this letter to Jim Daniell (Northern Ireland Office) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Personal and confidential

A 086/767

MR POWELL <sup>COO</sup> 7B

The Taoiseach will come through to speak to the Prime Minister at about 1.00 pm.

2. Mr Nally was very guarded when I asked about the agenda, but I think that the Taoiseach may talk about two things:

1. He may suggest that there should be a meeting between Mr Nally and me to consider "where we go from here" on the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
2. He may want to have a word about political aspects of his forthcoming visit to the United States; he will not talk about money.
3. The Taoiseach may also mention one or two little local issues.

RTA

7. iii. 86



Mr Powell



PP agreed  
Smith table  
N.L.W.

7.3

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Dr Fitzgerald wants  
to talk to you on  
the telephone before  
he leaves at  
2.30 pm for the  
U.S.A. Subject  
unknown, but  
RTA will try to



found out.

Shall we tell  
his office that he  
can telephone about  
1.00 pm.<sup>7</sup>

N. L. W.



PRIME MINISTER

seen by PM & approved  
in version 2.  
CDP.

MESSAGE TO THE TAOISEACH

I attach a reply to the Taoiseach's message, following up your talk with him in February. It is basically a Northern Ireland Office product with help from the Cabinet Office, though I have made some changes.

Tom King's advice is that you should not in the letter deal directly with either the allegedly unhelpful statements of Irish Ministers or the precise details of security forces along the border. The reason in the first case is that they haven't actually been able to come up with very convincing examples (the best they can do is at Flag A). He therefore recommends these two points be dealt with at official level.

This is really a point for you to decide. If you want to quote examples of objectionable statements, I attach three which seem to me the most telling. I have therefore provided two alternative versions of pages 4 and 5 of the letter to leave you the option of a reference.

CDP

CDP

7 March, 1986.

BM2AFJ



R1113



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Seen by PM.  
Draft reply  
reported.  
CDD  
4/3.

7th March 1986.

Rt. Hon. Margaret H. Thatcher, MP.,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON SW1.

Dear Prime Minister

At our meeting on Tuesday 25th February we agreed to reflect on a number of suggestions put by you and to that end we held consultations with our colleagues at various levels in our respective Parties.

At each level the overwhelming view was that your statement indicated no change in the situation which has obtained since 15th November 1985 when you signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Accordingly, we do not see in it a basis for continuing, constructive discussion.

However, it remains our purpose to create the framework within which dialogue can take place. To that end we enclose for your consideration two Resolutions - one unanimously approved by the Executive of the Ulster Unionist Party on 28th February; the other unanimously approved by the Central Executive Committee of the Democratic Unionist Party on 6th March.

We hope that you will view these proposals as a constructive development.

Yours sincerely

Jim Molyneux

John Parry



RESOLUTION

28 February 1986

We the Executive Committee of the Ulster Unionist Party register our deep dismay at the negative response of the Prime Minister to the representations made by Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley and congratulate our Leader on his determined and resolute defence of the policy of this Party determined by this Executive on Monday 18 November 1985.

We reaffirm our repudiation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and our determination never to submit or consent to joint London/Dublin authority over Northern Ireland.

We insist that arrangements for the government and administration of Northern Ireland, in so far as they differ from those applying in the rest of the United Kingdom, must be agreed with the representatives of our people and we call upon Her Majesty's Government to abandon or suspend the Anglo-Irish Agreement pending discussion of our proposals.

We believe the Government's objectives of peace, stability and reconciliation can be pursued and achieved either through a policy of total integration with Britain or by way of an alternative agreement centred on devolution acceptable to the majority of the people of this province.

We remind the Prime Minister that the historic and consistent demand of Unionism has been for equality of citizenship within the United Kingdom. We consider it our fundamental right to be governed in accordance with the principles, procedures and practices which obtain in the Kingdom as a whole and if Government persists in its refusal of this just demand we invite it to give the reasons why.

If integration continues to prove unacceptable, and if Mrs Thatcher's intentions are as she has suggested, then we believe her objectives can, in large measure be pursued in harmony with the majority community in Northern Ireland by way of a two-tier or two-stage Conference -

THE FIRST between Her Majesty's Government and the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland to consider the Government's proposals for devolution, and



THE SECOND - dependent upon agreement at the first - between the Governments in London and Dublin and a newly constituted Government of Northern Ireland to agree a new British/Irish framework within which genuine friendship, co-operation and consultation may be developed and encouraged within these islands.

We appreciate that the success of this proposal would require agreement at both Conferences but we warn that if agreement is to be achieved the process of compromise and barter must be a two-way street.

Specifically we believe it must be made plain to Nationalists that they must be expected to give as well as to take and that we have no intention of entering into negotiations on the basis of abject surrender.

In order that our position be understood, and to alleviate any possibility of subsequent confusion or misunderstanding, we wish it to be understood that the requirements made of Unionism at one Conference would have a direct bearing on our capacity for manoeuvre and accommodation at the other. This is to say we will expect Nationalists to consider which is the more important - a new relationship with the Irish Republic or a role in the internal government of Northern Ireland.





RESOLUTION.

1. THE PRIME MINISTER CLOSED THE DOOR ON DEMOCRACY WHEN SHE FAILED TO RESPOND TO THE REJECTION OF THE ANGLO/IRISH AGREEMENT AT THE BALLOT BOX. RECOGNISING THAT THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS HAS BEEN STYMIED BY THE PRIME MINISTER WE REAFFIRM OUR TOTAL AND UNDIVIDED COMMITMENT TO STEP UP THE CAMPAIGN OF OPPOSITION TO THE UNWORKABLE ANGLO/IRISH AGREEMENT.
  
2. IF THE PRIME MINISTER REFLECTS UPON THE SITUATION AS SHE AGREED TO DO AT THE DOWNING STREET MEETING ON 25TH FEBRUARY 1986, SHE SHOULD ACCEPT THE POSITIVE SUGGESTION ALREADY PLACED BEFORE HER AS A PRINCIPAL BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION NAMELY THAT THE ANGLO/IRISH AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED WHILST ROUND TABLE TALKS ARE HELD INVOLVING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND ALL PARTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND THAT ESCHEW VIOLENCE.
  
3. IN KEEPING WITH THE COMMUNICATION SENT BY DR. PAISLEY AND MR. MOLYNEAUX ON 21ST AUGUST 1985 WE ARE PREPARED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED ABOVE TO CONSIDER STRUCTURES FOR THE INTERNAL GOVERNMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND THEN WORK OUT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IRISH REPUBLIC NOT AS INFERIORS BUT AS EQUALS.



**CONFIDENTIAL**  
From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

*copy*



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
WHITEHALL  
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

*CDP 7/3*

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

6 March 1986

*Dear Charles,*

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE TAOISEACH

*FLAP PT 14*

In your letter of 19 February you asked us to let you have as soon as possible examples of statements by Irish Ministers which we regarded as making unjustified claims about the Agreement and the role which it gives the Republic in the affairs of the North. Since then the Taoiseach has sent his letter of 24 February, the Prime Minister has met the Unionist leaders including James Kilfedder and John Hume, and the Unionist "day of action" has taken place.

My Secretary of State now believes that we should take the opportunity of a reply to the Taoiseach's letter to give him an assessment of the new situation and to follow up what the Prime Minister said at her meeting with him by reinforcing the message especially in the light of last Monday's events, that restraint, patience and understanding continue to be required from the Irish - and from the SDLP - if we are to succeed either in bringing the Unionists back to constructive discussion or weaning them from further strikes, of which there are now some encouraging signs so far as Mr Molyneaux at least is concerned. Mr King believes that the best way of getting Irish co-operation would be to reassure the Taoiseach of our determination to stand firm on the Agreement, to acknowledge the assistance already given, and to reiterate the need for the Irish to play their part by scrupulously avoiding giving offence to Unionists' sensibilities and by collaborating in operating the Agreement sensitively. He believes that it would detract from that message if the letter dwelt on unhelpful speeches the Irish have made or entered detailed argument about the level of Irish security effort along the border.

... The attached draft reply therefore suggests that these particular points might be dealt with through other channels - ie the Secretariat and the new bilateral police/official group considering a programme of security co-operation - rather than through the medium of this letter, especially since there are some signs that the Irish are now taking more care over what they say: for example,

**CONFIDENTIAL**

/.....



CONFIDENTIAL



the Taoiseach deflected Seamus Mallon's criticism of RUC handling of the strike into a less potentially damaging course; the statement issued by the Irish Government after the strike was ... also supportive. However for your information, I attach some examples of the kind of unhelpful statements the Irish have made in the past. This approach is endorsed by the Cabinet Office ... and the FCO. I attach also the Fine Gael paper issued shortly after the signing of the Agreement and which in its whole form has offended unionists although we perhaps might not take such offence at it; its language, for example closely parallels the Agreement, although some subtle inferences occur which give an impression towards joint authority. Perhaps the passage which might most offend Unionists is the last paragraph on page 2. This selects the provisions of the Agreement to give the impression that the Conference gives the Irish "real power" and by inference approaches joint authority. (We should bear in mind however that we had agreed with the Irish the line that the arrangements could be described as "more consultative").

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Stark and Len Appleyard.

*Yours Sincerely  
Neil Ward.*

CONFIDENTIAL



EXAMPLES OF UNHELPFUL IRISH REMARKS

7.12.85 Mr Spring quoted in the 'Irish Advocate':

"If they try to frustrate on a consistent basis our efforts on behalf of the nationalist community, the impact on Mrs Thatcher and British politicians will be devastating. We would have no choice but to pull out. And Britain would have to stand in the dock of world opinion to answer for its failure to honour the solemn commitment that it has now made....We have reached a point where the Conference is going to become an integral part of the machinery of administration in NI. That is an enormous step in any man's language. Who could have envisaged a decade or more ago that we'd now have people from the Republic living and working in Belfast with a say in how the North is to be run?"

A

21.12.85 Mr Barry in the Irish Independent

"Mr Barry took obvious pride in saying that he was the first Irish Nationalist in 200 years to have an input in Northern Ireland on behalf of the Nationalists."

8.12.85 Mr Barry at Fine Gael Dublin-Leinster Conference

"It is this Conference which gives to the Irish Government its direct, institutional, authoritative role in Northern Ireland.... the new institutional arrangements (which) provide the Irish Government with a direct role in the North"

B

Dr FitzGerald, Channel 4 News (date not yet established)

"The consequences of failure to reach agreement on major issues or even on small issues would obviously be very serious, something that no British or Irish Government would lightly contemplate."

Dr FitzGerald - reported in Irish Independent of 17 November 1985

"Dublin's new role is 'as near to joint authority as you can get'."

NB: This appears to have been given in private briefing and was not expected to be reported.

/.....



E.

Fine Gael Briefing Note on Agreement

This gives the impression that the Agreement will be more executive in character than is warranted by the Agreement eg, it implies that the Conference will have "real power", and uses language which indicates that the Conference will have a more executive role than is the case.

Mr Barry's Speech of 24 February

Although this contains some helpful features, its tone - on the eve of the meeting with Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley - was overly aggressive towards Unionists in the circumstances:


"What we have seen in the North over the past two months ... is a tissue of deliberate falsehoods and it is deliberately geared to whip up hysteria among/<sup>a</sup>confused and frightened people".



MA

GRS160

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM DUBLIN  
TO DESKBY 050900Z FCOLN  
TELNO 141  
OF 041815Z MARCH 86  
INFO IMMEDIATE NIO (B)



MY TEL NO 138, PARA 6:  
UNIONIST DAY OF ACTION: IRISH GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

1. FOLLOWING THIS MORNING'S CABINET MEETING TO REVIEW THE  
EVENTS OF YESTERDAY THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT  
AT 041700Z

'THE GOVERNMENT REITERATES THAT IT IS THEIR INTENTION TO PRESS  
AHEAD WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT.  
IN THIS WAY PRACTICAL ACTION WILL RESULT WHICH WILL BENEFIT  
BOTH COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND IRELAND AS A WHOLE.  
STRIKES AND DEMONSTRATIONS LEAD ONLY TO VIOLENCE AS YESTERDAY  
DEMONSTRATED. THE GOVERNMENT ARE OF THE VIEW THAT ONLY THE PATH  
OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS CAN BRING RECONCILIATION, PEACE AND  
STABILITY TO NORTHERN IRELAND. THEY APPEAL TO UNIONISTS TO ENTER  
INTO TALKS WITH THE NATIONALISTS WITH A VIEW TO WORKING OUT  
TOGETHER A SYSTEM OF DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT FOR NORTHERN IRELAND.  
THE GOVERNMENT AGAIN STRESS THAT THEY ARE OPEN TO ANY CONSTRUCTIVE  
VIEWS THAT THE UNIONISTS WISH TO PUT FORWARD.'

2. THIS TEXT IS SIMILAR TO THE ADVANCE VERSION GIVEN TO BRENNAN  
NIO(L) FOR SOFS (NI)'S USE EARLIER THIS AFTERNOON.

3. FCO PLEASE PASS BELL, NIO(L).

GOODISON

NORTHERN IRELAND  
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RID  
NAD  
INFO DEPT.  
NEWS DEPT.  
PUSD  
RESEARCH DEPT.  
PLANNING STAFF  
PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR GOODALL  
MR HOUSTON

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:  
NORTHERN IRELAND.



# Fine Gael

## ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

### HOW DOES THIS AGREEMENT IMPROVE THE POSITION OF NATIONALISTS?

First of all in the preamble to the Agreement the British Government, amongst other things, recognises the need to acknowledge the rights of the two major traditions that exist in Ireland, both the Unionist tradition and the tradition of "those who aspire to a sovereign united Ireland achieved by peaceful means and through agreement". These words closely reflect the views of the Forum.

The British Government also accepts the need to "recognise and respect the identities of the two communities in Northern Ireland, and the right of each to pursue its aspirations by peaceful constitutional means". They also commit themselves to a "society in Northern Ireland free from discrimination and intolerance, with the opportunity for both communities to participate fully in the structures and processes of government". Moreover if a majority of the people of Northern Ireland give their consent to Irish unity the British Government commit themselves to "introduce and support" in the Westminster parliament, legislation to give effect to this.

Secondly, the British Government agrees to the establishment of an Intergovernmental Conference concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations between the two parts of the island, in order to deal on a regular basis with — to quote from the Communique's passage on the agenda for the first meeting: "all fields — political, security, legal, economic, social and cultural — which come within its competence." Within the Conference the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland under these headings and the two governments commit themselves, in the interests of promoting peace and stability, to making determined efforts through the Conference to resolve any differences.

These two principles, based in a binding international agreement, govern the entire range of Northern Ireland issues within the Conference. The role of the Irish Government and indeed of the Conference although not executive, is thus obviously more than consultative. The Agreement describes the Conference as being "a framework within which the two Governments work together for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions which exist in Northern Ireland". The Conference is required to concern itself with measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland, to protect human rights and to prevent discrimination. Its



An Taoiseach, and Fine Gael Leader, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, T.D.

functions will include measures to foster the cultural heritage of both traditions, changes in electoral arrangements, the use of flags and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social discrimination, as well as the consideration of a possible Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland.

Through the Conference also the Irish Government will have a function in relation to the role and composition of a number of important Bodies in Northern Ireland including the Police Authority, the Police Complaints Board, the Fair Employment Agency, the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights.

The Conference will consider relations between the security forces and the community, including implementing what is seen by both Governments as a need for a programme of special measures to improve relations between the security forces and the community, with the object in particular of making these forces more readily accepted by the nationalist community. It will consider policy issues relating to prisons as well as dealing with individual cases of prisoners. Moreover, in the security area also, it will be addressing at its regular meetings not only policy issues but also serious incidents and forthcoming events, such as parades and processions.

It will have the function of helping to harmonise the criminal law North and South, and will have the job of



seeking measures that will give substantial expression to the aim of ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice. In doing this, it will consider among other things the possibility of mixed Courts in both jurisdictions for the trial of certain offences. (That would mean Courts with Judges from one jurisdiction sitting in the Special Courts of the other).

Finally, so long as there is not devolution to a Government in Northern Ireland in which both sections of the community participate, the role of the Conference will extend to all major legislative and major policy issues under the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Departments, where the interests of the minority community are significantly or especially affected. The range of issues dealt with by the Conference is therefore comprehensive.

#### **WHAT ABOUT THE RUC?**

At its first meeting the conference will consider ways of underlining the policy that the RUC and the armed forces in Northern Ireland discharge their duties even-handedly and with equal respect for the Unionists' and the Nationalists' identities and traditions.

#### **WHAT ABOUT THE UDR?**

At its first meeting the Conference will consider the application of the principle that the armed forces, (i.e. the British Army and the Ulster Defence Regiment of that Army), operate only in support of the civil power. The objective of the Conference will be to ensure as rapidly as possible that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, there is a police presence in *all* operations that involve direct contact with the community. This will mean that the role of the UDR will be to accompany the RUC on patrol and at check-points but that the direct contact with the public will, as soon as administratively possible, in all cases be by the members of the RUC involved.

Moreover, whatever emerges in relation to the manner in which the RUC is required to discharge its duties in relation to the two communities will be considered for application to the UDR and the British Army. Finally our Minister in the Conference will put forward Irish views and proposals for the progressive establishment of a new security system which would obviate a need for the UDR to be involved in local security. This will be pursued sensitively, carefully and firmly.

#### **WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THERE WERE DEVOLUTION TO SOME KIND OF LOCAL EXECUTIVE IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN WHICH BOTH COMMUNITIES PARTICIPATED? WOULD THE CONFERENCE CEASE TO HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY?**

The Conference would, of course, continue to carry out its basic functions in relation to human rights, identity, and justice, which are, of course, the most difficult matters in the North. Only in those areas of policy and legislation that came within the control of such an Executive would it cease to operate.

Moreover on the question of devolution itself the Irish Government will have a role to play in putting forward its views and proposals on the ways of bringing about devolution in Northern Ireland, in so far as these relate to the interests of the minority community.

It should be added that the Government favours, and in this agreement commits itself to supporting devolution involving constitutional representatives of both communities in executive capacities, viz. some form of power-sharing.

There is provision in the Agreement for what happens in relation to cross-border co-operation if devolution comes about.

#### **DOES THIS AGREEMENT NOT INVOLVE ACCEPTING PARTITION – IN FACT, COPPER-FASTENING IT? DOES IT NOT UNDERMINE THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION?**

No. It does none of these things. Of course it accepts the inescapable fact that Ireland is not at present united and faces the question of what can be done to help Northern Nationalists in this situation without detriment to the Unionist tradition.

In 1949 Mr. de Valera said "there is no good trying to pretend that the British Government is not responsible for the government of that particular area".

In 1965 Mr. Lemass demonstrated his acceptance of the fact of division by going to Stormont to meet the Northern Ireland Prime Minister, Capt. Terence O'Neill, and inviting him subsequently to make a return visit to Dublin.

In the Communique of 21st May 1980, following his meeting with the British Prime Minister, Mr. Haughey said "any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland". The wording of Article 1(a) of this Agreement is identical, apart from the omission of the word "constitutional".

Given that, as Mr. de Valera said, the British Government is responsible for the government of Northern Ireland, the Agreement provides a framework within which the Irish Government can exercise a role in relation to the North with maximum effect.

The Agreement has no effect on the constitutional position — nor could it. The provisions of the Constitution can be changed only by referendum, following enactment of legislation by the Dail and Seanad.

No sane person seeks to end the division of our Island against the wishes of a majority in Northern Ireland; we all know that that is simply not possible. But this Agreement for the first time commits the British Government to *introducing* and supporting legislation for the re-unification of Ireland if and *when that consent emerges*. This commitment settles once and for all the argument about whether Britain wants to stay in the North regardless of the wishes of the people there. Britain is now legally committed to taking the steps necessary to achieve Irish unity whenever a majority in Northern Ireland support this course of action.

#### **BUT IS THE CONFERENCE NOT TO BE CONSULTATIVE ONLY – WILL IT HAVE ANY REAL POWER?**

It is not merely consultative. It involves much more than a mere obligation on the British Government to ask the Irish Government for its views on certain matters. It gives to the Irish Government the right to put forward its views and proposals over the whole range of issues mentioned in the previous pages, and imposes a legal obligation on the two governments to make "determined efforts through



the conference to resolve any differences . . . in the interests of promoting peace and stability”.

#### **HOW WILL THE CONFERENCE ACTUALLY OPERATE?**

It will involve regular and frequent meetings of Ministers of the Irish Government with British Ministers in Belfast, and special meetings can be called at any time at the request of either side. The meetings of Ministers will be presided over jointly by the permanent Irish Ministerial Representative — Peter Barry, Minister for Foreign Affairs is being designated to this position — and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. But other Irish and British Ministers can attend and when legal matters are being considered the Attorney General can attend. Ministers can be accompanied by their officials and professional advisers, or by officials of relevant Government Departments when questions of economic, social or cultural policy or co-operation are being discussed. These regular and frequent meetings of the Inter-Governmental Conference of Ministers will be serviced by a joint secretariat which will be established by the two Governments in Belfast and will operate on a continuing basis between Ministerial meetings.

#### **WHAT WILL HAPPEN WHEN THE CONFERENCE FIRST MEETS?**

At its first meeting the Conference will consider its future programme of work in all of the fields that come within its competence — political, security, legal, economic, social and cultural. It will concentrate at its initial meetings on three areas — relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland; seeking measures that will give substantial expression to the question of public confidence in the administration of justice; and ways of enhancing security co-operation between the two Governments. The two sides are committed to work for early progress in these matters.

#### **WHAT IMPLICATIONS DOES THE AGREEMENT HAVE FOR EXTRADITION?**

The Communique (Par. 7) says that the two Governments are committed to work for early progress on:

- relations between the security forces and the minority
- measures to underline the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Taoiseach has said that *against this background*, it was the intention of the Government to accede as soon as possible to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

#### **WHAT WILL ACCESSION TO THIS CONVENTION INVOLVE?**

When this Convention was first introduced in 1977 it was believed we could not sign it because of the particular interpretation of our High Court of “political offences” for extradition purposes. But in the light of the fact that our Courts now make a distinction between terrorist offences and truly political offences this obstacle has been removed. The form of any legislation giving effect to our accession to the Convention would be designed to ensure that the final decision as to whether a particular offence is political or terrorist will continue to be determined by the Courts.

#### **WILL THERE BE A CROSS-BORDER DIMENSION TO THIS AGREEMENT?**

Yes. The Conference will be responsible among other things for the promotion of cross-Border co-operation — viz. the development of economic, social and cultural co-operation between the two parts of the island.

In particular the two Governments are committed to co-operating to promote the economic and social development of those areas of both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely from the consequences of the instability of recent years, and they are to consider the possibility of securing international support for this work. There is reason to believe that substantial financial support may be available for this purpose from the United States, and possible also from European countries, and from some other countries overseas.

Of course, if devolved Government is established on a basis that involves both sections of the community in Northern Ireland, many cross-border matters will become the responsibility of that devolved Government. In these circumstances machinery will be established by the responsible authorities in the North and South for practical co-operation in respect of cross-Border matters.

#### **HOW IMPORTANT COULD THIS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM ABROAD BE?**

It is much too soon to make any forecast about this, but reactions from a number of Governments suggest that it could involve some hundreds of millions of pounds. Cross-Border areas would be particularly likely to benefit, although other areas, both North and South, have of course also been severely affected by the violence of the last sixteen years.

#### **IS THE AGREEMENT PERMANENT AND FIXED? CAN IT BE REVIEWED?**

The Agreement makes provision for a review at the end of three years or earlier if requested by either Government. The purpose of such a review of the working of the Conference will be to see whether any changes in the scope and nature of its activities are desirable.

#### **WHAT HAS TO HAPPEN IN ORDER TO MAKE THIS AGREEMENT EFFECTIVE?**

For the Agreement to be made effective it needs to be endorsed by the Dail and by the British Parliament. It will be brought before both these bodies within the next week or so. Both Governments expect that the Agreement will be endorsed by these bodies, and immediately afterwards it will be brought into force by an exchange of letters between the two Governments.

#### **THERE HAS BEEN TALK OF REGISTERING THE AGREEMENT AT THE UNITED NATIONS — IS THIS GOING TO HAPPEN?**

Yes. This is a requirement of Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

#### **WILL THIS REGISTRATION AT THE U.N. HAVE ANY EFFECT ON OUR CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION VIS-A-VIS NORTHERN IRELAND?**

Our Constitution can be changed only by the people in a Referendum on the basis of a proposal endorsed by the Dail and Seanad.



**SOME YEARS AGO THERE WAS TALK ABOUT AN ANGLO-IRISH PARLIAMENTARY BODY OR TIER BEING ESTABLISHED. ARE WE ANY FURTHER ON WITH THIS?**

Yes. Up to now this matter has been left entirely to the two Parliaments which have not felt it appropriate to move in the matter. There is now considerable support from the British Parliament for such a Body which will also, we believe, have support in the Dail and Seanad. A new development in this Agreement is that the two Governments agree that they would give support as appropriate to such a Body if it were to be established. This offer of support seems likely to encourage an early development in this area.

**WHAT EFFECT IS THE AGREEMENT LIKELY TO HAVE IN NORTHERN IRELAND?**

Of course it is impossible to predict what will happen in an area where there has been so much violence and where the two communities are so polarised. But it is our hope that the effect on the nationalist minority of the extensive involvement of the Irish Government in the processes of government in Northern Ireland, will have a major impact on their sense of alienation from the structures of government, the security forces and the judicial system in Northern Ireland. And as it is this alienation that has provided the opportunity for the IRA to undertake its campaign of violence, thus provoking the counter-violence of the Protestant paramilitaries, we hope that the operation of the Agreement whatever difficulties there may be in the early stages, will gradually lead to the

phasing out of violence, to peace and stability in all Ireland, and to even better relations between Britain and Ireland.

**DOESN'T THE AGREEMENT CARRY RISKS HOWEVER?**

Yes — of course it does. Any Agreement to take action in Northern Ireland is bound to stir up hostility at both extremes — amongst the IRA on one side, which owes its existence to the alienation of the minority community, and amongst extremists on the Unionist side also. As both Governments have made it clear on occasions before the signature of this Agreement it cannot exclude the possibility of greater unrest, and even violence, in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the Agreement. But the prospect of giving the minority in Northern Ireland for the first time in sixty-five years a fair deal, of eliminating their legitimate grievances, and of removing the ground from under the IRA, makes it worthwhile to take these risks, and, we believe, requires us to do so. Of course it is always easier to do nothing, in the hope of avoiding blame for anything that may go wrong, but such an attitude would be totally irresponsible in the face of the tragedy of Northern Ireland.

**WHY HAS THE NEGOTIATION TAKEN SO LONG?**

It has been long and difficult because the two Governments were attempting something for which there is no precedent anywhere else in the world. That is why it has taken so many meetings over a period of eighteen months to reach this Agreement.



# SUMMARY

## OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT 1985

1. The Agreement begins with a preamble incorporating a joint statement of objectives.

### The Status of Northern Ireland

2. The two Governments affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland; recognise that the present wish of a majority there is for no change in that status; and declare that, if in the future a majority there clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, the two Governments will introduce and support legislation in the respective Parliaments to give effect to this. (Article 1)

### Framework and Objectives of the Intergovernmental Conference

3. The Agreement establishes, within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council, an Intergovernmental Conference concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations between the two parts of the island of Ireland which, subject to the terms of the Agreement, will deal on a regular basis with:

- political matters;
- security and related matters;
- legal matters, including the administration of justice;
- the promotion of cross-border co-operation. (Article 2(a)).

The Agreement provides for a review of the working of the Conference after three years, or earlier if either side desires. (Article 11).

4. The Conference will proceed on the basis that:
- the United Kingdom Government accept that the Irish Government will put forward within the Conference views and proposals on certain matters relating to Northern Ireland as provided for in the Agreement;
  - in the interest of promoting peace and stability, determined efforts will be made in the Conference to resolve any differences;
  - there will be no derogation from the sovereignty of either Government, and each retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction. (Article 2(b)).

5. The Conference will be a framework within which the two Governments work together for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland and for peace, stability and prosperity throughout Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights, cooperation against terrorism and the development of economic, social and cultural cooperation. (Article 4(a)).

### Procedures and Membership of the Intergovernmental Conference

6. There will be regular and frequent meetings of the Conference at Ministerial level as well as meetings at official level, and special meetings may be convened at the request of either side. The joint Chairmen at Ministerial level will be on the Irish side a Minister designated as the Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative and on the United Kingdom side the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Other Ministers and advisers will participate as appropriate. There will be a Secretariat to service the Conference on a continuing basis. (Article 3).

7. The Irish Government declare their support for the United Kingdom Government's policy of seeking devolution in Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community. (Article 4(b)). The Conference will be a framework in which the Irish Government can put forward views and proposals on the modalities of devolution, in so far as

they relate to the interests of the minority community. (Article 4(c)). Should a devolved administration be established, the devolved matters would not be for consideration by the Conference. (Article 2).

### Political Matters

8. The Conference will concern itself with measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of both traditions in Northern Ireland in such areas as cultural heritage, electoral arrangements, use of flags and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social discrimination and the advantages and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. (Article 5(a)).

9. Should it prove impossible to achieve and sustain devolution, proposals for major legislation and major policy issues where the interests of the minority community are significantly or especially affected and which come within the administrative responsibility of the Northern Ireland Departments will be for consideration by the Conference. (Article 5(c)).

10. The Conference will be a framework within which the Irish Government may put forward views on the role and composition of bodies appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or his Departments. (Article 6).

### Security and Related Matters within Northern Ireland

11. The Conference will consider security policy issues as well as serious incidents and forthcoming events. A programme of action will be developed with the particular object of improving the relations between the security forces and the nationalist community. Elements of the programme may be considered by the Irish Government for application in the South. The Conference may also consider policy issues relating to prisons, and individual cases may be raised. (Article 7).

### Legal Matters including the Administration of Justice

12. Both Governments recognise the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice. The Conference will seek measures that would give substantial expression to this aim, considering among other things the possibility of mixed courts in both jurisdictions for the trial of certain offences. The Conference will also consider whether there are areas of the criminal law in both jurisdictions which might with benefit be harmonised and will be concerned with policy aspects of extradition and extra-territorial jurisdiction as between North and South. (Article 8).

### Cross-border Co-operation on Security, Economic, Social and Cultural matters

13. The Conference will set in hand a programme of work to be undertaken by the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána with a view to enhancing co-operation between the security forces of the two Governments in such areas as threat assessments, exchange of information, liaison structures, technical co-operation, training of personnel and operational resources. The Conference will have no operational responsibilities. (Article 9).

14. The two Governments undertake to co-operate to promote the economic and social development of those areas in both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely as a result of the instability of recent years. The two Governments will consider the possibility of securing international support for this work. (Article 10(a)).

15. The Conference will, in the absence of devolution, be the framework for the promotion of cross-border economic, social and cultural co-operation. In the event of devolution, machinery would be needed to deal with co-operation in respect of cross-border aspects of devolved matters. (Article 10 (b) and (c)).

### Interparliamentary Body

16. The two Governments agree that they would give appropriate support to any Anglo-Irish Interparliamentary body established by the two Parliaments. (Article 12).



# Anglo-Irish Summit Meeting

15 November 1985

## Joint Communiqué

1. The Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald TD and the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Mrs. Margaret Thatcher FRS MP, met at Hillsborough on 15th November 1985. It was the third meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council to be held at the level of Heads of Government.

2. The Taoiseach was accompanied by the Tanaiste, Mr. Dick Spring TD, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Peter Barry TD. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP, and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Rt Hon Tom King MP.

3. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister signed a formal and binding Agreement between their two Governments, which will enter into force as soon as each Government has notified the other of acceptance. The Agreement has the aims of promoting peace and stability in Northern Ireland; helping to reconcile the two major traditions in Ireland; creating a new climate of friendship and co-operation between the people of the two countries; and improving co-operation in combatting terrorism.

4. The Agreement deals in particular with the status of Northern Ireland and the establishment of an Intergovernmental Conference in which the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals concerning stated aspects of Northern Ireland affairs; in which the promotion of cross-border co-operation will be discussed; and in which determined efforts will be made to resolve any differences between the two Governments.

5. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister committed themselves to implementing and sustaining the measures set out in the Agreement with determination and imagination and undertook to encourage people of both unionist and nationalist traditions in Ireland to make new efforts to understand and respect each other's concerns with a view to promoting reconciliation.

6. The exchange of notifications of acceptance will not be completed until the Agreement has been approved by Dail Eireann and by the British Parliament. The two Governments intend that action to implement the provisions of the Agreement should begin once the exchange of notifications has been completed. The first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference will take place as soon as possible thereafter. The Irish side will be led by the Minister designated as the Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative and the British side by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

7. The two Governments envisage that the meetings and agenda of the Conference will not normally be announced. But they wish it to be known that, at its first meeting, the Conference will consider its future programme of work in all the fields — political, security, legal, economic, social and cultural — assigned to it

under the Agreement. It will concentrate at its initial meetings on:

- relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland;
- ways of enhancing security co-operation between the two Governments; and
- seeking measures which would give substantial expression to the aim of underlining the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice.

In the interests of the people of Northern Ireland the two sides are committed to work for early progress in these matters. Against this background, the Taoiseach said that it was the intention of his Government to accede as soon as possible to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

8. In addressing the improvement of relations between the security Forces and the minority community, the Conference at its first meeting will consider:

- a. the application of the principle that the Armed Forces (which include the Ulster Defence Regiment) operate only in support of the civil power, with the particular objective of ensuring as rapidly as possible that, save in the most exceptional of circumstances, there is a police presence in all operations which involve direct contact with the community;
- b. ways of underlining the policy of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Armed Forces in Northern Ireland that they discharge their duties even-handedly and with equal respect for the unionist and nationalist identities and traditions.

9. In its discussion of the enhancement of cross-border co-operation on security, the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference will give particular attention to the importance of continuing and enhanced co-operation, as envisaged in Article 9(a) of the Agreement, in the policing of border areas.

10. In addition to concluding the new Agreement, the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister reviewed the wide range of work being done under the auspices of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council to develop further the unique relationship between the two countries. The fact that in the past year there have been more than twenty meetings between Ministers of the two Governments demonstrates the closeness of co-operation. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister decided that this work should be actively continued, in the interests of friendship between all the people of both countries.

11. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister agree to meet again at an appropriate time to take stock of the development of relations between the two countries and of the implementation of the Agreement which they have signed.



B M 2 A F L

To [unclear]  
[unclear]

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DRAFT

To: The Taoiseach  
From: Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 24 February following our earlier meeting. Events have moved on since then, and it may help to give you my personal impressions of how matters stand following the talks I had last week with the Unionist leaders, <sup>here</sup> and with John Hume and most recently the Unionist "day of action" on 3 March.

2. When I met the Unionists there was a good deal of plain talking: I refused to countenance any suggestion that the Agreement could be abandoned or suspended. The furthest ~~that~~ that I was prepared to go on this central issue was to undertake to operate the Agreement sensitively - and I shall return to that point below. I did, however, take full account of the strength of Unionist feeling against aspects of the Agreement. I <sup>laid stress on the fact</sup> emphasised, <sup>that</sup> as you yourself have suggested, that the Agreement provides that any matters devolved to a Northern Ireland administration would no longer fall for discussion in the Conference - a point which we shall be working hard to get across in Northern Ireland where it seems as yet to be <sup>im</sup>perfectly understood. And I readily agreed, therefore, to consider Mr Molyneaux's and Dr Paisley's suggestion of a round table Conference (which



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Mr. Curran were  
 Mr Hume was also willing to endorse) at which devolution might be discussed. I remain convinced that sensible arrangements for devolution <sup>which</sup> could command widespread acceptance throughout the community offer the best long term hope for peace and stability in the Province.

3. I also, as you will know, made other suggestions which were designed to take account of legitimate Unionist concerns and to counter their feeling that they are excluded from influence on decision making in Northern Ireland. I accordingly offered them new arrangements for consultation with the Government about affairs in Northern Ireland including security. I also offered them consultations about the future of the Northern Ireland Assembly and about the way in which Northern Ireland matters are handled at Westminster.

4. Briefly, <sup>A</sup> at the end of our meeting, ~~it seemed that~~ the Unionist leaders <sup>appeared to</sup> might be willing to talk constructively about the future without pressing their demand that the Agreement be suspended. But as we saw, on their return to Belfast, they were unable to carry their supporters with them. In the light both of that turnround and still more of what happened on <sup>3 Nov</sup> Monday, no one can be in any doubt either about the strength of Unionist feelings nor of the formidable difficulties with which <sup>we</sup> Tom King and I are faced in the Province. As for the



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events of 3 March themselves, I do not think that I can do  
... better than send you a copy of what Tom King said in the  
House [~~yesterday~~/on Tuesday~~s~~]. I scarcely need to say how much  
I deplore the disgraceful tactics adopted by opponents of our  
Agreement. You will also see from that statement just how  
great were the additional pressures imposed on the RUC by the  
strikers, and what they nevertheless managed to achieve. I  
should also tell you, in confidence, that Tom King ~~has~~  
~~personally~~ asked the Chief Constable/urgent report  
~~on~~ on the policing aspects of the "day of action".  
In addition to providing facts and figures, etc, the Chief  
Constable has also been asked to deal with the allegations  
which have been made that the police did not do enough to  
prevent the intimidation of those who were seeking to get to  
work.

5. However, as a result of my meeting with Mr Molyneaux and  
Dr Paisley the Unionists can be in no doubt that the  
British Government will not be deflected from its determination  
to implement the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and that there can be  
no question of asking Parliament, ~~which on this issue has~~  
~~undoubtedly expressed the view of the overwhelming majority~~  
~~of the people of the United Kingdom,~~ to repudiate a measure  
which barely three months ago it gave massive endorsement.  
~~I can give you my unqualified assurance that~~ the events of  
last Monday have in no way weakened that determinaton, nor will



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recourse to similar action in future.

6. At the same time, we have to recognise that more than <sup>if we are</sup> determination on our part will be necessary/to get through what will undoubtedly will be some very difficult months ahead. I know that you share my view that it is important at the present time to avoid exacerbating Unionists sensitivities, and the events of the "day of action" underline just how essential this continues to be. We also need to find all possible ways of commending the Agreement to moderate and reasonable Unionists who must, I am sure, be dismayed by the recent turn of events. I regard it, therefore, as vital that the SDLP adopts a generous and statesmanlike approach during this critical period. I ~~therefore~~ left Mr Hume in no doubt that it is not enough now to sit back and leave it to us to deal with Unionist opposition. None of us will benefit if we simply exchange an estranged minority for a non-cooperative majority. The Unionists cannot make me abandon the Agreement. But their prolonged hostility can prevent it from achieving the reconciliation and stability that we both seek. I welcome what the SDLP have already done by way, for example, of avoiding triumphalism; and Mr Hume's recent declaration of readiness to talk about devolution without preconditions was also helpful. He told me that I would find the SDLP "constructive". I hope that, with your help, this will indeed prove so and that they will also show discretion. (Mr Mallon's widely reported remarks



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on RUC conduct on Monday were, as so often, the reverse of helpful and I appreciated the way you took the sting out of what he said). In the coming weeks, the Unionist leaders will be looking for any action or statements from the SDLP - or indeed from the Republic - that they can use to confirm their supporters' fears of the Agreement. It remains vital to deprive them of such ammunition and that is another reason why I so much welcomed your signature, without reservation, of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

7. It is no less imperative that we can demonstrate the benefits for all the people of Northern Ireland that the Agreement is capable of bringing. It is essential that we should be seen to be making progress in the Intergovernmental Conference in those areas which, while serving our common interest, will be welcome to Unionists. I have in mind, in particular, the need for visible and substantial progress in enhancing security cooperation at all levels and in all the areas covered in Article 9(a) of the Agreement. It was the pursuit of such objectives, combined with restraint in making claims for the Conference and care in avoiding precipitate action which would offend Unionists' sensitivities that I had in mind when I referred to operating the Agreement "sensitively". I have not given up hope of bringing the Unionists back to the path of constructive dialogue that, for a moment, they seemed ready to follow last week. The offers I then made to them remain on the table. To that end I know I can count of your support and understanding. I hope that ~~John Hume, Seamus Mallon~~ <sup>the SDLP will</sup> and their



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Please type this page  
of the letter twice. Once  
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X  
though I enclose  
three examples of  
statements which ~~are~~  
~~inevitably~~ inevitably  
raise ~~the~~ heads in  
the north

8. You raised a number of more detailed matters in your letter. You asked, for instance, about actual statements that we had found unhelpful: I am arranging for these to be followed up through <sup>by officials</sup> the Secretariat. You also provided information about your Government's commitment to security on the border: I note <sup>what you said and</sup> ~~and~~, <sup>F</sup> for the present at least, this subject can <sup>perhaps</sup> ~~perhaps~~ be pursued by the new quadripartite group of policemen and officials from both sides which held its first meeting in Belfast last week. But I think that we both agree that our first priority now must be to be seen to make progress as rapidly as possible in a way that will help the majority in the North, however reluctantly in many cases, to accept that the Agreement is not only here to stay, but can further, rather than damage, their own interests.

~~pathology~~ that the comparisons ~~and be~~  
generally ~~to~~ with 1969 ~~rather~~ than ~~at~~  
period incredibly before the Agreement.



SUBJECT  
cc Masterfile  
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10 DOWNING STREET

6 March 1986

*From the Private Secretary*

Dear Jim,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. CUSHNAHAN

The Prime Minister had a meeting this evening with Mr. John Cushnahan, Leader of the Alliance Party in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Secretary was also present.

Mr. Cushnahan said that he fully endorsed the Government's policy. They must hold firm to the Anglo-Irish agreement but at the same time offer a lifeline to the Unionists, particularly the Official Unionists. He thought that the Northern Ireland Secretary had handled matters since the strike with very great skill. He hoped that the Prime Minister would confirm that her offer to the two main Unionist parties on 25 February remained on the table. It was important to keep emphasising this and to put the onus for rejecting talks on the Unionist parties. He also thought that the Prime Minister should go ahead and call a round table conference on devolution, even without the prior agreement of the Unionist parties to attend. The Unionists would be under pressure to turn up; and at the conference the SDLP would be under pressure to show whether they were seriously prepared to move towards devolution on an acceptable basis. The Prime Minister said that this last point needed careful thought. She could only play the round table conference card once and it would be important to get the timing right.

Mr. Cushnahan expressed unease about the conduct of the RUC during the day of action on 3 March. This had done damage to the RUC's reputation which might well be further increased by the leaking of tape recording of a Police Federation meeting in Northern Ireland at which strong criticism of the Anglo-Irish agreement was expressed and applauded. This would make it much harder to persuade the minority to support the security forces. The Northern Ireland Secretary said that he had called for a full report into the RUC's handling of the day of action.


Mr. Cushnahan said that he had a number of suggestions to offer on the handling of the Intergovernmental Conference. He thought that the Government should insist that only issues of policy were dealt with in the IGC. The Republic should not be allowed to raise trivial matters. It



would help to secure acceptance of the Agreement in the North if more stress could be placed on social and economic co-operation through the IGC. It would also help if a few occasions could be found for the Government to say no to proposals put forward by the Republic. The agenda for meetings of the IGC should be published, to dispel secrecy surrounding it. The Government might also discuss the agenda in advance with the Northern Ireland political parties. The Prime Minister undertook to consider these suggestions.

The attached statement to the press was agreed with Mr. Cushnahan at the end of the meeting and has subsequently been released by the No. 10 Press Office. Mr. Cushnahan said that, in commenting on his meeting with the Prime Minister, he would say he had found her firm in her determination to implement the agreement but also more than anxious to allay the fears of the Unionist community. The proposals which she had put to the Unionist parties still stood and she was willing to discuss them at any time.

I am copying this letter to Joan MacNaughton (Lord President's Office), Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,  
  
(C.D. Powell)

Jim Daniell, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office



PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. CUSHNAHAN

The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland today met Mr. Cushnahan, Leader of the Alliance Party.

Mr. Cushnahan confirmed his Party's view that the Agreement should be given a chance by all sections of the community in Northern Ireland to achieve its objectives.

Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Cushnahan condemned the violence and intimidation that had accompanied the day of action and protest on 3 March. They expressed concern at the damage that had been caused within Northern Ireland itself by the strike, and equally importantly the harm to potential foreign investment and to the image of Northern Ireland abroad.

The Prime Minister confirmed to Mr. Cushnahan that the offer which she had made to the Unionist Party leaders on 25 February still stood and indicated her willingness to resume discussions on that basis at any time. Mr. Cushnahan welcomed this.

The Prime Minister stated that the Government remained ready to consider positively the suggestion by the UUP and DUP of a round table conference on devolution. Mr. Cushnahan expressed his Party's willingness to participate, especially as he had made similar proposals previously.



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Prime Minister CC PC BU  
Mr. Cushman and his party

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BRIEF FOR PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR CUSHNAHAN

are particularly concerned at the RUC's failure to deal effectively with intimidation during the strike. There is a statement in

Objectives

- a) To retain Alliance Party (qualified) support for the Anglo-Irish Agreement;
- b) To reassure Mr Cushman that the Police remain committed to ensuring as far as possible that people can travel to work during strike action; and to explain the limitations of resources in dealing with such situations;
- c) To describe to him the offer that was put to Mr Molyneux, Dr Paisley and Mr Kilfedder; and to point out that to a large extent these would meet Alliance concerns;
- d) To seek his support for Government efforts to resume dialogue with the Unionists;
- e) To explain Government policy towards the Assembly.

use at the end of the meeting. CDP 5/3

Background

- ... 1. A personality note on Mr Cushman is included at Annex A.
- i) The Anglo-Irish Agreement
- 2. The Alliance Party supports the Anglo-Irish Agreement with reservations, reflecting the fact that, although the party draws support from both sides of the community, its members support the union, and share the concern of the Unionist community. (The Alliance Party of course differs from the Unionist parties in supporting Government policy on devolution). The Resolution passed by their Policy Council was as follows:

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/"That ...



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which  
"That this Council, accepts the authority of Parliament in Westminster, will strive to ensure that it is given a fair chance to work for the benefit of both sides of our divided community.

"This Council believes that the party leadership should continue to seek:-

- i) An end to total secrecy and its replacement with a more open approach to the workings and deliberations of the Inter-Governmental Conference.
- ii) The establishment of a mechanism whereby all Northern Ireland constitutional parties have an input into the deliberations of the Intergovernmental Conference.
- iii) Prompt and significant reciprocal gestures from the SDLP in order to assist political progress in Northern Ireland.

"This Council further believes that as the Government and Parliament are intent on implementing this agreement continued rejection of it will lead to a major confrontation which would have catastrophic consequences for the well being of Northern Ireland and its people."

3. The first two detailed points on secrecy and on input by NI parties have been (largely) met by the offer to Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley of consultation arrangements, including matters discussed in the Conference. (The Government also agrees on the need for some gestures and the statement issued following the Prime Minister's .. meeting with Mr Hume (Annex B) showed that the SDLP were prepared to discuss devolution without preconditions and gave warmer support for the RUC than usual).

ii) The One-Day Strike

4. The Alliance Party did not support the strike. Mr Cushnahan has expressed his disquiet about police tactics during the one day



of action. His main concerns are similar to those expressed by others and include the apparent inability or unwillingness of the RUC to intervene to remove illegal road blocks or to provide protection to those trying to pass through illegal blocks. At one stage he suggested that Alliance confidence in the police might be so weakened that he would have to withdraw his previous unconditional support and move to a position closer to that expressed by the SDLP where support for the RUC is given only when they are acting impartially to uphold the law. He has now handed over a (large) dossier of alleged intimidation and police inactivity reported to Alliance Party Headquarters on 5 March. Amongst the victims of intimidation and violence were Alliance Assemblymen David Cook and Seamus Close and Cllr Paddy McGowan of Coleraine.

iii) Future of the Assembly

5. The Alliance has strongly opposed the Unionists' use of the Assembly as a platform for anti-Agreement rhetoric. They have withdrawn from the plenary sessions of the Assembly and refused to participate in its Grand Committee. They have striven to keep the Assembly Committees functioning, although not successfully. Mr Cushnahan has proposed prorogation of the Assembly for a period as a means of preventing its misuse.

6. But at the same time, the Alliance does not wish to see the Assembly destroyed. It continues to have potential to assume devolved power. The Alliance remains committed to devolution both for its own sake and as a means of defusing the tense situation in Northern Ireland. Many of its members are dependent on the Assembly for their livelihoods.

iv) Alliance Role in Local Government

7. Alliance Councillors have been at the forefront of attempts to keep local government operating in Northern Ireland; a group of Alliance Councillors brought the High Court case to compel Belfast City Council to make a rate (the ruling was confirmed in the Court of Appeal on 14 February but Belfast City Council subsequently defied it).



Arguments

- a) The strike on Monday can only have harmed NI's interests. The Province will be seen as industrially unstable. More regrettably the strike has encouraged the more violent elements to come to the fore. There were disgraceful incidents - including petrol bombs and shots fired during disturbances in loyalist areas. It has put at risk the future of all the people of Northern Ireland. Now that opposition to the Agreement has been registered, it is in everyone's interest that dialogue resumes. There are signs that moderate Unionists - not least Mr Molyneaux - are concerned about the violence. What is your view?
- b) The Government is concerned about complaints of police inaction. A full report on all policing aspects of the 24 hours of the strike has been requested from the Chief Constable. We will all learn from any mistakes; and the police and the Government remain committed to ensuring that in such circumstances as far as possible anyone who wishes to go to work will be able to.

Before criticising the police one must look at their problems. With such widespread disruption they are thinly spread, and cannot deal effectively with every instance of intimidation or other action. But 441 out of 655 roadblocks were cleared, most main roads were open and most people were able to go to work and return home. 57 arrests and another 184 people are being considered for prosecution.

All complaints of negligence by the police will be investigated.

- c) The Government remains committed to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Endorsed at Westminster by massive majorities. At the same time we recognise the significance of the Unionist vote in the by-elections.



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- d) We need to dispel misrepresentations of the Agreement and concerns about it. The Agreement is not a move towards a United Ireland. In fact it reinforces the status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom and right of majority to determine that status, as well as the sovereign responsibility of HMG in Northern Ireland. The Government wants Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom.

Determined that Agreement shall bring benefits for everyone in Northern Ireland including unionists. Not doing badly so far. Arms finds in Sligo and Roscommon on 26 January were biggest ever on land in Ireland. We are working hard for more successes like that. Irish Republic has signed European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, something Unionists have long wanted.

Grateful for any support the Alliance party can give to get these messages over.

- e) The Government recognises the wish of Alliance and the Unionist parties to be consulted fully about the affairs of Northern Ireland in parallel with what goes on in the Intergovernmental Conference. We would like to establish arrangements for consultation - not necessarily confined to matters discussed in the Intergovernmental Conference. Such consultation would go some way to meeting Alliance concern.
- f) We are willing to consider positively the suggestion of a Round Table Conference on devolution. We are ready to consider any types of devolution that command widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland. We could look at the various possibilities (including a scheme within the 1982 Act; the DUP's idea of the devolution of legislative powers; the UUP's ideas for executive or administrative devolution; Sir Frederick Catherwood's idea of weighted majorities and Alliance proposals for devolution based on a system of committees) If devolution were to take place it would reduce the scope of

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the Intergovernmental Conference considerably.

- g) At the meeting on 25 February it was agreed that I would talk further with Mr Molyneux and Dr Paisley. They subsequently changed their minds. The Government would like to resume that dialogue. Grateful if any influence the Alliance party has could be used to persuade the UUP and DUP to resume it.
- h) The Government genuinely wishes to see the Assembly continue. It is an important forum in which Unionists and Alliance can make their views known. It has the potential to take on real power. We remain willing to discuss its future with you and Unionist leaders. Despite your best efforts, the Assembly is not carrying out its statutory functions.
- i) <sup>Assembly's</sup> The/ recent debates on the Anglo-Irish Agreement have served only to raise the temperature. All of this must put a question mark over its future. But the Secretary of State will try to take account of Alliance views on this subject over the days and weeks ahead.

Statement

... A possible draft statement is included at Annex C.

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JOHN CUSHNAHAN

Alliance Party: General Secretary 1974-82; Assembly member for C Down; Belfast City Councillor 1977-85, Party Leader .

Background

Born 1948 in the Lower Falls area of Belfast, he attended St Joseph's College of Education in West Belfast and gained a BEd degree from Queen's. He was president of the Students' Union for 2 years and vice president of the NUS. Active in the civil rights days, he did not join the Alliance Party until 1974, when he applied for, and obtained, the post of Party General Secretary. He was elected to Belfast City Council in 1977 and was the Party's candidate for North Belfast in the 1979 General Election, winning 4,000 votes.

He was a front-bench member of the Alliance Party delegation to the Conference on the Government of Northern Ireland in early 1980. Re-elected to Belfast City Council in May 1981. Announced in September 1981 that he had decided to resign the General Secretaryship, but would continue to work for the party. Resigned from the Board of the Housing Executive in 1982 (to which he was appointed in 1979) to stand for (and win) election to the 1982 Assembly in North Down, having transplanted from North Belfast. Married (Alice) he has 4 adopted children. A Catholic brought up in W Belfast, he now lives in Bangor. Unsuccessfully contested N Down seat in 1983 General Election. He did not contest the 1985 Government Election.

Personality and political views:

Hard-working, ambitious, and able, he is still something of a rough diamond. Firmly in the tradition of lay Catholic radicalism, he is critical of the hierarchy's role in Northern Ireland society and its opposition to integrated education. In his early political days, his importance derived from his position as full-time Party

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Secretary (Alliance's only full-time politician). His standing however increased as he matured and he quickly became recognised as the most able working-class Catholic in a predominantly middle-class Protestant party. Took over the leadership when Mr Napier resigned in September 1984.

Mr Cushnahan fought N Down against Kilfedder in the January '86 by-election. His share of the vote fell from 22.1% in 1983 to 21% in 1986.

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The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland held a meeting this afternoon with Mr John Hume, MP, leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party.

The Prime Minister confirmed the Government's commitment to implement the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

Mr Hume reaffirmed the SDLP's willingness to enter into discussions on devolution at any time without preconditions. Mr Hume recognised that, in accordance with the Anglo-Irish Agreement, if arrangements for devolution acceptable to both communities were achieved, the subjects which would become the responsibility of the devolved body would cease to be within the purview of the Intergovernmental Conference.

Mr Hume confirmed that the SDLP fully support the Security Forces in Northern Ireland in carrying out their duty of upholding the law impartially. The SDLP totally and utterly reject violence and all those who are involved in it or in support of it. They made clear their sympathy for the relatives of all those members of the Security Forces who had been killed or wounded by terrorists, and indeed for all innocent victims of terrorism.

The Prime Minister will be seeing other political leaders in Northern Ireland in the near future to discuss among other things devolution and will thereafter have further contacts with Mr Hume.



## DRAFT STATEMENT ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR CUSHNAHAN

*and the S-O-S-for N-1-*

The Prime Minister <sup>and Mr Cushnahan</sup> today met Mr Cushnahan, leader of the Alliance Party. The meeting lasted [ ] hours.

Both the Prime Minister and Mr Cushnahan condemned the violence and intimidation that had accompanied the day of action and protest on 3 March. They expressed concern at the damage that had been caused to Northern Ireland by the strike. The Prime Minister assured Mr Cushnahan that any allegations of inaction by the police would be investigated and that the Government and the police remained determined to ensure as far as possible, that people could travel to and from work in such circumstances.

The Prime Minister informed Mr Cushnahan that the offer of new arrangements for enabling views to be made known to the Government on affairs in Northern Ireland remained open. Mr Cushnahan expressed his party's support for such arrangements. Both the Prime Minister <sup>and Mr Cushnahan</sup> expressed a hope that dialogue between the Governments and the Unionists on these arrangements, <sup>on</sup> on the future of the Assembly and arrangements for handling Northern Ireland business in Parliament could be resumed. The Prime Minister stated that the Government remained ready to consider positively the suggestion by the UUP and DUP of a round table conference on devolution. Mr Cushnahan expressed his party's willingness to participate.

The Prime Minister and Mr Cushnahan agreed that both would continue to challenge misconceptions about the Agreement.



IRISH TIMES:

LEADS WITH A STORY THAT THE SDLP LEADER, MR JOHN HUME, YESTERDAY FIRMLY REJECTED DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS WHICH EMERGED FROM A SERIES OF MEETINGS BETWEEN 2 OFFICIAL UNIONISTS AND 2 MEMBERS OF THE SDLP. MR HUME SAID THAT THE 2 MEMBERS FROM THE SDLP WHO TOOK PART HAD BEEN ACTING IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN GOOD FAITH BUT NOT AS REPRESENTATIVES. MR HUME ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE PROPOSALS WERE NOT JUST ANOTHER NON-RUNNER, THEY WERE DEAD. HE ALSO SAID IF OFFICIAL UNIONISTS WANTED TALKS THEY SHOULD ASK FOR THEM IN THE NORMAL WAY.

THE U.S. AID PACKAGE LINKED FOR THE HILLSBOROUGH AGREEMENT WILL CONSIST OF 20 MILLION DOLLARS AS A DIRECT GRANT THIS YEAR TO AN INTERNATIONAL FUND AND 30 MILLION DOLLARS IN THE SAME PERIOD IN INVESTMENT CREDITS OF LOANS FOR HOUSING AND SMALL BUSINESSES IN BELFAST AND OTHER CITIES IN THE NORTH, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS TOLD A CONGRESSIONAL SUB-COMMITTEE YESTERDAY.

IN AN INSIDE PIECE THE PAPER SAYS THAT THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY EMPHATICALLY REJECTED UNIONIST REQUESTS FOR A SUSPENSION OF MEETINGS OF LONDON AND DUBLIN MINISTERS UNDER THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT FOR A 3-MONTH PERIOD WHILE INTER-PARTY TALKS ON DEVOLUTION GOT UNDERWAY IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS EMERGED AFTER MRS THATCHER MET THE LEADER OF THE POPULAR UNIONIST PARTY, MR JAMES KILFEDDER, AT DOWNING STREET YESTERDAY EVENING AS PART OF HER SERIES OF TALKS WITH NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICAL LEADERS OTHER THAN SINN FEIN. MRS THATCHER'S SENTIMENTS WERE ECHOED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT AT THE MEETING AND SAID AFTERWARDS THAT THE AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE SCRAPPED, NEITHER COULD IT BE SUSPENDED.

OFFICIAL UNIONIST POLITICIANS SEEMINGLY UNDETERRED BY THE VIOLENCE OF MONDAY'S DAY OF ACTION HAVE CLAIMED THE DAY A SUCCESS AND REFUSE TO CONCEDE THAT THE RIOTING AND INTIMIDATION HAD HANDED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT A PROPAGANDA VICTORY. THE PAPER SAYS THAT TYPICAL AMONG THEIR COMMENTS WERE THOSE OF THE PARTY'S ASSEMBLYMAN FOR NORTH DOWN, MR ROBERT MCCARTNEY, WIDELY REGARDED AS THE VOICE OF MODERATE UNIONISM WHO BLAMED THE BRITISH MEDIA FOR EXAGGERATING THE EXTENT OF THE VIOLENCE. MR MCCARTNEY IS REPORTED AS HAVING SAID THAT THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE POLICEMAN MURDERED - NONE WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED AND THAT THERE WAS LESS DAMAGE IN THE ONE-DAY STRIKE THAN IN THE RIOTS IN TOTTENHAM OR HANDS WORTH.

THE NI POLICE AUTHORITY LAST NIGHT GAVE ITS BACKING TO THE RUC'S HANDLING OF THE LOYALIST STRIKE. AFTER HEARING AN ACCOUNT OF THE POLICE OPERATION FROM THE CHIEF CONSTABLE SIR JOHN HERMON THE AUTHORITY CONGRATULATED HIM AND ALL THE FORCE MEMBERS FOR DEALING 'SO WELL WITH AN INCREDIBLY DIFFICULT SITUATION'. AT THE SAME TIME THE AUTHORITY REFERRED TO COMMENTS FROM THE CHIEF CONSTABLE WHO ADMITTED THAT SOME ERRORS IN BOTH DISPOSITION AND JUDGEMENT WERE MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY BUT THIS PRIMARILY LAY IN THE SCALE OF THE ACTIVITY CALLED FOR AND THE NECESSARY SPREAD OF RESOURCES AVAILABLE.

BELFAST CITY COUNCIL ADJOURNED AGAINST LAST NIGHT WITHOUT STRIKING A RATE. IT WAS THE COUNCIL'S LAST OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO BEFORE THE FINAL MARCH 8 DEADLINE SET BY THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT IS NOW EXPECTED TO STRIKE A RATE NEXT WEEK. NOT ONLY IS THE COUNCIL BREACHING THE DEADLINE SET BY THE DOE IT IS ALSO ACTING IN DEFIANCE OF A COURT ORDER GRANTED TO A GROUP OF ALLIANCE COUNCILLORS LAST MONTH. LAST NIGHT'S DECISION PLACES IN JEOPARDY SOME 29 JOBS DIRECTLY DEPENDENT ON A RENEWAL OF GRANTS BY THE COUNCILLORS BY 1 APRIL. MANY OF THOSE PEOPLE WORK IN COMMUNITY ADVICE BUREAUS AND OTHER WELFARE ASSOCIATIONS. THE PAPER REPORTS THAT THERE WAS A SIMILAR ADJOURNMENT AT LISBURN COUNCIL LAST NIGHT WHO HAVE ALSO DEFIED THE DIRECTIVE NOT TO STRIKE A DISTRICT RATE.



THAT WELL-KNOWN UNIONISTS ARE SENDING UP RESCUE SIGNALS. THE SPIRIT OF GIVE AND TAKE IS BEING SOUGHT IN RELATION TO THE NORTHERN SITUATION IN GENERAL AND THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT IN PARTICULAR. THE COLUMN EXHORTS THE NATIONALISTS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION TO BEND TOWARDS UNIONISTS, AND SAYS THAT THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT AND PEOPLE WOULD REACT WELL TO A STRONG POSITIVE SIGNAL COMING FROM MESSRS HUME AND MALLON INDICATING WILLINGNESS. IF THEY DO SO THE COLUMN ARGUES THAT THE MORE REASONABLE AND WILLING THE SDLP SHOWS ITSELF TO BE IN WESTMINSTER THE MORE WILL THE UNIONISTS BE WRONG-FOOTED.

#### IRISH PRESS:

A LOYALIST POLITICIAN SAID LAST NIGHT THAT HE INTENDED TO REVEAL CONVERSATIONS ABOUT THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING A MEETING A FORTNIGHT AGO OF THE POLICE FEDERATION, THE RUC'S REPRESENTATIVE BODY. THE REV IVAN FOSTER, THE DUP ASSEMBLYMAN FROM FERMANAGH, SAID THAT A SECRET TAPE RECORDING OF THE MEETING HAD BEEN MADE AND PASSED TO HIM. DUP DEPUTY LEADER, PETER ROBINSON, SAID LAST NIGHT THAT DISCUSSIONS ON THE TAPE WERE POLITICAL DYNAMITE. THE DUP WILL HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE AT STORMONT THIS MORNING DURING WHICH THEY SAY THEY WILL ALLOW REPORTERS TO TAKE NOTES FROM THE TAPE BUT NOT RECORD IT.

#### IRISH INDEPENDENT:

IN ITS LEADER COLUMN THE PAPER SAYS THAT ALTHOUGH JOHN HUME CLEARLY WANTS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE UNOFFICIAL TALKS THAT WERE BEING HELD BY MEMBERS OF THE UNIONISTS AND SDLP PARTIES, THE FACT THAT ANY NEGOTIATION IS TAKING PLACE IS SEEN AS A SIGN OF PROGRESS.

#### NEWS LETTER:

LEADS WITH A STORY THAT BELFAST CITY COUNCIL LAST NIGHT HAS EFFECTIVELY SIGNED ITS OWN DEATH WARRANT WITHOUT A SECOND THOUGHT. IN WHAT THE PAPER CALLS THE SHORTEST MEETING ON RECORD THE COUNCIL DECIDED TO IGNORE SATURDAY'S GOVERNMENT DEADLINE FOR STRIKING A RATE. DUP PRESS OFFICER, SAMMY WILSON, IS QUOTED AS HAVING SAID 'IT ALL DEPENDS NOW ON WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE GUTS TO CARRY THROUGH ITS THREAT TO SEND IN COMMISSIONERS AND I HOPE THEY DO'.

ANOTHER FRONT PAGE STORY IN THE PAPER SAYS THAT AN OFFICIAL MOLE HUNT IS TO GET UNDERWAY AT THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE. EAST BELFAST DUP ASSEMBLYMAN, DENNY VITTY, HAD REVEALED ON TUESDAY NIGHT THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FORCED TO SHELVE THE NEXT MEETING OF THE ANGLO-IRISH CONFERENCE. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT HE HAD INSIDE INFORMATION FROM A STORMONT CASTLE MOLE WHO TOLD HIM THAT FORESEEABLE MINISTERIAL ENGAGEMENTS HAD BEEN CANCELLED BECAUSE OF THE RISE IN LOYALIST ANGER. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD INSTIGATED A MOLE-HUNT WHICH COULD INVOLVE ENGLISH POLICE INVESTIGATING THE SOURCE OF THE LEAK. IN ITS LEADER COLUMN THE PAPER SAYS THAT WHATEVER OTHER UNDESIRABLE SIDE-EFFECTS MONDAY'S DAY OF ACTION MAY HAVE HAD IT HAS SERIOUSLY CALLED INTO QUESTION THE WISDOM OF PROCEEDING WITH A STRATEGY BASED ON GIVING UNIONISTS A BLOODY NOSE. THE COLUMN SAYS THAT MURMURINGS FROM DUBLIN INDICATE THAT SOME SUPPORTERS OF THE HILLSBOROUGH AGREEMENT MIGHT BE PREPARED TO SEE THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT ENTERING INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH UNIONISTS BEHIND MRS THATCHER'S BACK AND EVEN TO SEND FOREIGN MINISTER, PETER BARRY, ON HOLIDAY WHILE IRISHMEN GET ON WITH THE BUSINESS OF REPAIRING THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT. THE COLUMN SAYS IT WOULD BE A NOVEL WAY TO CONDUCT THE SERIOUS BUSINESS OF THE NATION'S AFFAIRS. HOWEVER THE PIECE CONCLUDES THAT ALTHOUGH UNIONIST LEADERS HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF LETTING THE EVIL GENIE OF LOYALIST VIOLENCE OUT OF A BOTTLE THIS IS A SLANDEROUS ALLEGATION BUT NEVERTHELESS VIOLENCE IN ALL ITS FORMS MUST BE REJECTED WITHOUT EQUIVOCATION BEFORE THE SERIOUS WORK OF REBUILDING ULSTER CAN BEGIN.

PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES ACROSS THE PROVINCE CONDEMNED VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION DURING LAST MONDAY'S STRIKE AGAINST THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT. THEY ALSO HAVE BACKED THE CALL BY THE CHURCH'S GENERAL BOARD FOR ROUND-TABLE TALKS INVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICIANS ON DEVOLUTION.



THE LOYALIST STRIKE AND SUBSEQUENT VIOLENCE IN NI YESTERDAY PROMPTED THE SECOND DUBLIN PARLIAMENTARY ROY IN 24 HOURS. THE OPPOSITION PARTY IN THE DAIL - FIANNA FAIL - COMPLAINED ABOUT A DECISION BY THE DAIL AUTHORITIES TO REFUSE A QUESTION ON THE ISSUE. TABLING A QUESTION ON BEHALF OF HIS LEADER MR BRIAN LENAHAN ASKED IF THERE WAS TO BE A MEETING OF THE NEW ANGLO-IRISH CONFERENCE ON NORTHERN IRELAND TO DISCUSS LAST MONDAY'S VIOLENCE, AND HE ALSO REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF THE ROLE OF THE CONFERENCE IN THE SERIOUS SITUATION FOLLOWING THE TOTAL BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER IN NI.

IRISH NEWS:

AN INSIDE PIECE REPORTS THAT THE STREETS OF BELFAST MAY NOT BE LITTERED WITH GOLD AT THE MOMENT BUT AT LEAST 12,000 POUNDS WILL BE SPENT REPAIRING THE SURFACES OF THEM DAMAGED BY BURNING BARRICADES DURING MONDAY'S DAY OF ACTION ACCORDING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT. IN ADDITION TO DAMAGE TO ROAD SURFACES THE REPORT SAYS THAT 13 STREET LAMPS WERE WRECKED AND 53 WERE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED THROUGHOUT THE DAY. TRAFFIC LIGHTS AT THE JUNCTION OF AINSWORTH AVENUE IN THE SHANKILL ROAD ALONE WILL COST AT LEAST 1,600 POUNDS TO REPLACE.

CONTROVERSIAL LARNE PRIEST FATHER PAT BUCKLEY IS SETTING UP A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE PEACE AND JUSTICE IN NI. DETAILS OF THE NEW COMMISSION WERE RELEASED YESTERDAY WHEN IT WAS REVEALED THE FIRST TASK WOULD BE TO INVESTIGATE INTIMIDATION DURING MONDAY'S LOYALIST STRIKE. IN ITS LEADER COLUMN THE PAPER WELCOMES THE UNAMBIGUOUS CONDEMNATION BY PRESBYTERIANS OF THE VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION ON MONDAY. THE COLUMN SAYS IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE CHURCH ACTED SO PROMPTLY TO ATTRACT PUBLIC ATTENTION TO THE REALITY THAT VIOLENCE IS TOTALLY ABHORRENT TO ITS MEMBERS. THE PIECE CONCLUDES THAT RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP SHOULD ANSWER IN URGENT READINESS THE PRESBYTERIAN CALL FOR ROUND-TABLE TALKS WITHOUT PRECONDITION.

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. CUSHNAHAN

The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland today met Mr. Cushnahan, Leader of the Alliance Party.

Mr. Cushnahan confirmed his Party's view that the Agreement should be given a chance by all sections of the community in Northern Ireland to achieve its objectives.

Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Cushnahan condemned the violence and intimidation that had accompanied the day of action and protest on 3 March. They expressed concern at the damage that had been caused within Northern Ireland itself by the strike, and equally importantly the harm to potential foreign investment and to the image of Northern Ireland abroad.

The Prime Minister confirmed to Mr. Cushnahan that the offer which she had made to the Unionist Party leaders on 25 February still stood and indicated her willingness to resume discussions on that basis at any time. Mr. Cushnahan welcomed this.

The Prime Minister stated that the Government remained ready to consider positively the suggestion by the UUP and DUP of a round table conference on devolution. Mr. Cushnahan expressed his Party's willingness to participate, especially as he had made similar proposals previously.



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STATEMENT ISSUED FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH  
MR. KILFEDDER, MP, ON 5 MARCH 1986

CAP  
3/3.

The Prime Minister and the Northern Ireland Secretary had a meeting today with Mr. Kilfedder of the Ulster Popular Unionist Party.

Mr. Kilfedder condemned unreservedly the violent incidents and intimidation which have occurred on 3 March. He and the Prime Minister agreed that further strikes like that on 3 March would be extremely damaging for Northern Ireland, both for its standing in the eyes of other countries and for employment prospects.

The Prime Minister explained that the Government would not be deterred by such tactics from implementing the Anglo-Irish Agreement. She expressed the hope that the Unionist leaders would take up the offer of dialogue which she had made to Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley at their meeting on 25 February covering new arrangements for Unionists to make their views known to the Government on affairs in Northern Ireland, the future of the Northern Ireland Assembly and arrangements for handling Northern Ireland issues at Westminster. The Prime Minister assured Mr. Kilfedder that the Government would like the Assembly to continue. But it would have to play a useful role in Northern Ireland.

The Prime Minister made clear that her offer to consider positively a suggestion by Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley that the Government should call a Round Table conference to discuss devolution in Northern Ireland remained on the table.

Mr. Kilfedder indicated that he would consider these points on behalf of his own party. He also undertook to relay to the other Unionist party leaders the Prime Minister's continuing offer of further discussion.



**E.R.**

STATEMENT 4 MARCH 1986

With permission Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement about the events in Northern Ireland yesterday.

2. As the House will be aware, the leaders of the two main Unionists parties had called for a day of action and protest. They invited everybody to stay away from work and stated that it was to be a passive and voluntary demonstration and that there should be no roadblocks or intimidation of those going to work.

3. In the event, there was widespread obstruction, intimidation and some violence during the day culminating in serious disorder in East and North Belfast last night. The first incidents occurred before midnight on Sunday and disturbances continued until the early hours of this morning.

4. In spite of these difficulties a very considerable number of people succeeded in getting to work; particularly in the commercial offices and public services, but many factories were seriously affected.

5. I pay tribute to the determination of all those who refused to be intimidated and exercised their right to go to work. I also pay tribute to the men of the security forces and particularly the RUC for all the work that they did to seek to keep roads open for people to be able to get to work. However there have also been a number of complaints when it is alleged that the police did not take action when it was required. The Chief Constable is preparing



**E.R.**

a full report on all the policing aspects of the past 24 hours. To give the House some indication of the scale of the workload that the RUC faced, on the latest information available there were some 655 roadblocks in the Province over the period of which 441 were cleared. There were in addition some 80 cavalcades and demonstrations, which caused considerable disruption in a number of towns mainly around midday. There were 57 arrests and the names of 184 people noted to proceed by way of summons. 65 Plastic Baton Rounds were fired, 47 policemen were injured. Last night there were a number of petrol bombs thrown, and there were over 20 shots fired in 3 firearms attacks on the police during the disturbances in the Loyalist areas.

6. The figures listed above give the details of a tragic day for Northern Ireland. Many Members will have seen some of the disgraceful incidents on television last night. These pictures have been shown all over the world and will do great damage to the reputation of the Province. The House will also have seen elected members of this House making common cause with people in paramilitary dress.

7. The Government is well aware of the strength of feeling among many Unionists about aspects of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The House will be aware that My Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister and I met the Right Honourable Member for Lagan Valley and the Member for North Antrim last Tuesday. During a long meeting My Right Honourable Friend put forward a number of proposals to help meet their main concerns and agreed to consider positively their suggestions that the Government should call Round Table Conference to discuss devolution in Northern Ireland; it was



**E.R.**

agreed that we would all reflect on the various suggestions that had been made and would meet again shortly. The prospects of constructive discussions instead of confrontation were greeted with widespread relief in the Province, only for that to be destroyed by their abrupt repudiation of this course following a meeting in Belfast late that night. They then decided to proceed with the day of protest.

8. The whole country can now see how tragic and totally counterproductive yesterday's action has been. It is now urgent that the Unionists leaders recognise again that the only way in which the concerns of those they seek to represent can be addressed is by constructive discussion and not by threats and violence. The degree of intimidation evident yesterday showed how little confidence many of the organisers had in being able peacefully to persuade their fellow citizens to join their day of protest. I make it quite clear that this Government, this Parliament will not be intimidated either by the sort of violent actions that took place yesterday. I believe that an increasing number of Unionists while disliking many aspects of the Anglo-Irish Agreement wish to look for a constructive way forward. The Government has made quite clear our willingness to sit down and discuss seriously the Unionists concerns. In our Parliamentary democracy, in this United Kingdom, that can be the only way.



CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH MR. JAMES KILFEDDER

A I attach a brief for your meeting with Mr. Kilfedder tomorrow. The main point is to bring home to him the damage done by yesterday's strike and the need to move rapidly to the discussions which you offered Dr. Paisley and Mr. Molyneux when they have called on you.

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You may also like to say some words of appreciation for the steadying role which he has played as Speaker of the Assembly.

B  
C At the end of the meeting, you may wish to seek his agreement to a statement which would be issued following the pattern of your meetings with Mr. Molyneux, Dr. Paisley and Mr. Hume. A Northern Ireland draft is in the folder. In case you feel that this is too long and a bit much for Mr. Kilfedder to swallow, I attach a shorter alternative version.

C D P

(C. D. POWELL)

4 March 1986

SRWAQE

CONFIDENTIAL



**Sir Edward du Cann:** Will my right hon. Friend look again at the figures for the appalling decline in Britain's merchant fleet? Is she aware that hon. Members in all parts of the House are now desperately concerned about this matter and its implications, both for our defence policy and economically? We could not mount another Falklands operation if we wished because we do not have the ships. More than 80 per cent. of British trade is now carried in ships with foreign flags. Is she aware that there are things that could be done to change the situation? Will she instruct her senior colleagues to see that they are done, and done without delay?

**The Prime Minister:** I know my right hon. Friend's interest in this subject, but I must disagree with him when he says that we could not mount another Falklands operation. We could. I would like to make that clear. The Government fully recognise the role that the merchant fleet plays in times of emergency and war and the requirements are subject to continuous review. The merchant fleet

remains capable of meeting all the needs of the armed forces. We have long-standing NATO arrangements. In a pool Alliance merchant shipping should there be war. In the important thing for the future of our merchant marine is to ensure that British shipping can compete with the fleets of other nations on costs. That is one of the problems.

**Mr. Terry Davis:** In view of the widespread impression that the Cabinet is biased in favour of a takeover of parts of the British motor industry by General Motors and the rumours that are now spreading in Birmingham, will the Prime Minister tell us whether any member of the Cabinet has a relative working for General Motors or one of its subsidiaries?

**The Prime Minister:** I resent the implication of the hon. Gentleman's question. The hon. Gentleman is aware that bids are in today and that they will be considered, and they will be considered with one thing in mind—what will give British industry the best chance of jobs.



## Northern Ireland

9.33 pm

**The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Mr. Tom King):** With permission, Mr. Speaker, I would like to make a statement about the events in Northern Ireland yesterday.

As the House will be aware, the leaders of the two main Unionist parties had called for a day of action and protest. They invited everybody to stay away from work and stated that it was to be a passive and voluntary demonstration and that there should be no road blocks or intimidation of those going to work.

In the event, there was widespread obstruction, intimidation and some violence during the day culminating in serious disorder in east and north Belfast last night. The first incidents occurred before midnight on Sunday and disturbances continued until the early hours of this morning.

In spite of these difficulties, a very considerable number of people succeeded in getting to work, particularly in the commercial offices and public services, but many factories were seriously affected.

I pay tribute to the determination of all those who refused to be intimidated and exercised their right to go to work. I also pay tribute to the men of the security forces and particularly the Royal Ulster Constabulary for all the work that they did to seek to keep roads open for people to be able to get to work. However, there have also been a number of complaints when it is alleged that the police did not take action when it was required. The Chief Constable is preparing a full report on all the policing aspects of the past 24 hours.

To give the House some indication of the scale of the workload that the RUC faced, on the latest information available to me there were some 655 road blocks in the province during the period, of which 441 were cleared. There were in addition some 80 cavalcades and demonstrations, which caused considerable disruption in a number of towns mainly around midday and in the afternoon. There were 57 arrests and the names of 184 people noted to proceed by way of summons. Sixty-five plastic baton rounds were fired and 47 policemen were injured. Last night there were a number of petrol bombs thrown, and there were over 20 shots fired in three firearms attacks on the police during the disturbances in the Loyalist areas.

The figures listed above give the details of a tragic day for Northern Ireland. Many Members will have seen some of the disgraceful incidents on television last night. These pictures have been shown all over the world and will do great damage to the reputation of the Province. The House will also have seen elected Members of this House making common cause with people in paramilitary dress.

The Government are well aware of the strength of feeling among many Unionists about aspects of the Anglo-Irish agreement. The House will be aware that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I met the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Mr. Molyneaux) and the hon. Member for Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley) last Tuesday. During a long meeting my right hon. Friend put forward a number of proposals to help meet their main concerns and agreed to consider positively their suggestions that the Government should call a round table conference to discuss devolution in Northern Ireland. It

was agreed that we would all reflect on the various suggestions that had been made and would meet again shortly. The prospects of constructive discussions instead of confrontation were greeted with widespread relief in the Province, only for that to be destroyed by their abrupt repudiation of this course following a meeting in Belfast late that night. They then decided to proceed with the day of protest.

The whole country can now see how tragic and totally counter-productive yesterday's action has been. It is now urgent that the Unionist leaders recognise again that the only way in which the concerns of those they seek to represent can be addressed is by constructive discussion and not by threats and violence. The degree of intimidation evident yesterday showed how little confidence many of the organisers had in being able peacefully to persuade their fellow citizens to join their day of protest. I make it quite clear that this Government, this Parliament, will not be intimidated either by the sort of violent actions that took place yesterday. I believe that an increasing number of Unionists, while disliking many aspects of the Anglo-Irish agreement, wish to look for a constructive way forward. The Government have made quite clear our willingness to sit down and discuss seriously the Unionists' concerns. In our parliamentary democracy, in this United Kingdom, that can be the only way.

**Mr. Peter Archer (Warley, West):** Does the Secretary of State accept that we on this side of the House share his abhorrence of the violence and intimidation which took place yesterday and which further alienated the sympathies of many people in Great Britain from the cause which it was apparently designed to promote?

Does the Secretary of State agree that if the protest was intended to demonstrate the strength of feeling in Northern Ireland against the Anglo-Irish agreement it failed as an indicator since we do not know how many people participated voluntarily and how many simply responded to intimidation? Bearing in mind the number of road blocks and the obvious evidence of preparations in advance, can the Secretary of State say whether investigations are taking place to ascertain whether the violence was planned and, if so, by whom? If it transpires that it was planned, will proceedings be initiated against those responsible?

While we join in the right hon. Gentleman's tribute to those police officers who strove hard, in difficult circumstances, to preserve order and to prevent intimidation, and while we offer our tribute to those who declined to be intimidated, he has referred to allegations of some incidents in which people were prevented from going about their business in the presence of police officers who failed to intervene. When the Chief Constable's report on these allegations is complete, will the Secretary of State report again to the House?

Will inquiries take place into reports that some off-duty members of the Ulster Defence Regiment were at the barricades? The Secretary of State has referred to suggestions from responsible leaders among all sections of opinion in Northern Ireland that they are prepared to meet those with whom they disagree to discuss how to make progress. Will he again invite them to meet together under his chairmanship and seek consensus, which will isolate the men of violence on both sides of the divide and offer a less dismaying future for the people of Northern Ireland?



**Mr. King:** I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for the way in which he has responded to the agreement and to his right hon. and hon. Friends for their support in this matter. He may have seen in the comments of the Chief Constable before the strike the clearest signs that this was to be a peaceful, dignified and voluntary protest. It manifestly was not so—and that was made manifest in ways that showed considerable planning in advance. I know that the Chief Constable will want to investigate all the policing aspects of what occurred yesterday. He has already put on the record that any evidence of incidents of indifferent policing should be brought to his attention and will be investigated.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman asked specifically about an invitation to the parties in Northern Ireland to talk sensibly about these problems. I hope that we can get discussions going. As the House knows, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister put some specific proposals to the leaders of the Unionist parties. This could have provided the way forward, but was repudiated, although in Northern Ireland only—we have not received any official communication to that effect. I shall do all that I can to seek ways in which discussions can start. That is the only way. Violence will not succeed, and will be only counter-productive.

**Sir John Biggs-Davison** (Epping Forest): Is it not a tragic absurdity that, as a result of the Anglo-Irish agreement, a Unionist Government's only political friends in the Province should be Republicans? How do the Government propose to govern the Province—by force—or will they seek a constructive way out, and get in touch with the Taoiseach and adjust this damnable agreement?

**Mr. King:** My hon. Friend knows very well that what he said about the support for the agreement in the Province is not true, and that many people with no nationalist sympathies see benefits in this agreement and have supported it. Clearly the problem—and I hope that my hon. Friend will assist in this—is to get a true understanding of what the agreement is. The literature that was being passed out yesterday, in which the right hon. Member for Strangford (Mr. Taylor) played his part, talking about the establishment of partial Dublin rule and allowing the agreement to bring about the all-Ireland that it seeks, makes one realise how great are the distortions still being perpetrated on the Unionist majority in Northern Ireland.

**Mr. Stephen Ross** (Isle of Wight): Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that we share his sentiments about yesterday's appalling events in the Province? We are reassured by the last paragraph of his statement. That is the right way to proceed and we support him all the way. We acknowledge the genuine feelings of Unionists who have suffered grievously at the hands of the IRA, the Provisional IRA and INLA, but is it not time that the Unionist leaders in the Province and Unionists themselves recognise that there is not an inexhaustible supply of finance from the rest of the United Kingdom, and that people from the rest of the United Kingdom also have the right to say "Enough is enough"? What about the workers at Harland and Wolff and Short Bros, which have been financed by large sums of money from here? Why did they stay away from work yesterday?

**Mr. King:** I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his support on behalf of his right hon. and hon. colleagues. Both my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I have made clear our strong hope and desire that Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom. Perhaps one of the most offensive things about some of the aspects of the protests is the implication that we are seeking to undermine the position of Northern Ireland. The purpose of the agreement is to reassure the Unionists about the validity of the position of the majority, and to get the agreement of the Republic confirmed in an international agreement to say that there can be no change in that majority position without the consent of the majority. The House will see that, even in the face of that, there are those who will refuse to accept it, no matter that it is article 1 of the agreement and should be a great reassurance to Unionists in Northern Ireland.

**Sir Peter Mills** (Torrige and Devon West): Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that the protest was not so much a demonstration but, in certain parts, a rebellion? Speaking from experience, I can say that nothing like that has happened before. Will my right hon. Friend also bear in mind that the £2,000 million poured into the Province at least demands some responsibility from the other side?

**Mr. King:** It has always been accepted in the United Kingdom that the areas in greatest need receive a greater subvention than other areas. In that respect, Northern Ireland is no different from other parts of the country in relation to the assessment of need.

However, in response to the first point raised by my hon. Friend, may I say that it is particularly tragic that at a time of considerable terrorist activity such an additional strain should have been placed on the security forces as was placed on them yesterday. That involved a massive redeployment of the RUC to maintain law and order and the rights of the citizen against the so-called Loyalist mobs in certain areas. People were definitely put at risk from terrorist attack in other parts of the Province.

**Mr. J. Enoch Powell** (South Down): In view of the concluding words of the Secretary of State's statement, will the Government take steps to proceed towards giving all the people of Northern Ireland a full share in what the right hon. Gentleman calls this parliamentary democracy?

**Mr. King:** I understand the right hon. Gentleman's views on this matter. I am not sure that his views are shared by the right hon. Member for Strangford (Mr. Taylor).

The government are anxious to achieve a system for administration in Northern Ireland on a basis that is widely acceptable to both communities. We have made that aim absolutely clear and the agreement is designed to encourage that.

**Sir Eldon Griffiths** (Bury St. Edmunds): Does my right hon. Friend recognise that it is wrong for him to come to the House and make splendid statements about not yielding to intimidation—which I agree with—when at the end of the day carrying out that policy depends on the courage and resolution of our security forces and, in particular, on the men and women of the RUC? Will he therefore show just a little more understanding of the human position of those police officers who are shot in the back by the violent minority and who now no longer have the consent of the majority and yet are gagged by their



of the community yesterday? Does he agree that the agreement is about recognising the validity of both traditions in Northern Ireland, and that Unionists can stomach equality of treatment for the people of Northern Ireland? Does he further agree that equality is the true basis of dialogue which is essential, if the community is to move forward? Will he name the date for the talks that he wishes to hold, and my party will attend?

**Mr. King:** On the question of damage or harm being suffered, there are already signs of the benefit that come from the agreement. Any intelligent Unionist must take comfort from the switch in votes from the party supporting violence to the hon. Gentleman's constitutional nationalist party which occurred in each of the by-elections in which there was a contest between those two parties. Any Unionist who is willing to look fairly at the agreement will begin to notice the encouraging signs of better co-operation on cross-border security. That is overwhelmingly to the benefit of every person in Northern Ireland. I hope that the people will see through the lies that they are being told, such as that this is joint authority and this is Dublin rule. Those slogans, on which the by-election campaigns were fought, are wholly untrue, and people will increasingly realise that. I hope that then we shall get men of good will, who do not act merely from bigotry and prejudice, but are prepared to look fairly at the position of the minority as well as the majority. Then we can start sensible discussions to the benefit of all concerned.

**Mr. Ivor Stanbrook** (Orpington): If we go on like this, with the majority in Northern Ireland feeling threatened and some of them taking desperate measures, and with my right hon. Friend condemning them in the strongest terms, as he has today, will not even the minority feel threatened? Will not the position become far worse than it already is? Does that not point to the fact that the Anglo-Irish agreement was a blunder of the first magnitude?

**Mr. King:** In my statement I paid tribute to the number of people who, often at considerable inconvenience and with considerable courage, ensured that people were not intimidated yesterday. The vast majority of people in many areas got to work, despite all the difficulties. My hon. Friend also chooses to overlook the fact that only a week ago today my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I met the leaders of the two Unionist parties and achieved an outcome which could have led to sensible, constructive talks. That is the way we must go, and the sooner the better.

**Mr. A. E. P. Duffy** (Sheffield, Attercliffe): Has the Secretary of State read the report on the front page of *The Irish Times* today entitled "Bottles, bricks and bigotry in Portadown" by Willy Clingan, a Northern Irish Protestant? He said that he saw none of the activity, on the part of either the RUC or the security forces, which the Secretary of State claimed. I dare say that that was just a black spot, although I would be surprised if it was the only one. Will the Secretary of State assure the House that, should there be a recurrence of yesterday's events in Northern Ireland, there will not be a repetition in Portadown, otherwise how will he and most hon. Members, who welcome the tone of the statement today, do their bit to help the RUC and in the spirit of the agreement?

**Mr. King:** I deeply resent the last sentence of my hon. Friend's remarks. I have made it absolutely clear that the RUC is aware that it is my full commitment and support. I have the greatest admiration for the RUC as a professional police force. I am well aware of my hon. Friend's concern about consultation and the rights of the Police Federation in Northern Ireland. My hon. Friend knows that that is under discussion at present.

**Mr. Merlyn Rees** (Morley and Leeds, South): Does the Secretary of State agree that yesterday's day of protest, which in some cases was near insurrection, and the plans projected for the weeks and months ahead to culminate in July can only seriously weaken the link between Northern Ireland and this country? In the light of that, it is no good the Government ignoring the situation. A number of us in the House faced such a situation in 1974. The situation exists today. The Government must talk with the Government in Dublin about what will happen if the link is stretched to breaking point.

**Mr. King:** It was precisely because of our recognition of the concern about the situation and about aspects of the Anglo-Irish agreement that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I met Unionist leaders last Tuesday. The Unionist leaders went to that meeting, as they said, expecting the door to be slammed in their faces. As the whole House will know, when they left the meeting they held a press conference and the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Mr. Molyneux) said that the deadlock had been broken. It is clear that a door has been opened. The tragedy is that when they returned to Belfast somebody else decided to slam a door in their face. We thought that we had succeeded in opening the way to sensible discussions. The best way to proceed is for the Prime Minister to talk to the leaders of the Unionist parties, who proclaim their loyalty to the United Kingdom. That is how I would like to proceed. After the futile, destructive events of yesterday, I hope that wise counsels will prevail and that people will return to honour that agreement.

**Mr. W. Beynon** (Milton Keynes): Does my right hon. Friend recall the great tragedy which occurred when the Labour Government gave in to the Ulster workers' strike? Is it not now time for strong nerves? Does he accept that most Tory Members are right behind him in upholding the laws of the United Kingdom?

**Mr. King:** It is a time for strong nerves, but I hope also for wise counsels. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his support. I hope that we can get the hon. Members involved to play their part in the House. Indeed, today one sees an increase in their attendance. I hope that we can debate these issues sensibly, and discuss the genuine anxieties of the people whom they seek to represent in this proper forum of the House of Commons.

**Mr. John Hume** (Foyle): Does the Secretary of State agree that, although the Anglo-Irish agreement has now been in place since 15 November, more than three months ago, it has not done any harm to any citizen in Northern Ireland? Does he agree that the only damage done has been self-inflicted, such as the serious damage to wide sections

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[Sir Eldon Griffiths]



**Mr. King:** In the atmosphere of claim and counterclaim about what the RUC did and did not do yesterday, I thought that the most helpful thing for the House would be for me to give the best statistics available at this time. The House will realise from the figures I gave of the Number of road blocks and the number which were removed that there were some gaps. I think that anybody would honestly say that it was quite a remarkable achievement to remove 441 road blocks over about 12 hours. I certainly am concerned, and I know that the Chief Constable is concerned, to learn any lessons that we can from the scale of the problems that were faced.

There is no doubt that the assertion, accepted in good faith and given by what the Chief Constable believed to be responsible leaders, about what was meant to be an orderly and dignified protest led, in some cases, to the police being too thinly spread in certain areas. That raised problems for them. I can certainly assure the hon. Gentleman that we wish to learn every lesson that we can.

**Mr. Ian Gow (Eastbourne):** Does my right hon. Friend agree that, however deep and justified is the hostility of the people of Northern Ireland—the Unionist majority—to the Anglo-Irish agreement, the scenes of violence we saw yesterday are not only deeply repugnant to everybody on this side of the House but also injure the Unionist cause? If my right hon. Friend should receive a request from the Government of the Irish Republic that the intergovernmental Conference should not meet for, say, three months, would he consider it carefully?

**Mr. King:** I listened this morning to the entirely constructive remarks that my hon. Friend made in his broadcast when I was in Stormont. I respect the view that he has taken about the lack of wisdom of yesterday's action. I think that they were wise words and I wish that they had been heeded by more unionists.

On his request and our attitude to it, may I say that we have entered into an agreement in good faith which we believe will bring benefit to all the people of Northern Ireland. If he is saying, for example, that we should suspend the discussion on improving cross-border security and the many steps that are being taken to make a more effective counter attack against terrorism, I think that that is a difficult proposition to make, but I note his comments.

**Mr. John David Taylor (Strangford):** Has the Secretary of State read the excellent analysis in *The Irish Times* today of the serious position developing in Northern Ireland by the former Cabinet colleague of the Taoiseach, Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien? Does he agree with Dr. O'Brien's analysis that the Government rule in Northern Ireland without consent? Does he also agree that the Anglo-Irish agreement can be maintained only "by massive and sustained use of force"?

Since the Secretary of State has rightly said that the RUC was extended yesterday, and since it is improper to use 8,000 RUC men to impose the Anglo-Irish agreement on 1 million free citizens in Northern Ireland, what additional forces does the Secretary of State intend to use?

**Mr. King:** May I say before answering the hon. Gentleman how pleased I am to see him here. I hope that he will persuade some of his colleagues that, rather than on the streets of Belfast and around barricades in the Province, the House of Commons is the right place to discuss these matters.

I failed fully to answer the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy). I have not read *The Irish Times* today, but I shall look at it later. It sounds like a similar version of the malign scenario that I think Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien has painted for a considerable time about this matter. I do not accept that view. I believe that there is a more optimistic and hopeful approach to the affairs of Northern Ireland. I regard Dr. O'Brien's approach as the gospel of despair.

There will not be a strain on the RUC if responsible politicians tell the truth about the agreement and if they do not incite their supporters to acts of violence. Some hon. Members, not necessarily in the Official Unionist party but in other parties in Northern Ireland, have not been noticeable for their reticence recently. In that situation there will certainly be an extra strain on the police. I very much hope that we shall see people respect the rule of law and be prepared to talk sensibly about the right way forward.

**Mr. Anthony Nelson (Chichester):** Does my right hon. Friend agree that the prospects for the Anglo-Irish agreement depend in part on the tenor of his responses to yesterday's events? However misguided, disruptive and violent the expressions of the people of Northern Ireland yesterday, the underlying implication was that those people wished to remain part of the United Kingdom. Will my right hon. Friend recognise this sensitivity in statements? Does he agree that what is really needed is sensitive, quiet persistence in carrying through the agreement?

**Mr. King:** I am grateful to my hon. Friend. As I have made clear again today, and as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has made clear on a number of occasions, we understand the sensitivity of the Unionists about their position in the United Kingdom. We have sought to give not only the clearest assurances about it but our own personal commitment to it. We feel that that should be better recognised than perhaps it is by some.

**Mr. Martin Flannery (Sheffield, Hillsborough):** Is it not clear that what the Unionist leaders mean by democracy is having their own way—when they have a communalist vote which gives them the right to do as they please? Is there not another serious political lesson to be learnt? When the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Mr. Molyneux) and the hon. Member for Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley) went to No. 10 Downing street, they were the nominal leaders of the Unionists but, by the time they returned to Northern Ireland, they found that they had been replaced and that other people, including the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson), were the real leaders of the Unionist party. Is it not a fact that the speeches made in the past few years by the nominal leaders of the Unionist party have aroused something that was always latent and threatening? Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that it was not a day of protest, as many have said, but, at the very least, a semi-revolt of the most serious proportions? It is no good us pretending that it was not something like that.

**Mr. King:** It is true that some of the activities of the leaders and other leading members of the parties in the months since the signing of the agreement have raised, quite unjustifiably, the antagonism of people towards the agreement and increased the expectation of what could be



[Mr. King]

achieved by their opposition. I think that some slightly wiser counsels have already broken through. People have recognised, as they have said, that it is not realistic to expect my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to agree to scrap the agreement. The agreement provides within its text for regular and frequent meetings—moreover, for meetings at the request of either party. The request for a suspension is therefore a breach of the agreement as well. Now people understand that the agreement is there. Sensible and constructive discussion must be the way forward.

**Several Hon. Members rose—**

**Mr. Speaker:** Order. I recognise the importance of this statement, but I must take into account also the other business before us today. I shall allow questions to continue for a further 10 minutes.

**Mr. Henry Bellingham** (Norfolk, North-West): Is my right hon. Friend aware that I spent all yesterday with true Loyalists in my constituency? Is he aware that, during that time, many of them expressed their profound dismay and disgust at the way in which other so-called Loyalists were behaving?

**Mr. King:** I am grateful to my hon. Friend. It is undoubtedly true that those sorts of things do great damage to the reputation of Unionism. I am certainly most anxious to see the way forward by discussion and not by violence and intimidation, which will only damage the Loyalists' own cause.

**Mr. Roy Mason** (Barnsley, Central): Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the vast majority of hon. Members wish him and his ministerial colleagues to remain firm and resolute against the re-emergence of paramilitary Protestant terrorism which we witnessed yesterday afternoon? Is the right hon. Gentleman also aware that, whether Members of Parliament are in favour of the accord or not, they would not wish him to be diverted from his course or to bow the knee to terrorism in Northern Ireland?

**Mr. King:** I very much appreciate those remarks, especially coming from the right hon. Gentleman. With his reputation in Northern Ireland for firmness of purpose in these respects, I think that they will be widely noted.

**Mrs. Anna McCurley** (Renfrew, West and Inverclyde): Does my right hon. Friend agree that the Unionist leaders would elicit far more sympathy from the rest of the United Kingdom if they participated more in aspects of the United Kingdom Parliament other than in just Northern Ireland affairs? What would happen if the Scots did this?

We would feel isolated and different I think that is why the Unionist leaders feel isolated and different.

**Mr. King:** This is one of the matters which we hoped we would be able to discuss and which we put forward in the proposals by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. It is true that one of the criticisms being made of the Unionists against the Government is that they are excluded from consultation and involvement in community affairs. The truth is that the Unionists are excluding themselves. They are absenting themselves from councils. They are not carrying out their proper duties in the Assembly of scrutinising the work of Northern Ireland departments.

They complain about being excluded and, to cap it all, they absent themselves from this sovereign House of Commons of the United Kingdom.

**Mr. Clive Soley** (Hammersmith): Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the British and Irish Governments, as the Governments of two sovereign states, have a joint interest in protecting the civil rights of the people of Northern Ireland and in enabling the two cultures to co-exist in Northern Ireland? Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that, if only for that reason, it is vital that no minority group exercises a veto over the democratically agreed policies of those two elected Governments?

**Mr. King:** The hon. Gentleman talks about joint interest. I should like to make it clear in case there is any misunderstanding that we have a clear responsibility, but we recognise the interest of the Irish Republic in matters affecting the nationalist community in the North. It must be clearly understood that there has never been in this agreement any question of joint authority. That is one of the lies told in some of the propaganda.

**Mr. Barry Porter** (Wirral, South): Does my right hon. Friend recognise that all Unionists either should or do condemn the violence and intimidation yesterday? Was that violence and intimidation not entirely predictable and, indeed, predicted? Is that violence likely to recur when the marching season starts? Will my right hon. Friend state in clear terms the offer to the Unionist leaders in terms of talks? Are those talks to be open-ended, without strings and with no options closed? If not, my right hon. Friend is wasting his time.

**Mr. King:** On the first point, if my hon. Friend is right and such violence was predictable, a heavy responsibility rests on the shoulders of those who called the day of protest. On talks, it was made clear by the two Unionist leaders that, if they entered into any discussion, it would not imply in any way acceptance of or agreement with the Anglo-Irish agreement and that they would wish to conduct the talks outside the ambit of any Anglo-Irish agreement. We understood that position. We made it absolutely clear that the talks on the matters discussed or on any other matters that they wished to raise could go ahead.

**Mr. Dennis Canavan** (Falkirk, West): Does the Secretary of State still believe that the so-called Anglo-Irish agreement will help to bring about peace in Northern Ireland?

**Mr. King:** Yes, I do.

**Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson** (Newbury): Will my right hon. Friend elucidate on his reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Wirral, South (Mr. Porter)? How are these talks to take place in the context in which there could be a constructive dialogue outside the Anglo-Irish agreement if that agreement is to stay in place?

**Mr. King:** I hope that my hon. Friend has seen a copy of the statement that was issued after the meeting that the Prime Minister and I had with the Unionist leaders. If he studies the statement he will see that various proposals were made. There is obviously a wide gulf and there is obviously total disagreement. Instead of harping continually on that, the intelligent way forward is to see whether there are areas upon which there can be agreement—not to concentrate upon the areas where there is disagreement.



**Ms. Clare Short** (Birmingham, Ladywood): Is the Secretary of State aware that the Unionists of Northern Ireland have always threatened violence in this way? That is how Ireland came to be partitioned. That is why there was such injustice and discrimination under Stormont. That is why Sunningdale failed. That is why Northern Ireland is the mess that it is. Always until now they have succeeded in that threat. Only if the British Government stand up to them and start to move forward can we begin to get peace in Northern Ireland.

**Mr. King:** One of the saddest aspects of yesterday is that many people will get the impression that the majority community in Northern Ireland are like that, when in fact the vast majority of Unionists are looking for a peaceful, prosperous and happy Province in which to live. They deserve a leadership that could look objectively at new proposals to see whether we can find a better way to go forward rather than the stalemate and the sadness of the last 12 or 14 years.

**Mr. Michael Latham** (Rutland and Melton): What kind of Loyalist puts on a hood and stands at a barricade? What are they loyal to? Is not the fact that they behave in that way doing tremendous harm to the instinctive support of the British people for the maintenance of the Union?

**Mr. King:** I find myself unable to answer my hon. Friend's question, because they were not even loyal to the protests in which they were supposed to be involved. As many hon. Members have said, nothing more destroyed the impact that that protest might have had than the visible intimidation, with the clear inference that if people were not going to work there were many other factors, except voluntary reasons, for not being there.

**Mr. Tam Dalyell** (Linlithgow): Were not yesterday's events, or something like them, foreseeable and foreseen with foreboding, and predictable and predicted by some of us who, with sorrow, went into the Lobby against the Anglo-Irish agreement? May I repeat the question that I put to the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) and my own Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, in 1969? Charles I, Sir Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, Cromwell, Peel, Gladstone, Lloyd George and, in our own time, other well-meaning politicians from this side of the water—who of them have had any success in Ireland? Is not the real problem us?

I make no criticism of the men of the British Army, but if there is what is seen as an English Army in Ireland, what else can we expect? Without being frivolous about it, because it is a very unfrivolous subject, if they can get behind Barry McGuigan, and if they can get behind the Northern Ireland football team, by some alchemy, will not the residents of Ireland solve this problem? We ought to recognise that there is nothing we can do from this side of the water.

**Mr. King:** It would take more than a supplementary answer to respond to the hon. Member and to the many points that he has raised. I simply believe that the inferences behind his question are quite unacceptable.

**Mr. Edward Leigh** (Gainsborough and Horncastle): Will my right hon. Friend agree that, much as the Parliament of the United Kingdom remains committed to the Union so long as the majority in Northern Ireland so wish, it has to be said that those who wrap themselves in

the flag of the Union to frustrate the Parliament of the Union and who destroy the consent upon which the Union is based put the Union at risk and no one else?

**Mr. King:** I have made absolutely clear, and I do so again, my belief in and my commitment to the Union of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. All I would say is that some of the events of yesterday, and other events as well—as when other people try occasionally to hit me over the head with a Union Jack wrapped in an iron bar—put some strain on that loyalty.

**Mr. Robert MacLennan** (Caithness and Sutherland): The Secretary of State has called attention to the fact that a number of hon. Members were making common cause yesterday with men at the barricades. If he is alleging that those hon. Members were in some way responsible directly for the violence in which they were participating, will he say who they were—because that role is not conformable with membership of this House—and ensure that they do not participate in the wider discussions that he must have with the Unionist community to ensure that their continuing anxieties are met?

**Mr. King:** The hon. Member may or may not have seen some of the television coverage of yesterday's events. He will have seen a number of people in paramilitary dress. I referred to the fact that Members of this House were making common cause. I noted the distinction that was made by the right hon. Member for Strangford (Mr. Taylor) in his by-election when a group of people in paramilitary dress arrived. My understanding is that the right hon. Gentleman very properly said that he would have nothing to do with them and they were invited immediately to leave that by-election rally. I wish that I had seen some of that same approach yesterday.

**Mr. K. Harvey Proctor** (Billericay): Is it not most unfair to blame my right hon. Friend the Member for Lagan Valley (Mr. Molyneux) for the current position in Ulster when in August of last year he warned that the denial of equal British rights to Ulster would seriously destabilise the Province, especially in the light of the comments yesterday of Mr. T. E. Utey in the *Daily Telegraph* who described the Hillsborough agreement as not being about equality and said that "it is a frigid lie to pretend that it is."

**Mr. King:** I totally reject the fact that any citizen of Northern Ireland does not have equal rights with others in the United Kingdom. One of the rights that people enjoy in the United Kingdom is representation in this House. I just happen to notice that that right is being denied to them at the present time by no will of the Government.

**Mr. Stuart Bell** (Middlesbrough): Will the Secretary of State confirm that if there is such a phrase as "no surrender" it relates to the attitude of this House and that the Anglo-Irish agreement still stands and will be acted upon? If there is a phrase in common parlance—"not an inch"—it is a phrase to be adopted by this House: that the gains of the Anglo-Irish agreement both to the Unionist and to the nationalist community will not be surrendered, not by an inch and not by an iota. Will the Secretary of State confirm that last week's offer of round table talks is still on the table?

**Mr. King:** I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I confirm that intimidation or threats are no way to approach this House of Commons or this Government. That is a very



[Mr. King]

counter-productive approach. Nor would there be any case to use it if it were suggested that there is no other approach, because the offer of talks and the agreement that we should meet again to review the suggestions that we made stands. Even more after yesterday I very much hope that people will realise that that is the sensible way to proceed. For elected Members in the United Kingdom, wherever they come from, faced with serious issues in their constituencies, to refuse to meet and talk with Ministers and with the Prime Minister and discuss these issues is a deplorable lack of responsibility at a very important time.

Later—

**Mr. Gow:** On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, in answer to a question which followed his statement, unwittingly misled the House. Can you give him an opportunity to correct the wrong impression which he gave? My right hon. Friend said that the rights of the Queen's subjects who live in Northern Ireland are the same as the rights of the Queen's subjects who live in Great Britain. My right hon. Friend will acknowledge that the passing of legislation for Northern Ireland is done by Order in Council, whereas for the rest of the kingdom it is done by ordinary Bills. Secondly, there is no—

**Mr. Speaker:** Order. That seems to be a continuation of the statement. I have already said that we have a very heavy day in front of us. We cannot continue the debate in that way.

## Immigration Rules

**Mr. Jeremy Corbyn** (Islington, North): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I wish to raise with you a point of order concerning the behaviour of the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden (Mrs. Rumbold), of which I have given you notice. Indeed, I have given notice of it to the hon. Member. I ask you whether it is in order for an hon. Member to write a letter on a matter relating to the immigration rules that libels another hon. Member. I refer to a letter which was sent in February by the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden to a firm of solicitors, in which she enclosed a copy of a letter which the Minister of State, Home Office, the hon. and learned Member for Ribbles Valley (Mr. Waddington) sent to me. In that letter she appears to say that new regulations are being prepared, of which the House has no knowledge, by the Minister of State, Home Office. The hon. Lady said in her letter:

"I wonder if you are aware that"—

the Minister of State—

"is working towards the introduction of new regulations which will prevent MPs such as"—

myself—

"exercising an open market in allowing people, such as"—

Mr. X—

"from coming into this country with illegal passports."

The hon. Lady claimed that

"about 20 Labour MPs . . . operated a system over the Christmas holiday period of inviting people to come to them on the completely wrong information that their own Member of Parliament is not available."

The hon. Lady explained how she spent two days during the Christmas period not answering the phone—

**Mr. Speaker:** Order. If the hon. Gentleman is putting a point of order to me, he must not recite from letters.

**Mr. Corbyn:** I am sure you will agree, Mr. Speaker, that it is important that I explain why I am putting the point. I shall be brief. The final point in the hon. Lady's letter is:

"I am sure you will appreciate that this does not endear the system to people, like myself, who work exceedingly hard on behalf of genuine cases, many of whom are resident and very supportive of the Conservative Party."

First, Mr. Speaker, is it in order for an hon. Member to write libellous comments about another hon. Member and, indeed, about a group of hon. Members? Secondly, as the Member concerned is a Minister in the Government, she appears to have information, which is not available to the House about the true purpose of the draft regulations which the Minister of State, Home Office has raised. I ask you, Mr. Speaker, whether it would be in order for both the hon. Lady and the Minister of State to come to the House and make statements about the true nature of the regulations which the Home Office is trying to introduce.

**Mr. Speaker:** Order. I cannot be asked to adjudicate on letters which pass between hon. Members and their constituents. This is a matter between the hon. Lady and her constituent. If the hon. Gentleman is alleging that it is a breach of privilege, that is a different matter and he should write to me about it.

**Mr. Gerald Kaufman** (Manchester, Gorton): Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. My hon. Friend has given me a copy of the letter. It goes a good deal wider than the hon. Lady's disgraceful personal allegations



**CONFIDENTIAL**

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CC B/ln  
RC



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

WHITEHALL

LONDON SW1A 2AZ

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London  
SW1

CDP  
S/S

4<sup>th</sup> March 1986

Statement Proposed  
by Northern Ireland Office

Dear Charles,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR KILFEDDER

I am now able to let you have a draft statement for discussion at, and with luck, publication after the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Kilfedder tomorrow.

As you will see, it follows closely the statement issued after the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Molyneux and Dr Paisley, and is compatible with the briefing with which we have already supplied you. In particular, it reflects our hope that Mr Kilfedder will try and persuade his Unionist colleagues to reopen the dialogue with the Prime Minister. But it also now seeks to have Mr Kilfedder publicly disassociate himself from yesterday's excesses in Northern Ireland. No radical changes to the briefing already supplied seem, however, to be necessary. The Secretary of State has not yet had a chance to see this. If he has any comments we will telephone them through to you.

A copy of this letter goes to Michael Stark and Len Appleyard.

Yours Sincerely  
Neil Ward.

N D WARD

**CONFIDENTIAL**

KL



R.

DRAFT

STATEMENT ISSUED FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH  
MR KILFEDDER MP ON 5 MARCH 1986

*and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.*

1. The Prime Minister had a meeting today with Mr Kilfedder of the Ulster Popular Unionist Party.

2. The Prime Minister told Mr Kilfedder that the Government was well aware of the strength of feeling among many Unionists about aspects of the Anglo-Irish Agreement which had underlain the strike on 3 March which she deplored. But both agreed that further strikes like that on 3 March would be extremely damaging for Northern Ireland, not least for employment prospects. The Prime Minister explained that the Government would not be deterred by such tactics from implementing the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and expressed the hope that the Unionist leaders would take up the offer of dialogue and reject a course which could only harm all the people of the Province and weaken support for the Union in the rest of the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister and Mr Kilfedder condemned unreservedly the violent incidents and intimidation which have occurred on 3 March.

repeated

3. The PM / again to Mr Kilfedder the points which she had put to Mr Molyneux and Dr Paisley. While reaffirming the Government's commitment to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, she made it clear that the Government remained willing to establish new arrangements for enabling unionists to make their views known to the Government on affairs in Northern Ireland. The Government would still welcome discussion with Unionist leaders of the form that such arrangements might take. The Prime Minister also made clear that the offer of consultations with the Unionist leaders about the future of the Northern Ireland Assembly and about the arrangements for handling Northern Ireland business in Parliament at Westminster remained on the table. The Prime Minister assured Mr Kilfedder that the Government would like the Assembly to continue. But it would have to play a useful role in Northern Ireland.



4. The PM recalled that she had agreed to consider positively a suggestion by Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley that the Government should call a Round Table conference to discuss devolution in Northern Ireland; and that the Government remained willing to consider any system of devolution commanding widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland. The PM also recalled that if the various ideas bore fruit consideration would have to be given to what that meant for the work of the Intergovernmental Conference.

5. Mr Kilfedder indicated that he would consider these points on behalf of his own party [and would meet the Prime Minister again soon]. He also undertook to relay to the other Unionist party leaders the Prime Minister's continuing offer of further discussion.



STATEMENT 4 MARCH 1986

With permission Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement about the events in Northern Ireland yesterday.

2. As the House will be aware, the leaders of the two main Unionists parties had called for a day of action and protest. They invited everybody to stay away from work and stated that it was to be a passive and voluntary demonstration and that there should be no roadblocks or intimidation of those going to work.

3. In the event, there was widespread obstruction, intimidation and some violence during the day culminating in serious disorder in East and North Belfast last night. The first incidents occurred before midnight on Sunday and disturbances continued until the early hours of this morning.

4. In spite of these difficulties a very considerable number of people succeeded in getting to work; particularly in the commercial offices and public services, but ~~the main~~<sup>many</sup> factories were seriously affected.

5. I pay tribute to the determination of all those who refused to be intimidated and exercised their right to go to work. I also pay tribute to the men of the security forces and particularly the RUC for all the work that they did to seek to keep roads open for people to be able to get to work. However there have also been a number of complaints when it is alleged that the police did not take action when it was required. The Chief Constable is preparing a full



a full report on all the policing aspects of the past 24 hours. To give the House some indication of the scale of the workload that the RUC faced, on the latest information available there were some 655 roadblocks in the Province over the period of which 441 were cleared. There were in addition some 80 cavalcades and demonstrations, which caused considerable disruption in a number of towns mainly around midday. There were 57 arrests and the names of 184 people noted to proceed by way of summons. 65 Plastic Baton Rounds were fired, 47 policemen were injured. Last night there were a number of petrol bombs thrown, and there were over 20 shots fired in 3 firearms attacks on the police during the disturbances in the Loyalist areas.

6. The figures listed above give the details of a tragic day for Northern Ireland. Many Members will have seen some of the disgraceful incidents on television last night. These pictures have been shown all over the world and will do great damage to the reputation of the Province. The House will also have seen elected members of this House making common cause with people in paramilitary dress.



7. The Government is well aware of the strength of feeling among many Unionists about aspects of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The House will be aware that My Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister and I met the Right Honourable Member for Lagan Valley and the Member for North Antrim last Tuesday. During a long meeting My Right Honourable Friend put forward a number of proposals to help meet their main concerns and agreed to consider positively their suggestions that the Government should call Round Table Conference to discuss devolution in Northern Ireland; it was



agreed that we would all reflect on the various suggestions that had been made and would meet again shortly. The prospects of constructive discussions instead of confrontation were greeted with widespread relief in the Province, only for that to be destroyed by their abrupt repudiation of this course following a meeting in Belfast late that night. They then decided to proceed with the day of protest.

8. The whole country can now see how tragic and totally counterproductive yesterday's action has been. It is now urgent that the Unionists leaders recognise again that the only way in which the concerns of those they seek to represent can be addressed is by constructive discussion and not by threats and violence. The degree of intimidation evident yesterday showed how little confidence many of the organisers had in being able peacefully to persuade their fellow citizens to join their day of protest. I make it quite clear that this Government, this Parliament will not be intimidated either by the sort of violent actions that took place yesterday. I believe that an increasing number of Unionists while disliking many aspects of the Anglo-Irish Agreement wish to look for a constructive way forward. The Government has made quite clear our willingness to sit down and discuss seriously the Unionists concerns. In our Parliamentary democracy, in this United Kingdom, that can be the only way.







CCPC



CONFIDENTIAL

B.07348

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robert Armstrong  
Mr Williamson

EDD  
4/3

OD(I): Meeting at 5 p.m. on 4 March

The worsening situation in Northern Ireland increases the need to do everything possible to foster gradual acquiescence in the Anglo-Irish Agreement among moderate unionists. International, including European Community, aid to Northern Ireland can contribute to this. I therefore suggest that it would be worth dealing as quickly as possible at OD(I) with the question of additionality for European Community aid, before starting a discussion of yesterday's events and the Government's response.

2. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland plans to make a statement in the House of Commons today. This is likely to set out the background to yesterday's events, notably that the Agreement is no threat to unionists and can produce benefits for all the people of Northern Ireland. The statement would rebut some of the most crass misrepresentations of the Agreement. It would describe yesterday's events and reject the criticism that the Royal Ulster Constabulary contributed to disruption by not removing road blocks, etc. It would end on a double theme: the need for unionists to think carefully and responsibly about their next steps, so that their actions improve rather than further worsen the situation; and reaffirmation of both the Government's determination to implement the Agreement and the offers you made to Messrs Molyneux and Paisley on 25 February. The statement can add to the latter by saying that you have since discussed the proposed conference on devolution with Mr Hume who reacted favourably, that you plan shortly to discuss it with Messrs




CONFIDENTIAL

Kilfedder and Cushnahan and that the Government's own views on such a conference are positive.

3. A Northern Ireland Office assessment of yesterday's events will be distributed to members of OD(I) before the meeting. Unionist leaders are meeting this evening to consider their next steps. The results should indicate how far the real leadership has shifted to people more extreme than Dr Paisley let alone Mr Molyneaux.

4. A draft reply to the Taoiseach's last message to you will be submitted in the next day or so by the Northern Ireland Office.



C L G Mallaby

4 March 1986



**CONFIDENTIAL**  
From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
WHITEHALL  
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

3 March 1986

CDP  
5/3

*Dear Charles,*

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR JAMES KILFEDDER

I attach a brief for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Kilfedder on 5 March. Clearly it may need to be revised in the light of the strike today and any subsequent developments.

The meeting with Mr Kilfedder may take on a more than usual importance. Mr Kilfedder has the ear of most Unionist politicians and might be asked to relay a message from the Government to ... Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley. The attached brief proposes that we might ask him to try to persuade them to resume the dialogue with the Government, which they abandoned when they returned to Belfast on 25 February. While such a meeting is unlikely to succeed at present, it is important that the Government continue to show itself ready to resume the dialogue.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard and Michael Stark.

*Yours sincerely  
Neil Ward*

N D WARD

**CONFIDENTIAL**

KL



CONFIDENTIAL

E.

BRIEF FOR PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR KILFEDDER

Objections

- a) To put the Government's view of the Anglo-Irish Agreement
- b) To put to Mr Kilfedder the same points which were put to Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley on 25 February; and to persuade him to accept them.
- c) To put to him the dangers of the confrontation on which the Unionists seem bent
- d) To persuade him to use his influence to get Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley to resume their dialogue with the Government
- e) To explain the Government's policy towards the Assembly.

Background

Mr Kilfedder is the leader of the Ulster Popular Unionist Party. The Party, which broke off from the UUP in 1979, is restricted to the North Down constituency where Mr Kilfedder has been MP for 16 years. He is also Speaker of the Assembly, a position which he gained because he was an acceptable candidate to both the UUP and DUP. He did not come with the other two Unionist leaders to meet the Prime Minister, perhaps because of his junior status in Northern Ireland politics. While he may decide to call the meeting off in solidarity with the other Unionists, equally he may be attracted by a meeting with the Prime Minister.

Mr Kilfedder is something of a maverick. He is a more liberal Unionist than most, but still very much opposed to the Anglo-Irish Agreement; He is at present the only Unionist politician who is still prepared to meet the Government. Any messages which we wish to put to the other Unionists as a whole might be put through Mr Kilfedder (although it will be important not to give Mr Kilfedder the impression that his party is less important than the others). We will by the time of the meeting know the extent of the strike on 3 March.

CONFIDENTIAL

/...



Mr Kilfedder is likely to be at least as concerned about the future of the NI Assembly, as with the Anglo-Irish Agreement. At present, it is not discharging its scrutiny functions under the Northern Ireland Act 1982. Instead, it is being used as a platform for unionist protests against the Agreement. Ministers, industrialists and civil servants have been ~~vitriolic~~<sup>villified</sup>. The Assembly Committees have sought to enquire into the impact of the Agreement on the Northern Ireland Departments by summoning Departmental officials to appear before them. The Secretary of State has declined to allow them to do so and has instead offered to meet Committee Chairmen himself. The offer has been rejected. He has also made clear that the position of civil servants seconded to the Committees, who at present have very little work to do, is under review. (The letter making these points was (because it replied to correspondence sent by Committee Clerks to Departmental Permanent Secretaries) directed to the Clerk of the Assembly rather than to the Speaker and Mr Kilfedder is known to regard this as a personal slight. The Secretary of State has since written to him setting out the full background.)

#### Arguments

- a) The Government is committed to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Endorsed at Westminster by massive majorities. At the same time we recognise the significance of the Unionist vote in the by-elections.

The Agreement reinforces the status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom and right of majority to determine that status, as well as the sovereign responsibility of HMG in Northern Ireland. The Government wants Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom.

Determined that Agreement shall bring benefits for everyone in Northern Ireland including unionists. Not doing badly so far. Arms finds in Sligo and Roscommon on 26 January were biggest



ever on land in Ireland. We are working hard for more successes like that. Irish Republic has signed European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, something Unionists have long wanted.

- b) The Government recognises the wish of Unionists to be consulted fully about the affairs of Northern Ireland in parallel with what goes on in the Intergovernmental Conference. We would like to establish arrangements for consultation - not necessarily confined to matters discussed in the Intergovernmental Conference. We are also ready to consult you and other leaders about the future of the NI Assembly and the arrangements for handling Northern Ireland business at Westminster.

We are willing to consider positively the suggestion of a Round Table Conference on devolution. We are ready to consider any types of devolution that command widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland. We could look at various possibilities including a scheme within the 1982 Act; the DUP's idea of the devolution of legislative powers; the UUP's ideas for executive or administrative devolution; or Sir Frederick Catherwood's idea of weighted majorities to protect minority interests. If devolution were to take place it would reduce the scope of the Intergovernmental Conference considerably.



- c) The strike on Monday can only have harmed NI's interests. The Province will be seen as industrially unstable. The strike has encouraged the more violent elements to come to the fore. It puts at risk the future of all the people of Northern Ireland. Now that opposition to the Agreement has been registered, it is in everyone's interest that dialogue resumes.
- d) At the meeting on 25 February it was agreed that I would talk further with Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley. They subsequently changed their minds. The Government would like to resume that dialogue. You are well placed as Speaker to encourage both the



UUP and DUP to resume it. I also hope it can be continued with you and with Mr Cushnahan.

- e) Appreciate the steady role which Mr Kilfedder has played in his capacity as Speaker.
- f) The Government genuinely wishes to see the Assembly continue. It is an important forum in which unionists can make their views known. It has the potential to take on real power.
- g) The Assembly was elected to produce widely-acceptable devolution proposals, and to scrutinise the Northern Ireland Departments. Instead, the First Report of its Grand Committee, declared that no devolution proposals will be forthcoming while the Agreement continues. The Assembly has also stopped its scrutiny work. Some of the anti-Agreement rhetoric seen recently is highly irresponsible. All this must put a question mark over its future.







ate

PRIME MINISTER

cc Mr. Flesher

NORTHERN IRELAND

The Northern Ireland Secretary will provide a full assessment of today's events in the morning. In the meantime I attach a suggested line for Questions.— DRAFT ONLY

CHARLES POWELL

3 March 1986



DRAFT

NORTHERN IRELAND

"My rt. hon. friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will be making a statement later.

But I have to say that yesterday was a sad day for Northern Ireland: a day scarred by violence, intimidation and fear. Those responsible have no claim to the title of loyalist. Their activities were directed against the law, against Parliament and against the people of Northern Ireland themselves. This Government and this House will not be intimidated by the tactics of the bully boy. I hope that the great majority of decent law-abiding people in Northern Ireland will reflect on the lessons of yesterday, and the consequences of the road on which some of their leaders have embarked."

EL3AXJ



CCPC

PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND: MEETING OF OD(I)

You may like to try to despatch the business of additionality in European Community aid to Northern Ireland very quickly by seeking agreement on one of the intermediate figures, and devote the greater part of the meeting to an assessment of the strike and of the next steps in the Province.

On this latter point you will want to ask the Northern Ireland Secretary what he thinks the Unionists and their supporters will do next. You will also want to consider whether there are any fresh moves which the Government should make to encourage the Unionists to take up your offer of talks. You will recall that Mr. Hume suggested that the Government should simply set a date for a round-table conference on devolution in the confident expectation that the Unionists would turn up. This actually seems to me rather provocative and only worth doing if it was clear that a significant number of the Unionist leaders would be tempted. Equally, it seems to me that the Government should continue to make clear its readiness to talk to Unionist representatives at any moment, while remaining absolutely firm in its commitment to implement the agreement.

C.D.P.

(C. D. POWELL)

3 March 1986

SRWAQA



PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND: SITREP

Now looking rather worse, mostly as a result of intimidation, some of it rather nasty.

Roads

Frequent attempts to block roads, with the police and army efficient in reopening them.

Buses

Good service.

Trains

Mostly not running,

Airport

Now closed after operating for some hours this morning.

Schools

Mostly closed.

Industry

Patchy, with large-scale absenteeism in Protestant-dominated areas, usually as a result of intimidation.

Civil servants

Some difficulties but generally at work.



Intimidation

Quite bad in some areas with attacks on cars and threats. RUC being told to be more active in stopping it.

Media tendency to reporting the strike as a qualified success. Northern Ireland Ministers emphasising the scale of intimidation, for which the Unionist leaders cannot absolve themselves of responsibility.

CDP

3 March, 1986.

1300 hours

JD3AJZ



As expected

blowing — patchy large-scale absorption

Schools — largely closed

Winds — road both gates worse. Dangers

Working hard to open a few need to map all on — not drops

Airport was ~~also~~ closed.

Beach — roped

Beach — big well

Beach — many shut

Beach — see Mr.

analyzed man showed through

Winds

lot of still in the north

about.



Jim

A bit better

Local radio reports many

people were

depressed.

Barren now many really

People walking

Barren in school a lot.

dit. ut in an bed. ~~Agains.~~

75% of death.

People bb. Anger. Are doing quickly

Wounded side — new slots  
Airport — for over in other <sup>to</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~



1. Electricity - sporadic cut
2. happens mark into central  
room Ballylinnyard. 2/3 of  
province.
3. Warrants - photos.
4. Transport patchy
5. Road blocks / road bombs.  
Manning - oil e low tank
6. Police very short
7. One aircraft left.
8. Air ops - effective: not so  
bad.
9. Green no hope.
10. Few helicopters



## Northern Ireland

SITUATION REPORT - 0001 TO 0300 HOURS MONDAY 3 MARCH 1986

1. Public Opinion - no early comment.

2. Public Order

a. Roads (Blockages)

While prior to midnight and in the early hours of the morning several barricades were built or attempts made to build Police were quickly on the scene to remove the obstructions where circumstances permitted. In the west of the province the locations where such actions commenced were Donemana, Strabane and Omagh. Action to build barricades was also taken in Belfast (2), Lisburn (1) and Bangor (1).

b. Damage to Property

A fire of unknown source occurred in a pub in Omagh. A signal box was set on fire on the main Belfast/Bangor line (near to Bangor).

c. Intimidation

Six pickets appeared early at Kilroot Power Station. Night shift workers at Glen Mouldings Factory, Bangor, were intimidated and left. At McCleerys Factory, Ballygowan, night shift workers received threatening phone calls and left work. The IDB security man at the Cutts, Dunmurry, received a threatening call and was advised workers would not be turning up for work.

Shots were fired allegedly at East Bridge Street, Belfast, and two houses belonging to Police Officers in Lurgan were petrol bombed. There was slight damage and no casualties.

3. Electricity

At 0130 hours DED reported no apparent problems on the electricity front.

4. Departmental Response

DOE taking action on roads blocked by trees at Upperlands, County Londonderry and Hightown Road, Horseshoe Bend, Belfast.



L.R.

3/8/11

N10 Ops Rooms - M

SITUATION REPORT - 0301 HOURS TO 0615 HOURS

1. Public Opinion

Downtown Radio at 6.00 am reported closure of M1, closed with oil and nails. Other minor roads had been closed during the night but these had been cleared by Police and firemen. Belfast Harbour Airport had closed down for the day but Aldergrove intended to keep going as long as possible. The Larne-Scottish services had closed down for at least 12 hours.

There had been one confirmed case of intimidation at Glen Moulding in Bangor where about 20 men had forced the night shift to leave. Brian Feeney (SDLP) said 20 NIES workers had been told they would also be forced to cease work; the Orange Order in Belfast said a number of workers had been warned by their employers of the consequences of stopping work. At Harland and Wolff, Dr Paisley and Mr Robinson had been at the shipyard gates where 60 pickets had gathered. There was also going to be a large picket at Stormont, the station reported.

2. Public Order

a. Roads

Since 0301 hours there has been an increase in the number of roads blocked. The major incidents both occurred on the M1 where oil spillages between Lisburn and Stockman's Lane and 2 miles beyond Lisburn towards Moira have closed the motorway.

b. Damage to Property

Nothing reported..

c. Intimidation

Nothing reported.



d. Electricity

Output reduced from 570 MW to 500 from 0200 hours. Nothing expected to happen until after 0600 hours when power needs to be increased and at 0700 hours shifts change.

4. Departmental Response

- i. DOE informed of road blockages and are attending to these.
- ii. All quiet in Prisons.
- iii. DHSS report no problems.



E. R.

ADDENDUM

Electricity

Banbridge and Enniskillen are without electricity. Load shedding is now in operation.

Ports

Larne - will be closed from 7.00 am to 7.00 pm.

TT vessel will not sail at 8.00 am.

Belfast - no sailing to Holyhead, Garston, Ardrossan. 60 pickets at Dee Street entrance to harbour up to 1.00 am.

1 vessel at Richardson's Wharf being worked. If sufficient men turn up it is planned to resume work of loading tanker.

Warrenpoint - nothing happening.



INCIDENTS LOG - 2200 HOURS 2 MARCH 1986-0300 HOURS 3 MARCH 1986

0107 Hours 3 March 1986 2 Petrol bomb attacks on RUC houses in Lurgan at 0020. One in Gilford Road and one in Toberhenny Lane. Slight damage no casualties.

2353 Hours 2 March 1986 Barricade on fire at Sidney Street West/ Mill Street, Belfast - presumed to have been dealt with.

0010 Hours 3 March 1986 Tree cut down at Mackna Road, Upperland County Londonderry.

0135 Hours 2 Trees down, Upper Hightown Road, Horseshoe Bend - DMSU in attendance.

0040 Hours Report of 6 pickets near Kilroot Power Station.

2258 Hours 2 March 1986 25 youths lit fire at side of main Belfast/Hollywood Road near Tillysburn Roundabout. No damage.

0001 Hours 3 March 1986 Intimidation at Glen Mouldings Factory, Balloo Avenue, Bangor - Night shift threatened by 20 men and all left.

0016 Hours Small barricade at Primacy Park, Bangor removed by Police.

0030 Hours Small barricade - Prince William Rd.



Lisburn (wood and bricks) - 4 youths  
ran away.

0043 Hours

Threatening call to security man at  
IDB Plant, The Cutts.

0020 Hours

Attempt to block Ballyearl Drive,  
Newtownabbey, using car - ran away when  
Police arrived.

0056 Hours

Railway Signal Box, Brunswick Road,  
Bangor, on fire - Fire Service  
extinguished it.

0025 Hours

Station Road, Ballymagorry (Strabane).  
Blocked - minor road - Police standing by

0026 Hours

Main Street, Donnemanna, blocked by  
tractors etc - Police standing by.  
Duncastle Road, Donnemana blocked by  
tractor.

2330 Hours 2 March 1986

Fire in pub in 7 John Street, Omagh - 3  
storey building with flats above - no  
report of injuries.

0025 Hours 3 March 1986

Report of large boulders on main Omagh/  
Drumquin Road, 3 miles out of Omagh -  
Police cleared road.



2316 Hours 2 March 1986

McCleerys Factory, Ballygowan - work  
force out after threatening phone calls.

0111 Hours 3 March 1986

2 shots heard East Bridge Street, Police  
checked area negative results.



## RUC STATISTICS

Date: 4/3/86

Time: 0430

XIV

## SUBJECTS

	Intin	Roads		Petrol bombs	Hi-jacks	Attacks on Police
		Blocked	Cleared			
A	3	4	3	-	-	1
B	-					
D	1	7	5	-	-	-
E	2	9	9	-	-	-
G	2	5	2	-	-	-
H	-					
J	2	5	3	2	-	2
K	-	3	-	-	-	-
L	1	4	1	-	-	-
N	-	6	-	2	-	-
O	-					
P	-	5	3	-	-	-
Totals	11	48	26	4	-	3



## SITUATION REPORT - 0616 HOURS TO 0800 HOURS

1. Public Opinion

7.30 am

BBC news: not significantly different from earlier sitrep.

Downtown: reports that Newtownards, Comber and Millisle closed by vehicles. Also says there are unconfirmed reports that on Portadown-Armagh road men were stopping cars and letting down their tyres.

2. Public Ordera. Roads

Since 6.15 there has been no significant increase in the number of the roads blocked. Blockages at the A6 and the West Link have been declared hoaxes and cleared but the Craigantlet route is now blocked at Clandeboye Estate. Fairly remot that roads service will be able to assist quickly at M1.

b. Damage to Property

Nothing reported.

c. Personal Injuries

Nothing reported.

d. Intimidation

Nothing reported.

e. Transport

Rail - crews have not reported for duty at York Road Station, the first crew has not reported at Lisburn. It is unlikely that a rail service will operate north of Ballymena. Only service operating Belfast to Bangor. Suspect device at Lisburn - Army dealing.

Bus - Ulsterbus report a patchy turn up of drivers. Patchy service throughout Northern Ireland still too early.

Aldergrove - 1st flight delayed - inadequate fire cover.



f. IEDs

An IED at Ballynahinch was declared a hoax and cleared by the ATO. No new incidents reported.

g. Electricity

The Chief Executive of the NIES reported that output up to now has been better than expected but demand is beginning to slightly outstrip supply. However Ballylumford is now threatening to close as workers are occupying the control room and attempting to force engineers to reduce output. The workers are expected to join dockers for a parade through Larne this morning. The shift change at 8.00 am will be critical and if Ballylumford closes it will involve an 8 hour shutdown affecting approximately two thirds of the Province.



## RUC STATISTICS

Date: 3 March 1986


Time: 0600 Hours

DIV

SUBJECTS

	Roads			SUBJECTS		
	<u>Intim</u>	<u>Blocked</u>	<u>Cleared</u>	<u>Petrol bombs</u>	<u>Mi-jacks</u>	<u>Attacks on Police</u>
A	3	4	3	-	-	1 (NAT?)
B	-	-	-	-	-	-
D	2	9	6	-	-	-
E	2	9	9	-	-	-
G	2	20	6	-	-	-
H	-	1	1	-	-	-
J	2	5	3	2	-	2 (refer to petrol bc)
K	-	12	7	-	-	-
L	1	14	6	-	-	-
N	-	7	1	2 (NAT?)	1	-
O	-	-	-	-	-	-
P	-	7	5	-	-	1
Totals	12	88	47	4	1	4







**E.R.**

# Northern Ireland Situation Report

REPORT AS AT 9am

(Others to follow regularly)

## 1. Public Opinion

Both local radio and national TV reporting that although some roads remain blocked many have been cleared by the RUC. Downtown reported at 8am that buses were moving fairly normally in the City Centre and a number of people were walking to work. At 8.30am, the station said that Belfast remains relatively quiet.

A number of schools have been forced to close because of lack of heat, Electricity cutbacks in some areas were reported as were the cancellation of sailings from Larne to Scotland. At 8.30 Downtown reported that a policeman had been shot in the leg at the RFD Factory in Seymour Hill in Dunmurry which is being picketed.

## 2. Public Order

### a) Roads:

Following blockages reported - Dual Carriageway between Newtownards and Belfast, M2 at Sandyknowles, Raven Hill Road. Some cars burned in Tennent Street. Cavalcade at Carryduff has left one lane open. Report of road block on main Banbridge/Portadown Road at Guilford close to RUC Station. 6 roads blocked in the Waterside area of Londonderry. Reports of a large number of Road Blocks in the Galgorm Area of Ballymena one car damaged. Blockage at Rathgael has been cleared and elsewhere is reported all clear. Difficulties have been reported in getting out of Bangor where all roads have heavy traffic which does not seem to be moving. There is no obvious sign of reason for delay.

### b) Damage to Property

Nothing Reported

### c) Personal Injuries

There was an accidental discharge at Seymour Hill following which a police officer was taken to hospital his condition is not serious. The incident involved a tussle with a crowd of youths who were attempting to prevent him going on duty.



**E.R.**

d) Intimidation

Nothing Reported

e) Transport

i) Rail

Suspect device at Lisburn now cleared.

ii) Buses

No change.

iii) Airports

First flight to London has taken off and a number of flights have landed. Fire Service is sufficient but traffic is limited.

f) IED's

Suspect Device reported at Ballykinler in two beer kegs, bomb disposal have been alerted.

g) Electricity

Supplies have been cut off, in the following areas. ARDS Peninsular, East Down, Western Half of Co Down, Co Armagh, (but not North Armagh or Craigavon), South of Londonderry City and 4 pockets in Co Antrim, Rasharkin, South of Antrim Town, Port Glenone, and East of Ballymena.

(487 MW local shedding, 104 MW).









NORTHERN  
IRELAND

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Ofs. Lane - m

613

SITUATION REPORT - 0901 HOURS TO 1030 HOURS

1. Public Opinion

Downtown reported at 9.30 am that about 200 masked youths were petrol bombing Police in North Belfast. The Policeman shot at the RFD factory in Dunmurry (reported on 9.00 am sitrep) had been injured by his own gun during an incident with pickets.

The "meals on wheels" service in Craigavon was suspended today, station reported. Belfast city centre was quiet, with many people walking to work.

2. Public Order

a. Roads

Roads in central Belfast are open. Main Belfast/Newtownards road blocked. Back roads open.

b. Damage to Property

Petrol bombing of residents cars in North Belfast confirmed. Minimal damage. Situation under control.

c. Personal Injuries

Nothing reported.

d. Intimidation

Number of youths boarding buses in Ballymena area with baseball bats. 14 masked men on Newcastle/Clough Road with car and digger stopping traffic. Some disruption of postal services.

e. Transport

Rail - Service available on Belfast, Bangor, Lisburn, Portadown lines. Normal service on Dublin line. No service Londonderry or Larne.

Bus - Citybus operating throughout city.

Adergrove - Dan-Air flight to Gatwick has left. British Midland flight cancelled due to lack of passengers. British Airways flight delayed as a result of problems with tarmac crew.

f. Ports

Belfast - 6 ships in Port, only one being worked. All ITGWU dockers arrived for work as normal but very few ATGWU.

Larne - No sailings expected until after 7.00 pm.



Not to be  
disclosed

Warrenpoint and Newry - Both ports working normally.

g. Electricity

About 25% load shedding. Demand not as high as expected. Ballylumford enough staff to run one unit out of 5 units. Belfast West new shift has reported for duty. Coolkeeragh - shift in. New areas cut off:- West of Lough Neagh - Cookstown and Stewartstown. Outskirts of Belfast - Knock, Malone. Areas which have been cut off - no indication when service will be resumed.

Plant details:	Kilroot	280 Megawatts
	Ballylumford	240 Megawatts
	Belfast	82 Megawatts
	Coolkeeragh	290 Megawatts
		<u>892 Megawatts</u>

145 Megawatts load sharing.

3. Industry

Shorts virtually closed down. Senior management and senior admin staff in place. Numbers get progressively smaller down the system. 20% of technical design team present but no supervisors and shop floor workers except one rivetter. Peaceful picket no intimidation.

4. Health Services

Strabane Hospital - generator not working properly. Electrician held up by pickets and road blocks.

Eastern Board - patchy turnout by laundry staff and porters. Staff turnout at all Board HQs not high at the moment. Problems not great at present.



ADDENDUM

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Public Opinion

BBC at 10.00 am reported that workers have taken over the control room at Ballylumford. BBC say they have received many reports of intimidation and also allegations that the RUC were standing by and taking no action. Women going into Gallagher's plant in Ballymena were spat upon and attacked with sticks. Mr Robinson (DUP) said there was massive support for the strike and denied that loyalists had been responsible for any intimidation or violence.

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## SITUATION REPORT - 1031 HOURS TO 1200 HOURS

NORTHERN IRELAND1. Public Opinion

Downtown at 11.00 am reported that a loyalist picket in Londonderry was injured after a van smashed into a picket line. Dr Paisley has complained to the RUC that a Policeman pointed a gun at a picket line. Many roads were blocked and strikers claimed that many towns in Tyrone, Armagh and Down were blocked off.

NIO has dismissed claims that strikers had taken over the Ballylumford control room. The station said there had been numerous complaints of intimidation and Police inactivity in clearing road blocks. Harland and Wolff said 10 to 15% of their workers had turned up.

BBC at 11.00 am reported that reports of widespread intimidation were increasing and callers to the BBC were also complaining of RUC inactivity. A Presbyterian minister, in an interview, told of intimidation on the Newtownards Road while RUC stood by. Industry: Most industrial firms have some workers in but "in some case the effect of picketing has been devastating". NIO denied Ballylumford workers takeover in control room.

2. Public Ordera. Roads

Cookstown is reported cut off whilst Comber isolated earlier is now clear. It is reported that Armagh and Tandragee are <sup>Controlled</sup> virtually sealed off by demonstrators. Traffic is being <sup>Blocked</sup> in both directions on the Dromore by-pass. Traffic in Belfast City centre is only about one fifth of what could normally be expected. The Army is dealing with 2 oil slicks on the M1 motorway, one at Ballyskeagh Bridge and one west of Lisburn - it is hoped to <sup>Clear</sup> the motorway <sup>AS SOON AS POSSIBLE</sup>.

Generally, although there are a lot of traffic blocks, people are getting through with perseverance.

b. Damage to Property

Nothing reported.



c. Personal Injuries

Nothing reported.

d. Intimidation

Several incidents have been reported in the Portadown and Lisburn areas and some intimidation has been directed towards Du Pont workers in Londonderry. Some schools have had to close due to intimidation of bus drivers and school meals personnel.

e. Transport

Trains - Correction to previous report - service is operational Bangor to Lisburn only. North bound trains are running as far as Portadown.

Buses - Service is reasonably good in greater Belfast area. Situation in rest of Province is unclear.

Airports - Fully operational although some delays caused by problems with turn-out of tarmac crews who deal with loading and re-fuelling.

f. Ports

Nothing reported.

g. Electricity

NOT FOR PUBLICATION [Load shedding is now 160 Megawatts.] All stations are contributing to the capacity. Some areas are now back on around Strabane, Enniskillen and Omagh while Carrick and Kilroot areas are now off. NIES reports that manual workers have walked out at Ballylumford because they refused to obey a management order that they should increase power on the one steam turbine working. Management forced to run turbine down but will compensate with gas turbines. This will even up the situation. Management unsure what effect this will have on the work force in other stations.

h. IEDs

Suspect IEDs at Ballykinner and Rostrevor/Kilkeel road have been declared hoaxes and cleared. Bomb disposal are dealing with confirmed IED on Crumlin Road, and will go on to suspect devices at Hilden Bridge Lisburn and Springfield Road, Belfast



2. Industry

Industrial attendance, in broad terms, shows high absenteeism in loyalist areas and good attendance in Nationalist areas. Only senior management in attendance at Harland and Wolff. Virtually nil attendance of other staff.

4. Public Service

Courts Service - RMS and most Judges have been able to get to their appropriate Courts today.

Schools - Widespread closure of schools is reported for various reasons - lack of heating and electricity, intimidation of bus drivers, road blocks. The central meals kitchen at Saintfield was opened but closed due to intimidation.

Social Security Offices - Two SSOS are reported closed whilst at others staff have reported trouble nearby. The general impression however is that most staff have reported for duty to their own or nearest office.







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INTERIM REPORT ON ONE-DAY STRIKE - MIDDAY 3 MARCH

## General

The overall tone of the day so far has been restrained with perhaps predictably patchy responses to the strike call. There are a number of reports of various forms of intimidation but so far they appear to be individual actions although evidence is emerging of massive organised campaigns to close roads and take other more violent action. The reduction in power supplies is producing the electricity cuts expected but these are being moved around to spread the load.

## Belfast and District

2. In the city centre the main shops are open but some smaller ones have remained closed. However the large stores report very little business and the manager of Marks and Spencers (75% of his staff reported for work) has said that no one is shopping and he anticipates there may be difficulties later in the day when the various marches converge on the City Hall.

3. Many of the more localised shopping areas (such as the Lisburn Road) have stayed closed and there are reports that no filling stations are open. In the traditional loyalist strongholds there are allegations of road blocks, burning cars and groups of men with their faces masked stopping people going to work.

4. One of the expected main targets, the Stormont estate, and in particular Stormont Castle and area, has so far been relatively untroubled. At 11 am two of the main entrances, those at Massey Avenue and on the Newtownards Road at the foot of the processional route, were completely unpicketed. (See footnote)

## North West

5. In Londonderry on the City side of the river business appears to be normal but in the unionist Waterside district most shops are closed and some of those that opened were 'advised' in explicit terms to shut. The Altnagelvin Hospital appears to be working normally but there are difficulties reported in the New Buildings area. <sup>One of</sup> the most disturbing incidents coming from the area concern car windows being broken in the Dales Corner area - this is likely to have been associated with attempts to prevent workers from going into Dupont. Considerable fears are being expressed that the proposed afternoon marches to the



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Guildhall will end up in violence.

## The West

6. Enniskillen, like Belfast, has most of the main shops open but many of the small ones have stayed closed. The main problem in the areas seems to be associated with roadblocks and the way that they are being dealt with seems to vary considerably. Therefore Armagh is very difficult to negotiate but on the other hand blocks on the main roads into Omagh are negotiable the police maintaining access. All the shops in Omagh are closed.

## Other Areas

7. Response to the strike call is very patchy with support coming in those areas where it might be expected. Thus small towns like Ballynahinch, Banbridge and Dromore are completely closed down but on the other hand other major shopping areas like Newry appear to be unaffected.

## Road Blocks

8. As the morning has progressed reports have started coming in that road blocks are springing up and that the atmosphere at them is becoming increasingly tense. There are reports of cars being damaged at a major road block on the Belfast-Newry road near Dromore. Reliable sources commented that both the Army and the Police have been aware of this activity for some time but as yet no action has been taken to clear the road or to prevent the interference and damage to cars.

## Summary

9. The strike has been patchy and at its most effective in the expected unionist strongholds. There appears to be a worrying trend towards road blocks with the increased likelihood of confrontation and violence. Concern has been expressed in more than one area about what may develop during the afternoon when the various unionist marches are underway. At this stage it appears that the emergence of the road block tactic is proving effective and reports suggest the balance of advantage is swinging towards the strikers.

## Political Affairs Division

RCB is the only NIO Dept to be seriously affected. Apparently the police did not know Quarry House is a Government building and had not provided any support and the staff arrived to be turned away by a 50 strong picket.



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19/4

DESK BY 2.45 PM!

NORTHERN IRELAND

SITUATION REPORT - 1201 HOURS TO 1330 HOURS

1. Public Opinion

BBC and Downtown continued to report widespread intimidation and allegations of police inactivity. Mr McCusker (OUP) said "tens of thousands" of workers had responded to the strike although there had been intimidation by employers. Belfast Chamber of Trade said two-thirds of shops were open today. (BBC national TV and ITN both showed pictures of road blocks with, in some cases, apparent RUC inactivity.

2. Public Order

a. Roads

Action being taken to clear spilt oil on M1. Reports from public of roads closed by barricades, etc, which have been passed to RUC HQ for action.

b. Damage to Property

Nothing reported.

c. Personal Injuries

Nothing reported.

d. Intimidation

There have been a number of reports from the public of intimidation throughout the Province which have been passed to RUC HQ for action.

e. Transport

Trains - No change.

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Airport - Airlines have indicated that they are withdrawing services due to lack of demand. They will be issuing a statement to be agreed with NIA early this afternoon which therefore should not be pre-empted.

Buses - Citybus services remain reasonably good. Ulsterbus cannot provide a service in Omagh, Armagh, Portadown, Lurgan, Lisburn, Coleraine, Carrick and Ballymena.

f. Ports

Nothing reported.

g. Electricity

Nothing reported.

3. Industry

MAFF - most food stores closed except in nationalist areas. Baking trade baked yesterday for today. Plant bakeries in Newry and Derry in production. Wholesale transport off the road. Grain silos 90% staffed but no vehicles.

Fisheries: (a) Kilkeel and Portavogie closed also processing plant; (b) Ardglass with fleet of 12 operating plus processing plant.

Slaughterhouses: 3 out of 20 open.

Eggs: all packing factories closed (lack of workforce).

Bacon processing open but no industrial staff

{ Milk: all milk collected yesterday. Today's can be held at farms until tomorrow.

{ Moira Poultry: direct intimidation of workforce, also Newtownards.

{ Aldergrove inspectors have been advised by Airport Security to go home to avoid trouble. This was denied by Aldergrove Airport security manager.

Not for  
general  
release



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IDB contacted 30 firms - Belfast, Ballymena, Carrick, Larne 80%/90% absenteeism. West of Province 5%-10% absenteeism. Du Pont very few absentees. Killyleagh Flax sent workers home due to power cuts. Others have started production on reinstatement of electricity.

**4. Health Services**

No major problems except in Southern Board Area. Emergency service operating but non-emergency services are disrupted. Report of consultant being turned away from Craigavon Hospital. There is a situation in Kilkeel as yet unidentified. There is a report that senior administrator took exception to pickets at one road-block and had his tyres damaged. Northern Board - a few day centres closed. All other services normal.

Social Security Offices - Portadown closed earlier; Newtownards closed 11.30 am, Lurgan and Larne closed. Ballymena and Lisburn - staff in but no public service. Number of sub-offices not opened.

**5. Communications**

BT report little inconvenience - only 16% of staff have not been able to get to work. On service side, traffic to operators is very heavy.

Postal - Normal service for letters deliveries Belfast City Centre, Holywood and Downpatrick. Rest of Province - many staff came in but went home due to intimidation and pickets. Some postmen at Ballymoney photographed by pickets. Parts of Newry, Londonderry (less Waterside) and Enniskillen normal.

Counters - a number of main post offices open, eg, Belfast, Londonderry and Enniskillen. Bangor open but under intimidation. Newry is alright. Some East and South Belfast offices opened but subsequently closed by intimidation. Many provincial offices not opened (a) due to inability to get through; (b) inability to get money to them.




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6. Miscellaneous

Member of public reports UDR men in plain clothes amongst pickets in Main Street, Dungannon, asking questions about Anglo-Irish Agreement.

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E.R. Desk Immediate

24/3

PAB/1499/BN

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PS/Secretary of State (L&B) -m


cc: PS/Ministers (L&B) -m  
 PS/PUS (L&B) -m  
 PS/Mr Bloomfield  
 Mr Stephens  
 Mr Brennan -w  
 Mr Chesterton -m  
 Mr Innes  
 Mr Elliott  
 Mr Spence  
 Mr Gilliland  
 Mr Bell -m  
 Miss Elliott -m  
 Mr Blackwell  
 Mr S Hewitt  
 Mr G Hewitt  
 Mr Ehrman -m

1. cc. Mr ~~Lowell~~ N<sup>o</sup>10.
2. Back to me.

now  
3/3.

FURTHER REPORT ON ONE-DAY STRIKE MID AFTERNOON 3 MARCH

I attach a further report on today's activities as promised.

  
J E McCONNELL

Political Affairs Division

3 March 1986

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FURTHER REPORT ON ONE-DAY STRIKE - MID AFTERNOON 3 MARCH

A clearer picture is emerging of the day's events and developments. In many places there was a very high initial turnout - for example 95% of the staff in Downpatrick Town Hall was a typical figure for employment within the public service. In addition many shops and businesses opened early in the day. However as matters have developed there is growing concern about the safety of workers on their way home. This is largely as a result of rumour based on anecdotal and some verified accounts of police inactivity in dealing with road blocks and other forms of intimidation. The following examples are typical.

- (i) Reliable sources reported an incident in the Newcastle area in which a female employee of the District Council <sup>who</sup> was journeying to work, was stopped at an unofficial road block. The block was not at her work nor associated with any other workplace. When she complained to police in the vicinity she was told they could not interfere with 'an official picket'. This incident has been reported as a complaint to the Newcastle police.
- (ii) Another very reliable source in Londonderry reports the closure of businesses following intimidation from a group of 50-60 'yobs'. No police were in evidence. The same source personally reported seeing a number of youths attacking a derelict house but when he reported this no police arrived. The widespread belief in Londonderry (he says) is people will have trouble getting home and businesses are closing to allow them to get home early. There are also unconfirmed reports of brake pipes being cut on school buses.
- (iii) One of the trouble spots now seems to be Kilkeel where it is reported that the town is sealed off. There are stories of cars being burnt and allegations (by a local councillor and as yet unconfirmed) that known members of the UDR have taken part in these activities.

Summary

It seems likely that in the aftermath of the day's actions that one of the central issues that will attract political comment is the role



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of the police. Their observed inactivity has created the impression that they have been unable or unwilling to offer adequate protection to the public.







2513

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SITUATION REPORT - 1331 HOURS TO 1500 HOURS1. Public Opinion

BBC reported that loyalists were gathering at Belfast City Hall for a "mock funeral". Widespread intimidation had been reported and six towns were still sealed off by protesters. The RUC said a "fair number" of arrests had been made. Although Belfast city centre shops were still open, traders said the strike had been disastrous for business.

2. Public Ordera. Roads

M1 motorway has been cleared.

b. Damage to Property

Nothing reported.

c. Personal Injuries

Nothing reported.

d. Intimidation

There have been further reports from the public of intimidation throughout the Province which have been passed to RUC HQ for action.

e. Transport

Trains - No change.

Buses - Citybus reasonably good. Ulsterbus experiencing operating difficulties because of road blocks.

Airports - No change.

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f. Ports

Nothing reported.

g. Electricity

Same amount of electricity available. Ards and Bangor back on stream but Belfast East and Central now affected.

h. IEDs

Nothing reported.

i. Arrests

At 1200 hours 16 arrests had been reported Province-wide and 31 people noted for future action.

3. Industry

No further reports.

4. Public Service

90% of non-industrial civil servants have attended work. Fire Authority working normally.

A Division of NIO (RCE) is not working today - on arrival staff were met by about 50 pickets who had chained and tied shut the main gate, and staff were not allowed to pass. There was no RUC presence during the incident - police did not know that Quarry House is a Government building.

5. Demonstrations

During a parade at Belfast City Centre a group of 50 broke away and set fire to a car at Charles Hurst's garage, Adelaide Street. A crowd of about 200 is reported near



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3.

Bryson Street, heading up Newtownards Road. A crowd is reported outside Rosepark and the road is blocked - there are adequate police to deal with the situation. The city centre parade, comprising 5,000 people, has dispersed in various directions with some minor damage reported.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**SITUATION REPORT - 1501 HOURS TO 1630 HOURS1. Public Opinion

Local radio stations are reporting on a series of rallies being held in provincial towns. The main one in Lisburn has blocked the town with a tractor cavalcade. OUP Leader, James Molyneaux, said at the Lisburn demonstration that rumours of widespread intimidation were highly exaggerated.

The earlier demonstration by a small group of 50 youths, in Bedford Street, has passed with minor damage and the news reports that the city centre is quiet. However, a mob of about 300 youths overturned a lorry at the junction of Alberthridge and Newtownards Road. Claims that police used baton rounds to disperse the crowds have been checked and are unfounded. Meanwhile, many civil servants have, on their own initiative, left work early. Reports of walkouts in considerable numbers include Dundonald House, Castle Buildings and Works Service.

A group of Catholic factory workers were attacked leaving the Lurgan firm Saracen this afternoon. It is generally understood that the factory was being picketed by Loyalists. During the fracas, policemen were injured, one seriously and one baton round was used to quell the antagonists.

Loyalist leaders, according to Downtown News at 3.30 pm, are claiming that the day of action has been a great success from their point of view.

2. Public Ordera. Roads

Further complaints from the public about barricades, etc, passed to RUC HQ for action.

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b. Damage to Property

Hyster Plant, Craigavon - approximately 200 people entered complex causing damage to 2 cars and minor damage to factory. All quiet now.

c. Personal Injuries

No further reports.

d. Intimidation

Further reports from public of intimidation passed to RUC for action. Saracen Clothing Factory, Lurgan, with mixed workforce has had some trouble. Police involved - 1 baton round fired, 3 police injured. Riots moved to Mourneview Estate and smaller groups continue to break windows in housing belonging to RUC personnel.

e. Transport

No further reports.

f. Ports

No further reports.

g. Electricity

No further reports.

h. IEDs

Suspicious device at Killowen, near Rilkeel, now cleared by ATO. Devices at Washing Bay Bridge and Aughnacloy permanent UCP have been declared hoaxes. Suspect device seen at Gransha Hospital, Londonderry, 1407 ATO tasked.

i. Arrests

No further reports.



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3.

3. Industry

No further reports.

4. Public Services

Heavy picketing at Rosepark House. Operations staff were given permission to leave after advice from RUC.

5. Demonstrations

300 approximately roaming Templemore Avenue/Dee Street area. One lorry overturned. No confrontation and no noticeable direction of travel. Vehicle burnt out in Kilkeel. Parade with coffin. 200 Vehicles/300 persons in cavalcade in town at present.

5. Health Services

Castle Buildings, Dundonald House, Works Unit have been told to go home. Various out-offices in Belfast, Antrim and Ballymoney have closed at the discretion of local managers. Their Operations Room (Benefits) will be closing now (1444).


Admin staff in the four Area Boards have maintained services. Starting to close down now (1530). Presence will be maintained at DHSS until told to close by NIO Branch.

7. Communications

Since this morning the service has worsened. No service at all in the East. Slight service in the West of the Province. Post Offices in the centre of Belfast now all closed due to trouble and lack of customers. Some offices in West still operating. No collections today except in some small areas in West. As airport is closed, no outgoing mail. If situation eases tonight to allow staff in and if airport re-opens for incoming mail, services can resume.

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17



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R. Desk - Immediate

1213

FAB/1497/BN

PS/Secretary of State (L&B) - m

cc: PS/Ministers (L&B) - m

PS/PUS (L&B) - m

PS/Mr Bloomfield

Mr Stephens

Mr Brennan - m

Mr Chesterton - m

Mr Innes

Mr Elliott

Mr Spence

Mr Gilliland

Mr Bell - m

Miss Elliott - m

Mr Blackwell

Mr S Hewitt

Mr G Hewitt

Mr Ehrman - m

1. cc C. Powell  
N<sup>o</sup> 10.

2. Back to me

NDW  
3/3.

INTERIM REPORT ON ONE-DAY STRIKE - MIDDAY 3 MARCH

I attach an interim report on today's activities and I will issue a further report as the day progresses.

J E McCONNELL

Political Affairs Division

3 March 1986

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

NORTHERN IRELAND

Mr Kenneth Maginnis MP telephoned me this evening with a proposal to defuse the situation in Northern Ireland. He said that it was a personal idea and that he had not discussed it with his Party leaders. His motive was his strong desire to stop Northern Ireland from slipping into anarchy. Mr Maginnis said that there was increasing pressure among Unionists to accelerate the day of action and make it open-ended. The decision had already been reached to extend it to 24 hours. He had himself been touring his Constituency of Fermanagh and South Tyrone which was a relatively moderate and sensible area, but he had been very worried by some of the meetings which he had attended. There were clearly harder faced people waiting to take over.

Mr Maginnis said that his proposal involves a small concession by the Government. This was to suspend the operation of the Joint Secretariat established by the Anglo Irish Agreement for a few weeks. He believed that if this could be agreed, he could persuade others in the Unionist movement that the Government had shown a spirit of compromise and that the day of action should either be called off or at least not extended. The suspension would last while talks between Unionists and other parties in the Government took place. He emphasised again that the idea was entirely his own. Time was short. He was ready to fly to London to discuss it with me.

I said that I noted very clearly what Mr Maginnis had said. It was not for me to pronounce on it. I would ensure that his idea was passed on and that he received a prompt reply. I would make only one comment. During their meeting with the Prime Minister, the Unionist Party leaders had at one stage suggested suspension of the activities of the Inter Government

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Conference and of the Joint Secretariat. The Prime Minister had pointed out that the Agreement itself provided for both parties to operate and it was therefore impossible for HMG unilaterally to declare a suspension of their activities. Mr Maginnis said that he recognised this point but that the Unionist supporters had to be offered something if a way out of the present impasse was to be found.

I subsequently telephoned the Northern Ireland Private Secretary to convey the gist of the above. Mr Daniell said that he would try to get Mr King to telephone Mr Maginnis back this evening or tomorrow.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

1 March 1986

CAJACT

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PART 14 ends:-

DIGEST OF MORNING PAPERS

28.2.86

PART 15 begins:-

CDP- Note for the file


1.3.86.



Inches 1 2 3  
Centimetres 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

# Colour Chart #13

Blue Cyan Green Yellow



A 1 2 3 4 5 6 M 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 B 17 18 19

Grey Scale #13

