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SECRET PART 1

MT

NEW FILE COVER

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

Policing & Demonstrations at Military Bases

Activities by Anti-Nuclear Demonstrators

DEFENCE

S 812

1 February 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~10.10.85~~ ~~7.3.86.~~ 26.3.86							
PART ENDS							

PREM 19/1846

Dd 8398366 2M 11/83 JET

PART ONE ends:-

SS.MOD to CST 26.3.86

PART TWO begins:-

CST to Home Sec. 8.4.86

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
Misc 7(83) 3rd meeting, item 3	28/03/1983

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed A Fewell Date 25/09/2014

PREM Records Team

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000

DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

MO 21/17/1L

26th March 1986

Prime Minister

Douglas Hurd and I agree we must move money for the Cambridgeshire police to help them police Molesworth and Alconbury.

Dear John,

Douglas Hurd sent me a copy of his letter to you of 7th March 1986 on the extension into 1986/87 of the special payment to the Cambridgeshire Police Authority in respect of policing tasks connected with RAF Molesworth and RAF Alconbury.

We are working to an extremely tight timescale for the development of Molesworth as the second cruise missile facility in the UK - we have less than 18 months for the major part of the construction to be completed before the first missiles arrive. RAF Alconbury will play an increasing role in the development of the base by providing administrative support and providing landing and storage facilities for much of the sensitive equipment. Demonstrations have had little effect on the development programme so far, thanks partly to the excellent relations between the MOD security authorities and the Cambridgeshire Constabulary. But as construction work peaks, and we move towards the delivery phase, we must expect an increasing amount of disruptive action against Molesworth and

The Rt Hon John MacGregor OBE MP

Alconbury. The role of the local police is unlikely to reduce during this period. It would be their responsibility, for example, to keep access roads open for construction traffic despite attempted blockades of the base along the lines of the demonstration on 6th February.

Clearly policing tasks associated with Molesworth and Alconbury have placed a strain on the resources of the Cambridgeshire Police Authority and are likely to continue to do so to an, as yet, unquantifiable degree. Whilst this is, of course, a Home Office matter, it is clear from my Department's dealings with the local authorities that they feel very strongly that this is an area in which Central Government support should be available.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, Douglas Hurd, Kenneth Baker, Malcolm Rifkind and John Wakeham.

Yours ever,

George.

George Younger

DEFENCE Policing & Demonstrations 2/85



QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SWIH 9AT

7 March 1986

Dear John.

Following representations from the Cambridgeshire Police Authority, strongly supported by local Members, about the burden which the additional costs of policing demonstrations at Molesworth and Alconbury would place on the police budget, Leon Brittan, with Peter Rees' agreement, offered a special payment to the authority for 1985-86. The first payment will shortly be made and we expect the total amount which will be paid out up to the end of 1985-86 to be around £400,000.

I have been considering whether the arrangements should be extended into 1986-87. The policing of Molesworth and Alconbury is a continuing commitment; the demonstrators have been there for a year and it is predictable that they will be there for some time yet. For other special payments, we have rested not only on the exceptional size of the expediture involved but also on the fact that it was unforeseeable. Since expenditure on policing these bases is foreseeable, it could be argued that the police authority should provide for it. However, this was also the position when our predecessors agreed on the special payment and I would find it difficult to use this argument publicly to defend bringing the special payment to an end.

There has, of course, been one significant change with the increase in police grant for 1986-87. This will be of benefit to the Cambridgeshire Police Authority but not of the same benefit as a special payment. The authority will argue that we are merely giving with one hand and taking with the other. I certainly regard the increase in police grant as strengthening my hand in resisting applications from police authorities for new special payments but it is difficult to apply the arguments where we are already making such a payment. As you know, in announcing the increase in the rate of police grant, I referred to the increasing demands on the police service arising from the need to combat drug abuse, public disorder and terrorism. To allow the benefit of the grant increase in Cambridgeshire to be absorbed entirely by the policing of Molesworth would imply that no contribution was being made to other increased demands on the force.

Furthermore, the police authority could still be left with a significant additional sum arising from the policing of Molesworth and Alconbury. We expect an increase in the level of protest activity as the construction of the base gets fully under way. With a police budget of only about £25m, even additional expenditure on the scale expected this year causes significant problems for the authority.

/The guarantee

The Rt Hon John MacGregor, MP

The guarantee of close-ending which Kenneth Baker has now given will benefit Cambridgeshire County Council by nearly £6.5m. However, in setting its precept each year Cambridgeshire has allowed for an expected level of flow-back and I understand that in planning its expenditure for 1986-87 the Council has already taken into account most of the additional sum. Since Cambridgeshire has already done what we hope other local authorities will do as a result of Kenneth Baker's announcement, it is difficult to argue that they should instead see the guarantee of close-ending as a substitute for a special payment.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Kenneth Baker, Malcolm Rifkind, George Younger and John Wakeham.

Yours

Doug'7.



CDP to see
MR 14/X.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7822~~ 218 2111/3

MO 18/1/4L

10th October 1985

Dear Mark,

As you will know, plans for the development of the Clyde Submarine Base are going ahead, following the decision by the Secretary of State for Scotland last March on the outline Notice of Proposed Development. The Defence Secretary has asked me to inform you of a related matter.

Associated with the development, we see a need to close two stretches of public road which no longer serve a useful purpose (you may find it helpful to refer to the attached plan on which the roads concerned are coloured blue). These roads will become increasingly busy with contractors' traffic as work gets under way, and powers are available under the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972 (read with the Land Powers (Defence) Act 1958) for closure on the grounds that this is necessary for the land to be used efficiently for defence purposes without danger to the public. An additional and important benefit of closure would be to remove public roads which are of security concern because of their proximity to sensitive areas (and could be used by CND and others to disrupt the work when it is in full swing).

We shall, therefore, be asking the Secretary of State for Scotland to close the roads. The proposed closure will need to be advertised and if a local or statutory authority objects, a public inquiry is obligatory. Although the issue is a narrow one, there will obviously be opportunities for protestors to gain attention, especially as they were denied any such opportunity last year when the Secretary of State for Scotland decided to deal with objections by written representations. But careful preparation and attention to public relations on our part should limit the effect, and Ministers here have accepted that the closure of these roads is necessary, both on security grounds and because of the construction activity associated with the development of the base.

Officials are now working on the papers to be put to the Scottish Office seeking closure. We shall ensure that an agreed press brief is available before the proposed closure is made public.

M Addison Esq
No 10 Downing Street

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Scotland and the Environment and to the Private Secretary to the Lord Advocate.

Yours ever,
Jeremy Wright

(J S WRIGHT)

MOD ARMY
(Fernicarry Farm)

COVE AND KILCREGGAN, GARELOCHHEAD
ROSNEATH AND ARROCHAR WARD

Garelochhead

STRATHCLYDE
REGIONAL COUNCIL

Garelochhead Forest

MOD
(ex Forestry Commission)

Mambeg

Tom Soilleir

MOD NAVY
COULPORT
TRIDENT BASE

MOD
(ex Harland)

Rahane

Coulport

NOT M.O.D

FASLANE

Gare Loch


14. X.
AM 85

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Prime Minister (2)
For information.
MLA 3/4

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

3 April 1985

Dear Mark,

MOLESWORTH

The Home Secretary thinks that the Prime Minister may wish to have a note about the demonstrations organised by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament which will take place at RAF Molesworth during the Easter weekend; and about the police preparations and plans to deal with any disorder which may arise.

We understand that there are to be two (relatively small) marches on Easter Sunday from Corby and Huntingdon, the second of these via RAF Alconbury where a short demonstration may take place. The police do not expect more than 1,000 people to take part in these marches. On Sunday night there will be a vigil at the base. The major demonstration, when the maximum attendance is expected to be 20,000 or more, will take place on Easter Monday. On present plans CND will encircle the base on three sides, using the eastern and western bridleways immediately outside the perimeter fence and, on the northern side, a bridleway at a little distance from the northern perimeter fence. At 2 pm on Easter Monday the demonstrators will tie ribbons and place pennants against the fence after ringing bells for ten minutes.

The base can be reached only by narrow lanes and there is nowhere on public land where a demonstration of any size can gather. These geographical features, taken together with the numbers expected to attend, mean that there is bound to be considerable disruption to the life of the local community, and some demonstrators will find their way onto private land, with consequent possible damage to crops. Some people may try to breach the perimeter fence. CND are not overtly encouraging or discouraging this, but are at least

Mark Addison, Esq

asking that such action does not take place before 3.30 pm so that demonstrators who do not wish to take part in that form of action have had a chance to leave the scene.

The police have been in close touch with the local community and with the CND organisers. Their approach is to try to minimise the disruption to the local community, without seeking to try to prevent the protesters from gathering at the site, since any attempt to frustrate the demonstration would be likely to cause more rather than less disorder. Substantial numbers of police - 2,000 in total - will be made available, some of whom will be on mutual aid, and 200 officers will be deployed at 'Peace Corner' which is expected to be the focal point of the demonstration. MOD police officers, who will be primarily concerned with the security of the base itself, will also be present. Arrangements are being made to ensure that the protestors can be collected and moved quickly once the demonstration is over. Particular care has been taken in formulating plans to deal with attempts to breach the fence. We believe that the arrangements the police have made will minimise the amount of disruption and disorder, and will ensure that the police are prepared for any disorder which may occur.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence.

Yours ever, Nigel

N A PANTLING

APR 1985

MOLESWORTH LAND DISPOSAL: LINE TO TAKE

"No-one could seriously expect the Government to sell land at Molesworth to people who might use it to interfere with the development of the base by mounting demonstrations at great inconvenience to the local community."

BACKGROUND NOTE

1. It has been the long standing policy to return surplus Ministry of Defence land to productive use, in this case most probably agricultural.

2. Former owners have an unconditional first option to purchase. Should they not exercise the option, it is the intention to dispose of the surplus land by private treaty to neighbouring farmers.

3. The Property Services Agency are acting as MoD's agents in this matter. The private treaty arrangement means that we are not obliged to accept the highest bid.There is no intention of knowingly selling to people who are either members of the peace movement, or who would make the land available to the peace movement for mounting demonstrations.

4. A copy of a recent letter from Secretary of State to John Major MP on this subject is attached.

5. There is no question of MoD/PSA using unconventional (ie surveillance)methods in order to ascertain whether or not an individual is associated with the peace movement.

6. A copy of this morning's "Guardian" article on this subject is attached.

NBPM
AF
8/2

CONFIDENTIAL

HOME SECRETARY

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

8 February 1985

Dear Peter,

RAF MOLESWORTH

Thank you for your letter of 24 January. I am glad that we have been able to reach agreement on the arrangement for special financial assistance for policing any mass demonstrations at Molesworth and Alconbury.

As regards finding offsetting savings for the cost of any additional grant which might have to be paid, I should of course do what I could, but you will understand that no allowance has been made in our Estimates for this purpose and I cannot rule out the possibility of having to seek assistance from the Reserve.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours,

The Rt Hon Peter Rees, QC, MP

CONFIDENTIAL

Defence: Policing of Demonstrations 2/83

PREM 19/1846

SECRET AND PERSONAL

FILE da

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

The Prime Minister has read with interest the letter from the Director General of the Security Service which was attached to your minute of 6 February (A085/404), and was grateful for it.

FERB

7 February 1985

SECRET AND PERSONAL

DMS

E.R

PRIME MINISTER

Attached is the statement made by the Defence Secretary on the operation at RAF Molesworth. This proved to be the expected straightforward political occasion with unanimous support coming from Government backbenches and unanimous condemnation from the Opposition. The latter was unspecific and illdirected, and Mr Heseltine had little difficulty in dealing with it. If this comes up in Questions tomorrow, which seems unlikely, the best line is perhaps the assertion of the Government's right and duty to protect its defence installations and, therefore, to implement the decision on the deployment of cruise which has been endorsed both by the electorate and Parliament.

6 February 1985

With permission, Mr Speaker, I wish to make a Statement about the operation conducted last night at RAF Molesworth to clear the site of trespassers and to fence it.

The then Secretary of State for Defence announced on 17th June 1980 the Government's decision that Molesworth, a disused airfield in Cambridgeshire, had been selected as the second United Kingdom cruise-missile base. The normal process of planning consultation was set in hand towards the end of last year against the requirement to begin major construction on the site this Autumn if deployment by 1988 is to be achieved.

As the House will be aware, RAF Molesworth, as an unfenced and open site, has been the scene of continued trespass by individuals and groups opposed to its use as a cruise missile base. Their activities have given rise to much local anxiety. The anti-nuclear protest groups have made clear their intention to engage in a systematic programme of deliberate delay and disruption, not excluding unlawful means, in order to prevent its development. It would have been quite wrong to allow such a protest to build up on Ministry of Defence land and to accept that the serious inconvenience to local people would continue.

I therefore directed that the necessary steps should be taken to end this as quickly as possible and with the least likelihood of danger to all concerned. To do so, it was necessary to act in secrecy and with speed in order to prevent the very serious problems which would have arisen from the reinforcement of the protesters that had been threatened. This could have led to a major confrontation with all the risks that involved to both demonstrators and those responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

This operation began shortly before midnight last night with the arrival of Ministry of Defence police to clear the site of trespassers and to take control of it. The civil police were responsible for policing outside the site itself. At the same time, 1500 Royal Engineers began to fence off the whole site with dannert-type fencing. They are also providing observation platforms and perimeter lighting which will assist the Ministry of Defence police in their continuing task of guarding the site. In addition members of the Property Services Agency and civil contractors moved heavy equipment onto the site to begin the construction of a permanent weldmesh fence for which planning agreement has already been given.

Mr Speaker this House reaffirmed in October 1983 its support for the NATO twin-track decision on intermediate range nuclear forces. The Government very much hopes that, now that the Soviet Union has returned to the negotiating table, it will be possible to make progress on the arms control element of that decision. But until progress

has been achieved which makes this unnecessary, we shall continue with preparations for the deployment of cruise missiles. That is a decision approved by Parliament. No responsible Secretary of State for Defence, or Government, could countenance such preparations being frustrated by a small, unrepresentative minority within our society.

That is why the action I have described has been undertaken today. I have myself visited Molesworth this morning in order to pass on the Government's thanks to those concerned. The House will I know wish to join me in paying tribute to all those involved in ensuring that this major operation has proceeded so successfully.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

5

Prime Minister

You will remember asking me to find out whether Sir Robert Armstrong knew who was financing CND's activities at Molesworth. The attached is his answer, though it does not answer the question where CND get their money from.

Ref. A085/404

MR BUTLER

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

In response to your minute of 25 January I attach a copy of a letter which I have received from the Director General of the Security Service.

FERB 6.2.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

6 February 1985

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET To dr talk

Correspondence to this address must be under double cover. The outer envelope should be addressed to The Secretary PO Box 500 London SW1P 1XH and not to any individual.

PO Box 500
London SW1P 1XH

Telephone 01-388 3232 ext.
01-491 4488 ext.

CABINET OFFICE
A 998
5 FEB 1985
FILING INSTRUCTIO
FILE No. .....

L602-12/DG

5 February 1985

Dear Robert,

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
(CND)

In your letter of 28 January you asked if we had any information about CND activities at Molesworth referred to in Robin Butler's minute of 25 January.

2. Our understanding is that anti-nuclear protest activities at Molesworth have hitherto not been organised by CND, but have been concentrated around two "peace" camps. One, called the "People's Peace Camp" at Clopton, was set up three years ago; and the other, known as the "Rainbow Fields Village" (which is on Ministry of Defence land at Brington) was set up last summer after a "Harvest for the Hungry" demonstration on the site. Unlike at Greenham, neither camp is exclusively feminist, but both are populated by floating groups of Quakers, and peace and ecology campaigners. Although individual members of subversive organisations have from time to time been involved with both the camps, neither owes its foundation or its continued existence to the support of any subversive group. Nor, as far as we can tell from overt sources, has CND itself as an organisation been involved in the formation or financing of either camp.

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO
Cabinet Office

/...

SECRET

3. CND involvement at Molesworth is about to increase, however. During the latter part of 1984 CND members in East Anglia, particularly those associated with the organisation "Action 84", were pressing CND to back the Molesworth "peace" campaign. A leading figure in this was Jimmy JOHNS, a former member of the (Trotskyist) Socialist Workers Party and one of the founders of "Action 84", who sits on CND's Projects Committee, which plans its future campaigns. As a result of this pressure, CND has decided to make Molesworth the focus of its campaigning in 1985. £20,000 has been set aside to finance a major demonstration culminating in a rally at Molesworth on Easter Monday. The rally will probably be well attended. The intention of CND now is to hinder any construction work at the site.

4. This is all by way of background. We ourselves had no knowledge of the house purchases referred to in Robin Butler's minute enclosed with your letter, but following your letter have obtained some information from the two police forces concerned. A crude structure used as a chapel has indeed been constructed by peace campers out of rubble on a site which may have been that of the former RAF chapel but is now within the campers' Rainbow Fields Village. The campers call the chapel "Eirene" after the Greek word for peace. The building has no roof but was dedicated (for religious services) by the Bishop of Huntingdon in September 1984. The structure, as well as the Rainbow Fields camp, is on land which is to be developed as part of the new base. In addition there has also been some interest shown, but not by CND, in purchasing a house in Clopton. The house was vacated and put on the market in December by its owner. At the end of December its Quaker caretaker received a letter from a member of the executive committee of the Ghandi Foundation. The writer understood that the owner of the house was anxious to sell it to someone connected with the peace movement and stated that the Ghandi Foundation might be interested in buying it. The house is no longer on the market, but the police do not know whether or not it has been sold.

Further information I have received from John Major is that the house was previously owned by a man called Lowe, a CND sympathiser. The Quaker caretaker is a man called Milne-Wallace, who is looking after the house with his wife. The member of the Executive committee of the Gandhi Foundation is thought to be Michael Lawler, a well-known CND sympathiser.

5. Neither we nor the local police know of any other prospective purchases of property in the area by peace campaigners in general or CND in particular, and we doubt that CND itself is currently in the market for such property. Certainly there is in its most recently published accounts no indication of such an intention. While the Campaign does have an annual income approaching £750,000 and could, if it chose, buy property, it could not do so without abandoning other established areas of activity or cutting back on full-time staff. We are aware of no evidence that they are planning to do either.

6. We have no information about the funding of the Ghandi Foundation.

Yours ever,

J L Jones

DEFENCE
Policing of Bases
Mulatan
Feb 83

FLC 84

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 January, 1985

Thank you for your letter of 25 January. The Prime Minister has seen and noted the terms of the Home Secretary's letter of 25 January to Cambridgeshire County Council.

DAVID BARCLAY

N. A. Pantling, Esq.,
Home Office

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

25 January 1985

Prime Minister (a)

Agreement has been reached on help for Cambridgeshire.

Dear David,

Duds 25/1

Following the Prime Minister's recent discussions with the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Environment about the representations received from Cambridgeshire Members concerning the financial arrangements for policing at RAF Molesworth and Alconbury, I enclose a copy of the letter the Home Secretary has today sent to Councillor Mrs Blatch, Chairman of the Cambridgeshire County Council.

Copies of the Home Secretary's letter have been sent to the Rt Hon Francis Pym, John Major, Sir Anthony Grant, Dr Brian Mawhinney and Robert Rhodes James.

Copies of this letter and its enclosure go to the Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Defence, Scotland and the Environment, the Chief Secretary and the Chief Whip.

Yours ever, Nigel

N A PANTLING

David Barclay, Esq.

HOME SECRETARY

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

25 January 1985

Dear Mrs Blatch,

In the light of the representations to me from Cambridgeshire Members, I have been giving further thought to the question of the financial arrangements for policing at Molesworth and Alconbury. As I said in my letter of 14 January, we cannot foresee now the scale of policing which may be needed in the coming months. However, I accept that if there are mass demonstrations of the kind which took place at Greenham Common in 1983 and 1984 there are likely to be heavy policing costs.

I thought it would be helpful to the County Council, in settling their budget for next year, to know that the Government will be prepared to give special assistance in meeting the additional costs of policing mass demonstrations at Molesworth and Alconbury in 1985-86 on the same basis as the assistance which we are giving with the costs of policing the miners' dispute. This means that the Home Office would meet 50% of the costs, up to the product of a 1p rate (£0.9M); beyond that, we should pay 90% (50% police grant and 40% special payment). So if the costs of policing mass demonstrations reached £3M, as you suggested in your letter, the Home Office would pay £2.34M, leaving £0.66M to be found by the County Council. If the costs were £2M, the Home Office would pay £1.44M. But the County Council's share of the costs would be limited to the product of a 3/4p rate; consequently, if the costs exceeded just over £3M, the Home Office would meet all the further costs. I am confidend that the police authority and the Chief Constable will do all they can to ensure that the arrangements for policing mass demonstrations are cost-effective, and because of this, I feel I can give you this assurance about the financial arrangements at this stage.

The question of a disregard under section 8 of the Local Government Finance Act 1982 is, of course, a matter for Patrick Jenkin. He has told me that he will give very sympathetic consideration to any application from the County Council for a disregard, should that prove necessary.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Margaret Shaw, as Chairman of the police authority.

Yours sincerely,

Leon Brittan

Councillor Mrs E M Blatch, CBE.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

file

EL3ADF

4

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)

The Prime Minister has heard from more than one source, but particularly from Mr John Major MP, that CND are making a major investment in properties in the neighbourhood of Molesworth as a base for their activities there. In particular, the Prime Minister has been told that a small brick-built shrine, known as an "Eirene" has recently been dedicated in the curtilage of Molesworth by the Bishop of Huntingdon. It is also reported, although this has not been confirmed, that CND are negotiating for a house at Clopton.

The Prime Minister has asked me to find out from you whether you have any access to information about these activities and in particular about the sources from which the substantial investment involved is being financed.

25 January 1985

SECRET AND PERSONAL

001/112

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister CCND
To note AT 24/1

Mr Turnbull
To note agreement reached.
Dub 24/1

CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE TREASURY

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

Rt Hon Leon Brittan QC MP
Secretary of State
Home Office
50 Queen Anne's Gate
London
SW1H 9AT

24 January 1985

Dear Leon

RAF MOLESWORTH

Thank you for your letter of 23 January about the arrangements for special financial assistance for policing mass demonstrations in 1985-86.

In all the circumstances I am content with your conclusion that the best course would be to make the special assistance available on the basis which applies for the additional costs of policing the miners' dispute. As and when additional costs arise at Molesworth and Alconbury, I would look to you to meet the cost of extra grant payments from either the police or other elements in your cash-limited programmes.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, Patrick Jenkin, George Younger, Michael Heseltine and John Wakeham.

Yours ever Peter

PETER REES

CONFIDENTIAL

24 JAN 1985



CONFIDENTIAL

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cc/no.

HOME SECRETARY

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SWIH 9AT

23 January 1985

Await Ch Sec's reply DMB 23/1

Dear Peter,

RAF MOLESWORTH

Since our discussion yesterday evening, I have given further thought to possible ways of giving Cambridgeshire additional financial help to meet the costs of policing at the two RAF bases at Molesworth and Alconbury.

I have considered a number of options and the effect at different levels of expenditure. I have come to the conclusion that the best course would be to adopt the same arrangements which we have used for financing the miners' dispute, but confining assistance to the additional costs arising from policing mass demonstrations at Molesworth and Alconbury. You will recall that for the miners' dispute assistance was based on a threshold of a one penny rate expenditure, above which special financial assistance was given. There was also a cut off point for the total share which a local authority would be expected to bear. The product of a 1p rate in Cambridgeshire is £0.9m. Additional costs up to that point would be shared equally between the Home Office and Cambridgeshire in the normal way. Beyond that point, we should meet 90% of the costs (that is, 50% police grant and 40% special payment). Cambridgeshire's total share would not exceed the product of a ¾p rate. Thus, if costs were £1m, our share would be £0.54m; at £2m, £1.44m, and at £3m, £2.34m. Once the total expenditure exceeded a little over £3m we would meet all the further costs. Using this arrangement will have the advantage that we can easily apply the system for administering the miners' dispute special payment.

I have considered whether we should reveal only part of our proposals at this stage, as we did with the miners' dispute. I have concluded that if the county council are to settle their budget next week with the necessary degree of confidence we shall have to reassure them that there will be a limit to their share, and that below their limit a specified proportion of the costs will be met. I would, however, propose to say nothing about the period beyond the financial year 1985/6 since that is outside the period to which the budget applies.

I propose, therefore, that I should tell Cambridgeshire that we shall be prepared to give special financial assistance in meeting the additional costs of policing mass demonstrations at Molesworth and Alconbury in 1985/6 on the same basis as the assistance which we are giving with the costs of policing the miners' dispute. I shall give further thought to the handling of this news.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, Patrick Jenkin, George Younger, Michael Heseltine and John Wakeham.

Yours ever, Leon

The Rt Hon Peter Rees, QC, MP

CONFIDENTIAL

23 JUIN 1983



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 September 1984

Demonstrations at Greenham Common

Thank you for your letter of 17 September, which the Prime Minister has seen and noted. She was grateful to be kept in touch.

(David Barclay)

Nigel Pantling, Esq.,
Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

010

ccpo

Prime Minister (2)
To note. There may be trouble at Greenham Common towards the end of the month, but on a relatively small scale.
DWB 17/9

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

17 September 1984

Dear David,

DEMONSTRATIONS AT GREENHAM COMMON: 20-30 SEPTEMBER 1984

The Home Secretary believes that the Prime Minister will wish to be aware that the women's peace movement is planning a series of demonstrations at RAF Greenham Common during the period 20-30 September, and to have a report of the plans which the police and Ministry of Defence are making.

The motivation for the demonstrations appears to have come from the Greenham peace women themselves and they appear to be responsible for their organisation. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has given over a limited amount of space in its publications for publicity for the demonstrations, but on a much reduced scale compared with previous occasions. Nationally, CND has shown no interest in organising the event and little in supporting it. The publicly declared aim of the demonstrations is to "recover" the base and the dates appear to have been chosen broadly to coincide with the Greenham peace camp's third anniversary. They also coincide with Operation Lionheart.

Some of the advance publicity for the demonstrations has anticipated 10 million people turning out in support of them. However the best assessment currently available from the Thames Valley Police suggests that the demonstrations will receive most support over the weekend 29/30 September, when something in the order of 3,000 demonstrators can be expected. The first weekend, 22/23 September is likely to be less well supported, as are week days. Some 300 can be expected during the week. You will appreciate that at this stage, these estimates are somewhat speculative; a more accurate assessment may only be possible a day or so before the event when the police have a clearer idea about, for example, the number of coaches that have been booked.

Whatever the attendance, however, the Thames Valley Police are expecting some problems with disorder and, as on previous occasions, attempts to breach the perimeter fence. They plan to maintain a 24 hour presence throughout the period and have obtained support from the Metropolitan Police Mounted Branch. Otherwise, the Thames Valley Police expect to meet the policing requirement from within their own resources and do not, at this stage, envisage having to call upon mutual aid from other forces.

I understand from the Ministry of Defence that they are taking steps to reinforce the inside of the perimeter in line with their policy of keeping incursions to a minimum and preventing trespassers coming into contact with armed US personnel in sensitive areas. These steps include -

(1) Increasing the established complement of Ministry of Defence Police from 50 to 200 by day and by night throughout the period, with additional dog teams.

/(2)

David Barclay, Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Increasing the number of RAF personnel from 120 to 250 throughout the period, with additional dog teams.

(3) Making available a composite infantry battalion of 600 men to reinforce the base at any time during the period, but particularly weekends.

(4) Keeping an RAF regiment on notice as additional reinforcements.

Command and control arrangements will follow the pattern successfully used in the past, whereby reinforcing units will come under the operational control of the Commander in Chief RAF Support Command, exercised by the RAF Commander on the spot. He will liaise closely with his USAF counterparts and with the Thames Valley Police.

I should also mention that on 12 September in the High Court, the Department of Transport obtained an order for possession of its land outside the main entrance to Greenham Common. I understand however that the Department of Transport does not intend to enforce the order until the demonstrations are over, an approach which has the full support of the Thames Valley Police.

We are remaining in close contact with the police and will, of course, report any significant changes in the assessment or planning before next Thursday.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Defence and Transport and to Richard Hatfield.

Yours ever

Nigel

N A PANTLING

1984

CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

MO 21/17/1

13th September 1984

Thank you for your letter of 3rd September 1984 about the land transfer arrangements to be effected at RAF Greenham Common.

I was, of course, pleased to hear of the action you have in hand to enforce your rights of eviction against the peace women camped on your land outside the main gate of RAF Greenham Common. I am content that you should proceed as you propose.

On land transfer arrangements, I am advised that agreement has been reached by both our Departments and the local authorities concerned on the land to be transferred and on the steps that are necessary; I understand that what is now required is for the PSA Estates Surveyor to draw up detailed maps to enable the transfers to be formally concluded, and that this is in hand.

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours.

Michael Heseltine

The Rt Hon Nicholas Ridley MP

CONFIDENTIAL

DEFENCE
Policy &
Demos
Feb 83

19 SEP 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB

01-212 3434

Rt Hon Michael Heseltine
Secretary of State
Ministry of Defence
Whitehall
London
SWIA 2HB

R/PSO/8382/84

3 September 1984

nbpm DMB 4/9

Dear Michael

Thank you for your letter of 1st August about the proposed land transfer at Greenham Common: you will have seen Leon Brittan's letter of 10th August to me.

I am now seeking an order under the procedure in Order 113 of the Rules of the Supreme Court to obtain possession and clearance of the highway land outside the airbase main gate. The hearing will be held at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, on Wednesday, 12th September and I expect that the order will be granted with immediate effect. It will be for the Under Sheriff of Berkshire to clear the land on a date to be arranged between 13th and 20th September, the Thames Valley Police being on hand to deal with any obstruction or breach of the peace. Clearance after 20th September will probably be impossible because I understand that the peace protestors are holding a 10 day rally at Greenham Common to celebrate the third anniversary of their protest.

My original intention had been to seek the court order after the rally had taken place but 10th October is electoral registration day at Newbury and the district council are naturally anxious to avoid residence claims being made by a large number of protestors attracted there by the prospect of another tilt at 'authority'.

Notice of the application and the hearing arrangements have now been made public: this is a requirement of the Order 113 procedure. It will inevitably alert the news media to speculate about a date for clearance - which we shall have to keep to ourselves in order to avoid a repetition of last April's events.

/ Now that the .....

CONFIDENTIAL

Now that the arrangements for initial clearance are under way, my officials are in touch with Newbury District Council to use their wardens to prevent to re-establishment of the peace camp on highway land. This will continue until the land is transferred to your Department. While on the subject of the land transfer, my officials tell me that they are still waiting for yours to put forward proposals for the amounts of highway and common land to be transferred. I do hope that this will be shortly forthcoming so that we may jointly make progress.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, the Lord President, Lord Chancellor, Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Scotland, Wales and Environment, to the Attorney General, Lord Advocate, the Home Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

NICHOLAS RIDLEY

DEFENCE : Policing of Military Bases

Feb 83

CONFIDENTIAL

CNO

HOME SECRETARY

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

10 August 1984

Dmb 13/8

DB to NCO

GREENHAM COMMON

WHN TF/DB?

In her letter of 2 August to the Prime Minister's Private Secretary, your Private Secretary explained that on 1 August, you and I, together with Douglas Hurd, discussed the actions which your Department might take in respect of protestors and their encampments which have returned to the Transport land outside the main gate at RAF Greenham Common, now that the roadworks there have been completed. In your letter of 26 July to me, you had agreed that action should be taken, in the interval before the land is transferred to the Ministry of Defence and brought within the base perimeter fence.

We were clear in our discussion that we were not concerned with concerted action by the landowners at Greenham which had been considered, and put to one side, at the meeting which the Prime Minister chaired on 5 March. In that context, 'concerted' meant both that all the landowners would apply together to the court for an order covering all the land, and that they would pursue jointly every measure of enforcement available, up to and including, if necessary, the imprisonment of protestors.

By contrast, the nature of the action which your Department would take would be in line with the alternative approach agreed at the meeting on 5 March. The relevant parts of the record of that meeting read:

> "The more effective approach would be gradually to make occupation of the land more inconvenient. This could be achieved by action at a local level, and without concerted recourse to the courts, if the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Transport authorised the Newbury officers to act on their behalf." and
>
> "Summing up, the Prime Minister said that the possibility of concerted civil action through the courts should not be pursued at present, although an order for possession might need to be sought at a later stage. The various public authorities involved, including the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Transport, should exercise their rights to remove trespassers, using the Newbury officers where possible."

Thus the objective is not to try to clear the land once and for all, insofar as that might require constant enforcement action and possibly the imprisonment of protestors, but rather to increase the inconvenience to them, as the other, local authority landowners are doing in their periodic actions to deal with trespass at Greenham.

The Rt Hon Nicholas Ridley, MP

CONFIDENTIAL

The particular remedy to adopt, and the pursuit of its enforcement, are of course matters for your Department, as the landowner to decide. As you mentioned at our meeting, and as your Private Secretary's letter records, your intention is to apply to the High Court for an order for possession of the land. We noted in our discussion that such an application may attract publicity, but the key factor will be to enforce the order without generating major opposition and reviving the protest. It would, of course, be sensible to avoid giving early advance publicity to the first or any subsequent date of enforcement action: when it was made public some weeks in advance that the land was to be cleared for the roadworks on 2 April, some hundreds of protestors gathered on that day to resist the bailiffs and the police.

The understanding of your officials was that it might take about two weeks to secure an order for possession, and that thereafter 28 days would need to pass before the order could be executed. In the interim, it might be possible to follow the example of the local authorities. Once or twice a week, with a police presence to deal with any breach of the peace, the enforcement officers engaged by Newbury District Council and who also act on behalf of Berkshire County Council, remove protestors' tents and other structures from Newbury's common land or Berkshire's highway land, as the case may be. With structures on the common land, the officers exercise the power of removal conferred by the byelaws which apply to it. For the action against structures on Berkshire's highway land, the officers give practical effect to the County Council's powers, as the landowner, of 'self help'. As the paper by officials noted, 'self-help' can be a potentially controversial measure if people are removed and force is used. But the experience of the other landowners involved suggests that the use of self-help to remove structures from your Department's land, which could be embarked upon as soon as enforcement officers were ready, should not excite controversy.

I should be grateful if your officials would keep in touch with mine about the plans for acting against the trespass on Transport land as well as the timetable for the later transfer of the land to the Ministry of Defence not least so that the police may be alerted as necessary.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Willie Whitelaw, Quintin Hailsham, Geoffrey Howe, Jim Prior, Michael Heseltine, George Younger, Nick Edwards, Patrick Jenkin, Michael Havers and Kenneth Cameron, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

DEFENCE
Editing of Demos
Feb 93

CC NO

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

MO 21/17/1

1st August 1984

Thank you for your letter of 20th July about the possible transfer of land at Greenham Common to the Ministry of Defence.

I am concerned that the Highways and Council land near the main gate at RAF Greenham Common should be enclosed within the base as soon as possible. The discussions now taking place at official level between our two Departments and Newbury District Council should enable us to confirm that land transfers are feasible, to identify precisely the steps required, and to estimate how long these should take. I shall write to you again once this information is available.

I naturally welcome your decision to take action against protestors camping on the Highway land while it remains within your Department's control. (Your letter of 26th July to Leon Brittan refers.) To be successful the eviction of trespassers from land around the base needs to be co-ordinated by the three major landholders concerned - the Department of Transport, MOD and Newbury District Council. I have therefore instructed my officials to assist and co-operate with your Department as much as possible on this matter.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, the Lord President, the Lord Chancellor, the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Scotland, Wales and the Environment, to

The Rt Hon Nicholas Ridley MP

the Attorney General, the Lord Advocate and the Home Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

Michael Heseltine

Defense Feb. 83

Military

Planning at ~~Air~~ bases

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB

01-212 3434

The Rt Hon Leon Brittan QC MP
Secretary of State for the
Home Department
Home Office
50 Queen Anne's Gate
LONDON SW1H 9AT

26 July 1984

Dear Leon

GREENHAM COMMON

Thank you for your letter of 24 July. I think it will have crossed with my own letters of 20 July to Quintin Hailsham and Michael Heseltine which I copied to you.

As you will have seen, I remain concerned that any attempts to evict the protesters from highway land will be difficult to enforce in the period before MOD acquire the land for the extension of entrance area of the Airbase. I also believe that a series of evictions beginning soon will give the protesters more publicity, another cause, increase their number, involve repeated police action and disturb the neighbourhood still more.

However, in the spirit of the note of the meeting of 5 March, I must accept that colleagues involved very much wish to see action taken against the protesters as trespassers on Government property. I have therefore today instructed my officials to begin action through the Courts to obtain an Order to re-possess the land now occupied by the protesters. I have asked them to call a meeting of Departments involved so that the implications can be fully appreciated and any further necessary action put in hand.

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My Department's actions will need careful presentation to the public at large and especially to people living in the Greenham Common area. Local people will want to be reassured that the proposed acquisition of land by MOD to take the main gate fencing up to the edge of the road and so to exclude the practical possibility of its use by protesters, will be going ahead as quickly as possible. Officials of MOD and my Department are meeting about this on 1 August.

I am copying this letter to those who received copies of your letter of 24 July.

NICHOLAS RIDLEY

Defence 2183

Policing of Bases



CONFIDENTIAL

CCNO

HOUSE OF LORDS,
SW1A 0PW

25 July 1984

Dear Nicky

Greenham Common

Thank you for your letter of 20th July and for sending me a copy of your letter to Michael Heseltine.

Whilst I appreciate your policy concerning travellers and the difficult decisions which are needed when they hardly travel and when they have camped in the same place for years, I still see our present problem quite differently. I think that your attitude towards these women should depend on the ownership of the land concerned by the Crown rather than on your functions as a highway authority.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Willie Whitelaw, Leon Brittan, Geoffrey Howe, Jim Prior, Michael Heseltine, George Younger, Nicholas Edwards, Patrick Jenkin, Michael Havers, Kenneth Cameron and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yrs:

The Right Honourable
Nicholas Ridley, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Transport.

CONFIDENTIAL

Policing of Demonstations : DEFENCE. Feb 83

CONFIDENTIAL

a/k

HOME SECRETARY

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

24th July 1984

DMB
24/7

Dear Nick,

GREENHAM COMMON

Thank you for your letter of 23 May about future action in respect of those pieces of land at RAF Greenham Common owned by your Department from which demonstrators were excluded whilst contractors were engaged on the roadworks there but which were not taken up by the works. Michael Heseltine has copied to me his letter of 28 June to you about this, and Quintin Hailsham has similarly copied to me his letter of 6 July to Michael.

The proposed transfer from your Department to the Ministry of Defence of the land which is surplus to highway needs is, of course, a matter for your two Departments. But I strongly support it, and hope it can be effected as quickly as possible. The broad result will be to bring within the base perimeter land on which protestors have hitherto, except during the roadworks, sited their major camps.

But this leaves the question of whether or not in the interim your Department should act against the protestors as trespassers, perhaps, like Berkshire County Council, employing the services of the enforcement officers engaged by Newbury District Council. Like Michael and Quintin, I would ask you to reconsider your position on this and very much hope that you will feel able to do so.

The meeting on 5 March chaired by the Prime Minister, put on ice the proposal that there should be concerted civil action by all the landowners, moving jointly to have protestors moved. But the alternative which we agreed was that the various public authorities involved, including Government Departments, should exercise their own powers to remove trespassers. That clear conclusion did of course leave it to each Department to decide the precise way of doing this. The road improvement scheme provided a basis for removing protestors from the land while those works were being undertaken; but now that that is over, the Department should surely use its ordinary powers as a landowner to remove trespassers. I feel very strongly that we should not now act in such a way as to allow the protestors on to Government land while at the same time we are encouraging local authorities to evict them from theirs.

The Chief Constable of Thames Valley tells me that that is what is happening. The number of protestors round the base, and the sites of their camps, vary but on a typical day, 13 July, of about 30 encamped protestors some 25 were on the Transport land. The meeting on 5 March took account of a letter from the Thames Valley Police Authority urging greater central co-ordination of action. The Authority have repeated that request in a letter to my Department. Whatever happens at Greenham, the police will have to carry the burden of their proper duties. But it will not be easy to reply to the Authority if we have to acknowledge that your Department's land is to continue to be made available to protestors. I understand that if your Department were to act to remove the

The Rt Hon Nicholas Ridley, MP

CONFIDENTIAL

protestors as trespassers it would be making an exception to its normal practice, and the protestors might be able to exploit this. But I very much doubt whether this would really enable them to attract fresh supporters to oppose removal action. I think that there would be general support for the view that the protestors have had every legitimate opportunity to exercise their democratic right of peaceful protest to which you refer, and that the circumstances at Greenham more than justify an exception being made to the Department's normal practice.

The bullet of enforcement will have to be bitten in any event when the land is brought within the base perimeter. The alternative to explaining taking action to remove the protestors as trespassers from Transport land is having to explain convincingly why such action is not being taken, against the background both of the activity of the local authorities and of the public perception of the action your Department took, in removing protestors, during the road improvement works.

We certainly need to develop a defensible public line on your Department's policy in relation to its land at Greenham. If, as I hope, you are able to conclude that action should be taken against the protestors as trespassers, it might be better if that were simply put in hand, without any public announcement which might attract opposition, although it would be helpful if your officials would liaise with mine in advance so that the police could have prior notice. If we have to wait for the transfer of the land to Michael's Department, which I very much hope will not be the case, I share his view that an early public announcement of that intention could help to reassure our supporters. The Written Answer on 9 July, in which you told Richard Tracey that you were considering the transfer, seems helpful. Perhaps it could in that eventuality be followed up by an Answer announcing that the transfer is in hand, as soon as that can be made.

I very much hope, however, that you will feel able to decide to act against the trespass of the protestors and would also appreciate it if I could be kept in touch with the timetable of the transfer of the land to the Ministry of Defence.

If you still feel that it is difficult to take action of this kind, I would like to have the chance of discussing the matter with you.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Willie Whitelaw, Quintin Hailsham, Geoffrey Howe, Jim Prior, Michael Heseltine, George Younger, Nicholas Edwards, Patrick Jenkin, Michael Havers, and Kenneth Cameron, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Defence: Policing of Military Bases
Feb 83



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cc PS P.S.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB

01-212 3434

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON SW1A 2HB

20 July 1984

Dear Michael

Thank you for your letter of 28 June agreeing that the surplus trunk road land outside the Greenham Common Air Base main gate should be acquired by your Department to provide extra space for the administrative area. As you know, I announced the news to the House on 9 July.

Provided that you can acquire the necessary common land from Newbury District Council, you will be able to move the air base perimeter fence close to the trunk road carriageway. Thus any subsequent encroachment by protestors on trunk road land would constitute an obstruction, and the civil police will be able to act. The land acquisition arrangements can be left to our officials, but must include the stopping-up of public rights of passage over the land.

As you say, the case is unusual. It is a protest of great durability on public land, both highway and common. There is no doubt that the protestors are trespassing. But they are not actually obstructing the highway. I would agree that, on the face of it, it would be possible to use landlord common law rights, or to seek the approval of the courts, to evict them. There can be little doubt that a court would grant an application.

CONFIDENTIAL

But there are three factors which influence my view that to seek eviction would not be the best approach.

First, there is our policy towards travellers. The situation of these people and the Greenham Common protestors is, I believe, in law much the same. They both trespass on the highway. Yet in the case of travellers, we condone it.

Secondly, if I evicted the protestors, there would be the problem of enforcement. It is very doubtful that applications for eviction would actually clear the camp site. This is why I have been chary about the question of eviction, whether it be by Newbury's wardens or in execution of a Court Order. I fear we would be faced by a series of continuous applications to the courts to seek the eviction of different sets of individuals. Our action would not only be ineffective for some time, but would be seen to be so.

Thirdly, I believe any attempt to evict the protestors now would bring them more publicity when Press interest is muted, and give the women a further cause. In the summer period, action might attract more attention and people to Greenham Common and particularly students during their vacation.

I believe that the proposal for the base to extend its boundaries represents the best means of ending the protest around the immediate main gate area, regarded as a focus for peace protestors generally. At this stage I

see no practical benefit in evicting the protestors. The affair is low-key at present, although I gather there is a prospect of a major demonstration by camping around the air base for 10 days to celebrate the third anniversary of the protest. That apart, there is surely little to be gained in provoking confrontation and reviving media interest. It could add to the aggravation and inconvenience caused and do nothing to assist the longer term interests of local residents.

I recognise it will not be possible to arrange transfer of my Department's land to your Department quickly; but, like you, I am anxious we should get ahead with the necessary arrangements as quickly as possible. My officials are standing by for the proposed meeting with your officials and Newbury District Council.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister and to the other recipients of our correspondence.

Yours ever

Nicholas

NICHOLAS RIDLEY

3F

23 JUL 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

CC/K

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB

01-212 3434

The Rt Hon The Lord Hailsham of
St Marylebone CH FRS DCL
Lord Chancellor
House of Lords
LONDON SW1A OPW

26 July 1984

Dear Quintin

Thank you for the copy of your letter of 6 July to Michael Heseltine about Greenham Common. I have written to Michael today as enclosed.

We all share the view that the case is unusual. But I do not believe there is a clear distinction between travellers and the protestors. Certainly some of the former live a nomadic life, but my Department's experience as a highway authority is that significant numbers do not. There are cases where they are camped on highway verges and have been there for years. Where they are safe and do not interfere with traffic, we have, in line with established Government policy, not attempted to harass them to be on their way.

Whether travellers or protestors, they both trespass on and illegally occupy the highway verge on which they camp. Should I proceed against the one but not the other? I do not think that at present I reasonably can. To do so would require a general change in our policy towards travellers. For this and the other reasons explained in my

CONFIDENTIAL

reply to Michael Heseltine, I am not persuaded of the wisdom of eviction now, which means trying to keep the protestors off the land until it is taken behind the air base perimeter fence. I say "trying" because I doubt in fact that our efforts would prove effective and we might being upon ourselves more problems than we would solve.

Copies of this letter go to the Prime Minister, Michael Heseltine and to the other recipients of the correspondence.

Yours ever

Nicholas

NICHOLAS RIDLEY


23 JUL 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

LCCPC

HOUSE OF LORDS,
SW1A 0PW

6 July 1984

nbpm Dmcb 9/7

My dear Michael: GREENHAM COMMON

In your letter of 28th June 1984 you ask Nicholas Ridley to reconsider the position he has taken that these women should be treated in the spirit of his Department's general policy of toleration towards gypsies and other itinerants who are not evicted from highway land provided that they do not cause obstruction or danger to traffic.

I share your view that we are not dealing with the usual case. These women are not itinerants who have nomadism as their cultural tradition. Neither are they lawful users of the highway. They are trespassers.

Our policy, which we agreed in March with the Prime Minister, must surely apply to land owned by the Crown and in our immediate control just as it does to that of other landowners including Newbury Council.

I am copying this letter to Nicholas Ridley, to the Prime Minister and to the others to whom you copied yours.

Yrs:

The Right Honourable
Michael Heseltine, M.P.,
Secretary of State for
Defence.

Defence: Policing of Demos Feb 83

- 9 JUL 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Sir PC
P. Surplus

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

MO 11/2/2

28th June 1984

Thank you for copying to me your letter of 23rd May to Leon Brittan, in which you discuss the future of those surplus pieces of highway land which remain now that road works at RAF Greenham Common have been completed.

As you will be aware, MOD and PSA officials have been in contact with the Department of Transport and with Newbury District Council, to consider the possibility of incorporating the surplus highway land and some common land into the base. Not only would such a transfer of land provide welcome extra space in the administrative area of the base, but it would make the situation outside the main gate much tidier. Under such a transfer, the perimeter fence would follow the road carriageway as closely as sight lines and safety considerations allow thus eliminating the area currently available to campers, and putting to use the residual highway land which has no highways value. I hope you will agree that officials from your Department and mine should meet as soon as possible to conclude arrangements to transfer the surplus highways land.

It is, of course, most important that the repositioned fence should follow exactly the boundary between what would then be

The Rt Hon Nicholas Ridley MP

Ministry of Defence land, and the remaining Transport land; so that on the one hand there is no Ministry of Defence land outside the perimeter fence (which I regard as an essential condition for the proposed transfer), while on the other hand any trespass or camping on the remaining Transport land would constitute a highways offence to be dealt with by the civil police. I attach diagrams on which the approximate position of the proposed new perimeter is marked; the exact position will be worked out in the light of detailed safety and sight line considerations.

The diagrams also show the areas of common land which it is proposed should be incorporated into the base, and of Ministry of Defence owned common land which would be transferred to the Council in exchange. This exchange both gives the Ministry of Defence useful administrative space in return for rough ground, and means that it will no longer be responsible for land outside the fence on the eastern side of the base. Negitiations with the Council to complete this exchange are bound to take a little longer than arrangements to transfer surplus Transport land. You will appreciate that I would not wish my Department actually to take possession of the Transport land until my staff have completed negotiations with the Council, and the newly acquired land can all be properly fenced in.

So far as preventing access to your land by peacewomen is concerned I appreciate that you would not wish to act against the spirit of your policy towards itinerants, but I am sure you will agree that this particular case is unusual. It was clear when we met with the Prime Minister in March that our policy was that all the landowners involved should exercise their landlord rights to remove trespassers, using the Newbury officers where possible. We are in danger of returning to the unsatisfactory position which existed before, where the Department of Transport would not act, and because of that Newbury Council would not clear their area - all of which causes the local police unnecessary extra trouble. I do not believe that this would be acceptable to our supporters. I wonder therefore whether

you would reconsider the position you take in your letter; and take action, perhaps by inviting the Newbury bailiffs (as the Ministry of Defence has in the past) to act on your Departments' behalf until the transfer arrangements are finished, to remove those who set up new camps on the land. I understand that in fact a number of women have already moved back onto it.

If you still feel unable to act to prevent the peace camp re-establishing itself on your land pending the land transfer arrangements, then it may be necessary, as soon as officials have worked out the precise arrangements, to consider an early announcement of our intentions if only to reassure our supporters locally.

Copies of this letter go to those to whom your letter to Leon Brittan was copied.

Yours ever

Michael Heseltine

ANNEX A

RAF GREENHAM COMMON



— Present MOD Fence
-- Proposed MOD Fence
■ DTp land for transfer to MOD
▩ MOD land for transfer to Council
□ Council land for transfer to MOD

See Annex B

ANNEX B

RAF GREENHAM COMMON

Main Gate Area



Present MOD Perimeter

Proposed MOD Perimeter

Transport Land

Common Land

Land for transfer to MOD

DEFENCE : Policing of Demos : Feb 83.

3 JUL 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB

01-212 3434

The Rt Hon Leon Brittan QC MP
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Home Office
50 Queen Anne's Gate
LONDON SW1H 9AT

Await Home Secretary and MOD

23 May 1984

Dear Leon

GREENHAM COMMON

See Mtg record 6.3.84

Following discussions earlier this year about the possibilities for concerted, co-ordinated action against the Greenham Common women, the Prime Minister agreed that I should press ahead with the minor road improvement scheme outside the air base main gate. As you know, the women were evicted on 4 April and work began immediately: I expect it to be completed during the first half of June.

When the works are complete the temporary restriction of the public rights of passage over the land will automatically come to an end and the area at present fenced off must be restored to the highway. Not all the trunk road verge has been incorporated into the carriageway, and there is a strong probability that as soon as the fence is taken down the women will immediately seek to reoccupy what remains.

My officials have been discussing with the Ministry of Defence the suggestion that arose in our earlier discussions that they should acquire the surplus highway land and incorporate it within the air base. The advantage of this would be to bring the perimeter fence down virtually to the edge of the trunk road carriageway and deny any permanent re-establishment of the camp at that site. But this is less straightforward than at first appeared, since MOD would also have to acquire some intervening common land owned by Newbury District Council.

The women could still camp on other areas of land and I think it is for Michael Heseltine to consider whether it is worth going through what are bound to be complex and somewhat time-consuming procedures to bring the gate nearer the trunk road. Officials of my Department will however continue discussions with Newbury about the exchange of some surplus highway land for a small piece of common land on the south side of the trunk road to construct a bus layby.

Whatever we do it is clear that the legal procedures involved cannot be completed before the current roadworks are finished. There will therefore be at least a period of time when the women could re-occupy the trunk road land. I do not think that on highway grounds I can act to prevent this. My Department, in common with others, has a well established policy of toleration towards gypsies and other itinerants. We do not evict them from highway land provided that they do not cause obstruction or danger to traffic. Similarly, in my view, it is not for me, acting as highway authority, to prevent the Greenham women from exercising their democratic right of peaceful protest. I should, of course, expect the police to take action if the women presented an actual obstruction or hazard to road traffic.

In passing, perhaps I should add that within the past few days another, but much smaller camp has been set up on highway land at the junction of the A1 and A14 trunk roads about 1 kilometre from the main entrance to RAF Alconbury, south of Peterborough. My Department thinks that the presence of the campers constitutes a potential hazard to traffic on these very busy roads and has served warning notices on them under section 143 of the Highway Act to remove their structures. We have also let the local police know that if an actual risk to road safety were to appear imminent we should expect them to take action at once.

We have not however - despite pressure from the County Council - taken any action to evict the women forthwith for trespass. This would be out of line with our attitude hitherto at Greenham Common and, to be consistent, would require a change in our current policy to gypsies and others who use road verges. There is also no certainty - as our earlier discussions showed - that we could effectively prevent determined protesters from constantly returning. I would of course be ready to take a tougher line about trespass on highway land if a general decision were taken to alter our policy towards gypsies or to take concerted action at Greenham. But in the absence of such decisions I think the only action I can publicly defend must be based on the rights and safety of road users.

Copies of this letter go to the Prime Minister, Willie Whitelaw, Quintin Hailsham, Geoffrey Howe, Jim Prior, Michael Heseltine, George Younger, Nicholas Edwards, Patrick Jenkin, Michael Havers, and James Mackay and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

Nicholas

NICHOLAS RIDLEY

P4 DMB 9/4

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

Greenham Common

The Department of Transport say the bailiffs will be trying again to repossess the Department's land at Greenham Common at dawn tomorrow. The Department are in close touch with the police.

DMB

3 April 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

JR

SUBJECT file
cc Master.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 March 1984

Dear Nigel,

PROTESTERS AT GREENHAM COMMON

The Prime Minister held a meeting on 5 March to consider the Home Secretary's minute of 21 February about protesters at Greenham Common. The Secretary of State for Transport's minute of 29 February was also before the meeting. In addition to your Secretary of State, thos present were the Lord President, the Lord Chancellor, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for the Environment, the Attorney General, the Minister of State for Transport and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Your Secretary of State said that officials had been examining the prospects for concerted civil action against the Greenham Common protesters, in the light of the earlier conclusion that the criminal law could not provide a comprehensive solution. Counsels' opinion had been obtained. It seemed that there would be little difficulty in commencing action to remove the women, but that once the necessary court orders had been obtained, enforcement could be a real problem. Although the names of the trespassers were not required for the purpose of obtaining a possession order under Order 113 of the Supreme Court, they would be required if an injunction had to be sought or if an action had to be brought for contempt of court.

Your Secretary of State added that, since his minute had been written, some further developments had occurred, and some further information had come to light. At the latest count, there were 67 people in six camps, though the total varied from day-to-day in the range 40-80. Officers employed by Newbury District Council were regularly removing structures erected by the women, both from common land, using their powers under the byelaws, and more recently from land owned by Berkshire County Council, acting as the County's agents. Thus, if the Government decided against concerted civil action, something at least was being done.

The Minister of State for Transport said that the Department of Transport was proposing to advertise on 13 March their intention to remove protesters from land in their ownership.

/ This would

088

This would enable work on the highway improvement scheme to start at the beginning of April. If this deadline were not met, a delay of three months would ensue.

In discussion, concern was expressed about the chances of concerted civil action failing, with a consequent loss of credibility for the Government. There was some evidence that the Greenham women were demoralised, and that the press were losing interest. It would be a mistake for the Government to offer them the cause they were seeking by adopting a higher profile than was strictly necessary. The more effective approach would be gradually to make occupation of the land more inconvenient. This could be achieved by action at a local level, and without concerted recourse to the courts, if the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Transport authorised the Newbury officers to act on their behalf. In would also be sensible for the Ministry of Defence land to be extended slightly to adjoin the highway, with a compensating grant of common land elsewhere.

Improvements to the perimeter fence were not the answer: no fence was entirely proof against incursions, and the more difficulties that were placed in the way of the women, the more it would add to their sense of adventure.

Difficulties would inevitably arise when the missiles were deployed off base. The Secretary of State for Defence planned that the convoys would be protected by civil police, accompanied by RAF police. It was an offence to obstruct a British serviceman in the course of his duty, and this, together with the offence of obstructing the highway, should allow the police to act. Nevertheless, vehicular obstruction, as so effectively demonstrated in the French lorry drivers' strike, was a real risk. The Secretary of State said that he was opposed to any extension of the Army Act to cover the obstruction of visiting servicemen, at least at present.

Summing up, the Prime Minister said that the possibility of concerted civil action through the courts should not be pursued at present, although an order for possession might need to be sought at a later stage. The various public authorities involved, including the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Transport, should exercise their rights to remove trespassers, using the Newbury officers where possible. The proposals in the Secretary of State for Transport's minute of 29 February were agreed. The resolution sent by the Thames Valley Police Authority to Sir Robert Armstrong should be noted, and copies sent to the appropriate Government Departments.

/ I am sending

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to those Ministers who attended the meeting, and to Dinah Nicols (Department of Transport), John Lyon (Northern Ireland Office), John Graham (Scottish Office), Colin Jones (Welsh Office), Christine Duncan (Lord Advocate's Department) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

David

(DAVID BARCLAY)

Nigel Pantling, Esq.,
Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Protestors at Greenham Common

This meeting has been called to discuss the Home Secretary's minute of 21 February at Flag A.

You have not yet seen the Secretary of State for Transport's minute at Flag B in which he argues that he must proceed soon with clearing the land needed for a road improvement scheme. He could do this whether or not there is a general move against the protestors, but the issue could conveniently be considered in the course of the meeting.

DMB

2 March 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

PROTESTERS AT GREENHAM COMMON

I have seen a copy of the Home Secretary's minute to you of 21 February together with the paper by officials and Counsels' joint advice on the prospects for concerted civil action against the so-called Greenham Common Peace Camp.

Whatever is decided about a general co-ordinated approach (which looks less than promising), I think we must proceed as soon as possible with the minor road improvement scheme at the junction of the trunk road and the main access to the air base. The roadworks are needed for road safety and traffic reasons. To do the works, I must repossess the highway land in the vicinity of the junction. The campers and their dwellings will have to go. It is likely that the two local authorities will take some simultaneous eviction action. As the Home Secretary points out in his minute, while this would not achieve total clearance it would be a significant step forward and can be done without the apparent degree of provocation that a more general move against the women might provoke.

The roadworks should start by early April if the present contractor is to be used. Delay beyond then will mean that another contractor has to be found; this will put back the scheme by 3 months. Unless therefore you

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and my colleagues feel strongly that I should hold my hand, I would propose to instruct my officials to proceed.

Copies of this minute go to the Lord President, the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland, Defence, Scotland and the Environment, the Attorney General, the Lord Advocate, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

NR

NICHOLAS RIDLEY
29 February 1984

DEFENCE: Basing of Military Bases

Feb 83

MAR 1984

Caroline

Could you please help us?

You asked for the attached to be filed. What is the meeting about?

Mark

27/2

Greenham Common

5 March

1700.

CR. 27/2

CF please file.
CR.

10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline -

the Lord Advocate's office rang, to say that he (ie Lord Advocate) will not attend the meeting on 9/3/84 which you have invited him to.

CST
23/2/84

MR. BUTLER
MR. COLES
MR. TURNBULL
MR. FLESHER
MR. BARCLAY ✓
MR. ALISON
MR. SHERBOURNE

CF: No brief required
Please b/f for meeting.
DMB
23/2

I have arranged the following meeting with the Prime Minister:-

Subject ..Protestors at Greenham Common..

Date ..5 March..

Time ..1700..

Venue ..No 10..

Person/people invited HP, Ld Pres, Ld Chancellor
P/Dep P/Env Min/Trans, AG, RTA
P/Wales, Ld advocate, FCS

Added Ministerial attendance .....

Briefing

a) I have commissioned briefing from .....

✓ b) Could you arrange briefing if necessary

Caroline Ryder

Mrs. Ryder

CONFIDENTIAL

Caroline
Re speak about the cast list.

10 DOWNING STREET

Dans 22/2

From the Private Secretary

22 February, 1984.

Protesters at Greenham Common

The Prime Minister was grateful for the Home Secretary's minute of 21 February, in which he suggests a discussion with colleagues about the possibility of concerted civil action against protesters at Greenham Common.

The Prime Minister agrees that such a discussion would be helpful, and we will be in touch with you and the other recipients of the Home Secretary's minute to find a time.

David Barclay

Nigel Pantling, Esq.,
Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

LIST A

Home Secretary ✓
Lord President ✓
Lord Chancellor ✓
[redacted]
S/ Defence ✓
S/ Environment ✓
S/ Transport — Lynda Chalker ✓
Attorney General ✓
RTA ✓

LIST B

+ S/ Scotland ✗
Wales ✓
N Ireland ✓
Lord Advocate ✓
FCS ✓

Shd be told of the time and invited to attend if they wish

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL. LONDON SW1A 2AT

noted
DWS
22/2

22 February 1984

Dear Robin,

PROTESTERS AT GREENHAM COMMON

The Lord President has seen the Home Secretary's minute of 21 February to the Prime Minister. He has said that he would like to attend any meeting of Ministers which is arranged to discuss this issue, since it involves major presentational problems.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Hugh Taylor and to Richard Hatfield.

Yours ever,
Janet Lewis-Jones.

JANET A LEWIS-JONES

Robin Butler Esq

Defence - Blocking of demonstrators / Greenham Common

22 JAN 1984

cc. CR.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 February, 1984.

Protesters at Greenham Common

The Prime Minister was grateful for the Home Secretary's minute of 21 February, in which he suggests a discussion with colleagues about the possibility of concerted civil action against protesters at Greenham Common.

The Prime Minister agrees that such a discussion would be helpful, and we will be in touch with you and the other recipients of the Home Secretary's minute to find a time.

David Barclay

Nigel Pantling, Esq.,
Home Office.

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Prime Minister (1)

The Home Secretary suggests a discussion on the next steps.

PRIME MINISTER

Yes pls

Agree we set this up, with colleagues listed in the last para?

PROTESTERS AT GREENHAM COMMON

DNB
21/2

Following my minute of 17 January you agreed that more work should be done on the prospects for concerted civil action. .... Attached is a further paper by officials and attached to that is .... a note of the joint advice by three Counsel. Counsels' advice is that, on the assumption that the councils will join in the action, there should be no insuperable problems in obtaining orders for possession under Order 113. They foresee greater difficulty about enforcement and, because of their judgment about the likely reaction of the protesters, they are pessimistic about the efficacy of using civil proceedings to secure the permanent removal of the relevant protesters. We must now decide what to do.

In the light of the advice from Counsel the judgment as to whether to proceed with concerted action is finely balanced. There is a strong case for going ahead. For over two years protesters have been in breach of the law at Greenham. Although some action has been taken to uphold the rule of law no concerted action has been taken. The protest has cost the taxpayer and ratepayer large sums of money and at times has tied up many military personnel and police officers. Local residents have been upset by the impact on the environment. Following major protests, such as that on 10 - 12 December, we come under strong pressure from our supporters to do something. The Lord President's minute of 18 January drew attention to this aspect.

Against that, particularly in the light of Counsels' advice, there are likely to be problems associated with a decision to take concerted civil action. Action may be misrepresented and criticised as an attempt to stifle the free expression of opinion. The

CONFIDENTIAL

current level of protest is low. By creating extra publicity, and because of resentment about the initiative, concerted action could increase support for the protest. Given Berkshire County Council's composition it might not be a completely reliable partner in an action. Counsels' advice is that the outcome of concerted civil action could be unsatisfactory, and if this were the case it would be argued that we should not have begun the action. Even if civil action were as successful as it could be, some form of protest would be likely to continue at Greenham and action could have the effect of encouraging further protest at other sites. There would also be added strains on the courts and on the prison system.

My officials have discussed the attached paper and Counsels' advice with the Chief Constable of Thames Valley. He is under pressure locally to "do something" and on 19 December at a meeting where emotions were high, his police authority passed a resolution calling upon the Government to co-ordinate action to deal with the protesters. I understand that on 13 February the Clerk to the Authority sent the resolution to Sir Robert Armstrong. The Chief Constable has himself comprehensively surveyed his own powers, and has not identified any offence or power under the criminal law which would enable more effective action by the police than they have already managed. For these reasons, he welcomed the initiative we have taken in exploring the scope for concerted civil action.

The Chief Constable was disappointed that Counsels' analysis of the prospects for effective enforcement is disheartening. Equally, he could see no way round the difficulties (although he mentioned the possibility that the protesters might be left with a small, harmless area of land as a safety valve, lessening their persistence in challenging enforcement action). The Chief Constable also referred to the possibility that action might displace the protest to another base where it could be even more difficult to police: he mentioned RAF Upper Heyford which is also in his force area, but there are plenty of other possibilities.

Our decision on concerted civil action will also need to have regard to recent developments and some which are in prospect in any event. You will no doubt have seen reports that Newbury

District Council have now taken action under their byelaws against the principal camp. There were twelve separate tents. On 14 February council officers removed ten of them. The protesters burnt another, and moved the twelfth on to adjacent Department of Transport land. On 8 February, in a Written Answer, the Secretary of State for Transport announced that he would shortly be improving the road junction which bisects that land, and that the campers would be required to vacate it. Parallel action by the Council and the Department of Transport cannot achieve the total clearance at which concerted civil action would aim. It would, however, represent a step forward since colleagues and I met on 16 January.

Another development will be the pattern of off-base deployment of cruise from Greenham for training purposes. This may be expected to raise the protest from its current low level. Assuming that the deployment is accomplished successfully, there will, however, then be no further occasions or new developments to prompt wider support for the protest. One approach could be to defer taking concerted civil action until the level of protest increases, although that could make enforcement more difficult, as there would be more protesters to be dealt with.

These factors lead me to conclude that the arguments for and against concerted civil action are finely balanced, and rest essentially upon political judgments which we should consider together. I should be grateful to know if you judge that the way forward is for us to discuss this with colleagues having a direct interest.

I am copying this minute and the enclosures to the Lord President, the Lord Chancellor, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland, Defence, Scotland, Wales, the Environment and Transport, the Attorney General and the Lord Advocate, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

L.B.

21 February 1984

E.R.

Home office Copy no 1 of 15 Copies

PROTESTORS AT GREENHAM COMMON: FURTHER ANALYSIS
PAPER BY OFFICIALS

INTRODUCTION

Following the Ministerial meeting on 16 January the Home Secretary sent a minute to the Prime Minister on 17 January setting out the conclusions of the meeting: that concerted action to remove the protestors using the existing law had considerable attractions, and that officials should be tasked to provide further analysis, charting the steps which might be taken together with the possible outcomes, on the basis of which Ministers could take a final view. The Prime Minister agreed that such work should be undertaken, and in his minute of 18 January the Lord President of the Council indicated that from a press and public relations point of view he welcomed the Home Secretary's minute, and hoped that coordinated civil action would proceed quickly, as continued acceptance of the present situation would do the Government increasing damage. Drawing on advice from Counsel (the Joint Option signed by Simon Brown and John Mummery (Junior Treasury Counsel), and Christopher Simons is attached at Annex A) this paper sets out the further analysis requested by Ministers together with the option for coordinated action favoured by Counsel. The contents of the paper have been agreed by officials of the Department of Transport (DTp), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) the Home Office, the Treasury Solicitors, the Law Officers' Department, the Lord Chancellor's Department (LCD) and the Department of the Environment.

Factual background

2. A copy of an up to date account of the factual background is attached at Annex B. The salient points are set out here. There are four public bodies owning land in the immediate vicinity of the perimeter fence of RAF Greenham Common which has been subject to encampment by the protestors:

(a) the perimeter fence around the base does not follow the boundary of the MOD land. The Secretary of State for Defence therefore owns a number of relatively small strips of land outside the fence, on at least one of which protestors are camped;

(b) as highway authority for the A339 trunk road which runs by the south of the base DTp owns the land occupied by the road and its verges together with a comparatively small triangle of land on either side of the access road linking the A339 to the main gate. Part of the

E.R.

main encampment of the protestors is on this land;

(c) again as highway authority, Berkshire County Council (Berkshire) owns or administers the land occupied by the other roads in the area, and their verges. In particular Berkshire is responsible for Bury's Bank Road which runs along the northern perimeter of RAF Greenham Common and those parts of the verge which are part of the highway. Protestors are encamped on the verge to the south of Bury's Bank Road;

(d) Newbury District Council (Newbury) owns some 410 acres of Greenham and Crookham Commons. The main encampment of the protestors, near the main gate to the base, is situated partly on common land (with the remainder on DTp land, see (b) above). Three other encampments on Newbury's land have recently been removed as a result of action taken under the byelaws made last year by Newbury. Byelaw 13 empowers an officer of the council to remove structures etc placed on the common in contravention of the byelaws.

3. Partly as a result of the action being taken by Newbury the siting of the various protestors' encampments is fluid. As with previous attempts to remove encampments Newbury's action has simply led to the movement of those affected to other land, for example that owned by MOD, to which the byelaws do not apply. It has only recently been established that MOD owns the strips of land mentioned in paragraph (a) above. MOD Ministers are considering whether, as has been the case with protestors' encampments elsewhere, MOD personnel should remove the protestors, using self-help. Alternatively, the removal could be effected as part of concerted action through the civil courts.

The Advice of Counsel

4. Counsel's advice is that if concerted action is to be undertaken it should take the form of a joint action or concurrent actions for trespass by the four landowners concerned - MOD, DTp, Berkshire and Newbury. Counsel are satisfied that the status of the land involved (as highway and common land) would not pose difficulties. Although the public and certain commoners have certain rights over some of the land, none of these provides any justification for the protestors' occupation of it.

An approach to Berkshire and Newbury

5. Joint action by the four landowners would call for an approach to Berkshire

E.R.

and Newbury at an early stage to seek their agreement. Newbury has written to the Home Secretary and to the Secretaries of State for Defence and the Environment seeking assurances that local ratepayers will be indemnified from the costs of policing the protests at Greenham and the costs of enforcing the byelaws. The Home Secretary has already made available £1.5 million to the Thames Valley Police Authority in recognition of the exceptional and unforseeable police costs. Any suggestion of action to Berkshire and Newbury is likely to be greeted with a request for the local authorities' costs to be met by central government. If a joint civil action were taken by the Secretary of State for Defence, DTp, Berkshire and Newbury the costs could be borne by central government without any difficulty.

6. The best method of broaching the proposal with Berkshire and Newbury might be for a Minister to see the leaders of the councils on an informal, confidential basis. They would need to be given a realistic assessment of the various steps which concerted action might involve (see paragraphs 10 to 20 below). If this went well officials might explain the details orally and in writing to the officers of Berkshire and Newbury. Informed consent to involvement would help to reduce the danger that the local authorities might consent to take part in concerted action at an early stage but withdraw as the scale of the commitment involved became apparent. Joint action by the four plaintiffs, with central government taking a dominant role, could also reduce this risk. Berkshire and Newbury might be able to deflect any local criticism onto the Government.

7. There are no local elections planned for 1984 which would affect the political composition of either Berkshire or Newbury. Berkshire has 87 elected members of whom 43 are Conservative, 27 Labour, 16 Liberal and one independent. The Conservative group has control of the council which has a Conservative Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The protestors have only recently moved onto land owned by Berkshire and its attitude to action against them is unclear. Informal contacts between DTp officials and Berkshire officials suggest that the council is considering taking civil action for an order for possession of land under Order 113 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. It seems that previous attempts by various committees of the council to reach a decision to take action have been abortive, and that a decision must await the next meeting of the full council which is due to take place in mid-February.

8. Newbury has 45 elected members, of whom 35 are Conservative and 10 Labour.

E.R.

Newbury took civil action to remove the protestors from the common land in 1983 and since the byelaws came into force on 21 November has taken action to enforce them. This, and informal contacts with Newbury officials on related issues, suggest that it might be willing to join in concerted action. Approval is likely to require a meeting of the full councils, so if informal approaches to the Conservative leaders of the councils were encouraging it would probably take two to three weeks before the participation of the councils was confirmed.

9. One aspect which needs to be considered is how the Government might proceed if one or both of the councils refused to take part in concerted action. Newbury's decision would appear to be the more critical as it owns by far the largest area of the land involved. If that happened, the options for analysis would be to proceed with the one cooperative council (provided both were not uncooperative), to take steps to move the protestors off all MOD and DTp land, or to restrict action to what is required by, for example, the road widening scheme. There would be pressure on Berkshire and Newbury to participate because of the risk that action by the remaining landowners might result in the transfer of the protestors' camps onto the land of any non-participant.

POSSIBLE PLAN FOR ACTION

The scope of the action

10. The following paragraphs set out the steps which might be taken, and the possible consequences, if Ministers decided to take action for trespass under the civil law to remove the encamped protestors, and Newbury and Berkshire agreed to take part. In the case of the MOD land the presence of the protestors on the land amounts to trespass. In the case of Newbury's land there is a legal right of access but the current occupation amounts to trespass. Similarly, in the case of the highway land (which is the responsibility of DTp and Berkshire) there is a legal right of passage and repassage but the current occupation involves trespass. Thus, in the case of all the non-MOD land, action would not be effective against those (including protestors) simply exercising a lawful right of access or passage.

An order for possession of land

11. The first step would be for the four plaintiffs to bring a joint action, in respect of all the land involved, for an order for possession of land under Order 113 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. This could be made against persons unnamed where those in adverse possession could not be named, although anyone

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who could be named would have to be. We understand that the police have made efforts to maintain an up to date list of the protestors in semi-permanent residence. Counsel are confident that, in the light of the judgment in University of Essex v Djemal and Others, an order for possession of land could be obtained in respect of the whole of the land and not just those parts actually occupied by trespassers. An order could only be obtained by each plaintiff if there were trespassers on some part of the land it owned. This is relevant to the question as to whether MOD should take prior action to remove protestors on their land, by self-help.

12. Allowing time for the collection of names, the establishment of boundaries and the preparation of the case by Counsel the plaintiffs would probably be in a position to commence proceedings within two weeks of deciding to take action. It is recommended that for a case of this significance proceedings should be taken in the High Court, and at the Royal Courts of Justice rather than a provincial centre. The Royal Courts of Justice would be able to absorb any commotion which might be associated with the proceedings rather better than a provincial centre. Order 113 provides for five days' notice to be given of proceedings, either to the named defendants or by displaying notices on the land concerned in the case of unnamed defendants, although this can be abridged in appropriate cases. Counsel have advised that as all persons who are on the land have a right to be joined as defendants the proceedings could be lengthy and disruptive.

13. Assuming that the proceedings were successful the four landowners would be able to obtain a writ for enforcement of the possession order by the Sheriff. If, as is suggested, the proceedings were taken in the High Court the Sheriff's officers for the whole county could be called upon to enforce the order. Given the joint nature of the action by the landowners, enforcement of the order on each area of land could coincide. The Sheriff's officers would remove those in adverse possession of the land, using reasonable force if that proved necessary. In relation to the MOD land it ought to be easy to decide who is in adverse possession as only commoners would have a right to be on the land. There could, however, be difficulty in differentiating the trespassers from those exercising their legal right of access on the common land owned by Newbury and similar difficulties might arise in relation to the highways. On a normal day at Greenham a visitor would have little difficulty in identifying the protestors, but once notice had been given of proceedings, and a judgment had been issued, sympathisers might well arive in large numbers to confuse the situation. The police could be expected to attend during the enforcement of the order against the possibility

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of a breach of the peace. If breaches occurred the police would help in the removal of those responsible from the land and might well arrest them. If not arrested the trespassers would simply be removed to the boundary of land covered by the order.

14. The effective enforcement of the order could involve the deployment of considerable resources if the protestors resisted and were assisted by large numbers of sympathisers not normally present. The relatively small number of protestors present at the moment (less than fifty) might be relatively easily cleared from the areas they now occupy but there could obviously be more difficulty in clearing all the land (which covers an area well in excess of 400 acres) if the protestors moved into other, less accessible parts of the common or if more protestors arrived. If, once the land had been cleared and the Sheriff and his officers had left, the same protestors returned to camp again the landowners would be able to apply in the same proceedings to a Master for a writ of restitution requiring the Sheriff to remove the trespassers again. If different protestors went onto the land after the original writ of possession had been enforced a writ of restitution would not be available and fresh proceedings would be necessary under Order 113. Even if the same women went back onto the land it might be difficult for the Sheriff and his officers to satisfy themselves that those concerned had previously been removed. As Counsel point out, the limitation of Order 113 is that it could become a frustrating exercise seeking to enforce it, particularly since no penalty attaches to subsequent trespass simply because an order under Order 113 has been made.

An injunction

15. The prospect could therefore be one of a succession of writs and subsequent evictions under Order 113, followed by the return of encamped protestors. Action through the civil courts could be stopped at that stage. But it would be difficult to counter the impression that the Government had embarked upon action to end the trespass and then surrendered in face of the protestors' determination. This could be the more so, since the civil law provides the remedy of an injunction.

16. The landowners might bring a joint action for a permanent injunction

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restraining those involved from further trespass. Continued trespass would then involve contempt of court. Counsel do not think that representative proceedings could be brought against a disparate group such as the Greenham Peace Women, and therefore proceedings for an injunction could only be brought against named individuals. Again proceedings should be brought in the High Court at the Royal Courts of Justice. Counsel advise that no proceedings for an injunction should be taken until an order for possession had been obtained and flouted. The original application to the court for the injunction would have to be served on each defendant two days prior to the proceedings, but the notice might be dispensed with, and in any event a hearing could be arranged without delay. The application for an injunction could be disposed of by one High Court judge in the course of two or three days.

17. Assuming an injunction were granted the order of the court would have to be served on the named defendants. If trespass continued it would be for the plaintiffs to apply to the court for an order for committal of a defendant for breach of the injunction and to prove to the court that all the necessary documents had been served on the individual concerned and that the individual had breached the injunction. The application for committal would have to be served personally on each defendant. A large body of process servers would be needed to ensure that the service of the various documents could be proven in the case of each indidual. The judge hearing an application to commit would have to hear argument about service and liability, and would have to consider the appropriate penalty. Officials of LCD have estimated that this might take an average of one hour for each individual.

18. If contempt is proven a warrant for committal for contempt would be issued, addressed to the officials of the court and to"all constables and other peace officers whom it may concern". Thus, if necessary, police assistance may be invoked to bring individuals before the court. The penalty would be a fine or imprisonment as the protestors do not belong to a formal body with funds of its own which could be sequestered. The court would probably prefer, in the first instance, to fine rather than imprison. Enforcement of fines would be a matter for the Queen's Remembrancer, who could look to the Treasury Solicitor for assistance. The business of enforcing fines, by the usual remedies available to collect debts, may prove difficult in the case of the protestors at Greenham and there are likely to be abortive attempts to enforce, leading the court to consider imprisonment.

19. The principal advantage of proceedings for an injunction as opposed to an

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order for possession of land is that those who return to the land can be committed for contempt, with the serious sanctions this entails. The disadvantage is that proceedings for an injunction relate to persons rather than to the land so that an injunction would only be effective against named persons. If the changing character of the population at Greenham meant that some of the encamped protestors could not be named the injunction would be wholly ineffective against them. And if injuncted persons were effectively removed - perhaps by imprisonment for contempt - and were replaced by others the replacements would have to be named and new proceedings undertaken. Obviously if large numbers of persons were involved the court time occupied (LCD estimate that proceedings for the committal of 25 persons might occupy one High Court judge for a week) and the burden on the female prison system (which is relatively inflexible, and can be put under strain by marginal increases in number, perhaps necessitating the use of police cells) could be considerable. Counsel express serious doubts as to whether an injunction could be effectively enforced in such circumstances.

20. Much, of course, depends upon an estimation of the reaction of the protestors and their supporters to the making of an injunction. The best outcome from the Government's point of view would be for the protestors simply to decide that it was not worthwhile fighting, and to leave the land. The worst case would be for the protestors to refuse to leave, with large numbers being brought before the courts for contempt and being imprisoned, while others arrived at Greenham to take their place, to be proceeded against in due course if they could be named. If this continued on a sufficiently large scale for a sufficient period of time the point would quickly come where the scale of the proceedings and committals to prison would cause difficulties and might even be counter productive. In this event the net effect of concerted action might be to stimulate larger protests and demonstrations at Greenham. A less extreme outcome might involve the continued trespass by relatively small numbers of protestors with demonstrations in sympathy with the protestors gradually declining as time passed. On this analysis the protestors might ultimately decide to leave the land, continuing their protest perhaps by other means.

21. In the past the protestors have tended to acquiese to enforcement action taken against their encampments, simply moving onto other land. A new situation would arise if the four landowners involved took concerted action. The protestors would either have to move onto the private land in the area, such as the golf course to the north of the base, or give up camping in the immediate vicinity of the base. In the past the protestors have apparently shown some reluctance

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to trespass on private land. Faced with these choices they might decide to ignore any injunction granted, with the possible consequences set out in paragraph 20. Perhaps one important factor which would affect the reaction of the protestors would be their assessment of the consequences of acquiescing. If compliance with an injunction meant an effective end to their protest they might well be less inclined to comply than if it did not (see paragraphs 23 and 24 below).

Possible timetable for action

22. Assuming that the various steps set out above were to be gone through a possible timetable for action might be:

mid February	:	Ministers decide to proceed with concerted action. Informal approaches to the councils are made.
early March	:	councils confirm that they are willing to participate.
mid March	:	case ready, notice of proceedings for an order for possession under Order 113 served on named women, and by posting notices on the land.
five days later	:	proceedings heard, order and writ for possession of land obtained. Sheriff's officers (and police) clear land.
late March/early April	:	series of writs of restitution obtained as protestors return. Proceedings for an injunction begun by service of notice on protestors.
mid April	:	action for injunction heard, injunction granted, copies served on protestors.
mid May onwards	:	proceedings to have protestors who return committed for contempt.

Consequences of the removal of the encampments

23. As indicated in paragraph 10 the protestors are trespassers on Newbury's common land only because their current occupation goes beyond the right of access under the Scheme of Management. Effective civil action could end the encampment of the protestors on the land but could not prevent them from simply being present on the common land. Similarly action in respect of the highway land by DTp and Berkshire could ensure the removal of encampments from the land, but could not prevent protestors from exercising the legal right of passage and repassage along the highway. This means that the net effect of successful

civil action would simply be to deny the protestors their present place of abode in the immediate vicinity of the base.

24. Thus the action could end the physical spectacle of the 'peace camps' around the base which has taken on a symbolic significance for some. This would remove an obvious focus for the large, set piece, demonstrations, and would end over two years acquiescence to adverse possession. But it would not necessarily bring an end to the continued presence of protestors at Greenham, and would certainly be most unlikely to result in an end to all demonstrations. The protestors already have available to them the facilities of a house in Newbury which is owned by a sympathiser, and a number of vehicles which provide transport. If effective action prevented the protestors camping at the base it would be open to them to find accommodation further afield, travelling to the base daily on a shift basis to continue their 'cruise watch' for signs of the deployment of cruise missiles. It is not, for example, impossible that sympathisers would purchase land for the use of the protestors. If this were to occur the practical consequences of effective civil action would have been limited to the creation of a slightly more difficult lifestyle for the protestors.

Handling of coordinated action

25. If Ministers conclude that concerted action should be undertaken arrangements would have to be made for its coordination. These might take the form of a small group of officials including representatives of the plaintiffs (DTp, MOD and, once enlisted, Berkshire and Newbury), perhaps chaired by the Home Office which might continue its coordinating role.

26. One important aspect of handling would be the presentation of the concerted action to the public through Parliament and the media.

IN THE MATTER OF LAND AT GREENHAM COMMON,
BERKSHIRE.

A D V I C E

The Factual Position

The present position (as observed on 31st January 1984) at the Greenham Common Airbase is that there are 6 separate encampments at gates into the airbase occupied by at most about 30 women. None of those women has any right to occupy any part of the land upon which the encampments are sited. While that number of encampments and women appears to be the normal position there have been in the past very large numbers of women over short periods of time demonstrating against the deployment of cruise missiles and for the purpose of this Advice it is

assumed that they intend to hold similar demonstrations in the future.

The Ownership of the Land

The land occupied by the women is not all in the same ownership. The area around the main gate is owned in part by the Department of Transport and in part by Newbury District Council ("Newbury") it being part of the Common. Other encampments are on land owned by the Ministry of Defence possibly by Berkshire County Council ("Berkshire"), as highway authority and by Newbury. In the past Newbury have taken court action to remove women from their land which has resulted in them moving on to other land in different ownership.

The Ambit of this Advice

We understand that our advice is sought as to the possibilities of effective further action against the women to remove them permanently from all the land in the vicinity of the airbase which is in public ownership. There is a small amount of land in the immediate vicinity which is in private ownership, but it is not contemplated that those owners would be involved in any joint action taken by central and local government. Whether the women would resort to private gardens and other land is open to doubt.

Court Action

There are two phases involved in any action before the Courts. In the first place a Court order is needed requiring the women to move from the land and/or enjoining them against returning to it. In the second place that order has to be enforced. It is the second phase that is likely to cause the major problem, albeit the first phase may well incur difficulties, not least in securing the cooperation of the local government authorities for the necessary concerted action.

Removal Orders

We have considered and rejected prosecuting under the Highways Act 1980 and also enforcing the byelaws on the Common. Neither result in removing the women nor can they alone deal with all the encampments some of which are on neither highway nor common land. In any event, both courses lead to fines in the Magistrates' Court which have not dissuaded the women from continuing their vigil in the past. Non-payment of the fines has led to terms of imprisonment which indeed the women appear to welcome for the attendant publicity.

We have also considered and rejected injunction proceedings against the women in a representative action under the provisions of Order 15, rule 12 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Recent authorities suggest a fairly liberal approach

by the Courts allowing representative actions to proceed even where the interest of the Defendants was not identical (see. e.g. John v. Rees 1970 1 Ch. 345; E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Kudhail and Others, The Times, June 28th, 1983; M. Michaels (Furriers) ltd. v. Askew and Others, The Times, June 25th, 1983). However, there must be real doubt as to whether such an action would succeed here where the women would no doubt argue that they each belonged to separate organisations each having different aims. So far as we are aware, there is no official organisation known as the Greenham Common Women, which could add to the difficulties. Further an unreported decision of the Court of Appeal (Winder v. Ward 1957) referred to in the notes to Order 15 rule 12 (15/12/2A) suggests that the rule does not apply to actions of trespass. We have not had an opportunity to see a transcript of that case. An injunction is a discretionary remedy and the women would no doubt argue, if properly advised, that it would be wrong to make such an order where another remedy was available, namely possession proceedings. While that argument might well fail by reason of the history at Greenham, it is nevertheless another hurdle to be surmounted. In any event if the first phase were successful, and a suitable Court Order was obtained, there would be considerable problems of enforcement. Order 15, rule 12(3) requires the leave of the Court to be obtained before enforcement against

any person and personal service is required (rule 12 (4)). There is also a right for that person to dispute liability if he or she feels they are entitled to be exempt from such an order (rule 12 (5)). The advantages of such proceedings are thus more apparent than real.

Order 113 of the Rules of the Supreme Court

We have reached the view that if any action is to be taken against the women then initially it should be by way of possession proceedings under Order 113. That Order provides as follows :-

> "1. Where a person claims possession of land which he alleges is occupied solely by a person or persons (...) who entered into or remained in occupation without his licence or consent or that of any predecessor in title of his, the proceedings may be brought by originating summons in accordance with the provisions of this Order."

The proceedings may be brought against named persons, who have to be served, and unnamed persons and the Order for Possession can be used to evict any person found on the land by the bailiff, acting under a warrant of possession. (R. v. Wandsworth County Court, ex.p. London Borough of Wandsworth 1975 1 W.L.R. 1314 applying Re: Wykeham Terrace, Brighton 1971 Ch.204 at 209 and McPhail v. Persons, Names Unknown 1973 Ch.447 at 458). A concerted action, or perhaps separate concurrent actions, would need to be brought by Newbury,

Berkshire and the Secretaries of State for Transport and Defence. The actions would have to seek possession of an ascertained area of land which would need to cover a sufficient area to keep the women some way away from the airbase. Clearly an order for possession in respect of the existing six camps alone would merely result in the women moving to adjoining land. The Court has power in a proper case to make an order over the whole of a landowner's land even when the occupation is limited to one or more areas of it. See University of Essex v. Djemal & Others 1980 1 W.L.R. 1301. That was a case of evicting students from certain buildings on a university campus where the students threatened to occupy other buildings in the future. The order was made in the terms :-

> "that they do recover possession of the premises at the University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, in the County of Essex"

and as Shaw, L.J. said that was without any geographic limitation.

Djemal was followed by the Court of Appeal in Wiltshire County Council and Others v. Frazer and Others, 5th July 1983 unreported. That case involved the recovery of possession of about one mile of a highway and land either side of it which was occupied intermittently by squatters. Although the Court of Appeal were considering whether an order for possession could

be made over highway land (which they unanimously decided it could) Stephenson, L.J. said :-

> "... I do not see how it can be argued that the Defendants are not persons who entered into and remained in occupation without the Plaintiffs' licence and consent. They are the only occupiers of this highway, and their occupation of many parts of the highway affects the authority's right of possession of the whole highway, including its unoccupied parts, and entitles the authority to possession of the whole highway: see University of Essex v. Djemal."

(A copy of the Judgments in this case is attached to this Advice.).

While the area of land contemplated in these proceedings may well be larger than other areas over which orders for possession have been made we can see little difficulty, in the circumstances here, in persuading a judge to make a suitable order. However, all persons who are on the land have a right to be joined as defendants (Order 113, rule5) and if all the women in occupation, and perhaps other recruits brought in, were to ask to be joined as defendants the proceedings could be lengthy and possibly disruptive. (Newspaper reports of the proceedings brought by Newbury suggest that orders were made against 161 named women on 10th March 1983, see report in The Times, 11th March 1983).

Enforcement

While we do not anticipate insuperable problems in successfully completing the first phase of this action the second phase, enforcement, will in our view be a different matter.

The writ of possession can be issued at any stage up to 3 months after the date of the Order. Thereafter the leave of the Court is required (Order 113, rule 7). That writ, as we have said, operates against any person in occupation of the land at the time of execution. People lawfully using the highway or the Common are not in occupation of the land and there may be an attempt by the women to avoid eviction by "lawfully" using the land over which the Order operates. We do not feel that will present great difficulties. The land can, in theory at least, be cleared of the women and their belongings. However, it is a very large area of land and there will certainly be considerable difficulty in clearing the whole of it. The writ of possession continues to operate until the land is cleared and vacant possession given. If the women, who would almost certainly by that time be in greater numbers than at present, decided to refuse to leave the land it might well be physically impossible to remove them.

However, assuming they could be removed and vacant possession was given, the difficulty then

arises as to how to keep them off the land. If the same persons were to go back on the land a writ of restitution could be applied for ex parte and the land could then be cleared again. If different women went on to the land after the writ of possession has been executed and the land cleared the only remedy would then appear to be fresh Order 113 proceedings. Even if the same women went back on to the land it might be difficult for the Sheriff and his officers to satisfy themselves that they had previously been removed. The alternative procedure to the writ of restitution would be to move to commit the offending women for contempt of court. Although that is not the normal way to proceed (see Alliance Building Society v. Austen 1951 2 A.E.R. 1068) in these circumstances the court would probably entertain such an action. However, that action requires identifying the women, serving them and proving that they had knowledge of the original order and that they were in breach of it. On a large scale that would be an almost impossible task.

Assuming that some at least of the women remain on the land further action could be taken by way of an injunction. If the women have taken the step of identifying themselves in the possession action the problem of identification will be eased, but will by no means have been removed. To obtain an effective injunction against an individual it will

be necessary to :-

(i) identify that person;

(ii) serve them with the proceedings;

(iii) obtain the Order for the injunction;

(iv) serve the Order personally on the person.

If that person is believed to be in breach of the injunction before that person can be committed for contempt it will be necessary to :-

(i) serve the committal papers on the person;

(ii) prove service of the original order;

(iii) prove a breach of that order;

(iv) persuade a judge that that person ought to be sent to prison rather than be fined.

All that assumes that the same women are at the airbase all the time. It is known that apart from a few "residents" the population changes all the time. It is difficult to see how the area round the airbase could ever be completely cleared of the women if they were determined to keep a presence there. It would be possible to short circuit part of the action outlined above by

bringing injunction proceedings, based on trespass, against some of the women presently in occupation, concurrently with proceedings under Order 113. They would have to be identified and served and all the steps set out above would thereafter have to be taken. Those proceedings would take longer to bring to court than the possession proceedings because of the need to identify and serve the women personally. The injunction would probably be granted if the women concerned made it clear they intended to ignore the Order for Possession. In the absence of such an intent it is doubtful whether an injunction would be granted in addition to the Order for Possession. On balance, we take the view that no proceedings should be taken for an injunction until an Order for Possession has been made and flouted.

What we have said above is dealing with the relatively small number of women who occupy the land around the airbase. While that has on occasions gone up to a few hundred that is still relatively small in comparison with the large demonstrations which have occurred when many thousands are present. In these situations the criminal law can be, and has been, invoked. However, it is quite impossible to see how any civil action in the Courts can stop these demonstrations. Even if the writ of possession (which ex facie only relates to those in "occupation") took effect on persons, like demonstrators, who come

onto the land for a relatively short time, which must be doubtful, attempting to clear the land of that number of people would be impossible.

To summarize our views, to attempt the permanent removal of the "residents" around the airbase would be difficult, would take a long time, would occupy much court time, would be likely to involve the imprisonment of a large number of people and even then is unlikely to be successfully achieved. It must be borne in mind that the existing "residents" would all too inevitably be replaced by others and that each fresh wave would need in turn to be the subject of enforcement proceedings. Moreover, the prevention of demonstrations of many thousands of people cannot be achieved through the civil courts.

We are, therefore, pessimistic about the efficacy of using civil proceedings to secure the permanent removal of "residents" from the Greenham Common Airbase let alone demonstrators in that vicinity.

SIMON BROWN

JOHN MUMMERY

CHRISTOPHER SYMONS

HEARING-DATES: 5 July 1983

5 July 1983

COUNSEL:
D Wood QC and G Aldous for the Appellants; D Levy QC and G Laurence for the Plaintiffs.

PANEL: Stephenson, Griffiths and May LJJ.

JUDGMENTBY-1: MAY LJ

JUDGMENT-1:
MAY LJ: This is an appeal from a judgment and order of Mr. Justice Mann given on 23rd March 1983. He had before him an originating summons issued under order 113 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, seeking possession of premises

described as a "Public Highway known as Green Lane, otherwise a road used as a Public Path No. 17, Britford, Near Salisbury, Wiltshire and the land adjacent thereto". On that summons he made an order for possession against a substantial number of named defendants and also against any persons unknown who might also be in occupation of it. Of those many defendants, nine now appeal against that order.

There is an agreed statement of facts in this case, but I think that it is really sufficient for the purposes of the appeal to cull the limited facts that one needs from the judgment of the learned judge.

Green Lane, South of Salisbury, is one of the green roads of England and is an ancient highway. It is a highway properly so-called and by virtue of the Highways Act 1980 it is vested in the first plaintiff, the Wiltshire County Council, as the relevant highway authority. Both the first plaintiff and the other four plaintiffs are, in addition, owners of land adjacent to the highway. In so far as the order for possession made by the learned judge concerned land other than the highway itself - that is to say, in so far as it ordered possession of land adjacent to the highway - no complaint is made. This appeal is concerned solely with the order for possession made in favour of the first plaintiff alone in respect of the highway itself, Green Lane. As I shall mention in a moment, the nature of the first plaintiff's interest in the

I therefore refer immediately to the provisions of order 113 rule 1; they are in these terms:

"Where a person claims possession of land which he alleges is occupied solely by a person or persons (not being a tenant or tenants holding over after the termination of the tenancy) who entered into or remained in occupation without his licence or consent or that of any predecessor in title of his, the proceedings may be brought by originating summons in accordance with the provisions of this order".
Rule 3 of the Order lays down the necessary contents of the affidavit to be sworn by a plaintiff in such proceedings in support of the originating summons. Rules 6 and 7 provide for the use of Form 42A as the form of the appropriate order for possession if one is made under the special procedure, and of Form 66A, which is the writ of possession which will issue to enforce the order for possession.

It is well known that the procedure laid down in order 113 was added to the Rules of the Supreme Court in order to enable the courts, and through them those entitled to the possession of land, to deal expeditiously and efficiently with the modern phenomenon of squatters. It has also been used, for instance, in respect of student sit-ins in universities. One particular aspect of the procedure under order 113 different from other procedures contemplated by the

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Rules of the Supreme Court, is that proceedings can be taken against persons unknown - solely, or in addition to known defendants. Again this is to deal with one aspect of the squatting problem. If frequently proved impossible to discover the identity of those who were wrongfully in occupation of premises. In addition, such is the nature of such occupation, that it may very well change from day to day, or at any rate frequently, and those in possession when the proceedings are originally served may well not be those in possession when the proceedings are ultimately heard.

Because of this and the summary nature of the procedure provided for by order 113, Mr. Wood first submits, in my judgment entirely correctly, that the provisions of the Order must be construed strictly. Orders for possession under this procedure should not be made unless its requirements are strictly and fully complied with. However, it is with the second and third submissions that Mr. Wood makes in support of the appeal, seeking to contend that the order 113 procedure is not available to the plaintiffs in the circumstances of the present case, that I respectfully disagree.

Mr. Wood submits that the remedy under order 113 is only available to a plaintiff where, as he puts it, the cause of action is in reality a cause of action for the recovery of possession. That being so, on the facts of this case there has been no real obstruction of passage along the highway by the Queen's

(Transcript:Association)

subjects; all that has happened is that a number of caravans have been parked, no doubt towards the verge of the highway, at various points along it. There is thus, he submits, no possession in any of the defendants inconsistent with the right to possession of the highway by the highway authority. Thus, his argument continues, use of the procedure under order 113 is inappropriate. He submits that the local authority should proceed by way of s 143 of the Highways Act 1980, which gives them statutory powers to remove obstructions from the highway.

However, Mr. Wood, very properly as I think, felt driven to make two concessions which in my view destroy his case entirely. He first accepts, as I have already mentioned, that the highway authority, the first plaintiff, has a fee simple in the surface of the highway, determinable in the event to which I have referred. That that is so is amply borne out by the judgments of this court in Tithe Redemption Commission v Runcorn Urban District Council and Another [1954] 1 Ch 383, [1954] 1 All ER 653. That was a case in which, by the Local Government Act 1929 it was provided that certain highways should vest in the local highway authority - phraseology which has appeared in similar legislation, at least as far back as 1835 and is used again word for word in s 263 of the Highways Act of 1980.

At p 398 of the report, when considering the nature and extent of the interest of the local authority, Lord Evershed, Master of the Rolls, referring

(Transcript:Association)

to the Act of 1929, said:

"... we are bound by authority to hold that a vesting, according to a formula such as that of the Act of 1929, did operate to confer upon a highway authority in respect of some part of the land, which although indefinite in extent included the essential surface (that is, essential for the purpose of tithe, tithe rentcharges and the Tithe Redemption Act), a legal estate known to the law, namely, a fee simple determinable on the happening of a particular event - the event of the land in question ceasing to be used as a highway".
And in similar terms, at p 403, the learned Master of the Rolls continued:

"I think, therefore, that these cases show" - he had been referring to a number of the authorities to which our attention has also been drawn - "that a highway authority, which had vested in its highways in that statutory form which I have already mentioned, acquired an estate known to the law, namely, a fee simple determinable."

The second concession which Mr. Wood made was that the remedies possessed by a highway authority by virtue of the Highways Act 1980 are additional to any common law powers it may possess. Again, I need only refer to one brief passage in one of the cases that was cited to us, that of Reynolds v Presteign Urban District Council [1896] 1 QB 604, where Lord Russell of Killowen at p.609 said

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"I think, however, that if they are able to shew that there is an obstruction or encroachment, they have the same right as a private individual has to protect his own property. Where there is an encroachment on or obstruction to private property, the owner is entitled to remove it. As regards the cutting of trees, the House of Lords, in the recent case of Lemmon v Webb, held that it was not even necessary to give notice to the owner of trees overhanging the land of an adjoining owner before the latter cut the branches which overhung. With respect to encroachments on or obstructions to highways, it is undoubtedly true that there are statutory provisions pointing out particular means which the local authority may adopt in order to obtain the removal of the encroachment or obstruction; but, in my opinion, those provisions are not intended to be exclusive. They are provisions not necessary but supplementary to the right to remove - provisions to which the local authority can resort if they so desire".

I think that it is also helpful to quote a short passage from the judgment of Lord Diplock in Greater London Council v Jenkins [1975] 1 All ER 354, [1975] 1 WLR 155. The facts are not material for present purposes. There the learned Law Lord, sitting in this court, referred to an earlier suggestion by the then Vice Chancellor that the court had a discretion in so far as order 113 was concerned, but said at p 157:

"For my part, I am unable to see that the court has any discretion to prevent a plaintiff using this procedure where the circumstances are those described in the rule. So, while agreeing, as I do, with the Vice-Chancellor's construction of the rule, I personally would disagree that the court has any discretion to prevent the use of this procedure where circumstances are such as to bring them within its terms"

With that introduction, I turn back to order 113, rule 1. In the instant case the highway authority is a person claiming possession of land. Their affidavit, which is in the papers and which was filed pursuant to rule 3 of the order, clearly shows their interest in the land. Being entitled to that interest then, prima facie at least, the highway authority is entitled to possession of this particular highway.

Continuing, this highway authority does allege that it is occupied solely by a person or persons who entered into or remained in occupation of the highway without the authority's licence or consent. By the affidavits in support of the originating summons which have been filed, the circumstances in which this land has come to be occupied by the defendants and other persons unknown without the licence or consent of the highway authority, have been set out in detail. It seems to me clear beyond a peradventure that no other interpretation of the facts is possible than that these defendants and the other persons unknown are

wrongly in occupation of the highway. I think it matters not that each several caravan is at a separate point on the highway. In the course of the argument the court put to Mr. Wood the circumstances in which squatters occupy one particular room in a larger house containing a number of rooms. I see no reason why an order for possession under order 113 cannot be made against those squatters in respect of the house as a whole, even though on the evidence they can be shown only to be in occupation of the particular room in that house. Quite clearly they are trespassers in the house, just as I think that each and every one of these defendants named and unnamed are trespassers on the highway. It is in respect of trespassers who are wrongly in occupation of land that the order provides a summary, expeditious, efficient and economic method of obtaining possession. cf. University of Essex v Djemal [1980] 2 All ER 742, [1980] 1 WLR 1301.

So far as Mr. Wood's main contention is concerned, however, namely that the extent of the occupation by each of the several defendants does not constitute, as he put it, any ouster of the plaintiffs' possession of the whole or any part of the highway, effectively because the public still use it, in my judgment that matters not. As I have said earlier, these defendants are clearly trespassers on the highway, just as squatters are trespassers in derelict premises. That there has been no complete, or near complete, blockage of the highway by the large number of caravans that there are, spread over the length of about a

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mile, is, I think, of no relevance.

Allied to that point was the final point which Mr. Wood pressed upon the court, based upon the word "solely" in rule 1 of order 113. His submission was that as any one of these defendants does not occupy the whole highway, that defendant cannot be said "solely" to occupy the land of which the local authority now seek to obtain possession. For my part, I do not think that the word "solely" in rule 1 of order 113 is used in that sense at all. It contemplates premises that may be occupied by, let us say, one person who has a right to occupy, and a number of people, whom he may perhaps have let into occupation, but who do not have any right to occupy. In those circumstances - and one can very well understand the reason why - it has not been thought right to enable the courts to make a swift order for possession against one or more defendant who may have a right to be in possession. It is only when all those in occupation of the relevant premises are there without the licence or consent of the person entitled to possession that it is appropriate to proceed under order 113.

For the reasons which I have sought to give, in my judgment this is a clear case. These defendants are trespassers on the land in which the highway authority, the first plaintiff, has a fee simple determinable. The highway authority is entitled to possession. In my judgment the learned judge was

(Transcript:Association)

entirely right to make an order in their favour under the procedure provided by order 113 and I would dismiss this appeal.

JUDGMENTBY-2: GRIFFITHS LJ

JUDGMENT-2:

GRIFFITHS LJ: The facts of this case reveal that a large number of persons have encamped themselves on a part of the Green Lane and the land immediately adjoining it, near Salisbury. Some of them have been there for a long time; they are living in various types of dwellings, some in caravans, some in tents and some in other structures. They have no right to be there at all; they are all trespassers; they do not have the permission of the owners of the land adjoining the Green Lane, nor have they the permission of the local authority, who are the highway authority in whom Green Lane, which is an ancient highway, is vested.

It is conceded that, as they are trespassers, both the landowners and the Wiltshire County Council, the highway authority, are entitled to have them removed, and the only question before this court is whether or not the use of order 113 was the use of an appropriate process to obtain a court order for their removal.

(Transcript:Association)

They are squatters. Order 113 had to be introduced in order to provide landowners and others with a reasonably expeditious and inexpensive way of recovering their land when it is invaded by squatters; and I myself would be very troubled if I found that, in the circumstances of this case, where there has been a massive squatting, this summary and reasonably economical procedure was not available.

It is conceded on the authority of this court in Tithe Redemption Commission v Runcorn Urban District Council [1954], Ch 383, [1954] 1 All ER 653 that the highway authority are in possession of the surface of the highway and of so much of the subsoil beneath it as is necessary for the discharge of their function as a highway authority. It is conceded that if some persons went into occupation of the Green Lane so completely that it was utterly blocked and that no person could pass and repass along it, in those circumstances an action for possession would lie against those persons at the suit of the highway authority. It must follow from that, as order 113 is purely procedural and is intended to be an expeditious and economical way of recovering possession where the plaintiff would be entitled to proceed by a writ for possession, that order 113 procedure would lie in such circumstances. But as I understand the submission that has been made, it is that because the caravans, tents, structures and so forth are pitched on, and adjacent to, the highway but do not at any point completely obstruct it, neither a writ of possession nor a summons under order 113 will

(Transcript:Association)

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lie against those trespassers who have encamped on the highway.

For my part I entirely reject that submission. If the highway authority finds that some person has come upon their highway and set up house upon it, either in a caravan or in a tent, he is entitled to proceed against that person by writ of possession, and furthermore he is entitled to use the procedure under order 113 if he so chooses. I regard that as decided, if a decision on such a point were necessary, by the decision of this court in University of Essex v Djamal [1980] 2 All ER 742, [1980] 1 WLR 1301, in which it was pointed out that where a part of land is occupied, nevertheless order 113 can be used to recover possession of the whole of the land.

Here, beyond doubt these people are occupying a part of the highway, possession of which is vested in the highway authority, and the highway authority is entitled to tell them to go; if they will not go, they are clearly in adverse possession of part of the highway. That is the situation here and, that being so, a writ of possession lies against them, or alternatively the expeditious procedure under order 113.

For these reasons, and for those given by my Lord, I agree that this appeal fails.

(Transcript:Association)

JUDGMENTBY-3: STEPHENSON LJ

JUDGMENT-3:

STEPHENSON LJ: I agree with both judgments.

For a party to avail himself of order 113 of the Rules of the Supreme Court he must bring himself within its words. If he does so the courts has, in my judgment, no discretion to refuse him possession, even if he is not using the rule for the purpose, or mainly for the purpose, of overcoming one of the two shortcomings of less summary procedures which are referred to in the Supreme Court Practice notes to order 113. It is not so much the object aimed at by the order, and rule 1 of it, which the court has to consider, as what its plain language fairly and squarely hits. This seems to me to be in line with what Lord Diplock said in the passage quoted by my Lord, Lord Justice May, from Greater London Council v Jenkins [1975] 1 All ER 354, [1975] 1 WLR 155.

What do the words of the rule require? (1) Of the plaintiff, that he should have a right to possession of the land in question and claim possession of land which he alleges to be occupied solely by the defendants. (2) That the defendant, whom he seeks to evict from his land, should be persons who have entered into or have remained in occupation of it without his licence or consent.

(Transcript:Association)

I agree that the plaintiff authority are qualified, by the peculiar interest which they have in the surface of the highway, on the authority of the decisions of this court in Foley's Charity v Dudley Corporation [1910] 1 KB 317 and in Tithe Redemption Commission v Runcorn Urban District Council [1954] 1 Ch 383, [1954] 1 All ER 653 which the learned judge followed. And the other plaintiffs have a right to possess their own land adjacent to the highway.

That, in my view, is the end of the appeal, because I do not see how it can be argued that the defendants are not persons who entered into and remained in occupation without the plaintiffs' licence and consent. They are the only occupiers of this highway, and their occupation of many parts of the highway affects the authority's right of possession of the whole highway, including its unoccupied parts, and entitles the authority to possession of the whole highway: see University of Essex v Djamal [1980] 2 All ER 742, [1980] 1 WLR 1301, in particular per Lord Justice Shaw at p 1305 D.

For these reasons I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.

DISPOSITION:

Appeal dismissed; no order as to costs, except that the costs be paid out of the legal aid fund unless the Law Society objects within ten weeks from today's date; legal aid taxation of costs of defendants who are legally aided.

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1984

IN THE MATTER OF LAND AT GREENHAM COMMON, BERKSHIRE.

A D V I C E

FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE SITUATION AT GREENHAM

This paper sets out, for Ministers, the factual background to the situation at Greenham. A difficulty is that two of the potential litigants in any concerted action - Berkshire County Council (Berkshire) and Newbury District Council (Newbury) - cannot be approached at this stage. Thus although the contents of the paper have been agreed by officials of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Department of Transport (DTp) which, together with Berkshire and Newbury would appear to be the potential instigators of any action, the information relating to the position of the councils is necessarily second hand and less detailed. The paper has also been agreed by officials of the Home Office (which is co-ordinating the current exercise), the Department of the Environment and the Lord Chancellor's Department.

The history and pattern of land ownership.

2. RAF Greenham Common occupies some 860 acres of Greenham and Crookham Commons which, excluding the are now covered by the air base, extend to some 410 acres. In addition the base covers some 50 acres of land which is not common land. The land comprising Greenham Common (including that now occupied by MOD) was purchased by Newbury Borough Council from the estate of Mr L H Baxondale on 4 February 1939. Later that year the council executed a deed under section 193 of the Law of Property Act 1925 to grant public access for air and exercise. By virtue of section 193(4) of the 1925 Act the deed had the affect of making it an offence to drive vehicles, camp or light fires on the Common. In June 1930 Mr A S B Tull, the owner of Crookham Common (including that part now occupied by the base), had executed a similar deed in respect of that Common.

3. In 1943 the area now occupied by RAF Greenham Common (together with the 180 acres later sold to Newbury) was requisitioned by MOD under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939. Under powers conferred by section 9 of the Defence Act 1842 MoD purchased the requisitioned common land (Crookham Common in 1955, and Greenham Common in 1960) and by 1960 had purchased the remaining 50 acres of the land covered by the base from the various landowners concerned. During 1960 MoD revoked, in respect of the part of Greenham Common it owned, the deed under the Law of Property Act

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giving public access. In 1982 180 acres of Crookham Common were sold by MoD to Newbury. During February 1983 Newbury revoked, in respect of the parts of Greenham and Cookham Commons now owned by MoD, the deeds previously executed under section 193 of the Law of Property Act 1925. It then proceeded on 26 July 1983 to make a Scheme of Management under section 1 of the Commons Act 1899 in order to be better able to regulate the Commons. Besides conferring a power to make byelaws, the Scheme provides that the Council shall maintain the common free from all encroachments and not permit any trespass, that all rights of common are unaffected, and that all inhabitants have a free right of access to every part of the Common. On 10 August 1983 the Council made byelaws, applying to both Greenham and Crookham Commons under the Scheme of Management. The byelaws were confirmed on behalf of the Home Secretary on 7 November and came into force on 21 November 1983. In March 1983 MoD had also revoked the deed executed under the Law of Property Act 1925 in respect of its part of Crookham Common - thus extinguishing the public right of access over the land owned by MoD.

4. The rights of common over Greenham and Crookham Commons were subject to registration under the Commons Registration Act 1965. Some 34 people have registered rights of common over Greenham Common, while there have been 29 such registrations in respect of Crookham Common. MoD are not aware that any of the rights of common over the land occupied by RAF Greenham Common have been exercised. While it cannot be established with certainty without approaching Berkshire, the likelihood seems to be that the rights of common over the land owned by MoD are still effective.

5. As highway authority in respect of the A339 trunk road which runs by the south of the base, DTp own a comparatively small triange of land on either side of the access road linking the A339 to the main gate. In February 1964 this land was acquired by DTp from Newbury Municipal Corporation under the Provision and Improvement of Highways (Berkshire) Compulsory Purchase (No 1) Order 1959. The land was purchased in connection with the diversion of the A339 and the creation of a juntion between the A339 and the access road to the base. Berkshire is the highway authority in respect of the remaining roads in the area, including Burys Bank Road which follows the northern perimeter of the base and Brackenhurst Lane which

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runs from the A339 to the contractors gate at the south of the base. This does not necessarily mean that Berkshire owns the land covered by the highways (ie the road and its verges); but its powers as highway authority would allow it to undertake, for example, court proceedings against trespassers. (It should be noted that the section of the access road to the base between the highway boundary and the main gate is not part of the highway).

6. In addition to its ownership of the land within the base, MOD also owns two areas of land north of the base, and one to the south. The first, at Greenham Lodge, contains housing for United States' Air Force (USAF) personnel. The second, which contains the disused Butts ranges is in a densely wooded area and forms part of an area designated in 1983 as a site of special scientific interest under section 28(2) of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. This designation effectively prevents any development and MoD are in the process of trying to dispose of the land.

7. There are no other significant areas of land in public ownership in the immediate vicinity of the base. The boundary of the privately owned golf course to the north of the base is close to the perimeter, but in the past protestors who have strayed onto the land have moved off when told by the police that they were on private, rather than public, land.

History of the protests at Greenham

8. On 17 June 1980 Francis Pym, the then Secretary of State for Defence, announced in the House of Commons that Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) would be deployed at two bases in England - RAF Greenham Common and RAF Molesworth. The first missiles were to arrive at Greenham in 1983. In August/September 1981 the first 'peace camp' was established near the main gate at RAF Greenham Common on common land owned by Newbury. The camp consisted of around a dozen women, with several children, living in seven or eight caravans. In the early part of 1982 Newbury evicted the protestors (we think using the entitlement of a person with a right to occupy land to use self help to remove trespassers, without resorting to civil proceedings) who then moved onto the DTp land alongside the junction between the A339 and the access road. During July 1982 DTp gave notice

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that it intended to take action under section 143 of the Highways Act 1980 to remove the protestors' caravans from the DTp land as they were obstructing the line of sight of traffic using the junction. In late September DTp proceeded to remove the caravans under section 143 of the 1980 Act, and then banked up its land with earth and stones to prevent the return of the caravans. DTp have not taken any action against the protestors since then. As a result of the action by DTp in September 1982 the protestors moved back onto the common land owned by Newbury. On 9 March 1983 Newbury obtained a high court injunction against 21 protestors which required them to leave the common land, not to re-enter, and not to conspire with others to trespass (a further part prohibiting the women from conspiring to incite others to trespass was refused). On 10 March Newbury obtained from the high court an order for possession of land under Order 113 of the Rules of the Supreme Court against 161 named women "and persons unknown". The order was enforced by the Sheriff and the women subsequently moved the structures which had previously been on common land onto the DTp land near the junction between the A339 and the access road, (when, on occasion, the structures then erected on DTp land have obstructed sight lines at the junction the protestors have been willing to move them when asked to do so by the police, thus avoiding any obstruction of the highway). Informal contacts with Newbury have suggested some dissatisfaction with the efficacy of these proceedings. Difficulties were experienced in naming protestors for the purposes of the proceedings for an injunction, and the injunction was only, apparently, enforceable against the persons named. Newbury felt that the civil proceedings did not provide an effective remedy given the changing population of protestors and the surrounding events at Greenham (presumably the large set-piece demonstrations). Since March 1983 the council has relied upon their common law rights to remove trespassers (using reasonable force if necessary) and, more latterly, the byelaws (see paragraph 17 below).

9. Whilst the protestors have been encamped at Greenham there have been various instances of attempts to enter, and actual entry into, the air base. It would appear that from time to time the protestors weaken the perimeter fence by cutting away with bolt cutters at the supporting wires, thus making it easier for the fence to be breached during the large set-piece occasions, and at other times. This activity, and the resultant weaknesses

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in the fence, are difficult to detect given the nine mile length of the perimeter. When protestors have been apprehended inside the fence it has sometimes been difficult to prove that they have been responsible for cutting the holes in the fence through which they have entered, as they have not been in possession of bolt cutters, and other people have committed the damage for them. In such cases the protestors can only be removed as trespassers. On 27 December 1983 two women entered the base having got through the external and internal security fences and broke into a control tower which is used only during the infrequent take-offs and landings at the base. On this occasion the women were charged with causing criminal damage in breaking into the building.

10. In addition to such small scale activity there has been a number of larger, set-piece,demonstrations at Greenham Common. Some have been peaceful and orderly, and caused no disruption of the base. Examples include the encirclement of the perimeter on Sunday 12 December 1982, and the events on 1 April 1983 when about 50,000 people formed a 14 mile human 'chain' between Greenham, Burghfield and Aldermaston. There have also been concerted attempts at obstruction. For example, between 4 and 8 July 1983 supporters of an "International Women's Blockade" attempted to blockade the gates. The maximum number of women involved at any time was about 550. The police maintained access to and from the base, making a total of 115 arrests for obstruction. And on 15 November 1983, 141 women were arrested for attempting to obstruct the gates.

11. The demonstrations between 4-8 July 1983 also saw the first serious attempt to cut the perimeter fence with bolt-cutters: on 6 July, 17 women entered the base by this means, and it was found that large sections of the fence could be cut down quickly. On 29 October, some 400 women managed to cut down about 2,000 yards of the 9 mile fence, despite the presence of 700 police officers and over 2,000 military personnel inside the base. 197 women were arrested, principally for criminal damage. On 11 December, between 3.00 pm and 5.00 pm some hundreds of 20-25,000 demonstrators round the base attacked the fence at various points sometimes using bolt-cutters but otherwise shaking and pulling sections down with their bare hands. About 1,000 officers, 30 of whom were injured, were deployed, and there were 57 arrests, principally for criminal damge.

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12. The continued presence of the encamped protestors (with the resultant threat to the perimeter fence) combined with the large set-piece demonstrations, has placed a considerable burden upon the police and military resources. When the situation at the base is relatively quiet Thames Valley Police leave the area to be policed through regular visits by beat officers, with a sergeant and ten constables available in an emergency from Newbury police station. But during the demonstrations in late October and November connected with the deployment of cruise the police were using some 400 officers during each 24 hour period. During large demonstrations at the base last Easter, and on 11 December, some 1,000 officers were deployed. Estimates of the cost of the additional police deployment vary according to the basis used, but Thames Valley Police have estimated the cost to be in the region of £2.8 million in this financial year. Central government contributes some 65% of the cost of policing under normal arrangements, and the Home Secretary has made available to the police authority an additional £1.5 million from the contingency reserve in recognition of the exceptional and unforseeable additional costs of policing at Greenham. As to MoD personnel, prior to the deployment of cruise and the large demonstrations in December over one hundred additional personnel were present at the air base as a result of the protests. Since then over four hundred additional personnel have been at the base. During large demonstrations up to 2,000 additional personnel have been on duty. Because servicemen receive no overtime, and would in any case be being paid if not on duty at Greenham, it is not possible to provide an estimate of the total cost of this additional manpower.

Previous court cases involving the protestors

13. Principally for offences committed during the demonstrations at Greenham, although also for offences committed on other occasions, Thames Valley Police have arrested over 1,000 people while MoD police have arrested in the region of 400 people. Some 800 cases have been brought to the courts so far. When prosecuted the protestors have tended to attempt to rely on novel defences which, they argue, justify their actions. Thus defendants have argued that although they are in breach of the law in this country, they are acting in accordance with

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some higher authority, for example the law of God. Defendants have also argued that they are seeking to uphold peace (by preventing nuclear war), not to breach it, when charged with a breach of the peace. Thames Valley Police have indicated that the courts have tended to allow those involved to express their views in this way. The reports of Newbury District Councils civil actions against the protestors suggest that similar arguments may have been used by the defendants then.

14. On 9 November 13 women connected with the peace camps at Greenham Common together with two US Congressment began proceedings in a District Court in New York against the US President and Government. They alleged that the deployment of cruise missiles breached the Hague and Geneva Conventions (because the Conventions required the non-combatants to be protected in the event of war); the US constitution; and the plaintiffs "right to survive". The plaintiffs had apparently received sympathetic advice from Ramsey Clark, an ex-US Attorney General. The court refused an application for a temporary order restraining the deployment of cruise - on the basis that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that they would suffer irreparable harm if such an order was not granted. The judge deferred a decision as to whether there was a substantive case to answer, and as far as we are aware, there has been no further hearing. During the case 150 protestors demonstrated outside the court in New York, and in England and Wales peace campaigners set up 75 camps outside military installations as a show of support for the women in New York.

The current situation at Greenham

15. The character of the 1983 campaign and demonstrations was essentially to oppose the installation of GLCMs at Greenham. The first cruise missile equipment was delivered to Greenham in November/December 1983, although there will be a continuing programme of deliveries from March 1984. In 1984, convoys of vehicles are expected to leave and return to the base on training exercises. It is likely that protestors will seek to prevent these operations. Since the arrival of the missiles the number of camps around the base has increased. As part of a 'cruise watch' the protestors claim to be able to watch every gate for any attempt to deploy the GLCM

equipment. The position is, however, fluid and this tendency has been increased by the recent activity of Newbury in enforcing its byelaws (see paragraph 17). On 5 January there were nine camps situated at various points around the perimeter fence (all but one at gates). The Thames Valley Police estimated that in total there were some 145 tents and other structures, occupied by a total of an average of about 100 people. By 24 January three of these encampments had been removed from land owned by Newbury as a result of enforcement action by its officers under the byelaws. The police estimated that some 40 to 50 protestors were present.

16. The police have indicated that on 4 February there were six camps at Greenham;

- the main camp, situated either side of the access road from the A339. There were 29 tents and other structures (consisting of shelters constructed from plastic sheeting) and five vehicles. The camp was sited principally on Newbury land, with some spillage onto the contiguous land owned by DTp;

- a camp at Gate L. South of this gate, on MoD land between the fence and the road, were 15 structures, together with two vehicles;

- a camp at Gate F. To the west of the gate by the fence, there were seven tents or other structures. The camp was situated on land owned by Berkshire;

- a camp at Gate D. East of this gate, on land owned by Berkshire, there were six tents and structures and one vehicle;

- a camp at Gate A. East of the gate between the fence and the road on land owned by Berkshire, there were 16 tents and other structures, with two vehicles;

- a camp at the contractor's gate. 50 yards each of the gate, on common land, there were 28 tents and structures, together with three vehicles.

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In total the tents and structures were occupied by an average of something fewer than 50 protestors. As this indicates not all the tents and structures are continually occupied. But it could be mistaken to interpret the current low level of activity as part of a general decline, as the numbers present have varied considerably since the first camp was established in 1981. The numbers can swell quickly on particular occasions when the call goes out for further support; numbers often reach 200 with weekend supporters and many more when the weather is pleasant. The police have reported that at the moment many of the long term residents at the camps are absent, having been replaced by other protestors. Apparently this has occurred before at this time of year, with the 'regulars' returning after a break of two or three weeks.

Recent action by Newbury District Council

17. It has already been indicated (paragraph 3 above) that Newbury has made byelaws regulating Greenham and Crookham Commons. The following byelaws appear to be relevant to the position of the protestors encamped on the common land;

byelaw no 12: A person shall not without lawful authority camp or light any fire on any part of the common.

byelaw no 13: An officer of the council may after due warning remove any structure etc erected or placed on the common in contravention of the byelaws.

byelaw no 15: A person shall not, without the consent of the council, or other lawful authority, erect on the common any building, shed, tent, fence, post railing or other structure or fix bills placards or notices on trees, fences, erections or notice boards on the common.

byelaw no 16: A person shall not intentionally obstruct or hinder any officer of the council in the exercise of his powers or duties under the byelaws.

byelaw no 17: Any person who contravenes the byelaws commits an offence with a maximum penalty of a fine of fifty pounds. (There is no power of arrest).

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At a meeting of Newbury on 13 December the council was informed that there had been an increase in the number of camps on the common land, and that these could be expected to increase once DTp took action to clear its land in connection with its road improvement scheme (see paragraph 18 below). The council then decided to take action under byelaw 13 to remove the structures concerned. An existing employee has taken on the role of enforcement officer, whilst two bailiffs have been employed to patrol the common and report infringements. Prior to Christmas encampments near gates A and H were removed by the council's officers. The police were present, but there was no trouble. The protestors immediately began to reassemble their camps on other land. The structures near gate H were moved back onto common land but have now been removed again, whilst those near gate A are on land owned by Berkshire. Since Christmas officers of Newbury have taken action to remove structures on a number of occasions. As yet Newbury have not prosecuted any protestors for contravention of the byelaws and informal contacts suggest that they would be reluctant to do so. The MoD land immediately outside gate L has been treated as a refuge by the protestors since Newbury began to take action to enforce the byelaws.

Prospective action by the Department of Transport

18. DTp has in hand a road improvement scheme which, in widening and curving the access road from the A339 to the base, will consume part of their land on which the principal camp is at present sited. The remaining part of DTp's land is not covered by the scheme. The intention has been that part of the land would be exchanged with Newbury for a piece of common land, for use as a bus bay. However, on 10 January, Newbury informed DTp that they were not prepared to make this exchange because of the considerable inequality in the areas involved. (The road scheme will consume only a quarter of DTp's land and this would leave over 300 square metres of land to be given to Newbury in exchange for under 100 square metres of common land needed for the bus bay.) Newbury officials have now suggested that the council might be prepared to agree to an exchange of equal areas of land, and this is being explored. Once the road has been improved, any

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attempt to camp on the land covered by it will be a criminal offence (of obstruction of the highway); but there will remain on either side DTp land to which that will not apply. Whilst the road is being improved, however, all the DTp land would be cleared of campers and structures fenced off. The scheme is at present due to start in mid-March, with completion possibly in late May/early June. Efforts to clear the land of protestors and structures would not be needed until the day on which work on the scheme was to begin.

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Defence: Policing of Demos
at Military Bases

Feb 83



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FIL 84

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 January, 1984

Greenham Common

The Prime Minister was grateful for and has noted the Lord President's minute of 18 January, commenting on one from the Home Secretary of 17 January about possible civil action against protesters at Greenham Common.

DAVID BARCLAY

Miss Janet Lewis-Jones,
Lord President's Office

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FILE HL.

cc: LPO✓ DoE✓
LCO✓ D/Trans✓
FCO✓ LOD.
NIO✓ CO
MOD✓
SO✓
WO✓

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 January 1984

Greenham Common

The Prime Minister was grateful for the Home Secretary's minute of 17 January about the possible options for action in respect of protesters at Greenham Common.

The Prime Minister is content for officials to undertake further work on possible concerted action under the civil law. She has also noted that the Secretary of State for Defence is considering the making of by-laws under the Military Lands Act 1892. The Prime Minister would be grateful to be kept closely in touch.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the recipients of your Secretary of State's minute.

David Barclay

Hugh Taylor, Esq.,
Home Office.

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Prime Minister

The Home Secretary's minute referred to was about Greenham Common.

PRIME MINISTER

Due 19/1

I have seen the Home Secretary's minute to you of 17 January. From a Press and Public Relations point of view I greatly welcome his minute and hope the co-ordinated civil action will proceed as quickly as possible. There is no doubt that continued acceptance of the present situation would do the Government increasing damage.

I am copying this minute to Leon Brittan, Quintin Hailsham, Geoffrey Howe, Jim Prior, Michael Heseltine, George Younger, Nicholas Edwards, Patrick Jenkin, Nicholas Ridley, Michael Havers and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

18 January 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

20 JAN 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister ①

Agree that officials should do further work on possible civil action against the Greenham women?

Or would you like a word with the Home Secretary first?

No. MT

DMB 18/1

PRIME MINISTER

GREENHAM COMMON

You agreed that a number of other interested colleagues and I should consider possible options for action in respect of the protesters at Greenham Common. On 16 January, I chaired a meeting with Michael Heseltine, Nicholas Edwards, Patrick Jenkin, Nicholas Ridley and Michael Havers; Nicholas Scott represented Jim Prior, and Douglas Hurd was with me. We had before us the .... attached paper agreed by officials which, we think, provides an admirably comprehensive and clear analysis of the factual and legal background and the possible options.

We concluded that primary legislation to amend the criminal law because of the current situation at Greenham does not appear to be either necessary or desirable. Michael Heseltine is, however, actively considering the making of byelaws under the Military Lands Act 1892, to create a criminal offence of trespass on the base.

We did agree, however, that, at this stage, there seems to be a strong case for concerted action under the civil law to remove the protesters as trespassers. The protesters have had more than enough time to make their demonstration and state their case, at considerable expense to central and local government which shows every sign of continuing. There could be considerable public and political support for moves to end this persistent mischief, and the civil law seems to offer effective remedies.

What would be required would be co-ordinated action, by the Department of Transport, Newbury District Council, Berkshire County Council and possibly the Ministry of Defence. There could be

parallel or joint actions for possession of land, backed up if necessary by injunctions. One possibility would be that such actions on the part of the local authorities and the Ministry of Defence might be co-ordinated with the plan which the Department of Transport already has in hand to clear their land in order to effect a road improvement scheme; and either the District Council, or if necessary the Attorney General, could apply for an injunction restraining persistent breaches of the byelaws which already ban structures such as tents on their land.

It was clear to us, however, that although the attractions of concerted action of this kind are very considerable, this course should not be taken without more work and analysis by officials, on the basis of which Ministers would take a final view. The analysis would need to chart the possible progression of steps through the courts and the various stages of enforcement action and its potential consequences. The precise timescale and the management of co-ordinated action need particular consideration. The two local authorities would have key parts to play in both. Berkshire County Council could present a particular problem given that whilst the Conservatives form the largest party on the Council there is no overall majority. We would not envisage making approaches to either local authority unless and until Ministers agreed to that as part of an approved analysis and plan for action. At the moment, we envisage that the Home Office might co-ordinate the implementation of such a plan.

As the scale of resistance is not predictable there can be no complete guarantee that court orders would be readily enforced, although I am confident that the police will do everything within their power to assist, and the prospects of effective enforcement seem reasonably good. The alternative is to allow a forcible occupation of public property to continue virtually indefinitely. The merits of concerted civil action seem to warrant the further work on it which I have indicated, although we should not rule out the possibility that work could lead to a less encouraging view of the prospects of success.

For the moment I should be grateful to know if you agree that the further work should be undertaken and reported for collective consideration. I would, of course, be happy to discuss this with you.

I am copying this minute to Willie Whitelaw, Quintin Hailsham, Geoffrey Howe, Jim Prior, Michael Heseltine, George Younger, Nicholas Edwards, Patrick Jenkin, Nicholas Ridley and Michael Havers, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

L.B.

17 January 1984

E.R.

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy no 25 of 25 copies

PROTESTORS AT GREENHAM COMMON : POSSIBLE OPTIONS

PAPER BY OFFICIALS

Introduction

In a letter of 16 December 1983 to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Home Secretary said he had come to the clear view that there were a number of threads relating to the continued presence of the protestors at Greenham Common which needed to be pulled together. He suggested that it would be helpful for a number of colleagues to meet, to assess the possible options within the existing law, to assess the ways in which the law might be changed by primary or secondary legislation, and to agree on the best strategy in the light of the wider considerations.

2. The meeting has been arranged to take place at the Home Office at 10.00 am on Monday 16 January. The Home Secretary proposed that the meeting should have before it a paper by officials bringing together the relevant information about the legal and factual background. This is that paper: it has been agreed by officials of the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Department of Transport (DTp), the Law Officers' Department, the Lord Chancellor's Department and the Department of the Environment.

3. The paper:

(i) describes the background including the current situation at Greenham Common, and action by DTp and Newbury District Council which is in prospect; and

(ii) sets out a range of options, beginning with the remedies available under the existing law and procedures and then identifying various changes which might be made to the law.

4. As an index to the second part:

(a) remedies which may be available under the existing law in respect of the presence of the encamped women are:

- self help (paragraphs 16 and 17);
- the use of the provisions of highways legislation (paragraphs 18 and 19);

- an order for possession of land (paragraphs 20-22);

- an injunction restraining those encamped from further trespass (paragraph 23);

- action in respect of a public or private nuisance (paragraphs 24 and 25); and

- the enforcement of Newbury District Council's byelaws, possibly followed by an injunction restraining further contravention of the byelaws (paragraphs 26-29).

(b) other provisions of the existing law, which may be relevant depending on the actions of protestors are:

- section 193 of the Army Act 1955 and the same section of the Air Force Act 1955 (paragraphs 30-32);

- section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 and section 3 of the Official Secrets Act 1920 (paragraphs 33-38); and

- section 77 of the Explosive Act 1875 (paragraphs 39-41).

(c) options involving subordinate legislation or procedures are:

- an Order in Council to extend to members of visiting forces (such as the US personnel at Greenham) the protection of certain provisions of the law (paragraph 42); and

- the making of byelaws under the Military Lands Act 1892, to create a criminal offence of trespass (paragraphs 43 and 44).

(d) options requiring primary legislation are:

- increase of the maximum penalties and enhancement of the enforcement powers of existing provisions (paragraphs 45-50);

- the introduction of a new criminal offence of trespass (paragraphs 51-54); and

- the introduction of a power to prohibit or limit the presence of people within a specified area (paragraphs 55-60).

The current situation at Greenham Common

5. At annex A is a map of RAF Greenham Common and the area immediately surrounding the nine-mile perimeter. Most of the land immediately outside the perimeter fence is common land (Greenham and Crookham Commons), in the possession of Newbury District Council. Some of the land by the side of the roads running by the base is owned by Berkshire County Council, as highway authority. A comparatively small area of land, either side of the access road linking the A339, which runs by the south of the base, to the main gate on that side, is owned by DTp as highway authority (see map at annex B).

6. The first "peace camp" outside the base was established in 1981. The Thames Valley police report that on 5 January there were a number of camps:

- the main camp, situated either side of the access road from the A339. There are 49 tents and other structures (consisting of shelters constructed from plastic sheeting) and eight vehicles. There are on average 30 campers. The camp is sited principally on DTp land, with some spillage on to the contiguous common land;

- a camp at Gate L. South of this gate, on common land between the fence and the road, are nine structures. On common land on the opposite side of the road are a further twelve tents and other structures and one vehicle. On average, twelve people occupy the two sets of structures; the numbers have from time to time swelled to 40-50;

- a camp at Gate H. On common land on the opposite side of the road from the fence are four structures, used by four or five people;

- a camp at Gate F. To the west of the gate by the fence, there are five tents or other structures, with four - five occupants. The camp is situated on land owned by Berkshire County Council. On the opposite side of the road, on common land, adjacent to the golf course, a further three people use three structures.

- a camp at Gate D. East of this gate, on land owned by the County Council, are five tents and structures and one vehicle, with only one occupant;

- a camp at Gate A. East of the gate between the fence and the road, on land owned by the County Council, are 22 tents and other structures, one vehicle and an average of 20 people;

- a camp at Gate N. On common land six people are encamped in six structures;

- a camp between Gate N and the contractor's gate. On common land four people are encamped in two tents;

- a camp at the contractor's gate. 50 yards east of the gate, on common land, there are 28 tents and structures, four vehicles and an average of 15 people.

The presence and activities of protestors

7. As the description above of the current camps indicates, not all the tents and other structures are continually occupied. The numbers can swell quickly on particular occasions; they increase to about 200 with weekend supporters, and more when the weather is pleasant.

8. The character of the 1983 campaign and demonstrations was essentially to oppose the installation of cruise missiles at the base. The major demonstrations at Easter and in the summer and early autumn often involved mass attempts to blockade the base. There were also attacks on the perimeter fence, and incursions by small numbers of women. The major attacks were on 29 October, when some hundreds of women cut down over 1,000 yards of the fence altogether, and on 11 December, when again hundreds of women among 20-25,000 demonstrators cut and grabbed at sections at different points: the longest breach was about 50 yards. A continuing problem is the cutting of the fence by one or more campers, often at night.

9. The first cruise missile equipment was delivered to Greenham in November/December 1983, but there will be a continuing programme of deliveries from March 1984. In 1984, convoys of vehicles are expected to leave and return to the base on training exercises. It is likely that protestors will seek to prevent these operations. The proliferation of the camps at the gates of the base is

part of a "cruise watch" being mounted by the women, to be ready for the first convoy movement.

Prospective action by the Department of Transport and Newbury District Council

10. DTp has in hand a road improvement scheme which, in widening and curving the access road from the A339 to the base, will consumepart of their land on which the principal camp is at present sited. The remaining part of DTp's land is not covered by the scheme. The intention had been that that part of the land would be exchanged with the District Council for a piece of common land, for use as a bus bay. On 10 January, the District Council informed DTp that they were not prepared to make this exchange. Once the road has been improved, any attempt to camp on the land covered by it will be a criminal offence (of obstruction of the highway); but there will remain on either side DTp land to which that will not apply. Whilst the road is being improved, however, all the DTp land would be cleared of campers and structures and fenced off.

11. The scheme is at present due to start in mid-March, with completion possibly in late May/early June. Efforts to clear the land of protestors and structures would not be needed until the day on which work on the scheme was to begin.

12. As is explained in paragraphs 26 and 27 below, Newbury District Council have, apparently, recently decided to take continuous action under new byelaws to remove tents and structures from the common land.

13. There may therefore be some prospect that, at least during the period in which contractors are engaged on the road improvement and the whole of DTp's land is consequently cleared and fenced off, the DTp scheme and action by the District Council might make it increasingly difficult for peace campers to maintain a foothold immediately outside the base perimeter. This will depend very much on the persistence and effectiveness of the action taken by the Council, whether under the byelaws or otherwise. In the past when the Council have used self-help powers (see paragraphs 16 and 17 below) to remove structures, they have simply been re-erected by campers, often on other areas of the common as well as on DTp land.

Other land: Berkshire County Council

14. However effective action taken by DTp and Newbury District Council may prove to be, there is other land, owned by neither, which is close to the base and onto which, as the list of camps in paragraph 6 above records, some people

are already sited, ie land owned by Berkshire County Council. The prospect could be of further displacement on to such land. If it were decided in principle to take or to try to encourage further action against the peace camps, to clear them from the surrounding area as a whole, it would be necessary to approach the County Council to establish if they would be prepared to participate in a co-ordinated exercise. Officers of the County Council are understood to be considering what advice they should give the Council about taking action in respect of the camps which are already sited on the Council's land. The political composition of the County Council is finely balanced (the Conservative Party holds 42 of 87 seats).

Some general considerations

15. Among general considerations which might be borne in mind are:

(i) the Greenham Women and some of their supporters are determined and ingenious and have access to advice and guidance from sympathetic lawyers. They may be expected to try to devise tactics to circumvent on the ground action taken against them rather than give up camping, and to try to challenge in the courts any loophole they or their advisers identify in the legality of moves to remove them;

(ii) so far the number of protestors imprisoned for criminal offences at Greenham has not been large. Persistent offending, or the commission of grave offences, could lead to more custodial penalties. That could also be one result of increasing confrontation between the authorities and the women. For example, if an injunction were granted but not obeyed, the court would find it difficult not to commit for contempt scores or more women. This could present serious difficulties for the female prison system, the capacity of which is inelastic and which can be put under strain by what are only marginal increases in the total size of the prison population. The result could be that those women, or others, would have to be held in police cells;

(iii) Greenham Common is the principal focus of "peace camping". But there are minor camps, and have been incursions into and demonstrations at, other military bases, in England and in Scotland. Action which removed protestors from the Greenham area could displace them to other sites, with even less effective fencing or no fencing at all. The women have already announced that they intend to move in this direction in 1984. This is not, of course, necessarily an argument for not taking action at Greenham. It could equally argue for general action, for example in respect of all military bases or

categories of base and surrounding land. But if the camping phenomenon were further spread rather than dissipated, there could be an increase in the operational demands on the police and on military personnel.

REMEDIES AVAILABLE UNDER THE EXISTING LAW IN RESPECT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE ENCAMPED WOMEN

Self-help

16. The common law recognises the right of a person with a right to occupy land to remove trespassers and their property, using reasonable force if necessary. It is therefore open to the owners of land on which the peace campers and their structures are or may be sited to remove them by 'self-help' without the need for recourse to the civil courts or reliance on a statutory power. In the past, Newbury District Council have removed structures (but not people), relying on self-help, not an injunction or their byelaws.

17. This is, however, a potentially controversial measure, particularly if people are removed and force is used. The use of violence is undesirable in itself, and may provoke a breach of the peace, leading both to injury and litigation. As a matter of public policy, it seems preferable for central or local government which decides to act in circumstances such as the trespass at Greenham to obtain in advance the backing of an order from the court or to rely on a statutory provision if that is available. Self-help might be all that is needed if women were asked to move, for example, from DTp land because work was about to begin and there was no attempt to stop them moving to other land nearby. But it seems dangerous for a concerted effort at removal to rely on self-help.

The provisions of highways legislation

18. Highways legislation includes various provisions designed to deal with obstruction of the highways which includes, for these purposes, the verges such as those on which the main peace camp is situated. The expression "highways authority" means DTp in respect of the A339 and Berkshire County Council in respect of the other roads in the area. The following would seem to be the most relevant provisions;

(a) section 130 of the Highways Act 1980 imposes a duty on each highway authority to assert and protect the right of the public to use and enjoy any highway for which they are the responsible authority;

(b) by virtue of section 137 of the 1980 Act a person who, without lawful authority or excuse, wilfully obstructs free passage along a highway commits an arrestable offence with a maximum penalty of level 3 on the standard scale (£200). This section provides adequate powers for the police to arrest anyone encamped on the verges of the road if they obstruct free passage along the highway, but actual obstruction of traffic would have to be proven;

(c) section 143 of the 1980 Act gives a highway authority power to serve a notice requiring any person having control or possession of a structure, including anything capable of causing an obstruction, which has been erected on the highway without authority to remove the structure within a specified period (of not less than 1 month). If the notice is not complied with the authority may remove the structure. The length of the notice required combined with the fact that a notice can be frustrated by removing the offending item for a short period or to another location, or by transferring control or possession, suggests that this power would not be effective in the context of the peace camps;

(d) section 333 makes it clear that the 1980 Act does not affect other statutory and common law powers.

(e) section 12 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967 allows a highway authority to make an order temporarily prohibiting vehicles or foot passengers from making use of part of the highway in circumstances where road works are to be executed. Contravention of such an order is an offence with a maximum penalty of level 3 on the standard scale (£200), but there is no power of arrest without warrant.

19. It should be noted that any exercise of the powers conferred by the highways legislation in circumstances where there was no genuine 'highways' nuisance such as obstruction might well be open to successful challenge in the courts. However, in the context of the need to clear the DTp land to make way for the road improvement scheme such a nuisance would arise.

Proceedings for possession of the land

20. A number of aspects of the civil law concerning trespass would appear to bite in the context of the Greenham peace camps. The women encamped on highways authority land are trespassing as their use of the land goes beyond the legal right of passage and repassage along the highway and its verges. The encampments of the protestors on common land may also amount to trespass because it goes

beyond any rights which exist over the common land. But the powers available to Newbury District Council under the byelaws (paragraphs 26 to 27) are likely to be a more straightforward avenue to pursue. The presence of the protestors on MoD land, or land owned by anyone else which was not highway or common land, would also involve trespass. But the shifting character of the population of the camps would make it difficult to proceed via a standard action for trespass, as this would involve naming the individual trespassers and would take a considerable time. The women are often difficult to identify - giving false names when questioned - and an individual who was identified in proceedings could drop from the scene to be replaced by others. A streamlined procedure is, however, available in the county court under Order 24 of the County Court Rules 1981 and in the High Court under Order 113 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

21. Under both procedures a person claiming possession of land which is occupied solely by persons who entered or remained without his consent may apply to the court for an order for possession. It is not necessary for the landowner to be able to name the trespassers (although he would need to declare that he could not name any trespasser not named, and the protestors might try to make this difficult) and only five days notice need be given of the proceedings (either to named defendants or by displaying notices on the land concerned). In urgent cases the five days notice can be shortened. Where an order is granted the landowner is able to obtain a warrant of possession for enforcement by the bailiff (in the County Court) or a writ for enforcement of the order by the sheriff (in the High Court). In such a situation the police could attend in order to prevent a breach of the peace and to assist the bailiff or sheriff if the warrant or writ is resisted.

22. In a leading case (University of Essex v Djemal and Others) it was decided that the jurisdiction of the court to grant an order for possession extended beyond the area actually in wrongful occupation to the whole of the property of the legal owner - particularly where there was a threat of further adverse possession. And such an order would be enforceable against any person who might be in wrongful occupation of any part of the premises. If the protestors returned after the order for possession had been executed the landowner could obtain a writ of restitution to remove them again without new proceedings.

An injunction in respect of trespass

23. An order for repossession of land ought to provide an adequate remedy against any trespasser. But if it were thought necessary the landowner could apply for

an injunction restraining the protestors from trespassing. If a permanent injunction were granted failure to comply would amount to a contempt of court which could, ultimately, involve imprisonment. The difficulty here is that proceedings for an injunction would involve naming the trespassers. Even if particular protestors present at the camps could be identified they could leave the camp to be replaced by others. Two possibilities present themselves. First, in theory it ought to be possible to bring proceedings for an injunction against one or two named persons using terms which extend to any person helping or accompanying the named individuals. The injunction could then be enforced against any such persons. It cannot, however, be certain that this form of injunction would be effective in the circumstances at Greenham Common, where people might act independently rather than in groups demonstrably assisting those who were subject to the injunction. Secondly it might be possible to proceed via representative proceedings under rule 12 of Order 15 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. This would allow proceedings to be brought against one named protestor if the court were satisfied that the named defendant was representative of numerous persons having the same interest in the proceedings. An injunction issued after proceedings under rule 12 could be enforced against a person who had not been a party to the proceedings, but only with the leave of the court. There must be some doubt as to whether representative proceedings could be invoked in the case of Greenham Common protestors, and representative proceedings for an injunction should be regarded as a last resort, available once other remedies had been exhausted.

Action in respect of nuisance

24. The encampment of female protestors on DTp land will amount to a public nuisance if it inflicts damage, injury or inconvenience on the public, or on all members of a class of the public (such as service personnel) who come within the neighbourhood. Thus if the camps create an obstruction of the highway this will amount to a public nuisance. Obstruction of the gates of Greenham Common air base by protestors who declined to move until forced to do so would probably also be a public nuisance, since it would inconvenience the service personnel who probably consistitute a sufficiently large and readily identifiable class of persons. The courts are more likely to class acts as a public nuisance if they are committed intentionally rather than negligently. A public nuisance is a criminal offence at common law triable either way and carrying a maximum penalty of a fine of £1,000 or six months imprisonment on summary conviction. It is also a civil wrong, but proceedings for damages or an injunction (or both) can be brought by an individual or body only if he can show that he has suffered particular damage over and above the damage suffered by the public generally.

In this case MoD might argue that it suffers particular damage by the obstruction of the section of the highway in question. Similar arguments might be put by other landowners. In other cases an individual or body can usually only sue if the Attorney General consents to being named as a plaintiff in the case (a relator action). Alternatively the Attorney General could bring proceedings independently, or the local authority could do so under section 222(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 where it considered it expedient to do so for the promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants of its area to do so. (The policy of the Attorney is that now local authorities can bring proceedings in their own name under section 222(1) they should be encouraged to do so, rather than involving him in a relator action. But the case establishing the ability of local authorities to bring actions in this way is the subject of an appeal to the House of Lords, and if the decision were adverse a different situation would arise).

25. As an alternative a landowner might bring proceedings for private nuisance (which can be for damages or an injunction) if the presence of camp(s) interferes with his use or enjoyment of the land at Greenham Common air base. It should be noted that if proceedings for an injunction were successful this would not necessarily allow the camps to be removed if those encamped could abate the nuisance involved, for example obstruction, without actually leaving the land.

The Greenham Common byelaws

26. Under a scheme of regulation made under the Commons Act 1899 Newbury District Council has made byelaws which apply to Greenham and Crookham Commons (which is owned by Newbury District Council), were confirmed on behalf of the Home Secretary on 7 November 1983, and came into effect on 21 November. The scheme provides that the Council shall maintain the common free from all encroachments and not permit any trespass. It also states that all inhabitants have a free right of access to every part of the Common, subject to any byelaws made by the Council. The following byelaws are relevant to the position of the female protestors encamped on the common land;

byelaw no 12: A person shall not without lawful authority camp or light any fire on any part of the common.

byelaw no 13: An officer of the Council may after due warning remove any structure etc erected or placed on the common in contravention of the byelaws.

byelaw no 15: A person shall not, without the consent of the Council or other lawful authority, erect on the common any building, shed, tent, fence post, railing or other structure or fix bills placards or notices on trees, fences, erections or notice boards on the common.

byelaw no 16: A person shall not intentionally obstruct or hinder any officer of the Council in the exercise of his powers or duties under the byelaws.

byelaw no 17: Any person who contravenes the byelaws commits an offence with a maximum penalty of a fine of fifty pounds. (There is no power of arrest).

27. One problem which might arise is whether the byelaws could be enforced in the case of structures erected before the byelaws came into force. But most structures will have been erected since then and the initiative would rest with a person whose property was removed to establish that the structure was not covered by the byelaws. At a meeting of Newbury District Council on 13 December the Council was informed that there had been an increase in the number of camps on the common land, and that these could be expected to increase once DTp took action to clear its land in connection with the road improvement scheme. The Council then decided to take action under byelaw 13 to remove the structures concerned. An existing employee is to take on the role of enforcement officer for the Council, whilst two wardens are to be employed to patrol the common and report infringements. Prior to Christmas encampments near gates A and H were removed by the Council's officers. The police were present, but there was no trouble. The protestors immediately began to reassemble their camps on other land. As indicated in paragraph 3 the structures near gate H have now been moved back onto common land, whilst those near gate A are on land owned by Berkshire County Council. The District Council now intend to take continuous action to enforce the byelaws.

An injunction restraining further breaches of the byelaws

28. It is possible, given the nature of the peace camps and the byelaws, and the resources available to Newbury District Council, that breaches of the byelaws will continue despite the enforcement measures to be taken. Structures removed by Council officers may be replaced, and any prosecutions brought are unlikely to be a significant deterrent given the penalties available. In such circumstances it would be possible to apply to the courts for an injunction restraining those

involved from further breaches of the byelaws (although it is not yet clear that the Council would wish to take such action). If an injunction were granted contravention would constitute contempt of court. One difficulty with such proceedings is that the person pursuing the case would normally need to show a sufficient interest or locus in the issue before the court. This difficulty can be overcome if the Attorney General consents to being named as a plaintiff in a relator action, or the local authority brings the action in its name under section 222(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 (see paragraph 23 above). Of course, any proceedings for an injunction would face the same difficulties in identifying those involved as are set out in paragraph 23 above, and representative proceedings might have to be considered.

29. It should be noted that the Department of the Environment has no powers in respect of common land which would be relevant to the present position at Greenham.

OTHER REMEDIES AVAILABLE UNDER EXISTING LAW

Army Act 1955

30. Section 193 of this Act makes it an offence wilfully to obstruct or otherwise to interfere with any member of the regular forces acting in the execution of his duty. The offence is not arrestable. The maximum penalty is a fine of £200 and three months' imprisonment. Section 193 of the Air Force Act 1955 makes corresponding provision in relation to the RAF. Cases decided in the context of obstructing the police seem to indicate the section would cover conduct such as lying down in front of military vehicles.

31. The protection afforded by these provisions does not extend to members of visiting forces. As to the possibility of extending this see paragraph 42 below.

32. The offence will be arrestable as a result of the enactment of clause 22 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill as currently drafted if any of the general arrest conditions set out in that clause are satisfied. These are broadly: if a police officer could not ascertain the offender's name or address, or for the purpose of preventing physical harm to the offender or anyone else, or damage to property or preventing an obstruction of the highway. (See also paragraphs 46-50 below about powers of arrest and the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill).

E.R.

Official Secrets Act 1911

33. Section 1 of the Act provides that:

> "If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State -
> a. approaches, inspects, passes over, or is in the neighbourhood of, or enters any prohibited place within the meaning of this Act ... he shall be guilty of an offence".

"Prohibited place" is defined in section 3. A military base such as Greenham Common is a prohibited place within this definition. The offence is arrestable and carries a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment.

34. In Chandler v DPP (1964) members of the Committee of 100 were convicted of conspiring together and with others to commit a breach of section 1 of the 1911 Act, where they intended to enter an operational airfield and by obstruction, prevent any aircraft taking off for a number of hours, their object being to prevent nuclear war and to get the facts about it known to the public. By a majority decision the House of Lords took the view that if the jury are satisfied that the "immediate purpose" of demonstrators is to obstruct the operation of such a place then they have to consider whether that purpose is prejudicial to the interests of the State and disregard the demonstrators' long-term purpose or motive. Moreover, the defendants in such a case will not be entitled to adduce evidence on whether it is prejudicial to the interests of the State to have nuclear armaments since this is for the Government and cannot be tried in a court of law.

35. The advantages of using this legislation are that it already exists and that a conviction in a relevant case has been upheld by the highest Appellate authority. But a successful prosecution would need to satisfy the courts that the "immediate purpose" of the women was prejudicial to the interests of the State. Where this involves simple trespass or perhaps merely damage to the perimeter fence it must be open to question whether these circumstances meet the legal requirements. Thus it appears that so far the actions of the protestors have not amounted to a section 1 offence. Furthermore, the use of this provision against peaceful demonstrators unconnected with any foreign power may be seen as draconian and lead to criticism of the provision of the Act itself and to pressure for change. Its use would be particularly difficult if the activity which appeared to be caught by section 1 were committed by large numbers of people.

E.R.

CONFIDENTIAL

Official Secrets Act 1920

36. Section 3 of this Act makes it an offence for any person in the vicinity of a prohibited place to obstruct, interfere or impede the police or members of Her Majesty's Forces engaged in guard, sentry or other similar duties. The offence is not at present arrestable and carries a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment. It will, however, become a full arrestable offence under clause 21 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, and carry unconditional powers of arrest accordingly.

37. The protection of this provision does not extend to members of visiting forces. Paragraph 42 below deals with the feasibility of so extending this. This point arose in the recent Warner case where the Solicitor General consented to prosecution under this provision. Warner drove his vehicle through one of the entrances to Greenham Common at a time when sensitive equipment was being unloaded from a Galaxy aircraft. Consent was granted on the basis of obstruction of two MoD police officers on guard duty at the entrance but all other personnel involved in the incident were US personnel. The case is sub judice.

38. There are similar sensitivities to the use of the 1920 Act as to the use of the 1911 Act. But while the Attorney General has indicated a reluctance to invoke such provisions in relation to peaceful protest and those responsible for simple trespass, the Attorney General (as in the Warner case) would be ready to consider (under both the 1911 and the 1920 Acts) applications for fiats in the case of more serious assaults and obstructions.

Explosives Act 1875

39. Section 77 of this Act creates an offence of trespassing upon any "factory, magazine or store" (a widely-drawn definition in the Act) wherein explosives are kept. The provision is specifically applied (by virtue of section 97) to premises in the occupation of the Crown or of the Secretary of State or other Government Department. Prosecutions can be instituted only by or with the consent of the DPP or the Health and Safety Executive. The offence is triable either way and carries a maximum penalty of 2 years' imprisonment. There is a power to remove trespassers, but unless the offence falls within section 78 of the Explosives Act 1875 (which makes it an arrestable offence to commit an act likely to cause an explosion or fire within any factory etc) there is at present no power of arrest. (See also paragraph 50). The offence will carry a power of arrest under clause 22 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill in the same way as an offence under section 193 of the Army Act 1955 if the general grounds for arrest are satisfied.

CONFIDENTIAL

40. The provision extends also to "land immediately adjoining" the stores and accordingly it would be a matter of degree as to the extent of trespass necessary at Greenham to constitute the offence. For example it would be for the courts to decide whether it was necessary for a defendant to be very near the missile silos for the provision to bite or whether successful prosecutions could also be brought against those just inside the perimeter fence.

41. The advantage of using this provision is it seems apt and neither trivial nor draconian. There may, however, be some sensitivity about any associated need to confirm where and when explosives are stored.

OPTIONS INVOLVING CHANGES IN THE LAW FALLING SHORT OF PRIMARY LEGISLATION

The extension of section 193 of the Army and Air Force Acts and section 3 of the Official Secrets Act 1920 to visiting forces.

42. There have been instances of intrusion into Greenham Common where those principally affected have been US personnel and this may also be the case as and when GLCMs are deployed, although on such occasions MoD personnel, and perhaps civil police, will also be present. If sections 193 of the Army and Air Force Acts 1955 and section 3 of the Official Secrets Act 1920 were thought to provide useful remedies (see paragraphs 30 to 32 and 36 to 38 above) it might seem sensible that their protection should be extended to US personnel. Section 8(3) of the Visiting Forces Act 1952 enables any enactment which prohibits the doing of anything in relation to any of the home forces to be applied to visiting forces. There is therefore the power to apply section 193 of the Army and Air Force Acts and section 3 of the Official Secrets Act 1920 to visiting forces although section 8 has not previously been used to extend the application of the criminal law in this way and any extension of the Official Secrets Act is bound to be controversial.

Military Lands Act 1892

43. Section 14 of the Military Lands Act empowers the Secretary of State to make byelaws "for regulating the use of land [used for military purposes] for the purposes to which it was appropriated, and for securing the public against danger arising from that use, with power to prohibit all intrusion on the land and all obstruction of the use therefore". There are at present no byelaws made under this Act for Greenham Common. The maximum penalty for contravening byelaws made under the Military Lands Act is a fine not exceeding Level 2 on the standard scale, currently £50, and the offence is arrestable.

44. Full use could be made of the byelaw making powers in order to prohibit trespass and obstruction within the base. The advantages of making byelaws are that they use an existing local remedy, which quite clearly covers intrusions and trespass, for a local problem; the procedure, while cumbersome, is likely to be less difficult and time consuming and no more controversial than primary legislation on trespass; and there is a power of arrest without a warrant for breach of the byelaws. The disadvantages of making byelaws are that it can be a fairly lengthy procedure: that the penalties are fairly low (but see paragraph 45) and that the need to consult locally may cause some controversy.

OPTIONS INVOLVING PRIMARY LEGISLATION

Increased penalties under existing legislation

45. The maximum fines for offences under the Highways Act 1980, Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967, Army Act 1955, Air Force Act 1955 and Military Lands Act 1892 will double in April when a general inflation proofing order comes into effect and will thereafter be increased automatically by similar general orders. Such orders will not raise maximum fines contained in byelaws but will amend provisions in primary legislation which specify the maximum penalties byelaws may impose. Therefore, although the penalties in the existing byelaws under the Commons Act 1899 will remain at £50 after April, it will then be possible to make new byelaws carrying penalties up to £100. However, the Military Lands Act 1892 exceptionally specifies the penalty for contravention of byelaws made under it: if any were made, their penalties would be increased automatically by inflation proofing orders. Any increase in fines beyond such general increases would require amendment of the relevant primary legislation. It is at present unusual for byelaws to carry maximum penalties of more than £50, or in the case of byelaws affecting public safety £200, (there are, however, anomolous byelaws under which levels up to the normal summary maximum, currently £1,000, are precedented). Any increase in maximum sentences of imprisonment or the introduction of imprisonment for any offence would require amendment of the relevant primary legislation. The Home Office is not aware of any byelaw offence which currently attracts imprisonment and its introduction to a byelaw would be likely to be particularly controversial. The principal argument for increasing penalties would be the hope of increasing their deterrent effect. It is, however, doubtful whether deterrence would be achieved by increased penalties; the special circumstances of Greenham Common in particular make this unlikely. A particular reason for increasing the maximum sentence of imprisonment under section 193 of the Army Act 1955 would be to make the offence arrestable. But this would entail a drastic

E.R.

increase of the penalty from 3 months to 5 years; would have to be accompanied by the right to trial on indictment, making prosecutions for obstruction potentially protracted and difficult; and the offence could in any case be made arrestable by more direct means (see paragraph 49).

Changes in the powers of arrest available

46. Clause 22 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill empowers a constable to arrest for any offence (including an offence against byelaws) if a) he has reasonable grounds for believing that an arrest is necessary to prevent the offender from causing injury to himself or others, damage to property or affront to public decency or an obstruction of the highway; or b) it is impossible to proceed by way of summons because he fails to give his name or an address at which a summons may satisfactorily be served.

47. Clause 23 in addition preserves certain powers of arrest whose exercise is not dependent on the above conditions, including the power to arrest for an offence against byelaws made under the Military Lands Act 1892. Clause 21 confers a full unconditional power of arrest (exercisable by members of the public as well as police officers) in respect of all offences punishable with at least 5 years imprisonment together with a small number of offences carrying lesser maxima.

48. There are three ways in which the Bill might be amended to give additional powers of arrest. First in a letter of 9 August to the Home Secretary the Solicitor General suggested the amendment of clause 22 so as to empower a constable to arrest for any offence in order to prevent continued obstruction of himself or other officers in the execution of their duty. Under clause 22 as at present drafted a constable may not arrest someone for the offence of obstructing him in the execution of his duty (maximum penalty 1 month or £200 fine) unless any of the specified arrest conditions applies or the situation involves an actual or apprehended breach of the peace. The offence carries no power of arrest under the present law. This change would be intended to deal with the situation in which a trespasser, by refusing to leave a military base on request, commits the offence of obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty. Unless a breach of the peace is apprehended or the general grounds for arrest set out in clause 22 apply, the position under the Bill as drafted will be that a constable will have to eject the trespasser and prosecute for the offence by way of summons. The advantage of the option is that the constable would be able to arrest the person, so that he or she may be taken to a police station and charged at once. The disadvantages are as follows: i) the power to arrest would not arise where a

trespasser was willing to leave on request and it appears many at Greenham have been willing to do so. ii) The creation of what amounts to a power of arrest for the offence of obstruction would catch a wide variety of circumstances unconnected with military bases and where the summons procedure would provide an adequate means of enforcement. iii) There would be no power to detain an arrested person at the police station pending appearance in court unless the detention conditions in Part IV of the Bill were satisfied. Those conditions do not include the prevention or the repetition or continuation of the offence concerned, so a person arrested for obstruction would have to be released after charge unless Part IV of the Bill were also amended. The Bill as drafted already allows arrest for the offence and subsequent detention if there is reason to fear that the offender would go on to damage property unless arrested or detained. The difference in practice between releasing a trespasser at the boundary of the base and at the police station might be slight. The necessary amendments to the Bill would be very controversial.

49. The second option would be to amend clause 22 of the Bill so as to empower a constable to arrest for any offence in order to prevent continuing obstruction of or interference with any member of the regular forces acting in the execution of their duty. Such obstruction or interference is an offence under the Army Act 1955 (see paragraphs 30 to 32) but again there is no power of arrest. To make this option effective it would be necessary also to empower members of the forces themselves to arrest in these circumstances, which would probably require an amendment to clause 102 of the Bill. To an extent this option is consequential upon the first. If it were decided not to make the continuing obstruction of a constable a ground for arrest it would be very odd to do so in the case of a member of the armed forces. If on the other hand the first option were accepted, the advantage of the second would be that it would provide a power of arrest not only in the situation where protestors invade a base but also where they interfere with off-base deployment. Where interference takes the form of obstructing the highway then the police would in any event be present and would be able to arrest under clause 22 as drafted. But interference might occur on land where the police were not present, in which case the forces would be able to arrest protestors in their absence and deliver them into police custody when this was possible. This option would only make a difference to the first option in the situation where the police were not present: where they were present then it would be possible under that option for the police to arrest protestors for obstructing them in the execution of their duty to prevent the obstruction of members of the forces in theirs. The disadvantage is therefore that it would extend the role of the

forces into the enforcement of relatively minor offences under the criminal law against members of the public as opposed to their removal as trespassers.

50. Lastly the Bill could be amended so as to confer an unconditional power of arrest in respect of the offence under section 77 of the Explosives Act 1875 of trespassing on any magazine or adjoining land. Clause 22 as drafted would already allow the police to arrest for the offence of trespassing in or near a magazine if an arrest were reasonably considered to be necessary to prevent injury to any person or damage to any property. On the face of it the nature of the offence would normally permit arrest on this ground. The advantage of attaching a specific power of arrest to this offence would be to allow arrests in all circumstances in which it was committed. The disadvantage would be that it would be difficult to explain to Parliament why arrest was necessary where there was no risk to persons or property and where the trespassers could be ejected and prosecuted by way of summons. As in the case of the first option an amendment to the detention as well as to the arrest provisions of the Bill would be needed if the prevention of a trespasser's return to the base by means of detention at the police station were to be secured in the absence of a risk to persons or property.

Criminal offence of trespass in defined areas

51. With the exception of trespass on diplomatic missions and section 77 of the Explosives Act 1875 (see paragraphs 39-41 above), there is no criminal offence of trespass as such where intrusion is not associated with other criminal or violent conduct. In England and Wales trespass has traditionally fallen within the province of the civil rather than the criminal law. Very recently the Government has announced its conclusion that there is a need for a new criminal offence of trespass on residential premises. (The relevant extract from Hansard is at annex C). However, the Government has so far seen considerable difficulties in formulating a sufficiently precise and enforceable offence of trespass on land, either generally or adjacent to residential premises. It is for consideration whether these difficulties apply with equal force to the relevant military bases and to whether an offence of trespass could be formulated in acceptable terms and in relation to defined areas.

52. The arguments which point to the exclusion of land from the scope of a generally applicable offence of criminal trespass are broadly that: it would be technically difficult to exclude from the scope of the offence people other than those against whom the offence is directed, eg people entitled to use rights of way or who may have acceptable reasons for being present; given this there would be considerable opposition from many quarters to the framing of such an offence;

and that there is no clear need for such an offence in the context of the general law (whatever may be said about the specific problem at Greenham or other military bases).

53. However, legislation aimed only at trespass on military bases could be more specific in its area of application and therefore less open to objection than, for example, proposals to extend a general criminal offence of trespass to all privately owned land. But such a provision would require controversial primary legislation and might not have a broader scope than that now available under the Military Lands Act byelaw making powers; neither would it extend to the land outside the base on which the Greenham Common demonstrators camp. The precise area covered by the offence would have to be defined although it might be possible to define this in subordinate legislation. There would also be the awkwardness of the relationship between a new criminal offence of trespass on a military base which did not involve proving a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, and section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911, which does.

54. All that said, however, a case in principle for such legislation can be made out. What is at issue is whether the scope of such an offence could be sufficiently defined or restricted to avoid an unacceptable extension of the criminal law to the public generally and to catch the mischief at which it is aimed. Further consideration would need to be given to the best ways of achieving the latter.

A new power to prohibit or limit the presence of people in the area

55. A combination of factors which lead to special problems at Greenham have prompted consideration of a special measure. One factor is the continuing presence of the "peace camp". Day by day the number of women camping outside the perimeter fence is small and the principal mischief is trespass and,where they are on the common land, contravention of the byelaws. Unless the women choose the tactic of blockading the offence of obstruction does not arise nor generally is there any reason to fear a breach of the peace. Other factors are the weakness of the perimeter fence, the fact that it is the women who have shown that it can easily be cut, and the (symbolic rather than operational) importance of whether or not the fence is breached. The inter-action of these factors has led to the increasing determination of demonstrators to attack the fence, requiring the expensive deployment of large numbers of police and servicemen, particularly for 3/4 weeks from 29 October.

56. The police have, of course, powers to deal with people equipped to commit criminal damage or attempting or committing the offence. The problem is that bolt-cutters can easily be concealed in the camps or wooded areas of the common, or quickly brought to the scene, and the women in the camps can act as a forward base or nucleus for attacks by larger groups.

57. Added to that is the development experienced on 11 December, when people among the many thousands of peaceful demonstrators attacked the fence. On occasions, their actions almost certainly amounted to breach of the peace as well as criminal damage (and assaults on officers). In theory, the police would therefore have had a power to disperse the women; but the presence of the thousands of other demonstrators would have made that impracticable. Because of the permanent camp there is constant uncertainty about whether the fence will be attacked and this uncertainty is heightened on the larger, set-piece occasions.

58. On one analysis, therefore, what may appear to be needed or justified (if it could be devised) would be a means of (i) keeping the area round the fence free of campers and (ii) limiting if not prohibiting the presence of people in the area. Before 11 December, the exercise of such a means might have been limited to the purpose of the prevention of crime (ie criminal damage). The experience of 11 December suggests that a broader criterion might be necessary, to catch large groups whom those intent on crime might otherwise use for cover.

59. The model for the means might be the arrangements which apply in the area round Parliament by virtue of the Sessional Order and Commissioner's directions under the Metropolitan Police Act 1839. (The Sessional Orders are passed by each House at the beginning of each session, and in effect require the Commissioner to prevent obstruction or disorder in the areas surrounding the Palace of Westminster. To give effect to the Orders, the Commissioner issues directions under section 52 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839, requiring his officers to disperse all assemblies or processions causing or likely to cause obstruction and disorder within a specified area of the Palace.) Thus the new provision would confer a power to declare that within a specified area round a particular site, the police should have the power to disperse all assemblies and processions.

60. Evidently, such an arrangement would involve formidable problems of formulation and possibly of enforcement, and could be highly controversial. It would for example be necessary to try to avoid creating what would in effect be a criminal offence of trespass, ie a total prohibition on simply being on the land to which the power applies, whilst at the same time having a criterion

of application sufficiently broad to catch those intent on mischief. The Sessional Order arrangements are workable because they allow people generally to move about and gather in the area round Parliament, providing for the dispersal of groups only if they cause or are likely to cause obstruction and disorder and they do not, of course, apply to private land. It would be necessary to explore in greater depth whether this would be sufficient for the purposes at Greenham Common. However the criterion were expressed, to be effective the power would represent a considerable erosion of the freedom of assembly and it would be necessary to circumscribe it with effective safeguards. One arrangement might be that (possibly consulting the chief officer of police of the area concerned) a Secretary of State could by order declare that the power applied within a specified area round a particular site. There could be pressure to provide that such an order should be subject to Parliamentary resolution (possibly affirmative rather than negative). Even so a measure along these lines would be fought every inch of the way and would certainly be very controversial.

Serial No.

ANNEX A




Greenham Common Airfield
A339 NEWBURY ROAD
Greenham Common
Alderwood House
Marcindale Farm
Gorse Cottage
Periwinkle Cottage
Harwood House
Ridley Cottage
Dell Cottage
Lasswade
Pumping Station
Outfall
The Moors
HIGHWAY LAND
BOUNDARY OF RAF CAMP
ACCESS ROAD BETWEEN TRUNK ROAD AND BOUNDARY OF RAF CAMP
PEACE CAMP OCCUPANCY (VERY APPROXIMATE)
ANNEX B

Annex C

1 DECEMBER 1983

Trespass

Mr. Sims asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what conclusions he has reached on the need for a criminal offence of trespass on residentiol premises in the light of the comments received on the consultative document issued earlier in the current year.

Mr. Brittan: I have given careful consideration, in consultation with my noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General, to the considerable number of comments received in response to the consultative document on trespass on residential premises in England and Wales.

The response has shown a broad consensus that criminal sanctions should be available against uninvited intrusions into people's homes. It is clearly, too, the general wish that if there is to be a new criminal offence, it should afford protection to all citizens in their homes and not be confined, for example, to royal residences. There is, however, also concern that any new offence should apply only to those who trespass intentionally and have no reasonable excuse for their behaviour.

I have therefore asked officials to draw up proposals for a new offence of trespassing on residential premises which achieves this result. The scale of the problem as indicated by our consultations was not such as to suggest that legislation is needed urgently. Proposals will be brought forward as soon as the details have been fully worked out and other commitments allow.

17 JAN 1984

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pa
DMB
19/12

PRIME MINISTER

GREENHAM COMMON

The Home Secretary's Office have let us know informally that Mr. Brittan is examining what scope there might be within the existing law for dislodging the Greenham women and preventing their return. He is looking both at statute law and at the common law, and will be holding a meeting with Ministerial colleagues next week.

This would be highly sensitive if it leaked. Are you content for the Home Secretary to proceed, on the basis that you are consulted before anything is said publicly, and before any action is contemplated?

Yes

MT

DMB

16 December 1983

Spoke to Home Office accordingly.

DMB
19/12

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

12 December 1983

Dear David,

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS: GREENHAM COMMON 10 - 12 DECEMBER

I attach a factual note setting out the police report on the disturbances at RAF Greenham Common over the week-end. I will, as agreed, offer you tomorrow morning a line for the Prime Minister to take on the general question of the level of policing at Greenham Common and the associated financial issue (about which, I understand, the Home Secretary spoke to the Prime Minister briefly today).

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

H. H. TAYLOR

David Barclay, Esq.

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

MJ

CONFIDENTIAL

9 December 1983

Policing at Greenham Common

Thank you for your letter of 8 December setting out information from the Thames Valley Police about the demonstrations planned at Greenham Common this weekend, and the plans they have made to deal with these.

The Prime Minister has noted these arrangements without comment.

DB

Hugh Taylor, Esq.,
Home Office.

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HOME SECRETARY

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SWIH 9AT

8 December 1983

DEAR DAVID,

Yes

Prime Minister

Content? DHS 8/12

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS: GREENHAM COMMON 10-12 DECEMBER

The Home Secretary believes that the Prime Minister will wish to be aware of information from the Thames Valley Police about major demonstrations planned to take place at Greenham Common on Saturday 10 to Monday 12 December, and the police operational planning to deal with them.

The significance of the week-end is that it is the first anniversary of the first major demonstrations at Greenham and the anniversary of the announcement of the decision to site cruise missiles there. The Greenham Peace Women (GPW) have for some time been canvassing for support from throughout the country for a large scale, all women demonstration. With reluctance, the National Executive of CND have accepted that men should not take part, and have recommended CND members to support a "Women Only Action" to "Refuse Cruise". It appears, however, that many CND groups are unwilling to accept this recommendation and may mount their own, simultaneous demonstrations at Greenham. The prospect is of three separate groups - the GPW, CND Women and other CND supporters - acting independently, with a potential for disorganised and to some extent unpredictable action.

The largest numbers of demonstrators are expected on Sunday, the day specified by the CND. In their discussions with the police, the CND have estimated that about 30,000 people will attend. Estimates from CND organisers of the numbers for previous demonstrations - as opposed to their claims of the size of attendance after those events - have been generally accurate. At present, the intelligence available to the police is that there will be at least 15,000 people, with a strong possibility that that number will be exceeded.

The police expect, however, that demonstrators will begin to arrive on Friday night, with numbers increasing throughout Saturday, either to try to take action then or to camp overnight. On past experience, bad and cold weather will not necessarily deter some thousands of people staying overnight. Similarly, the police are planning for the contengency that appreciable numbers of people may stay on until Monday, and perhaps be joined by new arrivals that day, in order to attempt to blockade traffic on the first day of the working week.

The range of tactics which demonstrators may attempt to employ at various times over the three days include encircling the base, obstructing the highway and blockading the gates. One suggestion which had been made is to attempt to block all major roads to Greenham, including the M4, on Saturday.

It is also likely that attempts will be made to cut the perimeter fence with bolt cutters. In anticipation of this, the police have obtained warrants to search the peace camps in advance, if their sources indicate that the women there have cutting equipment with them. The police will also be alert to the possibility that some demonstrators may bring bolt cutters with them: possession of equipment for committing criminal danage, or with intent to pass the equipment to another peron for that purpose, is an arrestable offence.

The police currently plan to have a total of about 600 officers on duty on each of Saturday and Monday which, allowing for shift and off-duty times, will enable some 400 officers to be deployed during the daytime. The comparable numbers for Sunday are a total of upwards of 900, and a deployment capacity of 750. As well as Thames Valley officers, there will be reinforcements from the Metropolitan Police (including mounted officers), Avon and Somerset, Bedfordshire, Hampshire, Surrey and Wiltshire. A police helicopter will be available for use throughout, and nearby Newbury race course will be used as the operational headquarters, and as a charging centre if necessary.

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We understand that there is close and effective liaison between the police and the local military authorities.

The police have undertaken to update us on Friday, and I will let you know if their assessment, and so their plans, change significantly.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Hugh Taylor

H. H. TAYLOR

David Barclay, Esq.

(2)

DLO

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12/12

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Prime Minister

Dmb
9/12

PRIME MINISTER

GREENHAM COMMON SECURITY: DEMONSTRATIONS 10TH/11TH DECEMBER 1983

You will wish to know of our plans to maintain security at Greenham Common during the expected anti-nuclear demonstrations over the weekend of 10th/11th December 1983.

2. Events last weekend, when we had some minor incursions, have once again demonstrated - despite our programme of physical security improvements - how difficult it is to secure the entire nine mile perimeter against every attempted incursion, even with over 200 MOD and RAF Police who were on base supplementing the USAF guards. I personally reviewed the situation on Monday. Further UK reinforcements have been deployed and a very large operation is planned for next weekend, as I describe below. There will be a further review of all our arrangements, including physical security measures in the light of experience over the weekend. Our long term aim remains to avoid playing into the womens peace movement's hands by tying down large manpower numbers against the threat of minor trespass of no real security significance. The women's claim last weekend to have penetrated sensitive areas of the base was totally unfounded; key points are well defended and while we cannot afford to see large scale trespass onto the remainder of the base, we should make it clear by our attitudes and our reaction that minor incursions are an empty gesture. What is important is to be on top of the major demonstrations and to ensure that key installations on the base are secure at all times.

3. The information currently available to my Department suggests that over the period 10th/11th December we can expect a demonstration by women supporters of CND very similar in type and scale to that which occurred last December when some 16,000 women encircled the base. They are expected to be peaceful and law abiding in the main. In addition, however, we expect a parallel demonstration by the womens peace movement itself perhaps involving anything up to 1,000 women who are likely to be well equipped with bolt cutters etc, and to use the opportunity of the major demonstration to attempt incursions. There could also be an attempt by the latter group, to blockade the base on Monday 12th December after the CND demonstration has dispersed.

4. In the light of this threat assessment, we plan to mount an operation very similar in scale to that recently executed during the GLCM delivery programme, involving MOD police, RAF personnel and the deployment of 2 infantry battalions with helicopters in support. Both these battalions will be in place by tomorrow morning. For the period of the major CND demonstration on Sunday 11th December, a third infantry battalion will be ready to be deployed on base if required to strengthen perimeter security. These arrangements should suffice to contain any incursions which the civil police are unable to prevent, to keep demonstrators away from sensitive areas and to prevent confrontations with armed USAF personnel.

5. The operational staffs concern with this planning have been in close touch at local level with the Thames Valley Police. I should, however, like to take this opportunity of emphasising the importance which I attach to what we understand to be the intentions of the Thames Valley Police themselves to mount a substantial operation outside the base. This is, of course, the only means by which demonstrators can effectively be prevented from cutting the fence from the outside.

6. I am copying this letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, to the Home Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
8th December 1983

9 DEC 1983

10 DOWNING STREET

~~GR~~ CF

I have asked MoD for a note on where we are in the delivery programme.

DMB
30/11

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3

Prime Minister

To note the revised security arrangements now implemented by Mr Heseltine.

Dms
25/11

MO 21/17/1

MO

PRIME MINISTER

GREENHAM COMMON SECURITY

I have been reviewing our arrangements for security at Greenham Common, now that the GLCM delivery programme is complete.

No - this stage of the programme is complete - surely.

2. We reinforced the base very substantially over the weekend of 29th/30th October 1983 to ensure the security of the delivery programme. The reinforcement comprised substantial numbers of MOD police and RAF personnel, and up to three infantry battalions for a period. In addition the Thames Valley Police mounted a large operation outside the perimeter. After the events on Saturday 29th October when the women did some considerable damage to the perimeter fence, there was no further significant threat to base security. There have been no attempts at incursions over the last few days, and other than at weekends the women's peace camp rarely exceeds 100 in number.

3. Given that the delivery programme is now over and the current relatively low level of threat it is clearly neither necessary nor desirable to sustain any longer this size of operation and our eventual aim should be that security at Greenham Common, as at other USAF bases in this country, should on a day to day basis be handled by the USAF's own resources supplemented by a permanent core of 50 MOD police. Nonetheless, there is a continuing threat of attacks by the peace women who have demonstrated their ability to field some

2-300 demonstrators at short notice and our arrangements must be sufficient to prevent these leading to mass incursions or to large scale confrontations with the Aermicans.

4. Steps have therefore been taken to strengthen substantially the physical security arrangements at Greenham Common. A fixed lighting installation has been completed which affords a capability to illuminate the whole perimeter. An internal track-way has been constructed enabling the fence to be patrolled from the inside by vehicles throughout its entire nine mile length. A strong internal security fence has been erected around the whole perimeter. Watch towers have been erected at strategic points behind the security lighting. These improvements greatly enhance the capability to detect attempts at night-time incursion and to apprehend any trespassers who penetrate the outer fence well before they could get close to the sensitive areas. There is a corresponding trade-off in the manpower required to provide full security, and I have decided to withdraw both of the remaining infantry battalions, though placing a company from each at a high state of readiness.

5. The on-base forces, in addition to the USAF personnel, will now comprise some 400 MOD police and RAF personnel, together with a helicopter equipped with a searchlight and infra-red detectors. Outside the base the Thames Valley Police intend to continue their current operation at least until after the major demonstration planned for 10th/11th December, which will also require a substantial re-inforcement operation by us. I shall review the position next week, in the light of experience of this lower manpower level, and of any reactions from the peace movement once they have detected the smaller size of force on-base.

6. It is too early to make a judgement as to the longer term intentions of the women's peace movement in regard to Greenham Common and when it will be possible finally to withdraw the MOD reinforcements remaining. One factor in all this is the peace movement's declared aim

of preventing or disrupting the off-base deployment of GLCMs on training exercises. This in itself raises a range of problems and I shall be examining the whole question in detail shortly and will report to you as appropriate.

7. I am copying this minute to the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
24th November 1983

4 - NOV 1983

820

CONFIDENTIAL

3/11

10 DOWNING STREET

Robin Harris Esq
Special Adviser
Home Office
50 Queen Anne's Gate
LONDON
SW1

2 November 1983

Dear Robin,

PEACE PROTEST AND PUBLIC ORDER

I would like to draw your attention to some of the tactics and activities currently being planned by CND and others as part of their campaigning over the coming weeks. They indicate an increased militancy which has important consequences for the preservation of public order.

Clearly the threat to Greenham Common air base and the need to maintain security there is well understood and appropriate steps taken. My somewhat broader concerns are as follows:

(a) that CND is now beginning a nationwide campaign of 'non-violent direct action' (NVDA) which will not be confined to Greenham;

(b) that this campaign will include civil disobedience and disruptive activities which may entail law breaking on a wide scale;

(c) that a minority which is not constrained by principles of non-violence may take more serious action against property and/or persons.

Some of these activities will be properly organised, announced in advance and, like Monday's demonstration in Whitehall, be passive and peaceful, if disruptive. Others however may be guerilla style activities such as occupation of other military installations or Government offices and will not be advertised.

The CND Chairman, Mrs Ruddock said yesterday (on Channel Four) that although official activities would be non-violent, she set no limits to them. CND announced yesterday that it is planning at least 28 separate regional peace actions between now and Christmas, some of which included civil disobedience and were therefore being kept secret. The organisation is presently running NVDA training courses in preparation for these activities. The literature and the activists' manuals describe a hierarchy of NVDA from symbolic protest, to intervention and resistance, which do entail confrontation with the law. It is this higher level of NVDA which is being contemplated now. And there have been some, vague references in the left-wing press to unspecified "spectacular actions".

Among those attaching themselves to the peace movement who are

not committed to non-violence are some anarchist elements. They were a prominent minority on the CND march of 22 October and were concerned in the 'Stop the City' activity a few weeks ago. They are incidentally returning to the City for two Days of Action Against Banks on 4 and 11 November. These people are outlandish in appearance (punk style) and clearly have a desire to shock with their rhetoric as well. If they are serious however, then they may be capable of carrying out acts of violence against individuals in the 'establishment' as well as against property. By contrast, the Marxist extreme left, such as the Socialist Workers' Party, have been increasingly confined to the margins of the peace movement.

Among the advertised activities you may care to note in addition to those mentioned above are the following:

(i) 8 and 9 November: peace camps at 102 alleged US bases in Britain, organised by the Greenham Women Against Cruise;

(ii) 12 November: blockade of RAF Bishopscourt, Co Down, Northern Ireland;

(iii) 13 November: a demonstration at the Cenotaph on Remembrance Sunday immediately after the two minutes' silence.

In conclusion, I would say that we should be prepared for an intense period of activity, not only at Greenham, but in London and at any locations of military and Governmental installations. Events may stretch police resources where there is an element of surprise. Some of the possibilities I have outlined may not happen. But I feel they are realistic enough to merit preparedness. We cannot afford otherwise.

I have copied this letter to Ferdy Mount and Tim Flesher.

Yours sincerely,
Peter

PETER SHIPLEY

METROPOLITAN POLICE
SPECIAL BRANCH
NEW SCOTLAND YARD
BROADWAY, LONDON, SW1H 0BG
Telephone 01-230 1212 Ext. 4420 and at No. 10 Downing Street.

F.E.R. Butler, Esq.

Your ref.:

Our ref.:

31.10.83.

Mr. Butler.

TODAY'S EVENTS.

1. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament - mainly women from the Greenham Common demonstration - intend mass-lobbying Parliament this afternoon before the Defence debate. They will assemble from 3.30 pm on in Parliament Square, and will attempt to intercept the new MP for Buckingham, Mr. George Walden, CMG (Conservative) among others.

2. The CND will hold a rally in Trafalgar Square tonight between 8 pm and 10 pm. This may be followed by some form of non-violent action in Whitehall by CND personnel carrying some form of outward identification but no posters.

3. The intention is to stop the Cruise missiles being stationed here. The information is from secret sources.

4. It would be advisable for the Prime Minister to arrive at the House of Commons well before 3 pm today.

Copy to Mr. INGHAM

Gordon Lawthorne.

SECRET

copy on
DEFENCE
INF Part 4.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 October 1983

RAF Greenham Common: Cruise Missile Deliveries and Security Arrangements

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 20 October on this subject.

She is content with the security arrangements which have been made.

We agreed on the telephone that the second sentence of Mr. Heseltine's minute was subject to any further messages that we might receive on the timetable for deployment from the Federal German Chancellor and the President of the United States.

I am copying this letter to Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office), Brian Fall (FCO), Henry Steel (Attorney General's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

FCE 57

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 October, 1983

Thank you for your letter of 19 October to Tim Flesher.

The Prime Minister has noted that CND will be laying a wreath on the Cenotaph tomorrow, and that the wording of any inscription will be cleared with your Secretary of State.

DAVID BARCLAY

Roger Bright, Esq.,
Department of the Environment

SH

FILE SH

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 October, 1983

Demonstration about Nuclear Defence Policy

Thank you for your letter of 19 October about tomorrow's CND demonstration.

The Prime Minister was grateful for and has noted the assessment of the Metropolitan Police.

DAVID BARCLAY

Hugh Taylor, Esq.,
Home Office

SH

original at DEFENCE: INF Part 4

MO 11/2/2

Prime Minister

Important. Content with these arrangements?

A.J.C. 24/10.

Yes MK

PRIME MINISTER

RAF GREENHAM COMMON:
CRUISE MISSILE DELIVERIES AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Deliveries by USAF aircraft of warheads, missiles and associated equipment necessary to meet the objective of achieving initial operational capability by the end of the year are to be made to Greenham Common in the period 1st-8th November 1983. The warheads will arrive on the first aircraft on the first day. We can expect some sort of reaction by the anti-nuclear movement to these deliveries. You will wish to know the security arrangements we have accordingly made, in close liaison with the Home Office, the Thames Valley Police and the American authorities.

Depending on reply from Chancellor Kohl.

2. Despite some initial low-grade reports that the anti-nuclear movement had plans to mount a major demonstration at around this time there is currently no hard evidence to suggest either that they are aware of the delivery timetable or have made any concrete plans. Experience has shown that to mount a major demonstration they must first advertise the event widely, and well in advance, and take other overt steps such as booking coaches. None of these things has yet happened which makes it unlikely that at least for the period of the delivery programme we need fear any planned activity on a major scale. The anti-nuclear movement's main emphasis is on the October 22nd demonstration in London. For Greenham Common it looks at the moment as though the most likely forecast is of a relatively minor, and by now traditional,

demonstration by the resident peace camp and its supporters over the Halloween period (29th/30th October) and perhaps a larger demonstration in December, as last year, on the anniversary of NATO's INF modernisation decision, with random and probably determined outbreaks of action from those at the camp site once they get knowledge of the deliveries.

3. The Thames Valley Police, who have been kept discreetly informed of our plans, are on the alert for an increased activities by the anti-nuclear movement and are ready to respond. As for our own arrangements, I have directed that a plan be drawn up on a contingency basis so that sufficient UK reinforcements are available at Greenham Common to contain any trespass which the civil police are unable to prevent, to prevent any interference with the delivery programme, and to prevent confrontations between demonstrators and armed US personnel. I have further directed that our plans should be sufficiently comprehensive to deal with attempted incursions on a larger scale than anything seen hitherto, or anything we currently have cause to expect. It is essential that we are effective against any level of threat.

4. Any early deployment of reinforcements (unless a demonstration has already built up) would give warning to the peace camp. Our present intention is that on the evening before the first aircraft deliveries, RAF personnel should be inserted covertly into the base to be reinforced by substantial numbers of Ministry of Defence Police who would arrive very shortly before the first aircraft landed. To cater for the possibility that the anti-nuclear movement will attempt to attract supporters to the base as soon as the delivery programme is noticed, up to four infantry battalions will be held in reserve. The entire force will be available for deployment in part or in full from 28th October 1983. All these arrangements will be made very discreetly, in close co-ordination with the Americans own security arrangements.

5. The period of greatest risk is when the warheads are being transferred from the transport aircraft to the GLCM facility, an operation which will be cordoned by the armed American guards permanently based at Greenham Common and who are charged with the direct protection of these weapons with rules of engagement exactly the same of our own. While our security arrangements already minimise the risk of any demonstrator getting sufficiently close to warheads as to necessitate the use of firearms by the US guards, the political implications of a demonstrator being shot by an American guard would, at this stage of initial deployment, be very grave. I have therefore directed that the screen of UK personnel which will support the USAF guards on this particular part of the delivery programme should include a small number of armed RAF personnel, operating very close to the armed US personnel and with the same rules of engagement. Therefore any determined demonstrator who managed to penetrate the perimeter fence and its guard force, and was then able to penetrate the next screen of unarmed UK personnel, would finally confront an armed British Serviceman rather than an armed American. I believe this to be a prudent precaution although I would stress that the situation is highly unlikely to arise.

6. I shall be minuting you separately about the Parliamentary and Public Relations aspects.

7. I am copying this minute to the Home Secretary, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, to the Attorney General and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

MJH

Ministry of Defence
20th October 1983

PRIME MINISTER

CND Demonstration: Saturday 22 October

CND plan two marches on Saturday taking different routes from the Victoria Embankment to a rally in Hyde Park. Estimates of the numbers attending range from 70,000 to 200,000. The Leader of the Opposition will be among the speakers at the rally.

The routes for the marches have been agreed with the police. One will pass along Whitehall, and the Secretary of State for the Environment has given permission for a wreath to be laid at the Cenotaph. This will carry the CND symbol, but any inscription will have to be agreed with the Secretary of State for the Environment.

The police accept CND's claim that the demonstration is intended to be peaceful. Nevertheless there clearly could be some disorder, and arrests (e.g. for non-violent offences such as obstruction). The police have contingency arrangements to deal with any large-scale offences of this nature.

There are also two pro-defence policy events planned for Saturday (one organised by Lady Olga Maitland and the other by Coalition for peace through security). Much smaller attendances are expected, and there is no reason to expect disorder.

The police are in close touch with those responsible for the security of Government buildings (including No. 10) and the staff likely to be affected have been warned.

DMB

20 October 1983

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

19 October 1983

Dear David,

DEMONSTRATIONS ABOUT NUCLEAR DEFENCE POLICY: LONDON 22 OCTOBER

The Home Secretary believes that the Prime Minister may wish to have the current assessment from the Metropolitan Police of demonstrations about nuclear defence policy to take place in London on Saturday 22 October, and an indication of the policing arrangements which have been planned.

By far the largest events will be two marches and a rally against the deployment of cruise missiles organised by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. The CND claim to be expecting altogether between 150,000 and 200,000 supporters if not more. The police's current estimate is that the number may be between 50,000 and 70,000 although that may alter nearer the time and even numbers of that order will require a major policing operation.

CND supporters are to gather at Victoria Embankment, to move off at 11.30 am by two routes to the rally, in Hyde Park. Speakers expected there include the Leader of the Opposition, Monsignor Bruce Kent and Ms Joan Ruddock of the CND and Bishop Trevor Huddleston. The rally is planned to end at about 5.00 pm.

One route to the rally will take marchers initially in almost a circle, ie up Northumberland Avenue to the east of Trafalgar Square, along the Strand, south across Waterloo Bridge, past the Royal Festival Hall and County Hall, north across Westminster Bridge and turning right along Victoria Embankment; the route will then be up Horseguards Avenue, left down Whitehall to Parliament Square, along Broad Sanctuary to Victoria Street, Bressenden and Grosvenor Places to eastern Hyde Park Corner and the Park. The other, shorter route will not cross the Thames, but go by the side of Victoria Embankment Gardens, up Horseguards Avenue to turn right up Whitehall, past the west of Trafalgar Square and along Cockspur Street and Pall Mall, right up St James's Street and left down Piccadilly to western Hyde Park Corner and the Park.

The routes have been agreed only after protracted negotiations between the police and the CND. Press reports that the police have "climbed down" are wrong. The arrangements are a considerable modification of CND's initial plan, which was to encircle the centre of London and close it to traffic. As a variant, CND wanted Westminster Bridge closed, to enable both marches to converge in Bridge Street; the Bridge will not be closed, and the one point of convergence will be in Horseguards Avenue. Traffic management will still be difficult, but at all but a few points traffic will be able to pass alongside the marchers, and there will be crossing points for pedestrians and vehicles.

/The police

David Barclay, Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The police accept CND's claim that their intention is to hold a peaceful event, not least because of the association with the speakers at the rally. CND are hoping to create a carnival atmosphere, with marching bands and other entertainments. There can, however, be no guarantee that there may not be some disorder, or the need to make arrests for 'peaceful' offences. The events may attract an extremist fringe; and the 'Stop the City' campaign on 29 September, when 200 people had to be arrested, mainly for obstruction, is a recent example of the willingness of some members of the 'peace movement' to resort to non-violent direct action. One influence may be the nature of other demonstrations elsewhere in Western Europe, particularly in Western Germany, this week; with the exception of that in Bremerharven last weekend, those appear so far to have been peaceful.

Two other groups are arranging pro defence policy events in London on Saturday. Women for Families and Defence, organised by Lady Olga Maitland, are to hold a rally and vigil in Trafalgar Square from 2.00 pm to 9.00 pm, with the theme "Peace and Freedom". Lady Olga estimates that between 2,000 and 3,000 people will attend; the police certainly doubt that there will be more, and have no reason to expect disorder.

In addition, the Coalition for Peace through Security (CPS) are hoping to organise a small rally at Speakers' Corner at some time during the day. The CPS have refused to discuss their plans in any more detail with the police because they consider the police have co-operated too closely with the CND. The CPS rally is not expected to be disorderly, although the organisation may seek to use their offices in Whitehall, just opposite the Whitehall Theatre, to express their opposition to the marchers as they pass by.

The police plan to deploy some 4,000 officers to police the demonstration, with significant numbers in reserve ready to respond either because of developments at the demonstrations or as needed at the five football grounds in London where teams are playing at home on 22 October. The police are in close liaison with those responsible for premises on the routes of the CND marches, including the security officers of Government buildings; and they have made contingency arrangements to deal with large scale attempts at obstruction or other forms of non-violent direct action.

The police will up-date their assessment nearer to 22 October and I shall, of couse, let you know if they report any significant developments.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence and to the Private Secretary to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

Hugh Taylor

H H TAYLOR

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE NOTICE

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Demonstration
Saturday 22 October 1983

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) plans to mount a large scale march on Saturday 22 October the theme of which will be "Together we can stop the bomb".

The organisers are hoping that some 500,000 persons will attend. The march will consist of two columns both starting on the Embankment at 1100 hours in the area of Somerset House and is not expected to clear the Whitehall area before 1600 hours. One column will follow the route Embankment - Horse Guards Avenue - Whitehall - Pall Mall - Piccadilly - Hyde Park. The other will follow the route Embankment - Northumberland Avenue - Strand - Waterloo Bridge - County Hall - Westminster Bridge - Embankment - Horse Guards Avenue - Whitehall - Parliament Square - Victoria Street - Grosvenor Place - Hyde Park.

The marchers will occupy only one side of the road so that the police may use the other side for essential traffic. A number of roads will however be closed to all vehicular traffic. Extensive use will be made of barriers which will make it impossible to cross a number of roads.

During the march, access to Downing Street and King Charles Street from Whitehall will not be possible. Staff wishing to enter Nos. 10, 11 and 12 should use one of the following pedestrian and vehicular crossing points to gain access to St. James's Park and then to Downing Street via King Charles Steps (parking will be allowed on Horse Guards Parade for permit holders).

a) Junction of Victoria Street and Storey's Gate

b) Junction of Victoria Street and Buckingham Gate

c) Junction of Buckingham Palace Road and Bressenden Place

Additionally there will be pedestrian crossing points at

/ a)

a) Junction of Victoria Street and Bressenden Place

b) Junction of Grosvenor Place and Lower Grosvenor Place

c) Junction of Lower Regent Street (Waterloo Place) and Pall Mall

Essential vehicular traffic that needs to gain access to Downing Street will do so via the FCO quadrangle from Great George Street (having entered the area via one of the above vehicular crossing points).

Before the head of the column reaches Parliament Street, the subway at the junction of Parliament Street and Parliament Square may also be used by pedestrians.

The Metropolitan Police anticipate that there will be severe traffic congestion in the area and it seems likely that London Transport bus services will terminate some distance from the two routes. Underground services will operate but will be very congested. Extra services are being run to bring the marchers to the stations along the Embankment.

Staff who have to visit Nos. 10, 11 or 12 should allow plenty of time for their journey.

P.S. Joce

P.S. Joce

19 October 1983

DB.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT

2 MARSHAM STREET
LONDON SW1P 3EB
01-212 3434

My ref:

Your ref:

19 October 1983

Dear Tim

As you will know, CND are holding a demonstration in Central London next Saturday 27 October. They plan to assemble on Victoria Embankment and to march to Hyde Park by routes agreed with the Metropolitan Police.

One of the routes includes Whitehall, and CND have asked the Department for permission to lay a wreath on the Cenotaph, pausing for a couple of minutes as they pass in order to do so. This would be at about 12.15-12.30pm. My Secretary of State has considered the matter carefully and has concluded that on balance to refuse permission would give CND more propaganda than the act of laying the wreath itself. You will wish to be aware that he has therefore given permission for the wreath-laying.

The Metropolitan Police have been consulted and have no objection. They would prefer the marchers not to halt but are prepared for them to do so.

Finally, you will wish to note that the wreath will carry the CND symbol and possibly an inscription attached by card on the lines of "In memory of the victims of all wars". CND have yet finally to make up their minds on an inscription, but we have made it clear that a form of words more in accord with the purpose of the Cenotaph would be preferred. They have undertaken to clear the wording of the inscription with the Department when they have reached a final view.

I am copying this for information to Richard Mottram in the Secretary of State for Defence's Office.

Yours sincerely

Roger Bright.

ROGER BRIGHT
Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq

Mr. P. Joce 20/10
10 Downing St (For info)

CUSTODY SERVICE BULLETIN 7/83

INSTRUCTION TO CUSTODY GUARDS

CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (CND) DEMONSTRATION

SATURDAY 22ND OCTOBER 1983

1. The CND are to mount a large scale demonstration in London on the above date when it is anticipated that some 150,000 people will take part in marches from Victoria Embankment to Hyde Park where a rally will be held.

2. Whilst the organisers intend that this should be a peaceful protest the presence of small groups who may seek to gain publicity in a more positive way cannot be ruled out and it is possible that there may be attempts to gain entry to Government buildings, both on the route of the march and in the central area generally. Whilst the Whitehall area may be the focal point for any trouble it cannot be ruled out elsewhere.

3. The marchers will assemble on Victoria Embankment where they will be split into two groups which will then proceed by separate routes to Hyde Park - RED and GREEN - details of which are attached. The marchers will start to leave Victoria Embankment at about 1100 hours and whilst there are no firm estimates of the times of arrival at Hyde Park the shorter (GREEN) route is expected to take some three and a half hours with the longer (RED) route considerably in excess of this. It is not possible to give times at which the marchers will pass any particular buildings and a very high standard of alertness will be required throughout the day.

4. Vehicle traffic will be excluded from area from about 1045 until mid-afternoon although considerable congestion is expected to continue for some time afterwards. Custody Guards reporting for duty should bear this in mind.
N.B. The Day Car will not be able to operate in this area during this period.

WHATEVER THE LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS NO CHANGEOVER OF DUTIES WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE 1800 HOURS.

5. Special attention will be given to the security of buildings with particular regard to access points at ground floor and basement levels and the admission of visitors, from Friday evening, 21st October, onwards throughout the week-end. Departments will be seeking to limit the need for access by members of their staff during Saturday.

6. The following additional precautions will be taken on Saturday.

(1) Additional Guards will be allocated to single posts on the routes.

(2) Patrols will be concentrated on the lower floor levels where intruders might seek to force entry.

(3) Blinds, Curtains, Shutters etc on Ground Floor level should be drawn wherever possible.

(4) Whilst observing what is going on outside Guards should not draw attention to their presence.

(5) In the event of an intrusion into a building or any other problem, real or suspected, the Police should be contacted immediately by dialling 999 and giving the location and nature of the problem.

(6) Should an intrusion occur and the Police are contacted wherever possible they should be given any information that will help them to gain access to resolve the problem.

7. Occupying Departments may issue their own instructions at individual buildings in relation to staff requiring admission, facilities to be afforded the Police, etc. These will be read and implemented in conjunction with this instruction.

8. Custody Service HQ and the Group Supervisor should be kept advised of all developments at the earliest possible opportunity.

F J FARMER
Head of Custody Service
19th October 1983

Room P2/010A
2 Marsham Street
212 8098

Distribution:- All buildings on the route of the marches and those in the general area, (see attached list)
Group Supervisors
Occupying Departments
Ceremonial Office, Cannon Row.

RED ROUTE

	Dept	Number of Guards	Special Requirements/Comments
Audit House	E&A	1	Reinforce with 1 Guard from Fleetbank from 09.00 - 13.00 hrs
Somerset House	IR	5	Special attention to Embankment entrance
Savoy Hill House	MOD	1	Off main route. Extra Guard not necessary
Northumberland House	MOD	2	
Cornwall House	FCO/ HMSO	2	Annexe only adjacent to route
Waterloo Bridge House	DTI	1	
Elizabeth House	DEd	3	
1 Bridge Street	PSA	1	Police presence should be adequate. No second Guard
Palace Chambers	FCO	1	Off immediate route? Guard from Central Buildings
Old War Office	MOD	4	
MOD Main	MOD	17	
Welsh Office	WO	1	Allocate 1 extra Guard
Scottish Office	SO	1	Allocate 1 extra Guard
10 Downing Street	MPO	3	
Parliament Square House	DTpr	1	Allocate 1 extra Guard from 2 Marsham Street

Broad Sanctuary	Treas	2	Ensure outer doors are secured
1/19 Victoria Street	DTI	4	
Dacre House	DPP	1	Off main route. Adjacent to New Scotland Yard. No extra Guard
Ashdown House	DTI	3	
Eland House	ODM	2	
Bressenden Place	DTI	1	Not directly vulnerable ? 1 Guard from 1/19 Victoria Street

GREEN ROUTE

	Dept	Number of Guards	Special Requirements/Comments
Audit House	E&A	1	Reinforce with 1 Guard from Fleetbank from 09.00 - 13.00 hrs
Somerset House	IR	5	Special attention to Embankment entrance
Savoy Hill House	MOD	1	Off main route. Extra guard not necessary
Old War Office	MOD	4	
MOD Main	MOD	17	
3 and 10 Whitehall Place	MAFF	3	Off main route. Buildings are linked. No extra guard required
36 Whitehall	MPO	1	Allocate 1 extra Guard
Admiralty House	PSA	1	Outer gates to Whitehall to be secured. No extra guard required
Ripley House	MOD	2	
Archway South/Mall House	MOD	3	Off main route
Marlborough House	FCO	2	Outer main gates to be secured
Press and TV Centre	PSA	1	Off main route. Ground floor windows have gridles. No extra guard required

A8 BRANCH

METROPOLITAN POLICE

11th OCTOBER 1983

CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT - MARCH AND RALLY - SATURDAY 22ND OCTOBER 1983

INFORMATION SHEET

INFORMATION

1. On Saturday 22nd October 1983 at about 10.30 am supporters of the 'Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) will assemble at Victoria Embankment, WC1, east of Northumberland Avenue. At 11.30 am they propose to march to Reformers Tree, Hyde Park for a rally, via either of the two routes shown in Red and Green on the map overleaf.

2. The theme of this year's march will be 'Together We Can Stop The Bomb'. The organisers anticipate support for the event will be very large.

INTENTION

3. It is the intention of police that all events should be policed to a peaceful conclusion in accord with the organisers' stated intention. To this end, all officers must be vigilant, tactful, cheerful yet firm when necessary and be prepared to give advice to the public. Police will take such action as may be necessary to prevent disorder, protect property and control the movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic to minimise congestion. Stewards will be appointed and briefed by organisers to assist in this same task.

ENTERTAINMENT

4. The following additional events have been arranged by the CND Organisation :

   a. 10.30 am Christian CND Service in Victoria Embankment Gardens.

   b. 10.30 am to about Midday, The American Bread and Puppet Theatre Company with musicians and giant puppets performing in Jubilee Gardens. From 1.30 pm they will be performing in Hyde Park.

   c. 11.00 am - 3.00 pm The Greater London Council are organising music platforms, entertainments and exhibitions in Jubilee Gardens, the South Bank and in County Hall Car Park.

   d. 11.00 am - 2.00 pm Music platforms/floats will entertain at the assembly area and along the route.

   e. 11.00 am - 3.00 pm Children's Entertainment area at Jubilee Gardens.

   f. 12.30 pm - 5.00 pm Children's Entertainment area at Hyde Park.

   g. 1.00 pm - 5.00 pm Entertainment and speeches from the platform at Hyde Park.

LOST CHILDREN

5. The CND have arranged that lost children should either be taken to the CND van near Hungerford Bridge or to the children's area in Jubilee Gardens. Any children left at the assembly area once the marches have left will be taken to the Information Tent next to the children's area in Hyde Park. Police will be on duty at these locations to ensure proper supervision and collation of details through the PIC (see para 17).

AMBULANCE AND FIRST AID ARRANGEMENTS

6. The London Ambulance Service Forward Control will be at Hyde Park. The St John Ambulance Brigade will have units stationed at Victoria Embankment and Hyde Park.

   All calls for ambulances will be made via Operations Room at New Scotland Yard.


SECTORS
ROUTE 1.
ROUTE 2.
PEDESTRIAN CROSSING POINTS
1
2
3
4
PARK
GREEN PARK
ST. JAMES'S PARK
HYDE PARK
PALACE GARDENS
Buckingham Palace
Queen Victoria Mem. Gdns
The Mall
Trafalgar Square
Whitehall
Westminster Abbey
Houses of Parliament
New Palace Yard
Victoria Embankment Gdns
Jubilee Gardens
Thames Police Sta
Cleopatra's Needle
Charing Cross Pier
Hungerford Railway Bridge
Westminster Bridge
Lambeth Bridge
Lambeth Pier
Westminster Pier
Victoria Tower Gdns
Albert Gate
Marble Arch
Hyde Park Corner
Wellington Arch
Speakers' Corner
Serpentine
Reservoir
Bandstand
Boating Lake
Achilles Statue
Wellington Museum
Apsley Ho
Wellington Mon.
Police Sta.
Queen's Gallery
The Quadrangle
The Forecourt
Lake
Duck Island
Park Lake
Guards Mem.
Refreshments
Horse Guards Parade
Banqueting House
Old War Office
Old Admiralty Offices
Foreign Office
Government Offices
Cenotaph
Min. of Defence
Wtmr. Coll. Mus.
Henry VIII
PS Tattershall Castle
PS Old Caledonia
Hispaniola
Footpath
Victoria Embankment Gdns
Queen Elizabeth Hall
Royal Festival Hall
Hayward Gallery
National Theatre
South Bank Television Centre
Royal Waterloo Hosp.
Jubilee Gardens
The County Hall
Lambeth Palace
St. Thomas' Hospital
St. Thomas' Medical School
Archbishop's Palace
Archbishop Tait's Infants Sch.
Holy Trinity School
Christ Ch. & Upton Chapel
Archbishop Temple's Sec. Sch.
Walnut Tree Walk Prim. Sch.
Red Grd
Victoria Embankment Gdns
Somerset House
Royal Courts of Justice
Temple Pier
Inner Temple Hall
Middle Temple
Mid. Temple Hall
Temple Gdn
Royal Coll of Surgeons
Old Curiosity Shop
Freemasons Hall
Moorfields Eye Hospital
Swimming Pool
St. Paul's Hosp.
St. Giles-in-the-Fields Ch.
Shaftesbury Hosp.
Swiss Ch.
St. Martin's Sch. of Art
Royal Opera House
Crown Court Ch.
Bow St. Police Sta.
London Transport Mus.
Inland Revenue
Bush House
London School of Economics
General Register Off.
Clement Danes Prim. Sch.
St. Clement Danes Ch.
Indoor Sports & Recn. Cen.
Ball Room
Davey's Ch.
Friends' Meeting House
Min. of Defence
Duncannon St.
Northumberland Ave.
Whitehall Court
Whitehall Place
Scotland Yard
Richmond Ter.
Richmond Ter. Mews
Downing St.
Horse Guards Rd.
Parliament St.
Great George St.
Parliament Sq.
Margaret St.
Broadway
Victoria St.
Millbank
Vauxhall Bridge Rd.
Grosvenor Rd.
Lambeth Rd.
Westminster Bridge Rd.
Waterloo Bridge
Embankment
Strand
Haymarket
Regent St.
Oxford St.
Piccadilly
Piccadilly Circus
Leicester Sq.
Charing Cross
Cockspur St.
Pall Mall East
Pall Mall
St. James's St.
Duke of York St.
King St.
Charles II St.
Jermyn St.
Regent St.
Waterloo Pl.
Lower Regent St.
Carlton House Ter.
Carlton Gdns
Admiralty Arch
Mall Galleries
Inst. of Contemporary Arts
Duke of York Memorial
The Inst. of Directors
London Library
St. James's Palace
Clarence House
Lancaster Ho.
Marlborough House
Commonwealth Conference Centre
R.A.C.
Christian Science Ch.
Christ Ch.
Subway
Underground Car Park
Entrance to Underground Car Park
Grosvenor Chapel
Ch. of the Immaculate Conception
St. George's Prim. Sch.
Faraday Museum
Royal Academy of Arts
Museum of Mankind
Burlington House
Burlington Arcade
Bond St.
New Bond St.
Conduit St.
Clifford St.
Old Bond St.
Grosvenor Sq.
Grosvenor Gdns
Grosvenor Hill
Brook St.
Upper Brook St.
Mount St.
Reeves Mews
Adams Mews
Roosevelt Mem.
Grimpel Fils Galleries
Lumley Cazalet Galleries
Mansfield St.
Hanover Sq.
Hanover Sq. Gdns
Oxford St. Restricted access 7am-7pm Mon.-Sat.
Regent Hall
Polytechnic Annexe
Madden Gall.
Kings Weigh Ho Ch.
T.A.V.R. Centre
St. Mark's Ch.
St. George's Ch.
Wesleyan Hall
Victoria Hall
Royal Throat, Nose & Ear Hosp.
Victoria Hall
St. Thomas' Ch.
Employment Exchange
London Coll. of Inf. Music
Swimming Baths
St. Peter's Ch.
British Music Centre
Waldegrave Hall
Church Army H.Q.
Ch. of the Annunciation
Police Sta.
Seymour Pl.
Seymour St.
Orchard St.
Portman Sq.
Portman St.
Gloucester Pl.
Baker St.
Upper Berkeley St.
Connaught Sq.
Connaught Pl.
Cumberland Gate
Upper Grosvenor St.
Park Lane
Dorchester Hotel
Hilton
Grosvenor House
Inter-Continental
Curzon St.
Half Moon St.
Piccadilly
Green Park
Hamilton Pl.
Stratton St.
Berkeley St.
Bruton St.
Bruton Pl.
Mason's Yard
Duke St. St. James's
Jermyn St.
Haymarket
Suffolk St.
Pall Mall East
Trafalgar Sq.
Nelson's Column
National Gallery
National Portrait Gallery
Canada House
South Africa House
Cockspur St.
Spring Gardens
Police Sta.
Admiralty Arch
Old Admiralty Offices
Old War Office
Horse Guards
Banqueting House
Min. of Defence
Wtmr. Coll. Mus.
Henry VIII
Foreign Office
Government Offices
Cenotaph

STEWARDS/MARSHALS

7. Each block of marchers, of which there will be four in each march, will be supervised by two 'Block Marshals'. These Marshals will oversee the stewards on the march and can be identified by orange tabards. They will carry a megaphone and a personal radio on the CND radio network.

8. In the march there will be one steward for every 25 demonstrators. Stewards can be identified by their yellow tabards.

BARRIERS

9. Barriers will be positioned at the assembly area and at certain locations along the routes.

PEDESTRIAN CROSS-OVER POINTS

10. Pedestrian Cross Over points for members of the public who require access are shown in Blue on the map overleaf. These points will be suitably signposted.

TRAFFIC

11. The marchers will only occupy one side of the road; traffic, including public transport, will run on the other side except one-way streets.

12. When both marches occupy the full length of both routes, a central area will be enclosed (see map overleaf).

13. Traffic Cross Over Points into the enclosed area will be maintained by traffic and foot duty officers at :

    a. Storey's Gate/Victoria Street.

    b. Victoria Street/Buckingham Gate.

    c. Buckingham Palace Road/Bressenden Place.

    These routes are indicated on the map by blue circles.

14. Access will also be maintained to Carlton Gardens from Marlborough Road on the south side of Pall Mall.

15. Essential traffic wishing to enter Whitehall -

    a. South of Horse Guards Avenue, will be allowed access via Bridge Street or in a contra-flow lane at Parliament Square (east side) into Parliament Street.

    b. North of Horse Guards Avenue, will be allowed access via Trafalgar Square, south side and Charing Cross - leaving via Northumberland Avenue, westbound.

    These routes are indicated on the map by blue arrows.

16. Traffic access will be maintained into Charing Cross Station via Duncannon Street and Strand (eastbound).

POLICE INFORMATION CENTRE

17. The Police Information Centre at New Scotland Yard will be open from 9.00 am and will collate details of :

    a. Injured Police Officers.

    b. Police Officers detached from their serials for any reason.

    c. Reportable incidents for both police and the media.

    d. Lost/Found Children.

    e. Persons arrested.

    The telephone number of the PIC was given to you at your briefing.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner 'A' (Operations)

RESTRICTED

Air Vice-Marshal B G Lock CB CBE AFC
MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL OFFICE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2AZ
5216
Telephone Direct line 01-273
GTN 273
Switchboard 01-273 3000

For Distribution see List A and
List B attached

5 October 1983

Dear Departmental Security Officer

CND DEMONSTRATION ON SATURDAY 22 OCTOBER 1983

As you may be aware the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) plan to mount a large scale demonstration in the Whitehall and Parliament Street areas on Saturday 22 October 1983 from 11 am onwards.

2. The purpose of this letter is to draw your attention to the need to ensure that all Government buildings in the threatened vicinity are properly secured against intrusion by CND members or supporters or any other group taking advantage of the situation.

3. The main responsibility for guarding during the silent hours falls to the PSA Custody Service but individual Departments will no doubt wish to consider increased manning levels during the period in question and the issue of special instructions regarding the entry/exit of authorised personnel in such a manner as to prevent unauthorised personnel simultaneously gaining access. It will also be necessary to advise staff concerning traffic /transport problems and the need to arrive on duty well before the demonstrations begin.

4. The Metropolitan Police are to hold a briefing meeting at 10 am on Wednesday 12 October in the 5th Floor Conference Room of New Scotland Yard and they will be contacting you (or a member of your staff) by telephone within the next few days inviting you to send a representative.

5. Copies of this letter go to J Farmer Esq, Head of the Custody Service, Superintendent Rowe, New Scotland Yard, Sergeant B Peardon, Cannon Row, Colonel J Dixon, London District.

Yours sincerely,

Basil Lock

cc. PS/Lord Gowrie
PS/2nd Permanent Secretary
Mr Davie

RESTRICTED

LIST A: DEPARTMENTS WITH BUILDINGS IN WHITEHALL

J W Stevens Esq — 233 8238
Cabinet Office
and Management and Personnel Office
70 Whitehall
SW1A 2AS

M Holton Esq — 218 7075
Director of MOD Security
Metropole Building
Northumberland Avenue
WC2N 5BL

Dr A Howe — 405 4310 ex 519
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
10 Whitehall Place
London
SW1A 2HH

B M Fox Esq — 233 5742
HM Treasury
Parliament Street
SW1P 3AG

E L Perkins Esq — 233 8223
Northern Ireland Office
Government Buildings
Great George Street
SW1P 3AJ

J K E Broadley Esq — 273 5627
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
4 Central Buildings
Matthew Parker Street
SW1H 9NL

Mrs M Evans — 233 8504
Welsh Office
Gwydyr House
Whitehall
SW1A 2ER

G A D Philip Esq — 233 8670
Scottish Office
Dover House
Whitehall
SW1A 2AU

B A Shillito Esq — 273 4468
Parliamentary Counsel Office
36 Whitehall
SW1A 2AY

C E S Horsford Esq — 273 3084
Privy Council Office
Whitehall
SW1A 2AT

NOTE B: MAJOR DEPARTMENTS IN WHITEHALL/PARLIAMENT STREET VICINITY

K C Hall Esq — 215 5045
Department of Trade and Industry
Sancturary Buildings
16/20 Great Smith Street
SW1P 3DB

D G Stratton Esq — 213 4259
Department of Employment
Caxton House
Tothill Street
SW1H 9NA

P G Spurgeon Esq — 637 2355 ex 110
Home Office
Whittington House
19-30 Alfred Place
WC1E 7EA

R M C Venables Esq — 273 4181
Treasury Solicitor's Department
Matthew Parker Street
SW1H 9NN

P Joce Esq — 930 4433
No 10 Downing Street
London

GREEN PARK
ST. JAMES'S PARK
PALACE GARDENS
Bandstand
Lake
Queen Victoria Memorial
Buckingham Palace
The Royal Mews
Queens Gallery
The Queen's Chapel of the Savoy
Wellington Barracks
Guards Chapel
Home Office
Guards Museum
Queen Anne's Gate
Marlborough House
Commonwealth Conference Centre
Lancaster House
Clarence House
St James's Palace
Duck Island
Horse Guards Parade
Horse Guards
Banqueting House
Old Admiralty Offices
Old War Office
Foreign Office
Cenotaph
Government Offices
Whitehall
Trafalgar Square
Nelson's Column
Canada House
National Gallery
National Portrait Gallery
St Martin-in-the-Fields
Charing Cross
Central Lending Library
Friends Meeting House
St Peter's Hosp
Royal Opera House
Coliseum
London Transport Mus
Indoor Sports Rec Cen
Inland Revenue
Somerset House
Victoria Embankment Gdns
Cleopatra's Needle
Thames Police Sta
PS Old Caledonia
Charing Cross Pier
Footpath
Hungerford Railway Bridge
PS Tattershall Castle
Victoria Embankment Gardens
Henry VIII Wine Cellar Museum
Min of Defence
Jubilee Gardens
The County Hall
Westminster Pier
South Bank
Queen Elizabeth Hall
Royal Festival Hall
National Theatre
Royal Waterloo Hosp
Houses of Parliament
New Palace Yard
Big Ben
Westminster Hall
Westminster Abbey
The Close
Old Palace Abingdon
Abbey Gardens
Church House
Westminster Sch
Choir Sch
Middlesex Guildhall
Sanctuary
St Margaret's Ch
Broad Sanctuary
Parliament St
Abbat George St
Bridge St
Westminster Bridge
Westminster Bridge Rd
St Thomas' Hospital
St Thomas' Medical School
Holy Trinity School
Archbishops Park
Archbishop Temple's Sec Sch
Victoria Tower Gdns
Millbank
Lambeth Palace Rd
Addington St
Hospital
Library
Victoria Embankment Gdns
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Somerset House
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Lambeth Palace Rd
Addington St
Hospital
Library

Welsh Presbyterian Ch
Royal Opera House
Coventry Court Ch
Inland Revenue
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Thames Police Sta
P.S. Old Caledonia
Cleopatra's Needle
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National Theatre
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Old Admiralty Offices
Horse Guards
Horse Guards Parade
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Min. of Defence
Foreign Office
Cenotaph
Government Offices
Parliament Pl
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The County Hall
Addington St
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Abbat George St
Bridge St. Westminster
Bridge Westminster Bri. Rd
Middlesex Guildhall
New Palace Yard
Big Ben
Sanctuary Square
St. Margaret's Ch
Westminster Hall
Houses of Parliament
Broad Sanctuary
Westminster Abbey
St. Thomas' Hospital
The Close
Old Palace Yd
Abingdon St
Abbey Gardens
Victoria Tower Gdns
Holy Trinity School
Archbishops Park
St. Thomas' Medical School
Lambeth Palace Rd
Lower Marsh
Waterloo Rd
Duncannon St
St Martin's Pl
St Martin's Le Grand
Trafalgar Square
Whitehall
Parliament St
Victoria Embankment
Wellington St
Strand
Haymarket
Regent St
Oxford St
Charing Cross Rd
Tottenham Court Rd
Bloomsbury Way
Kingsway
Aldwych
Lincoln's Inn Fields
Holborn
Fleet St
Ludgate Hill
Cannon St
Queen Victoria St
Embankment
Upper Thames St
Lower Thames St
Tower Bridge Rd
Tower Bridge
Tower of London
Tower Hill
Minories
Aldgate
Aldgate High St
Houndsditch
Bishopsgate
Liverpool St
Moorgate
Old Broad St
London Wall
Finsbury Circus
Blomfield St
Wood St
Cheapside
Gresham St
Queen St
Cannon St
Mansion House
Bank
Lombard St
Threadneedle St
Princes St
Poultry
Cornhill
Leadenhall St
Fenchurch St
Gracechurch St
Eastcheap
Monument
King William St
London Bridge
Southwark Bridge
Cannon St Railway Bridge
Blackfriars Bridge
Blackfriars Railway Bridge
Waterloo Bridge
Hungerford Bridge
Golden Jubilee Bridges
Westminster Bridge
Lambeth Bridge
Vauxhall Bridge
Chelsea Bridge
Battersea Bridge
Albert Bridge
Battersea Park Bridge
Wandsworth Bridge
Putney Bridge
Hammersmith Bridge
Barnes Bridge
Chiswick Bridge
Kew Bridge
Richmond Bridge
Twickenham Bridge
Teddington Lock
Hampton Court Bridge
Kingston Bridge
Thames Ditton
Surbiton
Molesey
East Molesey
West Molesey
Walton-on-Thames
Weybridge
Shepperton
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Maidenhead
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Henley-on-Thames
Wallingford
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Brighton
Worthing
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Bognor Regis
Chichester
Portsmouth
Southampton
Winchester
Salisbury
Andover
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Bracknell
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Sunningdale
Virginia Water
Egham
Runnymede
Cobham
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Merton
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Coulsdon
Purley
Caterham
Oxted
Edenbridge
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Sidcup
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
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Nelson Column
Canada House
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SPRING GARDENS
Admiralty Arch
Old Admiralty Offices
Horse Guards Parade
Horse Guards
Guards
Police Sta
WHITEHALL
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Banqueting House
Foreign Office
Government Offices
Cenotaph
PARLIAMENT ST
KING CHARLES STREET
RICHMOND TER
RICHMOND TER MEWS
CANNON ROW
Pol Sta
GREAT GEORGE ST
Middlesex Guildhall
Central Hall
BROAD SANCTUARY
St Margaret's Ch
SANCTUARY
Westminster Abbey
The Close
Chapter House
Westminster Sch
Choir Sch
Abbey Gardens
Library
Hat. Library for Blind
Christian Science Ch
Crown Agents for Overseas Governments
Department of the
College
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DEAN'S YD
LITTLE SMITH ST
GREAT PETER ST
GREAT COLLEGE ST
LITTLE COLLEGE ST
CANON ROW
ST MARGARET ST
OLD PALACE YD
ABINGDON ST
MILLBANK
MARSHAM ST
Victoria Tower Gdns
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Bull Inn Ct
Min of Defence
Savoy Hill
Savoy Pl
Savoy Row
Savoy Steps
Savoy Way
Waterloo Pl
Waterloo Bridge
Embankment Pl
Embankment
Victoria Embankment Gdns
Duncannon St
Northumberland Ave
Northumberland
Spring Gdns
Spring Gdns Yard
Scotland Yard
Whitehall Yard
Whitehall Ct
Whitehall Pl
Richmond Ter
Richmond Ter Mews
Cannon Row
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Westminster Bridge Rd
Broad Sanctuary
Dean's Yd
Little Smith St
Great Peter St
Great College St
Little College St
Canon Row
St Margaret St
Old Palace Yd
Abingdon St
Millbank
Marsham St
Victoria Tower Gdns
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Victoria Embankment Gdns
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Charing Cross Pier
Cleopatra's Needle


GREEN PARK
PALACE GARDENS
ST. JAMES'S PARK
Bandstand
Lake
Duck Island
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R.A.C.
Buckingham Gate
Queen Anne's Gate
Artillery Row
Greycoat Pl
Victoria Sq
Grosvenor Pl
Bressenden Pl
Constitution Hill
Birdcage Walk
Victoria Sta
St James's
Piccadilly Circ
Regent St
Conduit St
Bond St
New Bond St
Oxford St
Duke of York's Column
Wellington Arch
Hyde Park Corner
Knightsbridge
Sloane St
Sloane Sq
Victoria
Buckingham Gate Sec Sch
Caxton Hall
Caxton Centre
Victoria Junior Coll
St Thomas
Museum of Mankind
Royal Academy of Arts
Trafalgar Sq
Whitehall
Downing St
Horse Guards Parade
Admiralty Arch
Mall
Cockspur St
Haymarket
Leicester Sq
Coventry St
Shaftesbury Ave
Charing Cross Rd
Soho
Gerrard St
Regent St
Oxford St
Bond St
Conduit St
Brook St
Grosvenor Sq
Mount St
Audley Sq
Park Lane
Hyde Park
Marble Arch
Edgware Rd
Bayswater Rd
Kensington Gardens
Kensington Palace
Kensington High St
Kensington Church St
Notting Hill Gate
Holland Park
Holland Park Ave
Shepherd's Bush
Uxbridge Rd
Shepherd's Bush Rd
Goldhawk Rd
Hammersmith
King St
Chiswick
Chiswick High Rd
Turnham Green
Gunnersbury Park
Kew Bridge
Kew Gardens
Richmond
Richmond Park
Kingston
Kingston Bridge
Thames
Putney
Putney Bridge
Putney Heath
Wandsworth
Wandsworth Common
Clapham Common
Clapham Junction
Battersea
Battersea Park
Battersea Bridge
Chelsea
Chelsea Bridge
Chelsea Embankment
Cheyne Walk
Albert Bridge
Battersea Park Rd
Vauxhall
Vauxhall Bridge
Vauxhall Bridge Rd
Lambeth
Lambeth Palace
Lambeth Bridge
Lambeth Rd
Waterloo
Waterloo Bridge
Waterloo Rd
Westminster Bridge
Westminster Bridge Rd
Westminster Abbey
Houses of Parliament
Big Ben
Parliament Sq
Parliament St
Whitehall
Downing St
Horse Guards Parade
Admiralty Arch
Mall
Trafalgar Sq
National Gallery
St Martin-in-the-Fields
Charing Cross
Strand
Aldwych
Kingsway
Holborn
High Holborn
Gray's Inn Rd
Theobalds Rd
Bloomsbury
Bloomsbury Sq
British Museum
Museum of Mankind
University College
Euston Rd
Euston
Euston Sq
Euston Station
Euston Arch
Gower St
Tottenham Court Rd
Oxford St
Regent St
Portland Place
Langham Place
All Souls Church
Broadcasting House
BBC
Regent's Park
Regent's Canal
Camden Town
Camden Lock
Camden High St
Chalk Farm
Primrose Hill
Primrose Hill Rd
Adelaide Rd
Swiss Cottage
Finchley Rd
Finchley Rd Station
Hampstead
Hampstead Heath
Hampstead Heath Station
Heath St
Golders Green
Golders Green Rd
Golders Green Station
Hendon
Hendon Central Station
Hendon Central
Hendon Way
Brent Cross
Brent Cross Shopping Centre
Cricklewood
Cricklewood Broadway
Willesden
Willesden Junction
Willesden Green
Kilburn
Kilburn High Rd
Kilburn Park
Maida Vale
Maida Vale Station
Warwick Ave
Paddington
Paddington Station
Praed St
Edgware Rd
Bayswater
Bayswater Rd
Queensway
Queensway Station
Notting Hill Gate
Notting Hill Gate Station
Holland Park
Holland Park Ave
Shepherd's Bush
Shepherd's Bush Rd
Goldhawk Rd
Hammersmith
King St
Chiswick
Chiswick High Rd
Turnham Green
Gunnersbury Park
Kew Bridge
Kew Gardens
Richmond
Richmond Park
Kingston
Kingston Bridge
Thames
Putney
Putney Bridge
Putney Heath
Wandsworth
Wandsworth Common
Clapham Common
Clapham Junction
Battersea
Battersea Park
Battersea Bridge
Chelsea
Chelsea Bridge
Chelsea Embankment
Cheyne Walk
Albert Bridge
Battersea Park Rd
Vauxhall
Vauxhall Bridge
Vauxhall Bridge Rd
Lambeth
Lambeth Palace
Lambeth Bridge
Lambeth Rd
Waterloo
Waterloo Bridge
Waterloo Rd
Westminster Bridge
Westminster Bridge Rd
Westminster Abbey
Houses of Parliament
Big Ben
Parliament Sq
Parliament St

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

20 July 1983

DEAR TIM,

INTERNATIONAL AIR TATTOO, GREENHAM COMMON, 23-24 JULY: POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES BY ANTI-NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATIONS

The bi-ennial International Air Tattoo, organised by the RAF Benevolent Fund, and which I understand the Secretary of State for Defence is attending, is to be held at Greenham Common air base on Saturday 23 and 24 July and is likely to be covered extensively by the press and television. The Home Secretary thought that the Prime Minister may wish to know the current assessment from the Thames Valley Police of attempts which anti-nuclear demonstrators may make to exploit the event, and to have a summary of the policing arrangements.

The Tattoo will be held in the northern, non-operational part of the base, which will be open to the public. Upwards of 100,000 visitors are expected on each of the two days. They will be separated from the southern, operational area by two parallel lines of crowd barriers, with a 30 yard sterile area between them.

There is no current information that the Greenham Common "peace women" are planning to take action during next weekend (although it has to be said that it is often difficult to obtain intelligence of their intentions). It may be that the women recognise that the great majority of the visitors are likely to be opposed to their campaign.

Leaflets have, however, been circulated by "Cat's Cradle Action", which appears to be a new anti-nuclear group. The leaflet gives travel directions to Greenham and invites campaigners to attempt to hand out anti-nuclear literature at the entrances to the base, and in the car-parks, which will be inside the perimeter fence. The leaflet invites supporters to be good-humoured, not to disrupt the event and during it to follow any police instructions and not to obstruct the police. But it states that some campaigners, "trained in non-violent direct action", will seek to "re-claim the base for peace", by attempting to remain inside the perimeter when the Tattoo ends at 8.00 pm each day. It is said that those attempts will be watched by observers and that legal advisers will be present. The police currently estimate that about 100 campaigners will attend each day, but think that not all of them will attempt to stay after 8.00 pm.

During the Tattoo, the policing of the area of the base open to the public will be the responsibility of the Thames Valley Police, although the RAF Benevolent Fund will provide some 500 stewards. There will be no grounds for excluding anti-nuclear campaigners provided they pay the entrance fee and do not break the law. But the police are alert to the possibilities that the campaigners may not behave responsibly, or that they may excite a hostile and perhaps disorderly reaction from some of the visitors. Thames Valley will, therefore, deploy a

/total of

Tim Flesher, Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

total of 450 officers at the base, on a shift system providing about 200 officers on duty at any one time. One reason for deploying such a considerable number of men is that it would be difficult to provide re-inforcements quickly from other parts of Thames Valley. On past experience, there will be tail-backs of traffic on the roads to Greenham of 5-7 miles.

The Benevolent Fund are paying for the presence of about 30 officers on duty inside the northern area, who will assist in crowd direction and control and deal with any crime (there will be considerable sums of money about - the entrance fee per car is £5) but will also be alert to intelligence, or signs, of trouble caused by campaigners.

The police are also planning to deploy a reserve of about 50-60 officers outside the base, in tenting on the northern, 'public' side of the dividing barriers. Those officers will deal with any attempt to breach the barriers (we understand there will be MOD personnel on the other side, to deal with anyone who managed to get past the police). The reserve will also be available to respond to disorder elsewhere within the base or, if necessary, to re-inforce the remaining 100 or so officers who will be at the gates or patrolling outside the perimeter. Similarly, those externally deployed officers could, if necessary, act within the base. They will also be alert to any need to protect the "peace camp" from the attentions of visitors, although the chance of difficulty there seems remote: the camp is on the southern side of the perimeter, well away from the entrances on the north which the visitors will use.

If campaigners do attempt to stay inside the base on either day after the Tattoo has ended, it will fall to MOD personnel to eject them, since the property will have become private and the campaigners trespassers. Thames Valley officers will, however, be ready to assist the MOD men, in the same way that the police may assist any land-owner to remove trespassers.

We understand that liaison between the police and the military authorities remains excellent.

The police have undertaken to up-date us on Friday, and I will let you know if their assessment, and so their plans, change significantly.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Hugh

H H TAYLOR

CONFIDENTIAL

HL

cc HO
FCO
CO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 July 1983

Policing of demonstrations: Greenham Common

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your Secretary of State's minute of 30 June and of Hugh Taylor's letter of 1 July.

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor (Home Office), Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

NR

(2)

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

1 July 1983

Prime Minister

DEAR TIM,

MF.

A.J.C. 1/7.

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS: GREENHAM COMMON

In my letter of 23 June about forthcoming demonstrations at Greenham Common I said I would be in touch with you again, with the up-dated assessment from the Thames Valley Police of the demonstrations planned for 4-8 July.

The intelligence currently available to the police is that the organisers are likely to fall significantly short of their aim of attracting a total of 30,000 demonstrators, ie 3,000 for each of two shifts for each of the five days. But the organisers may respond to that by changing their plans, for example by seeking to concentrate the support they do receive at the two occasions each day when personnel will have to pass through a perimeter gate, and inviting supporters of the demonstration on one day to stay on, or return, for that on another.

The police are therefore continuing with the plans to deal with significant demonstrations which I indicated in my earlier letter. 750 officers will still be deployed, together with 13 mounted officers from the Metropolitan Police.

There are about 1,500 workers to be escorted, in a convoy of vehicles, through one of the gates each day. Their entry to the base will begin at about 7,30 am, and their exit at about 4.30 pm, and the police aim will be to prevent the demonstrators from effectively blockading these convoys.

The police are also alert to the strong possibility that demonstrators will attempt to breach the perimeter fence. The fence was breached, with the use of bolt cutters, during the demonstration last Saturday, 25 June, although the intruders were quickly apprehended. Seven cuts in the fence were found by police patrols last Friday night and repaired by the military authorities. On Saturday afternoon, some 80 women went through an opening made by a further cut, which was at one of the most densely wooded stretches of the fence. They were confronted by a barrier of barbed wire, which about two dozen of them crossed, using ladders, intending to paint slogans on the runway. The intrusion was spotted from a police helicopter, and Ministry of Defence personnel apprehended the women before they were able to paint anything legible. The names of the women were taken, and they were escorted from the base. They denied having cut the fence themselves and it has not been possible to identify people to be prosecuted for offences of criminal damage. The police believe that, in order to hinder prosecutions, those who cut the fence were not among the intruders.

The mounted officers will assist in patrols looking for further actual or attempted cuts in the fence next week, and the police will again use a helicopter. Large numbers of shovels have been bought in Newbury, and the patrolling and surveillance officers will also be on the alert for attempts by demonstrators to dig their way under the fence. If, nonetheless, demonstrators do manage to breach the perimeter, they will be dealt with by members of the re-inforced strength of Ministry of Defence personnel about which I understand the Secretary of State for Defence's office are writing to you.

Home Office officials will be in close touch with the Thames Valley Police throughout next week, and we will let you know of any significant developments which the police report.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Hugh

H H TAYLOR

T Flesher, Esq

Defence:
Policing of demo's
2/83

JUL 1983



(2)

Prime Minister

To note.

A.J.C. 4/7.

MO 18/1/2

PRIME MINISTER

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS: GREENHAM COMMON

I have seen a copy of the Home Secretary's Private Secretary's letter of 23rd June about the forthcoming demonstrations at Greenham Common.

2. In respect of last Saturday's demonstrations, the Thames Valley police were fortunately able to give us last minute intelligence of the likely scale and nature of the events. The necessary MOD reinforcements - comprising over 100 MOD police and 150 RAF personnel - were rapidly deployed on Friday night and succeeded in dealing swiftly with the 80 or so demonstrators who broke into the base.

3. So far as the blockade between the 4th and the 8th July is concerned I have directed that for this period, as was done at Upper Heyford, the internal security fence at Greenham Common will be heavily reinforced by MOD and UK Service personnel to deal swiftly with any incursion which the civil police operation is unable to prevent. In this way any trespassers should be swiftly apprehended before they can do damage to the base, penetrate sensitive areas or confront US personnel. The UK reinforcements will be of the same size and nature as those deployed at Upper Heyford, namely some 300 MOD police, nearly 200 RAF personnel and an infantry battalion of about 600 (with a second infantry battalion available if required to be deployed in whole or in part from its normal barracks). The fence itself has been strengthened by mounting an additional 60 tons of barbed wire around the whole of the perimeter. This operation

was completed before last weekend. There is close liaison between the responsible service authorities and the civil police on planning for movements of necessary personnel, including the construction contractors, on and off the base throughout the period of the 4th July - 8th July blockade, by a system of convoys.

4. As at Upper Heyford there are normally a substantial number of armed US security police at RAF Greenham Common, but for the period 4th-8th July only a minimum number will be deployed and only at those few sensitive locations where USAF regulations require their presence. They will be accompanied in those locations by unarmed UK personnel, as at Upper Heyford, and will similarly be briefed on the need for maximum restraint in the avoidance of the use of weapons. The Americans are very clear on the importance of this issue and fully understand the need to avoid any incidents involving fire-arms. As at Upper Heyford, warning notices indicating the presence of armed patrols will be erected inside the perimeter fence, where they would be encountered by persons who had already trespassed. Neither these warning notices nor any other aspect of the internal security operation attracted any adverse comment during the Upper Heyford demonstrations.

5. I am advised that there is close and excellent co-ordination between the Thames Valley Police, the USAF at Greenham Common, and RAF Support Command senior personnel who will be responsible for the operations of the UK internal security force. Officials here are also in close touch with their counterparts in the Home Office.

6. Our planning for events such as this must naturally be tailored to the specific circumstances of the threat as it is perceived by the civil police. But we also need to address the longer term question of physical security measures at all vulnerable sites in order to help reduce the need for large scale reinforcements of this kind in the future. I have therefore set in hand urgent studies of ways to improve our capability to keep demonstrators out of the bases most likely to be affected. These studies will include the

provision of improved fencing - including possibly electric fencing - at such bases. They will also address the legal and manpower implications. I shall report further to my colleagues when the results are available.

7. I am copying this letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
30th June 1983

Defence : Policy of Defence Sales

AF 2/83

JUL 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

1 Mr Coles AR 24/6
2 Prime Minister

2

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

WR 24/6

23 June 1983

Dear Tim,

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS: GREENHAM COMMON

The Home Secretary believes that the Prime Minister will wish to be aware of information from the Thames Valley Police about forthcoming demonstrations at Greenham Common and the operational planning to deal with them.

The first event is an attempt planned this week by the Greenham Common women to organise a 'linking of hands' round the perimeter of the base this Saturday, 25 June. Since the perimeter is 9 miles long, successful encirclement of it would involve a large number of demonstrators. The intelligence currently available to the police indicates that the women will not attract anywhere near the necessary strength of support, but we are keeping in touch with the police about this.

A more serious threat, for which the women have been planning for some time, is an attempted blockade of the Greenham Common base from Monday 4 to Friday 8 July. Their aim is to maintain the blockade throughout the week with eight hour shifts, each of 3,000 women, drawn in turn from various parts of the country. The organisers hope to draw these shifts from a pool of 30,000 women gathered in the area, who would all take part in a major demonstration on the last day.

The police are not yet able to assess accurately what numbers these plans will attract. But they have been widely publicised, and leading figures among the Greenham Common women have visited various parts of this country, and have been to West Germany, seeking support.

The police are therefore planning to deal with major and determined demonstrations throughout the week, with the aim of ensuring that those with proper business at the base are able to enter and leave it, and of preventing breaches of the perimeter. As with previous attempts to blockade Greenham Common, the police will each morning select one of the entrances to the base and escort workers through it, and there will be a similar procedure at the end of each day. They do not consider it necessary to maintain access at other times.

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In preventing breaches of the perimeter fence, a perennial threat given its length, the police expect to be helped considerably by the fact that the Ministry of Defence have arranged for a large quantity of barbed wire to be fitted to the top of the fence. The police hope that, at best, this will deter attempts to climb the fence, and, at worst, by hindering climbers, give officers a better chance of apprehending them before they get over. (We understand that the fitting of the wire should be completed this Friday, which could be of assistance in dealing with the encirclement of the base planned for the next day.)

The wire has been fitted at the suggestion of the police, and they report that, as with the demonstrations at Easter, their liaison with the military authorities, whose own police are responsible for security within the base, is very good.

The Thames Valley Police are planning to deploy 750 officers in the July week (much the same number as that deployed at Greenham during the successful operation at Easter). They do not at present think it will be necessary to seek the assistance of additional officers from neighbouring forces, except that they are again exploring with the Metropolitan Police the provision of a number of mounted officers. Those proved useful at Easter for patrolling those parts of the perimeter which can otherwise be reached only by foot. Again as before, the police will use nearby Newbury racecourse as their operational headquarters, and as a charging centre if it proves necessary to make large numbers of arrests.

I will let you know of any further information from the police this week about the prospects for the demonstration on 25 June, and be in touch with you towards the end of next week about their later assessments of the demonstrations which are to begin on 4 July.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Hugh

H H TAYLOR

T Flesher, Esq

24 JUN 1983



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CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 24 May 1983

Policing of Demonstrations: RAF Upper Heyford

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 23 May and has noted the security operations which are now planned for dealing with the CND blockade of RAF Upper Heyford from 31 May to 3 June. Following a telephone conversation with Nick Evans this morning, I shall assume that these plans remain unchanged in the light of Colin Walters' letter of 23 May describing police estimates of the likely size of the demonstration.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (FCO), Colin Walters (Home Office), Alex Galloway (Paymaster General's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

Defence Feb 83

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

23 May 1983

N.B.I.M.

AR 24/5

Dear John

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS: RAF UPPER HEYFORD

In your letter of 13 May to Richard Mottram you asked to be kept closely in touch with developments in connection with the planned blockade of the Upper Heyford base from 31 May to 3 June.

The latest intelligence is that CND nationally are having no involvement in the planned blockade. Bruce Kent said so over the week-end in conversation with Thames Valley police at Upper Heyford during the Christian CND event. The whole burden of organisation will fall on the shoulders of members of the local peace camp. The organisers have revised their target for a constant attendance of demonstrators from 1,000 to 400-500. The police think that they will be lucky to achieve 200-250. There is no information about plans in other parts of the country for significant numbers of demonstrators to go to Upper Heyford. The police are sure that if there were plans they would know something about them. The police are meeting the organisers on the evening of 24 May and will report to us again on 25 May.

Police planning is proceeding for the moment on the basis that there might be 1,000 demonstrators because it is easier to stand people down than call them up at short notice.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign & Commonwealth Office), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Alex Galloway (Paymaster General's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

C. J. WALTERS

A. J. Coles, Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL

Defence Feb 83

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

Important. The Defence Secretary will need to have up to 1000 unarmed UK personnel available to deal with the CND blockade from 31 May to 2 June. This could become public any time from Wednesday onwards when the notice to the Servicemen concerned is reduced.

MO 11/2/2

PRIME MINISTER

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS: RAF UPPER HEYFORD

A.V.C. 23/5

I have seen your Private Secretary's note in response to my minute of 12th May, and the Home Secretary's minute of 17th May.

2. I have received the further report from my officials on the work in hand to prepare for the events to take place at the end of this month at RAF Upper Heyford. I should say first of all that the "Peace Pentecost" is not assessed by us or the civil police as likely to pose any security problems. Our security concern remains with the planned CND blockade from 31st May to 3rd June. The assessment of the likely scale of CND's blockade remains unchanged as yet, but the responsible authorities have now reviewed in detail the security arrangements necessary to meet my direction that the base should continue normal operations; and that intruders must be swiftly apprehended before they are able to halt or impede operations or penetrate to sensitive areas. Against the background of a normal planned flying programme, with aircraft being refuelled or maintained in various parts of the airfield, the assessment of the required security force has been revised upwards. I should also add, as a supplementary to my earlier minute, that the Americans are required by their own authorities to protect operational aircraft with armed guards; the armed US security police will not therefore be totally confined to the two nuclear sites on the base. I do not see this as a major problem given the scale and nature of the security operations now planned and which are outlined below.

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3. In addition to the forces whose deployment I had already approved as outlined in my earlier minute ie 160 MOD police and 100 RAF police, with dog teams and slightly smaller forces by night, it is now judged necessary to increase the MOD police presence by 75, day and night; to deploy on base throughout the period an unarmed RAF Regiment Squadron of 160 men; and to have available for the period a force equivalent to that of an infantry battalion (slightly under 600 men). This yields a total force of 1,000 unarmed UK personnel. With such a force there is confidence that our requirements for the base operations and security can be met in full. I have accordingly directed that forces of this size should be discreetly held ready for possible deployment in whole or in part subject to the developing threat assessment. This is a very substantial operation, and will no doubt attract much media attention but the alternative would be either ourselves to close the base down and lock all the aircraft away or to take unacceptable risks with security. Notice to the Servicemen concerned will be reduced with effect from tomorrow. MT.

4. Of course I very much share the Home Secretary's concerns about the political sensitivity of the presence of armed guards, and above all the grave consequences that would attend any use of weapons. On the questions of signs, I can offer the reassurance that the warning signs now being prepared are intended to be erected only on the internal fences; they will not be erected along the public road. I cannot give a total guarantee that they will be invisible from outside the fence but they will be much less visible than the USAF armed police who are there every day. The purpose of these notices is to give a warning to those who have already trespassed by penetrating the outer fences. The only notices to be erected outside the perimeter fence will be the standard signs declaring that the base is a prohibited area within the meaning of the Official Secrets Act.

5. On the question of the actual use of firearms, I can give an absolute assurance that the United States Air Force in this country, from their Commanding General downwards, have a complete understanding of the British viewpoint and of the need to exercise the maximum possible restraint. Not only will special briefings be given to those armed personnel who will be on the base during the period, but the USAF Commander has made several constructive suggestions in order to minimise the risk still further such as, for example, that UK personnel operate right alongside armed US guards and even take up positions within the secure nuclear areas. Moreover, the overall size of the UK security force is such as to give us confidence that we should be able to prevent any intruders getting to the sensitive areas where armed US personnel may be present. The US Embassy are in fact in no doubt as to the importance we attach to avoiding the use of weapons, which has been the subject of frequent official level discussions; but I understand that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has directed his officials to make an approach to the Minister in the Embassy in this respect and I welcome that.

6. My officials remain in close touch with their American counterparts, and will continue to liaise closely with the Home Office. I shall of course report further should there be any new developments.

7. I am copying this minute to the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Paymaster General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

MICHAEL HESELTINE

[Approved by the Defence Secretary and signed on his behalf]

Ministry of Defence
23rd May 1983

23 MAY

CONFIDENTIAL

file

20 May 1983

DEMONSTRATIONS AT RAF UPPER HEYFORD

The Prime Minister was grateful for your Secretary of State's minute of 18 May about the presentational aspects of the protests planned for Upper Heyford. She has noted this without comment.

C

W. F. S. RICKETT

Nick Evans, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

cc RJ (2)

Prime Minister

for information.

A.J.C. 19/5.

FCS/83/101

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Policing of Demonstrations: RAF Upper Heyford

1. In his minute of 17 May to you the Home Secretary suggests that we make a high level approach to the Americans on the need for their armed guards to show maximum discretion during the proposed blockade of RAF Upper Heyford by the CND from 31 May to 3 June.

2. The Americans are already conscious of the need to avoid any untoward incidents. I understand that your Second Permanent Secretary recently convened a meeting (at which the Home Office was represented) with senior US servicemen and representatives of the US Embassy to make this point clear and to underline the political sensitivities. I also understand that the US Ambassador and his Deputy, Mr Streator, are well seized of the problem.

3. Nevertheless, to make assurance doubly sure I have asked that Mr Streator be called in to the FCO this week and told of the great importance that I attach to this issue.

4. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary, the Paymaster General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

19 May 1983

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Defence: Policing of Military bases
Feb '83

19 ... 1983



cc RJ (2)

Prime Minister

You will wish to note these arrangements.

A.J.C. 11/5

MO 11/2/2

PRIME MINISTER

DEMONSTRATIONS AT RAF UPPER HEYFORD

I mentioned to you in my minute of 12th May that I would be dealing separately with the presentational aspects of the two protests planned for Upper Heyford between now and the election.

2. The first of these, the "peace pentecost", is due to take place on 21st-23rd May, organised by Christian CND. As a counter to the activities at the Base the Bishop of Woolwich has agreed to make a speech over that weekend and John Selwyn Gummer is looking after the publicity for him. We are also attempting to persuade another Bishop - probably Norwich or London - to say something over the same weekend. Some of Lady Olga Maitland's Women for Defence will be taking part in the camp to try to put across the multilateralist point of view.

3. The CND blockade of Upper Heyford scheduled for 31st May to 3rd June looks like being a larger event and our candidate for Banbury, Tony Baldry, is working with Neil Marten to arrange some events, mainly in nearby Bicester, which will attract publicity for our case. They plan to take a local hall and organise discussions emphasising a more thoughtful approach to deterrence and disarmament. They are planning to mount a visual display on the importance of NATO and there may also be some posters linking the current CND campaign with the peace demonstrations of the 1930s.

4. I have myself been attempting to arrange for a major speech to be made at Bicester during the period and I am pleased to say that Alec Home has agreed to speak at lunchtime on June 3rd. If necessary I should be prepared to drop in at Bicester or Upper Heyford myself and Peter Blaker will be speaking in the area on June 3rd. Baldry has also

made arrangements for the Upper Heyford local councillor to be available to appear on TV with a number of other local residents, all of whom can be relied on to speak out clearly and critically about the peace campers living on the edge of the Base.

5. The only other significant incident we expect between now and the election is the International Women's Day for Disarmament currently planned for 24th May. CND will be attempting to arrange a number of events around the country involving blockades, "die-ins" and other types of civil action. Our enquiries so far with local police forces indicate however that these are likely to be on a relatively small scale.

6. I am copying this to Cecil Parkinson to see if he wishes to use any of our forthcoming press conferences to invite along some women candidates, such as Virginia Bottomley, to make it clear that CND and Labour do not have a monopoly of concern about maintaining peace.

7. I am sending copies to Francis Pym, Willie Whitelaw and John Selwyn Gummer.

Ministry of Defence
18th May 1983

DEFENCE: Policing of Military Bases
IDS 83

19 MAR 2003

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BDC

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 18 May 1983

Dear Tony,

The Prime Minister has now seen the Home Secretary's minute of 17 May to the Secretary of State for Defence about the policing of demonstrations at RAF Upper Heyford.

Subject to the views of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary she agrees that a message should be sent to the Americans along the lines suggested by the Home Secretary.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Alex Galloway (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Tim.

(Timothy Flesher)

Tony Rawsthorne, Esq.,
Home Office

CONFIDENTIAL

BDC.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

RJ

Prime Minister

The Home Secretary believes that an incident involving U.S. firearms could be a major election problem.

Agree that the Americans should be approached as at X ?

A.J.C. 17/5

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS: RAF UPPER HEYFORD

Thank you for sending me a copy of your minute of 12 May to the Prime Minister.

I strongly support your judgment that it would be a mistake to make any public reference to the presence of armed guards in the next few weeks. The arming of security personnel in any circumstances is a potentially controversial issue. In this case there is the added complication that they are US personnel outside out control. We must avoid this side issue obscuring the sharp message about defence policy which you and the Prime Minister will be putting across.

On the question of signs warning of the presence of armed guards, I quite see that it would be irresponsible not to put them up but I hope that they can be displayed so that they are only seen by someone who has already breached the security of the perimeter. I understand that some of the most sensitive areas are close to the northern perimeter but perhaps the signs could be screened so that they are not actually visible from outside the perimeter to the naked eye or with the aid of binoculars etc. I think that otherwise there would be an unnecessary risk of this issue coming to public attention.

I see the difficulty of signalling tactfully to the US authorities our expectation that firearms will not be used without good cause during the proposed blockade from 31 May to 3 June. But the timing, which could hardly be more sensitive, and the traditionally different approach to the use of firearms in law enforcement in the United States make me think that the possibility should, at least, be explored. Washington has as much interest as we have in avoiding a shooting which seems to have been unjustifiable or where the facts are in dispute. I have in mind a high level approach to the US Embassy who might be persuaded to emphasise the risks to the military commanders responsible for the base and the need for the armed guards to be as unobtrusive as possible. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would, no doubt, advise on whether some message might be sent and how it could best be delivered.

X

Needless to say, I am well aware that the best way to avoid an incident involving firearms is to make sure that perimeter security is not breached and that, if it is, no-one passes the unarmed UK forces. With this in mind, I am keeping in close touch with the Thames Valley Police's arrangements for policing outside the perimeter.

I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Paymaster General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

17 May 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

Defence: Policing of Demo's 2/83



CONFIDENTIAL

cc HO
FCO
PGO
CO

HL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 May 1983

Policing of demonstrations: RAF Upper Heyford

The Prime Minister was grateful for Mr. Heseltine's minute of 12 May, the contents of which she has noted.

I should be grateful if you and Tony Rawsthorne could keep this office closely informed of developments, in particular during CND's planned blockade of the Upper Heyford base from 31 May to 3 June.

I am copying this letter to Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office), Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Alex Galloway (Paymaster General's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

Defence Feb 83

(2)

VCC RJ
cf BI

Prime Minister

MO 11/2/2

To note.

A.J.C. 12/5

PRIME MINISTER

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS: RAF UPPER HEYFORD

I have been reviewing our planning for two CND demonstrations expected to take place at RAF Upper Heyford during the next three weeks. RAF Upper Heyford is a major USAF operational base - one of the most important in Europe - with a force of some 70 F111 nuclear capable aircraft and appropriate nuclear weapon storage. CND's intentions are:

a. A Christian CND march from Bicester to Upper Heyford on Saturday 21st May, when they will hold a service outside the base, followed by a vigil overnight and a service the following morning. There may be another service and vigil on Monday 23rd May. The organisers hope to attract about 2,000 supporters for this event, which the civil police expect to be orderly and law abiding. The Thames Valley Police will control events outside the base, with their strength ranging from 40 to 100 over the period. We have made arrangements for similar numbers of Ministry of Defence Police, supplemented if necessary by RAF Police, to be present within the perimeter to deal with any intrusions.

b. Of much greater significance in terms of operational threat is CND's planned blockade of the base from 31st May to 3rd June. For these four working days they hope to maintain a constant presence of 1,000 demonstrators, in shifts, outside the base throughout the period. Their aim is to halt or impede base operations. This poses a direct challenge to our

ability to maintain operational readiness at an important base, and there must be a risk of deliberate intrusions into the base of similar sites by fringe groups which attach themselves to the demonstration; possibly on a troublesome scale.

2. Now that the Election has been called, it is possible that CND may change their plans and tactics. And currently the Thames Valley Police doubt whether CND can assemble the numbers they hope for from 31st May to 3rd June. But I have no doubt that we must plan on the basis that the blockade will go ahead, and at least on the scale currently envisaged by the civil police: I have directed that our planning must be sufficiently flexible and comprehensive to deal if necessary with much larger numbers if intelligence (which has so far been good) nearer the time suggests that may be the case.

3. A particularly difficult problem affecting security arrangements at Upper Heyford, as we discussed before Easter, is the public road which bisects the base. The map at Annex A shows the position. To the north of the public road lie the nuclear weapons storage area, other ammunition depots, and operational aircraft including those armed aircraft held on quick reaction alert in hardened aircraft shelters. To the south lie the accommodation and recreational facilities. The northern area is almost wholly fenced off but the southern area is not fenced along the main road. Access to the operational part of the base is effectively confined to the gates opening off the public road and during any 24 hour period some 3,000 US personnel must move on and off the base. It is of cardinal importance to keep this road clear, both to maintain access for the personnel needed to support operations, and to prevent the demonstration getting so out of hand as to make large scale incursions possible. On the basis that the numbers of CND demonstrators are unlikely to reach 1,000 at any time, the current assessment, the Thames Valley Police have expressed confidence in

their ability to keep this road open and to control events, deploying up to 600 Police Officers.

4. We have already strengthened the physical defences of the northern area of the base, by laying an additional 5 miles of barbed wire inside the existing perimeter fence. Further improvements on these lines are planned before 31st May, but wire cannot offer a totally guaranteed defence. Internal security at Upper Heyford, as at other operational USAF bases, is an American responsibility and the USAF Commander is responsible to his own authorities for the security of his nuclear weapons and the aircraft which carry them. This authority rests in the Agreement regarding the Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (Command 9363 of Jan 1955). For this purpose the local commander has a force of 470 armed US Service Police. But in these special circumstances, and to minimise the risk of any confrontation between demonstrators and armed US personnel, we have agreed with the American authorities that the US security force will confine its operations to the protection of the nuclear areas shown to the north of the runway at Annex A. The UK will provide an outer cordon, which we currently plan to comprise 160 MOD Police by day (120 by night) with 5 dog teams (3 by night) and 100 RAF Police with 19 dog teams. If later intelligence suggests it may be necessary, this force will be supplemented by appropriate and if necessary large numbers of unarmed UK service personnel. I have directed that the UK force must be sufficient in number to deal swiftly with any intruders and prevent them from impeding operations or penetrating to sensitive areas. It would clearly be intolerable if CND were able to claim that they had seriously affected operations at RAF Upper Heyford, or if our security arrangements could be claimed to have been ineffective. Unlike Greenham Common, which was still a base under construction, we must plan to maintain normal military activities including flying operations. We must also prevent demonstrators interfering with American and local British people who will be going about their daily business in the accommodation and recreational areas.

5. Our plans are flexible. We will keep them under review in case additional reinforcements may be necessary before the event. I have already approved reinforcements on the scale mentioned above, and that Service helicopters be available to move them if necessary. I have also directed that signs in adequate numbers be prepared in time for 21st May which will warn of the presence of armed guards. Currently there are no such signs, but since we can no longer guarantee the behaviour of the demonstrators, or that all of them are well-intentioned, this is a prudent and necessary step. I do not however propose as yet to volunteer any public statement about the presence of armed guards, and the notices themselves would be within the base perimeter. To advertise the importance of the base, and its security, might be taken as a challenge; but equally we cannot and must not seek to minimise either aspect.

6. There will continue to be the closest possible consultation between the MOD, the Home Office, the USAF and the Thames Valley Police. This worked admirably over Greenham Common.

7. I have not in this minute mentioned the more directly political and presentational aspects of these events should they occur. They are very important, but I shall deal with them separately.

8. I am copying this minute to the Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary, the Paymaster General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Hartgrams [Private Secretary]
draft approved by Mr Heseltine and signed in his absence.

Ministry of Defence
12th May 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

HIGH SECURITY AREAS SHOWN IN RED.

PERIMETER FENCE SHOWN IN GREEN

"OTHER" AIRCRAFT SHELTERS

NUCLEAR WEAPON STORE

NUCLEAR-ARMED AIRCRAFT QRA SHELTERS

AIRCRAFT PARKING AREA

AIRCRAFT SHELTERS

CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES STORE. (INTERMEDIATE SECURITY)

PUBLIC ROAD

"PEACE CAMP"

SCHOOL

RECREATIONAL FACILITIES

PX SHOP

PERIMETER FENCE

OFFICERS MESS AREA

PUBLIC ROAD

SUPPORT GROUP HQ

WING HQ

USAF

MARRIED AND SINGLE QUARTERS

TECHNICAL ACCOMMODATION

384 TOWER

GLIDESLOPE

LEGEND

BOUNDARIES
- EXISTING PROPERTY LINE
- EXISTING PROPERTY LINE (EASEMENT (E) LEASE (L) PERMIT (P))
- SECURE AREA FENCING
- EXISTING FENCE
- APPROACH-DEPARTURE ZONE & R/W CLEARANCES

AIRFIELD PAVEMENTS
- EXISTING TO BE RETAINED
- EXISTING TO BE ABANDONED
- EXISTING ABANDONED
- SHOULDER STABILIZATION
- OVERRUN

ROADS & PARKING
- EXISTING TO BE RETAINED

STRUCTURES
- EXISTING PERMANENT
- EXISTING SEMI-PERMANENT
- EXISTING TEMPORARY
- FUEL HYDRANT OUTLET
- BENCH MARK
- EWS TANK (EMERGENCY WATER SUPPLY)

NATURAL FEATURES
- CONTOUR (VI. 3.0 METRES)
- EXISTING TREE COVER
- STREAMS IN GENERAL WITH DIRECTION OF FLOW
- INTERMITTENT STREAMS OR DITCHES WITH DIRECTION OF FLOW
- DEPRESSION CONTOURS

MAGNETIC NORTH IS 06°30' WEST OF TRUE NORTH (JAN 1980)
ANNUAL MAGNETIC CHANGE IS 00°11'18" EASTERLY.
Magnetic variation based on information supplied by : THE INSTITUTE OF GEOLOGICAL SCIENCES, GEOMAGNETISM UNIT, EDINBURGH.
Airfield Elevation 133·6 m (438·3 Feet) Contour Interval 3 Metres

100 0 200 400 600 800 1000 metres

SURVEYED AND ISSUED BY CENTRAL SURVEY BRANCH DCES PROPERTY SERVICES AGENCY

REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION	INITIAL
4	26JAN83	ANNUAL UPDATE	G.S.H
3	30SEP82	ANNUAL UPDATE	G.P.G
2	MAY 82	PERIMETER ROAD ADDED 27 AMD	G.P.G
1	30 SEP 81	ANNUAL UPDATE	G.P.G

PLAN REVISIONS

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL ENGINEERING DCS/P&R - WASHINGTON D.C.

U.S. FORCES EUROPE
MASTER PLAN
UPPER HEYFORD AIR FORCE BASE
OXFORDSHIRE, ENGLAND.

SCALE 1:5000 | DATE FEB 1980 | TAB. NO. C-1

FOR TRUE TO SCALE COPIES, PHOTOGRAPHIC ENLARGEMENTS AND REDUCTIONS OF THIS DRAWING APPLY TO:- CENTRAL SURVEY BRANCH DCES/PSA

Based upon the Ordnance Survey map with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office. Crown Copyright reserved.

O.S. Sheet Nos
SP 4827 4927
SP 4826 4926 5026 5126 5236
SP 4825 4925 5025 5125 5252

NOTES:
This drawing has been produced from the original 1:2500 compilation Sheet Nos S 704-706/75 and S 768/75, which was based upon Ordnance Survey 1:2500 A.R.I. Sheets dated April 1975 and revised by Fairey Survey Ltd Nov 1979
LEVEL DATUM LIVERPOOL
CONTOUR V.I. 3 metres

R.A.F. UPPER HEYFORD

RECORD OF SITE PLAN

100 0 200 400 600 800 1000 metres

SHEET DIAGRAM
This drawing has been produced from a photographic reduction of the original 1:2500 compilation, Sheet Nos S 415-418/80.

SHEET 1 OF 1
See also drawings Nos
S 415-418/80 1:2500
1:5000 Reduction
S 419/80 1:10000 Reduction
S 420/80

DATE FEB 1980

Compiled by D6285/1 ENGINEERING SURVEYS LTD
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CHECKED / /
on behalf of Central Survey, DCES
for DCES

SURVEY JOB Nº 26208

SCALE - 1:5000
CENTRAL SURVEY DCES PROPERTY SERVICES AGENCY

S 419/80

CENTRAL SURVEY | DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT

S-1-35
F-1-35

CONFIDENTIAL.

12 MAI 1983



From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

010

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

30 March 1983

Dear John,

You asked to be kept in touch with developments at Greenham Common on Friday.

Our Police Department is arranging to receive periodic reports from Thames Valley police and will alert us if there is anything significant to report. We in turn will let you know of developments on the same basis.

If you need to contact us our home telephone numbers are as follows:

Tony Rawsthorne	(01) 778 6420
Colin Walters	(01) 852 5253
Lesley Pallett	(01) 657 5197

Those receiving the reports from the police will be Joe Pilling (0865 50370) and Peter Honour (213 6249).

Yours,
Tony

A. R. RAWSTHORNE

A. J. Coles, Esq.

30 MAR 1983

DEFENCE

Ref: B06749

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

MISC 7: Policing of Demonstrations at Military Bases

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the meeting is to review the adequacy of the measures being taken to prevent demonstrations at military bases over the Easter weekend resulting in incursions into the bases themselves, and widespread public disorder. The precautions are set out in the Defence Secretary's minute of 18th March, covering a report by Home Office and Ministry of Defence officials, which follows up the minute of 9th March by the Home Secretary.

FLAG A
FLAG B

2. CND's timetable for demonstrations over the Easter weekend is as follows.

a. Thursday 31st March: a blockade of RAF Greenham Common (up to 2,000 women) and the Royal Ordnance Factory (ROF) Burghfield, continuing overnight.

b. Friday 1st April: the blockade at a. continues until 6.00 pm. In the afternoon 40-80,000 people form a human chain linking Greenham Common, ROF Burghfield and the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) at Aldermaston.

c. Saturday 2nd April: CND intend to encourage their supporters to travel to Glasgow for a demonstration; there are no indications that this is planned to affect the Clyde Submarine Base.

d. Sunday 3rd April: CND traditionally organise a demonstration in London on Easter Sunday, but there is no information that one is planned this year.

3. In the medium term, CND are threatening a blockade of Upper Heyford (the American F 111 base, from 31st May to 3rd June.

4. Thursday 31st March is assessed as being the day with the largest risk of public order problems and incursions into a base (Greenham Common). 31st March is a working day, and steps will have to be taken to maintain access to the site by contractors' traffic in the face of the blockade. Although CND have hitherto co-operated with the Police and kept their demonstrations within the law, the womens camp at Greenham Common means that the prospect of illegal action cannot be ruled out.

5. The report by officials attached to the Defence Secretary's minute sets out the measures being taken to counter the threat to the sites. These are -

a. Greenham Common Some measures have already been taken to improve the security of the perimeter fence, and additional barbed wire is being laid to make it more difficult for demonstrators to reach areas manned by United States Air Force personnel (which carries the risk of escalating the confrontation). Clearance of undergrowth inside the fence to make unobserved intrusion more difficult is taking place in high priority areas. New security lights will be available before Easter, and helicopters will be available to provide night illumination and to move security forces rapidly. In addition to the Thames Valley Policy (1,000 of whom will be deployed to deal with all the demonstrations on Thursday, with 1,200 on Friday), the Ministry of Defence security forces will be augmented substantially, to a total of 200 Ministry of Defence Police (with dogs), RAF Police and ancillaries. A further 100 men of the RAF Regiment will be on standby as reinforcements. Nevertheless, the security of the ten mile perimeter fence cannot be guaranteed, but there is confidence that the GLCM area and other sensitive points can be safeguarded.

b. AWRE Aldermaston There is no evidence of a planned blockade at Aldermaston, although it forms the pivotal point of the human chain on Friday 1st April. The security of sensitive areas of the site is assessed as adequate against the perceived threat. Steps are being taken to minimise the risk of confrontation between demonstrators and the armed Ministry of Defence police who guard special nuclear materials. 184 Ministry of Defence police, with dogs, will be on duty by day over the period.

c. ROF Burghfield Is planned to be blockaded on Thursday and form an extremity of the human chain on Friday. The special weapon storage area and other sensitive sites are assessed as being adequately protected. 100 Ministry of Defence police will be on duty by day. Similar precautions relating to those carrying firearms will apply as at Aldermaston.

In addition, the Chief Constable Ministry of Defence Police will have on call a reserve of about 170 men.

6. In general, it is concluded that the substantial police presence should be sufficient to maintain public order outside the bases, but the blockade of Greenham Common might result in incursions which could create serious presentational problems. The human chain is likely to cause traffic disruption and other public order difficulties.

7. Upper Heyford, because of its bisection by a public road and extensive perimeter, presents even more difficulties. A blockade could pose a real threat to its operational capability. It is not, however, assessed to be a likely target for demonstrators before the end of May. The note attached to the Defence Secretary's minute recommends that the protection of Upper Heyford should be reviewed in the light of experiences elsewhere over Easter.

8. The Chief of the Defence Staff has been invited to attend.

HANDLING

9. You could first invite the Home Secretary to report on the latest assessment of CND's intentions for demonstrations over the Easter period and any information on the likely activities of the "peace women". The Defence Secretary could then be invited to comment on the detailed measures being taken to deal with the expected demonstrations at each of the bases. Points to establish in subsequent discussion are -

a. Is the meeting generally satisfied with the plans that have been developed, and the additional precautions that are being taken Is the risk of an incursion at Greenham Common acceptable? Can it be avoided? Are there any further useful measures which could be taken before Easter?

b. In the longer term, should it be the aim to establish better defences at Greenham Common and Upper Heyford? Could we ever reach a position of confidence that the defences could not be breached?

Prime Minister
Mr. Heseltine plans to go to Berlin - see letter attached.
A.J.C. 25/3.

c. What steps are being taken to counter the widespread publicity which CND and other "peace" movements will receive from their activities over Easter? What are the PR arrangements at the bases referred to in paragraph 15 of the Home Office/Ministry of Defence note? Should Ministers make a conscious effort to be available for interviews with the media over the period?

CONCLUSION

10. Subject to the points made in discussion, you could guide the Meeting

i. to endorse the measures which have already been put in hand to police the expected demonstrations at military bases over Easter;

ii. to invite the Secretary of State for Defence, in consultation with the Home Secretary, to report to colleagues after Easter on the handling of the demonstrations, and any lessons learned;

iii. to invite the Secretary of State for Defence to consider the need for further long term strengthening of the defences at Greenham Common and for additional measures to help control any demonstrations at Upper Heyford; and to report;

iv. to note the plans which have been made to counter the publicity accruing to the "peace" movements as a result of the Easter demonstrations.

David Goodall

25th March 1983

A D S GOODALL

CONFIDENTIAL

DIB

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 25/2

25th March 1983

Prime Minister

A.J.C. 25/3

Dear Roger,

We spoke on the telephone about the Defence Secretary's proposed visit to Berlin. Before he visited Portugal for the NPG, Mr Heseltine saw Bonn Telegram No 271 of 18th March about our Ambassador's discussions with the German authorities. In the light of this he spoke to Dr Woerner during their bilateral discussion on Wednesday, a full record of which follows shortly.

Dr Woerner himself raised the issue of how to combat the peace movements in Britain and the organisation which Mr Heseltine had established for this purpose. The Defence Secretary explained the working of the new Ministerial group and the need to combat CND demonstrations by events of our own. He said that there were large scale demonstrations planned in this country for Easter and he had wondered about visiting Berlin at this time since it symbolised the divide between the West and East. He might draw attention to the absence of personal freedom and the right to demonstrate beyond the Wall. He said that he understood that this might be awkward for the German Government and the Berlin authorities at Easter and he wondered if Dr Woerner had any views. Dr Woerner said that Mr Heseltine would be very welcome. The proposed visit was a good idea but it should not be announced in advance in order to avoid provoking demonstrations in Berlin itself.

In the light of this conversation, the Defence Secretary intends to proceed with his visit. He suggests that it might now be concentrated on Maundy Thursday so as to avoid offending susceptibilities about Good Friday. We are planning on travelling to Berlin on Thursday morning, visiting the Wall and the garrison that day, and returning to Britain on Good Friday morning.

We shall of course be in touch with your officials over the content of the comments which Mr Heseltine intends to make while in Berlin.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10) and Bernard Ingham (Chief Press Secretary, No 10).

Yours ever,

R. Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)

R Bone Esq

RE: Policing of Demos at Military Bases.

S/S Delivered to PM 18/3.

10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline

Please arrange. I think the P.M. means this week.

He should consult Tim about participation :-

Defence Sec.
Home Sec
FCS
Cabinet Office
+ ?

21
3

Defence RJ (2)

Prime Minister (A)

I wonder whether you should not have a meeting to consider the likely events over the Easter weekend. The situation looks pretty serious to me.

A.P.C. 15/3.

MO 11/2/2

PRIME MINISTER

Yes - we should. Next week perhaps

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS AT MILITARY BASES

I am forwarding a copy of the report which has been produced by MOD and Home Office officials following the Home Secretary's minute to you of 9th March.

2. I have personally reviewed the security arrangements at these sites in the light of the threat as it is currently perceived. There is no doubt that there is cause for concern. Greenham Common, Aldermaston and Burghfield cover extensive areas and the degree of protection provided by the perimeter fences is, in some cases, inadequate. As the report reveals we shall be doing all we can to strengthen our defences over the next few days. But there is no way in which the full measure of protection required to rule out the possibility of incursions can be provided within that time.

3. Therefore, while the arrangements to protect the most sensitive installations within the establishments should be sufficient to deter intruders, there remains scope for determined demonstrators to break through the fences and make considerable propaganda out of "occupations", however short lived of less sensitive areas. CND have stated that they intend to conduct the demonstrations in an orderly and law-abiding way. If they keep to this the increased security measures described in the report and the resources of civil, service and Ministry of Defence police which have been allocated should be sufficient. But the possibility of maverick action by peace women or other extremist elements cannot be ruled out. We shall be monitoring the threat closely as it develops over the next few days. If necessary increased resources of manpower will be allocated. In the longer term I am in no doubt that we shall need to devote increased resources to the provision of enhanced security measures both within and outside our sensitive installations.

4. I am copying this minute to the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Attorney General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
18th March 1983

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS AT MILITARY BASES

INTRODUCTION

1. Following the Home Secretary's minute of 9 March 1983 to the Prime Minister, officials in the Ministry of Defence and the Home Office were invited to review very urgently the physical defences of Greenham Common and Upper Heyford and policing arrangements both inside and outside the establishments concerned. This review is now complete.

SUMMARY

2. The joint report

a. summarizes the various threats at Greenham Common, Aldermaston and Burghfield.

b. describes the configurations of the Establishments and the police forces which will be available over the Easter period both within the Establishments, and at the disposal of the civil police.

c. outlines certain further measures which will or could be taken to increase security at Greenham Common.

d. stresses the special circumstances at Aldermaston and Burghfield and the existence of armed Ministry of Defence Police, with particular precise instructions for the protection of special material.

e. draws certain general conclusions.

f. refers to certain special points about the use of helicopters.

g. concludes that nothing can be done about the peace camp on Department of Transport land before Easter.

h. discusses the different problem at Upper Heyford, its later timescale and action set in hand to study further security improvements.

CO-OPERATION

3. Before discussing security arrangements in detail, we should say at the outset that in respect of all four establishments we are impressed with the good relations between the Thames Valley Police and the MOD and USAF authorities concerned. These relations go deeper than just goodwill; they extend to close administrative and operational cooperation. This is of course extremely important given the considerable number of organisations involved; RAF and USAF Commands, the Ministry of Defence Police and RAF Police and civil police in the field, and of course the policy and PR arrangements both at Whitehall and at local level. Steps have already been taken to draw up and define clear responsibilities and chains of command.

4. Greenham Common/Aldermaston/Burghfield

We should first outline the threat at Easter as it is at present known to the Thames Valley Police. The principal organisers are the CND who, in line with their general policy, are in touch with the police about their plans. But a significant part is to be played by the women's peace movement, who are well organised but refuse to deal with the police and whose actions can be unpredictable. The plan for Thursday 31 March is to blockade Greenham Common and Burghfield from 6 am, without Aldermaston being blockaded as such. The blockade at Greenham Common will be undertaken by up to 2,000 women. The size of the blockade at Burghfield cannot yet usefully be predicted, but the event will be organised by the CND, with demonstrators of both sexes. The blockade will continue overnight and until 6 pm on Friday 1 April; and in the afternoon CND hope to assemble between 40-80,000 people to form a human chain linking all three establishments. In policing terms the main problem seems likely to be maintaining access to Greenham Common on the Thursday. This will be a normal working day when large numbers of contractor and service personnel must enter and leave the base. The demonstrators are likely to blockade the gates and try to prevent the passing of vehicles. They may also try to penetrate the perimeter fence to gain access to the base for publicity purposes. On Friday the base will not be working (the Americans have agreed to observe a holiday) and there will be few vehicles passing through the gates. The 14 mile human chain is likely to be peaceful; but the very large numbers involved will present public order and traffic problems for the police, and there may be further attempts to gain access to Greenham Common or to Burghfield or Aldermaston. Although the main focus of activity will be over these two days, the possibility of difficulty at Greenham will of course continue both before and after then.

5. It is understood that CND will encourage their supporters to travel to Scotland for a demonstration in Glasgow on Saturday 2 April. Currently there are no indications that this particular demonstration will affect the Clyde Submarine Base. However, some activity at Faslane is expected over this Easter period and appropriate arrangements are being made to deal with this.

6. The CND customarily organise a demonstration in London on Easter Sunday, but the Metropolitan Police have as yet no information that the demonstration will be held this year, possibily because of the events planned for the preceding days.

7. RAF Greenham Common. There is already a small peace camp outside RAF Greenham Common, currently occupying Department of Transport land (see para 14 below). There have been earlier demonstrations, and minor incursions through the fence onto the base. Greenham Common is a very large airfield with a correspondingly long (10 miles) perimeter delineated by a chain link fence topped with barbed wire. The fence has already been reinforced in places with additional coils of barbed wire (dannert). The physical security of the perimeter has also been improved by the introduction at selected areas of additional sodium lighting which will be supplemented by Easter by the security lighting now being installed in the cruise missile complex which is under construction. This complex has itself been further protected by the completion of the special security fence already planned, dannert

wire and a secure entry check point. Although, of course, there are no sensitive materials yet installed within the cruise missile complex it is important to preserve its integrity partly because of the political embarrassment of incursions by demonstrators into this most sensitive part of the establishment, and partly because of the risk of damage, eg to electrical trunking, which could put back the date of completion. In addition to the USAF security police, (about 30 in number) the MOD Police presence has been reinforced by 40 RAF Police including 9 dog teams. Plans have been made for the UK security force to be substantially augmented from the outset of the Easter period. The MOD Police plan to have 100 men plus 10 dogs available on site by day reducing to about 70 men and 3 dogs by night. A further 60 RAF Police will be introduced, with an additional 40 ancillary personnel, eg RAF firefighters to deal with any minor fires the protestors might start (they have previously evinced a disposition towards this kind of behaviour). Finally about 100 men of the RAF Regiment will be on standby to reinforce the RAF and MOD Police (who will of course be unarmed). This is very much an extra reserve against unexpected contingencies and unlike civilian and Service police the RAF Regiment are not normally trained for or used in the rather special role of handling civilian demonstrations. Measures have been planned in coordination with Thames Valley Police to ensure that necessary access to the base can continue despite the planned blockade. Although security personnel will of course be in position before the blockade takes place and the USAF Commander has cooperated in reducing his planned activities over the period, there will remain a need to move certain essential personnel in and out of the base on Thursday including contractors' personnel. This will be done by arranging convoys of coaches which will move through gates to be selected by the Thames Valley Police who will arrange clearance through the blockade. All gates will of course be locked and guarded and only opened to allow ingress and egress of convoys under police supervision.

8. In the course of this review we have carefully considered what additional physical security arrangements would be valuable and could be in place by Easter. It would be impractical to lay additional barbed wire all round the perimeter; parts of the perimeter are very inaccessible because of scrub and undergrowth which would have to be cleared before the wire could be laid; in other areas the ground is heavily waterlogged. In any case, barbed wire alone offers only minor difficulty and impediment to those determined to make an incursion; unless it were kept under continual observation by personnel lining the perimeter (which would involve very large numbers indeed) it will add little to the physical security of the establishment. There are however particular parts of the establishment where barbed wire could be used with some advantage to improve the protection of particular areas such as the wing headquarters which demonstrators might try to enter and occupy; plans have already been made for such areas to be manned by USAF personnel but in order to minimise the risk of direct confrontation between demonstrators and US personnel, additional barbed wire will now be laid in order to make it more difficult for demonstrators to reach such areas quickly and give the police more time to apprehend them. Thought has been given to the selective clearance of undergrowth inside the perimeter to make unobserved intrusion more difficult. This is a larger-scale task than could be completed by Easter, but a start will be made on high-priority areas. Gate security has already been mentioned and additional measures will be taken to

strengthen it. In addition to the new security lighting which will be available at Easter, the Secretary of State for Defence has given authority to use a helicopter equipped with nitesun to improve the capability of detecting night incursions, and also to employ Service helicopters, if necessary, for carrying in personnel and for command and control.

/9. ....

9. AWRE Aldermaston. As mentioned above, there are no indications of any planned blockade at AWRE Aldermaston although on Friday it forms the pivotal point of the 14 mile human chain. Aldermaston has a 4½ mile perimeter, fenced off in much the same manner as Greenham Common. Within the site itself, sensitive buildings - in terms of radio-active or explosive materials, classified documents or power station facilities providing vital safety services are wide-spread - as opposed to the closely segregated sensitive compounds at eg Greenham Common and Upper Heyford. Within the perimeter fence there are a number of compartmented areas with intruder detection devices but the planned internal security fence will not be complete by Easter and the internal fences which do exist can at best confuse and delay intruders. The Aldermaston authorities are however endeavouring to make some further improvements before Easter. Over the holiday period, policing arrangements will comprise a Ministry of Defence complement of 184, some with arms, deployed as at Greenham Common; that is, about 110 by day and a slightly smaller number at night all working 12-hour shifts, and the force includes 10 dogs. The Secretary of State for Defence has already been made aware of the arrangements which will be made to minimise the risk that demonstrators will come into direct confrontation with armed Ministry of Defence Police but clearly there can be no relaxation of the rigorous security arrangements necessary to protect radio-active materials. Armed officers will be fully aware that they are issued with their weapons under the same conditions as normal and not for the purpose of dealing with demonstrators whose intention may be only to gain publicity and embarrass the authorities by penetrating the perimeter fence. A weapon will not be drawn or used in such circumstances and an armed officer who is so confronted will take any necessary immediate police action short of armed force and summon unarmed officers to his assistance.

10. ROF Burghfield. ROF Burghfield will be blockaded from Thursday until Friday, and on Friday it forms one extremity of the human chain. It is less than half the size of AWRE Aldermaston, and its chain-link perimeter fence is already thickened with coiled barbed wire. Within the perimeter the key weapon assembly and storage areas, and the areas containing classified documents are protected by a special security compound with microwave and TV devices. The normal MDP complement of 101, some with arms, and 4 dogs will be augmented to provide 100 on duty by day and about half that number by night. Again, although steps are planned to minimise the risk of direct confrontation between demonstrators and armed police the defence of nuclear material must take overriding priority in the event that any real threat is presented.

11. In addition to the Ministry of Defence police numbers already described at each of these three establishments, the Chief Constable MOD Police will have on call a strategic reserve of about 170 men who could be deployed to any particular point of threat by helicopter (following Ministerial approval of the submission already made to this effect).

12. Thames Valley Police. The Thames Valley Police plan to deploy a total of just under 1,000 police officers on Thursday with an additional 200 on the Friday. They have already been in touch with

/neighbouring

neighbouring forces about the provision of reinforcements, if necessary, under the mutual aid system, and have details of the numbers who could be made available at one, two and three hours' notice. The force will be using a rented helicopter. As to liaison with the military, there will be a military liaison officer at the headquarters of the police operation at Newbury, and a police Liaison Officer inside the Greenham Common base.

13. In general, we conclude;

a. The combination of physical security arrangements and a greatly reinforcedmilitary and civil police presence inside and outside the establishments is the most that can reasonably be done and should be adequate to prevent serious incursions unless events take a totally unforeseen course;

b. at Greenham Common, the security of the 10 mile perimeter cannot be guaranteed; but action is in hand to protect the GLCM area and other sensitive points; additional barbed wire, lighting, gate security measures and scrub clearance to be undertaken by Easter should make it easier to prevent or deal with incursions and to maintain access to the base;

c. the security of sensitive areas of AWRE Aldermaston appears adequate against the foreseen threat although, because of the physical nature of the site, the manpower will be stretched;

d. the sensitive area at ROF Burghfield is adequately defended;

e. the substantial civil police presence planned should be sufficient to maintain public order outside the bases; but the blockade of Greenham Common could present serious problems and lead to large numbers of arrests, while the human chain on Good Friday is likely to cause serious traffic disruption.

14. Additional Points. Importance is attached by all concerned to the use of helicopters, for intelligence, mobility of MDP reinforcements, and command and control. Secondly, we consider that adequate measures have been taken to minimise the risk of confrontation between demonstrators and armed MDP personnel without in any way compromising the overriding requirement for the security of special materials. Thirdly, we have considered with the Department of Transport the question of the peace camp at Greenham Common which has now moved back onto Department of Transport land. The Department of Transport has powers under the 1980 Highways Act to remove them from the land, as they did in September 1982, although the procedures would take about six weeks to complete. From an administrative and security point of view, however, the fact that the campers are now on Department of Transport land is of no significance in the view of both the civil police and MOD authorities. They could not in any case be moved before Easter because of the time required for the legal steps necessary; and indeed the Department of Transport, whose current assessment is that the campers do not constitute a physical obstruction of the highway, would wish carefully to consider the grounds on which legal action could be brought. They will submit this issue separately to their Ministers who will themselves wish to consult colleagues.

15. Ministers will wish to be aware that arrangements have already been made by the MOD, with USAF and in coordination with the Thames Valley Police, for PR arrangements over Easter. Both sides have a clear understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities and communications links are being set up.

16. Although the main attention at Easter is going to be focussed on Greenham Common, Aldermaston and Burghfield, and thereafter on Upper Heyford, it should be noted that peace camps of various kinds have been established at a number of MOD and USAF bases. For example, there is a small one outside RAF Molesworth, currently an accommodation store but planned to be the second UK GLCM base later on. There have been protests at RAF Alconbury (an active USAF airfield) and a peace camp comprising apparently a combination of peace and animal rights movements activists hasvery recently been set up outside Porton Down. This is not an exhaustive list. Currently, none of these can certainly be identified as posing an immediately significant administrative or operational problem. But the possibility exists that one or other of them may develop in this way, and all of them are closely watched.

17. RAF Upper Heyford. As mentioned above, RAF Upper Heyford does not currently figure in CND's protest plans for Easter, although both the MOD and the civil police will be alert for any indications of likely trouble. Currently, however, the threat is of an attempted blockade of RAF Upper Heyford from 31 May to 3 June. As the Home Secretary has pointed out, Upper Heyford presents a very great problem in policing terms against such a threat. It is a major USAF strike base housing a large F111 force and the associated weapons. The site is bisected by a public road. To the south of the road lie the base recreational and accommodation facilities in an unfenced enclave. To the north, immediately adjacent to the public road, lie the operational facilities; runways, hardened aircraft shelters, weapons storage area, communications and headquarters accommodation. This northern area is bounded by a perimeter fence of the usual kind ie chain-link topped with barbed wire but there are a number ofgates leading from the public road onto the site. At either end of the runway the perimeter fence is very low for flight safety reasons; and for the same reasons cannot be heightened. The weapons storage area is protected to the NATO standard required for such a specially sensitive area. There is an armed USAF police guard with reinforcements available at very short notice. The QRA (Quick Reaction Alert) shelters in which armed aircraft are kept at readiness are similarly protected. Elsewhere the aircraft and other operational compounds are protected by low fencing designed more to delineate the sensitive area than to offer significant resistance to incursion; but within these fences the areas are guarded by armed USAF personnel. In addition, because of the presence of a peace camp on MOD land just outside the northern part of the base, there has been temporarily a small Ministry of Defence police presence. This camp was evicted yesterday and the land totally fenced in.

18. A blockade could pose a real threat to the operational capability of RAF Upper Heyford since, although one or two minor roads approach the base from other directions, effectively the only access is via the

/gates

gates fronting on the main public road which divides the base in two. If this road were occupied by very large numbers of demonstrators the civil police would face enormous practical problems of ensuring ingress and egress of the personnel whose presence is necessary to the conduct of flying and other operations. The police do not have legal powers either to close the road or to prevent demonstrators assembling in an orderly manner. Sheer weight of numbers could hinder the civil police from clearing the road by large scale arrest and detention. A number of measures are possible which would enhance the physical integrity of the base; Ministry of Defence police could be deployed from other establishments to help to prevent demonstrators on the public road spilling over into the administrative buildings to the south; and to the north could augment security at the main gates and act as a buffer between any demonstrators who penetrated the wire and the armed USAF police on the base. (There could however be no question of replacing the armed USAF police who protect the special weapons stores, armed aircraft and other operationally vital assets. This is partly because internal security at a USAFoperational base, such as this, is accepted administratively as a USAF responsibility; but more importantly, protection of military assets of this kind has to meet NATO standards which in view of the nature of the weapons must be maintained in full).

19. We have considered ways of enhancing the physical protection of the perimeter of the northern part of the base; the first impressions are that additional barbed wire would of itself constitute only a small improvement but the Service security authorities will conduct an urgent survey both into the ways in which some areas might benefit from barbed wire and into any other measures to improve physical security at the runway ends. In addition the Ministry of Defence police are making the necessary contingency plans for the period in question. Essentially, the combined MOD and USAF resources should be sufficient to prevent any significant incursion into the northern area of the base; the real and major problem is the difficulty which the Thames Valley Police may encounter in preventing an effective blockade virtually closing down the operations of the base. The Home Office and Ministry of Defence will remain in close touch with the Thames Valley Police and will review the situation in all aspects in the light of experience at Easter and as intelligence hardens on the plans for 31 May.

17th March 1983.

Defense Feb 83

Bureau of Democracy Military Bases

(2)

Prime Minister

The main need at Greenham Common is for some 50 to 70 extra police officers - the Home Secretary will doubtless comment.

A.J.C. 3/3.

MO 11/2/2

PRIME MINISTER

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS AT MILITARY BASES

The Home Secretary copied to me his minute of 17th February about the policing of demonstrations outside military bases. I have also seen your Private Secretary's letter of 21st February and the comments from the Home Secretary's Private Secretary in his letter of 25th February.

2. I entirely share the concern about security at Greenham Common and about the need severely to reduce, if we cannot entirely eliminate, the incursions into the base. But, for reasons which I will explain, it is not the case that demonstrators would find it as easy to enter an operational cruise missile facility or any other sensitive defence installation.

3. Clearly a combination of defences is required beginning with patrolling outside the perimeter of the airfield and including perimeter fencing, a security force within, and the special defences of the cruise missile base itself. I can understand the Home Secretary's concern over the potential cost of perimeter patrols by the Police sufficient to guarantee that there would be no further incursions. Nevertheless deterrent patrolling is important. Given the nine mile length of the base perimeter, and its layout, I do wonder whether a presence of just over 20 Police officers on duty around the base is adequate? I understand that the Chief Constable's own assessment is that he would require somewhere between 50 and 70 officers on duty

if he were to patrol the vulnerable, southern, wooded area of the base effectively. This would seem the level of civil Police presence which should now be provided if incursions are to be effectively discouraged.

4. The perimeter fence surrounding our bases is normally made of chain link fencing and is not designed to keep out a determined intruder. There are a number of technical aids for improving security which are summarised in the attached note. These are expensive to install at a base as large as Greenham Common: for example, to install closed circuit television round the whole perimeter could cost £1-2 million depending on the type of camera used, and detector systems could cost £4-6 million. The major problem is that all such systems are susceptible to false alarms and are manpower expensive because they have to be constantly monitored.

5. We have already installed at Greenham Common a second fence of barbed-wire behind the existing chain link perimeter fence around the area of the cruise missile site itself to prevent protestors reaching the construction area. We are also looking at laying more barbed-wire round the base perimeter concentrating essentially on those areas which are most vulnerable, and at installing closed circuit television in selected areas which are currently difficult to patrol and observe. All this needs to be pressed forward quickly.

6. Finally there is the question of the protection of the most sensitive operational areas. Our policy is to concentrate the defences because this is more effective as well as being sensible on cost and manpower grounds. Thus nuclear weapon storage sites are stringently protected. The areas have double barbed-wire fences, intruder detector alarm systems, powerful lighting, observation towers, and other technical aids. Moreover, they are manned on a 24-hour basis by Servicemen capable of reacting immediately to any threat and backed up by reserve forces at a few minutes notice. This will be the position at the cruise missile site inside the airfield when the equipment is deployed to Greenham Common.

7. To sum up, technical aids can be of only limited use in an area as large as Greenham Common and they will not necessarily themselves prevent incursions - for example, CND could assemble large numbers of small groups and use diversionary tactics. We must make sure that the fencing is adequate. The other immediate need is for more effective policing. For my part I have already taken steps in this direction with the deployment of 40 additional RAF Policemen and Police dogs. I hope that the Home Secretary will feel able to encourage the Chief Constable to provide a larger civil Police effort.

8. There is also the question of arrangements to deal with possible demonstrations at Easter involving Greenham Common, Aldermaston, Burghfield and possibly Upper Heyford. Here, as the Home Secretary has reported, planning is well in hand and there is close co-operation between my staff and the other authorities concerned and lines of responsibility are being clarified.

9. I am copying this minute to the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Scotland, the Attorney General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence

2nd March 1983

ANNEX A

ASSESSMENT OF TECHNICAL SECURITY AIDS

1. Intruder Detector System (IDS) For Perimeter Fences. IDS are rarely hung on perimeter fences because of the high false alarm rate from wildlife, wind-blown objects etc. If used it is essential that the fenceline should also be under surveillance by guards or closed circuit television (CCTV) to identify the cause of the alarm quickly. A trained Response Force must also be made available to respond quickly to a security incident. The following systems are available.

a. Inertia Switches. Expensive and very vulnerable to false alarms unless used on internal fences. Cost £5,700 per 100m run. The rough cost of protecting Greenham Common would be about £6M.

b. Microwave. Various systems are available. Average cost £3,500 per 100m run. Rough cost about £4M.

c. Radiating Cable. Various systems available. Guidar (Canadian) shows promise but not yet granted a Home Office licence because it operates on a high frequency band. Plessy is well tried and tested. Can be above or an underground system. Average cost £75-£100 per m. Rough cost at Greenham Common about £5M.

All these systems have to be monitored.

2. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). Various systems available but once again not usually used on long perimeters. With low light CCTV it is usual to provide some security lighting. There are two options: One costs £10,000 per camera (includes installation, lighting and monitoring consol) and will cover a 400m run. The other costs £5,000 per camera but will only cover a 100m run. Rough cost about £2M.

3. Barbed Wire/Tape. Could be used to surround most of Greenham Common and is probably the best method of achieving quick results. However, various gaps would have to be left to permit traffic/pedestrians to enter. To be effective these gaps would have to be manned when in use. This would be very demanding in terms of manpower. The cost of a 3-coil fence with stakes etc would be £250,000 (includes kit and fixing).

Reference
Feb '83. Policing
of Demo's at
Military Bases

3 MAR 1983

Defence Feb 83

DEFENCE

1. MR COLES

2. PRIME MINISTER

EASTER AND CND

You asked about the plans being made to counter CND publicity at Easter.

CND Activity

My understanding is that the CND will try to take over Easter with the following demonstrations:

- Maundy Thursday: 12 hour blockage of Greenham Common by women; mixed demonstration at Burghfield Royal Ordnance Factory, Berks; and a demonstration at Faslane;

- Good Friday: CND plan a 14 mile human chain from Aldermaston to Greenham Common; demonstrations against Trident in Scotland;

- Saturday, April 2: mass die-in (5-10,000) in Glasgow city centre;

- Easter Sunday: continuation of demonstration at Greenham Common plus Easter marches in West Germany, including non-violent direct action at nuclear weapons sites, and in Canada.

It is possible that the Greenham Common demonstration will continue into Easter Monday.

Our Planning

Some thought has been given - and continues to be given - by Mr Heseltine and his colleagues (who meet as regularly as possible on Monday evenings) to countering this publicity.

At present the only action proposed is for Mr Heseltine to be photographed at the Berlin Wall, making the point that this is where the marching stops.

But the meeting recognises that this, while a helpful response, is unlikely to divert attention in any significant way from the CND effort. With the objective of stimulating further discussion I have today submitted the attached paper to Mr Heseltine's office.

B. INGHAM
17 March 1983

MR LEDLIE

CND AND EASTER

We have considered on several occasions in Mr Heseltine's meetings how we might counter CND propaganda over Easter. So far the only proposal is for Mr Heseltine to be filmed for press and tv at the Berlin Wall to underline where the marching stops. We recognise that this, while potentially helpful, is not likely to divert attention significantly away from the CND campaign.

This note is intended to further our discussion of countering CND activity over Easter.

Facts

The CND plans to monopolise the nation's attention over Easter - from Maundy Thursday to Easter Monday with demonstrations at Aldermaston, Greenham Common, Faslane and in Glasgow. In addition there are plans for Easter Sunday marches in West Germany and Canada.

Their aim will be to secure extensive television coverage to impress on the public the extent of their support in the UK.

Problems

Our problems are:

- how to compete with their televisual appeal - with the ingredients of action, emotion and, if possible for tv, conflict;

- how to put whatever they do in perspective and convince the public that, whatever their support, they are in fact a minority Spring pastime;

- how to get over the multilateralist message and preempt their unilateralism; and

- how to achieve the three objectives above without lending momentum to the CND.

Considerations

The CND have failed to make much impact with a number of demonstrations up and down the country in recent weeks. Newbury local authority has eventually revolted against the squalor of Greenham Common peace camp and its intrusion on the lives of local people and may move to evict the women. There is also evidence that the Greenham Common women are a wasting asset; their immoderation during Mr Heseltine's visit to Newbury was particularly damaging to them.

However, we cannot assume that the Easter holiday demonstrations will be poorly supported; on the contrary, they will be the focus for protest. Nor can we expect a public opinion bonus from unlawful activity; the public will not be impressed with Government if there is a mass invasion of a military base - as there is likely to be if there is a breach of the Greenham Common perimeter.

Thus the problems remain.

We need to consider first whether there is anything useful we can do to neutralise the television appeal of these demonstrations. The truth is that the demonstrations will to a large extent stand or fall by their news value. They will secure less airtime and have less impact if something more newsworthy in television terms occurs - eg. (to be brutal) a North Sea blow out; an assassination attempt on the Pope, etc; some awful tragedy.

All this is in the lap of the gods and all tragedies are devoutly not to be wished. I reach the conclusion there is nothing we can usefully do to try to compete in televisual terms, though there may be other things we can do to reduce the amount of air time available to CND (see below).

Putting the CND protest in perspective (demonstrating that the CND is a minority Easter pursuit) and getting over the multilateralist message are within our capacity. But they have to be reconciled with the fourth objective, set out above, of avoiding lending momentum to the CND. That is an important constraint. But in my view it is not overriding. The fact is that the CND is a well established (though minority) organisation

which should be taken seriously and costs the Government no points for so treating it. What we have to avoid is the charge that the CND's Easter activities have the Government rattled. This, I believe, can be dealt with by effective presentation.

Proposals

FCO Ministers have some reservations about Mr Heseltine's plans to visit the Berlin Wall. If these can be resolved, we need to link that visit, its timing and its message with the proposals set out below.

If we accept that only a major tragedy can compete with CND pictures, Mr Heseltine's visit to the Berlin Wall should be seen more as a preemptive strike than a competitive event. In any case, I have serious doubts about Ministers being seen to be competing with CND on Good Friday, the day of Christ's Crucifixion.

Consequently, I recommend:

1. Mr Heseltine visits the Berlin Wall early on Maundy Thursday and issues a short statement to accompany the TV pictures which gets over to the British public these points:

"The only reason CND still exists in the West, given Russian aims (never giving up what it has got, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland) and its designs on Afghanistan and the arc of subversion, is the NATO Alliance and its strong right (nuclear) arm.

"To the West of me (Mr Heseltine) people are free to say what they think even if what they say is calculated to destroy their right to say it, while to the East of me they would go to the Gulag if they uttered the same thoughts.

"Against this background, the reason freedom is preserved in the West is our ability to deter the forces of oppression - the very forces CND wishes to destroy. CND, if successful, contains not the seeds but the certainty of its own annihilation."

If Mr Heseltine does not visit the Berlin Wall, I recommend:

2. He issues a statement on the above lines early on Maundy Thursday and appears on breakfast radio and tv to hammer it home.

And whether or not he goes to Berlin;

Every Minister and Conservative MP issues a similar statement to his own constituency, (catching the weekly papers, many of which will go to bed on Wednesday or Thursday) and uses every opportunity to further this point of view by local radio and tv;(some regional co-ordination will be required to ensure this is done effectively).

So far as the Prime Minister is concerned, I recommend her:

3. to do nothing; to go to Chequers and to allow us to present her as having a break, safe in the knowledge that this country is sound and solid for peace through strength and balanced and verifiable disarmament.

To underline this, I recommend:

4. a one-page speaking note to be distributed by the Lord President to all Ministers, Backbenchers and Departmental press officers setting out the essentials of our defence policy and the opinion poll measures of support for it.

I think that Good Friday is a lost cause. This is the day when the CND chain will (or will not) be formed between Aldermaston and Greenham Common. It is also a day when there is not much sport.

However, what would take the trick would be press and tv pictures, for the release on the evening of Good Friday and/or Saturday newspapers of Prince William in Australia.

I recommend:

5. pictures of Prince William in Australia are released for use in newspapers on Easter Saturday (April 2), and for TV on Good Friday evening.

Attachment to Ingham to Coles/PM
17/3/83

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Temporarily retained pending completion of review

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

I recommend:

5.

Original put in place 21/07/2016. Had been misfiled in piece to that point AD 21/7/2016

On the Saturday, we need to take care of the Sunday newspapers. If we accept we cannot win the television war, we can at least attempt to win the battle for ideas.

I recommend:

6. - every effort is made by MOD to collect statistics for issue that day in the form of a televised Ministerial statement setting out the extent to which the British public, far from demonstrating, was that day;

   - motoring;

   - watching football;

   - racing;

   - fishing;

   - hiking;

   - gardening;

   - at the seaside;

   - pigeon or whippet or tortoise racing (or whatever respectable minority sport we can confidently prove attracts more participants than CND demonstrating); and

   - and complemented by a short exposition of why all these people have been free to do their own thing in their own country for nigh on 40 years: the nuclear deterrent.

I recommend:

7. if this idea is accepted, then we should feed into BBC and ITN at an appropriate level the idea of getting cameras to film the various pursuits to illustrate the Ministerial point.

I recommend in addition for the Sunday:

8. a series of speeches by senior Ministers built up as a counter blast to CND for issue for the Sunday press;

9. the capture of as many Sunday leader pages as possible by a variety of Ministers with articles directed at explaining the counter-productive nature of CND Easter rallies to the security of the West.

I recommend that on Wednesday, March 30:

10. Scottish Offices issue detailed statistics showing the projected cost in money, man hours and risks associated with policing demos; and

11. the Department of the Environment finds a way of feeding out detailed statistics of the extent to which local authorities are funding CND activities, leaflets, publicity, etc.

I recommend that on Easter Sunday, April 3:

12. the Secretary of State for Defence/Foreign Secretary take the opportunity to bring all the material and publicity together in broadcasts on radio/tv with the objective of putting CND efforts in perspective and getting over the multilateralist argument.

I recommend that for the whole of the holiday:

13. Scottish Office makes similar arrangements tailored to the Scottish scene.

I recommend:

14. to the extent that Welsh and Northern Ireland Offices find the justification they should seize similar opportunities to further the objectives defined in this paper.

B. INGHAM
17 March 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

cc MOD
FCO
SO
LOD
CO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 March 1983

Policing of demonstrations at military bases

The Prime Minister has seen the Home Secretary's minute of 9 March on the above subject. She looks forward to a further account of measures which might be taken before Easter to improve the defences of Greenham Common and Upper Heyford and the policing arrangements.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Muir Russell (Scottish Office), Henry Steel (Law Officers' Department) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Tony Rawsthorne, Esq.,
Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2)

Prime Minister

Agree to await further report at end of next week?

A.J.C. 10/3.

PRIME MINISTER

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS AT MILITARY BASES

PM's Box

The Secretary of State for Defence copied to me his minute to you of 2 March about the protection of military bases.

Taking first the perimeter defences, I understand that where barbed wire has been installed it has been effective. Among its other qualities it is an improvement on the existing fence because it is difficult to dig underneath it. I am glad that work on this is being pressed forward quickly. The more barbed wire that can be installed before Easter the better will be the chances of avoiding a newsworthy incursion by large numbers of people either on Maundy Thursday when 1-2,000 women are expected or on Good Friday when CND are hoping to have 80,000 supporters dispersed between Burghfield, Aldermaston and Greenham Common and on a route which links them. It is difficult to assess what will happen at Easter. The large demonstration in December did not include any attempt to copy the incident last summer when a significant stretch of the fence at Greenham Common was torn down. Easter may be as peaceful but because of the potential weight of numbers the police would appreciate any additional insurance that can be taken out. I hope that the entire perimeter might be ringed by an additional barbed wire fence by the end of this month.

A study of the defences at Greenham Common should also consider the gates. Last night 50 women entered the base by simply walking through the main gate which was manned but not adequately to prevent an incursion on that scale. This was a repetition of similar, earlier incursions.

I have looked very carefully at the regular police patrolling by Thames Valley and so far I am not persuaded that the use of additional officers can be justified. The figure of 50-70 officers mentioned in paragraph 3 of the Secretary of State for Defence's minute was an immediate guess by the chief constable at a meeting in the Home Office attended also by a Ministry of Defence official. The chief constable has now provided more carefully calculated estimates of the number of officers who would be needed to make sure that any incursion was immediately detected and the number needed to make it quite difficult for the women to get into the camp at all. His figures are 100 and 200 respectively. Even the larger figure would not guarantee that there would be no incursions. Taking account of shifts, sickness and holidays this would require the allocation of the equivalent of 500 and 1,000 police officers respectively to full-time duty at the base. From a force of just over 3,000 Thames Valley could only manage this by using mutual aid for which they would have to pay. In a full year the cost of the difference between the Thames Valley officers there now and the lower figure of 100 would be about £7m. This compares with the force's overtime budget for 1983-4 of about £3m.

Quite apart from the cost, there are other reasons for not pressing the chief constable to do more. The Police Authority would be almost certain to criticise vigorously policing arrangements which allocated so many officers to Greenham Common when there were fewer officers available in the urban centres of the area. For example, at 10.00 am there were 55 police constables available in the division which covers Slough, 38 in the division which covers Reading and 37 in the division which covers Newbury. Part of the local political background is that Thames Valley has the lowest police/population ratio in the country (1:573). I plan to make known in the next few days that I will increase their establishment in 1983-4 by 43 posts, which will be the largest increase for any force outside London but that will not remove the local sensitivities.

If security is greatly tightened by more police officers at Greenham Common I am afraid that it will lead to more publicity for the protesters when they do breach it and it may also turn their attention to other bases such as Molesworth in Cambridgeshire and Upper Heyford, also in Thames Valley. The latter has already been the scene of considerable protest. Since the protesters have the benefits of mobility and surprise it would be wrong to assume that if they seemed to have left Greenham Common, the police effort could safely be scaled down.

Upper Heyford is, perhaps, an even more worrying problem than Greenham Common because the basic perimeter defences are non-existent in places. It simply cannot be protected. I am sure that urgent attention should be given to installing effective fencing before the threatened blockade of Upper Heyford from 31 May to 3 June.

The best way forward now might be for Home Office and Ministry of Defence officials to review together very urgently the physical defences of Greenham Common and Upper Heyford and the policing arrangements, inside and out. I am instructing my officials to get in touch with officials in the Ministry of Defence immediately. It seems desirable for them to report on any measures that should be taken before Easter by the end of next week.

I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Scotland, the Attorney General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

hdlw

9 March 1983

Defence,
Feb '83,
Policing of Demo's

10 MAR 1983

FILE

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Defence

28 February 1983

This is just to record that the Prime Minister has seen and noted your letter of 25 February about the policing of demonstrations at military bases.

Timothy Flesher

A.R. Rawsthorne, Esq.,
Home Office.

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Prime Minister (2)

To note.

CONFIDENTIAL

HA-D-C-25/2

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

25 February 1983

Dear John,

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS AT MILITARY BASES

The Home Secretary has seen your letter of 21 February, in which you said that the Prime Minister would be grateful for further comments on the problem of preventing incursions at Greenham Common and elsewhere.

The Home Secretary has asked me to say that he agrees with the Prime Minister that the options for strengthening the whole or part of the perimeter at Greenham Common should be identified and costed by the Ministry of Defence. It would be useful if the note which sets out this analysis could also make proposals for a second line of defence around the site of the missiles itself. The Home Secretary understands that some thought has already been given to this latter point. If the Prime Minister thought that it would be helpful, the Home Secretary would be very ready to join in a discussion of this subject when the Secretary of State for Defence is ready with his analysis.

We had a word about it on Thursday

It is generally accepted that determined attempts to enter the base at Greenham Common cannot be reliably prevented by police patrolling. The length of the perimeter (9 miles) and the terrain through which it runs (much of it common land covered by trees) make this impossible. The precise number of police officers to be committed each day to duties in connection with the "peace" camp is a matter for the chief constable's judgment, and he can if necessary call for reinforcements from other police forces. But it would be enormously expensive in manpower to provide on a continuous basis sufficient officers to guarantee that there would be no further incursions.

Since his minute of 17 February the Home Secretary has received a further report about the chief constable's plans for Easter. He is satisfied that preparations are well-advanced and, on present information, adequate. There is a high level of co-operation between the police and the military authorities.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Muir Russell (Scottish Office), Henry Steel (Law Officers Department) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Tony Rawsthorne

A R RAWSTHORNE
Principal Private Secretary

John Coles, Esq

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

CONFIDENTIAL

Defence TTLP

cc MOD
FCO
SO
LOD
CO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 February 1983

Dear Tony,

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS AT MILITARY BASES

The Prime Minister has seen the Home Secretary's minute of 17 February about the possibility of disorder and breaches of security at demonstrations at the "peace camps" outside military bases.

While noting the difficulty of preventing incursions, the Prime Minister has expressed concern about the implications for security. If incursions into, e.g. the Greenham Common base, are as easy as they appear to be, she feels that the security of this and other bases both before and after Cruise is installed must be at risk. The Prime Minister is inclined to think that we should take urgent steps to strengthen the whole perimeter of the Greenham Common base and perhaps other bases.

She would be grateful for further comments on this problem.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Muir Russell (Scottish Office), Henry Steel (Law Officers' Department) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

John Coles.

A.R. Rawsthorne, Esq.,
Home Office.

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Prime Minister

(1)

In view of x below, there must be serious doubt not just about the maintenance of order but about the actual security of the bases before and after Cruise is installed. What is to stop enemy agents getting in? Would you like me to seek comments on this problem?

A.J.C. 18/2

Yes - surely we should strengthen the whole perimeter not

PRIME MINISTER

POLICING OF DEMONSTRATIONS AT MILITARY BASES

I have been concerned about the possibility of disorder and breaches of security at demonstrations organised around the semi-permanent "peace camps" outside military bases and I know that my concern has been shared by the Secretary of State for Defence. Up to twenty of these camps exist or have existed in the past year, but the only one with which serious disorder has so far been associated is Greenham Common. Demonstrators were able to enter the base on 9 July 1982 and on 1 January and 7, 14 and 15 February this year.

The problems faced by the Thames Valley Police in preventing such incursions have been formidable. The Women's Peace Movement has refused to discuss its activities with the police, and no advance information about their intentions is normally available. The nine-mile perimeter fence is not difficult to scale, and for more than half its length cover is provided by woodland. The powers of the police to deal with those entering the site are limited and the protesters seem to be very well briefed about the limits of the criminal law and the police's powers.

Officials in my Department, in conjunction with representatives of the Ministry of Defence, have discussed these matters with the Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police, who is now well aware of the importance attached by the Government to the maintenance of order at Greenham Common. It is not practicable to ensure that attempted incursions at any point in the nine miles are always foiled. But 23 officers are on duty around the base every day and this number is, of course, augmented whenever heightened activity by the demonstrators demands it. In the early part of this week there was an average of 160 officers on the site. Thames Valley Police have discussed with officials, and with members of other forces with relevant experience, how best to pool information about those likely to cause disruption, in order to help police operations.

Contingency planning by the police is being carried forward for two large scale events at Greenham Common. On Good Friday, 1 April, the CND plan to link arms between the base, the Royal Ordnance Factory at Burghfield, and the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston: it hopes to attract 40,000 supporters. Much smaller demonstrations at Greenham and Burghfield are expected on the previous day. The policing of the demonstrations will involve the Hampshire and Thames Valley forces in a joint operation, and a series of meetings has been held to draw up plans. The police are relatively sanguine about these and other planned CND activity at Easter in London and at Faslane because they receive good co-operation from CND organisers. The major CND marches in London recently have been very large but peaceful and law-abiding. Later in the year, on 23 and 24 July, the International Air Tattoo will be held at Greenham Common, its normal venue, and is expected to draw up to 200,000 people. The Thames Valley force is already planning for this event on the assumption that the anti-nuclear campaigners will not wish to let it pass unnoticed. My officials will continue to be in frequent contact with the police and will report to me.

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I am sending copies of this minute to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Scotland, the Attorney General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

17 February 1983

18 FEB 1985

PART _____ ends:-

PART ONE begins:-

Home Sec to PM 17.2.83


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