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PREM 19/1966

SECRET UKEO

Relations with South Africa
Policy on arms sales
Internal Situation
ECGD Credits
PM's Emissary - J. Hunt

PART 9

SOUTH AFRICA

Pt 1 : June 1979

Pt 9 : March 1986

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~3.3.86~~		~~13.5.86~~					
~~5.3.86~~		~~15.5.86~~					
~~6.3.86~~		~~16.5.86~~					
~~10.3.86~~		~~19.5.86~~					
~~11.3.86~~		~~21.5.86~~					
~~13.3.86~~		~~22.5.86~~					
~~17.3.86~~		~~29.5.86~~					
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~~9.5.86~~							

PREM 19/1966

PART 9 ends:-

FCO to CDP 30-5-86

PART 10 begins:-

PM to Pres. Botha 1-6-86

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(86) 9th meeting, item 3	06/03/1986
CC(86) 10th meeting, item 2	13/03/1986
CC(86) 12th meeting, item 2	20/03/1986
CC(86) 14th meeting, item 2	10/04/1986
CC(86) 17th meeting, item 4	24/04/1986
CC(86) 18th meeting, item 2	01/05/1986
CC(86) 19th meeting, item 2	08/05/1986
MISC 118(86) 8	02/05/1986
CC(86) 20th meeting, item 3 (previous reference CC(86) 19.2)	15/05/1986
CC(86) 21st meeting, item 4	22/05/1986

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed _____ Date 28/10/2014

PREM Records Team

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 May 1986

Prime Minister

I have re-cast the message. (I told the FO exactly what you wanted, but they know better!)

Agree to sign attached letter?

CDP 30/5

Dear Charles,

Thank you and

South Africa: Message from President Botha

Your letter of 29 May asked for a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to President Botha. I enclose a draft which has been approved by the Foreign Secretary. It takes into account the South African Government's response of 29 May to the co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (your letter of 29 May).

The Foreign Secretary considers that this response shows once again that President Botha wants not just a suspension of violence from the ANC and other opposition groups, but a more far-reaching commitment from them to ending that violence. The letter also raises what appear to be two specific preconditions for the South Africans.

These are "a substantial reduction in violence" by others (which by implication would need to precede any move by the South African Government), and a commitment by others to "abandon all forms of intimidation". The letter also states that the South Africans are not prepared to negotiate about "a transfer of power", though they are prepared to discuss "power sharing".

Apart from the potential difficulties in meeting these South African concerns, the letter gives no indication of the South African Government's attitude to what is asked of it in the negotiating concept by way of the release of Mandela, unbanning of the ANC, etc. The South Africans offer no more than further discussions with the Group.

Ewen Fergusson spoke this morning to Lord Barber who fully understands the need to explore every avenue but who is not sure whether the other members of the Commonwealth Group will agree to the South African offer of further discussions and be willing to return there for what would be a last round of talks before finalising their report.

/Lord Barber

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Lord Barber believes that Mr Fraser's view on this is likely to be crucial. He will speak to him by telephone over the weekend and will try to persuade him that it would be wrong for the Group not to have further discussions with the South African Government. Fergusson encouraged him in this.

Despite the difficult nature of the South African reply to the Commonwealth Group, the Foreign Secretary considers that we have no option but to encourage the Group to make the best of it and to continue with their negotiations. Pretoria telno 86 reports some slightly more helpful comments by the Deputy Director General of the South African DFA (though we would expect him to put the best possible gloss on his Government's reply). Von Hirschberg claimed that the reply meant that the South African Government were interested in continuing to explore the negotiating concept. He also said that violence remains the key issue and that if this could be resolved the other three issues mentioned in the letter should fall into place.

The danger is that the Group will nevertheless conclude that the South Africans are just stringing them along. They will understandably wish to see real evidence that any of the South African Government's leaders, apart from Pik Botha, are really committed to the COMGEP exercise. Without such evidence they are likely to decide that the conditions for dialogue do not exist.

When we know the Group's reaction to the South African response, the Foreign Secretary will consider what further action we can usefully take with President Botha and the South African Government.

Yours ever

Robert Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

The Hon P W Botha DMS

MSZBZH

Your Reference

Copies to:

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.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Clearly we ~~did~~ were both upset by the other's reaction to recent events.

I see from your letter of 26 May that you are as dismayed by what I felt it necessary to say, as I had earlier been by your raids. We ought now to put this behind us. What matters is that we should both do all we can to keep alive the hope of peaceful progress offered by the Commonwealth Group's initiative.

If that breaks down, the ANC will rejoice as will all those who want a violent solution.

If the Group's negotiations break down, those of your opponents in the ANC and elsewhere who want a violent solution will have got what they wanted. They will have been let off the hook, and will be able to pursue unfettered a policy of confrontation. The chances of persuading others to try better ways of making progress will have been greatly reduced.

My own credibility in urging my colleagues not to take such steps will be greatly diminished

I have seen your Foreign Minister's letter to the co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth Group giving your response to the Group's negotiating concept and saying that your Government would welcome further discussions with the Group. The Group are meeting here next week.

/I do

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Relations : SOUTH AFRICA
PR9.

I do not yet know what their reaction will be, but I very much hope that they will decide to continue the discussions. I shall do what I can to encourage this.



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WASHINGTON TELNO 1406: US/SOUTH AFRICA

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT YET TO REPLY TO PW BOTHA. PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICA INTENSIFYING. STATE APPREHENSIVE.

DETAIL

2. HARRIS (DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN AFRICAN AFFAIRS) TOLD US ON 30 MAY THAT THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO P W BOTHA'S LETTER HAD STILL NOT ISSUED. A ROBUST DRAFT HAD BEEN CLEARED BY SHULTZ AND POINDEXTER AND WAS NOW BEING CONSIDERED IN THE WHITE HOUSE. BUT, HARRIS ADDED IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, STATE WERE AWARE OF SOME FURTHER INFORMAL CONTACTS ON THE RIGHT-WING NET BETWEEN P W BOTHA AND THE PRESIDENT. IT WAS THEREFORE POSSIBLE THAT THE TEXT WOULD NOW BE WATERED DOWN.

3. HARRIS SAID THAT STATE WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED BY SUCH AN OUTCOME. HE ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL TO KNOW THE CONTENTS OF POST-RAID EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND BOTHA SINCE IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO DIVIDE THE US AND THE UK. SUCH INFORMATION COULD BE PASSED AT A HIGH LEVEL (EG ARMACOST OR POINDEXTER) AND WOULD BE CAREFULLY PROTECTED (THERE IS NOTHING IN UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 550 TO INDICATE THAT RECENT EXCHANGES WERE DISCUSSED IN ANY DETAIL WITH SHULTZ: GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS).

4. HARRIS CONFIRMED THAT STATE'S ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAIDS WERE CONTINUING TO HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL OPINION. STATE FEARED THAT THIS WOULD BE COMPOUNDED BY THE VIOLENCE LIKELY TO MARK THE SOWETO ANNIVERSARY NEXT MONTH, AND BY THE SWINGEING NEW REPRESSIVE MEASURES EXPECTED TO BE INTRODUCED BY THE SAG NEXT WEEK (HARRIS SAID THAT THESE MEASURES WERE AT THE TOP OF THE IMMEDIATE US AGENDA WITH THE SAG, ALONGSIDE GROWING CONCERNS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING DETENTION).

5. HARRIS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SO FAR SAID NEXT TO NOTHING ABOUT RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS. STATE WERE RECOMMENDING THAT HE SHOULD SOON TRY TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE, AND THE NSC APPEARED TO AGREE, BUT ELEMENTS IN THE WHITE HOUSE WERE URGING THAT HE SHOULD KEEP HIS POWDER DRY UNTIL CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES HAD INTENSIFIED. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HARRIS JUDGED THAT SOME IN THE WHITE HOUSE SUSPECTED THAT THIS MIGHT PROVE TO BE AN ISSUE THE PRESIDENT SIMPLY COULD NOT WIN, AND ONE ON WHICH HIS PROFILE SHOULD THEREFORE REMAIN LOWER THAN THE STATE DEPARTMENT ADVISED.

6. STATE EXPECT THE KENNEDY/GRAY 1986 ANTI-APARTHEID BILL (WASHINGTON TELNO 1389) TO BE MARKED UP ON 4 JUNE AND TO REACH THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE BY MID-MONTH. THEIR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT ELEMENTS FROM THE TOUCHER DELLUMS BILL (WOODLEY'S 10 APRIL TELELETTER TO HUMFREY, SAFD) MAY THEN BE ADDED. AND THEY NOW THINK IT LIKELY THAT QUOTE SERIOUS UNQUOTE SANCTIONS PROPOSALS WILL PASS IN THE HOUSE BEFORE THE SUMMER RECESS. AS FOR THE SENATE, HARRIS SAID THAT STATE WERE PRESENTLY PICKING UP WORRYING INDICATIONS THAT A NUMBER OF PAST SUPPORTERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION ON SOUTH AFRICA WERE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD STICK TO THEIR GUNS AS LONG AS THEY COULD, BUT THERE CLEARLY WERE GROUNDS FOR CONCERN ABOUT THE CONGRESSIONAL PROSPECTS.

7. HARRIS SAID THAT THE ISSUE MIGHT IN ANY CASE COME TO A HEAD IN CONGRESS BEFORE THE AUTUMN, GIVEN THE KENNEDY/WEICKER ATTEMPT TO ATTACH A SOUTH AFRICAN AMENDMENT TO THE TAX BILL (WOODLEY'S 13 MAY TELELETTER TO PRENDERGAST, SAFD). IN THE INTERESTS OF THE TAX BILL ITSELF, SENATOR PACKWOOD WAS SO FAR FIGHTING HARD AGAINST AMENDMENTS OF ANY SORT, BUT MORE BAD NEWS FROM SOUTH AFRICA COULD TIP THE BALANCE. IF SO, THE KENNEDY/WEICKER PROVISION SEEMED LIKELY TO PASS - WHICH WOULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL DISINVESTMENT IMPACT.

8. STATE ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE REPERCUSSIONS OF TUTU'S CURRENT VISIT, AND OF THE QUOTE WITNESS TO APARTHEID UNQUOTE FILM (HARRIS FEARED THAT THE FILM COULD PROVE PARTICULARLY EXPLOSIVE).

9. MEANWHILE, SEVERAL OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PIPELINE ENSURE THAT THE REVIVAL OF INTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICA DOES NOT DISSIPATE. SHULTZ'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ARE HOLDING TWO DAYS OF OPEN HEARINGS ON 2/3 JUNE. SHULTZ HIMSELF WILL BE ADDRESSING A SOUTH AFRICA WORKING GROUP CONFERENCE OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS NEXT WEEK. BOESAK IS ABOUT TO ARRIVE. THE FORD FOUNDATION IS SHORTLY TO HOST A CONFERENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA'S FUTURE WHICH WILL BRING TOGETHER BOTH WHITE CONSERVATIVES AND THE ANC (MBEKI WILL BE CALLING ON STATE). AND OPPENHEIMER'S SOUTH AFRICA BEYOND APARTHEID GROUP WILL BE HERE IN MID-JUNE.

10. IN SHORT, A RECEPTIVE ATMOSPHERE FOR ANY NEWS - GOOD OR BAD - OUT OF SOUTH AFRICA OR THE EPG EXERCISE.

WRIGHT

SOUTH AFRICA

LIMITED

S AF D
C AF D
UND
ECD(E)
NEWS D
LEGAL ADVISERS
PLANNING STAFF
CCD
CONS D
SCD
PUSD
DEF D

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR FERGUSSON
MR REEVE

CABINET OFFICE

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

29 May 1986

Dear Secretary-General,

Thank you for your letter of 16 May with your proposals for the review of progress towards the objectives set out in the Nassau Accord and of the work of the Eminent Persons Group. I welcome the informal arrangements you propose and confirm my agreement to the dates, venue and Chairmanship.

I agree that the report by the Eminent Persons Group will be of central importance to the review. I have been impressed by their hard work and tenacity. I believe that the Group was right to take the difficult decision to carry on after last week's military incursions by South Africa into the territories of three Commonwealth countries, which as you know I have condemned vigorously. Their mission must be given every encouragement to succeed, despite this setback. The alternative to a peaceful solution in South Africa through dialogue is increasing bitterness and violence: a prospect so unacceptable that we must do everything possible to assist the Group so long as there is any prospect of progress.

Whatever the outcome, we owe the members of the Group a gratitude to upholding the Commonwealth tradition or reaching out for peaceful solutions. I am sure that their hard work will not have been in vain.

I am content that you should inform fellow Commonwealth Heads of Government and announce the details of the review in the manner you propose. I look forward to hearing further details nearer the time of the meeting.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal, A.C., Kt., C.M.G., G.C.

SUBJECT
cc master
ops.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 1030(i)/86

सत्यमेव जयते

PRIME MINISTER

New Delhi
May 29, 1986

Dear Prime Minister,

I have just returned from a tour of four Frontline States - Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Tanzania. The visit has left a deep impression on me. All the four countries are developing, but the conditions in Angola and Tanzania were particularly distressing. Despite their economic underdevelopment and dependence on South Africa - acute in the case of Zimbabwe and Zambia - I was touched by the determination of the leadership to preserve the independence of their countries. It is sometimes said that poor countries cannot afford to be over-sensitive about their self-respect and dignity. But no self-respecting leader anywhere can but admire the dignity of the leaders of the Frontline States.

My discussions with a wide cross-section of opinion in the four countries have reinforced my conviction that time is indeed running out on a peaceful solution to the problem in South Africa. The blacks in South Africa are getting extremely restive. There is an atmosphere of violence in the region. South Africa's raids against Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia should not come as a surprise to anyone. South Africa's record of contempt for international public opinion is known to all of us. Recent events in other parts of the world have only further emboldened South Africa in its aggressive designs.

...2/-

President Botha's speech of May 15 has left no doubt, at least in my mind, about his attitude to the EPG. South Africa may now try to somehow explain it away, but we should have no illusions. You know how much I believe in making every possible effort to find a peaceful solution. Our objective is clear. Apartheid must be dismantled. The other demands - release of Nelson Mandela and other freedom fighters, etc. - are also important, but they are essentially a means to the ultimate end. None of us, I am sure, would compromise on that.

We thought of EPG as a means to persuade South African authorities to see reason. EPG was to convince the South Africans that a dialogue with the genuine representatives of the African majority is in the enlightened self-interest of the White community, that the blacks will not wait indefinitely for the dialogue to be initiated and that if the dialogue failed or did not take place, there will be bloodshed. I am not pre-judging the results of EPG's endeavours. We shall wait for their report once their mandate expires at the end of June.

The Nassau CHOGM mandated seven from among us to meet and review the situation in the light of EPG's report. We shall be meeting in London in early August. We must keep up the pressure.

...3/-

Nobody, least of all I, wants violence but my visit to the Frontline States has made it clear to me that the patience of the Blacks in South Africa is wearing extremely thin.

Yours sincerely,

Rt. Hon'ble Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of Britain
London

'013

CCPC (2)

South African Embassy
Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

29 May 1986

Prime Minister

Rin on absence, but it keeps the door ajar if the EPG want to help themselves in play.

CDP
24/5.

Mr C D Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Charles

The Ambassador has this morning delivered the enclosed reply of the South African Government to Marlborough House for transmission to the Co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons' Group.

We trust that the reply will be seen as positive and providing scope for diplomacy to take its course. In the prevailing climate in South Africa it entailed hard work but perhaps the notion of all parties committing themselves to a non-violent course will help the Group achieve breaking the cycle of violence.

Yours sincerely

L H Evans
MINISTER

South African Embassy
Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

29 May 1986

The Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser
General Olusegun Obasanjo
Co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth
Group of Eminent Persons
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
LONDON SW1Y 5HX

Dear Mr Fraser and General Obasanjo

I refer to the 'possible negotiating concept' attached to your letter dated 13 March 1986 and the recent discussions you held with Ministers of the South African Government. There are four major questions which are exercising the mind of the South African Government about the possible negotiating concept presented by your Group.

1. The concept of ending or suspending violence.

   It is not the choice of a particular word but the concept of terminating violence as a means of achieving political objectives which is relevant. The South African Government cannot accept the suggestion that violence should be discontinued only for as long as negotiations take place. To use violence or the threat of violence as a bargaining counter is unacceptable to the South African Government.

2. Evidence of commitment to a peaceful solution.

The use of violence for political ends cannot be equated with the responsibility of Government to maintain law and order. The South African Government has committed itself to a constitutional dispensation which guarantees

- the removal of racial discrimination;
- sharing of power up to the highest level of government;
- democratic principles including an independent judicial system and the equality of all under the law;
- private property rights;
- private initiative and effective competition;
- fundamental human rights and civil liberties;
- the protection of minority rights in a manner which would ensure that there will be no political domination by any one community of any other;
- freedom of the press and of expression in general;
- freedom of religion and worship;

and is taking substantial steps to carry out this commitment. It would, therefore, be reasonable to expect evidence that the parties presently involved in violence are in principle willing to commit themselves to a peaceful solution through negotiation and in an environment free of violence. A substantial reduction in violence would help to create the atmosphere in which the additional steps could be taken.

3. Intimidation to be abandoned.

It is not only the Government which should permit 'normal political activity' and 'freedom of assembly and discussion'. Other parties need to respect these principles in practice and commit themselves to abandon all forms of intimidation.

4. The nature of the negotiations that are envisaged.

The South African Government is prepared to negotiate with South African citizens about a new constitutional dispensation which will provide for power sharing. It is not interested in negotiation about a transfer of power. The South African Government is committed to a negotiated democratic settlement which addresses the legitimate political aspirations of all South Africans. In contrast, others are on record as wanting a diminished democracy in the form of a one-party state with restricted personal and other freedoms.

The South African Government would welcome further discussions which could accommodate the concerns addressed above.

I would like to thank you and your colleagues for the spirit in which we have been able to conduct our discussions.

Yours sincerely

R F BOTHA
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

29 May 1986

I enclose a copy of a letter which I have just received from the South African Embassy, covering the South African Government's reply to the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. I do not know whether you have received this from other sources.

CHARLES POWELL

Robert Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The National Archives

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CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 May 1986

CDL 29/5

Dear Charles

Message from President Botha to the Prime Minister

Cape Town telegram no 283 of 20 May contained the text of President Botha's letter of 19 May to the Prime Minister. I now enclose the signed original of the letter.

Yours ever

Robert Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

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file

JR

Lc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

29 May 1986

Dear Robert,

SOUTH AFRICA: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA

Thank you for your letter of 28 May conveying the Foreign Secretary's views on President Botha's latest message and on the way ahead. The Prime Minister agrees that we should do everything possible to keep the COMGEP initiative alive, however unpromising the prospects for it, and to play for time.

The Prime Minister would wish to reply to President Botha's letter straight away. The reply should be very brief and say that she and the President were both upset by the other's reaction, but that what matters is that negotiations are kept alive. The ANC will rejoice if they break down and the Prime Minister will have no chance or credibility in trying any other way of making progress. I should be grateful to have a draft on these lines later today (or am happy to do it myself if you prefer).

The Prime Minister is content for further analysis to be conducted under Cabinet Office auspices of the consequences for the United Kingdom of various possible additional measures against South Africa. The work should not attempt to prejudge in any way whether such measures are necessary or desirable.

As regards the suggestion of a meeting between European Heads of Government and President Botha, the Prime Minister's view is that we should not reject any way forward which could help avoid a confrontation and gain time. She hopes therefore that the Foreign Secretary will explore the idea very discreetly with his principal European colleagues and with Secretary Shultz to see how they would view it. There may be opportunities to do so in the margins of the current NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark in the Cabinet Office.

yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

R.N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

I incline to a very brief reply saying

PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA

Clearly we are both upset by the other's reaction - but we must not let our negotiations with negotiations are kept alive

The Foreign Secretary recommends:

(i) that you should not reply to President Botha's recent, ~~the~~ and intemperate message for the time being. This should wait until we know the terms of the South African reponse to the Possible Negotiating Concept of the EPG. (Intelligence suggests that the response will be negative). Agree? I shall have no chance credibility in trying up any other ~~plan~~ way. not

(ii) that we should set in hand work internally on possible additional measures against South Africa, in the event that the EPG initiative breaks down. The aim should be to identify measures which cause the least possible damage to unemployment in this country or to South African blacks. This is more tricky. The Foreign Office are convinced (once again) that measures are inevitable: and once work is done on them, the notion that they are unavoidable will gather pace. On the other hand, such work under Cabinet Office auspices is a prudent precaution. Agree to work being done, to draw up an illustrative list of possible measures, without prejudging Ministerial decisions on whether any of them should be applied? Under Cabinet auspices - yes but de minimus

(iii) that Pik Botha's suggestion of a meeting between European Heads of Government and President Botha should not be pursued for the time being. The other governments are unlikely to be enthusiastic, and once again, it is a ploy which might be held in reserve until we know the nature of South Africa's response to the EPG. I think that the advice on timing is probably right, though I would not like to see the idea dismissed out of hand. The Foreign Secretary might be asked to canvass it in strict confidence with Shultz and his principal European colleagues. One is tempted

to suggest that you might undertake such a mission alone, as the only person with the remotest chance of swaying President Botha. But in the light of all the evidence the chances of such a mission being successful are very slim: and you would be very exposed if it failed, with the pressure for sanctions all the greater.

Agree that the Foreign Secretary should canvass very discreetly views on a possible collective meeting with President Botha?

Yes, with this everything we can. We must play for time.

CDP

Charles Powell

28 May 1986

BM2ANS

I incline to a very brief reply saying

PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA

Clearly we are bolt upset by the Boer's reaction - but whether actions initial negotiations are kept alive The Boers will regret it if they break down

The Foreign Secretary recommends:

(i) that you should not reply to President Botha's recent, ~~the~~ and intemperate message for the time being. This should wait until we know the terms of the South African reponse to the Possible Negotiating Concept of the EPG. (Intelligence suggests that the response will be negative). Agree? I shall have no choice credibility in trying ~~to~~ any other way. No

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CDP

Charles Powell

28 May 1986

BM2ANS

PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA

The Foreign Secretary recommends:

(i) that you should not reply to President Botha's recent, intemperate message for the time being. This should wait until we know the terms of the South African reponse to the Possible Negotiating Concept of the EPG. (Intelligence suggests that the response will be negative). Agree?

(ii) that we should set in hand work internally on possible additional measures against South Africa, in the event that the EPG initiative breaks down. The aim should be to identify measures which cause the least possible damage to unemployment in this country or to South African blacks. This is more tricky. The Foreign Office are convinced (once again) that measures are inevitable: and once work is done on them, the notion that they are unavoidable will gather pace. On the other hand, such work under Cabinet Office auspices is a prudent precaution. Agree to work being done, to draw up an illustrative list of possible measures, without prejudging Ministerial decisions on whether any of them should be applied?

(iii) that Pik Botha's suggestion of a meeting between European Heads of Government and President Botha should not be pursued for the time being. The other governments are unlikely to be enthusiastic, and once again, it is a ploy which might be held in reserve until we know the nature of South Africa's response to the EPG. I think that the advice on timing is probably right, though I would not like to see the idea dismissed out of hand. The Foreign Secretary might be asked to canvass it in strict confidence with Shultz and his principal European colleagues. One is tempted

to suggest that you might undertake such a mission alone, as the only person with the remotest chance of swaying President Botha. But in the light of all the evidence the chances of such a mission being successful are very slim: and you would be very exposed if it failed, with the pressure for sanctions all the greater.

Agree that the Foreign Secretary should canvass very discreetly views on a possible collective meeting with President Botha?

CDP

Charles Powell

28 May 1986

BM2ANS

CCPC

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 May 1986

Dear Charles,

South Africa: Message from President Botha

The Prime Minister will have seen the latest message from President Botha, together with Sir Patrick Moberly's account of his meeting with the South African Foreign Minister on 26 May and his comments on it (Cape Town telnos 294-296 refer).

The Foreign Secretary agrees with our Ambassador that the content and tone of the President's reply and Pik Botha's comments are thoroughly discouraging. P W Botha's message gives no ground for optimism about the nature of the South African response to COMGEP which is expected in the next few days. Indeed, the State President does not refer to the Commonwealth initiative other than in the context of exchanges about the meaning of the term "suspension of violence". The message represents confirmation that Pik Botha has lost out, at least for the present, to hard line colleagues in the Cabinet. Yet again, there is no hint of recognition of the problems caused by the raids for those who have been trying to help South Africa out of the blind alley in which they are situated. The self-justificatory tone of the letter, P W Botha's obsession with the requirement as he sees it to achieve a renunciation rather than a suspension of violence, and his corresponding failure to recognise the difficulty of expecting the ANC to concede this in advance of negotiations (and that to do so would anyway be ineffective, since they would lose credibility with their followers in black townships) are all deeply depressing.

Nevertheless, Sir Geoffrey Howe considers that there is no alternative but to continue to support the COMGEP initiative and to put what pressure is possible on the South Africans to make its continuation possible. It is uncomfortable that all our eggs should be in this one basket: but no other mechanism exists with any potential for making progress on suspension of violence/beginning of dialogue.

/The

The question therefore arises whether the Prime Minister should reply immediately to State President Botha's latest message. In the Foreign Secretary's view, it would be inadvisable to do so. There is little more we can say at this level to the South Africans until they have revealed their hand to the Commonwealth Group. Should they do so in the same sort of uncompromising terms as P W Botha's letter to Mrs Thatcher, the likelihood is that the Group would conclude that there is no more mileage in the initiative. This, in Sir Geoffrey's view, might be the time to make one last appeal direct to President Botha.

Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary intends to discuss these developments with Mr Shultz, since President Reagan is, we understand, about to send his own message to P W Botha about the raids. It would also, in Sir Geoffrey's view, be prudent to accelerate inter-departmental preparations against the possible, indeed probable, failure of COMGEP. If the initiative founders, we shall face sharply increasing pressure, from the Commonwealth, our European partners and the US for further economic measures against South Africa. Sir Geoffrey considers that it would be wise to determine our own position now, so that we shall be ready with a range of optional (but not intolerable) measures which could enable us, at some suitable point, to rally support from our main industrial partners, notably the US, France, Germany and Japan. This would involve identifying measures which would signal to the South Africans our strong disapproval of their intransigent position and at the same time limit the risk to our interests not just in black Africa, but also in the Third World in general, and more widely. If, per contra, we did nothing, the risk is that we would be held responsible for the subsequent strains in the Commonwealth which could be serious. This would carry international and domestic penalties.

There would be no more question than in the past of our taking measures in isolation, so that the risk of South African retaliation, which has been a concern to other Whitehall Departments, should be manageable. The idea would be to seek measures which have the maximum impact on white supporters of the South African Government, and cause the least possible damage either to unemployment in this country or among South African blacks. These constraints would considerably narrow the field. But they nevertheless leave some scope for action. MISC 118 should be asked to accelerate their considerations of such measures against the very real possibility that they may be needed.

/Finally,

Finally, the Foreign Secretary has considered the hint by Pik Botha (paragraph 7 of Cape Town telno 294) that it might help if a small number of Western leaders (say those of four leading countries of the European Community) were to meet State President Botha direct. The four European countries concerned would presumably be France, Germany, Italy as well as ourselves (though Sir Geoffrey considers that it would be odd if the US were not to take part in such a summit). The Foreign Secretary strongly doubts whether our European partners or the Americans would have anything to do with such a meeting, which they would see (in much the same way as they saw P W Botha's appeal to the Tokyo Summit) as carrying a high risk of failure. Commonwealth and other Third World leaders could be expected to view such a move with less than enthusiasm. Nor does Sir Geoffrey think that much would be achieved by a meeting with the State President in his present mood. We need not however take a final position on this until the South Africans have replied to COMGEP. In any case, the proposal appears to be a personal suggestion by Pik Botha, and there is no guarantee that if we take it up State President Botha would respond.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street


28. V.

CC PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 May 1986

Dear Charles,

Review of the Commonwealth Accord on South Africa

Thank you for your letter of 19 May enclosing the Commonwealth Secretary-General's proposals for the modalities of the Commonwealth meeting.

As you know, Sir Antony Acland had already made known to Mr Ramphal our readiness to fall in with the preference of other Commonwealth leaders for a meeting in early August. The proposed package of London, 3-5 August under the Chairmanship of Sir Lynden Pindling, is earlier than the Prime Minister would have wished but otherwise suits our interests. The South African raids on alleged ANC targets in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana, their implications for the prospects for COMGEP, and the subsequent UK/US vetoes in the Security Council will only have strengthened the general wish to have the review meeting sooner rather than later. Indeed, if the Commonwealth Group complete their report on time (ie mid-June) there may be some pressure to bring forward the date.

The Commonwealth Group themselves are anxious not to allow themselves to be strung along by the South Africans. As the Prime Minister knows, the prospects for their mission are not bright. Nevertheless, we believe that the reluctance of most members of the Group not to write off the initiative unless and until it becomes clear that it has reached a dead end should enable us to hold the ground against any calls for an emergency review meeting before August. But the total collapse of the Commonwealth Group, particularly if it led to public recriminations between the Group and the South African Government, would result in intense pressure on us. Australia voted for last week's draft Security Council Resolution (which would have imposed a series of mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII) and the Canadian Foreign Minister has made clear publicly that the failure of the Commonwealth Group would mean the Canadian Government adopting a harder line on sanctions. If necessary we may have to point out that the Prime Minister's diary simply does not allow an earlier meeting. Fortunately, other heads of government are likely to have similar problems.

/Irrespective

Irrespective of the conclusions and recommendations of the Commonwealth Report, the fact of the South African raids guarantees a difficult review meeting especially since President Kaunda and Mr Mugabe, whose countries were among the victims of last week's raids, will be present. We believe that the informal arrangements proposed by Mr Ramphal will suit our interests, in so far as the restricted sessions he envisages may help to keep down the temperature.

/ I enclose a draft letter of acceptance to the Commonwealth Secretary-General for the Prime Minister's signature.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/~~Final~~

FROM: Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

BUILDING: ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO: Shridath S Ramphal
Commonwealth Secretary-General
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
LONDON
SW1Y 5HX

Copies to:

CAT.

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 16 May with your proposals for the review of progress towards the objectives set out in the Nassau Accord and of the work of the Eminent Persons Group. I welcome the informal arrangements you propose and confirm my agreement to the dates, venue and Chairmanship.

I agree that the report by the Eminent Persons Group will be of central importance to the review. I have been impressed by their ~~dedication~~ hard work and tenacity. I believe that the Group ~~were~~ right to take the difficult decision to carry on after last week's military incursions by South Africa into the territories of three Commonwealth countries, which as you know I have condemned vigorously. Their mission must be given every encouragement to succeed, despite this setback. ~~For~~ The alternative to a peaceful solution in South Africa ~~via~~ through dialogue is increasing bitterness and violence: a prospect so ~~appalling~~ macabre that we must do everything possible to assist the Group so long as there is any prospect of ~~a breakthrough~~ progress.

//Whatever

S. AFRICA RELATIONS PT 7

Whatever the outcome, we owe the members of the Group a ~~debt of~~ gratitude for upholding the Commonwealth tradition of ~~seeking~~ reaching out for peaceful solutions. I am sure that their hard work will not have been in vain.

I am content that you should inform fellow Commonwealth Heads of Government and announce the details of the review in the manner you propose. I look forward to hearing further details nearer the time of the meeting.

CMJ

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DEDIP
FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 261930Z FCO
TELNO 296
OF 261750Z MAY 86

MIPT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA.

COMMENT

1. THE CONTENT AND THE TONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY AND FOREIGN MINISTER'S COMMENTS ARE THOROUGHLY DISCOURAGING.

2. THE MINISTER HINTED AND KILLEN AFTERWARDS CONFIRMED TO HEAD OF CHANCERY AND MYSELF THAT THE REPLY WAS PREPARED IN THE PRESIDENT'S OWN OFFICE (UNLIKE PREVIOUS MESSAGES IN THIS SERIES DRAFTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS). PIK BOTHA ALLOWED ME TO DRAW THE INFERENCE THAT HE MIGHT NOT HAVE RESPONDED IN THIS WAY HIMSELF AND RECOGNISED HOW DISHEARTENING THE REPLY WOULD BE. IT MAY BE SIGNIFICANT THAT HE UNDERLINED PRESIDENT BOTHA'S OWN ROLE IN VARIOUS WAYS. IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS REPORTED IN DISCUSSION PIK BOTHA SUGGESTED AT ONE STAGE THAT HE COULD TRY TO ARRANGE FOR ME TO MEET THE PRESIDENT IF WE WANTEDFURTHER CLARIFICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL VIEWS.

3. IT LOOKS AS IF THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER MINISTERS HAVE DETERMINED TO TAKE A HARD LINE. WE HAVE RECOGNISED THAT IT HAD BEEN LARGELY PIK BOTHA HIMSELF WHO HAS KEPT THE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE ALIVE HERE SO FAR. THE PROBABILITY IS THAT HE HAS LOST OUT FOR THE PRESENT TO HARD-LINE COLLEAGUES. I HAVE HEARD HIM TAKE A SIMILAR LINE BEFORE ON SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. BUT IN SPEAKING AS HE DID AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE HE WAS LEAVING US WITH LITTLE REASON TO THINK THAT THE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE CAN BE RESCUED. HE MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN CHASTENED BY HIS CONFRONTATION WITH RIGHT WING EXTRMISTS AT PIETERSBURG LAST THURSDAY.

4. NEVERTHELESS I THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO DO WHAT I COULD TO URGE THAT A FURTHER EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO KEEP THE INITIATIVE ALIVE. THIS IS NOT RULED OUT BY THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ITSELF AND PIK BOTHA HAD GIVEN ME THE LEAD BY SAYING THAT HE DID NOT SEE WHY FURTHER EXCHANGES WITH THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE.

/S. KILLEN

5. KILLEN TOLD US THAT HE THOUGHT HIS MINISTER'S ACCUSATION ABOUT A HIDDEN AGENDA WAS TRIGGERED BY WESTNRN FALLURE TO RESPOND TO PRO-WESTER N PRINCIPLES DECLARED BY PRESIDENT BOTHA AS ESSENTIAL TO ANY SETTLEMENT. IF SO, IT JUST SHOWS HOW SENSITIVE THESE PEOPLE ARE TO WHAT THEY REGARD AS LACK OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THE WEST.

6. THE KEY ISSUE IS BEING PRESENTED AS THE NEED TO WORK FOR THE PERMANENT RATHER THAN TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE. ONE INTERPRETATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY IS THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ARE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN ANY COMPROMISE WITH THE ANC. HOWEVER THE ONLY SMALL CHINK I CAN SEE WOULD BE IF THE GROUP WERE TO COME HERE AGAIN AND DEAL SKILLFULLY WITH THE ISSUE OF ENDING VIOLENCE. ANYTHING MORE WE CAN SAY TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND TO THE EPG MIGHT PERHAPS FOCUS ON THIS POINT.

MOBERLY

LIMITED.

HD. SAFD.
HD. CCD.
PS.
PS|LADY YOUNG.
PS|MRS. CHALKER.
PS|PUS.
MR. DEREK THOMAS.
MR. FERGUSSON.
MR. REEVE.

COPIES TO:

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GRS 1540 CONFIDENTIAL

Subject cc Ops Master

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T100/86

CONFIDENTIAL
DEDIP
FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 261900Z FCO
TELNO 295
OF 261315Z MAY 86

MIPT : MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT DATED 26 MAY.

BEGINS

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

THERE ARE SOME VEILED THREATS IN YOUR MESSAGE OF 22 MAY 1986, ESPECIALLY IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH.

IN YOUR MESSAGE YOU STATED AS FOLLOWS :

'' I BELIEVE THAT THE GROUP MAY YET RESPOND TO A GENUINE AND UNEQUVOCAL STEP FORWARD ON YOUR PART, BUT THEY WILL NOT ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BECOME INVOLVED IN A DEBATE ON SEMANTICS, WHICH THEY WILL SEE AS JUST AN ATTEMPT TO STRING THEM ALONG. WHAT IS NEEDED IS AN EARLY AND CLEAR CUT ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR NEGOTIATING CONCEPT, TOGETHER WITH SPECIFIC INDICATIONS OF THE WAY IN WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT INTEND TO IMPLEMENT IT.''

FIRSTLY, IF YOUR OBSERVATION REGARDING ''SEMANTICS'' IS SUPPOSED TO BE A REFERNCE TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE REAL MEANING OF ''SUSPENSION'' ON THE ONE HAND AND ''CESSATION'' AND RENUNCIATION ON THE OTHER, IT IMPLIES A VERY UNREALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF MY COUNTRY'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS INDEED.

[Nonsense]

SECONDLY, THE ''NEGOTIATING CONCEPT'' WHICH YOU INSIST I ACCEPT WITHOUT ANY QUALIFICATION WHATSOEVER AND , APPARENTLY, WITHOUT FURTHER NEGOTIATION,WAS PRESENTED TO MY GOVERNMENT AS A ''POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT''. I REGARD SUCH INSISTENCE AS THE HEIGHT OF INTRANSIGENCE AND, IN VIEW OF THE PRAGMATISM WHICH HAS CHARACTERISED YOUR ATTITUDE TO DATE, I WAS DISMAYED WHEN I TOOK NOTE THEREOF.

HOWEVER, SINCE YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY INVITED ME TO TAKE YOU INTO MY CONFIDENCE SHOULD ANY DIFFICULTIES ARISE REGARDING THE EPG INITIATIVE, I NOW ASK YOU TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING.

ON 15 FEBRUARY 1985, BEFORE THERE WAS EVEN TALK OF THE COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP, I STATED PUBLICLY AS FOLLOWS :

'' IF THE ANC AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS CONCERNED ALSO DECIDE TO REJECT AND RENOUNCE VIOLENCE, THE GOVERNMENT IS WILLING TO TALK TO THEM, AS WITH ANY OTHER ORGANISATION THAT STRIVES FOR TRUE PEACE AND

CONFIDENTIAL /DEVELOPMENT

DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PEOPLES OF OUR LAND. WE SHOULD HEED THE LESSONS OF HISTORY, AND BUILD A SAFE FUTURE ON THE WISDOM OF EXPERIENCE. WE MUST NOT REPEAT THE MISTAKES THAT WERE MADE ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA.''

YOU WILL ALSO RECALL THAT IT WAS I WHO TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN JANUARY 1985 BY ANNOUNCING THAT I WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE RELEASE OF MR NELSON MANDELA ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS PROVIDED THAT HE RENOUNCES VIOLENCE. AT THE TIME IT WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A PERFECTLY REASONABLE OFFER.

WHEN I WROTE TO YOU ON 4 OCTOBER 1985, I REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATION WITH THE LEADERS OF ALL SOUTH AFRICA'S COMMUNITIES AND PROCEEDED AS FOLLOWED :

''WE HAVE SAID THAT WE SHALL NOT PRESCRIBE WHO MAY REPRESENT THE OTHER COMMUNITIES. THE ONLY CONDITION WE HAVE STIPULATED IS THAT THOSE WHO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.''

FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING, YOU WROTE TO ME ON 21 OCTOBER 1985 AND INFORMED ME THAT THE OUTCOME OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN A DECLARATION WHICH SETS OUT THE COMMONWEALTH'S APPROACH. THE DECLARATION INTER ALIA COMPRISED ''A CALL FOR A POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMEN T
AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES.''

ON 22 OCTOBER 1985 I RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO ME WHAT WAS MEANT BY ''SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES'' AND THAT IF IT WAS INTENDED TO MEAN THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WAS PERPETRATING VIOLENCE, THE COMMONWEALTH MISSION COULD NOT PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE.

SUBSEQUENTLY ON 31 OCTOBER 1985,YOU RESPONDED BY STATING AS FOLLOWS:

'' MY OTHER MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO SECURE COMMONWEALTH BACKING FOR DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES. THE CONCEPT OF COURSE COMES FROM YOUR EARLIER LETTER TO ME: AND I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT IS NO SMALL ACHIEVEMENT TO HAVE PERSUADED THE COMMONWEALTH TO PUT ITS NAME TO A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE, THOUGH THERE ARE SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS WHO WILL NOT WISH TO SEE SUBSTANCE GIVEN TO THIS COMMITMENT IF THEY CAN AVOID IT.''
NATURALLY I ASSUMED THAT THIS WAS A REFERENCE TO MY LETTER OF 4 OCTOBER IN WHICH I REFERRED TO THE GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE WITH PEOPLE WHO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AS A MEANS OF AMCHIEVING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. CONSEQUENTLY, I HENCEFORTH CORRESPONDED WITH YOU ON THE BASIS THAT SUSPENSION EQUALS RENUNCIATION AND CESSATION OF VIOLENCE.

SINCE YOU INFORMED ME ON 14 DECEMBER 1985 THAT YOU HAVE HAD AN

/OPPORTUNITY

OPPORTUNITY FOR A LONG DISCUSSION WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP, I ASSUMED THAT THEY TOO WERE PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF THIS PREMISE.

MY IMPRESSION WAS STRENGHTENED BY YOUR LETTER OF 8 JANUARY 1986 IN WHICH YOU REGRETTED THE UPSURGE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND STATED THAT THERE ''CAN BY NO SYMPATHY OR JUSTIFICATION FOR ACTS OF INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE''.

YOU WOULD HAVE NOTED THAT IN MY LETTER OF 24 JANUARY 1986, I STATED THAT THE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON STRUCTURING A REALISTIC SYSTEM OF POWER SHARING IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE AS ACCEPTED BY THE COMMONWEALTH. I IMMEDIATELY PROCEEDED TO ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTION:
''WHAT IS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DOING IN ORDER TO COMPEL THE CHIEF ARCHITECT OF VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA, THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS AFFILIATE, THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, TO STOP THEIR CAMPAIGN OF TERROR?''

I PROCEEDED BY SAYING THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT ALL ORGANISATIONS, INTERNAL AS WELL AS EXTERNAL, ENGAGED IN COMMITTING ACTS OF VIOLENCE AS A MATTER OF POLICY, SHOULD BECOME THE OBJECT OF A CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN AIMED AT ENDING THEIR POLICY OF VIOLENCE AND TERROR.

AS YOU KNOW, I MET WITH THE EPG ON 12 MARCH 1986. ACCORDING TO THE MINUTES OF THAT MEETING, I TOOK THE POSITION THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THAE ANC TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES SUCH AS ZAMBIA. IF THEY RENOUNCED VIOLENCE THEY COULD ''COME AND JOIN US''.

ON 10 APRIL 1986, WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR LETTER OF 20 MARCH 1986, I EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR YOUR OBVIOUS INTEREST IN A CESSATION OF VIOLENCE AND INDICATED THAT A CESSATION OF VIOLENCE WAS THE KEY TO THE MATTERS WHICH I ENUMERATED IN THAT LETTER.

FOLLOWING THIS, IN YOUR LETTER OF 18 APRIL 1986, YOU EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH MY POINT OF VIEW THAT A CESSATION OF VIOLENCE IS WHAT WE SHOULD BE AIMING FOR BUT YOU SUSPECTED THAT THE GROUP WOULD NOT REGARD MY FORMULATION AS A FAIR EXCHANGE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE COMMONWEALTH ACCORD SPEAKS IN TERMS OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE. YOU ENCOURAGED ME TO EXPLORE WITH THE GROUP WHAT A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE WOULD ENTAIL.

THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT MEMBERS OF MY GOVERNMENT DID DURING THE GROUP'S RECENT VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA.

NATURALLY I WAS DISMAYED TO LEARN, NOT ONLY THAT THE GROUP IS THINKING IN TERMS OF WHAT COULD BE A TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE, BUT ALSO, ACCORDING TO LORD BARBER, THAT IT WOULD BE UNFAIR AND UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT OF THE ANC TO SUSPEND VIOLENCE INDEFINITELY.

YOU WILL NO DOUBT AGREE THAT THIS POSITION IS CAPABLE OF A CONSTRUCTION TO THE EFFECT THAT WHEN AND FOR AS LONG AS THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ANC ARE NOT NEGOTIATING, THE PENETRATION OF VIOLENCE BY THE ANC IS JUSTIFIED.

IN ANY EVENT, I AM OF THE OPINION THAT ONLY A COMMITMENT TO PEACE CAN RESULT IN NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THAT THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO PEACE AND SHOULD HAVE CLOSED THE DOOR ON VIOLENCE BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS SUPPLIED VISIBLE PROOF OF ITS COMMITMENT TO A NEGOTIATED DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT WHICH SHOULD ADDRESS THE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS OF ALL SOUTH AFRICANS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I CANNOT SEE THE NEED FOR THE ANC TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS WHILST RETAINING THE ''RIGHT'' TO RESORT TO VIOLENCE WHENEVER, IN ITS VIEW, THE NEGOTIATIONS BREAK DOWN. PARTICULARLY SINCE THE ANC ITSELF CAN CAUSE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS TO BREAK DOWN.

LORD BARBER HAS ALSO TOLD MR MANDELA THAT OFFICIALS OF MY GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN TALKING OF SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE AND NOT RENUNCIATION AND THAT HE REGARDED THIS AS REASONABLY (SIC EXCLAM) POSITIVE.

EVEN IF WE ACCEPT, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT, THAT I HAVE TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE AS OPPOSED TO THE REJECTION THEREOF AS A MEANS TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL GOALS, IT IS NOW ALSO REQUIRED OF ME TO RELEASE MR MANDELA AND OTHERS WITHOUT THEM HAVING TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE - A CONDITION TO WHICH I AM PUBLICLY COMMITTED.

IN ADDITION IT IS NOT ONLY REQUIRED OF ME TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ANC BUT TO UNBAN IT, KNOWING FULL WELL THAT AT ANY GIVEN POINT IN TIME IT MAY UNILATERALLY DECIDE TO AGAIN RESORT TO VIOLENCE. CLEARLY THIS HAS INCALCULABLE POTENTIALLY PREJUDICIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY SITUATION IN MY COUNTRY.

SOME MEMBERS OF THE GROUP ALSO SEEM TO HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT IF WE DO NOT ACCEPT THEIR ''POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT'' NO FURTHER PROPOSAL WILL EMANATE FROM THEM. THE MERE HEADING OF THEIR PROPOSAL WOULD MILITATE AGAINST SUCH INTRANSIGENCE - IF IT DOES EXIST. I SUPPOSE THAT IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR OWN INTRANSIGENCE, I MUST ASSUME THIS.

WITH REFERENCE TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF YOUR MESSAGE, I WISH TO PUT ON RECORD MY DEEP DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE CONTENTY, AS WELL AS THE SPIRIT THEREOF.

IT IS IN SHARP CONTRAST WITH THE RELATIONSHIP OF CONFIDENCE I THOUGHT EXISTED BETWEEN US.

/FURTHERMORE

FURTHERMORE, I MUST EXPRESS MY STRONG ABHORENCE OF THE DOUBLE TALK IN CONNECTION WITH TERRORISM. I WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT YOU CLEARLY STATE: ''TERRORISM CANNOT BE APPEASED''.

IF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IS FORCED TO MAKE A CHOICE BETWEEN ACCEPTING THE DOMINATION BY MARXIST REVOLUTIONARY FORCES AND THREATS FROM CERTAIN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND OUR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN CIVILISED STANDARDS AND OUR VERY EXISTENCE - WE HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO FOLLOW THE DICTATES OF OUR OWN CONSCIENCES. HOWEVER DEEPLY WE ARE COMMITTED TO INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION, WE CAN NEVER ACCEPT THE DICTATES FROM OUTSIDE FORCES.

YOURS SINCERELY
P W BOTHA
ENDS

MOBERLY

LIMITED.

HD. SAFD.
HD. CCD.
PS.
PS|LADY YOUNG.
PS|MRS. CHALKER.
PS|PUS.
MR. DEREK THOMAS.
MR. FERGUSSON.
MR. REEVE.

COPIES TO:

PS|N° 10 DOWNING ST.

T'a akone

I.5

Tuynhuys
Cape Town

26 May 1986

Dear Prime Minister

There are some veiled threats in your message of 22 May 1986, especially in the last paragraph.

In your message you stated as follows :

> "I believe that the Group may yet respond to a genuine and unequivocal step forward on your part, but they will not allow themselves to become involved in a debate on semantics, which they will see as just an attempt to string them along. What is needed is an early and clear cut acceptance of their negotiating concept, together with specific indications of the way in which the South African Government intend to implement it."

Firstly, if your observation regarding "semantics" is supposed to be a reference to the difference between the real meaning of "suspension" on the one hand and "cessation" and "renunciation" on the other, it implies a very unrealistic assessment of my country's security requirements indeed.

Secondly, the "negotiating concept" which you insist I accept without any qualification whatsoever and, apparently, without further negotiation, was presented to my Government as a "possible negotiating concept". I regard such insistence as the height of intransigence and, in view of the pragmatism which has characterised your attitude to date, I was dismayed when I took note thereof.

However, since you have previously invited me to take you into my confidence should any difficulties arise regarding the EPG initiative, I now ask you to consider the following.

On 15 February 1985, before there was even talk of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, I stated publicly as follows:

> "If the ANC and other organisations concerned also decide to reject and renounce violence, the Government is willing to talk to them, as with any other organisation that strives for true peace and development for the peoples of our land. We should heed the lessons of history, and build a safe future on the wisdom of experience. We must not repeat the mistakes that were made elsewhere in Africa."

You will also recall that it was I who took the initiative in January 1985 by announcing that I would be prepared to consider the release of Mr Nelson Mandela on humanitarian grounds provided that he renounces violence. At the time it was considered to be a perfectly reasonable offer.

3/...

When I wrote to you on 4 October 1985, I referred to the need for negotiation with the leaders of all South Africa's communities and proceeded as follows:

> "We have said that we shall not prescribe who may represent the other communities. The only condition we have stipulated is that those who participate in the negotiations should renounce violence as a means of achieving political objectives."

Following the October Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, you wrote to me on 21 October 1985 and informed me that the outcome of your discussions had been a declaration which sets out the Commonwealth's approach. The declaration inter alia comprised "a call for a political dialogue between the South African Government and representatives of the black community in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides".

On 22 October 1985 I responded by saying that it was not clear to me what was meant by "suspension of violence on all sides" and that if it was intended to mean that the South African Government was perpetrating violence, the Commonwealth mission could not play a positive role.

Subsequently, on 31 October 1985, you responded by stating as follows:

> "My other main purpose was to secure Commonwealth backing for dialogue between the South African Government and representatives of the black community in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides. The concept of course comes from your earlier letter to me: and I hope you will agree that it is no small achievement to have persuaded the Commonwealth to put its name to a suspension of violence, though there are

4/...

> several Governments who will not wish to see substance given to this commitment if they can avoid it."

Naturally I assumed that this was a reference to my letter of 4 October in which I referred to the Government's willingness to negotiate with people who renounce violence as a means of achieving political objectives. Consequently, I henceforth corresponded with you on the basis that suspension equals renunciation and cessation of violence.

Since you informed me on 14 December 1985 that you have had an opportunity for a long discussion with the members of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, I assumed that they too were proceeding on the basis of this premise.

My impression was strengthened by your letter of 8 January 1986 in which you regretted the upsurge of violence against civilians in South Africa and stated that there "can be no sympathy or justification for acts of indiscriminate violence".

You would have noted that in my letter of 24 January 1986, I stated that the emphasis should be on structuring a realistic system of power sharing in the context of a suspension of violence as accepted by the Commonwealth. I immediately proceeded to ask the following question:

> "What is the international community doing in order to compel the chief architect of violence in South Africa, the South African Communist Party and its affiliate, the African National Congress, to stop their campaign of terror?"

I proceeded by saying that it was imperative that all organisations, internal as well as external, engaged in committing acts of violence as a matter of policy, should become the object of a concerted international campaign aimed at ending their policy of violence and terror.

5/...

As you know, I met with the EPG on 12 March 1986. According to the minutes of that meeting, I took the position that there was no need for the ANC to participate in the political life of South Africa from neighbouring countries such as Zambia. If they renounced violence they could "come and join us".

On 10 April 1986, with reference to your letter of 20 March 1986, I expressed appreciation for your obvious interest in a cessation of violence and indicated that a cessation of violence was the key to the matters which I enumerated in that letter.

Following this, in your letter of 18 April 1986, you expressed agreement with my point of view that a cessation of violence is what we should be aiming for but you suspected that the Group would not regard my formulation as a fair exchange, especially since the Commonwealth Accord speaks in terms of a suspension of violence. You encouraged me to explore with the Group what a suspension of violence would entail.

This is precisely what members of my Government did during the Group's recent visit to South Africa.

Naturally I was dismayed to learn, not only that the Group is thinking in terms of what could be a temporary suspension of violence, but also, according to Lord Barber, that it would be unfair and unreasonable to expect of the ANC to suspend violence indefinitely.

You will no doubt agree that this position is capable of a construction to the effect that when and for as long as the Government and the ANC are not negotiating, the perpetration of violence by the ANC is justified.

6/...

In any event, I am of the opinion that only a commitment to peace can result in negotiated settlements and, consequently, that the participants in the negotiations should have committed themselves to peace and should have closed the door on violence before the commencement of the negotiations.

The South African Government has supplied visible proof of its commitment to a negotiated democratic settlement which should address the legitimate political aspirations of all South Africans. Under these circumstances I cannot see the need for the ANC to participate in negotiations whilst retaining the "right" to resort to violence whenever, in its view, the negotiations break down. Particularly since the ANC itself can cause such negotiations to break down.

Lord Barber has also told Mr Mandela that officials of my Government have been talking of suspension of violence and not renunciation and that he regarded this as reasonably (sic!) positive.

Even if we accept, for the sake of argument, that I have to negotiate on the basis of a suspension of violence as opposed to the rejection thereof as a means to achieve political goals, it is now also required of me to release Mr Mandela and others without them having to renounce violence - a condition to which I am publicly committed.

In addition it is not only required of me to negotiate with the ANC but to unban it, knowing full well that at any given point in time it may unilaterally decide to again resort to violence. Clearly this has incalculable potentially prejudicial implications for the security situation in my country.

7/...

Some members of the Group also seem to have taken the position that if we do not accept their "possible negotiating concept" no further proposal will emanate from them. The mere heading of their proposal would militate against such intransigence - if it does exist. I suppose that in the light of your own intransigence, I must assume this.

With reference to the last paragraph of your message, I wish to put on record my deep disillusionment with the contents, as well as the spirit thereof.

It is in sharp contrast with the relationship of confidence I thought existed between us.

Furthermore, I must express my strong abhorence of the double talk in connection with terrorism. I was under the impression that you clearly stated : "Terrorism cannot be appeased".

If the Republic of South Africa is forced to make a choice between accepting the domination by Marxist revolutionary forces and threats from certain Western countries and our determination to maintain civilised standards and our very existence - we have no option but to follow the dictates of our own consciences. However deeply we are committed to international co-operation, we can never accept the dictates from outside forces.

Yours sincerely

P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL
DEDIP
FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 261900Z FCO
TELNO 294
OF 261600Z MAY 86

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA

1. I WAS SUMMONED THIS AFTERNOON BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO RECEIVE A TOUGH REPLY FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE OF 22 MAY (YOUR TELNO 151). PW BOTHA'S OWN REMARKS WERE EQUALLY TOUGH. TEXT OF MESSAGE IN MIFT. ORIGINAL BY BAG. FOR COMMENTS SEE MY SECOND MIFT.

2. PW BOTHA SAID HE HAD NOTHING TO ADD ABOUT REASONS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAIDS TO WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID IN PARLIAMENT. AS REGARDS TIMING, TO DEFER THE RAIDS WOULD HAVE RISKED THEIR SUCCESS. THEY HAD BEEN PLANNED A LONG TIME AHEAD AND COULD NOT BE HELD BACK JUST BECAUSE OF THE EPG. INFACT THE TIMING HAD NOTHING TO DO WOTH THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP AT ALL. MOREOVER THE ANC THEMSELVES HAD NOT REFRAINED FROM VIOLENCE WHILE THE GROUP HAD BEEN IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION ON THIS SCORE WAS AN EXAMPLE OF LJACK OF EVEN HANDEDNESS WHICH DEEPLY CONCERNED THE SOUTH AFRICANS
.

3. HE HOPED THAT A REPLY WOULD BE READY WITHIN A FEW DAYS TO THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP PROPOSALS. HE DID NOT RULE OUT FURTHER EXCHANGES . BUT
BUT THE QUESTION THAT NEEDED TO BE RESOLVED WAS THE ENDING OF VIOLENCE.

4. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE FORESEEN THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAD NOW ARISEN. THAT WAS WHY MESSAGES WERE SENT TO THE GOVERNMENTS PARTICIPATING IN THE TOKYO SUMMIT. IT WAS AT THAT STAGE THAT THINGS WENT WRONG. HE HAD HOPED THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE A CLEAR AND HELPFUL STATEMENT. BUT IT APPEARED THAT OTHER NATIONS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN FINDING A SOLUTION WHICH TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES.

5. PW BOTHA THEN SAID THAT THE TIME HAD COME TO SPEAK OPENLY. HE COULD NOT ESCAPE THE FEELING THAT THERE WAS A HIDDEN AGENDA IN LONDON AND ELSEWHERE FOR A STRATEGY WHICH BROADLY ENTAILED THE HANDING OVER OF POWER TO THE ANC WITH ITS MAJORITY OF COMMUNISTS. HE BELIEVED THAT THE VIEW BEING TAKEN WAS THAT EVENTUALLY THE BEST HOPE FOR STABLE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE TO DEAL WITH THE ANC RATHER THAN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OR EVEN A GOVERNMENT OF MODERATE WHITE AND BLACKS. IT SEEMED TO HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES THAT NO MATTER WHAT THEY DID TO INTRODUCE REFORM THEY FOUND NO DIFFERENCE IN THE WAY SOUTH AFRICA WAS TREATED. THE ABSENCE OF RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE FROM ALL THE TOKYO SUMMIT COUNTRIES EXCEPT BRITAIN HAD EFFECTIVELY PULLED THE RUG FROM UNDER THE FEET OF THOSE WHO WANTED TO PREVENT FURTHER SANCTIONS. IT MIGHT BE BETTER FOR WESTERN GOVERNMENTS TO GO AHEAD AND TRY TO FORCE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO TOE THEIR LINE AND SEE IF IT WORKED. AFTER A YEAR OR TWO THEY COULD PERHAPS TALK AGAIN. THERE

WAS NO REASON WHY SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD BEE A BURDEN TO WESTERN COUNTRIES WHEN THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM SEEMED SO WIDE AS TO BE UNBRIDGEABLE.

6. HE ADDED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES COMPLETELY FAILED TO RECOGNISE THE THREATS FACING SOUTH AFRICA AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WERE NOW IMPEDED BY A LOSS OF SUPPORT AMONGST THEIR OWN FOLLOWERS . MRS THATCHER'S MESSAGE OF 22 MAY HAD STRUCK THE WRONG NOTE WITH THE PRESIDENT AS WAS EVIDENT FROM HIS REPLY. PIK BOTHA COULD NOT SAY MORE ABOUT THE EPG AT PRESENT THAN THAT THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNISED THAT A RESPONSE WAS DUE. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT A RECENT REFERENCE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO ''THE PRETORIA REGIME'' HAD BEEN RESENTED. HE MUST BE HONEST. HE FORESAW SEVERE DIFFICULTIES AHEAD IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U K AND SOUTH AFRICA.

7. PIK BOTHA CONCLUDED BY WONDERING WHETHER IT MIGHT HELP MATTERS IF A SMALL NUMBER OF WESTERN LEADERS WERE ABLE TO MEET THE PRESIDENT DIRECT. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WAS HIS OWN PERSONAL IDEA. BUT WAS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY OF MRS THATCHER TAKING A LEAD IN ARRANGING FOR SUCH A MEETING , SAY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND LEADERS OF FOUR LEADING COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY?

8. IN RESPONDING TO ALL THIS I SAID THAT IT WAS THE MOST DEPRESSING INTERVIEW I HAD HAD WITH ANY MINISTER DURING MY FOUR AND A HALF YEARS AS AMBASSADOR, FIRST IN ISREAL AND THEN IN SOUTH AFRICA. I DID NOT WISH TO CONCEAL THE FACT THAT THERE WOULD BE GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT IN LONDON AT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S OWN REMARKS.

9. IT WOULD BE CLEAR TO HIM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE THAT THERE WAS DISMAY IN LONDON AT THE RAIDS AND PARTICULARLY AT THEIR TIMING. WE WERE GENUINELY AT A LOSS HOW TO INTERPRET THE SIGNAL GIVEN BY THE RAIDS IN RELATION TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THE EPG. AS REGARD HIS EXPLANATION THAT THE RAIDS HAD BEEN PLANNED FOR A LONG TIME , I FAILED TO UNDERSTAND WHY THEY COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CALLED OFF WHEN IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT THEY WOULD COINCIDE WITH A FURTHER ROUND OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE EPG AND THE GOVERNMENT.

10. I SAID THAT THE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE WAS WIDELY SEEN TO HAVE REACHED A WATERSHED. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE EPG WERE GIVEN SOMETHING POSITIVE TO GO ON IF THEY WERE TO CONTINUE THEIR TASK AS WE HOPED. ALTHOUGH HIS COMMENTS IMPLIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT DOUBTED THE PURPOSE OF FURTHER NEGOTIATING , I NOTED THAT HE HAD NOT SLAMMED THE DOOR.

11. I TOOK UP HIS REFERENCE TO TOKYO. THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE HAD REACHED MRS THATCHER AND OTHER SUMMIT LEADERS ONLY ON THE EVE OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH REDUCED WHATEVER CHANCE THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN OF A POSITIVE STATEMENT. IN ANY CASE MRS THATCHER HAD REPLIED TO PRESIDENT BOTHA (IT APPEARS ALONE AMONG THE SEVEN LEADERS) AND HAD DONE MORE THAN ANYONE TO TRY AND SECURE SOMETHING HELPFUL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. IT WAS WHOLLY UNREASONABLE TO LAY A LACK OF RESPONSE FROM THE TOKYO SEVEN AT HER DOOR.

/12. FINALLY

12. FINALLY I TOOK STRONG EXCEPTION TO HIS SUGGESTION THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD SOME KIND OF HIDDEN AGENDA FOR SOUTH AFRICA IN FAVOUR OF THE ANC. I WAS SURE DR WORRALL HAD NEVER BEEN GIVEN THE SLIGHTEST REASON TO BELIEVE THIS. ON THE CONTRARY, WE HAD REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATED OUR SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL NEGOTIATED COMPROMISE WHILE TAKING CARE NOT TO PRONOUNCE ON THE PRECISE SHAPE OF AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT. I COULD NOT IMAGINE HOW HE SERIOUSLY THOUGHT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD HAVE MADE SUCH STRENUOUS EFFORTS WITH THEIR EUROPEAN AND COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES IF THEY WERE INTERESTED ONLY IN SOUTH AFRICA BEING HANDED OVER TO THE ANC. HIS TALK OF OUR BEING WILLING TO TURN TO SANCTIONS WAS EQUALLY UNREALISTIC WHEN AT CONSIDERABLE COST TO OURSELVES WE HAD CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED THAT COURSE IN FAVOUR OF DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION. IF BILATERAL RELATIONS WERE NOW LIKELY TO DETERIORATE AS HE SAID, I DID NOT ACCEPT THAT THIS WOULD BE OF OUR CHOOSING.

13 .AT THIS POINT PIK BOTHA BROKE OFF IN ORDER TO ATTEND A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. I THEREFORE DELIVERED A CONCLUDING REMARK TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL WHO REMAINED BEHIND: THAT FAR FROM CHOOSING SANCTIONS AS HIS MINISTER HAD IMPLIED , THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S OWN INABILITY TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE EPG COULD PUSH US FURTHER DOWN THAT ROAD. I REITERATED TO KILLEN THE HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S REPLY TO THE EPG WOULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING THAN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE APPEARED TO SUGGEST.

MOBERLY

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See Page 1/4.

WEEKEND WORLD

Sunday, 25th May, 1986

Brian Walden interviews:

WISEMAN KHUZWAYO	-	Special Correspondent 'African Concord'
NICHOLAS ASHFORD	-	Diplomatic Correspondent 'The Times'
JESMOND BLUMENFELD	-	Lecturer in Economics Brunel Univeristy
FLEUR de VILLIERS	-	Assistant Editor 'Sunday Times', South Africa
WILLIE BREYTENBACH	-	Professor of Politics Stellenbosch University
GERRIT OLIVIER	-	Professor of Politics Rand Afrikaans University
RAPH UWECHUE	-	Publishing Editor 'Africa Magazine'
PATRICK KEATLEY	-	Lecturer in International Relations University of the West Indies

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Hello and good afternoon.
Last week the turbulence in South Africa entered a new and potentially more dangerous phase.
For months the violence in the townships between Black and Black, and Black and White has been worsening.
But Thursday night's disturbance in which White demonstrators broke up a White political meeting, was unprecedented in recent times. Now concern is growing that this riot could signal the development of more extremism and violence in the White community. And ultimately conflict between the races could be intensified.
So today we're going to examine the causes and consequences of Thursday's riot. We'll be looking at why it happened, what its implications could be, and how this new South African phenomenon might affect the difficult search for peace in that troubled land.
First though, let's hear the latest news headlines from ITN and Alastair Stewart.

ITN NEWS HEADLINES

BRIAN WALDEN

It was always probable that at some point South Africa would see not just Black unrest but increasing White unrest as well. It's this man, who more than anybody else, has provoked the recent episode of White protest.
President P.W. Botha has tried to bring about change in South Africa since he first became the country's leader in 1978.
Under the separate development or apartheid system, South Africa's majority 24 million Blacks, were denied political and other rights in 86 per cent of the country.
This 86 per cent, by far the richest part, was preserved for the Whites. Only in the remaining 14 per cent, the so-called Homelands, would Blacks exercise political rights.
This system Mr Botha has long tried to reform. But he's faced increasing opposition from amongst his fellow Whites. It's from members of his own Afrikaaner community, decendants of Dutch-speaking settlers, that this opposition has mainly come from. Within his own party, the Nationalists, President Botha is known as a Verlichte , an enlightened one.

BRIAN WALDEN (contd)

But he's faced criticism from Nationalist Verkramptes the hard-liners. Outside the Nationalist camp, Dr. Andreas Treuernicht, known as Dr. No, has built up a significant following amongst Afrikaaners. A former member of Mr Botha's own party, the Nationalists, Dr. Treuernicht has formed a new party, the Conservatives. And at the grass roots, the Afrikaaner Weerstandsbeweging or AWB, a neo-Nazi White supremacist group, has been building up support. This sort of opposition has acted as a break on reform. So Blacks have become increasingly frustrated. In 1984 a Tricameral or three-house parliament was set up, in which elected representatives of the country's Asian and Coloured communities had seats. And a commitment was given that some form of national political representation for Blacks would eventually be provided. But far from easing Black dissatisfactions, President Botha's reforms have merely served to stoke them up.

JOHN BATTERSBY
LONDON CORRESPONDENT
SOUTH AFRICAN MORNING NEWSPAPERS

Well instead of responding in the way that President Botha had hoped, Blacks have in fact become more radicalised and his reforms have unleashed a new wave of expectations which is the inevitable result I would argue from 20 or 30 years of Nationalist rule and repression; the lid has blown off the pressure cooker, and instead of appeasing the Blacks in fact President Botha is facing a new, more radicalised political agenda from them.

BRIAN WALDEN

So Black revolt has steadily grown, damaging South Africa, both internally and externally. Some Blacks have been more reluctant than others to press for radical change. The Inkatha Movement, based on the Kwazulu homeland, is led by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. He's set his sights, at least for the interim, on a federal South Africa, in which Whites would control some areas and Blacks others.

But other groups have demanded swift progress to one-man, one-vote majority rule.

BRIAN WALDEN

From bases outside the country the long established African National Congress has started to wage a guerrilla war. Inside the country the ANC's partner, the United Democratic Front, hasbrought many smaller Black organisations together in protest. And more recently new more shadowy gangs of young Black revolutionaries, nicknamed the Comrades, have emerged. The result has been chaos and blood-shed in the townships where most Blacks live. Sometimes Conservatives and Radicals have clashed with bloody results. The shanty town of Crossroads near Capetown, was the scene last week of just such a conflict. In the last 20 months some 400 or so are estimated to have died in Black-on-Black violence. But more often Black protest has been repressed by the South African police and army. About 1,000 lives are thought to have been lost this way; 10,000 Blacks have been arrested but the result has only been to increase the pressure for change. South African industry and commerce has felt heavy pressure, and not just as a direct result of the turmoil in the townships. To grow, South African companies rely on loans and investments from abroad, but they've been these finding harder and harder to obtain as South Africa's image abroad has deteriorated.

MICHAEL COULSON
SOUTH AFRICA ANALYST
PHILIPS & DREW STOCKBROKERS

Last year the South Africans received a bit of a shock when the American banks who were lending them short-term loans, suddenly pulled the plug and said they wanted the money back straight away. The rest of the participants and the short-term market with the South Africans got cold feet, the South Africans found they were very short of liquidity, they couldn't repay the Americans, so basically they said that's it, no, declared a moratorium and since then we've been trying to get this whole matter straight, and these negotiations are likely to go on, I think for another year or so. The critical problem while this goes on is that South African economy really needs these injections of funds to grow at the required rate, which is basically nearer 5 per cent than the current 3 per cent or so. The reason they need the extra 2 per cent is toaccommodate the natural increase in population growth amongst the Black South Africans in particular, who are coming into the workforce.

BRIAN WALDEN

But more immediately potent has been the threat of economic sanctions. In the West, criticism of South Africa has mounted. In America, especially, a wave of protest has swept through university campuses and the national capital Washington DC. As a consequence President Reagan has been forced to impose a limited package of sanctions.

PRESIDENT REAGAN

"America's view of apartheid is simple and straightforward, we believe it's wrong."

BRIAN WALDEN

But it's the possibility of economic sanctions imposed by Britain which has always worried the South Africans most. Britain is one of South Africa's biggest trading partners. We import about a billion pounds worth of South African goods each year. Yet Margaret Thatcher has always resisted imposing sanctions. Instead since she met President Botha at Chequers in 1984 she's preferred to use persuasion. She's been in regular correspondence with him, but increasingly Mrs Thatcher's found her position hard to sustain. That's because of Britain's membership of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth leaders have become convinced that action should be taken as the unrest in South Africa has grown. Last October at the Commonwealth Conference at Nassau in the Bahamas they tackled Mrs Thatcher. The strength of the diplomatic pressure led her to make concessions to the sanctions lobby. It was announced that Britain would ban the import of South African Krugerrands. But Mrs Thatcher stressed this was only a token gesture.

MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER

"Tiny little bit, tiny little bit, do you know how many, the value of krugerrands that are imported, half a million pounds."

BRIAN WALDEN

But at the same time, the Commonwealth leaders took a much more significant step. They set up a commission of seven senior figures from various Commonwealth countries. This commission was dubbed the Eminent Persons Group or EPG, and the EPG was asked to monitor progress in South Africa and report back this Summer.

JOHN BATTERSBY

When the Eminent Persons Group was formed at the Commonwealth Summit in the Bahamas last year, there were very low expectations of it, and indeed a great deal of scepticism. As the group has developed and become involved in the negotiating process, it has proved in fact that it is a formidable international negotiating team under the leadership of Malcolm Fraser and General Obasanjo of Nigeria and there's no question now that the group holds the key on sanctions, and unless their report next month is favourable it will greatly increase the pressure for international sanctions and bring the threat much closer.

BRIAN WALDEN

Until very recently it did look as if the EPG might give the South Africans a better report than had been expected. EPG members began to engage in shuttle diplomacy. After talking to ANC leaders in the Zambian capital of Lusaka they talked to President Botha's ministers in Cape Town. There were suggestions that they might just have the makings of a package which could bring Black and White together. But these suggestions appear to have been the last straw for many far right Afrikaaners.

BARRY STREEK
POLITICAL WRITER
'CAPE TIMES'

The far right believe the Botha Government is betraying them. They believe the Botha Government's reform programme is a sell-out of White interests, they believe it's going to lead in one direction, which is towards Black rule. And the talk that Nelson Mandela may be released has heightened these suspicions. The talk that the ANC may be unbanned has raised more fears. And yet these are precisely the terms of the EPG package as has been reported.

BARRY STREEK (contd)

And the fact that President Botha is prepared to talk to the EPG on these terms has increased their fears that a sell-out of their country is about to take place.

BRIAN WALDEN

Attempts do seem to have been made by President Botha to head off an explosion of far right anger. Last weekend's raids on ANC targets in neighbouring countries appear to have been intended to impress far right opinion. South African commandos blew up an ANC office in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe. An aircraft attacked ANC-owned buildings near Lusaka in Zambia. And other soldiers attacked a building on the outskirts of Gaberone, the capital of Botswana, killing two people. But the attacks don't seem to have fullfilled President Botha's purpose. It was in the town of Pietersburg in the Transvaal last Thursday that the hard-line AWB broke up a meeting. The meeting was to have been addressed by South Africa's Foreign Minister Pik Botha. Encouraged by their leader, Eugene Terreblanche, AWB activists stormed the platform. There were suggestions that the police on duty didn't try very hard to prevent this because many of them had AWB sympathies; eventually the police did use tear gas to suppress the disorder, but by then the meeting had been wrecked. Thus it is that the Pietersburg riot was the culmination of a White backlash against President Botha's reform programme. So what's likely to happen now?

Well the Botha Government may be able to suppress the backlash, using force. Yesterday Louis Legrange, the Government's Law and Order Minister, spoke at a meeting at Elisras in the Transvaal. This was a meeting that the AWB had threatened to disrupt as it did at Pietersburg. At Elisras it failed. But Mr Legrange was only able to go ahead with the protection of hundreds of soldiers, police and plain clothes security men. If this sort of thing became a regular feature of Nationalist political life it might only serve to add to White disaffection. And in the long run this backlash could force the Botha Government to halt the reform process. If that happened there would, of course, be no hope whatsoever of stemming the unrest in the townships. Yet if instead President Botha and his colleagues voluntarily put the reform programme into reverse, the result would be the same. So either development could lead to deepening turmoil.

BARRY STREEK

There are fears in the ruling National Party about the growth of the far right in South Africa. There are even some people who believe that the right wing may be able to put the brakes on the Government's reform programme. The Government does not have to face an election for a number of years, but the right wing is determined to stop the Government in its tracks. If that were to happen, or if the reform programme were to be reversed there's little doubt that Black people would see that as a sign of confrontation, or increased confrontation in which the only solution is through revolution.

BRIAN WALDEN

So both White disaffection and Black frustration could have appalling consequences for South Africa.
But will anything or anybody come to the country's rescue?
We'll be back in a moment to find out.

PART TWO

BRIAN WALDEN:

Hello again. This weekend South Africa appears to face the prospect of either growing White disaffection or increasing Black frustration. So is there a way these twin threats can be headed off? On the face of it, the prospects do seem bleak. Possibly the only viable course would be reform which was sufficient to satisfy Black aspirations without setting off uncontrollable White revolt. And at present it's President Botha who still has the ball in his court. It might be expected that post-Pietersburg he'd be a more reluctant reformer than he was but at a fundamental level he does still seem to be committed to his previous course. He still appears to appreciate that if he's to have any chance of ending the turmoil in the townships, further change is essential and this must continue, AWB or no AWB.

BARRY STREEK:

The disruption of the Pietersburg meeting was a shock to most Whites and it certainly was a shock to the government. The fact that their own Minister for Foreign Affairs could not address a party meeting without disruption was a real shock and the suspicions that the Police did not act as quickly and as effectively as they might have. Nevertheless President Botha is committed to his reform programme and he seems determined to press ahead and there are very good reasons for this. The violence in the townships has increased rather than dropped off. Black frustration is increasing, the economy is in a mess and the recession seems to be continuing. International isolation is growing, the threat of sanctions is looming. All these reasons they are really are very good reasons for President Botha to continue with his reform programme.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Indeed Denis Worrall, the South African Ambassador for London and a close confidant of Mr Botha re-emphasised the South African President's commitment to reform on Friday. But it's much less certain that the reforms Mr Botha plans will succeed in solving South Africa's problems. Ten days ago he announced plans for a new National Statutory Council. He said the Council would include leading Black figures and they'd help to prepare the new constitution under which Blacks would share power. But these plans may not help to solve the country's problems. It's probable that the far Right will be very critical. The AWB and like-minded

BRIAN WALDEN ... Cont'd

organisations might gain support but the National Statutory Council seems unlikely to placate Black opinion either. The Black leaders involved will be drawn mainly from the government-sponsored local councils in the townships and from the homelands. There seems little likelihood that the constitution they produce will satisfy the aspirations of the supporters of the UDF and the ANC. But if it seems very difficult for Mr Botha to succeed with his initiative, could the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group do better? Earlier this week there were rumours that the EPG mission was among the victims of the South African raids at the weekend. It seemed possible that the Eminent Persons had pulled out in disgust. But since then several of them have denied this. Malcolm Fraser, former Australian Prime Minister and General Obasanjo of Nigeria have both stressed that the work of the group continues. They and their colleagues seem to have decided that their mission is too important to be wrecked in this way. So the EPG has survived. And so has the package deal it was negotiating with the Botha government and the ANC before the raids. Indeed, President Botha and his colleagues have committed themselves to responding to the EPG within the next few days but for the President to accept this package could be very difficult indeed. The main terms have only recently emerged. Under these terms the ANC would suspend its campaign of violence, agreeing a truce with the South African government. But in return President Botha and his colleagues would agree to legalise the ANC and they would also release from prison the veteran ANC leader, Nelson Mandela. It's hoped by the EPG that this deal would set off a dialogue which might ultimately provide some prospect of solving South Africa's problems. But accepting such terms could carry great risks for the Botha government. Earlier this year, President Botha did speak of the possibility of releasing Mr Mandela on humanitarian grounds and for some time now it's been the government's official position that Mr Mandela would be let out and the ANC legalised if the ANC renounced violence. But renouncing is not the same as suspending. Suspending is far less permanent. If Mr Botha were to settle for simple suspension, as proposed in the EPG package, he could face considerable problems. For in the eyes of many South Africans, Nelson Mandela is a dangerous Communist. The ANC are terrorists and EPG are meddling foreigners. The risk is that if President Botha accepted the EPG package, the far Right

BRIAN WALDEN ... Cont'd

would accumulate still greater public support. There could be more Pietersburgs and more hard-line pressure on the government. Yet if Mr Botha and his Ministers did accept the package, that would be far from the end of the story. The ANC would then need to give its agreement. But that might not be readily forthcoming either. Oliver Tambo the President of the ANC and his colleagues in the leadership were rumoured to have looked favourably on the EPG package a couple of weeks ago but that was before last weekend's raids. Now it must be less likely that Mr Tambo and his colleagues would be willing to compromise. Yet even if they were, the international reaction would still be important to the future of South Africa. The response of the Commonwealth as a whole and of international bankers to any agreement would be crucial. Commonwealth leaders are due to meet in London in mid-summer to review the EPG's mission and decide whether sanctions should be implemented. In recent days, some Commonwealth governments have become increasingly impatient. For instance, after last weekend's raids, there were calls from within the Nigerian government for the EPG to be immediately disbanded and sanctions imposed. But if the EPG initiative were successful then such calls would go unheeded. International bankers, however, might be more cautious. They might want to see real evidence that peace had broken out, otherwise they could remain unwilling to extend to South African firms the loans they very badly need. The economy would remain very shaky. And that could leave prospects for long-term stability still looking poor. Thus it is that the path to peace in South Africa appears to be a very tortuous one.
So what are the chances that the EPG process will succeed?

BRIAN WALDEN

Well with me in the studio is a group of eight experts on South Africa. Miss de Villiers, Mr Olivier, Mr Breytenbach, let me come to you first because you're all experts on South African government and politics. Let me start with you Miss de Villiers. Obviously Mr Botha has a crucial choice to make at the moment which is whether or not to accept the EPG package Do you think, after he's considered it, he will accept, meaning by that that as a result of it he will release Nelson Mandela and will in fact legalise the ANC?

FLEUR de VILLIERS, ASSISTANT EDITOR, 'SUNDAY TIMES', SOUTH AFRICA

I think that the release of Mandela is inevitable, whether as part of the EPG package or not is still open to doubt. Certainly pressure has been growing on President Botha for the last two years ever since he put the possibility of Mandela's release on the table and I think Winnie Mandela, one of the few correct things that she has said, is that since then President Botha has become Mandela's prisoner as much as Mandela is President Botha's prisoner. Now whether the release of Mandela will be in response to the EPG initiative or not I think one can only guess. It would certainly be wise for the South African government at this juncture to make it part of its package and to put the burden back on the EPG to produce the other leg of the initiative which is an ANC promise for a moratorium on violence. Recent reports have indicated that although Nelson Mandela himself is prepared to agree to a truce, his comrades in Lusaka are a little more dubious about this, possibly through fear that they would not be able to make such a moratorium stick and their inability to control the violence would show up the fact that they do not in fact own the hearts and minds of all Black South Africans.

BRIAN WALDEN

Okay. Mr Breytenbach, supposing the State President did in fact decide to do what Miss de Villiers has suggested. Could he carry White opinion with him?

WILLIE BREYTENBACH, PROFESSOR OF POLITICS, STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY

Right now the name of the game is stopping the violence and I think South Africans and also people who've got an interest in what is going on in South Africa share this common perception. Now, as far as outside interests are concerned, the EPG represents a very important initiative but it's not the only show in town. There is still the American initiative which

WILLIE BREYTENBACH (cont'd.)

is divided between two kind of strategies, that is the Sullivan Code signatories, and they are very prominent nowadays in South Africa in calling on government to make its reforms more visible and to expedite the process, and then obviously also the twelve wise men appointed by President Reagan last year almost simultaneously when the EPG group was appointed to look into alternatives as far as the constructive engagement policy was concerned and then as far as Africans are concerned themselves there are various groups in South Africa who've got a vested interest in reform going on but also violence stopping, violence in the townships ...

BRIAN WALDEN

Sure.

WILLIE BREYTENBACH

... and also White/Black violence.

BRIAN WALDEN

Sure. Let's for the moment stick with the EPG though it really it's the same question for all the others. What I'm putting to you is this. Supposing Botha says 'Okay, I'll release Mandela and I might be prepared to legalise the ANC.' Can he take White South African opinion with him in doing that?

WILLIE BREYTENBACH

It depends very much on what Mr Mandela will do should he be released or what his intentions will be after he's released because I think here one can draw some comparisons between two other not unrelated incidents as far as this particular instance is concerned, and . one is the release of some time ago, a couple of years ago, of Mr Herman Toivo Ja Toivo who has been a political prisoner for many years. He's been a leader of Swapo, a Namibian nationalist organisation, he's been in RobbenIsland for many years, and he was released and he simply dissipated into oblivion but then there is the other possibility, the other scenario, and that is of the Ayatollah Khomeini. When he returned to Iran in the late 70s his return unleashed new violence and a new thrust of politics and I think Mr Mandela's parallel, should there be a parallel

WILLIE BREYTENBACH (cont'd.)

between any of these two, would rather be on the Ayatollah Khomeini lines rather than on the Ja Toivo lines and this could open up a new can of worms and obviously then violence wouldn't stop.

BRIAN WALDEN

Let me come to you Mr Olivier. Obviously there will be a worry, not simply in terms of world opinion but what probably matters more to South Africans in Nationalist Party circles themselves about the strength of the Right. Let me ask you, how seriously do you take, for instance, the AWB?

GERRIT OLIVIER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICS, RAND AFRIKAANS UNIVERSITY

Oh the AWB is very vociferous, it's very obvious, according to what we have seen earlier in the programme, that they take very serious action against Mr P W Botha's reform programme but they are from the rural areas, they are highly organised and the ...

BRIAN WALDEN

Are there are a lot of them in the rural areas?

GERRIT OLIVIER

Well there are many in the rural areas but you see the strength of the electorate is really these days in the cities, so I think this gives you a wrong image of what is really happening on the political scene in South Africa. These meetings, you know, which we referred to took place and this gave them a chance to show their strength and show their organisation but I think in terms of the total picture, things taken in general, they are not so strong.

BRIAN WALDEN

Miss de Villiers, let me put to you a point very, very often made sometimes in South Africa, but even more frequently outside it, that the Nationalist Party has always placed enormous stress on Afrikaaner unity, political unity. A lot of people say 'But look, you see, if Botha goes ahead with any reform package and certainly if he releases Mandela and does some sort of deal with the ANC, that's the end of Afrikaaner unity, you'll never get it, so it is a tremendous sanction against him going down that road,' what do you think?

FLEUR de VILLIERS

Afrikaaner hegemony is not about to disappear, it disappeared very effectively three years ago when President Botha took his first hesitant steps down the reform path. I mean, he introduced a constitution which, however defective and flawed it may appear, introduced the idea of power-sharing with people of a different shade of pale for the first time in South Africa. That split the Afrikaanerdom fundamentally and permanently and what we are seeing now is perhaps a growth in the Right wing, a growth aggravated, one must say, by economic recession, because the parties of the far Right are also populist parties, but the idea, the dream, that Afrikaaner hegemony can be restored is not being lost today it was lost three years ago. Botha now knows that he can only carry White South Africa with him if he forgets about the extreme Right, and then he will be able to carry not only the young urban professional Afrikaaner but also the English-speaking vote.

BRIAN WALDEN

All right. Then would it be an unfair summary if I said that certainly as far as you're concerned Miss de Villiers and I suspect the same is true of you Mr Olivier, and maybe Mr Breytenbach too, that what you really anticipate is that President Botha will in fact go some way, if not the whole way, to accept the EPG package, that he will release Mandela, that he would, if the ANC were prepared to suspend violence, legalise the ANC and that though there will be objections from the AWB and the Conservatives and particularly amongst rural Afrikaaners, those objections can be overcome and will be? Is that about right?

GERRIT OLIVIER

Well it depends how the EPG package coincides with what's happening in South Africa in terms of the total process. As Professor Breytenbach explained, you know, the EPG group is one role-player among many role-players and it depends on the coincidence of solutions being offered in order to achieve peace and the end of violence in South Africa, so that is the bottom line and depends on what role the EPG is playing in that respect.

BRIAN WALDEN

Miss de Villiers?

FLEUR de VILLIERS

I think you've put an awful lot of different elements into that package. I know that there is a very strong feeling in some government circles that Mandela should be released, whether or not this is under the auspices of the EPG initiative or not, simply to try and demythologise the ANC, to deprive it of its symbolic value, and bring it back into the country where it can battle against other Black political groupings, but that feeling is not necessarily dominant and if the ANC is unbanned,I think President Botha has already indicated that that unbanning would not extend to the South African Communist Party members of the ANC or Umkhonto We Sizwe which is the armed wing of the ANC.

GERRIT OLIVIER

Does he differentiate between the Nationalists and the Communists in the ANC?

BRIAN WALDEN

All right. Let me know move on to two other gentlemen in our group who also, for obvious reasons, know a great deal about Southern Africa and particularly about feeling within the ANC,Mr Khuzwayo and Mr Uwechue. I wonder if I may start with you Mr Khuzwayo and ask you this. If as at least seems possible and many people think is probable, President Botha does say 'All right, I will accept the EPG package, I will release Mandela, I will make some arrangement to legalise at least sections of the ANC' what would be the ANC's response to that?

WISEMAN KHUZWAYO, SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT, 'AFRICAN CONCORD'

I think they would laugh at it in fact. One, because I mean if Botha was to make that offer it would be completely unrealistic: one, to expect ANC members to defend you know themselves, I mean, their own charge, in terms of are they Communist or not, you know, so who's going to decide who's a Communist? Is it Botha, you know. And secondly, legalising the ANC and saying that members of Umkhonto We Sizwe can't get back to the country, I think it's yet another joke in terms of, you know, the ANC is not the ANC without Umkhonto We Sizwe, you know, so, you know, without the armed wing, you know, then the ANC is finished and the ANC's not likely to

WISEMAN KHUZWAYO (cont'd.)

accept that. I mean, in fact, I can almost predict it's going to be rejected by the ANC.

BRIAN WALDEN

All right. Let me switch to you Mr Uwechue, though I will come back to you Mr Khuzwayo on another aspect of that, but let me come to you now Mr Uwechue. Isn't the ANC worried that if Botha in fact accepts the EPG package and the ANC doesn't, that it's going to have an unfortunate impact on world opinion as far as the ANC's concerned?

RAPH UWECHUE

I wouldn't really put in that way. I think we get things back into focus. If we look at what the ANC really stands for, this is a multi-racial party which insists on all the people of South Africa in their entirety, not just a group whether large or small, Black, Coloured or White, but all of them together deciding the form of government for the country and who should be entrusted with running that country. If one gets this right it becomes easy to understand that if any proposal comes forward which convinces the leadership of the ANC that the apartheid regime has accepted to dismantle apartheid and is only looking for the mechanics of dismantling, I think within that context there'll be a lot of people in the ANC who would like to look at the package carefully.

BRIAN WALDEN

Do the EPG proposals fall into the category you've just listed?

RAPH UWECHUE

Well, at this point in time what we have is guess-work. None of us really knows ...

BRIAN WALDEN

So you don't know.

RAPH UWECHUE

... the impact of this package.

BRIAN WALDEN:
All right, let me put the thing to you in colloquial terms as I'm sure it would be expressed in the world. You see, it isn't a question of whether the ANC leadership fancies it all that much, what I'm anxious to get from you is what the fall-out will be if the ANC turns it down on world opinion ? Won't a lot of people say, well now look, this chap Botha is not as bad as he's painted, here are all these eminent blokes who've been going around and they've suggested a deal to him, and he said yes, but the ANC won't accept it, perhaps Botha's right, perhaps they're a very extremist group. Now, isn't there a danger of that ?

RAPH UWECHUE:
I don't think there's that danger, you see what is happening is that we miss the point when we think of Botha granting anything to the ANC or anybody, the issue at stake is whether a minority has any legitimacy in actually governing a country. So, if...

BRIAN WALDEN:
He can't give you that in the package, can he ?

RAPH UWECHUE:
Well then, the ANC, if the ANC does reject anything that does not convince them that Botha wants to change apartheid nobody who's reasonable anywhere will blame the ANC for it.

BRIAN WALDEN:
All right.

RAPH UWECHUE:
Because that is the central issue at stake.

BRIAN WALDEN:
All right, let me come back to you, Mr Khuzwayo, on a rather related point. You see, Mr Uwechue says, it's a perfectly simple matter, the White minority has no right to be ruling anyway, and what we want from them is an acknowledgement in fact of one-man one-vote, and Black majority rule. Doesn't what happened in Pietersburg stir in your mind the feeling that you're asking Botha to give you something, that even if he was willing, he couldn't. Even the reforms that he suggested so far, have obviously had a tremendous impact on at least rural Afrikanner opinion. Doesn't that make

BRIAN WALDEN continued:
you rather more sympathetic to Botha's problems ?

WISEMAN KHUZWAYO:
No, not at all, because...

BRIAN WALDEN:
Why ?

WISEMAN KHUZWAYO:
Well, first of all if you look at the root of the problem, it's the constitution that came into existence 3 years ago. It was fool-hardy of PW Botha to come up with such an unworkable constitution, I mean, he decided that he was going to include the Coloureds and Indians and leave out the majority, you know, that is the Africans, so, and in the process , he started faltering and all that, and he then decided that he had to play, you know, try and move with the Right, the extreme right with him, and he's fading, it's, I don't think that's the ANC problem, it's Botha's problems, you know. And therefore, it should not be, you know, put alongside the ANC, as you know.

BRIAN WALDEN:
All right, at a later stage, I think I might come back to what I take are the implications of that, but for the moment can I switch to Mr Ashford and Mr Keatley, both experts on Commonwealth opinion. Supposing in fact Botha does accept the EPG package, or at least most of it. What impact do you think that that's likely to have on Commonwealth opinion, Mr Ashford ?

NICHOLAS ASHFORD - DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT - THE TIMES:
Well, obviously if he were to accept the whole package, I mean this would make the Commonwealth have to go back and re-think, but I don't think anybody within the Commonwealth is really expecting this, I think what we will see is a sort of a mixed answer when the South Africans reply this week they will give a little bit and hedge on a lot more. The South Africans are past masters at stringing the international community and international opinion along and what they're going to try and do is just to keep the whole process rolling on a bit longer and give Mrs Thatcher, who is after all the key person within the Commonwealth enough for her to stand up and say, no, I'm not going to go along with sanctions.

BRIAN WALDEN:
All right, Mr Keatley, supposing Mr Ashford is right, and that the South Africans accept part of the package, don't accept other parts of it. Will the sort of scenario that Mr Ashford's painting be enough to fend off the threat of sanctions as far as Britain's concerned?

PATRICK KEATLEY - LECTURER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - UNIVERSITY OF WEST INDIES:
Well, I think Mrs Thatcher has a in-built resistance anyway, she's got a gut reaction, she just doesn't want to go with sanctions at all, and she said so, and she has a technique of tying her own hands in public, which she's carefully done in this one, and so I would not expect to see the lady do a U-turn, I think she's, you know, tough minded, obstinate if you like, and her reputation is on the line.

BRIAN WALDEN:
All right. Let me now come to you, Mr Blumenfeld, who are an economic expert on South Africa. Suppose that the best happens from South African businesses' point of view, and that there are no sanctions implied by Britain. Does that mean that without sanctions on South Africa's economic problems are fundamentally over, and they'll find it very easy to raise international loans ?

JESMOND BLUMENFELD - LECTURER IN ECONOMICS - BRUNEL UNIVERSITY:
If the South African economy is actually going to be able to deliver the goods to the great majority of people in South Africa, then it has got to do four things, and this would apply whether we were talking about a future Black-led administration as much as it does to the present White-led administration. It would have to grow at a rate faster than the rate of population growth, so that per capita incomes can be increased. It would have to generate a very large number of jobs to absorb the vast increase in the labour force, and hopefully to make some impact on very severe levels of unemployment. It would have to generate very substantial new resources, to give material content to the reform programme, it's one thing to talk about dismantling apartheid, de-racialising the economy, removing discrimination and so on, but if you cannot produce the housing, the schools, the health, the health infrastructure and so on, in order to raise living standards across the board, then that has no content to it at all. And in addition, it has to try and do this in a non-inflationary manner,

JESMOND BLUMENFELD continued:
because within the racially charged atmosphere of South African society, inflation erodes the living standards of Blacks.

BRIAN WALDEN:
You don't sound at all optimistic that it's going to pull off these various feats, is that right ?

JESMOND BLUMENFELD:
Its facing very severe difficulties. It faces the consequences of a long running recession, the consequences of a severe drought, the effect of slow world economic recovery which has reduced for South African exports, the inflationary pressures are very severe, because of excessive government spending, and because of the decline in the Rand which has, which is now standing at about 30% of its value of three years ago.

BRIAN WALDEN:
So it doesn't sound very probable that you're going to get the kind of economic growth that you need that would assist the political reform process, is that right ?

JESMOND BLUMENFELD:
Even without the international pressures, that would be very difficult...

BRIAN WALDEN
All right.

JESMOND BLUMENFELD:
The international pressures add very substantially to that, and if I may say, the international pressures produce this rather curious paradox. On the one hand, they're saying to South Africa you've got to deliver on reform, on the other hand they're denying the country the ability to generate the resources which can give content to that reform.

BRIAN WALDEN:
Fine. Can I now really come to you very generally, I promised that I would do this, to Mr Khuzwayo, in view of some of the things that he said, and I think it's right that we should. Let me come to you first, Professor Breytenbach, and come away from all technicalities. I'll ask you a question I often hear put to me by people who say, look it's impossible. It's irreconcilable. What Botha is trying to do may begood or bad and what the Afrikaaners are prepared to concede and indeed, the white population in general, may be generous or ungenerous but the whole position is hopeless, it is inevitably going to lead to conflict and there isn't very much that anybody can do to make an impact on it. Now what would be your answer to that ?

WILLIE BREYTENBACH:
My answer is the middle answer. One could postulate two extremes, total collapse scenario on the one hand and negotiated reform on the other hand. And I think what we've witnessed in South Africa during the last couple of weeks, also this week, is that negotiation and reform are two very difficult objectives to achieve. I think it is more difficult to achieve a negotiated settlement than settlement or reforms in itself, and latching on to the question of Afrikaaner unity or not, one does sense an urgency in government circles and also in the private sector in South Africa, that the need for economic growth to underscore the results of the negotiated processes that government is committed to take place, is that that has become a greater prority than Afrikaaner unity in the longer run, and this introduces a new equation into the ball game in South Africa.

BRIAN WALDEN:
Mr Khuzwayo, Professor Breytenbach says that negotiated reform and a negotiated agreement is very, very difficult. Do you think this it's possible at all ?

WISEMAN KHUZWAYO:
Well, the ANC has made its conditions very, very clear indeed.

BRIAN WALDEN:
And do, well, let me on that very point. Do you think there is the slightest chance that any White South African government could ever accept it in that form ?

WISEMAN KHUZWAYO:
Well, any South African government has got to be realistic. Right, the ANC did not take to the armed struggle, you know just for the sake of it because it was you know, a question of necessity. Botha has got to be realistic and the aims he has made it very clear, you know, before any negotiations take place, Botha or whatever, whoever's in charge had to got not to make a declaration of intent, you know, that you know, in future they will dismantle apartheid, but they have got to come out and say we're dismantling apartheid and you know, release all political prisoners you know, that's the basis upon which talks can take place. So, Botha is not interested in that, he's just trying to confuse world opinion.

BRIAN WALDEN:
Miss de Villiers, you see the problem of course, don't you that is in my mind ? The statements still don't look to me to reconcilable, for instance, what Mr Khuzwayo has just said. Do you think that the ANC are bluffing, or do you think that that's really what they want, and if that's really what they want, is there any chance at all that a White government in South African can give it to them.?

FLEUR de VILLIERS:
I don't think any White government in South Africa is going to meekly hand over the keys of the castle to the ANC and exchange one government for another, one form if you like of oppression for another. I think that, that the future of South Africa has to be achieved through negotiation and consensus. And scepticism may have its uses and its, but it has also become part of a strategy in dealing with South Africa. Certainly South Africa has earned that scepticism by its actions over the past few years, but I believe that the kind of scepticism that we've been hearing today is actually destructive and that there is no way that the Botha could risk the kind of scenes we've seen this week.

BRIAN WALDEN:
Sure. I must move to ask Mr Keatley, are they trying to reconcile the irreconcilable ?

PATRICK KEATLEY:
I think they will resort to the technique, I first it after Sharpeville, two decades ago. The technique has always been that of jam tomorrow as in Alice in Wonderland, you promise a good deal tomorrow and you say that things are in the works right now, hang on, and you buy time.

BRIAN WALDEN:
Well, then why shouldn't it end up, you buy some time, yes, but why shouldn't it end up with it being settled as many things are in this sad world, by force ?

PATRICK KEATLEY:
Because there is an enormous, undefeated, high spirited army which has hardly been tested at all, and if you're presiding over a mighty military machine, as Mr Botha is, you'll feel no need to concede.

BRIAN WALDEN:
Lady and gentlemen, thank you all very much indeed. Thank you

THE END

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FROM M J GRIFFITHS , CAPE TOWN
FOLLOWING FOR C T W HUMFREY ESQ, SAFD, FCO

SUBJECT COMGEP: PRESS LEAKS

SUMMARY

1. A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE RECENT COMMONWEALTH GROUP'S MEETING WITH MANDELA HAS APPEARED IN THE LOCAL PRESS.

DETAIL

2. ''THE CAPE TIMES'' TODAY (23 MAY) CARRIES A STORY BY JOHN BATTERSBY, THEIR LONDON CORRESPONDENT , ON WHAT TRANSPIRED AT THE MEETING BETWEEN COMGEP AND NELSON MANDELA ON 17 MAY. BATTERSBY'S FACTS ARE ACCURATE. HE REPORTS MANDELA AS HAVING AGREED TO COMGEP'S NEGOTIATING CONCEPT, WHICH INCLUES THE RELEASE OF MANDELA, UNBANNING OF THE ANC, AND IN RETURN A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE BY THE ANC.

3. WE ARE SENDING A COPY OF BATTERSBY'S REPORT AND A MORE SPECULATIVE ARTICLE IN THE SAME NEWSPAPER, ALSO BY BATTERSBY ON THE QUESTION OF COMGEP'S FUTURE AFTER THE SADF RAIDS.

4. EDDIE BOTHA, THE POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT OF THE AFRIKAANS NEWSPAPER 'RAPPORT' HAS TOLD US THAT BATTERSBY'S SOURCE FOR THE MANDELA REPORT IS DENNIS WORRALL. BOTHA KNOWS THIS AS HE HAS RECIEVED THE SAME INFORMATION FROM HIS OWN COLLEAGUE IN LONDON, QUOTING WORRALL. BOTHA HAS ALSO TOLD US THAT HE AND SELECTED OTHER POLITICAL CORRESPONDENTS RECIEVE REGULAR OFF-THE-RECORD BRIEFINGS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON COMGEP. THESE BRIEFINGS INCLUDE ACCESS TO COPIES OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND COMGEP, AND TO PRESIDENT BOTHA'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE SEVEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ATTENDING THE TOKYO SUMMIT. COMGEP'S 'NEGOTIATING CONCEPT' PROPOSALS HAVE ALSO BEEN SHOWN TO THESE CORRESPONDENTS.

5. ALTHOUGH BOTHA HAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE MOTIVE BEHIND THIS DELIBERATE LEAKING IN THE PAST HAS BEEN TO ADD THE MOMENTUM OF COMGEP'S INITIATIVE HE IS PUZZLED AT DR WORRALL'S LATEST LEAK. PRESIDOT BOTHA IS KNOWN TO BE ANGRY AT THE LEAKS, AND THIS LATEST INSTANCE WOULD, IN EDDIE BOTHA'S VIEW , LAY WORRALL'S JOB ''ON THE LINE''.

COMMENT

6. WE HAVE SUSPECTED FOR SOME TIME THAT FOREIGN MINISTER PIK BOTHA HAS BEEN BEHIND THE LEAKS, AND THAT HIS MOTIVE HAD BEEN TO IMPROVE THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF THE COMGEP INITIATIVE.

7. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE EXACT MOTIVES FOR THE LEAKING OF MANDELA'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMGEP PROPOSALS. IT COULD BE THAT THIS IS A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO KEEP THE INITIATIVE ALIVE.

SIGNED.....M J GRIFFITHS

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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22 May 1986

Dear Charles,

South African Raids

State President Botha has written to the Prime Minister about the South African Defence Force (SADF) raids on Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. We understand that this is a round robin addressed to the Summit Heads of Government, which may explain the peculiar complaint that he has had no answer from Mrs Thatcher to two of the points raised in pre-Tokyo correspondence.

Even so, the Foreign Secretary finds P W Botha's letter quite inadequate. His justification for the raids is flimsy and perfunctory; his statement that "terrorist forces remain adamant that they are not interested in a negotiating process" takes no account of the fact that the Commonwealth Group had at the time of the raids just returned from the talks with the ANC in Lusaka; and there is no direct mention in the State President's letter of the Commonwealth Group. Above all, the Foreign Secretary notes that President Botha's letter shows no glimmer of appreciation for the risks taken by the Prime Minister on his behalf; for the efforts made by her to promote and rally widespread international support for COMGEP and to stave off pressure for sanctions; or of the embarrassment caused by the raids to those who have been prepared to give South Africa the benefit of the doubt.

Sir Geoffrey Howe recommends that the Prime Minister should reply to President Botha as soon as possible making clear to him the very damaging impact which the South African raids on three neighbouring Commonwealth countries (two of whom - Zambia and Zimbabwe - will of course be at the Commonwealth Review Meeting) are likely to have, especially as regards COMGEP and further international pressure for sanctions. The White House has issued a strongly worded statement about the raids; further US measures against South Africa are not to be excluded. The Front Line States have already called for economic sanctions. If COMGEP collapses, the pressure for action of that kind will be such that if nothing is done to accommodate it there is a real risk that some countries will take action to break up the Commonwealth and in other ways (as they see it) to disadvantage Britain. Sir Geoffrey Howe is also worried at the domestic

/political

political implications of a breakdown: public opinion in this country could quickly move against the government if COMGEP collapsed and the UK were seen to be the main, if not the only, defenders of an intransigent South Africa: as he told the Prime Minister on Tuesday, he is already concerned that opposition to sanctions is increasingly equated with support for apartheid.

There is clear evidence that the raids were approved by President Botha and that Pik Botha was consulted. The fact that the Commonwealth Group were in Southern Africa at the time can hardly have been coincidental. But COMGEP - extraordinary as it may seem - does not seem to have been a factor in the President's calculations (this is perhaps borne out by the terms of his latest letter). This reflects the familiar South African lack of international perspective. Yet just as it may have been no coincidence that the Cabinda incident and the earlier raid on Gaborone occurred when, from the hard line South African point of view, there was a risk that the South African Government might be drawn into serious negotiations leading to Namibian independence, so too on this occasion.

The Commonwealth Group itself has not reacted formally to the raids. Those members who have spoken publicly have for the most part shown a commendable unwillingness to write it off prematurely. But we know that there is considerable anger within the Group at the raids, and not just over their timing. General Obasanjo for one feels particularly outraged by an attack, while he was in South Africa, on the two countries (Zambia and Zimbabwe) who nominated him to the Group. The Foreign Secretary has argued strongly, through Lord Barber whom he saw yesterday evening, that the Group should not allow itself to be deflected from its task. Lord Barber himself believes that all is not necessarily lost. If the Group's mood when they reached London survives the pressures on them from their parent governments (and this is by no means to be taken for granted) and if the South African Government come up with a positive response, he does not exclude the possibility that they may be willing to soldier on for a little longer. But Lord Barber is certain that a major step forward by the South African Government is required if the initiative is not to founder.

In this connection, Ramphal has told Sir Antony Acland that if there is to be any chance of the Group (whom he expects will meet in London on 4-6 June to draft their report) continuing, the South Africans will have to come up with a really convincing response. This would consist of a clear cut acceptance by the South African Government of their "negotiating concept" and specific undertakings on how they intend to implement this.

/We

We have evidence that the South African Government are due to formulate their response to the Group this weekend. Hence the importance, in the Foreign Secretary's view, of an early letter from the Prime Minister to President Botha leaving him in no doubt of our position, of the fact that time is running out, and of the consequences of failure. I attach a draft letter from Mrs Thatcher accordingly.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

STRICTLY PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

The Hon P W BOTHA DMS

Your Reference

Copies to:

SLHARY

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 19 May (which does not appear to take account of mine of 9 May). It arrived as I was on the point of writing to let you know of my ~~shock and dismay~~ vexation and indeed anger at the raids on 19 May by the South African Defence Forces on alleged ANC targets in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

I find this action by the South African Government absolutely impossible to understand. The raid on Botswana is particularly inexplicable given that your own officials had only recently been holding discussions on security co-operation with their Botswanan counterparts and that a meeting of the Joint Commission had been proposed for 23 May. I have condemned the raids just as I condemn all cross-border violations in either direction.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I have looked in vain in your letter for any convincing justification of the attacks. They do not appear to have brought you any ~~significant~~ military advantage. Nor can I see what possible advantage to South Africa could outweigh the immense damage done to your

/ international

STRICTLY PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

international position and in particular to the Commonwealth initiative of which you make no mention but which I have supported so strongly, believing it to be in your interest. I frankly find this omission astonishing. I was also puzzled by your statement that "terrorist forces remain adamant that they are not interested in a negotiating process", given that at the time of the raids the Commonwealth Group had just returned from Lusaka where they had been exploring this very point with the ANC.

You will know from our frank exchanges since the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Nassau last October how much importance my colleagues and I have attached to the success of the Commonwealth initiative. The Group's efforts have become the vehicle for the hopes of many within and outside South Africa who saw it as a unique opportunity to help break the cycle of violence and ~~make~~ hopefully a start on dialogue. With so much pinned on the Commonwealth Group by the European Community and governments of the Seven Summit leaders as well as by the Commonwealth itself, the reaction if the initiative founders as a result of South African policy will be that much harsher. I simply do not understand why the South African Government should have mounted such attacks while the Commonwealth Group were in Southern Africa trying to make progress towards achieving dialogue. Given the timing of the raids, it will inevitably be said that they were a deliberate attempt by your Government to torpedo an initiative which was developing too well. I myself find them hard to reconcile with the relationship of trust and confidence which I had thought we had established.

//We

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Enclosures—flag(s).....

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/Even

Even so, I believe we still need to consider whether the COMGEP process can be salvaged. I take it that you want it to succeed. ~~But the task, always difficult, has been made yet more difficult by these raids on your neighbours.~~ It may still not be too late to get the process going again, though I know that there is much anger and resentment in the Group at the raids. ~~(General Obasanjo, for example, is mindful of the fact that he was actually nominated for the Group by Zambia and Zimbabwe.)~~ I believe that the Group may yet respond to a genuine and unequivocal step forward on your part; but they will not allow themselves to become involved in a debate on semantics, which they will see as just an attempt to string them along. ~~I am sure that~~ What is needed is an early and clear cut acceptance of their negotiating concept, together with specific indications of the way in which the South African Government intend to implement it.

(No more than in the part I)

~~I do not~~ underestimate the difficulties for you, nor ~~do I overlook the~~ political problems you face with those who are adamantly opposed to change. But I urge you most strongly to consider what is at stake. We are at a watershed. Failure of the Commonwealth initiative would have the most serious consequences. It would hugely increase the already considerable international pressure for further measures against South Africa. You know what my attitude has been, but there must be a limit to how far we can put our own interests at risk by standing alone. On present form, the Group are likely to meet in early June to draft their report. Once that is done, I fear that the die will be cast. ~~It is~~ The way in which your government responds in the next few days ~~with it~~ could be decisive.

/I

I do not think I need to send you a detailed response on the other points you raise in your latest letter, since I have already commented on them in my letter of 18 April.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 May 1986

SUBJECT cc MASTER
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T96/86

Dear Mr. President

Thank you for your letter of 19 May (which does not appear to take account of mine of 9 May). It arrived as I was on the point of writing to let you know of my vexation and indeed anger at the raids on 19 May by the South African Defence Forces on alleged ANC targets in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

I find this action by the South African Government absolutely impossible to understand. The raid on Botswana is particularly inexplicable given that your own officials had only recently been holding discussions on security co-operation with their Botswanan counterparts and that a meeting of the Joint Commission had been proposed for 23 May. I have condemned the raids just as I condemn all cross-border violations in either direction.

I have looked in vain in your letter for any convincing justification of the attacks. They do not appear to have brought you any military advantage. Nor can I see what possible advantage to South Africa could outweigh the immense damage done to your international position and in particular to the Commonwealth initiative of which you make no mention but which I have supported so strongly, believing it to be in your interest. I frankly find this omission astonishing. I

was also puzzled by your statement that "terrorist forces remain adamant that they are not interested in a negotiating process", given that at the time of the raids the Commonwealth Group had just returned from Lusaka where they had been exploring this very point with the ANC.

You will know from our frank exchanges since the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Nassau last October how much importance I have attached to the success of the Commonwealth initiative. The Group's efforts have become the vehicle for the hopes of many within and outside South Africa who see it as a unique opportunity to help break the cycle of violence and promote a start on dialogue. With so much pinned on the Commonwealth Group by the Seven Summit leaders and by governments of the European Community, as well as by the Commonwealth itself, the reaction if the initiative founders as a result of South African policy will be that much harsher. I simply do not understand why the South African Government should have mounted such attacks while the Commonwealth Group were in Southern Africa trying to make progress towards achieving dialogue. Given the timing of the raids, it will inevitably be said that they were a deliberate attempt by your Government to torpedo an initiative which was developing too well. I myself find them hard to reconcile with the relationship of trust and confidence which I had thought we had established.

Even so, I believe we still need to consider whether the COMGEP process can be salvaged. I take it that you want it to succeed. It may still not be too late to get the process going again, thought I know that there is much anger and resentment in the Group at the raids. I believe that the Group may yet respond to a genuine and unequivocal step forward on your part; but they will not allow themselves to become involved in a debate on semantics, which they will see as just an attempt to string them along. What is needed is an early and clear cut acceptance of their negotiating concept, together with specific indications of the way in which the South African Government intend to implement it.

No more than in the past do I underestimate the difficulties for you, nor the political problems you face with those who are adamantly opposed to change. But I urge you most strongly to consier what is at stake. We are at a watershed. Failure of the Commonwealth initiative would have the most serious consequences. It would hugely increase the already considerable international pressure for further measures against South Africa. You know what my attitude has been, but there is a limit to how far I am able to hold that position. It says a great deal for the Commonwealth Group that they nevertheless went ahead with their meeting with your Ministers despite the raids. It shows that they are genuinely anxious for a solution. On present form, the Group are likely to meet in early June to draft their report. Once that is done, I fear that the die will be cast. The way in which your Government responds in the next few days could be decisive. I cannot emphasise enough the deep anxiety which we all feel about South Africa's future if what I believe may be the last chance for a negotiated solution is rejected.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable P. W. Botha, D.M.S.

OCMIAN 8355
CONFIDENTIAL
ZZ GABOR
FM FCOLN TO GABOR
211030Z MAY
GRS 300

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM FCO
TO FLASH GABORONE
TELNO 68
OF 211030Z MAY 86

MY TELNO 161: SOUTH AFRICAN RAIDS
1. PLEASE CONVEY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MASIRE.
QUOTE
DEAR MR PRESIDENT
I WISH TO EXPRESS TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF BOTSWANA MY DEEP SYMPATHY AT THE SUDDEN AND INEXCUSABLE ATTACK BY SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCES ON 19 MAY. THE ATTACK IS THE MORE TO BE DEPLORED BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF LIFE AND INJURIES WHICH IT HAS CAUSED.
I MADE CLEAR IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THIS AFTERNOON THAT I TOTALLY AND UTTERLY CONDEMNED THE SOUTH AFRICAN ACTION. WE HAVE ALSO SUMMONED THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHARGE TO MAKE CLEAR OUR CONDEMNATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN BEHAVIOUR AND TO EMPHASISE OUR VIEW THAT SUCH ACTIONS CAN ONLY SET BACK THE PROCESS OF FINDING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO SOUTH AFRICA'S PROBLEMS WHICH WE ALL SO EARNESTLY DESIRE. IT IS EVEN MORE DEPLORABLE THAT THE ATTACKS SHOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE WHILE THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS WERE IN SOUTH AFRICA ON A MISSION AIMED AT ACHIEVING A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES AND THE START OF DIALOGUE.
DESPITE THIS VERY SERIOUS SETBACK, I BELIEVE THAT THE COMGEP PROCESS IS STILL THE BEST AVAILABLE MEANS OR PROMOTING PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA, AND AVOIDING THE BLOODBATH WHICH NONE OF US WISH TO SEE. THE IMMEDIATE NEED IS TO CONSIDER HOW BEST

TO KEEP IT ALIVE. A MAJOR EFFORT OF WILL AND IMAGINATION IS GOING TO BE REQUIRED, FIRST AND FOREMOST FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN THIS. BUT I AM SURE THAT THE EFFORT MUST BE MADE: THERE IS STILL A WORTHWHILE CHANCE OF MAKING PROGRESS, AND WE MUST NOT LET IT SLIP.

WITH WARM REGARDS

UNQUOTE

2. SIMILAR MESSAGES ARE ALSO BEING SENT TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND MR MUGABE.

3. ORIGINALS FOLLOW BY BAG.

HOWE

SOUTH AFRICA

LIMITED

SAFD
CAFD
UND — CCD
ECD(E)
NEWS DEPT.
LEGAL ADVISERS
PLANNING STAFF
CONS DEPT.
SCD
PUSD
DEFENCE DEPT.
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR FERGUSSON
MR REEVE
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
GS SEC (2) / MOD
ASSESSMENT STAFF, CABINET OFFICE.

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 May 1986

Dear Colin,

SOUTH AFRICAN RAIDS

Thank you for your letter of 22 May enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Botha about the recent South African raids on Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. I enclose the message signed by the Prime Minister. Provided you are content with the various amendments which I have made, I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be despatched telegraphically to Cape Town as rapidly as possible.

Yours sincerely

(CHARLES POWELL)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 May 1986

Thank you for your letter of 20 May enclosing draft messages from the Prime Minister to Presidents Kaunda and Masire and Prime Minister Mugabe.

I enclose originals of the messages signed by the Prime Minister. You will no doubt want to telegraph the text as quickly as possible.

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

No 10 (VIA TUBE) DD

20/634

R. Lyall on file

ZCZC
HPLNAN 4831 CFPOAN 0495
CONFIDENTIAL
DD 201700Z FCOLN
FM CAPEM TO FCOLN
201530Z MAY
GRS 310

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 201700Z FCO
TELNO 282
OF 201530Z MAY 86

MY TELNO 278 : SOUTH AFRICAN RAIDS : MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA

1. I WAS SUMMONED THIS AFTERNOON BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO RECEIVE A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA TO THE PRIME MINISTER DATED 19 MAY. TEXT IN MIFT. SIMILAR MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO THE OTHER TOKYO SEVEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

2. HAVING READ THE LETTER I SAID I WISHED TO MAKE TWO IMMEDIATE COMMENTS :

(A) THE PRESIDENT IMPLIED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED NO WORD FROM MRS THATCHER SINCE TOKYO, YET SHE HAD IN FACT WRITTEN TO HIM IN THE DIRECT AFTERMATH OF THE TOKYO MEETING. THE DFA'S EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD RECEIVED NO RESPONSE ON THE TWO SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED IN THE FIRST PART OF HIS LETTER, NAMELY A POSSIBLE CONTINUATION OF VIOLENCE AND THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ANC.

(B) I TOOK UP THE REFENCE TO ''TERRORIST FORCES REMAIN ADAMANT THAT THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATING PROCESS''. I SAID THIS PART OF THE EXPLANATION FOR THE SADF RAIDS WOULD BE RECEIVED WITH ASTONISHMENT IN LONDON, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP HAD JUST BEEN EXPLORING THIS VERY POINT WITH THE ANC AND WERE IN CAPE TOWN FOR FURTHER TALKS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME OF THE RAIDS.

3. I ADDED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD ALREADY KNOW THAT NEWS OF THE RAIDS HAD BEEN VERY BADLY RECEIVED IN LONDON. I TOOK HIM THROUGH AN EXCERPT OF YOUR REMARKS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. I SAID WE WERE AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR THESE ATTACKS AGAINST THE TERRITORY OF THREE OF OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP WERE IN CAPE TOWN. I HADBEEN INSTRUCTED YESTERDAY TO REQUEST A MEETING WITH HIS MINISTER FOR WHICH I WAS STILL WAITING. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WOULD OF COURSE ANSWER SOME OF OUR QUESTIONS I STILL HOPED FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE PIK BOTHA AND TO ASK HIM PARTICULARLY WHAT WE WERE TO MAKE OF THE TIMING OF THEIR DECISION TO LAUNCH THESE RAIDS AND HOW THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT NOW VIEWED EFFORTS TO END VIOLENCE THROUGH THE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE IN THE LIGHT OF THE RAIDS AND THEIR OWN MEETING WITH THE GROUP YESTERDAY.

4. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

MOBERLY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 201730Z FCO
TELNO 283
OF 201535Z MAY 86

CC/PC

No 10,
Please keep in file. T'd below

MIPT : SOUTH AFRICAN RAIDS : MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT :

A most unconvincing message.
CDP 20/5.

BEGINS

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

YOU WILL RECALL THAT I WROTE TO YOU ON 29 APRIL 1986 ABOUT TWO ISSUES WHICH REMAIN A SOURCE OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN TO ME AND MY GOVERNMENT. THE FIRST RELATED TO THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OF A CONTINUATION OF THE PERPETRATION OF VIOLENCE ACCOMPANYING THE DEMAND FOR MR MANDELA'S RELEASE OR A SUBSEQUENT RESURGENCE OF GENERAL VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRY AS A FORM OF PRESSURE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. I SAID THAT NOT ONLY THE ANC BUT OTHER PARTIES AS WELL, OR ELEMENTS WITHIN THEM, WERE ENGAGED IN A CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE AND THAT WE NEEDED TO BE SATISFIED THAT AT LEAST THEIR LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS THE ANC LEADERSHIP WOULD HONOUR COMMITMENTS TO END THEIR VIOLENCE.

I REALISE THAT IN EXCHANGES WITH YOUR AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS, WE HAVE ALTERNATED THE USE OF WORDS SUCH AS ''SUSPEND'', ''END'', AND ''CESSATION OF'' IN RELATION TO ''VIOLENCE''. IT IS NOT, TO MY MIND, THE CHOICE OF A PARTICULAR WORD BUT THE CONCEPT OF TERMINATING VIOLENCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES WHICH IS RELEVANT. I AM SURE THAT YOU COULD NO MORE SUPPORT THE NOTION THAT VIOLENCE SHOULD BE DISCONTINUED ONLY FOR AS LONG AS NEGOTIATIONS

TAKE PLACE, THAN I ASSUME YOU COULD ACCEPT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD REINSTITUTE ''APARTHEID'' UNLESS THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONCLUDED TO ITS SATISFACTION.

MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT UNACCEPTABLE PRICIPLES SHOULD NOT BE ADVANCED AS CONDITIONS FOR DISCUSSIONS. TO USE VIOLENCE OR THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE AS A BARGAINING COUNTER IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT.

I INTIMATED PREVIOUSLY THAT I DID NOT WANT TO FIND MYSELF IN A SITUATION OF HAVING TO REINSTATE MEASURES IN ORDER TO CONTROL A

POSSIBLE RESURGENCE OF VIOLENCE AND DISCOVER, AS YOU ACKNOWLEDGE MIGHT HAPPEN, THAT SOME GOVERNMENTS WOULD SEE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, DESPITE OUR ACTING IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHIN REASON, AS AN EXCUSE FOR FURTHER PUNITIVE MEASURES.

THE OTHER MATTER WAS THAT OF THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ANC. I SAID THAT THERE WAS AN URGENT NEED FOR GOVERNMENTS WHICH SHARED YOUR VIEWS OF TERRORISM PUBLICLY TO DENOUNCE THE ANC AND I URGED THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT PRESENT AT THE SUMMIT MEETING IN TOKYO TO REJECT VIOLENCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.

[Complete nonsense]

TO DATE I HAVE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE FROM YOU ON THESE TWO ISSUES.

IN THE MEANTIME FURTHER EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRODUCED INDICATING THAT CERTAIN COUNTRIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA CONTINUE TO HARBOUR TERRORISTS. THESE ARE THE ELEMENTS THAT ARE NOT INTERESTED IN ANY REFORM. THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN MY GOVERNMENT'S STATED INTENTION TO REMOVE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND MY GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO POWER SHARING.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES WERE LEFT WITH NO OPTION BUT TO ATTACK THE TERRORIST OPERATIONAL CENTRE AND TERRORIST TRANSIT FACILITY IN HARARE, A TERRORIST TRANSIT FACILITY IN BOTSWANA AND A TERRORIST OPERATIONAL CENTRE NEAR LUSAKA IN ZAMBIA.

REPRESENTATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO CURTAIL THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ANC INSIDE THIR TERRITORIES AND IN PARTICULAR THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF VIOLENCE FROM THEIR TERRITORIES. THEY WERE REQUESTED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO PREVENT THE INFILTRATION OF TERRORISTS FROM THEIR TERRITORIES. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS ISSUED FREQUENT WARNINGS THAT IT WILL HAVE TO TAKE ACTION IF GOVERNMENTS TOLERATE THE HARBOURING OF TERRORISTS ENGAGED IN VIOLENT ACTIONS AGAINST CIVILIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

ON 31 JANUARY THIS YEAR, I PROPOSED PUBLICLY THAT THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA GIVE URGENT AND SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT JOINT MECHANISM FOR DEALING WITH MATTERS OF SECURITY, PARTICULARLY THREATS TO PEACE AND PROSPERITY IN OUR SUB- CONTINENT.

MY GOVERNMENT STANDS READY TO COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING WITH ALL OUR NEIGHBOURS IN REGARD TO THE PROHIBITION OF SUPPORT FOR CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE OR THE PLANNING OF SUCH VIOLENCE.

IT CANNOT BE EXPECTED OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE

WITH ITS REFORM PROCESS WHILE TERRORIST FORCES REMAIN ADAMANT THAT THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATING PROCESS BUT WILL CONTINUE WITH THEIR VIOLENCE UNTIL POWER IS HANDED OVER TO THEM IN ORDER THAT THEY CAN RULE THE COUNTRY ON THE BASIS OF NORMS AND STANDARDS WHICH NO ONE IN THE FREE WORLD CAN SUPPORT AND WE IN SOUTH AFRICAN DO NOT ACCEPT.

WHEN YOU ISSUED YOUR STATEMENT IN TOKYO ON THE NECESSITY TO COMBAT ALL FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, MY GOVERNMENT SUBSCRIBED TO YOUR VIEWS AND MEASURES. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR ACTIONS ARE IN LINE WITH YOUR PROPOSALS TO END THE EVIL OF TERRORISM.

I TRUST YOU WILL BE ABLE TO CONDEMN THE USE OF VIOLENCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

YOURS SINCERELY
P W BOTHA

ENDS

MOBERLY

YYYY
CFPOAN 0496

NNNN

[PASSED OTHER SVCS]

SUBJECT
cc master
ops

Already received (with CSP) original dated 19.5.86.

NO 10
FILE

TKS

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LNCYAN 1132 CFPOAN 0496
CONFIDENTIAL
OO CAOFF
FM CAPEM TO FCOLN
201535Z MAY
GRS 700

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T95/86

CONFIDENTIAL
FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 201730Z FCO
TELNO 283
OF 201535Z MAY 86

MIPT : SOUTH AFRICAN RAIDS : MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT :

BEGINS

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TAKE PLACE, THAN I ASSUME YOU COULD ACCEPT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD REINSTITUTE ''APARTHEID'' UNLESS THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONCLUDED TO ITS SATISFACTION.

MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT UNACCEPTABLE PRICIPLES SHOULD NOT BE ADVANCED AS CONDITIONS FOR DISCUSSIONS. TO USE VIOLENCE OR THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE AS A BARGAINING COUNTER IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT.

I INTIMATED PREVIOUSLY THAT I DID NOT WANT TO FIND MYSELF IN A SITUATION OF HAVING TO REINSTATE MEASURES IN ORDER TO CONTROL A POSSIBLE RESURGENCE OF VIOLENCE AND DISCOVER, AS YOU ACKNOWLEDGE MIGHT HAPPEN, THAT SOME GOVERNMENTS WOULD SEE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, DESPITE OUR ACTING IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHIN REASON, AS AN EXCUSE FOR FURTHER PUNITIVE MEASURES.

THE OTHER MATTER WAS THAT OF THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ANC. I SAID THAT THERE WAS AN URGENT NEED FOR GOVERNMENTS WHICH SHARED YOUR VIEWS OF TERRORISM PUBLICLY TO DENOUNCE THE ANC AND I URGED THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT PRESENT AT THE SUMMIT MEETING IN TOKYO TO REJECT VIOLENCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.

TO DATE I HAVE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE FROM YOU ON THESE TWO ISSUES.

IN THE MEANTIME FURTHER EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRODUCED INDICATING THAT CERTAIN COUNTRIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA CONTINUE TO HARBOUR TERRORISTS. THESE ARE THE ELEMENTS THAT ARE NOT INTERESTED IN ANY REFORM. THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN MY GOVERNMENT'S STATED INTENTION TO REMOVE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND MY GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO POWER SHARING.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES WERE LEFT WITH NO OPTION BUT TO ATTACK THE TERRORIST OPERATIONAL CENTRE AND TERRORIST TRANSIT FACILITY IN HARARE, A TERRORIST TRANSIT FACILITY IN BOTSWANA AND A TERRORIST OPERATIONAL CENTRE NEAR LUSAKA IN ZAMBIA.

REPRESENTATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO CURTAIL THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ANC INSIDE THIR TERRITORIES AND IN PARTICULAR THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF VIOLENCE FROM THEIR TERRITORIES. THEY WERE REQUESTED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO PREVENT THE INFILTRATION OF TERRORISTS FROM THEIR TERRITORIES. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS ISSUED FREQUENT WARNINGS THAT IT WILL HAVE TO TAKE ACTION IF GOVERNMENTS TOLERATE THE HARBOURING OF TERRORISTS ENGAGED IN VIOLENT ACTIONS AGAINST CIVILIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

ON 31 JANUARY THIS YEAR, I PROPO H CLY THAT THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA GIVE URGENT AND SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT JOINT MECHANISM FOR DEALING WITH MATTERS OF SECURITY, PARTICULARLY THREATS TO PEACE AND PROSPERITY IN OUR SUB- CONTINENT.

MY GOVERNMENT STANDS READY TO COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING WITH ALL OUR NEIGHBOURS IN REGARD TO THE PROHIBITION OF SUPPORT FOR CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE OR THE PLANNING OF SUCH VIOLENCE.

IT CANNOT BE EXPECTED OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE WITH ITS REFORM PROCESS WHILE TERRORIST FORCES REMAIN ADAMANT THAT THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATING PROCESS BUT WILL CONTINUE WITH THEIR VIOLENCE UNTIL POWER IS HANDED OVER TO THEM IN ORDER THAT THEY CAN RULE THE COUNTRY ON THE BASIS OF NORMS AND STANDARDS WHICH NO ONE IN THE FREE WORLD CAN SUPPORT AND WE IN SOUTH AFRICAN DO NOT ACCEPT.

WHEN YOU ISSUED YOUR STATEMENT IN TOKYO ON THE NECESSITY TO COMBAT ALL FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, MY GOVERNMENT SUBSCRIBED TO YOUR VIEWS AND MEASURES. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR ACTIONS ARE IN LINE WITH YOUR PROPOSALS TO END THE EVIL OF TERRORISM.

I TRUST YOU WILL BE ABLE TO CONDEMN THE USE OF VIOLENCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

YOURS SINCERELY
P W BOTHA

ENDS

MOBERLY

YYYY
CFPOAN 0496

NNNN

SUBJECT
cc Master
Ops

file SLW
cc FCO
Sir P Cradock

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 May 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T94/86

Dear Kenneth,

I wish to express to you and the people of Zambia my deep sympathy at the sudden and inexcusable attack by South African Defence Forces on 19 May. The attack is the more to be deplored because of the loss of life and injuries which it has caused. I made clear in the House of Commons this afternoon that I totally and utterly condemned the South African action. We have also summoned the South African Chargé to make clear our condemnation of South African behaviour and to emphasise our view that such actions can only set back the process of finding a peaceful solution to South Africa's problems which we all so earnestly desire. It is even more deplorable that the attacks should have taken place while the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons were in South Africa on a mission aimed at achieving a suspension of violence on all sides and the start of dialogue.

Despite this very serious setback, I believe that the COMGEP process is still the best available means of promoting peaceful change in South Africa, and avoiding the bloodbath which none of us wish to see. The immediate need is to consider how best to keep it alive. A major effort of will and imagination is going to be required, first and foremost from the South African Government, if we are to succeed in this. But I am sure that the effort must be made: there is still a worthwhile chance of making progress, and we must not

MT

let it slip. You will recall how we did not falter in the negotiations for Zimbabwe's independence despite many setbacks and acts of violence.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret

His Excelleny Dr. Kenneth Kaunda

SUBJECT
cc Master
OPS

L-de S RW
cc FCO
Sir P Cradock

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 May 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 93/86

Dear Mr. President,

I wish to express to you and the people of Botswana my deep sympathy at the sudden and inexcusable attack by South African Defence Forces on 19 May. The attack is the more to be deplored because of the loss of life and injuries which it has caused. I made clear in the House of Commons this afternoon that I totally and utterly condemned the South African action. We have also summoned the South African Chargé to make clear our condemnation of South African behaviour and to emphasise our view that such actions can only set back the process of finding a peaceful solution to South Africa's problems which we all so earnestly desire. It is even more deplorable that the attacks should have taken place while the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons were in South Africa on a mission aimed at achieving a suspension of violence on all sides and the start of dialogue.

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from the South African Government, if we are to succeed in this. But I am sure that the effort must be made: there is still a worthwhile chance of making progress, and we must not let it slip.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Dr. Quett Ketumile Jonny Masire, J.P., M.P.

SUBJECT
cc Master
Ops

file SPW
ref to
Sir P Cradock

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 May 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 92/86

Dear Prime Minister,

I wish to express to you and the people of Zimbabwe my deep sympathy at the sudden and inexcusable attack by South African Defence Forces on 19 May. The attack is the more to be deplored because of the loss of life and injuries which it has caused. I made clear in the House of Commons this afternoon that I totally and utterly condemned the South African action. We have also summoned the South African Chargé to make clear our condemnation of South African behaviour and to emphasise our view that such actions can only set back the process of finding a peaceful solution to South Africa's problems which we all so earnestly desire. It is even more deplorable that the attacks should have taken place while the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons were in South Africa on a mission aimed at achieving a suspension of violence on all sides and the start of dialogue.

Despite this very serious setback, I believe that the COMGEP process is still the best available means of promoting peaceful change in South Africa, and avoiding the bloodbath which none of us wish to see. The immediate need is to consider how best to keep it alive. A major effort of will and imagination is going to be required, first and foremost from the South African Government, if we are to succeed in

KLB

this. But I am sure that the effort must be made: there is still a worthwhile chance of making progress, and we must not let it slip.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable Robert Mugabe, M.P.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 May 1986

Dear Charles,

As he told the Prime Minister this morning, the Foreign Secretary believes that there is a strong case for her to send an early message to President Botha, making quite clear our disapproval of the South African raids on Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, before putting forward a draft he wishes first to discuss yesterday's events and their implications with Lord Barber, whom he will be meeting on 21 May.

Meanwhile he thinks it important that the Prime Minister should send messages of sympathy to Presidents Kaunda, Mugabe and Masire.

Clearly the wording of the individual messages should be consistent with the public position we have already adopted and, in the case of Botswana, with the words the Prime Minister used to President Masire in June last year following the last South African attack on Gaborone.

I enclose draft messages.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

President Kenneth Kaunda

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT: SPEAST

I wish to express to you and the people of Zambia my deep sympathy ~~and sense of shock~~ at the sudden and ~~indefensible~~ inexcusable attack by South African Defence Forces on 19 May. The attack is the more to be deplored because of the loss of life and injuries which it has caused. I made clear in the House of Commons this afternoon ~~As you may know, later the same day in Parliament~~ with I totally & utterly condemned the ~~the Foreign Secretary condemned South Africa's action as~~ South Africa action. We have also summoned ~~a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of three fellow~~ Commonwealth countries. ~~The Minister of State, Lynda Chalker, had by then already summoned the South African~~ Chargé. ~~She made clear to him our total condemnation of~~ to make clear South African behaviour and to emphasise our view that such actions can only set back the process of finding a peaceful solution to South Africa's problems which we all so earnestly desire. It is even more deplorable that the attacks should have taken place while the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons were in South Africa on a mission aimed at achieving a suspension of violence on all sides and the start of dialogue.

/Despite

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Despite this very serious setback, I believe that the COMGEP process is still the best available means of promoting peaceful change in South Africa, and avoiding the bloodbath which none of us wish to see. The immediate need is to consider how best to keep it alive. A major effort of will and imagination is going to be required, first and foremost from the South African Government, if we are to succeed in this. But I am sure that the effort must be made: there is still a worthwhile chance of making progress, and we must not let it slip.

With warm regards.

You will recall how we did not falter in our reactions for Zimbabwe, adopted a bipartisan approach to setbacks & acts of violence.

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

President Masire

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT: SRWABU

I wish to express to you and the people of Zimbabwe my deep sympathy ~~and shock~~ at the sudden and ~~indefensible~~ inexcusable attack by South African Defence Forces on 19 May. I am particularly saddened to hear that the raid has caused death and injury.

As you may know, later the same day in Parliament the Foreign Secretary condemned South Africa's action as a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of three fellow Commonwealth countries. The Minister of State, Lynda Chalker, had by then already summoned the South African Chargé. She made clear to him our total condemnation of South African behaviour and emphasised our view that such actions can only set back the process of finding a peaceful solution to South Africa's problems which we all so earnestly desire. It is even more deplorable that the attacks should have taken place while the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons were in South Africa on a mission aimed at achieving a suspension of violence on all sides and the start of dialogue.

as for first draft

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/Despite

Despite this very serious setback, I believe that the COMGEP process is still the best available means of promoting peaceful change in South Africa, and avoiding the bloodbath which none of us wish to see. The immediate need is to consider how best to keep it alive. A major effort of will and imagination is going to be required, first and foremost from the South African Government, if we are to succeed in this. But I am sure that the effort must be made: there is still a worthwhile chance of making progress, and we must not let it slip.

With warm regards.

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Mr Robert Mugabe

Your Reference

Copies to:

SRWABV

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

I wish to express to you and the people of Zimbabwe my deep sympathy and ~~sense of shock~~ at the sudden and inexcusable ~~indefensible~~ attack by South African Defence Forces on 19 May.

As you may know, later the same day in Parliament the Foreign Secretary condemned South Africa's action as a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of three fellow Commonwealth countries. The Minister of State, Lynda Chalker, had by then already summoned the South African Chargé. She made clear to him our total condemnation of South African behaviour and emphasised our view that such actions can only set back the process of finding a peaceful solution to South Africa's problems which we all so earnestly desire. It is even more deplorable that the attacks should have taken place while the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons were in South Africa on a mission aimed at achieving a suspension of violence on all sides and the start of dialogue.

Despite this very serious setback, I believe that

Enclosures—flag(s).....

the COMGEP process is still the best available means of promoting peaceful change in South Africa, and avoiding the bloodbath which none of us wish to see. The immediate need is to consider how best to keep it alive. A major effort of will and imagination is going to be required, first and foremost from the South African Government, if we are to succeed in this. But I am sure that the effort must be made: there is still a worthwhile chance of making progress, and we must not let it slip.

With best wishes.

T95/86.

Tuynhuys
Cape Town

19 May 1986

Dear Prime Minister

You will recall that I wrote to you on 29 April 1986 about two issues which remain a source of considerable concern to me and my Government. The first related to the implications for the South African Government of a continuation of the perpetration of violence accompanying the demand for Mr Mandela's release or a subsequent resurgence of general violence in the country as a form of pressure in the negotiating process. I said that not only the ANC but other parties as well, or elements within them, were engaged in a campaign of violence and that we needed to be satisfied that at least their leadership as well as the ANC leadership would honour commitments to end their violence.

I realise that in exchanges with your and other governments, we have alternated the use of words such as "suspend", "end", and "cessation of" in relation to "violence". It is not, to my mind, the choice of a particular word but the concept of terminating violence as a means of achieving political objectives which is relevant. I am sure that you could no more support the notion that violence should be discontinued only for as long as negotiations take place, than I assume you could accept that the South African

Government would re-institute "apartheid" unless the negotiations were concluded to its satisfaction.

My Government believes that unacceptable principles should not be advanced as conditions for discussions. To use violence or the threat of violence as a bargaining counter is unacceptable to the South African Government.

I intimated previously that I did not want to find myself in a situation of having to reinstate measures in order to control a possible resurgence of violence and discover, as you acknowledge might happen, that some Governments would see such a development, despite our acting in good faith and within reason, as an excuse for further punitive measures.

The other matter was that of the aims and objectives of the ANC. I said that there was an urgent need for Governments which shared your views of terrorism publicly to denounce the ANC and I urged the Heads of Government present at the Summit Meeting at Tokyo to reject violence as a means of achieving political objectives.

To date I have received no response from you on these two issues.

In the meantime further evidence has been produced indicating that certain countries in Southern Africa continue to harbour terrorists. These are the elements that are not interested in any reform. They are not interested in my Government's stated intention to remove racial discrimination and my Government's commitment to power sharing.

The South African Security Forces were left with no option but to attack the terrorist operational centre and terrorist transit facility in Harare, a terrorist transit facility in Botswana and a terrorist operational centre near Lusaka in Zambia.

Representations have been made to the Governments concerned to curtail the activities of the ANC inside their territories and in particular the planning and execution of violence from their territories. They were requested to take appropriate measures to prevent the infiltration of terrorists from their territories. The South African Government has issued frequent warnings that it will have to take action if Governments tolerate the harbouring of terrorists engaged in violent actions against civilians in South Africa.

On 31 January this year, I proposed publicly that the countries of Southern Africa give urgent and serious consideration to the establishment of a permanent joint mechanism for dealing with matters of security, particularly threats to peace and prosperity in our sub-continent.

My Government stands ready to come to an understanding with all our neighbours in regard to the prohibition of support for cross-border violence or the planning of such violence.

It cannot be expected of the South African Government to continue with its reform process while terrorist forces remain adamant that they are not interested in a negotiating process but will continue with their violence until power is handed over to them in order that they can rule the country on the basis of norms and standards which no one in the free world can support and we in South Africa do not accept.

When you issued your statement in Tokyo on the necessity to combat all forms of international terrorism, my Government subscribed to your views and measures. We believe that our actions are in line with your proposals to end the evil of terrorism.

I trust that you will be able to condemn the use of violence as a means of achieving political objectives in Southern Africa.

Yours sincerely

P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Right Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON

S. AFRICA

RELATIONS

PT 9



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 May 1986

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the Commonwealth Secretary-General, formally proposing dates for the Commonwealth Review Meeting of the work of the Eminent Persons' Group. I should be grateful for a draft reply.

Charles Powell

Colin Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

South Africa

3.31 pm

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Geoffrey Howe): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement on South African incursions into Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

As the House knows, a number of locations in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe were attacked early this morning. The South African defence forces have acknowledged that they were responsible for these attacks, full details of which are not yet available.

My hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Mrs. Chalker) has already summoned the South African chargé to ask for an urgent explanation. She expressed to him our grave concern. Our ambassador in South Africa has been instructed to seek an early call on the South African Foreign Minister.

Our high commissioners in Gabarone, Lusaka and Harare have been instructed to convey to their host Governments the British Government's concern at these attacks and to seek further details about them, including any indication of casualties.

We have always made plain our opposition to cross-border violence and have consistently condemned the resort to force by South Africa against her neighbours. Today's attacks by the South African defence forces represent a plain violation of the sovereignty of three fellow Commonwealth countries It is particularly deplorable that they should have taken place while the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons were in South Africa, seeking to promote a process of dialogue which would lead to the ending of apartheid, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides. Today's events underline the urgent need for just such a suspension of violence.

Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East): Yet again the South African Government have committed acts of aggression against front-line states. Yet again the sovereignty of independent Commonwealth Governments has been infringed by acts of state terrorism by the South African Government. Following President Botha's speech last Thursday, when he spoke against meddling foreigners, does that not show that South Africa is rejecting possibly its last chance of proceeding to a relatively bloodless evolution to majority rule via the mediation of the Eminent Persons Group, which, after all, our Prime Minister put forward at Nassau last October as a means, in her isolation, of preventing effective sanctions against South Africa?

President Botha, by this raid, has sent us a clear message. What a limp message the Foreign Secretary has sent in reply. Is the Foreign Secretary aware that Bishop Tutu has just said that the world awaits what the Prime Minister and President Reagan will do now, as always in the past the Prime Minister and President Reagan have vetoed mandatory sanctions against South Africa?

Does the Foreign Secretary not recognise that because of what happened at the Tokyo summit, and because of our isolated stance at the Luxembourg meeting last September with EEC Foreign Ministers and our isolated stance at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Nassau last October, we are perceived in the world as South Africa's best friend? The Foreign Secretary proposes to show our disapproval of this incursion by asking the Minister of State to wag her finger at the South African chargé d'affaires. This is an absurdly weak response, but how typical of the Government.

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman now take the lead in seeking the full implementation of the range of measures agreed at Luxembourg in September and at Nassau in October? In the letter and spirit of Luxembourg, how can he justify the South African military attachés accredited to Britain remaining en poste in London? In the light of the decision at Nassau last October, how can we still allow the importation of Krugerrands? Will he now send to President Botha a message that he will understand? What better reason than this aggression is there for immediately proceeding with selective sanctions against South Africa?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I can understand the indignation that the hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson) seeks to express in his questions. I deny absolutely the suggestion that the Government have adopted an isolated stance. We have condemned apartheid, and shall continue to condemn it, without reservation, and we wish it to be abolished as soon as possible. We wish that abolition to be achieved without the condemnation of all the peoples of South Africa to a bloodbath of violence. For that reason the Prime Minister and the Government were able to take the lead at Nassau and in the European Community in promoting an effective opportunity for a peaceful solution through the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. When it, has suited them, Opposition Members have been only too willing to endorse the legitimacy and effectiveness of that group. Let us start from the common ground.

We wish to bring about an early end to apartheid in South Africa. We wish that to be brought about by peaceful means, and the Eminent Persons Group is the most effective instrument devised so far for achieving that. As I said in my statement, it is for that reason that we regret this series of attacks. I have described as particularly deplorable the fact that they are taking place at this time. *[Interruption.]* If Opposition Members wished to address themselves seriously to trying to bring about what is necessary, they should stop shouting about it in their present absurd fashion. We have made our condemnation clear and will consider with out partners what further action may be necessary. Our objective will be to bring about a suspension of violence and a cessation of apartheid as soon as possible.

Sir John Biggs-Davison (Epping Forest): Should not our judgment of these matters be based, not on the merits or demerits of African Governments, but on international law? What is the international law on these matters? Was the air strike against terrorists in Tunisia consistent with international law?

Mr. Geoffrey Howe: My hon. Friend raises the matter of the air strike against Tunisia. He will recollect that we condemned that air strike without hesitation as having no foundation in international law.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: Libya.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: My hon. Friend said Tunisia.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: I apoligise, I meant Libya.

and agricultural development? Is there a policy block, or is it just that that is the way things have been done in the past and it is very difficult to change them?

Mr. Raison: I am ready to consider proposals for increased and further agricultural aid, because I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is very important. However, one has to remember that it is a question not only of this country accepting proposals but of the recipient Governments making a commitment to agricultural proposals as opposed to others.

Voluntary Agencies

56. **Mr. Stuart Holland** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he intends to make increased provision to the voluntary agencies concerned with development over the next three years.

Mr. Raison: The voluntary agencies provide very cost-effective aid to some of the poorest communities in the developing world. Our support for the agencies has increased considerably in recent years, and I expect to continue to offer them substantial financial support in the future.

Mr. Holland: Will the Minister come clean about how much he will contribute, because he did not in his reply say how much that might be? Does he intend at least to keep the increase in contributions in line with inflation? If not, in effect there will be a real cut. Despite all that he has said about his support for such excellent intitiatives as Sport Aid, if the Government's contributions to voluntary agencies cannot be increased in real terms, Sport Aid is the privatisation of what should be the Government's support policy.

Mr. Raison: It is not the Government's practice to publish detailed figures for three years ahead. If the hon. Gentleman looks at our record in the voluntary sector since 1979, he will find that our support for the British volunteer programme has increased by no less than 101 per cent. in real terms and that our support for the joint funding scheme has increased, again in real terms, by 41 per cent. That represents a major increase in support to the voluntary sector.

Mr. Forman: Does my right hon. Friend accept that many of his right hon. and hon. Friends think that to increase the provision for the voluntary agencies is a most cost effective way of using the funds that are available for the aid programme? Does he take heart from the paragraph in the Tokyo summit declaration that makes it clear that the Prime Minister and all the other Heads of Government are committed to maintaining and, where appropriate, increasing official aid from this country and from the other countries involved?

Mr. Raison: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his remarks about the Government's support for the voluntary sector. I have already said that our support has been outstanding. I, too, was heartened by the Tokyo summit communiqué.

Equatorial and Tropical Forests

57. **Mr. Spearing** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is his policy towards aid projects which affect the conservation of equatorial and tropical forests.

Mr. Raison: Our policy is to support the wise use and replenishment of the forests. In doing so we have accepted the Food and Agriculture Organisation's tropical forest action plan as a valuable framework for our actions.

Mr. Spearing: I thank the Minister for that reply. Will he assure the House that special attention will be given where there is objection to any aid project for which he is responsible which does not comply with the criteria that he has laid down? What action are Her Majesty's Government taking in respect of aid projects from other countries which do not meet the criteria which he outlined?

Mr. Raison: I accept that it is important that our aid projects should have full regard to environmental and human factors. As I have told the House, I have made representations to the president of the World Bank stressing our belief in the importance of giving proper regard to the environmental factors in respect of other aid programmes; and, of course, we are happy to discuss that with our fellow donors through the various means of donor co-ordination.

Public Expenditure (Aid)

58. **Mr. Alton** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what proportion of total public expenditure was spent on overseas aid in 1985.

Mr. Raison: For the financial year 1985-86 provisional figures indicate that overseas aid accounted for 0·84 per cent. of total public expenditure.

Mr. Alton: I thank the Minister for that reply. Will he confirm that as a percentage of GDP that is a lower precentage than in the late 1970s, and, despite Live Aid, Band Aid and the famine in africa, we are spending less now in real terms than we were then? Do the Government have any plans for increasing the amount of money spent on overseas aid?

Mr. Raison: There has been a fall in percentage terms since 1979; on the other hand, the aid programme is now broadly stable as a proportion of planned public expenditure, and we have had an increase in real terms this year over last year.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: Libya was quite different. There we had the plainest possible conclusion that state-directed terrorism was promoted, organised, sustained and directed by the Libyan Government, and it was universally recognised and condemned as such. That must be distinguished from what is happening in this case. One cannot conclude that any of the three Governments concerned have been promoting or inspiring, still less directing, terrorism in South Africa. In addition, we know that the Government of Botswana are at this moment considering with the South African Government means of curtailing terrorism. The circumstances could not be more different.

Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport): The whole House will join the Foreign Secretary in condemning this attack — [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] — this outrageous attack, particularly as it is not justifiable in international law. I am glad, at least, that the Foreign Secretary has not given us a justification in terms of article 51. Will he recognise that he will have to come before the House and the Security Council and agree now to a package of sanctions against South Africa? That is the logic of the present position. The South Africans deliberately undermined the Commonwealth peace initiative. That must now be met with sanctions, which must involve a banning of air flights to and from South Africa and a banning of new investment in South Africa.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I understand the point of view expressed by the right hon. Gentleman, but I do not depart from what I have said about the deplorable nature and timing of what has taken place, particularly because of the powerful efforts that my right hon. friend the Prime Minister and others have made in trying to promote the work of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. However, it is too early to come to a judgment on what action should be taken. Certainly the situation is very serious.

Mr. Jerry Wiggin (Weston-super-Mare): What representations has my right hon. and learned Friend made to the Governments of the three Commonwealth countries concerned against the quite open and flagrant harbouring of Communist-assisted terrorists?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: We have made plain our position over a very long period of time. We are opposed to cross-frontier violence of any kind, from whatever country, in southern Africa. Equally I must make it plain to my hon Friend that there is no evidence comparable to that cited in other cases that the front-line Commonwealth Governments concerned have been involved in the promotion, direction or inspiration of terrorism. Certainly there is nothing whatever to justify unprovoked attacks of this kind from South Africa.

Mr. Merlyn Rees (Morley and Leeds, South): May we come back to the point about international law? Is the Foreign Secretary saying on behalf of the Government that these violations of sovereignty are wrong and that the violation of the sovereignty of Libya, using aircraft from this country, was right?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I have already said in my statement that the attacks by the South African defence forces represent a plain violation of the sovereignty of three fellow Commonwealth countries, and they are to be deplored. I have made it plain to the House on other occasions, and do so again, that in the case of Libya—a totally different case from this—there was the plainest possible evidence of a Government directing and promoting state-sponsored terrorism and attacks on innocent targets. In the case of Libya there is plain evidence of state-sponsored terrorism, but there is no evidence of that kind in this case.

Mr. Tim Rathbone (Lewes): Will my right hon. and learned Friend accept that there might be a more balanced view on this matter if the Government were in touch with the ANC and were able to talk to it and find out the reactions, not only from the terrorist parts of that organisation, but from the nationalist parts?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: It was for that reason that we took steps to authorise contacts with the ANC at the time of my visit to Lusaka earlier this year and subsequently.

Mr. Tom Clarke (Monklands, West): Will the Foreign Secretary accept that those of us, including my hon. Friend the Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mrs. Dunwoody), who visited Gabarone last summer, after that infamous raid, and who saw rooms where young children had been shot in their own beds, regard South Africa as the focus of evil in the international society? Does not what has happened call for more than mere words and platitudes? Will the Foreign Secretary join the three Commonwealth countries concerned in demanding sanctions as the only real response to this outrage?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I entirely sympathise with the point expressed by the hon. Gentleman and by his hon. Friend the Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mrs. Dunwoody) about the way in which the incident is bound to be seen in Botswana. I have discussed the earlier incident there on more than one occasion with my opposite number, the Botswanan Foreign Minister, and I know that throughout the earlier part of this year Botswana was engaged in discussions with the South African Government, through a joint commission and other means, about methods of preventing the risk of terrorist action across their frontier. In those circumstances, with a meeting of the joint commission due to take place at the end of this week, I have already deplored this action, particularly with reference to Botswana.

Mr. Eric Forth (Mid-Worcestershire): My right hon. and learned Friend will recall that our American friends and allies persuaded us that Libya had mounted terrorist attacks from its territory, which justified an attack in turn on Libya. What opportunity has he given our South African friends to tell us of their evidence of terrorist attacks mounted on them from the three countries concerned?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: We have, of course, been in touch with the South African Government on earlier occasions

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Mr. Forth: This time.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: Today, my hon. Friend the Minister of State has been in touch with the South African chargé in London. I cannot emphasise too strongly the lack of similarity between the two events. There is almost universal recognition of sustained, direct, proclaimed Libyan state-sponsored terrorist attacks on innocent people outside that country. The two cases are as different as chalk from cheese.

Mr. David Winnick (Walsall, North): Leaving aside the fellow travellers of the South African regime who are sitting on the Tory Benches, do not the raids once again demonstrate that the South Africans have no more intention of observing international law than of respecting human and political rights in South Africa? When will the Foreign Secretary realise that a gentle rebuke now and again of the South African authorities is not sufficient? Much stronger action is required. When will the British Government face their responsibilities and recognise that far more effective measures including economic sanctions, are required against that apartheid regime?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: If the matter were only one tenth as simple as the hon. Gentleman implies! The Prime Minister and I have made it plan to the South African Government on many occasions that there is an urgent need for them to take the necessary steps to bring apartheid to an end. To that end, with the support of Commonwealth and European Governments, we have promoted the energetic work of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. We have invested a lot of effort in that exercise, and that is why we join the whole House in deploring the attacks that have taken place today.

Mr. Richard Alexander (Newark): If terrorist raids had taken place from those three Commonwealth countries against South Africa's sovereign territory, it would surely have been with the connivance, at the very least, of their Governments.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I have already said that there is no evidence that any violence by the ANC or anybody else in South Arica is sanctioned, still less directed, by the authorities in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. At the very time when the attack took place, contacts were made between the Governments of Botswana and South Africa with a view to a further meeting of the joint commission directed towards joint action against such activity.

Mr. Guy Barnett (Greenwich): Did the Foreign Secretary notice that when President Masire of Botswana surveyed the damage done by the brutality of South African troops he described the action as being "completely unprovoked and unwarranted"? He asked:

"What have we done to deserve this?"

Does that not sound like a cry for help to fellow Commonwealth countries? What practical contribution will the Government make to the Government of Botswana in order to repair some of the damage done by South African troops?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I have not yet seen the President's observation, but I can well understand why he made it. We shall have to consider that question, and several other matters arising out of it.

Mr. Hugh Dykes (Harrow, East): Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that the fact that he has made a statement is appreciated in all parts of the House, especially as the United Kingdom Government is in a difficult position, which deserves some sympathy, but do not the raids conclusively show that the regime in Pretoria is not only extremely dislikeable, but stupid? After all, it has perpetrated an act that will make it far more difficult for the Eminent Persons Group to reach a successful conclusion. Is there any prospect of this Government, as a leading Government in the Commonwealth, and as they are taking over the EEC presidency on 1 July, making sure that there are renewed initiatives? Is my right hon. and learned Friend still hopeful that the Eminent Persons Group will be successful? Has not the day been brought inevitably closer when full sanctions will be imposed against Pretoria?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, the Governments concerned, and others, are bound now to consider how far, and in what way—if at all—the group can continue to play a part. We believe that it should be possible for it to play an important role in the search for a settlement, but obviously this series of raids underlines the urgency of its work. We have made absolutely plain to the South African Government our view of the gravity of the action that they have taken.

Mr. A. J. Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed): Is it not likely that the raids will make it impossible for the CEPG to continue its work, and that the raids might have been designed for that purpose? If that work comes to an end, will that not represent a decisive change in the circumstances under which the Prime Minister said in Bermuda that she was not prepared to contemplate sanctions? Does the Foreign Secretary accept that the British Government's attitude must be completely reassessed if those circumstances arise?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I shall not undertake a reassessment of the Government's attitude in the House of Commons this afternoon. It is plain from what I have said already that the attacks, when the Commonwealth group is in South Africa, are to be particularly deplored. Plainly, they make a substantial difference to the atmosphere in which the group has been trying to do its work. We still believe that it is important to try, if it is humanly possible, to promote a peaceful solution to the troubles of southern Africa.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I have to take into account subsequent business being under the guillotine. I shall allow questions to continue until 4 o'clock, and then we must move on.

Mr. Robert Adley (Christchurch): I welcome my right hon. and learned Friend's decision to make a statement today, and I welcome what he said. Will he please note that his description of state terrorism as perpetrated by the South Africans seems to be a more accurate use of such a phrase than on other occasions on which it has been used recently by Her Majesty's Government? Will my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that the South Africans have put themselves in exactly the same position as the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the Vietnamese in Kampuchia and the Israelis in the Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Syria, in that they have deliberately invaded and occupied a neighbouring country because they do not like the nature of the regime there?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I have made plain our condemnation of the action. I urge my hon. Friend not to press his analogies too far, because what is plainly different is that incursions have taken place into three countries, but no attempt at occupation has been made. That is totally different from my hon. Friend's examples.

Mr. Ted Leadbitter (Hartlepool): The Secretary of State has said several times that he has condemned the action. The interesting question to put to him now is

simply this: if that is all that he is to do, what impact will that condemnation have on President Botha, and what impression will that condemnation, without any other action, have upon the Commonwealth countries affected?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: If that were all that happened, the hon. Gentleman's question might have some sense in it. We are speaking less than 12 hours after the incident took place. I have already made it plain that we shall have to assess the situation carefully—not only on our own—with a view to deciding whether any further action is appropriate.

Mr. John Stokes (Halesowen and Stourbridge): Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that Government Members understand the difficulties, particularly in view of our membership of the Commonwealth, but how long are this Government and country planning to behave towards South Africa as if we were a sort of nanny? Surely that independent nation should pursue its own salvation in its own way? Pious protests from us might be counter-productive.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: There is no question of our proceeding as a "sort of nanny". We have important political and economic relations with South Africa, and a large number of British citizens are resident there. We have had historic connections over many years and a profound interest in the prospects of peace in southern Africa. For those reasons, we rightly interest ourselves in the future of that country.

Mrs. Gwyneth Dunwoody (Crewe and Nantwich): Is the Foreign Secretary not aware that this violent and brutal attack when the Commonwealth group of personages are in South Africa is no accident, but is a deliberate policy of destabilisation? Those of us who saw the brutal attacks on people who had nothing to do with politics and the murder of a six-year-old in the street know exactly the degree of savagery of which the South Africans are capable. The right hon. and learned Gentleman must do more than talk.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I understand the hon. Lady's concern. We are all totally affronted and shocked by violence and savagery, in whatever form. For that reason, we have consistently called for a way forward in South Africa in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides. For that reason also, I have already made plain the extent to which we deplore the fact that the action took place while the Commonwealth group was in South Africa.

Mr. John Browne (Winchester): Does my right hon. and learned Friend accept that the ANC is heavily infiltrated by Soviet Marxist forces, which are anti-democratic, and are fulfilling a role of world terror? The raids emphasise only too clearly that the chances of a peaceful solution in South Africa are fast running out. Does my right hon. and learned Friend accept that the chances of a peaceful solution are based on power sharing that will protect minorities, and that such a solution has been adopted in the past by Switzerland, where the power is based on cantons? Does he believe that such a solution is applicable to South Africa? If so, will he agree to push for one?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: Despite our close interest in the future of South Africa, we have, I think rightly, refrained from seeking to offer detailed prescriptions for the constitutional future of that country.

Mr. Andrew Faulds (Warley, East): The right hon. and learned Gentleman has obviously heard of Libya, because he agreed to this country's bases being used in an attack on that country. Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman realise that had the British Government attempted to say no, Reagan would have gone ahead in any case?

When will he stop trying to differentiate between state terrorism, whether lodged by South Africa, Israel or South America, in countries such as Libya and against a possible foe such as Nicaragua?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I can understand how anyone might be tempted to draw parallels and comparisons within the wide number of examples cited by my hon. Friend. It is not possible to lump them together in one general categorisation.

Mr. Harry Greenway (Ealing, North): Will my right hon. and learned Friend draw the attention of advocates of sanctions to the experience of the Wilson Government in the late 1960s, when they tried to impose sanctions against Rhodesia and failed completely, especially in respect of oil?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: That is one of the reasons why our view of sanctions has always been as we have expressed it many times.

Mr. David Young (Bolton, South-East): Will the Secretary of State take on board the fact that, in the eyes of the world, we are on trial? The Commonwealth is looking at us to see to what degree we put words in place of action. The terrorists in South Africa, who are nothing but a lot of terrorist wolves, recognise a dead sheep when they see one.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I cannot accept the absurd proposition with which the hon. Gentleman started his question.

Mr. Tom Sackville (Bolton, West): Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the South Africans would be better advised to try to learn something from the remarkable reconciliation and co-existence between blacks and whites in Zimbabwe than to try to disrupt the whole region through such an attack?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: My hon. Friend has made an entirely valid point.

Mr. Tony Banks (Newham, North-West): As the Government in Harare have made it clear that Zimbabwe is not being used for attacks on South Africa, is the Secretary of State prepared to accept any requests from the Government of Zimbabwe, or of any Commonwealth country to erect British anti-aircraft missile systems around the capital cities? Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman prepared to send British military advisers to those countries to safeguard territorial integrity?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The points raised by the hon. Gentleman went a good deal further than the conclusions that we have drawn from our discussions.

Mr. Tony Marlow (Northampton, North): Will my right hon. and learned Friend expand on his answer to our

[Mr. Tony Marlow]

hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr. Adley) concerning the fact that the operation today is a lesser evil than the Israeli incursion into Lebanon? When my right hon. and learned Friend considers what action to take—if he considers taking action—will he bear in mind the action that was taken in respect of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I can understand why my hon. Friend attempted to draw every kind of parallel. It is not easy to deal with the matter in any sensible fashion at this length. The fact is that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon involved both an invasion and an occupation of Lebanon. That is to be distinguished from the incidents taking place today, however deplorable they may be.

Mr. Martin Flannery (Sheffield, Hillsborough): Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that, to defend an indefensible regime, the South African Government are now thrashing round wildly in a way which is utterly unaceptable to the civilised world and which, I hope, is unacceptable to us, although it has massive backing on the Conservative Benches, as has been shown clearly today? Will he realise that platitudes give aid and comfort to the Pretoria Government, and that only when some action such as sanctions is taken, and only when the right hon. and learned Gentleman gets President Reagan to do something rather than helping UNITA, will South Africa be stopped from bombing places around them, bombing Angola and occupying Namibia, contrary to the wishes of the United Nations?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I have already made clear our view that these actions are a plain violation of the sovereignty of neighbouring countries and that they are especially deplorable in these circumstances. We shall have to consider what further action may be necessary. I am not prepared, however, to endorse the proposition offered by the hon. Gentleman and to align any of my hon. Friends with support for the apartheid regime, which is condemned and deplored on both sides of the House.

Mr. Nicholas Fairbairn (Perth and Kinross): Assuming that the attacks had not been against these military camps, but from them and against South Africa, would my right hon. and learned Friend have made a statement, and, if so, what would it have been?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I am not able to follow my hon. and learned Friend's reference to attacks from and against South Africa. It seems to me to be a confusion of thought.

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): Will the Foreign Secretary reconsider his answer to my right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees)? He said that Libya was as different from South Africa as chalk is from cheese. Is it not a fact that the Federal police in Germany—the Bundeskriminalamt—has said that it has found no connection whatever between the pretext for the bomb in Berlin and the Libyan connection and that Herr Lochte in Hamburg, the head of the Verfassungschutz who is in a position to know, has said that he——

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman's question must be related to South Africa.

Mr. Dalyell: It is related to a statement by the Foreign Secretary which is just not true. He said——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I have given the hon. Gentleman a good chance. He must get his question in order.

Mr. Dalyell: The Foreign Secretary should not be allowed to get away with things that are factually inaccurate when answering my right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Leeds, South. The fact is that a man who is in a position to know in the Verfassungschutz has said that he excludes any connection. It is intolerable that the Foreign Secretary should come to the House and by sleight of hand make statements for which there is no factual backing.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that we have heard enough for the Foreign Secretary to make a brief reply if he wishes.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I do not.

Private Secretary

Charles

Any comments?

Colin

Andrew — I've
told him
CDP

STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

As the House knows, the South African Defence Forces attacked a number of locations in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe early this morning. The South African Defence Forces have acknowledged that they were responsible for these attacks, full details of which are not yet available.

My Hon Friend the Member for Wallasey this morning summoned the South African Charge to ask for an urgent explanation. She expressed to him our grave concern. Our Ambassador in South Africa has been instructed to seek an early call on the South African Foreign Minister.

Our High Commissioners in Gabarone, Lusaka and Harare have been instructed to convey to their host governments the British Government's concern at these attacks, and to seek further details about them, including any indication of casualties.

We have always made plain our opposition to cross-border violence and have consistently condemned the resort to force by South Africa against her neighbours. It follows that we strongly condemn today's attacks by the South African Defence Forces, which represent a plain violation of the sovereignty of three fellow Commonwealth countries. It is particularly deplorable that they should have taken

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place while the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons were in South Africa on a mission aimed at achieving a suspension of violence on all sides and start on a dialogue. It underlines the urgent need for such a suspension of violence by all the parties concerned.



PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA

It is now established that the South Africans have attacked targets, allegedly ANC offices, in Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia.

No details yet of casualties.

South Africans are saying that it is in retaliation for discovery of a major arms cache near Johannesburg yesterday.

They are also claiming analogy with the US attack on Libya. We propose to say that it is more like the Israeli attack on Tunis.

We are sending in our Ambassadors in South Africa and elsewhere to find out exactly what has happened. I have said that until we know the facts we should not pass any judgement.

The Foreign Secretary proposes to make a statement to the House this afternoon. On first sight, this looks like another example of rushing into reflexive statements on matters for which we are not responsible. The arguments for doing it are to pre-empt PNQs (of which there are several); and to say something while we can still honestly take the line that we are still investigating precisely what has happened and cannot, therefore, pass judgement on it. It is not a very strong case but I think just passes muster.

CDP

CHARLES POWELL

19 May 1986

LOSAAM

CVPC

OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL
MARLBOROUGH HOUSE · PALL MALL · LONDON SW1Y 5HX

16 May, 1986

Dear Prime Minister, attached @ Part 8.

In my initial message of 23 November, 1985 to Commonwealth Heads of Government announcing the constitution of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons I proposed that we treat 1 January, 1986 as the starting point of the Group's formal work and the commencement of the period of six months envisaged in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord on Southern Africa. I went on to explain that at the end of that period the Meeting of the seven Commonwealth leaders named in paragraph 5 would take place as envisaged in paragraph 7. On this basis, the essential purpose of the Meeting will be to review the situation in the light of the work of the Group of Eminent Persons, and the other measures agreed upon at Nassau, and to form a judgement as to whether, in the period ending 30 June, 1986, adequate concrete progress has been made towards the objectives stated in the Accord. Contingent on that judgement, other elements of paragraph 7 could become operable. It is in this context that I am writing to formalise arrangements for the Review Meeting.

The Group itself has been particularly mindful of its mandate under the Accord and of the importance of reporting to Commonwealth leaders in time to facilitate the Review Meeting at the end of the six month period. It is their present expectation to submit a report on their work before 30 June, 1986. That report will be of immense importance to the Review Meeting and I envisage that Commonwealth leaders will wish to have it in good time. I have tried to take account of all this in my consultations with regard to the Meeting, and to find dates that are both compatible with the expectations of Nassau and the convenience of the seven Heads of Government concerned. With the co-operation of everyone, I am now able to propose formally for your confirmation that the Review Meeting be held at Commonwealth Secretariat Headquarters in Marlborough House, London, between 3 and 5 August, 1986.

2/

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

I envisage that the Meeting will commence with a dinner on the evening of 3 August in Marlborough House, which it would be my honour to host, and at which discussions can begin. Since the Meeting is in the nature of a continuation of the discussions at Nassau, it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister of the Bahamas to continue in the Chair; and I hope he will do so commencing with the discussions over dinner. Provision will then be made for the Meeting to continue throughout the following day and to conclude by lunchtime on Tuesday, 5 August. I hope I may now proceed to finalise these arrangements.

I feel sure you would wish the Review Meeting to be as informal as is consistent with its objectives, and I shall try to ensure that it is. To start with, therefore, may I propose that normal Heads of Government procedures be followed, even though it is a meeting of only seven Heads of Government. I have particularly in mind arrangements limiting the numbers of those present in the room with Heads of Government to two per delegation - while retaining, of course, the possibility of your enlarging this by mutual agreement or of closed sessions with advisers absent. I will proceed on this basis unless you wish me to do otherwise.

The work of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (COMGEP) has been one of the most important of Commonwealth undertakings. As I write, it is not possible to make a judgement on its out-turn; but, it is already clear that it is an effort that has won respect and continues to hold out hope for advancing the objectives of the Nassau Accord. The Review Meeting will be therefore, one of major significance. Your own participation in it is of the utmost importance and I look forward to being able to welcome you to Marlborough House on 3 August, 1986. Meanwhile, I shall continue to be in touch over more detailed matters through normal channels.

Assuming these arrangements to be acceptable to you and the other six participating leaders, I plan to inform other Commonwealth Heads of Government of them by 1 June, and to announce the date and venue of the Meeting on 6 June, 1986.

With deep respect,



Shridath S. Ramphal

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MY TELNO 266 (NOT TO ALL): COMMONWEALTH GROUP

SUMMARY

1. THE GROUP LEAVE THIS AFTERNOON FOR LUSAKA AFTER SEVERAL DAYS HERE WHICH WERE INITIALLY DISAPPOINTING BUT ENDED THIS MORNING ON A BRIGHTER NOTE. THEY EXPECT TO RETURN TO CAPE TOWN FOR FURTHER MEETINGS WITH MINISTERS AT THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK.

DETAIL

2. UP TO LAST NIGHT THE GROUP FELT THEY WERE MAKING NO PROGRESS IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OVER THE EPG'S NEGOTIATING CONCEPT. NOR HAD THEY YET BEEN ABLE TO MEET MANDELA. THIS MORNING THEY SAW MANDELA AND THEN PIK BOTHA AGAIN. AFTERWARDS LORD BARBER TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) JUST BEFORE LEAVING FOR THE AIRPORT EN ROUTE TO LUSAKA THAT THE SITUATION HAS NOW CHANGED FOR THE BETTER.

3. ACCORDING TO LORD BARBER (AGAIN PLEASE PROTECT) THE GROUP FELT THAT THEIR MEETING WITH MANDELA HAD BEEN EXCELLENT. (THE MEETING ITSELF IS MEANT TO BE REGARDED AS CONFIDENTIAL, THOUGH THE GROUP ASSUME IT MAY SOON LEAK). THEY SHOWED HIM THE TEXT OF THEIR NEGOTIATING CONCEPT, I.E. THE PAPER ALREADY PRESENTED TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. MANDELA'S REACTION WAS THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD NO PROBLEM WITH IT AND WOULD BE WILLING TO COOPERATE IN A SCENARIO OF THE KIND SUGGESTED. HE AGREED THAT THE GROUP COULD PASS THIS ON AS HIS VIEW TO THE ANC IN LUSAKA. THE SOUTH AFRICANS ALSO KNOW THE SCORE ABOUT MANDELA'S REACTION BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT'S LEGAL ADVISER WAS PRESENT DURING THE INTERVIEW (A POINT WHICH HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SOME DISAGREEMENT BEFOREHAND).

4. THE GROUP SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED ON PIK BOTHA. COMPARED TO THEIR FIRST MEETING WITH HIM THREE DAYS PREVIOUSLY, LORD BARBER SAID IT HAD BEEN A GOOD-HUMOURED OCCASION ALTHOUGH NOTHING MORE OF SUBSTANCE EMERGED FROM THE SOUTH AFRICANS SIDE ABOUT THE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT. PIK BOTHA DEVOTED MUCH OF THE TIME TO ADVISING THE GROUP ON HOW TO HANDLE THEIR NEXT MAJOR CONTACT WITH MINISTERS AT WHICH THE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT WILL BE DISCUSSED. THIS IS TO BE WITH SIX SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT ON 19 MAY AFTER THE GROUP HAVE RETURNED FROM LUSAKA. IT WILL CLEARLY BE A MORE REVEALING TEST OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE THAN ANYTHING DURING THE PAST WEEK.

WEEK.

5. ON PRESENT PLANS THE GROUP WILL FLY BACK FROM LUSAKA TO CAPE TOWN ON 18 MAY. LORD BARBER HAS TO RETURN TO LONDON OVERNIGHT ON TUESDAY 20 MAY ON STANDARD CHARTERED BANK BUSINESS BUT IS PREPARED TO FLY OUT TO SOUTH AFRICA AGAIN 24 HOURS LATER. I UNDERSTAND THAT OBASANJO ALSO HAS TO LEAVE ON TUESDAY. BUT THE REST OF THE GROUP SHOULD STILL BE AVAILABLE HERE FOR WHATEVER FURTHER TALKS SEEM NECESSARY.

6. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I BELIEVE ANY THOUGHT OF INTERVENING OURSELVES WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT CAN WAIT AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER THE MEETING WITH SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTERS ON MONDAY.

CCN PREAMBLE

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MOBERLY

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CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 May 1986

Dear Charles,

Ramphal's Views on International Economic Issues

You spoke to Colin Budd recently about Kuala Lumpur telno 167, reporting Ramphal's remarks at the South/South conference there in early May; and suggested that we should take up with Ramphal what he is alleged to have said. We have now seen the text of Ramphal's speech, and it is clear that the High Commission and the International Herald Tribune of 6 May accurately reported his remarks on "economic dominion and dependency", "political and economic control of the South" and, most objectionable of all, "the resurgence of (economic) doctrines which support dominance, and which even have a fascist flavour".

The Foreign Secretary shares the Prime Minister's irritation. Sir Antony Acland has already remonstrated with Ramphal, and we have ensured that our views are known to other members of the Commonwealth Secretariat. The Foreign Secretary recommends leaving matters at that: annoying though Ramphal's remarks are, they were not specifically directed at Britain, and a large part of his speech consisted of a call on developing countries to put their own house in order and to negotiate more skilfully in international gatherings. More generally, we want to keep Ramphal on board at this critical stage of COMGEP's discussions with the South Africans. The Foreign Secretary would be willing to tackle Ramphal informally about his speech if an opportunity presented itself, but does not think that a formal complaint is desirable in the circumstances.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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PM

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TO DESKBY 151800Z FCO

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MIPT: SPEECH BY PRESIDENT BOTHA

1. LORD BARBER TELLS ME THAT THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP TAKE THE VIEW THAT THE SPEECH DOES NOT SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGE THE SITUATION AND THAT THEY SHOULD CONTINUE AS BEFORE. THIS IS ALSO MY OWN VIEW.

2. THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP WERE NOT THEMSELVES MENTIONED IN THE SPEECH ALTHOUGH SOME SPECULATION IS INEVITABLE ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT ABOUT VISITORS FROM ABROAD WHO INTERFERED IN SOUTH AFRICA'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. HE SAID THAT SOME WERE WELL INTENTIONED ALTHOUGH OTHERS ONLY COMPOUNDED CONFUSION.

3. IN ONE RESPECT THE SPEECH MAY APPEAR INCONSISTENT. THE PRESIDENT REJECTS THE IDEA OF PEOPLE LAYING DOWN PRIOR CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS YET HIMSELF TALKS OF NON-NEGOTIABLE PRINCIPLES. THE DANGER MUST BE THAT MANDELA AND THE ANC WILL FIND THIS UNACCEPTABLE WHICH COULD MAKE THE GROUP'S WORK MORE DIFFICULT. BUT THE PRESIDENT ALSO TALKS ABOUT THE NEED TO RETAIN NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY. ALSO HIS FORMULATION ABOUT TALKING TO THOSE WHO DO NOT RESORT TO VIOLENCE SEEMS MARGINALLY BETTER THAN PAST INSIS-TENCE ON PRIOR RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE (ALTHOUGH THERE IS A LATER REFERENCE TO REJECTING VIOLENCE).

4. EARLIER IN THE DAY THE GROUP ASKED COMMONWEALTH AMBASSADORS THAT THEIR CAPITALS SHOULD DEFER ANY IMMEDIATE REACTION TO THE SPEECH UNTIL THE GROUP THEMSELVES HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONSIDER THEIR POSITION. I UNDERSTAND FROM LORD BARBER THAT THEY ARE NOW CONTENT TO WAIVE THIS REQUEST.

5. IF YOU WISH TO RESPOND PUBLICLY I SUGGEST IT WOULD BE ENOUGH TO SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS UNDERLINE THE NEED FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THAT WE BELIEVE THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP CAN CONTINUE TO FULFILL A USEFUL ROLE.

MOBERLY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA

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South African Embassy
LONDON

15 May 1986

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
No. 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1A

Prime Minister
An important speech, though in the usual coded language. You might note the passages which I have underlined. CDP 15/5

Dear Charles,

As you are aware the Commonwealth Eminent Persons' Group is in Cape Town at present. It has met with the Government. In confidence I can tell you that it will meet with Mr Nelson Mandela tomorrow and then again with Government Ministers including the State President.

This Afternoon the State President made a very important speech which should be read in this context and in that of the prevailing domestic climate.

The Ambassador, Dr Worrall, is attending the meetings in South Africa and has told me that the context of the speech is an important backdrop to the contacts that are taking place at the moment.

He is very satisfied that the Eminent Persons' Group initiative is "on track". We, of course, hope that over the next few days it will continue to be able to make constructive progress.

Yours sincerely

L.H. EVANS
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL IN CAPE TOWN ON 15 MAY 1986

Mr Chairman and members of the Council:

The President's Council serves as a symbol of mutual understanding among peace- loving South Africans.

Constitutionally, the President's Council has a very important role to play, particularly when Parliament is not unanimous regarding the contents of proposed legislation.

For this reason, I deem it appropriate to take this opportunity to speak on a few matter which are of paramount importance to South Africa as a whole.

It has become evident to me that disinformation and the propagation of blatant untruths by enemies of South Africa give rise to uncertainty and confusion about the Government's constitutional intentions.

In this process the fact that the Government is committed to negotiated reform is exploited.

This confusion is also exacerbated by continued visits from abroad by official and non- official groups who interfere in South Africa's domestic affairs.

Some of these groups are well- intentioned, but the activities of others have only one effect and that is to compound the confusion.

To the extend that unsolicited interference increase, increased resistance against confusion and misconceptions will be required of South Africans. We do not want to break off our foreign relations, but the unsolicited interference sometimes reach proportions which undeniably prove that some countries want to conceal their domestic problems behind meddling in our problems.

Consequently, there are questions in the minds of South Africans who wish to live together peacefully in this country.

Often a false impression is being created that the Governments is failing to maintain and protect that which was built up to the advantage of the country over many generations, as well as that we are on the road of abdication. I reject this false impression.

We will not allow the spiritual and material heritage built up over 300 years to simply fall into the hands of a revolutionary power clique.

The powers of stability and responsibility are greater than the forces of disorder.

I deem it essential to spell out clearly and explicitly the point of view of the Government in regard to reform and negotiation.

I have often stated that the South African Government is committed to peaceful negotiated political and socioeconomic reform, to achieve and maintain stability and progress for the Republic

of South Afirca. We do what we believe to be just and not because we are pressurised to do so.

It has become something of a cliche to say that whenever a country experiences a period of reform there is bound to be uncertainty.

This is often accompanied by doubt concerning the Government's ability to effectively administer the process of reform and to guarantee and acceptable solution.

This uncertainty and doubt are compounded when a Government embarks upon a programme of major reform in the most important fields of human actovity. Such uncertainty is in our case increased by forces of intimidation, destruction and revolution.

This uncertainty and doubt have, understandably so, induced many people to insist that the Government should be specific, not only as regards the direction of the process of reform, but also as regards the contents of the end result.

On the other hand there are people, including many who have consistently demanded meaningful negotiated change, who demand of the Government to issue a declaration of intent.

The argument is used that this should be done so as to provide impetus to the negotiating process which must result in such meaningful change.

However, many of the people in this category, as well as others who do not belong to this category, have stated that the Government should not be prescriptive in any sense.

In addition they require that the agenda for negotiation should be open- ended.

Clearly there is a real risk that if the Government should comply with the request for a declaration of intent, it would stand accused of being prescriptive.

To complicate matters even further, some people and institutions have laid down certain preconditions which they require to be met even before they enter into a process of negotiation.

Others subscribe to political models and concepts that cannot be applied to the South African situation in their classical meaning. Some individuals are attempting to gain support for contemptuous disloyalty to our country in other countries.

THE GOVERNMENT

As far as the Government is concerned it remains adamant that it is prepared to negotiate with citizens of South Africa, provided that they do not resort to violence as a means of attaining their political and other goals, or call in foreign agencies to support them.

The Government is not a minor party in so- called faction fighting.

ccording to the law the Government represents the State. Any reform proposals must be made bearing this in mind.

NEGOTIATION

Negotiation of necessity implies that participants should accept that not all their requirements are likely to be met; it implies a willingness to listen, to discuss and seek solutions. But these solutions will result from deliberations by South Africans in the interest of South Africans.

Essentially it is a process of give and take during which people are required, on the one hand, to scale down their demands and, on the other, to be lenient when required to make concessions to satisfy reasonable demands.

It is in this spirit that the Government approaches the process of negotiation and I want to appeal to all who have made the choice for peacefull and constitutional change, to display a similar disposition.

Having said this, I am constrained to decline requests to bespecific about the end product precisely because it must be a product of negotition.

We are at present dealing in Parliament with a number of measures which are the results of such negotiation. I referred to these measures during my opening address of Parliament as well as during the discussions on the budget vote of the Sate President.

I personally and my Government have gone very far to meet the legitimate demands of various South African communities. But excessive demands can very easily lead to excessive reactions. Im am not at the disposal of people who make such excesive demands.

NORMS AND VALUES

Consequently,in the interest of South Africa and our various population groups, I want to spell out emphatically certain important principles which are not negotiable.

FIRSTLY, whatever negotiated solutions we can produce will have to be implemented by Parliament since negotiated

reform must be implemented constitutionally. This includes the possibility of general elections or a referendum, In the case of drastic deviation from already accepted policies.

SECONDLY, the Government subscribes to certain fundamental norm and values by which it will be guided throughout the process of negotiation in the belief that a negotiated settlement is only possible within the parameters of these norms and values.

It will also be guided by these norms and values while it

cntinues to govern the country as a civilised state.

These normsand values include the following which will have to be intrenched in any new dispensation:

1. The realisation of the democratic ideal since it is the Government's accepted principle that only democratic institutions can meet he demands of justice and fairness.

   This means that a democratic dispenstion of government which must accommodate the legitimate political aspirations of all South Africa's communities must be designd and implemented.

   Such a dispensation must take cognisance of and reflect the multi- cultural nature of the South African society and must provide for visible and effective protection of minority groups and the rights against domination and for self- determination for such groups and communities.

   South Africa is a country of miniorities and a multicultural societ. Its diversity is a fact that must be accepted.

   The Government is committed to devise such democratic solutions in co- operation with South Africans who are also committed to peacefull and democratic solutions and who reject violence as a means of achieving political goals.

   In this respect it in the Government's conviction that only purposeful broadening of democracy of the South African society at large and accompaning socioceconomic reform can ensure lasting peace and stability.

2. Adherence to Christian values and civilised norms with recognition and protection of freedom of faith and worship. This principle is a cornerstone of our existece as a civilised state.

3. Maintenance of the sovereignty and the integrity of the Republic of South Africa. This requires well diciplined and suitably equipped Security Forces. It means that South Africa must be able to protect the integrity of its borders, as well as to defend its peoples against internationally organised terrorism and to maintain law

   and order. Nobody must underestimate our determination in this egard. A a rgional power in Southern Africa, this is our indisputable duty.

4. The sanctity and indivisibility of law and the just application therof, the independence of the judiciary and the equality of all under the law.

5. Liberty as a cornerstone of true democracy which must manifest itself on different levels.

Firstly, on the personal and individual level which also implies respect for and the protection of the human dignity, life and property of all.

Secondly, liberty on the group and community level which implies respect for and the promotion and protection of the right to elf-determination of population groups and peoples.

Thirdly, liberty on the state and national level to safeguard the integrity and freedom of the country and to secure the protection of our citizens through the application of civilised standards of justice, order and security.

True democracy for the Republic of South Africa and all it's peoples, individually and collectively, must recognise each of these components of freedom since the absence of such recognition will diminish, not increase, the freedom of our peoples.

6. Purtberance of private enterprise and effective competition as well as confidence in our economy.

7. Elimination of discrimination implying selection for unfavourable treatment or prejudicial action on the basis of race, cultural affiliation or religious conviction.

National Council

In view of these preconditions for peaceful negotiation and co-existence, I announced that I wantto institute a National Council. I envisage that the purpose of the Council could be the following:

- to provide opportunity for participation in the planning and preperation of a new constitutional dispensation;

- to provide a say to Black South Africans in governmental processes on an interim basis; and to further sound relations among all and the human dignity, rights and freedoms of all.

The Bill which makes this Council possible has now been drawn up and it will shortly be published y the Minister concerned for comment, before it is submitted to Parliament for discussion.

Appeal

I wish to make an urgent appeal to all responsible South Africans to now assist the Government in a balanced way and with great responsibility, to place and keep South Africa on the road to progress, stability and security. This can only be effected by means of constitutional

action.

Radicalism from whichever quarter cannot make a contribution.

I would however shirk my responsibility if I do not state clearly that the Governmen is adament to maintain order. People who perpetrate violence must take note that if they do not renounce violence, they will inevitably face the full power at the disposal of the State, which has not nearly been applied to the full. In future there must be no misunderstanding about this.

It is my deepest wish that senseless violence be abandoned now. I plead with the public media to assist in this regard.

There is no reason for panic, but there is reason for responsible action. South Africa is worth much more than those who play with its highest interests in a reckless manner.

Let us each consider our next step.

Let us ensure orderly co-existence.

Let us build a new South Africa.

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

FILE DA

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 15 May 1986

SOUTH AFRICA

I enclose a copy of a letter which I have received from the South African Charge d'Affaires, covering a copy of President Botha's speech this afternoon.

(Charles Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ADVANCE COPIES 15

File on

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PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON

MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE
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FLASH

MY TELNO 259:(NOT TO ALL):COMMONWEALTH GROUP

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER DETAIL OF YESTERDAY'S TALKS WITH P.W. BOTHA. COMMONWEALTH GROUP UNCERTAIN AS TO NEXT MOVES BUT HOPE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTERS.

DETAIL

2. LORD BARBER CAME TO SEE ME THIS MORNING HAVING FIRST CLEARED HIS LINES WITH OBASANJO. BOTH OF THEM HAD SPOKEN TO RAMPHAL ON THE TELEPHONE TO SAY THAT THE REPORT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN YESTERDAY FROM ONE OF HIS OWN STAFF WAS OVER-DRAMATIC. THERE WAS NO NEED FOR ANY INTERVENTION FROM LONDON AT THIS STAGE.

3. ACCORDING TO BARBER, P.W. BOTHA HAD BEGUN YESTERDAY'S DELAYED MEETING BY REMONSTRATING OVER LEAKS TO THE PRESS ABOUT THE EPG NEGOTIATING CONCEPT APPARENTLY ORIGINATING IN LONDON. P.W. BOTHA SUGGESTED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MIGHT HAVE HAD A HAND. THE GROUP STRONGLY DENIED HAVING SPOKEN TO THE PRESS THEMSELVES. BARBER ASSURED P.W. BOTHA THAT HAVING SEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO ENQUIRE ABOUT REPORTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN MESSAGES TO THE TOKYO SUMMIT GOVERNMENTS, HE WAS CERTAIN THAT THE BRITISH WERE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ALLOWING DETAILS OF THE EPG IDEAS TO REACH THE PRESS.

4. P.W. BOTHA HAD THEN SPOKEN ABOUT THE DILEMMA FACING THE GOVERNMENT IN RELEASING MANDELA AND ALLOWING THE ANC A FREE HAND. SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD NEED A GREAT DEAL OF PERSUADING. HE WAS CLEARLY UNWILLING TO GO INTO SUBSTANCE ON THE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT ITSELF BEYOND TAKING ISSUE WITH THE DESCRIPTION "ACKNOWLEDGED" BLACK LEADERS. P.W. BOTHA ALSO SAID THAT BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT COULD BE EXPECTED TO TAKE SUCH MOMENTOUS STEPS A START SHOULD BE MADE ON DE-ESCALATING VIOLENCE.

5. DISCUSSION THEN WAS TAKEN UP ALMOST ENTIRELY WITH THE QUESTION

5. DISCUSSION THEN WAS TAKEN UP ALMOST ENTIRELY WITH THE QUESTION OF MANDELA. PIK BOTHA PROPOSED THAT IN ORDER FOR BOTH GOVERNMENT AND GROUP TO BE CLEAR AS TO MANDELA'S POSITION, THE GROUP SHOULD SEE HIM IN COMPANY WITH THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND THE PRESIDENT'S LEGAL ADVISOR. OBASANJO SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS AND NONE OF THE REST OF THE GROUP DEMURRED AT THE TIME. ON RETURNING TO THEIR HOTEL, HOWEVER, THEY REALISED THAT FOR THE GROUP TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY GOVERN-
MENT REPRESENTATIVES MIGHT COMPROMISE THEM IN MANDELA'S EYES, AND THEY THEY THEREFORE RANG PIK BOTHA'S OFFICE TO REVERSE THEIR INITIAL AGREEMENT TO THIS.

6. HIRSCHBERG (DFA) THEREUPON CAME ROUND TO THE HOTEL. HE BEGGED THEM TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WERE BEING ASKED TO TAKE THE MOST FAR-REACHING DECISIONS. THEY COULD NOT BE RUSHED. THE ONLY CHANCE WAS TO GIVE THEM MORE TIME AND TO PROCEED STEP BY STEP.

7. THE GROUP ARE SEEING THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE THIS AFTERNOON FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF ARRANGEMENTS ABOUT VISITING MANDELA. THE CO-CHAIRMEN WERE ALSO HOPING TO SEE MRS HELEN SUZMAN THIS MORNING TO HEAR MORE ABOUT HER RECENT INTERVIEW WITH MANDELA. THERE IS NO DATE FIXED FOR A FURTHER ROUND WITH PIK BOTHA, BUT LORD BARBER SAYS THE GROUP ARE CONFIDENT OF SEEING HIM AGAIN IN ORDER TO FOLLOW UP ANY TALK WITH MANDELA. (IN THE EVENT, THE EXPECTED WORKING LUNCH YESTERDAY WITH MEMBERS OF THE CABINET'S CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE WAS LIMITED TO ONLY TWO OTHER MINISTERS BESIDES PIK BOTHA, NAMELY HOME AFFAIRS AND FINANCE).

COMMENT

8. LORD BARBER WAS ADAMANT THAT ALTHOUGH THIS WAS A DISAPPOINTING START IT WAS CERTAINLY TOO EARLY TO ASSUME THAT THE GROUP WOULD GET NO FURTHER. I SAID THE EVIDENCE SEEMED TO SUGGEST GENUINE DIVISIONS AMONG MINISTERS. WE KNEW THE MEETING YESTERDAY HAD BEEN DELAYED BECAUSE PIK WAS SEEING THE PRESIDENT. I THOUGHT IT ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT THERE HAD BEEN A MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION WHICH LEFT MATTERS INCONCLUSIVE . THIS WOULD EXPLAIN WHY PIK HAD BEEN SO UNFORTHCOMING AND WHY FEW OTHER MINISTERS HAD TURNED UP TO MEET THE GROUP. BUT IN MY VIEW IT DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT A FIRM DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO REJECT THE NEGOTIATING PACKAGE. THE WHOLE PACKAGE COULD WELL BE SO DIFFICULT FOR MINISTERS THAT THEY HAD NOT REALLY FOCUSSED ON IT COLLECTIVELY TILL NOW. I WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT THAT PIK BOTHA WAS GENUINE IN WANTING TO CARRY THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER COLLEAGUES TOWARDS A PACKAGE OF THIS KIND. THIS WOULD ALSO EXPLAIN HIRSCHBERG'S HEARTFELT PLEA FOR MORE TIME.

9. WE HAVE HAD SEPARATE CONFIRMATION FROM ONE OF THE DEPUTY MINISTERS THAT THE NATIONAL PARTY IS SPLIT ON THE QUESTION OF RELEASING MANDELA AND ENGAGING THE ANC IN NEGOTIATION. THE ISSUES ARE BEING OPENLY CANVASSED WITHIN THE PARTY. IT IS ALL TOO LIKELY THEREFORE THAT A SIMILAR SPLIT EXISTS AMONG THE SENIOR MINISTERS.

10. I TOLD LORD BARBER THAT ONE REAL DIFFICULTY FOR THE GOVERNMENT WAS THEIR BEING ASKED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES BEFORE THEY HAVE ANY INKLING WHETHER OR NOT THE ANC ARE INTERESTED IN THE EPG'S NEGOTIATING CONCEPT. SHORT OF A CLEAR OUTRIGHT REJECTION BY THE GOVERNMENT WHICH MADE THE GROUP CONCLUDE THEY HAD ALREADY FAILED, MY OWN VIEW WAS THAT THE GROUP SHOULD PUT THE CENTRAL IDEAS IN THEIR NEGOTIATING CONCEPT TO THE ANC IN THE LIGHT OF WHATEVER FURTHER TALKS THEY MAY HAVE WITH THE GOVERNMENT THIS WEEK.NOT EVEN TO TEST THE ANC REACTIONS WOULD SEEM LIKE DOING ONLY HALF THE JOB. I AM SURE IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR PIK BOTHA TO CONVINCE WAVERERS AMONG HIS COLLEAGUES IF HE WERE IN A POSITION TO SAY THAT THE PACKAGE WOULD ACTUALLY RUN WITH THE ANC. BARBER SAID THAT HE WOULD PUT THESE POINTS TO HIS COLLEAGUES.

HOBEEKY

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Prime Minister (2)

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CDP 13/5

13 May 1986

[Ramphal is coming to lunch tomorrow]

Dear Charles,

COMGEP Visit To South Africa

The Foreign Secretary thought the Prime Minister ought to be aware, before she sees the Commonwealth Secretary-General at her lunch for the UN Secretary-General tomorrow, of news about the current COMGEP visit to South Africa which Mr Ramphal gave to Sir Antony Acland this evening.

According to Mr Ramphal (who had only received an outline account over the telephone from South Africa). COMGEP had an extremely difficult meeting with the South African Foreign Minister this afternoon. In it, Pik Botha represented the South African Government's attitude to the COMGEP mission in terms entirely different from those used by von Hirshberg in London. Mr Botha said that publicity about the possibility of a breakthrough by the COMGEP mission had undermined his own position; addressing Lord Barber in particular, he said that Britain had sought to stir up such publicity in order to give the Prime Minister credit for what COMGEP might have achieved. Mr Botha also appeared to be fundamentally hostile to the idea of releasing Mandela, saying that the South African Government did not know what Mr Mandela's attitude to negotiations would be but it was unlikely to be favourable.

Mr Ramphal continued that there had been a sharp exchange between Mr Botha and Mr Fraser about the purpose of the Group remaining in South Africa. General Obasanjo was extremely depressed. Overall, the impression was that Pik Botha had been reined in by his colleagues in the South African Government, and that his interview with the Group was a contrived backtracking exercise.

Nevertheless Mr Ramphal said that he had urged the Group to stick to their mission, and he was confident that they would not do anything rash without consulting him. They had an appointment with the South African Minister of Justice tomorrow, but no further contact with Pik Botha was planned.

In reply, Sir Antony Acland commented that this was very disappointing news. He thought that it was right for Mr Ramphal to urge the Group to stick at their mission, and to ensure that the South African Government had a clear

/view

view of both sides of the equation. The British Government's impression was that publicity for the Group's mission had originated mainly in South Africa.

We have known for some time of the deep divisions within the South African Cabinet and the difficult task which Pick Botha faces in seeking to carry his colleagues and the President with him. There could well, also, have been an element of hard bargaining in this initial contact. Despite Mr Ramphal's gloomy tone, the Foreign Secretary does not believe that this is necessarily the end of the story as far as the COMGEP mission is concerned. He will wish to reflect further overnight on what, if anything, HMG might do to help keep the show on the road. Meanwhile we need the earliest possible independent picture of what has happened and we have asked for a report from our Ambassador, taking account of Lord Barber's impressions, to reach us as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office) and Sir Percy Cradock.

Yours ever,

Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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RLE

LPO

cc FCO.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

9 May 1986

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T86/86

cc Master
OPS

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 30 April suggesting the possibility of a declaration on South Africa at the Tokyo Summit.

I am afraid that it was clear from the outset at Tokyo that there were major practical difficulties in the way of agreeing a statement on South Africa which would be balanced and helpful. It was evident in early discussion between Foreign Ministers that any statement would have to include, at the insistence of others, demands and criticisms of South Africa which would have been far from welcome to you. There was also the important consideration that an unbalanced statement might have greatly complicated the current discussions between your Government and the Commonwealth Group.

We therefore decided to promote the idea that the Japanese Prime Minister should include a short reference to South Africa at the joint press conference with other Heads of Government on 6 May when he summarised the political discussion at the Summit. Discussion between Heads of Government was concerned only with the terms of this statement: in the event he told the press that the seven Heads of Government had agreed on the importance of a

EA

peaceful solution to the question of apartheid, and, appreciating the various international efforts which had been exerted, had agreed to continue to call on the parties to strive for such an objective. This was less than I had hoped for. But the summary is nevertheless helpful in its emphasis on the need for a peaceful solution and I do not think that it includes anything which might hinder your negotiations with the Commonwealth Group.

I am very pleased that the Group has now decided to return to Southern Africa and will be visiting South Africa for further talks with your Government in the next few days. The initial response of your Government to the Group's "negotiating concept" was most helpful in bringing this about. I know that the Group are hoping to have a detailed discussion which will enable them to take away a more precise idea of the steps your Government would be prepared to take under certain conditions. I am sure that, like me, you will have been struck by the increasing international interest in, and support for, the Group's efforts. I hope that everything can now be done to build on this promising start to their mission and that you will be able to develop your response to the "negotiating concept" so that the momentum can be maintained.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable P. W. Botha D.M.S., M.P.

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MR POWELL

c Mr Stark

South Africa

Officials have reviewed (in the Official Group on Policy towards Selected non-Community Countries) the likely effects of political and economic developments in South Africa on the United Kingdom's economic stake there.

2. I attach the resulting paper, to which all interested Departments and the Bank of England contributed. It is being submitted by their officials to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretaries of State for Trade and Industry, Transport, Energy and Defence.

3. The paper examines two time frames, five years and twenty years, and identifies three possible political scenarios for the first and four for the second. Political forecasting in South Africa is inevitably hazardous. There are additional variables in economic forecasting. Given all the uncertainties it was not easy for Departments to agree in assessing the future prospects of South Africa or their likely consequences for our economic stake there.

4. The paper does however point to the likelihood that the United Kingdom's economic stake in South Africa will continue to decline in value and to the need to avoid action which could add to United Kingdom losses there. Thus it highlights the importance of our policy of exerting all the influence we can for peaceful change and continuing to oppose far-reaching economic sanctions. It urges caution in considering any

possible new commitments to investment in or lending to the South African economy. (The many wider factors, not directly concerned with the South African economy, which affect our policy on sanctions are not discussed in the paper.)

C L G Mallaby

8 May 1986

STA

CCPC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 May 1986

Dear Charles,

Tokyo Summit: South Africa

Now that the Tokyo Summit is over, the Prime Minister will need to reply substantively to President Botha's letter of 30 April about a statement on South Africa by the Summit (copy / enclosed for convenience).

As you know, Sir Patrick Moberly conveyed the Prime Minister's preliminary comments on the letter through the South African Foreign Minister's Office on 2 May. Sir Geoffrey Howe assumes that the Prime Minister will wish to explain to President Botha why it was not possible for the Summit to produce a detailed statement of the sort he was seeking. She may also wish to take the opportunity to encourage President Botha to build on his Government's earlier helpful response to the Commonwealth Group, when the Group goes to South Africa for further discussions on 13 May.

I enclose a draft reply on these lines which has been agreed / by the Foreign Secretary.

Yours ever,

Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street



DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/~~telegram/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

The Honourable P W Botha DMS MP

Your Reference

Copies to:

LO3AMP

To inform

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 30 April suggesting the possibility of a declaration on South Africa at the Tokyo Summit. ~~It was helpful for me and my colleagues at the Summit to have had this first hand account from you of current South African concerns.~~ how things appear to you, just in advance of the Summit

I am afraid that it was clear from the outset at Tokyo that there were major practical difficulties in the way of agreeing a statement on South Africa which would be balanced and helpful. It was evident in early discussion between Foreign Ministers that any statement would have to include, at the insistence of others, demands and criticisms of South Africa which would have been far from welcome to you. There was also the important consideration that an unbalanced statement might have greatly complicated the current discussions between your Government and the Commonwealth Group.

We therefore decided to promote the idea that the Japanese Prime Minister should include a short reference to South Africa at the joint press conference with other Heads of Government on 6 May when he summarised the

/political

Enclosures—flag(s).....

political discussion at the Summit. Discussion between Heads of Government was concerned only with the terms of this statement: in the event he told the press that the seven Heads of Government had agreed on the importance of a peaceful solution to the question of apartheid, and, appreciating the various international efforts which had been exerted, had agreed to continue to call on the parties to strive for such an objective. This was less than I had hoped for. But the summary is nevertheless helpful in its emphasis on the need for a peaceful solution and I do not think that it includes anything which might hinder your negotiations with the Commonwealth Group.

I am very pleased that the Group has now decided to return to Southern Africa and will be visiting South Africa for further talks with your Government in the next few days. The initial response of your Government to the Group's "negotiating concept" was most helpful in bringing this about. I know that the Group are hoping to have a detailed discussion which will enable them to take away a more precise idea of the steps your Government would be prepared to take under certain conditions. I am sure that, like me, you will have been struck by the increasing international interest in, and support for, the Group's efforts. I hope that everything can now be done to build on this promising start to their mission and that you will be able to develop your response to the "negotiating concept" so that the momentum can be maintained.

CDN.

Mr Powell
to see

Please do not reply
needed
CRW 7/5
phoned 8/5

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

no ack

6 May 1986

I attach a copy of a letter to Mr. Wicks here from Mr. Emeka Anyaoku, Deputy Secretary General of the Eminent Persons Group. Mr. Anyaoku's letter contains a message from the two co-Chairmen to the Prime Minister.

I should be grateful for your advice and a draft reply as soon as possible.

MARK ADDISON

Robert Culshaw Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

CABLES: COMSECGEN LONDON SW1
TELEX: 27678
TELEPHONE: 01-839 3411 Ext:

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE,
PALL MALL,
LONDON, SW1Y 5HX

Your ref:
Our ref:

CONFIDENTIAL

6 May 1986

Dear Mr Wicks,

The Co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth Group would be grateful if you could kindly convey to the Prime Minister the following message:

BEGINS

Dear Prime Minister

The Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons are planning to return to Cape Town next week to continue their discussions with the South African Government which have now reached a delicate stage. We have therefore been interested and concerned to learn that the South African Government has sent messages to the seven leaders meeting in Tokyo, seeking assurances pertaining to possible international reaction to future developments in South Africa. We are concerned that bilateral exchanges with the South African Government at this time, especially if they involve the sort of assurances reported, would not only complicate our work but also make it much more difficult for the Group to retain the necessary co-operation of all the parties involved in the achievement of our mandate. It is our belief in respect of future developments in South Africa that the

...2

Mr N L Wicks CBE
Principal Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

best assurance against further measures by the international community would be the early commencement and assiduous pursuit of genuine negotiations involving the authentic leaders of the people of South Africa along the lines we have already indicated to the South African Government.

Yours sincerely

Malcolm Fraser

Olusegun Obasanjo

ENDS

Yours Sincerely

Emeka Anyaoku.

Emeka Anyaoku
Deputy Secretary-General



GRS 450
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RESTRICTED

FM CAPE TOWN
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 252
OF 061415Z MAY 86
INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, HARARE
INFO SAVING JOHANNESBURG, DURBAN, CAPE TOWN CONSULATE

NELSON MANDELA

1. TWO MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION PROGRESSIVE FEDERAL PARTY, HELEN SUZMAN AND TIAN VAN DER MERWE, HAD A TWO AND A HALF HOUR MEETING IN POLLSMOOR PRISON WITH NELSON MANDELA YESTERDAY (5 MAY).

2. VAN DER MERWE HAS BRIEFED US ABOUT THE MEETING. MRS SUZMAN HAD ASKED FOR THIS SOME MONTHS AGO. SHE HAS ASKED REGULARLY TO SEE MANDELA BUT SINCE A MEETING IN 1983 THE GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT ACCEDED TO HER REQUEST. NO REASON WAS GIVEN WHY THERE WAS THE MORE FORTHCOMING RESPONSE THIS YEAR.

3. THE MEETING HAD BEEN IN THE PRESENCE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF POLLSMOOR PRISON BUT MANDELA HAD SPOKEN APPARENTLY WITHOUT INHIBITION. VAN DER MERWE SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT TRIED TO PRESS HIM ON DIFFICULT POINTS AND FOR THIS REASON LITTLE HAD BEEN SAID ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE BUT A NUMBER OF THINGS HAD COME ACROSS VERY CLEARLY. IN THE FIRST PLACE MANDELA HAD APPEARED TO GO OUT OF HIS WAY TO TALK ABOUT THE NEED FOR A CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HE HAD STRESSED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYTHING COULD BE ACHIEVED IN THE END BY VIOLENCE. THE VIOLENCE HAD PLAYED ITS PART IN PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT BUT ANY SETTLEMENT WOULD REQUIRE DISCUSSIONS AROUND A TABLE WITH THE RULING PARTY AND WITH OTHER BLACK PARTICIPANTS. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT CHIEF BUTHELEZI AND THE INKATHA MOVEMENT WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE INVOLVED. HE HAD TALKED POSITIVELY ABOUT BUTHELEZI AND REFERRED TO CORRESPONDENCE WITH HIM. HE DID NOT APPEAR TO SHARE THE ANTAGONISM FOR BUTHELEZI EXPRESSED BY OTHER RADICAL LEADERS.

4. MANDELA HAD ALSO STRESSED THAT HE WAS FIRST AND FOREMOST A BLACK AFRICAN NATIONALIST. HE HAD SAID THAT HE WAS NOT A MARXIST. HE DESCRIBED TAMBO AS SHARING HIS VIEWS AND CLAIMED THAT MOST MEMBERS OF THE ANC WERE NOT THE HARDLINERS THAT THEY WERE FREQUENTLY DESCRIBED AS. HE HIMSELF BELIEVED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE REASSURANCES TO WHITES ABOUT THEIR FUTURE. THIS APPLIED IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE. THERE WERE PLENTY OF LESSONS AROUND TO TAKE NOTE OF. A GOOD EXAMPLE WAS THE MESS THAT MOZAMBIQUE HAD GOT INTO BECAUSE OF THE APPLICATION OF DOCTRINAIRE POLICIES.

5. MANDELA HAD REITERATED HIS DETERMINATION TO ACCEPT NOTHING LESS THAN UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE /EXPECTED.

RESTRICTED

EXPECTED HIS FELLOW PRISONERS TO BE RELEASED WITH HIM. THE VISITORS HAD BEEN LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT MANDELA HAD FELT ALMOST INSULTED THAT HIS RELEASE HAD BEEN LINKED BY PRESIDENT BOTHA TO THE FREEING OF SOVIET DISSIDENTS.

6. MANDELA HAD SEEMED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH AND HAD SAID THAT HE WAS FULLY RECOVERED FROM HIS RECENT OPERATION. HE HAD HAD NO COMPLAINTS ABOUT HIS TREATMENT EXCEPT OVER SOME DIFFICULTY WITH THE TRANSMISSION OF CORRESPONDENCE.

7. VAN DER MERWE, WHO HAD NOT MET MANDELA BEFORE, SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN MORE IMPRESSED THAN HE HAD EXPECTED. HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH MANDELA'S KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT AFFAIRS AND SHREWD JUDGEMENTS AND THAT HIS CONVERSATION THROUGHOUT HAD AVOIDED POLITICAL SLOGANS AND HARDLINE ASSERTIONS. HE HAD LEFT THE IMPRESSION OF BEING GENUINELY COMMITTED TO WORK FOR REAL NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH GROUPS ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM WOULD BE INCLUDED.

MOBERLY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA
STANDARD (PALACE)
SAFD
OADs
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NAD
ECDs
SOVIET D
MR REEVE

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
SOUTHERN AFRICA

Passed to FCO
& Kuala Lumpur

[redacted]ND TFC LCB486

file.

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FM AIRBORNE
TO CABINET OFFICE 016 F L A S H
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PLEASE PASS FLASH FCO
INFO IMMEDIATE KUALA LUMPUR

FOR FERGUSSON FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
YOUR TEL NO 406 TO TOKYO: ECONOMIC SUMMIT: SOUTH AFRICA
1. AS YOU WILL BY NOW HAVE SEEN, THERE WAS NO REFERENCE IN THE SUMMIT DECLARATIONS TO SOUTH AFRICA. INSTEAD IT WAS AGREED THAT THE CHAIRMAN SROULD IN HIS SLMMING UP REMARKS MAKE A FAIRLY BLAND STATEMENT CALLING FOR AN END TO APARTHEID BUT ENCOURAGING THE EFFORTS CURRENTLY UNDER WAY TO PROMOTE D I A L O G U E. IN THE EVENT HE CALED FOR AN END TO APARTHEID BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ACHEIVE D I A L O G U E. ON THE BASIS OF THIS PLEASE SEEK TO REASSURE ANYAOKU. YOU SHOULD NOT SHOW HIM THE TEXT OF P W BOTHA'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER OR DESCRIBE ITS CONTENTS. YOU SHOULD HOWEVER TELL HIM THAT ALL THE

SUMMIT LEADERS WERE CONCERNED NOT TO DO OR SAY ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT CUT ACROSS THE WORK OF COMGEP. FOREIGN MINISTERS DID DISCUSS SOUTH AFRICA, BUT NOT THE HEADS OF GOVT. SAVE TO AGREE THAT THE CHAIRMAN SHOULD SUM UP IN A WAY WHICH WOULD, WHILST STRESSING THE NEED FOR AN END TO APARTHEID, SEEK TO ENCOURAGE THE PROCESS OF D I A L O G U E. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THEIR GIVING ASSURANCES TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ABOUT WHAT THEY WOULD OR WOULD NOT DO IN ANY PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE FUTURE, OR OF MAKING ANY OTHER CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION.
2. IF RAMPHAL IS STILL IN KUALA LUMPUR, GRATEFUL IF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER WOULD SPEAK TO HIM IN SIMILAR TERMS, SAYING THAT HE IS DOING SO ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE FOREIGN SECRETARY.
3. SINCE RAMPHAL HAS APPARENTLY SENT THE SAME MESSAGE TO THE CANADIANS, GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD INFORM THEM OF NPE TERMS OF OUR REPLY. DURING DISCUSSION AMONG FOREIGN MINISTERS MR CLARK URGED THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID OR DONE WHICH MIGHT INTERFERE WITH COMGEP'S DELICATE TAKSNOL THIS WAS GENERALLY SUPPORTED.
GRS 00318
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PPS/PM

PS/PM

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DD 060800Z FCOLN
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RESTRICTED
FM KUALA LUMPUR
TO DESKBY 060630Z TOKYO
TELNO 2
OF 060435Z MAY 86
AND TO DESKBY 060800Z FCO

PM's Party

FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY
MIPT: MESSAGE FROM COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL TO
THE PRIME MINISTER: SOUTH AFRICA
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM SIR SONNY RAMPHAL
TO THE PRIME MINISTER:
MESSAGE BEGINS

''FOLLOWING THE BBC'S REPORT OF A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
BOTHA TO THE TOKYO SUMMIT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMMONWEALTH
EPG'S PACKAGE, I FEEL YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT ON THIS MATTER
THE EPG REPLY OF 1 MAY TO PIK BOTHA WAS AS FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT OF REPLY
QUOTE
IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THE BEST ASSURANCE AGAINST FURTHER
MEASURES BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO WHICH YOU REFER
WOULD BE THE EARLY COMMENCEMENT AND ASSIDUOUS PURSUIT OF
GENUINE NEGOTIATION ALONG THE LINES ENVISAGED IN OUR
NEGOTIATING CONCEPT, AND INVOLVING THE AUTHENTIC LEADERS
OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA.
UNQUOTE
END TEXT OF REPLY
I FEAR THAT TO GO FURTHER BY WAY OF ASSURANCES ON SANCTIONS
IN THE CONTEXT OF A HYPOTHETICAL ''LAW AND ORDER'' BREAK-DOWN
MAY MAKE THE PACKAGE UNSALEABLE TO OTHERS WHO MAY THEN
SEE IT AS A POTENTIAL TRAP. IN THE PRESENT DELICATE STAGE
OF DISCUSSIONS, I HOPE YOU AND PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY
TO WHOM I AM SENDING A SIMILAR MESSAGE CAN DISCOURAGE ANY
SUCH ASSURANCE FROM THE SUMMIT TO PRESIDENT BOTHA.
WITH DEEP RESPECT,
SONNY RAMPHAL''

MESSAGE ENDS

GILLMORE

YYYY

KJSMAN 2715

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FM KUALA LUMPUR
TO DESKBY 060630Z TOKYO
TELNO 001
OF 060430Z MAY 86
AND TO DESKBY 060800Z FCO

Distribution:

PM's Party

FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY
MESSAGE FROM COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER:
SOUTH AFRICA
1. SIR SONNY RAMPHAL, WHO IS ATTENDING THE SECOND SUMMIT OF THIRD WORLD SCHOLARS AND STATESMEN (SOUTH-SOUTH II) IN KUALA LUMPUR, HAS ASKED ME TO PASS AN URGENT MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER. A SIMILAR MESSAGE IS BEING TRANSMITTED TO THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER. RAMPHAL SAYS IN HIS COVERING LETTER TO ME THAT HE HAS TALKED HERE WITH OLIVER TAMBO OF THE ANC (WHO IS ALSO ATTENDING THE KUALA LUMPUR MEETING.). BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER TAMBO HAS BEEN CONSULTED ON THE MESSAGE.
2. TEXT OF MESSAGE IS IN MIFT.

GILLMORE

YYYY

KJSMAN 2714

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Private Secretary

cc: PS/Number 10
Sir R Armstrong
Mr Braithwaite
Mr Ingham
Mr Meyer

SOUTH AFRICA: HANDLING OF P W BOTHA'S REQUEST FOR A STATEMENT

1. Discussion this morning with the Japanese, US and Canadian Foreign Ministers revealed strong doubts about the possibility of getting agreement at Tokyo on a brief balance statement of support for a dialogue between South Africa and black representatives of the kind the Prime Minister hopes to be able to achieve. They all agreed that the original South African expectations were quite unrealistic.

2. The arguments put forward were:

(i) any proposal for a positive statement on South Africa would be met with counter-proposals for additions. These would be on standard lines (condemnation of apartheid, demand for release of Mandela, faster progress towards dismantling of apartheid etc) of the kind that would be unwelcome to Botha at present.

(ii) the above risk would be particularly acute in the case of a separate statement. It might be reduced if a short passage could be included in a more general statement. But there is no suitable vehicle available. The general declaration of economic conclusions are quite unsuitable;

(iii) an alternative possibility might be for a brief reference to be made to South Africa in the Chairman's summing-up if suitable wording could be agreed and used.

3. The dangers to the COMGEP process of an unbalanced statement from Tokyo are particularly acute at present. A bad reaction in South Africa would rub off on their attitude towards COMGEP and prejudice the prospects for a further visit to South Africa. Great care will therefore be needed here.

4. The best approach would be for the Prime Minister to sound out her colleagues (especially The Netherlands Prime Minister, also President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl) before the joint session on the afternoon of 5 May. It would be necessary to explain the rationale for making a positive statement at this juncture, and avoiding the standard condemnatory language. If their reaction was positive, it would be worth circulating the attached draft passage at the joint session.

5. The risk would be that additions would be proposed drawn from recent statements on South Africa, eg by the 12, which would therefore be difficult to reject.

6. It would need to be clearly understood that if a passage on these lines was agreed for use by the Chairman in his summing up he should stick to the agreed wording.

7. If the responses from the Prime Minister's colleagues were equivocal, it would be best to avoid these risks altogether and to invite the Chairman simply to state, in his summing up, that the question of South Africa had been discussed, but avoid going into details.

4 May 1986

D M D Thomas

SUGGESTED PASSAGE ON SOUTH AFRICA FOR CHAIRMAN'S SUMMING UP

On South Africa, the Seven Summit leaders noted and welcomed the progress made so far by the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons. They expressed full support for the aim of facilitating a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion in South Africa in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides. They called for the complete abolition of apartheid and for the establishment of a democratic, non-racial system of government which would ensure the protection of minorities.

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HPSJAN 1644 OCMIAN 4149
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DD Ø2123ØZ SEOUL
FM FCOLN TO SEOUL
Ø212ØØZ MAY
GRS 25Ø

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO DESKBY Ø2123ØZ SEOUL
TELNO 228
OF Ø212ØØZ MAY 86

IN

FOR POWELL FROM GALSWORTHY
YOUR AIRBORNE TELEGRAM OF 2 MAY: PRESIDENT BOTHA'S MESSAGE
1. THE CHOGM CONCLUSIONS (A COPY OF WHICH WE SHALL BE BRINGING WITH US TO TOKYO) DOES NOT FULLY FIT THE BILL, THOUGH IT DOES CONTAIN LANGUAGE ON SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE. HOWEVER, THE LUXEMBOURG ACCORD (A COPY OF WHICH WE SHALL ALSO BRING) CONTAINS HELPFUL LANGUAGE ABOUT PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.
2. FOLLOWING IS A SUGGESTED PASSAGE ON SOUTH AFRICA AS REQUESTED, LARGELY DRAWN FROM BOTH DOCUMENTS:
ON SOUTH AFRICA, THE SEVEN SUMMIT LEADERS NOTED AND WELCOMED THE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR BY THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS. THEY EXPRESSED FULL SUPPORT FOR THE AIM OF FACILITATING A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE ACROSS LINES OF COLOUR, POLITICS AND RELIGION IN SOUTH AFRICA IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES. THEY CALLED FOR THE COMPLETE ABOLITION OF APARTHEID AND FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC, NON-RACIAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.
3. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY INTENDS TO INSTRUCT HM AMBASSADOR TO TELL THE SAG THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL PURSUE THE POSSIBILITY OF A RELATIVELY SHORT BUT BALANCED REFERENCE, BUT NOT TO BE DRAWN ON ITS LIKELY CONTENT.

HOWE

CONFIDENTIAL

OCMIAN 4149

NNNN UFGZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE DESKBY 020800Z FOR ADDISON, NO 10 DOWNING STREET AND GALSWORTHY, FCO FROM CHARLES POWELL.
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT BOTHA'S MESSAGE

THE PRIME MINISTER FINDS THE PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS TO HM AMBASSADOR CAPETOWN TOO NEGATIVE. WHILE SHE RECOGNISES THAT THERE IS NO REALISTIC CHANCE OF NEGOTIATING A DETAILED STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA AT TOKYO, SHE THINKS THAT WE OUGHT TO TRY TO GET A BRIEF REFERENCE THERE TO THE SUMMIT'S SUPPORT FOR A D I A L O G U E BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND BLACK REPRESENTATIVES, IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES, LEADING TO THE END OF APARTHEID AND A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WHICH PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES.

THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD THEREFORE WANT POINT (C) OF THE DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS MODIFIED TO SAY THAT, WHILE A DETAILED TEXT OF THE SORT PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT BOTHA STANDS A LITTLE OR NO CHANCE, SHE WILL DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT THE POSSIBILITY OF A BRIEF AND BALANCED REFERENCE TO SOUTH AFRICA (ON THE LINES I HAVE SUGGESTED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH) IN THE SUMMIT CONCLUSIONS. WHILE SHE CANNOT GUARANTEE THIS, SHE WILL DO HER BEST.

WOULD THE FCO PLEASE TELEGRAPH TO US IN SEOUL OR TO THE AIRCRAFT TWO OR THREE SENTENCES ON THE LINES WHICH I HAVE SUGGESTED (IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE), WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER COULD PUT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON, AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IF SHE SO DECIDES. THESE MIGHT BE DRAWN FROM RELEVANT PASSAGES IN THE CHOGM CONCLUSIONS (INDEED IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A COPY OF THESE AVAILABLE IN TOKYO).
GRS00000
NNNN

05445 ACDEN

TOD 020617Z

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CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE
DESJBY 020800Z for Addison, No. 10 Downing Street and
Galsworthy, FCO from Charles Powell.
Subject; President Botha's message.

The Prime Minister finds the proposed instructions to HM Ambassador Capetown too negative. While she recognises that there is no realistic chance of negotiating a detailed statement on South Africa at Tokyo, she thinks that we ought to try to get a brief reference there to the Summit's support for a dialogue between the South African Government and black representatives, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, leading to ~~an~~ the end of apartheid and a system of government which protects the rights of minorities.

The Prime Minister would therefore want point (c) of the draft instructions modified to say that, while a detailed text of the sort proposed by President Botha stands little or no chance, she will discuss with President Reagan and other Heads of Government the possibility of a brief and balanced reference to South Africa (on the lines I have suggested in the preceding paragraph) in the Summit conclusions. While she cannot guarantee this, she will do her best.

Would the FCO please telegraph to us in Seoul or to the aircraft two or three sentences on the lines which I have suggested (in this paragraph I above), which the Prime Minister could put to President Reagan on Sunday afternoon, and subsequently to other Heads of Government if she so decides. These might be drawn from relevant passages in the CHOGM conclusions (indeed it would be helpful to have a copy of these available in Tokyo).

C.D.P.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The proposed reply looks a shade too negative. It certainly won't be possible to negotiate a full text on South Africa. But I would not exclude a couple of sentences referring to the Summit's support for a dialogue between the SAG & black representatives, in the context of a suspension of violence. You could at least say that you will discuss this with the President.

Agree?

C.D.P.

012020Z MAY 86
FM CABINET OFFICE
TO AIRBORNE 002 IMMEDIATE
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
AIRBORNE 002
FOLLOWING FOR ATTENTION OF CHARLES POWELL
FROM MARK ADDISON

ToR 020421Z

PLEASE SEE FOLLOWING REQUEST FROM FCO FOR CLEARANCE. WE ARE ASSUMING THAT YOU HAVE WITH YOU CAPE TOWN TELS 242 AND 243 OF 1/5/86. THEY CAN BE TRANSMITTED TO YOU IF YOU DO NOT HAVE THEM.

DEAR CHARLES,

SOUTH AFRICA

YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED ADVANCE COPIES OF P W BOTHA'S LATEST MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER, TOGETHER WITH SIR P MOBERLY'S COMMENTS. I ATTACH COPIES TO CAPE TOWN TELNOS 242 AND 243 FOR EASE OF REFERENCE.

THE SOUTH AFRICANS APPEAR TO HAVE QUITE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS OF WHAT THEY MIGHT HOPE TO ACHIEVE BY WAY OF A STATEMENT FROM THE TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT. IN LINE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S EARLIER OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY TRIED TO RIDE THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR OFF A STATEMENT WHEN THEY MET ON 25 APRIL: HE ARGUES THAT IT WAS TOO LATE TO NEGOTIATE A STATEMENT, THAT THE AGENDA WAS ALREADY OVERLOADED, AND THAT THE IDEA WAS A PANDORA'S BOX BECAUSE THERE COULD BE NO ASSURANCE THAT ANY STATEMENT WOULD BE FREE OF POINTS WHICH WERE UNPALATABLE TO THE SOUTH ARICANS. WORRALL APPEARED TO TAKE THE POINT, BUT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE NEVERTHELESS GONE AHEAD. IT MAY BE THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE ENCOURAGED THEM IN THIS, THOUGH WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO THAT EFFECT, SINCE THEY HAVE AS YOU KNOW FAVOURED A DISCUSSION AND STATEMENT FROM THE SUMMIT.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY GREATLY DOUBTS WHETHER THERE WOULD BE A CONSENSUS AT THE SUMMIT IN FAVOUR OF A STATEMENT ON THE LINES PROPOSED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE PRESIDENT. THERE WOULD BE REAL PROBLEMS OVER LANGUAGE: FOR INSTANCE THE REFERENCE TO THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN A MANNER ENSURING NO POLITICAL DOMINATION BY ANY ONE COMMUNITY OF ANOTHER, WHICH WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY SOME AS WHITE INSISTENCE ON A VETO OVE
PALL IMPORTANT DECISIONS: AND THE BALD STATEMENT THAT A SUFFICIENT BASIS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR A TRANSITION TO NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH IS HARDLY BORNE OUT BY THE FACTS. AS REGARDS THE SOUTH AFRICAN WISH TO HAVE THE SEVEN SUMMIT LEADERS LAY DOWN PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ANY FUTURE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, SEVERAL SUMMIT COUNTRIES SHARE OUR VIEW THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES MUST REACH A PEACEFULLY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND THAT IT IS NOT FOR OUTSIDERS TO PRAWCRIBE PARTICULAR SOLUTIONS.

IN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VIEW, THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE BEST ADVISED TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE SUMMIT BEFORE REPLYING TO THE STATE PRESIDENT. HOWEVER SIR GEOFFREY HOWE SEES ADVANTAGE IN OUR AMBASSADOR AT CAPE TOWN BEING INSTRUCTED MEANWHILE TO EXPLAIN TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER THAT ALTHOUGH WE SHALL CERTAINLY DO OUR BEST TO STEER THE INITIATIVE NOW LAUNCHED TO A POSITIVE CONCLUSION THERE WILL BE MANY DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN PRODUCING A SATISFACTORY STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA IN THE SHORT TIME AVAILABLE, WHILEUEVEN IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE ONE, THE RESULT MAY NOT BE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S TASTE. I ATTACH A DRAFT TELEGRAM OF INSTRUCTIONS TO SIR P MOBERLY ACCORDINGLY. YOU WILL SEE THAT IT DOES NOT RULE OUT ALTOGETHER THE POSSIBILITY OF A STATEMENT, SINCE WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE AMTRICANS MIGHT BE UP TO. ITS MAIN PURPOSE IS TO LOWER SOUTH AFRICAN EXPECTATIONS.

DRAFT BEGINS

YOUR TELNOS 242 AND 243: SOUTH AFRICA: COMGEP AND TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT

1. PLEASE SEEK AN EARLY MEETING WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER (AT ATL EVENTS BEFORE THE EVENING OF 5 MAY).

2. YOU SHOULD TELL BOTHA THAT THE RRHME MINISTER READ THE STATE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WITH GREAT INTEREST. SHE WILL BE REPLYING AFTER THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT. MEANWHILE, HER PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
(A) IT IS VERY USEFUL THAT PRESIDENT BOTHA SHOULD HAVE WRITTEN TO HER AND THE OTHER SUMMIT LEADERS. THIS WILL HELP ENSURE THAT WHEN SOUTH AFRICA IS DISCUSSED HER COLLEAGUES HAVE A FIRST-HAND ACCOUNT OF CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN CONCERNS:
(B) MRS THATCHER FEELS SHE OUGHT TO WARN THE STATE PRESIDENT BOTH THAT THERE IS UNLIKELY TO BE SUFFICIENT TIME AT TOKYO TO NEGOTIATE A SATISFACTORY TEXT: THE POLITICAL AGENDA IS ALREADY OVER-CROWDED: AND THAT IT IS TO SAY THE LEAST UNLIKELY THAT ANY STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE ON THE LINES HE ENVISAGES: SOME OF THOSE CONCERNED MAY WELL FEEL THAT SUCH A STATEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE CRITICISM OF SOUTH AFRICA AND A CALL FOR FASTER PROGRESS TOWARDS THE COMPLETE DISMANTLEMENT OF APARTHEID.
(C) THIT IS WHY THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD HAVE PREFERRED NOTHING AT ALL SAID IN PUBLIC, OR AT MOST A REFERENCE BY THE JAPANESE CHAIRMAN IN HIS FINAL SUMMING UP TO THE FACT THATHSOUTH AFRICA HAD BEEN DISCUSSED, THAT THE SUMMIT LEADERS HAD WELCOMED PROGRESS MADE BY COMGEP, AND SO ON.

3. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF YOUR TALK WITH PIK BOTHA IS THUS TO EXPLAIN THAT ALTHOUGH WE SHALL CERTAINLY DO OUR BEST TO STEER THE SOUTH AFRICAN INITIATIVE TO A POSITIVE CONCLUSION THERE WILL BE MANY DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF ANY ATTEMPT TO SECURE AGREEMENT TO A STATEMENU AT TOKYO. APART FROM THE PROBLEMS THAT OTHERS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE OVER SOME OF THE LANGUAGE (EG NO POLITICAL DOMINATION BY ANY ONE COMMUNITY OVER ANY OTHER) THE SUGGESTION THAT A SUFFICIENT BASIS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR A TRANSITION TO NEGOTIATIONS IS DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE WITH THE STAGE REACHED IN THE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE: A NUMBER OF THOSE PRESENT AT THE SUMMIT CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE RELUCTANT TO ENDORSE IN PUBLIC THE VIEW THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE NOW DONE ALL THAT IS REQUIRED OF THEM IN RETURN FOR A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE. MORE GENERALLY, OUR OWN CONSISTENT POSITION HAS AS YOU KNOW BEEN THAT IT IS NOT FOR OUTSIDERS TO PRENHFIND
SHAPE OF A SOLUTION, WHICHTDUST BE
REACHED THROUGH PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION BY THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA.

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FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE SEOUL
TELNO 231
HF Ø219ØØZ MAY 86
AND TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO

FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER AND PS/FOREIGN SECRETARY ON ARRIVAL FROM PUS

COMGEP REVIEW MEETING

1. RAMPHAL SPOKE TO ME AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON JUST BEFORE LEAVING FOR MALAYSIA AND INDIA.3 HE HAS CONTACTED NEARLY ALL THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT CONCERNED ABOUT THE DATE AND SAID THAT HE REALLY DID BELIEVE THAT THERE WERE GENUINE AND INESCAPABLE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT EARLY SEPTEMBER. ALL THOSE CONSULTED THINK THAT AN EARLIER MEETING IS POLITICALLY DESIRABLE AND, IN THE LIGHT OF THE SUCCESSFUL CONTACTS BETWEEN COMGEP AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN THE LAST TWO DAYS IN LONDON, RAMPHAL HIMSELF BELIEVES THAT ANY EARLIER MEETING MIGHT HELP TO ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF THE COMGEP PROCESS. ON PRACTICALITIES, MUGABE IS CHAIRING THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN HARARE IN EARLY SEPTEMBER AND SEVERAL HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ARE STAYING ON THEREAFTER. KAUNDA AND GANDHI WILL OF COURSE BE INVOLVED. MULRONEY IS HOST TO CHIRAC AT THE SAME TIME.

2. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, ALL ARE AGREED TO COME TO LONDON IN EARLY AUGUST AND RAMPHAL THINKS THAT THERE WILL BE AGREEMENT TOO ON PINDLING'S CHAIRMANSHIP. GANDHI WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE LONDON BY MID-DAY ON 5 AUGUST IF HE IS TO GET TO MEXICO IN TIME FOR THE MEETING OF THE NON-NUCLEAR GROUP.

3. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO MANAGE EARLY AUGUST BUT I THOUGHT THAT, IF THE OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT HAD ABSOLUTELY INESCAPABLE COMMITMENTS FROM 1-3 SEPTEMBER AND IF THEY WERE PREPARED TO MEET IN LONDON, SHE MIGHT AGREE TO REARRANGE HER PROGRAMME. RAMPHAL SAID THAT HE WOULD PROPOSE THAT THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD MEET FOR DINNER ON SUNDAY 3 AUGUST, WORK THROUGH 4 AUGUST AND FINISH NOT LATER THAN MID-DAY ON 5 AUGUST. IN VIEW OF THE DISCRETION GIVEN TO ME AND SINCE I BELIEVE THERE ARE VERY GENUINE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE OTHERS IN EQRLY SEPTEMBER I AGREED THAT HE SHOULD WRITE TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WITH TOHOSE PROPOSALS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L
FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE DESKBY 020800Z FOR ADDISON, NO 10 DOWNING STREET AND GALSWORTHY, FCO FROM CHARLES POWELL.
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT BOTHA'S MESSAGE

THE PRIME MINISTER FINDS THE PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS TO HM AMBASSADOR CAPETOWN TOO NEGATIVE. WHILE SHE RECOGNISES THAT THERE IS NO REALISTIC CHANCE OF NEGOTIATING A DETAILED STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA AT TOKYO, SHE THINKS THAT WE OUGHT TO TRY TO GET A BRIEF REFERENCE THERE TO THE SUMMIT'S SUPPORT FOR A D I A L O G U E BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND BLACK REPRESENTATIVES, IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES, LEADING TO THE END OF APARTHEID AND A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WHICH PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES.

THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD THEREFORE WANT POINT (C) OF THE DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS MODIFIED TO SAY THAT, WHILE A DETAILED TEXT OF THE SORT PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT BOTHA STANDS A LITTLE OR NO CHANCE, SHE WILL DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT THE POSSIBILITY OF A BRIEF AND BALANCED REFERENCE TO SOUTH AFRICA (ON THE LINES I HAVE SUGGESTED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH) IN THE SUMMIT CONCLUSIONS. WHILE SHE CANNOT GUARANTEE THIS, SHE WILL DO HER BEST.

WOULD THE FCO PLEASE TELEGRAPH TO US IN SEOUL OR TO THE AIRCRAFT TWO OR THREE SENTENCES ON THE LINES WHICH I HAVE SUGGESTED (IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE), WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER COULD PUT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON, AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IF SHE SO DECIDES.
THESE MIGHT BE DRAWN FROM RELEVANT PASSAGES IN THE CHOGM CONCLUSIONS (INDEED IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A COPY OF THESE AVAILABLE IN TOKYO).
GRS 00274
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CONFIDENTIAL

PLEASE TRANSMIT TO THE PLANE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 May 1986

Dear Charles,

South Africa

You will have received advance copies of P W Botha's latest message to the Prime Minister, together with Sir P Moberly's comments. I attach copies of Cape Town telnos 242 and 243 for ease of reference.

The South Africans appear to have quite unrealistic expectations of what they might hope to achieve by way of a statement from the Tokyo Economic Summit. In line with the Prime Minister's earlier opposition to the idea, the Foreign Secretary tried to ride the South African Ambassador off a statement when they met on 25 April; he argued that it was too late to negotiate a statement, that the agenda was already overloaded, and that the idea was a Pandora's box because there could be no assurance that any statement would be free of points which were unpalatable to the South Africans. Worrall appeared to take the point, but the South Africans have nevertheless gone ahead. It may be that the Americans have encouraged them in this, though we have no evidence to that effect, since they have as you know favoured a discussion and statement from the Summit.

The Foreign Secretary greatly doubts whether there would be a consensus at the Summit in favour of a statement on the lines proposed by the South African State President. There would be real problems over language: for instance the reference to the protection of minority rights in a manner ensuring no political domination by any one community of another, which would be interpreted by some as white insistence on a veto over all important decisions; and the bald statement that a sufficient basis has been established for a transition to negotiations, which is hardly borne out by the facts. As regards the South African wish to have the seven Summit leaders lay down principles governing any future constitution of South Africa, several Summit countries share our view that the South African people themselves must reach a peacefully negotiated settlement and that it is not for outsiders to prescribe particular solutions.

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In the Foreign Secretary's view, the Prime Minister would be best advised to wait until after the Summit before replying to the State President. However Sir Geoffrey Howe sees advantage in our Ambassador at Cape Town being instructed meanwhile to explain to the South African Foreign Minister that although we shall certainly do our best to steer the initiative now launched to a positive conclusion there will be many difficulties inherent in producing a satisfactory statement on South Africa in the short time available, while even if it is possible to negotiate one, the result may not be to the South African Government's taste. I attach a draft telegram of instructions to Sir P Moberly accordingly. You will see that it does not rule out altogether the possibility of a statement, since we do not know what the Americans might be up to. Its main purpose is to lower South African expectations.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL	DEDIP	IMMEDIATE DESKBY

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TO IMMEDIATE CAPETOWN DESKBY
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OF 011700Z MAY 86
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

YOUR TELNOS 242 AND 243: SOUTH AFRICA: COMGEP AND TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT

1. Please seek an early meeting with the South African Foreign Minister (at all events before ~~the Summit ends on~~ the evening of 5 May).

2. You should tell Botha that the Prime Minister read the State President's message with great interest. She will be replying after the Economic Summit. Meanwhile, her preliminary comments are as follows:

(a) It is very useful that President Botha should have written to her and the other Summit leaders. This will help ensure that when South Africa is discussed her colleagues have a first-hand account of current South African concerns:

(b) Mrs Thatcher feels she ought to warn the State President both that there is unlikely to be sufficient time at Tokyo to negotiate a satisfactory text: the political agenda is already over-crowded; and that it is to say the least unlikely that any statement on South Africa would be on the lines he envisages: some ~~at least~~ of those concerned may well feel that such a

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Catchword: statement

File number	Dept	Drafted by (Block capitals)	Telephone no
	PRIVATE OFFICE	C R BUDD	233 4831

Authorised for despatch by: Initials Date/time

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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statement should include criticism of South Africa and a call for faster progress towards the complete dismantlement of apartheid.

(c) That is why the Prime Minister would have preferred nothing at all said in public, or at most a reference by the Japanese chairman in his final summing up to the fact that South Africa had been discussed, that the Summit leaders had welcomed progress made by COMGEP, and so on.

3. The main purpose of your talk with Pik Botha is thus to explain that although we shall certainly do our best to steer the South African initiative to a positive conclusion there will be many difficulties in the way of any attempt to secure agreement to a statement at Tokyo. Apart from the problems that others are likely to have over some of the language (eg no political domination by any one community over any other) the suggestion that a sufficient basis has been established for a transition to negotiations is difficult to reconcile with the stage reached in the Commonwealth initiative: a number of those present at the Summit can be expected to be reluctant to endorse in public the view that the South Africans have now done all that is required of them in return for a suspension of violence. More generally, our own consistent position has as you know been that it is not for outsiders to prescribe the shape of a solution, which must be reached through peaceful negotiation by the people of South Africa.

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Head of SAFD

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PS/MRS CHALKER

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Catchword: PS/PUS

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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3 Mr E Fergusson
4 Mr Derek Thomas
5 Mr Reeve
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TO DESKBY 011100Z FCO
TELNO 243
OF 010840Z MAY 86

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T83AA/86
SUBJECT
cc Master
OPS
NB original dated 29.4.86

MIPT: SOUTH AFRICA: COMGEP AND TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA TO MRS THATCHER:
BEGINS
DEAR PRIME MINISTER
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 18 APRIL 1986.
YOU ARE ALREADY IN POSSESSION OF MY FOREIGN MINISTER'S LETTER OF 24 APRIL 1986 TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS WHICH CONTAINS THE INITIAL RESPONSE OF MY GOVERNMENT TO THE GROUP'S ''NEGOTIATING CONCEPT''. AS INTIMATED TO YOUR AMBASSADOR ON 24 APRIL YOUR VIEWS WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE FORMULATION OF THIS RESPONSE AND I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT PROVIDES A BASIS FOR FURTHER POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS.

OF THE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN MY LETTER TO YOU ON 10 APRIL TWO REMAIN A SOURCE OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN TO ME AND MY GOVERNMENT. THE FIRST RELATES TO THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OF A CONTINUATION OR ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE ACCOMPANYING MR MANDELA'S RELEASE OR A SUBSEQUENT RESURGENCE OF GENERAL VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRY AS A FORM OF PRESSURE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. NOT ONLY THE ANC BUT OTHER PARTIES AS WELL, OR ELEMENTS WITHIN THEM, ARE ENGAGED IN A CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE AND WE NEED TO BE SATISFIED THAT AT LEAST THEIR LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS THE ANC LEADERSHIP WILL HONOUR COMMITMENTS TO SUSPEND THEIR VIOLENCE. I DO NOT WANT TO FIND MYSELF IN A SITUATION OF HAVING TO REINSTATE MEASURES IN ORDER TO CONTROL A POSSIBLE RESURGENCE OF VIOLENCE AND DISCOVER AS YOU ACKNOWLEDGE MIGHT HAPPEN, THAT SOME GOVERNMENTS WOULD SEE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, DESPITE OUR ACTING IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHIN REASON, AS AN EXCUSE FOR FURTHER PUNITIVE MEASURES.

/I ACCEPT

Confidential -DEDIP

I ACCEPT THAT THE GROUP MAY NOT BE ABLE TO OFFER ABSOLUTE ASSURANCES BUT WE SHOULD LIKE AT LEAST TO HAVE CLARIFICATION ON A NUMBER OF ASPECTS INHERENT IN THIS ISSUE. THIS IS WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IN SUGGESTING TO THE GROUP THAT WE EMBARK ON FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.

THE OTHER MATTER IS THAT OF THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ANC. I NOTE YOUR OWN WELL-KNOWN COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND OPPOSITION TO COMMUNISM, TERRORISM AND TOTALITARIANISM. GOVERNMENTS WHICH SHARE YOUR VALUES AND BELIEFS ARE UNFORTUNATELY OUTNUMBERED BY SUPPORTERS OF THE ANC AND WHAT IT STANDS FOR. THERES IS AN URGENT NEED FOR GOVERNMENTS WHICH SHARE YOUR VIEWS ON TERRORISM PUBLICLY TO DENOUNCE THE VIOLENCE OF THE ANC.

IN ADDITION THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT PRESENT AT THE SUMMIT MEETING IN TOKYO IN EARLY MAY COULD PROVIDE MOMENTUM TO CURRENT EFFORTS TO BRING AN END TO VIOLENCE AND FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLDUING THE EPG'S EFFORTS, BY AFFIRMING

- THEIR SUPPORT FOR A CONSTITUTION WHICH GUARANTEES:
- DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES INCLUDING AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE EQUALITY OF ALL UNDER THE LAW
- PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
- PRIVATE INITIATIVE AND EFFECTIVE COMPETITION
- FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
- THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD ENSURE THAT THERE WILL BE NO POLITICAL DOMINATION BY ANY ONE COMMUNITY OF ANY OTHER
- FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND OF EXPRESSION IN GENERAL
- FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND WORSHIP.

- THAT THEY WELCOME THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S READINESS TO NEGOTIATE A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER BASED ON THE SHARING OF POWER UP TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT AND RECOGNISE THAT THE STRUCTURES GIVING EFFECT TO THIS OBJMECTIVE MUST BE JOINTLY AGREED UPON BY SOUTH AFRICANS ALONE.

/- THEIR

- THEIR REJECTION OF VIOLENCE AS A MEANS TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES SEMI COLON
- THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO SUSPEND ALL VIOLENCE AND ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS TO THIS END SEMI COLON
- THAT A SUFFICIENT BASIS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR A TRANSITION TO NEGOTIATIONS.

WE HAVE ADVANCED SUFFICIENTLY FAR ALONG THE ROAD OF REFORM TO JUSTIFY ACCEPTANCE BY BLACK LEADERS IN GENERAL OF THE URGENT NEED TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL DISPENSATION.

I HOPE YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES WILL FEEL ABLE TO ACT ON THESE SUGGESTIONS.

SIMILAR COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE SENT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE TOKYO SUMMIT.

YOURS SINCERELY
P W BOTHA
ENDS

MOBERLY

LIMITED.

HD. SAFD.
HD. PLANNING STAFF.
HD. ERD.
PS.
PS/MRS. CHALKER.
PS/PUS.
MR. DEREK THOMAS.
MR. E. FERGUSSON
MR. MAUD.
MR. REEVE
N° 10 DOWNING ST.

GRS 600

CONFIDENTIAL
DEDIP
FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 011100Z FCO
TELNO 243
OF 010840Z MAY 86

(T'd above)

MIPT: SOUTH AFRICA: COMGEP AND TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT

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 -DEDIP- /- THEIR

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MOBERLY

LIMITED

HD. SAFD.
HD. PLANNING STAFF.
HD. ERD.
PS.
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PS|PUS.
MR. DEREK THOMAS.
MR. E. FERGUSSON
MR. MAUD.
MR. REEVE
N° 10 DOWNING ST.

GRS 350

CONFIDENTIAL
DEDIP
FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 011000Z FCO
TELNO 242
OF 010815Z MAY 86

SOUTH AFRICA: COMGEP AND TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT

1. FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME YESTERDAY EVENING TO HAND OVER A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA TO THE PRIME MINISTER. TEXT IN MIFT. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

2. THE LETTER IS IN TWO PARTS. THE FIRST DEALS WITH POINTS RAISED BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN HER LAST MESSAGE ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP. THE SECOND GOES ON TO PROPOSE THAT THE TOKYO SUMMIT MEETING SHOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA SUPPORTING AN END TO VIOLENCE AND TRANSITION TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION BASED ON DEMOCRATIC VALUES. SIMILAR LETTERS CONCERNING THIS PROPOSAL HAVE BEEN SENT TO ALL SEVEN SUMMIT LEADERS.

3. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT THE APPEAL TO SUMMIT GOVERNMENTS TOOK ACCOUNT OF YOUR DISCUSSION WITH WORRALL ON 25 APRIL. HE DREW MY ATTENTION TO A PHRASE IN THE LETTER MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR A STATEMENT AT TOKYO WAS INTENDED TO REINFORCE THE EPG'S EFFORTS.

4. HE ADDED ''IT IT COMES OFF, THIS WILL DO IT''. I ASKED HIM TO BE MORE EXPLICIT. HE SAID THAT A STATEMENT ON THESE LINES BY THE SEVEN WOULD GIVE A MAJOR IMPETUS TO A PROCESS INVOLVING RELEASE OF MANDELA AND OTHER STEPS TO FACILITATE AN END TO VIOLENCE AND OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS AS OUTLINED BY THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP. THIS WAS POSSIBLY THE MOST IMPORTANT MESSAGE WHICH PRESIDENT BOTHA HAD EVER SENT TO OTHER LEADERS.

/5. IN A

5. IN A BRIEF SURVEY OF POSSIBLE REACTIONS BY THE SEVEN, P.K BOTHA REFERRED TO A RECENT MESSAGE ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE FROM THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER. MOST OF IT HAD BEEN WHAT P.K BOTHA CALLED USEFUL. BUT ONE PASSAGE HAD COME NEAR TO RUINING EVERYTHING. MR MULRONEY HAD IMPLIED THAT IT WAS SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY TO GOVERN ON THE BASIS OF HAVING REPUDIATED MAJORITY RULE. P.K BOTHA DECRIBED THIS AS OFFENSIVE, UNCALLED FOR AND WRONG. THIS GAVE ME AN OPENING TO SAY THAT I UNDERSTOOD THERE WAS CONCERN IN LONDON THAT DISCUSSION OF ANY STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA AT TOKYO MIGHT OPEN UP DIFFERENCES OF VIEW AMONG THE SEVEN. HE REPLIED THAT ALL 7 GOVERNMENTS HAD AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER SUBSCRIBED TO PRINCIPLES SIMILAR TO THOSE LISTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. SURELY IT WAS NOT ASKING TOO MUCH THAT THEY SHOULD ENDORSE THEM PUBLICLY AND JOINTLY AT SUCH A KEY MOMENT.

MOBERLY

LIMITED.

HD. SAFD.
HD. PLANNING STAFF.
HD. ERD.
PS.
PS|MRS. CHALKER.
PS|PUS.
MR. DEREK THOMAS.
MR. E. FERGUSSON
MR. MAUD.
MR. REEVE
N° 10 DOWNING ST.

CONFIDENTIAL

file

BM2ALD

BM

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 April 1986

COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

Thank you for your letter of 28 April about the modalities of the Commonwealth Review meeting to consider the forthcoming report of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons.

The Prime Minister remains highly reluctant to agree to a meeting in late July or early August and sees little evidence that any serious effort has been made to persuade the other countries concerned that the meeting should be delayed until September (apart from her own efforts with Mr. Hawke). In her view it is still not too late to mount an effort to persuade the others to accept dates in September (for instance in the period 1 - 3 September), and she would like to see this done. She would not object to a preliminary meeting of Foreign Ministers in July if this would help. In the last resort and if this attempt were to fail, she would accept Monday 4 and/or Tuesday 5 August, but no date after that until early September. Nor can she manage late July, given her parliamentary commitments. Her agreement is predicated upon the meeting being in London: she is not prepared to go to New Delhi or Nassau. She would not object to Sir Lynden Pindling being in the chair at a meeting in London.

I should be grateful if you could set in hand action on the above lines.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to other Ministers in OD and to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. POWELL)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

T 83 AA/86

CDP
12/5

Tuynhuys
Cape Town
29 April 1986

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 18 April 1986.

You are already in possession of my Foreign Minister's letter of 24 April 1986 to the Co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons which contains the initial response of my Government to the Group's "negotiating concept". As intimated to your Ambassador on 24 April your views were taken into account in the formulation of this response and I hope you will agree that it provides a basis for further positive developments.

Of the issues addressed in my letter to you on 10 April, two remain a source of considerable concern to me and my Government. The first relates to the implications for the South African Government of a continuation or escalation of violence accompanying Mr Mandela's release or a subsequent resurgence of general violence in the country as a form of pressure in the negotiating process. Not only the ANC but other parties as well, or elements within them, are engaged in a campaign of violence and we need to be satisfied that

at least their leadership as well as the ANC leadership will honour commitments to suspend their violence. I do not want to find myself in a situation of having to reinstate measures in order to control a possible resurgence of violence and discover, as you acknowledge might happen, that some Governments would see such a development, despite our acting in good faith and within reason, as an excuse for further punitive measures.

I accept that the Group may not be able to offer absolute assurances but we should like at least to have clarification on a number of aspects inherent in this issue. This is what we have in mind in suggesting to the Group that we embark on further discussions.

The other matter is that of the aims and objectives of the ANC. I note your own well-known commitment to democratic values and opposition to communism, terrorism and totalitarianism. Governments which share your values and beliefs are unfortunately outnumbered by supporters of the ANC and what it stands for. There is an urgent need for Governments which share your views on terrorism publicly to denounce the violence of the ANC.

In addition the Heads of Government present at the Summit Meeting in Tokyo in early May could provide momentum to current efforts to bring an end to violence and facilitate negotiations, including the EPG's efforts, by affirming

- their support for a constitution which guarantees
    - democratic principles including an independent judicial system and the equality of all under the law;
    - private property rights;

- private initiative and effective competition;
- fundamental human rights and civil liberties;
- the protection of minority rights in a manner which would ensure that there will be no political domination by any one community of any other;
- freedom of the press and of expression in general;
- freedom of religion and worship.

- that they welcome the South African Government's readiness to negotiate a new constitutional order based on the sharing of power up to the highest level of government and recognise that the structures giving effect to this objective must be jointly agreed upon by South Africans alone.

- their rejection of violence as a means to achieve political objectives;

- that now is the time to suspend all violence and engage in negotiations to this end;

- that a sufficient basis has been established for a transition to negotiations;

We have advanced sufficiently far along the road of reform to justify acceptance by Black leaders in general of the urgent need to engage in negotiations in order to arrive at a new constitutional dispensation.

I hope you and your colleagues will feel able to act on these suggestions.

Similar communications will be sent to the Governments of the other countries participating in the Tokyo Summit.

Yours sincerely

P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Right Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON

COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

Established pursuant to the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa, Nassau, October 1985

Cables: COMSECGEN LONDON SW1
Telex: 27678
Telephone: 01-839 3411

Marlborough House
Pall Mall
London SW1Y 5HX

CONFIDENTIAL

Cape Sun Hotel
Cape Town

13 March 1986

The Hon Pik Botha
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
H F Verwoerd Building
CAPE TOWN

My dear Foreign Minister

We are enclosing a copy of a note that the Group has left with Minister Heunis. We wish once more to thank you for the courtesy and help which you personally and your Ministry have extended to us throughout our visit and discussions in South Africa.

We would wish to emphasise once again that we are advancing a concept. We really do believe as a result of all our discussions in South Africa and outside, that there is a real chance of establishing productive negotiations about the future of South Africa. We have also indicated that if the Government believes there is some future role for this Group we stand ready to advance the cause of negotiations.

Again many thanks for your courtesy and for the time that you spent with us.

Yours sincerely

Malcolm Fraser

Olusegun Obasanjo

Members:
The Rt.Hon. MALCOLM FRASER *(Co-Chairman)*; General OLUSEGUN OBASANJO *(Co-Chairman)*
The Rt.Hon. LORD BARBER; Dame NITA BARROW; Mr. JOHN MALECELA; Sardar SWARAN SINGH; The Most Rev. Archbishop EDWARD W. SCOTT DD.

A POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT

The South African Government has declared its commitment to dismantling the system of apartheid, to ending racial discrimination and to broad-based negotiations leading to new constitutional arrangements for power sharing by all the people of South Africa. In the light of preliminary and as yet incomplete discussions with representatives of various organisations and groups, within and outside South Africa, we believe that in the context of specific and meaningful steps being taken towards ending apartheid, the following additional action might ensure negotiations and a break in the cycle of violence.

On the part of the Government:

(a) Removal of the military from the townships, providing for freedom of assembly and discussion and suspension of detention without trial.

(b) The release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees.

(c) The unbanning of the ANC and PAC and the permitting of normal political activity.

On the part of the ANC and others:

Entering negotiations and suspending violence.

It is our view that simultaneous announcements incorporating these ideas might be negotiated if the Government were to be interested in pursuing this broad approach.

In the light of the Government's indication to us that it

(i) is not in principle against the release of Mr. Nelson Mandela and similar prisoners;

(ii) is not opposed in principle to the unbanning of any organisations;

...2

(iii) is prepared to enter into negotiations with the acknowledged leaders of the people of South Africa;

(iv) is committed to the removal of discrimination, not only from the statute books but also from South African society as a whole;

(v) is committed to the ending of white domination;

(vi) will not prescribe who may represent black communities in negotiations on a new constitution for South Africa;

(vii) is prepared to negotiate an open agenda,

the South African Government may wish to give serious consideration to the approach outlined in this note

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Republic of South Africa

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1715 Hendrik Verwoerd Building
Cape Town
8001
Tel
Ref.: 45-5848
MB 11/31

CONFIDENTIAL

24 April 1986

Dear Mr Fraser and General Obasanjo

The South African Government has been giving serious consideration to the salient features of the "possible negotiating concept" attached to your letter of 13 March 1986 which I have been asked to respond to.

You will be aware, from previous statements which the South African State President and other members of the South African Government have made on the issue of the release of Mr Nelson Mandela, that the South African Government's basic concern is that his release should not be accompanied by or result in further violence.

It must be clear that the key to the release of Mr Mandela and similar prisoners, withdrawal of the Security Forces from certain urban areas and lifting of the ban on the ANC and PAC is a suspension of violence.

The question which arises is how this can be put into effect. In your "possible negotiating concept" you suggest that, "in the context of specific and meaningful steps being taken towards ending apartheid", certain additional action by the South African Government and the ANC and others might ensure negotiations and a break in the cycle of violence. Moreover you will recall that during the Group's recent discussions with representatives of the South African Government, the influx control system and pass laws were highlighted by the Group as important issues affecting the daily lives of black people. At that stage the Group was aware of the State President's commitment, made during the opening of Parliament earlier this year, that this situation would be fundamentally altered by 1 July 1986. In line with this commitment the State President announced in Parliament on Friday 18 April 1986, that no further charges would be preferred in terms of the existing legislation; that people who have been convicted in terms of this legislation would be released forthwith, and that those who are being detained pending trial would likewise be released. The Government proposes to repeal or amend no fewer than 34 Acts

and Proclamations to ensure that the movement of people will not be subject to discrimination on the grounds of colour or race.

These additional reform measures testify to the Government's acceptance that no further forced removals in pursuit of a political ideology will take place. The Government has noted with satisfaction in this connection the Group's recognition that positive actions on the part of the South African Government should be matched by corresponding responses by those now opposed to negotiation and committed to violence.

The Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons will understand that if the South African Government does move along the lines suggested in its "possible negotiating concept" and violence continues or increases, the Government may have no alternative but to take appropriate measures to control the violence. The Group will recall that I raised this issue with them during their visit. It is my recollection that it responded that it recognised the responsibility of the Government to maintain order but the question arises whether such action on the part of the Government would not then result in further punitive action against South Africa. This is a most important issue which will require further discussion.

The South African Government continues to believe that the Group can serve a useful purpose and it accordingly proposes, in the light of the foregoing, that the whole Group or representative members of the Group meet with representatives of the South African Government to exchange views on how further to proceed, particularly on the modalities of achieving a suspension of violence and facilitating discussions.

Yours sincerely

R F Botha

R F BOTHA

The Right Honourable Malcolm Fraser
General Olusegun Obasanjo
Co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth Group
of Eminent Persons
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
LONDON SW1Y 5HX

SOUTH AFRICA Retained PT9

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CGPC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 April 1986

Dear Charles,

Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons

Thank you for your letter of 15 April giving the Prime Minister's views on the modalities of the Commonwealth Review meeting to consider the forthcoming report of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons.

Meanwhile, in addition to the Prime Minister's discussion with Mr Hawke (your letter of 21 April) Sir Antony Acland has talked to the Secretary General of the Commonwealth. It emerged that Ramphal had consulted nearly all the Heads of Government concerned. Most were thinking in terms of late July, though Mr Hawke had specifically suggested 4 August. All were assuming that they themselves should attend. On venue, Mr Mulroney was not keen on having the meeting in Ottawa and had suggested Nassau. Rajiv Gandhi had definitely offered New Delhi. Ramphal thought that the alternative would be the Commonwealth Secretariat in London.

On chairmanship, Ramphal seemed initially to think that the Head of Government of the host country would have to chair the meeting. If it were in London, he was not sure whether Mrs Thatcher would want to be in the chair or whether this would be acceptable to others. In further discussion Ramphal came increasingly round to the idea that Sir L Pindling, as the Chairman of the Commonwealth meeting in Nassau, should continue. Sir Antony Acland said that while he did not know what the Prime Minister thought on the subject of venue or chairmanship, a meeting at the Commonwealth Secretariat under Sir L Pindling's chairmanship might be a practical and economic solution.

The Foreign Secretary also spoke to Joe Clark on this subject at the OECD meeting in Paris on 17 April. The latter expressed doubt about the acceptability to some other Commonwealth members of London as a venue and indicated a Canadian preference for Ottawa for this reason (but see paragraph 6 below). Despite this the Foreign Secretary believes that the Canadians could probably be brought to accept Sir Antony Acland's proposal in paragraph 3 above.

/There seems

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There seems to be a consensus in the Commonwealth that the meeting should take place at Head of Government level. This accords with the Prime Minister's own feeling. Timing remains a problem, and the Foreign Secretary does not believe that we shall be able to delay matters until September. This would go against the preference of the others concerned and risk giving an impression of British foot dragging. The issues of venue and chairmanship are to some extent linked. It looks as though we might be able to secure agreement on a meeting in London, but this could be at the price of ceding the chair to Sir L Pindling. Sir Geoffrey Howe sees some advantage in making a virtue of necessity. If the meeting takes place at Head of Government level the Prime Minister will be better able to argue the British case if she is not in the chair. Willingness to cede the chairmanship might also serve to reduce suspicions of the British role. Sir L Pindling played a helpful Chairman's role in Nassau and might reasonably be expected to do so again.

Sir Geoffrey Howe considers that there remains advantage in putting forward a definite proposal on the modalities of the review meeting before the views of others get too set (for example, the Canadian High Commission told us on 23 April that they had just conveyed to Ramphal a message indicating that Mr Mulroney could agree to attending a review meeting in Delhi on 4 August: the High Commission thought Mr Mulroney would personally prefer London, but Delhi was the only capital being canvassed by the Commonwealth Secretariat). He therefore recommends that we should go for London on 4 August at Heads of Government level with Sir L Pindling in the chair. The Foreign Secretary accepts that such a format is not ideal and does not entirely meet the Prime Minister's preferences. But in his view it constitutes the best package we are likely to achieve without a great deal of ill feeling and adequately protects our own interests.

If the Prime Minister agrees, the Foreign Secretary suggests that we should move quickly. He would himself proposed to call in Mr Ramphal to ask him formally to convey to the other governments concerned a proposal on the above lines. At the same time, given that Mr Ramphal is evidently for his own reasons actively canvassing for the review meeting to be held in Delhi, Sir Geoffrey Howe suggests that we should take direct action with the other governments, probably through High Commissioners in London, starting with the Bahamian (as Sir L Pindling would have to agree to staying on in the Chair despite the change of venue). The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary will in addition have an opportunity to talk to their Australian and Canadian colleagues in the margins of the Tokyo Economic Summit. But Sir Geoffrey does not think things can be left until then.

/He therefore

He therefore intends to telephone Joe Clark early this week.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of other Ministers in OD and to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

STH. AFRICA Relations Pt 9



(1)

PRIME MINISTER

COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

The attached letter says that the Foreign Secretary has taken soundings of other Governments about the level, venue and timing of the review conference for the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. Why?

On level, it is quite clear that the other heads of Government concerned are all expecting to meet. Clearly you will have to take part.

On venue, there is a move afoot to hold the meeting in Delhi. The Foreign Secretary is concerned to get in a firm bid for London very quickly in order to pre-empt this. To get London accepted, he thinks he will have to agree that Sir Lynden Pindling (rather than you) should be in the Chair. Actually I think this will probably suit you: it will be easier to push the British point of view. Yes not

The main problem remains that of timing. The soundings conducted by Sonny Ramphal show that all the heads of Government expect to meet in late July or, as Mr. Hawke has suggested, 4 August. The Foreign Secretary's view is that it is simply not feasible to postpone the date until September. The truth of the matter is, I am afraid, that no real effort has been made to get agreement on postponement except for your own attempt with Mr. Hawke. The Foreign Secretary obviously believes it is now too late and the bandwagon is moving in favour of late July/early August. The choices are either:

(i) to go back to him and instruct that a proper effort be made to get agreement on dates in September (though even September is pretty full for you). Or

This would be much better. not

(ii) to agree to a meeting on 4/5 August (you could just do this before your engagements starting on 6 August), provided the meeting is in London.

Agree to (i) or (ii)?

I may not be able to do an early Bilderberg meeting. I certainly would not go to Helsinki for it. But what really bothers me is that the FCO do not seem interested in getting the best results only in foreign affairs. CDP

C D POWELL

28 April 1986

SLHAKP

JU92
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET
Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215 5422
GTN 215) .....
(Switchboard) 01-215 7877

28 April 1986

CONFIDENTIAL

Colin R Budd Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for
Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

CDP
28/4

Dear Colin,

COMMONWEALTH GROUP ON EMINENT PERSONS

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 14 April to Charles Powell. I have now seen his reply of 15 April.

My Secretary of State strongly supports the recommendations of the paper which you enclosed, in favour of trying to steer the COMGEP report and the review meeting towards an acceptable outcome. He agrees that we must do everything possible to encourage a positive approach by COMGEP, and a constructive South African Government reaction to the Group's proposals, with the objective of pre-empting calls for further economic measures against South Africa.

Officials are now in touch about implementing the legislative ban on the import of Krugerrands. This and other measures which we have already been obliged to implement have just about exhausted what we can do without serious damage to our considerable South African trade and investment interests. Officials in the MISC 118 Group are, of course, still examining the likely consequences of possible further measures. But our preliminary view is that we should have extreme difficulty in agreeing to any further economic measures against South Africa.

I am copying this letter to the other recipients of yours.

Yours ever,

Michael

MICHAEL GILBERTSON
Private Secretary

1786 BOARD OF TRADE BICENTENARY

999-1

SOUTH AFRICA Relations PTQ

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FM CAPE TOWN
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 236
OF 250920Z APRIL 86

CONFIDENTIAL

No. Curran o.r.

MY TELS NO. 233 AND 234: SOUTH AFRICAN REPLY TO COMMONWEALTH GROUP.

1. FURTHER READING OF P.W. BOTHA'S LETTER CONFIRMS MY INITIAL IMPRESSION THAT IT IS WEAK ON COMMITMENT TO THE EPG IDEAS BUT STRONG IN OFFERING FURTHER TALKS. HEAD OF CHANCERY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY OF A LONG PRIVATE TALK WITH THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE DFA LAST NIGHT HOWEVER, WHICH THROWS SOME MORE LIGHT ON THE GOVERNMENT'S THINKING.

2. VON HIRSCHBERG SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT THE CO-CHAIRMEN WOULD RECOGNISE HIS MINISTER'S RESPONSE AS A POSITIVE ONE. IT WAS INTENDED TO BE. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN THE POTENTIAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP. THEY FACED MAJOR PROBLEMS IN GETTING BLACKS INVOLVED IN DIALOGUE. PROGRESS WAS NECESSARY FOR THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA. HIS MINISTER BELIEVED THAT THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP INITIATIVE COULD PLAY A VITAL PART. BUT IT WAS GOING TO BE ENORMOUSLY DIFFICULT TO MAKE PROGRESS. TO DO SO WOULD REQUIRE BOTH SKILL AND TIME. THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WAS SERIOUSLY INTERESTED. THE EVIDENCE FOR THIS WAS ALREADY THERE. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED THE GROUP THE ACCESS GIVEN TO THEM AND STATEMENTS SUCH AS THAT RECENTLY MADE IN PARLIAMENT BY THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE NOT INTERESTED IN TRYING TO MAKE POSITIVE PROGRESS. TO SOME EXTENT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD LOCKED THEMSELVES INTO THE GROUP INITIATIVE BY WHAT THEY HAD ALREADY DONE. IF IT NOW FAILED THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WERE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT THEY THEMSELVES WOULD ALSO BE DAMAGED.

3. NEVERTHELESS IT WAS NECESSARY TO LOOK AT ALL THIS FROM A SOUTH AFRICAN POINT OF VIEW. SEEN FROM HERE THE SITUATION WAS THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WERE MAKING REAL CHANGES. IN PARTICULAR SINCE THE GROUP INITIATIVE WAS LAUNCHED THEY HAD CALLED OFF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, RELEASED DETAINEES UNDER THE EMERGENCY, ANNOUNCED THE ENDING OF PASS LAWS AND INFLUX CONTROL. THERE WAS A DANGER THAT AS THEY HAD DONE THIS THEY WOULD NOW BE GIVEN NO CREDIT FOR THESE MOVES. AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD HAVE BEEN FOR THEM TO DO NOTHING AND TO TRY TO BARGAIN WITH THESE PROMISES OF CHANGE. THEY HAD NOT CHOSEN THIS COURSE BUT THEY NOW NEEDED TO POINT OUT THAT THEY DESERVED CREDIT FOR WHAT HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE. THIS WAS ONE OF THE AIMS IN HIS MINISTER'S LETTER.

4. VON HIRSCHBERG SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD CONSIDERED THE RESPONSE CAREFULLY. ONE VIEW WAS THAT THE ANC WERE NOT SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN DIALOGUE. THE FEAR WAS THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUOUSLY WIDEN THEIR DEMANDS COUNTING ON PRESSURE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO MAKE CONCESSIONS WITHOUT THEMSELVES OFFERING ANY-

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THING. HARDLINERS IN THE ANC HAD A VESTED INTEREST IN CONTINUING CONFRONTATION WHICH THEY PROBABLY BELIEVED WOULD IN THE END BRING THEM TO POWER. THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD NOT AFFORD TO FOLLOW THIS COURSE. THEY THEREFORE NEEDED SOME INDICATION THAT THE ANC COULD DELIVER. BUT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT RECOGNISED THAT WE AND OTHERS WERE LOOKING FOR A POSITIVE REPLY. THEY HAD THEREFORE DECIDED NOT TO MAKE DEMANDS IN THEIR REPLY. IT WAS BETTER TO INDICATE THAT DISCUSSION SHOULD CONTINUE. HOPEFULLY THIS WOULD BE A POSITIVE WAY OF TAKING THE INITIATIVE FURTHER. HIS MINISTER WAS VERY INTERESTED IN THE IDEA OF A SYNCHRONISED APPROACH. THIS COULD BE TACKLED IN THE WAY OF DIALOGUE. IF THERE COULD BE UNDERTAKINGS TO STOP THE VIOLENCE THIS WOULD BE OF REAL INTEREST TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. BUT THEY HAD RESPONSIBILITIES TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER. THEY SAW A RISK IN A PROCESS OF SYNCHRONISATION THAT THIS MIGHT BE USED AGAINST THEM. THEY COULD BE WORSE OFF IF AN INITIATIVE GOT UNDER WAY AND THEY WERE THEN DEEMED TO HAVE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH UNDERTAKINGS BECAUSE THEY HAD TO DEAL WITH CONTINUING VIOLENCE. THEY NEEDED TO BE SURE THAT THE ANC WOULD BE PREPARED TO HONOUR ITS UNDERTAKINGS. THIS WAS WHERE THE PROCESS OF SYNCHRONISATION CAME IN AND WHERE THEY FELT THAT THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP COULD PLAY A KEY PART.

MOBERLY

SOUTH AFRICA

LIMITED
S AF D
C AF D
UND
ECD(E)
NEWS D
LEGAL ADVISERS
PLANNING STAFF

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR FERGUSSON
MR REEVE
CABINET OFFICE

N°. 10.



ADVANCE COPIES

SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS (2)
PS/MRS CHALKER.
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON

MR REEVE

HD/SAFD
HD/CAFD
HD/UND
HD/NEWS DEPT
~~PRESIDENT CLERK~~

MR CLG MALLABY , CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE

15.11.8

GRS 600

CONFIDENTIAL
FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 241730Z FCO
TELNO 234
OF 241545Z APRIL 86

MY OPT: SOUTH AFRICAN REPLY TO COMMONWEALTH GROUP.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PIK BOTHA'S LETTER TO FRASER AND OBASANJO: BEGINS
THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE SALIENT FEATURES OF THE ''POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT'' ATTACHED TO YOUR LETTER OF 13 MARCH 1986 WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO RESPOND TO.

YOU WILL BE AWARE, FROM PREVIOUS STATEMENTS WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE PRESIDENT AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE ON THE ISSUE OF THE RELEASE OF MR NELSON MANDELA, THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S BASIC CONCERN IS THAT HIS RELEASE SHOULD NOT BE ACCOMPANIED BY OR RESULT IN FURTHER VIOLENCE.

IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT THEY KEY TO THE RELEASE OF MR MANDELA AND SIMILAR PRISONERS, WITHDRAWAL OF THE SECURITY FORCES FROM CERTAIN URBAN AREAS AND LIFTING OF THE BAN ON THE ANC AND PAC IS A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE.

THE QUESTION WHICH ARISES IS HOW THIS CAN BE PUT INTO EFFECT. IN YOUR ' POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT'' YOU SUGGEST THAT, ''IN THE CONTEXT OF SPECIFIC AND MEANINGFUL STEPS BEING TAKEN TOWARDS ENDING APARTHEID'', CERTAIN ADDITIONAL ACTION BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ANC AND OTHERS MIGHT ENSURE NEGOTIATIONS AND A BREAK IN THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE. MOREOVER YOU WILL RECALL THAT

GOVERNMENT AND THE ANC AND OTHERS MIGHT ENSURE NEGOTIATIONS AND A BREAK IN THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE. MOREOEVER YOU WILL RECALL THAT DURING THE GROUP'S RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITHV REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, THE INFLUX CONTROL SYSTEM AND PASS LAWS WERE HIGHLIGHTED BY THE GROUP AS IMPORTANT ISSUES AFFECTING THE DAILY LIVES OF BLACK PEOPLE. AT THAT STAGE THE GROUP WAS AWARE OF THE STATE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT, MADE DURING THE OPENING OF PARLIAMENT EARLIER THIS YEAR, THAT THIS SITUATION WOULD BE FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED BY 1 JULY 1986. IN LINE WITH THIS COMMITMENT THE STATE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED IN PARLIAMENT ON FRIDAY 18 APRIL 1986, THAT NO FURTHER CHARGES WOULD BE PREFERRED IN TERMS OF THE EXISTING LEGISLATION SEMI COLON THAT PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN CONVICTED IN TERMS OF THIS LEGISLATION WOULD BE RELEASED FORTHWITH, AND THAT THOSE WHO ARE BEING DETAINED EPNDING TRIAL WOULD LIKEWISE BE RELEASED. THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSES TO REPEAL OR AMEND NO FEWER THAN 34 ACTS AND PROCLAMATIONS TO ENSURE THAT THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE WILL NO BE SUBJECT TO DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF COLOUR OR RACE.

THESE ADDITIONAL REFORM MEASURES TESTIFY TO THE GOVERNMENT'S ACCEPTANCE THAT NO FURTHER FORCED REMOVALS IN PURSUIT OF A POLITICAL IDEOLOGY WILL TAKE PLACE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOTED WITH SATISFACTION IN THIS CONNECTION THE GROUP'S RECOGNITION THAT POSITIVE ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE MATCHED BY CORRESPONDING RESPONSES BY THOSE NOW OPPOSED TO NEGOTIATION AND COMMITTED TO VIOLENCE.

THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS WILL UNDERSTAND THAT IF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT DOES MOVE LALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED IN ITS ''POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT'' AND VIOLENCE CONTINUES OR INCREASES, THE GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO CONTROL THE VIOLENCE. THE GROUP WILL RECALL THAT I RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH THEM DURING THEIR VISIST. IT IS MY RECOLLECTION THAT IT RESPONDED THAT IT RECOGNISED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN ORDER BUT THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER SUCH ACTION ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT THEN RESULT IN FURTHER PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. THIS IS A MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE WHICH WILL REQUIRE FURTHER DISCUSSION.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE GROUP CAN SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE AND IT ACCORDINGLY PROPOSES, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, THAT THE WHOLE GROUP OR REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON HOW FURTHER TO PROCEED, PARTICULARLY ON THE MODALITIES OF ACHIEVING A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE AND FACILITATING DISCUSSIONS.
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SOUTH AFRICAN REPLY TO COMMONWEALTH GROUP

1. FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ME TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE TO ATTEND THE CORONATION IN SWAZILAND. HE HANDED ME A COPY OF THE LETTER WHICH HE HAS SENT TODAY THROUGH THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT TO THE TWO CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP. TEXT IN MIFT.

2. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HIS LETTER TOOK FULL ACCOUNT OF THE RECENT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA. IT WAS INTENDED AS A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY THE EPG. HE DREW ATTENTION PARTICULARLY TO THE PROPOSAL FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE GROUP AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. IN DELIVERING THE LETTER, WORRALL WAS BEING INSTRUCTED TO SUGGEST THAT HE AND THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE DFA, VON HIRSCHBERG, MIGHT FOLLOW THIS UP WITH THE GROUP IN LONDON AS

VON HIRSCHBERG, MIGHT FOLLOW THIS UP WITH THE GROUP IN LONDON AS A PRELIMINARY TO ANY FURTHER MEETINGS WITH SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTERS.

3. PIK BOTHA ADDED THAT THE LINE TAKEN IN THE LETTER WAS AS FAR AS HE COULD POSSIBLY GO WITHIN THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. IT WAS NOW UP TO TO THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP TO TAKE UP THE OFFER OF FURTHER EXCHANGES ON HOW TO ACHIEVE A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE AND TO FACILITATE DISCUSSIONS.

4. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT IT WAS TIME FOR WESTERN GOVERNMENTS TO COME OUT CLEARLY IN CONDEMNING VIOLENCE BY THE ANC AND OTHERS AND IN PERSUADING THEM TOWARDS THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

5. I SAID I WAS SURE THE SUGGESTION FOR A CONTINUATION OF EXCHANGES WITH THE EPG WOULD BE WELCOME IN LONDON. THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP ITSELF WOULD NO DOUBT WISH TO TAKE A COOL LOOK AT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE LETTER BEFORE RESPONDING. PIK BOTHA BEGAN TO BRIDLE AT THIS, THINKING THAT I WAS IMPLYING (AS INDEED I WAS) THAT THE GROUP MIGHT NOT FIND A GREAT DEAL OF MOVEMENT ON THE GOVERNMENT'S PART TOWARDS THE IDEAS IN THEIR NEGOTIATING CONCEPT. VON HIRSCHBERG SMOOTHED THIS OUT BY SAYING I WAS PRESUMABLY REFERRING TO THE GROUP WANTING TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT THE LETTER AS A WHOLE. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE APPRECIATED THE GOVERNMENT'S SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO GET A REPLY TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN IN ADVANCE OF NEXT WEEK'S MEETING.

6. THE MINISTER SAID THAT A REPLY TO MRS THATCHER FROM THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE FORTHCOMING SHORTLY. HE EXPECTED THAT THIS WOULD INCLUDE A SUGGESTION THAT SOUTH AFRICA COULD USEFULLY BE DISCUSSED AT THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN TOKYO. SIMILAR MESSAGES WOULD PROBABLY BE SEN TO OTHER HEADS OF GOVERMENT ATTENDING THE SUMMIT. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT THE SEVEN LEADERS MIGHT BE WILLING TO SAY SOMETHING PUBLICLY ABOUT THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE ANS SUPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON THE PART OF ORGANISATIONS LIKE THE ANC. I SAID I THOUGHT A PRIME CONSIDERATION IN OUR OWN MINDS WOULD BE TO AVOID CUTTING ACROSS THE WORK OF THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP.

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REACTIONS TO GOVERNMENT REFORM ANNOUNCEMENTS

SUMMARY

1. THERE HAS BEEN A BROAD WELCOME FROM WHITES TO THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS FOR ABOLITION OF THE PASS LAWS AND INFLUX CONTROL. ONLY THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OBJECTS TO THE REFORMS. BLACKS ARE GENERALLY SCEPTICAL. INITIAL PRESS COMMENT TO THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE PUBLIC SAFETY ACT IS ALSO CRITICAL.

DETAIL

2. WHITE COMMENT ON TH GOVERNMENT'S REFORM PROPOSALS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CRITICISM BY THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY HAS BEEN FAVOURABLE. COLIN EGLIN, LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION PROGRESSIVE FEDERAL PARTY, HAS SAID THAT QUOTE THE ENORMOUS TASK OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION CAN NOW BEGIN UNQUOTE. THE LABOUR PARTY, WHILE OBJECTING TO THE RACIAL BASIS OF THE POPULATION REGISTER HAS WELCOMED THE REFORMS AS ''ANOTHER BLOW FOR APARTHEID''.

3. JAN STEYN, SPEAKING FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR COUNCIL ON URBANISATION WHICH REPRESENTS THE FOUR MAJOR BUSINESS ORGANISATIONS (FCI, ASSOCOM, AHI AND NAFCOC) AS WELL AS THE URBAN FOUNDATION, SAID THAT THE PAPER ON URBANISATION IS ''A SIGNIFICANT MILESTONE IN DECISIVELY MOVING SOUTH AFRICA AWAY FROM RACIAL DISCRIMINATION''.

4. THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS WAS MORE CAUTIOUS IN ITS WELCOME, COMMENTING THAT ALTHOUGH THE ''GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO HUMAN DIGNITY AND EQUAL TREATMENT'' WAS WELCOME, THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF GROUP AREAS AND THE FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE RIGHTS OF TBVC CITIZENS IN SOUTH AFRICA WERE NEGATIVE FACTORS. BLACK SASH AND THE DETAINEES PARENTS SUPPORT COMMITTEE HAVE MADE SIMILAR COMMENTS.

5. THE LOCAL PRESS HAVE WELCOMED THE REFORM PROPOSALS, THOUGH HERE TOO RESERVATIONS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED. 'BUSINESS DAY' COMMENTED THAT ''THE GROUP AREAS ACT IS APPARENTLY TO BE USED AS A CONTROL MECHANISM, AND THERE IS SOME QUESTION WHETHER RESTRICTIONS ON SQUATTING AND HEALTH ARE TO BE APPLIED IN GOOD FAITH''. HOWEVER THE LIBERAL 'CAPE TIMES' DESCRIBED RESERVATIONS AS ''MINIMAL COMPARED TO THE OVERHWELMING EXPRESSION OF GOOD INTENTIONS''.

THE

THE AFRIKAANS NEWSPAPER 'BEELD' COMMENTED THAT THE REFORMS WOULD LEAD TO AN IMPROVEMENT OF BLACK CIRCUMSTANCES, ''IN A FIELD WHERE THERE ARE PROFOUND GRIEVANCES''.

6. IN CONTRAST, BLACKS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY ARE LOOKING FOR MORE SWEEPING CHANGES. CHIEF BUTHELEZI HAS SAID THAT ''THERE WILL NEVER BE A JUST URBANISATION POLICY WHILE THE GROUP AREAS ACT REMAINS ON THE STATUTE BOOK''. BISHOP TUTU HAS DESCRIBED THE REFORMS AS ''TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE''. AZAPO HAS CALLED IT A ''MINUTE STEP''. THE UDF, SAYING THAT IT NEEDED TIME TO STUDY THE PROPOSALS, ADDED THAT ''WE WILL RESPOND WHEN IT HAS BECOME CLEAR WHAT FORM OF ACTION IS POSSIBLE''.

7. BLACKS ARE ALSO CRITICAL OF THE PROPOSED INCREASED POWERS FOR THE MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER UNDER THE PUBLIC SAFETY ACT. 'THE ARGUS' NEWSPAPER DESCRIBED IT AS ''A MOVE TO REASSURE THE WHITE RIGHT'' AND THE 'CAPE TIMES' HAS CONDEMNED IT COMMENTING THAT THE IMPOSITION OF EMERGENCY POWERS IN 1985 PROVIDED NO REMEDY, AND THAT THERE IS THEREFORE NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT THESE POWERS WILL HELP. 'BEELD', THOUGH DEFENDING THE INCREASED POWERS ON THE GROUNDS THAT LAW AND ORDER WAS A PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATED REFORM, CONCLUDED THAT ''WITH THE GREATER POWERS OF THE POLICE THERE SHOULD BE A GREATER EFFORT ON THE PART OF GOVERNMENT TO ACCELERATE THE REFORM PROCESS''.

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PRETORIA PASS SAVING TO DURBAN

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MY TELNO 226: ENDING OF PASS LAWS
SUMMARY

1. THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE HAS CONFIRMED THAT ALL PRISONERS HELD ON PASS LAW OFFENCES HAVE BEEN RELEASED.

DETAIL

2. IN A SEPARATE STATEMENT ON 23 APRIL, THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, MR COETSEE, CONFIRMED THAT INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED THAT NO FURTHER PROSECUTIONS SHOULD BE MADE IN TERMS OF STATUTORY MEASURES THAT MAY RELATE TO INFLUX CONTROL AND THE PASS LAWS AS IDENTIFIED IN THE GOVERNMENT'S WHITE PAPER.

3. THE MINISTER ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRISON SERVICE HAD MADE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR PRISONERS SENTENCED UNDER THOSE MEASURES TO BE RELEASED.

4. THE NUMBER OF SENTENCED AND AWAITING TRIAL PRISONERS DETAINED IN PRISONS (EXCLUDING POLICE CELLS) ON 31 MARCH 86 IN TERMS OF THOSE MEASURES IS AS FOLLOWS AND ARE AN INDICATION OF THE NUMBERS THAT WILL NOW BE RELEASED:

- THE 72-HOUR PROVISION	25
- FAILURE TO PRODUCE REFERENCE BOOK OR OTHER DOCUMENTS	76
- IDLE AND UNDESIRABLE PERSONS (SECTION 29)	64
- PERMITS	80
TOTAL	285

5. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF OTHER PRISONERS BEING RELEASED EG. FOREIGNERS HELD AS PROHIBITED IMMIGRANTS.

6. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PRISONERS IN CUSTODY ON 31 MARCH WAS 113 432.

MOBERLY
PRETORIA PSE PASS SAVING DURBAN

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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS

"SOUTH AFRICA : REFORM, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE MIDDLE GROUND"

BY

DR S J SAUNDERS, VICE-CHANCELLOR AND PRINCIPAL

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

It is a great honour for me to deliver the Presidential Address to the South African Institute of Race Relations tonight.

In this address I will be simplistic in a number of respects inasmuch as I am afraid I will be stating the obvious, but it does seem to me that the obvious needs to be stated unequivocally in South Africa in 1986.

The Institute was founded to promote good race relations, implying also sound intergroup relations between people who have different cultural and historical backgrounds, and not only in the narrow, racial context. Good relationships between human beings result from complex and often fragile mutual interaction. No society can afford to lower its guard against the development of racial prejudices within it. While it is true that every individual must play his or her full part in promoting good relationships with people of another race or culture, in the end success in this crucial area is likely to

occur and to endure in a healthy society if the constitution of the country and the laws of the land allow it. It isn't enough to say that a legal system has a high reputation of independence if all that independence means is the application of racially discriminatory laws. It isn't enough to say that health services are available to all people or that the standard of living of South African blacks is higher than elsewhere in Africa if, in fact, the laws on the statute book are discriminatory. It is not enough to have noble words in a constitution if the constitution is not legitimate in the eyes of the people subject to it.

One often hears a plaintive question as to why South Africans are selected out for condemnation throughout the world. Why are the excesses of the Soviet Union ignored, or apparently ignored, in certain circumstances, or for example the excesses in Uganda? It is plain that the record of Uganda and of the Soviet Union and of many other countries in race and intergroup relations is abysmal and must be condemned, but it is also plain that South Africa is unique in as much as we have placed upon the statute book as a deliberate and public policy, discriminatory legislation which effectively keeps people in a subordinate and inferior position solely because they belong to another race.

So I would like to focus on the necessity of removing discriminatory legislation before we can talk about good race or intergroup relations in this country, but without ignoring or neglecting the enormous importance of developing good inter-personal and intergroup relations, quite apart from the legislation. But until the legislation is repealed, no high-sounding words will meet the needs of this country, and nobody, least of all the people in this country who are discriminated against in 1986, will be fooled by the rhetoric.

Many of us were encouraged by both the style and the content of the State President's speech when he opened the South African Parliament on Friday, 31st January of this year. The full realisation of the promises and commitments, stated and implied in that speech, could indeed herald a new day for South Africa, and could revolutionize in a peaceful and constructive manner, race relations in this country. And so we should give every credit to the State President for making that speech in the way in which he did, but before we join the euphoric chorus, we should also note with great earnestness that 1986 will need to be marked by the commitments in that speech being given flesh and blood and structure in the form of the repeal of discriminatory legislation and clear moves towards a legitimate constitution. And we should wait to see whether those events occur, before we cynically disregard and reject what the State President said.

The speech committed the Government to the restoration of South African citizenship to those from whom it was arbitrarily and undemocratically taken away; the involvement of black communities in decision making; freehold property rights for members of black communities; the removal of existing influx control measures; an undivided South Africa with one citizenship; the sovereignty of law, and, I quote: "We believe the human dignity, life, liberty and property of all, must be protected, regardless of colour, race, creed or religion" and "We believe that a democratic system of government which must accommodate all legitimate political aspirations of all South African communities must be negotiated. All South Africans must be placed in a position where they can participate in government through their elected representatives." As I have said, the full realisation of those statements could transform the future of South Africa and enhance good race relations, but failure to give them legislative muscle and failure to repeal discriminatory legislation will do the reverse.

And we need to state clearly what we believe the words in the State President's speech to mean. Some years ago a young British political scientist who had made a special study of Kissinger's role in the then Rhodesia told me that Kissinger had used the English language like a political rapier. The precise use and meaning of words are crucial. Let us look at the meaning of some of the State President's words:

(i) "One citizenship for all South Africans"

I would suggest that "one citizenship for all South Africans" means that all citizens must have the same political rights, e.g. a real influence in the system of taxation; in determining foreign policy; and in the constitution of and control of the military. South African citizenship for all cannot simply mean all having the same passport - it is civil rights that determine citizenship whatever the constitutional framework through which they are exercised may be. The commitment to restore citizenship to black persons who forfeited it with the independence of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei is to be welcomed but the restoration needs to be to a citizenship with civil rights. One should note that there was no consultation before the citizenship was removed.

(ii) "Removal of existing influx control measures".

Very simply, the pass laws and influx control must go. They must not be replaced by alternative discriminatory legislation or regulations. The average black man and woman must feel the enormous weight of the notorious dompas (passes) lifted from their backs. There must be no manœuvering by Government; no ifs and buts. And administrative delays about issuing identity documents to thirty million South Africans must not be allowed to delay this development. I am sure modern technology can speed things up enormously. And no discriminatory system must be allowed to replace the existing one. The State President said:
"The present system has become too costly and has become obsolete".

It has become too costly not only in financial terms but most important of all in human ones.

(iii) "We believe in the sovereignty of the law as the basis for the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals as well as groups. We believe in the sanctity and indivisibility of law and the just application thereof. There can be no peace, freedom and democracy without law. Any future system must conform with the requirements of a civilized legal order, and must ensure access to the courts and equality before the law."

It was on June 15th, 1215 that King John signed the Magna Carta. The document made it clear that there was a law that was above the king and which even he could not break. This reaffirmation of supreme law and its formulation in the charter that was still imperfect strengthened the rule of law initiated by Henry the Second. For the first time a king was himself bound by the law, and the charter became, in the words of Winston Churchill, an enduring witness that the "power of the crown was not absolute". Referring to Britain, Churchill went on: "And when in subsequent ages the State, swollen with its own authority, has attempted to ride roughshod over the rights or liberties of the subject, it is to this doctrine that appeal has again and again been made, and never yet without success." The barons of the thirteenth century realised that the rights of the individual had to be protected. That truism holds as strongly today as it did then, and the rule of law is an indispensable prerequisite to peace and prosperity in this country and to good race relations. Indeed the Old Testament emphasises the need the Israelites identified to have their kings kept in check and to uphold the Law. And the Rule of Law must include the restoration of habeas corpus, and the repeal of laws making possible detention without trial, house arrest, banning and other restrictions of human liberty not determined by the courts. The citizens must be protected by a Bill of Rights and an independent judiciary enshrined in the constitution to ensure that

the Rule of Law prevails.

(iv) "Involvement of black communities in decision making" and "the restructuring of the system of provincial government to involve all communities" must mean equal involvement by all with ultimate decisions tested by a referendum or some other democratic voting procedure to ensure the legitimacy of the decisions.

And the system of local government must not result in a South Africa largely divided into impoverished and rich communities each being called in large part to provide development and other funds from local resources. The State President's statement regarding restructuring provincial government implies regionalisation and there is nothing wrong with that provided its base is geographic and not ethnic and provided all regions are economically viable.

(v) "Freehold rights for members of black communities" must mean that land can be purchased in any area and occupancy must not be impeded by "orderly urbanisation".

And the meaning of all the other statements must imply full consultation with all sectors of society, the testing of decisions in a manner suggested above and the equal and even-handed application of the results to all irrespective of colour.

To make the words of the State President's speech of January 31 mean anything at all, the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act and the Natives Land Act must be repealed. Without that the words will have a hollow ring.

What I am saying is that the State President's speech can be read in more than one way. Its implementation can only be successful if it means that South Africa moves completely away from making race the final determinant in all decisions in the political structures and replaces it by placing human rights and non-racial considerations on centre stage. The peaceful future of South Africa is dependant upon the State President's words as meaning that Government has made this fundamental shift. The failure of the South African Government to give such a reality to the content of that speech will do more damage to race relations in this country and to the future of us all than any other single event in recent times.

The speech claimed, and I quote:

> "The 1983 Constitution proved within a year that our various communities can take part effectively and peacefully in joint decision-making at the central level."

One should add that the 1983 constitution, which is the present constitution of our country, is a racist constitution, and as such it is fatally flawed, as Dr Alan Paton rightly pointed out in his 1985 Hoernlé Lecture. It has given effect to a tricameral parliament based on race. It has excluded Africans completely from the centre of the legislative process, and has been one of the main sources of the upheavals and problems which beset our country in 1985 and 1986. We have had to come to grips with the nightmarish concept of "general affairs" and "own affairs" and, to quote from many people who have spoken to me, members of the Government and

senior officials: "We must make the constituiton work." It seems to me that it doesn't matter what the cost in human terms or in resources and money, but we are asked to "make the constitution work". My submission, like that of Paton, is that the constitution is unworkable, and I would add that it is increasing the bureaucracy enormously, that it is too costly in financial terms for the country, and that it is skewing national priorities.

Let us look at the question of education. I think without doubt most would agree that the problems in education are amongst the root causes of unhappiness which black South Africans have at this moment. We have a Department of National Education, "General Affairs". We have a Department of Education and Culture, House of Assembly, i.e. white "Own Affairs", a Department of Education and Culture, House of Representatives, i.e. coloured "Own Affairs", a Department of Education and Culture, House of Delegates, i.e. Asian "Own Affairs". We have numerous education departments in the "homelands" which are not yet independent, and we have departments of education in the "homelands" which have opted for independence. We have a Department of Education which expressly takes care of the needs of Africans within the Republic. The simple fact of the matter is that multiple departments of education at that level are costly and inefficient, and that South Africa simply does not have the manpower and the talent to staff those departments with people of adequate ability. It is just impossible. And ultimately, that whole machine must grind more and more slowly and more and more inefficiently. It is true that the Department of National Education "General Affairs" is taking more responsibility in increasing areas of common concern, but this does not alter the fact that we have a ridiculous superfluity of education departments. And the creation of a National Certifying Council and other structures cannot substitute for what, after all, was one of the fundamental recommendations of the Human Sciences Research Council's

Commission of Inquiry into the Provision of Education in the RSA, that there should be one ministry of education and one minister of education. Those words were not chosen by the HSRC committee members by chance. They weren't haphazard words. They were deliberate words, because the members of that committee foresaw the dangers of having multiple education departments and multiple ministers, and so they used the words deliberately: one ministry of education and one minister. And while it is true that serious attempts are being made to equalize standards and to bring equality into education, it simply won't wash that this can be achieved in the full sense of the word without one ministry and one minister. The Human Sciences Research Council's report dealt with the equal provision of education and that is what the one ministry must do. It is not enough to have one ministry for general policy and multiple ministries (and budgets) for the provision of education. As long as we have the present multiple system, we are going to have widespread dissatisfaction and unhappiness. It is part and parcel of a constitution which is based on race, and a constitution based on race is unhealthy for good race relations. It is another form of apartheid. Separate cannot be equal.

How long will it take, under ideal conditions, to ensure an equal provision of education for all people in South Africa? I think most people would answer by saying "two generations", so that for a long time many children in South Africa are going to get a sub-optimal education. And so South Africans need to believe that everything possible is being done to ensure that they reach that point of equal provision of education, as soon as possible, and they will only live with the inevitable long, lag period if they believe just that. If they suspect that there is any dragging of feet, or any lack of commitment, the wait will become intolerable. And I would submit that the one tangible way in which that commitment can be expressed, is to remove the racial connotations which are inherent in the present constitutional structure which places education as an "eie saak"

nd therefore ethnically differentiated from parliament down. Until we move away from that system, we cannot have good race relations in this country, however much one consults, talks, debates and argues, or however much money one spends.

Of course it is commendable that so much more is being spent on black education at the moment than ever before. Of course it is commendable that major efforts are being undertaken to upgrade teacher qualifications, both by the State and by the private sector. But it is no accident that the tumult in South Africa has been focused on the schools ever since 1976, and highlighted in 1985. It is the perceptions of society that count, and you cannot fool the people of South Africa. They know what they are getting, and the crucial issue facing the country at the moment is to ensure that all the people of South Africa believe that every effort is being made to ensure a rapid march towards equality in education. Under the present dispensation at least one minister feels that he cannot talk to a statutory body which includes members who are members of another race group, because he is an "own affairs" minister, and yet that is the very group of people whom he should be consulting in making important decisions. The only logical way around that, of course, is to create yet another body representing one ethnic group only, and that would be to effect a major step backwards! The hamhandedness and intolerance shown by the Ministry of Education and Culture House of Representatives in relation to the educational needs of the coloured people should fill us all with a feeling of shame.

In contrast to what happened in "coloured" education Mr de Beer's, (the Deputy Minister concerned with African education), approach was more conciliatory and more intelligent and enabled the sensible leadership given by the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee to be heeded by black scholars in South Africa. As I write this it is not clear how many of the

requests of the SPCC will be met, but at least they are negotiable and one hopes that a result acceptable to all will be achieved.

And another fundamental danger of our present constitution came to light when a group of us appealed to the State President to intervene to help to resolve the crisis in coloured education in the Western Cape. It became apparent that the decisions concerning coloured education were to be made exclusively by those in power in the House of Representatives. Now, if the coloured community were living in a country all by themselves, one could see the logic of that, but it does not. No man is an island, and what happens in coloured education impinges very much upon what happens in the education of everybody in South Africa, and it seems to me that this is an enormous danger because it is not only in education that this situation can arise. This does not mean that I believe that all power should be centralised in Pretoria. Power can be decentralised - and education is an area where this might be appropriate - but the criteria of decentralisation are important. These include the scope of the authority decentralised and the legitimacy of the institutions to which power is to be decentralised. These cannot be determined by racial criteria, by a white parliament, nor can the authority be one like the Ministers Council of the House of Delegates, which does not enjoy legitimacy. Let us not forget that while the whites held a referendum to approve the 1983 constitution, no one else did so. And the limits of authority in education are circumscribed by, inter alia, the National Policy Education Act and own schools policy enacted by a white parliament under the old constitution.

The most striking additional example of the danger of the present constitution lies in the field of health. For a long time South Africa has had a fragmented health service. We have the State Health Department, primarily responsible for preventive health, forensic medicine and mental

health services; we have the second level of Provincial Government responsible for curative health, and we have the local authorities which are also running preventive health clinics, etc. This three-tiered system has itself been inefficient and costly, and has been criticized by the medical profession from time to time. On top of this it seems likely that a system of "own affairs" and "general affairs" will be grafted, so it seems probable that we are to have hospitals in this country which will be white "own affairs" hospitals, hospitals which will be coloured "own affairs" hospitals, Indian "own affairs" hospitals, and "general affairs" hospitals. I don't understand how anybody can conceive of a system of health service delivery which is fragmented vertically and horizontally. It seems to me, and it seems to, as far as I know, every medical faculty in this country, and certainly to every principal of every university with a medical faculty in this country, that the only way to move forward is to have one health service and one administration and that it should all, therefore, be "general affairs". I know of no one in government or out of it who has experience in health service delivery, who will defend "own affairs" and "general affairs" hospitals and who will say that this system of "own" and "general affairs" health services is in the best interests of South Africa or the best way to meet the health requirements of this country. I defy any of my medical colleagues from the Minister down to stand up and say publicly that their preferred option is to have "own affairs" and "general affairs" hospitals. I have not met anybody who says it privately. Why then should we distort and damage the health services of this country, health services which have won us high praise, which have commendably given care to people of all races. In a country as big as South Africa there inevitably will be some disparities, but by and large the curative health service provision, certainly in the urban areas, has been very good and has brought us great credit, and when it has been investigated, has not been found to be wanting. There are exceptions, but

no society is perfect. For example, there is much to be done in improving health care in rural areas. But we are now to dismantle this and tamper with it and divide it into a fragmented, racially oriented, health service delivery system. It is indefensible. It will be inefficient. It raises important ethical questions for the medical profession. There have been attempts to reserve Coronation Hospital for coloured people and to move black and Indian patients elsewhere. What sort of nonsense is this? The division of health services into "general" and "own" affairs will result in increasing the size of the civil service and the bureaucracy, and it will correctly be roundly condemned by everyone who has insight into these matters, both in South Africa and throughout the world, and it will bring the medical profession in South Africa into question on ethical grounds. It is an example of our confounded constitution skewing national priorities. And it is an example of the difficulty that arises if you have a fatally flawed system. My submission is again that the constitution is at the root of the problem, because it is based on race, and not on what is in the best interests of all the people in South Africa.

As I am not a water engineer, and as I do not know very much about the distribution, reticulation and provision of water for human and industrial consumption, I shan't pass comment on the fact that this is also an "own affairs" matter, but I wait with interest to see how the water provision to different communities in the Cape Peninsula, for example, is divided up between the different administrations. "That's nothing to what I could say if I chose" (Lewis Carroll).

Good race relations and a happy future for this country are impossible without the involvement of black South Africans at the centre of legislative power, which brings me back again to our present constitution. Even if Africans were represented in a fourth chamber, they would not be at the centre of legislative power, because the fact of the matter is that under

Those are three small examples which have an enormous symbolic significance, and we mustn't overlook the importance of symbolism in promoting good race relations. Not only must racially discriminatory legislation be repealed, but there must be positive legislation to enhance good race relations, and in the ordinary little things, the symbolism, particularly on the part of government and leaders in the community, must be such as to make it plain to everybody that racial prejudice is a thing of the past. The credibility of the Government's commitment to reform was badly dented in the eyes of many by Minister de Klerk's contribution to the No Confidence Debate and by the repudiation of Minister Pik Botha by the State President. For the sake of all South Africans we can only hope that those events reflected political strategy designed for conservative white consumption and not the conviction of the Government.

Talking of symbols, there can be no question but that the repeal of the Mixed Marriages Act and the Immorality Act were examples of the removal of discriminatory legislation by Act of Parliament for the first time, and as such has great symbolical significance.

We have to persuade as many of the various political groups as possible, both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, to enter real dialogue and debate and diminish the influence of extremists on both sides. Hence the need to strengthen the middle ground - an area in which I believe the SAIRR could play some part.

What constitutes the middle ground in South Africa in the second half of the '80s, and what should it do? Broadly it consists of all those groupings and individuals who share the concepts of citizenship and democracy I have tried to clarify tonight, and who believe that change should be achieved peacefully through negotiation. They would include groups and organisations

both in and out of parliament. Parliament has a fundamentally important role to play in this process, but so do forces outside of it, and there is nothing undemocratic about that at all. Indeed it is part and parcel of the democratic process as shown for example by the consumer and ecological groups in the USA and elsewhere. When most of the people living in this country have no real political rights at all, when Africans have no role in Parliament, coloured and Indian people have little real power, then the extra-parliamentary political process becomes much more important and crucial in the process of change. It is essential to strengthen the middle ground as much as possible and to promote the in-depth discussions and debate which may be able to lead us to a peaceful future.

With regard to the importance of the moderate centre and historical threats to it, it is instructive to examine how extremists of the right and the left have come into power during the twentieth century, and the fate of the middle ground in each instance. The centre ground of the Weimar Republic was occupied by the Social Democrats, crippled by the dreadful economic situation of Germany at that time, and other inheritances from the Versailles peace treaty at the end of the First World War. Through intrigue and street violence, the Communists and the Fascists steadily eroded the centre, and no statesman appeared at the leadership of the Social Democrats who could inspire the German people and counteract the excesses of the left or the right. Tragically, Konrad Adenauer's attempt to form a centre coalition in 1926 failed, partly because of the actions of Gustav Stresemann, the then Foreign Minister, and Ernst Scholtz, the leader of the People's Party. There had been considerable economic improvement in Germany during the rule by the centre in the second half of the 1920s. But partly because of internecine strife amongst the Social Democrats, the centre did not hold. Indeed, a few years earlier the same Gustav Stresemann had formed a "great coalition" including the Social Democrats and the moderates to the right of them, but it was only able to remain intact for a hundred days. The failure of the centre of the Weimar

Republic made it much easier for Hitler to come to power, and once there, he ruthlessly and deliberately eliminated all moderate opposition.

In Russia, Lenin progressively and systematically destroyed the moderate centre, including eliminating anyone within his own organisation who didn't take an extreme view. He and Stalin and their successors ruthlessly eliminated any moderate opposition, and as in the case of anyone who holds total power, extended it widely into Russian society, with the resultant murder, deportation or incarceration of millions of people.

As with the Nazis, the Soviet Communists eliminated people in groups, and largely not because of alleged personal guilt or responsibility, perhaps the most frightening aspect of it all. In both instances the Jews, and in the case of Russia, high-school teachers, parish councils, priests, trade union officials, and many others, were destroyed as groups.

Paul Johnson's analysis of what happened in Algeria is instructive. On 1st November 1954 Ben Bella joined up with Belkacem Krim and launched a national rising. Their objective was not to confront directly and to attempt to defeat the French army because that was beyond their means, but rather to destroy any possibility of a multiracial society emerging in Algeria, by eliminating the moderates on both sides. The first casualty was the French liberal, Guy Monnerot. He was a school teacher, popular with the Arabs. On the Arab side, the first to die was the pro-French local governor, Hadj Sakok. For the most part the FLN acted against those Muslims who showed any loyalty to France, and they employed the tactics of torture and murder on a large scale. As Johnson points out, Ben Bella's written orders included: "Liquidate all personalities who want to play the role of interlocuteur valable"; "Kill any person attempting to deflect the militants, and inculcate them with a bourguibien spirit"; "Kill the Caids. Take their children and kill them.

Kill all those who pay taxes and those who collect them. Burn the houses of the Muslim NCOs away on active service". In the first two and a half years of the war, they murdered 1 035 whites, and 6 352 Arabs, although it is speculated that the figure was closer to 20 000. The only way for moderates to survive was either by joining the extremists or leaving the country. The French response was to act with terror on an equal scale. In a fatal decision the Governor-General, Lacoste, gave General Massu freedom of action to deal with the FLN in Algiers. The result was that the security forces were no longer under the control of the civil government, and their excesses are well documented. In the end the destruction of the centre ground left the FLN in control of Algiers after de Gaulle's return to power, and his subsequent actions, which extricated France from the Algerian problem, included on his part, a fair amount of double talk. We must ensure that the moderate centre is strengthened in South Africa and give it credibility so that it is not seen as a "holding action" but as intent on reconstruction.

We are dealing with human beings, and human beings must operate within defined structures which protect them from one another. For example, accounting procedures must ensure that the occasional person tempted to commit fraud or to swindle the company is protected against himself or herself. The system is important. The same applies for all the conditions of men and women, whether it be the way in which a school is organised or the way in which a police force is run: there must be checks and balances and the system must protect the individuals within the system and the individuals affected by it. One cannot rely on goodwill; one cannot rely on good intentions. The structure is vital. It is essential for the security forces of any nation to remain firmly and clearly under civilian control. Not only must this be the case, but it must be seen to be the case. The grossness of some of their actions takes one's breath away. The "T shirt" ban in the Western Cape is a good example of the unbridled use of power and that sort of action brings all law enforcement into disrepute and ridicule.

The security forces in South Africa have enormous powers which are, of course, increased in areas where a state of emergency applies. Procedures such as detention without trial, severe restrictions placed upon individuals who are technically at liberty, and banning orders, may have some success in the short-term, but in the long-term can only aggravate the situation. The upheavals in South Africa during 1985, including widespread school and consumer boycotts, were ostensibly controlled by such draconian measures, but the heritage of excessive use of force and widespread detentions is a very worrying one.

As an educationalist, I can only express my deepest concern at the fact that school examinations took place under police guard and that policemen were actually in examination halls while children were writing. More importantly, the repeated accusations of excessive use of force on the part of the police, including actions by the police against students of my own university, which were completely unjustified, indicate very clearly the dangers of giving undue, inadequately controlled authority, to any security force. To my knowledge, the Minister of Police and the Cabinet have at no time in the past years publicly criticised or reprimanded a security force officer. I repeat, not only must civilian control be effective, but it must be seen by all the citizens of a country to be effective. And indeed there is an urgent need for the restoration of the rule of law in South Africa.

It is idle to think that the root causes of the troubled times which we saw in 1985 are the result of intimidators and agitators, and that long-term solutions can result from actions of the security forces. When people really believe that they are facing a just and secure future, it will be very difficult for large numbers of citizens in this country to be mobilised in such a way that they will indulge in anti-social and violent acts. And we must all be aghast at the death and destruction in South Africa in recent times. Because of apartheid the white people of South Africa have largely been insulated from the violence and its consequences.

democracy and like the social engineering of the Soviet Union are unacceptable to all democrats. The Government's commitment to stop them is a welcome development.

The lessons from Algeria and elsewhere are clear. Failure to introduce necessary reforms, coupled with the excessive use of force on the part of the police and army, simply play into the hands of the extreme revolutionaries. In 1985 we witnessed dreadful events in which members of communities turned upon each other with torture and murder. Tensions ran high amongst the so-called coloured people of the Western Cape as a result of the upheavals in the school system, and the tension was greatly exacerbated, not only by the actions of the security forces, but also by the actions of the Department of Education and Culture of the House of Representatives, which set itself the task of acting in a punitive fashion against both scholars and teachers. Impediments were put in the way of scholars who wished to write supplementary examinations, and teachers were summarily suspended. The headmaster and departmental heads of one of the leading coloured schools in the Peninsula were suspended, people who had given years of their lives to education; and had developed and maintained the highest possible standards of secondary school education; members of society who rightly enjoy the respect of their community and of all right-minded South Africans. Why was it necessary to summarily suspend such outstanding men and women?

There is no perfect and there is no absolutely secure future anywhere in the world, but the constitutions and systems of government can help to make the future more likely to be a happy one.

It seems clear that without healthy economic growth we are unlikely to solve South Africa's problems peacefully, which is something which those who seek to damage the South African economy by sanctions and other methods should pause and give thought to. The threat of economic sanctions, disinvestment and divestment to encourage reform is one thing;

the reality of comprehensive and effective sanctions would be quite another. Some place the unemployment figure in the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage area at between 50% and 60%. Those who seek to damage the South African motor industry, for example, have to face the reality that real human misery and starvation will result, and that this will certainly not strengthen the middle ground. And the debate in the middle ground must concern economic as well as political futures for South Africa.

And South Africa's future is inextricably bound up with the demographic realities where the predictions are that the present population will increase frighteningly by the year 2 000. Education and employment opportunities will therefore be needed on an incredibly large scale, and as with the rest of the world where the birthrates are high, it is in everyone's interest to control excessive population growth as much as possible, otherwise whatever we do and whatever solution is found, will in the end be inadequate, purely in terms of physical survival. The problems of over-population and population growth tend to be pushed into the background in national and international debates concerning the future of nations, and yet it should be on centre stage as one of the major problems facing mankind.

The Nationalist Government is like a colonial power in South Africa, analogous to the earlier British colonial power in this country or elsewhere in the world at the time of the British Raj. I am not convinced that they are really in touch with the real current opinions and values of South African blacks. It seems to me that real dialogue between those whites in power and the authentic voices of black South Africans is urgently needed. The middle ground must help to promote that.

I believe that if South African blacks do not have to carry passes after July 1, if they are no longer harassed by the police and others for failing to do so, if they can seek work where they will, if the level of unemployment drops, and if they believe that the Government is committed to

reconstruction, they will not expect miracles overnight. It is going to be a long haul and it is in the hands of the South African Government to effect peaceful change. That is why it is so vital for the statements of the State President to be realised. South Africans must understand that a society based on racial discrimination is not acceptable in the modern world and cannot endure.

We have to strengthen the middle ground to help to achieve the dream we all have of South Africa. And if substance is given to the rhetoric and we do move away from our obsession with race and make human rights the basis of our society, we must not be slow in our praise of those who have the courage to embark on reconstruction.

Let us remember the first verse of Yeats' poem:

"Turning and turning in the widening gyre
the falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity."

If we do not want the hour of Yeats' "rough beast" to come with escalating violence and confrontation in South Africa, we must strengthen and encourage the forces advocating a non-racial future. I hope the South African Institute of Race Relations will play its part in this challenging task.

SJS/cmw
6/3/86

22.IV.
AMST

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 April 1986

Dear Charles,

Reform in South Africa

The Foreign Secretary has read a copy of a speech recently given to the South African Institute of Race Relations by Dr Stuart Saunders, the Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of Cape Town. He believes that the Prime Minister may be interested to see this powerful plea for peaceful but fundamental change in South Africa.

Dr Saunders is one of a small group of leading South African academics whose views on political and social matters attract attention inside South Africa. While it is impossible to judge the influence they have, they do represent an important internal force for change which the South African Government cannot ignore.

Dr Saunders does not mince his words in analysing what is wrong with South Africa. He argues that the fine principles of President Botha's speeches must become reality; all discriminatory laws must be repealed and the "confounded" constitution introduced in 1983 must be replaced by a new model not based on race. Failure to introduce necessary reforms, coupled with excessive use of force by the police and army, only play into the hands of the extreme revolutionaries.

Dr Saunders goes into some detail on the changes which need to be made to the South African constitution. But, not surprisingly perhaps, he stops short of offering specific answers to the two most difficult questions: how do you abolish all discrimination without being taken straight to one man one vote in a unitary state; and how do you achieve equality of treatment between the races without a massive redistribution of resources away from the whites? Both questions, of course, need to be answered in stages - the first perhaps more easily than the second.

Dr Saunders argues eloquently that only bold moves will strengthen the role of moderates. The rule of law and the protection it offers must not be undermined by abuses under the

/law.

law. He draws a telling analogy with the Algerian experience, where the middle ground was lost to the extremists of left and right. He did not need to remind his audience that most white South Africans do not have the option of departure that was enjoyed by the colonial French.

Dr Saunders' speech is a good example of how far the debate on the future of South Africa has opened up, at least outside Government circles. Were the Government ready to think of responding as Dr Saunders suggests, the way would be open for the sort of dialogue that the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons is trying to promote.

Yours ever,

Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Original on AUSTRALIA – Visits by Australian PM – Jan. 86

SUBJECT cc MASTER

CONFIDENTIAL

file

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 April 1986

Dear Tony.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA

The Prime Minister had a talk with Mr. Hawke for some 45 minutes this afternoon before the plenary session of Anglo-Australian talks. Mr. Hawke was accompanied by the Australian High Commissioner only.

Libya

Mr. Hawke said that he had been surprised at the amount of opposition in Britain and more generally in Europe to the United States' action against Libya. He had found the Americans almost equally surprised. In his view the evidence for Libya's complicity in terrorism was overwhelming though he had some reservations about the wisdom of going as far as the Americans felt it necessary to do in publishing intelligence material. The Prime Minister agreed that it was sad that nowadays you had to publish evidence to convince people that you were telling the truth. More generally, far too much information had leaked out in Washington in advance about the Americans' plans to take action. But she remained convinced that the American action had been entirely justified. There were times when the only way to defend yourself against force was to use force. She believed that opinion in the United Kingdom was gradually coming round to understand this.

Mr. Hawke said that, on his return to Canberra, he would look seriously at the question of whether to allow the Libyan People's Bureau in Australia to remain The Australians had already reduced its size in January in response to the American request for some action. The Prime Minister said that the Libyan People's Bureaux were undoubtedly centres for sponsoring terrorism. She was sceptical as to whether other European countries would go so far as to close them down though she understood that agreement had just been reached in Luxembourg to reduce their size.

Mr. Hawke observed that the Americans did not seem to be unduly worried about reaction of Arab Governments. The Prime Minister thought it too early to reach definite conclusions about this. Arab Governments themselves had reacted calmly but might come under further pressure from their public opinion.

Mr. Hawke said that he had been told in Washington that Soviet naval vessels stationed off Libya had failed to give the Libyan Government early warning of the American attack. The Americans were not sure whether this was deliberate or simply incompetence.

New Zealand Ship Visits

Mr. Hawke said that he had discussed the question of New Zealand ship visits with Lady Young during her visit to Australia. He admired the United Kingdom's persistence in trying to find a solution to the problem. But he did not think that the so-called China Formula would help as far as New Zealand was concerned. His personal view was that there was little point in negotiations. The New Zealand Government would not change its position. The Prime Minister said that she was inclined to agree. Mr. Lange was completely hooked on his policy and seemed determined to stay hooked.

Mr. Hawke said that he had told President Reagan that when New Zealand legislated on ships' visits, Australia would not want to see the ANZUS Treaty abrogated. He envisaged an exchange of letters which would keep it in operation between Australia and the United States. At the same time Australia would maintain its bilateral defence cooperation with New Zealand, but would not share intelligence material obtained from the United States. No-one could blame the United States for the way they have handled New Zealand over this matter. The Americans had conducted themselves eminently reasonably.

The Prime Minister said that we had tried hard to find a way around the problem but Mr. Lange himself had been no help. She doubted whether the present discussions would lead to a tolerable result. But we would nonetheless go on supporting New Zealand in the European Community and on other matters.

South Africa

The Prime Minister said that she thought that she and Mr. Hawke agreed on the importance of the Eminent Persons Group. It probably represented the last hope of peaceful progress in South Africa. But President Botha had to be brought along carefully. Statements of the sort recently made by Mrs. Mandela only made matters more difficult. The South African Government were naturally worried about what would happen if the ANC agreed to suspend violence but were in practice unable to control their supporters. But she believed that the South African Government were at last

beginning to face reality and that a suspension of violence leading to talks between the South African Government and black representatives including the ANC could be brought about.

Mr. Hawke said that he had discussed those issues in Washington. He had detected a perceptible change in the American analysis. They no longer saw South Africa as a long-term problem: they realised that there had to be progress towards a solution now. The Administration fully supported the Eminent Persons Group strategy and President Reagan had written to President Botha in this sense. The Americans also had other initiatives in mind. But it was essential that President Botha should give the Eminent Persons Group a definite response. Vague promises of willingness to consider taking action on the points put forward by the Group would not be enough.

The Prime Minister said that one had to have some understanding for the South African Government's concerns. They needed reassurance that if they agreed to act on the points put foward by the Eminent Persons Group, the latter would really be able to persuade the ANC to suspend violence. A lot depended on the ANC. Mr. Hawke said that Mr. Fraser seemed certain that they would suspend violence if there was a positive response from the South African Government to the Eminent Persons Group's proposals. The Prime Minister repeated that it would be a mistake to drive President Botha too hard. Nor should we give up too soon. We must be sure that it was simply not possible to persuade President Botha to move further before abandoning the Eminent Persons Group initiative.

Mr. Hawke asked whether the Prime Minister had any views about where and when the Review meeting should take place. He understood that various informal soundings suggested that the first week of August would suit several people well. The Prime Minister said that July would be very difficult indeed for her and the first week of August no better. She would much prefer the meeting to be held towards the middle of September. This would give the Eminent Persons Group's initiative more time to make progress. Another possibility would be to have a preliminary meeting of Foreign Ministers in July with Heads of Government meeting later.

Mr. Hawke doubted whether the conclusions of Nassau would stretch to postponing the Review meeting of Heads of Government until September. He did not want to be dogmatic or risk the possible success of the initiative by holding the meeting too soon. But all the elements were there to enable the South African Government to reach its decision and there were no obvious arguments for delay. The Prime Minister said that it all depended on whether one's priority was to maintain the time-frame established at Nassau or to achieve a positive result. No other way forward had a similar chance of success. It would be tragic to ruin the prospects of the Eminent Persons Group by pushing ahead too fast.

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone

Mr. Hawke said that Australian officials had talked to their British counterparts about the draft Treaty for a South Pacific nuclear free zone. He had also mentioned the matter during his recent visit to Washington. He believed that the United States' Administration were persuaded about the appropriateness of the provisions of the Treaty. Australia would not be a party to the Treaty if it were to infringe on the rights of the United States or of ANZUS. But he had received an explicit reassurance from CINCPAC that the Americans saw the proposed Treaty in positive terms and did not regard it as an inhibition on the options of the United States' forces. He hoped that the Prime Minister would consider United Kingdom adherence to the Protocols favourably.

The Prime Minister said that she was very sceptical of such proposals. You did not create a nuclear free zone simply by declaring one. The Soviet Union would not take the slightest notice. The matter would need to be considered and discussed very carefully. She could give no commitment.

Australian Bicentennial

Mr. Hawke expressed gratitude for the British Government's cooperation over the Australian Bicentennial.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

yours ever,

C D POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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He therefore intends to telephone Joe Clark early this week.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of other Ministers in OD and to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

GRS 450

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FM WASHINGTON
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELNO 1004
OF 180430Z APRIL 86
INFO ROUTINE CAPETOWN

WASHINGTON TELNO 916: US/SOUTH AFRICA: COMGEP

1. FRASER AND OBASANJO COMPLETED THEIR VISIT HERE ON 16 APRIL. THEIR OFFICIAL PROGRAMME INCLUDED SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT, SHULTZ, CROCKER AND HOLLADAY, AS WELL AS SESSIONS WITH THE HOUSE AND SENATE AFRICA SUB-COMMITTEES, OTHER CONGRESSMEN AND PROMINENT ACADEMICS. I BELIEVE THAT FRASER (PLUS OBASANJO?) ALSO CALLED PRIVATELY ON JUDGE CLARK, AND ON CASEY. I SAW THEM ON 13 APRIL.

2. BY ALL US ACCOUNTS OBASANJO SAID LITTLE THROUGHOUT. FRASER SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MORE VOLUBLE BUT NOT PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. A SENATE CONTACT TELLS US THAT HE GAVE THE SENATE AFRICA SUB-COMMITTEE A DOWN-BEAT VIEW OF THE COMGEP EXERCISE AND APPEARED TO HAVE NO DOUBTS ABOUT THE MERITS OF PUNITIVE SANCTIONS. WITH THE ADMINISTRATION HE ALSO APPEARED TO BE ALL BUT WRITING OFF COMGEP, AND INSISTING ON THE NEED TO STEP UP SANCTIONS SOON.

3. AFTER THE MEETING WITH CROCKER, WHEN FRASER TOOK THIS LINE, DAVIDOW (DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN AFRICAN AFFAIRS) SOUGHT OUT MULHOTRA BEFORE YESTERDAY'S CALL ON SHULTZ, IN ORDER TO WARN THAT FIREWORKS WERE LIKELY IF FRASER PERSISTED IN CRITICISING EXISTING US POLICY. IN THE EVENT, FRASER MODERATED HIS APPROACH CONSIDERABLY, AND THERE WAS NO ROW. BUT SHULTZ MADE CLEAR THE US BELIEF THAT THE COMGEP EXERCISE WAS THE ONLY SHOW IN TOWN, AND THAT THE US WOULD CONSIDER SERIOUSLY ANY COMGEP REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE.

4. STATE'S VIEWS ARE DOUBTLESS COLOURED BY THEIR ANTIPATHY TOWARDS FRASER ON THIS SUBJECT. WE HAVE YET TO ESTABLISH WHAT IMPACT THE VISIT MADE ON OTHERS. IT HAS AT LEAST ATTRACTED NO PUBLICITY, BUT IT MAY ALSO HAVE HELPED TO ENSURE THAT THE SANCTIONS ISSUE RETURNS TO CENTRE STAGE IF COMGEP COMES TO NOUGHT.

5. STATE HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY ARE STILL STALLING ON THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO P W BOTHA'S LAST LETTER (PARA 2 OF TUR). THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, GREATLY WELCOME SOME INDICATION OF OUR THINKING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

WRIGHT

SOUTH AFRICA

LIMITED
S AF D
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ECD(E)
NEWS D
LEGAL ADVISERS
PLANNING STAFF

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PS/MRS CHALKER
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MR FERGUSSON
MR REEVE
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8RW

18 April 1986

I enclose the Prime Minister's reply to President Botha's recent message. One or two relatively small amendments have been made to the draft which you submitted. I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be checked quickly to ensure that the changes present no problems. Subject to that it should be despatched as soon as possible.

(C. D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Subject cc OPS, Master

SRW

CCFCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

18 April 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T75/86

Dear Mr President,

Thank you for your letter of 10 April. I am much encouraged that you felt able to respond in a positive way. You know the importance I attach to the Commonwealth initiative. It is well worth making a serious effort to see if progress can be made by this route. If the present effort founders, I see nothing to replace it except a rising chorus of calls for economic sanctions.

I do urge you to communicate your interest in their "Negotiating Concept" direct to the Commonwealth Group as soon as possible. While I follow closely what they are doing and am trying to channel their efforts into constructive directions, the Group are, as you know, independent of governments. There is a real risk that in the absence of what can be seen by the Group as a whole as a positive South African response, there will be pressure at the next meeting on 30 April to wind up the exercise. Tony Barber is already doing all he can to ensure that the Group produces a helpful report. It would only increase suspicions of Britain's role if I tried to insert myself as honest broker between them and the South African Government.

You are the best judge of where your interests lie. I have drawn encouragement from what you have told me in your letter and recognise the difficulties for you. But I ought to say frankly that I do not believe that in its present form your offer is likely to be seen by the Commonwealth Group as giving them enough to go on. They will say that what you are

SRW

asking for is an indefinite cessation of violence in return for which you would "consider" moves along the lines suggested in the negotiating concept. I entirely agree that a cessation of violence is what we should be aiming for. But I suspect that the Group would not regard your formulation as a fair exchange, especially since the Commonwealth accord speaks in terms of a suspension of violence. I would encourage you to explore with the Group exactly what a suspension of violence would entail.

I well understand how concerned you feel at the possibility that the South African Government might be blamed if it had to take action to restore control should a call for suspension of violence prove ineffective. I of course accept the right of any government to take reasonable measures to maintain law and order and would stand up publicly for that. But I fear that the Commonwealth Group as a whole would see the condition you suggest as a request for a blank cheque and will not be disposed to give you a blanket assurance. Certainly the British Government would try to ensure that you were given credit for acting in good faith, especially if the measures sought by the Commonwealth Group were being implemented. There is bound to be some risk in taking such a step. But they have to be set against the dangers of rejecting the proposal.

I do not need to assure you of my own commitment to western democratic values and unwavering opposition to communism, to terrorism and to totalitarianism of all kinds. If a dialogue can be established between your government and genuine representatives of black South Africans, this should surely encourage legitimate black political aspirations at the expense of the ideologues: frustrated nationalism is in my experience the most fertile ground for Soviet communism in Africa.

For our part we shall continue to emphasise to the ANC our condemnation of violence and our commitment to dialogue. There is a readiness on their part to talk; but

realistically they will need something they can show to their supporters to justify calling for a suspension of violence. I realise the difficulties; but I cannot believe that, given the political will, it is impossible to find a way of resolving the question of who accepts who's conditions first. The Commonwealth Group could play a valuable mediating role over this. We shall give them every encouragement to do so.

Your letter reinforces my belief that the Commonwealth initiative can succeed and that a breakthrough can be achieved. I do therefore urge you to send an early response to the Group and to cast your offer in as positive terms as possible. I believe that they too will be ready to show some flexibility. Certainly I shall do my best to encourage them to consider very seriously any firm proposal you might make to them and to explore it thoroughly with black African leaders with whom we are in contact.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable P. W. Botha, D.M.S., M.P.

CONFIDENTIAL

EL3BBL

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 April 1986

SOUTH AFRICA: CHOGM ACCORD - KRUGERRANDS

The Prime Minister has considered the Foreign Secretary's minute of 15 April about the implementation of the commitment we undertook at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau to take action to preclude the import of Krugerrands. She accepts that the arguments are finely balanced but agrees with the Foreign Secretary that we shall have to proceed through a legislative ban if we are to implement our commitment convincingly.

I am copying this letter to Michael Gilbertson (Department of Trade and Industry) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CPE

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL. LONDON SW1A 2AT

17 April 1986

CDP
18/4

Dear Colin,

COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

The Lord President has seen the recent exchange of correspondence on the modalities of the Commonwealth review meeting which will consider the forthcoming report of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons.

The Lord President feels that, however difficult it might be, the timing of the review conference should be played longer rather than shorter; and he agrees with the Prime Minister that London is very much the first choice for the location of the meeting.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Charles Powell, to the Private Secretaries to members of OD Committee, and to Michael Stark in the Cabinet Office.

Yours sincerely

Joan

JOAN MACNAUGHTON
Private Secretary

C R Budd Esq

STH AFRICA Relations P/9



PRIME MINISTER

REPLY TO PRESIDENT BOTHA

I attach the FCO draft reply to President Botha's recent message.

There is a very difficult balance to be struck. You must keep Botha's confidence. That remains essential if we are going to get anywhere. But you can't negotiate with the Eminent Persons Group as a proxy for him because

(a) the proposition he wants you to sell is unsaleable. He wants a guarantee of cessation of violence, but will only consider the EPG proposals for action by the South African government. He also wants a guarantee that sanctions would not be imposed if a pledge by the ANC to suspend violence was broken and the South African government took action to restore order. The EPG can't give that guarantee and the Commonwealth wouldn't.

(b) It simply isn't feasible for you to act as an intermediary with the EPG of which we are members. The EPG itself simply wouldn't have it.

So on the one hand we have to make Botha feel that his efforts are appreciated, that an important step forward has been taken, and there is a real prospect of making progress through the EPG.

On the other, we have to bring home to him first that he must deal direct with the EPG, not through us; and second that his proposals in their present form will not be enough to keep the EPG in play. He nees to wind down what he wants from the ANC to suspension of violence; and to step up what he offers in readiness to take at least some of the steps envisaged by the EPG (perhaps progressively if the suspension of violence

holds). We can assure him that we at least would not be a party to punitive measures if the South African government had to restore order.

I think the FCO draft covers these points, though it could be improved.

But the first thing is to see whether you agree the approach?

CDP

C D POWELL

16 April 1986

SL3AQI

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 April 1986

Dear Charles,

South Africa: Message from President Botha

Thank you for your letter of 11 April about President Botha's reply to the Prime Minister's letter. The Foreign Secretary agrees that the tone of the letter is reasonably encouraging.

On the substance, he considers it rather mixed. It shows that the South Africans understand the need to come up with a reply to the Commonwealth Group which is positive enough to ensure that the Group do not end the exercise forthwith. The letter no doubt reflects the split in the South African Government between those who are sceptical whether the Commonwealth Group can produce any progress and are anxious that the blame for failure should not be pinned on South Africa, and others who are more hopeful that the initiative might lead somewhere. In Sir Geoffrey Howe's view, President Botha's letter is a compromise between the two schools of thought. It is cleverly worded and contains a number of possible pitfalls which we must avoid.

As you suggested, the request for an assurance that South Africa will not be penalised by the international community for taking appropriate security measures should the ANC undertaking that violence will cease prove ineffective is particularly difficult. It may be a wrecking amendment, or reflect genuine anxieties, or be an attempt to secure a blank cheque. We shall have a better idea should the South Africans proceed with this tactic in their exchanges with the Commonwealth Group despite Mrs Thatcher's discouragement.

The Foreign Secretary also agrees that we should not allow the South Africans to draw us into the role of an additional honest broker between them and the Commonwealth Group. Not only is this bound to be ineffective in terms of the attitudes of other members; but it would risk leaving us saddled with the responsibility for failure. What is urgently needed, in view of the COMGEP meeting on 30 April/1 May, is for the South Africans to put some positive ideas direct to COMGEP.

/The Foreign

CONFIDENTIAL

The Foreign Secretary does not believe that what is on offer in President Botha's letter is sufficient for the purpose. The South Africans are proposing an unequal bargain. In return for a "definite" assurance of a cessation of violence (the Commonwealth Accord speaks of a suspension of violence on all sides) the South African Government would be prepared to "consider" moves along the lines suggested by the Commonwealth Group. Those in the Group who want an early conclusion to the initiative may be disposed to interpret this as a try-on which the South Africans must know would be unacceptable to the ANC.

The enclosed draft from the Prime Minister to President Botha is intended to encourage the State President to improve on his opening gambit, to re-assure him about some of the other concerns expressed in his letter, and to emphasise the need for urgent action vis-a-vis the Commonwealth Group if the present initiative is not to go off the rails. The Foreign Secretary considers that we should emphasise that the central purpose of our contacts with the ANC has been to encourage them to be flexible and to put across the points which President Botha says they need to hear from democratic governments.

Yours ever,

Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DS2 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

TO:

The Honourable P W Botha DMS
State President of the Republic
of South Africa

Your Reference

Copies to:

SFWABX

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 10 April. I am much encouraged that you felt able to respond in ~~this way~~ a positive way. You know the importance I attach to the Commonwealth initiative. It ~~seems to me vital that we should not lose an historic opportunity to make progress.~~ is well worth making a serious effort to see if progress can be made by this route. If the present effort founders, I see nothing to replace it except a rising chorus of calls for economic sanctions.

I ~~think it essential~~ do urge you that you should ~~as soon as possible~~ communicate your interest in their "Negotiating Concept" direct to the Commonwealth Group as soon as possible. While I follow closely what they are doing and am trying to channel their efforts into constructive directions, the Group are, as you know, independent of governments. There is a real risk that in the absence of what can be seen by the Group as a whole as a positive South African response, there will be ~~considerable~~ pressure at the next meeting on 30 April to wind up the exercise. Tony Barber is already doing all he can to ensure that the Group produces a helpful report. It would only increase suspicions of Britain's role if I tried to insert myself as honest broker between them and the South African Government.

// You

You are the best judge of where your interests lie. But while I have drawn encouragement from what you have told me in your letter, I ought to say frankly that I do not believe that in its present form your offer is likely to be seen by the Commonwealth Group as giving them enough to go on. They will say that what you are asking for is an indefinite cessation of violence in return for which you would "consider" moves along the lines suggested in the negotiating concept. I entirely agree that a cessation of violence is what we should be aiming for. But I suspect that the Group would not regard your formulation as a fair exchange, especially since the Commonwealth Accord speaks in terms of a suspension of violence. I would encourage you to explore with the Group exactly what a suspension of violence would entail.

I well understand how concerned you feel at the possibility that the South African Government might be blamed if it had to take action to restore control should a call for suspension of violence prove ineffective. I of course accept the right of any government to take reasonable measures to maintain law and order. But I fear that the Commonwealth Group as a whole would see the condition you suggest as a request for a blank cheque. Obviously, neither I nor the Commonwealth can give you a blanket assurance. What I can say is that the British Government would try to ensure that you were given credit for acting in good faith, especially if the measures sought by the Commonwealth Group were being implemented. There is bound to be some risk in taking such a step but I believe that the dangers in rejecting the proposal are greater.

~~I hope~~ I do not need to assure you of my commitment to Western democratic values and ~~my~~ unwavering opposition to communism, to terrorism and to totalitarianism of all kinds. ~~It is my hope that if progress can be made this will~~ encourage legitimate black political aspirations at the expense of the ideologues: ~~has been able to exploit~~ frustrated nationalism.

For our part we shall continue to emphasise to the ANC our condemnation of violence and our commitment to dialogue. There is a readiness on their part to talk; but realistically they will need something they can show to their supporters to justify calling for a suspension of violence. I realise the difficulties; but I cannot believe that, given the political will, it is impossible to find a way of resolving the question of who accepts who's conditions first. The Commonwealth Group could play a valuable mediating role over this. We shall give them every encouragement to do so.

~~You would, I know, expect me to speak frankly. We are now at a very critical moment.~~ Your letter reinforces my belief that the Commonwealth initiative can succeed and that a breakthrough can be achieved. I do therefore urge you to send an early response to the Group and to cast your offer in as positive terms as possible. I believe that they too will be ready to show some flexibility. Certainly I shall do my best to encourage them to consider very seriously any firm proposal you might make to them and to explore it thoroughly with black African leaders with whom we are in contact.

SOUTH AFRICA Relations AA

CONFIDENTIAL

JA

cc PC. LPO
LPCO HMT
DTI LCO
LPSO CO
MOD

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 April 1986

Dear Colin,

COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

Thank you for your letter of 14 April enclosing a note on the modalities of the Commonwealth review meeting which will consider the forthcoming report of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons.

The Prime Minister will be very reluctant to see the review conference take place in July, and would like us to encourage delay until September at least. This is as much on timetable grounds as anything else, given that she believes that it will, in practice, have to be at Head of Government level: the others will probably want this, and it might be helpful also from the point of view of our relations with South Africa. It might therefore be left to others to make the running on the level of representation. She is firmly of the view that the meeting should take place in London and that we should work hard to secure this. Ottawa would obviously be better than Canberra or New Delhi, if one had to look at alternatives.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of other Ministers in OD and to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

yours sincerely,

(CHARLES POWELL)

C. R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

PM/86/014

PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA: CHOGM ACCORD - KRUGERRANDS

1. You will recall that the Nassau Communiqué contains the following commitment among the list of agreed economic measures against South Africa:

> "a readiness to take unilaterally what action may be possible to preclude the import of Krugerrands".

2. We subsequently agreed (your Private Secretary's letter of 6 November) that in implementing that commitment we should not get out ahead of the United States and our Commonwealth partners and other members of the EC (though this is not a matter on which the EC has taken a position - it is to the Commonwealth that we have given our commitment). In addition to the United States, where an Executive Order banning the import of Krugerrands came into force on 11 October, many of the principal Commonwealth countries now have similar legislation in place. These include the key members of COMGEP (Australia, Tanzania, India, Nigeria), though Canada has not moved from the purely voluntary ban already in force before CHOGM. Further delay in declaring our own position is therefore becoming an embarrassment. The issue has been raised from both sides of the House on two of the last three occasions when the FCO has been top for Questions, and a decision needs to be reached before the Foreign Affairs debate on 23 April. The Commonwealth Secretary General has also recently raised the point with me.

3. I have discussed the position with Paul Channon, who recognises the need now to make clear what we propose to do.

/4.

4. There is, in my view, a strong domestic and international political case for a legislative ban to give effect to the commitment. There is, of course, no question of primary legislation. The necessary Order can be made at short notice under the Import, Export and Customs (Defence) Powers Act, 1939. It would be limited to the direct import of Krugerrands from South Africa in order to avoid complications which might arise in terms of our EC obligations if we sought to ban the import of all Krugerrands. Once the necessary Order was signed by an official in the DTI, Customs and Excise could implement the ban very rapidly.

5. Had we acted fairly soon after CHOGM, a voluntary ban might have been sufficient to requite the Nassau undertaking. The trade in Krugerrands, as you pointed out publicly at Nassau, is now very small and diminishing, as production has ceased. But after a lapse of nearly six months a simple voluntary ban risks leading our Commonwealth partners to impugn our good faith in volunteering the concession at Nassau but then failing to take effective action; they would not believe that it could be made to bite. It would be difficult now to argue that we were unable to take a step President Reagan took in October. We should be open to criticism just as we were preparing for the Commonwealth review in June and risk provoking our partners to take a tougher line over calls for further sanctions of a more objectionable kind.

6. In Paul Channon's view, however, a legislative ban would be a clear breach of the GATT. It would involve openly setting aside the fundamental GATT principle of non-discrimination, for political reasons. It could therefore be regarded as potentially harmful to our wider and more fundamental interest, as a nation dependent on trade, to uphold the GATT. In my view the risk of adverse effects on the GATT is unavoidable, given

/US action.

US action. But Paul Channon considers that our interest is not reduced because others have already decided to flout the GATT, and that it could be argued that, on the contrary, it is more important for us to defend it in such circumstances. Others, including the Americans, might, if challenged, invoke an exemption in the GATT for "gold and silver", but the GATT Secretariat Legal Advisers have given as their firm view that this refers only to bullion. The GATT problem is, however,not a question of direct commercial repercussions (although the South Africans could still decide to invoke the GATT dispute procedures), but that, once we ourselves have rejected a GATT commitment for political reasons, our own ability to invoke those commitments when our own interests are threatened will be weakened. For these reasons, Paul Channon believes that through a legislative ban we should risk long-term disadvantage for the sake of short-term purposes. He would however be prepared to go along with a voluntary ban.

7. A voluntary ban would take the form of an inspired PQ, exhorting importers not to buy Krugerrands, followed up by an official letter on similar lines to identified importers. This too would, strictly speaking, sit uneasily with our GATT obligations: but it would not undermine them so clearly or so prominently. The Department of Trade and Industry view is that we should, at least as a first step, see whether we can get away with this, before considering more drastic, legislative action. Paul Channon considers that a voluntary ban would put us in respectable, if somewhat select, company with the Canadians and would be sufficient to comply with the letter of what was proposed in Nassau, in a way compatible with the stress laid at the time, in your own press conference for example, on the phrase "what action may be possible" which was intended to take account of the limitations imposed by our international obligations. The flow of imports is, in any

/case

case, likely to diminish still further now that the South Africans have ceased minting Krugerrands. A voluntary ban could therefore set the seal on a further reduction of imports, as well as providing an effective psychological signal to the South African Government.

8. Paul Channon, without favouring either course of action, is prepared to support the "voluntary ban" in view of the difficult foreign policy considerations. He believes a legislative ban could be a sledgehammer to crack a nut and would carry too great a risk for our wider trade policy interests. Moreover, if we abandon our GATT commitments over this relatively minor issue, we would in his view be powerless to invoke them to help fend off subsequent pressure for more comprehensive and damaging sanctions.

9. We are thus faced with a clear political choice. I believe it would be unwise to risk being obliged to take two bites at this cherry. If we are to live up to our commitment after so long a delay, I consider that only a legislative ban would be completely convincing as a means of implementing the concession we volunteered at Nassau. Any lesser action on Krugerrands than the Americans - and many of our Commonwealth partners - have already taken would expose us to entirely avoidable criticism in what is any case going to be a very difficult period.

10. I am sending a copy of this minute to Paul Channon and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office
15 April 1986

GEOFFREY HOWE

SOUTH AFRICA Relations Pt 9.



(1)

PRIME MINISTER

COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

The attached note deals with our tactics towards the Eminent Persons Group over the next few months. It is based on the assumption that we try hard to persuade the South African Government to respond positively to the EPG's proposals and engage in a continuing dialogue.

The particular points on which the Foreign Secretary seeks your agreement are the timing, the venue and the level of the Commonwealth Review meeting.

On the timing, the Foreign Secretary does not think it feasible to let it slip beyond July. The crucial question is whether we could achieve a better result by spinning it out longer. It seems to me that by July we shall have a clear idea of whether the South African Government is prepared to get locked into further discussions, in which case we will want the process to continue; or whether they have turned down the EPG's proposals, in which case we might as well draw a line under the process.

On venue there is some pressure from the Commonwealth Secretariat for Ottawa or Delhi. London would be more convenient and more appropriate, and we would be in the Chair. The only argument against it is that having the meeting in London might attract more interest in the subject here.

On level, the Foreign Secretary suggests that the review should be conducted at Foreign Minister level. This would certainly be more convenient for you, though I rather wonder whether the other Heads of Government concerned will agree to it since they clearly enjoy their role in all this. And if the going gets tough, we may need you. It seems to me this could be left open until later.

Agree:

- to go along with holding the Review Conference in July? I am very reluctant to do so - it is desperately busy.

- to work hard to have it in London?

- to postpone any decision on level? Yes pse

C.D.P.

CDP
14 April, 1986.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 April 1986

Dear Charles,

Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons

Thank you for your letter of ~~26~~ at Flop March (not to others) in which you asked for the Foreign Secretary's considered views on the handling of the modalities of the Commonwealth review meeting which will consider the forthcoming report of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent persons (COMGEP).

As you will see from the enclosed FCO paper, as well as the modalities of the review meeting Sir Geoffrey has given careful thought to what we can continue to do meanwhile to ensure a positive approach by COMGEP, which in turn means encouraging a constructive response from the South African Government to the proposals which have been put to them by the Group. We are in touch separately about this. The Foreign Secretary also suggests that the exact tactics for handling the Commonwealth review meeting will need to be decided in the light of the report's findings, but that we would be wise to take advance action to try to steer the meeting towards an acceptable outcome.

There is an urgent need for us to take national decisions on what level, venue and timing we want to see for the meeting. If we are to avoid a consensus forming on these without us we need to begin immediately to lobby for our preferred options. If the Prime Minister is in agreement with the Foreign Secretary's recommendations on these points Sir Geoffrey would propose to speak immediately to the Canadian Foreign Minister to seek his support.

In view of the wider foreign policy interest in this meeting I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of the other Ministers in OD and to Michael Stark in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

8

THE HANDLING OF THE COMGEP REPORT AND ENSUING REVIEW OF THE COMMONWEALTH ACCORD

Introduction

1. The Commonwealth Accord commits the seven Heads of Government (who each nominated a member of COMGEP), or their representatives, to review progress towards the objectives of the Accord after six months. It was subsequently agreed the six months should start from 1 January 1986. No decision has yet been taken on where, when or at what level this review should be conducted. However, we know that others including the Commonwealth Secretary General and the Indians are beginning to give some thought to the matter; some may well want to steer the review towards agreeing to further measures against South Africa.

2. We have so far taken the position that it is too early to discuss the modalities of the review and that it must be considered in the context of the results of the COMGEP exercise which is still under way.

3. Before considering what line we should take on the modalities and the substance of the Commonwealth review we need to consider the possible scenarios for the review. Broadly there are three possible scenarios in which we could find ourselves. These are:

Scenarios

(A) The SAG reacts constructively to COMGEP's proposals. COMGEP's report recommends continuing its effort to promote dialogue. No call for further measures against South Africa for the time being.

(B) The SAG give a nuancé/temporising reaction to COMGEP's proposals. COMGEP produces a partly negative report. It criticises the SAG's position. But it leaves open the possibility of pursuing dialogue. It gives implied support for further measures against South Africa.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

(C) The SAG react negatively to COMGEP's proposals. COMGEP produces a negative report. It condemns SAG's position. It concludes that there are no possibilities for pursuing dialogue. Implicitly or explicitly it calls for further sanctions against South Africa.

Assessment of Scenarios

4. Realistically, the most likely scenarios are either (B) or (C). Recent reports from our Ambassador in South Africa hold out little hope of an early change in the SAG's position on such key questions as the release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of the ANC and indeed of willingness to enter into genuine dialogue with those who speak for the Blacks in the townships. They also bring out the increasing radicalisation and organisation of the township Blacks and hence the growing likelihood of serious violence. Another massacre like that at Uitenhage or Sharpeville between now and the COMGEP report would dramatically worsen its context and probably its conclusions. the ANC have pressed COMGEP not to extend its mission beyond the six months it was given. The more radical members of COMGEP, probably including Mr Fraser, are likely to be strongly influenced by this. The Group will in any case be predisposed to wind up their work at the end of their initially allotted span, unless they are convinced that the SAG is willing to negotiate seriously on the basis of the Group's proposals.

5. However, despite the difficulties our objective must still be to try and bring about scenario (A) or as close to it as possible. The more progressive element in the SAG, eg Pik Botha, appear to have grasped the importance of avoiding a negative reaction and of replying in terms which at least hold open the possibility of further dialogue (if they do this COMGEP may well seek to clarify and firm up such a prospect by making a further visit to South Africa before it reports). Also the Commonwealth Secretariat, at least in theory, should have a vested interest in COMGEP continuing its mediating role. If COMGEP finishes so does the prominent role which it gives the Commonwealth and Mr Ramphal.

8

Action prior to Commonwealth Review

6. In the run up to the Commonwealth Group's report we should continue to do the following:

(i) work on the SAG to give as constructive a reaction as possible.

(ii) work on COMGEP through the Secretariat and Lord Barber to produce a report which keeps open the possibility of the Group continuing to pursue its mediatory role and makes no recommendations about sanctions.

(iii) work on other states eg US, FLS, EC to give public support to COMGEP's initiative and so extend the body of international opinion that is supportive of it continuing its work.

Modalities of the Review

7. Our attitude to the modalities of the review will of course depend on how COMGEP progresses. But if we wait until COMGEP's report before expressing any views we risk a consensus being reached without us by the other six Commonwealth countries which could prove very difficult to reverse later.

Timing - The Commonwealth Secretariat are likely to press for July. There are various considerations. Unrest and violence in South Africa may well flare up in June. The UN is also holding its sanctions conference that month. Momentum for further measures against South Africa may well begin to build up again internationally from then. A too obvious attempt by us to delay the meeting beyond July could well prove counter-productive and only stoke up the pressures on us. It seems most unlikely in any case that we could postpone the review beyond September or that we could achieve a better result by spinning out the process for an extra month or two.

Level - It would seem best for us to have a review at the level of Foreign Minister rather than Head of Government. This level worked well at the recent EC/FLS meeting in Lusaka. It would reduce the risk of the press building up the meeting. It could also enable us to delay or defer any final decisions. The possibility of a Heads

8

of Government Meeting could be held in reserve, if necessary for a later stage.

Venue - The Commonwealth Secretariat apparently favour Ottawa or Delhi. London, however, or Ottawa look best for us. In Canberra there might be unhelpful influence from Fraser and Hawke. In any of the Third World capitals there would be great domestic pressure for sanctions and a tendency to focus on the UK. In London there would be pros and cons for us. We would be better informed about the attitudes of those participating and in a better position to try to influence them. The Prime Minister would be on hand if her intervention was needed. We would also be in the chair (for which reason the Commonwealth Secretariat is against it). But it might increase domestic parliamentary and public interest in and pressure on the meeting. In Ottawa we might expect the Canadians to do their best to play a constructive role in the chair, but we would have less direct influence on the proceedings. On balance, London should be our preference with Ottawa an acceptable fall back.

Substance of Review

8. If we have the most favourable outcome, scenario (A), our aim would almost certainly be to try to get the agreement of the other six Commonwealth Governments to have the COMGEP mission continued, though not necessarily in the same form. At the same time we would argue strongly for deferring consideration of further measures against South Africa.

9. The case of scenario (B) would be more complex. We would need to decide beforehand whether to press for a continuation of COMGEP, seek some successor mechanism or try to end any Commonwealth initiative. An end to COMGEP or any mechanism for promoting dialogue would make it more difficult for us to argue internationally for emphasis on a policy of dialogue. It would also increase the immediate pressure to take further measures. On the other hand ending the initiative might free us to some extent from the Commonwealth link and reduce the opportunities for other Commonwealth governments to put direct pressure on us. On the other

hand, it might diminish our potential influence on the attitudes of others. We shall have to judge these questions nearer the time.

10. If the COMGEP report contains elements on which we can build, the best course might be to seek support before the review (from the Canadians, Kaunda etc) for an acceptable package outcome that would continue the emphasis on facilitating dialogue in South Africa.This could be either through an extension of COMGEP's mandate or some other means. We should need to explore the alternatives if the Eminent Persons would not agree to devote more time to the job. Two alternative possibilities might be (i) the appointment of a single Commonwealth mediator or (ii) having a group of Commonwealth countries play this role. (One problem with the former would be the difficulty of getting agreement to anyone likely to be acceptable to the South African Government or having the necessary skill and experience.) A pre-emptive approach with this objective in mind might enable the UK to be seen in a more favourable light at the review as a prime mover in any final agreement. We would, of course, aim to deflect the question of further measures, if necessary by seeking further deferment of their consideration.

11. If we have scenario (C), the worst possible outcome, there will be no chance of getting COMGEP to continue its mission. In that case we should probably wish to draw as clean a line as possible under the exercise to avoid further Commonwealth involvement or indeed any further high level Commonwealth meetings on the subject until the next Heads of Government meeting in 1987. The pressures to take further measures would be very great. Ministers might have to weigh up at the time the relative costs to us of the different courses of action. We would need to make, through contacts with the Commonwealth governments beforehand, an assessment of the likely strengths of these pressures and find ways of minimising the difficulty for the UK.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. (i) We should continue to do everything possible prior to the Commonwealth review to get COMGEP firmly engaged in its task of promoting dialogue (para 6). This will require a constructive response from the SAG and a positive approach by COMGEP.

(ii) We should avoid a consensus forming, without our agreement, on the modalities for the Commonwealth review. We should begin immediately to try to influence the other Commonwealth governments concerned towards having the review at foreign minister level, and in London or if not preferably Ottawa. On timing, it would not seem to our advantage to try to delay it beyond July (para 7).

(iii) We should await COMGEP's report and further developments in South Africa before deciding our exact tactics for the review. A key decision will be whether or not to press for COMGEP to continue, or whether to explore the possibility of some successor mechanism (para 10). In the worst case we may need to try and draw a line under further Commonwealth involvement. We should aim to adopt a pre-emptive approach, and through consultations beforehand, move towards agreement on a new Commonwealth position which would stay in place for as long as possible.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
11 April 1986

SOUTH AFRICA Relations PTQ

GRS 420

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 916
OF 112320Z APRIL 86
INFO ROUTINE CAPE TOWN

WASHINGTON TELNO 852: US/ SOUTH AFRICA

1. CROCKER TOLD MINISTER ON THE AFTERNOON OF 11 APRIL THAT P W BOTHA HAD NOW REPLIED IN REMARKABLY POSITIVE TERMS TO THE MESSAGES FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT.

2. CROCKER SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US AND UK AMBASSADORS IN CAPE TOWN HAD ALREADY COMPARED NOTES ABOUT THESE REPLIES. HE EMPHASISED THE DESIRABILITY OF BOTH SIDES NOW WORKING VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER, AND HOPED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO SHARE OUR REACTION TO PW BOTHA'S RESPONSE AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. ALTHOUGH P W BOTHA'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN DID NOT SEEM TO BE SEEKING ANY SPECIFIC US ACTION, AN EARLY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WOULD AT LEAST BE REQUIRED AND IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR THIS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE LINE THE PRIME MINISTER TOOK. (WE HAVE NOW RECEIVED COPIES OF CAPE TOWN TELNOS 210 AND 211: GRATEFUL FOR EARLY LINE TO TAKE WITH CROCKER.)

3. CROCKER SAID THAT PIK BOTHA WAS EVIDENTLY DELIGHTED BY THE PROGRESS HE HAD ACHIEVED. THE AMERICANS NOW WONDERED WHETHER THE QUOTE PEACE PARTY UNQUOTE MIGHT IN FACT BE RATHER LARGER, AND MORE INFLUENTIAL, THAN THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY SUPPOSED.

4. CROCKER CONFIRMED THAT LORD BARBER'S 10 APRIL MEETING WITH SHULTZ HAD BEEN USEFUL. SHULTZ HAD MADE CLEAR THE US WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT THE COMGEP EXERCISE. BUT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN DISTURBED BY LORD BARBER'S APPARENT CONCERN ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH COMGEP WOULD BE WILLING TO PRESS THE ANC.

5. CROCKER REVEALED IN CONFIDENCE THAT HE WAS INCLINED TO SHARE OUR DOUBTS (AND THOSE OF LORD BARBER) ABOUT THE WISDOM OF ADDRESSING SOUTH AFRICA AT THE SUMMIT. BUT SHULTZ WAS ATTRACTED TO THE IDEA: WE MIGHT THEREFORE NOT HAVE HEARD THE LAST OF IT.

6. FRASER AND OBASANJO WILL BE CALLING ON CROCKER ON 14 APRIL AND SHULTZ ON 16 APRIL.

WRIGHT

SOUTH AFRICA

LIMITED
S AF D
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UND
ECD(E)
NEWS D
LEGAL ADVISERS
PLANNING STAFF

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR FERGUSSON
MR REEVE
CABINET OFFICE

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~~FPC~~
ELIBAZ

bc P.E.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 April 1986

Dear Colin,

SOUTH AFRICA: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA

Thank you for your letter of 10 April conveying the text of President Botha's reply to the Prime Minister's recent letter.

The Prime Minister is reasonably encouraged by the tone of the reply. The rub is, of course, the request for an assurance that in the event of a continuation or escalation of violence - in the wake of an ANC assurance of its cessation - South Africa would not be penalised by the international community for taking appropriate security measures. In one sense this is not unreasonable. The South African government could not stand by if violence erupted again. If the ANC break their understanding, or it is broken against their wishes, the South Africans must be able to uphold order. On the other hand, an undertaking or even an understanding of the sort which the South African Government seek is not deliverable and would anyway amount to giving them a blank cheque. The fact that they have sought it poses the question whether it is a 'wrecking amendment'.

The Prime Minister would like to make an early reply to President Botha. She will want to encourage him to respond positively to the EPG, but equally make clear that we cannot answer for the latter or give assurances about what will be acceptable to them. We shall need to point out the likely snags in the South African Government's line, while making clear that we accept their right to take reasonable measures to uphold order if violence were to continue.

I should be grateful for a draft reply.

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 April 1986

Dear Charles,

Message from President Botha

I enclose copies of two telegrams from Sir P Moberly. We have given them a minimal distribution.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 101730Z FCO
TELNO 210
OF 101615Z APRIL 86

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ADVANCE COPY

HD/SAFD

COMMONWEALTH GROUP : MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ME TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON AND HANDED OVER A REPLY FROM THE STATE PRESIDENT TO MRS THATCHER'S RECENT MESSAGE. TEXT IN MIFT. ORIGINAL BY BAG.

2. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD REGARD THIS AS A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE COMMENTS MADE BY MRS THATCHER IN HER MESSAGE. THE PRESIDENT WAS NOW LOOKING FOR A FURTHER RESPONSE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER. PIK BOTHA HOPED THAT THIS WOULD ENDORSE THE GENERAL APPROACH SET OUT IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. NO REPLY WOULD BE SENT TO THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP THEMSELVES UNTIL THE PRESIDENT HAD HEARD AGAIN FROM MRS THATCHER.

3. PIK BOTHA ADDED THAT THIS WAS THE LIMIT OF WHAT HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO PERSUADE THE PRESIDENT TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO AT THIS STAGE. THE PRESIDENT WAS PREPARED TO WRITE IN THESE TERMS TO MRS THATCHER BUT NOT YET TO THE EPG. HENCE THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER BROADLY SUPPORTED THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT APPROACH. ARMED WITH THIS, PIK BOTHA WAS CONFIDENT THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THE PRESIDENT TO AUTHORISE A LETTER IN SIMILAR TERMS TO THE EPG IN RESPONSE TO THE PAPER THEY HAD LEFT HERE.

4. I ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHETHER HE WAS HOPING THAT WE WOULD NOW BE IN TOUCH WITH THE EPG AND EITHER THROUGH THEM OR POSSIBLY DIRECT WITH THE ANC BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER REPLIED. HE SAID IT WAS OF COURSE UP TO MRS THATCHER TO DECIDE WHAT SHE DID ON RECEIPT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. HE DID NOT WANT TO SUGGEST THAT IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR HER TO CONSULT OTHERS BEFORE REPLYING, ALTHOUGH TO DO SO COULD ADD TO THE WEIGHT OF ANYTHING FURTHER SHE WROTE TO THE PRESIDENT. BUT THE IMPORTANT THING IN PIK BOTHA'S VIEW WAS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD IF POSSIBLE SHOW HERSELF IN AGREEMENT WITH THE IDEAS NOW BEING PUT TO HER. HE ACCEPTED THAT SHE COULD HARDLY BE EXPECTED TO GUARANTEE A PARTICULAR ATTITUDE BY THE ANC.

5. I POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER STOPPED SHORT OF PROMISING THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE CERTAIN STEPS SUGGESTED BY THE EPG IF THE GOVERNMENT COULD RECEIVE A DEFINITE ASSURANCE ABOUT VIOLENCE EANAING. IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE EPG'S CONCEPT WAS TO SECURE PARALLEL UNDERTAKINGS FROM EACH SIDE. WAS THERE NOT A RISK OF THE ANC BEING ASKED TO GIVE A FIRM COMMITMENT AGAINST A SOUTH AFRICAN UNDERTAKING ONLY OF THE GOVERNMENT BEING PREPARED TO CONSIDER ACTION SUGGESTED BY THE EPG. I ASKED IF SUCH AN UNDERTAKING COULD BE READ AS A CLEAR HINT THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD FIND IT POSSIBLE TO GO AHEAD IN THE EVENT OF AN ASSURANCE FROM THE ANC. PIK BOTHA SAID YES. HE ADDED HOWEVER THAT THERE WAS NO WAY IN WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT COULD NEGOTIATE A SYNCHRONISED DEAL IN ADVANCE DIRECTLY WITH THE ANC. FOR ONE THING THIS WOULD BE RESENTED BY OTHER BLACKS WHO WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE INVOLVED IN ANY EVENTUAL DIALOGUE. IN ANY CASE, AS WE WOULD SEE FROM THE TEXT, IT WAS AN ASSURANCE FROM THE EPG RATHER THAN THA ANC WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE NEEDING IN REGARD TO CESSATION OF VIOLENCE (AND HE ADDED IN REGARD TO A SITUATION IN WHICH VIOLENCE NEVERTHELESS CONTINUED).

6. THE FOREIGN MINISTER DREW ATTENTION TO ONE OTHER POINT IN THE TEXT WHERE THE PRESIDENT HAS SET OUT A NUMBER OF POINTS WHICH HE BELIEVED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT EXPECT HIM TO NEGOTIATE IN ANY NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER. P.K BOTHA SAID IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IF THE PRIME MINISTER WERE ABLE TO INDICATE UNDERSTANDING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION IN THIS RESPECT.

7. AS I LEFT HE OBSERVED THAT WE WERE ON THE BRINK OF A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH IF MATTERS NOW WENT AHEAD AS HE HOPED. HE REPEATED HIS HOPE FOR A FURTHER LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE PRESIDENT TO RESPOND TO THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP ON THESE LINES.

MOBERLY

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FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 101700Z FCO
TELNO 211
OF 101510Z APRIL 86

MIPT :

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM THE STATE PRESIDENT TO MRS THATCHER DATED 10 APRIL 1986 :

BEGINS

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

THANKYOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 20 MARCH 1986. YOUR OBVIOUS INTEREST IN A CESSATION OF VIOLENCE AND THE PROMOTION OF A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION AND DIALOGUE IN SOUTH AFRICA IS APPRECIATED.

YOU WILL BE AWARE FROM PREVIOUS STATEMENTS WHICH I HAVE MADE ON THE ISSUE OF THE RELEASE OF MR NELSON MANDELA THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S BASIC CONCERN IS THAT HIS RELEASE SHOULD NOT BE ACCOMPANIED BY OR RESULT IN FURTHER VIOLENCE. ANY ESCALATION IN VIOLENCE AT THE TIME OF HIS RELEASE WOULD FORCE THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES TO TAKE COUNTER-ACTION INCLUDING ACTION AGAINST THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR ASSOCIATED WITH THE VIOLENCE. IT IS MY VIEW, AND I HAVE STATED IT PUBLICLY, THAT MR MANDELA IS IN EFFECT BEING KEPT IN PRISON BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS AFFILIATE, THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, AS IT SUITS THEM THAT HE SHOULD REMAIN IN PRISON.

IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT THE KEY TO THE :

- RELEASE OF MR MANDELA AND SIMILAR PRISONERS,

- WITHDRAWAL OF THE SECURITY FORCES FROM CERTAIN URBAN AREAS AND

- LIFTING OF THE BAN ON THE ANC AND PAC,

IS A CESSATION OF VIOLENCE.

IF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT COULD RECEIVE A DEFINITE ASSURANCE TO THE EFFECT THAT VIOLENCE WOULD CEASE, IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER MOVES ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED IN THE ''POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT'' OF THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS BUT THEN ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT IN THE EVENT OF A CONTINUATION OR ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA WOULD NOT BE FORTHCOMING SHOULD APPROPRIATE MEASURES BE TAKEN BY SECURITY FORCES TO CONTAIN THE VIOLENCE.

This is the string.

I SAID IN AN EARLIER LETTER TO YOU THAT IF THE GROUP CONFINED ITSELF TO PROMOTING PEACEFUL POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND DISCOURAGING VIOLENCE AND COULD BE SEEN TO BE UNBIASED IN THIS RESPECT, IT COULD SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE. AN ASSURANCE BY THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS THAT THE ANC AND OTHERS WOULD CEASE THEIR VIOLENCE, WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY FACILITATE A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE FROM MY GOVERNMENT TO THE GROUP'S CONCEPT AND WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THEIR WORK - SUBJECT, NATURALLY, TO THE CONDITION THAT THEY WOULD HAVE NO RIGHT TO INTERFERE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR PRESCRIBE HOW ANY POSSIBLE FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL DISPENSATION SHOULD LOOK.

I AM , HOWEVER, CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT I PERCEIVE TO BE LACK OF UNDRSTANDING ON THE PART OF SOME WESTERN GOVERNMENTS OF THE POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS. THE QUESTION WHICH H[illegible] BEEN EXERCISING IN MY MIND IS WHETHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS ARE AWARE THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE OF THE ANC ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND THAT THE ANC HAS CLOSE LINKS WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. INDEED THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE ANC AND PAC ARE BEING TRAINED IN AND DIRECTED FROM LIBYA. I TRUST THAT WHATEVER HAPPENS ALONG THE ROAD AHEAD, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT EXPECT ME TO NEGOTIATE A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER FOR SOUTH AFRICA ON THE BASIS OF A ONE-PARTY STATE, NATIONALISATION OF PRIVATE PRPERTY, A GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED PRESS, A RESTRICTED JUDICIAL SYSTEM, AND NO GUARANTEES OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES INCLUDING THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS.

I AM ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT CONDEMNATORY STATEMENTS DIRECTED AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ALONE BY, FOR EXAMPLE, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WITHOUT ANY CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF THE VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL AIMS OF THE ANC AND OTHERS. THE ANC NEEDS TO BE TOLD BLUNTLY BY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS THAT THEIR PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES ARE UNACCEPTABLE.

WHAT IS AT LEAST HELPFUL IN THE APPROACH OF THE COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP IS ITS RECOGNITION THAT FUTURE POSITIVE ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE MATCHED BY CORRESPONDING RESPONSES BY THOSE NOW OPPOSED TO NEGOTIATION AND COMMITTED TO VIOLENCE. I TRUST THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT CONTINUED INSISTENCE ON CHANGE WITHOUT INSISTENCE ON A MATCHING PERFORMANCE BY THE ANC AND OTHERS AND CONTINUED INVOCATION OF THE THREAT OF FURTHER SANCTIONS SERVES ONLY TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER OBDURACY ON THE PART OF THOSE WHO HAVE THUS FAR TURNED THEIR BACKS ON A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

GAIN PLACE ON RECORD MY APPREVIATION FOR YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THIS MATTER.

YOURS SINCERELY
P W BOTHA

ENDS

MOBERLY

YYYY
CFPOAN 0354

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(1)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

A very important message from President Botha.

He is prepared to contemplate moving ahead on the basis proposed by the EPG, BUT

he wants some sort of promise that if violence continues despite a promise by the ANC that it will cease, and if South Africa cracks down on it, there will be no punitive measures such as sanctions. It would be

virtually impossible
to get any
guarantee of this, since
it would amount to
a blank cheque to
the South African
Govt.

CDP
10/4.

What he is asking has
no new reason. He could
not stand by it no less
emphatically again. If the OAU
breaks their undertaking to
it is broken against them states
wishing Botha would decide to
respond to its attacks by withdrawing
under pressure

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 April 1986

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has received today from President Reagan in reply to hers of 20 March about the visit to South Africa of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. As you will see, the President agrees the Prime Minister's suggestion that he should write to President Botha.

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT
cc Master
Ops

CC PC

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 708/86

Tuynhuys
Cape Town

10 April 1986

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 20 March 1986. Your obvious interest in a cessation of violence and the promotion of a process of negotiation and dialogue in South Africa is appreciated.

You will be aware from previous statements which I have made on the issue of the release of Mr Nelson Mandela that the South African Government's basic concern is that his release should not be accompanied by or result in further violence. Any escalation in violence at the time of his release would force the security authorities to take counter-action including action against those responsible for or associated with the violence. It is my view, and I have stated it publicly, that Mr Mandela is in effect being kept in prison by the South African Communist Party and its affiliate, the African National Congress as it suits them that he should remain in prison.

It must be clear that the key to the:

- release of Mr Mandela and similar prisoners,

- withdrawal of the security forces from certain urban areas and

- lifting of the ban on the ANC and PAC,

is a cessation of violence.

If the South African Government could receive a definite assurance to the effect that violence would cease, it would be prepared to consider moves along the lines suggested in the "possible negotiating concept" of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons but then on the clear understanding that in the event of a continuation or escalation of violence punitive action against South Africa would not be forthcoming should appropriate measures be taken by the security forces to contain the violence.

I said in an earlier letter to you that if the Group confined itself to promoting peaceful political dialogue and discouraging violence and could be seen to be unbiased in this respect, it could serve a useful purpose. An assurance by the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons that the ANC and others would cease their violence, would undoubtedly facilitate a constructive response from my Government to the Group's concept and would pave the way for the continuation of their work - subject, naturally, to the condition that they would have no right to interfere in South Africa's internal affairs or prescribe how any possible future constitutional dispensation should look.

I am, however, concerned about what I perceive to be a lack of understanding on the part of some Western Governments of the policies and objectives of the African National Congress. The question which has been exercising my mind is whether Western Governments are

3/...

aware that the majority of the members of the executive of the ANC are also members of the South African Communist Party and that the ANC has close links with international terrorism. Indeed there are indications that some members of the ANC and PAC are being trained in and directed from Libya. I trust that whatever happens along the road ahead, the British Government would not expect me to negotiate a new constitutional order for South Africa on the basis of a one party state; nationalisation of private property; a government controlled press; a restricted judicial system; and no guarantees of fundamental human rights and civil liberties including the protection of minority rights.

I am also concerned about condemnatory statements directed at the South African Government alone by, for example, the European Community without any categorical rejection of the violence and political aims of the ANC and others. The ANC needs to be told bluntly by democratic governments that their principles and policies are unacceptable.

What is at least helpful in the approach of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group is its recognition that future positive actions on the part of the South African Government should be matched by corresponding responses by those now opposed to negotiation and committed to violence. I trust that you will agree that continued insistence on change without insistence on a matching performance by the ANC and others and continued invocation of the threat of further sanctions serve only to encourage further obduracy on the part of those who have thus far turned their backs on a peaceful solution.

4/...

I again place on record my appreciation for your constructive involvement in this matter.

Yours sincerely

P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON



S. Africa : Relations PEQ

CCPC

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

April 7, 1986

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver to you the enclosed letter from President Reagan which was received at the Embassy over the weekend.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Raymond Seitz

R.G.H. Seitz
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

Enclosure: CONFIDENTIAL

The Right Honorable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister,
Number 10 Downing Street,
London, SW 1.

Subject

cc Ops i master

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister (2)

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T63/86

CDP 7/4

April 6, 1986

US Declassified

Dear Margaret:

Thank you for your letter of March 20 concerning the recent visit to South Africa by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. It is encouraging to learn that the Group has begun a serious exchange of ideas with South African Government officials. The Group's proposal provides a possible framework for negotiations, and offers an opportunity to end the violence.

I agree with you regarding the difficulty of the reconciliation task, but I believe it is essential that each opportunity be explored in all seriousness. I am pleased to support your efforts and will write to State President Botha, as you suggest, to urge him to continue the dialogue with the Commonwealth Group.

I very much appreciate your continuing to keep me informed about Commonwealth efforts in southern Africa. In our approach to that troubled area of the world we have much in common. We will continue to work together and keep in close touch.

Sincerely,

/S/

Ronald Reagan

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 271130Z FCO
TELNO 185
OF 270930Z MARCH 86

YOUR TELNO 107: COMMONWEALTH GROUP

SUMMARY

1. A REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE MAY ISSUE SOON. BUT ACCORDING TO PIK BOTHA, MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION OF THE GROUP'S IDEAS IS STILL AT AN EARLY STAGE. A PRELIMINARY HOLDING REPLY TO THE GROUP IS LIKELY.

DETAIL

2. I SAW PIK BOTHA YESTERDAY (26 MARCH). HE IS WORKING ON A REPLY TO MRS THATCHER'S LATEST MESSAGE TO THE STATE PRESIDENT WHICH COULD ISSUE BEFORE EASTER. ONE INGREDIENT MAY BE AN EXPLANATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN DISTRUST OF THE ANC WHICH IS AT THE FRONT OF THE STATE PRESIDENT'S MIND.

3. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY HEUNIS TO TAKE THE LEAD IN RESPONDING TO THE GROUP'S IDEAS (A DESCRIPTION WHICH THE PRESIDENT PREFERS TO ''PROPOSALS''). HE HAD TOUCHED ON THE MATTER WITH THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER COLLEAGUES BUT HAD NOT YEN TAKEN IT UP FORMALLY WITH THEM. IT WAS ESSENTIAL ON SUCH DELICATE ISSUES NOT TO RUSH THE PRESIDENT WHO AFTER A TIRING PERIOD WAS PLANNING TO BE AWAY IN THE WEEK FOLLOWING EASTER AND WOULD THEN BE IMMERSED IN PREPARING FOR THE ANNUAL PARLIAMENTARY WEEK'S DEBATE ON HIS DEPARTMENT'S ESTIMATES. PIK BOTHA JUDGED IT DESIRABLE TO WAIT UNTIL THIS WAS OUT OF THE WAY ON 25 APRIL IF HE WAS TO FULLY ENGAGE THE PRESIDENT'S ATTENTION AND GET THE BEST POSSIBLE OUTCOME. HE WOULD BE FLYING TO SWAZILAND WITH THE PRESIDENT ON 26 APRIL AND THIS WOULD GIVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK ABOUT THE MATTER AT LENGTH.

4. I EXPLAINED THE GROUP'S OWN PLANS AND URGED A POSITIVE RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OR AT LEAST AN AFFIRMATIVE HOLDING REPLY INDICATING THAT THE GROUP'S IDEAS WERE BEING CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HE WOULD ARRANGE FOR THE GROUP TO RECEIVE A PRELIMINARY RESPONSE ON THESE LINES.

CONFIDENTIAL

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5. HE THEN WENT ON TO TALK AT LENGTH ABOUT HIS PROBLEMS IN TAKING MATTERS FORWARD. THE PRESIDENT WAS VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT PRESSURE AND DEADLINES AND HAD ALREADY COMMENTED UNFAVOURABLY THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE AN ELEMENT OF ''RESPOND OR ELSE'' IN THE GROUP'S APPROACH. HE HAD ALSO BECOME IMPATIENT AT THE CONSTANT STREAM OF VISITORS AND PRESSURE FROM ABROAD. PROMINENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S MIND WERE MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE AIMS OF THE ANC. THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED MIM WHETHER THE IMPLICATIONS WERE FULLY REALISED IN LONDON OF THE FACT THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ANC E ECUTIVE WERE MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY. SURELY THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE NOT EXPECTED TO HAND OVER THEIR COUNTRY TO COMMUNISTS ON THEIR TERMS. THE PRESIDENT WAS DISMAYED BY CONTINUED CENSURING OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WHEN NOTHING WAS SAID BY WESTERN GOVERNMENTS ABOUT THE ANC'S DEMANDS FOR A ONE PARTY STATE, GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF THE PRESS AND NATIONALISATION OF BUSINESS. IT HAD BEEN HELPFUL THAT THE WHITE HOUSE HAD RECENTLY CLARIFIED THEIR POSITION BY EXPLAINING THAT THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THE ANC AS FREEDOM FIGHTERS.

6. PIK BOTHA THEN MOVED TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP'S IDEAS. HE STRESSED HE WAS TALKING PERSONALLY AS HE HAD NOT PUT HIS OWN THOUGHTS TO HIS COLLEAGUES AND, INDEED, HAD NOT FINALLY DECIDED ON HIS RECOMMENDATION. HE SAID IN THE FIRST PLACE THAT THE WORDING AND ORDER OF THE GROUP'S CONCEPT PAPER WAS NOT IDEAL AND THAT HE MIGHT PROPOSE SOME CHANGES. THE KEY WAS WHETHER THERE COULD BE AN END TO VIOLENCE. IF VIOLENCE ENDED THE SECURITY FORCES COULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE TOWNSHIPS AND THE ANC AND PAC COULD PERHAPS BE UNBANNED. THE PROCESS REQUIRED SYNCHRONISATION BUT HE DID NOT AT PRESENT SEE HOW THIS COULD HAPPEN. THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD NOT THEMSELVES SEND A MESSAGE TO THE ANC PROPOSING THE IMMEDIATE END OF VIOLENCE, RELEASE OF MANDELA AND UNBANNING OF THE ANC. THE CONCEPT WAS VALUABLE AND COULD BE DEVELOPED. BUT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ABDICATE FROM STEPS TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER IF VIOLENCE CONTINUED ONCE TALKS BEGAN. THE GROUP SHOULD ACCEPT THIS.

7. I ASKED WHETHER HE SAW A ROLE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP IN THE PROCESS OF SYNCHRONISATION TO WHICH HE HAD REFERRED. HE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS DISTRUST OF SOME MEMBERS OF THE GROUP. HE APPEARED TO MANE FRASER FOR ONE, BUT ADDED THAT PRIVATE REMARKS BY ARCHBISHOP SCOTT TO SOME SOUTH AFRICAN BUSINESSMEN IN LONDON CASTING DOUBT ON THE SINCERITY OF SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTERS HAD BEEN DAMAGING TO CONFIDENCE IN HIM.

8. HE REVERTED TO THE PROBLEMS OF DEALING WITH THE ANC. AT THE END OF THE DAY IF IT CAME TO TALKS WITH TAMBO (AND THERE WOULD BE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THIS WITH OTHER BLACK LEADERS SUCH AS BUTHELEZI) HE COULD SEE SCOPE FOR COMPROMISE ON MANY ISSUES. BUT IF THE ANC DEMANDED A ONE PARTY STATE, NATIONALISATION, ETC, THERE WOULD BE NO WAY THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT COULD ACCEPT THIS AT THE EXPENSE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS. THE PRESIDENT WAS KEEN TO ESTABLISH THIS POINT WITH WESTERN LEADERS.

CONFIDENTIAL

19

COMMENT

9. PIK BOTHA'S COMMENTS CONFIRM THAT PROSPECTS FOR A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE GROUP'S IDEAS REST ON A KNIFE EDGE. HE GIVES THE IMPRESSION OF WISHING TO KEEP THE INTIATIVE ALIVE AND EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. BUT SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES ARE CERTAIN TO BE MUCH LESS INTERESTED. THE EY WILL BE WHETHER HE CAN CONVINCE THE PRESIDENT.

10. THERE SEEMS NO CHANCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL REPLY TO THE GROUP (EXCEPT IF PRESSED, A NEGATIVE ONE) BEFORE THE PERIOD 17-21 APRIL WHEN ITS MEMBERS ARE PLANNING TO MEET IN LONDON. THE MOST WE CAN HOPE FOR IS A FAIRLY OPEN TEMPORISING REPLY. I HAD A CHANCE WITH THE DFA DIRECTOR-GENERAL LAST NIGHT TO REITERATE THE CASE FOR MAKING THIS AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE. BUT GIVEN THE DIFFICULTY OF PIK BOTHA'S POSITION WE CANNOT EXPECT ANY PRELIMINARY REPLY TO TAKE THE GROUP MUCH FURTHER FORWARD.

11. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I WONDER IF THERE IS ANY CHANCE OF THE GROUP AGREEING TO DEFER THEIR MEETING UNTIL THE END OF APRIL OR EVEN EARLY MAY. THIS WOULD NOT GUARANTEE A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE GOVERNMENT. BUT THE LONGER PIK BOTHA HAS TO TRY AND CARRY HIS COLLEAGUES WITH HIM, AND ABOVE ALL THE PRESIDENT, THE BETTER THE PROPOSECT OF KEEPING THE COMMONWEALTH INTIATIVE FROM FOUNDERING. I DO NOT BELIEVE THIS IS JUST A MATTER OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS PLAYING FOR TIME. IT GENUINELY REFLECTS THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ISSUES FOR THEM AND THE RIVALRY BETWEEN THE MAIN CAMPS IN CABINET.

CCN PARA 6 LINE 8 SHOULD READ QUOTE WITHDRAWN FROM THE TOWNSHIPS AND THE ANC AND PAC UNQUOTE

MOBERLY

SOUTHERN AFRICA

STANDARD (PALACE)

SAFD
OADs
UND
NAD
ECDs
SOVIET D
MR JOHNSON

CABINET OFFICE

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
SOUTHERN AFRICA

(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 March 1986

Prime Minister

A knee-jerk reaction, but reasonably sensibly expressed (if it is used as amended).

CDP 27/3

Dear Charles,

Representations by the Twelve on the Current Unrest in South Africa

I am writing to let you know that the Netherlands Presidency proposed earlier this afternoon (COREU CPE PRES HAG 464 enclosed) that they should make immediate representations on behalf of the Twelve to the South African authorities about their handling of the unrest in which over 30 people have been killed in the last 48 hours.

As you will know, there has been considerable press and television coverage of the violence in the UK and it was the lead story - "Bloodbath in South Africa" - in the "Daily Express" this morning.

It is clearly most important that the South African authorities should use the minimum force necessary in handling the current unrest, if the situation is not going to lead to a major tragedy like those of Sharpeville and Uitenhage in the past, with all the consequences that would have, not least for the future of the COMGEP initiative.

In the circumstances, and faced with the Dutch proposal, the Foreign Secretary has judged it right to agree to the Presidency making representations. We have however proposed certain modifications in the line which the Dutch propose to take. (I enclose a copy of our telegraphic reply). An additional advantage of having the Twelve make representations is that it makes it unnecessary for us to take action bilaterally.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

FM LA HAYE COREU
TO ALL COREU - IMMEDIAT DESKBY 27/3 - 13.00Z

CPE PRES HAG 464
27-3-1986 12.53 L.T.

HD/SAH D

DIFFUSION RESTREINTE
DISTRIBUTION LIMITEE

OBJET: PROPOSED DEMARCHE BY THE TWELVE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ON THE PRESENT UNREST IN SOUTH AFRICA

THE PRESIDENCY HAS LEARNED THAT DURING THE PAST 48 HOURS, VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA HAS INCREASED CONSIDERABLY AND THAT WELL OVER 30 PEOPLE HAVE DIED, MOST OF THEM AS A RESULT OF POLICE-ACTIONS, A.O. IN BOPHUTHATSWANA.

THE PRESIDENCY IS HIGHLY CONCERNED ABOUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND PROPOSES TO PARTNERS TO EXPRESS THE DEEP CONCERN OF THE TWELVE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TODAY, 27 MARCH.

THIS PROPOSED STEP SHOULD CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

- AN URGENT CALL ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO RESTRAIN POLICE-ACTIONS IMMEDIATELY.,

- A CALL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TERM MEASURES TO FACILITATE A NATIONAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE TRUE REPRESENTATIVES OF SOUTH AFRICA'S BLACK POPULATION.

- A REFERENCE TO EARLIER RELEVANT EPC-DECLARATIONS.

UNLESS PARTNERS EXPRESS MAJOR OBJECTIONS BEFORE 15.00 HOURS G.M.T. TODAY, THE PRESIDENCY WILL CARRY OUT THE DEMARCHE TODAY 27 MARCH OR, AT THE LATEST ON 28 MARCH.

FIN DE TEXTE
LA HAYE COREU

OUT COREU TELEGRAM

Classification	Precedence
DIFFUSION RESTREINTE	IMMEDIAT DESKBY 271~~6~~30Z

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FM LDN C	2	LON COREU
TO*C Pre	3	THE HAGUE COREU IMMEDIAT DESKBY 271~~6~~30Z
INFO*Pre	4	INFO ALL COREU IMMEDIAT
CPE*ETR	5	CPE/LON
DATETIME	6	271615Z MARCH 86
CLASS	7	DIFFUSION RESTREINTE
DISTN	8	
	9	OBJET: PROPOSED DEMARCHE TO SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT
	10	REF: CPE PRES HAG 464
	11	1. The United Kingdom agrees with the proposal for a
	12	Presidency demarche to the South African authorities but would
	13	wish to see a slight modification in its terms, as follows:
	14	(a) instead of first tiret, substitute QUOTE ~~unquote~~ Draw the attention
	15	of the South African Government to the continuing need for
	16	restraint on the part of its police force unqu~~o~~t~~e~~e.
	17	(b) instead of second tiret, substitute quote underline to the
	18	South African Government ~~a~~the increasingly urgent need for them
	19	to make a positive response to the calls for measures to
	20	facilitate a national dialogue with the ~~genuine~~ TRUE representatives of
	21	the black population. unq~~u~~uo~~t~~te.
///	22	2. The United Kingdom considers that an approach in these
//	23	terms would stand a better chance of having a constructive
/	24	effect on the South African authorities.
	25	

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword COREU LON
File number	Dept PS	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) BUDD		
Telephone number 4831		
Authorised for despatch C R Budd 27/3		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	EEC Embassies

XY 50

Printed in the U.K. for H.M.S.O. Dmd 8303488 3/83 11258 IP 35222

Classification: DIFFUSION RESTRENTE

Page: 2

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

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS (6)
PS/MRS CHALKER.
PS/PUS
~~MR FERGUSSON~~SIR D MIERS
~~SIR J FREELAND~~ MR DARLIN
MR JOHNSON
MR O'NEILL
HD/SAFD
HD/CAFD
HD/UND
HD/NEWS DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

MR CLG MALLABY , CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO ~~10~~ DOWNING STREET

IMMEDIATE

SENT
27 MAR 1986

CONFIDENTIAL
FM CAPE TOWN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 189
OF 271445Z MARCH 86

MY TELNO 185: COMMONWEALTH GROUP

1. THE DIRECTOR OF PIK BOTHA'S OFFICE ADDED SOME POINTS AT LUNCH WITH ME TODAY TO THE ACCOUNT WHICH WE RECEIVED FROM HIS MINISTER YESTERDAY AFTERNOON.

2. MANLEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE REPLY FROM PRESIDENT BOTHA TO THE PRIME MINISTER WAS LIKELY TO RAISE THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING SOME SORT OF CONFIRMATION NOW OF ANC INTEREST IN THE CONCEPT BEING ADVANCED BY THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP. CERTAINTY ABOUT ENDING VIOLENCE WAS A KEY POINT FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THUS FOR THE CHANCES OF GETTING A FAVOURABLE RESPONSE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GROUP'S IDEAS.

3. I ASKED IF THE EXPECTED MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD IN MANLEY'S VIEW REQUIRE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC ACTION WITH THE ANC. HE SAID HE ASSUMED THAT ANY APPROACH TO THE ANC MIGHT BE MORE EASILY UNDERTAKEN BY A MEMBER OR MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP. I COMMENTED THAT, QUITE APART FROM THE INTRINSIC DELICACY OF HANDLING THE ANC, THIS SUGGESTION WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE GROUP NEEDING TO BE TOLD ABOUT PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT EVEN AT THIS STAGE THERE WOULD BE A MATTER OF WHAT HIS MINISTER YESTERDAY CALLED SYNCHRONISATION. THE QUESTION WOULD BE ASKED WHY THE ANC SHOULD BE PRESSED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES IN ADVANCE OF THE GROUP RECEIVING ANYTHING BEYOND A HOLDING REPLY FROM THE SOUTH AFRICANS. I URGED MANLEY (WHO HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY PIK BOTHA TO PREPARE A DRAFT REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MRS THATCHER) THAT ANY REQUEST TO US ABOUT CLARIFYING THE ANC'S ATTITUDE SHOULD BE MATCHED BY THE MOST FORTHCOMING STATEMENT POSSIBLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN THE GROUP'S IDEAS.

4. AT THIS STAGE IN THE CONVERSATION IT EMERGED - AS WE HAD SUSPECTED - THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS APPARENTLY STILL NOT SEEN THE

SUSPECTED - THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS APPARENTLY STILL NOT SEEN THE ACTUAL PAPER LEFT HERE BY THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP. ACCORDING TO MANLEY, THE PRESIDENT UNDERSTANDS THAT THE BALL IS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN COURT BUT PIK BOTHA HAS DELIBERATELY NOT WANTED TO CONFRONT THE PRESIDENT WITH PRECISE FORMULATIONS YET.

5. I ASKED WHETHER AN EVENTUAL RESPONSE TO THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP WOULD NEED TO GO THROUGH CABINET. MANLEY THOUGHT HIS MINISTER'S APPROACH WOULD BE TO CONCENTRATE ON PERSUADING THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF. ONLY ONE OR TWO KEY MINISTERS WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE INVOLVED.

6. MANLEY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF VIOLENCE BEING BROUGHT TO AN END. HE REPEATED A POINT MADE BY PIK BOTHA YESTERDAY THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN PREFERABLE IF THE ''NEGOTIATING CONCEPT'' HAD SPOKEN OF CESSATION RATHER THAN SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE. MANLEY WAS REALISTIC ENOUGH TO ADMIT HOWEVER THAT IF TALKS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND ANC EVER STARTED AND THEN BROKE DOWN, A WIDESPREAD RETURN TO VIOLENCE WAS ALMOST INEVITABLE. THIS WAS INDEED A MAJOR WORRY FOR THE GOVERNMENT, SINCE IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THEY WOULD BE WORSE OFF THAN IF THE PROCESS OF TALKING TO THE ANC HAD NEVER BEGUN.

7. MANLEY ALSO REVERTED TO HIS MINISTER'S CONCERN (PARAGRAPH 6 OF TUR) THAT THE GROUP MUST UNDERSTAND THAT NOTHING WOULD STOP THE AUTHORITIES FROM ACTING TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER IF VIOLENCE FROM ANY QUARTER CONTINUED DURING TALKS. THE GOVERNMENT HAD NO WISH TO FIND THEMSELVES BEING HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR A BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATION AS A R ESULT OF ACTING AGAINST CONTINUED UNREST AND THUS AUTOMATICALLY BRINGING DOWN INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS ON THEIR HEADS. THEY WOULD WISH FOR REASSURANCE ON THIS SCORE FROM THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP.

8. FINALLY MANLEY CONFIRMED THAT PIK BOTHA WAS ANXIOUS FOR SOME INDICATION OF ANC WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO CALL OFF VIOLENCE ON THE GROUP'S TERMS BEFORE (BEFORE) THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT DELIVER THEIR SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO THE ''NEGOTIATING CONCEPT''. IN PRACTICE PIK BOTHA WILL BE LOOKING FOR A FURTHER MESSAGE FROM LONDON TO HELP HIM CARRY THE PRESIDENT WITH HIM. I POINTED OUT THAT THIS WOULD ADD ANOTHER STEP TO AN ALREADY TIGHT TIMETABLE.

9. ON A POINT A DETAIL I SHOULD CORRECT THE REFERENCE IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF MY TUR TO REMARKS BY ARCHBISHOP SCOTT OF WHICH PIK BOTHA COMPLAINED. IT APPEARS THAT THE ARCHBISHOP WAS IN FACT SPEAKING TO CANADIAN BUSINESSMEN IN SOUTH AFRICA.

MOBERLY

YYYY

CFPOAN 0307

NNNN

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

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15 (16)

MR CLG MALLABY , CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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27 MAR 1986

15.11.84

CONFIDENTIAL
FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 271130Z FCO
TELNO 185
OF 270930Z MARCH 86

YOUR TELNO 107: COMMONWEALTH GROUP

SUMMARY

1. A ~~REPLY FROM THE~~ REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE MAY ISSUE SOON. BUT ACCORDING TO PIK BOTHA, MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION OF THE GROUP'S IDEAS IS STILL AT AN EARLY STAGE. A PRELIMINARY HOLDING REPLY TO THE GROUP IS LIKELY.

DETAIL

2. I SAW PIK BOTHA YESTERDAY (26 MARCH). HE IS WORKING ON A REPLY TO MRS THATCHER'S LATEST MESSAGE TO THE STATE PRESIDENT WHICH COULD ISSUE BEFORE EASTER. ONE INGREDIENT MAY BE AN EXPLANATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN DISTRUST OF THE ANC WHICH IS AT THE FRONT OF THE STATE PRESIDENT'S MIND.

3. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY HEUNIS TO TAKE THE LEAD IN RESPONDING TO THE GROUP'S IDEAS (A DESCRIPTION WHICH THE PRESIDENT PREFERS TO ''PROPOSALS''). HE HAD TOUCHED ON THE MATTER WITH THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER COLLEAGUES BUT HAD NOT YEN TAKEN IT UP FORMALLY WITH THEM. IT WAS ESSENTIAL ON SUCH DELICATE ISSUES NOT TO RUSH THE PRESIDENT WHO AFTER A TIRING PERIOD WAS PLANNING TO BE AWAY IN THE WEEK FOLLOWING EASTER AND WOULD THEN BE IMMERSED IN PREPARING FOR THE ANNUAL PARLIAMENTARY WEEK'S DEBATE ON HIS DEPARTMENT'S ESTIMATES. PIK BOTHA JUDGED IT DESIRABLE TO WAIT UNTIL THIS WAS OUT OF THE WAY ON 25 APRIL IF HE WAS TO FULLY ENGAGE THE PRESIDENT'S ATTENTION AND GET THE BEST POSSIBLE OUTCOME. HE WOULD BE FLYING TO SWAZILAND WITH THE PRESIDENT ON 26 APRIL AND THIS WOULD GIVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK ABOUT THE MATTER AT LENGTH.

4. I EXPLAINED THE GROUP'S OWN PLANS AND URGED A POSITIVE RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OR AT LEAST AN AFFIRMATIVE HOLDING REPLY INDICATING THAT THE GROUP'S IDEAS WERE BEING CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HE WOULD ARRANGE FOR THE GROUP TO RECEIVE A PRELIMINARY RESPONSE ON THESE LINES.

This makes it important to delay the group's return

N.B. I see this is proposed on 26th. pity.

5. HE THEN WENT ON TO TALK AT LENGTH ABOUT HIS PROBLEMS IN TAKING MATTERS FORWARD. THE PRESIDENT WAS VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT PRESSURE AND DEADLINES AND HAD ALREADY COMMENTED UNFAVOURABLY THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE AN ELEMENT OF "RESPOND OR ELSE" IN THE GROUP'S APPROACH. HE HAD ALSO BECOME IMPATIENT AT THE CONSTANT STREAM OF VISITORS AND PRESSURE FROM ABROAD. PROMINENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S MIND WERE MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE AIMS OF THE ANC. THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM WHETHER THE IMPLICATIONS WERE FULLY REALISED IN LONDON OF THE FACT THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ANC E ECUTIVE WERE MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY. SURELY THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE NOT EXPECTED TO HAND OVER THEIR COUNTRY TO COMMUNISTS ON THEIR TERMS. THE PRESIDENT WAS DISMAYED BY CONTINUED CENSURING OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WHEN NOTHING WAS SAID BY WESTERN GOVERNMENTS ABOUT THE ANC'S DEMANDS FOR A ONE PARTY STATE, GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF THE PRESS AND NATIONALISATION OF BUSINESS. IT HAD BEEN HELPFUL THAT THE WHITE HOUSE HAD RECENTLY CLARIFIED THEIR POSITION BY EXPLAINING THAT THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THE ANC AS FREEDOM FIGHTERS.

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COMMENT

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CCN PARA 6 LINE 8 SHOULD READ QUOTE WITHDRAWN FROM THE TOWNSHIPS AND THE ANC AND PAC UNQUOTE
ERLY

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CFPOAN 0302

NNNN

MUSUM

CCN PARA 6 LINE 8 SHOULD READ QUOTE WITHDRAWN FROM THE TOWNSHIPS AND ANC AND PAC UNQUOTE

MOBERLY

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CFPOAN 0302

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CONFIDENTIAL

file

MS 2 BSZ

cc CST 15/4.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 March 1986

Dear Colin.

COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS ON SOUTH AFRICA

The Foreign Secretary suggested to the Prime Minister this evening that it would be very difficult to postpone a follow-up Commonwealth meeting to consider the report of the Eminent Persons Group beyond July. He could well understand the Prime Minister's anxiety not to have the meeting in Canada at the time of her visit to Vancouver since this would prolong, possible considerably, her absence from the United Kingdom at a traditionally busy time. He wondered whether we ought to take the initiative now in suggesting to the Commonwealth Secretary General that the meeting be held in London. We might also float the idea that it should be at Foreign Minister level.

The Prime Minister expressed the hope that it might still be possible to slip the meeting into the early autumn, while recognising the difficulties of this. She did not reach any conclusion whether it should be at Head of Government or Foreign Minister level.

The Foreign Secretary will no doubt want to let the Prime Minister have his considered views on this in due course.

yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Colin Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

OA

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

8PW

CCPC

26 March 1986

COMMONWEALTH FELLOWSHIP SCHEME FOR BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS

Thank you for your letter of 25 March setting out the details of the proposed Scheme to provide post-graduate fellowships for black South Africans.

The Prime Minister is happy with the way in which it is intended to organise the Scheme and is content for discussions to begin with the Commonwealth Secretariat.

(C. D. POWELL)

C. R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

PRIME MINISTER

Mr. Elliott has a very brief slot in the diary. I think, if you agree, it might be wise if I were to be present. He might have some interesting views on South Africa, where he has been fairly recently.

CHARLES POWELL

25 March 1986

L04AFJL

RESTRICTED

Prime Minister

This proposes a scheme heavily tilted towards bilateral arrangements; & no nominations from political organisations. Initially it would be funded at £½ million p.a. from the ODA budget. The South African Govt are unlikely to object. Agree to HM proposed arrangements?

Yes ms

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 March 1986

Dear Charles,

Commonwealth Fellowship Scheme for Black South Africans

You will recall that at CHOGM last year the Prime Minister proposed the creation of a new Commonwealth Scheme to provide post-graduate fellowships for black South Africans. As you know, Mr Raison announced in the House of Commons on 19 December that some of the UNESCO savings had been earmarked for the scheme.

The Commonwealth Secretary General was particularly interested in the Prime Minister's initiative at Nassau. Since then, ODA officials have had some preliminary discussions with him and his staff about how the scheme might operate. Officials in both wings of the FCO have now drawn up and agreed the details of a two tier scheme, similar to that which we operated for Rhodesian students after UDI. As envisaged the scheme would comprise two elements:

(a) A bilateral tier within a broad Commonwealth framework, encompassing schemes run on their own by several Commonwealth governments, for training black and other disadvantaged students at post-graduate levels outside South Africa.

(b) A small contribution to a multilateral tier to be run by the Commonwealth Secretariat, which could also benefit refugee students.

The scheme as devised would ensure that we retained maximum control over determining who should benefit. No nominations would be accepted from any organisation or political grouping. Details are contained in the annex to this letter.

The Foreign Secretary, who has approved the scheme as outlined above, would like the Prime Minister to be consulted before we go further. If the Prime Minister agrees, Sir Crispin Tickell would put these proposals to the Commonwealth Secretary General. In the unlikely event of Mr Ramphal's rejecting them, the Foreign Secretary recommends that we go ahead wi h the bilateral tier on our own.

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As you know, as a result of our opposition to sanctions we are seen by a significant number of black Africans, both within South Africa and elsewhere, as supporting apartheid. The Prime Minister is aware of the need to take adequate positive measures to counter calls for further restrictive measures. We expect that the new Commonwealth scheme will make a valuable contribution to the process of convincing South African blacks of our goodwill.

We have consulted our Ambassador in Cape Town. Sir Patrick Moberly supports these proposals, which he believes will improve our standing generally among the non-white communities. Sir Patrick is also keen to step up our involvement in local projects inside South Africa and to be seen doing so. We envisage that once the proposed Commonwealth Scheme is operational, it will be possible to divert some of the funds from our existing bilateral aid programme away from post-graduate scholarships into other projects in South Africa. The ODA Chief Education Adviser is visiting South Africa next month with a view to identifying schemes which merit our support.

We have also sought Sir Patrick's advice about presentation. He believes that we should aim for the maximum impact on blacks. The Embassy already deliberately gives the bilateral aid programme a high profile and would see advantage in doing likewise with the Commonwealth scheme. Sir Patrick does not anticipate any unfavourable reaction from the South African Government.

In the past year, the United States government have stepped up their bilateral aid to South African blacks to $3 million, much of it for study fellowships. Their action has been widely publicised and has been well received by blacks. The South African Government have not reacted advserely to the American arrangements.

In any case, the Foreign Secretary believes that the slight risk of any South African Government criticism of the scheme would be outweighed by the very considerable advantage of improving our image elsewhere in Africa and the Commonwealth. Indeed, if carefully timed the announcement of the scheme could help reinforce the work of the Eminent Persons Group.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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ANNEX

Proposed Commonwealth Fellowship Scheme for Black South Africans

The scheme, which resembles that introduced for Phodesian students after the illegal Declaration of Independence, would cons st of two tiers:

(a) A bilateral tier within a broad Commonwealth framework, encompassing schemes run on their own by the UK and other Commonwealth states, for training black and other disadvantaged students at post-graduate levels outside South Africa. Students would come mainly from inside the Republic.

(b) A small contribution to a multilateral tier to be run by the Commonwealth Secretariat, which would also benefit refugee students.

The first tier would comprise bilaterally financed post-graduate fellowships for study in the donor country. Donors would select candidates for each course of study. The second tier would be financed multilaterally through the Commonwealth Secretariat. The Secretariat would select and place candidates with donors or in third countries within the Commonwealth. Donors and the Secretariat would have to agree how contributions were to be spent, and who would receive awards.

Both tiers would, in principle, be open to South African refugees and to those domiciled in South Africa. All UK awards under the bilateral scheme would be for non-white South Africans resident in that country. Under the multilateral tier, priority for UK funds would be fellowships in Britain or a third country for non-white South Africans from the Republic. But some South African refugees might also benefit. We would have to accept that other donors - perhaps a majority - would wish most, or even all, their multilateral awards to go to refugees. (In negotiations with the Commonwealth Secretariat, we should have discretion to bring Namibian refugees into this scheme and be ready to permit appropriate first degree and corresponding technical or vocational awards if these features made our proposal more acceptable.)

/The

The scheme would be arranged so that action in South Africa, including selection, would be carried out by the British Council. No government-to-government agreement would be required.

The inclusion of South African refugees in the scheme is necessary to ensure a Commonwealth hallmark. It is a logical extension of our current support for the education of South Africans living outside the country through the United Nations and through the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation. An expansion of Commonwealth assistance for the education of South African and Namibian refugees is in keeping with the Nassau Communique.

The Secretariat have already agreed that candidates should be considered as individuals and that nominations by such organisations as the African National Congress and the Pan-African Congress should not be accepted.

Our contribution to the new scheme would come from money formerly earmarked for UNESCO. In the financial year 1986/87 it is proposed to set aside roughly £450,000 for the bilateral tier and £50,000 for the multilateral tier. We could increase our contribution to the multilateral scheme to £75,000 if other countries collectively matched this figure. If the fellowships offered under the scheme were taken up, total spending on both would rise to £700,000 by 1989.

Our existing bilateral assistance for training and educating black South Africans from within South Africa is increasing from £800,000 in 1985/86 to £1,000,000 in 1986/87. Although the merit of this scheme is recognised by those concerned, it has not attracted much attention outside South Africa. It is highly valued by HM Ambassador but he is keen to expand still further the assistance to local projects where we can make a greater visible impact. Once the Commonwealth Scheme is in operation, we should be able to divert up to £350,000 from the training element of our existing bilateral programme into such projects.


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cc/RC

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 March 1986

GK.

Please amend the letter & return to me, so that I can explain to the PM

Dear Charles,

Letter from the Prime Minister to President Botha

and get her to sign the revised version

Before handing over the letter from the Prime Minister to President Botha on 21 March, HM Ambassador in Cape Town felt it wise to delete the reference in paragraph 3 to "the Group's negotiating concept". It was the Ambassador's understanding that the Group had decided not to show the paper to President Botha, having received advice in this sense from other South African Ministers.

The first sentence in the third paragraph was accordingly amended to read "Lord Barber explained to me the ideas which they set out during their discussions in Cape Town".

I apologise for our apparent failure to consult you before this was done. But given that it has been done, I should be grateful if a revised version of the original letter could now be prepared and sent to us for onward transmission.

Yours ever

Robin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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Relations: SOUTH AFRICA Pt 9.

BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL
5th Floor Nedbank Mall 145-7 Commissioner Street
PO Box 10101 Johannesburg 2000

~~Telephone 21 8161 Telex 8-7115~~
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Telephone: XXXX 8161 Telex 48-7115 (Answer back)
331

EM

Your reference

Our reference

Date 24 March 1986

E A J Fergusson Esq
Deputy Under-Secretary of State
F C O
London

Dear Em,

POLICE STRENGTHS

1. During your albeit brief visit to Johannesburg, you asked whether I could obtain some factual information on Police strengths in our area. I have spoken again to Brigadier Coetze in Soweto, and last weekend at a lunch in Pretoria I managed to have a few words with the Brigadier commanding the Pretoria area. The information they gave me is as follows.

2. Brigadier Coetze has revised his earlier figures to me and now says that for policing a population of almost two million he has at his disposal fourteen hundred police officers, of whom twelve hundred are black. At any one time, he can call upon five to six hundred of these to police or control a riot situation. In addition, he can call upon a further one thousand to fifteen hundred members of the South Africa Defence Force (SADF) who are within thirty minutes of his area.

3. The situation in the Pretoria police district area is different. The Brigadier there can call upon the personnel and students from two SAP police academies. This together with his own command gives him a disposable force of over two thousand policemen at any given moment. These units, in his own words, can "isolate and seal off" Mamelodi or Atteridgeville within the hour. In addition, he can call upon Army garrisons in the Pretoria area to furnish a further two thousand soldiers. Although the Brigadier claims to be on good terms with black civic leaders in his area - including Father Mkhatshwa - he made it clear that this relationship was based upon the fact that he was able to "wield a very big stick in very short time".

Yours.

R S Reeve

Mr Humphrys
Mr Fergusson
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

Prime Minister
Ewen Fergusson's report of his recent (re-)visit to South Africa. Rather gloomy so far as the prospects for the Eminent Persons Group are concerned.

blind cc: Mr Powell, No 10

(2)

From: E A J Fergusson

Date: 24 March 1986

Private Secretary

CDP 24/3.

SOUTH AFRICA REVISITED (13-20 March 1986)

1. It is salutary to come to South Africa from Angola and Mozambique and to be reminded of the extraordinary difference when white/European skills capital and energy are grafted onto essentially the same traditional African human base. There is also a reverse process, since the disaster that is Angola and Mozambique shows what happens when those same European skills (sparingly applied as they were) are precipitately taken away.

2. Superficially, very little has changed since I left South Africa 21 months ago. There are still few signs of any need for security precautions - conspicuously fewer than we here are accustomed to. Black, brown and white mingle in the thronged streets. Despite the recession, there is not much visible sign of hardship evident to the ordinary European traveller; it is concealed in the townships and rural areas. The roads are full of the usual panoply of white - (and black) owned Mercedes and BMWs, and farmers in bakkies, and Combis filled with blacks returning home for the weekend. The physical infrastructure (tarmac roads, airports, services of all kinds) remains at a high standard. Soweto is now electrified - with inevitable complaints about the high cost of electricity. In the country, as one flies across the border (I was in a slow single-engined 'plane), South Africa makes an immediate impact by the tidy and ordered way in which the hand of man has been applied to a landscape which in most other African countries seems intractable and unchanging.

3. Yet I was conscious of an immediate difference in atmosphere for white and black. The anxiety level is noticeably higher; for white the time horizon for significant change has got noticeably closer, without its nature having got much clearer; for my black contacts (since I was seeing more or less moderate people, opposed to extremism) the risk of uncontrolled violence seemed far greater than it was, and their influence in jeopardy.

4. It is important to be reminded by a personal visit of the immense complexity of the South African scene and the ferment of ideas. At all levels of society, conversation is dominated by politics - as is natural when survival is at stake. And the ideas cut across all the inherent differences within and between the groups. I attach a very schematic indication of the main elements on the political spectrum, as an illustration of what I mean.

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5. Law and order is inevitably a major preoccupation. Given the complexity of society and its historical tradition of violent interaction, it is an astonishing reflection on the inherent acquiescence of the bulk of the population in the system that a population of some 30 million has a police force of only 45,000 (just under half black); Soweto, with a population greater than that of Northern Ireland, has a police establishment of roughly 500. Although there are good police officers, white policemen have predominantly been recruited from the bottom tier of Afrikaner society - as though in Birmingham we recruited from the National Front - and they are not trained in the tradition of moderation and minimum use of force of the British policeman. They are grossly overstretched and, as violence has increased, instead of being able to respond - as, say, the UK police were able to respond during the miner's strike - by blanketing potential violence with a massive numerical show of strength, small numbers of police, often young and inexperienced, "frazzled" by overwork, frightened by the overwhelming numbers which they face, have themselves responded with unprovoked violence. There are, too, more malign elements - members of the police force who believe that the problem of controlling the black population will only be resolved when the Government has shown its strength in a massive use of force, with thousands dead on the streets. And right wing influence is growing - Eugene Terreblanche of the far-right extremist AWB, asked if his organization was inflitrating the police, replied, "How can we infiltrate ourselves?".

6. I found a major preoccupation among the white people whom I met, particularly though predictably among National Party MPs and Ministers, with the swing to the right - such as could lead to major defections in Parliament with the Conservative Party becoming the official opposition, by-elections which would show how far the Government had lost its traditional basis of support, and the growth of extra-parliamentary extremism and "vigilante" activity. An impression of this comes from the attached notes which Sir P Moberly made of a few of my main calls in Cape Town. In theory, of course, the Government should fear no real challenge because, in theory, it could pick up electoral support by broadening its appeal away from its Afrikaner base. This notion is based, however, on what are in practice two false assumptions; the first is that English-speakers, when put to the test, would in fact support liberal policies; the second is that it is conceivable that the present Afrikaner National Party, and PW Botha in particular, is psychologically ready to think of itself as concerned primarily with anything other than Afrikaner survival. Indeed, it is one of the tragedies of the situation today that P.W. Botha with his background in the struggles of the 1930s and 1940s as a party organizer, has failed to transcend his limitations and to present himself as a "man for all South Africa".

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7. At the other end of the spectrum, I found an equal preoccupation with the extent to which the pathology of violence had taken hold, especially among the young - the students between 13 and 22 who are the motor force of township violence, and whose willingness to use violence against collaborators has effectively removed Government control of day-by-day administration from many of the townships. A respected pastor in a black township spoke to me of the loss of will to live/willingness to die of many school children; the (coloured) Rector of a Cape College of Technology spoke of the romanticization of violence. That attitude is enhanced by the isolation of black and coloured people in their townships - the slogan among schools-boycotters of "Liberation before education" is based (as indeed are many perceptions abroad) on a wholly unrealistic impression of the weakness of the South African State and a misperception of the Government's willingness to use massive force if it sees a serious risk of major breakdown. The next three months could well provide a tragic illustration - triggers could be the "schools' deadline" of 31 March, 1 May for which the Trades Union Confederation COSATU are calling for demonstrations and the 10th Anniversary of the Soweto uprising on 16 June. It is regrettably true that some in Government, in the Police and in the Army, believe that a "short, sharp shock", an Amritsar-scale affair, will do the trick. The SAG for its part does not feel that its existence is challenged by violence on the left. The Army remains strong and it and the Police have more black volunteers than they can handle.

8. This then is the "background" against which the Commonwealth Group are operating. Unfortunately, I did not see the Foreign Minister, Mr Pik Botha, who left suddenly for Frankfurt to see Mr Wisner just as I arrived in Cape Town, but I saw various of his officials, including the helpful but ineffective and about-to-be-absent Mr Carl von Hirschberg. Pik Botha clearly perceives the advantage to South Africa of reaching an agreement with the Commonwealth Group - of thereby enlisting the support of a wide and diverse range of countries who would carry other important groups such as the EC with them for the process of reform in South Africa - particularly if the price is only to do sooner what will be done before long anyway over Mandela, ANC etc. Unfortunately, I do not think that there is much chance of his carrying the bulk of his colleagues with him, nor of his convincing his President. P W Botha's meeting with the group reflected that. And I believe that Dr Gerrit Viljoen crystallized the Government's point of view when he said that they could carry almost any programme of orderly reform with less risk of alienating their constituency than would be the case if they followed the Mandela/ ANC path. This is the immediate consequence of the swing to the right.

9. The Government is of course engaged in what, by its standards, is a dramatic programme of reform - black property rights, the removal of influx control (subject to "orderly urbanization, but that is not unreasonable), the introduction of a uniform identity document, modification to the Group Areas Act, the likely abolition of separate communities, educational reforms, massive provision of resources for black welfare and the urgent study of structures which could bring blacks into Parliament and could build on their role at lower levels (eg the Regional Service Councils). In order to carry the National Party forward on the major issue of black participation there will be an advisory Federal Congress in August, followed by Provincial Councils (which in the National Party Constitution have the power to decide policy) leading at a later stage to a white referendum. The Government pursues its concept of "managed change" - that is change conferred from above.

10. It remains to be seen how far this widespread programme of reform will satisfy black aspirations and enlist the support of credible elements in the black community. The Government talk of support from homeland leaders, and the move to give "independence" to Kwandebele has to be seen as a step to buy that support. The Government still talk of a role for tribal chiefs! It may be, as the impact of the reforms significantly meets some black concerns over the next year or so, that the moderate constituency will feel greater confidence and more black people will be prepared to come forward. The omens at present are unpropitious. In the Eastern Cape, for instance, the ethnic basis of the Regional Service Councils has led to a more or less complete absence of black support. In their place, "Civic Associations" are springing up, often dominated by the men of violence, offering a parallel administration or focus of power in the townships. There is a very deep scepticism, which the Government has yet even to start allaying, whether this Government could ever be sincere over power-sharing. The Government's vocabulary of "group rights/group protection" reinforces the view that their underlying aim is to preserve Afrikaner control, while neutralizing demands for more far-reaching transfers of power by mechanisms to permit some black participation in Government. At present it is hard to believe that the Government will be able to bring about the kind of visible dialogue with "genuinely representative" black leaders for which many blacks and the world outside are asking.

11. I met a division of opinion among those close to the black community and radical elements within it about what could bring about negotiation. Some thought that it was too late to avoid violence - that if Mandela and the ANC and other parties were to enter a dialogue in the absence of violence their inability to control violence would be made manifest. In those circumstances,

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only the tragedy of a major incident or series of incidents, would alter the situation. Others thought that Mandela's charisma, his personification of the aspirations of blacks of all ages and conditions and his inherent moderation, meant that his release could transform the situation. None, however, underestimated the immense risks - to the Government, or to Mandela himself (violence from either extreme - and the practical difficulties of releasing him.

12. The Afrikaner is obdurate - pigheaded. He does not respond to pressure (my judgment is that pressure so far has sometimes affected timing on presentation, sometimes affected "minor issues", but has not influenced basic policies). There is an important strand of Afrikaner thinking which says "let them do their worst, we are strong enough to stand on our own and to reform in our own way, on our own timescale". These are the proponents of Fortress South Africa, who believe that, on the Rhodesian analogy, a seige economy would significantly enhance South Africa's economic welfare while at the same time inflicting substantial net losses on the world outside (see for instance Dr Duplessis' remarks in the note attached). I was glad, however, to find that virtually every one of the large number of those whom I saw at the top of the financial/economic structures of Government would have none of this argument. They continue to hope for a stable, prosperous South Africa in future decades, able to feed and employ its growing black population and to be the motor force of the regional economy, but only on the basis of continuing substantial inflows of foreign funds, and the continuing major reforms which that will require.

13. There is inevitably much nervousness about the future, and about international reactions - especially the risk of sanctions. The line-up is familiar - Bishop Tutu and many articulate blacks "for", almost all whites against. I fear that, in the black township communities, whose views have the greatest reverberation abroad, the easy connection "opposition to sanctions means support for apartheid" is very regularly made. It is difficult in these circumstances to get a hearing for our views and sometimes difficult for the Embassy to make contact with those who most ought to hear our views. The task is not an easy one. As I know only too well from my own experience as Ambassador, it is not possible to satisfy all South African audiences simultaneously.

14. I have not tried to draw specific conclusions - though, if I have one it is that the task of deciding on an appropriate British policy is even more difficult than I thought it was and that the next three or four months are likely to bring into relief the problem of reconciling what makes sense in a purely South African context with what defends our interests in the world as a whole.

E A J Fergusson

cc:
PS/Mrs Chalker
PS/PUS
PS/Mr Raison
PS/Sir C Tickell
Sir W Harding
Mr Derek Thomas
Mr Johnson
SAfD
CAfD
EAD
WAD
Planning Staff
PUSD

Mr Mallaby, Cabinet Office

THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM IN SOUTH AFRICA
(a very schematic selection)

Reading from left to right:

1. Student and other nihilists at present locked into violence (co-ordinating organizations not known at present)

2. The ANC, overtly abroad and covertly in South Africa, stretching from:

   a. the militant wing, "Umkontho wi Sizwe";

   b. the S.African Communist Party to

   c. "moderate" nationalists.

[There are some in the SAG who think that the ANC could be split over the issue of "dialogue"].

The PAC ("Black Consciousness"); less numerous than ANC.

3. "Radical" blacks and others within South Africa struggling to "ride the tiger" of violent protest (the UDF, COSATU, Boesak, Tutu, Motlana etc) who display very varying degrees of radicalism, especially on economic issues.

4. Whites opposing the SAG and "the system"(NUSAS, Black Sash, South African Council of Churches etc)

5. Blacks within the system but generally opposing the Government or setting important conditions for a relationship (Buthelezi, Mabusa).

6. Blacks within the system generally supporting the Government

   a. Mangope, Sebe and other "independent homeland" leaders

   b. Pathudi (Lebowa) and other "self-governing homeland" leaders

   c. leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church in Africa and the Church of Zion

   d. Town Councillors, blacks in the police and SADF.

7. Coloured and Indian participants in the tricameral Parliament (Hendrickse, Rajbansi) [N.B. Coloured and Indian people cover as broad a spectrum as do blacks].

/8.

8. PFP and most liberal whites working within the system who display varying degrees of opposition to specific Government measures and support for a different pace and substance of reform, with considerable financial support from the business community (especially Anglo-American, Barlow Band etc).

9. Liberal Afrikaners (including academics and some churchmen), mostly supporting the Government but favouring faster reform (this includes a significant component of the Afrikaner business community).

10. Middle of the road Afrikaners, hitherto solidly in the National Party and supportive of P.W. Botha but increasingly anxious about black radicalism and violence. Moving rightwards. This group includes Ministers, MPs and Churchmen, and the mainstream of the Broederbond.

11. The Afrikaner Parliamentary Opposition - the Conservative Party and the HNP, together with their Broederbond supporters and conservative churchmen.

12. The violent right-wing fringe - the AWB.

N.B. The South African English-speaking population is notionally or presentationally more "Liberal" than the Afrikaner population and dominates 8. above; in practice English speakers cover the spectrum; many would equate with 9. and 10. above, and some can certainly be found at both extremes.

POINTS FROM MR FERGUSSON'S CALLS IN CAPE TOWN

Minister of Trade and Industry

1. Dr de Villiers spoke of two broad concerns:

(a) whether any reform would make a difference to blacks in their present mood,

(b) drift to the right. The Government would be in real trouble if there were an election tomorrow. In his own constitutency for instance an entire committee of 100 NP supporters had just resigned. On the other hand he claimed there was no instance of the Government failing to take some decision because of fear of right wing reaction.

2. He accepted that the going ahead would be rough in terms of unrest and violence. "The struggle is on". This would inevitably have some impact on South Africa's external position, which would just have to be accepted.

3. He could see no single move, not even release of Mandela, which would be worth the Government making in the hope of transforming the situation. The greatest need was for a clear idea as to future structures, i.e. how to bring blacks into the system. He thought it would make sense for the Government to make its ideas public about new constitutional possibilities even before the special Party Congress.

4. Asked about the NGK Church he said that there is now a debate going on of the same kind as the National Party had experienced at the time of the Treurnicht split. A full Synod was being held later this year, the first for four years. He hoped they would reach a more forward looking position. But he claimed that the reluctance of many people in the NGK hitherto to adapt to a new way of thinking had not prevented the Government from moving forward, but had made it harder for Afrikaners as a whole to support change.

5. In general, the impression given by de Villiers was that the Government would stick broadly to their present policy of moving forward cautiously on reform, refusing to be hustled, while doing their best to maintain law and order.

Chairman of the Council, House of Representatives

6. Mr Hendrickse said he hoped the Separate Amenities Act would be abolished altogether during this session. As regards other legislation of particular interest to the Coloureds, he mentioned three items in the educational field. The first two were certification and syllabus, which he said would be made common to all schools. The third was exams, where there was greater resistance, although a compromise might be to have common exams on a regional basis, with each region being free to settle its own.

/7.

7. He spoke of the difficulty of persuading the Minister of Law and Order to take a more imaginative view of problems. With the commitment to abolish pass books by 1 July, most Ministers had argued for a moratorium on any further arrests of pass law offenders. Only Le Grange had said that policy should go on being enforced according to the old law until a new law was passed. In the end he had been overridden, and a decision taken that nobody should now be arrested for breaking the pass laws. But Hendrickse was surprised this had not yet been announced, especially so as to forestall a wave of pass burning in the townships on the anniversary of Sharpeville in a few days time. (Later Dr Viljoen said he thought the Soweto anniversary in June was a greater worry.)

8. Asked about a possible referendum later this year, Hendrickse said he didnot see a case for holding a referendum of the Coloured or Indian communities. It was only in the white community that the Government needed to test opinion about power sharing.

Chairman, President's Council

9. Dr Koornhof told us that the President's Council are at work on four related Acts: Separate Amenities, [Separate]Community Development, Slums, and Group Areas. It had been decided to report on all four as a single package. By reporting on the Separate Amenities Act alone, the President's Council would be liable to find themselves under strong conservative pressure not to fiddle with the Group Areas Act, and it was therefore better to tackle them together in one fell swoop. The earliest timing for a report would be May. He gave the impression that it was likely to be later, however, and in any case no deadline has been fixed by President Botha. Koornhof added that if the report were to slip to June, then it might as well be August because the chance of legislation during this session would anyhow have been missed.

10. The other main task in front of the President's Council is the Constitutional one. Koornhof said this was not just a matter of reporting on how the President's Council could be enlarged to include blacks. The requirement had been redefined on lines of advising on the promotion of dialogue and on structures which would open the way for bringing blacks into Parliament. Asked whether this meant the tricameral Parliament, Koornhof said yes. But he then went on to give a contrary explanation by ruling out a fourth Chamber and implying that the report could cover solutions outside the existing Parliament. His guidance to members of the President's Council working on this subject was not to worry about this complication!

11. On a referendum, he thought the Government would definitely need to have put forward a clear package of constitutional proposals on which people could vote yes or no. As regards Government policy generally, he said more than once that the secret is timing - whether this is applied to dialogue, reforms or release of Mandela.

Chairman of Sanlam

12. Dr du Plessis said he was worried above all by the danger of right wing action, by which he meant right wing vigilantes taking law and order into their own hands. In those circumstances he

/believed

believed the police and even the army might stand by.

13. In his view, only a major collision between the security forces and blacks in the townships, involving massive loss of life, might be enough to bring people to their senses and to rally moderates of all communities round a centrist grouping of forces.

14. He argued that whites could hold out indefinitely against disruption to the economy through black boycotts and stoppages. The townships were capable of being sealed off, and blacks would be forced back to work by having to keep themselves alive. Of course there would be strong reaction abroad. Some foreign banks would refuse any further dealings with South Africa, but others would go on lending. If the West tried to seize South African assets South Africa could retaliate much more effectively against Western assets here. (Moral: "better a lender than a borrower be, provided you borrow on a large enough scale".) In any case the South African economy would get by. He did not see it as being in their own interests to withhold exports of scarce materials such as ferrochrome.

Rector of the Cape Technikon

15. Dr Sonn said that violence had become romanticised for township blacks. He could see no way of avoiding a descending spiral of violence and death. It would take a massive slaughter of blacks ("a thousand bodies in the township") for the survivors to realise that the Government are not about to be tumbled and that blacks would have to compromise. [Compare du Plessis' comment above.]

16. He did not think that releasing Mandela nor even unbanning the ANC would help, because blacks were so worked up that they would not heed a call from the ANC to stop violence. In any case Mandela would probably be assassinated.

17. In Sonn's view, people like Boesak and Tutu were riding a tiger. They did not know how to dismount, but they were saying things which in their hearts they no longer believed.

Minister of Education and Development Aid

18. Dr Viljoen said that legislation would be tabled shortly on identity documents and on influx control. The new documents would be identical for everyone, and would no longer be used to monitor non-compliance of blacks with residential controls. There would of course be some inflow of blacks from decentralised areas into townships once the existing influx control laws were repealed, though he personally did not think it would be too large. Under new legislation there would still be controls, but these would be "colour blind" and would apply not to movement but to conditions in which people lived, e.g. slums would need to be replaced by minimum standard of housing. The Government was making additional money available. Their proposals for urbanisation would be set out in a White Paper, but there would be no legislation on this aspect in the present session.

/19.

19. Apart from identity documents and influx control, he mentioned citizenship and property rights as subjects for imminent legislation. He ruled out changes in the Group Areas Act for the moment.

20. As regards black schools, he said that his Department were prepared to meet most if not all of the educational demands put forward by students. The security authorities could likewise go a fair way to meet student demands. Political demands were another matter. He thought the students would never be satisfied short of major political reform.

21. It was noticeable that the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee with whom the Department had had some useful meetings at first was now far less responsive and indeed ill-informed about detailed issues. The present committee seemed like puppets responsive only to some controlling hand off-stage, i.e. the ANC.

22. Viljoen said that the crucial need now was for steady constitutional reform. When the time came for a referendum he thought it would be to gain general acceptance not for constitutional proposals being put forward by the Government but for the outcome of any negotiation. He did not think the President's Council would play a role in this last process, but seemed to think that the National Statutory Council could.

23. On Mandela, he clearly did not see release as an early likelihood. He said the President would be taking a greater risk with his constituency by releasing Mandela than by pressing forward with considered measures of reform. [This struck us as an important comment.]

24. Finally, asked about the Commonwealth Group, Viljoen said he thought it had shown a potentially useful role in trying to clear the ground for dialogue. But he was careful to warn against the Group getting on to actual proposals for a future constitutional dispensation.

Minister of National Education

25. Mr F W de Klerk identified four issues on which the Government were being judged by their supporters: law and order, constitutional reform, the economy, and external reactions. On this last point, he spoke of the impression made here by reluctance of foreign governments to acknowledge changes taking place in South Africa.

26. He referred to the very real danger of right wing authoritarian control of government if the present policies failed. "I hear the AWB drum beats". He said that moderate leaders like himself could well be brushed aside.

27. As regards the special Party Congress, he said that the Government saw the need for a platform:

(a) to launch new initiatives with backing from the Party,

(b) to redefine their bottom line in any negotiation.

/Asked

Asked about a referendum, he said he did not envisage this happening within the next year or so. Nor was there any firm decision yet as to whether a referendum would be designed to endorse proposals for negotiation, or implementation of a package worked out in negotiation.

28. We discussed the Commonwealth Group and its role, which de Klerk said he had found not unhelpful so far. But there was no question of any dialogue being regarded as another Lancaster House i.e. between two equally exhausted parties. The Government had no intention whatever of giving up their responsibilities to govern or of simply transferring power to anyone else; the issue was one of sharing power. Nor were they about to collpase at the next puff of wind. On the contrary, the alternative to the Government was something far further to the right.

29. Moreover, de Klerk said that the Government was certainly not going to sit down and negotiate with the ANC so long as it was dominated by members of the SA Communist Party, though it might be possible to treat with individual leaders other than SACP ones. The Government's approach was to engage in dialogue with as broad a cross-section of the black community as could be persuaded to come forward. He thought the proposed National Statutory Council would be the main channel.

Director-General for Constitutional Affairs

30. Dr van Wyk confirmed that new legislation would be tabled shortly on citizenship, property rights, identity documents, and repeal of existing influx control laws. There would also be a White Paper on urbanisation, though it is not yet clear whether this will be followed by legislation during this session. He also confirmed that the main means of control over blacks coming into townships would be economic. The Government would need to provide land and facilities for self-help housing. He skirted round the question of any other forms of control.

31. No decision yet, but repeal of Separate Amenities Act is possible later this session after the President's Council has reported. In theory, he could imagine even the Population Registration Act being repealed, although he defended its necessity on practical rather than ideological grounds.

32. On constitutional proposals, he said that the view earlier was that it would be a mistake for the Government to put forward specific ideas which might appear to foreclose genuine negotiation. They now realised that it would be helpful to indicate broadly what was on offer, not least because the white electorate could then have a chance to express support. Hence the plan for a National Party Congress in August, and a referendum at some stage.

33. He underlined the important role of the National Statutory Council. It would require legislation, which he hoped would soon be tabled. It would not be a mere talking shop but a statutory means of enabling blacks to have a say in the legislative process.

/34.

34. We raised KwaNdebele independence. He said there was no commitment from the Government to any date. Proposals would in any case require legislation in Parliament. He implied that the case is not as open and shut as Chief Minister Skosana has suggested.

Leader of the Progressive Federal Party

35. Mr Colin Eglin said that the Government had left the white electorate uncertain as to where the reform programme was taking them. When the Government, and P W Botha in particular, gave them a clear lead, then the majority of whites were prepared to follow them.

36. However, he doubted if P W Botha was the man to lead the country through the next stage of reform. After years of depending on his Afrikaner power base it was extraordinarily difficult for him to have to change to a much wider power base.

37. Asked whether the PFP were still looking for a statement of intent from the Government, Eglin said that the 31 January speech in effect served that purpose. What was needed now were specific measures to give effect to the Government's intentions, plus a real effort at establishing dialogue with black representatives. The longer this was deferred the harder it would become and the more likely it was that potential moderates would be overtaken by extremists on either side.

38. Release of Mandela was an essential ingredient in getting dialogue going. It was no good the Government continuing to limit themselves to dialogue only with people "to the right of Buthelezi".

39. Eglin agreed that in principle it would be helpful for the Government to declare their positions more openly about constitutional reform. But he admitted that a referendum would pose a dilemma for the PFP if the Government's proposals fell short of offering real power-sharing likely to be acceptable to blacks.

British Embassy
CAPE TOWN

18 March 1986

South Africa Rels Pt 9.

(2)

From: **JOHN BROWNE,** *MSc, MBA, MP*

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street
London SW1

20th March 1986

Prime Minister
Mr. Browne is coming to see you on Thursday. You may like to glance at the papers Rt Hon has sent you, before then.

Dear Prime Minister,

I have just returned from a brief visit to South Africa where the situation is worsening by the day.

I fully realise that you are given briefings and advice from all quarters upon South Africa, a situation fraught with complexity and potential violence on a grand scale. I do not pretend in any way to be an expert but I humbly submit my views for your consideration.

Yours ever

JDBrowne.

JOHN BROWNE

Enclosure

He has two main proposals:

(1) that you & President Reagan should meet & map out a plan for South Africa. You would then convene a conference to be attended by all South African parties including the ANC. Not very realistic as it stands, but not dissimilar from the motivation of the Eminent Persons Group.

(2) that South Africa's future constitutional structure should be based on the Swiss cantonal/federal model. I think there will be more people who will agree that it should be federal. CDPS/4

ARTICLE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN CAULDRON

Is an Anglo-American Initiative Essential to a Peaceful Solution?

Time is fast running out in South Africa. In fact, time has already run out for an internally generated and peaceful solution. South Africa needs help if a blood bath is to be avoided. In the interests of humanity alone, the Western nations have a clear duty to help South Africa in its hour of agony.

Two nations above all have both the knowledge and the power to restore the balance of reason and the peaceful abolition of apartheid in South Africa. These nations are Great Britain and the United States of America, both of whom have a vital interest in ensuring a peaceful evolution in South Africa.

The White South Africans, particularly the Afrikaners, feel that they built South Africa, that it is their country and they have nowhere else to go. They have seen that in most other countries of Africa, the transition to universal franchise has resulted in not just one man one vote but one man one vote ONCE! They have noted that no Black government in Africa has ever been toppled through the ballot box. Their fear of being swamped by the Blacks has been increased by the recent violence. For years the Black South Africans have had to endure degrading and often brutal colour discrimination. For years they have lived in third world ghetto areas and townships within an exclusively White first world nation. Their senses of injustice and frustration are now being exploited by radical Black leaders especially by the young and the Soviet inspired.

Despite this polarisation, the bulk of the population want peace and prosperity and remain moderate in their views. Moderate Blacks want an end to colour discrimination, including property rights and voting power. Moderate Whites accept the end to discrimination by colour and power sharing. They want peace and continued prosperity.

There is little doubt that the Afrikaner government sees clearly the problems before them and wishes to take the path of moderation. They particularly lack any commitment to change fast enough to avoid a blood bath. They fear the erosion of their constituency power bases if they are seen to move too fast. They also see how the initial weakness shown by the Czar of Russia in 1917 and by the Shah of Iran in 1979 encouraged the forces of revolution towards a violent overthrow. Whilst they see the necessity and even desirability of change, they fear it. Furthermore, unlike the Russian Czar or the Iranian Shah, the South African

government enjoys the total loyalty of both the police and the armed forces. They also have the Blacks strategically isolated in the townships and the homelands. They realise that there can be no mistakes and they are reticent to yield any meaningful power. The result is that the South African government has moved towards change but has, so far, done too little too late. Worse still, the small concessions that have been granted have done nothing to boost the credibility of moderate Black leaders who have not been involved in fruitful negotiations. Furthermore, having enjoyed undisputed, almost dictatorial power for some 40 years, the government has become woefully inexperienced in its ability to influence public opinion both at home and abroad.

There is no doubt that State President Botha is a very lonely man, uncertain as to which way to turn and how far to go. He needs the help of Western statesmen and he needs it quickly if a blood bath is to be avoided. Such help could include not only advice and support but also encouragement, including the somewhat forceful encouragement of much feared disinvestment.

If they have not already done so, President Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher should meet to discuss South Africa in detail and formulate a plan of exactly what they wish to see happen.

Using their economic power, including their prestige as brokers, The President and The Prime Minister should convene a conference to be attended by all the main domestic parties including the ANC. This Conference should be chaired by the South African government. It is unlikely, however, that the ANC would agree to attend such a conference without major concessions being made in advance. No such concessions should be made unless the ANC denounces violence. They should be made to see that their absence is not in their long term interests.

At this first conference the South African government should make major and binding concessions on apartheid including school integration but excluding voting rights which should be held over for a second conference.

The concessions granted by the South African government should appear to have been gained by the moderate leaders who attend the conference. These concessions should include the release of Nelson Mandela whose release should be denied until that time. The moderate Black leaders would then be in a position to enhance their influence over Black opinion and to detract from the potentially violent influence of the ANC and other Soviet inspired organisations.

A short time should then be allowed for legislative enactment of at least some of the concessions granted by the White government, including the release of Mandela. This would re-establish credibility.

A second conference should then be called to discuss the future constitution of South Africa, including voting rights. With the trappings of apartheid by then abolished and Nelson Mandela released, it would be hard to imagine that even the ANC would boycott the opportunity to exercise an influence on maping the future constitution of the country.

At first sight, the possibility of bringing together the complex and sometimes violently opposed interests within South Africa may appear to be impossible. However, it is interesting to note that a similar situation faced the early Swiss at the end of the 13th century. They had three nations and four languages of which German accounted for the vast majority of 65%. In the 700 years that followed the Swiss designed a system of government that allowed for the maximisation of democracy and the protection of minorities. The vast German speaking majority does not control the lives of the Swiss people.

The diversity of Switzerland has been turned to strength. Their system of government is based essentially upon a system of independent cantons and even sub-cantons or communes, under a central government that is largely administrative. It is felt by writers such as Leon Louw and Frances Kendall, in their excellent book, 'The Solution', that such a system of cantonal government could well be applied to South Africa with its population comprising : 72% Blacks; 16% Whites; 9% coloureds; and 3% Asians. Such a cantonal system would be ideally suited to the 360 magisterial districts. With an average population of some 80,000 people, no single magisterial district is as small as the smallest Swiss canton.

Over 7 centuries, the Swiss have designed a system of cantonal government combined with a Bill of Rights and universal franchise, based upon proportional representation which could prove most appropriate for South Africa. Their system reduces the power of extremists and increases the forces of moderation whilst at the same time protecting minorities. Such a system is worthy of deep study by the statesmen of the world, particularly those who wish to help South Africa towards a peaceful solution with a people freed from racial discrimination and that have both a vote and the chance to exercise it often.

South Africa and particularly its President, face a most grave situation which could have world wide repercussions. They need help. It is not only in the interest but also within the ability of The President and The Prime Minister to give that help. They must act before it is too late.

JOHN BROWNE

18th March 1986

MEMORANDUM

18 March 1986

VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA 1 - 14 MARCH 1986

OUTLINE ASSESSMENT

By John Browne MP

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The situation is South Africa is extremely complex and is becoming increasingly violent and polarised. Apartheid is breaking down. Nevertheless, the South African Blacks are still faced with such things as the Pass Laws; Group Areas Act; school segregation and no vote. In their townships and homelands they effectively live in third world countries. However, when they travel to the White areas they see a well developed nation which is basically for Whites. Their natural frustration is being used by opportunist politicians and by Marxist infiltrators to foster hatred and a breeding ground for violence. The bulk of South African Whites, including a majority of the government, realise that apartheid must go. However, they are unsure as to its replacement. They fear the economic and political repercussions of a universal Black franchise. This fear leads to a lack of commitment in the dismantling of the apartheid laws and consequently to cynical distrust of the government by Blacks.

The strategic importance of South Africa in terms of strategic raw materials source; military position; stabilising influence; and as a media smokescreen for Soviet activities in, for example, the Libyan-Sudanese-Ethiopian noose around Egypt, must be apparent to most Western leaders. The British also have most important investment interests to consider. With the exception of President Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who executed an adroit and valuable time saving manoeuvre at the Nassau Commonwealth Conference, the Western leaders appear to be led by the grass roots opinion of the international community towards a blind anti White South African policy with little or no idea of how or with what to replace apartheid. Whilst apartheid itself, especially with regard to voting rights, is somewhat complex the international community's view is simplistic. Unlike the Soviets, most Western leaders other than those of the United Kingdom and United States, appear to fail utterly in the defence of their pro rata Western interests in South Africa. They also fail totally in enunciating to the world at large what alternative they would like to see.

Any visitor to South Africa, who has been subjected to the Western news media, will be disgusted by the living conditions of Blacks in townships such as Crossroads but, equally will be astounded by the degree to which apartheid has effectively been eroded, albeit unofficially, and the high level of law and order.

The plain fact is that the South African government has started to dismantle apartheid, both legislatively (vide the Mixed Marriages Act, which itself has major implications for education, citizenship and residence) and tacitly by not enforcing strictly the pass law or Group Areas Act etc. The tacit non enforcement of apartheid laws rather than their legal repeal, leads to the law falling into disrepute. This sets a dangerous precedent in dealing with future violence by Blacks and also Whites.

Furthermore, the government has indicated a programme of legislative reform such as the abolition of the pass law by 1st July. In doing so, the South Afican government has risked the serious erosion of its domestic White power base, particularly amongst the Afrikaners. It also risked demoralisation and a birth of White terrorism. The South African government also see that their first tentative moves to abolish apartheid are greeted with continued and often intensified talks about sanctions and financial disinvestment by the international community. The West appears to make no attempt to reward or congratulate the South African government on its anti apartheid initiatives. This is partly because the South African government has made promises in the past which it has failed to keep. It is also due to the confusing way in which anti apartheid sentiments are expressed by the State President and immediately countermanded by Ministers who fear the erosion of their constituencies. The South African government now has to restore credibility to its statements.

The concessions of the South African government appear to have been begrudgingly squeezed out of them by the international community. The moderate Black leaders are not publically involved in any serious negotiations with the government. They are therefore unable to claim any credit for the concessions from amongst their own supporters who are turning increasingly to militant young black leaders.

It is likely that the government will try to achieve some legislative moves towards the abolition of apartheid during the current six month session. It then plans to hold a party conference in August 1986 at which it will probably attempt to agree to major constitution reforms

which will then be put to voters in the form of a referendum in October 1986. Again, it is unlikely that any moderate Black leaders will be involved. Their constituencies will be further polarised.

It is unlikely that a unitary voting system with universal Black sufferage would be acceptable to the White community who would see it as threatening their lives both economically and politically. It is quite possible however that a federal or cantonal system of government could be devised, based upon the present magistrates districts. I believe that Black majority voting would be acceptable to the majority of Whites on this basis so long as Whites retained minority protection and the key influence over national affairs such as defence, foreign relations and the basic economy.

In my opinion, the South African government needs help and they need it fast. In the interest of world peace in general and the self interest of the United States and Great Britian I believe that the President and the Prime Minister should offer State President P W Botha encouragement, advice and support. If such help were given I believe that the South African government may well be able to manage the transition from apartheid to universal sufferage, on a cantonal basis, in a relatively peaceful manner.

It should always be remembered that many White South Africans look to Great Britain both with nostalgia and with respect. Furthermore, the economic and diplomatic power of the United States and the United Kingdom should not be underestimated, particularly in the field of disinvestment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. If they have not already done so, President Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher should meet to discuss South Africa in detail and formulate a plan of exactly what they wish to see happen.

2. Using their economic power, including their prestige as brokers, The President and The Prime Minister should convene a conference to be attended by all the main domestic parties including the ANC. This Conference should be chaired by the South African government. It is unlikely, however, that the ANC would agree to attend such a conference without major concessions being made in advance. In my opinion, no such concessions should be made unless the ANC denounces violence. They should be made to see that their absence is not in their long term interests.

3. At this first conference the South African government should make major and binding concessions on apartheid including school integration but excluding voting rights which should be held over for a second conference.

   The concessions granted by South African government should appear to have been gained by the moderate leaders who attend the conference. These concessions should include the release of Nelson Mandela. His release should be denied until that time. The moderate Black leaders would then be in a position to enhance their influence over Black opinion and to detract from the potentially violent influence of the ANC and other Soviet inspired organisations.

4. A short time should then be allowed for legislative enactment of at least some of the concessions granted by the White government, including the release of Mandela. This would establish credibility.

5. A second conference should then be called to discuss the future constitution of South Africa, including voting rights. With the trappings of apartheid by then abolished and Nelson Mandela released, it would be hard to imagine that even the ANC would boycott the opportunity to exercise an influence on maping the future constitution of the country.

6. The British and American leaders should analyse the Swiss Cantonal constitution, together with its Bill of Rights; its universal franchise; and its electoral system based on proportional representation. They should seek a way of applying this to the situation in South Africa and of persuading the South African government of its merits, which are described in outline below, and in more detail in the attached paper on General Observations.

At first sight, these recommendations may seem overdramatic and untenable. However, I believe that the situation in South Africa is now becoming so obviously grave that the minds of moderate men and of all colours are being focused to an extent that will enable negotiations to take place. I believe that The President and The Prime Minister can offer great enticements to the South African government to co-operate by means of: advising President Botha privatley on courses of action ; helping him to handle his public relations; and encouraging and rewarding (by lessening sanctions and halting disinvestment) Botha's moves towards the abolition of apartheid. Should the South African government prove obstinate, the use of specifically

targetted sanctions (mail and South African Airways landing rights etc) together with the threat of major disinvestment would, I feel, yield immediate and beneficial results.

At first sight, the possibility of bringing together the complex and sometimes violently opposed interests within South Africa may appear to be impossible. However, it is interesting to note that a similar situation faced the early Swiss at the end of the 13th Century. They had three nations and four languages of which German accounted for the vast majority of 65%. In the 700 years that followed, the Swiss designed a system of government that allowed for the maximisation of democracy and the protection of minorities. The vast German speaking majority does not control the lives of the Swiss people. The diversity of Switzerland has been turned to strength. Their system of government is based essentially upon a system of independent cantons and even sub-cantons or communes, under a central government that is largely administrative. It is felt by writers such as Leon Louw and Frances Kendall in their excellent book "The Solution", that such a system of cantonal government could well be applied to South Africa with its population comprising: 72% Blacks; 16% Whites; 9% Coloureds; and 3% Asians. Such a cantonal system would be ideally suited to the 360 magisterial districts. With an average population of some 80,000 people, no single magistrates district is as small as the smallest Swiss canton. Over 7 centuries, the Swiss have designed a system of cantonal government combined with a Bill of Rights and universal franchise, based upon proportional representation, which could prove most appropriate for South Africa. Their system reduces the power of extremists and increases the forces of moderation whilst at the same time protecting minorities. Such a system is worthy of deep study by the statesmen of the world, particularly those who wish to help South Africa towards a peaceful solution, where a people freed from racial discrimination each have both a vote and the chance to exercise it often.

South Africa and particularly its President, face a most grave situation which could have world wide repercussions. They need help. It is not only in the interest but also within the ability of the President and the Prime Minister to give that help. They must act before it is too late.

The stakes are very high. The situation is tense. Time is short. There is a desperate need for co-ordinated, clever and courageous action by leaders of integrity.

JOHN BROWNE

18 March 1986

18 March 1986

VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1 - 14 MARCH 1986

OUTLINE ASSESSMENT

By John Browne MP

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

BACKGROUND

The situation in South Africa is extremely complex as is reflected by some 15 political parties or groupings. The situation is also becoming increasingly tense and polarised. Despite some seriously distorted Western media reporting and that many of the reported killings are of Blacks by Blacks, the fact remains that time is critically short if a peaceful solution is to be found.

Following the second Boer War, the British enacted legislation that was grossly discriminatory towards black South Africans. Whilst such racial discrimination was not considered strange or immoral at the turn of the century, it is true to say that the seeds of apartheid were sown in that early British legislation. The main problem is that as South Africa slipped under Afrikaner control no change was made in the apartheid laws which reflected major changes in the views and ethics of the international community.

It is easy to over simplify both apartheid and the political situation in South Africa. Having visited the country for only two weeks one realises the enormous complexities of this rapidly changing scene. It is therefore with humility that I submit my assessment and recommendations.

In writing this paper I have assumed that the reader has a knowledge of the general situation in South Africa.

MAJOR GROUPS

As I see it, there are basically 4 major interest groups: the Whites; the Blacks; the Soviets and the West. However, each of these groups can be split further. For instance, the Whites alone can be split into 5 sub groups in addition to the 10 main parties which represent them.

THE WHITES

This group comprises five distinct interest groups: the Afrikaner community; the English speaking community; the Cape Coloured community; the business executive community; and the Nationalist Government.

- The Afrikaners The Afrikaners are descended from the first settlers and the fortreckers who settled the interior. They fought the elements , the Zulus and the British. They fled from their homeland in order to find free expression. They are extremely proud of their achievements which in part are reflected in their new and distinctly separate language. They are also very religious, stubborn and tough. The farming community within the Afrikaners comprises the backbone of the Nationalist Party and those to the right of it such as the Conservatives and the HNP. They also comprise the backbone of the AWP, or the right wing potential terrorist group. Also, the bulk of the civil service is staffed by Afrikaners.

  The Afrikaners are proud of South Africa, a country they feel they have built and are very aware of the effort that has been put into it. They have watched closely the events in the rest of Africa and they fear that power sharing with the Blacks could sweep them into the position of an unprotected minority. They have noted that no government in black Africa has ever been displaced through the ballot box. They realise that in handing any form of power to the Blacks there is no turning back and that they can afford no mistakes. They are intensely suspicious, fearful and conservative. They are also aware that despite the clamour of international opinion and Black unrest within South Africa, they, through their Nationalist Party government, hold complete control of the police and the army. Furthermore, they are aware that the Black townships place the Blacks at a major strategic disadvantage. They have power and they are fearful of releasing any of it.

- English Speaking Community The English speaking communities include Germans, Jews and Portugese etc., but are predominantly British. Following the second Boer War they began to opt out of politics preferring to concentrate on making money. They are owners of major wealth-creating activities within South Africa. By nature they are more amenable to change and believe that apartheid must go and that some power should be

given to the Blacks. However, they are split as to whether such power sharing should be absolute or on a federal or cantonal basis with built in protections for minorities. They see the justification for almost all the demands of the moderate Blacks. They fear that the intransigency of the Afrikaner government will lead to a rise of militant Black leaders and thus to a blood bath.

- Cape Coloureds In the present circumstances, this group has been included with the Whites as a minority. They also fear a Black takeover and are therefore closely allied to White interests.

- Business Executives This group of Whites is potentially very influential in its influence upon events in South Africa. The activities of big business men are widely reported in the South African press. (E.g. Raymond Ackerman of Pick 'n Pay in his fight with the Government over discount coupons given at his petrol outlets.) Furthermore, many of these executives play a key role in influencing their multi-national corporate decision makers concerning possible disinvestment in South Africa.

- Nationalist Government The Nationalist Party was swept into Government in 1948 and has enjoyed some 40 years of almost dictatorial power in a police state with an economy dominated by state owned monopolies. It could be said that whilst Capitalism exists for the Whites, Socialism certainly exists for the Blacks. This period of unquestioned power has led them to become arrogant. It has also resulted in them having had to pay virtually no attention to public relations. They now possess woefully inadequate skills in public relations both domestically and internationally.

The original Afrikaner leaders were men possessed of considerable style and imaginative leadership qualities. A near half century of stability and unchallenged power has led to a new breed of leader epitomised by State President P W Botha. President Botha is above all an organisation man. He is intelligent and capable but he is not gifted with public charisma.

The Afrikaner government has already seen one erosion in its overwhelming political power base in Parliament when the Conservatives split off to form

their own party. In a country where information is still relatively controlled, the government is in a position to see the true problems facing South Africa. They realise that change is necessary but they are wary of losing their constituents by moving too fast leftwards towards the centre ground. The statement by President Botha on the possibilty of a Black President and integrated schools and their immediate countermands are classic examples.

THE BLACKS

Whereas the Black community in South Africa is broadly united in its wish to see an end to apartheid, there are major differences of opinion as to how the abolition of apartheid should be negotiated and exactly what type of country and economy is right for South Africa. It is a common misconception amongst the international community to see the Blacks as one cohesive group. The reality is that the Blacks are deeply divided between co-operation (homelands) with the Nationalist government and violent overthrow of the System (ANC). Furthermore, the Black community is divided by strong tribal jealousies. Chief Buthelezi could be expected to have a much larger moderate power base then he now enjoys. His problem is that he is seen by many as a collaborator with the White System. He is also a Zulu chief and this discourages much of the potential support of non Zulus.

Religion plays a relatively strong role amongst both White and Black South Africans. Indeed, it is interesting to note how many leaders of the White and Black communities are men of the Church. The Church can sometimes transcend some of the tribal differences that exist amongst the Black Community. The power basis of leaders such as Bishop Tutu are therefore sometimes larger than would appear at first sight on a strictly tribal basis.

South African Blacks have a tribal heritage in which property rights and the enlarged family play a key role. By instinct they are very status concious and good small traders.

APARTHEID

Apartheid in South Africa means total discrimination on the basis of colour. The Blacks coming bottom of the pile. Not only have they had their property rights taken

from them but also their ability to conduct viable business outside the homelands. They have no vote and they are herded into townships next to the big cities and in the rural areas into the homelands. They are deeply suspicious of government intentions and have an intense hatred for the often unnecessarily brutal South African police.

In more specific terms apartheid included amongst other measures the ban of mixed marriages; pass laws; influx controls; Group Areas Act; separate education; and separate amenities e.g. transportation etc.

Apartheid was officially sanctioned by the Dutch Reform Church in South Africa. The church have now decided to remove these sanctions.

Despite the existence of many of the above restrictions and laws, it is quite possible to travel in the White cities oblivious of the existence of apartheid. Blacks now dine in smart white restaurants and there are few outward signs of apartheid. This is due to the abolition of the Mixed Marriages Act and to the tacit approval by the government of the breaking of many of the apartheid laws. For example, senior managers in White businesses are now effectively being allowed to stay, if not live in White areas. Nonetheless, apartheid still exists on the trains, in the schools and in access to the ballot box. Whatever the end to apartheid means in the West, to the South African Black it means the complete abolition of discrimination on the basis of race or colour including equal voting rights.

TOWNSHIPS

Black townships are effectively holding areas for Black labour outside the major White cities. On an international scale the townships, like Soweto, offer reasonable accommodation and amenities, whereas Crossroads is appalling. The most important aspect of the townships is that many of the Blacks living in them work in a developed nation i.e. White South African cities. On the other hand, the Blacks live in a third nation - the townships. Their sense of degradation together with utter frustration and growing hatred has therefore increased.

The frustration of the township Blacks would have increased of its own accord. It has been intensified by statements within the international community and by Soviet infiltration. The problem is that the moderate

Black leaders are being challenged by the youth, who now form a very large proportion of the Black population. The new young Black leaders are energetic, militant and brave. They are filled with hatred for apartheid and see their elders as collaborators with the System. Much of the conflict in the Black townships is between Blacks. It is based sometimes on tribal differences but more often on the growing friction between the moderate Black leadership and that of the young Black militants. Collaboration with the Whites is considered by the young militant Black leaders to be a capital offence. Indeed, only last night a Black Councillor had to shoot to kill in order to defend himself in his township. The same problem is felt by Blacks who become executives in White companies and even by consumers who are seen to shop in White shops.

THE BLACK HOMELANDS

The Bophuthatswana homeland is a shining example of what can be achieved. It is multi racial with no reverse discrimination. Only recently it proved it could exploit its natural mining and tourist assets to an extent that made the state financially viable and a model of its type. Unfortunately, I believe that the Chief has been involved in 'washing' South African money to buy arms for radical Black movements. He has also allowed himself to benefit financially from his dictatorial position in allocating contracts. Corruption is now rife. In addition, the leaders of the homelands are widely seen elsewhere within the Black community as collaborators with the System.

Notwithstanding the above, Bophuthatswana does show that, given the right conditions, a cantonal system of government could be made viable in South Africa.

THE TRADES UNIONS

The Trades Unions in South Africa are politically naive. They are also relatively weak because Black unemployment is high and there is effectively no form of social security.

Some of the Trades Union leaders, such as Elijah Barayi, in order to maintain the co-operation of White business men and administrators who they realise are vital to the future development of the country, are relatively moderate in their views i.e. whilst they want a total end to apartheid, they would be prepared to negotiate over power sharing. Unfortunately, the Trades Unions are being heavily infiltrated by Marxists whose interests are in fermenting

economic chaos. These Marxist commissar/advisers, such as Marcel Golding of NUM, are often Personal Assistants or even drivers for the Trades Union leaders. They are having an increasingly harmful influence.

THE SOVIETS

The Soviets appear to be quite clear in their aims of causing the maximum turmoil and blood shed in South Africa.

Sensing an opportunity to corner the world market in key strategic raw materials, including gold, and of causing serious destabilisation in Southern and Central Africa, the Soviets have followed a subtle policy of infiltration and disruption, feeding on the understandable frustrations of the Blacks. As time passes the Blacks are becoming increasingly resentful and politicised. The increasing influence of young Blacks is the cause for serious concern. Young Blacks are less content to accept the lot that was begrudgingly accepted by their elders. They are more susceptible to Soviet propoganda and they are more prepared to suffer personal injury in the fight against the established system.

THE WEST

The West appears to be disunited and unclear of its aims. No Western leader has yet come out with a clear picture as to what they wish to see exist in South Africa after apartheid has been abolished.

THE APPARENT LACK OF WESTERN INITIATIVE IN SOUTH AFRICA IS CAUSING A POWER VACUUM WHICH IS BEING FILLED BY THE SOVIETS.IN MY OPINION THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR ACTION BY WESTERN LEADERS. THE URGENCY MAY BE FELT IN PRIVATE BUT IT IS NOT APPARENT TO THE PUBLIC!

MISCELLANEOUS

SANCTIONS

Western sanctions have undoubtedly had an effect in South Africa. Indeed, in the military field, they appear to be hurting, particularly in the field of sophisticated aircraft and missile systems. It will take many years for sanctions to bite more effectively. Also, it should be remembered that as they bite, they will hurt the Black community disproportionately. Sanctions will also have a dramatic effect upon South Africa's neighbours who depend heavily upon transit through trade with South Africa.

Obviously, the West could become more selective in its sanctions i.e. employing sanctions that would particularly hurt Whites. These may include the denial of landing rights to South African Airways and the non-processing of South African mail. On the other hand, if they are over played they could force serious White emigration from South Africa and a worsening of the present situation by formenting a White backlash involving White terrorism.

DISINVESTMENT

Large scale disinvestment would seriously damage the South African economy causing not only economic deprivation but also increased unemployment. Interestingly, the unemployment would probably hit Whites almost equally as hard as Blacks. This would result in disproportionately high internal political damage to the present government and could also result in a White backlash and even the growth of White terrorism.

The recent actions by the banks, including Barclays, has had a dramatic effect on Afrikaner thinking. There is no doubt that disinvestment represents a powerful weapon in the hands of the West in forcing the Afrikaner government to come more rapidly to terms with the present situation.

WHITE TERRORISM

The White Afrikaners are not only proud and tough but they are fearful of a Black takeover, similar to that which has occurred in other countries in Africa. Unlike other Western colonists (e.g. Southern Rhodesia) in Africa, the Afrikaners have nowhere to which to flee. They feel that South Africa is their country and just beneath the surface they have a strong lager mentality. They know they have power and they are prepared to defend it and

their livlihoods. As violence increases in the Black areas, so does the pressure towards radical action by the Whites including terrorism. This is a most dangerous aspect as it would polarise the situation still further. White African leaders need to be encouraged to treat White terrorism severly.

NELSON MANDELA

Nelson Mandela is a folklore hero. It is possible that he is of more use to the ANC in jail than if he were free. There is great danger to the South African government of him dying in captivity. However, there is also danger that he may be assassinated if he were freed, not to mention the possibility of his organising a mass rally to march on a major city such as Pretoria. The South African government is in an acute dilemma over his release and to some extent President Botha is Mandela's prisoner. Two rapid visits by Dr Denis Warrall (Ambassador to the United Kingdom) led to the feeling that Mandela's release may be imminent. I personally believe that he should not yet be released.

THE CANTONAL SOLUTION

In the late 13th Century the states that eventually joined to form Switzerland, faced the problems that are in some important ways similar to those faced by the peoples of South Africa.

The early Swiss were faced with the problem of uniting into one country the peoples from three nations who spoke four separate languages. There was an overwhelming majority of German speaking people. Means had to be found of unifying these disparate peoples into a country which was essentially democratic, and where the rights of minorities were not only protected, but where the lives of citizens were not overwhelmingly influenced by the wishes of the German speaking minority. The Swiss developed a system of government whose mainstay was the canton which had independent legislative rights. These cantons were small and to this date some have populations of less than 80,000. The cantons were subject also to the wishes of the smaller communes within them. The cantons were free to form alliances and agreements with other cantons. They were largely independent states as far as domestic affairs were concerned.

The national government of Switzerland was effectively restricted to an administrative agency representing the cantons, for things such as infrastructure (roads; railways; etc.) and home affairs (police; administration of courts;

etc.). The central government was responsible for: foreign affairs; finance (central budget; reserve bank; foreign exchange; and national currency; etc.); defence; infrastructure; and home affairs.

The cantons of Switzerland were designed to be extremely independent. They could carry out services for themselves or contract, by treaty, to have them performed by the central government.

Further, the adult male in Switzerland was given the vote (with the exception of two cantons, this has now been extended to females). The voting system was one of proportional representation which tended to act against extremists from either side. Furthermore, much use was made of referenda and the right by small communities to call for a referendum. There are two national houses in the national legislature, and a cabinet, which is elected by the legislatures, as is the national President.

Over the past 700 years, the Swiss have evolved a constitution which is arguably the most democratic and the most devolved in the world. The Swiss have succeeded in coping with diversity of race and interests and combining them in a way that makes them one of the strongest and most respected nations in the world. It is worthy of note that a country with 65% German speaking; 18% French; 10% Italian; 1% Romansh; and 6% migration languages, combine to form one of the most unitarian countries on earth. The essential ingredient is that the cantons allow central government only one absolute power, and that is the right to make peace or war on behalf of their nation.

When one looks at South Africa with 72% Blacks; 16% Whites; 9% Coloureds; and 3% Asians; of varying nations and now split by apartheid and polarised by extremists, one is tempted to think of a Swiss cantonal solution. The excellent research done by Leon Louw and Frances Kendall in their book "The Solution", shows that South Africa has 306 magesterial districts, each with an average population of 80,000. None of the South African magisterial districts is as small as the smallest Swiss canton.

Merely bringing peace to South Africa is unlikely to provide a solution to South Africa's growing economy. Some constitutional way must be found of offering one man and one vote and a continuing chance of exercising that vote which will both protect the minorities and mitigate against extremists. It would appear that a peaceful solution to South Africa's problem could be found by the institution of a Swiss cantonal system combined with the universal franchise based on proportional representation.

Each canton would have its own legislature and would effectively be an independent state within a South African federation. Two national legislative houses could be elected by universal franchise using proportional representation. The cabinet or central government would obviously fill a largely administrative role and would be elected by the two national legislative assemblies.

Before such a solution could be effectively introduced into South Africa, peace must be restored together with the credibility of the South African Government. It is most unlikely that the South African Government alone would be able to bring this about without the help of well meaning outside foreign powers such as Great Britain and the United States.

PRESIDENT BOTHA

Top leadership is always a lonely role. For P W Botha the presidential role must be extremely lonely. He is assailed by criticism from all sides within his own country and from the international community. If he makes a speech even hinting at moves towards concessions, he is assailed by his own constituents who fear a sell out to the Blacks. The arrogance of his closest supporters is almost terrifying as is the increased rise in the militancy of the Blacks. However, it is clear that some of his Ministers, most notably Dr G van N Viljoen, (Minister of Education), see the need for changes. Other Ministers lack the conviction that major changes are necessary. Their lack of conviction leads to an impression of insincerity resulting in cynicism and suspicion amongst both Blacks and Whites.

Unfortunately, whilst the groundswell of White South African opinion could be said to be moving left towards the abolition of apartheid and some form of power sharing, Black opinion is not moving right towards the centre. It also is moving left, away from the moderate leaders of both sides towards the violence of the new young Black radicals. President Botha must know that time is extremely short if South Africa is to avoid a blood bath which would polarise feelings to such an extent that there would be little chance of turning back. His attempts to appease opinion in the international community are often ruined by his totally inept handling of public relations. In my opinion President Botha needs help - help that I believe Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Reagan can give in terms of encouragement, advice and co-operation.

JOHN BROWNE

Already T'd
(T57/86.)

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INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN, PRETORIA

1. GRATEFUL YOU DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.
BEGINS DEAR RON, I PROMISED TO WRITE FURTHER TO YOU ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA.
THE GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS APPOINTED BY COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT LAST OCTOBER COMPLETED A FORTNIGHT'S VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA AND SOME OF THE FRONT LINE STATES LAST WEEK. OUR NOMINEE ON THE GROUP, LORD BARBER LONG HYPHEN WHO WAS CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER IN THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN 1970 AND 1974 AND IS NOW CHAIRMAN OF THE STANDARD AND CHARTERED BANK LONG HYPHEN HAS GIVEN ME A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE GROUP'S WORK. THE MEMBERS HAVE SPECIFICALLY ASKED ME TO BRIEF YOU FULLY ON THE OUTCOME.
THE GROUP'S COMPOSITION, REPRESENTING ALL SIDES OF OPINION WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH, GIVES IT A UNIQUE CHARACTER AND A SOLID BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. ITS MEMBERS CLEARLY GOT ON WELL TOGETHER AND WERE SINCERE IN THEIR DESIRE TO FIND A PEACEFUL WAY THROUGH SOUTH AFRICA'S PROBLEMS BY DOING ALL THEY COULD TO PROMOTE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS. THEY WORKED HARD IN SOUTH AFRICA, SEEING REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL POLITICAL GROUPS AND SHUNNING ALL

PUBLICITY. THEY HAVE GRADUALLY BUILT UP THEIR CREDIBILITY BOTH WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND MORE WIDELY. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO ALLOW THE WHOLE GROUP TO MEET NELSON MANDELA SECRETLY SHOWS THAT THEY TAKE THIS INITIATIVE SERIOUSLY.

I REGARD AS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT THE FACT THAT THE GROUP HAS ENGAGED THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IN A SERIOUS EXCHANGE OF IDEAS ON HOW THE CONDITIONS FOR DIALOGUE CAN BE ESTABLISHED. AT THE END OF LAST WEEK THE GROUP LEFT WITH SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTERS A PAPER WHICH THEY CAREFULLY DESCRIBED AS 'A POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT'. WE HAVE BEEN SHOWN THE PAPER IN STRICT CONFIDENCE AND I ENCLOSE A COPY FOR YOUR INFORMATION. IT TAKES ACCOUNT OF COMMENTS MADE BY SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTERS AND IS INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE BOTH SIDES TO MOVE FORWARD. THE GROUP'S PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE THE ANC TO SUSPEND VIOLENCE AND TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO NEGOTIATIONS.

I AM ACUTELY CONSCIOUS THAT THE STEPS PROPOSED BY THE GROUP REPRESENT VERY DIFFICULT POLITICAL DECISIONS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THAT IT MUST BE DOUBTFUL THAT THEY CAN ACCEPT THE PAPER AS IT STANDS. THE PROPOSAL FOR LIFTING THE BAN ON THE ANC WILL BE PARTICULARLY HARD FOR THEM. BUT THE STEPS WHICH THE PAPER PROPOSES ARE THOSE FOR WHICH BOTH OF US AND MANY WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF HAVE REPEATEDLY CALLED. THEY DO NOT REPRESENT HARD-AND-FAST DEMANDS AND THE GROUP IS READY TO DISCUSS THEM FURTHER. BUT IT IS VITAL THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S REPLY SHOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY FORTHCOMING TO ENABLE THE GROUP TO CONTINUE THEIR DIFFICULT AND DELICATE TASK. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC IF THEIR IDEAS WERE REJECTED OUTRIGHT.

I AM UNDER NO ILLUSIONS: BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE GROUP'S INITIATIVE DOES OFFER AN OPPORTUNITY TO END THE VIOLENCE AND PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE OF NEGOTIATION TO THE PRESENT CONFRONTATION WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA. IT COULD ALSO DIMINISH SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION, WHICH WOULD BE WELCOME TO BOTH OF US. IT IS CERTAINLY THE ONLY CONCILIATION EFFORT IN EXISTENCE OR PROSPECT AT PRESENT WHICH OFFERS ANY POSSIBILITY OF MAKING HEADWAY. I FEAR THAT IF THIS CHANCE IS LOST THERE MAY NOT BE ANOTHER

SUCH OPPORTUNITY.

IT IS THE EARNEST HOPE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP LONG HYPHEN AND ONE I SHARE LONG HYPHEN THAT YOU MIGHT AGREE TO ADD YOUR SUPPORT TO THEIR EFFORTS AT WHAT COULD PROVE TO BE A CRITICAL MOMENT. I THEREFORE HOPE THAT YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO USE YOUR GREAT PERSONAL INFLUENCE WITH PRESIDENT BOTHA TO PERSUADE HIM NOT TO REJECT THE GROUP'S PROPOSAL BUT TO BE SUFFICIENTLY OPEN IN HIS RESPONSE TO ALLOW DISCUSSIONS ON IT TO CONTINUE. I HAVE WRITTEN TO HIM IN THIS VEIN MYSELF.

MY OFFICIALS IN LONDON WILL BE ABLE TO BRIEF YOURS FULLY ON THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL AND THE BACKGROUND. THE GROUP HOPE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WILL REPLY BY EARLY APRIL IN A WAY THAT WILL ALLOW THE GROUP TO RETURN TO SOUTHERN AFRICA LATER IN THE MONTH.

YOURS EVER, MARGARET ENDS

2. TEXT OF THE QUOTE POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING PAPER UNQUOTE IS CONTAINED IN CAPE TOWN TELNO 158, NOW COPIED TO YOU.

3. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

HOWE

SOUTH AFRICA

LIMITED	PS
S AF D	PS/LADY YOUNG
C AF D	PS/MRS CHALKER
UND	PS/PUS
ECD(E)	MR DEREK THOMAS
NEWS D	MR FERGUSSON
LEGAL ADVISERS	MR JOHNSON
PLANNING STAFF	CABINET OFFICE

Already T'd.
(T56/86)

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TO DESKBY 201500Z CAPE TOWN
TELNO 103
OF 201230Z MARCH 86
INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, WASHINGTON

COMGEP: LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA. GRATEFUL YOU DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. LETTER BEGINS..

DEAR PRESIDENT BOTHA, LORD BARBER HAS GIVEN ME A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP'S RECENT VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA. HE HAD HIGH PRAISE FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT'S HELPFUL ATTITUDE. THE GROUP HAD SEEN EVERYONE THEY WANTED TO SEE AND HAD BEEN GIVEN A FAIR HEARING.

I UNDERSTAND THAT THE GROUP WILL NOW BE CONSIDERING WHAT THEY HAVE LEARNED AND HOW THEY SHOULD TAKE THEIR INITIATIVE FORWARD. THEIR AIM SEEMS TO BE TO SUBMIT THEIR REPORT TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT BY MID-JUNE. IN THE MEANTIME THEY WISELY INTEND TO CONTINUE TO AVOID ALL PUBLICITY.

LORD BARBER HAS EXPLAINED TO ME THE IDEAS - THE GROUP'S QUOTE POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT UNQUOTE WHICH THEY LEFT WITH YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES. HE STRESSED THAT THEY HAD TRIED TO BUILD WHEREVER POSSIBLE ON WHAT THEY UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE POSITIONS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT. THE RESULTS SEEM TO ME TO CONTAIN

MUCH THAT IS POTENTIALLY HELPFUL, PARTICULARLY THE INSISTENCE THAT THE ANC AND OTHERS MUST SUSPEND VIOLENCE AS PART OF THE ACTION NEEDED TO BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS.

I DO NOT KNOW WHAT RESPONSE THE GROUP WILL GET FROM OTHERS. BUT THEY SAW THE ANC IN LUSAKA BEFORE ARRIVING IN SOUTH AFRICA AND I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ARE NOT UNHOPEFUL THAT A CONCEPT ON THE LINES SUGGESTED MIGHT BE ACCEPTED BY THE ANC. IF THEY FELT THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT'S REACTION OPENED THE WAY TO NEGOTIATIONS, I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY WOULD GO BACK TO THE ANC TO TRY TO SECURE A FIRM AND PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO SUSPEND VIOLENCE FOR THE DURATION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

I VERY MUCH HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT YOU WILL BE READY TO ENGAGE IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE GROUP'S QUOTE POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT UNQUOTE. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR INITIATIVE OFFERS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE PROGRESS AND THAT EVEN THOSE WHO WERE INITIALLY SCEPTICAL NOW SHARE THIS VIEW. THE GROUP'S MIX OF AFRICAN AND WESTERN REPRESENTATION AND SUPPORT GIVES IT INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY. BY ITS DISCREET BEHAVIOUR AND EXPLORATORY STYLE THE GROUP HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS SERIOUS INTEREST IN CONTRIBUTING TO A DIALOGUE RATHER THAN MAKING PROPAGANDA. IN MY VIEW, THERE IS NO OTHER WAY FORWARD ON OFFER WHICH STANDS A REMOTELY COMPARABLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS OR OF SECURING THE SAME INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S PROBLEMS WHICH YOU SEEK. EVERYTHING WHICH I HAVE HEARD CONVINCES ME THAT SUCH AN OUTCOME CAN BE ATTAINED.

THE GROUP'S REPORT WILL CLEARLY BE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE BOTH IN ITSELF AND IN DETERMINING THE DEGREE TO WHICH OTHER GOVERNMENTS ARE PREPARED TO GIVE DIALOGUE IN SOUTH AFRICA A CHANCE TO WORK. YOUR RESPONSE TO THEIR QUOTE POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT UNQUOTE WILL BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR IN SHAPING THAT REPORT AND SUBSEQUENT STEPS. THEY WILL ALSO BE LOOKING FOR FIRM EVIDENCE THAT THE FAR-REACHING MEASURES OF REFORM WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA WHICH YOU HAVE OUTLINED WILL BE IMPLEMENTED RAPIDLY. I SHALL GO ON ARGUING, AS I DID AT NASSAU, THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT MUST BE ENABLED TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. BUT I SHALL ONLY STAND

A CHANCE OF CONVINCING MY COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES OF THIS IF I CAN POINTS TO A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE FROM YOU TO THE GROUP'S IDEAS.

I AM THE FIRST TO RECOGNISE THAT THIS FACES YOU WITH VERY DIFFICULT AND FAR-REACHING DECISIONS WHICH INVOLVE THE WHOLE FUTURE OF YOUR COUNTRY. BUT I THINK IT VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD GIVE THE GROUP A RESPONSE WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU. I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ARE PLANNING TO MEET AGAIN ON 21 APRIL. SOME INDICATION OF YOUR APPROACH IN ADVANCE OF THAT MEETING WILL THEREFORE BE VITAL FOR THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THEIR WORK.

IF THERE IS ANY WAY IN WHICH I CAN HELP, PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO LET ME KNOW.

WITH BEST WISHES, YOUR SINCERELY MARGARET THATCHER. LETTER ENDS.

2. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

HOWE

SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED

S AF D	PS
C AF D	PS/LADY YOUNG
UND	PS/MRS CHALKER
ECD(E)	PS/PUS
NEWS D	MR DEREK THOMAS
LEGAL ADVISERS	MR FERGUSSON
PLANNING STAFF	MR JOHNSON
	CABINET OFFICE

FCO asked to attach text enclosure

file DSG SEWAAR cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 March 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T57/86

Dear Ron,

I promised to write further to you about South Africa.

The Group of Eminent Persons appointed by Commonwealth Heads of Government last October completed a fortnight's visit to South Africa and some of the Front Line States last week. Our nominee on the Group, Lord Barber - who was Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Conservative Government between 1970 and 1974 and is now Chairman of the Standard and Chartered Bank - has given me a detailed account of the Group's work. The members have specifically asked me to brief you fully on the outcome.

The Group's composition, representing all sides of opinion within the Commonwealth, gives it a unique character and a solid basis of international support. Its members clearly got on well together and were sincere in their desire to find a peaceful way through South Africa's problems by doing all they could to promote a dialogue between the South African Government and black South Africans. They worked hard in South Africa, seeing representatives of all political groups and shunning all publicity. They have gradually built up their credibility both with the South African Government and more widely. The South African Government's decision to allow the whole Group to meet Nelson Mandela secretly shows that they take this initiative seriously.

I regard as particularly significant the fact that the Group has engaged the South African Government in a serious exchange of ideas on how the conditions for dialogue can be established. At the end of last week the Group left with South African Ministers a paper which they carefully described as "a possible negotiating concept". We have been shown the paper in strict confidence and I enclose a copy for your information. It takes account of comments made by South African Ministers and is intended to encourage both sides to move forward. The Group's proposal would require the ANC to suspend violence and to commit themselves to negotiations.

I am acutely conscious that the steps proposed by the Group represent very difficult political decisions for the South African Government and that it must be doubtful that they can accept the paper as it stands. The proposal for lifting the ban on the ANC will be particularly hard for them. But the steps which the paper proposes are those for which both of us and many within South Africa itself have repeatedly called. They do not represent hard-and-fast demands and the Group is ready to discuss them further. But it is vital that the South African Government's reply should be sufficiently forthcoming to enable the Group to continue their difficult and delicate task. It would be tragic if their ideas were rejected outright.

I am under no illusions: but I believe that the Group's initiative does offer an opportunity to end the violence and provide an alternative of negotiation to the present confrontation within South Africa. It could also diminish South Africa's international isolation, which would be welcome to both of us. It is certainly the only conciliation effort in existence or prospect at present which offers any possibility of making headway. I fear that if this chance is lost there may not be another such opportunity.

It is the earnest hope of the members of the Group - and one I share - that you might agree to add your support to

their efforts at what could prove to be a critical moment. I therefore hope that you will feel able to use your great personal influence with President Botha to persuade him not to reject the Group's proposal but to be sufficiently open in his response to allow discussions on it to continue. I have written to him in this vein myself.

My officials in London will be able to brief yours fully on the details of the proposal and the background. The Group hope that the South African Government will reply by early April in a way that will allow the Group to return to Southern Africa later in the month.

Yours ever

Margaret

The President of the United States of America

No 10

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FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 131645Z FCO
TELNO 158
OF 131530Z MARCH 86
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

PRETORIA - PERSONAL FOR MINISTER

MIPT : COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF EPG PAPER (PLEASE PROTECT)
BEGINS

A POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED ITS COMMITMENT TO DISMANTLING THE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID, TO ENDING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND TO BROAD-BASED NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR POWER SHARING BY ALL THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA. IN THE LIGHT OF PRELIMINARY AND AS YET INCOMPLETE DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS ORGANISATIONS AND GROUPS, WITHIN AND OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA, WE BELIEVE THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF SPECIFIC AND MEANINGFUL STEPS BEING TAKEN TOWARDS ENDING APARTHEID, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL ACTION MIGHT ENSURE NEGOTIATIONS AND A BREAK IN THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE.

ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT:

(A) REMOVAL OF THE MILITARY FROM THE TOWNSHIPS, PROVIDING FOR FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND DISCUSSION AND SUSPENSION OF DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL.
(B) THE RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES.
(C) THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC AND PAC AND THE PERMITTING OF NORMAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

ON THE PART OF THE ANC AND OTHERS:
ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS AND SUSPENDING VIOLENCE.

IT IS OUR VIEW THAT SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENTS INCORPORATING THESE IDEAS MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE TO BE INTERESTED IN PURSUING THIS BROAD APPROACH.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INDICATION TO US THAT IT

1(1)

(I) IS NOT IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST THE RELEASE OF MR NELSON MANDELA AND SIMILAR PRISONERS

(II) IS NOT OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO THE UNBANNING OF ANY ORGANISATIONS

(III) IS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ACKNOWLEDGED LEADERS OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA

(IV) IS COMMITED TO THE REMOVAL OF DISCRIMINATION, NOT ONLY FROM THE STATUTE BOOKS BUT ALSO FROM SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY AS A WHOLE

(V) IS COMMITTED TO THE ENDING OF WHITE DOMINATION

(VI) WILL NOT PRESCRIBE WHO MAY REPRESENT BLACK COMMUNITIES IN NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR SOUTH AFRICA

(VII) IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE AN OPEN AGENDA.

THE SOUTH AFICAN GOVERNMENT MAY WISH TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN THIS NOTE.

MOBERLY

SOUTH AFRICA

LIMITED	PS
S AF D	PS/LADY YOUNG
C AF D	PS/MRS CHALKER
UND	PS/PUS
ECD(E)	MR DEREK THOMAS
NEWS D	MR FERGUSSON
LEGAL ADVISERS	MR JOHNSON
PLANNING STAFF	CABINET OFFICE

SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

File SPW (amended version)

Subject cc Ops Master

cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 March 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T56/86

Dear Mr. President,

Lord Barber has given me a full account of the Commonwealth Group's recent visit to South Africa. He had high praise for your Government's helpful attitude. The Group had seen everyone they wanted to see and had been given a fair hearing.

I understand that the Group will now be considering what they have learned and how they should take their initiative forward. Their aim seems to be to submit their report to Heads of Government by mid-June. In the meantime they wisely intend to continue to avoid all publicity.

Lord Barber explained to me the ideas which they set out during their discussions in Cape Town. He stressed that they had tried to build wherever possible on what they understood to be the positions of your Government. The results seem to me to contain much that is potentially helpful, particularly the insistence that the ANC and others must suspend violence as part of the action needed to bring about negotiations.

I do not know what response the Group will get from others. But they saw the ANC in Lusaka before arriving in South Africa and I understand that they are not unhopeful that a concept on the lines suggested might be accepted by the ANC. If they felt that your Government's reaction opened the way to negotiations, I understand that they would go back to the ANC to try to secure a firm and public commitment to suspend violence for the duration of negotiations.

OA

I very much hope, therefore, that you will be ready to engage in further discussions and negotiations about the Group's 'possible negotiating concept'. I continue to believe that their initiative offers a unique opportunity to make progress and that even those who were initially sceptical now share this view. The Group's mix of African and Western representation and support gives it international credibility. By its discreet behaviour and exploratory style the Group has demonstrated its serious interest in contributing to a dialogue rather than making propaganda. In my view, there is no other way forward on offer which stands a remotely comparable chance of success or of securing the same international support for the peaceful resolution of South Africa's problems which you seek. Everything which I have heard convinces me that such an outcome can be attained.

The Group's report will clearly be of major importance both in itself and in determining the degree to which other governments are prepared to give dialogue in South Africa a chance to work. Your response to their 'possible negotiating concept' will be the determining factor in shaping that report and subsequent steps. They will also be looking for firm evidence that the far-reaching measures of reform within South Africa which you have outlined will be implemented rapidly. I shall go on arguing, as I did at Nassau, that your Government must be enabled to achieve a peaceful outcome. But I shall only stand a chance of convincing my Commonwealth colleagues of this if I can point to a constructive response from you to the Group's ideas.

I am the first to recognise that this faces you with very difficult and far-reaching decisions which involve the whole future of your country. But I think it vitally important that your Government should give the Group a response which would enable them to continue discussions with you. I understand that they are planning to meet again on 21 April. Some indication of your approach in advance of

that meeting will therefore be vital for the future direction of their work.

If there is any way in which I can help, please do not hesitate to let me know.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Hon. P. W. Botha, DMS.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 March 1986

Dear President Botha,

Lord Barber has given me a full account of the Commonwealth Group's recent visit to South Africa. He had high praise for your Government's helpful attitude. The Group had seen everyone they wanted to see and had been given a fair hearing.

I understand that the Group will now be considering what they have learned and how they should take their initiative forward. Their aim seems to be to submit their report to Heads of Government by mid-June. In the meantime they wisely intend to continue to avoid all publicity.

Lord Barber has explained to me the ideas - the Group's 'possible negotiating concept' - which they left with you and your colleagues. He stressed that they had tried to build wherever possible on what they understood to be the positions of your Government. The results seem to me to contain much that is potentially helpful, particularly the insistence that the ANC and others must suspend violence as part of the action needed to bring about negotiations.

I do not know what response the Group will get from others. But they saw the ANC in Lusaka before arriving in South Africa and I understand that they are not unhopeful that a concept on the lines suggested might be accepted by the ANC. If they felt that your Government's reaction opened the way to negotiations, I understand that they would go back

to the ANC to try to secure a firm and public commitment to suspend violence for the duration of negotiations.

I very much hope, therefore, that you will be ready to engage in further discussions and negotiations about the Group's 'possible negotiating concept'. I continue to believe that their initiative offers a unique opportunity to make progress and that even those who were initially sceptical now share this view. The Group's mix of African and Western representation and support gives it international credibility. By its discreet behaviour and exploratory style the Group has demonstrated its serious interest in contributing to a dialogue rather than making propaganda. In my view, there is no other way forward on offer which stands a remotely comparable chance of success or of securing the same international support for the peaceful resolution of South Africa's problems which you seek. Everything which I have heard convinces me that such an outcome can be attained.

The Group's report will clearly be of major importance both in itself and in determining the degree to which other governments are prepared to give dialogue in South Africa a chance to work. Your response to their 'possible negotiating concept' will be the determining factor in shaping that report and subsequent steps. They will also be looking for firm evidence that the far-reaching measures of reform within South Africa which you have outlined will be implemented rapidly. I shall go on arguing, as I did at Nassau, that your Government must be enabled to achieve a peaceful outcome. But I shall only stand a chance of convincing my Commonwealth colleagues of this if I can point to a constructive response from you to the Group's ideas.

I am the first to recognise that this faces you with very difficult and far-reaching decisions which involve the whole future of your country. But I think it vitally important that your Government should give the Group a response which would enable them to continue discussions with

you. I understand that they are planning to meet again on 21 April. Some indication of your approach in advance of that meeting will therefore be vital for the future direction of their work.

If there is any way in which I can help, please do not hesitate to let me know.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Hon. P. W. Botha, DMS.

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

The Rt Hon Ronald Reagan

Your Reference

Copies to:

SRWAAR

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT: ~~I know that the situation is South Africa causes us both much concern. The complexities of the problem and the strong feelings on both sides make the task of reconciliation extremely difficult.~~

~~In the search for ways to assist that process~~ the Group of Eminent Persons appointed by Commonwealth Heads of Government last October completed a visit to South Africa and some of the Front Line States last week. The British nominee, Lord Barber, has ~~just~~ given me a detailed account of the Group's work. They have specifically asked me to brief you fully on the ~~progress they have achieved~~ outcome.

The composition ~~of the Group~~, representing all sides of opinion within the Commonwealth, gives it a unique character and a solid basis of international support. ~~Moreover, I believe that the West's best interests would be served if their efforts proved successful.~~ The members of the Group have worked hard, shunning all publicity, and have gradually built up their credibility. They /have

Enclosures—flag(s).....

have now made considerable progress in the difficult task of winning the cooperation of both the South African Government and the leaders of black opinion. Both the ANC and the leaders of the Front Line States believe that the Commonwealth mission should be given an opportunity to explore ways of bringing the two sides together and of fostering the climate for the dialogue about the future that is so urgently needed.

The South African Government's decision to allow the whole Group secretly to meet Nelson Mandela shows that they take this initiative seriously. But of greater significance is the fact that the Group has engaged the Government in a serious exchange of ideas on how the conditions for dialogue can be established. At the end of last week the Group left with South African Ministers a paper which they carefully described as "a possible negotiating concept". We have been shown the paper in strict confidence and I enclose a copy for your information. It takes account of comments made on an earlier draft by South African Ministers and is intended to encourage both sides to move forward. The Group's proposal would require the ANC to suspend violence and to commit themselves to negotiations.

I am acutely conscious that the steps proposed by the Group represent very difficult political decisions for the South African Government. But they constitute confidence building measures for which both of us and many within South Africa have repeatedly called.

/They

They do not represent hard-and-fast demands and the Group is open to further discussions of them. But it is vital that the South African Government's reply should be sufficiently forthcoming to enable the Group to continue their difficult and delicate task.

I am under no illusions: but I believe that the Group's initiative might just conceivably offer an opportunity to break the cycle of violence and provide an alternative to increasing confrontation within South Africa and internationally. It is certainly the only conciliation effort in existence or prospect at present which offers any possibility of making headway. I ~~very much~~ fear that if this chance is lost there may not be another such opportunity.

It is the earnest hope of the members of the Group - and one I share - that you might agree to add your support to their efforts at what could prove to be a critical moment. I ~~very much~~ therefore hope that you will feel able to use your undoubted personal influence with President Botha to persuade him not to reject the Group's proposal and to be prepared to continue discussions on it. I ~~am writing~~ have written to him in this vein myself.

My officials in London will be able to brief yours fully on the details of the proposal and the background. The Group hope that the South African Government will reply by early April in a way that will allow the Group to return to Southern Africa later in the month.

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DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: **TEL. NO:**

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:
President Botha

Your Reference

Copies to:

SRWAAQ

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

~~I have been~~ given a full account by Lord Barber of the Commonwealth Group's recent visit to South Africa. He ~~was full of~~ praise for your Government's ~~help with the visit.~~ He said that the Group had seen everyone they wanted to see and had been given a fair hearing.

The Group will now be considering what they have learned and how they should take their initiative forward. They ~~apparently~~ aim to submit their report to Heads of Government by mid-June. In the meantime they wisely intend to continue to avoid all publicity.

Lord Barber has explained to me the ideas - the Group's "concept" - which they left with your ~~Government~~. ~~I have looked carefully at their~~ /suggested approach and I believe that ~~it~~ represents a serious attempt by the Group to assist in bringing about dialogue. ~~Lord Barber~~ said that they had tried to build wherever possible on ~~the stated~~ positions of your Government. The results seems to me to contain much that is ~~valuable and~~ helpful, ~~including~~

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/the insistence

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(b) On the second page, in the paragraph beginning "I do not know", Barber would like to change the paragraph from "ANC" to read as follows: "(...), but the group saw the ANC in Lusaka before arriving in South Africa and I understand that they are not unhopeful that a concept on the lines suggested might be accepted by the ANC. However, before going back to the ANC, the group would hope to have the reaction of your Government".

// I do not know what response the Group will get from the ANC"

the insistence that the ANC and others must suspend violence as part of the action needed to bring about negotiations.

I do not know what the Group will get elsewhere, for example from the ANC. I understand that before trying our their ideas on them, the Group wishes to have the considered reaction of your Government.

I very much hope that you will not dismiss this approach out of hand even though you will no doubt want to negotiate over the modalities. I am convinced that the Group's initiative offers a vital opportunity to make progress. The Group's unique mix of African and Western respresentation and support gives it international credibility. It is not perfect. But at least the Group excludes the Communists and those of your enemies who have no wish to explore peaceful solutions. By its discreet behaviour and exploratory approach it has already gained considerably in stature. In my view, there is no other mechanism on offer which stands a remotely comparable chance of securing the same international support or success.

The Group's report will clearly be of major importance. I believe therefore that a very great deal hangs on your response. I will go on arguing that your Government should

/be given

be given the chance to achieve a peaceful outcome, as I did ~~so~~ at Nassau ~~and I will do so again~~. But I can only argue the case to full effect if you provide me with the ammunition that a constructive response would give. This means it is essential that the gap between ~~your recent far-reaching statements and their implementation should be narrowed and then closed just as quickly as possible. If that is happening I shall then have at least a reasonable chance of helping to convince people~~ of your seriousness of purpose. If you can build on the Group's concept, a worthwhile start can be made.

I recognise that you face very difficult decisions and that some of them cannot be rushed. But I think it essential that your Government should demonstrate its readiness to make these decisions. The Group is planning to meet again on 21 April and some indication of your views in advance of that meeting will therefore be very important for the Group.

If there is any other way in which I can help, please do not hesitate to let me know.

With best wishes.


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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 March 1986

Dear Charles.

South Africa: Commonwealth Group

Thank you for your letter of 17 March giving an account of Lord Barber's meeting with the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister agreed that she would send messages to both President Botha and to President Reagan in support of the Group's initiative. She would ask President Reagan to add his influence to persuade the South African Government to avoid reacting to the Group's paper in a negative way.

I enclose two draft letters which have been approved by the Foreign Secretary. We are showing them also to Lord Barber, in confidence, since he wished to be consulted. I will let you know whether he has any comments on them.

I understand that Mr Fraser and General Obasanjo will not be going to Washington until next month, but the sooner President Reagan can be persuaded to act with President Botha the better.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SOUTH AFRICA : Relations Pt 9

SUBJECT
cc Master.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ale SH

cc Sir P Cradock.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 March 1986

Dear Colin,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH LORD BARBER

The Prime Minister saw Lord Barber this morning to receive an account of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group's visit to South Africa. The Foreign Secretary was also present.

Lord Barber reported that the members of the EPG had got on well together on a personal level. There was some suspicion among the Group of the United Kingdom's role in preventing agreement on economic sanctions at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau. On the other hand, President Botha had made clear that South Africa would not have been prepared to receive the EPG had it not been for the Prime Minister's personal intervention.

The Group had visited both South Africa and most of the Front Line States. On the whole, the latter had been prepared to give the Group's activities a fair chance. Indeed Mr. Mugabe had underlined the importance which he attached to the mission which had been a Commonwealth and not just a British initiative. Those whom the Group had met appeared to believe that there was at least a remote chance that it would succeed in bringing people together in South Africa.

The Group had met the leaders of the ANC in Lusaka. In Lord Barber's judgement, Oliver Tambo would be ready to take part in negotiations with the South African Government provided certain conditions were laid down. This was not necessarily true of all his lieutenants. Tambo was evidently not Communist himself, although again the ANC leadership had made clear that they would accept support from any quarter. It had been left that the Group could go back to the ANC if they had further proposals to put following their visit to South Africa.

Members of the Group had also met Nelson Mandela and had been impressed by him. Mandela, for his part, had said that the EPG was the most important visiting group which he had met. The EPG assessed that it should be possible for an accommodation to be reached between Mandela and the South African Government. Equally they believed that, were the older generation of ANC leaders such as Mandela and Tambo to

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disappear or be bypassed, supporters of a hard line would come to the fore. Indeed the young people in some of the townships were already effectively out of the ANC's control.

Turning to the Group's dealings with the South African Government, Lord Barber said that they had been very well received. The South African Government had gone out of its way to make clear that they took the EPG very seriously. There had been three meetings respectively with Pik Botha and Heunis as well as meetings with a number of other ministers. The talk with President Botha, however, had been a disaster. The Group had received a 45-minute lecture during what had been intended as a courtesy call, but had avoided reacting so as not to raise the temperature unnecessarily. The Group's overall impression from its contacts with the South African Government was that they were deeply split on what should and could be done. But they also recognised that if they turned down the Group's ideas, they would be face to face again with demands for stepped-up sanctions.

Lord Barber said that there were two points which he particularly wished to stress to the Prime Minister. First, although the South African Government talked about dismantling apartheid it was difficult to pin them down to what this meant in practice. It was clear that they were not prepared to abolish, at least at present, the Population Registration Act or the Group Areas Act. South African ministers had also stated categorically that there was no possibility of doing away with separate education. The Prime Minister commented that the South African Government would have to change its position on some of these points, particularly the Group Areas Act. There must at least be the prospect of change within a defined period. Lord Barber continued that, secondly, there should be no misapprehension about the nature of the police state which the South African Government ran in the black townships. Blacks were subject to a great deal of harassment. Equally, the Group was in no doubt that the South African Government could contain black unrest more or less indefinitely.

Lord Barber said that the Group had left the South African Government with a piece of paper described as a possible negotiating concept. Its title was intended to make clear that it was not a hard and fast position but a document which could be the subject of discussion and negotiation. They had also made clear their view that the South African Government were tactically inept in continuing to make belated concessions without securing anything in return. If they were prepared to accept the Group's document or something close to it, the Group would be ready to go to the ANC and urge them to give an absolute assurance to suspend violence while negotiations between the South African Government and representatives of the black population took place.

Lord Barber said that he had two requests to make of the Prime Minister on behalf of the Group. The first was

that she should send a message to President Botha urging him not to turn down the Group's paper even though he might wish to suggest modifications to it. Secondly, they hoped that the Prime Minister would be ready to urge President Reagan to add his influence to persuading the South African Government to avoid reacting to the Group's paper in a negative way.

The Prime Minister complimented Lord Barber on the Group's work so far. She was certainly ready to meet both the requests made of her. She had studied the Group's paper and suspected that dropping the ban on the ANC would be the most difficult point for the South African Government. She saw little prospect that they would agree to this without the firm assurance that the ANC would suspend violence. It would not surprise her if there were to be a serious split within the South African Government on this point. There was also the risk that the ANC would not be able to deliver a suspension of violence. This would give President Botha an excuse for breaking off any negotiations. She thought that the United States Administration's decision to meet Savimbi might have helped re-establish their credentials with President Botha. She assumed that the objective of a message to the President would be to inform him of the Group's meetings and to ask him to urge the South African Government to give their proposals very serious consideration indeed, pointing out that if the South African Government turned these proposals down there was really nothing else on offer which had a chance of securing international support. Ideally she would wish to discuss this directly with the President. But there would be no chance for them to meet until the Economic Summit in Tokyo in May.

Lord Barber said that he thought the South African Government realised that what the Group were asking was not unreasonable. They would like to find a way to release Nelson Mandela and other imprisoned ANC leaders. They also recognised that the ANC leaders could not be released into South African society without lifting the ban on the ANC, otherwise they would simply find themselves flouting the law. Equally, it was recognised that there could not be negotiations with representatives of black South Africans unless there was also freedom of assembly and freedom of speech. The Foreign Secretary added that it would be helpful to get President Reagan's specific endorsement of the Group's role.

Lord Barber stressed the need for early progress. The South African Government had been asked to give a reply to the Group's document by the end of April and the Group would be ready to return to South Africa at that time. Lord Barber also referred to the possibility of the Group conducting a shuttle between the ANC in Lusaka and the South African Government. The Commonwealth Secretariat were urging the Group to have their report ready by mid-June, to leave scope for a possible meeting of Heads of Government in mid-July. The Prime Minister said sharply that this had not been agreed. It was more important to continue the process

of discussion and negotiation than to set deadlines for meetings. It was vital to keep President Botha in play. The Prime Minister added that she doubted that the Commonwealth Secretariat were playing a helpful role.

Yours sincerely

Charles Powell

C D POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 March 1986

Prime Minister

CDP
14/3

Dear Charles,

Commonwealth Group on Eminent Persons

Lord Barber is to call on the Prime Minister on 17 March to report on the outcome of the Group's visit to South Africa.

After two weeks of extensive discussions in which they spoke to all sides of opinion in South Africa, the Group have left with the South African Government a paper setting out "a possible negotiating concept" to which they await the South African Government's considered response.

Lord Barber has told us that he will wish to brief the Prime Minister fully on the discussions the Group had and to give his personal assessment of the prospects for further progress. At the request of the Group as a whole, Lord Barber will urge the Prime Minister to send a personal message to President Botha not to reject the Group's proposals but to respond in a way that will then enable further discussions to take place. The Group's work has now reached a potentially critical stage. The South African Government's response to the Group will determine whether or not further progress can be made. The Group clearly attach importance to the Prime Minister's ability to exert some influence on President Botha. Depending on how the discussion with Lord Barber goes, the Foreign Secretary's instinct is that a message from the Prime Minister would be timely, and would also be a valuable indication of our interest in the success of the Group.

/Lord Barber

Lord Barber will also ask the Prime Minister to brief President Reagan on the progress that the Group has made and to encourage him to use his influence in support of the Group's proposals. The United States, while being generally supportive, has played no part in the Group's mission. The Foreign Secretary believes that the time may well now be opportune to seek to involve the Americans in support of the Commonwealth initiative, but we can see how the discussion goes with Lord Barber.

Finally, Lord Barber will wish to discuss the next steps and to look ahead to the review of the Commonwealth Accord in June. If a sufficiently encouraging reply is forthcoming from the South African Government before the middle of April, the Group will be thinking in terms of another round of talks with the South African Government and leaders of other groups in the second half of April. Mr Fraser has spoken privately of the Group preparing its report by the middle of June. This timescale should allow sufficient flexibility for the intensive discussion that will be necessary if progress is being made.

The Foreign Secretary believes that it is too early to take a position on when, where and at what level the six-month review called for in the Commonwealth Accord should take place. He believes that much will depend on the outcome of the present exchanges and further negotiations over the coming weeks. We should not be drawn by our Commonwealth Partners into discussing the review in detail at this stage.

/ I enclose a copy of the brief prepared for the Foreign Secretary's meeting with Lord Barber on 16 March. This identifies some of the points on which Lord Barber's views would be of particular interest. The Background Note summarises the present situation following the Group's discussions in South Africa.

Yours ever,
Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS (COMGEP)

LINE TO TAKE

- Welcome this opportunity for an early discussion. In circumstances, believe you and other members of Group can claim a successful conclusion to the first difficult stage of your mission.

- Impressed that, despite strains, Group has held together and avoided confrontation with SAG. Know that you have played a vital part in achieving this.

- Involving SAG in exchange of ideas - talks about dialogue - a major achievement. SAG seem to accept that COMGEP can play an effective role. Very much in our interests to keep process going.

- Note that paper avoids defining what reforms should be undertaken to end apartheid. Right that Group should have stuck to Commonwealth Accord in setting out steps it wishes SAG to take.

- How firm was SAG position and principles as set out in the paper? Note that these wisely drew on earlier public statements by President Botha and others.

- Encouraged by lifting of State of Emergency. How in your view will SAG respond to your other proposals?

- They should be able to concede point A (removal of troops from townships).

- Not impossible that they agree to release Mandela, Sisulu and Mbeki. Note: paper does not call for release of all political prisoners and detainees.

- Unbanning of the ANC and permitting it to operate within South Africa likely to be the sticking point. Is there room for flexibility (perhaps seeking prior assurances on a suspension of violence from both sides)?

- Most interested in your impressions of President Botha's attitude. How divided is South African Cabinet? How significant is Pik Botha's position; Heunis's; Viljoen's.

- What were your impressions of Mandela? How did his views compare with those of ANC/UDF?

- Ramphal is clearly committed to the COMGEP initiative. He is hopeful that SAG response will be sufficiently forthcoming to enable Group to continue and pay another visit to South Africa before the end of April. He hopes we will do what we can to keep the process moving forward.

- How do you see it evolving? Must continue to urge a constructive and flexible approach on both sides. The key for the SAG likely to be an undertaking on the suspension of violence. Will be considering carefully what we might do in this regard.

- Looking further ahead, when is the COMGEP report likely to be written. Are minds likely to be open or closed?

- Any further action we should take now? Agree that we should involve President Reagan. Americans have kept back and have not sought to use their influence up to now. Will recommend to Prime Minister that she urges President Reagan to bring his weight to bear in support of the Group's proposal. Would it be useful for us to talk again to the ANC and urge a suspension of violence?

- Very pleased to see that Group will not make statements or speak to the press before issuing its report. Visit to Mandela has already leaked. Dangers of public speculation or comment about members of the Group are obvious.

BACKGROUND

1. The first full stage of COMGEP mission has been completed. This included an initial visit by the two co-chairmen and Dame Nita Barrow to South Africa in February, visits to Lusaka (for meetings with the Zambian Government and the ANC), Harare, Gaborone, Lesotho and Luanda and finally a two-week visit to South Africa by the whole Group.

2. Despite earlier indications that Mr Fraser might be trying to force the pace with the South African Government, his briefing for the British, Australian and Canadian Ambassadors was reasonably encouraging. He recognises the delicacy of the situation and the need to give the South African Government time for a considered reply to the Group's proposals. He indicated that the Group would hope to present its report by the middle of June and was looking towards another visit by the Group in the second half of April. This would mean that the South African Government's response to the COMGEP paper should be received not later than early April.

3. The paper that COMGEP have left with the South African
D Government is an expansion of their original draft. Drawing on para 2 of the Commonwealth Accord, which sets out a series of confidence building measures, it suggests action that the South African Government should take alongside "specific and meaningful steps being taken towards ending apartheid". The paper carefully avoids specifying what reforms it would expect to see the South African Government introduce. It proposes that the opposition groups should, at the same time, undertake to suspend violence and enter negotiations.

4. The Group have suggested action under three headings:
(a) Removal of the troops from the townships and the suspension of detention without trial. Following the lifting of the state of emergency (one of the Group's original proposals) the South African Government should be able to agree to the withdrawal of the military provided the police are still available. It is likely that the Government could agree to at least a moratorium on detention without trial.

(b) The release of Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees. The South African Government has been exploring ways in which agreement on the release of Mandela could be reached. The unconditional release of Mandela and the two other "old" ANC leaders serving life sentences, Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki, might therefore be possible. Almost all detainees held under the emergency regulations have been released. A large number remain in detention under other legislaton and a number of UDF and trades union leaders are on trial for treason. The paper does not suggest, however, that all political prisoners and detainees should be released.

(c) The unbanning of the ANC and the PAC. This is the most fundamental proposal in the paper. Against a background of sporadic ANC violence and the deaths of whites in the border areas and in Durban in recent months, it would be politically very difficult for the South African Government to allow the ANC free political rein in South Africa.

5. The paper now also includes the carefully drafted set of principles to which COMGEP believe the South African Government have agreed. This draws on statements of principle made by President Botha and other Ministers in recent months and has apparently been the subject of some discussion between the Group and the South African Government.

6. With the agreement of the two co-chairmen, Lord Barber will suggest that the Prime Minister should brief President Reagan on the progress so far, encouraging him to use his influence on the South African Government to respond favourably. Apart from making some encouraging noises, the United States has deliberately stayed out of the COMGEP initiative but this would seem the time for them to become involved.

7. When Mr Ramphal called on the Secretary of State on 13 March, he seemed reasonably hopeful that the COMGEP exercise would continue. He noted that the Group had been encouraged by the attitude of Pik Botha but discouraged by the line taken by President Botha and some other Ministers. He expressed the hope to the Secretary of State that the United Kingdom would do what it could to keep the initiative moving forward.

8. The attitude of the ANC and their willingness to co-operate may be critical to the future of COMGEP. This may be an opportune moment to reinforce what COMGEP has achieved by talking to the ANC again at official level, possibly in Lusaka. Our aim would be to impress upon the ANC leaders the need for a positive response on the question of a suspension of violence. This would clearly be the key to a more forthcoming reply from the South African Government.

9. Henri de Villiers, the Chairman of Standard Bank (SA) told our Consul-General in Johannesburg, in strict confidence, that he regarded Fraser as the main problem in the Group. He was also critical of the balance of the Group's programme and believed that too little account had been taken of the views of Afrikaner businessmen such as Fred du Plessis. They had more influence with the South African Government.

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FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 131615Z FCO
TELNO 156
OF 131430Z MARCH 86
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA, JOHANNESBURG, LUSAKA, HARARE, DAR ES SALAAM
INFO PRIORITY LAGOS, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, NEW DELHI, NASSAU, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP

SUMMARY

1. THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP LEAVE SOUTH AFRICA TODAY. THEY ARE ISSUING A SHORT STATEMENT TO THE PRESS REFERRING TO A USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE FIRST ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. LORD BARBER IS RETURNING TO LONDON OVERNIGHT AND WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH NO. 10 ON HIS RETURN.

DETAIL

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MOBERLY

SOUTH AFRICA

LIMITED	PS
S AF D	PS/LADY YOUNG
C AF D	PS/MRS CHALKER
UND	PS/PUS
ECD(E)	MR DEREK THOMAS
NEWS D	MR FERGUSSON
LEGAL ADVISERS	MR JOHNSON
PLANNING STAFF	CABINET OFFICE

RRS 380
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 131645Z FCO
TELNO 158
OF 131530Z MARCH 86
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

PRETORIA - PERSONAL FOR MINISTER

MIPT : COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP
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ON THE PART OF THE ANC AND OTHERS:
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THE SOUTH AFICAN GOVERNMENT MAY WISH TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN THIS NOTE.

MOBERLY

SOUTH AFRICA

LIMITED	PS
S AF D	PS/LADY YOUNG
C AF D	PS/MRS CHALKER
UND	PS/PUS
ECD(E)	MR DEREK THOMAS
NEWS D	MR FERGUSSON
LEGAL ADVISERS	MR JOHNSON
PLANNING STAFF	CABINET OFFICE

GRS 550

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 131630Z FCO
TELNO 157
OF 131500Z MARCH 86
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

PRETORIA - PERSONAL FOR MINISTER

MIPT: COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP

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CONFIDENTIAL

BY

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
14. III.
PM 86

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH LORD BARBER

Lord Barber has returned from South Africa and is anxious to see you as soon as possible. I have therefore put him in the diary for Monday morning.

You read the telegrams (enclosed) about the outcome of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons' Group's visit to South Africa. There is now an additional telegram giving the text of the paper which they left with the South African Government.

The two points which Lord Barber will wish to put to you are:

(i) He will ask you to send a message to President Botha urging him to be receptive and flexible over the suggestions in the Eminent Persons' Group's paper.

(ii) He will ~~also~~ ask you to send a message to President Reagan encouraging him to intervene with President Botha also.

You will want to respond positively to both requests, though a message to President Botha will require very careful drafting indeed, so that it does not look as though you are simply parroting the Eminent Persons' Group. You will probably be most effective if you can distance yourself a bit from some of their recommendations while urging him to accept others. You may wish to discuss with Lord Barber which points in the Group's paper he considers the most vital.

Incidentally, you should be aware that the fact that members of the Group saw Mandela in prison has become public knowledge.

CDP.

Charles Powell
14 March 1986

RAMAFD

No 10

DISTRIBUTION SELECTORS
FILE COPY

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FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 131645Z FCO
TELNO 158
OF 131530Z MARCH 86
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

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NEWS D	MR FERGUSSON
LEGAL ADVISERS	MR JOHNSON
PLANNING STAFF	CABINET OFFICE

SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS (2)
PS/MRS CHALKER.
PS/PUS
~~MR FERGUSSON~~ MR JOHNSON
SIR J FREELAND
MR JOHNSON
MR O'NEILL
HD/SAFD
HD/CAFD
HD/UND
HD/NEWS DEPT
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

MR CLG MALLABY , CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ~~STREET~~

15.11.84

CONFIDENTIAL
FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 131630Z FCO
TELNO 157
OF 131500Z MARCH 86
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

ADVANCE COPY

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MOBERLY

YYYY

CFPOAN 0251

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES

SOUTHERN AFRICA

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PS/PUS
~~MR FERGUSSON~~
SIR J FREELAND
MR JOHNSON
MR O'NEILL
ED/SAFD
ED/CAFD
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~~PRESIDENT CLERK~~

MR CLG MALLABY , CABINET OFFICE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

15.14.84

RECEIVED 13 MAR 1986

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FM CAPE TOWN
TO DESKBY 131615Z FCO
TELNO 156
OF 131430Z MARCH 86
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA, JOHANNESBURG, LUSAKA, HARARE, DAR ES SALAAM
INFO PRIORITY LAGOS, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, NEW DELHI, NASSAU, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP

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MOBERLY

YYYY

CFPOAN 0250

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 March 1986

Agreed by Prime Minister with one amendment. CDP 11/3.

Dear Charles,

Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons

Thank you for your letter of 10 March about Pretoria telegram No 14.

As you will have seen from the telegram, Lord Barber told our Minister in Pretoria on 7 March that the Group had put to the South African Ministers a detailed proposal which they described as a "concept" to bring the ANC and others to the negotiating table. The South African DFA have since given us, in confidence, a copy of this proposal. In essence, it calls for the South African Government to commit itself to dismantling apartheid and entering into broad based negotiations on power sharing while undertaking the following steps:

(a) Terminate the State of Emergency and remove troops from the townships;

(b) Release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees;

(c) Unban the ANC and PAC and permit normal political activity.

In return the "ANC and others" are called on both to enter negotiations and to suspend violence.

Lord Barber asked that Sir Patrick Moberly should consider making representations to the South African Government in support of the Group's proposal. He was concerned that if South African Ministers rejected the proposal when they met the Group on 12 or 13 March this would mean that the other members of the Group, led by Mr Fraser, would then prepare a report highly critical of the South African Government and reflecting the unanimous support of blacks they have met for wide ranging sanctions.

Sir Patrick Moberly spoke informally to the Director General in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs over

/the weekend

the weekend to learn more about the South African position and to prepare a recommendation on what action we could take with the South African Government. The Director General subsequently asked him to call on him for a further word this morning. Killen claimed that the South Africans were in principle prepared to go along with most of the proposals but that the SAG's acceptance of the points listed must be in the context of a suspension of violence. The present text was also "too blunt" in places and the DFA were working on textual amendments.

Killen, who had clearly discussed the whole matter with Pik Botha, also suggested that it would be helpful if the Prime Minister were to send a further message to President Botha on the matter before Wednesday's meeting of the South African cabinet. Her last message welcoming the lifting of the State of Emergency had been "right on target" and a further message could encourage the State President to pursue the South African Government's declared aim of dialogue with all parties if violence was suspended.

Sir Patrick has rightly pointed out that Killen's surprisingly positive comments on the Group's proposal need to be tempered by the fact that he was speaking for the DFA not the Government as a whole. President Botha and other members of the Cabinet may be much less receptive particularly over the point of releasing political prisoners and unbanning the ANC and PAC. Sir Patrick agrees, however, on the key importance of Wednesday's Cabinet meeting and strongly recommends that we should send a high level message to the SAG in the course of today (11 March) to try to prevent a breakdown between the Group and the South African Government and to encourage the latter to adopt a flexible and imaginative approach to handling the Group and their proposal.

The Foreign Secretary supports this recommendation. Sir Patrick Moberly has suggested sending a personal message from the Prime Minister to President Botha. However, the Foreign Secretary thinks it would be better for the Prime Minister to keep a letter from her in reserve for the time being. He therefore recommends that Sir Patrick should be instructed to speak to the South African Foreign Minister immediately, making it clear that he is doing so on instructions from the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary and handing over a message from the Foreign Secretary. I enclose two draft telegrams to Sir Patrick giving him a line to take.

//

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		DESKBY 110700Z

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
TC	2	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEAT	3	
FM	4	FM FCO
TO	5	TO DESKBY 110700Z CAPE TOWN
TELNO	6	TELNO
OF	7	OF 101945Z MARCH 86
AND TO	8	INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA
	9	
	10	
	11	YOUR TELNOS 149 AND 150: COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS
	12	1. Please seek an urgent appointment with Pik Botha in the
	13	course of today (11 March). You should explain that you are
	14	asking for the appointment on the direct instructions of the
	15	Prime Minister and myself because we have learned in confidence
	16	from Lord Barber that the mission of the Commonwealth Group may
	17	be reaching a critical stage. You should say that you will be
	18	delivering a letter from me. The text of this is in MIFT.
	19	2. You should explain to Pik Botha when you see him the position
	20	as described to us by Lord Barber and reiterate the points in
	21	my letter as you judge helpful. We assume that he will pass on
	22	to President Botha and other key Ministers the substance of our
	23	approach. You may like to confirm this with him.
	24	3. Grateful for an immediate report of the outcome of your
///	25	meeting. We shall, of course, be giving your representations no
//	26	(no) publicity. You will also wish to brief Lord Barber, in
/	27	strict confidence, as you consider appropriate.
	28	HOWE
	29	

YYYY
MAIN
ADDITIONAL
NNNN

		Catchword: YYYY	
File number	Dept: SAFD	Drafted by (Block capitals): C T W HUMFREY	Telephone no: 2323 4954
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials	Date/time	
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

XY 48 (REV)

Dd8422499 50m 9/85 27081

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		DESKBY110700Z

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YYYY
MAIN
SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED

NNNN

For distribution order see Page

Catchword:

XY 48A (REV)

Dd8422552 50m 10/85 27081

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		DESKBY110700Z

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO
TO DESKBY 110700Z CAPE TOWN
TELNO
OF 101945Z MARCH 86
INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA

MIPT: COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

1. Following is the text of my letter to Pik Botha:

BEGINS I am writing to you urgently because the Prime Minister and I have learned in confidence from Lord Barber that the mission of the Commonwealth Group may be reaching a critical stage.

We have been much impressed by the courteous and helpful way in which your government has received the Group and facilitated their two visits to South Africa. This and the Group's decision to avoid all publicity have allowed them to begin their work in the most favourable possible circumstances. The endorsement which they received from both the Front Line States and members of the European Community last month in Lusaka will also have added to their international credibility and importance.

We understand from Lord Barber that the Group have put certain proposals to your government which they plan to discuss with Ministers in the course of this week. ~~My Government~~ We would not presume to advise ~~the South African Government~~ you on how far ~~they~~ you should be prepared to go in meeting the substance of these

YYYY
MAIN
ADDITIONAL
NNNN

		Catchword: PROPOSALS	
File number	Dept: SAFD	Drafted by (Block capitals): C T W HUMFREY	Telephone no: 233 4954
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials	Date/time	
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Dd8422499 50m 9/85 27081

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		DESKBY110700Z

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proposals at this time. I note that one of the points, the lifting of the State of Emergency, has already beenn met and that most of the detainees held under emergency powers have been released. The other points no doubt involve differing considerations for the South African Government and you will know to what extent they are negotiable.

I should like, however, to let you know that in the opinion of Lord Barber - for whose judgement both the Prime Minister and I have much respect - both the tenor and substance of your government's response to the Group this week is likely to have a significant influence on the future course of the Group's mission. I am sure that you will agree that it is very much in the interests of both our Governments that the Group should be encouraged to try to develop their mission in a constructive way and not rush into making a hasty and negative report which would have very unfortunate international repercussions. We very much hope therefore, that ~~South African Ministers~~ you will feel able to reply to the Group in terms which leave open the possibility of further movement on their proposals and encourage them to continue their mission in an imaginativve and flexible way.

Communique decision ?

For ~~my Government's~~ Our part, ~~we shall~~ the Prime Minister and I will be prepared to encourage maximum flexibility on the part of all others concerned and to stress to them the crucial importance of a suspension of violence as part of any future understanding.

~~May I take this opportunity to extend to you my~~ Best wishes.

Geoffrey Howe. ENDS

HOWE

///

//

YYYY

/

MAIN

SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED

For distribution order see Page

Catchword:

XY 48A (REV)

Dd8422552 50m 10/85 27081

South Africa: Refs P4 9.



SECRET

SL2 3

cuk.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 March 1986

SOUTH AFRICA: COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS

I have shown the Prime Minister Pretoria telegram No. 14 to Cape Town which reports Lord Barber's suggestion that we should make representations to the South African Government in support of the ideas put to them by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group in Cape Town.

The Prime Minister has commented that she thinks we should take up this suggestion but that it will need very careful handling indeed. Our approach should be that we are trying to be helpful to the South African Government in their own interest.

The Prime Ministe would like to see any instructions prepared for representations on this matter before they issue.

C D POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

GRS 500

SECRET

SECRET
FM PRETORIA
DESKBY 071030Z CAPE TOWN EMBASSY
TELNO 14
OF 070830Z MARCH 1986
AND TO DESKBY 071030Z FCO (PERSONAL FOR FERGUSSON)

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR
YOUR TEL TO FCO NO 139: COMMONWEALTH GROUP

SUMMARY

1. LORD BARBER SUGGESTS YOU MIGHT CONSIDER REPRESENTATIONS TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT (SAG) IN SUPPORT OF IDEAS PUT BY THE GROUP TO MINISTERS IN CAPE TOWN. A NEGATIVE OR PREVARICATING RESPONSE BY THE SAG WOULD LEAD TO A HIGHLY CRITICAL REPORT WEIGHTED STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON LORD BARBER AT HIS HOTEL ON THE EVENING OF 6 MARCH AND SHOWED HIM YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE. HE SAID THAT THE GROUP HAD PUT TO MINISTERS IN CAPE TOWN A ''CONCEPT'' OF THE SORT OF MEASURES WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO ANC AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE. THESE WERE AN END TO THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, TROOPS OUT OF THE TOWNSHIPS, RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, UNBANNING OF THE ANC AND A STATEMENT OF INTENT TO ELIMINATE APARTHEID. THESE POINTS HAD NOT YET BEEN CLEARED WITH THE ANC BUT WERE BASED ON TALKS WITH THEM IN LUSAKA. IN RETURN THE ANC WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO USE THEIR BEST ENDEAVOURS TO SUSPEND VIOLENCE AND ACCEPT AN OPEN AGENDA FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS (MINISTERS HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE SAG COULD ACCEPT THE LATTER POINT). THERE COULD BE SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENTS OF ACCEPTANCE BY THE TWO SIDES.

3. LORD BARBER INITIALLY PASSED THIS ON FOR YOUR OWN CONFIDENTIAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION. HOWEVER HE TELEPHONED ME EARLY ON 7 MARCH TO SAY THAT THE ''CONCEPT'' HAD BEEN EXPLAINED BY THE GROUP IN SOME DETAIL TO GAVIN RELLY AND A SMALL GROUP OF OTHER BUSINESSMEN OVER DINNER THE PREVIOUS NIGHT, WITH A REQUEST THAT THEY SHOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE SAG. RELLY DID NOT SAY YES OR NO, BUT LEFT THE IMPRESSION HE WOULD ACT.

4. LORD BARBER HOPES THAT THE SAG COULD BE PERSUADED TO GIVE A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE GROUP'S PROPOSAL AND REQUEST THE GROUP TO TRY IT OUT ON THE ANC. HE EMPHASISED TO ME THAT THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL WERE NOT IMMUTABLE AND IT WAS OPEN TO THE SAG TO SUGGEST MODIFICATIONS OF WORDING TO THE GROUP. FRASER WAS DETERMINED TO PRODUCE THE GROUP'S REPORT BY MID-JUNE. IF THE SAG DECIDED THEY NEEDED TIME TO THINK, THE LATEST PRACTICAL DATE FOR A RETURN VISIT BY THE GROUP WOULD BE APRIL.

/5.

SECRET

5. LORD BARBER FEARED THAT WHEN THE GROUP AGAIN MET WITH MINISTERS NEXT WEEK THE LATTER WOULD IN FACT GIVE A LARGELY NEGATIVE RESPONSE OR ATTEMPT TO PREVARICATE. IF SO, HE WAS SURE THE RESULT WOULD BE A REPORT HIGHLY CRITICAL OF INADEQUATE PROGRESS TOWARDS REMOVING APARTHEID AND REFLECTING THE SO FAR UNANIMOUS SUPPORT OF BLACKS THEY HAD MET FOR WIDE-RANGING SANCTIONS. FRASER WOULD BE OUT TO ''BASH'' THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF LORD BARBER) WOULD GO ALONG WITH HIM.

6. LORD BARBER HAS ASKED OBASANJO IN STRICT CONFIDENCE WHETHER HE SHOULD INFORM YOU OF ALL THIS AND OBASANJO HAD AGREED. LORD BARBER WAS NOT MAKING A FIRM REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE, BUT HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD CONSIDER MAKING REPRESENTATIONS (FOR EXAMPLE TO VON HIRSCHBERG) IN SUPPORT OF THE GROUP'S PROPOSAL. HE COMMENTED THAT YOU WOULD CLEARLY HAVE TO CONSIDER VERY CAREFULLY HOW THIS COULD BEST BE PUT TO THE SAG. HE CONFIRMED THAT YOU COULD REVEAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROPOSAL AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 2 ABOVE, AND IF YOU JUDGED IT NECESSARY COULD MENTION HIM AS A SOURCE. BUT HE ASKED YOU NOT TO REFER TO OBASANJO AND NOT TO REVEAL ANY OF THIS TO YOUR AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN COLLEAGUES.

7. THE GROUP WILL LEAVE FOR CAPE TOWN ON EITHER THE EVENING OF 11 MARCH OR EARLY MORNING OF 12 MARCH. THEIR FIRST APPOINTMENT THERE IS AT 10 AM ON 12 MARCH AND THEIR PROGRAMME IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE INTO 13 MARCH.

COMMENT

8. ALTHOUGH LORD BABER MENTIONED VON HIRSCHBERG (PARA 6 ABOVE) I AM SURE HE WOULD ACCEPT YOUR JUDGEMENT IF YOU CONCLUDED THAT REPRESENTATIONS AT A HIGHER LEVEL WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE.

SOLESBY

LIMITED
SAFD
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON
MR JOHNSON

COPIES TO:
PS/NO. 10 DOWNING ST

SECRET

QRS 350
SECRET
FM PRETORIA
TO DESKBY 071030Z CAPE TOWN EMBASSY
TELNO 15
OF 070910Z MARCH 1986
AND TO DESKBY 071030Z FCO (PERSONAL FOR FERGUSSON)

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR
MIPT: COMMONWEALTH GROUP

1. WHEN I CALLED ON HIM ON THE EVEINING OF 6 MARCH LORD BARBER WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH THE THINKING OF THE REST OF THE GROUP WAS DEVELOPING AND THE LIKELY CONTENT OF THE REPORT SHOULD THE SAG FAIL TO GIVE A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO THE GROUP'S ''CONCEPT''.

2. GROUP MEMBERS FELT THAT WHILE THE SAG HAD BEEN SCRUPULOUSLY COURTEOUS THEY HAD NOT GIVEN AN INCH ON SUBSTANCE. THEY COULD SEE NO REALY SIGN OF LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL. THE LIFTING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY HAD BEEN SPOILED BY LE GRANGE'S SUBSEQUENT RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION. WHEN HE NEXT SAW SAG MINISTERS FRASER PLANNED TO ASK FOR AN ASSURANCE THAT THE GROUP AREAS ACT AND POPULATION REGISTRATION ACT WOULD IN DUE COURSE BE REPEALED BUT CONFIDENTLY EXPECTED A NEGATIVE ANSWER. THE RESTRICTED MEETING BETWEEN THE CO-CHAIRMAN AND LORD BARBER REFERRED TO IN YOUR TEL TO FCO NO 139 HAD IN FACT BEEN WITH HEUNIS WHO HAD PROVED UNVEARINGLY PATRONISING AND MADE QUITE THE WRONG IMPRESSION. ALL MEMBERS OF THE GROUP, INCLUDING LORD BARBER, HAD BEEN HORRIFIED BY SOME OF THE BLACK TOWNSHIPS SUCH AS LITTLE SOWETO NEAR PORT ELIZABETH. THE SECURITY FORCES HAD BEEN OVER-CONSPICIOUS AND TACTLESS DURING THE GROUP'S VISITS.

3. ALL THE BLACKS THEY HAD SEEN SO FAR HAD BEEN UNANIMOUS IN THEIR SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS, AND THIS HAD MADE A STRONG IMPACT. DR BEYERS NAUDE HAD EVEN CALLED FOR A NAVAL BLOCKADE, AND LORD BARBER WAS CONFIDENT FRASER WOULD SHARE THIS VIEW. FRASER WAS PLAYING A GENERALLY UNHELPFUL FOLE. HE HAD COME WITH PRE-CONCEIVED PREJUDICES AGAINST THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND HAD NOT MODIFIED THEM. THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT MEMBERS WHO WOULD PRODUCE THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE REPORT THOUGHT ON SIMILAR LINES.

SECRET

4.

4. LORD BARBER SAID HE WAS KEEPING A LOW PROFILE AND HOLDING HIS MAIN FIRE FOR THE REPORT STAGE. HE HAD, WITH DIFFICULTY, PERSUADED THE GROUP TO SEE BUTHELEZI AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES OF SOME INDEPENDENT HOMELANDS AND OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (IN JOHANNESBURG ON 10 MARCH). FRASER HAD AGREED THAT LORD BARBER SHOULD SEE AN EARLY COPY OF THE DRAFT REPORT AND BE ABLE TO COMMENT TO FRASER BEFORE THE GROUP MET TO CONSIDER IT. LORD BARBER HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW BEST TO REACT TO THE REPORT IF IT PROVES AS UNACCEPTABLE AS HE NOW FEARED. HE WOULD STICK TO HIS CONTENTION THAT DECISIONS ON THE NEED FOR FURTHER SANCTIONS WERE FOR MINISTERS AND NOT FOR THE GROUP. MEANWHILE HOWEVER HE WAS MAINTAINING GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH ALL MEMBERS OF THE GROUP.

5. I SHALL BE SENDING AN OUTLINE OF THE PROGRAMME FOR THE CURRENT VISIT TO JOHANNESBURG/PRETORIA BY TELELETTER.

SOLESBY

LIMITED

SAFD

PS

PS/HRSCHALKER

PS/PUS

MR FERGUSSON

MR JOHNSON

COPIES TO:

PS/No DOWNING ST.

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

NICHOLAS ELLIOTT

Nicholas Elliott has returned from South Africa and you will remember that it was agreed that he should ring me on his return to see if you had time to see him for 10 minutes. I implied on the telephone that you would not be able to fit him in.

Is this correct?

No - I will see him

½ hour

CR

C.R.
6 March 1986

When?

26/1
2.30pm

cc CDP

PRIME MINISTER

NICHOLAS ELLIOTT

I have told Nicholas Elliott that he only has a quarter of an hour although I have allowed half an hour in the diary. One of the things which he wishes to raise with you is the fact that he has inherited quite a large sum of money and wants to have a word with you as to how it should best be used. But he would want to support his usual interests.

Mr Elliott has just returned from South Africa and he saw Pik Botha. The South African Government very much appreciated what you have done to resist the pressures on sanctions particularly as they realise your difficulties. It was in order to show their appreciation that they agreed to welcome the Eminent Persons Group and are particularly pleased with the presence of Tony Barber as a member.

Caroline Ryder
6 March 1986

Duty Clerk

With the compliments of

Russell
Assistant

~~THE~~ PRIVATE SECRETARY

for your file

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

(Already T'd - T43/86)

CONFIDENTIAL

20225 - 1

ZCZC
MILNAN 0225 OCMIAN 0225
CONFIDENTIAL
DD 051515Z CAPEM
FM FCOLN TO CAPEM
051330Z MAR
GRS 247

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO DEKSBY 051515Z CAPE TOWN
TELNO 87
OF 051330Z MARCH 86
INFO IMMEDIATE LUANDA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA
1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA. GRATEFUL YOU DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
QUOTE DEAR MR PRESIDENT, I WANTED YOU TO KNOW HOW WARMLY I WELCOME THE IMPORTANT STEPS WHICH YOU HAVE JUST ANNOUNCED. THE LIFTING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE SHOULD DO MUCH TO HELP TO CREATE THE CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE NEEDED FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE FROM MODERATE BLACK LEADERS TO YOUR PROPOSALS FOR DIALOGUE. THE DECISION TO NAME A DATE ON WHICH YOU WILL BE PREPARED TO BEGIN IMPLEMENTING SCR 435 SUBJECT TO PRIOR AGREEMENT ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL SHOULD FOR ITS PART GIVE A WELCOME BOOST TO THE NEGOTIATIONS LED BY THE UNITED STATES WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE SUPPORTED FROM THE OUTSET. FLEXIBILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON ALL SIDES IF AGREEMENT IS TO BE REACHED ON THE CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING SCR 435. WE SHALL BE WORKING HARD TO PERSUADE THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT TO PLAY ITS PART.
I AM MUCH ENCOURAGED THAT YOU HAVE SEIZED THE INITIATIVE ON THESE TWO IMPORTANT ISSUES. WE MUST HOPE THAT THE RESPONSE WILL ENABLE YOU TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM.
YOURS SINCERELY, MARGARET THATCHER. UNQUOTE.

2. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

HOWE



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RESIDENT CLERK

MR CLG MALLABY , CABINET OFFICE
PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

15.11.84

RESTRICTED
FM JOHANNESBURG
TO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN
TELNO 27
OF 051255Z MARCH 86
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO, PRETORIA

ALEXANDRA FUNERALS: YOUR TELNO 129 TO FCO.

1. REEVE ATTENDED THE FUNERAL SERVICE AT THE ALEXANDRA STADIUM THIS MORNING. OTHER DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS REPRESENTED WERE: FRG, NETHERLANDS, FRANCE, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND US. THE US DECISION TO ATTEND WAS NOT TAKEN UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVE ARRIVED LATE AT THE PROCEEDINGS. THE PRESENCE OF DIPLOMATS WAS CAREFULLY NOTED BY THE FOREIGN PRESS.

2. THE PROCEEDINGS THEMSELVES, WHICH LASTED FOR OVER FOUR HOURS, WERE ORDERLY IF NOISY. THE ALEXANDRA CIVIC ORGANISATION HAD RECRUITED SOME TWO HUNDRED MARSHALLS TO KEEP ORDER. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, NUMEROUS ANC BANNERS AND PLACARDS AND THE LOUDEST CHEERS WERE RESERVED FOR THE APPEARANCE OF A WREATH IN ANC COLOURS TO BE LAID AT THE FOOT OF THE SEVENTEEN COFFINS. (ACCORDING TO THE ORGANISERS, THERE ARE STILL THIRTEEN UNIDENTIFIED BODIES IN THE ALEXANDRA MORTUARY.)

3. ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE TOWNSHIP THERE WAS A MASSIVE SAP AND SADF PRESENCE. ARMOURED VEHICLES WERE PLENTIFUL AND MOST OF THE RIOT POLICE SEEN PROMINENTLY CARRIED RIFLES AND SHOTGUNS.

COMMENT.
4. ALTHOUGH THE FUNERAL SERVICE ITSELF PASSED RELATIVELY PEACEFULLY, THERE WAS AN ATMOSPHERE OF EXTREME TENSION CAUSED BY THE PRESENCE OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND IT MAY WELL BE THAT VIOLENCE WILL BREAK OUT LATER TODAY.

BRANT

YYYY

JDPOAN 0066

NNNN

SUBJECT CC MASTER
OPS

BM

cc FCO.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

5 March 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 43/86

Dear Mr. President,

I wanted you to know how warmly I welcome the important steps which you have just announced. The lifting of the State of Emergency in the very near future should do much to help to create the climate of confidence needed for a constructive response from moderate black leaders to your proposals for dialogue. The decision to name a date on which you will be prepared to begin implementing SCR 435 subject to prior agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal should for its part give a welcome boost to the negotiations led by the United States which, as you know, we have supported from the outset. Flexibility will be needed on all sides if agreement is to be reached on the conditions for implementing SCR 435. We shall be working hard to persuade the Angolan Government to play its part.

I am much encouraged that you have seized the initiative on these two important issues. We must hope that the response will enable you to maintain the momentum.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable P.W. Botha, D.M.S., M.P.

EA

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 March

Dear Len,

I enclose a signed message from the Prime Minister to President Botha, unedited in some respects from your draft. I showed it to the Foreign Secretary after he was over here. He was content.

ECL

I should be grateful if it could be dispatched as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely

Ruth Rendell

PREM 19/1510

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 March 1986

Dear Charles,

President Botha's Speech to Parliament: 4 March

You said that the Prime Minister would like to send an early message to President Botha commenting favourably on his speech today in which he announced important developments, both internally and in relation to Namibia.

I attach a possible draft. The Foreign Secretary points out that Ewen Fergusson will be visiting Southern Africa next week. During his visit to Luanda he will take the opportunity to urge the Angolan Government to respond constructively to President Botha's offer to begin implementation of SCR 435 on 1 August. He could, if the Prime Minister so desired, convey an oral or written message to President Dos Santos.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

BM2AFA

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

The Honourable P W Botha DMS MP
State President of the Republic of South Africa

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

I wanted you to know how warmly I welcome ~~your speech to Parliament and~~ the important steps which you have just announced.

~~I am sure you were right to announce~~ the lifting of the State of Emergency in the very near future. ~~It would~~ should do much to help to create the climate of confidence needed for a constructive response from moderate black leaders to your proposals for dialogue.

~~I was heartened to see that you have decided~~ The decision to name a date on which you will be prepared to begin implementing SCR 435 subject to prior agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal. ~~This significant step~~ should give a welcome boost to the ~~US-led~~ negotiations led by the United States which, as you know, we have supported from the outset. ~~Reaching agreement on~~ flexibility will be needed on all sides if agreement is to be reached on the conditions for implementing SCR 435 will require ~~flexibility on all sides, and~~ we shall be working hard to persuade the Angolan Government to play its part. ~~Independence for Namibia would be a great prize which could dramatically change for the better the present situation in Southern Africa.~~

/I assure

I am writing for much encouraging news. I welcome your lead in the initiative on

Enclosures—flag(s).....

there two important issues. We must keep the response will enable you to maintain the momentum.

I ~~assure you~~ I do not underestimate the difficulties which you face. ~~But I am convinced it would be right for~~ you to move swiftly and steadfastly in the direction mapped out in your speech.

File

10 DOWNING STREET
SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 March 1986

Thank you for your letter of 4 March enclosing a copy of a letter to the Netherlands Foreign Minister, responding to a European Community Aide Memoire handed to your Foreign Minister on 2 March. I am drawing the letter, as well of course as the announcements relating to the early lifting of the state of emergency and to the date for implementation of Security Council Resolution 435, to the Prime Minister's attention.

(Charles Powell)

L. H. Evans, Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL

File OAIALU cepc

10 DOWNING STREET

4 March 1986

From the Private Secretary

SOUTH AFRICA

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a brief word this morning about South Africa. The Prime Minister spoke on the lines of my letter to you of 3 March of her dissatisfaction about the way in which the recent representations of the South African Government were handled. The Foreign Secretary stressed the importance both of preserving our unique influence with President Botha and of sustaining the credibility with the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group and with black African opinion.

The Foreign Secretary mentioned that we had information from Dr. Crocker that the South Africans would shortly set a date for withdrawal from Namibia in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435. The Prime Minister commented that if this was the case, and depending on what riders or conditions were attached it would probably be appropriate for her to send a prompt message of congratulations to President Botha.

(CHARLES POWELL)

L. V. Appleyard Esq, CMG.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRESS RELEASE

STATEMENT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE PRESIDENT, MR P W BOTHA BEFORE A JOINT SITTING OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT ON 4 MARCH 1986

SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA

"Just about eight years ago, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 435 which was intended to provide a definite programme for the Independence of South West Africa/Namibia. Those who know the history of this matter know that the fact that the territory has not yet attained independence cannot be laid at South Africa's door. The last remaining obstacle to the implementation of the international settlement plan is the continuing threat posed to South West Africa/Namibia and to our region by the presence of the Cubans in Angola.

"Despite the progress which has been made in bilateral discussions since October 1984 when Angola agreed in principle to the withdrawal of the Cubans in conjunction with the implementation of the settlement plan, the Angolan Government has yet to agree to a satisfactory timetable for Cuban withdrawal.

"The people of South West Africa/Namibia have waited long enough for independence.

"In a serious attempt to facilitate a resolution of this difficult problem, I propose that 1 August 1986 be set as the date for commencement of implementation of the settlement plan based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), provided a firm and satisfactory agreement can be reached before that date on the withdrawal of the Cubans."

STATE OF EMERGENCY

"The violent and lawless circumstances which required the Government last year to declare a State of Emergency in certain magisterial districts is known to honourable members. Sporadic and isolated instances of violence are however still being instigated in different parts of the country. Nevertheless, the situation has improved to the point where I can announce that in the near future, probably this Friday, a proclamation will be issued which will lift the State of Emergency in those magisterial districts where it still applies.

"In order to place the authorities in a position to deal with ongoing instances of unrest without subjecting the population to the inconvenience of a State of Emergency, existing legislation will be reviewed and amendments proposed during the present parliamentary session to provide the authorities with the statutory powers required to protect lives and property effectively. In the meantime, security forces will maintain the order and protection of communities in terms of existing laws.

"I am taking this step in the genuine hope that all South Africans will solve their differences peacefully and show understanding for one another. Violence instigated in peaceful communities does not result in anything constructive and only creates unnecessary suffering.

"For its part the Government is dealing with legitimate grievances with a view to their elimination. In addition, I have also announced a clear basis on which all South Africans who denounce violence can come to the conference table in order to jointly negotiate a new constitutional dispensation for our country.

"I ask all South Africans to respond positively to this appeal. I believe we owe it to ourselves and we owe it to the peaceful process of positive political development in South Africa."

MINISTER (INFORMATION)
SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

4 MARCH 1986

South African Embassy
LONDON

4 March 1986

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1A

Dear Charles,

I attach a copy of a letter dated 4 March 1986 addressed to the Dutch Foreign Minister in response to an EEC Aide Memoire handed to the South African Foreign Minister on 2 March.

In view of the importance of the general content of this letter and, in particular, the announcements relating to a date for implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 and the early lifting of the State of Emergency, I wonder if you could bring it to the attention of the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely
L H Evans

L H Evans
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES a i

(2)

TEXT OF A LETTER DATED 4 MARCH 1986 ADDRESSED BY MR R.F. BOTHA TO MR H. VAN DEN BROEK IN RESPONSE TO AN AIDE MEMOIRE DATED 3 MARCH HANDED OVER TO MR BOTHA

Prime Minister
Underlined passages only. I suggest
CDP
4/3

Quote

Dear Colleague,

I refer to the Aide Memoire dated 3 March 1986 which was delivered to me on behalf of the Twelve.

The South African Government is concerned at the apparent lack of understanding on the part of the Twelve of the issues involved in South Africa at this time. Surely the Twelve must be in a position to make a realistic assessment of the Soviet Union's designs in Southern Africa.

Although the South African Government has been encouraged by the acknowledgement on the part of individual members of the Twelve of positive elements in the South African State President's address of 31 January 1986, there are nevertheless disturbing aspects in the attitude of the Twelve especially towards the underlying causes of the disturbances in the country.

Once again I appeal to European Governments to take a wider and more balanced view of what is happening in South and Southern Africa. The greater the pressure exerted by Western Governments, the less likely are the chances of getting the leaders of all the communities of South Africa to the conference table and the less likely are we of establishing a new constitutional order in South Africa. The South African Government has clearly stated that "apartheid" is disappearing. We have stated that we accept power-sharing by all the communities up to the highest level of Government (if the Twelve are able to devise "progress" in the abolition of "apartheid" more "significant" than a deicision to share power with the other South African communities, we should like to be informed of it). We accept equal treatment for the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals as well as of minorities; the sanctity and indivisibility of law and the just application thereof; equality before the law; protection of human dignity, life, liberty and property of all, regardless of colour, race, creed or religion; a democratic system of Government, which must be negotiated and which must accommodate all legitimate political aspirations of all the South African communities; participation by all South Africans in Government through their elected representatives; sharing of power between all communities but also the devolution of power as far as possible and the protection of minority rights, without one group dominating another.

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The South African Government has, moreover, introduced far-reaching measures in the economic, social and political field, removing racial discrimination.

The Twelve must be aware that there are elements both within and outside of South Africa who simply refuse in principle to support a peaceful resolution of the problems facing South Africa. According to these elements it makes no difference what agreement the South African Government and Black Leaders, who seek a peaceful solution, arrive at. They are opposed to a system of Government which does not constitute a one-party State, nationalisation of property and the means of production and a Government-controlled press. What I am trying to point out to you is the fact that it is simply not true that the violence has arisen out of grievances, but has been purposely instigated, inter alia, to draw the support of the West to bring about South Africa's isolation as a part of their strategy to introduce an idealogical order into South Africa which would not tolerate fundamental human rights and freedoms. While we accept that there are grievances which need to be addressed and which must be addressed, the West must come to realise that what is now at stake in South Africa is a struggle between the forces working towards a political order based on accepted norms and standards and forces opposed to a new democratic order.

Negotiation is the key to the resolution of our internal problems. But I see in the Aide Memoire handed to me, no appeal to the other parties in South Africa who must participate, to engage in such negotiations. The South African Government has been striving for months to encourage them to do so and has repealed or amended one discriminatory measure after another in an attempt to secure their cooperation but why should they negotiate when members of the international community such as the Twelve are doing their negotiating for them?

What we need from you now is a moratorium on counter-productive measures. The South African Government urges you to use your influence to persuade the other South African parties to respond to the South African Government's appeals for dialogue in order to come to an agreement on a new constitutional order encompassing norms and values which all civilised nations can support. You know that this is what I have been urging for some time now and you know that this was the thrust of the speech of the South African State President of 31 January 1986.

The situation in Angola gives rise for serious concern. A massive Cuban expeditionary force is, after ten years, still inside that country to sustain the Government in Luanda against the wishes of the people. They are there in contravention of the Alvor Agreement. The Government in Luanda is being

3/...

constantly supplied with new and increasingly more sophisticated weapons by the Soviet Union. Over the two years the Soviet Union has injected at least US (dollars) 2 billion in military equipment into Angola. There is evidence that the numbers of Cuban troops are being increased and that Soviet involvement through tactical and other advisors is growing. Moreover, it is expected that a major new offensive, on a larger scale than the offensive of late last year, is being prepared against UNITA's headquarters at Jamba and that it will commence in May/June of this year.

The turn of events in Angola is a matter of great importance for the future of the sub-continent as a whole. There are alternatives available to the leadership in Luanda if they really desire peace. South Africa cannot be held responsible for the civil war which is raging in that country. Surely the Twelve must know that UNITA has been fighting for freedom in Angola for more than twenty years. The Twelve also ought to know that the South African Government complied in good faith with the Lusaka Agreement of 16 February 1984, despite the Angolan Government's inability to contain SWAPO's incursions across the Namibian border.

By pursuing the military option, the MPLA is progressively impoverishing the land and its people. The struggle ultimately is between those who wish to live in peace and who seek progress and those who wish to impose their will and ideology on an unwilling majority. What is required in Angola is reconciliation. This is not an unattainable goal. The strategy which the Soviet Union is following in Angola can no longer be in doubt. They require a subjugated Angola to extend their influence along the west coast of Africa, south and north of Angola. If the Soviet Union succeeds in its aims in Angola, no country in Southern Africa will be safe from Soviet encroachment. The leaders of the countries immediately north of Angola are deeply concerning about this threat. If you do not believe me, why do you not ask them yourselves? Urgent action is required to ward off this threat. I would urge you to use your influence to achieve and end to the new imperialism which threatens us all.

Nonetheless as regards South West Africa/Namibia, in a sincere endeavour to facilitate the establishment of peace and stability in the region, the South African State President intends to make the following statement before a joint sitting of the South African Parliament to be convened on 4 March 1986:

"Just about eight years ago, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 435 which was intended to provide a definite programme for the independence of South West Africa/Namibia. Those who know the history of this matter know that the fact

that the territory has not yet attained independence cannot be laid at South Africa's door. The last remaining obstacle to the implementation of the international settlement plan is the continuing threat posed to South West Africa/Namibia and to our region by the presence of the Cubans in Angola. Despite the progress which has been made in bilateral discussion since October 1984 when Angola agreed in principle to the withdrawal of the Cubans in conjunction with the implementation of the settlement plan, the Angolan Government has yet to agree to a satisfactory timetable for Cuban withdrawal. The people of South West Africa/Namibia have waited long enough for independence. In a serious attempt to facilitate a resolution of this difficult problem, I propose that 1 August 1986 be set as the date for commencement of implementation of the settlement plan based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), provided a firm and satisfactory agreement can be reached before that date on the withdrawal of the Cubans."

I turst that the European Twelve will find it possible to support this statement as a significant attempt to attain a peaceful resolution of the Namibian/Angolan Imbroglio.

The South African State President also intends to announce the early lifting of the state of emergency in those districts of South Africa where it is still in operation. At the same time he will make a further appeal to discuss a new constitutional order for South Africa. The South African Government trusts that the Twelve will support this appeal clearly and unambiguously.

If the proponents of violence should take advantage of the lifting of the state of emergency and continue their acts of lawlessness and violence, then clearly the South African Government will have to take appropriate steps to protect the lives and property of its citizens even if it means declaring a state of emergency once again in the areas affected.

In addition, the South African Government intends to introduce legislation, in line with legislation elsewhere in the world, to deal with situations of unrest without delcaring a state emergency.

Yours sincerely,

R.F. BOTHA

Unquote

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 March 1986

REPRESENTATIONS TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT

Thank you for your letter of 28 February explaining the background to the representations made by HM Ambassador in Capetown to the South African government on 25 February to which the latter have responded publicly.

As you know, the Prime Minister thought that this matter had been handled most unsatisfactorily. While recognising that a difficult balance has to be struck in our dealings with the South African government, she thinks that the timing of the representations was unfortunate against the background of our efforts to persuade the South African government to deal sensible with the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group; and that the decision to give publicity to them smacked of acting for effect and me-tooism, which not surprisingly gained us the worst of all worlds.

The Prime Minister has asked me to make clear that she would wish No. 10 to be consulted before any decision is reached whether to make representations in similarly delicate situations in future (as is indeed your normal practice).

CHARLES POWELL

L.V. Appleyard, Esq., CMG,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PART 8 ends:-

FCO to CDP 28/2/86

PART 9 begins:-

CDP to FCO 3/3/86

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