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PREM 19/1968

PART II

TOP SECRET

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CAB ONE SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

Relations with South Africa
Policy on arms sales
Internal Situation
ECGD Credits

'SOUTH AFRICA

PT I : JUNE 1979

PT II : JULY 1986

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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PART 11 ends:-

DTI to fco (plus encls) 15/7/86

PART 12 begins:-

CR to CDP/NCW/PM

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(86) 26th meeting, item 3	03/07/1986
CC(86) 27th meeting, item 2	10/07/1986

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed _____ Date 28/10/2014

PREM Records Team

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1-19 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1H 0ET
Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215 5422
GTN 215) .....
(Switchboard) 01-215 7877

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

15 July 1986

Colin Budd Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Dear Colin,

SOUTH AFRICA: EC CODE OF CONDUCT: WHITE PAPER

As you will know, we decided to postpone publication of the White Paper in the face of the re-imposition of the State of Emergency in South Africa and the ensuing lively debate on sanctions, in case this should be regarded as our response to events and found wanting on that score. However, since then the Government have made quite clear their attitude towards further measures and my Secretary of State now sees advantage in publishing the White Paper before the end of the current session.

You are aware that we have revealed the existence of "informal guidance" to companies and I understand that Mr Frank Field asked for a copy when he saw Mrs Chalker on 10 July. Whether or not we withhold it, it should not prove too difficult for him to obtain it, perhaps through companies. The present draft has been carefully worked out by officials and UK business representatives and we should not welcome a further public debate on what our advice should be to companies on the revised Code and reporting format. Prompt publication seems the best way of forestalling this.

In addition, I believe that Mr Field raised a point about the inclusion of benefits provided free of charge by employers in determining whether companies have complied with the minimum pay requirements of the Code. The old UK reporting format stated that such benefits should be separately listed and Mr Field has

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Colin Budd Esq

July 1986

indicated his view that to drop this stipulation would be to weaken the Code. We cannot now change the reporting format without re-opening discussions with our EC partners. But we can take care of the point by adding the enclosed paragraph to our explanatory guidance. As you will see, it draws upon a statement by Professor Nel which we have obtained permission to quote.

Time is very short if we are to present the White Paper to Parliament in decent time before the House rises. We aim to do this on 23 July and are accordingly sending the text to the printers forthwith. However, should you or any of the other recipients of this letter have objections, I should be grateful if you could let us know by Thursday 17 July at the latest, so that we could stop publication or make any necessary amendments.

The Department of Employment suggested that we should list more clearly in the Introduction to the White Paper the differences between the revised and former texts of the Code. Paragraph 6 of the Introduction in the attached text has therefore been amended.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Charles Powell (No 10), Joan MacNaughton (Lord President's office), Tony Kuczys (Treasury), Andrew Lansley (Chancellor of the Duchy's office), John Turner (Employment) and Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's office).

Yours ever,
Michael

MICHAEL GILBERTSON
Private Secretary

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CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR COMPANIES WITH INTERESTS
IN SOUTH AFRICA

Government Guidance to British Companies on the Code of Conduct Adopted by the Governments of the Twelve Member States of the European Community on 19 November 1985

Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in association with the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Employment
by Command of Her Majesty
July 1986

LONDON
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

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CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COMPANIES WITH INTERESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

At their meeting in Luxembourg on 19 November 1985 the Foreign Ministers of the Ten Member States of the European Community approved the text of a revised Code of Conduct for companies with interests in South Africa. Its aim was to adapt and strengthen the provisions of the Code adopted by the Community in September 1977, in the light of developments since then. Spain and Portugal also subsequently subscribed to it. This revised text is at Annex 1 and now replaces that which was published by the Government in Command Paper No 7233 in May 1978.

2. The Code, which remains voluntary, is addressed to all companies in the member states of the EC who have interests in South African companies. It is hoped that all companies will use their links with South Africa to encourage wider observance of the principles and standards set out in the Code. But, as is made clear in the text of the revised Code, full, detailed reports are expected only from those British and other EC companies whose interests are represented by a controlling holding in a South African company, whatever form this takes (subsidiary, branch, joint venture etc).

3 The Government will accordingly continue to look for publication of detailed information and the submission of a full report to the Department of Trade and Industry in all cases where a British company holds 50 per cent or more of the equity of a South African company. As previously, UK companies with minority shareholdings will be expected to publish and submit to the Government as much information as possible on the policy and practices of their South African affiliates in respect of the areas covered by the Code. The Government recognises that provision of detailed reports would be inappropriate where the South African company employs fewer than 20 black Africans. But the UK parent is asked at least to state publicly, wherever possible, the number and whether their pay and conditions of employment are in line with the Code.

4. In South Africa, and elsewhere, it remains Her Majesty's Government's policy that United Kingdom companies and their affiliates should act in accordance with the laws of the countries within which they operate. In urging adoption of the policies and practices recommended in the Code at Annex 1, including those in Section 1, the Government is not asking companies to act contrary to South African law. These policies and practices are in many respects already incorporated and recommended in other international codes, for example, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.

5. There are a number of references in the Code to black African employers or workers. The intention is to ensure that the conditions and terms of employment of such employers satisfy the standards set out in the Code and not that similar benefits and treatment should be denied to workers of other races who feel similar problems, needs or circumstances.

6. The revised Code now makes specific mention of a number of areas which are of greater relevance and concern than in 1977. Greater emphasis has been given in the new text to the role of independent trade unions representing black African workers. Companies are asked to pay greater attention to education, training, black career development and wider community projects, areas where many British firms are already active. Other innovations are contained in the new Sections on the encouragement of black businesses and on Procedure. It is now intended that all EC companies should observe identical procedures and reporting requirements many of which will already be familiar to UK companies. In particular, company reports under the Code are to be based on uniform criteria. These and national summary reports are to be made public, in line with existing UK practice.

7. Companies to which the full reporting requirements apply are asked to provide reports relating to the new Code in the common, agreed format contained in Annex 3. The report should state the

facts as at 30 June each year and should give an account of progress over the previous twelve months. The report should be published and a copy sent to the Government not later than 30 September each year. The report need not form part of the United Kingdom parent company's Annual Report, but companies are asked to ensure that a reference to the public availability of such report is included in their Annual Report or Chairman's Statement.

ANNEX 1

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COMPANIES FROM THE EC WITH SUBSIDIARIES, BRANCHES OR REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

This Code is addressed to all companies from the European Community which have subsidiaries, branches or representatives in South Africa.

The aim of the Code is to make a contribution towards abolishing apartheid. None of the provisions of this Code should be interpreted as leading to discrimination between the various racial communities in South Africa. The dispositions concerning black employees have the sole objective of putting these on an equal footing with the other employees.

1. Relations within the undertaking

(a) Companies should ensure that all their employees irrespective of racial or other distinction are allowed to choose freely and without any hindrance the type of organisation to represent them.

(b) Companies should pay particular attention to black trade unions and be prepared to recognize them.

(c) Companies should be prepared to sign recognition agreements with representative black trade unions within the company and allow collective bargaining, including the signing of collective agreements, in accordance with internationally accepted labour standards.
Employers should regularly and unequivocally inform their employees that consultations and collective bargaining with organisations which are freely elected and representative of employees are part of company policy.

(d) Companies should do everything possible to inform their employees within the company of their social and trade union rights.
Employers should make every effort to ensure that black African employees are free to form or join the trade union of their choice. Steps should be taken as a matter of course to allow trade union officials to explain to employees the aims of trade unions and the advantages of membership, to distribute trade union documentation and display trade union notices on the company's premises, to have reasonable time off to carry out their union duties without loss of pay and to organize meetings. Employers should encourage trade union members to take part in trade union training programmes.

(e) Companies should do everything to establish a climate of confidence in their relations with their employees and should in particular make available to them the text of the Code of Conduct of the European Communities and inform them, in an appropriate language and in places to which they normally have access, of what the company is doing to implement this Code.

(f) In companies where works or liaison committees already operate, trade union officials should have representative status on these bodies if employees so wish. The existence of these types of committee should not prejudice the development or status of trade unions or of their representatives.

2. Migrant labour

(a) The policy of apartheid leads to the use of migrant labour, which robs the individual of the basic freedom to seek and obtain the job of his choice. It also causes grave social and family problems.

(b) Employers have the social responsibility to contribute towards ensuring freedom of movement for black African workers and giving them the opportunity to lead a family life.

(c) Employers should endeavour to alleviate the effects of existing regulations, in particular by facilitating the regular renewal of contracts of employment and making it easier for the families of employees to settle near their companies.

3. Pay and wage structures

(a) Companies should assume a special responsibility as regards the pay and conditions of employment of their black African employees. In this context, they should refer to the data of the University of South Africa (UNISA).
They should formulate specific guidelines aimed at improving their terms of employment. Pay based on the "supplemented living level" for an average-sized family must be considered as the absolute minimum necessary.(*) Nevertheless companies should make every effort to exceed this level when fixing wages. In their reports they should supply the required explanations and, in particular, give an account of their wage scale and the possibilities for progress in this context.

(*) In this context, it is to be recalled that the previous text of the Code of Conduct mentioned that the minimum wage should exceed by at least 50 % the minimum level required to satisfy the basic needs of an employee and his family."

(b) The principle of equal opportunities for all employees ought to be fully respected. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" means that all jobs should be open to any worker who possesses suitable qualifications, irrespective of racial or other distinction, and that wages should be based on a qualitative job evaluation. The same pay scales should be applied to the same jobs.

4. Training and promotion of black employees

(a) The principle of equal pay would, however, be meaningless if black African employees were kept in inferior jobs. Employers should therefore draw up an appropriate range of training schemes of a suitable standard to provide training for their black African employees and reduce the dependence of their companies on immigrant white labour.

(b) Companies should ensure that supervisory and management jobs and those requiring high technical qualifications are open to their black African employees.

Companies should, if possible, organize occupational training programmes for their black employees. Companies should, if possible, help their black employees to take advantage of other educational and occupational training programmes outside their places of work. Where required, companies should set up or use educational facilities to enable their black employees to benefit from more specialized training.

(c) Companies should make every effort to eliminate in practice the de facto restrictions or based on custom on apprenticeships for black employees. They should ensure that employees of different racial groups can take part in training programmes without any form of segregation.

5. Fringe benefits

(a) In view of their social responsibilities, companies should concern themselves with the living conditions of their employees and their families.

(b) For this purpose, company funds could be set aside to provide benefits over and above those currently provided according to South African legislation :

- providing complete social protection schemes for employees and their families (health, accident and unemployment insurance and old age pensions);

- ensuring that their employees and their families have the benefit of adequate medical care;

- in the education of members of their families:

- involving the accommodation of black African staff and their families, in particular by helping them to buy their own housing;

- providing transport from home to work and back;

- providing their employees with assistance in problems they encounter with the authorities over their movement from one place to another, their choice of residence and their employment;

- providing leisure facilities.

(c) Companies should support projects which aim to improve the quality of life of the black communities from which they draw their staff.

6. Desegregation at places of work

(a) Employers should do everything possible to abolish any practice of segregation, notably at the workplace, in canteens, in education and training and in sports activities. They should also ensure equal working conditions for all their staff.

(b) Along with the advancement of their black employees, companies should directly support inter-staff contacts, and help employees from different racial groups to get to know each other better and integrate more fully.

Companies should encourage sporting activities in which employees from different racial groups take part as mixed teams in mixed competitions.

7. Encouragement of black businesses

As far as they are able, companies should, in the framework of their activities, encourage the setting up and expansion of black businesses by sub-contracting, providing assistance for their black employees to set up their own companies and preferential, priority treatment in customer-supplier relations.

P R O C E D U R E

1. Criteria for implementation

   (a) A detailed and fully documented report should be prepared by all companies which have a controlling interest in a South African company employing black workers.

   (b) In other companies where there are European interests, whether significant or not, the European shareholders should make every effort to ensure that the principles of this Code are implemented and that a report is produced.

2. Drafting of reports

   (a) Reports shall be drafted by companies according to the uniform criteria agreed by the European Community countries. These reports shall be sent either to Embassies in South Africa or directly to the national authorities of the country of origin and should be made public by the companies.

   (b) The reports shall cover the period from 1 July of the previous year to 30 June of the current year. They should be sent to the national authorities by the end of September. The authorities will then be responsible for drawing up national reports to be available by the end of March in the following year and submitted to the national parliaments. A summary report will be prepared by the Presidency in-Office of the countries of the Community and presented to the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee of the European Community before the summer recess. The national and joint reports will be public.

3. Coordinating implementation of the Code

   The Member States will consult regularly on the implementation of this Code, in particular through their representatives in South Africa. To this effect, the latter will draw up an annual report which will be taken into account when the summary report is drafted. This annual report will also assess the impact of this Code of Conduct in the economic and social context of South Africa and in particular the views of the relevant trade union and employers' circles concerning its content and implementation.

ANNEX 2

EXPLANATORY GUIDANCE

Section 1: Relations within the undertaking

1. Section 1 of the Code does not ask companies to promote, set up, or do the job of trade unions. It does, however, ask companies to "ensure that their employees irrespective of racial or other distinction are allowed to choose freely and without any hindrance the type of organisation to represent them". To this end, the Code proposes that employers should make it known to their employees that consultations and collective bargaining with organisations which are freely chosen and representative of employees are part of company policy.

2. There is, of course, nothing in South African law which prohibits free choice of representation. A feature of the labour relations scene in recent years has been the involvement of black African workers in the statutory industrial relations system and the emergence and growing influence of independent trade unions representing black African employees. The Code states that companies should pay particular attention to such unions and be prepared to conclude recognition agreements with them. But this should not, of course, be at the expense of the employees' freedom of choice. Nor does it imply that unions in practice representing only black workers should be regarded as necessarily superior or preferable to those whose membership is multiracial.

3. Section 1(c) of the Code asks companies to allow collective bargaining "in accordance with internationally accepted labour standards". These are International Labour Conventions No.87 on freedom of assocation and No.98 on the right to collective bargaining. The suggestions made in Section 1(d) of the Code are examples of action which employers can take to ensure that black African employees can exercise the freedom of choice and of association described in these two Conventions. These examples

are based on International Labour Convention No.135 and International Labour Recommendation No.143. Other steps which employers can take include an undertaking that employees will not be victimised on account of trade union membership or for participation in trade union affairs. As far as workers' representatives are concerned, other practical measures include granting of reasonable time off without loss of pay or fringe benefits to allow representatives to carry out their representational functions, and to attend trade union meetings, training courses, seminars, congresses and conferences; co-operation in the collection of trade union dues; provision of access to the management of the undertaking; permission to enter workplaces (both for employees and for representatives of trade unions which have members working in them); co-operation in the collection of trade union dues; provision of information which is needed for meaningful negotiations on conditions of employment. The Code suggests (Section 1(f)) that, if employees so wish, their union officials should have representative status in already established works or liaison committees.

4. Companies are urged to ensure that their employees are aware of their trade union and other rights, in particular as set out in the Code, and of company policy in regard to implementation of the Code. Companies may consider it appropriate to convey such information through the freely chosen trade union or other representatives of the workforce. The main consideration should be, as indicated in the Code, to establish a climate of confidence with the workforce.

Section 2: Migrant Labour

5. Section 2 of the Code states that "employers should endeavour to alleviate the effects of existing regulations" on migrant workers. This term applies to black Africans who are temporarily absent from their homes in the Republic or neighbouring territories for the purpose of taking up wage-earning employment. It does not, of course, apply to daily commuting workers, wherever these reside. A number of companies have

provided advisory services for migrant workers, including those from neighbouring countries, to assist them when problems arise, eg over authority to move from one place to another within the Republic.

6. In addition to freedom of movement problems, the Code reflects concern at the disruption of family life which such workers are likely to face and urges employers to endeavour to facilitate the settlement of workers' families near their companies. Other forms of action may include allowing migrant workers, whose families have not accompanied or followed them to the district where they are employed, reasonable periods of paid leave at regular intervals and financial assistance to and from their homeland. Companies can also work within employers' associations for improved hostel accommodation for migrant workers. Procedures can be devised for family remittances and saving schemes.

7. The Code states that employers should try to facilitate the renewal of migrant workers' contracts where this is relevant. A company may, of course, have many considerations to weigh before offering or renewing contracts of employment, such as economic circumstances, the availability of jobs and the efficiency of the employee(s) in question. The Code's aim, however, is to alleviate or remove the disadvantages which migrant workers face in comparison with other black African employees. One device which facilitates the return of migrant workers to a company's employment is the "calling-in card", obtainable at Labour Bureaux, for migrants who have completed a period of approved employment. After a period in his home area, these enable a migrant worker to return to his former employer for a period of up to one year without passing through the normal recruitment process.

Section 3: Pay and Wage Structures

8. The improvement of wages of black African employees continues to be an important issue on which the parent company should formulate a positive policy. Special care is needed in

respect of minimum wages, ie the minimum rate in the lowest grades. It is stated clearly that the level of minimum wages advocated by the Code is the supplemented living level (SLL) for the district concerned, as calculated by the University of South Africa, for a family of average size. In practice, this currently means a family of five. SLL makes provision at current local prices for items considered by researchers to be essential to human needs in South Africa, additional to those costed in the minimum living level (MLL) (regarded as the minimum subsistence level in African conditions).

9. The Code stresses that pay based on SLL for an average-sized family should be regarded as an absolute minimum, and not as a target. It is recognised that the Code urges the recognition of Trade Unions where that is the wish of employees and that pay and conditions may therefore be subject to collective bargaining. Nevertheless employers should refer to the SLL and to the possibilities of exceeding this level when determining their pay scales.

10. Some companies may prefer to relate their wage rates to other indices. But however minimum wage rates are set, the SLL for a family of five must, as emphasised in the preceding paragraph, be regarded as the absolute minimum necessary. Companies should in any case regularly review the adequacy of their wage rates, especially for employees at the lower end of the scale, in the light of inflation and of the reports published by the various bodies producing statistical studies on living and wage levels at various locations.

11. A particular problem of concern to a number of firms is whether or not the monetary value of benefits provided free of charge to employees (for example, accommodation or food) may be included when comparison is made with SLLs. Questions of detail may be referred to Professor Nel at the Bureau of Market Research, University of South Africa (UNISA), PO Box 392, Pretoria, who is responsible for the SLL calculations and research. However UNISA have advised that "Any items allowed for the SLL, received free of

charge by employees from their employers, in accordance with the detailed make-up of the SLL, may be taken into account in determining whether or not the employee's renumeration is lower or higher than the employee's SLL". In providing full details of wage scales, in accordance with the common EC reporting format (Annex 3), companies are nevertheless asked to show separately the value of cash wages and of SLL items provided free of charge by the employer, in accordance with the practice established under the previous UK reporting format published in Cmnd 7233.

12. Section 3(b) of the Code draws attention to the principle of "equal pay for equal work" and urges that "all jobs should be open to any worker who possesses suitable qualifications, irrespective of racial or other distinction". Qualifications, in this context, may include not only formal, professional qualifications, but also, for example, experience and leadership qualities. Wages should, as stated in the Code, be based on a qualitative job evaluation. There may be scope within wage scales applying to particular jobs, to vary renumeration in accordance with the seniority or experience of individual employees. But race should never be a factor in determining rates of pay.

Section 4: Training and Promotion of Black Employees

13. As the Code states, the principle of equal pay would be meaningless if black African employees were kept in inferior jobs. It urges employers to make it possible for black Africans to be employed increasingly in higher grade posts, including those at managerial level, and to arrange more programmes designed to assist such advancement by black Africans.

14. As the Code emphasises, this will entail companies paying close attention to the training requirements of their black employees and the reduction of dependence on immigrant white labour. Companies should consider, for example, the development of in-plant training whenever the scale of operation permits, the use of external training courses and educational programmes. Companies should also consider providing assistance with basic

education wherever this is required before black African workers can take advantage of opportunities for technical and occupational training.

Section 5: Fringe Benefits

15. The Code stresses the importance of fringe benefits for employees and their families and gives examples of the kinds of benefits which could be provided. Many UK companies already provide an extensive range of such benefits. It is not suggested that all companies should provide all the benefits listed, or that the list of benefits in the Code is necessarily comprehensive. In deciding which benefits they can provide companies will doubtless wish to take account of the particular circumstances, needs and wishes of their employees and the adequacy and accessibility to their black employees of existing services, including transport and schemes outside the company. Companies need not report to the Department benefits which they are obliged to provide under South African legislation.

16. In the case of pension schemes, companies may wish to ensure that the benefits available to black African employees are comparable with those for white employees in similar employment, but suited to the needs of Africans including migrant workers. In cases of injury and death arising out of employment, and where black Africans become unemployed, employers should pay full and urgent attention to their responsibilities associated with claims to the appropriate social benefits.

17. In the case of education, companies could for example, further the education of their black African employees' families by providing financial assistance for literacy programmes or funding bursaries for university education.

18. In the case of housing, company help can take a variety of forms, for example, representations to local housing authorities,

or appropriate provision by the company of financial assistance to enable the employee to acquire his own home. Some companies have already devised schemes to assist home ownership.

19. In the case of assistance to employees encountering problems with the authorities over freedom of movement etc, the Code does not require companies to act in contravention of South African law or to assist in law breaking. They could, however, consider practical help to their black workers to overcome practical difficulties which they face as a result of particular restrictions and might also make representations and use their influence to secure changes in laws which discriminate against their employees on grounds of race.

20. In addition to the provision of benefits directly to their black workers, companies should support projects concerned with the welfare and advancement of the communities from which these workers are drawn. This could involve financial or practical and moral support and might for example take the form of direct contributions to particular communities and projects, working directly through existing private sector schemes, notably in education, or donations to institutions and organisations active in this field.

Section 6: Desegregation at Place of Work

21. Elimination of racial segregation at the work place is now common. Many employers have now introduced total desegregation in all company premises, facilities and activities. But there remains scope for some companies to do more. Those companies that have achieved full integration have generally done so without complaints or other repercussions. Where employers have experienced resistance within the workforce a tactful approach has often paid dividends. Sports and other activities as suggested in the Code, can promote inter staff contacts, breaking down antagonism and resistance to greater integration.

Section 7: Encouragement of Black Businesses

22. Economic development and the growth of black African prosperity are contributing towards the abolition of apartheid, which is also the aim of the Code. The expansion of the black African business sector is part of this process. The Code accordingly encourages companies, so far as they are able and within the framework of their own activities, to support the establishment and growth of black owned businesses. Companies are requested to give preference where they can to black sub-contractors, suppliers etc. But it is recognised that preference cannot be given irrespective of other considerations which, as a matter of sensible business practice, companies have to take into account, such as the quality or price of the goods or services to be supplied.

Sources of Further Guidance and Information

There are several organisations in South Africa, Governmental and non-Governmental, which can provide information and advice on a wide range of matters referred to in the Code. Addresses of these organisations and further guidance on the Code are available from the Department of Trade and Industry (Overseas Trade Division 4/3a: Enquiries telephone no 01-215 5276).

The First Secretary (Labour) at the British Embassy, 6 Hill Street, Arcadia, Pretoria 0002 (telephone 43-3121) is also available to provide information and, when requested, advice in general terms to United Kingdom companies or their South African affiliates. Enquiries may also be directed through the British Consulate-General in Johannesburg and the Consulates in Cape Town and Durban.

ANNEX 3

REPORTING FORMAT

Preamble

The intention of this common format is:

A. To standardise the criteria according to which companies prepare their reports.

B. To simplify the drafting of reports.

C. To reflect the provisions and requirements of the Code.

Note: Companies are free to attach further written explanation, as part of their reports, should they feel that certain material would otherwise be omitted or that the form gives them insufficient scope to explain fully their position regarding the requirements of the Code.

Report for twelve months to 30 June
Report by (Name and Company)
of (Address)

Please provide name(s) and address(es) of South African Subsidiaries, Associates, Branches etc, showing percentage of equity held, the total workforce and breakdown to show the number of whites, coloureds, asians and black workers employed by each and their place and district of employment.

Section 1: Relations within the Undertaking

1.1 Please confirm that all employees, irrespective of racial or other distinctions are able to choose freely and without hindrance the type of organisation to represent them.

1.2 Please state progress made in implementing that policy including:

a) whether recognition and collective bargaining agreements in accordance with internationally accepted labour standards have been signed with trade unions representing black workers;

b) or whether the company is prepared to conclude such agreements;

c) who are the parties to such agreements;

d) what other machinery (liaison committee, works council or similar body) is established to conclude collective agreements on pay and working conditions on behalf of black employees and whether there is trade union representation within it;

e) whether trade union officials have requested the facilities outlined in section 1(d) of the Code;

f) what was or would be the company's response to such an approach;

g) what measures the company has taken to inform its employees of their social and trade union rights, to promote the Code and to inform its employees of its policy on implementation.

Section 2: Migrant Labour

2.1 Please state whether migrant workers are employed and, if so, how many.

2.2 If the company is employing migrant workers, please explain its policy towards the use of such labour and what action it is taking to alleviate the effects of existing regulations on such employees and to help them to lead a family life. Indicate particular measures, including any to facilitate:

a) the opportunity to lead a family life;

b) the regular renewal of contracts and;

c) any arrangements for making it easier for the families of employees to settle near their companies.

Section 3: Pay and Wage Structures

3.1 Please state company policy on pay of black employees and whether common pay scales for all employees, irrespective of race (ie. equal pay for equal work) are applied and whether wages are based on a qualitative job evaluation.

3.2 Please attach as much information as possible on wage scales for all grades, indicating the numbers of black workers employed at each level and the districts in which they are employed and the number of working hours per week. The information provided should be sufficient to answer the following questions. (Separate information is required for each affiliate):

A The supplemented living level (SLL) for a family of five in the location of your subsidiary as assessed by the University of South Africa.

B Excluding overtime and other bonuses, except where these are guaranteed and certain, are all black employees paid at or above the SLL for a family of five? If not, how many are paid below this level?

C What are the wages of the lowest paid grades (rands per month)?

D How many black workers are in the lowest paid grades?

E What was the date, within the reporting period, when the company last revised wage scales, including those for the lowest paid workers?

3.3 If the wages of the lowest paid employees are below the minimum level laid down in the code, please describe the company's plans and any timetable for achieving this minimum.

3.4 Please indicate any plans the company has to upgrade the minimum wages to higher levels.

Training and Promotion of Black Employees

4.1 Please state (with details of the numbers involved) company policy for training and promoting black employees including:

a) company policy and practice on employment and promotion of black employees in supervisory and management jobs and those requiring higher technical qualifications;

b) company training schemes for the advancement of black employees and examples of successes achieved;

c) company assistance to black employees to take advantage of other educational and occupational training schemes outside their place of work;

d) apprenticeship schemes and specialised training programmes (including preparatory programmes for apprenticeship), which the company operates or participates in, explaining whether these are open to all suitably qualified workers, irrespective of race and without any form of segregation.

4.2 Please state company policy on the employment of white immigrants and, if applicable, details of the numbers employed and plans to reduce dependence on such labour.

Section 5 FRINGE BENEFITS

5.1 Please describe fringe benefits provided or envisaged by the company, in particular for the purposes listed in section 5(b) of the Code which include medical, educational and assistance with accommodation.

5.2 Please also give details of any support for projects which aim to improve the quality of life in the black communities from which your company derives its workforce.

Section 6: Desegregation of Places of Work

6.1 Please state whether your company has done everything possible to abolish any practice of segregation, notably at the work place, in canteens, in education and training and in sports facilities.

6.2 Please indicate whether it is company policy to remove any remaining segregation at the earliest possible opportunity.

6.3 Please indicate measures taken to promote inter-staff contacts from different racial groups.

Section 7: Encouragement of Black Business

Please state company policy towards the encouragement of black businesses, indicating whether the company has helped to develop small black-owned businesses, or has sub-contracted or has regularly placed orders with such companies.

Publication of company reports

Please state whether this report will be made publicly available by the company.



→ Mr Powell
(No. 10)

Confidential

GRS 110

Private Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL
FM PRETORIA
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 151
OF 150800Z JULY 1986

Ler No 10 see?

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR FERGUSSON

SOUTH AFRICA/FRANCE

1. DURING YOUR CALL ON PIK BOTHA ON 14 JULY HE TOLD YOU IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT HE HAD RECEIVED AN (UNNAMED) EMISSARY FROM CHIRAC LAST WEEK AND HAD RAISED WITH HIM FRANCE'S ''DOUBLE ROLE'' ON THE SANCTIONS ISSUE. PIK BOTHA HAD SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL FRANCE HAD NOT SUPPORTED MRS THATCHER AND OTHERS IN OPPOSING SANCTIONS. THE EMISSARY HAD HOTLY DENIED THIS. PIK BOTHA HAD THEN REQUESTED THAT CHIRAC SHOULD WRITE TO THE STATE PRESIDENT TO EXPLAIN FRENCH POLICY. THERE HAD SO FAR BEEN NO RESPONSE.

MOBERLY

LIMITED
SAFD
ELD(E)
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR REEVE

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(2)

blind cc:
Mr Powell, No 10

From: E A J Fergusson

Date: 15 July 1986

Prime Minister
Exactly
COP 15/7

Mr Prendergast, SAfD, K 224

COMGEP: MRS HELEN SUZMAN

1. It is worth noting that Mrs Suzman, when I saw her in Pretoria, was very critical of the tone and substance of the COMGEP report, which she thought tendentious and distorted, and also of Lord Barber for putting his name to the report, when he could not possibly have agreed with much of what was in it.

E A J Fergusson

cc:
Private Secretary
PS/Mrs Chalker
PS/PUS
mr Reeve

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

PM/86/045

PRIME MINISTER

South Africa

1. The purpose of this minute is to bring colleagues up-to-date on the progress of my mission.

2. From 8-11 July I visited Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique where I had talks with Presidents Kaunda and Machel and Prime Minister Mugabe.

3. In these talks I stressed:

- our conviction that apartheid must give way to a non-racial fully representative society as soon as possible;

- our belief that negotiations will end apartheid more quickly than violence, which will actually slow the process of change; and that the South Africans could resist a military "solution" for many years;

- the need to acknowledge that the South African Government had already taken some steps towards removal of apartheid;

- our sincerely held view that comprehensive sanctions will not bring down apartheid and that the South Africans would more probably retaliate against their

/neighbours.

neighbours. The EC's decision to study further measures which might be needed was in itself a carefully considered fresh signal;

- the need to do everything possible to advance dialogue so long as the option of peaceful negotiation remained available.

4. President Kaunda was sceptical of the possibility of persuading the South African Government to move; he genuinely believes that nothing less than comprehensive sanctions will induce the South African Government to do so, and that they will buy time for change by persuading the South African blacks to hold back from further violence, because they will see that the West is not against them. But he was willing to wish my mission success.

5. President Machel espouses the case for dialogue. Of the three he was the most realistic in his assessment of the internal political situation in South Africa. He and his Foreign Minister made it clear that they did not favour comprehensive sanctions. But they warned that the dominant influence of the military would make the South African Government hard to shift.

6. Mugabe, though friendly, was the least sympathetic: he made it clear that he suspects our motive to be the preservation of white rule; in his view only military pressure from the ANC, backed by comprehensive sanctions by the world outside, could be effective.

7. I did not seek a meeting with the ANC in Lusaka because there were no credible leaders present at the time. The ANC continued throughout my visit to say that they would refuse to meet me during my mission, since they too still have to be convinced of its sincerity.

/8.

8. We now need to look forward to my further visit to South Africa and to the Commonwealth Review Conference. We need to reconcile what makes sense in a purely South African context with our duty to defend Britain's wide interests in the world as a whole. We must take care that our understandable concern with the former does not lead us to put more fundamental interests at risk.

Tactics with the South Africans

9. The difficulties of convincing African leaders that my mission stands any chance of success (and is not just an attempt to buy time for Britain) highlight the need to obtain some evidence of South African flexibility in my first meeting with P W Botha. Ewen Fergusson, our former Ambassador in South Africa, accompanied me on my recent visit to Southern Africa and then went on to Pretoria, where he saw Pik Botha on 14 July. He left the South Africans in no doubt of the mounting pressures throughout the West for early action, and underlined the need for a forthcoming and substantial response. He also warned of the danger of military action, which would make our attempt to get negotiations under way even more difficult than it is already (there is some evidence that the SADF may be contemplating further action against her neighbours of the kind which wrecked the COMGEP initiative).

10. My immediate objective when I get to South Africa must be to persuade them to create the ncessary conditions for a start of dialogue by releasing Mandela and other political leaders and unbanning political organisations including the ANC. Clearly we should not try to prescribe the political and constitutional arrangements which might emerge from any negotiations, but it might be useful to develop formulae which could be deployed if necessary once negotiations were in train (for example we recognise the need for safeguards for minorities and that this is the reason for South African

/anxiety

anxiety about an unqualified one-man one-vote system in a unitary state). In order to avoid foreclosing options, we should meanwhile refrain from public utterances which might conflict with them.

The ANC

11. The South Africans will be anxious to ensure that negotiations only commence in the context of an abandonment of violence. They have resiled from their earlier publicly implied willingness to settle for a "suspension" of violence. It will be necessary, but very difficult, to try to find a formula which both sides can accept.

12. This underlines the importance of my making contact with the ANC. It will be less difficult to persuade the South Africans to talk to them if I have done so myself and can say that I believe there would be a response if the South Africans were ready to make a gesture. I am trying a number of avenues to arrange a meeting with Tambo, who is in Europe. Tambo's attitude may well determine Mandela's willingness to see me.

Contact with other industrialised countries

13. In the meantime I am in contact with other industrialised countries both in order so far as possible to coordinate policy with them and to bring out to the South Africans the broadly based nature of my mission. I intend to visit Washington on 17/18 July and to meet Shultz and Vice-President Bush. My Political Director, Derek Thomas, who was also with me in Southern Africa, has visited Canberra and Tokyo. You have of course already had contact with the Canadian Government.

/The Commmonwealth Review Conference

The Commonwealth Review Conference

14. The Commonwealth Review Conference in early August, judging from my contacts on this trip, will be extremely difficult. Following COMGEP's lack of success, all those who will be present (including even the Canadians and Australians) can be expected to demand the immediate implementation of most of the measures listed in the Commonwealth Accord. The vigour and persistence with which we have continued to make the case against comprehensive sanctions has led them to conclude, contrary to the Hague understanding, that we have ruled out any move in that direction. This has prompted many of them to see us not just as the sole obstacle to that course, but often as the sole defender of apartheid. The African countries are already threatening action against us: some of this is rhetoric, but concrete measures against our interests now appear quite likely. Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have withdrawn from the Commonwealth Games; others, most notably President Kaunda, have been talking about withdrawal from the Commonwealth. There are also some signs that the African Commonwealth states may take action against British airlines: certain of their Ambassadors in Bonn told Herr Genscher on 8 July that they already had Indian support for such a move. If there were to be a ban on British airlines, the survival of British Caledonian as well as the flotation of British Airways could be at risk.

15. If there were tangible signs of progress arising from my visit to South Africa, it would be easier to get through the Review Meeting without serious damage to our interests. Correspondingly, any further repressive acts by the police or security forces (particularly if they involved large-scale loss of life), or fresh raids by the SADF on South Africa's neighbours, would greatly add to the difficulties.

/16.

16. Even without such actions, in the absence of a real breakthough an attempt by us simply to stand pat at the review meeting could have dangerous implications for our wider interests. On the other hand, the Hague declaration allowed 3 months for consultations between the community and other industrialised countries on further measures. The Nassau Accord committed Heads of Government to consider the adoption of further measures if in their opinion adequate progress towards the objectives outlines in the Accord had not meanwhile been made. Our Commonwealth partners would not accept that their decisions should wait on the timetable subsequently laid down by the European Community. We should have to try to reconcile these conflicting priorities: one possible means of doing so would be to try to gain acceptance of the idea that if any measures are to be taken they will only be adopted, by outselves at least, if the three month period ends with no substantial movement from the South African Government. In the circumstances I have suggested, the very minimum which might get us through would be agreement in principle to specific limited measures if the mission has not achieved tangible and substantial progress, and also to recommend them to the EC and other industrial countries.

17. Meanwhile we need to be very careful how we present our policy in public. We have registered clearly enough the case against comprehensive economic sanctions. Our aim now should be to concentrate our moral indignation on apartheid and those who uphold it. This emphasis would be consistent with the case that you have put in private correspondence with Commonwealth leaders.

18. We should instead stress the positive attempt to get dialogue going. At the same time willingness to adopt economic measures if all else fails was implicit in the EC decision at The Hague, and we should say nothing to suggest that we rule it out. In this way we can avoid fuelling the

/suspicions

suspicions (already widespread and deep) that our main purpose is simply to delay sanctions rather than to achieve change in South Africa.

19. I was struck in my visit to Maputo by the crucially important geographical position of Mozambique in relation to the Central African countries. At the moment Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana are thrust into dependence on South Africa to a large extent by the unworkability of the transport links through Mozambique. We and some of our European partners are already doing a good deal through our aid programmes to rehabilitate these links. But I think there may be room for a still more closely coordinated European policy along these lines. This would have the advantage of strengthening the influence in the region of the Government which has the most moderate and realistic assessment of the South African situation. It would also help to persuade Zambia and Zimbabwe that we are not espousing the cause of South Africa against them. We should therefore discuss this possibility with our European partners.

20. I am copying this minute to OD colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

15 July 1986


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OF 142015Z JULY 86

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR MULRONEY: 13 JULY: SOUTH AFRICA

SUMMARY

1. EXTENSIVE REPORTING OF MULRONEY PRESS CONFERENCE: HE REFERRED TO THE MEETING AS BEING ''EXCELLENT'' AND ''FRANK'', REITERATED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE NASSAU ACCORD COMMITTED COMMONWEALTH LEADERS TO AGREE TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS AND DENIED THAT HE SAW A ROLE FOR HIMSELF AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE REST OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

DETAIL

2. THE CANADIAN MEDIA HEADLINE THEIR REPORTING OF THE MEETING BY CONCENTRATING ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S MAINTENANCE OF HMG'S POSITION AGAINST SANCTIONS IN SPITE OF MR MULRONEY'S EFFORTS TO DEFLECT HER. HE CONFIRMED CANADA'S READINESS TO IMPLEMENT FURTHER MEASURES. HE MAINTAINED THAT BOTH THE NASSAU MEETING AND COMGEP HAD EFFECTIVELY CALLED FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT CHANGE ITS POLICY. HE DISMISSED THE ARGUMENT THAT ''SIGNALS'' AND ''MEASURES'' MEAN ANYTHING OTHER THAN SANCTIONS. HE BELIEVED THAT THE NASSAU MEETING HAD COMMITTED COMMONWEALTH LEADERS TO SANCTIONS AND SAID CANADA ''WILL FOLLOW THROUGH ON ITS OBLIGATIONS''. MR MULRONEY REJECTED THE SUGGESTION THAT HE WAS POSSIBLY THE ONLY PERSON WHO COULD ACT AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT SEMI COLON HE DID NOT SEE SUCH A ROLE FOR HIMSELF. HE REPLIED TO THE SUGGESTION THAT ONLY FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WOULD BRING ABOUT REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA BY SAYING ''IN TERMS OF THOSE WHO PLEAD FOR MORE TIME, IT WAS 25 YEARS AGO THAT THOSE SAME ARGUMENTS WERE MADE BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS. IN THAT TIME GENERATIONS HAVE GROWN UP AND DIED. AN EVIL REGIME HAS NOT CHANGED IN

ITS FUNDAMENTALS''. THE FAILURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH TO AGREE OVER SANCTIONS, OR THE BREAK UP OF THE COMMONWEALTH, ''WILL BE A BONANZA TO MR BOTHA''.

3. TWO PAPERS COMMENTED THAT THE HOLDING OF SEPARATE NEWS CONFERENCES BY THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS WAS A REFLECTION OF THEIR DIFFERENCES.

DAY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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MR REEVE
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TO DD 150800Z FCO LONDON
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INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON,HARARE,LUSAKA,MAPUTO,MASERU,MBABANE

SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS .

BOTSWANA

1. FERGUSSON RAISED SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH BOTSWANA IN SOME DETAIL WITH KILLEN, DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DFA, AND SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK UP THE POINT AGAIN DURING HIS CALL ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON 14 JULY. ON BOTH OCCASIONS HE MADE CLEAR YOUR PERSONAL CONCERN IN THE LIGHT OF REPRESENTATIONS BY THE BOTSWANAN FOREIGN MINISTER. BOTH KILLEN AND PIK BOTHA INSISTED THAT THEY HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE PERPETRATORS OF MUCH RECENT VIOLENCE HAD TRANSITED THROUGH BOTSWANA. THE BOTSWANAN AUTHORITIES HAD CLOSED THEIR EYES TO THIS.

MOZAMBIQUE.

2. PIK BOTHA ADDED THATTHE SAME WAS TRUE OF THE MOZAMBICAN AUTHORITIES. A NUMBER OF TERRORISTS WERE ABLE TO TRANSIT THROUGH MAPUTO AIRPORT. VELOSO HAD RECENTLY SUGGESTED A FURTHER BILATERAL MEETING BUT PIK BOTHA HAD REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO POINT AT THIS STAGE. HE WAS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING SUSPENDING ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE.

ZIMBABWE.

3. PIK BOTHA ALSO SPOKE BITTERLY ABOUT MUGABE'S PRESSURE FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES WERE PREPARING PLANS FOR SCALING DOWN TRANSPORT FACILITIES USED BY ZIMBABWE. FERGUSSON QUESTIONED WHETHER MUGABE'S RHETORIC SHOULD BE TAKEN AT ITS FACE VALUE AND POINTED OUT THE RISKS ARISING FROM THE RATCHET EFFECT OF ONE SIDE RESPONDING TO THE PROVOCATION OF THE OTHER. PIK BOTHA RECOGNISED THAT THIS WAS A POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCE BUT SAID THAT THE SANCTION THREATS HAD GONE ON FOR TOO LONG.

MOBERLY.

SOUTH AFRICA
LIMITED

S AF D
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LEGAL ADVISERS
PLANNING STAFF
CCD
CONS D
SCD
PUSD
DEF D

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR FERGUSSON
MR REEVE

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CALL ON SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER
SUMMARY

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1. THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT WESTERN PRESSURES ON SOUTH AFRICA TO RELEASE MANDELA AND UNBAN THE ANC IGNORED THE VERY REAL DIFFICULTIES. THERE WOULD BE LITTLE HOPE FOR YOUR MISSION UNLESS PROGRESS WERE MADE ON THE RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE AND PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FOR MINORITIES.

DETAIL

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2. FERGUSSON AND I CALLED ON PIK BOTHA ON 14 JULY. KILLEN AND VON HIRSCHBERG WERE ALSO PRESENT THOUGH THEY SAID LITTLE. OUR DISCUSSION WAS FRANK BUT THE TONE WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT.

3. FERGUSSON BEGAN BY DESCRIBING THE BACKGROUND TO YOUR MISSION. HE STRESSED YOUR PRESIDENCY STATUS AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL EC GOVERNMENTS, AND ALSO YOUR COMMITMENT TO FINDING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WHICH WOULD BRING AN END TO THE SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE. FERGUSSON UNDERLINED THE PERCEPTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT THE RELEASE OF MANDELA AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS AND THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC AND OTHER PARTIES WERE CRUCIAL IN BREAKING THE SEQUENCE OF VIOLENCE, COUNTER-REPRESSION AND PRESSURE FOR SANCTIONS. PIK BOTHA TOOK A CAREFUL NOTE OF THE TIMETABLE FOR INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE INTENSE BUILD-UP OF PRESSURE FOR SANCTIONS. FERGUSSON ALSO OUTLINED THE OUTCOME OF YOUR VISITS TO LUSAKA, HARARE AND MAPUTO. HE EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP HAD COME TO A PREMATURE END AND ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY MESSAGE HE COULD TAKE BACK TO YOU IN PREPARATION FOR YOUR MISSION.

4. PIK BOTHA VOICED WARM APPRECIATION FOR ALL THE PRIME MINISTER WAS DOING TO AVOID VIOLENCE AND PUNITIVE SANCTIONS. THE LATTER WOULD ONLY INCREASE THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE AND PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF MOSCOW AND THE COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN THE ANC. HOWEVER, HIS MAIN CONCERN WAS THE WAY THE EC MANDATE HAD BEEN PHRASED. IT IGNORED THE FORMIDABLE SECURITY DANGERS INHERENT IN SIMPLY RELEASING MANDELA AND UNBANNING THE ANC. WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS FEARED THAT THE DEMANDS WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WERE PLACING ON SOUTH AFRICA WOULD LEAD INEVITABLY TO PLACING THE ANC IN POWER AND THUS DESTROY THE CHANCE OF CREATING A SOCIETY IN WHICH WHITES WOULD RETAIN ANY RIGHTS. IT SEEMED THAT TWO ALTERNATIVES FACED SOUTH AFRICA, EITHER TO SURRENDER TO THE ANC OR TO PERSEVERE WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S OWN PROGRAMME OF REFORM, SLOW THOUGH THIS WAS, AND ACCEPT THAT SANCTIONS WOULD BE IMPOSED ON THEM. THE LATTER COURSE AT LEAST HELD OUT SOME HOPE AND WOULD BE THE ONE THEY WOULD CHOOSE.

5. WHEN FERGUSSON POINTED OUT THAT YOUR MISSION WAS AN ATTEMPT TO FIND A THIRD ALTERNATIVE, PIK BOTHA REPLIED THAT IF THERE WAS TO BE ANY HOPE FOR A SOLUTION, SOUTH AFRICA NEEDED THE SUPPORT OF WESTERN LEADERS SUCH AS MRS THATCHER, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND CHANCELLOR KOHL ON TWO POINTS:

(I) RENUCIATION OF THE USE OF VIOLENCE BY ANY GROUP AS A MEANS OF OBTAINING POLITICAL CHANGE.

(II) INCORPORATION OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN ANY FUTURE CONSTITUTION.

THESE SHOULD BE THE TWO MAIN ISSUES FOR YOUR MEETING WITH THE STATE PRESIDENT. WITHOUT PROGRESS ON THEM HE FEARED YOUR MISSION WOULD NOT SUCCEED. HE ADDED IN PASSING THAT HE WOULD NOT ADVISE YOU TO LAY TOO MUCH EMPHASIS WITH THE STATE PRESIDENT ON TIME CONSTRAINTS, REAL THOUGH HE RECOGNISED THEM TO BE.

6. WHEN FERGUSSON POINTED OUT THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN THE ANC WOULD INEVITABLY RENEW VIOLENCE, PIK BOTHA ACCEPTED THIS BUT EMPHASISED THE PRESENTATIONAL PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE LIKE ''SUSPENSION'' WHICH IMPLIED THAT NEGOTIATION WOULD BE HELD UNDER THREAT OF RENEWED VIOLENCE.

7. HE ADDED THAT ONE DAY MANDELA WOULD BE RELEASED AND THE ANC UN-BANNED. MODERATE BLACKS WERE ASKING FOR THIS AS A CONDITION FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT'S PROCESS OF POLITICAL REFORM. IT WAS THE MAIN REMAINING OBSTACLE FOR BUTHELEZI. THE GOVERNMENT WAS CONSIDERING THIS POSSIBILITY, BUT IT COULD ONLY HAPPEN IN CON-DITIONS WHICH DID NOT LEAD TO THE GOVERNMENT LOSING CONTROL. HE WAS VISIBLY NERVOUS AT THE RISK OF OUR RAISING FORMALLY THE POSSIBIL-ITY OF SEEING MANDELA BEFORE YOUR CALL ON THE STATE PRESIDENT.

8. PIK BOTHA STRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE FAILURE OF THE TOKYO SUMMIT TO RESPOND TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN REQUEST FOR ENDORSEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. FERGUSSON SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A MISTAKE TO PUT AN ISSUE OF THIS SORT AT THE LAST MOMENT TO THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT. PIK BOTHA CLAIMED TO HAVE RECEIVED A REPORT THAT AT TOKYO YOU HAD ARGUED ACCEPTANCE OF MINORITY RIGHTS MIGHT BE PERCEIVED AS ACCEPTANCE OF APARTHEID. IN FACT, THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS WAS A NECESSARY ELEMENT IN THE STRUCTURE OF POWER-SHARING AND WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH POWER BEING IN THE HANDS OF A MAJORITY COALITION OF INTERESTS.

9. SEPARATE TELS COVER DISCUSSION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS AND DETAILS OF YOUR PROGRAMME.

10. FCO PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

MOBERLY

SOUTH AFRICA
LIMITED

S AF D
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O 141955Z JUL 86
FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
BT
S E C R E T

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING +EYES ONLY+ MESSAGE TO
ADMIRAL POINDEXTER FROM CHARLES POWELL

DEAR JOHN,
THANK YOU FOR YOUR NOTE OF TODAY'S DATE ABOUT THE CORRESPONDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA. I THINK I CAN EXPLAIN WHAT HAPPENED. WE DID NOT SHOW THE EXCHANGE TO OUR FOREIGN OFFICE OR INDEED TO ANYONE ELSE. HOWEVER, WHEN YOUR TWO COLLEAGUES FROM THE NSC STAFF CAME TO TALK TO ME ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA, THERE WAS INEVITABLY SOME REFERENCE TO THE MESSAGE. THEY HAD BROUGHT WITH THEM A MEMBER OF YOUR EMBASSY STAFF WHO NO DOUBT REPORTED BACK. I HAD NOT REALISED IN ADVANCE THAT HE WAS COMING, AND IT SEEMED RUDE TO EXCLUDE HIM. I WAS MYSELF RATHER SURPRISED WHEN CHARLIE PRICE REFERRED TO THE EXCHANGE THE OTHER DAY. BUT I ASSUME THAT THIS IS HOW HE GOT TO HEAR OF IT. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE ALWAYS GO TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS TO KEEP EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT EXTREMELY CONFIDENTIAL.

THANK YOU FOR DRAWING IT TO MY ATTENTION.

BEST WISHES,
CHARLES

BT

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EYES ONLY WHO4007

PLESAE DELIVER FOLLOWING EYES ONLY MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL
FROM ADMIRAL POINDEXTER.

14 JULY 1986

DEAR CHARLES:

I AM WRITING ABOUT A DELICATE MATTER. AS YOU KNOW, IN SOME INSTANCES, WE INFORM CHARLIE PRICE ABOUT CORRESPONDENCE OVER THE CABINET LINE. I UNDERSTAND YOU DO THE SAME WITH OLIVER WRIGHT.

HOWEVER, IN A CASE LIKE THE RECENT EXCHANGE ON SOUTH AFRICA IN WHICH YOU SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT KNOWLEDGE OF IT BE RESTRICTED AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE AND THAT IT NOT BE SEEN OUTSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE, WE FRANKLY DID NOT PLAN ON SENDING CHARLIE COPIES OF THE EXCHANGE. CHARLIE, HOWEVER, GOT WIND OF IT -- WE BELIEVE IN LONDON -- SO HE NOW HAS COPIES.

MY COMMENTS IN NO WAY REFLECT ON CHARLIE PRICE. BUT PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT WHEN YOU SPECIFICALLY ASK US TO KEEP PRIVACY CHANNEL EXCHANGES CLOSE HOLD AND THAT THEY NOT BE SEEN OUTSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE, WE WILL DO SO. WE ARE CONFIDENT YOU WILL ACCORD THEM THE SAME TREATMENT, WHEN WE MAKE SUCH A REQUEST.

PLEASE KEEP IN TOUCH.

WARM REGARDS,

JOHN

0230
£4007

NNNN

TOR 1625Z DAB

E.R.

(1)

CDP.
all arranged
Buckingham Palace
HLC. CR.

PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA

We have re-arranged your bilateral with the Foreign Secretary for Wednesday morning. He is very keen to have a further meeting of the restricted Ministerial group on South Africa later that day to pave the way for discussion in Cabinet. I think this is probably wise. The group consists of the Lord President, Foreign Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Chief Whip.

Agree to a meeting of this group on Wednesday?

C.D.P.

Yes

Fcs ✓
Ld Bgs ✓
ch Ex ✓
Chancellor ✓
S/T ✓
CW.

Charles Powell

14 July 1986

DG2BGF

Original filed on CANADA: EXPO'86: July 81
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File

DCABIP

bc PCW

meeting record

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 July 1986

Dear Colin,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER: SOUTH AFRICA

I have recorded separately the Prime Minister's discussions with Mr. Mulroney of a number of bilateral and international issues. This letter reports their discussion on South Africa. I should be grateful if it could be given a very limited circulation (3).

Mr. Mulroney opened by saying that the United Kingdom's leadership in the Commonwealth was vital. That leadership would be imperilled, at least in the world of perceptions, by failure to reach agreement at the meeting of seven Commonwealth Heads of Government in London on further action against South Africa. There was no doubt that there would be very strong pressure at that meeting for further measures based on what had been agreed in Nassau. The old Commonwealth countries must be ready to respond. He did not wish to dramatise the situation. He agreed with the Prime Minister's comment that the Commonwealth had come through a lot of difficulties in the past. Nor was Canada's friendship with Britain in doubt. But he had to say that he was very concerned about the August meeting and the consequences of it for the Commonwealth. He wondered how the Prime Minister saw the prospects for the August meeting and for progress from the Foreign Secretary's mission to Southern Africa.

The Prime Minister said that one had to draw a distinction between leadership and followership. She hoped that Mr. Mulroney was not saying that leadership required Britain to fall in with the views of a number of other Commonwealth countries even though we believed they were fundamentally wrong. She had looked very carefully at every argument for and against general economic sanctions. She was convinced that they would not achieve their professed goal. There was no historical precedent for sanctions

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persuading a government to change its internal policies. Moreover it was inconsistent to pour aid into Africa to combat famine while simultaneously taking measures which would increase the likelihood of starvation of black people in South Africa. Responsible western governments also had to consider the risk that the South African government would, in retaliation, deny supplies of vital raw materials. We all shared the objective of getting rid of apartheid. But the best prospect of achieving this lay through negotiation. She feared that some African leaders actually wanted violence in South Africa, because their own experience had taught them that this was the quickest way to achieve power. One could not overlook the changes that had taken place in South Africa. The National Party convention in August would show to what extent further significant change could be expected. She did not believe that the South African Government would respond to threats or an ultimatum. Moreover moderate opinion, both black and white, in South Africa was opposed to sanctions. Of course she was alive to the importance of keeping the Commonweatlh together, though it was legitimate to wonder what real value those who used their membership as a means of pressure on other governments really attached to the institution. She came back to her starting point: our policy could not be determined by majority opinion in the Commonwealth. The starting point had to be a clear analysis of what course was most likely to bring about the desired aim of dismantling apartheid.

Mr. Mulroney said that, in his view, the principal objective at the London meeting was how to give life to the Nassau Accord. He did not think that it was possible to leave London without sending some further signals to the South African Government. He was not talking about comprehensive sanctions but rather about looking at a list of possible measures against South Africa and seeing what could be done to send a stronger signal to the South African Government. He did not want to get into an argument about the morality of sanctions, though in his own view if you were seeking a noble end sanctions were a justified means. They had anyway been adopted by the West in other situations. As regards raw materials, Canada could supply many of those for which South Africa was currently the main source provided there was sufficient investment. He thought that change in South Africa could only be achieved by stepping up pressure from outside. Canadian and British views on this were clearly at variance.

The Prime Minister said that the difficulty with the course proposed by Mr. Mulroney was that it involved moving further down a slippery slope towards general economic sanctions. It was also based on a misreading of the psychology of the Afrikaners. And it took no account of the

strong likelihood of retaliation by South Africa against neighbouring black African countries, who would no doubt turn to the United Kingdom and Canada for help. She certainly did not want to see dissension at the Commonwealth meeting in August. Her goal would be convergence on a reasonable policy. In her view that meant seeking to bring about the end of apartheid by negotiation. The European Community's mission should be given a reasonable chance to achieve this.

Mr. Mulroney said that it was clear that Canada and the United Kingdom had a strong divergence of opinion on this. This was not a happy situation. Canada wanted to see something positive emerge from the London meeting. The Prime Minister commented that she did not regard sanctions as positive. Mr. Mulroney said that he hoped the two governments could keep in close touch in the period leading up to the Commonwealth meeting. He would be particularly interested in any information on the progress of the Foreign Secretary's mission.

It was agreed that the press should be told that there had been a preliminary discussion between the Prime Minister and Mr. Mulroney of the issues which would arise at the Commonwealth meeting in August. In the event, Mr. Mulroney's public comments clearly went well beyond this.

yours ever,

(CHARLES POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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YOUR TELNO 110: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT: PRESS REACTION
1. THE ARTICLE WAS PRESUMABLY REFERRING TO THE SERIES OF INVITATIONS ISSUED BY PRESIDENT BOTHA IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TO BLACK REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS IDEAS FOR POWER-SHARING, MOST RECENTLY THROUGH THE PROPOSED NATIONAL STATUTARY COUNCIL. THESE INVITATIONS HAVE SO FAR BEEN REJECTED BY ALL BLACK LEADERS OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY ASSOCIATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT. THE RADICALS ARE NOT INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATING ABOUT POWER-SHARING APPARENTLY DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN WHITE CONTROL. THE MODERATES INCLUDING BUTHELEZI FEEL UNABLE TO RESPOND UNTIL MANDELA IS RELEASED AND THE ANC BANNED.
2. THE ARTICLE MAY ALSO BE REFERRING TO THE PERIODIC CONTACTS WHICH TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE STATE PRESIDENT AND BLACK LEADERS SUCH AS BISHOP TUTU AND DR BOESAK. OFFICIAL SOURCES CLAIM THAT SUCH CONTACTS ARE MORE FREQUENT THAN IS GENERALLY REALISED.
3. THE ARTICLE REFLECTS THE WIDESPREAD BELIEF HERE AMONG GOVERNMENT SYMPATHISERS THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS ARE ILL-INFORMED, EITHER WILLFULLY OR BY NEGLECT, OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S REFORM PROGRAMME, AND IN PARTICULAR ITS EFFORTS TO ENGAGE BLACKS IN MOVES TOWARDS POWER-SHARING.

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OF 111015Z JULY 86
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA, LUSAKA, LAGOS, ACCRA

YOUR TELNO 161: COMMONWEALTH AFRICAN REACTIONS TO BRITISH POLICY ON SOUTH AFRICA

1. MUGABE'S COMMENTS DURING SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO HARARE ON 9-10 JULY MADE IT CLEAR THAT, UNTIL NIGERIA AND GHANA ACTED, HARARE HAD NOT LINKED THE ISSUE OF PARTICIPATION IN THE GAMES WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION (MY TELNO 283)

2. THERE IS NO INDICATION HERE, THEREFORE, THAT THIS MOVE MAY BE THE FIRST STEP IN ANY SERIES OF MEASURES AGREED WITH ZIMBABWE. BUT NOW THAT GHANA AND NIGERIA HAVE WITHDRAWN, AND GIVEN ZIMBABWEAN DISQUIET OVER BUDD AND COWLEYON ZIMBABWE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY JOIN IN ANY WIDER MOVE BY COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES TO BOYCOTT THE GAMES.

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BEGINS
FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE AIRBORNE DESKBY 111800Z

MIPT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MISSION: PRESS REACTIONS
1. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE EDITORIAL COMMENT THIS WEEK. THE VISITS TO LUSAKA, HARARE AND MAPUTO HAVE BEEN REPORTED DAY BY DAY, MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF AGENCY REPORTS, BUT HAVE MOSTLY NOT MADE FRONT PAGE HEADLINES. THE SLANT HAS BEEN PRIMARILY ON ARGUMENTS OVER SANCTIONS AND RIFTS WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH. THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENTS ON SANCTIONS HAVE BEEN WARMLY WELCOMED.
2. IN GENERAL, THE PAESS HAS HELD OUT LITTLE PROSPECT OF SUCCESS FOR YOUR MISSION, ALTHOUGH ONE OR TWO PAPERS CLEARLY WISH IT WELL. SPECIFIC COMMENTS OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS HAVE INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:-

''IT IS NOT CLEAR WHY SIR G HOWE IS COMING TO THIS COUNTRY AT ALL. IT WOULD BE QUIATE FOOLISH TO BELIEVE THAT HE IS GOING TO MAKE ONE IOTA OF DIFFERENCE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THE IMPRISONED MANDELA, THE ANC OR THE STATE OF EMERGENCY...THE VISIT DOESN'T HAVE THE LEAST OPPORTUNITY FOR REDUCING VIOLENCE AND PROMOTING PEACEFUL CHANGE TO POWER-SHARING...A MEASURE OF SUCCESS NORTH OF THE LIMPOPO WOULD HAVE ENABLED HIM TO FACE THE BOTHAS WITH SOME CONCRETE DIPLOMATIC ADVANCE WHICH THEY WOULD NOT WANT TO IGNORE OR HAVE ANY DIFFICULTY ACKNOWLEDGING IN PUBLIC...IF HE WERE TO APPEAR IN CAPE TOWN NOW HE WOULD HAVE NOTHING REMOTELY OF THAT SORT WITH WHICH TO PARLEY.''
(FINANCIAL MAIL, 11 JULY - INDEPENDENT WEEKLY)

''AFTER (PIK BOTHA'S OUTBURST LAST WEEK), IT IS A RELIEF TO KNOW THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOW AGREED TO A MEETING BETWEEN SIR GEOFFREY HOWE AND PRESIDENT BOTHA LATER THIS MONTH. IT RAISES HOPES THAT A PRAGMATIC RESPONSE MAY STILL GREET THE APPROACH OF THOSE WESTERN LEADERS WHO REMAIN CONVINCED THAT IT IS NOT TOO LATE FOR NEGOTIATING RATHER THAN FORCING THE DEMISE OF APARTHEID. BUT NOT ONLY THE GOVERNMENT MUST AGREE TO TALK...RADICAL OPPONENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO BE EQUALLY WILLING TO TALK...THE ALTERNATIVE TO NEGOTIATION AND PAINSTAKING TALK IS VIOLENCE AND MORE VIOLENCE.''
(THE STAR, 10 JULY - INDEPENDENT)

''SIR G. HOWE'S LACK OF FLAMBOYANCY MAY BE A DECISIVE FACTOR IN MAKING HIM A MORE CREDIBLE ARBITRATOR AS FAR AS PRETORIA IS CONCERNED AND OF THE HIGH AND MIGHTY KNOW-ALLS WHO HAVE CROSSED OUR THRESHOLD IN THE PAST...IF THERE IS ONE PERSON THAT CAN WIN THE CONFIDENCE OF BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND BLACK LEADERS, IT IS SIR G. HOWE.''
(DIE TRANSVALER, 10 JULY - AFRIKAANS DAILY SUPPORTING RIGHT WING OF NATIONAL PARTY)

''THE MOOD IN PRETORIA IS UNMISTAKABLE - AT WORST DEFIANCE, AT BEST FATALISM...IF SIR G. HOWE DOES COME, HE SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THERE IS NO HOPE OO A QUICK POLITICAL FIX, NOT EVEN IF FULL-SCALE SANCTIONS ARE THE CERTAIN ALTERNATIVE. IF HE MANAGES TO FIX THAT IDEA FIRMLY IN HIS MIND, HIS VISIT WILL AT LEAST BEGIN ON A NOTE OF REALISM - EVEN IF IT ENDS UP, LIKE ALL OTHER PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS, IN DEEP FRUSTRATION.''
(BUSINESS DAY, 8 JULY - INDEPENDENT)
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INFO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO, HARARE, LUSAKA, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, CANBERRA

CANBERRA FOR DEREK THOMAS
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE PURPOSE OF HIS MISSION. MACHEL ACCEPTED THAT HE WAS ACTING IN GOOD FAITH ON BEHALF OF THE EC. HE AGREED TO TRY TO PERSUADE HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE FRONT LINE STATES AND OTHER BLACK AFRICAN LEADERS TO TAKE A MORE SYMPATHETIC VIEW OF THE MISSION.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT MACHEL SUMMARISED HIS MEETINGS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE SINCE 1983. SINCE 1985 BRITAIN HAD PLAYED A POSITIVE ROLE IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM IN MOZAMBIQUE AS A RESULT OF THE POSITIVE STAND TAKEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER. HE CITED IN PARTICULAR MILITARY TRAINING AT NYANGA, MILITARY COURSES IN THE UK, AND BRITISH HELP IN THE REHABILITATION OF THE RAILWAY LINES TO MAPUTO. BRITAIN AND MOZAMBIQUE WERE TOTALLY AGREED ON THE NEED TO ABOLISH APARTHEID. WHEN HE HAD SEEN THE PRIME MINISTER LAST YEAR SHE HAD BEEN INDIGNANT AT SOUT
H
AFRICAN VIOLATIONS OF THE NKOMATI ACCORD. SHE HAD PROMISED TO WRITE TO P W BOTHA AND MACHEL HAD BEEN TOLD BY PIK BOTHA THAT SHE HAD DONE SO.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND HE VALUED THEIR MEETINGS WITH MACHEL. HE INFORMED MACHEL OF THE DECISION TO CONTINUE B. MATT TRAINING AT NYANGA FOR ANOTHER YEAR FROM JANUARY 1987 AND TO ADD HELP ON THE BEIRA LINE TO THE HELP WE WERE ALREADY GIVING ON THE LIMPOPO AND NACALA LINES AND AT MAPUTO PORT.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THEN EXPLAINED THE PURPOSE OF HIS MISSION ON BEHALF OF THE EC. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT CHANGE QUICKLY THROUGH DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SAG AND BLACK AFRICAN LEADERS. THIS WOULD PRODUCE CHANGE FASTER THAN THE PATH OF VIOLENCE. HE WOULD VISIT SOUTH AFRICA AT THE END OF JULY AND WOULD SEE P W BOTHA TWICE, BRINGING A MESSAGE FROM THE OUTSIDE WORLD THAT APARTHEID MUST GIVE WAY TO A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. HE WOULD GIVE CREDIT TO THE SAG FOR STEPS ALREADY TAKEN, BUT STRESS THAT THEY MUST GO FURTHER AND FASTER. THE PRESENT PATTERN OF MOUNTING VIOLENCE COULD ONLY PROLONG MISERY. THE BEST WAY FORWARD WOULD BE THROUGH DIALOGUE WITH BLACK AFRICAN LEADERS BASED ON THE FREEING OF MANDELA AND OTHER PRISONERS AND THE UNBANNING OF POLITICAL PARTIES. BRITAIN FIRMLY BELIEVED COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS WOULD DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD. THEY WOULD DO HARM TO BLACKS MORE THAN WHITES , TO INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES INCLUDING BRITAINS, AND, IF SOUTH AFRICA RETALIATED, TO THE FLS INCLUDING MOZAMBIQUE. ALL THIS MIGHT BE WORTH CONSIDERING IF IT WOULD PRODUCE THE RIGHT RESULT, BUT IF WOULD IN FACT ONLY LEAD TO GREATER ISOLATIONISM AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE. HE WAS AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF HIS MISION. AFTER INITIAL RELUCTANCE, P W BOTHA HAD NOW AGREED TO MEET HIM. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT BLACK AFRICAN LEADERS SHOULD DO THE SAME.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
COULD NOT TELL BOTHA TO TALK TO THEM IF THEY HAD SHOWN THEMSELVES UNWILLING TO TALK TO HIMSELF.

5. PRESIDENT MACHEL SAID THIS MESSAGE WAS CLEAR. HE GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETINGS WITH P W AND PIK BOTHA OVER THE PAST YEAR. HE HAD TOLD PIK THAT THE BOERS HAD FOUGHT BRITAIN TO ACHIEVE THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM: YET THEY WERE NOW DENYING THE SAME RIGHT TO OTHERS. PIK HAD TOLD HIM LAST AUGUST THAT THE SAG WANTED TO ABOLISH THE PASS LAWS, ESTABLISH SINGLE CITIZENSHIP, BRING REPRESENTATIVE LEADERS TOGETHER TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE, ACT JOINTLY WITH MOZAMBIQUE AGAINST SANCTIONS, AND RELEASE MANDELA IF HE WOULD RMNOUNCE VIOLENCE. MACHEL HAD WELCOMED THE FIRST THREE POINTS BUT HAD SAID MOZAMBIQUE COULD NOT HELP OVER SANCTIONS AS IT COULD NOT IMPOSE ITS VIEWS ON THE REST OF THE WORLD. IT WAS A MISTAKE TO BASE CITIZENSHIP ON COLOUR. BLACKS AND WHITES SHOULD BE BROUGHT TOGETHER TO THE TOP OF THE MOUNTAIN TO SEE THAT THE WHOLE COUNTRY WAS ONE. IT SHOULD NOT BE FRAGMENTED ON TRIBAL LINES AND BOTH APARTHEID AND THE HOMELANDS MUST BE ABOLISHED. PIK BOTHA HAD AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS BUT ASKED FOR MORE TIME.

6. MACHEL ASKED WHAT ROLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE WANTED HIM TO PLAY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED HIM TO SUSTAIN THE CASE HE WAS ALREADY PUTTING TO THE SAG. CHANGES MUST BE BROUGHT ABOUT WITH THE AGREEMENT OF BLACK AND WHITE LEADERS THROUGH DIALOGUE. THE SAG HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT APARTHEID WAS DOOMED AS PRESSURES WOULD ONLY INCREASE SO LONG AS IT REMAINED. THEREFORE PIK BOTHA SHOULD RECAPTURE HIS COURAGE, REINVIGORATE P W BOTHA AND GIVE DIALOGUE A CHANCE.

7. MACHEL SAID HE HAD SUGGESTED (LAST YEAR) THAT MANDELA AND HIS COLLEAGUES SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO MAPUTO WHERE THEY COULD SPEAK FREELY TO PIK BOTHA AND HIS COLLEAGUES. PIK HAD SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER THIS. MACHEL SAID HE HAD ALSO URGED PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT THE US SHOULD TALK WITH THE ANC AND MANDELA. THE ANC WAS A POPULAR MOVEMENT WHICH COULD NOT BE IGNORED: TAMBO AND MANDELA WERE NATIONALISTS, NOT COMMUNISTS. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT 24 MILLION BLACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA SUPPORTED SANCTIONS BECAUSE THEIR SITUATION COULD BE NO WORSE THAN IT WAS ALREADY. THOUSANDS WERE ALREADY APPLYINMG SANCTIONS THROUGH STRIKES WHICH WERE CAUSING FACTORIES AND MINES TO CLOSE. THE SAG COULD ONLY EXERCISE CONTROL THROUGH THE BAYONET. BUT THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE COULD NOT BE IMPRISONED FOREVER. EVERYONE WISHED TO SEEA GRADUAL AND PEACEFUL TRANSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA WITHOUT DAMAGE TO THE COUNTRY'S PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY. BUT IT WAS ALREADY BEING DESTROYED.

8. THE WHITES IN SOUTH AFRICA WERE DIVIDED. BUSINESSMEN, THE BRITISH AND JEWISH COMMUNITIES AND SOME BOERS WERE AGAINST APARTHEID. PIK BOTHER WANTED RAPID CHANGE NOW BUT THE MILITARY PREVENTED IT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT WOULD BE COMPROMISED BY THEM. EVEN IF THE SAG TOOK SOME MEASURES AS A RESULT OF THE LATTER VISIT, THE MILITARY, WOULD DISTORT THEM. P W BOTHA WAS THEIR PRISONER. THE NKOMATI ACCORD WAS BEING VIOLATED BY THE MILITARY, NOT BY PW OR PIK BOTHA. A PLAN HAD BEEN DEVISED BETWEEN CHIRAC, HOUPHUET-BOIGNY, AND P W BOTHA FOR BOTHA TO VISIT THE IVORY COAST TO SEE HOW A NON-RACIAL AFRICAN COUNTRY FUNCTIONEDM ESTABLISHMENT OF EMBASSIES WAS ENVISAGED. AN ADVANCE PARTY HAD GONE TO THE IVORY COAST TO MAKE DETAILZD ARRANGEMENTS BUT THE PLAN HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY RUINED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY AND THE VISIT HAD BEEN CANCELLED.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WISHED TO LEAVE A MESSAGE WITH THE SAG THAT THE WHOLE WORLD BELIEVED DIALOGUE BASED ON THE RELEASE OF MANDELA AND OTHER PRISONERS WAS THE ONLY WAY FORWARD. IT WAS NOT TRUE, AS MUGABE HAD SUGGESTED, THAT HIS MISSION WAS ONLY INTENDED TO GAIN TIME. AGAINST THE PERSPECTIVE OF HISTORY THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN TRYING TO SAVE A FEW WEEKS OR MONTHS. HIS MISSION WAS TO CONVINCE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ON BEHALF OF ALL THE INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES THAT THIS WAS ALMOST THEIR LAST CHANCE. HE HOPED MACHEL WOULD PERSUADE HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE FRONT LINE STATEX OF THE SERIOUSNES OF THE MISSION. THE PRIME MINISTER AND HE HAD HEEDED THE ADVICE OF MACHEL AND OTHERS TO TALK TO THE ANC. THE FIRST CONTACT HAD BEEN IN LUSAKA IN FEBRUARY, FOLLOWED BY MINISTERIAL CONTACT TWO WEEKS' AGO. IT WAS NOW ESSENTIAL THAT HE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TALYTO THE ANC SO THAT HE COULD TELL THE SAG TO DO THE SAME.

1Ø. MACHEL SAID THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD TALK TO THE ANC OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA AND TO MANDELA, BISHOP TUTU AND BOESAK IN SOUTH AFRICA. HE WOULD TRY TO PERSUADE THEM NOT TO REGARD THE SECRETARY OF STATE AS A TRAITOR TO THEIR CAUSE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT THAT IF THEY DID NOT MOVE THEY WOULD EMBARRASS BRITAIN, THE US AND THE FRG.

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FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE AIRBORNE DESKBY 111800Z

MAPUTO TELNO 67: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MISSION

1. THERE HAS BEEN NO OFFICIAL REACTION TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MISSION BY THE GOVERNMENT THIS WEEK. THE LAST MINISTERIAL STATEMENT WHICH BY IMPLICATION TOOK A HARD LINE ABOUT THE VISIT WAS THE SPEECH ON 3 JULY BY PIK BOTHA REPORTED IN MY TELNO 130. WE UNDERSTAND THAT MOST MINISTERS ARE STILL AWAY FROM THEIR DESKS TAKING THE USUAL BREAK AFTER THE END OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SESSION. BUT THE GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN PART OF THE MISSION IS ALREADY EVIDENT FROM THEIR HANDLING OF DATES FOR THE VISIT, ALTHOUGH THE UNSOLICITED OFFER OF TWO MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT WAS PERHAPS DESIGNED TO BE HELPFUL. WE MAY LEARN MORE WHEN FERGUSSON SEES PIK BOTHA ON MONDAY AFTERNOON (14 JULY).

2. EARLIER THIS WEEK THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS A STRONG FEELING AMONG MINISTERS THAT WHATEVER THE PRICE BEING DEMANDED BY THE WEST FOR CALLING OFF THREATENED SANCTIONS IT WOULD BE TOO HIGH. IN ANY CASE, THE PRICE REQUIRED TODAY WAS LIABLE TO BE RAISED TOMORROW. ''THE GOALPOSTS ARE CONTINUALLY BEING MOVED''. IN THAT CASE SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT AS WELL ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF SANCTIONS, WHILE PREPARING CONTINGENCY PLANS AGAINST THEM. KILLEN ADDED THAT MINISTERS WERE UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD ALONE BE PRESSED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. WHAT ABOUT OTHER PARTIES TO A POSSIBLE DIALOGUE? OUR WILLINGNESS TO URGE THE ANC TO ABANDON VIOLENCE HAD HOWEVER GONE DOWN WELL HERE.

3. I BELIEVE WE ARE RIGHT TO ASSUME THAT KILLEN'S REMARKS INDEED REPRESENT GOVERNMENT THINKING. HIS OWN MINISTER'S OURSPOKEN REMARKS LAST WEEK AGAINST FOREIGN PRESSURES ALSO CLEARLY REFLECT THE PREVAILING MOOD IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE LINE TAKEN THIS WEEK BY KAUNDA AND MUGABE WILL HAVE COME AS NO SURPRISE TO THEM. BUT IT WILL HAVE REINFORCED THE GOVERNMENT HERE IN THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MISSION IS UNLIKELY TO ACHIEVE A POSITIVE RESULT. ON THE CONTRARY, THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO SIGN WHATSOEVER OF GIVE ON THE PART OF ZAMBIA AND ZIMBABWE (OR INDEED THE ANC) WILL MAKE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ALL THE MORE DETERMINED NOT TO BE THE ONLY ONES TO YIELD TO PRESSURE FROM OUTSIDE.

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4. SO I EXPECT THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE AWAITING SIR G HOWE'S ARRIVAL HERE SCEPTICALLY COUPLED WITH A CERTAIN DEGREE OF PUZZLEMENT AS TO WHAT HE MAY HAVE TO SAY TO THEM. I DOUBT WHETHER THE 5 POINTS DEPLOYED BY HIM PUBLICLY THIS WEEK, BALANCED AS THEY ARE, WILL HAVE BROUGHT THEM MUCH COMFORT IN THEIR PRESENT MOOD. IF ALL THE SPECULATION ABOUT THE APPROACH OF FURTHER SANCTIONS IS BEGINNING TO GIVE THEM SECOND THOUGHTS, THEY ARE NOT GIVING ANY HINT OF IT. ALL THE SIGNS ARE THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY WEIGHED THIS AND WILL TELL HIM THEY HAVE DECIDED NEVERTHELESS TO STICK TO THEIR COURSE.
5. SEE MIFT FOR PRESS REACTIONS.

MOBERLY

SOUTH AFRICA

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MR DEREK THOMAS
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MR REEVE

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

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FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE AIRBORNE DESKBY 111800Z

MAPUTO TELNO 67: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MISSION

1. THERE HAS BEEEN NO OFFICIAL REACTION THE SECRETARY STATE'S MISSION BY THE GOVERNMENT THIS WEEK. THE LAST MINISTERIAL STATEMENT WHICH BY IMPLICATION TOOK A HARD LINE ABOUT THE VISIT WAS THE SPEECH ON 3 JULY BY PIK BOTHA REPORTED IN MY TELNO. 130. UNDERSTAND THAT MOST MINISTERS ARE STILL AWAY FROM THEIR DESKS TAKING THE USUAL BREAK AFTER THE END OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SESSION. BUT THE GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN PART OF THE MISSION IS ALREADY EVIDENT FROM THEIR HANDLING OF DATES FOR THE VISIT, ALTHOUGH THE UNSOLICITED OFFER OF TWO MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT WAS PERHAPS DESIGNED TO BE HELPFUL. WE MAY LEARN MORE WHEN FERGUSSON SEES PIK BOTHA ON MONDAY AFTERNOON (14 JULY).

2. EARLIER THIS WEEK THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS A STRONG FEELING AMONG MINISTERS THAT WHATEVER THE PRICE BEING DEMANDED BY THE WEST FOR CALLING OFF THREATENED SANCTIONS IT WOULD BE TOO HIGH. IN ANY CASE, THE PRICE REQUIRED TODAY WAS LIABLE TO BE RAISED TOMORROW, ''THE GOALPOSTS ARE CONTINUALLY BEING MOVED''. IN THAT CASE SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT AS WELL ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF SANCTIONS, WHILE PREPARING CONTINGENCY PLANS AGAINST THEM. KILLEN ADDED THAT MINISTERS WERE UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD ALONE BE PRESSED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. WHAT ABOUT OTHER PARTIES TO A POSSIBLE DIALOGUE? OUR WILLINGNESS TO OURGE THE ANC TO ABANDON VIOLENCE HAD HOWEVER GONE DOWN WELL HERE.

3. I BELIEVE WE ARE RIGHT TO ASSUME THAT KILLEN'S REMARKS INDEED REPRESENT GOVERNMENT THINKING. HIS OWN MINISTER'S OUTSPOKEN REMARKS LAST WEEK AGAINST FOREIGN PRESSURES ALSO CLEARLY REFLECT THE PREVAILING MOOD IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE LINE TAKEN THIS WEEK BY KAUNDA AND MUGABE WILL HAVE COME AS NO SURPRISE TO THEM. BUT IT WILL HAVE REINFORCED THE GOVERNMENT HERE IN THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MISSION IS UNLIKELY TO ACHIEVE A POSITIVE RESULT. ON THE CONTRARY, THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO SIGN WHATSOEVER OF GIVE ON THE PART OF ZAMBIA AND ZIMBABWE (OR INDEED THE ANC) WILL MAKE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ALL THE MORE DETERMINED NOT TO BE THE ONLY ONES TO YIELD TO PRESSURE FROM OUTSIDE.

4. SO I EXPECT THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE AWAITING SIR G HOWE'S ARRIVAL HERE SCEPTICALLY COUPLED WITH A CERTAIN DEGREE OF PUZZLEMENT AS TO WHAT HE MAY HAVE TO SAY TO THEM. I DOUBT WHETHER THE 5 POINTS DEPLOYED BY HIM PUBLICLY THIS WEEK, BALANCED AS THEY ARE, WILL HAVE BROUGHT THEM MUCH COMFORT IN THEIR PRESENT MOOD. IF ALL THE SPECULATION ABOUT THE APPROACH OF FURTHER SANCTIONS IS BEGINNING TO GIVE THEM SECOND THOUGHTS, THEY ARE NOT GIVING ANY HINT OF IT. ALL THE SIGNS ARE THAT THEY AHVE ALREADY WEIGHED THIS AND WILL TELL HIM THEY HAVE DECIDED NEVERTHELESS TO STICK TO THEIR COURSE.

5. SEE MIFT FOR PRESS REACTIONS.

HOWE

[redacted]ZCZC
WBODAN 4589 OCMIAN 9615
CONFIDENTIAL
DD 131400Z OTTAW
FM FCOLN TO NAIRO
121515Z JUL
GRS 329

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 121630Z NAIROBI
TELNO 249
OF 121515Z JULY 86
AND TO DESKBY 122300Z WELLINGTON
AND TO DESKBY 130400Z NEDEL
AND TO DESKBY 131400Z OTTAWA
AND TO DESKBY CERTAIN COMMONWEALTH POSTS
AND TO IMMEDIATE ALL OTHER COMMONWEALTH POSTS

COMMONWEALTH GAMES
1. IN VIEW OF KENYA'S KEY POSITION, AND OF YOUR EARLIER REPORTING OF A REASONABLY ROBUST ATTITUDE IN NAIROBI, WE WERE SURPRISED AND CONCERNED AT THIS MORNING'S (12 JULY) REPORTS THAT THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO PULL OUT OF THE COMMONWEALTH GAMES. WE HAVE FEW ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES THAT WE WILL NOW FACE IN HOLDING OTHER AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS IN LINE. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD CONSIDER WHETHER, EVEN AT THIS LATE STAGE, THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT CAN BE PERSUADED TO CHANGE ITS MIND. WOULD A DECISION BY THE COMMONWEALTH GAMES FEDERATION TO EXCLUDE ZOLA BUDD INFLUENCE THE KENYANS? IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SUCH A DECISION WILL BE TAKEN IN ADVANCE OF THE MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 17 JULY. YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT THE UK PRESS FOR 12 JULY REPORTS THAT MR KINNOCK HAS WRITTEN TO ALL COMMONWEALTH HIGH COMMISSIONERS. HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE APPEALED TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS NOT TO FOLLOW NIGERIA AND GHANA'S EXAMPLE AND URGED THEM INSTEAD TO CONVINCE MRS THATCHER OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO IMPOSE FULL SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.
2. YOU WILL, OF COURSE, BE USING THE ARGUMENT THAT THE COMMONWEALTH IS NO LONGER A BRITISH ORGANISATION. AND FOR WHAT ITS WORTH, THE GAMES WILL BE HOSTED BY SCOTLAND NOT ENGLAND.
3. (FOR OTTAWA) UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION, GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ASK THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO STEADY COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN.
4. WELLINGTON MAY WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER NEW ZEALAND MIGHT DO THE SAME WITH PACIFIC COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES.
5. OTHER POSTS WILL WISH TO TAKE THE ABOVE INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR CONTACT WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS.

HOWE

OCMIAN 9615

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 122100Z OTTAW
TELNO 290
OF 121735Z JULY 86

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATD TO YOU AT REQUEST OF RES CLERK WAS RECEIVED FROM PRETORIA TELEGRAM NO MISC 003 OF 11 JULY 86

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, LUSAKA, HARARE, MAPUTO

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE AIRBORNE DESKBY 111800Z

EC PRESIDENCY MISSION
1. THE LOCAL PRESS REPORTS THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO ALLOW SIR GEOFFREY HOW TO VISIT NELSON MANDELA DURING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S FORTHCOMING VISIT. HOWEVER MRS MANDELA MET TODAY WITH NELSON MANDELA IN POLLSMOOR PRISON. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT A POSSIBLE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AFTER THE MEETING, SHE IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID:

'HE REGRETS TERRIBLY THE FACT THAT HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SEE HIM. THE POLITICAL SITUATION IS SUCH THAT THERE IS NO PURPOSE IN SEEING FURTHER EMINENT PERSONS. IF REQUESTED HE WOULD REFUSE A MEETING.'

2. MRS MANDELA ALSO TOLD REUTERS THAT NELSON MANDELA HAD DESCRIBED THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MISSION AS A ''NON-EVENT'.

MOBERLY

12126

OCMIAN 9618

NNNN

CDP

You wrote to Res. Clerk 29.6.86 covering messages about the Euro. Council.

As far as we & the FCO can establish, a message was not sent to Sonny Ramphal. He was in London, therefore he is not listed on the distribution for any of the telegrams (FCO Tel 197 covers all the others). I suppose we should have typed a separate letter for Mr Ramphal & sent it from NO 10.

I assume it would all be old news to him now anyway.

Julie
11-7-86.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 July 1986

Dear Charles,

COMGEP : Letter from Mr Fraser

I mentioned by telephone that we had received today by facsimile from Canberra the text of a letter from Mr Fraser to the Prime Minister.

I now enclose the text. You will in particular note Mr Fraser's judgement, expressed in the penultimate page of his letter, that he and General Obasanjo could not be successful in persuading black leadership to meet Sir Geoffrey Howe.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MALCOLM FRASER, C.H

NAREEN,
VICTORIA 3313

44TH FLOOR
ANZ TOWER
55 COLLINS STREET
MELBOURNE VICTORIA 3000
TELEPHONE 654 1922
TELEX AA 34804 JMFRAS

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you very much for your letter concerning Sir Geoffrey Howe's visit to South Africa. If Sir Geoffrey is able to achieve in this visit what the Commonwealth Group was unable to achieve, namely a change in heart on the part of the South African Government and a willingness to negotiate genuinely for the future against a background of the abolition of Apartheid, he will have achieved much.

It is important to understand why our own efforts to achieve a negotiation broke down. A critical stage had been reached at the end of April and early May. The Commonwealth Group, at that point, had some grounds for optimism that the South African Government would accept our negotiating concept. We also had confidence that the Black leadership would do likewise. Why, then, did the Government make a hard about-turn and set its face against negotiation? Not only that but also embark on a whole series of actions which have fouled the atmosphere for negotiations.

There are two reasons. First, there were always hard-line members of the Cabinet who believe that the South African Government could either tough it out or shoot it out with the Black population. At least one Minister indicated to us that if enough young terrorists were shot, their kind of normalcy would be restored.

It is clear that, since the bombing of three neighbouring States, the hard liners have been in the ascendancy. There is, however, another factor of great significance which probably served to tip the balance decisively against negotiation.

The South African Government has consistently stated that political rights would have to be exercised through racial groups. Its emphasis has always been on group rights and not on individual rights. That view of the future, of course, would maintain Apartheid but in another form. This view is unacceptable to the Black leadership who emphasize South African citizenship above all.

It is my view that the South African Government had believed that, at a negotiation it would be able to achieve some support for their own view of the future. If the Black leadership was divided into a number of different groups, it may be that one or two of the homeland leaders would have supported the Government's concept. However, in our discussions with Nelson Mandela, Chief Buthelezi and with other African leaders, we had formed the view that a freed Mandela would be able to unify African leadership.

The Government would have known that it would never be able to get support for its concept of the future in such circumstances. On the contrary, a unified Black leadership under Mandela, negotiating with the Government, would have exposed absolutely the mythology of the Government's claim for South Africa to be a nation of minorities and the falseness of the Government's suggestion that political rights should be exercised through racial groups.

Such a realisation, which would have been evident from reports of discussions we had with Chief Buthelezi and Nelson Mandela, which were obviously freely available to the Government, must have been a significant contributing factor in turning the Government against negotiation.

If you can accept this analysis, it is clear that something substantial will have to happen to alter the balance before the Government would be moved from its own view.

Against the background I have outlined, that would be a formidable task indeed.

We must keep in mind that ultimately there will have to be two or more parties to a negotiation. While the Commonwealth Group was confident that the Black leadership would have accepted our negotiation concept in the environment of April, I think that we would be equally confident that today they would not even consider it. What more must Government do, therefore, to re-establish the possibility of negotiation? I would think at the minimum a withdrawal of the emergency provisions and laws that have been put in place in the last few months, the lifting of censorship, together with the repeal of the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act, two fundamental legal pillars of Apartheid.

Perhaps a point of emphasis is needed here. If the Government were genuine in seeking to establish one South Africa, based on individual political rights, it should have no problem with the repeal of these two Acts. Economic forces would prevent any sudden exodus of Blacks from the townships or the homelands. How many could afford to buy a house in the white suburbs or establish a business in any of the central business districts? Economic forces would prevent any dramatic change in the face of South Africa for perhaps 20 years.

Can Sir Geoffrey Howe persuade the South African Government to undertake the measures I have indicated? It would be a notable, quite singular achievement if he could. I suggest that anything less could not be successful.

I am sure the South African Government will say that they are prepared to negotiate. That they have been calling for people to come and speak with them for well over a year. We know that the genuine leaders of the Blacks will not talk with the Government because the conditions for talks do not prevail. The Government, by its action, has made it plain that it only wants talks on its own terms. It will be important not to be bemused by South African diplomacy.

Chester Crocker has 5-6 years of unhappy history of discussion with the South African Government under his policy of constructive engagement. That also has achieved nothing. The South African Government has conceded nothing. Whatever agreements it had entered into, the Lusaka and Nkomati accords were broken almost before the ink was dry. The South African Government is very good at negotiating to no purpose. The time is past when any of us should continue to play their game.

In the next few weeks it will be important to bear in mind that the Black leadership has its own agenda, its own timetable. The Commonwealth leaders will be meeting early in August. This might be the most fundamental date of all. If the Commonwealth then decides to take no action, or if Britain does not join in concerted Commonwealth action, thus grievously damaging the effectiveness of whatever the Commonwealth could do, the Black leadership may well decide that, so far as effective support of the West is concerned, they are truly on their own.

That decision would be of some significance because, once it is taken, the Black leadership will be inevitably moved towards a total guerilla effort throughout South Africa. This would be a guerilla war Asia-style, in which soft targets are the prime targets attacked, in which every family, every school, every small community would soon be demanding full-time military protection.

Relatively few guerillas could dissipate the strength of the South African army quickly. They could not overcome the Government in a matter of months or even a year or two. That would take 8, 10, maybe 12 years, but it would happen. If anyone still believes that the Afrikaner and the Whites of South Africa can be secure behind that army, then they misunderstand the lessons of guerilla warfare of the last 50 years. I have some knowledge of these things as Minister for the Army and Minister for Defence and what I am saying is not opinion, it is factually based.

The kind of Government that would emerge from such a conflict would owe allegiance to its source of arms; it would probably be Marxist; the whole of southern Africa would be embroiled. The kind of Government that emerged would nationalise the

totality of Western commercial interest. Thus Western strategic and commercial interests would both be destroyed by this course. That would be the consequence of merely maintaining present policies.

Thus, what Commonwealth leaders do early in August will be of significance. It is possible, if Britain does not join the Commonwealth at that point, that the kinds of decisions that I have foreshadowed may be deferred until action from the United States becomes clearer. Before the Congress rises for their mid-term election, the same critical point will have been reached. Beyond that time the capacity for the West to influence events may have ended. In other words, the European Economic Community timetable of three months is too long and too late.

Let me mention one or two specific points.

The purpose of sanctions would not be to destroy the South African economy but they would need to be constructed in such a way to give the economy and the white population in particular a real body-blow. It is not a question of turning the screws gently and steadily, it is a question of a hard blow. When the banks took their action last year, based on commercial decisions, many white South Africans for the first time understood that their futures were under threat. Since then, whites have been more active in seeking to bring pressures on their own Government. The purpose of sanctions must be to cause them to re-enforce their efforts considerably. Incidentally, it is not sanctions but guerilla warfare that would really destroy the economy.

The measures mentioned in the letter sent to you jointly by my Co-Chairman and myself are the minimum measures that General Obasanjo and I considered necessary.

It is often said that sanctions hurt Blacks and therefore should not be imposed. While recognising that sanctions will have an impact on the lives of Blacks, I really do believe, Prime Minister, that this argument should be put aside. The Blacks are hurting now, every day, in South Africa. In many townships the unemployment is 60%-70%. Because the land is barren in the homelands, there is virtually no activity and unemployment is even greater. Further, the mere imposition of Apartheid creates most difficult conditions for the Black population.

Virtually all Black leaders, with the exception of Chief Buthelezi, say 'impose sanctions, we would sooner be hurt more now than to endure our present conditions for ever.' That is their decision. It is a legitimate decision. It is motivated by the same yearning for participation in one's own Government that has motivated forces for freedom around the world time and time again. It cannot be regarded as less legitimate because the yearning comes from Blacks in South Africa. The hurt done to Blacks through sanctions will be nothing compared to the otherwise inevitable loss of life and destructions caused by civil and guerilla war.

Unfortunately, the South African Government has made things more difficult for itself by falsely slandering the African National Congress. The best description of the ANC has been provided by Professor Lodge of Witswatersrand University. He concludes that, even though there are some Communists within the ANC, there are not as many as the Government claims. It is basically a praqmatic organisation, committed to national purposes and objectives. Indeed, in the condition of South Africa, it may be a wonder that more Blacks have not joined the Communist Party. It is quite clear, however, that, if something is not done to break the present circle, the Black leadership will be driven towards the Soviet Union and her satellites for arms. The West, by inaction, is quite capable of making a present of southern Africa to the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, a Government which included Mandela, Tambo, Buthelezi and other Black leaders would be largely pragmatic. I doubt very much if it would embark on any major course of nationalisation. We need to remember the Freedom Charter was written a very long while ago, before collectivist policies had been demonstrated to fail for most of southern Africa. It would be naive to suggest that lessons that have been learned across the entire continent have not carried weight with the leadership of the ANC.

You mention in your letter to me that we must be careful not to force the South African Government into the laager where he will refuse to budge his position. I have a contrary view of the Afrikaner character which I believe should be considered and which, in my view, is reinforced by the lessons of British history. The Afrikaner is stubborn, he is determined. He will not be dissuaded from his own chosen course by reasoned argument or quiet diplomacy, even if it is called constructive engagement. He will only be dissuaded from his own course by pressure and often extreme pressure. Misunderstanding of this point has hampered the West's dealings with South Africa over decades. We have accepted their dis-information and in our own minds made it reality.

At the conclusion of your letter you asked if General Obasanjo and myself feel able to lend such support and encouragement as we can to Sir Geoffrey's visit. I take that to mean can we persuade the Black leadership to meet Sir Geoffrey.

I do not believe we could be successful in such a venture because the Black leadership regard this visit and the decision of the EEC as an attempt to delay and to divert consideration of our own report.

Further, the visit must be judged in the context in which the Black leadership has become very sceptical of British objectives, simply because of Britain's repeated objections to sanctions.

Incidentally, it is currently more sceptical of the U.S. policy, not only because of the President's stated attitude to sanctions but also because of the US support for Savimbi. That act has virtually destroyed US influence in southern Africa.

There may well be a time when whatever influence General Obasanjo and I have with the Black leadership will need to be used in purposes capable of success.

I regret that, in my judgment, to seek to use that influence on this occasion would only depreciate whatever credit we had.

I earnestly ask you, Prime Minister, to heed the arguments that I have put in this letter and hope very much that Britain will feel able to join all other members of the Commonwealth in full-blooded support for stern measures when the leaders meet in August.

Nobody can guarantee that substantial economic measures will work. I personally believe there is a reasonable chance that they will. I also believe they represent the last remaining option for major states in the West to exercise influence in a cause which is just but, perhaps more to the point, from their own national perspective, is indeed in their own self interest.

My warmest good wishes.

(Malcolm Fraser)

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MALCOLM FRASER, C.H.

NAREEN,
VICTORIA 3315

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MELBOURNE, VICTORIA 3000
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I do not believe we could be successful in such a venture because the Black leadership regard this visit and the decision of the EEC as an attempt to delay and to divert consideration of our own report.

Further, the visit must be judged in the context in which the Black leadership has become very sceptical of British objectives, simply because of Britain's repeated objections to sanctions.

Incidentally, it is currently more sceptical of the U.S. policy, not only because of the President's stated attitude to sanctions but also because of the US support for Savimbi. That act has virtually destroyed US influence in southern Africa.

There may well be a time when whatever influence General Obasanjo and I have with the Black leadership will need to be used in purposes capable of success.

I regret that, in my judgment, to seek to use that influence on this occasion would only depreciate whatever credit we had.

I earnestly ask you, Prime Minister, to heed the arguments that I have put in this letter and hope very much that Britain will feel able to join all other members of the Commonwealth in full-blooded support for stern measures when the leaders meet in August.

Nobody can guarantee that substantial economic measures will work. I personally believe there is a reasonable chance that they will. I also believe they represent the last remaining option for major states in the West to exercise influence in a cause which is just but, perhaps more to the point, from their own national perspective, is indeed in their own self interest.

My warmest good wishes.

(Malcolm Fraser)

original on canada : Expo '86 : July 81.

MINUTE:

TO: PRIVATE SECRETARY

MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

The Canadians have noted suggestions that they have not done much more than the U.K. in imposing measures against South Africa. They have drawn up the attached chart to demonstrate their contention that they have gone further than us.

Sir Derek Day

11 July 1986

Quote

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2/3

ANTI-APARTHEID MEASURES ADOPTED BY BRITAIN AND CANADA

	U.K.	CANADA
Embargo on Arms Imports	X	X
Embargo on Arms Exports	X	X
Ban on government loans to Government of South Africa	X	X
Ban on Krugerrand sales/imports	X	X
Code of Conduct on Employment Practices	X	X
Aid to Black Education	X	X
Oil Embargo	X	X
Ban on Sporting and Cultural Contacts	X	Broader Application
Limitation on Scientific, Technical and Cultural Contacts	X	Broader Application
Restrictions on Exports of Sensitive Equipment	X	Broader Application
End to Military Cooperation	X	X
Withdrawal of accreditation/Recall of military attachés	X	X
End of all nuclear collaboration	X	X
Termination of Export Financing (export credits and guarantees)	--	X
Termination of Export Insurance	--	X
Termination of Investment Insurance	--	X
Abrogation of Trade Agreements	--	X
Abrogation of Double Taxation Treaty	--	X
Withdrawal of Trade Commissioners	--	X
Closure of Consulates in South Africa	--	X
Withdrawal of Accreditation of South African Attachés	--	X

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3/3

	U.K.	CANADA
Ban on Bank Loans to Government of South Africa and its Agencies	--	X
Air Embargo	--	X
Termination of Toll-Processing of Namibian Uranium	--	X
Termination of government procurement of South African products	--	X
Ban on the promotion of tourism	--	X

Telephone E.J. Bergbusch at (613) 990-6572 or (613) 733-5779.

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subject cc: master
OPS

Prime Minister (2)

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 128A/86

CDP
9/7.

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE
TO THE RT.HON. MARGARET THATCHER, MP
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER

" I thank you very much for your message concerning South Africa, which was transmitted to me through Sir Sydney Giffard on July 1, 1986.

"It has been, and will continue to be, the position of the Government of Japan that the abolition of Apartheid should be effected through peaceful means. That was the substance of the appeals repeatedly made by us to the South African Government and all the Parties involved.

"I am pleased therefore to learn of the efforts rendered by the Commonwealth and the European Community with that objective. I also earnestly hope that the mission of Sir Geoffrey Howe will prove fruitful.

"With regard to measures toward South Africa, especially economic measures, I believe that they require concerted efforts of the international community, should they be effective, as you imply in your message. In co-operation with major industrial democracies, the Government of Japan will be prepared to study possible ways of participating in such concerted efforts.

"In the meantime, I wish to maintain close contact with you and other leaders of the major Western industrialized countries on this issue./."

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Ja 02365

11 July 1986

CDT

MR POWELL

c Mr Stark

SOUTH AFRICA: INTERNAL DISORDERS

1. There is quite likely to be extra trouble on 14 July. The black schools are due to reopen; if there are boycotts (no specific indications, but quite likely) there will no doubt be numerous arrests. COSATU (mainly black trades union organisation) has called a one-day strike, which (this time) may lead to confrontation in the townships. It is also the day for collecting the (just increased) rents and rates in Soweto. Residents may refuse to pay.

2. There are also reports that there has been a large-scale call-up of the army reserve (as there was before Soweto day on 16 June).

MRMorland

M R MORLAND

SUBJECT
CC MASTER
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 129/86

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OF 101445Z JULY 86
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MIPT: OAU AND SOUTH AFRICA: MESSAGE
FOLLOWING IS TEXT:
BEGINS: I RECALL WITH PLEASURE OUR TALK LAST FEBRUARY, AND WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON THE GRAVE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA WHILE LETTING YOU KNOW HOW WE IN BRITAIN SEE THE NEXT STEPS. I FEEL THAT IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD BOTH KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WHILE YOU ARE CHAIRMAN OF THE OAU AND BRITAIN HOLDS THE PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

I WAS DISAPPOINTED, AS I AM SURE YOU WERE, BY THE BREAKDOWN OF THE MISSION UNDERTAKEN BY THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS. IT IS SAD THAT HAVING ACHIEVED SO MUCH THEY SHOULD AT THE LAST HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED BY THE OBDURACY OF PRESIDENT BOTHA'S GOVERNMENT. THE THREE SOUTH AFRICAN RAIDS ON NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES ANGERED US ALL.

SINCE THEN THE HEADS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING WHAT MORE WE CAN AND SHOULD DO TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. WE ALL BELIEVE THAT OUR OBJECTIVE MUST CONTINUE TO BE TO BRING APARTHEID TO AN END THROUGH DIALOGUE AND A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES. THAT IS ALSO THE OBJECTIVE OFTHE COMMONWEALTH.

THE QUESTION THE HEADS OF THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT ASKED

EACH OTHER ONCE AGAIN AT THE HAGUE ON 26-27 JUNE WAS THIS: IS THE PROMOTION OF DIALOGUE NOW A HOPELESS CAUSE, OR IS THERE STILL A CASE FOR TRYING ONCE MORE THE ROAD OF PERSUASION BEFORE WE RESIGN OURSELVES TO THE PROSPECT OF SOUTH AFRICA BEING CAUGHT UP INEVITABLY IN A RISING TIDE OF VIOLENCE?

I HAVE BEEN PROFOUNDLY CONCERNED AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE REIMPOSITION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND THE INTERNAL MEASURES GOING WITH IT THREATEN FURTHER VIOLENCE AND INTER-RACIAL CONFLICT. I AM DETERMINED THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DONE TO AVERT THAT CATASTROPHE, AND TO BRING APARTHEID TO AN END BY PEACEFUL MEANS LONG HYPHEN THAT, I BELIEVE, IS THE QUICKEST WAY LONG HYPHEN THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND NOT CONFLICT.

THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THAT ROUTE IS STILL POSSIBLE. A CRUCIAL FACTOR MUST BE THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. MY READING OF THE AFRIKANER CHARACTER IS QUITE CLEAR: IF WE ARE TO AVOID DRIVING PRESIDENT BOTHA AND HIS PEOPLE INSIDE THE LAAGER, WITH ALL THE THREAT OF MOUNTING BLOODSHED THAT THAT WOULD IMPLY, THEN IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR DISAPPROVAL OF THE POLICIES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT CAUSING THEM TO REACT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO RULE OUT DIALOGUE AND COMPROMISE.

IT WAS WITH THOSE THOUGHTS IN MIND THAT I APPROACHED MY MEETING LAST MONTH WITH MY EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES. WE REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE MOST EFFECTIVE ACTION THAT WE COULD TAKE AT THIS STAGE.

WE HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE KEY MOVE THAT WAS NECESSARY TO PROMOTE THE GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE WHICH WE ALL WANT WOULD BE FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT UNCONDITIONALLY TO RELEASE NELSON MANDELA AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS AND TO LIFT THE BAN ON THE ANC, PAC AND OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES. DESPITE THE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED WE DECIDED TOO THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO UNDERTAKE ONE MORE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE TO THAT END. IT WAS ACCORDINGLY AGREED THAT GEOFFREY HOWE SHOULD TRAVEL SOON TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE COMMUNITY, TO CARRY OUT THIS MISSION. AS A FIRST STEP, HE GOES THIS WEEK

TO LUSAKA AND HARARE, AND WE ARE NOW CONSIDERING DATES PROPOSED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT FOR HIS VISIT THERE.

IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT DURING THE NEXT THREE MONTHS IN SUPPORT OF THAT MISSION THE TWELVE WOULD ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS WITH THE OTHER INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES ON FURTHER MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE NEEDED, COVERING IN PARTICULAR A BAN ON NEW INVESTMENT AND ON THE IMPORT OF COAL, IRON, STEEL AND GOLD COINS FROM SOUTH AFRICA. THIS DECISION TO CONSULT OTHER INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES ABOUT POSSIBLE FURTHER MEASURES WAS, OF COURSE, TAKEN BECAUSE IF MEASURES ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES AS A WHOLE.

AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS ALL THESE ISSUES WILL ARISE WHEN THE SEVEN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DIRECTLY INVOLVED WILL FORMALLY REVIEW THE REPORT OF THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP IN EARLY AUGUST, SHORTLY AFTER THE OAU SUMMIT. I REALISE THAT OAU LEADERS WILL HAVE SOUTHERN AFRICA AT THE TOP OF THEIR AGENDA. I HOPE NEVERTHELESS THAT UNDER YOUR GUIDANCE THE OUTCOME OF THE OAU SUMMIT WILL NOT BE SUCH AS TO PREJUDICE THE CHANCES OF A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME TO THE COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING. IN ANY CASE, I HOPE THAT THIS ACCOUNT OF MY VIEWS ON THE SITUATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS THAT SO CONCERN US BOTH WILL BE HELPFUL TO YOU IN YOUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE ADDIS MEETING.

ON A RELATED TOPIC, MAY I SAY THAT I FOLLOWED WITH INTEREST THE DEVELOPMENTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON AFRICA IN NEW YORK WHICH ENDED ON 1 JUNE. I HAVE HEARD OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE WAY IN WHICH THE SENEGALESE DELEGATION HELPED TO EDGE THE CONFERENCE TOWARDS ITS SATISFACTORY OUTCOME, AND I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT YOUR OWN STATESMANLIKE ADDRESS IN PLENARY WAS ESSENTIAL IN SETTING THE POSITIVE TONE FOR THE SESSION. IT WAS MOST ENCOURAGING THAT AN AGREED RESOLUTION WAS FINALLY ACHIEVED, WHICH OUTLINES CLEARLY THE NATURE AND SERIOUSNESS OF AFRICA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND THE MEANS BY WHICH THEY CAN BE RESOLVED. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE APPRECIATION OF MY OWN GOVERNMENT FOR THE PERSONAL ROLE YOU PLAYED IN THESE IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS.

WITH KIND REGARDS AND WARM MEMORIES OF YOUR VISIT.

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MR DEREK THOMAS
MR E FERGUSSON
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SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MR MUGABE

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED REASONS FOR A FURTHER PUSH FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. MUGABE EXPRESSED SCEPTICISM ABOUT PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS. ONLY PRESSURE WOULD MOVE THE SOUTH AFRICANS, IN THE FORM OF SANCTIONS AND MILITARY ACTION BY THE ANC. HE QUESTIONED BRITISH MOTIVES: THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFUTED THIS FIRMLY.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE REASONS FOR HIS MISSION ON BEHALF OF THE EC. DIALOGUE WOULD BRING CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA MORE QUICKLY THAN ALTERNATIVE PATH OF MOUNTING VIOLENCE, WHICH WOULD SLOW CHANGE. THE SAG HAD AN ENORMOUS CAPACITY TO RESIST SUCH PRESSURES. WE SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE CHANGES ALREADY OCCURRING IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ENCOURAGE THE PROGRESSIVE ELEMENTS THERE TO PRESS FOR MORE. A NUMBER OF ECONOMIC MEASURES HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE EC WERE STUDYING FURTHER MEASURES IN CASE THEY WERE NEEDED. BUT A FURTHER ATTEMPT AT DIALOGUE WAS ESSENTIAL. SANCTIONS WOULD NOT BRING DOWN THE REGIME QUICKLY, AND THE SAG WOULD RETALIATE, IN PARTICULAR AT ZIMBABWEAN TRANSPORT ROUTES. OUR OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE SAG WOULD BE MORE FIRMLY ENTRENCHED AS A RESULT OF COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS AND THAT GREAT DAMAGE WOULD BE DONE TO THE FLS AND THE BLACK POPULATION. HE HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY OF HIS MISSION, BUT THOUGHT A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF MANDELA, UNBANNING OF THE ANC ETC, ESSENTIAL.

3. MUGABE SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW WE EXPECTED TO SUCCEED WHERE THE EPG, WHICH HAD DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB, HAD FAILED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE GROUP HAD DONE A GOOD JOB: BUT THE EC THOUGHT A FURTHER EFFORT BY THE EC IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES WOULD REINFORCE THE ATTEMPT TO GET THE SAG TO MOVE. COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THIS. MUGABE SAID THAT WE WERE APPROACHING SOUTH AFRICA WITH A WHITE FLAG: THERE WAS NO MOTIVE FOR THE SAG TOGMOVE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT PRESSURE WAS PROVIDED BY MEASURES ALREADY IN POSITION AND THE KNOWLEDGE THAT OTHER MEASURES WERE BEING STUDIED. AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD EXPLAINED IN HER LETTER, EXPLICIT THREATS WERE LIKELY TO PRODUCE A PERVERSE REACTION.

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4. MUGABE SAID THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF REAL MEASURES WE COULD ONLY KNEEL BEFORE THE ARCHITECTS OF APARTHEID AND PLEAD FOR REASON. ONLY YESTERDAY THE PRIME MINISTER HAD AGAIN BEEN EMPHASISING HER TOTAL OPPOSITION TO SANCTIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REMINDED HIM OF THE MEAUSRES WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT GENUINELY BELIEVED THAT COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE THE NET EFFECT OF STRENGTHENING THE SAG WHILE HARMING EVERYBODY ELSE.

5. ON TRANSPORT LINKS, MUGABE SAID THAT THE RECENT DECISION TO STEP UP THEIR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE TRANSPORT LINKS WAS COSTING ZIMBABWE MUCH MONEY. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE ALREADY USING MILITARY FORCE AGAINST ZIMBABWE AND HER TRANSPORT LINKS. IF SOUTH AFRICA DISRUPTED THE ZIMBABWEAN LINK SOUTHWARDS IT WOULD ALSO COST ZIMBABWE A LOT OF MONEY, BUT DID NOT THINK THEY WOULD BE ANY WORSE OFF. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE DID NOT THINK SOUTH AFRICA COULD SURVIVE IF WE ALL, INCLUDING THE COMMONWEALTH, THE EC AND INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES COMBINED FORCES AGAINST APARTHEID. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK ZIMBABWE HAD AN EFFECTIVE CHOICE BETWEEN EXPENDITURE ON DEFENDING HER LINKS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND EXPENDITURE TO REPLACE THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSPORT LINK IN THE EVENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN RETALIATION. THERE WOULD SIMPLE BE A MASSIVE INCREASE IN THE EXPENDITURE NEEDED. THE CORE OF SOUTH AFRICA WOULD SURVIVE SANCTIONS AND THE SITUATION WOULD PERSIST FOR YEARS.

6. MUGABE SAID THAT ZIMBABWE WOULD BE HIT HARD, BUT IF A NEW SITUATION WERE PRODUCED IN SOUTH AFRICA IT WOULD BE WORTH IT. THEY WOULD HAVE TO OPEN THE MAPUTO LINK, BUT THERE WOULD BE SOME RESULTING ADVANTAGES. ZIMBABWE COULD FEED HERSELF AND WOULD SURVIVE, ALTHOUGH HER INDUSTRY WOULD BE BIT. SHE WOULD NOT BE HIT AS HARD AS BOTSWANA, LESOTHO AND SWAZILAND. MRS THATCHER SHOULD NOT SPEAK ON BEHALF OF ZIMBABWE. IF SHE CONFINED HER STATEMENTS TO THE LOSSES WHICH BRITAIN WOULD SUFFER, WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGED, SHE WOULD BE MORE CREDIBLE.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME BEFORE A NEW SITUATION WAS PRODUCED IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE CERTAINLY DID EXPRESS OUR WORRY ABOUT THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON OURSELVES OF SANCTIONS. BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, OUR CALCULATION OF THE NET ET
GENERAL EFFECT WAS THAT IT WOULD BE NEGATIVE. SO WE THOUGHT THAT A FURTHER EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO PERSUADE THE SOUTH AFRICANS.

8. MUGABE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK WE WOULD SUCCED. HE SUSPECTED THAT THE UK HAVING GOT THE SUPPORT OF THE EC WAS NOW TRYING TO DIVERT THE WORLD FROM SANCTIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DENIED THIS. HE SAID THAT ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ACCEPTED THAT THE EFFECT OF COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS WAS LIKELY TO BE NEGATIVE, AND THEREFORE THOUGHT THAT A DIFFERENT WAY SHOULD BE TRIED.

9. MUGABE SAID THAT WITHOUT THE THREAT OF SANCTIONS (OR MILITARY ACTION ON THE PART OF THE WEST, WHICH HE RULED OUT,) THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD NOT MOVE. HE RELUCTANTLY BELIEVED THAT MILITARY ACTION BY THE ANC/PAC WAS NECESSARY. BUT THE REST OF THE WORLD WHICH BELIEVED IN A NON-VIOLENT METHOD SHOULD ADOPT EFFECTIVE NON-VIOLENT MEASURES. A COMBINATION OF THIS AND THE CAMPAIGN BY THE ANC WOULD ONE DAY DELIVER THE GOODS. THE MOMENTUM WOULD GROW STRONGLY OVER THE FOLLOWING YEAR, 45,000 LIVES HAD BEEN LOST IN FREEING ZIMBABWE: THE TOLL IN SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE GREATER.

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE SAG COULD HOLD OUT FOR A VERY LONG TIME: THEY WERE IN NO WAY COMPARABLE TO THE PREVIOUS RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT.

11. MUGABE ASKED WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WISHES TO SEE A TRUE NON-RACIAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY BE PREDOMINANTLY BLACK. HE STRONGLY DOUBTED THIS SEEING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S PREVIOUS HISTORY IN RHODESIA. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY SOMETIMES ADOPTED RACIST POSTURES. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE WOULD NOT IN FACT CONSIDER THAT A CHANGE TO BLACK RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS TO US.

12. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IF MUGABE READ THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER HE WOULD SEE THAT WE WERE STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA. HE TOTALLY EXCLUDED THE SUGGESTION OF RACISM IN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY'S APPROACH. OUR APPROACH WAS BASED ON A CLEAR ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION. HE SHOULD GIVE CREDIT TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR HAVING WORKED AT LUSAKA FOR ZIMBABWEAN INDEPENDENCE: THIS ALONE SHOULD SHOW THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN AFRAID OF BLACK MAJORITY RULE. THE PRIME MINISTER APPROACHED THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION IN THE SAME WAS AS SHE HAD THE ZIMBABWEAN ONE. SHE WANTED TO ACHIEVE THE BREAKTHROUGH WHICH WE ACHIEVED FOR ZIMBABWE AT LUSAKA. SHE BELIEVED THAT THE LONGER THE DELAY IN RELEASING MANDELA, THE LONGER THE TRAGEDY WOULD CONTINUE. WE KNEW THE SAG WOULD BE HARD TO SHIFT BUT WE HAD TO TRY, BECAUSE ONLY THIS WOULD BRING QUICKER CHANGE.

13. MUGABE SAID THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO DIFFER ON THE ANALYSIS. THESE DIFFERENCES WOULD BE PUBLIC, BUT THEY SHOULD NOT UNDERMINE THE GENERALLY FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UK AND ZIMBABWE. HE THEN LAUNCHED INTO A LENGTHY ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT SOUGHT TO TIE ITS AID PROGRAMME TO THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED, AND WAS NOW DEMANDING AN APOLOGY FROM ZIMBABWE FOR THE SPEECH MADE

/AT

AT THE US NATIONAL DAY PARTY LAST WEEK. ZIMBABWE COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH CONDITIONALITY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE FRIENDLY WITH BOTH THE US AND ZIMBABWE AND NATURALLY HOPED THAT ANY DISAGREEMENT COULD BE RESOLVED QUICKLY. HE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD SPEAK CANDIDLY TO EACH OTHER BUT WISHED TO EMPHASISE THAT MUGABE SHOULD NOT CHALLENGE THE GOOD FAITH OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OR THE PRIME MINISTER. MUGABE SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED OUR HAVING MADE KNOWN OUR VIEWS: OF COURSE HE WOULD TELL US WHEN HE DISAGREED WITH THEM, BUT WE COULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THEM.

14. NOW SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

MELHUISH

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MR FERGUSSON
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TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 595
OF 101220Z JULY 86
AND TO FLASH HARARE, MAPUTO

This would be very helpful. I have told the FCO to encourage the foreign ferry.
CDP

FLASH SECRETARY OF STATE'S FLIGHT

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT.

1. I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM AN HOUR'S TALK WITH AKINYEMI, ON WHICH I WILL REPORT FULLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AT THE END OF IT HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE YOU HERE IN LAGOS, HOWEVER BRIEFLY, IF YOU COULD DROP OFF ON YOUR RETURN JOURNEY. HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO COME OUT TO THE AIRPORT FOR THE PURPOSE. THIS PROVIDED YOU COULD COME EITHER TOMORROW OR SATURDAY, SINCE HE HAS A COMMITMENT TO LEAVE LAGOS ON SUNDAY.

EWANS

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FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE OFFICE FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER.

1. WE UNDERSTAND THAT BRIEFING FOR THIS CALL WAS BEING SUBMITTED, PRESUMABLY TO MRS CHALKER ON 8 JULY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS ANXIOUS THAT RAMPHAL SHOULD SO FAR AS POSSIBLE BE KEPT IN PLAY IN RELATION TO HIS PRESENT MISSION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECOGNISES THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WISH TO TAKE UP WITH RAMPHAL THE EPISODE OF THE FORWARD TO THE COMGEP REPORT, AND TO URGE ON HIM THAT THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT MUST BE AND BE SEEN TO BE IMPARTIAL. IT IS SURELY WRONG THAT SOMEONE AS DISPASSIONATE AS LORD BARBER SHOULD BE ABLE TO POINT THE FINGER AT THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL. NEVERTHELESS THE SECRETARY OF STATE HOPES THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL DO HER BEST TO URGE ON REMPHAL THE NEED FOR HIM TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE IN RELATION TO HIS PRESENT EFFORTS. SHE MIGHT IMPRESS ON HIM THE GREAT SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE APPROACH THE TASK, THE SINCERITY OF OUR BELIEF THAT THE ROAD THROUGH SANCTIONS AND CONFRONTATION IS SUCH A DESPERATE ONE THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO FIND ANOTHER - QUITE POSSIBLY QUICKER - WAY FORWARD. HE COULD MAKE AN IMMENSE CONTRIBUTION BY URGING AFRICAN LEADERS IN THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE ANC TO TAKE THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MISSION SERIOUSLY AND TO COOPERATE WITH IT.

3. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PASS THE ABOVE ON TO CHARLES POWELL.

HOWE

GRS 0025O
NNNN

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

Foreign Secretary's Russian to Southern Africa.

The Foreign Secretary is now in Harare. We do not have any report yet of his talks with Kaunda. But I am told that morale is high. Lady Young should have more news for Cabinet. C.D.P. 9/7

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 July 1986

I am afraid that it is not going to be possible for the Prime Minister to see Dr. Phatudi, the Chief Minister of Lebowa. But Mrs. Lynda Chalker, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, would be happy to do so if Dr. Phatudi would like to call upon her. May I suggest that you pursue this direct with the Foreign Office.

(Charles Powell)

Mr. L.H. Evans

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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

PRIME MINISTER

Lord Tonypandy telephoned this evening to say that he had been watching your Canadian TV interview on South Africa - which has been picked up by our TV - and was absolutely thrilled. He is 1000% in support of your stand. He has not written because he does not want to be a burden. He also said that he was happy to speak out if you wish.

If you agree, I will do a thank-you letter tomorrow.

(C. D. POWELL)
8 July 1986

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 1968 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Minute from Powell to Prime Minister dated 8 July 1980	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION 40(2); 41	19 January 2016 D Wayland
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CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 July 1986

OAU AND SOUTH AFRICA

Thank you for your letter of 7 July enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Diouf about the situation in South Africa. This may issue with the minor amendments marked on the enclosed copy.

Charles Powell

A C Galsworthy Esq CMG
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 927 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED
FM PRETORIA
TO DD 090500Z LUSAKA
TELNO 029
OF 081545Z JULY 86
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO LONDON
INFO ROUTINE JOHANNESBURG,HARARE,UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING CAPETOWN CONSULATE, DURBAN

OUR TELNO 103 : SITREP : INTERNAL SITUATION.

SUMMARY.

1. FURTHER BOMB ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS IN WHITE AREAS HAVE CAUSED SIGNIFICANT CASUALTIES. NO-ONE HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY BUT THE GOVERNMENT INSIST, PROBABLY RIGHTLY SO, THAT THE ANC IS THE PERPETRATOR. THEY HAVE PROVOKED A BITTER REACTION AMONGST MOST OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY AND FURTHER CONSOLIDATED MAJORITY WHITE OPINION IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S EMERGENCY MEASURES AND AGAINST POLITICAL CONCESSIONS TO THE ANC.

2. THE STATE OF EMERGENCY CONTINUES TO BE GENERALLY EFFECTIVE IN PREVENTING LARGE-SCALE DEMONSTRATIONS AND CLASHES, AND THE OVERALL LEVEL OF UNREST INCIDENTS PROBABLY REMAINS LOWER THAN BEFORE THE EMERGENCY. BUT GOVERNMENT CLAIMS OF A LOWER NUMBER OF DEATHS ARE QUESTIONABLE. STRIKES AGAINST DETENTIONS CONTINUE IN CERTAIN INDUSTRIES. THE EMERGENCY RESTRICTIONS HAVE BEEN FURTHER TIGHTENED PROBABLY IN PREPARATION FOR THE RETURN TO SCHOOL ON 14 JULY AND ALSO RUMOURED PREPARATIONS BY COSATU FOR A GENERAL STRIKE ON THAT DAY.

DETAIL.

BOMB INCIDENTS.

3. ATTACKS ON WHITE ''SOFT TARGETS'' CONTINUE TO MOUNT. A TOTAL OF 12 BOMB BLASTS , INCLUDING LANDMINE EXPLOSIONS, HAVE OCCURRED IN WHITE AREAS SINCE THE EMERGENCY WAS DECLARED ON 12 JUNE. IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS 27 PEOPLE (WHITE AND BLACK) HAVE BEEN INJURED IN THREE BLASTS IN CENTRAL JOHANNESBURG. 20 PEOPLE (INCLUDING BLACKS) WERE INJURED OUTSIDE A PRETORIA SUPERMARKET ON 4 JULY. A SCHOOLBOY WAS ALSO SERIOUSLY INJURED WHEN A BOMB EXPLODED IN QUEENSTOWN ON 28 JUNE.

4. TWO POLICE PERSONNEL WERE INJURED WHEN AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE CAUSED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO MOWBRAY POLICE STATION IN CAPETOWN ON 3 JULY. TWO BOMB EXPLOSIONS IN DURBAN ON 30 JUNE DAMAGED A WATER PIPELINE.

5. COMMENTING ON THE BOMB ATTACKS (2JULY) BISHOP TUTU CONDEMNED ''SUCH ACTS OF TERRORISM VEHEMENTLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY ''.

/UNREST

UNREST.

6. FOLLOWING THE DEATHS OF NINE PEOPLE IN UNREST INCIDENTS OVER THE PAST WEEKEND, INCLUDING FIVE EAST RAND DEVELOPMENT BOARD EMPLOYEES KILLED BY MEN ARMED WITH AK47 RIFLES (TWO WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SHOT DEAD BY POLICE), 107 PEOPLE ARE NOW REPORTED TO HAVE DIED SINCE THE EMERGENCY BEGAN. THE BIGGEST SINGLE DEATH TOLL IN THE PAST TEN DAYS WAS 10 PEOPLE KILLED IN BOPHUTHATSWANA WHEN A VEHICLE BLEW UP , REPORTEDLY CAUSED BY EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

7. THE BUREAU OF INFORMATION CLAIMS A STEADY DECREASE IN THE LEVEL OF UNREST. ACCORDING TO THEM, DURING THE PAST WEEK A DAILY AVERAGE OF 44 UNREST RELATED INCIDENTS OCCURRED, A DECREASE OF SIXTY-FIVE PERCENT COMPARED WITH THE AVERAGE IN MAY. THIS ALMOST CERTAINLY UNDERSTATES THE UNREST IN THE TOWNSHIPS AND RURAL AREAS ALIKE, BUT THE OVERALL LEVEL IS PROBABLY LOWER THAN BEFORE THE EMERGENCY. THE BUREAU'S CURRENT AVERAGE DEATHS PER DAY FIGURE OF 4.3 COMPARED WITH 7.3 DURING THE EMERGENCY'S FIRST WEEK AND 5.1 IN MAY IS LIKELY TO BE CONSIDERABLY LOWER THAN THE ACTUAL NUMBER.

8. UNDER THE STATE OF EMERGENCY A NUMBER OF POLITICAL AND STUDENT GROUPS HAVE BEEN BANNED FROM HOLDING INDOOR MEETINGS (OUTDOOR ONES WERE ALREADY PRESCRIBED) OVER A WIDE AREA. THE MAIN BLACK TRADE UNION FEDERATION , COSATU, AS WELL AS THE NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS AND OTHER TRADE UNIONS HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY RESTRAINED IN JOHANNESBURG AND ELSEWHERE.

DETENTIONS.

9. SOME MONITORING GROUPS CONSIDER THE TOTAL NUMBER OF DETAINEES PROBABLY REMAINS AROUND 3,000 BUT THE ACTUAL TOTAL MAY BE MUCH HIGHER. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN A TRICKLE OF RELEASES, ARRESTS OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS CONTINUE. ZWELAKHE SISULU, THE EDITOR OF NEW NATION AND SON OF WALTER SISULU, WAS DETAINED ON 27 JUNE. AMONGST OTHERS DETAINED IN THE PAST TWO OR THREE WEEKS ARE FIVE BLACK SASH LADIES.

10. A BUREAU OF INFORMATION SPOKESMAN HAS STATED THAT CHARGES, INCLUDING MURDER, ARSON AND ASSAULT , ARE BEING BROUGHT AGAINST 780 EMERGENCY DETAINEES.

TRADE UNIONS.

11. ACCORDING TO THE INDEPENDENT LABOUR MONITORING GROUP 218 UNION LEADERS WERE STILL IN DETENTION LAST WEEK . THE STRIKES IN PROTEST AGAINST DETENTIONS OF UNION LEADERS HAVE CEASED IN THE RETAIL TRADE, BUT BROKEN OUT IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND SOME MINES. COSATU HELD A CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING ON 1 JULY AT WHICH IT GAVE EMPLOYERS A SHORT DEADLINE TO MEET A NUMBER OF TRADE UNION AND POLITICAL DEMANDS, WITH A WARNING THAT COSATU WOULD OTHERWISE '' PROCEED TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES ''. THERE ARE RUMOURS OF CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR A GENERAL STRIKE ON 14 JULY.

BANNINGS

12. WINNIE MANDELA'S NAME WAS NOT INCLUDED AMONGST THOSE LISTED AS BANNED PEOPLE UNDER SECTIONS 16 AND 23 OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT WHEN THE NEW CONSOLIDATED LIST WAS GAZETTED ON 4 JULY.

SCHOOLS

13. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING HAS ANNOUNCED THAT TOUGH SECURITY MEASURES WILL BE IMPLEMENTED AT ALL BLACK SCHOOLS WHEN THEY REOPEN ON 14 JULY (POSTPONED FROM 1 JULY). THESE INCLUDE IDENTITY CARDS FOR ALL PUPILS.

PRESS

14. BUREAU OF INFORMATION BRIEFINGS REMAIN THE ONLY READY SOURCE OF UNREST INFORMATION. RESTRICTIONS ON MEDIA COVERAGE ARE AS SEVERE AS EVER. A WEST GERMAN ARD TELEVISION CORRESPONDENT WAS EXPELLED, THE FOURTH JOURNALIST SINCE THE EMERGENCY.

REFORM PROGRAMME

15. FOLLOWING ON THE REFORM LEGISLATION OF THE RECENTLY ENDED PARLIAMENTARY SESSION, THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL IS EXPECTED TO SUBMIT ITS LONG-AWAITED REPORT ON THE GROUP AREAS AND SEPARATE AMENITIES ACTS TO THE GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO THE NATIONAL PARTY FEDERAL CONGRESS ON 12-13 AUGUST.

IMMEDIATE OUTLOOK

16. THERE IS NO END IN SIGHT FOR THE STATE OF EMERGENCY WHICH IS WIDELY EXPECTED TO REMAIN FOR A CONSIDERABLE TIME. THE NEXT POSSIBLE FLASHPOINT IS 14 JULY WHEN THERE COULD BE A COMBINATION OF A RETURN TO SCHOOL AND COSATU-LED GENERAL STRIKE. FEARS AMONG THE WHITE COMMUNITY ARE CONCENTRATED MAINLY ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF FURTHER BOMBINGS AGAINST CIVILIANS IN WHITE AREAS.

SOLESBY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA
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MR REEVE
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
SOUTHERN AFRICA

file CF 8 JUL

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

8 July 1986

Dear Dr. Barber,

Thank you for your letter of 2 July. I was very pleased to hear that the Fellowship Scheme is likely to get under way this October. I very much hope you will be able to keep to this timetable. I am most grateful for the tremendous efforts you are making in this field.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Dr. James Barber, J.P.

8 JUL

cc RC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 July 1986

Dear Charles

Chief Minister of Lebowa

Thank you for your letter of 2 July seeking our views on the suggestion that Dr Cedric Phatudi, the Chief Minister of Lebowa, should call on the Prime Minister.

This would be the third time the Prime Minister had met a homeland leader in recent months. Although in general we are in favour of the Prime Minister meeting black leaders, we are not sure that much would be gained from meeting Dr Phatudi. He is now 74 years old and more traditional and, in terms of the current situation, a less relevant figure than Chief Buthelezi or Enos Mabuza, the other homeland leaders the Prime Minister has seen.

If Dr Phatudi is to visit London Mrs Chalker would be ready to meet him. As a homeland leader, and someone who has consistently opposed Verwoerdian "independence" Dr Phatudi is certainly someone we would expect to be involved in the eventual dialogue about the constitutional future of South Africa (provided he is still alive).

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

S. AFRICA
RELATIONS
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AND TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

EUROPEAN COUNCIL/SOUTH AFRICA: MESSAGES

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL OBASANJO AND MR. FRASER. PLEASE ARRANGE TO HAVE IT DELIVERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BEGINS

FOLLOWING THE RECENT MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL I SHOULD LIKE TO LET YOU KNOW HOW WE SEE THE NEXT STEPS IN RELATION TO SOUTH AFRICA.

YOU WILL KNOW FROM OUR MEETING ON 12 JUNE, WHEN YOU KINDLY CALLED ON ME TO DISCUSS THE COMGEP REPORT, THAT LIKE ALL MY COLLEAGUES IN THE COMMONWEALTH, I WAS GREATLY DISAPPOINTED BY THE BREAKDOWN OF YOUR MISSION. AS I SAID THEN, IT IS TRAGIC THAT HAVING ACHIEVED SO MUCH YOU SHOULD AT THE LAST HAVE FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

SINCE WE MET WE HAVE, OF COURSE, ALL BEEN CONSIDERING WHAT MORE IS NEEDED TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. SO TOO HAVE MY COLLEAGUES AT THE HEADS OF EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. LIKE US IN THE COMMONWEALTH

THEY BELIEVE, WITH THE SAME PROFOUND CONVICTION, THAT THE OBJECTIVES WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH SET AT NASSAU - TO BRING APARTHEID TO AN END, THROUGH DIALOGUE AND A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES - REMAIN ENTIRELY VALID. AFTER ALL, THOSE WERE THE OBJECTIVES WHICH THE COMMUNITY TOO SET ITSELF AT LUXEMBOURG LAST SEPTEMBER, AND AGAIN AT THE JOINT MEETING WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES IN LUSAKA EARLIER THIS YEAR.

THE QUESTION WE ASKED EACH OTHER AT THE HAGUE WAS THIS: IS NOT THE PROSPECT OF A RISING TIDE OF VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA SO SERIOUS THAT WE SHOULD MAKE A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE, BUILDING ON THE WORK WHICH YOUR GROUP HAD DONE?

A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN ESTABLISHING WHETHER THAT ROUTE IS STILL POSSIBLE MUST BE THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. MY READING OF THE AFRIKANER CHARACTER IS QUITE CLEAR: IF WE ARE TO AVOID SIMPLY DRIVING PRESIDENT BOTHA AND HIS PEOPLE INSIDE THE LAAGER, THEN IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR DISAPPROVAL AND CONDEMNATION OF THE POLICIES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT CAUSING THEM TO REACT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO RULE OUT DIALOGUE AND COMPROMISE.

IT WAS WITH THOSE THOUGHTS IN MIND THAT I APPROACHED MY MEETING IN THE HAGUE WITH MY EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES. AFTER LONG DISCUSSION WE REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE MOST EFFECTIVE ACTION THAT WE COULD TAKE AT THIS STAGE.

WE HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE KEY MOVE THAT WAS NECESSARY TO PROMOTE THE GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE WHICH WE ALL WANT WAS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT UNCONDITIONALLY TO RELEASE NELSON MANDELA AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS AND TO LIFT THE BAN ON THE ANC, PAC AND OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES. YOU WILL RECALL MY OWN STRONG FEELING ABOUT THE NEED TO FOCUS ON THESE STEPS. OPEN SQUARE BRACKET FOR OBASANJO ONLY: AND I RECALL YOUR SAYING TO ME ON 12 JUNE THAT THE RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA COULD OPEN THE WAY TO A SOLUTION. CLOSE SQUARE BRACKET. DESPITE THE OBVIOUS

DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED WE DECIDED TOO THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO UNDERTAKE A EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE TO THAT END. IT WAS ACCORDINGLY AGREED THAT GEOFFREY HOWE SHOULD GO TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE COMMUNITY, TO CARRY OUT THIS MISSION.

IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT DURING THE NEXT THREE MONTHS IN SUPPORT OF THAT MISSION THE TWELVE WOULD ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS WITH THE OTHER INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES ON FURTHER MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE NEEDED, COVERING IN PARTICULAR A BAN ON NEW INVESTMENT AND ON THE IMPORT OF COAL, IRON, STEEL AND GOLD COINS FROM SOUTH AFRICA. THIS DECISION TO CONSULT OTHER INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES ABOUT POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY MEASURES WAS, OF COURSE, INTENDED TO REINFORCE THE POSITION WE IN THE COMMONWEALTH HAVE ALREADY TAKEN: IF MEASURES ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES AS A WHOLE.

I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND THAT YOU AND YOUR FELLOW MEMBERS OF THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP MUST BE CONCERNED THAT THIS MOVE BY THE COMMUNITY MIGHT CUT ACROSS THE WORK ON WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED TOGETHER. I SHOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU AN ASSURANCE THAT THE ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN WITH OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS IS VERY MUCH IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF WHAT THE COMMONWEALTH AGREED IN NASSAU. THE MISSION BEING UNDERTAKEN BY GEOFFREY HOWE IS NOT INTENDED TO SUPERSEDE OR UNDERMINE THE FINDINGS OF THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP. ITS AIM, ON THE CONTRARY, IS TO BUILD ON YOUR WORK AND FOLLOW THE COURSE WHICH YOU CHARTED, IN PURSUIT OF THE SAME OBJECTIVES. YOU WILL RECALL THAT AT THE END OF OUR MEETING YOU SUGGESTED THAT I MIGHT MYSELF MEET PRESIDENT BOTHA. I DID NOT THINK THIS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE, AT THIS STAGE AT LEAST. BUT IT WAS WITH YOUR SUGGESTION VERY MUCH IN MIND THAT WE DECIDED ON GEOFFREY HOWE'S MISSION. THE SEVEN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS ALL THESE ISSUES AT THE MEETING IN LONDON IN AUGUST

TO REVIEW THE COMMONWEALTH ACCORD. MEANWHILE I SHOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT GEOFFREY HOWE'S MISSION IS MOST SERIOUSLY AND SINCERELY INTENDED. IF IT IS TO HAVE A CHANCE OF SUCCESS AGAINST WHAT WE MUST ALL SEE AS VERY LONG ODDS, HE WILL NEED TO HAVE THE CHANCE OF MEETING A WIDE RANGE OF PEOPLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. I DO VERY MUCH HOPE THAT YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO LEND SUCH SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT AS YOU CAN.

OPEN SQUARE BRACKET FOR OBASANJO ONLY: FINALLY, I SHOULD LIKE ONCE MORE TO ADD MY OWN PERSONAL TRIBUTE TO THE PART YOU PLAYED IN THE COMGEP MISSION. THE STATESMANSHIP WHICH YOU CONTRIBUTED IN SUCH FULL MEASURE THROUGHOUT REAPED PRAISE NOT ONLY FOR YOURSELF BUT FOR YOUR COUNTRY AND THE COMMONWEALTH AS A WHOLE. I THANK YOU MOST WARMLY. CLOSE SQUARE BRACKET
ENDS

HOWE

LIMITED
HD OF SAFD
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR E FERGUSSON
MR REEVE

CONFIDENTIAL

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DSG

bc: fc

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 July 1986

SOUTH AFRICA

Sir Laurens van der Post telephoned me this morning to stress a point which he thought he had not emphasised vigorously enough to the Foreign Secretary, namely that Mandela was not just a prisoner of the South African Government, but also of the ANC. There were good reasons to think that the ANC preferred to have Mandela in jail. He had information that Mandela's Indian lawyer based in Lusaka, working with Mrs. Mandela, was insisting that Mandela should not see Sir Geoffrey Howe even though Mandela himself would wish to do so. Sir Laurens therefore hopes that the Foreign Secretary will do all he can while in Lusaka to persuade President Kaunda to overcome the malign influence of those in the ANC who wish to block a meeting between him and Mandela.

Charles Powell

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 July 1986

SOUTH AFRICA

I enclose a copy of a further message to the Prime Minister from President Botha which has just come in. As you will see, it is in rather a friendlier tone. It offers a meeting with the Foreign Secretary at 1430 on 23 July and a further meeting if necessary on 29 July. You will want to inform the Foreign Secretary of this in Strasbourg. I am inclined to think that any reply is best conveyed through our Embassy or through the South African Embassy here rather than by a further message. Obviously it would be helpful to get South African agreement to announcing the meeting as soon as possible.

(CHARLES POWELL)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

South African Embassy
TRAFALGAR SQUARE
WC2N 5DP

8 July 1986

Mr Charles D Powell
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Dear Charles,

I attach a copy of a letter dated 7 July 1986 addressed to The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP from the State President Mr P W Botha in response to Mrs Thatcher's message of 7 July 1986.

It would be appreciated if you could bring the contents of the letter to the attention of the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely

L H EVANS
MINISTER

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T127A/86

SUBJECT
cc MASTER
UPS

(2)

Prime Minister
A message from the President of Tanzania: far more helpful than you would have got from Nyerere. CDP 7/7.

The Rt. Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister.

"I thank you most sincerely for your message of 29 June 1986 in which you let me know of the nature and spirit of the discussions as well as the decisions of the recent European Community Summit on the problem of South Africa. I appreciated in particular the sincerity and conviction with which you participated in the Summit and lent support to its programme of action on this question during the next three months.

Let me assure you that I have never been in doubt about the sincerity of your position on this matter. Nor have I doubted your determination to do everything possible to avert the looming catastrophy, with which apartheid is certain to visit South Africa unless that thoroughly despicable system is dismantled. I also understand the preference we all share for a negotiated process between the South African regime and the authentic leaders of the African majority.

Pressure will clearly have to be brought to bear on the South African Government to accept this course of action rather than that of continued confrontation and unacceptable repression. As a form of pressure, I welcome the consultations that will be undertaken by the twelve with other industrialised countries concerning further measures of pressure on the South African Government, covering in particular a ban on new investment and on the import of coal, iron, steel and gold coins from South Africa. To be effective the South African Government must not perceive them as mere motions, but rather as earnest evidence of firm intent to resort to measures of an effective kind as the 'COMGEP' has urged. Without such evidence, the South African authorities are certain to interpret them as simply placatory of outraged international opinion, and no more.

Which brings me round to what I see as the problem of Sir Geoffrey's visit in relation to the work and report of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons.

As I see it, the merits of the work of the 'COMGEP' have turned out to be four fold. First is the wholesomeness of their operating principles, as outlined in their report. Second is the fact that they were able to consult widely

...2.

within South Africa and outside it and received sufficient and professional back-up from the Commonwealth Secretariat. Third was their unanimous finding regarding the attitude of the South African Government to and readiness for fundamental change in the apartheid system. And fourthly was their unanimous and unequivocal recommendation regarding the way forward: namely the imposition of effective measures against South Africa - which do not rule out economic sanctions.

The work of the 'COMGEP' has met with universal approbation. Their report and its recommendations have generated a pressure and impetus of their own. Nor should anything be done which would give the impression, however, unintended, that it was even partly wanting in thoroughness, clarity and credibility. The 'COMGEP' work and report have assumed a central role in the efforts of the Commonwealth and the International Community as a whole to make its collective will felt on the South African regime. That role should not be eroded.

It is in this context that I am frankly concerned by the mission being undertaken by Sir Geoffrey Howe. I recognise that because of the close economic links between the United Kingdom and South Africa and also between the European Community and South Africa, Sir Geoffrey in his capacity as both British Foreign Secretary and President of the European Council of Ministers may be able to bring fresh influence to bear on the South African Government. That would obviously be to the good.

However, given the instant and contemptuous dismissal which the South African Government gave to the European Community Summit Appeal, there is the very real danger that Sir Geoffrey's mission will only muddy the waters which the 'COMGEP' have so painstakingly filtered. I believe this is the more likely outturn. That would be unfortunate and would have the inexorable effect of either disuniting the International Community in its aspiration to embark on effective measures, or of opening a debate between the 'COMGEP' and Sir Geoffrey Howe's mission - to further obfuscation of the unmitigated terror with which the South African Government continue their evil policies.

A great deal will depend on How Sir Geoffrey goes about his task. We in Tanzania shall follow it very closely, and I will want to take advantage of your offer to keep me informed of his progress. Although I see his task as almost a "Mission Impossible", I wish him well.

This message brings with it my best wishes for your continued good health."

Ali Hassan Mwinyi,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA.

London,
7th July, 1986.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

8 July 1986

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the President of Tanzania, replying to her recent message about the outcome of the European Council's discussion of South Africa. As you will see, while expressing some misgivings about the Foreign Secretary's mission, the President ends up by wishing the Foreign Secretary well. He also asks to be kept closely informed of progress. I do not see any need for a further immediate reply.

(CHARLES POWELL)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TELEPHONE: 01-499 8951
TELEGRAMS: TANZANREP LONDON
TELEX: 262504

HIGH COMMISSION OF THE
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

43, HERTFORD STREET
LONDON, W1Y 8DB

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

TZLC/P.40/66

8th July, 1986.

Mr. Nigel Wicks,
Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minister,
Prime Minister's Office,
10, Downing Street,
London, SW1.

R Powell.

Dear Mr. Wicks.

I would be most grateful if you could deliver the attached message from H.E. President Ali Hassan Mwinyi to the Rt. Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

A.V. Magere,
Ag. High Commissioner.

Encl.

The Rt. Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister.

"I thank you most sincerely for your message of 29 June 1986 in which you let me know of the nature and spirit of the discussions as well as the decisions of the recent European Community Summit on the problem of South Africa. I appreciated in particular the sincerity and conviction with which you participated in the Summit and lent support to its programme of action on this question during the next three months.

Let me assure you that I have never been in doubt about the sincerity of your position on this matter. Nor have I doubted your determination to do everything possible to avert the looming catastrophy, with which apartheid is certain to visit South Africa unless that thoroughly despicable system is dismantled. I also understand the preference we all share for a negotiated process between the South African regime and the authentic leaders of the African majority.

Pressure will clearly have to be brought to bear on the South African Government to accept this course of action rather than that of continued confrontation and unacceptable repression. As a form of pressure, I welcome the consultations that will be undertaken by the twelve with other industrialised countries concerning further measures of pressure on the South African Government, covering in particular a ban on new investment and on the import of coal, iron, steel and gold coins from South Africa. To be effective the South African Government must not perceive them as mere motions, but rather as earnest evidence of firm intent to resort to measures of an effective kind as the 'COMGEP' has urged. Without such evidence, the South African authorities are certain to interpret them as simply placatory of outraged international opinion, and no more.

Which brings me round to what I see as the problem of Sir Geoffrey's visit in relation to the work and report of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons.

As I see it, the merits of the work of the 'COMGEP' have turned out to be four fold. First is the wholesomeness of their operating principles, as outlined in their report. Second is the fact that they were able to consult widely

...2.

within South Africa and outside it and received sufficient and professional back-up from the Commonwealth Secretariat. Third was their unanimous finding regarding the attitude of the South African Government to and readiness for fundamental change in the apartheid system. And fourthly was their unanimous and unequivocal recommendation regarding the way forward: namely the imposition of effective measures against South Africa - which do not rule out economic sanctions.

The work of the 'COMGEP' has met with universal approbation. Their report and its recommendations have generated a pressure and impetus of their own. Nor should anything be done which would give the impression, however, unintended, that it was even partly wanting in thoroughness, clarity and credibility. The 'COMGEP' work and report have assumed a central role in the efforts of the Commonwealth and the International Community as a whole to make its collective will felt on the South African regime. That role should not be eroded.

It is in this context that I am frankly concerned by the mission being undertaken by Sir Geoffrey Howe. I recognise that because of the close economic links between the United Kingdom and South Africa and also between the European Community and South Africa, Sir Geoffrey in his capacity as both British Foreign Secretary and President of the European Council of Ministers may be able to bring fresh influence to bear on the South African Government. That would obviously be to the good.

However, given the instant and contemptuous dismissal which the South African Government gave to the European Community Summit Appeal, there is the very real danger that Sir Geoffrey's mission will only muddy the waters which the 'COMGEP' have so painstakingly filtered. I believe this is the more likely outturn. That would be unfortunate and would have the inexorable effect of either disuniting the International Community in its aspiration to embark on effective measures, or of opening a debate between the 'COMGEP' and Sir Geoffrey Howe's mission - to further obfuscation of the unmitigated terror with which the South African Government continue their evil policies.

....3.

A great deal will depend on How Sir Geoffrey goes about his task. We in Tanzania shall follow it very closely, and I will want to take advantage of your offer to keep me informed of his progress. Although I see his task as almost a "Mission Impossible", I wish him well.

This message brings with it my best wishes for your continued good health."

Ali Hassan Mwinyi,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA.

London,
7th July, 1986.

Already rec'd

Subject a Ops master

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T127/86

Union Buildings
Pretoria

7 July 1986

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for the message conveyed to me this evening concerning Sir Geoffrey Howe's visit and for your understanding of the pressures on my programme.

I was pleased to note that Sir Geoffrey will convey in clear terms to the ANC leadership that if progress is to be made, it can only be achieved by peaceful means and that he will be laying particular emphasis on the need to abandon violence.

In these circumstances, I shall be available to meet Sir Geoffrey at 14h30 on 23 July and if necessary again on the 29th July.

So far as a meeting with Mr Nelson Mandela is concerned, as I mentioned to you in my message of 1 July, I shall discuss this with Sir Geoffrey at our first meeting and let him have my decision then.

I appreciate the constructive terms of your message.

Yours sincerely

P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON

SUBJECT
cc MASTER
OPS

(2)

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 127/86

South African Embassy

7 July 1986

Prime Minister
A much friendlier
message
CDP 8/7.

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for the message conveyed to me this evening concerning Sir Geoffrey Howe's visit and for your understanding of the pressures on my programme.

I was pleased to note that Sir Geoffrey will convey in clear terms to the ANC leadership that if progress is to be made, it can only be achieved by peaceful means and that he will be laying particular emphasis on the need to abandon violence.

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So far as a meeting with Mr Nelson Mandela is concerned, as I mentioned to you in my message of 1 July, I shall discuss this with Sir Geoffrey at our first meeting and let him have my decision then.

I appreciate the constructive terms of your message.

Yours sincerely

P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

CC TF
CP
Press
PU
OIL

7 JULY 1986

BY PRIVATE NOTICE 2.

*LA DENIS HEALEY (SWANSEA EAST): TO ASK THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, WHETHER IT REMAINS HIS INTENTION TO VISIT SOUTH AFRICA, AND IF SO WHAT ARE HIS PLANS.

SIR GEOFFREY HOWE

I INTEND TO MAKE AN EARLY START ON THE MISSION ENTRUSTED TO ME AT THE RECENT EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING IN THE HAGUE. I ACCORDINGLY PROPOSED LAST WEEK TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA THAT I SHOULD VISIT THEM IN THE PERIOD 9-11 JULY ON THE FIRST STAGE OF THE MISSION. THE ZAMBIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE CONFIRMED THAT A VISIT THIS WEEK IS CONVENIENT. THE ZIMBABWEAN AUTHORITIES HAVE GIVEN A SIMILAR INDICATION BUT WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR CONFIRMATION. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY ARE READY TO RECEIVE ME, BUT HAVE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE DATES. THESE ARE NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION. I SHALL THEREFORE PROCEED WITH THE VISIT TO LUSAKA AND HARARE, LEAVING FROM STRASBOURG TOMORROW EVENING, AND PLAN TO VISIT SOUTH AFRICA LATER IN THE MONTH. FURTHER VISITS TO AND WITHIN THE REGION ARE OF COURSE NOT EXCLUDED.

JD3 ANJ

STRICTLY PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

7 July, 1986.

SIGNED COPY NOT NECESSARY.

Thank you for your helpful and constructive reply, delivered yesterday, to my message of 4 July.

I fully understand the pressures on your programme, and am grateful for your efforts to advance the timing of your meeting with Geoffrey Howe. It is a pity that 14 July is impossible for him because of the Soviet Foreign Minister's visit.

I know that the Foreign Secretary is looking forward to meeting you on 29 July. As I said in my earlier message, there is much to talk about, and you may not find you can get through it all in one meeting. Moreover a meeting only on 29 July would leave very little time for a subsequent meeting with Mr. Nelson Mandela to which, as you know, I attach great importance. I wonder therefore if you would try to see the Foreign Secretary nearer to the outset of his visit. I am very conscious that I have to meet with a number of other Commonwealth Heads of Government on 3/5 August in London. I want to have as strong a case as possible to put to them.

I read with interest the reference in your letter to the need for European Governments to put pressure on those who are encouraging intimidation and violence so as to prevent

negotiations from taking place. Very much with that point in mind, you should know that Geoffrey Howe and I have decided that he should visit Zambia, along with Zimbabwe, later this week. A meeting with President Kaunda had already been agreed before we learnt of your diary difficulties. While in Zambia, the Foreign Secretary is likely to have a meeting with the ANC leadership in order to put across a very clear message, that if progress is to be made, it can only be achieved by peaceful means. During these visits, Geoffrey Howe will therefore be laying particular emphasis on the need to abandon violence.

As you say, we agree on some fundamental objectives, but we differ as to the best way of achieving them. I hope very much that we can enlarge the area of common ground, in all our interests.

The Honourable P.W. Botha, DMS, MP.

DSR 11 (Revised)

STRICTLY PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO: Dear P

The Honorable P W Botha DMS MP

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your helpful and constructive reply, delivered yesterday, to my message of 4 July.

I fully understand the pressures on your programme and am grateful for your efforts to advance the timing of your meeting with Geoffrey Howe. It is a pity that 14 July is impossible for him because of the ~~Shevardnadze~~ Soviet Foreign Minister's visit.

I know that the Foreign Secretary is looking forward to meeting you on 29 July. As I said in my earlier message, there is much to talk about. For that reason I feel ~~strongly that if there are to be the kind of in depth discussions for which we both hope it will almost certainly be necessary for him to have more than one meeting with you during that visit.~~ A meeting only on 29 July would leave very little time for a subsequent meeting with Mr Nelson Mandela to which, as you know, I attach great importance. ~~I therefore very much hope that it may be possible for you to fit in a meeting with the Foreign Secretary nearer to the outset of his visit,~~

/say

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I wonder whether if you would try to see the Foreign Secretary

I want to have as good a case as possible to put to the Commonwealth Heads of Government with whom I have to meet on 3 August.

say on 24 or 25 July.

I read with interest the reference in your letter to the need for European Governments to put pressure on those who are encouraging intimidation and violence so as to prevent negotiations from taking place. Very much with that point in mind, you should know that Geoffrey Howe and I have decided that he should visit Zambia, along with ~~[probably]~~ Zimbabwe [~~and~~ Mozambique] ~~[also]~~, later this week. A meeting with President Kaunda had already been agreed before we learnt of your diary difficulties. While in Zambia, the Foreign Secretary ~~will hope~~ is likely to have a meeting with the ANC leadership. ~~He will be~~ putting across a very clear message, ~~designed to bring home to them our view~~, that if progress is to be made, it [~~would be far better and more quickly~~] can only be achieved by peaceful means. During these visits, Geoffrey Howe will therefore be ~~giving~~ laying particular emphasis ~~to~~ on the need to ~~foreswear~~ abandon violence.

I am very conscious that I have to meet with a number of other Commonwealth Heads of Government on 3/5 August in London. I want to ~~have~~ have as strong a case as possible to put to them.

As you say, we ~~seem to be in~~ agree~~ment~~ on some fundamental objectives, but to differ as to the best way of achieving them. ~~The sooner we seek to enlarge the area of common ground, the better.~~ I hope very much that we can in all our interests.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 July, 1986.

FOR TELEGRAM

REPLY TO PRESIDENT BOTHA'S LATEST MESSAGE

I enclose a reply from the Prime Minister to President Botha's latest message which I should be grateful if you would despatch.

(C.D. Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SRW

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 July 1986

SOUTH AFRICA: FOLLOW UP TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

Thank you for your letter of 4 July enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to General Obasanjo and Mr. Malcolm Fraser. I enclose a message with some revisions in a form which the Prime Minister has agreed. Provided the Foreign Secretary is content with it as amended, it may be despatched.

BY FOR TELEGRAM

(C. D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

OUT TELEGRAM

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		CONFIDENTIAL		IMMEDIATE

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EUROPEAN COUNCIL/SOUTH AFRICA: MESSAGES

1. Following is text of a message from the Prime Minister to General Obasanjo and Mr. Fraser. Please arrange to have it delivered as soon as possible.

Begins

Following last week's meeting of the European Council I should like to let you know how we see the next steps in relation to South Africa.

You will know from our meeting on 12 June, when you kindly called on me to discuss the COMGEP report, that like all my colleagues in the Commonwealth, I was greatly disappointed by the breakdown of your mission. As I said then, it is tragic that having achieved so much you should at the last have found it impossible to reach a successful conclusion.

/// // /

Since we met we have, of course, all been considering what more is needed to bring about a change in the attitude of the South African Government. So too have my colleagues at the

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File number	Dept: Private Office	Drafted by (Block capitals): C R Budd	Telephone no: 4831
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials	Date/time	
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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	CONFIDENTIAL		IMMEDIATE

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Heads of European Governments. Like us in the Commonwealth they believe, with the same profound conviction, that the objectives which the Commonwealth set at Nassau - to bring apartheid to an end, through dialogue and a suspension of violence on all sides - remain entirely valid. After all, those were the objectives which the Community too set itself at Luxembourg last September, and again at the joint meeting with the Front Line States in Lusaka earlier this year.

The question we asked each other at The Hague was this: is not the prospect of a rising tide of violence in South Africa so serious, that we should make a further attempt to promote dialogue, building on the work which your Group had done?

A crucial factor in establishing whether that route is still possible must be the attitude of the South African Government. My reading of the Afrikaner character is quite clear: if we are to avoid simply driving President Botha and his people inside the laager, then it is imperative that we should demonstrate our disapproval and condemnation of the policies of the South African Government without causing them to react in such a way as to rule out dialogue and compromise.

It was with those thoughts in mind that I approached my meeting in The Hague with my European Community colleagues. After long discussion we reached agreement on the most effective action that we could take at this stage.

We had no doubt that the key move that was necessary to promote

/// // / the genuine national dialogue which we all want was for the South African Government unconditionally to release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and to lift the ban on the ANC, PAC and other political parties. You will recall

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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my own strong feeling about the need to focus on these steps. Open square bracket For Obasanjo only: And I recall your saying to me on 12 June that the release of Nelson Mandela could open the way to a solution. close square bracket. Despite the obvious difficulties involved we decided too that it was right to undertake a European diplomatic initiative to that end. It was accordingly agreed that Geoffrey Howe should go to Southern Africa, in his capacity as President of the European Council of Ministers and with the full support of the Community, to carry out this mission.

It was also agreed that during the next three months in support of that mission the Twelve would enter into consultations with the other industrialised countries on further measures which might be needed, covering in particular a ban on new investment and on the import of coal, iron, steel and gold coins from South Africa. This decision to consult other industrialised countries about possible contingency measures was, of course, intended to reinforce the position we in the Commonwealth have already taken: if measures are to be effective it is essential that they should have the support of the industrialised countries as a whole.

I can well understand that you and your fellow members of the Eminent Persons Group must be concerned that this move by the Community might cut across the work on which we have been engaged together. I should like to give you an assurance that the action we have taken with our European partners is very much in keeping with the spirit of what the Commonwealth agreed in Nassau. The mission being undertaken by Geoffrey Howe is not intended to supersede or undermine the findings of the Eminent Persons Group. Its aim, on the contrary, is to build on your work and follow the course which you charted, in pursuit

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of the same objectives. You will recall that at the end of our meeting you suggested that I might myself meet President Botha. I did not think this would be appropriate, at this stage at least. But it was with your suggestion very much in mind that we decided on Geoffrey Howe's mission. The seven Commonwealth heads of Government will have an opportunity to discuss all these issues at the meeting in London in August to review the Commonwealth Accord. Meanwhile I should like to assure you that Geoffrey Howe's mission is most seriously and sincerely intended. If it is to have a chance of success against what we must all see as very long odds, he will need to have the chance of meeting a wide range of people in Southern Africa, as well as members of the South African Government. I do very much hope that you will feel able to lend such support and encouragement as you can.

Open square bracket For Obasanjo only: Finally, I should like once more to add my own personal tribute to the part you played in the COMGEP mission. The statesmanship which you contributed in such full emasure throughout reaped praise not only for yourself but for your country and the Commonwealth as a whole. I thank you most warmly. close square bracket
Ends

Howe

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fill

DSG

CCKG

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

7 July 1986

Dear Premier,

Thank you for your heart-warming letter. It was good of you to write and I value your support and encouragement.

Warm regards,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Hon. Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, KCMG, MLA

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 1968 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Letter from Budd to Powell dated 7 July 1986, with enclosures.	
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 July 1986

Dear Charles,

OAU and South Africa

President Diouf of Senegal recently asked both Mr Raison and Sir John Thomson whether he could be briefed on how we see the situation in South Africa. Our Ambassador at Dakar has now recommended that it would be to our advantage to do this (President Diouf is Chairman of the OAU, which is having a summit meeting on 28-30 July) and that a message from the Prime Minister would make the maximum impact.

The Foreign Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should agree to send such a message. President Diouf is an important figure on the African scene. He is also moderate. At the UN Special Session on Africa President Diouf spoke appreciatively of his meeting with the Prime Minister during his visit here in February, and recalled in particular what she had told him of the establishment of COMGEP.

We therefore have an opportunity to encourage President Diouf to use whatever moderating influence he may have to discourage any discussion at the OAU Summit which might pre-judge the outcome of the COMGEP review. At the same time, the Prime Minister could share with him Commonwealth and European concern about the situation in Southern Africa and ask for his encouragement and support for the Secretary of State's mission. We cannot expect to alter President Diouf's commitment to sanctions against South Africa. But we can ensure that he has a clear grasp of our thinking. He respects our experience in the area and will listen to and reflect on anything we have to say.

A message from the Prime Minister could also usefully refer to the helpful role which President Diouf played at the UN Special Session. That the conference went a good deal better than it might have done was due in no small part to the important role played by President Diouf. As OAU President, he presented the African case in a statesmanlike way, and throughout the Senegalese led the Africans constructively.

I attach draft telegrams to Dakar. We should aim to get any message to President Diouf in good time before the OAU summit.

Yours ever,

Tony Galsworthy

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification	Caveat	Precedence
		CONFIDENTIAL		IMMEDIATE

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TELNO	6	TELNO
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AND TO	8	INFO ROUTINE PARIS, ADDIS ABABA
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	10	
	11	YOUR TELNO 156: OAU AND SOUTH AFRICA
	12	1. MIFT contains the text of a message from the Prime Minister
	13	to President Diouf. Please deliver as soon as possible.
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	19	MAIN
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//	27	MR E FERGUSSON
/	28	MR REEVE
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		Catchword: NNNN	
File number	Dept: SAFD	Drafted by (Block capitals): W K PRENDERGAST	Telephone no: 233 5189
Authorised for despatch by: Initials Date/time			
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	11	MIPT: OAU AND SOUTH AFRICA: MESSAGE
	12	FOLLOWING IS TEXT:
	13	BEGINS: I RECALL WITH PLEASURE OUR TALK LAST FEBRUARY, AND WANTED
	14	TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON THE GRAVE SITUATION IN SOUTH
	15	AFRICA WHILE LETTING YOU KNOW HOW WE IN BRITAIN SEE THE NEXT
	16	STEPS. I FEEL THAT IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD
	17	BOTH KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WHILE YOU ARE CHAIRMAN OF THE OAU AND
	18	BRITAIN HOLDS THE PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.
	19	I WAS DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED, AS I AM SURE YOU WERE, BY THE
	20	BREAKDOWN OF THE MISSION UNDERTAKEN BY THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF
	21	EMINENT PERSONS. IT IS VERY SAD THAT HAVING ACHIEVED SO MUCH
	22	THEY SHOULD AT THE LAST HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED BY THE OBDURACY OF
	23	PRESIDENT BOTHA'S GOVERNMENT. THE THREE SOUTH AFRICAN RAIDS ON
	24	NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES WERE A SHOCK WHICH ANGERED US ALL.
	25	SINCE THEN THE HEADS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY GOVERNMENTS HAVE
///	26	BEEN CONSIDERING WHAT MORE WE CAN AND SHOULD DO TO BRING ABOUT A
//	27	CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. WE ALL
/	28	BELIEVE, WITH THE SAME PROFOUND CONVICTION, THAT OUR OBJECTIVE
	29	MUST CONTINUE TO BE TO BRING APARTHEID TO AN END THROUGH DIALOGUE

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MAIN	File number	Dept: SAFD	Drafted by (Block capitals): W K PRENDERGAST	Telephone no: 233 5189
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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AND A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES. THAT IS ALSO THE OBJECTIVE OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

THE QUESTION THE HEADS OF THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT ALL ASKED EACH OTHER ONCE AGAIN AT THE HAGUE ON 26-27 JUNE WAS THIS: IS THE PROMOTION OF DIALOGUE NOW A HOPELESS CAUSE, OR IS THERE STILL A CASE FOR TRYING ONCE MORE THE ROAD OF PERSUASION BEFORE WE RESIGN OURSELVES TO THE PROSPECT OF SOUTH AFRICA BEING CAUGHT UP INEVITABLY IN A RISING TIDE OF VIOLENCE?

~~I AM SURE THAT I DO NOT HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT~~ I HAVE BEEN PROFOUNDLY CONCERNED AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE REIMPOSITION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND THE FURTHER INTERNAL MEASURES GOING WITH IT ARE A RECIPE FOR AN EVEN SWIFTER UPWARD SPIRAL OF REPRESSION AND VIOLENCE AND INTER-RACIAL CONFLICT. I AM UTTERLY DETERMINED THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DONE TO AVERT THAT LOOMING CATASTROPHE, AND TO BRING APARTHEID TO AN END BY PEACEFUL MEANS LONG HYPHEN THAT, I BELIEVE, IS THE QUICKEST WAY LONG HYPHEN THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND NOT CONFLICT.

THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THAT ROUTE IS STILL POSSIBLE. A CRUCIAL FACTOR MUST BE THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. MY READING OF THE AFRIKANER CHARACTER IS QUITE CLEAR: IF WE ARE TO AVOID SIMPLY DRIVING PRESIDENT BOTHA AND HIS PEOPLE INSIDE THE LAAGER, WITH ALL THE THREAT OF MOUNTING BLOODSHED THAT THAT WOULD IMPLY, THEN IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR DISAPPROVAL AND CONDEMNATION OF THE POLICIES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT CAUSING THEM TO REACT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO RULE OUT DIALOGUE AND COMPROMISE.

IT WAS WITH THOSE THOUGHTS IN MIND THAT I APPROACHED MY MEETING LAST MONTH WITH MY EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES. AFTER LONG DISCUSSION WE REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE MOST EFFECTIVE ACTION THAT WE COULD TAKE AT THIS STAGE.

WE HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE KEY MOVE THAT WAS NECESSARY TO PROMOTE THE GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE WHICH WE ALL WANT WOULD BE FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT UNCONDITIONALLY TO RELEASE

For distribution order see Page	Catchword:

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

		Classification	Caveat	Precedence
		CONFIDENTIAL		

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NELSON MANDELA AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS AND TO LIFT THE BAN ON THE ANC, PAC AND OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES. DESPITE THE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED WE DECIDED TOO THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO UNDERTAKE ONE MORE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE TO THAT END. IT WAS ACCORDINGLY AGREED THAT GEOFFREY HOWE SHOULD TRAVEL SOON TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE COMMUNITY, TO CARRY OUT THIS MISSION. AS A FIRST STEP, HE GOES THIS WEEK TO LUSAKA AND HARARE, AND WE ARE NOW CONSIDERING DATES PROPOSED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT FOR HIS VISIT THERE.

IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT DURING THE NEXT THREE MONTHS IN SUPPORT OF THAT MISSION THE TWELVE WOULD ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS WITH THE OTHER INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES ON FURTHER MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE NEEDED, COVERING IN PARTICULAR A BAN ON NEW INVESTMENT AND ON THE IMPORT OF COAL, IRON, STEEL AND GOLD COINS FROM SOUTH AFRICA. THIS DECISION TO CONSULT OTHER INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES ABOUT POSSIBLE FURTHER MEASURES WAS, OF COURSE, TAKEN BECAUSE IF MEASURES ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES AS A WHOLE.

AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS ALL THESE ISSUES WILL ARISE WHEN THE SEVEN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DIRECTLY INVOLVED WILL FORMALLY REVIEW THE REPORT OF THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP IN EARLY AUGUST, SHORTLY AFTER THE OAU SUMMIT. ~~BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULT AND DELICATE NATURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEM, I FEEL THAT ANY MAJOR DISCUSSION OF THE REPORT BEFORE THE OUTCOME OF THE REVIEW IS KNOWN COULD PROVE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. I VERY MUCH HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT~~ THIS ACCOUNT OF MY VIEWS ON THE SITUATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS THAT SO CONCERN US BOTH WILL BE HELPFUL TO YOU IN YOUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE ADDIS MEETING.

ON A RELATED TOPIC, MAY I SAY THAT I FOLLOWED WITH GREAT INTEREST THE DEVELOPMENTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON AFRICA IN NEW YORK WHICH ENDED ON 1 JUNE. I HAVE HEARD OF THE

I realise that OAU leaders will have Southern Africa at the top of their agenda. I hope nevertheless that under your guidance, the outcome of the OAU Summit will not be such as to prejudice the chances of a constructive outcome to the Commonwealth review meeting. In any case, I hope that

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XY 48A (REV)

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

		Classification	Caveat	Precedence
		CONFIDENTIAL		

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CONSTRUCTIVE AND ENERGETIC WAY IN WHICH THE SENEGALESE DELEGATION HELPED TO EDGE THE CONFERENCE TOWARDS ITS SATISFACTORY OUTCOME, AND I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT YOUR OWN WISE AND STATESMANLIKE ADDRESS IN PLENARY WAS ESSENTIAL IN SETTING THE POSITIVE TONE FOR THE SESSION. IT WAS MOST ENCOURAGING THAT AN AGREED RESOLUTION WAS FINALLY ACHIEVED, WHICH OUTLINES CLEARLY THE NATURE AND SERIOUSNESS OF AFRICA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND THE MEANS BY WHICH THEY CAN BE RESOLVED. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE WARM APPRECIATION OF MY OWN GOVERNMENT FOR THE PERSONAL ROLE YOU PLAYED IN THESE IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS.

WITH KIND REGARDS AND WARM MEMORIES OF YOUR VISIT.

HOWE

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XY 48A (REV)

SUBJECT
MASTER
OPS

Subject on S. AFRICA Relations Pt. 11

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T126A/86

OCMIAN 8265
CONFIDENTIAL
ZZ PRETO
FM FCOLN TO PRETO
071500Z JUL
GRS 424

CONFIDENTIAL
DEDIP
FM FCO
TO FLASH PRETORIA
TELNO 108
OF 071500Z JULY 86

PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH STATE PRESIDENT BOTHA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REPLY FROM PRIME MINISTER TO P W BOTHA'S LATEST MESSAGE, WHICH WAS DELIVERED HERE YESTERDAY AND WHICH WE ASSUME IS AVAILABLE TO YOU VIA THE DFA. WE ARE DELIVERING ACTION COPY TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY, IN THE INTERESTS OF SPEED.

2. MESSAGE BEGINS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELPFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE REPLY, DELIVERED YESTERDAY, TO MY MESSAGE OF 4 JULY.

I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE PRESSURES ON YOUR PROGRAMME, AND AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EFFORTS TO ADVANCE THE TIMING OF YOUR MEETING WITH GEOFFREY HOWE. IT IS A PITY THAT 14 JULY IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT.

I KNOW THAT THE FOREIGN SECRETARY IS LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING YOU ON 29 JULY. AS I SAID IN MY EARLIER MESSAGE, THERE IS MUCH TO TALK ABOUT, AND YOU MAY NOT FIND YOU CAN GET THROUGH IT ALL IN ONE MEETING. MOREOVER A MEETING ONLY ON 29 JULY WOULD LEAVE VERY LITTLE TIME FOR A SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH MR NELSON MANDELA TO WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, I ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE. I WONDER THEREFORE IF YOU WOULD TRY TO SEE THE FOREIGN SECRETARY NEARER TO THE OUTSET OF HIS VISIT. I AM VERY CONSCIOUS THAT I HAVE TO MEET WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ON

3/5 AUGUST IN LONDON. I WANT TO HAVE AS STRONG A CASE AS POSSIBLE TO PUT TO THEM.
I READ WITH INTEREST THE REFERENCE IN YOUR LETTER TO THE NEED FOR EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO PUT PRESSURE ON THOSE WHO ARE ENCOURAGING INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE SO AS TO PREVENT NEGOTIATIONS FROM TAKING PLACE. VERY MUCH WITH THAT POINT IN MIND, YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT GEOFFREY HOWE AND I HAVE DECIDED THAT HE SHOULD VISIT ZAMBIA, ALONG WITH ZIMBABWE, LATER THIS WEEK. A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA HAD ALREADY BEEN AGREED BEFORE WE LEARNT OF YOUR DIARY DIFFICULTIES. WHILE IN ZAMBIA, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY IS LIKELY TO HAVE A MEETING WITH THE ANC LEADERSHIP IN ORDER TO PUT ACROSS A VERY CLEAR MESSAGE, THAT IF PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE, IT CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY PEACEFUL MEANS. DURING THESE VISITS, GEOFFREY HOWE WILL THEREFORE BE LAYING PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO ABANDON VIOLENCE.

AS YOU SAY, WE AGREE ON SOME FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES, BUT WE DIFFER AS TO THE BEST WAY OF ACHIEVING THEM. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT WE CAN ENLARGE THE AREA OF COMMON GROUND, IN ALL OUR INTERESTS.
MESSAGE ENDS.

HOWE

OCMIAN 8265

NNNN
LIMITED
HEAD OF SAFD
PS
PS/PUS
MR E FERGUSSON
MR REEVE

Already Rec'd

Subject cc Master Ops

Union Buildings
Pretoria

5 July 1986

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for the message conveyed to me yesterday.

The stand you have taken on sanctions in the face of so much pressure is courageous indeed. May I assure you of my and my Government's deep appreciation.

I am concerned that so many European Heads of Government should be thinking of further punitive measures. This must inevitably create problems for us. The extent and degree of intimidation already makes it difficult for moderate Black leaders to engage in talks on a new constitutional dispensation for this country. The moves abroad to increase pressure through further punitive measures have the effect only of encouraging the intimidators and perpetrators of violence to continue with their efforts to prevent negotiations taking place. They should be the object of European pressure, not the South African Government.

I have noted your views on the issues I raised with you in my message of 1 July. We seem to be in agreement on some fundamental objectives but differ as to the means of achieving them and apparently also on the whole concept of a cessation of violence. I note in this connection that you still refer to a "suspension" of violence. From this and other points of view, it will be useful to have in depth discussions with Sir Geoffrey Howe when we meet later this month.

Let me assure you that I want to be accommodating on dates for a meeting with him but I have an extremely tight schedule ahead of me. The Department of Foreign Affairs told your Embassy here even before Sir Geoffrey's initial request for a meeting had reached me that I was fully engaged until the 14th July. In the light of your representations, I have had another look at my diary. I could have received Sir Geoffrey on the afternoon of the 14th July but I understand that he will have to be in London then for the visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister. The earliest date thereafter is the 29th July.

I hope we can find a mutually convenient date.

Yours sincerely

P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON

SUBJECT
MASTER
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 126/86

Trafalgar Square
London
WC2N 5DP

M1

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

6 July 1986

CDP

Dear Prime Minister

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The stand you have taken on sanctions in the face of so much pressure is courageous indeed. May I assure you of my and my Government's deep appreciation.

I am concerned that so many European Heads of Government should be thinking of further punitive measures. This must inevitably create problems for us. The extent and degree of intimidation already makes it difficult for moderate black leaders to engage in talks on a new constitutional dispensation for this country. The moves abroad to increase pressure through further punitive measures have the effect only of encouraging the intimidators and perpetrators of violence to continue with their efforts to prevent negotiations taking place. They should be the object of European pressure, not the South African Government.

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2/...

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I hope we can find a mutually convenient date.

Yours sincerely

P.W. BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON

One woman's view of SA

By Violet Johnstone

IN [illegible] two weeks that Wendy Ackerman has accompanied her husband on business in America and Europe, ending in London, she has sometimes lied when questioned about where she comes from—yet she is an honest, proud and loyal South African. Just to get a bit of peace and quiet, when asked, she would name the last place she had been to, exhausted with having to fight to explain herself.

Wendy Ackerman: desire to put the record straight

Watching television in London during her short stay here, however, has sparked off a desire to put the record straight. "Unfortunately, as we see it from your television, everybody is so hysterical they are losing sight of the fact that normal, everyday life is going on in South Africa, as it is in Britain.

"The pictures shown, which are old pictures because the Press aren't allowed in, make it look as if the police are running round beating up the population all the time, and it really isn't like that. What is presented appears so simplistic: all whites are bad, all blacks are good."

Like her husband, Raymond, who owns one of the largest chains of supermarkets in South Africa, she is a great critic of the South African Government, and has fought many issues, the Group Areas Act, in particular, all her adult life.

"Because the Government has its attitude, you cannot tar the whole nation with that point of view. There are lots and lots of liberal-thinking whites and blacks in South Africa who want an integrated society, who want to live and work together very happily, and we can and will."

The Ackermans met in Cape Town when she was recruited as a volunteer teacher in one of a group of 10 night schools for blacks founded by Raymond on the Cape Peninsula. After their marriage they moved to Johannesburg, and, through the English Academy, she went to the township in Soweto, taught in schools and was involved in running an experimental course for teachers to upgrade their English.

"We had to use wind-up gramophones as the houses had no electricity, and the teachers would listen to the records to improve their English pronunciation."

She ran a drama festival for black schools in the Transvaal to which children from schools as far away as 600 to 700 miles would come to compete.

One of the most moving experiences of listening to Shakespeare she has ever had was in a church in Soweto where Juliet and Romeo acted the balcony scene: she in the pulpit, wearing her sister's wedding dress, he, down below, wearing his mother's black tights and his sister's black blouse. "These children had amazing feeling for the music of the language," says Mrs Ackerman.

That was in the Sixties, since when the Ackermans have moved back to Cape Town. "I don't know that I would be welcome in Soweto any longer; the colour of my face is against me," she says.

As her husband was busy building up his newly-acquired chain of Pick 'n' Pay supermarkets, she, by now the mother of four, got involved in running a nursery school in a black township in Cape Town.

The '76 riots stopped this voluntary work, and Wendy then devoted all her time to her husband's supermarket chain, taking over the directon of the housing for staff, particularly weekly paid staff. "I had people coming to me all the time saying, 'Please help us find a house.' Well, there were no houses to be found, so we had to take to building them."

She had to find ways round the maze of appalling regulations. The barrier to black people owing their own houses, for example, was eventually broken down by the creation of the Urban Foundation, of which her husband is a founder member.

Wendy's first housing scheme was in Soweto, with 35 houses for which the company helps to subsidise employees' mortgage repayments. Houses outside Durban and now "in a lovely township" in the Western Cape have followed.

As liaison director for personnel in a company with 20,000 employees, and also in charge of the company's bursary scheme to help educate both employees and their children, Wendy Ackerman copes with many different problems. Forty-one per cent of the company's management is black, and she speaks proudly of one of the occasions when they brazenly broke the law.

"We appointed a black manager in a white area, in a store which was opposite the Prime Minister's residence. Cabinet ministers lived all around and their wives would shop in the supermarket. When my husband met Vorster 18 months after the appointment and talked to him about it, the Prime Minister replied: "I am very aware of this and want you to go on."

The company's policy of integration has made it difficult for some blacks, she points out. "It's not easy for them to work in an integrated society during the day and return to a black society at night. When there are troubles our managers are felt to be sell-outs to the whites and are pressured by their community."

She speaks angrily of the television report which stated that you rarely see black and white children playing together in South Africa.

"This is rubbish. My cook's little girl, who is black, goes to a white school and comes home with blonde, blue-eyed girlfriends to play. I have taken black and coloured children with us on holiday. We are always a mixed group around our table, though I'm not saying that everybody lives like this."

Her immediate hopes are that the state of emergency ends quickly and the Press ban is lifted; that the Government gets off its high horse, saying it won't talk to the African National Congress unless it forswears violence; that the two sides meet and talk, and come to some sort of solution to the voting problems, perhaps working towards a confederation system. As for sanctions, she is no political scientist, says Wendy Ackerman, but in her opinion they would turn South Africa into another Ethiopia.

NEFF GAS OVENS

MODELS 2031/11 LHECSG, 2051/31 LHECSG, 2071/41 LHECSG

An important announcement for anyone who has purchased a Neff Gas Oven, model number 2031/11 LHECSG, 2051/31 LHECSG, 2071/41 LHECSG, within the last twelve months.

Although there is no immediate cause for concern, long-term testing in our laboratories has identified a possibility of a component failure on the Neff Gas Oven models listed above.

As reputable manufacturers, we urgently wish to locate all Neff Gas Ovens (above model numbers only) in order to arrange an immediate inspection by one of our engineers.

All Neff Gas Oven owners are therefore kindly requested to check their model number and to telephone us today, Sunday, between 10.00am and 5.00pm, on 01-848 3711, or write to:

Neff (UK) Ltd
Freepost, The Quadrangle, Westmount Centre
Uxbridge Road, Hayes, Middlesex UB4 0HD.

It is stressed that only customers owning a Neff Gas Oven model 2031/11 LHECSG, 2051/31 LHECSG and 2071/41 LHECSG, need respond to this advertisement.

We can assure you that no other Neff Ovens – gas or electric – are in any way affected by this announcement.

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SUNDAY TELEGRAPH 6/7/86

SUBJECT
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Subject on S. AFRICA Relations Pt. 11 (43)

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. 125/86 TOP COPY

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

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TO FLASH PRETORIA
TELNO 106
OF 041900Z JULY 1986

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA
1. IN THE INTERESTS OF SPEED WE HAVE PASSED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE THROUGH THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY.
BEGINS
THANK YOU FOR THE MESSAGE WHICH YOUR EMBASSY CONVEYED TO MY OFFICE ON 2 JULY.

I AM SORRY THAT YOU DO NOT ACCEPT THAT THE OVERALL THRUST AND INTENTION OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING AT THE HAGUE LAST WEEK WERE POSITIVE. THEY WERE CERTAINLY INTENDED TO BE SO. SINCE THAT MEETING I HAVE PUBLICLY AND REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR THAT THE COUNCIL DECISION SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS AN ULTIMATUM. I HAVE SAID EXPLICITLY THAT WE DO NOT THINK THAT THREATENING FURTHER SANCTIONS IMMEDIATELY OR AUTOMATICALLY WOULD HELP TO BRING ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE ALL WANT.

I HAVE ALSO TOLD THE HOUSE OF COMMONS REPEATEDLY OF MY OPPOSITION TO COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS AND MY CONVICTION THAT YOUR PROBLEMS HAVE TO BE SOLVED BY NEGOTIATION. I REITERATED OUR VIEW THAT IT IS NOT FOR US OR FOR ANYONE ELSE OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA TO SAY WHAT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD COME OUT OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. IT

WILL BE FOR ALL THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA TO DECIDE ON THE FUTURE CONSTITUTION THEY WOULD LIKE.

SO FAR AS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE CONCERNED, THERE DOES INDEED NEED TO BE A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL SIDES, AS CALLED FOR BY COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT NASSAU. I CERTAINLY DO NOT SEE YOU AS BEING REQUIRED TO MAKE A UNILATERAL CONCESSION. IT REMAINS MY VIEW THAT A COMMITMENT TO THE EARLY RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA AND THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC, IN EXCHANGE FOR A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE, WOULD DO MORE THAN ANY OTHER STEP TO CREATE THE CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE IN WHICH A DIALOGUE WOULD BECOME POSSIBLE.

THIS BRINGS ME TO YOUR QUESTION ABOUT WHAT IS MEANT BY QUOTE AUTHENTIC LEADERS UNQUOTE OF THE BLACK POPULATION. OF COURSE, IT IS HARD TO BE SURE UNTIL, AS YOU PROMISED IN YOUR SPEECH OF 31 JANUARY, ALL SOUTH AFRICANS ARE IN A POSITION WHERE THEY CAN PARTICIPATE IN GOVERNMENT THROUGH THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES. BUT I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE, LIKE OTHERS, DO NOT HAVE ONLY THE ANC IN MIND (THOUGH THEY CLEARLY HAVE A SIZEABLE FOLLOWING).

THERE IS MUCH ELSE TO DISCUSS IN YOUR LETTER. BUT I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE BEST IF GEOFFREY HOWE WERE ABLE TO GO OVER THE GROUND WITH YOU IN PERSON AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY. HIS AIM WOULD BE TO SEE IN WHAT WAYS WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION. OF COURSE I ACCEPT YOUR COMMITMENT TO POWER-SHARING AND TO A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WHICH ACCOMMODATES ALL LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS OF ALL THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNITIES. THE CHALLENGE IS HOW TO DRAW IN THOSE GROUPS WHO HAVE HITHERTO BEEN UNWILLING TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH THE PLANS AND STRUCTURES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT.

I NOW HEAR THAT IT IS UNLIKELY TO BE CONVENIENT FOR YOU TO RECEIVE GEOFFREY HOWE NEXT WEEK AS WE HAD PROPOSED. THIS PERTURBS ME CONSIDERABLY. I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS NOT EASY TO ACCOMMODATE SUCH A VISIT AT SHORT NOTICE. BUT IT WAS NOT THROUGH ANY WISH TO INCONVENIENCE YOU THAT WE SUGGESTED IT. IT IS MY

HONEST ASSESSMENT THAT AN EARLY VISIT, DURING WHICH GEOFFREY HOWE WOULD MEET WITH YOU, WILL BEST ENABLE ME TO DEFEND WHAT I PERCEIVE TO BE YOUR INTERESTS AS MUCH AS OURS IN THE FACE OF THE RAPIDLY MOUNTING PRESSURES FOR ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.

COULD I ASK YOU TO BE KIND ENOUGH TO LOOK AGAIN AT THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT BY GEOFFREY HOWE NEXT WEEK, AND OF SEEING HIM YOURSELF? I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT HE WOULD ACT WITH THE GREATEST POSSIBLE DISCRETION. I WOULD NOT COME BACK TO YOU ON THIS UNLESS I REALLY BELIEVED IT A MATTER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE.
ENDS

HOWE

OCMIAN 7969

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MAIN
LIMITED
HEAD SAFD
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR E FERGUSSON
MR REEVE

010

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 July 1986

Prime Minister
Agree this message, with the amendment I have suggested? CDP

Dear Charles,

South Africa: Follow up to the European Council

7/7

I now attach a draft message for the Prime Minister to send to General Obasanjo and Mr Malcolm Fraser.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		IMMEDIATE

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ZCZC
CONFIDENTIAL

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TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS
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OF
AND TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

EUROPEAN COUNCIL/SOUTH AFRICA: MESSAGES

1. Following is text of a message from the Prime Minister to General Obasanjo and Mr Fraser. Please arrange to have it delivered as soon as possible.

Begins

Following last week's meeting of the European Council I should like to let you know how we see the next steps in relation to South Africa.

You will know from our meeting on 12 June, when you kindly called on me to discuss the COMGEP report, that like all my colleagues in the Commonwealth, I was ~~grievously~~ greatly disappointed by the breakdown of your mission. As I said then, it is tragic that having achieved so much you should at the last have found it impossible to reach a successful conclusion.

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Since we met we have, of course, all been considering what more

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is needed to bring about a change in the attitude of the South African Government. So too have my colleagues at the Heads of

YYYY
MAIN
ADDITIONAL
NNNN

		Catchword: European	
File number	Dept: Private Office	Drafted by (Block capitals): C R Budd	Telephone no: 4831
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials	Date/time	
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

XY 48 (REV)

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		IMMEDIATE

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European Governments. Like us in the Commonwealth they believe, with the same profound conviction, that the objectives which the Commonwealth set at Nassau - to bring apartheid to an end, through dialogue and a suspension of violence on all sides - remain entirely valid. After all, those were the objectives which the Community too set itself at Luxembourg last September, and again at the joint meeting with the Front Line States in Lusaka earlier this year.

The question we ~~all~~ asked each other ~~once again~~ at The Hague was this: ~~is the promotion of dialogue now a quite hopeless case, or is there still a case for trying once more the road of persuasion before we resign ourselves to the prospect of South Africa being caught up inevitably in a rising tide of violence question mark~~ is not the prospect of a rising tide of violence in South Africa so serious, that we should make a further attempt to promote dialogue, building on the work which your Group had done?

Let me stress with all the sincerity at my command that I have been profoundly concerned - as I know you have been - at recent developments in South Africa. The reimposition of the State of Emergency and the further internal measures going with it are a recipe for an even swifter upward spiral of repression and violence and inter-racial conflict than the one we so recently discussed. I am ~~utterly~~ determined that everything possible should be done to avert that looming catastrophe, and to bring apartheid to an end by peaceful means, through negotiation and not conflict.

~~we need to establish whether~~ The question is whether that route is still possible. A crucial factor must be the attitude of the South African Government. My reading of the Afrikaner character is quite clear: if we are to avoid simply driving President Botha and his people inside the laager, then it is imperative that we should demonstrate our disapproval and condemnation of the policies of the South African

in establishing ~~that~~ whether // that // route // is still possible

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Government without causing them to react in such a way as to rule out dialogue and compromise.

It was with those thoughts in mind that I approached my meeting in The Hague with my European Community colleagues. After long discussion we reached agreement on the most effective action that we could take at this stage.

We had no doubt that the key move that was necessary to promote the genuine national dialogue which we all want was for the South African Government unconditionally to release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and to lift the ban on the ANC, PAC and other political parties. You will recall my own strong feeling about the need to focus on these steps. Open square bracket For Obasanjo only: And I recall your saying to me on 12 June that the release of Nelson Mandela could open the way to a solution. close square bracket. Despite the obvious difficulties involved we decided too that it was right to undertake ~~one~~ a European ~~more~~ diplomatic initiative to that end. It was accordingly agreed that Geoffrey Howe should go to Southern Africa, in his capacity as President of the European Council of Ministers and with the full support of the Community, to carry out this mission. ~~He is proposing to make a first visit as soon as possible.~~

It was also agreed that during the next three months in support of that mission the Twelve would enter into consultations with the other industrialised countries on further measures which might be needed, covering in particular a ban on new investment and on the import of coal, iron, steel and gold coins from South Africa. This decision to consult other industrialised countries about possible contingency measures was, of course, intended to reinforce the position we in the Commonwealth have already taken:

You will recall at the end of our meeting you suggested that I might myself meet President Botha. I do not

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if measures are to be effective it is essential that they should have the support of the industrialised countries as a whole. Open square bracket For Fraser only: We also had in mind your ~~agreement~~ argument that the possibility of further measures is needed in order to give moderate blacks in South Africa some hope of Western support. close square bracket.

I can well understand that you and your fellow members of the Eminent Persons Group must be concerned that this move by the Community might cut across the work on which we have been engaged together. I should like to give you an ~~very strong~~ assurance that the action we have taken with our European partners is very much in keeping with the spirit of what the Commonwealth agreed in Nassau. The mission being undertaken by Geoffrey Howe is ~~in~~ no~~t~~ ~~way~~ intended to supersede or undermine the findings of the Eminent Persons Group. Its aim, on the contrary, is to build on your work and follow the course which you charted, in pursuit of the same objectives. The seven Commonwealth heads of Government will have an opportunity to discuss all these issues at the meeting in London in August to review the Commonwealth Accord. Meanwhile I should like to assure you that Geoffrey Howe's mission is most seriously and sincerely intended. If it is to have a chance of success against what we must all see as very long odds, he will need to have the chance of meeting a wide range of people in Southern Africa, as well as members of the South African Government. I do very much hope that you will feel able to lend such support and encouragement as you can.

Open square bracket For Obasanjo only: Finally, I should like once more to add my own personal tribute to the part you played in the COMGEP mission. The ~~integrity, maturity and~~ statesmanship which you contributed in such full measure throughout reaped praise not only for yourself but for your country and the Commonwealth as a

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whole. I thank you most warmly. close square bracket
Ends

HOWE

YYYY
MAIN
SOUTHERN AFRICA
STANDARD (PALACE)
SAFD
OADS
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MR REEVE
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ADDITIONAL
SOUTHERN AFRICA

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CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister
This contains some of the information which you wanted — though not on detentions. There are some very good quotes in the Renwick book on sanctions. I have underlined them.
CDP 4/7

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 July 1986

Can Tim have a copy for [illegible] and I would also like a copy to keep handy for me at

Dear Charles,

South Africa

Thank you for your letter of 30 June.

I enclose a note which deals with your first three questions: recent states of emergency in Commonwealth countries; Commonwealth one party states; and deaths caused by the security forces in Commonwealth countries. It shows that some Commonwealth countries, although by no means the majority, have a distinctly stained record.

Nonetheless, Sir Geoffrey Howe takes the view that we need to be very cautious in the public use we make of this information, particularly at the present time during his two visits to Southern Africa and the run up to the Commonwealth Review Meeting. He doubts whether we will further our objectives at the meeting by deploying this sort of information and hopes that it can therefore be regarded strictly as background material.

As regards sanctions, I enclose the concluding chapter of Robin Renwick's book "Economic Sanctions" published in 1981. His conclusions are that the arguments are by no means clear cut; he emphasises the importance of not expecting too much from a sanctions policy, but suggests that they have had some impact on occasions. In opposing sanctions it has of course been part of our policy to point out their ineffectiveness by reference to eg Rhodesia. Nevertheless the present government has imposed various forms of trade sanction four times during its term of office - Poland, Iran, Afghanistan and Argentina, as well as the recent limited measures against Libya. Too absolutist a line on the general ineffectiveness of sanctions per se can therefore land us in difficulty in explaining why we decided to apply them on previous occasions. So too with South Africa, where we already have a number of economic measures in place and have agreed to the making of contingency plans for more.

[Actually, it comes out heavily against sanctions as an effective weapon]

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH

1. Commonwealth countries with recent states of emergency

ZIMBABWE: Continuously since Rhodesian UDI in November 1965, renewed annually every six months.

KENYA: Since June 1966 a Presidential Order (Section 25 of the Constitution) permits detention without trial. Has been renewed annually.

THE GAMBIA: From 1981-85 after an abortive coup.

INDIA: 1975-77 (declared by Mrs Gandhi)

SRI LANKA: In Northern and Eastern (Tamil-majority) provinces. Various emergency regulations in force since intercommunal rioting erupted in 1985.

BANGLADESH: Martial law since 1982

BRUNEI: State of emergency since 1963 revolt

2. Commonwealth One Party States

KENYA: Presidential candidates from the single party have been returned unopposed.

SIERRA LEONE, TANZANIA, ZAMBIA: Democratic in that the President has to obtain the support of the majority of voters to be declared elected.

MALAWI, SEYCHELLES

3. Significant deaths resulting from clashes between the security forces and the local population

NIGERIA: 6,500 deaths from 1980-85 in attempts by the Nigerian armed forces and police to eradicate members of the fanatical Maitatsine religious sect. About 1,000 deaths January-September 1983 in disturbances arising from presidential and legislative elections.

ZIMBABWE: Anti-dissident operations in Northern and Southern Matabeleland between December 1982 and spring 1984 led to in excess of 1,000 civilian deaths.

UGANDA: Government action against the National Resistance Army (NRA) from 1980 until January 1986 (when the NRA defeated the government forces) led to about 150,000 deaths, mostly civilians.

/BANGLADESH:

BANGLADESH: Frequent significant civilian fatalities since war of independence in 1971.

INDIA: Significant fatalities on several occasions, although most of the recent incidents which have been widely reported have stemmed from intercommunal violence and have not involved the security forces to a significant extent. Operation Blue Star (the clearing of the Golden Temple) in 1984 led to over 600 civilian casualties.

SRI LANKA: Significant numbers of deaths resulting from Tamil/Sinhalese racial conflict since 1983.

6

CONCLUSIONS

There is an obvious difficulty in attempting any precise estimate of the effects of sanctions. It is impossible to isolate them from other factors or to judge with any confidence what might have happened if they had not been imposed. It is, however, possible to arrive at certain general conclusions. It is often argued, for instance, that "sanctions have no effect." Yet it is clear that in the main cases considered in this study sanctions did have considerable economic effects. Sanctions against Italy in 1935-36 caused a sharp fall in the value of exports and a severe cutback in imports. Italy's gold and foreign exchange reserves fell rapidly in the short period (eight months) in which they were in force. For Cuba the loss of the United States market for sugar was to a large extent offset by Soviet purchases. But Cuba did suffer in the early years from the loss of U.S. supplies of plant and machinery. U.S. sanctions against Cuba increased the costs to the Soviet Union of support for the Cuban economy.

Rhodesia represents the most ambitious attempt at sanctions enforcement and the only case in which comprehensive mandatory sanctions have been imposed under the appropriate provisions of the U.N. Charter. There can be no doubt that sanctions had a significant economic effect, causing a severe loss of export earnings and foreign exchange difficulties and acting as a constant brake on economic growth. Their effects were very clearly described by Mr. Smith, who was normally in the habit of dismissing them as no more than a "nuisance," in the Rhodesian Parliament in April 1973:

> The imposition of sanctions created many trading problems for us. We find that we are compelled to export at a discount and import at a premium. The result is that we lose out on both transactions. This has the effect of reducing profit margins internally and at the national level it has an adverse effect on our balance of payments and foreign reserves . . . because our foreign reserves are depleted artificially, our natural development is prejudiced. This clearly has a serious inhibiting effect on the creation of job opportunities.

Rhodesia, however, continued to be able to obtain essential imports and to find markets for its exports. The economy was diversified and sustained economic growth was achieved throughout most of the first decade of sanctions enforcement. The subsequent difficulties owed far more to the world economic recession and, increasingly, to the war than to sanctions.

Rhodesia would not have been able to withstand sanctions but for the non-participation of South Africa, leaving a huge gap in their application. It is possible to envisage circumstances in which sanctions might be universally applied against an "offending" country. In that event their efficacy would depend on the degree of self-sufficiency of the target country. The Rhodesian case, however, is the one in which, to date, sanctions have been applied with the *widest* international support. Partial sanctions enforcement has so far been the rule rather than the exception. Given the opportunities for fraud and evasion and the fact that for the "target" country this becomes a matter of survival, it has proved difficult to conceive of fully effective sanctions enforcement without recourse to a blockade or equivalent measures to isolate the country to which they are applied.

The difficulty of predicting the effects of economic pressures has been demonstrated in a number of cases. In the Abyssinian crisis the British Cabinet concluded that it was "impossible to say whether an oil embargo would be effective until it was tried."[1] Exaggerated expectations were entertained as to the economic effects of sanctions against Rhodesia and in other instances. As in the conviction of the German naval strategists in 1917 that Britain would be obliged to sue for peace if a certain proportion of her external trade were extinguished, the origin of most of the mistaken or overconfident forecasts of the effects of sanctions has lain in the static nature of the

assessment. It was imagined, for instance, that if all the major importing countries agreed to a formal embargo on Rhodesian tobacco exports, Rhodesia actually would lose virtually all the earnings from those exports (which did not prove to be the case); and that Rhodesia could hardly withstand the loss of one-third of her external trade, which also did not prove to be the case. Any such assessments must make a large and, of necessity, unquantifiable allowance for the redirection of trade, leakages, disguised exports, and so forth. Such estimates have also been vitiated by the tendency, ignoring political factors, consistently to underestimate the strength of the resistance the imposition of sanctions—or other economic pressures—is liable to bring forth. The German experience in two World Wars demonstrates the ability of a sufficiently resilient economy—even one which, normally, is highly dependent on imports—to withstand an economic siege. Certain raw materials, especially minerals, which were regarded as indispensable turned out not to be so. Remarkable success in eking out scarce supplies was achieved by the reduction of consumption and substitution. In the Rhodesian case import dependence was reduced by the rapid development of manufacturing industry.

The implementation of sanctions is beset by many difficulties, described in the preceding chapters. It requires a complex administrative apparatus. It frequently is hard to reconcile the conflicting requirements of—or pressures on—the various departments of government (foreign affairs, commerce, treasury, agriculture, customs, etc.) to say nothing of the central banks and other agencies involved. The administration of financial sanctions is of itself a matter of great complexity. In the operation of any embargo difficulties of interpretation and demands for exceptions on humanitarian or other grounds invariably arise, necessitating a series of difficult and, frequently, controversial consequential decisions. Much greater bureaucratic tenacity is required in the pursuit of breaches than most governments are prepared to devote to such a purpose; and this kind of persistence, particularly in dealings with other governments involved, is liable to create considerable friction. There is a tendency to assume that all countries have a governmental apparatus which is actually capable of enforcing sanctions and that, having voted for sanctions, all countries will take the necessary legislative and sustained administrative action required to bring them into effect. This has not so far proved to be the case. In the case of many countries which do have the necessary apparatus, serious difficulty is liable to arise over the burden of proof. The governments of most countries will be reluctant to prosecute companies unless they are reasonably certain of securing a conviction. At times the juridical complexities may simply be used to resist demands from other governments for the more rigorous enforcement of sanctions. Frequently, however, the difficulties are genuine. In the great majority of breaches of sanctions, particularly those involving indirect trade, documentary or other positive proofs are unlikely to be obtained.

Some though not all of these difficulties of enforcement can be overcome if sufficient political will exists to make sanctions effective. Their observance depends to a large extent on the vigor with which governments are prepared to follow up suspected breaches by persons and companies within their jurisdiction. The energy with which national governments proceed to enforce sanctions, however, has tended to depend on their own direct interest in the case. Sanctions against Iran were much more rigorously enforced by the United States and sanctions against Rhodesia—despite the oil leakages—were more strictly applied by Britain than by most other countries. It has proved difficult to conceive of a case in which sanctions are enforced with equal zeal by all the major trading partners of the target country. The unevenness of their implementation rapidly increases pressures on governments which are enforcing them to adopt a more liberal interpretation to avoid forgoing important commercial opportunities. The effectiveness of sanctions and their enforcement depend crucially also on the extent of national support for the sanctions policy. The U.S. Administration has experienced relatively little difficulty in enforcing the embargoes on trade with North Korea, Cuba, Iran, or Vietnam. Sanctions against Rhodesia commanded much less support, particularly among the business community, in the United States as in Europe. In the Rhodesian case publicity became a major factor in sanctions enforcement. Reputable companies were concerned to avoid any suggestion that they were in breach of the law. Companies with important commercial interests elsewhere in Africa were increasingly concerned about the effect on these of non-compliance.

A characteristic of attempts to organize economic denial is the rapid redirection of trade around whatever obstacles are interposed. Undertakings by countries not applying sanctions to hold trade to "normal" levels have tended to prove of limited real effect and to be

subject to very elastic interpretation. The U.S. "moral embargo" against Italy was largely ineffective. Neutral trade posed a major problem in both World Wars. Rhodesia was able to secure virtually all the imports it required by indirect trade. When from October 1973 the Arab countries sought to exploit the "oil weapon," the sudden increase in oil prices and, for a time, the cutbacks in production had dramatic effects on the world economy; but the actual embargoes imposed on deliveries to the United States and the Netherlands were short-circuited by the redirection of supplies. A similar phenomenon was evident in the case of the partial grain embargo imposed by the United States in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.[2] The effects were diminished by increased Soviet imports from other sources—though it was not possible to make up the entire shortfall and alternative supplies did entail some additional costs.

Sanctions almost invariably result in increased state intervention in the economy to which they are applied as governments introduce or intensify import and other controls to mitigate their effects. Embargoes on imports from a target country, except in the case of scarce commodities (e.g., certain minerals), have tended to be more effective than prohibitions on exports to them as a natural function of the intense competition for export markets. The embargoes on exports to both Italy and Rhodesia were largely ineffective; but the embargoes on their exports did substantially reduce their capacity to earn the foreign exchange needed to finance imports. Disinvestment—as distinct from the prevention of new investment—has proved virtually impossible to realize. For existing investment is to a large extent captive. Attempts to remove it on any substantial scale can be—and have been—relatively easily defeated by the imposition of exchange and other controls.

The initially attractive theory of the graduated application of sanctions, involving the progressive extension of embargoes in the absence of a satisfactory response, failed to take adequate account of the fact that the progressive application of sanctions allows more time for the target economy to adapt; while the real difficulty has been that of making even a comprehensive embargo sufficiently effective to produce tangible results. Selective sanctions are complex and difficult to operate, being liable to give rise to serious difficulties of interpretation, both within and between governments, as to what trade is permitted and what is not. Their effectiveness has

tended to depend on the extent to which they are concentrated on particularly vulnerable export products, i.e., those for which alternative sources of supply are readily available, as in the case of Rhodesian tobacco; or in areas, such as weapons and high technology, where the embargoed items already are subject to stringent national measures of export control.

One of the most serious problems in the application of sanctions has been the very long time required for them to take effect. The estimates of economic experts, the British government noted in the Abyssinian crisis, were "apt to work out more slowly than they anticipated."[3] If governments are prepared to show sufficient determination in the matter, exports to and imports from a target country can be interrupted rapidly. But this is liable greatly to increase the costs to the country applying them. If existing sales or contracts are exempted it may take many months, as it did in the application of sanctions by most countries against Rhodesia and Iran, for trade flows to diminish. Trade with Italy in 1935-36 fell off more quickly in part because the lead times for most international transactions in the 1930s were much shorter than they are today. In the case of Cuba as in that of Rhodesia it took two to three years for sanctions to have their maximum effect. Thereafter the pressure exerted by them tended to diminish as the necessary processes of adaptation took place. The fact that the impact of sanctions can only be gradual and cumulative allows time to organize their evasion and, in almost every case, has created acute problems in relation to the political expectations that they will somehow yield quicker and more obvious results.

There is always a cost attached to sanctions. They are liable to inflict considerable economic damage on those applying them, as well as on those to whom they are applied. It is not only business interests which are liable to suffer. The loss of important raw materials, especially minerals, and of export opportunities is a source of great concern to the governments of major trading nations. Especially in a time of recession, particular concern is likely to be felt about the effects on employment. At times, however, in parallel with a disposition to exaggerate the effects of sanctions on the target country, there has been a tendency similarly to exaggerate the costs or other difficulties to those applying them. In the case of neighboring countries these are liable to be very significant; in other cases often much less so. As the German experience indicates it is not in general the

case, for instance, that scarce minerals are irreplaceable. It is more often the case that they can be obtained elsewhere, or substituted; but in general at a substantially increased cost.

Nor does the loss of export opportunities always turn out to be as significant—or as absolute—as is feared. In 1935-36 the British government was concerned about the effect of the loss of coal exports to Italy on an already hard-hit industry. The President of the Board of Trade convinced himself that "irreparable" harm was being done to British trade. Italy, however, accounted for less than three percent of Britain's exports which, overall, did not decline in the sanctions period. In the case of Rhodesia, the phenomenon of indirect trade significantly reduced the real loss of exports to most of the major exporting countries—though Britain suffered particular damage in a market which, hitherto, it had dominated. Despite the partial embargo on the sale of grain to the Soviet Union, partly as a result of the redirection of trade, U.S. grain exports overall increased substantially in the period in which the embargo was in force. A significant problem, however, has proved to be the unevenness of the impact of sanctions on business and other interests in the country applying them. It has rarely proved possible to compensate enterprises affected by sanctions for the loss of trade resulting from them. Such action, apart from its potential costs, is liable to be both controversial and litigious, giving rise to a host of conflicting claims.

Far too little attention has been paid to the effects of sanctions on neighboring countries. These may be no less severe than the impact on the "target" country. Under Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant member states undertook to assist each other to minimize the loss and disruption liable to result from the application of sanctions. A proposal adopted by the League Council envisaged attempting to compensate states particularly affected by the loss of Italian supplies or markets by increased imports by or exports from other member states. Of Italy's neighbors, Austria and Switzerland did not apply sanctions, while the results of the attempt to organize assistance for Yugoslavia were extremely meager. So far as military measures were concerned, the British government was conscious throughout the crisis that, if it resulted in a war, "mutual support" would not necessarily be forthcoming from other League members.

Similar problems arose in a much more acute form in the case of Rhodesia. Article 50 of the U.N. Charter provides that states confronted by special economic problems arising from the implementation of Security Council measures shall have the right to consult with the Security Council about a solution to those problems. It was recognized that Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho would not be able to apply sanctions against Rhodesia. Nor, initially, was Zambia able to do so. The economies of the two countries had been closely linked in the Central African Federation; and Zambia depended on Rhodesia Railways for much of its export and import trade. The decision to apply oil sanctions against Rhodesia necessitated an air lift of oil supplies to Zambia until alternative routes could be established. Security Council Resolution 253 of 29 May 1968 imposing comprehensive mandatory sanctions called for assistance to Zambia to help solve her special problems in carrying out the Security Council decision. These were serious. The Zambian government stated at the time that as a result of the Rhodesian crisis it had already incurred costs amounting to US $241 million, of which $46 million had been met by Britain. Mr. Smith was to claim that his opponents were prepared to fight "to the last Zambian." In 1976 U.N. officials estimated that the closing of the border with Rhodesia in 1973 had cost Zambia about $450 million. President Kaunda commented that the international community had been "more generous with moral than with material support." China had made a major contribution to reducing Zambia's dependence on Rhodesian routes with the building of the rail link to Tanzania. By 1978, however, Zambia was forced by bottlenecks on that route to resume exports and imports via Rhodesia. The experience of Mozambique following the border closure in 1976 was to demonstrate no less clearly that the limited amount of additional economic assistance received could in no way compensate for the economic disruption caused by the loss of cross-border and transit trade.

By no means the least of the difficulties attending the application of sanctions has been the problem of terminating them. For it frequently is the case when sanctions are imposed that inadequate attention is given to the circumstances in which it is envisaged that they should be lifted. In the case of Italy, the League of Nations got the worst of all possible worlds. The sanctions imposed were insufficiently rigorous to exert real pressure except on an extended timescale; yet they were in force for only eight months. They were imposed in order to deter aggression. They were removed not because the aggression had been terminated, but because it had been successful. When sanctions have been imposed on a national or "volun-

tary" basis, the problem of their termination has related mainly to the political difficulties of withdrawing from a position once adopted or admitting that the expectations attached to a policy have not been fulfilled. Particularly if a sanctions policy has been adopted primarily or even partly to impress opinion in third countries the costs of abandoning it may be considerable, irrespective of the impact on the "target" country. Embargoes often are maintained primarily for historical reasons. It is quite possible for a government to find itself continuing to apply sanctions when circumstances have changed and it may itself no longer have much faith in the policy on the basis of which they were imposed.

So far as sanctions under general international auspices are concerned, the initial attempt under Article 16 of the League Covenant to impose an automatic obligation on member states to apply sanctions was unrealistic. The effect of the interpretative resolutions passed in 1921 was to mean that sanctions were decided by majority vote in the League Council and applied by those member states who supported them. There was no binding obligation on other League members to follow suit. Sanctions could be and were terminated by majority vote. The position is different under the U.N. Charter. If a determination is made under Article 39 of the Charter (as it was in the Rhodesian case) that a threat to the peace exists, resolutions may be passed which impose legally binding obligations on the member states—though such obligations in some cases have been disregarded with impunity.

This framework for the application of sanctions has given rise to different problems. A Security Council resolution requires the assent or at least the acquiescence of all five permanent members of the Council. Collective action under the mandatory provisions of the Charter is not, therefore, feasible in any circumstances in which one of them is the aggressor. In the Rhodesian case, particular difficulty arose from the fact that most of the British sanctions orders were subject to annual parliamentary renewal, while the mandatory sanctions imposed under U.N. auspices were open-ended. Most member states took the view that the *removal* of sanctions required a fresh affirmative resolution from the Security Council. This would have given any permanent member a potential veto over the terms of a settlement. The British government thus found itself in the unenviable position of having to secure annual approval in its own Parliament for the renewal of sanctions (and this in some years was no

easy task), but having no certainty that the United Nations would terminate them in the event of a settlement the British Parliament considered satisfactory.

Sanctions are liable to have perverse effects, both political and economic. The effect of sanctions on the target economy may turn out to be by no means wholly prejudicial. In the case of Italy, the loss of exports was accompanied by a cutback in imports which actually resulted in an *improvement* in the trade balance. Financial sanctions proved to be a two-edged weapon. Italy's large debt rendered creditors anxious to avoid a default. The interruption of remittances to companies abroad helped the balance of payments in the short term. Similarly, the interruption of remittances had a beneficial effect on the Rhodesian balance of payments and helped to create sufficient liquidity in the Rhodesian banking system to enable credit to be made readily available for the diversification of industry and agriculture. These benefits were obtained at serious long-term costs in terms of the loss of foreign investment (but investment was still forthcoming from South Africa).

Of much greater significance was the diversification of the economy and greatly increased self-reliance which resulted from sanctions. In the decade from 1965 to 1975 the Rhodesian economy was transformed from virtually total dependence on the importation of manufactured goods in exchange for raw materials to a remarkable degree of self-sufficiency in most areas except oil and industrial plant and machinery. The successes in moving into or expanding the production of ferrochrome, refined steel products, railroad cars, consumer goods and so forth, were a product of local ingenuity and enterprise, under the stimulus of sanctions. The German economy responded to a much sharper economic siege in two World Wars with remarkable advances in synthetic production and innovations in the use of ferro-alloys in reinforcing steel.

Sanctions frequently—one might almost say, generally—are decided in large measure as a consequence of the lack of feasible alternatives. In the case of Iran, as in that of Rhodesia, they represented an attempt to achieve some external influence on the situation. In both instances an attempt was being made to achieve a real result. In virtually all the cases in which sanctions have been applied, however, the purpose has also been *demonstrative*. In a good many instances the demonstration of disapproval appears to have been the main purpose of applying sanctions. For in some of the more partial

cases it can scarcely have been supposed that they would have much effect on the target country. The use of sanctions for demonstrative purposes rests on the conception that they are a way of "signalling" to the target country and, no less important, to other countries a government's position in relation to some manifestation of international—or internal—misconduct. There are international circumstances in which it may appear wholly inadequate for a government to confine itself to inveighing rhetorically against the conduct of another state and when it may consider it essential to demonstrate its disapproval by action as well as words, even at the cost of some damage to its own country's interests—the acceptance of such damage in itself indicating its determination. Such an attitude may also be intended to indicate the resistance further action of the kind is likely to encounter. The economic measures decided by the United States in response to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan were intended *inter alia* to serve this purpose.

Even if sanctions fail to make the target country comply, they may well serve a purpose which is useful in the eyes of those applying them. A government may consider sanctions useful if they serve to "declare its position to internal and external publics or [help] to win support at home or abroad."[4] It certainly is the case that sanctions policies often have been decided on this basis. The most important argument in favor of such a policy may be the desire to maintain or improve relations with third countries; or to impress domestic opinion. But the idea that sanctions may serve as a useful instrument of policy *irrespective of their impact on the target country* gives rise to certain obvious difficulties. Vis-à-vis the target country, the application of sanctions is liable to be incompatible with attempts to influence its policies by "persuasive" action (diplomatic démarches and so forth). Expectations often are entertained that it will somehow be possible to do both. This is likely to be the case only to the extent that sufficient real pressure is exerted to give the target regime a serious incentive to negotiate. Token or "mild" sanctions are liable to produce a reverse political effect, while enabling the government to which they are applied in turn to demonstrate that it can withstand them. Once it is apparent that such action is producing little effect on the target, those the demonstration is intended to convince may no longer be particularly impressed by it.

Considerable hopes have been placed on the *threat* of sanctions as

a way of inducing a country to alter its behavior. Sanctions do have an economic effect: obviously, therefore, any government has an interest in avoiding them if it can. The possibility—or likelihood—of the imposition of sanctions can have some deterrent effect by increasing the potential costs of a given course of action. The threat of sanctions did not, however, deter Mussolini from invading Abyssinia or Mr. Smith and his colleagues from their unilateral declaration of independence. In political terms, it is the latent or implicit rather than the explicit threat of sanctions which is likely to be most effective. For once a direct threat is made that sanctions will follow unless a certain course of action is adopted, the *amour propre*—and possibly even the political survival—of the "receiving" government will be at stake; and it will be liable to take its chance with the economic penalties rather than face the political humiliation of having to capitulate to external pressures. This will particularly be the case if the government concerned feels that its survival—or that of "the system"—will in any event be at stake if it *does* comply.

Sanctions were conceived as a means of resisting aggression without the need for resort to the use of force. Their main attraction has been as a way of exerting pressure on a recalcitrant power without causing excessive risks to the country applying them. There are times when sanctions may distract attention from other and more effective ways of achieving the desired result (e.g., the closure of the Suez Canal to Italian troop ships en route to Abyssinia). A blockade is a more effective form of sanctions policy, but one which offers a much greater risk of precipitating a conflict. While sanctions have not proved an effective instrument in terms of resisting aggression, they do have the virtue of offering an alternative to military action and, at times, of affording a government a means of containing pressures to embark on some much riskier course. Since sanctions do have a punitive effect, they can impose some penalty on international misconduct, though they are unlikely of themselves to bring it to an end. While sanctions, in this perspective, may often appear an attractive option, those governments which have sought to achieve a real impact on the target country—as distinct from purely "demonstrative" effects—have found that the problem of escalation may take other forms, as over whether to apply oil sanctions against Italy or to extend sanctions against Rhodesia to the whole of southern Africa. The imposition of sanctions is liable to lead to the dilemma

of accepting either that they are going to be relatively ineffective, or the necessity of taking further and more difficult steps in an attempt to improve their effectiveness.

Sanctions in practice, though not always in intention, are an application of the principle of collective guilt, or at least collective punishment. External pressures, at least initially, may tend to promote social and political cohesion, rather than dissent. In increasing the sense of isolation of the society to which they are applied, they may not render it more amenable to external influence. In terms of incentive, it is not sufficient that sanctions are perceived as a penalty, or at any rate a nuisance. Alternative courses of action must also be perceived as lesser evils.[5]

The Rhodesian case exhibits all the difficulties which the international enforcement of economic sanctions may be expected to encounter; yet astonishment is still expressed when the same difficulties are encountered in other cases. The political effects which had been hoped for never materialized. Through the various attempts to negotiate with Mr. Smith in the early years, one factor remained constant: he was prepared to agree to majority rule, but only on condition it was deferred to the Greek kalends. The regime in this period was not brought progressively to modify its position—not because it was not suffering economic penalties, but because it was prepared to accept those penalties rather than agree to its own disappearance. It was all the easier for it to do so because, as yet, few of its supporters were having to make real sacrifices—yet support for it was maintained when, later, they were obliged to do so and indeed to risk their lives, and those of their families, for its survival.

Nor did sanctions succeed in encouraging the development of opposition within the white community. There was a failure to appreciate that no one was going to stand by and see the collapse of his business and personal fortunes. A third of the white electorate had consistently voted against the Rhodesian Front and they continued to do so; but there was no sign that their numbers were increasing. Sanctions did tend to place other elements of society in the same position as active supporters of the regime: most of those who had their homes and fortunes in the country found themselves engaged in their evasion. The regime in turn sought to create and exploit a siege mentality to silence or discredit its critics. The various pressure groups which had been expected to have an influence—the business

community or the farmers' leaders—seemed unable to make that influence felt. In terms of weakening internal support for the regime among the white electorate, sanctions were totally ineffective. A similar phenomenon has been noted in the cases of Italy and Cuba. It is important to note, however, as the counterpart of this paradox, the finding of the Pearce Commission that in Rhodesia the continuance of sanctions was supported by African opinion despite the effects on African standards of living.

Sanctions have been defined as the "penalty imposed to secure obedience to a law." Their purpose is to exert influence on the target country—to get them to "change their mind."[6] The theory of sanctions rests on the assumption that if subjected to economic penalties a nation will, as a matter of self-interest, change its conduct. The idea of an automatic correlation between economic deprivation and the loss of the political will to resist is, to say the least, questionable. The theory depends on the notion that people's income can be threatened rather like their lives. In the first place this is not easy to achieve; in the second, it may not produce the desired political result. It may be possible, as happened to some extent in the case of Rhodesia, to transfer the economic penalties to others; and the reaction to economic or other pressures depends on the character of the society to which they are applied. Such pressures are always liable to have the opposite effect. For the Europeans in Rhodesia, compliance meant majority rule. This they saw as a greater threat, not just to their economic well-being, but to their way of life.

The lack of correlation between their economic and political effects is the most serious of all the problems attached to sanctions policies. In discussion of the efficacy of sanctions, however, there is an alternative theory no less doctrinaire than that on which the theology of sanctions originally was based. *The idea that sanctions have no effect, impose no penalty, or that their avoidance (or termination) offers no incentive, is contrary to the evidence, as it is to common sense.* Financial sanctions did have some effect in the Iranian and other cases. Sanctions against Rhodesia did exert some pressure for a negotiated solution, though the pressure was never irresistible and they did so at the considerable political cost of tending to consolidate rather than diminish white support for the regime. In the final phase their premature removal would have encouraged resistance to a wider settlement. They had perverse effects on the Rhodesian economy, encouraging self-reliance and diversification. But

their overall effect was to limit its expansion and in the long run to weaken the regime to which they were applied.

Despite the limited and uncertain results so far achieved from sanctions policies, the possibility of recourse to collective economic measures—with varying degrees of international support—remains an important factor in international relations and will continue to do so. The attempt to deny military or economically strategic materials or technology to a potential adversary is and will remain the most widely practiced form of embargo. The export of such items normally is already subject to effective national measures of control and it has proved possible to achieve systems of denial in this area which have been effective not so much in preventing as in slowing down transfers or technological "catching up." Any government faced with acts of outright hostility or the arbitrary expropriation of assets is likely to react by interrupting economic relations with the country concerned.

Even when their interests are not directly threatened there will continue to be circumstances in which governments will feel it necessary to declare their position by something more than words alone. The traditional method of breaking off diplomatic relations has been found in many respects to be the least effective sanction of all. It inflicts no real penalty on the target country and deprives the initiating government of a flow of first-hand information and the most effective channel of communication. The British government in 1965 did hope that sanctions against Rhodesia would bring about political change. But it also faced the prospect that, if no action were taken, this would increase the damage to Britain's position in other parts of the world. It was concerned at the possibilities the Rhodesian crisis offered for exploitation by the Soviet Union.* It did not consider that it could afford simply to acquiesce or appear to be acquiescing in what had happened. The imposition of sanctions was intended *inter alia* to declare its position on the fundamental question of racial equality. The decision of the European governments to join in sanctions against Iran, despite uncertainty as to their probable effects, was intended essentially as a declaration of solidarity with the United States over the question of the hostages.

*With Mr. Wilson speaking in the House of Commons of a "struggle for the soul of Africa" (12 November 1965).

Sanctions have been described as a "romantic delusion . . . Where military power is not employed and the enforcement of an embargo depends merely on the agreement of nations—whether or not expressed in a U.N. resolution—the result will more likely be annoyance than hardship."[7] It certainly is the case that, to date, they have very rarely succeeded in producing the desired result. Much confusion has arisen from the overambitious expectations attached to them and the fact that in many of the cases in which they have been imposed for "demonstrative" purposes, they have succeeded only in demonstrating their ineffectiveness. Still greater harm has been done by the imposition of sanctions in circumstances in which they were never really intended to be effective—as was the case, for some of the participants at least, with sanctions against Italy in the Abyssinian crisis. In the Rhodesian case it is at least arguable that they did more damage to the neighboring countries than to the one to which they were applied.

Sanctions were conceived in piety as a bloodless substitute for war—and, it was hoped, an effective one. If applied with sufficient determination, economic sanctions can and do produce *economic* effects. They may increase the self-reliance of the target country. They can also serve to render the attainment of economic objectives more difficult for it—to act as a brake on economic growth. One of the most serious flaws in sanctions policies has been reliance on the theory that they can be depended upon, beyond that, to have a *corrective* effect—to bring about the desired political changes. The avoidance of future fiascoes will depend *inter alia* on a much clearer understanding of the limitations of sanctions policies—and of why governments are likely to continue to find it difficult to do without them. On one level there is the indirect benefit of helping to contain domestic pressures to take some more drastic action vis-à-vis the country concerned; on another the continuing conviction that sanctions can help to demonstrate that certain types of conduct, if repeated or continued, will encounter real resistance, not merely verbal indignation.

The purpose of sanctions was conceived initially as being either preventive or remedial. Their main effect, however, has invariably been *punitive*. There are international circumstances in which it may become necessary to take some punitive action, falling short of the use of force, either to weaken the regime to which sanctions are applied or, by penalizing it for one undesirable action, to try to

deter it from further action of that kind. Given the fact that they do have a punitive effect the possibility that economic penalties will be imposed is a factor it is desirable to maintain in the calculations of a government apparently bent on acting in defiance of international law. To abandon altogether the idea of recourse to sanctions in response to acts of aggression or other flagrant violations of international law or human rights would be to reduce the choice of response to one between military action and acquiescence—an unattractive choice at the best of times and particularly so in a nuclear age. In cases in which "real" sanctions are applied, provided (a) they affect a significant proportion of the target country's external trade (or external finance); and (b) there is sufficient international support, they can impose some penalty on the target country. They may have some deterrent effect, though they are not likely to do so if the regime believes its survival in any event to be at stake. Once applied they may, if sufficiently effective, weaken the target regime; but they will not necessarily change its behavior.

The purpose of this study is to suggest that, when consideration is given to the use of the "economic weapon," greater attention should be paid to the effects this is likely to have on the target country. Exaggerated expectations should not be entertained as to the likely economic effects, or the time-scale on which these may be felt; still less as to the probable political results. The possibility of recourse to sanctions is liable to be more effective as a means of pressure than their implementation. The threat of the imposition of sanctions may increase bargaining power with the government concerned, though it may do so in circumstances in which it becomes difficult for either side to give way. Minor or petty sanctions are virtually certain to produce a reverse political effect without exerting any real pressure. On the occasions on which it is thought right to have recourse to sanctions, it will be as well to do so without illusions. A sanctions policy should never be based on the initial fallacy, which was the supposition that it would prove possible to deter aggression or otherwise to change fundamentally the political conduct of states by the threat of economic penalties alone. The implementation of sanctions is essentially punitive, the effect—if there is sufficient international support—being to weaken the country to which they are applied. There are international circumstances in which this may be a necessary action to take. More ambitious claims should not be made for a sanctions policy.


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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 July, 1986.

SOUTH AFRICA

Thank you for your letter of 4 July enclosing certain details for which I had asked about conditions in Commonwealth countries.

Could you please add examples of cases where there had been extensive detentions without trial, with a few figures. One thinks of India in 1975-77 and Zimbabwe more recently.

(C.D. Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

gt

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 July, 1986.

SOUTH AFRICA
REPLY TO PRESIDENT BOTHA'S MESSAGE

You sent me earlier today a draft reply to President Botha's recent message to the Prime Minister. I enclose a version which has been approved by the Prime Minister, and would be grateful if the text could be telegraphed to Cape Town for delivery as soon as possible tomorrow.

(C.D. Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for the message which your Embassy conveyed to my office on 2 July.

I am sorry that you do not accept that the overall thrust and intention of the conclusions of the European Council meeting at The Hague last week were positive. They were certainly intended to be so. Since that meeting I have publicly and repeatedly made clear that the Council decision should not be seen as an ultimatum. I have said explicitly that we do not think that threatening further sanctions immediately or automatically would help to bring about the negotiations that we all want.

I have also told the House of Commons repeatedly of my opposition to comprehensive sanctions and my conviction that your problems have to be solved by negotiation. I reiterated our view that it is not for us or for anyone else outside South Africa to say what arrangements would come out of such negotiations. It will be for all the people of South Africa to decide on the future constitution they would like.

So far as the British Government are concerned, there does indeed need to be a suspension of violence on all sides, as called for by Commonwealth Heads of Government at Nassau. I certainly do not see you as being required to make a unilateral concession. It remains my view that a commitment

to the early release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC, in exchange for a suspension of violence, would do more than any other step to create the climate of confidence in which a dialogue would become possible.

This brings me to your question about what is meant by "authentic leaders" of the black population. Of course, it is hard to be sure until, as you promised in your speech of 31 January, all South Africans are in a position where they can participate in government through their elected representatives. But I can assure you that we, like others, do not have only the ANC in mind (though they clearly have a sizeable following).

There is much else to discuss in your letter. But I think that it would be best if Geoffrey Howe were able to go over the ground with you in person at the earliest possible opportunity. His aim would be to see in what ways we might be able to help the process of negotiation. Of course I accept your commitment to power-sharing and to a democratic system of government which accommodates all legitimate political aspirations of all the South African communities. The challenge is how to draw in those groups who have hitherto been unwilling to associate themselves with the plans and structures of the South African Government.

I now hear that it is unlikely to be convenient for you to receive Geoffrey Howe next week as we had proposed. This perturbs me considerably. I can well understand that it is not easy to accommodate such a visit at short notice. But it was not through any wish to inconvenience you that we suggested it. It is my honest assessment that an early visit, during which Geoffrey Howe would meet with you, will best enable me to defend what I perceive to be your interests as much as ours in the face of the rapidly mounting pressures for action against South Africa.

Could I ask you to be kind enough to look again at the possibility of a visit by Geoffrey Howe next week, and of seeing him yourself? I can assure you that he would act with the greatest possible discretion. I would not come back to you on this unless I really believed it a matter of great importance.

The Honourable P. W. Botha, D.M.S.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 July 1986

Thank you for your letter conveying the text of the Declaration on South Africa recently adopted by Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community.

CHARLES POWELL

Mr. C. J. E. Barker.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 July 1986

SOUTH AFRICA: CARIBBEAN VIEWS

I enclose a copy of the Declaration on Southern Africa adopted by the Seventh Meeting of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community on 3 July, which has been sent to the Prime Minister by the President of Guyana.

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Guyana High Commission

3 Palace Court · Bayswater Road · London W2 4LP

Telephone: 01-229 7684/8 Telex: 23945 Cable Address: GUYCOM, LONDON

July 4 1986

Dear Private Secretary,

I have been requested by President Desmond Hoyte to forward the attached document to the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister.

It is a Declaration on Southern Africa adopted by the 7th Meeting of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community in Georgetown, Guyana on July 3 1986.

Yours sincerely,

C J E Barker
Acting High Commissioner

The Private Secretary
to the Rt Hon Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

3/7/86

Guyana High Commission

3 Palace Court · Bayswater Road · London W2 4LP

Telephone: 01-229 7684/8 Telex: 23945 Cable Address: GUYCOM, LONDON

I have the honour to transmit to you the following declaration on Southern Africa adopted by the 7th Meeting of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community here in Georgetown - today July 3, 1986.

DECLARATION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

The Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community at their seventh meeting held in Georgetown, considered recent and current developments in Southern Africa. They recalled that the increased repression by the racist regime in Southern Africa of that country's black population and the blatant aggression perpetrated against Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, had been widely condemned. They noted that recent events, particularly the reintroduction of a state of emergency, the sweeping powers of arrest and detention given to the Police which have led to the imprisonment of over a thousand persons, and the severe censorship of the press, have only heightened the sense of outrage felt by the people of the Caribbean. These events have also strengthened the solidarity of the Caribbean with the oppressed people of South Africa and with the Governments and people of the frontline states, victims of persistent South African aggression.

The Heads reflected on the efforts in the past for a peaceful negotiation solution to the depressing situation in Southern Africa. They noted that all these have been frustrated by the intransigence of the Pretoria regime leaving the oppressed people no other option but to engage in an armed struggle.

In this context, the Heads of Government specially welcomed the report of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons, which they had joined in commissioning in The Bahamas last October. They expressed appreciation for the efforts of the group to facilitate the objectives of the Nassau Accord, namely, the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment in South Africa of a non-racial representative Government - both, as a matter of compelling urgency.

..2/

The Heads of Government expressed their disappointment that the efforts of the Eminent Persons Group to secure a dialogue for peaceful change involving the true representatives of the black population were so crudely aborted by the racist regime. However the group's findings that there is at present no genuine intention on the part of Pretoria to dismantle apartheid and no prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishing of a non-racial and representative Government come as no surprise. It is clear, that, since October last, there has been no progress in South Africa towards meeting the objectives of the Nassau Accord. Indeed, in the view of the Heads, the situation has worsened.

The Heads of Government share with the Group of Eminent Persons their conviction that the absence of effective economic pressure on South Africa, and the belief of the racist regime that such pressure need not be feared, - are actually deferring change in South Africa. They therefore believe that effective pressure on South Africa can no longer be postponed if a conflagration is to be avoided. It follows that further economic measures, to which the Group of Eminent Persons sees no alternative, are absolutely imperative. To defer sanctions is to further sustain apartheid. This is wholly repugnant and unacceptable to the Caribbean Community. The Heads pledge, therefore to work in all forums, including the Commonwealth, OAS, SELA and the United Nations, to ensure that such deferment does not prevail and that mandatory economic sanctions are applied to South Africa by the entire international community.

The Prime Minister of The Bahamas will preside over the Commonwealth review meeting in August. The Heads of Government have mandated him to convey to the meeting their collective views and their resolve to use every means at their disposal to further the objectives of the Nassau Accord. The Heads call on all other colleagues attending that meeting to share that resolve and to set in train processes that will lead swiftly to the application of the further programme of sanctions envisaged in the Accord and their rigorous implementation.

The Heads of Government recognise that the imposition of economic sanctions has a cost both for the people of South Africa and for the countries which impose them. The oppressed people of South Africa have clearly demonstrated that they are prepared to bear the cost. The people in the Commonwealth Caribbean also have borne that cost for over three decades having long ago severed all links with South Africa.

..3/

The Heads of Government are simultaneously taking appropriate steps to communicate their views to the leaders of the European Economic Community (EEC) countries and the United States, urging them to share their concerns and to respond effectively to the imperatives of change in South Africa. The people of the Caribbean Community are bound in unbreakable solidarity with all who struggle against apartheid.

Finally, if despite all efforts the Commonwealth review meeting in August fails to reach unanimity on advancing agreed Commonwealth goals on South Africa, the Prime Minister of The Bahamas will in the name of the Heads of Government call for an emergency meeting of all Commonwealth Heads of Government to be convened as a matter of the utmost urgency.

HUGH DESMOND HOYTE
CHAIRMAN OF THE MEETING AND PRESIDENT
OF THE COOPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA

3rd July 1986

phoned CDP 4/7
MS

PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA

P. W. Botha is being difficult about seeing the Foreign Secretary next week.

The Foreign Secretary would like you to weigh in by sending Botha a reply to his recent message, tonight if possible, and urging him most strongly to receive the mission next week.

I have some misgivings about <u>your</u> having to ask favours of Botha at this early stage, when you will certainly need to do so later. But if we don't get the whole exercise off to a good start, there won't be a later.

I have rewritten the FCO draft quite extensively. Agree to send it?

CDP

CDP
4 July 1986

Already despatched by telegram. 12/7 is a confirmatory copy
CDP

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OA
CEFCP

SUBJECT

10 DOWNING STREET

cc Masters
OPS

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 July 1986

T125/86

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO.

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for the message which your Embassy conveyed to my office on 2 July.

I am sorry that you do not accept that the overall thrust and intention of the conclusions of the European Council meeting at The Hague last week were positive. They were certainly intended to be so. Since that meeting I have publicly and repeatedly made clear that the Council decision should not be seen as an ultimatum. I have said explicitly that we do not think that threatening further sanctions immediately or automatically would help to bring about the negotiations that we all want.

I have also told the House of Commons repeatedly of my opposition to comprehensive sanctions and my conviction that your problems have to be solved by negotiation. I reiterated our view that it is not for us or for anyone else outside South Africa to say what arrangements would come out of such negotiations. It will be for all the people of South Africa to decide on the future constitution they would like.

So far as the British Government are concerned, there does indeed need to be a suspension of violence on all sides, as called for by Commonwealth Heads of Government at Nassau. I certainly do not see you as being required to make a unilateral concession. It remains my view that a commitment

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STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

to the early release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC, in exchange for a suspension of violence, would do more than any other step to create the climate of confidence in which a dialogue would become possible.

This brings me to your question about what is meant by "authentic leaders" of the black population. Of course, it is hard to be sure until, as you promised in your speech of 31 January, all South Africans are in a position where they can participate in government through their elected representatives. But I can assure you that we, like others, do not have only the ANC in mind (though they clearly have a sizeable following).

There is much else to discuss in your letter. But I think that it would be best if Geoffrey Howe were able to go over the ground with you in person at the earliest possible opportunity. His aim would be to see in what ways we might be able to help the process of negotiation. Of course I accept your commitment to power-sharing and to a democratic system of government which accommodates all legitimate political aspirations of all the South African communities. The challenge is how to draw in those groups who have hitherto been unwilling to associate themselves with the plans and structures of the South African Government.

I now hear that it is unlikely to be convenient for you to receive Geoffrey Howe next week as we had proposed. This perturbs me considerably. I can well understand that it is not easy to accommodate such a visit at short notice. But it was not through any wish to inconvenience you that we suggested it. It is my honest assessment that an early visit, during which Geoffrey Howe would meet with you, will best enable me to defend what I perceive to be your interests as much as ours in the face of the rapidly mounting pressures for action against South Africa.

Could I ask you to be kind enough to look again at the possibility of a visit by Geoffrey Howe next week, and of seeing him yourself? I can assure you that he would act with the greatest possible discretion. I would not come back to you on this unless I really believed it a matter of great importance.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable P. W. Botha, D.M.S.

SECRET

cc PC

4

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 July 1986

Dear Charles,

South Africa: Message from P W Botha to the Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 2 July enclosing the text of a message from State President Botha to the Prime Minister.

Meanwhile, difficulties have arisen over the Foreign Secretary's plans to pay a short visit to the area next week, from 8-12 July (with a more extensive one during the period 23-30 July). The South Africans have told us that on present plans P W Botha will not be available during the period of the Secretary of State's visit. This was confirmed, as a firm decision at the highest level, following numerous exchanges yesterday evening, when the South African Ambassador saw Sir Geoffrey Howe at breakfast this morning. Moreover, the State President's latest message to the Prime Minister indicates that he will not take a decision on whether to allow Sir Geoffrey to visit Mr Nelson Mandela until after he, and possibly some other Ministers, have met the Foreign Secretary.

We understand that the State President does have genuine diary problems.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

As the Prime Minister knows, the Foreign Secretary attaches importance to being able to fit in two visits to this area this month. A single journey, particularly with the South Africans in their present mulish mood, risks being presented by the media, and therefore to our Commonwealth partners, as a "make or break" occasion. Moreover, there would be more chance of such groups as

/the ANC

the ANC and UDF agreeing to a meeting if a certain amount of first hand softening up had first been done on President Kaunda. Sir Geoffrey sees the first visit as a mainly exploratory opportunity to seek to establish what scope exists for movement on the part of the SAG. It would be followed by a more extensive journey from 23 to 30 July during which he would hope to follow up whatever leads present themselves and also to have contact with a range of black African leaders, including the ANC (from whom movement will of course also be needed if there is to be progress).

It would be very difficult for Sir Geoffrey to visit South Africa next week without seeing P W Botha (given that he would not then be seeing Mandela either). This would be seen by our EC and Commonwealth partners - and presented by the media and Opposition - as a resounding snub. In the light of the firm South African reaction reported by the Ambassador, the Foreign Secretary thinks it essential that the Prime Minister should send an immediate reply to P W Botha's latest message which seeks to focus the State President on Sir Geoffrey 's mission. There is no point in taking issue with those elements in it with which we do not agree or debating the issues in the terms set by the State President. This is best left for a face-to-face meeting, when Sir Geoffrey sees P W Botha.

/ The enclosed draft reply to State President Botha has been drafted with these considerations in mind.

/ At the urging of Dr Worrall, the Foreign Secretary yesterday sent a message to Pik Botha (copy enclosed), the reaction to which has been covered above.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to Michael Stark, Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

THE PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

THE HONOURABLE PRESIDENT BOTHA DMS

Your Reference

Copies to:

DAMAGE

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for the message which your Embassy conveyed to my office on 2 July.

I am sorry that you ~~are unable to~~ do not accept that the overall thrust and intention of the conclusions of the European Council meeting at The Hague last week were positive. ~~I myself am still convinced that they are.~~ ~~In particular, I have repeatedly made clear in public, and for example during the statement I made in the House of Commons on 1 July,~~ (such at meeting I have repeatedly) that the Council decision should not be seen as an ultimatum. ~~The measures outlined in the communique represented contingency plans.~~ In referring ~~to them~~ I have said explicitly that we do not think that threatening further sanctions immediately or automatically would help to bring about the negotiations that we all ~~desire~~ want.

~~In the course of my statement,~~ I have also told the House of Commons repeatedly of my opposition to comprehensive sanctions and my conviction that your problems have to be solved by negotiation. I reiterated our view that it is not for us or for anyone else outside South Africa to

Pity where certainly entitled to be so, at least as far as Helmut Kohl and I were concerned, and I would like to discuss

say what arrangements would come out of such negotiations ~~and that~~ it will be for all the people of South Africa to decide on the future constitution they would like.

So far as the British Government are concerned, there does indeed need to be a suspension of violence on all sides, as called for by Commonwealth Heads of Government at Nassau. I certainly do not see you as being required to make a unilateral concession. It remains my view, ~~however,~~ that the early release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC, ~~would do more than any other step to help create the sort of climate of confidence in which a suspension of violence and a start on the dialogue which we all want would become possible.~~

This brings me to your question about ~~who foreign leaders have in mind when they talk about~~ "authentic leaders" of the black population. Of course, it is hard to be sure until, as you promised in your speech of 31 January, all South Africans are in a position where they can participate in government through their elected representatives. But I can assure you that we, like others, do not have only the ANC in mind (though they clearly have a sizeable following).

There is much else to discuss in your letter. ~~But I believe~~ that it would be ~~immensely valuable for both of us~~ if Geoffrey Howe ~~was~~ able to go over the ground with you in person at the earliest possible opportunity. His aim would be to see in what ways we might be able to help the process of negotiation. ~~I~~ of course accept your commitment to power-sharing and to a democratic

system of government which accommodates all legitimate political aspirations of all the South African communities. The challenge is how to draw in those groups who have hitherto been unwilling to associate themselves with the plans and structures of the South African Government.

I had very much hoped that Geoffrey Howe could pay a short initial visit to the area next week, from 9-11 July, and follow that up with a more extensive visit towards the end of the month, in the course of which he would want to see as representative a selection of South Africans as possible. He has been in touch with your Foreign Minister to explain the reason for the short notice, exactly why there is so little flexibility in his schedule, and why it is so important to lose no time and therefore to pay two visits rather than one in the course of this month.

I have therefore been very perturbed to hear that your Ambassador has indicated that the earlier visit would not be welcome to you. I fully understand that you have your own priorities. May I ask you, however, to put very full weight on the problems which I face in defending what I perceive to be your interests as much as ours in the face of the rapidly mounting pressures for action against South Africa.

/In

I now understand that it is unlikely to be convenient for you to receive Geoffrey Howe next week as we had proposed. This perturbs me considerably. I can well understand that it is not easy to accommodate such a visit at short notice. But it was not through any wish to inconvenience you that we suggested it. It is my honest assessment that an early visit, followed by ... during which Geoffrey Howe would meet with you, will best enable me to ... to get us ... started

Could I ask you to be kind enough to ~~In these circumstances, while I fully recognise that there could be some cost to you, I should be particularly grateful if you could~~ look again at the possibility of a visit by Geoffrey Howe next week, and ~~at the option~~ of seeing him yourself. I can assure you that he would act with the greatest possible discretion. ~~I should not hide from you the very great~~ disappointment which both I and my colleagues in the European Council would feel if there seemed to be undue delay in his holding discussions with statesmen in Southern Africa at the highest level from the start of his mission, and the difficulty there would be in managing the public reaction if he should not embark on ~~his task promptly.~~

I would not come back to you on this ~~unless~~ unless I really believed it a matter of great importance.

CDP.

MESSAGE FROM SIR GEOFFREY HOWE TO SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER

"I understand from conversations Ewen Fergusson has had with Denis Worrall and from our Embassy's contacts in Pretoria with the DFA that although you are free to see me during my planned visit to the area next week, there are very real practical difficulties about a meeting with the State President.

I well understand the difficulties which a visit proposed at this short notice must cause you, and I am very aware of the great pressures on the State President's programme. On the other hand, the Prime Minister and her fellow Heads of State and Government at the recent European Council placed great importance on my establishing contact with statesmen in Southern Africa at the highest level. I very much share that view. I am also anxious, as I am sure you will understand, that the absence of a meeting with the State President could all too easily provoke comment that could be unhelpful to us both. I very much hope therefore that he will be able to find time for a meeting during my first visit.

I should also explain the reason why I am planning to go to the area at such short notice and why there is so little give in my dates. My aim is to pay two visits in the course of July. The first would aim to establish contact with the main policy makers in South Africa. That is why I myself attach so much importance to a meeting with the State President. This would be followed by a more extensive visit towards the end of July during which I would hope to follow up whatever leads present themselves and meet a cross-section of the various South African communities.

Unfortunately, my existing commitments are such that there are only two windows of opportunity between now and the end of the month. The first is the period 9-11 July. I must be back for the visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister who arrives here on 13 July. Another opening will not arise until after the Foreign Affairs Council on 21/22 July, which given my role as Chairman I simply cannot miss.

/We

We have not announced or confirmed any dates. But inevitably the press have a pretty fair idea of what we are proposing. This stems from their extensive knowledge of my July commitments, coupled with intelligent speculation.

I hope that I can count on you to do everything you can to try to arrange a meeting with the State President during the period 9-11 July. I would of course be willing to fly with my own aircraft (a VC10) to any part of South Africa convenient to the State President."

S. AFRICA

RELATIONS

PT 11

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TELNO 419
OF 032025Z JULY 86
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YOUR TELNO 197 AND 198: SOUTH AFRICA: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE

1. THE MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO MR MULRONEY ON 29 JUNE. I COULD NOT SPEAK PERSONALLY TO HIM AS HE WAS IN THE THROWS OF A MAJOR CABINET RESHUFFLE OVER THE WEEKEND AND ON 30 JUNE. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY THE CANADA DAY HOLIDAY ON 1 JULY AND HIS DEPARTURE FOR A CABINET MEETING IN THE WEST TODAY. SECRETARY OF STATE, JOE CLARK, HAS BEEN OUT OF OTTAWA.

2. I WENT OVER THE GROUND AGAIN TODAY WITH THE HEAD OF THE DEA TASK FORCE ON SOUTH AFRICA (BERGBUSCH). WE HAD PREVIOUSLY PASSED TO THE DEA THE TEXT OF THE EC STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA (HAGUE TELNO 424) AND CONVEYED THE POINTS MADE IN YOUR TELNO 150 TO ACCRA. BERGBUSCH HAD SEEN THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO MR MULRONEY AND HAS PROVIDED US WITH A COPY OF MR MULRONEY'S LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF JUNE 27.

3. BERGBUSCH WAS NOT EXPECTING MR MULRONEY TO REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE BEFORE THEY MET ON JULY 13. I SAID THAT I HAD NO REACTION FROM LONDON TO MR MULRONEY'S MESSAGE, BUT DOUBTED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE A RESPONSE BEFORE NEXT WEEK'S MEETING.

4. ON YOUR MISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA, BERGBUSCH INDICATED THAT THERE WAS SOME SCEPTICISM AS TO WHETHER A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO BRING THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT INTO DIALOGUE WOULD BE ANY MORE FRUITFUL THAN THAT OF THE EPG. WHAT WAS NOW REQUIRED IN CANADIAN EYES WAS A CLEAR AND FIRM SIGNAL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE PATIENCE OF THE WEST, AND IN PARTICULAR OF SOUTH AFRICA'S MAJOR TRADE PARTNERS, WAS EXHAUSTED. INCREASED ECONOMIC PRESSURE WAS THE ONLY WAY TO GET THAT MESSAGE ACROSS. BERGBUSCH REFERRED FREQUENTLY TO THE NEED FOR SUCH 'SIGNALS'. HE ARGUED THAT, SO FAR, THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WERE UNCONVINCED OF THE DETERMINATION OF THE WEST TO SECURE EARLY POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

5. I EXPLAINED THAT NO ONE QUESTIONED THE DIFFICULTY OF YOUR MISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA OR OVER-ESTIMATED THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS. NEVERTHELESS, DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION REMAINED THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO INCREASED VIOLENCE AND BLOODSHED. NO OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL PROGRESS SHOULD BE LOST. YOUR MISSION HAD THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE 12 MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND MERITED THE SUPPORT OF CANADA AND OTHERS. I HOPED THAT WE /COULD

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COULD COUNT ON THAT SUPPORT AND DRAW ATTENTION TO THE PASSAGE IN MR MULRONEY'S MESSAGE IN WHICH HE WISHED US WELL IN ANY ATTEMPT AT GETTING TALKS STARTED BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND BLACK LEADERS.

6. ON POSSIBLE FURTHER ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, BERGBUSCH REVEALED THAT THE CANADIANS HAD BEEN EXAMINING SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS OF SUGAR, AND WINES AND SPIRITS. CANADA WAS A SIGNIFICANT IMPORTER, WITH THE UK, OF BOTH ITEMS. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF SUPPLY WERE AVAILABLE SEMI COLON SOUTH AFRICA WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN FINDING ALTERNATIVE MARKETS. THIS MIGHT BE THE KIND OF MEASURE THAT THE COMMONWEALTH COULD CONSIDER IN ADDITION TO THE MEASURES IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE NASSAU ACCORD.

7. BERGBUSCH CONFIRMED THAT MR CLARK STILL HOPED TO AVOID A MOVE TO COMPREHENSIVE MANDATORY SANCTIONS WHICH WOULD NOT BE WATER-TIGHT AND WOULD NOT BRING ABOUT EARLY DIALOGUE IN SOUTH AFRICA. BUT IF THE PRESSURE FOR SUCH MEASURES WERE TO BE RESISTED WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH AND MORE WIDELY, FURTHER COMMONWEALTH ACTION WAS ESSENTIAL.

8. LOOKING TO THE AUGUST MEETING IN LONDON, AND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT YOUR MISSION HAD NOT BY THEN PRODUCED RESULTS, BERGBUSCH ASSUMED THAT HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WOULD CONCLUDE THAT 'ADEQUATE PROGRESS' HAD NOT BEEN MADE TOWARDS THE OBJECTIVES SET IN NASSAU. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, FURTHER MEASURES WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED. HE JUDGED THAT HIS MINISTERS WOULD WANT TO AGREE IN LONDON UPON SPECIFIC MEASURES THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED THERE WOULD BE PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT AND TO RECOMMEND TO THE REST OF THE COMMONWEALTH. HE ENQUIRED HOW THE COMMONWEALTH TIMETABLE COULD BE FITTED IN WITH THE EC PROGRAMME WHICH PROVIDED FOR CONSULTATIONS CONTINUING UNTIL THE END OF SEPTEMBER. I POINTED OUT THAT ANY MEASURES IMPLEMENTED BY COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WOULD NOT BE VERY EFFECTIVE UNLESS THEY WERE ENDORSED BY THE OTHER MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES WHO THE EC WOULD BE CONSULTING.

9. SOUTH AFRICA MAY WELL FEATURE DURING THE 3-DAY CABINET MEETING BEING HELD THIS WEEK IN WESTERN CANADA. I WOULD EXPECT MINISTERS TO CONFIRM THE BROAD POLICY ALREADY ADOPTED BY THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT, NAMELY A CONTINUED TIGHTENING OF THE ECONOMIC SCREWS UPON SOUTH AFRICA.

DAY

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MY TELNO 389

AUSTRALIAN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

SUMMARY

1. CABINET DECIDE ON A RANGE OF MEASURES BUT LEAVE IT UP TO MR HAWKE WHEN TO ANNOUNCE THEM. NO ACTION LIKELY BEFORE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LONDON, BUT PRESSURE AT NEXT WEEK'S ALP CONFERENCE COULD LEAD TO AN EARLIER ANNOUNCMENT.

DETAIL

2. I HAVE NOW BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN FROM MCINNES (DEP SEC DPMC) AND ACCOUNT OF WHAT WAS DECIDED AT MONDAY'S CABINET MEETING. WE HAVE ALSO HAD A DISCUSSION WITH THE HEAD OF DFA SOUTHERN AFRICA SECTION. MINISTERS THEMSELVES ARE OUT OF TOWN PREPARING FOR NEXT WEEK'S ALP CONFERENCE IN HOBART. MCINNES SAID THAT WHAT HAD APPEARED IN THE PRESS WAS REASONABLY ACCURATE. CABINET HAD ENDORSED A RANGE OF MEASURES INCLUDING BANS ON SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS, ON AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS AND ON PROMOTION OF TOURISM AND NEW INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA. DFA ADDED THAT CABINET HAD ALSO APPROVED THE STEPPING UP OF LINKS WITH THE ANC AND AN INCREASED PROGRAMME OF TRAINING FOR BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS, BUT HAD NOT APPROVED WITHDRAWAL OF VISA FACILITIES FOR SOUTH AFRICANS WISHING TO VISIT AUSTRALIA.

4. ACCORDING TO MCINNES CABINET HAD RESOLVED TO LEAVE IT TO MR HAWKE'S DISCRETION TO ANNOUNCE WHEN THE SANCTIONS WOULD BE IMPOSED AFTER THE LONDON MEETING IN EARLY AUGUST. THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO ACT UNILATERALLY BEFORE THEN BUT IT WAS POSSIBLE, THOUGH UNLIKELY, THAT MR HAWKE MIGHT FEEL A NEED TO SATISFY PARTY DEMANDS FOR SOME IMMEDIATE ACTION. DFA SUGGESTED THAT, IN THE LATTER EVENT, THE MOST LIKELY MEASURES TO BE ANNOUNCED EARLY WOULD BE THE SUSPENSION OF SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS SERVICES AND AN INCREASE IN CONTACT WITH THE ANC, POSSIBLY INVOLVING AN INVITATION FOR OLIVER TAMBO TO VISIT AUSTRALIA.

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5. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SUGGESTIONS IN THE PRESS THAT THE ALP CONFERENCE MIGHT DEBATE A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR BRITAIN'S EXPULSION FROM THE COMMONWEALTH MCINNES SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD BE BROUGHT FORWARD AND THAT IT WAS CERTAINLY NOT PART OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TO CALL FOR BRITAIN'S EXPULSION.

DOUGAL

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Meeting Record

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 July, 1986.

SUBJECT CC MASTER

SOUTH AFRICA

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a word after Cabinet this morning about the Foreign Secretary's forthcoming visits to South Africa. The Prime Minister agreed that the Foreign Secretary was right to think in terms of two visits in July. She also agreed that we should play the visits in a low key and not raise expectations too high. She was emphatic, however, that we must work on the assumption that there would be a further visit following the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, perhaps in September. Since the European Council have agreed that there should be a period of three months for the mission, we must at all costs avoid bringing it to a premature conclusion. Anything less would be to let down the Germans, which the Prime Minister could not contemplate.

The Prime Minister agreed that further efforts should be made to obtain advance assurance from the South African Government that the Foreign Secretary would be able to see Mandela in the course of his first visit. The Foreign Secretary said that he would raise this with the South African Ambassador. The Prime Minister also agreed that it would be appropriate for the Foreign Secretary to see Mr. Tambo in the course of one of his visits, making clear that he did so in his role as President of the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve, rather than as Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

It was recognised that there would have to be a debate on South Africa before the House rose. The best time for this was likely to be in the interval between the Foreign Secretary's two visits to South Africa, that is round 16 or 17 July.

(C.D. Powell)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Master
J. P. BARBER
J.P., M.A., Ph.D.

HATFIELD COLLEGE
DURHAM DH1 3RQ
Telephone 64261-2

JPB/CTO

2nd July, 1986

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,
The Prime Minister,
10, Downing Street,
ONDON, W1.

Dear Prime Minister,

SOUTH AFRICAN SCHOOLTEACHER FELLOWSHIPS:

I thought you would be pleased to know that it now looks almost certain that we shall start the Fellowship Scheme this coming October. Following a successful trip which the British Council arranged for one of my colleagues in the English Language Department, ten Fellows have been selected (seven African, two coloured and one Indian).

As we all know the political situation surrounding South Africa is so volatile that it is difficult to state anything with confidence - hence my reference to "almost certain". I believe that we have been able to progress so quickly because the scheme has not been sucked into the bitter political contraversy, and I hope that we can continue to keep it out. As we all appreciate, this is a venture that should help blacks whatever the political solution that emerges in the Republic.

Again I thank you for your great help in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

James Barber.

JAMES P. BARBER.

STH AFRICA Relations Pt. 11

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FM LAGOS
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 577
OF 021345Z JULY 86
INFO PRIORITY HARARE, LUSAKA, PRETORIA, DAR ES SALAAM, NAIROBI
SOUTH AFRICA

1. I CALLED THIS MORNING ON GENERAL OBASANJO AT HIS FARM NEAR LAGOS. ON THE EPG HE HAD LITTLE TO ADD TO HIS BRIEFINGS IN DAR ES SALAAM (DAR ES SALAAM TELNO 165) AND NAIROBI (NAIROBI TELNO 279). HE REITERATED HIS ADMIRATION FOR NELSON MANDELA AND PAID TRIBUTE ONCE MORE TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY LORD BARBER. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE EPG MIGHT MEET AGAIN IN LONDON JUST PRIOR TO THE REVIEW MEETING. ALTHOUGH A LITTLE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE VALUE OF THIS, HE SAW NO OBJECTION.

2. I HANDED OBASANJO A COPY OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA, AND EXPLAINED WHAT THE EC WERE TRYING TO DO. ON THE TEXT, HE COMMENTED THAT THE USE OF THE TERM ''AUTHENTIC LEADERS'' WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, WHO HAD STRONGLY CHALLENGED THE EPG ABOUT THE IDENTITIES OF THESE ''LEADERS''. ON THE SUBSTANCE, HE WAS NOT IN THE LEAST DISMISSIVE OF YOUR FOURTHCOMING VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA AND SAID HE HOPED YOU WOULD SUCCEED WHERE THE EPG HAD FAILED. HE IMMAGINED THAT ''THE STING'' WOULD BE TAKEN OUT OF THE REVIEW MEETING IF YOU WERE ABLE TO SECURE THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF MANDELA BEFOREHAND: OTHERWISE HE FORESAW PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD NO DOUBT SPILL OVER INTO THE NAM MEETING AT HARARE. HE ALSO SAW THE NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND OTHER INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES BEFORE THE IMPOSITION OF ANY ''SELECTIVE SANTIONS''.

3. OBASANJO WILL BE IN NIGERIA THROUGHOUT JULY, EXCEPT FOR A SHORT VISIT TO PARIS. THE NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY DOES NOT KEEP HIM INFORMED OF EVENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA (OBASANJO IMPLIED THAT AKINYEMI WAS A LAW UNTO HIMSELF). HE WOULD THEREFORE WELCOME ANY BRIEFING WE ARE ABLE TO PROVIDE HIM ON DEVELOPMENTS. OBASANJO IS WELL DISPOSED TO US AND I WOULD SEE CONSIDERABLE MERIT IN KEEPING HIM ABREAST OF EVENTS BY SENDING HIM THE TEXT OF IMPORTANT BRITISH STATEMENTS, SPEECHES, ETC ON SOUTH AFRICA. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE DEPARTMENT WOULD ENSURE THAT I RECEIVE THE NECESSARY MATERIAL FOR THIS PURPOSE.

EWANS

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WASHINGTON TELNO 1748: SOUTH AFRICA: US/UK CONSULTATIONS

1. JENKINS CALLED ON CROCKER ON 2 JULY FOR A FURTHER DISCUSSION ON SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL, THE US POLICY REVIEW AND THE PROSPECTS FOR US/UK AND WESTERN COORDINATION. DETAILS ARE CONTAINED IN MIFTS.

2. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ALSO RAISED SOUTH AFRICA WITH SHULTZ ON 2 JULY, STRESSING THE CONCERN EXPRESSED IN YOUR MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 1177) ABOUT LEAP-FROGGING MEASURES. SHULTZ AGREED WHOLE-HEARTEDLY ON THE NEED FOR COORDINATION, AND EMPHASISED THE PRESIDENT'S CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO PUNITIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. BUT SHULTZ ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT, IF THE ADMINISTRATION WERE TO MANAGE THE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES AND TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE HERE, THEY WERE LIKELY TO HAVE TO INCLUDE SOME RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN THE POLICY STATEMENT NOW IN PREPARATION.

WRIGHT

SOUTH AFRICA
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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 July 1986

We have received a suggestion that the Prime Minister should see the Chief Minister of Lebowa, who will be visiting London this month. I should be grateful for advice.

(Charles Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ADVANCE COPIES 18

SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS
PS/MRS CHALKER.
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON

MR REEVE

HD/SAFD
HD/CAFD
HD/UND
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/NAD

MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

PS/SRS MOD

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IMMEDIATE

MIPT: SOUTH AFRICA: US/UK CONSULTATIONS
SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

1 CROCKER SAID THAT HE WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PRESENT MOOD WITHIN THE SAG. THERE HAD BEEN A SEA-CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICAN THINKING SINCE THE TOKYO SUMMIT, IF NOT BEFORE. P W BOTHA NOW APPEARED TO BE MAKING ALL THE DECISIONS, AT BEST CONSULTING ONLY A FEW HARD-LINERS SUCH AS HEUNIS. HE WAS EVIDENTLY DETERMINED TO DEMONSTRATE AT HOME AND ABROAD WHO WAS BOSS, AND TO TRY TO BREAK THE BACK OF THE BLACK RESISTENCE WHILE ENHANCING HIS STANDING AMONG WHITE CONSERVATIVES. HE APPEARED TO HAVE DECIDED THAT HE COULD RIDE OUT WHATEVER THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION MIGHT BE. HE HAD CLOSED HIS EARS TO THE MODERATE VOICES IN HIS GOVERNMENT: PIK BOTHA, IN PARTICULAR, SEEMED TO BE KEPT OUT OF THE GAME.

2. CROCKER SAID THAT, AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, HE (AND AMBASSADOR NICKEL) FEARED THAT IT COULD BE SOME TIME BEFORE THE QUOTE PRICE TAG UNQUOTE OF CURRENT POLICIES BECAME APPARENT TO BOTHA. IT WAS VERY HARD TO FIND A SOUTH AFRICAN INTERLOCUTOR WITH ANY INFLUENCE WHO REALLY UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS AT STAKE. US/SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS REMAINED AT A LOW EBB. RECENT EXCHANGES HAD BEEN ACERBIC AND P W BOTHA'S MANNER DISOBLIGING. BOTHA HAD JUST REFUSED TO SEE CY VANCE, FOR WHOM HE HAD PREVIOUSLY ENTERTAINED SOME REGARD. AND HE STILL SEEMED DETERMINED TO HARBOUR UNREALISTIC ILLUSIONS ABOUT CONTINUING SUPPORT FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN. FURTHER REPRESSION SEEMED ALL TOO LIKELY, AND THERE WAS AN EVER-PRESENT RISK OF MORE CROSS-BORDER MILITARY ACTION.

3. CROCKER SUSPECTED THAT, IF THE SAG CONCLUDED THAT THE ESSENTIAL PURPOSE OF YOUR MISSION WAS TO RESURRECT THE EPG APPROACH, IT MIGHT NOT GET FAR. HE FELT THAT THE EPG HAD GIVEN UP TOO SOON AND THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN READY TO DEPLOY FALL-BACK POSITIONS TO THE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT, IF ONLY TO HAVE EXPLORED FURTHER THE WILLINGNESS OF THE ANC TO MAKE SOME DIFFICULT CHOICES. THE WILLINGNESS OF EITHER SIDE TO NEGOTIATE HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY TESTED. THE AMERICANS ALSO FOUND IT HARD, UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, TO THINK OF WAYS OF PERSUADING P W BOTHA TO ACCELERATE THE REFORM PROCESS. AT BEST, BOTHA SEEMED LIKELY TO TRY TO GO IT ALONE INTERNALLY IN THE SHORT TERM, WITH AN ATTEMPT TO CUT A DEAL WITH BUTHELEZI AND OTHERS. BUT THIS WOULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEMS THE SAG (OR

AND OTHERS. BUT THIS WOULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEMS THE SAG (OR THE WEST) FACED. WE (HOWEVER) THE US, THE UK AND, SAY, THE FRG COULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY GENUINELY WANTED TO ADDRESS THE COMPLEX ELEMENTS THAT MIGHT IN TIME LEAD TO REAL NEGOTIATIONS, THE SAG MIGHT COME TO SEE SOME ATTRACTIONS IN OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT. BUT THIS WOULD BE A PAINSTAKING PROCESS AND, IN CROCKER'S JUDGEMENT, COULD ONLY BE SOLD TO THE SAG AS A LONG TERM EXERCISE.

4. SEE MIFIS.

WRIGHT

YYYY

ORWBAN 4624

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS

PS/MRS CHALKER.

PS/PUS

MR FERGUSSON

MR REEVE

HD/SAFD

HD/CAFD

HD/UND

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD NAD

MR CLG MALLABY , CABINET OFFICE

PS | SYS MOD

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1766

OF 022358Z JULY 86

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

MIPT: SOUTH AFRICA: US/UK CONSULTATIONS

US/UK AND WESTERN COORDINATION

1 CROCKER WAS STILL CONCERNED BY THE FACT THAT THE US, THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE EC RISKED GETTING OUT OF STEP. THE US HAD ONE UNAVOIDABLE SET OF DECISIONS TO MAKE BY 22 JULY (SHULTZ TOLD THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THAT HE HOPED THAT THIS DATE WOULD HOLD). THE UK WAS FACING EARLY AUGUST AND LATE SEPTEMBER DEADLINES. HOW COULD THIS PROCESS BE COORDINATED? THINKING ALOUD, CROCKER WONDERED WHETHER THE AMERICANS COULD GET AWAY WITH TAKING A LIMITED NUMBER OF MEASURES THIS MONTH, AND ANNOUNCING THAT OTHERS (POSSIBLY FROM THE CHOGM LIST, GIVEN THAT THE POTENTIAL EC MEASURES CAUSED THE US CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES) WOULD BE A MATTER FOR URGENT DISCUSSION WITH US ALLIES AND MIGHT, BY IMPLICATION, BE CONTINGENT UPON THE OUTCOME OF YOUR SECOND VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA AND/OR THE COURSE OF THE COMMONWEALTH DISCUSSIONS. HOWEVER, USING YOUR VISIT IN THIS WAY TO STAVE OFF SENATE REPUBLICAN PRESSURE COULD PROVE SOMETHING OF A HOSTAGE TO FORTUNE IF THINGS WENT BADLY. AND BEFORE GIVING FURTHER THOUGHT TO SUCH A BRIDGING TACTIC THE AMERICANS WOULD NEED A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HOW WE EXPECTED THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING TO GO. CLEARLY, THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE US/UK CONSULTATION WOULD BE NEEDED AFTER YOUR FIRST VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA (BUT, CROCKER WARNED, IT COULD PROVE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO GO TO

MEETING TO GO. CLEARLY, THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE US/UK CONSULTATION WOULD BE NEEDED AFTER YOUR FIRST VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA (BUT) CROCKER WARNED) IT COULD PROVE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO GO TO LONDON DURING THE WEEK BEGINNING 14 JULY, SINCE THE POLICY REVIEW HERE WOULD THEN BE REACHING A CRUCIAL STAGE).

2 CROCKER ARGUED THAT THERE WAS ALSO A STRONG CASE FOR CONSULTATION ON POSITIVE MEASURES, IN ORDER TO AVOID A WASTEFUL DUPLICATION OF EFFORT. IN ADDITION, IT SEEMED DESIRABLE FOR THE WEST TO TRY TO AGREE ON WHAT MEASURES, IF ANY, WERE MOST LIKELY IN PRACTICE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS WE WERE ALL TRYING TO SEE RESOLVED. MOREOVER, WE NEEDED TO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO SIGNAL APPROVAL IF THE SAG DID IN FACT TAKE SOME CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS. FINALLY, THERE WAS A NEED TO AGREE ON OUR RESPONSE IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS DECIDED TO TIGHTEN THE ECONOMIC SCREWS ON THEIR NEIGHBOURS, EITHER OFF THEIR OWN BAT OR IN RESPONSE TO WHATEVER MEASURES THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TOOK. THE ZIMBABWEAN EXPERIENCE HAD PROBABLY ENCOURAGED EXPECTATIONS THAT THE WEST WOULD AT LEAST PROVIDE SOME EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE. THERE WOULD DOUBTLESS BE MUCH DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON US TO THAT END. CROCKER SAID THAT THESE POINTS MIGHT USEFULLY BE DISCUSSED WITH REEVE AND OTHERS DURING REEVE'S VISIT HERE NEXT WEEK.

WRIGHT

YYYY

ORWBAN 4626

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES 18 A.11

SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS
PS/MR CHALKER.
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON

MR REEVE

HD/SAFD
HD/CAFD
HD/UND
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/NAD

MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

PS/SYS MOD



CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1765
OF 022356Z JULY 86
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

MIPT: SOUTH AFRICA: US/UK CONSULTATIONS
US POLICY REVIEW

1 CROCKER SAID THAT HIS ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL SCENE LED HIM TO CONCLUDE THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO BE THINKING ABOUT US EMISSARIES. THIS VIEW WAS SHARED BY SHULTZ. INSTEAD CROCKER THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL TO SHOW THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT THERE WAS A PAINFUL PRICE TO BE PAID FOR P W BOTHA'S BELIEF THAT HE COULD SOLVE HIS PROBLEMS HIS OWN WAY. THE CRUCIAL POINT WAS TO TRY TO BRING THIS MESSAGE HOME WITHOUT ENGAGING IN ECONOMIC WARFARE (ALTHOUGH THE PRIVATE SECTOR RISKED VOTING WITH THEIR FEET REGARDLESS). THE ONLY APPROPRIATE CARROT WAS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT, SOMEWHERE DOWN THE ROAD, THE US WAS READY AND WILLING TO PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IF THE SAG GAVE THEM AN OPENING. BUT IN DOMESTIC TERMS, THE ADMINISTRATION NOW NEEDED TO TAKE SOME EFFECTIVE DECISIONS IF THEY WERE NOT TO BE STEAMROLLERED BY CONGRESS (SHULTZ SPELT THIS POINT OUT EQUALLY CLEARLY TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND REFERRED ALSO TO THE POSSIBILITY OF UNAVOIDABLE SENATE HEARINGS BEFORE 22 JULY).

2. CROCKER INSISTED (AS DID SHULTZ) THAT NO DECISIONS ABOUT FUTURE US MEASURES HAD YET BEEN TAKEN. BUT, IN ADDITION TO HIS PREVIOUS REMARKS ABOUT AIR LINKS AND VUSAS, HE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY

PREVIOUS REMARKS ABOUT AIR LINKS AND VISAS, HE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE US (PARTICULARLY ATTRACTIVE, HE THOUGHT, SINCE THE SADF HAD A LARGE MEASURE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CURRENT CRISIS). CROCKER ALSO MENTIONED STEPS TO CURB THE EASE WITH WHICH SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICIALS HAD ACCESS TO THE US, AND ESPECIALLY TO US TECHNOLOGY. HE WENT ON TO GIVE A CLEAR SIGNAL (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT FURTHER CONTROLS ON US COMPUTER EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION. AND HE SPOKE WITH SOME BITTERNESS ABOUT THE CONTINUED COOPERATION OF CERTAIN EC MEMBERS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND COMPONENTS.

3. CROCKER CONFIRMED THAT WHATEVER STATEMENT ISSUED FOLLOWING THE US POLICY REVIEW WOULD SEEK TO FOCUS ON BOTH THE REFORM OF APARTHEID AND THE NEED TO GET DIALOGUE UNDERWAY (HE CLEARLY FEARED THAT THE EC STATEMENT, LIKE THE EPG EXERCISE, CONVEYED UNREALISTICALLY SHORT-TERM EXPECTATIONS OF PROGRESS ON THE SECOND COUNT). IT WAS ALSO LIKELY THAT THE STATEMENT WOULD SAY SOMETHING ABOUT INCREASED ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS WITH THE ANC. ANY ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESTRICTIVE MEASURES WOULD BE BALANCED BY POSITIVE STEPS. IN THIS CONTEXT THERE WAS SOME US CONCERN ABOUT THE RISK THAT MEASURES SUCH AS TIGHTENING VISA PROCEDURES WOULD LEAD TO A SOUTH AFRICAN DECISION TO CURTAIL US ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS.

4. SEE MIFT.

WRIGHT

YYYY

ORWBAN 4625

NNNN

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 July 1986

Thank you for your letter and for sending the article from the Johannesburg Sunday Times.

I shall look into the possibility of a meeting with Dr. Phatudi. It was kind of you to draw his visit to my attention.

(Charles Powell)

Mr. L.H. Evans

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 July 1986

I enclose the text of a reply to the Prime Minister's recent message from President Botha. You will wish to keep knowledge of it limited to those who need to know.

As you will see, President Botha recognises our role in avoiding punitive measures and agrees to see the Foreign Secretary. A decision on visiting Mandela, however, is to be delayed until after that meeting.

The Prime Minister would like to send a prompt reply based on her remarks in the House of Commons yesterday. Particular points which she would want to make are: that the European Council conclusions are not an ultimatum: it is up to the South African people to decide their own form of government: as far as we are concerned, there has to be a suspension of violence on both sides (but we were unable to get the French to accept this at the European Council): authentic black leaders does not mean only the ANC: and that we tried to get the Tokyo Economic Summit to focus on South Africa, but were unable to overcome the resistance of others. There will no doubt be other points.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 July, 1986.

Thank you for your letter of 1 July setting out the Foreign Secretary's views on the conduct of his mission to South Africa. I believe the Prime Minister will be content with what is proposed. She and the Foreign Secretary will, of course, have an opportunity to discuss it at their regular bilateral tomorrow.

I am sure that the Prime Minister would agree that the Foreign Secretary should have the services of an RAF VC10.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

South African Embassy

B8/6/2

2 July 1986

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
No. 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1A

Dear Charles

It would be much appreciated if you could kindly hand the enclosed letter from the South African State President to the Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher.

Your assistance is much appreciated.

Yours sincerely

LEO H EVANS
MINISTER

SUBJECT
cc MASTER
OPS,

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T122/86
I.5

Union Buildings
Pretoria

1 July 1986

Dear Prime Minister

I have received the text of your letter of 27 June 1986.

I should like to reaffirm my appreciation for your opposition to demands for punitive sanctions against my country. I realise that tremendous pressure is being brought to bear upon you.

I have always respected the forthright and frank manner in which you have corresponded with me. I believe that this is the best approach. In the same vein may I take issue with you on some of the matters raised in your letter.

Firstly, you express the view that the overall thrust and intention of the European Council's decision is positive. An analysis of the contents of that decision points to the contrary.

For instance, you present as positive the fact that consideration of immediate punitive measures against South Africa has been deferred pending consultation with the United States, Japan and others. However, according to the Council statement, that consultation will be "on <u>further measures which might be needed covering in particular a ban on new investments, the import of coal, iron, steel, and gold coins from South Africa</u>."

You say furthermore that the Council's decision does not constitute an ultimatum. Sir Geoffrey Howe has expressed a similar view. I believe it is an ultimatum: the Council calls on the South African Government to take certain steps and then proceeds to refer to consultation with other industrialised countries, in the next three months, on further measures which might be needed. The implication is clear: if the South African Government does not comply, further measures will be considered.

It is interesting, in this connection, that the two actions which the South African Government is called upon to take, are actions which, among others, the Eminent Persons Group suggested that the South African Government might take but then only in return for assured rewards. In fact, members of the EPG frequently stated that the Government should make no further concession except as part of a package requiring the African National Congress and other parties to "suspend" violence and enter into negotiations. These are actions which we are now called upon to take unilaterally and without any assurance of any quid pro quo from the ANC and others. This is a contradiction which disturbs me. Surely my hands must be immeasurably weakened and my negotiating position undermined by concessions which I am required to make, one after the other in quick succession, without any matching performance on the part of other parties.

I am concerned also about the reference to the need for the start of an immediate dialogue with the "authentic leaders of the Black populations". The implication is that the dialogue which has been in process for some time with a variety of Black leaders - democratically elected, traditionally accepted and other acknowledged leaders - is of no consequence.

The implication that they are not "authentic" is an unacceptable reflection on them and the people they represent. For my part, I am ready to enter into negotiations with anyone who abandons violence as a means of achieving political objectives. It seems, however, that only Black leaders who resort to terrorism and violence are regarded as "authentic".

You say in your letter that you agreed on a number of additional measures to assist Black South Africans. This in itself is a worthy objective. But what the Council in fact also did was to proceed from the assumption that the unfortunate people of Crossroads, and the "political prisoners" who have been arrested since the imposition of the state of emergency, are "victims of apartheid". This is simply not true.

I regret very much that at the very moment that my Government is providing visible proof of its commitment to the democratic ideal, evidenced again by the promulgation on 1 July of further far-reaching legislative reform measures, the demand for punitive measures against South Africa should be increasing.

Let me repeat: I am committed to power-sharing and to the enshrinement in a new constitution of democratic principles which are accepted in the Western democratic world as pre-requisites for any democratic state. Yet when I appealed to the participants in the Tokyo summit to endorse those principles in respect of a future South Africa and to condemn violence as a political instrument, the response, except for yours, was total silence. Instead we are being asked to release persons hitherto committed to violence and to unban and negotiate with organisations which refuse to forego violence. It is even acceptable to the Western democracies that these organisations retain in their

negotiating armoury the possibility of reverting to violence when it serves their interests, clearly implied in the acceptance of "suspension" and rejection of "renunciation" of violence in the vocabulary of the Commonwealth and European Governments.

Would it not serve our mutual interests best and undermine those of the enemies of the West, if we were to devise and implement a democratic system of Government for South Africa based on a negotiated form of power-sharing? This can be achieved by resolute action not only on the part of the South African Government but equally on the part of the Western democracies. Why should the European Community become the captive of UN majority groupings which do not have the interests of the West at heart? Far from joining in a punitive campaign against my country the West should refuse to compromise its own ideals.

No government, mine included, submits to threats, ultimatums or intimidation and the leaders of the Western world should know better than to resort to such a strategy in the case of South Africa. It is not only counter-productive; it is unnecessary since my Government is committed to negotiations. This is an essential element in the reform process. I do not require the pressure of punitive action to embark on this course of action. The circumstances hindering that process need not be spelt out in this letter. They are well-known to you. I hope Sir Geoffrey Howe will concentrate on them in carrying out his assignment.

The emphasis must be on peace not violence, on democratic ideals not totalitarianism expressed by some organisations. It must be on economic development and an expansion of the free market system not on the

debilitation and deprivation caused by sanctions, nor the kind of socialist catastrophe which has brought so much misery and poverty to most of Africa. It must be on the realities of our multi-cultural society, not a deliberate obfuscation of those realities with a repetition of the bloody encounters which have characterised the history of states elsewhere in Africa.

When the European Council, the Eminent Persons Group and others talk about "national dialogue", "genuine negotiations" and "authentic leaders", there must be clarity on the basic issues that are under consideration.

We must not be drawn into a game of deception - the achievement of ends other than those professed so eloquently for example in the Council's call for " ... negotiations leading to a truly democratic and non-racial South Africa."

We sometimes ponder over what our foreign critics really have in mind when they use slogans such as "authentic leaders", "genuine negotiations", "a truly democratic and non-racial South Africa"

- the ANC led by Mandela and Tambo?
- a transfer of power to the ANC?
- a totalitarian socialist-type state or a one-party dictatorship, the hallmark of African Statehood?

The Government of South Africa cannot afford to skate around such issues. We have a task and a responsibility to our peoples and to our region.

We are a sovereign state, and we are a proud people. How does the world expect us to react to the pervasive pressure of punitive measures?

I can only hope that your actions in the future will not force you and other leaders in Europe to lament as did Lloyd George when referring to South Africa, that "A war of annexation against a proud people must be a war of extermination, and that is unfortunately what it seems we are now committing ourselves to ...".

As far as Mr Nelson Mandela's release is concerned, I have stated my position on more than one occasion, most recently in my letter to you dated 26 May 1986. My position was widely regarded as reasonable. I also regard it as such.

As far as the possibility of Sir Geoffrey visiting Mr Mandela is concerned, I shall take a decision on the matter after I, and possibly some of my Ministers, have had occasion to meet with Sir Geoffrey.

I look forward to receiving Sir Geoffrey in acknowledgement of your efforts to resist the imposition of sanctions. But, this should not be construed as detracting from our often stated position, which is sanctioned by international law, that we shall not tolerate foreign intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Republic of South Africa.

I hope that we can also use the opportunity of Sir Geoffrey's visit to achieve a sound understanding of exactly what the future holds for Southern Africa as a whole.

Yours sincerely

STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON

GRS 280

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM LUSAKA
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 214
OF 011300Z JUL 86
INFO ROUTINE CAPE TOWN, PRETORIA, HARARE, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM
INFO ROUTINE LAGOS, NASSAU, OTTAWA, NEW DELHI, CANBERRA, TOKYO

YOUR TELSNO 197 AND 198: SOUTH AFRICA: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE

1. I DELIVERED THE MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA AT 1830 HOURS ON 30 JUNE. AS YOU KNOW, HE HAD LEARNT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECISION FROM THE BBC ON 27 JUNE, AND HAD EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPROVAL IN FORCIBLE TERMS THAT EVENING TO HTN. HE HAD SPOKEN IN SIMILAR TERMS TO MR HEALEY ON 28 JUNE (MY TELNO 211).

2. KAUNDA THANKED ME AND SAID HE WOULD REPLY IN A FEW DAYS. HE WISHED TO COMMENT STRAIGHTAWAY ON THAT PART OF PARA 5 BEGINNING ''I AM UTTERLY DETERMINED.....''. A MAJOR BRITISH ERROR IN ANALYSIS WAS TO LOOK TO SOUTH AFRICA FOR PEACEFUL DEVELOPEMENT WHEN THE SITUATION WAS MOVING TOWARDS AN EXPLOSION. HIS OWN ANALYSIS AT NASSAU HAD BEEN THAT SANCTIONS WOULD BUY TIME, PERHAPS STAVING OFF THE EXPLOSION UNTIL THE DIEHARD BOERS COME ROUND. SANCTIONS MIGHT NOT WORK BUT WHILE THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF BOTHA LISTENING TO REASON THEY WOULD SERVE TO APPLY PRESSURE, BUY TIME, AND SHOW THE BLACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA THAT THE WORLD WAS CONCERNED.

3. I MANAGED A JUDICIOUS PLUG FOR YOUR MISSION. KAUNDA DID NOT SEE HOW THIS COULD ACHIEVE ANYTHING WHEN THE EPG AND LORD BARBER (''A PERFECT GENTLEMAN'') HAD COME BACK DISILLUSIONED. BUT HE WAS NOT WHOLLY DISMISSIVE, PERHAPS THROUGH INNATE COURTESY, AND THOUGH HE KNOWS THAT BLACK LEADERS IN SOUTH AFRICA HAVE SAID THEY WILL NOT RECEIVE YOU HE DID NOT SAY THAT FOR HIMSELF.

WHITE

SOUTHERN AFRICA
STANDARD (PALACE)
SAFD
OADs
UND
NAD
ECDs
SOVIET D
MR REEVE
CABINET OFFICE

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Prime Minister.
This is the Foreign Secretary's game plan. A visit in several stages, with the first one next week and the second just before the Commonwealth Meeting. He will go to Zambia & Zimbabwe as well. He may ask to meet Tambo later, wearing his EC hat. He would like a VC 10.
Agree?
CDP 1/7

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 July 1986

Dear Charles,

Mission to Southern Africa

The Foreign Secretary has been giving urgent thought to his msision to Southern Africa. His views are as follows:

Strategy

The mandate from the European Council for the visit flows from the statement in The Hague Communique of 27 June that the commencement without delay of a national dialogue is essential to halt further escalation of violence and allow negotiations in South Africa, and that such dialogue cannot take place so long as recognised leaders of the black community are detained and their organisations are proscribed. The release of Nelson Mandela is specifically urged. The Community asks Sir Geoffrey Howe to visit Southern Africa "in a further effort to establish conditions in which the necessary dialogue can commence".

Sir Geoffrey Howe considers it essential that we should be seen from the outset to be engaged on a purposeful diplomatic initiative. We must refute all criticism that the mission is a delaying tactic or that it merely duplicates the work already done by the European Troika and the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. We should emphasise that it is not a fact finding mission. The aim is to persuade the key parties, in particular the South African Government, to make concrete progress towards the European and Commonwealth objectives of dialogue and the suspension of violence. The European Council's agreement and the intention to bring other major industralized countries on board gives a major new strength to the process.

We shall stand a greater chance of convincing Commonwealth leaders and black South Africans of our sincerity if Sir Geoffrey is seen to start his mission as soon as possible. An early first visit would also allow time for further visits and contacts in which the net could be spread wider and any opening that he achieves exploited. Also, to have a reasonable chance of success it will be essential, to begin with at least, that talks with the South African Government and other key leaders should be kept as confidential as possible. This was the key to the Commonwealth Group's initiative getting as far as it did.

/Timing

Timing/Itinerary - two stage approach

The Foreign Secretary therefore intends to begin his mission with a short first visit to the area next week which would be aimed at establishing what flexibility there may be on the South African Government's position. Pik Botha has given a very qualified public reaction to the European Council Statement; we can expect an early reply from President Botha to the Prime Minister's message. That may itself indicate what, if any, flexibility there is. His point of departure will be the COMGEP "negotiating concept" and the South African Government's replies to this, the last of which was never followed up by the Group. But it will also be essential to engage the Commonwealth Front Line States and black South African leaders. In order to do this, he will fly first to Lusaka to meet President Kaunda and explain our objectives to him. The Foreign Secretary will then go on to South Africa. In South Africa he intends to see Pik Botha (probably in Pretoria), P W Botha (possibly in the Cape) and Nelson Mandela (Cape Town). He will not attempt on the first visit to see other South African spokesmen, black or white. He may return via Harare, to brief Mr Mugabe, whose chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Summit at the end of August gives him scope for considerable damage if we do not carry him with us.

The Foreign Secretary intends to keep fully confidential the content of his discussions during this first visit. The precedent of the Commonwealth initiative suggests that this practice can be helpful in generating confidence, especially on the part of the SAG. After the first visit, there will be an opportunity to take stock in London and to work out proposals for a slightly more extensive second visit to Southern Africa shortly before the Commonwealth review meeting. During this second visit Sir Geoffrey intends to have a wider range of meetings. In order for the mission to carry credibility with the Front Line States and black South Africans generally such meetings would have to include one with the ANC which would mean Sir Geoffrey seeing Tambo, as a logical follow-up from his meeting with Nelson Mandela. This would of course be in his EC Presidency capacity. Such a meeting would be important not just for its intrinsic value but because it would make contacts in South Africa much easier, with eg Bishop Tutu, Mrs Mandela and UDF leaders, some of whom have already indicated that they would refuse to talk to Sir Geoffrey. The Foreign Secretary intends if necessary to enlist the support of President Kaunda in approaching Tambo.

Dates

Sir Geoffrey plans to undertake the first visit between 9-13 July (he will be addressing the European Parliament on 8 July and would need to be back for Shevardnadze's visit here on 14/15 July). The second visit could take place between 23-30 July. He would like to have the services of an RAF VC10.

/Consultation

Consultation

The first step is to confirm that the South African Government agree to the visit and to get Kaunda's and Mugabe's agreement to Sir Geoffrey visiting Lusaka and Harare. We intend to approach the South African Embassy formally this afternoon. It will be particularly important to turn around Kaunda from his initial opposition to the mission. The Prime Minister has already written to him (as well as to other key Commonwealth leaders) and the Secretary of State will telephone President Kaunda to follow this up. We shall also need to keep our Community Partners closely informed and to enlist their active support. The Foreign Secretary spoke to a number of his EC colleagues during the EUREKA meeting yesterday. He notes that the Germans, Belgians, French and Portuguese all have contacts who could be useful either with the South Africans or with the black African states. We are also keeping in touch with the Americans and the Japanese. For instance we are suggesting that Crocker should come here shortly for a meeting with FCO officials (it will not be helpful to our efforts if Congressional pressures lead President Reagan to take new steps during the period of Sir Geoffrey's visits).

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office) as well as to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) in view of the request for the use of the VC10.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street



Mrs. Ryder

MR. POWELL

Thank you. Please encourage him to telephone me if there is anything important in the meantime

CDP 1/7

SIR LAURENS VAN DER POST - SOUTH AFRICA

I spoke to Laurens as you suggested this morning. His reaction to the Prime Minister's triumph in The Hague was that it was "the best that could be done", and he felt that a great deal could come out of the Foreign Secretary's visit to South Africa. He reiterated that any appeasement is out of the question and that there should be no compromise as far as sanctions are concerned. If we start on sanctions, it will be the end of South Africa.

As I mentioned, he would like to come in and see the Prime Minister, preferably early next week. But I will go back to him in a couple of days and tell him that it would be better if he came in around the middle of July, having produced some thoughts for the mini Summit at the beginning of August.

CR.

For me file

I spoke to Laurens & offered him 21 July.

CR.

2/7.

Caroline Ryder

1 July 1986

PART 10 ends:-

Cape Town Tel No 026 30/6

PART 11 begins:-

CR to COP 1/7/86.


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C
Y
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Inches
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Colour Chart #13
Blue
Cyan
Green
Yellow