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PART 12 — SECRET —

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

Relations with South Africa

Policy on Arms Sales

Internal Situation

ECGD Credits

In attached folder. Foreign Affairs Committee on S Africa

SOUTH AFRICA

PT 1 : JUNE 1979

PT 12 : 16 JULY 1986

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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PART 12 ends:-

Pres Babangida to PM 31/7/86 (T143A/86)

PART 13 begins:-

CSP to FCO 1/8/86

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
MISC 118(86) 24	15/07/1986
CC(86) 28th meeting, item 5	17/07/1986
CC(86) 29th meeting, item 2	24/07/1986
CC(86) 30th meeting, item 2	31/07/1986

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed _____ Date 28/10/2014

PREM Records Team

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T143A/86

State House,
Lagos, Nigeria.

cc Master
OPS

31 July, 1986.

Prime Minister
A notably
moderate letter from
President Babangida
CDP
2/8.

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister,
10, Downing Street
London

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

Events in South Africa and their effects elsewhere have all moved so fast since I received your kind message of 29th June, that whatever I would have had to say in reply would have been overtaken before you got it. The outcome of Sir Geoffrey's mission to Southern Africa, and the meeting this weekend of the seven Heads of Government agreed in Nassau, provide me with a good opportunity, however, to share with you my thought on what we should now do.

You will of course know that the view of successive Nigerian governments has been that, given the obduracy of the white South African Government to undertake meaningful reform, comprehensive and mandatory sanctions require to be put in place under the aegis of the United Nations Security Council. That remains my Administration's view, and if I may say so, the blunt rejection by the South African authority of Sir Geoffrey's presentation on behalf of the EEC, as well as the earlier rude ending to the efforts of the Eminent Persons' Group, confirm us in that view.

.../2"

Once the EPG had reported, we did not feel that another mission to South Africa, so soon, was necessary and we would have been happier, instead, to see the EEC make some decisions on sanctions at their meeting in The Hague, based on the detailed considerations contained in the EPG report. I therefore felt unable to endorse Sir Geoffrey's mission, but even so refrained from any public denunciation that might have reduced even further his slim chance of success. After all, his bottom-line twin objective of seeking Mr Nelson Mandela's (and other political prisoners') release, and the unbanning of the ANC, as a prelude to negotiations, is shared by all of us.

As I see it, the question now before us is do we in the light of the rather definitive rebuff to Sir Geoffrey's purpose on behalf of the EEC continue to hope that further missions of this kind may by themselves, one day, change the mind of the privileged minority who now rule South Africa? I do not believe that time would be on our side for this, even if there was cause for such forlorn hope. Rather, I believe that we should no longer delay an extension of the limited sanctions now in operation. I was interested to learn that the South African Minister of Finance had spoken during Sir Geoffrey's stay there of the effect of sanctions. I believe that it would be well to keep this in mind in assessing the often exaggerated invulnerability of the South African economy to sanctions.

.../3"

I have used the word "sanctions" in this letter, but I rather suspect that we are closer here than your own preferred expression of "effective measures" may suggest. Neither of us (nor the other Commonwealth leaders) wish to see South Africa made into a wasteland: we would not wish the African majority to inherit a wasteland, for one thing. What therefore we wish to see is the imposition of further sanctions - or effective measures as you would say - which would produce the incentive for meaningful negotiations. I can not accept that the white minority population would, at all levels of sanctions, rather prefer suicide than enter into such a negotiation.

I am hoping very much therefore that at the meeting of the Seven, you will find it possible, in the new situation brought about by the failure of Sir Geoffrey's mission, to join the other Commonwealth leaders in agreeing the adoption of effective measures, or sanctions, which would give a lead to the EEC and very usefully complement the efforts of the U.S. Congress (and in turn encourage President Reagan not to veto the emerging Congressional Bill).

I am pleased that our bilateral relations are once again on an even keel. George Dove-Edwin has reported to me on the warmth of his reception and the goodwill which exists for Nigeria, as indeed it does here for Britain.

.../4"

I am confident that as South Africa becomes less of an issue between our two countries, those relations will strengthen even more. Our decision to withdraw our participation from the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh as a gesture of protest against your Government's insistent opposition to sanctions was not taken lightly. We have however noted the slight shift in policy signalled by Sir Geoffrey's statement to the House of Commons.

Yours Sincerely

Ibrahim Babangida.

(Major-General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida)
President, Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian
Armed Forces.

[BARONESS EWART-BIGGS.]

On the other hand, we must remember that the Single European Act does, at least, give the Community a basis for policies which are relevant to 90 per cent. of the Community's workforce who are not engaged in agriculture. My Lords, as I said, the Minister and previous speakers have already described what the Single European Act does and I certainly should not want to go over that, but I should like to comment on one or two aspects of the changes outlined. First, there are the new provisions on technology, the environment and social affairs. These really seem to fill genuine gaps in the existing treaties. With the competition we are now facing, not only from the United States and Japan but also from some of the newly industrialised countries, co-operation in Europe must be the only way to ensure our long-term survival. Indeed, I should not like to see a de-industrialised Britain which had to depend on tourism and the City of London to pay for its imports when North Sea oil runs out.

In the environment too, my Lords, there is another gap in the existing treaties. The Community needs to do more in actually tackling Europe's environmental problems. Many of these problems, of course, are purely local and need local solutions, but some of them transcend national boundaries and require Community action. The new provisions set out what seem to be sensible and well balanced criteria. There are also social provisions, and it cannot, frankly, be said that they go very far beyond what the Community already does in practice. Protecting the health and safety of workers and encouraging dialogue between management and labour are objectives which ought to have been written into the community treaties from the start. Therefore, I think we should welcome any new provisions, however limited in their scope, which might help make the Community more aware of the social dimensions of its policies.

There was a great deal of discussion in the debate in the other place about the role of the European Parliament, but, for my part, I am astonished how on the one hand we so often criticise that Parliament for its failings, whilst at the same time we resist any changes which might enable it to be more effective. It is like urging a horse to gallop whilst hobbling it at the same time. Moreover, I must confess to feeling a certain respect for the European Parliament's record on equal rights, on environmental issues and on other social and employment issues. I am glad the noble Baroness, Lady Elles, has returned to her seat to hear me say that. I feel that the European Parliament has instigated some progressive reforms, such as parental and family leave, to name but one, which have helped workers very much in the EEC. For my part, I very much welcome the provision in the Single European Act which will strengthen the Parliament in relation to the Council of Ministers.

Lastly, my Lords, so far as political co-operation goes, there is no doubt that Governments of both parties have rightly regarded participation in political co-operation. This, after all, goes hand in hand with our membership of the Community and is one of the most valuable features of our wider commitment to Europe. I strongly believe that many of our national goals can be achieved only in co-operation with others. I will give two examples. We talk about controlling multinational companies, but how can one country on its own control the strength of multinationals? Indeed, the Council of Ministers a few years ago, missed a very good opportunity to exercise control when they voted against the proposal of the Parliament which would have allowed workers in multinational companies to have much more information about the way their companies operated. My second example is the importance of co-operation regarding the methods of dealing with terrorism. There can be little doubt that the very nature of modern international terrorism demands an effective international response. Although advances have been made, I believe European framework could be used much more by member states to devise ways of making the horrendous task of a terrrorist more difficult.

My Lords, may I end by saying that I have long believed and still believe that this country's national interests are best served from within the European Community. Cruelly though it has disappointed in so many hopes placed in it, nonetheless the European Community is better than any alternative organisation which could conceivably be brought into existence to replace it. I believe that that view also represents the attitude of the British people. In spite of its failings, we have grown accustomed to the European Community. We grumble about it much as we grumble about the weather; but in the same way as we should like to see the weather improved, we should also like to see the workings of the Community improved. In my understanding (and I see it in a very modest way) that is what the Bill is trying to do.

Southern Africa: Foreign Secretary's Visit

2.30 p.m.

Baroness Young: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now make a Statement about the recent visit to southern Africa of my right honourable and learned friend the Foreign Secretary.

In accordance with the mandate entrusted to him by the 12 European Community countries at The Hague on 27th June 1986, the Foreign Secretary made a second visit to southern Africa from 22nd to 29th July. He undertook a busy programme of 20 separate meetings in five days in South Africa as well as spending three days visiting other countries in the region. In South Africa he had meetings at the beginning and end of his mission with State President Botha and with the South African Foreign Minister. He also met four other members of the South African Cabinet. Outside the Government he met, among others, opposition and Government MPs, and black and white business leaders. He also had meetings with two leaders of homelands, Chief Buthelezi and Mr. Enos Mabuza. My right honourable and learned friend had hoped to see Mr. Nelson Mandela as well as representatives of radical black organisations but regrettably this did not prove possible.

While in the region, my right honourable and learned friend also had meetings with President Kaunda of Zambia, President Masire of Botswana, Prime Minister Bhekimbi of Swaziland and with King Moeshoeshoe and General Lekhanya of Lesotho. The

point out in the long debates in the other place on these matters in the 1960s and 1970s. So, that being the position, and we being under an obligation to see that the provisions of the treaty are respected and that Community competence is not given an authorised extension to the detriment of national sovereignty, I accepted (though I did not seek) membership of the old nominated European Parliament and became a Member of its Legal Committee. After two years that committee were good enough to make me their chairman, a position which I held for the ensuing four years.

I have therefore first-hand knowledge of the European Parliament, and I enjoyed, and continue to enjoy, the friendship of many of its members and officials, I agree that it should have a full and proper part in the workings of the Community. Nevertheless I think it would be unrealistic to rely on the European Parliament as a bulwark for the defence of national interests and institutions, including the residual sovereignty of Parliament, particularly as in its directly-elected form, which is constitutionally appropriate, its connection with the national Parliaments is so much weakened.

Indeed, that is evident from the overwhelming majority it accorded to the Spinelli Treaty, a frankly federalist document, going much further in the transfer of functions than the present Act. Again, I hasten to say that it is only the treaty which I criticise and not its author. I have great respect for Mr. Spinelli, who indeed sat under my undistinguished chairmanship in the Legal Committee of those days before he in later years became the distinguished chairman of the New Institutional Affairs Committee.

But I would ask your Lordships, and particularly those friends who continue to sit in the European Parliament, to accept that being a good European does not necessarily involve being federalist. There are other, more practical ways of promoting the wellbeing of the Community and of the nations which comprise it. I have mentioned some. I emphasise also the requirements of information and scrutiny, referred to by the noble Baroness and by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Templeman, which will enable our Parliament to assist our Ministers in the task of protecting the national interest and promoting practical measures.

I certainly have no time to dwell on these. They are well set out in the two reports which have been referred to: the 12th Report, and the recent 19th Report. All repay study and contain valuable suggestions, as indeed do the House of Commons Select Committee reports.

My noble and learned friend Lord Templeman has said that he and I are not entirely *ad idem* on the scope and extent of the proposed scrutiny and as to how far it should extend to the management committees. On the very rare occasions on which I differ from my noble and learned friend, I have a strong presumption that I am almost certainly wrong. But I think that we shall be able to go further into this important matter as time goes on. What I think is true is that it is only the extent and not the principle on which there is any difference. The principle we all regard as of the greatest importance.

So I conclude by saying this. Given the information and the necessary powers of scrutiny, there is much that we here in Parliament can do to assist and improve the workings of the Community and its institutions, and to protect the constitutional heritage which we continue to prize in the altered circumstances of today. It is in this practical and positive way, rather than in pursuing theoretical and visionary concepts, that our labours will best be expended, and there is certainly much work to do.

2.21 p.m.

Baroness Ewart-Biggs: My Lords, coming after so many very expert and highly informed speakers, my own short contribution will seem rather low key. However, I should like to say how very grateful I am to my noble friend Lady Llewelyn-Davies for outlining the House of Lords Select Committee's report, which did so much to clarify the consequences of the Bill before us. I am equally grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Templeman, for also bringing out further points to help us understand the consequences of this Bill. I very much look forward to hearing the Minister's reply to my noble friend Lord Bruce who, quite rightly, brought out the all-important concerns of British sovereignty and how the safeguards would be written in.

I must confess that it is a long time since I have spoken in your Lordships' House on Community affairs, and it is an even longer time since, from the vantage point of our Brussels and Paris embassies, I was an observer to the negotiations for Britain's entry followed by her taking up membership in 1972. There can be little doubt that now, in this 14th year of our membership, much of the idealism which I remember inspired our thinking in those early days has been replaced by practical considerations as to the workings of the European Community.

It is for that reason that this Bill, with its objective of up-dating the treaties in unison with the other 11 members, is an important one to consider. Indeed, many might say that it really is high time to move the European Community into line with the changes which have occurred in all member countries during that time. Yet in spite of that, there is little doubt that critics of the Bill, both in Parliament and in the press and outside, have over the last months sought to use it as a vehicle for re-opening all those old arguments regarding Britain's membership, which were, after all, conclusively settled more than a decade ago. So the time has surely now come to look forward rather than backwards and to consider what real contribution the Single European Act will make to changing the Community in the ways which will benefit most the people of this country.

There is much that we should like to see the Single European Act do which we know it will not do. For example, it will not curb the excesses of the common agricultural policy and bring about the agricultural reforms which this House considers essential. It will not ensure that less of the Community's budget is spent on the creation, storage, disposal and even destruction of unwanted surpluses, and more on modernising the structure of our economies and the social adjustment which that entails. These are all important priorities.

discussions which he had with these leaders provided a valuable opportunity to explain the Twelve's policy and to seek their views on the South African problem. They also brought out the serious concern felt by most of South Africa's neighbours about the potential consequences for their countries of a policy of general economic sanctions against South Africa and the dangers of escalating confrontation in the region.

In his discussions with the South African Government, the Foreign Secretary made clear the view of the 12 members of the European Community that there was an urgent need for fundamental but peaceful change in South Africa, leading to the total abolition of apartheid. In this connection, he stressed that in order to establish the necessary conditions for peaceful dialogue it was essential to release Nelson Mandela and other political leaders and to unban the ANC and other political parties. My right honourable and learned friend was able in this way to convey to the South African Government the deep concern felt by the United Kingdom, the European Community and western countries generally on this matter. The South African Government can be in no doubt of the strength of this concern.

My right honourable and learned friend regrets that the responses he received from the South African Government were not such as to enable him to report progress of the kind which he sought. He is conveying the outcome to our Community partners and will also be able to give his assessment of the visit to the review meeting of the seven Commonwealth Heads of Government which begins in London on 3rd August. The Government will continue to make every effort to work for a negotiated solution to the problem of South Africa.

Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Young, for the Statement that she has made about the Foreign Secretary's visit to southern Africa. I am bound to say, however, that the Statement is deeply disappointing and says nothing whatsoever by way of positive proposals as to how to deal with the present critical situation affecting this country, our relations with the Commonwealth, our relations with the United States and with the world at large.

While the Foreign Secretary's chances of success on his mission to Pretoria were slim, all sides of the House wished him well. In the course of the impossible task placed upon the Foreign Secretary by the Government, his personal standing was, if I may say so, not diminished by his experiences and by his reactions to them.

I accept that the noble Baroness and the Government are opposed to apartheid. My personal abhorrence of apartheid was implanted for ever in my mind when, on behalf of the International Commission of Jurists, I attended in 1961 the inquiry at Vereeniging into the massacre by South African police of 67 Africans in Sharpeville, demonstrating peacefully against the pass laws.

Has not the situation now become a critical one in the light of the total collapse of the Foreign Secretary's mission to South Africa? Are there not now urgent questions that, frankly, many of us were hoping and expecting the Government to make reference to, and to provide answers to, in the course of today's Statement? First, there has been serious delay in dealing with the problems—already six weeks have elapsed since the Commonwealth group of eminent persons reported—and yet there is no indication of urgency in the Statement. What I now ask is this. What specific proposals will Her Majesty's Government be putting to the mini-Commonwealth summit next Sunday if that conference is not to end in disarray? Should not the Government be making a public commitment now to proceeding with effective measures by way of comprehensive sactions without delay?

Secondly, is the noble Baroness aware of the comment in the Foreign Affairs Committee report that:

> "The danger of the disintegration of the Commonwealth as a result of differences of policy towards southern Africa is not to be dismissed lightly"?

What steps are the Government taking to convince our Commonwealth partners, who want action, that the British Government are committed to speedy elimination of apartheid? Will efforts be made to direct the EC under the period of British presidency towards implementing rigorous measures against the South African Government if they persist in their actions and refuse to meet the gravity of the situation?

Finally, should not the Government now join our friends and allies in the Commonwealth and in the EC—and now, as seems possible, in the United States—in proposing mandatory sanctions against South Africa in the Security Council?

Baroness Seear: My Lords, we on these Benches also wish to thank the noble Baroness for making the Statement in your Lordships' House this afternoon, and we, too, wish to express our understanding of the extremely difficult task undertaken by the Foreign Secretary; undertaken with great courage and determination, if, alas! with total lack of success.

Having said that, I am bound to observe that the Statement appears to be totally inadequate in the face of the position in South Africa, and also in the light of the anger and anxiety that is developing in this country at what is going on in South Africa; at the increasing bloodshed, and at the arrogant rejection by the South African leaders of any attempt to meet our Foreign Secretary and to discuss with him, in a way that would lead to any hope of understanding, the deep problems that confront South Africa and all of us because of our connections with South Africa.

There is anger and anxiety because time is running out. For months we have heard a great deal, and have known for years, that the issue of apartheid has been getting worse and worse. We had the meeting in Nassau. We had the Eminent Persons Group. The result, so far, is nothing. Time is not on our side. It is not on the side of South Africa. It is not on the side of the moderate leaders of the blacks, without whose leadership there is no hope for anything other than a bloodbath in South Africa. If those men are swept aside, what hope is there for decades to come of either the economic or political development of South Africa which we wish to see?

In the light of this one can only say that the Statement is a totally inadequate response. I should

[BARONESS SEEAR.]

like to ask the noble Baroness one or two questions in connection with it. In the first place, we are told that the border states expressed concern about the potential consequences of general economic sanctions, but I suspect that they expressed a great deal more than that. Can we be told more about what Kenneth Kaunda said to the Foreign Secretary? What was his attitude? What did he hope would come from the mission, if anything, and what did he feel we ought to be doing? Surely more was said than a mere expression of concern about the effect of sanctions.

What is the Foreign Secretary going to say to the EC countries in his position as President of the EC. What sort of a lead is he going to give? In the last sentence of the Statement the Government refer to continuing to work for a negotiated solution to the problems of South Africa. Why do the Government think that continuing to work for a negotiated solution, which up to now has led to nothing, will lead to any success in the future; unless the Foreign Secretary is seen to be negotiating from a basis of strength, with a determination to take positive measures and see that something is done? Why should the South African Government take any more notice in the future than they have in the past if Sir Geoffrey continues to negotiate from the position of weakness which he takes up at the present time?

Her Majesty's Government were party to the Nassau Agreement. It was laid down clearly then what was to be expected: the release of Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC. Six months were given for that to take place. The Eminent Persons Group went with a commission to bring about achievement along the lines laid down at Nassau. They said that they failed. Do we just stand back with that failure and do nothing? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones asked: what are the Government going to say to the seven members of the Commonwealth? They have shown their anger in a mild way—though not mild to many people—in their reaction to the Commonwealth Games. What will they say in reacting to what Sir Geoffrey will apparently by saying to them in the light of today's Statement?

Finally, I ask the noble Baroness to tell the House that if, during the Recess, any member of the Commonwealth decides to leave the Commonwealth, Parliament will be recalled to discuss this before the Commonwealth breaks up.

2.45 p.m.

Baroness Young: My Lords, I am grateful that both the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, reiterated what has been said from both the Labour and Liberal Benches, that they wished my right honourable and learned friend well in his mission to South Africa. They reiterated what I think is believed by all British people—that is, that in no way has his personal standing been diminished by any of his experiences. Indeed, he has bravely stood out and stood up for what we all believe—the point that has been made: that we all want to seek a change in apartheid and we want to see that change brought about peacefully. The question is how we are to achieve that.

I have been asked a number of questons both by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, and by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, and as in a sense both sets of questions overlap. I shall answer them together. I think the first one concerns a general feeling that the Government had no positive or new proposals on how to deal with the present situation. Let me put it to your Lordships this particular way. The position what we are in remains as my right honourable and learned friend has already made clear. In the Commonwealth meeting which will take place on 3rd August, consideration of the case for further measures is an item on the agenda, and so too is it in the European Community connection on a different timescale. It would really not be right on this occasion for me to anticipate what will come out of that meeting.

Perhaps I may say to your Lordships that we are already implementing a whole range of measures with our European Community partners and our Commonwealth partners. I shall not list them all today, though I have done so on previous occasions, but of course they include the United Nations arms embargo, the Gleneagles agreement, the Luxembourg package and Nassau accord. May I say to your Lordships that there is no automaticity that something further will happen, but I repeat that my right honourable and learned friend has said in another place that if his mission did not procure tangible and substantial progress, then agreement on further measures was likely to be necessary. This is an objective statement of reality; it is not a threat.

I was secondly asked about the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee regarding the dangers of the disintegration of the Commonwealth. The noble and learned Lord will be well aware of the convention of the Government not commenting on a committee report at this stage, so I can only say to him that of course we acknowledge the importance of the Commonwealth. I should like to say to the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, with regard to the last point that she raised, that whether or not any country might leave the Commonwealth is a totally hypothetical situation, and I think it would be most unwise to comment in any way on this suggestion.

As for the recall of Parliament, that would be a matter not for myself but for consideration in the usual way in which these matters are conducted in both Houses of Parliament. However, in the present context I think it is very important to stick to the facts, and, following upon the Cabinet meeting this morning, I should like to add that the Cabinet thanked my right honourable and learned friend for the dignified and persuasive way in which he carried out his mission. The Cabinet was deeply dismayed by President Botha's discourtesy to my right honourable and learned friend; and it was unanimous in its support for the policy that both my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and my right honourable and learned friend the Foreign Secretary have pursued, which is to try by negotiation to achieve and end to apartheid.

Viscount Massereene and Ferrard: My Lords, eleven days ago I was priviledged to meet representatives of the Zulu nation, which is a nation of 6 million people. To a man, they were against sanctions. I also was upset about the discourtesy shown to our Foreign

Secretary by President Botha, but I should like to point out that in the past three years he has pretty well dimantled apartheid apart from the Group Areas Act.

Noble Lords: No, no!

Viscount Massereene and Ferrard: Yes, my Lords, he has—apart from having one man, one vote, which of course, as a great number of educated Africans will tell you, would create complete chaos. Change has to come slowly. He has dismantled everything apart from the Group Areas Act. If your Lordships do not know what the Group Areas Act is, I will tell you. It does not actually allow black Africans to live in the better suburbs and housing districts which are limited to whites. However, the South African government are rather winking an eye at that. I happen to know that it is actually happening. The only other matter is, as I say, the question of one man one vote, which will take time and which will have to be done through persuasion and not by the stick. I should also like to point out that the South African government have on several occasions offered Mr. Mandela his freedom if he would renounce violence. They have done the same in relation to the African National Union, but they will not renounce violence. With the greatest respect——

Noble Lords: Order! Order!

Lord Nugent of Guildford: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that it is entirely wrong to continue with a statement? He should bring his remarks to a close with a question.

Baroness Young: My Lords, my noble friend, Lord Massereene and Ferrard, asked three questions. My right honourable and learned friend did in fact meet Chief Buthelezi and is well aware of the views which he has expressed on behalf of the Zulu people. We are also well aware that the South African Government has taken steps partially to dismantle apartheid. We have welcomed those steps. What we have always said is that they have not gone far enough or fast enough. Concerning the point of the offer of freedom for Nelson Mandela in return for the renunciation of violence, I think it is important to note that what my right honourable and learned friend said (and it is the view of the Government) is that we want not only the release of Nelson Mandela but also the release of other political prisoners and the unbanning of the ANC.

Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, only a few hours ago I was asking the noble Lady in a two-hour debate a question concerning what the Government's response was to the report of the Eminent Persons Group. She did not answer the House last night and she did not answer the House in the Statement this afternoon. She did quote the Nassau Agreement of last October, which stated that if the Eminent Persons Group did not find any movement towards what the whole Commonwealth was looking for in South Africa, then there would be a mini-summit meeting to consider further measures. Are we not entitled to know what the policy of Her Majesty's Government is when the Eminent Persons report has made it clear that the Africans of South Africa are willing to negotiate with the Government, but the South African government is not willing to negotiate, which has been confirmed by the visit of the Foreign Secretary? Are we not entitled to know now what the policy of Her Majesty's Government is in relation to what has been made plain by every other member of the Commonwealth as they enter this crucial summit meeting this weekend?

Baroness Young: My Lords, I am completely dismayed by what the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, has said. We had a debate last night lasting nearly two hours, at the end of which I set out the Government's statement. I went out of my way to answer the specific points he raised and I have no intention of repeating this afternoon what I said last night. I can only say that so far as what the noble Lord has described as the mini-summit (by which I take it he means the meeting of seven Commonwealth countries), I have already answered that question in what I have said to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones.

Lord Soames: My Lord, will my noble friend tell the House that the Government have been discussing for many weeks with the other main trading partners of South Africa what action they should all agree to take if the highly regrettable state of affairs comes about whereby the Government of Pretoria refuse to take further steps to dismantle apartheid of their own volition?

Baroness Young: My Lords, my noble friend is absolutely correct. Discussions have been going on with our Community partners, and we had discussions with our Commonwealth partners stemming from the Nassau meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government. As I said, we are already implementing a whole range of measures with our Community and Commonwealth partners. As I have also indicated, my right honourable and learned friend made clear on 17th July in another place his view on other measures.

Lord Brockway: My Lords, what has happened is a deep humiliation both to the Foreign Secretary and to the Prime Minister. They were persuaded that apartheid could be ended by reasonable discussion. The Foreign Secretary travelled half-way round the world to discuss this matter with President Botha of South Africa. He was given a colossal snub. The South African Head of Government even refused to consider the proposals that he was going to make. Both the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister must feel utterly humiliated by what has occurred.

What I do not understand is this. Why did not the British Embassy in South Africa, and indeed the embassies of the other EC countries, obtain the knowledge and give the information to the British Government which would have prevented that disaster? Apparently it was only two days before he met the Head of State of South Africa, when the Foreign Secretary was in Botswana, that he understood the rejection which was likely to take place.

I welcome the reported proposal of the Indian Government that in September there should be a

[LORD BROCKWAY.]

meeting of all the Commonwealth countries to consider what should be done. I suggest that that meeting should be broader than just a meeting of the Commonwealth countries. The governments of the EC are involved; the world is involved. I should like to see the Security Council of the United Nations initiating a world conference to consider what action can be taken. A meeting of the Commonwealth nations might well precede it.

Lord Soames: Enough is enough, my Lords!

Lord Brockway: My Lords, I wish to sound a warning against the possibility of limited sanctions. They would fail. All history shows the ability of governments, when foreign action is taken, to adjust themselves to it. Apartheid is not just a matter of rules, regulations and adminstration; it is, as my noble friend Lord Hatch of Lusby pointd out in his remarkable speech during the South African debate, a way of life for the Afrikaners who rule the South African Government. Only a fundamental change of power will end that. I have no doubt that in the long run apartheid will be abolished, but I am fearful and pessimistic about the means of that realisation.

Noble Lords: Question!

Lord Brockway: My Lords, there will be a blood bath in South Africa and a war in the world. I conclude by urging intervention by United Nations forces if apartheid is ultimately to be overthrown.

3 p.m.

Baroness Young: My Lords, I do not accept what the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, said: that either my right honourable friend the Prime Minister or my right honourable and learned friend the Foreign Secretary have been humiliated by that visit. I am bound to say that I have listened in this House on many occasions to the noble Lord putting, if I may say so, eloquently the case for negotiation and talks with people. I am surprised that he should feel that making a further effort to negotiate with the people who are in a position to implement change in apartheid is humiliating or not worth while. We do not see it in those terms.

I was interested to hear what he said about sanctions because I think that he has indicated that sanctions are not easy to apply, or the easy policy which is sometimes implied, which will bring about the changes that we should all like to see. I should not like to comment on the Indian Government's proposals as I have not seen anything of that nature.

Lord Paget of Northampton: My Lords, I shall confine myself to questions but I have several questions to ask. First, has not the Foreign Office been a little naïve? Has it not taken it a very long time to find out that neither the Jews nor the Boers can be talked out of their promised lands? Both are people of faith: both are good fighters. Should the Foreign Office also not consider that they both have the bomb? Have we costed sanctions? There are certainly more than a million migrant workers in South Africa. When sanctions are put on they will not be needed and they will become a menace. Within days, they will be trucked out of the country. Who will feed them? Where will they go? Has UNRWA prepared refugee camps to receive them, because they will need them?

On the question of trade, all South Africa's neighbours have her as their largest trading partner. They do not just trade with South Africa; there is the question of transport. The remittances will be cut on which their budgets so largely depend to pay for their imports. What are we going to do to meet their problems? The heroic black leaders scorn these materialistic considerations. They say, "We will take the suffering". It is not the leaders who will starve. Mr. Nelson Mandela will still get his ration; millions will not. African leaders have always had the tendency to take heroic policies and the lives of the ruled have always been expendable. I do not think that there is—in fact I am sure that there is not—a single black ruled country in Africa in which the ordinary citizen's prospect of dying from natural causes has not considerably receded since colonial days.

Noble Lords: Speech!

Lord Paget of Northampton: My Lords, as the noble Baroness is aware, they have suffered from drought. But what rulers of Africa have not suffered from drought? Droughts are endemic in the African climate. The differing factor has been black governments and millions have died as a result throughout Africa——

Noble Lords: Order!

Lord Paget of Northampton: My Lords, is it not odd that we should be conspiring to wreck the only economy in Africa that works? I think we could be better occupied. Again, do we need the burden of feeding the millions on South Africa's borders? If we do not, nobody will. What is the cost of this?

The Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Lord Belstead): My Lords, one thing that is clear about a Statement is that we must not turn it into a debate. I wonder whether the noble Lord would think it right to draw his remarks to a conclusion.

Lord Paget of Northampton: My Lords, can I put my final question? Who will pay for the victims of this? We start off with Namibia. Who will pay for Namibia? South Africa has been paying some 500 million a year. Who will take that on? That is only a trifle compared with the needs of all her other neighbours who are going to be starving. Are we really to go in for this performance——

Noble Lords: Order!

Lord Paget of Northampton: My Lords, I end with this. Our Prime Minister has behaved with the utmost courage. I hope that her courage does not leave her, because if it does millions will die.

Baroness Young: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paget, has asked a number of questions and made a number of points. But I shall try to confine my answers to those which are relevant to the Statement.

The noble Lord mentioned a whole range of measures which might be taken and asked whether, in what we have done, we had considered their effects. We have consistently argued against general economic sanctions. Experience has shown that they do not work, and any further mesures in addition to those that the United Kingdom has implemented over the years have to be considered in the light of that experience. We believe that, against the supposed benefits, all should weigh carefully the effects of general economic sanctions in South Africa on South Africa's neighbours and on the United Kingdom. We believe that the balance is against such sanctions.

On the effects of sanctions on the front-line states, we are examining the possibility for further assistance in the context of the Southern African Develoment Co-ordination Conference, but clearly the United Kingdom is not in a position to offset the effects of economic sanctions on the front-line states. The importance of that is that it underlines the importance of seeking a solution through dialogue and not through confrontation.

I should like to conclude by saying that the mandate which my right honourable and learned friend was given at the Hague meeting has still nearly two months to run. There is no need for instant decisions.

Lord Boyd-Carpenter: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that the calm good sense of her original Statement does not, to many of us, seem to merit the highly critical comments which it received from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Seear? Is she also aware that it seems to many of us thoroughly sensible not to indicate in advance of the meeting with the Commonwealth Heads of Government at the weekend and in advance of discussions with them, exactly how Her Majesty's Government are contemplating proceeding? Is not the purpose to have a discussion with them and to see whether a meeting of minds can be achieved among those who are very largely concerned?

Is my noble friend also aware of the fact that the apparent wish of a number of noble Lords opposite to rush into measures which, whatever else they may do, would inflict untold misery and suffering on a large number of innocent people, shocks some of us?

Baroness Young: My Lords, I should like to thank my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter for his very helpful and positive support for the Statement that I have made and for his support for the policy and the line that is being pursued by the Government.

Lord Molloy: My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that those of us who wished our Foreign Secretary all good fortune and godspeed in his difficult task, acknowledging that he was speaking not for this country but for the European Community as well, consider that his summary dismissal by Botha was indicative of what that country thinks of the opinion of the rest of Europe? Will not the noble Baroness also agree that most political parties in Western Europe and in the United Kingdom as well as the United States Congress approved of the Report of the Eminent Persons Group and that they were sabotaged and prevented from implementing their recommendations by the stubborness of the President of the United States of America and the British Prime Minister? Therefore, would not the noble Baroness agree that the Commonwealth conference can provide, if we take the right initiative, a vital wind of change which will not only be able to unite this nation, the European Community and the United States, but will find approval in the rest of the civilised world? I am referring to the fact that in our unity we condemn apartheid with our words and we have the courage and the fortitude to make our words a reality in some form of unified action which will speak even louder than the words of the most courageous person.

Baroness Young: My Lords, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, I point out that my right honourable and learned friend during his visit to Southern Africa had the opportunity to put very frankly our view about the situation in South Africa to State President Botha and to other members of the South African Government, and in the same way he has had the opportunity to put very freely and frankly our position to President Kaunda. We have made clear on many occasions that we condemn apartheid. I would only add so far as concerns the United States and its attitude to the mission of my right honourable and learned friend, that it has been very supportive, and my right honourable and learned friend will be seeing Dr. Crocker later this afternoon. The Hague Summit decision provided for consultation with other industrialised countries.

Lord Alport: My Lords, I should like to ask my noble friend, or rather I should like to ask the Leader of the House whether he does not consider that most of the interventions that have taken place since this Statement was made, apart from those from the Front Bench, have been a gross abuse of the procedure of the House; contrary to the traditions of the House and unfair on a Minister who is here not to have a debate but to answer questions? In those circumstances, the proceedings of the past half hour or so have not been of any advantage to the reputation of this House.

Baroness Young: My Lords, I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Alport, that it is a matter of concern that some of the questions have been way outside the terms of the Statement. The convention of the House is that on a Statement noble Lords should put questions, with the exception of the Front Bench speakers. I shall of course draw to the notice of my noble friend the Leader of the House the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Alport.

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede: My Lords, the standing order refers to Statements as being the opportunity for "brief comments and questions", so noble Lords may make brief comments as well as ask questions.

The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that in the hotels of Johannesburg and Pretoria there are now waiting salesmen from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, and agents of the state trading companies in Eastern Europe, all of whom are hoping that we shall be stupid enough to impose sanctions?

[THE EARL OF ONSLOW.]

Furthermore, is my noble friend aware that large numbers of people in this country are fed up to the back teeth with being lectured by people who come from governments whose legitimacy and rectitude leave much to be desired?

Thirdly, and lastly, is it not unhealthy that we are so obsessed by South Africa that we take no notice of other tyrannies in this world? Was that obsession not totally encapsulated by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, who gave the impression of being one of Lord Milner's children, and that she wanted to govern and boss about South Africa? South Africa is not a nice state, but we should not be quite so obsessed with one tyranny in the world when there are hundreds of others.

Baroness Young: My Lords, I note of course what my noble friend Lord Onslow has said. One of the difficulties about sanctions is that to be effective they require the complete co-operation of all countries. He is right to draw this point to our attention.

Following on what the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, has said—and I appreciate that I had not the advantage he had of having the *Companion to the Standing Orders* in front of me—in fact we have now spent just over three-quarters of an hour on this Statement while we are in the middle of a debate on an important Bill. We had a debate on South Africa last night—the third such debate since April—and it might be the wish of your Lordships that we should return to the debate on the European Community.

Lord Monson: My Lords, I shall be brief. Would the noble Baroness agree that all those African Commonwealth countries which are trying to force or panic this country into precipitate action by boycotting the Commonwealth Games and so on themselves engage in trade with South Africa, whether openly or surreptitiously?

Baroness Young: My Lords, we very much regret what has happened regarding the Commonwealth Games. The important thing to remember is that they are Commonwealth Games, although they happen to be taking place in Edinburgh.

Lord Mishcon: My Lords, I promise questions, comments and brevity. May I first be allowed to dissociate these Benches from the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Paget. Secondly, may I ask the noble Baroness whether it is not a pity that the one House of Parliament sitting at this critical time is dealing with a Statement out of which only words have come while no policy statement at all has issued from Her Majesty's Government? If, one takes it for granted, as we do from all sides of this House, that it was right and proper, with his customary dignity, for the Foreign Secretary to try to use the force of reason with the Government of South Africa, is it not clear that that voice of reason was treated with impertinence? If that is so, what are we going to do now that reason has been shown not to prevail?

Baroness Young: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, puts in rather a different form the question that was put by his noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones. My answer remains to him, as it was in the beginning to the noble and learned Lord, that my right honourable and learned friend has made clear that at the Commonwealth meeting next week consideration of the case for further measures is an item on the agenda. So is it too in the European Community context, but on a different timescale. It would not be right for me to anticipate that discussion.

Lord Ferrier: My Lords, will the noble Baroness——

Lord Tordoff: My Lords, may I say——

Noble Lords: Order!

Lord Belstead: My Lords, I do not think we can have two or more than two noble Lords on their feet at the same time. I wonder whether I might ask your Lordships if it is the feeling of the House, despite the fact that this is a matter of considerable concern, that after 50 minutes we ought now to move on to other business?

Lord Tordoff: My Lords, I rose to my feet to say just that to the noble Lord. From these Benches we support him completely.

European Communities (Amendment) Bill

Debate on Second Reading resumed.

3.22 p.m.

Lord Nugent of Guildford: My Lords, after that very important intervention, we return to the slightly calmer waters of the debate on the European Communities (Amendment) Bill. May I preface my remarks by saying, as the majority of your Lordships troop out, that a number of noble Lords here are still waiting to speak. We are not yet halfway through the list of speakers at this relatively late hour this afternoon and I propose to make my remarks very brief. Indeed we have already heard a detailed and expert exposition of what is entailed in the Single European Act, including an admirable précis from Lord Templeman of the report of the Select Committee which he chaired so ably.

The broad effect of what we have before us is to speed up decision making and to facilitate progress towards European economic unity. In particular the existing structure provides not 16, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Templeman, said, but some 30 different procedures for dealing with measures. It is to be reduced by this action in the exercise of delegated powers by the Commission to three procedures. This is a drastic reduction and all it will mean is that objections to Commission proposals by individual member countries—that includes us—will not be allowed to hold up indefinitely the enactment of measures which member countries regard generally as beneficial to the Community. In other words this will mean qualified majority decisions.

PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA: TALK WITH MR. CHESTER CROCKER

Chet Crocker (President Reagan's Special Envoy for Africa) came to see me this evening with the American Ambassador, after his meeting with the Foreign Secretary.

Mr. Crocker said that it was clear that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would very shortly report out a bill containing additional measures against South Africa. This was likely to be voted upon by the Senate before 15 August. In practice it was unlikely that there would be time to effect a reconciliation between the Senate and House Bills before Congress went into recess on 15 August, although he could not rule this out entirely. The President would be faced with a very difficult choice. His instinct would be to veto a Bill containing economic sanctions, but to do so would be very divisive in the United States. In any event, there might be sufficient votes in the Senate to override his veto. He had to say that the likelihood was that there would be additional US measures in place by mid September at the latest. He could not predict exactly what these would be. But it seemed almost inevitable that there would be a ban on air services to South Africa, since this was cost-free for the United States. There was also likely to be a ban on iron and steel imports, on new investments and on new loans, possibly with a provision for further sanctions in the absence of progress in South Africa in a year's time. I asked whether the restrictions on investments and loans would be voluntary or mandatory. Mr. Crocker said that they would be mandatory.

Mr. Crocker asked about the position that we were likely to take at the Commonwealth Review meeting. I said that I did not want to reveal our negotiating hand (I seem to be about the only person in London not to do so!) but I did not think that the US Government would be faced with any surprises. We continued to believe that economic sanctions would not achieve their purpose. Mr. Crocker said that what the President did

would be much influenced by decisions you reached as a result of the Commonwealth meeting. He did not want to get out of step with you.

I said that I was particularly concerned to hear that the Senate legislation might contain provision for further measures later. Our aim was to put an end to the ratchet effect. If we took some further measures, we would want to draw a line. Mr. Crocker agreed that this was desirable, but did not have much confidence in being able to block the Senate on this.

Mr. Crocker floated, without being very specific, the possibility of a fresh political initiative. He was careful not to imply that the United States had anything particular in mind. Indeed, he seemed anxious to suggest that it was up to someone else - he mentioned the Germans - to take a lead. But he was clearly interested in the possibility of a meeting of major industrial countries - the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan - to discuss policy towards South Africa and possibly to meet subsequently with the South African Government. I said that I thought that we would be interested in such ideas if they seemed likely to contribute to initiating a dialogue in South Africa, although I did not expect us to want to take the lead in any separate exercise while the EEC initiative was still in being. Mr. Crocker commented that, in the South African Government's present mood, no initiative seemed to stand much of a chance of success.

C.D.P.

C.D. POWELL
31 July 1986

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Subject cc Ops
Master

TELEGRAMS: PRIME
TELEPHONE: 2251/2

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
P.O. BOX 395,
MBABANE,
SWAZILAND.

PMO.21/76

31st July, 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T143Ai/86

Your Excellency,

PROPOSED SANCTIONS AGAINST THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Swaziland is concerned by the threat to impose comprehensive economic sanctions on South Africa and not having had the opportunity to make representations to the E.P.G., I feel it necessary to place Swaziland's position on record.

Swaziland reiterates her abhorrence and rejection of apartheid in all its forms. It has, in this region, created instability which is affecting the entire international community.

Swaziland upholds its policy of peaceful negotiation as a means of solving problems and conflicts. Swaziland believes that parties in conflict should be brought together without pre-conditions, prescriptions or prejudice to work out a mutually acceptable solution by which they are prepared to abide.

We in Swaziland have always been active in promoting the philosophy of dialogue. Our late King Sobhuza II achieved a number of successes in pursuance of this policy. We are still committed to, and actively engaged in this policy. Our contribution towards peaceful change in the region will be made/our traditional /in method of unpublicised diplomacy.

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TELEGRAMS: PRIME
TELEPHONE: 2251/2

GOVERNMENT HOUSE.
P.O. BOX 395,
MBABANE,
SWAZILAND.

The international community is imposing economic sanctions against South Africa. We in Swaziland, however, cannot support actions which will eventually threaten our own survival. Unless comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa are accompanied by a large inflow of aid and investment into Swaziland, our survival will be endangered.

The economy of Swaziland is small, open and dependent on that of South Africa. Reducing this dependence without serious disruption of our economy is a difficult and slow process.

Most of our foreign trade is with South Africa with whom we have had no trade barriers since 1910. In order to stabilize trade in the long term, our currency is tied to the South African Rand and has consequently experienced enormous depreciation over the past months as a result of international action against South Africa.

Our foreign trade is also highly dependent on South African roads, railways and seaports. Our traditional harbour, Maputo, is no longer a reliable alternative port to our international markets. Our economy would therefore be highly vulnerable both to South African actions and to an international embargo on supplies to South Africa. A large proportion of our food and all our fuel is imported from South AFrica and they also supply a significant share of our electricity and water requirements.

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TELEGRAMS: PRIME
TELEPHONE: 2251/2

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
P.O. BOX 395,
MBABANE,
SWAZILAND.

Many of our citizens work in South Africa both in the mines and elsewhere. An expulsion of these workers for political or economic reasons would create enormous hardship in Swaziland. The loss of remittance income and the worsening of the unemployment problem would further depress an economy already battered by recession, cyclone, drought, a large influx of refugees and low world commodity prices. Per capita incomes are already falling significantly in Swaziland.

Swaziland and South Africa, by virtue of history and geography, are economically inter-dependent to such a degree that sanctions against South Africa will seriously damage Swaziland. Indeed retaliatory action (as threatened) by South Africa would endanger the economic and political survival of Swaziland.

In conclusion, I make this submission confident that Swaziland's position will be considered in the course of your deliberations, and if further economic sanctions are imposed.

Yours sincerely,

PRINCE BHEKIMPI
PRIME MINISTER OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND

The Right Honourable
H.E. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
10 Downing Street,
ENGLAND.
United Kingdom.

OD

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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70 WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AS

01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO

Ref. A086/2216

31 July 1986

Dear Tony,

South Africa

The minutes of today's discussion in Cabinet will record that the Cabinet endorsed OD's conclusions on the handling of the Commonwealth Review Meeting, but not what those conclusions were.

The conclusions as reported by the Prime Minister at and endorsed by the Cabinet were recorded as follows:

a. The United Kingdom would not stand out against the implementation of the measures against South Africa identified by the European Council at their meeting at the end of June if, at the end of the three month period allowed for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's European mission, the other members of the Community wished to impose them. The measures in question were a ban on new investment in South Africa, which in the case of the United Kingdom would have to be voluntary, and bans on the import from South Africa of coal, iron and steel, and gold coins.

b. Since sanctions against South Africa would not promote progress there, any further measures adopted by the United Kingdom should be justified and presented clearly as a signal of our disapproval of apartheid. She would be in touch with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Herr Helmut Kohl, about the possibility of the United Kingdom agreeing at the Commonwealth Review Meeting to adopt a voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa and a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa.

c. The United Kingdom should seek to put an end to the "ratchet" process whereby each conference which discussed measures against South Africa ended with commitments to

A C Galsworthy Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

/consider

SECRET AND PERSONAL

consider yet further measures at the next stage. It was desirable that there should be no commitment to consideration of further measures in the Commonwealth.

d. Members of the Commonwealth relied on British development aid and on British support in negotiations about their financial difficulties in the International Monetary Fund. It would be important that other participants in the Commonwealth Review Meeting should be aware that public opinion in this country could require the Government to reconsider such support if countries which benefited from it acted against the United Kingdom in connection with South Africa.

e. The concept of progress by negotiation which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had advocated during his visit to Southern Africa was the most hopeful basis for positive change, and should be kept in being, in the hope that discussion of it could resume in due course.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Charles Powell.

Yours ever

Robert Armstrong

FILE CAJ

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 July 1986

Thank you for your letter of 30 July, enclosing the text of a message to the Prime Minister from the Secretary General of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, together with a draft for a proposed reply from Mrs. Chalker.

The Prime Minister would indeed be grateful if Mrs. Chalker would reply, but would like to strengthen the draft somewhat. I enclose a revised version.

C. D. POWELL

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CJ2A10

MESSAGE FROM MRS. CHALKER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL FOR SPORT IN AFRICA

Dear Secretary General

Thank you for your recent message to the Prime Minister, forwarded via the British Ambassador in Yaounde. I am afraid that you are misinformed. The European Economic Community is not in favour of applying comprehensive economic sanctions.

Sir Geoffrey Howe has recently returned from his visit to South Africa as part of the mission entrusted to him by the Twelve member states of the European Community to try to establish conditions for the much needed dialogue in that country. The Community will consider the results of the mission at the end of September.

We shall next be discussing our approach to South Africa at the forthcoming Commonwealth Review Meeting in London on 3-5 August. The Commonwealth has had to face many difficult issues in the past, but has been strong enough and flexible enough to survive. I am confident that it will do so on this occasion.

I know that the British Ambassador has spoken to you in some detail about our policy. The position is that Britain, together with our European and Commonwealth Partners, has already adopted a whole range of measures. Our common aim must be to promote dialogue and a suspension of violence on all sides, so that there can be a peaceful solution in South Africa that commands the support of all its people.

With good wishes

Lynda Chalker
Minister of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CAJ

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 July 1986

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr. Mulroney.

C. D. POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Canadian High Commission

Haut Commissariat du Canada

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, July 31, 1986

Mr. Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON

Dear Mr. Powell,

Attached is a personal message from Prime Minister Mulroney to Prime Minister Thatcher. I should be most grateful if you would transmit it to Prime Minister Thatcher.

Yours sincerely,

L.A. Delvoie
Deputy High Commissioner

Att.

(2)

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT CDP 31/7.

OTTAWA, July 30, 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T142A/86

cc Master
OPS

"Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I have been following the reports of Sir Geoffrey Howe's mission to Southern Africa on behalf of the European Community. It was a challenging venture and we all admired the grace he showed in pressing the case for negotiations in the face of resistance and criticism.

Please let him know that we appreciated the manner in which he pressed for the breakthrough we have all sought.

Warm wishes to you.

Brian Mulroney"

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of Great Britain
10 Downing Street
LONDON



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TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA
TELNO 193
OF 301130Z JULY 86

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH P W BOTHA: 29 JULY
SUMMARY

1. A VERY DIFFICULT AND AT TIMES STORMY MEETING. THE SECRETARY OF STATE URGED THE CASE FOR DIALOGUE WITH LEADERS OF ALL COMMUNITIES AND THE NEED FOR THE SAG TO FIND THE COURAGE TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR ALL SECTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY TO PARTICIPATE. P W BOTHA MAINTAINED THAT THE WORLD WAS JUDGING SOUTH AFRICA BY DOUBLE STANDARDS. NO RECOGNITION OF ROLE PLAYED BY US/UK IN HOLDING OFF SANCTIONS. HE WOULD DEAL WITH MANDELA HIMSELF IN HIS OWN TIME, AND WOULD RELEASE HIM ONLY IF HE ABANDONED VIOLENCE: THE ANC MUST FREE THEMSELVES FROM COMMUNIST INFLUENCE BEFORE HE WOULD DEAL WITH THEM. HE CHALLENGED THE WORLD TO APPLY SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.

DETAIL

2. AFTER INITIAL COURTESIES, PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE CLAIMED THE SAG HAD THE KEY TO PROGRESS: NOW THE WORLD WANTED TO TAKE IT AWAY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED AS A FURTHER DISPLAY OF THE COURAGE WHICH THE SAG HAD ALREADY SHOWN IN

STARTING

STARTING TO MAKE CHANGES. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT HE HAD LOST FAITH IN THE WESTERN COMMUNITY, WHICH WAS CONSTANTLY PICKING ON SOUTH AFRICA. HE THEN PRODUCED A PREPARED LIST OF QUESTIONS (WHICH WERE LATER MADE PUBLIC). IN SUMMARY THEY WERE:

(I) WOULD PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA BE LINKED TO ACTION AGAINST OTHER COUNTRIES WHERE RACIAL OR ETHNIC DIFFERENTIATION EXISTED?

(II) WOULD THE EC CONDEMN AND SET TIME-SCALES FOR RESOLUTION OF ALL SITUATIONS WHICH WERE NOT TRULY DEMOCRATIC AND NON-RACIAL?

(III) WOULD THE EC LAUNCH AN INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO SOLVE SIMULTANEOUSLY PROBLEMS IN ALL COUNTRIES EXPERIENCING A CONFLICT AS A RESULT OF RACIAL, ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS TENSIONS?

(IV) WOULD THEY LINK THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION WITH SIMILAR QUESTIONS INVOLVING SIKHS, TAMILS, GURKHAS, ABORIGINES, MAORIS, NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS AND BASQUES?

(V) WOULD THEY AGREE TO A COMMON APPROACH TO SO-CALLED POLITICAL PRISONERS IN COUNTRIES ALL OVER THE WORLD, SUCH AS SAKHAROV AND MAGEE?

3. OVER THREE DECADES THE SAG HAD MADE SOUTH AFRICA INTO A SHOWPIECE: ALL ITS COMMUNITIES HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THIS. THERE HAD BEEN NO ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FROM THE WORLD. SOUTH AFRICA WAS AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY: AS LONG AS HE WAS ITS LEADER HE WOULD NOT ALLOW IT TO BE TREATED AS A COLONY. HE OBJECTED TO THE WORLD'S TREATMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT AND SELF-GOVERNING HOMELAND STATES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD NOT TROUBLED TO SEE THE GOOD SIDE OF SOUTH AFRICA DURING HIS VISIT.

4. THE PRESS REPORTED THE SECRETARY OF STATE AS DOUBTING THAT THE SAG HAD THE COURAGE TO FREE MANDELA. SOUTH AFRICAN LEADERS WERE MORE COURAGEOUS THAN OTHER LEADERS. SOUTH AFRICA WAS ISOLATED BY THE APPLICATION OF DOUBLE STANDARDS. HE WOULD DEAL WITH MANDELA IN HIS OWN WAY: BUT HE WOULD HAVE TO OPENLY ABANDON VIOLENCE BEFORE HE COULD BE FREED.

THIS

THIS COULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH 'SUSPENSION' OR 'HALTING' OF VIOLENCE. HE WOULD NOT BE FORCED INTO A LANCASTER HOUSE SITUATION. THE ANC MUST UNDERTAKE TO ABANDON VIOLENCE AND FREE THEMSELVES FROM COMMUNIST INFLUENCE BEFORE HE WOULD DEAL WITH THEM.

5. THERE WAS NOW A CLEAR ATTEMPT TO FORCE HIM TO MAKE A DECISION BETWEEN ACCEPTING THE RELEASE OF MANDELA AND THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC OR SANCTIONS. HE CHOSE SANCTIONS. HE HOPED WE WOULD ASK THE FLS TO APPLY THEM FIRST. IF THERE WERE SANCTIONS HE WOULD PREPARE SOUTH AFRICA FOR THAT FIGHT.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ON THIS ISSUE HE REPRESENTED A GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD DEMONSTRATED MORE SYMPATHY FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S POSITION, AND HAD DONE MORE TO REPRESENT THAT CASE THAN ALMOST ANY OTHER IN THE WORLD. IN MAKING THE CASE HE HAD COME TO MAKE ON BEHALF OF THE EC AND THE COMMONWEALTH, HE WAS PROBABLY THE MOST MODERATE IN STYLE AND SUBSTANCE OF ANY OF HIS EC COLLEAGUES. THE CASE HE HAD PRESENTED WAS FOUNDED ON THE SUPPORT OF ALL EC COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES. WE MORE THAN ANY HAD RECOGNISED THE PROGRESS IN SOUTH AFRICA, AND HAD OFTEN BEEN DENOUNCED FOR IT. THE CASE HE ADVOCATED WAS ACCEPTED BY MANY HE HAD SPOKEN TO IN SOUTH AFRICA.

7. THE FIVE QUESTIONS THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED SHOWED THE GAP OF PERCEPTION: FOR INSTANCE IN QUESTION (IV) ALL THE RACES NAMED WERE SITUATED IN COUNTRIES WITH FULL DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE FOR THE BLACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA, WHO WERE NOT EVEN IN THE TRICAMERAL PARLIAMENT. SOUTH AFRICA'S ISOLATION WAS SELF-IMPOSED. MARKET DECISIONS TO STOP INVESTMENT HAD HAD MORE EFFECT THAN ANY GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED SANCTIONS. HE DENIED THAT THERE WERE DOUBLE STANDARDS: WE SAW THE SAG AS AN ENTITY WHICH CLAIMED AND INDEED DID TRY TO LIVE BY THE STANDARDS OF WESTERN CIVILISATION. THIS WAS WHY WE EXPECTED THEM TO ACT BY THOSE STANDARDS. HE URGED AGAIN THAT THE SAG SHOULD RECONSIDER THE FREEING OF MANDELA AND THE UNBANNING OF

THE

THE ANC. THEY WERE OF COURSE PERFECTLY ENTITLED TO ASK THE LATTER FOR A MATCHING COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL DIALOGUE.

8. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT MANDELA HAD BEEN PUT IN PRISON BY THE COURTS. WOULD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AGREE TO HOLD TALKS WITH PATRICK MAGEE? THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THERE WAS NO PARALLEL: IN THE UK, INCLUDING NORTHERN IRELAND, THERE WAS A FULL DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN WHICH ALL COULD TAKE PART. THE PROBLEM FOR DIALOGUE WAS THAT EVEN THOSE LIKE BUTHELEZI WHO WERE FREE AND WANTED TO TAKE PART FELT THEY COULD NOT DO SO WHILE MANDELA AND OTHERS REMAINED IN JAIL. PRESIDENT BOTHA INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT WE WERE THREATENING SANCTIONS TO DEAL WITH A BRITISH INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT SO: OUR POSITION, THOUGH MORE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION, WAS IN LINE WITH THAT OF OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES: IT WAS PRESSURE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WHICH WAS LEADING TOWARDS FURTHER SANCTIONS.

9. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT THE COMMONWEALTH WAS FULL OF MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS AND ONE PARTY STATES: WE SHOULD NOT PREACH TO HIM. DID WE CONSIDER GHANA AND UGANDA PERFECT? THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WHATEVER THEIR DEFECTS, AND HE DID NOT DENY THEM, THESE COUNTRIES WERE NOT FOUNDED ON EXPLICIT RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WHICH ABSOLUTELY EXCLUDED THE MAJORITY OF PEOPLE FROM THE POLITICAL PROCESS. NOR DID THEY EXPRESSLY ASPIRE, AS DOES SOUTH AFRICA, TO WESTERN STANDARDS. WE HAD NOT COME TO EXPRESS VIEWS BECAUSE OF SOME DESTRUCTIVE MALICE, BUT IN THE HOPE OF ASSISTING PROGRESS. FOR THIS DIALOGUE WAS NEEDED. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT HE WAS IN FAVOUR OF DIALOGUE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT NEVERTHELESS HE HAD NOT YET TAKEN THE STEPS NECESSARY TO MAKE EFFECTIVE DIALOGUE POSSIBLE.

10. PRESIDENT BOTHA INTERJECTED ANGRILY THAT THIS WAS A NONSENSICAL STATEMENT. HE HAD COLOURED PEOPLE IN HIS CABINET, WHICH COULD NOT BE SAID FOR THE UK. THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED OUT THAT THEY WERE NOMINATED MEMBERS.

HE

HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT BOTHA HAD SET IN HAND A PROCESS OF CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE US AND THE UK HAD BEEN ALMOST ALONE IN RECOGNISING THIS. BUT BECAUSE THE BLACK MAJORITY AS YET PLAYED NO PART IN GOVERNMENT, FURTHER STEPS WERE NEEDED. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A PROCESS WHICH WOULD COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF FREELY CHOSEN BLACK LEADERS. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT THE SAG WAS SO OVER-WHELMED WITH BLACKS WHO WISHED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WORK OF THE NATIONAL STATUTORY COUNCIL THAT IT WOULD TAKE THEM A LONG TIME EVEN TO SORT OUT THE APPLICATIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT SUCCESS NEEDED THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL PARTIES: IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD FREE THE BANNED BLACK POLITICAL PARTIES THEY WOULD BE ENTITLED TO ASK FOR A HALT TO VIOLENCE AND THE BEGINNING OF PEACEFUL DIALOGUE. PRESIDENT BOTHA REVERTED TO HIS EARLIER REMARKS ABOUT PATRICK MAGEE. HE SAID THAT WE SHOULD APPLY SANCTIONS AGAINST COUNTRIES SUCH AS GHANA AND NIGERIA.

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT THE ISSUE. HE HAD JUST READ THE WORDS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION ON THE WALL OF PRESIDENT BOTHA'S OUTER OFFICE. THEY CONTAINED ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF WESTERN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY. ALL WE WERE ASKING WAS THAT THEY BE FULLY APPLIED. PRESIDENT BOTHA CLAIMED THAT THE BASE OF THE SAG HAD BEEN GREATLY BROADENED. HE HAD HIMSELF SAID THAT APARTHEID WAS OUT-MODED. HE HAD DONE AWAY WITH THE INFLUX CONTROL MEASURES. APARTHEID WAS IN MANY WAYS A LEGACY OF BRITISH RULE. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE SAG, NOT TREAT THEM AS LEPERS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE HAD COMMENDED THE CHANGES WHICH HAD BEEN MADE. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD NOT DONE SO: INSTEAD HE THREATENED SANCTIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE HAD NOT DONE THIS: WHAT HE HAD DESCRIBED WAS A LIKELY EVOLUTION OF THE SITUATION, WHETHER WE LIKED IT OR NOT. IF FURTHER MEASURES WERE ADOPTED MANY OF THE STATES TAKING THEM WOULD DO SO WITH GREAT SADNESS. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT HE RECEIVED MANY LETTERS FROM ALL OVER THE COMMONWEALTH

/SUPPORTING

SUPPORTING HIS STANCE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT NEVERTHELESS THE POLITICAL PRESSURE WAS IN THE OTHER DIRECTION. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT WE HAD SET THE PACE. THE SOONER SANCTIONS WERE APPLIED THE BETTER. IN THE END THEY WOULD STRENGTHEN SOUTH AFRICA AS HAD PREVIOUS MEASURES. SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD FIGHT WITH SELF-RESPECT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT SOME IN SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT FEEL ABLE TO GO IT ALONE, BUT THE COST WOULD BE VERY GREAT. MANY IN SOUTH AFRICA FEARED THE CONSEQUENCES.

12. PRESIDENT BOTHA COMPLAINED THAT THE EC HAD SHOWN INTEREST ONLY IN THE FREEING OF MANDELA AND THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC. THEY IGNORED HIS ACHIEVEMENTS. IT WAS NOTICEABLE THAT HE HAD TREATED THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECENTLY, UNLIKE PRESIDENT KAUNDA. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REMINDED HIM THAT THE REASON FOR HIS BAD RECEPTION IN ZAMBIA WAS THAT HE WAS THOUGHT TO BE CONSPIRING WITH THE SAG. PRESIDENT BOTHA REPEATED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS NOW IN A CIVILISED COUNTRY, UNLIKE OTHERS.

13. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT WAS THE CONSIDERED VIEW OF THE COUNTRIES HE REPRESENTED THAT THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA MUST BE FOUNDED ON DIALOGUE. WE WERE PREPARED TO PRESS ON BLACK LEADERS THE NEED TO MAKE A MATCHING COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL DIALOGUE IF THE SAG WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE. HE HAD COMMENDED THE COURAGE AND TENACITY OF THE AFRIKANER NATION, WHICH WE HAD GOOD REASON TO KNOW AS WE HAD FOUGHT BOTH AGAINST AND ALONGSIDE THEM, AND HAD RECOGNISED THAT THE STEPS WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN HAD REQUIRED COURAGE. HE HAD NOT, AS THE PRESIDENT ALLEGED, SAID THAT THE SAG LACKED COURAGE, BUT HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THE COURAGE WHICH HAD BEEN REQUIRED IN THE STEPS ALREADY TAKEN, AND RECOGNISED THE NEED FOR STILL FURTHER COURAGE IN ORDER TO ENABLE DIALOGUE TO TAKE PLACE.

14. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT INSTEAD OF LOOKING AT THE REAL SOUTH AFRICA, THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD TOURED NEIGHBOURING STATES IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN TO THEM THE NEED

/FOR

FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THIS WAS A TOTAL MISUNDERSTANDING: HE WANTED TO SEE FOR HIMSELF JUST HOW BADLY THEY WOULD BE AFFECTED BY SANCTIONS, SO THAT HE COULD EXPLAIN THAT POINT TO OTHERS. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT PREACH TO HIM ABOUT WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE. HE WOULD DO IT HIS WAY, WHETHER OR NOT WE APPLIED SANCTIONS. HE WOULD NOT BE SHOUTED AT BY THE WORLD. THE WEST SHOULD NOT BE FEARFUL: SOUTH AFRICA WOULD STILL BE THERE WHEN THE WEST NEEDED IT AGAIN.

15. FINALLY HE ASKED FOR HIS REGARDS TO BE CONVEYED TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

HOWE

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

STANDARD (PALACE)

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CABINET OFFICE

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
SOUTHERN AFRICA

10 DOWNING STREET

Charles Powell

With the compliments of

Please see my attached letter
to a correspondent - whose
letter you saw.
It brings together all my
briefings

John

10 DOWNING STREET

PERSONAL

From the Press Secretary

M R Hanson Esq
UKCC
23 Portland Place
London W1N 3AF

30 July 1986

Dear Michael,

Many thanks for your letter of July 22 re South Africa and more particularly Botswana's attitudes to Britain. I very much hope that as a result of the Foreign Secretary's recent visit to Botswana its leaders are now clearer about the British position.

One of the problems I have encountered through this whole piece is the over simplification to the point of utter distortion inherent in British politics and journalism.

This manifests itself in this case in the form of the Prime Minister's being South Africa's "friend" because she is against general economic sanctions. (NB: We can't be against selective economic sanctions or other measures since we already have 13 in place.) This in turn is twisted by some politicians to infer or assert that the Prime Minister is racist. And so we go on.

To be against general economic sanctions is not necessarily to be for South Africa. Indeed, the Government in my view shares the broad aim of all moderate, as distinct from extreme or uncaring or unthinking, people of securing an end to apartheid sooner rather than later on the basis of a peaceful settlement with minimum damage to the South African economy.

The argument is really about means. But that is where it becomes difficult for those whose sole contribution to constructive thinking about the issue is to parrot the world "sanctions". I think I can say without fear of contradiction that for the last 2 months we have encountered no argument, merely slogans, in response to the Government case against general economic sanctions and for diplomacy.

I am satisfied that sanctions, whether economic or otherwise, won't work in the sense of securing an early fundamental change in the apartheid policy. I am satisfied that they won't work, partly because sanctions never do work in the face of the ingenuity (the son of greed) of which the world is capable and partly because the South Africans are determined to win through

anyway. I am satisfied that gesture politics will also be ineffective. I am not satisfied that diplomacy is useless and that patient talking is not more likely to secure the broad aim I set out above. The problem is time and emotion.

We are therefore heavily engaged in the business of procuring and managing change in a part of the world where we probably have as much influence as any other country, though that is not saying much. This requires us to keep on trying - while at the same time also trying to keep the lid on things.

All this - and Botha language and US Congress activity and so on - will test our ingenuity and skill. But I believe we shall better succeed with patience rather than bluster. In the meantime, I agree it would help if our motives, and especially those of the Prime Minister, were more accurately understood. It is my daily task to strive for that understanding. It would help if much of the world wanted to listen.

BERNARD INGHAM

(1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 July 1986

Prime Minister
A pretty feeble reply.
Agree to it as amended? CAP.

Dear Charles,

The Secretary General of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa has asked the British Ambassador in Yaounde to pass the following message to the Prime Minister : 30/7

BEGINS

We hereby appeal once more to you and your Government to apply economic sanctions against racist South Africa as demanded by the international community.

We are quite aware of your position but even your partners in the economic community are in favour of applying comprehensive economic sanctions. Nonsense

In the light of recent developments and the threat it poses to the existence of the Commonwealth we sincerely hope that you will act in the right direction.

Very high regards

Elame Jackson Rodolphe
Director of Cabinet for Secretary General

ENDS

If you agree, we would propose to send a reply from Mrs Chalker to Mr Rodolphe, for our Ambassasdor to convey on the Prime Minister's behalf.

/BEGINS

CJ2ACO

I am afraid that you are misinformed. ~~The~~ The European Economic Community is not in favour of applying comprehensive economic sanctions.

BEGINS

Dear Secretary General

Thank you for your recent message to the Prime Minister, forwarded via the British Ambassador in Yaounde.

The Community will consider the results of the mission at the end of September.

~~As you know,~~ Sir Geoffrey Howe has recently returned from his visit to South Africa as part of the mission entrusted to him by the Twelve member states of the European Community to try to establish conditions for the much needed dialogue in that country. We shall next be discussing our approach to South Africa at the forthcoming Commonwealth Review Meeting in London on 3-5 August. The Commonwealth has had no face many difficult issues in the past, but has been strong enough & flexible enough to survive. I am confident that it will do so on this occasion.

I know that the British Ambassador has spoken to you in some detail about our policy. The position is that Britain, together with our European and Commonwealth Partners, has already adopted a whole range of measures. Our common aim must be to promote dialogue and a suspension of violence on all sides, so that there can be a peaceful solution in South Africa that commands the support of all its people.

With good wishes

Lynda Chalker
Minister of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

ENDS

Yours ever

Robert Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St


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Prime Minister

SOUTH AFRICA

1. In my minute of 15 July, I reported to OD colleagues on the first leg of my mission, to Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

2. From 22-29 July, I paid a further visit to the area during which I had another meeting with President Kaunda, more than twelve hours of discussion with the South African State President and Foreign Minister, and meetings with the Heads of Government of Botswana,, Swaziland and Lesotho. Within South Africa, I also had talks with a wide range of white and moderate black opinion.

3. I had hoped to arrange a meeting with the ANC leadership. But I shall not now be meeting Tambo until after the Commonwealth Review Meeting. The public statements made earlier by the ANC Executive Committee and black radicals, meant that the UDF and figures such as Bishop Tutu were not willing to receive me. I had originally hoped to see Nelson Mandela, but he was reportedly unwilling to see me; in the event the State President refused to allow me to approach him for a meeting.

Talks in South Africa

4. The starting point for my discussions with the South African Government (SAG), was that laid down by the Hague Communiqué: namely that they must create the necessary conditions for a start of dialogue by releasing Mandela and other political leaders and unbanning political organisations including the ANC. I made no headway with P W Botha on this central issue.

5. My talks with the State President were difficult. He was dismissive of my mission, and showed little willingness to comprehend, let alone accept any view of the world but his own. He was obsessed by what he saw as the failure of the West to acclaim what he had done, and betrayed no understanding of the gap between the changes he has so far contemplated and what the West expects of him. The State President would see and deal with Mandela, if at all, in his own time. He insisted that the ANC was dominated by Communists, with whom he would discuss nothing, now or in the future. Only if those ANC leaders who were not Communists would commit themselves to the abandonment of violence and to a peaceful constitutional process would he allow them back to South Africa. (The State President also floated the idea of a three-sided meeting between the SAG, other Southern African leaders and leaders of the EC.)

6. Pik Botha discussed the issues in more rational terms and managed to convey the tensions within Government between those like him who see clearly what is needed and those who think they can continue indefinitely to dictate the pace, extent and form of change. Pik's line was distinctly ambivalent. He complained that outside interference made change more difficult. The SAG were willing for a dialogue with

anyone who committed themselves to peaceful change and abandoned violence. But the ANC was virtually synonymous with the South African Communist Party; the South African Government had no intention of negotiating a takeover by Marxists. He also gave a brutal warning that the South Africans would make sure their neighbours suffered in the event of sanctions. Yet he also acknowledged the damage done to South Africa's image by the State of Emergency and so many detentions without charge; that sooner or later Mandela would have to be released and the ANC unbanned; that dialogue would have to encompass a fully representative range of black opinion; and that change was too slow for the world to accept. The problem, he made very clear, was that he could not convince his colleagues of this. But I myself was impressed by the clearness with which some other Ministers saw what action needed to be taken.

7. Notwithstanding the boycott by radicals, I managed to see a fair cross-section of the rest of South African society, black and white, including the leader of the opposition and other PFP MPs; black and white businessmen (both Afrikaans and English speaking); the Head of the Broederbond; representatives of anti-apartheid organisations such as Black Sash; judges and lawyers; academics; and the leaders (Mabuza and Buthelezi) of two of the self-governing black homelands.

8. I shall be circulating separately some of the more interesting records. Meanwhile, I found a remarkable degree of common ground for such a disparate selection of people:

- Acceptance of the need for fundamental change and for a leap of the imagination by the SAG if the present cycle of repression and violence was to be broken, coupled with scepticism whether P W Botha was capable of this.

- Acceptance that the release of Mandela and unbanning of political parties were prerequisites if there was to be any hope of a genuine dialogue in which the South African Government and blacks could work out arrangements for a system of government which commanded the support of the majority of the population.

- The crucial importance in this of changing P W Botha's conception of the ANC, as one of the African organisations which needed to be involved in any dialogue. Unless his vision of them as a Marxist-dominated body committed to revolutionary violence could somehow be changed, there was no chance of breaking the mould.

- Acceptance that if the South African Government maintained their present course, further economic measures were inevitable. Comprehensive sanctions might well put an end to the reform process, and would heighten confrontation and problems with neighbours.

- Recognition that the prospect of further sanctions has had some impact in South Africa. Indeed, there was some feeling that for the South African Government the threat was worse than the reality.

- The impact of sanctions would be limited and erratic for a considerable period. The SAG had prepared effective plans to circumvent them and to take punitive countermeasures against their neighbours.

9. I was also struck by the way in which the unacceptable aspects of the policies and practices of the SAG touched on the lives of even the most respectable people. For example,

- the Chief Minister of KaNgwane (one of the black homelands), who is widely respected for his moderation and is one of the few blacks with credibility in the nationalist camp who was willing to talk to me, argued that it was unreasonable for the SAG to insist that the ANC renounce their form of violence whilst continuing to maintain their own. The State of Emergency had led to thousands of people in KaNgwane either being detained, going into hiding or crossing into Swaziland or Mozambique.

- The SAG were trying to force him to join the National Statutory Council by reducing revenue to KwaNgane (which contrasted with P W Botha's claim of an overwhelming response to the proposal for a National Statutory Council).

- One of the leaders of Black Sash told me that half of the PFP Monitoring Group for Northern Transvaal, hardly a radical body, were in detention.

- Pillars of the business community whom I met spoke of the "crass stupidity" of locking up the leaders of the black trades union movement, with whom they had been able to establish good working relations.

- The (black) leader of the conservative National African Federated Chamber of Commerce told me that some of his Council Members had been imprisoned. His own wife had been detained. So too had the wife of

one of his colleagues apparently because she had been trying to have certain municipal services in her township restored after they had broken down. Any black person risked being detained and the police did not have to give reasons.

Talks in Neighbouring States

10. The serious effect on their economies of comprehensive sanctions was very much on the minds of the Governments of Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho:

- President Masire was clear about the impact South African countermeasures would have on Botswana, but was not willing to denounce sanctions. He was concerned at the prospect of South Africa's use of the transport monopoly to disrupt Botswanan exports.

- The Swazi Prime Minister told me that sanctions against South Africa meant sanctions against Swaziland.

- The Lesotho Government and King were similarly apprehensive. Lesotho was entirely surrounded by South Africa and depended on South Africa for almost one hundred percent of its imports, electricity and oil.

11. My second round of talks with President Kaunda on 24 July began with accusations of a conspiracy between the British and US Governments. But after his emotional outburst in public we had a more even-tempered private discussion during which I told him that his outburst had been wholly unwarranted. I sought to emphasise South African imperviousness to sanctions and the high risk of violence, cross border strikes and the onset of economic

warfare. None of this would produce a corresponding dividend in terms of faster change in South Africa. I suggested to him a form of words which I had distilled from my earlier talk with Pik Botha and which was based on the EPG approach: the South African Government should agree to release Mandela and other political prisoners, to unban the ANC and other political parties, and to enter into peaceful dialogue against a matching commitment from the ANC to call a halt to violence and to enter into peaceful dialogue. Kaunda agreed to consider this without commitment. I commended the same approach to President Masire and General Lekhanya.

12. I put this same idea to Pik Botha. Towards the end of my visit he gave signs of regarding it as a possible way out of the current impasse. But there was no evidence that President Botha was prepared to contemplate anything of the kind. Such a formula would be unlikely to commend itself to the black African side if it were seen to come from a Western or South African source. It might be different if, say, Kaunda was to take up the idea. We thus need to nurture it with care and discretion.

13. I also mentioned to President Kaunda, and later to President Masire, Botha's suggestion of a three-sided meeting (paragraph 5 above). Neither reacted, and I doubt whether it is a starter. The FLS, and most of our EC and Commonwealth Partners, would be likely to regard it as yet another SA device for buying time.

Conclusion

14. I pressed the SAG very hard to make the commitment needed if further measures against SA were to be averted. I left them in no doubt as to what was required or of the inevitable consequences if they did not move: given the pressures that were building up in the EC, Commonwealth, the US Congress, decisions on further measures were likely by the end of September at the latest.

15. I am pretty sure that Pik Botha and a number of others in and around government grasp the point. It was clear that he sees the advantage of drawing Mandela into the process of dialogue. Pik Botha also knows that moderates like Buthelezi will only particpate if Mandela is freed and the ANC are free to enter talks with the SAG if they wish (that they should actually do so is not a precondition for Buthelezi; but they must have the opportunity). Pik Botha also understands the damage done to SA interests abroad by the re-imposition of the State of Emergency and the detention without trial of so many people. But he does not speak for the SAG as a whole. The State President retains a dominant influence, and I detected no evidence that P W Botha or Heunis, the architect of the present reform programme, were prepared to grasp the nettle of creating the conditions for dialogue, let alone fundamentally altering the power structure.

16. My judgement therefore is that although Pik Botha and perhaps others are ready to move forward, the SAG is not yet willing to make the required leap of imagination. Their position is unlikely to evolve on any timescale likely to be of help to us, ie by late

September. The SAG appear to accept the inevitability of further measures. My impression is that they would almost welcome them as a relief from international pressures and as an opportunity to show the world that it is their neighbours and not South Africa that will feel the pain.

Implications for British Policy

17. We need to consider where this leaves us in terms of overall policy towards South Africa. Our immediate pre-occupation is the handling of the Commonwealth Review Meeting on 3-5 August, on which I am minuting separately. But it seems to me important for us to to take a medium-term view and not allow ourselves to be buffeted by day to day events.

18. Change in South Africa is bound to be a long haul. There will no doubt be further initiatives and further reverses. The need for change is very widely recognised within South Africa except at the highest level. But meanwhile there are bound to be further disagreeable incidents both internally and against South Africa's neighbours (eg counter-measures and/or raids).

19. I have been concerned during my visit at the extent to which the US and UK are seen as friends of apartheid. We know how mistaken this is. Nevertheless, the SAG contrive to present us as their closest friends and that together with our opposition to comprehensive sanctions has led to the perception that we are against any action that is likely to be effective. This is of course, nonsense; but it is a factor to be reckoned with. We need to steer a course which distances us more clearly from the policies of the SAG.

21. I am copying this minute to OD colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

30 July 1986

PRIME MINISTER

MG

OD: SOUTH AFRICA

The folder contains the Foreign Secretary's paper for OD and a note recounting his mission. You need not read the latter since he gave you the main points.

No paper is being circulated to Cabinet. You will report the conclusions of OD.

Neither the Lord President nor the Lord Chancellor can be at OD.

OD Paper

The OD paper is designed to make your colleagues' flesh creep by describing the Dreadful Consequences should there be no agreement at the Commonwealth Meeting. But apart from that it is not too bad. It suggests:

(a) that any decisions - including provisional ones - about further measures should be accompanied by a renewed commitment to get dialogue going;

(b) that we go for the post-dated cheque solution, that is the one in my note (readiness to take further measures in agreement with EC partners by end September if the South Africans have not moved, and other industrialised countries do likewise. You will want to underline that this is not automatic.)

(c) if necessary, some very limited selective measures now (the Annex is missing, but includes visas and a ban on the promotion of tourism.)

You might point out that the paper makes no reference at all to domestic political aspects, which are actually quite important!

Tactics

You will want to aim for a low-key discussion which leaves you the maximum flexibility for handling the Commonwealth meeting. I should keep off controversial themes which are bound to lead to argument with the Foreign Secretary, because (a) they will provoke the Chancellor and the Home Secretary into supporting him, and (b) it will be damaging to have stories of Cabinet/OD disunity. Anyway, the fact is that you will have the microphone at the Commonwealth Meeting and say what is necessary, so the most important thing is to avoid being tied down.

CDP

CDP

30 July, 1986.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

30 July 1986

From the Private Secretary

SOUTH AFRICA

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary continued their discussion of South Africa at a further bilateral meeting this afternoon.

The Foreign Secretary said that he would propose that we should make clear at the Commonwealth Review Conference that we were ready to take, in concert with other industrial powers, the measures foreshadowed in the European Council conclusions if the required steps had not been taken by the South African Government by the end of September. The Prime Minister stressed that this must be drafted in such a way to make clear that there was no automaticity. Chancellor Kohl had attached particular importance to this. The Foreign Secretary said that the drafting would be looked at carefully.

(CHARLES POWELL)

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 July 1986

SOUTH AFRICA

The Foreign Secretary reported to the Prime Minister earlier this afternoon on his recent visit to Southern Africa.

The Foreign Secretary said that he had presented the case for change through peaceful negotiation in South Africa as widely as possible to members of the Government as well as to representatives of all communities, and had stressed the need for early action on Mandela and the ANC if pressure for sanctions against South Africa was to be resisted. Unfortunately his final meeting with President Botha and the latter's subsequent press conference - of which we had not been told in advance - had been very unsatisfactory and damaging. Botha had been defiant, ill-mannered and truculent. He had not been prepared to give any credit at all to the United Kingdom or the United States for their attempts to work for peaceful change. Rather he had accused the Foreign Secretary at one point of forcing the pace on sanctions. A number of South African ministers were more open-minded and would probably like to accept the propositions which he had put forward although they were
anxious about embarking on discussions with the ANC without knowing where they would lead. They were aware of the distortion of the South African economy which had resulted from sanctions already imposed, and the economic penalties caused by South Africa's growing isolation. But although President Botha seemed increasingly isolated and reclusive, there seemed to be no way round him. In consequence, the prospects of any early progress were very bleak.

The Foreign Secretary continued that in his contacts with black leaders, he had found that none of them were willing to take part in discussions with the South African government without Mandela's participation. At the least he must be free to exercise the option to take part.

The Foreign Secretary said that he could not now recommend that he pay a further visit to South Africa in September, although we should leave open the possibility of such a visit if developments at the Nationalist Party Conference and the special session of the South African Parliament in August were, against his expectations, to

warrant it. In effect there was no point in his going back unless we received the plainest possible indication that what we wanted would be forthcoming. At the same time we should go on pressing the ANC and other black representatives to put forward proposals of their own in a form designed to exert the maximum pressure on the South African government.

The Foreign Secretary said that he had reached the view that continuous pressure applied in measured fashion from outside could contribute to change in South Africa. He believed that we should be ready to translate the commitments on further measures which we had accepted at Nassau and at the European Council into action. It was clear that the United States was likely to take additional measures very shortly. We should therefore be ready to say at the Commonwealth Review Conference that, if there had been no progress in South Africa towards meeting the Community's conditions by the end of September, we would recommend the adoption of the measures envisaged by the Hague European Council. Anything less would put our economic interests elsewhere in the Commonwealth at serious risk.

The Prime Minister said that the Foreign Secretary had done very well indeed on his mission and conducted himself with great dignity and patience, steadily putting to the South African government arguments which they had not chosen to hear or to heed. She recalled that we had not expected the mission to achieve great progress. It was inevitable President Botha would distance himself from any impression of reacting to external pressure. We should not rule out some movement in August. She remained extremely reluctant to envisage the adoption, let alone recommendation, of further economic measures since she was absolutely convinced that sanctions would not achieve internal change. Moreover the government's strong opposition to sanctions was receiving considerable support in the country. But we had agreed not to exclude further measures, as signals, at the end of the three month period if the EC as a whole was agreed upon them and other industrialised countries were equally committed to them. We should make clear at the Commonwealth meeting that we would stand by this commitment. But she would be reluctant to go further.

It was agreed to continue the discussion later.

(C. D. POWELL)

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CDP
357.

CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE BY MR SAM MOTSUENYANE, CHAIRMAN OF NATIONAL AFRICAN FEDERATED CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (NAFCOC), HMA'S RESIDENCE, PRETORIA, 0945 24 JULY 1986

Present:

Secretary of State
Sir Patrick Moberly
Mr Galsworthy
Mr Meyer
Mr Lewty

Mr Sam Motsuenyane
Mr MSP Kutumela
Mr Ramakobya

1. The Secretary of State invited Mr Motsuenyane to describe NAFCOC's history and current views. Mr Motsuenyane said that for 22 years NAFCOC had worked against great odds to establish a black involvement in South African business life. At the beginning blacks had not been allowed to form companies or to sell to whites. There had been a change of attitude by the SAG during the last 10 years. Blacks were now allowed to form companies and to develop their businesses beyond "Mom and Pop stores". Pressure still had to be maintained. The law still discriminated against the black business community. This contradicted the SAG's claim that South Africa was a free enterprise country.

2. As for the current situation NAFCOC, like all black organisations, was disenchanted with what was happening. The increased repression, illustrated by the State of Emergency, was regrettable and needed to be phased out. In response to the Secretary of State's question about the effect of the State of Emergency on NAFCOC, Mr Motsuenyane said that some Council members had been imprisoned. Mr Kutumela's wife had been detained for three weeks. She could be described as an activist to the extent that she had been involved in trying to have certain municipal services in her township restored after they had broken down, but basically any black person risked being detained and the police were not obliged to give reasons. Mr Kutumela said that NAFCOC were therefore concerned to see a greater climate of freedom in South Africa and hoped the Secretary of State would stress to the SAG the need to release Nelson Mandela and unban the political organisations. After all, the ANC had been banned originally for opposing the pass laws which the SAG had themselves now dismantled. After these two steps, there would need to be real

/negotiations

negotiations on a new constitution for the country; the current one which disregarded the existence of the major part of the country's population was not acceptable. The Secretary of State said that this was just what he had been telling the SAG. They must engage the blacks in negotiations, and to do so it was obviously necessary to release Mandela and unban the political parties. When he made this point that SAG had said that the ANC was only the South African Communist Party (SACP) in disguise. How did NAFCOC view that statement? Mr Motsuenyane said that the ANC had been a nationalist organisation from its foundation in 1912 until about 1960. Change had begun following the banning of the SACP in 1952 which caused some communists to join the ANC; not many, but sufficient to cause a split in that organisation. As repression had increased, the feeling had grown that unity of black organisations was essential. Mr Ramakobya stressed however that the ANC was not the SACP. In any case if the SAG could talk to President Machel, an avowed Marxist, why not to the ANC? South African blacks did not want to look eastwards but were forced to do so in current circumstances. Moreover the SAG equated anybody expressing anti-government views with communism.

3. The Secretary of State said that the SAG had also told him they could not negotiate without the ANC committing itself to halting violence. Mr Motsuenyane asked why it was necessary for the ANC to make such a commitment in advance. If Mandela were released he would be subject to the same laws as everybody else. The Secretary of State said this was why we had called for Mandela to be released unconditionally. Nevertheless the SAG continued to say they could not negotiate before such a commitment. Mr Motsuenyane pointed out that the SAG themselves engaged in violence towards the black community. The Secretary of State said that was why the Commonwealth Accord had referred to the need for a suspension of violence on all sides.

4. Mr Motsuenyane said that NAFCOC had seen sanctions as a last resort. They had tried everything else but were not getting any results from persuasion. In the past they had not been disinvestment as a logical way of trying to bring about improvement. But it was born of a sense of frustration and the feeling that only when whites experienced the kind of sufferings which blacks had done for years that the SAG would change. NAFCOC itself had hitherto advocated a policy of conditional investment. They could not accept investment which had the effect of buttressing the system but welcomed that which increased black skills. The Secretary of State said that the European Code of Conduct was designed to do just that. Mr Motsuenyane said NAFCOC welcomed

/that

that, but wondered how realistic it was in present circumstances. Even black businessmen were now being attacked by many people in the black community. NAFCOC were trying to establish the reasons for this hostility: was it because they were seen as conforming to the system, or was there something else? If the situation deteriorated further the black business community would suffer much more than the white. It was not therefore prudent to take a position against that adopted in the black community generally. NAFCOC's Council was therefore expected to review soon its current policy of welcoming investment conditionally and he expected it to join the others in calling for sanctions. The Secretary of State asked if any of those present had suffered attacks personally. Mr Motsuenyane said that he was now living in a caravan since he had been driven from his house (though he suspected the police rather than the so-called "comrades" to have been responsible). His wife had also been detained. Mr Kutumela said that black businessmen were being hit from both sides so had to align themselves with the community. Those who said blacks would suffer from sanctions were merely making excuses. Black business would suffer more if there were no change of policy.

5. The Secretary of State said it was always the poor who suffered most. If sanctions were imposed by the outside world the SAG would respond with the introduction of sanctions against the FLS, who were very dependent on it for transport and communications. This would lead to further sanctions but the whites running the SAG would suffer least of all. Violence would increase on all sides, hence our urgency in urging negotiation. Mr Motsuenyane said it seemed to the blacks in South Africa that those with leverage over the SAG needed to pull the levers more vigorously than they had hitherto. Surely the USA, UK and FRG could bring the SAG to its senses. The Secretary of State said there was no sign that sanctions would have this effect. The SAG would just hit the FLS and become even more repressive internally. Mr Motsuenyane wondered how long the SAG could in practice survive in isolation. The Secretary of State said it could do so for a very long time. As NAFCOC knew only too well, the SAG had the weapons of repression. They could also heighten misery in the FLS. Those we were most anxious to influence would suffer least from sanctions. Hence we kept pressing for negotiations. Mr Motsuenyane said it seemed to NAFCOC that the Secretary of State's mission was the last chance to persuade the SAG to negotiate. Failure would confirm the views of those who had refused to meet him and make even bleaker the prospect of negotiations in the future. The Secretary of State must therefore make it clear to the SAG that if they did not agree to negotiate, they would suffer both

/externally

externally and internally. Blacks in South Africa believed that Western countries did not appreciate how badly they were suffering. The difference between what the SAG was doing and what had happened to the Jews under Hitler was one of degree not of kind.

6. The Secretary of State said the West did want to see apartheid changed and had taken steps to put pressure on South Africa. Both the Commonwealth and the EC were committed to considering further measures. The UK was reluctant to go down that road because we could see it leading to a further escalation of violence and intensification of suffering. Nevertheless if the mission failed, there would be agreement on further measures. The SAG would respond to them as he had earlier described.

7. The Secretary of State asked for NAFCOC's views on the proposed National Statutory Council (NSC). How representative were those whom the SAG would appoint? Mr Motsuenyane said the black members would include the Presidents of the non-independent homelands and 10 represnetatives from Community Councils, all initially appointed by the SAG. NAFCOC would have nothing to do with it. The Secretary of State asked how authentic the homeland leaders were, eg Buthelezi. Mr Motsuenyane said that his early membership of the ANC had given him credibility but his image had deteriorated because of his position as a homeland leader. The black membership of the NSC would consist of only a few opportunists. Mr Kutumela asked how the Secretary of State's mission differed from the work of the EPG. The Secretary of State said he was taking over where the EPG left off. Because the SAG had not accepted the Group's negotiating concept as Mandela had done, he was trying to persuade them to change their mind. He has pressed the need to negotiate in his talks with both Bothas. When asked about prospects for success, he said he had some hope, but realised it would be very difficult.

Pretoria
July 1986

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397

2

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND PROFESSOR PIETER DE LANGE, RECTOR OF THE RAND AFRIKAANS UNIVERSITY AND PRESIDENT OF THE BROEDERBOND

Present

Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe
Sir Patrick Moberly
Mr E A J Fergusson

Professor de Lange

1. Professor de Lange said that he would speak for the 15-16,000 Afrikaners in the Broederbond who, since the 1982 split, represented those who believed that the interests of Afrikaners could only be established within the interests of South Africa as a whole. There was concern at what were perceived as attempts to take away from Afrikaners any opportunity to determine their own future. Nevertheless he believed that there was general acceptance of powersharing as the basis of a negotiated settlement, provided that the Afrikaners were left with sufficient powers to protect themselves and their culture group (control over schools and language were especially sensitive).

2. Professor de Lange said that he had had talks with the ANC, most recently at a meeting in New York in June. There had been surprisingly little negative reaction in the Broederbond to his doing so; there was growing acceptance of the need for ANC participation at the negotiating table, subject to their committing themselves to abjuring violence. None the less, the negative impact of the ANC's communist affiliations should not be underestimated. He believed that the alliance between the SACP and the nationalist element in the ANC was an alliance of convenience: many nationalists had embraced Marxism as an instrument for the pursuit of social justice and not as a basic ideology. It was difficult to judge the weight within the ANC of committed Communists such as Slovo and Maharaj but their role was a source of confusion for Afrikaners thinking about ANC involvement in the negotiating process. The Secretary of State commented that all nationalist movements tended to have their communist elements. We saw the ANC as only one of the black representative organisations, but they were important and people such as Tambo and Mandela clearly displayed wisdom and moderation. One should discriminate between the radical ideologists and those who genuinely wanted to discuss a stable future for South Africa. The best way of reinforcing the latter was by taking the major leap of releasing Mandela and the other political prisoners and unbanning the political parties.

/3.

3. Professor de Lange said that he believed that Afrikaners were ready for new thinking and for innovative leadership. Many members of the party and the government accepted the need to get the ANC to the negotiating table. The problem was how to get PW Botha out of the corner into which he had painted himself, given his very strong personal feelings. Professor de Lange believed that if PW Botha acted imaginatively he would find strong support in Cabinet and in the national party caucus, and such action would have a band-waggon effect. There would also be support from many English speakers (he counselled against identifying the English speakers with liberalism; some were among the most conservative elements in the population).

4. Professor de Lange said that, allowing for media exaggeration, there was genuine pressure on the right. On the other hand he had been surprised how far Afrikaners, even in the most remote rural areas, had been prepared to go in accepting reform. But terrorist violence had a profoundly negative impact on such changes of attitude.

5. In response to the Secretary of State's arguments for more rapid movement, Professor de Lange emphasised that in dealing with the present South African Government, one was dealing with a group with all the prickly, defensive/aggressive characteristics of a minority. If Afrikaners felt that their existence was being put into question then they would rally to each other and there would be a "hell of a mess". He could not exclude that possibility. There was massive new external pressure on South Africa but the emotional terms in which such pressures were expressed provoked a matching emotional reaction in Afrikanerdom, and could only lead to increasing obstinacy.

6. Professor de Lange said that the essential political change had to come from within the President himself. He spoke to PW Botha fairly often and had no doubt of his honesty of purpose in pursuing the reform programme. PW had revealed "a feeling of sadness" that he could not move the process along faster. In talking of Mandela he had said "we are both old men". The two main psychological blocks on the President's part were his pathological fear of 'communism' and his absolute rejection of revolutionary violence as a means of pressure. PW Botha also believed that he had to stay in office to carry through the reform process because, in the absence of any obvious successor, there would be a prolonged struggle for the succession. The need for change was so urgent that such delay was unacceptable.

7. The Secretary of State restated his view that other black African organisations had a part to play. It was impossible to predict now what the ultimate balance would be between the parties but without the participation of the banned organisations he could not see how violence in the townships could be brought under control. Professor de Lange said that a vital question

/was

was how far, for its part, the ANC was ready to join the negotiating process as only one of a number of parties. So far they continued to insist that they alone represented the black people. The Secretary of State said that the position of the Commonwealth and of the European Community was clear on this: we did not admit that the ANC was the sole authentic voice.

8. Professor de Lange accepted the Secretary of State's view that the longer the process of reform was protracted the greater the influence of the revolutionary left; that had been his own experience in the university field, where the rhetoric of Marxism was becoming more commonplace. Indeed divisions in the black community across the generation divide were leading older people to adopt radical terminologies in order to preserve any credibility with and influence over younger people, for instance in the faculties and among those involved in the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee. The Secretary of State commented that this process tended to bring everyone down on the wrong side of the ideological divide.

9. The Secretary of State said he hoped that the South African Government could get away from emphasis on the semantics of violence. Professor de Lange said that he had told the President that in saying that no negotiation had ever been undertaken while violence was continuing he was talking nonsense. The Secretary of State said that if the Government took the brave decision to release Mandela and unban the parties, he believed that countries outside South Africa could help get the participants to commit themselves to peaceful discussion around the table.

10. The Secretary of State said that he wanted to counteract the impression that we were seeking to wish communism on South Africa. The truth was that we believed that the faster the move to dialogue the better was the chance of counteracting communism - an ideology which in recent years had been seen increasingly to have no convincing message to offer.

11. The Secretary of State referred to the homelands policy and the decision to give KwaNdebele independence. This made the Government's other protestations in a favour of change seem incredible. Had it really been thought through?
Professor de Lange, with some apparent embarrassment, said that the decision had derived from the original apartheid philosophy which itself could only have been evolved by someone of Verwoerd's monumental ignorance of economics.
The reality was, however, that the homelands were political entities which would be part of the scene for the foreseeable future, though he did not disagree with the Secretary of State that that might be as no more than administrative units in a wider structure and not as independent components.

/12.

12. In response to a question, Professor de Lange said that Xhosa influence in the ANC was still dominant (Mandela, Tambo, Mbeki etc). Other groups were represented, from among black, white, coloured and Indian groups, but the majority in the Executive was still strongly Xhosa. He accepted, however, that young people from all tribal backgrounds were joining the ANC.

13. Summing up his own views, Professor de Lange said that he feared that the South African Government were at present trying to finesse the influence of the far right and the far left and to build up enough support in the centre of the political spectrum to allow negotiations to take place. But history showed how difficult this was. Any peaceful settlement needed to bring in the extremes. It was essential to get this insight into the mind of PW Botha - his present policy was based on a fallacy.

CDP
30/7

MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND DR G VILJOEN (MINISTER OF EDUCATION) IN PRETORIA AT 0800 ON 29 JULY 1986

1. Dr Viljoen said that sanctions had major implications for education policy, since they affected the economy and thus the size of the cake to be shared out: the more sanctions were imposed, the smaller would be the education budget's share of the cake. South Africa faced a high population growth rate, and a declining drop out rate from the schools: school rolls were expanding fast. The Government was taking steps to spend more money on black education, though it had faced the valid criticism during the recent Parliamentary session that as of now the majority of new money was still going to white schools. A major reason for this was that a lot of new money was going on teachers salaries: because salaries were determined by qualifications the lion's share was going to the better qualified whites. In real terms less money would be spent next year on white and Indian education than had been spent last year, but there would still not be enough for the blacks and coloureds. Sanctions would only make matters worse. South Africa faced the problems in the education field which could be found all over Africa: an education budget growing faster than GNP, and excessive population growth - together in her case with a large influx of school age children from neighbouring countries.

2. The average teacher/pupil ratio in white schools was 1:20. This was far too favourable, and needed to be brought down to 1:30. Another aim was to achieve parity of white/black salaries at the lowest teaching levels, as well as higher up the scale.

3. The Secretary of State acknowledged that important steps towards political reform had been taken. But they had not been taken with the consent of the leaders of the black majority, and as a result they were insufficient either to prevent growing black violence inside the country or international pressure for sanctions. That was why the burden of his song was that the SAG must now take the plunge, with all the risks that entailed, by releasing Mandela et al and unbanning the black political parties. The ANC must be brought into a process of peaceful dialogue. In the absence of such changes, pressure from the rest of the world would go on increasing, and there would be further measures from every quarter. The SAG had a major advantage in the current Reagan/Thatcher/Kohl combination, but that would not last forever. In the US Senate, Lugar seemed likely in any case to propose new measures before very long.

4. All sanctions were economically destructive, but they were being taken nonetheless because the SAG had not done enough to satisfy the international community; it was up to them to summon up the fresh reserves of courage that were necessary. He fully understood the SAG's worries about the ANC, which did contain some Communist elements. But the ANC did also express the basic discontent of the black nationalist. HMG would play its part by

/pressing

pressing the ANC and Kaunda et al to deliver their share of the bargain, but the key was in the attitude of the SAG.

5. Dr Viljoen said he fully appreciated the Secretary of State's basic point. However he saw two central difficulties. One was that the willingness of black leaders to enter into negotiations had been diminished by their feeling that radical change was now inevitable: they saw the SAG as being under such heavy pressure from outside that it would be bound to capitulate in the very near future. The extent of the pressure from outside was thus not making it any easier to end the impasse. Second, some way had to be found of ensuring that all black leaders had a chance to enter into negotiations. That was considered important by Buthelezi, and was indeed a very, very high priority. HMG could help in this area, by trying to bring about a situation in which genuine freedom of choice could be made possible: the circumstances in which negotiations would take place must not include intimidation and threats of violence. Moderate blacks must be allowed a voice. There must be a genuine freedom to negotiate.

6. The Secretary of State said he very much agreed. That concept had been central to the approach of the EPG, and had been accepted by Mandela, though not yet by the ANC. HMG were pushing it hard in their dialogue with the ANC.

7. A major problem was indeed that black expectations were so high. Many thought that all that was necessary was one last heave. HMG stressed to all their interlocutors the extent to which that view was quite mistaken (Dr Viljoen expressed keen appreciation). But this high level of expectations meant that it was essential for the SAG to adopt a position of leadership. At some point they must surprise the black leaders, and jolt them out of the mistrust of the SAG which was now (as a result of (a) the raids during the EPG's mission and (b) SAG policy over Namibia) very deeply ingrained.

8. Dr Viljoen said he took that point. Whatever happened in South Africa had to be the result of action taken by the SAG. There would inevitably be high risks in any initiative, but they could be reduced to more acceptable levels if the risks for moderates in taking part in the negotiating process could also be reduced, by the ANC committing themselves to non-violence. The threat of violence must be reduced, though it could not be eliminated ("I grant you that").

9. The Secretary of State pointed out that the ANC would argue that the SAG too would always have available the option of having recourse to violence. That was why there needed to be a matching commitment by the SAG. He hoped that the main focus of argument would in any event concern the substance of what was at issue, and not mere semantics.

/10.

10. Dr Viljoen asked if we had thought of calling the SAG's bluff, by asking them to accept negotiations on the basis of non-violence in order to see if they were prepared to make meaningful progress. The Secretary of State said that he had conducted his talks with black leaders with precisely that end in mind. He then read out the formula he had put to Kaunda. The tragedy was that the SAG could not quite make the jump to letting Mandela out. The SAG too could call the ANC's bluff, by inviting them to come to the negotiating table. Once they were out in the open the hand of the moderates among them - by no means all of them were Marxists - would be greatly strengthened. Dr Viljoen said he did not think that the fact that there were Marxists among the ANC should scare the SAG off.

11. Mr Fergusson asked how far domestic political constraints made it difficult for the SAG to release Mandela. Dr Viljoen said that there was general acceptance of the need for power-sharing but still major reservations about letting out Mandela - though it would not be a serious problem if the right formula could be found.

12. Mr Fergusson asked if a stable constitutional formula could be found without taking the extremes into account. Dr Viljoen said he had considerable doubts about that. The important point was that the ANC had to be given the option of taking part in negotiations. His experience in the Namibian context had been that once the political system had been opened up, a meaningful number of SWAPO moderates had returned from exile and made themselves felt. The same would happen with the ANC. The sooner Mandela was out of prison, the better. It was a very high priority to find a formula which would make his release possible.

13. The Secretary of State said that the reluctance of any government to act under threat was perfectly understandable. But it must be for the SAG to take steps to reduce the pressure on them: no-one could achieve that by acting from the outside.

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Mr Budd

CDP 30/7.

2 errors v. unlikely

SECRETARY OF STATE &
SUMMARY RECORD OF MEETING WITH/JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, 27 JULY

Present:

Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Sir Patrick Moberly
Mr EAJ Fergusson
Mr AC Galsworthy
Mr Justice Goldstone
Professor Dugard
Mr Browde
Mr Chaskelson

1. The Secretary of State explained the purpose of his mission. Mr Goldstone said that in his personal view sanctions of some kind were inevitable, and that being so they should be used with surgical precision and not as a club. The SAG was not contemplating changes to the power structure, but only to the discriminatory rules. The latter would not in itself mean the abolition of apartheid. Mr Browde added without the unbanning of the ANC and freeing of the detainees there was no prospect of negotiation: he feared that sanctions would not change the SAG's attitude, but they would cause suffering. Mr Chaskelson said that sanctions were seen as supporting the SAG, and the SAG did its best to foster this picture, particularly by representing the UK and the US as allies of the SAG.

2. In his view the most effective sanction would be cutting of air traffic links, thus forcing South Africans to transit via Harare. There were no serious economic repercussions, but it would have a considerable impact. In his view the Government would give way only to pressure, and that really meant internal pressure. External pressure probably would not do the trick. Sir Patrick Moberly asked on whom this pressure should be exercised. Mr Dugard said that it should be exercised on that section of the community which was ambivalent. A cancellation of direct air links would impact on the business community, and force them to put pressure on the Government. Mr Chaskelson said that forcing the Government to rely on Harare would to some extent lessen the leverage which the SAG at the moment had on neighbouring countries.

3. Mr Dugard said that one reason why the US and the UK were associated in the popular mind with the SAG was the continuing veto of mandatory sanctions at the UN. We should perhaps shake the SAG out of its complacency by allowing a further limited mandatory sanction to be passed at the UN. The Secretary of State pointed out that there was already a mandatory ban on arms sales.

4. Mr Dugard suggested that more legitimacy needed to be given by foreign governments to the ANC. This was the way to divide Afrikanerdom: the Afrikaner business community would be particularly susceptible to influence. The moderate whites were already themselves in contact with the ANC. Mr Browde said that the image of the ANC suffered because nothing they said could be

/quoted

quoted under the present law. Thus their views and intentions were never made clear. It was probable that given the chance Tambo would say that he was against violence, and this would do something to reduce the fears of the white community. Mr Dugard added that at present there was no pressure on the ANC to give a clear view of what it was they wanted: if they were forced to take part in a responsible political process, they would be likely to become more reasonable.

5. The Secretary of State asked whether it was true that there was a strong Xhosa bias in the ANC. Mr Browde said that the ANC now had fairly general support, especially among the young. In his view 7 out of 10 blacks would probably vote for them.

6. Mr Goldstone said that he was visiting the detainees on a systematic basis, and had seen 80% of them in the last 3-4 weeks. He was very struck by the lack of political sophistication among those detained. They tended to be angry young people and the middle-class man in the street, and very ordinary people indeed. The Secretary of State asked why the Government was detaining such people. Mr Browde said that they were simply casting the net as wide as possible. They hoped that if these people were removed more moderate people would replace them. In fact the effect was often the opposite: with the influence of their leaders removed those left behind became if anything more disorderly.

7. The Secretary of State asked whether most of the detainees were taken from the cities. Mr Dugard said that it was just as bad in the rural districts and in the homelands. There were massive detentions all over the West and East Cape. The situation might be a little better in Natal because of Buthelezi.

8. Mr Goldstone said that his visits to the detainees enabled him to help their families a bit, but there was nothing he could do to get them released. The main virtue in what he was doing was that the police knew that he might appear at any moment and were somewhat constrained by this.

9. Mr Goldstone said that it might help if there was more contact between the British legal fraternity and their counterparts in South Africa. Mr Browde said that the US already gave some aid to legal associations in South Africa. The Secretary of State asked whether Britain could do more in this respect. Mr Browde said that there were some black legal organisations which could do with assistance especially in the East Cape: he mentioned the Democratic Lawyers Association. He said that he would provide details to the Embassy. Mr Dugard said that it was very important to give both sides faith in the legal system. It was interesting that the blacks did ~~not~~ quite frequent recourse to the courts, the UDF in particular.

/10.

10. The Secretary of State asked what view they took of the concept of independence for the homelands. Mr Dugard said that the SAG now realised that there was no prospect of international recognition of Bophuthatswana and the other homelands, though legally it could not be challenged. The idea of independence for KwaNdebele was absurd: they had no idea why the SAG was proceeding with it.

MR. INGHAM

SOUTH AFRICA

I have discussed a line for the press with the Prime Minister. You might make the following points:

(1) She is very grateful to the Foreign Secretary for carrying out his mission with such patience and steadiness. He will have made clear our detestation of apartheid. The South Africans will also have heard the arguments for change presented lucidly andpersuasively.

(2) He will be reporting to her personally later today.

(3) It is no secret that the South Africans dislike outside interference and their immediate reaction is no great surprise. But we need to see to what extent the points made by the Foreign Secretary sink in and are acted upon in practice. We are interested in results - release of Mandela, unbanning of the ANC. There are particular opportunities for the South African Government to move during August and September (i.e. the party congress, etc.). The European Community will assess the situation in late September.

(4) Any decisions on the way forward must wait until after the Foreign Secretary has reported to Cabinet. But it is no less true than before that sanctions are not effective in securing internal reform.

(C. D. POWELL)
30 July 1986

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

South Africa

We need a line for Bernard to use this morning. I suggest something on the following lines:

(1) Of course the outcome of the Foreign Secretary's mission so far is disappointing;

(2) but we can't reach judgements on a day to day basis. It was no secret that the South Africans resent and dislike outside interference. Or that President Botha was likely to say so.

(3) the proof of the pudding..... We shall watch

developments in South Africa over the next month or so very carefully. To see whether the ideas and proposals put by the Foreign Secretary bear fruit in practice. There are important events in August (party congress etc). Let's see what they produce. If the South Africans want to say that they reach decisions on their own grounds, in their own time, rather than on the basis of outside advice, that's fine by us. We are interested in results.

④ It remains the case that sanctions are no answer - and more & more people recognise that reality. If there is to be progress it will be through negotiations, internal negotiations. And sanctions won't help

that process one for.

(5) But the South African government knows that the industrialized countries are bound to signal their disapproval if there is no progress. This was foreseen at the European Council, which said that further measures might be needed. Further measures – limited & selected measures – are indeed now more likely.

(6) But the aim of those who are interested in peaceful progress in South Africa, rather than in breakdown & chaos, must remain to create the conditions for negotiations. We shall use the remainder of the three months agreed by the European Council for that purpose.

If this is broadly right, perhaps you could let me have it back in the hall when you leave, so that I can give it to Bernard.

CDP

30/7.

GRS 1500

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OF 291645Z JULY 86

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY STATE PRESIDENT P E BOTHA ON 29 JULY 1986

BEGINS

''DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, REPRESENTING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS WELL AS THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER, VISITED SOUTHERN AFRICA.

I ALSO RECEIVED MESSAGES FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHERS IN CONNECTION WITH OUR DISCUSSIONS.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IS ALWAYS PREPARED TO RECEIVE PROMINENT REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND TO DISCUSS WITH THEM MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN.

WE ARE ALSO WIVMING TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT OUR COUNTRY, BECAUSE WE HAVE NOTHING TO HIDE.

IT HAS BEEN STATED BY SIR GEOFFREY THAT THE ''SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HOLDS THE KEY TO A SOLUTION'' AND THAT ''A LEAP OF IMAGINATION'' IS NOW NEEDED FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT.

WE FULLY REALISE THAT WE DO HOLD THE KEY, AND WE ALSO REALISE THAT NAWITH THAT KEY WE CAN OPEN THE DOOR TO PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE IN MULTI-CULTURAL COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE. BUT THERE ARE ELEMENTS WHICH OBSTRUCT US IN USING THIS KEY.

IN THIS REGARD I POSED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS TO SIR GEOFFREY, RELATING TO KEY I SUES, NOT ONLY IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS, BUT IN A HOST OF OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL.

IF WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT ON THESE QUESTIONS, AND THEIR ANSWERS, I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE THE KEY TO THE SOLUTION, AND THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO JOINTLY HELP IN SOLNING THESE PROBLEMS WORLDWIDE THROUGH A COMBINED LEAP OF IMAGINATION.

YET, INSTEAD OF ENCOURAGEMENT AND CO-OPERATION WE FIND THAT WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND TOTALITARIAN STATES ALIKE ARE NEITHER PREPARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE SINCERITY OF OUR EFFORTS NOR TO GRANT US THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE OUR GOALS.

WE ARE A DEVELOPING COUNTRY THAT HAS ACHIEVED MUCH TO BE PROUD OF AND WHEN SOUND ADVICE IS GIVEN TO US IN A SPIRIT OF GOODWILL, WE WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS AND TEST IT.

WE PREFER TO HAVE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER CIVILISED STATES, BUT WE CANNOT ALLOW UNCALLED FOR DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, WHICH COULD ONLY LEAD TO CONFUSION AND DETERIORATION OF RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OUR COUNTRY.

DURING THE DISCUSSIONS WITH SIR GEOFFREY I AVAILED MYSELF OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE HIM WITH INFORMATION ON THE VAST AND COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF REFORM CARRIED OUT IN SOUTH AFRICA. I ALSO EXPLAINED TO HIM TO WHAT EXTENT THE BLS COUNTRIES IN PARTICULAR, AS WELL AS THEIR NEIGHBOURING STATES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA ARE DEPENDENT ON SOUTH AFRICA.

I MENTIONED THE FACT THAT MORE THAN A MILLION FOREIGN WORKERS FIND REFUGE IN SOUTH AFRICA, BECAUSE THERE IS NO HOPE FOR THEM IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES.

FURTHERMORE, I EXPLAINED TO HIM TO WHAT EXTENT THESE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES ARE DEPENDENT ON THE CONTINUANCE OF OUR CUSTOMS UNION AND THAT WITHOUT IT, THEIR ECONOMIC POSITION WILL BECOME HOPELESS.

IN OUR DISCUSSIONS I ALSO REFERRED TO THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORM PROGRAMMES WHICH WE CARRIED OUT DURING THE PAST NUMBER OF YEARS IN THE FIELDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, SPORT, LABOUR, INFLUX CONTROL, PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR BLACKS, EDUCATION AND BUSINESS.

I SPECIFICALLY DREW HIS ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT AS A RESULT OF SOUND HEALTH POLICIES, THE LIFE EXPECTANCY AND INFANT MORTALITY RATE IN SOUTH AFRICA WAS BETTER THAN IN MOST OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

I ALSO APPEALED TO HIM THAT THE WORLD AT LARGE SHOULD TAKE A GREATER INTEREST IN THE REAL REDEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES, BECAUSE WE PREFER TO HAVE PROPERAUS NEIGHBOURS.

BUT DURING OUR DISCUSSIONS IT WAS QUITE CLEAR TO ME THAT SIR GEOFFREY, AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TWELVE NATIONS WAS NOT INTERESTED IN THESE POSITIVE POLICY MATTERS. HE CAME TO SOUTH AFRICA MAINLY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON US TO UNCONDITIONALLY RELEASE MR MANDELA AND TO UNBAN THE ANC.

I CONSQUENTLY TOLD HIM CANLIDLY THAT I WOULD BE READY TO LET MR MANDELA BE RELEASED THE MOMENT HE IS PREPARED TO ABANDON VIOLENCE THEREBY MAKING IT POSSIBLE TO HAVE PROPER DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF PEACE.

I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT AS FAR AS THE ANC IS CONCERNED, THERE CAN BE NO TALKS WITH THEM AFCA LONG AS THEY ARE UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL, AND THAT THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE IF THEY ABANDON VIOLENCE AND TAKE PART IN PEACEFUL PROCESSES IN SOUTH AFRICA.

I DREW HIS ATTENTION TO THE CRUEL MURDERS PERPETRATED AGAINST INNOCENT PEOPLE AND THE INTIMIDATION OF BLACK PEOPLE BY BLACKS UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE ANC AND THEIR COHORTS.

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I IMPRESSED ON SIR GEOFFREY THE NECESSITY THAT SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD BE LEFT IN PEATE SEMICLN THAT THERE ARE ENOUGH AUTHENTIC AND REPRESENTATIVE LEADERS IN THIS COUNTRY WITH WHOM WE CAN IRON OUT OUR FUTURE DISPENSATION SEMICLN THAT WE ARE MAKING HEADWAY SEMICLN AND THAT THE REACTION TO OUR PROPOSAL ABOUT THE NATIONAL COUNCIL IS SO OVERWHELMING THAT I AM OPTIMISTIC THAT WE WILL MAKE THE NECESSARY PROGRESS.

IN THE PAST WE HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE TO DEVELOP SOUTH AFRICA AND TO MAKE IT A SAFE HAVEN FOR MILLIONS OF ITS CITIZENS, AND A BEACON OF HOPE FOR THE TROUBLED NATIONS AROUND US. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO SO AND WE SHALL CONTINUE TO INVITE REASONABLE PEOPLE AND LEADERS TO CO-OPERATE WITH US, AS MANY OF THEM ARE ALREADY DOING.

IN PURSUANCE OF INTERNAL CO-OPERATION AND COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF SOUTH AFRICA, WE SHALL CONTINUE WITH DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION WITH PEACELOVING LEADERS OF ALL OUR COMMUNITIES, AS WE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST.

WE ARE RESOLUTELY COMMITTED TO DIALOGUE, AS PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO BROADEN DEMOCRACY IN OUR COUNTRY, AND IT IS OUR ASPIRATION TO CONTINUE WITH DIALOGUE IN OUR SEARCH FOR A COMMON DESTINY FOR ALL SOUTH AFRICA'S PEOPLES.

HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT DIALOGUE SHOULD NOT INEVITABLY HAVE THE END RESULT OF JEOPARDIZING THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE GROUPS AND COMMUNITIES IN OUR MULTI-CULTURAL COUNTRY, BUT THAT IT MUST BE AN INSTRUMENT OF HOPE, PEACE AND FREEDOM FOR ALL.

I TOLD SIR GEOFFREY THAT I LOOKED UPON HIS RECENT SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AS NOTHING BUT A THREAT AGAINST OUR COUNTRY.

IN CONNECTION WITH SANCTIONS AND THREATS OF SANCTIONS I INFORMED HIM AS FOLLOWS:

I QUOTE:

> ''IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IS THREATENING US WITH SANCTIONS (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) INTER ALIA BECAUSE SOME OF OUR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES HAVE URGED THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY TO DO SO. I WOULD IN TURN URGE YOU TO SUGGEST TO THOSE STATES THAT IT IS INCUMBENT ON THEM TO SET AN EXAMPLE BY THEMSELVES, INITIATING COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.''
>
> ''THEY SHOULD HAVE THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS INSTEAD OF CONTINUING TO ENJOY THE CONSIDERABLE BENIFITS OF CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA, WHILE LEAVING IT TO OTHERS TO PAY THE PRICE OF SANCTIONS.''
>
> ''THE PROSPERITY AND WELFARE OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION SHOULD BE A MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE WHOLE OF THE FREE WORLD, NOT ONLY TO THE REGION AS SUCH.''

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''I DERIVE NO SATISFACTION AT ALL FROM THE KNOWLEDGE THAT SANCTIONS WILL HURT OUR NEIGHBOURS IN THE REGION EVEN MORE THAN THEY WILL HURT SOUTH AFRICA.''

''I STAND READY THEREFORE TO MEET WITH OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICAN LEADERS, AS WELL AS LEADERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, FOR THE PURPOSE OF JOINTLY IDEQTIFYING AND ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS THAT AFFLICT US AND OTHERS IN THE REGION, IN SEEKING SOLUTIONS.''

''I WOULD NOT SEE SUCH AN ASSEMBLY AS IN ANY WAY REPLACING OR DETRACTING FROM THE INTERNAL REFORM PROCESS TO WHICH MY GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED AND WHICH WILL CONTINUE UNTIL OUR GOALS ARE REACHED.''

''A JOINT MEETING OF THIS NATURE THUS STRIKES ME AS POTENTIALLY MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN THE CURRENT PRACTICE OF PROMOTING HOSTILITY AND ALIENATION.''

LET THERE BE NO QUESTION ABOUT IT: I CAN NEVER COMMIT SUICIDE BY ACCEPTING THREATS AND PRESCRIPTIONS FROM OUTSIDE FORCES AND HAND SOUTH AFRICA OVER TO COMMUNIST FORCES IN DISGUISE.

I HOPE THIS HYSTERICAL OUTCRY OF CERTAIN WESTERN COUNTRIES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA WILL SONON PASS, BUT IF SANCTIONS ARE ALPLIED WITHOUT TAKING NOTE OF ALL OUR ENDEAVOURS TO BUILD THIS COUNTRY AND TO DEVELOP IT, THEN WE WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO PRESERVE OUR NATIONAL INTEREST.

IN THE PAST, COMPREHENSIVE MILITARY SANCTIONS WERE INSTITUTED AGAINST OUR COUNTRY. WE SUCCEEDED IN OVERCOMING THEM AND TODAY WE ARE EXPORTING SOME OF THE BEST WEAPONRY IN THE WORLD.

OIL SANCTIONS WERE APPLIED AGAINST US. THE STEPS WE TOOK ALSO PUT US IN A POSITION TO OVERCOME THAT PROBLEM.

I DON'T BELIEVE IN SANCTIONS. IF THIS WORLD IS TO BECOME A BETTER PLACE TO LIVE IN, NATIONS MUST LEARN TO DEAL WITH EACH OTHER IN A MORE JUST, RESPONSIBLE AND CIVILISED WAY. BUT IF WE ARE FORCED UNTIL OUR BACKS ARE AGAINST THE WALL, WE WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO STAND UP IN SELF-RESPECT AND SAY TO THE WORLD: YOU WON'T FORCE SOUTH AFRICANS TO COMMIT NATIONAL SUICIDE.

/LEAVE

LEAVE SOUTH AFRICA TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND WITH GODS HELP OUR COUNTRY CAN GO FORWARD IN FAITH.',

ENDS

MOBERLY

YYYY
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HOWE SPEAKS OUT

PRETORIA, TUESDAY - FOREIGN SECRETARY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE SAID TODAY AT THE END OF HIS ONE-WEEK MISSION FOR PEACE THAT DIALOGUE WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IN SOUTH AFRICA ''SO LONG AS BLACK LEADERS LIKE NELSON MANDELA ARE IN PRISON OR EXILE AND ORGANISATIONS SUCH AS THE ANC BANNED.

''WHAT IS NEEDED IS THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANGOVERNMENT SHOULD AGREE TO RELEASE MANDELA AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS TOUNBAN THE ANC AND OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES, AND TO ENTER INTO PEACEFUL DIALOGUE - AGAINST A MATCHING COMMITMENT FROM THE ANC TO CALL A HALT TO VIOLENCE AND TO ENTER INTO PEACEFUL DIALOGUE.

''IN SHORT, ECH SIDE NEEDS TOMAKE AN OFFER THAT THE OTHER CANNOT REFUSE,'' HE SAID.

SIR GEOFFREY, MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE INITIATIVE TO OPEN DIALOGUE REMAINED WITH PRETORIA. ''IT MUST BE FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO CARRY THROUGH WITH THAT PROCESS, IN A WAY WHICH CAN ENLIST THE SUPPORT AND INVOLVEMENT OF THE MAJORITY. THE KEY TO THE FUTURE IS IN THEIR HANDS.''

ASKED IF FOLLOWING HIS MEETINGS WITH OFFICIALS IN SOUTH AFRICA HE HAD SEEN THE MOVEMENT REQUIRED, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING MANDELA'S RELEASE, SIR GEOFFREY SAID: ''THE RESPONSES I'VE RECEIVED HAVE NOT YET ENABLED ME TO PROCLAIM THAT I HAVE MADE THE PROGRESS I WOULD HAVE LIKED.''

HE MADE THE TRIP ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, WHICH IS GETTING READY TO CONSIDER ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA TO SPEED THE END OF APARTHEID.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY MET FOR AN HOUR WITH PRESIDENT P.W.BOTHA BEFORE GIVING HIS FINAL NEWS CONFERENCE.

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BOTHA DISMISSES HOWE PLEA

PRETORIA, TUESDAY - PRESIDENT P.W. BOTHA SAID TODAY HE HAD REJECTED THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY'S PLEA FOR THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA AND DECLARED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD PREFER SANCTIONS TO ''NATIONAL SUICIDE.''

MR BOTHA, AT THE CONCLUSION OF SIR GEOFFREY HOWE'S ONE-WEEK PEACE MISSION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, SAID HE TOLD THE FOREIGN SECRETARY THAT MANDELA WOULD REMAIN JAILED AND THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS HE LEADS WOULD STAY BANNED UNTIL THEY RENOUNCED VIOLENCE AND PURGED THE ANC OF COMMUNIST LEADERS.

THE ONLY NEW SOUTH AFRICAN PROPOSAL REFERRED TO BY MR BOTHA WAS HIS OFFER TO MEET WITH LEADERS OF OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS TO DISCUSS ''THE PROBLEMS THAT AFFLICT US AND OTHERS IN THE REGION.''

HE SAID HE WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS SOUTH AFRICAN DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES IF THE OTHER LEADERS WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF THEIR COUNTRIES.

MR BOTHA SAID HE TOLD SIR GEOFFREY THAT THE WEST, IF INTENT ON PUNISHING SOUTH AFRICA, SHOULD AGREE TO TAKE SIMILAR MEASURES AGAINST ALL COUNTRIES WHERE RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION EXIST.

''I CAN NEVER COMMIT SUICIDE BY ACCEPTING THREATS AND PRESCRIPTIONS FROM OUTSIDE FORCES, AND HAND SOUTH AFRICA OVER TO COMMUNIST FORCES IN DISGUISE,'' HE SAID.

''I HOPE THIS HYSTERIAL OUTCRY OF CERTAIN WESTERN COUNTRIES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA WILL SOON PASS,'' HE SAID. ''I DON'T BELIEVE IN SANCTIONS ... BUT IF WE ARE FORCED UNTIL OUR BACKS ARE AGAINST THE WALL, WE WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO STAND UP IN SELF-RESPECT AND SAY TO THE WORLD: ''YOU WON'T FORCE SOUTH AFRICANS TO COMMIT NATIONAL SUICIDE.''

MR BOTHA AGREED WITH SIR GEOFFREY THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HOLDS THE KEY TO BEGINNING THE PROCESS TO PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION OF A CHANGE IN APARTHEID. BUT MR BOTHA SAID THERE ARE ENOUGH ''AUTHENTIC'' BLACK LEADERS TO DEAL WITH.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

29 July 1986

THE OAU AND SOUTH AFRICA

Thank you for your letter of 28 July proposing that the Prime Minister should send a message to the President of the People's Republic of Congo, in his role as new Chairman of the OAU.

The Prime Minister sees no point in such a message given what your letter says about President Sassou-Nguesso's strong line on South Africa. She thinks that it would only call forth a caustic reply. She has commented for good measure that, in any case, the draft message was muddled and grovelling and she could not have brought herself to send it.

Charles Powell

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 July 1986

COP

29/7

Dear Charles

Prime Minister's Message to Mr Malcolm Fraser

/ I write to enclose the original of Mr Fraser's reply to the Prime Minister's message about the Secretary of State's mission to South Africa.

Yours ever

Robin Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MALCOLM FRASER, C.H.

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11 JUL 1986

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you very much for your letter concerning Sir Geoffrey Howe's visit to South Africa. If Sir Geoffrey is able to achieve in this visit what the Commonwealth Group was unable to achieve, namely a change in heart on the part of the South African Government and a willingness to negotiate genuinely for the future against a background of the abolition of Apartheid, he will have achieved much.

It is important to understand why our own efforts to achieve a negotiation broke down. A critical stage had been reached at the end of April and early May. The Commonwealth Group, at that point, had some grounds for optimism that the South African Government would accept our negotiating concept. We also had confidence that the Black leadership would do likewise. Why, then, did the Government make a hard about-turn and set its face against negotiation? Not only that but also embark on a whole series of actions which have fouled the atmosphere for negotiations.

There are two reasons. First, there were always hard-line members of the Cabinet who believe that the South African Government could either tough it out or shoot it out with the Black population. At least one Minister indicated to us that if enough young terrorists were shot, their kind of normalcy would be restored.

It is clear that, since the bombing of three neighbouring States, the hard liners have been in the ascendancy. There is, however, another factor of great significance which probably served to tip the balance decisively against negotiation.

The South African Government has consistently stated that political rights would have to be exercised through racial groups. Its emphasis has always been on group rights and not on individual rights. That view of the future, of course, would maintain Apartheid but in another form. This view is unacceptable to the Black leadership who emphasize South African citizenship above all.

It is my view that the South African Government had believed that, at a negotiation it would be able to achieve some support for their own view of the future. If the Black leadership was divided into a number of different groups, it may be that one or two of the homeland leaders would have supported the Government's concept. However, in our discussions with Nelson Mandela, Chief Buthelezi and with other African leaders, we had formed the view that a freed Mandela would be able to unify African leadership.

The Government would have known that it would never be able to get support for its concept of the future in such circumstances. On the contrary, a unified Black leadership under Mandela, negotiating with the Government, would have exposed absolutely the mythology of the Government's claim for South Africa to be a nation of minorities and the falseness of the Government's suggestion that political rights should be exercised through racial groups.

Such a realisation, which would have been evident from reports of discussions we had with Chief Buthelezi and Nelson Mandela, which were obviously freely available to the Government, must have been a significant contributing factor in turning the Government against negotiation.

If you can accept this analysis, it is clear that something substantial will have to happen to alter the balance before the Government would be moved from its own view.

Against the background I have outlined, that would be a formidable task indeed.

We must keep in mind that ultimately there will have to be two or more parties to a negotiation. While the Commonwealth Group was confident that the Black leadership would have accepted our negotiation concept in the environment of April, I think that we would be equally confident that today they would not even consider it. What more must Government do, therefore, to re-establish the possibility of negotiation? I would think at the minimum a withdrawal of the emergency provisions and laws that have been put in place in the last few months, the lifting of censorship, together with the repeal of the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act, two fundamental legal pillars of Apartheid.

Perhaps a point of emphasis is needed here. If the Government were genuine in seeking to establish one South Africa, based on individual political rights, it should have no problem with the repeal of these two Acts. Economic forces would prevent any sudden exodus of Blacks from the townships or the homelands. How many could afford to buy a house in the white suburbs or establish a business in any of the central business districts? Economic forces would prevent any dramatic change in the face of South Africa for perhaps 20 years.

Can Sir Geoffrey Howe persuade the South African Government to undertake the measures I have indicated? It would be a notable, quite singular achievement if he could. I suggest that anything less could not be successful.

I am sure the South African Government will say that they are prepared to negotiate. That they have been calling for people to come and speak with them for well over a year. We know that the genuine leaders of the Blacks will not talk with the Government because the conditions for talks do not prevail. The Government, by its action, has made it plain that it only wants talks on its own terms. It will be important not to be bemused by South African diplomacy.

Chester Crocker has 5-6 years of unhappy history of discussion with the South African Government under his policy of constructive engagement. That also has achieved nothing. The South African Government has conceded nothing. Whatever agreements it had entered into, the Lusaka and Nkomati accords were broken almost before the ink was dry. The South African Government is very good at negotiating to no purpose. The time is past when any of us should continue to play their game.

In the next few weeks it will be important to bear in mind that the Black leadership has its own agenda, its own timetable. The Commonwealth leaders will be meeting early in August. This might be the most fundamental date of all. If the Commonwealth then decides to take no action, or if Britain does not join in concerted Commonwealth action, thus grievously damaging the effectiveness of whatever the Commonwealth could do, the Black leadership may well decide that, so far as effective support of the West is concerned, they are truly on their own.

That decision would be of some significance because, once it is taken, the Black leadership will be inevitably moved towards a total guerilla effort throughout South Africa. This would be a guerilla war Asia-style, in which soft targets are the prime targets attacked, in which every family, every school, every small community would soon be demanding full-time military protection.

Relatively few guerillas could dissipate the strength of the South African army quickly. They could not overcome the Government in a matter of months or even a year or two. That would take 8, 10, maybe 12 years, but it would happen. If anyone still believes that the Afrikaner and the Whites of South Africa can be secure behind that army, then they misunderstand the lessons of guerilla warfare of the last 50 years. I have some knowledge of these things as Minister for the Army and Minister for Defence and what I am saying is not opinion, it is factually based.

The kind of Government that would emerge from such a conflict would owe allegiance to its source of arms; it would probably be Marxist; the whole of southern Africa would be embroiled. The kind of Government that emerged would nationalise the

totality of Western commercial interest. Thus Western strategic and commercial interests would both be destroyed by this course. That would be the consequence of merely maintaining present policies.

Thus, what Commonwealth leaders do early in August will be of significance. It is possible, if Britain does not join the Commonwealth at that point, that the kinds of decisions that I have foreshadowed may be deferred until action from the United States becomes clearer. Before the Congress rises for their mid-term election, the same critical point will have been reached. Beyond that time the capacity for the West to influence events may have ended. In other words, the European Economic Community timetable of three months is too long and too late.

Let me mention one or two specific points.

The purpose of sanctions would not be to destroy the South African economy but they would need to be constructed in such a way to give the economy and the white population in particular a real body-blow. It is not a question of turning the screws gently and steadily, it is a question of a hard blow. When the banks took their action last year, based on commercial decisions, many white South Africans for the first time understood that their futures were under threat. Since then, whites have been more active in seeking to bring pressures on their own Government. The purpose of sanctions must be to cause them to re-enforce their efforts considerably. Incidentally, it is not sanctions but guerilla warfare that would really destroy the economy.

The measures mentioned in the letter sent to you jointly by my Co-Chairman and myself are the minimum measures that General Obasanjo and I considered necessary.

It is often said that sanctions hurt Blacks and therefore should not be imposed. While recognising that sanctions will have an impact on the lives of Blacks, I really do believe, Prime Minister, that this argument should be put aside. The Blacks are hurting now, every day, in South Africa. In many townships the unemployment is 60%-70%. Because the land is barren in the homelands, there is virtually no activity and unemployment is even greater. Further, the mere imposition of Apartheid creates most difficult conditions for the Black population.

Virtually all Black leaders, with the exception of Chief Buthelezi, say 'impose sanctions, we would sooner be hurt more now than to endure our present conditions for ever.' That is their decision. It is a legitimate decision. It is motivated by the same yearning for participation in one's own Government that has motivated forces for freedom around the world time and time again. It cannot be regarded as less legitimate because the yearning comes from Blacks in South Africa. The hurt done to Blacks through sanctions will be nothing compared to the otherwise inevitable loss of life and destructions caused by civil and guerilla war.

Unfortunately, the South African Government has made things more difficult for itself by falsely slandering the African National Congress. The best description of the ANC has been provided by Professor Lodge of Witswatersrand University. He concludes that, even though there are some Communists within the ANC, there are not as many as the Government claims. It is basically a pragmatic organisation, committed to national purposes and objectives. Indeed, in the condition of South Africa, it may be a wonder that more Blacks have not joined the Communist Party. It is quite clear, however, that, if something is not done to break the present circle, the Black leadership will be driven towards the Soviet Union and her satellites for arms. The West, by inaction, is quite capable of making a present of southern Africa to the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, a Government which included Mandela, Tambo, Buthelezi and other Black leaders would be largely pragmatic. I doubt very much if it would embark on any major course of nationalisation. We need to remember the Freedom Charter was written a very long while ago, before collectivist policies had been demonstrated to fail for most of southern Africa. It would be naive to suggest that lessons that have been learned across the entire continent have not carried weight with the leadership of the ANC.

You mention in your letter to me that we must be careful not to force the South African Government into the laager where he will refuse to budge his position. I have a contrary view of the Afrikaner character which I believe should be considered and which, in my view, is reinforced by the lessons of British history. The Afrikaner is stubborn, he is determined. He will not be dissuaded from his own chosen course by reasoned argument or quiet diplomacy, even if it is called constructive engagement. He will only be dissuaded from his own course by pressure and often extreme pressure. Misunderstanding of this point has hampered the West's dealings with South Africa over decades. We have accepted their dis-information and in our own minds made it reality.

At the conclusion of your letter you asked if General Obasanjo and myself feel able to lend such support and encouragement as we can to Sir Geoffrey's visit. I take that to mean can we persuade the Black leadership to meet Sir Geoffrey.

I do not believe we could be successful in such a venture because the Black leadership regard this visit and the decision of the EEC as an attempt to delay and to divert consideration of our own report.

Further, the visit must be judged in the context in which the Black leadership has become very sceptical of British objectives, simply because of Britain's repeated objections to sanctions.

Incidentally, it is currently more sceptical of the U.S. policy, not only because of the President's stated attitude to sanctions but also because of the US support for Savimbi. That act has virtually destroyed US influence in southern Africa.

There may well be a time when whatever influence General Obasanjo and I have with the Black leadership will need to be used in purposes capable of success.

I regret that, in my judgment, to seek to use that influence on this occasion would only depreciate whatever credit we had.

I earnestly ask you, Prime Minister, to heed the arguments that I have put in this letter and hope very much that Britain will feel able to join all other members of the Commonwealth in full-blooded support for stern measures when the leaders meet in August.

Nobody can guarantee that substantial economic measures will work. I personally believe there is a reasonable chance that they will. I also believe they represent the last remaining option for major states in the West to exercise influence in a cause which is just but, perhaps more to the point, from their own national perspective, is indeed in their own self interest.

My warmest good wishes.

Malcolm Fraser

(Malcolm Fraser)


29. VII

MR POWELL COP 29/7

The Prime Minister has seen the attached, and her note is self-explanatory.

I am therefore passing the papers to you.

SHANA

29.7.86

A Scenario for Change

ANTHONY SAMPSON

As the debate about sanctions against South Africa reaches a new peak, both sides are putting forth doomsday scenarios. The pro-sanction lobby warns of the genocide that will follow if blacks are left to the mercies of the Afrikaner military. Their opponents warn that sanctions will cause starvation and misery. Both sides fear that South Africa could descend into the kind of economic and political chaos that has plagued some black African states. Yet they cannot offer a realistic, attractive scenario for continued white rule.

But will the imposition of sanctions necessarily cause greater long-term suffering? After revisiting South Africa just after the new state of emergency was declared, I am more convinced that sanctions—provided they are rapid and decisive—could open the way to a peaceful solution, and stop the slaughter.

What is very clear inside South Africa is that sanctions already are working—but in a way that provides no effective political leverage. As one leading Johannesburg businessman told me, "At present we have the worst of both worlds. Financial sanctions began when the banks pulled out last year. Together with boycotts, they are slowly undermining the economy. But they have no political clout."

Sanctions could open the way to a peaceful solution in South Africa

The argument that sanctions will drive the Afrikaner further into the laager is not supported by the record. After foreign bankers precipitated a debt crisis last August, President Botha promised to step up reforms and abolish the pass laws, and nearly released Nelson Mandela in January. He left no doubt that he was scared of sanctions. The sudden imposition of the state of emergency showed every sign of confusion rather than decisiveness: it made no sense to legalize labor unions and then to arrest union leaders, to talk of reform and enforce repression. It was a desperate last bid to call the bluff of the sanction lobby. If the West allows that bluff to be called, it will only lead to more repression and defiance.

Imposing sanctions—provided they are orchestrated with defined objectives—could open the way to a transition that need not lead to economic or political chaos. There is one scenario for South Africa that offers some hope for a peaceful transition. It goes something like this:

1. Immediate sanctions are imposed in the most sensitive areas—including the withdrawal of airline landing rights and government visas—making clear that Western nations are no longer bluffing.

2. The economic effects of that move, including a further flight of capital and a sharp fall in the rand, at last show whites that they cannot hope for any economic upturn, or for any assistance from their overseas friends.

3. The deepening economic crisis before the next rescheduling by the banks in early 1987 gives Western governments additional leverage. It also provides Pretoria with a harsh choice: either to default—and opt out of the international system—or to accept the Western terms for financial support, which include releasing Mandela and legalizing his organization, the African National Congress (ANC).

4. The cabinet, which was closely balanced before the state of emergency, tilts back toward the liberals, who speed up President Botha's retirement and elect a successor who appears to be intransigent but prepares for compromise.

5. The cabinet releases Mandela, who appeals to South African nonracial patriotism, speaking partly in Afrikaans. He attacks the extremists in the black townships. He appeals for Western financial support. And he calls for a national convention embracing all groups—including the right-wing parties and the Zulu leader Gatsha Buthelezi.

6. Mandela attracts support from whites, including many Afrikaners, in much the same way that Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta won support from whites after his release from prison 25 years ago.

7. Parliament realigns with a centrist party committed to a national convention, which is then summoned. Mandela and the ANC insist on "one man, one vote" but dissociate themselves from the mounting excesses of the "comrades" in the townships. The ANC suspends violence and supports tough measures against both black and white bitter-enders.

8. A massive reconstruction plan is launched by a consortium of international bankers, channeling funds into the black townships, and subsidizing emigration schemes to countries that welcome Afrikaner emigrants.

9. The first elections under universal suffrage, in the 1990s, return President Mandela with a broad coalition, including a multiracial party backed by big business. The extreme parties of right-wing Afrikaners and left-wing blacks organize sabotage and sporadic strikes, but are firmly suppressed by a new, multiracial police force.

This scenario has one indispensable ingredient: Nelson Mandela. He has the unique ability to moderate and defuse an otherwise uncontrollable crisis. And he made clear to the Eminent Persons Group that his priorities after his release would be to reassure the white minority, and to limit black expectations. Only he could achieve those objectives.

But time is running out. Though Mandela is in excellent health ("like a warrior," as his doctor described him to me), he is now 68. Only unambiguous sanctions will persuade the Pretoria government to release him: to throw away that weapon is to condemn him to jail. This scenario may seem optimistic, but it is not unattainable. All the other scenarios spell disaster.

Anthony Sampson was editor of the black magazine Drum in Johannesburg in the early 1950s and has frequently visited South Africa since then.



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CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 July 1986

Prime Minister
The idea of a letter is a good one. But the draft is horribly long-winded. I started to amend it but gave up.
I attach an alternative version for you to sign.
Dear Charles
Agree to sign?
CDP 28/7.

The OAU and South Africa

Mrs Chalker has been considering whether to extend our efforts to explain our South African policy to more influential African Heads of State/Government. The Prime Minister has already sent a message (on 10 July) explaining our policies to President Diouf as present Chairman of the OAU. President Sassou-Nguesso of the People's Republic of the Congo is likely to be elected to succeed President Diouf at the OAU Summit opening in Addis Ababa today.

President Sassou-Nguesso is known to take a strong line against South Africa and against economic links with South Africa (for example his Government has closed shops down when it has discovered them selling South African products). Nevertheless Mrs Chalker thinks it would be in our interests to ensure that the President is made fully aware of our policy and the reasons for it. There is no reason to suppose that President Diouf will necessarily do this for us.

I attach accordingly draft telegrams to Addis Ababa containing instructions and the text of a proposed message from the Prime Minister.

(Charles - Surely this does not will only call forth a caustic reply especially Robert (Culshaw) in view of the strong line the Minister has taken. CDP

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

OUT TELEGRAM

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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
TC	2	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEAT	3	
FM	4	FM FCO
TO	5	TO DESKBY Z ADDIS ABABA
TELNO	6	TELNO
OF	7	OF Z JULY 86
AND TO	8	INFO IMMEDIATE BRAZZAVILLE, KINSHASA, PRETORIA (FOR
	9	SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
	10	
	11	
	12	FCO TELNO 173 AND KINSHASA TELNO 293: OAU AND SOUTH AFRICA
	13	
	14	1. On the assumption that President Sassou-Nguesso will
	15	be elected as the new Chairman of the OAU at the opening
	16	session on 28 July, please arrange to pass to him as soon
	17	as possible thereafter the message in MIFT from the Prime
	18	Minister.
	19	
	20	HOWE
	21	
	22	
	23	YYYY
	24	MAIN
	25	PS
///	26	PS/MRS CHALKER
//	27	PS/PUS
/	28	MR DEREK THOMAS
	29	MR E FERGUSSON

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		Catchword: MR REEVE	
File number	Dept: PRIVATE OFFICE	Drafted by (Block capitals): R N CULSHAW	Telephone no: 233 4641
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials Date/time		
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

XY 48 (REV)

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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TO 5 TO DESKBY Z ADDIS ABABA
TELNO 6 TELNO
OF 7 OF Z JULY 86
AND TO 8 INFO IMMEDIATE BRAZZAVILLE, KINSHASA, PRETORIA (FOR
9 SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
10
11
12 MIPT: OAU AND SOUTH AFRICA: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF
13 PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE
14
15 1. BEGINS.
16 I [should like to] congratulate you on your appointment as
17 Chairman of the OAU and wish you every success in the
18 important and responsible task which lies ahead of you.
19 [I believe] it is particularly important that we should keep
20 in close touch with each other on the [grave] situation in
21 South Africa. As you know Britain currently holds the
22 Presidency of the European Community, and I should like
23 to share our thoughts with you.
24
25 We were [bitterly] disappointed by the breakdown of the mission
/// 26 undertaken by the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons,
// 27 who had achieved so much, and who were frustrated by the
/ 28 obduracy of President Botha and his Government. We were
29 [particularly] angered by the South African raids on

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neighbouring countries in May. However, as you will know, the Heads of the European Community Governments meeting at The Hague on 26/27 June came to the view, after the most careful consideration, that, despite all the difficulties, there was still a case for trying once more the road of persuasion in order to bring apartheid to an end through dialogue and a suspension of violence on all sides. We also agreed that the key move that is necessary to promote the genuine dialogue which we all want is for the South African Government unconditionally to release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and to lift the ban on the ANC and other political parties. It was agreed that it would be right to undertake a further one more diplomatic initiative to that end ~~and it was accordingly agreed that~~ for the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, should undertake a mission to Southern Africa in his capacity as President of the European Council of Ministers and with the full support of the Community.

As you will also know, Sir Geoffrey Howe is now in South Africa on the second ~~leg~~ stage of his mission. During the first ~~leg~~ stage he was able to explain to President Kaunda, Prime Minister Mugabe and President Machel that the European Community's purpose is to make a further effort to try to promote dialogue between the South African Government and representatives of the black population, and that his mission sought to build on the work of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. He explained that we are proceeding on the following basis:

/// - the present situation in South Africa cannot go on.
// Apartheid must give way to a non-racial fully representative
/ society as soon as possible.
- the South African Government has recently taken some

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steps towards the removal of apartheid. This should be acknowledged. But the changes need to be [much] faster and more far reaching.

- negotiations will end apartheid more quickly and spare more lives. Violence will slow change and prolong misery for years to come.

- the Community, including Britain, have already implemented a number of measures. They are studying certain further measures in case they might be needed. The idea that quote one last push unquote from outside, through comprehensive sanctions, would bring down apartheid is sadly an illusion.

- it is essential to take every chance to advance dialogue. The option of peaceful negotiations will not be available indefinitely.

The main purpose of Sir Geoffrey Howe's current visit to Southern Africa is to concentrate on the position of the South African Government which is the key to progress. He has made it clear that if, when the results of his visits to the area have been assessed, it is apparent that they have not led to tangible and substantial progress in South Africa, [then further measures may be needed he would regard agreement on further measures as likely to be necessary.] As well as visiting several other countries in the region, Sir Geoffrey Howe remains willing to see as wide a range as possible of leaders of black African opinion including ANC leaders.

We shall [of course,] (with our Community partners,) be assess[ing] the progress of the mission [once Sir Geoffrey Howe returns from Southern Africa. We shall also, in accordance with the agreement at The Hague,] continue consultations with the other industrialised countries on further measures

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which might be needed covering in particular the ban on new investment and the import on coal, iron, steel and gold coins from South Africa. The decision of the European Community to consult other industrialised countries was of course taken because if measures are to be effective in bringing about change in South Africa it is essential that they should have the support of the industrialised countries as a whole.

There will be an important opportunity to discuss all these issues when the seven Commonwealth Heads of Government directly involved, including Britain, will formally review the report of the Eminent Persons Group in early August. I expect Sir Geoffrey Howe's report on his visits to Southern Africa will provide an important input to the meeting, in particular on the South African Government's attitude. This important meeting takes place shortly after the OAU Summit is over. I realise that you and the other OAU leaders will have Southern Africa at the top of your Agenda. I hope that under your guidance the outcome of the OAU Summit will help to promote friendly understanding and cooperation between member countries of the OAU and of the European Community on this important question and contribute to a constructive outcome to the Commonwealth Review Meeting. I strongly believe that any divisions between us will be of benefit only to those who are resisting change in South Africa. In any case I hope that this account of my views and of the continuing efforts of Britain and the European Community to find a peaceful solution to the South African problem will be helpful to you.

///

//

/

In conclusion may I say that I hope we shall have the opportunity to meet during your Chairmanship of the OAU.

Most unlikely!

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<<<<
Yours sincerely,
ENDS.

HOWE

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PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR E FERGUSSON
MR REEVE
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

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

SUSPEND

Dear

Following your appointment as Chairman of the OAU, on which I congratulate you, I should like to take this early opportunity to explain to you my Government's views on the situation in Southern Africa. I know the very great importance which this situation has for the members of the OAU. I can assure you that we in Britain and in Europe are no less concerned by the violence in South Africa, and no less determined to see apartheid brought to an early end.

At the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Nassau last October, we decided to appoint a Group of Eminent Persons to encourage the evolution of a political dialogue in South Africa. The Group made a good deal of progress over the ensuing months. Indeed at one time it seemed possible that they would succeed in their task. Sadly, their mission failed following raids by the South African Government on neighbouring countries, which we condemned in the severest possible terms.

When the Heads of European Community Governments met in late June, we decided that it was nonetheless worth making a further attempt to create the conditions for dialogue and negotiation in South Africa. We were agreed that the most important step towards that goal would be the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and the lifting of the ban on the ANC and other political parties. The Heads of Government also agreed that Sir

Geoffrey Howe should undertake a mission to Southern Africa on behalf of the European Community in his capacity as President of the European Council of Ministers.

Sir Geoffrey Howe paid a first visit to Southern Africa some two some weeks ago, during which he held meetings with President Kaunda, President Machel and Prime Minister Mugabe. He explained to them that his mission was an attempt to build upon the work of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group and that he was guided by the following principles:

- apartheid must give way to a non-racial society as soon as possible.

- the steps already taken by the South African Government towards the removal of apartheid should be acknowledged, but faster and more far-reaching changes will be required.

- negotiations offer the best prospect of ending apartheid quickly and of reducing loss of life. Violence, on the other hand, will only slow change and prolong misery.

- while the European Community has already implemented a number of measures against South Africa, the idea that "one last push" from outside through comprehensive sanctions will bring down apartheid is an illusion.

- every chance should be taken to advance dialogue. The opportunity to hold peaceful negotiations should be taken while it is still available.

Over the last week, Sir Geoffrey Howe has visited both South Africa itself as well as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland and also held further talks with President Kaunda. He has not seen as many leaders of black opinion in South Africa as he would like but remains ready to meet them, including ANC leaders. I have not yet received an account of his visit.

We shall want to assess the outcome of Sir Geoffrey's mission carefully with our European Community partners. We are also holding consultations with other industrialised countries on further measures against South Africa which might be needed if there is no tangible and substantial progress. The European Heads of Government identified a ban on new investment and on the import of coal, iron, steel and gold coins from South Africa as steps which might need to be taken. We are consulting other Governments because it is clear that no measures will be effective unless they have support of the industrialised countries as a whole.

The situation in Southern Africa will also be considered by seven Commonwealth Heads of Government,including the United Kingdom, when they meet to review the report of the Emiment Persons Group in early August. Each of the countries attending that meeting is of course also a member of other regional groups such as the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and, in our own case, the European Community. Our discussions and decisions in the Commonwealth context will have to take account of our obligations and undertakings as members of these other groups. I hope that we shall agree in confirming our determination to work for the earliest possible start to negotiations in South Africa, against the background of a suspension of violence by all sides.

I hope that this brief account of my views and of the continuing efforts of Britain and the European Community to promote a peaceful solution to the problems of South Africa will be of help to you. I should be happy to arrange for more detailed briefing and discussions with members of your Government were you to judge that useful.

I send you my best wishes.

President Sassou-Nguesso

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OF 2818OOZ JULY 86

STR*CTLY PERSONAL FOR PR*VATE SECRETARY TO FORE*GN SECRETARY
FROM CHARLES POWELL
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TELEGRAM NO 185. THE BEG*N UNDERL*N*NG SUNDAY TELEGRAPH CEASE UNDERL*N*NG ART*CLE HAS NOT SO FAR BEEN P*CKED UP BY RAD*O, TELEV*S*ON OR OTHER NEWSPAPERS HERE, OR CAUSED ANY PART*CULAR COMMENT. *T W*LL NO DOUBT BE A FEW DAYS BEFORE WE KNOW WHETHER *T G*VES R*SE TO REACT*ONS *N THE COMMONWEALTH. ONE OR TWO PEOPLE WHO M*GHT BE EXPECTED TO REACT D*FFERENTLY E.G. ANTHONY SAMPSON, HAVE TOLD ME WHAT A GOOD *NTERV*EW *T WAS. WE HAD ALREADY *DENT*F*ED THE POS*T*VE PO*NTS TO MAKE ABOUT *T (PARA 11 OF YOUR TELEGRAM).

MEANWH*LE OUR ON-THE-RECORD STATEMENT THAT THE PR*ME M*N*STER HAS NO PLANS WHATSOEVER TO V*S*T SOUTH AFR*CA WAS CARR*ED PROM*NENTLY ON RAD*O AND TELEV*S*ON BROADCASTS FROM M*D-MORN*NG YESTERDAY AND *S WELL REFLECTED *N TODAY'S PRESS.

THE PR*ME M*N*STER AND THE FORE*GN SECRETARY W*LL OF COURSE BE ABLE TO D*SCUSS THE LATTER'S V*EWS AS SET OUT *N YOUR TELEGRAM ON H*S RETURN. * HAVE TO SAY THAT SOME FUNDAMENTAL D*FFERENCES OF ASSESSMENT CLEARLY PERS*ST. THE PR*ME M*N*STER WOULD ARGUE, * BEL*EVE, THAT THE V*EWS SET OUT *N YOUR TELEGRAM DO NOT G*VE ADEQUATE WE*GHT TO THE NEED TO W*N THE ARGUMENT ABOUT GENERAL ECONOM*C SANCT*ONS *N TH*S COUNTRY (WH*CH SHE BEL*EVES HAS LARGELY BEEN DONE) OR TO THE *MPORTANCE OF DEMONSTRAT*NG THAT WE SHALL NOT BE BLACKMA*LED OR BULL*ED *NTO SANCT*ONS AGA*NST WHAT WE BEL*EVE TO BE R*GHT AND AGA*NST OUR OWN *NTERESTS.
SHE WOULD STRESS THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE OUR F*RMNESS AND RESOLVE AHEAD OF THE REV*EW MEET*NG (TO LAY DOWN A BARRAGE, TO USE THE JARGON). TH*S *S NOT TO SAY THAT SHE HAS UNREAL*ST*C EXPECTAT*ONS OF THE REV*EW MEET*NG. * HAVE WR*TTEN TODAY TO ROBERT CULSHAW SETT*NG OUT THE SORT OF PACKAGE WH*CH THE PR*ME M*N*STER WOULD REGARD AS A TOLERABLE OUTCOME FROM THAT MEET*NG. THE RELEVANT PASSAGE READS AS FOLLOWS:
'AN OUTCOME TO THE COMMONWEALTH REV*EW MEET*NG WH*CH *NCLUDED THE FOLLOW*NG ELEMENTS WOULD BE TOLERABLE:
A. SOME STRONG*SH CR*T*C*SM OF THE SOUTH AFR*CAN GOVERNMENT'S FA*LURE TO TAKE THE STEPS REQU*RED FOR THE EPG M*SS*ON TO SUCCEED
B. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT (PROBABLY GRUDG*NG) OF THE EX*STENCE OF THE EUROPEAN *N*T*AT*VE AND THE UK'S OBL*GAT*ON TO MOVE *N STEP W*TH *TS EC PARTNERS
C. RECOGN*T*ON THAT UNAN*MOUS DEC*S*ONS ON FUTURE MEASURES ARE NOT THEREFORE POSS*BLE AT TH*S STAGE
D. STATEMENT THAT NONETHELESS THE GREAT MAJOR*TY OF COMMON-WEALTH COUNTR*ES BEL*EVE SUCH MEASURES TO BE REQU*RED *MMED*ATELY AND ARE READY TO *MPLEMENT THEM
E. *DENT*F*CAT*ON OF MEASURES WH*CH SHOULD BE TAKEN, PREFERABLY AS AN *ND*CAT*VE L*ST
F. DECLARAT*ON OF THE UN*TED K*NGDOM'S READ*NESS TO *MPLEMENT SOME FURTHER MEASURES FROM TH*S L*ST, PROV*DED (A) THEY ARE JUDGED APPROPR*ATE BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUN*TY AS A WHOLE, WHEN *T HAS ASSESSED THE RESULTS OF THE FORE*GN SECRETARY'S M*SS*ON AND (B) S*M*LAR MEASURES ARE TAKEN BY OTHER *NDUSTR*AL*SED COUNTR*ES.
* RECOGN*SE THAT ON THE BAS*S OF PARAGRAPH 10 OF YOUR TELEGRAM, THE FORE*GN SECRETARY MAY ARGUE THAT TH*S *S NO LONGER ADEQUATE. THE PR*ME M*N*STER, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD REGARD *T AS GO*NG A LONG WAY TO MEET COMMONWEALTH V*EWS.

* STRESS THAT * HAVE NOT (REPEAT NOT) SHOWN YOUR TELEGRAM OR TH*S ONE TO THE PR*ME M*N*STER. *T *S MY *NTERPRETAT*ON OF HER V*EWS. BUT *T MAY BE USEFUL TO *DENT*FY L*KELY D*FFERENCES AHEAD OF WEDNESDAY'S D*SCUSS*ON.

HOWE

OCM*AN 2960

NNNN M

CONFIDENTIAL AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 July 1986

SOUTH AFRICA

I enclose a copy of a further personal telegram which I should be grateful if you would send to Tony Galsworthy. I would not want it seen more widely.

C. D. POWELL

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

OUT TELEGRAM

183

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STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN SECRETARY
FROM CHARLES POWELL

Thank you for your telegram no 185. The begin underlining Sunday Telegraph cease underlining article has not so far been picked up by radio, television or other newspapers here, or caused any particular comment. It will no doubt be a few days before we know whether it gives rise to reactions in the Commonwealth. One or two people who might be expected to react differently e.g. Anthony Sampson, have told me what a good interview it was. We had already identified the positive points to make about it (para 11 of your telegram).

Meanwhile ~~on~~ our on-the-record statement that the Prime Minister has no plans whatsoever to visit South Africa was carried prominently on radio and television broadcasts from mid-morning yesterday and is well reflected in today's press.

/// The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary will of course
// be able to discuss the latter's views as set out in your telegram
/ on his return. I have to say that some fundamental differences of assessment clearly persist. The Prime Minister would argue,

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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I believe, that the views set out in your telegram do not give adequate weight to the need to win the argument about general economic sanctions in this country (which she believes has largely been done) or ~~of~~ To L the importance of demonstrating that we shall not be blackmailed or bullied into sanctions against what we believe to be right and against our own interests.

She would stress the need to demonstrate our firmness and resolve ahead of the Review meeting (to lay down a barrage, to use the jargon). This is not to say that she has unrealistic expectations of the Review meeting. I have written today to Robert Culshaw setting out the sort of package which the Prime Minister would regard as a tolerable outcome from that meeting. The relevant passage reads as follows:

"an outcome to the Commonwealth Review Meeting which included the following elements would be tolerable:

a. some strongish criticism of the South African Government's failure to take the steps required for the EPG mission to succeed

b. acknowledgement (probably grudging) of the existence of the European initiative and the UK's obligation to move in step with its EC partners

c. recognition that unanimous decisions on future measures are not therefore possible at this stage

d. statement that nonetheless the great majority of Commonwealth countries believe such measures to be required immediately and are ready to implement them

e. identification of measures which should be taken, preferably as an indicative list

f. declaration of the United Kingdom's readiness to implement some further measures from this list, provided (a) they are judged appropriate by the European Community as a whole, when

/// it has assessed the results of the Foreign Secretary's mission

// and (b) similar measures are taken by other industrialised

/ countries.

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification	Caveat	Precedence

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I recognise that on the basis of paragraph 10 of your telegram, the Foreign Secretary may argue that this is no longer adequate. The Prime Minister, on the other hand, would regard it as going a long way to meet Commonwealth views.

I stress that I have not (repeat not) shown your telegram or this one to the Prime Minister. It is my interpretation of her views. But it may be useful to identify likely differences ahead of Wednesday's discussion.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 July 1986

SOUTH AFRICA: FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VISIT

The Prime Minister has asked what the Foreign Secretary plans to say about the future of his mission when he leaves South Africa after his second meeting with President Botha tomorrow. While the precise terms of any statement cannot of course be decided until after that final meeting takes place, the Prime Minister would like to underline the importance of confirming that the mandate of the Twelve for the mission runs until the end of September, and the fact that there are important events in South Africa in August (the Nationalist Party convention and the extraordinary session of the South African Parliament) which will need to be taken into account when the Twelve come to review their position. She hopes, therefore, that whatever is said about the progress (or lack of it) of the mission so far, the Foreign Secretary will make clear that further contacts with the South African government are envisaged in September.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

The Spectator 26.7.86

less happiness while at the same time enjoying it herself? If only politics could keep away, there would, of course, be nothing but good in the Commonwealth. If the Queen's Headship were simply a grander equivalent of Prince Philip's presidency of the World Wildlife Fund, what could be more agreeable? But it isn't and it never was. Was it right, for instance, that Commonwealth considerations should have deterred British governments from entering the EEC in the early Fifties (whatever one thinks about the EEC)? Was it right that Commonwealth sentiment should have framed the British Nationality Act 1948 to allow almost unrestricted mass immigration? Is it sensible that Commonwealth feelings now force the British Government into a corner over South Africa and provoke a full-dress political crisis over something so unimportant to this country?

There is a more general objection, too. It is the objection that Dr Johnson makes to 'Lycidas' that 'with these trifling fictions are mingled the most sacred and awful truths'. The history of Britain has involved a long fight about the derivation, scope and power of monarchy. People have killed one another over these things, and the questions involved can never be permanently settled. We are lucky to live at a time when there is broad agreement about the monarch's political position in Britain. This is a situation rare in history, one that not even Victoria enjoyed. It can only continue if people continue to believe that the monarch's position is coherent, that is, that the lines of responsibility are clear. The Headship of the Commonwealth is a title and a role which obscures those lines. The Queen cannot sustain a role which sets her against her own Government. It is frightening that her advisers do not seem to realise this.

Everything comes back to Britain. One of the trifling fictions which the Commonwealth invented is that the Queen's Headship, and her monarchy of particular members such as Canada, exists quite separately from her monarchy of Britain, as if, in theory, she could continue Head although she was not Queen of the United Kingdom. As Sir Robert Menzies told the Australian parliament at the time, 'We are not to divide the Crown up artificially', '. . . the plain truth is that Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second sits on the throne not because of some law of Australia but because of the law of the United Kingdom'. She is Head of the Commonwealth for the same reason. Everything the Queen has and does derives from Britain and from nowhere else. (Her son married this week in Westminster Abbey, not Kuala Lumpur or Lusaka.) That is the fact, although royal families, like tax evaders, always keep an eye on a foreign escape route. We know that Elizabeth II has the heart and stomach of a Queen; that is not enough — they must be of a Queen of England too.

Prince Philip

An interesting article from the Spectator (spotted by Caroline) 29/7

NOT BLACK AND WHITE

Stephen Robinson returns to a Britain which over-simplifies South Africa

SINCE my return from South Africa three weeks ago many people have asked me if South Africa is really as bad as it seems on the television. Invariably my reply is equivocal. I am not one who sees — as do many white South Africans and some observers in Britain — a card-carrying member of the African National Congress lurking behind every BBC video camera. Yet somehow, the image of South Africa projected on British television screens, and to a lesser extent on the pages of the national newspapers, does not reflect how it feels to live there. What is happening in South Africa is neither 'better' nor 'worse' than it appears from the outside — it is simply different.

Recently it has become fashionable for expelled foreign correspondents to hold press conferences at which they make horrifying predictions about the country's future. One such American reporter was quoted recently as saying that the whole country was in flames, and that the whites did not know and did not care. It is to the second half of this statement that I take particular exception. If the reporter had spent all his time in South Africa travelling around the hinterland interviewing sheep farmers he would doubtless have encountered a bewildering complacency about events elsewhere in the country. But had he ventured into one of the major cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town or Durban, he would have discovered that the country's uncertain future has become a national obsession. If it is possible to salvage any hope from the dreadful violence of the past two years it is that white South Africans have been forced — in many cases for the first time — to concentrate their minds on the political and economic iniquities of their system of government.

Anxiety about the future, about sanctions and the general state of the economy, and the fear that the violence could become totally out of control, dominate the lives of a high proportion of white South Africans. Several thousand have already voted with their feet and emigrated; many more have well-rehearsed contingency plans to get out quickly if the balloon really goes up. But the vast majority will stay: some because they have nowhere else to go, but many more because they honestly believe it is cowardly to leave and that they should stay to sort out the mess.

Certainly many white South Africans have responded to recent upheavals simply by buying guns and bolting up their windows. But to imply that the vast majority of them are merrily swilling gin slings as the townships smoulder is wildly inaccurate, and grossly unfair to the thousands of people who are actively seeking ways out of the chaos.

Internal white opposition has changed beyond all recognition from what might once have been caricatured as a blue-rinsed Jewish lady standing in silent protest on a Johannesburg street corner. The formation of the United Democratic Front three years ago brought thousands of whites into a new non-racial form of extra-parliamentary opposition. The much maligned and mocked official liberal opposition, the Progressive Federal Party, has also risen to recent challenges by moving away from futile debates in Parlia-

One hundred years ago

Sir, — You often give us pleasant anecdotes of our four-footed friends. You may think the following worthy of record. I have a little dog, a not particularly well-bred fox terrier. He is much attached to me, and shows by his obedience, and sometimes *in* his disobedience, that he understands a good deal. Yesterday I was away all day, and he, I am told, was very uneasy, and searched everywhere for me. Every day at 5 p.m. I go to church. 'Toby' seems to know this is not an ordinary walk, and never offers to come with me. But yesterday, when the bell began, he started off and took up his position by the vestry door. I believe he reasoned with himself, — 'There goes the bell; now I shall catch the Vicar.' I am, Sir, &c.,

WILLIAM QUENNELL

The Vicarage, Tring, July 14

Spectator, 24 July 1886

ment towards establishing monitoring groups in the townships to uncover police brutality.

Many important political developments in South Africa are somehow overlooked in the desire to portray the dramatic clash between the 'white régime' and the 'increasingly restless black opposition'. Nine-year-old Afrikaner schoolboys dressed in khaki shorts with a pistol on the hip make dramatic television footage and do reflect the hardening of attitudes in some of the rural areas. Yet it is somehow harder to convey the agonised soul-searching of students at the University of Stellenbosch — traditionally the breeding ground for upstanding Afrikaner nationalists — whose recent efforts to initiate dialogue with the exiled ANC leadership so discomfited government ministers. Prominent in this group is none other than the grandson of Dr Hendrik Verwoerd.

The English-language universities have long been rallying points for opposition to the government. Indeed, many students who travel to study overseas return astonished by the Hooray Henry boorishness and political apathy of British and American campus life; others are merely perplexed that foreign students and academics should so obsessively seek to sever links with South African universities.

This same superficiality is apparent in the portrayal of black nationalist leaders. Mrs Winnie Mandela's profile has been somewhat lowered of late on account of her well-publicised 'necklace' gaffe. But Bishop Desmond Tutu, it appears, only has to open his mouth to be guaranteed front page treatment in Britain and the United States. He certainly cuts quite a dashing figure in his episcopal robes, but he also speaks a great deal of nonsense. The prediction he made last year to American journalists that black maids would soon resort to murdering their white madams caused enormous offence back home, and not only to starchy Anglican matrons in hats.

It is of course predictable that the South African Broadcasting Corporation should prefer to ignore the turbulent archbishop-elect, but even liberal and radical South Africans view Tutu with some embarrassment and suspicion. True, he is a compelling orator; but most Anglicans — black and white — wish he would spend rather more time in South Africa ministering to his troubled flock than collecting awards in America.

By contrast Chief Buthelezi is commonly portrayed as the rogue stooge of southern Africa, dismissed by Denis Healey after a recent flying visit as a puppet of Pretoria. The Zulu leader is not everyone's cup of tea: he is nauseatingly pompous and self-important. His claim to represent the sole non-violent alternative to Marxist revolution is questionable to say the least, and his well-drilled impi regiments are among the most thuggish operators in South Africa. In a perfect world, or if Africa were like Europe, he would not exist. But the plain fact is that many Zulus — well over a million of them in fact — go for that sort of thing. He simply cannot be ignored, and ANC and United Democratic Front leaders admit as much privately. Only someone who has never lived in Natal would dismiss him as irrelevant.

Surprisingly perhaps, relations between the races have not deteriorated over the past two years. Indeed, one of the most striking developments of the recent violence in the Western Cape, for instance, has been the growth in white sympathy for the lot of black and coloured colleagues whose living areas have become battle grounds. Many whites have been appalled to hear about — and in some cases witness — the brutality and indiscipline of the security forces. The repeated use of terms such as 'white laager' and 'simmering black majority' suggests a coherence — an overwhelming sense of racial identity — which many South Africans abhor and reject. A casual visitor wandering around the more outré environs of Cape Town or Johannesburg and peering at the health food stores and alternative book shops could be forgiven for thinking he was in Islington rather than some latter-day Calvinistic laager. Certainly the racial question dominates South African politics, but it is not necessarily the only factor which determines how the people react to one another.

Yet an illogical racialism pervades British attitudes to South Africa. Dr David Owen, and some Conservative MPs, call for sanctions or measures 'which will only hit the whites'. This is based on the curious assumption that two separate economies operate in South Africa — one for whites, and one for the blacks. Only whites can afford to fly, the argument goes, so cut air links and send an unequivocal signal to Pretoria. This would doubtless inconvenience wealthy South Africans, which might make some people in Britain feel more cheerful. But the main effect of such a measure would be the total destruction of the South African tourist industry, and the loss of thousands of black jobs. Even if it were desirable in itself to attempt to aim sanctions specifically at whites, it would be patently impossible to put them into effect.

The South African government goes to much trouble and expense to fly foreign opinion-formers over to see how well blacks live in their new model townships. My guess is that they would do rather better to show the visitors that white South Africans do not all live in outrageous luxury, as most people here seem to believe. Most whites do not have enormous swimming-pools and tennis courts; many Afrikaners do not regularly beat their black servants. If this misconception could be corrected, I suspect many observers would feel less strongly about apartheid.

There is certainly little to be optimistic about in South Africa today, and the xenophobic tone of President Botha's recent pronouncements is probably only a small taste of things to come. But the majority of white South Africans are now at least aware that the violence can no longer be blamed on a minority of troublemakers, and they do not require 'signals' from Whitehall to know they have problems. But most of all, black and white South Africans will be amused, and not unduly surprised, to note that in Britain the 'South African crisis' now has much more to do with Mrs Thatcher's problems with the Commonwealth than with black township dwellers on the wrong end of a policeman's sjambok.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

25th July, 1986

Dear Hector,

Many thanks for your note of 23rd July, together with a copy which you enclosed of a letter to you from the Reverend M Lindsay-Parkinson. His letter, together with the extract from the record of the proceedings of his Church Council, make most impressive and encouraging reading.

I have passed to the Prime Minister the extracts from the Church Council meeting.

Yours ever
Michael

MICHAEL ALISON
Parliamentary Private Secretary

Sir Hector Monro MP

PRIME MINISTER

You will want to see the attached record of a statement issued by the Church Council of a substantial Anglican church in South Africa. It was sent in to Hector Monro by the Rector, the Reverend M Lindsay-Parkinson.

Hector asked me to place this encouraging and supportive material before you.

MA

Keep in mind S. African

Golden -

MT

MICHAEL ALISON
25.7.86

At a meeting held in the Parish Hall Kokstad, on Thursday 23rd. January 1986, and at subsequent meetings, the following statement was agreed upon unanimously by the Rectors, Church Wardens and Parishioners of Holy Trinity Church Kokstad, St. Stephen's Church Matatiele, St. Mary's Church Cedarville and St. Luke's and St. John's Churches Swartberg. It was then approved by both Deaneries of the Archdeaconry of East Griqualand.

1. As the Church of the Province of Southern Africa has always been a multi-racial church community we are opposed to the oppression or domination of one group over another.
2. We are in favour of reforms in South Africa as soon as possible by peaceful means.
3. We are against violence in achieving this aim.
4. We are against disinvestment, boycotts and sanctions against our country, as this will only lead to violence and suffering of the very people we, as a church, are committed to help.
5. We disassociate ourselves from support of the African National Congress and any other organisation advocationg violence, boycotts and sanctions.
6. We would like to make it clear that Church leaders who call for these measurs do not represent us.

Anglican backlash against political meddling gains new support

A MODERATE backlash against Anglican church involvement in politics has won substantial all-race support in East Griqualand.

About 12 000 black, white and coloured parishioners of the Church of the Province of Southern Africa in East Griqualand — and church officials including rectors and wardens — have dissociated themselves from church leaders who supported the African National Congress and called for disinvestment and sanctions against South Africa.

In a statement approved by both deaneries of the Archdeaconery of East Griqualand, and supported by Bishop Jacob Dlamini of Swartberg, it was unanimously agreed that the participants:

Reforms

- Dissociate themselves from support of the African National Congress and any other organisation advocating violence, boycotts and sanctions.
- Oppose the oppression or domination of one racial group over another and favour speedy reforms in South Africa by peaceful means.
- Oppose violence in achieving this aim and disinvestment, boycotts and sanctions as this would lead only to violence and suffering.

"I am all in favour of it (the statement)," said Bishop Dlamini. He did not name the church leaders parishioners were reacting to, but said he believed Bishop Desmond Tutu of Johannesburg was not the target.

By CAS St LEGER

The parishioners' stance was first mentioned at a meeting at the Parish Hall, Kokstad, on January 23 and, after a series of meetings, was finalised a fortnight ago by members of the Holy Trinity Church, Kokstad; St Stephen's Church, Matatiele; St Mary's Church, Cedarville; and St Luke's and St John's churches, Swartberg.

East Griqualand's rural dean, the Very Rev Michael Lindsay-Parkinson, said congregations in all four parishes had been asked to vote and had reached concensus.

"There was no dissention, though we had expected some," Dean Lindsay-Parkinson said.

He said the motivation for the statement was a falling-off in church membership — especially white — after certain church leaders "in the limelight" had become involved in political issues and had espoused violence or said it was inevitable — though he would not name those responsible.

"They should make it quite clear when they are speaking on behalf of the church, and when they are expressing their personal opinions," he said.

He said he had been gladdened that black congregations in particular had lent their full support to the statement, which is now being sent to the Archbishop of Cape Town, the Most Rev Philip Russell, for his reaction.

The Archbishop's office said the statement had not yet been received and would therefore make no comment.

Debate

The church's liaison man in Johannesburg, Bishop John Carter, said: "My experience has been that it is easier to communicate outside South Africa than inside, and any communication is to be welcomed.

"This statement by a number of Anglicans in East Griqualand can be seen as a contribution to continuing debate and discussion between Christian people in Southern Africa. The important thing, I think, is that we should be in dialogue with one another on these vital matters which concern us all."

Note. Philip Russell replied that we must speak on "the church" except on matters that had been ruled by the Episcopal Synod on

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STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY FROM CHARLES POWELL, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE.

WE HAVE A POSSIBLE PROBLEM OVER AN ARTICLE WHICH WILL APPEAR IN THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH ON 27 JULY.

2. THE ARTICLE IS BASED ON A CONVERSATION WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAD AT CHEQUERS ON SATURDAY 19 JULY WITH GRAHAM TURNER, WHO IS A PERSONAL FRIEND. IT WAS NOT ARRANGED THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS. THE THEORY WAS THAT HE WOULD WRITE ABOUT LONGER TERM ISSUES. BUT THE CONVERSATION ALSO TOUCHED ON SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FORTHCOMING COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING. THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH HAVE CHOSEN TO HIGHLIGHT THIS PART, WHICH WILL REPRESENT ABOUT HALF OF THE ARTICLE. THERE IS NOTHING IN IT WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS NOT SAID BEFORE (THOUGH A LOT WHICH SHE HAS). THE TONE IS FORTHRIGHT. COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WILL NOT LIKE IT. REPEATED EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE PROPRIETOR, THE EDITOR AND THE JOURNALIST CONCERNED TO AGREE TO MAKE DELETIONS FROM THE TEXT HAVE FAILED. THE ARTICLE IS THEREFORE LIKELY TO GO OUT IN ITS RAW FORM.

I FIND IT HARD TO SAY HOW MUCH ATTENTION IT IS LIKELY TO ATTRACT. PROBABLY LESS THAN I FEAR. AS I SAY, THERE IS NOTHING NEW. NONETHELESS, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WILL WISH TO BE WARNED THAT THE ARTICLE IS IMMINENT.

3. I AM NOT TELEGRAPHING THE TEXT SINCE THERE IS NOTHING YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. BUT ROBERT CULSHAW WILL HAVE IT IF YOU WANT IT. OPEN BRACKET I REALISE THIS MAY REMIND YOU OF THE JEWISH TELEGRAM: 'START WORRYING, LETTER FOLLOWS' EXCLAMATION CLOSE BRACKETS.

4. PLEASE SHOW THIS TELEGRAM ONLY TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY.

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STRICTLY PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 July 1986

SOUTH AFRICA

I enclose a telegram which I would be grateful if you would despatch to Tony Galsworthy. I see little point in sending him the text of the article. But you might like to see it in case he wants it.

Please show this letter and enclosure only to the PUS (whom I have informed).

CHARLES POWELL

R.N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

STRICTLY PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

OUT TELEGRAM

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10 STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN AND
11 COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY FROM CHARLES POWELL, PRIME MINISTER'S
12 OFFICE.
13
14 We have a possible problem over an article which will appear
15 in the Sunday Telegraph on 27 July.
16
17 2. The article is based on a conversation which the Prime
18 Minister had at Chequers on Saturday 19 July with Graham
19 Turner, who is a personal friend. It was not arranged
20 through normal channels. The theory was that he would write
21 about longer term issues. But the conversation also touched
22 on South Africa and the forthcoming Commonwealth Review Meeting.
23 The Sunday Telegraph have chosen to highlight this part,
24 which will represent about half of the article. There is
25 nothing in it which the Prime Minister has not said before
/// 26 (though a lot which she has). The tone is forthright.
// 27 Commonwealth countries will not like it. Repeated efforts
/ 28 to persuade the proprietor, the editor and the journalist
29 concerned to agree to make deletions from the text have failed.

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification	Caveat	Precedence

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The article is therefore likely to go out in its raw form. I find it hard to say how much attention it is likely to attract. Probably less than I fear. As I say, there is nothing new. Nonetheless, the Foreign Secretary will wish to be warned that the article is imminent.

3. I am not telegraphing the text since there is nothing you can do about it. But Robert Culshaw will have it if you want it. Open bracket I realise this may remind you of the Jewish telegram: "Start worrying, letter follows" Exclamation close brackets.

4. Please show this telegram only to the Foreign Secretary.

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TELEGRAM TO PRETORIA

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STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY FROM CHARLES POWELL, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

REFERENCE MIPT

Below is text of article by Graham Turner which will appear in the Sunday Telegraph of 27 July.

QUOTE "

Yes, she admitted, she was worried about the Commonwealth Conference, worried about whether we should be able to persuade the others that the view we were taking on sanctions was not only reasonable but also the way most likely to bring an end to apartheid better and faster than the alternatives.

/ As for the danger

As for the danger that the Commonwealth might actually break up over the issue, such a step, she declared, would be "absolutely absurd". After all, it wasn't the British Commonwealth, its members had long ago refused to have it called that. "So it is their club, their Commonwealth. If they wish to break it up, I think that's absurd".

Nor was it, in her view, a club whose time was past, not if the members really valued it anyway. It was a grouping which girdled the world, the only international conference she attended where no translators were needed and where debate was therefore that much freer and more genuine. What was more, some of its members didn't belong to ar other institution. In that sense, she implied, it was their only clut

It would also be absurd to break it up because it had already weathered great difficulties. What sort of relationship was it that couldn't accommodate differences of opinion, particularly when what was being proposed would affect member countries very differently ? There were vigorous differences in the UN, but nobody suggested the Security Council should fold up on that account.

"Good Heavens!", said Mrs. Thatcher, "just look at what it has had to withstand to date! Don't think all the countries in it are democracies in our sense of the term. Some have military governments some states of emergency, some have had censorship at times, some internal massacres - and some have put Opposition people in jail without trial.

"Of course", she went on, "we have withstood all that, partly because you understand that some countries do have problems, and it i not for us to pontificate about how they should deal with them". Just because some of them were not democracies in our sense, we didn't "go into a terrific argument" and say "do this or we shall leave the Commonwealth!"

Nor was the problem, she added later, essentially one of colour. You only had to look at the rest of Africa to see that. There was real trouble in both Angola and Mozambique, though there were no whit people there. They had left long ago, but what had you got ? Fighting. Angola could have a fantastic economy, it was rich, but instead you had fighting between different groups of people. The problem was essentially one of human nature, not colour.

So what she was hoping for was that the Commonwealth would stay together, that everyone would speak their minds courteously in the knowledge that the South Africans were doing things "which most of us find repugnant" and that they all wanted to bring apartheid to an end - "and it <u>will</u> end", declared the Prime Minister firmly, "I have no doubt of that".

But what did she mean by the end of apartheid - one man, one vote ? "That sort of constitutional arrangement", declared the Prime Minister, "is not for an outside entity to determine. Once you have got dialogue going - and I think myself there will probably have to b two lots of negotiations, one with the black South Africans and the

second with them all together - then they have got to fashion their own constitution.

"After all, there used to be a Central African Federation, which we put together and the Africans then took apart. We have got to stop acting as if we can impose things upon them".

She seemed, I remarked, to have shifted somewhat towards the side of further measures. Had that been provoked, as had been reported, by being "deserted" by her Cabinet or having had a row with the Queen ?

"I have not shifted at all", retorted Mrs. Thatcher, "and I am amazed, utterly amazed at some of the stories I read in the Press". What went on between monarch and Prime Minister was totally confidential. So was what happened in Cabinet and, for that reason, she was not in a position to refute the assertions which had been made, but when, pray, did I imagine that she had been "deserted" by her Cabinet

So it wasn't true that she had been put under pressure by her colleagues on sanctions ? By now, the Prime Minister's indignation had reached simmering-point. "You know", she said, "people must thir I have the strongest personality that was ever born on this earth" - they might indeed believe that, I murmured - "that I can get my own way regardless of what anyone else thinks at any time".

She did, it was true, argue a great deal but, if she got her owr way, it was only by convincing other people.

But some of her critics had said she would have been better

advised to make modest concessions on sanctions at the outset and thus avoid accentuating the divisions which existed. "Whatever I do", sai the Prime Minister, with just a hint of resignation, "they will complain".

The fact was that, by getting people to analyse what they meant by comprehensive sanctions - by asking questions such as 'do you realise what you are doing to farm-workers in the Cape where they have no supplementar benefit ?', 'do you realise what you are doing to the British merchan marine which, on other occasions, you never hesitate to tell me is getting smaller ?', 'do you realise that the Labour Party, when in power, utterly recoiled from sanctions for the same reasons ?' - they had been made to face what sanctions meant in practice.

Was I really telling her that it was wrong to face people with the consequences of their day-to-day actions, and that <u>that</u> was handling the situation badly ? Poppycock!

"What we have done", declared Mrs. Thatcher, "is to knock out general economic sanctions as a possible way forward, and get people to realise that there is no point in applying them if others pick up the business or it goes through third countries". Then, it merely arrived in this country at a higher price or, if it worked, it worked by starving people. She and the Government had no intention of creating a wasteland in southern Africa. Much better to have "a free and hopefully democratic society coming through in our way".

So, she conceded, the Commonwealth Conference was going to be tough but "if you care deeply about trying to get what you believe to be the best decision, then you go on being tough. If you didn't care two hoots, you wouldn't have to be. You would sit back and say 'if I didn't do anything controversial, if I took the easy way every time, maybe I would be liked. But, if I did that, I would despise myself and in the long run, I wouldn't be liked anyway.

"Years from now, people would turn back and say 'look, they had their first woman Prime Minister and she didn't tackle the problems of her time'".

So she did not feel that President Botha was unable to move because his hands were tied by the South African military and police No, declared Mrs. Thatcher, she did not, because more and more people there, both black and white, were ready to negotiate though "whether we have got the time-scale too tight, I don't know".

She also had critics, I pointed out, who claimed that she would show more concern if it were whites that were being killed, and not blacks. The charge genuinely shocked her. She had never, she said, heard such an accusation. What concerned her were deaths, whether black or white. After all, there might be as many as 800,000 people in South Africa many of them Indian, who were entitled to come to this country and she was naturally concerned about them.

"Can I just say", she went on, "that I find the necklace which black uses to kill black utterly repugnant and it is one of

the things which, faster than anything else, turned my sympathies off any case which some of them might have been putting".

But wasn't it just as bad that the South African police should have done to death people like Steve Biko, the black African leader ? "Oh", exclaimed Mrs. Thatcher, "it was absolutely appalling what the did to Biko, but no one stands up for that, everybody condemns it, while you actually hear people standing up for the necklace, or at least refusing to condemn it".

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"My basic wish", she said, "is that there should be more obvious and visible signs that they are going to get rid of apartheid". She was very much aware of Botha's timing difficulties, but there were signs that the South Africans genuinely wanted negotiations -"and I just hope". "

UNQUOTE

Prime Minister (2)

CDP 28/7.

Royal Commonwealth Society

From Sir Michael Scott KCVO CMG

25th July 1986

Dear Charles,

While the Society cannot adopt a public corporate stance on political matters it has an obligation to speak up on behalf of the Commonwealth. Accordingly a letter from our President, Lord Trend, has been sent to the Editor of The Times for publication and I enclose a copy.

I have been asked to let the Prime Minister's Office know what the Society has done, especially in case the Editor chooses not to print it.

Yours ever,

Michael Scott.

Secretary-General

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to
The Rt Hon The Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London S W 1

Northumberland Avenue, London WC2N 5BJ/Phone 01. 930 6733/Telegraphic address Recital London WC2

COPY

Royal Commonwealth Society

From Rt Hon Lord Trend PC GCB CVO

24th July 1986

The threat to Commonwealth unity implicit in the current debate about South Africa is a matter of the greatest concern to all of us in the Royal Commonwealth Society.

As a "non-sectarian and non-party organisation" under our Charter, it is not for us to enter the argument about the best means of bringing apartheid to an early end with the minimum of conflict and damage. But, as a Society dedicated to promoting the contemporary Commonwealth and with members from all its regions, we would urge upon the decision-makers everywhere, in whatever stresses or strains there may be in the weeks ahead, the need to think as much about the value of Commonwealth cohesion in the world as about putting things to rights in South Africa.

It would be an ironic victory for the supporters of apartheid if the challenge which that repulsive creed presents to the conscience of the civilised world were to be made the occasion of weakening Commonwealth unity and so diminishing its influence for good in international affairs, instead of reaffirming the common purpose of all its members to promote justice and freedom as widely as possible throughout the world. The way to realise that purpose is not by leaving the Commonwealth or by seeking to force others to leave it, nor by pressing a difference of view about the means to be employed so far that it may call in question whether there is real agreement on the end to be achieved. This is not the first time that the Commonwealth will have had to show that it can accommodate divergent views about means when it is united about the end.

/Page 2.

Northumberland Avenue, London WC2N 5BJ/Phone 01. 930 6733/Telegraphic address Recital London WC2

Let us remember what The Queen said in Her Commonwealth Day Message last March - calling on everyone, especially the young, to show goodwill, tolerance and understanding in the cause of easing world tensions. That message must continue to govern the words and actions of all who have the true interests of the Commonwealth at heart; and this Society will do all in its power to contribute to that endeavour.

President

The Editor
The Times
1 Pennington Street
London E1 9XN



(1)

PRIME MINISTER

INTERVIEW WITH GRAHAM TURNER

Graham Turner has now produced the attached story, based on his talk with you, which he intends to be publish in the Sunday Telegraph next Sunday.

As you will see, about half of it deals with South Africa.

I agree with everything you say about South Africa. I think it will go down well with the home audience. And most of it you have said before. The problem lies in the presentation and the timing in relation to the forthcoming Commonwealth meeting and the Foreign Secretary's mission to South Africa. I am bound to say that, in its present form, the article runs the risk of exposing you to sharp criticism for dealing too vigorously with Southern African problems at a very sensitive moment, for neglecting to say some things e.g. on the possible need for measures which would reassure the Commonwealth, for thus increasing the risk of confrontation at the forthcoming Commonwealth meeting, and for once again speaking out on this subject at the very moment when the Foreign Secretary is engaged in delicate negotiations. Some Commonwealth countries are likely to react badly.

Bernard is not so convinced about these risks. He thinks that the robust approach will go down well with the domestic audience.

For these reasons, it would be much better if we could persuade Mr. Turner and the Sunday Telegraph to drop this part of the article. They have behaved badly by bouncing you into talking on South Africa. Unhappily both Perry Worthsthorne and Graham Turner are proving very resistant. They might be more disposed to negotiate on amendments to the text.

The possibilities are:

(i) a further appeal to Perry Worthsthorne and/or Conrad Black not to publish the passages on South Africa. This might be accompanied by a promise of a further interview on a topical subject in the autumn. But, in Bernard's view, this is most unlikely to succeed.

(ii) attempt to negotiate some deletions from the text. I have marked on the attached copy the changes which I think we should seek. Again, Bernard is sceptical whether we shall succeed.

To have any chance of success in either ploy, we shall need to say that the request has your full authority. May we please do this?

C.D.P.

Had it not been Graham Turner I should have refused to do the interview last Saturday because it was really obtained on a false basis. I feel pretty strongly about it. By all means try very hard to negotiate the deletions. This is the minimum we can expect — especially as things have worsened during the last week. They must also say that the interview took place over 8 days ago. - i.e. on Sat morning - 19th July (before the day's other events)

Also - later events on Saturday and Sunday could put a complexion upon it - that it was not intended to bear.

CHARLES POWELL
24 July 1986

CJ2ACG

At Chequers last weekend, the Prime Minister was in training for the political version of the Commonwealth Games. A lot of the athletes may have been ordered to stay away, but none of the Prime Ministers has scratched and Mrs. Thatcher is clearly anticipating a tetchy and difficult contest. "Hurdle after hurdle after hurdle", she murmured, musing on the ups and downs on the political steeplechase in general, in the manner of one who would welcome a few more races on the flat.

It has been a year to test the nerve and endurance of the bravest : Westland, the deal with General Motors which never was, the Libyan raid and now South Africa, with the charge that she has been deserted by her Cabinet, gravely displeased the Queen and put the Commonwealth at risk.

Yet, in spite of the encircling glooms, Mrs. Thatcher showed no sign of curling at the edges, nor indeed of temporising for the sake of a quieter life. For over two hours, she spoke with candour and undiminished vigour, in language liberally peppered with "poppycocks!" and "absolute nonsenses" both about the immediate perplexities and about her larger, long-term battle to "revive the spirit of Britain". At times like this, she makes Boadicea seem like a wimp.

Yes, she admitted, she was worried about the Commonwealth Conference, worried about whether we should be able to persuade the others that the view we were taking on sanctions was not only reasonable but also the way most likely to bring an end to apartheid better and faster than the alternatives.

As for the danger that the Commonwealth might actually break up over the issue, such a step, she declared, would be "absolutely absurd". After all, it wasn't the British Commonwealth, its members had long ago refused to have it called that. "So it is their club, their Commonwealth. If they wish to break it up, I think that's absurd".

Nor was it, in her view, a club whose time was past, not if the members really valued it anyway. It was a grouping which girdled the world, the only international conference she attended where no translators were needed and where debate was therefore that much freer and more genuine. What was more, some of its members didn't belong to ar other institution. In that sense, she implied, it was their only clut

It would also be absurd to break it up because it had already weathered great difficulties. What sort of relationship was it that couldn't accommodate differences of opinion, particularly when what was being proposed would affect member countries very differently ? There were vigorous differences in the UN, but nobody suggested the Security Council should fold up on that account.

"Good Heavens!", said Mrs. Thatcher, "just look at what it has had to withstand to date! Don't think all the countries in it are democracies in our sense of the term. Some have military governments some states of emergency, some have had censorship at times, some internal massacres - and some have put Opposition people in jail without trial.

"Of course", she went on, "we have withstood all that, partly because you understand that some countries do have problems, and it i not for us to pontificate about how they should deal with them". Just because some of them were not democracies in our sense, we didn't "go into a terrific argument" and say "do this or we shall leave the Commonwealth!"

Nor was the problem, she added later, essentially one of colour. You only had to look at the rest of Africa to see that. There was real trouble in both Angola and Mozambique, though there were no whit people there. They had left long ago, but what had you got ? Fighting. Angola could have a fantastic economy, it was rich, but instead you had fighting between different groups of people. The problem was essentially one of human nature, not colour.

So what she was hoping for was that the Commonwealth would stay together, that everyone would speak their minds courteously in the knowledge that the South Africans were doing things "which most of us find repugnant" and that they all wanted to bring apartheid to an end - "and it <u>will</u> end", declared the Prime Minister firmly, "I have no doubt of that".

But what did she mean by the end of apartheid - one man, one vote ? "That sort of constitutional arrangement", declared the Prime Minister, "is not for an outside entity to determine. Once you have got dialogue going - and I think myself there will probably have to t two lots of negotiations, one with the black South Africans and the

second with them all together - then they have got to fashion their own constitution.

"After all, there used to be a Central African Federation, which we put together and the Africans then took apart. We have got to stop acting as if we can impose things upon them".

She seemed, I remarked, to have shifted somewhat towards the side of further measures. Had that been provoked, as had been reported, by being "deserted" by her Cabinet or having had a row with the Queen ?

"I have not shifted at all", retorted Mrs. Thatcher, "and I am amazed, utterly amazed at some of the stories I read in the Press". What went on between monarch and Prime Minister was totally confidential. So was what happened in Cabinet and, for that reason, she was not in a position to refute the assertions which had been made, but when, pray, did I imagine that she had been "deserted" by her Cabinet

So it wasn't true that she had been put under pressure by her colleagues on sanctions ? By now, the Prime Minister's indignation had reached simmering-point. "You know", she said, "people must thir I have the strongest personality that was ever born on this earth" - they might indeed believe that, I murmured - "that I can get my own way regardless of what anyone else thinks at any time".

She did, it was true, argue a great deal but, if she got her own way, it was only by convincing other people.

But some of her critics had said she would have been better

advised to make modest concessions on sanctions at the outset and thus avoid accentuating the divisions which existed. "Whatever I do", sai the Prime Minister, with just a hint of resignation, "they will complain".

The fact was that, by getting people to analyse what they meant by (comprehensive) sanctions - by asking questions such as 'do you realise what you are doing to farm-workers in the Cape where they have no supplementar benefit ?', 'do you realise what you are doing to the British merchan marine which, on other occasions, you never hesitate to tell me is getting smaller ?', 'do you realise that the Labour Party, when in power, utterly recoiled from sanctions for the same reasons ?' - they had been made to face what sanctions meant in practice.

Was I really telling her that it was wrong to face people with the consequences of their day-to-day actions, and that <u>that</u> was handling the situation badly ? [Poppycock!]

"What we have done", declared Mrs. Thatcher, "is to knock out general economic sanctions as a possible way forward, and get people to realise that there is no point in applying them if others pick up the business or it goes through third countries". Then, it merely arrived in this country at a higher price or, if it worked, it worked by starving people. She and the Government had no intention of creating a wasteland in southern Africa. Much better to have "a free and hopefully democratic society coming through in our way".

So, she conceded, the Commonwealth Conference was going to be tough but "if you care deeply about trying to get what you believe to be the best decision, then you go on being tough. If you didn't care two hoots, you wouldn't have to be. You would sit back and say 'if I didn't do anything controversial, if I took the easy way every time, maybe I would be liked'. But, if I did that, I would despise myself and in the long run, I wouldn't be liked anyway.

"Years from now, people would turn back and say 'look, they had their first woman Prime Minister and she didn't tackle the problems of her time'".

So she did not feel that President Botha was unable to move because his hands were tied by the South African military and police No, declared Mrs. Thatcher, she did not, because more and more people there, both black and white, were ready to negotiate, though "whether we have got the time-scale too tight, I don't know".

She also had critics, I pointed out, who claimed that she would show more concern if it were whites that were being killed, and not blacks. The charge genuinely shocked her. She had never, she said, heard such an accusation. What concerned her were deaths, whether black or white. After all, there might be as many as 800,000 people in South Africa many of them Indian, who were entitled to come to this country and she was naturally concerned about them.

"Can I just say", she went on, "that I find the necklace which black uses to kill black utterly repugnant and it is one of

the things which, faster than anything else, turned my sympathies off any case which some of them might have been putting".

But wasn't it just as bad that the South African police should have done to death people like Steve Biko, the black African leader ? "Oh", exclaimed Mrs. Thatcher, "it was absolutely appalling what the did to Biko, but no one stands up for that, everybody condemns it, while you actually hear people standing up for the necklace, or at least refusing to condemn it".

There was another story, I said, that she had already reached a private deal with Botha, that Nelson Mandela should be released durir the Commonwealth Conference. "I have done no private deals", declare the Prime Minister categorically. Of course we worked for Mandela's release and for the lifting of the ban on the ANC, even though we disliked many of the things they stood for. The fact was that you couldn't have a negotiation unless Mandela and the ANC could come to it and speak freely.

"My basic wish", she said, "is that there should be more obvious and visible signs that they are going to get rid of apartheid". She was very much aware of Botha's timing difficulties, but there were signs that the South Africans genuinely wanted negotiations -"and I just hope".

But hope, in the minefield of southern Africa, seemed such a fragile flower. After the post-Libyan storms, the sneer that she was nothing more than Reagan's stooge, had it not been tempting to play

for safety on South Africa, to drift with the tide ? Or did she perhaps have some constitutional instinct to swim against it, an in-built contrariness ? It seemed an entirely new idea to the Prime Minister, who is not much given to self-analysis.

"I do not think I have ever thought", she said pensively, "'shall I take the tough or easy way ?' I don't think I have ever said 'let's go the easy way for once'." On South Africa, it had certainly never ~~even~~ entered her head. She just looked at problems and decided what she thought was the right way - no, "correct" was a better word, because "right" made her sound so pious.

But hadn't it been at least tempting, particularly after the great shambles of Westland and BL ? "Well, you say great shambles", retorted Mrs. Thatcher, "but they were comparatively small things, in fact, if I may say so, very small things". Politically, though, surely not ? Yes, conceded the Prime Minister grudgingly, Westland had been difficult, but only because because the Press were more interested in the personalities than the underlying issue.

As for Libya, she was well pleased with the outcome. A bully only went on bullying so long as the people he was bullying didn't fight back. When they did, anyone who was contemplating being a bull was suddenly faced with the unknown. They said to themselves "Gosh! I can't just knock this group of people about, they might hit back". That was exactly what they had done to Gadaffi.

But hadn't one of the results of not taking the easy way out

been that, during her period of office, she had quarrelled with most of the major institutions of the State - the Civil Service, the universities, the Church of England.....?

"I have not quarrelled with the Church of England", interjected the Prime Minister. "What I did say in the House the other day was that I find it absolutely astonishing that, at one stage, we are asked to give more money to stop starvation in Africa and, at another, to pursue a policy which would increase it. Am I not entitled to say that because I believe it to be correct ?"

The point I was trying to put, I said, was that these institutions were part of the basic framework of the State, and whether she regarded the State as simply the will of the Prime Minister, licensed by the people ? No, retorted Mrs. Thatcher, she did not, but I was taking the opposite view that no Prime Minister could ever discuss anything with the institutions of State, she must accept what they said willy-nilly.

They came out with all kinds of things, and she did not complain but, now and then, she did exercise "a scintilla of freedom of speech"!

But did not the fact that these battles had taken place, with the sense of tension and conflict they brought, make it harder to govern the country ? No, it didn't, said the Prime Minister. The GCHQ thing had been "a very limited exercise". As for the service in St Pauls after the Falklands campaign, she had simply been anxious that people

who had fought there should take part, and they had.

What I was arguing, though, she declared, was that everyone could have their say except a Prime Minister. "Good Lord!", she exclaimed, "if you ever dare say anything, you are quarrelling with the great institutions. Nonsense! I am not going to be gagged!"

That seemed a good moment to take a ~~rest~~ break from current headaches and look back at the long, hard road Mrs Thatcher has travelled since taking office in 1979. In how bad a state, I asked, had the country then been ? Where were we heading ? I expected an answer purely economic terms, with a ghoulish vision of Britain sinking downhill towards, first, the Portugese and then the Mozambiquean condition. What I got was something quite different.

Of course, she recalled, we were in a state where the unions had become more important than the Government, where people thought Jack Jones more powerful than Callaghan, but there was a deeper malaise: the malignant blight of socialism was eating away the British spirit of enterprise and independence.

"They set out to do more things for people", said Mrs. Thatcher, "but what they actually do is try to control their lives and create a dependency on government. They want more council houses, so they can say who should go into them. They want more rent subsidies, so they can say who should get them and who shouldn't. They want more central and local government jobs so they have a hold over those people".

Nor did the blight stop there. The more dependent on government you became, the less independent you were and, by 1979, the socialists had given such large numbers of people a vested interest in the continuance of a Labour Government that we only just managed to get back to being a free society. In other words, she implied, we were on the road to becoming a nation of State-dependent drones.

"We had had 35 years when the government took a larger and larger part in life, so we had the safety net, but we were forgetting ~~had forgotten~~ the ladder of opportunity. After 35 years of that kind of thinking, with people even in our own Party believing that the touchstone of showing you were for the people was to take more and more of their money to do more and more things for them, we desperately needed a reinvigoration of the spirit". It was taking a long time to bring that about.

One of the reasons the North of England was not recovering as quickly as it might was that it no longer had the same number of people ready to start up their own businesses. "The North", said Mrs. Thatcher, "as built by enterprise long before we had a Minister of Industry, but then it got so ossified that people just expected jobs to be forthcoming from the big companies".

No, when she really thought about it, she wasn't disappointed with the British people, nor did she consider them a sluggish bunch. When you had had the other spirit - "I've got a problem, the government must solve it" - for such a long time, you really mustn't

expect too big a turn-around in eight years, but it was coming.

There was another reason why she did not believe that the spirit of enterprise had been totally sapped :"where people see a direct relationship between the work they put in and the money they get out, my goodness, they go out and find and create jobs, and that is the black economy. That is the very evidence that the enterprise is stil there if the incentive is".

Yet, while many people admired and liked her, I observed, there were others who, to judge from the vile abuse levelled at her, disliked and even hated her. Why did she think that was ?

"Because", Mrs. Thatcher replied bluntly, "anyone who has to do things which have been neglected for years upsets the/nice, even way of those who have been used to the old regime, and really rather like it. You see, there are people who are quite happy to be dependent on the State, quite happy.

"When things changed, it disturbed the even tenor of their ways. And I upset all those Labour people, who had got to the top of the unions and were Lefties and were running things, because they liked people to be dependent on them".

So it had nothing to do with their reaction to her personally ? "I think maybe sometimes it has", conceded the Prime Minister. "I have had to fight so hard and I suppose they are irritated that one has been able to go on. Yes, I do have to shout to make myself heard

and sometimes I say 'I am not going to shout any more like I did last time, I will just stand there until they are quiet'".

But some people alleged that she had simply created a more divided society. How did she respond to that ? "Very simply", she replied. "There was a totally divided society in 1979, in the sense that the unions were in control. You did what the union leader said or you lost your job and, under the compassionate, caring Labour Party, if you lost your job, they made the employer sack you without compensation". So, far from having divided society, she had actually liberated many people.

The only division now was between a Socialism which wanted more and more people dependent on them and a Conservatism which wanted a strong, proud country of independent people.

So she did not accept that she had, perhaps, been unintentionall responsible for the increasing violence in society which had marked her period in office, that it might never have occurred if we had had someone more soothing at the top ?

"Certainly not", retorted the Prime Minister, "that is absolutely absurd." Crime had gone up in every country during the post-war years and by roughly the same percentage. "And don't forget Mrs. Thatcher went on, "that we were seeing some very ugly scenes before we came into power. Don't you remember Saltley Cokeworks, where the trade unions were saying that, no matter what the courts and the government said, they were going to rule by that method ?"

And, if I was suggesting that socialism was the alternative, the we'd seen that in action on the picket-line at Orgreave during the miners' strike, and you could see it in action now at Wapping, in Haringey and in Liverpool.

Had she, then, enjoyed her period in office or wasn't that quite the right word ? She wasn't sure it was, replied Mrs. Thatcher, but it was the job she had wanted to do, and which she wanted to go on doing. It suited her and she felt natural in it.

But what was it that drove her on, particularly at moments like this with the storm-clouds gathering round her head again ? Was it sheer love of power ? Had that eaten into her soul after seven years "No", declared the Prime Minister, "it does not eat into my soul at all.

"What <u>is</u> constantly in my mind is 'Look! There is a lot more t do before there is again running through the bloodstream of the British character the things which should run through it as a matte of habit : that Britain is a free and enterprising society, and that you cease to be free when you become dependent on the State."

As for the trappings of power, well, it was marvellous to be able to come to a beautiful place like Chequers but, given all that, what would be her greatest desire if she had an evening free ? Really, just to go home. That was why she'd so much missed their little Chelsea house when they sold it. "No", she said, "it's wonderful to have this place, but it wouldn't bother me at all to give it up".

The conversation turned to less personal issues. Given the possibility of a growing tension between America and Europe, ought we to be seeking a new relationship with Russia, or was that always going to be delusory given the nature of Communism ?

Of course, said Mrs. Thatcher, she did not like Communism. It resulted neither in the dignity of freedom nor in the higher prosperit we achieved in the Western world, but we did have certain things in common and our differences must never come to a fight.

We didn't talk about attacking people, but the Soviet Union had attacked other people, and we had to make it clear to them :"One foo over that line, and we shall fight with all the capacity at our command - and you would not win, or the price is such that is never worth your starting!"

But the Russians, too, were entitled to their security, so we could negotiate with them on arms control and we could talk about fundamental human rights. When she said she could do business with Gorbachov, it didn't at all mean that she regarded him in the same way as Mitterand or Kohl, but it did mean that there was some business which she could, and should do with him.

On the other hand, you had to take the measure of the person you were doing business with, you must never wear rose-tinted spectacles. Communism was going to be Communism in the same form for most of her lifetime.

And her future ? She obviously, I remarked, wanted a third

term, but people could fairly say that they had already had a large dose of her. Why should they put her in again ? "For two reasons", replied Mrs. Thatcher. "First, if they believe what I believe in, the greater independence of people, the whole feeling that the State must never become so powerful that it smothers the independent spirit. Second, if they believe in defending ourselves".

Then they should look at the opposing doctrine, at what the left wing unions had done and would like to do again, at the intimidation, and at the way the Bernie Grants, the Liverpools ran their societies.

But her critics, I suggested, might well say that her stande was so rigid that she could no longer take the country forward, that resistance to her was now so great that her usefuless was at an end. "How can my stance be too rigid", replied Mrs. Thatcher, "when what I am saying is more power to the people, together with more responsibility and more choice"?

People were paying vast sums of money for our schools and yet they were not getting the education for their children which they wanted. They had to go to the local comprehensive. She wanted to give them the chance to go to a different school, so how could people say she was inflexible ?

She also wanted them to have more choice in housing. She felt deeply for people trapped in huge tower blocks. Those blocks had a lot to answer for. Before they were built, when children went out to play in the street, there was a visible authority from the kitchen-

window - "now you just stop that!" Once you went up into a tower block, that had gone, the natural visible authority which parents exefcised.

What, then, were the factors on which she would decide to call the next election ? Surely nothing as small as choosing a time when she felt she sould win ? Mrs. Thatcher rose vertically to the bait. "That is not small", she bridled. "If the Government I lead believes in what it is doing - and it does! - then it is my duty to see that that is allowed to continue".

That was the prime consideration, but there were other things. One was that people didn't like elections too often, and they were quite right, because it induced an extra instability. All right, she had gone to the country after only four years of her first term, but this time it might be the full five - "and let me add this. People may say I have already decided when to have the election, but that is complete nonsense!"

And, when she did finally depart, what would she like people to say of her ? "I ~~knows~~ know what they will say", said the Prime Minister, ~~somewhat~~ sombrely. "The most complimentary will be 'oh well, she was a strong leader and a fighter and you did know where you stood with her'".

But what would she actually like them to say ? Mrs Thatcher bowed her head, visibly moved. "What I would like them to say", she said haltingly, "is 'we think what she has done for Britain is really

right. It was a bit hard to face at the time, but perhaps it was right'. So not 'she was right' but 'perhaps she was right'".

And, so saying, the most remarkable and courageous Prime Ministe of the post-war years departed to confront yet another high hurdle. She can be shrewish, and she can certainly be strident, but she sees through us as a nation, our sloppiness, our languor, our lack of enterprise and ambition and, whatever flak may come her way, she is determined that we shall not settle for second-best.

Too many of our recent Prime Ministers have taken the low road o shallow compromise. After Mrs. Thatcher, we cannot claim that we lacked a leader who gave us the chance to live up to the best of ourselves. If we reject her and put into office the shifty, the divided and the second-rate, we shall surely deserve our fate.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

South Africa.

Two rather disturbing reports, which you should see, about the projects for the Commonwealth Meeting. We are going to need strong nerves.

CDP.

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MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

PS/SofS MoD

LADY YOUNG
MR POWELL No 10 D.St

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH PIK BOTHA, 23 JULY

SUMMARY

1. CURTAIN RAISER FOR P.W. SECRETARY OF STATE PRESSED BOTHA HARD ON NEED FOR CHANGE, MANDELA/ANC. PIK UNYIELDING. COMPLAINED THAT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE MADE CHANGE MORE DIFFICULT. INSISTENT THAT THE ANC WAS VIRTUALLY SYNONYMOUS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY: AND THAT THE SAG HAD NO INTENTION OF NEGOTIATING A TAKE OVER BY MARXISTS. APPRECIATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S ROLE: BUT CRITICISM OF THE EUROPEANS FOR "FIGHTING THE BATTLE OF THOSE WHO DO NOT WANT TO NEGOTIATE". NO SIGN OF ANY IMMINENT BREAKTHROUGH ON SUBSTANCE, BUT VAGUE HINTS THAT SOMETHING MIGHT BE BREWING ON MANDELA PROVIDED THIS DID NOT APPEAR THE RESULT OF FOREIGN PRESSURE. WARNINGS THAT SOUTH AFRICAS NEIGHBOURS WOULD SUFFER IN THE EVENT OF SANCTIONS.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD ALMOST AN HOUR AND A HALF OF TALKS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE MORNING OF 23 JULY, FOLLOWED BY A WORKING LUNCH.

JULY, FOLLOWED BY A WORKING LUNCH.

3. PIK BOTHA BEGAN BY COMPLAINING THAT THE EPG AND OTHER MISSIONS, INCLUDING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S HAD CREATED A HIGH PROFILE IN THE MEDIA. THIS CONTINUAL INTERFERENCE HAD HAD AN ADVERSE CUMULATIVE EFFECT ON WHITES AND ON MODERATE COLOURED, INDIAN AND BLACK OPINION. MANY NOW FELT THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE EUROPEANS DECIDED ON SANTCTIONS, LEAVING THE SAG TO CONCENTRATE ON OTHER MATTERS. THERE WAS A DANGER OF REFORM BEING SEEN BY THE GOVERNMENT'S OWN SUPPORTERS AS THE RESULT OF FOREIGN PRESSURE. THIS MADE CHANGE MORE DIFFICULT.

4. MANDELA WAS A CASE IN POINT. VERY CONFIDENTIALLY, BOTHA CLAIMED THAT BEFORE THE EPG VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA THERE HAD BEEN REASON TO BELIEVE THAT S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM MANDELA PRESENTED MIGHT BE FOUND. WITH THEIR VISIT, MATTERS HAD REVERTED TO SQUARE ONE. PROSPECTS WERE ONCE AGAIN LOOKING BETTER, THOUGH BOTHA COULD NOT SAY MORE AT THIS STAGE.

5. BOTHA SAID THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT HAD COME AT A VERY DIFFICULT TIME. THE SAG WAS FULLY ACQUAINTED WITH THE VARIOUS KINDS OF PRESSURE FOR SANCTIONS ON THE PRIME MINISTER. THEY COULD SEE THAT WITHOUT TANGIBLE RESULTS THERE WERE ROUGH WATERS AHEAD WITHIN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY. THE MESSAGE WAS THEREFORE THAT SHOULD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FEEL THAT THEIR POSITION HAD BECOME UNTENABLE IT WOULD BE BETTER TO OPT FOR SANCTIONS (''THROW SOME MEAT TO THE WOLVES'') THAN TO ALLOW BITTERNESS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA TO DEVELOP. BUT THAT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY: THINGS COULD HAPPEN IN COMING MONTHS WHICH MIGHT WARD OFF SANCTIONS. (PRESSED ABOUT THIS LATER BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, BOTHA SPOKE VAGUELY IN TERMS OF EVENTS, TRENDS, DIRECTIONS).

6. BOTHA SAID HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE DID NOT BELIEVE THE SAG WHEN THEY TOLD US THAT PRESSURE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ANC AMOUNTED TO A REQUIREMENT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY. IN TURN SAG'S VIEW THIS WAS A ROAD LEADING NOT TO POWER-SHARING AND THE REMOVAL OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, WHICH THE SAG WANTED, BUT TO A MARXIST TAKE-OVER.

7. IN REPLY THE SECRETARY OF STATE BEGAN BY REFERRING TO THE MANY CONNECTIONS, HUMAN AND FAMILY, BETWEEN THE UK AND SOUTH AFRICA AND THE ABUNDANT GOODWILL FELT TOWARDS A FUTURE SOUTH AFRICA WHICH WOULD BE STABLE, PROSPEROUS AND WESTERN ORIENTATED. THE SAME WENT FOR OTHER EC COUNTRIES. WHAT WORRIED US WAS THAT WE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE OUR GOAL ON THE BASIS OF SUCH A FUNDAMENTALLY DISCRIMINATORY AND UNEQUAL POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE, AS THE STATE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAD ACKNOWLEDGED. NOR DID WE THINK IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CREATE A FRAMEWORK TO ACCOMMODATE THE NECESSARY CHANGES WITHOUT DIALOGUE WITH A FREELY CHOSEN AND FREE BLACK LEADERSHIP. THIS EXPLAINED THE INTERNATIONAL FOCUS ON FREEING MANDELA AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS AND ON UNBANNING POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS INCLUDING THE ANC.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MADE CLEAR THAT WE DID NOT SEE THE ANC AS THE ONLY NEGOTIATING PARTNER. BUT IZ WAS ONE REPRESENTATIVE ORGANISATION AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS WAS THE KEY TO THE PARTICIPATION OF MODERATES SUCH AS BUTHELEZI. OF COURSE THERE WAS COMMUNIST INFLUENCE WITHIN

[illegible] BUTHELEZI. OF COURSE THERE WAS COMMUNIST INFLUENCE WITHIN THE ANC, AS IN MANY NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. BUT NEGOTIATION WOULD DISARM SUCH ELEMENTS. COVERSELY, 5£3 ¤£-,¤3 9% A MOSCOW-DOMINATED SOUTH AFRICA COULD ONLY BE ENHANCED BY FAILURE TO NEGOTIATE.

9. BOTHA SAID THAT THE SAG WERE UPSET AT THE LACK OF APPRECIATION BY THE TWELVE OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION, OF THE VARIETY OF FORCES IN PLACE (INCLUDING WITHIN THE WHITE COMMUNITY) AND OF WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE PAST TWO YEARS: EG ABOLITION OF THE PASS LAWS, INFLUX CONTROL, THE IMMORALITY ACT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD INDEED ACKNOWLEDGED THE DEGREE OF CHANGE ACHIEVED. HE DID NOT DISCOUNT ITS IMPORTANCE, THOUGH IT HAD COME LATER THAN WE HAD HOPED. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM REMAINED THAT THE MAJORITY IN SOUTH AFRICA WERE UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN POLITICAL STRUCTURES. THE SOONER THIS WAS PUT RIGHT THE BETTER. SURELY THE SAG HAD A REAL INTEREST IN NEGOTIATING WITH MEN OF THE CALIBRE OF MANDELA AND TAMBO WHILE THEY WERE STILL ON THE SCENE? BOTHA ACKNOWLEDGED THE FORCE OF THIS ARGUMENT. MANDELA MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN DIALOGUE BUT STATEMENTS BY HIS WIFE AND LAWYER MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SAG.

10. BOTHA WENT ON TO ALLEGE AGAIN THAT THERE WAS LITTLE APPRECIATION ABROAD OF SOUTH AFRICA'S EFFORTS TO GET DIALOGUE GOING. THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO ACHIEVE DIALOGE WITH A PARTY THAT DID NOT WANT IT. THERE WAS ALSO A PROBLEM OF INTIMIDATION. THE SAG SAW EUROPEAN PRESSURE AS UNHELPFUL. HE CLAIMED THAT THE SAG HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WERE READY FOR DIALOGUE WITH ANYONE. THE ONLY CONDITION WAS THAT THERE MUST BE A COMMITMENT TO PEACEFUL CHANGE AND TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE. HE SHOUGHT TO SHOW THAT THE SAG ACCEPTED THE NEED TO COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION. THE TWELVE AND THE UNITED STATES COULD HELP BY ENCOURAGING BLACK LEADERS TO NEGOTIATE. WHAT ABOUT SOMETHING POSITIVE, SUCH AS ARRANGING A MEETING BETWEEN THE SAG, THE FLS AND EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS?

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE PRESSED THE CASE FOR COURAGE ON BOTH SIDES. THE SAG NEEDED TO MAKE THE QUANTUM LEAP OF REACHING OUT TO MANDELA AND TAMBO. THIS WOULD DISARM THEIR CRITICS AND CREATE AN OVERWHELMING CALL FOR A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE. WITHOUT SUCH ACTION, PRESSURE FOR EARLY DECISIONS ON FURTHER MEASURES WOULD GROW. THE EC, COMMONWEALTH AND U.S. HAD ALREADY TAKEN A SERIES OF MEASURES. IT WAS NOT JUST THE EC WHO WANTED FURTHER ACTION. THE COMMONWEALTH (INCLUDING THE OLD COMMON-WEALTH) WERE PRESSING STRONGLY AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE WAS RUNNING IN THAT DIRECTION. TOGETHER THE THE GERMANS AND THE PORTUGUESE, WE WERE RESISTING SANCTIONS. BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA ON THE REQUIRED SCALE THE QUESTION WAS INCREASINGLY BEING ASKED WHAT ALTERNATIVE COURSE THERE WAS.

12. BOTHA SEEMED RESIGNED TO DECISIONS ON FURTHER MEASURES SOON IN ONE OR MORE FORUMS. THE TROUBLE WAS THAT ONCE IMPOSED SANCTIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO REMOVE. THE SAG HAD ALREADY DRAWN UP PLANS TO RETURN MIGRANT WORKERS TO NEIGHBOURING STATES, CURTAIL TRANSPORT FACILITIES, REVISE THE CUSTOMS UNION AND SO ON. IN ORDER TO AVOID THIS HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DRAW OUT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT AND

POSSIBLE TO DRAW OUT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT AND GAIN TIME.

13. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT RETALIATION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS WOULD ADD TO EXISTING PRESSURES FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AND THUS BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE. FURTHER MILITARY RAIDS WOULD MAKE THE SITUATION EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. THE SIGNS POINTED TOWARDS AN ESCALATION WHICH WOULD BE BAD FOR SOUTH AFRICA, FOR HER NEIGHBOURS, AND FOR THE WORLD. THE ONLY SOLUTION WAS DIALOGUE. BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF READINESS TO FREE POLITICAL PRISONERS AND UNBAN THE ANC IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO TURN THE CORNER. THIS WAS WHY WE WERE ALSO SO WORRIED ABOUT DETAINEES UNDER THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. (PIK BOTHA APPEARED TO ACCEPT THE FORCE OF THIS ARGUMENT ALSO). THE FACT THAT THOSE DETAINED INCLUDED LEADING TRADES UNIONISTS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF REPUTABLE ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS BLACK SASH CREATED THE WORST POSSIBLE IMPRESSION ABROAD.

14. THE SECRETARY OF STATE PRESSED HOME THE ARGUMENT ABOUT THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE WITH REPRESENTATIVE BLACK LEADERS THEREBY ENCOURAGE ING M THOSE WHO PREFERRED NEGOTIATION TO VIOLENCE AND SO PROMOTING PEACEFUL CHANGE, BUT BOTHA WOULD NOT BUDGE. IF THE CHOICE WAS BETWEEN TOTAL ISOLATION AND COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS OR SURRENDER TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY, THE SAG COULD UNDOUBTEDLY MANAGE ISOLATION FOR A WHILE. BUT AS ONE SOUTH AFRICAN BUSINESSMAN HAD PUT IT, THE CHOICE WAS BETWEEN ULTIMATE DISASTER AND GREAT DANGER, IE GOING DOWN THE ROAD OF DIALOGUE. THE LONGER THINGS WERE LEFT, THE GREATER THE CHANCE OF DISASTER. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT RELEASE OF MANDELA AND UNBANNING OF THE ANC CONTAINED RISKS BUT THERE WAS NO OTHER WAY AND THE PRIZE WAS GREAT. CONFIDENCE CUT TWO WAYS. MANY PEOPLE HAD LOST CONFIDENCE IN THE SAG AFTER THE 19 MAY RAIDS, THE TIMING OF WHICH HAD BEEN EITHER WILFUL OR RECKLESS.

15. BOTHA SAID THAT HE FELT BETRAYED. HE WAS TEMPTED TO THINK THAT THERE WAS A HIDDEN AGENDA OUTSIDE AND THAT SOME EUROPEANS ERE ACTUALLY RESIGNED TO SEEING A MARXIST GOVERNMENT INSTALLED IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE EUROPEAN AIM WASCERTAINLY NOT A COMMUNIST TAKE OVER BUT A REALISTIC DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SAG AND THE BLACK POPULATION THAT COULD BRING AN END TO VIOLENCE AND ENABLE PROGRESS TO BE MADE TOWARDS A NON RACIAL REPRESENTATIVE SOCIETY.

16. REEVE MAY DRAW DISCREETLY ON THIS TELEGRAM IN BRIEFING THE AFRICAN WORKING GROUP IN STRICT CONFIDENCE ON 29 JULY.

17. FOR COPY RECIPIENTS. THE FOREGOING IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY, EXCEPT THAT WASHINGTON MAY GIVE A GUARDED ACCOUNT TO THE STATE DEPT.

MOBERLY

YYYY
FCO PASS SAVING CANBERRA, DAKAR, KINSHASHA, DELHI

NNNN

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NEWS RELEASE

CBI

(2)

EMBARGOED : NOT FOR PUBLICATION BEFORE 1445 HRS ON THURSDAY 24 JULY 1986

P.131.86

Prime Minister
This is actually quite a good and balanced statement. But there is some risk that X will be presented as "British industry opens the door to measures against South Africa".
CDP 24/7.

SOUTH AFRICA

The CBI Council today discussed South Africa and reaffirmed the principles on which its policy is based. These are :

** We are totally opposed to apartheid
** We support all efforts to promote dialogue as the best way to peaceful change
** Our attitude to political restraints on trade with South Africa is the same as with any other country and was enunciated in August 1980 in our statement on trade policy.

This attitude is that we deplore any political restraints on freedom to trade, but we recognise that it is for our elected Government to decide what is in the national interest. We will accept their decisions provided that three conditions are satisfied :

** That the national economic interest has been fully weighed
** That any restrictions are given legal force
** That our competitors suffer the same restrictions

X1

We do not believe "sanctions" are an all-or-nothing question. There are a range of possible measures. If Sir Geoffrey Howe's mission fails, the Government has said it may be necessary to envisage further measures. Meanwhile we support the strenuous efforts the Government is making, and we await their decision on what action is appropriate on the South African issue.

24 July 1986

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CBI INDUSTRY YEAR

CONFIDENTIAL

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NOTE
As approved by Council, after slight amendments. NOT released to Press.

TO THE COUNCIL FOR THE MEETING ON 24 JULY 1986

SOUTH AFRICA

Introduction

1 CBI policy on South Africa was set out in the President's letter of 9 September 1985 to Council members, which was noted with approval at the meeting of 18 September. It was then publicly stated in Sir James Cleminson's address to the conference of ASSOCOM in Cape Town in October, and summarised in the CBI leaflet "South Africa: the Business Approach", published in December 1985.

2 Events have moved on considerably since that date, and an intense public debate is in progress about South Africa. It was therefore agreed at Council on 25 June that there should be a full discussion of the issues at the meeting of 24 July.

The British Industry Committee on South Africa (BICSA)

3 In January 1986, with the support of the CBI and UKSATA, leading companies with South African interests formed BICSA to act as lead spokesman in this area for British industry. BICSA stated its views in February 1986 and again on 20 June: they were well in line with the policy earlier approved by Council and on both occasions the CBI endorsed them. The existence of BICSA does not, however, remove the need for the CBI to take a position on South African issues. Whereas BICSA represents companies involved in that country, the CBI also represents many others without such involvement but whose interests worldwide could be affected by events there. It is therefore appropriate for Council to review CBI policy and confirm or qualify its support of that advocated by BICSA.

The Basis of CBI Policy

4 The CBI's prime objective in relation to South Africa is to achieve the end of the apartheid system, in the interests of South Africa as a whole and of the neighbouring states.

5 There is at present an immense emotional wave of enthusiasm for "sanctions", and any reservation expressed by British industry about this concept is interpreted as a lack of commitment to the ending of apartheid. We must therefore strongly emphasise that our reluctance to support the movement for general sanctions is because of our doubts of their effectiveness in achieving the goal of an end to apartheid, as well as the very damaging effects such moves could have on British industry and employment.

6 Given our firm commitment to this goal, British business because of its broad involvement in South Africa has a particular responsibility to work for its attainment by the most effective means.

7 These means are to promote and increase economic growth, which is what exerts most pressure on the South African Government for change. Many of

.../2

the concessions forced on that Government in recent years have been due to the economy's increased dependence on the black community. Economic growth thus makes the South African Government more amenable to reform.

8 Full economic sanctions would work against growth, and would seriously damage the country's economy at a time when it needs at least to be maintained intact to under-pin the painful transition from the old society to the new. (For example 350,000 new jobs are needed each year merely to keep pace with population growth.) Full economic sanctions would also increase Afrikaner resistance to change, encouraging the "laager" mentality and strengthening right-wing movements.

9 It is of course for the British Government to take final decisions on what is in the national interest. The CBI calls on it, in doing so, to ensure that any "negative" measures on which it decides are those which do the least damage to economic growth in South Africa and exert the most effective pressure on the South African Government for fundamental political reform.

10 Such measures should be those which do least damage to the economy and employment in the UK, but we stress that in present circumstances this is not the main consideration. Government should ensure that any measures taken in restraint of trade are fully complied with by all South Africa's trading partners.

Support for the South African Business Community

11 The CBI fully supports the strenuous efforts of the South African business community to promote peaceful change through political dialogue between the South African Government and all political forces in South Africa including the ANC. We regret that certain trades union leaders are not at present in a position to take part in that dialogue. We also support all efforts to foster and assist social and economic development in the non-white communities through organisations such as the Urban Foundation.

Positive Action

12 British companies have a special responsibility for the 100,000 employees of their subsidiaries in South Africa. In their overwhelming majority these companies have a good record of compliance with the EEC Code of Conduct, and many have made heavy social investments to better the lot of their workforce and the neighbouring communities. The CBI fully endorses the new version of the EEC Code, and urges companies to maximise their contribution to social development.

13 The CBI will do all it can to support greatly expanded programmes of aid to the victims of apartheid (broadly defined), which are reported to be under consideration by Government and the European Community.

Support for Government Policy

14 The CBI supports all Government efforts to bring pressure to bear on the South African regime to move back to the path of negotiation, which the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group was unable to persuade it to do.

15 In voicing this support CBI policy is in line with that advocated by BICSA and by the business organisations within South Africa in which British companies there play an active part.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 July, 1986.

I enclose a copy of a telex to the Prime Minister giving the text of a statement by Mr. Mangope to the Bophuthatswana Parliament. No reply is required.

(C.D. Powell)

R.N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SIR HECTOR MONRO

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

23 Jan

Michael,

I mentioned his letter yesterday. No need for you to respond to it but the extract from the Restoration & the press cutting might be useful.

The Rev. M. Lindsay-Parkinson was the Rector of a church in my constituency before going to S. Africa.

Hector

Tel. 0373-3589. St Stephen's.

P.O Box 33.

Matatiele

4730.

S.A.

14/7/86.

Sir Hector Monro.

William wood.

Leicester.

Oamfirenshire.

U.K.

Dear Hector.

A letter out of the blue! I hope you and Anne are both well, and all the family. Please give Anne our love, and best wishes to the young. We are both well and as happy as possible under the present conditions.

I write firstly about the current international position regarding S.A. Like, and I think most people here are full of admiration for Maggie Thatcher and the present administration for stepping up sanctions etc. The problem is only the political picture painted to them. Under this S.A is in the middle of an economic crisis that is of our deepest consequence. The two cannot be separated, of course, and are mixed up with tribal conflict, language barriers, cultural change, crime, and an

on, in some ways like W. Ireland.

I am sure I do not need to go on.

The above is only to introduce that I would like you and the anti-sanction people to know that the Church here, while recognising in Desmond Tutu a great spiritual leader, does not in any way support him, as a whole, in his call for economic pressure against S.A.

In East Griqualand we are trying to organise enough support to restrain him from speaking for "The Church" on this matter. Though I am afraid we may be too late by the time we get our motion to the St John's Episcopal Synod at the beginning of October, and then to the Provincial Synod from there.

I enclose two bits of paper as illustration. The Sunday Times one is the only one that has been photo-copied from various press items. And, as ~~[illegible]~~ usual, is incorrect in the fact that the Bishop is Bishop of the St John's (Transkei, Umtata) not Swartberg, which is one of my parishes.

Elizabeth is in U.K. at the moment,

and was to speak yesterday in Lubumbashi and Bukavu Chambers on this matter.

She will be staying for a few days with a friend, Jane Hawkins, (Mc Gregor) who is an I.T.V producer, in Charlie, for a few days before she returns. Jane had wanted her to speak on a Granada programme, but as on other occasions in case it is misinterpreted by the authorities here, and she is denied re-entry.

Anyway, on to a more personal matter. We have now been here for nearly 4 years, and feel it is not the time to leave as we are now deeply involved for better or for worse.

We are having difficulty gaining Tax exemption certificates from the Ramee people. I wonder if as my M.P. you could perhaps be of some help. I know this is a lot to ask as you are terribly busy. But as the church pay here is the equivalent of about £1,500 P.A. we are very dependent on the money left by our respective families for their work.

Brocklebank, Lutwidge, in the ancestral building Elizabeth's trust.

He is in touch with those, Bowman & Grimshaw, Birley Street. Blackpool, who are handling my parents estates. The Blackpool connection is because my grandfather. Sir Albert L-P. was for many years the M.P. there.

The Trust E's father, William Rees, set up for her is the Lowry House Trust.

Sorry to burden you with all this – but I have a worrying idea that the Government has a tendency to do all that it can to prevent money going to E.S.A. "But in our case......" I can hear you want to put up with that sentence!

I hope you have been able to wade through my terrible writing, one of the banes of my life (and others.).

If ever you come out here come and stay. Natal is beautiful, and mostly sunny, and very healthy.

No snipers as yet, in East Griqualand, and

very little back stabbing.

Some excellent fishing in the Drakensberg dams, a little in the rivers in season. Mostly Rainbows. Some Guinea-fowl shooting in a week or two.

Give our good wishes to Sir Geoffrey if you happen to be in touch.

He has been given one hell of a job. I only hope the Conservatives have not lost the next Election for doing the right thing.

Every Blessing to you all.

Yours as ever.

Michael.

(Lindsay-Parkinson.)

At a meeting held in the Parish Hall Kokstad, on Thursday 23rd. January 1986, and at subsequent meetings, the following statement was agreed upon unanimously by the Rectors, Church Wardens and Parishioners of Holy Trinity Church Kokstad, St. Stephen's Church Matatiele, St. Mary's Church Cedarville and St. Luke's and St. John's Churches Swartberg. It was then approved by both Deaneries of the Archdeaconry of East Griqualand.

1. As the Church of the Province of Southern Africa has always been a multi-racial church community we are opposed to the oppression or domination of one group over another.
2. We are in favour of reforms in South Africa as soon as possible by peaceful means.
3. We are against violence in achieving this aim.
4. We are against disinvestment, boycotts and sanctions against our country, as this will only lead to violence and suffering of the very people we, as a church, are committed to help.
5. We disassociate ourselves from support of the African National Congress and any other organisation advocationg violence, boycotts and sanctions.
6. We would like to make it clear that Church leaders who call for these measurs do not represent us.

Anglican backlash against political meddling gains new support

By CAS St LEGER

A MODERATE backlash against Anglican church involvement in politics has won substantial all-race support in East Griqualand.

About 12 000 black, white and coloured parishioners of the Church of the Province of Southern Africa in East Griqualand — and church officials including rectors and wardens — have dissociated themselves from church leaders who supported the African National Congress and called for disinvestment and sanctions against South Africa.

In a statement approved by both deaneries of the Archdeaconery of East Griqualand, and supported by Bishop Jacob Dlamini of Swartberg, it was unanimously agreed that the participants:

Reforms

- Dissociate themselves from support of the African National Congress and any other organisation advocating violence, boycotts and sanctions.
- Oppose the oppression or domination of one racial group over another and favour speedy reforms in South Africa by peaceful means.
- Oppose violence in achieving this aim and disinvestment, boycotts and sanctions as this would lead only to violence and suffering.

"I am all in favour of it (the statement)," said Bishop Dlamini. He did not name the church leaders parishioners were reacting to, but said he believed Bishop Desmond Tutu of Johannesburg was not the target.

The parishioners' stance was first mentioned at a meeting at the Parish Hall, Kokstad, on January 23 and, after a series of meetings, was finalised a fortnight ago by members of the Holy Trinity Church, Kokstad; St Stephen's Church, Matatiele; St Mary's Church, Cedarville; and St Luke's and St John's churches, Swartberg.

East Griqualand's rural dean, the Very Rev Michael Lindsay-Parkinson, said congregations in all four parishes had been asked to vote and had reached concensus.

"There was no dissention, though we had expected some," Dean Lindsay-Parkinson said.

He said the motivation for the statement was a falling-off in church membership — especially white — after certain church leaders "in the limelight" had become involved in political issues and had espoused violence or said it was inevitable — though he would not name those responsible.

"They should make it quite clear when they are speaking on behalf of the church, and when they are expressing their personal opinions," he said.

He said he had been gladdened that black congregations in particular had lent their full support to the statement, which is now being sent to the Archbishop of Cape Town, the Most Rev Philip Russell, for his reaction.

The Archbishop's office said the statement had not yet been received and would therefore make no comment.

Debate

The church's liaison man in Johannesburg, Bishop John Carter, said: "My experience has been that it is easier to communicate outside South Africa than inside, and any communication is to be welcomed.

"This statement by a number of Anglicans in East Griqualand can be seen as a contribution to continuing debate and discussion between Christian people in Southern Africa. The important thing, I think, is that we should be in dialogue with one another on these vital matters which concern us all."

Note: ~~[illegible]~~ Philip Russell replied that no-one could speak for "the Church" except on matters that had been passed by the Episcopal Synod or Provincial Synod. — MAS.

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SOUTHERN AFRICA :-

PS
PS/MRS CHALKER.
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON

MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

PS/SYS MOD.

MR REEVE

Mr Powell No 10 D.S.

MR REEVE

ED/SAFD
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24 JUL 1986

WASHINGTON - PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH P W BOTHA: 23 JULY

SUMMARY

1. TWO HOURS WITH P W BOTHA. A DIFFICULT AND AT TIMES HEATED DISCUSSION WITH LITTLE UNDER STANDING OF THE PRESSURS IN THE OUTSIDE WORLD. THE PRESIDENT MAINTAINED STRONGLY HIS ACHIEVEMENT AND COMMITMENT TO REFORM AND FAILURE OF WEST TO RECOGNISE THIS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED NEED FOR MORE URGENT REFORM, AND IN PARTICULAR RELEASE OF MANDELA AND UNBANNING OF ANC. PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD SEE AND DEAL WITH MANDELA IN DUE COURSE IN HIS OWN TIME. HE HWARNED OF RETAILIATION AGAINST FLS IF SANCTIONS IMPOSED , AND PROPOSED A HEADS OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL MEETING WITH CERTAIN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE FLS. SECRETARY OF STATE WARNED AGAINST FURTHER RAIDS AGAINST NEIGHBOURS.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT HE WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE PURPOSE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MISSION WAS, AND WOULD NOT HAVE RECEIVED HIM BUT FOR HIS REGARD FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE PURPOSE OF HIS MISSION. OUR ANXIETY WAS TO SEE A STABLE, DEMOCRATIC, PROSPEROUS, WESTERN-ALIGNED SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AVOIDANCE OF DISORDER AND EVENTUAL COMMUNIST DOMINATION. WE HAD ARGUED AGAINST SANCTIONS, BECAUSE WE THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD HARM, NOT HELP. THERE WAS A WIDESPREAD HOPE THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD RAPIDLY

SANCTIONS, BECAUSE WE THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD HARM, NOT HELP. THERE WAS A WIDESPREAD HOPE THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD RAPIDLY COMPLETE THE CHANGES WHICH HAS BEEN STARTED AND PRODUCE A SYSTEM ACCEPTABLE BY ALL RACES. FOR THIS DIALOGUE WAS NEEDED; THUS THE SPECIFIC EC PROPOSITION FOR THE RELEASE OF MANDELA AND OF THE DETAINEES, AND THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC. OTHERWISE WE FEARED THE PRESSURE FOR FURTHER ECONOMIC MEASURES WAS LIKELY TO BE IRRESISTIBLE.

4. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT THE PRESSURE FOR SANCTIONS, WHICH HE PERCEIVED, WAS A MARCH OF FOLLY. HE HAD ONE MORE THAN ANYONE TO BRING PROGRESSIVE CHANGE TO SOUTH AFRICA AND HAD SPLIT HIS OWN PARTY. IN RETURN FOR THIS HE RECEIVED NO ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, BUT THREATS OF SANCTIONS. EUROPE WAS CLEARLY ATTEMPTING TO INTERFERE DIRECTLY IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY. DOUBLE STANDARDS WERE APPLIED TO SOUTH AFRICA AND TO DICTATORSHIPS IN THE COMMONWEALTH AND COMMUNIST STATES. THE ROOTS OF DISCRIMINATION WENT BACK IN SOUTH AFRICA'S HISTORY BEYOND APARTHEID TO THE DAYS OF BRITISH RULE. SOUTH AFRICA WAS A COUNTRY OF WIDELY VARYING CULTURAL GROUPS.

5. THE EC WANTED POLITICAL REFORM, BUT THIS MUST GO HAND IN HAND WITH A LEVELLING OUT OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FIRST WORLD AND THIRD WORLD ECONOMIES WHICH CO-EXISTED IN SOUTH AFRICA. THIS INVOLVED THE WHOLE OF SOUTHER AFRICA. THE FRONT LINE STATES WERE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON SOUTH AFRICA.

6. REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA REQUIRED AN ENORMOUS INCREASE IN EDUCATION: THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAD PUT HUGE EFFORTS INTO IMPROVING BLACK EDUCATION.

7. THE WEST SPOKE OF "AUTHENTIC LEADERS" OF THE BLACK POPULATION: IN HIS VIEW MORE THAN HALF THE BLACK POPULATION WERE ALREADY WELL REPRESENTED BY THEIR OWN AUTHENTIC LEADERS, FOR INSTANCE IN THE BANTUSTANS. THE SAME COULD NOT BE SAID OF COUNTRIES SUCH AS ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. HE AGREED THE BLACK URBAN POPLUATION WERE NOT YET PROPERLY REPRESENTED, BUT MEASURES WOULD BE TAKEN TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR OWN REPRESENTATIVES. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING HARD TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE. THE MAIN REASON FOR FAILURE SO FAR WAS FOREIGN INTERFERENCE.

8. MANY OF THOSE WHO COMMANDED MAXIMUM ATTENTION IN THE WEST WERE NOT REPRESENTATIVE: BISHOP TUTU ONLY REPRESENTED A SMALL PROPORTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN CHRISTIANS.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD MUCH OF PRESIDENT BOTHA'S RESERVATIONS, AND THE PRIDE, INTEGRITY AND COURAGE WITH WHICH HE AND HIS PEOPLE HAD FOUGHT FOR THEIR FREEDOM IN THE PAST. WE DID NOT DISCOUNT THEIR COMMITMENT TO CEMOCRATIC CONCEPTS AND THE RULE OF LAW. BUT THEIR OWN COMMITMENT TO EUROPEAN STANDARDS OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY LED US TO EXPECT THEM TO BE EXTENDED TO ALL THE PEOPLE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

10. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT NO MATTER HOW WE ARGUED THE CASE AGAINST SANCTIONS THE PERCEPTION WAS GAINING AROUND THE WORLD THAT THEY WERE NEEDED BECAUSE THE CENTRAL STRUCTURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION REMAINED INADEQUATE IN THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE PLAYED NO PART IN IT. PRESIDENT BOTHA ASKED WHETHER WE WERE DEMANDING ONE MAN ONE VOTE IN A UNITARY STATE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE NOT OURSELVES PRESCRIBING A SYSTEM, NOR INSISTING ON THE UNITARY STATE FORMULA. BUT THE COMPONENT WHICH WAS SO FAR MISSING WAS THE NEED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE BASIS OF THE CONSENT OF THE MAJORITY ACCOMPANIED BY THE LEGALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES. HENCE OUR EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR THE RELEASE OF BLACK

MAJORITY ACCOMPANIED BY THE LEGALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES. HENCE OUR EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR THE RELEASE OF BLACK LEADERS, ESPECIALLY MANDELA. BUTHELEZI HAD MADE THIS A CONDITION OF ENTERING INTO DIALOGUE.

11. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT RELEASE ANYONE UNLESS THEY WERE PREPARED TO SAY THEY WOULD NOT COMMIT VIOLENCE AGAIN: THE WORD "ABANDON" IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER WAS THE KEY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT BOTHA HAD HIMSELF ORIGINALLY USED THE WORD SUSPEND: WHATEVER WAS SAID, THERE COULD BE NO GUARANTEE THAT VIOLENCE WOULD NOT RECUR IF NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN.

12. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS CLEARLY INTERESTED ONLY IN THE RELEASE OF MANDELA AND NOT IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFORM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DENIED THIS. BUT HE SAID THE REASON WHY SOUTH AFRICA WAS NOT UNIVERSALLY ACCLAIMED FOR ITS ECONOMIC TRIUMPHS WAS THE LACK OF A DEMOCRATIC BASE.

13. PRESIDENT BOTHA REPEATED THE CONDITIONS WHICH HE HAD MADE IN PARLIAMENT FOR THE RELEASE OF MANDELA IF HE RENOUNCED VIOLENCE. MANDELA REMAINED IN JAIL ESSENTIALLY BECAUSE IT SUITED THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY THAT HE SHOULD. MANDELA AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE NOW SAYING THAT THEY WOULD NOT SEE ANY FURTHER VISITORS, INCLUDING THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HE, PRESIDENT BOTHA, COULD NOT AGREE THAT HE SHOULD BE INTERVIEWED FURTHER BY FOREIGNERS OR REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES. SUCH MEETINGS DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE FINDING OF SOLUTIONS AND THE DEGREE OF UNDERSTANDING WITH MANDELA WHICH EXISTED WOULD ONLY BE PREJUDICED BY FURTHER VISITORS. HE HIMSELF WAS FULLY IN CONTROL OF THIS SITUATION AND, BASING HIMSELF ON THE INFORMATION AT HIS DISPOSAL, WOULD DECIDE WHEN TO SPEAK TO MANDELA. ALTHOUGH HE HAD IDEAS ABOUT THIS, HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO SPECIFY THEM AT THIS TIME, AND THE MOMENT WAS NOT YET OPPORTUNE.

14. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECALLED MANDELA'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE EPG NEGOTIATING CONCEPT. SURELY THIS WILLINGNESS SHOULD BE USED. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT THE MATTER MUST BE LEFT IN HIS HANDS. AS FOR RELEASING MANDELA, IT DEPENED ON HIS REJECTING VIOLENCE.

15. ON THE ANC PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT IT WAS DOMINATED BY COMMUNISTS. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY NOW OR IN THE FUTURE. HE BELIEVED SOME ANC LEADERS WERE NOT COMMUNISTS, AND IF THEY WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO THE ABANDONMENT OF VIOLENCE AND TO A PEACEFUL CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS HE WOULD ALLOW THEM BACK TO SOUTH AFRICA. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO TALK TO THEM WHILE VIOLENCE, MURDERS AND NECKLACINGS CONTINUED.

16. HE WAS CLEAR THAT MANY EUROPEAN LEADERS HAD DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD APPLY SANCTIONS. BEFORE THIS HE TRUSTED THAT THEY WOULD GIVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET AT HEAD OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL, BECAUSE HE HAD SOMETHING TO SAY WHICH HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO REVEAL AT THIS POINT.

17. HE THEN SAID, READING FROM A PREPARED STATEMENT, THAT IT WAS THE SOUTH AFRICAN IMPRESSION THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WAS THREATENING SANCTIONS BECAUSE THE FRONT LINE STATES HAD URGED THEM TO DO SO. HE URGED US TO SUGGEST TO THE FRONT LINE STATES THAT THEY SHOULD THEMSELVES INITIATE COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. THE PROSPERITY AND WELFARE OF THE SOUTHER AFRICAN REGION SHOULD BE MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE WHOLE OF THE FREE WORLD. AND HE DERIVED NO SATISFACTION FROM THE

SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. THE PROSPERITY AND WELFARE OF THE SOUTHER AFRICAN REGION SHOULD BE MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE WHOLE OF THE FREE WORLD, AND HE DERIVED NO SATISFACTION FROM THE KNOWLEDGE THAT SANCTIONS WOULD HURT SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS MORE THAN SOUTH AFRICA. HE WAS THEREFORE READY TO MEET OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICAN LEADERS AS WELL AS LEADERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ANYWHERE AT ANY TIME IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS WHICH AFFLICTED SOUTHERN AFRICA AND TO SEEK SOLUTIONS. SUCH A MEETING WOULD NOT REPLACE OR DETRACT FROM THE INTERNAL REFORM PROCESS, WHICH WOULD CONTINUE. HE HAD SENT MESSAGES TO EUROPEAN GOVERMENTS PROPOSING SUCH A MEETING.

18. SOUGH AFRICA HAD TAKEN PRECAUTIONARY STEPS. THEY WERE CALLING TOGETHER THE CUSTOMS UNION COUNTRIES FOR A STRAIGHT TALK. IF THE FRONT LINE STATES TOOK STEPS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA WOULD RETALIATE. SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS WERE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSPORT.

19. HE WAS OCCUPIED NOW WITH SOCIAL, EDUCATIONAL AND POLITICAL REFORMS WHICH WOULD TURN SOUTH AFRICA INTO A BROADBASED DEMOCRACY, BUT HE WOULD DO IT HIS OWN WAY AFTER CONSULTATION WITH SOUTH AFRICAN LEADERS AND WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE. WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DETERMINATION OR THE WILL-POWER OF SOUTH AFRICA TO SAFEGUARD ITS OWN RIGHTS.

20. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE IN NOW WAY UNDERESTIMATED THIS, AND OUR OWN OPPOSITION TO SANCTIONS WAS BECAUSE WE SAW FULLY THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THAT COURSE. THE PROPOSALS HE WAS MAKING WERE MADE PRECISELY TO AVERT A DEPARTURE DOWN THIS ROAD. THAT WAS WHY WE ADVOCATED DIALOGUE. HE DID NOT KNOW HOW INDIVIDUAL EC COUNTRIES WOULD REACT TO A PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING. PRESIDENT REAGAN HIMSELF HAD MADE CLEAR IN WASHINGTON THE WEEK BEFORE THE MOUNTING PRESSURES FOR SANCTIONS, AND HAD ADDED THAT ANY FURTHER ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS WOULD MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO RESIST CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE.

21. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT THE FRONT LINE STATES HARBOURED ANC TERRORISTS IN SPITE OF HIS APPEALS TO THEM NOT TO DO SO. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAIDTHAT MANY OF THE FRONT LINE STATES HAD MADE CLEAR TO US THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY DID COOPERATE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS ON SECURITY MATTERS, THAOUGH NONE OF THEM WAS PHYSICALLY ABLE TO ENSURE TOTAL COMPLIANCE. PRESIDENT BOTHA MAINTAINED THAT THEY WERE WILLINGLY ALLOWING THE ANC TO OPERATE IN THEIR COUNTRIES.

22. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPEATED THAT OUR WHOLE CASE WAS BASED ON THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE AND NOT VIOLENCE. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT HE DID NOT WANT WAR, BUT IF HE WAS FORCED TO HE WOULD DO THE SAME AS GREAT BRITAIN HAD DONE IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE UNDERLINED THE NEED TO REACH OUT FOR DIALOGUE NOW IN ORDER TO AVERT THAT KIND OF CONCLUSION. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WANTED TO SEE DIALOGUE ACROSS THE BOARD FOLLOWING A GENERAL RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE. HE WAS NOT A RACIALIST AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS KNEW IT. HIS POSITION AT THE MOMENT IN THE WHITE COMMUNITY AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY WAS STRONGER THAN IT HAD EVER BEEN. BUT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO LEAD THE COUNTRY INTO A MESS AND HE WISHED THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND OTHERS TO STOP POKING THEIR NOSES IN.

23. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE MODERN WORLD WAS NOT ONE IN WHICH ANY COUNTRY COULD STAND IN ISOLATION. PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT IN THAT CASE SOUTH AFRICA MUST FIGHT SEMI COLON HE WOULD RATHER DO THIS THAN FACE HUMILIATION.

24. FINALLY, PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO

24. FINALLY, PRESIDENT BOTHA SAID THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGAIN ON 29 JULY.

MOBERLY

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ANC

10 DOWNING STREET

23 July 1986

From the Private Secretary

22/7/86.

The Prime Minister has seen a copy of Mr. Oliver Tambo's message to the Foreign Secretary conveyed in East Berlin tel. no. 142. She takes the view that, given the ANC's lack of co-operation in refusing to meet the Foreign Secretary during his current mission to South Africa, we should not fall over ourselves to offer a meeting - at least at the level of the Foreign Secretary - in any other context. She would like to be involved in consideration of the timing of any further meetings with the ANC.

(CHARLES POWELL)

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

BM

Leader of the Opposition

Parliament House, Canberra, A.C.T. 2600
Tel. (062) 72 6994

Australian Government Centre
Chifley Square, Sydney, N.S.W. 2000
Tel. (02) 239 3050

22 July 1986

Already answered
31/7.

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1
ENGLAND

My dear Prime Minister,

I would like you to know that there is wide understanding and support for your position over the South African sanctions issue here in Australia.

I believe that the majority of Australians regard the Commonwealth as a valuable body. We would all be the poorer if it were seriously weakened or worse still, broken up over this issue.

It is therefore disturbing to me and many of my colleagues that a number of Commonwealth members have ignored a basic Commonwealth principle - viz. the right of each member country to fully determine its national policy.

There are many of us who believe that the recent attacks on Britain and you in particular have been both hypocritical and irrational.

I know that you are as keen as anyone else to see the end of apartheid but that you do not see this being achieved by the use of punitive economic sanctions which would effectively destroy the South African economy. That is a view shared by the Liberal and National Parties here in Australia.

I hope this message of support and understanding is helpful.

With kind regards.

Yours sincerely

John Howard

(John Howard)

CONFIDENTIAL

CCR (2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Dear Charles

23 July 1986

It looks as though we shall need to seek Chancellor Kohl's help between the Foreign Secretary's first and second meetings with President Botha.

CDP 23/7

South Africa: Chancellor Kohl's Views

Thank you for your letter of 21 July.

In Dr Teltschik's absence, the right person to talk to in Chancellor Kohl's office is Immo Stabreit (telephone number Bonn 562210). He is an Under-Secretary on secondment from the German Foreign Ministry.

You also asked for the Foreign Secretary's views on how Chancellor Kohl's offer of help with President Botha can most effectively be taken up in relation to Sir Geoffrey's forthcoming visit to South Africa. Chancellor Kohl has of course already taken action in that he has sent a trusted messenger to talk to Botha (paragraph 2 of Bonn telegram number 624). In the Foreign Secretary's view, it could well be helpful for similar action to be taken between Sir Geoffrey's first meeting with State President Botha today and the second meeting on 29 July.

The precise terms of the message to be conveyed by an emissary on behalf of Chancellor Kohl cannot be decided in advance of Sir Geoffrey's first meeting. But it is likely to be on the following lines: What the Community are asking of the South African Government is tangible progress (ie the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners; and the unbanning of the ANC and other political parties). In the absence of such movement, there will inevitably be Community pressure at the end of the three month EC grace period for further measures against South Africa; and if Sir Geoffrey's visit produces nothing the British Government is bound to come under intense Commonwealth pressure to acquiesce in decisions at the Commonwealth Review meeting on 3 - 5 August. A lot therefore rests on the outcome of the Foreign Secretary's second meeting with State President Botha on 29 July.

Particularly at this crucial juncture, it would be very helpful if you could keep us informed about any exchanges you may have with Chancellor Kohl's office.

Yours ever

Robin Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS
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OF 221315Z JULY 86

OUR TELNO 408 AND YOUR TEL 614
FURTHER MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO OBASANJO. PLEASE ARRANGE TO HAVE IT DELIVERED ASAP.
BEGINS:
1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE.
I AM SURPRISED THAT YOU BELIEVE SIR GEOFFREY HOWE'S MISSION IS BEING SEEN AS 'AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY'. I RECALL THAT DURING OUR TALK ON 11 JUNE YOU TOLD ME THAT YOU THOUGHT PRESIDENT BOTHA WOULD BE PREPARED TO TALK FRANKLY TO ME ABOUT HIS FEARS AND ABOUT WHAT HE WAS PREPARED TO DO. YOU ALSO SUGGESTED THAT I MIGHT BE ABLE TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT BOTHA TO RELEASE MR MANDELA. AT THAT STAGE YOU CLEARLY SAW FURTHER DIRECT CONTACT AS USEFUL. I DO NOT QUITE UNDERSTAND WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THEN TO CHANGE YOUR MIND. MOREOVER, YOUR MESSAGE DOES NOT APPEAR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SIR GEOFFREY'S MISSION IS CARRIED OUT ON BEHALF, NOT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ALONE, BUT OF THE TWELVE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. THE TWELVE HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE PLAIN THEIR REJECTION OF APARTHEID AND CANNOT POSSIBLY BE REGARDED AS OFFERING 'UNYIELDING SUPPORT FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS APARTHEID POLICY'.
I HAVE FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED MY UTTER DETESTATION OF APARTHEID IN STRONG TERMS, AND I CANNOT IMAGINE HOW ANYONE COULD

/REASONABLY

REASONABLY 'CAST MY POSITION IN A RACIST MOULD' AS YOU SUGGEST. MY OPPOSITION TO GENERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS BASED ON A CONVICTION THAT THEY HAVE NEVER IN HISTORY SUCCEEDED IN CHANGING A COUNTRY'S INTERNAL POLICIES, WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ENFORCE, WOULD INFLICT DAMAGE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY AND ABOVE ALL ON THE BLACK PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA, AND WOULD HARDEN THE RESISTANCE OF THOSE OPPOSED TO REFORM. IN SHORT THEY WOULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE. EQUALLY, AS YOU WILL KNOW, WE HAVE TAKEN A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF MEASURES TO DEMONSTRATE OUR EXTREME DISAPPROVAL OF APARTHEID. WE HAVE ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT, FAILING EARLY AND SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN SOUTH AFRICA, FURTHER MEASURES MAY BE NEEDED. CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE.
LIKE YOU, I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT THE MEETING OF CERTAIN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN EARLY AUGUST WILL BE able TO ADVANCE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO SOUTH AFRICA'S PROBLEMS. THAT WILL CERTAINLY BE MY AIM.
I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU THEN.
WITH BEST WISHES.
ENDS.
2. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

HOWE

LIMITED
WAD
SAFD
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER.
PS/PUS
MR E. FERGUSSON
MR REEVE
MR DEREK THOMAS.
CCD
PUSD.
CABINET OFFICE.

From Sir Robert Crichton-Brown
KCMG., CBE., TD

15 Hill Street
London W1X 7FB

01-491 4366

CDP.3147
CF
pl. put on South Africa file & bring forward when we prepare for the C'wealth meeting in early August. CDP

RCB/BMFC
22nd July 1986

F.E.R. Butler, Esq.,
Second Permanent Secretary,
Public Services,
H.M. Treasury,
Parliament Street,
London SW1P 3AG.

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL - BY HAND

Charles
We spoke. The source of these documents should not be revealed outside No. 10.
Robin.

Dear Robin,

I enclose some papers which may be of some value to the PM, although I imagine that she is well aware of the content.

As you know, we have no interest in or business activities with South Africa.

It is interesting to note, however, that the tobacco industry imports substantial quantities of leaf from Zimbabwe, and in the event of these supplies being cut off Canadian leaf is a suitable substitute!

Looking forward to seeing you soon.

With all good wishes.

Yours ever,

Bob.

encs:

ZIMBABWE LEAF TOBACCO COMPANY (PRIVATE) LIMITED

Telegrams & Cables
"Zimleaf" Harare
Telephone 65551
Telex 4220 ZW

BUYERS . PACKERS . EXPORTERS

P.O. Box 1597
Harare
Zimbabwe

5th November 1985

Dear

Enclosed please find various papers relating to the imposition of sanctions on South Africa and the effects of this on the Front Line States.

All the papers are self explanatory and go some way to show that a lot is being done to put the whole situation in prospective.

I hope you find these papers informative and also reassuring.

With kindest personal regards,

Yours sincerely

I.S. TAYLOR

encl/

Directors: R. H. Hywood (Chairman), D. F. Bell, W. T. Hunt, A. B. Scarles, I. S. Taylor, K. D. Walker, T. Whitley.
Alternate: I. N. Fraser.
J. J. Gilleran.

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[redacted] Road,
P.O. Box ST 180,
Southerton,
Zimbabwe

TOBACCO TRADE ASSOCIATION

Telephone 760386
760357
Cable: "Tobtrade"
Tlx 2206 Tradas ZW

ZIMBABWE TOBACCO EXPORT ROUTES

NATIONAL RAILWAYS OF ZIMBABWE

In the last three years major improvements have taken place in the services and efficiency provided by our National Railways. The employment of expatriate staff and the establishment of training centres are now showing positive results in all aspects of the NRZ functions.

The tobacco industry continues to enjoy top priority in the allocation of export rail wagons and the Association is represented on the Export Committee which places weekly bids for rail wagons required for submission to the Railway Priority Committee.

With the assistance of National Railways of Zimbabwe exporters of tobacco, members of our Association, form tobacco unit trains for destination either through Durban or Beira and are guaranteed minimum transit time.

We continue to enjoy full co-operation with our railway system and are in constant contact with their Head Office.

EXPORTS THROUGH DURBAN

The movement of tobacco for export through Durban continues to be extremely fluid and once again very close co-operation is enjoyed with the South African transport system and many concessions have been granted to tobacco exporters on preferential rates for export through their route.

Unit trains of 39 wagons, the equivalent of 78 6 metre containers, travel on a regular basis to the port of Durban in a transit time of approximately five days.

EXPORTS THROUGH BEIRA

The Association has been actively engaged in increasing movement of tobacco through the port of Beira since mid 1983 and has successfully established a working relationship with the national railways of Mozambique, Caminhos de Ferro de Mozambique (C.F.M.), and the Port Authorities.

Representatives of the Association visit Beira on a regular basis, so far four times this year, the latest visit was on 21st August, 1985, and we are confident that progress, though slow, is taking place in improving rail link and port facilities.

It is understood that foreign aid from different sources has been car-marked for the improvement of the rail line between Zimbabwe/Mozambique border and Beira, the rehabilitation of the wharf, construction of a permanent container stacking area and the building of a Ro-Ro vessel berth.

2/...

It is considered that Beira is the natural port for the export of Zimbabwe tobacco and it is sincerely hoped that projects now in hand for the improvement of this export route will be implemented in the near future. We are confident that the assistance we are receiving from the local authorities and those in Mozambique will result in the full re-establishment of Zimbabwe's shortest and easiest route to the sea.

Unit trains of tobacco are currently running between Harare and Beira and receiving priority traffic movement in Mozambique, thus ensuring minimum transit delays.

Successful negotiations have taken place with C.F.M. authorities in view of reducing the cost of railing through the port of Beira.

T.D. de CHASSART
CHIEF EXECUTIVE

3 September, 1985
TDdC/cmdj/1(7)b

SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA: EFFECTS ON LAND-LOCKED FRONT-LINE STATES

Introduction

1. Economic sanctions against apartheid (minority rule) have been advocated for well over 20 years. Now, for the first time, however, the sanctions campaign has achieved such momentum that they have become a serious possibility in the foreseeable future.

2. Outside South Africa itself, the campaign has always been led by governments and groups remote from the region, to whom sanctions would cost little or nothing. Their motives range from a desire to express moral outrage at apartheid, to interest in a "political free lunch". Black opinion inside South Africa is divided on sanctions, (though all agree that the struggle will be primarily an internal process). It is generally assumed that sanctions, once applied will remain in force until the whites surrender power to the majority - a process which could yet take some decades.

Effects of Sanctions on South Africa

3. These are unpredictable, and in any case of only secondary concern to most advocates of sanctions. But there is no reason to suppose that they would have a significantly greater effect on economic and political developments in South Africa than they had during the 15 years of global, comprehensive, mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. Annex A suggests the main effects on Rhodesia. But the main point is that real living standards for the white minority rose steadily throughout the UDI period. And the main reason was that businessmen, with a financial incentive to do so, proved better at evading sanctions than civil servants were at enforcing them. At least 60 countries, from all regions, are known to have traded with Rhodesia; and few governments were assiduous in denying jobs to their own citizens for the benefit of their competitors. Thus the practical effects of sanctions inside South Africa are likely to be marginal.

South African Counter-Measures

4. President Botha has said he will pass on the effects of sanctions to the FLS, whether or not they themselves apply sanctions. South African options range from partial to total interruption of road and rail access to South African ports. They could also deny transit traffic, while permitting 2-way trade with South Africa itself, thus tying the land-locked FLS economies even more closely to their own. In addition, South Africa can cut other outlets to the sea by military means.

Economic Effects on Land-Locked FLS

5. If President Botha means what he says, these would be far more serious for the land-locked FLS than for South Africa itself, since a physical blockade could not be evaded. Annex B sets out the dependence of the land-locked FLS on South African transit routes. Simply by closing two frontier points, at Beitbridge and Mafeking, South Africa could reduce

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the physical trade flows of the land-locked FLS overnight by 85% to 15% of normal. The consequences are readily imagined. Factories, mines and commercial farms would progressively shut down. Most urban people would become unemployed. The tax base would shrink rapidly. Inflation would soar. Social services would decline. Large numbers of public servants would be dismissed. Most people who could leave would do so. The economy affected would move fairly quickly back towards subsistence level, as the formal sectors crumbled.

Political Effects on Land-Locked FLS

6. These are unpredictable. Popular discontent would, however, certainly become acute, especially as it became clear that FLS populations were suffering severely, while South Africa itself was relatively unaffected. Political instability would increase. Riots and military coups could not be excluded. It is difficult to see how governments in the countries concerned could avoid sooner or later, coming to terms with South Africa. (It would also seem likely that multiple "Nkomati"-type agreements of this kind would set back rather than advance the liberation struggle in South Africa itself.)

Land-Locked FLS Counter-Measures

7. In the long term, the development of alternative routes to the sea, notably through Beira, would reduce land-locked FLS dependence on South Africa, (though such routes would always remain vulnerable to South African military action). Annex B suggests that, with approximately US$ billion spent on the Beira and Nacala routes, a minimum of 2 years for contruction, and a doubling of efficiency on the Tan-Zam railway/Dar es Salaam port route, trade for the affected countries could rise from 15% to 65% of current levels. But aid resources on anything approaching this scale are unlikely to be forthcoming.

8. The notion of an air-lift is wholly unrealistic, because of the tonnages, distances and costs involved.

Conclusion

9. The application of sanctions against South Africa, before the land-locked FLS have reduced their dependence on South Africa to manageable proportions, and are thus able to survive the consequences, would entail massive costs to the FLS with at best minimal and at worst negative benefits in terms of political pressure on apartheid.

22 August 1985

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Annex A

APPARENT EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON RHODESIA

1. Economic Effects

(a) An equivalent to a 10-15% tariff on Rhodesia's imports and exports.

(b) The skewing of total investment resources away from rural areas into import-substituting industries.

(c) The diversification of agriculture away from its virtual mono-export crop, tobacco.

(d) The development of a more dynamic and ingenious business community.

(e) Some diversification of Zimbabwean trade patterns away from traditional OECD markets and towards Japan, the Third World, notably Latin America and the Far East, and Eastern Europe.

(f) A steady run-down only in those major items of imported infra-structure which only major firms could supply, all of whom were unwilling to do so, such as telecommunications, and power-generating plant.

(g) Nonetheless the real standard of living of the white community rose steadily throughout the years of sanctions (at the expense of the black community) leaving aside hardships resulting directly from the liberation struggle itself.

(h) Outside Rhodesia the main effect was the enrichment of several thousand middlemen/traders in many countries, who were consistently better at evading sanctions than civil servants were at enforcing them.

2. Political Effects

(a) Some demoralisation among the whites, especially in the early days.

(b) A compensating emergence of a sense of solidarity under siege. (It is relevant that many businessmen actually enjoyed the excitement of sanctions-breaking.)

(c) An increased isolation within the white community, permitting the whites to reinforce mutually their conviction that they were right, uninfluenced by outside opinion.

(d) Some diversion of attention among some nationalist leaders especially in the early years, from the armed struggle, while it was tempting to believe that the international community was going to solve the problem.

(e) Nonetheless, the prospect of the lifting of sanctions was an inducement to the business community to maintain some modest pressure on Smith throughout the sanctions period to compromise - a view vindicated by the immediate post-Independence boom.

22 August 1985

SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA: ALTERNATIVE TRADE ROUTES FOR LAND-LOCKED FRONT-LINE STATES

1. The countries concerned are: Zimbabwe, Zambia, Zaire, Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho. The last two, being physically separated from the rest, are not addressed below.

TOTAL TONNAGES INVOLVED

2. At present the total tonnages of goods being imported and exported by the countries concerned are:

Zimbabwe	8	m.t. per year (million tonnes)
Zambia	3.7	m.t. " "
Zaire (Lubumbashi Province)	1.5	m.t. " "
Malawi	1	m.t. " "
Botswana	0.75	m.t. " "

TONNAGES CURRENTLY CARRIED ON NON-SOUTH AFRICAN ROUTES

3. At present the Tan-Zam railway takes about 1.7 m.t. from Zambia, or some 45%; Beira takes some 800,000 tonnes from Zimbabwe, ie, 10% of Zimbabwe's or 7% of the whole region's trade. The lines from Chicualacuala to Maputo and from Benguela to Lobito are currently closed by military action, and would require extensive rehabilitation before they could carry significant tonnages, after the security situation permitted any work to commence. The remaining 12.5 m.t., or some 85% of the region's trade, passes through South Africa.

BEIRA CAPACITY

4. Beira's theoretical capacity with the current port and railway is 1.7 m.t., (eg. 1.2 m.t. for Zimbabwe and 0.5 m.t. for Malawi) - approximately double the present tonnages. It has been estimated that, if US$500 m. were spent on relaying the railway line to Beira with electrified double track, and deepening and extending the port facilities, together with good management, Beira's capacity could increase to 4 m.t.

OTHER OPTIONS

5. If security could be restored to the line between Malawi and Nacala, and a similar major rehabilitation and extension programme undertaken for it, its capacity might rise to 2 m.t. Theoretically the Tan-Zam railway can take all of Zambia's requirements, though it has never in practice done so.

22 August 1985

THE TOBACCO MARKETING BOARD

PLEASE ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE GENERAL MANAGER

Telephone: 707255/6
Telegram: Fluecured

P.O. Box UA 214, Union Av.
Harare, Zimbabwe

Z.T.A. House
95 Baker Avenue

MGA/DK/1/103.

22nd October, 1985.

Dear Sir,

Following a recent visit to London, representatives of the Tobacco Trade Association and the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association made this Board fully aware of the deep concern that was expressed by the Directors of your Leaf Departments concerning Zimbabwe's continued ability to export tobacco to it's overseas markets. This very real issue has been brought, not only to the attention of our Industry, but also to Ministers in our Cabinet. At a meeting held with the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Settlement, Mr. Moven Mahachi, senior members of the Board were given the Minister's strong views on the issue, and the enclosed copy of his letter gives a clear position as to our country's attitude towards the problems facing South Africa.

The Zimbabwe Tobacco Industry has also been questioned by your senior Executives on the role it was playing in expanding all its export routes. We wish to assure you that the Tobacco Trade Association, through the most efficient services of its Shipping Committee, has been relentless in it's endeavours, which started soon after our country's Independence in April, 1980, and it is worth detailing the progress which the Tobacco Trade Association has made in the spheres of improved efficiency and cost saving.

Whilst rolling stock and locomotive power were at a premium in the early 1980's, National Railways of Zimbabwe is now running an efficient internal rail system and has surplus capacity which it can loan to Mozambique.

In successful negotiations with National Railways of Zimbabwe, the Tobacco Unit Trains were introduced whereby entire liner trains move unbroken from Harare to either the port of Beira or the port of Durban. At the same time, the Tobacco Industry was granted, through the South African tranport system, special commodity rates of approximately 60% of standard tariffs. Further, wharfage charges at the port of Durban were reduced by approximately 70% when the introduction of a box rate replaced an ad valorem calculation. It must also be noted that, as an inducement to make better usage of the good container facilities in the port of Maputo, the South African Transport Services has given us a reduced rate for

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6"d

traffic from Beit Bridge to Komatipoort, the crossing point into Mozambique. Finally, we have now received full clearance from our own railway system, the South African port authorities and Shipping Lines to carry containerised tobacco under fumigation. There is no doubt that we are enjoying the greatest co-operation from the two national systems, our own National Railways of Zimbabwe, and South African Transport Services.

Turning to our eastern routes, representatives of our Shipping Committee have regularly visited the Mozambican Railway authorities, Caminhos de Ferro de Mozambique (CFM), and port authorities of Beira to discuss ways and means of increasing the volume of traffic through that port. A few weeks ago, the Director of CFM, Engineer Mendes, visited our offices with his delegation to discuss the introduction of reduced commodity rates for tobacco destined for the port of Beira. This has now been successfully concluded, and we are confident that more traffic will move on that line at rates competitive with those offered from South African ports. A great degree of co-operation now exists between NRZ and CFM, and we are confident that our traffic will receive top priority handling into Beira. Whilst it is appreciated that the amount of cargo which can be handled on the railway line to Beira and through the port of Beira is limited, we are well aware that the SADCC Transport and Telecommunications Committee, which was established in 1980, is planning the rehabilitation of that export route and many projects are under consideration. The Chief Executive of the Tobacco Trade Association was invited to join an official delegation led by our Minister of Transport, Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze, to meet with the Mozambican Minister of Transport, Dr. A. do Santos, on 4th October, 1985, to discuss further plans in hand.

Finally, the Industry keeps in daily contact with specific Ministries, such as the Ministry of Transport, Trade and Commerce, Agriculture, and the Ministry of Finance, and keeps Ministers well appraised of the activities of the Tobacco Industry. We receive a hearing of points submitted to those Ministries and, in most cases, their fully committed support.

It is our intention to keep you fully appraised of developments in the field of export facilities by issuing a monthly news letter from the offices of the Tobacco Trade Association.

Yours faithfully,

M.G. ARKWRIGHT
GENERAL MANAGER.

ZIMBABWE

Telephone 706081

MINISTER OF LANDS, AGRICULTURE
AND RURAL RESETTLEMENT
MUKUBUYANA BUILDING
PRIVATE BAG 7701, CAUSEWAY
ZIMBABWE

21st October, 1985

The President of the ZTA
The President of the TTA

Dear Mr Ashburner and Mr Morris,

At our meeting held on Monday 14th October, 1985, I was concerned to learn that our very good and long-standing customers, the overseas merchants and manufacturers, are expressing apprehension at Zimbabwe's ability to continue to meet its tobacco export commitments, in view of the international problems facing South Africa.

This letter is to confirm the Zimbabwe Government's stand point that while we support International sanctions against South Africa, Zimbabwe's economy as compared to that of South Africa is very weak to the extend that Zimbabwe as an individual country is not capable to impose effective and meaningful trade sanctions, that is the reasons why we have to maintain a trade mission in South Africa.

At the moment South Africa is our largest single trading partner and provides Zimbabwe with efficient and vital international routes. Therefore it follows that it would not be in the interest of our economy if we were to close our border between Zimbabwe and South Africa.

I understand that you will be communicating with the overseas tobacco manufacturers to appraise them of the Zimbabwe Government's viewpoint.

Finally you must asure all our customers and other potential buyers that Zimbabwe is a stable country, they will get all the quality and quantities of tobacco they need. Zimbabwe Government will do all in its power to make sure the routes to transport tobacco are safe, secure and reliable as it has been in the past.

Yours faithfully,

M.E. MAHACHI
MINISTER OF LANDS, AGRICULTURE AND RURAL RESETTLEMENT

MEM/hm

P. 11

GRS 500

→ Mr Powell (

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OF 220800Z JULY 86
INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, PRETORIA, UKREP BRUSSELS, BONN, THE HAGUE
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON

OUR TELNO 001 TO UKREP BRUSSELS: CONTACT WITH ANC.
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF OLIVER TAMBO'S REPLY TO SECRETARY OF STATE WHICH WAS RECEIVED BD TELEX TODAY.
KINDLY RELAY THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE BY MR O R TAMBO TO THE LETTER BY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE

We must play too easy to get on the proposed meeting at x. If we don't cooperate with us over the mission, we needn't hurry to meet them

CDP 22/7.

I agree

H.E. SIR GEOFFREY HOWE,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH FFAIRS, LONDON.

SIR GEOFFREY,

I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR KIND LETTER OF 18 JULY 1986 WHICH HAS NOW REACHED ME, AND GREATLY APPRECIATE THE TROUBLE YOU HAVE TAKEN TO COMMUNICATE TO US YOUR VIEWS ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION.

WITH REGARD TO THE PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH OF THE LETTER, IT WILL REGRETTABLY NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO TRAVEL TO BRUSSELS BEFORE THE 5TH OR 6TH OF AUGUST.

I HAVE NOTED WITH GREAT INTEREST THE OBSERVATIONS YOU MAKE IN HE REST OF YOUR LETTER, TO WHICH I SHALL BE REPLYING MORE FULLY.
FOR THE MOMENT, I WISH TO RECALL THAT TWO WEEKS AGO, THE ANC MADE IT KNOWN THAT WE WOULD NOT MEET YOU ON YOUR VISIT TO SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE REASONS GIVEN THEN FOR OUR DECISION REMAIN VALID:

WE WERE CONVINCED THAT THE IDEA OF THE MISSION WAS CONCEIVED IN LONDON IN THE CONTEXT OF A REJECTION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS (E.P.G.), AND WAS CALCULATED TO RENDER IRREVELANT THE NASSAU DECISIONS, THE E.P.G MISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA AND EVEN THE COMMONWEALTH MINI-SUMMIT CONVENING IN AUGUST EXPRESSLY TO CONSIDER THE E.P.G. REPORT AS DECIDED BY THE 49 COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT WHO MET IN NASSAU.

WE DID NOT AND DO NOT SEE OUR WAY CLEAR TO PARTICIPATING IN A PROCESS SO OBVIOUSLY DESIGNED TO EVADE AND INDEFINATELY POSTPONE DECISIVE ACTION TO END THE APARTHEID SYSTEM. IN THIS REGARD, THE STATEMENTS REPEATEDLY MADE BY THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HAVE, TO SAY THE LEAST, BEEN WHOLLY UNHELPFUL.

WE ACCEPT THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND POSSIBLY EVEN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, HAVE SINCE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MISSION. ZUT, IN OUR VIEW, THIS DOES NOT ALTER ITS FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE AND EFFECT.

I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE INTEND NO DISRESPECT EITHER TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OR TO YOU PERSONALLY, SIR GEOFFREY. INDEED, I WOULD BE HONOURED TO MEET YOU, OUTSIDE OF HE CONTEXT OF YOUR CURRENT MISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA, TO DISCUSS THE BURNING QUESTION OF THE NEED FOR DECISIVE INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO BRING ABOUT A SPEEDY END TO THE APARTHEID SYSTEM.

X
/WE

WE HAVE OVER THE YEARS BENEFITTED FROM DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE HAD AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT WITH MOST OF THE MEMBER-STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND WOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CLOSER CONTACT.

I WOULD AK THAT YOUR MINISTRY MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH MY OFFICE IN LUSAKA WITH A VIEW TO ARRANGING DATES WHICH MIGHT BE SUITABLE FOR OUR MEETING.
5

PLEASE ACCEPT, SIR, THE ASSURANCES OF OUR HIGHEST CONSIDERATION

OLIVER TAMBO,
PRESIDENT,
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS.
21 JULY, 1986.

ENDS

FORD

LIMITED

SAFD
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PUSD
NEWS D
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR E FERGUSSON
MR REEVE
MR HOUSTON

BOPHUTHATSWANA

International Affairs

Our Ref:

Mr B Ingham
Press Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
WESTMINSTER

22nd July 1986

Dear Mr Ingham

I have been asked to convey to the Prime Minister the text of a speech made by H.E. President Lucas Mangope to the Bophuthatswana Parliament today.

I should be most grateful if you would pass the enclosed text on to Mrs Thatcher.

Many thanks.

Yours sincerely

Ruth Rees

International Business Centre, 29 Glasshouse Street, London W1R 5PA. Telephone 01-734 8466 · Telex 296146/7

86-07-22 12:35
Msg 842 Title : BOP GC

I HAVE TODAY ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AS AN ADDRESS TO THE BOPHUTHATSWANA PARLIAMENT. I SEND YOU THIS WITH MY DEEPEST RESPECT.

(SIGNED)
LUCAS M. MANGOPE
PRESIDENT
REPUBLIC OF BOPHUTHATSWSANA

--

WE ARE ALL OF US, ON THE FOREFRONT OF A COURAGEOUS STRUGGLE.

IT IS A STRUGGLE TO END THE DESPICABLE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID. A SYSTEM OF HUMILIATION OF DEGRADATION. A SYSTEM WHICH HAS BEEN FORCED UPON MILLIONS FOR GENERATIONS.

BUT NOW WE HAVE ENTERED A NEW GENERATION. THE FREEDOM GENERATION.

THE FREEDOM GENERATION IS MADE UP OF COUNTLESS HUMAN BEINGS. WE ARE BLACK, WE ARE WHITE, WE ARE INDIANS AND AFRICANS, EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS. WE ARE UNITED BY THE COMMON RESOLVE TO LIVE IN PEACE AND EQUAL DIGNITY WITH ONE ANOTHER. WE ARE UNITED BY THE COMMON RESOLVE TO REJECT THE SCOURGE OF APARTHEID.

YES, WE ARE THE FREEDOM GENERATION.

IN BOPHUTHATSWANA, WE ARE PROUD THAT OUR STRUGGLE HAS ALREADY BORNE FRUIT.:
WE HAVE A CONSTITUTION WHICH GUARANTEES ALL OFOUR CITIZENS, WHATEVER THE COLOUR OF THEIR SKIN, EQUALITY. AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD A JUST, FAIR, INDEPENDENT NATION.

WE MET THE CRITERIA OF SOVEREIGNTY: A SETTLED POPULATION A GOVERNMENT- - DEMOCRATICALLY CHOSEN -- WHICH EXERCISES EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF ITS TERRITORY, AND THE INDEPENDENCE TO SPEAK OUT, AS A FREE PEOPLE.

TAKE A WALK DOWN THE STREETS OF OUR CAPITAL, MMABATHO, AND YOU WILL FIND BLACKS AND WHITES WORKING TOGETHER, SHOPPING TOGETHER AND TALKING TOGETHER.

LOOK AT OUR SCHOOLS, WHERE CHILDREN OF ALL RACES ARE LEARNING TOGETHER.

LOOK AT OUR MEDICAL FACILITIES, WHERE DOCTORS--BLACK AND WHITE -- WORK TOGETHER TO CURE THE ILL, WHATEVER THE COLOUR OF THEIR SKIN.

BUT OUR STRUGGLE IN BOPHUTHATSWANA IS NOT OVER. WE OF THE FREEDOM GENERATION MUST NOW PUSH ONWARD. WE MUST CONTINUE OUR STRUGGLE TO HAVE OUR NATION'S BORDERS EXTENDED SO THAT ALL OF THE HISTORIC TERRITORY OF THE TSWANA IS JOINED AS ONE. WE MUST CONTINUE TO SPEAK OUT FOR THE OTHER PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, WHO DESIRE AND DESERVE THE STATUS OF NATIONHOOD. AND WE MUST CONTINUE TO STRUGGLE FOR THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF APARTHEID NOW.'

TODAY I HAVE SENT MESSAGES TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND SOME OF THE INTERESTED PARTIES INVOLVED INCLUDING THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, URGING THEM TO BEGIN IMMEDIATE TALKS TO THIS END.

SUCH TALKS SHOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL AND IN GOOD FAITH.

NOW, I KNOW THERE ARE SOME WHO SAY IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD TALKS BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE A.N.C. BUT LET ME RECALL THE INSPIRATIONAL WORDS OF COURAGE OF ONE OF THE GREAT STATESMEN OF OUR TIME, THE REV. JESSE JACKSON. AS HE SAYS, '' IF YOU TRY YOU MAY FAIL, BUT IF YOU DON'T TRY, YOU FAIL FOR CERTAIN.

THE DISCUSSIONS MUST START AT ONCE. TODAY, THE YOUTH OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA STILL DO LISTEN TO THE A.N.C. BUT THERE ARE ALARMING--YES, EVEN FRIGHTENING SIGNS, THAT SOME OF THE MORE FRUSTRATED YOUNG PEOPLE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN TOWNSHIPS ARE LOSING THEIR PATIENCE.

WITHOUT UNMISTAKABLE SIGNS OF REAL PROGRESS, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT SOME SOUTH AFRICAN YOUNG PEOPLE WILL STOP EVEN LISTENING TO THE A.N.C.

AND IF THAT HAPPENS, THE FREEDOM GENERATION WILL BECOME THREATENED BY A NEW, VIOLENT FORCE. SOUTH AFRICA'S B VERSION OF A BEIRUT GENERATION.

BY THAT I MEAN A GENERATION WHO WILL KNOW NOTHING BUT VIOLENCE.

WE MUST PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING.

WE MUST SEE TO IT THAT NEGOTIATIONS TO ELIMINATE APARTHEID AND TO PREVENT UNCONTROLLABLE VIOLENCE BEGIN IMMEDIATELY. THE TASKS OF THE GENERATION ARE TO ACHIEVE OUR GOALS OF LIVING TOGETHER, IN RESPECT AND DIGNITY AND AT PEACE WITH ONE ANOTHER.

AND SO I CALL ON ALL OF THE PEOPLES OF EVERY NATION OF EVERY COLOR TO JOIN IN THE STRUGGLE OF OUR TIME: THE STRUGGLE OF THE FREEDOM GENERATION.

AND I CALL ON THOSE WHO ARE STILL CLINGING TO THE VIOLENCE THAT IS CALLED APARTHEID TO GIVE UP - TO GO AWAY -. TO LET ALL OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA LIVE IN PEACE - IN THE FREEDOM GENERATION.

- E N D -

Briterol

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 July 1986

The Prime Minister has decided to reply to General Obasanjo's latest message to her, the text of which was in Lagos tel. no. 614. I enclose her reply and would be grateful if you would arrange for it to be telegraphed to Lagos.

(Charles Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

I attach a restrained reply to Obasanjo's letter.

"Dear General Obasanjo"

CDP.

GR

Please return to me for covering letter to FCO.

CM

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 July 1986

Dear General Obasanjo.

Thank you for your message.

I am surprised that you believe Sir Geoffrey Howe's mission is being seen as "an exercise in futility". I recall that during our talk on 11 June you told me that you thought President Botha would be prepared to talk frankly to me about his fears and about what he was prepared to do. You also suggested that I might be able to persuade President Botha to release Mr. Mandela. At that stage you clearly saw further direct contact as useful. I do not quite understand what has happened since then to change your mind. Moreover, your message does not appear to acknowledge that Sir Geoffrey's mission is carried out on behalf, not of the United Kingdom alone, but of the Twelve countries of the European Community. The Twelve have repeatedly made plain their rejection of apartheid and cannot possibly be regarded as offering "unyielding support for the South African government and its apartheid policy".

I have frequently expressed my utter detestation of apartheid in strong terms, and I cannot imagine how anyone could reasonably "cast my position in a racist mould" as you suggest. My opposition to general economic sanctions is based on a conviction that they have never in history succeeded in changing a country's internal policies, would be very difficult to enforce, would inflict damage on the South African economy and above all on the black people of South Africa, and would harden the resistance of those opposed to

reform. In short they would not be effective. Equally, as you will know, we have taken a considerable number of measures to demonstrate our extreme disapproval of apartheid. We have also made clear that, failing early and substantial progress in South Africa, further measures may be needed. Contingency arrangements are being made.

Like you, I hope very much that the meeting of certain Commonwealth Heads of Government in early August will be able to advance a peaceful solution to South Africa's problems. That will certainly be my aim.

I look forward to seeing you then.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

General Olusegun Obasanjo

XG

PS(t)
Mr Derek Thomas
Mr Gregson

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HD/WAD

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INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA, CANBERRA

Prime Minister
A disappointing & frankly unacceptable reply. Do you wish to return it with no change? or let it go?
CDP 16/7

OUR TELNO 607 : MESSAGE FROM OBASANJO TO THE PRIME MINISTER

It is not worth arguing point by point - but I think we should remind him that we have suggested that we are willing to receive Nkobi to discuss

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF OBASANJO'S REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE IN YOUR TELNO 408

DEAR MADAM PRIME MINISTER,

I THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 8TH JULY INRESPECT OF SIR GEOFFREY HOWE'S MISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA. THE MESSAGE WAS DELIVERED TO ME ON 14TH JULY. MUCH AS I WOULD WANT TO WISH SIR GEOFFREY SUCCESS IN HIS MISSION, THE FIRST STAGE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE AS SUCCESSFUL AS YOU WOULD HAVE WANTED. THAT IS PERFECTLY UNDERSTANDABLE.

IF MEMBERS OF THE EPG INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY BELIEVED THAT VIOLENCE WAS THE ONLY WEAPON LEFT TO DISMANTLE APARTHEID, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE UNDERTAKEN THE MISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA. THE EPG FAILED ON THE MAIN FOCUS OF THEIR MISSION TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE BLACK LEADERSHIP. THE REASON IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA WAS NOT READY TO DISMANTLE APARTHEID AND ERECT A NEW GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE AND DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURE OF ~~GOVERNMENT, KNOWING THIS AND THE INITIAL RESENTMENT OF BOTH THE~~

~~... GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE AND DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURE OF~~ GOVERNMENT. KNOWING THIS AND THE INITIAL RESENTMENT OF BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BLACK LEADERSHIP TO OUR OWN GROUP AND YOUR PERSONAL EFFORT TO GET THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO COOPERATE WITH THE GROUP, YOUR PROMOTION OF SIR GEOFFREY'S MISSION SO CLOSE TO THE EPG'S REPORT WITHOUT FORMAL ACCEPTANCE OF THAT REPORT AND POSITIVE REACTION ALONG THE LINE OF ITS CONCLUSION CAN ONLY BE SEEN IN MANY QUARTERS AS EXERCISE IN FUTILITY, DELAYING TACTICS AND UNYIELDING SUPPORT FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS APARTHEID POLICY.

MY OWN UNDERSTANDING OF THE AFRIKANER BOTH FROM HISTORY AND FROM RECENT AND CURRENT EVENTS IS THAT HE IS TOUGH, TRIBALISTIC, STUBBORN, RUTHLESS, OPPRESSIVE AND SEEMINGLY INFLEXIBLE BUT HE HAS NEVER COMMITTED SUICIDE: HE HAS ONLY CHANGED UNDER PRESSURE AND THE MORE THE PRESSURE THE GREATER THE CHANGE. THOSE CHARACTERISTICS MAY NOT BE THE SPECIAL POSSESSION OF THE AFRIKANER ALONE. IF THERE IS NO PRESSURE THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE AND WHERE EXTERNAL PRESSURE IS LACKING OR INADEQUATE INTERNAL PRESSURE WILL EVENTUALLY ASSUME INCREASING PROPORTION. PRESSURE, ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE PRESSURE, WILL GET PRESIDENT BOTHA AND HIS PEOPLE OVER THE HUMP AND NOT DRIVE THEM INSIDE THE LAAGER. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT NEEDS THE WORLD, ESPECIALLY THE INDUSTRIALISED WORLD, TO MAINTAIN THE VERY HIGH STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE MINORITY OF ITS POPULATION. THAT GOVERNMENT FEARS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNAL UNREST AND ONE NEEDS NO FURTHER PROOF THAT THEY CAN BE EFFECTIVE.

I THEREFORE SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT "IF MEASURES ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES AS A WHOLE". FOR ME, AND I BELIEVE FOR MOST OF US WHO HAVE FIRST-HAND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA, THE QUESTION IS NOT MORE MISSIONS INTO SOUTH AFRICA BUT EFFECTIVE MEASURES (NOT TOKENS OR SYMBOLS) THAT WILL HURT ENOUGH TO BRING ABOUT COMPARATIVELY PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA WITHOUT SEVERE DESTRUCTION OF ITS ECONOMY AND/OR ITS PEOPLE. THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY MUST NOT ONLY BE PRESERVED FOR SOUTH AFRICA BUT FOR AFRICA AND THE ENTIRE WORLD ON THE BASIS OF EQUITY, JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY.

THOSE OF US WHO FROM PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE HAVE SHOWN UNDERSTANDING FOR YOUR PERSONAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATION, ARE HARD PUT TO EXPLAIN AWAY YOUR CONTINUED INSISTENCE ON NO SANCTIONS. MUCH HAS HAPPENED IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS, ALL OF IT - FROM THE ACTIONS THAT SIGNALLED THEIR REJECTION OF OUR EFFORTS THROUGH EVER - MORE DRACONIAN STEPS OF REPRESSION - INITIATED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, HOW CAN THE FACT THAT YOUR STANCE ON SANCTIONS REMAINS UNCHANGED BE EXPLAINED WITHOUT GIVING AMMUNITION TO THOSE WHO SEE RACISM IN YOUR PRONOUNCEMENTS?

TO THOSE WHO SEE RACISM IN YOUR PRONOUNCEMENTS?

THIS, I DARE SAY, CANNOT BE WHAT YOU WISH TO CONVEY. TO MOST BLACK AFRICANS, AS THEY REPEATEDLY MAKE CLEAR, STARVATION IS MORE TOLERABLE THAN THE BRUTILITY, OPPRESSION, VIOLENCE, AND DEATH INFLICTED ON THEM BY APARTHEID. BUT YOU DESCRIBE THE CALL BY AFRICAN LEADERS (INSIDE AND OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA) FOR EFFECTIVE SANCTION IRRESPECTIVE OF THE SHORT-TERM EFFECT ON THEIR PEOPLE AS COLD, CALLOUS, AND IMMORAL, WITHOUT EVER DESCRIBING APARTHEID IN THE SAME LANGUAGE. THE CONTRAST ESCAPES NO ONE AND CAN ONLY TEND TO CAST YOUR POSITION IN A RACIST MOULD.

I BELIEVE THAT SIR GEOFFREY'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US ADMINISTRATION AND OTHER INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES TO ATTAIN A CONCERTED AND EFFECTIVE EFFORT ON ECONOMIC MEASURES SUPPORTED BY THE COMITY OF NATIONS CAN BE MORE DECISIVE THAN HIS SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRAVELS IN DRIVING PRESIDENT BOTHA TOWARDS MEANINGFUL CHANGE, (UNLESS OF COURSE, YOU CAN CHARM HIM MORE THAN WE COULD AS HE EXPRESSED GREAT REGARD AND RESPECT FOR YOU AND PRESIDENT REAGAN AS TWO LEADERS WHO SHOW UNDERSTANDING OF AND SUPPORT FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT).

BUT WHATEVER MAY BE THE RESULT OF SIR GEOFFREY'S MISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA, YOU HAVE GREAT AND GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE AUGUST MEETING OF THE SEVEN COMMONWEALTH LEADERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH. MY KNOWLEDGE OF YOU HAS ALWAYS CONVINCED ME THAT WHEN THE TIME COMES, YOU WILL LIVE UP TO THAT RESPONSIBILITY.

YOURS SINCERELY,

O OBASANJO

GENERAL OLUSETGUN OBASANJO

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 July 1986

SOUTH AFRICA: CHANCELLOR KOHL'S VIEWS

The Prime Minister has seen a copy of Bonn telegram number 624 reporting Chancellor Kohl's views on South Africa.

The Prime Minister is as keen as Chancellor Kohl to remain in close touch about South Africa, and indeed I have been speaking to Dr. Teltschik on the telephone, although he has now gone on holiday. Is there anyone particular you would advise me to deal with in his absence?

The Prime Minister thinks that we should take up Chancellor Kohl's offer of help with President Botha. She should be grateful for advice on how the Foreign Secretary thinks this offer can most effectively be taken up in relation to his own forthcoming visit to South Africa.

CHARLES POWELL

C. R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister.
20/7
Charles wanted you to be aware of this

ADVANCE COPIES 18/19.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

PS
PS/MRS CHALKER.
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON

MR REEVE

HD/SAFD
HD/CAFD
HD/UND
HD/NEWS DEPT
RESIDENT CLERK
HD/SCD
HD/CONS. D

MR CLG MALLABY, CABINET OFFICE

PS/SIR S. MOD.

PS/NO 10

Subject to ops master

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

15.11.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T133A/86

CONFIDENTIAL
FM LUSAKA
TO DESKBY 210800Z FCO
TELNO 248
OF 200800Z JUL 86
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

ZAMBIA: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA, DATED 17 JULY. (OUR COPY HAS JUST BEEN RECEIVED.)

BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR THE RECENT LETTERS WHICH I RECEIVED THROUGH YOUR HIGH COMMISSIONER HERE IN LUSAKA.

I AM PLEASED TO LEARN THAT YOU ARE DETERMINED, AS THE REST OF US IN THE COMMONWEALTH ARE, IN SEEKING GENUINE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTH AFRICA.

WHILE WHAT YOU STATED IN YOUR LETTERS AS YOUR POLICY GOAL IS LAUDABLE, I AM NEVERTHELESS, WORRIED ABOUT THE MEANS YOU PROPOSE TO USE TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL.

I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYTHING SHORT OF COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE CHANGE OF ATTITUDE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEADERS OR TO BUY US TIME FOR A RELATIVELY PEACEFUL TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA.

WHEN I MET GEOFFREY HOWE HERE RECENTLY, I AGAIN EXPLAINED TO HIM HOW WE IN THIS REGION SEE THINGS IN SOUTH AFRICA. I MADE IT QUITE CLEAR TO HIM THAT IF WHAT I HAD HEARD FROM THE PRESS WAS ANYTHING TO GO BY, THEN BRITISH POLICY ON SOUTH AFRICA WAS ON A WRONG TRACK.

GEOFFREY TRIED VERY HARD TO CONVINCE ME THAT YOUR HEART ON THE PROBLEM OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA WAS IN THE RIGHT

THE PROBLEM OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA WAS IN THE RIGHT PLACE. I TOLD HIM THAT I WISH I COULD BELIEVE HIM, BUT YOUR REJECTION OF COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS IS OF GREAT CONCERN TO ME AND MY COLLEAGUES IN THIS REGION. WE REGARD YOUR POSITION AS HALF-HEARTED AND NOT SUFFICIENT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS.

IN YOUR PERSONAL LETTER, YOU HAVE MADE REFERENCE TO THREATS AGAINST BRITAIN. MARGRET, I KNOW OF NO ONE WHO HAS MADE SUCH THREATS. CERTAINLY ZAMBIA HAS MADE NO THREATS. WE HAVE SOUGHT OF NO PLAN TO ISOLATE BRITAIN IN ANY WAY. BUT YOU ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ISOLATE YOURSELF AND BRITAIN FROM THE REST OF US. ALL OF US IN THE COMMONWEALTH WANT TO HAVE SOUND RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN. BUT WE DO NOT WANT BRITAIN TO PROP UP AND SUPPORT A REGIME THAT IS KILLING SO MANY PEOPLE ON THE BASIS THAT THEY BELONG TO A DIFFERENT COLOUR.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO CLEAVERAGES IN THE RANKS OF THOSE WHO ARE AGAINST APARTHEID, FOR THE ONLY PEOPLE TO BENEFIT FROM SUCH A DIVISION IN OUR RANKS ARE THE SOUTH AFRICANS. I, THEREFORE, URGE YOU NOT TO BE THE ODD ONE OUT OF THE REST OF US.

I DEPLORE THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. IT IS NOT HELPFUL IN ANY WAY. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SIR GEOFFREY HOWE'S

TRIP TO SOUTH AFRICA CAN ACHIEVE ANYTHING BETTER THAN THE EMINENT GROUP OF PERSONS. I REGARD THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S DECISION AS AN ATTEMPT BY BRITAINFTO CAUSE CONFUSION IN THE RANKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND DELAY MEASURES THAT SHOULD NOW BE TAKEN BY THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

I NEED NOT TELL YOU THAT THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA IS VERY SERIOUS INDEED. IT CALLS FOR A DRASTIC ACTION FROM ALL OF US WHO DISAPPROVE STRONGLY OF APARTHEID.

I HOPE AND PRAY THAT IN THE COMING WEEKS, THE GOOD LORD, GOD ALMIGHTY, WILL HELP YOU SEE WHAT WE ARE SEEING IN SOUTH AFRICA AND TO APPRECIATE OUR CONCERN. I HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS PAID TRIBUTE TO YOU FOR THE ROLE YOU PLAYED TO BRING ABOUT THE INDEPENDENCE OF ZIMBABWE. I EARNESTLY ASK YOU TO HELP US AGAIN ON THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRIDA.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN LONDON IN EARLY AUGUST.

WITH ALL GOOD WISHES.

KENNETH D. KAUNDA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

ENDS.

WHITE

YYYY

LLHPAN 2859

Pile SM.

PRIME MINISTER

The Foreign Secretary's meetings in Washington seem to have been satisfactory. The Americans do not want punitive economic sanctions. They think they can avoid any further measures until September (9 September is a crucial date, because that is when the President's Executive Order expires). Shultz will be testifying in this sense next week. However, they may have to impose some additional limited measures then. The only factor likely to affect this timetable is further South African cross-border raids, which would, in effect, make it impossible for the President to veto action by Congress. The President authorised the Foreign Secretary to tell President Botha that. Among selective measures which the Americans are considering, first place is being given to action on air services. The Foreign Secretary argued strongly against this.

The Americans asked us not to say anything public about their intentions in advance of Shultz's testimony next week. I am telling Bernard to stick to the line that there was useful co-ordination.

There are telegrams coming from Washington. I will have them mufaxed down to you during the day.

CHARLES POWELL
19 July 1986

GRS 966

Restricted

RESTRICTED
FM PRETORIA
TO DD 210900Z FCO LONDON
TELNO 164
OF 191055Z JULY 86
INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA,HARARE,UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO ROUTINE JOHANNESBURGE
INFO SAVING CAPETOWN CONSULATE , DURBAN

OUR TELNO 29 TO LUSAKA : SITREP : INTERNAL SITUATION.

SUMMARY.

1. THE RETURN TO BLACK SCHOOLS AND ONE DAY WORK STAY-AWAY ON 14 JULY PASSED WITHOUT SERIOUS INCIDENT AND WITH VARYING DEGREES OF PARTICIPATION. THE GOVERNMENT ARE LIKELY TO CONSIDER THIS AS A SET-BACK FOR THE RADICALS AND FURTHER JUSTIFICATION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. THE LATTER CONTINUES TO BE GENERALLY EFFECTIVE IN PREVENTING SERIOUS DEMONSTRATIONS AND CLASHES, THOUGH THERE WAS A BRIEF CONFRONTATION IN SOWETO. THE LEVEL OF BLACK DEATHS REMAINS SIGNIFICANT. THERE HAS BEEN A PAUSE IN BOMB ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS IN WHITE AREAS.

2. A COURT JUDGEMENT IN NATAL HAS DECLARED CERTAIN LIMITED ASPECTS OF THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS TO BE INVALID. THIS IS FURTHER WELCOME EVIDENCE OF A GROWING READINESS BY JUDGES TO TAKE A STAND IN DEFENCE OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS , BUT IT LEAVES MOST OF THE EMERGENCY POWERS INTACT.

DETAIL.

RETURN TO SCHOOLS.

3. ABOUT EIGHTY PERCENT OF BLACK PUPILS RETURNED TO SCHOOLS FOR THE NEW TERM ON 14 JULY. BUT 340,000 STAYED AWAY. ATTENDANCE VARIED ACROSS THE COUNTRY : THE WESTERN CAPE AND PORT ELIZABETH AREA 20 - 50% , TRANSVAAL ABOUT 80%, BUT A LOW TURN OUT IN SOME REEF TOWNSHIPS : NATAL 90% , EXCEPT LAMONTVILLE : FREE STATE 90 - 100%.

4. PUPILS HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNTIL 25 JULY TO RE-REGISTER, AND THE ONUS FOR ENDING SCHOOL UNREST PLACED ON TEACHERS UNDER A NEW CODE OF MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. THE MINISTER , DR VILJOEN, STATED THAT FUNDS WOULD BE TRANSFERRED FROM EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WHERE UNREST PERSISTED.

Restricted

TRADE.

TRADE UNION DAY OF ACTION.

5. COSATU'S CALL FOR A ONE DAY STAY-AWAY FROM WORK ON 14 JULY MET WITH A GENERALLY POOR RESPONSE EXCEPT IN THE EASTERN CAPE. ACCORDING TO THE INDEPENDENT LABOUR MONITORING GROUP ONLY TWENTY FOUR PERCENT OF BLACK WORKERS IN COSATU-ORGANISED FACTORIES ON THE REEF, AND ELEVEN PERCENT IN THE REGION'S RETAIL SECTOR RESPONDED TO THE CALL. PRETORIA AND JOHANNESBURG WERE LARGELY UNAFFECTED. IN THE EASTERN CAPE THOUSANDS INITIALLY REPORTED FOR WORK BUT LEFT SHORTLY AFTERWARDS. GENERAL MOTORS WAS FORCED TO CLOSE ITS PLANT IN PORT ELIZABETH. IN THE INKATHA/UWUSA STRONG-HOLDS OF NATAL THE ACTION WAS POORLY SUPPORTED, WITH A FEW WORKERS IN THE DURBAN AREA STAYING AWAY . IN THE WESTERN CAPE THE STAY-AWAY WAS CALLED OFF.

6. THE SPORADIC RESPONSE MAY BE DUE TO THE SEVERE RESTRICTIONS ON UNION ACTIVITY WHICH HAVE MADE COMMUNICATION AND NATION - WIDE COORDINATION DIFFICULT. ARREST OF INDIVIDUAL TRADE UNION OFFICIALS AND GROUPS OF WORKERS CONTINUE. ON THE OTHER HAND, PROBABLY DUE TO PRESSURE FROM EMPLOYERS, THE GOVERNMENT LIFTED FOUR DAYS LATER THE RESTRICTIONS ON INDOOR MEETINGS IN JOHANNESBURG OF TRADE UNIONS AND SOME OTHER ORGANISATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN IMPOSED ON 7 JULY.

INCIDENTS.

7. THE BUREAU OF INFORMATION STATED THAT THE LEVEL OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS CONTINUED TO DROP AND HAD NOW DECREASED BY SEVENTY SEVEN PERCENT FROM THE LEVEL OF THE FIRST WEEK AFTER THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. SOWETO, THE EAST RAND AND THE EASTERN CAPE WERE THE AREAS WHERE MOST INCIDENTS OCCURRED. ALTHOUGH THIS OFFICIAL ACCOUNT PROBABLY UNDER-ESTIMATES THE VIOLENCE , THE OVERALL LEVEL DOES APPEAR TO REMAIN LOWER THAN BEFORE THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. HOWEVER, UNREST DEATHS CONTINUE AND PROBABLY AT ABOUT THE SAME LEVEL AS BEFORE THE EMERGENCY.

8. ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL FIGURES 32 SUSPECTED ANC OPERATIVES HAVE BEEN KILLED IN SHOOTOUTS WITH THE POLICE SINCE THE EMERGENCY BEGAN. AT LEAST 14 OTHERS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED. THESE SUCCESSES FOR THE POLICE ARE SAID TO INCLUDE SOME OF THE PERPETRATORS OF RECENT BOMBINGS IN WHITE AREAS.

DETENTIONS.

9. THE DETAINEES PARENTS SUPPORT COMMITTEE ESTIMATE THAT ABOUT 5,000 PEOPLE MAY HAVE BEEN DETAINED IN THE EMERGENCY'S FIRST THREE WEEKS . THE ACTUAL FIGURE MAY BE SOMEWHAT HIGHER. SOME RELEASES HAVE BEEN MADE, BUT THEY ARE PROBABLY AT LEAST BALANCED BY NEW ARRESTS.

1 Emergency.

EMERGENCY REGULATIONS.

10. THE NATAL SUPREME COURT ON 16 JULY PRONOUNCED CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS INVALID, BUT OTHERWISE UPHELD THE LEGALITY OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. THE COURT REJECTED AN ARGUMENT BY THE METAL AND ALLIED WORKERS' UNION (MAWU) THAT THE EMERGENCY WAS ILLEGAL ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS, BUT STATED THAT ONLY ONE OF SIX CLAUSES DEFINING A SUBVERSIVE STATEMENT WAS SUFFICIENTLY PRECISE TO BE CONSIDERED LAWFUL. THE TERMS IN THE OTHERS WERE TOO BROAD TO BE CLEARLY UNDERSTANDABLE. THE COURT ALSO DECLARED THAT THE STATE PRESIDENT HAD ACTED BEYOOND HIS POWERS IN BANNING DETAINEES' ACCESS TO LAWYERS.

11. THE JTDGEMENT APPEARS TO APPLY ONLY IN NATAL AND THE APPEAL COURT MIGHT HAVE TO CLARIFY THE POSITION. THE BULK OF THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS REMAIN IN FULL FORCE. THE GOVERNMENT IS CONSIDERING THE NATAL JUDGEMENT, BUT THERE IS NO SIGN THAT IT WILL LEAD TO AN EARLY LIFTING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY.

REFORM PROGRAMME.

12. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON THE GROUP AREAS AND SEPARATE AMENITIES ACTS (OUR TUR PARA 13) IS NOW NOT EXPECTED UNTIL AT LEAST OCTOBER. MEANWHILE THE GOVERNMENT HAVE RESCINDED A SMALL NUMBER OF REGULATIONS UNDER THE FORMER ACT.

IMMEDIATE OUTLOOK.

13. THE GENERAL UNEASY CALM ENFORCED BY THE STATE OF EMERGENCY SEEMS LIKELY TO BE MAINTAINED. HOWEVER, TROUBLE COULD STILL BREAK OUT IN THE BLACK SCHOOLS. ISOLATED GUERILLA BOMB ATTACKS IN WHITE AREAS COULD BE RESUMED AT ANY TIME .

MOBERLY

SOUTHERN AFRICA
STANDARD (PALACE)
SAFD
OADs
UND
NAD
ECDs
SOVIET D
MR REEVE

CABINET OFFICE

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

Master
J. P. BARBER
J.P., M.A., Ph.D.

HATFIELD COLLEGE
DURHAM DH1 3RQ
Telephone 64261-2

JPB/cac

18th July 1986

c)
fyR?

R21/7

Mrs M. Thatcher,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London Wl

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

at flap PTB

Thank you for your kind ~~letter~~ about the South African Schoolteacher Fellowships. I apologise for burdening you with another letter. I had not intended to write again, but with South Africa in the forefront of public attention I feel frustrated by the generally negative approach that is advocated, and so I hope you will be prepared to consider a further and much larger proposal from me. The proposal is made in the spirit of doing something positive for black South Africans in contrast to the negative approach of punitive economic sanctions.

In broad terms my proposal is that we in Britain initiate a major development programme for black South Africans. Possibly the proposal could be extended to a Commonwealth or an EEC programme which would enable other members to make their contributions.

The type of programme I have in mind is as follows:

1. A joint initiative from the government, private industry, and public institutions.

2. The aim would be to help black South Africans (i.e. Africans, Coloureds, and Indians) in furthering the development of their country.

3. The programme would operate in South Africa and in Britain (or other Commonwealth and EEC countries if a broader international approach were adopted).

4. The programme would concentrate on such activities as: a. Training and education; b. Improvement and development works (e.g. the provision of water in urban and rural areas); c. Improved work conditions and opportunities for blacks.

5. The training would include on the job experience, so that we might see black South Africans in this country behind the counters in Barclays, or on secondment to a local authority, or in ICI laboratories, or marketing oil for Shell. The courses to be offered would be very practical - e.g. computing, accountancy, engineering etc.

In fact many of these things are already being done, but with little public notice and not in a co-ordinated way. My proposal is that we should do more, and make it known what we are doing so that we can widen

the agenda of debate about South Africa. This would require a co-ordinating organization which would need government support, but would not be an exclusively government enterprise.

Do you think it worthwhile pursuing this proposal? If you do I should like the opportunity to discuss it further with you or some of your colleagues. Also if possible, I should like to make a contribution towards it.

Yours sincerely,

James Barber.

James Barber

SOUTH AFRICA Relations PT12

GRS 420

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 624
OF 181120Z JULY 86
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, LUSAKA

Charles - we must take up this idea and keep in touch with Kohl ourselves

SOUTH AFRICA: CHANCELLOR KOHL'S VIEWS

1. WHEN I SAW KOHL TODAY HE SAID THAT IF THERE WAS GOING TO BE ANY SHIFT IN THE BRITISH POSITION ON SANCTIONS HE HOPED THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT LEARN OF IT FROM THE NEWSPAPERS. I SAID I WAS SURE THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THIS HAPPENING, AND READ HIM THE KEY SENTENCE FROM YOUR SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 16 JULY. TODAY'S GERMAN PRESS HAD EXAGGERATED.

2. KOHL SET OUT HIS GENERAL POSITION, REFERRING NOW AND AGAIN TO POINTS HE HAD EVIDENTLY MADE AT THE HAGUE. SOUTH AFRICA HELD SOME STRONG CARDS, INCLUDING THE ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE OF HER NEIGHBOURS AND THE 600,000 PORTUGUESE. THE LAAGER MENTALITY WAS THE PROBLEM. THE WAY THEY HAD TREATED YOU SO FAR WAS ABSURD AND CHILDISH. AS KOHL'S MOTHER USED TO SAY TO HIM, SLAM THE DOOR IF YOU LIKE, BUT REMEMBER THAT YOU GOING TO HAVE TO OPEN IT AGAIN. KOHL TOLD ME IN GREAT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT HE HAD SENT A TRUSTED MESSENGER TO TALK TO BOTHA. HE OUGHT TO BE THANKING HIS LUCKY STARS THAT THE PRESIDENCY HAD PASSED TO BRITAIN JUST AT THIS MOMENT. THE EC HAD NO FOREIGN MINISTER (AND THIS INCLUDED THE GERMAN) MORE SUITABLE AND BETTER EQUIPPED TO CARRY OUT SUCH A MISSION. KOHL WANTED NOTHING MORE THAN THAT IT SHOULD SUCCEED. ON HOLIDAY OR NOT, HE WAS READY TO HELP AT ANY TIME AND TO PRESERVE THE GREATEST DISCRETION ABOUT IT. A TELEPHONE CALL TO HIS OFFICE HERE WOULD BE ENOUGH.

3. AS TO HOW THIS MIGHT BE BROUGHT ABOUT, KOHL HAD TWO THOUGHTS. FIRST, IT WAS NOT REASONABLE TO EXPECT MANDELA TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE IN EXCHANGE FOR RELEASE. BUT HE MIGHT BE GOT TO SAY THAT IF RELEASED HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE PART IN NEGOTIATIONS, AND KOHL'S HUNCH WAS THAT BOTHA MIGHT REGARD THIS AS GOOD ENOUGH. SECOND, KOHL DID NOT BELIEVE THAT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNAL PARTIES WOULD SUCCEED IF THEY WERE HELD IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF. THE TABLE HAD TO BE MOVED ELSEWHERE: WHETHER TO

Confidential

/LONDON

LONDON, GENEVA OR ANYWHERE ELSE WAS NOT IMPORTANT. THE POINT WAS TO GET THE TALKS OUT OF THE COUNTRY. A PROPOSAL ON THESE LINES WOULD, KOHL THOUGHT, BE HARD FOR BOTHA TO REJECT.

4. KOHL SPOKE RATHER DISMISSIVELY OF THE ANC. THEY WERE A MOTLEY LOT, AND THEIR LEADERS DID NOT REALLY WANT MANDELA RELEASED: IN PRISON HE WAS A USEFUL MARTYR, OUT OF PRISON HE WOULD BE A COMPETITOR FOR THEM.

5. KOHL SAID THAT ANGLO-GERMAN COLLABORATION ON THIS PROBLEM WAS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE MOOD IN PARIS WAS BECOMING SO UNPREDICTABLE AND DECISIONS INCREASINGLY DICTATED BY INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS.

COMMENT

6. I THINK IT WOULD BE WISE TO MAINTAIN NO LESS CLOSE CONTACT WITH KOHL THAN I KNOW HAS BEEN THE CASE BETWEEN YOU AND GENSCHER.

BULLARD

SOUTH AFRICA

LIMITED

S AF D
C AF D
UND
ECD(E)
NEWS D
LEGAL ADVISERS
PLANNING STAFF
CCD
CONS D
SCD
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PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
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MR DEREK THOMAS
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MR MALLABY CABINET OFFICE

RESTRICTED
FM HARARE
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 296
OF 181040Z JULY 86
INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LUANDA

CDP
18/7

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM ORIGINALLY TRANSMITTED AS IMMEDIATE AND NOW UPGRADED TO FLASH AT REQUEST OF ORIGINATOR FOR ATTENTION CAFD FCO

YOUR TELNO 174: FLS MEETING

1. I HAVE PASSED THE TEXTS IN YOUR TUR IN WRITING TO ALL THE DELEGATIONS EXCEPT THE ANGOLAN (ARRIVING LATE). BECAUSE OF CONFUSED ARRANGEMENTS, I HANDED THEM PERSONALLY TO MACHEL AND BOTSWANA FOREIGN MINISTER, WITHOUT CONVERSATION: TO MUGABE AND MWINYI SEPARATELY, WITH A SHORT CONVERSATION IN ELABORATION (BOTH WERE NON-COMMITTAL): TO KAUNDA (PLUS A SEPARATE LETTER WITH THE TEXT IN YOUR TELNO 223 TO LUSAKA) VIA THE ZAMBIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER: AND HAVE LEFT THE MESSAGE FOR THE ANGOLAN WITH PERMANENT SECRETARY MFA, WHO PROMISES TO PASS IT ON ON THEIR ARRIVAL.

2. EXISTENCE OF THIS MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY BECAME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, BECAUSE MANGWENDE INSISTED THAT I HAND IT TO MUGABE UNDER TELEVISION CAMERAS. WE TALKED LATER IN PRIVATE. TO WAITING JOURNALISTS AFTERWARDS I REFERRED ONLY TO RECENT STATEMENTS IN THE HOUSE, AND THE NEED FOR OUR GOVERNMENTS TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH.

3. I DELEIVERED MESSAGE TO MANGWENDE (YOUR TELNO 171) TO HIS HOUSE LAST NIGHT, AND HE CONFIRMED RECEIPT TODAY, WITHOUT COMMENT.

4. IN THE MARGINS, PERM SEC MFA TOLD ME HE WOULD NOT (NOT) BE ABLE TO GIVE ACCURATE PREVIEW OF MUGABE'S MOVEMENTS DURING PERIOD OF SECRETARY OF STATE'S SOUTHERN AFRICAN TOUR UNTIL NEXT WEEK.

MARTIN

YYYY

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RESTRICTED
OO COLOM
FM FCOLN TO HARAR
171943Z JUL
GRS 393

RESTRICTED
FM FCO
TO FLASH HARARE
TELNO 174
OF 171943Z JULY 86
AND TO IMMEDIATE KINGSTON, BRIDGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN
AND TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, DHAKA, COLOMBO, KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE
AND TO IMMEDIATE GABORONE, LUSAKA, NAIROBI, KAMPALA, LAGOS, ACCRA
AND TO IMMEDIATE FREETOWN, BANJUL, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON
AND TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, NASSAU, DAR ES SALEM

SOUTH AFRICA:- STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER
1. (FOR HARARE) THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTERS REMARKS ON SOUTH AFRICA IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS IN PARLIAMENT THIS AFTERNOON (17 JULY) HAS BEEN SENT FLASH TO YOU AND IMMEDIATE TO OTHER ADDRESSES IN THE RETRACT SERIES.
2. PLEASE DRAW URGENTLY TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT AND OF OTHER DELEGATIONS OF THE FRONT LINE STATES IN HARARE AT AS HIGH A LEVEL AS POSSIBLE, THE PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT QUOTE BEGINS

BOTH THE NASSAU ACCORD AND THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING AT THE HAGUE ENVISAGED DISCUSSION ON FURTHER MEASURES THAT MIGHT BE NEEDED. AS I SAID IN THE HOUSE ON 1 JULY CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE
QUOTE ENDS.
3. THIS SHOULD BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH MY OWN STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE YESTERDAY (16 JULY) SENT TO YOU IN THE VERBATIM SERIES THAT QUOTE BEGINS
I AM ENGAGED IN A MISSION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, NOT TO PROMOTE

MEASURES, BUT TO SEEK CHANGES AND COMMITMENTS TO PROGRESS WHICH ARE DESIRED BY HONOURABLE MEMBERS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE HOUSE, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE COMMONWEALTH. IT MUST BE RECOGNISED THAT I MAY NOT ACHIEVE THOSE CHANGES. IF THE MISSION DOES NOT PRODUCE TANGIBLE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN SOUTH AFRICA, I WOULD REGARD AGREEMENT ON FURTHER MEASURES AS LIKELY TO BE NECESSARY.

QUOTE ENDS

4. IN HANDING OVER COPIES OF THESE STATEMENTS YOU SHOULD SAY THAT YOU ARE DOING SO IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENTS ARE FULLY BRIEFED ON HMG'S POLICY. (FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION THE FORMULATIONS IN THESE STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY JUDGED IN RELATION TO THE FORTHCOMING COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING AND WE ALSO HOPE THAT THEY MAY BE HELPFUL IN PERSUADING THE COMMONWEALTH FRONT LINE STATES NOT TO JOIN IN THE BOYCOTT OF THE COMMONWEALTH GAMES. YOU SHOULD OF COURSE MAKE NO EXPLICIT LINK BETWEEN THE STATEMENTS AND THE GAMES.)

5. (FOR OTHER ADDRESSES) PROVIDING YOU THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL PLEASE SIMILARLY DRAW THESE STATEMENTS URGENTLY TO THE ATTENTION OF YOUR HOST GOVERNMENTS (ON THE SAME BASIS AS FOR HARARE)

HOWE

SOUTH AFRICA

LIMITED

S AF D
C AF D
UND
ECD(E)
NEWS D
LEGAL ADVISERS
PLANNING STAFF
CCD
CRD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR FERGUSSON
MR REEVE

CABINET OFFICE

South African Embassy

B8/6/2

18 July 1986

CDP
21/7.

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1A

Dear Charles,

Further to my letter of 2 July 1986, herewith the original letter from President Botha to Prime Minister Thatcher, dated 1 July 1986.

For your background information you might be interested to see the attached centre pages of the South African Sunday Times of last Sunday. Besides demonstrating the intensity of the debate on sanctions from a South African perspective the various commentary articles will convey something of the mood developing in South Africa.

With kind regards

yours sincerely

Les Evans.

L H EVANS
MINISTER

GRS 600

Confidential

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1902
OF 182045Z JULY 86
INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA MOSCOW
INFO ROUTINE HARARE LUSAKA

YOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN INVITED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO SEE HIM AT SHORT NOTICE THIS MORNING.

2. THE PRESIDENT BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE HAD BEEN GLAD TO BE ABLE TO PASS THE NEWS ABOUT THE EXTRADITION TREATY TO THE PRIME MINISTER LAST NIGHT, EVEN THOUGH HE HAD HAD TO TRACK HER DOWN AT A DINNER PARTY. YOU EXPRESSED YOUR APPRECIATION TO THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY SHULTZ AND THE WHOLE ADMINISTRATION.

3. ON SOUTH AFRICA, THE PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR HIS OPPOSITION TO PUNITIVE SANCTIONS BUT STRESSED THE NEED TO FIND A WAY TO PRODUCE CHANGE. HE THOUGHT THE WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS MIGHT SEE VALUE IN SOME CANTONAL ARRANGEMENT: IT WAS UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT THEM TO GO IMMEDIATELY TO THE ALTERNATIVE OF ONE MAN ONE VOTE. CLEARLY THINKING OUT LOUD, THE PRESIDENT WONDERED WHETHER THE US, THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE EC TOGETHER COULD PLAY A PART IN SECURING CHANGE BY OFFERING TO BE INTERMEDIARIES . YOU CONFIRMED THAT THE COMMONWEALTH WAS ALREADY ENGAGED IN THE SEARCH FOR THE BEST MEANS OF SECURING CHANGE. YOUR OWN MISSION ON BEHALF OF THE EC HAD THE SAME OBJECTIVE. IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF IN ADDITION THE PRESIDENT COULD MAKE PLAIN IN PUBLIC THAT THE EC MISSION ENJOYED HIS SUPPORT AND AUTHORISE YOU TO SAY SO IN PRETORIA. YOU POINTED OUT THAT BLACKS COULD SOMETIMES GET A MESSAGE ACROSS TO FELLOW BLACKS WHICH WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED IF IT CAME FROM WHITES. BUT THE TIME WAS NOT RIGHT NOW FOR A DIFFERENT INITIATIVE.

4. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT HE WAS WORKING HARD TO GET RIGHT HIS TESTIMONY TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON 23 JULY. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GIVE A MESSAGE THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE EC MISSION. HE WOULD DESCRIBE THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION AS FOR POSITIVE CHANGE BUT AGAINST SANCTIONS, THOUGH HE RECOGNISED THAT CONGRESS WAS LIKELY TO WANT TO GO FURTHER ON THIS ISSUE. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR P W BOTHA TO UNDERSTAND THAT IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS UNDERTOOK FURTHER CROSS-BORDER RAIDS THE EFFECT WOULD BE VERY DETRIMENTAL INDEED TO THEIR INTERESTS IN THE US. IT WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO SUSTAIN A VETO OF SANCTIONS LEGISLATION. THE PRESIDENT HOPED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE ABLE TO GET THIS MESSAGE ACROSS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

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5. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF THE ANC, AND PRODUCED ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ON THE CAMPUSES WHEN HE WAS GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA. BUT HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIALOGUE WITH THEM. HE THOUGHT IT WAS USEFUL THAT THERE WERE BLACK LEADERS WITH WHOM DIALOGUE WAS POSSIBLE (HE MENTIONED BUTHELEZI).

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COMMENT

8. WHILE YOUR TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT WAS VALUABLE ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, I THINK THE SYMBOLISM OF IT WAS EVEN MORE STRIKING. HIS INVITATION TO YOU TO THE WHITE HOUSE WAS CLEARLY INTENDED TO UNDERLINE THE CLOSENESS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN AND AMERICA AND THE SOLIDARITY BETWEEN US AT A TIME OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE.

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YOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN

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Already T'd. T133A/86 (20.7.86)

Text already received by Telegram CDO 20/7.

State House

Lusaka, Republic of Zambia

17th July, 1986

Dear Margret,

Thank you for the recent letters which I received through your High Commissioner here in Lusaka.

I am pleased to learn that you are determined, as the rest of us in the Commonwealth are, in seeking genuine solutions to the problems of South Africa.

While what you stated in your letters as your policy goal is laudable, I am nevertheless, worried about the means you propose to use to achieve that goal.

I do not believe that anything short of comprehensive sanctions will be sufficient to induce change of attitude in the South African leaders or to buy us time for a relatively peaceful transformation of the political system in South Africa.

/...

Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margret Thatcher, MP.
Prime Minister,
No. 10 Downing Street,
LONDON.

When I met Geoffrey Howe here recently, I again explained to him how we in this region see things in South Africa. I made it quite clear to him that if what I had heard from the Press was anything to go by, then British policy on South Africa was on a wrong track.

Geoffrey tried very hard to convince me that your heart on the problem of apartheid in South Africa was in the right place. I told him that I wish I could believe him, but your rejection of comprehensive sanctions is of great concern to me and my colleagues in this region. We regard your position as half-hearted and not sufficient to be taken seriously by the South Africans.

In your personal letter, you have made reference to threats against Britain. Margret, I know of no one who has made such threats. Certainly Zambia has made no threats. We have sought of no plan to isolate Britain in any way. But you are doing everything possible to isolate yourself and Britain from the rest of us. All of us in the Commonwealth want to have sound relations with Britain. But we do not want Britain to prop up and support a regime that is killing so many people on the basis that they belong to a different colour.

I agree with you that there should be no cleaverages in the ranks of those who are against apartheid, for the only people to benefit from such a division in our ranks are the South Africans. I, therefore, urge you not to be the odd one out of the rest of us.

/...

I deplore the decision taken by the European Community. It is not helpful in any way. I do not believe that Sir Geoffrey Howe's trip to South Africa can achieve anything better than the Eminent Group of Persons. I regard the European Community's decision as an attempt by Britain to cause confusion in the ranks of the Commonwealth and delay measures that should now be taken by the Commonwealth and the rest of the international community.

I need not tell you that the situation in South Africa is very serious indeed. It calls for a drastic action from all of us who disapprove strongly of apartheid.

I hope and pray that in the coming weeks, the Good Lord, God Almighty, will help you see what we are seeing in South Africa and to appreciate our concern. I have on several occasions paid tribute to you for the role you played to bring about the Independence of Zimbabwe. I earnestly ask you to help us again on the question of South Africa.

I look forward to seeing you in London in early August.

With all good wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Kenneth .

Kenneth D. Kaunda
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

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Prime Minister

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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON TELNO 1868: US/UK CONSULTATIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETINGS WITH SHULTZ AND LUGAR

SUMMARY

1. SOUTH AFRICA DISCUSSED WITH SHULTZ AND LUGAR. BOTH SUGGEST NO CONGRESSIONAL MEASURES TILL SEPTEMBER, BUT IN ABSENCE OF PROGRESS HEAVY PRESSURE THEN. BAN ON LANDING RIGHTS ATTRACTIVE TO US. PRESIDENT STILL UNDECIDED WHETHER TO SPEAK ON SUBJECT NEXT WEEK. SECRETARY OF STATE BRIEFED ON PROGRESS OF HIS MISSION SO FAR AND PROSPECTS AS WE SAW THEM.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DISCUSSED SOUTH AFRICA WITH SHULTZ AND LUGAR ON 17 JULY.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE, BRIEFING SHULTZ ON HIS 9-11 JULY VISIT TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, SAID THAT HE HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE TASK HE HAD BEEN SET. A DECISIVE CHANGE IN THE THINKING OF THE SAG WOULD PROBABLY BE A LONG TIME COMING. BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL, MEANWHILE, TO KEEP IN CONTACT WITH THE SAG, AND THUS TO RETAIN THE CAPACITY FOR HAVING A POSITIVE INFLUENCE, DESPITE THE WIDESPREAD PRESSURE TO EXCOMMUNICATE THEM. WE NEEDED ALSO TO BRING HOME TO THEM THE EXTENT OF THE PRESSURE DEVELOPING IN THE WEST TO TAKE SANCTIONS. THE EC, FRUSTRATED BY THE EPG'S ABILITY TO GO SO FAR BUT NO FURTHER, HAD DECIDED TO MAKE ONE MORE EFFORT AT PERSUASION. SHULTZ WONDERED IF THE EPG COULD BE RESURRECTED: THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT NOT.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ARGUED THAT, IF THE SAG FAILED TO GO FAR ENOUGH TO ENABLE US TO HOLD THE LINE AGAINST FURTHER MEASURES, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO MOVE SLOWLY, TO CONSULT CLOSELY, AND TO CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ON THOSE STEPS MOST LIKELY TO INJECT REASON INTO SAG THINKING. WE NEEDED TO KEEP OUR TIMESCALE IN LINE WITH THAT OF OTHER INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES, IN PARTICULAR THE US. THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF ONE CONCERTED PUSH BRINGING AN OVERNIGHT CHANGE OF SAG POLICY. FOR OUR PART, WE WERE NOW FACED BY THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING AND THE EC MEETING, IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT WHATEVER INFLUENCE WE HAD COULD BE DESTROYED BY FURTHER EXCESSES ON THE PART OF THE SAG AND IN THE EXPECTATION THAT THE SAG WERE UNLIKELY TO DELIVER ON MANDELA OR THE ANC.

5. SHULTZ SUGGESTED THAT, OBJECTIVELY, THE SITUATION WAS DETERIORATING FAST. THE PROSPECTS FOR DIALOGUE LOOKED BLEAK.

THE CONCEPT OF QUOTE POLITICAL UNQUOTE SANCTIONS WAS BECOMING IRRELEVANT. CONGRESS WAS ALREADY CONSIDERING PROPOSALS FOR A TOTAL US WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH AFRICA. THERE WAS IN ANY CASE NO NEW INVESTMENT UNDER WAY, AND FROM HIS RECENT CONTACTS WITH GENERAL MOTORS, IBM AND JOHNSON AND JOHNSON (BELLWEATHERS FOR US INDUSTRY) HE KNEW THAT A WINDING DOWN PROCESS WAS ALL BUT UNDERWAY. THE ONLY MEASURE WHICH HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAVE SOME EFFECT IN PRACTICE WOULD BE A BAN ON LANDING AND OVERFLYING RIGHTS. THE SAG WAS BEING GIVEN A CLEAR MESSAGE FROM THE MARKET PLACE, REGARDLESS OF WHAT GOVERNMENTS DECIDED TO DO. IN THE US VIEW, SOUTH AFRICA COULD INDEED SURVIVE THIS PROCESS - WHETHER OR NOT SUPPLEMENTED BY SANCTIONS - ALBEIT WITH A REDUCED STANDARD OF LIVING. THE FLS, MEANWHILE, SHOWED NO SIGNS OF REALISM ABOUT THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON THEIR ECONOMIES. IF THE PRESENT PRESSURE HAD THE RESULTS THEY WERE SEEKING, THEIR COUNTRIES COULD VERGE ON THE UNGOVERNABLE. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD THEREFORE BE TRYING TO PERSUADE THE ADVOCATES OF SANCTIONS TO CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES, BUT THE OUTLOOK WAS DEPRESSING. TO THE AMERICANS, IT LOOKED AS THOUGH IT WAS ALREADY TEN MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRIVATE DOUBTS ABOUT SANCTIONS EXPRESSED BY BOTSWANA, LESOTHO AND MOZAMBIQUE, THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO ARGUE THE CASE IN PUBLIC. IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO GIVE MORE THOUGHT TO HELPING TO SUSTAIN THE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE FLS BY PROVIDING ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORT LINKS. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE BEIRA CORRIDOR PROJECT HELD SOME ATTRACTIONS FOR THE US: THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE WILLING TO GIVE SUPPORT TO IT.

7. SHULTZ VOLUNTEERED THAT PRESSURE FROM THE HILL FOR ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA WAS UNDIMINISHED. BUT HE HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO NEW SENATE INITIATIVES BEFORE HIS 23 JULY TESTIMONY TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. THERE WAS THEN AT LEAST A CHANCE THAT THE SENATE WOULD TAKE NO MAJOR LEGISLATIVE STEPS UNTIL THEY RETURNED FROM RECESS IN SEPTEMBER. BUT THEY WOULD THEN WISH TO VOTE ON SOMETHING (AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE TO RENEW OR AMEND HIS OWN 1985 EXECUTIVE ORDER BY 8 SEPTEMBER). IT WAS STILL NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE A SPEECH ON SOUTH AFRICA EARLY NEXT WEEK: HE WANTED TO BE HELPFUL, BUT WOULD ONLY SPEAK OUT IF HE THOUGHT IT COULD IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. (SHULTZ WONDERED OUT LOUD WHETHER STATE COULD FIND A WAY OF TESTING OUT ON US ANY LANGUAGE IN HIS OR THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS WHICH MIGHT SEEM TO US PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE: AND WE HAVE SINCE AGREED WITH CROCKER THAT IF TIME PERMITS HE WILL TRY OUT ON US ANY LANGUAGE ABOUT WHICH HE IS DOUBTFUL).

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SHULTZ AGREED THAT WE WERE ALL HOSTAGE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. SHULTZ SAID THAT IF P W BOTHA REPEATED HIS AUGUST 1985 PERFORMANCE NEXT MONTH, DISENGAGEMENT LEGISLATION WAS LIKELY TO SAIL THROUGH (CROCKER SAID THAT STATE'S CALCULATIONS WERE THAT LEGISLATION WOULD HAVE TO BE

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PASSED IN THE SENATE BY 23 SEPTEMBER IF THE PRESIDENT WAS TO BE FORCED TO CONSIDER A VETO). SIMILARLY, THE OUTCOME OF THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING WAS BOUND TO HAVE A CONSIDERABLE CONGRESSIONAL IMPACT - PARTICULARLY WITH SO MANY SENATORS THINKING ABOUT THE BLACK VOTE IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE FURTHER ANY NEW US MEASURES COULD BE PUSHED TOWARDS LATE SEPTEMBER, AND THE MORE THEIR SCOPE COULD BE CONTAINED, THE BETTER FOR US. A BAN ON LANDING RIGHTS, WHICH WOULD BE COST-FREE TO THE AMERICANS, WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR US AND SOME OTHER COUNTRIES, AND HE HOPED THE US COULD AVOID IT. SHULTZ TOOK NOTE, BUT SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION ALSO NEEDED TO BE ABLE TO POINT TO MOVEMENT OF SOME KIND. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD STATED IN PARLIAMENT THAT IF HIS MISSION FAILED TO PRODUCE TANGIBLE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS, FURTHER MEASURES WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE NECESSARY. THAT SAID, HE HAD NOT SPELT OUT WHEN HE WOULD BE REGARDING HIS CURRENT MISSION AS OVER. IF THERE WAS A REAL PROSPECT OF CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA, THE EC MEASURES MIGHT BE HELD IN CHECK. BUT IT SEEMED UNLIKELY THAT THE COMMONWEALTH COULD BE RESTRAINED. THE BEST FORSEEABLE OUTCOME TO THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING SEEMED TO BE ONE IN WHICH WE WOULD WITHOLD A DECISION ACTUALLY TO IMPLEMENT ANY FURTHER MEASURES UNTIL THE END OF THE EC THREE MONTH PERIOD.

9. SHULTZ SUMMARISED BY SAYING THAT WE SEEMED TO BE AGREEING THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS WERE BLEAK, BUT THAT WE STILL HAD TO DO ALL WE COULD TO MAXIMISE THE CHANCE OF A DIALOGUE: THIS WAS NOT AN EASY MESSAGE TO SELL, OTHER THAN BY SPELLING OUT HOW BIG THE REWARDS WOULD BE (AND HOW FEW REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES WERE ON OFFER). BUT HE WAS WORRIED LEST, IN SIX OR EIGHT MONTHS TIME, WE COULD BE CONFRONTED BY A SITUATION IN WHICH FURTHER MEASURES WERE IN PLACE AND VIOLENCE WAS STILL RISING. A PARALLEL WITH LEBANON WAS NOT INCONCEIVABLE, WITH FIGHTING FUELLED BY THE RUSSIANS: THEN WHAT WOULD THE WEST DO? HISTORICALLY, AMERICANS MOST PREOCCUPIED WITH EAST/WEST ISSUES HAD ALWAYS TAKEN THE SIDE OF THE SAG - BUT DOUBTS WERE INCREASING. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE LONGER THE SAG TOOK TO CHANGE, THE MORE HOSTILE AND MARXIST BOTH A FUTURE SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS RISKED BECOMING. THIS WAS A POINT TO PUT TO P W BOTHA - BUT IT WOULD REQUIRE ENORMOUS COURAGE FOR HIM TO ACT UPON IT.

10. SHULTZ SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH PRESSURE WAS A CRUCIAL PART OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS, TIMING WAS CRITICAL IF THERE WAS TO BE ANY PROSPECT OF THE WEST PLAYING A SUCCESSFUL MEDIATION ROLE - YET WE WERE CONFRONTED BY IMMEDIATE POLITICAL PRESSURES. HE WONDERED WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN LAYING DOWN A BROADER POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOUTH AFRICA (ALONG THE LINES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE) WHICH COULD SERVE AS A REFERENCE POINT FOR LONGER TERM EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE CHANGE. ALTHOUGH THE WEST COULD NOT OFFER A PRESCRIPTION FOR A POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA, THERE WERE SURELY CONSTRUCTIVE POINTS WE COULD MAKE WHICH MIGHT HINT AT A POSSIBLE WAY AHEAD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPLIED THAT, GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTY ON

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THE GROUND AND THE RISK THAT ANY OUTSIDE ATTEMPT TO ARRIVE AT A FORMULA FOR SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE MISCONCEIVED BY BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS, THE EC HAD COME DOWN IN FAVOUR OF MORE TANGIBLE OBJECTIVES THE RELEASE OF MANDELA AND THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC.

11. SENATOR LUGAR, WHOM THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAW IMMEDIATELY AFTER SHULTZ, THOUGHT IT DIFFICULT TO PREDICT THE LIKELY OUTCOME IN CONGRESS. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE LEADERSHIP SHOWN BY THE PRESIDENT. IF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED MESSAGE AND SHULTZ'S TESTIMONY TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE NEXT WEEK WERE NOT PERCEIVED AS INDICATING A SUFFICIENT DEGREE OF CHANGE, VARIOUS LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS WOULD COME FORWARD IN THE SENATE. NOTHING FINAL WAS LIKELY TO EMERGE BEFORE THE MID-AUGUST BREAK. BUT BY SEPTEMBER THE SENATE LEADERSHIP WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A DECISION. LUGAR THOUGHT THAT US PUBLIC OPINION WAS 3:1 IN FAVOUR OF MORE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. HOUSE MEMBERS WERE ALREADY GAINING POLITICAL CREDIT FOR THEIR VOTE ON THE HOUSE BILL. WITH THE ELECTIONS COMING UP, IT WAS LIKELY THAT THE SENATE WOULD HAVE TO ACT TOO. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF US ACTION NOT GETTING OUT OF LINE WITH WHAT THE EUROPEANS WERE DOING. ASKED BY LUGAR WHAT SORT OF US ACTION WOULD BE LEAST UNWELCOME IN EUROPE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE MADE CLEAR THAT THE UK WERE VERY ANXIOUS TO AVOID A BAN ON LANDING RIGHTS. IF THERE HAD TO BE FURTHER MEASURES, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO GO FOR MEASURES SUCH AS THOSE ALREADY CURTAILMENT PLUGGED BY THE EC, FOR EXAMPLE OF IMPORTS (EG COAL, IRON AND STEEL) RATHER THAN BANS ON EXPORTS. LUGAR MADE THE POINT THAT A NUMBER OF SMALLER US BUSINESSES WERE ALREADY PULLING OUT OF SOUTH AFRICA BECAUSE THEY WERE LOSING MONEY. THE POSITION OF THE MAJOR US CORPORATIONS (IBM, XEROX AND GENERAL MOTORS) WAS CRITICAL. IF THEY TOO WERE TO PULL OUT, THIS COULD RENDER ANY CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IRRELEVANT.

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PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR FERGUSSON
MR REEVE

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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON TELNO 1868: US/UK CONSULTATIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETINGS WITH SHULTZ AND LUGAR

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5. SHULTZ SUGGESTED THAT, OBJECTIVELY, THE SITUATION WAS DETERIORATING FAST. THE PROSPECTS FOR DIALOGUE LOOKED BLEAK.

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THE CONCEPT OF QUOTE POLITICAL UNQUOTE SANCTIONS WAS BECOMING IRRELEVANT. CONGRESS WAS ALREADY CONSIDERING PROPOSALS FOR A TOTAL US WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH AFRICA. THERE WAS IN ANY CASE NO NEW INVESTMENT UNDER WAY, AND FROM HIS RECENT CONTACTS WITH GENERAL MOTORS, IBM AND JOHNSON AND JOHNSON (BELLWEATHERS FOR US INDUSTRY) HE KNEW THAT A WINDING DOWN PROCESS WAS ALL BUT UNDERWAY. THE ONLY MEASURE WHICH HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAVE SOME EFFECT IN PRACTICE WOULD BE A BAN ON LANDING AND OVERFLYING RIGHTS. THE SAG WAS BEING GIVEN A CLEAR MESSAGE FROM THE MARKET PLACE, REGARDLESS OF WHAT GOVERNMENTS DECIDED TO DO. IN THE US VIEW, SOUTH AFRICA COULD INDEED SURVIVE THIS PROCESS - WHETHER OR NOT SUPPLEMENTED BY SANCTIONS - ALBEIT WITH A REDUCED STANDARD OF LIVING. THE FLS, MEANWHILE, SHOWED NO SIGNS OF REALISM ABOUT THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON THEIR ECONOMIES. IF THE PRESENT PRESSURE HAD THE RESULTS THEY WERE SEEKING, THEIR COUNTRIES COULD VERGE ON THE UNGOVERNABLE. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD THEREFORE BE TRYING TO PERSUADE THE ADVOCATES OF SANCTIONS TO CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES, BUT THE OUTLOOK WAS DEPRESSING. TO THE AMERICANS, IT LOOKED AS THOUGH IT WAS ALREADY TEN MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRIVATE DOUBTS ABOUT SANCTIONS EXPRESSED BY BOTSWANA, LESOTHO AND MOZAMBIQUE, THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO ARGUE THE CASE IN PUBLIC. IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO GIVE MORE THOUGHT TO HELPING TO SUSTAIN THE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE FLS BY PROVIDING ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORT LINKS. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE BEIRA CORRIDOR PROJECT HELD SOME ATTRACTIONS FOR THE US: THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE WILLING TO GIVE SUPPORT TO IT.

7. SHULTZ VOLUNTEERED THAT PRESSURE FROM THE HILL FOR ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA WAS UNDIMINISHED. BUT HE HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO NEW SENATE INITIATIVES BEFORE HIS 23 JULY TESTIMONY TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. THERE WAS THEN AT LEAST A CHANCE THAT THE SENATE WOULD TAKE NO MAJOR LEGISLATIVE STEPS UNTIL THEY RETURNED FROM RECESS IN SEPTEMBER. BUT THEY WOULD THEN WISH TO VOTE ON SOMETHING (AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE TO RENEW OR AMEND HIS OWN 1985 EXECUTIVE ORDER BY 8 SEPTEMBER). IT WAS STILL NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE A SPEECH ON SOUTH AFRICA EARLY NEXT WEEK: HE WANTED TO BE HELPFUL, BUT WOULD ONLY SPEAK OUT IF HE THOUGHT IT COULD IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. (SHULTZ WONDERED OUT LOUD WHETHER STATE COULD FIND A WAY OF TESTING OUT ON US ANY LANGUAGE IN HIS OR THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS WHICH MIGHT SEEM TO US PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE: AND WE HAVE SINCE AGREED WITH CROCKER THAT IF TIME PERMITS HE WILL TRY OUT ON US ANY LANGUAGE ABOUT WHICH HE IS DOUBTFUL).

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SHULTZ AGREED THAT WE WERE ALL HOSTAGE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. SHULTZ SAID THAT IF P W BOTHA REPEATED HIS AUGUST 1985 PERFORMANCE NEXT MONTH, DISENGAGEMENT LEGISLATION WAS LIKELY TO SAIL THROUGH (CROCKER SAID THAT STATE'S CALCULATIONS WERE THAT LEGISLATION WOULD HAVE TO BE

PASSED IN THE SENATE BY 23 SEPTEMBER IF THE PRESIDENT WAS TO BE FORCED TO CONSIDER A VETO). SIMILARLY, THE OUTCOME OF THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING WAS BOUND TO HAVE A CONSIDERABLE CONGRESSIONAL IMPACT - PARTICULARLY WITH SO MANY SENATORS THINKING ABOUT THE BLACK VOTE IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE FURTHER ANY NEW US MEASURES COULD BE PUSHED TOWARDS LATE SEPTEMBER, AND THE MORE THEIR SCOPE COULD BE CONTAINED, THE BETTER FOR US. A BAN ON LANDING RIGHTS, WHICH WOULD BE COST-FREE TO THE AMERICANS, WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR US AND SOME OTHER COUNTRIES, AND HE HOPED THE US COULD AVOID IT. SHULTZ TOOK NOTE, BUT SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION ALSO NEEDED TO BE ABLE TO POINT TO MOVEMENT OF SOME KIND. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD STATED IN PARLIAMENT THAT IF HIS MISSION FAILED TO PRODUCE TANGIBLE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS, FURTHER MEASURES WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE NECESSARY. THAT SAID, HE HAD NOT SPELT OUT WHEN HE WOULD BE REGARDING HIS CURRENT MISSION AS OVER. IF THERE WAS A REAL PROSPECT OF CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA, THE EC MEASURES MIGHT BE HELD IN CHECK. BUT IT SEEMED UNLIKELY THAT THE COMMONWEALTH COULD BE RESTRAINED. THE BEST FORSEEABLE OUTCOME TO THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING SEEMED TO BE ONE IN WHICH WE WOULD WITHOLD A DECISION ACTUALLY TO IMPLEMENT ANY FURTHER MEASURES UNTIL THE END OF THE EC THREE MONTH PERIOD.

9. SHULTZ SUMMARISED BY SAYING THAT WE SEEMED TO BE AGREEING THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS WERE BLEAK, BUT THAT WE STILL HAD TO DO ALL WE COULD TO MAXIMISE THE CHANCE OF A DIALOGUE: THIS WAS NOT AN EASY MESSAGE TO SELL, OTHER THAN BY SPELLING OUT HOW BIG THE REWARDS WOULD BE (AND HOW FEW REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES WERE ON OFFER). BUT HE WAS WORRIED LEST, IN SIX OR EIGHT MONTHS TIME, WE COULD BE CONFRONTED BY A SITUATION IN WHICH FURTHER MEASURES WERE IN PLACE AND VIOLENCE WAS STILL RISING. A PARALLEL WITH LEBANON WAS NOT INCONCEIVABLE, WITH FIGHTING FUELLED BY THE RUSSIANS: THEN WHAT WOULD THE WEST DO? HISTORICALLY, AMERICANS MOST PREOCCUPIED WITH EAST/WEST ISSUES HAD ALWAYS TAKEN THE SIDE OF THE SAG - BUT DOUBTS WERE INCREASING. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE LONGER THE SAG TOOK TO CHANGE, THE MORE HOSTILE AND MARXIST BOTH A FUTURE SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS RISKED BECOMING. THIS WAS A POINT TO PUT TO P W BOTHA - BUT IT WOULD REQUIRE ENORMOUS COURAGE FOR HIM TO ACT UPON IT.

10. SHULTZ SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH PRESSURE WAS A CRUCIAL PART OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS, TIMING WAS CRITICAL IF THERE WAS TO BE ANY PROSPECT OF THE WEST PLAYING A SUCCESSFUL MEDIATION ROLE - YET WE WERE CONFRONTED BY IMMEDIATE POLITICAL PRESSURES. HE WONDERED WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN LAYING DOWN A BROADER POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOUTH AFRICA (ALONG THE LINES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE) WHICH COULD SERVE AS A REFERENCE POINT FOR LONGER TERM EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE CHANGE. ALTHOUGH THE WEST COULD NOT OFFER A PRESCRIPTION FOR A POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA, THERE WERE SURELY CONSTRUCTIVE POINTS WE COULD MAKE WHICH MIGHT HINT AT A POSSIBLE WAY AHEAD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPLIED THAT, GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTY ON

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THE GROUND AND THE RISK THAT ANY OUTSIDE ATTEMPT TO ARRIVE AT A FORMULA FOR SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE MISCONCEIVED BY BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS, THE EC HAD COME DOWN IN FAVOUR OF MORE TANGIBLE OBJECTIVES THE RELEASE OF MANDELA AND THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC.

11. SENATOR LUGAR, WHOM THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAW IMMEDIATELY AFTER SHULTZ, THOUGHT IT DIFFICULT TO PREDICT THE LIKELY OUTCOME IN CONGRESS. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE LEADERSHIP SHOWN BY THE PRESIDENT. IF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED MESSAGE AND SHULTZ'S TESTIMONY TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE NEXT WEEK WERE NOT PERCEIVED AS INDICATING A SUFFICIENT DEGREE OF CHANGE, VARIOUS LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS WOULD COME FORWARD IN THE SENATE. NOTHING FINAL WAS LIKELY TO EMERGE BEFORE THE MID-AUGUST BREAK. BUT BY SEPTEMBER THE SENATE LEADERSHIP WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A DECISION. LUGAR THOUGHT THAT US PUBLIC OPINION WAS 3:1 IN FAVOUR OF MORE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. HOUSE MEMBERS WERE ALREADY GAINING POLITICAL CREDIT FOR THEIR VOTE ON THE HOUSE BILL. WITH THE ELECTIONS COMING UP, IT WAS LIKELY THAT THE SENATE WOULD HAVE TO ACT TOO. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF US ACTION NOT GETTING OUT OF LINE WITH WHAT THE EUROPEANS WERE DOING. ASKED BY LUGAR WHAT SORT OF US ACTION WOULD BE LEAST UNWELCOME IN EUROPE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE MADE CLEAR THAT THE UK WERE VERY ANXIOUS TO AVOID A BAN ON LANDING RIGHTS. IF THERE HAD TO BE FURTHER MEASURES, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO GO FOR MEASURES SUCH AS THOSE ALREADY CURTAILMENT PLUGGED BY THE EC, FOR EXAMPLE OF IMPORTS (EG COAL, IRON AND STEEL) RATHER THAN BANS ON EXPORTS. LUGAR MADE THE POINT THAT A NUMBER OF SMALLER US BUSINESSES WERE ALREADY PULLING OUT OF SOUTH AFRICA BECAUSE THEY WERE LOSING MONEY. THE POSITION OF THE MAJOR US CORPORATIONS (IBM, XEROX AND GENERAL MOTORS) WAS CRITICAL. IF THEY TOO WERE TO PULL OUT, THIS COULD RENDER ANY CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IRRELEVANT.

WRIGHT

SOUTH AFRICA
LIMITED

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UND
ECD(E)
NEWS D
LEGAL ADVISERS
PLANNING STAFF
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CCPC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 July 1986

CDB 17/7.

Dear Mike,

South Africa: EC Code of Conduct: White Paper

Thank you for your letter of 15 July suggesting publication on 23 July of the White Paper on the Code.

The FCO have already cleared the draft and we have no objection to publication now. Indeed, as companies are already preparing reports for 1985/86 under the new Code there seems every advantage in publishing the White Paper as soon as possible.

We agree that the Explanatory Guidance should include an additional paragraph reminding companies to list cash wages and benefits in kind separately. We agree that without such a reference there would be some small risk of criticism that the Code had been weakened.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours and to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours Sincerely,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

M Gilbertson Esq
PS/Secretary of State for Trade & Industry
D/Trade & Industry

S. AFRICA
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

Spoken to Sir Michael Scott. N.fa. CDP 21/7.

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

Sir Peter Michael Scott, Chairman of the Royal Commonwealth Society, telephoned yesterday to say that the Society would be very happy to offer you a platform on South Africa between now and the Commonwealth Review meeting in early August. You will recall that Mr Kinnock addressed them yesterday.

I told Sir Peter that you had set out your views on South Africa on several occasions in the House and in interviews in recent weeks; that I doubted whether you would want to deliver a public speech while the Foreign Secretary was in South Africa; and that anyway your diary between now and early August was already full. I thought it was very unlikely that you would want to accept, but would tell you of the invitation.

No time

C.D.P.

Charles Powell

17 July 1986

CCPC (2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 July 1986

Prime Minister
Some more material on Commonwealth middleth.
FICE GPP TH CDP

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 4 July. I enclose notes on detention without trial; one covering Commonwealth Africa and the other India and Sri Lanka.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

COMMONWEALTH AFRICA: DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL

1. Introduction

Currently the situation is much improved over 1985. The worst cases then, Uganda and Nigeria, have had changes of government and both now have governments which have markedly better policies and performance in human rights. In most other Commonwealth African countries there has been a movement towards imprisonment after trial and in these the number of past detentions has been limited and selective, not extensive. However, even trials in some countries are suspect and severe sentences have sometimes been imposed for obviously political reasons. The following examples illustrate the improvement. South African subversive and terrorist activities in the Front Line States appear to have contributed to internal tensions.

2. West Africa

a. Nigeria. Over 500 politicians detained in early 1984 after December 1983 military coup. 250 relesed in October 1984, 144 more in December 1984, 85 in August 1985 before the 27 August military coup, another 87 after. Remainder, including the former President Shagari and his Vice-President, released July 1986, but they and some others remain restricted to their home areas. Over 1000 others (ie non-political) detainees also released since August 1985.

b. Ghana. A small number of political dissidents are detained under the Preventative Detention Act 1982.

c. Sierra Leone. About 200 detained at the end of 1983, reduced to 30 by the end of 1984.

d. Gambia. Nil.

3. East Africa

a. Uganda. About 2000 in detention without trial in 1984 of whom over 250 were political detainees detained under the Public Order and Security Act. Most of these were released in July 1985 after the overthrow of the Obote government. The new Museveni government which came to power in January 1986, has declared that all cases will be brought to trial.

/b. Kenya

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b. Kenya. Since 1966 up to 50 detainees have been held at any one time, including leading politicians under the Preservation of Public Security Act. Ater the death of President Kenyatta in 1978, these numbers were reduced but increased again after an attempted coup in August 1982. In January 1984 about 35 were in detention but only 3 by the end of 1984. From 1982 upwards a number of prisoners were convicted for posession of seditious documents and in 1986 there have been numerous arrests and convictions on this count. Currently the policy is to convict political offenders rather than to detain them without trial but at least two have been detained since 1982.

c. Tanzania. There was strong Parliamentary pressure for the repeal of the Preventive Detention Act preceding the introduction of a new constitution in 1985. 24 people were detained in Zanzibar for a short time early in 1984. 14 people were detained in 1983 following the uncovering of a coup plot and released in April 1986. 19 others were brought to trial for the same plot of whom 9 were convicted and 10 acquitted. There are no known political detainees at present but a small number of politicans are in exile.

4. Central Africa

a. Malawi. Detentions without trial were common until the mid-1970s when there was a marked improvement following a purge of police and Party. Few have been detained since but they include the leading opponents of the regime, Mr and Mrs Chirwa whose sentences of death were commuted in 1984 to life imprisonment. In 1983 they had been convicted by a traditional court in which they had no legal representation. 13 other detainees were freed in May 1984, including 4 who had attempted to form a political party. At least 4 others remained in detention at the end of 1984, when punitive detention of hard-core criminals who had completed their sentences was also reported.

b. Zambia. At least 8 detentions took place in 1981 under the Preservation of Public Security Regulations after the discovery of an alleged plot against the government. 6 detainees were freed in 1984 but 2 remained in detention.

/c. Zimbabwe

c. Zimbabwe. Detentions reached a peak of about 400 in 1985, mostly members of the opposition parties. They were either held under Section 17 of the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations or held illegally, mostly at a Bulawayo detention camp, Stops Camp. Many of these detentions were for short terms of 30-40 days but the subjects were often maltreated. But following representations by Amnesty International fresh illegal detentions ceased and since December 1985 the number in detention has declined from 400 to about 150: on 9 July the Zimbabwe Government announced the release off a further 8 detainess - some of whom had been held since 1984 for suspected security offences. This improvement may reflect recognition by the Zimbabwe Government of its need to curb abuses of human rights if it is to be a credible critic of South African abuses.

5. Southern Africa

a. Lesotho. The Internal Security (General) Act permits detention for up to 42 days. Following the military take-over on 20 January, some members of the previous government have been confined to their homes, but in practice few restrictions have been placed on them. Several members of the Lesotho Parliamentary Force (now the Royal Lesotho Defence Force) have been detained since 17 January following a meeting. Three have died in detention. The new Lesotho authorities have promised a full enquiry and to make the findings public. 26 of the mutineers remain in detention and are appearing before a court martial.

INDIA AND SRI LANKA: DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL

1. India

a. A Government of India figure of 110,806 arrested during 1975-77 under Emergency regulations appears in "India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation", by Robert Hardgrave, an American academic. Of the 110,806, 34,988 were detained under the Emergency Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) and 75,818 under the Defence of India Rules. These figures are believed to be accurate. In April 1977 the GOI announced that 34,630 had been detained without trial under MISA during the Emergency. The Guardian of 25 November 1977, however, quoted a figure of 100,000 detained under MISA at the height of the Emergency.

b. Detention without trial is still permitted under the 1980 National Security Act when there is judged to be a threat to national security. Such detentions are subject to periodic judicial review: we do not know how many people are detained under this Act.

c. The Defence of India Rules for Preventive Detention can be invoked under the Defence of India Act of 1962. This Act was used during the Bangladesh war and during the 1975-77 state of emergency. Also a Terrorism and Disruption Activities Prevention Act appears to have been approved in 1985 for application in specific areas.

2. Sri Lanka

The 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act permits detainees to be held for 18 months without trial. Most of those detained appear to be suspected of sympathy/or support for Tamil extremist groups. Amnesty International claimed (April 1986) that "hundreds of people had been arrested", particularly Tamils, in the North and East, and many had been held incommunicado for many months. We have no independent confirmation of these figures.

Amnesty also quoted reports of many arrests in other parts of the island in recent months, of Sinhalese as well as of Tamils. These were said to give details of more than 2,000 people who had been killed and more than 500 who had disappeared during 1985-86.

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CENTRE FOR POLICY STUDIES

8 Wilfred Street, London SW1E 6 PL. Tel: 01-828 1176

16 July 1986

Prime Minister

THE COMMONWEALTH AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

It has been obvious for some time that the future shape of the Commonwealth has needed thought. I said this in the speech on the Address in 1984 and the Centre said more or less the same in their report, A Case for Coherence.

Surely it should be possible to divert the meeting of Heads of Government from their rhetorical obsessions with some calm consideration on how the Commonwealth might be used to further, e.g. democracy in Africa, the growth of domestic free markets and free trade, as well as dealing with the problems of agriculture and food supply in Africa. Will it not be possible to create a new ground of argument on some of these themes?

As for sanctions, there is a useful book by two Americans who * have analized some eighty uses of economic sanctions since the First World War with great care. You may already have this.

I drew the attention of Stephen Sherborne's office to the article in the London Review of Books by the left-wing philosopher, Richard Wollheim, in which he said that, during a journey in South Africa recently, with visits to most universities, he did not meet anybody who was in favour of economic sanctions.

I do not know whether you saw the speech by Lord Gladwyn in the House of Lord's debate on South Africa? I rarely agree with my father-in-law on any subject, but on this occasion he made a most sensible statement. It is well worth reading since he served on one of the committees dealing with economic sanctions against Italy over Ethiopia in 1935. There is also, what seems to me, an interesting allusion to the possibilities of transferring responsibility for action to the United Nations. This might be dangerous, but, if we were machiavellian, it might well be profitable to consider this, since once a subject of this nature is raised at the United Nations, it is no doubt easier to use it in the labyrinthian corridors in which it would be inconceivable to imagine a United States vote for e.g. a blockade in which they would have to share responsibility with the Soviet Union.

* Economic Sanctions Re-considered by Garry Hufbauer (Institute for International Economics)- Distributed by the MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1985.

Hugh Thomas

CC SO

Prime Minister (2)
I have underlined the main points.
I don't think you can 'divert' the August meeting. The only agenda item is the EPG report.
The new B book on sanctions is Renwick which you have recently.
CP 10/7.
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D

BOARD OF DIRECTORS Lord Thomas (Chairman) Ronald Halstead (Hon Treasurer) Lord Beloff Peter Bowring Professor Alan Dashwood Jonathan Gestetner Professor R V Jones Sir Hector Laing Shirley Letwin Professor Kenneth Minogue Ferdinand Mount Derek Palmar Cyril Taylor Simon Webley Nathalie Brooke (Secretary) FOUNDERS Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph
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[LORD CHALFONT.]

training to assassins, and shelter to hijackers of aircraft and murderers of children.

I am aware that Her Majesty's Government are already giving great attention to this problem together with the governments of other democratic countries. I do not suggest for one moment that nothing is being done. But I suggest that we, the citizens of this country, need to experience a greater sense of urgency. I should like to see the setting up of a really high level inter-departmental task force to consider this problem and to co-ordinate anti-terrorist activities. As part of this we need to abandon our apparently defensive and reactive approach to terrorism. We must not wait passively for the next murderous incident and then simply pursue—not often successfully—the people who have perpetuated it. We must embark on a policy of preventive and pre-emptive action; and this applies to the IRA as much as to any other organisation in the league of terror.

Whenever our intelligence organisations detect preparations for a terrorist attack we should move swiftly and ruthlessly to neutralise the terrorists before they can strike. If, at times, this involves problems of national boundaries or national sovereignty, that may be something we shall have to accept. Those who harbour and give aid and comfort to murderers cannot expect to hide behind the niceties of civilised international behaviour.

I expect that to some people all this may seem draconian and hawkish, but the only alternative is to wait—and we may not have to wait too long—until there is some quite appalling act of terrorist violence in this country or in the country of one of our allies; an assault on our lives and on our senses beside which the bombs at Harrods, Hyde Park and Brighton will pale into insignificance. It will be a little late then to look for the terrorist; indeed, he may have already died with his victims.

This is a war that we can win but which, I fear, we look more and more like losing. In my view, there must be no sanctuary, no freedom of movement and no mercy for the terrorists. If anyone should protest that we are adopting the standards of the terrorist in order to defeat him, I suggest that there is a limit at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue. I remind your Lordships that the pages of history are littered with the chronicles of civilisations which died because they were too civilised to defend themselves.

5.26 p.m.

Lord Thomas of Swynnerton: My Lords, like other speakers I, too, congratulate our two maiden speakers today. In particular, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Moran, on his important description of the difficulties of being a British official during a time of relative national decline. Those of us who had previously admired his life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman were not surprised by his literary qualities, but we could be excused if we were surprised by his eloquence. We look forward to hearing him again.

Trade, tourism and terrorism, to which the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, has just devoted such an effective, timely and important speech; environmental problems; the relation of our ethnic minorities with their own relations in poorer countries; Europe; the fact that we still, though not a super-power, have major global responsibilities; the fact that we are, as it were, the geographical hinge of freedom lying between Europe and the United States—all these things make an agile and determined foreign policy an essential part of Government activities.

My noble friend Lord Young of Graffham, in a maiden speech a week or two ago, alluded to the increasingly hostile world in which British traders have to operate. We know that in order to change that increasingly hostile world in a way that we should wish, to our benefit and to theirs, towards encouragement of free trade, towards respect for contracts and the establishment of good bases for investment, our own economy would have to recover more than it has as yet done. Nevertheless, even now we know that we are expected, and we ourselves expect our Government, to support the idea of good government in other countries: that good government which alone in the long run, as we all know, can prevent such tragedies which are now being seen in Ethiopia from occurring, to which reference has naturally been made.

All these aspects of our political life make it surprising that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is not required, and in fact does not wish, to prepare annually a statement on foreign policy rather on the lines of the annual White Paper on defence. Such a paper would relate the smaller questions, and the bigger ones, to the larger purposes—Henry Kissinger's phrase—against which all foreign policy is played out.

It might even be that if such a White Paper were annually prepared the Foreign and Commonwealth Office might sustain the case that it should have a larger annual budget than the £600 million which it now receives; and it might even sustain an argument that there should be more than one Minister in the Cabinet to discuss foreign and international affairs—as, after all, noble Lords will remember used always to be the case when there was a Secretary of State for India, for the Commonwealth and for the Colonies a relatively short time ago. Furthermore, we all know that to have to put things together in some conceptual form always helps us to keep our priorities in the right order; and, who knows, this might assist the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to have an even wider, and even wiser, range of foreign policy decisions.

Let me explain what I mean. It is obvious that during the next Session noble Lords from all sides of the House will put a bewilderingly large number of questions to my noble friend and her colleagues on subjects as various as, for example, the reason why Government seem to have greater partiality than previously expected for multilateral rather than bilateral aid, whereas all the evidence is that multilateral aid is more difficult to monitor. Other noble Lords will wish to question the reasons for the major diplomatic defeat which we (that is to say the West) have met in UNESCO in allowing it to remain the state in which it now is, whether or not we should within the organisation at all.

Other noble Lords will wish to press my noble friend even further on questions of the relation between European Community and defence than she

gratifyingly went in her speech today. Still other noble Lords will perhaps suggest that the character of the war in Afghanistan merits a greater international or United Nations investigation than it has received. Some noble Lords may remember that after the war—at the time of the Greek civil war, for example—there was a United Nations commission on the Balkans which drew attention to the atrocities perpetrated by the Communists, including the kidnapping of children, and which was of importance in bringing that war to the successful end that actually occurred.

Still other noble Lords will press the Minister on such questions as whether the conventional wisdom which used to apply in the Middle East—that if the Arab-Israeli quarrels could only be resolved the major source of Middle East troubles would be out of the way—should be re-examined. All these important questions will no doubt be put, and they will be courteously and expertly answered. But I suggest that it would be easier for the Government to give answers to all these and other questions if they did that against a coherently worked-out—conceptualised—foreign policy, which they would put forward annually in this and in another place.

This paper could also discuss and go further into the questions of what the Government hope to achieve in the future—not what has happened in the recent past, but what they would like to see occur in the immediate, and perhaps in the long-term, future. For example, we are members of a large number of international organisations. How do the Government see some of those evolving in future? What, for example, is our policy towards the Commonwealth? We are members of this, and the gracious Speech alludes to the importance of that membership. Do we wish to expand membership of the Commonwealth so that it will one day embrace all ex-colonies or ex-dependencies of the British Empire? Do we want perhaps to use it in order to promote our other foreign policies—our disposition in favour of free trade, and our expectation that representative government is the best bet for most societies? Surely we should strive to give this important association a specific purpose. Furthermore, we could debate whether the Commonwealth might not itself consider expelling members which became Marxist, as Grenada did last year and in the months before. That certainly might save a recurrence of that particular type of crisis, which caused such heart-searching 12 months ago.

Then there is the question of Europe. The noble Baroness referred to the future development of the European Community, as indeed does the gracious Speech. But what exactly in the gracious Speech does "development" really mean, and what does it really lead to? Let us assume, for example, that we have done all the short-term things which the Government would like to do; that we have in fact achieved the united Common Market, including a common market in services. Let us suppose that we have brought in successfully Spain and Portugal. Let us suppose that, indeed, we have done as the noble Lord, Lord Chelwyn, suggested should be done in that context, and let us suppose that we have resolved the question of Gibraltar. What then would happen? What will our aims be within the European Community? This is a long-term and important question, and one to which we should address ourselves. What we want to be certain about is whether we can continue to partake of the benefits of an increasingly politically self-conscious Common Market and customs union without at the same time creating within the European Community an even larger national state at the Brussels level, of which we have had such bad experiences in our own national lives in the twentieth century.

Then there is the question of the Soviet Union, to which a lot of attention has been paid during the course of this debate, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, who seemed to me in some of his remarks to be suggesting that the Soviet Union was more like a misunderstood whale than an adversary—a large enterprise, certainly, but with very inadequate jaws for dealing with the rest of its neighbours. This would suggest that he has abandoned the view that the Soviet Union is interested in imperialism as well as in ideology. We should like to see in such a Government White Paper as I am suggesting some consideration of how the Government see the interrelation between ideology and imperialism in the Soviet Union.

We should like to know whether, in welcoming Mr. Gorbachev next week and Mr. Gromyko next year, the Government feel that they, and indeed any other foreseeable Soviet leader, can be expected to think of the West in a different way from that which they have in the past. Hitherto we have all assumed that the Soviet Union looked on other states which were not a part of the Soviet world as, in the first instance, capitalist states anxious to attack them, and, in the second instance, states which are in a transitional stage, on their way to becoming Soviet states of their own; and with those states (that is to say, with us) the Soviet Union would not naturally be able to make any firm agreements, since, after all, agreements in the Soviet ideology are mere halts on the route—short-term arrangements, to be altered when the correlation of forces, as they put it, becomes favourable to Moscow. The noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, has given a different picture of the Soviet Union. That is the picture which we are more accustomed to think is valid.

These are some of the questions to which I feel the Government might well devote attention in a White Paper on foreign policy. There are other, even more important, even more difficult and even more interesting questions, and it is upon some of these that I suggest and hope that the noble Baroness might persuade her colleagues in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to brood in future.

5.41 p.m.

Viscount Falkland: My Lords, I too should like to pay tribute to the two maiden speakers tonight: the noble Lord, Eden of Winton, and the noble Lord, Lord Moran. Being myself a recent maiden speaker, and without the quite clear experience that these two speakers have, I am full of admiration for the forceful and elegant way in which they delivered their speeches. I look forward, as I am sure do all of your Lordships, to hearing the noble Lords again.

I was puzzled first by the very brief reference in the gracious Speech to the amount of aid which was going to be maintained. I considered it slightly ambiguous. I did not quite understand what maintaining substantial aid really meant. I can only put the very best

8

The Commonwealth

The extent to which the Commonwealth should figure in any current discussion of Britain's external relations is a matter on which disagreement is possible. The defenders of the Commonwealth still point to it as a vehicle for the exercise of Britain's influence over the globe—a shadowy substitute for a vanished Empire—and advocate for that reason measures for strengthening ties between Britain and other Commonwealth members in trade, higher education, and so forth. The difficulty is that Britain's ability to do this is impaired by the obligations of the European Community. Thus, for instance, students from countries of the Community pay the same fees as British students while students from Commonwealth countries are treated as foreigners. Other defenders of the Commonwealth system see the use of it to lie in the fact that its membership bridges the alleged gap between the developed and the developing world, so providing a forum where leaders and officials from member countries of the two groups can talk to their mutual advantage.

From the point of view of the poorer countries which form the majority of Commonwealth countries, the picture is quite other. The cross-links between Commonwealth countries other than Britain are neither numerous nor important, apart from Canada's contributions in development, but the Commonwealth does provide a forum from which pressure can be brought to bear upon Britain in such matters as overseas aid and immigration and on political topics such as apartheid in South Africa. The 'Gleneagles Agreement', so damaging to British cricket, was the fruit of such pressure.

In considering the future one can rule out two suggestions canvassed in the past but no longer viable. One is the expansion of the system to include countries never under the British flag: for which no demand exists (the re-admission of Pakistan at some future date is not excluded should circumstances change). The other idea, that of a two-ring Commonwealth with an inner core of like-minded mainly white democracies, and an outer ring of the rest, would also no longer find serious adherents. The strength of the non-aligned movement makes political co-operation or defence co-operation on a Commonwealth basis inconceivable.

There is, however, one problem that may have to be resolved and that is the ambiguous position of the monarch. The British monarch is

head of state in only a limited number of Commonwealth countries —Australia, Canada, New Zealand and some smaller territories—but is also 'Head of the Commonwealth'. The monarch is bound on all things political by the advice of the cabinet in the country in which she is present—normally Britain; but it could be, for instance, Canada or Australia (though the prospect of Australia becoming a republic is a real one). When in a foreign country the British sovereign is treated as monarch of the United Kingdom so no constitutional problem arises. When in a Commonwealth country which is not a republic, presumably the same rule applies. But if, as in her 1984 Christmas broadcast, the Queen speaks as Head of the Commonwealth, she may say things which have policy implications. The importance of the issue lies perhaps in the view that keeping the Commonwealth together is regarded as an important function of the royal family and some support for the very institution of monarchy. The issues of Zimbabwe and Grenada both brought up these matters: both appear to have been affected by the consideration that the monarch had interests.

To dissolve the Commonwealth, which would presumably need general agreement, or unilaterally to withdraw appear to be exercises too radical for a government to undertake. On the other hand, to make more of the Commonwealth than at present is unrealistic in the light of our other commitments. It may be recalled that the Holy Roman Empire went on for a very long time with little discernible content; its princes seldom met except, as a rule, for war, hunting or marriage.

Diary

Every morning as I woke up I reached for my radio. A cheerful Home Counties voice announced: 'Sunny skies in Buenos Aires, Toronto, Calgary and Tokyo: overcast in Dublin, Rome and Ankara: rain in London, Athens, Nairobi and Frankfurt.' As South Africa gets the weather, so it gets its news: in gobbets of fact, fragmented beyond all hope of comprehension.

There are items that the news loves. They are, top, world disapproval of South Africa, then corruption in black countries, sporting events of all kinds in all countries, speeches on terrorism by foreign politicians; internally, the collapse of a strike whose beginning was never reported, the opening of a trial of which nothing more will be heard. When news turns to comment, anonymously delivered, cheerfulness gives way to the rasping tones of common sense. 'South Africa, whose feet have now been set irrevocably on the path of reform, will not be deflected by extremists either of the right or of the left.' The word 'certain' carries most opprobrium: 'certain groups', 'certain interests', 'certain persons for reasons best known to themselves', 'certain ideologues of a Marxist or Westminster persuasion'. A correspondent from London regrets the decay of the relative clause in the speech and writing of the young. Songs punctuate the news to unpremeditated effect: Frank Sinatra, Petula Clark, Victoria de los Angeles, and, one morning, Yves Montand singing the favourite song of the Italian Communist partisans. It is difficult to exclude the external world if you cannot recognise it.

I was in a position to think these thoughts because back in the late Seventies two South African lecturers had come to visit me. They had been friends of the legendary Rick Turner, a brilliant young philosopher who, having gone to Paris to study Sartre and Marx, had returned to teach, had eventually been banned by the authorities, and, answering the front-door bell one morning, had been shot dead. That had been a year or so earlier. They talked to me of the isolation of the Left and the reinforcement of the Right by touring lecturers from Baptist colleges in the Southern States of America. If I ever had the chance, would I please go? When I went last month I was not prepared for what I found: for the splendours or for the miseries.

Superficially the University of Cape Town is like a Californian campus. It has a magnificent site, which it has done quite a bit to spoil. The faculty have been to foreign universities. The students are intelligent and eager and believe in showing it. The ideas that circulate come from France and America. Posters advertise protest marches and shared rides home and lectures and water-skiing equipment; they denounce the Police and nuclear energy and conscription. There is more theology than there would be in England. Out of ten thousand students, two to three thousand (I was told) are radical, five hundred, of whom next to nothing is heard, support the Government, and the rest are in the centre and occupied with life's ordinary ambitions. Fifteen per cent are non-white. But if all this approximates to California, there are two big differences. For the first difference you would have to imagine the airport functioning, say, one day a month. People do come and go, but with a meagreness which is out of keeping with the modern world. Students carry around not books but xeroxes of chapters of books that by now no one can afford to buy. And the second difference is that the more amusing-looking students, the elegant kids, who don't give the impression of having just come off the sports field, who wear a touch of ethnic clothing or T-shirts demanding the release of Mandela and gold and silver chains and bracelets, whose hair is slightly longer if they are girls or slightly shorter if they are boys – these students lay, perhaps not their lives, but certainly their safety on the line.

I had the chance of seeing the Police in action on the campus. It was nothing, people tell me, compared with last autumn or ten years ago. It was nothing compared with what I had seen at Minneapolis in 1972. It was the reaction-time that was special. Three or four hundred students had gathered on Jameson Steps to denounce the cross-border raids. After discussing and voting on every issue of tactics, they followed their elected leader, one of the students who had been to see the external ANC, across the edge of a rugger field, down to the verge of the freeway. There they shouted slogans and held up their placards to passing motorists. A police officer in shirtsleeves, with that walk parodied in *Woza Albert* in which the body bends from the ribcage, strolled over to the central divider and spoke inaudibly through a megaphone. 'Here it comes,' the shout went up barely a minute later and an armoured vehicle raced along the freeway spraying the students and the grass with blue liquid. Tear-gas was fired into the crowd, and police, appearing from behind, where they had been hidden, chased the demonstrators into a narrow area lined with long glass windows. Re-forming, the students vowed to return. But already, drawn up behind an ornamental balustrade, silhouetted against the sky, were the Coloured police, in loose blue fatigues like prisoners, with the monstrous black sjamboks dangling from their hands. Below them a rugby practice continued through the light drifts of tear-gas.

Four students were arrested. Meanwhile, less than ten miles away, a thousand shacks had been destroyed and twenty, twenty-five thousand blacks had been made homeless. I could understand how the children of the middle classes, returning from Crossroads where they did much of the relief work, could resolve to have themselves and their university pilloried and blackguarded and boycotted by the world to the point where their impoverishment, their inner isolation, their humiliation, seemed to approach that which they felt they had connived in imposing on people whom they were not allowed to think of as their fellow-citizens. As far as I could see, in a country which desperately needed ideas not just to effect change but, if it ever came, to consolidate change, this was not the right answer. But it was a response. It showed something that was lacking in the English lecturer who told me that what most worried him about Crossroads was the anarchy.

Everyone by now – everyone, that is, outside South Africa – knows what happened at Crossroads. They know how the authorities, to ingratiate themselves with a compliant and corrupt leader, to get rid of a large and potentially troublesome community, and, as a bonus, to propagate the facile idea that blacks readily show violence to blacks, turned the vigilantes of old Crossroads upon the miserable triangle of shacks and hovels that lay on its periphery.

I went to Crossroads twice. Once was on my way to the elegant campus of Stellenbosch with a friend who had offered to drive me. Talking to me with pride of his radical children, he revealed the anxieties he experienced as a parent. Would the telephone ring and tell him that his daughter had been picked up by the police? Would his son go to jail for six years for refusing conscription? By now we had left the freeway and we were driving along Landsdowne Road first past ramshackle suburbs, and then, with the Portland Cement Factory to our right, we could see to the left, on rising ground, what looked like the embers of an Australian bush fire. Charred wood, broken bits of corrugated iron, grass long trodden to dust, and pools of water the colour of milk chocolate. At regular intervals young fair-haired soldiers peered out of their troop-carriers to see if somewhere in this scene of desolation there was still the threatening presence of life. By the time of my second visit, which was with a social worker three days later, much of the site had been bulldozed and it was now surrounded with barbed-wire and arc lights. Rain had fallen. At one place the coils had been lifted to allow lorries with protective mesh over the windscreen to enter and clear the junk. Boys, old men, young mothers with four, five, six children in tow, slipped in after them and scrambled up what they could lay hands on and carried it out under the expressionless eyes of the police. What I saw as detritus were the building blocks of the only home they could ever anticipate.

Looking across from where we stood, occasionally jumping back as the police or army drove past swerving through the puddles to splash us with water, I could see the line of trees and bushes that separated Old Crossroads, now in dead ground, from the satellite encampments that had once, a week before, stretched from there up to the road we were now on, and one thing that was clear was that, if the authorities had been concerned to save life and property, if they had merely thought it their duty to maintain law and order, they would have stationed the police, with all the resources that a war economy has placed at their disposal, along that hedge. *If* – and this is a big if – *if* the Police are still under control.

In South Africa there is much convenient talk about the threat from the right. Foreign media collude in giving the ultra-conservative parties coverage. But, if there really is a threat from the right, it cannot come from these parties, which, in a country where at least five out of six people desire massive change, have been gerrymandered into existence so that a government which has abandoned principle but clings desperately to power can call itself 'moderate'. The threat, if it exists, comes from the security forces, which can be as readily dismantled as a nuclear power station.

Another thing that was made clear, looking out from Mahobe Drive, was that to the black leaders, standing where they stood, amongst the rubble of their houses, looking back at us up the barrels of the guns trained on them, the appeal for moderation, the call to renounce violence, the invitation to engage in meaningful political compromise, if it ever reached them, was likely to seem in a foreign language. Who asked the Maquis to compromise, or called the July Plot an internecine conflict?

I drove one long afternoon through the heady sensuous beauty of the countryside. I started at Knysna on the Indian Ocean, drove up through forests filled with giant trees, out along the top of a mountain range, through a deep stony gorge, and then across the scrubby desert, past flocks of sheep and large clumps of cactus and red-hot pokers, with the mountains away to the left and right going blue, green, purple, violet-grey as the sun sank, and at nightfall I arrived at the small whitewashed town of Graaf-Reinet, built in a kind of rustic rococo, pressed against the hillside. In half a day's drive I had passed five cars, and at regular intervals a neat bungalow, which was the farmhouse, and then, about a hundred yards further on, on the other side of the road, a few hen-coops where the labour lived. As my car raced along, sending up clouds of pale red dust, black youths poured out of the forest, or single figures materialised, like mirages, in the solitude of the desert. They thumbed a lift. I did not stop. At one moment I felt tired and wanted to sleep on the verge of the road and wake up to a distant view of mountains. I drove on. Reluctantly I admitted why. Fear, and the fear of fear, kept me going. What conceivable reason, I asked myself, could these people give themselves not to rob me, or kill me, or both? What would restrain me if I were in their position? Only the fear which would not let me stop. In the countryside, under the vast skies of the karoo, apartheid, or segregation, or separate cultural development, or mutual respect for national identity, or whatever is the phrase of the moment, seemed a more inhuman, a more deathly, presence.

At Grahamstown my host threw open the french windows. 'He loves this view,' his wife said. From the garden we could see the lights of the town: there the cathedral, there the quiet English-looking university, which now has 20 per cent non-white students, there the leafy, colonial streets. 'And over there,' he said, 'on the hillside the black township. In pitch darkness.' 'Have they never had light?' I asked foolishly. Last autumn they had light. During the unrest the Army stationed itself on the hill opposite, and they beamed searchlights across the town and raked the dirt paths for anyone who stirred. The township had light, night after sleepless night.

The relief was that no one in South Africa said to me: 'We're not as bad as you thought, are we?' No one said 'we'. They referred to the Government as 'the Government' or 'them'. I remarked on this and someone said to me: 'That is because you've not been to the heart of Afrikanerdom. Even the most radical people there say "we" – say it with shame.'

I never got to the heart of Afrikanerdom. I went to one austere Afrikaans university in the north. There was an exhibition of an incredibly talented black weaver. People asked me how my ideas related to Foucault or Richard Rorty. A painter, Swedish by origin, of great intensity as was his work, talked to me of the problems of South Africa. They were not political problems, he said, they were cultural problems. They were problems of communication and of creativity. The Afrikaner, who could not cry and distrusted his feelings, who was bigoted but without any real conviction, who was submissive to all forms of authority, who felt this hollow in himself, needed the African, but, every time he met one, he was caught up in the same old crude reactions. 'But with time, with education, with more sensitivity...' Then he told me of how every Saturday he and his whole family spent the day in a Coloured township: marriage-counselling, ecology, Bible-reading, teaching crafts. After two years they started to overcome suspicion, and they were still trying to overcome things in themselves. 'You have to be able to reach out to these persons as persons to survive the stench.' It was South Africa's problems, he and his wife said to me, that were its hope. Purged by its torments, it could become the greatest country in the world.

I never met anyone – though everyone was adamant that I very easily might have – who supported economic sanctions. The poor of South Africa could not tolerate much more poverty: the well-off could. What was needed was massive capital spent in ways that bypassed the Government: on education, on health, on training, on agriculture, on urbanisation, on the transfer of power. Some were more definite, some were hazier, about how this could be achieved. All were aware that on the fringe of such a discussion there waited – and for how much longer? – an ever-increasing body of youth who all their lives had been denied privacy, respect, education, work, and their own leaders. All they had picked up was bitterness and the martial arts. Who except those who had shared their fate could tell them to renounce their only two acquisitions?

On my last day I found in a dusty classroom in Witwatersrand University a copy of the now banned *Sowetan*, dated 29 May 1986. There was a report of a treason trial in the course of which the counsel for the defence cross-questioned a security policeman about the video of a funeral which the police had confiscated. They had also arrested the crew.

> Mr Bizos: Could it not be that the TV crew wanted to show Germany a bit of the truth about South Africa?
>
> Sgt Mong: Is that not propaganda?

Sgt Mong was quite right. The truth about South Africa is its condemnation, and what I had learnt in the three weeks I had been there was the heroism of many people who try to find out, against massive obstacles, massive blandishments, what is the truth about South Africa, and then try to lead their lives in the light of this truth. Someone told me of the exhilaration he felt as a young conscript sitting in the hills above Luanda and hearing the Foreign Minister solemnly swear that not one member of the South African Defence Forces had crossed the border. Loyalty fell away, like an old unwanted skin. It is a heroism that has to be repeated over and over again, and it requires of different people different things: questioning, teaching, standing together, resisting the demands of the state, exposing its lies, perhaps just keeping the forces of life going. The struggle is to build, within the carcass of the present state, an alternative society. If foreign countries can assist these forces of truth and disorder, then they will find something worth doing.

Richard Wollheim

That should be a series of signals to the South African Government saying, "You need not worry too much. You have friends on the other side of the Mediterranean. We shall see to it that you do not come to any serious harm." That is the wrong message to send to the South African Government at present.

I view the whole situation with profound pessimism. It is possible, either of its own motion or under the increased pressure of sanctions—under its own motion, wildly unlikely, under the pressure of increased sanctions at any rate possible—that the South African Government would move to what could be regarded as a real beginning in the dismantling of apartheid. If so, I shall be greatly and attractively surprised. Unhappily, I see no such process going on at present.

We happen to be debating this matter on the 120th anniversary of the publication of the American Declaration of Independence. I imagine that we are all aware of the opening words of that statement:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal".

Cynics have pointed out that some of those who drafted the statement were slave owners. We should do the founding fathers of the American constitution an injustice if we did not realise that many of them were aware of what was implied by the explosive doctrine that they had set forth. It has not been those words which have been so much in my mind today but the words of another prominent American, Thomas Jefferson, who, writing about the institution of slavery in his state of Virginia, used words that any wise, white South African might well use today:

"I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just".

1.44 p.m.

Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, I shall confine myself to a few general reflections which might conceivably bear on action. I start with a personal experience. At the beginning of 1936, now just over 50 years ago, I was appointed by Mr. Eden, as he then was, to be a member of a League of Nations sub-committee in Geneva set up to consider and make recommendations about the application of sanctions, which was a new term then, taken in principle by the League of Nations against Italy because of the flagrant violation of the Covenants, inherent in her invasion of Ethiopia. It was one of the most futile committees I have ever attended, and that is saying a lot.

As my noble friend Lord Crawshaw has already said, none of the measures that we pored over for so long at that time had the slightest effect on Mussolini. Only one sanction would have had any effect and that was agreement, not only by members of the League but by America, to refuse to ship any oil to Italy. That would have meant declaring a blockade and, as we all know, a blockade can only be made effective by the use of force. As there was no agreement to use force, which might have ended in war, and for which at that moment we were totally unprepared, the Duce proceeded, as we all know, on his wicked way.

It is always risky and perhaps unprofitable to seek historic parallels for situations which may be very different. I think, however, we can say with some confidence in the light of experience that sanctions

[LORD GLADWYN.]

against an errant member of the international community are unlikely to induce that member to abandon the policies which give offence, unless the nations applying sanctions are determined, in the last resort, to impose their will by some manifestation of force, for example, by a blockade.

If this judgment is at all acceptable, and it may not be, how might it apply to the insistence that South Africa should not only formally renounce apartheid but should now negotiate a new constitution based on the principle of one man, one vote with representatives of the African National Congress, local nationalists and other groups?

Not having had the opportunity to study the situation on the spot, I may well be wrong. No doubt those who think differently from me may explain later in the debate why that may be so. But from what I have read and have been told—more especially perhaps in the light of what that admirable South African Liberal, Mrs. Suzman, said recently in *The Times*—it seems that none of the sanctions so far contemplated could be counted on to induce the present South African Government to go as far as that. They might conceivably, under the threat of such sanctions, release Nelson Mandela. At the moment that seems pretty unlikely. They might introduce a few more rather superficial reforms—we must not ignore the reforms that they have already accomplished—and they might even do a separate deal with the Zulu chief, Buthelezi, but that would probably be as far as they could be induced to go.

I repeat that I am merely saying what I have heard. If I am wrong, I stand to be corrected. On the other hand, the distress and unemployment in South Africa, which would of course follow drastic economic measures, may in the opinion of some and perhaps in the opinion of many, result in the Pretoria Government losing control and being succeeded by another prepared to do what was demanded of them.

If we are realistic we must assume that, given the unlimited powers now in the hands of a large and well organised police force, that could only be said to be certain if other than economic measures—and they could only be forcible measures—were taken or contemplated by those countries, notably Commonwealth countries, which were determined to impose their will. At least, that is the conclusion that I believe we should be well advised to draw.

It seems likely that severe economic measures would unfavourably affect some of the nations participating in them, notably ourselves, while many of those most eager to apply them would hardly be affected at all. It may be that the effect on this country would not be as unfavourable as some suggest, but it would be considerable. That is obviously one of the reasons why a common policy, even among members of the European Community, is not easy to come by. Against that, it may be recalled that during the American civil war, which after all was fought on a not dissimilar issue, cotton operatives in this country entirely approved of the decision not to trade with the southern states, in spite of the grave distress that this occasioned in Lancashire. It was a question of conscience then and I suppose that any British workers who might find

themselves reduced to the dole or any British companies that might suffer grave loss, or even become bankrupt, would all regard it as a question of conscience now. At least, if severe economic measures are embarked upon, that must presumably be taken for granted.

My own rather tentative proposal—I only throw it out as an idea—is that if sanctions with the declared object of forcing (I repeat "forcing") the South African Government to end apartheid in the way proposed are taken at all, they might best be taken by the Security Council of the United Nations as a result of a formal vote under Chapter VIII of the charter in accordance with which the five permanent members of the council, along with all other members of the United Nations (because such a decision would be binding on everyone) would have to take, jointly, all measures including, if necessary, military measures, designed to oblige the South African Government to conform with what might, I suppose, be considered to be the common conscience of mankind. True, such action could only be taken legally under the charter if it was held that South Africa had committed the equivalent of an act of aggression—that is charter language—which might, I suppose, be considered to be inherent in the bombing of the capitals of neighbouring states. If an actual revolution was then in progress in South Africa it might, I imagine, also be argued that the South African Government were in effect indulging in aggression against a large majority of their own people.

My main conclusion in any case is that far-reaching economic measures (I repeat "far-reaching economic measures") are only likely to achieve the result that we all desire if they are taken with more or less universal consent—for otherwise, the whole operation would be plagued by leaks—and with the firm intention not so much to persuade but actually to oblige the South African Government to abandon the position to which they are at present committed even if this means organising something that may in the last resort be the equivalent of a second Boer War. Things might not, of course, come to such a pass. Probably, they would not. The Boer government might well surrender well before then. But the government would have to be somehow convinced that their position was entirely hopeless.

If such a firm and generally held intention is not for any reason present—I would regard the attitude of the United States and Japan as being the most important in such circumstances—then, although some additional measure seem now to be inevitable, no extreme measures will presumably be taken in the pretty confident hope that no government of South Africa will be able to resist both external indignation and internal pressure increasingly to modify the present system in the sense desired, so as ultimately to arrive at something not far off one man, one vote, or its broad equivalent.

Whatever course is followed—I am only trying now to indicate what I personally believe to be the broad choices—let us not be under any illusion. It was difficult enough, as other noble Lords, I believe, have said, to arrive at such a solution in Rhodesia, where the whites numbered only 2 or 3 per cent. of the population. It will be much more difficult to do that in the Union where they number 24 or 25 per cent, and where there are substantial Indian and coloured

groups. We must assume that such considerations are present in the minds of the leaders of all those civilised and democratic nations who undoubtedly agree on one thing, namely, that the evil system known as apartheid must be completely abandoned in South Africa if peace is to prevail, even if the process of replacing it by a more civilised system may take rather longer than is sometimes now thought. By all means, let us hope—it is perhaps a rather forlorn hope—that the projected mission of Sir Geoffrey Howe will be successful in furthering this end. If it is not, surely it is high time that we all agreed on the best practical means of overcoming the rather fundamental difficulties that would still be in the way of achieving what all reasonable people most sincerely desire. That will not be easy.

1.56 p.m.

Lord Saint Brides: My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, reminded us, it was an ill day for South Africa and for the world when in 1948 the National Party with its racist ideas replaced the Smuts Government and introduced an avowedly white supremacist regime. It was underpinned, as we all know, by creating the system of institutionalised injustice which we know and abhor as apartheid. It has taken the Nationalists all this time to realise into what a blind alley they then led their country, and to begin to dismantle some of apartheid's less essential but still iniquitous manifestations, like the Mixed Marriages Act, the pass laws and now, it seems perhaps also the Group Areas Act.

But, of course, the heart and core of apartheid is the exclusion of the blacks from political power. So far, the Nationalists have not been able to conceive of a way to bestow some political power on the blacks without their diminishing severely or indeed forfeiting their own. Nevertheless, events both inside and outside South Africa are visibly and, indeed, remorselessly, pointing in this direction. To that extent, South Africa stands again today, as it did in 1948, at a crossroads. It is a matter of concern to the whole world that this time it should choose the right direction and not the wrong one, as it did 38 years ago.

No other nation has shared as we British have in shaping South African history. And no other nation today possesses the collective knowledge that we do of that complex country. It follows that we are, or should be, uniquely well qualified to gauge—to the extent that this can be done from outside the country—what needs to be done to put right what has gone wrong there; and uniquely well qualified to judge how best our own still considerable influence and that of the world at large can be used in support of this objective.

Of course, we must respect the depth and sincerity of the feelings and views of our EC and Commonwealth partners. But we ought not to feel inhibited from telling them how we view the situation in South Africa from our own standpoint of greater involvement and greater knowledge. We shall find, moreover, that recognising this, countries the world over are likely to follow our lead.

At Nassau, as the noble Lord, Lord Barber, reminded us, the Commonwealth called on Pretoria to initiate a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion with a view to establishing a non-

FROM: THE RT. HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

112, EATON SQUARE,
SWIW 9AA

TEL: 01-235 1543
01-235 7409

(2)

Confidential

16th July, 1986

Prime Minister
CDP
16/7

Dear Margaret,

I think perhaps you should see personally the enclosed ploy which I have suggested to Geoffrey Howe.

Yours ever,

Julian

Julian Amery

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP

16th July, 1986

May I recap briefly on what I said to you after the Foreign Affairs committee yesterday afternoon.

We have got ourselves rather committed to the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC.

If I read the texts aright this is going further than the Eminent Persons who made the release and unbanning conditional on the suspension of violence.

I would judge that this must be very difficult for President Botha partly because it would be seen to be giving in to external pressure; even more because it would virtually nominate the ANC as his opposite numbers in the dialogue you and he want to bring about.

Is there a way of squaring this rather difficult circle?

Buthelezi has said in public that he could not join the President's proposed Council unless Mandela was released. But might there not be advantage in reversing this process? Would it not strengthen Buthelezi hand and Botha's hand if the two were to come together first, whether in the Council, the Cabinet or wherever and then together offer Mandela his freedom and the unbanning of the ANC under such emergency laws as Botha and Buthelezi thought necessary? Whites and Zulus would then be playing from strength and making it clear that the ANC was only one element in a dialogue.

../

I don't know how quickly this could be brought about but if you were assured by both Botha and Buthelezi that it was on the way your mission could still be crowned with success.

I am copying this to Margaret Thatcher.

Julian Amery

The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC., MP

The National Archives

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Extract details: Letter from Heseltine to Tutu dated 15 July 1986	
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CCPC
(Minute only)

CONFIDENTIAL

This is also covered in the JIC weekly digest, which the Prime Minister will read over the week-end
CDP
18/7

B.07483

MR POWELL

Southern Africa

As background for further consideration by Ministers of policy with regard to Southern Africa, officials have prepared the attached paper on the countries in the area which have important economic links with the Republic of South Africa - Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. The conclusions are in paragraphs 26 to 28. Departments involved in preparing the paper are submitting it to their Secretaries of State.

2. I am sending copies of this minute and the attachment to the Private Secretaries to the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Sir Robert Armstrong.

C L G Mallaby

15 July 1986

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FILE CJ2ABT

OBJECT CC MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

16 July 1986

From the Private Secretary

SOUTH AFRICA

The Prime Minister had a talk with the Foreign Secretary this morning about South Africa.

The Foreign Secretary gave an account of his visit to the front line states. The Prime Minister said that she thought the Foreign Secretary had been "absolutely superb" in the way in which he had carried out his mission. That had been widely recognised at home.

The Foreign Secretary said that Mr. Fergusson had recently visited South Africa and met Pik Botha. His assessment was that it would be extremely difficult for the South African Government to make the sort of concessions for which we were looking in a timeframe which would be hepful to us. He understood that the State Department took the same view, believing it might well be a year or more before the South African government would resume serious movement towards negotiations with the black community.

The Foreign Secretary emphasised the need for particular care in the public presentation of our position. Our opposition to general economic sanctions, with which he wholeheartedly agreed, was receiving exaggerated attention at the expense of our dislike of apartheid and the willingness which we had expressed at the Commonwealth meeting at Nassau and the European Council in The Hague to consider further measures which might be needed. He hoped that it might be possible to establish a better balance. He proposed to take the line in today's debate that, if tangible progress was not achieved in South Africa, it was likely to be necessary to agree to further measures. The Prime Minister noted this, adding that we should also make clear that further measures were not automatic. We had to stand by the commitments which we had given to the Federal Republic and others at the European Council. She herself at spoken in public of our looking at further measures on a contingency basis. She thought that this was a good formulation.

The Foreign Secretary said that he was concerned at the damage which would be done both to British interests and to the Government's standing were the Commonwealth Review

Meeting in early August to go badly, leading a number of countries to leave the Commonwealth and to the adoption of measures against the United Kingdom's economic interests. He had set out in his minute of 15 July what he believed was the minimum which would get us through the Commonwealth Review Meeting. The Prime Minister said that the line proposed by the Foreign Secretary in paragraph 16 of his minute caused her some concern because it would be interpreted by the South African Government as an ultimatum. We must abide by the mandate agreed at the European Council which deferred any decision on further measures until the Foreign Secretary's mission had run its course and the results had been assessed. Some very careful thought was needed on the presentation of our position on this point at the Review Meeting.

The Foreign Secretary suggested that it was not necessary to have a meeting of Ministers as originally planned for later today. He would report the position to Cabinet on 17 July. The Prime Minister agreed.

CHARLES POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PM told 16-7

"Lord Whitelaw has made it clear that reports in this morning's newspapers concerning his involvement with the South African issue are ludicrous and unfounded."

1

Prime Minister

Lord Whitelaw's office has telephoned me and the Press Office, on his instructions, to say that there is absolutely no truth in the reports in this morning's papers regarding his involvement with S. Africa. He has subsequently authorised Bernard to place the statement above on the lobby Notice Board. N.L.W 16.7

CONFIDENTIAL

Rite MJ

cc PL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 July 1986

Dear Mike,

SOUTH AFRICA: EC CODE OF CONDUCT: WHITE PAPER

The Prime Minister has seen a copy of your letter to Colin Budd in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office conveying the Trade and Industry Secretary's intention to publish the White Paper on the EC Code of Conduct before the end of the current session.

Subject to the views of colleagues, the Prime Minister is content with what is proposed.

I am copying this letter to Joan MacNaughton (Lord President's Office), Tony Kuczys (HM Treasury), Andrew Lansley (Chancellor of the Duchy's Office), John Turner (Department of Employment) and Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Michael Gilbertson Esq
Department of Trade and Industry

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PART 11 ends:-

DTI to FCO 15/7/86

PART 12 begins:-

CR to CDP/NUW/PM.


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