

Confidential Filing

Visit by the Sudanese
Prime Minister, Dr Dafalla.

SUDAN

AND HIS SUCCESSOR - MR SADIQ
EL MAHDI

July 1985

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 December 1986

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Dear Charles

The Sudanese Embassy has asked us to convey
/ to you the enclosed letter from the Prime Minister
of Sudan, Sayed Sadiq al Mahdi, to the Prime Minister.
The letter is sealed, but may be a belated thank-you
for the lunch which the Prime Minister hosted for
Sadiq on 15 October.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Prime Minister

COO
3/12

رئيس مجلس الوزراء

November 1, 1986

Prime Minister,
Mrs. Thatcher

Dear Mrs. Prime Minister,


I thank you and your Cabinet Colleagues for the very useful exchange of views we had in the course of my recent visit to the United Kingdom. Your hospitality and sincere understanding of the difficult problems our country faces made my mission easier and are highly appreciated. The responsible agencies in my Government have now been instructed to carry out the necessary follow up on the essential issues agreed upon during the visit. Through this we hope to further consolidate our relations with your admirable country.

I look-forward to seeing you in the near future,
hopefully in the Sudan.

Warm regards.

السيد السيد
ALSADIQ ALMAHDI

PRIME MINISTER, REPUBLIC
OF THE SUDAN



BOX

BRITISH AIRWAYS

Jim Harris
Director of Marketing

22 October 1986
JH 1413

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The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
House of Commons
London SW1.

BOX

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you very much indeed for inviting me to the luncheon you gave for the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. It was a most enjoyable occasion and I am most grateful.

Yours sincerely,

Jim Harris

J R HARRIS



British Airways Plc,
Registered office:
Speedbird House,
Heathrow Airport (London)
Hounslow TW6 2JA,
Registered in England No. 1777777.



House of Lords

October 15th 1986.

- R16/10

Dear Prime Minister,

mt

Thank you very much indeed for having been kind enough to include us in your guests for the lunch which you gave for the Prime Minister of Sweden.

It was not only a privilege to come to the lunch, but it was a particular one to sit next to the Prime Minister & to hear first-hand of



the problems & the aspirations of
his country. I am still mesmerised
by it being the size of India &
only 22 million people.

Thank you so much for
an occasion which was interesting,
stimulating & very enjoyable.

Yours sincerely,

Robin Peres,



PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 6328 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

USofS(DP) 25/2/1

14 October 1986

Dear Mr Powell,

Rene Pinot
COP.

Mr Hamilton this morning met with Sadiq El-Mahdi, the Sudanese Prime Minister (also Defence Minister) at the Sudanese Embassy. This was the latter's first official engagement during his present visit and provided a useful insight into his objectives and approach to their achievement that will obviously be of interest to the Prime Minister who is to be his host at lunch tomorrow. Mr Patten and Mr Renton, who will be seeing El-Mahdi on Thursday, will also have an interest.

The Sudanese Prime Minister has apparently come with a specific aim to secure military aid. He is clearly well aware of the sensitivity of advancing a direct request against the background of internal disorder with the danger of refusal on predictable political grounds. Instead he spent time and care in building up a case based on the legitimate right of a democratic and independent state to the maintenance of internal stability and the establishment of effective defence against external aggression. He advanced an elaborate explanation of the Ethiopian threat to give substance to this thesis.


While he went on to say that he had, in this context, prepared both short and longer term proposals for the strengthening of his armed forces to counter Ethiopian aggression, Sadiq El-Mahdi was led away in discussion from presenting any specific demands. There can however be little doubt that he has a list; and that he will wish to table it before he leaves at the end of the week; but that he will seek first to achieve recognition of the legitimacy of his argument that his needs are related to an external threat (even when its agents operate by rebellion within the borders of the country).

C D Powell Esq
Private Secretary (Overseas Affairs) to:
The Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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It may well be, therefore, that FCO Ministers on Thursday will be faced with a specific request for aid in the form of gifting of military hardware and more extensive subsidised training than that which is currently planned.

I attach a copy of the record of the meeting. I am copying this to Messrs Westmacott and Dinham at the FCO.



H D KERNOHAN
(Private Secretary)

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RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN US OF S(DP)
AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF SUDAN

HELD IN LONDON AT THE SUDANESE EMBASSY
AT 12.00 ON TUESDAY 14 OCTOBER 1986

Present:

The Hon. Archie Hamilton
Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State for Defence Procurement

Sadiq El-Mahdi
Prime Minister of
Sudan

Mr W A Perry
Head of Regional Marketing
Directorate 3, MOD

HE the Ambassador

Mr W R Davies
Head of Secretariat (Overseas)
(Commitments), MOD

and three others

Capt M F Bird RN
Assistant Director of Defence
Commitments (Middle East), MOD

Mr H D Kernohan
Private Secretary

1. After the introductory courtesies, US of S(DP) referred to the personnel which HMG provides to assist in military training in Sudan and to the recent increases in their number, which the Prime Minister acknowledged.

2. The Prime Minister described the political situation in Sudan. After the fall of Numeiri, there was no longer any reason for there to be any armed conflict in Sudan. Numeiri had created the conditions which provoked conflict and it had been expected that those in conflict would have laid down their arms and discussed the future under civilian and democratic government. A National Constitutional Conference would have addressed the special problems caused by Sudan's under-development and ethnic problems. The Prime Minister identified four specific areas which the constitution had to cover:

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- a. the relationship of religion and politics;
- b. Arab and African identities;
- c. a just sharing of power between ethnic and regional groups;
- d. the distribution of wealth;

One immediate reform had been to agree that population groups be represented in the Cabinet in proportion to their size.

3. Negotiations had taken place with the rebels and after a meeting on 14 August 1986 they had made a statement noting the positive developments and agreeing some points; further contact was expected. On 16 August a civilian aircraft was shot down by the rebels and the Sudanese government broke off negotiations as a consequence of this "atrocitv".

4. The Prime Minister presented his government's analysis of the current nature of the rebel movement. The leadership are totally under the control of the government of Ethiopia, which provides the rebels with food, lodging, arms, training, logistic support, broadcasting facilities and diplomatic cover.

5. The Sudanese government offered Ethiopia a "peace pact" lest their stance arose from fear of Sudan's relationship with the Eritreans. A positive response was expected but no response at all has been received yet. Ethiopia is currently very weak (with eight separate provinces in rebellion) and may believe that it cannot tolerate strong, cohesive states (such as Sudan could become) as neighbours. Therefore, it may be aiming to destabilize those neighbours and establish Marxist client states on its borders.

6. The Prime Minister said that even Sudanese extremists now accepted that an internal solution was possible but that the problems arose because Sudan had become the target of external aggression from Ethiopia, including the Sudanese rebel movement which they controlled. The Sudanese armed forces were not adequate to counter such a threat, so the government had prepared a two-tier policy of short-term improvements and more thorough modernization in the longer term. The question is where and how is Sudan to get the material. How far can the United Kingdom go as a "friend supportive of democracy"; will HMG change its current policy?

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7 In response, US of S(DP) said that this was a new initiative and he was not in a position to redraw HMG's policy here. The extent of the Ethiopian involvement is a dimension which will need to be considered. He undertook to relay the Prime Minister's views to colleagues. In addition, US of S(DP) explained the political difficulties which would arise if HMG were seen to supply arms which were thought to be used against the Sudanese rebels in the south. Publicly this was perceived as an internal Sudanese matter, and if the Prime Minister's analysis was correct attitudes would need to be changed.

8. The Prime Minister explained that it was incorrect to view Sudan as if it were still as it had been under Numeiri. It was not true that they were seeking to resolve the issues by force, or that they were not negotiating. The internal question was no longer paramount. HMG must take account of the new facts of Ethiopian aggression: Mengistu is a ruthless leader and would kill the Sudanese rebel leaders if they stepped out of line. All other aspects of UK-Sudanese defence relations were secondary to this.

9. Head of Sec(O)(C) pointed out that it was easier for HMG to continue to assist Sudan as it had done traditionally and that the Sudanese government should bear this in mind while pursuing the new political approach which the Prime Minister had outlined.

10. The Prime Minister said that the present rebel movement was not, in itself, a military threat but was rather a group of terrorists seeking to isolate the south and hold the population hostage. In his view this was a stupid policy. The movement is weak and has no cause while the government offers unconditional negotiations. Ultimately, Sudan can do more damage to Ethiopia than vice versa. Currently the government was trying to re-open the routes to the south and was looking for military equipment for this task and for keeping them open subsequently.

11. US of S (DP) asked whether it would be possible to resume negotiations once the immediate response to the shooting-down of the civilian aircraft had subsided. The Prime Minister said yes and referred to his recent meeting with the President of Kenya, who had offered to chair a meeting with the rebel leaders. The Prime Minister had been content with this proposal if the rebel leaders had been able to negotiate as free agents, which proved not to be the case.

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12. US of S(DP) asked whether the Ugandan role could be significant and whether Uganda understood Sudan's problems. The Prime Minister replied that Uganda did understand and was able to assist but, like the whole area, had its own problems.

13. The meeting concluded at 12.55.

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M186

[Faint handwritten signature]

PRIME MINISTER

LUNCH FOR THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE SUDAN

You are giving lunch to the Prime Minister of the Sudan on Wednesday. We have not provided for separate talks. But the attached brief covers points which might come up over lunch.

Few countries can be further up the creek than Sudan. The economy is a disaster as a result of protracted mismanagement. The IMF has declared Sudan ineligible, but the government are making no attempt to seek an IMF approved reform programme. Indeed, as President Mubarak has often complained, Sudanese governments do not seem to do anything much at all about the country's problems and this one is no exception. The civil war in the South has got worse. Efforts to negotiate a solution have been suspended but the army is not strong enough to force a military solution. Meanwhile famine in the south is worsening and relief aid is not getting through. We may well face Ethiopian-type pictures on our TV screens this autumn. Finally the government has a disturbingly naive approach to Libya, believing that it can Quddle up to Qadhafi without paying a price.

But when all is said and done, Sudan today is a democracy, is strongly pro-British (even though the present Prime Minister's great-grandfather was responsible for doing in General Gordon) and deserves some support against such unpleasant neighbours as Libya and Ethiopia.

Against this background, the main points to make are:

- i. We sympathise with the appallingly difficult tasks which Sadiq El Mahdi faces, we want to see him overcome them, and shall continue our substantial aid programme and modest military training help.
- ii. but a solution to Sudan's problems will require some hard choices. It seems to us that Sudan will have to try to

reach an agreement with the IMF as the key to unlock further aid. Although the IMF's prescriptions are tough, they are not unreasonable or insensitive to the need to avoid political and social disruption. We are ready to play a helpful role.

- iii. similarly with the war in the south, Sudan can look to support from its friends, in particular pressure on Ethiopia (though the poor state of our relations with the Ethiopians restricts what we can do). It is important that the Government should retain the political initiative by emphasising its readiness for further talks on a reasonable basis. A military solution does not stand a dog's chance.
- iv. the need to bear in mind the damage that could be done to the Sudanese Government's international standing if the media blame them for blocking relief in the south - however unjustly - and illustrate this with heart-rending television coverage of starvation. The ICRC could play a useful and discreet role in getting aid through to the south without requiring political concessions from the Sudan government.
- v. while it must be for the Sudan government to judge how best to handle relations with Sudan's neighbours, our own information suggests that Qadhafi is once again active in support of terrorism and subversion, and it would be well for Sudan to keep a discreet distance from him.

I attach notes for a short speech at lunch.

C.P.R.

Charles Powell
10 October 1986

JAlBBK



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 October 1986

CDP
10/x.

Dear Charles

Prime Minister's Lunch with the
Prime Minister of Sudan, 15 October 1986

/ As requested I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister to use at her lunch in honour of the Sudanese Prime Minister on 15 October, together with some 'toast notes'. The brief has been concerted with ODA, MOD, DTI and HM Treasury, but FCO Ministers will not see a copy of the full brief until later today.

I am copying this letter and its enclosures to Martin Dinham (ODA), John Howe (MOD), Timothy Walker (DTI) and Alex Allan (HM Treasury).

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 October 1986

CM

Dear Charles

Lunch for Sadiq Al Mahdi

You asked this morning for the speech notes for this lunch to be redrafted and expanded. I enclose a fresh version, which should be sufficient for four or five minutes of informal remarks by the Prime Minister.

I can confirm that the Sudanese are not expecting a separate session of talks at Number 10 on 15 October, apart from the lunch itself.

Yours ever

R N Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

Fursten und Kantonen

London 1771





PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH WITH HE SAYED SADIQ EL MAHDI, PRIME MINISTER OF SUDAN, 1 PM ON 15 OCTOBER 1986

OUR OBJECTIVES

- To establish a good personal relationship between the Prime Minister and Sadiq.
- To demonstrate support for Sudan's stability and pro-Western orientation and to urge caution over relations with Libya.
- To encourage Sadiq to be more active in his search for realistic solutions to Sudan's civil war and economic distress.
- To underline HMG's concern at suffering in South; to ask about Sudanese contingency planning for future drought; to remind Sudanese of substantial UK aid programme - but to avoid raising hopes of additional aid without Sudanese agreement with IMF.

ARGUMENTS TO USE

- Very encouraged by Sudan's return to democracy. Keen to promote high-level dialogue with your government (as demonstrated by Mr Renton's recent visit).
- Sympathy and concern at war in South. Convinced a military solution is impossible: a political settlement essential. Stand ready to help, should you see any openings. What chance of further talks with Garang?
- Hope relief in South will be stepped up soon. Chances of a food truce?
- Understand harvest prospects better this year. But what contingency planning against possibility of future drought?



- Believe our aid programme to Sudan useful, with focus on natural resources and rehabilitation. Sudan one of largest UK aid recipients.
- Fully accept Sudan's need for cordial relations with neighbours, including Libya. But urge caution and vigilance in dealings with Qadhafi. (Suspension of LAA flights to London). Want to keep closely in touch over this and give you what help we can.
- Wish to help Sudan's economic recovery. But a realistic adjustment programme is vital if donors and creditors are to provide the further support needed. Any progress in contacts with international financial institutions? What steps to stimulate private sector?

TACTICAL ARGUMENTS

- Hope coalition parties will sink factional differences which only help rebels and fundamentalist opposition.
- Worth running considerable political risks to alleviate growing human suffering is South. Would compromise on Sharia law help bring SPLA/Ethiopia to negotiating table? (Defensive) See little scope for UK mediation in war while sides so far apart.
- ICRC has special standing and experience. Hope some arrangement through them will be possible. British voluntary agencies (eg OXFAM) also want to help.
- Recognise steps already taken to curb Libyan activities. Continued Libyan interference in Sudan would alienate important friends (eg US and Egypt).
- Early normalisation of relations with IMF would help unlock door to debt rescheduling and donor support. Best first step out of economic mire.




HIS OBJECTIVES

- To seek maximum political support for his new regime and, possibly, additional economic and military aid.
- To reassure us about his government's stability and ability to achieve peace in the South and economic recovery.
- To blame rebels for blocking relief effort in South.

OUR RESPONSE

- UK's long-term aid programme substantial. Plan to continue with this. But any additional aid for import-financing will depend on Sudan reaching agreement with IMF.



ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. This is Sadiq's first visit to Britain since taking office in May. He will be in London following a brief visit to Turkey on his way back from the US and plans to be accompanied by his Ministers of Finance and of Labour and Social Security. Recent bilateral visits have been few owing to changes of regime, but Mr Renton's visit to Sudan on 24-27 September has helped establish high-level contact and provided a foretaste of the line Sadiq is likely to take (see Annex C). Mr Luce visited Sudan in April 1985 (just after Nimeiri's overthrow) and Mr Raison in January 1986. Dr Dafalla, interim Prime Minister until elections were held in April, visited London briefly in October 1985 and saw the Foreign Secretary.

2. With 40% of Constituent Assembly seats, Sadiq's Umma party is in uneasy coalition with the Egyptian-backed Democratic Unionist Party. The Muslim fundamentalist National Islamic Front forms a large but so far ineffectual Opposition.

3. Since taking office, Sadiq has concentrated on consolidating his power base in Khartoum and establishing influence over the armed forces. (Last month he summarily retired Sudan's five top Generals). Frictions within the coalition have been contained largely by avoiding difficult political decisions.

4. Sudan faces colossal problems. The civil war in the South has got worse as John Garang's Ethiopian-backed Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) extends its area of operations. Garang (who had a fruitless meeting with Sadiq in July) has set difficult pre-conditions for attending a constitutional conference on the South, including the total abolition of Sharia law. The NIF bitterly oppose this. The shooting-down of a civilian aircraft by the SPLA in August appears to have convinced Sadiq that Ethiopia will not let Garang negotiate. It may also have hardened his attitude in favour of a military solution. The Sudanese armed forces lack the training and morale to provide this. Meanwhile there seems to be no scope for outside mediation (Tiny Rowland and

Terry Waite are among those who have recently shown a personal interest in this).

5. Relief work in the South has been at a virtual halt since mid-August despite widespread and well publicised suffering. A UN-led airlift to the towns of Wau and Juba ('Operation Rainbow') has been hampered by rebel opposition following the Government's refusal to allow direct relief flights to SPLA-held territory. Quiet diplomacy may stand a better chance of success. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has unique standing and experience in this sort of situation and we would wish to support their efforts diplomatically and financially. We have already committed £250,000 to ICRC for emergency airlifts (this remains largely unspent). We have also supported, through the EC, OXFAM's relief work in Juba (though this has now run out of food and fuel).

6. Sudan's mainly agricultural economy has been in accelerating decline since the early 1980s. Governments have consistently overspent and mismanaged their foreign exchange needs and exchange rates. Despite earlier attempts at stabilisation with IMF support, external debt has risen to over \$10 billion with chronic payments arrears. The debt service problem is completely out of hand and export receipts have recently fallen to a very low level. With mounting arrears to the IMF (now over \$377 million) the Fund in February declared Sudan ineligible to draw on its resources. Despite prospects of further Saudi aid, debt rescheduling and significant new support from Western donors (including World Bank finance) looks out of the question in the absence of a serious attempt to find an IMF-approved reform programme. The 1986/87 budget, announced on 29 September, contains a large measure of wishful thinking and of reliance on unworkable controls. It provides for a large increase in budgeted expenditure and makes optimistic assumptions about aid inputs and internal revenue, while offering no prospect of an early rapprochement with the international financial institutions.

7. Drought led to a disastrous harvest throughout Sudan in late 1984, and a patchy harvest in late 1985. A major international relief effort followed during 1985 and 1986. The UK has provided substantial emergency support over this period, and British voluntary agencies (particularly Save the Children Fund and OXFAM) have played a very important role. The prospects for this year look better. But it is essential that there should be adequate contingency plans to deal with any future emergencies. The lead has to be taken by the Sudanese authorities, who are sensitive about the extent of voluntary agency involvement. But they have shown little capability so far.

8. Foreign policy. Although Sudan depends heavily on the West, Sadiq is keen to develop his Non-Aligned credentials. Ethiopia has been unresponsive to his peace overtures and may see continued unstability in Southern Sudan as being in its best interests. Kenya and Uganda also sympathise with the rebels. Libya has courted Sudan with offers of aid and in March provided aircraft for use against SPLA positions. The Libyans have a strong presence in Khartoum and are well placed to conduct subversive activities and to threaten Western residents there. A low-key exchange of visits by Sadiq and Qadhafi in August/September led to the removal of a Libyan military convoy present in Western Sudan since the Spring and to agreement for Libya to provide further oil to Sudan. An offer by Qadhafi to mediate in the civil war has proved an empty gesture. During Mr Renton's visit Sadiq argued that it was better to humour Qadhafi and allow him to see for himself how little support he had in Sudan than to antagonise him: Sudan needed good relations with all its neighbours. Partly because of the Libyan connection, Sudan's relations with Egypt and the US remain edgy. US concern at the Libyan presence in Khartoum caused the withdrawal in April of most US personnel. This has badly affected levels of US aid spending, although in Washington Sadiq recently appears to have secured a revival of a previous US commitment to commodity aid. Sadiq visited the Soviet Union in August to appeal for military aid and a curtailment of Ethiopian support for Garang. The Russians appear to have responded coolly.

9. UK aid. The UK maintains a substantial long-term programme (£23

million in 1985/86). The focus has recently shifted over the last year from the power sector to agriculture. Aid is being provided for the rehabilitation of irrigation schemes along the Nile, and of boreholes in drought-affected Western Sudan, though we have had to suspend activity in the South because of security problems. Support is also being provided for the education sector, and for the training of Sudanese in the UK. We plan to continue our long-term programme at a level of around £17 million a year (not to be disclosed). But any additional aid for short-term import financing (balance of payments support), as we have provided in some recent years, will depend on Sudan reaching agreement with the IMF.

10. UK/Sudan Trade. The UK has traditionally been Sudan's major supplier of goods and services. Compared with 1985 UK exports fell by 19% to £55 million in the period of January-August. Sudan's exports to the UK fell by 47% to £9 million in the same period. Much UK trade is aid-related. ECGD cover is only available for short-term business where payment is secured by a Confirmed Irrevocable Letter of Credit.

11. UK/Sudan defence relations. An expansion of our two-man British Army Training Team by two additional officers is planned in the near future (subject to the continued exclusion of Libyans from the Omdurman Staff College). There are four Sudanese students on army training courses in the UK and we are soon to provide training for the Sudanese medical corps. The RAF enjoy valuable overflight concessions. Recent defence sales have been meagre despite increased interest this year by the Sudanese military. Sales of Strikemaster aircraft to Sudan were suspended in 1985 owing to their potential counter-insurgency role in Southern Sudan.

ANNEXES

- A. Personality note on Sadiq.
- B. Outline programme of his visit to UK.
- C. Record of Mr Renton's call on Sadiq on 25 September.

SADIQ EL MAHDI

Prime Minister and Minister of Defence since May 1986. Imam of the Ansar sect and leader of the New National Umma Party.

Born 1935. Great grandson of the Mahdi who founded the Ansar and defeated General Gordon in 1884.

Became Chairman of the Umma Party in 1964 and Prime Minister of a coalition government in July 1966. Serious splits within his party caused the government to fall nine months later.

Defeated in 1968 elections. His party was afterwards reunited, but after Nimeiri's coup d'etat in May 1969 Sadiq was imprisoned. Deported to Cairo in 1970 following a massacre of Ansar supporters.

Brought back to Sudan under house arrest in 1972. Inconclusive negotiations with Nimeiri led to exile in 1974.

With other exile groups he formed the Sudanese National Front, which launched an abortive coup (with Libyan help) in 1976.

Returned to Sudan under an agreement signed with Nimeiri in London in 1977. Appointed to the Politburo of the ruling party in 1978, but soon withdrew, ostensibly in protest at Camp David. Distancing himself from the regime, he left Sudan again 1981-82. Attacked Nimeiri's September 1983 (Islamic) Laws and was imprisoned again until December 1984. Supported the demonstrations that triggered Nimeiri's overthrow in April 1985.

Became Prime Minister again in coalition government formed after April 1986 elections. He has since been much preoccupied with consolidating his power base in Khartoum. Since taking office he has visited Kenya, Ethiopia, Libya, the Soviet Union and the UN in New York.

Lively, ambitious, charismatic, a devout Muslim but no fanatic. His second wife managed party affairs in London during his imprisonment.

VISIT OF HE SAYED SADIQ EL MAHDI, PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF
DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN, 13-18 OCTOBER 1986

OUTLINE PROGRAMME

13 October

Arrival

14 October

Meetings with Mr Hamilton (PUSS(DP))
British Voluntary Organisation and Charities
Lord Winchelsea (Liberal)

Possible meeting with Labour front bench member.

15 October

Morning: Meetings with Dr David Owen (SDP)
and with the Director General, British Council.

1300: Lunch hosted by the Prime Minister

1730: Talk at Chatham House: 'Sudan - The Challenge for Democracy'.

16 October

Morning: Meetings with Mr Patten
and Mr Renton at Sudanese Embassy.

Afternoon: Meeting with members of House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee and British/Sudanese
Parliamentary Group

Evening: Sudanese Embassy reception.

17 October

Morning: Press briefing

Afternoon: Prayers at Regent's Park mosque.
Meeting with Sudanese community.

18 October

Departure.

GRS 1450

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FM KHARTOUM

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 420

OF 270630Z SEPTEMBER 86

INFO PRIORITY ODA, CAIRO, ADDIS ABABA, RIYADH, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL IMF/IBRD, UKMIS NEW YORK

FOLLOWING FROM PS/MR RENTON

MR RENTON'S CALL ON SUDANESE PRIME MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. CONFIDENT PERFORMANCE FROM SADIQ AL MAHDI. CONCERN AT FEAR OF NEIGHBOURING STATES THAT SUDANESE DEMOCRACY MIGHT SPREAD BALANCED BY POLITE BUT FIRM JUSTIFICATION OF DEALINGS WITH QADHAFI. UPBEAT ACCOUNT OF PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH SPLM, BUT DOUBT OVER WHETHER ETHIOPAINS WILL PLAY BALL. FIRM DEFENCE OF SUDANESE GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW 'RAINBOW' FLIGHTS TO WAU. ACCEPTANCE OF DESIRABILITY OF AGREED PROGRAMME WITH IMF PROVIDED ACCOUNT IS TAKEN OF SUDAN'S SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

DETAIL

2. MR RENTON SPENT 90 MINUTES WITH SADIQ AL MAHDI ON 25 SEPTEMBER. HE BEGAN BY CONGRATULATING SADIQ ON SUDAN'S RETURN TO DEMOCRACY.

SADIQ SAW SUDAN'S DEMOCRACY AS A LONELY BIRD IN THE AFRICAN CONTINENT, BEING SHOT AT FROM MANY DIRECTIONS. NEIGHBOURING DICTATORSHIPS WERE CONCERNED THAT THE SUDANESE PEOPLE HAD BOTH OVERTHROWN A DICTATOR WITHOUT BLOODSHED AND SHOWN THAT DEMOCRACY COULD WORK. EVEN THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT WAS NERVOUS AT THE UNFAVOURABLE COMPARISONS DRAWN IN THE CAIRO PRESS BETWEEN POLITICAL LIFE IN SUDAN AND EGYPT. QADHAFI HAD ALSO BEEN UNNERVED DURING HIS RECENT VISIT BY THE SIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTIES ACTING FOR THE NATIONAL GOOD IN NON-PARTISAN FASHION.

3. MR RENTON WARNED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER MORE CONCERN ABOUT SUDAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH LIBYA DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE US AND EUROPE. SADIQ REPLIED FIRMLY AND AT LENGTH. QADHAFI WAS A NEIGHBOUR WHOM THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT CHOSEN. SUDAN NEEDED TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL ITS NEIGHBOURS, SINCE IT DID NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO POLICE ALL ITS BORDERS - BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF ITS OWN INTERESTS. THE AXIS NIMETRE HAD ESTABLISHED WITH CAIRO HAD BEEN A MAJOR ERROR, PROVOKING A LIBYAN-ETHIOPIAN COUNTER-AXIS COMMITTED TO HIS DESTRUCTION. QADHAFI'S RECENT VISIT TO SUDAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED BY SUDAN'S FRIENDS AS EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT KNEW HOW TO HANDLE ITS UNPREDICTABLE NEIGHBOUR. AN UNEXPECTED BONUS HAD BEEN QADHAFI'S UNDERTAKING TO URGE THE ETHIOPAINS TO ALLOW

CONFIDENTIAL

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THE REBELS IN THE SOUTH TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. THE RECEPTION GIVEN TO QADHAFI'S PROPOSALS, EG FOR IMMEDIATE UNITY BETWEEN LIBYA AND SUDAN, SHOWED THAT THERE WAS NO SYMPATHY FOR THEM IN SUDAN. ON TERRORISM, WHICH SADIQ RECOGNISED AS AN AREA OF CONCERN TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, SUDAN HAD NO TRUCK WITH QADHAFI'S ACTIVITIES, AND HAD A LONG HISTORY OF OPPOSITION TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE OF ANY KIND. BY DEALING WITH HIM ON ITS OWN TERMS, THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT WAS DEMYTHOLOGISING QADHAFI IN EVERYONE'S INTERESTS.

4. TURNING TO THE SOUTHERN PROBLEM, MR RENTON URGED A RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE WITH THE REBELS. SADIQ THOUGHT AN AGREEMENT WAS INEVITABLE SOME TIME. THE SPLA COULD NEVER GAIN THEIR ENDS MILITARILY. THE PROBLEM WAS URGENT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE TREAT TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE SOUTH AND TO SUDAN'S NEWLY-ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACY. AT HIS MEETING WITH GARANG IN ADDIS ON 31 JULY HE HAD REACHED AGREEMENT ON ALL KEY POINTS EXCEPT ON WHAT TO PUT IN PLACE OF SHARIA LAW. BOTH SIDES HAD SAID PUBLICLY THAT THEY WISHED TO PURSUE THIS POINT. TWO DAYS LATER, THE SPLA HAD SHOT DOWN THE SUDAN AIR AIRLINER, KILLING 60 PEOPLE. THAT EVENT HAD CHANGED THE ENTIRE CLIMATE OF NEGOTIATIONS. IN SADIQ'S JUDGEMENT, THIS HAD SHOWN THAT THE ETHIOPIANS WOULD NOT ALLOW GARANG TO DEAL WITH KHARTOUM, WITHOUT EXTRACTING A PRICE. THE PROSPECT OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SPLA NOW DEPENDED ON EITHER THE ETHIOPIANS GIVING THEIR CONSENT, IN EXCHANGE FOR SOME KIND OF REASSURANCE ABOUT THE ENDING OF SUDANESE SUPPORT FOR THE ERITREAN REBELS, OR ON GARANG BREAKING WITH MENGISTU. BOTH ALTERNATIVES WERE PROBLEMATIC. BUT A SOLUTION HAD TO BE FOUND. HENCE QADHAFI'S UNDERTAKING TO SPEAK TO MENGISTU. SADIQ WAS CONVINCED THAT, IF GARANG WAS A FREE MAN, THE TWO OF THEM COULD MAKE A DEAL.

5. MR RENTON RAISED THE "RAINBOW OPERATION" IN THE CONTEXT OF TODAY'S BBC REPORTS CRITICISING THE SUDAN GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW RELIEF FLIGHT TO WAU. WE WERE NOT FINANCIAL BACKERS OF RAINBOW BUT THE GREAT INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SUDAN MEANT THAT PUBLICITY OF THIS KIND WOULD BE AN UNHELPFUL CURTAIN-RAISER TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S WESTERN TOUR. SADIQ SAID HE WOULD NOT ALLOW HIS POLICIES TO BE DICTATED BY THE MEDIA. IF THE PRESS REPRESENTED HIS GOVERNMENT AS BLOCKING RELIEF OPERATIONS TO THE SOUTH, HE WOULD RESPOND VIGOROUSLY. THIS WAS QUITE UNTRUE. THE RELIEF ORGANISATIONS IN SUDAN WERE GIVEN EVERY ENCOURAGEMENT. WAU, HOWEVER, WAS THE ONE AIRPORT TO WHICH FLIGHTS COULD NOT BE ALLOWED BECAUSE THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES DID NOT CONSIDER IT SAFE. KHARTOUM WAS IN CONTACT DAILY WITH WAU, AND WAS DETERMINED THAT FLIGHTS SHOULD RESUME AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. MEANWHILE, WAU MUST WAIT FOR AIR SERVICES AND

-2-
CONFIDENTIAL

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THE RELIEF ORGANISATIONS SHOULD FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF THE CONVOY OF 40 TRUCKS WHICH HAD ARRIVED FROM JUBA ON 24 SEPTEMBER. ALTERNATIVE ACCESS WAS AVAILABLE, AND THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE RELIEF ORGANISATIONS TO COMPLAIN CHILDISHLY THAT THEY WERE NOT RECEIVING THE COOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT.

6. MR RENTON REMINDED THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE RELIEF ORGANISATIONS HAD THE BEST INTERESTS OF SUDAN AT HEART. HE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT A COMPROMISE COULD BE FOUND WHICH WOULD AVOID PUBLIC MISUNDERSTANDING. SADIQ AT NO POINT REFERRED TO THE SPLA'S INSISTENCE ON A FLIGHT TO AN SPLA-HELD TOWN AS PRICE FOR NOT SHOOTING DOWN THE RELIEF AIRCRAFT AND SUGGESTED THAT RAINBOW SHOULD FLY TO MALAKAL AND JUBA (PRESUMABLY WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE SPLA).

7. MR RENTON SAID HE HOPED SUDAN WOULD SOON BE ABLE TO AGREE A COMPREHENSIVE REFORM PROGRAMME WITH THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN WASHINGTON, THEREBY RELEASING NEW CREDITS AND FACILITATING DEBT RESCHEDULING. SADIQ SAID IT TOOK TWO TO TANGO. AN AGREEMENT WAS DESIRABLE. BUT SUDAN WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE SAME OLD PRESCRIPTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN SUCH A FAILURE IN NIMMERI'S TIME. HE AND HIS FINANCE MINISTER WOULD PRESS FOR AN OBJECTIVE REVIEW OF ALL THE OPTIONS FOR THE SUDANESE ECONOMY. MR RENTON COMMENTED THAT THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HAD SHOWN THEMSELVES MORE FLEXIBLE IN RECENT MONTHS, BUT AN EFFECTIVE RECOVERY PROGRAMME INEVITABLY INVOLVED SOME HARSH DECISIONS.

STIRLING



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 September 1986

ABF?

Dear Charles

Mrs. Goodchild ^{SS}

Sudanese Prime Minister's Visit

I have made
some
amendments
CJH

Your letter of 22 August asked for a guest list for the Prime Minister's lunch for Sadiq al Mahdi at 1300 on 15 October.

With apologies for the delay, I now enclose our suggested list.

Yours ever

(Handwritten signature)

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SUDAN: Visit by Sudanese PM

July 85.



[Faint, illegible handwritten text]

[Faint, illegible handwritten text]

DRAFT GUEST LIST - PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR SUDANESE PRIME MINISTER
 SAYED SADIQ AL MAHDI 48 STAG AT 1300 ON 15 OCTOBER 1986

NAME	ADDRESS/ TEL NO	REASON FOR INVITATION
The Prime Minister	<i>Add Delta Security Agriculture Security</i>	
✓ Mr Renton		
✓ Mr Patten		
? Mr Stewart	Economic Secretary HM Treasury 01-233-3608	
— Sir David Miers KBE, CMG	AUS	
HE Sayed Sadiq Al Mahdi	Prime Minister of Sudan	
HE Dr Bashir Omer Fadl	Minister of Finance	
HE Sayed Serafino Wani	Minister of Transport	
HE Dr Mohamed Kamal Shawqi	Commissioner for Relief and Rehabilitation	
HE Sayed Yithaya Akol Bedut	Director MFA Western European Dept	

HE Sayed Abu Shammer

Director MFA American
Dept

Sayed Ibrahim Ali

Chef De Cabinet

HE Sayed Ibrahim Mohamed Ali

Ambassador of the
Republic of Sudan
3 Cleveland Row
London SW1A 1DD
01-839-8080

Sir Anthony Kershaw MP (Con)

Chairman FAC

Visited Sudan
February 1985

No
Dame Judith Hart (Lab)

Ex ODM Minister

Mr Tom Cox MP (Lab)

Secretary Anglo-
Sudanese Parliamentary
Group

Mr Robert Banks MP (Con)

Chairman Anglo-
Sudanese Parliamentary
Group

or

~~Mr Bowen Wells~~ MP (Con)

Visited Sudan February
1985

Mr Colin Moynihan MP (Con) ✓

Visited Sudan February
1985

Mr Jim Lester MP (Con)

Visited Sudan February
1985

Baroness Ewart-Biggs

01-352-4275

Visited Sudan February
1986: involved in
refugee work there.

or

Mr Michael Meadowcroft MP
(SDP)

Mr R Luce MP

Ex Minister of State,
FCO. Visited Sudan
April 1985

Mr Frank Judd

Director of Oxfam
Banbury Road,
Oxford
0865-56777

Mr Nicholas Hinton

Director of Save
the Children Fund
Mary Datchelor
House
17 Grove Lane,
Camberwell
01-703-5400

Mr John Burke-Gaffney

Director British
Red Cross
9 Grosvenor Cres
London
01-235-5454

Rt Rev John Neale

The Lord Bishop Suffragan
of Ramsbury

Bishop's House,
Urchfont,
Devizes, SN10 4QH
0380 84373

Visited Sudan on
church aid work
July-Sept 1986

Alternatives

Mr Julian Filochowski X

Director, Catholic
Fund for Over-
seas Development
2 Garden Close
Stockwell Road
London SW9
01-733-7900

Sir Brian Young ✓

Chairman
Christian Aid
British Council
of Churches
PO BOX 1,
London SW9 8BH
01-733-5500

✓ Mr Julian Amery MP ✓

Horn of Africa
Council

ACADEMIC

Sir John Ellis MBE, ME FRCP

Chairman,
Committee of
Management,
University of
London Institute
of Education,
20 Bedford Way,
London WC1
01-636-1500

Recently visited
Sudan to advise on
health service.

Sir Laurence Kirwan KCMG

Ex President,
British Institute
of East Africa,
³²
~~28~~ Oakley Street, SW3
01-352 0433

Involved in Soba
excavations

SNT

Sir John Burgh KCMG, CB

Director General,
British Council,
1 Spring Gardens,
London SW1
01-930 9466 x 2052

Alternatives

Mr Robin Hodgkin

Chairman, Gordon
Memorial Trust,
Bareppa House,
Falmouth
0326 250 210

Aid to University of
Khartoum

Falmouth

Professor Glyn O Phillips

Executive Principal,
North- East Wales
Institute of Higher
Education,
Kelsterton College
Connah's Quay,
Deeside CH5 4BB
0244 817531

Links with Khartoum
Polytechnic

BUSINESS/ECONOMIC

Mr T Harrison

Chairman,
NEI Projects Ltd,
Saltmeadows Road,
Tyne and Wear
Gateshead NE8 1YZ
091-477-6666

Khartoum North Power
Station (biggest UK
Capital aid project)

Mr H Phillips

Managing Director,
Hugh Phillips
Engineering Ltd,
Unit 12,
Tafarnaubach
Industrial Estate,
Tredegar, Gwent
NP2 3AA
0495-711001

Refurbishing steam
locomotives

Mr B Goodman

CBE

Chairman, Ewbank &
Partners,

Prece 7/62

Prudential House,

North St,

Brighton, BN1 IRW

0273-724533

Consultants Khartoum

North Power Station

Mr J F Robson OBE

Partner,

Sir Malcom MacDonald &

Partners Ltd,

Demeter House,

Station Rd, Cambridge,

CB1 2RS

0223-66455

Consultants Northern

Region Irrigation

Project

~~Mr M E M Fitzgerald~~

~~Assistant Director,~~

~~Morgan Grenfell &~~

~~Co Ltd,~~

~~25 Winchester St,~~

~~01-588-4545~~

~~Advisers on debt etc to~~

~~Bank of Sudan~~

Mr A D Loehnis

Executive Director,

Bank of England,

Threadneedle St,

London EC2

01-601-4212

Supervises debt matters.

Mr David Gawthorpe

Joint Managing

Gezira Light Railway

Director,
Huslet
Huslet Holdings Plc,
Jack Lane
Leeds, LS10 1BT

0532-432261

Mr J R Harris

Director of Marketing,

Frequent direct flights

British Airways,

to Khartoum

Speedbird House, ~~S225~~

PO Box 10
Heathrow Airport,
Leeds

Hounslow, Middx,

TW6 2JA
01-562-7827

Mr J A Gilroy

Managing Director,

Sales to Sudanese

Land Rover Ltd,

customers and aid

Lode Lane,

agencies

Solihull B92 8NW

021-743 4242

Mr D T Sinker

Chairman Hunting

Western Savannah

Technical

Project

Services Ltd

Elstree
Estate Way,

Boreham Wood,

Herts, WD6 1SB

01-953-6161

Mr Graham Thomas

or

Mr D C Carden CMG

Sir Richard Beaumont KCMG

Mr K Edwards

Sir James Craig GCMG

14 Honorwood Close,
Prestwood,
Gt Missenden,
Bucks HP16 9HH
02406 3084

Wistaria Cottage,
174 Castle St,
Portchester,
Hants PO16 9QH
0705-375-458

Chairman of Arab-
British Chamber
of Commerce,
6 Belgrave Sq,
London SW1X 8TH
01-235-4363

Deputy Director,
General CBI,
Centre Point,
New Oxford St,
London WC1
01-379-7400

Middle East Association
33 Bury St, St James,
London SW1Y 6AX
01-839-2137

Ex Sudan colonial
service: Friend of
Al Mahdis

Ex Sudan colonial
service and Ambassador
in Sudan

Hon David A C Douglas-Home

Chairman Comet
33 Bury St, St James,
London SW1Y 6AX
01-839-1170

Also a Director of
Morgan Grenfell who
advise Bank of Sudan

Mr P F Barry

Director, Crown Agents
St Nicholas House,
Sutton, Surrey, SM1
1EL 01-643-3311

Opening office in Sudan

Alternatives

~~Mr Abdul Karim Al Mudaris~~

~~Sec General,
Arab-British Chamber
of Commerce
6 Belgrave Sq, SW1
01-235-4363~~

Major General
Mr S K Lecky CB, OBE

Director-General
Agricultural Engineers
Assoc. Ltd,
6 Buckingham Gate SW1
01-828-7973

E 674

Rt Hon D L Ferrers

Chairman,
Agricultural Export
Council,
35 Belgrave Sq,
London SW1
01-235-9819

Mr A J Lippett CB

Board Member, GEC,
1 Stanhope Gate,
London W1A 1EH
01-493-8484

Ex DUS, DTI. Involved
in Sudan Railways

Mr J M Durber

Chairman,
Lister Petter and Dep
Managing Director
Hawker Siddeley,
18 St James Sq, London
01-930-6177

Suppliers Northern
Irrigation Project

Mr S J Ekester

Director, MacAlister,
Elliot & Partners
56 High St,
Leamington,
Hants, SO4 9AH
0590-75973

Marine Consultants Red
Sea Fisheries

PRESS

Mr Husni Imam

X

Kuwait News Agency,
International Press
Centre, 76 Shoe Lane
London EC4
01-583 5813

Egyptian journalist
with very good Sudanese
contacts at high level

Mr Peter Preston

Editor,
'The Guardian'
119 Farringdon Rd,
London EC1
01-278-2332

Regular coverage of
Sudan civil war and
famine

Mr Geoffrey Owen

Editor
'Financial Times'
Bracken House,
Cannon Street,
London EC4
01-248-8000

Good coverage of major
developments in Sudan

Mr John Tusa

Managing Director,
BBC External Services,
Bush House,
The Strand, EC2
01-257-2057

Controls English and
Arabic broadcasting
widely listened to in
Sudan

Alternatives

Mr Michael Wall


Editor,
Middle East
International,
21 Collingham Rd,
London SW5 ONU
01-373-5228

Former Director of CAABU

Mr Mark Dodd

Controller,
BBC Overseas Services,
Bush House,
The Strand, EC2
01-257-2644

Controls vernacular
services including
those in Arabic and
African languages





file

SA
cc PC
Sue G.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 August 1986

**PROPOSED VISIT OF SUDANESE
PRIME MINISTER TO THE U.K.**

David Reddaway wrote to Tim Flesher on 15 August asking whether the Prime Minister would see the Prime Minister of Sudan when he visits London this Autumn. The Prime Minister has agreed to give the Sudanese Prime Minister lunch on Wednesday 15 October at 1300. There will be no separate talks on this occasion.

I would be grateful if you could provide a draft guest list as soon as possible and briefing at the appropriate time.

I am copying this letter to Timothy Walker (Department of Trade and Industry), Tony Kuczys (HM Treasury) and to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

(Mrs. Caroline Ryder)

C. R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



10 DOWNING STREET

Pine Muntz

Sudanese Pine Muntz

Do you
wish to see him?

Yes

and

is worth to offer him
lunch (dinner would
surely be overdoing it).

OK. lunch
not

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me



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

From The Minister of State

15 August 1986

PROPOSED VISIT OF SUDANESE PRIME MINISTER TO THE UK

Our Ambassador in Khartoum has been asked in confidence whether it would be possible for the Prime Minister of Sudan, Sadiq el Mahdi, to pay a working visit to London on his way to or from the United Nations General Assembly this autumn. Sadiq would specifically welcome an opportunity to call on the Prime Minister, preferably on 15 or 16 October, on his return from New York, although it might be possible for him to extend his stay to 17 October.

Lady Young hopes that the Prime Minister will be able to receive Sadiq and, if possible, offer him lunch or dinner. Sir Geoffrey Howe will be in China but Sadiq's programme could include meetings with Mr Raison (who visited Sudan in January), Mr Renton (who is due to do so next month) and possibly other Ministers.

Lady Young believes there is a very strong case on foreign policy grounds for welcoming Sadiq in October. Sadiq assumed office after the elections in April at the head of a coalition of moderate parties that polled some 70 per cent of votes cast. We need to establish personal relationships with the new government at the highest level, not only to reinforce confidence in Sudan's return to democracy but also to give weight to our warnings against Libyan interference in Sudan and to probe Sadiq's approach to Sudan's two main problems - the civil war in

/the

Tim Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street

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the South and the bankrupt national economy. A meeting with the Prime Minister would therefore be a valuable opportunity to impress upon him our belief in the need for a negotiated political settlement to the civil war and for Sudan to resume serious discussions with the IMF over its economic crisis.


Sadiq is an intelligent and charismatic individual who studied in Oxford and knows the UK well. But he has not always displayed sound political judgement and his pro-Western sympathies cannot be taken for granted. Since taking office he has visited Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Tripoli and Moscow. His proposed visit to London would form part of his first trip to the West since becoming Prime Minister, and would undoubtedly help cement our good relations with Sudan, which remain closer than those of our Allies and EC Partners.

I am copying this letter to Tim Walker (Department of Trade), Tony Kuczys (HM Treasury) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

David Reddaway

David Reddaway
Private Secretary to
Baroness Young





10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 October 1985

VISIT BY THE SUDANESE PRIME MINISTER

My letter of 24 July said that the Prime Minister would see the Sudanese Prime Minister when he passed through London in late October and set a time of 0915 on Friday, 25 October.

Now that the Prime Minister has to be in New York on 23 and 24 October, returning early on 25 October to London, she can no longer maintain this appointment. There will have to be a Cabinet early on 25 October and the whole of the rest of the day is committed to engagements outside Downing Street.

You will wish to explain these new circumstances to the Sudanese Government with the Prime Minister's regrets. The Prime Minister suggests that the Foreign Secretary may like to offer to see Dr. Dafalla on her behalf. Alternatively, we might suggest postponing the visit to a more convenient time.

(C. D. POWELL)

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



SRW

file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 July 1985

VISIT OF THE SUDANESE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 22 July conveying the Foreign Secretary's recommendations that the Prime Minister should see the Sudanese Prime Minister when he passes through London in late October.

The Prime Minister could see Dr. Dafalla at 0915 on Friday, 25 October.

(C. D. POWELL)

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

lu

~~CCPC~~



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

①

London SW1A 2AH

22 July, 1985

Dear Charles
Yes not
Prime Minister
Agree to see
him? CJD
22/7.

Visit by the Sudanese Prime Minister

HM Ambassador at Khartoum has reported that Dr Gizouli Dafalla, Prime Minister of Sudan in the transitional regime which took over from President Nimeiri on 6 April, wishes to visit Britain and other European countries on his return from a visit to the United Nations at New York. The dates he has in mind for London are between Friday, 25 October and Sunday, 27 October. He has particularly asked to call on the Prime Minister and would be ready to come to London a day or two earlier if that were more convenient. I enclose a personality note on Dr Dafalla.

As you know, we have a long tradition of close political, economic and personal friendship with Sudan, which has consistently pursued moderate Arab and pro-Western policies. We had some difficulties in the later years of Nimeiri, until his fall last April. Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that Sudan, with its strategic position and resources, is a key country which it is very much in the Western interest to support. The Americans think the same. Parliamentary interest in Sudan is, as you know, acute, not least because of the problems of the drought.

The Transitional Military Council and the Civilian Council of Ministers led by Dr Dafalla face intractable problems and are committed to elections and a return to fully democratic rule. Their success will however largely depend on their ability to make progress in handling the immediate problems, and in this they will need all the support they can muster. We are already providing much practical help; we have given £23 million in emergency relief since October 1984, including 62,000 tons of food aid, and maintain a substantial regular aid programme. Richard Luce was the first Western Minister to visit Khartoum after the change of regime in April. He met Dr Dafalla and formed a favourable impression of him as determined to tackle Sudan's problems constructively, though lacking in experience.

As part of its efforts to tackle the Southern problem the new regime has had to renew relations with Libya and Ethiopia. These developments have not been particularly

/welcome



welcome to us, especially the former but the Sudanese have insisted that they are fully conscious of the risks and that this will in no way affect their traditional friendships with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the US and ourselves. The recent announcement of the signature of a joint military protocol between Sudan and Libya was disquieting, but appears to have little substantive importance. There seems to be disagreement within the TMC about the desirability of having entered into it. We are not fully convinced of Sudanese ability to handle the Libyans, and are continuing to register our concern with appropriate quarters in Khartoum. Sir Geoffrey believes that a call by Dr Dafalla would be a useful opportunity for the Prime Minister to emphasise this message.

We understand that the West Germans and Italians have already agreed to receive Dr Dafalla. It would be most unfortunate if we lagged behind or appeared to snub the Head of Government of a country in which we have such wide-ranging interests. Sir Geoffrey therefore hopes that the Prime Minister would be able to receive him at least briefly following her return from CHOGM; the most convenient date might be 25 October.

Yours wv,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Grey Scale #13



A 1 2 3 4 5 6 **M** 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 **B** 17 18 19

