PREM 19/1995

PART 2.

Confidential Filing

Visits by Secretary General of the UN, Mr Perez de Cuellar & the Question of His Successor.

BRIEFING FOR PM'S MEETING WITH DG CUELLAR 16/4/84 and 14/5/86 IN ATTACHED FOLDERS

UNITED NATIONS

Part 1 May '79
Part 2 May '82

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~2.6.82~~							
~~[illegible]~~							
~~14.7.82~~							
~~15.7.82~~							
~~16.7.82~~							
~~22.1.85~~							
~~22.1.85~~							
~~2.1.86~~							
~~9.5.86~~							
~~14.5.86~~							
~~23.5.86~~							
~~12.6.86~~							
~~25.7.86~~							
~~7.10.86~~							
~~15.10.86~~							
18.11.86							
PT2 ENDS							

PREM 19/1995

PART 2 ends:-

PEREZ de CUÉLLAR to PM 18.11.86.

PART 3 begins:-

HELMUT SCHMIDT to PM 20.10.87.

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(82) 38th meeting, item 2	15/07/1982

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed _____ Date 23/10/2014

PREM Records Team

cc PJC (4)

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Prime Minister

CDP 26/XI

18 November 1986

MT

Dear Prime Minister,

I should like to express my sincere appreciation for your kind message upon my reappointment as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

In carrying out the responsibilities which the international community has once again entrusted to me, the close cooperation of Member States will be of the utmost importance. I therefore warmly welcome the assurance you kindly conveyed to me of your country's support for my own efforts and for the purposes and principles which the Organization was created to serve.

Please accept, dear Prime Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

Her Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland

(113)

(pa)

GRS 60

UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELNO 1047
OF 152315Z OCTOBER 1986

(113) (114)

YOUR TELNOS 652 AND 655: SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1. FOR THE RECORD THE CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES FROM BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WERE HANDED, TOGETHER, TO HIS SPECIAL ASSISTANT THIS EVENING, 15 OCTOBER.

THOMSON

YYYY

NFLNAN 5501
LIMITED
UND
NEWS.D.
INFO.D.
PS
PS/MR.EGGAR
MR. THOMAS
MR. BRAITHWAITE
MR. SLATER

File

D/28KW

cc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 October 1986

Thank you for your letter of 14 October enclosing a draft message of congratulations from the Prime Minister to Senor Perez de Cuellar. I am sure that the Prime Minister would want to send a message and would be grateful if you could despatch the slightly amended version enclosed.

Charles Powell

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

VL

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
UNCLASSIFIED		IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELNO
141320Z OCTOBER 86
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS VIENNA, LIMA
AND TO INFO SAVING UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK
YOUR TELNO 1025: SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
1. Please deliver the following message from the Prime Minister to Senor Perez de Cuellar
BEGINS
I was ~~very pleased~~ delighted to hear of your unanimous re-election as Secretary-General of the United Nations. This was a ~~fitting~~ well-deserved tribute to your achievements in presiding over the Organisation in the past five years. I know that you will bring to the tasks ahead the same dedication you have shown in the past. I send you my warm and best wishes. congratulations
ENDS

HOWE

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/ PS
PS/MR EGGAR

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ADDITIONAL
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		Catchword: MR DEREK THOMAS	
File number	Dept PRIVATE OFFICE	Drafted by (Block capitals) R N CULSHAW	Telephone no 4641
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials Date/time		
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

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20 OCT 1986
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INDEX | FA | Action Taken
24/10

UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELNO 655
OF 141320Z OCTOBER 86
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS VIENNA, LIMA
INFO SAVING UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 1025: SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO SENOR PEREZ DE CUELLAR
BEGINS
I WAS DELIGHTED TO HEAR OF YOUR UNANIMOUS RE-ELECTION AS SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THIS WAS A WELL-DESERVED TRIBUTE TO YOUR ACHIEVEMENTS IN PRESIDING OVER THE ORGANISATION IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS. I KNOW THAT YOU WILL BRING TO THE TASKS AHEAD THE SAME DEDICATION YOU HAVE SHOWN IN THE PAST. I SEND YOU MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES.
ENDS

HOWE
LIMITED

UND
PS
PS/MR EGGAR
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR SLATER

020

CCPC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 October 1986

Prime Minister
Agreed to send a message?
CDP 14/X

Dear Charles

Senor Perez de Cuellar was re-elected unopposed for a second five-year term as UN Secretary-General on 10 October. I attach a draft message of congratulations from the Prime Minister; if she is content, we shall ask UKMIS New York to deliver it.

The Prime Minister may also wish to see the message which Sir Geoffrey Howe is sending today to Senor Perez de Cuellar.

Yours ever

Robin Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
UNCLASSIFIED		IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELNO
141320Z OCTOBER 86
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS VIENNA, LIMA
AND TO INFO SAVING UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK
YOUR TELNO 1025: SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
1. Please deliver the following message from the Prime Minister to Senor Perez de Cuellar
BEGINS
I was ~~very pleased~~ delighted to hear of your unanimous re-election as Secretary-General of the United Nations. This was a ~~fitting~~ well-deserved tribute to your achievements in presiding over the Organisation in the past five years. I know that you will bring to the tasks ahead the same dedication you have shown in the past. I send you my warm and best wishes. congratulations
ENDS

HOWE

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PS/MR EGGAR

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		Catchword: MR DEREK THOMAS	
File number	Dept PRIVATE OFFICE	Drafted by (Block capitals) R N CULSHAW	Telephone no 4641
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials Date/time		
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

XY 48 (REV)

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
UNCLASSIFIED		IMMEDIATE

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MR DEREK THOMAS
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR SLATER
NEWS DEPT

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For distribution order see Page

Catchword:

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OUT TELEGRAM

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AND TO

ZCZC
UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELNO
OF 141315Z OCTOBER 86
SAVING UKDIS GENEVA in NEW YORK
AND TO INFO ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS VIENNA, LIMA
FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
YOUR TELNO 1025: SECRETARY-GENERAL UNITED NATIONS
1. Please deliver the following message to Perez de Cuellar from the Secretary of State:
BEGINS
I would like to offer my congratulations on your re-election as UN Secretary-General for a second term. The knowledge and experience which you have acquired will be invaluable in handling the organisation's future problems. I look forward to continuing our close cooperation.
ENDS

HOWE

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// UND
/ PS
PS/MR EGGAR

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MAIN
ADDITIONAL
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		Catchword: MR DEREK THOMAS	
File number	Dept PRIVATE OFFICE	Drafted by (Block capitals) R N CULSHAW	Telephone no 4641
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials RM	Date/time 14/X 1400	
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

XY48 (REV)

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
UNCLASSIFIED		IMMEDIATE

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3 MR BRAITHWAITE
4 MR SLATER
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For distribution order see Page

Catchword:

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WITH AGA KHAN 2/83

(2) CCPC

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 October 1986

Prime Minister

CDP 7/x.

Dear Charles,

UN Secretary-Generalship

In my letter of 30 September I said it was our expectation that the re-election of Perez de Cuellar would be completed in the course of October. I now enclose UKMIS New York telegram 978 of 2 October which gives the latest position.

In brief, the five Permanent Members have assured Perez de Cuellar of their support and received his agreement to serve a second term. Procedures are in hand aimed at his election by the Security Council and then afterwards by the General Assembly on 10 October.

Yours ever

Robin Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 880

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

cc for information & file.

DEDIP

UKMIS NEW YORK

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 978

OF 022310Z OCTOBER 86

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING

TOP COPY

Mrs Rogerson.

We shd submit to PS and for PS/10

TK

MY TELNO 847: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

SUMMARY

1. PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS WILLING TO SERVE A SECOND TERM. THE 5 PERMANENT MEMBERS HAVE ASSURED HIM OF THEIR SUPPORT AND SO INFORMED THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHO WILL NOW TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION.

DETAIL

2. THE AMBASSADORS OF THE 5 STATES PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CALLED BY ARRANGEMENT ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS HOUSE ON THE AFTERNOON OF 2 OCTOBER. EACH OF THE FIVE, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF HIS OWN GOVERNMENT, EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE HOPE THAT HE WOULD SERVE FOR A SECOND TERM. IF HE WOULD AGREE, THEY WOULD SUPPORT HIM.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT, IF ELECTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HE WOULD BE WILLING TO SERVE A SECOND TERM, THOUGH THIS WOULD BE AT SOME PERSONAL SACRIFICE, SINCE IT WAS NOT ALTOGETHER A PLEASANT JOB AND HE HAD MANY THINGS IN PRIVATE LIFE WHICH HE WOULD LIKE TO DO. HOWEVER, HE COULD NOT REFUSE A CALL TO SUCH DUTY AND HIS HEALTH, HE BELIEVED, WAS SATISFACTORY. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN PERSONALLY AND FROM MR SHULTZ OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS AND, IN PARTICULAR, FOR AMERICAN FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS. AMBASSADOR WALTERS CONFIRMED THIS AND SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WOULD REDOUBLE HIS EFFORTS WITH THE US CONGRESS.

4. I SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BELIEVED PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS THE RIGHT MAN FOR 2 CRUCIAL TASKS. THE FIRST WAS TO CARRY OUT A NUMBER OF REFORMS INTERNALLY IN THE UNITED NATIONS SO AS TO PRODUCE A MORE EFFICIENT AND COST-EFFECTIVE ORGANISATION. THE WAY FORWARD LAY THROUGH THE APPROVAL OF THE G18 REPORT AND THEN ITS IMPLEMENTATION. WE LOOKED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TAKE A LEAD AND, IF HE DID SO, WE WOULD GIVE HIM FULL SUPPORT. THE SECOND TASK WAS TO ASSIST THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN RESOLVING ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS. THIS WOULD BE MORE EASILY ACHIEVED (AS THE SECRETARY-

GENERAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HAD HIMSELF OBSERVED) IF THERE WAS PROGRESS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS. THE PRESENT JOINT APPROACH BY THE 5 PERMANENT MEMBERS WAS A HAPPY AUGURY AND REPRESENTED A READINESS TO WORK TOGETHER WHICH NEEDED TO BE CARRIED OVER INTO OTHER PROBLEMS.

5. AMBASSADOR DE KEMOULARIA SPOKE SIMILARLY FOR FRANCE, STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF A SLIMMING DOWN OF THE UN STRUCTURE. HE SPOKE GLOWINGLY OF THE INDEPENDENT ROLE A SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD PLAY. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SHOWED SIGNS OF RESTLESSNESS AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL INTERVENED TO SAY THAT IN HIS VIEW THE CHARTER PRESCRIBED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS THE SERVANT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HE WOULD ALWAYS WISH TO ACT IN THE CLOSEST CONCERT WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND NOTABLY WITH ITS 5 PERMANENT MEMBERS.

6. THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HIS COUNTRY WAS SET ON THE PATH OF REFORM. THEY KNEW FROM THIS EXPERIENCE THAT REFORM WAS NO EASY MATTER, BUT UNQUESTIONABLY THE UN NEEDED A GOOD DEAL OF REFORMING. HIS DELEGATION WOULD GIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUPPORT IN THIS DIFFICULT TASK.

7. AMBASSADOR WALTERS ALSO SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF THE NECESSITY OF REFORM AND OF A BUDGETARY PROCESS WHICH PROCEEDED BY CONSENSUS AND GAVE DUE WEIGHT TO THE MAIN CONTRIBUTORS. (THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ME THAT CHINA WAS NOT, REPEAT NOT, PREPARED TO INSIST ON CONSENSUS. FRANKLY THEY DID NOT TRUST THE U S TO BEHAVE IN A ''UN-SPIRITED'' MANNER.) THE SECRETARY-GENERAL NOTED THE DIFFICULTY OF REFORM BUT EXPRESSED HIS DETERMINATION TO CARRY IT OUT, THOUGH WITH FAIRNESS TO ALL CONCERNED.

8. AFTER HIS ORIGINAL STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR A SECOND TERM FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AMBASSADOR BELONOGOV SAID NOTHING. HOWEVER, HE SMILED HAPPILY WHEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR NOTED THE APPROPRIATE SYMBOLISM OF OUR ACCIDENTAL SEATING WHICH HAD PLACED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO HIS LEFT AND THE US AMBASSADOR TO HIS RIGHT. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE SIGNS OF AN IMPROVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER POWERS HAD BEEN INFLUENTIAL IN HIS READINESS TO SERVE A SECOND TERM.

9. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS MEETING THE 5 AMBASSADORS CALLED ON THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (THE UAE AMBASSADOR). THE FIVE INFORMED HIM THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS WILLING TO SERVE A SECOND TERM AND THAT THEY WOULD GIVE HIM THEIR SUPPORT. HE WAS INVITED TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE FIVE AS TO NEXT STEPS. HE SUGGESTED THE PRESIDENT MIGHT LIKE TO CONSULT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL INDIVIDUALLY TELLING THEM OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S WILLINGNESS

/TO

TO SERVE AGAIN. IF, AS I HOPED, THERE WAS UNANIMITY, HE WOULD NO DOUBT WISH PERSONALLY TO INFORM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IN SUCH AN EVENT I SUGGESTED THAT HE SHOULD MEET WITH THE LEGAL ADVISERS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO MAKE SURE THAT THERE WAS FULL UNDERSTANDING ON PROCEDURES. I BELIEVED THAT IT MIGHT BE FOUND CONVENIENT FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO MEET IN FORMAL PRIVATE SESSION ON THE MORNING OF FRIDAY 10 OCTOBER TO ELECT PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO MEET THE SAME AFTERNOON FOR THE SAME PURPOSE. (I HAD EARLIER IN THE DAY CONFIRMED WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT THIS PROCEDURE WOULD BE CONVENIENT.) THE UAE AMBASSADOR LOOKED GRATIFIED AND SEEMED READY TO ACT ACCORDINGLY.

10. THE FIVE AMBASSADORS AGREED THAT, IF ASKED WHY THEY HAD CALLED JOINTLY ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (THOUGH OF COURSE WE WOULD DO OUR BEST TO AVOID PUBLICITY), WE WOULD SAY THAT WE HAD CALLED TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. IF ASKED WHY WE HAD CALLED ON THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WE WOULD REPLY THAT WE HAD DISCUSSED SECURITY COUNCIL BUSINESS AND REFUSE TO BE DRAWN BEYOND THAT.

THOMSON

YYYY

NFLNAN 5248

LIMITED

HD /UND
PS
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR SLATER

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 July 1986

Overtaken
PQ 25/7.

Dear Charles

You will have seen UKMis New York telegram number 692 reporting that the Secretary-General underwent a coronary by-pass operation on 24 July. The Foreign Secretary this morning sent a message conveying his good wishes to Sr Perez de Cuellar (Lusaka telegram number 001, attached).

The Prime Minister of course knows Sr Perez de Cuellar well: they met most recently in May during the Secretary-General's official visit to London, when the Prime Minister made it known to Sr Perez de Cuellar that she would be pleased to see him re-elected to the post of Secretary-General. We therefore recommend that the Prime Minister send a message to Sr Perez de Cuellar on the following lines:

> "It was a great pleasure to see you here in May. I was very sorry to learn today of your sudden operation. I send you my warmest good wishes for a very early recovery, and for a successful return to your duties, which are so important for the world."

Yours ever

Robert Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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OF 250830Z JUL 86
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TODAY:

''I WAS MOST DISMAYED TO LEARN ON THIS MORNING'S NEWS THAT YOU HAD HAD TO UNDERGO A MAJOR OPERATION YESTERDAY. THIS IS AN IRONIC STROKE OF ILL FORTUNE AT SUCH A CRITICAL JUNCTURE WHEN YOUR WISDOM AND EXPERIENCE ARE SO BADLY NEEDED. I SEND YOU MY WARMEST GOOD WISHES FOR A RAPID AND COMPLETE RECOVERY''.

WHITE

YYYY

LLHPAN 2941

NNNN

file
cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 June 1986

Dear Tony,

You should know, for the Foreign Secretary's information, that at the end of the Prime Minister's meeting with the co-Chairmen of the Eminent Persons Group this evening, Mr. Fraser drew her aside to say that he understood that Perez de Cuellar would not stand again as Secretary General of the United Nations, in which case General Obasanjo wuld be a very strong candidate.

yours sincerely

Charles Powell

C D POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

File

MT2840

bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 May 1986

UN SECRETARY GENERAL

Thank you for your letter of 22 May about Perez de Cuellar's future. I am sure that the Prime Minister would agree that the Foreign Secretary should raise this privately with Secretary Shultz on the lines suggested.

Charles Powell

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

BL

CUPC

(1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 May 1986

Prime Minister
Agreed that Foreign Secretary should raise this with George Shultz as proposed?
CDP

Dear Charles

UN Secretary-Generalship

Your letter of 14 May reported the Prime Minister's discussions earlier that day with Perez de Cuellar. You explained that the question of Perez de Cuellar's own future was raised over lunch; that the Secretary-General said that he did not relish continuing to head an organisation which the US seemed determined to destroy; and that the Prime Minister undertook to send a message to the Americans about this. Sir Geoffrey Howe had a similar conversation with Perez de Cuellar over dinner the same night.

In the light of these exchanges Sir Geoffrey Howe intends to raise the matter when he has an informal tête à tête with Shultz in Washington on 27 May.

Yours ever

Robin Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

UN Visits of de Cuellar PT2.

File

bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 May 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL

The Prime Minister's meeting with Senor Perez de Cuellar was conducted entirely tête-à-tête. I understand that the following points were covered.

Falklands

The Prime Minister said that the UK had made all the running in terms of improved bilateral relations with Argentina and the establishment of a multilateral fisheries regime. But the Argentinian response had been disappointing. She saw no point in further talks on the model of those held in Berne since it was inevitable that the Argentinians would try to draw in the issue of sovereignty. There was no question at all of our being ready to discuss sovereignty.

Senor Perez de Cuellar gave a brief account of his visit to Argentina in early April. He thought it might be possible to reach agreement whereby Argentina would end the state of hostilities if the UK agreed to lift the exclusion zone. The Prime Minister said that she would reflect on this possibility and let the Secretary General know her conclusions. It would have to be absolutely clear that such action was not being undertaken as a prelude to discussions on sovereignty.

Cyprus

The Prime Minister expressed gratitude for the Secretary General's efforts to make progress towards a solution. She had done her best to persuade President Kyprianou to accept the Secretary General's documentation. She saw some risk that her credibility would be undermined if she continued to press him, since she had already twice made clear that failure to agree to the Secretary General's proposals risked bringing about the end of his efforts, while in practice the various deadlines had been allowed to pass without anything happening. The Secretary General, while grateful for all that the Prime Minister had done, expressed some disappointment that the Prime Minister was not prepared to have another go at Kyprianou at this stage.

Middle East

There was some discussion of the Prime Minister's forthcoming visit to Israel and the prospects for progress in the Middle East. The Secretary General was doubtful whether there was any contribution which the United Nations could usefully make at present in view of US and Israeli attitudes towards United Nations' involvement.

Lebanon

The Secretary General urged the Prime Minister to bring home to the Israelis that their security zone in South Lebanon was not working and that they should withdraw their forces back into Israel. The Secretary General said that he had discussed the role of UNIFIL with the Foreign Secretary, who would no doubt report their conversation to the Prime Minister.

Afghanistan

Both the Prime Minister and the Secretary General were sceptical whether the present discussions would lead to any useful results.

Future of the Secretary General

This was raised during lunch. The Prime Minister said that she hoped Senor Perez de Cuellar would agree to serve another term. The Secretary General was grateful for this declaration of support. His main problem lay with the United States. He did not relish continuing to head an organisation which the US seemed determined to destroy. He would like some sort of assurance of the United States' commitment to preserving the United Nations before he reached any decision whether to continue in office. The Prime Minister said that she would send a message to Secretary Shultz about this.

Charles Powell

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN FOR THE VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND SENORA PEREZ DE CUELLAR

10-15 MAY 1986

(to be read in conjunction with the printed programme)

SATURDAY 10TH MAY

Arrival

When the aircraft has landed, a representative of the British Airports Authority will accompany the greeting party from the VIP suite to the meeting point, where the visitors will be welcomed by (in order):

Sir John Stow
Special Representative of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Dr Erik Jensen
Director of the United Nations Office and Information Centre

and Mrs Jensen

Brigadier Alan Cowan
Government Hospitality

Group Captain Robert Thomson
Government Hospitality Escort

The party will proceed to the VIP suite.

Transport

Cars are provided for the official suite by Government Hospitality (see car plans at Annex I).

Participation of the official suite in the Secretary-General's programme

Dr Erik Jensen, Director of the United Nations Office in London, and Sir John Thomson, United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the United Nations, will accompany the Secretary-General throughout the programme, except where otherwise stated.

It is anticipated that the other members of the official suite, as listed at page 1 of the printed programme, will also accompany the Secretary-General, except where stated.

WEDNESDAY 14 MAY

Talks with the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

1100 - 1210 : The Secretary-General will be accompanied by Mr Marrack Goulding, Senor Alvaro de Soto, Dr Erik Jensen and Monsieur François Giuliani.

Talks with the Prime Minister at No 10 Downing Street

1215 - 1300 : The Secretary-General will be accompanied by Mr Marrack Goulding, Senor Alvaro de Soto and either Dr Erik Jensen or Monseiur François Giuliani.

Luncheon with the Prime Minister

1300 : The following members of the official suite are also invited:

Mr Marrack Goulding
Senor Alvaro de Soto
Dr Erik Jensen
Monsieur François Giuliani

Dinner at Admiralty House

2000 : The Secretary-General and Senora Perez de Cuellar will be accompanied only by Mr Marrack Goulding.

THURSDAY 15 MAY

Audience of HM The Queen

1200 : The Secretary-General and Senora Perez de Cuellar will be accompanied by Mr John Hrusovsky (who will not participate in the Audience).



Anne Morrison (Mrs)
Visits Section
Protocol Department
Foreign and
Commonwealth Office
Tel: 210 6365

8 May 1986

CAR PLANS

SATURDAY 10 MAY

London Heathrow Airport to Brown's Hotel

Car 1	His Excellency Señor Pérez de Cuéllar
	Señora Perez de Cuéllar
	Group Captain Thomson
Car 2	Dr Jensen
	Mrs Jensen
	Mr Goulding
	Mr Hrusovsky

NB: Mr Panzarino will travel to Brown's Hotel with the luggage vehicle. Señor de Soto, Monsieur Giuliani and Miss Letellier will arrive privately in London.

TUESDAY 13 MAY

Balliol College to Brown's Hotel

Car 1	His Excellency Señor Pérez de Cuéllar
	Señora Pérez de Cuéllar
	Group Captain Thomson
Car 2	Mr Goulding
	Sir John Thomson
	Mr Hrusovsky
Car 3	Dr Jensen
	Señor de Soto
Car 4	Monsieur Giuliani
	Miss Letellier

WEDNESDAY 14 MAY

Brown's Hotel to Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Car 1	His Excellency Señor Pérez de Cuéllar
	Dr Jensen
	Group Captain Thomson

WEDNESDAY 14 MAY (cont'd)

Car 3	Mr Goulding Mr Hrusovsky Sir John Thomson
Car 4	Señor de Soto Monsieur Giuliani

NB: Walk to 10 Downing Street

Hotel to 10 Downing Street

Car 3	Señora Pérez de Cuéllar Mrs Jensen

10 Downing Street to hotel (to be confirmed)

Car 1	His Excellency Señor Pérez de Cuéllar Señora Pérez de Cuéllar Group Captain Thomson
Car 2	Dr Jensen Mrs Jensen Mr Hrusovsky
Car 3	Mr Goulding Sir John Thomson
Car 4	Señor de Soto Monsieur Giuliani

Hotel to Lambeth Palace

Car 1	His Excellency Señor Pérez de Cuéllar Señora Pérez de Cuéllar Group Captain Thomson
Car 2	Dr Jensen Mr Hrusovsky
Car 3	Mr Goulding Señor de Soto Monsieur Giuliani

Lambeth Palace to Church House

Car 1	His Excellency Señor Pérez de Cuéllar
	Dr Robert Runcie
	Group Captain Thomson
Car 2	Señora Pérez de Cuéllar
	Dr Jensen
	Mr Hrusovsky
Car 3	Mr Goulding
	Señor de Soto
	Monsieur Giuliani

Church House to hotel

Car 1	His Excellency Señor Pérez de Cuéllar
	Señora Pérez de Cuéllar
	Group Captain Thomson
Car 2	Dr Jensen
	Mr Hrusovsky
Car 3	Mr Goulding
	Señor de Soto
	Monsieur Giuliani

Hotel to Admiralty House and return to hotel (to be confirmed)

Car 1	His Excellency Señor Pérez de Cuéllar
	Señora Pérez de Cuéllar
	Group Captain Thomson
Car 2	Mr Goulding
	Mr Hrusovsky
	Sir John Thomson

THURSDAY 15 MAY

Hotel to Buckingham Palace

Car 1	His Excellency Señor Pérez de Cuéllar
	Señora Pérez de Cuéllar
	Mr Hrusovsky
	Group Captain Thomson

Buckingham Palace/Hotel to Gatwick Airport

To be announced.

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News Department (3)
(Mr Worthington)
Resident Clerk

Government Hospitality (30)

IVSABN

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. Falklands. We have made all the running to improve bilateral relations. Disappointing response. Tried to be constructive on fisheries, again without helpful reaction. No evidence that Argentines willing to drop aim of negotiating on sovereignty - indeed Perez' own visit showed this. In the circumstances, see no point in further meetings like Berne, though remain ready to respond to any signs of willingness to improve bilateral relations.

2. Cyprus. Need to tighten the screws on Kyprianou. Must not allow him to keep slipping deadlines. Nothing

much more you can do, until Secretary General himself really puts Kyprianou under pressure. Tactic of threatening to report to Security Council a good one. We may have to reduce our contribution to UNFICYP, perhaps even this year.

3. Terrorism. Give an account of Summit discussions. Need for UN to be seen to take action against states supporting terrorism. (You will be saying this at lunch.)

4. Chernobyl. Need for IAEA mandatory system of reporting accidents.

5. Middle East. Your visit to Israel and prospects for progress towards a settlement. West Bank seems to offer

st chance of limited advance.

6. Lebanon. Will urge Israelis to remove remaining troops. Concern at reports of Syria's intention to move forces into South Lebanon. High risk of Israeli retaliation. Delicate role for UN in facilitating negotiations between Israel and Lebanese factions.

7. Southern Africa. Eminent Persons Group offers best prospect of progress, though apparently difficult meeting with Pik Botha yesterday.

8. UN Finances. Compliment on efforts to bring under control. But serious pressure needed on Soviet Union and East Europeans to pay their contributions towards peace-keeping.

9. Future of Secretary-General. Any hint of his intentions. Happy to see him remain if he wants to.

10. Miss Anstee. Hope he will find a way to promote her to new Under-Secretary job in charge of drugs and social subjects. Very talented and promotion long overdue!

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL

You will have 45 minutes with Perez de Cuellar before lunch.

There is a full list of briefs. The subjects which he has said he particularly wants to discuss with you are the Falklands, Cyprus, terrorism and nuclear matters following Chernobyl.

Other subjects which might come up in the talks or over lunch are the Middle East, Southern Africa, the Lebanon, the UN's finances, Iran-Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Perez de Cuellar has said publicly that Falklands (Brief no.3) will be a prime topic during his visit to the United Kingdom. He visited Argentina in early April. I suggest that you launch straight into the subject to deprive him of the initiative. Your line might be that we have made all the running in trying to improve bilateral relations, with a disappointing response. We have also tried to be constructive about fisheries by proposing a multilateral conservation and management regime, to be negotiated in the FAO. The Argentinians seem to be trying to do their best to sabotage this. In the circumstances, there would be no point in further discussions with the Argentinians like those which were held in Berne, since it is quite clear that they are determined to raise sovereignty. Indeed his own visit to Argentina demonstrated that there was no change of substance in the Argentine position. Until they are more realistic about this, you see no scope for further meetings, though we remain ready to improve bilateral relations. Of course you are open to be convinced that the Argentinians have changed their views and objectives. But you need evidence and none has been forthcoming yet. You hope that the Secretary-General will say nothing to the press which will suggest that he is acting as a broker between the UK and Argentina. I suspect that a fairly robust approach on this

line will be needed to offset a more emollient line from the Foreign Secretary beforehand.

You might move on next to Cyprus (Brief no.2). He appears ready to be fairly tough with Kyprianou, and has threatened to report to the Security Council by the end of the month, blaming the Greek Cypriots for breakdown if they do not accept his documentation by then. It remains to be seen whether this is another vanishing deadline. But you will want to leave him in no doubt that there is no more you can do with Kyprianou until the Secretary General himself gets tough. Otherwise Kyprianou will always believe that it is possible to squeeze out a little more.

There is another aspect to Cyprus which you perhaps ought to raise, and that is the question of our contribution to UNFICYP. The Foreign Office say they simply cannot afford our subscription of £25 million a year any more, and the MOD refuse to take it over. In the circumstances we may have to reduce our contribution significantly as early as this year. You will want to warn the Secretary General on this in confidence.

On terrorism and Chernobyl, I think that the Secretary General simply wishes to have an account of what passed at Tokyo. But you will want to ask him what role he sees the IAEA playing in the negotiation of an agreement on exchange of information in the case of nuclear accidents.

Among the other issues, you might discuss with him your forthcoming visit to Israel, and how it can best contribute to progress towards a Middle East settlement. He is reluctant to see the UN get involved in any new initiative without any prior assurances that it will be acceptable to the parties, and there is nothing in sight at present. He is likely to be cautious about the idea of a UN Special Representative on the West Bank for fear that the Israelis will simply refuse to cooperate.

On Southern Africa, you will want to urge him to give full time to the Eminent Persons' Group to make progress: it has already achieved more in six months than the UN in 30 years (though there are disturbing reports tonight that it has just had a most unsatisfactory meeting with Pik Botha).

On Lebanon, he will probably ask you to encourage the Israelis to find a way to remove their remaining troops from Lebanon. The UN are ready to conduct arms length negotiations with Israel and the various Lebanese factions on this. You might also mention the unfortunate case of Collett. We still have no confirmation that he is dead although the likelihood seems ever greater.

On the UN's Finances he has produced some savings. But the basic problem of failure to pay assessed contributions - particularly by the Russians to the UN's peacekeeping operations - remains. You will want to disabuse him of any hope that we will be prepared to pay additional contributions.

Perez de Cuellar's intentions for the future are not clear. He certainly will not run for a contested re-election as Secretary General when his term expires at the end of the year, but may agree to be drafted. There is no need for us to make any formal commitment to him at this stage.

Perez de Cuellar spent the weekend privately in London and Oxford. He will have met the Foreign Secretary immediately before his meeting with you. His other engagements include the Archbishop of Canterbury, a reception given by the UN

I attach your lunch-time speech.

C.D.P

(C. D. POWELL)
13 May 1986

JD3ALM

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
This is really a matter for the Foreign Secretary to raise, not you. But Yes and Dear Charles being inexhaustible, I expect you'll do it!
CDP 13/5

13 May 1986

Call by UN Secretary General: Joan Anstee

In advance of her discussion with Señor Perez de Cuellar tomorrow the Prime Minister might like some thoughts on how to handle the question of senior appointments in the UN Secretariat, notably the future of Miss Joan Anstee. This letter reflects discussion earlier today between Mr Eggar and Sir John Thomson; it has not been seen by the Foreign Secretary, but will be submitted to him tonight.

The Prime Minister is aware of the background to our unsuccessful attempts to persuade the UN Secretary General to appoint Miss Anstee as UN High Commissioner for Refugees and subsequently as Head of the UN Food Council.

The Secretary General has now told Sir John Thomson that he is thinking of promoting Miss Anstee (for whom he continues to claim he has the highest regard) in the following way. He would create a new job at Under Secretary General level with responsibility for drugs and a range of social subjects (as yet unspecified). He regards Miss Anstee as an ideal candidate for this post, given the wide experience of Latin America that she has had and the confidence she enjoys in that continent. She would also be used as an Ambassador at large in Latin America.

Miss Anstee's appointment would serve our interests well. Apart from the general objective of placing UK nationals in senior and influential posts in the UN, we would benefit in foreign policy terms (and indeed domestically) from her appointment to a high-profile job dealing with drugs. The Prime Minister may therefore wish to try to encourage the Secretary General in this direction, bearing in mind that he has failed to live up to our expectations with regard to Miss Anstee on the two previous occasions noted above. The Prime Minister might talk to the Secretary General along the following lines (replacing the points to make at brief no 13):

i) We are sorry that the Secretary General's idea of appointing Miss Anstee Head of the World Food Council did not come off;

ii) We share his high regard for Miss Anstee's talents;

iii) We attach considerable importance to the UN's activities in the drugs sphere, especially in Latin America;

/iv)

iv) We have heard that the Secretary General plans to appoint Miss Anstee to a senior job dealing with this subject;

v) We hope that these plans come to a successful conclusion, and we are ready to do anything we can to help.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 May 1986

CDP 13/5

Dear Charles

Official Visit of the UN Secretary General: 13-15 May

My earlier letter today transmitted briefing for the Secretary General's call on the Prime Minister on 14 May.

/ I enclose the promised further brief on the nuclear issue.

/ I also enclose a short brief on UN Administration and Coordination, on which the Prime Minister may wish to draw over lunch. The brief takes account of the conclusions of a UN Heads of Mission Conference held in the Foreign Office yesterday and today.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

dcpc
B/UP

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 May 1986

CDP
13/5

Dear Charles,

Official Visit of the UN Secretary-General, 13-15 May

I enclose briefing for the UN Secretary-General's call on the Prime Minister at 12.15 on 14 May. It is, inevitably, wide-ranging. Mrs Perez de Cuellar will join the Secretary-General for the lunch which the Prime Minister is hosting subsequently. My letter of 12 May covered participation in the talks.

Perez de Cuellar suggested in a meeting with British correspondents in New York on 8 May that he would wish to raise the Falklands, Cyprus, the Middle East, Southern Africa, the UN financial crisis, Iran/Iraq and Afghanistan. (The first four of these seem particularly suitable for discussion at No 10.) The Secretary-General also said that terrorism was 'a subject which had to be discussed'.

The Secretary-General placed particular emphasis in his press briefing on his wish to convey to the Prime Minister his impressions of recent discussions with the Argentine President and Foreign Minister in Buenos Aires. If the Prime Minister agrees, the Foreign Secretary will suggest that discussion of the Falklands be mainly reserved for the meeting at No 10.

The briefing in addition covers questions which are live at the UN (UN Special Session on Africa), or in which there is a particular UK interest (UN Secretary-Generalship, Joan Anstee). There is also a contingency brief on Waldheim and the case of the East German Klenner, who has been a possible East European candidate for 1987 Chairman of the UN Commission on Human Rights.

The Prime Minister last met the Secretary-General when she addressed the Commemorative Session of the General Assembly last October. Perez de Cuellar made an official visit to London in July 1982, when he had talks with the Prime Minister and was guest of honour at lunch at No 10. Mr & Mrs Perez de Cuellar have spent a private weekend in London and the

.../Secretary-General

Secretary-General will undertake speaking engagements in Cardiff and Oxford, with a visit to Atlantic College, before commencing the official part of his visit on the evening of 13 May.

The last two weeks have been bruising for the Secretary-General, with the UN General Assembly meeting in resumed session to consider the budget deficit and the Secretary-General's proposals for economies. His term expires at the end of this year and his comments on whether he would accept a second term have been ambivalent. It is clear that he will not run for re-election, but Sir John Thomson believes that he would accept office again if invited to do so by a sufficient number of UN members (including the Permanent Members of the Security Council). On present form he is likely to be the best candidate with a realistic chance of success, and it is therefore in our interests that he should take a positive attitude to a second term. At the same time it would be preferable to avoid making any overt commitment at this stage until we are clearer about how the land lies.

Since the above was typed I have seen UKMIS New York telegram no: 480 (enclosed), which casts light on the division of topics between No: 10 and the FCO. We shall supply a separate brief on nuclear matters following Chernobyl.

Yours ever

R N Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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13/5

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S VISIT

1. UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL GOULDING, WHO WAS DRAFTING A STEERING BRIEF FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S VISIT TO LONDON OVER THE WEEKEND, CONSULTED US ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF THE OFFICIAL TALKS WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR. HE WAS ANXIOUS IN PARTICULAR FOR A STEER ON WHICH SUBJECTS WOULD BE HANDLED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND WHICH BY YOURSELF.

2. ALTHOUGH WE HAD NO SPECIFIC GUIDANCE WE TOOK THE LINE THAT THE TWO QUESTIONS THAT WERE LIKELY TO DOMINATE THE DISCUSSION AT NUMBER 10 WERE THE FALKLANDS AND CYPRUS AND THAT THE OTHER SUBJECTS, NOTABLY THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA WOULD BE COVERED IN THE TALKS AT THE FCO. GOULDING SAID THAT THIS WAS ALSO HIS EXPECTATION THOUGH HE KNEW THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS TWO ''TOKYO TOPICS'' WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, IN ADDITION TO THE FALKLANDS AND CYPRUS: THESE WERE TERRORISM AND NUCLEAR MATTERS FOLLOWING CHERNOBYL. GOULDING DID NOT WISH TO BE DRAWN TOO FAR ON EITHER OF THESE SUBJECTS BUT DID SAY THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD SOME IDEAS ON TERRORISM AND HAD BEEN GIVEN SPECIFIC CLEARANCE BY BLIX OF THE IAEA TO RAISE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE.

3. PLEASE INFORM SIR J THOMSON WHOSE DESPATCH OF 8 MAY ON THE UN AND TERRORISM IS DIRECTLY RELEVANT.

MAXEY

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PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/PUS
MR SLATER

COPIES TO:
MR J. THOMPSON,
C/O HEADS OF MISSION SECTION.

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BM

a PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 May 1986

OFFICIAL VISIT BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL: 13 - 15 MAY

Thank you for your letter of 12 May about participation in the Prime Minister's talks with the United Nations Secretary-General.

The Prime Minister will be reluctant to hold talks with so many present but I agree that in the circumstances there is little alternative.

(C.D. Powell)

Robert Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

DSG

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 May 1986

Dear Charles,

Official Visit by the UN Secretary-General: 13-15 May

The UN Secretary-General is calling on the Secretary of State at 1100 on 14 May and will then proceed to No 10 for talks with the Prime Minister at 1215. Sir John Thomson is returning from New York for the Secretary-General's visit and the Secretary of State recommends that he attend Perez de Cuellar's meeting with the Prime Minister. This would create a four-a-side format which is slightly larger than ideal. But this same format was adopted when Perez de Cuellar paid his earlier official visit to the UK in 1982, and the Secretary of State thinks it would be useful for Sir John Thomson again to participate.

The Secretary-General would in these circumstances be accompanied by Mr Goulding (Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs); Mr Alvaro de Soto (Special Assistant to the Secretary-General); and either Dr Erik Jensen (Head of the UN Information Centre in London) or M. Francois Giuliani (the Secretary-General's spokesman).

We shall forward tomorrow the briefing for the Secretary-General's call.

Yours ever

Robert Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CDP

CDP

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 May 1986

This is just a summary of the PM's speech to the UN 40th Anniversary.
CDP
12/5

Dear Charles

Visit of Perez de Cuellar

You asked to see speech notes for the Prime Minister's use at lunch on 14 May as soon as possible.

I therefore now enclose the notes which we have drafted. These have not yet been seen by Sir Geoffrey Howe, but will be submitted to him in parallel tonight.

I shall write separately about arrangements for the meeting and lunch, and the full briefing will also follow next week.

Yours ever

Robin Culshaw

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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NOTES FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT LUNCH ON 14 MAY

1. Welcome your second official visit to UK. On same occasion four years ago, I said that problems facing international community enormous: but that future of the UN could not be in better hands. Proved right on both counts.

2. Past four years have been difficult. Wars continue in many parts of world. Terrible famine in Africa. Human rights abuses in numerous countries. And problems of international drug trade and violent terrorism. In these dangerous times you have led Organisation with energy, integrity and good sense. Valuable personal contribution to easing tension in many areas. Perseverance with intractable problems an example to us all.

3. UN itself not immune from problems. Sterility of many General Assembly debates. Declaratory nature of many resolutions. Misuse of Security Council for rhetoric and propaganda. Politicisation of UN Agencies. And now Organisation facing financial crisis.

4. UK Government long been concerned about failure of certain Member States to pay full share towards UN activities. Peacekeeping a case in point. Have also deplored tendency of UN members to land Secretariat with superfluous conferences, pointless studies. Not

only creates unnecessary expenditure. Also undermines consensus on which effective UN must be based. Present crisis, though unwelcome, brings with it opportunity to establish broader agreement on use of UN resources.

5. We believe this task of major importance. Remain committed to effective UN. Need to build on Organisation's many achievements:

- Security Council's role in many crises

- International peacekeeping

- Codification of international law

- Coordination of humanitarian work

- Cooperation on technical issues

6. Your visit a valuable opportunity to hear your views on some of these questions, and on wider problems facing world community. As always they displayed both imaginination and realism. Have valued greatly our contacts during the past four years. Look forward to continuing our close cooperation [in the months - and perhaps years? - ahead]

File

bc: Sir P. Cradock

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 January 1986

UN SECRETARY GENERAL:
INVITATION TO VISIT THE UNITED KINGDOM

You wrote on 5 December about Senor Perez de Cuellar's forthcoming visit to the United Kingdom. My reply appears to have gone astray (some have gone so far as to suggest that I never wrote it!).

The Prime Minister could see Senor Perez de Cuellar for talks at 1215 hours followed by lunch at 1300 on Wednesday, 14 May.

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Charles.

Visit by Perez de Cuellar.

it does not appear that we have replied to the attached letter.

Julie

2.1.86

cc PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 December 1985

Dear Charles,

UN Secretary-General: Invitation to Visit UK

Sr Perez de Cuellar will visit the United Kingdom next year to deliver the Montagu Burton lecture at Oxford University, probably on 13 May. This visit may well be his last to the UK as Secretary-General, as he is due to complete his term of office at the end of 1986. The Foreign Secretary recommends, therefore, that we invite him as a guest of the Government.

The Prime Minister has traditionally offered hospitality to Secretaries-General of the UN paying official visits to this country. In 1980 Mrs Thatcher hosted a dinner and reception in honour of Dr Waldheim. In 1982, when Sr Perez de Cuellar paid his only previous official visit to the UK, she hosted a lunch. If Sr Perez de Cuellar were to arrive in the UK on 12 May and spend the following day in Oxford, the Prime Minister might consider offering lunch or dinner for him on 14 May or lunch on 15 May. The Secretary-General's programme might in addition include a call on The Queen, and talks with Sir Geoffrey Howe.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

U. NATIONS
SEC GENERAL VISITS
PT 2

EL.

cc MASTER SET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 January 1985

Dear Len,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL

I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's meeting with Senor Perez de Cuellar earlier today.

Follow-up is required on Cyprus, on which the Prime Minister told the Secretary-General that we would be ready to take action with the Turkish Government to urge them to restrain the Turkish Cypriots from any irreversible action to consolidate UDI; and with all parties to encourage them to show flexibility in advance of further high level talks. I should be grateful for draft messages from the Prime Minister to Mr Ozal and President Kyprianou. We are also committed to considering, in slower time, action to rally the Canadians and Danes against any tendency to withdraw from UNFICYP.

I should record that the Cypriot High Commissioner telephoned this afternoon (with President Kyprianou audible in the background) to enquire about the Secretary-General's talks with the Prime Minister. I said that Perez de Cuellar had expressed great regret at the failure to reach agreement in New York and had attributed blame to both sides. But he had also spoken of his determination to continue his efforts to achieve a solution and to hold a further round of high level talks. The Prime Minister had welcomed this. The High Commissioner said that President Kyprianou wished to express his warmest thanks to the Prime Minister for the active interest which she had taken in the progress of the high level meeting. He added that there had been some unfortunate and one-sided leaks from the UN Secretariat about the high-level talks. I said that this was for the Cyprus Government to pursue with the Secretary-General.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(C.D. Powell)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 23 JANUARY AT 11.30

Present:

Prime Minister
Foreign Secretary
Mr C D Powell

Senor Perez de Cuellar
Mr Brian Urquhart (Under Secretary-General)
Dr Jensen (Head of the United Nations Information Office in London)

The Prime Minister complimented the Secretary-General on his speech in Edinburgh and referred to the forthcoming 40th anniversary of the United Nations. The Secretary-General said that he hoped that as many Heads of State and Government as possible would attend the 40th anniversary celebrations. He noted that President Reagan had attended all General Debates over the past three years. He expected him to attend again this year.

Cyprus

The Prime Minister said that she had been disappointed that the high level talks which the Secretary-General had organised on 19/20 January between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders had failed to reach agreement when one seemed so near. She had told President Kyprianou, when he visited London shortly before the talks, that he should concentrate on a limited number of key issues, in particular the quality of the territory to be returned to the Greek Cypriots and the veto powers in the constitution, leaving other contentious matters such as troop withdrawals for a later stage. He had clearly not heeded this advice. The Secretary-General said that from the beginning there had been two different interpretations of the documentation which he

had prepared for the meeting. The two parties were aware of this and had come to the meeting in the full knowledge of it. So it could not be said that he had misled them. He agreed with the Prime Minister that President Kyprianou had not handled the meeting at all well. The Secretary-General added that he had in fact persuaded Denktash to agree amendments to the text on the legislature, particularly as concerned the Upper House. Denktash had withdrawn this concession when President Kyprianou had insisted on an immediate commitment on withdrawal of Turkish troops. But it would be wrong to blame President Kyprianou alone: the fault lay on both sides.

The Secretary-General continued that he was not discouraged despite the set back. He hoped to arrange further high level talks at the end of February or in early March. Denktash had refused to commit himself to a date but had subsequently made clear that he was ready for a further meeting under the Secretary-General's auspices. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that his impression was that reactions in both Greece and Turkey were less intemperate than might have been feared. Both sides appeared to want the Secretary-General to remain in business. Mr Urquhart said that neither side had any alternative.

The Secretary-General said that he wanted to ask the Prime Minister for help in preventing any precipitate or irreversible move by Denktash such as holding elections in the Turkish Cypriot zone. He would be making the same request of President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl. The Prime Minister said that she supposed such action should be taken with Turkey. The Secretary-General confirmed this. His only useful negotiations had been with the Turkish Government not with the Turkish Cypriots. In his view, Denktash was not interested in a solution. The Prime Minister said that she always had in mind that both President Kyprianou and Denktash would lose personally from restoration of a unitary state in Cyprus and might not really want it. The Secretary-General agreed that life would be easier if both of them were off the scene.

The Foreign Secretary asked about the timing of action with the Turkish Government. The United States' view appeared to be against making a move too soon. On the other hand, he recognised the risk that Denktash might be tempted to make a move to consolidate UDI rapidly. The Secretary-General said that early action was indispensible. The Prime Minister said that such action should be directed both at discouraging precipitate moves by Denktash and at encouraging flexibility by both parties before the next high level meeting. In response to a question from the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary-General said that there was no doubt in his mind that Turkish troops would have to withdraw as soon as a provisional Government started functioning. But the discussion of this should be left until later in the negotiations.

The Secretary-General said that he feared that some countries such as Denmark and Canada might lose heart at the failure of the high level talks and consider withdrawal from UNFICYP. He hoped that we would be ready to make discreet démarches to prevent this. The Prime Minister observed that the risk of a weakening commitment to UNFICYP was a useful card to play with President Kyprianou. We would consider what action we would take to help the Secretary-General. She was pleased that he was resolved to continue his efforts and could count on our support. In reply to a question from the Foreign Secretary about the timing of a further high level meeting, the Secretary-General said that his aim was to arrange such a meeting in March. But he would not rush to set a date. He intended to send his special representative back to Cyprus to continue discussions.

Lebanon

Mr Urquhart said that, after two months of fruitless negotiations with the Lebanese Government about their withdrawal with Lebanon, the Israeli Government had opted for a unilateral declaration of withdrawal. In his view this was a wise move. Only by confronting the Lebanese Government with deadlines

would it ever be possible to get them to take decisions. Mr Urquhart continued that the Lebanese had at first wanted a "massive" involvement of UN troops north of the Litani. But this idea had run into problems with the Syrians. The Lebanese had tried to persuade the Secretary-General to propose it but had been told that this was not on. He had subsequently encouraged the Lebanese to go back into talks with the Israelis at Naquora to exchange military information about withdrawal. The first round of such talks had gone well and there would be a further session on 24 January. At the same time he had suggested that, if they were unable to agree upon a request for a UN presence for the whole of the withdrawal process, they should put forward to the Security Council an interim request for assistance in the period between the Israelis' departure from Sidon on 18 February and the later stages of their withdrawal. Mr Urquhart continued that the recent bomb attack against the Sunni leader in Sidon had been a bad sign: Saad had been working for agreement between the communities and the prevention of bloodshed following Israel's withdrawal.

Mr Urquhart said that he did not know whether it was possible to get the Lebanese to help themselves: but he had never seen Israel so sensible, flexible and constructive. What was required now was a straightforward interim request from the Lebanese for United Nations involvement. The Foreign Secretary asked whether this would relate specifically to UNIFIL or simply to unspecified United Nations involvement. The Prime Minister recalled that UNIFIL was not a peace-keeping force. Too much should not be expected of it. Mr Urquhart said that because of Lebanese anxiety about the area of UNIFIL's deployment, they would prefer to talk of an enlarged UN presence without specifying its nature. The United Nations had a fair number of observers available and could put these together with units drawn from UNIFIL to form a temporary force under another name. The Syrians were reasonably positive towards the idea.

The Secretary-General observed that any new involvement

by the United Nations would require the backing of the Security Council. The Prime Minister asked what incentive there was for the Syrians to agree to this. Mr Urquhart said that the Syrians would wish to avoid the collapse of the Lebanese Government. Indeed there was an ironical coincidence of interest between the Syrians and Israelis in a stable situation in South Lebanon.

United Nations Finances

Mr Urquhart said that he was very worried about the United Nations' financial situation. Reinforcement of the UN presence in South Lebanon must, so far as possible, come from within existing strengths and funds. The Prime Minister enquired why the Secretary-General did not tackle the Soviet Union about contributing financially to UNIFIL. The Secretary-General said that he did so frequently. Indeed the Soviet Union was so far behind with its United Nations contributions that it was close to the point that it could technically be excluded from the General Assembly. The Prime Minister said that maximum use should be made of this fact to cause the Russians to suffer international disgrace.

Argentina/Falklands

The Secretary-General said that he hesitated to raise the subject but had been asked to do so by the Argentine Government. The Prime Minister interjected that she would save the Secretary-General any embarrassment by raising it herself. The Secretary-General continued that he had been asked to give the Prime Minister an assurance that it was not true that the Argentine Government were buying new arms. Any deliveries were mostly spare parts and came under earlier contracts. The Prime Minister said that this was simply not true. There was firm evidence that they were buying arms of a highly sophisticated sort, some of themfrom Israel. The Foreign Secretary said that a high proportion of Argentine GNP went on arms and equipment. The Secretary-General asked if he could make use of the information which the Prime Minister had

given him. The Prime Minister said that it should be treated with discretion.

The Prime Minister said that we continued to seek normalisation of financial and economic relations. Our banks had played their part in the Paris Club meeting last week. We would now look for ways to reduce commercial restrictions in the Paris Club context. But Argentina had promised as long ago as September 1982 to withdraw financial restrictions. This promise had still not been honoured. The basic problem was that President Alfonsin was not strong enough to deliver on his good intentions. Democracy in Argentina was very fragile. The Secretary-General agreed that President Alfonsin was a man of good faith but could not make his views stick. The Prime Minister recalled the history of the Berne talks. It remained our position that there could be no question of discussing sovereignty. The only practical way forward was by restoring commercial and financial contacts. The Secretary-General commented that the amendment of the Falklands Constitution to include a specific reference to self-determination had caused the Argentines unease. The Prime Minister pointed out that the passage on self-determination had been taken from the relevant United Nations Declaration and ought to be acceptable to everyone.

The meeting ended at 1220 pm.

C.D.P.

23 January 1985

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LECTURE AT EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY

'VISION AND REALITY: THE UNITED NATIONS AT FORTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW'

22 JANUARY 1985

MR. VICE-CHANCELLOR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

IT IS AN HONOUR FOR ME TO SPEAK TO YOU AT THIS OLD AND FAMOUS UNIVERSITY SET IN A CITY JUSTLY KNOWN AS THE "ATHENS OF THE NORTH" BECAUSE OF ITS ROLE AS A MAJOR EUROPEAN SEAT OF LEARNING. I COME FROM THE NEW WORLD AND FROM A NEW ORGANIZATION BUT THE ONE DERIVES ITS CIVILIZATION AND THE OTHER ITS FORMATIVE CONCEPTS FROM WHAT WAS BUILT OVER CENTURIES HERE IN THE OLD WORLD. THE IDEA OF A LEGAL ORDER, WHICH IS THE BASIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, HAS BEEN A PRINCIPAL MOTIF OF EUROPE'S POLITICAL EVOLUTION AND IT HAS BEEN GIVEN SHAPE AND BEEN AMPLIFIED BY UNIVERSITIES SUCH AS THIS. IT IS WITHIN THE WALLS OF INSTITUTIONS LIKE YOURS THAT MATURE JUDGEMENTS MUST BE MADE ON WHAT WE, WHO ARE ACTIVE IN THE FIELD OF DAY-TO-DAY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS, HAVE ACCOMPLISHED AND WHAT WE HAVE YET TO ACHIEVE.

ON THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WHICH WILL BE OBSERVED THIS YEAR, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL, QUITE NATURALLY, SEEK TO EVALUATE THE PAST RECORD, THE CONTINUED RAISON D'ETRE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.

THE UNITED NATIONS IS ONE OF THE GREAT REPOSITORIES OF THE VISIONS AND HOPES OF MANKIND. AMIDST THE RUINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND HAVING WITNESSED THE FAILURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM WHICH EXISTED TILL THEN TO PREVENT DEVASTATING CONFLICTS, THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD ARTICULATED THE URGE TO MAKE A NEW BEGINNING TOWARDS WORLD ORDER AND PEACE AND BUILD A NEW STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE SHAPE OF THE UNITED NATIONS. SET AGAINST THE PERFECT WORLD OF HARMONY AND CONCORD WHICH WAS ENVISIONED BY ITS FOUNDERS, THE ORGANIZATION HAS PERHAPS FALLEN SHORT OF EXPECTATIONS. HOWEVER, IN THE REAL WORLD IN WHICH IT HAS FUNCTIONED - THE WORLD OF GREAT-POWER TENSIONS, THE ARMS RACE, COLLISIONS OF NATIONAL INTERESTS, ECONOMIC DISPARITIES, POVERTY AND DROUGHT AND FAMINE - IT HAS ENDEAVOURED STRENUOUSLY, AS MUCH AS ITS MEMBER STATES PERMITTED, TO REDUCE THE CAUSES OF TENSION AND CONFLICT, PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL EQUITY, PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS AND ADVANCE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS.

A FACT OF PARAMOUNT HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE NEEDS TO BE KEPT IN MIND IN THIS CONTEXT. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS BASED THE SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY ON THE ASSUMPTION OF UNANIMITY AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND CONCERTED ACTION BY THEM IN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. HOWEVER, SOON AFTER THE CHARTER CAME INTO FORCE, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS TOOK SUCH A COURSE AS TO MAKE THE ASSUMPTION WHOLLY UNREALISTIC. IN VIEW OF THIS, WHAT IS SURPRISING IS NOT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAS NOT BEEN AS EFFECTIVE AS THE CHARTER ENVISAGED IN PREVENTING AND RESOLVING CONFLICT; WHAT IS NOTEWORTHY IS THAT, DESPITE THE HANDICAP OF DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE GREAT POWERS, DESPITE THE POLITICAL GULF BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST AND THE ECONOMIC DIVISION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH, THE UNITED NATIONS HAS PERSEVERED IN MAINTAINING A FOCUS ON THE PRIME REQUISITES OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE, JUSTICE AND PROGRESS AND HAS MADE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE HUMAN CONDITION IN DIVERSE FIELDS. A RECOGNITION OF ITS ACHIEVEMENTS IS NOT MERELY A MATTER OF FAIRNESS; IT IS ALSO A QUESTION OF VIEWING THE HUMAN SITUATION IN PERSPECTIVE.

SOME OF THESE ACHIEVEMENTS COULD NOT EVEN HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED IN CONDITIONS WHICH PREVAILED AT THE TIME THE CHARTER WAS FRAMED. THE UNITED NATIONS PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE DECOLONIZATION PROCESS WHICH, MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, BROUGHT ABOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL STATES IN PLACE OF ONE GOVERNED BY ONLY A FEW. THAT THIS GREATEST OF ALL POLITICAL TRANSITIONS IN HUMAN HISTORY WAS BY AND LARGE PEACEFUL IS NOT A FACT OF NEGLIGIBLE IMPORTANCE. TODAY, THANKS TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE WORLD ORGANIZATION, PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS CONTINUE TO HELP CONTAIN CONFLICT IN A NUMBER OF REGIONS. AGAIN, THANKS TO THE UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES ARE HELPING TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED COUNTRIES. MILLIONS OF REFUGEES HAVE OVER THE YEARS OWED THEIR VERY EXISTENCE AND CHANCES FOR A BETTER LIFE TO THE UNITED NATIONS. THIS AND MUCH MORE IS BEING DONE AT AN ANNUAL COST WHICH IS LESS THAN THE BUDGETS OF SOME OF THE MAJOR CITIES OF THE WORLD AND A TINY FRACTION OF WHAT IS BEING RELENTLESSLY SPENT ON THE PILING UP OF ARMAMENTS.

FURTHER, AND BY NO MEANS LEAST, THE UNITED NATIONS HAS LABOURED PAINSTAKINGLY, AND SUCCESSFULLY, TO BUILD A GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER. IN A HIGHLY COMPLEX WORLD OF SOVEREIGN STATES AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS, ONLY SUCH AN ORDER CAN PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE AND THE NECESSARY FRAMEWORK FOR MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATION. DESPITE ITS BASIC IMPORTANCE, THIS IS AN AREA LITTLE KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC AT LARGE. MANY REAL ACHIEVEMENTS IN THIS FIELD HAVE PASSED ALMOST UNNOTICED. I WILL TRY TO SKETCH SOME OF THEM VERY BRIEFLY TODAY.

IT WAS WILLIAM PITT THE ELDER WHO SAID THAT WHERE LAWS END, TYRANNY BEGINS. THIS IS AS TRUE OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS IS OF NATIONAL COMMUNITIES. PEOPLE OF WISDOM AND GOOD WILL HAVE LONG HAD A VISION OF A WORLD WHERE NATIONS, LIKE INDIVIDUALS, WOULD OPERATE WITHIN A COMPLETE, COHERENT AND VIABLE SYSTEM OF LAW, IMPARTIALLY ADMINISTERED AND ENFORCED. THIS VISION WAS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL MOTIVATING FORCES BEHIND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LARGE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AT THE APEX OF WHICH STANDS THE UNITED NATIONS. THESE ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE UNITED NATIONS, ARE BASED ON LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - INTERNATIONAL TREATIES. THE UNITED NATIONS IS NOT A SUPER STATE, WITH FULL EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POWERS. IT WOULD BE A GROSS MISREADING OF THE ORGANIZATION'S POTENTIAL AND ACHIEVEMENTS TO THINK OF IT AS A SOVEREIGN ENTITY, WITH THE POWERS OF SUCH AN ENTITY. THE ORGANIZATION IS AN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION OF A PERMANENT CHARACTER, DERIVING ITS FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FROM AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY WHICH SPELLS OUT AND LIMITS THOSE FUNCTIONS.

EACH OF THE ORGANIZATIONS WAS MEANT, IN ITS OWN WAY AND BY ITS OWN PARTICULAR MEANS, TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT, IN THE WORDS OF THE PREAMBLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, OF "CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH JUSTICE AND RESPECT FOR OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM TREATIES AND OTHER SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CAN BE MAINTAINED". THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH CONDITIONS IS A TASK WHICH, BY ITS VERY NATURE, CAN NEVER BE COMPLETED AT ANY GIVEN POINT IN HISTORY. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS STEADY MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE GOAL. THEREFORE, WE MUST TAKE STOCK OF THE DIRECTION OF OUR EFFORT AND OF WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND WHAT MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE.

INTERNATIONAL LAW, OF COURSE, HAS BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR A LONG TIME. A FAMOUS INTERNATIONAL JURIST FROM SCOTLAND, LORD MCNAIR, ONCE REMARKED THAT IT WAS A DELUSION THAT GOVERNMENTS IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ACTED INDEPENDENTLY AND CAPRICIOUSLY AND WITHOUT REFERENCE TO LEGAL PRINCIPLE. HE ADDED THAT EVEN THE ROUTINE BUSINESS OF DIPLOMACY WAS CONDUCTED AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF LAW. MY OWN EXPERIENCE IN A LIFETIME OF DIPLOMACY, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS, CONFIRMS THIS OBSERVATION. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, NO NATION HAS EVER ARGUED IN UNITED NATIONS DEBATES THAT IT WAS ABOVE THE LAW. IN FACT, A VERY LARGE PART OF THE DISCUSSION AT THE UNITED NATIONS, EVEN ON THE MOST EXPLOSIVE POLITICAL ISSUES, IS DEVOTED TO A KIND OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION AND TO THE INVOCATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN DEFENCE OF CERTAIN POSITIONS IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. NATIONS MAY ARGUE ABOUT WHAT THE LAW IS AND HOW IT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED IN A GIVEN CASE BUT THEY DO NOT ARGUE ABOUT ITS VERY EXISTENCE. HOWEVER, THE LAW REFERRED TO BY LORD MCNAIR WAS DEVELOPED, LARGELY ON A CUSTOMARY BASIS, FIRST IN EUROPE AND THEN, AS THEY BECAME INDEPENDENT, IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE AMERICAS. IT POSSESSED NO INSTITUTIONALIZED FRAMEWORK OF A PERMANENT CHARACTER FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ADAPTATION ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS OR FOR ADJUDICATION BY A STANDING COURT SYSTEM. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE LAW HAD BEEN CODIFIED AND SYSTEMATIZED AT ALL, IT WAS ON AN OCCASIONAL AND AD HOC BASIS AT CONFERENCES CONVENED BY INDIVIDUAL STATES. LIKEWISE, TO THE EXTENT THAT IT EXISTED, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION HAD PROCEEDED LARGELY BY WAY OF AD HOC ARBITRATIONS. THIS WAS THE RUDIMENTARY WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS WAS BORN. COMPARE IT WITH THE WORLD OF TODAY, AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS IMPORTANT FIELD STANDS IN SHARP RELIEF.

IT IS QUITE CLEAR FROM THE PREAMBLE AND ARTICLE 1 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER THAT ITS FRAMERS FULLY RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ATTAINING THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE ORGANIZATION. TO THIS END, AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE WAS ESTABLISHED AS A PRINCIPAL ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WAS MANDATED TO ENCOURAGE THE PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS CODIFICATION. BUILDING ON CONCEPTS PARTIALLY PERCEIVED AND REALIZED BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER THUS MADE PROVISION IN BROAD OUTLINE FOR AN INSTITUTIONALIZED FRAMEWORK FOR MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FOR INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION. HOW THIS FRAMEWORK HAS FUNCTIONED AND DEVELOPED IN PRACTICE SHOULD BE A MATTER OF THE GREATEST INTEREST TO ALL WHO ARE CONCERNED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER.

INTERNATIONAL LAW, LIKE THE UNITED NATIONS, HAS HAD TO FACE A PERIOD OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE UNPARALLELED IN HISTORY. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER HAS TAKEN PLACE AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF A THREE-FOLD INCREASE IN THE SIZE OF THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS. NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES TODAY ACCOUNT FOR MORE THAN TWO-THIRDS OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE ORGANIZATION.

AS THESE STATES HAVE TAKEN THEIR PLACE IN AN ESTABLISHED PRE-EXISTING ORDER, IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT THEY SHOULD BRING EW CONSIDERATIONS INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAT ORDER AND CALL FOR A REVIEW OF WHAT HAD BEEN CREATED WITHOUT THEIR PARTICIPATION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE AREAS OF INTER-STATE ACTIVITY TO BE REGULATED BY LAW HAVE EXPANDED BEYOND THE PURELY FORMAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTO NUMEROUS SPHERES OF HUMAN CONCERN. OUTER SPACE, THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, THE SEA-BED, ANTARCTICA, DISARMAMENT, THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND MODERN COMMUNICATIONS ARE SOME OF THE NEW FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. THERE IS AN UNMISTAKABLE URGE ON THE PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ESTABLISH RULES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF STATES IN ALL THESE AREAS. THERE IS ALSO A GROWING RECOGNITION THAT, TO BE EFFECTIVE, SUCH RULES MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATE IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS AND DISPUTE-SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES.

SOON AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR, SOME OUTSTANDING AND PRESCIENT JURISTS PREDICTED A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RENOVATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE PANORAMA OFFERED TODAY BY THE BREADTH AND SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, ITS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES, AND SEPARATE REGIONAL BODIES SUCH AS THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, AMPLY BEAR OUT THEIR VIEW. WHILE QUANTITATIVE AMPLIFICATION IS THE MOST VISIBLE CHANGE THAT HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN IMPORTANT QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH POINT TOWARDS AN INCREASING ACCEPTANCE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

FROM ITS INCEPTION, THE UNITED NATIONS HAS VIEWED THE CODIFICATION AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A PROGRAMMATIC IMPERATIVE. OF COURSE, THE IDEA OF DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE RESTATEMENT OF EXISTING RULES OR THROUGH THE FORMULATION OF NEW RULES IS NOT NEW. THE WORK OF CODIFICATION WAS PROPOSED AS FAR BACK AS THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BY ENLIGHTENED THINKERS AND PHILOSOPHERS SUCH AS JEREMY BENTHAM AND IT BEGAN TO TAKE HOLD AS A MOVEMENT AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. HOWEVER, IT WAS WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION IN 1947 THAT A SYSTEMATIC PROGRAMME WAS LAUNCHED TOWARDS THIS END. THE PROGRAMME WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DEVELOPED THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF OTHER PERMANENT OR AD HOC BODIES TAILORED TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE PARTICULAR AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN WITH WHICH THEY WERE ENTRUSTED.

IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION HAS BEEN, AND CONTINUES TO BE, THE CENTRE OF CODIFICATION ACTIVITY FOR PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ITS TRADITIONAL SENSE. CONSISTING OF THIRTY-FOUR EXPERTS, ELECTED IN AN INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND NOT AS REPRESENTATIVES OF GOVERNMENTS, THE COMMISSION HAS BEEN ABLE, OVER THE YEARS, TO DEVELOP A COLLEGIATE SENSE OF SOLIDARITY WHICH LENDS GREAT AUTHORITY TO ITS WORK. IT IS LARGE ENOUGH TO ENCOMPASS ALL THE CURRENT IDEAS AND CONCERNS ON THE TRADITIONAL SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

BY SUBMITTING ITS DRAFTS AT VARIOUS STAGES OF PREPARATION TO THE SCRUTINY OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IT IS ABLE TO PRODUCE FINAL TEXTS WHICH ARE USUALLY ACCEPTABLE TO NEARLY ALL THE VARIOUS SEGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. THESE DRAFTS OFTEN TAKE MANY YEARS TO PREPARE, BUT THIS IS SURELY COMPENSATED FOR BY THEIR VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS ACCEPTANCE. IT IS PERHAPS A MARK OF THE RECOGNITION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION AND A SIGN OF THE MATURING OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER THAT THE COMMISSION'S WORK OFTEN TENDS TO BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED.

THE COMMISSION'S ENDEAVOURS HAVE LED TO THE SUCCESSFUL CONSTRUCTION OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF MANY OF THE BASIC PARTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. LET ME CITE A FEW EXAMPLES.
DAY-TO-DAY RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES ARE CONDUCTED BY DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS. THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS, CONCLUDED BY THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE BASIS OF DRAFTS PREPARED BY THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, ARE NOW THE CORNERSTONES ON WHICH SUCH DAY-TO-DAY RELATIONS SUBSIST.
AS THE LAW OF CONTRACT IS FUNDAMENTAL TO PRIVATE LAW, SO THE LAW OF TREATIES IS FUNDAMENTAL TO INTERNATIONAL LAW. THIS, AGAIN, HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CODIFIED BY THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES.

THE GROUNDS FOR THE INVALIDITY OR NULLITY OF TREATIES WERE PREVIOUSLY AMONG THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL PARTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. THEY ARE DETERMINED BY THE VIENNA CONVENTION, WHICH ALSO SETS UP MECHANISMS FOR DECIDING ANY DISPUTE WHICH MIGHT ARISE OUT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONVENTION IN THESE MATTERS IN PARTICULAR CASES. THE COMMISSION WAS ALSO THE AUTHOR OF THE 1958 GENEVA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, WHICH CODIFIED THE LAW THEN APPLICABLE TO MUCH OF THE GLOBE UNTIL THE CHANGING CONSTITUENCY OF THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS AND POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS REQUIRED THE ELABORATION OF A NEW CONVENTION COVERING ALL ASPECTS OF THE LAW OF THE SEA.

FUNDAMENTAL AS IT MAY BE IN THE FIELD OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION DOES NOT, BY ANY MEANS, EXHAUST THE WHOLE PICTURE. IN THE FIELD OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE COUNTERPART OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, HAS MADE STRIKING CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ELIMINATION OF LEGAL OBSTACLES TO THE FLOW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE THROUGH ITS ATTEMPT TO UNIFY AND HARMONIZE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE LAW OF TRADE.
THE COMMISSION, NOW WELL-KNOWN AS UNCITRAL, HAS AN ESTABLISHED REPUTATION AS THE CORE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL BODY IN THIS FIELD.

THIS IS PARTLY BECAUSE OF ITS SEVERAL PROMISING ACHIEVEMENTS, SUCH AS THE PREPARATION OF THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES WHICH ARE NOW EXTENSIVELY USED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD IN A VARIETY OF CONTEXTS: FOR EXAMPLE, THE CURRENT IRANIAN-UNITED STATES ARBITRATION WHICH IS ONE OF THE LARGEST EVER UNDERTAKEN, AND THE COMMISSION'S SUCCESS IN PREPARING THE VALUABLE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION FOR CONTRACTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS OF 1980, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO ENTER INTO FORCE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

THE COMMISSION'S CO-ORDINATING ROLE HAS ALSO BEEN MUCH EMPHASIZED IN RECENT YEARS. MANY INTERNATIONAL BODIES CONCERNED WITH TRADE ARE RESPONDING FAVOURABLY TO ITS MANDATE IN ORDER TO ENHANCE EFFICIENCY IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THEIR MUTUAL GOALS THROUGH CONCERTED EFFORTS. I HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THIS COMMISSION, WHICH CONSISTS OF 36 MEMBER STATES ELECTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE BASIS OF GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION, WILL HELP IN A PRAGMATIC MANNER TO CREATE A BETTER LEGAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH INTERNATIONAL TRADE CAN DEVELOP FOR THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD.

QUITE APART FROM THE WORK OF THESE TWO PERMANENT COMMISSIONS, ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH LAW-MAKING ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ITSELF OR ITS AD HOC COMMITTEES AND CONFERENCES. THIS PROCESS OF LAW-MAKING, AS DISTINCT FROM PURELY CODIFYING, HAS RESULTED IN SEVERAL NOTABLE ACHIEVEMENTS IN SUCH DIVERSE FIELDS AS OUTER SPACE, HUMAN RIGHTS, NARCOTICS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA.

THE WHOLE OF SPACE LAW HAS BEEN MADE UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND IT REPRESENTS A VERY SOLID ACHIEVEMENT IN WHAT WILL BE A NEW FRONTIER FOR GENERATIONS TO COME. FIVE CONVENTIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN CONCLUDED BY THE UNITED NATIONS. TWO OF BASIC IMPORTANCE ARE THE TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE EXPLORATION AND USES OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES AND THE AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES. THESE INSTRUMENTS PROVIDE A RATIONAL AND AGREED BASIS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACTIVITIES IN SPACE AND THUS LIMIT THE POTENTIALITY FOR CONFLICT IN THIS AREA.

THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THEM SEEK PROGRESSIVELY TO LIMIT THE POTENTIAL MILITARY USES OF OUTER SPACE BY PROHIBITING THE ORBITING OF NUCLEAR OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR THEIR STATIONING ON CELESTIAL BODIES. THEY ALSO PROVIDE THAT THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES SHALL BE USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

THE RECENTLY ADOPTED UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA REPRESENTS A NOTABLE MILESTONE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF ITS SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE PROCEDURES OF NEGOTIATION WHICH WERE UTILISED FOR ITS FORMULATION. IT IS NOT GENERALLY REALIZED THAT THIS CONVENTION IS IN VERY LARGE PART THE PRODUCT OF A CONSENSUS PROCEDURE RATHER THAN MAJORITY VOTING.

ACHIEVING CONSENSUS IN A BROAD MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK SUCH AS THE UNITED NATIONS IS INFINITELY MORE DIFFICULT AND REQUIRES MORE PATIENCE AND AN ACCOMMODATING ATTITUDE THAN OBTAINING A MAJORITY VOTE. BY THAT VERY TOKEN, ITS RESULTS ARE LIKELY TO BE MUCH MORE SATISFACTORY. INDEED, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS METHOD OF NEGOTIATION ON ISSUES OF A GLOBAL CHARACTER IS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD NUMBER OF 159 SIGNATURES FROM ALL REGIONS AND FROM ALL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GROUPINGS WHICH THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION HAS OBTAINED.

THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR TO THE PROCESS OF CONSENSUS-BUILDING AT THE CONFERENCE.
THROUGH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION REGARDING NAVIGATION, MARINE POLLUTION, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND THE EXTENDED JURISDICTION OVER THE RESOURCES OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF,
THE UNITED KINGDOM COULD CERTAINLY BE AMONG THOSE STATES WHICH STAND TO GAIN THE MOST FROM THE CONVENTION. THE SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES THROUGH CONVENTIONAL LAW NOW PROVIDES FOR GREATER CERTAINTY THAN MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE CASE UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW. INDEED, ISSUES RESULTING FROM OVERLAPPING OR CONFLICTING CLAIMS FOR DEEP SEA-BED MINING SITES REINFORCE THE NEED FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN THE USES OF THE OCEANS WHICH THE CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA PROVIDES.

THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ALSO REPRESENT A IGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS MAN, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THEIR SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE INNOVATIVE IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS WHICH ARE PROVIDED IN THEM. HE WORK OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE COVENANTS NCREASINGLY ATTESTS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL MONITORING VEN IN SUCH A SENSITIVE AREA. THE ENDEAVOURS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AVE NOT ENDED WITH THE CONCLUSION OF THE COVENANTS. THIS IS CLEAR ROM THE ADOPTION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY A CONSENSUS VOTE ONLY A EW WEEKS AGO OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER RUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT. HERE AGAIN IS CONVENTION NOT ONLY SEEKS TO PREVENT ACTIONS OF TORTURE AND TO ECURE THE PUNISHMENT OF THOSE GUILTY OF SUCH ACTS; IT ALSO ESTABLISHES N INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM SIMILAR TO THAT FOUND IN RESPECT OF THE OVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO MONITOR THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION PRACTICE.

THE ENDEAVOURS TO CONTROL NARCOTIC DRUGS AND TO END THE ILLICIT RUG TRAFFIC ARE ALSO CENTERED IN THE UNITED NATIONS. THERE ARE NO SS THAN EIGHTEEN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS IN THIS FIELD, PRINCIPAL ONG THEM THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS AND THE CONVENTION PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES WHICH SET UP THE INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY R THE CONTROL OF ALL POTENTIALLY ADDICTIVE DRUGS, WHETHER OF NATURAL SYNTHETIC ORIGIN. IN THE WAR AGAINST THE INSIDIOUS EVIL OF LICIT DRUGS, THE LATEST ENDEAVOUR IS A LATIN AMERICAN INITIATIVE AT E RECENT SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR THE CONCLUSION OF AN TERNATIONAL TREATY WHICH WOULD IN EFFECT EQUATE DRUG TRAFFICKING TH INTERNATIONAL CRIMES SUCH AS SLAVE TRADING.

IN THE PAST 40 YEARS MORE HAS BEEN DONE BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN CODIFYING INTERNATIONAL LAW THAN IN ALL THE PREVIOUS YEARS OF HISTORY TOGETHER. IN 1873, WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION WAS FOUNDED, THERE WERE NO MORE THAN 133 MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN THE WHOLE WORLD. AS AGAINST THIS, THE UNITED NATIONS HAS SECURED THE CONCLUSION OF AS MANY AS 350 MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING SOME OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE. MOREOVER, IN THE PAST, MULTILATERAL TREATIES RARELY HAD MORE THAN 10 PARTIES. NOWADAYS, A TYPICAL UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION HAS AT LEAST 50 PARTIES; SOME MAJOR ONES HAVE OVER 100. THE DIVERSITY OF SUBJECTS COVERED IS INDEED PHENOMENAL, SOME OF THEM TOUCHING ON MOST ASPECTS OF DAILY LIFE AND ALL TESTIFYING TO THE VARIETY OF CONCERNS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN A WORLD OF GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE.

EVEN THE PRINCIPAL CLASSIFICATIONS OF THESE SUBJECTS MAKE A LENGTHY LIST. TO CITE SOME EXAMPLES, IN ADDITION TO THOSE I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED, THEY COVER THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES; REFUGEES AND STATELESS PERSONS; TRAFFIC IN PERSONS; OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS; HEALTH; INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT; TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS; NAVIGATION; ECONOMIC STATISTICS; EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL MATTERS; THE STATUS OF WOMEN; FREEDOM OF INFORMATION; PENAL MATTERS; COMMODITIES; MAINTENANCE OBLIGATIONS; TELECOMMUNICATIONS; FISCAL MATTERS; DISARMAMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT. THIS MERE ENUMERATION SERVES TO SHOW THE ESSENTIALITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH PROVIDE PERMANENT MACHINERY FOR LAW-MAKING FOR MAINTAINING ORDER IN THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OF THE MODERN WORLD.

IT IS NOT POSSIBLE, IN THE LIGHT OF OUR CURRENT INTERDEPENDENCE, TO RETURN TO THE DAYS WHEN DIPLOMACY WAS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY BILATERAL AND LAW-MAKING - IF UNDERTAKEN AT ALL - WAS CARRIED OUT ON A PURELY AD HOC BASIS AND THEN BY A LIMITED NUMBER OF STATES. TO REVERT TO SUCH A SITUATION WOULD BE A GIGANTIC STEP BACKWARDS INTO THE MIDDLE AGES, WHICH I THINK NONE OF US WOULD REALLY WANT TO TAKE. THE MODERN WORLD MAY BE LARGE, CONFUSING AND CHANGING TOO FAST FOR OUR COMFORT BUT WE HAVE TO LEARN TO LIVE WITH IT, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE AN ESSENTIAL MEANS FOR DOING SO. THE UNITED NATIONS IS NOT, THEREFORE, THE REMOTE PLACE OF THEORETICAL AND ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE WITH AN OVERBLOWN BUREAUCRACY OFTEN PORTRAYED BY ITS CRITICS. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS THE PRINCIPAL INSTRUMENT FOR THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS TO GUIDE INTERNATIONAL LIFE ACCORDING TO STANDARDS WHICH ALL HAVE ACCEPTED IN AGREEING TO THE CHARTER, AND TO UNDERTAKE THE LAW-MAKING ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE ORDERLY GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT.

MR. VICE-CHANCELLOR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I HAVE SPOKEN IN A GENERAL WAY ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS AS A MECHANISM FOR THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. I MUST, HOWEVER, ADD THAT ATTENTION NEEDS TO BE FOCUSSED ON TWO OTHER VITAL PARTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER. THE FIRST OF THESE IS THE NECESSITY FOR A TRULY UNIVERSAL RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN ALL ITS ASPECTS AND THE SECOND IS THE ACCEPTANCE BY STATES OF THIRD PARTY ADJUDICATION AS AN ESSENTIAL MEANS OF SETTLING LEGAL DISPUTES.

THESE ARE PRIMARILY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES RATHER THAN OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. STATES COULD GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THAT RESPONSIBILITY, IN THIS FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY YEAR OF THE WORLD ORGANIZATION, BY REDEDICATING THEMSELVES TO THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WHICH INCLUDES THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. THE REDEDICATION WHICH THE PRESENT SITUATION CALLS FOR SHOULD NOT CONSIST OF MERE SYMBOLIC AFFIRMATION; IT SHOULD MEAN ACKNOWLEDGING THE LEGAL FACT THAT THE CHARTER IS AS BINDING UPON STATES AS THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS. THIS WOULD GIVE REAL MEANING TO THE THEME OF THE ANNIVERSARY WHICH IS "UNITED NATIONS FOR A BETTER WORLD".

THE REALITIES OF TODAY ARE STILL FAR REMOVED FROM WHAT THE CHARTER ENVISIONED. THE IDEAL WE SEEK TO ATTAIN IS THAT OF A WORLD WHERE - AS I SAID EARLIER - NATIONS, LIKE INDIVIDUALS, WILL OPERATE WITHIN A COMPLETE, COHERENT AND VIABLE SYSTEM OF LAW, IMPARTIALLY ADMINISTERED AND ENFORCED. CONSIDERING THE MOST DISQUIETING FEATURES OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION - THE ERUPTIONS OF VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT, THE DISARRAY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE RECURRENCE OF THREATS OF FORCE AND UNILATERAL DECISIONS AFFECTING OTHER STATES, THE PERSISTENCE OF A SENSELESS ARMS RACE IN BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS - OUR PROGRESS TOWARDS THAT IDEAL MAY BE JUDGED TO BE SMALL. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS PROGRESS <u>TOWARDS</u> THE IDEAL, NOT <u>AWAY</u> FROM IT.

IF THE PREVALENCE OF CRIME IN NATIONAL SOCIETIES DOES NOT ARGUE FOR A REPEAL OF THEIR LAWS AND ABOLITION OF THEIR LAW-MAKING BODIES, THE PERSISTENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS IS NOT A JUSTIFICATION FOR TURNING AWAY FROM THE UNITED NATIONS. RATHER, IT MAKES IT ALL THE MORE INCUMBENT TO SUPPORT THE UNITED NATIONS AND STRENGTHEN ITS ABILITY TO FULFIL ITS MANDATE.

THE OLDER GENERATION OF PEOPLE WHO CREATED AND MOULDED THE UNITED NATIONS WILL SOON YIELD THE REINS TO THE YOUNG. IT IS IN THE WORLD'S GREAT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING SUCH AS THIS UNIVERSITY THAT THE YOUNG CAN PREPARE THEMSELVES FOR THE AWESOME RESPONSIBILITY THEY ARE GOING TO UNDERTAKE. SO I WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE BY ADDRESSING A FEW WORDS TO YOU, THE STUDENTS OF THIS UNIVERSITY. IN EXTENDING MY BEST WISHES FOR YOUR FUTURE PURSUITS, I WISH TO EXPRESS MY FERVENT HOPE THAT YOUR HORIZONS ARE UNCLOUDED BY THE FEARS AND PREJUDICES AND INGRAINED ATTITUDES WHICH ARE A LEGACY OF THE TROUBLED PAST AND WHICH HAVE SO OFTEN THWARTED OUR QUEST FOR A MORE PEACEFUL AND SANER WORLD. YOURS WILL BE AN EXCITING ADVENTURE AND YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO FAIL.

* * * * * * * * *

PRIME MINISTER

Talks with Perez de Cuellar

He is calling on you at 1130, accompanied by Brian Urquhart (Under Secretary-General) and Dr. Jensen (Head of the UN office in London). The Foreign Secretary will also attend.

The main subjects are Cyprus, Lebanon, Afghanistan, S.E. Asia, UNESCO and Ethiopia. I attach a card.

The brief does not suggest any mention of Falklands/ Argentina. I think this is wrong and that you should say that we made an effort in the Berne talks towards normalisation but the Argentines let us down badly. We remain ready to try bilaterally, but not if the Argentines try to play tricks on sovereignty.

He may ask whether you will attend the UN 40th Anniversary (night after CHOGM). The FCO may want you to: but I should avoid any commitment.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

MT

22 January, 1985

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22/1

22 January 1985

Dear Charles,

Call on the Prime Minister by the UN Secretary General: 1130, Wednesday 23 January

I enclose briefs for the Prime Minister for the call by Sr Perez de Cuellar at 1130 on Wednesday 23 January. These cover Cyprus, East-West relations, Lebanon, Africa Economic, South East Asia, UNESCO and the UN 40th Anniversary.

The Secretary-General is on his way to South-East Asia, where he will be visiting Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, New Zealand and Australia. I enclose a copy of the Secretary-General's programme during his three-day visit here in the UK.

The Secretary-General proposes to be accompanied by Mr Brian Urquhart (Under-Secretary-General) and Dr Erik Jensen, the Head of the UN Information Office in London (short personality notes enclosed). Sir Geoffrey Howe will, as agreed, also attend.

Len Appleyard has written separately on the question of Senior UN Secretariat appointments (his letter of 20 January).

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL:
1130, WEDNESDAY 23 JANUARY 1985

CYPRUS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. A difficult four days with Kyprianou and Denktash. They failed to use the unique opportunity you created. Nobody could have done more than you. Glad to see they both expressed their appreciation of your efforts. You are still best placed to achieve progress. You continue to have our active support.

2. We told Kyprianou when he was here on 14 January to raise the least contentious points first, moving on to matters like troop withdrawals later. Kyprianou seems to have made his conciliatory moves too late. Glad to hear your view of meetings.

3. You took a positive line at the final press conference. We have echoed this here. How do you see way ahead? Will Denktash consolidate UDI? Is an early reference to Security Council likely?

4. Can we help? If so how? Seem to have virtually exhausted general exhortation. But vital to keep the negotiating process going if tension in Cyprus is not to escalate.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The visit follows the disappointing high level meeting in New York. We want his assessment of current situation, thoughts on the way forward and judgement on the value and thrust of future UK action with any of the parties.

2. Telegram No 40 of 21 January from the Acting Permanent Representative to the UN is attached as additional background as is the record of the Prime Minister's meeting of 14 January with Kyprianou.

3. High level meeting ended in at least partial failure on evening of 20 January. Both sides stuck closely to their original positions: Denktash that the purpose of the meeting was simply to sign the Secretary-General's documentation and decide on some dates, Kyprianou that important issues (particularly troop withdrawals, guarantees, territory and the three freedoms) remained to be resolved at the highest political level before agreement on a framework could be reached.

4. On the last day (20 January) Kyprianou said he would accept the Secretary-General's documentation on condition that a working group be set up to deal with constitutional matters, and a date set for another high level meeting to discuss matters of prime concern to him. The UN Secretariat said the move had some merit but simply came too late. It was in any case rejected (not surprisingly) by Denktash after consultation with the Turks.

5. The Secretary-General said at the press conference after the meeting that the gap between the two parties had never been so narrow, that there was a need to persevere, that the parties were ready to continue their direct contacts and he would remain in contact with them with a view to their meeting again if possible before the end of February. He said, in answer to a question that

/he

he was 'prepared to be a scapegoat'. It appears he was trying to salvage what he could from a disappointing outcome.

6. Denktash said at the same press conference that the Secretary-General's documentation was no longer 'live' and that there would have to be a 'political evaluation' at home including having to 'set his house in order about elections'. However, he said he was willing to continue contacts with Kyprianou in Cyprus (something Kyprianou will be reluctant to accept). Kyprianou said he had been assured by the Secretary-General and by 'many governments' that the high level meeting would be a negotiation, that he could hardly have been expected to sign the document since elements of it were still unclear eg on troop withdrawals. He said he was ready to attend a new high level meeting whenever the Secretary-General wished. (Iacovou had earlier told the Mission in New York that if the meeting collapsed, they would immediately go to the Security Council. No mention was made of this at the press conference).

7. We made clear to the Secretary-General throughout the meeting our readiness to intervene with either or both the parties if he thought it would be useful. He did not ask for help at any stage. We nevertheless urged the Greek Cypriots in New York and in London to follow the advice the Prime Minister gave Kyprianou on 14 Janaury to set his sights lower and, in New York, the Turkish Cypriots and Turks to accept Kyprianou's last minute compromise offer. We impressed upon them both the importance British ministers attached to the talks continuing.

8. The Americans, despite regular requests from the Greek Cypriots, refused to intervene. They wanted to keep their powder dry for the period ahead.

9. The Secretary General has a strong personal interest in achieving success on Cyprus. It may be that in his enthusiasm to reach a high level meeting he over-estimated the degree of understanding and willingness to cooperate between the two sides at the end of the third round of proximity talks in December. The high level meeting may in consequence have been doomed at the most to very limited success.

10. The UN Secretariat's view was that if Kyprianou had made his final offer earlier in the meeting it might have met with more success. The Greek Cypriots had been 'incredibly inept'. They did not realise how events were moving against them. Denktash would now probably 'go for broke' on UDI.

11. If a further meeting between the two is to be achieved, some active diplomacy will be needed. Our further action will greatly depend on the Secretary-General's evaluation of the way forward. Our line has been to act in support of him. We want to maintain this chance. He is still best placed to carry matters forward. The result of total failure is likely to be consolidation of UDI and increased tension.

CONFIDENTIAL

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL

11.30, WEDNESDAY, 23 JANUARY 1985

Points to Make

EAST/WEST RELATIONS (INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL AND AFGHANISTAN)

1. Broad aim to keep East/West disagreements out of UN. Nevertheless new signs of Soviet willingness to negotiate could have benefits outside East/West context .

2. Russians will still hope to split West; Allies equally determined not to let this happen. Meanwhile West working to increase contacts. Face to face exchanges best way of showing Soviet leadership we are sincere.

3. Nuclear/Space Arms Control: Important achievement by Shultz and Gromyko at Geneva. But no Soviet moves yet on substance. Difficult process ahead. But Allies determined to ensure maximum progress in all three groups of talks. Hope Russians will take as seriously as West need to prevent arms race in space and end it on earth.

4. Afghanistan: What chance of Cordovez being able to persuade Soviet Union to make concessions on troop withdrawal timetable at Geneva in ~~February~~ March? See no room for Pakistani concessions. They have done much to help Cordovez; Russians' turn to move.

CD?

LEBANON

5. Support UN efforts to promote orderly Israeli withdrawal. Grateful for Secretary-General's briefing of the Security Council. Interested to hear about Mr Urquhart's visit to the area last week.

6. Need for security plan for Sidon-Jezzine area before completion of first phase of Israeli withdrawal. Do Lebanese have one? Likelihood of useful Israeli/Lebanese coordination at Naquora?

7. Support wider UNIFIL role. Lebanese/Syrian/Soviet attitudes to this? Possibility of UNIFIL enlargement? Financial difficulties.

ARAB/ISRAEL

8. International Conference under UN auspices (King Hussein's proposal) - little hope of progress when no agreed basis for negotiations between parties directly involved. Hope progress in Lebanon may improve Arab/Israel atmosphere.

AFRICA ECONOMIC

9. Support World Bank's Joint Action Programme and Special Facility (but will not make direct contribution to latter).

10. Welcome steps taken to sort out UN famine relief effort. How is Office for Emergency Operations in Africa coping?

11. Ethiopia: Welcome Jansson's appointment. Share his concern that co-ordination between donors has yet to be achieved; food shipments may exceed port handling capacity. Vital to improve planning. Welcome UNDP/IBRD co-ordination of donor efforts.

SOUTH EAST ASIA

12. Deplore continuing Vietnamese attacks in Thai/Cambodian border area. Hope you will persuade Hanoi to desist. Vietnamese must withdraw from Cambodia, leaving people to decide own future.

13. Disappointing lack of progress. We support UN Resolutions and withhold UK aid from Hanoi. Any new role for UN?

14. Aid to the Border (defensive, if the Secretary-General appeals for UK funds). Will consider request sympathetically.

UNESCO

15. Will review our notice of intention to withdraw after General Conference this autumn. Continue to work for reform. Some progress made last year. Concerned with value for money; programmes devoted to action - education, culture, science.

16. How to keep controversy out of UN technical bodies?

40TH ANNIVERSARY

17. (If SG raises question of PM's attendance). Too early to say.

CONFIDENTIAL

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

11.30, WEDNESDAY, 23 JANUARY 1985

Essential Facts

AFGHANISTAN

1. Sixth UN resolution, November 1984, passed by record 99 majority. Called inter alia for immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan.

2. Next round of indirect talks at Geneva likely to be postponed (because of Pakistan elections) until after 23 March. At last round in August 1984 Pakistanis agreed to all texts Cordovez put to them, including on "non-interference". Talks remain stalemated by Soviet refusal to agree a specific withdrawal timetable.

3. Perez de Cuellar has pressed Soviet Union on timetable. [NOT TO BE REVEALED: There are indications that in order to keep initiative alive he and Cordovez may have urged Pakistan to be "flexible" and agree to direct talks with Karmal regime. Essential to ensure UNSG maintains pressure on Russians.]

LEBANON

4. The Israeli Cabinet announced on 14 January a three-stage withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. The first phase to a line between the Zahrani and Litani rivers (leaving the towns of Sidon and Jezzine) to be completed by 18 February; the second and third phases to the international border to be implemented by autumn (exact timing to depend on developments). Israelis envisage South Lebanese Army continuing to operate with Israeli support after withdrawal.

5. UN continuing efforts to promote orderly withdrawal. Urquhart visited the area last week in attempt to promote agreement between the parties on a wider role for UNIFIL. The Israel/Lebanon talks at Naqoura (UNIFIL HQ, South Lebanon) are expected to resume this week.

S-G made clear, in his briefing of the Security Council on 15 January, that UN was trying to facilitate the Naqoura talks, rather than mediate between Israel and Lebanon: up to the parties to indicate next steps. If Lebanese sought a change in current strength, deployment or responsibilities of UNIFIL, he would submit such a request to the Security Council.

ARAB/ISRAEL

6. The Prime Minister told King Hussein on 10 December that we did not think that his proposal of a conference involving the five permanent members of the UN Security Council offered much hope of progress. Arab expectations will have been raised by recent US confirmation of possible Middle East talks with the Soviet Union despite Washington's attempts to play down their significance, which they see in terms of US/Soviet relations.

7. UNRWA (Defensive). The UN Relief and Works Agency is suffering acute financial crisis with an anticipated budget deficit of about $30 million for 1985. The present Commissioner-General, Olof Rydbeck, is to undertake a fund-raising mission in the Middle East in February and then intends to address major Western donors. The UK has over the years been UNRWA's second largest individual contributor, giving £5 million pa plus 20% of the EC contribution of over $20 million pa.

AFRICA ECONOMIC

8. World Bank's diagnosis and prescription for change have been set out in its Joint Action Programme. This requires donors to provide aid more flexibly in a concerted way and in the context of a properly planned development framework in recipient countries. Changes in economic management in many countries are required and the Bank has called for additional concessionary resources (US$1 Special Facility) to be used solely as an incentive to African states to undertake structural reform.

9. At a meeting in New York 17 December UN Secretary-General announced his own special initiative for Africa involving most significantly establishment of Office of Emergency Operation in Africa, responsible for UN co-ordination of efforts. Brad Morse,

UNDP Administrator, was put in charge.

ETHIOPIA

10. Following representations by the Prime Minister (and other Heads of Government) the UN Secretary-General appointed Kurt Jansson as Assistant Secretary-General for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia on 6 November 1984. Jansson's role is to liaise with UN agencies, donors, voluntary agencies and the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, and co-ordinate emergency relief measures. He has established an office in Addis Ababa and has made some progress on co-ordination. He held a useful meeting with donors in New York on 18 December, but it is clear more work needs to be done particularly co-ordination of relief shipments. Shipments in January and February will considerably exceed the capacity of Ethiopian ports. Jansson has reminded donors of the need for them to clear shipments in advance with the World Food Programme (WFP) so that they may be phased effectively. This is already happening with British official and voluntary aid.

11. Jansson and his team seem to have made a positive impact, but would be more effective if all donors acknowledged them as the central point of co-ordination and made their own representatives in Addis the focal point of donor information. At present too many donors continue to work through the Headquarters of other organisations.

12. Both the IBRD and the UNDP have undergone a change of thinking. The IBRD has taken on board the US and UK demand that they should lead on donor co-ordination. The UNDP has accepted that their country Round Tables should change from "project fairs" and become occasions for real discussion of policy and macroeconomic issues.

SOUTH EAST ASIA

Thai/Cambodian Border Attacks

13. The current Vietnamese offensive is the heaviest since they occupied Cambodia in 1979. Over 150,000 refugees have had to flee into Thailand. The Khmer Peoples' National Liberation Front (KPNLF), the main pro-Western partner in the Cambodian Resistance

Coalition, has been hit hardest. In contrast, the Khmer Rouge forces have suffered only minor attacks and the Sihanoukists none. The Vietnamese have considerable cause for satisfaction. The KPNLF have suffered serious setbacks which could have adverse implications for the Cambodian coalition. The ASEAN countries have been increasingly concerned at developments. The Thais are particularly exposed and have complained to the UN Secretary-General about alleged Vietnamese incursions into Thai territory.

14. We issued a statement in the name of the Foreign Secretary on 23 November, expressing concern at the Vietnamese attacks. We supported an EC demarche, made in Hanoi, in mid-December and have proposed that another be made now. The Vietnamese Ambassador was summoned to see Sir W Harding (DUSS) at the FCO on 18 January. The UN Secretary-General issued a statement on 27 December expressing concern at the Vietnamese attacks.

15. There is little progress on a political settlement. We, in common with other Western governments, and the ASEAN states, support the conclusions of the UN sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea (1981) which called for the total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and free elections for a neutral non-aligned and independent Cambodia. Proposals on these lines have been incorporated into annual resolutions on Cambodia at UNGA sponsored by ASEAN. This year's Resolution which we co-sponsored, had overwhelming support (110-22-18) but the Vietnamese show no signs of yielding.

UK Aid to the Thai/Cambodia Border

16. During FY 1983/4 we provided £750,000 for border relief, £200,000 of this going to the UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO). We have earmarked £300,000 for UNBRO for FY 1984/5, £250,000 of which has been pledged and now disbursed. The UN Secretary-General's special representative on Cambodian Aid, Mr Kunugi, has said that there will have to be frurther pledges soon to cover the additional cost of the current evacuation.

UNESCO

17. Intention to submit formal notice of withdrawal was announced

to Parliament on 22 November, and conveyed to the Director General by the Secretary of State on 5 December 1984. Withdrawal takes effect from 1 January 1986 unless rescinded before then. Britain and others concerned for many years with politicisation and lack of efficiency. Our decision was both to safeguard our position in 1986 and to maximise pressure . United States left UNESCO this January.

18. In the letter to Mr M'Bow we have reiterated areas in which more progress is required, including programme concentration, more action, avoidance of areas of politically irrevocable difference, decentralisation, less overlap with other United Nations bodies, reduction of the 1986/87 Budget, and possible use of outside consultants in certain areas. Some improvements - particularly in management - were agreed in principle in 1984 but there was less progress over specific programmes.

19. In 1985 three Executive Boards will take place, first in February to review implications of the United States withdrawal. Temporary Committee monitoring progress and implementation of reforms. Biennial General Conference will be held in Sofia in October/November. Western countries are co-ordinating positions on reform, and explaining these to Third World countries.

20. Politicisation of UNESCO was discussed between the Prime Minister and the United Nations Secretary-General at their meeting in April 1984. The Secretary-General thought that the United Nations family ought to avoid the politicisation of its technical bodies and suggested an appeal to member governments to confine political issues to the UN General Assembly or the Security Council. He may have given further thought to this.

21. The Director General of UNESCO has been criticised in the Western Press. His current term of office expires in 1987 and has shown no signs of resigning before then. Britain has avoided personalising our criticism of UNESCO publicly. We believe that although Mr M'Bow is not entirely blameless, it would be a mistake to lay all UNESCO's failings at his door.

UN 40TH ANNIVERSARY

22. The recent UN General Assembly adopted unanimously a Resolution on this year's 40th Anniversary of the Organisation which included provision for a commemorative session culminating on 24 October (the draft in 1945 when the UN Charter came into force) which Heads of State and Government are likely to attend. Mr Macmillan attended the 15th Anniversary in 1960, and Mr Heath the 25th in 1970. The Secretary of State may wish in due course to recommend that the Prime Minister attend this year. But we do not yet know the form the commemorative session will take (this will be decided by a Preparatory Committee of which we are members); nor the intentions of friends and allies.

VISIT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL: 21-24 JANUARY

Monday, 21 January

0740	Arrive Heathrow on flight BA 174
1630	Call on Lord Mayor at Mansion House
1700	Reception at Merchant Taylors' Hall arranged by Lord Ennals and the UNA
1830	Reception given by the Speaker
2000	Dinner given by Mr Bowen Wells MP in association with the Institute for Development Studies
Overnight	Browns Hotel.

Tuesday, 22 January

1100	Depart Heathrow for Edinburgh on flight BA 4752
1300 for 1315	Lunch given by Edinburgh University
1520	Meet press
1600	Call on the Lord Provost at City Chambers
1715	Lecture at the University as Montague Burton Visiting Professor
1945	Dinner given by the Secretary of State for Scotland at Bute House
Overnight	Caledonian Hotel.

Wednesday, 23 January

0910	Depart Edinburgh on flight BA 4733
1020	Arrive Heathrow
1130	Call on the Prime Minister at Number 10
1215 for 1230	Working lunch given by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary at 1 Carlton Gardens
1730	Press briefing
Overnight	Browns Hotel

Thursday, 24 January

1415	Depart Heathrow for Bangkok via Amsterdam on flight KL 122.

PEREZ DE CUELLAR, Javier

Secretary-General of the United Nations since 1 January 1982.

Peruvian. Born 1920 in Lima. Joined the Peruvian Diplomatic Service in 1944 and was a member of the Peruvian delegation to the first session of the General Assembly in 1946. Subsequently served in Paris, London, La Paz and Rio and as Ambassador in Berne, Moscow, Caracas and at the UN. He joined the UN in 1975 and for the following two years was the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus. In 1979 he was appointed UN Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs (and the SG's Personal Representative for Afghanistan from 1980).

Perez de Cuellar is an exceedingly able diplomat. Self-effacing and modest, he thinks hard before acting. He is conscious both of the delicacy and the importance of his position, and is cautious about being propelled into the firing line with possible consequent damage to his authority. But he is willing to take a strong stand if necessary, and wishes to make a mark as Secretary-General. He regards his service in London and Paris as his formative years and professes special admiration for the institutions and traditions of the UK.

URQUHART, BRIAN EDWARD

Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, 1974.

British. Born 1919. Educated at Westminster and Christ Church, Oxford. Army 1939-45. Joined UN in 1945. One of the outstanding international civil servants of his generation, the first to have risen through the ranks to the level of Under Secretary-General. He made his name by restoring some order to the UN's peacekeeping operation in the Congo in 1961, when he was Hammarskjold's special representative. Since then he has concentrated on the UN's peacekeeping role, notably in the Middle East and Cyprus. His influence has been pervasive and for the good. A modest man, he is utterly straight and inspires trust. After a generation at the UN he remains devoted to its ideals.

His office is, on the political side, the cutting edge of the UN Secretariat. It runs the various United Nations peacekeeping operations and advises the Secretary-General on the use of his "good offices" in relation to areas of international tension and conflict.

JENSEN, ERIK

Director of UN Information Centre London. Rank D2.

Malaysian. Born 1933 in Copenhagen. Educated St Paul's, London and Copenhagen University (he also holds a degree in philosophy from Harvard University and a B Litt from Worcester College, Oxford). Jensen joined the UN Secretariat in 1967. Before that he worked for the Governments of Sarawak (1961-63 and 1966) and Malaysia (1963-66). From 1968-71 he participated in UN Missions to Nigeria, Bahrain, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. From 1971-80 he was Chef de Cabinet to the Director General of the UN Office in Geneva. From November 1980 until his appointment to London he was Director of the Office of the Under-Secretary General for Special Political Questions and Coordinator of Special Economic Assistance Programmes (in which capacity he visited Chad, Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Guinea-Bissau and Djibouti) at the UN Secretariat in New York.

Jensen is a highly sophisticated man who is a Malaysian by accident but entirely European by upbringing and disposition. Sensitive and artistic (he is an accomplished painter in his own right) he is keen to make more of an impression in London than did his predecessor.

A determined Anglophile, Jensen speaks fluent English, Danish, French and Iban (Malaysian). His wife is English and they have two young children.

MR. POWELL

PEREZ DE CUELLAR

1. Cyprus. Did our best to persuade Kyprianou to be realistic. How do you see the way ahead? How can UK best help in next phase?

2. Lebanon. Know Mr. Urquhart just back. Assessment of prospects for wider role for UNIFIL? For Israel/Lebanon talks?

3. Falklands/Argentine.

4. Afghanistan. Any prospects of progress with Soviet Union on timetable for withdrawal of troops? Would be wrong to press Pakistan to make any more concessions: have done everything which can reasonably be expected of them.

/5. S.E.Asia.

5. S.E. Asia. Vietnamese behaving abominably in Cambodia. Hope Secretary-General will do all possible to bring pressure on them to withdraw.

6. UNESCO. Discussed this with you in April 1984. Regrettably little improvement since then. Our notice of intention to withdraw unlikely to be rescinded unless substantial improvement in areas we have identified: programme concentration, more action outside Paris, avoiding politicization, decentralization, less overlap.

7. Ethiopia. Grateful for your rapid appointment of Aid Co-ordinator for Ethiopia. Still scope to improve planning.

CONFIDENTIAL
STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

1) FEL BRRS
2) NBPM

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CDP
2/1

21 January 1985

Dear Charles,

UN Secretary-General's Call on the Prime Minister
11.30, 23 January

Before the Prime Minister sees the UN Secretary-General on 23 January, you may like to be aware of the position on the two senior UN Secretariat appointments we have been pursuing, that of a successor to Brian Urquhart as Under-Secretary-General and Sir J Moberly's candidature as Commissioner-General for the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA).

When Sir Geoffrey Howe saw Perez de Cuellar in New York on 24 September, the Secretary-General gave him a clear assurance that he would appoint a British successor to Mr Urquhart. He spoke highly of our candidate, Mr Goulding, at present HM Ambassador in Luanda. The Secretary-General said he was planning on the assumption that the changeover would take place early in 1986. At the same meeting the Secretary-General said that we must expect that the job of UNRWA Commissioner-General would go to another country. We have since heard privately in New York that the Secretary-General intends to appoint an Italian.

At Sir Geoffrey Howe's working lunch for the Secretary-General on 23 January, he will try to confirm the timing of the Urquhart succession for late 1985/early 1986. He also proposes to ask about the UNRWA job, if only to confirm that an Italian is to be appointed. We see no reason for the Prime Minister to raise either appointment on this occasion.

We will be sending across briefs for the call on Tuesday, 22 January.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL
STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 December 1984

Visit of the United Nations Secretary-General

Thank you for your letter of 14 December to Charles Powell.

The Prime Minister agrees to see Senor Perez de Cuellar in the course of his visit next month, and could do so at 1130 hours on Wednesday 23 January, for up to three-quarters of an hour.

David Barclay

Peter Ricketts Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

14 December 1984

Agree to see Perez de Cuellar?

CDP 16/xii

Dear Charles,

Visit of the United Nations Secretary-General

Sr Perez de Cuellar will be spending three days in this country from 21 to 23 January. The occasion for his visit is an invitation from the University of Edinburgh to give a lecture there on 22 January. The Foreign Secretary will be giving him lunch on 23 January.

He has not specifically asked for a meeting with the Prime Minister. But she has seen Senor Perez de Cuellar on previous visits, and there are a number of major issues with which he is concerned at present. In particular the Secretary-General's efforts to promote a solution of the Cyprus question could shortly be reaching their culmination. It is not possible to say now precisely what stage will have been reached by 23 January but it would be valuable if the Prime Minister could personally demonstrate our continuing support for the Secretary-General's initiative. The Prime Minister's help with Kyprianou has been much appreciated by Perez de Cuellar.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

E.R.

UN DINNER : SPEAKING NOTES

A WARM WELCOME TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL AND ALL THE HEADS AND OFFICIALS OF THE OTHER UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATIONS AND SPECIALISED AGENCIES GATHERED HERE.

AND TO OUR OTHER GUESTS, PRACTICALLY ALL OF WHOM ARE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH AND DIRECTLY INTERESTED IN THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

I AM DELIGHTED THAT LONDON, THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANISATION, IS HOSTING YOUR MEETING THIS WEEK.

/ NOW, I AM

NOW, I AM TOLD THAT I MUST BE CAREFUL, THAT EVERY ORGANISATION AND SPECIALISED AGENCY HERE IS PROUD OF ITS SPECIAL STATUS, THAT IF I MENTION ONE BY NAME I MUST MENTION THEM ALL - AND THAT IF I GET THEM IN THE WRONG ORDER I SHALL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE PERSONALLY CONDEMNED IN THE NEXT RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

WELL, I DARE SAY I COULD STAND THAT.

BUT I WILL AVOID THE TRAPS ANYWAY AND TALK INSTEAD ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS FAMILY.

/ THE UNITED

THE UNITED KINGDOM CAN CLAIM - INDEED WE DO CLAIM - TO HAVE PLAYED A MAJOR PART IN THE CREATION OF VIRTUALLY EVERY INSTITUTION REPRESENTED AROUND THIS TABLE.

YOU REPRESENT AN EXTRAORDINARY RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, DEVELOPMENTAL, HUMANITARIAN, REGULATORY.

BETWEEN YOU, YOU HAVE, THROUGH THE MEMBER COUNTRIES, IMMENSE CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE OUR WHOLE PLANET.

YOU SEE IN EVERY DAY OF YOUR WORKING LIVES THE ATTEMPTS TO IMPLEMENT THE IDEALS OF THE UNITED NATIONS - YOU SEE THE SUCCESSES AND

/ YOU ARE

YOU ARE MORE CONSCIOUS THAN MOST OF THE FAILURES.

AND IT FOLLOWS THAT YOU FEEL PARTICULARLY KEENLY THE FRUSTRATIONS WHICH COME FROM THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE IDEALS AND THE PERFORMANCE.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S MESSAGE TO YOU TONIGHT IS ONE OF STRONG SUPPORT FOR YOUR EFFORTS.

HISTORY HAS MADE BRITAIN A COUNTRY WHICH IS ALMOST UNIQUE IN THE STRENGTH OF ITS TIES WITH SO MANY OTHER COUNTRIES IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD.

THEIR PEACE AND PROSPERITY ARE VITAL BRITISH CONCERNS.

/ BUT THE

BUT THE PEACE AND PROSPERITY OF OUR PLANET ARE YOUR GOALS TOO.

THAT IS ONE REASON - NOT THE ONLY ONE - WHY WE WORK WITH YOU.

WE SHARE AND UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERNS.

YOU HAVE HEARD A GOOD DEAL FROM OUR SPOKESMAN ABOUT MONEY.

I EXPECT YOU WILL HEAR A GOOD DEAL MORE.

IN A TIME OF ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY ACROSS THE WORLD WE HAVE HAD TO LOOK TO THE UNITED NATIONS TO EXERCISE MAXIMUM FINANCIAL RESTRAINT.

/ WE CANNOT URGE

WE CANNOT URGE PRUDENT FINANCIAL POLICIES AT HOME WITHOUT SEEKING SIMILAR POLICIES IN THOSE ORGANISATIONS WHICH WE SUPPORT AND TO WHICH WE CONTRIBUTE.

I KNOW THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THIS - AND WE WELCOME THE RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATIONS HAVE GENERALLY SHOWN.

I WISH YOU A GOOD AND PRODUCTIVE MEETING IN LONDON.

AND I HOPE WHEN YOU LEAVE YOU WILL FEEL - IF NOT REFRESHED, FOR THE EFFECT OF LONG MEETINGS IS RARELY TO REFRESH - AT LEAST ENCOURAGED.

/ ENCOURAGED

ENCOURAGED BECAUSE YOU HAVE SOLVED FOR EVER ALL PROBLEMS OF CO-ORDINATION AND RIVALRIES BETWEEN THE ORGANISATIONS AND AGENCIES. ?? (Joke :-)

MORE SERIOUSLY, ENCOURAGED BECAUSE YOU HAVE LOOKED INTO THE FUTURE AND NOT FOUND IT ENTIRELY DAUNTING.

AND ENCOURAGED BECAUSE YOU FEEL THAT WE IN THIS COUNTRY ARE BEHIND YOU AND WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH YOU TOWARD THE IDEALS OF THE INSTITUTIONS YOU REPRESENT.

TOAST

CONFIDENTIAL

cc MASTER SET

file vc/SSM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 April 1984

Dear Roger,

Call by the UN Secretary General

Mr. Perez de Cuellar called on the Prime Minister this afternoon. A record of the conversation is enclosed.

Yours ever

John Coles.

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SSM

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERALY AT 1730 ON 16 APRIL 1984 AT 10 DOWNING STREET

Present:

Prime Minister	Mr. Perez de Cuellar
Sir Antony Acland	Mr. Urquhart
Sir John Thomson	Mr. de Soto
Mr. A.J. Coles	Mr. Picco

* * * * * * * * * *

Taking up a reference by Mr. Perez de Cuellar to the US attitude towards UNESCO, the Prime Minister said that the American position was not without some justification. The Secretary General agreed. But he thought it was unfair to accuse the UN organisations of the politicisation of their activities. UN bodies, which to some extent were the creation of Western countries, tended to follow the democratic precept by which the majority dictated the proceedings. The Prime Minister commented that less than one-third of UN member states were democracies. The Secretary General said that the UN family ought to avoid the politicisation of its technical bodies. An appeal should be made to member governments that, if they wanted to raise political issues, they should have recourse to the UN General Assembly or the Security Council.

The Prime Minister said that, of all the current world problems, the Iran/Iraq war was the most frustrating. The normal rules of humanity did not seem to apply. She had frequently discussed the problem with representatives of countries in the area but no progress had been made. Sir Antony Acland said that he agreed that the Iran/Iraq war was potentially the most dangerous current problem.

The Secretary General said that the only channel of communication to both sides was his own office. One of his colleagues had visited Iran a few days ago. His main purpose had been to deal with the issue of Afghanistan but he had raised

/ the Iran/

the Iran/Iraq war. There had been total Iranian opposition to any involvement which could lead to a negotiated settlement because Iran was convinced that it could win. There was similar obstinacy on the Iraqi side. Nevertheless, both countries accepted the UN Secretary General as a channel of communication even though Iraq was annoyed about the recent UN mission to enquire into the allegations of chemical warfare. The Prime Minister commented that the Secretary General had had no option but to despatch such a mission. The Secretary General said that there was a moral principle involved. The despatch of the mission had, at the least, been a warning to other countries not to use chemical weapons. It was probably true to say that Iraq was more interested than Iran in a peaceful solution. Following references to possible mediation by Algeria and Egypt the Secretary General said that Egypt tended to be discounted as a mediator because of its support for Iraq. But the Egyptians apparently intended to make contact with Mrs Gandhi and work through the Non-Aligned Movement. He was pessimistic about their chances of success. The only way to put an end to the war was a general freeze on the supply of arms, however naive that proposition might sound.

The Prime Minister said that it was probably impossible to achieve such a freeze. We ourselves sent no lethal weapons to Iran, though we were considering releasing three ships which were unarmed and which were covered by contracts signed under the Shah's regime. When we enquired as to the sources of arms supplies to the combatants, we found that North Korea, China, Israel and Libya were involved. Moreover, arms supplied to countries not involved could find their way to the combatants through other countries. We had urged the United States to make contact with the Soviet Union so that, if Western intervention in the Gulf became necessary, the Soviet Union would know that the Western objective was simply to protect freedom of navigation. We had put it to Arab countries that the Soviet Union ought to share an interest with the West in preventing an Iranian success. But some of our Arab friends thought that the Soviet Union would welcome the disintegration of the area. If this was so, arms supplies could not be prevented - for the Soviet Union could supply weapons through, eg Syria.

/ Iran

Iran apparently thought that because it had greater resources of manpower it could continue to fight much longer than Iraq. We had tried to persuade Saudi Arabia to take firm action with Syria but to no avail. Some representatives of Arab countries seemed to believe that even if Khomeini disappeared, there would be little change in the Iranian attitude. She was not so certain - there was perhaps no substitute for a charismatic figure who had brought the Shah's regime to an end.

Taking up an earlier reference by the Prime Minister to South East Asia, the Secretary General said that this problem had almost been forgotten. He had recently seen the Prime Minister of Thailand who had expressed concern about the possibility of another incursion of Vietnamese forces into his territory. The Thai Prime Minister was ready to go to the UN Security Council as soon as he detected such activity. A special representative of the Secretary General would go to the area next month. Sir John Thomson said that he was interested to hear that Thailand might seek Security Council action. Hitherto, it had refrained from doing so. The Secretary General said that the Chinese position on these matters was very tough. The ASEAN countries were rather divided since some of them distrusted the Chinese. The situation was dangerous and he would keep an eye on it.

American critics of the UN tended to ignore Western successes. The last vote on the Afghanistan issue was a notable example. In response to a question from the Prime Minister, Sir Antony Acland said that there were about 115,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The Secretary General said that Mr. Cordovez had just returned from Afghanistan and Pakistan where he had been attempting to make progress in the negotiations. This was a very slow process but some modest progress could be observed. He was now concentrating on the problems of Soviet withdrawal and the cessation of interference in the affairs of Aghanistan. This was another case where the UN Secretary General was the only available channel of communication. He himself hoped soon to discuss the problem with the Russians in Moscow in the hope of accelerating the negotiating process.

/ In response to

In response to a question from Sir Antony Acland, the Secretary General said that his negotiator was trying to make progress on four points simultaneously: Soviet withdrawal, non-interference in Afghanistan, international guarantees and the return of refugees. A current difficulty was that Afghanistan sought direct talks but that Pakistan wanted indirect talks through the United Nations. He was trying to establish whether proximity talks would be a solution. Progress was being made on procedure and perhaps some advance was being made on substance. But flexibility was needed on both sides. If we were honest, we would recognise that the regime of Babrak Karmal had been preceded by Communist or pro-Communist regimes. It was unrealistic to expect Afghanistan to become an anti-Communist country. The Prime Minister agreed - if this prospect emerged, the Soviet Union would never leave. The Secretary General said that there was a consequent need to preserve Soviet face. The Prime Minister commented that the most encouraging feature was that the Afghan resistance could apparently not be defeated. The Secretary General replied that their efforts were admirable, but they were completely divided.

Sir John Thomson asked whether there was any sign that the Russians were prepared to set dates for withdrawal. The Secretary General replied that he was working in that direction. But he would need to make a personal demarche at the earliest possible moment.

The Prime Minister raised the question of Cyprus. It was difficult to see the way forward. The Secretary-General said that Mr Gobbi had accepted the impossible mission of trying to make progress. The ball was now in the court of the Turkish/Cypriots. But everything he had heard from Mr Denktash had been unhelpful and negative. He had presented him with a balanced package by which Denktash would freeze Turkish/Cypriot UDI and would hand over to the UN Secretary-General, rather than the Greeks, Varosha and part of its hinterland; while the Greek/Cypriots would abandon internationalisation of the issue. Last January President Evren had appeared to be interested in these ideas. But then Denktash had suddenly started to consolidate UDI. The

The latter was now working on a constitution. This approach was exactly the opposite of what was required. The Turkish/Cypriots were now delaying their response to his approach and were meanwhile taking unhelpful decisions. For example, they were contemplating a referendum in August. All this undermined the UN formula. He might be forced to inform the Security Council of the situation; if he did not, the non-aligned countries would probably request him to make a report. Mr Gobbi would now examine the situation. He himself had been prepared to go to the area once his formula had been accepted in order to see whether inter-communal talks could be launched. But his efforts had been undermined.

Sir John Thomson pointed out that the timing was tight because once the issue was raised in the Security Council the outcome would be so anti-Turkish that the Secretary-General's good offices would be brought to an end. We should then be back to questions about guarantees. There were perhaps only a few weeks left. Mr Urquhart commented that, according to Denktash, the main difficulty at present was the decision of the House Appropriation Committee in the United States linking progress on the problem to aid to Turkey.

Sir John Thomson suggested that, since Mr Denktash did not really want a solution, President Evren was the key. The Prime Minister said that it must be recognised that the constitution that we had bequeathed to Cyprus had not worked properly. The Turkish/Cypriots had not been given a fair deal. The Secretary-General agreed. At the beginning the faults lay largely with the Greek side. Mr Urquhart said that more recently there had been faults on both sides.

Sir John Thomson asked whether the Secretary-General saw any prospect of influencing Evren. The Secretary-General said that, after his meeting with Evren in Casablanca, the latter had been uncommitted. But Denktash was now exploiting Turkish internal politics. The Prime Minister said that the link made by the United States with aid to Turkey was probably unwise since it touched on questions of national pride. We must not forget

/ the strategic

the strategic importance of Turkey. The Secretary-General said that so far Turkey was the only country to recognise UDI. The Turkish Ambassador in New York still maintained that the constitution for Northern Cyprus would contain an article making it clear theat Northern Cyprus was part of a Federal State. If Denktash was shrewd, he would respond to the Secretary General's formula by asking him to obtain from the Greek Cypriots an undertaking that an end to internationalisation would mean the lifting of the economic embargo on Northern Cyprus.

Sir Anthony Acland asked whether Mr Denktash's offer on Varosha was still valid. The Secretary-General said that the offer was continually changing. Mr Urquhart commented that the Greek/Cypriots felt that if they accepted the offer, it would be the end of all territorial concessions. He did not see how anyone could lose by accepting the Secretary-General's offer to make Varosha a UN buffer zone.

Turning to the Lebanon the Prime Minister said that the British contingent had done a very good job. She was sorry for President Gemayel who did not comprehend the situaiton. There was an interesting internal situation in Syria. Mr Urquhart said that he had just visited Damascus. The situation was indeed peculiar. Batteries of 155mm guns were trained on the centre of the town, apparantely by RIFAAT ASAD. The Secretary- General said that he had just heard from a Lebanese source that ASAD himself was likely to go go Switzerland for a heart operation by American surgeons and that his brother would meanwhile take control in Syria.

Sir Anthony Acland observed that the draft resolution renewing the mandate of UNIFIL was due for discussion on 19 April It was important that the resolution should enable the Secretary General to continue his discussions with the parties about withdrawal of foreign troops. Mr Urquhart said that the Secretary-General's proposals involved both the renewal and the extension of UNIFIL's

/ mandate.

Gemayel had been keen on this as were the Amal and Shia. But the Americans had raised difficulties. Sir Antony Acland said that the Americans did not approve of the paragraph in the Resolution which enabled the Secretary General to pursue his discussions. They believed that the text was too much directed to the question of Israeli withdrawal. Mr. Urquhart commented that the Israelis were very keen on withdrawing from parts of Southern Lebanon. They were suffering several attacks a day there and the situation would get worse. Sir John Thomson suggested that the American attitude was partly a reaction to the Security Council Resolution on Nicaragua. The paragraph in the UN Resolution to which they objected did not restrict the Secretary General to talking to the Israelis.

The Prime Minister said that her impression was that the Israelis wished to withdraw from Sidon. Mr. Urquhart said that the July elections in Israel presented a problem. It was difficult for the present government to advocate withdrawal because that implied that the original invasion was a mistake. The Prime Minister commented that with time the threat of further loss of Israeli life in the Lebanon might be more important electorally. Mr. Urquhuart said that the Israeli military would like the United Nations to assist Israeli withdrawal. But some Israeli politicians took a different attitude. He had spent three hours in discussion with Mr. David Kimche in Israel on the Secretary General's recommendations. He did not believe that they were a matter of concern to Israel. But the US was worried about them, partly because of Nicaragua and partly because Mr. Shultz was so sensitive about Southern Lebanon. Sir John Thomson said that he understood that the Soviet Union was now proposing amendments to the particular paragraph in question. Mr. Urquhart said that the Soviet Union had earlier agreed to the text and were now making difficulties because the US had done so.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister about Soviet policy, the Secretary General said that he expected to see Mr. Chernenko soon at the latter's invitation. Meanwhile he saw little prospect of change in Soviet policy. The Russians were not interested in helping President Reagan during a US election period.

/ Sir John

Sir John Thomson entered the qualification that, with regard to the Lebanon, the Russians would probably do what Damascus wanted.

The Secretary-General then raised the question of Argentina and the Falklands. The Prime Minister said that we had proposed to Argentina discussions about restoring commercial relations; we had received a reply; and we had sent a further note. We could not negotiate about sovereignty. We wished to restore commercial relations and then diplomatic relations. The problem was how to get talks started. We were not prepared to do this on a false basis. We could not discuss sovereignty. Nor could we restore diplomatic relations until Argentina had renounced the use of force for ever. These matters had to be dealt with face to face, not through a third party.

The Secretary General said that the Argentine Foreign Minister had called on him a week earlier. Caputo had asked him on a personal basis to clarify the position. He wanted to make it clear that although Argentina envisaged formal talks on matters including sovereignty he suggested that there should be a preliminary or informal dialogue with an open agenda. The Prime Minister commented that this was virtually the message which we had received from Buenos Aires. In the Argentine view discussions would lead to negotiation but we could not negotiate on sovereignty. This would turn a knife in the heart of the Falkland Islanders. The Argentines were trying to insist that discussions must be capable of leading to sovereignty. This was not possible.

The Secretary General said that Caputo had then made the point that the preliminary talks could take place in the presence of either the United Nations or the protecting powers. The Prime Minister commented that this was unacceptable.

The Secretary General said that Caputo had made two further points. First, he did not object to a statement at the end of the meeting that there had been no agreement on sovereignty. Secondly, he did not insist on a prior commitment that preliminary talks would be followed by formal talks.

/ The Prime

The Prime Minister said that Argentina was trying to lay down by one way or another that sovereignty should be on the agenda. It could not be. We should start by discussing commercial relations. If this was successful, we should proceed to discussing diplomatic relations. But Argentina was in so much financial trouble that even British banks were helping out. Any discussions involving sovereignty would be seen by the people of the Falkland Islands as betrayal.

In conclusion, it was agreed that both sides, in talking to the press, would simply list the subjects covered in the talks.

The discussion ended at 1840.

A.J.C.

16 April 1984

File

UN

16 July 1982

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the U.N. Secretary General thanking her for the hospitality extended during his visit to the United Kingdom.

AJC

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

1532

918969 PRDRME G
23737 UNICUK G

PS / No. 10,

FROM: THE UNITED NATIONS

15 JULY 1982

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I SHOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU MOST SINCERELY FOR THE WARM WELCOME AND VERY KIND HOSPITALITY YOU EXTENDED TO ME DURING MY VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM. I PARTICULARLY APPRECIATED THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU AGAIN FOR SUCH VALUABLE AND EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS ON THE MANY ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN. IT WAS EXTREMELY USEFUL FOR ME TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS ON SEVERAL OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH WHICH WE ARE CONFRONTED AT THIS TIME AND ON THE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES FOR THEIR SOLUTION. LET ME ALSO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO AGAIN EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE FOR THE CONSISTENT SUPPORT EXTENDED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS, WHICH IS A SOURCE OF GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT TO US IN OUR EFFORTS FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION.

MY WIFE AND I VERY MUCH ENJOYED THE DELIGHTFUL LUNCHEON WHICH YOU SO KINDLY GAVE FOR US. IT WAS A MOST AGREEABLE OCCASION AND I WAS VERY PLEASED TO HAVE SUCH INTERESTING TALKS WITH YOU AND YOUR DISTINGUISHED GUESTS IN WHAT WAS INDEED A VERY RELAXED AND WARMHEARTED ATMOSPHERE.

WITH MY RENEWED THANKS AND BEST WISHES, PLEASE ACCEPT, PRIME MINISTER, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR

HER EXCELLENCY
THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER MP
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
LONDON

UN

NOTES FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH

AT LUNCH ON WEDNESDAY 14 JULY 1982

PROBLEMS FACING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SINCE YOU BECAME SECRETARY-GENERAL OF SUPERHUMAN PROPORTIONS.

YOU AND COLLEAGUES IN SECRETARIAT COULD BE FORGIVEN FOR THINKING INSURMOUNTABLE.

TRIAL BY FIRE.

SOME ARGUE UN'S FAILURE TO RESOLVE MAJOR DISPUTES AND ENFORCE DECISIONS NECESSITATE FUNDAMENTAL REVIEW OF ORGANISATION'S ROLE.

SOME CONCLUDE IT NEEDS STRENGTHENING, OTHERS ARGUE IT SHOULD BE DISCARDED.

WE TAKE A REALISTIC VIEW OF ITS POTENTIAL.

NOT DISILLUSIONED.

STRONGLY BELIEVE IDEALS OF CHARTER RIGHT.

/ PROBLEM

PROBLEM NOT IN THE CHARTER OR THE STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANISATION, BUT IN THE CONFLICTING POLICIES OF THE MEMBERS.

UN BEST HOPE FOR IMPROVING PRESENT SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND BEST FRAMEWORK FOR A MORE CIVILISED WORLD ORDER.

BELIEVE THIS INSPITE OF SIGNIFICANT RESERVATIONS.

TOO MUCH HOT AIR AND POSTURING.

TOO MUCH GROUP POLITICS WHICH DISTORTS DEBATE AND REDUCES POSSIBILITIES FOR PRACTICAL PROGRESS.

BUT ANXIOUS TO CO-OPERATE IN MAKING BEST POSSIBLE USE.

/ YOUR PERFORMANCE

YOUR PERFORMANCE IN FIRST HALF YEAR OF OFFICE FIRST RATE.

INTEGRITY AND ENERGY HAVE BROUGHT ORGANISATION CONSIDERATION CREDIT.

FUTURE OF UN COULD NOT BE IN BETTER HANDS.

THANK YOU FOR VISITING BRITAIN SO EARLY IN YOUR TENURE.

AS PERMANENT MEMBER OF SECURITY COUNCIL PARTICULARLY VALUABLE TO US.

EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER, IN FRANKNESS AND TRUST, TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES WE SHARE.

THE RT. HON. THE PRIME MINISTER

His Excellency
Señor Javier Perez de Cuellar

MR. DENIS THATCHER

Señora Perez de Cuellar

The Right Reverend the
Lord Bishop of London

The Rt. Hon.
Baroness Young

Monsieur François Giuliani

Mrs. Rifkind

His Excellency
Mr. S. S. Ramphal

The Lady Forte

The Lord Gladwyn

Lady Laing

The Rt. Hon. Denis Healey

Mrs. Owen

Sir Antony Acland

Mrs. Douglas-Home

Sir John Thomson

Mr. Andrew Knight

Mr. Bowen Wells

Mr. Malcolm Rifkind

Mrs. Srivastava

Dr. G. T. Young

The Lady Colville of Culross

Mr. Gilberto Rizzo

Mrs. Macmillan

The Lord Thomas of Swynnerton

Lady Parsons

The Rt. Hon. Terence Higgins

Lady Jennings

The Rt. Hon. Humphrey Atkins

Mrs. Ferguson

Mrs. Stokes

Mr. Ian Gow

Mr. Brian Urquhart

The Rt. Hon. Francis Pym

Señor Alvaro de Soto

Mrs. Leonard

The Rt. Hon.
Lord Shackleton

The Lady Gladwyn

Mr. C. P. Srivastava

The Lady Thomas
of Swynnerton

The Lord Forte

Professor Rosalyn Higgins

The Rt. Hon.
Maurice Macmillan

Lady Thomson

Professor John Ferguson

Mrs. Rhodes James

Mr. Charles Douglas-Home

Mrs. Wells

Mr. John Stokes

Mr. John Coles

The Rt. Hon. John Nott

Mrs. Ramphal

The Lord Colville
of Culross

Mrs. Healey

Sir Hector Laing

Lady Acland

The Rt. Hon. Dr. David Owen

Miss Margaret Quass

Sir Robert Jennings

Mrs. Atkins

Sir Anthony Parsons

Mrs. Knight

Mr. Robert Rhodes James

ENTRANCE

10 Downing Street
14 July 1982

Mr. John Coles

PRIME MINISTER

Lunch for the United Nations Secretary General
Wednesday, 14 July

I attach the list of guests attending the lunch for the United Nations Secretary General on Wednesday, 14 July together with a draft seating plan. John Coles has seen the seating plan. Do you agree please?

Sue Goodchild

13 July 1982

c.c. Mr. Denis Thatcher

Mr. John Coles

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LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. DENIS THATCHER IN HONOUR OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND SENORA PEREZ DE CUELLAR ON WEDNESDAY, 14 JULY AT 1.00 PM FOR 1.15 PM

The Prime Minister and Mr. Denis Thatcher	
His Excellency Señor Javier Perez de Cuellar and Señora de Cuellar	Secretary General of the United Nations
UN Officials	
Mr. Brian Urquhart	Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs
Señor Alvaro de Soto	Special Assistant to the Secretary-General
Monsieur Francois Giuliani	Spokesman for the Secretary General
Mr. C.P. Srivastava and Mrs. Srivastava	Secretary General of Intergovernmental Maritime Organisation
Mr. Gilberto Rizzo	Director, UN Information Centre, London
HM Government	
Rt, Hon. Francis Pym, MP	
Rt. Hon. John Nott, MP	
Rt. Hon. Baroness Young and Dr. Young	
Mr. Malcolm Rifkind, MP and Mrs. Rifkind	FCO Parliamentary Under Secretary of State with responsibility for the UN
Conservative MPs	
Rt. Hon. Maurice Macmillan, MP and Mrs. Macmillan	
Rt. Hon. Humphrey Atkins, MP and Mrs. Atkins	
Mr. Robert Rhodes James, MP and Mrs. Rhodes James	former senior UN official
Mr. Bowen Wells, MP and Mrs. Wells	Member of UN Parliamentary Group and Foreign Affairs Committee
Mr. John Stokes, MP and Mrs. Stokes	

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Labour Party

Rt. Hon. Denis Healey, MP and and Mrs. Healey	Visited New York in May 1982 and met Secretary-General

SDP

Rt. Hon. Dr. David Owen, MP and Mrs. Owen	" " "

House of Lords

Rt. Hon. Lord Shackleton	
The Lord Gladwyn and Lady Gladwyn	Acting Secretary-General of UN when Senor Perez de Cuellar attended 1st General Assembly in 1946
The Lord Thomas of Swynnerton and Lady Thomas of Swynnerton	

Others

The Right Reverend The Lord Bishop of London and Mrs. Leonard	
Professor Rosalyn Higgins and Rt. Hon. Terence Higgins, MP	Professor of International Law at LSE and Expert on UN Affairs;
Professor John Ferguson and Mrs. Ferguson	Chairman of UNA
Miss Margaret Quass	Council for Education in World Citizenship

Industry

The Lord Forte and Lady Forte	Trust Houses Forte Ltd.
Sir Hector Laing and Lady Laing	United Biscuits Ltd.

Diplomatic Corps

His Excellency Mr. Shridath Ramphal and Mrs. Ramphal	Commonwealth Secretary-General

UN Representatives to UN Bodies

The Lord Colville of Culross and Lady Colville of Culross	Leader of UK Delegation to Human Rights Commission
Sir Robert Jennings and Lady Jennings	British Judge on the International Court of Justice

Fleet Street

Mr. Charles Douglas-Home and Mrs. Douglas-Home	Editor, The Times
Mr. Andrew Knight and Mrs. Knight	Editor, The Economist

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Officials

Sir Anthony Parsons and Lady Parsons	UN Representative to the UN
Sir Antony Acland and Lady Acland	Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Sir John Thomson and Lady Thomson	UK Permanent Representative-designate to the UN

10 Downing Street

Mr. Ian Gow, MP

Mr. John Coles

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DRAFT SEATING PLAN
LUNCH ON WEDNESDAY, 14 JULY

PRIME MINISTER

HE SENOR JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR

Mr. Brian Urquhart

MR. DENIS THATCHER

Rt. Hon. Francis Pym

SENORA PEREZ DE CUELLAR

Senor Alvaro de Soto

The Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of London

Mrs. Leonard

Rt. Hon. Baroness Young	Mr. Malcolm Rifkind	Rt. Hon. Lord Shackleton	Rt. Hon. John Nott
Monsieur Francois Giuliani	Mrs. Srivastava	The Lady Gladwyn	Mrs. Ramphal
Mrs. Rifkind	Dr. G.T. Young	Mr. C.P. Srivastava	The Lord Colville of Culross
His Excellency Mr. S.S. Ramphal	The Lady Colville of Culross	The Lady Thomas of Swynnerton	Mrs. Healey
The Lady Forte	Mr. Gilberto Rizzo	The Lord Forte	Sir Hector Laing
The Lord Gladwyn	Mrs. Macmillan	Professor Rosalyn Higgins	Lady Acland
Lady Laing	The Lord Thomas of Swynnerton	Rt. Hon. Maurice Macmillan	Rt. Hon. David Owen
Rt. Hon. Denis Healey	Lady Parsons	Lady Thomson	Miss Margaret Quass
Mrs. Owen	Rt. Hon. Terence Higgins	Professor John Ferguson	Sir Robert Jennings
Sir Antony Acland	Lady Jennings	Mrs. Rhodes James	Mrs. Atkins
Mrs. Douglas-Home	Rt. Hon. Humphrey Atkins	Mr. Charles Douglas-Home	Sir Antony Parsons
Sir John Thomson	Mrs. Ferguson	Mrs. Wells	Mrs. Knight
Mr. Andrew Knight	Mrs. Stokes	Mr. John Stokes	Mr. Robert Rhodes James

Mr. Bowen Wells Mr. Ian Gow

Mr. John Coles

ENTRANCE

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 July 1982

Dear John,

Visit of UN Secretary-General

I enclose two copies of a revised brief on Namibia for the Prime Minister's talks with the UN Secretary-General on 14 July.

briefing attached to FCO to AJC of 9/7/82

original briefing destroyed.

Yours ever,

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 July 1982

A.J.C. 14/7

Dear John,

Talks with UN Secretary-General: 14 July

I enclose two copies of a revised brief on Iran/Iraq following last night's Security Council vote.

briefing attached to FCO to ASC of 9/7/82

Original briefing destroyed.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The Secretary-General will just have had talks with the Foreign Secretary. I have agreed with the F/C.O. that they should leave the Falklands and Lebanon to be dealt with here.

Agree that Mr. Pym and Sir John Thomson should attend?

A. J. C. 13/7.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 July 1982

A.J.C. 14/7

Dear John,

UN Secretary-General

I now enclose a brief on Lebanon for the Prime Minister's talks and lunch with the Secretary-General. I also enclose a supplementary brief on Cambodia.

Briefing attached to FCO to NSC 9/7/82

Original briefing destroyed

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 July 1982

Dear John,

Prime Minister's Talks with UN Secretary-General: 14 July

I enclose briefing for this meeting. Brief No 3 on the Lebanon will follow later in order to take account of the developments on the ground. I also enclose speaking notes for the Prime Minister's lunch for Mr Perez de Cuellar.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

TALKS WITH UN SECRETARY-GENERAL: 14 JULY

BRIEF NO 1: STEERING BRIEF

1. The following annexes are attached:

A Programme
B List of Briefs
C Personality Notes

British Objectives

2. These are to consolidate our working relationship with the new Secretary-General, to encourage him to use his Office to the full for the resolution of crises and to support his search for greater efficiency in the UN system. Specifically we must persuade him that there is no foreseeable UN role vis-à-vis the Falklands; and we should urge him to accept that there should always be a British Under-Secretary-General.

Secretary-General's objectives

3. These are likely to be to seek assurances of our cooperation, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, over the range of issues of common concern. He may try to revive his role as intermediary between Britain and Argentina and to find a basis for possible future negotiations.

Background

4. The Secretary-General's visit is part of a series of familiarisation tours during his first months of Office. In April he visited Rome and Geneva which are the seats of UN agencies. His present tour has taken him to Geneva again (where he has been attending ECOSOC) and the Hague (International Court of Justice). He has also visited Berne. After London he will visit Yugoslavia and Romania.

5. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary met Perez de Cuellar in New York on 2 May for talks on the Falklands. The Prime Minister called on him during her visit to New York for UNSSD II on 23 June.

/6. Our

6. Our experiences in recent months have confirmed our high regard for Perez de Cuellar as an impartial and capable operator. We have cause to regret his continuing wish for involvement over the Falklands (Brief No 2) but we should seek to check any despondency which may exist in the Secretariat as a result of the acute crises of recent months (especially the Lebanon - Brief No 3) which have left the UN on the sidelines.

Agenda

7. Falklands (Brief No 2)

We must try to disabuse the Secretary-General of any notion that his mandate under Security Council Resolution 505 is still in being and that he is under an obligation to submit a further report to the Council.

8. Lebanon (Brief No 3)

Depending on developments on the ground, discussion will probably focus on future peacekeeping arrangements. We should make clear our support for the principle of an expanded UNIFIL but avoid commitment to British participation in this or any non-UN force.

9. Afghanistan (Brief No 4)

We shall want to obtain the Secretary-General's assessment of what progress has been made at the Geneva talks towards realising the principles of the three General Assembly Resolutions: withdrawal of foreign (ie. Soviet) troops; self-determination; 'preservation' of Afghanistan's independence and Non-Alignment; creation of conditions in which refugees can return. We should ask for help over Pinder-Wilson.

10. Namibia (Brief No 5)

We wish to keep in touch with the Secretary-General on current progress towards a Namibia settlement. He may be particularly interested in the linkage with Cuban withdrawal from Angola and our likely contribution to the UN Transition Assistance Group.

/Cyprus

11. Cyprus (Brief No 6)

We are interested in the Secretary-General's own appraisal of the situation in Cyprus following his meetings with Kyprianou and Denktash. We should reaffirm UK support for the UN effort to find a solution to the Cyprus problem through the intercommunal talks.

12. Cambodia (Brief No 7)

The new coalition of Cambodian opposition forces should encourage continuing support for Democratic Kampuchean credentials at the UNGA. It may also help toward a long-term political solution, though Vietnam remains unlikely to co-operate with the UN Ad Hoc Committee on a negotiated settlement of the Cambodian issue. The Secretary-General has a Special Representative on Cambodia so Perez de Cuellar's views on the prospects would be valuable.

13. Iran/Iraq (Brief No 8)

The UK is ready to support the current initiative at the UN but if this is to be effective it must obtain Iranian support or acquiescence.

14. Global Negotiations (Brief No 9)

(Not essential to raise this) Despite discussion since Versailles, no agreement yet reached on launching Global Negotiations. Further consideration is unlikely before mid-September, and outlook very uncertain. Secretary-General's own assessment would be useful.

16. UN Management and Appointments (Brief No 10)

Secretary-General would welcome encouragement for his efforts to improve the efficiency of the UN machine. We should reaffirm our zero real growth policy. We should insist on there always being a British Under-Secretary-General.

TALKS WITH UN SECRETARY-GENERAL: 14 JULY 1982

BRIEF NO 2: FALKLANDS

Points to Make

1. Negotiations with Argentina not now acceptable

After the fighting and the deaths British public opinion and Parliament could not accept negotiations. We have been fighting to restore the Islanders' rights; we cannot now be prepared to negotiate them away.

2. At least several months is now needed for a return to normality on the Islands

The Islanders can then take stock and consider the future. Must not be hurried. The mood on the Islands is, naturally, now even more strongly anti-Argentine than before.

3. We are pressing the Argentines for a satisfactory assurance that they consider active hostilities at an end

There are sufficient channels available to us for this. We are not looking for a formal agreement to which the Argentines would never agree. But we decided to release the remaining Argentine POWs, as a positive gesture to Argentina.

4. We see no need for Secretary-General to report further to the Security Council

SCR 505 was passed in circumstances which now no longer apply. Secretary-General has not reported back on Olof Palme's mission to Iran/Iraq, and this has not led to challenge. We would strongly oppose any move during cooling off period to re-open matters at the Security Council.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. A copy of Security Council Resolution 505, adopted on 26 May, is attached. The Secretary-General submitted an Interim Report to the Security Council on 2 June. After stating that it was his considered view that the positions of the two parties did not offer the possibility of developing at this time for a cease fire which would be mutually acceptable, he announced that he would maintain close contact with the parties in the event that his good offices could contribute to bringing the tragic crisis to an end.

2. The Secretary-General may well feel that he should make a further report to the Security Council on the basis that his mandate under SCR 505 is still in being.

3. Mr Olof Palme was appointed on 11 November 1980 by Mr Kurt Waldheim as Special Emissary of the Secretary-General in relation to the Iran/Iraq war. He was appointed by an informal letter, the text of which was not published, and the fact of his appointment was notified informally by the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, also in an unpublished letter. There are thus no official terms of reference. Mr Palme reported confidentially to the Secretary-General, who did not report to the Security Council. The Security Council resolution which preceded Mr Palme's appointment was adopted on 28 September 1980. It 'support(ed) the efforts of the Secretary-General and the offer of his good offices for the resolution of the situation' and 'request(ed) him to report to the Security Council within 48 hours'.

South America Department

8 July 1982

UNITED NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/505 (1982)
26 May 1982

RESOLUTION 505 (1982)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2368th meeting on 26 May 1982

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982,

Noting with the deepest concern that the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) has seriously deteriorated,

Having heard the statement made by the Secretary-General to the Security Council at its 2360th meeting on 21 May 1982, as well as the statements in the debate of the representatives of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Concerned to achieve as a matter of the greatest urgency a cessation of hostilities and an end to the present conflict between the armed forces of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

1. Expresses appreciation to the Secretary-General for the efforts which he has already made to bring about an agreement between the parties, to ensure the implementation of Security Council resolution 502 (1982), and thereby to restore peace to the region;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices bearing in mind Security Council resolution 502 (1982) and the approach outlined in his statement of 21 May 1982;

3. Urges the parties to the conflict to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);

4. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into contact immediately with the parties with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire, including, if necessary, arrangements for the dispatch of United Nations observers to monitor compliance with the terms of the cease-fire;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the Security Council as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than seven days after the adoption of the present resolution.

TALKS WITH UN SECRETARY-GENERAL : 14 JULY 1982

BRIEF NUMBER 3: LEBANON

Points to Make

1. Peacekeeping: Two distinct operations likely to be needed: short-term force to surpervise evacuation of PLO fighters from Beirut: and a longer-term peacekeeping force for Southern Lebanon.

2. Strong support in principle for both types of force. But in view of other commitments very difficult for UK to contribute personnel. Recognise it may be difficult to achieve UN agreement to force as proposed by Americans for Beirut.

3. Longer-term peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon likely to be essential to secure Israeli withdrawal. Hope it will be possible to build on UNIFIL's experience to produce UN force with enlarged mandate. Need to start work on this soon.

4. Negotiations: growing concern at failure to make progress. Habib's efforts clearly hampered by practical difficulties. His inability to deal direct with PLO makes detailed agreement on highly sensitive questions even more difficult. But continuing support for US efforts.

5. [If raised] Franco/Egyptian initiative: working paper causes no difficulties of substance for us. But important that the Security Council should proceed on the Palestinian issue on the basis of unanimity. So timing looks unrealistic.

BACKGROUND

1. A further ceasefire was declared in Beirut on the evening of 11 July following a day of prolonged artillery exchanges. In a further turn of the screw, the Israelis have let it be known that they are studying 'military alternatives' to get the PLO out of Beirut.

2. Habib's negotiations appear to have made little progress in recent days. Problems remain on where the Palestinians would go and how they would leave Beirut. The Syrians made clear on 9 July that they were not prepared to receive Palestinian fighters. Draper has been sent to Damascus to pursue the subject.

3. Discussions continue on an international force to supervise the evacuation from Beirut. The PLO are insisting that it should be deployed before Palestinian withdrawal begins, to give them maximum protection. President Reagan has stuck to his offer to use the marines, but has recently put rather more emphasis on the condition that the Lebanese and Palestinians agree. The French have also underlined that they would only participate if all parties agreed and UN ''acquiescence'' was obtained. The US oppose this on the grounds that the Russians would veto any attempt to give UN legitimacy to what would in practice be a US-dominated force.

4. The US have suggested as an alternative to UN endorsement the idea that UN military observers might accompany the force in Beirut. They apparently believed that this could be done on the Secretary-General's authority, although the UN Secretariat have told them firmly that the Security Council would have to be consulted (this seems right).

5. The current priority is the establishment of a force for Beirut. But in the longer-term a peacekeeping force for Southern Lebanon will also be needed if the Israelis are to withdraw. In our view the first choice should be a UN force building on UNIFIL's experience, but with a stronger and clearer mandate. UNIFIL's present mandate

/expires

expires on 19 August; contributors will probably be reluctant to leave their forces in Lebanon beyond that time without a clearer idea of the long-term future of the force.

6. On the Franco/Egyptian proposal for a Security Council resolution, reaffirming earlier resolutions on Lebanon and also including acknowledgement of the Palestinians' right to self-determination, the French have told us that they are delaying putting forward a draft for a few days. They would be prepared to water-down their present draft if this would achieve a constructive result. But in the last resort they consider that a firm draft vetoed by the Americans would be better than no action at all in New York, to give the PLO some political gain to compensate for their abandonment of the military option.

TALKS WITH UN SECRETARY-GENERAL: 14 JULY 1982

BRIEF NO 4: AFGHANISTAN

POINTS TO MAKE

1. What progress was made at Geneva towards a solution in accordance with provisions of General Assembly resolutions (to which we attach great importance)?

2. Is it really likely that Karmal regime now accepts that Soviet withdrawal must be the primary element in any solution?

3. What part did Russians play at Geneva? Any real flexibility? Interested to know your impression after your forthcoming visit to Moscow.

4. Will Iran continue its involvement in process of mediation?

Pinder-Wilson

5. Pinder-Wilson (aged 63), an eminent archaeologist, has been detained in Kabul since 28 March. TASS and the Afghan press have carried reports that he was tried on 24 June on charges of illegal export of antiquities, and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Despite our repeated representations, the Karmal regime have not explained to us why he was detained, have not provided any information about his trial and have only once allowed consular access (two months ago).

6. A matter of significant public concern. Realise you have your own problems over some arrested UN officials in Kabul. Welcome any advice from you on how to handle the Afghans and grateful for any help you or your representatives could give in asking regime to provide information and consular access. Strong humanitarian case for his release. [Hand over note of case].

ESSENTIAL FACTS

''Indirect talks'' at Geneva (16-25 June)

1. Cordovez's objective was to start drafting framework for the withdrawal of foreign (ie, Soviet) troops and the return of the refugees. Pakistanis say that Karmal regime made concessions as a result of Russian pressure. In particular the regime was ready to talk about a package in which the run down of Soviet troops would begin in advance of the return of Afghan refugees.

2. Pakistanis say that they stuck firmly to principles of UNGA resolutions (withdrawal of foreign troops, self-determination, ''preservation'' of Afghanistan's independence and non-aligned character, and creation of conditions in which refugees can return in peace and honour). They also insisted that the refugees must be consulted about any settlement, and avoided any recognition of the Karmal regime.

3. We doubt that Russians are ready for real concessions. Soviet troop levels have increased, and Soviet withdrawal would lead to an immediate collapse of the regime. Soviet objective in encouraging an apparently conciliatory position at Geneva was probably to reduce international political pressure. The continuation of ''indirect talks'' (the next round is to be held in New York in September) may enhance the international standing of the regime and divert attention from Soviet responsibility for the crisis. Russians will try to tempt Pakistan to modify their normal robust position at the forthcoming session of the UNGA.

4. Perez de Cuellar will probably follow Cordovez in highlighting the apparent progress which was made at the Geneva talks. The Secretary-General (who was formerly Mr Waldheim's personal representative on Afghanistan) has

/distanced

distanced his mediation from the provisions of the UNGA resolutions. He seems more interested in establishing common ground between Pakistan and the Karmal regime than in putting pressure on the Russians to take steps towards a settlement in accordance with the provisions of the three General Assembly resolutions.

5. According to press reports Perez de Cuellar and Cordovez will be visiting Moscow later in the summer. Cordovez expects to make a further visit to Islamabad and Kabul towards the end of the year.

Situation in Afghanistan

6. The Soviet/Kabul regime claims to have captured the strategically important Panjshir Valley north of Kabul. Journalists and others who were with the resistance during the battle say that they made a tactical retreat to the side valley and high ground before attacking Soviet/Afghan positions. Russians may find it difficult to secure the valley, but the damage they have done to irrigation works vital to the local economy may make it hard for the resistance to repopulate the valley. There are no signs that the resistance is weakening either in Panjshir or elsewhere.

Pinder-Wilson

7. Background is set out in the attached note, which may be handed to Perez de Cuellar.

DETENTION IN KABUL OF DR RALPH PINDER-WILSON, DIRECTOR OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF AFGHAN STUDIES

Ralph Pinder-Wilson (aged 63) has been detained by the security authorities in Kabul since 28 March. Despite repeated representations by the British Embassy, officials of the Karmal regime have not said whether charges have been made against him, or given a proper explanation of the reason for his detention. On 25 June the Soviet press agency TASS and (on 26 June) Kabul TV carried reports that he had appeared before a special revolutionary court on 24 June on charges of illegally exporting archaeological items and helping Afghans to leave the country. According to an article which appeared in an official newspaper on 27 June, he has been sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. The Embassy have been pressing the Afghans for clarification, but the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintain that they are unable to provide any information about the reported trial and sentence.

The British Consul in Kabul was allowed to see Dr Pinder-Wilson briefly on 15 April, but the meeting was held in restricted circumstances and Dr Pinder-Wilson was not allowed to speak freely.

Dr Pinder-Wilson is an eminent archaeologist. There is significant public concern in the UK and among scholars abroad about the conditions in which Dr Pinder-Wilson is being held. He is an elderly man (aged 63) and has a record of poor health during the past few years.

Is there any way in which you can help?

TALKS WITH UN SECRETARY-GENERAL: 14 JULY 1982

BRIEF NUMBER 5: NAMIBIA

POINTS TO MAKE

FIVE PRESSING FOR EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF UN PLAN

1. Prospects for early settlement now better than for a long time. Five need to work closely with UN Secretariat and welcome co-operation forthcoming.

FIRST REPORTS OF NEW YORK CONSULTATIONS ENCOURAGING

2. Glad that we have been making encouraging progress at informal consultations with SWAPO and Front Line States in New York. With goodwill it should be possible to prepare ground for resolution of all outstanding issues. What is Secretary-General's assessment?

CUBA/ANGOLA LINKAGE

3. Clear that some parallel agreement on this an essential part of settlement. Unique opportunity for wider regional settlement removing area from dangers of super power conflict and stimulating economic development.

UK TROOP CONTRIBUTION TO UN TRANSITION ASSISTANCE GROUP (UNTAG) [IF RAISED]

4. Our commitments have unexpectedly increased since our offer of a signals squadron in 1978. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that we will be able to confirm that offer but are ready to explore other areas where we could help.

UK FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTATION [IF RAISED]

5. Willing to consider helping Secretary-General with cash flow problems at beginning of implementation, although we ourselves have to operate within narrow cash limits.

TALKS WITH UN SECRETARY-GENERAL: 14 JULY 1982

BRIEF NUMBER 5: NAMIBIA

ESSENTIAL FACTS [MAY BE USED FREELY, EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NEGOTIATIONS

1. The Five began informal consultations with Front Line States (FLS) and SWAPO in New York on 6 July, in parallel with US/South African discussions in Washington with a view to resolving remaining obstacles to implementation. The Five are represented in New York by Africa Directors, SWAPO by a leading official, and the FLS by permanent representatives and special emissaries from capitals. Depending on progress made, the Five may up-grade present series of consultations into proximity or all-party talks as appropriate. First reports of the consultations indicate that SWAPO and the FLS receptive to the Five's ideas. The Secretary-General met Nujoma in Geneva on 6 July.

LINKAGE OF A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT WITH CUBAN WITHDRAWAL

2. The Five support the US objective of securing Cuban withdrawal from Angola but agree that their joint efforts should be confined to a Namibia settlement. We have urged the FLS to recognise that some arrangement on the Cubans is an essential element in the Namibia negotiations in view of the importance of this issue to the South Africans and Americans. Privately some of the FLS have acknowledged the desirability of a wider regional settlement, whilst stressing that it is a matter for the Angolans. The latter and SWAPO are strongly opposed to overt linkage and parallel withdrawals. [NOT FOR USE]: A US special envoy, General Walters, proposes to discuss Cuban withdrawal with President dos Santos in Luanda on 19-20 July. There are signs that the US and South Africans may be willing to contemplate an agreement falling short of total Cuban troop withdrawal in parallel with South African troop reductions in Namibia.

/NAMIBIA

NAMIBIA ISSUES DIRECTLY INVOLVING THE UN

3. The UN was not directly concerned with the search for agreement on the constitutional principles, but the Five recorded this agreement in a letter to the Secretary-General delivered on 12 July, with the proviso that the electoral system which has caused delay recently is to be decided at a later stage. The UN is directly involved in other outstanding issues: the Five will need to tackle South African concerns about UN impartiality during implementation, and a corresponding absence of bias by South Africa's Administrator-General in the territory, to be verified by the UN Special Representative. The Five are also consulting the parties about the size, composition and deployment of UNTAG. These issues involve close liaison with the UN Secretariat, which has already begun with a few selected senior officials.

SUPPORT FOR UNTAG

4. In 1979 the Secretary-General gratefully accepted our offer to contribute to UNTAG a signals squadron of 80 men, subject to reimbursement of full costs. We have anticipated a formal request from the Secretary-General for confirmation of our offer but MOD have indicated that because of commitments in the Falklands and Belize it would be very difficult to provide a signals unit. We are in touch with MOD/Treasury on other possible contributions. He may also ask the Five to underwrite initial UN expenses on launching UNTAG, before General Assembly is able to make an appropriation; again we are in touch with the Treasury.

Southern Africa Department
13 July 1982

TALKS WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL: 14 JULY 1982

BRIEF NO 6: CYPRUS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. What is UN Secretary-General's assessment of intercommunal talks following meeting with Kyprianou and Denktash?

2. UK supports the intercommunal talks being held under UN auspices. They offer only realistic chance of progress. Pleased that atmosphere is good and that there has been some progress during the year. Gobbi has done an excellent job.

3. Kyprianou seems likely to seek recourse to the UNGA, especially with impending Presidential elections (due before end of February 1983). Fear that Turkish side will react badly and talks be jeopardised. What chances of keeping issue away from General Assembly?

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. President Kyprianou and Mr Denktash (President of the ''Turkish Federated State of Cyprus'') met Sr Perez de Cuellar separately in New York on 8 and 9 June. The meetings went well. The intercommunal talks are likely to survive the summer but longer term prospects are less good.

2. The tabling of the UN ''evaluation'' in November 1981 gave the intercommunal talks a new lease of life. The talks were recently speeded up from 1 to 2 meetings a week. The areas of the evaluation which are still to be discussed include territory and safeguards for the Turkish Cypriots; both will be difficult and deadlock may well be reached by the end of the summer. The two sides have agreed on a list of ''points of coincidence'' on the constitution but the value of this is diminished by footnotes and reservations entered by both sides.

3. Greek Cypriot threats to resort to UNGA are worrying. But this would be less objectionable than other recent ideas on ''internationalisation'' (eg international conference, appointment of mediator) apparently favoured by Papandreou, who sees no future in the intercommunal talks until Turkish troops withdraw from Cyprus.

4. We have given full support to the efforts of the UN Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Dr Gobbi, in promoting the intercommunal talks. We also support the UN effort in Cyprus by our contribution to UNFICYP. (The UK is the largest single contributor of men and money. We also give the force logistical back-up from our Sovereign Base Areas.)

5. Sr Perez de Cuellar was the UN Special Representative in Cyprus from 1975 to 1977. He is accordingly well informed about Cyprus problems and takes a close personal interest in them.

Southern European Department
7 July 1982

TALKS WITH UN SECRETARY-GENERAL: 14 JULY 1982

BRIEF NUMBER 7: CAMBODIA

POINTS TO MAKE

NEW COALITION A PROMISING DEVELOPMENT

1. Hope that recent coalition of anti-Vietnamese forces in Cambodia may contribute in due course to a political settlement. Unlikely, however quickly to change the situation on the ground.

MAY INFLUENCE UNGA VOTING

2. Should strengthen vote for DK credentials. UK would expect to continue support.

ANY UN PROGRESS ON OTHER FRONTS?

3. Vietnam may in due course be more interested in a political solution. How does the ad hoc committee of the International Conference see prospects? Or Mr Rafeeuddin Ahmed (Secretary General's Special Representative)?

RECOGNITION OF CGDK (DEFENSIVE)

4. We now recognise countries not governments but will continue to deal as before with Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann as non-official VIP's.

TALKS WITH UN SECRETARY-GENERAL: 14 JULY 1982

BRIEF NO 7: CAMBODIA

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. On 22 June in Kuala Lumpur the three Cambodian opposition groups agreed to form a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) to work for the removal of Vietnamese forces (possibly 150,000) which have been in Cambodia since their installation of the Heng Samrin regime in January 1979.

2. The CGDK will be led by Prince Sihanouk (President: he broke with the Khmers Rouges in 1979); Khieu Samphan (Vice President, with responsibility for foreign affairs: he is No 4 in the Khmers Rouges, who formed the notorious government of Democratic Kampuchea from 1975-79 and who with some 25,000 guerillas under the leadership of Pol Pot still pose the only serious military threat to the Vietnamese); and Son Sann (Prime Minister: a former Finance Minister, his Khmer People's National Liberation Front has about 10,000 supporters mainly in the Thai border areas). The coalition is a loose one.

3. ASEAN members have worked hard to promote the coalition and see it as a valuable political and diplomatic initiative. (Vietnam's reaction has been very defensive). They hope that in the long run the non-Communist forces can be strengthened and eventually eclipse the Khmers Rouges. But formation of the coalition will not have any immediate effect on the military and political situation in Cambodia.

4. Since 1979 we have joined a large majority at the UN General Assembly in endorsing the credentials committee's acceptance of Democratic Kampuchea - principally to prevent Vietnam 'legitimising' Heng Samrin (we withdrew formal recognition of the DK in December 1979). The new coalition should avert a possible decline in the DK vote this year, particularly if Prince Sihanouk attends, as expected.

5. The CGDK declaration is also set firmly in the context of last July's ASEAN-sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea in New York which called for withdrawal of all foreign forces and free elections for a neutral and non-aligned Cambodia. The

 /Conference

Conference Chairman, Austrian Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr is still active and is expected in Hanoi from 14-16 July. The Conference's ad hoc committee (Belgium, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand) has recently been in Europe and is due to visit Bangkok and Tokyo at the end of this month. But USSR and Vietnam boycotted the International Conference, and Hanoi rejects the UN's good offices. If there are any prospects for a shift in Vietnam's position we may learn more after their Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has toured ASEAN capitals later this month. At the end of this week's meeting of Indochinese Foreign Ministers he announced a unilateral withdrawal of some Vietnamese forces, but Thailand has already denounced this as cosmetic. ASEAN is unlikely to be deflected from its support of the proposals adopted by the New York Conference (and which were endorsed by the General Assembly).

6. The Secretary General's Special Representative, Rafeeuddin Ahmed, visited SE Asia in Febraury. He was unable to tempt Hanoi to a limited Conference on the Geneva model. Prince Sihanouk's similar suggestions recently found no regional - or wider - support. The ad hoc committee must remain the best forum for political progress, but it will be a long game. Difficult to make progress until Vietnam and her allies agree to take part.

SOUTH-EAST ASIAN DEPARTMENT

8 July 1982

TALKS WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL: 14 JULY

SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF

CAMBODIA RELIEF OPERATIONS [DEFENSIVE]

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Admire UN efforts in this important area, especially the work of WFP - UNBRO (World Food Programme - UN Border Relief Operation)

2. We are of course concerned for the continuity of the programme, and are now considering an addition to our November 1981 pledge.

3. Like a number of other donors, we continue to believe that our aid is best directed to the Thai border,

TALKS WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL: 14 JULY

SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF

CAMBODIA RELIEF OPERATIONS

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The Secretary-General is now expected to attend the next donors' meeting in New York on 26 July where we may be under some pressure to make a further pledge.

2. UKMIS New York report that commitments for the Thai/Cambodia border area, which we consider most important, are still US $20 m short, though exact figures will not be available before the meeting itself.

3. In November 1981 UK pledged £500,000 for WFP and ICRC operations in the border areas.

4. We would propose to give any further aid to Cambodia (and other refugees) on the Thai border and to villagers displaced by the conflict. We, and a number of other donors, are reluctant to give aid for distribution inside Cambodia. The aid would have to go through the Vietnamese backed Heng Samrin regime with which we have no relations.

SOUTH-EAST ASIAN DEPARTMENT
12 JULY 1982

TALKS WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL: 14 JULY 1982.

BRIEF NO 8: IRAN/IRAQ

Points to make:

ACTION AT UN

1. UK voted in support of Security Council Resolution 514 on 12 July. But it was rejected by Tehran. Imminent invasion of Iraq has not been averted. Would have serious implications for stability and security of region.

FUTURE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

2. See advantage in your sending emissary to Tehran and Baghdad to establish clearly positions of both parties. This unlikely to avert Iranian invasion: but it might draw Iranians into public discussion of their demands in Security Council, thus paving way for a ceasefire.

ROLE OF THE WEST

3. See no direct role for the West or Ten to play: we have no leverage over Iran. Algeria, Turkey and Pakistan perhaps better places. How can process of mediation be speeded up? Will Iranians stop short of trying to overthrow present Iraqi regime by force?

DANGER OF WAR SPREADING

4. If Iranians invade preventing spread of war will be an important objective. Gulf countries seem to appreciate danger of war across Gulf and have been seeking accommodation with Iran. But is there danger of Jordanian and Egyptians being dragged in?

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Action in UN

1. The Iraqis actively canvassed support in New York and Baghdad for action in Security Council. Despite Iranian opposition and luke warm support from most members of Security Council, current President Mr Sinclair, (Guyane) forced the debate and vote. We voted in favour. In our explanation of our vote we however expressed concern that the Security Council proposals did not have the support of Iran. We hoped that the Secretary General would consider urgently the possibility of sending a representative to Tehran and Baghdad to establish clearly the positions of the two belligerents. Such an initiative would have the merit of persuading the Iranians to enter into public discussions, in the Security Council, of their demands.

West's Role

2. We have no leverage with Iran and little influence in Baghdad. Moderate Islamic States should take the lead. The Gulf States and Saudi Arabia have already signalled clearly that they are ready to finance post-war reconstruction. Best way forward is for them to continue to explore arrangements which could satisfy Iran and Iraq. Those with influence in Tehran - Pakistan, Turkey and Algeria - are best placed to persuade the Iranians to come to the negotiating table.

Iranian Invasion of Iraq

3. The Iranians are maintaining the pressure on the Iraqis in a war of words. Their forces may now be poised to attack and invade Iraq. The withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory was the latest olive branch which Saddam Hussein offered the Iranians in an attempt to bring about a ceasefire

/and negotiated

and negotiated settlement. It has in effect met one of the Iranian demands. But the Iranians continue to demand reparations, condemnation of Iraq as aggressor, the return of Iraqi exiles and the downfall of Saddam Hussein. The first two conditions are negotiable but the other two may not at present be realistic. By maintaining the threat of an invasion the Iranians may be tightening the screw on the Iraqi leadership. If the Iranians actually invade, we should expect to be in urgent consultations with our allies and friends in the region.

Mediation Efforts

4. The Iranians are annoyed by a recent decision of the Non Aligned Movement to proceed with the Baghdad Summit in September. They may attempt to make the meeting impossible on security grounds and will be unlikely to accept NAM as valid mediators. The Islamic Conference made a fresh and fruitless attempt in May to mediate. Mr Olaf Palme, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, has no plans to renew his efforts. The Algerians who played honest brokers in the negotiations of the 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iran and Iraq (the latter abrogated it unilaterally in 1980) may be prepared to try their hand again.

MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT
13 JULY 1982

TALKS WITH UN SECRETARY-GENERAL: 14 JULY 1982

BRIEF NO 9: GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. HMG support Global Negotiations (GNs) provided independence of specialised bodies is preserved.

2. Had hoped that small amendments to G77 text agreed at Versailles would open the way to launching GNs. Regret that G77 could not accept them as they stood. Chance for rapid progress lost.

3. G77 counter-amendments likely to reopen difficult discussions. Important to recognise flexibility shown recently by Americans to preserve momentum generated at Versailles.

4. Meanwhile important that preparations for GNs should not distract from other major events notably GATT Ministerial and UNCTAD VI.

5. In the interests of all to maintain and strengthen existing international arrangements for cooperation on trade and development issues.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Until recently preparations for Global Negotiations (GNs) had been deadlocked with the G77 and the Americans unable to agree on a launching resolution. In March the Algerians produced a text (the so-called Bedjaoui text) backed by the G77. With the exception of the Americans all countries regarded the text as an acceptable basis for negotiation. Within the Community all but the Germans and ourselves could accept it unchanged. We however wanted changes to remove the ambiguity over the link between the GNs and the Specialised Bodies.

2. At Versailles President Reagan agreed to positive language on GNs to the effect that the G77 text was helpful and would serve as a basis for consultations with the countries concerned. Four amendments to the Bedjaoui text were agreed at Versailles which the Canadians then put to the G77 in New York. Text with amendments is at Annex A.

3. The G77 have now responded formally. They have said that two of the Versailles amendments are not acceptable and have proposed counter-amendments. They are:

(a) the replacement in the preambular paragraph of 'recalling' by 'guided by';
and

(b) the replacement in operative paragraph 5 of 'without duplication of existing appropriate fora' by "by consensus'.

4. These are most unlikely to be considered let alone accepted by the Americans; the second also causes difficulty for us.

5. The first, counter-amendment causes us no problem. But the Americans have long insisted that GNs should not be tied too closely to GA Resolution 34/138 (which signalled the start of consultations on GNs).

6. The second undermines the protection we and the Americans seek for the specialised bodies, like the IMF and World Bank. The amendment proposed at Versailles would have prevented the GNs Conference from bypassing these bodies. But the G77 have not felt able to agree to this.

7. There will be future discussion in OECD on 12/13 July. But it is unlikely that serious consultations will take place until September. It is difficult to see how further progress can be achieved then, since at Versailles the Americans had clearly reached the limits of what they could accept. The prospects for Global Negotiations are therefore bleak. In fact, the collapse of Global Negotiations would not be unwelcome to us, though we must avoid incurring any blame, from the G77 or our EC partners, for their demise.

Economic Relations Department
8 July 1982

BEDJAOUI TEXT (3.31.1982)

ANNEX A

The General Assembly

Having considered the item entitled 'launching of the Global Negotiations on international economic cooperation for development',

In accordance with resolution 34/138,

1. Decides to convene a United Nations Conference for Global Negotiations on international economic cooperation for development from 3 May 1982. Such negotiations should be action-oriented and proceed in a simultaneous manner in order to ensure a coherent and integrated approach to the issues under negotiations;

2. Decides that the Conference will function throughout and reach agreement on the basis of consensus;

3. Decides that the Conference will in a preliminary phase establish the procedures, agenda and timeframe for the Global Negotiations;

4. Decides that the Conference will exercise the central role in the Global Negotiations. The jurisdiction, competence, functions and powers of the specialised fora within the United Nations system will be respected;

5. Decides that due attention shall be given in the preliminary phase to the inter-relationship between the central role of the Conference and the specialised fora which, together with the ad hoc groups it may create, will be entrusted with specific agenda items or parts thereof. Both the specialised fora and the ad hoc groups will proceed with their work on the basis of the relevant and appropriate objectives and guidance established by the Conference;

6. Decides to accord high priority to the Conference in relation to other United Nations activities except those of the principal organs established by the Charter of the United Nations in respect of facilities and services and requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary documentation to the Conference;

7. Decides that the Conference will report to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY VERSAILLES SUMMIT PARTICIPANTS

Recalling the resolution 34/138

As soon as a consensus is reached the Conference will enter the substantive phase

... will be respected by the Conference

... with the ad hoc groups it may create without duplication of existing appropriate fora, will be entrusted ...

TALKS WITH THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL: 14 JULY 1982

BRIEF NO 10 : UN MANAGEMENT AND APPOINTMENTS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. We welcome the Secretary-General's close interest in the efficiency and independence of the Secretariat.

2. We had hoped that he would look to us to supply Brian Urquhart's successor but we recognise his prerogatives and do not insist on this.

3. We do insist that we should always have an Under-Secretary-Generalship as a Permanent Member and major contributor. Would welcome Miss Anstee's promotion.

4. We are concerned about abuses by Soviet members of the Secretariat, particularly the Head of Personnel in Geneva.

5. We hope the Secretary-General remains intent on zero real growth in the UN Budget.

/ESSENTIAL FACTS

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. In an inaugural address to Headquarters Staff, the Secretary-General made the following points:

(i) the strengthening of the Secretariat was the first order of business;

(ii) he was determined to defend the independent and international character of the Secretariat;

(iii) the UN needed to reward merit and put a premium on good performance. Nationality should not be a relevant factor in career development;

(iv) the UN was required to work within a zero growth budget.

2. In a recent speech in Geneva he called for a major increase in resources for the UN, but may have been thinking primarily of development funds rather than the UN Budget proper. We and other major Western contributors are working for zero real growth. Final decisions are taken by the General Assembly, but the Secretary-General's proposals are crucial.

3. The Charter states that efficiency, competence and integrity should be the paramount considerations in staff recruitment but due regard should also be paid to an equitable geographical distribution of staff. Each of the Permanent Members of the Security Council and each of the major contributors has one of the Under-Secretary-Generalships. Last year Waldheim agreed to a request by the Prime Minister that he should look to us to supply a successor to Urquhart as Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs. Perez de Cuellar has declined to renew that pledge. He appears to be grooming an Indian member of Urquhart's staff to take over when Urquhart eventually decides to go. The Indian is very good. There is an obvious case for promotion from within the Secretariat where possible. Urquhart himself reached his position that way.

4. Miss Anstee is the second most senior Briton in the Secretariat. She has long experience on the development side and is well known

/to Perez de Cuellar.

to Perez de Cuellar. She deserves promotion and this would assure us of continuing representation at Under-Secretary-General level when Urquhart goes.

5. Many Soviet UN officials are KGB officers and all abuse their positions to provide intelligence to the Russians. Waldheim's appointment of Dneprovsky to the personnel job in Geneva, which gives him access to personal information on all Geneva staff, was particularly regrettable. His contract comes up for renewal shortly and should be terminated.

United Nations Department
9 July 1982

Annex C.

MR JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR

1. Secretary-General of the United Nations since 1 January 1982.

2. Peruvian. Born 1920 in Lima. Gruadated from the Law Faculty of the Catholic University, Lima in 1943. Joined the Peruvian Diplomatic Service in 1944 and was a member of the Peruvian delegation to the first session of the General Assembly in 1946. Subsequently served in the Peruvian Embassies in Paris, London, La Paz and Rio.

1961 - 64: Ministry of External Relations, Lima (successively Director of Administration, Director of Protocol and Political Director).

1964 - 66: Ambassador in Berne.

1966 - 69: Secretary-General (ie. PUS) of the Ministry of External Relations, Lima.

1969 - 71: Peruvian Ambassador in Moscow (and concurrently Warsaw).

1971 - 75: Permanent Representative at the UN (President of the Security Council during the 1974 Cyprus crisis).

October 1975 - December 1977: Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus.

December 1977 - February 1979: Peruvian Ambassador in Caracas.

February 1979: Appointed UN Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs.

/ He was

He was additionally appointed the Secretary-General's Personal Representative for Afghanistan in 1980 and also represented the Secretary-General at the Rhodesian independence elections. He resigned as Under-Secretary-General on 31 May 1981, but remained Waldheim's Personal Representative for Afghanistan. He was then nominated as Peruvian Ambassador in Brasilia but his appointment became a political issue in the Peruvian Parliament, where the Senate rejected it on the grounds that he had continued in office as Secretary-General at the Foreign Ministry when President Belaunde was overthrown by Velasco in a military coup in October 1968 and had been present at the swearing-in ceremony of Velasco and his government. He finally left the active service of the Peruvian government in October 1981.

3. In the 1981 contest for Secretary-Generalship of the United Nations, the only declared candidates initially were Kurt Waldheim and Salim Salim (Foreign Minister of Tanzania). The Peruvian government lobbied intensively for Perez de Cuellar as a compromise candidate in the event of deadlock between Waldheim and Salim, but Perez de Cuellar himself stayed quietly in his tent outside Lima, a tactic which won him points over the other potential compromise candidates who were visible and active in New York. When Waldheim and Salim finally agreed to withdraw from the contest, and thus made way for new candidates, the Russians immediately made clear that Perez de Cuellar was the only one of the latter whom they were prepared to accept. (He had been largely responsible for the improvement in relations with the Soviet Union after the Velasco coup and was Peru's first Ambassador in Moscow). In the subsequent ballot in the Security Council he received the necessary nine votes and no vetoes. His nearest rival, Sadruddin Aga Khan, gained ten votes but was vetoed by the Russians.

4. Perez de Cuellar is an exceedingly able diplomat. He is quite non-Latin in temperament, being self-effacing and modest. Unlike his predecessor as Secretary-General, he shuns the limelight, thinks hard and carefully before acting, and has made it clear that he does not want to serve more than one five-year term.

 / He regards

He regards his service in London and Paris as his formative years and professes special admiration for the institutions and traditions of the UK; he is always eager to visit London. He played a central role in attempts to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Falklands crisis in the first half of 1982. He brought considerable professionalism and skill to this thankless task and was scrupulously impartial. It was not his fault that his efforts failed.

5. He speaks perfect French. His English is less good and he does not always understand what is said, especially in a conversation involving two or more native English speakers. This is a point to be borne in mind. His spoken English is better and he is remarkably adroit in fielding questions from the media.

6. His first marriage, by which he had two children, ended in divorce. His second wife is Marcela Temple de Perez de Cuellar (a Peruvian lady whose father is of British origin).

PEREZ DE CUELLAR, MRS MARCELA

1. Born Marcela Temple on 14 August 1933 in Piura, northern Peru. One of seven children. Father a land-holder of English and Scottish stock. Mother from family of Spanish origin settled in northern Peru for many generations. She studied at convent schools in Piura and in Lima.

2. Married Javier Perez de Cuellar in October 1975, and accompanied him in Cyprus; during his Ambassadorial tour of duty in Venezuela; and in New York while he was Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs.

3. Several children by previous marriage, one killed in a road accident early in 1982. Involved in social work, principally with children.

4. Interested in visual arts, enjoys reading in Spanish and English.

URQUHART, BRIAN EDWARD

1. Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs.

2. Born 1919. British. Educated at Christ Church, Oxford. Joined UN in 1945. Personal Assistant to first Secretary-General from 1946-49. Subsequently held various posts in the Secretariat. Before present post was Director of the Office of the Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs.

3. One of the outstanding international civil servants of his generation. The first to have risen through the ranks to the level of Under Secretary General. Made his name by restoring some order out of chaos of UN peacekeeping operation in Congo in 1961 (as Hammarskjold's special representative). Since then has concentrated on the UN's peacekeeping role, notably in the Middle East and Cyprus. Admirer of Hammarskjold but has loyally served all Secretaries-General. They have relied on his judgement and good sense. Urquhart's influence upon successive Secretaries-General has been pervasive and for the good. Modest. His political sense is realistic. After 36 years at the UN, remains devoted to its ideals.

4. Urquhart's office is, on the political side, the cutting edge of the United Nations Secretariat. It runs the various United Nations peacekeeping operations and advises the Secretary-General on the use of his ''good offices'' in relation to areas of international tension and conflict. To avoid the bureaucratic inertia which bedevils many divisions of the Secretariat, Urquhart has deliberately kept his section small. In consequence, although the section operates far more effectively than most parts of the Secretariat, the strain on Urquhart himself can at times be considerable. But he enjoys his work and remains remarkably patient and accessible.

DE SOTO, ALVARO

1. Special Assistant to the Secretary-General since 1 May 1982: RankD1.

2. Peruvian. Born 1943. Studied Law at University of San Marcos in Lima. Member of Peruvian Foreign Service. 1968-75 Peruvian Mission to the UN. During this period he served principally on the First Committee and was rapporteur at the 28th Session. 1975-78 Acting Director for Law of the Sea matters at MEA in Lima. 1978-82 Deputy Permanent Representative in Peruvian Mission to the UN in Geneva. Member of Peru's UNLOSC delegation.

3. Very close to Perez de Cuellar who wanted to bring him into his Private Office as soon as he was appointed but the Peruvian government would not release him until after the spring session of UNLOSC. De Soto arrived just in time for the peak of the Falklands crisis on which he quickly became Perez de Cuellar's principal adviser and agent, displacing Rafeeiddin Ahmed. He was a strong advocate of a role for the UN, but recognised the political realities.

4. Friendly, smooth, anglophile and very able. Perfect English.

GIULIANI, FRANCOIS

1. Spokesman for the Secretary-General since 1976.

2. French. Born 1938. From Corsican family. Educated at the Lycee in London, Lille University and Oxford. Worked for some years as a Reuter correspondent before joining the UN Office of Public Information.

3. Friendly, relaxed, approachable. Well adapted to work with press. Has established himself securely and enjoys confidence of the Secretary-General.

4. Bilingual in French and English.

c/ SG

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Sue Goodchild

1 July, 1982

Pl. make these changes.

A.J.C. 2/7

Dear Willie,

Visit of the United Nations Secretary-General, 13/14 July 1982

We now have the final list of those UN officials accompanying the UN Secretary-General on his visit to London on 13/14 July. One name has been changed and another added to the party and amendments are now necessary to the suggested guest list (which I sent under cover of my letter of 24 June 1982) for the Prime Minister's lunch on 14 July. Mr Brian Urquhart, Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, is now the senior UN official in the Secretary-General's party (in place of Mr de Olivares who no longer figures) and Mr Alvaro de Soto, Special Assistant to the Secretary-General, is an additional name.

I would be grateful if you would amend the guest list so that the names under the sub-heading 'UN Officials' on the first page, read as follows;

Mr Brian Urquhart - Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs

Mr Alvaro de Soto - Special Assistant to the Secretary-General

Mr Francois Giuliani- Spokesman for the Secretary-General

I understand that Mrs Rizzo who also figures on the guest list under 'UN Officials' cannot attend. The addition of Mr de Soto does not therefore change the numbers for that section.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

W Rickett Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

NO DA

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 June 1982

Visit of UN Secretary-General

Thank you for your letter of 7 May to John Coles. I can confirm that the Prime Minister is ready to see Mr. Perez de Cuellar for talks at 12 noon on 14 July, and to offer him lunch immediately afterwards. The lunch will be for the usual 48 guests, and I should be grateful for a suggested guest list in due course.

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DSS

PRIME MINISTER

Visit of UN Secretary-General:
13/14 July

You asked whether you were free to give Mr. Perez de Cuellar dinner.

On 13 July, you give dinner to the Prime Minister of Singapore. On 14 July, you are due to give a cocktail party for Members and their wives, and the invitations for this have already gone out and have been answered. It might be possible to give a dinner and reception for the Secretary-General after this cocktail party, but it would be a bit of a squeeze, and very tiring for you. It would probably mean that the guests arriving for dinner would get mixed up with those leaving the cocktail party. I see no way of cancelling the cocktail party without causing great offence.

Agree to stick to the plan to give Mr. Perez de Cuellar lunch on 14 July, preceded by talks at 1200?

CDP

Yes MT

2 June 1982

UN

10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline

Are timings o.k.?

AR 7/5

JC

Fine - but if we have Lee K.Y. to dinner on TUE 13th, he FCO would be able to come?

CL.

10/5

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Agree to have talks and lunch with U.N. Secretary-General on 14 July?

A.J.C. 11/5

7 May 1982

Dear John,

Visit of UN Secretary-General

As you may know, tentative plans have been made for Mr Perez de Cuellar, the United Nations Secretary-General, to make an official visit to the United Kingdom as a guest of HMG on 13 and 14 July.

Mr Pym proposes to entertain the Secretary-General on the evening of 13 July at the Royal Opera House and then, along with other FCO Ministers, to hold talks with him on Wednesday morning, 14 July. I understand that the Prime Minister might be free to see the Secretary-General for talks at 12 noon on 14 July and to offer him lunch immediately afterwards.

Preparations for the visit are now at the stage at which we should like to consider issuing a formal invitation to the Secretary-General. We should thus be grateful for your confirmation that the above arrangements are acceptable to the Prime Minister.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

We must entertain him very fully. Have I slip: a dinner at Wilton's and then we had a dinner followed by a reception. MT

He came with U Thant

CONFIDENTIAL

PART 1 ends:-

Waldheim to PM 13.5.81

PART 2 begins:-

FCO to AJC 7.5.82

Grey Scale #13

C Y M

A 1 2 3 4 5 6 M 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 B 17 18 19