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PREM 19/2004



Part 4

**TOP SECRET**

Confidential Filing

UK/Zimbabwe Relations.  
Internal Situation. Aid to  
Zimbabwe.  
Zimbabwe/S. Africa Relations.

ZIMBABWE

Part 1: May 1980

Part 4: November 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>16.11.83</del>		<del>5.2.85</del>					
<del>24.11.83</del>		<del>5.2.85</del>					
<del>11.2.83</del>		<del>6.6.85</del>					
<del>5.12.83</del>		<del>12/6/85</del>					
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PREM 19/2004

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PART 4 ends:-

Be. High Commission Harare

PART 5 begins:-

PC to CDP - 24.3.87



## Foreign and Commonwealth Office documents


Reference: Departmental Series DS No 15/84, DS(L) 2476, JCP  
011/1

Description: Department Series Central African Department: And  
now the real Mugabe stands up.

The above FCO documents, which were enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. When released they are available in the appropriate FCO CLASSES.

Signed



Date

11/4/18

**PREM Records Team**





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his power no 10  
an

*With the compliments of*

E. A. J. FERGUSSON  
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

*ER*



BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION  
HARARE

*Private Secretary*

5 November 1986

A Reeve Esq  
AUSS  
FCO

*a Ps / Mr. Chalke  
Ps / Mr. Patten  
Ps / Mrs  
Sir Crispin Tickell.*

*Mr Ferguson*

*Did you see? A*

*Dear Tony, Perceptive and entirely plausible. Very good read.  
Key area worth reading.*

*ER* 13/11 *Jesse* 13. 11

ROGER MARTIN'S VALEDICTORY: WHITHER ZIMBABWE

*(Counsellor in the High Commission, now resigns for the DS)*

1. Conscious of Roger Martin's close involvement with Rhodesia/Zimbabwe over the years, I asked him to put down on paper his final thoughts on Zimbabwe before he left here on his resignation from a Service in which he spent 22 busy and interesting years. I now attach the paper he produced which I warmly commend to you and to the other addressees of this letter.

2. It is, as you will see, a highly personal account of his involvement with this country and an equally personal look into the future. It bears the hallmark of his long and committed interest in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and displays a depth of experience and understanding which I can never hope to match.

3. I do not have time before the bag closes to comment on the many important issues he raises. But, reluctantly, I find myself in general agreement with his generally downbeat forecast of Zimbabwe's future. When I first arrived in this country, I was distinctly optimistic about the situation and the prospects. I am now much less sanguine, mostly for the reasons put forward by Roger. This pessimism is the more galling since I can still see - or I think I can still see - how easy it would be not merely to keep the success story of modern Zimbabwe going but actually to build on those successes in order to improve the lot of the average Zimbabwean even further. Now I fear the opposite will be true.

*Yours ever,*

*Murray*

M R Melhuish

cc: See attached list

*pages 2, 5, 6 and 8  
of despatch missing at  
review. CRW*

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Copies to: Sir P Moberly KCMG  
PRETORIA

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P S Fairweather Esq CMG  
LUANDA

M K Ewans Esq CMG  
LAGOS

## WHITHER ZIMBABWE?

1. Zimbabwe is only 6 years into perhaps several thousand years of history as an independent state; so it is very early days to be making judgements. In any case, the future is everywhere and always uncertain.
2. Nonetheless I happened to have been involved with Zimbabwe for over 26 years, since my first visit which also comprised the beginning of my political education at the hands of black nationalists. I was in Rhodesia Department in the CRO for the 2 years around UDI, opposing the policy of sanctions and independence before majority rule, and coining the phrase "NIBMAR". I strongly opposed the "big bang" option considered after the Pearce Commission (renouncing sovereignty and ending sanctions). I attended the Geneva Conference. I followed Lancaster House closely, did fairly well in the 1980 election sweepstake; and have lived in Zimbabwe for half its independent history. Before coming here, Zimbabwe mattered more to me as a political abstraction; and I have enjoyed developing a different three-dimensional view of the place.
3. I have always believed the equation "Happiness =  $\frac{\text{Actual}}{\text{Expected}}$ " embodies a profound truth. But although I have a track record of winning bets on Zimbabwe, (perhaps as a Service we should systematize the method of sealed envelope bets on the future?), I got one forecast very badly wrong. On UDI day, as I collected my winnings, I forecast that there would be a war and the blacks would win it, within 10 years (out by four); but that when they had won it there would be whites hanging from lampposts in Cecil Square and fleeing from burning farms, (mercifully totally wrong).
4. And indeed the balance of achievement and failure since Independence still seems to me substantially in credit. By



seems incongruous in an African country that, for instance, my host in Bulawayo should have had numerous recent visits from municipal officials pursuing his missing dog licence. But beneath the modernist dogmas, I seem to detect a great mix, in each individual and perhaps differing between generations, of enthusiastic support for an understanding of, versus indifference towards, various aspects of the European heritage. Zimbabwe will in a sense make its own selection of what it does and does not value from this heritage over the coming decades.

8. Because despite the 15,000 black graduates who returned from the West at Independence, this remains essentially an African country. I loathe racism as much as ever. But there is no denying the fact of cultural differences. And it is essentially the cultural qualities that have created and sustain modern industrialised societies in the West to which black Zimbabwe will or will not adapt, from its very different tribal and village origins. Much of what follows is not specific to the Shona, but doubtless applies also elsewhere in the continent.

9. In an early conversation during my tour with Sir Garfield Todd I observed that I had found most black Zimbabweans just like anybody else. He rephrased it cautiously: "If you assume they will react as you would yourself in the same circumstances, you will probably be right rather more often than wrong". And over time here, and despite numerous exceptions and great diversity among individuals, I seem to discern some cultural differences which will make the adaptation to the modern state hard to sustain:

- (a) Concern for status rather than function. For instance a newly appointed professor is entirely confident of

through the laws of physics. It tends to mean that conspiracy theories are preferred to muddle theories.

It gives rise to excessive time and emotion spent on funerals sometimes as though senior ministers were more concerned with the dead than the living.

10. Perhaps the spirits, certainly the war, possibly the ease with which their country was dominated and transformed by a relative handful of Europeans, leaves a sense of uncertainty, a lack of self-confidence, and (at least among many senior Shona) a worrying strand of paranoia.

11. In any case, I imagine through most of Africa and certainly here, the sudden plunge into modern urban living is often stressful, sometimes traumatic. To be a village herd boy at 8, and a Permanent Secretary 30 years later, is not easy. The evidence of ones eyes, endorsed by the view of urban teachers, suggests a rapid erosion of urban family life. There is no underlying protestant ethic in the consumer society (the all-pervasive ideology), and those who find themselves now with their feet on the rungs on the consumer ladder have often done so with surprising speed and ease. Their jobless children, whose expectations have exploded in line with the lucky generation, will find it very much more difficult. Together, these possibly account for the oddly blatant addiction of many senior Zimbabweans to excessive drink, extra-marital sex, and "illicitly" obtained money. It is sad to come across so many cases where promising blacks, in everything from charities, through Building Societies to Government departments, confronted with large amounts of other people's money, somehow feel unable to resist the temptation to help themselves. (Indeed it is in recognition of this phenomenon that Mugaba insists on a white chairman for the Public Accounts Committee).



Yes - the white grandmother. She politely asks them to wait their turn. They shout and jeer at her. All the blacks in the queue are clearly giving her moral support; but no one moves a muscle. And I concluded from this, and many other less vivid examples, that the people of Africa will only be free of their tyrants when they are prepared to liberate themselves - as the people of Europe have been doing for many hundreds of years.

15. Where do all these gloomy impressions point? The only white Zimbabwean-born wife I know of an (excellent) black Zimbabwean takes an extreme view. "We will simply have to regress back to what we were in 1890, and start building again from there". An able black senior executive, watching the opening of a splendid new office tower, answers the question "What will you be doing with this in 50 years time?" with "Keep chickens in it, of course". He goes on "Why should this bother you? Our chickens are quite harmless, and we keep them quite well...!". A recent trip to the tragic, decaying hopelessness of Beira leaves me feeling "I have seen the future, and it doesn't work". We ourselves can hardly feel superior. After the Legions marched out of Britain, how many centuries was it before we ourselves resumed a development which was in some genuine sense "British"?

16. So a deeply pessimistic prognosis. But one where a number of paradoxes and wild cards suggest at least a possibility of something "better". First the central paradox in attitudes towards authority. The Shona, stereo-typed as pacific or cowardly, in fact fought a longer and tougher war of liberation against the whites than anyone else in black Africa. Talking to the most ordinary people who turn out to have been combatants on one of the three sides, one is repeatedly struck by a sense of tenacity and heroism, rare in modern Britain. In the whites, the quality appears more active and inventive; in the blacks more passive and dogged. But many of the black leaders led a life of

5 out of the 7 top divisional management jobs (excluding finance and engineering), and productivity improves. The 15,000 black graduates who returned from the West with independence certainly think of themselves as Romans, not as Celtic tribesmen, and intend to keep things in good Imperial order - though if they try their hand at politics, they find they must play by the Celtic rules; and the range of politics is widening.

18. The timescale is the principal unknown. There is no doubt that things will get worse before they get better, but they will not get worse forever. An old American with 25 years experience of the ADB believes in looking at change over generations rather than years. He recalls his first conversation with the first Permanent Secretary at the Tanzanian Treasury - all about "hut tax", the limit of the man's perception; whereas his successor today has as sophisticated a grasp of modern economic theory as most people in Great George Street.

Forecasts: General

19. Zimbabwe will gradually run down for at least a decade, faster in the public sector, ie infrastructure (still good) and parastatals (already showing acute signs of strain), than in the private sector, as the management style and the political environment become more "African", and the foreign exchange shortage continues to take its toll. If Zimbabwe manages to continue to stay neutral in the internal South African conflict, this will be a relatively slow though gently accelerating process; if not, it could happen very quickly.

Forecasts: Specific

20. Over the next decade, and given minimal South African interference, I would bet the following:



have no great effect <sup>with</sup> many, such as shopkeepers or bank clerks, there are some key whites whose departure will accelerate decline);


- (j) nonetheless, a number of impressive rear-guard actions will be fought and won throughout the decade;
- (k) the only prospect of significant economic growth would be if Zimbabwe cooperated as enthusiastically as Swaziland in helping the South Africans to bust sanctions - both irony and poetic justice, given that Zimbabwe could thus take back from South Africa even more in "sanctions premium" than South Africa took from Zimbabwe over 15 years of UDI;
- (l) while South African sponsored dissidents may render much of rural Matabeleland virtually ungovernable, rural Mashonaland will remain relatively untouched. The people, like the country, will of course "survive".

#### Conclusion

21. No one can predict how many generations it will take to change direction, nor which course Zimbabwe would then adopt. But certainly some, perhaps a good deal, of the European heritage must go, before the residue becomes grafted onto genuine African root stock, and African growth can resume.

13 October 1986  
HARARE

Roger Martin



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From: C A K Cullimore  
CAFD

Date: 3 September 1986


cc: UN Dept

✓ PS

EDP  
3/9.

NAM TELEGRAMS

1. I enclose copies of Harare tels nos 396, 397, 398, 399 and 407 (405 to which 407 refers has not yet been received) reporting the progress of the NAM Summit so far.
2. I have asked UN Department (the lead Department on NAM matters) to ensure that No 10 is added to the distribution of all future telegrams from Harare.



C A K Cullimore  
Central African Department

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 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
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MY TELNO 405: NAM SUMMIT

SUMMARY

1. AFTER SPENDING 1 SEPTEMBER ON FORMAL PROCEEDINGS SUMMIT GENERAL DEBATE GETS OFF TO ITS USUAL SLOW START. IRAN/IRAQ DOMINATES THE FIRST MORNING. NICARAGUA DETERMINED TO PRESS ITS CANDIDATURE FOR THE NEXT CHAIRMANSHIP BUT AT PRESENT IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE SUMMIT WILL TAKE NO DECISION ON THIS ISSUE. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEES.

DETAIL

2. AFTER THE FORMAL OPENING SPEECHES REPORTED IN MY TUR THE SUMMIT DEVOTED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON TO A COMMEMORATIVE DEBATE MARKING THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NAM AND THE ADOPTION OF A DECLARATION IN COMMEMORATION OF THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MOVEMENT. SPEECHES WERE MADE BY MUGABE, GANDHI, CASTRO, YUGOSLAVIA, ALGERIA, IRAQ, AND SWAPO. THEY WERE MOSTLY DEVOTED TO AN ANALYSIS OF A NON ALIGNMENT IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND WERE BY AND LARGE UNCONFRONTATIONAL. CASTRO'S PERFORMANCE WAS BY HIS STANDARDS NOTABLY RESTRAINED. BUT POLITICS WERE NOT WHOLLY ABSENT: GANDHI SAID THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE SUMMIT WOULD BE JUDGED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT COULD HASTEN THE LIBERATION OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE EMERGENCE OF NAMIBIA AS A SOVEREIGN NATION.

3. THIS MORNING THE SUMMIT APPROVED ITS AGENDA AND THE REPORT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING. IN ACCEPTING THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' REPORT THEY APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL DECLARATION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA (MY TELNO 397), BUT THE TEXT MAY STILL BE SUBJECT TO SOME NEGOTIATIONS.

4. WITH THE FORMAL BUSINESS OUT OF THE WAY THE GENERAL DEBATE GOT OFF TO ITS NORMAL SLOW START. ONLY ALGERIA AND IRAN SPOKE THIS MORNING WITH KHAMEINI DEVOTING THE LAST HALF HOUR OF HIS ONE AND THREE QUARTER HOUR PERORATION TO A SUSTAINED ATTACK ON IRAQ. HE REJECTED AN APPEAL BY ARAFAT MADE AT THE INAUGURAL CEREMONY YESTERDAY TO IRAN AND IRAQ TO STOP THE WAR AND CONCENTRATE THEIR ENERGIES ON FIGHTING ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA.

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THE ZIMBABWEANS CLEARLY DID NOT APPRECIATE THIS PERFORMANCE. LIVE TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE SPEECH WAS CUT OFF SHORTLY BEFORE KHOMEINI ASKED FOR THE IRAQIS TO BE EXPELLED FROM THE MOVEMENT.

5. CASTRO IS DUE TO SPEAK THIS AFTERNOON. ADVANCE COPIES OF HIS SPEECH SUGGEST THAT HE WILL OFFER TO WITHDRAW 20,000 FRONT LINE CUBAN TROOPS (THE FIRST TIME, WE UNDERSTAND THAT A FIGURE HAS BEEN MENTIONED BY THE CUBANS) FROM ANGOLA IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 435. THE WITHDRAWAL OF OTHER CUBAN TROOPS WOULD BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE CUBAN AND ANGOLAN GOVERNMENTS BEARING IN MIND THAT NAMIBIA COULD NEVER BE TRULY INDEPENDENT WHILE THE PRESENT SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME REMAINED IN POWER AND THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD CONTINUE TO POSE A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE AFRICAN STATES IN THE REGION. HE KHOMEINI AND QADDAFI (WHO ARRIVED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON) ARE SAID TO HAVE HAD SHORT MEETING THIS MORNING.

6. OUTSIDE THE CONFERENCE THERE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONTEST FOR THE NEXT CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE NON ALIGNED. THE CUBANS ARE LOBBYING HEAVILY ON BEHALF OF NICARAGUANS, WHO SEEM DETERMINED TO PRESS THEIR CANDIDATURE. THE LATIN AMERICAN GROUP STILL SEEMS DETERMINED NOT TO ENDORSE NICARAGUA AND THE MATTER IS TO BE DISCUSSED BY THEIR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT LATER IN THE WEEK. THE PERUVIANS NOW SEEM TO BE HANGING BACK AND SAY THAT THEY WILL ONLY OFFER THEMSELVES AS A COMPROMISE LATIN AMERICAN CANDIDATE. THE INDONESIANS ARE MEANWHILE CONTINUING TO LOBBY HARD BUT ARE WORRIED THAT MUGABE WILL USE HIS INFLUENCE AGAINST THEM. THE YUGOSLAVS TOLD THE AMERICANS YESTERDAY EVENING THAT THEY WERE FAIRLY CERTAIN THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS THE SUMMIT WOULD NOT (NOT) TAKE A DECISION ON THE CHAIRMANSHIP. PYONGYANG IS NOW THE ONLY FORMAL CANDIDATE TO HOST THE 1988 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING SINCE LIBYA HAS WITHDRAWN ITS OFFER TO DO SO AND THE ARGENTINES HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT BUENOS AIRES WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE BECAUSE OF ELECTIONS THAT YEAR.

7. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEES HAVE NOW STARTED WORK IN EARNEST. WE UNDERSTAND THAT BY THE WEEKEND THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAD APPROVED THE INTRODUCTION TO THE DRAFT POLITICAL DECLARATION AND AMENDED VERSIONS OF THE SECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF NON-ALIGNMENT, MAYOTTE, DIEGO GARCIA, KOREA, NEW CALEDONIA (ON WHICH SEE PARA 9 BELOW), ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAQI NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS, LEBANON (MY TELNO 396), IOPZ, EUROPE AND DECOLONISATION. TWO WORKING GROUPS HAVE BEEN SET UP TO DEAL WITH DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS (SECTIONS III-V OF THE DRAFT DECLARATION) AND A MISCELLANY OF OTHER DEVELOPMENT AND UN-RELATED MATTERS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE MAIN POINTS OF CONTENTION IN THE DISARMAMENT SECTION ARE THE INCLUSION OF A REFERENCE TO THE US POSITION ON SALT II, WHETHER TO CALL FOR A BAN ON NUCLEAR OR

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NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS (THIS HAS DEVELOPED INTO A ROW BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN) AND THE LANGUAGE TO BE USED IN URGING THE US TO INTRODUCE A MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING. THE ARGENTINES HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE LANGUAGE ON VERIFICATION DESIGNED TO REFLECT THE NON-ALIGNED POSITION IN THE CD.

8. THE SITUATION ON THE AFRICAN TEXTS IS STILL UNCLEAR. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE FLs HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY ARE HAPPY WITH THE LANGUAGE OF THE DRAFT SPECIAL DECLARATION AND WILL RESIST ATTEMPTS BY THE INDIANS AND OTHERS TO TOUGHEN IT UP. THE AFRICANS ARE ALSO SAID TO BE AGREED AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL THAT THE DRAFT SECTION OF THE POLITICAL DECLARATION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA IS ON THE RIGHT LINES AND TO HAVE URGED OTHER DELEGATIONS NOT TO PUT FORWARD AMENDMENTS. THE EXISTING TEXT WILL AT THE LEAST, HOWEVER, REQUIRE SOME UPDATING.

9. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE LANGUAGE OF NEW CALEDONIA AGREED BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE INCLUDED A DISOBLIGING AMENDMENT BY VANUATU DESIGNED TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE QUESTION TO BE RAISED AT THE FORTHCOMING UNGA. THE FRENCH ARE LOBBYING HARD TO HAVE THE DISCUSSION IN THE COMMITTEE REOPENED BUT ARE NOT SURPRISINGLY FINDING IT AN UPHILL STRUGGLE. ACCORDING TO THE PORTUGUESE INDONESIA HAVE SUCCEEDED IN ENSURING THAT THERE WILL BE NO (NO) MENTION OF EAST TIMOR IN THE POLITICAL DECLARATION; ONLY MOZAMBIQUE SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF INCLUDING SUCH LANGUAGE. ON CAMBODIA, SIERRA LEONE IS SAID TO HAVE PUT FORWARD AN AMENDMENT REFERRING TO THE CDGK'S 8 POINT PLAN WITHOUT CONSULTING EITHER ASEAN OR VIETNAM. THIS HAS ANNOYED BOTH OF THEM AND THE TEXT IS LIKELY TO REMAIN IN ITS PRESENT FORM. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE AFGHANS ARE TRYING TO INSERT A REFERENCE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF SIX SOVIET REGIMENTS BUT ALL THE DELEGATIONS TO WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN ARE CERTAIN THAT THE PAKISTANIS WILL SUCCEED IN HEADING THIS OFF.

10. THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE CONTINUES TO HAVE PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFICULTIES OVER THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT DECLARATION. A LARGE NUMBER OF AMENDMENTS HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD AND SECTIONS OF THE DRAFT HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO WORKING GROUPS. THE MAIN NEW DEVELOPMENT (MY TELNO 397) IS AN INITIATIVE BY MALAYSIA TO ESTABLISH A COMMITTEE OF EMINENT PERSONS ON SOUTH/SOUTH ISSUES (DR MAHATIR VISITED TANZANIA YESTERDAY IN ORDER, IT IS RUMOURED, TO SIGN UP NYERERE AS CHAIRMAN). THE PERUVIANS ARE ALSO ACTIVE ON THE DEBT FRONT AND ARE RUMOURED TO BE THINKING IN TERMS OF AMENDMENTS TO THE DECLARATION MAKING IT CLEAR THAT EVERY COUNTRY SHOULD BE FREE TO DETERMINE AND IMPLEMENT ECONOMIC POLICIES OF ITS OWN CHOOSING AND HAVE THE RIGHT TO LIMIT DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS TO A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE OF EXPORT EARNINGS. THEY ARE IN ADDITION LIKELY TO PROPOSE THAT THE DECLARATION SHOULD CALL ON THE IMF TO ESTABLISH A NEW MECHANISM TO HELP BAD DEBTORS WHICH, WHILE PROVIDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, WILL ALLOW THEM TO ACHIEVE ECONOMIC GROWTH.



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11. THE NON-ALIGNED COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE MET ON 29 AUGUST  
AND ADOPTED ITS REPORT TO THE SUMMIT.

12. MIFT (NOT TO ALL) REPORTS DEVELOPMENTS ON ANTARCTICA.

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PS LADY YOUNG  
PS / MRS CHALTER  
PS / MR EGAN  
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MR FERLUSON  
MR BRATHWAITE  
MR SLATER  
MR REEVE

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MIPT: NAM SUMMIT: SPECIAL DECLARATION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

1. FOLLOWING IS LIST OF MEASURES REFERRED TO IN PARA 4 OF  
MIPT.

- (A) PROHIBITION OF TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO SOUTH AFRICA:
- (B) CESSATION OF EXPORT, SALE OF TRANSPORT OF OIL AND OIL PRODUCTS TO SOUTH AFRICA, AND OF ANY COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S OIL INDUSTRY:
- (C) CESSATION OF FURTHER INVESTMENTS IN AND FINANCIAL LOANS TO SOUTH AFRICA OO NAMIBIA AND OF ANY GOVERNMENTAL INSURANCE GUARANTEE OF CREDITS TO THE RACIST REGIME:
- (D) AN EMD TO ALL PROMOTION OF OR SUPPORT FOR TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA, INCLUDING GOVERNMENTAL ASSISTANCE TO TRADE MISSIONS:
- (E) PROHIBITION OF THE SALE OF KRUGERRANDS AND ANY OTHER COINS MINTED IN SOUTH AFRICA:
- (F) PROHIBITION OF IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, COAL, URANIUM, IRON AND STEEL ETC:
- (G) ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION OR ADOPTION OF OTHER MEASURES TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NATIONS DECREE NO 1 FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF NAMIBIA ENACTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA IN 1974:
- (H) TERMINATION OF ANY VISA-FREE ENTRY PRIVILEGES AND THE PROMOTION OF TOURISM TO SOUTH AFRICA:
- (I) TERMINATION OF AIR AND SHIPPING LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA:
- (J) CESSATION OF ALL ACADEMIC, CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC AND SPORTS RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, AND OF RELATIONS WITH INDIVIDUALS, INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER BODIES ENDORSING OR BASED ON APARTHEID:

(K).



- (K) SUSPENSION OR ABROGATION OF AGREEMENTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA,  
SUCH AS AGREEMENTS ON CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION;
- (L) THE TERMINATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENTS WITH SOUTH  
AFRICA;
- (M) A BAN ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS WITH MAJORITY-OWNED SOUTH  
AFRICAN COMPANIES.

MELHUIH

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SOUTH AFRICA  
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WAD.

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MRS CHALKER  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR FERGISSON  
MR REEVE  
SIR C TICKELL (ODA)  
CABINET OFFICE  
MR RATFORD  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
MR SLATER

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MR MALLABY CABINET OFFICE  
D SEC(O) (C) /5/8 MOD  
MRS CASE TREASURY

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RESTRICTED

FM HARARE

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 398

OF 010930Z SEPTEMBER 86

INFO ROUTINE DAKAR, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, LUSAKA, LUANDA  
INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA, ALGIERS, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, ADDIS ABABA

MIPT: NAM SUMMIT: SPECIAL DECLARATION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

## SUMMARY

1. DETAILS OF DRAFT SPECIAL DECLARATION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. TENTATIVE BUT HEALTHY SIGNS OF CAUTION ON SANCTIONS, REFLECTING DAWNING RECOGNITION OF FLS VULNERABILITY.

## DETAIL

2. THE DRAFT SPECIAL DECLARATION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA (COPIED BY BAG), RUNS TO NINE PAGES. APART FROM THE NORMAL RHETORIC ON SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF IT AVOIDS ATTACKING WESTERN COUNTRIES BY NAME (THE US IS, HOWEVER, CONDEMNED EXPLICITLY OVER LINKAGE AND IMPLICITLY FOR THE POLICY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT) THE DRAFT HAS THREE SUB-HEADINGS DEALING WITH NAMIBIA, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FRONT LINE AND OTHER NEIGHBOURING STATES. IT COMMITS NAM MEMBER STATES TO THE MEASURES SPECIFIED UNDER EACH SUB-HEADING - BUT NOTE THE CAREFUL DRAFTING ON SANCTIONS (PARAS 4 AND 6 BELOW).
3. ON NAMIBIA THE DRAFT CONDEMNS LINKAGE AND REAFFIRMS NAM SUPPORT FOR SCR 435 AS THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION. IT REQUESTS THE UN SECURITY GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TOWARDS THE SPEEDY IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT RESOLUTION AND CALLS FOR COMPREHENSIVE MANDATORY SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA TO COMPEL IT TO COOPERATE. IT GOES ON TO MANDATE MUGABE, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NAM, PERSONALLY TO CONVEY THE MOVEMENTS' CONCERNS AND DETERMINATION TO THE SPECIAL SESSION ON NAMIBIA LATER THIS MONTH.
4. THE DRAFT REAFFIRMS THAT THE IMPOSITION OF CHAPTER VII SOMETIMES REMAINS THE ONLY PEACEFUL OPTION TO COMPEL SOUTH AFRICA TO ABANDON APARTHEID. IT ENDORSES A LOT OF MEASURES (DETAILS IN MIFT) WHICH HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY CERTAIN COUNTRIES AND ORGANISATIONS AND COMMENDS THEM TO THE WIDER INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR URGENT ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION PENDING THE ADOPTION OF COMPREHENSIVE AND MANDATORY SANCTIONS.
5. THIS SECTION OF THE DRAFT ON THE FRONT LINE STATES DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE URGENT NEED FOR CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL ACTION

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TO ENABLE THEM TO WITHSTAND THE EFFECTS OF RETALIATORY SANCTIONS BY SOUTH AFRICA. IT REJECTS THE POLICY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND ANY ATTEMPT TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF QUOTE A CATEGORICAL AND IRREVERSIBLE PROCESS DESIGNED TO TOTALLY ERADICATE APARTHEID AND TO ACCOMPLISH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 435 UNQUOTE. IT ALSO ANNOUNCES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOLIDARITY FUND FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND LONG TERM HELP TO THE FRONT LINE AND OTHER NEIGHBOURING STATES. IT INDICATES THAT THE NAM WILL CONTRIBUTE GENEROUSLY AND URGE THE WIDER INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO DO SO TOO (CANADA IS ALREADY RUMOURED TO BE READY TO CONTRIBUTE).

## COMMENT

6. THE SPECIAL DECLARATION SHOWS SIGNS OF CAREFUL AND SOPHISTICATED DRAFTING. IT AVOIDS CRITICISM OF THE UK AND THE LANGUAGE ON MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA DOES NOT AS FAR AS WE CAN SEE ACTUALLY COMMIT MEMBERS OF THE NAM TO IMPLEMENTING ANY OF THEM. THIS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE MORE CAUTIOUS LINE ON SANCTIONS TAKEN BY MUGABE AT HIS PRE-SUMMIT PRESS CONFERENCE (MY TELNO 396) AND BY THE ZIMBABWEAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN AN INTERVIEW GIVEN HERE YESTERDAY (QUOTE SOME FRONT LINE STATES WILL BE ABLE TO DISENGAGE FROM SOUTH AFRICA QUICKLY, OTHERS OVER A PERIOD OF TIME AND SOME WILL BE UNABLE TO DISENGAGE IN ANY WAY UNQUOTE). A ZIMBABWEAN MINISTER DREW MY ATTENTION LAST NIGHT TO THE RESTRAINED ATMOSPHERE HERE OVER SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE LACK OF CRITICISM OF THE UK AND US. NOWHERE ON THE DRAFT DECLARATION IS THERE ANY SUGGESTION OF RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST COUNTRIES WHO REFUSE TO APPLY SANCTIONS. THE LANGUAGE ON DIALOGUE WITH SOUTH AFRICA IS ALSO NEW.

7. WE ARE DRAWING WITH TRUSED CONTACTS ON THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 6 ABOVE AND POINTING OUT THAT THE UK ALREADY IMPLEMENTS A GOOD NUMBER OF THE MEASURES CALLED FOR IN THE DRAFT.

MELHUIH  
HQHPAN 4370

SOUTH AFRICA

LIMITED

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CONSULAR DEPT  
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ECON ADVISERS  
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PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MRS CHALKER  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR FERGUSSON  
MR REEVE  
SIR C TICKELL (ODA)  
CABINET OFFICE  
MR RATFORD  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
MR SLATER

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MRS CASE TREASURY

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TELNO 397  
OF 010900Z SEPTEMBER 86

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INFO ROUTINE ALGIERS, BELGRADE, JAKARTA, NEW DELHI, LUSAKA  
INFO ROUTINE LUANDA, PRETORIA, BONN, CAIRO, SAN OSE, MANILA  
INFO ROUTINE CANBERRA, LIMA, RABAT, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, TEHRAN  
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, PEKING, ADEN, PARIS, KUALA LUMPUR

MY TELNO 396: NAM SUMMIT

SUMMARY

1. FOREIGN MINISTERS ADOPT DRAFT SPECIAL DECLARATION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA (DETAILS IN MY TWO IFTS) BUT GANDHI SUBSEQUENTLY TELLS THE PRESS THAT IT NEEDS TO BE TOUGHENED UP. CAMBODIAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN SECTIONS OF DRAFT POLITICAL DECLARATION SETTLED, BUT MIDDLE EASTERN ISSUES STILL LIKELY TO CAUSE TROUBLE. ECONOMIC COMMITTEE CONTINUES TO WORK AT SNAIL'S PACE. HAITI AND THE PHILIPPINES APPLY FOR FULL MEMBERSHIP OF THE NAM.

DETAIL

2. LATE ON 29 AUGUST FOREIGN MINISTERS APPROVED WITH MINOR AMENDMENTS A DRAFT SPECIAL DECLARATION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA (DETAILS IN MY TWO IFTS, NOT TO ALL). IT WAS SUBMITTED BY THE AFRICAN GROUP AND IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN DRAFTED BY THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE OAU. IT IS MODERATE AND IN TONE AND, WHILE CALLING FOR COMPREHENSIVE MANDATORY SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA ENDORSES A NUMBER OF SELECTIVE MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN IN THE INTERIM THOUGH IT DOES NOT, AS FAR AS WE CAN SEE, COMMIT ANY NAM MEMBER TO IMPLEMENTING THEM. GANDHI TOLD ZIMBABWEAN TELEVISION LAST NIGHT, HOWEVER, THAT THE TEXT AGREED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA NEEDED TO BE TOUGHENED UP. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER HE WILL GET HIS WAY ON WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY AN AFRICAN ISSUE. BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF STATIONING INDIAN TROOPS IN ZIMBABWE (PARA 7 BELOW) MAY STRENGTHEN HIS HAND.

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3. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS ALSO DESIDED, AFTER MUCH DEBATE NOT (NOT) TO ACCEPT THE NEW AGENDA ITEMS PROPOSED BY LIBYA, SYRIA AND IRAN (MY TELNO 379). THE OMANIS TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT THEY DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WOULD BE MUCH TROUBLE OVER IRAN/IRAQ. BUT IT IS LIKELY THAT IRAN AND OTHERS WILL TRY TO GET THEIR WAY BY PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT POLITICAL DECLARATION IN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. THE SECTION OF DECLARATION ON LEBANON HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN AGREED WITH MINOR UPDATING.
4. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ASEANS AND VIETNAM HAVE AGREED NOT (NOT) TO AMEND THE CAMBODIAN SECTION OF THE DRAFT POLITICAL DECLARATION. IT HAS ALSO BEEN AGREED THAT, AS AT THE PREVIOUS TWO SUMMITS, THE CAMBODIAN SEAT SHOULD REMAIN EMPTY. PRINCE SIHANOUK'S ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A SEAT FOR THE CGDK HAS THEREFORE FAILED.
5. THE DIFFICULTIES OVER THE CENTRAL AMERICAN SECTION OF THE DRAFT POLITICAL DECLARATION UNDER THE LATIN GROUP ALSO SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SETTLED. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE LATINs HAVE AGREED TO TOUGHER LANGUAGE ON US POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA IN RETURN FOR AGREEMENT THAT THE GROUP SHOULD NOT (NOT) ENDORSE NICARAGUA'S BID TO HOLD THE NEXT SUMMIT.
6. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCES THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE CONTINUES TO PROGRESS AT A MNAIL'S PACE: AS EXPECTED MALAYSIA HAS PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS ON SOUTH/SOUTH COOPERATION AND PERU IS SAID TO HAVE PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS ON DEBT CONSISTENT WITH GARCIA'S POLICIES ON THIS ISSUE. WE HAVE NOT YET, HOWEVER, SEEN DETAILS OF EITHER.
7. WE HAVE HEARD RUMOURS FOR SOME DAYS THAT RAJIV GANDHI HAS OFFERED TO DEPLOY INDIAN TROOPS IN ZIMBABWE TO RELEASE MORE MEN FROM THE ZNA TO GUARD THE BEIRA CORRIDOR AND LIMPOPO LINE. WE HAVE NO MEANS OF VERIFYING THE TRUTH OF THIS BUT REMARKS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY MUGABE AT A CONFIDENTIAL BRIEFING FOR SENIOR ZIMBABWEAN JOURNALISTS LAST WEEK SUGGEST THAT SOMETHING MAY BE BEHIND IT. HE TOLD ZIMBABWEAN TELEVISION LAST NIGHT THAT THE NAM NEEDED TO SET UP MACHINERY TO SUPPORT ITS POSITION ON ISSUES SUCH AS THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA. HE ADDED THAT QUOTE THOSE COUNTRIES WITHIN THE NAM WITH THE CAPABILITY TO OFFER MILITARY

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ASSISTANCE

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ASSISTANCE BY WAY OF EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE OFFERING THAT ASSISTANCE UNQUOTE. GANDHI IS REPORTED IN THE PRESS HERE AS BEING CONCERNED THAT THE NAM SHOULD PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE FRONT LINE STATES TO ENABLE THEM TO WITHSTAND RETALIATORY ACTION BY SOUTH AFRICA AND TO HAVE CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS TO DISCUSS WITH THE ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT.

8. IT WAS ANNOUNCED THIS MORNING THAT HAITI AND THE PHILLIPINES (CURRENTLY AN OBSERVER) HAVE APPLIED FOR FULL MEMBERSHIP OF THE NAM.

MELHUIH  
HGHPAN 4368

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NAD  
WIAD  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
MR FERGUSSON  
SIR W HARDING  
DR WILSON  
MR SAATER  
MR REEVE  
MR FEARN

3

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# Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM HARARE  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 396  
OF 291515Z AUGUST 86

INFO ROUTINE UKRIS NEW YORK, UKRIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, HAVANA  
INFO ROUTINE ALGIERS, BELGRADE, JAKARTA, NEW DELHI, LUSAKA  
INFO ROUTINE LUANDA, PRETORIA, JMW, CAIRO, SAN JOSE, MANILA  
INFO ROUTINE CANDERRA, LIMA, RABAT, DAMASCUS, DASHDAD, TEHRAN  
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, PEKING, ADEN, PARIS, KUALA LUMPUR

NY TELNO 383: NAM SUMMIT: FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING

## SUMMARY

1. STATESMANLIKE PERFORMANCE BY MUGABE AT PRESS CONFERENCE SETTING THE SCENE FOR THE SUMMIT. HARD INFORMATION ON THE STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE DRAFT DECLARATIONS VERY DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN BUT PARAGRAPHS ON THE FALKLANDS, PUERTO RICO AND CUBA SEEM TO HAVE BEEN AGREED UNAMENJED. CONTINUING PROBLEMS OVER CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. NO NEWS ON SOUTHER AFRICA.

## DETAIL

2. THE MAIN INTEREST TODAY HAS BEEN MUGABE'S PRESS CONFERENCE SETTING THE SCENE FOR THE SUMMIT. IT LASTED FOR AN HOUR AND WAS A MEASURED AND STATESMANLIKE PERFORMANCE. MUGABE STUCK CLOSELY TO A MAINSTREAM EXPLANATION OF NON-ALIGNED DOCTRINE IE THAT THE MOVEMENT SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF BOTH BLOCS AND READY TO SUPPORT ANY MOVES BY EITHER WHICH WOULD LEAD TO GOOD SUPERPOWER RELATIONS.

3. MUGABE'S REMARKS ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA WERE RELATIVELY RESTRAINED AND WITHOUT POLEMICS. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING HE MADE NO ATTACKS ON THE UK: ZIMBAWE WOULD COMPLY WITH THE SANCTIONS IN THE COMMONWEALTH PACKAGE AS THEY WOULD WITH ANY PACKAGE AGREED AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED. HE WAS CONCERNED THROUGHOUT TO PLACE ANY MEASURES TAKEN BY ZIMBAWE FIRMLY IN THE CONTEXT OF SANCTIONS AGREED BY OTHERS: THERE WAS NO (NO) SUGGESTION THAT THEY WOULD GET OUT IN FRONT OF THE PACK. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS MUGABE MADE IT CLEAR THAT ANY AGREED PACKAGE OF SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE PRIORITY OVER THE SOUTH AFRICA/ ZIMBAWE TRADE AGREEMENT. BUT THE TONE OF HIS REMARKS WAS NOT SUCH THAT HE COULD BE SAID TO BE "TEARING UP" THE AGREEMENT AS REUTERS HAVE REPORTED.

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4. THE CONFERENCE ITSELF HAS MOVED INTO COMMITTEE. HARD INFORMATION ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS GOING ON OVER THE DRAFT DECLARATIONS IS VERY DIFFICULT TO COME BY. WE UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE IS LOCKED IN A PROCEDURAL BATTLE AND HAS NOT YET GOT DOWN TO SERIOUS WORK. IN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE THE ASIAN GROUP IS APPARENTLY EXPERIENCING GREAT DIFFICULTY IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST SECTION OF THE DECLARATION LARGELY BECAUSE OF ATTEMPTS BY LIBYA, SYRIA AND IRAN TO INSERT WORDING TIED TO THEIR PROPOSED AGENDA ITEMS (MY TELNO 379, NOT TO ALL). THE LATIN AMERICANS APPEAR TO HAVE AGREED THE INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPHS OF THE SECTION ON LATIN AMERICA TOGETHER WITH THOSE ON THE FALKLANDS, PUERTO RICO AND CUBA WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT AMENDMENT. THERE IS SOME DISAGREEMENT OVER THE PARAGRAPHS ON SURINAM AND PANAMA AND DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED VIEWS ON WHAT SHOULD BE SAID ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICA. THERE IS NO (NO) NEWS OF HOW THINGS ARE GOING ON SOUTHERN AFRICA.

5. SENEGAL WAS TODAY APPOINTED TO THE REMAINING AFRICAN VICE PRESIDENCY OF THE CONFERENCE. MALI WAS APPOINTED RAPPORTEUR.

MELHUIH

HGHFAN 4366

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NEWS D  
INFO D  
PLANNING STAFF  
RESEARCH D  
PS  
PS / LADY YOUNG  
PS / MRS CHALKER  
PS / MR EGGAR  
PS / PUS  
MR FERGUSON  
MR BRAMWATE  
MR SLATER  
MR REEVE

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

-2-

# Confidential



OCMIAN 8178  
CONFIDENTIAL  
OO HARAR  
FM PCOLN TO HARAR  
221815Z AUG  
GRS 257

**Confidential**

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO  
TO IMMEDIATE HARARE  
TELNO 225  
OF 221815Z AUGUST 86

YOUR TELNO 368: EC MESSAGE TO NON ALIGNED SUMMIT

1. THE TEXT AGREED BY PARTNERS IS AS FOLLOWS:

'I HAVE THE HONOUR ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO SEND YOU CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OCCASION OF THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT.

THE TWELVE ACKNOWLEDGE THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH A TRULY NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT CAN MAKE TO WORLD STABILITY, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT. THE CONTINUING PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND MANY MEMBER STATES OF THE NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT UNDER THE LOME III CONVENTION AND OTHER CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS IS A NOTABLE EXAMPLE OF OUR SHARED CONCERNS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWELVE AND MEMBERS OF THE NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT.'

2. YOU SHOULD AWAIT TRIGGER TELEPHONE CALL OR TELEGRAM. SUBJECT TO THAT YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO DELIVER THE TEXT WHENEVER YOU CONSIDER IT WOULD HAVE MOST IMPACT. THIS MAY

BE BEFORE DRAFTING OF THE DECLARATION HAS GOT UNDER WAY: OR YOU MAY JUDGE IT PREFERABLE TO AWAIT THE ARRIVAL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS LATER IN THE WEEK. THE MESSAGE IS FROM SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, ON BEHALF OF THE TWELVE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO MR MUGABE, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT.

3. PLEASE INFORM US OF ACTION TAKEN.

YOUNG

OCMIAN 8178  
LIMITED  
UND  
ECD(P)  
ECD(E)  
CAFD  
SAFD  
PS  
PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
MR RATFORD  
MR SLATER

**Confidential**



FUE

CAT

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

11 August 1986

The Prime Minister has seen Robert Culshaw's letter of 8 August proposing a message from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to Mr. Mugabe in his role as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Conference, She has agreed that the message may be issued as proposed.

~~BF~~  
for tel.

TIMOTHY FLESHER

David Reddaway, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

VC



Prime Minister ①

APC

Agree that the PC should send the message, as drafted? MEST 8/8  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



Pretty hollow

London SW1A 2AH

Yes  
MT

Message!

8 August 1986

Dear Tim

Non-Aligned Summit: Presidency Message

The Non-Aligned Movement are due to hold their 25th Anniversary Summit meeting from 26 August to 7 September.

Our other Community partners consider that a message should be sent by the Presidency on behalf of the Twelve to mark the Summit. We see little purpose but no significant objection to such a gesture. We therefore consider it right that, as Presidency, we should meet our partners' wishes. We have undertaken to circulate a draft text.

We consider that the message should go from the Foreign Secretary as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council to Mr Mugabe as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Conference before the Summit begins. The text we propose is as follows:

"I have the honour, on behalf of the member states of the European Community, to send you congratulations on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Twelve acknowledge the contribution which truly non-aligned states can make to world stability and development. The continuing partnership between the Community and many member states of the Non-Aligned Movement under the Lome III Convention is a notable example of our shared concerns. We look forward to continuing cooperation between the Twelve and members of the Non-Aligned Movement."

I should be grateful for the Prime Minister's approval of these proposals.

*John Major*

*R N Culshaw*

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

Timothy Flesher Esq  
10 Downing Street



SUBJECT CC MASTER  
OPS

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 July 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T123/86

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for writing to me on 12 June about the negotiations for a general increase in the African Development Bank's capital stock.

May I say first that I warmly welcome the important role which your Government's Finance Minister, Dr. Chidzero, has assumed as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of Governors of the Bank. We shall give him our full support in exploring the detailed issues raised by the Management's proposal within the Committee, in a positive and constructive way.

We ourselves recognise the need for a capital increase, and I believe this is widely shared by other non-regional members, including those that belong to the European Community. However, the size and composition of the increase depend largely upon what lending programme the Bank can sensibly develop over the next few years, bearing in mind the constraints regional members face in taking up borrowing on market terms. The eventual arrangements must also preserve and enhance the Bank's standing in the international financial markets.

I feel sure that all members of the Bank share a common concern for its future as a soundly run, effective and growing institution, and I hope therefore that the Committee will make rapid progress at its meetings in July and October.

NA



For our part I gladly confirm our continuing commitment to support Africa's development, and to do so as appropriate through our membership of the Bank.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

---

The Hon. Robert Mugabe, M.P.

010

celc



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 July 1986

Dear Charles,

African Development Bank: General Capital Increase

/ Mr Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, wrote to the  
/ Prime Minister as in the attached letter. He asked for our  
/ support for the fourth general capital increase of the  
/ African Development Bank, referring particularly to the  
/ increased awareness of the need to strengthen solidarity  
/ with Africa, following the recent Special Session of the  
/ United Nations on Africa.

/ I attach a draft reply, plus a background note on the  
/ general capital increase.

Yours ever,  
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: The Prime Minister

Reference

*R. Robert*  
*DGR BEL*

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: The Hon Robert G Mugabe MP  
Prime Minister of the Republic of  
Zimbabwe  
HARARE

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified \*

Copies to:

(not on original) cc: HE Mr M R Melhuish, CMG, BHC,  
Harare

Mr Lewty, CAFD - 2 copies

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK: GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for writing to me on 12 June about the negotiations for a general increase in the African Development Bank's capital stock.

*May I say first that*

I ~~first~~ warmly welcome the important role which your Government's Finance Minister, Dr Chidzero, has assumed as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of Governors of the Bank. We shall give him our full support in exploring the detailed issues raised by the Management's proposal within the Committee, in a positive and constructive way.

We ourselves recognise the need for a ~~substantial~~ capital increase, and I believe this is widely shared by other non-regional members, including those that belong to the European Community. However, the size and composition of the increase depend largely upon what lending programme the Bank can sensibly develop over the next few years, bearing in mind the constraints regional members face in taking up borrowing on market terms. The eventual arrangements must also preserve and enhance the Bank's standing in the international financial markets.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/ I feel

I feel sure that all members of the Bank share a common concern for its future as a soundly run, effective and growing institution, and I hope therefore that the Committee will make rapid progress at its meetings in July and October. For our part I gladly confirm our continuing commitment to support Africa's development, and to do so as appropriate through our membership of the Bank.

cm





AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK: GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE

Background

1. Until 1982 the Bank belonged solely to its regional members. That year they finally agreed to admit non-regional countries to a maximum of one-third of its shareholding. There are now 50 African and 25 non-regional members, the latter including all the main OECD donors, three OPEC donors (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE) and Brazil, Argentina, China, India, Korea and Yugoslavia. When the Bank was enlarged, so was its capital, from about 1.2bn. SDR to about 5.4bn. Britain holds 1.4% of the stock.
  
2. Last autumn a new President (previously Vice-President, Finance) took over and at the end of 1985 draft proposals were put forward for a capital increase of 150%. The proposals were poorly prepared and justified, and were combined with proposals for a major internal reorganisation, an increased emphasis on policy dialogue, and large staff increases. There was no clear picture of how all these changes could and would be carried out. The "need" for a large and early GCI seemed to be the starting point of the argument, rather than its conclusion. Subsequently, the Bank produced a revised proposal for a 200% increase, with the same cash amount to be paid in as under the 150% proposal, and - after pressure from non-regional Directors - a further alternative scenario for a 100% increase. However, it was clear that the President had pinned his reputation to getting a 200% increase.
  
3. The Board of Governors' Annual Meeting in Harare in May considered this without formal Board of Directors' support at that stage for any one of the scenarios. It was decided in Harare that an Ad Hoc Committee of Governors would be set up under the chairmanship of Dr Chidzero, Zimbabwe's Finance Minister and currently chairman of the Bank's Board of Governors, to consider the proposals and to make specific recommendations for a GCI by the end of October 1986. There will be up to three meetings - in July in Paris, in October in Washington following the IMF/IBRD Annual Meeting, and if necessary later in October in Abidjan at the Bank's headquarters. The Ad Hoc Committee has 18 members - 12 regionals and 6 non-regionals - based

/on





on the constituencies of countries in the Board of Directors (where Germany at present represents us). But all member countries can attend as observers and participate. Meanwhile a series of questions have been formulated by the donors and put to Management to answer before the Paris meeting on 21/22 July.

4. So far none of the proposed levels of increase has yet been properly justified, and all donors want the detailed case thoroughly examined by the Committee. Levels of lending have been suggested which look to be beyond what African countries can absorb; many are too weak to service a growing burden of debt. Many are already in arrears to the Bank. The 200% proposal includes a bid for over \$2bn. non-project lending which we do not think would in practice be accompanied by sufficient conditionality. We do not consider the AfDB has the managerial and staff capacity to undertake properly the present level of lending, nor the political will to be tough on conditionality on its own, let alone to be able to cope with a large increase. Finally, the Bank's liquidity policy is not tight enough and as a result its borrowing plans look excessively ambitious. These concerns are very widely shared among the non-regional donors, but in the wake of the recent UN Special Session on Africa and in present circumstances there is some risk that African Bank members will resist any reasoned and detailed discussion of such points, and resort solely to political pressure to get what the Bank President wants.

5. Mr Mugabe's letter is in the same terms as a similar letter from President Houphouet-Boigny of the Cote D'Ivoire to President Reagan, President Mitterand and Chancellor Kohl, and has thus clearly been prepared by Bank staff. Presumably the Bank asked Mr Mugabe to write to the Prime Minister because of the Commonwealth connection and because his Minister of Finance will chair the forthcoming discussions. We regard Dr Chidzero's chairmanship as helpful and welcome, but in the wake of Mr Mugabe's letter he may feel constrained about how far he can use it to encourage the Committee to reach an agreement on the capital increase which is acceptable to all.

International Financial Institutions Department  
Overseas Development Administration

30 June 1986





EDD  
25/6

With the Compliments of  
Private Secretary  
to the  
Minister for Overseas Development

Eland House, Stag Place  
London SW1E 5DH  
Tel: 01-213 5409

*cepc*

FROM : M J DINHAM  
PS/Mr Raison

DATE : 25 JUNE 1986

cc Mr Powell, No 10 ✓  
Private Secretary  
PS/Mrs Chalker  
Mr Buist  
Mr Hudson  
Mr Reeve  
Mr Lewty CAFD

Mr Carter (IFID)

... ODA has received via Central Africa Department in the Diplomatic Wing the attached letter from Mr Mugabe to the Prime Minister about the proposed General Capital Increase of the African Development Bank. I should be grateful if you would submit a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature through this office to the Secretary of State's office by 1 July with a covering draft letter from the Secretary of State's office to No 10.

*M J Dinham*

M J Dinham  
25 June 1986



PRIME MINISTER  
HARARE



12th June, 1986

Your Excellency,

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK FOURTH GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE

The Board of Governors of the African Development Bank had, during its 21st Annual Meeting held in Brazzaville (Congo) from 8th to 10th May, 1985, approved the principle of the Bank's fourth general capital increase. On the basis of this decision, the Management of the Bank, at the ADB Annual Meeting which has just ended in Harare (Zimbabwe), proposed the setting up of an Ad Hoc Committee of 18 Governors representing the 18 constituencies which elect regional members. The Committee, under the Chairmanship of Zimbabwe by virtue of its being Chairman of the Board of Governors, it was further proposed, should meet in Paris, in mid-July 1986. As for the options concerning the level of the general capital increase, a 200% increase was suggested by the Management of the Bank, in view of the considerable needs of our continent.

The Right Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
PRIME MINISTER,  
UNITED KINGDOM

The Board of Governors approved the setting up of the Ad Hoc Committee, and has entrusted the latter with the task of submitting, by general consensus before the end of October 1986, a single proposal on the level of the capital increase.

The Ad Hoc Committee drew up the timetable for three meetings as follows:-

21st to 22nd July, 1986;  
3rd October, immediately  
after the Annual Meeting  
of the World Bank in  
Washington;  
end of October in Abidjan.

Generally, it emerged from the official statements made in Harare that no country objected to the general capital increase. A great majority of African countries agreed to a substantial increase in the Bank's resources, though some non-regional countries did not go this far.

In the present context of Africa, characterised by a grave shortage of financial resources and a substantial fall in the transfers needed for the financing of development, it is vital to provide the ADB, Africa's leading financial institution, with the resources which will enable it to play its role effectively.

It should also be recalled that the main argument which had been presented to justify the opening up of the capital of the ADB to the non-regional countries, related to the considerable fresh resources which these new partners could provide to Africa for its development.



Since the current general increase is the first of its kind to be made with the non-regional countries, it is important that this increase should be substantial and that the non-regionals should be its active promoters. Given the increased awareness of the need to strengthen solidarity with Africa and, following the recent Special Session of the United Nations on our continent, it is natural to make the ADB Africa's main financing instrument by considerably strengthening its financial and human resources.

Your Excellency, I have the honour, to respectfully request you to give all your support to the fourth general capital increase of the African Development Bank. Considering the special place occupied by your country in the European Economic Community (EEC) and the preponderant role which it plays in international bodies responsible for development aid, especially towards Africa, I should be most grateful for any action which your country may kindly take with EEC governments so that they may support the ADB in this exercise.


I should like to draw your attention, particularly to the need for adequate measures to be taken so that the Governors representing the member countries on the Ad Hoc Committee may come to the meeting to be held in Paris in July 1986 armed with the necessary powers to support a substantial increase in the Capital of the African Development Bank.

I take this opportunity to thank you for the effectual support which your country and yourself have always generously and steadfastly given to Africa.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the expression of my profound gratitude and of my highest consideration.

*Yours sincerely*  
*R. G. Mugabe*

ROBERT G. MUGABE  
PRIME MINISTER OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE



RGM/yc



2262

cc/cg

PRIME MINISTER  
HARARE



SUBJECT cc MASTER  
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T109A/86

12th June, 1986

Your Excellency,

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I should like to draw your attention, particularly to the need for adequate measures to be taken so that the Governors representing the member countries on the Ad Hoc Committee may come to the meeting to be held in Paris in July 1986 armed with the necessary powers to support a substantial increase in the Capital of the African Development Bank.


I take this opportunity to thank you for the effectual support which your country and yourself have always generously and steadfastly given to Africa.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the expression of my profound gratitude and of my highest consideration.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*R. G. Mugabe*

ROBERT G. MUGABE

PRIME MINISTER OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE



RGM/yc



**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HARARE

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 35

OF 240930Z JANUARY 86

*MW*

YOUR TELNOS 20 AND 21: ZIMBABWE/SOUTH AFRICA

1. AT THE SMALL DINNER WHICH PRIME MINISTER AND MRS MUGABE GAVE LAST NIGHT FOR LORD AND LADY SOAMES, TO WHICH MY WIFE AND I AND THE PERMANENT SECRETARY OF THE MFA AND HIS WIFE WERE ALSO INVITED, MUGABE WAS CLEARLY ENCOURAGED BY THE LATEST MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH I PASSED ON ON 22 JANUARY. LORD SOAMES SPOKE AS SUGGESTED IN FCO TELNO 20. MUGABE COULD NOT RESIST RETURNING TO GNAW THE BONE OF THE OFFENDING SENTENCES. BUT NEVERTHELESS HE DID NOT REFUTE LORD SOAMES' AND MY EXPLANATIONS THAT WE HAD NEVER DOUBTED HIS POLICY TO DENY THE ANC BASES IN ZIMBABWE.
2. THE GENERAL TONE OF THE EVENING WAS VERY WARM AND FRIENDLY, WITH MUGABE PAYING TRIBUTE TO LORD SOAMES' PAST AND PRESENT CONTRIBUTION TO ZIMBABWE'S PROGRESS. LORD SOAMES CONTINUED TO PRESS HOME THE MESSAGE HE HAS REPEATED TO VERY MINISTER HE HAS MET, THAT ZIMBABWE WILL NOT ATTRACT THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IT NEEDS UNTIL A STOP IS PUT TO MARXIST/LENINIST RHETORIC AND AN INVESTMENT CODE, OR SOMETHING LIKE IT IS INTRODUCED. MUGABE CONCEDED THE POINT BUT GAVE NO GROUND IN HIS DEFENCE OF SOCIALISM.
3. AFTER DINNER LORD SOAMES, KNOWING THAT MUGABE HAS SCHEDULED A MEETING WITH NKOMO EARLY NEXT WEEK, TOOK MUGABE ASIDE TO EXPRESS HIS STRONG CONVICTION THAT THE OPPORTUNITY NOW EXISTED, AND MIGHT NOT RETURN FOR MANY YEARS TO COME IF IT WAS WASTED, TO BRING ABOUT ZAPU/ZANU UNITY. HE PASSED ON NKOMO'S DENIAL OF PERSONAL AMBITION (MY TELNO 028) AND URGED MUGABE TO BE AS MAGNANIMOUS AND FLEXIBLE AS HE COULD. MUGABE'S RESPONSE WAS NOT VERY POSITIVE. HE WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT ZAPU'S ABILITY TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE, CLAIMING THAT THERE WERE AT LEAST 3 ZAPU FACTIONS OPERATING ON THIS ISSUE. BUT HE PROMISED TO SEE WHAT HE COULD DO.
4. LORD SOAMES ALSO SPOKE TO MUGABE ABOUT THE STORIES OF CORRUPTION AFFECTING MINISTERS WHICH HE HAD HEARD. MUGABE SAID HE WAS TOTALLY DETERMINED TO ERADICATE CORRUPTION WHEREVER IT OCCURRED. MINISTERS WOULD GO TO PRISON IF CORRUPTION CHARGES WERE PROVED.

15.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

5. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT LORD SOAMES' VISIT TO ZIMBABWE, ON WHICH I WILL BE REPORTING MORE FULLY BY BAG, HAS BEEN A GREAT SUCCESS, NOT LEAST IN BRINGING HOME TO MUGABE THAT ZIMBABWE HAS MANY FRIENDS IN BRITAIN WHO WISH THE COUNTRY WELL BUT WHO BELIEVE MANY CURRENT ISSUES HERE COULD BE HANDLED BETTER. MUGABE'S AFFECTION FOR LORD SOAMES AND THE FILLIP THAT THIS HAS GIVEN THE GENERAL CAUSE OF ANGLO-ZIMBABWEAN RELATIONS, WERE VERY EVIDENT LAST NIGHT, AND INDEED THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE VISIT. THERE WAS NEVER ANY QUESTION OF CHANGING MUGABE'S STRONGLY HELD VIEWS: BUT AT LEAST HE MAY NOW BE MORE AWARE THAT THERE IS AN EXTERNAL DIMENSION TO MANY DECISIONS HE MAKES HERE IN ZIMBABWE.

MELHUISH

LIMITED  
CAFD  
SAFD  
PUSD  
PLANNING STAFF  
PS  
PS/ LADY YOUNG  
PS/ MRS CHALKER  
PS/PUS  
MR FERGUSSON  
MR JOHNSON

COPIES TO  
PS/ NO. 10 DOWNING ST.

-2-  
CONFIDENTIAL



Subject cc Ops  
Master

(401)  
Serial 395  
402

TOP COPY

RESTRICTED  
PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T2238/85

OCMIAN 8815  
RESTRICTED  
OO HARAR  
FM FCOLN TO HARAR  
271230Z NOV  
GRS 124

JCP 014/2

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 38		
28 NOV 1985		
DESK OFFICER	RECEIVED BY	
INDEX	PA	ALLOCATION
	12/29/11	29/11

RESTRICTED  
FM FCO  
TO IMMEDIATE HARARE  
TELNO 411  
OF 271230Z NOVEMBER 1985

395

YOUR TELNO DISTRESS 161: ATTACK ON THEKWANE

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR MUGABE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS. WE WERE ALL DEEPLY DISTRESSED

TO HEAR OF THE ATTACK ON THE METHODIST SCHOOL AT THEKWANE ON 25 NOVEMBER, IN WHICH THE HEADMASTER AND HIS WIFE WERE KILLED AND MR DOUTHWALTE INJURED. ON BEHALF OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE I EXTEND TO YOU AND THE FAMILIES CONCERNED MY DEEPEST SYMPATHY. ENDS.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ALSO WRITTEN TO REV MOSLEY.

HOWE

YYYY

OCMIAN 8815

NNNN  
DISTRIBUTION

MAIN

CAFD

SAFD

CONSULAR D

SCD

PS

PS/MR RIFKIND

MR FERGUSSON

MR JOHNSON

MR BARRINGTON . 1

RESTRICTED

COPIES TO  
No 10 Downing St



JD

cc FCO.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

27 November 1985

Dear Mr. Mosley

I was most distressed to hear of the attack on the Methodist school at Thekwane on 25 November and of the casualties which resulted.

Please send my deepest sympathy to the families of those involved, and my best wishes for Robert Douthwaite's recovery.

It is shocking that a Church school should suffer such a dreadful attack. I have sent a message of sympathy to Prime Minister Mugabe of Zimbabwe.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

The Reverend Mosley

ea





①

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Murders in Zimbabwe

You were asked  
about this in the  
House this afternoon.

Two messages  
attached, one for  
signature one for  
approval please.

CDD

# OUT TELEGRAM


	Classification <b>RESTRICTED</b>	Caveat	Precedence <b>IMMEDIATE</b>
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ZCZC  
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CAVEAT  
FM  
TO  
TELNO  
OF  
AND TO

1 ZCZC  
2 RESTRICTED  
3  
4 FM FCO  
5 TO IMMEDIATE HARARE  
6 TELNO  
7 OF 262100Z NOVEMBER 1985  
8  
9  
10 YOUR TELNO DISTRESS 161: ATTACK ON THEKWANE  
11 1. Please pass following message to Mr Mugabe from the Prime  
12 Minister.  
13 ~~Beginns. Members of the House of Commons were~~ <sup>we</sup> <sup>all</sup> deeply distressed  
14 to hear of the attack on the Methodist School at Thekwane on  
15 25 November, in which the Headmaster and his wife were killed and  
16 Mr Douthwaite injured. On behalf of the British Government and  
17 people I extend to you and the families concerned my deepest  
18 sympathy. Ends.  
19 2. The Prime Minister has also written to Rev Mosley.  
20  
21 HOWE  
22  
23  
24 YYYY  
25 MAIN  
/// 26 CAFD  
// 27 SAFD  
/ 28 CONSULAR D  
29 SCF

*Despatched to FCO  
27/11/85  
BF / For 'T'*

*Amend out*



YYYY  
MAIN  
ADDITIONAL  
NNNN

		Catchword: <b>PS</b>	
File number	Dept <b>Private Office</b>	Drafted by (Block capitals) <b>C R BUDD</b>	Telephone no
Authorised for despatch by:		Initials	Date/time
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by



GRS 210

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM HARARE  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO DISTRESS 161  
OF 260905Z NOVEMBER 85  
AND TO IMMEDIATE CAFD, FCO

ROBERT JOSS MCGRATH DOUTHWAITE, DOB 19.3.67 BRITISH PASSPORT  
NO C229911C.

1. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY WORGER OF METHODIST CHURCH,  
HARARE, THAT A/N WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED LAST NIGHT DURING  
ARMED ATTACK ON METHODIST SCHOOL AT THEKWANE (TEGWANI). HE  
IS PRESENTLY SERIOUSLY ILL IN INTENSIVE CARE UNIT, BULAWAYO  
CENTRAL HOSPITAL.

2. WORGER HAS ALREADY NOTIFIED DETAILS TO REV MOSLEY OF  
METHODIST CHURCH OVERSEAS DIVISION, 25 MARYLEBONE ROAD,  
NW1 (TELNO: 01 -935 2541) AND ASKED THAT THEY INFORM  
DOUTHWAITE'S PARENTS: MR AND MRS R G DOUTHWAITE, CLOONA,  
WESTPORT, COUNTY MAYO, EIRE (TELNO: (098) 25313). PLEASE  
LIAISE WITH REV MOSLEY.

3. ZIMBABWEAN HEADMASTER AND WIFE KILLED DURING ATTACK  
ON SCHOOL. WIFE IS MRS KUMALO (NEE GOSLING) DOB 13-10-31.  
NO OTHER DETAILS AVAILABLE BUT COULD BE BRITISH NATIONAL.  
GRATEFUL FOR CHECK WITH HAYES FOR POSSIBLE PASSPORT ISSUE  
IN UK.

4. METHODISTS ARE ARRANGING EVACUATION TO BULAWAYO OF  
WIVES AND CHILDREN OF THEIR BRITISH NATIONALS AT THEKWANI  
SCHOOL. WE HAVE ADVISED VSO IN HARARE THAT VOLUNTEERS,  
ALISON KEEN AND CATHY RICKETTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED.

MELBOURNE

LIMITED  
CONSULAR D  
SCD  
CAFD  
MR BARRINGTON  
MR FERGUSSON  
MR JOHNSON

*DB*  
*Jean*



THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 DISTRICT COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
 IN RE: [Illegible Name]  
 [Illegible text follows, including what appears to be a list of items or a description of property, but the text is too faint to transcribe accurately.]



[Illegible text, possibly a signature or a set of initials, located at the bottom right of the page.]



SUBJECT  
cc Master  
Ops.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 1328/85

RESTRICTED

30489 -

GRS 115

RESTRICTED  
DESKEY 081400Z  
FM FCO 081330Z JUL 85  
TO IMMEDIATE HARARE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 254 OF 8 JULY

YOUR TELNO 341: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR MUGABE. BEGINS. CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ELECTORAL VICTORY AND YOUR RE-APPOINTMENT AS PRIME MINISTER. TO YOU AND ALL THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE, I OFFER MY BEST WISHES FOR THE IMPORTANT WORK OF CONTINUING NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND RECONCILIATION WHICH LIES AHEAD UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN OCTOBER. ENDS.

2. PLEASE DELIVER IT AS SOON AS YOU ARE ABLE, IF POSSIBLE IN PERSON.

HOWE

DISTRIBUTION :  
LIMITED  
CAFD  
CONSULAR D  
PUSD  
NEWS D  
DEFENCE D  
RESEARCH D  
INFO D  
PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
MR. FERGUSSON  
MR. JOHNSON  
SIR C TICKELL (ODA)  
MR. BUIST (ODA)

COPIES TO :  
SIR PHILIP MOORE,  
BUCKINGHAM PALACE.  
ASSESSMENTS STAFF,  
CABINET OFFICE.  
SEC(O)(C)MOD.  
HD/CSAD, ODA.  
MR J P ROBERTS,  
ECONOMIC SERVICE, ODA.

1

RESTRICTED

PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTION TIME: TUESDAY 9 JULY 1985

ZIMBABWE: ELECTIONS

LINE TO TAKE

Election Result

1. Zimbabwe an independent country like any other. The election a purely internal matter. Not for outsiders to comment.

2. Mr Mugabe has frequently stated his intention to change certain aspects of the Constitution: in the past he has also repeatedly emphasised his wish to proceed constitutionally.

Mugabe's Threats to 'Cleanse' Constitution/Abolish White Seats/  
Introduce One Party State etc

3. Zimbabwean Constitution a matter for the Zimbabwean Government and courts. British Government has no responsibility for Government of Zimbabwe and no standing in Zimbabwe's internal affairs.

Mugabe's 'Threat' to 'make life difficult' for Whites who do not support the Govt.

4. Repeat, election a purely internal matter. Not for us to comment on statements made during it.

What about Lancaster House Conference? Britain as Guarantor?

5. Zimbabwe an independent country. We naturally have close interest in its development and this is reflected in our contacts with authorities there, but clearly understood at Conference that we could not guarantee application of Zimbabwe Constitution. An internal matter for Zimbabwe Government and courts.

British Policy

6. Our hopes for political reconciliation between all groups and races in Zimbabwe are well known.

Cut British Aid?

7. I cannot agree. Our aid is designed to benefit all the people of Zimbabwe and is given in support of the full range of British interests there and in the region.



PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTION TIME: TUESDAY 9 JULY 1985:

ZIMBABWE: ELECTIONS

BACKGROUND

Result

1. Mr Mugabe has won the election and been re-appointed Prime Minister. He increased his overall majority from 57 out of 80 seats to 63 out of 79 (almost certainly 64 out of 80 when a by-election caused by a candidate's death takes place soon: see detailed results attached).

Campaign

2. The campaign was free, if not completely fair. Despite earlier fears of widespread violence there were no deaths or serious injuries. Opposition parties were able to operate, though with some hindrance, and had greater access to the media than in recent years (though still limited).

Voting

3. There was high turn-out. All the early reports speak of considerable and unforced popular interest in casting vote; meticulous application of correct procedures; dignified, orderly and apparently secret ballot in generally relaxed atmosphere (though somewhat more tense in Matabeleland).

Post-Election

4. Since the election Mr Mugabe has been speaking of abolishing the 20 entrenched white seats and of moving quickly towards a one-party state. He has threatened to 'make life difficult' for whites who oppose his Government. Our High Commission doubt that he will try to proceed unconstitutionally. They report Mr Andersen (who was a Minister of State in Mr Mugabe's office in the previous Administration) as being confident that white Ministers will remain in the Government. Nevertheless, the good black/white relations which have been a remarkable feature of Zimbabwe so far may well come under greater strain in the coming months.

5. As for Mr Smith, he has pledged himself to cooperate with a ZANU Government in office and not to seek to try to overthrow it through coalition. He stressed his wish to 'renew and intensify' his efforts to communicate with Mr Mugabe.

/UK

UK Legal and Constitutional Responsibility

6. Zimbabwe is an independent country like any other and its independence is unqualified. The Zimbabwe Act 1979 1(2) says "on and after Independence Day Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shall have no responsibility for the Government of Zimbabwe..." and the Zimbabwe Constitution says I (1) "Zimbabwe is a sovereign republic" and I (3) "This Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe...". The UK has no vestigial rights in Zimbabwean affairs.

The Constitution and the White Seats

7. The Zimbabwean Parliament may amend, add to or repeal any of the provisions of the Constitution by means of a Constitutional Bill, but:

- a) A Constitutional Bill must receive the affirmative votes of not less than 70 members of the House of Assembly (lower house).
- b) Until 1990 any Constitutional Bill which seeks to amend the provisions relating to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual (including the right to form or belong to political parties) must receive the affirmative votes of all 100 members of the House of Assembly.
- c) Until 1987 any Constitutional Bill seeking to amend certain provisions relating to the composition of Parliament or of its constituent parts, including the 20 white seats, requires the affirmative votes of all 100 members of the House of Assembly.

Action by HMG

8. The Prime Minister is sending a congratulatory message to Mr Mugabe (and in addition Lord Soames has agreed to send a private message urging reconciliation).

8. In their routine contacts with whites our High Commission in Harare are stressing the need for the CAZ to emphasise their desire to work closely with Mr Mugabe for the good of Zimbabwe as a whole, rather than for narrow white interests only.



ZIMBABWE: ELECTION RESULTS

Black Result (1980 figures in brackets)

Mr Mugabe/ZANU	63 (57)
Dr Nkomo/ZAPU	15 (20)
Bishop Muzorewa/ANC	0 (3)
Rev Ndabaningi Sithole/ZANU (S)	1 (0)

Voting took place in only 79 constituencies following the death of one candidate during the campaign. There is to be a by-election shortly. We have heard that there is to be a re-count in the seat won by ZANU (S).

White Result (1980 figures in brackets)

Mr Irvine/Independent Zimbabwe Group	4 (12)
Mr Smith/Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe	15 (7)
Mr Andersen/independent	1 (1)

GR600

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM HARARE 081500Z JUL 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 344 OF 8 JULY

INFO PRETORIA, LUSAKA, GABORONE, WASHINGTON, MAPUTO, LILONGWE.

MIP 2 TELEGRAMS: ELECTIONS; COMMENT.

SUMMARY

1. FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS HAVE PRODUCED UNCOMFORTABLY STARK TRIBAL OUTCOME, BOTH REFLECTING AND ACCENTUATING DIVISION RATHER THAN UNITY BETWEEN SHONAS, MATABELES AND WHITES. MUGABE'S STATEMENTS IN VICTORY ARE MUCH LESS CONCILIATORY THAN FIVE YEARS AGO, AND MAY HERALD TROUBLE OVER THE CONSTITUTION - ONE PARTY STATE AND THE WHITE SEATS - AND "SOCIALISM", WHATEVER THAT MEANS. BUT ACTIONS, AS EVER, WILL SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS.

DETAIL

2. THE RESULTS VINDICATE OUR JUDGEMENT THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE FREE AND FAIR. IF ANYONE WAS GOING TO CHEAT ANYWHERE IT WAS NKALA IN HNSIIZA - AND HE LOST HIS DEPOSIT. APART FROM THE WHITE RESULT, THE ONLY SURPRISES ARE THE VERY STARKNESS OF THE EXPECTED TRIBAL DIVIDE BETWEEN MATABELE AND SHONA, THE COMPLETENESS OF MUZOREWA'S EXPECTED ECLIPSE, AND THE ZANU (SITHOLE) VICTORY IN CHIPINGE, ITSELF A TRIBAL (NDAU) AFFAIR. NO SIGNIFICANT SHONA "PROTEST VOTE" MATERIALIZED. AND WHILE PAST VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION WERE UNDOUBTEDLY FACTORS, THE PEACEFUL AND DIGNIFIED WAY IN WHICH VOTING WAS GENERALLY CONDUCTED CAN LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE OUTCOME REPRESENTS THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE TODAY.

TRENDS

3. FIRST, THE VERY HIGH POLL SHOWS IMPORTANCE WHICH THE POVO ATTACHED TO THIS ELECTION. PEOPLE WANTED PATIENTLY TO VOTE FOR MANY HOURS, SOMETIMES DAYS, NOT GENERALLY BECAUSE THEY WERE FORCED TO BUT BECAUSE IT MATTERED TO THEM. SECONDLY, GIVEN ZANU (PF)'S MONOPOLY OF POWER ON A DAILY BASIS AMONG THE SHONA FOR YEARS, IT HAS NOT BEEN WORTH PEOPLE'S WHILE TO IDENTIFY PUBLICLY WITH MINORITY PARTIES, NOR TO VOTE FOR THEM IN THE SECRECY OF THE POLLING BOOTH. MANY SHONA MAY GRUMBLE, BUT THEY WILL DO SO FROM WITHIN THE FAMILY RATHER THAN FROM OUTSIDE, A COMMON AFRICAN SENTIMENT. THIRDLY, ALMOST ALL BLACKS OUTSIDE MATABELELAND COULD SEE THAT THERE WAS NO CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE GOVERNMENT UNDER NKOMO, MUZOREWA, SMITH, OR ANY COALITION.

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4. MOST GOVERNMENTS SWEEPING BACK TO POWER WITH AN INCREASED MAJORITY AFTER 5 YEARS IN OFFICE WOULD HAVE BEEN PLEASED AT THEIR PERFORMANCE, MAGNANIMOUS TO THEIR POLITICAL FOES AND GENERALLY BULLISH. THIS IS NOT THE CASE HERE AT PRESENT. THERE IS A PERVADING AIR OF BITTERNESS, OF REPROACH AND OF HOSTILITY WHICH, ACCORDING TO SOME REPORTS JUST COMING IN, MAY HAVE BEEN TRANSLATED INTO NASTY INCIDENTS IN THE HARARE HIGH-DENSITY SUBURBS AND ELSEWHERE. MUGABE IS STILL SOUNDING OFF ABOUT THE SINS OF THE TWO UNRECONCILED MINORITIES, THE MATABELE AND THE WHITES, ABOUT THE INIQUITIES OF LANCASTER HOUSE AND ABOUT THE RENEWED REQUIREMENTS OF SOCIALISM AND THE ONE-PARTY STATE. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THIS ANGER IS SINCERE AND THERE IS A DANGER THAT HE MAY TAKE IMPULSIVE DECISIONS WHICH HE WILL LATER REGRET. BUT IN REALITY NOT MUCH HAS CHANGED, EXCEPT PERHAPS THE UNEXPECTED SHOWING OF IAN SMITH'S CAZ DIEHARDS. MUGABE IS EFFECTIVELY BOXED IN BY THE ECONOMY'S DEPENDENCE ON THE WHITE FARMERS AND BUSINESSMEN AND BY THE INTRACTABILITY OF THE MATABELE RESISTANCE. HE COULD TEAR UP PARTS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT BUT, HAVING LIVED WITH IT FOR 5 YEARS AND WITH A GOOD CHANCE OF SECURING 70 VOTES IN 1987 FOR ACTION ON THE WHITE ROLL, HE MAY CONCLUDE THERE IS LITTLE POINT IN PRECIPITATE ACTION. HIS DECISIONS ON HIS NEW CABINET THIS WEEK AND THE SELECTION OF SENATORS WILL SHOW WHETHER HE PLANS TO FAN THE FLAMES OF RESENTMENT OR TO CALM THINGS DOWN.

MELHUISH

ZIMBABWE

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

5 July 1985

**MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS  
TO MR. MUGABE**

Thank you for your letter of 5 July enclosing a draft message of congratulations to Mr. Mugabe.

I enclose a version of the message as approved by the Prime Minister.

C D POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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*CST*



TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

TO MR. MUGABE

"Congratulations on your electoral victory and your re-appointment as Prime Minister. To you and all the people of Zimbabwe, I offer my best wishes for the important work of continuing national development and reconciliation which lies ahead under your leadership. I look forward to seeing you again at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in October".

cc/c



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 July 1985

*Dear Charles,*

Zimbabwe Election: Proposed Congratulatory Message from  
Prime Minister to Mr Mugabe

I am writing to give you advance warning that we shall be recommending that the Prime Minister send a congratulatory message to Mr Mugabe if, as is expected, he wins the current election there and is reappointed as Prime Minister. I enclose a draft.

It would be normal practice for the Prime Minister to send a message of congratulation to a Commonwealth Head of Government. In this case, moreover, there are two additional arguments in favour of doing so.

By African standards the election has been reasonably free and fair. There was an outburst of violence and intimidation in March and a certain amount has continued since, but by and large the Government have restrained their supporters, imposed a moderately good level of order and allowed electioneering activities by all parties. The conduct of the polling has so far appeared exemplary, if rather slow.

The second consideration is Mr Mugabe's angry reaction to the electoral success of Mr Smith's party, which Mr Mugabe sees as a rejection by the whites of the policy of reconciliation which he announced at independence and has largely held to since. His first public reaction, threatening to make life "very difficult" for whites who fail to follow his line, may well reflect part anger and part electioneering tactics (he must have feared that Mr Smith's victory would encourage opposition groups in the subsequent black election). Nevertheless, the harmonious black/white relations which have been a remarkable feature of Zimbabwe so far may well come under greater strain in the coming months. This makes it even more desirable for us to maintain our good bilateral relations and the restraining influence these give us. The excellent personal relationship between the Prime Minister and Mr Mugabe is an important factor in this.

/if



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If the message from the Prime Minister is to make maximum impact it should be delivered soon after Mr Mugabe's reappointment has been confirmed. This is likely to happen at the end of this week or beginning of next.

Yours ever,  
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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~~DRAFT TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MR MUGABE~~

~~"Please accept my warm personal~~ Congratulations  
on your electoral victory and your re-appointment  
as Prime Minister. To you and all the people of  
Zimbabwe, I offer my best wishes for the important  
work of continuing national development which lies  
ahead under your leadership. *and re-orientation*  
I greatly value the  
close and friendly relationship which has developed  
between Britain and independent Zimbabwe, and I  
much look forward to continuing our work together  
to maintain and extend it. I ~~also greatly~~ look  
forward to seeing you again at the Commonwealth  
Heads of Government meeting in October."

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FROM HARARE 200930Z JUN 85

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 306 OF 20 JUNE

INFO PRETORIA, CAPE TOWN, LUSAKA, GABORONE, WASHINGTON.

*[Handwritten scribble]*

ZIMBABWE ELECTION: OVER VIEW: MY TELNO 54 OF 4 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

*M. Brown*  
*nr*

1. DELAY IN THE ELECTION HAS SO FAR PROVED A BLESSING. IMPROVEMENTS ACROSS THE BOARD SINCE ABORTIVE CAMPAIGN LAUNCHED IN FEBRUARY. WITH GOOD RAINS AND RISING PROSPERITY HAVE COME INCREASED CONFIDENCE BY ZANU, A REAL AND SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO CONTROL YOUTH LEAGUE AND SECURITY FORCE VIOLENCE, AND THE ABANDONMENT OF THE DIMISIVE ONE-PARTY STATE ISSUE FOR THIS ELECTION. WITH UNDER TWO WEEKS TO RUN, CURRENT CAMPAIGN IS AS FREE AND FAIR AS ONE COULD HOPE. OUTLOOK REMAINS FOR ZANU TO SWEEP THE BOARD IN MASHONALAND AND MIDLANDS, AND ZAPU IN MATABELELAND. BUT SIZE OF PROTEST VOTE UNPREDICABLE. WHITE ELECTION RESULT WIDE OPEN.

JCP 04/2

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 38  
21 JUN 1985

GENERAL

2. THIS YEAR'S RECORD HARVESTS AND GREEN FIELDS HAVE MADE THIS A PROPITIOUS MOMENT FOR ZANU TO HOLD AN ELECTION. LAST YEAR MANY ZANU LEADERS WERE TENSE AND NERVOUS, SUSPECTING THEMSELVES TO BE UNPOPULAR, AND DETERMINED TO COMPEL OBEDIENCE INSTEAD. NOW THEY SEEM MUCH MORE RELAXED, AND GENUINELY CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN WIN A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION. HENCE THE REMARKABLY EFFECTIVE GRIP ACHIEVED ON THE YOUTH LEAGUE SINCE MARCH, THE GREATLY IMPROVED BEHAVIOUR BY THE SECURITY FORCES, AND THE IMPRESSIVE COMMITMENT AMONG ALL MINISTERS IN RECENT MONTHS TO "OPERATION FREE AND FAIR". THE FORMAL DEFERRAL OF THE ONE PARTY STATE ISSUE UNTIL 1990 HAS ALSO REMOVED THE MOST CONTENTIOUS ISSUE FROM THE CAMPAIGN. DOUBTLESS THUGGERY WILL INCREASE IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. BUT THE EVIDENCE, AS AT CHITUNGWIZA (MY TELNO 305) IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS SINCERELY STRIVING TO CONTROL IT.

MINORITY PARTIES

3. EXCEPT FOR ZAPU IN ITS HOME TERRITORY OF MATABELELAND, THESE SEEM WHOLLY AMATEURISH AND OUT OF TOUCH. THEIR FINANCING AND ORGANISATION ARE WEAK. THEIR POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS HAVE DIFFICULTY IN DISTINGUISHING THEMSELVES FROM ZANU'S. GIVEN THE TALENT THAT MUZOREWA AND NKOMO GATHERED ROUND THEM IN 1980, THE MEDIOCRITY OF THE TOP MINORITY LEADERSHIP TODAY IS DISAPPOINTING. THE BRIGHTEST ONE HAVE ALREADY CROSSED THE FLOOR.

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*ISSUES*

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4. AS IN MY TUR, THE OVERWHELMING ISSUE IS POWER, THOUGH INFLATION, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND ABUSE OF POWER ARE THE CAUSE OF WIDESPREAD GRUMBLING.

## MANIFESTOS

5. ZANU'S IS LONG AND PROFESSIONAL, DETAILING ITS RECORD AND SETTING OUT POLICIES FOR MOST AREAS IN MODERATE TERMS, SIGNIFICANTLY MORE MODERATE THAN THE EARLIER DRAFT WHICH WE SAW. DESPITE THE COMMITMENT TO GREATER STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE ECONOMY, IT IS IN MANY WAYS LESS RADICAL THAN THE LAST BRITISH LABOUR PARTY PARTY MANIFESTO. THE OTHERS DO NOT IMPRESS. APART FROM THE SLOGANS OF ONE PARTY/MULTI-PARTY, SOCIALISM/MIXED ECONOMY, AND THE CONSTITUTION VERSUS ABUSE OF POWER, THEY HAVE VIRTUALLY NO ALTERNATIVE POLICIES IN ANY FIELD.

## MEDIA COVERAGE

6. BULAWAYO CHRONICLE AND SUNDAY MAIL ARE BY NOW CREDITABLY IMPARTIAL. HERALD AND BROADCASTING MEDIA, WHILST STILL BIASED IN FAVOUR OF ZANU, HAVE GIVEN CONSPICUOUSLY MORE COVERAGE TO OPPOSITION PARTIES IN LAST TWO WEEKS.

## SECURITY/INTIMIDATION

7. THE DISSIDENT INCIDENT RATE HAS RISEN IN MATABELELAND, THOUGH IT COULD STILL IN NO WAY BE CALLED A "PRE-ELECTION OFFENSIVE". IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR IF THEIR STRATEGY IS TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR A CRY OF "FOUL", OR SIMPLY TO REMIND PEOPLE THAT THEY REMAIN IN BEING, AND WANT A LOCAL ZAPU VICTORY. SECURITY FORCES, THOUGH DEPLOYED, APPEAR TO BE BEHAVING WELL. THE CATHOLIC JUSTICE AND PEACE COMMISSION ARE ALMOST EUPHORIC ABOUT THE LACK OF SERIOUS REPORTS SINCE MARCH/APRIL. BUT TOWNSHIP STONINGS ETC LIKE THAT IN CHITUNGWIZA, SEEM LIKELY TO INCREASE IN NEXT TWO WEEKS. AND OF COURSE THE SERIOUS INTIMIDATION BEFORE MARCH IS STILL FRESH IN PEOPLE'S MEMORIES, THOUGH IT IS NOT NOW CLEAR WHETHER THE EFFECT WILL BE TO INCREASE OR DECREASE THE ANTI-ZANU VOTE.

## POLLING DAY PROCEDURES

8. IN PRINCIPLE, THESE WILL PROVIDE METICULOUSLY FOR ALL-PARTY MONITORING OF EVERY STAGE. IN PRACTICE, GIVEN THAT VIRTUALLY ALL THE RETURNING OFFICERS ARE ZANU MEMBERS, AND THE GENERAL LACK OF CONTROL IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, SOME ABUSE SEEMS LIKELY.

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WHITE



#### WHITE ELECTIONS

9. THE WHITE PARTIES EXPECT HIGH APATHY, A LOW POLL, AND AN UNPREDICTABLE RESULT. THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONSTITUTION HAS, NOT SURPRISINGLY, COME IN FOR A GOOD DEAL OF PUBLIC RIDICULE, GIVEN THAT THE TOTAL WHITE ELECTORATE, WITH 20 SEATS IN PARLIAMENT, IS SMALLER THAN ANY ONE BLACK CONSTITUENCY. THE WHITE COMMUNITY'S TRACK RECORD OF SHORT-SIGHTEDNESS HERE OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS DOES NOT INSPIRE CONFIDENCE, AND THEY MAY GET IT WRONG AGAIN BY NOT TURNING OUT ON THE DAY AND BY ELECTING CAZ CANDIDATES.

#### LIKELY OUTCOME

10. ON CURRENT FORM ZAPU WILL GENERALLY SWEEP THE BOARD IN MATABELELAND AND ZANU EVERYWHERE ELSE. BUT ZANU MAY STAND A CHANCE IN THREE CONSTITUENCIES IN MATABELELAND, BINGA (TONGA ELEMENT AND A RESPECTED ZANU CANDIDATE), BEITBRIDGE (VENDA ELEMENT AND WHERE THE ZANU CANDIDATE WON LAST YEAR'S GANG WARFARE), AND INSIZA (WHERE NKALA MAY WELL CHEAT). IN THE MIDLANDS, ZAPU MIGHT GET GWERU DISTRICT AND KWEKWE WEST. IN MASHONALAND, ZANU HAVE PUT UP AN INCOMPREHENSIBLY WEAK CANDIDATE AGAINST MUZOREWA IN GLENNIEW, HARARE: THERE IS A STRONG UANC CANDIDATE IN MUTASA (NAMELY CHIEF MUTASA); AND SITHOLE'S CANDIDATE IN NYANGA MIGHT STAND A CHANCE IN A STRAIGHT FIGHT WITH ZANU. IN ALL, EXCEPT INSIZA AND BEITBRIDGE, HOWEVER, THE OPPOSITION VOTE IS POTENTIALLY SPLIT. THE MINORITY PARTIES ARE IN ANY CASE PREPARING THE GROUND FOR POST-ELECTION COMPLAINTS. THERE WILL INEVITABLY BE SOME TRUTH IN THEIR ALLEGATIONS, BUT SO FAR THEY HAVE PRODUCED NOTHING SPECIALLY CONVINCING. AS FOR THE GENERAL RESULT, I WOULD EXPECT ZANU TO INCREASE THEIR SEATS, ENDING IN THE RANGE 60 TO 65.

#### THE UNEXPECTED

11. THE GREAT UNKNOWN IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUBMERGED DISCONTENT WITH ZANU WILL TRANSLATE INTO PROTEST VOTING. MY GUESS IS THAT THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT VOTES AGAINST ZANU IN MOST PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, BUT NOT SUFFICIENT TO ELECT OPPOSITION MPS. I CAN SEE NO CHANCE OF ZANU LOSING THEIR MAJORITY: EVEN IF THE ELECTORATE VOTED THAT WAY, WHICH IS MOST UNLIKELY, THE PUBLISHED RESULTS WOULD TELL A DIFFERENT STORY. AND IN ANY CASE IT SEEMS INCONCEIVABLE THAT REX NHONGO AND THE ARMY WOULD LET ANYONE ELSE TAKE OVER.

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## POST-ELECTION

12. UNLESS THE UNEXPECTED HAPPENS, THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO BE ANNOUNCED IN MID-JULY WILL BE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE ELECTION RESULT. A SLIMMER INCOMING GOVERNMENT, WITHOUT SOME CURRENT DEAD WOOD, AND WITH THE LEGITIMACY OF A CONVINCING AND REASONABLY FAIR ELECTION VICTORY, WOULD BE WELL PLACED TO PRESENT A TOUGH BUDGET AND, AGAINST ALL THE ODDS, TO TAKE A FURTHER INITIATIVE OF RECONCILIATION WITH ZAPU AND THE NDEBELE.

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
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I suggest summary only. CDP

ZIMBABWE - THE ELECTION

SUMMARY

1. ZANU MINISTERS PUT OVER STRONG MESSAGE THAT THEY WANT THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS TO BE PROPERLY CONDUCTED. THE COUNTRY SEEMS QUIET. NKOMO IS FULL OF COMPLAINTS AND SEEMS OUT OF TOUCH. SO FAR THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT MISUSED ITS POWER IN ANY UNCONSTITUTIONAL WAY BUT ZANU HAS EVERY ADVANTAGE OVER ITS RIVALRY, WHICH IT WILL NOT HESITATE TO USE. MATABELELAND WILL PROVIDE THE GREATEST ELECTORAL INTEREST.

DETAIL

2. IN THE PAST WEEK I HAVE PAID COURTESY CALLS ON MINISTERS MUTUMBUKA, MNANGAWA AND NKALA, ALL POLITBURO MEMBERS, AND HAVE DISCUSSED ELECTION PROSPECTS WITH THEM. (MOST OTHER MINISTERS ON MY LIST OF INITIAL CALLS ARE NOW REFUSING ALL HARARE ENGAGEMENTS, AS THEY ARE AWAY ELECTIONEERING.) I RECEIVED THE STRONG MESSAGE FROM ALL THREE MINISTERS THAT THE ZANU(PF) LEADERSHIP WANTS THIS IMPORTANT ELECTION TO BE AS PROPERLY CONDUCTED AS LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES WILL PERMIT. NKALA, AN NDEBELE, WHOSE PAST RECORD TOWARDS ZAPU HAS BEEN UNCOMPROMISING AND OFTEN RUTHLESS, EMPHASISED TO ME THAT ZANU(PF) KNEW THEY WOULD WIN, AND WIN WELL WITH MORE SEATS, BUT THAT THEY WERE DETERMINED TO RUN THE ELECTION WITHOUT INTIMIDATION OR DUBIOUS PRACTICES. THEY WANTED A SECOND MANDATE WITHOUT BLEMISH. IN ALL CASES I APPLAUDED THIS MINISTERIAL CONFIRMATION THAT THE ELECTION WOULD BE PROPERLY CONDUCTED. MANY PEOPLE IN THE WEST WERE LOOKING CRITICALLY AT ZIMBABWE AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ESCHEW VIOLENCE AND TO BEND OVER BACKWARDS TO BE FAIR.

3. ALL MINISTERS, AND NOTABLY MNANGAWA WHO SHOULD KNOW, SAID THAT THE COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY MATABELELAND, WAS STILL RELATIVELY PEACEFUL, WITH NO MARKED INCREASE IN INSURGENCY. HE CONFIRMED THAT ZNA TROOPS WERE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

4. I ALSO PAID MY FIRST CALL YESTERDAY ON JOSHUA NKOMO. (I SPENT A MORNING ON BILL IRVINE'S FARM LAST WEEK AND HAVE ALSO ASKED TO CALL ON BISHOP MUZOREWA AND IAN SMITH.) NKOMO SPENT MOST OF THE TIME COMPLAINING ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S SHARP ELECTORAL PRACTICES WHICH INCLUDED FIDDLING THE VOTERS' ROLLS SO THAT ZAPU CANDIDATES HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY IN ESTABLISHING THE BONA FIDES OF THEIR 10 SPONSORS: DENYING ZAPU CANDIDATES, HIMSELF IN PARTICULAR, ACCESS TO OPEN AIR STADIUMS ETC BY DEMANDING EXCESSIVE FEES AND EVEN HIGHER INSURANCE COVERAGE:

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INFILTRATING ZANU YOUTH LEAGUE HOTHEADS INTO ZAPU RALLIES; AND DRESSING UP MERCENARY THUGS IN PSEUDO ZNA UNIFORMS SO THAT THEY COULD INTIMIDATE ZAPU SUPPORTERS ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. HE SAID HE PLANNED TO CAMPAIGN THROUGHOUT ZIMBABWE AND CLAIMED THAT ZAPU, WHO WOULD FIELD 80 CANDIDATES, HAD SUPPORT EVERYWHERE. HE DECLINED MY INVITATION TO LIST COMPLAINTS ABOUT ZANU VIOLENCE IN MATABELELAND, SAYING THAT THE TWO PROVINCES WERE QUIET. HE REFUSED TO ACCEPT THAT THERE WAS SUCH A THING AS A GENUINE DISSIDENT, CLAIMING THAT ALL SO-CALLED DISSIDENTS WERE MERELY ZNA (OUT OF UNIFORM) AND OTHER ZANU SUPPORTERS INTENT ON VIOLENCE. I FOUND HIM AGEING, ERRATIC, KEENER TO COMPLAIN THAN TO ACT, AND ALARMLINGLY OUT OF TOUCH. (THE UANC AND ZANU(S+HOLE) ARE IN EVEN GREATER DISARRAY)

5. NOW THAT NOMINATIONS ARE COMPLETED, THE SERIOUS ELECTIONEERING BEGINS. WE WILL SEND PERIODIC ASSESSMENTS BUT SO FAR THE GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO BE CARRYING OUT ITS STATED INTENTION TO CONDUCT A FAIR ELECTION. THEY ARE ADMITTEDLY USING THEIR GREATER MUSCLE, THEIR DEEPER COFFERS AND THEIR MUCH BETTER ORGANISATION WITHOUT TOO MUCH SCRUPLE. MUGABE FOR EXAMPLE TRAVELLED THE LENGTH OF THE COUNTRY OVER THE WEEKEND, FROM NYANGA TO BULAWAYO, BY OFFICIAL HELICOPTER, WHILE THE MINORITY PARTIES MOVE LABORIOUSLY BY CAR. STATE CONTROL OF THE MEDIA UNDOUBTEDLY HELPS ZANU(PF); BUT EVEN THE HERALD MENTIONS THE OTHER PARTIES. AND THERE IS SOME TRUTH IN NKOMO'S COMPLAINTS, ALTHOUGH HE WAS GIVEN ANOTHER 36 HOURS TO GET HIS NOMINATIONS IN AND ALL HIS 80 CANDIDATES HAVE NOW BEEN APPROVED. MY ASSESSMENT SO FAR IS THAT ZANU(PF) HAS NOT ACTUALLY CHEATED, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE TAKING EVERY ADVANTAGE OF THEIR POWERFUL POSITION. THE DANGER MUST BE THAT, AS THE ELECTION HOTS UP, LOCAL ZANU SUPPORTERS START THROWING THEIR WEIGHT AROUND IN THE CONSTITUENCIES.

6. THE FOCUS ON THE ELECTION IN THE NEXT THREE WEEKS WILL BE MATABELELAND. NKALA, WHO IS HIMSELF A CANDIDATE IN MATABELELAND SOUTH, TOLD ME THAT ZANU (PF) WILL BE DEVOTING ALL ITS RESOURCES TO THE DIFFICULT TASK OF WINNING SEATS BACK THERE FROM ZAPU. MUGABE WOULD UNDERTAKE AT LEAST TWO MORE SWINGS THROUGH THE TWO PROVINCES. WE INTEND TO COVER AS MUCH OF THAT MATABELELAND CAMPAIGN, WITH HELP FROM OTHER FRIENDLY MISSIONS, AS WE CAN.

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PS/N<sup>o</sup> 10 Downing St ✓

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*From the Private Secretary*

6 June 1985

ZIMBABWE

Mr. C. G. Tracey, Chairman of the Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Limited, called recently on Michael Alison to report on developments in Zimbabwe. He left the attached package of Zimbabwe company reports behind, saying that they showed a situation of encouraging progress in the Zimbabwe economy.

Mr. Tracey added that within the last three months a senior South African Minister had visited Zimbabwe and been received by Mr. Mugabe and other Ministers. He drew the conclusion that relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa were discreetly improving.

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Company reports sent to FCO

Charles Powell

Mr C G Tracey, Chairman of the Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Limited, came to see me here on Tuesday, as part of an occasional visit he makes when he is in London to keep me in touch with Zimbabwe affairs.

He left the attached package of Zimbabwe company reports behind which he asked to be passed through to the desk in the FCO which might find them of interest. They generally report a situation of encouraging progress in the Zimbabwe economy.

Mr Tracey also told me that within the last three months a South African (white) senior Government Minister has travelled to Zimbabwe and has been received by Mr Mugabe and also by other ministers and civil servants in Zimbabwe. Relations between the two countries thus seem to be developing along discreetly improving lines.

MA

MICHAEL ALISON  
6.6.85





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cc/b

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 February 1985

Thank you for your further letter of 4 January to the Prime Minister about the delay in receiving your pension contributions from the Zimbabwean Government. I have been asked to reply.

I very much regret that you have still not received these funds from Zimbabwe and well understand your continuing frustration at the delay. I have again consulted our High Commission in Harare who, as you know, keep in regular touch with both the Zimbabwean authorities and with your legal representative, Mr. Mollatt. The High Commission say that the delay is due to procedural difficulties caused by the Zimbabwean exchange control regulations and by what appear to be varying interpretations of their instructions regarding the case by the different Zimbabwean bodies involved. You may already know that Mr. Mollatt is seeking clarification of the position from the Zimbabwean authorities and is attempting to resolve the difficulties as quickly as possible. I very much hope that his efforts will be successful and I can assure you that our High Commission will continue to do whatever they properly can to be helpful.

With regard to your understanding of what was said to you on this topic at the time of your release in Zimbabwe I must point out once more that, as has always been made plain, we neither had or can have any formal standing in this matter. This naturally places strict limits on the action we can take.

CHARLES POWELL

Wing Commander P. R. Briscoe AFZ (Rtd).

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 February, 1985

Dear Charles,

Zimbabwe: Air Force Officers' Pensions: Letter to the Prime  
from Wing Commander Briscoe

As requested in your letter of 22 January I enclose a draft reply from you to Wing Commander Briscoe about his Zimbabwean pension.

The position is that at the beginning of October last year the officers' lawyer (Mr Mollatt) heard from the Zimbabwean authorities that refunds of pension contributions and outstanding leave pay had been authorised (the Zimbabweans will not pay pensions as such). The officers have agreed that the leave pay should be held by Mr Mollatt to meet contingencies and he has applied for permission to remit the pension contribution refunds.

The view of our High Commission in Harare is that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe's interpretation of the exchange control regulations, together with bureaucratic incompetence and/or misunderstanding, rather than any active malevolence, are responsible for the continuing delay. Mr Mollatt is seeking clarification from the various authorities involved and hopes to be able to get around the problems. Our High Commission remain in touch with him and they have also had a quiet word with the Reserve Bank and with Mr Anderson, the Minister for the Public Service. If the problems continue the High Commission will consider what else might be done.

The officers have claimed that at the time of their release from detention in Zimbabwe in 1983 the then Deputy High Commissioner there told them that their pensions would be paid. We believe this to be a misunderstanding on the officers' part of what was said to them during a tense and difficult situation in the period immediately before their release. We have, however, consistently made it clear to them that while we did not have and cannot have any formal standing in a matter concerning the payment of Zimbabwean pensions to Zimbabwean citizens we shall continue to do what we properly can to help them. The draft reply to Wing Commander Briscoe reiterates this point.

Yours ever  
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



CF on 3/4/84

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/telegram/despatch/notice~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

PS/No 10

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Wing Commander P R Briscoe AFZ (Rtd)



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SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your further letter of 4 January 1985 to the Prime Minister about the delay in receiving your pension contributions from the Zimbabwean Government. I have been asked to reply.

I very much regret that you have still not received these funds from Zimbabwe and well understand your continuing frustration at the delay. <sup>I have</sup> On receipt of your letter we again consulted our High Commission in Harare who, as you know, keep in regular touch with both the Zimbabwean authorities and with your legal representative, Mr Mollatt, on this question. The High Commission understand that the delay is due to procedural difficulties caused by the Zimbabwean exchange control regulations and by what appear to be varying interpretations of their instructions regarding the case by the different Zimbabwean bodies involved. You may already know that Mr Mollatt is seeking clarification of the position from the Zimbabwean authorities and is attempting to resolve

/the

Enclosures—flag(s).....

the difficulties as <sup>quickly</sup> swiftly as possible. I very much hope that his efforts will be successful and I can assure you that our High Commission will continue to do whatever they properly can to be helpful.

With regard to your understanding of what was said on this topic to you /at the time of your release in Zimbabwe I must, however, point out once more that, as has always been made plain, we neither had nor can have any formal standing in this matter. This naturally places strict limits on the action we can take.

CD

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

31 January, 1985

Zimbabwe Elections: Request for Money  
by Bishop Muzorewa

Thank you for your letter of 30 January about Bishop Muzorewa's request for financial assistance for his party in the forthcoming elections.


The Prime Minister agrees that the request should be turned down.

C. D. POWELL

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 January, 1985

Dear Charles,

Zimbabwe Elections: Request for Money by Bishop Muzorewa

The enclosed exchange of telegrams with our High Commission in Harare concern a note sent to the High Commission by Bishop Muzorewa asking for the Prime Minister to give his party financial assistance. The Foreign Secretary endorses the recommendation of our High Commission that this request should be declined.

You will recall that Bishop Muzorewa, President of the United African National Council (UNAC), was arrested on 31 October 1983 under the Emergency Powers regulations, allegedly in connection with 'clandestine activities against the State'. He was not charged and was eventually released in September 1984. We know little about the evidence (if any) against the Bishop. He and his supporters (his party has 3 seats in the House of Assembly) pose little threat to the Zimbabwean Government, as several Zimbabwean Ministers have admitted. Nevertheless the Government appeared to believe that he had been conspiring against them with the South African and Israeli authorities. Mr Mugabe has referred to these alleged links, for instance during his meeting with the Prime Minister in New Delhi in November 1983.

Since his release Bishop Muzorewa has been actively campaigning with an eye to the forthcoming election, now announced for March. The UANC, like the other black parties, has suffered from political violence and intimidation and, like the other opposition parties, from partial news blackouts. We have been exerting our influence on Mr Mugabe in favour of properly conducted elections. The Foreign Secretary raised the issue during his recent visit and received an assurance that Mr Mugabe was firmly committed to full free and fair elections. There is evidence that some Zimbabwean Ministers are working to restrain their supporters from excesses, though this is made more difficult by the fact that in some areas ZANU itself is the target of violence. We will continue to bring our influence to bear where we usefully can.

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The Bishop first mentioned money to our High Commissioner last October (he wanted to raise election expenses of Z\$8m (£5m) and funds for his personal security of Z\$0.4m (£0.25m). The High Commissioner did not respond, but Muzorewa's deputy mentioned money again very obliquely to officials during the Secretary of State's visit to Zimbabwe last month. Now our Acting High Commissioner in Harare has received a note from Muzorewa asking for the following message to be conveyed to the Prime Minister: "Please don't let Zimbabwe down. Please don't fail her and please don't fail me. We are financially crippled".

It would be unusual, to say the least, for us to contribute to the election expenses of a minor opposition party in a friendly Commonwealth country. It would constitute grave interference in internal affairs. Any payment would at once become known to Mr Mugabe and the excellent relationship established by the Prime Minister since the New Delhi meeting would be destroyed. There would therefore seem to be no practical alternative to turning the request down.

If the request and our response becomes known we propose to say in reply to any enquiries that the election is a matter purely for Zimbabweans and that it would be quite inappropriate for HMG to give financial assistance to any of the parties involved.

We understand that Bishop Muzorewa has also asked the US and South African Governments for money and that both have refused.

*Yours ever,*

*Len Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



GR210  
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FROM HARARE 241030Z JAN 85  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 43 OF 24 JANUARY

CONFIDENTIAL

BISHOP MUZUREWA: REQUEST FOR MONEY

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER REQUEST BY MUZUREWA TO PRIME MINISTER FOR MONEY.  
I RECOMMEND REFUSAL.

DETAIL

2. WE REPORTED THROUGH LAST OCTOBER A REQUEST BY BISHOP MUZUREWA, WHICH WE IGNORED, FOR MONEY FOR PERSONAL SECURITY (DOLLARS 400,000) AND ELECTION EXPENSES (DOLLARS 8 MILLION). MUZUREWA'S DEPUTY, MAZAIWANA, MENTIONED THIS AGAIN VERY OBLIQUELY WHEN HE CALLED ON FERGUSSON DURING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT. WE HAVE NOW RECEIVED A NOTE FROM MUZUREWA HIMSELF ASKING US TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

"PLEASE DON'T LET ZIMBABWE DOWN. PLEASE DON'T FAIL HER AND PLEASE DON'T FAIL ME. WE ARE SINANCIALLY CRIPPLED".

3. SINCE ZANU ARE GOING TO WIN THIS ELECTION ANYWAY, AND SINCE ANY CONTRIBUTION WE MADE WOULD AT ONCE BECOME KNOWN TO THEM UNDERMINING 5 YEARS OF HARD-WON TRUST BETWEEN US, I FIRMLY RECOMMEND:

- A. THAT WE SIMPLY INFORM MUZUREWA ON INSTRUCTIONS THAT WE CANNOT HELP: AND
- B. THAT, SINCE THE ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT IS AWARE OF MUZUREWA'S APPROACH TO UK, US AND SOUTH AFRICA (BOTH THE OTHERS HAVE REFUSED), WE DISCREETLY ENSURE THAT THEY ALSO BECOME AWARE OF OUR REFUSAL.

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FM FCO 251600Z JAN 85

TO PRIORITY HARARE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 055 OF 25 JAN

YOUR TELNO 43: BISHOP MUZOREWA: REQUEST FOR MONEY

1. WE AGREE. PLEASE (A) INFORM MUZOREWA (UNAMBIGUOUSLY BUT NOT TOO BRUSQUELY) THAT HMG IS UNABLE TO HELP AND (B) LET THE ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT KNOW (VERY DISCREETLY) OF OUR REFUSAL.

HOWE

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MR FERGUSSON

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

22 January, 1985

I enclose a letter the Prime Minister has received from Wing Commander Peter Briscoe (Roger Bone's letter of 6 June, 1984 to John Coles refers to earlier correspondence).

I should be grateful if you could let me have an early draft reply to send to Wing Commander Briscoe.

(C.D. Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Bx

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[First page only,  
 1 suggest]

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

**SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MUGABE : BILATERAL QUESTIONS**

SUMMARY

*mt*

1. FRIENDLY, RELAXED AND BUSINESSLIKE MEETING, LASTING NEARLY TWO HOURS, AND COVERING A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES. MIET COVERS INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS. MUGABE DELIGHTED WITH PRIME MINISTER'S ORAL MESSAGE AND INVITED PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT ZIMBABWE. MUGABE VERY HAPPY WITH PERFORMANCE OF BMATT. ALSO PLEASSED WITH BRITISH AID PROGRAMME, ESPECIALLY COOPERATION OVER RESETTLEMENT. SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED WESTLAND HELICOPTERS. MUGABE SAID NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE AND HE WOULD LOOK AT THIS MATTER AGAIN. SECRETARY OF STATE ALSO RAISED EXCHANGE CONTROL CONSTRAINTS. ASSURANCES FROM MUGABE THAT IF THE ECONOMIC UP-TURN CONTINUED THE RESTRAINTS WOULD BE RELAXED. BRIEF DISCUSSION ON WORLD BANK REPORT ON

SUB SAHARAN AFRICA AND THE PROPOSED SPECIAL FACILITY. ACCOUNT FROM MUGABE OF SITUATION IN MATABELELAND AND HIS PLANS FOR ELECTIONS.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A MEETING TODAY WITH MUGABE LASTING NEARLY TWO HOURS. THE TONE WAS NOTABLY FRIENDLY, RELAXED AND BUSINESSLIKE. THE DISCUSSION COVERED A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES. THIS TELEGRAM REPORTS THE DISCUSSION ON BILATERAL QUESTIONS.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE BEGAN BY CONVEYING THE ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER. MUGABE WAS EVIDENTLY VERY PLEASSED AND ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO CONVEY HIS BEST WISHES IN RETURN. HE LATER SAID THAT HE VERY MUCH HOPED THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD VISIT ZIMBABWE SOME TIME IN THE COMING YEAR. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE WAS NOT SURE THAT SHE WOULD BE ABLE TO FIT THIS INTO HER PROGRAMME.

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(BMATT)



BMATT

4. MUGABE BEGAN THE BILATERAL DISCUSSION BY SAYING HE WAS VERY HAPPY WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF BMATT. THE ZIMBABWE ARMY COMMAND WAS VERY PLEASED WITH BMATT'S WORK AND WANTED IT TO CONTINUE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. ALTHOUGH THE BULK OF THE TRAINING WOULD BE DONE BY BMATT HERE, MUGABE HOPED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO SEND MORE ZIMBABWE OFFICERS TO STAFF COLLEGES IN BRITAIN. HE HOPED THAT BMATT'S TRAINING OF ARMY BATTALIONS WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL EVERY BATTALION HAD BENEFITED FROM THEIR SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE. ZIMBABWE WAS SHORT OF FUNDS AT THE MOMENT FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, BUT HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT, AS RESOURCES INCREASED, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PURCHASE MORE EQUIPMENT OF SUFFICIENT QUALITY TO TRANSFORM ZIMBABWE'S CAPABILITY.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE WAS GLAD THAT BMATT WAS PERFORMING SUCH A USEFUL ROLE. THE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD CONTINUE AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF 1985, WHEN WE WOULD NEED TO SEE HOW THE SITUATION LOOKED AT THE TIME. HE COMMENDED BRIGADIER JONES'S SUCCESSOR, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE ZIMBABWEANS COULD USEFULLY MAKE MORE USE OF THE FACT THAT THE HEAD OF BMATT WAS A BRIGADIER BY TAKING GREATER ADVANTAGE OF HIS ADVISORY ROLE. MUGABE SAID THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS THIS WITH THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE AND THE ARMY COMMANDERS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REMINDED HIM ALSO THAT WE WERE CONSIDERING A REQUEST FOR POLICE TRAINING.

AID

6. MUGABE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS ALSO VERY PLEASED WITH THE BRITISH AID PROGRAMME, ESPECIALLY COOPERATION OVER RE-SETTLEMENT. HE WAS CONSCIOUS THAT NOT ALL THE FUNDS BRITAIN HAD MADE AVAILABLE HAD BEEN SPENT, BUT HE HAD ASKED OFFICIALS TO WORK OUT WAYS OF ENSURING THAT THE FUNDS FLOWED MORE SMOOTHLY. HE WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH THE CDC DAIRY FARMING PROJECT AT RUSITU. HE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL TO BENEFIT FROM BRITAIN'S EXPERIENCE AND HE LOOKED FORWARD TO WIDER COOPERATION IN THE LIVESTOCK AND DAIRY INDUSTRIES IN RURAL AREAS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT SMALL PRODUCERS, SINCE HITHERTO THE LIVESTOCK AND DAIRY INDUSTRIES HAD RELIED ON THE LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL PRODUCERS. HE WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT ARABLE FARMING SINCE THE GOVERNMENT HAD SUCCEEDED IN GENERATING CONSIDERABLE ENTHUSIASM AMONG SMALL-SCALE FARMERS FOR IMPROVING THEIR METHODS. IN REPLY THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HIS IMPRESSION TOO WAS THAT THE AID PROGRAMME WAS GOING WELL, WITH A GROWING EMPHASIS ON MANPOWER AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

2  
CONFIDENTIAL

WESTLAND

CONFIDENTIAL

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED THE WESTLAND HELICOPTER DEFENCE SALES PROJECT. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE WESTLAND HELICOPTERS HAD MORE CAPACITY THAN THEIR COMPETING ITALIAN AND FRENCH RIVALS. IN ADDITION, BRITAIN WAS PREPARED TO OFFER FOUR HUNTER AIRCRAFT AS PART OF THE DEAL, AND TO PLACE THEIR DEFENCE SALES EXPERTISE AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE ZIMBABWEANS FOR THE SALE OF THEIR OBSOLETE CANBERRAS. HE ALSO STRESSED THE WIDE RANGE OF BRITAIN'S COOPERATION ON MILITARY MATTERS WITH ZIMBABWE THROUGH BMATT AND THROUGH OTHER MILITARY AID.

8. MUGABE SAID THAT THE BRIEF WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE AIR FORCE SHOWED THAT THE LATTER WERE INCLINED TO FAVOUR THE FRENCH COMPETITOR. HOWEVER, NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUGGESTED THAT THE ZIMBABWEANS OUGHT TO MAKE A THOROUGH EVALUATION OF THE WESTLANDS HELICOPTERS BEFORE MAKING UP THEIR MINDS. MUGABE AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE USEFUL. HE THEN ASKED THE HIGH COMMISSIONER TO LET HIM HAVE A LETTER ABOUT WESTLAND HELICOPTERS SO THAT HE COULD "ARGUE YOUR CASE ON YOUR BEHALF".

## EXCHANGE CONTROL

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH SOME COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUALS HAD ENCOUNTERED OVER EXCHANGE CONTROL RESTRAINTS ON THE REPATRIATION OF FUNDS FROM ZIMBABWE. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR INVESTMENT WERE GREATLY ENHANCED IF FOREIGN EXCHANGE REPAYMENTS WERE MADE WITHOUT CONSTRAINT. MUGABE SAID THAT ZIMBABWE WAS IN PRINCIPLE COMMITTED TO CONTINUE TO PAY DIVIDENDS AND PENSIONS ABROAD. HE RECOGNISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS FOR ATTRACTING INWARD INVESTMENT. THE PRESENT CONSTRAINTS WERE ONLY TEMPORARY AND REFLECTED A REAL SHORTAGE OF RESOURCES. THE ECONOMY WAS NOW ON THE UP-TURN. IF THIS CONTINUED, HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO RELAX THE RESTRAINTS TO SOME EXTENT. HE FELT THIS WAS A MORAL OBLIGATION ON HIS GOVERNMENT. HE ARGUED THAT IN ANY CASE THE ZIMBABWE CONSTITUTION IMPOSED CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY ON COMPENSATION FOR COMPULSORY PURCHASE. IN SOME CASES THE ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT HAD CONCLUDED BILATERAL INVESTMENT PROTECTION AGREEMENTS WITH MAJOR COMPANIES.

## WORLD BANK FUND

10. MANGWENDE, FOREIGN MINISTER, INTERVENED TO RAISE THE WORLD BANK REPORT ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, AND THE PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIAL FACILITY FOR AFRICA, APPARENTLY AT THE BEHEST OF THE MINISTER OF FINANCE. MANGWENDE ARGUED THAT, ACCORDING TO HIS INFORMATION, ALL THE MAJOR POWERS WERE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE EXCEPT BRITAIN, WEST GERMANY AND JAPAN. THIS WAS DELAYING THE OPENING OF THE PROGRAMME. HE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE, WHICH WOULD AFFECT THE POSITION OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES, WOULD CHANGE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTY ABOUT FINDING RESOURCES AND SAID THAT WE WERE STILL EXAMINING THIS QUESTION.

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# CONFIDENTIAL

## MATABELELAND

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED MUGABE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN MATABELELAND. MUGABE SAID THAT HE ESTIMATED THERE WERE 300-500 DISSIDENTS, THOUGH THEIR ACTIVITIES WERE NOT AS WIDESPREAD AS BEFORE. THE DISSIDENTS WERE ALSO BITTERLY DIVIDED AND HE FELT THAT THE VIOLENCE WAS ON A DOWNWARD TREND. ALTHOUGH NKOMO WAS CLEARLY IMPLICATED, MUGABE DID NOT WANT TO ARREST AND DETAIN HIM. IF NKOMO AND THE OTHERS WOULD ONLY DENOUNCE THIS VIOLENCE, THE PROBLEM WOULD BE MUCH EASIER (HE COMMENTED THAT NKOMO WAS HIS PARTNER ON ONE ISSUE, THE REFORM OF THE CONSTITUTION).

12. MUGABE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ZIMBABWE ELECTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE SOON, POSSIBLY END FEBRUARY/EARLY MARCH, IF THE CONSTITUENCIES HAD BEEN DEFINED BY THEN. HE WAS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO FULL, FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. THOUGH THERE WAS INEVITABLY A PROBLEM IN CONTROLLING "OVER-ZEALOUS YOUTH". HE WAS STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF ONE-MAN CONSTITUENCIES, BUT IF THE CONSTITUENCY DEFINITION PROGRAMME WAS DELAYED HE WOULD RELUCTANTLY BE PREPARED TO RETURN TO THE FORMER SYSTEM OF PARTY LISTS.

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Peter R. Briscoe

4 January 1985

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The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
10 Downing Street  
London, England

Dear Mrs. Thatcher:


I am once again writing to you in connection with my pension which I still have not received from the Zimbabwe Government.

It is now some 16 months since I was released from my unjust imprisonment and I would like to remind you once again that when Messrs. Slatter, Pile and I agreed to accept release and deportation we were assured by the British Deputy High Commissioner in Harare that our pensions would be paid. This has still not come to pass.

I have received information that the Zimbabwe Government intend to refund our pension contributions (less tax!); however, it is impossible to get any concrete news of this as it appears that any communications between ourselves and our lawyers in Zimbabwe are being intercepted by the Zimbabwe authorities. For well over a year now I have dealt with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and these dealings have been totally unsatisfactory. We have constantly been put off with words like, "be patient", "do not raise a public outcry through the press", and the like. It is extremely difficult to exercise patience when one's due entitlements are being stolen by an unscrupulous Marxist government; however, it is comparatively easy to counsel caution from the comfort of a desk in Whitehall.

I hope I have not caused any offence by what I have said, however the time has come to call a spade a spade. If the British Government's interest in our case has ceased, please feel free to say so, if not, please advise us as to what is happening.

Yours sincerely,



Peter R. Briscoe





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pc

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

23 December 1984

ZIMBABWE

Thank you for your letter of 17 December about policy towards Zimbabwe.

The Prime Minister agrees that the Foreign Secretary should deliver the oral message to Mugabe proposed in your letter, as well as good wishes to Moi and Kaunda.

(C.D. POWELL)

TMS

C.R. Budd, Esq<sup>ts</sup>,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agree (i) message to Mugabe  
at end of letter?

Yes

(ii) FCS to convey your  
good wishes orally to  
Moi and Kaunda?

Yes not

Dear Charles,

Dms  
18/12Zimbabwe

You will recall that the Foreign Secretary will be visiting Zimbabwe shortly during a wider tour including Zambia and Kenya (4-12 January). As part of the preparation for his visit, Sir Geoffrey has undertaken a review of our policy towards Zimbabwe. This has taken account of the despatch from our High Commissioner in Harare on "the real Mugabe", of which I attach a copy.

Sir Geoffrey accepts that the somewhat depressing picture of Mr Mugabe painted in that despatch is probably about right. But the fact must be faced that he is firmly in the saddle, and the man with whom we must deal if we are to promote the considerable interests which we have at stake in Zimbabwe.

By his underlying beliefs Mr Mugabe is committed to goals inimical to us, and his means and still more his rhetoric will cause us difficulties. But his ideological commitment is at least to some extent more conceptual than practical, and much of his actual policy shows a strong pragmatic streak (which is not sufficiently recognised in the despatch). This is reflected for example in his reconciliation with the white community, his encouragement of the commercial farmers, his restraint over land settlement and public ownership, and his respect for the limitations on his powers laid down in the Constitution. Mr Mugabe's worst record is with the black political opposition (largely but not only the Matabele), and we must expect further acts of intimidation as the current election campaign intensifies. Another problem which we face is Mr Mugabe's isolation and the limited access which even his Ministers are allowed, which has prevented our High Commissioners getting close to him. Nevertheless, despite all his shortcomings, the evidence offers some hope of exerting influence, although the difficulties should not be underestimated.

/The





The Foreign Secretary has concluded that it is right to maintain our efforts to influence Mr Mugabe in the direction we want. This requires a mixture of support and education. A major advantage we have is the excellent relationship which the Prime Minister has succeeded in establishing with him. We should build on this. It is also important that we should maintain our aid programme, especially the British Military and Training Team. And we need to use systematically the many visitors in both directions in order to get our message across.

Sir Geoffrey will aim to use his own visit in this way. His approach will be to reassure Mr Mugabe of our continuing support, make clear to him in a low-key manner our concern over certain aspects of his policies and encourage him to give better access to our High Commissioner. Domestic opinion in this country will need attention, and Sir Geoffrey intends to give both Parliamentary and press briefings.

In view of the importance which Mr Mugabe attaches to his personal relationship with the Prime Minister, Sir Geoffrey recommends that he should convey an oral message from Mrs Thatcher. This might be on the following lines:

"Mrs Thatcher has asked me to convey to you her best wishes. She remembers with pleasure her meeting with you in July and the discussion which you had with her on developments within Zimbabwe and more widely in Southern Africa. She hopes that you will speak equally frankly to me about the current situation and prospects for the coming months, and she awaits with interest an account from me of your views."

Short messages of greetings would also seem appropriate for President Moi and President Kaunda.

I should be grateful for your confirmation that the Prime Minister agrees.

Yours ever,  
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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bc PC ✓



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

11 November 1984

BMATT ZIMBABWE:  
TRAINING FOR 5 BRIGADE

Thank you for your letter of 6 November reporting the Zimbabwe Government's decision not after all to send a 5 Brigade battalion to the Battalion Training School this month. The Prime Minister has noted this.

I am copying this letter to Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

mg.

Simon Lowe, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence

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u/k (4)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~3007022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/6

6th November 1984

Rich Director  
CDP b1x.

Dear Charles

ms

BMATT ZIMBABWE: TRAINING FOR 5 BRIGADE

In your letter of 15th October to Richard Mottram, you recorded the Prime Minister's agreement to accepting a battalion of 5 Brigade at the BMATT-run Battalion Training School in Zimbabwe, in early November.

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware that the Zimbabweans have after all decided not to send a 5 Brigade battalion to the Battalion Training School this month. Commander BMATT now believes it unlikely that a 5 Brigade battalion will be sent before April or May of next year, although the position could well change again.

I am copying this letter to Peter Ricketts (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever  
Simon Lowe

(S H LOWE)  
Private Secretary

C Powell Esq

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Mo SH  
CCPC



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 October, 1984


Dear Richard,

BMATT Zimbabwe : Training for 5 Brigade

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 8 October proposing that BMATT should undertake the re-training of 5 Brigade.

The Prime Minister takes the view that we crossed the Rubicon when we agreed to train individuals from 5 Brigade. She therefore agrees that we should accept a battalion of 5 Brigade at the BMATT Battalion Training School in early November.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely  
  
C. D. POWELL

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence





cc/c

50.  
 We crossed the Rubicon  
 then in regard to  
 MO 5/6 train individuals.  
 for a 5-Brigade: One this  
 further training  
 no



Prime Minister  
 Agree Defence Secretary's  
 and FCS' recommendation  
 that BMATT Zimbabwe  
should undertake training  
of 5 Brigade? C.D.P.

PRIME MINISTER

BMATT ZIMBABWE: TRAINING FOR 5 BRIGADE

You will wish to be aware that the Commander of the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in Zimbabwe has just learnt that the Zimbabweans are apparently proposing to send a battalion of 5 Brigade to the BMATT-run Battalion Training School in early November.

2. Hitherto, we have avoided involvement with units from 5 Brigade (though we have trained individuals), in view of the Brigade's association with atrocities in Matabeleland. I have therefore considered whether our reaction ought not to be to warn the Zimbabweans of the political embarrassment such a move could cause us, and urge them to substitute a battalion from a less controversial formation. But I am reluctant to take this course. Our High Commissioner in Harare has urged that the Zimbabweans would regard such a reaction on our part as an unreasonable rebuff to their own efforts to take 5 Brigade in hand; and it would anyway seem wrong indefinitely to deny the benefits of BMATT's training to those units of the Zimbabwean Army most in need of it. The potential advantages of becoming involved in the re-training of 5 Brigade (as of the Presidential Guard, the other Zimbabwean Army formation with which we have hitherto avoided association) are great, in terms of underlining the failure of North Korean training, of entrenching BMATT's influence and of serving the wider cause of peace and stability in Zimbabwe.

3. That said, the political risks are clearly considerable - not so much in the short-term but if a further round of brutality were to take place in Matabeleland in which 5 Brigade were implicated.



The High Commissioner reports some grounds for optimism on this score; he believes that both the Zimbabwean Government and the Army are learning the lesson that such tactics in Matabeleland are counter-productive locally and damaging to Zimbabwe's image abroad. He also points out that 5 Brigade have anyway been behaving much better in operations in Matabeleland in recent weeks. Nonetheless, the possibility of a further round of trouble, perhaps during the rainy season early next year, can be by no means excluded. In those circumstances, we should have to be prepared to defend our involvement with unit training of 5 Brigade by pointing out that BMATT has no direct involvement with the Brigade's operational role; but that, given the Brigade's reputation for brutality stemming from indiscipline and poor command and control, it would have been irresponsible of us to have refused to help the Zimbabweans in their own efforts to reintegrate the formation into the rest of the Zimbabwean Army, at the same time repairing the damage done by North Korean training. But success will not be achieved over-night; it will take time for the full benefit of BMATT training to be felt throughout the Brigade as a whole. If there were specific criticism of the element of Internal Security training in the Battalion School syllabus, we would counter that such training (less than 10% of the syllabus) is a regular part of the standard British Army infantry training, and that its fundamental purpose is to impart the doctrines of "minimum necessary force" and "hearts and minds".

4. The defence of our policy on these lines might not be comfortable, but I think it would be sustainable. In all the circumstances, I judge that the potential benefits to be derived from becoming involved in the training of 5 Brigade out-weigh the undoubted risk of political embarrassment. BMATT would, of course, undertake such training out of their existing resources. I therefore propose to tell Commander BMATT that he should be prepared to acquiesce in the sending of a 5 Brigade battalion to the school next month. I understand that the Foreign Secretary agrees that





this would be the right course; I would be glad to know that you share that judgement.



5. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, to other OD colleagues and to the Secretary of the Cabinet.

*WJH*

Ministry of Defence

8th October 1984

# A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES	PREM 19	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number)	2004	
Extract details: Letter from Bodd to Barclay dated 23 August 1984		
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....		
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .  
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.  
This should be an indication of what the extract is,  
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.  
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

CONFIDENTIAL

CC. LCO  
FCO  
HMT  
LPO  
LPSO  
CDL  
DTI

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 July, 1984.

Future of BMATT Zimbabwe

The Defence Secretary minuted the Prime Minister on 18 July on this subject.

The Prime Minister did not have time to see the minute before she met Mr. Mugabe. But she did tell him that we were able to meet Zimbabwe's requests for additional assistance. I have recommended, in a separate letter to Colin Budd recording the discussion with Mr. Mugabe that our High Commissioner should give the Zimbabweans a fuller account of the details of our offer, and make the further points about the difficulty of meeting any future requests.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of other OD members and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

C.D. Powell

CONFIDENTIAL





Prime Minister  
 EDP  
 15/7.

MO 5/6

PRIME MINISTERFUTURE OF BMATT ZIMBABWE

You will have seen the recent exchange between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and myself about the future role of the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in Zimbabwe, and in particular the latest Zimbabwean request for additional assistance in the areas of logistics and armour and artillery training. We are both agreed that we should if at all possible respond positively to these requests. The problem, however, has been to find the money. The essentially political purposes of our military assistance programme in Zimbabwe suggest that this might most appropriately be a charge to the FCO's UKMTAS fund; but the Foreign Secretary has fairly pointed out that the sums involved, and especially the particularly heavy incidence of expenditure in the 1985/86 Financial Year, would severely distort the balance of UKMTAS's operations.

2. I sympathise with this concern; and I would therefore be ready, exceptionally, to agree to attribute a significant proportion of the expenditure involved to the Defence Policy Fund (DPF). My officials have agreed with FCO officials that an appropriate division might be for UKMTAS to pay for the logistics task, leaving the armour and artillery training to be set against the DPF.

3. If, therefore, you are content - and unless other OD colleagues see objection - the way would be open for you to tell Mr Mugabe later today that we are able to undertake these additional tasks, by providing three officers on two-year tours to help the logistics staff at Army Headquarters, and a team of about 17 for a 15-month period



to undertake the armour and artillery training. In doing so you would no doubt wish to emphasise that it has not been easy for us to find the resources. It would also be very helpful - and you will have seen that the Foreign Secretary endorses this point - if it could be impressed upon Mr Mugabe that he cannot expect us to keep responding positively to further requests.

4. A suitable line might be that we are delighted on this occasion to be able to help; but Mr Mugabe will understand the resource constraints we are under. BMATT's aim must eventually be to work itself out of a job; and, through mutual co-operation, a great deal has already been accomplished over the last four years. Accordingly, we are unlikely to be able to continue to respond positively to any further requests involving additional resources; for the future we see BMATT's longer-term role as concentration on the advisory and staff training functions.

5. Finally, I should pick up the point made by the Foreign Secretary about the possibility of economies in BMATT's planned complement to continue existing tasks. Both Commander BMATT and our High Commissioner in Harare have expressed the view that this complement is the necessary minimum if BMATT is to continue to operate as effectively as it has to date. I am therefore doubtful whether there is much scope for reduction; but I will certainly have it looked at again.

6. I am copying this to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, our other OD colleagues and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence  
18th July 1984



FROM:

THE RT. HON. LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, C.H., F.R.S., D.C.L.



CCPC

8.  
CO. 1877.  
HOUSE OF LORDS,  
SW1A 0PW

SECRET

17th July, 1984

The Right Honourable  
Michael Heseltine, MP  
Secretary of State for Defence,  
Ministry of Defence,  
Main Building,  
Whitehall,  
London,  
SW1.

Dear Michael:

Future of BMATT Zimbabwe

Thank you for copying to me your minute of 13 July 1984 to Sir Geoffrey Howe.

I support your proposal to accede to the Zimbabwe Government's request that BMATT should undertake the additional tasks you listed. But I hope that, if we are to continue assistance of this kind, it will be on terms (unexpressed but present) that we replace the murderous Chinese and Koreans who have caused such dismay to all.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, our other OD colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yrs:

SECRET

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Zimbabwe relations etc

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FCS/84/204

DEFENCE SECRETARY

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 cc/c  
 The point of  
 financing has been  
 resolved between  
 DS & FCS. NBPM

CDP 17/72

Future of the British Military Training Assistance Team (BMATT),

Zimbabwe

1. Thank you for your minute of 13 July about the future of BMATT in Zimbabwe.
2. BMATT has made a considerable and most successful contribution to the establishment and development of the Zimbabwean National Army (ZNA) and clearly still has an important role to play particularly on the advisory and staff training sides. I therefore agree that we should continue the existing tasks of the Team at least until the end of 1985.
3. As for the recent requests from the Zimbabweans for additional assistance I too see good reasons for trying to meet them. It would be a considerable achievement to have replaced both the Chinese and North Koreans in exercising influence over the ZNA. This would not only be good in itself but a useful boost for the morale of the white community and a contribution to our efforts to improve South Africa's perceptions of their northern neighbour. Conversely, a refusal on our part might lead to the Zimbabweans turning for help in unwelcome directions. Furthermore, to agree to the requests should enhance the standing of the Commander of BMATT and help with his access to the highest levels of Government and the Armed Forces.
4. The problem basically, as you recognise, is one of finance. Hitherto, apart from contributions from the Zimbabweans themselves, the FCO has met the bill under the United Kingdom Military Training Assistance Scheme (UKMTAS). This has meant that in some years Zimbabwe has accounted for over half of the total UKMTAS budget



for the provision of loan service personnel (LSP). This has reduced our capability to assist with priorities elsewhere. For 1985/86 we have been thinking in terms of an allocation of £2 million which, assuming a Zimbabwean contribution of £500,000, would be sufficient to cover existing BMATT tasks but not the additional requests. To take on these would require a further allocation of around £1.2 million and would mean that Zimbabwe would again be getting around a half of the likely UKMTAS budget for LSP, at a time when we shall have high priorities elsewhere, eg, in the Caribbean. Quite frankly, I think this too large a commitment for one country. I would not, however, exclude the possibility of some increase in next year's UKMTAS allocation for Zimbabwe if funds could also be found from elsewhere.

5. I see little prospect of any significant increase in the Zimbabwean contribution and I wonder therefore whether you might be prepared to consider helping under the Defence Policy Fund (DPF). I know that Zimbabwe is not at present targetted under the Fund. I understand, however, that the Chiefs of Staff, in their Out of Area Strategic Review last year took the view that there were good and valid military reasons for BMATT to function at reasonable size, and also accorded Zimbabwe the status of a country of major importance to stability in an area of strategic interest. Most other countries which have been accorded such status are, I gather, eligible for DPF assistance. It would clearly help us meet our shared objective of meeting the additional training requests if the receipt waiving facilities of the DPF, which has not in any case been fully utilised since it was set up in 1982, could be extended to include Zimbabwe.

6. Another possibility perhaps worth examining is whether there is any scope for further staff economies in our commitment to existing BMATT tasks. If some saving could be made here this would release resources which would be helpful in the context of the additional assistance requested.





7. I hope you can agree to provide some assistance under the DPF. If so, I suggest that our officials get together as a matter of urgency, in view of Mr Mugabe's call on the Prime Minister on 18 July, to try to work out a package for meeting the additional requests. It would certainly be useful if the Prime Minister could inform Mr Mugabe of our decision at this meeting. I agree, however, that it would also be appropriate to tell him that there is a limit to the extent that we can meet requests for additional assistance and that our long term aim remains the reduction in the size of BMATT, with its emphasis being on the advisory and staff training roles.
8. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, other OD colleagues and Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

17 July, 1984



MO 5/6

6. cefc  
 St. amir  
 FCS section  
 An submit.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARYFUTURE OF BMATT ZIMBABWE

You will recall that in January we considered the future of BMATT Zimbabwe and agreed that it should continue in being, but with the numbers reducing from 60 to about 30 by the end of this year, and with a further shift in the team's role away from field training of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) towards the advisory and staff training functions. We also agreed to review the future of BMATT later this year.

2. Despite a further round of ZNA repression in Matabeleland this Spring, I am in no doubt that we should continue the existing tasks of BMATT at least until the end of 1985, and we can continue to find the necessary personnel. However, since our last review we have had a request from the Zimbabwe Government for BMATT to undertake three additional tasks: assistance at the School of Infantry; armour and artillery tactical training; and assistance to the logistics staff at Army HQ. Two of the requests can be accommodated relatively easily; the School of Infantry task can be undertaken from within existing resources this year, and has now been inserted in the BMATT programme, while the logistics assistance would be of great benefit to the ZNA and would only require three additional personnel for two years.
  
3. The request for armour and artillery training assistance presents greater difficulties. If we agree it will mean postponing the rundown in the size of BMATT: a reconnaissance has shown that the additional manpower needed is some 17 men over a period of 15 months. It would also mean at least temporarily reversing the trend away from field training. However there seems little doubt that the Zimbabwe Government






attaches great importance to this request and if we refuse it there is a risk that the Commander BMATT's standing and influence could be undermined. It also offers us the opportunity to replace the last elements of Chinese and North Korean influence over the ZNA. On the other hand, although the British Army can find the extra personnel needed, the total cost of accepting the logistic and armour and artillery requests will be some £1.6M (of which £400K represents the logistics assistance). About £1.2M would fall in 1985/86.

4. While I believe that the advantages of meeting the Zimbabwe Government requests outweigh the disadvantages, the essential purpose of BMATT is in support of our foreign policy objectives, which has been reflected by the fact that the FCO has up to now met the cost of the team from the UKMTAS budget. I understand that to fund these additional tasks will present you with considerable difficulties. I should therefore be grateful for your views both on whether you consider that we should meet the requests and if so how the funding problem might be resolved.

5. I am aware that Mr Mugabe is due to visit London shortly and if we do agree to undertake these additional talks the Prime Minister may wish to tell him of our decision at their meeting. However I suggest that we would also need to make clear to him that Zimbabwe is continuing to take a very substantial part of our military assistance resources, and that he cannot expect us to keep responding positively to further requests. Our long term aim must remain to reduce the overall size of BMATT and to concentrate on the advisory and staff training roles.

6. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, our other OD colleagues and also to Sir Robert Armstrong.

  
Ministry of Defence  
13th July 1984

SUBJECT.

cc. ops.

cc. master.

*Windward (Relations)*

file

DSG



cc fro

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T112/84  
25 June 1984

THE PRIME MINISTER

*Dear Prime Minister,*

Thank you for your kind message marking the occasion of Her Majesty The Queen's Official Birthday.

I appreciate your kind remarks about the relationship between our two Governments. I am glad that you feel that we have been able to assist. I too attach importance to continuing the close co-operation we have established on the basis of mutual respect and understanding.

Thank you also for your personal good wishes. I hope that we shall have an opportunity to meet when you are in London next month.

*Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher*

The Honourable Robert G. Mugabe.

*da*





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 June 1984

*John Chalker,*

Zimbabwe: Message to the Prime Minister from Mr Mugabe

Mr Mugabe has sent a message to the Prime Minister to mark The Queen's Official Birthday (the President of Zimbabwe sent a separate greeting to Her Majesty). The message took some days to arrive.

In the message, which is warm in tone, Mr Mugabe takes the opportunity to express his Government's gratitude for our aid.

As you know, Mr Mugabe is to pay a private visit to Britain from 19-21 July and hopes to call on the Prime Minister. I have written to you separately today about possible timings.

I attach a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Mr Mugabe.

*Yours  
R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

Await top letter.

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

The Hon Robert G Mugabe  
Prime Minister of the Republic  
of Zimbabwe  
HARARE

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your kind message marking the occasion of Her Majesty The Queen's Official Birthday.

CAVEAT.....

I appreciate your kind remarks about the relationship between our two Governments. I am glad that you feel that we have been able to assist. I too attach importance to continuing the close cooperation we have established on the basis of mutual respect and understanding.

Thank you also for your personal good wishes. I hope that we shall have an opportunity to meet when you are in London next month.

Enclosures—flag(s).....



SUBJECT

cc. ops.  
cc. Master

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T98E/84

Baa

Zimbabwe

297711 PRDRME G  
297711 PRDRME G  
2141 ZIMGOV ZW

1509/11

14/06/84

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE COMMA UNITED KINGDOM

HONOUR TO REQUEST TRANSMISSION OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE  
HONOURABLE PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE COMMA  
COMRADE ROBERT GABRIEL MUGABE COMMA TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PRIME  
MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND  
COMMA MRS MARGARET THATCHER STOP

QUOTE

I HAVE GREAT PLEASURE COMMA ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF  
ZIMBABWE COMMA TO CONGRATULATE YOU COMMA THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF  
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND ON THE  
JOYOUS OCCASION OF HER MAJESTY'S BIRTHDAY STOP

I WISH ON THIS OCCASION TO REITERATE MY GOVERNMENT'S GRATITUDE FOR  
THE CONTINUED ASSISTANCE ZIMBABWE RECEIVES FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM OF  
GREAT BRITAIN AND TO EXPRESS MY HOPE THAT COOPERATION, MUTUAL  
RESPECT AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL BE  
FURTHER STRENGTHENED IN THE YEAR AHEAD STOP

I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY COMMA HONOURABLE PRIME MINISTER COMMA TO  
WISH YOU GOOD HEALTH COMMA AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF  
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE AND PROSPERITY IN THE  
YEAR AHEAD STOP

PLEASE ACCEPT THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION STOP

ROBERT GABRIEL MUGABE  
PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE

UNQUOTE

HIGHEST CONSIDERATION STOP

= MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HARARE, ZIMBABWE =====

MINIMAL

PROTOCOL DEPT

CAFD

ee Feb 6



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 June, 1984.

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 15 May about the problem of your pension from Zimbabwe and to let you have the following reply.

Mrs. Thatcher understands your continuing frustration over the protracted delay in receiving your pension, and appreciates the distress this must be causing you and your family. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office continue to keep in close touch with Air Commodore Pile over this matter, and our High Commission in Harare are regularly in contact with your lawyers, who are pursuing your case with the Zimbabwean authorities.

I can assure you that we have not lost sight of your case. Our High Commissioner in Harare has raised the matter informally with the Zimbabwean authorities on a number of occasions, and although our lack of any formal standing places limits on the action we can take, we shall certainly continue to take all suitable opportunities to do what we can to help.

A. J. COLES

Wing Commander P.R. Briscoe (Rtd)

6



cc Fes h



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 June, 1984.

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 8 May about the problem of your pension from Zimbabwe and to let you have the following reply.

Mrs. Thatcher fully understands and sympathises with your anxiety over the protracted delay in receiving your pension, and can appreciate the distress this must be causing you and your family. As you know, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have kept in close touch with Air Commodore Pile over this matter, and I understand that he in turn briefs you and Wing Commander Briscoe. You will also be aware that our High Commission in Harare is in regular contact with your lawyers, who are pursuing the question of your pensions with the Zimbabwe authorities.

I can assure you that we have this case very much in mind. Our High Commissioner in Harare has raised it informally with the Zimbabwean authorities on a number of occasions, and although our lack of any formal standing places limits on the action we can take, we shall certainly continue to take all suitable opportunities to do what we can to help.

H. COLEMAN

Air Vice Marshal H.C.S. Slatter (Rtd)

CST.

ls

ACPC CONFIDENTIAL

ASC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 June, 1984

*Type letter pl.*

*MBG  
/c.*

*John John,*

Please refer to your letters of ~~18~~ and ~~23~~ May enclosing ones from Air Vice Marshal Slatter and Wing Commander Briscoe about their Zimbabwe pensions.

Since their release from detention, the three most senior Zimbabwe Air Force officers, Messrs Slatter, Pile and Briscoe, who are the only ones with a claim to substantial pensions, have been pressing their case. Now the men's lawyer has apparently written to them saying that the Zimbabweans have decided not to pay the pensions. We believe that while this is correct, pension contributions are to be refunded, but this information is still strictly unofficial and may not be passed on.

If the men were now to mount a concerted publicity campaign, they could jeopardise even this outcome. While the decision is, of course, for the men themselves, we and their lawyers have consistently counselled against strident publicity, for this reason.

We have no formal standing in this case. All the officers are Zimbabwean citizens, although some - but not Air Vice Marshal Slatter nor Wing Commander Briscoe - also hold British nationality. Nevertheless, our High Commissioner in Harare has been active on the men's behalf and has sounded out the Secretary of State for Defence on a number of occasions to see how we can best help them.

The Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Mr Stanley, considered raising the matter with Mr Mugabe when he visited Harare last week, but eventually decided that this would not help their cause. We will now look for other avenues of approach, but our scope for effective action is limited and we cannot be optimistic about persuading the Zimbabweans to be more generous.

I attach proposed draft replies to Air Vice Marshal Slatter and to Wing Commander Briscoe. For ease of reference you may wish to have the attached copy of Timothy Flesher's letter to Wing Commander Briscoe of 30 March.

*Yours  
R B Bone*

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary



DRAFT: ~~XXXXX~~ Letter ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM  
PS/No 10

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Air Vice Marshal H C S Slatter (Rtd)

Copies to:

CLOSED UNDER THE  
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION  
ACT 2000

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

*The Prime Minister has asked me to*

↳ Thank you for your letter of 8 May to the

Prime Minister about the problem of your pension from Zimbabwe *and to let you have the following reply.*  
~~I have been asked to reply.~~

*Mr. Slatter*

~~The Prime Minister~~ fully understands and sympathises with your anxiety over the protracted delay in receiving your pension, and can appreciate the distress this must be causing you and your family. As you know, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have kept in close touch with Air Commodore Pile over this matter, and I understand that he in turn briefs you and Wing Commander Briscoe. You will also be aware that our High Commission in Harare is in regular contact with your lawyers, who are pursuing the question of your pensions with the Zimbabwe authorities.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I can assure you that we have this case very much in mind. ~~As you know,~~ Our High Commissioner in Harare has raised it informally with the Zimbabwean authorities on a number of occasions, and although our lack of any formal standing places limits on the action we can take, we shall certainly continue to take all suitable opportunities to do what we can to help.

MLG  
/6.



DRAFT: ~~XXXX~~/letter/~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

Reference

PS/No 10

DEPARTMENT:

TEL NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret


Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Wing Commander P B Briscoe (Rtd)



Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

*The hi draft to add me to*

Thank you for your letter of 15 May to the Prime Minister about the problem of your pension from Zimbabwe. *and to let you have the following* I have been asked to reply.

*Mr. Thelto*

The Prime Minister ~~can~~ understands your continuing frustration over the protracted delay in receiving your pension and appreciates the distress this must be causing you and your family. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office continue to keep in close touch with Air Commander Pile over this matter and our High Commission in Harare are regularly in contact with your lawyers, who are pursuing your case with the Zimbabwean authorities.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I can assure you that we have not lost sight  
of your case. ~~As you know,~~ Our High Commissioner  
in Harare has raised the matter informally with the  
Zimbabwean authorities on a number of occasions,  
and although our lack of any formal standing places  
limits on the action we can take, we shall certainly  
continue to take all suitable opportunities to  
do what we can to help.

*mg*  
/6





10 DOWNING STREET

30 March 1984

*From the Private Secretary*

Thank you for your letter of 6 March to the Prime Minister about the problem of your pension from Zimbabwe. I have been asked to reply.

I fully understand and sympathise with your anxiety over the long delay in receiving your pension, and with the considerable worries which this must have caused you. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have kept in close touch with Air Commodore Pile over this matter and he undertook to write to you and to Air Vice Marshal Slatter to explain the current position.

As you know, our High Commission in Harare are in regular touch with your lawyers, who are pursuing the question of your pensions with the Zimbabwe authorities. We understand that there are certain procedural and legal aspects of the matter which the authorities have yet to resolve and we are, of course, keeping a close watch on developments. I can understand your frustration at the protracted course of events, and I share your hope that the matter will soon be resolved.

I can assure you that we have this case very much in mind, and that we will continue to take suitable opportunities to register with the Zimbabwe authorities our concern at the delay and the anxiety which this is causing you and your colleagues.

(Timothy Flesher)

Wing Commander P.R. Briscoe AFZ (Rtd)

GR950

CONFIDENTIAL

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FM HARARE 010655Z JUNE 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 296 OF 1 JUNE

INFO CAPE TOWN, MAPUTO, MODUK (MA/MR STANLEY, DMAO, ACDS(CTS),  
DEFENCE SALES)

VISIT OF THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR THE ARMED FORCES

SUMMARY

1. A SUCCESSFUL VISIT. BUSINESSLIKE TALKS WITH MUGABE, WITH OTHER MINISTERS AND WITH THE ARMY COMMANDER. VISITS TO BMATT: MEETINGS WITH ITS PERSONNEL AND WIVES. ZIMBABWEAN REQUESTS FOR A CONTINUATION AND MODEST EXPANSION OF BMATT'S ACTIVITIES. DEFENCE SALES POSSIBILITIES. FRANK DISCUSSIONS WITH ZIMBABWEAN MINISTERS ON MATABELELAND.

DETAIL

2. MR STANLEY HAS JUST CONCLUDED A SUCCESSFUL 3-DAY VISIT TO ZIMBABWE. HE HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH MUGABE, WITH KADUNGURE, THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, WITH MNANGAGWA, THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR SECURITY, AND WITH GENERAL NHONGO, THE ARMY COMMANDER. HE SAW BMATT IN OPERATION IN DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS, AT THE ZIMBABWE STAFF COLLEGE AND AT THE BATTALION BATTLE SCHOOL AT NYANGA. HE MET A NUMBER OF SENIOR ZIMBABWEANS AT MY HOUSE AND ATTENDED A RECEPTION HELD BY COMMANDER BMATT TO INTRODUCE HIS STAFF AND THEIR WIVES, TOGETHER WITH A WIDE SELECTION OF BMATT'S ZIMBABWEAN FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES.

MEETING WITH MUGABE

3. THE MEETING WITH MUGABE WAS FRIENDLY AND BUSINESSLIKE. MUGABE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE GREATLY VALUED BMATT'S PRESENCE AND THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A CONTINUATION AND EXPANSION OF ITS ACTIVITIES. HE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF HELPING MOZAMBIQUE WITH MILITARY TRAINING. HE INDICATED THAT HE WISHED TO INTRODUCE A COHERENT EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT POLICY, STRETCHING OVER THE NEXT 5 TO 10 YEARS, AND WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY WHICH WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE VISIT BY MINISTER OF STATE KADUNGURE TO THE BRITISH ARMY EQUIPMENT EXHIBITION NEXT MONTH, TO SEE WHAT BRITAIN HAS TO OFFER AND TO DISCUSS FINANCIAL TERMS. HE RESPONDED SOBERLY TO MR STANLEY'S INVITATION TO SPEAK ABOUT HIS CONCERNS IN MATABELELAND, MAINTAINING THAT, ALTHOUGH INCIDENTS WOULD NO DOUBT CONTINUE, THE SITUATION WAS UNDER CONTROL. HE WAS, HOWEVER, WORRIED LEST THE SOUTH AFRICANS MIGHT RENEW THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE DISSIDENTS.

| BMATT'S

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4. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH KADUNGURE AND GENERAL NHONGO, MR STANLEY DISCUSSED IN DETAIL THE ZIMBABWEANS REQUESTS, OF WHICH WE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN NOTIFIED, COVERING BMATT'S FUTURE ROLE. THE ZIMBABWEANS SAID THAT THEY WISHED BMATT TO RETAIN ITS PRESENCE IN ARMY HEADQUARTERS, AT THE STAFF COLLEGE, AT THE ZIMBABWE MILITARY ACADEMY AND AT THE BATTALION BATTLE SCHOOL. MR STANLEY AGREED THAT THESE REQUESTS COULD BE MET FROM WITHIN THE COMPLEMENT OF ABOUT 30 WHICH BRITISH MINISTERS HAD DECIDED SHOULD BE REACHED BY BMATT BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. HE ALSO AGREED THAT A SMALL TEAM SHOULD BE SENT FOR A FEW MONTHS LATER THIS YEAR TO THE ZIMBABWE SCHOOL OF INFANTRY, TO HELP REVISE THEIR SYLLABUS AND TEACHING METHODS: THIS COULD BE ARRANGED FROM WITH BMATT'S EXISTING COMPLEMENT.

5. THE ZIMBABWEANS ALSO ASKED THAT BMATT SHOULD TAKE OVER FROM THE CHINESE TEAM PRESENTLY IN ZIMBABWE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRAINING THE ZNA'S ARTILLERY AND ARMOUR WINGS. MR STANLEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT BRITISH MINISTERS WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER ANY ENLARGEMENT OF BMATT BEYOND THE SIZE ALREADY AGREED, BUT UNDERTOOK, STRESSING THAT THIS WAS WITHOUT COMMITMENT, TO ARRANGE FOR ANY EARLY VISIT BY TWO SPECIALISTS TO ASSESS AND ADVISE ON THIS REQUEST. THE ZIMBABWEANS' FINAL BID WAS FOR THE SERVICES OF 3 OFFICERS TO HELP THEM ON THE LOGISTICS SIDE: MR STANLEY AGAIN MADE NO COMMITMENT, BUT UNDERTOOK THAT THIS REQUEST WOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED.

## DEFENCE SALES

6. THE POSSIBILITY OF DEFENCE PROCUREMENT WAS DISCUSSED IN MORE DETAIL WITH KADUNGURE. PARTICULAR ITEMS MENTIONED WERE HAWK AIRCRAFT (BRITISH AEROSPACE HAVE JUST BEEN ASKED TO PROVIDE QUOTES FOR A FURTHER 7); THE 105 MM LIGHT GUN; AND HELICOPTERS. MY DEFENCE ADVISER HAS TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY ABOUT KADUNGURE'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO BRITAIN FOR THE BAEE. IT IS SURPRISING THAT ZIMBABWE SHOULD BE IN THE MARKET FOR NEW EQUIPMENT, GIVEN HER CURRENT ACUTE FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESTRAINTS, AND QUICK RESULTS ARE UNLIKELY. THERE WILL NO DOUBT IN ANY CASE BE KEEN COMPETITION FROM OTHER POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS. BUT IN THIS COUNTRY, AS ELSEWHERE, DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS ARE GIVEN PRIORITY, EVEN IF FINANCIAL PRUDENCE MIGHT DICTATE OTHERWISE. BMATT'S PRESENCE GIVES US AN INSIDE TRACK AND I ASSUME THAT WE WILL WISH TO PURSUE THESE OPPORTUNITIES VIGOROUSLY.

## MATABELELAND

7. IN ADDITION TO THE DISCUSSION WITH MUGABE, MR STANLEY WAS GIVEN AN EXTENSIVE BRIEFING ON MATABELELAND BY MNANGAGWA. THE LATTER DESCRIBED BOTH THE GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM AND THE PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION, USING A WALL MAP TO SHOW THE PATTERN OF RECENT INCIDENTS. HE DESCRIBED IN DETAIL THE EVIDENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT, ALTHOUGH CONCEDED THAT SUCH EVIDENCE HAD BEEN LACKING

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FOR THE PAST FEW MONTHS. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT MR STANLEY'S INVITATION TO BOTH MUGABE AND TO MNANGAGWA TO PUT TO HIM THEIR POINTS OF VIEW WILL HAVE FURTHER SIGNALLED OUR CONCERN ABOUT EVENTS IN MATABELELELAND, WHILE AVOIDING ANY REACTION WHICH MIGHT HAVE REBOUNDED ON BMATT OR OUR RELATIONS GENERALLY. ZIMBABWEAN SENSITIVITY TO OUR CONCERN WAS INDEED SHOWN BY KADUNGURE, WHO INDICATED PRIVATELY TO MR STANLEY THAT THE GOVERNMENT WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT THAT WE WOULD NOT WISH BMATT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY COUNTER-INSURGENCY TRAINING SPECIFIC TO MATABELELAND. HE ALSO APPRECIATED HOW UNHELPFUL HAD BEEN THE SUGGESTION WHICH HAD BEEN MADE PUBLICLY BY THE ZIMBABWEAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION THAT BMATT HAD TAKEN OVER FROM THE NORTH KOREANS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRAINING THE 5TH BRIGADE (WHICH OF COURSE THEY HAVE NOT).

## CONCLUSION

8. DURING HIS VISIT, MR STANLEY WAS LEFT IN NO DOUBT OF THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED IN THIS COUNTRY TO BMATT'S CONTINUING PRESENCE. THE POINT WAS MADE TO HIM NOT JUST BY THE RESPONSIBLE MINISTERS BUT ALSO BY THE OTHER SENIOR ZIMBABWEANS, BOTH BLACK AND WHITE, WHOM HE MET. I BELIEVE THAT HE FOR HIS PART WAS MOST IMPRESSED BY THE PURPOSEFUL WAY IN WHICH BMATT IS OPERATING, AND BY THE COMPETENCE AND HIGH MORALE OF ITS OFFICERS. THE ZIMBABWEANS WERE GRATIFIED BY HIS IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT TO THE ASSISTANCE FOR THE SCHOOL OF INFANTRY AND TO THE REVIEW OF THEIR ARTILLERY AND ARMOUR REQUIREMENTS. I PERSONALLY VERY MUCH HOPE THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE ZIMBABWEAN REQUEST FOR A MODEST EXPANSION IN BMATT'S SIZE (WHICH WILL STILL LEAVE IT SMALLER THAN IT IS AT THIS MOMENT). IT IS A MAJOR BRITISH AND WESTERN ASSET, NOT JUST IN ZIMBABWE BUT ALSO IN THE WIDER SOUTHERN AFRICAN CONTEXT.

EWANS  
BT

SOUTHERN AFRICA

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD(PALACE)

S AF D	WED
O&DS	EGD
MCAD	SOV D
UND	ERD
NAD	MR SQUIRE
	CABINET OFFICE

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Wing. Co. P.R. BRISCOE

file. ecc



6/6

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

23 May 1984

The Prime Minister has received a further letter from Wing Commander P R Briscoe.

I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply for Private Secretary signature, to reach me by 6 June.

David Barclay

Roger Bone Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

6/6



Brc

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

18 May 1984

Zimbabwe: Pensions of  
Released Air Force Officers

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Air Vice Marshal Slatter. He seeks help from the Government in persuading the Zimbabwe Government to pay the pensions which he believes are due to himself, Air Commodore Pile and Wing Commander Briscoe.

I should be grateful for a draft reply for my signature on behalf of the Prime Minister.

Brc

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION  
ACT 2000

Wing Commander Peter R Briscoe

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
No. 10 Downing Street,  
Whitehall,  
London,  
England

15 May 1984

123 Ark 23/5

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I am writing to you once again with reference to the pensions which the Zimbabwe Government appears determined to withhold from me and the other officers.

In the reply I received to my last letter, your Private Secretary stated that the High Commission in Harare was in touch with our lawyers who were pursuing the question of our pensions with the Zimbabwe Government. In addition it was stated that there were certain procedural and legal aspects of the matter which required resolution.

As I understand it, Mr. Rifkind received assurances regarding our pensions last November; the subject was raised during the visit by the Prince of Wales in March of this year and now, I am led to believe, the subject will once again be broached when Mr. Stanley visits Zimbabwe later this month. I think we must realize that the time for the "softly softly" approach has run out. The only reason we were released was because of international pressure and it is obvious that purely legal and quiet diplomatic moves to obtain our pensions have failed.

I think the Zimbabwe Government should be seen for what it is, a regime that holds the moral norms to which we aspire in the utmost contempt. Forgive me if I remind you of a few instances of their bare-faced duplicity. After the torture allegations by Air Vice Marshall Slatter and myself, the then Minister of Justice, Mr. Mubako, promised (in the Press) that should torture be proven in our case, the culprits would be brought to book. Mr. Mugabe promised the same thing in Parliament. Needless to say the torturers still hold their jobs, probably having been promoted by now. We only have to look at the present genocidal (a strong term but an accurate one) campaign in Matabeleland by the Fifth

Brigade and the continuing atrocities vouched for by such august bodies as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Catholic Bishops Conference to realize just what the Zimbabwe Government is about.

Once more, Ma'am, I humbly ask for your personal intercession on our behalf. I regret to say that should this not be forthcoming or successful it will leave me and my colleagues no option but to go public regarding the treatment we have received. I am sure you would agree that Zimbabwe could well do without the adverse publicity this would generate, however, in many respects it would be exactly what they deserve.

I am sorry to have to couch this letter in these terms, however, for us the torture and injustice is not over, it continues every day as we try desparately to rebuild our shattered lives without the financial resources so rightfully ours.

Thanking you once again for your urgent consideration of this matter.

Yours faithfully,



Peter R Briscoe



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ACT 2000

R 7/5

8 May 1984

The Honourable M. Thatcher  
Prime Minister of Great Britain  
and Northern Ireland  
No. 10 Downing Street  
Whitehall, London

FR

ON

Dear Prime Minister:

It is some time since I wrote to you to thank you for the efforts of your Government in securing my just release, and that of my fellow officers, from prison in Zimbabwe. I had hoped that I would have no further cause to concern you with this matter but it appears that I have now exhausted all legal channels, and courses advised by your staff at the Foreign Office, without any sign of success.

I refer to the failure of the Zimbabwe Government to honour their lawful, constitutional and moral obligation to pay our pensions. I have heard indirectly from our lawyers in Harare that the Zimbabwe Government considers our pensions a "closed issue"! If this is indeed the case, the following points must be made:

- a. Both Air Commodore Pile and I have earned pensions under the Federal Government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as well as our service with the Royal Rhodesian Air Force and the Rhodesian Air Force. Finally, of course, we both had service with the Air Force of Zimbabwe and were fully committed to that service in the true and full spirit of the Lancaster House agreement.
- b. Wing Commander Briscoe had qualifying service with the Rhodesian Air Force as well as the Air Force of Zimbabwe and was equally committed and loyal.
- c. Air Commodore Pile had over 26 years of qualifying service, while I had 22 years. Both were lifetime careers in the service of the country - both of us were dedicated career officers.
- d. All of us left the country at the instigation of the then Minister of Home Affairs (Dr. H. Ushewokunze), but only on the clear understanding that we were retiring from the Air Force in a normal manner and under the usual conditions. I particularly asked for clarification on this point (among others) through your Staff at the High Commission in Harare and received what I understood to be a satisfactory answer.

The Honourable M. Thatcher  
Prime Minister of Great Britain  
and Northern Ireland  
8 May 1984  
Page 2

In my opinion the failure of the Zimbabwe Government to pay our pensions amounts to theft - pure and simple. If I felt that they would abide by a court decision, I would instruct my lawyers to press charges accordingly. However, that Government has already refused to pay costs to me, in direct contravention of a lawful High Court order, for expenses incurred in the writ of "habeas corpus" pursued by my wife and lawyers. Their other actions in overruling Court orders are well known. It is the opinion of our Queen's Counsel (Mr. Harry Ognall) that legal action against that Government is futile.

In any civilized country in the world, we would have had no difficulty in securing our lawfully-earned pensions. We would also have received substantial damages for proven torture. I am sure that you are aware that no public inquiry into Police behaviour was ordered, and it is my understanding that some of those Police who perpetrated the systematic and methodical torture of myself and my colleagues have actually been promoted!

I must also point out that all of my family's personal effects, furniture, household items and the like are still effectively impounded in Zimbabwe. In spite of numerous attempts to have our effects shipped to us, I am told that this cannot happen until our emigration is approved. I am further told that emigration cannot be approved until final tax clearance is given; tax clearance cannot be given until pensions are finalized! The whole affair smacks of deliberate and vindictive obstructionism.

I am totally disgusted by the actions of that Government and its complete failure to take any remedial action. I appeal to you to stand up for justice and decency as you have done in the past. I cannot believe that the British Government, as overseer of the Lancaster House Agreement, will fail to act on such despicable actions and omissions by the Zimbabwean authorities.

I have the honour to be, Madam,  
Your Obedient Servant.



(H.C.S. Slatter)  
Air Vice Marshal (ret'd)





10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 March 1984

Thank you for your letter of 6 March to the Prime Minister about the problem of your pension from Zimbabwe. I have been asked to reply.

I fully understand and sympathise with your anxiety over the long delay in receiving your pension, and with the considerable worries which this must have caused you. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have kept in close touch with Air Commodore Pile over this matter and he undertook to write to you and to Air Vice Marshal Slatter to explain the current position.

As you know, our High Commission in Harare are in regular touch with your lawyers, who are pursuing the question of your pensions with the Zimbabwe authorities. We understand that there are certain procedural and legal aspects of the matter which the authorities have yet to resolve and we are, of course, keeping a close watch on developments. I can understand your frustration at the protracted course of events, and I share your hope that the matter will soon be resolved.

I can assure you that we have this case very much in mind, and that we will continue to take suitable opportunities to register with the Zimbabwe authorities our concern at the delay and the anxiety which this is causing you and your colleagues.

(Timothy Flesher)

Wing Commander P.R. Briscoe AFZ (Rtd)

Brr

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 March, 1984

*Jan David,*

*pre-lyne*

Thank you for your letter of 19 March enclosing one from Wing Commander Peter Briscoe about his Zimbabwe pension.

Since their release from detention the three most senior Zimbabwe Air Force officers, who are the only ones with a claim to substantial pension payments, have been pressing their case. Our High Commissioner in Harare has been active on the men's behalf. He has been informed by the Zimbabwe Secretary for Defence that there are a number of aspects of the case, mainly involving the manner of the officers' dismissal, which are being discussed between the Public Service Commission and his Ministry. He emphasised the need for patience and a low profile, and suggested that an appeal to Mr Mugabe at the right moment could bring some movement. Our High Commissioner has recommended that we should return to the charge after the visit by the Prince of Wales which has just taken place. We shall now follow this up.

Air Commander Pile, who is the only senior officer now in the UK, has been kept in the picture in strict confidence, and he fully understands the delicacy of the situation. He undertook to explain some of the background to his colleagues and to urge that the signs still point to keeping a low profile until we and the defence lawyers judge that an approach will have the best chance of success.

I attach a proposed draft reply to Wing Commander Briscoe.

*Jan Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

David Barclay Esq  
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: PS/No 10

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: Wing Commander P R Briscoe AFZ (Rtd) Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

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PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 6 March to the Prime Minister about the problem of your pension from Zimbabwe. I have been asked to reply.

CAVEAT.....

I fully understand and sympathise with your anxiety over the long delay in receiving your pension, and with the considerable worries which this <sup>must have</sup> ~~has no doubt~~ caused you. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have kept in close touch with Air Commodore Pile over this matter and he undertook to write to you and to Air Vice Marshal Slatter to explain the current position.

As you know, our High Commission in Harare are in regular touch with your lawyers, who are pursuing the question of your pensions with the Zimbabwe authorities. We understand that there are certain procedural and legal aspects of the matter which the authorities have yet to resolve and we are, of course, keeping a close watch on developments. I can understand your frustration at the protracted course of events, and I share your hope that the matter will soon be resolved.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I can assure you that we have this case very much in mind, and that we will continue to take suitable opportunities to register with the Zimbabwe authorities our concern at the delay and the anxiety which this is causing you and your colleagues.

30 May 1984

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CONFIDENTIAL

GR 960

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HARARE 271244Z MAR 84

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 158 OF 27 MARCH.

INFO ROUTINE DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, GABORONE, CAPE TOWN, ODA.

MY TELNO 120 : PRINCE OF WALES' VISIT.

SUMMARY.

1. THE PRINCE OF WALES' ALL TOO SHORT VISIT TO ZIMBABWE WAS MOST SUCCESSFUL, THE VAGARIES OF ZIMBABWEAN PROTOCOL NOTWITHSTANDING. THE HIGHLIGHT WAS THE MUGABE'S DIMMER AT WHICH MUGABE MADE AN EFFUSIVE SPEECH ABOUT BRITAIN, ALTHOUGH HE WAS OTHERWISE WITHDRAWN AND PREOCCUPIED. MEDIA COVERAGE WAS UNIFORMLY EXCELLENT. THE VISIT SHOULD GIVE A POWERFUL BOOST TO THE EMBRYONIC CDC PROGRAMME HERE. HRH BROUGHT MUCH-NEEDED RAIN WITH HIM.

DETAIL.

2. HRH THE PRINCE OF WALES HAS JUST COMPLETED A MOST SUCCESSFUL TWO-DAY VISIT TO ZIMBABWE. HE WENT TO THE HENDERSON RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WHERE HE SAW SOME APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY AND THEIR DAIRY RESEARCH PROGRAMME, TO THE GREAT ZIMBABWE RUINS NEAR MASVINGO, TO A WHITE COMMERCIAL FARM NEAR HARARE, AND TO THE CHIBERO AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE. THIS AGRICULTURAL BIAS TO HIS PROGRAMME REFLECTED THE FACT THAT HE WAS UNDERTAKING HIS CURRENT AFRICAN TOUR PRIMARILY AS A DIRECTOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, AND HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE CHAIRMAN, LORD KINDERSLEY. HE WAS ENTERTAINED TO LUNCH BY THE PRESIDENT, TO DINNER BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO A LARGE RECEPTION HOSTED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER; AND HE MET SOME SENIOR ZIMBABWEANS AND CROWN SERVANTS WORKING IN ZIMBABWE AT A DINNER AND RECEPTION RESPECTIVELY AT MY HOUSE. IT DID NOT ESCAPE NOTICE THAT HRH'S ARRIVAL COINCIDED WITH THE FIRST GOOD RAINS WHICH ZIMBABWE HAS HAD THIS SEASON, AND HIS REPUTATION AS A ROYAL RAINMAKER HAS BEEN ENHANCED.

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3. THE HIGHLIGHT OF THE VISIT WAS THE DINNER GIVEN IN HRH'S HONOUR BY THE MUGABES. IT IS MOST UNUSUAL FOR THEM TO ENTERTAIN A FOREIGN VISITOR ON THEIR OWN PREMISES, AND THIS WAS AN EXCEPTIONAL GESTURE. WE WERE TOLD THAT THEIR ORIGINAL INTENTION WAS TO MAKE IT AN INTIMATE FAMILY OCCASION, BUT IT WAS EXPANDED AT THE LAST MINUTE TO INCLUDE SEVERAL MINISTERS AND THEIR WIVES AND ALL COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF MISSION. I SUSPECT THAT MUGABE FELT THAT HE WAS IN DANGER OF BEING UP-STAGED BY NYERERE AND KAUNDA. THE PRINCE OF WALES WAS TOUCHED BY THE OBVIOUS EXTENT TO WHICH THE MUGABES HAD PUT THEMSELVES OUT TO ENTERTAIN HIM WITH RESOURCES WHICH WERE BARELY ADEQUATE, AND MRS MUGABE HERSELF HAD TO SUPERVISE THE PREPARATION AND SERVING OF THE MEAL. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DINNER, MUGABE DELIVERED A SPEECH WHICH, IN ADDITION TO REHEARSING ZIMBABWE'S ACHIEVEMENTS AND TRIBULATIONS SINCE INDEPENDENCE IN FAMILIAR TERMS, CONCLUDED WITH FULSOME TRIBUTES TO HRH PERSONALLY, TO BRITISH ASSISTANCE IN THE CURRENT DROUGHT, TO THE BRITISH MILITARY ADVISORY AND TRAINING TEAM AND TO THE COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. HE WELCOMED BACK TO ZIMBABWE "THE PRINCE WHOM WE LOVE AND REGARD AS ONE OF US". HE PRAISED BHATT FOR THE "WONDERFUL WORK THEY ARE DOING", AND HE WELCOMED THE CDC'S RECENTLY AGREED INVOLVEMENT IN THE RUSITU DAIRY PROJECT AND SAID THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO THEIR FURTHER INVESTMENT IN ZIMBABWE. ALTOGETHER, I COULD NOT HAVE WISHED FOR A MORE AGREEABLE PERFORMANCE, THE EFFECT OF WHICH WILL HAVE BEEN MAGNIFIED BY ITS DELIVERY BEFORE MY COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES. MUGABE ALSO INCLUDED A WARM COMMENDATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND OF THE CHOGM AT DELHI. THE LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT BANANA, BY CONTRAST, WAS INCONSEQUENTIAL.

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5. FOR HIS PART, THE PRINCE OF WALES EMPHASISED HIS HOPE THAT YOUNG PEOPLE FROM BRITAIN, IN PARTICULAR YOUNG UNEMPLOYED DOCTORS AND TEACHERS, WOULD COME OUT TO WORK IN ZIMBABWE ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS, AND I THINK HE WAS PLEASED TO LEARN THAT VSO IS JUST STARTING UP HERE. HE EXPRESSED SYMPATHY OVER THE DROUGHT AND TOLD MUGABE THAT WE WERE ABLE TO OFFER AN ADDITIONAL POUNDS 100,000 TO THE RED CROSS FOR DROUGHT RELIEF. THIS WE HAVE SINCE PUBLICISED.
6. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE VISIT HAD BEEN PROMINENT, EXTENSIVE AND ENTIRELY FAVOURABLE, COMPLETE WITH FRONT-PAGE PICTURES AND MUCH ATTENTION ON TELEVISION.
7. TO SUM UP, THE ZIMBABWEANS WERE CLEARLY DELIGHTED TO HAVE THE PRINCE OF WALES BACK WITH THEM, IF ONLY FOR A BRIEF VISIT. LOCAL WHITES WERE PARTICULARLY PLEASED AND EFFUSIVE. IT WAS MUSIC TO ONE'S EARS TO HEAR FOREIGN MINISTER MANGWENDE, NOT A NOTABLE ANGLOPHILE, REFERRING DURING HIS RECEPTION TO ZIMBABWE'S "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH BRITAIN. AS A RESULT OF THE VISIT, THE CDC IS NOW, AFTER AN UNCERTAIN START, FIRMLY ON THE MAP IN ZIMBABWE, AND THERE IS NOW NO DOUBT THAT MUGABE WISHES ITS INVOLVEMENT HERE TO BE EXTENDED. I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO HRH FOR AGREEING TO COME HERE AND, IN THE PROCESS, PUTTING UP WITH THE AMBIVALENCE AND VAGARIES OF ZIMBABWEAN PROTOCOL, WHICH TENDED TO RESULT, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE ABSENCES OF KEY PERSONS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIMES AND DEMANDS FOR SPEECHES FOLLOWING ASSURANCES THAT NONE WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE OUTCOME HAS BEEN MORE THAN WORTHWHILE.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

EWANS

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

COPIES TO

HON E ADEANE,  
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

ZIMBABWE

LIMITED

C AF D

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PUSD

NEWS D

DEF D

PS - PROTOCOL D

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR SQUIRE

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<sup>3</sup>  
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2/4  
Wing Comdr BRISCOE

19 March 1984

I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Wing Commander P.R. Briscoe.

I should be grateful if you could let us have a draft Private Secretary reply to send, to reach us by Monday 2 April.

David Barclay

Roger Bone Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

HL



Wing Commander P.R.Briscoe AFZ (Rtd)

6th March 1984

R1913

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher  
No. 10 Downing Street  
Whitehall  
London  
England

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

As you are aware I was released from detention in Zimbabwe on 14 September 1983 and deported to Britain, thanks in no small measure to your good offices.

On arrival in Britain, the efforts of myself and Messrs Slatter and Pile centred on trying to effect the release of our brother officers who were still incarcerated in Zimbabwe and to this end we kept a "low profile" believing that this best served the interests of the others.

In late November, officials at the Foreign Office debriefed us on a visit to Zimbabwe by Mr. Rifkind which gave rise to justified optimism as to the prospects of release of Messrs Cox, Weir and Lloyd. All the while we had also been seeking news of our pensions to which we were lawfully entitled and were assured that Mr. Rifkind had received certain assurances from the Zimbabwean authorities that they had no objection to us receiving our pensions. It is now three and a half months later and we have still not received a cent.


Ma'am, we remained in Zimbabwe after independence partly as a result of the urging of Lord Soames who advised everyone to work together to ensure the success of the new nation. Other members of your Government urged us to do likewise. Now, because of our loyalty, we are in dire straights. I, my wife and our two children have been living off the charity and the hospitality of friends and family for the last six months. I ask you in all compassion to consider our situation. We were tortured, imprisoned for a year, forced to the brink of bankruptcy by a trial which cost us some Z\$ 250,000, re-arrested and then deported. On departure from Zimbabwe we were each allowed a mere Z\$ 1000 per family. In addition, after a career which held out much promise, I now have to start a new career from square one, not an easy task after some twenty years of Air Force Service.

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ACT 2000

The Zimbabwe government is acting in flagrant violation of the Constitution agreed at Lancaster House in denying us our pensions. We have no recourse to any court of law having been deported from Zimbabwe. For this reason Ma'am, I would humbly request that you do something to help us obtain what is rightfully ours. Rightly or wrongly, we believe that at the very least the British Government has a moral responsibility towards us and our families for the acquisition of our pensions. In addition I personally believe that you Ma'am are the only person who can help us.

Thanking you for your consideration of this matter,

Yours faithfully,



Wing Commander Peter R. Briscoe AFZ (Rtd)



APC 10/2 2/2



10 DOWNING STREET

I'm afraid your letter  
to the Rev. Sitkhale had  
already been sent (by post)  
before FCO's revised version  
arrived here.

Mand  
21/2

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 February 1984

Dear John,

AS 2/2

k.a.

Zimbabwe: Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole

With my letter of 20 February I sent you inter alia some notes on detailed points in the letter to the Prime Minister from the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. We would like to revise this slightly in the light of further information from Harare. I attach a revised version of page 2 and would be grateful if you would substitute it. (The revision occurs in the paragraph on 'Tribal Genocide').

Your sincerely

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED





- 2 -

5th Brigade etc

5th Brigade has now been made an integral part of the National Army.

Police

Since the appointment of a new Home Affairs Minister the notorious ZIPOLIS has been brought into the normal Police command. General Police standards are unsatisfactory by Western standards, though mainly inherited from the UDI period, and there have been a number of instances of ill-treatment during interrogation.

Tribal Genocide

The brutality used by the army in Matabeleland early last year was largely brought under control and army discipline improved. However, dissident activity in Matabeleland remains very worrying, and the current large scale army operation in South Matabeleland could well lead to more excesses. A Commission of Enquiry into earlier allegations is still working.

Intimidation

There is a certain amount of harassment and intimidation especially within Matabeleland (see under Rights and Freedoms above).

Freedom of the Press

Press freedom has been restricted but there is still a reasonable amount. For all the difficulties, most foreign journalists find it one of the easiest countries in Africa to work in.

Zimbabwe: vk ru Pt 4



20 JAN 1984

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

POST OFFICE





10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 February 1984

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your letter of 31 January about Zimbabwe.

You suggest that the British Government have connived in attempts to overthrow the Lancaster House Agreement, and you ask that HMG should intervene on behalf of "the democratic state as contained in the Agreement". The Government cannot accept the former allegation. As regards your suggestion of intervention, it is necessary to recall the British Government's status as regards Zimbabwe. As a co-signatory of the Agreement we naturally maintain a close interest in developments in that country, and this is reflected in our contacts with the Zimbabwean authorities. We make clear our views when we consider this appropriate and useful. However, we have no responsibilities under the Agreement for the internal affairs of Zimbabwe. We have no right to interfere and we do not do so.

It was perhaps inevitable that Zimbabwe would go through a difficult period after independence. The British Government's interest is to encourage the development of a stable, multi-racial and prosperous society there, in which civil rights and the rule of law are observed. This is the purpose, for example, of our aid programme. We recognise that this is a medium or even long-term process and that there are bound to be difficulties on the way. We do not think these difficulties should deter us from persevering with our efforts.

A. I. COLES

The Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

20 February, 1984

*The letter pl.**AM 20/2**Dear John,*

As requested in your letter of 8 February, I enclose a draft reply to the letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole.

Although a well-known name from the past, the Rev Sithole now has very little support in Zimbabwe and no political future there. Neither he nor other members of his party won seats in the 1980 General Election. The Zimbabwean Government believe that the Rev Sithole is engaged in seditious activity (they would almost certainly detain him should he return). Mr Mugabe mentioned his subversive activities to the Prime Minister in New Delhi. We have evidence that he has been in contact with the South African Embassy in London over a period of time and still is, and receives assistance from them. Since arriving in the UK (on a 6-month visa) he has been active with the media and in lobbying against Mr Mugabe.

In these circumstances it would seem right for HMG to keep Rev Sithole at arms length. He may well make public any reply from the Prime Minister. Were he to receive any personal attention from the Prime Minister this would be likely to arouse suspicion and resentment among the Zimbabwean Government. In view of his comments to the Prime Minister, Mr Mugabe might well view it as a discourtesy or worse to himself.

Sir Geoffrey Howe therefore recommends that the Prime Minister should not herself write to the Rev Sithole and that the reply instead should go from yourself. This might in any case seem more suitable given the contentious tone and contents of the Rev Sithole's letter. For the same reasons it would seem advisable to keep the draft in general terms. However, I enclose a brief commentary on the points raised in the letter for your own background information.

You may also wish to know that Mr Amery has informally enquired whether the Rev Sithole could be received by either Mr Rifkind or Sir J Leahy. For the reasons I have given, Sir Geoffrey Howe considers that it would be wrong for either Ministers or senior officials to have official contact with him. You will recall that we adopted this position with Mr Nkomo during his recent visits to this country. If the Rev Sithole

/wants





wants to make contact with the FCO, we would propose to offer an informal call or contact at no higher than Head of Department level.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

pp. (R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teletype/letter/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

PS/No 10

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

The Rev Ndabaningi Sithole  
Apt 3  
30 Maida Vale  
LONDON W9

Secret

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PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your letter of 31 January about Zimbabwe.

You suggest that the British Government have connived in attempts to overthrow the Lancaster House Agreement, and you ask that HMG should intervene on behalf of "the democratic state as contained in the Agreement". <sup>The Government cannot accept</sup> ~~I must reject~~ the former allegation. ~~Your~~ <sup>↓</sup> ~~comments seem to reflect a misunderstanding of the~~ British Government's status as regards Zimbabwe. As a co-signatory of the Agreement we naturally maintain a close interest in developments <sup>in that country</sup> there, and this is reflected in our contacts with the Zimbabwean authorities. We make clear our views when we consider this appropriate and useful. However, we have no responsibilities under the Agreement for the internal affairs of Zimbabwe. We have no right to interfere and we do not do so.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

~~I do not think you will expect me to comment on all the points you raise.~~ It was <sup>perhaps</sup> ~~I suppose~~ inevitable that

*An regards your suggestion of intervention, it is necessary to recall*



Zimbabwe would go through a difficult period after independence. The British Government's interest is to encourage the development of a stable, multi-racial and prosperous society there, in which civil rights and the rule of law are observed. This is the purpose, for example, of our aid programme. We recognise that this is a medium or even long-term process and that there are bound to be difficulties on the way. We do not think these difficulties should deter us from persevering with our efforts.

MS 20  
2



NOTES ON LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER FROM THE REV NDABANGI SITHOLE  
OF 31 JANUARY

1. Although there have been a number of disquieting trends in Zimbabwe, it is not true to say that the Lancaster House Agreement has been flagrantly violated. On the whole the Zimbabwean Government has adhered to it. It is of course not true that HMG have connived in any violation. HMG are not responsible for enforcing the Constitution of Zimbabwe which was outlined in the Lancaster House Agreement. The Constitution is part of the law of Zimbabwe and enforcement is the responsibility of the courts of Zimbabwe.

2. As regards the specific points raised, there is an element of truth in all of them, but most are exaggerated.

Crippled signatories

We did not intervene with the Zimbabwean Government on Mr Nkomo's behalf, nor did we have any official contact with him. He was allowed to live and work freely on return to Zimbabwe.

Bishop Muzorewa's appeal has been heard by the Review Tribunal, and the Zimbabwean Government has said that it will abide by its finding.

One-Party State/Dictatorial State

Mugabe aims at a one-party State, but has repeatedly said he will respect the relevant provisions in the Constitution.

Socialist/Marxist State

Mugabe has Socialist long-term aims but has encouraged the private sector and foreign private investment.

Rights and Freedoms

It is true that there have been a number of worrying infringements of human rights and rule of law. HMG have voiced concern.

Independence of Judiciary

There has been political pressure on the judiciary but the courts have maintained their independence and integrity. Recent appointments of judges have tended to bolster confidence. The Constitution permits certain provisions of its Declaration of Rights to be derogated from in a public emergency. Detention under the Emergency Powers regulations, inherited from the UDI period, has been used on certain occasions to circumvent court acquittals.





### 5th Brigade etc

5th Brigade has now been made an integral part of the National Army.

### Police

Since the appointment of a new Home Affairs Minister the notorious ZIPOLIS has been brought into the normal Police command. General Police standards are unsatisfactory by Western standards, though mainly inherited from the UDI period, and there have been a number of instances of ill-treatment during interrogation.

### Tribal Genocide

The brutality used by the Army in Matabeleland early last year has largely been brought under control and Army discipline has improved, though occasional incidents have continued to occur. The current large-scale Army operation in south Matabeleland could lead to more excesses. A Commission of Enquiry into the earlier allegations is still working.

### Intimidation

There is a certain amount of harassment and intimidation especially within Matabeleland (see under Rights and Freedoms above).

### Freedom of the Press

Press freedom has been restricted but there is still a reasonable amount. For all the difficulties, most foreign journalists find it one of the easiest countries in Africa to work in.

GR 900

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FM HARARE 170825Z FE 84

TO PRIORITY FCG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 087 OF 17 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY ODA, DTI, LILONGWE

INFO SAVING LUSAKA PRETORIA CAPE TOWN LUANDA MOPUTO GABORONE

UKREP BRUSSELS WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 2 TO LUSAKA: ZIMBABWE: DROUGHT AND THE ECONOMY

SUMMARY

1. A CRISIS OF FRIGHTENING PROPORTIONS IS DAILY LOOMING CLOSER IN ZIMBABWE, AS THE THIRD YEAR OF DROUGHT CONTINUES AND THE NEED FOR LARGE SCALE FOOD IMPORTS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE COUNTRY'S HISTORY BECOMES MORE CERTAIN. IT IS BOUND TO HAVE A PROFOUND EFFECT ON THE ECONOMY IN THE INDUSTRIAL, AS WELL AS THE AGRICULTURAL, SPHERE. SOME STARVATION IS NOW A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY LATER IN THE YEAR. HOW CAN WE HELP?

DETAIL

2. SINCE I WROTE MY ANNUAL REVIEW, AND EVEN SINCE MY TUR WAS DRAFTED, ZIMBABWE'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS HAVE DETERIORATED SHARPLY, DUE TO THE CONTINUING DROUGHT. THIS SEASON'S MAIZE CROP HAS NOW FAILED COMPLETELY IN A GROWING NUMBER OF AREAS, NOTABLY IN THE SOUTH AND CENTRE OF THE COUNTRY. IT IS CERTAIN THAT THERE WILL BE A MAIZE IMPORT REQUIREMENT BETWEEN THE TIME THE SILOS EMPTY IN EARLY APRIL AND THE NEW CROP IS HARVESTED IN MID-MAY. WE WERE YESTERDAY FORMALLY ASKED TO FINANCE PURCHASES OF 100,000 TONNES OF MAIZE (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM FROM CAHILL, ODA).

3. BUT THE MORE SERIOUS PROBLEM IS THE CERTAINTY OF A MUCH LARGER MAIZE SHORT-FALL AT THE END OF THIS YEAR. MY CURRENT BEST GUESS IS THAT THIS WILL TOTAL SOME 600,000 TONNES OF MAIZE. THERE ARE SERIOUS DOUBTS WHETHER THE EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE OF ROAD AND RAIL TRANSPORT CAN PHYSICALLY IMPORT TONNAGES ON THIS SCALE (ON WHICH WE ARE ENCOURAGING ZIMBABWEANS TO DO SOME URGENT SUMS - IT APPEARS TO REQUIRE THE EQUIVALENT OF BETWEEN ONE AND TWO MAXIMUM-LOAD TRAINS DAILY GMRM DURBAN OVER A PERIOD OF AT LEAST 300 DAYS). APART FROM THAT, THE ADDITIONAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE COST IN A COUNTRY ALREADY HARD PRESSED WILL BE CONSIDERABLE, ABOUT DOLLARS 150 MILLION, OR 15 PER CENT OF TOTAL CURRENT VISIBLE EXPORTS. IN CONVERSATION WITH ME, A SENIOR OFFICIAL HAS DESCRIBED THE PROBLEMS, BOTH LOGISTIC AND FINANCIAL, AS 'IMPOSSIBLE'. IF SO, SOME STARVATION IS A REAL DANGER LATER IN THE YEAR.

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14.



4. HOW CAN ZIMBABWE RAISE THE MONEY? THE OPTIONS SEEM TO BE (IN DECREASING ORDER OF PROBABILITY): TO REDUCE OR SUSPEND THE REMITTABILITY OF ROYALTY PAYMENTS, RENTS AND DIVIDENDS: TO REDUCE FUEL IMPORTS AND INTRODUCE FUEL RATIONING: TO SQUEEZE IMPORT ALLOCATIONS FURTHER (THOUGH SCOPE IS LIMITED WITHOUT PROVOKING WIDESPREAD BANKRUPTCIES); AND TO RESCHEDULE DEBTS. I WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, EXPECT THEM TO RESTRICT THE COMMUTATION OR PAYMENT OF PENSIONS.

5. SOME OF OUR FIRMS WILL DOUBTLESS COMPLAIN AS THESE ACTIONS ARE TAKEN: BUT LOCAL BUSINESSMEN ARE REALISTIC ABOUT THE NEED FOR THEM. FOREIGN INVESTMENT SEEMS A LOST CAUSE ANYWAY. THERE WILL BE NO EASY PROGRESS OVER BLOCKED FUNDS.

6. APART FROM MAIZE, THE DAMS REMAIN EMPTY SO THERE WILL BE NO WHEAT CROP. THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN ASKED FOR 40,000 TONNES OF MAIZE OR WHEAT, AND HAVE TODAY OFFERED 30,000 TONNES OF MAIZE, WITH LUCK FOR DELIVERY IN DURBAN BY EARLY APRIL. THE TOBACCO, COTTON AND TEA CROPS, HOWEVER, MAY YET DO REASONABLY WELL.

7. THE CATTLE HERD HAS ALREADY BEEN DEPLETED BY SOME 10 PER CENT. ANIMALS ARE DYING DAILY. FURTHERMORE, MANY CANNOT BE SLAUGHTERED BECAUSE MODERN ABATTOIRS CONSUME SO MUCH WATER, AND THE COLD STORAGE COMMISSION IS FULLY BOOKED FOR MONTHS AHEAD. I HOPE THAT THE WAY CAN SOON BE OPENED FOR BEEF EXPORTS TO THE EC, ALTHOUGH THERE IS A GENUINE FOOT-AND-MOUTH FACTOR TO BE ASSESSED.

8. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, CAUGHT BETWEEN THE LOCAL RECESSION AND THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE SQUEEZE, SEEMS TO BE ENTERING A LIQUIDITY CRISIS. STORIES PROLIFERATE OF CHAINS OF UNPAID DEBTS.

9. AFTER THREE YEARS OF HEAVY BORROWING FOR CROPS WHICH HAVE FAILED TO GROW, THE FARMERS' DEBT PROBLEM IS ALSO WAY BEYOND A WHOLLY COMMERCIAL SOLUTION. THE ONLY MEANS WE CAN SEE OF AVOIDING LARGE-SCALE WHITE FARMING BANKRUPTCIES WILL BE THROUGH A GOVERNMENT RESCUE OPERATION. THIS, HOWEVER, WOULD BREACH CURRENT IMF TARGETS.

10. THOUGH I WILL NOT DWELL ON THEM HERE, THE WORLD RECESSION, THE CONTINUED OUTFLOW OF WHITE SKILLED MANPOWER, AND THE IMPACT OF INCREASINGLY INEFFICIENT GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, ARE CONTRIBUTORY, ALBEIT SECONDARY, CAUSES OF THE LOOMING PROBLEM.

11. WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, COMPLACENCY IS GRADUALLY BEING REPLACED BY HARD-HEADED PRAGMATISM. DESPITE THE PRESSURES OF THE FORTHCOMING PARTY CONGRESS IN AUGUST, THERE IS GROWING EVIDENCE THAT ZIMBABWE'S DESPERATE FOOD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE SITUATION IS GIVING THE PRAGMATISTS THE UPPER HAND IN DAY-TO-DAY POLICY-MAKING.

2  
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/12

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12. BRITISH POLICY. THE SCOPE FOR BRITISH ASSISTANCE IS LIMITED. HOWEVER, WE EARNESTLY HOPE THAT:-

- A. WE WILL BE ABLE TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY IN THE AID PROGRAMME IN RESPONDING TO ZIMBABWE'S NEEDS:
- B. WE WILL ADOPT A SYMPATHETIC PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE VARIOUS UNPALATABLE BUT INEVITABLE STEPS TO SAVE FOREIGN EXCHANGE:
- C. WE WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE ZIMBABWE SUPPORT WITHIN THE EC, BOTH ON QUESTIONS OF ACCESS FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND OVER RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE:

AND

- D. WE WILL DO WHAT WE CAN TO PERSUADE SOUTH AFRICA TO USE THEIR NEW AND EVEN TIGHTER GRIP ON ZIMBABWE'S JUGULAR RESPONSIBLY.
13. FCO PASS SAVING LUSAKA, PRETORIA, CAPE TOWN, LUANDA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON.

EWANS

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

ZIMBABWE  
LIMITED  
CAF D  
EAD  
PUS D  
NEWS D  
DEF D  
SAF D  
ODA  
AP D  
PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR RAISON  
PS/PUS  
SIL J LEAHY  
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file

307

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 February 1984

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 31 January.

This is receiving attention and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

A. J. COLES

The Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole



file  
BT

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 February 1984

ZIMBABWE

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Reverend Sithole.

~~BT~~

I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply for my signature by 15 February.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



APT. 3

30 MAIDA VALE

LONDON W9

31st January 1984

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

ASZ

Dear Prime Minister,

Greetings to you.

In view of the unhappy turn of events in Zimbabwe altering the Lancaster House Agreement in some of its fundamental and important respects, I wish to draw your attention to the following as a matter of great urgency:

1. Crippled Signatories

Mr. Joshua Nkomo had to take refuge in Britain to save his life which he almost lost at the hands of Zimbabwe's Security forces, but now with the help of Her Majesty's Government a working relation has been established between himself and the Government. It took Her Majesty's Government to intervene successfully on Mr. Nkomo's behalf.

The second signatory to the Agreement - Bishop Abel Muzorewa - has been detained for close on three months now without trial - a flagrant infringement of the provision of the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was party.

2. One-party state:

There is a strong move which has been publicly made to turn Zimbabwe into a one-party state, and thus to alter the true nature of that state as contained in the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was also signatory.

3. Socialist-Marxist State:

The country is being rapidly turned into a socialist-marxist state with all that this implies - a thing that was not contained in the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was party.

4. Birth of a dictatorial state:

The establishment of a dictatorial state resulting from that of the one-party state above becomes inevitable since any one-party state cannot be anything else but a thorough going party dictatorship. This was never part of the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was party.

5. Rights and Freedoms:

The declaration of rights and freedoms to which Her Majesty's Government was also party is being eroded by the Government of Zimbabwe with the result that the essential nature of the state as contained in the Agreement is being radically altered.

/.....

6. Independence of the Judiciary:  
According to the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was also party, the independence of the judiciary was to be respected, but the government has deviated from this undertaking, thus altering the essential nature of the Agreement.
7. Fifth and Special Brigades:  
In terms of the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was party, a national army was to be created, but now an additional army - Fifth and Special Brigades - responsible only to the Prime Minister - have been created, and this further alters the essential nature of the state as contained in the Agreement.
8. The Police Force: In terms of the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was party, the main function of the police force was to enforce law and order, but now it is being used as a political instrument for the ruling party as against other parties. This is a radical departure from the Agreement and has altered the true nature of the state as contained in the Agreement.
9. Tribal genocide:  
According to the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was party, protection of human life was guaranteed, but tribal genocide is being carried out in Matebeleland and in other parts of Zimbabwe, and this further alters the true nature of the state as contained in the Agreement.
10. Intimidation:  
According to the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was party, freedom from intimidation was guaranteed, but the government has intensified it throughout the country by use of the National Army, the Fifth Brigade, the Special Brigade and the Youth Brigade, and this has further altered the true nature of the state as contained in the Agreement.
11. Freedom of the Press:  
According to the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was party, freedom of the press was guaranteed, but the government is now denying it to members of other parties, and there are now several areas from which members of the press are now barred from entering.
12. We now strongly feel:
  - (a) That the true nature of the state as contained in the Agreement has been flagrantly violated by the government.
  - (b) That this has been done with the connivance of Her Majesty's Government.
  - (c) That points 1 to 11 inclusive above, attest to the violation of the true nature of the state as contained in the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was party.
  - (d) That the spirit and the letter of the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was party have been violated and therefore the true nature of the state radically altered.



In the light of the above we deeply feel that unless the true nature of the State of Zimbabwe is restored to what it was at the time of the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was party, a point will soon be reached when no self-respecting person in Zimbabwe will feel bound by that Agreement which has been so shamelessly stripped of its original nature.

We feel that the legitimacy and legality of the State of Zimbabwe have been now so compromised with the connivance of Her Majesty's Government which was party to the Agreement, that an aura of illegitimacy and illegality is now being built around the government and the State of Zimbabwe and loyalty to that state is now being rapidly undermined to a point when tragic and disastrous consequences will become inevitable unless the present radically altered nature of the state is restored to what it was in terms of the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was a major party.

We feel that the Government with the connivance of Her Majesty's Government is plotting to overthrow the state as contained in the Agreement and replace it altogether with an opposite state based on party dictatorship with all that this implies which is completely inimical to the spirit and the letter of the Lancaster House Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was signatory.

While we fully appreciate your successful intervention on behalf of the six white airmen re-detained after court acquittal we shall also appreciate your intervention on behalf of the democratic state as contained in the Agreement to which Her Majesty's Government was signatory.

I beg to remain,

Yours faithfully,

*Ndabaningi Sithole*

The Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 January, 1984

Dear John,

Type letter pl.

A.S.C. 1/1.

Thank you for your letter of 16/January enclosing one from Wing Commander Cox to the Prime Minister about his release from detention in Zimbabwe.

As requested I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Wing Commander J R Cox

Copies to:

CLOSED UNDER THE  
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION  
ACT 2000

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of 12 January.

As you know I took a close and personal interest in your case and was delighted when the Zimbabwe Government accepted the recommendation of the Review Tribunal that you and your two other colleagues remaining in detention should be released. ~~My release, of course, meant that~~ <sup>This</sup> ~~all 7 officers have been re-united with their families,~~ <sup>have</sup> and the happiness which this brought to you all touched many hearts in this country and beyond.

The reuniting of all seven officers with their families and the happiness which this brought to you all

R.  
1

Enclosures—flag(s).....

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

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FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

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The reuniting of all seven officers with their families and the happiness which this brought to you all

*R.*  
1

*Temporarily Retained.*

Enclosures—flag(s).....

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT





Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

A.J.C.  $\frac{19}{1}$

16 January 1984

Dear John,

Zimbabwe: Air Force Officers

You will recall that the remaining Air Force officers were released from detention by the Zimbabwean authorities shortly before Christmas and have now come to Britain.

The senior officer among the seven who were detained, Air Vice Marshal Hugh Slatter, has now written to Mr Rifkind expressing his gratitude, and that of the other officers concerned, for the help given to them, and asking for these thanks to be passed on to the Prime Minister. I enclose a copy.

In his latest letter AVM Slatter mentions once more the question of the officers' pensions. Our High Commission in Harare is continuing to pursue this question with the Zimbabwean authorities. We are not at all optimistic that the full pensions will be paid and our standing in the matter is very limited. However, the legal remedies available to the officers are not yet finally exhausted.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

PP (R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



*With the compliments of*

**THE PRIVATE SECRETARY**

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
SW1A 2AH**



37 Mill House Drive,  
Leamington Spa,  
Warwickshire CV32 6AW

5th January 1984

The Honourable M. Rifkinid, MP  
Minister of State (Africa).  
Foreign Office.  
Whitehall.

Dear Minister,

I was delighted to be able to greet my fellow officers in person at Heathrow last Friday and to see their joy at being free and with their families again.

I realise that you have

1  
spent a great deal of your  
time and effort in recent months  
to bring this sorry matter to a  
fair conclusion and I am very  
grateful to you and your staff  
here and in Harare for your  
assistance. On behalf of all  
the subject officers, thank you  
very much.

I am, of course, hopeful that  
the remaining problem regarding  
our legitimate pensions can  
also be resolved without rancour  
or further delay, bearing in  
mind that the Zimbabwe Govt  
has had four months to act  
since we left. Perhaps your



Staff would be kind enough  
to update me on this issue?

I would be grateful if my  
thanks could be passed on to  
the Prime Minister when you  
have an appropriate opportunity.

May I take this chance to  
wish you and your staff a  
very happy New Year.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient servant,

Slatter

(H.C.S. SLATTER)

Air Vice Marshal (ret'd)

File

BF

289

16 January 1984

ZIMBABWE

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Wing Commander Cox about his release from detention in Zimbabwe.

I think that the Prime Minister would like to reply quickly and to sign the reply personally. Could you kindly arrange for a suitable draft to reach me by 19 February.

AJC

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



SECRET

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HM/T  
16 January 1984  
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File



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR ZIMBABWE

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 10 January and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 13 January on the above subject.

Mrs. Thatcher agrees with Mr. Heseltine and Sir Geoffrey Howe that, subject to any views which other OD colleagues may wish to offer, it would be right for BMATT to continue to serve in Zimbabwe, though with the aim of reducing its numbers and modifying its role in the ways suggested in the minutes under reference.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries of other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

N. J. COLE

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET



PM/84/10

PRIME MINISTERZimbabwe: BMATT

1. In his minute of 10 January Michael Heseltine sets out his conclusion that the British Military Advisory and training Team (BMATT) should continue in Zimbabwe in 1984, though with a substantial further reduction in numbers, and that its role should again be reviewed in the second half of next year. I fully agree. The Zimbabweans still need our help in promoting discipline and cohesion in their army. BMATT continues to do this with outstanding success, while at the same time helping stability in the country, bolstering confidence among the white community, and encouraging Mr Mugabe in his generally pro-Western stance. The work which BMATT has already put into producing qualified Zimbabwean instructors now allows us to take some profit. By continuing to shift the emphasis away from BMATT's field training role towards its advisory role, and the judicious use of resources, we can maintain the position throughout next year while at the same time substantially reducing our commitment.

2. I am copying this minute to other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
13 January 1984





Prime Minister.

2

①

The Foreign Secretary (attached) suggests this.

2. Agree that BMATT should continue but with diminishing numbers - and subject to a review later this year?

A.F.C. 13/1.

Yes no

MO 5/6

~~Handwritten scribble~~PRIME MINISTERMILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR ZIMBABWE

-15th? See Pt 3

In his letter of 18th April, your Private Secretary recorded your agreement that the future of the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) in Zimbabwe should be reviewed at the end of the year.

2. We have of course had our difficulties with Zimbabwe in recent months. But relations now seem to be on the mend; and, particularly in the light of your own successful meeting with Mr Mugabe in New Delhi, I am sure that it would be right for us to continue with our military assistance effort, which has already done so much for stability in Zimbabwe. Mr Mugabe has made plain that he would welcome this. He continues to make warm public references to BMATT. At the same time, I see scope for a substantial further reduction in the scale of our effort there, without detriment to our underlying aims.

3. I attach a joint paper by MOD and FCO officials, which examines these issues in more detail. It concludes that the balance of advantage lies with the continuation of BMATT, though with a further reduction in the numbers of personnel involved from the present level of 60 to 30 or so by the end of this year. It also recommends a further shift of BMATT's role away from field training of the

SECRET



Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) towards concentration on the advisory function and the consolidation of British influence in the Zimbabwe Staff College and similar institutions. This seems to me a sensible basis on which to proceed. I suggest we should have a further review of how things are going at an appropriate stage in the second half of this year.

4. I am copying this minute to members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*WMA*

Ministry of Defence  
10th January 1984

SECRET



ZIMBABWE: THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH MILITARY ADVISORY AND TRAINING TEAM (BMATT)

Joint Paper by MOD and FCO Officials

1. Last July, on completion of its previous training task, BMATT was reduced from over 100 to its present strength of 60. At the same time, command passed from Major General Shortis to Brigadier Jones. In agreeing to this restructuring of BMATT, Ministers stipulated that BMATT's activity should be subject to a further review towards the end of this year. This paper considers the future role and size of BMATT. It reflects the views of Commander BMATT and the High Commissioner in Harare and has been endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff.

2. During the last year our military and developmental assistance to Zimbabwe has come under particular scrutiny in the light of some unwelcome developments in that country - in particular, the Air Force officers' case and episodes of brutality by the ZNA's 5th Brigade in Matabeleland. There is still a clear risk that further incidents of army brutality may occur. The level of dissident activity was somewhat lower during the summer and autumn; and the ZNA are making efforts to improve the discipline and command and control of their forces engaged in counter-insurgency operations. But dissident activity continues and may again increase; and there are indications of South African support. The possibility of more serious incursions by the ZNA into Botswana in pursuit of dissidents cannot be discounted. 5 Brigade, who were removed from the area in the Autumn, are back in Matabeleland (though now reorganised). Nor is there any sign of readiness on Mugabe's part to achieve the political accommodation which might cut the root of the dissident problem.

3. Against this background the Prime Minister has recently discussed British policy towards Zimbabwe with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and agreed that we should proceed with the sale of RAF Hunters to Zimbabwe. (Mr Coles's letter of 28th October). In that discussion, Sir Geoffrey Howe pointed out that "in considering the question of aid to Zimbabwe, we of course had to

take into account political reactions here to our continuing aid programme. But if we cut off aid and Mugabe reacted violently, one result would be that the feeling of insecurity among the white community would be greatly increased and we might face the possibility of a major exodus." The Chiefs of Staff have also recently drawn attention to the strategic importance of Zimbabwe and recommended that we should continue to do what we can to promote stability there.

4. BMATT remains a crucial element in this process and one which the High Commissioner regards as fundamental to our continuing influence in Zimbabwe. In spite of the continuing deficiencies in the ZNA, remarkable progress has been achieved in creating unified and increasingly disciplined armed forces. The Zimbabweans have given full credit to BMATT, and hope we will stay to continue the task. By contrast, the North Koreans have been totally discredited. They no longer have any instructors in Zimbabwe; and the Presidential Guard and 5 Brigade are both now being retrained on British lines (though without BMATT assistance - our involvement with 5 Brigade remains limited to the acceptance of individual officers and NCOs from that Brigade on courses run for the ZNA as a whole). This development, evidence of a Zimbabwean decision to end the special status of these units and reintegrate them into the ZNA, could be important for Zimbabwe's stability. Commander BMATT's position as military advisor gives him access to and influence over the highest levels of the Zimbabwean Government and Armed Forces. Neighbours as diverse as Mozambique and South Africa have expressed approval of BMATT's role and contribution to regional stability. The Americans, too, value our effort there. Perhaps most importantly, BMATT's presence and Commander BMATT's role continue to have a symbolic importance; they play a major part in sustaining the confidence of the white community. These arguments in favour of continuing BMATT appear decisive.

5. Nonetheless, there is a strong case for further retrenching BMATT in order to bring it progressively into line with our efforts in other Commonwealth countries. Despite the Zimbabwean financial



contribution (some £600,000 last year), BMATT represents a considerable commitment of UKMTAS funds, as it does of high quality army personnel. Commander BMATT reckons that our underlying objectives of maintaining a presence and exercising our influence could still be achieved with a substantially reduced level of involvement. He therefore proposes approximately halving BMATT personnel over the next year by gradually handing over a number of BMATT-run courses to Zimbabwean instructors. In doing so, the guiding principles should be to make sure that courses we hand over are going concerns (not least to avoid charges of withdrawing with precipitous haste), and to concentrate on those areas of activity which will be most useful to us in the longer term.

6. At present the 60 BMATT personnel are roughly divided between supporting the Commander in his advisory role, running a battalion training camp at Nyanga (nearly half the total strength), running courses at the Zimbabwean Military Academy (ZMA) and Zimbabwean Staff College (ZSC), and providing specialist advice on pay and logistics. Commander BMATT proposes largely handing over the running of the battalion camp to the Zimbabweans once the course (which only began in September) has been properly established and Zimbabwean instructors become sufficiently competent. This would mean reducing British involvement there to a core group of 6 personnel towards the end of next year. Similarly, numbers deployed at the ZMA could be substantially reduced during the year as Zimbabwean Instructors become competent to take over. BMATT numbers would thus come down to about 30 by the end of next year, with the principal concentration of effort being on support for the Commander in his continuing advisory role (including provision of specialist advice to ZNA Headquarters), and on provision of instructors for the ZSC (to influence future senior officers). Within that manpower ceiling, Commander BMATT would also aim to establish (if the Zimbabweans agreed) a small presence at the School of Infantry, a key point for influencing the military doctrine imparted to junior ranks. Commander BMATT would also aim to meet from within these resources the expected Zimbabwean request for some modest

training assistance over a six-month period in their efforts to set up a special investigative branch of their Military Police. This venture could, if successful, assist the Zimbabweans in tackling fraud and could contribute to the maintenance of discipline in the ZNA. Finally, the proposed resources would allow a small number of places on BMATT courses to be provided for Mozambican officers, as promised to President Machel during his recent visit.

7. In sum we recommend that BMATT should continue, but that its strength should be progressively reduced during the course of next year to reach a level of about 30. We also recommend that BMATT's position should again be reviewed at an appropriate juncture in the latter half of next year.

December 1983



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 December 1983

ZIMBABWE: AIR FORCE OFFICERS

Thank you for your letter of 22 December.

The Prime Minister has approved the following revised version of the suggested message to Mr. Mugabe. Would you please arrange for its despatch today.

"I have learnt with great pleasure of your Government's decision, following the recommendations of the Review Tribunal, to release the three Air Force officers who remained in detention. Coming as it does on the eve of Christmas, the news of the releases will be especially welcome to their families and friends. I send you my own good wishes and look forward to our next meeting and to continuing the close relations between our two countries.

This is of course an entirely personal message and will be given no publicity here.

My best wishes for the New Year."

A.J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject a Master of

TOP COPY

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T228 A/85

RESTRICTED

8763 - 1

DD 221700Z HARARE

GRS 130

DESKBY 221700Z

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 221610Z DEC 83

TO IMMEDIATE HARARE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 590 OF 22 DECEMBER

*John Oishi*

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 23 DEC 1983

INDEX	FILE	SEARCHED
		<i>2F</i>

ZIMBABWE: AIR FORCE OFFICERS

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR MUGABE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BEGINS

I HAVE LEARNT WITH GREAT PLEASURE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S DECISION, FOLLOWING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REVIEW TRIBUNAL, TO RELEASE THE THREE AIR FORCE OFFICERS WHO REMAINED IN DETENTION. COMING AS IT DOES ON THE EVE OF CHRISTMAS, THE NEWS OF THE RELEASES WILL BE ESPECIALLY WELCOME TO THEIR FAMILIES AND FRIENDS. I SEND YOU MY OWN GOOD WISHES AND LOOK FORWARD TO OUR NEXT MEETING AND TO CONTINUING THE CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THIS IS OF COURSE AN ENTIRELY PRIVATE MESSAGE, AND WE SHALL GIVE IT NO PUBLICITY.

MY BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR  
ENDS

HOWE

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CAF/D

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PS

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR SQUIRE

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 December 1983

I have asked the F./C.O. to  
despatch the message as  
amended. A.F.C.  $\frac{22}{12}$ .

Your Tru.

Zimbabwe: Air Force Officers

/ As requested, I enclose a draft message  
to Mr Mugabe.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, which appears to be 'R B Bone', written over a horizontal line.

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats  
RESTRICTED

Precedence/Deskby  
IMMEDIATE

ZCZC 1 ZCZC  
GRS 2 GRS  
CLASS 3 RESTRICTED  
CAVEATS 4  
DESKBY 5  
FM FCO 6 FM FCO  
PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE HARARE  
TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 ZIMBABWE: AIR FORCE OFFICERS  
10 1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister  
11 to Mr Mugabe as soon as possible.  
12 BEGINS: I have learnt with great pleasure of your Government's  
13 decision, following the recommendations of the Review Tribunal,  
14 to release the three Air Force officers who remained in  
15 detention. Coming as it does on the eve of Christmas, the news  
16 of the releases will be especially welcome to ~~the officers' etc~~  
17 families and friends. I send you my own good wishes and look  
18 forward to our next meeting and to continuing the close  
19 relations between our two countries.  
20 My best wishes for the New Year. ENDS

/// 22 HOWE  
// 23 NNNN  
/ 24  
25

*This is of course an entirely personal message  
and will be given no publicity here.*

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) PRIVATE SECRETARY		
Telephone number 233 4831		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



GR 115  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM HARARE 221008Z DEC 83  
TO F L A S H FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 994 OF 22 DECEMBER.  
INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN.

*pa  
2nd  
22/12*

MY TELNO 992 : AIR FORCE OFFICERS.

1. MUBAKO, ACTING MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS, HAS JUST ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

"THE ACTING MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS RETURN FROM NEW DELHI CONCERNING THE 3 AIR FORCE OFFICERS STILL IN DETENTION, HAS CONSIDERED THE RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE REVIEW TRIBUNAL EARLIER THIS MONTH AND HAS DECIDED THAT THE OFFICERS SHOULD BE RELEASED FROM DETENTION. THE OFFICERS (NAMES GIVEN) HAVE THEREFORE BEEN RELEASED WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT AND ARE BEING ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN ZIMBABWE FOR A GIVEN PERIOD TO ENABLE THEM TO WIND UP THEIR AFFAIRS."

EWANS

SOUTHERN AFRICA [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD

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MR SQUIRE

CABINET OFFICE

FROM: R H BROWN

DATE 21 DECEMBER 1983

MR HENDRIE

cc: PS  
 PS/Mr Rifkind  
 Sir J Leahy  
 Mr Squire  
 News Dept  
 Resident Clerk  
 Miss C Stevens (No 10 Downing  
 St)

ZIMBABWE: AIR FORCE OFFICERS

1. In Harare Telno 992, the High Commissioner reports that the three Air Force officers remaining in detention are to be released tomorrow (22 December) and that the Zimbabwe Government will make a statement in Harare at about 10 am local time tomorrow, 22 December (8 am in London). The High Commissioner has been warned <sup>that</sup> if there is any leakage whatsoever before then the release will not take place.
2. The Prime Minister is to answer questions in the House at 10.15 am tomorrow, and wishes to refer to the release if they have taken place by then. I have therefore arranged for the High Commission in Harare to ring the Resident Clerk (backing this by a flash telegram) shortly after 8 am our time tomorrow to say whether or not the statement has been made and the officers released.
3. If all is well, the Prime Minister could then tell the House about the releases along the following lines:-

'I understand that this morning the Zimbabwean Government announced that the three Air Force officers remaining in detention are to be released. This is a welcome development and we are naturally very pleased.'



4. If the Prime Minister is asked whether the releases flowed from her meeting with Mr Mugabe in New Delhi, she could recall her replies to questions in Parliament on 1 December, when she said that she saw Mr Mugabe in New Delhi and that they had a conversation in which this issue arose. She understood that the other three cases would come before the Review Tribunal. News Dept could then speak to this line as appropriate in answer to press enquiries.

*R H Brown*

R H Brown  
Central African Dept

B. R.  
JOHN

Cameron the Duty Clerk rang.

Text of telegram received.

Harare No. 994 of 22 December.

Begins.

Mubako, Acting Minister of Home Affairs, has just issued the following statement:

"The Acting Minister of Home Affairs, in accordance with the statements made by the Prime Minister on his return from New Delhi concerning the three airforce officers still in detention, has considered the recommendations by the review tribunal earlier this month and has decided that the officers should be released from detention. The officers (names given) have therefore been released with immediate effect and are being allowed to remain in Zimbabwe for a given period to enable them to wind up their affairs".

Zimbabwe



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 220

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HARARE 190928Z 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 987 OF 19 DECEMBER.

*lead in fee.*

*AS 11/12*

MY TELNO 969 : AIR FORCE OFFICERS.

1. I HAVE NOW LEARNT RELIABLY THAT ON 14 DECEMBER OR THEREABOUTS, THE REVIEW TRIBUNAL DELIVERED TO THE GOVERNMENT ITS RECOMMENDATION THAT THERE WAS NO GOOD REASON WHY THE 3 REMAINING OFFICERS SHOULD BE DETAINED ANY LONGER. BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL'S HEARING TOOK PLACE, THE CHAIRMAN HAD BEEN TIPPED OFF THAT IT WOULD SUIT THE GOVERNMENT IF THEY COULD MAKE A RECOMMENDATION IN THIS SENSE.

*MT*

2. THE TRIBUNAL'S RECOMMENDATION WAS SUBMITTED TO THE PRIME MINISTER AT THE END OF LAST WEEK AND HE AND MUBAKO, THE ACTING MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS, ARE TO DISCUSS IT ON 21 DECEMBER.

3. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT, OVER AND ABOVE THE ASSURANCE REPORTED IN MY TELNO 965, THE GOVERNMENT HAVE TOLD THE LAW SOCIETY HERE THAT, AS THEY HAVE ALWAYS DONE IN THE PAST, THEY WILL CONTINUE TO ABIDE BY DECISIONS REACHED BY THE REVIEW TRIBUNAL.

4. BARRING ACCIDENTS, THEREFORE, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE 3 MEN WILL BE RELEASED VERY SOON. I HAVE MANAGED TO FEED IN THE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE SPLENDID IF THEIR RELEASE COULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE CHRISTMAS, BUT I DOUBT IF IT WILL NOW BE POSSIBLE ADMINISTRATIVELY TO ACHIEVE THIS.

EWANS

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

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MR SQUIRE

CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 8-12-83

GR 50

UNCLASSIFIED

FM HAPARE 080840Z DEC 83

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 965 OF 8 DECEMBER.

*mt*

MY TEL 864 : AFZ OFFICERS.

1. MUBAKO, ACTING MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS, CONFIRMED YESTERDAY IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY THAT THE RE-DETENTION OF THE AFZ OFFICERS WOULD BE REVIEWED "VERY SOON". THE GOVERNMENT WOULD GO BY THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL.

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

EWANS

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GR 530  
DESKBY 011100Z  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM HARARE 011010Z DEC 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 958 OF 01 DECEMBER

NEW DELHI TELNO 001 TO HARARE: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING  
WITH MR MUGABE

1. FOLLING IS THE FULL TEXT OF MR MUGABE'S REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT ANGLO-ZIMBABWEAN RELATIONS AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE ON HIS RETURN FROM NEW DELHI YESTERDAY:

WHEN I GOT TO NEW DELHI AND I MET MRS THATCHER AT THE FIRST OFFICIAL OCCASION, WE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD HOLD A MEETING TO DISCUSS RELATIONS. WE HELD THIS MEETING IN THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONERS RESIDENCE IN NEW DELHI. MRS THATCHER WANTED TO KNOW WHY RELATIONS HAD TENDED OF LATE TO BE THAT SOUR, AND COULD I TALK FRANKLY AND TELL HER WHAT THE ISSUE IS. SO I ADDRESSED THE QUESTION QUITE FRANKLY. THAT IN OUR VIEW RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN HAD BEEN VERY EXCELLENT UNTIL THE CASE OF THE AIR FORCE MEN. THAT IS WHAT SOURED RELATIONS BECAUSE OF WHAT WE ALLEGE TO BE INTERFERENCE BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. WE MADE IT CLEAR TO HER THAT WHEREAS SHE HAS A PUBLIC OPINION TO SATISFY, WE ALSO HAVE A PUBLIC OPINION TO SATISFY, AND THAT WE COULDN'T BE SEEN TO RELEASE ANYBODY MERELY BECAUSE HE IS OF BRITISH EXTRACTION WHEN HE IS PROPERLY DETAINED UNDER OUR LAWS OR IMPRISONED UNDER OUR LAWS, MERELY BECAUSE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS INTERVENED. IT WOULD BE A WEAKNESS ON OUR PART. WE ARE A SOVERIGN GOVERNMENT AND THE LESS INTERFERENCE THERE IS, THE BETTER.

I THINK THERE WAS A GREAT UNDERSTANDING. SHE HAS HER OWN PROBLEMS. SHE SAYS THE PROBLEM IS THE QUESTIONS SHE IS ASKED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. SHE HAS THREE HOURS EVERY WEEK ON TUESDAY AND FRIDAY, SO THEY GRILL HER AND THEY WANT TO KNOW THESE MATTERS AND SO ON. BUT I ASSURED HER THAT THE MEN ARE VERY SAFE, THAT NO HARM WILL COME TO THEM. IN DUE COURSE THEIR CASES WILL COME BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL AND WHEN THE TRIBUNAL RECOMMEND THEIR RELEASE AND WE ARE SATISFIED THAT INDEED WE CAN RELEASE THEM, THERE IS NO REASON WHY THEY SHOULD BE HELD AD INFINITUM IN DETENTION. BUT WHEN WE ARREST PEOPLE, WHETHER THIS BE UNDER OUR OWN COMMON LAW OR UNDER THE EMERGENCY POWERS ACT, WHICH PROVIDES REGULATIONS FOR DETENTION, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD RESPECT OUR ACTION. MORESO THAT IT IS NOT EVERY BRITISH CITIZEN IN ZIMBABWE WHO IS BEING HARASSED.

THERE.

THERE HAS BEEN MAGNANIMTY ON OUR PART. WE HAVE BENT OVER BACKWARDS TO ACCOMMODATE PEOPLE LIKE IAN SMITH. THE WHITE COMMUNITY IS STILL IN A POSITION OF ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE - THEY REIGN THE ECONOMIC WORLD IN OUR COUNTRY. AND SO WHAT WRONG HAVE WE DONE? THEN I TRIED TO GIVE A WHOLE BACKGROUND OF HOW SOME MEN, OTHERS HAVE BEEN VERY LOYAL, IN THE ARMY HAVE COMMITTED ACTS OF SABOTAGE, SOME OF THEM HAVE BEEN WHITE. THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR ARMS DUMP IN INKOMO BARRACKS WHICH COST US ZIMBABWE DOLLARS 36 MILLION. SHE WAS SHOCKED TO HEAR THAT WE HAD LOST THAT MUCH, SHE HADN'T HEARD ABOUT THIS ONE. THE LOSS OF ARMS AT THORNHILL. THE FACT THAT WE HAVE HAD MEN LIKE THE ONE (GERICKE) WHO WAS RELEASED BY VARKEVISSER WORKING WITH SOUTH AFRICA. AND NOW THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR AIRCRAFT. THESE ARE INCIDENTS WHICH SHOW THAT SOME PEOPLE ARE STILL WORKING WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND WE CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO BE SEEN TO RESPECT THEM MERELY BECAUSE THEY ARE OF BRITISH ORIGIN.

SO WE TALKED FRANKLY. AT THE END OF IT SHE WAS VERY HAPPY THAT WE HAD FRANKLY EXPRESSED OURSELVES. SHE UNDERSTOOD OUR VIEWPOINT, AND I THINK THE RELATIONS WHICH WERE SOURED HAVE BEEN REPAIRED AND THERE ARE SMILES NOW ON BOTH SIDES AND ONE WOULD WANT TO SEE THE PATH CONTINUE TO BE A HARMONIOUS ONE, MAKING FOR GREATER CLOSENESS OF RELATIONS IN AREAS OF CO-OPERATION WITH BRITAIN.

EWANS

SOUTHERN AFRICA [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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MR SQUIRE

CABINET OFFICE





Zimbabwe  
relations  
file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 November 1983

Dear Brian,

Mr. Mugabe

The Prime Minister had a bilateral meeting with Mr. Mugabe on 24 November during the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in New Delhi. I enclose the record of the conversation.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

I should be grateful if the record could be very closely protected. Its contents should be brought to the attention only of those who have an essential operational need to know of its contents.

Your ever

John Major

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SF

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE AT 1845 HOURS ON THURSDAY 24 NOVEMBER  
1983 AT THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER'S RESIDENCE IN NEW DELHI

---

Present:

Prime Minister	Mr. Mugabe
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Mr. Mnungagwa
Sir John Leahy	Mr. Mangwende
Mr. A.J. Coles	

The Prime Minister said that she was glad to have the opportunity of a meeting because things were not going so well as they should between Britain and Zimbabwe. She understood that Mr. Mugabe had had a successful meeting recently with Mr. Rifkind. Our views on certain matters were well known and she would not repeat them. But she wanted fully to understand Mr. Mugabe's thinking - would he please talk?

We wanted to maintain our aid programme. We had agreed to supply Hunter aircraft. And BMATT were engaged in a valuable training operation. She would like a frank discussion. She had no toes to tread on. Her only wish was that at the end of the talk both sides could agree to cooperate. Britain had expected, and still expected, a great deal of Zimbabwe. We had always believed that an independent Zimbabwe, founded on free elections, could change the whole perspective of Southern Africa.

Mr. Mugabe thanked the Prime Minister for offering him an opportunity to exchange views and ideas and thereby to achieve a greater understanding than had existed in the recent past.

When Zimbabwe had commenced its life as a newly independent country, against a historical background of bitter fighting, his Party had pronounced itself as committed, were it elected to Government, to a process of reconciliation. That commitment

/ was genuine -



was genuine - they were deceiving no-one. Britain and the white community were shocked that the man whom they regarded as a terrorist and a guerilla leader was elected. But his people had never been terrorists - they were in search of freedom, justice and democracy. Having won the election, they had no need to be influenced by the hostile relations that had bedevilled Zimbabwe society. He had told Ian Smith and others that he was prepared to let bygones be bygones provided everybody else was prepared to respond to the hand of friendship. He had asked Lord Soames to remain to give him the tutelage which he needed. Neither he nor the other members of the Zimbabwe Cabinet had experience of Government or administration. The presence of Lord Soames was also needed to assure the British Government and people that the new Zimbabwe Government was not their enemy. Part of British culture had become part of Zimbabwe's culture. There was a large British community which needed assurance. Then help had been sought from Britain on the merging of the various armed forces. The former Rhodesian army had reservations about this exercise unless they were the central unit into which all others would be integrated. But he had set his face against this approach. None of the three armies could be allowed to exist as an army in its own right. There had to be reconciliation and unity.

Britain had immensely assisted the process. Zimbabwe was grateful to this day for the help which we had given in creating a national army. There had since been a few deserters who were creating problems here and there. And there was still much to be done to secure the full loyalty and commitment of the armed forces to the State. The present size of the armed forces - some 41,000 men - was the maximum necessary. The need now was to improve their quality.

Things had gone well in 1980 and 1981. Relations were gaining in strength. But not everyone had responded to the call for national reconciliation. For example, Ian Smith was bitter that the cause for which he had fought was lost. Others had similar feelings.

The Prime Minister said that these things could not be forgotten quickly. Mr. Mugabe said that his then friend and partner, Joshua Nkomo, had also been very bitter. Following

/ the Lancaster

the Lancaster House Conference he had wanted to enter into a pact with Mr. Mugabe's party for electoral purposes. But Zanu had wanted the leadership question to be settled and believed that it was for the people to choose their leader. Nevertheless, they had pledged themselves to coalition with Zapu whether they won or lost. Zapu, however, had broken ranks. They had sought an alliance with Muzorewa and even with Ian Smith. Nkomo wanted to be leader and wanted his party to have a Parliamentary majority. His bitterness continued to simmer. After the elections, the Soviet Union had shipped arms to Zapu. Some of these, including 56 Sam 7 missiles, had now come into the possession of the Zimbabwe Government.

In 1976/77, Zapu had worked out a "zero hour" strategy. They had decided to leave the fighting to Zanu in the expectation that the latter would become exhausted and would not in the end be able to resist Zapu. Then Zapu would have moved in with an army well equipped with Soviet weapons. Later, contrary to the agreement that all weapons would be handed over to a national army, Zapu had hidden weapons. They had acquired over 25 large farms for storing these weapons and also for retraining cadres. Deliberately, they had not integrated their crack forces. When the arms caches had been discovered, his confidence in Nkomo had been immediately dashed. He had removed Nkomo and one or two other members of Zapu from the Cabinet. But there were still Zapu people in the Cabinet today. The situation was now under control but pockets existed eg isolated farms where people felt unsafe.

As to Muzorewa, it was known that he had kept 5,000 of his former troops and sent them to South Africa. Taxed with this, Muzorewa had denied it and said that if it was true, it had been done without his knowledge. He had told Muzorewa that he would take his denial at face value - events would prove whether he was associated with this matter. In 1981 some of these troops, who had been retained by the South Africans, had been re-infiltrated into Zimbabwe. Later, the South Africans had stopped this traffic and concentrated instead on disrupting Zimbabwe's routes to Mozambique. They had also sent some of Muzorewa's soldiers on missions to Angola and Mozambique. The group which had attacked Mtola in Mozambique and some of the mercenaries who went to the Seychelles had been drawn from these people, both black and white.

/ Sithole



Sithole was also a very disappointed man. He had organised subversion but this had not been very significant. It was known that he had sent people to train in Mozambique alongside the MPRA. Now, Sithole was a spent force.

All these people had been accepted as partners to build a new Zimbabwe - it had been hard to accept that they had behaved in the way they had behaved.

Muzorewa had developed links with Zaire and, more recently, with Israel. Israel had earlier trained people in South Africa for the Rhodesian army. Latterly, Muzorewa had gone to Jerusalem, reportedly to study the bible. The fact that South Africa had again started to infiltrate men into Zimbabwe had been one of the factors leading to the detention of Muzorewa.

The outside world claimed that the Zimbabwe Government was harassing its opponents. But it wanted opposition provided it was lawful. There would be elections in a year's time - "they" would be free to set up parties and contest the elections.

With regard to the white community, there had been problems and it was in connection with these that our bilateral relations had gone a little sour. It took time for people with a history of privilege and racial domination to adjust and to accept a new position. He had shown understanding and given them time to adjust. Those who could not do so were urged to leave and some had. Others remained, among them those who had financial need of their pensions. People like this could not accept that the guerillas against whom they had fought yesterday had today become the Government. It was very difficult for them to sever their relationship with South Africa.

In 1981 £36 million worth of ammunition had been destroyed at a barracks just outside Harare. The loss had been tremendous. A committee had reached the conclusion that the sabotage had been arranged from within. Later, a group of three whites and one black had been caught while attempting to enter Zimbabwe from South Africa. Then, an agent of South Africa, working in the Zimbabwe army, had been arrested. He had confessed to giving

South Africa information about the locations of barracks and ammunition dumps, etc. But the policeman in charge of him, who had an Afrikaans name, had arranged for him to be released.

In the Central Intelligence Organisation, Mugabe had kept the people whom he had found there. He knew that they had worked for Smith and had connections with South Africa but they had pledged loyalty so they had been retained. The head of the CIO was initially Mr. Flower, who was well regarded, but who had now retired. Then Robertson had been appointed but he had had to retire through illness. Two members of the CIO had been arrested as agents of South Africa - a charge to which they had confessed. Their coordinator had got wind of their likely arrest and had gone to the UK on a false pretext of wanting to see a sick mother. The British High Commissioner had pleaded for the release of these people. The reaction in Britain had been disappointing. He had been accused of infringing human rights. The Conservative Party, the British press and then the United States had taken up the cry. Orchestration was apparent. The Prime Minister said that there was no orchestration - look at what the press said about her. But Mr. Mugabe was entitled to complain; the press were interested in discord. We knew all about preventive detention from our experience in Northern Ireland where many British soldiers had lost their lives. However, what had really provoked criticism in Britain was allegations of torture <sup>of</sup> which she thought Mr. Mugabe had no knowledge.

Mr. Mugabe said that no government would ever instruct that torture be used. But security people had their methods. Mr. Mnungagwa was deaf in one ear as a result of torture. Other members of the present Cabinet had suffered similarly. But the two South African agents in the CIO had not been tortured, though the conditions of their detention were not good. In the case of the air force officers, it had been alleged that three had been tortured and according to the Courts this was true. But his own people would not admit it even to him. If there had been torture it was not because that was the wish of the Zimbabwe Government. When people were arrested and detained - and there was immediate hostile reaction from the Conservative Party (the Prime Minister had at once made representations), then the Zimbabwe Government



wondered whether there was understanding. Did these critics recognise the good that he had tried to do? Did the good vanish because of one or two isolated acts? Where was the balance in this criticism? Why had the positive achievements been ignored? Look at the environment. The majority of the white community were content. They still had their privileges, except the privilege of ruling. They had a far higher standard of living and occupied prominent posts. Firms had not been nationalised and had even been encouraged to expand. Zimbabwe was saddened by criticism that did not recognise the positive achievements.

The Prime Minister said that she had to face questions twice a week in the House of Commons. Recently, she had been asked to cut off all aid to Zimbabwe. She had said that she would not do so - this would not be conducive to helping those whom we wished to help.

Mr. Mugabe said that four of the seven air force officers had now been released. The Zimbabwe Government had been forewarned by the Attorney General that judgement would go against it. The Government had considered the issue and had taken the view that the Court had acquitted these people in view of certain technical considerations of the criminal law, particularly the requirement that confessions must be corroborated. The Government had therefore decided to examine the cases and had found that some had been more culpable than others. When three of the six who had been tried were on the point of release, he had received a message from the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister commented: "And you blew your top". Mr. Mugabe said that he could not accept direction from outside Zimbabwe. He had been very angry with our High Commissioner. The Prime Minister explained that she was continually asked whether we had made representations to the Zimbabwe Government - and we should continue to be questioned in this sense about the three who were still detained. Mr. Mugabe said that he could not be seen to be acting in response to representations by the British Government. No harm would come to the three who were still detained and they were likely to be released in due course. The Prime Minister said that we would try to find a new formula when faced with questions. We could perhaps refer to the fact that one more of the seven

/ detainees

detainees had been released and that our views on this matter were well known. Mr. Mugabe's helpful analysis had brought us up to the present time. Did he still want BMATT? Mr. Mugabe said that he did. They were doing good work. They would conclude the present exercise by August of next year and if another use could be found for them, they would stay on. The Prime Minister said that she was not pressing Mr. Mugabe to keep our soldiers - they were in great demand. She had been worried about the prospect of BMATT training elements of the Fifth Brigade. Mr. Mugabe said that the Fifth Brigade was notorious for nothing. The fact that they had been trained by the North Koreans did not make them any more dangerous than other units.

The Prime Minister said that since the question of the air force officers, there had been no fresh difficulty and we hoped that that situation could continue. Mr. Mugabe said that there was one point when he was very angry with the British Government. This had been when he had visited Ireland on his way to the United States. The Irish Government had told him that they were under pressure from Britain to raise the question of the detainees. The press there had been interested only in that issue. It had appeared that the British Government was preparing pressure for him everywhere he went. The whole matter seemed to be orchestrated. That was why he had made his public criticism of the Prime Minister, not because our general relationship was sour.

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Mugabe to understand. British public opinion expected perfection from Mr. Mugabe - his intellectual ability was unquestioned, he was known to be a religious man, he had won a free election. To have brought Rhodesia from its former condition to a state of independence was an enormous achievement. So when Mr. Mugabe had come to power people's expectations of him were unreasonably high. Everyone who knew him knew that he was incapable of corruption and everyone who met him thought highly of him. She had told him at No. 10 Downing Street that the Zimbabwe judicial system was very highly regarded. All these factors had led us to judge that acquittal of the air force officers must mean their release. Mr. Mugabe commented that these expectations were in a sense justified but people should take into account the fact that

/ Zimbabwe



Zimbabwe was going through a difficult period of transition. The Prime Minister said that it was true that critics did not take into account the fact that Mr. Mugabe and his people had suffered and had experienced preventive detention. The task of integrating the armies had not been easy. Mr. Mugabe said that he would never claim that the fact that he had been detained entitled him to detain others. But did people in Britain really expect that the situation in Zimbabwe would have been normalised so soon? What was the state of America four years after independence? The Prime Minister said that this was a fair point. Critics assumed that Zimbabwe should learn faster than others had. Britain had not moved to a one person/one vote basis until 1950. Mr. Mugabe said that if his Government had resorted to mass detentions, the world ought to be alarmed. But when it was only a matter of a few people, he ought to be given some credit for judgement. The cases of those still detained would come under review.

The Prime Minister repeated that we would try to find some new formula for use in public. We could state that there was a review tribunal which regularly reviewed cases. The cases of those still detained were on the cause list for the review tribunal. She now had a better understanding of Mr. Mugabe's viewpoint.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recalled that when the air force officers had been acquitted he had received an immediate report to this effect. When this had been followed by a report of the detention of some of them, there had naturally been great disappointment.

The Prime Minister said that there would be occasion for more discussion at Goa. Taking up a reference by the Prime Minister to the President of Mozambique, Mr. Mugabe said that Mr. Machel had taken 2½ hours to describe to him his visit to Europe. Most of this time had been spent in praise of The Queen, the Prime Minister, etc. Machel had been deeply excited by his visit. He did not want to come under Soviet influence. No-one wanted to. Machel had been very grateful for the aid package he had been offered in London.

/ At this

SECRET

- 9 -

At this point, the Prime Minister and Mr. Mugabe had to leave for dinner with Mrs Gandhi. The discussion ended at 2000.

A.S.C.

24 November 1983

SECRET



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MR A J S GOODALL  
CABINET OFFICE

PS/Mr RIFKIND

PS/PUS

PS/NO.10 DOWNING STREET

SIR J LEAHY

MR SQUIRE

MR ADAMS

ED/SAFD

ED/CAFØ

ED/UND

ED/NEWS D

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADV. Rm. WH216

~~RESIDENT OFFICE~~

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 927 OF 17 NOVEMBER

INFO PRETORIA

MY TELNO 924: AIR FORCE OFFICERS

1. LEWIS-WALKER WAS DULY RELEASED YESTERDAY, WITH MINIMAL LOCAL PUBLICITY. WE HAVE SEEN HIM. HE IS IN FINE FETTLE AND EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR EVERYTHING HMO HAS DONE. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS HAS CONFIRMED TO HIS LAWYER THAT HIS RELEASE IS UNCONDITIONAL, IE HE DOES NOT HAVE TO LEAVE ZIMBABWE. HE NEVERTHELESS PLANS TO DEPART FOR BRITAIN (WHERE HE HPEAS TO JOIN THE RAF REGIMENT: WE ARE PURSUING SEPARATELY), PROBABLY ON 25 NOVEMBER, WHEN HE HAS SORTED OUT HIS AFFAIRS. WE WILL TELEGRAPH TRAVEL DETAILS.

MS

~~APPEARS. HE WILL TELEGRAPH TRIVEL DETAILS.~~

2. LEWIS-WALKER REPORTS THAT THE REMAINING THREE OFFICERS, WITH WHOME HE SHARED A CELL, ARE IN GOOD SPIRITS. THEY INTERPRET HIS RELEASE AS AN ENCOURAGING AUGURY FOR THEIR OWN. SO DO I. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT REMAIN RETICENT, THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION ARE TELLING JOURNALISTS UNATTRIBUTABLY, AND HAVE REPEATED THIS TO US, THAT LEWIS-WALKER'S RELEASE SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS THE "BEGINNING OF THE END" OF THE AIR FORCE OFFICERS SAGA. BUT THEY WILL NOT BE DRAWN ON DATES.

3. THE DEFENCE LAWYER, MOLLETT, IS NOW CONSIDERING WHETHER TO APPLY TO THE HIGH COURT FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS (EQUIVALENT TO HABEUS CORPUS) FOR THE 3 OFFICERS' RELEASE. IT IS WIDELY EXPECTED THAT YESTERDAY'S SUPREME COURT HEARING OF DEBENGA'S CASE (MY TELNO 227) WILL RESULT IN A RULING THAT HE SHOULD BE SET FREE FORTHWITH. IF SO A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN RELATION TO THE OFFICERS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY SUCCEED. ON THE OTHER HAND, MOLLATT WOULD NOT WISH TO HUMILIATE THE GOVERNMENT PUBLICLY, PARTICULARLY IF THEY INTEND TO RELEASE THE OFFICERS BEFORE LONG ANYWAY. ON OUR ADVICE, MOLLATT WILL TRY TO PIN THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS DOWN BY SUGGESTING THAT HE WOULD NOT INITIATE LEGAL ACTION IN THE HIGH COURT IF THE AUTHORITIES COULD GIVE A PRIVATE ASSURANCE AS TO THE PROBABLE TIMING OF THE OFFICERS' RELEASE.

4. LEWIS-WALKER IS BEING HIGHLY CIRCUMSPECT IN WHAT HE IS SAYING TO THE PRESS. WE ARE CONFINING COMMENT TO EXPRESSIONS OF PLEASURE AT HIS RELEASE.

EWANS

NNNN



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PS

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CABINET OFFICE

PS/MT RIFKIND

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SIR J LEAHY

MR SQUIRE

MR ADAMS

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ED/CAFD

ED/UND

ED/NEWS D

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADV. Rm. WE216

RESIDENT CLERK



GR 40

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DESKBY FCO 161100Z

FM HARARE 161030Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 924 OF 16 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA.

MY TELNO 909 : AFZ OFFICERS.

1. LEWIS-WALKER IS TO BE RELEASED TODAY - UNCONDITIONALLY -  
BUT HE WILL LEAVE ZIMBABWE, PROBABLY FOR THE UK, IN A DAY OR  
TWO.

EWANS

NNNN

PART 3 ends:-

AST to PLO (mtg Record) 28/10

PART 4 begins:-

Harare tel: 924 16/11