PREM 19/2021

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UK/BAHRAINI Relations.

PM's meeting with Sheik Khalifa.

State visit by Amir of Bahrain April 1984

BAHRAIN

PT 1 - JUNE 1979

Nov 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
3.7.79							
~~13.7.79~~							
~~10.2.81~~							
~~30.4.82~~							
~~28.1.83~~							
29.1.83							
~~18.3.83~~							
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~~4.4.83~~							
~~26.6.83~~							
~~4.7.83~~							
~~25.1.84~~							
~~26.1.84~~							
~~20/2/84~~							
~~1/3/84~~							
~~29.3.84~~							
11.4.84							
~~30.4.84~~							
~~23.10.84~~							
15.7.87							

PART 1 ENDS

PREM 19/2021

PART 1 ends:-

CDP to FCO (Culshaw) 16.7.87

PART 2. begins:-

FCO (Culshaw) to CDP 11.9.87

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(79) 8th conclusions, minute 2	05/07/1979

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed C Wayland Date 20 July 2016

PREM Records Team

Foreign and Commonwealth Office document

Reference: Diplomatic Report No 148/81

Description: Bahrain: Annual Review for 1980

Date: 10 February 1981

The above FCO document, which was enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. When released they are available in the appropriate FCO CLASSES.

Signed P Wayland Date 20 July 2016

PREM Records Team

MEETING WITH THE BAHRAINI PRIME MINISTER

Points to make

Welcome increased regional co-operation on political and economic fronts. We hope Bahrain can play a part here, particularly in closer relations between Oman and her neighbours. Lord Carrington in Baghdad 3-4 July. How do Gulf States see relations with Iraq?

Iran

Confused internal situation. New constitution disputed. Economy in bad shape. Oil exports low. Unrest in Khuzestan not over. Is there a serious risk of conflict with Iraq? Iranian Government have denied earlier claim to sovereignty over Bahrain. If this was pursued, Bahrain would have backing of the international community.

Arab/Israel

Gradual approach only practical course at present. But we and our European partners are committed to full implementation of UN Resolution 242 and satisfaction of legitimate Palestinian rights. Have told Israel peace treaty cannot last without progress towards comprehensive solution. Have spoken firmly to Mr. Begin about West Bank settlements and genuine Palestinian autonomy.

/Essential Facts

Essential Facts

Concern over Iran and common opposition to Egypt/Israel treaty has moved Iraqis towards Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. But suspicion remains of Iraqi intentions in Gulf.

Gulf States surprisingly calm over effects of Iranian revolution despite their significant Shia and Iranian populations, especially in Bahrain. But rulers ready to take the lessons of the Shah's fall. Ayatollah Ruhani recently challenged Shah's right to drop historic Persian claim to Bahrain in 1970. But Iranian Government then issued statement that 'at present' Iran made no claims to islands in the Gulf other than those she already possessed. Bahrainis are nervous nonetheless.

Bahrainis depend on Egyptian skilled labour but have followed Saudi line in opposing peace treaty and implementing Arab sanctions against Egypt. In private softer against Sadat but they think he should have consulted other Arabs and should not speak for the Palestinians. Also believe the US should be much tougher with Israel.

MEETING WITH THE

BAHRAINI PRIME

MINISTER

Personality Note

Shaikh Khalifa Bin Sulman Al Khalifa, Prime Minister of Bahrain. Brother of the Amir. Aged 43. Educated partly in Britain. Prime Minister since 1971. Intelligent hard working and capable. Very close to his brother the Amir. The administration of Bahrain depends heavily on him. Pro-British and not by nature an Arab Nationalist, but hard-headed about Bahrain's interests in foreign affairs. Speaks fluent English.

BACKGROUND NOTE

Bahrain's oil production is now declining. But its population of 340,000 is prosperous and well-educated. It is governed by a traditional ruling family who though Sunni Muslim govern well and are at pains to look after the Shia majority, which includes many Iranians. Bahrain relies for its income on refining (mostly Saudi) crude oil, on financial services, and on some industry (aluminium smelting and import substitution). In foreign affairs Bahrain usually follows the Saudi lead. She is a major regional market for UK goods and services (1978 exports equal £120 million).

28/3

In honour of
Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II
His Royal Highness The Prince and Prince Philip Duke of Edinburgh
by command of
His Highness Shaikh Isa Bin Sulman Al-Khalifa
His Highness's Head of the Amiri Court
requests the honour of the company of

The Right Honourable the Prime Minister

at a Banquet on Thursday, 12th April, 1984, at 8.30 p.m.
at the Dorchester, London, W.1.

R.S.V.P.
The Private Secretary,
Embassy of the State of Bahrain,
98, Gloucester Road,
London, SW7 4AU

National Dress, Evening Dress, Decorations

Guests should arrive at the
Ballroom Entrance in Park Lane
between 7.50 - 8.10 p.m.

PLEASE PRESENT THIS CARD

12 Apr

In honour of
Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II
His Royal Highness The Prince Philip Duke of Edinburgh
and
by command of
His Highness Shaikh Isa Bin Sulman Al-Khalifa
His Highness's Head of the Amiri Court
requests the honour of the company of

Mr. Denis Thatcher

at a Banquet on Thursday, 12th April, 1984, at 8.30 p.m.
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National Dress, Evening Dress, Decorations

Guests should arrive at the
Ballroom Entrance in Park Lane
between 7.50 - 8.10 p.m.

PLEASE PRESENT THIS CARD

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File

COPIED TO:

QATAR: Relations Feb 82

CCPC

(06)

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

16 July 1987

VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM OF THE CROWN PRINCES OF QATAR AND BAHRAIN

Thank you for your letter of 14 July about the visits expected this autumn from the Crown Princes of Qatar and Bahrain. The Prime Minister will be ready to see both of them. She could receive the Qatari Heir Apparent on Wednesday 28 October at 1430 hours and the Crown Prince of Bahrain on Monday 14 September at 1600 hours. I should be grateful for appropriate briefing nearer the time.

BF//

C. D. POWELL

R. N. Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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COPIED TO:
QATAR: Relations Feb 82

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 July 1987

Prime Minister
Agree to the Crown Princes of Qatar & Bahrain in the autumn? Only a meeting is envisaged in each case. The Royal Family will give hospitality

Dear Charles

Visit to the UK of the Crown Princes of Qatar and Bahrain

We have offered an invitation in principle to the Heir Apparent and Minister of Defence of Qatar to visit the United Kingdom this autumn. We should like to propose that the Qatari should come from 27-30 October. He is known to be prickly about protocol. He will know that the Deputy Rulers/Heirs Apparent of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Bahrain have all been received by the Prime Minister on previous visits to Britain. He himself received high-level treatment on a recent official visit to France during which he was met by the Prime Minister and received by the President as well as having talks with the Foreign and Defence Ministers. According to reports, France has agreed a five-year defence development plan with Qatar worth £2 billion.

We need to make a special effort to improve our defence sales to Qatar, which have declined in recent years. The French have taken advantage of this. We shall get nowhere however if we are unable to match the degree of reception accorded to the Qatari Heir Apparent during his visit to France. We should like to be able to instruct our Ambassador in Qatar to discuss a programme with the Heir Apparent which includes a call on the Prime Minister, a call on the Defence Secretary and a meal hosted by him, and a call on the Foreign Secretary and a meal hosted by him. The Prince of Wales has indicated his willingness to be associated with the visit and once dates are agreed we shall recommend that HRH give a dinner in honour of the Qatari.

Wed 28/10 1430

I should accordingly be grateful if you would seek the agreement of the Prime Minister to receive the Qatari Heir Apparent some time during 27-30 October. It would be helpful if John Howe, to whom a copy of this letter goes, would indicate when the Defence Secretary could receive the Qatari and offer him a meal.

Mon 14/9 1600

The Crown Prince of Bahrain has also been invited to visit the United Kingdom and the dates proposed for him are 11-15 September. He is considerably more amenable than his Qatari rival but in terms of our relationship with the two states it is important that we should offer nothing less to the Bahraini than we offer to the Qatari. I should be grateful if you and John Howe would let me know when similar calls and hospitality could be offered.

The Crown Prince of Bahrain called on the Prime Minister during a private visit in March 1983. The Prince of Wales has indicated his willingness to be associated with this visit also and we shall accordingly be recommending that he give a dinner in honour of the Bahraini as well.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

TEMPORARILY RETAINED
J. Gray
9/7/2016

I am copying this letter to John Howe.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

SECRET

MKSAGK

2

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 October 1984

Visit to Bahrain by the Armilla Patrol

The Prime Minister has considered the Minister of State for the Armed Forces' minute of 23 October about the planned visit of the Armilla Patrol to Bahrain on 25/29 October.

The Prime Minister agrees that the visit should go ahead. She considered whether it would be prudent to notify the Iranians and Iraqis in advance. There are clearly arguments either way. She concluded that we should treat the visit in the normal way, doing no more and no less than usual in terms of notifications.

I have established that FCO Ministers are also content.

I am copying this letter to Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

John Oughton Esq
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

SECRET

MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/JS/9/1

23 October 1984

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT TO BAHRAIN BY THE ARMILLA PATROL

1. As Michael Heseltine is overseas I am writing to let you know that the Armilla patrol, currently HMS CARDIFF and HMS HERMIONE with Fleet Auxiliary BAYLEAF, is programmed to visit Bahrain on 25 - 29 October. Diplomatic clearance for this visit has already been sought and obtained from Bahrain. We need to decide to-day whether the visit should go ahead in the light of the current situation in the Gulf.

2. The Patrol does not normally operate inside the Gulf, but it does on a number of occasions each year pay visits such as this to ports in friendly Gulf states. Unfortunately attacks at sea by Iranian and Iraqi aircraft have slightly increased recently, and the possibilities of escalation, possibly involving US vessels, may have also increased. I have therefore been closely reviewing the risks associated with this visit with the Defence Intelligence and Naval staffs.

3. In the last five weeks, after a slight lull at the end of August, there has been a spate of tit-for-tat attacks on merchant

[spoken to PM who agreed]
CDP
23/X.

Prime Minister
Agree that the Armilla patrol can visit Bahrain, starting tomorrow?
(There is inevitably some risk: but the US have a standing naval presence up there, and have not been subject to any attacks)
CDP
23/X.

... shipping by Iraqi and Iranian aircraft. The attached map shows the location of these. The Iraqi attacks have all been at the upper end of the Gulf around Kharg Island and Bushire, within the Iraqi-declared Maritime Exclusion Zone, and I am advised that it is unlikely that they will try to extend greatly the area of their attacks, though they have recently taken delivery of the longer-range French Mirage F1/EQ5. However, all the recent Iranian attacks have been in the central area of the Gulf through which the Armilla Patrol would pass on passage to and from Bahrain. You will see from the map that there have been three Iranian attacks in this area since October 11 (Nos 12, 14 and 16). Therefore there is the possibility that RN ships could be called upon to give assistance to a damaged vessel or, if the vessel were entitled to RN protection, to engage Iranian aircraft in its defence. (The latter possibility is low with no more than a dozen UK vessels in the Gulf among the two hundred odd likely to be there at any given time.) The likelihood of incidents while the Patrol is inside the Gulf which will be from October 24 to October 30, depends on how long the current spate of attacks continues which is not possible to predict. The latest limited Iranian ground offensive on the central front is not expected to affect the war at sea, although if a major offensive were to begin in the south this could certainly spill-over into more tit-for-tat attacks on ships in the Gulf.

4. The chance of accidental attack on the Patrol by Iranian aircraft is assessed as low: the Iranians reconnoitre and select their targets carefully. On current Iranian practice, there is no reason to suppose they will launch a deliberate attack on RN

ships. There have been no attacks so far on any Western warships, including US warships which maintain a constant presence in the Gulf (there are 3 USN warships there now) and whose relations locally with the Iranians are tense. Moreover in the unlikely event of an Iranian attack on the Patrol, the Naval Staff consider the Patrol's chances of successful defence to be high. The Iranians do not have EXOCETS at present and have had to make their attacks at close range using either free-fall bombs or Mavericks which are TV guided anti-tank missiles. They have recently adapted the Standard radar-homing missile, for delivery by air, but this missile only has a marginally increased range and capability over Maverick. Our Patrol ships between them have Sea Dart, Sea Wolf and Javelin missiles and a variety of air-defence guns.

5. A possibility we have to consider particularly carefully over the next fortnight is that of an Iranian clash with US ships in the Gulf which could draw in any RN ships in the area. As you know it is assessed that the chance of Iranian attacks on some American presence in the Middle East in the run-up to the US Presidential Election is considered high. This could lead to an Iranian attack on a US warship in the Gulf, either unprompted or in retaliation for US counter-action against Iranian-backed terrorism elsewhere. You will be aware of the background to this from the Foreign Secretary's letter to you (PM/84/163) and the JIC Assessment of 19 October (JIC(84)(1A)43).

6. Against this we have to set the possible repercussions of a postponement or cancellation which is bound to become known.

It is likely to be interpreted by merchant shipping interests and by friendly Gulf states as a withdrawal of UK support. The Americans especially could look upon it as a failure to support them at a particularly sensitive moment.

7. On balance I believe the likely adverse repercussions of stopping this visit outweigh the uncertain but low risks to our ships of continuing it and I propose that the visit should go ahead. The First Sea Lord considers that it should proceed. I should be grateful for your agreement.

8. Copies of this minute go to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

JPS

JOHN STANLEY



ATTACKS ON SHIPPING

IRAN: 15 since 27.3.84

IRAQ: 37 since 27.3.84

DETAILS OF INCIDENTS FROM 1.8.84

IRAQI ATTACKS

1	FRIENDSHIP L	7/8
4	RANA	23/8
5	AMETHYST	24/8
7	ST TOBIAS	11/9
8	SEETRANS 21	12/9
11	WORLD KNIGHT	8/10
13	SIVAND	12/10
15	SIVAND	15/10

IRANIAN ATTACKS

2	JOHAR	15/8
3	ENDEAVOUR	18/8
6	CLEO I	27/8
9	MEDHERON	16/9
10	ROYAL COLOMBO	16/9
12	JAG PARI	11/10
14	GAZ FOUNTAIN	12/10
16	PACIFIC PROTECTOR	19/10

Telemessage

British TELECOM

KEC4305 LMY5508 PDA0491 P30 5132LOND

30 APR 1984/1119

RHS

T66/84

30 April 1984

TELEMESSAGE
THE RT.HON. PRIME MINISTER
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON
SW1

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T66/84

A. & C. Ys

h.a.

a MASTER
OPS

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,
I AM VERY PLEASED, AS I LEAVE THE UNITED KINGDOM, TO HAVE HAD SUCH AN EXCELLENT CHANCE TO CONFIRM DURING THIS RECENT VISIT THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. I AM GRATEFUL FOR OUR TALKS AT DOWNING STREET WHICH ENABLED US TO CLARIFY VIEWS ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN, AND I NOW LOOK FORWARD TO EVEN CLOSER TIES BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES. I SEND MY BEST WISHES TO YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT.

ISA BIN SULMAN AL-KHALIFA,
AMIR OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN

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R80803X9/83 1,000m

BAHRAIN LUNCH

SPEAKING NOTES

DELIGHTED TO WELCOME HIS HIGHNESS, THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN, AND HIS DISTINGUISHED DELEGATION.

YOUR HIGHNESS, YOUR STATE VISIT TO BRITAIN IS A VERY HAPPY OCCASION.

WE KNOW YOU AS A LONG AND TRUE FRIEND OF BRITAIN.

WE HAVE WELCOMED YOU IN LONDON MANY TIMES AS A PRIVATE VISITOR.

BUT WE ARE NOW DELIGHTED TO HAVE THE PLEASURE OF RECEIVING YOU OFFICIALLY - THE AMIR OF A FRIENDLY COUNTRY FOR WHICH ALL HERE PRESENT, AND MANY WHO COULD NOT BE PRESENT, FEEL THE GREATEST AFFECTION.

/ AROUND YOU

AROUND YOU AT THIS LUNCH TABLE, YOUR HIGHNESS, ARE MANY WHO KNOW YOUR COUNTRY WELL.

SOME HAVE LIVED THERE WITH GREAT ENJOYMENT.

SOME HAVE HAD LINKS WITH YOUR ARMED FORCES.

SOME HAVE WRITTEN ABOUT BAHRAIN.

MANY HAVE TRADED WITH IT.

SOME HAVE EVEN DUG PARTS OF IT UP -

EITHER CO-OPERATING WITH YOUR PROGRAMME OF CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, OR HELPING TO REVEAL THE DEEP HISTORICAL ROOTS OF BAHRAIN.

/ ALL OF US

ALL OF US OWE BAHRAIN THANKS FOR THE WARMTH OF ITS HOSPITALITY, THE VIGOUR OF ITS COMMERCIAL LIFE AND THE EVEN TENOR OF ITS SOCIETY. 8,000 BRITISH EXPATRIATES WHO NOW LIVE IN BAHRAIN WOULD JOIN WITH ME IN THOSE THANKS.

I REMEMBER WITH GREAT PLEASURE MY OWN VISIT IN 1981. YOUR COUNTRY IS AN EXCITING PLACE TO COME TO. THERE IS AN AIR OF SUCCESS AND ACHIEVEMENT WHICH OWES A GREAT DEAL TO THE SKILL AND ENTERPRISE OF BAHRAINIS IN DIVERSIFYING THE ECONOMY AND ESTABLISHING BAHRAIN AS A REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CENTRE OF BANKING AND COMMUNICATIONS.

/ BAHRAIN

BAHRAIN IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF ONE OF THE GREAT MODERN SUCCESS STORIES - THE RAPID ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GULF WHICH HAS IN VERY FEW YEARS TRANSFORMED THE WAY OF LIFE OF THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION AND BROUGHT TO THEM THE BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND MODERN TECHNOLOGY.

YET WE CANNOT IGNORE THE PROBLEMS WHICH ARE OF SUCH DEEP CONCERN TO US BOTH, AS WAS CLEAR, YOUR HIGHNESS, FROM OUR TALKS BEFORE LUNCH.

/ THE CONTINUATION

THE CONTINUATION OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR IMPOSES FURTHER SUFFERING AND HARDSHIP ON THE PEOPLES OF THOSE TWO COUNTRIES.

IT ALSO ENDANGERS THE STABILITY OF AN AREA WHOSE PEOPLE THREATEN NO-ONE AND WHICH PLAYS A VITAL PART IN THE WORLD ECONOMY.

IT IS AN INTRACTABLE PROBLEM AND IT IS NOT EASY TO SEE HOW A SOLUTION CAN BE OBTAINED.

BUT THAT WAR, WITH ITS IMMENSE SUFFERING, IS NEVER FAR FROM OUR THOUGHTS.

WE SHALL STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ALL OUR FRIENDS IN THE GULF AND DO ALL WE CAN TO CONTRIBUTE TO A LESSENING OF THE DANGERS AND AN EVENTUAL SOLUTION.

/ YOUR HIGHNESS

YOUR HIGHNESS, WE WISH YOU AND YOUR DELEGATION A VERY HAPPY STAY IN OUR COUNTRY AND WE WISH YOU PEACE AND PROSPERITY AT HOME.

Highgrove,
Ashburton,
S. Devon.

14th April

DM 1/5
F.a.

Dear John,

After the state visit was over yesterday morning I went and had an hour tete à tete at The Dorchester with my blood-brother, Shaikh Isa.

I thought the Prime Minister might like to know that the little man was absolutely enraptured, even more than I had expected, by his state visit. So were all my old chums in his entourage. Isa was particularly fulsome about his time at No 10. "Oh Tony I am just so sorry I did not record Mrs Thatcher's speech to take back to Bahrain with me". The only word of criticism he had was about the press - harping on →

how we were trying to sell arms to him and so on - but I have every sympathy with him over that.

I know that Anglo-Bahraini relations are not central to the survival of Britain and that they are normally freer of problems than our relations with most Arabs, but I was genuinely struck by the depth of Isa's emotion and particularly by the impression the P.M. had made on him - and on all the Bahrainis she talked to.

I hope the P.M. gives Dick Troughton a break. A long letter from him was waiting for me in Devon yesterday evening. As he puts it "our financial year has already begun and still we have no idea of what we will have this year a next.... y no improvement is made for this year's Budget we will have been cut by 26% since 1980!" Yrs Tony

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

The Amir's Return Banquet at the Dorchester, Thursday 12 April

You are sitting between the Duke of Kent and the Minister of Development and Industry. I attach a background note on the Minister.

The detectives have all the relevant cards, etc.

CR.

11 April 1984

SHIRAWI, YUSUF BIN AHMAD

Minister of Development and Industry. Speaks excellent English. Born 1925. Married, five daughters.

Acting Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs (1982). Bahrain's representative at OAPEC. Also Government Director both of Aluminium Bahrain and of Gulf Air.

Sunni of Persian extraction. Educated in Bahrain and the American University of Beirut.

Yusuf is the outstanding official in Bahrain. Dynamic, intelligent, straightforward and competent. He is outspoken and Europeans often do not realise that he is teasing them. He used to run all the economic and technical aspects of Government himself, until the Prime Minister made him relinquish, with reluctance, some of his responsibilities.

He has a keenly analytical mind and wide interests. Talks volubly on any subject and it is sometimes difficult to follow the thread of his discourse. The Amir, who mistrusted his progressive views and outspoken forthrightness has come to appreciate his worth. He supported the democratic experiment with optimism but without illusion. A strong nationalist - and a Bahraini first.

Yusuf deliberately flouted the traditionalists by marrying a Shia, May al-Arrayed, in 1960 and insisting that she renounce purdah and attend mixed parties. He is allergic to shell-fish.

FILE cc: FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 April 1984

Your Highness

It was a great pleasure to receive you at No.10 today. I much enjoyed our discussions.

I write to thank you most warmly for the magnificent gifts which you so kindly sent to me. These will be kept at 10 Downing Street as a precious memento of your State Visit.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Highness Shaikh Isa Bin Sulman Al Khalifa, G.C.M.G.

R07

MR BUTLER

MR COLES

cc Duty Clerk
Mrs Ryder

Sir William Heseltine has telephoned to say that a present to the Prime Minister from the Amir of Bahrein is being sent here from Windsor Castle (to arrive at about 10.30). Sir William asked that the Prime Minister could see the present before the Amir arrives at No 10.

I have warned the front door.

Angela
9.30
11.4

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 April 1984

STATE VISIT OF THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN

Shaikh Isa Bin Sulman Al Khalifa called on the Prime Minister this morning. I enclose a record of the conversation.

I am copying this record and enclosure to Richard Mottram.

AJC

Peter Ricketts Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN AT 1215 ON WEDNESDAY 11 APRIL 1984 AT NO.10 DOWNING STREET

Present: Prime Minister
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
Mr Tomkys
Mr Coles
Shaikh Isa Bin Sulman Al Khalifa
Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al Khalifa
Shaikh Abdul Rahman Faris Al Khalifa

The Prime Minister welcomed the Amir and congratulated him on his speech at the State Banquet the previous evening. The Amir said that he wanted friendship between Bahrain and the United Kingdom to endure forever. British assistance for Bahrain was most valuable.

The Prime Minister raised the question of the war between Iran and Iraq. It was difficult to identify anyone in the Iranian leadership with whom one could have reasonable discussions. The Amir said that Bahrain wanted an end to the war but did not know how to bring this about. There was a lack of will to do so.

The Prime Minister said that Iran appeared to believe that because of its larger population it could afford to continue the war. It displayed none of the ordinary feelings of humanity. The Amir commented that Iran was encouraged by other countries to continue the fighting. But if the war continued Bahrain and other countries would be affected.

The Prime Minister said that we were often accused of supplying arms to Iran but the fact was that we supplied no lethal items. The only equipment under consideration at the moment was three ships which had been ordered and paid for at the time of the Shah. We were very concerned about the Iran/Iraq situation. We had been expecting a major Iranian offensive for some time and were beginning to wonder whether the delay was a matter of psychological tactics on Iran's part. So far Iraq had resisted adequately and our hope was that it would continue to do so. But it was difficult to see an end of the war during Khomeini's lifetime. Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak said that while it was true that Iraq had been the first to declare war, the effect of Khomeini's actions since he had come

/to power

to power was that of a war against the whole area. He sought fundamental change. This was evidenced by the existence in Iran or an Iraqi Government in exile and Islamic movements for the liberation of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and other countries. The war had now lasted for four years. The Gulf could not afford just to sit and watch. Iran had refused all offers of mediation while Iraq had accepted proposals for negotiation. The question was how long Iraq could hold out. It seemed unlikely to be able to retake the Majnoon Islands. If Iran proved able to push forward and take the Baghdad/Basra road the status quo in the whole area would have changed. Iran would be at the borders of Kuwait.

All countries should show that, while they were not identified with Iraq, they were opposed to the war and would take action if it continued. The United States had been active recently. Bahrain had told Mr Rumsfeld that it was necessary to stop the supply, whether direct or indirect, or arms to Iran. Rumsfeld had promised to help and had said that he would talk to Spain and Portugal.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak said that Israel was supplying Iran with weapons; so was China, indirectly. The Amir added that some Arab countries were too e.g. Syria and Libya.

Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak said that the Americans had recently prevented Italy from sending Bell helicopters to Iran. Spain was selling arms to Syria for onward shipment to Iran. Bahrain's request was that the United Kingdom should help to stop this flow of weaponry and use its influence with those countries with which we had close relations.

The Prime Minister said that we had recently prevented the implementation of an arms contract between a British company and Iran. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the list of countries cited by the Bahrainis as suppliers of arms to Iran was very wide-ranging and included countries which were not responsive to the normal code of international behaviour. It was difficult to mobilize pressure which would bind a country like North Korea.

The Prime Minister repeated that we had not supplied lethal weapons to Iran. But we should perhaps look at orders received from other countries which might be destined for Iran. Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak said that Mr Rumsfeld had discussed this matter with Mr Shamir who had stated that Israel did not supply arms to Iran directly. But Spain and Portugal were thought to provide the Iranians with arms through third parties. The Prime Minister commented that she had not heard this before.

Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak said that there appeared to be a change of attitude in Eastern Europe, induced by offers of oil supplies from Iran. But the important objective was to ensure that Iran could not prolong the war until Iraq was broken. If Iran reached the borders of Kuwait, the implications would be very grave. Now was the time to act.

The Prime Minister asked whether, if Iran broke through, Syria would not be very concerned about the consequences. It was wracked by internal problems. Asad's health was not good. Syrian policy towards Iran appeared to be short-sighted. The Amir commented that now that Syria had secured American withdrawal from Lebanon it felt much stronger.

Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak said that Bahrain had discussed the Iran/Iraq situation with Britain on many occasions. We had been helpful at the United Nations, especially in obtaining Resolution 540. There were difficulties about applying to Iran the sanctions provided for in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. So the only course was to put pressure on Iran by blocking the source of its arms supplies, while making clear that we were doing this not out of hostility for Iran but in order to bring the war to an end.

The Prime Minister asked whether, in Bahrain's view, the Russians believed it to be in their interest to prevent an Iranian success because of the potential affect of Moslem fundamentalism on their Islamic population. Or would they see advantage in fermenting trouble? Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak replied that the Russians had already acquired Afghanistan as a buffer zone. If Iran broke through Iraq and proceeded to the rest of the Gulf the Russians would see the

/resulting

resulting destabilisation of the area as being in their own interests.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Bahrain wanted to see concerted action to deprive Iran of arms. But there seemed to be no concerted action in the Arab world. Shaihk Mohammed Bin Mubarak replied that it was not possible to persuade people like Qadhafi to desist from supplying arms. It would be difficult to block the sources of supply completely but the flow could be minimised. That would send a signal to the Iranian regime. Mr Tomkys asked whether Syria was any more amenable to reason. Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak said that Syria was faced with great internal problems. Bahrain had sought to persuade the Syrians and would continue to do so. He agreed with the Prime Minister that an Iranian defeat of Iraq would have disadvantages for Syria. But what was needed was a world-wide campaign to persuade Iran to stop fighting.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether Khomeini's position would survive the ending of the war. Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak replied that the effect would be adverse. Khomeini believed that he was the messenger of God and that the whole Islami world needed to be redeemed from corruption. It was a dangerous philosophy. But Khomeini was in charge. When the Algerians had tried to convince the Iranian Foreign Minister that it was his country's interest to end the war he had replied that his problem was to convince Khomeini.

The Prime Minister asked whether, if Iraq collapsed, Khomeini would proceed further. Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak replied that, in the Bahraini view, Iran would declare an Islamic Republic in the area of Basra and thus set Iraqis against Iraqis. The next aim would be to change the regime in Kuwait. The Prime Minister commented that Shi'a communities elsewhere in the Middle East seemed to have maintained their loyalties to their own countries. But if Khomeini was successful in Iraq, would the Shi'a communities in the rest of the Gulf be affected? The Amir replied in the affirmative. Khomeini had supporters in many countries.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister the Amir said that the Saudi Arabians had tried to influence Syria but did

/not wish

not wish to pursue their efforts. The reason for this was unclear. Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak said that the situation was now very critical. The efforts of the last four years had failed. It was now necessary to try something else. The Amir said that the United States had earlier been tempted to help Khomeini because he was anti-Soviet. The Prime Minister pointed out that the United States had, nevertheless, been deeply wounded by the incident of the Iranian hostages. The Amir commented that American credibility had suffered from their weakness in Beirut.

The Amir then prompted the Bahraini Foreign Minister to raise a question of bilateral relations. Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak said that for many years Bahrain had been considering the creation of an air wing in its defence force. It had discussed this possibility with many countries including the United States and France. It now wished to consider buying equipment and obtaining advice from the United Kingdom. The Chief of Defence Staff would visit Bahrain shortly. Bahrain would like a team from the Royal Air Force to visit the country to discuss with the Minister of Defence the establishment of an air wing. There was a possibility of buying air defence equipment from Britain. The Prime Minister said that we would ensure that such a team visited Bahrain. We were stepping up our efforts to help Gulf countries with air defence through, for example, the Hawk Trainer. Mr Tomkys said that he thought that Hawk should become the trainer aircraft for Bahrain. There was a potential interest in Tornado and also in establishing an air base on the south of the island where we could give assistance.

It was agreed that the Bahraini proposal would be followed up during the course of the State Visit.

The Prime Minister then referred to the Arab/Israel problem. It was possible that the situation would change after the Israeli elections. The Amir said that he hoped this was so. It was necessary to find a way forward. Bahrain did not want, and had never wanted, to destroy Israel. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Syria's attitude differed from that of the rest of the Arab world. Asad's position seemed to be less secure. The Amir commented that he believed Syria to be stronger now than it had been in the past.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister said that she had sympathy for President Gemayel. He was not a natural politician. The Amir commented that Gemayel was unlikely to last long.

The discussion ended at 1300 hours.

A.J.C.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

I have promised Lord Lothian that we should arrange for him to have a few words with the Amir at drinks before lunch.

A. J. C. 19/4.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 April 1984

Dear John,

State Visit of the Amir of Bahrain

As requested, I enclose some notes for the Prime Minister's use during her toast at her luncheon in honour of the Amir of Bahrain on 11 April.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

STATE VISIT OF THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN: NOTES FOR PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT NO 10 LUNCHEON

1. Delighted to welcome you; remember my own visit to Bahrain in 1981 with great pleasure; struck by skill and enterprise of Bahraini people in diversifying their economy - creating new industries (aluminium smelting, shipping repair) and establishing Bahrain as regional and international banking and communications centre.

2. Great personal satisfaction that our relations have continued to be so close; believe this is true not just at political and economic level, but at personal level as well. Seven thousand British expatriates enjoy at first hand warmth and friendliness of Bahraini society; hope that the many Bahrainis who visit London feel equally welcome.

3. Though visit intended as joyous occasion, setting seal on Anglo/Bahraini relations, sadly cannot ignore regional and international problems of deep concern to us both. Failure to end Iran/Iraq war imposes further suffering and hardship on peoples of the two countries; but also endangers stability of an area whose people threaten no-one and which plays a vital part in world economy. Wish I could believe prospects for settlement were brighter; numerous mediators have tried and failed. Nevertheless will not give up: remain in closest touch with our friends in the Gulf (our talks this morning) and doing all we can at the UN.

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN

I shall let you have some speaking notes for after lunch separately (now attached)

For the talks the Amir wishes to be accompanied by his Foreign Minister (Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa) and his Ambassador (Shaikh Abdul-Rahman). On our side we will have the Foreign Secretary and our Ambassador in Bahrain (Mr. Roger Tomkys).

I suggest that we have talks in the White Room.

The two subjects which the Amir will want to discuss are Iran/Iraq and Arab/Israel. I suggest that you concentrate on the briefs in this folder on these subjects. Perhaps the most important point is contingency planning for a deterioration in the Iran/Iraq war.

A.S.C.

10 April, 1984

BAHRAIN LUNCH

SPEAKING NOTES

DELIGHTED TO WELCOME HIS HIGHNESS, THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN, AND HIS DISTINGUISHED DELEGATION.

YOUR HIGHNESS, YOUR STATE VISIT TO BRITAIN IS A VERY HAPPY OCCASION.

WE KNOW YOU AS A LONG AND TRUE FRIEND OF BRITAIN.

WE HAVE WELCOMED YOU IN LONDON MANY TIMES AS A PRIVATE VISITOR.

BUT WE ARE NOW DELIGHTED TO HAVE THE PLEASURE OF RECEIVING YOU OFFICIALLY - THE AMIR OF A FRIENDLY COUNTRY FOR WHICH ALL HERE PRESENT, AND MANY WHO COULD NOT BE PRESENT, FEEL THE GREATEST AFFECTION.

/ AROUND YOU

AROUND YOU AT THIS LUNCH TABLE, YOUR HIGHNESS, ARE MANY WHO KNOW YOUR COUNTRY WELL.

SOME HAVE LIVED THERE WITH GREAT ENJOYMENT.

SOME HAVE HAD LINKS WITH YOUR ARMED FORCES.

SOME HAVE WRITTEN ABOUT BAHRAIN.

MANY HAVE TRADED WITH IT.

SOME HAVE EVEN DUG PARTS OF IT UP - EITHER CO-OPERATING WITH YOUR PROGRAMME OF CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, OR HELPING TO REVEAL THE DEEP HISTORICAL ROOTS OF BAHRAIN.

/ ALL OF US

ALL OF US OWE BAHRAIN THANKS FOR THE WARMTH OF ITS HOSPITALITY, THE VIGOUR OF ITS COMMERCIAL LIFE AND THE EVEN TENOR OF ITS SOCIETY. 8,000 BRITISH EXPATRIATES WHO NOW LIVE IN BAHRAIN WOULD JOIN WITH ME IN THOSE THANKS.

I REMEMBER WITH GREAT PLEASURE MY OWN VISIT IN 1981. YOUR COUNTRY IS AN EXCITING PLACE TO COME TO. THERE IS AN AIR OF SUCCESS AND ACHIEVEMENT WHICH OWES A GREAT DEAL TO THE SKILL AND ENTERPRISE OF BAHRAINIANS IN DIVERSIFYING THE ECONOMY AND ESTABLISHING BAHRAIN AS A REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CENTRE OF BANKING AND COMMUNICATIONS.

/ BAHRAIN

BAHRAIN IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF ONE OF THE GREAT MODERN SUCCESS STORIES - THE RAPID ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GULF WHICH HAS IN VERY FEW YEARS TRANSFORMED THE WAY OF LIFE OF THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION AND BROUGHT TO THEM THE BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND MODERN TECHNOLOGY.

YET WE CANNOT IGNORE THE PROBLEMS WHICH ARE OF SUCH DEEP CONCERN TO US BOTH, AS WAS CLEAR, YOUR HIGHNESS, FROM OUR TALKS BEFORE LUNCH.

/ THE CONTINUATION

THE CONTINUATION OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR IMPOSES FURTHER SUFFERING AND HARDSHIP ON THE PEOPLES OF THOSE TWO COUNTRIES.

IT ALSO ENDANGERS THE STABILITY OF AN AREA WHOSE PEOPLE THREATEN NO-ONE AND WHICH PLAYS A VITAL PART IN THE WORLD ECONOMY.

IT IS AN INTRACTABLE PROBLEM AND IT IS NOT EASY TO SEE HOW A SOLUTION CAN BE OBTAINED.

BUT THAT WAR, WITH ITS IMMENSE SUFFERING, IS NEVER FAR FROM OUR THOUGHTS.

WE SHALL STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ALL OUR FRIENDS IN THE GULF AND DO ALL WE CAN TO CONTRIBUTE TO A LESSENING OF THE DANGERS AND AN EVENTUAL SOLUTION.

/ YOUR HIGHNESS

YOUR HIGHNESS, WE WISH YOU AND YOUR DELEGATION A VERY HAPPY STAY IN OUR COUNTRY AND WE WISH YOU PEACE AND PROSPERITY AT HOME.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 April 1984

A.J.C. 11/4.

Dear John.

h.a.

State Visit of the Amir of Bahrain

I enclose three sets of briefing for the official talks on 11 April.* We envisage that the Amir and Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak will wish to concentrate on the Iran/Iraq conflict and the security of Bahrain. There are no bilateral problems likely to be raised.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

* See attached Folder.

The National Archives

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EMBASSY
OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN
LONDON

سفارة دولة البحرين
لندن

Ref. _____ الرقم _____

Date 5th April, 1984 التاريخ _____

Dear Private Secretary,

BAHRAIN STATE VISIT

The Amir's Return Banquet at the Dorchester

Thursday, 12th March, 1984

I enclose for information a copy of a memorandum from the Lord Chamberlain's Office about the arrangements for this Banquet.

Also attached is a copy of the seating plan of the top table. You should note the processional arrangements for members of the Royal Family and others sitting at the top table; and also for the arrangements at the conclusion of the Banquet as set out in the final paragraph.

Yours faithfully,

Rosamond Thonger

Rosamond J E Thonger (Miss)
Ambassador's Secretary

Private Secretary to
The Rt Hon the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

LORD CHAMBERLAIN'S OFFICE,
ST JAMES'S PALACE, S.W.1.

4th April, 1984.

M E M O R A N D U M

From: Comptroller

To: Private Secretary
Private Secretary to The Duke of Edinburgh
Private Secretary to The Duke and Duchess of Kent
Private Secretary to Prince Michael of Kent
Private Secretary to Princess Alexandra,
the Hon. Mrs. Angus Ogilvy

Hon. Angus Ogilvy

Copy: Lieutenant-Colonel George West
Major Hugh Lindsay
Captain Alexander Matheson

BAHRAIN STATE VISIT

The Amir's Return Banquet at the Dorchester

Thursday, 12th March, 1984

The Banquet will take place in the Ballroom where the Top Table will have seating on one side only and in front of it 26 Round Tables.

A seating plan of the Top Table is attached.

The Amir, The Queen and The Duke of Edinburgh, Members of the Royal Family and all others seated at the Top Table assemble in the New Park Suite before the Banquet.

After the general guests have taken their places in the Ballroom Members of the Royal Family and others seated at the Top Table will be conducted to their seats as follows :-

The Duke of Kent
The Prime Minister
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Duchess of Kent
Prince Michael of Kent
by the Minister of the Interior

Princess Alexandra
The Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps
Viscountess Whitelaw
by the Financial Adviser to the
(Bahrain) Prime Minister

Hon. Angus Ogilvy
Mrs. Weatherill
Mr. Denis Thatcher
by Lieutenant-Colonel George West

Lord Chancellor
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Baroness Phillips
by the Minister of Development and Industry

Lord President of the Council
The Speaker
Lady Howe
by the Minister of Information

Thereafter, the Head of the Amiri Court will conduct Her Majesty, His Royal Highness and His Highness to the Ballroom.

At the conclusion of the Banquet the Amir will conduct The Queen and The Duke of Edinburgh, followed by Members of the Royal Family and all those seated at the Top Table and the general guests to the Silver and Gold Rooms, adjoining the Ballroom.

BANQUET AT THE DORCHESTER

Thursday, 12th April, 1984

The Speaker

Lady Howe

Minister of Information

Viscount Whitelaw

Princess Alexandra,
Hon. Mrs. Angus Ogilvy

The Doyen

Financial Advisor to
the Prime Minister

Viscountess Whitelaw

Prince Michael of Kent

Minister of the Interior

The Duchess of Kent

The Duke of Edinburgh

The Amir

The Queen

Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Duke of Kent

The Prime Minister

Minister of Development
and Industry

Lord Chancellor

Baroness Phillips

Sir Geoffrey Howe

Hon. Angus Ogilvy

Mrs. Weatherill

Head of Amiri Court

Mr. Denis Thatcher

FLE

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 April, 1984

STATE VISIT OF THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN

Thank you for your letter of 3 April. I agree with your suggestion as to who should participate in the Prime Minister's talks with the Amir.

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

gc PC

RESTRICTED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 April 1984

Dear John,

State Visit of the Amir of Bahrain

Your letter of 9 January recorded that the Prime Minister had set aside 45 minutes before lunch on 11 April for talks with the Amir of Bahrain.

The Bahraini Embassy here are unable to say who will accompany the Amir to the talks. Our Ambassador in Bahrain has advised that he will probably wish to bring with him his Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Development and Industry and Information.

We suggest that on this basis the Prime Minister might be accompanied on our side by the Foreign Secretary, Mr Luce and Sir John Leahy from the FCO. We understand that Mr Pattie is also interested in attending (the Defence Secretary will be away). Although the Defence Minister will not be present on the Bahraini side, defence issues may be raised. British Ministerial counterparts of other Bahraini Ministers are not available on this date.

I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister agrees with these arrangements.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Lord Chamberlain's Office and to S R Douglas (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

Bahrain June 79 relations

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 March 1984

A.J.C. 29/3

Dear John,

State Visit of the Amir of Bahrain,

You might like to have a copy of the * confidential and unclassified briefs which have been produced

We shall, of course, be providing separate briefing for the Prime Minister's talks with the Amir.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

* To be found in the folder at the back of this file.

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT OF THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN

TUESDAY 10 APRIL 1984

STATE VISIT OF
HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA
AMIR OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN
10-13 APRIL 1984

LIST OF BRIEFS

(i) Steering Brief
(ii) Iran/Iraq and the Gulf
(iii) Arab/Israel
(iv) Defence Sales
(v) Trade (Background)
(vi) British Council and Educational Co-operation

Annexes: A Personality notes
B Forms of Address and Pronunciation Guide

STATE VISIT OF HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA
AMIR OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN

STEERING BRIEF

1. In area Bahrain is the smallest of the Gulf States, although its population of approximately 400,000 is nearly twice that of Qatar. It was the first Gulf State to produce oil, and is now the first to face the challenge of running its economy without a large oil income. Because of its early oil wealth (and its long trading history), it has a more varied and better educated society and a more cosmopolitan atmosphere than the other Gulf States. But it is also the state most vulnerable to subversion.

2. Bahrain never had vast oil reserves; they have now almost run out. Its economy relies heavily on Saudi aid and the refining of Saudi crude, though it has attempted to diversify by developing industries (aluminium smelting, ship repairing), and by promoting Bahrain as a communications and off-shore banking centre. The economy has coped well with the world recession. The opening of a causeway linking Bahrain to Saudi Arabia in 1986 should increase income from Saudi visitors and give Bahrain's merchant community new scope (although some claim they will suffer in competition with their Saudi counterparts, who have a much larger domestic base).

3. The most serious threat to Bahrain's stability remains the Sunni/Shia divide. When the Al-Khalifa and their tribal followers conquered Bahrain 200 years ago, the island was almost wholly Shia. Even today the Sunni constitute less than a third of the population and many of these are of mixed Persian/Arab origin without strong roots in Bahrain. Although there are many wealthy Shia contractors and merchants, there remains a substantial class of poor Bahrainis, drawn almost exclusively from the native Shia of the villages and those of Persian origin in Manama. They remain susceptible to Iranian and other subversion, whether Islamic or left-wing in

/origin.

origin. An Iranian-backed conspiracy was foiled in December 1981. There has been little trouble-making since then, but any instability in Bahrain would have repercussions up and down the Gulf.

4. British relations have remained close since the ending of the special treaty relationship in 1971. A Treaty of Friendship was signed in 1971 and renewed in 1981. Most of the senior members of the ruling family are anglophile and anglophone, and Britain is regarded by many as their second home. There are British advisers in several key positions. British Contractors and Consultants have played a leading role in Bahrain's development. There are about 8,000 British expatriates living in Bahrain who make a substantial contribution to invisible earnings. Competition is now keen, but in 1982 we held first place with 24% of the import market, selling goods worth £150 million.

5. This will be the Amir's first State Visit to the UK, though he has made many private visits, and follows the visit by The Queen and The Duke of Edinburgh to Bahrain in 1979. It will be of especial importance to the Amir because of his strong personal affection for Britain and the high regard in which he holds The Queen.

Principal UK Objectives

6. (i) give the Amir political reassurance of our commitment to and interest in the Gulf;

(ii) indicate our willingness to continue discreet help on problems of internal security (The Minister of Interior will be attending separate talks on this);

(iii) engage the Bahrainis, especially the Foreign Minister, in a dialogue on regional issues;

(iv) express our willingness to continue helping to train, advise and equip the Bahrain Defence Force.

Probable Bahrain Objectives

7. (i) to discuss the Iran/Iraq war and Gulf security;

(ii) to discuss developments in Lebanon and to seek assurances of continuing European efforts (particularly pressure on the US) regarding the Arab/Israel dispute (Foreign Minister only).

The Briefs

Iran/Iraq : Gulf Security

8. The Bahrainis are realistic about the prospects of further mediation between Iran and Iraq. They are also very aware of their vulnerability both to subversion (though their internal security forces appear to have this under control) and to retaliatory air raids. (Bahrain has no air force as yet and minimal air defence.) We have no formal defence commitments: the Treaty of Friendship merely provides for consultation in times of need. But the Bahrainis are likely to want to discuss the nature of the threat and to be assured of our commitment to Bahrain.

Arab/Israel/Lebanon

9. Shaikh Muhammad bin Mubarak, the Foreign Minister, is an articulate and respected advocate for the Gulf countries and understands better than most the constraints on Western policy. He has no illusions about the prospects for progress on these issues, although he has strong personal views on the Palestinians.

Defence Sales

10. Bahrain is to receive substantial funds from the GCC to help with its defence procurement. This is already leading to pressure to standardise on existing Saudi (predominantly French and American) equipment, but the Amir has instructed that priority be given to

/UK

UK manufacturers. The sale of Hawk to Kuwait and the UAE should help a similar sale to Bahrain.

Trade

11. Background briefing only.

Bilateral

12. Apart from a short note on the British Council, no separate briefing is provided, as there are no bilateral problems. The Duke of Gloucester has plans to visit Bahrain in October, and Mr Luce in November/December.

STATE VISIT OF THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN
BRIEF NO 1 - IRAN/IRAQ AND THE GULF

POINTS TO MAKE

The War

1. Concerned by recent fighting on land. Further major Iranian offensive in south still expected. We believe Iraq can withstand this. What is Bahraini view?

Escalation

2. Wish to avoid escalation of the conflict. Iraqi attacks on shipping not helpful. How likely are major Iraqi attacks on Kharg Island or on oil tankers in the Gulf? Do not want Iran to be given excuse for attacks on Gulf States. How do you see the current threat?

Mediation

3. UK will support any diplomatic efforts which may help end the war. UN report on use of chemical weapons in the conflict might provide basis for reactivating mediation efforts of UN Secretary-General. How do you envisage follow-up to Arab League Foreign Ministers' meeting in Baghdad.

Contingency Planning

4. Our first response to any escalation of the war in the Gulf would be diplomatic, but only prudent to undertake some contingency planning. We and Americans need to know whether support and facilities of regional states will be available in a crisis. Where does Bahrain stand? Will facilities already granted to Americans be extended? If Iran launched attacks on individual Gulf States or interfered with shipping in the Straits of Hormuz, how would the GCC react? Would there be a collective invitation, without which Western powers could not intervene? Wish to continue our present support for Bahrain Defence force. [If pressed on our response in the event of attack] We cannot give precise advance commitments.

Iraqi Use of CW

5. Very concerned that reports of specialists appointed by the UN Secretary-General confirm that chemical weapons have been used. Condemn the use of chemical weapons wherever it occurs. Iraq risks losing the support of world opinion. Report underlines urgent need to end conflict.

Arms Sales (Defensive)

6. We remain strictly neutral and have not supplied lethal items to either side: particularly Iran. Our even-handed position helps to keep open a channel of communication with Iran, which could be of use if mediation ever gets under way.

BACKGROUND

The War

1. Fighting has intensified in recent weeks with a series of Iranian offensives in the central and southern sectors of the front, though it is comparatively quiet at present. Iranians are preparing for a further large-scale attack. Not clear why this has not yet been launched: there may be differences of view in the Iranian hierarchy. Iraqi Army's performance in defence so far has been good. They should be able to contain the expected main offensive.

The Gulf

2. Iraqi air attacks on shipping have continued. On 27 March the Iraqis damaged a Greek tanker and sank a South Korean supply boat working for Saudi Arabia. These attacks were outside the Iraqi MEZ. On 28 March, Iraq attacked an Iranian convoy near Bandar Khomeini, hitting a Greek and an Iranian vessel. Oil prices and insurance rates have not as yet been affected by these attacks.

Bahraini View

3. The Amir is aware that Bahrain is vulnerable both to external attack and internal subversion. (Bahrain is the only Gulf State with a Shia majority.) He is therefore particularly afraid of Iranian victory.

UN Mediation and Chemical Weapons

A 4. Main problem remains Iranian intransigence. The Presidential declaration endorsed by the Security Council on 30 March, following a UN investigation into the use of chemical weapons in the conflict, might prove to be a means of getting the Iranians back into play with the UN. It confirmed the Iranian claims that chemical weapons had been used, but also supported the efforts of the UN Secretary-General to mediate. The former should please Iran, the latter Iraq. In the meantime, the UK continues to encourage any realistic mediation effort (Mr Palme, NAM, Islamic Conference).

5. Arab League Foreign Ministers held an emergency meeting on 13/14 March in Baghdad. They affirmed their support for Iraq, and set up a committee to work for an end to the war through fresh international contacts. The committee held their first meeting in the margins of the Arab League Council on 2 April in Tunis. Part of the committee's mandate may be to work out ways of bringing pressure on the West not to trade with Iran.

Action by the Ten

B 6. The Foreign Ministers of the Ten agreed the text of a statement of the Middle East at the European Council on 19/20 March, which was issued after the Foreign Ministers' meeting on 27 March, in Brussels.

Arms Sales

7. There have been a number of press reports that the UK has been supplying arms to Iran, including Spey military engines and Rapier and Tigercat missile spares. These reports are untrue. Repeated denials that the UK has supplied lethal equipment to Iran seem to have convinced neither Iraq nor its Arab backers. The Saudis approached us again on 4 April to urge us to stop supplying arms to Iran, possibly as a result of the Arab League Council meeting. The Bahrainis may also raise this question.

8. [Not for Use] There has been some progress in discussions with the Iranians on an interim package of blocked military equipment. Decisions on some tank spares have been delayed to allow a more thorough investigation of their lethality. A fleet support ship, the Kharg, and two Yarrow logistic support ships (all unarmed), will be released though none is likely to leave the UK for several months. These will be of no benefit to Iran in the conflict.

Contigency Planning

9. The Bahrainis are more realistic than most of the other Gulf states about the need to discuss contingency planning. In November last year the Amir agreed that the US could add an HQ element from US CENTCOM to the existing naval presence in Bahrain (MidEastFor). But the Amir has become more critical generally of US policy in the Middle East, and the American performance in Lebanon (and before that Iran) has raised doubts in his mind about American reliability. The Foreign Minister, Shaikh Mohammad bin Mubarak, has always resented US links with Israel and is more sensitive to the internal and regional penalties arising from any intervention in the Gulf. For effective military help the Bahrainis will turn first to the US in a crisis; but it would be unacceptable to them if they supposed we regarded them as being America's clients and not our own. There would be no advantage to us in acquiescing in such a division of responsibilities.

British Support for Bahrain

10. Internal security is maintained by an efficient Special Branch, headed by a British expatriate. External defence is managed by the Bahrain Defence Force for which we provide assistance through the Director of Military Assistance Overseas, at present in the form of the Royal Marine Training Team. Both these forms of assistance are particularly valued by the Bahrainis.

GRS 450

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 317 OF 29 MARCH
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, BIS TEHRAN, UKDIS GENEVA, PARIS, THE HAGUE, WASHINGTON
PRIORITY STOCKHOLM, UKDEL OECD, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, GULF POSTS.

MIPT: IRAN / IRAQ: CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT:

ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I AM AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING DECLARATION:

"THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HAVING CONSIDERED AGAIN THE QUESTION ENTITLED 'THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ', AND GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONFLICT WHICH ENDANGERS INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION, HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE REPORT OF THE SPECIALISTS APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INVESTIAGE ALLEGATIONS BY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN CONCERNING THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (S/16433).

"THEY NOTE WITH PARTICULAR CONCERN THE UNANIMOUS CONCLUSIONS OF THE SPECIALISTS THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE BEEN USED. FURTHERMORE, THEY EXPRESS THEIR GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT ALL REPORTED VIOLATIONS IN THE CONFLICT OF THE RULES OF INTERNATIONA LAW AND OF THE PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT ACCEPTED BY THE WORLD COMMUNITY TO PREVENT OR ALLEVIATE THE HUMAN SUFFERING OF WARFARE, AND AFFIRM STRONGLY THE CONCLUSION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT THESE HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS CAN ONLY BE FULLY SATISFIED BY PUTTING AN END TO THE TRAGIC CONFLICT THAT CONTINUES TO DEPLETE THE PRECIOUS HUMAN RESOURCES OF IRAN AND IRAQ.

"THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL:
- STRONGLY CONDEMN THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS REPORTED BY THE FINDING OF THE MISSION OF SPECIALISTS:
- REAFFIRM THE NEED TO ABIDE STRICTLY BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES AND OF BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE:
- CALL ON THE STATES CONCERNED SCRUPULOUSLY TO ADHERE TO THE OBLIGATIONS FLOWING FROM THEIR ACCESSION TO THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925:
- CONDEMN ALL VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND URGE BOTH PARTIES TO OBSERVE THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW WHICH ARE APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS/UNS

UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS DESIGNED TO PREVENT OR ALLEVIATE THE HUMAN SUFFERING OF WARFARE:

- RECALL RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, RENEW URGENTLY THEIR CALLS FOR THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF A CEASE-FIRE AND FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT AND CALL UPON ALL GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE COUNCIL IN ITS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT CONDITIONS LEADING TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
- APPRECIATE THE MEDIATION EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND REQUEST HIM TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE , JUST AND HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE FOR BOTH SIDES: AND
- DECIDE TO KEEP THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ UNDER CLOSE REVIEW''.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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MINISTERIAL STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON 27 MARCH

IRAN/IRAQ

The Foreign Ministers emphasise the gravity of the risks which continued warfare between Iran and Iraq poses for the region of the Gulf, for the entire Middle East and for international peace and stability.

Recent developments have increased the sufferings of the peoples of both countries and could open the way to new and dangerous escalation in the intensity and spread of the conflict.

The Ten wish to record their distress at the allegations of the use of chemical weapons. They hope that, as a result of the UN enquiry, the truth of the matter will be brought to light. They recall their unreserved condemnation of any use of these weapons.

The Ten call on the parties to comply with the principles and provisions of humanitarian international law in armed conflicts.

The Ten hope that each of the parties will finally agree to comply with the Security Council resolutions and heed the numerous appeals addressed to them by the international community. They hope that the parties will cooperate in the search for a peaceful solution, honourable for them both.

They hope that the UN Secretary-General will intensify his efforts for the restoration of peace and are ready to lend him their support to this end.

STATE VISIT OF HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA, AMIR OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN, 10-13 APRIL 1984

BRIEF NO 2: ARAB/ISRAEL

Points to Make

1. Welcome resumption of Jordan/PLO dialogue. Momentum must be maintained. Hussein and Arafat will need moderate Arab support. UK/Ten intend to continue active diplomacy based on our well-known principles, but for parties to make the running. (If UK/Europe criticised for doing too little) Britain's practical support for Palestinians has been strong. Our contribution to UNRWA is the second largest since the agency's inception in 1950.

2. While Arabs differ on negotiating posture Israeli settlements forge ahead. We view settlements as illegal and an obstacle to peace. Israeli elections offer some hope of movement in their position. But much greater Arab unity needed if Israelis are ever to come under real pressure to negotiate. How would Bahrain view the election of an Israeli labour government commited to making concessions on settlements and negotiatating over the Occupied Territories with Reagan Plan as a starting point?

3. (Defensive) US essential to peace process. Believe Reagan sincere in his attachment to 1982 proposals but engaged at present in US elections; hope US will play a more active mediating role after elections.

Background

1. The Bahrainis take a relatively moderate stance on the Arab/Israel dispute, seeking a political solution based on the Fez principles. They adopt a low profile on Arab/Israel themselves, but will probably ask us to adopt a high one and in particular use our influence to moderate US policies.

2. Arafat visited Amman in late February. The joint communique, largely drafted by the PLO side, sold no passes: the two sides reaffirmed the position of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and their commitment to Fez. The result of the visit amounted to little more than agreement to continue the dialogue. A brief second visit by Arafat to Amman in early March added little. Prospects for real progress in the dialogue are not good. Arafat, though disengaged from pro-Syrian PLO rebels, still has difficulties with remaining hardliners. Syria can make its opposition felt through pressure both on the PLO and Jordan. The present Israeli Government insists it will never negotiate with Arafat.

3. Unless the US is willing to put pressure on Israel, Arafat is unlikely to be able to reach agreement with King Hussein. Hussein asked the US to press Israel to allow Palestinians from the West Bank to attend a Palestine National Council meeting, which Arafat hopes to convene to strengthen his hand against PLO hardliners. President Reagan declined to do so, and also told Hussein that his draft SCR on Israeli settlements, which did not describe them as illegal, was inappropriate and unhelpful. Hussein reacted badly and, in an interview with the New York Times published on 15 March, lambasted the US for one-sided support of Israel and rejected the Reagan proposals for Jordanian/Palestinian negotiations with Israel. In view of the critical role for Jordan in the Reagan plan, Hussein has subsequently toned down his language, and has reaffirmed his respect for the President personally. Nevertheless it is clear that he has no illusions that the US can give him much help before the election. He may also have doubts about a sufficient US commitment

to the peace process after the election. The Administration's failure to pursue the proposed sale of "Stinger" anti-aircraft missiles to Jordan will not help relations. The Administration is, on the other hand, opposed to Senator Moynihan's draft legislation to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem (Hart and Mondale support it).

4. The King's attack on the US will have done him less harm with the Arab world. Distancing himself from Washington may be of some help in building a Jordanian/PLO position, and in defusing Syrian propaganda claims that he is preparing to sell out to Israel and the US. But for the next stage - negotiations with Israel - Jordan cannot do without US support. We should therefore expect Jordanian/US relations to recover in due course, but real progress will be difficult until the US election is over.

5. Apart form the US, Britain has been the largest contributor to the United Relations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) since its operations began in 1950. Our present annual contribution to UNRWA's core budget stands at £5m and we responded to the agency's 1984 Lebanon Appeal with a further £0.5 m. In contrast, Arab contributions are negligible, on the basis that the Arab world is not responsible for the creation of the Palestinian problem.

NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA DEPARTMENT

5 April 1984

STATE VISIT OF HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA, AMIR OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN, 10-13 APRIL 1984

DEFENCE SALES BRIEF - BAHRAIN

Points to make

1. We are always ready to assist the Bahrain Defence Force with defence equipment and training. In particular we have interest in:

a. Hawk. We welcome BDF interest in Hawk. Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Kuwait have already acquired the aircraft. Saudi Arabia is showing interest. It is well on the way to becoming the standard GCC jet trainer.

b. AFVs. We are pleased that the BDF were able to attend the UAE Armour Trial last summer and hope it will assist the final decision-making process.

c. Sea Skua/Sea Spray. We welcome the BDF interest in Sea Skua and can wholeheartedly endorse the system which performed so well during the Falklands campaign.

d. Air Defence. We remain happy to assist with air defence both in terms of advice and equipment.

STATE VISIT OF HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA, AMIR OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN, 10-13 APRIL 1984

DEFENCE SALES BRIEF - BAHRAIN

Essential Facts

1. General. Bahrain is a small market for defence sales; there is not much money nor the manpower to sustain large purchases of equipment. However, Bahrain is due to receive $1.7 billion of GCC funds for defence purchases over the next 10 years and this will transform the position. Although Saudi thinking will naturally influence Bahraini choice, the Amir has instructed that priority be given to UK equipment. There is strong US competition.

2. Hawk. This is a good prospect, since the US are not prepared to offer to the Gulf States F16 aircraft in service with USAF. It could well gain impetus from the recent Hawk trainer contracts signed with UAE and Kuwait. The Saudi attitude could prove crucial although the Saudi Air Force has recently shown interest in Hawk too. GCC funds would provide the means by which Bahrain could make the purchase (value £25M).

3. Main Battle Tanks. The Bahrainis are thinking of acquiring about 30 tanks, though delays in the arrival of GCC funds may mean that the purchase is deferred. Further discussions on requirements are unlikely to begin for another 4 months. Despite our efforts (a letter of comfort from the Secretary of State and a statement on the commonality of spares between Valiant and Challenger), Valiant seems to have lost its position as a prime contender, both on the grounds that it is not in service with the British Army and because of its poor showing in the UAE armour trials last August. BDF were impressed with Challenger's performance during the Abu Dhabi trials; should other GCC states acquire Challenger, Bahrain may well follow suit. An alternative to heavy armour could be MCV 80 fitted with a large calibre gun (value £50M). There is evidence that the BDF have a requirement for light AFVs to complement their intended tank purchase.

4. Sea Skua/Sea Spray. BDF have expressed a strong interest in acquiring this missile system for their Bell 212 helicopters. Maximum requirement could be for up to 6 systems. BAe DG have submitted proposals based on joint development work with Agusta Bell. Project radar fit is Ferranti's Sea Spray as used by the RN in

Lynx. Prospects have been markedly improved by BAe's success in selling Sea Skua/ Sea Spray to Turkey for installation in their Bell 212 helicopters (value £25M).

5. Air Defence. Defecting Iranian helicopters landing undetected in Bahrain have prompted a request that HMG should study ways of improving the Defence Force's and the Coastguard's surveillance capability for both maritime and air movements. A joint RAF/DSO team visited Bahrain in July/August 1983 to discuss requirements and an independent MOD assessment was submitted to BDF in September, followed by a DSO paper on what equipment UK industry could provide. The Chief of Staff asked DMAO to recommend the British company best suited to provide ground-based radars (either Marconi or Plessey) during his visit in January 1984 and a response is being prepared. The main competition, with Saudi backing, is from US. The BDF hope to acquire close range missile systems and although I-Hawk currently seems favoured, Rapier and Javelin may still be in the running (value £10M initially).

JP

STATE VISIT OF HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA, AMIR OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN - 10-13 APRIL 1984

TRADE BRIEF

Visible Trade (Current Values)

£ million

	1981	1982	1983
UK Exports	102	152	150
UK Imports	17	36	38

Market Share of OECD Exports-League Table 1982

1	UK	24%
2	Japan	20%
3	USA	19%
4	FRG	9%
5	France	4½%

UK Performance

1 Britain's exports up in 1982 by 50% after some years in the doldrums, but in 1983 slight drop of 1% on the previous year's performance. British exports broadly based but we have made little impact on major project business despite goodwill towards Britain.

JP

2 UK EXPORTS TO BAHRAIN BY SECTOR

SITC SECTION

		1981 £m	1982 £m	1983 £m
0	Food and Live Animals chiefly for food	4.0	6.2	7.3
1	Beverages and Tobacco	3.5	6.3	7.7
2	Crude Materials, Inedible except fuels	0.4	0.3	0.2
3	Mineral fuels, lubricants and related minerals	0.4	0.9	1.0
4	Animal and Vegetable oils, fats and waxes	NEG	NEG	NEG
5	Chemicals and Related Products NES	15.1	16.3	16.9
6	Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by Material	15.8	25.1	26.9
7	Machinery and Transport Equipment	45.5	72.4	64.9
8	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	13.5	20.8	21.0
9	Commodities and Transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC	3.9	3.8	4.3
		102.1	152.1	150.2

SOURCE: Overseas Trade Statistics

Economy

3 Significant progress made in recent years in broadening economic base (aluminium production; ship building and repair yard; offshore banking units). Aluminium industry an important source of income but lowering of world demand led to Aluminium Bahrain (ALBA) suffering a loss of US $26 million in 1982. However, sales up 47% in first six months of 1983.

jp

4 Bahrain now recognised as one of world's major financial centres with twenty onshore commercial banks and approx 75 offshore banking units (OBU's) plus other financial services. OBUs have grown at a phenomenal rate (now more steady) and although set backs occurred earlier last year, market is now more confident about the future.

5 Despite diversification of economy, income from oil production and refining accounts on average for 70% of total budgetary income. 1983 was a year of belt tightening with introduction of Government measures to help to offset drop in oil revenues. The Four Year Social and Economic Development Plan (1982-85) extended to six years.

Commercial Prospects

6 Outline details 1984/5 budget indicate anticipated expenditure only slightly down on allocation for 1982/3. Government emphasise that although allocations down they are higher than outturn of expenditure in some sectors and contain ample provision to keep economy moving. Growth rate of 5% is aimed at through 1984/85.

7 Although no very large contracts in the offing possibility of a new civic centre in Manama which might be worth up to £20 million for a joint British/Bahraini venture.

8 Notwithstanding recent slowing down in economic activity, opportunities for British products remain good.

Existing/Potential Priority Sectors for UK Exports

9 Electricity generation; desalination; sewerage; telecommunications; healthcare; information technology; security and fire protection; repair and maintenance.

Department of Trade and Industry
April 1984

STATE VISIT OF HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA
AMIR OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN
10-13 APRIL 1984

POINTS TO MAKE

BRITISH COUNCIL AND EDUCATIONAL CO OPERATION

1. We are hoping to expand the British Council's activities in Bahrain, particularly in view of the development of the Arabian Gulf University. Plans have been drawn up to construct a new British Council Centre, which, we hope, will meet the expected increase in demand for its services.

STATE VISIT OF HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA, AMIR OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN, 10-13 APRIL 1984

BRITISH COUNCIL AND EDUCATIONAL CO-OPERATION

1. The British Council have been active in Bahrain since 1959, first as an outpost of the Representation in Kuwait and becoming a fully independent Office in 1968.

2. The Council's main activity in Bahrain is English Language Training. Some 1,400 students enrol each year in the Council's own English Training Centre which provides courses at all levels for the general public for professional, educational and social purposes. Specially designed courses are also provided for groups of industrial workers and for government and public service employees. The revenue from fees amounts to well over £1/2 million annually.

3. There is general agreement that the Council's existing premises, which comprise offices, the teaching centre, the library and a small theatre are now substandard and limit the potential range of activities in Bahrain. The Council hope to build a new Centre there within the next two or three years.

4. The Council recruit and administer British specialist staff for schools and colleges in Bahrain. They also advise on and arrange training in Britain for Bahraini students and trainees, both private and government-sponsored. They also conduct examinations in Bahrain for British institutions.

5. The new Arabian Gulf University, jointly sponsored by seven Gulf States is expected to open in Bahrain in 1986. A planning symposium was held in Bahrain in May 1983 and reached the conclusion that, except for the Medical Faculty, the new University should concentrate on post-graduate studies and research. The

/symposium

symposium was attended by two British academics, Sir Frank Hartley who is a former Vice Chancellor of London University, and Professor Lockwood of Southampton University. It is proposed that scholarships in the United Kingdom for university staff development will be awarded by the British Council and by the Ambassador under the FCO Scholarships and Awards Scheme. It is likely that a President of the University will be appointed before the end of this year and the British Council have it in mind to invite the appointee to visit Britain as early as possible to prepare the ground for establishing links with British universities.

HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA (GCMG)

Amir of Bahrain. Speaks good English. Born 1932. Married, nine children.

Became Ruler on his father's death in 1961. Has paid visits to Britain, America, Europe and India. During his successful official visit to Britain in 1964 he received the KCMG. A regular private visitor to London in earlier years he now prefers Geneva. Received the GCMG from The Queen during her tour in February 1979.

He was profoundly shocked by the announcement of impending British withdrawals in 1968, for he would have preferred to keep Bahrain under British protection indefinitely: he dislikes and fears Iraq, maintains with enthusiasm the ancestral quarrel with Qatar, does not care for the Kuwaitis whom he regards as over-bearing, but is pleased to be on good terms, as a respected client, with his fellow-tribesmen the Al Sa'ud. He has no time personally for the Arab League, Arab nationalism, Palestinians or other new-fangled ideas, but at the insistence of his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, accepts the need to go along with them. He is devout but no bigot.

In internal affairs, he delegated his authority in 1970 to the State Council, forerunner of the present Council of

/Ministers,

Ministers, with reluctance. He consented to popular representation with great misgivings, and felt himself justified by the intransigence of the National Assembly which led to its dissolution in 1975. Although he is now a constitutional monarch he still has much influence, and is remarkably well informed about everything that goes on. The Prime Minister, his brother Sahikh Khalifa runs the country from day to day but would not insist on any course of action to which the Amir was fundamentally opposed.

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As a person the Amir is kind, humorous and endearing. His manners are perfect and he has great charm. Is shrewd but limited by lack of education. He is deeply suspicious of change.

/What

What appears to be indecision is really often caution, tolerance and soft heartedness, but when necessary he can show skill, judgement and nerve. Until the Iranian backed coup attempt of December 1981 he took no obvious precautions when moving about Bahrain. Suffers from diabetes; intermittently a chain smoker. Hates flying.

Married in 1949 Shaikha Hassa and has nine children in all. Speaks English, but does not understand as well as he speaks.

HE SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN MUBARAK BIN HAMAD AL KHALIFA

Minister for Foreign Affairs. Speaks excellent English. Born about 1935. Married, two children.

Educated in Bahrain and at the American University of Beirut. Thereafter he studied history for 18 months at Oxford and law for two years in London. Holds a Diploma in International Law.

In 1968/69 he moved into the inner circle of advisers to the Ruler and since 1970 his influence has probably been second only to that of Shaikh Khalifa, the Prime Minister. He is intelligent and articulate, and has a much wider knowledge of foreign affairs, and a more sophisticated and international outlook than the Prime Minister or the Ruler. On 'Arab' questions his approach is often markedly different, and though he probably does not dictate policy he certainly influences it strongly. In general he thinks that Bahrain must keep up with the progressive Arab stream of thinking; he takes a particularly strong pro-Palestinian line. But he also recognises the limitations on Bahrain's freedom to act against the mood of the conservatives and the Saudis. He too values the British connection, and sees our point of view even when he cannot go along with it against an Arab concensus.

He has an attractive personality; is fond of travelling and visits the United Kingdom regularly.

AL KHALIFA, SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN KHALIFA BIN HAMAD

Minister of the Interior. Speaks good English. Born 1937. Married, four children.

Educated in Bahrain and at Concord College, Shrewsbury for four years. Attended Sandhurst 1957/59. Joined Bahrain State Police in September 1959. Made Deputy Commandant of Police 1970, redesignated 'Deputy Director-General' 1971.

Got a poor report from Sandhurst but settled down well to police work in Bahrain. He took over the post of Deputy Commandant of Police confidently and showed a firm grasp of the full range of police reponsibilities. In late 1972 he quarrelled with the (British) Director-General and his post was allowed to lapse. He was brought back as Minister in December 1973 - the only possible candidate who would accept the post - to help make up the number of Ministers allowed under the new Constitution. He defers on all matters to the Prime Minister.

Pleasant and capable and intelligent, but rather diffident when outside his immediate responsibilities. Plays football, tennis, basketball, volleyball and billiards and is an active swimmer. Likes gardening. Speaks good English; says he regards England as his second home.

AL-ALAWI, SAYYID MAHMOUD

Financial Adviser to Prime Minister. Speaks fair English. Born about 1910. Married. Educated at Agra University in India. Worked in the Finance Department of the Bahrain Government for 48 years, rising through the ranks from clerk to Head of the Department 1950. Appointed to the State Council in charge of Finance in January 1970. Minister 1971-76.

His seniority and the confidence reposed in him by the Ruling Family as a financial expert kept him on as Minister of Finance long after he had passed his peak. His present post is largely honorific, but he still commands influence and privileged access to the Amir.

Lives modestly. In frail health. He has a flat in London. Can still be helpful behind the scenes and is respected by the present team of economic and financial Ministers.

SHIRAWI, YUSUF BIN AHMAD

Minister of Development and Industry. Speaks excellent English. Born 1925. Married, five daughters.

Acting Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs (1982). Bahrain's representative at OAPEC. Also Government Director both of Aluminium Bahrain and of Gulf Air.

Sunni of Persian extraction. Educated in Bahrain and the American University of Beirut.

Yusuf is the outstanding official in Bahrain. Dynamic, intelligent, straightforward and competent. He is outspoken and Europeans often do not realise that he is teasing them. He used to run all the economic and technical aspects of Government himself, until the Prime Minister made him relinquish, with reluctance, some of his responsibilities.

He has a keenly analytical mind and wide interests. Talks volubly on any subject and it is sometimes difficult to follow the thread of his discourse. The Amir, who mistrusted his progressive views and outspoken forthrightness has come to appreciate his worth. He supported the democratic experiment with optimism but without illusion. A strong nationalist - and a Bahraini first.

Yusuf deliberately flouted the traditionalists by marrying a Shia, May al-Arrayed, in 1960 and insisting that she renounce purdah and attend mixed parties. He is allergic to shell-fish.

AL-MOAYYED, TARIQ ABDULRAHMAN

Minister of Information. Speaks good English. Born 1943. Married, two children.

The eldest son of Abdulrahman Khalil Al-Moayyed. Graduate in Political Economy of Manchester University, 1967. On his return to Bahrain, joined his father to run his building supply business. A nominated member of the Constituent Assembly 1972. A dynamic and hard-working Minister, who takes a keen interest in the work of his Department. Seems genuinely to believe (as, no doubt, the Prime Minister does not) that Bahrain would be best advised to maintain an open attitude towards representatives of the foreign media.

Tough minded and caustic, can be very touchy. At one time a playboy. Friendly to us.

AL DOSARI, YUSUF RAHMA

Head of the Amiri Court. Speaks fair English. Born about 1930. No record of marriage.

The Dosari family (plural Dawasir) are among the principal tribal supporters of the Al Khalifa but many of them returned to the Arabian peninsula after lawlessness provoked political trouble in the 1920s. However, those who remain are close to and on occasion inter-marry with the Al Khalifa.

Yusuf Rahma is small, weaselly and rather taciturn in English. As head of the Amiri Court he has an important and difficult role controlling the Amir's finances.

SHAIKH ABDUL RAHMAN BIN FARIS AL KHALIFA

Ambassador to London since November 1980. Speaks good English. Born 1942. Married, five children.

Joined the General Division of the MFA in 1969 after training in Kuwait and at the UN, New York. Director of the Department of Protocol and Consular and Legal Affairs 1969-74. Appointed Director of the Directorate of Administrative, Financial and Consular Affairs 1974. Promoted to the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in August 1979. He is amiable and co-operative.

Shaikh Abdul Rahman's wife, Shaikha Latifa, is an attractive woman who goes out in mixed company; she speaks reasonable English. The couple have one son and four daughters born between 1970 and 1980.

JALAL, MOHAMMED BIN YUSIF

President of the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Speaks good English. Born about 1917. Married. Sunni. Educated New Delhi. Began life as a civil servant but then got a job as an engineer with the United States Consulate-General in Dhahran. He then returned to Bahrain and set up as a building contractor. Has now also acquired several car agencies. Member of the Constituent Assembly (Nominated) in 1972-3.

His business is expanding well through his association with large overseas firms. A close friend of Yusuf Shirawi and the Amir and is used by the latter for personal business e.g. arms deals. His first loyalty is to the Amir even to the detriment of his own business interests. His sons are being groomed to the business and employs competent English staff as senior managers.

A charming person. Travels widely particularly with the Amir and the Amir's family. For a long time he was a widower then in 1970 married an attractive and sensible English ex-nurse Jane.

KANOO, MUBARAK QASSIM

Member of Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Speaks fluent English. No record of age or marriage.

The Yusuf bin Ahmad Kanoo Group of Companies is very large and figures among the top ten companies in the Gulf area. Their chief interests are shipping and travel.

Mubarak, who is the resident partner in Bahrain, is the cousin of Ahmed Kanoo, the head of the family business. Unimpressive to meet, but would not be where he is if he were not a smart businessman. Particularly self-effacing in the company of the Amir. The Kanoos are treated by the Amir as his travel agents and it is Mubarak's role to look after Shaikh Isa's holiday arrangements.

QAMBAR, NABIL EBRAHIM

Head of Protocol Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Speaks good English. Born about 1940. Married with children.

Shia Moslem. Served in the Bahrain embassy in London 1971-1973, subsequently in Cairo from 1973-1979. Has been Charge d'Affaires in Kuwait.

Friendly, helpful and efficient. Wears European clothes at all times even on occasions where he is very much the exception.

FULL NAME	PRONUNCIATION	ABBREVIATED FORM OF NAME FOR USE IN CONVERSATION	STANDARD OF ENGLISH
His Highness Shaikh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa Amir of the State of Bahrain	Shaikh as in ''Shake'' Final kh as in ''Loch'' I-sa as Ee-sa. Khăléefa	Your Highness [Shaikh Isa]	Fluent thou not perfect
His Excellency Shaikh Mohammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa Minister of Foreign Affairs	Mubárak as in ''took'' ''car'' ''rack''	Your Excellency [Shaikh Mohammad]	Fluent
His Excellency Shaikh Mohammad bin Khalifa Al Khalifa Minister of the Interior		Your Excellency [Shaikh Mohammad]	Fluent
His Excellency Sayed Mahmoud Ahmad Al-Alawi Financial Advisor to the Prime Minister	Mah as in ''mat'' Moud as in ''mood'' Alawi rhymes with ''salary''	Your Excellency [Sayed Mahmoud]	Fair Somewhat de

FULL NAME	PRONUNCIATION	ABBREVIATED FORM OF NAME FOR USE IN CONVERSATION	STANDARD OF ENGLISH
His Excellency Mr Yousuf Ahmed Al-Shirawi Minister of Development and Industry	You-sif Shirawi	Your Excellency [Mr Shirawi]	Fluent
His Excellency Mr Tariq Abdul Rahman Almoayed Minister of Information	Tar as in ''tar'' -iq as in ''quick'' Al as in ''al'' mo as in ''took'' ay as in ''hay'' yed as in ''fed''	Your Excellency [Mr Almoayed]	Fluent
His Excellency Mr Yusuf Rahma Al-Dosari Head of the Amiri Court	Yusuf as in ''You-sif'' Rahma rhymes with ''farmer'' Dosari rhymes with ''Goes Harry''	Your Excellency [Mr Al-Dosari]	Fair

FULL NAME	PRONUNCIATION	ABBREVIATED FORM OF NAME FOR USE IN CONVERSATION	STANDARD OF ENGLISH
His Excellency Shaikh Abdul Rahman Faris Al Khalifa Ambassador of the State of Bahrain to the Court of St James's	Abdul Rahmán - Rah as in ''cat'' Man as in ''tarn''	Your Excellency [Shaikh Abdul Rahman] NB: Abdul Rahman is one name; never ''Abdul'' separately	Fluent
Mr Mohammad Yusuf Jalal Chairman of the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry	Jal as ''jell'' al as in ''Pall Mall''	Mr Jalal	Fluent
Mr Mubarak Qassim Kanoo Member of the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry	Mub as in ''hub'' ár as in ''car'' ak as in ''rack'' Ká as in ''car'' noo as in ''who''	Mr Kanoo	Fluent

FULL NAME	PRONUNCIATION	ABBREVIATED FORM OF NAME FOR USE IN CONVERSATION	STANDARD O ENGLISH
Mr Nabil Ebrahim Qambar Director of Protocol Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Nab as in ''nab'' -íl as in ''eel'' Qam as in ''come'' bar as in ''bar''	Mr Qambar	Fluent

NB: Apart from His Highness the Shaikhs in the party, ie the members of the Al Khalifa family, are normally addressed as such, ie ''Shaikh Mohammad'', etc without further qualification, but distinguished as third persons by adding their father's name, ie ''Shaikh Mohammad bin Mubarak'', ''Shaikh Mohammad bin Khalifa'', etc. The other Bahrainis use first names more readily than is the custom in England, both in addressing people and in referring to them. Sayyid Mahmoud is generally so called, without his surname (Sayyid is an honorific title).

The English spelling of all Arab names is largely arbitrary.

(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

You may like to see these copies of the Queen's brief for the Italian State Visit.

A.J.C.W.

State Visit of
His Highness
Shaikh Isa Bin Sulman Al Khalifa
Amir of the State of Bahrain

10th.-13th. April 1984

STATE VISIT OF

HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA

AMIR OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN

10-13 APRIL 1984

(i) Background Brief on Bahrain

(ii) Personality Notes on the Bahrain Suite

(iv) Forms of Address and Pronunciation Guide

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STATE VISIT OF HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA, AMIR OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN: 10-13 APRIL 1984

BACKGROUND BRIEF

The Visit: Background and Aims

1. This will be the Amir's first State Visit to the UK and follows the visit by The Queen and The Duke of Edinburgh to Bahrain in 1979.

2. The Amir already knows this country well. He paid an official visit to Britain in 1964 and has been a frequent private visitor to London, most recently in July last year. On that occasion The Queen was not in London at the time and therefore unable to meet him. The Queen last met the Amir during a brief stop-over in Bahrain on her way to Australia in October 1982.

3. The State Visit will provide an opportunity to:

(i) give the Amir political reassurance of our commitment to and interest in the Gulf;

(ii) indicate our willingness to continue indirect help on problems of internal security;

(iii) engage the Bahrainis, especially the Foreign Minister, in a dialogue on regional issues;

/(iv)

(iv) express our willingness to continue helping to train, advise, and equip the Bahrain Defence Force.

4. The visit will be of especial importance to the Amir because of his strong personal affection for Britain and the high regard in which he holds The Queen.

History

5. Bahrain is known to early history as the site of the city of Dilmun, built some four or five thousand years ago. This became a wealthy trading centre between the civilisations of Mesopotamia and the Indus Valley. Bahrain again achieved prominence in the early 16th century, when its pearling industry made it the focus of Portuguese interest. An expeditionary force invaded the island and it was under Portuguese domination for much of the 16th century. During the 17th and 18th centuries Bahrain became an important trading and shipping centre, occasionally coming under Iranian rule. Iranian claims to Bahrain, based on their occupation, were formally renounced when Bahrain became independent in 1971, though some members of the present Iranian regime have tried to revive them. In 1783 the Iranians were expelled from the island by the Utub tribe from Saudi Arabia, whose paramount family, the Al-Khalifa have ruled the island ever since.

6. Britain's long association with Bahrain began in 1820, when a treaty was made between the two countries for the suppression of piracy. In 1861, in the face of political claims put forward by Iran and Turkey, the Ruler signed a further treaty with Britain in which he promised to abstain from piracy and slavery in return for British support against aggression. In 1880 and 1892, the Ruler signed two further agreements which gave Britain responsibility for Bahrain's defence and external affairs. In 1914, the Ruler agreed not to exploit any oil deposits without the approval of the British Government. Between 1946 and 1971, the British Residency (which was responsible for overseeing British interests throughout the Gulf) was based in Bahrain.

7. The present Amir, Shaikh Isa, succeeded his father in 1961. He was genuinely shocked at the UK's announced intention to terminate its special relationship with the Gulf States, but since 1971 Bahrain has successfully assumed full responsibility for its external affairs. In 1973 an elected national assembly was established. This lasted only two years and failed largely because of complaints within the Government that the Assembly was preventing it from carrying out its functions. Despite this, Bahrain remains a 'moderate' Arab State and the Government, by regional standards, is both liberal and tolerant.

/Political

Political

8. In area Bahrain is the smallest of the Gulf States, although its population of approximately 400,000 is nearly twice that of Qatar. It was the first Gulf State to develop its oil resources and is now the first to face the challenge of running its economy without a large oil income. Because of its early oil wealth (and its long trading history), it has a more varied and better educated society and a more cosmopolitan atmosphere than the other Gulf city states. But it is also the state most vulnerable to subversion.

9. The most serious threat to Bahrain's stability remains the Sunni/Shia divide. When the Al-Khalifa and their tribal followers conquered Bahrain 200 years ago, the island was almost wholly Shia. Even today the Sunni constitute less than a third of the population and many of these are of mixed Persian/Arab origin without strong roots in Bahrain. The Al-Khalifa themselves still hold political power and the Army and police are their exclusive property. Although there are many wealthy Shia contractors and merchants, there remains a substantial class of poor Bahrainis, drawn almost exclusively from the native Shia of the villages and those of Persian origin in Manama. They remain susceptible to Iranian and other subversion, whether Islamic or left-wing in origin. An Iranian-backed conspiracy was foiled in December 1981, but there has been little trouble-making since then.

/Economic

Economic

10. The exploitation of Bahrain's oil reserves began in the 1930's, but they were never large and now account for only about 30% of GDP. The petroleum industry relies heavily on Saudi Arabia and the refining of Saudi crude. During the present Amir's rule, there has been an attempt to establish an independent industrial base. In 1971, an aluminium smelter was opened and six years later, a shipbuilding and repair yard was built. Bahrain has also successfully promoted itself as a banking and communications centre for the Gulf and beyond. In 1976, offshore banking laws were passed allowing foreign banks to open branches on the island - there are now more than 50 offshore banking units with assets worth over $50,000 million. Bahrain's airport is the busiest in the Gulf and is the headquarters of Gulf Air. Its telecommunications are the best in the Middle East (it was the first Arab country to establish direct dialling to London). A causeway is now being built which will link Bahrain with Saudi Arabia. It is due for completion at the end of 1985 and should give the traditional acumen of Bahrain's merchant community new scope (though some claim they will suffer in competition with their Saudi counterparts who have a much larger domestic base).

Foreign Relations

11. Although it is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, Bahrain's most important links are with the West. It has no relations with

the Soviet bloc and remains suspicious of Soviet ambitions in the region. Bahrain's main preoccupation is the Iran/Iraq war and the threat this poses to the stability of the Gulf. The formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council in 1981, which strengthened Bahrain's links with Saudi Arabia and the other traditional regimes in the Gulf, was in part a response to this threat. Bahrain would, nevertheless, have to look to the United States, who have certain military facilities in Bahrain, for military support against any external attack. At the same time, the Bahrainis do not want to be seen as American clients and therefore place considerable value on a close relationship with the UK.

UK/Bahrain Relations

12. Relations have remained close since independence in 1971. A Treaty of Friendship was signed in 1971 and renewed in 1981. Most of the senior members of the ruling family are anglophile and anglophone, and Britain is regarded by many as their second home. There are British advisers in several key positions.

13. Members of recent Governments have paid Bahrain close attention with visits by the Secretaries of State for Defence and Energy (both 1981), a visit by the Prime Minister in 1981, and a stop-over by Mr Pym, as Secretary of State for Foreign and

/Commonwealth

Commonwealth Affairs in 1983. Several junior Ministers have also visited Bahrain recently. Mr Hurd, as Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, took a keen interest in Bahrain, and Mr Luce, his successor, visited Bahrain last December. Mr Luce's late father, Sir William, was Political Resident in Bahrain in the early sixties and was held in high regard by the Bahrainis. He was also the Foreign Secretary's Special Representative during the negotiations which led to the final independence of Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE in 1971. Bahraini Ministers make frequent private visits to Britain and many spend part of the summer here. The Foreign Minister, Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, called on the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs last July.

14. British contractors and consultants have played a leading role in Bahrain's development. There are about 8,000 British expatriates living in Bahrain who make a substantial contribution to invisible earnings. Competition is now keen, but in 1982 we held a 24% share of the import market, selling goods worth £150 million - mainly machinery, power generating equipment, information technology and invisibles. In the financial Sector, British banks are particularly well represented. There are no very large contracts in the offing, though there is the possibility of a new civic centre in Manama, which might be worth up to £20 million for a joint British/Bahraini venture.

/15.

15. The British Council, who have had an office in Bahrain since 1959, are actively involved in promoting Britain's interests and have had an important role in providing English Language training and technical co-operation. It is acknowledged that the range of the Council's operations needs to be widened, especially in the field of higher education, for which Bahrain is set to become an important centre in the region. The Gulf Polytechnic, and soon the Arabian Gulf University, will attract to Bahrain students from the other Gulf States and there is certain to be a much greater call for the Council's facilities than at present. There are now plans to rebuild the Council's offices in Bahrain.

ANNEXES

16. The following are attached:

Annex A	Fact Sheet on Bahrain
Annex B	A list of the Bahraini Council of Ministers

ANNEX A

STATE VISIT OF HIGH HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA, AMIR OF BAHRAIN: 10-13 APRIL 1984

FACT SHEET ON BAHRAIN

Size: 678 square kilometres

(United Kingdom 244,000 square kilometres)

Capital: Manama

Population (1980): 360,000

Religion: Moslem (approx 65% Shia, 35% Sunni)

Economy: Oil and petroleum products account for 30% of GDP. Other revenue is from banks, service industries and some heavy industries (aluminium production, petrochemicals and ship repairing). Average per capita GNP approximately $5,560

UK/Bahrain Trade: Figures for 1982 (comprehensive statistics for 1983 not available)

UK exports	£152 million
UK imports	£36 million

Main Supplier to Bahrain in 1982:

In percentage terms -	UK	24%
	Japan	20%
	USA	19%
	FRG	9%
	France	4½

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BAHRAIN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Prime Minister	Shailh Khalifa bin Sulman Al Khalifa
Crown Prince and Commander-in-Chief, Bahrain Defence Force	Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa
Foreign Affairs	Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa
Justice and Islamic Affairs	Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalid Al Khalifa
Development and Industry (and Acting Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs)	Yusuf Ahmad Shirawi
Education	Dr Ali Fakhroo
Interior	Shaikh Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Khalifa
Information	Tariq Abdulrahman Al Moayyed
Legal Affairs	Dr Hussain Al Baharna
Health	Jawad Salim Al Arayyed
Finance and National Economy	Ibrahim Abdul Karim Mohammed
Works, Power and Water	Majid Jawad Al Jishi
Transportation	Ibrahim Mohammed Humaidan
Commerce and Agriculture	Habib Ahmed Kassim
Housing	Shaikh Khalid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa
Labour and Social Affairs	Shaikh Khalifa bin Sulman bin Mohammed Al Khalifa

AL KHALIFA, HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN (GCMG)

Amir of Bahrain. Speaks good English. Born 1932. Married, nine children.

Became Ruler on his father's death in 1961. Has paid visits to Britain, America, Europe and India. During his successful official visit to Britain in 1964 he received the KCMG. A regular private visitor to London in earlier years he now prefers Geneva. Received the GCMG from The Queen during her tour in February 1979.

He was profoundly shocked by the announcement of impending British withdrawals in 1968, for he would have preferred to keep Bahrain under British protection indefinitely: he dislikes and fears Iraq, maintains with enthusiasm the ancestral quarrel with Qatar, does not care for the Kuwaitis whom he regards as overbearing, but is pleased to be on good terms, as a respected client, with his fellow-tribesmen the Al Sa'ud. He has no time personally for the Arab League, Arab nationalism, Palestinians or other new-fangled ideas, but at the insistence of his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifah, accepts the need to go along with them. He is devout but no bigot.

In internal affairs, he delegated his authority in 1970 to the State Council, forerunner of the present Council of Ministers, with reluctance. He consented to popular representation with great misgivings, and felt himself justified by the intransigence of the National Assembly which led to its dissolution in 1975. Although he is now a constitutional monarch he still has much influence, and is remarkably well informed about everything that goes on. The Prime Minister, his brother Shaikh Khalifa, runs the country from day to

/day

day but would not insist on any course of action to which the Amir was fundamentally opposed.

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As a person the Amir is kind, humorous and endearing. His manners are perfect and he has great charm. Is shrewd but limited by lack of education. He is deeply suspicious of change. What appears to be indecision is really often caution, tolerance and soft heartednes but when necessary he can show skill, judgement and nerve. Until the Iranian backed coup attempt of December 1981 he took no obvious precautions when moving about Bahrain. Suffers from diabetes; intermittently a chain smoker. Hates flying.

Married in 1949 Shaikha Hassa and has nine children in all. Speaks English, but does not understand as well as he speaks.

HE SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN MUBARAK BIN HAMAD AL KHALIFA

Minister for Foreign Affairs. Speaks excellent English. Born about 1935. Married, two children.

Educated in Bahrain and at the American University of Beirut. Thereafter he studied history for 18 months at Oxford and law for two years in London. Holds a Diploma in International Law.

In 1968/69 he moved into the inner circle of advisers to the Ruler and since 1970 his influence has probably been second only to that of Shaikh Khalifa, the Prime Minister. He is intelligent and articulate, and has a much wider knowledge of foreign affairs, and a more sophisticated and international outlook than the Prime Minister or the Ruler. On 'Arab' questions his approach is often markedly different, and though he probably does not dictate policy he certainly influences it strongly. In general he thinks that Bahrain must keep up with the progressive Arab stream of thinking; he takes a particularly strong pro-Palestinian line. But he also recognises the limitations on Bahrain's freedom to act against the mood of the conservatives and the Saudis. He too values the British connection, and sees our point of view even when he cannot go along with it against an Arab concensus.

He has an attractive personality; is fond of travelling and visits the United Kingdom regularly.

AL KHALIFA, SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN KHALIFA BIN HAMAD

Minister of the Interior. Speaks good English. Born 1937. Married, four children.

Educated in Bahrain and at Concord College, Shrewsbury for four years. Attended Sandhurst 1957/59. Joined Bahrain State Police in September 1959. Made Deputy Commandant of Police 1970, redesignated 'Deputy Director-General' 1971.

Got a poor report from Sandhurst but settled down well to police work in Bahrain. He took over the post of Deputy Commandant of Police confidently and showed a firm grasp of the full range of police reponsibilities. In late 1972 he quarrelled with the (British) Director-General and his post was allowed to lapse. He was brought back as Minister in December 1973 - the only possible candidate who would accept the post - to help make up the number of Ministers allowed under the new Constitution. He defers on all matters to the Prime Minister.

Pleasant and capable and intelligent, but rather diffident when outside his immediate responsibilities. Plays football, tennis, basketball, volleyball and billiards and is an active swimmer. Likes gardening. Speaks good English; says he regards England as his second home.

AL-ALAWI, SAYYID MAHMOUD

Financial Adviser to Prime Minister. Speaks fair English. Born about 1910. Married. Educated at Agra University in India. Worked in the Finance Department of the Bahrain Government for 48 years, rising through the ranks from clerk to Head of the Department 1950. Appointed to the State Council in charge of Finance in January 1970. Minister 1971-76.

His seniority and the confidence reposed in him by the Ruling Family as a financial expert kept him on as Minister of Finance long after he had passed his peak. His present post is largely honorific, but he still commands influence and privileged access to the Amir.

Lives modestly. In frail health. He has a flat in London. Can still be helpful behind the scenes and is respected by the present team of economic and financial Ministers.

SHIRAWI, YUSUF BIN AHMAD

Minister of Development and Industry. Speaks excellent English. Born 1925. Married, five daughters.

Acting Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs (1982). Bahrain's representative at OAPEC. Also Government Director both of Aluminium Bahrain and of Gulf Air.

Sunni of Persian extraction. Educated in Bahrain and the American University of Beirut.

Yusuf is the outstanding official in Bahrain. Dynamic, intelligent, straightforward and competent. He is outspoken and Europeans often do not realise that he is teasing them. He used to run all the economic and technical aspects of Government himself, until the Prime Minister made him relinquish, with reluctance, some of his responsibilities.

He has a keenly analytical mind and wide interests. Talks volubly on any subject and it is sometimes difficult to follow the thread of his discourse. The Amir, who mistrusted his progressive views and outspoken forthrightness has come to appreciate his worth. He supported the democratic experiment with optimism but without illusion. A strong nationalist - and a Bahraini first.

Yusuf deliberately flouted the traditionalists by marrying a Shia, May al-Arrayed, in 1960 and insisting that she renounce purdah and attend mixed parties. He is allergic to shell-fish.

AL-MOAYYED, TARIQ ABDULRAHMAN

Minister of Information. Speaks good English. Born 1943. Married, two children.

The eldest son of Abdulrahman Khalil Al-Moayyed. Graduate in Political Economy of Manchester University, 1967. On his return to Bahrain, joined his father to run his building supply business. A nominated member of the Constituent Assembly 1972. A dynamic and hard-working Minister, who takes a keen interest in the work of his Department. Seems genuinely to believe (as, no doubt, the Prime Minister does not) that Bahrain would be best advised to maintain an open attitude towards representatives of the foreign media.

Tough minded and caustic, can be very touchy. At one time a playboy. Friendly to us.

AL DOSARI, YUSUF RAHMA

Head of the Amiri Court. Speaks fair English. Born about 1930. No record of marriage.

The Dosari family (plural Dawasir) are among the principal tribal supporters of the Al Khalifa but many of them returned to the Arabian peninsula after lawlessness provoked political trouble in the 1920s. However, those who remain are close to and on occasion inter-marry with the Al Khalifa.

Yusuf Rahma is small, weaselly and rather taciturn in English. As head of the Amiri Court he has an important and difficult role controlling the Amir's finances.

AL KHALIFA, SHAIKH ABDUL RAHMAN BIN FARIS

Ambassador to London since November 1980. Speaks good English. Born 1942. Married, five children.

Joined the General Division of the MFA in 1969 after training in Kuwait and at the UN, New York. Director of the Department of Protocol and Consular and Legal Affairs 1969-74. Appointed Director of the Directorate of Administrative, Financial and Consular Affairs 1974. Promoted to the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in August 1979. He is amiable and cooperative.

Shaikh Abdul Rahman's wife, Shaikha Latifa, is an attractive woman who goes out in mixed company; she speaks reasonable English. The couple have one son and four daughters born between 1970 and 1980.

JALAL, MOHAMMED BIN YUSIF

President of the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Speaks good English. Born about 1917. Married. Sunni. Educated New Delhi. Began life as a civil servant but then got a job as an engineer with the United States Consulate-General in Dhahran. He then returned to Bahrain and set up as a building contractor. Has now also acquired several car agencies. Member of the Constituent Assembly (Nominated) in 1972-3.

His business is expanding well through his association with large overseas firms. A close friend of Yusuf Shirawi and the Amir and is used by the latter for personal business e.g. arms deals. His first loyalty is to the Amir even to the detriment of his own business interests. His sons are being groomed to the business and employs competent English staff as senior managers.

A charming person. Travels widely particularly with the Amir and the Amir's family. For a long time he was a widower then in 1970 married an attractive and sensible English ex-nurse Jane.

KANOO, MUBARAK QASSIM

Member of Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Speaks fluent English. No record of age or marriage.

The Yusuf bin Ahmad Kanoo Group of Companies is very large and figures among the top ten companies in the Gulf area. Their chief interests are shipping and travel.

Mubarak, who is the resident partner in Bahrain, is the cousin of Ahmed Kanoo, the head of the family business. Unimpressive to meet, but would not be where he is if he were not a smart businessman. Particularly self-effacing in the company of the Amir. The Kanoos are treated by the Amir as his travel agents and it is Mubarak's role to look after Shaikh Isa's holiday arrangements.

QAMBAR, NABIL EBRAHIM

Head of Protocol Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Speaks good English. Born about 1940. Married with children.

Shia Moslem. Served in the Bahrain embassy in London 1971-1973, subsequently in Cairo from 1973-1979. Has been Charge d'Affaires in Kuwait.

Friendly, helpful and efficient. Wears European clothes at all times even on occasions where he is very much the exception.

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His Highness Shaikh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa Amir of the State of Bahrain	Shaikh as in ''Shake'' Final kh as in ''Loch'' I-sa as Ee-sa. Khăléefa	Your Highness [Shaikh Isa]	Fluent though not perfect
His Excellency Shaikh Mohammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa Minister of Foreign Affairs	Mubárak as in ''took'' ''car'' ''rack''	Your Excellency [Shaikh Mohammad]	Fluent
His Excellency Shaikh Mohammad bin Khalifa Al Khalifa Minister of the Interior		Your Excellency [Shaikh Mohammad]	Fluent
His Excellency Sayed Mahmoud Ahmad Al-Alawi Financial Advisor to the Prime Minister	Mah as in ''mat'' Moud as in ''mood'' Alawi rhymes with ''salary''	Your Excellency [Sayed Mahmoud]	Fair Somewhat deaf

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His Excellency Shaikh Abdul Rahman Faris Al Khalifa Ambassador of the State of Bahrain to the Court of St James's	Abdul Rahmán - Rah as in ''cat'' Man as in ''tarn''	Your Excellency [Shaikh Abdul Rahman] NB: Abdul Rahman is one name; never ''Abdul'' separately	Fluent
Mr Mohammad Yusuf Jalal Chairman of the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry	Jal as ''jell'' al as in ''Pall Mall''	Mr Jalal	Fluent
Mr Mubarak Qassim Kanoo Member of the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry	Mub as in ''hub'' ár as in ''car'' ak as in ''rack'' Ká as in ''car'' noo as in ''who''	Mr Kanoo	Fluent

FULL NAME	PRONUNCIATION	ABBREVIATED FORM OF NAME FOR USE IN CONVERSATION	STANDARD OF ENGLISH
His Excellency Mr Yousuf Ahmed Al-Shirawi Minister of Development and Industry	You-sif Shirawi	Your Excellency [Mr Shirawi]	Fluent
His Excellency Mr Tariq Abdul Rahman Almoayed Minister of Information	Tar as in ''tar'' -iq as in ''quick'' Al as in ''al'' mo as in ''took'' ay as in ''hay'' yed as in ''fed''	Your Excellency [Mr Almoayed]	Fluent
His Excellency Mr Yusuf Rahma Al-Dosari Head of the Amiri Court	Yusuf as in ''You-sif'' Rahma rhymes with ''farmer'' Dosari rhymes with ''Goes Harry''	Your Excellency [Mr Al-Dosari]	Fair

FULL NAME	PRONUNCIATION	ABBREVIATED FORM OF NAME FOR USE IN CONVERSATION	STANDARD OF ENGLISH
Mr Nabil Ebrahim Qambar Director of Protocol Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Nab as in ''nab'' -íl as in ''eel'' Qam as in ''come'' bar as in ''bar''	Mr Qambar	Fluent

NB: Apart from His Highness the Shaikhs in the party, ie the members of the Al Khalifa family, are normally addressed as such, ie ''Shaikh Mohammad'', etc without further qualification, but distinguished as third persons by adding their father's name, ie ''Shaikh Mohammad bin Mubarak'', ''Shaikh Mohammad bin Khalifa'', etc. The other Bahrainis use first names more readily than is the custom in England, both in addressing people and in referring to them. Sayyid Mahmoud is generally so called, without his surname (Sayyid is an honorific title).

The English spelling of all Arab names is largely arbitrary.

State Visit of
His Highness
Shaikh Isa Bin Sulman Al Khalifa
Amir of the State of Bahrain

10th.-13th. April 1984

STATE VISIT OF

HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA

AMIR OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN

10-13 APRIL 1984

(i) Background Brief on Bahrain

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BACKGROUND BRIEF

The Visit: Background and Aims

1. This will be the Amir's first State Visit to the UK and follows the visit by The Queen and The Duke of Edinburgh to Bahrain in 1979. The Amir already knows this country well. He paid an official visit to Britain in 1964 and has been a frequent private visitor to London, most recently in July last year. The Queen last met the Amir during a brief stop-over in Bahrain on her way to Australia in October 1982.

2. The aim of the visit is to reinforce our excellent political relations with a country which, because of its strategic position in the Gulf, is of great importance to ourselves and the West. The visit will be of especial importance to the Amir because of his strong personal affection for Britain and the high regard in which he holds The Queen.

General

3. The State of Bahrain consists of one main and several smaller islands situated midway down the Persian Gulf about 18 miles from the east coast of Saudi Arabia. It has a population of about

/400,000

400,000. Like the other Gulf States, it is run by a traditional ruling family - the Al Khalifa. Because of its early oil wealth and long trading history, Bahrain has a more varied and well educated society and a more liberal and cosmopolitan atmosphere than most of the other Gulf States.

History

4. Bahrain is known to early history as the site of the city of Dilmun, built some four or five thousand years ago. This became a wealthy trading centre between the civilisations of Mesopotamia and the Indus Valley. Bahrain again achieved prominence in the early 16th century, when its pearling industry made it the focus of Portuguese interest. An expeditionary force invaded the island and it was under Portuguese domination for much of the 16th century. During the 17th and 18th centuries, Bahrain became an important trading and shipping centre, occasionally coming under Iranian rule. Iranian claims to Bahrain, based on their occupation, were formally renounced when Bahrain became independent in 1971. In 1783, the Iranians were expelled from the island by the Utub tribe from Saudi Arabia, whose paramount family, the Al-Khalifa, have ruled the island ever since. Last year the Al-Khalifa held celebrations to commemorate their bicentenary.

5. Britain's long association with Bahrain began in 1820, when a treaty was made between the two countries for the suppression

of piracy. In 1861, in the face of political claims put forward by Iran and Turkey, the Ruler signed a further treaty with Britain, in which he promised to abstain from piracy and slavery in return for British support against aggression. In 1880 and 1892, the Ruler signed two further agreements which gave Britain responsibility for Bahrain's defence and external affairs. Between 1946 and 1971, the British Residency (which was responsible for overseeing British interests throughout the Gulf) was based in Bahrain. The present Amir, Shaikh Isa, succeeded his father in 1961. Although the UK's decision to terminate its special relationships with the Gulf States in 1971 was regretted, Bahrain has successfully assumed full responsibility for its external affairs.

Economic

6. The exploitation of Bahrain's oil reserves began in the 1930s, but they were never large and now account for only about 30% of GDP. The petroleum industry relies heavily on Saudi Arabia and the refining of Saudi crude. During the present Amir's rule, there has been a sustained effort to establish an independent industrial base. In 1971, an aluminium smelter was opened and six years later a shipbuilding and repair yard was built. Bahrain has also successfully promoted itself as a banking and communications centre for the Gulf and beyond. In 1976, offshore banking laws were passed allowing foreign banks to open branches on the island - there are now more than 50 offshore banking units

/with

with assets worth over $50,000 million. Bahrain's airport is the busiest in the Gulf and is the headquarters of Gulf Air. Its telecommunications are the best in the Middle East (it was the first Arab country to establish direct dialling to London). A causeway is now being built which will link Bahrain with Saudi Arabia. It is due for completion at the end of 1985, and should give the traditional acumen of Bahrain's merchant community new scope (though some claim they will suffer in competition with their Saudi counterparts who have a much larger domestic base).

Foreign Relations

7. Bahrain is a member of the United Nations and the Arab League. Although it is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, its most important links are with the West. The formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council in 1981 strengthened Bahrain's links with Saudi Arabia and the other traditional regimes in the Gulf.

UK/Bahrain Relations

8. Relations have remained close since independence in 1971. A Treaty of Friendship was signed in 1971 and renewed in 1981. Most of the senior members of the ruling family are anglophile and anglophone, and Britain is regarded by many as their second home. The Government of Bahrain employs several British advisers.

9. Members of recent Governments have paid Bahrain close attention with visits by the Secretaries of State for Defence and

Energy (both 1981), a visit by the Prime Minister in 1981, and a stop-over by Mr Pym, as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in 1983. Mr Luce, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, paid a visit in December 1983. His predecessor, Mr Hurd, also took a keen interest in Bahrain. Bahraini Ministers make frequent private visits to Britain and many spend part of the summer here. The Foreign Minister, Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, called on the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs last July.

10. British contractors and consultants have played a leading role in Bahrain's development. There are about 8,000 British expatriates living in Bahrain who make a substantial contribution to invisible earnings. Notwithstanding the competition, in 1982 we held a 24% share of Bahrain's import market, selling goods worth £150 million - mainly machinery, power generating equipment, information technology and invisibles. In the financial sector, British banks are particularly well represented.

11. The British Council, who have had an office in Bahrain since 1959, are actively involved in promoting Britain's interests and have had an important role in providing English Language training and technical co-operation. There is now scope for the range of the Council's operations to be widened, especially in the field of higher education, for which Bahrain is set to become an important centre in the region. The Gulf Polytechnic, and soon the Arabian Gulf University, will attract to Bahrain students from the other Gulf States and there is certain to be a much greater call for the Council's facilities than at present.

/Annexes

Annexes

12. The following are attached:

Annex A — Fact Sheet on Bahrain

Annex B — A list of the Bahraini Council of Ministers

ANNEX A

STATE VISIT OF HIGH HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA, AMIR OF BAHRAIN: 10-13 APRIL 1984

FACT SHEET ON BAHRAIN

Size: 678 square kilometres

(United Kingdom 244,000 square kilometres)

Capital: Manama

Population (1980): 360,000

Religion: Moslem

Economy: Oil and petroleum products account for 30% of GDP. Other revenue is from banks, service industries and some heavy industries (aluminium production, petro-chemicals and ship repairing). Average per capita GNP approximately $5,560

UK/Bahrain Trade: Figures for 1982 (comprehensive statistics for 1983 not available)

UK exports	£152 million
UK imports	£36 million

Main Supplier to Bahrain in 1982:

In percentage terms -

UK	24%
Japan	20%
USA	19%
FRG	9%
France	4½

BAHRAIN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Prime Minister	Shailh Khalifa bin Sulman Al Khalifa
Crown Prince and Commander-in-Chief, Bahrain Defence Force	Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa
Foreign Affairs	Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa
Justice and Islamic Affairs	Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalid Al Khalifa
Development and Industry (and Acting Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs)	Yusuf Ahmad Shirawi
Education	Dr Ali Fakhroo
Interior	Shaikh Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Khalifa
Information	Tariq Abdulrahman Al Moayyed
Legal Affairs	Dr Hussain Al Baharna
Health	Jawad Salim Al Arayyed
Finance and National Economy	Ibrahim Abdul Karim Mohammed
Works, Power and Water	Majid Jawad Al Jishi
Transportation	Ibrahim Mohammed Humaidan
Commerce and Agriculture	Habib Ahmed Kassim
Housing	Shaikh Khalid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa
Labour and Social Affairs	Shaikh Khalifa bin Sulman bin Mohammed Al Khalifa

HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA GCMG

Amir of Bahrain. Speaks good English. Born 1932. Married, nine children.

Born 1932. Eldest son of the late Ruler, Shaikh Sulman bin Hamad. Educated privately up to primary standard. Became Ruler on his father's death in 1961. Has paid visits to Britain, America, Europe and India. During his successful official visit to Britain in 1964, he received the KCMG. Has paid several private visits to London. Received the GCMG from The Queen during her tour in February 1979.

Although he is now a constitutional monarch he still has much influence and is remarkably well informed about everything that goes on. The Prime Minister, his brother Shaikh Khalifa, runs the country from day to day, but would not insist on any course of action to which the Amir was fundamentally opposed.

He sent his younger children to an English-style school in Switzerland, but in 1980 he agreed that his third son, Mohammed, should be sent for Service training at Dartmouth. Mohammed now serves in the Bahrain Defence Force Naval Wing. His two other sons received some schooling and private tuition in Britain. The fourth son, Abdullah, and his younger brother Ali, are now studying in Texas.

He has great respect and affection for Britain.

HE SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN MUBARAK BIN HAMAD AL KHALIFA

Minister for Foreign Affairs. Speaks excellent English. Born about 1935. Married, two children.

Educated in Bahrain and at the American University of Beirut. Thereafter he studied history for 18 months at Oxford and law for two years in London. Holds a Diploma in International Law. In 1968 appointed Head of the newly formed Political Bureau which became the Department of Foreign Affairs in January 1969. Appointed to the State Council on its formation in 1970.

In general, he thinks that Bahrain must keep up with the progressive Arab stream of thinking; he takes a particularly strong pro-Palestinian line. But he also recognises the limitations on Bahrain's freedom to act against the mood of the conservatives and the Saudis. He too values the British connection, and sees our point of view even when he cannot go along with it against an Arab concensus.

He is fond of travelling and visits the United Kingdom regularly.

AL KHALIFA, SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN KHALIFA BIN HAMAD

Minister of the Interior. Speaks good English. Born 1937. Married, four children.

Educated in Bahrain and at Concord College, Shrewsbury for four years. Attended Hendon Police College in 1956 and from 1957 to 1959, Sandhurst. Joined Bahrain State Police in September 1959. Made Deputy Commandant of Police 1970, redesignated 'Deputy Director-General' 1971.

He was made Minister in December 1973 to help make up the number of Ministers allowed under the new Constitution. He defers on all matters to the Prime Minister.

Plays football, tennis, basketball, volleyball and billiards and is an active swimmer. Likes gardening. Says he regards England as his second home.

AL-ALAWI, SAYYID MAHMOUD

Financial Adviser to Prime Minister. Speaks fair English. Born about 1910. Married. Educated at Agra Unversity in India. Worked in the Finance Department of the Bahrain Government for 48 years, rising through the ranks from clerk to Head of the Department 1950. Appointed to the State Council in charge of Finance in January 1970. Minister 1971-76. Retained as financial adviser after 1976. He is respected by the present team of economic and financial advisers.

He has a flat in London.

SHIRAWI. YUSUF BIN AHMAD

Minister of Development and Industry. Speaks excellent English. Born 1925. Married, five daughters.

Acting Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs (1982). Bahrain's representative at OAPEC. Also Government Director both of Aluminuim Bahrain and of Gulf Air.

Primary education in Bahrain and then American University in Beirut where he obtained a BA (Chemistry) Degree. Returned to Bahrain in 1950 and worked with the Bahrain Petroleum Company. One year diploma course in Chemistry at Glasgow University 1952. On returning to Bahrain he became an official in the Education Department. Head of the Oil Affairs Department in the Ministry of Finance 1963. Appointed also Head of the Development Bureau 1967. Chairman of the Gulf Technical College Executive Committee 1968. Appointed to the State Council on its formation in January 1970. Minister of Development and Engineering Services 1971.

AL-MOAYYED, TARIQ ABDULRAHMAN

Minister of Information. Speaks good English. Born 1943. Married, two children.

The eldest son of Abdulrahman Khalil Al-Moayyed. Graduate in Political Economy of Manchester University, 1967. On his return to Bahrain, joined his father to run his building supply business. A nominated member of the constituent Assembly 1972.

AL DOSARI, YUSUF RAHMA

Head of the Amiri Court. Speaks fair English. Born about 1930. No record of marriage.

AL KHALIFA, SHAIKH ABDUL RAHMAN BIN FARIS

Ambassador to London since November 1980. Speaks good English. Born 1942. Married, five children.

Joined the General Division of the MFA in 1969 after training in Kuwait and at the UN, New York. Director of the Department of Protocol and Consular and Legal Affairs 1969-74. Appointed Director of the Directorate of Administrative, Financial and Consular Affairs 1974. Promoted to the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in August 1979.

His wife, Shaikha Latifa, speaks reasonable English.

KANOO, MUBARAK QASSIM

Member of Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Speaks fluent English. No record of age or marriage.

The Yusuf bin Ahmad Kanoo Group of Companies is very large and figures among the top ten companies in the Gulf area. Their chief interests are shipping and travel.

Mubarak, who is the resident partner in Bahrain, is the cousin of Ahmed Kanoo, the head of the family business.

JALAL, MOHAMMED BIN YUSIF

President of the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Speaks good English. Born about 1917. Married. Educated New Delhi. Began life as a civil servant but then got a job as an engineer with the United States Consulate-General in Dhahran. He then returned to Bahrain and set up as a building contractor. Has now also acquired several car agencies. Member of the Constituent Assembly (Nomianted) in 1972-3.

For a long time he was a widower then in 1970 married an English ex-nurse Jane.

QAMBAR, NABIL EBRAHIM

Head of Protocol Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Speaks good English. Born about 1940. Married with children.

Served in the Bahrain Embassy in London 1971-1973, subsequently in Cairo from 1973-1979. Has been Charge d'Affaires in Kuwait.

FULL NAME	PRONUNCIATION	ABBREVIATED FORM OF NAME FOR USE IN CONVERSATION	STANDARD OF ENGLISH
His Highness Shaikh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa Amir of the State of Bahrain	Shaikh as in ''Shake'' Final kh as in ''Loch'' I-sa as Ee-sa. Khăléefa	Your Highness [Shaikh Isa]	Fluent though not perfect
His Excellency Shaikh Mohammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa Minister of Foreign Affairs	Mubárak as in ''took'' ''car'' ''rack''	Your Excellency [Shaikh Mohammad]	Fluent
His Excellency Shaikh Mohammad bin Khalifa Al Khalifa Minister of the Interior		Your Excellency [Shaikh Mohammad]	Fluent
His Excellency Sayed Mahmoud Ahmad Al-Alawi Financial Advisor to the Prime Minister	Mah as in ''mat'' Moud as in ''mood'' Alawi rhymes with ''salary''	Your Excellency [Sayèd Mahmoud]	Fair Somewhat deaf

FULL NAME	PRONUNCIATION	ABBREVIATED FORM OF NAME FOR USE IN CONVERSATION	STANDARD OF ENGLISH
His Excellency Mr Yousuf Ahmed Al-Shirawi Minister of Development and Industry	You-sif Shirawi	Your Excellency [Mr Shirawi]	Fluent
His Excellency Mr Tariq Abdul Rahman Almoayed Minister of Information	Tar as in ''tar'' -iq as in ''quick'' Al as in ''al'' mo as in ''took'' ay as in ''hay'' yed as in ''fed''	Your Excellency [Mr Almoayed]	Fluent
His Excellency Mr Yusuf Rahma Al-Dosari Head of the Amiri Court	Yusuf as in ''You-sif'' Rahma rhymes with ''farmer'' Dosari rhymes with ''Goes Harry''	Your Excellency [Mr Al-Dosari]	Fair

FULL NAME	PRONUNCIATION	ABBREVIATED FORM OF NAME FOR USE IN CONVERSATION	'STANDARD' OF ENGLISH
His Excellency Shaikh Abdul Rahman Faris Al Khalifa Ambassador of the State of Bahrain to the Court of St James's	Abdul Rahmán - Rah as in ''cat'' Man as in ''tarn''	Your Excellency [Shaikh Abdul Rahman] NB: Abdul Rahman is one name; never ''Abdul'' separately	Fluent
Mr Mohammad Yusuf Jalal Chairman of the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry	Jal as ''jell'' al as in ''Pall Mall''	Mr Jalal	Fluent
Mr Mubarak Qassim Kanoo Member of the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry	Mub as in ''hub'' ár as in ''car'' ak as in ''rack'' Ká as in ''car'' noo as in ''who''	Mr Kanoo	Fluent

FULL NAME	PRONUNCIATION	ABBREVIATED FORM OF NAME FOR USE IN CONVERSATION	STANDARD OF ENGLISH
Mr Nabil Ebrahim Qambar Director of Protocol Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Nab as in ''nab'' -íl as in ''eel'' Qam as in ''come'' bar as in ''bar''	Mr Qambar	Fluent

NB: Apart from His Highness the Shaikhs in the party, ie the members of the Al Khalifa family, are normally addressed as such, ie ''Shaikh Mohammad'', etc without further qualification, but distinguished as third persons by adding their father's name, ie ''Shaikh Mohammad bin Mubarak'', ''Shaikh Mohammad bin Khalifa'', etc. The other Bahrainis use first names more readily than is the custom in England, both in addressing people and in referring to them. Sayyid Mahmoud is generally so called, without his surname (Sayyid is an honorific title).

The English spelling of all Arab names is largely arbitrary.

BAHRAIN LUNCH

SPEAKING NOTES

DELIGHTED TO WELCOME HIS HIGHNESS, THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN, AND HIS DISTINGUISHED DELEGATION.

YOUR HIGHNESS, YOUR STATE VISIT TO BRITAIN IS A VERY HAPPY OCCASION.

WE KNOW YOU AS A LONG AND TRUE FRIEND OF BRITAIN.

WE HAVE WELCOMED YOU IN LONDON MANY TIMES AS A PRIVATE VISITOR.

BUT WE ARE NOW DELIGHTED TO HAVE THE PLEASURE OF RECEIVING YOU OFFICIALLY - THE AMIR OF A FRIENDLY COUNTRY FOR WHICH ALL HERE PRESENT, AND MANY WHO COULD NOT BE PRESENT, FEEL THE GREATEST AFFECTION.

/ AROUND YOU

AROUND YOU AT THIS LUNCH TABLE, YOUR HIGHNESS, ARE MANY WHO KNOW YOUR COUNTRY WELL.

SOME HAVE LIVED THERE WITH GREAT ENJOYMENT.

SOME HAVE HAD LINKS WITH YOUR ARMED FORCES.

SOME HAVE WRITTEN ABOUT BAHRAIN.

MANY HAVE TRADED WITH IT.

SOME HAVE EVEN DUG PARTS OF IT UP - EITHER CO-OPERATING WITH YOUR PROGRAMME OF CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, OR HELPING TO REVEAL THE DEEP HISTORICAL ROOTS OF BAHRAIN.

/ ALL OF US

ALL OF US OWE BAHRAIN THANKS FOR THE WARMTH OF ITS HOSPITALITY, THE VIGOUR OF ITS COMMERCIAL LIFE AND THE EVEN TENOR OF ITS SOCIETY. 8,000 BRITISH EXPATRIATES WHO NOW LIVE IN BAHRAIN WOULD JOIN WITH ME IN THOSE THANKS.

I REMEMBER WITH GREAT PLEASURE MY OWN VISIT IN 1981. YOUR COUNTRY IS AN EXCITING PLACE TO COME TO. THERE IS AN AIR OF SUCCESS AND ACHIEVEMENT WHICH OWES A GREAT DEAL TO THE SKILL AND ENTERPRISE OF BAHRAINIANS IN DIVERSIFYING THE ECONOMY AND ESTABLISHING BAHRAIN AS A REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CENTRE OF BANKING AND COMMUNICATIONS.

/ BAHRAIN

BAHRAIN IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF ONE OF THE GREAT MODERN SUCCESS STORIES - THE RAPID ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GULF WHICH HAS IN VERY FEW YEARS TRANSFORMED THE WAY OF LIFE OF THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION AND BROUGHT TO THEM THE BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND MODERN TECHNOLOGY.

YET WE CANNOT IGNORE THE PROBLEMS WHICH ARE OF SUCH DEEP CONCERN TO US BOTH, AS WAS CLEAR, YOUR HIGHNESS, FROM OUR TALKS BEFORE LUNCH.

/ THE CONTINUATION

THE CONTINUATION OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR IMPOSES FURTHER SUFFERING AND HARDSHIP ON THE PEOPLES OF THOSE TWO COUNTRIES.

IT ALSO ENDANGERS THE STABILITY OF AN AREA WHOSE PEOPLE THREATEN NO-ONE AND WHICH PLAYS A VITAL PART IN THE WORLD ECONOMY.

IT IS AN INTRACTABLE PROBLEM AND IT IS NOT EASY TO SEE HOW A SOLUTION CAN BE OBTAINED.

BUT THAT WAR, WITH ITS IMMENSE SUFFERING, IS NEVER FAR FROM OUR THOUGHTS.

WE SHALL STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ALL OUR FRIENDS IN THE GULF AND DO ALL WE CAN TO CONTRIBUTE TO A LESSENING OF THE DANGERS AND AN EVENTUAL SOLUTION.

/ YOUR HIGHNESS

YOUR HIGHNESS, WE WISH YOU AND YOUR DELEGATION A VERY HAPPY STAY IN OUR COUNTRY AND WE WISH YOU PEACE AND PROSPERITY AT HOME.

cc S.G.

Papers removed from file

Date 27/3

FCO to AJL 26/3

Bahrain: UK Relations

6/35

APC 29/2

MR. THATCHER : FOR INFORMATION ONLY

STATE VISIT OF THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN

This State Visit is taking place at Windsor. Can you make a note in your diary therefore that the Banquet on Tuesday 10 April will be at Windsor Castle. The Reception for St. Paul's School will therefore have to begin probably as early as 1700 hours.

MRS. CAROLINE RYDER

1 March 1984

PRIME MINISTER

STATE VISIT OF THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN

I have spoken to the Lord Chamberlain's office. There is no reception committee whatsoever at Heathrow Airport and all the dignitaries that usually turn up at Victoria Station will be at Windsor. So you are definitely not expected to meet him at the Airport.

We have checked on our files what you did for Reagan. It is true to say that you went to Heathrow to meet him but you also went to Windsor to greet him officially the following day.

Content to leave your participation in the arrangements for the arrival of the Amir of Bahrain at Windsor as they are?

Is it a Tuesday? E.R.

28 February 1984

10 DOWNING STREET

A.J.C. 21/2

1. MR COLES
2. PRIME MINISTER

State Visit of The Amir of Bahrain, 10 April, 1984

The Amir of Bahrain most inconveniently commences his State Visit at Windsor which will mean wasting most of the morning. However, I fear you have no alternative but to be present.

C.P.

20 February, 1984

But surely he arrives at Heathrow?

met R. Reagan at Heathrow

FILE

20 February, 1984

State Visit of the Amir of the State of Bahrain

Arrival - 10 April, 1984

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 17 February.

I am writing to confirm that Mrs. Thatcher will be delighted to be at the Home Park Windsor between 1130 and 1145 on Tuesday, 10 April to greet the Amir of Bahrain on his arrival to this country.

I confirm that the Prime Minister will commence her journey from No.10.

(Caroline Ryder)

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John Johnston, KCVO, MC.

From: Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John Johnston, KCVO., MC.

LORD CHAMBERLAIN'S OFFICE,
ST JAMES'S PALACE, S.W.1.

17th February, 1984

R 17/2

My dear Prime Minister,

State Visit of The Amir of the State of Bahrain

Arrival - 10th April, 1984

I have the honour to inform you that The Queen and The Duke of Edinburgh will be present at the Royal Pavilion in the Home Park (Public) Windsor to meet The Amir of the State of Bahrain upon his Arrival at the beginning of his State Visit to Britain at 12 noon on the 12th April next.

The Queen wishes you, as Prime Minister, to be present on this occasion and to arrive at the Home Park (Public) by Gate No. 1 between 11.30 a.m. and 11.45 a.m. A map of the Home Park showing this entrance will be sent to you with your Ceremonial.

Day Dress with hat will be worn.

I shall be grateful if you will be so good as to acknowledge this letter and let me know the address from which you will start your journey to Windsor, so that a route and windscreen label may be provided to facilitate your arrival.

Yours sincerely,

John Johnston

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, MP.,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

file cc Mrs. Goodchild

PRIME MINISTER

Your Lunch for the Amir of Bahrain
Wednesday 11 April

DT can only manage this lunch at great inconvenience to himself as he has a Board meeting that day.

Would it be all right if he did not co-host?

MRS. CAROLINE RYDER

26 January 1984

FILE RD7

PRIME MINISTER

STATE VISIT OF THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN

I was not aware until yesterday that the Amir of Bahrain was paying a state visit to this country.

The Banquet at Buckingham Palace on the day of his arrival, Tuesday, 10 April, coincides with a reception that you promised to give here for the St. Paul's School Appeal. The reception is scheduled to start at 1830 hrs and I do not foresee any specific problem, if you agree, to my writing to the Headmistress saying that you have to attend the Banquet at Buckingham Palace and will, therefore, have to leave the reception at about 1930 hrs to change.

Agree?

MRS. CAROLINE RYDER

25 January, 1984

10 DOWNING STREET

CAROLINE Ref (1)

1. Surely to Heaven, some one knew months ago the dates of a State Visit

2. I Can and will so re-"arrange life" to attend the Dinners on 10 Apr and 12 Apr

3. I have a Board Meeting on 11 April and cannot attend the No. 10 Lunch IF the P.M. specially

requires me to attend
then I must forfeit
but show at my Board
Please advise in due
course.

25/1

6

10 DOWNING STREET

MR THATCHER

There is a state visit in April which involves quite a lot of meals.

The visitor is the Amir of Bahrain who arrives on Tuesday, 10 April. There will be the usual Banquet at Buckingham Palace that evening, the Prime Minister's lunch for him on Wednesday, 11th and the return Banquet on Thursday, 12 April.

Do you have any problems with these dates?

CR.

25 January, 1984

10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline

The Amir of Bahrein's visit is a State Visit!

Dub
24/3

DT
St. Paul's

HL

23 January 1984

State Visit of the Amir of Bahrain

Thank you for your letter of 20 January. The Prime Minister will not be able to attend the Guildhall Banquet fn honour of the Amir on 11 April.

JOHN COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 January 1984

Dear John,

State Visit of the Amir of Bahrain

I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister would wish to attend the banquet at the Guildhall given by the Lord Mayor in honour of the Amir on Wednesday 11 April at 7.30 p.m.

The Prime Minister is of course hosting a luncheon the same day in honour of the Amir.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

Bahrain : UK/Bahrain June '79

20 JAN 1984

RESTRICTED

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 January 1984

State Visit of the Amir of Bahrain

Thank you for your letter of 5 January.

I confirm that you may include in the Amir's programme a lunch hosted by the Prime Minister on Wednesday, 11 April at 1.00 p.m.

I also confirm that we have set aside 45 minutes immediately before the lunch for talks between the Prime Minister and the Amir.

I am copying this letter to the Lord Chamberlain's Office.

A. J. COLES

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 January 1984

Mr. Ryder.

X and Y acceptable: yes ok all A.J.C. 5/1.

Dear John,

State Visit of the Amir of Bahrain: 10-13 April

As you know, the Amir of Bahrain will pay a State Visit to the United Kingdom from 10-13 April.

We understand that a luncheon hosted by the Prime Minister has been provisionally arranged for Wednesday, 11 April at 1 p.m. Since the Amir has now accepted the formal invitation, it would be useful if you could confirm that we may include this in the programme.

X

We recommend that 45 minutes be set aside immediately before the luncheon for a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Amir.

Y

We shall let you have further advice nearer the time on who might participate in the talks and attend the luncheon.

I am copying this letter to the Lord Chamberlain's office.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

Tim

I have told F.C.O. A.J.C. 5/7 ①

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Amir of Bahrain

He is coming privately. You said you wanted to see him.

Unfortunately, he is here only on 16 (Saturday) and 17 (Sunday) July. I believe that you cannot see him on Saturday because of other engagements.

There is no need to see him on Sunday, since he is here privately. But do you want to? No no

A.J.C. 4/7.

FILE

da

1 July 1983

Visit to the UK by the Amir of Bahrain

Thank you for your letter of 24 June. The Prime Minister would like to see Shaikh Isa provided a convenient time can be found. Perhaps our diary secretaries could be in touch about this.

A J COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NR

MR. COLES A.J.C. 25/6.

The FCO rang to say that the dates when the Amir of Bahrain will be in England are now 16/17 July. They are not asking for a meeting. This is just for information.

cl.

28 June 1983

(1)

Prime Minister

Since this is a private visit you do not have to see him.

But would you like to?

A.J.C. 27/6.

I should like to see him.

JH

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 June 1983

Dear John,

Visit to the UK by the Amir of Bahrain

Shaikh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa, the Amir of Bahrain, is planning to pay a private visit to the United Kingdom from 14 - 17 July on his way to the United States where he is to pay an official visit.

HM Ambassador in Bahrain has recommended against converting this private visit into an official programme. The Prime Minister might nevertheless wish to have advance warning of this visit in case she wanted to invite Shaikh Isa to call. She met Shaikh Isa in September 1981 when she was in Bahrain and had discussions at No 10 with his son, Shaikh Hamad, in March this year. It is likely that an FCO Minister will in any case call on the Ruler.

TEMPORARILY RETAINED J. Gray 9/7/16

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

010

(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 April, 1983

Prime Minister

To see.

A.J.C. 15/4.

Dear John,

Bahrain: Letter from the Crown Prince to the Prime Minister

I attach a letter from HH Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah to the Prime Minister, which has been delivered to us by the Bahraini Embassy.

The letter expresses Shaikh Hamad's pleasure at his discussions with the Prime Minister on 28 March.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الزوراق

قصر الزاهر

ZAHER PALACE,
BAHRAIN,
ARABIAN GULF.

7TH. APRIL, 1983.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

This letter conveys both my renewed Greetings, and my sincere good wishes to you, upon my return to Bahrain earlier this evening.

It gave me great pleasure to have met with you once again during my recent visit to the United Kingdom, and I would like to say how very much I welcomed our meeting at No. 10, Downing Street, on Monday, 28th. March, 1983.

Our frank and open discussion upon matters of mutual interest and concern to both of our governments was greatly appreciated, and I valued your comments regarding the possibility of increased future co-operation between our two countries. Please be assured that we shall always have the highest regard both for your continued interest in the welfare of Bahrain, and for your clear understanding and insight into the affairs of the Arabian Gulf.

I am requested by His Highness, The Emir of Bahrain, Sheikh Eissa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa, to convey an expression of his sincere, personal regards to you, and to say how pleasantly he recalls the pleasure of your visit to us here in Bahrain last year.

With my warmest good wishes to you.

Yours sincerely,

HAMED BIN EISSA AL-KHALIFA,
CROWN PRINCE OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN.

THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER, M.P.,
PRIME MINISTER,
NO. 10, DOWNING STREET,
LONDON, SW1,
ENGLAND.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT.

LCC Master

FLK

SNKM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 March, 1983

Dear Richard,

Crown Prince of Bahrain

I enclose a record of the discussion which took place between the Prime Minister and Shaikh Hamad when the latter called here this afternoon.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Yours ever

John Coles

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CROWN PRINCE OF BAHRAIN AT 1430 ON 28 MARCH AT 10 DOWNING STREET

Present:

Prime Minister	Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifah
Sir John Leahy	Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa
Mr. Coles	Bahraini Ambassador

The Prime Minister asked that her warm regards be conveyed to the Amir of Bahrain and to the Prime Minister.

The reports of the oil slick which was proceeding towards the shores of the Gulf were alarming. Shaikh Hamad said that this had hardly been mentioned in the British press but was a daily preoccupation in the Gulf press. An emergency situation had been declared in the Gulf. The main worry was not the effect on the environment or on fish but the possible effect on supplies of drinking water. The Gulf States depended on the sea, through desalination plants, for their drinking water. The slick was now 150 miles long and growing. If the Iranians could be persuaded to prevent the continuing flow of oil from the two wells concerned, the problem could be handled. But at present the Iranian attitude was that they would do nothing so long as the war continued. Sir John Leahy commented that Mr. Red Adair was in the area but required an assurance that there would be no Iranian attack before he commenced operations.

The Prime Minister asked whether there had been any develop ments in the Iraq/Iran situation. Shaikh Hamad said that he believed the situation could be contained, provided there was some progress in the Lebanon and on the wider Arab/Israel front. But without progress of this kind, the Iraq/Iran war could spread. The Prime Minister commented that the figures for casualties in the war were most disturbing.

/The

The visit by the Arab League delegation to London had been a great success. We were very pleased with the outcome. Shaikh Mohammed said that he had heard many reports to this effect. The subsequent declaration by the ten EC Member States had been very important. Some felt that if this declaration had been made earlier, the situation in Lebanon would not have occurred. The Prime Minister said that, immediately following the visit, she had written to President Reagan and stressed the urgency of action in the Middle East. Similarly, we had worked hard to achieve the EC declaration with its important statement that Israel should cease its current policy on settlements. Sir John Leahy said that he would be visiting Washington this week in order to follow up these matters. Shaikh Mohammed said that the Arab world was very dependent on the British role in bringing pressure to bear on President Reagan. Since Fez, the Arabs had had a clear cut policy. The EC Member States had a similarly clear policy now. It was the duty of the US to persuade Israel of the merits of co-existence. Mr. Begin's expansionist policy must stop.

The Prime Minister said that there was a difference between the British and American positions. We supported the principle of self-determination for the Palestinians. But President Reagan was not prepared to accept the idea of an independent Palestinian state. It was therefore necessary to work for confederation between Jordan and a Palestinian entity. Shaikh Hamad said that there was certain contradictions in Arab thinking. Some Arab countries would not accept the confederation idea, even though the Arab League was itself a confederation. The Prime Minister said that the only hope of progress was for King Hussein and the Palestinians to act together. Shaikh Mohammed agreed but said that the difficulty lay in Israel. If Israel was not ready for a settlement in the Lebanon, how could we expect them to work for a broader settlement? Moreover, how could King Hussein be expected to go to the negotiating table without further clarification of the Israeli position? Mr Begin still maintained that ownership of the West Bank was not negotiable. Sir John Leahy commented that there was a danger that if we tried now to describe the final result of the negotiations, the latter would never begin. Shaikh Hamad said that the original idea of a strong Israel was that Soviet influence in the Middle East could thereby be restrained. But the present attitude of Israel was encouraging Soviet expansionism.

/The

The Prime Minister asked whether it was fully accepted on the Arab side that Jordan should negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians. Shaikh Hamad said that this proposition had not been publicly accepted by all. He was not optimistic that Hussein would obtain more than a general blessing from Arafat. The latter would not commit himself to the outcome of Hussein's efforts. Sir John Leahy said that we had recently received reports that, in the PLO view, it was not for them but for the Fez Committee of Seven, at its meeting on 3 April, to give Hussein a mandate.

In conclusion, Shaikh Hamad reiterated that the declaration by the Ten on the Middle East had been a great help. It might not seem to us that this step was of particular significance but it had had a very big impact in the Middle East.

The discussion ended at 1500 hours.

A.J.C.

28 March, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01 XXX XXXX 218 2111/3

MO 25/8

25th March 1983

Dear John,

VISIT OF SHAIKH HAMAD

Yesterday I sent over briefing for this visit which included in the Defence Relations Brief a passage about "blanket diplomatic clearance for ship visits". We have just heard that the Bahrainis have turned down our request for blanket clearance for up to 28 ship day visits per year. We would not suggest that the Prime Minister raises this since my Secretary of State will do so if an opportunity arises. However, you may wish to annotate the Prime Minister's briefing pack.

Yours ever,

Jane Ridley

(J E RIDLEY) (MISS)

A J Coles Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

Covering SECRET

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~218 7222~~ 218 2111/3

MO 25/8

24th March 1983

Dear John,

VISIT OF SHAIKH HAMAD

As requested in your letter of 18th March I am attaching briefing for Shaikh Hamad's call on the Prime Minister scheduled for 2.30 on Monday, 28th March. As you will see, the pack includes defence relations and defence sales briefs prepared here, and FCO briefing.

I understand that Shaikh Hamad will be accompanied by HE Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, the Bahrain Foreign Minister and HE Shaikh Abdul-Rahman Faris Al-Khalifa, Ambassador of Bahrain.

I am copying this and the attachments to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Yours ever,

Jane Ridley

(J E RIDLEY) (MISS)

A J Coles Esq

Covering SECRET

CALL BY SHAIKH HAMAD BIN ISA AL KHALIFAH, CROWN PRINCE OF BAHRAIN AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE BAHRAIN DEFENCE FORCE, ACCOMPANIED BY SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN MUBARAK AL KHALIFAH, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 2.30 PM 28 MARCH 1983

LIST OF BRIEFS

1. Bilateral Relations

2. Iran/Iraq

3. Arab/Israel

4. Gulf Co-operation Council

5. Personality Notes: Shaikh Hamad
Shaikh Mohammed

SHAIKH HAMAD'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 28 MARCH 1983

BILATERAL RELATIONS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Value our long standing friendship. Attach importance to hearing Gulf States' views.

2. Recall with pleasure my visit to Bahrain in 1981.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Shaikh Hamad is in London en route for Washington where he will have politico-military talks. We understand that he will see Mr Bush and possibly the President. He is to be accompanied by Shaikh Mohammed.

2. The Prime Minister met both Shaikh Hamad and Shaikh Mohammed when she was in Bahrain in 1981.

3. Mr Pym made a brief stopover in Bahrain on 23 March en route for the EC/ASEAN meeting in Bangkok.

GARMCO - Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Project (should not be raised)

4. Davy McKee have made a bid of US $109 million for the Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Project in Bahrain. A lower bid of US $100 million has been made by IHI of Japan and the Department of Trade are looking at ways in which to make the Davy bid more attractive. The Prime Minister has written to Shaikh Khalifa, the Prime Minister supporting Davy's bid, It is hoped that a decision will be made soon, although in the present state of the oil and aluminium markets it is possible that the whole project will be deferred. Shaikh Khalifa and Shaikh Hamad are at odds on the project and the subject should not be raised.

SHAIKH HAMAD'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 28 MARCH 1983

IRAN/IRAQ

POINTS TO MAKE

Amir of Bahrain's Letter

1. My reply made clear our concern about the war. European Council Statement on 22 March expressed similar sentiments.

Miliary Situation

2. No major fighting since mid-February. Iranian intentions unclear. Iraqis well equipped to hold.

Mediation

3. Disappointed that attempts at NAM Summit in New Delhi unsuccessful. But NAM an obvious starting place for mediation efforts. Must continue to try to find a solution.

Oil Slick

4. This must be worrying for Bahrain. Have you been able to persaude Iraq to hold off while well is capped? Likely to harm Arabs more than Iran.

[If Bahrainis press over Western action to stop war]

5. (a) The Ten are sympathetic, and expressed their growing concern at the continued conflict in the statement on the Middle East put out by the European Council on 22 March:
(b) But condemnatory statements, however strong, are ignored by Iran.:

/(c)

(c) Iran even ignored the Security Council mandatory resolution calling for the release of the US Embassy hostages:

(d) On that occasion the Russians vetoed a resolution with teeth. What would their attitude be now? Opportunity for USSR to pose as Iran's protector?

(e) Iran is less isolated now than in 1980 (Syria, Pakistan would probably oppose mandatory action):

(f) Have the GCC members looked at practical aspects of ending the war, eg how to make Iranians bite on compensation offer? With the world oil price tending downward, there are advantages in Iran's seizing the offer quickly.

Security Assurances

6. Resources are limited. But where in an emergency assistance from Britain was practicable, would look favourably at any request for assistance and, depending on circumstances and commitments, do what we could to help.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Amir of Bahrain's Letter

A 1. The Amir wrote to the Prime Minister on 28 February to ask us to consider further action at the UN designed to bring an end to

B the Iran/Iraq war. The Prime Minister replied that although our leverage was very limited we were willing to support any realistic attempt to achieve a settlement in the Iran/Iraq war.

European Council

2. Statement issued on 22 March following European Council meeting in Brussels stressed partners' concern at continuation of war and their wish to see any early negotiated settlement.

Security Assurances

3. Bahrainis have in the past turned down politely, offer of assistance at time of Iranian successes in the war. Reluctance to respond favourably to any future requests for help would be inconsistent, and run risk of jeopardising our defence sales effort.

Mediation

4. Isalmic Conference efforts in abeyance, so, too, UN's. NAM attempted, unsuccessfully, to revive efforts to coincide with a Summit meeting in New Delhi 9/10 March. Resolution worded too strongly to obtain general support.

/Military

Military Situation

5. Since 11 February, only sporadic Iraqi Air attacks and artillery exchanges. Current Iranian military preparations consistent with possibility of further attack in late March. But Iranian intentions unclear. Iraqis should be able to hold any attack.

Oil Slick

6. In early March small Nowruz oil field 50 miles north-west of Kharg Island was set alight and also began leaking. Slick is now very large and is drifting south and could cause problems for Gulf States (particularly if it entered the desalination plants). US specialists (Red Adair) standing by to cap well. But need Iraqi guarantee not to attack.

SHEIKH HAMAD'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER

POINTS TO MAKE

Arab/Israel

1. Glad that Arab League Delegation visit took place successfully. Useful to hear views of Arab side at crucial moment in peace process. Khalidi's contribution impressive and useful. Significant that all concerned (including the Syrian) prepared to come and demonstrate Arab unity.

2. Essential for Arafat to join King Hussein in making positive response to US initiative if progress to be achieved. For this both PLO and Jordan need support from Arab side. Do not underestimate difficulties for Americans in bringing Israel to negotiating table. But the President is determined to do his best. Grim prospect if US initiative fails.

3. Have emphasised to US importance of progress in Lebanon withdrawal negotiations and on settlements freeze if negotiations are to begin. They understand this, but they need a clear statement from King Hussein in order to put effective pressure on Israel.

4. European Council Statement demonstrates continuing European commitment to principles including self-determination, and our interest in contributing to progress.

BACKGROUND

1. The Bahrainis will be relieved that our difficulties with the Arab League Delegation are now behind us, and will no doubt be interested to learn how the visit went.
/ Reporting telegram attached.

2. The Bahrainis take a notably moderate line on Arab/Israel and have few illusions that Fez is likely to get anywhere. Both Sheikh Mohamed bin Mubarak and the Crown Prince, Sheikh Hamad may seek reassurance about continuing European interest in the Arab/Israel problem; the Prime Minister might
/ refer to the European Council Statement (attached).

EUROPEAN COUNCIL, BRUSSELS, 21/22 MARCH 1983

FOLLOWING ARE EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS ON MIDDLE EAST

1. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING LEBANON AND THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

2. THE TEN ARE DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE CONTINUED LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER ARAB NEIGHBOURS. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT ALL PARTIES MUST SEIZE THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE THE TWO MOST URGENT OBJECTIVES: THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AND A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT.

3. THE TEN REAFFIRM THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATE OF LEBANON AND FOR ITS GOVERNMENT, WHICH SHOULD URGENTLY BE ENABLED TO RE-ESTABLISH WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE WHOLE OF ITS TERRITORY. THIS REQUIRES THE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES. THE TEN SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. THEY CALL ON ALL CONCERNED TO CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY. THEY CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE PEACEKEEPING ROLE OF UN AND MULTINATIONAL FORCES IN LEBANON.

4. THE PRINCIPLES WHICH UNDERLIE THE TEN'S APPROACH TO WIDER PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, AS SET OUT IN MORE THAN ONE PREVIOUS STATEMENT, REMAIN VALID. A LASTING PEACE CAN ONLY BE BUILT ON THE RIGHT TO A SECURE EXISTENCE FOR ALL STATES IN THE REGION INCLUDING ISRAEL, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL THE PEOPLES, INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION WITH ALL THAT THIS IMPLIES. THESE RIGHTS MUST BE MUTUALLY RECOGNISED BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES. NEGOTIATIONS WILL HAVE TO EMBRACE ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE: AND THE PLO WILL HAVE TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THEM. THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE MUST BE RENOUNCED BY ALL.

5. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1982 INDICATED A WAY TO PEACE, AND THE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING AT FEZ DEMONSTRATED A READINESS FOR IT. THE TASK NOW IS TO MOVE BEYOND STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE AND FIND A MEANS TO RECONCILE AND IMPLEMENT THE VARIOUS PEACE PROPOSALS. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE RECENT MEETING OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL CAN AND SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE TEN THEREFORE WELCOME THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND

AND THE PLO. THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THE PLO SHOULD SEIZE THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY BY DECLARING THEMSELVES IN FAVOUR OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD, TO WHICH THE TEN WOULD EXPECT ALL CONCERNED TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY.

6. THE TEN LOOK TO THE ARAB STATES TO PLAY THEIR PART BY SUPPORTING THOSE WHO SEEK A SOLUTION TO THE DEMANDS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BY POLITICAL MEANS.

7. THE EFFORTS OF THE US WILL CONTINUE TO BE INDISPENSABLE TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS CAN BEGIN.

8. ABOVE ALL THE TIME HAS COME FOR ISRAEL TO SHOW THAT IT STANDS READY FOR GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, IN THE FIRST PLACE BY REFRAINING FROM ENLARGING EXISTING SETTLEMENTS OR CREATING NEW ONES. THESE SETTLEMENTS ARE CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND A MAJOR AND GROWING OBSTACLE TO PEACE EFFORTS.

9. THE MIDDLE EAST IS A REGION WITH WHICH THE TEN HAVE LONG BEEN CLOSELY ASSOCIATED AND IN WHOSE FUTURE THEY HAVE A DEEP INTEREST. THEY INTEND TO MAINTAIN THEIR CONTACTS WITH ALL THE PARTIES AND TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE MOVEMENT TOWARDS COMPROMISE AND NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS. THEY BELIEVE THAT THIS IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE COUNTRIES AND THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION, OF THE TEN THEMSELVES AND OF THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS.

10. THE TEN EXPRESSED ONCE AGAIN THEIR GROWING CONCERN AT THE CONTINUED CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN, WHICH CONSTITUTES AN EVER MORE SERIOUS THREAT TO THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE ENTIRE REGION.

11. THE TEN DEEPLY REGRET THAT NONE OF THE PEACE INITIATIVES ORGANISED HITHERTO HAS SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING THE FIGHTING TO AN END. THEY CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE, THE CESSATION OF ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED FRONTIERS: AND FOR A JUST AND HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES.

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CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 190700Z AMMAN
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TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 68 OF 18 MARCH
INFO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 191000Z CONTACT ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY BRUSSELS, BONN, ROME, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, ATHENS, DUBLIN, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW
VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

1. KING HUSSEIN LED AN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION TO LONDON ON 18 MARCH WHICH ALSO INCLUDED THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN AND MOROCCO, ALGERIAN AND TUNISIAN REPRESENTATIVES AND WALID KHALIDI FOR THE PALESTINIANS.
THIS TELEGRAM RECORDS DISCUSSION AT THE PLENARY MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. IN ADDITION, KING HUSSEIN HAD A PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. THE FULL DELEGATION WERE PRESENTED TO THE QUEEN, AND THE SAUDI, SYRIAN AND MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH ME. MAJOR POINTS FROM THESE WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY AS NECESSARY. LEAHY WILL GIVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING AT 1500 HOURS ON 21 MARCH. THE TEXT OF A UK STATEMENT PUT OUT BY NO 10 IS BEING SENT TO ALL ADDRESSEES IN THE RETRACT SERIES (DESKBY TO MIDDLE EAST POSTS).

2. THE PLENARY MEETING WENT WELL. KING HUSSEIN OPENED WITH A FORMAL PRESENTATION. THE MAIN POINTS WERE:

(I) THE CLOSE TIES BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE ARAB WORLD, AND BRITAIN'S SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM.

(II) ISRAEL'S BLATANT VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, THE MOST RECENT OF WHICH WAS THE ATTACK ON THE AL AQSA MOSQUE.

(III) THE FEZ PRINCIPLES (WHICH KING HUSSEIN CALLED 'THE ARAB PEACE PLAN') WERE AN EXPRESSION OF ARAB SOLIDARITY REFLECTING THEIR BELIEF THAT A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE WAS POSSIBLE.

/(IV)

(IV) BRITAIN HAD PLAYED AN INFLUENTIAL ROLE IN THE PAST (242, THEVENICE DECLARATION) AND WAS CAPABLE OF PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE TODAY IN LENDING SUPPORT TO THE JUST CAUSE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

(V) THE ARAB PEACE PLAN, WHICH COMMITTED THE ARABS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE GUARANTEES, WAS A SINCERE CONTRIBUTION AIMED AT PUTTING AN END TO CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ISRAEL'S POLICIES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES INCREASED THE URGENCY OF A SETTLEMENT AND PUT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO A TEST OF ITS WILL AND ABILITY TO ACT.

3. IN REPLY, THE PRIME MINISTER UNDERLINED THAT WE REGARDED A UNIFIED ARAB PEACE PROGRAMME AS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD. SHE LAID SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THE ISRAELIS CLAIMED SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THEMSELVES AND MUST GRANT IT TO THE PALESTINIANS. WE WERE COMMITTED TO THE VENICE DECLARATION AND TO THE ASSOCIATION OF THE PLO WITH NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAD BEEN DISTRESSED BY THE INCIDENT AT THE AL AQSA MOSQUE AND HAD PUBLICLY CONDEMNED THE CONTINUATION OF SETTLEMENT BUILDING IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE WAR IN LEBANON WAS A FURTHER OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS BUT WE WOULD DO ALL WE COULD AT THE EUROPEAN SUMMIT AND AT THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT AT WILLIAMSBURG WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN TO EMPHASISE THE URGENCY BOTH ON LEBANON AND ARAB/ISRAEL.

4. WALID KHALIDI ASKED THAT BRITAIN SHOULD DO EVERYTHING IN HER POWER TO OBTAIN THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. HE NOTED THAT THE PNC HAD MADE SOME IMPORTANT POINTS. IT HAD CONFIRMED PALESTINIAN COMMITMENT TO FEZ: ENDORSED THE PRINCIPLE OF PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND WITH SYMPATHETIC JEWISH LEADERS: POINTED TO THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE REAGAN PLAN (NO REFERENCE TO RIGHT OF RETURN OR PALESTINIAN SOVEREIGNTY): AND ENDORSED THE CONCEPT OF PALESTINIAN/JORDANIAN CONFEDERATION. HE ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO MR BEGIN'S COMMITMENT TO THE REVISIONIST MOVEMENT, WHICH HAD ALWAYS SOUGHT JEWISH SETTLEMENT EAST OF THE JORDANIAN RIVER. IT WOULD REQUIRE UNMISTAKABLE SIGNALS FROM WASHINGTON TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE IN THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP. HE

/APPEALED

APPEALED TO THE PRIME MINISTER TO BRING THESE POINTS HOME TO REAGAN. THE PRIME MINISTER ACKNOWLEDGED THE POINT ABOUT BRITISH INFLUENCE ON WASHINGTON, AND SAID THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE AMERICANS, BUT OBSERVED THAT IN GOVERNMENT IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT TO OBTAIN EVERYTHING ONE WANTED.

5. KHADDAM SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE REAGAN PLAN PROVIDED A SERIOUS FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE. WASHINGTON WAS NOT SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE, AS WAS SHOWN BY THE SCALE OF US ARMS SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL. THE US FACED A CRUCIAL TEST.IF THEY SECURED ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WITH NO CONDITIONS, HE WOULD ADMIT THAT THEY MIGHT PLAY A USEFUL ROLE ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. THE PRIME MINISTER OBSERVED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE GENUINELY TRYING TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM.

6. I HAD SOME FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AFTER THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN HAD WITHDRAWN. I SAID THAT THE TWO ESSENTIALS WERE A COORDINATED POSITION ON THE ARAB SIDE ON WHICH GREAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE, AND A REAL CHANGE IN ISRAEL. PRINCE SAUD COMMENTED THAT WITH FEZ MUCH OF THE ARAB PART HAD BEEN DONE. THE CRUX WAS FOR THE ISRAELIS TO CHANGE, AND THIS REQUIRED ACTION BY WASHINGTON AS KHALIDI HAD EXPLAINED. THE US MUST SHOW ISRAEL THAT IF THERE WAS NO CHANGE, ISRAEL WOULD LOSE US SUPPORT. KHALIDI SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT TELL THE AMERICANS THAT BEGIN'S ZIONISM COMMITTED HIM TO MAINTAINING ISRAELI CONTROL OF THE WEST BANK, GAZA, GOLAN AND EVEN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE WITH THE SINAI. I MADE CLEAR IN CONCLUSION THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE AMERICANS. BUT THEY DID NOW REALISE THAT THE PALESTINIANS WERE THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM.' PRINCE SAUD OBSERVED THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THE AMERICANS DID NOT PAY ADEQUATE ATTENTION TO EUROPEAN AND WORLD OPINION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

PYM

MIDDLE EAST

STANDARD

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MR EGERTON
MR THOMAS
MR HAYES
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

SHAIKH HAMAD'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 28 MARCH 1983

GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Impressed by progress of the Gulf Co-operation Council. Believe it can make important contribution to regional stability.

Defence and Internal Security

2. How do you expect defence and internal security co-operation to develop?

Understand Bahrain is to receive GCC funds to help with its defence programme.

Keen to assist in this programme. Our equipment fully compatible with American equipment eg NATO.

Economic

3. Are you pleased with progress on economic matters? Do you expect falling oil revenues will reduce money available for GCC-funded projects?

GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL

ESSENTIAL FACTS

General

1. The Gulf Co-operation Council, comprising Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman, was formed in 1981 to promote political, economic and defence co-operation.

Defence Co-operation

2. Defence and security aspects are at the centre of GCC discussion. At the GCC Summit in November 1982 it was agreed that about 1.6 billion would be allocated to Bahrain over a ten year period to help them with defence procurement. We welcome this, but wish to ensure that such funds are not tied to standardisation on present Saudi (mostly American and French) equipment. We have tried to steer the Bahrainis into 'thinking British' by giving export advice on air defence (which Shaikh Hamad fed into wider GCC discussions) and a 'rapid intervention force'. Shaikh Hamad and Shaikh Mohammed will have discussions with Mr Heseltine directly after meeting the Prime Minister.

Economic Co-operation

3. The first phase of an economic agreement (creating a free trade area with the removal of tariffs on locally produced goods) finally came into effect this month. Bahrain is looking for GCC funding to help with its economic development.

SHAIKH HAMAD BIN ISA AL KHALIFAH ~~(KCMG)~~

Eldest son of the Amir, Crown Prince and Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defence Force. Chairman of Supreme Council for Youth and Sports.

Born 1949. Educated in Bahrain and at the Leys (1965), Sandhurst 1966-67, and Mons 1967-68. Received the KCMG on the occasion of The Queen's visit to Bahrain in February 1979.

he went to Mons where he did well. This success braced him and he applied himself to building up the National Guard (renamed the Defence Force in 1969) which remains his main interest. Takes his job as Acting Ruler seriously during his father' absences. He sees himself as a young 'progressive traditionalist' and enjoys discussion with Bahrainis and with visitors. Visits Britain regularly, but unlike his father he does not look automatical to Britain for support. In recent years he has been much courted by the French.

The relationship between Shaikh Hamad and the Prime Minister, Shaikh Khalifa, is clearly a difficult one, and provokes occasional rows.

TEMPORARILY RETAINED J. Young 9/7/2006

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He consciously models himself on King Hussein of Jordan, to whom he bears some physical resemblance.

Hamad speaks good English. Rides well and water-skis. Plays footbal and basketball with his soldiers and has taken up golf. Became a qualified helicopter pilot in 1978.

SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN MUBARAK BIN HAMAD AL KHALIFAH

Minister for Foreign Affairs since 1971.

Born about 1935. After secondary education in Bahrain he spent five years at the American University of Beirut. Thereafer he studied history for 18 months at Oxford and Law for 2 years in London.

In 1968/69 he moved into the inner circle of advisers to the Ruler and since 1970 his influence has probably been second only to that of Shaikh Khalifah, the Prime Minister. He is intelligent and articulate, and has a much wider knowledge of foreign affairs, and a more sophisticated and international outlook than the Prime Minister or the Ruler. On 'Arab' questions his approach is often markedly different, and though he probably does not dictate policy he certainly influences it strongly. In general he thinks that Bahrain must keep up with the progressive Arab stream of thinking; he takes a particularly strong pro-Palestinian line. But he also recognises the limitations on Bahrain's freedom to act against the mood of the conservatives and the Saudis. He too values the British connection, and sees our point of view even when he cannot go along with it against an Arab concensus.

His English is fluent. He has an attractive personality; is fond of travelling and visits the United Kingdom regularly.

28th February 1983

H E the Hon Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1
England
United Kingdom

Madam Prime Minister

We feel sure that Your Excellency will agree with us that the international peace and security of the world is entirely integrated and that one region cannot be isolated from another in this respect. Security, as you are certainly aware, is indivisible. Accordingly, the stability of the Gulf region is as important to the other States of the world as it is to the States of that region by virtue of the many important mutual interests involved. Such mutual interests cannot be preserved and developed unless the States of the region are able to enjoy peace and security, and this peace and security has become seriously threatened by the continuation for approximately the last three years of the war between Irag and Iran.

Peace cannot be maintained in the Gulf unless an end is put to this war. Hostilities have recently intensified and it has become the urgent duty of all States to discover a more effective means to secure peace than those previously sought by the United Nations, in particular through the Security Council, the Organisation of Islamic Countries and the Organisation of Non-Aligned Countries, and by certain friendly States.

The continuation of the war between Iraq and Iran will generate serious instability in the Gulf region. As long as the current situation remains unpredictable this war will jeopardise both the regional and individual safety of the States of the region and the freedom of navigation in the Gulf. Moreover, it will prejudice international peace and security contrary to the terms of the United Nations Charter.

Your Excellency, it is not unknown to you that the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council have made considerable efforts to find a means to end the Iraq-Iran war, and to arrest the consequent wastage and drain of human and financial resources. We have however, been unable to date to find a way to ensure that the two parties will cease hostilities and will enter into negotiations to solve their dispute by peaceful means

The States which comprise the United Nations Security Council bear a special responsibility under the United Nations Charter to maintain international peace and security. The Charter prescribes the measures to be taken whenever such international peace and security is threatened. We consider that the States of the Security Council have not yet done their utmost to secure an end to the war between Iraq and Iran.

We write to urge you to give further consideration to the possibility of applying the measures contained in the United Nations Charter, in the strongly held belief that the application of such measures will bring an end to a war which has exhausted both countries, destroyed their economic structures and undermined the stability of the entire Gulf region.

We look forward to learning of your views in this connection, and remain confident that you will take the necessary measures to ensure the maintenance of peace in the Gulf region.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of our highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Isa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa
Amir of the State of Bahrain

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 March 1983

Your Highness.

I am grateful for your letter about the urgent need to take steps to secure an early end to the war between Iran and Iraq.

We are very conscious of the enormous loss of human life, the grave suffering of the civilian population, and the material destruction caused by this conflict. We are also aware of the threat to the security of our friends in the Gulf which any expansion of the fighting would cause. In 1982 we supported the two Security Council Resolutions calling on both sides to initiate a ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally recognised frontiers.

It is very unfortunate that the various attempts to reach a settlement have so far proved unsuccessful. I am not sure how much influence we can realistically bring to bear, but we are willing to support any effort, including through the Security Council, which offers hope of bringing an early and negotiated settlement to the conflict. During his brief visit to your country on 23 March, Mr. Pym will be happy to

/ explore

explore in detail how in practice the international community might work to end the present conflict.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Highness Shaikh Isa Bin Sulman Al Khalifah, GCMG

VISIT OF SHAIKH HAMAD BIN ISA AL KHALIFAH, CROWN PRINCE AND COMMANDER OF THE BAHRAIN DEFENCE FORCE

UK/BAHRAIN DEFENCE RELATIONS BRIEF

LINE TO TAKE

1. We welcome the friendly, practical relationship that exists between us in the defence field. We are always pleased to hear of ways in which we may be able to assist in plans for improving Bahrain's defences.

2. Glad to hear that recent visits of RN ships to Bahrain went well.

3. Hope we can continue to assist in training Bahraini personnel.

4. The Falklands Campaign demonstrated the characteristics of flexibility and mobility which would enable our Armed Forces to respond effectively if required to do so outside the NATO area. Wherever possible we would hope to coordinate our policies with our allies. We support the concept of the US Rapid Deployment Force, and are pleased to see increased US-Bahraini cooperation in this field. What do you hope to achieve in your talks with the Americans?

BACKGROUND

1. Defence relations between the UK and Bahrain have remained cordial since our responsibility for Bahrain's defence and security ended in 1971. Under the 1971 Treaty of Friendship we have undertaken to consult with Bahrain in time of need, but we have been less deeply involved in the development of the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) than is the case in some other Gulf States. The provision of £1000m from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) funds from 1983 to equip the BDF offers defence sales opportunities and a chance to increase our influence with the expanding BDF. Bahrain is a potential recipient of Defence Policy Fund assistance on an opportunity basis.

2. Bahrain has close defence links with US, who store prepositioned equipment for their Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in warehouses in Bahrain. Shaikh Hamad is visiting London on his way to Washington for politico-military talks on increased US-Bahrain defence cooperation. In December 1982 the Americans suggested that we should concentrate on our relations with Kuwait, leaving them to concentrate on Bahrain. We refused to accept this unrealistic attempt to compartmentalize Western influence in the Gulf.

3. When Shaikh Hamad called on Sir John Nott in July 1982, his main pre-occupation was with the UK and US commitments to Gulf security. S of S said that while NATO must remain our first priority, the UK maintained a small but highly professional capability to operate out-of-area on behalf of 'friendly interests'. The Shaikh said that intelligence of troops movements would be the first necessity, and S of S explained that the UK would know quite soon if there were significant military preparations.

4. There are no British Loan Service Personnel at present serving with the BDF, although a three-man EOD* team is currently running a three month in-country training course. Following an advisory visit to Bahrain by an RM officer, we are considering the provision of an RM training team to help the BDF form a Marine Rifle Company Group. Other recent training assistance for the BDF has included a Drill Instruction Team, an advisory team to assist their Medical Services

Training of BDF personnel in the UK increased five-fold between 1977 and 1981. In Financial Year 1981/82, 32 Bahraini students attended UK military training courses.

5. At the BDF's request, the Military Assistance Office have produced studies on Regional Air Defence for the Gulf and a Gulf Rapid Deployment Force. We believe that the Bahrainis have passed these papers to their GCC partners as products of the Bahrain Defence Ministry.

6. RN ships deployed on the ARMILLA Patrol regularly visit Bahrain. The frigate GALATEA and the RFA PLUMLEAF visited in February, and the frigates AVENGER and AMBUSCADE, accompanied by the RFA PEARLEAF, are due in Bahrain from 7-11 April. One problem over such visits has been the Bahraini requirement for three months prior notice, which for operational reasons has often been difficult to meet. We have therefore proposed to the Bahrain Government that RN ships should be given 'blanket' Diplomatic Clearance for up to 28 ship day visits per year, subject to one month's notice being given. ~~A reply is awaited~~ This proposal has been rejected. Mr. Heseltine will raise the matter (no need for the Prime Minister to do so).

* Explosives Ordnance Disposal

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT
TEMPORARILY RETAINED S. Gray 9/7/2016

CALL BY SHAIKH HAMAD ON THE PRIME MINISTER

DEFENCE SALES

Points to make

1. General. Ready to help in whatever way we can to meet Bahrain's defence equipment and training requirements. Grateful for the interest shown in floating exhibition and for the chance to hold firing demonstration (which Shaikh Hamad attended). UK Government ready to give support for Bahraini purchases of British equipment.

2. GCC. Are GCC plans for financing Bahrain's defence purchases likely to go ahead?

3. Hawk. We welcome Bahraini interest in Hawk either as a trainer or in its new enhanced ground attack role. Other GCC states are also interested. It could suit as standard GCC trainer. Prospect of a local overhaul facility being set up in GCC area by BAe. Thank Shaikh Hamad for Bahraini agreement to hold Hawk demonstration on Friday 15 April in Bahrain, despite weekend holiday.

4. Main Battle Tanks and Armoured Vehicles. Glad Vickers Valiant is under consideration and also Scorpion and MCV 80. Firms are ready to hold further trials with MOD backing.

BACKGROUND

General/GCC

1. Bahrain is a small market for defence sales; she does not have money of her own nor the manpower to sustain large purchases of equipment although she is due to receive £1000M of GCC funds in 1983 and subsequent years. This changes her purchasing position radically. There has been no recent major sale of UK defence equipment to Bahrain, but several equipments are now in prospect. The Saudis tend to influence Bahraini choice.

2. Bahraini defence delegation toured potential supplier countries in 1982 to determine which areas might have priority for GCC funding; this delegation was in UK in May and discussed Vickers Valiant MBTs, light armoured vehicles and guided weapons.

3. Shaikh Hamad feels UK has been slow to recognise the expanding military requirements of the Gulf, and as a result has failed to maintain the position which should have come from our links with the area. Bahrain can also offer a useful vehicle for the input of UK defence ideas to GCC discussions on equipment and coordination. Floater was well received in Bahrain and made a good impression. The Ruler has instructed that priority be given to UK equipment.

4. Hawk. This has emerged very recently as a prospect for Bahrain as US are not prepared to offer aircraft in service with USAF for sale to Gulf states. It could well gain impetus from the recent Hawk trainer contract signed with Abu Dhabi. GCC funds might be the means by which Bahrain could purchase. BDF have agreed to and shown genuine interest in a DSO/BAe demonstration in-country in conjunction with similar demonstrations in Saudi and Kuwait planned for April 1983. A further point to be made is the (again recent) GCC interest in a centralised Hawk maintenance and stores facility possibly in Saudi. BAe is preparing proposals on this support facility and the proposals are being put to the BDF through our Embassy.

5. Main Battle tanks. Bahrain Defence Forces intend to purchase about 30 tanks in 1984. There is strong interest in the Vickers Valiant but BDF are worried about buying a tank not in service with the British

Army (Challenger is too heavy for Bahrain). UK will consider an MOU as means of allaying Bahraini fears on the future availability of spares and support. Likely that selected tanks will be invited for in-country trials in Spring 1984.

6. Armoured vehicles. Bahrain has a preference for tracked vehicles and interest centres on the MCV 80. GKN are making major efforts to continue the initiative in Bahrain. MCV 80 was not on Floater 83 but firm plan to carry out MCV 80 demonstrations in Bahrain and other Gulf states later this year. The Scorpion family performed exceptionally well during the Floater's visit and BDF showed positive interest for the first time. There is a possible requirement for 1, perhaps 2, squadrons and Alvis are following up.

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LOOSE MINUTE

D/PROT/614/4

APS/S of S

Copy to:
PS/Minister(AF)
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DS 11
CS(A)1b
D MOD Sy
HQ Sy 1b1
Chief Office Keeper
SO/DGOS) By hand of Major M. Hill
SO/DGTM)
Special Branch (Superintendent Pryde)
Cannon Row (Inspector Menear)

PS/Prime Minister
PS/S of S FCO
FCO, MED (Mr R. Austen)
FCO, Defence Dept
FCO, Protocol Office - Miss Reid
FCO, Protocol Office - Miss Connolly

Secretary, GHF
Commandant, RCDS

VISIT OF HH SHAIKH HAMAD BIN ISA AL-KHALIFA, CROWN PRINCE AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE BAHRAIN DEFENCE FORCE

Reference: D/DS 11/2/12 dated 14 Mar 83 - not to all.

1. HH Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa, Crown Prince of Bahrain and Commander-in-Chief of the Bahrain Defence Force, is visiting Washington for politico-military talks in late March accompanied by HE Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, the Bahrain Foreign Minister. He will break his journey in London and will call on the Prime Minister, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence. As his main interests are in the field of Defence arrangements it has been agreed that MOD will lead in making the arrangements for the visit.

2. The attached programme details the arrangements made; unfortunately there is not time to produce a printed copy. Essentially the programme covers arrival and departure at London Heathrow, calls on the Prime Minister, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Secretary of State for Defence plus an official luncheon at Admiralty House given by HMG, at which Mr Jerry Wiggin, US of S(AF), will be host.

3. The Bahrain Embassy have requested that facilities be provided for photographic coverage of the calls which the Crown Prince and Foreign Minister will make; it has been agreed by MED FCO that FCO News Department will co-ordinate this aspect with the Embassy.

RESTRICTED

4. FCO, Defence Department, will also initiate consideration of the need for Diplomatic protection.

5. Arrangements for hotel accommodation and cars have been made by the Bahrain Embassy.

24 Mar 83

J.W. FROST
Air Commodore (Retd)
Head of Protocol
Room 2254 Ext 6608

VISIT OF

HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH HAMAD BIN ISA AL-KHALIFA

CROWN PRINCE OF BAHRAIN

AND

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE BAHRAIN DEFENCE FORCE

VISITORS AND ADMINISTRATION

His Highness Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa
The Crown Prince of Bahrain and Commander-in-Chief of the Bahrain Defence Force.

His Excellency Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa
Foreign Minister

Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmad
Private Secretary to HH The Crown Prince

Colonel Shaikh Abdullah Bin Sulman
Deputy Chief of Staff Bahrain Defence Force

Colonel Shaikh Ali Bin Abdullah

ADMINISTRATION

Arrangements for the visit are being made by the Protocol Office, Room 2254, Ministry of Defence, Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1 (Telephone: 01-218 6608)

ACCOMMODATION

The visitors will be staying at the Dorchester Hotel, Park Lane, London, SW1 (Telephone 01-629 8888) under arrangements made by the Embassy of the State of Bahrain

PROGRAMME

Saturday, 26th March 1983

1430 Arrive London (Heathrow) Airport by Private aircraft (Boeing 727, Callsign Bahrain 1). Met by the Hounslow Suite, Terminal 2 by:-

Major General W Walley
Director General Ordnance Services
Representing the Secretary of State for Defence.

Sir Donald Logan
Special Representative of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Air Commodore J W Frost
Head of Protocol
Ministry of Defence

His Excellency Shaikh Abdul-Rahman Faris Al-Khalifa
Ambassador of the State of Bahrain

1500 Depart by car under arrangements made by the Embassy of the State of Bahrain

1530 Arrive at the Dorchester Hotel.

Evening

No official engagements are planned.

Sunday, 27th March 1983

No official engagements are planned.

Monday, 28th March 1983

1110 His Excellency Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, Foreign Minister

His Excellency Shaikh Abdul-Rahman Faris Al-Khalifa, Ambassador of the State of Bahrain

depart Dorchester Hotel.

1125 Arrive the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ambassadors Entrance.

1130 Call on The Right Honourable Francis Pym MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

1200 Depart the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for Admiralty House.

1240 His Highness The Crown Prince accompanied by Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmad, Colonel Shaikh Abdullah Bin Sulman and Colonel Shaikh Ali Bin Abdullah arrive Admiralty House, Whitehall. Met by:-

Air Commodore J.W. Frost
Head of Protocol, Ministry of Defence.

1245 for 1300 Luncheon. Host Mr Jerry Wiggin MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Armed Forces.

1425 His Highness The Crown Prince departs Admiralty House by car accompanied by:-

His Excellency Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, Foreign Minister

His Excellency Shaikh Abdul-Rahman Faris Al-Khalifa, Ambassador of the State of Bahrain

1430 Arrive No 10 Downing Street.

Call on The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher MP, Prime Minister.

1455 Depart No 10 Downing Street.

1500 Arrive Ministry of Defence, Horseguards Avenue Entrance. Met by:-

Air Commodore J.W. Frost
Head of Protocol, Ministry of Defence

Call on The Right Honourable Michael Heseltine MP, Secretary of State for Defence.

1530 Depart Ministry of Defence, Horseguards Avenue Entrance.

Evening

No official engagements are planned.

Tuesday, 29th March 1983

Depart Dorchester Hotel by car under arrangements made by the Embassy of the State of Bahrain.

Arrive London (Heathrow) Airport.

Depart by Private aircraft (Boeing 727 - Callsign Bahrain 1) for Washington.

Major General **W.M. Allen**
Director General of Transport and Movements
Representing the Secretary of State for Defence

Sir Donald Logan
Special Representative of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Air Commodore J M Frost
Head of Protocol
Ministry of Defence

will bid farewell.

DIRECTORY

Embassy of the State of Bahrain	01-370 5132
MOD, Protocol Office	01-218 6608
Hotel, The Dorchester Hotel	01-629 888

INFORMATION SERVICES

General Information	01-353 4242	The Daily Telegraph Information Service will do its best to answer any query of general interest.
Daily Events	01-246 8041	This number will give you a recorded 2½ mins. resume of the day's events in London.
London Weather	01-246 8091	Weather forecast and temperature information
Correct Time	123	

Bahrain

10 DOWNING STREET

John

Visit of Crown Prince of Bahrain. Sheikh Hamad MOD would like the PM to have her photo taken with the Crown Prince.

A photo call at the Front Door would suffice.

Content?

Andy

Andy:

We will arrange a photo 22/3 call as usual – I do not promise where.

JK noted.

AR 22/3

~~Be Kyeld~~ to see.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 March, 1983

Visit of Shaikh Hamad

Thank you for your letter of 15 March.

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister will be glad to receive the Crown Prince of Bahrain at 2.30 on Monday, 28 March. I should be grateful for a brief in due course.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. J. COLES

Miss J. E. Ridley,
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(1).

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 25/8

15th March 1983

Prime Minister

Agree to receive Crown Prince of Bahrain at 2.30 on Monday, 28 March.

A.J.C. 16/3

14-30
-15.15
Mon 28th March.

Yes

Dear John,

VISIT OF SHAIKH HAMAD

Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, the Crown Prince of Bahrain and Commander in Chief of the Bahrain Defence Force, will be passing through London on Monday 28th March on his way to politico-military talks in Washington. We are arranging a meeting for him with my Secretary of State, but the Shaikh has additionally asked to call on the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

Bahrain is an increasingly important market for Defence Sales, and Shaikh Hamad is a key figure in their equipment selection process. The Gulf Cooperation Council is providing Bahrain with £1000M in grants to re-equip her forces. The Ruler of Bahrain has provided us with encouragement by saying that he wants priority to be given to British equipment and Shaikh Hamad's additional support could clinch individual orders of up to £100M and total orders of over £300M in the next two or three years.

Shaikh Hamad will be seeing Vice President Bush and possibly President Reagan in Washington and is looking for similar high level meetings in London. Indeed, HMA Bahrain believes that unless the Prime Minister is able to see him, Shaikh Hamad may not come to England at all. I should therefore be grateful if you would explore the possibility of the Shaikh and the Bahraini Foreign Minister (who is to accompany him) making a short courtesy call on the Prime Minister on 28th March.

I am copying this to John Holmes (FCO).

Yours ever,

Jane Ridley

(J E RIDLEY) (MISS)

CONFIDENTIAL

A J Coles Esq

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T88/83

SUBJECT

NOTE: DOT did not keep copy of telex message. But amendments were implemented. Sent on 29.1.83

[DRAFT] MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEND TO BAHRAIN Bahrain

cc Marks + Ons.

His Excellency Shaikh Khalifa bin Sulman Al Khalifa
Prime Minister
Bahrain

Your Excellency

1. I recall with great pleasure my visit to Bahrain in 1981, and I know Peter Rees had a most successful visit last March in which he reaffirmed Her Majesty's Government's wish to extend the links between our two countries, particularly in the area of economic cooperation.

2. You may remember that during our talks in September 1981, I spoke to you about Davy McKee, one of the United Kingdom's and indeed one of the world's leading and most experienced contractors, who were bidding at that time for the ammonia/methanol plant to be built by the Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company. I was naturally disappointed, as I believe you were, that the UK were unable in the event to participate in this project. I was therefore very pleased ~~most interested~~ to learn that Davy McKee were hoping to participate in your country's impressive plans for aluminium processing through the Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill project. I know Peter Rees spoke to you of Davy McKee's interest in this project last March, but I thought it would be timely for me to raise with you Davy McKee's proven expertise in this particular field, and to urge you to consider their proposals sympathetically.

8

Davy McKee's bid has Her Majesty's Government fullest support~~in the framework of our international obligations~~. I do hope that this project is able to make a positive contribution towards the further development of the relations between our two countries.

Warm personal regards

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

File

B/F

Tel to T

Bahrain

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 January 1983

BAHRAIN: ALUMINIUM ROLLING MILL PROJECT - DAVY McKEE

Thank you for your letter of 27 January.

As I told you on the telephone this morning, the Prime Minister agrees to send to the Prime Minister of Bahrain the proposed message in support of Davy McKee's bid for the Aluminium Rolling Mill Project. But Mrs. Thatcher would like two amendments to be made to the text:

(a) In paragraph 2, delete "most interested" and substitute "very pleased".

(b) At the end of that paragraph, delete the phrase "in the framework of our international obligations".

The message should end with the words "warm personal regards, yours sincerely, Margaret Thatcher".

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the message to be despatched.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Jonathan Spencer (Department of Industry).

A. J. COLES

John Rhodes, Esq.,
Department of Trade.

COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE

(1)

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE 1 VICTORIA STREET LONDON SW1H 0ET Telephone 01-215 7877

Prime Minister
Decision needed tonight
Agree to send message to Prime Minister of Bahrain?
A. J. C. 27/1

From the Secretary of State

Yes MT

John Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
London
SW1

27 January 1983

Dear John,

BAHRAIN : ALUMINIUM ROLLING MILL PROJECT - DAVY MCKEE

The purpose of this letter is to seek the Prime Minister's urgent approval to send a message to the Prime Minister of Bahrain in support of Davy McKee's bid for this important project, valued at some £80 m (UK content approximately £70 m) and the largest project in Bahrain and one of the largest currently out to tender in the Middle East. The message would need to be conveyed to Bahrain tomorrow morning, Friday 28 January.

There is a strong industry case for supporting the project. It would be Davy's largest aluminium rolling mill to date, and as such an excellent reference plant incorporating the latest technological improvements. It represents 20,000 man years of work in the UK. There is a good chance that this project would lead to the further extensions worth a further £100 m.

The client is a newly formed Bahraini company (Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company - GARMCO) with shareholding from Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait. Arab sources around the project have, both in December and very recently, threatened political opposition because of the PLO/Arab League dispute. This has led Davy to keep in close touch with the Secretary of State for Trade, whom they saw recently. Following action taken as a result of that meeting, Davy succeeded in being short-listed, together with the French (then believed to be their main rivals) and the Japanese. At the beginning of this week Davy submitted a substantially reduced bid at a level which they had been told by their agent would give them a clear lead. But the Japanese have reduced their price further and it is still somewhat lower than Davy's.

HMA Bahrain has an appointment to see Shaikh Khalifa this Saturday (29 January) at which he will underline HMG's support for Davy's bid. This, the Ambassador sees, is the only means left to keep Davy's chance alive, and he has suggested that a message from the Prime Minister would add very greatly to the weight of his approach.

COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE

COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE

From the Secretary of State

My Secretary of State approves the line taken in the attached draft text, which has been cleared with the FCO.

Copies go to the Private Secretaries of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Industry.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN RHODES
Private Secretary

COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE

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NB 026/2

This will be the only record.

FM BAHRAIN 300700Z SEP 82
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 190 OF 30 SEP
INFO GULF POSTS TEHRAN BAGHDAD
INFO SAVING AMMAN CAIRO TEL AVIV

SUBJECT

cc Mr Ker Set

h.a.

4/10

1. THE PRIME MINISTER MADE AN HOUR'S STOPOVER AT BAHRAIN AIRPORT ON 29 SEPTEMBER. SHE WAS MET BY THE MINISTER OF DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRY YUSUF SHIRAWI, IN THE ABSENCE ABROAD OF THE CROWN PRINCE AND THE BAHRAIN PRIME MINISTER.

2. SHIRAWI TALKED FREELY AS IS HIS CUSTOM AND COVERED A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES. THE SALIENT POINTS WERE:

(A) THE HIGH ESTEEM IN WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER AND BRITAIN WERE HELD FOR THE FIRM DEFENCE OF PRINCIPLE OVER THE FALKLANDS.

(B) THE FAVOURABLE IMPACT MADE BY MRS THATCHER'S OUTSPOKEN COMMENTS IN TOKYO ON THE LEBANESE MASSACRE.

(C) THE GROWING STRENGTH OF THE MODERATE CAMP IN ARAB COUNCILS AND THE READINESS OF THE ARAB WORLD INCLUDING THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT TO RE-ESTABLISH EGYPT IN THE THE ARAB NATION AND TO SEEK PEACE WITH ISRAEL. BUT ISRAEL MUST BE PREPARED TO DEFINE THE BOUNDARIES IT SOUGHT.

THE 1967 BORDERS WERE A NEGOTIABLE BASIS ON WHICH TO WORK SUBJECT TO BALANCED ADJUSTMENT TO IMPROVE SECURITY ON BOTH SIDES. FEDERATION BETWEEN A PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA MIGHT COME AT A LATER STAGE BUT THE FIRST STEP RIX TO GIVE THE PALESTINIANS SELF DETERMINATION AND A PIECE OF TERRITORY OF THEIR OWN.

(D) JERUSALEM, AS MRS THATCHER SUGGESTED, WAS THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM. BUT SHIRAWI THOUGHT THAT ONCE THE BANDWAGON BEGAN TO ROLL TOWARD PEACE, EVEN THAT MIGHT BE RESOLVED. HE FAVOURED A RETURN TO THE PROPOSAL FOR SUPERVISION BY A JOINT COMMISSION DRAWN FROM THE THREE GREAT RELIGIONS.

(E) ALL FOREIGN TROOPS INCLUDING THE SYRIANS SHOULD LEAVE LEBANON. ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CREATE A FAIT ACCOMPLI THERE OR IN THE 1967 OCCUPIED TERRITORIESM BUT THE ARAB WORLD NEEDED THE CHRISTIAN ELEMENT OF LEBANON AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO LIVE ALSO WITH 2 MILLION ISRAELI JEWS.

(F) EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES SHOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT REVULSION AT EVENTS IN LEBANON LED TO GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE. SHIRAWI HAD NO ANSWER TO THE QUESTION WHETHER MR BEGIN WOULD EVER NEGOTIATE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK. IN THE LONGER TERM HE FEARED THAT CONFLICT BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS WOULD BE PERPETUATED THROUGH COMPETITION TO CONTROL THE LIMITED WATER SUPPLIES AVAILABLE.

(G) ARAB YOUTH WERE INCREASINGLY SCEPTICAL OF POLITICAL MOVEMENTS. THERE HAD BEEN NO EXPLOSION OF POLITICAL WRATH AT THE POWERLESSNESS OF MODERATE ARAB LEADERSHIP IN THE FACE OF CURRENT EVENTS. IT WAS THE EXTREMISTS, NOTABLY QADDAFI,WHO ERE DISCREDITED. BUT IN THE END, FAILURE TO BRING ABOUT AN ACCEPTABLE PEACE WITH ISRAEL WOULD UNDERMINE MODERATE LEADERSHIP IN ARABIA.

3. NEARER HOME, SHIRAWI SAID THAT THE DECEMBER COUP HAD BEEN WELL HANDLED BY THE AUTHORITIES. FEW BAHRAINI SHIA REALLY SUPPORTED KHOMEINI'S POLICIES THOUGH HIS ASCETICISM WON ADMIRATION WHEN COMPARED WITH SPENDTHRIFT LUXURY ELSEWHERE. THE BAHRAIN AUTHORITIES WERE CONSCIOUS OF THE CONTINUING RISKS BUT NOT NERVOUS. THE GULF STATES WERE GROWING IN ASSURANCE AND DEVELOPING COMMON POLICIES. INDEED THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL IN SOME RESPECTS WAS GOING TOO FAST. BUT HE REMAINED WORRIED ABOUT THE UAE WHICH HAD NOT SUCCESSFULLY COALESCED AS A UNITARY STATE, AND ABOUT KUWAIT WHICH, SENSITIVE TO THE THREATS POSED BY ITS IRAQI AND IRANIAN NEIGHBOURS AS WELL AS ITS PALESTINIAN POPULATION, WAS TOO READY TO DO NOTHING AND HOPE TROUBLES WOULD GO AWAY.

4. SHIRAWI WAS PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF THE GULF TO DISRUPTION OF OIL SHIPMENTS. HE EXPECTED THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR TO CONTINUE. IF THE AWAITED IRANIAN OFFENSIVE TOOK PLACE AND WAS CONFINED TO IRAQI MAINLAND TARGETS NO CONCLUSIVE RESULTS WOULD FOLLOW. IRANIAN SUCCESSES WOULD ONLY INCREASE IRAQI DETERMINATION TO FIGHT ON AND SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD NOT FALL. IF THE WAR SPREAD TO INCLUDE MAJOR IRANIAN ATTACKS LOWER DOWN THE GULF IT WOULD BE OUT OF ARAB HANDS. THE US WOULD BE DRAWN IN. BUT MINIG IN THE GULF, ON WHICH HE CITED A FALSE ALARM EARLIER THIS YEAR FOR WHICH THE (BRITISH RUN) MIDDLE EAST NAVIGATION AID SERVICES WERE STRONGLY CRITICISED, COULD HAVE VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES.

5. ASKED BY THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT OIL PRICES, SHIRAWI SAID HE EXPECTED THESE TO FALL IN REAL TERMS UNTIL ABOUT 1985, THEN TO RISE ROUGHLY IN LINE WITH INFLATION AND RESUMED GROWTH IN THE EUROPEAN AND US ECONOMIES. THIS WAS BASED ON THE EXPECTATION AND HOPE THAT BY 1985 THE INDUSTRIALISED WEST WOULD HAVE SINGLE FIGURE INFLATION AND A SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE SOMEWHAT SLOWER THAN THAT OF THE POSTWAR PERIOD.

6. THE LIMITED PRESS COVERAGE HAS BEEN FACTUAL AND FAVOURABLE, PUTTING IN THIS USEFUL STOPOVER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO BAHRAIN LAST YEAR AND INPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING AMMAN CAIRO TEL AVIV

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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Bahrain

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 July 1979

Many thanks for sending me, with your letter of 4 July, examples of local press coverage of the Prime Minister's short stop-over in Bahrain on 2 July.

I think the Prime Minister found her time with Shaikh Khalifa very useful and she has referred to it several times since in other discussions. I am glad that the stop-over may have been helpful to you as well.

The Prime Minister was most grateful, as were we all, for all the arrangements which you and your staff made for her short stay at the airport. Thank you very much for all your help.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

His Excellency Mr. H.B. Walker, C.M.G.

BRITISH EMBASSY
BAHRAIN

UNCLASSIFIED
026/1

4 July 1979

B G Cartledge Esq
No 10 Downing Street

Dear Bryan,

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO BAHRAIN

// 1. I enclose copies of the only two daily newspapers we have here to show, in context, how the Prime Minister's stop-over in Bahrain on 2 July was reported the following day.

2. The caption to the picture on the front page of "Akhbar al-Khalij" reads: "HE Shaikh Khalifa bin Sulman Al Khalifa, the Prime Minister, led those saying good-bye to Mrs Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the delegation accompanying her, when she left Bahrain International Airport at about 10.30 am after a stop-over there on her way home from Australia. Also bidding farewell to Mrs Thatcher were a number of Ministers and senior officials and the United Kingdom Ambassador to Bahrain."

3. As I said when you got back on board the aircraft, I am most grateful to the Prime Minister for taking the time to talk to Shaikh Khalifa; their meeting will have done no end of good for UK-Bahrain relations.

Yours ever,

H B Walker

No 10 D. St

Bahrain

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 142 OF 03 JULY

FOR MED

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO BAHRAIN

1. WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER PASSED THROUGH BAHRAIN ON THE MORNING OF 2 JULY SHE HAD JUST SHORT OF ONE HOUR'S CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF BAHRAIN, SHAIKH KHALIFA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA.

UK/BAHRAIN

2. SHAIKH KHALIFA SAID THAT UK/BAHRAIN RELATIONS WERE EXCELLENT. THE UK HAD GIVEN BAHRAIN A GREAT DEAL, PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF KNOW-HOW. HE WAS A SECURITY-MINDED PERSON AND, ALTHOUGH BAHRAIN WAS STABLE (PROBABLY THE MOST STABLE COUNTRY IN THE AREA), HE PARTICULARLY VALUED THE SERVICES OF MR BELL AND MR HENDERSON AND THE OTHER ASSISTANCE WE PROVIDED IN THE SECURITY FIELD. UK/BAHRAIN RELATIONS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND STRENGTHENED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY THROUGH PERSONAL CONTACTS: HE WOULD HAVE BEEN DISTRESSED IF MRS THATCHER HAD DECIDED TO STAY IN HER AIRCRAFT AS SHE PASSED THROUGH BAHRAIN.

IRAN

3. MRS THATCHER, DRAWING ATTENTION TO SOME OF THE REASONS FOR THE FALL OF THE SHAH, SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY NOW THAT ONE WAS REALISING JUST HOW CALAMITOUS AN EVENT IT HAD BEEN. SHAIKH KHALIFA COMMENTED THAT IT HAD BEEN APPARENT THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG WITH THE SHAH'S REGIME FROM THE NUMBER OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS FROM IRAN WHO HAD ARRIVED EACH WEEK IN BAHRAIN AND THE OTHER GULF STATES. HOWEVER, THE SHAH HAD BEEN ONE OF THE WEST'S BEST FRIENDS: THE BAHRAINIS WERE ADVISING THE AMERICANS NOT TO MAKE THE SAME MISTAKES VIS A VIS THE SAUDIS AS THEY HAD MADE VIS A VIS THE SHAH.

4. SHAIKH KHALIFA SAID THAT THE REVOLUTION IN IRAN WAS NOT LIVING UP TO ITS ORIGINAL PROMISE. THE COUNTRY WAS IN CHAOS. PERHAPS BECAUSE HE WAS SECURITY-MINDED HE COULD NOT SAY THAT HE COULD SEE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL. TWO STATEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE REVIVING THE IRANIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAIN. THESE HAD BEEN

OFFICIALLY DISOWNED BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TOTALLY TO ACCEPT THE DISAVOWALS WHEN ONE OF THE STATEMENTS HAD COME FROM A MAN KNOWN TO BE CLOSE TO KHOMEINI. THE IRANIANS WERE SEEKING TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THEIR OWN PROBLEMS BY FOCUSSING ATTENTION ON BAHRAIN.

IRAQ

5. MRS THATCHER TOLD SHAIKH KHALIFA THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS ABOUT TO VISIT IRAQ. A BRITISH BUSINESSMAN HAD BEEN IMPRISONED THERE WITH NO REASON GIVEN. THIS APART, THE IRAQIS SEEMED TO WANT TO BECOME MORE FRIENDLY. SHE ASKED SHAIKH KHALIFA FOR HIS ADVICE ON WHAT RESPONSE THE UK SHOULD MAKE. SHAIKUKHALIFA SAID THAT WE HAD NOTHING TO LOSE BY RESPONDING TO THE IRAQI SOUNDINGS. HE SPECULATED THAT ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT TO BE EXPECTED THAT THE IRAQI REGIME WOULD ALTOGETHER CHANGE ITS COLOURS ITS MEMBERS MIGHT HAVE REACHED A CERTAIN MATURITY AND ALSO BE LOOKING FOR FRIENDS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD.

LIBYA

6. SHAIKH KHALIFA SAID THAT EARLIER IN THE MORNING THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAD INFORMED HIM THAT PRESIDENT QADHAFI, NOW VISITING BAHRAIN, HAD SAID THAT HE WANTED TO GET ON TO BETTER TERMS WITH THE BRITISH. HE COULD ASSURE THE BAHRAINIS THAT FOR THREE YEARS HE HAD GIVEN NO ASSISTANCE TO THE IRA. HE NOW REGRETTED BREAKING THE ARMS CONTRACT LIBYA HAD HAD WITH THE UK. SHAIKH KHALIFA SPECULATED THAT, AS WITH THE IRAQI LEADERS (PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE), QADHAFI MIGHT BE BECOMING RATHER MORE MATURE. MRS THATCHER ASKED WHETHER QADHAFI HAD SAID ANYTHING TO HIS BAHRAINI HOSTS ABOUT HIS THREAT TO STOP EXPORTING LIBYAN OIL, WHICH WOULD WORRY THE UK VERY MUCH. SHAIKH KHALIFA SAID THAT HE WAS NOT DUE TO JOIN THE TALKS WITH QADHAFI UNTIL LATER IN THE DAY. PERHAPS HE COULD PUT THE POINT TO QADHAFI, BUT IN ANY CASE THE LATTER SEEMED TO HAVE PROVIDED AN OPENING FOR THE UK TO PURSUE DISCUSSIONS DIRECT WITH THE LIBYANS.

OIL AND THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM

7. MRS THATCHER SAID THAT AT TOKYO THE EUROPEANS HAD BEEN CONCERNED TO ACHIEVE MOVES TOWARDS RESYFAINT IN THE DEMAND FOR OIL NOT ONLY ON THEIR OWN PART BUT ALSO ON THE PART OF THE OTHER MAJOR INDUSTRIALISED POWERS. OIL PRICE RISES HIT THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES PARTICULARLY HARD. SHAIKH KHALIFA SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE EUROPEANS SHOULD TALK TO THE OIL PRODUCIKG ARAB STATES. THE EUROPEANS SHOULD LOOK AFTER THEIR OWN INTERESTS,

AND THE ARAB STATES FOR THEIR PART HAD A LOT TO GAIN FROM CO-OPERATION WITH EUROPE. IN THIS CONTEXT THE PARIS DECLARATION OF 18 JUNE ON THE MIDDLE EAST WAS AN ADMIRABLE DOCUMENT.

8. MRS THATCHER SAID THAT WE CONSIDERED GENUINE PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY TO BE OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. SHE HAD SPOKEN FIRMLY TO MR BEGIN ABOUT ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK BUT REGRETTABLY WITHOUT RESULT. HOWEVER, THOSE WHO HAD BEEN AT CAMP DAVID HAD TOLD HER THAT IT WAS MR BEGIN'S NATURE TO BE RIGID UP TO THE LAST MINUTE AND THEN TO MAKE A CONCESSION.

9. SHAIKH KHALIFA STRESSED (AND REITERATED AT THE END OF THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS' CONVERSATION) THE IMPORTANCE OF GIVING THE PALESTINIANS A HOMELAND. THIS MUST SURELY SEEM NO MORE THAN NATURAL JUSTICE TO THE WESTERN POWERS, WHO PLACED SO MUCH EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION OF MRS THATCHER'S, HE SAID HE WAS SURE THAT THE ARAB OIL-PRODUCING STATES WOULD BE READY TO CONTRIBUTE FINANCIALLY TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN HOMELAND. AND IF THERE WAS A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM ABOUT OIL FOR THE WEST.

WALKER.

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Bryan. Yes. BW 4/7

M. East Dept in the FCO want to copy this telegram to: Tripoli
Tehran
Bagdad
Jedda
Washington
Kuwait
Doha
Bonn
Paris
Tel Aviv
Cairo.

Do you approve?

Alasdair
4/7.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 July 1979

cc Master Set
cc Middle East Situation
cc Energy Policy Pt 2

Dear Paul,

Prime Minister's Meeting with the Prime Minister of Bahrain Sheikh Khalifa, at Bahrain Airport on 2 July 1979

The Prime Minister's aircraft made a refuelling stop at Bahrain Airport at 0930 (local time) this morning and the Prime Minister of Bahrain, Sheikh Khalifa, came to the airport to meet her (interrupting, in order to do so, a meeting with Colonel Qadaffi of Libya). The following is a summary of the main points which arose during half an hour's discussion in the airport lounge, at which H.M. Ambassador was also present. Audibility was poor and Mr. Walker may wish to supplement this account if he finds significant gaps in it.

Arab/Israel

Sheikh Khalifa said that the recent declaration on the Middle East by the E.E.C. had been helpful. It was essential to safeguard the rights of the Palestinians and to give them a homeland. Nothing would be achieved in the negotiations on the future of the West Bank unless the Palestinians, who were becoming desperate, were allowed to take part in them. Commenting on the Camp David agreements, Sheikh Khalifa said that they had so far failed to produce any concrete results. Although they had been intended to mark the first steps towards peace, the only outcome so far had been the isolation of Egypt from her close friends. The Arab world could not afford to wait two or three years for more substantial results.

The Prime Minister gave Sheikh Khalifa a short account of Mr. Begin's last visit to London, when she had found him immovable on the issue of Israeli settlements. The Prime Minister said, however, that it was Mr. Begin's usual tactic to go to the brink before making any concessions. Later in the discussion, Sheikh Khalifa repeated that the West could not go on making excuses for the absence of a solution to the problem of the Palestinians; a homeland had to be found for them.

Iran

Sheikh Khalifa repeatedly expressed his deep concern over recent developments in Iran and the present situation there. The Shah had been a constant and staunch friend of the West, and

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especially of the United States; but now the Americans would not even allow him into their country. The Prime Minister explained that the U.S., like the U.K., were constrained by the threat to their own people in Iran which would be created if the Shah were to be given permament refuge in either capital. Sheikh Khalifa expressed understanding of this. He said that the present course of events in Iran, and especially the wave of executions which had taken place, was not representative of Islam. He expected a further power struggle to develop in Iran; Iranian refugees were arriving in Bahrain at the rate of about 30 a week.

Iraq

The Prime Minister mentioned to Sheikh Khalifa the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's current visit to Baghdad, and asked for his advice on how the U.K. should respond to indications that the Iraqis wished to improve their relations with us. Sheikh Khalifa recommended that the British Government should respond positively.

Libya

Sheikh Khalifa told the Prime Minister that Colonel Qadaffi had arrived in Bahrain on the previous day and, when he heard that Sheikh Khalifa was to meet the British Prime Minister during her stop-over, had asked him to convey a message to her. This was to the effect that he wished to open a new book in Libya's relations with the U.K.. Colonel Qadaffi wished the Prime Minister to know that for the past three years there had been no contact between the Libyan regime and the I.R.A., nor any supply of weapons to them.. Colonel Qadaffi also admitted that he had been mistaken in his handling of the abortive defence deals between Libya and the U.K.. Sheikh Khalifa told the Prime Minsiter that Colonel Qadaffi evidently wished to improve relations with Britain: if he really meant it, this could be of benefit to the British Government. Libya evidently needed friends and a helping hand; but, the Sheikh added, there was an Arab proverb to the effect that if one had been bitten by a snake, one was suspicious of a piece of rope. The Sheikh suggested that Colonel Qadaffi's approaches could be pursued through diplomatic channels.

Relations between the West and OPEC

After a short discussion of the new instability in the Middle East and in Africa, following events in Iran and the activities of the Soviet Union's Cuban and East German proxies in Africa, Sheikh Khalifa spoke of the need to restore stability and said that the Communique issued at the end of the Tokyo Summit, like the E.E.C. Declaration on the Middle East, had produced a good effect in the OPEC countries. The fact remained, however, that unless the West's ideals concerning human rights were fulfilled so far as the Palestinians were concerned, OPEC would continue to use the

/ energy

energy weapon against Western consumers. He admitted frankly that the oil-producing countries had been robbing the West: Iran, for example, had cancelled all her long-term contracts and was now selling her oil to the highest bidder. The Iranians were producing less oil but gaining more revenue. Sheikh Khalifa said that he fully recognised, however, that if the West suffered, the Arab world would suffer as well. He agreed with the Prime Minister's comment that the less-developed countries would suffer most of all. The Prime Minister asked Sheikh Khalifa whether it was his view that if some advance could be achieved towards a solution of the Palestinian problem, oil prices would be stabilised: Sheikh Khalifa confirmed this. He strongly urged the Prime Minister to promote more frequent and more direct contact between the Western nations and the Arab world. The West should make a greater effort to hear Arab views at first hand. When the Prime Miniter mentioned Prince Salman's visit to London in May, Sheikh Khalifa commented that Saudi Arabia was deeply committed to maintaining stability in the region. The Prime Minister told Sheikh Khalifa that the West and the Arab world should stand together to prevent the spread of Communism. Sheikh Khalifa agreed and commented that it was easier to let the Communists in than to get them out.

Bilateral Relations

Sheikh Khalifa spoke very warmly of U.K./Bahraini relations. Bahrain found it easier to get along with the U.K. than with any other country. The Sheikh went on to stress the importance which he attached to security matters and told the Prime Minister that he would greatly value British co-operation in this field. The Prime Minister invited him to let us know of his requirements. Sheikh Khalifa said that Bahraini resources were limited but it was not simply a matter of purchasing equipment: training and techniques were at least as important and Bahrain would value assistance of this kind.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Charles

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Bryan ✓ Yes BM 4/7

May M. East Dept copy this to Bahrain.

A Lasdair

FCO informed -

ACKM.

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TO IMMEDIATE SINGAPORE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3 OF 01 JULY

RESTRICTED

FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY
FCO TEL 325 TO TOKYO (NOT REPEATED TO YOU): PRIME MINISTER'S STOPOVER IN BAHRAIN.

1. THE BAHRAIN PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE HAVE INDICATED THAT WHILE SHAIKH KHALIFA DOES NOT WISH TO PRESS FOR DISCUSSION OF ANY PARTICULAR MATTER HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON:
(A) OIL AND OIL PRICES
(B) BAHRAIN/UK RELATIONS
(C) QUOTE GENERAL POLITICAL MATTERS UNQUOTE.

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FM FCO 281200Z JUNE 79
TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 325 OF 28 JUNE 1979
INFO PRIORITY BAHRAIN
FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY.
PRIME MINISTER'S STOPOVER IN BAHRAIN, MONDAY 2 JULY

1. BAHRAINI PRIME MINISTER (PERSONALITY NOTE FOLLOWS) WILL BE AT THE AIRPORT AND LOOKS FORWARD TO MEETING PRIME MINISTER. THE AMIR WHO IS IN LONDON ON PRIVATE VISIT HAS WELCOMED THIS CHANCE OF A CONTACT WITH HIS GOVERNMENT.

2. BRIEFING FOR TALKS ON BAHRAIN

POINTS TO MAKE:

GENERAL

A. WELCOME INCREASED REGIONAL COOPERATION ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FRONTS. WE HOPE BAHRAIN CAN PLAY A PART HERE, PARTICULARLY IN CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN OMAN AND HER NEIGHBOURS. LORD CARRINGTON IN BAGHDAD 3-4 JULY. HOW DO GULF STATES SEE RELATIONS WITH IRAQ?

IRAN

B. CONFUSED INTERNAL SITUATION. NEW CONSTITUTION DISPUTED. ECONOMY IN BAD SHAPE. OIL EXPORTS LOW. UNREST IN KHUZESTAN NOT OVER. IS THERE A SERIOUS RISK OF CONFLICT WITH IRAQ? IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE DENIED EARLIER CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER BAHRAIN. IF THIS WAS PURSUED, BAHRAIN WOULD HAVE BACKING OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

ARAB/ISRAEL

C. GRADUAL APPROACH ONLY PRACTICAL COURSE AT PRESENT. BUT WE AND OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS ARE COMMITTED TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF UN RESOLUTION 242 AND SATISFACTION OF LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. HAVE TOLD ISRAEL PEACE TREATY CANNOT LAST WITHOUT PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION. HAVE SPOKEN FIRMLY TO

/MR BEGIN ABOUT

MR BEGIN ABOUT WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS AND GENUINE PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

A. CONCERN OVER IRAN AND COMMON OPPOSITION TO EGYPT/ISRAEL TREATY HAS MOVED IRAQIS TOWARDS GULF STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA. BUT SUSPICION REMAINS OF IRAQI INTENTIONS IN GULF.

B. GULF STATES SURPRISINGLY CALM OVER EFFECTS OF IRANIAN REVOLUTION DESPITE THEIR SIGNIFICANT SHIA AND IRANIAN POPULATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN BAHRAIN. BUT RULERS READY TO TAKE THE LESSONS OF THE SHAH'S FALL. AYATOLLAH RUHANI RECENTLY CHALLENGED SHAH'S RIGHT TO DROP HISTORIC PERSIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAIN IN 1970. BUT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT THEN ISSUED STATEMENT THAT 'AT PRESENT' IRAN MADE NO CLAIMS TO ISLANDS IN THE GULF OTHER THAN THOSE SHE ALREADY POSSESSED. BAHRAINIS ARE NERVOUS NONE-THELESS.

C. BAHRAINIS DEPEND ON EGYPTIAN SKILLED LABOUR BUT HAVE FOLLOWED SAUDI LINE IN OPPOSING PEACE TREATY AND IMPLEMENTING ARAB SANCTIONS AGAINST EGYPT. IN PRIVATE SOFTER AGAINST SADAT BUT THEY THINK HE SHOULD HAVE CONSULTED OTHER ARABS AND SHOULD NOT SPEAK FOR THE PALESTINIANS. ALSO BELIEVE THE US SHOULD BE MUCH TOUGHER WITH ISRAEL.

3. PERSONALITY NOTE

SHAIKH KHALIFA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA, PRIME MINISTER OF BAHRAIN. BROTHER OF THE AMIR. AGED 43. EDUCATED PARTLY IN BRITAIN. PRIME MINISTER SINCE 1971. INTELLIGENT HARD WORKING AND CAPABLE. VERY CLOSE TO HIS BROTHER THE AMIR. THE ADMINISTRATION OF BAHRAIN DEPENDS HEAVILY ON HIM. PRO-BRITISH AND NOT BY NATURE AN ARAB NATIONALIST, BUT HARD-HEADED ABOUT BAHRAIN'S INTERESTS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SPEAKS FLUENT ENGLISH.

4. BACKGROUND NOTE ON BAHRAIN

BAHRAIN'S OIL PRODUCTION IS NOW DECLINING. BUT ITS POPULATION OF 340,000 IS PROSPEROUS AND WELL-EDUCATED. IT IS GOVERNED BY A TRADITIONAL RULING FAMILY WHO THOUGH SUNNI MUSLIM GOVERN WELL AND ARE AT PAINS TO LOOK AFTER THE SHIA MAJORITY, WHICH INCLUDES MANY IRANIANS. BAHRAIN RELIES FOR ITS INCOME ON REFINING (MOSTLY SAUDI) CRUDE OIL, ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, AND ON SOME

INDUSTRY (ALUMINIUM SMELTING AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTION).
IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS BAHRAIN USUALLY FOLLOWS THE SAUDI LEAD.
SHE IS A MAJOR REGIONAL MARKET FOR UK GOODS AND SERVICES
(1978 EXPORTS EQUAL POUNDS 120 MILLION).

CARRINGTON

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MR J MOBERLY

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FROM FCO 271942Z
TO ROUTINE BAHRAIN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 112 OF 27 JUNE
AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, MUSCAT, KUWAIT, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, TEHRAN, CAIRO, UKDEL NATO, MOGADISHU AND TRIPOLI.

FOLLOWING FROM PARSONS
DISCUSSION WITH THE AMIR

1. I HAD AN HOUR'S TALK WITH SHAIKH ISSA AT THE DORCHESTER LAST EVENING. MUNRO CAME WITH ME. OUR DISCUSSION COVERED A NUMBER OF CURRENT REGIONAL PROBLEMS AS WELL AS BAHRAINI AFFAIRS. THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE WORTHY OF RECORD.

2. I GAVE SHAIKH ISSA MY GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE AREA IN THE WAKE OF IRAN, FOLLOWING MY RECENT ARABIAN TOUR. SINCE SEEING HIM IN BAHRAIN IN EARLY JUNE I HAD SPOKEN WITH OTHER GULF RULERS AND HAD SOUGHT TO PUT ACROSS SOME OF THE LESSONS OF THE SHAH'S FALL.

TEMPORARILY RETAINED J. Gray 9/7/2016

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

3. THE RULER AGREED THAT THE MAIN PRESENT THREAT TO THE AREA CAME THROUGH THE SIDE EFFECTS OF PALESTINIAN OPPOSITION TO THE SINAI GOVERNMENT, RATHER THAN FROM THE UPHEAVAL IN IRAN. I CONFIRMED THAT,

BOTH

BOTH IN BAHRAIN, AND ELSEWHERE IN THE GULF I HAD FOUND THAT THE SHI'A AND IRANIAN COMMUNITIES SO FAR SEEMED TO BE SHOWING LITTLE RESPONSE TO KHOMEINI'S REVOLUTION. BUT A MOVE TO THE LEFT OVER THE COMING MONTHS, WHICH WAS QUITE POSSIBLE, COULD INSPIRE FRESH TROUBLE. SHAIKH ISSA SHOWED SOME CONCERN ABOUT RESUSCITATION OF THE IRANIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAIN. I SAID THAT, AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD RECENTLY DENIED THE CLAIM. I DOUBTED WHETHER IRAN WOULD SERIOUSLY PURUSE THE ISSUE THOUGH IF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND THE ARAB WORLD DETERIORATED FURTHER IT MIGHT COME OUT OF THE HAT. EVEN IF IT DID, BAHRAIN WOULD I THOUGHT FIND HERSELF SUPPORTED NOT ONLY BY THE ARAB COMMUNITY BUT BY THE WHOLE UNITED NATIONS. THE UN CONFIRMATION OF BAHRAINI INDEPENDDENCE WAS ONE OF THE ORGANISATION'S MORE SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS. THE RULER SEEMED REASSURED.

4. SHAIKH ISSA CRITICISED IN SURPRISINGLY VEHEMENT TERMS REPORTS THAT THE US WAS SETTING UP A MILITARY INTERVENTION FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASKED WHETHER MASIRAH WOULD BECOME A US BASE. HE AGREED THAT THE WEST NEEDED TO SIGNAL TO THE RUSSIANS ITS CONCERN FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND DEPENDABLE OIL SUPPLIES, BUT OUTRIGHT TALK OR EVIDENCE OF MILITARY FORCE WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. I SAID WE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE AMERICANS AND THOUGHT THEY WERE AWARE OF THIS MESSAGE.

5. AT ONE POINT THE RULER HAD HIS ADVISERS LEAVE THE ROOM AND ASKED ME IN CONFIDENCE WHETHER I HAD HEARD ANYTHING ON MY VISIT TO BAHRAIN WHICH INDICATED POTENTIAL UNREST OR TROUBLE. I SAID THAT, SPEAKING AS A PERSONAL FRIEND, I HAD BEEN REASSURED TO FIND THE RULING FAMILY GENERALLY HELD IN HIGH ESTEEM AND NO CRITICISM WHATSOEVER OF HIS OWN RULE. I BELIEVED HIS PEOPLE REALLY RESPECTED HIM.

TEMPORARILY RETAINED J. Gray 9/7/2016

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6. SHAIKH ISSA SAID HE WAS GLAD THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE PASSING THROUGH BAHRAIN ON 2 JULY: AND WOULD HAVE A BRIEF CHANCE OF A MEETING WITH SHEIK KHALILA. HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN ASKED TO RETURN FOR AN UNEXPECTED (AND UNWELCOME) VISIT BY QADDAFI NEXT WEEK, FOLLOWED BY THE SOMALI PRESIDENT. HE COULDNOT HTINK WHY EITHER WAS COMING ANDHAD DECLINED TO RETURN: SHAIKH HAMAD COULD SEE THEM. HE HIMSELF WOULD STAY ON IN LONDON, THOUGH HE GRUMBLED AS USUAL THAT IT WAS TOO FULL OF ARABS.

CARRINGTON

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SIR A. PARSONS
MR J.C. MOBERLY

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D10, CABINET OFFICE

RESTRICTED

Prime Minister
AKW
27/vi

FM BAHRAIN 260700Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 134 OF 26 JUNE

CYPHER

INFO ROUTINE TOKYO

Admin

YOUR TEL 110: PRIME MINISTERS STOP-OVER IN BAHRAIN

1. WE HAD ALREADY ARRANGED A VIP LOUNGE AND PUT OUT FEELERS.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT SHAIKH KHALIFA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA, THE PRIME MINISTER, WOULD LIKE TO MEET

MRS THATCHER IF THIS WOULD CAUSE NO INCONVENIENCE. I ASSURED HIM MRS THATCHER WOULD BE DELIGHTED.

WALKER

0110/27

NNNN

Bahrein Briefing:
Duty Clerk requested to arrange for → Canberra

IT8.7/2-1993
2009:02

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