4201

TOP SECRET

106

MT

PART 10.

confidential filing

ARMS CONTROL TALKS AND THE EFFECT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

SALT MBFR

NUCLEAR ADVISORY PANEL

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

DEFENCE

PT1: May 1979

PT10: December 1986

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~2.12.86.~~							
3.12.86							
~~5.12.86~~							
~~6.12.86~~							
~~8.12.86~~							
~~9.12.86~~							
10.12.86							
11.12.86							
~~17.12.86~~							
~~18.12.86~~							
~~2.1.87~~							
~~12.1.87~~							
13.1.87							
~~16.1.87~~							
~~30.1.87~~							
~~5.2.87~~							
~~19.2.87~~							
~~24.2.87~~							
~~2.3.87~~							
~~3.3.87~~							
~~4.3.87~~							
~~5.3.87~~							
~~6.3.87~~							
~~7.3.87~~							
~~10.3.87~~							
~~12.3.87~~							
10.3.87							

S 3000

PREM 19/2053

PART ENDS

Od 8398366 2M 11/83 JET

PART 10 ends:-

WASHINGTON TEL 521 10.3.47

PART 11 begins:-

MOSCOW TEL 343 11.3.47

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(86) 40th Conclusions, Minute 3	05.12.86
CC(86) 42nd Conclusions, Minute 3	18.12.86

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed C Wayland Date 15 June 2015

PREM Records Team

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2053 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Washington telegram no. 521 dated 10 March 1987	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	20 May 2016
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

CDP 1/4/4

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 10, 1987

THE PRESIDENT'S UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON
SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

The following is the text of a letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate transmitting the President's report, in classified and unclassified versions, on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements as required by PL 99-145:

Dear Mr. Speaker (Dear Mr. President):

In response to congressional requests as set forth in Public Law 99-145, I am forwarding herewith classified and unclassified versions of the Administration's report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements.

Detailed classified briefings will be available to the Congress in the near future.

I believe the additional information provided, and issues addressed, especially in the more detailed classified report, will significantly increase understanding of Soviet violations and probable violations. Such understanding, and strong congressional consensus on the importance of compliance to achieving effective arms control, will do much to strengthen our efforts both in seeking corrective actions and in negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ronald Reagan

SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

At the request of the Congress, I have, in the past three years, provided four reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. These reports include the Administration's reports of January 1984, and February and December 1985, as well as the report on Soviet noncompliance prepared for me by the independent General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Each of these reports has enumerated and documented, in detail, issues of Soviet noncompliance, their adverse effects to our national security, and our attempts to resolve the issues. When taken as a whole, this series of reports also provides a clear picture of the continuing pattern of Soviet violations and a basis for our continuing concerns.

In the December 23, 1985, report, I stated:

> The Administration's most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of Soviet non-compliance. As documented in this and previous reports, the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligation under, or political commitment to, the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, the SALT II Agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the USSR has likely violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

I further stated:

> At the same time as the Administration has reported its concerns and findings to the Congress, the United States has had extensive exchanges with the Soviet Union on Soviet noncompliance in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), where SALT-related issues (including ABM issues) are discussed, and through other appropriate diplomatic channels.

I have also expressed my personal concerns directly to General Secretary Gorbachev during my meetings with him, both in 1985 in Geneva and then again this past October in Reykjavik.

Another year has passed and, despite these intensive efforts, the Soviet Union has failed to correct its noncompliant activities; neither have they provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on other compliance issues.

Compliance is a cornerstone of international law; states are to observe and comply with obligations they have freely undertaken.

In fact, in December 1985, the General Assembly of the United Nations recognized the importance of treaty compliance for future arms control, when, by a vote of 131-0 (with 16 abstentions), it passed a resolution that:

> Urges all parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to comply with their provisions;
>
> Calls upon those parties to consider the implications of noncompliance for international security and stability and for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament; and
>
> Appeals to all UN members to support efforts to resolve

noncompliance questions "with a view toward encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements."

Congress has repeatedly stated its concern about Soviet noncompliance. The U.S. Senate, on February 17, 1987, passed a resolution (S. Res. 94), by a vote of 93 to 2, which:

> ... declares that an important obstacle to the achievement of acceptable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union has been its violations of existing agreements, and calls upon it to take steps to rectify its violation of such agreements and, in particular, to dismantle the newly-constructed radar sited at Krasnoyarsk, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, since it is a clear violation of the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ...

Compliance with past arms control commitments is an essential prerequisite for future arms control agreements. As I have stated before:

> In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less.

I have also said that:

> Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future.... The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press, these compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.

The ABM Treaty

Today I must report that we have deep, continuing concerns about Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty. For several reasons, we are concerned with the Krasnoyarsk radar, which appeared to be completed externally in 1986. The radar demonstrates that the Soviets were designing and programming a prospective violation of the ABM Treaty even while they were negotiating a new agreement on strategic offensive weapons with the United States.

The only permitted functions for a large, phased-array radar (LPAR) with a location and orientation such as that of the Krasnoyarsk radar would be space-tracking and National Technical Means (NTM) of verification. Based on conclusive evidence, however, we judge that this radar is primarily designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking, not for space-tracking and NTM as the Soviets claim. Moreover, the coverage of the Krasnoyarsk radar closes the remaining gap in the Soviet ballistic missile detection and tracking screen; its location allows it to acquire attack characterization data that could aid in planning the battle for Soviet defensive forces and deciding timely offensive responses -- a standard role for such radars.

All LPARs, such as the Krasnoyarsk radar, have the inherent capability to track large numbers of objects accurately. Thus, they not only could perform as ballistic missile detection and tracking radars, but also have the inherent capability,

depending on location and orientation, of contributing to ABM battle management.

LPARs have always been considered to be the long lead-time elements of a possible territorial defense. Taken together, the Krasnoyarsk radar and other Soviet ABM-related activities give us concerns that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Some of the activities, such as construction of the new LPARs on the periphery of the Soviet Union and the upgrade of the Moscow ABM system, appear to be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The construction of the radar near Krasnoyarsk, however, is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty, while other Soviet ABM-related activities involve potential or probable Soviet violations or other ambiguous activity. These other issues, discussed fully in the body of the report, are:

The testing and development of components required for an ABM system that could be deployed to a site in months rather than years;

The concurrent operation of air defense components and ABM components;

The development of modern air defense systems that may have some ABM capabilities; and

The demonstration of an ability to reload ABM launchers in a period of time shorter than previously noted.

Soviet activities during the past year have contributed to our concerns. The Soviets have begun construction of three additional LPARs similar to the Krasnoyarsk radar. These new radars are located and oriented consistent with the ABM Treaty's provision on ballistic missile early warning radars, but they would increase the number of Soviet LPARs by 50 percent. The redundancy in coverage provided by these new radars suggests that their primary mission is ballistic missile acquisition and tracking.

This year's reexamination of Soviet ABM related activities demonstrates that the Soviets have not corrected their outstanding violation, the Krasnoyarsk radar. It is the totality of these Soviet ABM-related activities in 1986 and earlier years that gives rise to our continuing concerns that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. The ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment of an ABM system for the defense of the national territory of the parties and prohibits the parties from providing a base for such a defense. As I said in last December's report:

> This would have profound implications for the vital East-West balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its credibility.

Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons

The integrity of the arms control process is also hurt by Soviet violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Information obtained during the last year reinforces our concern about Soviet noncompliance with these important agreements. Progress toward an agreement banning chemical weapons is affected by Soviet noncompliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Because of the record of Soviet noncompliance with past agreements, we believe verification provisions are a matter of unprecedented importance in our efforts to rid the world of these heinous weapons -- weapons of mass destruction under international law.

The Soviets have continued to maintain a prohibited offensive biological warfare capability. We are particularly concerned because it may include advanced biological agents about which we have little knowledge and against which we have no defense. The Soviets continue to expand their chemical and toxin warfare capabilities. Neither NATO retaliatory nor defensive programs can begin to match the Soviet effort. Even though there have been no confirmed reports of lethal attacks since the beginning of 1984, previous activities have provided the Soviets with valuable testing, development, and operational experience.

Nuclear Testing

The record of Soviet noncompliance with the treaties on nuclear testing is of legal and military concern. Since the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) came into force over twenty years ago, the Soviet Union has conducted its nuclear weapons test program in a manner incompatible with the aims of the Treaty by regularly permitting the release of nuclear debris into the atmosphere beyond the borders of the USSR. Even though the debris from these Soviet tests does not pose calculable health, safety or environmental risks, and these infractions have no apparent military significance, our repeated attempts to discuss these occurrences with Soviet authorities have been continually rebuffed. Soviet refusal to discuss this matter calls into question their sincerity on the whole range of arms control agreements.

During their test moratorium, the Soviets undoubtedly maintained their sites because they quickly conducted a test soon after announcing intent to do so. Furthermore, there were numerous ambiguous events during this period that can neither be associated with, nor disassociated from, observed Soviet nuclear test-related activities.

Soviet testing at yields above the 150 kt limit would allow development of advanced nuclear weapons with proportionately higher yields of weapons than the U.S. could develop under the Treaty.

The United States and the Soviet Union have met on four occasions during the past year for expert-level discussions on the broad range of issues related to nuclear testing. Our objective during these discussions consistently has been to achieve agreement on an effective verification regime for the TTBT and PNET. I remain hopeful that we can accomplish this goal.

The Helsinki Final Act

In 1981 the Soviet Union conducted a major military exercise without providing prior notification of the maneuver's designation and the number of troops taking part, contrary to its political commitment to observe provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act.

During the past year, we have reached an accord at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures that contains new standards for notification, observation, and verification of military activities, including on-site inspection. We will be carefully assessing Soviet compliance with these new standards, which went into effect January 1, 1987.

Recent Developments

At the end of 1986 and during the early weeks of 1987, new information pertaining to some of the issues in this report became available, but it was judged that the data did not necessitate a change in any of the findings. This was partially due to the developing nature of the information at

the time and certain ambiguities associated with it. Furthermore, the Soviet Union resumed underground nuclear testing on February 26, 1987.

SALT II and the SALT I Interim Agreement

The Soviet Union repeatedly violated the SALT II Treaty and took other actions that were inconsistent with the Treaty's provisions. In no case where we determined that the Soviet Union was in violation did they take corrective action. We have raised these issues for the past three years in the SCC and in other diplomatic channels.

The Soviets committed four violations of their political commitment to observe SALT II; they were:

The development and deployment of the SS-25 missile, a prohibited second new type of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM);

Extensive encryption of telemetry during test flights of strategic ballistic missiles;

Concealment of the association between a missile and its launcher during testing; and

Exceeding the permitted number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs).

In addition, the Soviets:

Probably violated the prohibition on deploying the SS-16 ICBM;

Took actions inconsistent with their political commitment not to give the BACKFIRE bomber intercontinental operating capability by deploying it to Arctic bases; and

Evidently exceeded the agreed production quota by producing slightly more than the allowed 30 BACKFIRE bombers per year until 1984.

Concerning the SALT I Interim Agreement, the Soviets used former SS-7 ICBM facilities to support deployment of the SS-25 mobile ICBM, and thereby violated the prohibition on the use of former ICBM facilities.

Soviet Noncompliance and U.S. Restraint Policy

On June 10, 1985, I expressed concern that continued Soviet noncompliance increasingly affected our national security. I offered to give the Soviet Union additional time in order to take corrective actions to return to full compliance, and I asked them to join us in a policy of truly mutual restraint. At the same time, I stated that future U.S. decisions would be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their noncompliance, reversing their military buildup, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

The December 23, 1985, report showed that the Soviets had not taken any actions to correct their noncompliance with arms control commitments. In May 1986, I concluded that the Soviets had made no real progress toward meeting our concerns with respect to their noncompliance, particularly in those activities related to SALT II and the ABM Treaty. From June 1985 until May 1986, we saw no abatement of the Soviet strategic force buildup.

The third yardstick I had established for judging Soviet actions was their seriousness at negotiating deep arms

reductions. In May 1986 I concluded that, since the November 1985 summit, the Soviets had not followed up constructively on the commitment undertaken by General Secretary Gorbachev and me to build upon areas of common ground in the Geneva negotiations, including accelerating work toward an interim agreement on INF.

In Reykjavik, General Secretary Gorbachev and I narrowed substantially the differences between our two countries on nuclear arms control issues. However, the Soviets took a major step backward by insisting that progress in every area of nuclear arms control must be linked together in a single package that has as its focus killing the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Furthermore, it became clear that the Soviets intended to make the ABM Treaty more restrictive than it is on its own terms by limiting our SDI research strictly to the laboratory.

It was, however, the continuing pattern of noncompliant Soviet behavior that I have outlined above that was the primary reason why I decided, on May 27, 1986, to end U.S. observance of the provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement and SALT II. The decision to end the U.S. policy of observing the provisions of the Interim Agreement (which had expired) and the SALT II Treaty (which was never ratified and would have expired on December 31, 1985) was not made lightly. The United States cannot, and will not, allow a double standard of compliance with arms control agreements to be established.

Therefore, on May 27, 1986, I announced:

> In the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance and especially in a flawed SALT II Treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

Responding to a Soviet request, the U.S. agreed to hold a special session of the SCC in July 1986 to discuss my decision. During that session, the U.S. made it clear that we would continue to demonstrate the utmost restraint. At this session we stated that, assuming there is no significant change in the threat we face, the United States would not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union. We also repeated my May 27 invitation to the Soviet Union to join the U.S. in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint pending conclusion of a verifiable agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms. The Soviet response was negative.

In my May 27 announcement, I had said the United States would remain in technical observance of SALT II until later in the year when we would deploy our 131st Heavy Bomber equipped to carry air-launched cruise missiles. The deployment of that bomber on November 28, 1986, marked the full implementation of that policy.

Now that we have put the Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty behind us, Soviet activities with respect to those agreements, which have been studied and reported to the Congress in detail in the past, are not treated in the body of this report. This is not to suggest that the significance of the Soviet violations has in any way diminished. We are still concerned about the increasing Soviet military threat.

A number of activities involving SALT II constituted violations of the core or central provisions of the Treaty frequently cited by the proponents of SALT II as the primary reason for supporting the agreement. These violations involve both the substantive provisions and the vital verification provisions of the Treaty. Through violation of the SALT II limit of the one "new type" of ICBM, the Soviets are in the process of deploying illegal additions to their force that provide even more strategic capability.

Soviet encryption and concealment activities have, in the past, presented special obstacles to verifying compliance with arms control agreements. The Soviets' extensive encryption of ballistic missile telemetry impeded U.S. ability to verify key provisions of the SALT II Treaty. Of equal importance, these Soviet activities undermine the political confidence necessary for concluding new treaties and underscore the necessity that any new agreement be effectively verifiable.

Soviet Noncompliance and New Arms Control Agreements

Soviet noncompliance, as documented in this and previous Administration reports, has made verification and compliance pacing elements of arms control today. From the beginning of my Administration, I have sought deep and equitable reductions in the nuclear offensive arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union and have personally proposed ways to achieve the objectives in my meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev. If we are to enter agreements of this magnitude and significance, effective verification is indispensable and cheating is simply not acceptable.

I look forward to continued close consultations with the Congress as we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements.

The findings on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements follow.

THE FINDINGS

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

Treaty Status

The 1972 ABM Treaty and its Protocol ban deployment of ABM systems except that each Party is permitted to deploy one ABM system around the national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM deployment area. The ABM Treaty is in force and is of indefinite duration. Soviet actions not in accord with the ABM Treaty are, therefore, violations of a legal obligation.

1. The Krasnoyarsk Radar

Obligation: To preclude the development of a territorial defense or providing the base for a territorial ABM defense, the ABM Treaty provides that radars for early warning of ballistic missile attack may be deployed only at locations along the periphery of the national territory of each Party and that they be oriented outward. The Treaty permits deployment (without regard to location or orientation) of large phased-array radars for purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

Issue: The December 1985 report examined the issue of whether the Krasnoyarsk radar meets the provisions of the ABM Treaty governing phased-array radars. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the December 1985 report that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Continuing construction and the absence of credible alternative explanations have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

2. Mobility of ABM System Components

Obligation: Paragraph 1 of Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components.

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed a mobile land-based ABM system, or components for such a system, in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment of the December 1985 report that the evidence on Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility is ambiguous, but that the USSR's development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively limited special-purpose site preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

3. Concurrent Testing of ABM and Air Defense Components

Obligation: The ABM Treaty and its Protocol limit the Parties to one ABM deployment area. In addition to the ABM systems and components at that one deployment area, the Parties may have ABM systems and components for development and testing purposes so long as they are located at agreed test ranges. The Treaty also prohibits giving components, other than ABM system components, the capability "to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory" and prohibits the parties from testing them in "an ABM mode." The Parties agreed that the concurrent testing of SAM and ABM system components is prohibited.

Issue: The December 1985 compliance report examined whether the Soviet Union has concurrently tested SAM and ABM system components in violation of its legal obligation since 1978 not to do so. It was the purpose of that obligation to further constrain testing of air defense systems in an ABM mode. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the December 1985 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The large number, and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components, plus Soviet failure to accommodate fully U.S. concerns, indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases this may be highly probable. This and other ABM-related activities suggest the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

4. ABM Capability of Modern SAM Systems

Obligation: Under subparagraph (a) of Article VI of the ABM Treaty, each party undertakes not to give non-ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars "capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode...."

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether the Soviet Union has tested a SAM system or component in an ABM mode or given it the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory in violation of their legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the December 1985 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade is insufficient to assess compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, this and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

5. Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers

Obligation: The ABM Treaty limits to 100 the number of deployed ABM interceptor launchers and deployed interceptor missiles. It does not limit the number of interceptor missiles that can be built and stockpiled. Paragraph 2, Article V, of the Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of "automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload" of the permitted launchers.

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed, tested, or deployed automatic, semi-automatic, or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the December 1985 report that, on the basis of the evidence available, the USSR's actions with respect to the rapid reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's reload capabilities are a serious concern. These and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

6. ABM Territorial Defense

Obligation: The ABM Treaty and Protocol allow each party a single operational site, explicitly permit modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components, and explicitly recognize the existence of ABM test ranges for the development and testing of ABM components. The ABM Treaty prohibits, however, the deployment of an ABM system for defense of the national territory of the parties and prohibits the parties from providing a base for such a defense.

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether the Soviets have deployed an ABM system for the defense of their territory or provided a base for such a defense. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment of the December 1985 report that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload and ABM mobility) suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Our concern continues.

Biological Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol

Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons

Treaty Status: The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are multilateral treaties to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are Parties. Soviet actions not in accord with these treaties and customary international law relating to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are violations of legal obligations.

Obligations: The BWC bans the development, production, stockpiling or possession, and transfer of microbial or other biological agents or toxins except for a small quantity for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. It imposes the same obligation in relation to weapons, equipment and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of customary international law prohibit the first use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices and prohibits use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

Issues: The December 1985 report examined whether the Soviets are in violation of provisions that ban the development, production, transfer, possession, and use of biological and toxin weapons and whether they have been responsible for the use of lethal chemicals. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government judges that continued activity during 1986 at suspect biological and toxin weapon facilities in the Soviet Union, and reports that a Soviet BW program may now include investigation of new classes of BW agents, confirm the conclusion of the December 1985 report that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

There have been no confirmed attacks with lethal chemicals or toxins in Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan in 1986 according to our strict standards of evidence. Although several analytical efforts have been undertaken in the past year to investigate continuing reports of attacks, these studies have so far had no positive results. Therefore, there is no basis for amending the December, 1985, conclusion that, prior to this time, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuahea, and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

Nuclear Testing and the 150 Kiloton Limit

Treaty Status: The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed in 1974. The Treaty has not been ratified by either Party but neither Party has indicated an intention not to ratify. Therefore, both Parties are subject to the obligation under customary international law to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT. Actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT are therefore violations of legal obligations. The United States is seeking to negotiate improved verification measures for the Treaty. Both Parties have separately stated they would observe the 150-kiloton threshold of the TTBT.

Obligation: The Treaty prohibits beginning March 31, 1976, any underground nuclear weapon tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under the jurisdiction or control of the Parties. In view of the technical uncertainties associated with estimating the precise yield of nuclear weapon tests, the sides agreed that one or two slight, unintended breaches per year would not be considered a violation.

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether the Soviets have conducted nuclear tests in excess of 150 kilotons. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: During the past year, the U.S. Government has been reviewing Soviet nuclear weapons test activity that occurred prior to the self-imposed moratorium of August 6, 1985, and has been reviewing related U.S. Government methodologies for estimating Soviet nuclear test yields. The work is continuing. In December 1985, the U.S. Government found that: "Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty." At present, with our existing knowledge of this complex topic, that finding stands. It will be updated when studies now under way are completed. Such studies should provide a somewhat improved basis for assessing past Soviet compliance. Ambiguities in the nature and features of past Soviet testing and significant verification difficulties will continue, and much work remains to be done on this technically difficult issue. Such ambiguities demonstrate the need for effective verification measures to correct the verification inadequacies of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and its companion accord, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

Limited Test Ban Treaty

Underground Nuclear Test Venting

Treaty Status: The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty) (LTBT)) is a multilateral treaty that entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963. Soviet actions not in accord with this treaty are violations of a legal obligation.

Obligations: The LTBT specifically prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It also prohibits nuclear explosions in any other environment "if such explosions cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted."

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether the USSR's underground nuclear tests have caused radioactive debris to be present outside of its territorial limits. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the December 1985 report that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices resulted in the venting of radioactive matter on numerous occasions and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite numerous U.S. demarches and requests for corrective action.

Helsinki Final Act

Helsinki Final Act Notification of Military Exercises

Legal Status: The Final Act of the Conference on

Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in 1975. This document represents a political commitment and was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, along with 33 other States. Soviet actions not in accord with that document are violations of their political commitment.

Obligation: All signatory States of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to give prior notification of, and other details concerning, major military maneuvers, defined as those involving more than 25,000 troops.

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether notification of the Soviet military exercise "Zapad-81" was inadequate and therefore a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment under the Helsinki Final Act. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government previously judged and continues to find that the Soviet Union in 1981 violated its political commitment to observe provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act by not providing all the information required in its notification of exercise "ZAPAD-81." Since 1981, the Soviets have observed provisions of the Helsinki Final Act in letter, but rarely in spirit. The Soviet Union has a very restrictive interpretation of its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act, and Soviet implementation of voluntary confidence-building measures has been the exception rather than the rule. The Soviets have notified all exercises requiring notification (i.e., those of 25,000 troops or over), but have failed to make voluntary notifications (i.e., those numbering fewer than 25,000 troops). In their notifications, they have provided only the bare minimum of information. They have also observed only minimally the voluntary provision providing that observers be invited to exercises, having invited observers to only fifty percent of notified activities.

ADVANCE COPIES 20

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG — MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS — MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
MR THOMAS — NPS
MR BOYD — DACU, CDI — MOD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

IMMEDIATE

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

ADVANCE COPY 19.11.8

CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS
TO DESKBY 111000Z FCO
TELNO 265
OF 101838Z MARCH 87
INFO PRIORITY MODUK
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, BONN

MY TELNO 258: VORONTSOV VISIT TO PARIS

SUMMARY

1. VORONTSOV CLARIFIES SOME SOVIET POSITIONS ON INF AND SPACE/DEFENCE.

DETAIL

2. HENAULT (QUAI) DE-BRIEFED US IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TALKS THIS AFTERNOON IN THE QUAI WITH VORONTSOV. HE HAD FOUND HIM RELAXED AND CONFIDENT, AND MORE FLEXIBLE IN PRESENTATION THAN KARPOV.

3. VORONTSOV WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT INF. AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE NOW EXISTED. WORK ON THE DETAIL SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE SENATE TO RATIFY BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. HE CONFIRMED THAT VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WOULD BE INCLUDED IN A PROTOCOL ANNEXED TO THE TREATY, WHICH WOULD BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF IT. VERIFICATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT WOULD REQUIRE MORE THAN NTMS, I.E. ON-SITE INSPECTION, BECAUSE IT DID NOT PROVIDE FOR TOTAL LRINF ELIMINATION. VORONTSOV GAVE A HINT OF FLEXIBILITY OVER ALASKAN STATIONING BY ASKING IF THE AMERICANS REALLY WANTED TO DO IT AND ADDING THAT THEY MIGHT HAVE THE RIGHT BUT NOT EXERCISE IT. HE ATTRIBUTED THE SOVIET DECISION TO DELINK TO REFLECTION AFTER REYKJAVIK AND RESPONSIVENESS TO EUROPEAN PRESSURE. HE FIRMLY REJECTED A SUGGESTION FROM NOIVILLE THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT AGAIN ATTEMPT TO LINK THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT TO PROGRESS ELSEWHERE. ON SRINF, HE DID NOT ANSWER FRENCH QUESTIONS ABOUT GLOBALITY. HE SAID THAT WHEN ONE REACHED THAT

AN AGREEMENT TO PROGRESS ELSEWHERE. ON SRINF, HE DID NOT ANSWER FRENCH QUESTIONS ABOUT GLOBALITY. HE SAID THAT WHEN ONE REACHED THAT STAGE (I.E. NEGOTIATIONS ON MISSILES BELOW 1000 KM RANGE) IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CONSULT (BUT NOT NEGOTIATE WITH) THE EUROPEANS. CONVERSION OF PIDMS WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

3. THE SAME OPTIMISM DID NOT EXTEND TO SPACE/START, WHICH VORONTSOV DESCRIBED AS TWO FACES OF THE SAME NEGOTIATION. WHAT WORRIED THE RUSSIANS WAS SYSTEMS BASED IN SPACE WHICH COULD STRIKE SOVIET TARGETS. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, HE SAID THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN ABM SYSTEMS WITHIN THE TREATY OR EVEN LAND-BASED POINT-DEFENCE SYSTEMS DID NOT WORRY THE USSR AS LONG AS THERE WAS NO CAPABILITY FOR OFFENSIVE STRIKES FROM SPACE. LABORATORY RESEARCH POSED NO PROBLEM, BUT TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT IN SPACE DID. ASKED WHETHER A SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENT INVOLVING MIRRORS IN SPACE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, HE SAID THAT ONE COULD TALK ABOUT THAT.

4. VORONTSOV SAID THAT HE HOPED FOR REAL PROGRESS DURING SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. AFTER THAT, ONE WOULD SEE IF ''ANOTHER REYKJAVIK'' WAS NEEDED.

5. THE TALKS ALSO COVERED OTHER EAST/WEST AND MIDDLE EAST ISSUES, ON WHICH WE SHALL SEEK SEPARATE DE-BRIEFING.

FRETWELL

YYYY

PCLNAN 7912

NNNN

SUBJECT
cc MASTER
OPS

8

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T31/87

CAB/WHCA 001/7

O 070830Z MAR 87
FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO WHITE HOUSE
BT
S E C R E T

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

BEGINS

+DEAR RON,

IT WAS VERY GOOD TO TALK TO YOU ON THE TELEPHONE THE OTHER DAY, AND I CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR DIGNIFIED AND SUCCESSFUL RESPONSE TO THE TOWER COMMISSION REPORT. IT HAS BEEN VERY FAVOURABLY REPORTED OVER HERE. I KNOW THAT YOU MORE THAN ANYONE ARE ANXIOUS TO CONCENTRATE ON THE FUTURE, AND ABOVE ALL ON THE IMPORTANT ISSUES WHICH LIE AHEAD OF US IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ON ARMS CONTROL.

ON THIS I WAS GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR SENDING PAUL NITZE AND RICHARD PERLE TO SEE ME TO DISCUSSS THE START/SDI PROBLEM. WE HAD A VERY USEFUL TALK. I RECALLED THAT THE QUESTION OF THE BROAD VERSUS THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY HAD NOT ARISEN WHEN YOU AND I DISCUSSED THESE MATTERS AT CAMP DAVID IN DECEMBER 1984. THE IMPORTANT POINT WHICH WE DECIDED THEN WAS THAT SDI-RELATED DEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE A MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION. I REPEATED MY FIRM VIEW THAT THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAMME MUST GO AHEAD= AND THAT RESEARCH SHOULD BE TAKEN TO THE POINT OF ESTABLISHING FEASIBILITY. I SAID THAT IF THE STUDIES WHICH YOU ARE CONDUCTING SHOW THAT FEASIBILITY CAN ONLY BE ESTABLISHED BY TESTS CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY, THEN I WOULD SUPPORT GOING AHEAD ON THAT BASIS. BUT I SUGGESTED THAT YOU ONLY TAKE A DECISION TO MOVE TO THE BROADER INTERPRETATION WHEN IT IS STRICTLY NECESSARY TO DO SO.

WE ALSO HAVE TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT ON AN ACTUAL DECISION TO CONDUCT TESTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BROAD INTERPRETATION ON THE START NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA.

IN MY VIEW SUCH A DECISION WOULD NEED TO BE COMBINED WITH AN EFFORT TO GIVE GORBACHEV SOME PRACTICAL REASSURANCE ABOUT THE LIKELY SHAPE, SCOPE AND TIMESCALE OF THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAMME, TO ENABLE HIM TO GO AHEAD WITH THE 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH YOU AND I AGREED SHOULD BE A PRIORITY WHEN WE MET AT CAMP DAVID IN NOVEMBER. SUCH REASSURANCE NEED NOT IMPOSE NEW CONSTRAINTS IN PRACTICE ON THE SDI PROGRAMME: THERE ARE BOUND TO BE SOME PURELY PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS ON IT ANYWAY. THESE COULD BE EXPRESSED AS MILESTONES, WHICH WOULD MARK THE LIKELY PROGRESS OF THE PROGRAMME ACCORDING TO A REALISTIC TIMETABLE. THE OFFER WHICH YOU HAVE ALREADY MADE NOT TO DEPLOY SDI FOR A CERTAIN NUMBER OF YEARS WOULD ALSO STAND. TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE TWO POINTS SHOULD GIVE GORBACHEV A SENSE OF PREDICTABILITY AND HENCE IMPROVE THE START PROSPECTS. THERE IS OF COURSE NO QUESTION OF GIVING THE SOVIET UNION A VETO OVER SDI.

I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT YOUR NEGOTIATORS SHOULD DISCUSS IDEAS ON THESE LINES WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN GENEVA. THE ISSUES SEEM BOUND TO COME UP IN MY TALKS WITH GORBACHEV AT THE END OF THE MONTH.

GORBACHEV'S LATEST MOVE ON INF IS A VINDICATION OF YOUR OWN DETERMINATION AND OF THE ALLIANCE'S FIRMNESS. WE MUST NOW ENSURE THAT AN AGREEMENT IS SUPPORTED BY REALLY STRICT VERIFICIATION AND BY MEASURES TO DEAL WITH THE IMBALANCE IN SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS. THESE ARE VITAL TO OUR SECURITY.

I SHALL BE LETTING YOU HAVE SOME THOUGHTS SHORTLY ABOUT MY MOSCOW VISIT. I SHOULD AS ALWAYS WELCOME YOUR ADVICE.

WARM REGARDS,

MARGARET+

ENDS
BT

Authorized for dispatch.

CDP 7/3

SECRET

Please pass following message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan.

BEGINS

"Dear Ron,

It was very good to talk to you on the telephone the other day, and I congratulate you on your dignified and successful response to the Tower Commission report. It has been very favourably reported over here. I know that you more than anyone are anxious to concentrate on the future, and above all on the important issues which lie ahead of us in East/West relations and on arms control.

On this I was grateful to you for sending Paul Nitze and Richard Perle to see me to discuss the START/SDI problem. We had a very useful talk. I recalled that the question of the broad versus the narrow interpretation of the Treaty had not arisen when you and I discussed these matters at Camp David in December 1984. The important point which we decided then was that SDI-related deployment should be a matter for negotiation. I repeated my firm view that the SDI research programme must go ahead; and that research should be taken to the point of establishing feasibility. I said that if the studies which you are conducting show that feasibility can only be established by tests conducted in accordance with the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, then I would support going ahead on that basis. But I suggested that you only take a decision to move to the broader interpretation when it is strictly necessary to do so.

We also have to consider the effect of an actual decision to conduct tests in accordance with the broad interpretation on START negotiations in Geneva.

SECRET

In my view such a decision would need to be combined with an effort to give Gorbachev some practical reassurance about the likely shape, scope and timescale of the SDI research programme, to enable him to go ahead with the 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, which you and I agreed should be a priority when we met at Camp David in November. Such reassurance need not impose new constraints in practice on the SDI programme: there are bound to be some purely practical limitations on it anyway. These could be expressed as milestones, which would mark the likely progress of the programme according to a realistic timetable. The offer which you have already made not to deploy SDI for a certain number of years would also stand. Taken together, these two points should give Gorbachev a sense of predictability and hence improve the START prospects. There is of course no question of giving the Soviet Union a veto over SDI.

I hope very much that you will agree that your negotiators should discuss ideas on these lines with the Soviet Union in Geneva. The issues seem bound to come up in my talks with Gorbachev at the end of the month.

Gorbachev's latest move on INF is a vindication of your own determination and of the Alliance's firmness. We must now ensure that an agreement is supported by really strict verification and by measures to deal with the imbalance in shorter-range systems. These are vital to our security.

I shall be letting you have some thoughts shortly about my Moscow visit. I should as always welcome your advice.

Warm regards.

MARGARET"

Ends

CDP

JD3AWA

(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Terry a message received today from Chancellor Kohl.

I am having a draft reply prepared.

CDP 6/3

Thanks on me

SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 March 1987

Dear Charles,

INF: Shorter Range Systems, Verification and Conventional Balance

The Foreign Secretary was very glad to have had the chance this week to go over a number of INF-related issues with the Prime Minister. Given the complexity of this subject, he has found it useful to set out in writing some of the issues; he thought that it might also be useful to you. Hence this letter, which covers three of the points on which they touched:

- the place of shorter range systems in an INF agreement;
- the need for effective verification of such an agreement; and
- the relationship between the conclusion of the agreement and the conventional imbalance.

Shorter Range Systems

I enclose at Annex a simplified table of the INF and short-range (SNF) systems at issue. These have been divided into those Western and Soviet systems which the US envisage being covered under a longer-range (LR) INF agreement; and those which would not be caught at this stage of the LRINF negotiations if the Soviet Union accepted the US proposals. The two Soviet shorter-range (SR) SRINF systems which would be caught are the SS12/22 (Scaleboard) and the SS23. When reviewing negotiating options before the INF negotiations began in 1981, the Alliance collectively decided that these were the systems which presented the greatest danger of Soviet circumvention of an agreement on longer-range INF, by being deployed forward in unconstrained numbers. Hence the insistence since then by all the Allies that they should be constrained by ceilings at current Soviet levels, with a US right-to-match. FRG-operated Pershing I's, as third country systems, would not be involved.

SECRET

One Soviet SRINF system, the SCUD, would not be caught under the current US proposal. Among the reasons for not including this in 1981 were:

- the lower range of the system which makes it less of a threat from the point of view of circumvention ;

- the perceived difficulty by the Alliance - given our limited negotiating leverage - in achieving cuts in this system in addition to the removal of all the SS20s and SS4s, and the ceilings on the SS12/22 and 23; and

- the concern that lowering the range threshold could encourage the Soviet Union to seek the inclusion of dual-capable aircraft.

There is a potential for confusion in talking in general terms about "shorter range systems" in the context of the current negotiations in Geneva, since some would be caught by the US proposals and others would not. We need not, of course, be over-explicit in defining which particular systems we mean; the formulae used by the Prime Minister in the House this week were quite consistent with the Alliance position. It is however important that we should not confuse shorter range systems with short range systems (SNF).

The above is the position on SRINF, in the context of the present LRINF negotiations. It was endorsed most recently by the DPC and the NAC in December last year; and it is reflected in the draft treaty the US have tabled in Geneva. It continues to have the support of the rest of the Allies, including the French and Germans.

Should the current negotiations produce a LRINF agreement along the lines envisaged by the Americans, there would then be a follow-on negotiation, to which the US side committed themselves at Reykjavik, partly under pressure from the Germans. The issues raised by these follow on negotiations will have to be resolved within the Alliance on the basis of military advice and political judgements. A number of studies are already in progress in NATO, and within the MOD. These include the potential forces which the West could use to compensate for the removal of our own LRINF. This work should be accelerated if at all possible. Meanwhile, it is important in the Foreign Secretary's view that the Allied/US negotiating position for a follow-on negotiation is not pre-empted.

Verification

The US draft Treaty tabled this week in Geneva does not contain detailed provisions for verification. These were only made available to the Allies in final form three working days before, and clearance from the European basing countries was not possible within that timescale. As the result of a thorough survey by FCO and MOD officials of the American proposals for verification, Ministers in both departments are satisfied that they would provide an adequately rigorous regime, which would include challenge inspection and perimeter monitoring. The overall deterrent effect to Soviet cheating would be substantial, even if the scheme is somewhat modified in the course of further negotiations. In so far as direct UK interests are involved, the problems for us appear to be manageable and a worthwhile price for pinning the Russians down to effective verification.

There will be further discussions in Washington on 9 March between senior NATO officials, at which the Americans hope to secure final Allied clearance for their detailed proposals. UK officials are being briefed to tell them that Ministers are content with the ideas they have outlined, but will expect the closest consultation over the next few months as the all-important details are hammered out with the Russians in Geneva.

The Conventional Imbalance

The Foreign Secretary sees some risk that the impression could grow of the UK introducing a new pre-condition to a first stage LRINF agreement: the redressing of the conventional balance. (I see that the Prime Minister is to answer a written PQ on the subjecct on 9 March.) We should certainly continue to stress, as agreed at Camp David II that reductions in nuclear weapons would increase the importance of eliminating conventional disparities. But to go further, and to make progress in conventional arms control (which is unlikely to happen at least this year) a necessary condition for achieving the intermediate zero-zero option in LRINF would look excessively obstructive. The Foreign Secretary very much shares the Prime Minister's concern about further reductions in nuclear weapons (beyond those identified at Camp David) taking place without significant steps being taken towards redressing the undoubted imbalance in conventional forces between East and West. That will be something to keep very clearly in mind as the alliance considers its approach to the follow-on negotiations on INF.

SECRET

I am sending copies of this letter to John Howe (MOD) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

APOLOGIES FOR THE POOR QUALITY. WE WILL SEND CLEARER COPY ON MONDAY

SECRET

Soviet, US and Other Nato longer-range intermediate nuclear forces (LRINF), shorter-range INF (SRINF) and short-range nuclear forces (SNF)

A: SYSTEMS CONVERED BY US PROPOSALS FOR LRINF AGREEMENT

1. LRINF (Range 1800-5000kms)	System	Range (Kms)	Nos deployed/ warheads (Soviet facing Europe only)	TOTALS (warheads)
US	Pershing II GLCMs	1800 2500	108/108 208/208	316
Soviet Union	SS4 SS20	1950 5000	112/112 270/810	922
2. SRINF (Range 150 kms plus)				
US	Pershing I		Nil	Nil
Soviet Union	SS12/22 SS23	900 500	64 12	76

PH2AAB

SECRET

B: SYSTEMS NOT COVERED BY US PROPOSALS FOR LRINF AGREEMENT

3. SRINF (Range 150 kms plus)	System	Range (kms)	Nos deployed/ warheads	Total (warheads)
Soviet Union	SCUD	300	594	594
FRG	Pershing I	740	72	72
4. SNF (Range under 150 kms)				
Soviet Union	FROG SS21	70 85	661 106	767
US	LANCE	115	88	88
France	PLUTON	75	44	44

PH2AAB

Notes. 1. SCUD and FROG can carry nuclear, conventional or chemical warheads. Precise break-down unknown but in practice nuclear load up to full potential unlikely.

2. Above table does not take account of nuclear capable aircraft and artillery. Approximate figures are:-

	LRINF aircraft	SRINF aircraft	Artillery
Soviet Union	350	3800	6000
Aircraft declared to NATO	144	610	1500

SECRET

PH1ABF

SECRET

file 35.
6

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

despatched 7.3.87

From the Private Secretary

6 March 1987

ARMS CONTROL: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I enclose a copy of the Prime Minister's message to President Reagan in the form in which it was despatched on the direct line to Washington. I should be grateful if you could ensure that HM Ambassador in Washington sees a copy on a strictly personal basis.

C D POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

Authorized for dispatch.

CDP 7/3

SECRET

Please pass following message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan.

BEGINS

"Dear Ron,

It was very good to talk to you on the telephone the other day, and I congratulate you on your dignified and successful response to the Tower Commission report. It has been very favourably reported over here. I know that you more than anyone are anxious to concentrate on the future, and above all on the important issues which lie ahead of us in East/West relations and on arms control.

On this I was grateful to you for sending Paul Nitze and Richard Perle to see me to discuss the START/SDI problem. We had a very useful talk. I recalled that the question of the broad versus the narrow interpretation of the Treaty had not arisen when you and I discussed these matters at Camp David in December 1984. The important point which we decided then was that SDI-related deployment should be a matter for negotiation. I repeated my firm view that the SDI research programme must go ahead; and that research should be taken to the point of establishing feasibility. I said that if the studies which you are conducting show that feasibility can only be established by tests conducted in accordance with the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, then I would support going ahead on that basis. But I suggested that you only take a decision to move to the broader interpretation when it is strictly necessary to do so.

We also have to consider the effect of an actual decision to conduct tests in accordance with the broad interpretation on START negotiations in Geneva.

SECRET

In my view such a decision would need to be combined with an effort to give Gorbachev some practical reassurance about the likely shape, scope and timescale of the SDI research programme, to enable him to go ahead with the 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, which you and I agreed should be a priority when we met at Camp David in November. Such reassurance need not impose new constraints in practice on the SDI programme: there are bound to be some purely practical limitations on it anyway. These could be expressed as milestones, which would mark the likely progress of the programme according to a realistic timetable. The offer which you have already made not to deploy SDI for a certain number of years would also stand. Taken together, these two points should give Gorbachev a sense of predictability and hence improve the START prospects. There is of course no question of giving the Soviet Union a veto over SDI.

I hope very much that you will agree that your negotiators should discuss ideas on these lines with the Soviet Union in Geneva. The issues seem bound to come up in my talks with Gorbachev at the end of the month.

Gorbachev's latest move on INF is a vindication of your own determination and of the Alliance's firmness. We must now ensure that an agreement is supported by really strict verification and by measures to deal with the imbalance in shorter-range systems. These are vital to our security.

I shall be letting you have some thoughts shortly about my Moscow visit. I should as always welcome your advice.

Warm regards.

MARGARET"

Ends

CDP

JD3AWA

SECRET

5

PRIME MINISTER

ARMS CONTROL: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I attach a draft of the message to President Reagan on arms control which I showed you earlier today, with one or two additions suggested by the FCO and MOD. These are underlined for the sake of clarity. For the most part they reflect what you said to Nitze and Perle. The only new point is the last sentence of paragraph 2. This is a Foreign Secretary point.

If you are content for the message to issue in this form, I should be very grateful if you could send it down to the Duty Clerk before you leave for the Local Government Conference tomorrow morning. I will then arrange for its despatch over the weekend.

As amended

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

6 March 1987

Please pass following message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan

BEGINS

"Dear Ron,

It was very good to talk to you on the telephone the other day, and I congratulate you on your dignified and successful response to the Tower Commission report. It has been very favourably reported over here. I know that you more than anyone are anxious to concentrate on the future, and above all on the important issues which lie ahead of us in East/West relations and on arms control.

On this I was grateful to you for sending Paul Nitze and Richard Perle to see me to discuss the START/SDI problem. We had a very useful talk. I recalled that the question of the broad versus the narrow interpretation of the Treaty had not arisen when you and I discussed these matters at Camp David in December 1984. The important point which we decided then was that SDI-related deployment should be a matter for negotiation. I repeated my firm view that the SDI research programme must go ahead; and that research should be taken to the point of establishing feasibility. **I said that** if the studies which you are conducting show that feasibility can only be established by tests conducted in accordance with the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, then I would support going ahead on that basis. **But I counselled against taking a decision to move to the broader interpretation for political effect and before it is absolutely necessary to do so. I look forward to further discussion on this once your studies are complete.**

We also have to consider the effect of an actual decision to conduct tests in accordance with the broad interpretation on START negotiations in Geneva.

In my view such a decision needs to be combined with an effort to give Gorbachev some practical reassurance about the

likely shape, scope and timescale of the SDI research programme, to enable him to go ahead with the 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, which you and I agreed should be a priority when we met at Camp David in November. Such reassurance need not impose **new** constraints **in practice** on the SDI programme: there are bound to be some purely practical limitations on it anyway. These could be expressed as milestones, which would mark the likely progress of the programme according to a realistic time-table. The offer which you have already made not to deploy SDI for a certain number of years would also stand. Taken together, these two points **should** give Gorbachev a sense of predictability and hence improve the START prospects. There is of course no question of giving the Soviet Union a veto over SDI.

I hope very much that you will agree that your negotiators should discuss ideas on these lines with the Soviet Union in Geneva. The issues seem bound to come up in my talks with Gorbachev at the end of the month.

Gorbachev's latest move on INF is a vindication of your own determination and of the Alliance's firmness. We must now ensure that an agreement is supported by really strict verificiation and by ~~the~~ measures ~~we have already agreed~~ to deal with the imbalance in shorter-range systems. These are vital to our security.

I shall be letting you have some thoughts shortly about my Moscow visit. I should as always welcome your advice.

Warm regards.

MARGARET"

(but we do not want the US limited in the way indicated by the last phrase

SECRET

4 cc PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 March 1987

CDP 6/3

Dear Charles,

Many thanks for your letter of 6 March enclosing a proposed message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan. I have discussed this with the arms control experts in the FCO and with the Foreign Secretary.

All concerned think the message is a very good one. We would however like to suggest one or two additions and amendments, most of which are taken from your original letter reporting the Prime Minister's conversation with Nitze and Perle. For ease of reference I am enclosing an amended text.

I have agreed the amendments with John Howe in Mr Younger's office, to whom I am copying this letter.

Yours ever,

Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

Defence Arms Control PTTO

UKS431

061654 : MISSILE BREAKTHROUGH - MOSCOW

PARIS, March 6 - Chief Soviet arms negotiator Yuli Vorontsov said Soviet-American talks on cutting medium-range nuclear missiles had made a breakthrough.

Vorontsov said he expected a treaty would be ready for signing within three to four months following the latest talks in Geneva.

He told a news conference here "all the elements point to optimism" and only technical work on treaty language remained outstanding. - REUTER

CONFIDENTIAL

file D15 (69)

bc Mr. Mallaby

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 March 1987

DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

The Prime Minister has said that she would like the Defence White Paper to contain an essay on the continuing importance and validity of nuclear deterrence. She thinks that this will help counteract any tendency to believe that an INF agreement will (or should) diminish the need to continue to rely on nuclear deterrence for our security. I hope that this can be put in hand.

The Prime Minister also attaches particular importance this year to making the White Paper attractive presentationally. The Government has a good story to tell. We should put it across as effectively as possible.

C D POWELL

John Howe, Esq.
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

bc. P.C 40
63

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 March, 1987.

INF Negotiations

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from Chancellor Kohl about the INF negotiations. It is in practice no more than a repetition of the views which he has put to President Reagan on the subject. He concludes by asking the Prime Minister to lend her weight to these views.

I should be grateful to receive an early draft for a reply to Chancellor Kohl. This might quote from the Prime Minister's remarks in the House of Commons on INF.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

cc PC

DER BOTSCHAFTER
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
Baron Hans von Stein

Chargé d`Affaires a.i.

6 March 1987

Dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed message from Herr Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

A courtesy translation is attached.

I am, dear Prime Minister,
Yours sincerely
Hans v. Stein

Her Excellency
The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Her Majesty`s Prime Minister and
First Lord of the Treasury
L o n d o n

courtesy translation

SUBJECT MASTER CC MASTER SUBJECT, OPS TO BG T'd

Telegram

from

Herr Helmut Kohl

Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

to

Her Excellency

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T30B/87

Dear Margaret,

Now that General Secretary Gorbachov, by his statement of 28 February, has met a demand strongly stressed by the West and declared his willingness to conclude a separate INF agreement, I have written today to President Reagan expressing my views on the new situation thus confronting the Geneva negotiations.

I stated that the new situation requires a united and constructive response by the West and that we must make every effort so that the INF solution agreed at Reykjavik, which would lead to low global ceilings of 100 warheads on each side and in particular to the complete removal of the Soviet threat to Europe posed by the SS 20 missiles, is swiftly translated into tangible negotiated results.

I welcomed the fact that President Reagan has arranged for the US draft INF Agreement to be introduced at the Geneva negotiations on 4 March. This step underscores the determination to advance and accelerate the negotiating process.

As you know, in view of the need for further consultation within the Alliance, the draft agreement does not yet contain any definitive article on on-site inspections under a future INF Agreement. I told Präsident Reagan that I consider

it important to reach a consensus on the relevant verification provisions and welcomed in this connection the readiness of the US Government to continue soon the requisite consultative process.

Referring to earlier remarks of mine, I drew the President's attention to our interest in a process being initiated by an INF Agreement whereby the imbalance in the SRINF field is eliminated. I recalled the joint position of the Alliance, as expressed in the communiqué of 12 December 1986, which states: "They (the ministers) stress that an INF Agreement must not neglect the existing imbalances in shorter-range US and Soviet INF missiles and must provide for a commitment to follow-on negotiations on these missiles".

I stated that I consider it important for such follow-on negotiations to be commenced immediately after the signing of an INF Agreement, especially since General Secretary Gorbachov himself suggested the immediate commencement of follow-on negotiations in the statement he made on 28 February.

In this connection I stressed to President Reagan that it would appear necessary, in my Government's opionion, to agree concurrently with the INF Agreement on a concrete pledge to enter immediately into follow-on negotiations, i.e. not later than six months after the signing of the agreement, this pledge should be given in a form binding under international law, preferably as an integral part of the agreement. The aim of these follow-on negotiations must be to reduce all SRINF missiles to low, equal ceilings.

I would be grateful if you could expressly lend your support to this matter, which lies in the interest of the Alliance.

Yours sincerely,
Helmut Kohl

GRS 1570

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 84
OF 051814Z MARCH 87
AND TO PRIORITY MODUK
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW
INFO ROUTINE THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, ROME, UKDIS GENEVA, TOKYO
INFO SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG
INFO SAVING MADRID, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA
INFO SAVING UKDEL MBFR VIENNA

MODUK FOR DUS(P), DACU AND DNPS

GENEVA NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL NEGOITATIONS: US BRIEFING 5 MARCH

SUMMARY

1. USEFUL ROUND WITH VORONTSOV ADOPTING MORE BUSINESS LIKE APPROACH AND ACCEPTING MORE FLEXIBLE NEGOTIATING FORMAT. PROGRESS MADE IN FORMAL RECORDING OF AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT BUT APART FROM INF DELINKING LITTLE IN THE WAY OF SUBSTANTIVE ADVANCE. DETAILS OF GORBACHEV'S 28 FEBRUARY PROPOSALS STILL UNCLEAR. INF TALKS TO CONTINUE FOR SOME 2 WEEKS. GENERAL ALLIED SUPPORT FOR US POSITION AND WELCOME FOR GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT, COUPLED WITH RECOGNITION THAT MANY DETAILED OBSTACLES REMAINED, THAT VERIFICATION AND SRINF WERE PARTICULARLY CRUCIAL AND THAT CONTINUED ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY VITAL TO FURTHER PROGRESS.

DETAIL

2. IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT KAMPELMAN SAID THAT A CHANGE HAD BEEN EVIDENT WITH VORONTSOV'S ARRIVAL. HE HAD QUESTIONED THE VALUE OF JOINT PLENARY SESSIONS AND PROPOSED MORE FLEXIBLE NEGOTIATING ARRANGEMENTS BASED ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUB-GROUPS TO RECORD ON PAPER AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT. AS A SUGGESTION ORIGINALLY MADE BY THE US TEAM LAST YEAR, THIS HAD BEEN READILY ACCEPTED BY THE US SIDE.

INF

3. GLITMAN CONFIRMED THAT A DRAFT TREATY WAS TABLED YESTERDAY AND WOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR PROMPT WORK ON A QUOTE SOUND AND DURABLE UNQUOTE INF AGREEMENT. THIS, THEREFORE, REPRESENTED THE BEGINNING OF A NEW PHASE OF DETAILED WORK ON TREATY LANGUAGE. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS REPRESENTED A SIMILAR SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED IN THIS WAY. GLITMAN STRESSED THE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY TO PROGRESS SO FAR. HE HOPED THAT ALLIED AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION COULD BE REACHED QUICKLY SO THAT ARTICLE IX OF THE TREATY COULD BE TABLED AND DEALT WITH IN PARALLEL WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. PRIOR TO GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT, BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN WORKING ON A QUOTE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT UNQUOTE THOUGH THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD NOT DISCUSS DETAILS OF THEIR POSITION. DISAGREEMENT HAD CONTINUED OVER GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTRAINTS ON RESIDUAL US/ASIAN SYSTEMS AND A US RIGHT TO MATCH IN SRINF. ON THE CONTENT OF FOLLOW-ON LRINF TALKS, THE SOVIETS HAD IMPLIED THAT THEY DID NOT RULE OUT A REQUEST TO INCLUDE NON-MISSILE SYSTEMS. THE SOVIETS HAD ALSO OBJECTED TO THE CONVERSION OPTION AS ONE MEANS OF ELIMINATING LRINF SYSTEMS. THIS WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE QUOTE GOAL UNQUOE OF ELEMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

5. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD AGREED HOWEVER TO FOLLOW-ON TALKS ON SRINF WITHIN 6 MONTHS AND (LATE IN THE ROUND) TO ASIAN REDUCTIONS WITHIN THE SAME FIVE YEAR TIME SCALE AS EUROPEAN ONES. ALTHOUGH THEY HAD AGREED TO VERIFICATION PRINCIPLES, THE SOVIETS WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT US PROPOSALS ON NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NTMS AND THERE WERE DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF UNENCRYPTED TELEMETRY.

6. FOLLOWING GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT IT REMAINED UNCLEAR PRECISELY WHICH SHORTER RANGE MISSILES COULD BE REDUCED OR ELIMINATED, NOR WAS IT CERTAIN WHETHER A SRINF FREEZE REMAINED ON THE TABLE, ALTHOUGH IT DID SEEM CLEAR THAT GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS APPLIED ONLY TO EUROPE. GLITMAN ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE OFFER TO WITHDRAW SS12/22 FROM GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS NOT NEW.

START.

7. LEHMAN SAID THAT AGREEMENT TO SET UP A WORKING GROUP TO PREPARE A JOINT WORKING DOCUMENT HAD BEEN USEFUL, ALTHOUGH HE CONFIRMED THAT FIRM LINKAGE WITH DEFENCE AND SPACE REMAINED. WHILE THE DOCUMENT HAD SET OUT AGREEMENT ON THE MAIN START PRINCIPLES THERE WAS STILL DISAGREEMENT OVER A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES INCLUDING SUB-LIMITS, CONSTRAINTS ON SLCMS, CONSTRAINTS ON UNDEPLOYED BMS, AND REDUCTION IN SOVIET BM THROW-WEIGHT. NEVERTHELESS, LEHMAN SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE OF SUBSTANTIVE MOVEMENT IN THE NEXT ROUND WITH THE RESOLUTION OF REMAINING DIFFERENCES POSSIBLY TAKING PLACE AT A HIGHER LEVEL MEETING INVOLVING FOREIGN MINISTERTS. HOWEVER, WE HAD TO ACCEPT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD REMAIN OBDURATE OVER SOME ISSUES UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE IN ORDER TO RETAIN NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE.

DEFENCE AND SPACE

8. KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT REMAINED ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED. ATTEMPTS TO EXPLORE AREAS OF PERMISSIBLE ACTIVITY UNDER THE ABMT HAD NOT PRODUCED ANY ALTERATION IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING. THERE WERE STILL DIFFERENCES OVER THE RIGHT OF UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL DURING THE 10 YEAR PERIOD FOR REASONS OF SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST AND OVER THE RIGHT TO DEPLOY DEFENCES AFTER 10 YEARS. THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT ANY SPACE AND DEFENCE AGREEMENT BE IN PLACE BEFORE A START AGREEMENT AND HAD NOT RESPONDED TO US SUGGESTIONS OF SIMULTANEITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/DISCUSSION

DISCUSSION

9. IN DISCUSSION, PERMREPS CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE US NEGOTIATING EFFORTS AT GENEVA. WHILE WELCOMING GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS ON LRINF AS IN ACCORD WITH THE ALLIANCE'S LONG HELD POSITION ON THE ZERO OPTION, THEY EMPHASISED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET DETAILS OF ANY AGREEMENT RIGHT WITH VERIFICATION AND COLLATORAL CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF AS TWO PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT ASPECTS. PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIANCE POSITION WAS ALSO IMPORTANT. NATO COULD NOT BE SEEN TO BE DRAGGING ITS FEET AND AS A RELUCTANT PARTNER IN COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL. CASSIERS (BELGIUM) SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE PUBLIC BE MADE AWARE OF THE DISADVANTAGES OF A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE IN EUROPE.

10. HAASLER (FRG) STATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES PLACED GREAT IMPORTANCE ON FOLLOW-ON SRINF NEGOTIATIONS STARTING AT LATEST SIX MONTHS AFTER SIGNATUE OF AN LRINF AGREEMENT, WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING QUOTE A LOWER LEVEL WITH EQUAL CEILINGS UNQUOTE. GODECHOT (FRANCE) ACCEPTED THE PROPOSED LRINF REDUCTIONS AS IN THE INTERESTS OF FRANCE AND NATO, BUT WENT ON TO STRESS ALL THE MANY OBSTACLES STILL IN THE WAY OF AN AGREEMENT.

11. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, KAMPELMAN SAID THAT AN AGREEMENT ON A TREATY FRAMEWORK WOULD BE NEEDED BY THE SUMMER IF THERE WAS TO BE A REASONABLE CHANCE OF A RATIFIED TREATY BEFORE THE END OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. HOWEVER, THE US TEAM EMPHASISED THAT THE IMPORTANT MATTER WAS TO GET A SOUNDLY BASED TREATY AND NOT BE DRIVEN BY ARTIFICIAL DEADLINES. ASKED ABOUT THE ABSENCE OF ANY REFERENCE TO SRINF FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS IN THE DRAFT TREATY GLITMAN EXPLAINED THAT IF THIS WERE INCLUDED THEN THE PROVISION FOR TALKS WITHIN SIX MONTHS COULD NOT COME INTO EFFECT UNTIL THE TREATY WAS RATIFIED. IF TALKS WERE TO BE HELD WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF SIGNATURE, THEN A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WOULD BE NEEDED. THE WAY AHEAD ON THIS HAD NOT YET BEEN DECIDED.

12. KAMPELMAN WAS TACKLED ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OMISSION OF ANY ANY REFERENCE TO DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING IN GORBACHEV'S LINKAGE OF START TO SDI IN HIS 28TH FEBRUARY STATEMENT. HE SAID THAT THIS HAD NOT BEEN CLARIFIED IN GENEVA BUT HIS OWN VIEW WAS THAT THE STATEMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY DRAFTED AND THE OMITTED WORDS MIGHT WELL PROVE TO BE SIGNIFICANT. ON THE ISSUE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION, GLITMAN SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD HINTED THAT THEY WOULD BE IN FAVOUR OF RELATIVELY INTRUSIVE ARRANGEMENTS BUT HAD OFFERED NO DETAILS.

13. I ASKED GLITMAN WHAT THE US AIMS WERE IN SEEKING THE CONVERSION OPTIONS FOR LRINF GIVEN THAT THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO REGARD THIS AS AN ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT ANY ARRANGEMENT. HE APPEARED SOMEWHAT TAKEN ABACK BY THE QUESTION AND WAS NOT VERY FORTHCOMING BEYOND MENTIONING THE POSSIBILITY OF PII CONVERSION AND CLAIMING THAT IT WAS JUST A QUESTION OF QUOTE KEEPING OPENING POSSIBILITIES UNQUOTE NOT JUST FOR MISSILES, BUT ALSO FOR VEHICLES AND BASES. IN REPLY TO A FURTHER QUESTION OF MINE ABOUT VORONTSOV'S STYLE OF NEGOTIATING, KAMPELMAN

CONFIDENTIAL

/SAID

SAID THAT HE TENDED TO BE PREPARED TO ADOPT A FAIRLY FLEXIBLE APPROACH ON BROAD CONCEPTS BUT NOT ON DETAILS. HE ADDED THAT IT SEEMED LIKELY FROM ATTITUDES IN GENEVA THAT VORONTSOV HAD BEEN AWARE IN ADVANCE OF THE NATURE OF GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT BUT NOT PERHAPS OF THE PRECISE TIMING.

14. IN CONCLUDING, KAMPELMAN SAID THAT ROUND 7 WAS BEING FORMALLY EXTENDED UNTIL TOMORROW (FRIDAY) BUT THAT THE INF TALKS WOULD CONTINUE FOR SOME TWO WEEKS. ROUND 8 WAS PRESENTLY SCHEDULED TO START ON 23 APRIL

15. AT THE SUBSEQUENT DEPUTIES' LUNCH (THE TEAM LEADERS HAVING HAD TO FLY STRAIGHT TO WASHINGTON), THE US SIDE SAID THAT THEY BELIEVED THE SOVIETS WOULD TABLE THEIR OWN DRAFT INF TREATY NEXT WEEK.

ALEXANDER

YYYY
FCO PASS SAVING ANKARA ATHENS COPENHAGEN LISBON LUXEMBOURG MADRID OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK UKDEL CSCE VIENNA UKDEL MBFR VIENNA

UBLNAN 1569 (REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
LIMITED
ACDD
DEFENCE D
SOVIET D
NEWS D
NAD
EED
WED
PLANNING STAFF
RES D
INFO D
PUSD
NED
CSCE UNIT
POD
HD/SAD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR SLATER
MR BARRINGTON
MR GILLMORE
MR REEVE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

COPIES TO:
MR BERMAN LEGAL ADVISERS

010

cc PC

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-930 7022

MO 11/9/4L

5th March 1987

cDP 5/3.

Dear Tony.

INF: TELEPHONE CALL FROM DR WOERNER

Dr Woerner telephoned Mr Younger this morning. He said that letters were about to reach the Prime Minister from Chancellor Kohl, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary from Mr Genscher and Mr Younger from Dr Woerner explaining the FRG position on Mr Gorbachev's proposals and asking for our support for establishing an 'concrete obligation' to negotiate about short term systems. Mr Younger said that HMG's position was that the zero option for INF was acceptable, although we would prefer a number higher than zero. For shorter range systems, there should be a freeze and a right to match. Dr Woerner said these were identical with the FRG's conditions. There ought to be further study of the Alliance's requirement for shorter range systems.

Dr Woerner said that the US proposals for INF verification were not sufficiently precise or complete. There must be further consultation on them.

The two Ministers agreed to keep in touch on these issues.

I am copying this to Charles Powell in No 10 and to Trevor Woolley in the Cabinet Office.

Yours sincerely,

Julian Howe.

(J F HOWE)
Private Secretary

A C Galsworthy Esq, CMG
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

ADVANCE COPIES 20

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG — MR POWELL — No.10 DOWNING STREET
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS — MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
MR THOMAS — NPS
MR BOYD — DACU, CDI — MOD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

19.11.8



CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS
TO DESKBY 041730Z FCO
TELNO 240
OF 041624Z MARCH 87
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK
INFO PRIORITY BONN, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA

MODUK FOR DACU.

MY TELNO 237: INF: FRENCH REACTIONS.

SUMMARY

1. MITTERRAND URGES A LESS NEGATIVE FRENCH LINE.

DETAIL

2. AT THIS MORNING'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, BOTH MITTERRAND AND CHIRAC INTERVENED AFTER A REPORT FROM RAIMOND ON GORBACHEV'S INF STATEMENT. ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN, CHIRAC NOTED THAT THERE WAS A CLOSE CONVERGENCE ON THIS AFFAIR BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE PRESIDENT, ESPECIALLY ON THE FACT THAT FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD IN NO WAY BE INCLUDED IN AN INF NEGOTIATION. HE ADDED THAT QUOTE ANY NEGOTIATION WHICH COULD LEAD TO A REDUCTION OF EURO-MISSLES, AS LONG AS IT WAS BALANCED, SIMULTANEOUS AND VERIFIED, COULD NOT GIVE RISE ON FRANCE'S PART TO A NEGATIVE REACTION UNQUOTE.

3. A STATEMENT BY MITTERRAND HOWEVER CLEARLY GOES FURTHER:-

QUOTE I LEARNT WITH REAL INTEREST OF THE LATEST PROPOSALS OF M GORBACHEV ON THE US AND SOVIET INF IN EUROPE. THE PROSPECT OF THEIR ELIMINATION OR REDUCTION HAS ALREADY BEEN ACCEPTED BY NATO ESPECIALLY IN 1979, 1981 AND 1986. IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE INTERESTS OF FRANCE AND OF PEACE ..... UNQUOTE.

THE STATEMENT CONTINUES BY ECHOING CHIRAC'S REMARKS IN THE NEED FOR BALANCE ETC AND ON THE SPECIAL STATUS OF FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES, AND CONCLUDES WITH A CALL FOR EUROPE TO AFFIRM ITS UNITY OF VIEWS.

4. SOCIALIST LEADERS HAVE ALSO BEEN MAKING MORE POSITIVE NOISES TODAY. ALTHOUGH QUILES CONTINUED TO WARN AGAINST GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL, THE PS FIRST SECRETARY JOSPIN SAID THAT IT SHOULD BE

4. SOCIALIST LEADERS HAVE ALSO BEEN MAKING MORE POSITIVE NOISES TODAY. ALTHOUGH QUILES CONTINUED TO WARN AGAINST GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL, THE PS FIRST SECRETARY JOSPIN SAID THAT IT SHOULD BE TREATED MORE SERIOUSLY AND LESS NEGATIVELY THAN THE CHIRAC GOVERNMENT HAD DONE. ROCARD SPOKE OF IT AS A STEP TOWARDS PEACE, AND THE LEFT-WINGER CHEVENEMENT DESCRIBED THE ZERO OPTION AS QUOTE FAIR UNQUOTE.

5. A MORE DETAILED ATTACK ON THE GOVERNMENT LINE, CLEARLY INSPIRED BY THE ELYSEE, APPEARS IN THIS MORNING'S LE MATIN (SOCIALIST DAILY). THIS RECALLS MITTERRAND'S OWN SUPPORT FOR THE INF ZERO OPTION DURING THE DEPLOYMENT DEBATE OF 1981-83. IT SAYS THAT THE ELYSEE REGRETS NOT HAVING BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT THE QUAI'S WEEKEND STATEMENT. MITTERRAND BELIEVES THAT THE DANGERS OF DECOUPLING HAVE BEEN EXAGGERATED, THAT SOVIET NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY WILL CONTINUE TO BE BALANCED BY FRANCE'S DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONAL DETERRENCE, AND THAT BEFORE RUSHING IN TO EXPRESS RESERVATIONS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO WORK FOR EUROPEAN UNITY.

6. WE HAVE OURSELVES HAD SIMILAR ACCOUNTS OF HIS POSITION FROM HIS DIPLOMATIC ADVISERS. MUSITELLI SAID THAT INSTEAD OF ISSUING A STATEMENT OVER THE WEEKEND ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY, RAIMOND SHOULD HAVE PAUSED TO CONSULT WITH OTHERS FIRST. HE TELEPHONED GENSCHER ON 2 MARCH BUT BY THEN THE DIVISIONS WERE ALREADY EVIDENT. FRANCE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN A MORE POLITICAL VIEW OF THE QUESTION AND PUT FAR MORE EMPHASIS ON ITS DESIRE FOR AN AGREEMENT RATHER THAN APPEARING TO BE BLOCKING DISARMAMENT. THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT MITTERRAND DID NOT REGARD IT AS NECESSARY TO OBTAIN SRINF CONSTRAINTS, STRICT VERIFICATION AND A GLOBAL AGREEMENT, BUT THE PRESENTATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE POSITIVE. THE ONLY ASPECT OF GORBAHCEV'S PROPOSALS WHICH WAS REALLY DIFFICULT FOR FRENCH INTERESTS, WAS THE RISK OF THE PROGRESSIVE DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE. AS FOR US DECOUPLING, WE SHOULD PERHAPS REFLECT ON WHETHER THE AMERICANS SHOULD MAKE A GESTURE OR DECLARATION TO REAFFIRM THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH EUROPE IF AND WHEN AN INF AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED. COUPLING WAS IN ANY CASE A MORE COMPLEX POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENON THAN THE PRESENCE OF THE PARTICULAR MISSILE SYSTEM. VEDRINE SPOKE SIMILARLY TO WESTON.

COMMENT

7. WE CAN EXPECT ALL SIDES HERE NOW TO CLOSE RANKS AGAIN PUBLICLY, BUT MITTERRAND'S INTERVENTION SHOULD DETER THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT FROM GOING TOO FAR IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO INF ZERO OPTION. NOIVILLE (QUAI) TOLD DEREK THOMAS HERE TODAY THAT IT WOULD LEAD TO SOME CHANGES IN THE FRENCH PUBLIC LINE.

FRETWELL

YYYY

PCLNAN 7804

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER

INF

You might like to see the two attached comments:

(i) Richard Perle's interview with the BBC.

(ii) the key paragraph from General Bernard Rogers remarks in Brussels.

CDP

4 March, 1987.

EXCEPT FROM "TODAY" PROGRAMME : 3 MARCH 1987

I: The Soviet Union's proposals to eliminate all medium range nuclear weapons from Europe has had a generally favourable response. Mrs Thatcher is said to be cautiously optimistic but the retiring American Commander of NATO forces in Europe, Bernard Rodgers, has severe reservations. He warned last night in Brussels, as you may have heard earlier on this programme, that the zero option would leave Europe vulnerable unless reductions were also made in Soviet conventional forces as well as in short range nuclear and chemical weapons. The White House though has said it welcomes the move and plans to put forward its own proposals in response to the latest Soviet offer very soon.

Well the US Assistant Defence Secretary, Richard Perle, has given the first interview on British radio on the subject by an official of the Reagan administration. He told Aneka Frankwell his thoughts on the latest moves.

RP: Well we're quite pleased that Soviet policy has reverted to the policy of redeployment first at the Geneva Summit in 1985 and reversed after Reykjavic. That is a policy of concluding a separate agreement on intermediate nuclear forces untied to the other issues that continue to be under negotiation. But there are outstanding issues that will need to be resolved. Some of them are difficult. There's first the question of shorter range systems which in the Soviet case can substitute for the SS20s that will be withdrawn under the agreement which is now being

discussed. There are issues of verification which are important and made particularly important by the fact that the Soviets will retain some number of SS20s.

I: You quote these difficulties: do you think they may prevent an agreement from being reached?

RP: I would hope not. I think there is a desire on both sides to conclude an agreement.

I: General Bernard Rodgers has said in Brussels that reducing or eliminating the medium range missiles in Europe without also reducing other weapons would leave Western Europe worse off than in 1979.

RP: Well I think, I don't agree with that but obviously it would be highly desirable to remove some of the other weapons as well and in particular the shorter range systems where the Soviets have a sizeable number and there is nothing comparable on the Western side. The SS22s, the SS23s, and we will be working hard to bring about the elimination of weapons in those ranges.

I: But you, yourself, have argued many times that the Soviet Union has an advantage in other areas simply than in the shorter range missiles.

RP: The Soviets have very considerable advantages with respect to conventional forces and chemical weapons, that's quite right. The issue is, do we address both deficiencies by having a balance in intermediate nuclear forces in which the Soviets have three times the number of intermediate nuclear weapons the West have because we were hardly in a favourable position with respect to intermediate weapons. So from the

beginning the Soviets have had significant advantage. The agreement that's now being talked about would lead to the elimination of these missiles on both sides and I think that leaves us better off than we were before 1979 when the Soviets had several hundreds of these, or at any time since during which they have been adding to this overall intermediate nuclear capability. And I think it has now become clear that the American policy of firmness in dealing with these negotiations and a willingness to be patient and wait for a good outcome rather than accept the easy and often non-productive outcome has paid dividends and we now face the prospect - although we're not there yet - of a significantly better agreement than could have been obtained if we had listened to the counsel of those who were so eager to compromise, that they would have permitted a Soviet advantage in intermediate nuclear forces.

I: So you are saying basically that this new development vindicates the American position at Reykjavic.

RP: Absolutely. Not only at Reykjavic but in the period prior to Reykjavic beginning with the forum of 1981 when President Reagan proposed the elimination from the arsenals of both sides of intermediate nuclear missiles.

Mr Turner
PRU.

GENERAL ROGERS ON INF.

1. I attach a copy of the speech, sent on the fax from UKDel NATO. I am afraid the quality is very bad. I have checked the key (and worst) passages on pages 14 and 15 with UKDel NATO.

T.P. Hohmann

3

Sue
The best we can do I'm afraid

Mark 3/3

03020900R 87 0/6

REMARKS BY GENERAL BERNARD W. ROGERS
TO THE ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BRUSSELS, 2 MARCH 1987

NATO: Its Challenges in Today's World

It is a pleasure to be here tonight with this distinguished group. It should come as no surprise that I would like to take this opportunity to talk about NATO, specifically about some of the challenges that the Alliance is facing and will continue to confront in the years ahead. While these challenges are not new, neither are they problems that can be solved neatly and then put away on a shelf. Rather, they must be addressed day after day, year after year. To ignore them is to risk their escalating from "challenge" to "crisis", something we do not need in our Alliance.

These issues result from the world as we find it today. They are realities that cannot be eliminated by wishful thinking or washed away with good will, but which, if confronted with collective determination, can be coped with in order to ensure our continued security.

Perhaps the greatest challenge we face today as an Alliance is that of changing many of our peoples' attitudes from complacency, naivete and wishful thinking to awareness and concern about the issues we are discussing tonight; from a desire for peace, to a desire for peace with freedom. Many of you sitting here tonight share personal memories of the horrors caused by war, war that devastated Europe and killed millions. As importantly however, you can also recall why that war was

fought. Peace is important, but it must be a peace of free men joined together by the bonds of common interest, not a peace imposed on automatons joined by the chains of oppression.

Successor generations in Europe have, thank God, been spared the agony of war on the continent. As a result, many of them have come to view peace with freedom as a God-given right, not a privilege which has been earned and can only be maintained through sacrifice. Ironically, the very success of the NATO Alliance at preserving the peace over the last 38 years tends to lend support for the sense of complacency we often find. The ubiquitous Soviet propaganda and disinformation campaigns have also contributed to the sense that peace is derived not from strength, but from accommodation, and that rather than being a bulwark for peace with freedom, NATO creates the potential for war.

We cannot accept a complacency that undermines the strength of NATO, the source of our peace and our freedom. But neither can we ignore peoples' attitudes, because people -- you and I -- hold the key to our security. We will have the level of security that we the people collectively think is necessary and are willing to pay for. We must convince the uninformed, the doubters, and even the mind set ideologues of the threat to our freedom that we face. Then we must ensure that our legislative bodies, the allocators of national resources, hear our collective voice saying that we, the people, are prepared to sacrifice in other programs in order to bolster our security means. Doing so would mean that we were responding to the threat posed by the massive

Soviet military machine, the second challenge I wish to address.

Soviet military might already is far greater than that required to defend the "motherland", so we have to ask ourselves: Why do the Soviets continue to spend 14-16% of their GNP on the military? Why does Soviet military doctrine emphasize rapid offensive operations? Why are Warsaw Pact arsenals filled with weapons designed to implement such an aggressive doctrine? Why do they continue to occupy Eastern Europe with more than half a million troops? Why do they crush any glimmer of freedom or independence among their allies and neighbors?

The answers mostly rest with the fact that world domination through expansionism is the overarching Soviet goal, and military force is the principal instrument for reaching it. The Soviet economy is weak -- as even their leadership grudgingly admits -- and their ideology has been exposed as a bankrupt vision for the future. It is military power alone that supports the Soviet claim to superpower status, and it is military might that provides their ability to influence and intimidate other nations.

Over the years Soviet leaders have justified their huge military growth as a response to threats from the West. Their huge conventional forces were ostensibly to offset U.S. nuclear superiority. The fabric of this argument wears a little thin as the Soviets have achieved strategic nuclear parity -- even superiority in some dimensions of the strategic balance -- and have established a clear supremacy in the non-strategic nuclear field. Yet we see no signs of reduced arms expenditures despite the level of its military might and the strain on its economy.

The Soviet/Warsaw Pact military growth is both quantitative a qualitative and leaves us in the West facing a continuously widening gap between our defensive capabilities and the offens capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. As a defensive alliance we d not need to match the Warsaw Pact one for one in any area of force comparison, but we must ensure that the relative military situation, measured in terms of what is required for our security, does not get beyond restoration.

Were that to happen, we not only increase the possibility o aggression, but we also expose ourselves to being intimidated by Warsaw Pact's extensive military power. With regard to the latter, the Soviets would obviously prefer to avoid war - they'r too smart to wish to run the risks involved. The primary role o their military power is to enable the Soviets eventually to intimidate, coerce ~~and blackmail Western Europe in order to gain~~ political, economic and military concessions. In other words, to ~~gather the~~ **fruits of victory without the pain of war. This is** the Soviet objective in Western Europe, and she means to accomplish it patiently and opportunistically. My major concern is that when the gap between relative force capabilities widens beyond restoration, she will achieve that objective.

A third major challenge we face in NATO is to maintain an effective strategy in the face of the Warsaw Pact threat. There is and will continue to be a debate about what strategy is appropriate. In my view, our current strategy of Flexible Response and Forward Defense is just as appropriate today as it was in 1967 when we adopted it, providing adequate forces are

furnished for each leg of its Triad. It is a strategy of deterrence: the deterrence of both aggression and intimidation. There are three responses envisaged under this strategy: first, direct defense to defeat an attack or to force the burden of escalation onto the shoulder of the aggressor - our preferred response; second, deliberate escalation on our part, to include the option for the first use of nuclear weapons that can reach Soviet soil; and third, the general nuclear response, the ultimate guarantor of deterrence. If we are to accomplish our mission of deterrence, then all of these responses are necessary. We cannot eliminate the option for the first use of nuclear weapons if our deterrent is to remain credible. The Soviets may doubt that we would exercise that option, but they can never be sure that we will not; and it is this uncertainty, this incalculability, which is a key factor in our deterrent equation. We must continue to impress upon the Soviets that their aggression against NATO will always face them with the prospect of our escalating to the first use of nuclear weapons with the ultimate risk of escalation to the strategic nuclear exchange - the one thing which the Soviets fear.

Nuclear weapons are a reality. They cannot be wished away; they can only be negotiated away. Those who think that the nuclear threat can be mitigated by a declaration of nuclear-free zones or by unilateral nuclear disarmament are both mistaken and naive. With the mobility of nuclear weapons platforms and the range of nuclear missiles, nuclear free zones merely give the illusion of security without the substance of security.

Unilateral nuclear disarmament not only does not reduce the threat we face, but it also eliminates our ability to retaliate, the very foundation of credible deterrence, and thereby makes the threat of aggression or intimidation more likely.

Equally naive are those persons who would expect other alliance members to shoulder the burden and responsibilities which their nation in the past had agreed to bear and had faithfully shouldered for many years. To think that a NATO nation can try to slough off onto other nations part of its share of the collective security without adverse effects on the health of NATO would be flat wrong. If all are to share the benefits of the Alliance, then all must bear their agreed burdens. As the British would say, "In for a penny, in for a pound." When any nation refuses to bear its agreed share of the burden of deterrence, the thread that binds us into an effective alliance begins to unravel -- and at what point does the cloth become too weak to hold together?

Our common objective must be to ensure an adequate deterrent, so there is no need to resort to the use of any weapons, let alone nuclear weapons. The three responses envisaged in our strategy are broad and flexible enough to accommodate changes in the threat, changes in doctrine and the impact of new technology. Of course, we must have adequate strength for each leg of our triad of forces for our strategy to be effective. That is the fourth major challenge we face: providing adequate forces in a time of fiscal constraints, particularly adequate conventional forces.

How much conventional strength is enough? In my view we

would like to have sufficient conventional forces to be perceived by the Soviet Union as having a reasonable prospect of frustrating their conventional attack. But at a minimum, we require adequate conventional forces to permit our political authorities to make a determined and deliberate decision to move to a nuclear response, if that's necessary. They should also be sufficient to protect our nuclear assets so they are there when and if we need them. We also need to be able to get our reinforcements deployed. At the same time, we should avoid having such strong conventional forces -- even if we could acquire them -- that would delude ourselves and the Soviet Union into thinking that we might succeed conventionally without the threat of nuclear weapons. Again, I want to make it absolutely clear that the threat of our first use of nuclear weapons must remain the vital factor in our equation of deterrence.

Once the question of, "how much is enough?" is addressed, we must answer the question, "how much do we have?" As I examine our efforts to provide sufficient forces to make Flexible Response effective, I conclude that we are doing quite well on the strategic nuclear side, thanks to the efforts of the UK and US. The con[illegible] deployment of longer range non-strategic nuclear [illegible] is [illegible] us to fill the [illegible] spectrum [illegible] deterrence [illegible] it had to [illegible] the lack of adequate conventional means which has caused NATO to mortgage its defense to the early nuclear response. We need to make a greater effort to improve our conventional forces to reduce our dependency upon such early response. However, just

spending more is not the sole answer. We face another challenge of focusing available resources so as to get the best return on investment and to reduce drastically the waste and duplication of effort extant within NATO. I am encouraged by the endeavors of the Independent European Program Group in this regard. Further, the Alliance has a new tool -- the Conceptual Military Framework (CMF) -- by which it can set in priority those tasks, functions and capabilities which should be resourced. With the CMF looking out beyond the year 2000, commanders can now influence nations' research and development and procurement programs. Although the CMF will not provide additional resources, it does give us the means to utilize more effectively those resources made available.

Another challenge facing NATO in the future is to ensure that it exploits its technology to take advantage of its strengths and the Warsaw Pact's weaknesses. For example, the Warsaw Pact's massive number of ground forces causes its concept of operations to split them into various tactical, operational and strategic echelons and Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs). The WP concept is to continuously push forward these follow-on echelons to reinforce the lead echelon or to exploit its successes. I believe we should exploit our current and prospective technology to strike these follow-on forces with conventional weapons -- not massive ground forces -- in order to reduce to a manageable ratio the number of forces against which we must defend at our general defensive positions. Thus, one of our Key Mission Components identified in SACEUR's CHF is FOFA, Follow-on Forces Attack.

We apply FOFA from just behind the line of contact to as far

to the rear as our target acquisition means will permit and as far as conventional weapons can reach with accuracy. Today we can't see very far into the enemy's rear, but we're getting the proper types of target acquisition capabilities into our system currently, we can attack into the rear using manned aircraft, ~~just as we have always done.~~ But the fact is we have too many tasks for manned aircraft at the very time we should be attacking ~~follow-on forces.~~ Further, manned aircraft are becoming more vulnerable to the massive air defenses that the Warsaw Pact continues to build. So we're looking for means to do the job more effectively and efficiently.

If FOFA or other priority tasks we have identified are to be accomplished effectively, we must face up to the challenge of exploiting our technology. It will continue to change, new technology will come along, whether we like it or not. Failure to keep pace with technological change can have serious repercussions. We must seek ways to use our current and proven technologies better, and be willing to evaluate and test emerging technologies to determine if they might be mission-effective and cost-effective for our purposes.

I would hope that we in the Alliance would not become captive of what I call "the principle of preemptive concession." That is we say about a potential system: "well, it won't work," so we do not even evaluate it. Or "it's going to cost too much," so we do not even try to find out whether or not our predictions are correct.

The Strategic Defense Initiative is an example of where, I believe, there's been too much predicting of gloom and doom and

not enough careful evaluation by such prophets. At a minimum, need to carry on the research to find out if such a defensive system might be feasible and practical, that is, missions and cost-effective. Certainly the Soviets are doing just that. If it proves to be, then we should decide whether to deploy, after consultation by the U.S. with its allies and with the Soviet Union. Before such deployment we would also wish to assess its impact on our strategy and on arms control.

We in NATO should also get on with determining if the threat warrants a theater ballistic missile defense system, and, if it does, how do we go about providing it? I would hope that established NATO planning procedures would be followed and that we don't try to stitch together such determinations through bilateral advocacy.

All of our efforts to bolster alliance capabilities and to improve our defense posture will be wasted if we do not meet the major challenge of maintaining alliance cohesion in the face of Soviet machinations and perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic that there is a growing divergence of interests between the U.S. and Europe. For example, the anti-European feelings spawned in America and the anti-American feelings in Europe over SDI; about the Soviet pipeline; in the aftermath of the U.S. raid on Libya; over trade protectionism; over the U.S. declaring it will no longer be bound by the terms of the unratified SALT II Treaty; over the Reykjavik summit; over the interpretation of the ABM Treaty; selling arms to Iran; support of the Contras; or the old standby of potential disunity -- burden-sharing and the two-way street.

Categorizing the proponents of the opposite views as "Eurowimps" versus "American cowboys" does nothing for Alliance cohesion.

In recent years it has become popular to talk about a "widening Atlantic". There is a perception among some Americans -- methinks too many -- that Europe and NATO are no longer among U.S. vital national interests. I hear increasing talk in the U.S. of its realigning its policies away from Europe and towards the Pacific basin. This perception -- I would call it a misperception -- is dangerously far from the reality. The fact is that Europe is of vital U.S. interest in terms of the East/West balance, our collective security, economic interests, as well as ideological and cultural ties.

When I talk with American audiences I emphasize the vital importance of Europe to U.S. security, and I point out the major contributions European nations make to the collective security of NATO and hence to the U.S. Much of that contribution is in the form of hidden costs for which no credit is given. Americans are ever watchful for signs of weakened European commitment to sharing the burdens of common defense. What West Europeans must ensure is that its nations do not give any incentives to the United States to reduce her commitment to NATO - especially by withdrawing her forces, for example. Although doing so would be counter to U.S. vital interests, such action could result from perceptions that Europeans are not willing to maintain their commitments. U.S. troop withdrawal would unravel the Alliance; it would move the Soviets much closer to their objective of intimidating Western Europe without having to fire a single shot.

A threat to alliance cohesion is posed by the challenge of terrorism. Terrorism is a modus operandi with which we must learn to cope, but which we do not have to accept. The key question is what are we going to do about it and how do we manage our response in such a way that it does not impact adversely on the unity and cohesion of the Alliance, and the conventional preparedness of our forces.

Our response to terrorism has a number of elements. First, nations are taking prudent defensive security measures to make the terrorists' task more difficult. This is a national responsibility and we have made considerable progress in recent years, as anyone who has been traveling through airports will attest. Second, we need to continue to improve our intelligence exchange. While we have done fairly well in military channels in sharing intelligence about terrorists, we need to expand the level of cooperation at all levels.

Despite improved preventive measures, we will continue to experience terrorist attacks and must consider our options for responding to these actions; these fall into three basic categories -- political/diplomatic, economic, and military. Any response carries the risk of degrading Alliance cohesion because we do not have an effective procedure for producing a united Alliance response against terrorist actions.

In the absence of an effective Alliance response, we can expect that nations will act unilaterally, including using military force, to defend against terrorist activity. While the U.S. air strike on Libya caused much anxiety within the Alliance,

we should not be surprised by such unilateral endeavors so long as allies are unable to respond in unity.

Decisive response does have an effect. Britain's expulsion of Libyan and Syrian diplomats, the prosecution of captured terrorists such as last week by the French Court; EEC actions against Libya and U.S. military strikes have all contributed to drop in terrorist incidents. We should not expect such a decli to be permanent, so nations must continue to stand firm and recognize the importance of cohesion. There is no basic divergence of interests -- all oppose terrorism -- but response strategies may differ among nations. While we need to make greater efforts to cooperate, we cannot let disagreement over responses threaten alliance cohesion, for that would create great damage to our security.

Another challenge, one that affects Alliance cohesion, is the approach taken to arms reduction negotiations. Let me give you the view from SHAPE and from Allied Command Europe. Putting arms reductions in the context of our mission, the threat and our response to the threat, our cardinal principle is: accept no agreement which impacts unfavourably on Western security. Secondly, we view arms reduction as a means to an end -- enhanced security -- and not an end in itself. The questions we ask about any proposal being laid on the negotiating table are: does it lessen the threat? does it improve management of our response to the threat? Does a reduction in one nuclear category result in a greater threat overall? And finally, how much risk is involved and whose risk is it? We also must take into account the

proposal's potential impact in other areas; on NATO's desired "continuum of escalation"; Soviet territory becoming a sanctuary from West European land-based nuclear systems; over-reliance on other systems; ability to strike "time-urgent" targets; Alliance nuclear burden-sharing; and others.

In applying this approach to the "zero-level" LRINF proposal which was first proposed in 1981 and which General Secretary Gorbachev supposedly is proposing in Geneva today, we conclude as I did in 1981, that it would be extremely useful to implement such an agreement and thereby eliminate one category of nuclear weapons, provided there are also reductions to balanced and verifiable levels of shorter-range intermediate nuclear forces and chemical and conventional forces. We believe that the zero-level proposal in isolation would put us back to where we were pre 1979 in fact, with the Soviet enhancement in the interim of its nuclear and conventional capabilities which threaten Western Europe, we would be in a worse position.

Often forgotten is the fact that the 12 December '79 decision to deploy these weapons was necessitated by the need to fill a gap which had developed in our spectrum of deterrence. There was a need to put the Soviets in the same position they had had us for years, where from their soil they could strike us with nuclear-tipped missiles. We needed to show them that if they did so we could retaliate against Soviet territory with such missiles of our own located on West European soil. We had learned long

ago the importance of being perceived by the Soviets as strong and resolute if our deterrence is to be credible.

In the end, of course, there was a second track to that 1979 decision, a negotiating track which was required to get approval of the first track, that of deployment. Two tracks were better than no track. But the pacing track of that decision was the great necessity to deploy the LRINF. That fact is now often forgotten and the negotiating track has prominence in the minds of many.

On the other hand, while the 1979 agreement tightened the coupling between the security arrangements of the United States and those of Western Europe, I do not support the argument that the zero-zero option would lead to a decoupling. There are 326,000 U.S. troops in Europe under my command in my U.S. role, and they're here, not for reasons of charity, but as a part of the collective defense of common vital interests shared by the United States. I anticipate, and expect, the United States will do what is necessary to ensure the security of those 326,000 troops and in so doing, ensure the security of Western Europe.

The final challenge I want to mention tonight is that while we tend to dwell on problems, we must not forget all of the good things happening in NATO. Far too often the focus on problems creates a perception that the Alliance is in constant crisis. Indeed, one could be forgiven for believing that NATO's only function was crisis management. Nothing could be further from the truth. The fact is that, to the media, oftentimes good news is no news, and thus, many of the Alliance's successes are not

covered, successes such as 38 years of peace with freedom; the continued deployment of GLCMs and Pershing IIs; the Rapid Reinforcement Plan, which ties together the plans of the reinforcing and reinforced nations; the NATO Airborne Early Warning System -- a major success story; the Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study which points the way into the 21st Century and shows how, through certain actions, NATO might reduce its total nuclear warheads significantly below the 4600 mandated by the Montebello decision; the Conceptual Military Framework, mentioned earlier; and the Conventional Defense Improvement initiative of the Secretary General.

True, there have been crises: Suez, Lebanon, Czechoslovakia and Libya to name a few. Yet despite the intense heat that these events generated at the time, the Alliance has survived and remained strong. The reason for its strength is that our nations share common values and strong ties. Above all, NATO represents a belief in peace with freedom, and it is because this fundamental ideal is so powerful that NATO has become known as "the greatest peace movement in history." Despite what might occur at the edges of NATO, its core is firm.

An assessment of the challenges facing NATO leads me to conclude that they can be overcome, if we want to overcome them. The issue is not ability, it is will. If NATO is to continue to succeed in its mission of providing peace with freedom, the Soviets must perceive that we are united in our determination to overcome our deficiencies. They must perceive us as following Churchill's dictum: "It is not good enough to do just the best

you can; you must do what is necessary to ensure the future."

The future we all want is: peace with freedom, greater stability in the international environment and reduced and balanced levels of forces of all categories. The path to that future leads through Geneva and Vienna with the successful negotiation of balanced and verifiable reductions of all forces. The burden is upon the West to provide adequate incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously. This requires the retention of an adequate nuclear retaliatory capability and effective conventional defensive means. The Soviets will conduct meaningful negotiations only when clear-cut, determined, and unequivocal actions by the West, reflecting strength and resolve cause them to want to negotiate out of self-interest. This is borne out by the current arms negotiations being tied directly to the deployment of NATO's Pershing-IIs and GLCMs on European soil as well as the Soviet concern about the U.S. research on SDI.

In the end it will be the people who will hold the key to that future, since they alone will determine if we can meet the challenges which that future will bring, some of which I have mentioned tonight.

ADVANCE COPIES 20

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
NPS
DACU
CDI
MOD

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

19.11.8

ADVANCE COPY

SENT - 4 MAR 1987

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 041530Z F C O
TELNO 305
OF 041430Z MARCH 87
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 287: GORBACHEV'S INF PROPOSAL

1. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND HAS EMERGED.

2. FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER VORONTSOV, CHIEF SOVIET NEGOTIATOR AT GENEVA, RETURNED TO MOSCOW SHORTLY BEFORE THE ''PEACE FORUM'' ON 13-16 FEBRUARY, APPARENTLY IN ORDER TO WRITE AN ARMS CONTROL PASSAGE, PERHAPS INCLUDING THE INF INITIATIVE, INTO GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE FORUM ON 16 FEBRUARY. GORBACHEV EVIDENTLY DECIDED TO STAY HIS HAND - PERHAPS FOR THE REASONS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TUR. WHEN VORONTSOV, HAVING RETURNED TO GENEVA, DINED WITH KAMPELMANN ON 25 FEBRUARY HE WAS TAKING A HARD AND NEGATIVE LINE, EMPHASISING THE DOUBTS WHICH HE HAD FOUND IN MOSCOW CONCERNING U.S. SINCERITY IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SINISTER MOTIVES BEHIND THE APPARENT MOVE IN WASHINGTON TOWARDS ''BROAD'' INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT. IT WAS AGREED AT THIS DINNER THAT THE CURRENT GENEVA ROUND SHOULD END ON 4 MARCH. IN THE U.S. VIEW VORONTSOV (UNLESS HE IS A VERY SKILLED DISSEMBLER) WAS UNAWARE ON 25 FEBRUARY OF GORBACHEV'S IMPENDING INITIATIVE.

3. FROM INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE U.S. CHARGE (PLEASE PROTECT) IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT GORBACHEV'S INF STATEMENT ON 28 FEBRUARY WAS DISCUSSED AND APPROVED AT THE POLITBURO'S WEEKLY MEETING ON 26 FEBRUARY. BESSMERTNYKH (DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS) ATTENDED THIS MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE, PRESUMABLY TO ADVISE HIM ON THE INF ISSUE: UNUSUALLY, THE MEETING LASTED UNTIL 1900 HOURS, WHICH COULD INDICATE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW AND CONSEQUENTLY PROLONGED DISCUSSION.

4. THE ELEMENTS OF A DRAFT INF AGREEMENT WHICH THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAVE NOW TABLED IN GENEVA APPARENTLY INCLUDE A PROVISION THAT THE 100 EXTRA-EUROPEAN INF ALLOWED TO EACH SIDE SHOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED ON TERRITORY FROM WHICH THEY COULD REACH THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER E.G. ALASKA. THIS PROBLEM HAS NOT, THEREFORE, GONE AWAY

100 EXTRA-EUROPEAN INF ALLOWED TO EACH SIDE SHOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED ON TERRITORY FROM WHICH THEY COULD REACH THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER, E.G. ALASKA. THIS PROBLEM HAS NOT, THEREFORE, GONE AWAY.

5. ACCORDING TO THE ITALIANS, GORBACHEV VOLUNTEERED TO ANDREOTTI, DURING THE LATTER'S RECENT VISIT HERE, THAT AN INF AGREEMENT SHOULD NATURALLY TAKE ACCOUNT OF SRINF AND OF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE BALANCE.

6. DOBRYNIN TOOK AN OPTIMISTIC LINE ON INF WITH VISITING U.S. SENATOR PRYOR, SUGGESTING THAT AN INF AGREEMENT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A WASHINGTON SUMMIT THIS YEAR.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

MXHPAN 8237

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES 20

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG — MR POWELL — No.10 DOWNING STREET
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS — MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
MR THOMAS — NPS
MR BOYD — DACU, CDI — MOD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

19.11.8

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 040830Z FCO
TELNO 468
OF 032330Z MARCH 87
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, UKDEL NATO
INFO PRIORITY BONN, MOSCOW, THE HAGUE, ROME, BRUSSELS
MODUK FOR PS/S OF S,PS/MINISTER (AF), DACU
MIPT : INF

IMMEDIATE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT:

QUOTE WORKING CLOSELY WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN EUROPE AND ASIA, THE UNITED STATES HAS PURSUED, EVER SINCE MY INITIAL PROPOSAL OF NOVEMBER 1981, DEEP, EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS OF LAND-BASED US AND SOVIET LONGER RANGE INF MISSILES WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF THEIR COMPLETE GLOBAL ELIMINATION.

MOST RECENTLY WE'VE BEEN PREPARING A DETAILED TREATY TEXT TO IMPLEMENT THESE AGREED OBJECTIVES AND TO FOLLOW THE SPECIFIC FORMULA ON WHICH MR GORBACHEV AND I AGREED AT OUR MEETING IN ICELAND LAST OCTOBER. THIS CALLS FOR REDUCTIONS TO AN INTERIM GLOBAL CEILING OF 100 WARHEADS ON US AND SOVIET LONGER RANGE INF MISSILES, WITH NONE IN EUROPE, ALONG WITH CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE INF MISSILES AND PROVISIONS FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. I REMAIN FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THESE OBJECTIVES, HAVING LONG SOUGHT PROGRESS IN THIS AREA.

THEREFORE I WELCOME THE STATEMENT BY SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ON SATURDAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL NO LONGER INSIST ON LINKING AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS IN INF TO AGREEMENTS IN OTHER NEGOTIATIONS. THIS REMOVES A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS TOWARD INF REDUCTIONS, AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE UNDERSTANDING WHICH MR GORBACHEV AND I REACHED AT OUR 1985 GENEVA SUMMIT MEETING THAT WE WOULD INDEED SEEK A SEPARATE AGREEMENT IN THIS IMPORTANT

PROGRESS TOWARD INF REDUCTIONS, AND [illegible]
UNDERSTANDING WHICH MR GORBACHEV AND I REACHED AT OUR 1985 GENEVA SUMMIT MEETING THAT WE WOULD INDEED SEEK A SEPARATE AGREEMENT IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA. I WANT TO CONGRATULATE OUR ALLIES FOR THEIR FIRMNESS ON THIS ISSUE. OBVIOUSLY OUR STRENGTH OF PURPOSE HAS LED TO PROGRESS.

TO SEIZE THIS NEW OPPORTUNITY, I HAVE INSTRUCTED OUR NEGOTIATORS TO BEGIN THE PRESENTATION OF OUR DRAFT INF TREATY TEXT IN GENEVA TOMORROW. I HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL THEN PROCEED WITH US TO SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE DETAILS WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO TRANSLATE AREAS OF AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE INTO A CONCRETE AGREEMENT. AND I ATANT TO STRESS THAT OF THE IMPORTANT ISSUES WHICH REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED, NONE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN VERIFICATION. BECAUSE WE'RE COMMITTED TO GENUINE AND LASTING ARMS REDUCTIONS AND TO ENSURING FULL COMPLIANCE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT ANY AGREEMENT MUST BE EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE.

TO EXPLORE FURTHER THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, I HAVE ALSO ASKED OUR SENIOR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA, AMBASSADORS MAX KAMPELMAN, MIKE GLITMAN AND RON LEHMAN, TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON TO MEET WITH ME LATER THIS WEEK. FOLLOWING THESE DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, I WILL SEND A TEAM BACK TO GENEVA TO TAKE UP ONCE AGAIN THE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN INF REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT.

WE'LL CONTINUE AT THE SAME TIME OUR VERY CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON INF ISSUES WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN EUROPE AND ASIA. IT WAS, AFTER ALL, ALLIED FIRMNESS AND UNITY IN CARRYING OUT NATO'S 1979 DECISION WHICH HELPED TO BRING THE SOVIET UNION BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND LED TO THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT TO THE MUTUAL BENEFIT OF BOTH EAST AND WEST. AND AS WE PROCEED, IT IS WELL TO REMEMBER THAT NOTHING IS MORE IMPORTANT TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR COMMITMENT TO NATO AND OUR OTHER ALLIES AND TO THE VITALITY OF THESE ALLIANCES OF FREE NATIONS. UNQUOTE.

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWBAN 0023

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P) NPS DACU CDI — MOD

K19

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

19.11.8

CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 233
OF 031225Z MARCH 87
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK
INFO PRIORITY BONN, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA

MODUK FOR DACU

MY TELNO 225 : INF

1. THE CALL BY NITZE AND PERLE ON THE QUAI YESTERDAY (2 MARCH) WAS LARGELY DEVOTED TO INF DELINKAGE. RAIMOND TOOK THE LINE THAT GORBACHEV'S SPEECH WAS NO SURPRISE. HE HAD ALWAYS BELIEVED A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT WAS IN SOVIET INTERESTS. THE FRENCH SOUGHT TO CALM THE EUPHORIA IN OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (IE FRG). THEY DID NOT HOWEVER QUESTION THE ZERO OPTION ITSELF SINCE THEY WELL UNDERSTOOD THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO ITS ADOPTION BY THE ALLIANCE. WHAT WORRIED THEM WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE SEEKING TO ENGAGE THE WEST IN A DEVELOPING PROCESS OF EUROPEAN DENUCLEARISATION, PARTICULARLY THROUGH FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS ON SRINF. GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT ALREADY REFERRED TO ELIMINATION OF ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR MISSILES, IE A NEW ZERO OPTION. THE FRENCH WERE NOT THEREFORE OPPOSING NEGOTIATIONS ON LRINF AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION, BUT THEY WERE CONCERNED AT THE PROSPECT OF A NEGOTIATION ON THE NUCLEAR STATUS OF EUROPE. RAIMOND URGED THE US TO CLARIFY THEIR POSITION BY SAYING CLEARLY THAT ALTHOUGH THEY WERE COMMITTED TO THE ZERO OPTION FOR LRINF, THEY WERE ALSO COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE.

2. WE ARE REPORTING ABMT ASPECTS OF THE CALL AND FURTHER FRENCH PUBLIC REACTIONS ON INF SEPARATELY.

FRETWELL

YYYY

PCLNAN 7762

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES 20

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
NPS
DACU
CDI
} MOD

[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

19.11.8

ADVANCE COPY



UNCLASSIFIED
FM PARIS
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 237
OF 031657Z MARCH 87
INFO PRIORITY MODUK, BONN, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO
INFO PRIORITY UKDIS GENEVA

MODUK FOR DACU.

MY TELNO 233: INF: FRENCH PUBLIC REACTIONS.

SUMMARY

1. WIDESPREAD EXPRESSIONS OF ALARM OVER THE INF ZERO OPTION AND OF CONCERN THAT FRANCE IS ALMOST ALONE IN RESISTING THE PROGRESSIVE DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE.

DETAIL

2. BOTH RAIMOND AND GIRAUD HAVE COMMENTED PUBLICLY ON GORBACHEV'S INF STATEMENT. RAIMOND STRESSED THAT THE DELINKING WAS NOT IN ITSELF A SURPRISE. WHAT COULD BE NEW WAS THE SOVIET APPROACH TO SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS. BY NOT DEALING FIRST WITH STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, SERIOUS PROBLEMS WERE POSED FOR THE BALANCE IN EUROPE. GIRAUD, WHO REFERRED TO HIS MEETING ON 9 MARCH WITH MR YOUNGER, STRESSED THE NEED FOR EUROPE TO BE FULLY CONSULTED. IF GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL ON INF WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY MANY OTHER THINGS, IT WOULD CLEARLY BE UNBALANCED. AND IF THE PROPOSALS NEARLY AGREED AT REYKJAVIK WERE NOW AGREED, THERE WOULD BE ROOM FOR DEEP CONCERN.

3. REACTIONS FROM SENIOR POLITICANS OF ALL PARTIES (EXCEPT THE COMMUNISITS) HAVE BEEN IN SIMILAR VEIN. BOTH THE FORMER SOCIALIST DEFENCE MINISTERS, QUILES AND HERNU, WARNED THAT THE PROPOSAL IS NOT REALLY BALANCED BECAUSE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL, CHEMICAL AND SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY WOULD REMAIN. FABIUS COMMENTED THAT FRANCE SHOULD CHECK WHETHER THE AGREEMENT WOULD COVER SUCCESSOR SYSTEMS TO THE SS20 AND WHETHER GORBACHEV INTENDED TO MOVE FORWARD ON CW AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. BARRE'S DIRECTEUR DE CABINET WARNED OF A FEARFUL TRAP BEING SET FOR THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE AND CALLED FOR URGENT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN EUROPEANS.

4. TODAY'S PRESS GIVES THE SUBJECT EXTENSIVE COVERAGE AND MOST

4. TODAY'S PRESS GIVES THE SUBJECT EXTENSIVE COVERAGE AND MOST NEWSPAPERS OFFER COMMENT. LE FIGARO (RIGHT WING) DESCRIBES HOW ATTRACTIVE IT MUST BE FOR A WEAKENED REAGAN AND FOR MOST OF THE ALLIES, ESPECIALLY BONN, TO ACCEPT GORBACHEV'S OFFER. FRANCE, HOWEVER, IS THE ODD MAN OUT: FOR HER, THE TRAP IS TOO OBVIOUS. IT WOULD BE SUICIDAL TO ACCEPT AN ELIMINATION OF LRINF WHICH LEFT THE WP WITH AN OVERWHELMING CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL SUPERIORITY IN EUROPE. MOREOVER, THE US NUCLEAR GUARANTEE WOULD LOSE CREDIBILITY. LE FIGARO HOPES THAT VERIFICATION WILL PROVE AN INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE TO AGREEMENT. A COMMENTATOR IN THE SAME NEWSPAPER ADDS THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY AS EXTENDED TO SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS, SHOULD REOPEN THE INTERNAL FRENCH DEBATE ON THE CONDITIONS OF USE OF FRANCE'S OWN TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.

5. OTHER NEWSPAPERS STRIKE A SIMILAR NOTE. THEY TOO STRESS THE DIVISIONS CREATED IN THE WEST BY GORBACHEV'S QUOTE SKILFUL TACTICS UNQUOTE. THESE ARE PRINCIPALLY SEEN AS BEING BETWEEN THE US AND FRG ON ONE SIDE AND FRANCE ON THE OTHER. THE UK IS VARIOUSLY PLACED SOMEWHERE BETWEEN, OR AS WELCOMING THE SOVIET MOVE OR (BY FONTAINE, THE EDITOR OF LE MONDE) BRACKETTED WITH FRANCE. FONTAINE CONCLUDES THAT THE WEST CANNOT GO BACK ON THE ZERO OPTION NOW, BUT WARNS ABOUT THE DANGER THAT SOONER OR LATER THE ENORMOUS MILITARY POWER OF THE USSR IN EASTERN EUROPE MIGHT BE CONTAINED ONLY BY THE MODEST NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF THE UK AND FRANCE, AND THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO QUOTE FINLANDISATION UNQUOTE. HE SEES THIS AS AN ARGUMENT FOR A MORE INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN DEFENCE.

FRETWELL

YYYY

PCLNAN 7774

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES 20

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
~~MR PALL~~
MR FEARN

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
NPS
DACU
CDI
} MOD

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

19.11.8

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 458
OF 022359Z MARCH 87
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, UKDEL NATO
INFO PRIORITY BONN, MOSCOW, THE HAGUE, ROME, BRUSSELS

IMMEDIATE

MODUK FOR MINISTER (AF), DACU

MIPT: INF
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF WHITE HOUSE PRESS GUIDANCE:
QUOTE WE HAVE READ WITH INTEREST THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S STATEMENT. WE AND OUR ALLIES WILL CONSIDER IT CAREFULLY. BASED ON OUR PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, IT APPEARS TO BE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG BELIEVED THAT PROGRESS IN ONE AREA OF NEGOTIATION SHOULD NOT BE HELD HOSTAGE TO PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS. WE AND OUR ALLIES HAVE CONSISTENTLY URGED THAT WE SEEK EARLY PROGRESS ON REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES IN BOTH START AND INF. THUS, WE WELCOME THIS APPARENT SOVIET AGREEMENT TO MOVE FORWARD ON INF, FOR WHICH WE HAVE BEEN READY SINCE THE SOVIETS FIRST AGREED TO IT AT THE GENEVA SUMMIT IN NOVEMBER 1985. WE NOTE THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY SAID THAT PROPOSALS ARE BEING PLACED ON THE TABLE AT GENEVA. WE LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING SUCH PROPOSALS. TRUE PROGRESS TOWARD ARMS REDUCTIONS COMES NOT FROM PRESS STATEMENTS BUT FROM SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AT THE BARGAINING TABLE. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS READY FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. WE INTEND TO MAKE THAT READINESS CONCRETE BY TABLING SPECIFIC TREATY LANGUAGE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
(IF ASKED ONLY)
Q. WHEN DO YOU EXPECT TO TABLE SPECIFIC TREATY TEXT?
A. WE HAVE BEEN WORKING ON SUCH TEXT FOR SOME TIME AND ARE ESSENTIALLY COMPLETE. WHEN OUR WORK IS COMPLETE, WE WILL TABLE A TREATY TEXT. WE EXPECT THIS TO OCCUR SHORTLY. UNQUOTE.

ACLAND

Press Line on Gorbachev

1. Gorbachev has responded to Western negotiating proposals of many months. Delinking from SDI of agreement to eliminate all LRINF in Europe is what we had called for and is welcome.

2. Western tactics at Geneva have been justified. 1983 decisions to deploy Cruise and Pershing II have borne fruit.

3. Note with satisfaction no reference to UK or French forces.

4. Need to look carefully at fine print. We and Americans will explore in Geneva and in our own contacts leading to Prime Minister's visit to Moscow.

5. Constraints on SRINF leading to better balance remain crucial. Important of seeking conventional balance also cannot be ignored.

6. As emphasised at Camp David, an effective verification regime is vital to any agreement.

SOVIET PROPOSAL ON MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (INF)

1. At their Camp David meeting last November, the Prime Minister and President Reagan identified an "INF Agreement with restraints on shorter-range systems" as a priority. We welcome the fact that the Soviet Union now appears to accept that and is not insisting on a link with SDI.

2. Once again, Western firmness and resolve has been justified.

3. Also of course there is no question of constraints on modernisation of the UK deterrent with Trident. It is satisfactory that the Soviet proposal makes no attempt to reinstate conditions on this.

4. We shall want to see details of the Soviet proposal, bearing in mind two further points from the Camp David statement:

   - effective verification is essential
   - the importance of eliminating disparities in conventional ~~weapons~~ forces.

5. It will be particularly important to have a firm Soviet commitment to negotiations to correct the huge imbalance in the Soviet Union's favour in shorter-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

6. These points need to be dealt with satisfactorily. Subject to that we welcome the Soviet proposal.

VSCAEM

(1)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

This is the FCO assessment of the Gorbachev offer. It's a ~~bit late~~: and doesn't add much to the conclusions which you have already reached.

CDP

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 March 1987

Prime Minister

CDP

Dear Charles,

Gorbachev's Statement on INF

I enclose, as requested in your letter of earlier today, a preliminary FCO assessment of the significance of Gorbachev's INF statement on 28 February.

We are in touch with the Americans about their latest thinking on the Gorbachev move, and expect a report from our Embassy in Washington shortly. Initial FRG and French reactions were reported in Bonn telno 183 and Paris telno 225 (copies enclosed); further German reactions can be expected after today, which is a public holiday in Bonn.

Fin telegrams follow

As for a Moscow visit by Mr Shultz, Mr Nitze told us here last week that a Shultz/Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow was on the cards but that the US would continue to resist going firm until there had been more progress at Geneva. The Gorbachev statement suggests that the US may now be in a position to be more forthcoming, but we have not yet had further information to that effect.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

GORBACHEV'S 28 FEBRUARY STATEMENT ON INF: INITIAL FCO ASSESSMENT

1. On 28 February Gorbachev proposed that a separate agreement on "medium range missiles in Europe" be concluded without delay. His statement contained a number of important concessions:
(i) de-linking of such an agreement from the other Geneva issues (strategic arms and space/defence);
(ii) acceptance of US basing of residual systems on "national territory" i.e. including (presumably) Alaska;
(iii) acceptance of the same timescale (5 years) for the elimination of Asian/continental US systems as for those in Europe;
(iv) the withdrawal, not the freeze in place, of some shorter range systems in Eastern Europe (SS22); and
(v) no apparent linkage with negotiations on nuclear testing.

2. These points have been tabled in Geneva today, as part of a new Soviet negotiating position. The references in the statement to endorsement by the Politburo and the Defence Council may indicate a Gorbachev wish to emphasize the collective nature of these concessions. It is still unclear from the statement what precise linkage is envisaged between cuts in strategic arms and constraints on strategic defence activities; the former are described as "conditioned by a decision on the prevention of deployment of weapons in outer space". The statement lays heavy emphasis on the goal of a nuclear-free world.

3. Of the above concessions, that on de-linking from space/defence is the most striking. It should however be noted that the West had always assumed this would happen. In recent months the INF negotiations have failed to make progress because of Soviet intransigence in other areas; the linkage to space/defence was not the major reason for the impasse.

4. The preliminary response by HMG to the Gorbachev statement has been positive, emphasizing that the Gorbachev statement represents a belated Soviet readiness to accept some Western proposals which have been on the table at Geneva for some time. It also represents a marked success for Alliance cohesion and the firmness of Western Governments since the INF deployment decision was first taken.

5. Why have the Soviet concessions been made, and why now? The short answer to the first question is that Gorbachev no doubt sees advantages to the Soviet Union in an INF deal which eliminates US LRINF deployments from Europe. This would not only remove the Pershing II threat to the Soviet Union itself. It would weaken one rung in NATO's ladder of escalation control, and could cast doubt upon the US commitment to use nuclear forces in defence of Europe. In broader terms an agreement could encourage the momentum which Gorbachev tried to stimulate in his statement of 15 January 1986, towards a nuclear-free world.

6. As for the timing of the statement, it is assumed that the main Soviet target remains cuts in strategic arms and constraints on the SDI. A number of factors could have persuaded Gorbachev that now was the right time to move in INF:

(a) He could have concluded that the negotiations proper in Geneva were ~~also~~ not providing sufficient leverage to achieve what he wants on SDI.

(b) It might have appeared to Soviet eyes that the Europeans would not be blackmailed by the INF impasse, to the extent of pressing the Americans for further flexibility on SDI.

(c) conversely, an INF move could improve the chances for holding another Summit, where Gorbachev may believe he could achieve more on SDI than through the Geneva talks. A Summit would also give him the best opportunity to pursue personally with President Reagan the themes of the nuclear-free world which he may believe he succeeded in launching at Reykjavik.

(d) as an extension of this, the new move might enable them to exploit the current situation in Washington (changes in the White House, Congressional pressures etc) to create more

pressure on the President to give ground on SDI.

(e) In addition, a dramatic Soviet shift at this stage might complicate a decision by the Administration to move to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

(f) By conceding the INF de-linkage now, he would remove one of the main issues from his agenda with the Prime Minister where he would feel weakest.

(g) By calling for immediate talks on shorter range systems, with a view to "reducing and fully eliminating them" he might wrong-foot the West before the next round of INF negotiations.

(h) He may, as suggested by the Embassy in Moscow, have wished to get the resumption of nuclear testing established (for military reasons) before making another move with major propaganda significance.

7. Even if the Gorbachev statement opens up the way to an INF agreement, it could still be some months before this is achieved. The latest US assessment is that six months at least will be needed to negotiate all the necessary details. The Soviet MFA Spokesman said today that the last deadline for the US was late-summer, for the Soviet Union "the sooner the better".

8. The outstanding issues are:

(a) Verification

The US are seeking to table a full draft INF Treaty, with detailed provisions of verification, before the current Geneva round ends on 4 March. On 27 February they sought the agreement of the basing countries to this, and we have been trying to meet their wish. However, the Germans and Dutch have already made it clear that they will not be in a position to endorse this. The options will then be for the US either to table the full draft with only a general reference to verification; or to defer tabling until it can be done with Allied agreement between rounds or at the beginning of the next. It should be noted that resolving the verification problem would be easier if a global zero option were to apply i.e. if no residual warheads were left in Soviet Asia or the continental US;

(b) SRINF

Gorbachev has now announced the withdrawal of the SS22s deployed in Eastern Europe (around 60 launchers) but the Russians have yet to concede the ceilings at current levels on the SS22 and SS23, and the US right to match these, both of which points have long featured in the Western negotiating position. The Soviet refusal to accept a freeze on non-European SRINF also appears to remain in place.

9. As a separate issue from the SRINF content of the present LRINF agreement, Gorbachev has now offered immediate talks with a view to reducing and eliminating the former. This is in contrast to the apparent agreement at Reykjavik that such talks should begin six months after the conclusion of the first phase LRINF agreement. Further inter-Allied consideration and consultation will be required before an agreed position for the follow-up SRINF negotiations can be reached. Against the background of a obvious lack of Western negotiating leverage, the questions to be answered include:

(i) whether to aim for the removal of any residual LRINF warheads

(ii) whether to seek ceilings on current Soviet SRINF systems, with US right to match; or whether, and if so to what extent, to demand cuts;

(iii) in the latter event, how to prevent the Soviet Union offering not merely cuts but an elimination of SRINF i.e. yet another move towards a nuclear-free zone in Europe; and how to avoid the Soviet Union exploiting such a position to major public advantage;

(iv) how to verify any agreement covering SRINF; and

(v) how to deal with dual-capable systems, especially aircraft.

10. We have been informed by the Americans that the Russians have offered another Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow, perhaps as early as April. Last week Mr Nitze told us that the US were resisting this, until there were signs of greater progress at Geneva. This appears to remain the US position, but the Gorbachev statement will no doubt lead them to review it. The prospects for another such meeting at Ministerial level must have improved.

11. In summary, the Gorbachev statement represents a significant Soviet step forward, and a major success for the Alliance Nonetheless, there remain important areas of difficulty:

(a) the Soviet campaign for a nuclear-free world will have been given another boost. It will be important to emphasize that nuclear deterrence will remain the basis of our security for the foreseeable future.

(b) the Soviet leaders will undoubtedly try to recapture the high propaganda ground as a result of the latest initiative. We need to emphasize that they are merely responding to our own proposals, and resiling from previous positions which were untenable.

(c) The Russians will seek to represent us as an obstacle to this agreement, if we give them opportunities to do so. It will therefore be necessary to temper public candour about the difficulties (which are real) with robust backing to the objective of achieving an agreement, as envisaged at Camp David.

(d) a Soviet-inspired "dash for agreement" on INF could gloss over the negotiation of crucial details, including those for the verification regime. We shall have to insist that all the necessary threads are pulled together before signature of an agreement can take place; and

(e) given continuing doubts about the prudence of the zero option for Europe, there is a potential for public inter-Alliance dispute. It will be crucial to maintain Alliance support in public for the current US negotiating position at Geneva.

12. The handling of the arms control discussions during the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow will have to be determined in the light of answers to the questions in the above assessment as they emerge, and of further consultations with our Allies especially the US.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

2 March 1987

ADVANCE COPIES 19

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS (2)
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
NPS
DACU
CDI



[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

19.11.8

UNCLASSIFIED
FM BONN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 183
OF 021020Z MARCH 87
INFO PRIORITY MODUK FOR DACU, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, PARIS
INFO PRIORITY UKDIS GENEVA

MOSCOW TELNO 285
GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT ON INF

SUMMARY

1. WIDESPREAD GERMAN WELCOME FOR GORBACHEV'S MOVE, WITHOUT EUPHORIA.

DETAIL

2. POLITICAL LEADERS OF ALL PARTIES HAVE WELCOMED GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT AS OPENING THE WAY FOR EARLY PROGRESS AT GENEVA.

3. GENSCHER SAID THIS REMOVED A PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE (SOVIET LINKAGE) TO AN LRINF AGREEMENT, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF WHICH WAS A CENTRAL FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITY FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AND WHICH HAD ALWAYS BEEN LINKED WITH THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION. THE SOVIET READINESS TO WITHDRAW SS21S - SS22S AND TO NEGOTIATE IMMEDIATELY ABOUT SRINF MET GERMAN DEMANDS AND EUROPE'S SECURITY INTERESTS. GENSCHER SAID GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT WAS PROOF THAT AN INTENSIVE DIALOGUE AND PERSISTENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH MOSCOW WERE PRODUCTIVE, AS WAS A POLICY OF TAKING GORBACHEV AT HIS WORD (CF HIS DAVOS SPEECH). URGENT NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOW NECESSARY IN GENEVA TO SET THE SEAL ON THIS OPENING. A BREAKTHROUGH ON INF MIGHT HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

4. PRESS COMMENT IS PREDICTABLY POSITIVE BUT WITH SOME RECOGNITION THAT MOSCOW HAS SIMPLY LIFTED AN OBSTACLE OF ITS OWN MAKING AND THAT PROBLEMS, INCLUDING VERIFICATION, REMAIN TO BE SOLVED. THERE IS SOME COMMENT THAT GORBACHEV'S TIMING AND HANDLING ARE ODD, AFTER THE PEACE FORUM AND WITHOUT AS MUCH FLAVOUR OF PERSONAL INITIATIVE AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED. PERHAPS HE HAD TO ACCEPT, AS A CONCESSION, THAT THE MOVE BE PRESENTED AS THE WORKS OF THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE).

WILLIAMS

ADVANCE COPIES 20 (18)

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
NPS
DACU MOD
CDI

SENT - 2 MAR 1987

PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST

19.11.8

ADVANCE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED
FM PARIS
TO DESKBY 021630Z F C O
TELNO 225
OF 021506Z MARCH 87
INFO PRIORITY MODUK, BONN, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO
INFO PRIORITY UKDIS GENEVA

MODUK FOR DACU
MOSCOW TELNO 285: GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT ON INF
SUMMARY
1. THE FRENCH RECALL THEIR MISGIVINGS OVER THE ZERO OPTION.
DETAIL
2. THE QUAI SPOKESMAN SAID ON 1 MARCH THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS DID NOT COME AS IN ANY WAY A SURPRISE: DURING THE US/SOVIET CONVERSATIONS IN GENEVA A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT HAD BEEN ENVISAGED. TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL IMBALANCE IN EUROPE, THE OBJECTIVE HAD TO BE TO AVOID A DENUCLEARISATION OF WESTERN EUROPE. SUBJECT TO A CAREFUL STUDY OF THE DETAIL OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON INF REMAINED UNCHANGED:-

- NECESSITY FOR THE ELIMINATION OF INF IN EUROPE TO BE SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS, NOTABLY A GLOBAL AGREEMENT COVERING EUROPE AND ASIA TOGETHER,

- NECESSITY OF VERIFICATION (CONTROLE) DURING AND AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT,

- NECESSITY OF ELIMINATING THE RISK OF CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT BY INCLUDING APPROPRIATE CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE MISSILES, WHERE SOVIET SUPERIORITY WAS OBVIOUS.

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE SATISFACTORY TO LEAVE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH CONSTRAINTS TO A LATER NEGOTIATION.
2. THIS MORNING'S FRENCH PRESS REPORTS GORBACHEV'S SPEECH MAINLY ON INSIDE PAGES WITH LITTLE COMMENT. LE MONDE (3 MARCH) HOWEVER HEADLINES THE FAVOURABLE REACTIONS IN WASHINGTON AND BONN. IT STRESSES THE CONCERN FELT IN PARIS ABOUT THREE MAIN ASPECTS:- THE DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE AND RISK OF US DECOUPLING, THE PROBABILITY OF INCREASED PRESSURE ON UK/FRENCH NUCLEAR

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE SATISFACTORY TO LEAVE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH CONSTRAINTS TO A LATER NEGOTIATION.

2. THIS MORNING'S FRENCH PRESS REPORTS GORBACHEV'S SPEECH MAINLY ON INSIDE PAGES WITH LITTLE COMMENT. LE MONDE (3 MARCH) HOWEVER HEADLINES THE FAVOURABLE REACTIONS IN WASHINGTON AND BONN. IT STRESSES THE CONCERN FELT IN PARIS ABOUT THREE MAIN ASPECTS:- THE DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE AND RISK OF US DECOUPLING, THE PROBABILITY OF INCREASED PRESSURE ON UK/FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS. THE EDITORIAL CONCLUDES THAT THE SOVIET INITIATIVE PROMISES A DIFFICULT TEST FOR THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

FRETWELL

YYYY

PCLNAN 7734

NNNN

HPLNGN 5200 MXHPAN 9170

RESTRICTED

ADVANCE COPIES 19

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
NPS
DACU
CDI
MOD

SENT - 2 MAR 1987

PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST

19.11.E

ADVANCE COPY

SENT - 2 MAR 1987

PP GENIS
PP VIENN
FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 021730Z F C O
TELNO 294
OF 021545Z MARCH 87
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL CSCE VIENNA, UKMIS NEW YORK, ALL OTHER CSCE POSTS

14 CD

SIC EMA/EME/EMC

MODUK FOR DACU

SOVIET MFA PRESS CONFERENCE ON GORBACHEV STATEMENT OF 28 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH, MARSHALL AKHROMEYEV AND HEAD OF MFA ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DEPARTMENT KARPOV GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 2 MARCH ON THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT OF 28 FEBRUARY (MY TELNOS 285-7). THE THRUST WAS A CALL TO THOSE WHO HAD WANTED AN INF AGREEMENT TO BE DELINKED FROM THE REYKJAVIK PACKAGE NOW TO SIGN UP. ITS NEGOTIATION COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHIN SIX MONTHS. CONFIRMATION THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS WERE TO BE EXCLUDED FOR THE TIME BEING, AND THAT SRINF FROM THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOULD BE WITHDRAWN (TO SOVIET TERRITORY) NOT ELIMINATED AS A PRELUDE TO SRINF TALKS. NO CLARIFICATION, BUT SOME FIDGETING, ON THE SOVIET POSITION ON SDI DEVELOPMENT/TESTING/DEPLOYMENT.

DETAIL

2. BESSMERTNYKH'S OPENING STATEMENT REITERATED MOST OF THE POINTS IN GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT. BESSMERTNYKH EXPLAINED THAT AT THE GENEVA TALKS FOLLOWING REYKJAVIK THE SOVIET UNION HAD SOUGHT TO RESOLVE THE WHOLE RANGE OF NST ISSUES, INCLUDING A CTB, IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY "AT PROGRESSIVELY LOWER LEVELS OF ARMED CONFRONTATION". THIS WAS STILL THE PREFERABLE APPROACH BUT SINCE THE TALKS HAD RISKED BEING DEADLOCKED AGAIN

LEVELS OF ARMED CONFRONTATION''. THIS WAS STILL THE PREFERABLE APPROACH BUT SINCE THE TALKS HAD RISKED BEING DEADLOCKED AGAIN BECAUSE OF THE US POSITION, THE SOVIET UNION HAD DECIDED TO TRY TO SOLVE INF AS A PRIORITY. ''IN ADDITION IT MORE EASILY LENDS ITSELF TO A SOLUTION THAN THE OTHERS WOULD.''

3. BESSMERTNYKH QUOTED SHULTZ AS SAYING ON 17 OCTOBER 1986 THAT THERE WAS NOTHING TO PREVENT AN INF AGREEMENT, ON THE BASIS OF WHAT THE TWO LEADERS HAD SAID TO EACH OTHER. BESSMERTNYKH ADDED THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT SHOULD THEREFORE BE CONCLUDED WITHOUT DELAY. THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE INCLUSION OF INF IN THE REYKJAVIK PACKAGE MADE OVERALL AGREEMENT MORE DIFFICULT: ''THOSE WHO BELIEVED THAT - AND WE HEARD THOSE VOICES FROM WASHINGTON AND FROM EUROPEAN CAPITALS - SHOULD NOW SHOW US THAT THEY WERE SINCERE IN THEIR INTENTIONS TO REACH AGREEMENT.''

4. BESSMERTNYKH CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET INF PROPOSAL DID NOT PUSH ASIDE THE QUESTION OF SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS AND EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS. ''AGREEMENT ON THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE IF THERE IS A DECISION NOT TO ALLOW DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS IN SPACE, GIVEN THE ORGANIC INTER-LINKING OF THESE QUESTIONS''. THE SOVIET UNION HOPED THAT THE US WOULD NOW BE STIMULATED TO TAKE RECIPROCAL CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS ON THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF NUCLEAR AND SPACE WEAPONS.

5. THE FOLLOWING EMERGED IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS:

(I) SOVIET MOTIVATION FOR DE-LINKING

BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT ''CIRCUMSTANCES HAD RECENTLY EMERGED'' WHICH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THESE INCLUDED VIEWS EXPRESSED AT THE MOSCOW ROUND TABLE FORUM AND THE OBSTRUCTIONIST STANCE OF THE US AT GENEVA. AS INF WAS THE MOST SOLUBLE OF THE PROBLEMS IT REPRESENTED NOT JUST A SECURITY BUT A POLITICAL ISSUE. ''WE COULD NOT LEAVE THE DEADLOCK AT GENEVA AS IT WAS. ''A TOTAL OF 243 SS20 MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN PART'' WOULD BE DISMANTLED ALONG WITH CRUISE AND PERSHING. THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENTS IN OTHER SPHERES ACHIEVED AT REYKJAVIK REMAINED AND MUST BE BUILT ON: ''NOTHING HAS MADE US REVIEW THE PARAMETERS OF THOSE MAJOR AGREEMENTS''.

IN ANSWER TO WHETHER POLITICAL DISARRAY IN WASHINGTON HAD AFFECTED THE SOVIET DECISION KARPOV SAID THAT THE PREMISE FOR SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS WAS TO DEAL WITH THE PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION.

(II) ROLE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH DETERRENT

BESSMERTNIKH SAID THAT THE POSITION ADOPTED AT REYKJAVIK REMAINED VALID. THE SOVIET PROPOSED ''OPTION'' THAT AN INF AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED WITHOUT INCLUDING BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS WAS UNCHANGED. AKHROMEYEV ADDED THAT THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS COULD BE LEFT ASIDE FOR THE TIME BEING BUT THAT AT SOME STAGE BRITAIN AND FRANCE MUST COOPERATE. IT WAS HARD TO SAY AT WHAT STAGE. IT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE FUTURE BETWEEN THE FOUR CONCERNED NUCLEAR POWERS, AND PERHAPS BY ALL THE NUCLEAR POWERS.

(III) LINK BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND SPACE WEAPONS

THE ''GUARDIAN'S'' QUESTION AS TO WHETHER AN AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS WAS LINKED ONLY TO DEPLOYMENT AS DISTINCT FROM TESTING AND DEVELOPING OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS WAS MET WITH SILENCE THEN EMBARRASSED LAUGHTER BY THE SOVIET PANEL. EVENTUALLY KARPOV SAID THAT THE ABMT MUST BE IMPLEMENTED TO THE LETTER. UNTIL THE SOFEAR BROAD INTERPRETATION IN OCTOBER 1985 THERE HAD BEEN COMPLETE US/SOVIET UNDERSTANDING ON THE TREATY. SUBSEQUENT US LOBBYING OF [illegible] AND HAD NOT CANCELLED OUT

BROAD INTERPRETATION IN OCTOBER 1985 THERE HAD BEEN COMPLETE US/SOVIET UNDERSTANDING ON THE TREATY. SUBSEQUENT US LOBBYING OF THEIR ALLIES HAD NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL, AND HAD NOT CANCELLED OUT ARTICLE 5.

(IV) SRINF

BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT THE FORMAT OF SRINF TALKS WAS STILL TO BE DECIDED. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PREJUDGE THIS BUT THE QUESTION SHOULD BE SOLVED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AKHROMEYEV SAID THAT UPON SIGNATURE OF AN INF AGREEMENT THE SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES IN THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAWN TO SOVIET TERRITORY: THEIR FUTURE WOULD BE DECIDED DURING THE SRINF NEGOTIATIONS.

(V) PROGRAMME FOR GENEVA TALKS

KARPOV SAID THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE ROUND WOULD CONTINUE BEYOND 4 MARCH IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL.

(VI) INF NEGOTIATIONS

KARPOV SAID THAT EXPERIENCE SHOWED THE DIFFICULTIES OF DRAFTING. METICULOUS EFFORTS WOULD BE NEEDED BUT IF BOTH SIDES WERE WILLING AN AGREEMENT COULD PERHAPS BE MADE READY WITHIN SIX MONTHS. ON VERIFICATION, AKHROMEYEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WERE PREPARED FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION.

(VII) CONVENTIONAL FORCES

AKHROMEYEV EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE WEST LINKED INF TO A CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS SOLUTION. HE CLAIMED THE EXISTENCE OF NUMERICAL CONVENTIONAL BALANCE, WITH NATO'S SUPERIORITY IN ANTI-TANK WEAPONS AND BOMBERS SET AGAINST MORE WP TANKS AND INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT. ''THE SOVIET UNION IS WILLING TO TABLE AT THE TALKS CONCRETE FIGURES. BUT THE NATO COUNTRIES DO NOT YET AGREE EVEN TO BEGIN SUCH TALKS''.

(VIII) REACTION TO SOVIET PROPOSAL

BESSMERTNYKH DESCRIBED INTERNATIONAL REACTION AS POSITIVE. GENERAL ROGERS HAD SAID THAT ONLY MADMEN THOUGHT THIS PROBLEM WAS SOLUBLE, AND M. RAIMOND'S STATEMENT EXPRESSING DOUBTS HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTING. BUT THE SOVIET UNION WERE GRATIFIED BY THE GENERAL REACTION.

(IX) SUMMIT

BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO SAY WHETHER AN INF AGREEMENT WOULD LEAD TO A NEW SUMMIT. IT WAS NECESSARY TO AWAIT THE RESULTS OF AN INF AGREEMENT AND OTHER ISSUES AT GENEVA.

(X) FORWARD BASED MISSILES

AKHROMEYEV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT US FBS WERE A PROBLEM BOTH IN EUROPE AND ASIA. THE US HAD 15 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AT SEA, EACH OF WHICH HAD UP TO 100 AIRCRAFT, HALF OF WHICH WERE ARMED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY WERE WITHIN RANGE OF SOVIET TERRITORY. THE SOVIET UNION HAD RAISED THE ISSUE REPEATEDLY WITH THE US, AND HAD SOMETIMES REMOVED IT FOR THE SAKE OF REACHING AGREEMENT. BUT IT MUST BE ADDRESSED.

(XI) KRASNOYARKS

AKHROMEYEV TOOK THE STANDARD LINE THAT US CLAIMS ABOUT A SOVIET BREACH OF THE ABMT THROUGH THE RADAR AT KRASNOYARSK WERE FALSE. THE RADARS AT THULE AND FYLINGDALES WERE, HOWEVER, NEW AND NOT MERELY BEING MODERNISED. THE US HAD REJECTED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL

THE RADARS AT THULE AND FYLINGDALES WERE, HOWEVER, NEW AND NOT MERELY BEING MODERNISED. THE US HAD REJECTED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE ALL THREE RADARS.

CONCLUSIONS

6. NO SIGNIFICANT ELABORATION OF GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT. APART FROM THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED INF AGREEMENT ITSELF, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATING TO THE DISMANTLEMENT AND VERIFICATION PROCEDURES, TWO MAJOR QUESTION MARKS REMAIN OVER: A) THE DEGREE OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO SATISFY ALLIEANCE CONCERNS OVER SRINF. B) THE DEGREE OF SDI CONDITIONALITY ATTACHING TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS CUTS.

7. ON A) GORBACHEV SEEMS TO HAVE WISHED TO SIGNAL HIS SERIOUSNESS IN ADDRESSING THE NEED FOR SRINF TALKS. THE UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE COUNTERMEASURE MISSILES IS OFFERED AS TOKEN OF GOOD FAITH. BUT THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF WHAT IS ON OFFER NOW WILL NECESSARILY LEAD TO ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION OF RESIDUAL SRINF IMBALANCE. ON B) THE RUSSIANS MAY WELL NOT WISH TO SPOIL THE POSITIVE EFFECT OF THE SWEEPING STATEMENT, BY REVEALING THE NEGOTIATING DETAILS WHICH COULD WELL BE A GREAT DEAL LESS FORTHCOMING

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

MXHPAN 8178

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

RM 2 BCM

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 March 1987

POSSIBLE INF AGREEMENT: SOVIET PROPOSALS

The Prime Minister has seen the Soviet proposal for a separate INF agreement, conveyed in the statement reported in Moscow tel. no. 286. You will no doubt be letting us have an analysis of it in the course of the day, to supplement the first assessment which I let the Prime Minister have over the weekend. At first sight it seems a further step in the Soviet campaign to uncouple the United States from the nuclear defence of Europe and for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, as envisaged at Reykjavik.

I have sent you separately the press line which the No. 10 Press Office are taking.

The Prime Minister assumes that we are comparing notes urgently with the Americans and Germans about the Soviet proposal. Once we have reached a considered view she may wish to send messages to the President and Chancellor Kohl.

The Prime Minister has heard radio reports that Secretary Shultz may visit Moscow in the fairly near future. She would hope that there would be consultation before any such visit. She would want to see Mr. Shultz herself if possible. Perhaps you could find out from Washington what his plans are (I doubt in fact that a visit to Moscow is imminent).

I am copying this letter, together with copies of our press line, to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

JB

hle ecu

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 March 1987

GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

I attach the line prepared for the No.10 press briefing which the Prime Minister has approved.

(Charles Powell)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

LINE FOR NO.10 PRESS BRIEFING

SOVIET PROPOSAL ON MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (INF)

1. At their Camp David meeting last November, the Prime Minister and President Reagan identified an "INF Agreement with restraints on shorter-range systems" as a priority. We welcome the fact that the Soviet Union now appears to accept that and is not insisting on a link with SDI.

2. Once again, Western firmness and resolve has been justified.

3. Also of course there is no question of constraints on modernisation of the UK deterrent with Trident. It is satisfactory that the Soviet proposal makes no attempt to reinstate conditions on this.

4. We shall want to see details of the Soviet proposal, bearing in mind two further points from the Camp David statement:

   - effective verification is essential
   - the importance of eliminating disparities in conventional forces.

5. It will be particularly important to have a firm Soviet commitment to negotiations to correct the huge imbalance in the Soviet Union's favour in shorter-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

6. These points need to be dealt with satisfactorily. Subject to that we welcome the Soviet proposal.

VSCAEM

PRIME MINISTER

ARMS CONTROL: GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL

I attach some telegrams dealing with Gorbachev's proposal on INF.

There are a number of points which I would draw to your attention:

- it is not Gorbachev's proposal. You and President Reagan agreed at Camp David to give priority to an INF agreement, with restraints on short-range systems. You urged that the link with SDI be broken. Gorbachev has done what you ask. We are underlining this in public comment.

- it is not entirely clear why he has done so at this particular moment, with President Reagan's position relatively weak. It must in part be due to the very firm line taken by the US and NATO as a whole on SDI. Again we can claim credit for that.

- but I think that there is also a more sinister reason and it emerges from the reference in the proposal to readiness to reduce and eliminate shorter-range systems. This is on the face of it a surprising offer. But it is a part of Gorbachev's vision of a non-nuclear world. In Soviet eyes, elimination of shorter-range systems would cover not only Pershing I and Lance but the dual capable American F-III aircraft. In practice we would have an entirely non-nuclear Europe (except for the British and French deterrents), with the balance of conventional forces heavily in the Soviet Union's favour. We need to be very careful about going down this road. Our goal should be to reduce the imbalance in short-range systems not eliminate the systems altogether.

- some details of Gorbachev's proposal are not entirely clear. He does not explicitly confirm that the Soviet Union will not revert to its demand for no-modernisation of the British and French deterrents (though I think that we can be fairly confident that he is not doing so).

- some of the wording on the link between reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and the SDI is potentially very significant. He speaks of the format being "conditioned by a decision on the prevention of deployment of weapons in outer space" (no mention of testing, or of the ABM Treaty).

It seems to me that we have no option but to welcome the breaking of the link between INF and SDI, which we have long demanded. But we shall want to make clear that reductions in shorter-range systems must correct the imbalance in the Soviet Union's favour, while preserving both sides' security.

C.D.P.

CDP

1 March 1987

ZCZC
LNCYAN 1958
UNCLASSIFIED
FFFF FOR DUTY OFFICER NO 10

77 CAOFF
FM MOSCO TO FCOLN
282240Z FEB
GRS 1000

UNCLASSIFIED
FM MOSCOW
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 286
OF 282240Z FEBRUARY 87
AND TO FLASH MODUK (DACU)
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN , PARIS, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL CSCE VIENNA
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, ALL CSCE POSTS

MIPT: GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT

FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT:-

ON JANUARY 15, 1986, THE SOVIET UNION PUT FORWARD A HISTORIC PROGRAMME, THAT OF STAGE-BY-STAGE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHEN SUGGESTING IT WE PROCEEDED FROM THE FIRM CONVICTION THAT FUTURE SECURITY WOULD BE A NUCLEAR-FREE ONE.

THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, AND THE COUNTRY'S DEFENCE COUNCIL WHICH I AM INSTRUCTED TO HEAD, CONSTANTLY KEEP THE PROBLEMS OF UNIVERSAL SECURITY AT THE CENTRE OF ATTENTION. WE DO NOT HAVE THE SLIGHEST DOUBT THAT THE SECURITY OF THE WORLD AND THE SURVIVAL OF HUMANITY SHOULD BE ENSURED BY JOINT EFFORTS AND POLITICAL MEANS, AND NOT BY WEAPONS.

THE COMMON SENSE OF THE PEOPLES, AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS, AND THE NATURAL INSTINCT OF SELF-PRESERVATION DECLINE TO ACCEPT THE LOGIC OF HUMANITY'S SUICIDE.

GUIDED BY THE AWARENESS OF HIGH RESPONSIBILITY TO THE WORLD. THE SOVIET UNION COMES OUT IN FAVOUR OF FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS IN THE INTERESTS OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON''FREE AND NON-VIOLENT WORLD.

AT THE RECENT FORUM IN MOSCOW WE ONCE AGAIN FELT THE EXPECTIONS, CONCERNS AND INTENSE QUEST BY THE OUTSTANDING SCIENTISTS AND PERSONALITIES IN THE FIELD OF CULTURE, POLITICS AND RELIGIONS AND AGAIN BECAME KEENLY AWARE OF THE CRUCIAL NATURE OF OUR TIMES.

THE REYKJAVIK MEETING SHOWED THAT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IS A QUITE REALISTIC POLICY. IN THE CAPITAL OF ICELAND WE WERE ONE STEP AWAY FROM AN ACCORD ON A WHOLE RANGE OF SUCH DECISIONS WHICH IN THEIR AGGREGATE WOULD HAVE SIGNIFIED A DEEP BREAKTHROUGH IN THE FRONT OF NUCLEAR DANGER.

HEREIN IS THE GREATNESS AND TRAGEDY OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING. ITS GREATNESS WAS IN THE FACT THAT AN ATTAINABLE PROSPECT OF A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD OPENED UP. ITS TRAGEDY LAY IN THE FACT THAT POWERFUL FORCES, BEING HELD CAPTIVE BY NUCLEAR-STRENGTH MENTALITY, OPPOSED ACCORDS.

IT IS A MATTER OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE WHAT HAS HAPPENED AFTER THE REYKJAVIK MEETING. THE U.S. TALKS, NOTWITHSTANDING OUR EFFORTS TO GIVE DYNAMISM AND SPECIFIC CHARACTER TO THEM, ARE BEING AGAIN DELIBERATELY BLOCKED.

THE SAME OFFICIALS WHO REGARDED IT AS LOGICAL TO CONSIDER IN REYKJAVIK THE ENTIRE PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS COVERING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, SPACE WEAPONRY, AND NUCLEAR TESTS, ARE NOW PREOCCUPIED WITH SABOTAGING ACCORDS ON EACH OF THE AREAS BY PLEADING THAT THE SOVIET UNION INSISTS ON SOLVING THEM AS A PACKAGE.

IN ACTUAL FACT THE TALKS ARE BEING BLOCKED BY NARROW SELFISH INTERESTS AND BY UNWILLINGNESS TO GIVE UP COUNTING ON MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY, AND BY ILLUSORY EXPECTATIONS TO GET AHEAD, FIRST OF ALL, VIA OUTER SPACE.

TO US, THIS APPROACH IS ALIEN, AND MORE THAN THAT -- IT IS UNACCEPTABLE. OUR PRINCIPLED COURSE IS TIRELESSLY TO LOOK FOR SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD OPEN UP A WAY TO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORDS AND TO EQUAL SECURITY.

THE POLOTICAL BUREAU OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, UPON HAVING RECENTLY CONSIDERED THE PACKAGE OF ISSUES CONNECTED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD, DECIDED TO MAKE YET ANOTHER BIG STEP IN THIS DIRECTION.

TODAY, ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, I AM ANNOUNCING OUR DECISION WHICH IS AS FOLLOWS.

THE SOVIET UNION SUGGESTS THAT THE PROBLEM OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE BE SINGLED OUT FROM THE PACKAGE OF ISSUES, AND THAT A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON IT BE CONCLUDED ON IT, AND WITHOUT DELAY.

THERE IS ACTUALLY A READY ACCORD, AND NOT JUST A BASIS, FOR SUCH A STEP. IT WAS AGREED IN REYKJAVIK THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD ELIMINATE ALL THEIR MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES (MRM) IN EUROPED WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, WITHIN THE SAME PERIOD THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MRM'S IN THE ASIAN PART OF OUR TERRITORY WOULD BE CUT DOWN TO A HUNDRED WARHEADS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD LEAVE THE SAME NUMBER OF MRM WARHEADS IN ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY.

AS SOON AS AN AGREEMENT ON ELIMINATING SOVIET AND U.S. MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE IS SIGNED, THE SOVIET UNION WILL WITHDRAW LONGER RANGE THEATRE MISSILES FROM THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THOSE COUNTRIES, THE MISSILES WHICH HAD BEEN DEPLOYED THERE AS MEASURES IN REPLY TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING-2 AND CRUISE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE.

AS FAR AS OTHER THEATRE MISSILES ARE CONCERNED, WE ARE PREPARED TO BEGIN TALKS IMMEDIATELY WITH A VIEW TO REDUCING AND FULLY ELIMINATING THEM

SO, THERE IS A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO FREE OUR COMMON EUROPEAN HOME FROM A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF NUCLEAR BURDEN WITHIN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME. THAT WOULD BE A REAL AND BIG STEP TOWARDS FULL DELIVERANCE OF EUROPE FROM NUCLEAR ARMS, WE ARE PUTTING OUR PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES IN GENEVA.

WE WERE ASSURED MORE THAN ONCE THAT IF THE USSR SINGLES OUT THE ISSUE OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES FROM THE REYKJAVIK PACKAGE, THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY TO AGREE TO THEIR ELIMINATION IN EUROPE. A GOOD OPPORTUNITY IS NOW BEING OFFERED TO PROVE THAT IN PRACTICE. THIS IS BEING AWAITED BY THE EUROPEANS AND BY THE PEOPLES OF OTHER CONTINENTS. THIS IS REQUIRED BY THE INTERESTS OF THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE.

OF COURSE, THE CONCLUSION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, AS HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY EMPHASISED, SHOULD BE CONDITIONED BY A DECISION ON THE PREVENTION OF DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE, IN VIEW OF THE ORGANIC INTERCONNECTION OF THESE ISSUES.

DESPITE ALL THE DIFFICULTIES AND ARTIFICIAL OBSTUCTIONS, THE SOVIET UNION IS AGAIN SHOWING ITS WILL TO RESOLVE THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ISSUE.

THE NEW WAY OF THINKING MEANS AN ABILITY TO LISTEN TO THE VOICE OF THE PUBLIC. =THE EUROPEAN AND WORLD ONE, TO UNDERSTAND THE CONCERNS AND INTERESTS OF OTHER PEOPLES, AND NOT TO SEPARATE ONE'S OWN SECURITY FROM THE SECURITY OF NEIGHBOURS IN OUR INTERCONNECTED WORLD.

THE HISTORIC CHANCE SHOULD NOT BE MISSED (EXCLAMATION). WE ARE AWAITING A SPEEDY AND POSITIVE REPLY.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

MXHPAN 8159

NNNN

RESTRICTED
FFFF FOR DUTY OFFICER NO 10
ZZ CAOFF
FM FCOLN TO CAOFF
281115Z FEB
GRS 250

RESTRICTED
FM MOSCOW
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 285
OF 2822157 FEBRUARY 87
AND TO FLASH MODUK (DACU)
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL CSCE VIENNA
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, ALL CSCE POSTS

GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT ON DE-LINKAGE AN INF AGREEMENT.

1. IN A STATEMENT RELEASED ON TASS ON EVENING OF 28 FEBRUARY, GORBACHEV PROPOSED THAT ''THE PROBLEM OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE BE SINGLED OUT FROM THE (REYKJAVIK) PACKAGE OF ISSUES'' AND THAT A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON IT BE CONCLUDED WITHOUT DELAY. AS HAD BEEN ENVISAGED AT REYKJAVIK, THIS WOULD MEAN THE ELIMINATION OF ALL US AND SOVIET ''MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES'' IN EUROPE WITHIN FIVE YEARS, LEAVING 100 WARHEADS EACH IN THE ''ASIAN PART'' OF SOVIET TERRITORY AND ON US ''NATIONAL TERRITORY''.

2. UPON SIGNATURE OF AGREEMENT TO ELIMINATE MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ''WITHDRAW LONGER RANGE THEATRE MISSILES FROM THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA'' DECLARED AS BEING THE COUNTER-MEASURES TO CRUISE AND PERSHING, AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO BEGIN TALKS IMMEDIATELY ON ''REDUCING AND FULLY ELIMINATING'' OTHER THEATRE MISSILES.

3. THE ABOVE PROPOSALS WERE BEING TABLED IN GENEVA.

4. ON STRATEGIC AND SPACE WEAPONS, ''THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STILL CONSIDERS IT HIGHLY IMPORTANT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION AND THEM ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. OF COURSE THE CONCLUSION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT..... SHOULD BE CONDITIONED BY A DECISION ON THE PREVENTION OF DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE IN VIEW OF THE ORGANIC INTERCONNECTION OF THESE ISSUES''.

5. FOR FULL TEXT SEE MIFT.

6. COMMENT FOLLOWS.

7. SEE MY TWO IFTS.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

MXHPAN 8158

NNNN

GRS 820

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 71
OF 271928Z FEBRUARY 87
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, MODUK, TOKYO, ROME,
INFO PRIORITY THE HAGUE, MOSCOW
INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, UKDIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK

Weak lot!
mT.

MODUK FOR PS/S OF S, DUS(P) AND DACU

YOUR TELNOS 40, 41 AND 42: NAC BRIEFING BY NITZE ON SDI/ABMT

SUMMARY
1. NITZE AND PERLE REITERATED LINE TAKEN IN LONDON. IN RESPONSE ALLIES URGED NO MOVE TO BROAD INTERPRETATION OF ABMT WITHOUT FURTHER CONSULTATION IN NATO. SOME SUPPORT FOR FRG SUGGESTION THAT CONSULTATION BE CARRIED ON BY FOREIGN MINISTERS, PERHAPS AT REYKJAVIK NAC IN JUNE. CANADIAN PROPOSAL THAT CONCEPT OF OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP NEEDED FULL DISCUSSION IN FORMAL ALLIANCE FORUM. GENERAL CONCERN THAT MOVE TO BROAD INTERPRETATION NOW WOULD HAVE ADVERSE IMPLICATIONS FOR GENEVA TALKS, EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ALLIANCE COHESION. ACCEPTANCE THAT LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF ABM TREATY WAS A MATTER FOR THE SIGNATORIES.

DETAIL
2. IN HIS INITIAL STATEMENT, NITZE OUTLINED THE CURRENT US POSITION (SEE TURS). HE EMPHASISED AT THE OUTSET THAT THIS MEETING REPRESENTED AN INITIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND THAT DISCUSSION ABOUT AN EARLY DEPLOYMENT DECISION WAS QUOTE NOT APPROPRIATE THIS YEAR OR NEXT YEAR UNQUOTE. HE STRESSED THAT THE SDI PROGRAMME WAS BEING CONDUCTED IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY AND THAT THE ISSUE UNDER CONSIDERATION WAS WHETHER IT WAS NOW BECOMING TECHNICALLY NECESSARY TO RE-STRUCTURE THE PROGRAMME TO ENABLE TESTING TO BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BROAD INTERPRETATION. HE EXPLAINED THE STUDIES WHICH HAD BEEN INITIATED BY THE PRESIDENT INTO THE FURTHER LEGAL REVIEW OF THE TREATY'S INTERPRETATION AND OF TECHNICAL PROGAMME REQUIREMENTS. BEFORE TAKING ANY DECISIONS BASED ON THESE REVIEWS THE PRESIDENT WISHED TO OBTAIN ALLIED VIEWS AS WELL AS THOSE OF CONGRESS.
3. IN THE ENSUING DISCUSSION, PERMREPS ACCEPTED THAT THE CORRECT LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY WAS SOLELY A MATTER FOR THE TWO SIGNATORIES. CONCERNS FOCUSSED ON THE ADVERSE IMPLICATIONS THAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

/MOVE

MOVE TO THE BROAD INTERPRETATION COULD HAVE ON THE GENEVA TALKS, EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ALLIANCE COHESION.

4. SMITH (CANADA) STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS NOT YET CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS ANY PRACTICAL NEED TO MOVE TO THE BROAD INTERPRETATION AND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT A UNILATERAL MOVE BY THE US WOULD HAVE DESTABILISING CONSEQUENCES. HE NOTED THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD HAD NO FORMAL DISCUSSION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND SUGGESTED THAT THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE PURSUED IN THE COUNCIL SO THAT IT COULD BETTER UNDERSTAND THE ISSUES. THIS SUGGESTION WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SUPPORTED BY FULCI (ITALY) AND DE HOOP SCHEFFER (NETHERLANDS).

5. HANSEN (GERMANY) EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR CONTINUATION OF THE NARROW INTERPRETATION AND PROPOSED THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE WAS SUCH THAT A FURTHER ROUND OF ALLIANCE DISCUSSION SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. THIS IDEA WAS BACKED BY BORCH (DENMARK) AND CASSIERS (BELGIUM) WHO SUGGESTED THAT THE MEETING OF THE NAC IN REYKJAVIK WOULD BE A SUITABLE FORUM. BORCH REITERATED THE DANISH LINE ON THEIR INABILITY TO SUPPORT THE SDI PROGRAMME FOR WELL KNOWN REASONS. BERG (NORWAY) STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE NARROW INTERPRETATION.

6. IN AN UNUSUALLY EXPLICIT STATEMENT FULCI (ITALY) WARNED THAT ANY CHANGE IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY NEEDED TO BE CAREFULLY THOUGHT OUT AND DISCUSSED MUCH MORE THOROUGHLY BY THE ALLIANCE AND RECOMMENDED THAT ANY DECISION SHOULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR. I SPOKE ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELNO 42 AND WAS SUPPORTED IN MY SUGGESTION OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS BY MOST OF MY COLLEAGUES WHO EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF A CO-OPERATIVE APPROACH WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THE ISSUE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

7. IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION NITZE CONFIRMED THAT NO NEW INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN SENT TO THE NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA. PERLE TRIED TO OFFSET THE CONSENSUS VIEW THAT A MOVE TO THE BROAD INTERPRETATION WOULD ADVERSELY EFFECT THE GENEVA TALKS BY ARGUING THAT BY PLACING INCREASED PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION THIS COULD ACTUALLY MAKE THEM MORE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE, ALTHOUGH HE CONCEDED THAT THE SHORT TERM EFFECTS (AS IN 1983) MIGHT BE ADVERSE. HE WILL HAVE SHOCKED SOME BY HIS UNSCRIPTED REMARK THAT IN THE SHORT TERM THIS COULD EVEN CAUSE THE SOVIET UNION TO WALK OUT IN GENEVA, ALTHOUGH HIS FIRM VIEW WAS THAT THEY WOULD RETURN AS THEY HAD ON INF AFTER ALLIANCE DEPLOYMENTS. PERLE SUGGESTED THAT IF THE NARROW INTERPRETATION INHIBITED THE SDI PROGRAMME TO THE EXTENT OF MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE THE FEASIBILITY OF A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM, THIS WOULD IN TURN WEAKEN THE US POSITION AT GENEVA SINCE THERE WOULD BE LITTLE INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON REDUCTIONS IN

CONFIDENTIAL STRATEGIC.

STRATEGIC WEAPONS. NITZE CONFIRMED THAT THE US PROPOSAL FOR A 10 YEAR NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD REMAINED ON THE TABLE IN GENEVA BUT MADE CLEAR THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS LINKED TO THE ABOLITION OF ALL BMS, AND WAS THEREFORE UNLIKELY TO BE NEGOTIABLE.

COMMENT

8. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL CONSULT NEXT WEEK WITH PERMREPS OVER THE SUGGESTION THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD DISCUSS THE SUBJECT PERHAPS AT THE JUNE NAC. INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED.

ALEXANDER

YYYY

UBLNAN 1543

(Repetition to REYKJAVIK.
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.)

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
LIMITED
ACDD
DEFENCE D
SOVIET D
NEWS D
NAD
EED
WED
PLANNING STAFF
RES D
INFO D
PUSD
NED
CSCE UNIT
POD
SAD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FERN
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR SLATER
MR BARRINGTON
MR GILLMORE
MR REEVE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

COPIES TO:
MR BERMAN LEGAL ADVISERS

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

[WRITERS]

ADVANCE COPIES

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS (2)
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT
HD/NAD
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
NPS
DACU
CDI
} MOD

SENT
24 FEB 1987

[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

19.11.8

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 241600Z F C O
TELNO 260
OF 241415Z FEBRUARY 87
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

1510

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

ARMS CONTROL: CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDES

1. YOU MAY WISH TO HAVE, BEFORE NITZE'S VISIT TO LONDON, A SUMMARY OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS TO RETIRING US AMBASSADOR HARTMAN (AND PASSED TO ME IN CONFIDENCE BY THE US CHARGE) DURING HIS FAREWELL CALLS ON GROMYKO, ARBATOV AND BESSMERTNYKH, THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR US/SOVIET RELATIONS. HARTMAN HAD SOUGHT A FAREWELL CALL ON GORBACHEV BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS.)

2. THERE WAS A SHARP CONTRAST BETWEEN GROMYKO'S POSITION AND THOSE OF ARBATOV AND BESSMERTNYKH. GROMYKO, WHO WAS NOTABLY SELF-CONFIDENT AND ASSERTIVE - BEHAVING, HARTMAN REMARKED, LIKE A GENERAL SECRETARY- TOOK A CHARACTERISTICALLY HARD AND ORTHODOX LINE. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED IN US POLICY POST-REYKJAVIK, WHICH SEEMED TO HAVE BECOME MORE RIGID THAN EVER, THE US ADMINISTRATION WAS CLEARLY NOT READY TO REACH AGREEMENTS AND THIS WAS A MATTER OF DEEP CONCERN TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. THE ONLY CONCEIVABLE MOTIVE OF THE US IN INSISTING ON THE MILITARISATION OF SPACE WAS THAT THE US WAS DETERMINED TO ATTAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION. WASHINGTON'S ATTENTION WAS AT PRESENT CONCENTRATED ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. WITHOUT SOME PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT, TO WHICH THE PROBLEM OF THE SDI WAS CENTRAL, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE PROGRESS ON REGIONAL ISSUES EITHER. THE QUESTION OF SPACE, IE THE SDI, SHOULD BE GIVEN

ISSUES EITHER. THE QUESTION OF SPACE, IE THE SDI, SHOULD BE GIVEN ABSOLUTE PRIORITY. AT GENEVA, THE US AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS WERE USEFULLY ''TAKING PHOTOGRAPHS'' OF EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS BUT SINCE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ALL THE CRITICAL ISSUES REMAINED IN SQUARE BRACKETS, NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE THERE: THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT NEVERTHELESS BELIEVED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE.

3. ARBATOV HAD CLAIMED THAT, AT REYKJAVIK, THE INITIAL SOVIET POSITION HAD FOCUSSED ONLY ON STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS DURING THE FIRST 5 YEARS OF REAFFIRMED COMMITMENT TO THE ABM TREATY. WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL, ARBATOV ADMITTED THAT GORBACHEV HAD A FALL-BACK POSITION WHICH HE COULD USE AT HIS OWN DISCRETION AND IMPLIED THAT HE HAD DONE SO. ARBATOV SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO DEVISE A WHOLLY NEW APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. UNDER THE PRESENT SYSTEM, EVEN ''A SMALL RETURN TO COMMON SENSE'' WAS ALWAYS MADE TO LOOK LIKE A MAJOR CONCESSION. HE SAID THAT HE WAS ENGAGED IN DRAWING UP FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON A POSSIBLE NEW BASIS FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WOULD TAKE THE NORMAL FORM OF COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS AS ITS MODEL. (THIS SOUNDS TO ME LIKE TYPICAL ARBATOV FLIMFLAM.)

4. BESSMERTNYKH, TOO, SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS TAKING A CAREFUL LOOK AT THE WHOLE ARMS CONTROL PICTURE WITH THE INTENTION OF DRAWING UP A NEW FORMULA ''INTO WHICH ALL THE PIECES WOULD FIT - AT LEAST FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SOVIET INTERESTS''. THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS APPEARED TO BE PROCEEDING SATISFACTORILY BUT THERE WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, IN WHICH THE US WAS ERECTING ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLES. THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE OF VIEW IN MOSCOW AS TO WHY THIS DIFFICULTY SHOULD HAVE ARISEN: ONE POSSIBILITY WAS THAT THE NSC, UNDER ITS NEW LEADERSHIP, HAD NOT YET SETTLED DOWN. BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT PROGRESS IN GENEVA WAS NEVERTHELESS POSSIBLE, ''EVEN ON SPACE''. ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD US CONCERN OVER THE CSCE APPROACH BUT BELIEVED IT WOULD BE RISKY TO CREATE A CATEGORY OF ''SECOND CLASS'' PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING EG YUGOSLAVIA AND SWEDEN. BESSMERTNYKH TOLD HARTMAN THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE ARMACOST IN MID MARCH TO DISCUSS REGIONAL ISSUES: HE STRESSED THAT THIS VISIT COULD BE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO HELPING TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR A SUBSEQUENT VISIT BY SCHULTZ TO WHICH, HE IMPLIED, THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE.

COMMENT

5. I WOULD NOT BE INCLINED TO ATTACH MUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY GROMYKO OR ARBATOV. BUT BESSMERTNYKH'S LINE, PARTICULARLY THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS IN GENEVA ON SPACE WEAPONS, IS LIKELY TO BE CLOSEST TO GORBACHEV'S OWN VIEW AND MODERATELY ENCOURAGING.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

MXHPAN 8075

File SH
SLHAHE
CCPLV

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 February 1987

ABM TREATY

I enclose a copy of the Line to Take in the House of Commons on the ABM Treaty, which has been agreed by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary. A copy of it has also been made available to the No. 10 Press Office. The Prime Minister attaches great importance to ensuring that all public statements by the Government stick closely to this agreed statement of the Government's views.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

ABM TREATY

Mr. Speaker, I quite see that the RHG finds this issue difficult to understand. Let me try once again to explain it to him.

The only governments with a locus to interpret the ABM Treaty are the American and Soviet governments. Only they have access to the full negotiating record. We don't expect them to interpret the Treaty of Rome.

No-one disputes that research is legitimate; and as a matter of commonsense, it has to be allowed to the point of establishing whether something is feasible, which means that you have to be able to do some testing. Otherwise you would not know whether there was anything that could eventually be deployed.

Equally deployment itself is quite clearly a matter for negotiation, as President Reagan and I agreed at Camp David in December 1984. It is not at present under serious discussion.

We have received very satisfactory assurances from the US Administration that there will be consultations about any significant change of policy in relation to the SDI research programme and the way it is conducted. That is important because of the wider implications for arms control negotiations.

The Government fully support the SDI research programme which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. It is vital to our defence that the West should always be at the forefront of new technology. We learned that lesson in the last war. It is typical of the Opposition that they should set out to undermine one of the few areas of defence - and I stress defence - where the West may stand to gain an advantage {over the Soviet Union}.

SLHAHD

OCMIAN 7313
CONFIDENTIAL
RR ROMEE
RR MOSCO
FM FCOLN TO WASHI
121100Z FEB
GRS 1660

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELNO 233
OF 121100Z FEBRUARY 87
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, MODUK

VISIT OF MR ADELMAN, DIRECTOR, US ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY (ACDA): 6 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. MR ADELMAN CALLED ON LADY YOUNG (IN MR RENTON'S ABSENCE) AND MR FALL. HE CRITICISED UK IDEAS THAT THE US AND USSR SHOULD REACH UNDERSTANDINGS ON PERMISSIBLE AND NON-PERMITTED ACTIVITIES UNDER THE ABMT AS UNPRODUCTIVE AND UNHELPFUL AND ARGUED THAT AN EXTENSION OF THE NO WITHDRAWAL PERIOD FROM THE ABMT MIGHT BE A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. A MOVE FROM THE NARROW TO THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO ACCOMODATE ASPECTS OF THE FUTURE PROGRAMME NOW BEING CONSIDERED, AND TO AVOID ADDITIONAL COSTS. A ROW WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OVER TREATY INTERPRETATION WOULD BE UNHELPFUL. THE UK URGED THE NEED FOR THE CLOSEST ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS OVER ANY SUCH DECISION. TIME RUNNING OUT FOR ANY STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT UNDER REAGAN: THE OUTLINE OF ONE WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED BY SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1987 AT THE LATEST. CRITICISM OF UK CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSALS FOR ALLOWING TIME FOR A

CHALLENGED STATE TO REMOVE EVIDENCE OF NON-COMPLIANCE, AND AN APPEAL FOR CONTINUED ALLIANCE COHESION ON THE ISSUE. ADELMAN EXPRESSED SCEPTICISM THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS COULD PRODUCE IMPROVED LEVELS OF SECURITY.

DETAIL

SDI

2. ADELMAN TOLD LADY YOUNG THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE PREPARED TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON SDI INVOLVING NO MORE THAN AN EXTENSION OF THE PERIOD OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABMT. ON THE OTHER HAND, DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS ON AREAS OF PERMISSIBLE AND NON-PERMITTED ACTIVITIES UNDER THE TREATY WOULD BE A RECEIPE FOR ENDLESS AND UNPRODUCTIVE TALKS. THE US HAD ONLY LIMITED KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN SDI, COMPARED WITH THE MUCH GREATER INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE RUSSIANS ON US PROGRAMMES. SOVIET RESEARCH COULD NOT BE VERIFIED WHEREAS THE HIGH PUBLIC VISIBILITY OF THE US PROGRAMME MEANT THAT, FOR THE RUSSIANS, VERIFICATION WAS NOT A PROBLEM. REMARKS IN MY IISS SPEECH WERE, HE CLAIMED, NOT HELPFUL.

3. PRESS REPORTS THAT THE US AND USSR HAD SET UP A NEW WORKING PARTY AT GENEVA TO DISCUSS PERMITTED ACTIVITIES WERE INACCURATE: THE US HAD BEEN EXPLAINING ITS CURRENT POSITION FOR SOME TIME. THE SOVIETS WERE ONLY INTERESTED IN RE-NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY TO CONSTRAIN US RESEARCH. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DELINK SDI FROM INF. THE US SHOULD NOT PAY FOR CUTS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS BY ACCEPTING CONSTRAINTS ON SDI. THE US PROGRAMME WAS NEEDED IN ORDER TO COUNTER SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THIS FIELD. THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE CHANGE IN THE UNDERLYING SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS SPENDING ON AIR DEFENCES AND STRATEGIC DEFENCES SINCE THE US HAD ANNOUNCED ITS PROGRAMME (SEMI-COLON) THEIR EXPENDITURE TOTALLED SOME US DOLLARS 150 BILLION OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS, COMPARED WITH US EXPENDITURE OF DOLLARS 10 BILLION IN THE SAME PERIOD.

4. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH FALL, THE LATTER MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE UK WAS NOT SEEKING TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PERMITTED AND NON-PERMITTED AREAS OF RESEARCH, BUT OF THOSE STAGES OF THE PROGRAMME THAT FELL BETWEEN RESEARCH AND DEPLOYMENT. WOULD THE SOVIET UNION BE CONTENT MERELY WITH A NO WITHDRAWAL PERIOD, OR

WOULD THEY WANT SOME FORM OF ASSURANCE AGAINST BREAKOUT? AS HE HAD ALREADY SUGGESTED TO COCKELL DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO AGREE SOME CONSTRAINTS ON ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD BE AN ESSENTIAL PRELIMINARY TO DEPLOYMENT, TO ENSURE CONFIDENCE IN ANY AGREEMENT ON NON DEPLOYMENT. ADELMAN EXPRESSED SOME INTEREST IN THIS APPROACH, BUT SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT RAISED SUCH CONCERNS. VORONTSOV HAD MADE IT CLEAR IN GENEVA THJAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED CONSTRAINTS ON RESEARCH AND GREY AREA ACTIVITY TO ENSURE THAT IN FUTURE THE US COULD NOT DENY THE SOVIET UNION AN OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY AGAINST THE US. ANY US MOVES TOWARDS DEPLOYMENT COULD NOT BE KEPT HIDDEN. COMPLIANCE WAS THEREFORE NOT A PROBLEM FOR THE USSR.

5. ADELMAN SAID THAT A MOVE TO THE BROADER INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT WAS BEEN CONSIDERED NOT BECAUSE A DECISION TO DEPLOY WAS IMMINENT BUT IN ORDER TO ACCOMODATE CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE SDI PROGRAMME. THIS WAS NOW BUMPING UP AGAINST CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE NARROW INTERPRETATION. THE PROGRAMME WOULD BE CHEAPER TO EXECUTE UNDER THE BROADER INTERPRETATION. HE CLAIMED THAT THE COMMITMENT TO CONDUCT THE SDI PROGRAMME IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NARROW INTERPRETATION WAS CONDITIONAL ON RESEARCH BEING FULLY FUNDED BY CONGRESS, AND IT BEING CHEAPER THAN IT WOULD BE IF THE PROGRAMME WAS ALLOWED TO OPERATE UNDER THE BROAD INTERPRETATION. ADELMAN SAID THAT AFTER STUDYING THE NEGOTIATING RECORD HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE BROAD INTERPRETATION WAS JUSTIFIED.

6. ADELMAN EMPHASISED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL IF THE ALLIANCE MADE A MAJOR ISSUE OF A MOVE FROM THE NARROW TO THE BROAD INTERPRETATION. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A MOVE, THE PRESIDENT MIGHT FIND HIMSELF FACED WITH THE CHOICE OF HAVING TO BREAK THE ABMT IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF SDI WAS FEASIBLE. NO PRESIDENT WOULD BE LIKELY TO TAKE SUCH A STEP IN ORDER TO TEST SDI'S FEASIBILITY. THE EFFECT OF STAYING WITHIN THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION WOULD BE THAT IT WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE TO UNDERTAKE PARTIAL TESTING OF ELEMENTS OF SYSTEMS, BUT NOT TO TEST ASSEMBLED ELEMENTS AND DETERMINE WHETHER THEY WOULD WORK. NOONE WOUD SUPPORT A PROGRAMME CONDUCTED ON SUCH A BASIS. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT REACHED THE STAGE OF NEEDING TO TEST

ASSEMBLED ELEMENTS BUT WAS BEGINNING TO PLAN AND ORGANISE THEIR PROGRAMME.

7. FALL RECALLED THE UK HAD WELCOMED THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO CONDUCT THE SDI PROGRAMME WITHIN THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION. A US DECISION THAT SDI PROGRAMME REQUIREMENTS NECESSITATED A MOVE TO THE BROADER INTERPRETATION WOULD BE SEEN IN EUROPE AS A MAJOR STEP IN VIEW OF ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL TALKS AND ALLIANCE COHESION AND IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT THE US SHOULD CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE ALLIES IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN WHY THE STAGE OF THE PRGRAMME HAD NOW BEEN REACHED THAT NECESSITATED A DECISION ON INTERPRETATION NOW. CLOSE CONSULTATION COULD HELP INCREASE POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE US POSITION.

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

8. ADELMAN TOLD LADY YOUNG THAT THERE WAS LITTLE TIME LEFT TO NEGOTIATE, DRAFT AND RATIFY AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT DURING THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY. THE OUTLINES OF AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE IN PLACE BY SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1987 AT LATEST FOR THE SUBSEQUENT STAGES TO BE COMPLETED. OUTLINE AGREEMENTS COULD BE NEGOTIATED SUBSEQUENTLY BUT WOULD HAVE NO PRACTICAL EFFECT UNTIL IMPLEMENTED. LADY YOUNG STRESSED THE NEED FOR CONTINUED EFFORTS TO MAKE PROGRESS.

CW

9. LADY YOUNG SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THAT THE UK PROPOSAL ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION IN CD715 PROVIDED A WAY FORWARD. ADELMAN SAW TWO PROBLEMS. THE RUSSIANS WOULD REQUIRE JUSTIFICATION FOR ANY REQUEST TO INSPECT. THIS WOULD PUT THE ONUS ON THE CHALLENGING STATE RATHER THAN THE CHALLENGED STATE. SECOND, AND, MORE IMPORTANT, IF THE CHALLENGE PROCEDURE ENVISAGED IN CD715 INTRODUCED DELAYS OF DAYS OR EVEN HOURS BETWEEN THE REQUEST AND THE INSPECTION, ANY CHEMICAL INSTALLATION COULD BE CLEARED UP BEFORE THE INSPECTION TOOK PLACE. THE UK PROPOSAL WAS, HE CLAIMED, A RECEIPE FOR NEVER FINDING A VIOLATION.

10. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, FALL SAID THAT CD715 REMAINED OUR POSITION. THE UK WAS NOT GOING TO DILUTE IT IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR AND CONFRONT THE US WITH AN AGREED UK/USSR TEXT. WE WOULD IN PARTICULAR CONTINUE TO BE ROBUST IN

RESPONSE TO ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE A MULTILATERAL FILTER OR CRITERIA. WE WOULD BE READY TO CONSIDER ANY DETAILED US POINTS FOR IMPROVING CD715, IF THIS WOULD LEAD THE US TO ADD THEIR WEIGHT TO IT. ADELMAN WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT WHETHER THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE BUT EMPHASISED THE NEED TO MAINTAIN ALLIANCE COHESION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS QUOTE AS THE US HAD SOUGHT TO DO UNQUOTE.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

11. ADELMAN ARGUED THAT THE WEST WAS IN DANGER IN SETTING OUT UNREALISTIC OBJECTIVES FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE NO MORE THAN MBFR HAD DONE, AND WOULD LAST AS LONG. SETTING REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES AS AN OBJECTIVE WOULD OBSCURE THE REAL AIM OF ELIMINATING IMBALANCES WHICH WERE CREATED BY THE LEVEL OF WARSAW PACT FORCES. THE RUSSIANS WERE UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS AND THE ALLIANCE WOULD COME UNDER PRESSURE IN NEGOTIATION TO REDUCE ITS FORCES IN WAYS WHICH WOULD LEAVE IT WORSE OFF. THE GERMANS WERE ALREADY DRAWING UP UNREALISTIC PROPOSALS.

12. FALL RESPONDED THAT THE US AND UK WERE AGREED ON SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES, BUT DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS PERSISTED ON HOW TO OBTAIN THEM. WE SHOULD GET NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE 23 STATES GOING: AVOID A SYMBOLIC CONCLUSION TO MBFR WHICH COULD SET DAMAGING PRECEDENTS ON VERIFICATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS ELSEWHERE: AND PERSUADE OUR PUBLICS THAT THE REAL PROBLEM WAS ONE OF IMBALANCES. THE LATTER WOULD BE MORE EASILY ACHIEVED IF THE ALLIANCE WERE SEEN TO BE SEEKING SOLUTIONS. IF REDUCTIONS WERE EXCLUDED IT WOULD BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO RETAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MAINTAINING EXISTING CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVELS, AND IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO KEEP THE NNA OUT OF SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. THE UK WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGER OF CONCEDING REDUCTIONS WHICH LEFT THE WEST MILITARY WEAKER. WESTERN PROPOSALS WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO BE HIGHLY ASSYMETRICAL, BUT WITH SOME REDUCTIONS ON THE WEST SIDE. THE UK, US AND FRG MIGHT USEFULLY DISCUSS WHICH ELEMENTS OF MBFR SHOULD BE RETAINED AS NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING ADELMAN'S QUESTION WHETHER THE US AND SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE THE FIRST TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES. ADELMAN REFERRED TO AN IDEA BEING DEVELOPED BY HANSEN

FOR EQUAL PERCENTAGE WITHDRAWALS BY THE US AND USSR OF THEIR COMBAT READY DIVISIONS IN THE CENTRAL AREA TO OUTSIDE THE ATLANTIC/URALS ZONE. THESE IDEAS MIGHT BE DISCUSSED BY THE 3 COUNTRIES ABOVE.

HOWE

OCMIAN 7313

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
LIMITED
ACDD
DEFENCE D
SOVIET D
NEWS D
NAD
EED
WED
PLANNING STAFF
RES D
INFO D
PUSD
NED
CSCE UNIT
POD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR SLATER
MR BARRINGTON
MR GILLMORE
MR REEVE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

COPIES TO:
MR BERMAN LEGAL ADVISERS
MR R A BURNS SAD

ADVANCE COPIES 20

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
SIR D GOODALL
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P))
NPS)
DACU) MOD
CDI)



PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 251
OF 050213Z FEBRUARY 87

IMMEDIATE

Prime Minister
This is very
heartening.
CDS

PARA 6 OF YOUR TELNO 203: ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES

1. POST-REYKJAVIK WORK ON ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS COVERING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS IS PROCEEDING ON TWO FRONTS HERE:

A) THE JCS ARE STILL PREPARING THEIR STUDY OF POSSIBLE WAYS TO IMPLEMENT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES BY L996. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT NEW DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE VISIT HERE BY ADMIRAL SLATER AND HIS TEAM ON 14/15 JANUARY, EXCEPT THAT THE DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION OF THE QUOTE BASE CASE UNQUOTE REPORT TO THE WHITE HOUSE HAS AGAIN SLIPPED. THE STUDY IS NOW UNLIKELY TO LEAVE THE JCS BEFORE MID-FEBRUARY AT THE EARLIEST.

B) WORK IS CONTINUING, PARTICULARLY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, ON THE OFFENSIVE ASPECT OF THE SECOND FIVE YEARS OF THE PROPOSED TEN YEAR PERIOD OF COMMITMENT TO THE ABM TREATY. THE FOCUS IS ON POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC FORCES THAT MIGHT BE SOUGHT BY THE US IN THIS PERIOD (IE AFTER THE INITIAL 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN MADE). THE DIRECTION OF THE EFFORT IS THEREFORE TOWARDS FINDING A PROPOSAL FOR OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS THAT

THEREFORE TOWARDS FINDING A PROPOSAL FOR OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS THAT WOULD REPLACE THE PRESIDENT'S REKJAVIK PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES. THIS WORK HAS SO FAR BEEN FAIRLY DESULTORY: WE DO NOT THINK THAT ANY SPECIFIC OPTIONS HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT BY ANY AGENCY OR THAT THE MATTER HAS YET BEEN ADDRESSED ON AN INTER-AGENCY BASIS. IT IS, HOWEVER, POSSIBLE THAT THE MATTER WILL BE DISCUSSED AT AN NSPG MEETING TO BE HELD NEXT WEEK, PROBABLY ON 10 FEBRUARY.

2. IT IS STILL OUR JUDGEMENT THAT THE CAMP DAVID PRIORITIES ARE HOLDING UP WELL. WE ARE NOT AWARE THAT ANY IMPORTANT MEMBER OF THE ADMINISTRATION IS ACTIVELY PRESSING THE PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND MOST ARE NOW CLEAR THAT A 50 PCNT REDUCTION SHOULD BE THE MAIN START OBJECTIVE AND THAT ANY ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND FIVE YEARS SHOULD NOT INVOLVE SINGLING OUT BALLISTIC MISSILES FOR ELIMINATION. THE JCS CANNOT DROP THEIR STUDY OF HYPOTHETICAL FORCE STRUCTURES, BUT THEY ARE CERTAINLY NOT ARGUING THAT THE ISSUE SHOULD BE PRESSED WITH THE RUSSIANS. NOR ARE STATE OR OSD.

3. OF COURSE, THE REYKJAVIK PROPOSAL HAS NOT BEEN WITHDRAWN IN GENEVA, AND THERE IS NO REALISTIC CHANCE THAT IT WILL BE. (AND IN SO FAR AS RENDERING BALLISTIC MISSILES OBSOLETE IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE SDI PROGRAMME, THAT ASPIRATION WILL REMAIN A FEATURE OF THE ARMS CONTROL LANDSCAPE AS LONG AS SDI SURVIVES). BUT WE DETECT NO SIGN WHATSOEVER THAT ANYONE HERE IS STRIVING OFFICIOUSLY TO KEEP ALIVE IN INTER-AGENCY DEBATE, IN PUBLIC RHETORIC, OR AT GENEVA, THE REYKJAVIK IDEA OF A 10 YEAR ELIMINATION PROGRAMME.

ACLAND

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 February 1987

Dear Stephen,

UK Role in Arms Control

I attach an unclassified background paper on "The UK Role in Arms Control", which the Secretary of State thought his colleagues might find of value. It gives a brief summary of our approach, and describes our role in the various negotiations currently under way. It does not break new ground, but reflects the efforts which the Government has been making to secure progress in these fields.

I am sending copies of the paper to the Private Secretaries of all Cabinet Ministers. Copies have also been sent to selected Government MPs (and Peers), and to others in the UK with a special interest in arms control.

Yours sincerely,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

Steven Wood Esq
PS/Lord Privy Seal
Privy Council Office
60 Whitehall

UK ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL

1. The first duty of government is to maintain the security of its people. UK defences have to take full account of the threat posed by the very large numbers of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. Of course, no government in a democratic state wants to pile up weapons unnecessarily. We seek security at lower levels of armaments. But arms control is not an independent goal, to be pursued for its own sake and at any cost. It is an integral part of our overall defence effort.

2. What does this mean in practice?

- first, successful measures of arms control enhance security and reinforce stability in international relations. Making the possession of weapons more predictable also increases trust. It is unexpected and unexplained actions which cause distrust, and increase the risk of conflict. Balanced and verifiable reductions in forces can also reduce the resources devoted to defence on both sides;

- second, the terms must be right. It would be foolish to weaken national security - which is our foremost concern - by accepting unfair or badly thought out proposals. And we have to be confident that all parties will abide by an agreement, and that there are proper procedures for checking their compliance.

3. So the UK keeps up its defences with NATO allies - but for years we have also pressed for arms control.

- we have played a key role in negotiating some of the most significant agreements

the Partial Test Ban Treaty
the Stockholm Document
the Biological Weapons Convention
the Non-Proliferation Treaty

- we have signed all the major multilateral arms control agreements;

- we participate directly in all active negotiating fora, (except of course for the bilateral US/Soviet talks which we follow closely).

/4.

4. The UK takes a leading role where it can in working for arms control eg on chemical weapons. But in many areas the US, as the most powerful Western nuclear power, has to play the leading role for the West. So UK influence is also brought to bear on Washington, sometimes publicly, often privately. The UK also keeps closely in touch with Soviet thinking, taking due care of course not to allow the Russians to drive a wedge between us and our Allies. In all cases we seek common ground with our European Allies. It is the unity of Western democracies which gives us our strength.

Nuclear Weapons

5. The nuclear relationship between the two superpowers is key, and the most important negotiations currently under way are the US/Soviet Nuclear and Space Talks at Geneva. We have particularly close consultations with the US on the issues raised by these talks. After the Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev, the Prime Minister and President Reagan agreed on a number of priorities for the way ahead:

- An agreement on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), with restraints on shorter range systems.

- A 50% cut over 5 years in US and Soviet strategic offensive weapons.

- A ban on chemical weapons.

These priorities have since been endorsed by NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers at their Ministerial meetings in Brussels in December 1986.

6. Another important issue under discussion at the Geneva talks is the future of defences against ballistic missiles (BMD). The US Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) has received wide publicity; the Soviet Union also has extensive and long-standing programmes. The Prime Minister and President Regean drew up a list of criteria at Camp David in 1984 which remain the bacis for Alliance consideration of the Strategic Defence Initiative, that:

- The US/Western aim is not superiority but balance, taking account of Soviet developments.

- SDI-related deployment would, in view of existing treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation.

- The overall aim is to enhance not undermine deterrence.

/- East/West

PO4AAJ

- East/West negotiation should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

7. The UK has consulted closely with the US on the handling of the SDI in the Geneva negotiations. We have also repeatedly urged the Soviet Union to accept that they will not succeed in halting or undermining the SDI while their own activities remain unrestrained. They ought instead to seek an agreement with the US that allows Ballistic Missiles Defences research which is permited by the ABM Treaty to continue while reductions in nuclear arms are agreed and implemented. We have also urged them not to hold other separate issues hostage to an agreement on this question. This applies particularly to INF, which they themselves earlier agreed could be settled independently.

8. As for our own national deterrent, this is a minimum force, and it will remain so with Trident. It bears no comparison with the strategic arsenals of the superpowers. The priority must be for reductions in the superpower arsenals. For some years the Soviet Union sought to involve the UK deterrent in the INF negotiations under a series of specious pretexts. It was a step forward when Mr Gorbachev at the Reykjavik meeting said that the Soviet Union were dropping this condition, as he said "let them increase and be further improved". This realism is welcome, and a success for Alliance unity on this issue. But the Government has never said that the UK deterrent will never have any place in arms control. If Soviet and US strategic arsenals were to be very substantially reduced and if no significant changes had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, we would want to consider how we could best contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat.

9. As well as reductions in nuclear weapons, arms control talks have also sought to control nuclear weapons test explosions. UK work on nuclear testing constraints dates back many years. In 1963 the UK, together with the US and USSR negotiated the Partial Test Ban Treaty which banned nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. The Government is also committed to making progress towards a Comprehensive Test Ban . However, there are serious technical problems to be overcome. A solution needs to be closer before actual negotiations can resume. The UK is contributing to this work. We have tabled a number of working papers at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, and support the establishment of a committee there to address verification and other issues related to a CTB. Progress towards further constraints on nuclear testing is most likely to be made on a step by step basis. The

/Government

Government welcomes the measure of agreement between the US and Soviet Union to work towards such a phased approach, which would begin with improving the verification arrangements for, and then ratifying, the two US/Soviet Treaties (1974 and 1976) setting a limit for tests of 150 kilotons.

10. A set of international measures has been agreed which are designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Central to these is the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the UK helped draft. The UK is working hard to increase Treaty membership. We strongly support the international controls which have been set up to prevent proliferation - the safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group Guidelines and export controls (the Zangger Committee).

Chemical Weapons

11. Chemical weapons are a problem of increasing concern. They have been used to dreadful effect by Iraq in its war with Iran. The Soviet Union has built up a massive capability (estimated at some hundreds of thousands of tonnes of nerve gas alone) and Soviet troops are comprehensively equipped and trained to operate in an environment contaminated by chemicals. The Government believe that a world-wide, verifiable ban on production, stockpiling and use of CW is vital, and it is needed now.

12. The UK ceased production in the late 1950s and destroyed its CW stockpiles. We have no plans to reacquire any, nor are there any plans to store US weapons in the UK. In 1976 we tabled a complete Treaty for a CW ban. Since US/Soviet talks broke down in 1980 we have played a leading role in the negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, tabling 6 detailed proposals since 1982 (including papers on verification in the civil chemical industry and on the institutional arrangements necessary to implement a comprehensive ban). The UK chaired the negotiating committee during 1986. In July we launched a new initiative aimed to remove a major obstacle to agreement - "inspection on challenge" which would form an important part of verification procedures. We hope a ban may be agreed by the end of 1987.

Biological Weapons Convention

13. The use of biological weapons was banned by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, which the United Kingdom played a prominent role in drafting, prohibited their development, production and

/stockpiling

stockpiling in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes. The UK, which is a depository power, is keen to strengthen the authority of the Convention. We worked hard towards this end at the successful Review Conference held in Geneva in September 1986. We intend to follow this up at a meeting of experts to be held in the Spring.

Conventional Forces

14. The imbalance in conventional forces between East and West in Europe has been of concern to NATO for many years. (From the Atlantic to the Urals the Warsaw Pact has 4 million men to NATO's 3 million, 50,000 tanks to NATO's 18,000, 33,000 major artillery pieces to our 10,000 and 8,000 tactical aircraft to our 4,000.) A High Level Task Force was set up at French/British initiative at a NATO Ministerial Meeting in May 1986 to consider new negotiating steps. On 11 December 1986 NATO Foreign Ministers issued their Brussels Declaration, calling for East/West discussions to establish a new mandate for negotiating on conventional arms control covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

15. Meanwhile we have been successful in negotiating measures to encourage Confidence and Security between East and West in Europe. The Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) agreed on 22 September 1986, a substantial package of measures on the advance notification and observation of major military exercises. The agreement was important in that it was much more specific and detailed than earlier agreements of this kind, and is the first security agreement to include verification through "on-site" inspection. It reflected to a large extent the NATO proposals which the UK had played a significant role in developing. The UK also played a major role in the closing stages of the conference itself, leading the Western negotiating teams on several questions including the all-important verification provisions.

16. Negotiating actual troop reductions has been more difficult. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks have been under way since 1973. Targets have been agreed but there have been two major problems. First, the East has refused to provide an accurate and detailed breakdown of its forces in the proposed reductions area. And second, the East has not agreed to the kind of verification required to check that troops taken out of the areas are not filtered back in or replaced. We have tried many ways round the problem. The latest Western proposal, a UK idea, proposed that reductions go ahead before any

/exchange

PO4AAJ

exchange of information on forces, and that the dispute over existing force levels be resolved in the course of checking compliance.

Way and Means

17. As a member of NATO, the European Community, the Western European Union (a grouping of 7 Western nations) and as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, the UK has many multilateral, as well as bilateral fora in which to pursue detailed discussions. We are in frequent contact at all levels, with the US and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union. American negotiators and senior officals visited London for talks 9 times in 1986, and their Soviet counterparts 5 times. Mr Gorbachev sent a message to the Prime Minister 2 days before her meeting with President Reagan at Camp David in November 1986. In December the British Ambassador in Moscow handed over the Prime Minister's reply in the course of a lengthy 90 minute meeting with Mr Gorbachev. As Presidency of the European Community in the second half of 1986 we have had a particular role in representing European views, and coordinating European voting in UN discussions.

Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit

Foreign and Commonwealth Office January 1987

PO4AAJ

CONFIDENTIAL

file
bcpl

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

30 January 1987

Dear Tony,

ARMS CONTROL

Michael Alexander mentioned to the Prime Minister this morning his conviction that senior United States officials dealing with arms control were continuing to work on proposals for the abolition of all strategic ballistic missiles, i.e. the second 50%, as though Camp David had never happened. I have heard similar reports from other sources.

I think it is fair to say that the general tenor of the Embassy in Washington's reporting on this point is that, while elimination of strategic ballistic missiles remains formally part of the United States' negotiating position in Geneva, in practice the proposal is not being pursued very actively.

Clearly it would be worrying if we were to be presented by the United States with more fully worked-out proposals for the elimination of strategic ballistic missiles, without any proper warning or prior discussion. I realise that we may not have seen all the reporting from Washington. But the Prime Minister suggests that it would be helpful if the Embassy could let us have an assessment of how far the Americans are engaged in further detailed work on this. She has commented that, depending on what the Embassy's contacts reveal, Sir Antony Acland might discuss the matter with Mr. Carlucci, and seek a reaffirmation of the United States' commitment to the arms control priorities established at Camp David.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(C.D. POWELL)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 2000

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 161230Z FCO
TELNO 55
OF 161045Z JANUARY 87
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

Interesting that Shevardnadze devoted so much time to this. But I get a strong feeling of an attempt to set us up, and manoeuvre us into the position of intermediaries. CDP.

MY TELNO 54: MR RENTON'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE, 15 JANUARY

SUMMARY

1. 2 AND A HALF HOURS OF SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSION, COVERING EVERY ASPECT OF ARMS CONTROL. REPEATED EMPHASIS BY SHEVARDNADZE ON SOVIET WISH FOR '' PERMANENT DIALOGUE'' WITH THE UK ON ALL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. OBVIOUSLY AN ELEMENT OF WEDGE-DRIVING: BUT ALSO CLEAR EVIDENCE OF SOVIET DESIRE FOR A SERIOUS AND COMPREHENDING INTERLOCUTOR WHO COULD PLAY A ROLE IN BREAKING THE ARMS CONTROL LOG-JAM.

DETAIL

2. MR RENTON CALLED ON SHEVARDNADZE AT 1600 HOURS (LOCAL) ON 15 JANUARY: HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ME AND BY BISHOP AS INTERPRETER. THE MEETING LASTED FOR 2 AND A HALF HOURS AND SHEVARDNADZE WAS CLEARLY PREPARED TO DEVOTE TO IT AS MUCH TIME AS MR RENTON HAD AVAILABLE. ALTHOUGH, FOLLOWING THE OPENING COURTESIES, MR RENTON OPENED BY ASKING FOR SHEVARDNADZE'S VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN, IN THE LIGHT OF HIS RECENT VISIT, SHEVARDNADZE DEVOTED THE WHOLE DISCUSSION TO ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND TO THE ROLE WHICH THE UK/SOVIET DIALOGUE COULD PLAY IN RESOLVING THEM. FOR THE SAKE OF CLARITY, THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS REARRANGES THE DISCUSSION: FULL DRAFT RECORD WILL BE BROUGHT BACK TO LONDON BY FALL TODAY.

3. SHEVARDNADZE OPENED BY STRESSING THE DEPTH OF THE CHANGES WHICH WERE TAKING PLACE IN THE SOVIET UNION. THESE AMOUNTED TO ''REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION'', A ''SUBSTANTIAL RENEWAL''. INTERNATIONALLY, THE WORLD WAS SEEING A SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION BUT THIS WAS AS YET UNMATCHED BY A REVOLUTION IN POLITICS. THE VIEW THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE STABILISING AND ENHANCED SECURITY WAS OUT OF DATE: IT WAS TIME TO PUT THEIR ELIMINATION ON THE AGENDA AND TO PREVENT THEIR TRANSFER INTO SPACE. REYKJAVIK HAD SHOWN THAT, HOWEVER DIFFICULT THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE AS PARTNERS, IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A REALISTIC BASIS FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE WORLD. BRITAIN AND OTHER COUNTRIES COULD NOT STAND ASIDE FROM THIS PROCESS.

SDI AND SPACE

CONFIDENTIAL

4. SHEVARDNADZE RECALLED WITH APPROVAL THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN 1984 THAT SPACE SHOULD NOT BECOME A THEATRE OF WAR. BUT NEITHER THIS NOR PROFESSED BRITISH ATTACHMENT TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE ABM TREATY SQUARED WITH UK PARTICIPATION IN THE SDI. THE UK MIGHT BELIEVE THAT THE SDI WAS PURELY DEFENSIVE. BUT THE SOVIET UNION HAD LONG AGO PROPOSED TO THE U.S. AN AGREEMENT TO BAN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OFFENSIVE SPACE WEAPONS, SPECIFICALLY STRIKE WEAPONS OPERATING FROM SPACE TO EARTH. WHY HAD THE AMERICANS NOT AGREED TO THIS? UK/SOVIET CONSULTATIONS COULD HELP TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS AND SHOULD BE PUT ON A MORE SUBSTANTIAL BASIS. THE NUCLEAR STATUS OF BOTH POWERS CARRIED RESPONSIBILITIES. THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY FOR BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE UK ON NUCLEAR/SPACE ISSUES AND ''WANTED TO REACH AGREEMENT, NOT SIMPLY THROUGH THE U.S.'' THE UK AND THE SOVIET UNION COULD ALSO COOPERATE ON THE PEACEFUL USE OF OUTER SPACE. SHEVARDNADZE RECOGNISED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S WILLINGNESS TO STAY WITHIN THE ABM TREATY FOR 10 YEARS: BUT THE PROBLEM WAS THAT OF WHAT WAS PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE TREATY AND WHAT WAS NOT. HE HAD OFFERED SHULTZ NEGOTIATIONS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL TO RESOLVE THIS QUESTION BUT SHULTZ HAD NOT RESPONDED: WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON THIS, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SETTLE ANY DISARMAMENT ISSUES, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTIONS. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HIS SUGGESTION FOR A DIRECT UK/SOVIET DIALOGUE WAS MOTIVATED PARTLY BY HIS BELIEF THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT INFORMING THE BRITISH SIDE FULLY ENOUGH ON MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE.

5. MR RENTON COMMENTED THAT SINCE THE UK WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE ABM TREATY IT COULD NOT BE ASKED TO ARBITRATE ON ITS INTERPRETATION. THE UK ACCEPTED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ASSURANCE THAT SDI RESEARCH WAS TAKING PLACE ONLY WITHIN THE TREATY'S TERMS. WHY COULD THE SOVIET UNION NOT AGREE TO SOME REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS, AS A TOKEN OF GOOD FAITH, WHILE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY? THE PARTICIPATION OF BRITISH FIRMS IN SDI RESEARCH WAS IN NO WAY A VIOLATION OF THE TREATY: NOR COULD SUCH PARTICIPATION BE SAID TO CONFER ON THE UK A RIGHT TO ARBITRATE ON THE TREATY'S INTERPRETATION. MR RENTON RECALLED THE CAMP DAVID FOUR POINTS, PARTICULARLY ON SDI DEPLOYMENT, AND REAFFIRMED THAT ANY BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN SDI RESEARCH WOULD BE WITHIN ABM TREATY TERMS.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

6. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD BROADLY ACCEPTED THE UK APPROACH ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. REPEATING A PROPOSAL MADE TO MR RENTON EARLIER IN THE DAY BY FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KOVALEV, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS READY TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER FURTHER WITH A BRITISH COUNTERPART: DIALOGUE ON THIS COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE PREPARATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

CONFIDENTIAL

17

7. MR RENTON EXPLAINED (AS HE HAD DONE TO KOVALEV) THE DIFFICULTIES TO WHICH THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A ''MULTILATERAL FILTER'', AS PART OF A CHALLENGE INSPECTION REGIME, CREATED: THE UK COULD NOT ACCEPT IT. A CW CONVENTION WOULD BE INTERNATIONAL AND COULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED BILATERALLY. HE WAS NEVERTHELESS PREPARED TO AGREE TO ARRANGE FOR A SENIOR UK OFFICIAL TO JOIN MR CROMARTIE IN GENEVA TO DISCUSS WITH A SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE AND THE NEW HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, NAZARKIN, THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER PROGRESS ON ARTICLE 10 OF THE UK PROPOSAL. MR RENTON REGRETTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE UK SUGGESTION OF AN EXCHANGE OF VISITS TO UK AND SOVIET CHEMICAL DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENTS.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTIONS

8. SHEVARDNADZE INSTRUCTED USPENSKIY TO SHOW MR RENTON, AT A LATER TIME, THE SOVIET DRAFT DIRECTIVE WHICH HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR HANDING TO THE AMERICANS AT REYKJAVIK, INCLUDING THE PROPOSAL FOR A 50% REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD SAID AT REYKJAVIK THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO ELIMATE, BY 1996, ALL STRATEGIV OFFENSIVE WEAPONS INCLUDING HEAVY SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILES, CRUISE MISSILES AND INDEED THE ENTIRE NUCLEAR ARSENAL: THESE WERE REAGAN'S WORDS, AS NOTED BY USPENSKIY AT THE TIME. BRITAIN'S LEADERS WERE APPARENTLY UNWILLING TO GIVE UP NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BELIEF THAT THEY ENSURED A NUCLEAR BALANCE AND ENHANCED SECURITY: THIS POSITION CAUSED DIFFICULTIES IN THE WORLD AND MADE SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL DISCUSSION, ''A PERMANENT SOVIET/UK DIALOGUE'', IMPERATIVE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD TO THINK AHEAD: IF AGREEMENT WERE TO BE REACHED WITH THE U.S. ON A 50% REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND ON THE ELIMINATION OF INF IN EUROPE, THE UK DETERRENT WOULD THEN BECOME VERY SIGNIFICANT. WHY SHOULD THERE NOT BE BILATERAL UK/SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS NOW, IN CASE A SOVIET/US AGREEMENT WERE TO BE REACHED? IT COULD BE AGREED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT BY 1992 OR 1993 THE UK WOULD CUT OR FREEZE ITS NUCLEAR ARSENAL AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL. ''SUBSTANTIAL BILATERAL DIALOGUE'' WAS NEEDED ON THIS SUBJECT AMONG OTHERS.

9. MR RENTON STRESSED THAT THE CORRECT APPROACH WAS TO CONCENTRATE ON AGREEMENTS WHICH COULD BE BROUGHT TO FRUITION IN THE NEAR FUTURE: HE RECALLED THE PRIORITIES AGREED BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT REAGAN AT CAMP DAVID - THESE THREE OBJECTIVES COULD RESULT IN THE GREATEST REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR AND OTHER WEAPONRY WHICH THE WORLD HAD SEEN. UTOPIA WAS A FINE PLACE BUT HARD TO REACH. ON THE UK DETERRENT, MR RENTON SAID THAT EVEN AFTER MODERNISATION WITH TRIDENT, BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD STILL REPRESENT NO MORE THAN 3% OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC ARSENAL - A TRULY MINIMUM INDEPENDENT DETERRENT. HE REPEATED YOUR ''NEVER SAID NEVER'' FORMULA. ANY BILATERAL UK/SOVIET ARRANGEMENT, SUCH AS SHEVARDNADZE HAD SUGGESTED, WAS HYPOTHETICAL AND PREMATURE. FOR SO LONG AS THE SOVIET SIDE MADE STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS DEPENDENT ON AGREED ABM TREATY INTERPRETATIONN IT WAS HARD TO SEE HOW REDUCTIONS COULD TAKE PLACE.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

10. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT, ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES AS WELL, THE TIME HAD COME FOR MORE INTENSIVE SOVIET/UK BILATERAL CONTACTS. MR RENTON DREW SHEVARDNADZE'S ATTENTION TO THE NAC DECISIONS OF DECEMBER 1986, WHICH ENVISAGED EXCHANGES BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE TWO ALLIANCES ON THE REMOVAL OF IMBALANCES IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT NATO HAD INVENTED THE CONCEPT OF ''IMBALANCE'' AND PERSUADED ITSELF OF ITS REALITY: HE REGRETTED THE REJECTION OF SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR TALKS BETWEEN GENERAL ROGERS AND MARSHALL KULIKOV OR BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCE SECRETARIES-GENERAL.

COMMENT

11. IN ADDITION TO ITS UNEXPECTED AND UNUSUAL LENGTH, THIS DISCUSSION WAS OF VERY CONSIDERABLE INTEREST. I HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS, WHICH MR RENTON IS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT:

I) SHEVARDNADZE WAS DETERMINED TO DISCUSS ARMS CONTROL AND VIRTUALLY NOTHING ELSE. THE INTELLECTUAL BASIS OF HIS EXPOSITION WAS THAT RADICAL CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION HAD TO BE ACCOMPANIED , IF THEY WERE TO SUCCEED, BY RADICAL CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE, PRIMARILY THROUGH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. HIS PRESENTATION TENDED TO CONFIRM ME IN THE VIEW, WHICH I HAVE REPORTED IN OTHER CONTEXTS, THAT THE PRESENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP NEEDS THE INCREASED INTERNATIONAL STABILITY WHICH SUCH AGREEMENTS COULD BRING AND THE BRAKE ON SPIRALLING DEFENCE EXPENDITURE WHICH THEY COULD CREATE. IT WAS EQUALLY CLEAR FROM ALL THAT SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION STILL WISHES TO REACH AGREEMENTS WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, RATHER THAN WAITING POSSIBLY THREE YEARS TO DEAL WITH HIS SUCCESSOR, IF ONLY THEY COULD GET THROUGH TO IT.

II) GIVEN THAT THE RUSSIANS CANNOT, AT PRESENT, GET THROUGH TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION NOR, IN SOME RESPECTS, FATHOM WHAT U.S. INTENTIONS REALLY ARE (ESPECIALLY OVER THE SDI), THEY NEED SOMEBODY TO TALK TO WHO MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO HAVE AN INTELLIGENT APPRECIATION OF THEIR CONCERNS AND PROPOSALS, WITHOUT NECESSARILY SHARING OR AGREEING WITH THEM. FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS (NUCLEAR STATUS, IMPENDING PRIME MINISTERIAL VISIT, EVIDENT, IF UNHELPFUL INFLUENCE IN THE ALLIANCE AND CURRENT NON-VIABILITY OF OTHER INTERLOCUTORS, E.G. FRG, FRANCE) THE UK IS THE BEST CANDIDATE FOR THIS ROLE.

III) SHEVARDNADZE'S LEIT-MOTIF, THAT UK/SOVIET BILATERAL CONTACTS AND CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE MORE SUBSTANTIAL, MORE INTENSIVE, WIDER-RANGING AND ''PERMANENT'', DOUBTLESS CONTAINS AN ELEMENT OF TRADITIONAL WEDGE-DRIVING AND DELIBERATE FLATTERY. BUT MY PRELIMINARY VIEW IS THAT THIS ASPECT IS SUBSIDIARY, ALMOST INCIDENTAL: THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CURRENTLY FEELS IMPELLED TO COMMUNICATE ITS FRUSTRATIONS AND TO ATTEMPT TO

ENLIST

ENLIST ASSISTANCE WHERE IT CAN IN GETTING THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS MOVING AGAIN BY TACKLING, IF NECESSARY THROUGH THIRD PARTIES, KEY PROBLEMS SUCH AS ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION. SHEVARDNADZE'S REFERENCES TO UK INVOLVEMENT IN SDI WERE CLEARLY DESIGNED TO CREATE A ARTIFICIAL LOCUS STANDI FOR THE UK IN THE ABM TREATY DEBATE.

IV) MR RENTON'S AGREEMENT TO REINFORCE THE UK TEAM IN GENEVA FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING ARTICLE 10 OF OUR CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSAL USEFULLY HOLDS THE POSITION WHILE WE CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS, PITFALLS AND POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES OF AN EVENTUALLY MORE SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSE TO SHEVARDNADZE'S APPROACHES. THIS MIGHT IN ANY CASE REST AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

12. I SHALL REPORT SEPARATELY ON MR RENTON'S OTHER DISCUSSIONS DURING HIS MOSCOW VISIT, INCLUDING A TALK WITH DOBRYNIN WHICH HAD MUCH IN COMMON WITH THE SHEVARDNADZE DISCUSSION.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

MXHPAN 7348

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS LIMITED

SOVIET D.
DEFENCE D.
RESEARCH DEPT.
PLANNING STAFF
EED
NAD
SAD
WED
ACDD
CRD
NEWS DEPT.
INFO DEPT.
ECD(E)
POD
FED
NED
PUSD
CSCE UNIT
PROTOCOL DEPT.
ESSD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
CHIEF CLERK
SIR D GOODALL
MR FERGUSSON
MR GILLMORE
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
MR LONG
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR BARRINGTON
MR WINCHESTER
MR RENWICK

(COPIES TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARMS CONTROL TALKS

GRS 380

RESTRICTED

0941/16.

RESTRICTED
FM BONN
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 024
OF 160845Z JANUARY 87
INFO PRIORITY MOD UK, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON

KOHL ON DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL

1. CHANCELLOR KOHL GAVE A PRESS CONFEENCE ON 13 JANUARY. MAIN EMPHASIS OF HIS PREPARED STATEMENT WAS ON ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE (PASSAGES ON FRG/SOVIET RELATIONS REPORTED BY TELELETTER).

2. KOHL SAID THAT REAGAN AND GORBACHEV HAD REPEATEDLY STATED THAT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN REYKJAVIK AND THAT THE DIALOGUE SHOULD CONTINUE. 1987 SHOULD SEE THE THIRD US-SOVIET SUMMIT. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT THE ADVANCES ACHIEVED IN REYKJAVIK WOULD BE TRANSLATED INTO CONCRETE AGREEMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IN PARTICULAR:

A) A 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

B) A ZERO LRINF SOLUTION IN EUROPE TOGETHER WITH COMMITMENT TO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON SRINF.

IN THESE TWO AREAS NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS WERE WITHIN REACH. THEY MUST NOT BE MADE DEPENDENT ON AGREEMENT OVER SDI. LAST YEAR (BONN TELNO 313) KOHL HAD IDENTIFIED AS PARTICULAR GERMAN INTERESTS A GLOBAL CW BAN AND A NUCLEAR TEST BAN. IN BOTH AREAS PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. HE WELCOMED THE US ADMINISTRATION'S INTENTION TO SUBMIT THE THRESHOLD TREATIES TO THE SENATE FOR RATIFICATION. ON CW, A BRITISH MEDIATORY PROPOSAL ON VERIFICATION WAS ON THE TABLE. IT WAS ENCOURAGING THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BELIEVED IT POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS IN 1987.

3. ON CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT KOHL NOTED THE FORWARD-LOOKING BRUSSELS DECLARATION, WHICH PROPOSED NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS (SIC). THE SUCCESS OF THE CDE OUTCOME WAS CONFIRMED BY THE HIGH NUMBER OF WARSAW PACT MANOEUVRE NOTIFICATIONS FOR 1987.

EUROPEAN DEFENCE

4. KOHL SAID IT WAS BECOMING EVER MORE URGENTLY NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE AN AGREED EUROPEAN POSITION ON THE DIFFERENT AREAS OF SECURITY POLICY. WITH FRANCE, THE FRG HAD LAID THE FOUNDATIONS. SPECIFIC EUROPEAN INTERESTS, AFFECTED BY THE SUPERPOWER DIALOGUE, REQUIRED AN INSTITUTIONALISED COORDINATION OVER AND ABOVE THE FRANC/GERMAN DIALOGUE. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WERE CONVINCED THAT THE WEU WAS THE APPROPRIATE INSTRUMENT. HE FULLY SUPPORTED CHIRAC'S POSITION:

A) ON ORGANISATION, THE WEU MUST BE MADE CAPABLE OF FULFILLING THIS TASK: THE FIRST STEPS HAD BEEN TAKEN.

B) ON SUBSTANCE, THE WEU MUST BE GIVEN A POLITICAL IMPULSE SO THAT IT COULD, WITH AUTHORITY, BRING TO BEAR THE SECURITY POLICY INTERESTS OF EUROPE.

such

SUCH A WEU WOULD STRENGTHEN THE EUROPEAN ELEMENT IN THE ALLIANCE: IT WAS DIRECTED AGAINST NO ONE.

COMMENT

5. THIS POSITIVE REAFFIRMATION BY KOHL OF THE NEED FOR A UNITED EUROPEAN VOICE ON THESE QUESTIONS CONFIRMS ME IN MY RECOMMENDATION THAT MR YOUNGER SHOULD SPEAK ON THESE LINES AT THE WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE (MY TELNO 16). IT ALSO REINFORCES MY BELIEF THAT THERE IS AN OPENING FOR HMG TO TAKE A LEAD IN EUROPE ON THIS ISSUE, AS I MENTIONED IN MY LETTER OF 19 DECEMBER TO SIR D. GOODALL.

BULLARD

YYYY

BPLNAN 3292

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS
LIMITED

SOVIET D.
DEFENCE D.
RESEARCH DEPT.
PLANNING STAFF
EED
NAD
SAD
WED
ACDD
CRD
NEWS DEPT.
INFO DEPT.
ECD(E)
POD
FED
NED
PUSD
CSCE UNIT
PROTOCOL DEPT.
ESSD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
CHIEF CLERK
SIR D GOODALL
MR FERGUSSON
MR GILLMORE
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
MR LONG
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR BARRINGTON
MR WINCHESTER
MR RENWICK

(COPIES TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARMS CONTROL TALKS

file Subject ca: master OPS ECL

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T3B/87

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

16 January 1987

I enclose a copy of a message from Chancellor Kohl to the Prime Minister, replying to her request last December for German support in securing the inclusion of the arms control priorities of the Camp David statement in the communiqués of the NATO Ministerial meetings.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

EQL

Translation

Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Chancellor

Bonn, 6, January 1987

Dear Prime Minister,
Dear Margaret,

Thank you for your letter of 3 December 1986 asking me to support your efforts for your Camp David declaration to be taken into account in the Alliance's autumn communiqués. I gladly complied with your request because in your talks with President Reagan at Camp David on the basis of the WEU deliberations you stood up for important European interests and effectively defined them in the declaration.

I feel that the results and communiqués of the ministerial meetings at Brussels are highly satisfactory for us both. The Alliance demonstrated considerable cohesion and solidarity vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and our own public, presented a substantive overall concept for the shaping of East-West relations and - following Reykjavik - ensured a calmer and more objective debate on strategy.

Her Excellency
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland

London

In the field of arms control and disarmament, we supported the concentration - as outlined in your Camp David declaration - on specific steps emerging in the negotiations. The remarks in the Foreign Ministers' communiqué specifying the scope of an INF agreement are of great importance to us. I am particularly grateful to you for your understanding in this respect.

Yours sincerely,
(sgd.) Helmut Kohl

DER BOTSCHAFTER
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
Baron Rüdiger von Wechmar

15 January 1986

CDP
13/1

Dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed message from Herr Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

A courtesy translation is attached.

I am, Dear Prime Minister,

Yours sincerely

Her Excellency
The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Her Majesty's Prime Minister and
First Lord of the Treasury
London

GRS 1850

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 4
OF 141840Z JANUARY 87
AND TO PRIORITY MODUK
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW
INFO ROUTINE THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, ROME, UKDIS GENEVA, TOKYO
INFO SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, MADRID
INFO SAVING OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA
INFO SAVING UKDEL MBFR VIENNA

MODUK FOR DACU, DNPS AND DUS(P)

? YOUR TELNO ? (NOT TO ALL)

~~SOURCIZRH Y ALL~~: GENEVA NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS: US BRIEFING, 14 JANUARY.

SUMMARY.

1. US/SOVIET INTER-SESSIONAL TALKS ACROSS THE BOARD IN DECEMBER PROVIDED USEFUL CLARIFICATION BUT NO BREAKTHROUGHS, WITH SOVIET NEGOTIATORS MAINTAINING FIRM LINKAGE WITH SDI. NO SUBSTANTIVE NEW US PROPOSALS FOR ROUND 7. NO US DECISION YET ON WHETHER A DRAFT INF TREATY SHOULD BE TABLED IN ROUND 7. BUT ASSURANCE THAT ALLIES WILL BE CONSULTED BEFORE ANY TABLING. BROAD ALLIED SUPPORT FOR US POSITION (ALTHOUGH FRENCH REITERATED DOUBTS ON ZERO/ZERO LRINF) AND EMPHASIS ON PRIORITIES IDENTIFIED IN DECEMBER DPC/NAC COMMUNIQUES.

DETAIL

2. OPENING THE BRIEFING, KAMPELMAN INDICATED THAT THE US GOAL IN THE DECEMBER US/SOVIET INTERSESSIONAL TALKS HAD BEEN TO ACHIEVE A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE DEGREE OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN BOTH SIDES ON THE MAJOR ISSUES POST-REYKJAVIK. THE TALKS HAD BEEN, ON BALANCE, USEFUL. BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO BREAKTHROUGH. IT WAS PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTING THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD REFUSED TO WORK WITH THE AMERICANS ON DRAWING UP A JOINT ASSESSMENT OF WHERE EACH SIDE NOW STOOD. HE SPECULATED THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE AN AGREEMENT TO DO SO WOULD HAVE BEEN AT VARIANCE WITH THE SOVIET PUBLIC LINE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOW DEADLOCKED. AS IN THE CONCLUDING WEEKS OF ROUND SIX, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ALSO REMAINED INFLEXIBLE ON INF AND START, MAINTAINING A FIRM LINKAGE WITH THE RESOLUTION OF SPACE/DEFENCE ISSUES ON THEIR OWN TERMS. ON SPACE/DEFENCE, THEY HAD APPEARED MORE CONCILIATORY WITHOUT MOVING ON SUBSTANCE.

3. KAMPELMAN DECLINED TO SPECULATE ON WHETHER VORONTSOV'S APPOINTMENT WAS ANYTHING MORE THAN A PUBLIC RELATIONS GESTURE. IT WAS POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO SUPPORTINGE EVIDENCE, THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT DECIDE TO PUT FORWARD A NEW ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL AT THE BEGINNING OF ROUND SEVEN OR IN FEBRUARY. IF SO, THE US WOULD CONSIDER IT CAREFULLY.

Confidential

14.

4. HE WAS NOT AMONG THOSE WHO BELIEVED THAT GORBACHEV WAS NOT INTERESTED IN AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT OR HAD WRITTEN IT OFF AS IMPOSSIBLE DURING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REMAINING PERIOD IN OFFICE. HE CONTINUED TO THINK THAT REYKJAVIK HAD BROUGHT BOTH SIDES CLOSER ON A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES: THERE WAS A FIRM BASIS FOR RAPID PROGRESS IF THE USSR MADE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL DECISION TO MOVE FORWARD.

LRINF/SRINF

5. GLITMAN SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NOT IN DECEMBER BEEN READY TO ENGAGE IN SUBSTANTIVE INF DISCUSSIONS, PREFERRING TO INDULGE IN POLEMICS AND TO ACCUSE THE US OF WANTING TO QUOTE WALK AWAY UNQUOTE FROM REYKJAVIK. WITH QUOTE ORWELLIAN LOGIC UNQUOTE, THEY HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE US WAS HOLDING AN INF AGREEMENT HOSTAGE BY REFUSING TO ACCEPT AN OVERALL NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL PACKAGE. IT WAS, NEVERTHELESS, A FACT THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE MUCH CLOSER POST-REYKJAVIK ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL UNWILLING TO BE SPECIFIC ON THE TIMESCALE FOR REDUCTIONS IN ASIAN INF, HAD NOT ACCEPTED A US RIGHT TO MATCH, AND WERE REFUSING TO ACCEPT A GLOBAL SRINF FREEZE. THEY HAD ALSO BEEN UNWILLING TO GO INTO DETAIL ON VERIFICATION, AND HAD NOT CONFIRMED THEIR AGREEMENT ON THE NECESSITY FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION. GLITMAN REMARKED IN PARENTHESIS THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT FEEL, IN RETROSPECT, THAT THEY HAD GONE TOO FAR ON INF IN REYKJAVIK, IN PARTICULAR ON THEIR OFFER TO REDUCE TO 100 SS 20'S IN ASIA. ONLY TIME WOULD TELL HOW SERIOUS THEY WERE NOW PREPARED TO BE. IN THE COMING ROUND THE US WOULD CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO CLARIFY AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND TO NARROW DIFFERENCES. ITS SUCCESS IN THE ENDEAVOUR WOULD DEPEND ON CONTINUED ALLIED SUPPORT, AND ESPECIALLY ON ALLIED WILLINGNESS TO PRESS THE RUSSIANS TO ABANDON LINKAGE.

START.

6. LEHMAN OUTLINED PROGRESS DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON THE MAJOR START ISSUES.THE US HAD VAINLY SOUGHT IN DECEMBER TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE LISTING OF THE KEY ELEMENTS NECESSARY FOR AN ACCORD. THE FACT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD RETREATED FROM REYKJAVIK ON A NUMBER OF POINTS, INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF TWO OF THEIR EARLIER SUBLIMIT PROPOSALS, ILLUSTRATED THEIR STALLING TACTICS. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN HOW MUCH FURTHER PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE IN ROUND SEVEN. BUT THE FINAL OUTCOME WAS NOW VISIBLE TO BOTH SIDES: THEY COULD MOVE RELATIVELY QUICKLY TO AN AGREEMENT.

7. THE US SIDE WOULD TABLE A QUOTE KEY ELEMENTS UNQUOTE DOCUMENT EARLY IN ROUND SEVEN REFLECTING THE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR AND INCLUDING THE PROPOSALS ON SUBLIMITS TABLED IN THE LAST ROUND, AS WELL AS THAT FOR A 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IN SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW WEIGHT. THIS MIGHT CONSTITUTE THE BASIS FOR JOINT DRAFTING. BUT IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WERE WILLING TO PLAY.

/ DEFENCE

DEFENCE AND SPACE

8. KAMPELMAN REPORTED THAT THE DECEMBER DISCUSSIONS HAD (UNSUCCESSFULLY) ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY THE MEANING OF THE SOVIET REFERENCES TO QUOTE ELEMENT UNQUOTE AND QUOTE LABORATORY UNQUOTE. THE US NEGOTIATORS HAD PRESSED KARPOV ON STATEMENTS BY SEVERAL SOVIET SPOKESMEN HINTING AT A DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY OVER THE TERM QUOTE LABORATORY RESEARCH UNQUOTE. BUT HE HAD DENIED ANY SUCH FLEXIBILITY. KAMPELMAN WENT ON TO SAY THAT EVEN A BROAD DEFINITION OF THE TERM QUOTE LABORATORY UNQUOTE MIGHT BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US SINCE, ON ANY PLAUSIBLE DEFINITION, SDI-RELATED ACTIVITIES WOULD BE MORE CONSTRAINED THAN WAS PROVIDED FOR IN THE ABM TREATY, WHICH ALLOWED UNLIMITED TESTING OF ANY DEVICE WHICH DID NOT POSSESS THE QUOTE CAPABILITY OF A PROTOTYPE OF A COMPONENT UNQUOTE. THE SOVIET AIM SEEMED TO BE TO NEGOTIATE NEW VERSIONS OF EXISTING ABMT DEFINITIONS IN ORDER TO MAKE THE TREATY MORE RESTRICTIVE. BUT THE TERM QUOTE LABORATORY UNQUOTE SHOULD, IN HIS VIEW, BE UNDERSTOOD AS POSSESSING PRECISELY THE SAME MEANING AS IN THE TREATY. HE SUSPECTED THAT IF AND WHEN THE RUSSIANS DECIDED TO CHANGE THEIR FORMULATION OF WHAT WAS IMPLIED BY THE TERM QUOTE LABORATORY RESEARCH UNQUOTE THEY WOULD ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY THIS AS A CONCESSION.

9. THE US OBJECTIVE IN ROUND SEVEN WOULD BE TO REVIEW THE UNCHANGED BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE US APPROACH IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE BROADER AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET SIDE. US PRIORITIES WERE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE FORCES: THE AVOIDENCE OF CONSTRAINTS BEYOND THOSE EXISTING UNDER THE ABM TREATY: AN END TO SOVIET EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY REGIME: AND DISCUSSION ON WAYS OF STRENGTHENING STABILITY BY MOVING TOWARDS GREATER RELIANCE ON STRATEGIC DEFENCES, TOGETHER WITH FURTHER RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILES.

DISCUSSION

10. IN DISCUSSION, I DREW ON YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, SOUNDING KAMPELMAN, IN PARTICULAR, ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF A SOVIET DECISION TO PUT FORWARD A BROADER DEFINITION IN THE DEFENCE AND SPACE NEGOTIATION OF THE TERM QUOTE LABORATORY UNQUOTE. KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THE US SIDE WOULD HAVE TO STUDY THIS. IF THE PROPOSAL SEEMED TO REPRESENT A FORWARD MOVE - AND HE WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THIS POSSIBILITY ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION SO FAR AVAILABLE - THE AMERICANS WOULD WELCOME IT BUT WOULD POINT OUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH IT FELL SHORT OF WHAT THE ABMT ALREADY PERMITTED.

11. HANSEN (FRG) REITERATED FAMILIAR GERMAN INF CONCERNS AND EMPHASISED THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE REYKJAVIK ACHIEVEMENTS IN THIS FIELD. A DATE SHOULD BE SET FOR SRINF NEGOTIATIONS IN ANY INF AGREEMENT AND PROVISION FOR ON SITE INSPECTION SHOULD FORM AN INTEGRAL PART OF IT. HE HOPED THAT ALLIES WOULD BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT BEFORE ANY US DECISION TO TABLE A DRAFT INF TREATY. CURIEN (FRANCE) WAS ALSO PREDICTABLY CAUTIOUS ON ZERO/ZERO IN EUROPE.

12. IN RESPONSE TO EARLIER QUESTIONS ON INF, GLITMAN MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE US WAS NOT PREPARED TO COMPROMISE OVER LRINF BASING IN ALASKA, THE RIGHT TO MATCH IN SRINF (WHICH THE RUSSIANS CONTINUED TO REJECT), OR ON ANY SOVIET ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN US ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR DEFINITION OF THE TERM QUOTE STRATEGIC UNQUOTE. MEANWHILE, WORK WAS PROCEEDING IN WASHINGTON ON A DRAFT INF TREATY AND ON THE MODALITIES OF VERIFICATION. HE COULD NOT SAY WHETHER THIS WOULD BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR A DRAFT TREATY TO BE TABLED IN ROUND SEVEN. BUT THE US WOULD FOLLOW PAST PRACTICE ON CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES. HE TOOK, IN PARTICULAR THE POINT I HAD MADE EARLIER ABOUT THE NEED TO COOORDINATE WORK ON VERIFICATION WITH THOSE ALLIES WHO WOULD NEED TO BE INVOLVED BY REASON OF GEOGRAPHY.

13. ON START, LEHMAN CONFIRMED THAT THE KEY PRIORITY FOR THE US WAS 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS WITHIN FIVE YEARS. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD GIVE THIS OBJECTIVE EQUAL PRIORITY, PREFERRING TO FOCUS ON THE LINKAGE WITH SDI AND WITH NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUES, AND ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. ON MOBILE MISSILES, THE US POSITION WAS THAT THESE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY. BUT VERIFICATION AND OTHER (UNSPECIFIED) CONCERNS REMAINED. IN THE ABSENCE OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE, THE US HAD EARLIER TAKEN THE NEGOTIATING LINE THAT MOBILE MISSILES SHOULD BE BANNED. THIS WAS UNCHANGED ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT THE US POSITION THAT THIS WOULD NECESSARILY REMAIN THE CASE IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.

14. CONCLUDING, KAMPELMAN SUGGESTED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN REVIEWING THEIR OVERALL POSITION SINCE REYKJAVIK. THIS MIGHT EXPLAIN WHY THEY HAD BEEN SO OBDURATE DURING THE DECEMBER INTERSESSIONAL. HE HAD BEEN ASKED EARLIER WHETHER THEY HAD MOVED AWAY FROM THEIR EVIDENT ATTEMPT TO KILL THE US SDI PROGRAMME. HE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT NOW HAVE BEGUN TO DO SO. THIS DID NOT IMPLY THAT THEY HAD ABANDONED THE IDEA. BUT WE MIGHT BE SEEING SOME EROSION OF THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION. THEY HAD, AFTER ALL, MOVED ON FROM THEIR PREVIOUS INSISTENCE ON THE NEED TO BAN ALL QUOTE SPACE STRIKE ARMS UNQUOTE - A SLOGAN NOT A NEGOTIATING POSITION - TOWARDS PROPOSALS FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE ABMT FOR VARIOUS PERIODS. HE REMAINED, HOWEVER, CONCERNED THAT THEY WERE STILL DEMANDING RESTRICTIONS WHICH WENT BEYOND EXISTING ABMT CONSTRAINTS. HE THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED IF THEY WERE NOW WAITING TO SEE WHAT CONGRESS WOULD DO BEFORE GOING ANY FURTHER. IF THEY WAITED TOO LONG THEY MIGHT WELL QUOTE CUT OFF THEIR OWN NOSES UNQUOTE.

15. KAMPELMAN ALSO EXPRESSED ANXIETY ABOUT A QUOTE LARGE BODY OF EVIDENCE UNQUOTE - NOT YET CONCLUSIVE BUT A CAUSE FOR CONCERN - THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE PUTTING A STRUCTURE IN PLACE FOR THE CONDUCT OF TERRITORIAL DEFENCE. THE AMERICANS HAD DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH THEM AND HAD POINTED OUT THE POTENTIALLY ADVERSE IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICIES. THEY HAD ALSO EMPHASISED THAT THE SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR OWN SDI PROGRAMME PUBLICLY UNDERMINED THE BASIS FOR A QUOTE DECENT EXCHANGE UNQUOTE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AND THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE STABILITY.

16. KAMPELMAN REITERATED THAT HAD NO ANSWER TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VORONTSOV'S APPOINTMENT. GIVEN THE TRADITION THAT SOVIET CONCESSIONS WERE NEVER MADE UNTIL THE END GAME IN ANY NEGOTIATION, HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, ANTICIPATE ANY MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH IN ROUND SEVEN. BUT THE US SIDE WERE PREPARED FOR ANY CONTINGENCY AND EAGER FOR MOVEMENT.

17. A NOTE OF THE ADDITIONAL POINTS WHICH CAME UP IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION AT LUNCH FOLLOWS BY BAG. BUT IT IS WORTH RECORDING NOW THAT KAMPELMAN THEN SPECIFICALLY CONFIRMED THAT THE US PROPOSAL FOR THE ABOLITION OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC SYSTEMS OVER 10 YEARS HAD NOT BEEN TABLED IN GENEVA AS PART OF THE START AGENDA. IT HOWEVER REMAINED ONE OF THE US PROPOSALS IN THE DEFENCE AND SPACE TALKS, AS A COMPONENT OF THE US RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROPOSALS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE HANDLING OF THE FIVE YEAR PERIOD FOLLOWING THE INITIAL FIVE YEAR PERIOD FOR WHICH 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS WOULD, (HOPEFULLY) HAVE BEEN AGREED. BUT IT WAS NOT QUOTE A MAJOR ELEMENT UNQUOTE IN THE US POSITION.

ALEXANDER

YYYY
FCO PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

UBLNAN 1363

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
LIMITED
ACDD
DEFENCE D
SOVIET D
NEWS D
NAD
EED
WED
PLANNING STAFF
RES D
INFO D
PUSD
NED
CSCE UNIT
POD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
SIR D GOODALL
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR SLATER
MR BARRINGTON
MR GILLMORE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

COPIES TO:
MR BERMAN LEGAL ADVISERS
MR R A BURNS SAD

DEF ARMS CONTROL

GRS 1130

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 59
OF 132359Z JANUARY 87
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

MODUK FOR DACU

GENEVA NST : ROUND VII

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS FOR ROUND VII OF THE GENEVA NST UNLIKELY TO CONTAIN ANY IMPORTANT NEW POINTS.

DETAIL

2. THE US GENEVA NEGOTIATORS WILL BE BRIEFING THE NAC ON 14 JANUARY ON THE US APPROACH TO GENEVA ROUND VII (WHICH OPENS ON 15 JANUARY) AND WILL NO DOUBT DESCRIBE THE PRESIDENT'S NEW INSTRUCTIONS. THESE HAVE NOT YET IN FACT BEEN FINALLY APPROVED, BUT IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THEY WILL CONTAIN NOTHING SUBSTANTIVELY NEW.

3. AS REPORTED IN MY TELNO 3, THE GENERAL CONSENSUS HERE IS THAT NO MAJOR ADJUSTMENTS SHOULD BE MADE TO US NEGOTIATING POSITIONS UNLESS AND UNTIL THE RUSSIANS SHOW SERIOUS SIGNS OF WANTING TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. THE GENERAL VIEW HAS BEEN THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL WANT TO WAIT UNTIL THE IMPACT OF THE NEW CONGRESS ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S ARMS CONTROL POLICIES IS CLEARER AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WHITE HOUSE'S OTHER PROBLEMS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S APPROACH IN GENEVA CAN BE ASSESSED. OPTIMISTS NOW HOPE THAT VORONTSOV'S REPLACEMENT OF KARPOV MAY HERALD SOVIET MOVEMENT BUT NOONE IS JUMPING TO PREMATURE CONCLUSIONS. THE PRESIDENT'S NEW INSTRUCTIONS ARE THEREFORE LIKELY TO BE THAT US NEGOTIATORS SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS US POSITIONS ACROSS THE BOARD AND PUSH AHEAD WITH THEIR ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY AND AGREE WITH THE RUSSIANS POINTS OF CONVERGENCE IN THE THREE NEGOTIATING BASKETS.

4. ON INF, THERE IS STILL NO DECISION ON WHETHER GLITMAN SHOULD TABLE A NEW TREATY. HE IS PRESSING STRONGLY FOR AUTHORITY TO DO SO, WITH SUPPORT FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT. BUT A NUMBER OF MINOR POINTS, MAINLY CONCERNING THE OSI ELEMENT OF THE VERIFICATION REGIME, ARE STILL NOT AGREED. MEANWHILE, GLITMAN IS INSTRUCTED TO PRESS EXISTING US POSITIONS, IN PARTICULAR THAT:

(A) THE RUSSIANS SHOULD DROP THE INF/SDI LINKAGE ESTABLISHED SINCE REYKJAVIK AND PRESS AHEAD WITH THE CONCLUSION OF A SEPARATE INITIAL INF AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR ZERO-ZERO LRINF IN EUROPE AND 100 LRINF WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE IN SOVIET ASIA AND THE CONTINENTAL US (INCLUDING ALASKA:

Confidential

1(B)

(B) SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST BE GLOBAL IE THERE CANNOT BE SEPARATE TIMETABLES, LET ALONE SEPARATE AGREEMENTS, FOR REDUCTIONS IN ASIAN AND EUROPEAN SYSTEMS:

(C) AN AGREEMENT MUST INCLUDE COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON RELEVANT SRINF SYSTEMS IE THE SS12/22 AND SS23. SUCH CONSTRAINTS MUST ALSO BE GLOBAL (THE SOVIET POSITION SINCE REYKJAVIK HAS BEEN THAT SRINF CONSTRAINTS SHOULD APPLY IN EUROPE ONLY) AND MUST INCLUDE A US RIGHT TO MATCH SOVIET SRINF LEVELS

(D) AN AGREEMENT MUST INCLUDE THE THREE MAIN ELEMENTS OF A VERIFICATION REGIME AGREED AT REYKJAVIK IE PRIOR DATA EXCHANGE, OSI OF ELIMINATION OF SYSTEMS, AND EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF RESIDUAL SYSTEMS, INCLUDING OSI. (THE RUSSIANS HAVE DECLINED SINCE REYKJAVIK TO CONFIRM THEIR AGREEMENT TO OSI OF THE ELIMINATION OF SYSTEMS).

5. IN START, LEHMAN IS SEEKING AUTHORITY TO TABLE FORMALLY A PAPER IDENTIFYING THE QUOTE KEY ELEMENTS UNQUOTE OF A START AGREEMENT, MANY OF WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION NOW CONSIDER TO BE AGREED BY THE RUSSIANS. THESE ELEMENTS INCLUDE:

(A) OVERALL LIMITS OF 1600 SNDVS AND 6000 WEAPONS:

(B) THE COUNTING RULES FOR BOMBERS AND BOMBER WEAPONS AGREED AT REYKJAVIK:

(C) THE THREE CENTRAL ELEMENTS OF A VERIFICATION REGIME AGREED AT REYKJAVIK (AS IN PARA 4 (D) ABOVE):

(D) A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WAY OF LIMITING LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS, AS AGREED AT REYKJAVIK (SEE MY TELNO 51 NOT TO ALL):

(E) AGREED REDUCTIONS TO BE COMPLETED BY 1991:

(F) UNDER THE WEAPONS AGGREGATE, SUB-LIMITS OF 4800/4500 FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS, 3300/3000 FOR ICBM RVS, AND 1650/1500 FOR RVS ON PERMITTED ICBMS EXCEPT SILO-BASED LIGHT AND MEDIUM ICBMS WITH 6 RVS OR LESS (SEE MY TELNO 51 - NOT TO ALL).

6. THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF THE START INSTRUCTIONS STILL IN CONTENTION IS WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A CHANGE IN THE US POSITION ON MOBILE MISSILES. THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS ON MX AND MIDGETMAN (MY TELNO 3224) REQUIRE THAT THE US NOW DROP ITS PROPOSAL FOR A COMPLETE BAN ON MOBILE MISSILES AND TRY TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIANS IN A SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION. BUT OSD BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSED BAN SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

7. IN THE DEFENCE AND SPACE GROUP, FURTHER WRANGLING OVER WHAT WAS/WAS NOT PROPOSED AT REYKJAVIK IS FORESEEN. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT - NOT LEAST TO AVOID NEW SOVIET COMPLAINTS - THE US NEGOTIATORS WILL NOT BE INSTRUCTED TO WITHDRAW THE US PROPOSAL FOR THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WITHIN TEN YEARS, WHICH WAS SEEN BY THE PRESIDENT AT REYKJAVIK AS A CONDITION OF ANY US AGREEMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY BEFORE 1996.

8. THE PRESIDENT MET THE NEGOTIATORS AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON 12 JANUARY TO GIVE THEM A PRESIDENTIAL SEND OFF. HE ALSO ISSUED A STATEMENT (COPIES BY BAG) UNDERLINING THE HIGH PRIORITY HE ATTACHED TO REACHING AGREEMENTS IN GENEVA: RECALLING THE NEW (REYKJAVIK) US POSITIONS TABLED AT THE END OF ROUND VI: COMPLAINING AT SOVIET OBDURACY IN THE DECEMBER INTER-SESSIONAL MEETINGS, AND IN PARTICULAR AT THE ''RENEWED SOVIET ATTEMPT TO HOLD PROGRESS ON INF AND OTHER AREAS OF ARMS CONTROL HOSTAGE TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE LONG-STANDING SOVIET EFFORT TO CRIPPLE THE SDI PROGRAMME'': UNDERTAKING TO ''LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED'' IN THE SEARCH FOR AGREEMENTS INVOLVING REAL NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS: BUT MAKING NO SUBSTANTIVELY NEW POINTS.

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWSAN 8872

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
LIMITED
ACDD
DEFENCE D
SOVIET D
NEWS D
NAD
EED
WED
PLANNING STAFF
RES D
INFO D
PUSD
NED
CSCE UNIT
POD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
SIR D GOODALL
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR SLATER
MR BARRINGTON
MR GILLMORE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

COPIES TO:
MR BERMAN LEGAL ADVISERS
MR R A BURNS SAD

3

TOP SECRET

TO BE OPENED ONLY BY THE FOREIGN

AFFAIRS PRIVATE SECRETARY

On Her Majesty's Service

27-23

Recycled Paper

TOP SECRET


Tony Whitney
Tony Whitney
Tony Whitney
Tony Whitney
Tony Whitney
Tony Whitney
Tony Whitney

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2053 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Message from Powell to Carlucci dated 12 January 1987	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	20 May 2016 C Wayland
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2053 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Minute from Powell to Prime Minister dated 11 January 1987	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	20 May 2016 C Wayland
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

Prime Minister

MR CDP

NI4777 5 HHH 288

SOVIET STAR WARS PLEA TO THATCHER
(CORRECTED REPETITION)

AN APPEAL FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO MRS THATCHER TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND PRESIDENT REAGAN OVER STAR WARS CAME TODAY FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, MR LEONID ZAMYATIN.

THE AMBASSADOR, IN A NEW YEAR MESSAGE CALLING FOR GOODWILL BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN 1987, TOLD A LONDON PRESS CONFERENCE THAT MRS THATCHER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW IN MARCH WOULD BE VERY USEFUL. BUT HE ADDED: ''NO ONE CAN PREDICT HOW THE TALKS WILL GO.''

ASKED IF HE COULD SEE A WAY FOR MRS THATCHER TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK ON NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION TALKS FOLLOWING THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT MR ZAMYATIN SAID: ''WE CAN SEE THAT THESE TALKS WITH MRS THATCHER WOULD BE VERY USEFUL FOR THIS ASPECT. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER WILL GIVE A SERIOUS IMPETUS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ON A STABLE BASIS.''

MR ZAMYATIN SAID THAT IF THE SOVIETS COULD NOT GET ANY MOVEMENT ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE THEY WOULD STILL TRY TO FIND A SOLUTION.

''THERE IS NO OTHER WAY OUT,'' HE SAID. THE AMBASSADOR SAID MR GORBACHEV, THE SOVIET LEADER, ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CONTINUATION OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH BRITAIN WHICH BEGAN WITH HIS VISIT TO LONDON IN DECEMBER 1984.

''WE HOPE THAT THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER MRS THATCHER TO THE SOVIET UNION WILL BECOME THE NEXT IMPORTANT STAGE IN THE DIRECT TALKS OF THE LEADERS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

''THE MAIN CONTENTS OF SUCH A DIALOGUE IN THE OPINION OF THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE A JOINT SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION OF THE CARDINAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, LIMITATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT.''

--

091445 JAN 87

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 3B/87

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
DER BUNDESKANZLER

Bonn, den 6. Januar 1987

Ihrer Exzellenz
Frau Margaret Thatcher, MP
Premierminister des
Vereinigten Königreichs
Großbritannien und Nordirland

L o n d o n

Sehr geehrte Frau Premierminister,
liebe Margaret,

ich danke Ihnen für Ihr Schreiben vom 03. Dezember 1986, mit dem Sie mich baten, auf eine Berücksichtigung Ihrer Erklärung von Camp David in den Herbst-Kommuniqués des Bündnisses hinzuwirken. Ihrer Bitte habe ich gern entsprochen, denn Sie haben in Ihren Gesprächen mit Präsident Reagan in Camp David auf der Grundlage der WEU-Beratungen wichtige europäische Interessen vertreten und sie in Ihrer Erklärung wirksam definiert.

Ich glaube, wir können beide mit den Ergebnissen und den Kommuniqués der Ministertagungen von Brüssel sehr zufrieden sein. Gegenüber der Sowjetunion und vor unserer eigenen Öffentlichkeit hat das Bündnis beachtliche Geschlossenheit und Solidarität gezeigt, ein substantielles Gesamtkonzept für die Gestaltung der West-Ost-Beziehungen dargelegt und - nach Reykjavik - für Beruhigung und Versachlichung der Strategiediskussion gesorgt.

Im Bereich der Rüstungskontrolle und Abrüstung haben wir die von Ihnen in Ihrer Erklärung von Camp David skizzierte Konzentration auf die sich konkret abzeichnenden Verhandlungsschritte unterstützt. Dabei ist für uns die im Kommuniqué der Außenminister erfolgte inhaltliche Präzisierung eines INF-Abkommens von großer Bedeutung. Für Ihr Verständnis hierfür danke ich Ihnen besonders.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen



(2)

Prime Minister
Belated reply from
Chancellor Kohl.

Translation

Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Chancellor

Bonn, 6, January 1987

CDP
16/1

at flap

Dear Prime Minister,
Dear Margaret,

Thank you for your letter of 3 December 1986 asking me to support your efforts for your Camp David declaration to be taken into account in the Alliance's autumn communiqués. I gladly complied with your request because in your talks with President Reagan at Camp David on the basis of the WEU deliberations you stood up for important European interests and effectively defined them in the declaration.

I feel that the results and communiqués of the ministerial meetings at Brussels are highly satisfactory for us both. The Alliance demonstrated considerable cohesion and solidarity vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and our own public, presented a substantive overall concept for the shaping of East-West relations and - following Reykjavik - ensured a calmer and more objective debate on strategy.

MT

Her Excellency
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland

London

In the field of arms control and disarmament, we supported the concentration - as outlined in your Camp David declaration - on specific steps emerging in the negotiations. The remarks in the Foreign Ministers' communiqué specifying the scope of an INF agreement are of great importance to us. I am particularly grateful to you for your understanding in this respect.

Yours sincerely,
(sgd.) Helmut Kohl

GRS 1000

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 3
OF 022230Z JANUARY 87
INFO PRIORITY BOGOTA, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

BOGOTA FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY
MODUK FOR DACU
BILATERAL MEETING WITH SHULTZ, BERMUDA, 6-7 JANUARY: ARMS CONTROL

1. YOU MAY WELCOME A BRIEF SNAPSHOT OF THE STATE OF PLAY HERE ON THE MAIN ARMS CONTROL ISSUES BEFORE YOUR BERMUDA TALKS WITH SHULTZ.

2. AS REPORTED IN MY TELNO 3221, THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGN SINCE THE GENEVA INTERSESSIONAL TALKS ON 2-5 DECEMBER (MY TELNO 3080) OF ANY RADICAL INTER-AGENCY RETHINKING ON MAJOR NST ISSUES. THIS APPEARS TO BE PARTLY THE RESULT OF A WISH FOR A PERIOD OF DIGESTION AFTER THE RUSH OF ACTIVITY AT AND FOLLOWING REYKJAVIK: PARTLY THE RESULT OF A CALCULATION THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL BE IN NO HURRY TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN POSITIONS IN GENEVA UNTIL THEY CAN ASSESS THE IMPACT OF THE NEW CONGRESS AND THE WHITE HOUSE'S OTHER PROBLEMS ON US NEGOTIATING POSITIONS AND THAT THE US SHOULD THEREFORE BE IN NO HURRY EITHER: AND PARTLY THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE HIATUS IN THE NSC: CARLUCCI STARTS THERE TODAY. THIS HAS BEEN NO BAD THING FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW: IT HAS ALLOWED SOME OF THE POST-REYKJAVIK GIDDINESS TO DISSIPATE AND, IN THE ABSENCE OF ACTIVELY COMPETING APPROACHES, HAS PERMITTED THE CAMP DAVID APPROACH TO TAKE ROOT. I AM SURE YOU WOULD BE RIGHT TO GIVE THE CAMP DAVID PRIORITIES A FURTHER PUSH IN BERMUDA.

3. BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT SOME OF THE UNDERLYING NST ISSUES ARE NOT UNDER CONSIDERATION SEPARATELY IN THE AGENCIES CONCERNED OR THAT MODEST DEVELOPMENTS OF US GENEVA POSITIONS ARE NOT BEING CONTEMPLATED. IN PARTICULAR:

(A) ON DEFENCE AND SPACE, STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING PERMITTED SDI-TYPE ACTIVITY DURING ANY EXTENDED PERIOD OF COMMITMENT TO THE ABM TREATY. A PREFERENCE SEEMS TO BE EMERGING IN STATE FOR A QUOTE BOTTOM UP UNQUOTE APPROACH WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION EXCHANGING CLEAR AND DETAILED PROGRAMMATIC DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SDI-TYPE ACTIVITIES THEY PLAN TO PURSUE DURING THE PERIOD OF RESTRAINT. SUCH AN APPROACH IS THOUGHT TO BE A WAY OF PROVIDING PREDICTABILITY WHILE AVOIDING POSSIBLY STERILE ABSTRACT DEBATE ABOUT ABM TREATY INTERPRETATIONS (QUOTE BROAD UNQUOTE -VS- QUOTE RESTRICTIVE UNQUOTE) AND DEFINITIONS (QUOTE COMPONENT UNQUOTE QUOTE ELEMENT UNQUOTE, QUOTE LABORATORY UNQUOTE ETC). IT IS THOUGHT ALSO TO HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF FORCING A GREATER DEGREE OF DISCLOSURE BY THE RUSSIANS OF THEIR OWN PLANNED BMD -RELATED ACTIVITIES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SHULTZ HAS INDICATED THAT HE MAY IN PRINCIPLE BE INCLINED TO FAVOUR THIS APPROACH.

CONFIDENTIAL

/BUT

BUT INTER-AGENCY BATTLE HAS YET TO BE JOINED, AND IT IS BOUND TO BE FIERCE. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS NEVERTHELESS HOPE THAT SUCH AN APPROACH - THOUGH UNWELCOME TO OSD - MIGHT PROVE ATTRACTIVE TO SDI PROGRAMME-MANAGERS, WHO MAY SEE IT AS A WAY OF GUARANTEEING CERTAIN IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE PLANNED SDI PROGRAMME. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I HOPE YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO ENCOURAGE SHULTZ TO MOVE IN THE QUOTE PREDICTABILITY UNQUOTE DIRECTION.

(B) ON INF, CARLUCCI IS BEING ASKED TO CONSIDER VERY QUICKLY WHETHER THE AMERICANS SHOULD TABLE A NEW INF TREATY EARLY IN THE NEW ROUND IN GENEVA. IT WOULD REFLECT PRESENT US POSITIONS AND CONTAIN DETAILED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS OF THE SORT DISCUSSED WITH ALLIES. GLITMAN STRONGLY FAVOURS SUCH A MOVE AND THERE APPEARS TO BE NO STRENUOUS OPPOSITION FROM ANY QUARTER. IF A DECISION IS MADE TO DO THIS, THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EARLY SCG (OR, GIVEN THE EMPHASIS ON VERIFICATION, POSSIBLY ONLY QUINT) MEETING, PERHAPS AS SOON AS THE WEEK BEGINNING 12 JANUARY.

(C) ON START, THINGS ARE QUIET.

CW ARMS CONTROL

4. SIGNS OF POSSIBLE SOVIET READINESS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON KEY ASPECTS OF A CW CONVENTION, PARTICULARLY THOSE CONCERNED WITH VERIFICATION, HAVE PROMPTED NEW EXPRESSIONS OF OSD OPPOSITION TO A CW BAN ON ANY TERMS. OUR IDEAS FOR HANDLING THE CW DISCUSSION WITH SHULTZ WERE CONTAINED IN MY TELNO 3199. IN SHORT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE BEST APPROACH WILL BE TO EXPLAIN TO HIM AGAIN THE RATIONALE BEHIND OUR APPROACH, PARTICULARLY ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION: EXPLAIN AGAIN WHY OUR CD715 PROPOSALS INCORPORATE THE REQUIRED STRINGENCY AND THAT WE ARE NOT ABOUT TO MAKE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS IN THIS RESPECT: AND ASK FOR HIS QUIET SUPPORT AS WE CONTINUE OUR ATTEMPTS TO PRESS THE RUSSIANS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IT WILL, IN OUR JUDGEMENT, BE TOO EARLY TO BID FOR FORMAL ADMINISTRATION ENDORSEMENT OF OUR APPROACH, ON WHICH SHULTZ SEEMS LIKELY TO BE UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO DELIVER AT THIS STAGE.

OTHER ISSUES

5. OF THE OTHER ISSUES, CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, NUCLEAR TESTING, AND THE SPNFZ SEEM LIKELY TO FEATURE IN SHULTZ'S BRIEF.

6. HAVING FOUND SUFFICIENT COMMON GROUND WITH THE FRENCH ON THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY FORUM ISSUE TO GET THROUGH LAST MONTH'S NAC, ADMINISTRATION ATTENTION IS TURNING TO THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND SOME RENEWED INTER-AGENCY WORK IS NOW UNDERWAY ON IDEAS FOR A MANDATE AND POSSIBLE WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR THE PROSPECTIVE NEW NEGOTIATION. BUT NOTHING VERY SPECIFIC HAS SO FAR EMERGED.

7. ON NUCLEAR TESTING, THE GENERAL FEELING IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NOW MADE CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS WHAT IT IS PREPARED TO DO (IE ENTER INTO A SEQUENTIAL NEGOTIATION ON (A) IMPROVED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS FOR THE TWO UNRATIFIED TREATIES, AND (B) A STEP-BY-STEP PROGRAMME OF TESTING CONSTRAINTS TO RUN IN PARALLEL WITH NUCLEAR STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS) AND THAT THE BALL IS NOW IN THE SOVIET COURT. US READINESS TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS AGENDA (BUT NOT ON A CTB) IS LIKELY TO BE SIGNALLED TO THE RUSSIANS AGAIN EARLY THIS MONTH. MEANWHILE, THE PRESIDENT IS

CONFIDENTIAL

/COMMITTED

COMMITTED AS A FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS WITH THE NEW CONGRESS TO SEEKING THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE ON RATIFICATION OF THE TWO TREATIES WITH A RESERVATION WHICH WOULD PREVENT ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION BY THE US WHILE THE VERIFICATION ISSUE IS OUTSTANDING. THE DEMOCRATS WILL LOOK CLOSELY AT THE WORDING OF THE RESERVATION: NUCLEAR TESTING IS AN ISSUE ON WHICH STRONG PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION FROM THE NEW CONGRESS SEEMS CERTAIN (OTHERS ARE SALT COMPLIANCE, ASAT TESTING AND (PERHAPS) ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION).

8. ON THE SPNFZT, YOU ARE LIKELY TO FIND SHULTZ FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE US (AND PERHAPS THE UK) SHOULD ANNOUNCE THAT THEY WILL NOT SIGN THE PROTOCOLS, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING: HE IS REPORTEDLY NOT PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO FACE THE SUSTAINED FRENCH AND AUSTRALIAN LOBBYING THAT WOULD IN HIS VIEW BE ENTAILED BY HOLDING TO A US POSITION OF CONSIDERING THE SIGNATURE ISSUE INDEFINITELY.

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWBAN 8695

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
LIMITED
ACDD
DEFENCE D
SOVIET D
NEWS D
NAD
EED
WED
PLANNING STAFF
RES D
INFO D
PUSD
NED
CSCE UNIT
POD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR SLATER
MR BARRINGTON
MR GILLMORE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

COPIES TO:
MR BERMAN LEGAL ADVISERS
MR R A BURNS SAD

file

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 December 1986

The Prime Minister has agreed in principle to do a short article for the Sunday Express for next Sunday on the theme of "Peace On Earth". The article is needed by tomorrow afternoon. I enclose a draft which we will have to put in the Prime Minister's box tonight. It would be helpful to have, very urgently, any comments and suggestions either later this evening or first thing in the morning; and if the facts could be checked (ie, the number of those who have lost their lives in the Iran/Iraq War, length of time for which the War has lasted).

replied to
CDP 18/12/86

C D POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Peace on earth, goodwill towards men is the time-honoured message of Christmas.

Yet once again there is no peace this year for the people of Afghanistan.

For them, the eighth year of brutal Soviet occupation is starting.

Over ~~four~~ five million of them have been driven from their homes and into exile.

There is no peace, either, for the peoples of Iran and Iraq in a war which has already lasted longer than either of the two World Wars this century and claimed [ ] victims.

Nor for the many thousands immured in prison camps in the Soviet Union, whose only crime has been to demand their basic democratic rights.

Hope for them is represented by Anatoly

Sharansky and Yuri Orlov.

Two men small in stature but giants of physical and moral courage, who have at last gained their freedom.

Yet 1986 has held out some hope for those who yearn for peace.

After years of talks about arms control, we see at last a prospect of reductions in

nuclear weapons.

Very detailed and careful negotiations will be needed.

The issues are vital and consideration of them cannot be hurried.

If the Russians ~~cheat~~ mislead us over a relatively small matter like the withdrawal-that-never-was of troops from Afghanistan, how can we have confidence that they will keep their word about the

destruction of some of their nuclear weapons?

The answer is: only if there is provision for really effective, ~~on-the-spot~~ verification.

But the priority areas for future negotiation on which President Reagan and I agreed at Camp David in November - now endorsed by the whole of NATO - offer a clear way forward.

The elimination of longer range intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe.

A 50 per cent reduction in the strategic nuclear weapons of the two super-powers.

A ban on chemical weapons.

President Reagan has assured me of his determination to do everything possible to secure agreements on these issues in the remainder of his term.

I shall be discussing all these issues when I visit Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow next year.

Yet our hopes for peace do not depend just on negotiations about nuclear weapons. They are the symptoms rather than the cause of the tensions between East and West.

Only when the Berlin Wall comes down and the peoples of the Soviet Union and East

Europe are given a taste of the freedoms which we in the West take for granted, shall we be able to talk of fundamental change in the forces opposing us.

History has one clear lesson for us: you cannot rely on goodwill to achieve peace. Strength is its surest foundation. It is because the West has kept its defences strong and has refused to be

intimidated that we can now look to reductions in nuclear weapons.

The path of unilateral concessions, chosen by the Labour Party, is a recipe for weakness and instability.

The Government knows where its duty to the country and to peace lies.

We have a duty to keep Britain's defences

strong, by modernising our independent nuclear deterrent.

We have a duty to our Allies in NATO not to weaken or undermine the strategy on which we all agreed.

We have a duty to keep faith with our armed forces of whose superb professionalism and dedication we are so proud - and who are

now receiving the best and most up-to-date equipment.

We have a duty to keep faith also with our young people who have been saved by nuclear deterrence from being called up to war as their parents and grandparents were.

For nuclear weapons have kept the peace in Europe for 40 years.

We know that achieving a lasting peace takes stamina.

It takes readiness to go on spending on defence resources which could otherwise go to even more schools and hospitals.

It takes firmness and courage.

There are no short cuts, no easy options.

The prayer of Sir Francis Drake sums it all up:

"O Lord God, when thou givest to thy servants to endeavour any great matter, grant us to know that it is not the beginning but the continuing of the same, until it be thoroughly finished, which yieldeth the true glory."

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

Mr Pakenham (ACDD)

cc Hds SAD, ~~USSR~~
Sov D, NAD, Def D,
MED + PS x 2

CR Budd
17/12

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 December 1986

Comments to me, please, by 1800: plus *.

Dear Tony,

The Prime Minister has agreed in principle to do a short article for the Sunday Express for next Sunday on the theme of "Peace On Earth". The article is needed by tomorrow afternoon. I enclose a draft which we will have to put in the Prime Minister's box tonight. It would be helpful to have, very urgently, any comments and suggestions either later this evening or first thing in the morning; and if the facts could be checked (ie, the number of those who have lost their lives in the Iran/Iraq War, length of time for which the War has lasted).

*

yours sincerely,

C D POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Peace on earth, goodwill towards men is the time-honoured message of Christmas.

Yet once again there is no peace this year for the people of Afghanistan.

For them, the eighth year of brutal Soviet occupation is starting.

Says Andrew Burns of SAD

Over ~~four~~ five million of them have been driven from their homes and into exile.

[lasted since Sept '80]

There is no peace, either, for the peoples of Iran and Iraq in a war which has already lasted longer than either of the two World Wars this century and claimed [ ] victims.

[about ½ of whom killed]

getting on for 1 million

Nor for the many thousands immured in prison camps in the Soviet Union, whose only crime has been to demand their basic democratic rights.

Hope for them is represented by Anatoly

Sharansky and Yuri Orlov.

Two men small in stature but giants of physical and moral courage, who have at last gained their freedom.

Yet 1986 has held out some hope for those who yearn for peace.

After years of talks about arms control, we see at last a prospect of reductions in

nuclear weapons.

Very detailed and careful negotiations will be needed.

The issues are vital and consideration of them cannot be hurried.

If the Russians cheat over a relatively small matter like the withdrawal-that-never-was of troops from Afghanistan, how can we have confidence that they will keep their word about the

A bit rude? [OK: FCO get off the pitch!]

? ... try to pull the wool over our eyes about ....

destruction of some of their nuclear weapons?

The answer is: only if there is provision for effective, [on-the-spot] verification.

But the priority areas for future negotiation on which President Reagan and I agreed at Camp David in November - now endorsed by the whole of NATO - offer a clear way forward.

We shd much prefer to delete. Not axiomatic to our arms control position: eg on CW our line is country in ? has obligation to prove its innocence.

The elimination of longer range intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe.

A 50 per cent reduction in the strategic nuclear weapons of the two super-powers.

A ban on chemical weapons.

President Reagan has assured me of his determination to do everything possible to secure agreements on these issues in the remainder of his term.

? add "with ~~re~~ restraints on SRINF". But perhaps unnecessary for this audience.

I shall be discussing all these issues when I visit Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow next year.

Yet our hopes for peace do not depend just on negotiations about nuclear weapons. They are the symptoms rather than the cause of the tensions between East and West.

Only when the Berlin Wall comes down and the peoples of the Soviet Union and East

Europe are given a taste of the freedoms which we in the West take for granted, shall we be able to talk of fundamental change in the forces opposing us.

History has one clear lesson for us: you cannot rely on goodwill to achieve peace. Strength is its surest foundation. It is because the West has kept its defences strong and has refused to be

intimidated that we can now look to reductions in nuclear weapons.

The path of unilateral concessions, chosen by the Labour Party, is a recipe for weakness and instability.

The Government knows where its duty to the country and to peace lies.

We have a duty to keep Britain's defences

strong, by modernising our independent nuclear deterrent.

We have a duty to our Allies in NATO not to weaken or undermine the strategy on which we all agreed.

We have a duty to keep faith with our armed forces of whose superb professionalism and dedication we are so proud - and who are

now receiving the best and most up-to-date equipment.

We have a duty to keep faith also with our young people who have been saved by nuclear deterrence from being called up to war as their parents and grandparents were.

For nuclear weapons have kept the peace in Europe for 40 years.

We know that achieving a lasting peace takes stamina.

It takes readiness to go on spending on defence resources which could otherwise go to even more schools and hospitals.

It takes firmness and courage.

There are no short cuts, no easy options.

The prayer of Sir Francis Drake sums it all up:

"O Lord God, when thou givest to thy servants to endeavour any great matter, grant us to know that it is not the beginning but the continuing of the same, until it be thoroughly finished, which yieldeth the true glory."

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2053 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: UKDEL NATO tel. no. 366 dated 11 December 1986	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	20 May 2016 C Wayland
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 December 1986

CDP
12/12

Dear Charles,

NAC Communique

The text has now been agreed, ad referendum by all concerned. I enclose the text of the three paragraphs on arms control. The Communique is due to be adopted tomorrow. Changes from the DPC language proved unavoidable to meet various points pressed hard by the French and Germans; but the Foreign Secretary considers that the present text adequately reflects the arms control points in the Prime Minister's Washington statement of 15 November and is also otherwise acceptable. I should be grateful if you would seek the Prime Minister's approval for this text.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

CONFIDENTIAL

ARMS CONTROL PARAGRAPHS OF THE NAC COMMUNIQUÉ

3. The Alliance strategy of deterrence, based on adequate conventional and nuclear defences, has proved its value in safeguarding peace and enabling us to resist intimidation. It remains fully valid. The continuing build-up of Soviet forces underscores that maintaining this effective range of deterrence capabilities must remain a key Alliance priority.

4. Arms control and disarmament are an integral part of our security policy. We remain committed to reaching equitable agreements aimed at enhancing stability at lower level of forces and armaments. They must strengthen security in Europe and must not weaken the link between the European and North American members of the Alliance. Effective verification is an essential condition for all such agreements. Real progress on arms control can only be made if a stable overall balance is assured at all times.

5. Following Reykjavik we support the United States in seeking balanced, equitable and effectively verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. We agree that instead of simply codifying the existing levels of arsenals, agreements in Geneva should seek to achieve substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces in ways that will enhance peace and stability. We therefore welcome the progress at Reykjavik towards agreement on 50% reductions in US and Soviet strategic offensive forces and towards an agreement on longer-range intermediate nuclear missiles. We fully endorse the United States' determination to negotiate detailed agreements on this basis as a matter of priority and urge the Soviet Union to join in this effort in Geneva.

Opportunity for progress in some areas, notably in the LRINF negotiations, must not be held hostage to agreements in other unrelated ones. Soviet insistence on doing so would contradict assurances given at the highest level.

On the basis of the December 1979 NATO decision on LRINF modernisation and arms control, the Allies concerned fully support the envisaged elimination of American and Soviet land-based LRINF in Europe and the limitation to 100 warheads in Asia and the United States, while their ultimate objective remains the total elimination of all such LRINF. They stress that an INF agreement must not neglect the existing imbalances in shorter-range US and Soviet INF missiles and must provide for a commitment to follow-on negotiations on these missiles.

We also reviewed the US-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on defence and space systems which aim to prevent an arms race in space (and terminate it on earth) and strengthen strategic stability. We strongly support these efforts.

In all cases, effective verification would be an essential condition. We will continue to assess and to consult closely on all these issues in the appropriate Alliance fora.

no letter attached.

CCG

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

December 10, 1986

CHP 19/12.

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the attached letter to you from President Reagan, which was received at the Embassy this morning.

Sincerely,

Charles H. Price, II
Ambassador

Enclosure:

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W., 1.

DEFENCE : Arms Control : Pt 10

→ Mr Powell
(No.10)



With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Any comments
before these go?

Colin Budd
11/12

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		DESKBY 111430Z

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO
TO DESKBY 111430Z MOSCOW
TELNO
OF 111100Z DECEMBER 86
~~INFO DESKBY 111430Z UKDEL NATO~~

~~UKDEL NATO FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY~~
MIPT: CALL ON GORBACHEV

1. Following is text of draft Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control.
BEGINS.
1. At Halifax we agreed on the objective of strengthening stability and security in the whole of the Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. In pursuit of this objective we set up a High Level Task Force; we have today reviewed its first report. We have instructed it to continue in being and to provide further regular reports to the Council.

/// 2. Arms Control should enhance, and not diminish, security in
// Europe. We reiterate our commitment to the maintenance of an
/ effective and credible deterrence posture. Therefore our approach to arms control will remain consistent with the need, at

YYYY
MAIN
ADDITIONAL
NNNN

		Catchword: each	
File number	Dept: SOVIET	Drafted by (Block capitals): R E BRINKLEY	Telephone no: 233 5277
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials: [illegible]	Date/time: 11 12 30Z	
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

XY48 (REV)

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		DESKBY 111430

<<<<

each step of the negotiating process, to retain the means to implement Alliance and national strategies.

3. While maintaining effective deterrence involving both nuclear and conventional forces, we seek to establish a stable relationship of conventional forces in Europe. Reductions in nuclear weapons which are the subject of discussions betweeen the US and the USSR in Geneva would increase the importance of eliminating conventional disparities.

4. We are therefore ready to open East/West discussions with a view to the establishment of a new mandate for negotiating on conventional arms control covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

5. For such negotiations to succeed, there must be recognition of the facts about the current situation: and a common understanding on philosophy, objectives and methods.

The Facts

6. Statements by Eastern spokesmen sometimes imply that the present military situation in Europe is stable and balanced. It is not. On the contrary, it is marked by asymmetries and disparities which vary from region to region but which are detrimental to Western security and which are a source of potential instability. The relevant factors include:

- The armaments, equipment types, deployments, numbers, mobility and readiness of the armed forces involved.

///
//
/

- The information, predictability and confidence about them.

- Considerations of geography.

For distribution order see Page	Catchword: The

YF37

27081 Dd8422716 50m 7/86 3656

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		DESKBY 111430

<<<<

The Philosophy

7. Military forces should exist to prevent war and to ensure self-defence, not for the purpose of initiating aggression and not for purposes of political or military intimidation.

The Objectives

8. These should be:

- The establishment of a stable and secure level of forces, geared to the elimination of disparities.

- A negotiating process which proceeds step-by-step, and which guarantees the undiminished security of all concerned at each stage.

- Focus on the elimination of the capability for surprise attack or for the initiation of large scale offensive action.

- Further measures to build confidence and to improve openness and calculability about military behaviour.

- The application of the measures involved to the whole of Europe but in a way which takes account of and seeks to redress regional imbalances and to exclude circumvention.

- An effective verification regime (in which detailed exchanges of information and on-site inspection will play a vital part) to ensure compliance with the provisions of any agreement, to guarantee that limitations on force capabilities are not exceeded.

///
//
/

The Methods

9. We propose that distinct negotiations take place:

For distribution order see Page	Catchword: To

YF37

27081 Dd8422716 50m 7/86 3656

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		DESKBY 111430

<<<<

- To build upon and expand the results of the Stockholm Conference on confidence and security building measures.

- To eliminate existing disparities, from the Atlantic to the Urals, and establish conventional stability at lower levels, between the countries whose forces bear most immediately upon the essential security relationship in Europe, namely those belonging to the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

10. Therefore we are ready to initiate discussion on enhancing conventional stability in the whole of Europe.

ENDS.

HOWE

YYYY
MAIN
LIMITED
SOVIET DEPT
DEFENCE DEPT
ACDD
NEWS DEPT
PS
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR FALL
MR RATFORD

///
//
/

NNNN

For distribution order see Page	Catchword:

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		DESKBY 111430Z

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO
TO DESKBY 111430Z MOSCOW
TELNO
OF 111300Z DECEMBER 86
INFO DESKBY 111430Z UKDEL NATO

UKDEL NATO FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY
YOUR TELNO 1481 (NOW REPEATED TO UKDEL NATO):
CALL ON GORBACHEV

1. You asked for guidance on conventional arms reductions and the proposed Moscow humanitarian conference. The following line to take is subject to any comments from the Secretary of State in Brussels.

Conventional Arms Reductions

2. The proposed NAC declaration on conventional stability is in MIFT (any last-minute changes will be telegraphed to you). This will be your point of reference. You should make the following points:

/// (a) leave Gorbachev in no doubt of the importance we attach to
// effective and verifiable measures of conventional disarmament,
/ to eliminate disparities and reach a stable balance at lower levels.

YYYY
MAIN
ADDITIONAL
NNNN

		Catchword: (b) The	
File number	Dept: SOVIET	Drafted by (Block capitals): R E BRINKLEY	Telephone no: 233 5277
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials: [illegible]	Date/time: 11 1445Z	
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

XY48 (REV)

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		DESKBY 111430

<<<<

(b) The importance of this will increase as nuclear reductions - for which we are already working - proceed.

(c) We have been working hard with our allies on how best to proceed, and will have ideas to put forward in Vienna (after the CSCE meeting resumes). We see prospects both for further work on CSBMS, and for negotiations on reductions, in the wider Atlantic to Urals framework.

(d) Meanwhile MBFR must not be forgotten. Western proposals there offer an excellent opportunity for early progress semi colon but progress will not be possible - whatever the forum - without adequate measures of verification, which in turn means on-site inspection, and information.

3. If Gorbachev raises the messages to NATO officials from Kulikov, Todorov (Chairman, Warsaw Pact Working Group on conventional arms control) and Krolikowski (General Secretary, Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee), you should say that they have been brought to the attention of NATO governments. It is those Governments rather than NATO officials, including NATO's military commanders, who are best placed to pursue diplomatic contacts and negotiations with the Soviet Union and with other members of the Warsaw Pact. As the NAC declaration makes clear, NATO Governments are ready to play an active role in this process. That is most certainly the case as far as HMG is concerned.

4. On chemical weapons, there is little to add to the material you already have. The Russians have now commented on our challenge inspection initiative (UKDis Geneva telno 99). The Soviet position does not yet meet our requirements for stringency but we need to assess whether we are sufficiently close to the

///
//
/

For distribution order see Page	Catchword: same

YF37

27081 Dd8422716 50m 7/86 3656

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		DESKBY 111430

<<<<

same ball-park to engage the US. If asked, you should simply comment that Soviet views are being carefully studied in London, and that we welcome our continuing close contacts on this subject.

Moscow Humanitarian Conference

5. You will have seen UKDel CSCE telno 57 reporting further details of proposal provided yesterday in Vienna by Kovalev. This was a skillful presentation but predictably fudges the issues important to the West (eg conditions under which Conference would be held).

6. If Gorbachev raises this, you should say:
- We are in no doubt that the review of implementation in Vienna must result in better performance after the Vienna Meeting in area of human rights/human contacts.
- We and Western partners will give careful consideration to the Soviet proposal and Kovalev's explanation of it.
- It will need to be considered along with other proposals in this area (eg UK proposal for meeting on Information).
- Main criterion for debate - contribution proposals would make to better compliance with Helsinki commitments on human rights as well as other humanitarian issues.
- Experience of previous meetings (eg Ottawa, Berne) shows how far there is still to go in improving implementation.
- Difficult for Western public opinion to accept that meeting should be held in Moscow while eg members of Helsinki monitoring groups are imprisoned, and Western broadcasts jammed.

///
//
/

7. Incidentally, pace para 1 of TUR, Gorbachev has received two Ambassadors: Raimond, after his appointment as French Foreign Minister semi colon and the Indian Ambassador, in August,

For distribution order see Page	Catchword: delivering

YF37

27081 Dd8422716 50m 7/86 3656

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
CONFIDENTIAL		DESKBY 111430

<<<<

delivering a message from Gandhi.

8. Instructions on press line and text (paras 4 and 5 of TUR) follow.

HOWE

YYYY
MAIN
LIMITED
SOVIET DEPT
DEFENCE DEPT
ACDD
NEWS DEPT
PS
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR FALL
MR RATFORD

NNNN

///
//
/

For distribution order see Page	Catchword:

YF37

27081 Dd8422716 50m 7/86 3656

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification	Caveat	Precedence
		SECRET	BURNING BUSH DEDIP	IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
SECRET
BURNING BUSH DEDIP
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO
TELNO
OF 101000Z DECEMBER 86
AND TO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON

Prime Minister
NOT a very good report of what sounds to have been an interesting discussion.
CDP 10/12

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

QUADRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL: CHEVENING: 9 DECEMBER: ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY

1. Points of immediate relevance to NAC reported separately. Wide-ranging discussion of situation and objectives post-Reykjavik in which Genscher and Raimond supported me in broadly similar terms in warning about the dangers and in emphasising the priorities. Substantial, philosophical contribution by Shultz who invited ideas on quote the second five years unquote.

DETAIL

2. After dealing with the immediate NAC issues I introduced wider-ranging discussion by emphasising the need for a limited and credible agenda, of which Camp David had identified the components. Reykjavik had been neither a triumph nor a disaster. If the shake of the kaleidoscope had succeeded in enlarging the boundaries of the possible, it was important not to lose the opportunity for sensible progress. But we must beware of the absolutes (talk of the total abolition of nuclear or ballistic missiles on the one hand, too rigid linkages on the other) which

Catchword: would

YYYY
MAIN
ADDITIONAL
NNNN

File number	Dept	Drafted by (Block capitals)	Telephone no
	PRIVATE OFFICE	C R BUDD	4831

Authorised for despatch by: Initials CRBudd Date/time 1030 10/12

For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

YF36

27081 Dd8422716 50m 7/86 3656

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	SECRET	BURNING BUSH DEDIP	IMMEDIATE

<<<<

<<<<

would make such progress more difficult.

3. Shultz began by recalling the background to his and the President's approach. As far as security was concerned, the centre of gravity of the US remained the Alliance with Europe. From that followed the need for: a survivable US strategic force capable of reaching the Soviet Union, a militarily credible US troop presence in Europe, a US nuclear presence in Europe (though not necessarily LRINF), a properly functioning alliance and emphasis on the political values we had in common. At the same time we must think globally: this did not mean that NATO itself must be active out of area, but the Four should all look in the wider perspective when they thought of deterrence, stability and the sort of world we wanted.

4. Looking at Reykjavik against that background, Shultz noted the European concerns and said that the job now was to capitalise on what could usefully be done while thinking further about the points that caused difficulty. The good points were that we now had:

(i) on INF, quote pretty much the structure of an agreement unquote

(ii) On strategic arms, and for the first time, a clear idea of quote the principles that constitute the 50 per cen unquote and

(iii) in the third area, progress in the idea of a non-withdrawal period.

On the last point, Shultz said that it was not likely that either the Americans or the Soviets would give way to the other on whether it was ballistic or strategic nuclear missiles that were to be eliminated: this would no doubt come as a relief to the Europeans. But there was logic to the Soviet linkage between offensive and defensive strategic systems, and it was doubtful whether the 50% reductions could be achieved without a satisfactory alternative to what the linkage in the second five-

For distribution order see Page | Catchword: year

XY 48A (REV)

Dd8422552 50m 10/85 27081

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	SECRET	BURNING BUSH DEDIP	IMMEDIATE

<<<<

year period had been designed to achieve. Shultz recognised that neither the European allies nor the Soviets liked the form of linkage the Americans had proposed at Reykjavik, and invited us to think about what might be suggested instead.

5. Shultz, stressing that he was thinking aloud, went on to indicate that he was giving further consideration to what should be the permitted activities in the period of ABM constraint. He also wondered whether there might be a period of non-deployment after the expiry of a period of non-withdrawal. And he was not sure that we need stick to two periods of five years: perhaps the first could be extended, and one could think in terms of further gradual reductions rather than the present ten year goal. But none of these ideas were ready for presentation to the Soviets and the US position remained that tabled at Reykjavik.

6. Shultz went on to make the following further points:

(i) we should not leave Gorbachev the moral high ground in talking about a nuclear-free world. People did not like nuclear weapons, liked them even less after Chernobyl, and quote some of these things were going to explode some time unquote. We would be better advised to concentrate on what would have to change if a nuclear-free world were to be acceptable, and to seek public understanding for these essential conditions.

(ii) It was sensible and indeed helpful from the point of view of maintaining support for the US presence in Europe to seek to negotiate reductions in conventional forces, but we should at the same time be improving our conventional defences. There was no reason to be defeatist in the face of a Soviet capability potentially no stronger than our own.

(iii) The Soviet post-Reykjavik linkages did not necessarily operate to our disadvantage, and it was in any case

For distribution order see Page	Catchword: possible

XY 48A (REV)

Dd8422552 50m 10/85 27081

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	SECRET	DEDIP BURNING BUSH	IMMEDIATE

<<<<

possible that the Soviet Union would once again remove the link with INF in order to get the US systems out of Europe. but our public position should continue to be that the link was unjustified and should be removed.

7. From the three European participants, Shultz will have got a clear sense of the importance we all attached to nuclear deterrence, and the consequent concern about the visionary elements of Reykjavik. At the same time, there was strong support for 50 per cent reductions in strategic weapons (specifically shared in by Raimond), and support from both Genscher and me for an INF agreement on the lines currently envisaged, with the necessary constraints on SRINF. Raimond was predictably more cautious about the zero option, emphasising both the importance of the American nuclear presence in Europe and the danger of quote circumvention from below unquote. All three of us combined to counteract Shultz's optimism about the political and economic feasibility of a very much more substantial conventional defence effort on the part of Western Europe: Genscher drew the obvius lessons from history to point out that something near conventional parity was not enough to prevent war. Germany had every reason to want to reduce nuclear weapons, but not to the point where this might increase the risk of conventional war. Raimond added that the question had to be looked at not only in terms of the risk of war but in terms of possible reaction to the politico-military pressure the Soviet Union might be expected to exercise in a time of crisis if the West no longer had an effective nuclear deterrent.

8. In conclusion, I turned the discussion back to the points Shultz had raised on the second five year period: that was the area that had caused the difficulties, and that was where more thought was needed (as Shultz himself had suggested) before proposals were put to the Russians. I questioned the need for a linkage between the end of the period of constraint and the end

For distribution order see Page | Catchword:

XY 48A (REV)

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	SECRET	BURNING BUSH DEDIP	IMMEDIATE

<<<<

<<<<

of a process of reduction, and pointed out that one of the consequences of Reykjavik had been to make people think afresh about the importance of deterrence. Besides, what we were envisaging for the first five years would in itself be a major achievement. Shultz repeated his interest in having the benefit of our thinking in this area.

HOWE

YYYY
MAIN
LIMITED
PLANNING STAFF
HD/ACDD
HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/NEWS
MR FALL
MR GOODALL
MR THOMAS
PS/PUS
PS/MR RENTON
PS

NNNN

///
//
/

For distribution order see Page | Catchword:

XY 48A (REV)

Dd8422552 50m 10/85 27081

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 December 1986

Dear Charles,

NAC Communique

The Foreign Secretary thought that the Prime Minister might like to see the latest version of the draft NAC Communique as it emerged from discussions in Brussels on 8 December. He believes that the text is broadly on the right lines, reflecting as it does the DPC Communique, though there remain one or two points to be resolved with the French and Germans.

The outstanding points are as follows :

(a) In the second paragraph the French have argued that the final clause over-rates the importance of Reykjavik, even though as drafted the paragraph places the meeting between President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev firmly in the context of other high level meetings. The Foreign Secretary believes that while our views on Reykjavik differ little from those of the French, we should also take account of the fact that the Americans have agreed to the wholesale incorporation of DPC language in the NAC text and that, accordingly, we should offer a formula designed to meet the concerns of both sides: "offering the prospect of a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union", in place of "offering significant prospects".

/(b)

(b) In paragraph 5 the Germans are pressing for alternative language on LRINF and SRINF negotiations which would significantly change the formula agreed for the DPC Communique. Although they have some support from others, eg the Italians, the German texts are unacceptable to ourselves, the Americans, and others because they pre-judge the outcome both of negotiations on LRINF (by excluding the possibility that some residual LRINF capability might remain in Europe) and of the NATO deliberations on SRINF which have only just started. The Foreign Secretary has taken the matter up with Mr Genscher and there is some hope that the Germans will fall into line.

I am copying this letter to John Howe in the MOD.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL,
BRUSSELS, 11-12 DECEMBER 1986

DRAFT NAC COMMUNIQUE

1. Securing peace in freedom remains our fundamental purpose: wars of all kinds, nuclear and conventional must be prevented. In the conviction that the security of our Alliance is indivisible, we shall continue to consult closely and [coordinate policies] or [maintain cohesion] on all matters affecting our common interests.

2. We shall continue to explore all opportunities for a broad and constructive dialogue which addresses the concerns of the peoples of both East and West. We reconfirm our commitment to a more cooperative East-West relationship including political dialogue, commercial relations and cultural exchanges, in which all states participate on equal terms. Respect for human rights and encourgagement of human contacts remain essential.

We welcome recent high-level East-West meetings, notably that between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, [as offering significant prospects towards a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact.]

3. The Alliance strategy of deterrence, based on adequate conventional and nuclear defences, has proved its value in safeguarding peace and enabling us to resist intimidation. It remains fully valid. The continuing build-up of Soviet forces underscores that maintaining this effective range of deterrence capability must remain a key Alliance priority.

4. Arms control and disarmament are an integral part of our security policy. We remain committed to reaching equitable agreements aimed at lowering the level of forces and armaments. Effective verification is an essential condition for all such

agreements. They must enhance security in Europe and must not weaken the link between the European and North American members of the Alliance. Real progress on arms control can only be made if a stable, overall balance is established and maintained.

5. Following Reykjavik we support the United States in seeking balanced, equitable and effectively verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. We agree that instead of simply codifying the existing levels of arsenals, agreements in Geneva should seek to achieve substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces in ways that will enhance peace and stability. We therefore welcome the progress at Reykjavik towards agreement on 50% reductions in strategic offensive forces and towards an agreement on longer-range intermediate nuclear missiles. We fully endorse the United States' determination to negotiate detailed agreements on this basis as a matter of priority and urge the Soviet Union to join in this effort in Geneva. Opportunity for progress in some areas, notably in the LRINF negotiations, must not be held hostage to agreements in other unrelated ones. [Soviet insistence on doing so would destroy the credibility of the assurances given at the highest level.]

[Nor must such an INF agreement neglect the existing imbalances in shorter-range INF missiles for which constraints and equal rights must be provided, as well as subsequent negotiations on these missiles.]

OR (German alternative)

[We fully support the envisaged elimination of American and Soviet land-based LRINF in Europe and the limitation to 100 warheads in Asia and the United States while our objective remains the total elimination of all such LRINF. We stress the need to include in an INF agreement appropriate SRINF constraints as proposed by the US as well as a commitment to follow-on negotiations, aiming at equal ceilings at reduced levels for all SRINF missiles.]

In all cases, effective verification would be an essential condition. We will continue to assess and to consult closely on all these issues. [We reiterate our support for the United States' exploration of space and defence systems, (as is permitted by the ABM Treaty).]

6. Nuclear weapons cannot be dealt with in isolation. We also look for progress in other areas of arms control, particularly since reductions in nuclear weapons will increase the importance of removing conventional disparities and eliminating chemical weapons. An effective resolution of these issues is the essential condition for real and enduring security in Europe.

7. At our last session in Halifax we indicated the importance which we attach to conventional arms control and decided to consider all the issues involved in a High Level Group. We have today approved the first report of this group and have also adopted the Declaration on conventional arms control.

8. Those of us participating in MBFR reaffirm our determination to reach early and substantial agreement and call upon the East to respond constructively to the Western initiative of 5 December 1985. This would significantly contribute to the launching of other negotiations, this time extended to Europe as a whole.

9. The continued Soviet build-up of chemical weapons is a matter of great concern, as is the proliferation and use of such weapons. At the Geneva Confernce on Disarmament a convention which meets our objective, the general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all existing stock-piles, is now within reach if the Soviet Union is prepared to take a constructive attitude on all aspects of an effective verification regime. We appeal to the Soviet Union to join us in overcoming the outstanding obstacles to an agreement.

10. The Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting is of major importance for the promotion of stable and constructive East/West relations and their sustained long-term imporovement. Gravely concerned with the

deficiencies of Warsaw Pact countries in honouring their commitments, we shall continue to insist on the full implementation of all agreements reached in the CSCE process.

We welcome the results of the Stockholm CDE. The confidence and security building measures agreed upon, if fully implemented, will create more transparency and contribute to greater confidence and predictability of military activities in the whole of Europe. These measures thus represent progress in regard to the Helsinki Final Act and demonstrate the validity of the step-by-step approach defined in the Madrid Mandate.

We shall press for a balanced and constructive outcome at Vienna and a strengthening of the CSCE process through improved compliance by the East in all three baskets.

11. We respect the sovereignty and independence of all states. We will remain vigiliant and continue to consult on events outside the treaty area which might threaten our common security.

12. We call on the Soviet Union to end its unacceptable occupation of Afghanistan, soon to enter its eighth year, to respect the call of the International community for the speedy and complete withdrawal of its military forces, and to reach a political settlement which would restore Afghanistan's independence and non-aligned status, create conditions for the safe and honourable return of refugees to their homes, and permit Afghan self-determination.

13. We have intensified the fight against terrorism in all its forms. And from whatever quarter. We invite all states to unite their efforts to defeat this threat.

14. Berlin paragraph.

15. We have noted encouraging progress in our efforts to enhance armaments cooperation among all countries of the Alliance. We shall actively continue these efforts. In this context the recent work of

the IEPG also deserves to be noted and is contributing to the transatlantic dialogue in this field.

16. In the spirit of article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, we reaffirm the importance of mutual assistance and collaboration within the Alliance as well as the need to improve defence-industrial coooperation, particularly in order to enable Greece, Portugal and Turkey to upgrade their defence industries.

17. Thirty years ago, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Italy and Norway presented a report to the North Atlantic Council which called for enhanced political consultation, the improvement and extension of cooperation and the development of greater unity and solidarity within the Atlantic community. Commemorating this year the work of the Committee of Three, we acknowledge the continuing validity of these principles.

CONFIDENTIAL

file

ccpc

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 December 1986

I enclose a reply from President Reagan to the Prime Minister's recent message about the NATO Ministerial communiques.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C D POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister (2)

SUBJECT CC MASTER OPS

CDP 10/12

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 239/86

December 10, 1986

Dear Margaret:

Thank you very much for your message of December 2 concerning the nuclear arms control sections of the fall NATO Ministerial communiques. I am gratified that we have been able to work out language in the Defense Ministers' communique which supports and protects our mutual interests. Based on this and with our two countries standing shoulder to shoulder on this language, there is every reason to believe that we will be equally successful at the Foreign Ministers' meeting next week in maintaining this language, which underscores our common approach to these central issues of security and arms control.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ronald Reagan

US Declassified

mf

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GL

CRC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 December 1986

EUROPEAN CONSULTATIONS POST-REYKJAVIK

Thank you for your letter enclosing a copy of Paris tel. no. 1302. The story in this week's Time Magazine does not help. I may say that I was not approached by Time about this story or offered an opportunity to comment on it. And I am still waiting for my invitation to the high level group....

I have no objection to your telegram (though am fascinated by the Kanzelariat with its dual overtones of Germany and the wild west).

(Charles Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CDC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 December 1986

Dear Charles,

European Consultations Post-Reykjavik

I enclose a copy of Paris telno 1302, indicating that some loose talk by Attali and perhaps Teltschik may give rise to further problems with the Americans, if the story begins to gain credibility and to appear once more in the European press. The Foreign Secretary believes it important that Posts should have authority to scotch this sort of rumour if the American reactions suggest that mountains are in danger of being made.

I therefore enclose a draft telegram to Paris and Bonn, and would be grateful for clearance.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 140

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 1302
OF 051504Z DECEMBER 1986
INFO PRIORITY BONN, WASHINGTON, ROME

EUROPEAN CONSULTATION POST-REYKJAVIK.

1. WE HAVE HEARD RECENTLY FROM TWO SEPARATE AMERICAN SOURCES IN PARIS THAT ATTALI HAS BEEN PUTTING IT AROUND THAT A BRITISH/FRENCH/FRG HIGH-LEVEL GROUP OF SENIOR OFFICIALS EXISTS TO COORDINATE EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS POST-REYKJAVIK. ATTALI IS SAID TO HAVE BRIEFED CERTAIN JOURNALISTS THAT THIS GROUP CONSISTS OF HIMSELF, CHARLES POWELL AND TELTSCHIK, AND ONE VERSION ALSO HAS IT THAT BUJON IS INVOLVED.

2. WE HAVE TOLD OUR AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS THAT TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE THIS IS NOT TRUE, AND HAVE REFERRED THEM TO THE FCO SPOKESMAN'S DENIAL (CON RETRACT NO. 025 OF 3 NOVEMBER). BUT YOU MAY CARE TO BE AWARE THAT THE RUMOUR PERSISTS, GIVEN ITS OBVIOUS POTENTIAL FOR MISCHIEF. THE MINISTER AT THE US EMBASSY HERE INTIMATED TO US TODAY THAT THE GERMANS WERE BRIEFING INFORMALLY IN BONN THAT SOME SUCH GROUP DID EXIST AND THAT IT NOW INCLUDED THE ITALIANS.

3. GRATEFUL FOR ANY UP-DATE ON THE ACTUAL STATE OF PLAY, IF YOU CONSIDER THIS NECESSARY.

FRETWELL

YYYY

PCLNAN 6548

LIMITED

WED
NAD
DEF D.
ACDD
MR THOMAS
MR RATFORD

CONFIDENTIAL

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	CONFIDENTIAL		PRIORITY

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO
TO PRIORITY PARIS
TELNO
OF
AND TO PRIORITY BONN
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ROME, MODUK

MODUK for DACU

Your telno 1302: EUROPEAN CONSULTATIONS POST-REYKJAVIK

1. If you or other recipients feel that reassurance is necessary, you should say ~~You should emphasise~~ to your US colleagues that officials in the Private Offices of senior Ministers are in ~~continual~~ regular contact on ~~a variety of subjects~~ current business, including arms control and security questions. This applies as much to No 10, the Elysee and the Kanzelariat as to the White House and the State Department 7th Floor. However, as we clearly stated at the time of the inaccurate report in the Wall Street Journal (my telno 541 to Bonn) a substantive group along the lines suggested does not exist.

2. As for links with the Italians, the Americans will be well aware of the Bonn meeting on 11 November of the four European Allies (my telno 566 to Bonn), on which we have briefed them. Partjcipants in that meeting agreed on its ad hoc nature ~~& we~~ and there are no plans for further such meetings. ~~formal grouping of this sort does not exist, although the main Europeans will continue to consult each other in appropriate ways.~~

~~3. Grateful for any remedial action you and Bonn can take to~~

YYYY
MAIN
ADDITIONAL
NNNN

		Catchword: prevent	
File number	Dept	Drafted by (Block capitals)	Telephone no
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials Date/time		
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

XY 48 (REV)

cc PS

1

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7822~~ 218 2111/3

MO 11/9/4E

8th December 1986

Prime Minister

MS

to note

CDP 9/12

Dear Chris,

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES

PE 9

Thank you for your letter of 28th November, suggesting that Mr Younger should take the opportunity of his meetings with Mr Weinberger to secure a further commitment from Weinberger for a detailed UK input, the JCS work on this subject, and in particular suggesting that we should offer to send MOD experts to Washington.

Admiral Fieldhouse has arranged with Admiral Crowe that an MOD team should visit Washington in January. Our understanding is that the JCS study is due to be completed by the end of January. In order to reinforce this arrangement, Mr Younger referred briefly to it in his meeting with Mr Weinberger today. He thanked Mr Weinberger for his Department's co-operation and emphasised his interest in the outcome of the study.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell in No 10 and to Trevor Woolley in the Cabinet Office.

Yours sincerely,

John Howe.

(J F HOWE)

C R Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

DEFENCE : Arms Control : Part 10



ADVANCE COPIES 15

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR RATFORD
MR FALL.
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE D
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET D

RESIDENT CLERK

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD
PS. NPS(A) }
DACU }
CSI }

15.1.85

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

FM WASH TO FCOLN
06501552 DEC
GRS 500

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 3080
OF 0601552 DECEMBER 86
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, MODUK

SIC MODUK FOR DACU
GENEVA NST: INTER-SESSIONAL MEETING OF DELEGATION HEADS
2-5 DECEMBER
SUMMARY
1. NO PROGRESS ON ANY MAJOR ISSUE. RUSSIANS MAINTAIN TIGHT SDI LINKAGE.
DETAIL
2. THE THREE US GENEVA NEGOTIATORS (KAMPELMAN, LEHMAN AND GLITMAN) AND THEIR DEPUTIES MET THEIR SOVIET OPPOSITE NUMBERS IN GENEVA FROM 2-5 DECEMBER FOR AN INTER-SESSIONAL DISCUSSION OF NST ISSUES (THE NEXT FORMAL ROUND IN GENEVA OPENS ON 15 JANUARY). A PRELIMINARY ACCOUNT, BEFORE YOUR MEETING WITH SHULTZ ON 9 DECEMBER, MAY BE USEFUL.
3. ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATION WILL TRY IN PUBLIC TO PUT THE BEST POSSIBLE GLOSS ON THE DISCUSSIONS, OUR STATE DEPARTMENT CONTACTS HAVE MADE CLEAR TO US IN PRIVATE THAT NO PROGRESS WAS MADE. THE ADMINISTRATION'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO PREPARE WITH THE RUSSIANS A PAPER SETTING OUT AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT, BUT KARPOV AND HIS COLLEAGUES DECLINED TO TAKE PART IN THIS EXERCISE AND STONEWALLED ON ALL MAJOR ISSUES. IN PARTICULAR, THEY MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO TRY TO WORK ON START, INF OR NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUES IN ADVANCE OF NEW US PROPOSALS ON DEFENCE AND SPACE. OBUKHOV (SOVIET START NEGOTIATOR)

PROPOSALS ON DEFENCE AND SPACE. OBUKHOV (SOVIET START NEGOTIATOR) ABSENTED HIMSELF FROM GENEVA FOR PART OF THE MEETING, WHICH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS TAKE AS INDICATIVE OF LACK OF SOVIET SERIOUSNESS. KAMPELMAN'S JUDGEMENT APPARENTLY IS THAT THE RUSSIANS SAW THE MEETING AS PART OF THEIR POST-REYKJAVIK PUBLIC RELATIONS STRATEGY OF CLAIMING THAT MAJOR AND UNREQUITED SOVIET CONCESSIONS WERE MADE AT THE SUMMIT, AND THAT NO FURTHER SOVIET MOVES COULD BE EXPECTED WITHOUT US MOVES ON SDI.

4. THERE WAS SOME INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION BETWEEN KAMPELMAN AND KARPOV ON ABM TREATY ISSUES AND POSSIBLE DEFINITIONS OF PERMITTED SDI RESEARCH. BUT HERE TOO NO PROGRESS WAS MADE. KARPOV DID NOT CONFIRM HINTS OF POSSIBLE SOVIET FLEXIBILITY SINCE REYKJAVIK EG POSSIBLE SOVIET READINESS TO DEFINE A LABORATORY TO INCLUDE TEST RANGES. INDEED, HE WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO DENY ANY SUCH FLEXIBILITY AND TO REITERATE THAT THE SOVIET POSITION REMAINED AS STATED BY GORBACHEV AT REYKJAVIK. OUR STATE DEPARTMENT CONTACTS HAVE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING LEAKS ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR DISCUSSION, INCONCLUSIVE THOUGH IT WAS: THEY FEAR THAT ANY SUCH LEAKS WOULD PROMPT THE PENTAGON TO TRY TO CLIP KAMPELMAN'S WINGS AND REMOVE HIS PRESENT FLEXIBILITY TO ENGAGE IN INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF ABMT ISSUES.

5. THE STATE DEPARTMENT DO NOT THINK (ALTHOUGH KAMPELMAN'S FINAL REPORT IS NOT YET IN) THAT ANY AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON ANY FURTHER US/SOVIET CONTACT BEFORE 15 JANUARY. KAMPELMAN WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED A THIRD NITZE/KARPOV EXPERTS MEETING IN JANUARY, BUT WAS NOT INSTRUCTED TO PRESS THE IDEA IF THERE SEEMED LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT ANY SUCH MEETING WOULD
BE PRODUCTIVE.

ACLAND

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE
DA
CR

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 December 1986

Dear Colin,

NATO: DPC COMMUNIQUÉ

The Prime Minister has seen UKDEL NATO telegrams no. 349 and 350 giving the latest text of the DPC Communiqué. She is well content with the outcome. I should be grateful if you would pass on to the Defence Secretary the Prime Minister's thanks and her agreement that we should accept the text.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

yours sincerely,

(C.D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 349
OF 041820Z DECEMBER 86
INFO FLASH MODUK

ADVANCE COPY

ADVANCED
RE
PS/NO10

MODUK (FOR APS/SOFS, AUS(DS), DACU)

SIC EME

DPC COMMUNIQUE

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE DEFENCE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER CONCERNING THE DPC COMMUNIQUE.

TEXT BEGINS
I SAW CAP WEINBERGER THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED AFTER THE FINAL DPC SESSION TOMORROW MORNING. YOUR MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT HAD CLEARLY BEEN RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD AND CAP EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS TO LET OFFICIALS WORK ON THE BASIS OF YOUR CAMP DAVID STATEMENT. THERE IS NO DOUBT OF COURSE THAT CAP AND HIS OFFICIALS DO REMAIN COMMITTED TO ALL THE PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE IN GENEVA, BUT THEY DID AGREE TO DROP THEIR PREVIOUS REQUIREMENT FOR PUBLIC ALLIANCE ENDORSEMENT OF ALL THESE POSITIONS IN FAVOUR OF THE CAMP DAVID EXPRESSION OF AGREED PRIORITIES.

AFTER SOME VERY TOUGH TALKING THEREFORE WE HAVE NOW AGREED WORDING WHICH ACCEPTS ENTIRELY THE CORE UK PROPOSALS TOGETHER WITH SOME ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE ON SUCH ISSUES AS VERIFICATION AND A CW BAN WHICH IS HELPFUL TO BOTH THE US AND OURSELVES. WE EXPECT CONFIRMATION THAT THIS TEXT IS ALSO ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER ALLIES WITH ONLY A MINOR NORWEGIAN PROBLEM TO RESOLVE WITH THE US AND ON WHICH WE NEED NOT LEAD. SUBJECT TO YOUR AGREEMENT, I INTEND TO ACCEPT THIS TEXT FORMALLY TOMORROW MORNING.

TEXT ENDS

ALEXANDER

YYYY

UBLNAN 1233

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 350
OF 041829Z DECEMBER 86
INFO FLASH MODUK

MODUK (FOR APS/SOFS, AUS(DS), DACU)

SUBJECT EME

DPC COMMUNIQUE

1. FOLLOWING ARE PARAGRAPHS ON ARMS CONTROL AGREED AD REFERENDUM:

TEXT BEGINS

2. NATO'S AIM IS THE PREVENTION OF WAR SEMI COLON THEREFORE THE ALLIANCE MUST CONTINUE TO ENSURE ITS SECURITY THROUGH THE PROVISION OF ADEQUATE MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THE PARALLEL PURSUIT OF A MORE STABLE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP. CREDIBLE DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE IS AN ESSENTIAL BASIS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

3. NATO'S STRATEGY OF FORWARD DEFENCE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, INCLUDING THE COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE NUCLEAR DETERRENT POSTURE, HAS PRESERVED PEACE FOR MANY YEARS AND REMAINS FULLY VALID. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF EXISTING WARSAW PACT STRENGTH AND ONGOING FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, THIS STRATEGY CONTINUES TO REQUIRE EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, BASED ON A MIX OF SYSTEMS. GIVEN THE NEED FOR STABLE BALANCE AT ALL TIMES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION. REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD INCREASE THE IMPORTANCE OF ELIMINATING THE CURRENT IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. WE REJECT UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE ABANDONMENT BY NATO OF ITS DETERRENT STRATEGY, AND HENCE THE BASIS FOR ITS SECURITY AND STABILITY. AS IN THE PAST, ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND COHESION WILL BE IMPORTANT IN ENSURING PROGRESS TOWARDS A MORE SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT.

12. FOLLOWING REYKJAVIK WE SUPPORT THE US IN SEEKING BALANCED, EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE ~~ARMS~~ CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE AGREED THAT INSTEAD OF SIMPLY CODIFYING THE EXISTING LEVELS OF ARSENALS, AGREEMENTS REACHED IN GENEVA SHOULD SEEK TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES IN WAYS THAT WILL ENHANCE STABILITY AND MINIMISE THE RISK OF WAR. WE THEREFORE WELCOMED THE PROGRESS AT REYKJAVIK TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES AND ON LONGER-RANGE INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR MISSILES. WE FULLY ENDORSE THE US

PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES AND ON LONGER-RANGE INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR MISSILES. WE FULLY ENDORSE THE US DETERMINATION TO NEGOTIATE DETAILED AGREEMENTS ON THIS BASIS AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY AND URGE THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN IN THIS EFFORT IN GENEVA. PROGRESS ON INF MUST NOT BE HELD HOSTAGE TO ANY OTHER AGREEMENT SEMI COLON SOVIET INSISTENCE ON DOING SO WOULD DESTROY THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ASSURANCES GIVEN AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. NOR MUST SUCH AN INF AGREEMENT NEGLECT THE EXISTING IMBALANCES IN SHORTER-RANGE INF MISSILES FOR WHICH CONSTRTAINTS AND EQUAL RIGHTS MUST BE PROVIDED, INCLUDING SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE MISSILES. IN ALL CASES, EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION WOULD BE AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION. WE WILL CONTINUE TO ASSESS AND TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON ALL THESE ISSUES. (OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS) WE STRONGLY SUPPORT (CLOSE SQUAE BRACKETS) OR (OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS) WE REITERATED OUR SUPPORT FOR (CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS) (NOPRWEGIAN ALTERNATIVE) THE UNITED STATES' EXPLORATION OF SPACE AND DEFENCE SYSTEMS, AS IS PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY.

13. WE ALSO CONFIRMED OUR RESOLVE TO SEEK AN EARLY CONCLUSION OF A WORLDWIDE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IN THIS CONTEXT WE CALLED UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS.

14. WE ALSO EMPHASISED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CURRENT WORK IN THE ALLIANCE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. AT EVERY STAGE OF THIS PROCESS THE ALLIANCE MUST HAVE A POSITION WHICH PROTECTS THE ABILITY OF ITS MILITARY COMMANDERS TO CARRY OUT THEIR ASSIGNED TASKS. WE SHALL BE SEEKING TO ACHIEVE INCREASED OPENNESS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STABLE, COMPREHENSIVE AND VERIFIABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT LOWER LEVELS WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.

TEXT ENDS

2. THE NORWEGIAN DEFENCE MINISTER IS ALSO ASKING FOR A FURTHER SENTENCE TO BE ADDED TO PARA 12 ABOVE AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE THE PROGRESS IN ICELAND IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED OBJECTIVE OF PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE AND TERMINATING IT ON EARTH. UNQUOTE HE HAS NO SUPPORT AND IT IS NOT EXPECTED THAT HE WILL MAKE THIS A STICKING POINT TOMORROW.

ALEXANDER

YYYY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 349
OF 041820Z DECEMBER 86
INFO FLASH MODUK

ADVANCE COPY

ADVANCED
Re
PS/NATO

MODUK (FOR APS/SOFS, AUS(DS), DACU)

SIC EME

DPC COMMUNIQUE

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE DEFENCE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER CONCERNING THE DPC COMMUNIQUE.

TEXT BEGINS
I SAW CAP WEINBERGER THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED AFTER THE FINAL DPC SESSION TOMORROW MORNING. YOUR MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT HAD CLEARLY BEEN RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD AND CAP EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS TO LET OFFICIALS WORK ON THE BASIS OF YOUR CAMP DAVID STATEMENT. THERE IS NO DOUBT OF COURSE THAT CAP AND HIS OFFICIALS DO REMAIN COMMITTED TO ALL THE PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE IN GENEVA, BUT THEY DID AGREE TO DROP THEIR PREVIOUS REQUIREMENT FOR PUBLIC ALLIANCE ENDORSEMENT OF ALL THESE POSITIONS IN FAVOUR OF THE CAMP DAVID EXPRESSION OF AGREED PRIORITIES.

AFTER SOME VERY TOUGH TALKING THEREFORE WE HAVE NOW AGREED WORDING WHICH ACCEPTS ENTIRELY THE CORE UK PROPOSALS TOGETHER WITH SOME ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE ON SUCH ISSUES AS VERIFICATION AND A CW BAN WHICH IS HELPFUL TO BOTH THE US AND OURSELVES. WE EXPECT CONFIRMATION THAT THIS TEXT IS ALSO ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER ALLIES WITH ONLY A MINOR NORWEGIAN PROBLEM TO RESOLVE WITH THE US AND ON WHICH WE NEED NOT LEAD. SUBJECT TO YOUR AGREEMENT, I INTEND TO ACCEPT THIS TEXT FORMALLY TOMORROW MORNING.

TEXT ENDS

ALEXANDER

SENT
- 4 DEC 1986

YYYY

UBLNAN 1233

CONFIDENTIAL

file KPo
cc Sir P.C.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 December 1986

Dear Colin.

NATO Ministerial Communiques

Thank you for your letter of 3 ~~October~~ DECEMBER recounting the latest moves over the NATO Ministerial Communiques.

I do not find the State Department's version too far off what we could live with. I have spoken to John Kerr in Washington and suggested two amendments which, if the Americans take them, would probably make the text acceptable to the Prime Minister:

(i) the first phrase of the first paragraph should read: "Following Reykjavik, we support the United States intention to seek balanced, equitable .....";

(ii) the second paragraph should begin: "We therefore welcome ..... "

John Kerr will put these changes to the State Department. I have suggested that he make clear that if they are not accepted, we shall resort to insistence on our paragraph alone.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 December 1986

Dear Charles,

NATO Ministerial Communiques

Our Embassy at Washington have today pressed hard for the communique language approved by the Prime Minister overnight.

They have reported that the Pentagon continue to argue for the addition to our text of language endorsing the US positions at Reykjavik and Geneva. The State Department are ambivalent and see the need to come towards us. However, they say they will have difficulty in persuading the White House to over-rule the Pentagon unless they can offer a text which at least gives the appearance of taking some account of American concerns. The State Department have therefore suggested informally the following language:

"We support the United States' intention to build upon the progress achieved at Reykjavik in seeking balanced equitable and effectively verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. We will continue to consult closely on all of these issues. We agreed that, instead of simply codifying the existing levels of arsenals, agreements reached in Geneva should seek to achieve substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces in ways that will enhance stability and minimise the risk of war.

/In

We

In particular, we welcome the progress at Reykjavik towards agreement on 50% strategic reductions and on long-range intermediate nuclear weapons. We ~~fully~~ endorse the US determination to negotiate detailed agreements on this basis and urge the Soviet Union to join in this effort at the nuclear and space talks in Geneva. Progress on INF must not be held hostage to any other agreement, nor must it neglect the existing imbalances in SRINF of all relevant ranges for which constraints and equal rights must be provided. [Reductions in] Soviet SRINF will need to be addressed in subsequent negotiations."

(The State Department say that the text on SRINF may require adjustment. They have not indicated precisely what they envisage.)

The issue is likely to be put to the White House for decision between 2200 and 2300 GMT tonight. Instructions are then likely to issue to the US delegation attending the DPC at Brussels. Our State Department contacts have said that if we could indicate this evening a willingness to accept their compromise they believe they could ensure that the White House would over-rule any further attempts by the DOD to undermine the Camp David Agreement. Failing such willingness, the State Department believe that the Pentagon team will be left free to seek language more supportive of US positions.

The Foreign Secretary notes that while the State Department text could certainly have been worse, it falls some way short of what we ourselves want. The first paragraph contains language which you have said the Prime Minister does not like (point (ii) in your letter of 2 December).

/We

We would seem to have a choice between:

(i) accepting the State Department proposal, imperfect though it be;

(ii) simply instructing Mr Younger to stand firm;

(iii) as (ii) but buttressed by an approach to the NSC to underline the firmness of our position.

There are drafting amendments which could be made to the US text. For instance, we should - clearly - if we went down that path - delete the "In particular" the State Department have inserted just before the language we have proposed, and insert (say) "We therefore". But the gulf looks rather wider than that.

I am copying this letter to John Howe in the MOD.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

file
bc P.C

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 December, 1986.

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from the Taoiseach, dated 25 November, but received only today.

PART 9

(C.D. Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CCPS

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN, LONDAIN.



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

17 Grosvenor Place

SW1X 7HR

7 December 1986

Dear Private Secretary

RE9 – The attached letter to the Prime Minister the Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP is from the Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald TD. A copy of the Taoiseach's letter is enclosed for your information.

Yours sincerely

Cliona Manahan Leslie
Private Secretary to the Ambassador

Mr C D Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
Prime Minister's Office
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Enc

DEFENCE: Arms Control: PE10



SUBJECT
cc master
ops.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 231/86

CONFIDENTIAL

2883 - 1

OCMIAN 2883
CONFIDENTIAL
DD 022300Z WASHI
FM FCOLN TO WASHI
021800Z DEC
GRS 470

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 022300Z WASHINGTON
TELNO 2111
OF 021800Z DECEMBER 86
AND TO DESKBY 030800Z BONN, UKDEL NATO

NAC/DPC COMMUNIQUES

1. YOU AND BONN SHOULD CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND CHANCELLOR KOHL:
BEGINS
I VERY MUCH WELCOMED OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS YOUR/PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS STATEMENT ON 18 NOVEMBER THAT AT OUR MEETING AT CAMP DAVID WE HAD ''AGREED ON PRIORITIES FOR ARMS REDUCTION TALKS - 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, SWEEPING REDUCTIONS IN INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSIES, A BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND ADDRESSING CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMBALANCES''
IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE DIFFICULTY IN THE DRAFTING GROUPS AT NATO IN REFLECTING THESE VIEWS IN THE COMMUNIQUES TO BE ISSUED THIS WEEK AND NEXT. I THINK IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE SHOULDS RALLY TO THE LANGUAGE OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS WE/I AGREED WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS AT CAMP DAVID. I HAVE ASKED MY PEOPLE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH YOURS TO SUGGEST LANGUAGE FOR THE NATO COMMUNIQUEES WHICH I BELIEVE REFLECTS OUR SHARED INTENTIONS:
IT IS CRUCIAL THAT WE SHOULD GET OUT VIEWS SET OUT AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIET UNION IS DOING ALL IT CAN TO

ENCOURAGE DISUNITY IN THE ALLIANCE.
ENDS.
2. YOU AND BONN SHOULD THEREAFTER PUT THE FOLLOWING TEXT TO THE RELEVANT U.S. AND GERMAN OFFICIALS:
BEGINS
WE WELCOME THE PROGRESS AT REYKJAVIK TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON 50 PER CENT STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS AND ON LONG-RANGE INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE FULLY ENDORSE THE U.S. DETERMINATION TO NEGOTIATE DETAILED AGREEMENTS ON THIS BASIS AND URGE THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN IN THIS EFFORT AT THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS IN GENEVA. PROGRESS ON I.N.F. MUST NOT BE HELD HOSTAGE TO ANY OTHER AGREEMENT, NOR MUST IT NEGLECT THE EXISTING IMBALANCES IN S.R.I.N.F OF ALL RELEVANT RANGES FOR WHICH CONSTRAINTS AND EQUAL RIGHTS MUST BE PROVIDED. REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET SOVIET S.R.I.N.F WILL NEED TO BE ADDRESSED IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON ALL OF THESE ISSUES.
ENDS.
3. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CAMP DAVID LANGUAGE ARE DEALT WITH ELSEWHERE IN THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE. MOST OF THEM ARE IN FACT ALREADY IN THE DRAFT
4. YOU SHOULD TELL THE AMERICANS THAT IF THEY CAN ACCEPT THIS LANGUAGE WE COULD ACCEPT THE GLENEAGLES FORMULA ON S.D.I.
5. BONN SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE FINAL SENTENCE IS INTENDED TO REFLECT GERMAN CONCERNS.
6. UKDEL NATO SHOULD INTRODUCE THE TEXT AND MAKE CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED THE VERY HIGH POLITICAL IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO IT. UKDEL NATO SHOULD ALSO INFORM LORD CARRINGTON OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONCERN AND OF HER MESSAGES TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND CHANCELLOR KOHL.

HOWE

OCMIAN 2883

LIMITED.
DEF.D.
ACDD
PLANNING STAFF
NEWS D
INFO D
WED.
SOV.D.
EED.
ECD(P)
PS
PS/MR RENTON
MR GOODALL
MR THOMAS
MR FALL.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2)

Prime Minister

This matches your own conclusions. I have already written to FCO & MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

2 December 1986

NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUES

CDD 2/12

1. The Foreign Secretary's minute to the Secretary of State for Defence.

2. I find this disturbing:

a. The US team are pressing for endorsement of all aspects of Reykjavik.

b. Our allies, apart from the French, are apparently ready to accept US language. Unless we bestir ourselves we shall end up with a Gleneagles-type communique, as if Camp David had never been.

3. Nor am I happy with the NATO secretariat compromise draft, which the Foreign Secretary seems disposed to accept as a compromise. The annex to his minute is far from clear, but the NATO draft seems to contain the same sentence as the US draft, fully endorsing the US positions at Geneva on intermediate range strategic and defence and space systems.

4. It seems to me essential that having succeeded at Camp David we ensure that success is reflected in the wider NATO forum. Failure to do so will only encourage the Americans to slide back to Reykjavik positions; will confirm them in the view that European opinion can be readily manipulated; and will cast doubt on your own achievements. It will also give scope for damaging press questions.

5. Should we not consider representations in Washington as well as European capitals, particularly Bonn? To be effective a high level political message would be needed.

Yes

And to Paris

Carrington

PERCY CRADOCK

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

file SDB ATK
pc. PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 December, 1986.

NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE

I believe that the Prime Minister would be content with the draft message to President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl, together with the communique language, which you sent to me this evening, on the following conditions:

(i) that the other aspects of the Camp David language notably:

- the need for effective verification as an essential condition for arms reductions agreements in any field
- a ban on chemical weapons
- the continued requirement for effective deterrence based on a mix of systems
- the importance of eliminating conventional disparities
- and the need to maintain a stable overall balance at all times

are all dealt with elsewhere in the text of the communique. Most of them are in fact in the draft.

(ii) the second sentence of the draft communique passage should be amended to read: "We fully endorse the US determination to negotiate detailed agreements on this basis and urge .....". The present language is open to the interpretation that we endorse building on 50% reductions by going beyond them.

(iii) the text of the message itself should be amended to take account of the minor changes reflected in the enclosed retype.

The points in (i) above will need to be clearly reflected in the instructions to officials conveyed in the telegram.

CONFIDENTIAL

On this basis, and if the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary agree, the messages could issue tonight.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

C.D. Powell

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

I very much welcomed [your/President Reagan's] statement on 18 November that at our meeting at Camp David we had "agreed on priorities for arms reductions talks - 50% reductions in strategic offensive weapons, sweeping reductions in intermediate range missiles, a ban on chemical weapons, and addressing conventional force imbalances". It is unfortunate that there appears to be difficulty in the drafting groups at NATO in reflecting these views in the Communiqués to be issued this week and next. I think it very important that the Alliance as a whole should rally to the language [we agreed/I agreed with President Reagan] at Camp David. I have asked my people to get in touch with yours to suggest wording for the NATO Communiqués which I believe reflects our shared intentions: it is crucial that we should get our views set out as clearly as possible at a time when the Soviet Union is doing all it can to encourage disunity in the Alliance.

cc PC

FROM: B E Cleghorn, Defence Dept

DATE: 2 December 1986

cc: PS/Mr Renton
PS/PUS
Mr Goodall
Mr Houston
Mr Pakenham, ACDD
Mr Meyer, News Department

Mr Fall
Private Secretary

NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUÈS

1. I submit a draft Private Secretary minute responding to
A Mr Powell's letter of 2 December, which in turn was commenting on
B the Secretary of State's minute of 1 December to Mr Younger.

2. The draft agrees to the suggestion that the Prime Minister might send messages to President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl. It recommends, on the advice of our Embassy at Washington, that the Prime Minister should tell President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl that she strongly hopes the Aliance can rally on Camp David language and that her officials will be putting to theirs compromise language for use in both the DPC and NAC Communiqués which she has approved.

3. In the meantime we can send our proposed compromise language to our delegation at NATO telling them that, subject to No 10's agreement which we will confirm, ~~to~~ they should circulate it in the course of tomorrow's discussion on the NAC Communiqué.

B E CLEGHORN

We shall need to retain a degree of flexibility

Flexibility on the Communique language. But that is a point to which we can return later. The important thing at this stage is to back up our general points with some specific language.

A Fan 2/12

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:
Private Secretary
DEPARTMENT:
TEL. NO:
BUILDING:
ROOM NO:

Reference
BRUAFK
Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO:
PS/No 10

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUÉS

Thank you for copying to us your letter of 2 December to John Howe.

It is disappointing that the Camp David language we originally circulated in NATO has not found general support. But we ~~We~~ are continuing to lobby our Allies hard, and Mr Younger has sent a message to Mr Weinberger, whose officials - in particular Mr Perle - are the source of the problem. // ~~But~~ Subject to Mr Younger's views the Foreign Secretary thinks that short messages from the Prime Minister to the President and Chancellor Kohl would be a very helpful addition to the campaign. ~~However,~~ Our Embassy at Washington advise that unless we offer ~~new~~ precise language of our own American officials will continue to put forward texts unacceptable to us claiming nonetheless that these reflect the Camp David agreement. The Foreign Secretary suggests therefore that the Prime Minister should sends messages on the lines of the text in the enclosed telegram, which also includes draft communiqué language which our officials would put to their opposite numbers

CONFIDENTIAL

in Washington and Bonn and circulate at NATO.

This communiqué language builds on a NATO International Staff draft for the NAC Communiqué which the State Department have said they might be able to accept, adding language intended to reflect German concerns on SRINF, for which the Prime Minister has said she has sympathy. ~~Very~~ We shall be working separately to ensure satisfactory language ~~already on the table covering~~ on conventional reductions and chemical weapons. The telegram also makes it clear that, if the Americans can accept our formula on the follow up to Reykjavik, we would be prepared to live with their preferred language on SDI.

I am copying this letter to John Howe in the Ministry of Defence.

BRUAFM.

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification	Caveat	Precedence
		CONFIDENTIAL		

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
TC	2	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEAT	3	
FM	4	FM FCO
TO	5	TO DESKBY WASHINGTON
TELNO	6	TELNO
OF	7	OF 021800Z DECEMBER 86
AND TO	8	AND TO DESKBY BONN, UKDEL NATO
	9	
	10	
	11	NAC/DPC COMMUNIQUÉS
	12	
	13	1. You and Bonn should convey the following message from the
	14	Prime Minister to President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl:
	15	BEGINS
//	16	I very much welcomed open square brackets your/President Reagan's
	17	close square brackets statement on 18 November that at our
	18	meeting at Camp David we had "agreed on priorities for arms
	19	reductions talks - 50% reductions in strategic offensive weapons,
	20	sweeping reductions in intermediate range missiles, a ban on
	21	chemical weapons, and addressing conventional force imbalances".
	22	It is unfortunate that there appears to be difficulty in the
	23	drafting groups at NATO in reflecting these views in the
	24	Communiqués to be issued this week and next. I think it very
	25	important that the Alliance as a whole should rally to the
///	26	language open square brackets we ~~X~~ agreed/with President Reagan
//	27	close square brackets at Camp David. I have asked my ~~officials~~ people
/	28	to get in touch with yours to suggest ~~language~~ wording for the NATO
	29	Communiqués which I believe reflects our shared intentions:

YYYY		Catchword	
MAIN	File number	Dept	Drafted by (Block capitals) / Telephone no
ADDITIONAL			
NNNN	Authorised for despatch by:	Initials	Date/time
	For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number / Processed by

Dd8422499 50m 9/85 27081

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence

<<<<

it is crucial that we should get ~~out~~ our views set out as clearly as possible ~~on to the public record~~ at a time when the Soviet Union is doing all it can to encourage disunity in the Alliance.

ENDS

2. You and Bonn should thereafter put the following text to the relevant US and German officials:

BEGINS

We welcome the progress at Reykjavik towards agreement on 50% strategic reductions and on long-range intermediate nuclear weapons. We fully endorse the US determination to ~~build on~~ achieve this ~~common ground~~ reductions. We urge the Soviet Union to join in this effort at the nuclear and space talks in Geneva. Progress on INF must not be held hostage to any other agreement, nor must it neglect the existing imbalances in SRINF of all relevant ranges for which equal rights ~~and constraints~~ constraints and must be provided. Reductions in Soviet SRINF ~~would~~ will need to be addressed in subsequent negotiations. We will continue to consult closely on all of these issues.

ENDS

3. You should tell the Americans that if they can accept this language we could accept the Gleneagles formula on SDI.

4. Bonn should point out that the final sentence is intended to reflect German concerns.

5. UKDEL NATO should introduce the text and make clear to all concerned the very high political importance we attach to it. UKDEL NATO should also inform Lord Carrington of the Prime Minister's concern and of her messages to President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl.

HOWE

YYYY

For distribution order see Page	Catchword:

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence

<<<<

MINIMAL
LIMITED
EAST-WEST RELATIONS

ADDITIONAL
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

///
//
/

For distribution order see Page Catchword:

XY 48A (REV)

Dd8422552 50m 10/85 27081

CONFIDENTIAL

SRWAOF

apc

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 December 1986

NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUES

The Prime Minister has seen a copy of the Foreign Secretary's recent minute to the Defence Secretary about the draft communiqués for the meetings of NATO Defence and Foreign Ministers.

The Prime Minister takes the view that we must fight very hard indeed for acceptable wording, fully in line with the Camp David Statement, in these communiqués. To put it bluntly, the Americans should be told that what was good enough for the President at Camp David should be no less acceptable to them in the NATO context. She would not wish any draft of either communiqué to be agreed unless she herself has personally approved it. She would be ready, I believe, to send a message to the President, and possibly to Chancellor Kohl, ahead of the DPC meeting setting out her views and seeking their cooperation. Such a message would have to issue later today or early tomorrow to be effective. It would be helpful to have the Defence Secretary's and Foreign Secretary's views on this.

On more detailed points:

(i) the Prime Minister does not find the NATO international staff draft any more acceptable than the US version on the crucial point about the US negotiating position. She is not prepared, in any context, to endorse fully the United States' positions at Geneva. This passage should reflect the Camp David text accurately and fully;

(ii) she does not like the phrase in the NATO international staff draft about building on the progress achieved at Reykjavik;

(iii) nor does she accept the sentence in square brackets about progress in Iceland being fully consistent with the objective of preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth;

(iv) she would wish to omit the phrase "follow-on" in paragraph 13 of the NATO international staff draft and has a lot of sympathy with the proposed German amendment on SRINF mentioned in paragraph 4(b) of the Foreign Secretary's covering minute;

(v) she is not keen on the passage in square brackets in paragraph 2 of the draft communiqué;

(vi) she is not, however, particularly concerned by the points about SDI, although she would prefer to stick to the Camp David wording if possible.

I should make clear that point (i) above is by far the most important.

I am copying this letter to Tony Galsworthy (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

John Howe, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2053 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Minute from FCS to Sec. State for Defence undated, but received 4/12/86	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	20 May 2016 CWayland
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

NATO Documents

Reference	Date
Annex to JGP (86) 121(3rd revise): draft DPC	
Ministerial Communique	4/5 Dec 1986

The NATO documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of NATO and, as the originators, they reserve ownership of the documents they issue. NATO documents are, therefore, not public records even when they are kept on UK government files. When released they will be available in the NATO Archives in Brussels.

Signed C Wayland Date 15 June 2015

PREM Records Team

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-930 7022

MO 11/9/4E

1 December 1986

Dear Charles,

CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF: BRITISH PUBLIC LINE

I have seen a copy of Colin Budd's letter to you of 27th November, in which he proposed a UK public line on SRINF constraints within an INF arms control agreement.

In general, we agree with the FCO line. Pending further consultation and an agreed position within the Alliance on the question of a negotiating stance in any follow-on negotiations, we believe our public line should go no further than expressing support for the current US INF negotiating proposal at Geneva. This includes the general commitment in principle to follow-on negotiations but without proffering any detail as to their substance.

We would prefer however to spell out in clearer detail the UK stance on collateral constraints. Accordingly the MOD believe the last sentence of the FCO proposed public line should read "This should incorporate in the first INF agreement a freeze on Soviet SS22 and SS23 systems which could circumvent the agreement on longer-range INF forces, together with an agreed right for the US to match such systems."

I am sending a copy of this letter to Colin Budd (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Yours sincerely,

(J F HOWE)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

PART 9 ends:-

FCO (Budd) to MOD (Howe) 50

PART 10 begins:-

MOD (Howe) to CDP



IT8.7/2-1993
2009:02

Image Access

IT-8 Target

Printed on Kodak Professional Paper

Charge: R090212