PREM 19/2054

MT

PART 11

~~402~~ PT3 42.1

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

ARMS CONTROL TALKS AND THE EFFECT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
SALT MBFR
NUCLEAR ADVISORY PANEL
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

DEFENCE

PART 1: MAY 1979
PART 11: MARCH 1987

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~12.3.87~~							
~~13.3.87~~							
~~14.3.87~~							
~~19.3.87~~							
~~20.3.87~~							
~~23.3.87~~							
~~30.3.87~~							
~~1.4.87~~							
~~13.4.87~~							
~~14.4.87~~							
~~21.4.87~~							
~~23.4.87~~							
~~26.4.87~~							
~~29.4.87~~							
30.4.87							
Part 11 ends							

PREM 19/2054

PART 11 ends:-

CDP to PM 30.4.87

PART 12 begins:-

Washington tel no 9164 1-5-87

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2054 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Minute from Powell to Prime Minister dated 30 April 1987	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	20 May 2016 C Wayland
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
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DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

INF: SPEAKING NOTE FOR USE WITH FRG OFFICIALS

1. Across the INF board our positions are very similar. We now wish to see:

(i) the elimination of all LRINF missiles;

(ii) an integrated LR/SR agreement; and

(iii) globality, effective verification and exclusion of third country systems to apply to both LR and SR provisions.

2. In SRINF we both want:

(a) to prevent the denuclearisation of Europe, if such missiles are to be reduced/eliminated;

(b) as part of this process, to establish a fire break at the 500km level against further nuclear reductions/ negotiations irrespective of progress in the chemical/conventional fields;

(c) to sustain European confidence in the US nuclear guarantee; and

(d) to see the German Pershing 1As excluded from the negotiated constraints, in addition to the other (wholly) third country systems.

3. We still need to resolve one issue: the extent to which Western SRINF between 500 and 1000km are crucial to the preservation of Western security. You see the need for some limited deployments of land-based shorter-range missiles, capable of hitting targets in Eastern Europe (even if they cannot penetrate to any significant extent into the Soviet Union). This force would, we understand, be composed of an appropriate mix of German Pershing 1As and US Pershing 1Bs. We recognise the security arguments in favour of such deployments, were they to prove politically feasible.

4. However, we believe, as we have already stated to you, that zero SRINF should be considered an acceptable outcome provided that we establish clear terms for this, and take the necessary additional actions.

5. There remains therefore a nuance of difference between our positions. Its resolution depends in the first place on the practicality of deployment. The Belgians, Dutch and Italians appear unwilling to accept Pershing 1B deployments. Is the FRG ready to do so on its own?

6. Alternatively, is it ready to do so only with public support from at least the British and French Governments, support which we will be expected publicly to confirm ourselves? In that case, we are ready to state our support for German determination to carry through such deployments; and to make clear our view that they will provide a significant contribution to NATO's strategy of flexible response. But we cannot go so far as to state that zero-zero SRINF, with stringent conditions, would be intolerable.

7. We are also ready to continue our insistence on the exclusion of PlAs from any US/Soviet agreement; and our support would extend to their modernisation. Clearly however there will be strong pressures on the Alliance, if the Russians were to make this a sticking-point in the US/Soviet negotiations to the extent that a major agreement on both longer and shorter range INF missiles becomes unachievable.

8. In addition, we are not clear how it is proposed to reconcile:

(a) the exclusion of PlAs; and

(b) their being used to contribute to the proposed limited deployments and thereby being constrained.

9. In any case we see very considerable risks in any fall-back position on PlAs which would involve all SRINF being excluded from an LRINF agreement. Such a proposal would seem to us to open the way for

(i) significant Soviet circumvention of the LRINF agreement; and

(ii) Soviet proposals for further nuclear negotiations, perhaps all the way down to zero km, in which we would have lost our LRINF leverage and at the same time be faced with a real prospect of denuclearisation across the board.

10. This prospect seems to us a serious risk. It is far from clear to us that we would be able to sustain a position that required the implementation of PlB deployments while at the same time foreclosing on any further negotiations in the foreseeable future.

11. Against this background we propose that you and we should put the following propositions to the Americans (around which we would aim to gather support from our other European Allies):

(i) the two basic options - limited deployments or zero SRINF subject to certain terms - carry both benefits and disadvantages for the West.

(ii) provided that our five terms for zero SRINF are firmly set out, and we are satisfied about the additional steps the Alliance will need to take outside the negotiating context, we should start the negotiating bidding with the zero SRINF option (with the German PlAs excluded);

(iii) this would carry major verification advantages, would exclude third country systems, and would be used to establish a firm fire-break against further nuclear reductions in the near future;

(iv) this concept of the fire-break, as an agreed and publicly stated sticking-point of the whole Alliance, remains an essential part of our position if zero SRINF is to be acceptable. Otherwise we may find ourselves driven slowly, by Soviet and other pressures, towards the elimination of all nuclear systems from Europe. This posibility of further, follow-on negotiations carries the main risk of a "slide to denuclearisation".

(v) however, this position may not prove negotiable with the Russians, on the grounds of exclusion of the PlAs. In that case, we would propose that our fall-back position should be limited deployments on both sides (composed of a mix of PlAs and PlBs in the FRG), accompanied as before by a firm Alliance statement of our unwillingness to enter into further negotiations on these or lower-range systems until our concerns about the chemical and conventional imbalance had been fully met.

SPRECHZETTEL

Durch das gesamte INF-Spektrum hindurch haben wir sehr ähnliche Positionen bezogen. Wir wünschen nun:

(i) die Beseitigung aller nuklearen Mittelstreckenraketen grösserer Reichweite (LRINF);

(ii) ein integriertes Abkommen über Mittelstreckenraketen grösserer und kürzerer Reichweite; und

(iii) dass sich Globalität, wirksame Verifikation und die Ausklammerung von Drittstaatensystemen auf die Regelungen fuer Mittelstreckenraketen grösserer und kürzerer Reichweite beziehen sollen.

Im Bereich der nuklearen Mittelstreckenraketen kürzerer Reichweite (SRINF) möchten wir beide:

(a) die Entnuklearisierung Europas verhindern, wenn solche Raketen reduziert/beseitigt werden sollen;

(b) im Rahmen dieses Prozesses eine Feuerschneise beim Niveau der 500-Kilometer-Reichweite schlagen gegen weitere Reduzierungen/Verhandlungen im nuklearen Bereich, ungeachtet weiterer Fortschritte auf chemischem/konventionellem Gebiet;

(c) das europaeische Vertrauen in die nukleare Garantie der Vereinigten Staaten aufrechterhalten; und

(d) zusätzlich zu den anderen gänzlichen Drittstaatensystemen auch die deutschen Pershing 1A-Raketen aus den ausgehandelten Beschränkungen ausgeklammert sehen.

Eine Frage muss noch geregelt werden, nämlich inwieweit die westlichen SRINF-Raketen mit einer Reichweite von 500 bis 1000 Kilometern für die Erhaltung der westlichen Sicherheit von entscheidender Bedeutung sind. Sie halten die begrenzte Stationierung einiger bodengestützten Raketen kürzerer Reichweite, die Ziele in Osteuropa erreichen können - auch wenn sie in keinem erheblichen Ausmass bis in die Sowjetunion eindringen können -, für notwendig. Unseres Wissens würde diese Streitmacht aus einer angemessenen Mischung von deutschen Pershing 1A-Raketen und amerikanischen Pershing 1B-Raketen bestehen. Wir erkennen die sicherheitspolitischen Argumente für solche Stationierungen, wenn sie sich als politisch durchführbar

erweisen würden.

Wir sind allerdings der Auffassung - wie wir Ihnen bereits erklärt haben -, dass eine SRINF-Null-Lösung als ein annehmbares Ergebnis betrachtet werden sollte, vorausgesetzt, dass wir dafür deutliche Bedingungen festlegen und die notwendigen zusätzlichen Massnahmen ergreifen.

Es bleibt also die Nuance eines Unterschieds zwischen unseren beiden Positionen. Die Lösung dieser Frage hängt in erster Linie von der praktischen Durchführbarkeit der Stationierung ab. Die Belgier, Holländer und Italiener sind anscheinend nicht bereit, die Stationierung von Pershing 1B-Raketen zu akzeptieren. Ist die Bundesrepublik Deutschland bereit, dies im Alleingang durchzuführen?

Oder ist sie andererseits nur mit der öffentlichen Unterstützung zumindest der britischen und der französischen Regierung dazu bereit - eine Unterstützung, die wir auch unsererseits öffentlich kundtun sollten? In diesem Fall sind wir bereit, unsere Unterstützung zu erklären für die deutsche Entschlossenheit, solche Stationierungen durchzusetzen; und unsere Auffassung deutlich zu machen, dass sie einen wichtigen Beitrag zur NATO-Strategie der flexiblen Antwort leisten würden. Wir können jedoch nicht so weit gehen, dass wir eine doppelte Null-Lösung für SRINF mit strengen Bedingungen für untragbar erklären.

Wir sind auch bereit, weiterhin auf die Ausklammerung von Pershing 1A-Raketen aus einem möglichen amerikanisch-sowjetischen Abkommen zu bestehen; und unsere Unterstützung würde sich auch auf deren Modernisierung erstrecken. Das Bündnis würde jedoch natürlich starkem Druck ausgesetzt sein, wenn die Sowjets dies zu einem Hemmschuh fuer die amerikanisch-sowjetischen Verhandlungen machen würden und ein bedeutsames Abkommen über nukleare Mittelstreckenraketen grösserer und kürzerer Reichweite dadurch unerreichbar werden sollte.

Ausserdem ist es uns nicht klar, wie man

/ (a) die Ausklammerung der Pershing 1A-Raketen und

(b) deren Verwendung als Beitrag zur geplanten begrentzen Stationierung und folglich deren Einschränkung

miteinander vereinbaren will.

Auf jeden Fall sehen wir ganz erhebliche Risiken in

einer Ausweichposition bei Pershing 1A-Raketen, die die Ausklammerung aller SRINF-Raketen aus einem LRINF-Abkommen beinhalten würde. Ein solcher Vorschlag würde unseres Erachtens den Weg öffnen für

(i) eine beträchtliche sowjetische Umgehung des LRINF-Abkommens und

(ii) sowjetische Vorschläge für weitere Verhandlungen im nuklearen Bereich - vielleicht ganz runter bis zur Null-Reichweite -, bei denen wir den LRINF-Hebel nicht mehr hätten und gleichzeitig vor der reelen Aussicht einer umfassenden Entnuklearisierung stehen würden.

Diese Aussicht scheint uns ein erhebliches Risiko in sich zu bergen. Wir sind uns gar nicht klar darüber, dass wir eine Position aufrechterhalten könnten, die einerseits die Durchführung der Stationierung von Pershing 1B-Raketen verlangen, die aber gleichzeitig weitere Verhandlungen in absehbarer Zukunft ausschliessen würde.

Vor diesem Hintergrund möchten wir vorschlagen, dass Sie und wir den Amerikanern folgende Vorschläge unterbreiten (bei denen wir um die Unterstuetzung unserer europäischen Verbündetern werben würden):

(i) Die beiden grundlegenden Optionen - begrentze Stationierung oder SRINF-Null-Lösung vorbehaltlich gewisser Bedingungen - haben Vorteile und Nachtelie für den Westen.

(ii) Vorausgesetzt, dass unsere fünf Bedingungen für eine SRINF-Null-Lösung deutlich dargelegt werden und wir mit den zusätzlichen Massnahmen zufrieden sind, die das Bündnis ausserhalb des Verhandlungsrahmens wird ergreifen müssen, sollten wir die Verhandlungen mit dem Angebot einer SRINF-Null-Lösung eröffnen (wobei die deutschen Pershing 1A-Raketen ausgeklammert würden).

(iii) Dies würde grosse Vorteile bei der Verifikation mit sich bringen, die Drittstaatensysteme ausklammern und auch dazu dienen, eine wirksame Feuerschneise gegen weitere Reduzierungen im nuklearen Bereich in der nahen Zukunft zu schlagen.

K

(iv) Dieses Konzept einer Feuerschneise - als ein abgestimmter und öffentlich erklärter Hemmschuh fuer alle Bündnispartner - bleibt ein wesentlicher Bestandteil unserer Position, wenn eine SRINF-Null-Lösung annehmbar sein soll. Sonst werden wir uns vielleicht durch den Druck von sowjetischer und anderer Seite zur Beseitigung aller nuklearen Systeme aus Europa gezwungen sehen. Diese Möglichkeit weiterer Nachfolge-Verhandlungen birgt die Hauptgefahr eines "Hineingleitens in die Entnuklearisierung" in sich.

(v) Wegen der Ausklammerung der Pershing 1A-Raketen wird sich diese Position fuer die Sowjets möglicherweise als verhandlungsunfähig erweisen. Wir sollten nicht zulassen, dass ein LRINF-Abkommen aus diesem Grunde scheitert, sondern deutlich machen, dass die Verantwortung für einen Rückzug von der Null-Lösung eindeutig bei den Sowjets liegt. Wir könnten dann vorschlagen, dass unsere Ausweichposition der Sowjetunion das "Recht zum Gleichziehen" einräumen sollte, damit wir schliesslich begrenzte Stationierungen auf beiden Seiten hätten (bestehend aus einer Mischung von Pershing 1A und 1B-Raketen in der Bundesrepublik). Wir würden aber - und dies ist ein wesentlicher Punkt - den festen Bündnis-Standpunkt aufrechterhalten, dass wir nicht bereit sind, in weitere Verhandlungen über diese oder Systeme noch kürzerer Reichweite einzutreten, bis unsere Sorgen bezüglich des chemischen und des konventionellen Ungleichgewichts vollständig ausgeräumt sind.

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2054 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Letter from Powell to Parker dated 30 April 1987 with enclosure	X
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OCMIAN 1659
SECRET
DD WASHI 011700Z
FM FCOLN TO WASHI
302000Z APR
GRS 284

SECRET
D E Y O U PERSONAL
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 011700Z WASHINGTON
TELNO 688
OF 302000Z MAY 87

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

FCO TELNO 639: PRESIDENT REAGAN

1. IN SPEAKING TO THE PRESIDENT ON 2 MAY, YOU MAY LIKE TO TOUCH ON.

- SRINF YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, EMPHASISING THAT A DOUBLE ZERO INF AGREEMENT WILL NOT MAKE THE WEST SAFER UNLESS WE TAKE THE ADDITIONAL ACTIONS PROPOSED IN MRS THATCHER'S MESSAGE. THE COMMITMENT TO EUROPE OF EXTRA AMERICAN F-111S AND SUBMARINES EQUIPPED WITH CRUISE WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN BOOSTING EUROPEAN CONFIDENCE.

- SYRIA. YOU WILL ALSO HAVE SEEN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE ON THIS. YOU MIGHT STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICANS NOT CONCEDING ANYTHING TO SYRIA WITHOUT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR - AND PUBLICLY USABLE - EVIDENCE THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE CHANGED THEIR WAYS ON TERRORISM. AT PRESENT WE HAVE NO SUCH EVIDENCE.

- ECONOMIC SUMMIT. THE PRIME MINISTER HOPES TO HAVE A PRIVATE TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT, PREFERABLY ON THE EVENING OF 8 JUNE OR EARLY ON 9 JUNE. IT IS ALSO HER VERY FIRM WISH THAT THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT SHOULD AVOID ISSUING ANY DECLARATION ON SOUTH AFRICA.

2. NOW THAT THE PRINCE OF WALES IS NOT VISITING THE UNITED STATES IN SEPTEMBER THERE IS NO NEED FOR YOU TO MENTION ROYAL VISITS TO THE UNITED STATES, ALTHOUGH YOU COULD JUST TOUCH ON THE FACT THAT THE DUCHESS (AND POSSIBLY THE DUKE) OF YORK MAY BE PAYING A PRIVATE VISIT TO CONNECTICUT IN SEPTEMBER.

3. SEE MIFT.

HOWE

OCMIAN 1659

NNNN

LIMITED
HD/NAD
HD/ACDD
HD/DEFENCE
HD/ERD
HD/SAFD
HD/NENAD
HD/PROTOCOL
PRIVATE SECRETARY
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR GILLMORE
MR FALL
MR HERVEY

SIR D. MIGES
MR MAUD
MR REEVE

COPIES TO
MR POWELL NO 10 DOWNING ST.

OCMIAN 1657
SECRET
DD WASHI 011700Z
FM FCOLN TO WASHI
302000Z APR
GRS 66

SECRET
D E Y O U PERSONAL
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 011700Z WASHINGTON
TELNO 689
OF 302000Z MAY 87

STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

MIPT PRESIDENT REAGAN

1. YOU SHOULD ALSO MENTION TO THE PRESIDENT (AND NOTE FOR YOUR STRICLY PRIVATE INFORMATION) THAT, DEPENDING ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS THE PRIME MINISTER IS CONSIDERING PAYING A BRIEF AND INFORMAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN LATE JULY.

HOWE

OCMIAN 1657

NNNN

LIMITED
PRIVATE SECRETARY
PS/PUS

COPIES TO
MR POWELL NO 10 DOWNING ST.

SUBJECT
cc Master
OPS

35

SECRET

51383 - 1

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 80/87

OCMIAN 1383
SECRET
FM FCOLN TO BONNN
300800Z APR
GRS 658

SECRET
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 300930Z BONN
TELNO 245
OF 300800Z APRIL 87

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR/HEAD OF CHANCERY.

MIPT: INF: MESSAGE FROM PM TO CHANCELLOR KOHL

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE:
BEGINS
DEAR HELMUT,

IN THE SPIRIT OF THE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE ENJOYED IN RECENT MONTHS, I WANT TO GIVE YOU AN INDICATION OF THE WAY MY MIND IS MOVING ON NATO'S RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSALS PUT TO GEORGE SHULTZ IN MOSCOW FOR CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. OBVIOUSLY I DO NOT WANT TO PRE-EMPT THE OUTCOME OF THE CONSULTATIONS IN NATO. AND WE SHALL NEED TO STUDY THE DETAILS OF THE FORMAL SOVIET PROPOSALS NOW TABLED IN GENEVA. EQUALLY, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT NATO CAN AFFORD AN EXTENDED DELAY BEFORE MAKING A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE. THE RUSSIANS WILL EXPLOIT ANY INDECISION TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE, TO DAMAGE THE PRESENT COHESION OF THE WEST.

I DO HOPE THEREFORE THAT WE SHALL ALL BE ABLE TO REACH A COLLECTIVE DECISION WITHIN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND, MY PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ARE:

- ON (BEGIN UNDERLINING) INTERMEDIATE-RANGE (END UNDERLINING) NUCLEAR WEAPONS WE SHOULD GO ON TRYING HARD FOR A GLOBAL ZERO SOLUTION. THIS WOULD FORCE THE SOVIET UNION TO CLOSE THE PRODUCTION LINES FOR THE SS20 AND WOULD MAKE VERIFICATION EASIER. AT THE LEAST WE WOULD EMBARRASS THE SOVIETS OVER THEIR FAILURE TO ACCEPT THIS SEMI-COLON

- WE SHOULD AGREE TO CONSIDER A FURTHER ZERO OPTION FOR SOME (BEGIN UNDERLINING) SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS (END UNDERLINING) SEMI-COLON

AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST SET OUT CLEAR (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) TERMS TO BE ATTACHED TO A FURTHER ZERO OPTION FOR SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS.

- THE LIMITS MUST BE SET AT LEAST LOW ENOUGH TO CATCH THE SOVIET SS23 MISSILE AS WELL AS THE SS12/22 SEMI-COLON

- THE LIMITATIONS ON THESE SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS MUST BE EMBODIED IN THE LRINF AGREEMENT SEMI-COLON

- THERE MUST BE STRICT VERIFICATION SEMI-COLON

- WE SHOULD STAND OUT FOR GLOBAL ZERO, WITH ELIMINATION NOT LIMITED JUST TO EUROPE, ALSO FOR THE WEAPONS TO BE DESTROYED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SEMI-COLON

- THE AGREEMENT SHOULD EXCLUDE ALL THIRD COUNTRIES' SYSTEMS. THEN THERE ARE A NUMBER OF (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) ADDITIONAL ACTIONS WE SHOULD TAKE AS NATO, WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE RUSSIANS:

- IN MOVING TOWARDS AN SRINF ZERO OPTION, WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ENTER INTO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON

EVEN SHORTER-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BEFORE ANY FURTHER REDUCTIONS COULD BE CONSIDERED SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD HAVE TO BE ELIMINATED AND THE PRESENT IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES ELIMINATED. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BECOME A FIRM AND AGREED ALLIANCE POSITION, WHICH WE WOULD ALL EXPOUND PUBLICLY. THIS WILL PREVENT THE RUSSIANS FROM USING SALAMI TACTICS TO UNDERMINE OUR DEFENCES SEMI-COLON

- WE WOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT NATO INTENDED TO MODERNISE ITS REMAINING SHORTER-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (AS WELL AS ITS NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT) WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS ON NUMBERS. THE PROVISION OF A POWERFUL SUCCESSOR TO LANCE WILL BE IMPORTANT SEMI-COLON

- WE SHOULD ASK THE UNITED STATES TO CONSIDER THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL F-111 DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TO EUROPE AND ASSIGNMENT OF SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES TO SACEUR TO BOOST EUROPEAN CONFIDENCE IN THE CONTINUING COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE NUCLEAR DEFENCE OF EUROPE.

I AM SENDING YOU THESE IDEAS VERY MUCH ON A PERSONAL BASIS, AS OUR OWN INTERNAL CONSIDERATION IS NOT COMPLETE. BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT THEY SHOULD ENSURE THAT AN INF AGREEMENT WILL ENHANCE, NOT UNDERMINE, OUR COLLECTIVE SECURITY. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL FIND THEM A HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION TO YOUR OWN THINKING, AND TO YOUR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. AS I SAID EARLIER, I BELIEVE A COLLECTIVE DECISION IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE IS IMPORTANT. I HOPE THAT WE CAN REMAIN IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH ON THIS.

WARM REGARDS,
MARGARET.
ENDS

HOWE
OCMIAN 1383

LIMITED
ACDD
DEFENCE DEPT
PS
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR FALL

SUBJECT
cc ops
master

34

SECRET

51381 - 1

OCMIAN 1381
SECRET
DD 300930Z PARIS
FM FCOLN TO PARIS
300800Z APR
GRS 698

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 79/87

SECRET
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 300900Z PARIS
TELNO 232
OF 300800Z APRIL 87

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR/HEAD OF CHANCERY

MIPT: INF: MESSAGE FROM PM TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE:
BEGINS
DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

I VERY MUCH VALUED MY DISCUSSION HERE LAST WEEKEND WITH M. CHIRAC. AS I TOLD HIM THEN, I CONSIDER IT URGENT FOR THE ALLIANCE TO REACH AN AGREED POSITION ON THE RECENT SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR HANDLING SHORTER-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN AN INF AGREEMENT. OBVIOUSLY I DO NOT WANT TO PRE-EMPT THE OUTCOME OF THE CONSULTATIONS IN NATO. AND WE SHALL NEED TO STUDY THE DETAILS OF THE FORMAL SOVIET PROPOSALS NOW TABLED IN GENEVA. EQUALLY, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT OUR BEST INTERESTS WILL BE SERVED BY DELAY BEFORE WE PROVIDE THE RUSSIANS WITH A COLLECTIVE VIEW.

I KNOW THAT YOU WILL BE HAVING FURTHER CONTACTS WITH THE AMERICAN AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IN THE LIGHT OF OUR PREVIOUS, VERY CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON THESE MATTERS OF SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL, I THOUGHT THAT YOU MIGHT FIND IT

USEFUL TO HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF MY PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS. WHILE IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT IN AN IDEAL WORLD WE WOULD NOT WISH TO START FROM THE POSITION WE HAVE NOW REACHED, I AM SURE WE BOTH RECOGNISE THAT WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO DEAL WITH THE REALITIES - BOTH POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC - WHICH NOW CONFRONT US.

AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND, I BELIEVE THAT:

- ON (BEGIN UNDERLINING) INTERMEDIATE-RANGE (END UNDERLINING) NUCLEAR WEAPONS WE SHOULD GO ON TRYING HARD FOR A GLOBAL ZERO SOLUTION. THIS WOULD FORCE THE SOVIET UNION TO CLOSE THE PRODUCTION LINES FOR THE SS20 AND WOULD MAKE VERIFICATION EASIER. AT THE LEAST WE WOULD EMBARRASS THE SOVIETS OVER THEIR FAILURE TO ACCEPT THIS SEMI-COLON

- WE SHOULD AGREE TO CONSIDER A FURTHER ZERO OPTION FOR SOME (BEGIN UNDERLINING) SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS (END UNDERLINING) SEMI-COLON

AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST SET OUT CLEAR (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) TERMS TO BE ATTACHED TO A FURTHER ZERO OPTION FOR SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS.

- THE LIMITS MUST BE SET AT LEAST LOW ENOUGH TO CATCH THE SOVIET SS23 MISSILE AS WELL AS THE SS12/22 SEMI-COLON

- THE LIMITATIONS ON THESE SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS MUST BE EMBODIED IN THE LRINF AGREEMENT SEMI-COLON

- THERE MUST BE STRICT VERIFICATION SEMI-COLON

- WE SHOULD STAND OUT FOR GLOBAL ZERO, WITH ELIMINATION NOT LIMITED JUST TO EUROPE, ALSO FOR THE WEAPONS TO BE DESTROYED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SEMI-COLON

- THE AGREEMENT SHOULD EXCLUDE ALL THIRD COUNTRIES' SYSTEMS.

THEN THERE ARE A NUMBER OF (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) ADDITIONAL ACTIONS WE SHOULD TAKE AS NATO, WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE RUSSIANS:

- IN MOVING TOWARDS AN SRINF ZERO OPTION, WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ENTER INTO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON EVEN SHORTER-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BEFORE ANY FURTHER REDUCTIONS COULD BE CONSIDERED SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD HAVE TO BE ELIMINATED AND THE PRESENT IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES ELIMINATED. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BECOME A FIRM AND AGREED ALLIANCE POSITION, WHICH WE WOULD ALL EXPOUND PUBLICLY. THIS WILL PREVENT THE RUSSIANS FROM USING SALAMI TACTICS TO UNDERMINE OUR DEFENCES SEMI-COLON

- WE WOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT NATO INTENDED TO MODERNISE ITS REMAINING SHORTER-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (AS WELL AS ITS NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT) WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS ON NUMBERS. THE PROVISION OF A POWERFUL SUCCESSOR TO LANCE WILL BE IMPORTANT SEMI-COLON

- WE SHOULD ASK THE UNITED STATES TO CONSIDER THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL F-111 DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TO EUROPE AND ASSIGNMENT OF SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES TO SACEUR TO BOOST EUROPEAN CONFIDENCE IN THE CONTINUING COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE NUCLEAR DEFENCE OF EUROPE.

I AM SENDING YOU THESE IDEAS ON A PERSONAL BASIS, SINCE OUR OWN INTERNAL CONSIDERATION IS NOT COMPLETE. I TRUST, HOWEVER, THAT YOU AND YOUR CLOSEST COLLEAGUES WILL FIND THEM HELPFUL IN FORMULATING YOUR OWN IDEAS. THE KEY ISSUE SEEMS TO ME THE NEED TO MAINTAIN ALLIANCE COHESION SEMI-COLON TO ENSURE THAT AN INF AGREEMENT WILL ENHANCE, NOT UNDERMINE, OUR COLLECTIVE SECURITY SEMI-COLON AND TO DENY THE RUSSIANS THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT TO OUR DISADVANTAGE ANY DELAY IN THE ALLIANCE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

WITH WARM REGARDS,
YOURS SINCERELY,
MARGARET THATCHER.
ENDS

HOWE

OCMIAN 1381

NNNN
YYYY
MAIN
LIMITED
ACDD
DEFENCE DEPT
PS
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR FALL

CRS 460
UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 925
OF 292115Z APRIL 87
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MODUK
INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS

MODUK FOR DACU

INF: PRESIDENT'S PRESS INTERVIEW, 28 APRIL

1. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH A GROUP OF WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENTS ON 28 APRIL, THE PRESIDENT WAS ASKED WHY HE WAS NOT INSISTING (AS URGED BY NIXON, KISSINGER AND OTHERS) THAT INF ELIMINATION BE LINKED TO A CORRECTION OF THE NATO/WARSAW PACT IMBALANCE IN EUROPE. THE PRESIDENT REPLIED

QUOTE

I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED AND HAVE STATED MANY TIMES IN OUR MEETINGS THAT IF AND WHEN WE SUCCEED IN REDUCING WHAT I THINK ARE THE MOST DESTABILIZING WEAPONS - THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS - AND MY ULTIMATE GOAL HAS ALWAYS BEEN ELIMINATION - BUT THAT THEN MUST RECOGNIZE THAT YOU CANNOT PROCEED WITH THAT TO THE POINT THAT THEIR CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY IS INCREASED AND LEAVES AN IMBALANCE. THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, AND THAT IS TRUE WITH THE PRESENT - WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT PRESENTLY. WE RECOGNIZE THAT WE MUST KEEP IN MIND THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE, AND AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVER SINCE I'VE BEEN HERE WE HAVE BEEN, AS YOU KNOW, IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THAT MATTER OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. SO, IT'S WRONG TO ASSUME THAT WE'RE - THAT WE'RE NOT AWARE OF THAT AND THAT WE'RE NOT DEALING WITH IT.

UNQUOTE

2. THE PRESIDENT WAS ALSO ASKED WHETHER IT WAS RIGHT TO ALLOW THE RUSSIANS TO RETAIN 100 SS20 WARHEADS IN SOVIET ASIA RATHER THAN TO INSIST ON GLOBAL LRINF ELIMINATION. THE PRESIDENT REPLIED (SOMEWHAT OBSCURELY) QUOTE SO, YES, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IT BE GLOBAL, BUT - AND WE'LL SEEK THAT IN NEGOTIATIONS, BUT I DO - I'M NOT GOING TO SAY WHAT VALUE I PLACE ON THE OTHER EXCEPT THAT IF IT COMES DOWN TO A SMALL NUMBER MAINTAINED IN ANOTHER PART OF THE WORLD, SO LONG AS WE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO HAVE A DETERRENT CAPACITY, WHICH WE WOULD IN THIS CASE. AND - BUT, AS I SAY, NO, WE WOULD - WE'RE GOING TO SEEK A GLOBAL BALANCE. WE'D PREFER THAT UNQUOTE. ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON THE ELIMINATION OF SRINF, THE PRESIDENT SAID QUOTE WELL, REMEMBER THAT CONTRARY TO WHAT HAS BEEN SAID TOO MANY TIMES, THIS IS NOT A DENUCLEARIZATION OF EUROPE ... BUT REMEMBER THAT EVEN IF THE SHORT-RANGE AND THE LONG-RANGE WEAPONS, AND A DEAL IS MADE, THERE ARE STILL THOUSANDS OF WARHEADS LEFT IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OUR PART - AIRBORNE TACTICAL-TYPE WEAPONS AND SO FORTH ... THOSE ARE NOT A PART OF THIS NEGOTIATION AT ALL UNQUOTE.

13.

3. ON CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES, THE PRESIDENT SAID QUOTE WE'RE IN TOUCH WITH OUR ALLIES IN NATO AND WE WANT THEIR FEELINGS ON THIS ... UNQUOTE.

ACLAND

YYYY
FCO PASS SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, MADRID, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, ROME, UKDEL STOCKHOLM THE HAGUE, UKDEL VIENNA

ORWBAN 1317

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED	PS
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DEFENCE D.	PS/MRS CHALKER
SOVIET D.	PS/MR RENTON
NEWS D.	PS/PUS
NAD	MR DEREK THOMAS
EED	MR BOYD
WED	MR RATFORD
PLANNING STAFF	MR FALL
RES D.	MR FEARN
INFO D.	MR BRAITHWAITE
PUSD	MR SLATER
NED	MR BARRINGTON
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:
ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
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PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P) }
D. Nuc (POL) SY }
DACU }
CDI } MOD

[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

19.11.

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 343
OF 291450Z APRIL 87
INFO IMMEDIATE MOD UK, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME

MY TELNO 341: SRINF: GERMAN DECISION-MAKING TIMETABLE

1. AS OF NOW, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTEND TO TAKE A FINAL DECISION ON WEDNESDAY 6 MAY AT A RESTRICTED MEETING OF RELEVANT MINISTERS AND PARTY LEADERS. THE GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE A STATEMENT TO THE BUNDESTAG ON 7 MAY, FOLLOWED BY A DEBATE.

2. BEFORE THEN MOST RELEVANT MINISTERS, INCLUDING KOHL, ARE IN BERLIN FOR THE 750TH ANNIVERSARY FESTIVITIES. IT SEEMS LIKELY THERE WILL BE FURTHER INFORMAL DISCUSSION THERE ON THE ISSUE, BUT CONTACTS HERE TODAY DOUBT WHETHER ANY FINAL DECISION WILL EMERGE.

3. HANSEN (NATO) HAS RECEIVED RENEWED INSTRUCTIONS TODAY TO URGE FOR A POSTPONEMENT OF THE 4 MAY COUNCIL. THE GERMANS NEVERTHELESS WANT A NATO POSITION CLARIFIED DEFINITIVELY BEFORE THE NPG MINISTERIAL ON 14 MAY.

4. FRIDAY 1 MAY IS A PUBLIC HOLIDAY HERE.

BULLARD

YYYY

BPLNAN 3656

NNNN

SENT 29 APR 1987

SECRET

FILE
32 DA
CC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

29 April 1987

Dear Lyn,

INF: MESSAGES TO KOHL AND MITTERRAND

Thank you for your letter of 29 April enclosing draft messages from the Prime Minister to Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand. The Prime Minister has approved them in slightly amended form and I should be grateful if they could be despatched as soon as possible.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosures to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

(Charles Powell)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

Dear Helmut,

In the spirit of the close consultations we have enjoyed in recent months, I want to give you an indication of the way my mind is moving on NATO's response to the proposals put to George Shultz in Moscow for constraints on shorter-range nuclear weapons. Obviously I do not want to pre-empt the outcome of the consultations in NATO. And we shall need to study the details of the formal Soviet proposals now tabled in Geneva. Equally, I do not believe that NATO can afford an extended delay before making a substantive response. The Russians will exploit any indecision to their own advantage, to damage the present cohesion of the West.

I do hope therefore that we shall all be able to reach a collective decision within the very near future.

Against that background, my preliminary conclusions are:

- on intermediate-range nuclear weapons we should go on trying hard for a global zero solution. This would force the Soviet Union to close the production lines for the SS20 and would make verification easier. At the least we would embarrass the Soviets over their failure to accept this;

- we should agree to consider a further zero option for some shorter-range systems;

At the same time, we must set out clear terms to be attached to a further zero option for shorter-range systems.

- the limits must be set at least low enough to catch the Soviet SS23 missile as well as the SS12/22;

- the limitations on these shorter-range systems must be embodied in the LRINF agreement;

- there must be strict verification;

- we should stand out for global zero, with elimination not limited just to Europe, also for the weapons to be destroyed as soon as possible;

- the agreement should exclude all third countries' systems.

Then there are a number of additional actions we should take as NATO, which do not require to be negotiated with the Russians:

- in moving towards an SRINF zero option, we should make clear that we are not prepared to enter into further negotiations on even shorter-range nuclear weapons. Before any further reductions could be considered Soviet chemical weapons would have to be eliminated and the present imbalance in conventional forces eliminated. This would have to become a firm and agreed Alliance position, which we would all expound publicly. This will prevent the Russians from using salami tactics to undermine our defences;

- we would also make clear that NATO intended to modernise its remaining shorter-range nuclear weapons (as well as its nuclear-capable aircraft) without restrictions on numbers. The provision of a powerful successor to Lance will be important;

- we should ask the United States to consider the deployment of additional F-111 dual-capable aircraft to Europe and assignment of submarines with Cruise missiles to SACEUR to boost European confidence in the continuing commitment of the United States to the nuclear defence of Europe.

I am sending you these ideas very much on a personal basis, as our own internal consideration is not complete. But I do believe that they should ensure that an INF agreement will enhance, not undermine, our collective security. I hope that you will find them a helpful contribution to your own thinking, and to your further discussions over the next few days. As I said earlier, I believe a collective decision in the very near future is important. I hope that we can remain in the closest touch on this.

Warm regards,

Margaret

Dear Mr. President,

I very much valued my discussion here last weekend with M. Chirac. As I told him then, I consider it urgent for the Alliance to reach an agreed position on the recent Soviet proposals for handling shorter-range nuclear weapons in an INF agreement. Obviously I do not want to pre-empt the outcome of the current consultations in NATO. And we shall need to study the details of the formal Soviet proposals now tabled in Geneva. Equally, I do not believe that our best interests will be served by delay before we provide the Russians with a collective view.

I know that you will be having further contacts with the American and German governments over the next few days. In the light of our previous, very close consultations on these matters of security and arms control, I thought that you might find it useful to have an account of my preliminary conclusions. While it is certainly true that in an ideal world we would not wish to start from the position we have now reached, I am sure we both recognise that we have no choice but to deal with the realities - both political and strategic - which now confront us.

Against that background, I believe that:

- on <u>intermediate-range</u> nuclear weapons we should go on trying hard for a global zero solution. This would force the Soviet Union to close the production lines for the SS20 and would make verification easier. At the least we would embarrass the Soviets over their failure to accept this;

- we should agree to consider a further zero option for some <u>shorter-range systems</u>;

At the same time, we must set out clear <u>terms</u> to be attached to a further zero option for shorter-range systems.

- the limits must be set at least low enough to catch the Soviet SS23 missile as well as the SS12/22;

- the limitations on these shorter-range systems must be embodied in the LRINF agreement;

- there must be strict verification;

- we should stand out for global zero, with elimination not limited just to Europe, also for the weapons to be destroyed as soon as possible;

- the agreement should exclude all third countries' systems.

Then there are a number of <u>additional actions</u> we should take as NATO, which do not require to be negotiated with the Russians:

- in moving towards an SRINF zero option, we should make clear that we are not prepared to enter into further negotiations on even shorter-range nuclear weapons. Before any further reductions could be considered Soviet chemical weapons would have to be eliminated and the present imbalance in conventional forces eliminated. This would have to become a firm and agreed Alliance position, which we would all expound publicly. This will prevent the Russians from using salami tactics to undermine our defences;

- we would also make clear that NATO intended to modernise its remaining shorter-range nuclear weapons (as well as its nuclear-capable aircraft) without restrictions on numbers. The provision of a powerful successor to Lance will be important;

- we should ask the United States to consider the

deployment of additional F-111 dual-capable aircraft to Europe and assignment of submarines with Cruise missiles to SACEUR to boost European confidence in the continuing commitment of the United States to the nuclear defence of Europe.

I am sending you these ideas on a personal basis, since our own internal consideration is not yet complete. I trust, however, that you and your closest colleagues will find them helpful in formulating your own ideas. The key issue seems to me the need to maintain Alliance cohesion; to ensure that an INF agreement will enhance, not undermine our collective security; and to deny the Russians the opportunity to exploit to our disadvantage any delay in the Alliance decision-making process.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

31

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 19

Dear Charles,

INF : Messages to Kohl and Mitterrand

I enclose, as requested this morning, draft messages on which the Prime Minister might wish to draw it alerting Kohl and Mitterrand to her current thinking about INF.

The drafts draw heavily upon earlier papers. The main message for Kohl is that the Alliance cannot afford to delay indefinitely a decision on the Soviet offer on SRINF; and that a conditional acceptance seems to the Prime Minister to have clear attraction. For Mitterrand, the message seeks to underline the Prime Minister's remarks to Chirac last weekend, and to head off possible French trouble-making when Raimond visits Washington tomorrow (Paris telno 429 - copy enclosed for ease of reference).

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosures John Howe (MOD).

Yours ever, Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No. 10 Downing Street

SECRET

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
PRIME MINISTER

Reference
GE1AAM

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:
Chancellor Kohl

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Dear Helmut.

~~INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND ARMS CONTROL~~

In the spirit of the close consultations we have enjoyed in recent months, I want to give you an indication of the way my mind is moving on NATO's response to the proposals put to George Shultz in Moscow for constraints on shorter-range nuclear weapons. Obviously I do not want to pre-empt the outcome of the consultations in NATO. And we shall need to study the details of the formal Soviet proposals now tabled in Geneva. # Equally, I do not believe that the ~~Alliance~~ NATO can afford an extended delay before making a substantive response. I realise that for all of us getting the right answer will not be easy. But I doubt whether it will become easier if we allow matters to drift. ~~And I fear that~~ The Russians ~~might~~ will exploit ~~such a display of Alliance~~ any indecision to their own advantage, ~~and~~ to damage the present cohesion of the West.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

SECRET

I know that you will be shortly seeing Jacques Chirac, with whom I had a most interesting and useful talk here last weekend. And I understand that you have further talks scheduled with the Americans and Russians next week. Of course you will want to review all the necessary factors. But I do hope that we shall all be able to reach a collective decision within the very near future.

Against that background, my preliminary conclusions, in snapshot form, are:

- on intermediate-range nuclear weapons we should go on trying hard for a global zero solution. This would force the Soviet Union to close the production lines for the SS20 and would make verification easier. At the least we would embarrass the Soviets over their failure to accept this;

- we should agree to consider a further zero option for some shorter-range systems.

At the same time, we must set out clear terms to be attached to a further zero option.

- the limits must be set at least low enough to catch the Soviet SS23 missile as well as the SS12/22;

- the limitations on these shorter-range systems must be embodied in the LRINF agreement;

- there must be strict verification;

- we should stand out for global zero, with elimination not limited just to Europe, also for the weapons to be destroyed as soon as possible;

- the agreement should exclude all third countries' systems.

I note that the latest Soviet proposals seem to come some way to meet us on a number of these points. We shall have to press them hard to come all the way.

Then there are a number of additional actions we should take, ~~independently of the actual negotiations with the~~ as N.A.T.O., which I do not regard to be ~~the~~ negotiated with Russians:

- in moving towards an SRINF zero option, we should make clear that we are not prepared to enter into further negotiations on even shorter-range nuclear weapons. Before any further reductions could be considered Soviet chemical weapons would have to be eliminated and the present imbalance in conventional forces eliminated. This would have to become a firm and agreed Alliance position, which we would all expound publicly, to deter ~~Soviet~~ Russians from using ~~their~~ their forces to advantage our defences

- we would also make clear that NATO intended to modernise its remaining shorter-range nuclear weapons (as well as its nuclear-capable aircraft) without restrictions on numbers. ~~In view of the problem of~~ SCUD

The provision of a powerful successor to Lance will be important;

(We should ask to

- the United States would consider the deployment of additional F-111 dual-capable aircraft to Europe and assignment of submarines with Cruise missiles to SACEUR to boost Euopean confidence in the continuing commitment of the United States to the nuclear defence of Europe.

I am sending you these ideas very much on a personal basis, as our own internal consideration is not complete. But I do believe that they should ensure that an INF agreement will enhance, not undermine our collective security. I hope that you will find them a helpful contribution to your own thinking, and to your further discussions over the next few days. As I said earlier, I believe a collective decision in the very near future is important. I hope that we can remain in the closest touch on this.

Warm regards,
Norgard.

SECRET

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
PRIME MINISTER

Reference
GE1AAN

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Dear M. Président

~~INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND ARMS CONTROL~~

I very much valued my discussion here last weekend with ~~Jacques~~ M. Chirac. As I told him then, I consider it urgent for the Alliance to reach an agreed position on the recent Soviet proposals for handling shorter-range nuclear weapons in an INF agreement. Obviously I do not want to pre-empt the outcome of the current consultations in NATO. And we shall need to study the details of the formal Soviet proposals now tabled in Geneva. Equally, I do not believe that our best interests will be served by ~~an extensive~~ delay before we provide the Russians with a collective view, ~~in the form of the US response at Geneva~~.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I know that you will be having further contacts with the Americans and Germans over the next few days. In the light of our previous, very close consultations on these

SECRET

matter of security and arms control, I thought that you might find it useful to have an account of my preliminary conclusions, ~~in snapshot form~~. While it is certainly true that in an ideal world we would not wish to start from the position we have now reached, I am sure we both recognise that we have no choice but to deal with the realities - both political and strategic - which now confront us.

Against that background, I believe that:

- on intermediate-range nuclear weapons we should go on trying hard for a global zero solution. This would force the Soviet Union to close the production lines for the SS20 and would make verification easier. At the least we would embarrass the Soviets over their failure to accept this;

- we should agree to consider a further zero option for some shorter-range systems.

At the same time, we must set out clear terms to be attached to a further zero option:

- the limits must be set at least low enough to catch the Soviet SS23 missile as well as the SS12/22;

- the limitations on these shorter-range systems must be embodied in the LRINF agreement;

- there must be strict verification;

- we should stand out for global zero, with elimination not limited just to Europe, also for the weapons to be destroyed as soon as possible;

- the agreement should exclude all third countries' systems.

I note that the latest Soviet proposals seem to come a long way to meet us on a number of these points. We shall have to press them hard to come all the way.

Then there are a number of additional actions we should take independently of the actual negotiations with the Russians:

- in moving towards an SRINF zero option, we should make clear that we are not prepared to enter into further negotiations on even shorter-range nuclear weapons. Before any further reductions could be considered Soviet chemical weapons would have to be eliminated and the present imbalance in conventional forces eliminated. This would have to become a firm and agreed Alliance position, which we would all expound publicly;

- we would also make clear that NATO intended to modernise its remaining shorter-range nuclear weapons (as well as its nuclear-capable aircraft) without restrictions on numbers. In view of the problem of SCUD

the provision of a powerful successor to Lance will be important;

- the United States would consider the deployment of additional F-111 dual-capable aircraft to Europe and assignment of submarines with Cruise missiles to SACEUR to boost Euopean confidence in the continuing commitment of the United States to the nuclear defence of Europe.

I am sending you these ideas on a personal basis, since our own internal consideration is not yet complete. I trust, however, that you and your closest colleagues will find them helpful in formulating your own ideas. The key issue seems to me the need to maintain Alliance cohesion; to ensure that an INF agreement will enhance, not undermine our collective security; and to deny the Russians the opportunity to exploit to our disadvantage any extensive delay in the Alliance decision-making process.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT
cc master

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

29 April 1987

Dear Lyn,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

The Prime Minister had a talk this evening with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister. Mr. Bessmertnykh was accompanied by the Soviet Ambassador and Mr. Kossov. The discussion added little to his earlier talk with Mr. Renton, recorded in your letter of today's date.

The Prime Minister began by referring to her visit to Moscow and her gratitude to Mr. Gorbachev for the excellent arrangements and for devoting so much time to talks with her. These had been very valuable. She also wanted to say how much she appreciated the permission given to a number of individuals and families to emigrate from the Soviet Union since her visit. This was a step in the right direction. Mr. Bessmertnykh said that the Prime Minister's visit had made a considerable impact, both on the Soviet Government and on people generally. He brought regards from Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. Bessmertnykh said that good progress was being made in the arms control negotiations, particularly on intermediate-range missiles. All that was required for success here was a political decision in Washington. On the shorter-range systems, there was no problem on the missiles to be covered: SS12/22s and SS23s on the Soviet side and Pershing 1As on the American side. (He described the range of the SS23 as more than 450 km and less than 500 km.) The Soviet proposal was that these systems would be eliminated in Europe, but that each side would be allowed to retain equal numbers outside Europe. The Soviet Union could not accept conversion of Pershing IIs.

The Prime Minister gave an account of her views on the role of nuclear weapons in familiar terms. Europe was uniquely vulnerable to conventional and chemical attack, and in view of Soviet superiority in these weapons, it was essential for us to have American nuclear weapons based in Europe. Our approach to reductions was to ensure that any agreements preserved our security at every stage. On intermediate-range weapons, we would very much prefer a global zero option, which would be much easier to verify. It was regrettable that the Soviet Union so far seemed unable to accept this. The Soviet proposals in Geneva on phasing of

reductions were not acceptable since they preserved Soviet preponderance throughout the process. There also appeared to be a very curious proposal on the right to transfer missiles and warheads from Asia to Europe for training.

The Prime Minister continued that intensive discussions were going on in the Alliance on the Soviet proposals on shorter- range systems. We hoped to be in a position to respond soon. She regarded it as positive that the Soviet Union now accepted that there should be constraints on these systems in the context of an LRINF agreement. But the Soviet proposals tabled in Geneva caused us certain difficulties. There were good arguments for the complete elimination of US and Soviet missiles in the 500-1000 km range. But the Pershing IAs were German systems, and it had always been accepted that third country systems should be excluded from these negotiations.

Mr. Bessmertnykh dealt in reply with some of these points. He understood intellectually European fears of decoupling. But the reality was that, even after an agreement covering LRINF and SRINF, there would still be 5000 American nuclear warheads in Europe. He also understood the argument that an LRINF agreement would be easier to verify if all weapons in this category were eliminated. But the Soviet Union needed their 100 warheads in the Far East; and anyway, they would provide useful experience with verification arrangements. As regards the phasing of reductions, the Soviet Union could accept proportionate reductions to speed up elimination of the imbalance. He had never heard of the proposal to transfer SS20s from Asia to Europe for training purposes until it had been raised in the Foreign Office. There must be a misunderstanding. On SRINF, of course the Germans could keep their Pershing IAs: but the American-owned warheads would have to be eliminated. The possibility of a global zero solution for SRINF was not excluded.

The Prime Minister said that she wanted to stress that we could not envisage reductions in systems below 500 kms in range. NATO would modernise these weapons which were an essential part of the response to Soviet chemical and conventional superiority. Once there was agreement on LRINF and SRINF down to 500 km, the next priority should be 50% reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and elimination of chemical weapons.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

Yours sincerely,

(C.D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL
COVERING SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1987

CDP
294.

Dear Charles,

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister

As you know, Mr Bessmertnykh called on Mr Renton this morning. The Prime Minister may find it helpful to have a short account of Mr Renton's impressions of the meeting.

Bessmertnykh obviously tried to convey the impression of a flexible Soviet Union responding to points which the US had made during Mr Shultz' visit to Moscow. He claimed that the draft Treaty which the Soviet Union had tabled on 27 April was a compromise draft, drawing on the Reykjavik ideas, the US draft of 4 March, the discussions with Shultz, and some of the Soviet Union's own ideas. This contrasts strongly with the US report to the SCG on 28 April (UKDEL NATO telno 188 enclosed for ease of reference).

Bessmertnykh confirmed that the Soviet Union was sticking to the Reykjavik formula on LRINF of zero in Europe and 100 in Soviet Asia/the US. He claimed that such an arrangement would help test the verification arrangements; would help the Soviet Union preserve deterrence in Asia and the Western Pacific, and would be a counter-balance to US forces in that area. He was unsympathetic to our counter-arguments, referring instead to the Soviet scheme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century. Mr Renton referred to the Prime Minister's discussions whilst in Moscow, and her emphasis that nuclear weapons would be needed for the foreseeable future. Bessmertnykh said the Soviet Union had proposed equal percentage reductions in LRINF, but in response to US concerns could agree to the US idea of proportional reductions until equal numbers had been achieved. Thereafter, reductions would proceed in step. The Soviet Union did not accept the idea of eliminating LRINF by converting them to shorter ranges.

Again trying to convey the impression of Soviet flexibility, Bessmertnykh said that the Soviet Union accepted equal ceilings, the US right to match on SRINF, and the globality of an agreement. He did not deal specifically with the question of how many SRINF would be retained under a deal, although he did confirm that zero was a possible ceiling. Mr Renton spoke in general terms about how British thinking was evolving and emphasised that final decisions, which would be collective NATO decisions, had not yet been taken. We, of course, pointed out the difficulties for verification that retaining SRINF in Asia would involve. On the question of third country systems, Bessmertnykh more or less stuck to the position which the Soviet Union had put forward at Geneva on 27 April (UKDEL NATO telno 189, / enclosed). Having first said that the FRG Pershing IAs were included, he appeared to accept the argument that the negotiations focussed on US and Soviet missiles but went on to suggest that this might not be a problem if the negotiations were confined to what the US and the Soviet Union owned (ie, an attempt to tie down the US-owned warhead, as opposed to the missile itself). We made it clear that this would not help.

Mr Renton took the opportunity of raising CW with him, in particular the statement by the Soviet Ambassador to the CD, Nazarkin, on 16 April. In this the Soviet Union again appeared to suggest a multilateral filter on challenge inspection. This would be unacceptable to the UK as we were not able to dilute this aspect of our 1986 proposal. We pointed out the advantages of moving forward on other aspects of the Convention which were stil subject to negotiation, rather than concentrating exclusively on challenge inspection.

This is Bessmertnykh's first visit to London. He is combining some tourism with business. He is an adept conversationalist, responding quickly to the arguments made to him.

I am copying this letter to John Howe at the MOD.

Yours ever, Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

ADVANCE COPIES 20

30

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/Mrs Chalker
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
D. Nuc (POL) SY
DACU
CDI
} MOD

[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

19.11.8

SECRET
FM UKDEL NATO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 189
OF 281936Z APRIL 87
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS
INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, UKDIS GENEVA, MOSCOW
INFO SAVING TOKYO, CANBERRA, PEKING

MODUK FOR DACU
SIC EMA/EMC/EME

MIPT : SCG BRUSSELS : SOVIET SRINF PROPOSAL

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SOVIET STATEMENT ON SRINF MADE AT GENEVA ON 27 APRIL:-

QUOTE:
-- IN CONNECTION WITH PREPARATION OF THE TREATY ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, THE US SIDE HAS RAISED HERE THE QUESTION OF OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILES. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONCERN EXPRESSED IN WESTERN EUROPE AND WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AN ACCORD ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES THAT THE ISSUE OF OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILES BE RESOLVED AS FOLLOWS.

-- EQUAL LEVELS OF OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILES WILL BE ESTABLISHED ON A GLOBAL BASIS FOR THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES, AND NEITHER SIDE WILL HAVE SUCH MISSILES IN EUROPE SEMICLN MISSILES OF THIS CLASS IN EUROPE WILL BE SUBJECT TO DESTRUCTION.

-- THE OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILES TO BE LIMITED WILL INCLUDE, FOR THE USSR, SS-23 AND SS-12 MISSILES AND, FOR THE UNITED STATES, PERSHING IA AND PERSHING IB MISSILES SEMICLN US-OWNED WARHEADS FOR PERSHING IA MISSILES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY WOULD ALSO BE SUBJECT TO DESTRUCTION IN EUROPE.

-- THE PARTIES WILL UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEPLOY BALLISTIC OR CRUISE MISSILES WITH RANGES FROM 500 TO 1000 KM IN EUROPE SEMICLN THERE WOULD ALSO BE A PROVISION ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE ACCORD ON THE ELIMINATION OF OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILES IN EUROPE.

-- BOTH DEPLOYED AND NON-DEPLOYED OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILES OF

-- BOTH DEPLOYED AND NON-DEPLOYED OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILES OF THE USSR AND THE US AS WELL AS THE LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES IN EUROPE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO ELIMINATION.

-- SOVIET AND US OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILES IN EUROPE WILL BE ELIMINATED WITHIN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE PERIOD OF TIME, FOR EXAMPLE, WITHIN A YEAR.

-- IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY THE SIDES IN THIS CONNECTION WOULD BE SUBJECT TO STRICT, COMPREHENSIVE VERIFICATION, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION, BY ANALOGY WITH THE PROVISIONS FOR MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES.

-- THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES THAT AGREEMENT BE REACHED WITHOUT DELAY ON AN ACCORD ON THIS ISSUE, DRAWN UP IN LEGAL FORM. IT COULD BE WORKED OUT AS A SEPARATE AGREEMENT OR AS PART OF THE TREATY ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES.
UNQUOTE

ALEXANDER

YYYY
FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS NO. 10.
FCO PASS SAVING TO TOKYO, CANBERRA, PEKING

UBLNAN 1823

NNNN

SECRET

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2054 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

SRWAUZ

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CCB/VP

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

You are to see Mr. Bessmertnykh for half an hour tomorrow. He is the Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of Soviet relations with North America and of arms control. He accompanied Mr. Gorbachev to Reykjavik. He speaks fluent English and is a long time colleague and protege of Mr. Dobrynin. He will be accompanied by the Soviet Ambassador and Mr. Kossov.

Mr. Bessmertnykh will have done his main business with Mr. Renton and officials. I think this is right and we must not give the Russians the impression that their deputy ministers can just waltz in and negotiate with you. Against that background, half an hour is plenty.

The main purpose of the meeting is for him to brief you on the Soviet proposals and presumably the text of the draft INF agreement which they have tabled in Geneva, but which we have not yet seen. You will want to listen to what he has to say and put a number of questions and points about it. In particular you will want to establish whether the proposed zero option for shorter-range systems is global rather than limited just to Europe and whether third country systems are completely left out of account.

I think that you should be chary about revealing our own hand, given that we do not yet have a formal NATO position. We must not give too much away about our intentions. I suggest therefore that you limit yourself to some rather general points:

- our conviction of the essential role of nuclear weapons in preventing war in Europe;

- our determination to maintain a full spectrum of nuclear weapons as part of the strategy of flexible response;

CONFIDENTIAL

- our rejection of the concept of a Europe without nuclear weapons;

- the fact that we have to take account of Soviet superiority in chemical and conventional weapons, and must therefore retain some number of shorter-range land based missiles to counter this superiority; and

- the importance of conducting negotiations in Geneva rather than by a series of public statements, which give the impression of a greater interest in propaganda than in serious progress.

You could say that you were pleased with your own talks with Mr. Gorbachev in which you agreed on a number of priorities in the arms control process, including INF, chemical weapons and 50 per cent reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. You hope that Mr. Gorbachev has reflected further on your ideas on SDI and predictability.

My strong inclination would be not to go much beyond this.

You will find a brief in the folder.

C.D.P

(C. D. POWELL)
28 April 1987

ADDITIONAL POINTS TO MAKE TO BESSMERTNYKH

ON THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY

- Not yet seen the text.

But from what we have heard (from you) there are several points which cause very serious difficulty.

- The first is the phasing of reductions in medium-range missiles.

  Your proposal would allow the Soviet Union to retain a preponderance right through the reductions process.

  There must be proportionate reductions to reduce the imbalance.

- You cannot expect us to take seriously your claim to the right to transfer

remaining medium-range missiles in Asia to Europe for training purposes.

This rouses all our worst fears and is completely unacceptable.

It underlines how much better it would be to have <u>complete</u> elimination of medium range missiles.

- Your proposal provides for elimination of all shorter-range systems in the range

500-1000 km. from Europe but would allow each side to keep an equal number outside Europe.

This would not be equal, because it would be much easier for you to return your missiles to Europe than it would be for the US.

It would be better to agree on <u>global</u> elimination of these systems.

- There is no justification for including the German Pershing 1As in the agreement. It has always been a principle of US/Soviet negotiations that they do not cover third country systems. These are German missiles and launchers.

- We would insist on limitations on shorter-range systems being in the text of the main INF agreement itself.

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CC PC/ B/UP

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 April 1987

CDP 29/4

Dear Charles,

Call on the Prime Minister by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, 29 April

The Prime Minister has agreed, following your letter of 21 April (copy enclosed for ease of reference), to see Mr A A Bessmertnykh, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, at 1700 hours on Wednesday 29 April. He has asked for the meeting to brief the Prime Minister on the latest Soviet arms control position, in the light of the Shultz visit to Moscow. He will be accompanied by Ambassador Zamyatin and Mr Kossov, who will act as interpreter if necessary (although Mr Bessmertnykh speaks fluent English). Mr Bessmertnykh will have called on Mr Renton earlier in the day, and attended a lunch given by the Soviet Ambassador at which FCO officials will be present.

I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister's meeting which covers the arms control spectrum, with particular emphasis on INF. In addition, I enclose a personality note on Mr Bessmertnykh; from this you will see that he has had a long relationship with Mr Dobrynin, with whom he served for some time in the Washington Embassy.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosures to John Howe (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH, 29 APRIL 1987

Our Objectives

- To reaffirm the arms control priorities identified during the Prime Minister's Moscow visit.
- To press the Soviet Union for detailed/serious negotiations at Geneva.
- To resist Soviet attempt at wedge-driving, or to bounce us into INF agreement.

UK Arguments

LRINF

- UK priority remains elimination of all LRINF, globally. Long-standing Alliance position. Urge Soviet Union to accept global agreement.
- No third country forces to be included.

SRINF

- Examining latest Soviet offer (Gorbachev to Shultz in Moscow, 14 April) with care, in consultation with Allies. Will present collective view when ready.
- Soviet willingness to abandon monopoly over US in SRINF welcome. But proposal must be considered against total threat - nuclear, conventional, chemical - facing West.
- Any SRINF agreement must be capable of effective verification. Also should be part of LRINF agreement, and globally applied as latter.
- Look forward to hearing details of latest Soviet draft tabled at Geneva.
- Unclear how Gorbachev proposes to handle "tactical" (ie sub-500km) nuclear weapons. In any case, hard to see how can be separatedf from other short-range systems and conventional/chemical forces. Imbalance in latter becomes all the more important as cuts in nuclear systems proceed.

START

- US demonstrated willingness to move forward since Reykjavik. Regret lack of Soviet response until recently.
- Fully support 50% cuts. US move from 5 to 7 years for implementation period seems practical. Such reductions would be massive achievement, additional 2 years worthwhile if necessary.

SDI/ABMT

- Noted Gorbachev's 28 February statement that conclusion of START agreement should be conditioned by agreement on no weapons deployed in space. Also noted Gorbachev's statement of 23 April that some ABM research work in space may be allowed.
- Evolution in Soviet position? Details of what Soviet Union may have in mind for permissible/non-permissible activity in space? Follow-up to own ideas presented to Gorbachev in Moscow?
- Need now to follow through at Geneva. But no Soviet veto on US research. Helpful if Soviet Union acknowledges/explains nature of own activity.

Nuclear Testing

- Understand recent movement towards Reykjavik (step-by-step) approach to further constraints. UK would welcome such limited agreements as now envisaged.
- Progress not to be blocked by Soviet propaganda on CTBT.

His Objective

- To explain latest Soviet thinking on arms control.
- To make the case for Soviet flexibility, and sincerity in negotiations.
- To accuse the US of backsliding, and obduracy on SDI.
- To criticise Europeans (including UK) for erecting new obstacles to arms control.

- To draw attention to Soviet welcome to UK CW verification initiative.

Counter-Arguments

- Trust that serious period of negotiation now in train. Arms control to be conducted not by public diplomacy but by detailed proposals in Geneva.
- NATO ready to respond to genuine Soviet offers which will enhance security. But not prepared to sacrifice own interests, nor to play to international gallery.
- West united behind US negotiating position. Will not be rushed to judgement. Series of Soviet statements less helpful than committed approach in Geneva.
- NATO concern about Soviet superiority in INF, CW and conventional forces genuine, long-established. Not erecting new obstacles but determined only to sign agreements which enhance security.
- Pleased UK and Soviet positions on CW appear close. We hope to respond to Soviet proposals very soon.

Press Line

The Prime Minister met Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh on 29 April, at his request. The meeting lasted [30 minutes]. The Prime Minister set out the Government's current approach to arms control in light of her recent visit to Moscow, and against the background of recent US/Soviet talks. She reaffirmed the Government's commitment to achieving the maximum progress possible at the Geneva negotiations, and underlined the need for a genuine Soviet contribution to this. She noted that, in consultation with our Allies, we were still considering the latest Soviet proosal on INF, to which we expected a Western response in the near future.

GE1AAE

BESSMERTNYKH Aleksandr Aleksandrovich

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

A lawyer by training, Bessmertnykh (53) joined the MFA in 1957 and has spent the greater part of his career either in, or dealing with, the USA. In the early 1960s he was an official in the UN Secretariat in New York, and from 1970 to 1983 he served in the Soviet Embassy in Washington (under Anatoly Dobrynin, now a Party Secretary and head of the CC CPSU's International Department) rising to become Minister-Counsellor.

On his return to Moscow in 1983 he became Head of the MFA's USA Department, and in April 1986 he was appointed a Deputy Foreign Minister, with responsibility for Northern and Central America and arms control issues.

He accompanied Gorbachev to the Reykjavik summit in October last year, and was at the opening session of the CSCE conference in Vienna in November.

He speaks good English.

ADVANCE COPIES (20)

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/Mrs Chalker
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
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MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
A. Nuc (POL) SY
DACU
CDI
MOD

IMMEDIATE

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19.11.8

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 429
OF 281454Z APRIL 87
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, BONN
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOWW

Please file on

FRANCE AND INF

SUMMARY

1. RAIMOND WILL VISIT WASHINGTON ON 30 APRIL TO EXPRESS FRENCH DOUBTS ABOUT SRINF ZERO OPTION.

DETAIL

2. RAIMOND'S VISIT WILL BE A ONE-DAY AFFAIR. THE CENTREPIECE WILL BE A DISCUSSION WITH SHULTZ ON INF.

3. RACINE (MATHIGNON) TOLD US THAT THE VISIT HAD ONLY BEEN DECIDED ON 27 APRIL. THE FRENCH WERE ENCOURAGED BY ATTITUDES IN BONN AND OTHER CAPITALS TO THINK THAT EUROPEAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE SRINF ZERO OPTION WAS NOT A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. RAIMOND'S OBJECTIVE WOULD THEREFORE BE TO REDUCE AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THIS PROPOSAL. HE WOULD WARN AGAINST GETTING DRAWN INTO A PROCESS OF STEP-BY-STEP DENUCLEARISATION IN EUROPE.

4. RACINE COMMENTED THAT CHIRAC HAD FOUND HIS TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AT CHEQUERS EXTREMELY INTERESTING AND USEFUL AND WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE DEGREE OF AGREEMENT ON INF. HE WAS NOW LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS TALKS WITH KOHL ON 3 MAY, WHEN HE WOULD BE URGING THE GERMANS TO TAKE A TOUGH LINE ON ZERO SRINF.

WESTON

YYYY

PCLNAN 8770

NNNN

SECRET

File 28
CDP
29/4.

ARMS CONTROL: MAIN ELEMENTS OF UNITED KINGDOM'S POSITION ON SRINF

- we would accept a zero option below 1000 km. down to a range which traps the SS23. The limitation might be formulated terms of specific systems rather than in terms of range (which might pose difficulties for modernisation of our own short-range systems);

- the zero option must be global but should exclude third country systems (i.e. British and French nuclear weapons and the German Pershing 1As). It should be embodied in the INF agreement itself;

- at the same time we would reaffirm the Alliance's intention to retain land-based nuclear missiles up to 500 km. (or whatever precise limit is set) and to modernise them. There would be no limitation on numbers i.e. NATO would have the right to match the Soviet Union. The intention to retain and modernise nuclear-capable aircraft and their nuclear weapons would also be reaffirmed;

- the United States should deploy additional dual-capable aircraft to Europe and assign SLCMs to SACEUR;

- NATO would rule out negotiations on further reductions or limitations on land-based missiles of lower ranges, at least until agreement has been reached on the destruction of all chemical weapons and on parity in conventional forces;

- it will be very important to preserve the unity of the Alliance, and retain public confidence in Europe in whatever position is adopted.

MJ2AYF

SECRET AND PERSONAL

DG2BWS

File

bc: PC

27

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 April 1987

ARMS CONTROL: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I enclose a copy of the Prime Minister's message to President Reagan giving our preliminary views on NATO's response to the recent Soviet proposals on shorter-range nuclear weapons. It should be seen only by a very limited number of people with a strict need to know. But in this instance, copies might go on a strictly personal basis to Antony Acland and Michael Alexander (although they should not show knowledge of the message itself in contacts with their American colleagues).

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SUBJECT
cc master
Ops

26

CABINET OFFICE LONDON/WHITEHOUSE 001/28

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 77/87

IMMEDIATE
2819OOZ APR 87
FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO WHITEHOUSE
BT
S E C R E T

FOLLOWING FOR FRANK CARLUCI FROM CHARLES POWELL.

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT.

DEAR RON,

I WANT TO GIVE YOU AN INDICATION OF THE WAY MY MIND IS MOVING ON NATO'S RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSALS PUT TO GEORGE SHULTZ IN MOSCOW FOR CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

OBVIOUSLY I DO NOT WANT TO PRE-EMPT THE OUTCOME OF THE CONSULTATIONS IN NATO. AND I HAVE NOT YET SEEN DETAILS OF THE FORMAL SOVIET PROPOSALS TABLED IN GENEVA.

SUBJECT TO THAT, MY PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS, IN SNAPSHOT FORM, ARE:

- ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WE SHOULD GO ON TRYING HARD FOR A GLOBAL ZERO SOLUTION. THIS WOULD FORCE THE SOVIET UNION TO CLOSE THE PRODUCTION LINES FOR THE SS20 AND WOULD MAKE VERIFICATION EASIER. AT THE LEAST WE WOULD EMBARRASS THE SOVIETS OVER THEIR FAILURE TO ACCEPT THIS:

- WE SHOULD AGREE TO CONSIDER A FURTHER ZERO OPTION FOR SOME SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST SET OUT CLEAR TERMS TO BE ATTACHED TO A FURTHER ZERO OPTION:

- THE LIMITS MUST BE SET AT LEAST LOW ENOUGH TO CATCH THE SOVIET SS23 MISSILE AS WELL AS THE SS12/22:

- THE LIMITATIONS ON THESE SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS MUST BE EMBODIED IN THE LRINF AGREEMENT:

- THERE MUST BE STRICT VERIFICATION:

- WE SHOULD STAND OUT FOR GLOBAL ZERO, WITH ELIMINATION NOT LIMITED JUST TO EUROPE, ALSO FOR THE WEAPONS TO BE DESTROYED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

- THE AGREEMENT SHOULD EXCLUDE ALL THIRD COUNTRIES' SYSTEMS.

THEN THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL ACTIONS WE SHOULD TAKE INDEPENDENTLY OF THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS:

- IN MOVING TOWARDS AN SRINF ZERO OPTION, WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ENTER INTO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON EVEN SHORTER-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BEFORE ANY FURTHER REDUCTIONS COULD BE CONSIDERED SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD HAVE TO BE ELIMINATED AND PARITY ACHIEVED IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BECOME A FIRM AND AGREED ALLIANCE POSITION, WHICH WE WOULD ALL EXPOUND PUBLICLY:

- WE WOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT NATO INTENDED TO MODERNISE ITS REMAINING SHORTER-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (AS WELL AS ITS NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT) WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS ON NUMBERS. IN VIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF SCUD THE PROVISION OF A POWERFUL SUCCESSOR TO LANCE WILL BE IMPORTANT:

- THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONSIDER THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL F-111 DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TO EUROPE AND ASSIGNMENT OF SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES TO SACEUR TO BOOST EUROPEAN CONFIDENCE IN THE CONTINUING COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE NUCLEAR DEFENCE OF EUROPE.

NEITHER OF US WOULD EVER AGREE TO JEOPARDISE EUROPE'S SECURITY. I BELIEVE THAT MY PROPOSALS WOULD AVOID THAT. I AM SENDING THEM TO YOU VERY MUCH ON A PERSONAL BASIS, AS OUR OWN INTERNAL CONSIDERATION IS NOT COMPLETE. I WOULD VALUE YOUR COMMENTS IN THE SAME SPIRIT.

WARM REGARDS,

MARGARET.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER UNITED KINDOM
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
BT

25

FOLLOWING FOR FRANK CARLUCI FROM CHARLES POWELL.

Please pass following personal message from the Prime Minister to the President.

Dear Ron,

I want to give you an indication of the way my mind is moving on NATO's response to the proposals put to George Shultz in Moscow for constraints on shorter-range nuclear weapons.

Obviously I do not want to pre-empt the outcome of the consultations in NATO. And I have not yet seen details of the formal Soviet proposals tabled in Geneva.

Subject to that, my preliminary conclusions, in snapshot form, are:

- on intermediate-range nuclear weapons we should go on trying hard for a global zero solution. This would force the Soviet Union to close the production lines for the SS20 and would make verification easier. At the least we would embarrass the Soviets over their failure to accept this;

- we should agree to consider a further zero option for some shorter-range systems.

At the same time, we must set out clear terms to be attached to a further zero option:

- the limits must be set at least low enough to catch the Soviet SS23 missile as well as the SS12/22;

- the limitations on these shorter-range systems must be embodied in the LRINF agreement;

- there must be strict verification;

- we should stand out for global zero, with elimination not limited just to Europe, also for the weapons to be destroyed as soon as possible;

- the agreement should exclude all third countries' systems.

Then there are a number of additional actions we should take independently of the actual negotiations with the Russians:

- in moving towards an SRINF zero option, we should make clear that we are not prepared to enter into further negotiations on even shorter-range nuclear weapons. Before any further reductions could be considered Soviet chemical weapons would have to be eliminated and parity achieved in conventional forces. This would have to become a firm and agreed Alliance position, which we would all expound publicly;

- we would also make clear that NATO intended to modernise its remaining shorter-range nuclear weapons (as well as its nuclear-capable aircraft) without restrictions on numbers. In view of the problem of SCUD the provision of a powerful successor to Lance will be important;

- the United States would consider the deployment of additional F-111 dual-capable aircraft to Europe and assignment of submarines with Cruise missiles to SACEUR to boost European confidence in the continuing commitment of the United States to the nuclear defence of Europe.

Neither of us would ever agree to jeopardise Europe's security. I believe that my proposals would avoid that. I am sending them to you very much on a personal basis, as our own internal consideration is not complete. I would value

your comments in the same spirit.

Warm Regards,

Margaret.

CDP
25/4.

SECRET

cc P/C 24

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2111/3

CDP 28/4.

MO 11/9/4E

28th April 1987

Dear Charles.

ARMS CONTROL

FILE WITH CDP

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter today to Lyn Parker enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to the US President.

We have two related amendments to propose to the text. We believe - pending the results of our studies - that the balance of argument may strongly favour setting the lower range limit for a zero option for shorter range systems low enough to catch the SCUD (300 kms) as well as SS23. This is not only because a major part of the very considerable imbalance in systems in the SRINF range bracket as a whole (72 Pershing lAs on the NATO side versus 858 SS12/28, SCUD B and SS23 on the Soviet side) is attributable to SCUD (720 launchers); but more particularly because the SCUDS pose a considerable threat to the airfields on which the dual capable aircraft on which we would have crucially to rely are based.

We therefore suggest that it is important to avoid the definite implication that we would want the lower range limit of zero to go down to the SS23 but no further. Two small changes to the letter follow: to substitute "at least low enough" for "so as" in the penultimate line of page 1, and to delete "below the range of the Soviet SS23" in the fifth line of page 2 of your draft.

Since you and I spoke earlier this afternoon Mr Younger has strongly endorsed these amendments.

I am copying this letter to Lyn Parker (FCO).

Yours sincerely,
John Howe.

(J F HOWE)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET

DGfGNCG : Annex Contract Pt II



SECRET

CPC 23
CDP

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 April 1987

Dear Charles

CDP 28/4.

INF: Message to President Reagan

Thank you for your letter of earlier today, enclosing a draft message for the Prime Minister to send to President Reagan before he sees the Norwegian Prime Minister tomorrow. We have not of course been able to consult the Foreign Secretary; but in his absence we agree that it would be useful to set out the Prime Minister's current thinking at this stage, along the lines you suggest.

We believe that it would be useful to make a clearer distinction in the message between the various points which we wish to convey to the President: our position on LRINF; on SRINF; the terms we would wish to see attached to an agreement on the latter; and actions which the West should take independent of any negotiations with the Russians.

On points of detail, we wonder whether it would be right at this stage to make an overall agreement quite so tightly conditional on the achievement of all our objectives. Insisting on excluding the German Pershing Ia may not in practice be acceptable to the Germans themselves. To set the post-INF floor at the (probable) range of the SS23 might cause problems for the subsequent deployment of a LANCE follow-on system: it may be better therefore to refer specifically to a range-ceiling of 500kms. And you will be aware of reservations in the DOD about the commitment of US SLCMs to SACEUR.

No 1

I enclose a revised version of your draft which embodies the above points, with the exception of the last.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to John Howe (MOD).

Yours ever,

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

SECRET

SECRET

Following for Frank Carlucci from Charles Powell
Please pass following personal

~~DRAFT~~ MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Dear Ron,

I want to give you an indication of the way my mind is moving on NATO's response to the proposals put to George Shultz in Moscow for constraints on shorter-range nuclear weapons.

Obviously I do not want to pre-empt the outcome of the consultations in NATO. And I have not yet seen details of the formal Soviet proposals tabled in Geneva.

Subject to that, my preliminary conclusions, in snapshot form, are:

- on intermediate-range nuclear weapons we should go on trying hard for a <u>global</u> zero solution. This would force the Soviet Union to close the production lines for the SS20 and would make verification easier. At the least we would embarrass the Soviets over their failure to accept this;
- We should agree ~~that~~ to consider a further zero option for some shorter-range systems ~~should be acceptable.~~ would

— But there ~~However, on this latter point we must at the same time set out the terms~~ we would wish to see attached to such an agreement. In my view these should be:

/...

SECRET

- the limits must be set so as to catch the Soviet SS23 missile as well as the SS12/22
- the limitations on these shorter-range systems must be embodied in the LRINF agreement
- there must be adequate verification
- we should urge the need for global zero, with elimination not limited just to Europe, and for the weapons to be destroyed as soon as possible.
- the agreement should exclude all third countries' systems.

In addition to the above points, I believe that there are other actions we should take, independent of the negotiations with the Russians, ~~in order~~ to ensure that such an INF agreement truly enhances our security. These are:

- at the same time as we move towards an SRINF zero option, we should make it clear that we are not prepared to enter into further negotiations on reductions in nuclear systems below the Soviet SS23, setting a range ceiling for that purpose of 500km. We could only envisage further reductions when Soviet chemical weapons had been eliminated and parity achieved in conventional forces
- we would also make it clear that NATO intended to modernise its remaining shorter-range nuclear weapons (as well as its nuclear-capable aircraft) without restrictions on numbers
- the United States would consider the deployment of additional F111 dual-capable aircraft to Europe, and

the assignment of submarines with cruise missiles to SACEUR, in order to boost European confidence in the continuing commitment of the United States to the nuclear defence of your Allies.

I am sending you these thoughts very much on a personal basis, as our own internal consideration is not complete. I would value any comments in the same spirit.

Warm regards

Margaret

SECRET

Prime Minister 22
Consistent with your line. COS 254

COPY NO 1 OF 2

Yes - very good m

PRIME MINISTER

28 April 1987

INF

1. I have read Charles Powell's minute of 24 April about our response to Gorbachev's latest proposals. I agree broadly, and would only add one or two considerations.

2. Like Charles, I doubt whether it will be practicable to avoid zero/zero down to SS23/500 kilometres. The political momentum, particularly from the Americans, is there; there are certain obvious military gains, eg removing a Soviet superiority of the level of 9 to 1; and there will be a strong political disinclination in Europe to exercising a right to match in this range, even if we were to get one. Any reasonable outcome could be favourably presented as a result of Western firmness. Nor would it be wise in domestic terms for the UK to be seen trying single-handedly to stem the arms reduction tide.

3. So far so good. But we must be clear that this will not be the end of the road. Gorbachev is agile and restless and will want to keep us on the run. He has already referred to abolishing battlefield nuclear weapons. It will not be sufficient to accept the 500 kilometres offer without the most careful examination of our policy in the lower range. In other words any decision must be taken against the background of an agreement with our Allies on NATO's security requirements covering the whole spectrum. This will mean a readiness on the part of the Europeans to see modernisation and strengthening in the range below 500 kilometres. Given the problem with Scud, a follow-on to Lance, perhaps 400 kilometres, would be a key element. This right to modernisation or build up will have to be stipulated to the Russians and it will have to be recognised among our allies that in this stratum at least it will have to be exercised.

SECRET

4. At the same time there will have to be a collective agreement in NATO to expound publicly the need for a line to be drawn and for the Alliance's continuing requirement for nuclear weapons and nuclear missiles if stability is to be maintained. If the case is presented properly I am sure that most of the public will respond well.

5. We would presumably link any further discussions to removal of the vast Soviet superiority in conventional and chemical weapons. But we would have to be clear in our own minds that cosmetic reductions in this area would not be enough and that for all practicable purposes there would be no further movement - that Western Europe is in a strategic position which necessitates nuclear deterrence and flexible response. This immobilisme will need courage on the part of the Alliance in the face of further Soviet seductions, but will be an essential part of the game. The burden of public exposition should be collective and not left to you alone.

6. I agree with the various provisos suggested for our acceptance eg global zero, exclusion of third party systems, strict verification. We must also do our best to extract compensation from the Americans in the form of submarine-launched Cruise missiles assigned to Saceur. But my main concerns are: (a.) that the Alliance should see the security problem as a whole and (b.) that we should try to anticipate further Gorbachev moves by stating our requirements for stability, with the intention of meeting them.

PERCY CRADOCK

ADVANCE COPIES 20

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/Lord Chalfont
PS/LADY YOUNG — MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS — MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
MR THOMAS — A. Nuc (Pol) SY
MR BOYD — DACU
CDI — MOD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

IMMEDIATE

RESIDENT CLERK

[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

19.11.E

SENT 28 APR 1987

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 341
OF 281410Z APRIL 87
INFO IMMEDIATE MOD UK, UKDEL NATO
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME

MY TELNO 338: LRINF/SRINF

SUMMARY

1. KOHL'S COALITION REMAINS DIVIDED. THERE IS NO IMMEDIATELY OBVIOUS WAY OUT.

DETAIL

2. GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES AT ALLIANCE MEETINGS TODAY (WEU COUNCIL, SCG) HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAY A HOLDING GAME, WITH THE COALITION HOPING NO DOUBT THAT SOMETHING WILL TURN UP (E.G. UNEXPECTED LANGUAGE IN THE SOVIET TREATY TABLED IN GENEVA) WHICH WILL OBVIATE THE PROBLEMS FACING THE FEDERAL COALITION ON ZERO SRINF. SUBJECT TO DEVELOPMENTS, A FURTHER CABINET DISCUSSION THIS WEEK SEEMS UNAVOIDABLE IF THE GERMANS ARE TO HAVE A POSITION FOR THE NATO COUNCIL ON 4 MAY. IT NOW SEEMS THAT VORONTSOV WILL ONLY COME TO BONN ON 5 MAY, I.E. PROBABLY TOO LATE FOR FURTHER PROCRASTINATION UNLESS THE AMERICANS WILL AGREE TO A SLOWER TIME-FRAME FOR DECISION, AS SOME HERE ARE HOPING. KOHL SEES CHIRAC IN STRASBOURG ON 3 MAY AND GENSCHER FLIES TO WASHINGTON ON 7 MAY.

3. THE SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS IN PLAY HERE ARE NO DOUBT MIRRORED ELSEWHERE - WHETHER ACCEPTING DOUBLE ZERO WILL LEAD TO FURTHER CREEPING ZERO AND PROGRESSEVE DENUCLEARISATION, OR CAN BE USED TO CREATE A FIRM FIREBREAK: WHETHER DOUBLE ZERO WILL IMPAIR THE CREGDBOQJFE2-:.1..6m+'09,'3, OR WHETHER ENOUGH OTHER SYSTEMS REMAIN AVAILABLE TO OFFER MILITARY COMMANDERS ADEQUATE OPTIONS: THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTY OF SAYING NO, ETC.

CREDIBILITY

See below

4. THE PROBLEM IS COMPLICATED FOR THE GERMANS BY:

A) THEIR PARTICULAR CONCERN OVER THE REMAINING 600 SOVIET AND NSWP SCUD SYSTEMS (BELOW 500 KMS)

A) THEIR PARTICULAR CONCERN OVER THE REMAINING 600 SOVIET AND NSWP SCUD SYSTEMS (BELOW 500 KMS).

B) THE EXISTENCE OF 72 GERMAN PERSHING IA WHICH, IN ADDITION TO THEIR VALUE IN PROVIDING A UNIQUE NATO OPTION IN THE SRINF RANGE, HAVE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES HERE AS BEING SYSTEMS OVER WHICH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE MORE SAY THAN OVER PURELY US SYSTEMS.

ALL COALITION PARTIES HERE WANT TO RETAIN THE GERMAN PIA, AND NONE, I THINK, WANT TO PRECLUDE THEIR MODERNISATION IF POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTY OF DOING SO IN ISOLATION IS WELL-APPRECIATED.

5. THE DOMESTIC BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH THIS DEBATE TAKES PLACE IS MADE MORE SENSITIVE BY MEMORIES OF THE 1983 LRINF DEBATE, WHICH HERE, PROBABLY MORE THAN ANYWHERE ELSE IN EUROPE, LEFT A DEEP SCAR ON THE BODY POLITIC. THERE IS ENORMOUS PUBLIC AND PRESS INTEREST IN THE SRINF ISSUE. FURTHERMORE, THE FRG IS IN A SEMI-PERMANENT STATE OF ELECTION CAMPAIGN, WITH LAND ELECTIONS IN HAMBURG AND RHEINLAND PALATINATE ON 17 MAY, AND IN BREMEN AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN ON 13 SEPTEMBER. THE FDP IN PARTICULAR IS CONSCIOUS THAT JUDICIOUS SELF-PROFILING ON SUCH ISSUES NORMALLY GIVES IT AN ELECTORAL BOOST. THE CDU WILL BE CONCERNED TO AVOID THE CHARGE (ALREADY BEING MADE BY THE SPD) THAT THEY ARE THE PARTY OF RE-ARMAMENT, NOT DISARMAMENT. THE CDU ALSO WANT TO AVOID LETTING THE FDP MAKE THE RUNNING ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AS SO OFTEN THE CASE HITHERTO. THE BUNDESTAG REASSEMBLES NEXT WEEK AFTER THE EASTER RECESS. THE SPD HAVE ASKED FOR A DEBATE ON THE INF ISSUE ON 7 MAY, AND ARE NOW CONSIDERING CALLING FOR AN ADDITIONAL SPECIAL SESSION OF THE BUNDESTAG IN WHICH THEY WILL HOPE TO EXPOSE THE COALITION INTERNAL DIFFERENCES.

6. THIS BACKGROUND EXPLAINS GENSCHER'S COMMENT, REPORTED TODAY, THAT THIS DEBATE IS THE MOST DIFFICULT SINCE THE FORMATION OF THE COALITION IN 1982. THE FDP HAVE SAID THEY ARE AGAINST ANY NEW DEPLOYMENTS OF US SRINF AND DRAW ATTENTION TO THE AMERICAN INCLINATION TO ACCEPT ZERO SRINF. GENSCHER HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO CONSULT FDP COLLEAGUES THROUGHOUT, AND THEY SEEM UNITED BEHIND HIM.

7. THE CDU AND CSU SEEM TO BE AT ONE IN BACKING WOERNER. EVEN RUEHE (NORMALLY CLOSE TO KOHL, AND SOMETIMES BRANDED BY THE CSU AS A 'GENSCHERIST') ECHOES THE CDU RIGHT-WING AND CSU IN EMPHASISING THE PARTICULAR THREAT TO THE FRG IF DOUBLE ZERO IS ADOPTED. BUT CDU SECRETARY-GENERAL GEISSLER HAS TAKEN THE DEFENSIVE LINE THAT THE CDU IS A ''DISARMAMENT PARTY'' AND CALLED FOR CABINET DISCIPLINE AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

8. KOHL'S TRADITIONAL TRICK OF POSTPONING A DECISION, HOPING THE PROBLEM WILL GO AWAY, SEEMS UNLIKELY TO WORK IN THE TIME FRAME FOR DECISION NOW FACING THE COALITION (ALTHOUGH FMOD SUGGEST THAT THE LATEST NEWS FROM GENEVA AVOIDS THE NEED TO TAKE AN IMMEDIATE POSITION ON ZERO SRINF, I.E. STRENGTHENS WOERNER'S CASE). ALTHOUGH KOHL SCORES SOME POINTS IN PUBLIC COMMENT TODAY FOR NOT LETTING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BE RUSHED INTO DECISION ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT ISSUE, THERE IS HEAVIER CRITICISM THAT HE HAS NOT ACTED MORE FIRMLY TO RESTORE CABINET UNITY. BUT SOME COMMENT (E.G. SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG) NOTES THAT THERE IS LITTLE BONN CAN DO IF THE US AND SOVIET UNION ARE DETERMINED TO GO FOR ZERO SRINF.

9. THE CDU/CSU LINE-UP IN THE INNER-CABINET AGAINST GENSCHER IS STRONG: BUT THE US POSITION AND PUBLIC OPINION HERE, AS WELL AS THE IMMINENT ELECTIONS, STRENGTHEN GENSCHER'S HAND. ASSUMING DEVELOPMENTS IN GENEVA DO NOT OBVIATE THE NEED FOR A GERMAN POSITION ON ZERO SRINF, I WOULD NOT LIKE TO SAY WHICH WAY THE DEBATE HERE WILL COME OUT. I CANNOT SEE GENSCHER SECURING UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS (INDEED HE IS PICTURED AS COMFORTING HIMSELF TODAY THAT AT LEAST THE

9. THE CDU/CSU LINE-UP IN THE INNER-CABINET AGAINST GENSCHER IS STRONG; BUT THE US POSITION AND PUBLIC OPINION HERE, AS WELL AS THE IMMINENT ELECTIONS, STRENGTHEN GENSCHER'S HAND. ASSUMING DEVELOPMENTS IN GENEVA DO NOT OBVIATE THE NEED FOR A GERMAN POSITION ON ZERO SRINF, I WOULD NOT LIKE TO SAY WHICH WAY THE DEBATE HERE WILL COME OUT. I CANNOT SEE GENSCHER SECURING UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS (INDEED HE IS PICTURED AS COMFORTING HIMSELF TODAY THAT AT LEAST THE DECISION YESTERDAY DID NOT GO AGAINST HIM). GENSCHER IN ANY CASE HAS NOT SAID THAT ZERO SRINF MUST BE ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUALIFICATIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, I CANNOT SEE THIS COALITION LEADING THE EUROPEANS IN PERSUADING THE AMERICANS, CONTRARY TO PUBLICLY ADOPTED POSITIONS, THAT NEW US SRINF DEPLOYMENT IN THE FRG AND ELSEWHERE ARE NOW INDISPENSABLE.

10. MY FEELING THEREFORE (IT CAN BE NO MORE) IS THAT THE OUTCOME WILL PROBABLY FALL SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE TWO EXTREMES: IN OTHER WORDS ACCEPTING ZERO SRINF SUBJECT TO VARIOUS CONDITIONS. THESE MIGHT INCLUDE SOME OF THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS, WHICH ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE:

A) A FIRM LINK TO ARMS CONTROL ON CW AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

B) NO FURTHER NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT BELOW 500 KM.

C) EXPLICIT EXEMPTION OF THE PERSHING IAS AND PERHAPS EVEN A REFUSAL TO ACCEPT TREATY LANGUAGE WHICH WILL PRECLUDE MODERNISATION.

D) RENEWED US PUBLIC COMMITMENTS ON EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

I suspect this may partly reflect my talks with Teltschik.

11. THE FOREGOING IS CONSISTENT WITH 2 COMMENTS MADE TO ME TODAY BY RUEHL, STATE SECRETARY IN THE FMOD:

- THAT BY LIMITING THEIR DRAFT TREATY ON LRINF TO EUROPE, AND BY DEMANDING THAT GERMAN PERSHING IAS BE DESTROYED REPEAT DESTROYED AS PART OF A ZERO SRINF ARRANGEMENT, THE RUSSIANS HAD EASED THE GERMAN SITUATION

- THAT WHATEVER THE FINAL OUTCOME MIGHT BE, THERE WOULD BE NO ZERO SRINF WITHOUT CONDITIONS.

BULLARD

YYYY

BPLNAN 3647

NNNN

IFMLOLO K LINE 5 PAPARA THREE -

.....CREDIBILITY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE OR WHETHER ENOUGH OTHER

SECRET

FILE
DA
LPC

21

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 April 1987

ARMS CONTROL

The Prime Minister believes that we must let the Americans have a very early indication of the way our minds are moving on how NATO should respond to the recent Soviet proposals on medium and shorter-range nuclear weapons. We have had signals that the White House are anxious to have some idea, if only preliminary, of our thinking. The Prime Minister has of course spoken to M. Chirac and Mrs. Brundtland, and the latter will be seeing President Reagan tomorrow. It is likely that she will report what the Prime Minister said. It would be much better if he were to hear our preliminary views at first hand.

The Prime Minister therefore wishes to send the President a personal message today, on the direct line, setting out our ideas in brief but clear form. I enclose a draft and should be grateful for comments by 1700 today.

BF 11

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

(C.D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

JB

FOLLOWING FOR FRANK CARLUCI FROM CHARLES POWELL.

Please pass following personal message from the Prime Minister to the President.

Dear Ron,

I want to give you an indication of the way my mind is moving on NATO's response to the proposals put to George Shultz in Moscow for constraints on shorter-range nuclear weapons.

Obviously I do not want to pre-empt the outcome of the consultations in NATO. And I have not yet seen details of the formal Soviet proposals tabled in Geneva.

Subject to that, my preliminary conclusions, in snapshot form, are:

- on intermediate-range nuclear weapons we should go on trying hard for a global zero solution. This would force the Soviet Union to close the production lines for the SS20 and would make verification easier. At the least we would embarrass the Soviets over their failure to accept this;

- we should agree to consider a further zero option for some shorter-range systems, but only on certain strict conditions;

- it must be global zero and not limited just to Europe and the weapons must be destroyed;

- it should exclude third country systems, not just British and French but also the German Pershing Ias;

- the limits must be set so as to catch the Soviet SS23 missile as well as the SS12/22;

- the limitations on these shorter-range systems must be embodied in the INF agreement itself;

- there must be adequate verification;

- at the same time we would establish a floor against any further reductions below the range of the Soviet SS23 until Soviet chemical weapons had been eliminated and parity achieved in conventional forces;

- we would also make clear that NATO intended to modernise its remaining shorter-range nuclear weapons (as well as its nuclear-capable aircraft) without restrictions on numbers;

- the United States would consider the deployment of additional F1-11 dual-capable aircraft to Europe and assignment of submarines with Cruise missiles to SACEUR to boost European confidence in the continuing United States' nuclear commitment.

I am sending you these thoughts very much on a personal basis, as our own internal consideration is not complete. I would value any comments in the same spirit.

Warm Regards,

Margaret.

GRS 1050

SECRET

20A

SECRET
FM UKDEL NATO
TO DESKBY 270930Z FCO
TELNO 184
OF 270805Z APRIL 87
AND TO DESKBY 270930Z MODUK
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON

SIC EME
MODUK FOR MR STANLEY (MIN AF)

LRINF/SRINF: SACEUR'S VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. GENERAL ROGERS PRIVATELY AIRS TO VCDS AND PERMREP HIS CONTINUING STRONG DOUBTS ABOUT ANY ZERO-ZERO LRINF DEAL, AND ABOUT SHULZ'S PREFERRED OPTION FOR ELIMINATING SRINF, AND EXPRESSES A WISH THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN URGING THE PRESIDENT TO SLOW DOWN THIS ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. BUT HE RECOGNISES THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS, AND OUTLINES HIS APPROACH SHOULD MINISTERS NEVERTHELESS DECIDE TO BACK THE PRESENT US LINE.

DETAIL

2. AT HIS REQUEST SACEUR MET VCDS AND MYSELF YESTERDAY EVENING AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE (BRITISH) DEPUTY SACEUR. THE DISCUSSION WAS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE AND LASTED FOR OVER AN HOUR.

3. SACEUR OPENED BY EXPRESSING HIS CONTINUED OPPOSTION ON MILITARY GROUNDS TO ANY ZERO-ZERO LRINF DEAL THAT LEFT THE ALLIANCE WITHOUT ITS MOST SURVIVABLE, EFFECTIVE, AND EUROPEAN BASED MEANS OF HOLDING TARGETS AT RISK IN THE SOVIET UNION. HE WANTED THE HIGHEST POLITICAL CIRCLES TO BE AWARE OF THAT. HIS BASIC PURPOSE NOW WAS TO EXPLORE WHETHER THERE WAS, EVEN AT THIS LATE STAGE, ANY WAY OF SLOWING DOWN THE ARMS CONTROL TRAIN. HE WAS APPROACHING US BECAUSE THE PRIME MINISTER WAS THE MOST EFFECTIVE (HE ALSO USED THE WORDS, THE ONLY) WESTERN LEADER AND ONE WITH A UNIQUE ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE PRESIDENT. WAS THERE NO WAY, HE ASKED, OF SWITCHING THE ALLIANCE'S POSITION TO ALLOW THE RETENTION OF SOME LRINF, FOR EXAMPLE PICKING UP SENATOR NUNN'S IDEA OF HOLDING BACK THE LAST 20 PER CENT OF LRINF UNTIL THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE.

4. VCDS AND I IN RESPONE REVIEWED WITH SACEUR THE ARGUMENTS WHICH HAD LED THE ALLIANCE TO BACK ZERO-ZERO AS TABLED BY THE US IN GENEVA, AND THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR ALL ALLIANCE COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS THE RISKS FOR ALLIANCE COHESION, OF SWITCHING TRACKS NOW. SACEUR ACKNOWLEDGED THESE REALITIES, AND THAT THE LRINF TRAIN WAS PROBABLY UNSTOPPABLE. HE INDICATED THAT THIS WAS THE ANSWER HE HAD EXPECTED BUT ASKED THAT HIS MILITARY VIEWS NEVERTHELESS BE CONVEYED TO MINISTERS.

SECRET

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5. TURNING TO SRINF, ABOUT WHICH HIS CONCERNS WERE OF A LESSER ORDER (SINCE THE SYSTEMS IN QUESTION WOULD NOT REACH THE USSR), SACEUR ALSO ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS NO WAY OF LEAVING OPTIONS OPEN TO ALLOW RETAINING A WESTERN RIGHT TO DEPLOY IN THE 500 TO 1000 KM RANGE BAND, EG WITH THE P1B IN A MIX OF ABOUT 48 US AND 72 MODERNISED FRG SYSTEMS, ACCEPTING MATCHING SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS. VCDS AND I CONFINED OURSELVES TO SAYING THAT HMG WAS STILL CONSIDERING THE SHULTZ BRIEFING, AND EMPHASISED THAT CERTAINLY THE VIEWS OF THE NATO MILITRY AUTHORITIES WOULD BE PUT IN FULL TO MINISTERS. WE NOTED THAT IT SEEMED TO US VERY UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ALLOW THE P1A TO BE MODERNISED AND THAT IT PROBABLY PLANNED TO CATCH THE GERMAN SYSTEMS THROUGH THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSES OF ANY AGREEMENT. WE DISCUSSED THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE OF SOME EUROPEANS (AND AGAIN SACEUR HAD THE UK IN MIND) STOPPING AND BEING SEEN TO STOP THE US FROM REACHING AN EARLY AND VALID AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SACEUR WAS REALISTIC ABOUT THE PROBLEMS, AND WENT ON TO OUTLINE HIS VIEWS ON THE OTHER POSSIBLE OPTIONS.

6. IF MINISTERS RULE OUT P1B DEPLOYMENTS, THEN SACEUR WOULD PREFER TO EXTEND THE SRINF ZERO-ZERO TO CAPTURE THE SCUD (IE ZERO OVER 300 TO 1000 KM), AND ESTABLISH A LINK TO REMAINING WARSAW PACT SNF. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS AND THE COMPLICATIONS THAT THIS WOULD BRING TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ANY AGREEMENT IN A TIMESCALE ACCEPTABLE TO THE US.

7. IF MINISTERS CONCLUDE THAT THIS IS NOT PRACTICAL POLITICS AND THAT SOME FORM OF THE QUOTE DOUBLE ZERO UNQUOTE OPTION SHOULD BE PURSUED THEN SACEUR SAID THAT HE WOULD ENDORSE AN APPROACH THAT COUPLED ACCEPTANCE WITH THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE ALLIANCE STATEMENT THAT

A. EMPHASISED THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE SMICLN

B. EXPRESSED THE CONTINUING ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND A DETERMINATION TO AVOID QUOTE DENUCLEARISATION UNQUOTE SMICLN

C. COMMITTED THE ALLIANCE TO THE NECESSARY NUCLEAR MODERNISATION, NOT LEAST INCLUDING SACEUR'S NWRS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND A LANCE FOLLOW-ON SYSTEM SMICLN

D. STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DEALING WITH THE REMAINING IMBALANCES IN SHORTER RANGE LAND BASED NUCLEAR MISSILES, AND THE ALLIANCE'S WILLINGNESS TO SEE THESE NEGOTIATED OVER, ULTIMATELY PERHAPS DOWN TO GLOBAL ZERO, BUT ONLY AFTER SATISFACTORY PROGRESS ON CW AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS.

8. I ASKED SACEUR DIRECTLY FOR HIS VIEW ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF ALL LAND-BASED MISSILE SYSTEMS FOR ALLIANCE STRATEGY. HE SUCKED HIS TEETH, AND WOULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF IN ADVANCE OF FURTHER SHAPE STUDIES. NUCLEAR ARTILLERY AND CURRENT LANCE MISSILES HE COULD CONTEMPLATE GIVING UP UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES BUT BUT HE DID REFER TO THE CONVENTIONAL REQUIREMENT

/FOR.

FOR FUTURE FOFA SYSTEMS CURRENTLY PLANNED TO BE MET BY TACTICAL MISSILES. WE DISCUSSED THE ADVANTAGES OF REMOVING A FUTURE EXPENSIVE ATBM REQUIREMENT BUT SACEUR NOTED THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE CONCENTRATION OF OTHER FORMS OF WP ATTACK ON THE REMAINING AND CRUCIAL NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND RELATED FACILITIES.

COMMENT

9. VCDS AND I WERE IN NO DOUBT THAT SACEUR'S REAL CONCERNS STILL FOCUS ON THE LOSS OF HIS LRINF (GLCM AND PERSHING II) CAPABILITY TO STRIKE SOVIET TERRITORY. HE SENSES THAT HIS OWN INFLUENCE IS EBBING WITH ONLY TWO MONTHS MORE IN OFFICE. HE WILL CONTINUE TO SPEAK HIS MIND, IN PUBLIC WHEN ASKED, BUT HE HAS NO REAL EXPECTATION OF CHANGING EVENTS NOW. IF LRINF ZERO-ZERO HAS TO BE, HE WOULD PREFER POLITICIANS TO ACCEPT NEW DEPLOYMENTS OF AT LEAST THE 750 KM RANGE P1B IN PART COMPENSATION, OR FAILING THAT TO REORDER THE NEGOTIATIONS TO REMOVE THE SCUD AS WELL. BUT HIS BOTTOM LINE IS A PUBLIC COMMITMENT BY THE ALLIES (AND THE US IN PARTICULAR) TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, TO THE OTHER NUCLEAR MODERNISATIONS HE HAS LONG CALLED FOR, AND TO LINK FURTHER SHORT RANGE LAND BASED MISSILE REDUCTIONS, PERHAPS DOWN TO ZERO, TO THE OUTCOME OF CW AND CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS.

10. GENERAL ROGERS ASKED THAT HIS VIEWS BE MADE KNOWN TO UK MINISTERS. NO SPECIFIC REPLY IS CALLED FOR, BUT I RECOMMEND THAT I BRIEF HIM PERSONALY ON OUR POSITION WHEN IT IS CLEAR, PERHAPS IMMEDIATELY AFTER YOUR MEETING AT CHEVENING ON FRIDAY. SACEUR IS DUE TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON IN THE WEEK OF 4 MAY TO BRIEF PRESIDENT REAGAN PERSONALLY ON THE MILITARY IMPLICTIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE OF THE VARIOUS POSSIBLE LRINF/SRINF OUTCOMES (PLEASE PROTECT).

ALEXANDER

YYYY

UBLNAN 1814

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED
ACDD
DEFENCE D.
SOVIET D.
NEWS D.
NAD
EED
WED
PLANNING STAFF
RES D.
INFO D.
PUSD
NED
CSCE UNIT
POD
HD/SAD

PS
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PS/MRS CHALKER
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PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
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MR SLATER
MR BARRINGTON
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MR REEVE

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FM WASHINGTON
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 910
OF 272257Z APRIL 87
INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, UKDIS GENEVA
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL MBFR, VIENNA, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA, MODUK
INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS

(MODUK FOR DACU)
UK/US POLITICO-MILITARY TALKS, WASHINGTON, 23-24 APRIL

1. THE TALKS (LED BY HOLMES FOR THE US AND FALL FOR THE UK) WERE DOMINATED BY DISCUSSION OF INF (MY TELNOS 904 AND 905 - NOT TO ALL). MAIN POINTS ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL SUBJECTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

2. SDI/ABMT TREATY. HOLMES CONFIRMED OTHER ACCOUNTS OF DEVELOPMENTS DURING SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. THE RUSSIANS HAD SUGGESTED THAT A PERIOD OF NEGOTIATION ON SDI DEPLOYMENTS COULD BEGIN BEFORE RATHER THAN AT THE END OF A 10 YEAR PERIOD OF COMMITMENT TO THE ABM TREATY. THIS COULD BE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. THE RUSSIANS HAD ALSO PROPOSED AN ATTEMPT BY SENIOR DEFENCE OFFICIALS TO DRAW UP IN THE SCC A LIST OF ELEMENTS (NOT SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS) THAT COULD NOT BE TESTED IN SPACE. AS FAR AS THE US WAS CONCERNED, THE PRESIDENT WAS AWAITING THE DOD AND SOFAER REPORTS ON ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION ISSUES. SDI EARLY DEPLOYMENT WAS NOT AT PRESENT AN OPTION AND THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED TO ADHERE TO THE 1984 CAMP DAVID FOUR POINTS. THERE WOULD BE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES BEFORE ANY PRESIDENTIAL DECISION TO IMPLEMENT THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT. THE PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN UP THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONCEPT OF PREDICTABILITY AND WOULD WELCOME ANY FURTHER UK VIEWS ON THE HANDLING OF THE DEFENCE AND SPACE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. FALL WELCOMED THE US COMMITMENT TO FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES BEFORE ANY RESTRUCTURING OF THE SDI PROGRAMME IN LINE WITH THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY. THE UK APPROACH TO THE SDI WAS BASED ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FEASIBILITY AND PREDICTABILITY. WE THOUGHT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH THE RUSSIANS ARRANGEMENTS THAT MIGHT PROVIDE PREDICTABILITY. IF THE RUSSIANS SHOWED DURING SUCH DISCUSSIONS THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS NOT THE LEGITIMATE ONE OF OBTAINING REASSURANCE ABOUT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS BUT THE ILLEGITIMATE ONE OF CRIPPLING THE SDI PROGRAMME, THEY WOULD LOSE WESTERN SYMPATHY. BUT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE PREPARED TO PUT THIS TO THE TEST. HOLMES CONFIRMED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO ACHIEVE A COOPERATIVE TRANSITION TO A DEFENCE-DOMINATED STRATEGIC POSTURE. BUT THEY WERE ALSO STUDYING POSSIBLE WAYS OF EFFECTING SUCH A TRANSITION WITHOUT SOVIET CONSENT BUT WITHOUT INSTABILITY.

4. START. HOLMES SAID THAT SHULTZ HAD SUCCEEDED IN MOSCOW IN REESTABLISHING THE REYKJAVIK COUNTING RULE FOR BOMBER WEAPONS (THE RUSSIANS HAD BACKTRACKED ON THIS AFTER REYKJAVIK). BUT

/THERE

THERE HAD BEEN NO OTHER PROGRESS, ESPECIALLY ON SUB-LIMITS. BOTH SIDES WERE, HOWEVER, NOW CONCENTRATING ON 50 PER CENT START CUTS RATHER THAN MORE FAR-REACHING OBJECTIVES. FALL NOTED THAT SOME ASPECTS OF THE US START POSITION (EG ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION) WERE OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE UK. WE HOPED FOR EARLY CONSULTATION ON THESE POINTS, AS IN THE PAST. THIS WAS AGREED.

5. CW. FALL CONFIRMED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO WATERING DOWN OF OUR POSITION ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. IN PARTICULAR, WE WOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF INNOCENCE SHOULD LIE WITH THE CHALLENGED STATE AND THAT THE CHALLENGING STATE SHOULD BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE CHALLENGED STATE'S INNOCENCE OR OTHERWISE. IT SEEMED INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD ACCEPT THESE KEY ASPECTS OF CD 715. WE VIEWED MANAGED ACCESS AS A SUBSET OF OUR CONCEPT OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES.

6. THE US TEAM SAID THAT ADMINISTRATION THINKING ON A POSSIBLE SAFEGUARDS REGIME IN THE EVENT OF A BREACH OF THE CONVENTION AND ON POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE NON-SIGNATORY PROBLEM HAD NOT ADVANCED VERY FAR. THEY AGREED WITH US THAT FRENCH IDEAS ON THE RETENTION OF A MINIMUM CW RETALIATORY CAPABILITY AT AN UNDECLARED LOCATION WOULD CUT ACROSS VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND INVITE PROLIFERATION. THE FRENCH SHOULD BE PRESSED HARD ON THIS AT THE WASHINGTON MEETING ON 13 MAY, AT WHICH THE US ALSO WISHED TO DISCUSS MANAGED ACCESS SCENARIOS. THERE WAS UK/US AGREEMENT THAT AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO ADVANCE ASPECTS OF THE CW NEGOTIATIONS OTHER THAN CHALLENGE INSPECTION.

7. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. THE UK TEAM MADE CLEAR THAT THE CONTINUING DISARRAY OVER PROCEDURE WAS BECOMING A SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEM. WITH THE REYKJAVIK NAC APPROACHING, AND WITH FRENCH POLITICAL ATTITUDES HARDENING, WE BELIEVED THAT A DEAL HAD TO BE STRUCK SOON. THIS MIGHT BE BROKERED BY TWO OR THREE ALLIES AND BLESSED BY THE FULL SIXTEEN SHORTLY AFTERWARDS. THE US TEAM SEEMED RECEPTIVE TO THIS APPROACH. BUT WHILST THEY AGREED THAT ACHIEVING CONSENSUS ON TWO MANDATES WAS THE KEY ISSUE, THEY DID NOT ADMIT TO MUCH COMPENSATING FLEXIBILITY ON OTHER ISSUES. THEY THOUGHT THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE 23 NEGOTIATIONS TO THE NEXT CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING, TOGETHER WITH ANY EXPLICIT PROSPECT OF NNA INVOLVEMENT AT A FUTURE DATE, WERE POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS. THEY ALSO EXPRESSED SUSPICION THAT ANY DEAL, HOWEVER REACHED, WOULD BE UNRAVELLED BY THE FRENCH OVER TIME.

8. ON SUBSTANCE, THE US TEAM SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE STILL STUDYING THE FIVE OPTIONS IN THE UK PAPER, WITH A VIEW TO RESPONDING FORMALLY IN MAY. THE QUOTE SQUEEZE UNQUOTE ON EQUIPMENT WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION AS PART OF A WIDER APPROACH THAT MIGHT INCLUDE QUOTE NEGOTIATING FAT UNQUOTE (EG LIMITS ON PERCENTAGES OF STATIONED TANKS). CROSS-TRADING OF EQUIPMENT SUPERIORITIES, AS BEING CURRENTLY TOUTED BY GRINEVSKY, WAS ALSO BEING CONSIDERED.

9. CDE. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE WEST SHOULD EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO INSPECT. WHILST THAT RIGHT SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN THE CONTEXT OF DOUBTS ABOUT COMPLIANCE, WE SHOULD WORK TOWARDS INSPECTIONS BECOMING ESTABLISHED AS ROUTINE. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT, WITH MORE EXPERIENCE, OBSERVATION TECHNIQUES SHOULD BE EXAMINED WITH A VIEW TO MAKING THEM MORE PRODUCTIVE.

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10. NUCLEAR TESTING. HOLMES REPORTED LITTLE PROGRESS DURING SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW EXCEPT AGREEMENT THAT TECHNICAL EXPERTS SHOULD DISCUSS A SOVIET SUGGESTION THAT QUOTE CROSS-TESTING UNQUOTE (IE A SOVIET TEST AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE AND A US TEST IN THE SOVIET UNION) SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. THERE WAS NO NEW US THINKING ON WHAT INTERIM TESTING CONSTRAINTS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IF THE TTBT AND PNET WERE RATIFIED. THE RUSSIANS WERE MAKING NO PARTICULAR CONNECTION BETWEEN A US/SOVIET SUMMIT AND PROGRESS ON NUCLEAR TESTING.

11. TREATY OF TLATELOLCO. FALL SAID THAT WE WOULD WELCOME AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON HOW THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSED TO HANDLE THEIR SAFEGUARDS NEGOTIATION WITH THE IAEA AND ON HOW THEY WOULD PRESENT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US POSITION ON THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO AND US REJECTION OF SWNFZT AND SEANFZ.

12. FOR DISCUSSION OF NON-ARMS CONTROL SUBJECTS SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

ACLAND

YYYY
FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, MADRID, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, ROME, UKDEL STOCKHOLM, THE HAGUE.

ORWBAN 1264

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED
ACDD
DEFENCE D.
SOVIET D.
NEWS D.
NAD
EED
WED
PLANNING STAFF
RES D.
INFO D.
PUSD
NED
CSCE UNIT
POD
HD/SAD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR SLATER
MR BARRINGTON
MR GILLMORE
MR REEVE

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ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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IMMEDIATE

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
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PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P))
D. Nuc (Pol) SY)
DACU) MOD
CDI)

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[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

19.11.8

GRS 340
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 338
OF 271555Z APRIL 87
INFO IMMEDIATE MOD UK, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, MOSCOW, ROME

MY TELNO 333: LRINF/SRINF

SUMMARY

1. GERMANS POSTPONE DECISION ON ZERO SRINF.

DETAIL

2. I HAVE SPOKEN TO KOHL'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER, TELTSCHIK, WHO I UNDERSTAND HAS ALSO TALKED BY TELEPHONE TO POWELL, ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE INTER-MINISTERIAL MEETING HERE TODAY ON LRINF/SRINF.

3. THE MEETING WAS A LONG ONE, GOING OVER ALL THE GROUND (INCLUDING RELEVANCE OF CW AND CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE, PERSHING IA ETC), BUT IT DID NOT REACH A CLEAR CONCLUSION. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DECIDED NOT TO TAKE A DECISION UNTIL THE SOVIET POSITION ON LRINF/SRINF WAS ON THE TABLE AT GENEVA. THIS OUTCOME WAS ANNOUNCED BY FEDERAL SPOKESMAN OST.

4. REPORTS ARE THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION WILL TABLE A TREATY TODAY. SOVIET AMBASSADOR KVITSINSKI HAS SAID THAT VORONTSOV WILL COME TO BONN TO EXPLAIN IT. THE GERMANS WILL WAIT FOR THIS MEETING BEFORE TAKING THEIR OWN POSITION FURTHER. TELTSCHIK SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR EXAMPLE TO KNOW WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD PROPOSE GLOBAL OR EUROPEAN ZERO OPTION.

TAKING THEIR OWN POSITION FURTHER. TELTSCHIK SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR EXAMPLE TO KNOW WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD PROPOSE GLOBAL OR EUROPEAN ZERO OPTION.

5. GENSCHER AND WOERNER HAVE BOTH NOW LEFT FOR THE WEU MINISTERIAL.

6. TODAY'S ''MISSILE CABINET'' MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY KOHL, GENSCHER (FPD), WOERNER (CDU), SCHAEUBLE (CDU)- MINISTER AT THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY - AND ZIMMERMANN (CSU) - INTERIOR MINISTER. THE ONLY CONCEIVABLE REASON TO INCLUDE ZIMMERMANN CAN HAVE BEEN AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CSU AND STRAUSS: HE HAS NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE PARTICIPATED IN SIMILAR RECENT DISCUSSIONS. THE CDU/CSU LINE-UP AGAINST GENSCHER WAS THEREFORE FAIRLY HEAVY.

7. PARTY SPOKESMEN. BOTH SPD LEADER VOGEL AND FDP SPOKESMAN FELDMANN HAVE AGAIN SPOKEN IN FAVOUR OF ZERO SRINF. RUEHE (CDU PARLIAMENTARY SPOKESMAN) CURRENTLY IN WASHINGTON, HAS CONTINUED TO OPPOSE ZERO SRINF, SAYING THAT IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW THAT NEW SRINF DEPLOYMENTS MUST TAKE PLACE IN THE FRG (HE CONSCIOUSLY DISTANCED HIMSELF FROM SCHULTZ).

8. PRESS COMMENT HAS POINTED TO THE SIMILARITY OF VIEWS BETWEEN GENSCHER AND SCHULTZ. PERLE IS INTERVIEWED IN TODAY'S SPIEGEL, FAVOURING ZERO SRINF. THE CONSERVATIVE PRESS CONTINUE TO COMMENT ON THE DANGERS FOR THE FRG OF CONTINUED EXTENSION DOWNWARDS OF ZERO NUCLEAR OPTION.

9. AN OPINION POLL IN SPIEGEL TODAY GIVES 92% IN FAVOUR OF THE ZERO LRINF, 51% OF THESE IN FAVOUR OF ZERO LRINF INDEPENDENT OF THE RESULT OF THE SRINF TALKS, AND 41% SUPPORTING ZERO LRINF IF SRINF AGREEMENT REACHED. GENSCHER REMAINS IN FIRST PLACE (74%) AS THE POLITICIAN WHO ''SHOULD PLAY THE MOST IMPORTANT ROLE IN FRG POLITICS''.

BULLARD

YYYY

BPLNAN 3636

NNNN

(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

This is the
joint letter
from President Nixon
Dr. Kissinger.

The sombre and
portentous introduction
leads to some
very mild conclusions.

CDP
27/4

But
I suppose
we should
not

ON APRIL 26, THE WASHINGTON POST PUBLISHED THE FOLLOWING OPED COLUMN BY RICHARD M. NIXON AND HENRY A. KISSINGER UNDER THE HEAD, "AN ARMS AGREEMENT ON TWO CONDITIONS."

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD IN AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT A SUMMIT MEETING WILL OCCUR THIS YEAR AND THAT AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT WILL BE SIGNED. BUT WHETHER THIS LEADS TO A BREAKTHROUGH TOWARD PEACE DEPENDS ON WHETHER IT IS THE RIGHT KIND OF A DEAL. THAT IS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION.

HOW DID WE REACH THIS POINT? THERE ARE TWO PRINCIPAL FACTORS.

THE FIRST IS REAGAN"S SUCCESS IN RESTORING AMERICAN SELF-RESPECT AND MILITARY STRENGTH. HE HAS MADE THE UNITED STATES WORTH NEGOTIATING WITH. NO ONE CAN DENY THE DECISIVE ROLE OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE IN BRINGING THE SOVIETS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

THE SECOND IS THAT GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV NEEDS A DEAL. HE WANTS A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS WITH THE WEST IN ORDER TO PURSUE HIS DESPERATELY NEEDED DOMESTIC REFORMS.

ALL ATTENTION IS NOW FOCUSED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT ON MEDIUM-AND SHORT RANGE MISSILES. WITH RESPECT TO MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, GORBACHEV OFFERS TO GIVE UP 922 WARHEADS ON SS-20 MISSILES IF WE GIVE 316 WARHEADS ON PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES. HE HAS ALSO OFFERED TO DESTROY 142 SHORT-RANGE SS-12/22S AND SS-23S. EACH SIDE WOULD RETAIN 100 WARHEADS ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, WITH MOSCOW'S BASED IN SOVIET ASIA AND OURS IN THE UNITED STATES. IT SEEMS ALMOST TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE -- AN OFFER WE APPARENTLY CANNOT REFUSE.

WHY DOES A LEADER WHOSE ENTIRE CAREER WAS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY WITH EMPHASIS ON BALANCE OF POWER OFFER APPARENTLY UNEQUAL REDUCTIONS? GORBACHEV IS BY FAR THE ABLEST OF ALL SOVIET LEADERS SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II. HE HAS AN ACUTE INTELLIGENCE, A FORCEFUL PRESENCE AND A CONTAGIOUS CHARISMA. HE IS MAKING SOME BOLD DOMESTIC REFORMS. BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN HE IS A PHILANTHROPIST. HE KNOWS THAT SOVIET CUTS DO NOT REDUCE IN ANY SIGNIFICANT MANNER THE SOVIET CAPACITY TO ATTACK EUROPE WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THAT THEY INCREASE THE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL THREAT TO EUROPE. HE SEEKS TO ADVANCE THE CALCULATED PURPOSE OF WEAKENING THE TIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE AND BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

IF WE STRIKE THE WRONG KIND OF DEAL, WE COULD CREATE THE MOST PROFOUND CRISIS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE IN ITS 40-YEAR HISTORY -- AN ALLIANCE SUSTAINED BY SEVEN ADMINISTRATIONS OF BOTH PARTIES. BECAUSE WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS DANGER, WE WHO HAVE ATTENDED SEVERAL SUMMITS AND ENGAGED IN MANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIET LEADERS ARE SPEAKING OUT JOINTLY FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE BOTH OF US LEFT OFFICE.

WHEN NATO WAS CREATED, FACED WITH MOSCOW'S MASSIVE CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY, THE ALLIES CHOSE TO CONFRONT SOVIET MANPOWER BY THREATENING TO RESPOND TO A SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACK WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SO LONG AS THE UNITED STATES HAD SUPERIORITY IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THAT STRATEGY WAS CREDIBLE. BUT SINCE THE LATE 1970'S THE SOVIET STRATEGIC ARSENAL HAS GROWN TO EQUAL, AND IN LAND-BASED MISSILES TO EXCEED, THAT OF THE UNITED STATES. THIS MEANT THAT A NUCLEAR WAR WOULD INVOLVE SCORES OF MILLIONS OF AMERICAN CASUALTIES IN A MATTER OF HOURS. WE NEED NOT DEBATE WHETHER AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT WOULD UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES INITIATE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR IN RESPONSE TO AN ATTACK ON EUROPE. IT IS ENOUGH TO RECOGNIZE THAT IF THE SOVIETS BELIEVE HE MIGHT NOT, DETERRENCE COULD FAIL.

THAT IS WHY NATO DEVELOPED A DOCTRINE -- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE -- WHICH WOULD PERMIT A GRADUATED APPLICATION OF ITS NUCLEAR POWER. MEDIUM-AND-SHORT-RANGE MISSILES PLACED ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE RESTORED THE CREDIBILITY OF THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION, IF ONLY BECAUSE THE SOVIETS HAD TO CALCULATE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT PERMIT THEM TO BE OVERRUN WITHOUT USING THEM. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, WHICH, UNLIKE FRANCE AND BRITAIN, HAS NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND, UNLIKE, ITALY, HAS LARGE SOVIET ARMIES ON ITS BORDERS. THREE YEARS AGO, NATO GOVERNMENTS OVERCAME BITTER SOVIET-SPONSORED DEMONSTRATIONS TO DEPLOY THESE MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES.

IT IS REGRETTABLE THAT IN THE LATE 1970'S THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE THOSE WEAPONS WAS JUSTIFIED SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THEY WERE NEEDED TO BALANCE THE NEW SOVIET SS-20S WOULD PERMIT US TO WITHDRAW OUR MISSILES AS WELL. IN FACT, THESE MISSILES WERE NOT NEEDED TO OFFSET THEIR EQUIVALENTS. THEIR REAL FUNCTION WAS TO DISCOURAGE SOVIET NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL OF EUROPE BY WHATEVER WEAPON FROM WHATEVER LOCATION AND TO RAISE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION BY NATO TO SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. THEY CLOSED A GAP IN DETERRENCE CAUSED BY THE APOCALYPTIC NATURE OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR.

THE SOVIETS' STRATEGY SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II HAS BEEN TO EXPLOIT THE WEST'S FEAR OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY CALLING REPEATEDLY FOR THEIR EVENTUAL ABOLITION. IF WE ACQUIESCE IN THIS STRATEGY, WE WILL CREATE A FAR MORE DANGEROUS WORLD. ANY WESTERN LEADER WHO INDULGES IN THE SOVIETS'S DISINGENUOUS FANTASIES OF A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD COURTS UNIMAGINABLE PERILS.

IF WE ELIMINATE AMERICAN MEDIUM-AND SHORT-RANGE FORCES IN EUROPE WITHOUT REDRESSING THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE, THE SOVIET NUCLEAR THREAT TO EUROPE WILL REMAIN, AND THE GAP IN DETERRENCE TO CONVENTIONAL ATTACK WILL BE REOPENED. EVEN AFTER THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS THE ENTIRE SOVIET NUCLEAR ARSENAL OF 19,000 WARHEADS CAN, IF THE SOVIET UNION CHOOSES, BE AIMED AT WESTERN EUROPE FORM THE SOVIET UNION A FEW HUNDRED MILES AWAY. BUT GIVEN THE CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR, THE CREDIBILITY OF THE STRATEGIC U.S. THREAT IS ERODING, ALL THE MORE SO IF IT MUST BE INITIATED ON BEHALF OF DISTANT ALLIES AND AFTER WE HAVE JUST WITHDRAWN OUR STRATEGIC MISSILES ACROSS AN OCEAN.

DETERRENCE CANNOT BE BASED ON EITHER U.S. BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BECAUSE THEIR RANGE IS TOO SHORT, OR ON TACTICAL BOMBERS, BECAUSE OF THE FORMIDABLE SOVIET AIR DEFENSES. RELIANCE ON BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS TWO OTHER DISADVANTAGES. IT STAKES THE NUCLEAR THREAT ON THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS MOST DIFFICULT TO CONTROL BY CIVILIAN LEADERS. ABOVE ALL IT WOULD CONFINE THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EFFECT TO GERMAN SOIL.

FACED WITH SUCH PROSPECTS NO GERMAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO RESIST FOR LONG THE SIREN SONG OF DENUCLEARIZATION, ON THE ONE HAND, OR THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ON THE OTHER. AND THIS IN TURN WOULD LEAVE AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE WITHOUT ADEQUATE NUCLEAR PROTECTION.

IN RETROSPECT, NATO SHOULD NOT HAVE OFFERED THE ZERO OPTION IN THE LATE 1970'S. BUT WE HAVE CROSSED THAT BRIDGE. THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCEPTED OUR OFFER. BUT IT WOULD BE A PROFOUND MISTAKE TO CONCLUDE THE AGREEMENT IN ITS PRESENT FORM. WE MUST INSIST ON AT LEAST TWO CONDITIONS:

1. NO MISSILES IN ASIA. WE MUST DEMAND THAT THE ZERO OPTION ELIMINATE ALL INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES WORLDWIDE. FROM JUST BEYOND THE URAL MOUNTAINS, SOVIET SS-20 MISSILES COULD STILL REACH GERMANY AND, BEING MOBILE, COULD QUICKLY BE MOVED INTO POSITIONS THAT THREATEN ALL EUROPE. ALSO, GIVEN THE ENORMOUS SOVIET NUCLEAR ARSENAL, THE SOLE SOVIET PURPOSE IN RETAINING 100 WARHEADS IN ASIA IS TO INTIMIDATE CHINA, JAPAN AND KOREA WITH AMERICAN ACQUIESCENCE. FINALLY, BY PERMITTING 100 WARHEADS IN ASIA, THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM BECOMES ENORMOUS BECAUSE THAT WOULD ALLOW MOSCOW TO MAINTAIN ITS PRODUCTION LINES AND TEST FIRINGS.

2. LINKAGE TO CONVENTIONAL BALANCE. SINCE THE MISSILES REDUCTIONS ARE SLATED TO TAKE PLACE OVER FIVE YEARS, WE SHOULD LINK THE FINAL PHASE OF WITHDRAWALS TO THE ELIMINATION OF THE HUGE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY. THE AGREEMENT MUST PROVIDE THAT NEGOTIATIONS THIS END IMMEDIATELY AND BE CONCLUDED BEFORE THE FINAL PHASE OF MISSILE WITHDRAWAL BEGINS. IN PARTICULAR, WE MUST INSIST ON THE RIGHT OF EQUAL NUMBERS OF SHORT-RANGE MISSILES UNTIL THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IS ESTABLISHED, OTHERWISE, REMOVING MEDIUM-AND SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD SIMPLY MAKE EUROPE SAFE FOR CONVENTIONAL WAR.

OUR NEGOTIATORS MUST HOLD THEIR GROUND ON THESE POINTS. NO DEAL IS BETTER THAN A BAD DEAL. BUT THAT IS NOT OUR CHOICE. WE CAN REACH A GOOD DEAL, FOR BOTH SIDES, IF WE ALWAYS KEEP IN MIND THAT GORBACHEV NEEDS A DEAL AS MUCH AS WE DO. INDEED, IF HE IS GENUINELY INTERESTED PEACE, HE SHOULD WANT AN AGREEMENT THAT INCREASES THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES., UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS NOW MAY BRING A TEMPORARY RESPITE BUT ONLY AT THE COST OF GRAVE RISKS LATER.

IN ADDITION TO ARMS CONTROL, IT IS VITAL THAT A SUMMIT CONVENED TO SIGN A MISSILE AGREEMENT DEAL WITH THE MAJOR POLITICAL U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES. IF SUMMITRY IS TO PROMOTE THE CHANCES OF PEACE, THE SUPERPOWERS MUST ADDRESS THE POTENTIAL CAUSES OF WAR. IT IS NOT WEAPONS THAT CAUSE, BUT RATHER THE POLITICAL DIFFERENCES THAT LEAD TO THE USE OF THOSE WEAPONS. THEREFORE, WHEN REAGAN AND GORBACHEV MEET, THERE MUST BE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD RESOLVING KEY POLITICAL ISSUES, SUCH AS THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO NICARAGUA AND SOVIET-SPONSORED SUBVERSION IN CENTRAL AMERICA. GORBACHEV HAS TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD REFORM AT HOME BUT HAS NOT RETREATED ONE INCH FROM MOSCOW'S POSTURE ABROAD. INDEED, HIS POLICY CAN BE SAID TO BE A SUBTLER IMPLEMENTATION OF HISTORIC SOVIET PATTERNS. HE HAS CRITICIZED BREZHNEV, BUT HE STILL ENFORCES THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE.

EVERY PRESIDENT HAS AN UNDERSTANDABLE DESIRE TO ENSURE HIS PLACE IN HISTORY AS PEACEMAKER. BUT HE MUST ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT HOWEVER HE MAY BE HAILED IN TODAY'S HEADLINES, THE JUDGMENT OF TOMORROW'S HISTORY WOULD SEVERELY CONDEMN A FALSE PEACE. IF PRESIDENT REAGAN STANDS FIRM FOR THE PRINCIPLES THAT HE HAS MAINTAINED SO STEADFASTLY THROUGHOUT HIS CAREER, HE WILL BE ABLE TO SIGN THE RIGHT AGREEMENT AND MAKE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD REAL PEACE IN THE WORLD.

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PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

(MOSCOW : MINIMIZE CONSIDERED)

(LENINGRAD: MINIMIZE CONSIDERED)

ITEM

BT

#4278

Prime Minister (2)
CDP 27/4.

What's Wrong With 'Zero'

NATO's boss speaks out

Gen. Bernard Rogers once said he got "gas pains" at the idea of removing medium-range missiles from Europe, and no wonder: in eight years as supreme allied commander in Europe, he oversaw the installation of medium-range cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. The Europeans came to respect his soldierly candor—he made it his mission to goad them to greater military spending—but also to appreciate his sympathy for their views. Preparing for retirement in June, he spoke last week with NEWSWEEK national-security correspondent John Barry. Excerpts:

On Soviet leader Gorbachev's goals: He is trying to denuclearize Western Europe—trying to break the coupling between the strategic forces of the United States and their use as a nuclear umbrella for Western Europe. If I were the Soviet Union, I, too, would say, "Let's get rid of everything. There'd be no nuclear weapons in Western Europe. And we'll make Western Europe safe for conventional war."

On the danger to NATO's 'flexible response' doctrine: NATO policy is based on a continuum of escalation. That means being able to escalate from conventional forces to something else that is of concern to the Soviets—without having to turn to our strategic nuclear forces. If we are going to have a continuum of escalation, we can't have just disadvantaged conventional forces on one hand and strategic nuclear forces on the other and no coupling in between. You can't have it both ways. You have to have nuclear weapons in there someplace. That's what makes our deterrent credible: nuclear weapons, land based in Western Europe that can reach the heartland of the Soviet Union.

On shorter-range missiles: We should freeze the Soviets' shorter-range missiles [with a range of 311 to 621 miles] at a low level and get their agreement that we can have an equal number. That would be the minimum. And by the way, I don't believe there is a consensus within the alliance on going to the zero level on *these* missiles. That would wipe out our opportunity to strike even the Eastern European countries. And it would guarantee that West Germany was the battlefield in a nuclear exchange.

JOHN FICARA—NEWSWEEK

Visions of Soviet blackmail: *General Rogers*

On alternatives to dismantled Euromissiles: I do not believe that the Western Europeans would build up their shorter-range missiles to match the Soviet levels, even if that option were part of the deal. We might be able to convert [medium-range] Pershing II's to [battlefield-support] Pershing IB's—but only if we could convince another West European nation, in addition to Germany, to deploy Pershings. Sea-launched cruise missiles are another possibility—to replace land-based missiles on Western European soil. But U.S. strategic weapons *cannot* be asked to do the job of theater weapons. That's too big a burden for the United States to bear, and the Europeans shouldn't expect it.

On the possibility of a nuclear exchange in Europe: We have to be willing and able to use nuclear weapons first in response to a Soviet conventional attack. The first-use option is vital to credible deterrence. The Soviets may doubt that we would use it, but they can't be sure we won't—and they must be faced with the ultimate risk of its escalating to the strategic level. They might pre-empt with their strategic weapons or we might pre-empt after an exchange in Europe. And if we have such an escalation, I'm convinced that it would be impossible to relegate a nuclear war solely to the territory of Western Europe.

On the conventional-force imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact: If we're not going to let this gap continue to widen—and it does widen every year—every nation's going to have to do more. This is the major weakness in the alliance. We need to do better with the forces we already have, and we need to modernize them.

My greatest concern is not an attack out of the blue from the East. It's that down the road the conventional gap will get beyond restoration and the Soviets will be able to intimidate and coerce and blackmail Western European nations. If we end up getting rid of all nuclear weapons and we haven't achieved equity between their conventional forces and ours, we'll wake up one day and find ourselves dancing to the tune of the Soviet pipe.

On Western Europe's contribution to NATO: We're not giving the Western Europeans sufficient credit. We use all the wrong yardsticks to measure their contribution. We judge it by the percentage of gross domestic product that goes to defense or by the percentage of real increase or real decrease from year to year in their defense budgets. And when you do that you don't take into account the sizable hidden costs. You don't take into account the fact that the battlefield is going to be Western Europe.

On a better return on military expenditures: NATO spends around $350 billion a year on defense, but look at the duplication in research and development, in procurement, in the number of firms in various nations making the same kinds of weapons. We need more cooperation across the sea—cooperation and collaboration in exploiting technology.

His greatest disappointment as supreme commander: We have not convinced the people that there is a threat to them—the threat of coercion and intimidation and accommodation and blackmail. We just can't get that message across. Complacency is working against us because we've been so successful in NATO. There is a lot of wishful thinking that the Soviets have finally got a leader who's going to do everything differently. But we've seen no shift in Soviet foreign policy—no shift in the goal of world domination and no shift in the objectives for Western Europe.

20.

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PARTS 1, 2 AND 3 OF THREE

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SIC EMA/EMC/EME
SECTION ONE OF THREE

FROM STEPHENS AD/NUC POL
HLG 22-24 APRIL
SUMMARY

1. HLG DIVIDED ON RESPONSE TO SOVIET SRINF OFFER. US CLEARLY SET ON COUNTER PROPOSAL INVOLVING ELIMINATION OF ALL LRINF AND SRINF WITH MODERNISATION AND DEPLOYMENTS BELOW 500 KM UNCONSTRAINED. GROUP TO MEET AGAIN ON 29 APRIL TO ATTEMPT TO AGREE CONCLUSIONS. NPG MINISTERIAL PRESENTED AS POSSIBLE FINAL DEADLINE FOR DECISION

DETAIL

2. THE HLG MET ON WEDNESDAY AND FRIDAY IN ALBERQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO WITH GAFFNEY (US-OSD) IN THE CHAIR. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE MEETING HAD BEEN TO DEVELOP THE CHAIRMANS REPORT TO NPG MINISTERS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN LRINF ARMS CONROL AGREEMENT. IN THE EVENT, LRINF RECEIVED ONLY CURSORTY TREATMENT AS THE MEETING WAS DOMINATED BY SRINF AND IN PARTICULAR THE MATTER OF HOW THE GROUP SHOULD RESPOND TO THE SHULTZ BRIEFING OF THE NAC ON THE LATEST GORBACHEV OFFER

3. ALL WERE AGREED THAT THE GROUP HAD A KEY ROLE TO PLAY IN PROVIDING POLITICO/MILITARY ADVICE ON THE OPTIONS BEFORE THE ALLIANCE, BUT ON SUBSTANCE IT WAS CLEAR EARLY ON THAT THE GROUP WAS DEEPLY DIVIDED. AT ONE END OF THE SCALE NORWARY AND DENMARK, PREDICTABLY, URGED ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET OFFER. KARSTAD (NORWAY) CLAIMED THE CASE FOR DOING SO WAS STRONG NOT ONLY POLITICALLY BUT ALSO FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW (BENEFITS OF REMOVING SS12/SS23 THREAT, AVAILABILITY OF STEALTH AND OTHER TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES TO PRESERVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATOS REMAINING SYSTEMS). HE DISCOUNTED THE DENCULEARIZATION ARGUMENT (MANY WEAPONS WOULD REMAIN IN EUROPE) AND BY CONTRAST POINTED TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF EXPLAINING TO NATO PUBLICS HOW FLEXIBLE RESPONSE MADE RETENTION OF PIS ESSENTIAL

4. AT THE OTHER END OF THE SCALE LENZI (ITALY) CURTLY DISMISSED THE SOVIET OFFER AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH NATOS SECURITY INTERESTS. LESS BLUNTLY, LINDSEY (CANADA) SUGGESTED THAT THE LONG-RUNNING SOVIET CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE PERSHING MISSILE WAS A STRONG REASON FOR NATO KEEPING IT, NOT GIVING IT UP. NATO TOO READILY LOST CONFIDENCE IN ITS OWN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS IN THE FACE OF NEW SOVIET OFFERS

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5. IN BETWEEN THE DUTCH AND BELGIAN DELEGATES MADE AMBIVALENT INTERVENTIONS, ACKNOWLEDGING THE FORCE OF THE MILITARY CASE FOR NOT ACCEPTING THE SOVIET OFFER, AT LEAST NOT IN ISOLATION, BUT AT THE SAME TIME STRESSING THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE HLGS WORK AND IMPLYING THAT IN PRACTICAL POLITICAL TERMS NATO MIGHT HAVE NO OTHER OPTION. IN PARTICULAR, NATO COUNTER OFFERS INVOLVING THE SCUD COULD BE DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY IN THE LIGHT OF OUR POSITION ON SRINF CONSTRAINTS OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS. (CHAMPENOIS (BEL) ALSO QUERIED THE MILITARY SIFNIFICANCE OF THE SCUD THREAT.)

6. GRAYDON AND WILLIS (SHAPE) PRESENTED THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE TWO SHAPE STUDIES ON INF ARMS CONROL OUTCOMES, AND REPORTED SACEURS PERSONAL CONCERN AT THE THRUST OF THE SHULTZ BRIEFING TO THE NAC ON 16 APRIL THE SHAPE FINDINGS HAD TO BE PLACED IN THE CONTEXT OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY AS IT HAD BEEN DEVELOPED IN THE 1979 IDD, THE 1983 MONEBELLO STUDIES AND, MOST RECENTLY AND MOST DEFINITIVELY, IN THE GENERAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES. LONGISH RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (LIKE THE PERSHING MISSILE) WERE THE OBVIOUS INSTRUMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING THIS STRATEGY. PRIORITY SHOULD THEREFORE BE GIVEN TO RETAINING AT LEAST THE GERMAN PIS (AND THE SOVIET OFFER MIGHT BE ATTRACTIVE IF IT REALLY ALLOWED THIS, PROVIDED THAT MODERNISATION COULD BE ASSURED), BUT SOME FORM OF FREEZE AND RIGHT TO MATCH (IE. ALLOWING US DEPLOYMENTS AS WELL) WOULD BE MUCH BETTER. ONE OPTION MIGHT BE TO FREEZE AT SOVIET LEVELS FOLLOWING THE DESTRUCTION OF SS12S IN GDR AND CZECH. WOULD COUNTRIES AGREE TO DEPLOY US PIBS HOWEVER QUERY IF NOT WOULD THE FRG BE ABLE TO RETAIN ITS PIAS QUERY AND WOULD THEY BE MODERINSED QUERY ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTINS WERE URGENTLY NEEDED

7. HOWE (IMS) AGREED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PI QUESTIONS. THE OTHER KEY TSK FOR THE HLG WAS TOGET ACROSS THE MESSAGE THAT WHATEVER THE INF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT, NATO WOULD HAVE TO EMBARK UPON A SERIOUS MODERNISATION PROGRAMME TO UPGRADE REMAINING SYSTEMS. AT THE VERY LEAST THIS WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE NWRS 85 MEASURES

8. SLATER (UK) EXPLAINED THE PRELIMINSARY CONCLUSIONS ON SRINF REACHED BY THE UK DEFENCE STAFF, NOTING A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT WITH THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE SHAPE STUDIES:

-FIRST, THE REMOVAL OF P11 AND GLCM WOULD ALREADY HAVE MADE NATO VERY DEPENDENT FOR SELECTIVE USE ON EITHER BATTLEFIELD WEAPONS OR DCA. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES NATOS CAPABILITY AT LONG RANGES WOULD BE VERY LIMITED. TO FORECLOSE THE OPTION TO DEPLOY BACK TO EUROPE US PIBS WOULD REMOVE ON THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ALLEVIATING THIS PROBLEM. INDEED IT COULD MAKE THE PROBLEM WORSE IF GERMAN PIAS ALSO HAD TO BE REMOVED, EITHER AS PART OF THE AGREEMENT (AS ASSUMED BY SHAPE), OR AS A RESULT OF POLITICAL PRESSURES CAUSED BY THE AGREEMENT, OR BECAUSE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY US PERSHINGS, MAINTAING/MODERNISING THE GERMAN PERSHINGS WAS NO LONGER COST-EFFECTIVE

-SECOND, TO EXTEND THE INF ZERO APPROACH DOWN TO 500 KM WOULD REVERSE THE EFFORSTS OF THE LAST 10 YEARS TO PUT MORE EMPHASIS ON RELATIVELY LONGER RANGE SYSTEMS WITH THEIR GREATER

/FLEXIBILITY

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FLEXIBILITY AND ESCALATORY POTENTIAL (AS OPPOSED TO SOHORT RANGE QUOTE WARFIGHTING UNQUOTE SYSTEMS) AND TO REDUCE RELIANCE ON DCA, BOTH BECAUSE OF THEIR RELATIVE VULNERABILITY AND THEIR IMPORTANT CONVENTIONAL ROLE

-THIRD, THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE OVERALL SURVIVABILITY WAS A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FACTOR IN DETERMING THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE INF STOCKPILE. WITHOUT A SIGNIFICANT MISSILE COMPONENT THIS BECOMES DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE (AND WITH NO P1I OR GLCM THE PIB WOULD BE THE ONLY AVAILABLE LAND-BASED SUBSTITUTE)

-FOURTH, THOUGH THE REMOVAL OF INF DOWN TO 500 KM WOULD BE VERY MUCH TO NATOS ADVANTAGE NUMERICALLY, THE WP WOUD RETAIN A WIDE RANGE OF OTHER NUCLEAR OPTIONS FOR TARGETING NATOS REMAINING THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES. IN SHAPES TERMINOLOGY, THE QUOTE OVERKILL RATION UNQUOTE WOULD REMAIN HIGH

-FIFTH, THE EFFECT ON PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE OF ELIMINATING SRINF MISSILES DOWN TO 500 KM ON TOP OF THE ELIMINATION OF LRINF MISSILES COULD BE FAR REACHING. IT COULD SIGNIFICANTLY ADD TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF IMPLEMENTING FUTURE MODERNISATION PROGRAMMES (THOUGH ADMITTEDLY THERE COULD BE SIMILAR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES IF NATO WERE TO REJECT WHAT SEEMED AN ATTRACTIVE SOVIET OFFER)

IN SORT, THERE APPEARS TO BE A STRONG POLITICO/MILITARY CASE FOR PRESERVING THE OPTION TO DEPLOY PIB. BUT TO REJECT THE SOVIET OFFER ON THESE GROUNDS WOUD ONLY MAKE SENSE IF THERE WERE SOME REALISTIC PROSPECT OF NATO AT SOME POINT ACTUALLY TAKING UP THAT OPTION. HOW REALISTIC WAS THIS QUERY HOW MANY PIB AND ON WHAT CONDITIONS MIGHT THEY BE DEPLOYED QUERY LIKE SHAPE WE SAW THESE AS THE KEY QUESTIONS WITH WHICH NATO NEEDED TO GET TO GRIPS

9. HUTTEL (FRG) ENDORSED THESE REMARKS. NATO HAD TO HAVE THE SYSTEMS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT AGREED STRATEGY AS ARITICULATED IN THE RECENTLY AGREED GENERAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, NOT MERELY THE SYSTEMS WE HAPPENED TO HAVE IN THE 1970S. THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN OPTIONS FOR DELIBERATE ESCALATION WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AS BOTH THE SHAPE AAND UK PAPERS ON SRINF HAD MADE CLEAR. ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF US PIBS TO THE FRG, NOT SURPRISINGLY HE HAD NOTHING TO REPORT. (THE GERMANS PRIVATELY MENTIONED THAT KOHL, GENSCHER AND WORNER WERE MEETING TO AGREE A POSITION ON THIS ON MONDAY 27 APRIL). HE DID HOWEVER MAKE CLEAR THAT HE SAW LITTLE PROSPECT OF RETAINING/MODERNISING THE GERMAN PIAS IN THE EVENT OF AN SRINF ZERO AGREEMENT, EVEN IF THE LATTER EXPLICITLY EXCLUDED THIRT PARTY SYSTEMS

10. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE SRINF ISSUE SHOUD BE ADDRESSED IN A NEW SECTION IN THE CHAIRMANS REPORT TO MINISTERS. THIS WOULD BEGIN BY SETTING OUT THE CRITERIA (ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY) AGAINST WHICH POSSIBLE OUTCOMES NEEDED TO BE ASSESSED, AND WOULD THEN SET OUT AND EXAMINE THE PROS AND CONS OF A SERIES OF OPTIONS. IN PLACE OF THE THREE ALTERNATIVES IDENTIFIED BY SHULTZ, THE

CHAIR

CHAIR PROPOSED VIVE OPTIONS:

(1) FREEZE SOVIET SRINF AT CURRENT LEVEL AND COMMIT TO MATCH WITH NEW NATO DEPLOYMENTS OF PIB

(2) AGREE TO EQUAL BUT LOWER LEVEL OF SRINF AND COMMIT TO MTCH WITH NEW NATO DEPLOYMENTS OF PIB

(3) AGREE TO ZERO SRINF, TIED TO ELIMINATION OF REMAINING WARHEADS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A RANGE FLOOR AT 500 KM BELOW WHICH ARMS CONTROL REDUCTIONS WILL NOT BE PURUSED

(4) ZERO OR REDUCED SRINF LEVELS WITH RANGE FLOOR LOWERED TO CAPTURE AT LEAST SCUD

(5) AGREE TO SOVIET ZERO SRINF OFFER QUOTE AS IS UNQUOTE

11. IT SUBSEQUENTLY BECAME CLEAR IN PRIVATE TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS (US, UK, FRG) OVER THE DRAFTING OF THE CHAIRMANS REPORT, THAT THESE OPTIONS HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY CONSTRUCTED TO LEAD TO THE ADOPTION OF OPTION 3, AND THAT THE US WOUD VIGOROUSLY RESIST INCLUSION IN THE REPORT OF ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT LED TO A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION. IN PARTICULAR

(A) THEY INSISTED ON CHARACTERISING OPTIONS 1 AND 2 AS INVOLVING A QUOTE COMMITMENT UNQUOTE TO MATCH, RATHER THAN MERELY A RIGHT TO MATCH-IE, IMPLICITLY DENYING THAT A RIGHT TO MATCH (EVEN IF UNEXERCISED) MIGHT HAVE VALUE (SUCH AS BEING PERHAPS THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH GERMAN PIE MIGHT BE RETAINED)

(B) THEY REJECTED INCLUSION OF THE ORIGINAL SHAPE ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS (BALANCED REDUCTIONS ACROSS THE BOARD DOWN TO A LEVELNWHICH WOULD STILLNALLOW WORTHWHILE NATO DEPLOYMENTS: AND TERO BALISTIC MISSILES) AND WERE GENERALLY DISMISSIVE OF SHAPES ARGUMENTS BOTH ON THE STRATEGIC N REQUIREMENT FOR PIS AND, IN THEIR ABSENCE, ON THE NEED TO DEAL WITH THE SHORTER RANGE THREAT

(C) THEY FLATLY REFUSED ANY ATTEMPT TO PJIORITIZE THE OPTIONS FROM A SECUIRITY POINT OF VIEW AS URGED BY SACEUR, THE UK FRG (ALTHOUGH THEY RELENTED TO THE EXTEND OF ALLOWING SACEURS VIEWS ON OPTIONS GQN WN AND 5 TO BE VERY BRIEFLYR CITED-THE THREE OPTIONS TPEY HAVE CLEARLY JUDGED LEAST LIKELY TO BE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE)

FINAL SECTION OF THREE

FROM STEPHENS AD/NUC POL

HL 22-24 APRIL

THE RESULTING DRAFT REPORT (CONTAINED IN MIFT FOR WSHINTON AND BONN). WHICH WILL BE DISCUSSED AGAIN BY THE GROUP IN BRUSSELS ON WEDNESDAY 29 APRIL, IS THEREFORE IN ITS CURRENT STATE A SOMEWHAT UNSATISFACTORY BASIS ON WHICH TO REACH CONCLUSIONS

12. FINALLY THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON THE TIMETABLE FOR PROVIDING AN OVERALL ALLIANCE RESPONSE TO THE US ON THE SOVIET SRINF OFFER. LINDSEY (CANADA) AND BELL (IS) BOTH CAUTIONED AGAINST UNDUE HASTE OVER A DECISION THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH WOULD BE WITH THE ALLIANCE LONG AFTER THE PUBLIC APPLIAUSE FOR AN AGREEMENT HAD DIED AWAY. BELL SUGGESTED THAT THE FORTHCOMING THREE NTO MINISTERIALS (A NOT UNREASONABLE TIMESCALE OF AROUND SIX WEEKS) WERE THE OBVIOUS AND PROPER MEANS TO PRODUCE AN AGREED POSITION. AN ADDITIONAL JOINT MEETING OF FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTERS MIGHT BE WORTH CONSIDERING.

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GAFFNEY RELIED THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WOULD TAKE THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS SERIIOUSLY, BUT WAS UNDER ENORMOUS PRESSURE TO COME UP WITH A DECISION QUICLY. DEFENCE SECRETARY WEINBERGER BELIVED THAT NPG MINISTERS SHOULD BE INVOLVED: THZ NAC IN JUNE WAS PROBABLY TOO LATE HOWEVER

BT

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From the Private Secretary

26 April 1987

Arms Control

Thank you for your letter of 24 April conveying officials' comments on my letter of the same date setting out the Prime Minister's thinking on the content of an INF agreement. I agree that the interpretation of the Prime Minister's thinking in points (i), (ii), (iii) and (v) of your letter is correct. Point (iv) is more substantial but does not, as far as the Prime Minister is concerned, pose any insuperable obstacles for the United Kingdom, although it might for other West European countries.

I am sending a copy of this letter, on a personal basis, to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(CHARLES POWELL)

Lyn Parker Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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MODUK FOR ACDS (POL/NUC), AUS(POL), DACU
WELLINGTON FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MIPT: US/UK CONSULTATIONS ON INF

SUMMARY

1. POSSIBLE WESTERN OPTIONS BEING NARROWED TO TWO: REJECT SRINF ELIMINATION AND IMPLEMENT NEW DEPLOYMENTS, OR ACCEPT ELIMINATION, SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS. STRONG PREFERENCE CONFIRMED IN MOST PARTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION FOR ELIMINATION, AS PART OF AN LRINF AGREEMENT, BUT WEINBERGER AND THE JCS YET TO TAKE A VIEW AND THE PRESIDENT'S MIND STILL OPEN. FURTHER DISCUSSION NEXT WEEK IN BRUSSELS, WITH VIEW TO NAC MEETING IN WEEK OF 4 MAY.

DETAIL

2. AT TODAY'S POLITICO-MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, THE US TEAM LED BY HOLMES (STATE DEPARTMENT) BRIEFED THE UK TEAM LED BY FALL ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AT GENEVA. IN THE INF GROUP, THAT RESUMED WORK YESTERDAY, THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR INTENTION TO TABLE THEIR OWN TREATY ALTHOUGH THE FORMAT OF THIS WAS STILL NOT CLEAR. (THE AMERICANS WOULD BE CIRCULATING TO THE FIVE BASING COUNTRY EMBASSIES HERE LATER TODAY MORE DETAILS ON US VERIFICATION PROPOSALS). IN THE AFTERMATH OF SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, THERE REMAINED SOME AMBIGUITIES IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON SRINF. IN EFFECT, THE RUSSIANS HAD LAID A NUMBER OF IDEAS ON THE TABLE AND WERE WAITING TO SEE THE WESTERN RESPONSE. THE US TEAM INDICATED THAT THE QUOTE SOVIET OFFER UNQUOTE AS PRESENTED BY SHULTZ TO THE NAC REFLECTED A US COLLATION OF THE MOST ACCEPTABLE OF THE VARIOUS SOVIET PROPOSALS.

3. THE US TEAM THEN SET OUT THE STRONG CASE THEY SAW FOR PICKING UP THE CURRENT SOVIET OFFER. IT WOULD MAKE NO SENSE TO PRESERVE SOVIET SYSTEMS IN ORDER TO PROTECT AN OPTION WHICH THE WEST WAS NOT IN FACT GOING TO EXERCISE. THERE WERE OTHER OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO NATO TO MODERNISE ITS THEATRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, WHICH WOULD OBVIATE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT NEW DEPLOYMENTS OF SR INF MISSILES. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CARRY THROUGH THIS MODERNISATION PROGRAMME. A PROMPT RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS REQUIRED, IN ORDER TO AVOID A CONTINUING DEBATE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE LEADING TO NEW DIFFICULTIES.

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4. THE US TEAM AGREED WITH THE ANALYSIS OFFERED BY FALL THAT IN ADDRESSING THE SOVIET APPROACH OUR TACTICS MIGHT NEED TO VARY DEPENDING ON WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WERE THE DEMANDEURS. IF THE BALL WAS NOW IN OUR COURT AS THE RESULT OF A STRAIGHTFORWARD SOVIET OFFER, THEN IT MIGHT BE RETURNED WITH A NEW WESTERN SPIN ON IT (SUCH AS CERTAIN PROVISIONS). IF HOWEVER, (AS MANY OF OUR CONTACTS HERE THIS WEEK HAVE SUGGESTED) THE NEW PROPOSAL WAS LESS A CLEARCUT SOVIET INITIATIVE THAN THE PRODUCT OF THE US/SOVIET DIALOGUE DURING THE SHULTZ VISIT, THEN OUR ABILITY TO MASSAGE IT FURTHER WAS LESS CERTAIN.

5. HOLMES ADMITTED THAT IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD ACCEPT CONCURRENT (UNDERLINED) CONSTRAINTS ON BOTH LR AND SRINF. THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A SEPARATE NEGOTIATION LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MIGHT RENEGE ON PROSPECTIVE SR CONSTRAINTS ONCE AN LRINF AGREEMENT HAD BEEN CONCLUDED. HE NOTED THAT GORBACHEV HAD EXPLICITLY CONFIRMED TO SHULTZ THAT UNDER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL SRINF INCLUDED QUOTE THE SS23 AND UP UNQUOTE.

6. FALL AND LEGGE (MOD) EMPHASISED THAT THERE WAS NOT YET A FIRM UK POSITION, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE MINISTERIAL DECISION. HOWEVER, IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT THERE WERE TWO MAIN OPTIONS TO CONSIDER:

(A) TO REJECT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AND DEPLOY A CERTAIN NUMBER OF SRINF. THIS WOULD MEAN PURSUING THE ELIMINATION OF LRINF WHILE ALLOWING THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION SOME SHORTER RANGE MISSILES, OR

(B) TO ACCEPT THE ELIMINATION OF SRINF DOWN TO SS23/500 KM SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS (SEE BELOW).

HOLMES AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS, NOTING THAT A EUROPEAN PREFERENCE FOR EITHER OPTION WOULD HAVE A STRONG IMPACT ON US THINKING. CONVERSELY, A EUROPEAN FAILURE TO TAKE A CLEAR VIEW WOULD BE VERY BADLY RECEIVED HERE.

7. FALL SET OUT A NUMBER OF CONDITIONS WHICH SHOULD/COULD APPLY TO ANY ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. IT WAS CLEAR THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE GLOBAL IN SCOPE. SECOND, IT SHOULD BE BILATERAL ONLY, GIVEN THE HIGH DESIRABILITY OF RETAINING THE GERMAN PERSHING LAUNCHERS. HOLMES AGREED. ON THE BILATERAL POINT, THE US WOULD CONTINUE IN THEIR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS TO REJECT ANY CONSTRAINTS ON THIRD PARTIES. THE GERMAN SYSTEMS HAD NOT BEEN RAISED IN THE MOSCOW TALKS. HOWEVER, THE US SIDE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT STILL TRY TO CATCH THE US WARHEADS ON THE GERMAN LAUNCHERS, AND THAT WE MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTY THE GERMANS MIGHT HAVE IN PRESERVING THEIR PERSHING SYSTEMS AND PURSUING THEIR MODERNISATION.

8. IN THIS CONTEXT, HOLMES AND OTHER US OFFICIALS DESCRIBED AS QUOTE A TOTAL MYSTERY UNQUOTE SHULTZ'S REPORTED REMARKS AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW THAT THERE HAD BEEN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS OF THE UK AND FRENCH DETERRENTS. ACCORDING TO THE US TEAM, SUCH DISCUSSIONS HAD SIMPLY NOT TAKEN PLACE. (IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT SHULTZ MIGHT HAVE BEEN REFERRING TO THE EARLIER DEBATE, BEFORE HIS MOSCOW VISIT).

9. THIRDLY, FALL EMPHASISED THE NEED TO CATCH THE SS23. AS FOR LOWERING THE RANGE FLOOR FOR SRINF ELIMINATION TO 300 KM (TO CATCH THE SOVIET SCUDS), WE SHOULD BE READY TO LISTEN TO ARGUMENTS FOR THIS. HOWEVER THERE WERE ARGUMENTS AGAINST IF WE WANTED TO PRESERVE THE OPTION TO DEPLOY A WESTERN SYSTEM IN THAT RANGE BAND EG A LANCE FOLLOW-ON. THE US SIDE WERE CLEARLY DOUBTFULL ABOUT POSSIBLE PRESSURE TO INCLUDE THE SCUDS, WHICH MIGHT BE REPRESENTED AS A WESTERN ATTEMPT TO BLOCK A TREATY. IT COULD ALSO LEAD US DOWN THE DENUCLEARISATION PATH, WHICH WE ALL WISHED TO AVOID. IN ADDITION, HOLMES ARGUED FOR THE NEED TO AVOID A LINK BETWEEN LANCE MODERNISATION AND SOVIET SYSTEMS, WHICH COULD CREATE A NEW DUAL-TRACK SITUATION.

10. FALL SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE DESIRABLE TO PRESS THE RUSSIANS VERY HARD AS PART OF OUR RESPONSE TO THEIR SRINF PROPOSAL ON THE NEED FOR THE GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF LRINF. HOLMES AGREED THAT ALL THE ALLIES SHOULD PRESS AS HARD AS POSSIBLE FOR ELIMINATION OF THE REMAINING SS20 WARHEADS, USING THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT VERIFICATION AND THE US LEVERAGE WITH ALASKA. BUT, HE SUGGESTED, THIS SHOULD NOT BE MADE AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION SINCE IT WOULD RISK ERECTING A NEW OBSTACLE TO THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT AND WOULD REPRESENT A STEP BACK FROM REYKJAVIK. THE UK SIDE SUGGESTED THAT THE LATEST SOVIET MOVES HAD ALREADY MOVED THE GOAL POSTS SOME WAY. BUT THE US TEAM WERE DOUBTFUL: WHILE THERE SHOULD BE A CLEAR DETERMINATION TO SEEK GLOBAL ZERO FOR LRINF, THIS SHOULD NOT BE MADE A SINE QUA NON OF AN AGREEMENT.

11. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT SRINF CONSTRAINTS/ELIMINATION MUST BE AN INTEGRAL AND CONCURRENT PART OF AN LRINF AGREEMENT. HOLMES NOTED THAT SHULTZ APPEARED TO HAVE ACHIEVED SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THIS IN MOSCOW BUT THAT IT WOULD NEED TO BE CONFIRMED AT GENEVA. LASTLY, FALL SUGGESTED THAT WHILE, FOR PUBLIC PRESENTATION REASONS, WE SHOULD NOT ABSOLUTELY EXCLUDE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON REMAINING NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WE SHOULD NONETHELESS SEEK TO ESTABLISH A CLEAR FIRE-BREAK AGAINST SUCH A DEVELOPMENT UNTIL REAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN REDRESSING THE CONVENTIONAL/CHEMICAL IMBALANCE. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE THIS INCLUDED IN ANY NATO DECISION. HOLMES AGREED THAT CARE WOULD BE NEEDED IN THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF SUCH A FIRE-BREAK, NOT LEAST TO AVOID ANY ENDORSEMENT OF THE GORBACHEV APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL BELOW SS23/500 KM.

12. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE RELEVANCE OF AN INF AGREEMENT TO A SUMMIT, HOLMES ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME IN THE US BELIEVED THAT GORBACHEV WAS INDEED KEEN TO VISIT THE US (AND THE UN), TO ENHANCE THE LEGITIMACY OF HIS OWN POSITION. OTHER US EXPERTS BELIEVED, HOWEVER THAT HE WAS NERVOUS ABOUT A VISIT, PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE CRITICISM HE WOULD RECEIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS. HOLMES EMPHASISED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE TRYING TO PLAY DOWN SUMMIT PROSPECTS AND THE LINKAGE BETWEEN AN INF AGREEMENT AND A SUMMIT.

13. IT WAS AGREED THAT A FIRM DECISION BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (THE ONLY APPROPRIATE BODY) ON A RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE UNTIL THE GERMAN POSITION HAD BECOME CLEARER. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT, IF THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED BY THE WEEK OF 4 MAY, TO AVOID THE PUBLIC IMPRESSION THAT THE COUNCIL THEN HAD BEEN A FAILURE. HOLMES HOPED THAT OTHER ALLIES WOULD HELP THE GERMANS TO COME TO A DECISION, THE NEXT FORMAL OCCASION FOR CONSULTATION BEING THE SCG ON 28 APRIL. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT THE FORMAT IN WHICH THE WEST FINALLY ENDORSED AN SRINF DECISION WOULD DEPEND TO SOME EXTENT UPON THE NATURE OF THAT DECISION. IF SRINF ELIMINATION DOWN TO SS23/500 KM WERE ACCEPTED, AND WE WERE TO ARGUE THAT THIS REFLECTED THE WESTERN AIM ALL ALONG, THEN THERE MIGHT BE NO NEED FOR A FULL-SCALE MINISTERIAL MEETING. IF HOWEVER IT WERE REJECTED, AND WE WERE DETERMINED TO PURSUE DEPLOYMENTS, THEN THERE WOULD BE A STRONG CASE FOR A MINISTERIAL MEETING.

14. FALL'S CONTACTS WITH SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS OUTSIDE THE MAIN TALKS WITH HOLMES'S TEAM CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS A STRONG TREND WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION IN FAVOUR OF THE CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF GLOBAL SRINF ELIMINATION DOWN THE SS23/500 KM. THIS VIEW WAS SHARED BY PERLE, NITZE AND ADELMAN. HOWEVER, IT WAS ALSO CLEAR FROM THESE CONTACTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE VERY RECEPTIVE TO EUROPEAN VIEWS, AND POWELL (DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER) MADE CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS KEEPING AN OPEN MIND FOR THE MOMENT AND THAT NEITHER WEINBERGER NOR THE JCS HAD YET TAKEN A VIEW.

15. RESIDENT CLERK: PLEASE ADVANCE COPIES TO PS/NO 10, PS/MRS CHALKER, PS/MR RENTON, FALL (AUSS), ACDD, DEFENCE DEPARTMENT.

FCO PASS SAVING TOKYO, PEKING, UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA

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MODUK FOR ACDS (POL/NUC), AUS (POL), DACU
WELLINGTON FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

INF: US/UK AND NATO CONSULTATIONS

1. FALL LED AN FCO/MOD TEAM HERE TODAY IN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH AN INTER-AGENCY US TEAM CHAIRED BY HOLMES ON THE ALLIED APPROACH TO INF, AS PART OF REGULAR POLITICO-MILITARY CONSULTATIONS.

2. DETAILS OF THE DISCUSSION ARE IN MIFT BUT THERE WAS A CLEAR STATEMENT BY HOLMES'S TEAM OF A PREFERENCE FOR ELIMINATING BOTH LR AND SRINF DOWN TO 500 KM/SS 23, SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS. THEY ACKNOWLEDGED AT THE SAME TIME THAT IF THE EUROPEANS BELIEVED THAT SOME SRINF NEEDED TO BE DEPLOYED TO PROTECT ALLIANCE SECURITY AND (UNDERLINED) WERE PREPARED TO FOLLOW THIS THROUGH, THEN THIS WOULD HAVE A VERY SIGNIFICANT EFFECT UPON THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON THE POSITION THE US SHOULD ADOPT AT GENEVA.

3. PROCEDURALLY, THERE WILL NOW BE A MEETING OF THE SCG IN BRUSSELS ON 28 APRIL, AND OF THE HLG THE FOLLOWING DAY. THE ADMINISTRATION (AT LEAST IN STATE DEPARTMENT) ARE OPPOSED TO A JOINT MEETING OF THESE GROUPS. BUT THEY DO FAVOUR THE IDEA OF A NAC (PERHAPS REINFORCED) IN THE WEEK OF 4 MAY AS PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THIS MIGHT BE THE OCCASION FOR A FINAL VIEW TO BE TAKEN BY THE ALLIANCE (ALTHOUGH SOME IN ODD FAVOUR A SOMEWHAT SLOWER TIMETABLE PERHAPS INVOLVING AN NPG ELEMENT).

4. WE AGREED THAT THE INITIAL AIM OF THE SCG SHOULD BE TO FOCUS ON THE TWO MAIN OPTIONS - ACCEPTANCE OF THE GORBACHEV QUOTE OFFER UNQUOTE AS OUTLINED BY SHULTZ TO THE NAC, OR A LIMIT ON SRINF DOWN TO 500 KM/SS 23, WITH A US RIGHT TO DEPLOY UP TO THAT LIMIT. IN DOING SO IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO CLARIFY TWO KEY ISSUES: THE LIKELY FATE OF THE GERMAN PERSHING IAS, AND GERMAN (AND OTHER EUROPEAN) READINESS TO DEPLOY US PERSHING IBS ON THEIR TERRITORY.

5. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF TODAY'S DISCUSSIONS HERE AND OF THE OUTCOME OF THIS WEEKS'S HLG MEETING (WHICH IS BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY FROM LONDON), IT WILL, AS SEEN FROM HERE BE IMPORTANT FOR THE SCG TO FOCUS ON THE CORE QUESTION: HOW FAR ARE THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF ELIMINATING SRINF DOWN TO SS23/500KM SO DAMAGING THAT SOME NEW US SYSTEMS MUST BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE TO GUARD AGAINST THEM, AND - EQUALLY IMPORTANT - HOW READY ARE THE RELEVANT EUROPEAN

/NATIONS

NATIONS TO ACCEPT SUCH DEPLOYMENTS. AS SUGGESTED ABOVE, IF THE CONSENSUS EUROPEAN VIEW IS POSITIVE ON BOTH POINTS, THEN THIS COULD WELL SHIFT THE PRESIDENT AWAY FROM GOING FOR ZERO SRINF. THE WORST RESULT FROM THE CURRENT ALLIANCE CONSULTATION PROCESS WOULD BE A EUROPEAN UNREADINESS EITHER TO ENDORSE THE ZERO SRINF OPTION OR TO AFFIRM THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT DEPLOYMENT OF US PERSHING IBS.

6. THE GERMAN POSITION WILL CLEARLY BE CRUCIAL. BONN TELNO 331 SUGGESTS THAT IT MAY NOT BE CLARIFIED IMMEDIATELY. THIS ARGUES FOR THE BASIC UK AIMS AT THE SCG BEING: TO CLEAR THE WAY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TWO CLEAR OPTIONS SET OUT ABOVE, TO GAIN A CLEARER PICTURE OF GERMAN THINKING, AND TO WORK FOR AN ALLIED CONSENSUS ON THE CONDITIONS - BOTH ESSENTIAL AND DESIRABLE - WHICH SHOULD APPLY TO ANY SUBSEQUENT US DECISION TO ACCEPT SRINF ELIMINATION.

7. WEU MINISTERS WILL NO DOUBT DISCUSS THESE ISSUES AT THEIR MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG ON 27/28 APRIL. THE AMERICANS CAN HAVE NO LEGITIMATE OBJECTION TO THEIR DOING SO. BUT THERE WOULD CERTAINLY BE VERY CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM HERE IF EUROPEAN MINISTERS IN WEU WERE TO TAKE A COLLECTIVE POSITION ON SRINF WHICH WENT BEYOND THE STATE-OF-PLAY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE OR WHICH APPEARED (PERHAPS UNDER INFLUENCE FROM THE FRENCH) TO PREJUDGE FURTHER ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS AND A US DECISION. IT WOULD THEREFORE APPEAR FROM HERE TO BE PREFERABLE THAT THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON THE LATEST SOVIET OFFER ON SRINF.

8. RESIDENT CLERK: PLEASE ADVANCE COPIES TO PS/NO 10, PS/MRS CHALKER, PS/MR RENTON, FALL (AUSS), ACDD, DEFENCE DEPARTMENT.

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(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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18

PRIME MINISTER

ARMS CONTROL

You have yet to receive any formal advice from departments on how we should respond to Gorbachev's latest proposals. But the Americans clearly want decisions in the next 3/4 weeks. NATO will look divided and incompetent if we are unable to take them within that time-scale. We need some hard thinking in a short time.

I am increasingly coming to the view that the range of feasible as opposed to theoretical options is quite narrow: and that our security can probably be adequately preserved by any of the feasible options. It may be provocative to put it so bluntly. But if the assertion is true, two conclusions flow from it.

- maintaining the unity of the NATO alliance on this issue is just as important as the actual decision itself. Whichever we decide - zero option between ~~500~~ 1000 km or some agreed ceilings - confidence in Europe in the decision will be all important.

- we (the United Kingdom) must not seem to be dragooned into something reluctantly and against our will. This will be particularly true if we are running up to an election. Whatever decision is reached must appear to be our preferred option (and it almost certainly will be).

The point we have reached in the arms control negotiations is a success for Britain (and other NATO governments) and should be claimed as such. The Russians have been forced to retreat step by step on their terms for an INF agreement. Under any of the options under discussion, they will be giving up more than the West in numbers of missiles and warheads. People will be getting for the first time an agreement which reduces the number of nuclear weapons. This will be popular and will

demonstrably be the result of our firmness and persistence. The unilateralist policies of Labour would never have achieved this result. Removal of some American nuclear weapons from Europe should lead people to see even more clearly the need for the United Kingdom to preserve an independent nuclear deterrent.

What we have to guard against is getting caught on a roller-coaster. This is a political more than a military problem. Gorbachev is gambling that once people in the West have tasted reductions in nuclear weapons, their appetite for more will grow and governments will be unable to resist. He has a point. It will look pretty odd, for instance, if we welcome an agreement which eliminates Soviet superiority of 3:1 in LRINF but turn up our noses at a follow-on agreement which would eliminate 9:1 Soviet superiority in short-range weapons.

The military arguments are likely to be against accepting any further zero options after an LRINF agreement. They are perfectly valid in their own context. For the military it is better to have weapons than not to have them. Giving up land-based missiles would increase reliance on dual-capable aircraft, which are more vulnerable: it means sacrificing the penetrative capability of missiles: it puts NATO at a disadvantage more than the Warsaw Pact because of the latter's much greater geographical depth: and a zero option right down the line would leave us exposed to Soviet chemical and conventional superiority.

But the implication of these arguments is that NATO must be prepared to build and station more missles to balance Soviet superiority in the lower ranges. This is the difficult political question. As George Shultz has pointed out, you cannot in logical reject elimination of an imbalance in the Soviet Union's favour unless you are prepared to correct that imbalance by building up. Simply sticking to the existing position is not a credible option. NATO does have some plans for modernising its nuclear forces at lower levels (ie under

150 km), for instance with an up-dated Lance. But we don't plan anything new in the 500-1000km range. The question is would Congressional opinion in the United States be ready to finance the building of new missiles when the Russians are offering to get rid of them altogether; and would public opinion in Europe accept the stationing of them at the very moment when Cruise and Pershing II are being removed? There is no point in talking about a right to match unless we are actually capable of exercising that right in practice. Public opinion can surely be convinced that NATO must retain a land-based nuclear capability in Europe - in addition to the American aircraft and the British and French nuclear deterrents - in the face of Soviet chemical and conventional superiority. But increasing it and building new weapons is another matter.

It seems to me therefore that what Lord Carrington put to you as the most practical option - acceptance of a zero option down to 500 km but drawing an absolute line at that point and refusing any zero option below it - is probably right. And it is quite clear that the Americans increasingly favour it (but do not want to be seen to thrust it down the throats of their European Allies). The alternative of insisting on a western right to match in this 500 km - 1000 km range looks increasingly theoretical. But there are two important adjuncts:

- we need to push the Americans quite hard to agree to 'compensate' the Alliance for loss of Cruise/Pershing II and a zero option down to 500 km. This could be by increasing the number of dual-capable aircraft and by dedicating a number of submarine-launched Cruise missile submarines to NATO. They will reluctant to take this second step, on the grounds that they need them for other tasks. But we should press them hard.

- we should at least explore, as a refinement, the German idea of equal ceilings at low levels right through the range 150-1000 km. This would draw in the

Soviet SCUD (with a range of 300 km) to which NATO has no counterpart and which would be untouched by a zero option down to 500 km. This would arguably put the pressure on the Soviet Union, although they would probably come back at us by trying to draw on the dual-capable aircraft. It also gets us back into the problem of whether it is worth having a right to match if you are not in practice going to be able to exercise it.

This is just a first contribution. But I think we need to start thinking the issues through.

CDP

Charles Powell

24 April 1987

SECRET AND PERSONAL

17

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

17

London SW1A 2AH
24 April 1987

Dear Charles,

Arms Control

Thank you for your helpful personal letter of 24 April about the direction of the Prime Minister's thinking on the content of an INF Agreement. You asked for any immediate comments we might have in advance of the Prime Minister's meetings this weekend.

(!) The Foreign Secretary has not come to any final conclusion of his own on how best to handle Mr Gorbachev's latest offer. He will wish to await the results of the NATO meetings in the United States this week and in Brussels next week; and in particular further clarification of the views and intentions of our Allies, especially the Germans who are in a key position. There are evident differences between the Foreign and Defence Ministries in Bonn: the latest indications from our Embassy are that Chancellor Kohl seems likely to come down in favour of accepting zero/zero down to 500 kms, on the understanding that the Germans Pershing IAs are not affected. But from his initial discussions with officials in the FCO before leaving for the Far East, I am fairly sure that the Foreign Secretary shares the view that NATO should not reject Mr Gorbachev's offer of an extended zero/zero unless it is prepared actually to deploy (and not merely to retain the theoretical right to deploy) new systems in the 500-1000 kms range; and that he also shares the Prime Minister's misgivings about the risks of appearing to endorse a continued downward spiral of zero/zero solutions to further elements of the nuclear balance in Europe.

You will appreciate that I have not been able in the time available to consult the Foreign Secretary in Australia about the specific approach indicated in your letter for resolving this dilemma. But officials here are attracted by it. I note, incidentally, that it is similar to the line taken by Mr Perle of the US Department of Defense and Mr Adelman of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in conversation with Brian Fall on 22 April (Washington Telno 889).

Our officials would offer the following comments on the way the Prime Minister's preliminary conclusions are described in your letter:-

✓ (i) if we decide to accept an extended zero/zero option for INF we shall indeed need to be certain of catching the SS23. Whether this should best be done by drawing a range limit at less than

500 kms will however need further consideration. There is disagreement about the exact capabilities of the SS23 in terms of range; and we may well wish to retain the possibility ourselves of introducing a Lance follow-on system with a range of 3 - 400 kms plus. It may be therefore that the best way of catching the SS23 would be by formulating the treaty in terms which are "systems-specific" with appropriate provisions for non-circumvention;

[Good idea]

(ii) the exclusion of third country systems from the extended zero/zero option should apply (presumably this is intended) not just to British and French nuclear forces but also to the 72 German-owned Pershing IA missiles;

[of course]

(iii) the Alliance's intention to retain and modernise its land-based nuclear missiles up to 500 kms should be on the basis (presumably this too is intended) that such systems are not constrained in numbers, ie the US would have the right, if necessary, to build up its numbers to match those of the Soviet Union;

[of course]

(iv) the commitment to compensate for the elimination of LRINF will be required not simply from the Americans but from the Europeans as well. If the Americans are to deploy more dual capable aircraft (in practice probably F-111s) to Europe, they will need to know that European countries including (but perhaps not only) the UK are willing to recieve them; and if they are to assign SLCMs to SACEUR, they are likely to need assurances about berthing and other facilities in Europe (eg at Holy Loch). Moreover, the option of introducing air launched Cruise missiles on American, and indeed European, aircraft will need to be considered as well. It is not self-evident that it is only the Americans who should provide, in the case of aircraft, the delivery systems which might be needed;

(v) the reference to our not agreeing to consider a zero option for land-based missiles of lower ranges until agreement has been reached on the destruction of chemical weapons and on parity in conventional forces might imply that we would be prepared to enter negotiations on reductions or limitations of such systems, provided the result was above zero. Presumably this is not what the Prime Minister has in mind, and her intention would be to rule out any such negotiations unless those conditions were satisfied.

[yes]

SECRET AND PERSONAL

I am sending copies of this letter, on the same personal basis as yours, to John Howe, Ministry of Defence and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No. 10 Downing Street

SECRET AND PERSONAL

DRAFT LETTER FROM PS/MINISTER(AF) TO NO 10

ARMS CONTROL

Thank you for sending us a copy of your letter of todays date to Lyn Parker giving the Prime Minister's current thinking on the SRINF issue. This is very helpful. There are two other important factors that we believe need to be borne in mind:

(i) Even if the Russians keep to their current position that the extension of zero down to 500kms would exclude third party forces, the result would leave the FRG Pershing I's as the only SRINF missile of this category on either side in Europe. It seems very unlikely that the FRG would be able politically to retain them on this basis: still less that they would be able to modernise them, as they will have to before long if they are to remain effective.

(ii) We would agree that the prospect of agreeing now to redeploy US Pershing I's back to Europe are slim. But it is not so clear to us that the retention of the right to do so is therefore without value. The political picture could look quite different in two or three years time. And retaining this right would make it easier for the FRG to retain their current Pershing I missiles.

We will need to take these and the factors in your minute into account in driving at a final view on the next week or two.

16

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

ARMS CONTROL

I wrote to FCO and MOD this morning setting out your views on how we should respond to Gorbachev's proposals on SRINF.

You may be interested to see the attached comments. In general both departments seem well satisfied with your ideas (you've done their thinking for them). The points which they raise are refinements and do not seem to me to pose problems.

CHARLES POWELL

24 April 1987

VSCAFR

010.

CDP 24/4.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-930 7022

MO 11/9/4E

24th April 1987

Dear Charles,

ARMS CONTROL

We spoke about this Department's response to your letter of today about SRINF and shorter-range systems. Enclosed is a copy of the advice the department has submitted, in the absence today of both the Defence Secretary and Mr Stanley. It is of course not definitive at this stage, and Mr Stanley will be considering it tomorrow.

Yours sincerely

David Ball

(D C J BALL)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET

15

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

Seen by PM
CDS
28/4.

PRIME MINISTER

ARMS CONTROL

Thank you for your preliminary conclusions in Charles Powell's note of 24 April.

I think you would find it helpful to see CDS's preliminary advice on the military implications of eliminating SRINF missiles in the 500-1000km bracket in his attached minute to me of 14 April. (In the paper attached to that minute, paragraphs 10-11 provide a useful summary of the force posture implications of this proposal for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.)

I should like to add two further comments.

First, as you rightly highlight, the 1000kms to SS23 range zero option has to be global. The mobility and detection difficulty of these systems would make a "zero in Europe" option too risky.

Second, it will be essential to get Soviet agreement to the US verification package (or something very near to it) in the most recently tabled US draft INF Treaty, and this package will have to be applied to both the LRINF and the SRINF elements of the Treaty. You will be aware of our assessment that the numbers of SS20s manufactured is considerably in excess of the numbers actually deployed. We will need a verification regime that will give us the maximum practicable degree of certainty that the Soviet Union retains no SS20

SECRET

launchers or reload missiles above the 100 warheads they are allowed in Asia and no SS23 and SS12/22 (SCALEBOARD) launchers and missiles anywhere at all.

George Younger may wish to add further comments of his own when he returns to the UK on Monday.

I am copying this minute to Geoffrey Howe and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

JOHN STANLEY

25 April 1987

Covering SECRET

Lyle

Thank you for handling this.

I have included a couple of sheets of my scraper so that it can be typed.

I hope it is legible — please ring me if it is it!

D. Thomley

25 April 1987

PRIME MINISTER

ARMS CONTROL

Thank you for your preliminary conclusions in Charles Powell's note of 24 April.

I think you would find it helpful to see MJS's preliminary advice on the military implications of eliminating SRINF missiles in the 500 - 1000 km bracket attached in his minute to me of 14 April. (In the papers attached to that minute, paras. 10-11 provide a useful summary of the force posture implications of this proposal for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.)

I should like to add two further comments:

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launchers and missiles anywhere at all.

George Younger may wish to add further comments of his own when he returns to the UK on Monday.

I am copying this to Geoffrey Howe and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

JOHN STANLEY

DG2BWK

14

File

bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 April 1987

ARMS CONTROL

A great deal of work is in hand in NATO on the West's response to the recent Soviet proposals on SRINF and SNF. We await in particular the outcome of the High Level Group this week and the SCG next. Thereafter the Foreign and Defence Secretaries will no doubt be letting the Prime Minister have advice. Nothing said in this letter is intended to pre-empt any of this work. You might nonetheless find it helpful to have, on a personal basis, some idea of the Prime Minister's current thinking on these issues. I underline current because of course her views may change in the light of the outcome of the work referred to above.

The Prime Minister thinks that the range of feasible as opposed to theoretical options for NATO's response to the joint proposals is probably quite narrow. She sees the force of George Shultz's point that you cannot in logic reject elimination of an imbalance in the Soviet Union's favour unless you are prepared to correct that imbalance by building up NATO's weapons. She is sceptical whether in practice financing, building and stationing new missiles in the 500-1000 km range is a real option. At the same time, she agrees with those who see a risk of NATO being caught in a downward spiral of successive zero options which would at the end of the day leave us vulnerable and exposed to Soviet chemical and conventional superiority.

The preliminary conclusions which she draws are:

- we should probably do best to accept the zero option below 1000 km. down to a range which traps the SS23. This may mean setting the lower limit at less than 500 km;

- we should make clear that the zero option would be global but would exclude third country systems. It should be embodied in the INF agreement itself;

- we should reaffirm the Alliance's intention to retain land-based nuclear missiles up to 500 km. (or whatever

precise limit is set) and to modernise them, as well as retain and modernise our nuclear-capable aircraft and their nuclear weapons;

- we should try to obtain from the Americans a commitment to "compensate" for the elimination of LRINF and for the zero option down to 500 km. (or less) by increasing the number of dual capable aircraft and by dedicating a number of SLCMs to SACEUR;

- we should make clear that we shall not agree to consider a zero option for land-based missiles of lower ranges until agreement has been reached on the destruction of all chemical weapons (and possibly that destruction carried out) and parity reached in conventional forces;

- we should have very much in mind the importance of keeping the Alliance united. Public confidence in whatever position NATO agrees will be all important.

I repeat what I said at the beginning of this letter: these are only preliminary views and the point of letting you have them is to enable the Foreign and Defence Secretaries to formulate their advice in the knowledge of the Prime Minister's starting point. That said, I expect that her views will be reflected in a general sense in any discussions which she has of these issues (she is seeing both M. Chirac and Dr. Kissinger this weekend for instance). You may want to let me have some early comments on them, particularly if there are points likely to cause difficulty.

I am copying this letter on the same personal basis to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

CABINET: ARMS CONTROL

Since the Foreign Secretary is away, you may want to say something briefly at Cabinet about arms control (or invite the Defence Secretary to do so).

Briefly, Gorbachev has come up with a number of additional proposals - not all of them entirely consistent - in recent weeks. They can be summarised as:

- a zero option in Europe for intermediate range nuclear weapons (from 1000 km. range upwards) but with US and Soviet Union entitled to keep 100 warheads each in Alaska and Soviet Asia respectively;

- a global zero option in shorter-range missiles between 500 and 1000 km. range. The Soviets have significant numbers of missiles in this range (the SS22 and SS23). The Americans have none, although the Germans have some Pershing IAs.;

- negotiations on even shorter-range missiles in the context of discussions on conventional forces, again with the prospect of reducing to zero.

These offers pose some difficult questions for the Alliance, and there are urgent consultations going on in NATO, with a view to reaching an agreed position by the third week of May.

The fact is that the Soviet proposals represent a steady move towards the West's aim of reducing the major Soviet preponderance in intermediate and shorter-range nuclear

weapons. It is therefore a reward for the West's firmness and steadiness and should be presented as such (in contrast with the Opposition's support for unrequited concessions which would have achieved nothing). Obviously we need to consider how far reductions in the various categories are consistent with our security, given the great imbalance in the Soviet Union's favour in chemical and conventional forces. So long as this persists we shall need to retain some shorter-range nuclear weapons to ensure also that NATO's strategy of flexible response remains valid. But it is a matter for fine military and political judgement whether for certain ranges of missiles where NATO currently has no existing weapons, the balance of advantage does not lie in eliminating Soviet missiles rather than retaining a theoretical right for the West to match Soviet totals. Obviously the US are tending to this view, partly under the pressure of another Summit between Reagan and Gorbachev.

One point which we can certainly make vigorously: any reduction in NATO shorter-range nuclear weapons in Europe strengthens even further the case for Britain to retain an effective independent nuclear deterrent.

C.D.P.

(C.D. POWELL)

23 April 1987
DCABWN

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 April 1987

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from M. Chirac about his recent visit to the United States. I should be grateful if you could arrange for a very rapid translation to be made so that the Prime Minister can absorb the message before her meeting with M. Chirac on Sunday.

(Charles Powell)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

010

CCPC

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
LONDRES

22nd April, 1987

Dear Prime Minister,

I have just received through the diplomatic bag a letter addressed to you dated 16/4 by Monsieur Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister.

I enclose it herewith.

Yours sincerely

Bouillane de Lacoste

Jean-Noël de Bouillane de Lacoste,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister,
10, Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

COVERING SECRET

LcfC

12B

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-930 7022

MO 11/9/4L

21 April 1987

CDS 29/4.

Dear Charles.

IMPLICATIONS OF ZERO-ZERO SRINF DOWN TO 500 KM

You asked when we spoke earlier today about the work being done in the Ministry of Defence to arrive at a military assessment of the implications of Mr Gorbachev's latest offer of zero-zero SRINF. I explained that most of our experts are already in the USA for the meeting this week of the Higher Level Group but that some thought had already been given to the problem on a contingency basis.

I attach, on a personal basis, a copy of a minute of last week from the CDS to Mr Stanley in which he describes the implications of an offer of this sort as seen by the military here, and to which is attached a copy of the short discussion paper which is to be tabled by the UK at the HLG meeting tomorrow. We in the Private Office have attempted to set out these arguments in a rather more easily digestible form in the attached "Balance Sheet".

I hope that you will find these papers helpful. Please let me know if you would like any further information.

Yours ever

(I C F ANDREWS)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

COVERING SECRET

347/4 46

CDS 1095/1

14 Apr 87

Minister(AF)

Copy to:

11/9/4

PS/Secretary of State
PUS
VCDS
DUS(P)
CDI
ACDS(Pol/Nuc)
AUS(Pol)
D Nuc Pol Sy
D Nuc Systems
Head of DACU
DDI Assessments

SRINF: 500-1000 KM

44

1. In your private secretary's note of 6 April you asked for my advice on the military implications of eliminating SRINF missiles in the 500-1000km bracket (ie SS23 to SS12/22 (SCALEBOARD)).

2. The deterrence and security implications of a Soviet offer along these lines have been analysed by the Defence Staff in a short discussion paper for the forthcoming HLG on 22 April. I attach a copy. The aim of the paper is to provide a framework for the inputs we expect over the next week or so from the NATO Military Authorities and to facilitate the formulation of clear politico/military guidance on the 500-1000km issue in time for NATO ministerial meetings next month.

3. In the absence of a detailed military input (in particular from SHAPE), it would be unwise to attempt to reach a firm national view on the deterrence implications of extending zero down to 500kms. However, implicit in the paper are a number of preliminary conclusions which I fully endorse:

a. removing PIIs and GLCMs will already make NATO very dependent for selective employment of nuclear weapons on either battlefield weapons or on DCA. To foreclose the option to deploy back to Europe PIBs, would remove the most effective available means of alleviating this problem. Indeed, it could make the problem worse, in making difficult the retention of German PIAs (for a mixture of political, technicial and cost effectiveness reasons);

b. the effective elimination of all NATO INF missiles down to 500kms would reverse the efforts of the last 10 years to put more emphasis on relatively longer range systems with their greater flexibility and escalatory potential (as opposed to short range, "war fighting" systems) and to reduce reliance on DCA, both because of their relative vulnerability and their important conventional role;

c. a particularly important military factor in determining the size and composition of NATO's INF stockpile is the need for adequate overall survivability. Without a significant missile component (and with no LRINF, the PIB will be the only available substitute), this becomes difficult to achieve. High dependence on DCA increases the risk of a Soviet pre-emptive attack against NATO theatre nuclear forces;

d. the survivability of NATO DCA would of course be increased by Soviet INF reductions (to an extent to be advised by SHAPE) but the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact have a wide range of other nuclear options for targeting NATO airfields: not least their 700+ SCUD and large numbers of DCA, and at longer ranges a substantial force of medium bombers equipped with stand off missiles, and in due course SLCMs. Soviet strategic forces also have considerable potential against targets in the European theatre;

e. a mix of systems (missiles and aircraft) is important for other than purely survivability reasons. Missiles complement the inherent flexibility of aircraft with very high penetrativity and a capability against time urgent targets (cf our arguments against the US Reykjavik proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles);

f. the effect on public support for nuclear deterrence of eliminating SRINF missiles down to 500kms on top of the elimination of LRINF missiles could be far reaching. It could significantly add to the difficulties of implementing future modernisation programmes;

g. admittedly the prospects of the FRG and/or other ACE nations agreeing to deploy new SRINF missiles do not look very good, but the case in deterrence terms is sufficiently strong for it to be wrong to foreclose the option now.

4. In view of these preliminary conclusions, I very much welcome Mr Shultz's recent assurance to the Foreign Secretary that he would simply take note of any Soviet offers on 500-1000km systems pending further consideration and consultation within the Alliance.

CDS

NATO'S THEATRE NUCLEAR REQUIREMENTS IN THE EVENT ON AN INF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT: SRINF SYSTEM IN THE SS23 - SCALEBOARD RANGES (500-1000 KM)

INTRODUCTION AND AIM

1. Recent indications from Soviet spokesmen have suggested that the Soviet Union might be about to propose, as part of an initial INF agreement, the elimination of all SRINF missile systems down to the range of the SS23. This would eliminate SS23 and SCALEBOARD on the Soviet side and prohibit the deployment of any US PIB. It might also have implications for the existing German PIA. Were such a proposal to be global in scope (ie and include Asian SS12/22), then there would be considerable public and political pressure on Allied governments to accept it. From a deterrence point of view, however, the implications of such a proposal have yet to be specifically addressed, although the HLG at its 27 February meeting began to look at SRINF issues and reached some preliminary conclusions.

2. The aim of this short paper, building on the last Anglo-German discussion paper, is to identify more precisely the deterrence considerations which would arise from a proposal to extend zero-zero down to the range of the SS23, and thereby to provide a basis for the HLG at its meeting in New Mexico to agree clear guidance on this issue for the SCG/NPG.

SCOPE

3. The paper reviews the rationale for NATO SRINF and the principles governing the size and composition of the SRINF stockpile; it recalls the conclusions on SRINF reached by the HLG in the context of its work on the implications of an LRINF zero agreement; and it considers the implications of extending zero-zero down to 500 km. The paper does not consider the potential of strategic systems for deterrence in Europe. The HLG is already looking at the possibility of SACEUR making use of SLRMs in an LRINF role. On the Soviet side there is obviously considerable potential to use strategic systems (most of which have been tested down to a range of 500 km) in Europe to substitute for the loss of SS20 and SCALEBOARD/SS23.

BACKGROUND

4. Over the last ten years the HLG has carried out extensive work on the nuclear requirements of NATO strategy. In particular in 1983, the Group undertook a fundamental review of the rationale for SRINF/SNF and of the size and composition of the SRINF/SNF stockpile. The Group agreed that these weapons made a threefold contribution to the overall objectives of NATO strategy:

- in complicating Warsaw Pact planning for conventional war;

- in providing flexibility to hold targets at risk over wide geographic areas and providing opportunities for broad national participation; and

- in providing a capability in direct defence and credible options for deliberate escalation.

5. In general the Group deemed it essential that the stockpile should be structured in such a way as to underline NATO's determination to escalate the conflict if necessary to the strategic level, and that it should therefore reflect where possible the greater flexibility of relatively long range systems in their contribution to deterrence, rather than the lesser flexibility of systems suitable for use only on or near the battlefield.

6. More detailed considerations affecting the HLG's assessment of the size and structure of the stockpile included:

a. the need for stability in the stockpile (ie principally overall force survivability and endurance). NATO forces had to be able to survive attacks by enemy conventional, chemical and nuclear forces. In particular it was essential that Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces should not be able to destroy key elements of NATO's INF/SNF with relatively few and limited nuclear strikes.

b. the need for responsiveness (ie flexibility and reliability);

c. the need for an effective contribution to GNR;

d. the need for sufficient numbers of systems to avoid a "clear imbalance" with the Warsaw Pact which could lead the Warsaw Pact to believe that they might succeed through attrition of a significantly smaller opposing force;

e. the need for the stockpile to provide a deterrent commensurate with the scale and quality of the threat including its political and technological dimensions.

7. Against this background the Group agreed that both DCA and missiles had an important contribution to make in the SRINF category:

a. DCA were judged to be the most flexible nuclear delivery system, and were the most widespread, both in terms of geographic location and national participation. However they were dependent on a small number of relatively vulnerable fixed facilities, and their survivability could be degraded even during the conventional phase of a conflict, when they would also suffer attrition through their involvement in NATO conventional operations. They also had to contend with rapidly improving Soviet air defences. NATO's hitherto high dependence on DCA was judged to be the single principal limitation on overall force stability and responsiveness.

b. SRINF missiles provided range coverage comparable with DCA, coupled with high survivability and excellent penetrativity. Thus they contributed significantly to the credibility of the overall deterrent. The PIA was judged accurate and responsive with a good capability against fixed and time urgent targets. Its main drawbacks were its limited redeployment capability, its limited capability against mobile targets in common with any longer range system, and its limited flexibility (because of the yield/accuracy combination) in targeting near friendly forces and population areas.

8. In both areas the HLG, and subsequently SACEUR in his NWRS 85, recommended improvement measures: new air delivered weapons (for penetrativity) and various protection measures (for survivability) for DCA; and the upgrading of German PIA to PIB (to improve its flexibility and to help reduce dependence on DCA). It was assumed that US PIAs would be replaced with PIIs. This, it was noted, would constrain NATO's selective employment options in the range between SNF and LRINF, although LRINF missiles were judged to pose an inherent threat of employment at shorter ranges.

RECENT HLG WORK

9. In its more recent work, the HLG has focussed its attention on force posture adjustments which might be necessary if PII and GLCM are removed from Europe. It has noted, however, that adjustments at LRINF range may not prove feasible or may be unable to meet NATO's INF requirements. In this context, therefore, the HLG has reached the following preliminary conclusions on SRINF:

- that SRINF/SNF requirements would probably increase as a result of an LRINF agreement;

- that SACEUR's NWRS 85 improvements would become more important;

- that other adjustments to the SRINF stockpile would have to be considered to ensure a continued capability to implement NATO strategy;

- and that a mix of systems would appear to be important, including possibly additional PIB deployments (ie over and above the upgrading of German PIA already recommended by SACEUR in NWRS 85).

At the same time the Group has acknowledged that Soviet SRINF reductions might affect NATO's own SRINF requirements.

IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING ZERO-ZERO DOWN TO 500 KM

10. Force Posture. Annex A sets out the nuclear capable theatre systems remaining after an INF agreement which removed all INF missiles down to the range of the SS23, with the exception of a residual 100 LRINF warheads in the US and Asia. It assumes that any INF agreement excludes third party forces and thus that the 72 PIA in Germany remain. The principal effects on each side's force posture would be as follows:

a. NATO

- some 90% of NATO's planned land-based INF missiles would be removed from Europe, leaving only 72 German PIA.

- NATO would lose the option to deploy to Europe US PIB in place of PII. The option of upgrading German PIA and PIB might also be called into question (for cost-effectiveness reasons).

- NATO's dependence on DCA for selective employment options would be significantly increased with consequential implications for the stability and responsiveness of the INF stockpile.

- on the other hand, the threat to NATO airfields and other critical assets (both conventional and nuclear) from Soviet INF missiles would be reduced.

b. Warsaw Pact

- some 44% of the Warsaw Pact's nuclear capable INF missile systems would be removed from Europe, (some 47% of the global total) including all systems between the ranges of the SS23 and SCALEBOARD.

- the Soviet Union would lose the option of deploying any replacement for the ageing SCALEBOARD which may be in development. (The removal of the SS23, which would otherwise be constrained at 12 launchers, is perhaps no great loss to the Soviet Union.)

- the Warsaw Pact would, however, retain some 720 SCUD launchers capabile of striking from E Germany and Czechoslovakia almost all of W Germany and parts of the Netherlands and Belgium. (See Annex B). It is not known how many refires are available for these launchers. Production estimates suggest that there might be up to 7 to 8 per launcher, a significant proportion of which might be nuclear.

- in addition the Warsaw Pact would have large numbers of DCA and medium nuclear bombers with stand-off missiles. Soviet SLCMs when deployed, will have the potential for targeting Europe from the opposite direction to which NATO air defence is pointed.

11. An agreement along the above lines would have a number of attractions: it would "solve" at a stroke the difficult issue of SRINF collateral constraints which otherwise threatens to impede progress towards an LRINF agreement; it would appear to give NATO quite a lot (removal of an additional 144 Soviet warheads) in return for nothing (since there are currently no US SRINF missiles to give up); and it would spare the Alliance a potentially very divisive debate over possible proposals to build up its SRINF forces to Soviet levels.

12. However a number of questions concerning the implications for deterrence of such an outcome need to be considered for deterrence. The major issues to be addressed are as follows:

Question a. In the context of a 'zero plus 100' LRINF agreement, what is the value of long range SRINF missiles to NATO compared with their value to the Warsaw Pact?

Points to Consider. Force stability, flexibility of remaining "mix", target coverage, ability to deal with time urgent targets. The greater value of long range to NATO because of the greater territorial depth of the Warsaw Pact. The capabilities of systems given up or foresaken (relative old age of SCALEBOARD (1), and suspect performance of SS23 given small numbers deployed in eight years; compared with projected capabilities of the PIB). The availability to each side of alternative systems. The importance for NATO, which would be reducing to a much smaller number of weapons than the Warsaw Pact, to structure the remaining stockpile in the most effective way, and in particular to have credible options for escalation.

Question b. What weight should be given to the option of deploying PIBs compared with the opportunity to eliminate the threat from SS12/22 and SS23?

Points to Consider. The removal of SS12/22s (on top of the removal of SS20s) could affect the value to NATO of PIB deployments in two ways:

- through a reduction in threat (nuclear, chemical and conventional) to NATO's theatre nuclear forces;

- through a reduction in targets needing to be covered by NATO nuclear forces.

How significant would these reductions be in military terms? Could they offset the loss of force stability and responsiveness resulting from NATO's significantly increased dependence on DCA for selective employment?

(1) The Soviet Union would of course be foresaking a possible SCALEBOARD replacement.

Question c. What effect would the extension of zero down to 500 km have on public support for the maintenance of effective nuclear deterrence?

Points to Consider. As noted above, a Soviet offer to include SCALEBOARD and SS23 in an initial INF agreement would be very difficult, politically, to refuse. At the same time there is a danger that the removal/banning of all systems in the 500-1000 km bracket, coming on top of the elimination of LRINF missiles, could generate momentum towards the elimination of all ground - or even air-launched missile systems in Europe and towards the abandonment of any theatre nuclear contribution at all to deterrence. Future modernisation programmes (eg Lance successor) could become impossibly difficult. Conversely, it might be difficult to justify critical references to imbalances in Soviet Union's favour if we turn down opportunity to eliminate them. Would "denuclearisation" argument be sustainable, given the several thousand warheads which would anyway remain? If zero/zero rejected would public support be forthcoming for new nuclear deployments on Western side?

Question d. How realistic would be a NATO option to deploy US PIB?

Points to Consider. Deployment of PIB to ACE nations following an LRINF agreement would create considerable political difficulties for host countries, which would no doubt be exploited by vigorous Soviet propaganda. The charge that NATO was circumventing the LRINF agreement, its spirit if not its letter, might be difficult to deal with.

Question e. How valuable would a right to deploy PIB be, if NATO were to decide there were no prospect in foreseeable future of exercising that right?

Points to Consider. Even if there were no prospect of deployments today, circumstances might change. Moreover the principle that NATO should have the right to build up to Soviet levels of SRINF, might be considered sufficiently important for it to be worth enshrining in an initial INF agreement even at the expense of not removing SS12/22s and SS23s. Retaining a right to deploy PIB might also give leverage in subsequent negotiations, although the longer it remained unexercised, the weaker that leverage might become.

Question f. If NATO's right to deploy PIB were to be negotiated away, would the removal of SS12/22 and SS23 be a reasonable exchange?

Points to Consider. The feasibility and acceptability (in public presentation terms) of linking these missiles to other categories is a matter for the SCG to consider. From a military point of view, there is no particular reason why the giving up of an option to deploy PIB should be linked to the elimination of comparable systems on the Soviet side. NATO's requirements for PIBs would not primarily be a function of Soviet SCALEBOARD deployments. The overall threat to NATO NATO's INF has to be taken into account in which context the SCUD is clearly important: a missile which is already deployed in large numbers, which is capable of covering most important targets in the Central Region, and which if not constrained the Soviet Union would be free to improve/deploy in even greater numbers. NATO has no comparable system. There might also be a case for linking the surrendering of the right to deploy PIBs to changes in the conventional imbalance.

Question g. How long would German PIAs remain viable were the US itself not to continue with the Pershing system? Would the option to convert German PIAs to PIBs still be open?

Question h. If a zero-zero agreement down to the range of SS23 was acceptable to NATO, should it contain any commitment to follow-on talks?

Points to Consider. On the one hand this leaves SCUD unconstrained; on the other, we have nothing to bargain with in terms of US missiles and thus we risk bringing in third party systems and DCA. Any specific commitment to further talks in a given timescale might also add t othe momentum towards denuclearisation.

Question i. What difference would it make to the analysis if NATO were to agree in the event of an INF agreement to make force posture adjustments at LRINF range?

Points to Consider. At one end of the scale, a decision to rely more on DCA for longer range tasks would probably not significantly affect the structure of the stockpile and might therefore make little difference. (Indeed to the extent that it involved a reduction in systems available to cover targets at shorter ranges, it might strengthen the case for a

substantial SRINF missile component.) At the other end of the scale the availability for selective employment of, say, a significant number of SLCMs might make quite a big difference to the way in which other requirements could be met.

Question j. What if the Soviet offer on SRINF were designed to eliminate third party forces (ie German PIA)?

Points to Consider. Any disadvantages attached to an offer covering US and Soviet systems only would be compounded. Acceptance of such an offer would also require NATO to give up the principle of not including in the INF talks third party systems. Conversely, if the offer did not include third party systems, what would prevent the Soviet Union from transferring SCALEBCARD/SS23 to NSWP countries? Would we mind if they did, up to a limit of 72?

ANNEX A TO

LAND BASED INF/SNF
(Global Figures)

NATO			RANGE KM	WARSAW PACT		
US		Non US (1)		Soviet		NSWP
870	Artillery	972	0-150	6642	Artillery	898
36	Lance (115 km)	52		688 (2)	FROG (90 km)	222 (2)
				102 (2)	SS21 (80 km)	8 (2)
	-		150-500	588 (2)	SCUD (300 km)	132 (2)
				12 (2)	SS23 (470 km)	0
0	Pershing IA (740 km)	72	500-1000	132 (2)	SCALEBOARD (900 km)	0
380	DCA	430		4250 (3)	DCA	357 (3)
100	GLCM/PII	0	Above 1000	33	SS20	0
240	F-III	0	1000	758 (4)	BADGER/BLINDER/ BACKFIRE	0

Footnotes: (1) Fench forces not included.
(2) Numbers of missiles/refires available not known, nor proportion of these which would have nuclear warheads.
(3) It is not possible to estimate now many of these would be available for nuclear operations.
(4) Includes SNAF aircraft with capability against land targets.

ANNEX A

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF ELIMINATING SRINF IN THE 500-1000 KM RANGE BRACKET ACROSS EUROPE (ZERO-ZERO DOWN TO 500 KM)

COSTS

1. The removal of Pershing II and GLCM will increase NATO's dependence for selective employment of nuclear weapons on either battlefield systems or Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA). If the US is prevented from deploying Pershing IBs back to Europe (ie; by converting Pershing IIs) the most effective means of alleviating this problem would be lost. If third country systems were included (ie the German Pershing IAs), the problem would be compounded.

2. Elimination of all NATO INF missiles down to 500 kms would cap the efforts of the last 10 years to place more emphasis on relatively longer range systems (as opposed to shorter range "war fighting" systems) which offer greater flexibility and escalatory potential. This would also force the alliance to continue to rely for nuclear delivery on DCA despite their relative vulnerability and their important conventional role.

3. Elimination of the missile component of systems in this range bracket would have serious implications for survivability. High dependence on DCA increases the risk of a Soviet pre-emptive attack against NATO airfields and theatre nuclear forces.

BENEFITS

. The elimination of Soviet INF and SRINF systems in this range bracket would reduce the number of missiles targetted on NATO and would therefore increase survivability of alliance DCA, particularly at longer ranges. But see Costs (5).

4. A mix of systems ensures that missiles complement the inherent flexibility of aircraft; they offer very high penetrativity and provide a capability against time-urgent targets.

5. Although the survivability of NATO DCA would be increased by a reduction in Soviet systems, the Warsaw Pact would retain a wide range of other nuclear (and conventional and chemical) options for targetting NATO airfields. These include more than 700 SCUD missiles and very large numbers of DCA as well as, at longer ranges, a substantial force of medium bombers equipped with stand-off missiles and, in due course, SLCM.

ANNEX B

ZERO-ZERO DOWN TO 500 KMS: POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

FOR	AGAINST
(i) Political pressure for an agreement which will rid Europe of these weapons (and therefore the political cost of appearing to resist the achievement of this goal)	(i) The effect on public support for nuclear deterrence of eliminating both LRINF and SRINF could add significantly to the difficulty of implementing future modernisation programmes.
	(ii) Following on from the above it could be very difficult domestically for FRG and other ACE nations to accept the deployment of, for example, a new generation of SNF missiles with a range of just below 500 kms.

ANNEX C

SECRET

SOVIET, [redacted] AND OTHER NATO LONGER-RANGE INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES (LRINF), SHORTER-RANGE INF (SRINF) AND SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (SNF) [redacted]

A. Systems covered by US proposals for LRINF Agreements.

		Soviet Union			US			Other NATO (Not covered in		
LRINF (Range 1800-5000k's)		System	Range km	Nos deployed/ warheads facing Europe	System	Range km	Nos deployed/ warheads in Europe.	System	Range	Nos deployed/ warheads
	Missiles	SS4 SS20	1950 5000	112/112 270/810	Pershing II GLCMs	1800 2500	108/108 208/208			
	Total (warheads)			920 facing Europe			316 (at end 1986)			
SRINF (150kms-1800kms)		System	Range	Nos facing Europe deployed elsewhere	System	Range	Nos deployed/ warheads	System	Range	Nos deployed/ warheads
Draft treaty includes: - Ban on 1000-1800kms - Constraints on 500-1000kms	Missiles	SS12/22 SS23	900 470	66/66 12				Pershing	740	72 (FRG)
	Total (warheads)			78/66						72

Global 12/22 66
23 230

B. Systems not covered by US proposals for LRINF agreement

		Soviet Union			US			Other NATO (Not covered in any negotiations)		
NATO requires to be in follow-on negotiations		SCUD*	300	594						
	Total (warheads)			594						
SNF (Short range under 150kms)		System	Range	Nos facing Europe	System	Range	Nos deployed/	System	Range	Nos deployed
Missiles possible subject of follow-on negotiations.		FROG* SS21	70 85	661 106	LANCE	115	88	Pluton	16.8	44 (France)
	Total (warheads)			767			88			44

Notes* 1. SCUD and FROG can carry nuclear, conventional or chemical warheads. Precise break-down unknown.

2. Above table does not take account of nuclear capable aircraft and artillery. Approximate figures are:-

Approximate figures are:	LRINF aircraft	SRINF aircraft	Artillery
Soviet Union	350	3000	6000
Aircraft declared to NATO	144	610	1500

CONFIDENTIAL

BF

(2)

Prime Minister
CDP
22/4

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 April 1987

Dear Lyn,

UNITED KINGDOM/SOVIET UNION

Mr. Kossov of the Soviet Embassy slipped in to see me again this afternoon. The ostensible purpose was to leave two newspaper articles about the Prime Minister: one in English from the Moscow News, the other in Russian from Izvestia. He claimed that the latter in particular was of great interest and indeed unprecedented in its favourable treatment of the Prime Minister. She might like it for her personal files. I said that if it was that good, she might use it in her election campaign.

Mr. Kossov went on to say that Mr. Bessmertnych, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and very much involved in United States/Soviet relations and arms control matters, would be in London on 28 and 29 April. He realised that it might be shooting a bit high to ask for a call on the Prime Minister. But her expertise and close interest in arms control matters were well-known and the Soviet authorities therefore wondered whether she might agree to see Mr. Bessmertnych, who would be in a position to explain in detail Mr. Gorbachev's latest proposals. Failing that, they hoped that the Prime Minister would designate someone else to see him. I said that I was not sure of the Prime Minister's availability on the dates in question but would ensure that the request was considered.

We had some discussion of the latest Soviet proposals on INF and SRINF with Mr. Kossov probing for a reaction. I said that we were still examining them, and there would have to be a thorough discussion in the Alliance. I asked Mr. Kossov point blank whether the proposal for a zero option in the range 500km-1000km was meant to include or exclude the Pershing 1As in Germany. Kossov said quite categorically that they were not included but were regarded as a third country system. He appeared absolutely confident about this. I also asked whether the Soviet proposal was for a global zero option in this category or applied only to Europe. Kossov was equally confident that it was global, making a particular point of saying that it included the units in Asia.

CONFIDENTIAL

I should be grateful for a translation of the Izvestia article and for advice on whether it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to see Mr. Bessmertnych.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(1)

Fixed for 5 p.m. on 29 April. COP 22/4

PRIME MINISTER

ARMS CONTROL

I attach a copy of a note about a further meeting with Mr. Kossov of the Soviet Embassy.

As you will see he has asked whether you would be able to receive Mr. Bessmertnych, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, next week to be briefed on Gorbachev's latest arms control proposals. There are pros and cons to this. We cannot keep having the Russians in at varying levels and I doubt you will actually hear anything very new. Bessmertnych's main meetings should certainly be in the FCO and MOD. But, in the present climate, there might well be advantages in a brief meeting in the wake of your visit to Moscow.

Agree to see Mr. Bessmertnych?

Yes

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL
21 April 1987

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CONFIDENTIAL.

SRWALL.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 April 1987

Dear Lyn,

UNITED KINGDOM/SOVIET UNION

Mr. Kossov of the Soviet Embassy slipped in to see me again this afternoon. The ostensible purpose was to leave two newspaper articles about the Prime Minister: one in English from the Moscow News, the other in Russian from Izvestia. He claimed that the latter in particular was of great interest and indeed unprecedented in its favourable treatment of the Prime Minister. She might like it for her personal files. I said that if it was that good, she might use it in her election campaign.

Mr. Kossov went on to say that Mr. Bessmertnych, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and very much involved in United States/Soviet relations and arms control matters, would be in London on 28 and 29 April. He realised that it might be shooting a bit high to ask for a call on the Prime Minister. But her expertise and close interest in arms control matters were well-known and the Soviet authorities therefore wondered whether she might agree to see Mr. Bessmertnych, who would be in a position to explain in detail Mr. Gorbachev's latest proposals. Failing that, they hoped that the Prime Minister would designate someone else to see him. I said that I was not sure of the Prime Minister's availability on the dates in question but would ensure that the request was considered.

We had some discussion of the latest Soviet proposals on INF and SRINK with Mr. Kossov probing for a reaction. I said that we were still examining them, and there would have to be a thorough discussion in the Alliance. I asked Mr. Kossov point blank whether the proposal for a zero option in the range 500km-1000km was meant to include or exclude the Pershing 1As in Germany. Kossov said quite categorically that they were not included but were regarded as a third country system. He appeared absolutely confident about this. I also asked whether the Soviet proposal was for a global zero option in this category or applied only to Europe. Kossov was equally confident that it was global, making a particular point of saying that it included the units in Asia.

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I should be grateful for a translation of the Izvestia article and for advice on whether it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to see Mr. Bessmertnych.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Mr.A.BESSMERTNYCH

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the USSR

In London: April 28-29

Вместе у телевизора

Нет худа без добра

Из международных телепередач последних месяцев не припомню ни одной, вызвавшей такой же широкий и сильный отклик, как интервью Маргарет Тэтчер трем советским журналистам. Прошло больше недели после той, почти полуночной передачи, а все еще со всех сторон слышится: Ну и как? Что скажете? И в вопросе ехидство и камень в наш огород — огород журналистов-международников и той его грядки, которую возделывают политические обозреватели.

Поражаешься, насколько обширна аудитория телевидения — едва ли не весь народ. И насколько велик интерес к международной политике, особенно к прямому показу ее главных делателей, участников.

Увеличительное стекло телеэкрана порождает эффект присутствия, страсть и азарт болельщика. Передаточные, объясняющие звенья устранены. Один на один с событием, творящимся на его глазах, телезритель выносит свое собственное суждение.

Профессионалу - журналисту, вроде меня, в этом суждении видно преобладание эмоций. Возмущение: Что же это они на нее так напали? На женщину?!.. Восхищение: А она их — как!!! И критическое обобщение, опять же на уровне чувства, сарказм: Обозреватели! Тоже мне...

Итак, болельщики, демонстрируя объективность, сходятся на том, что матч закончился не в нашу пользу. В их приговоре, если вдуматься, есть даже некое тайное удовлетворение. Оно выдает недовольство состоянием дел в нашей международной журналистике, которая, не торопясь расстаться с привычными стереотипами, отстает от темпов перестройки в телезрительском и читательском сознании. Как часто бывает, явление, скрытое до поры — до времени, ждет случая, чтобы выявить себя. И таким случаем стало телеинтервью с британским премьер-министром.

Хочу взглянуть на него глазами профессионала, от которого ожидаются не эмоции, а хладнокровный и взвешенный анализ. При этом не буду вслед за другими бросать камень в огород — для меня он не чужой, а свой, и я без труда представляю себя на месте трех коллег, которое выглядело почетным, а оказалось неуютным. Однако интересы дела, и профессиональные, и общественные, требуют размышлений и извлечения уроков.

Урок первый, касающийся всех нас, международников,— не надо упрощать, окарикатуривать наших западных партнеров или противников. Новая пора гласности, сложнее и шире открывая внешний мир, предъявляет сейчас к оплате некоторые старые счета.

За те восемь лет, что Маргарет Тэтчер находится на посту британского премьера, мы немало потрудились, чтобы создать стереотип «железной леди», в котором неприемлемость политических взглядов британского консерватора как бы автоматически соединялась с человеческой непривлекательностью. Упрощение. Оно не выдержало испытания жизнью, вернее, нашим телеэкраном. Более того, присутствуя в сознании телезрителя, старое упрощение по закону контраста и компенсации помогло новому образу Маргарет Тэтчер, ибо мы увидели английскую леди на высоком государственном посту, умную, опытнейшую, привлекательную, с подкупающим чувством достоинства. Консерватор? Да. Оценка не изменилась ни на йоту. Но кто сказал, что нельзя испытывать уважение к убежденному консерватору, с которым ведешь диалог в поисках мира? Никто не говорил. Однако не принято было говорить и другое: без такого уважения, без известного доверия не может быть ни мирного сосуществования, ни продуктивных контактов между государственными руководителями.

Урок второй надо бы усвоить и журналистам, и их аудитории. Как бы ни разыгрывались страсти болельщиков, интервью по самой природе жанра не может быть спортивным матчем, в котором обязательны победители и побежденные. Ошибаются те, кто видит в интервью способ «прижать» другую сторону «к стене». За редкими исключениями, это непосильная для журналистов задача — особенно с опытными и искушенными политическими деятелями. Надо понять простую истину — они идут на интервью не для того, чтобы их «прижали», а для того, чтобы изложить свои позиции и взгляды (или замаскировать их). Если брать чисто пропагандистский эффект интервью, то у отвечающего куда больше шансов добиться его, чем у спрашивающего. Последнему достается эффект получения информации, старой или новой. Собственно, в этом и состоит закон жанра — в получении информации, а не в конфронтации, предполагающей победу или поражение.

Маргарет Тэтчер удачно использовала предоставленную ей возможность. Возможности журналистов были много меньше. Степень их удачи или неудачи определяется лишь тем, насколько полно они их использовали. К примеру, мы не услышали ответа на вопрос о планах наращивания ядерного потенциала Великобритании, потому что такой вопрос не был задан. Мы не узнали, на какой компромиссной, взаимовыгодной почве могли бы встретиться британская защита доктрины ядерного сдерживания и советский план достижения безъядерного мира. И такого вопроса не было.

Но стоит ли убиваться? И стоит ли удивляться — на уровне анализа, а не эмоций,— что у другой стороны есть своя логика, вытекающая из другой жизни? Не из каждого словесного турнира выйдешь победителем, тем более не из каждого интервью. Как говорится, на каждый роток не накинешь платок. И гласность, кроме прочего, предполагает право телезрителя и читателя самому делать выводы.

Урок третий — урок такта и тактики. Насчет такта реакция публики была весьма сильной, а тактика как бы осталась вне ее внимания. Между тем именно тактика ведения интервью, на мой взгляд, не была должным образом разработана. Пятьдесят минут — огромное время на телеэкране. Это, может быть, ответы на два десятка вопросов. Их не оказалось. Чрезмерно много минут было израсходовано на то, чтобы «прижать», на малопродуктивное прокручивание темы ядерного сдерживания. И это усугубило эмоции телезрителя.

Наверное, можно извлечь и другие уроки. И важно извлечь. Нет худа без добра. Практика гласности сулит новые интервью, встречи, опыты — и новые испытания. Так или иначе журналистам-международникам надо перестраиваться, учиться и переучиваться.

Станислав КОНДРАШОВ.

"Известия"
11.04.87

GRS 1200

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FOLLOW-ON TO SHULTZ'S NAC BRIEFING : FUTURE ALLIANCE WORK

1. MY TELNO 177 TO FCO RECORDS SHULTZ'S BRIEFING OF THE NAC TODAY. THE ALLIANCE IS NOW IN A GOOD POSITION TO MOVE FORWARD TO ACHIEVE THE 1979 OBJECTIVE OF AN LRINF AGREEMENT. A VERY EARLY DECISION IS REQUIRED ON THE FORM OF CONSTRAINTS TO BE APPLIED TO SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS TO AVOID SOVIET CIRCUMVENTION. SPECIFICALLY THE SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSED ZERO-ZERO SRINF ON WHICH WE NEED AN ALLIANCE RESPONSE. THIS TELEGRAM SETS OUT THE ISSUES NOW FACING THE ALLIANCE.
2. SHULTZ FACED THE ALLIANCE WITH 3 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES:

(A) SAYING SNAP TO THE SOVIET ZERO LR/SRINF PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD ELIMINATE SS20, SS4, SS12/22 AND SS23 IN RETURN FOR US PII AND GLCM DEPLOYMENTS SEMICLN
(B) ACCEPT AN LRINF AGREEMENT BUT REJECT THE SOVIET ZERO-ZERO SRINF PROPOSAL AND IMPLICITLY ABANDON ANY EFFECTIVE CONSTRAINT ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS. INSTEAD DEPLOY NEW US SRINF SYSTEMS, MOST LIKELY BY CONVERTING PII TO PIBS THOUGH OTHERS MIGHT ALSO BE NEEDED SEMICLN
(C) OFFER TO REACH LRINF AGREEMENT WITH A COUNTER-PROPOSAL ON SRINF INVOLVING EQUAL GLOBAL CEILINGS BELOW CURRENT SOVIET LEVELS BUT ABOVE ZERO.

3. APPROACH (A) ABOVE SEEMS THE US PREFERRED POSITION. THERE ARE SOME OBVIOUS POLITICAL ADVANTAGES. IT AVOIDS ARGUMENTS OVER NEW US PERSHING DEPLOYMENTS. BUT THERE IS ONE IMPORTANT ISSUE UNRESOLVED, THAT OF THE FUTURE OF THE GERMAN OWNED PIA MISSILES, 72 OF WHICH ARE STATIONED IN THE FRG. SHULTZ SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW OF THE GERMANS PIAS. IF THE LRINF/SRINF ZERO-ZERO AGREEMENT EXCLUDED THESE SYSTEMS AND THE ALLIANCE RETAINED THE RIGHT TO MODERNISE THE PIA WITH THE PIB WHEN THE FORMER BECOME OBSOLETE IN THE EARLY 1990S, THEN THE OVERALL DEAL LOOKS MORE FAVOURABLE FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. SACEUR WOULD RETAIN 72 HIGH ACCURACY MISSILES WHICH WOULD FULFIL AN IMPORTANT PART OF HIS REQUIREMENT FOR SELECTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SINCE HE COULD HELD AT PROMPT RISK KEY TARGETS AT RANGES OF 750 KM WITH HIGH SURVIVABILITY OF THE SYSTEMS AND ASSURED PENETRATION. BUT IF THE SRINF/LRINF AGREEMENT LOOKED LIKELY TO INVOLVE GIVING UP THE PIAS, OR THE FRG'S RIGHT TO MODERNISE, THEN SEEN FROM HERE THE DEAL LOOKS VERY MUCH LESS ATTRACTIVE SINCE IN TERMS OF LAND BASED SYSTEMS SACEUR WOULD BE LEFT

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WITH DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (DCA) PLUS VERY MUCH SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS (AT PRESENT ONLY 80 KM LANCE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A LONGER RANGE LANCE FOLLOW-ON AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE). WHILST THE WP WOULD BE LEFT WITH A MASSIVE ADVANTAGE IN SHORTER RANGE MISSILES SUCH AS SCUD AND SS21 WHICH WOULD THREATEN KEY NATO MILITARY TARGETS INCLUDING NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND WHICH, EX HYPOTHESI, WOULD NOT BE COVERED IN ANY WAY BY THE AGREEMENT. IT SEEMS TO ME ESSENTIAL THAT THE FRG PI ISSUE IS CLARIFIED URGENTLY SO THAT A PROPER APPRECIATION CAN BE MADE OF THIS APPROACH.

4. THE SECOND APPROACH ((B) ABOVE) SEEMS UNWORKABLE FOR THE WEST. THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF NEW US DEPLOYMENTS NEED NO STRESSING. EVEN WITH LIMITED DEPLOYMENTS WE WOULD HAVE PLACED NO EFFECTIVE CEILING ON FURTHER SOVIET BUILD-UP OF SRINF TO CIRCUMVENT THE ABOLITION OF THE SS20. I DO NOT SEE THE ALLIES ACCEPTING THIS APPROACH.

5. THAT LEAVES THE THIRD APPROACH ((C) ABOVE). HERE THERE ARE A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT OPTIONS TO COMPLEMENT AN LRINF AGREEMENT:

(I) CONTINUE WITH ALLIANCE POLICY ON SRINF CONSTRAINTS WITH EQUAL BUT REDUCED CEILINGS AND A WESTERN RIGHT TO MATCH FOR SRINF SYSTEMS. NO SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS (EQUIVALENT TO FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS FAILING TO PRODUCE A RESULT) SEMICLN

(II) GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF SRINF SYSTEMS DOWN TO THE SS23 BUT ACCOMPANY THIS BY EQUAL BUT REDUCED CEILINGS WITH A RIGHT TO MATCH AT THE LOWER RANGES (SCUD ETC) SEMICLN

(III) GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS (SNF) AS WELL DOWN TO SAY SCUD WITH EQUAL BUT REDUCED CEILINGS AND A RIGHT TO MATCH AT LOWER LEVELS SEMICLN AND

(IV) GLOBAL ELIMINATION ON BOTH SIDES OF ALL SRINF/SNF LAND-BASED MISSILES.

6. ON (I) ABOVE SHULTZ MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF EQUAL GLOBAL CEILINGS AT THE SOVIET LEVEL AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF THE SRINF MISSILES IN GDR/CZECHOSLOVAKIA. BUT THERE ARE NO SIGNS THAT THIS IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION, IT COULD THEREFORE DELAY LRINF AGREEMENT, AND WOULD POSE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE WEST. IT COULD EASILY BE REPRESENTED BY GORBACHEV AS THE ALLIANCE REJECTING AN AGREEMENT. IN ANY CASE SHULTZ EMPHASISED THAT IF THEY DID NEGOTIATE EQUAL SRINF CEILINGS THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO EXERCISE ITS RIGHT AND DEPLOY NEW SYSTEMS.

7. ON THE OTHER OPTIONS SHULTZ MADE CLEAR HIS VIEW THAT SNF IS NOT ON THE TABLE AND THAT HIS WISH IS TO CONSTRAIN DISCUSSIONS TO SRINF SYSTEMS (SS12/22 AND SS23). BUT WE NEED TO CONSIDER VERY CAREFULLY NOW WHETHER WE OUGHT NOT TO ADD IN THOSE SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS SUCH AS SCUD IN WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE A PREPONDERANCE, AND SEEK TO REDUCE THOSE (OPTIONS (II) AND (III) ABOVE). THE FRG PI REMAINS A JOKER BUT SEEN FROM HERE THE ESSENTIAL IS THAT WHEREVER THE LINE IS DRAWN A BALANCE (OR RIGHT TO BALANCE) SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN NATO AND WP SYSTEMS IN ALL THE RANGE BANDS FOR LAND-BASED MISSILES. WE MUST NOT SETTLE TOO HASTILY FOR AN AGREEMENT IN ONE PARTICULAR BAND LEAVING OUR INTENTIONS ON SHORTER RANGES UNCLEAR. THE MILITARY ADVICE FROM SHAPE ARGUES STRONGLY FOR NOT CONFINING OUR CONSIDERATION TO THE SS12/22 AND SS23.

8. THE ALLIANCE NEEDS THEREFORE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT MILITARY ADVICE, TO DECIDE WHETHER TO FOLLOW THE US AND CONFINE CONSIDERATION TO SRINF PROPER (SS12/22 AND SS23) OR WHETHER TO FORMULATE A COUNTER-PROPOSAL FOR REDUCED BUT EQUAL CEILINGS (OR EVEN FOR ZERO) FOR THE FULL SPECTRUM OF LAND-BASED MISSILES.

9. IN ANY EVENT, THE ALLIANCE WILL NEED TO BE RESOLUTE IN MAINTAINING ITS STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, INCLUDING CONTINUED AND MODERNISED EUROPEAN BASED SYSTEMS. IN THE ABSENCE OF LAND-BASED MISSILES, THIS WILL PUT THE EMPHASIS ON IMPROVEMENTS IN DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND THEIR WEAPONS. BUT UNDER ANY OPTION DCA IMPROVEMENTS WILL BE NEEDED. (FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF ALL THESE ISSUES SEE MY LETTER OF 14 APRIL TO MR FALL, COPIED ONLY TO MOD).

10. TO SUM UP, THE KEY CONSIDERATIONS IN REACHING A DECISION ON THE SOVIET ZERO-ZERO SRINF OFFER SEEM TO BE:

(A) THE STATUS OF FRG PIAS AND THEIR MODERNISATION SEMICLN

(B) ALLIANCE WILLINGNESS TO CONTEMPLATE NEW US LAND-BASED MISSILES BASED ON CONVERTING PIIS INTO PIBS SEMICLN

(C) ALLIANCE WILLINGNESS TO PRODUCE A NEW SHORTER RANGE SYSTEM SUCH AS LANCE FOLLOW-ON SEMICLN

(D) DEPENDENT UPON THE ABOVE ANSWERS, WHETHER TO CONFINE THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE LRINF CONTEXT TO SRINF OR WHETHER TO INCLUDE SNF, AND IF SO AT WHAT LEVELS DOWN TO AND INCLUDING ZERO.

11. WE SHOULD, IN MY VIEW, BE AIMING TO FORM OUR OWN JUDGEMENTS ON THESE PROBLEMS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE AND THEN TO DISCUSS THEM AT A HIGH LEVEL WITH THE GERMANS AND THE AMERICANS. I AM NOT VERY HAPPY AT THE PROSPECT OF STARTING SERIOUS DISCUSSION, WHETHER IN THE HLG OR ELSEWHERE, IN A FULL ALLIANCE FORUM.

ALEXANDER

YYYY

UBLNAN 1795

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARMS CONTROL TALKS

Secret

Le Premier Ministre

PARIS, LE 16 avril 1987

N° 77.013

Chère Madame le Premier Ministre,

Au retour de ma récente visite aux Etats-Unis, dont je me plais à souligner qu'elle s'est déroulée dans un climat de très confiante amitié, je souhaite vous faire part des réflexions que m'inspirent mes entretiens avec le Président REAGAN, ses principaux ministres et les membres du Congrès.

Les négociations de contrôle des armements ont tout naturellement constitué l'un des thèmes importants de ces conversations. Tous mes interlocuteurs ont souligné la priorité qu'ils attachaient à la conclusion, si possible d'ici à la fin de l'année, d'un accord séparé sur les forces nucléaires intermédiaires, incluant, comme l'Alliance en a reconnu la nécessité, des dispositions concernant le plafonnement à des niveaux égaux des systèmes nucléaires soviétiques et américains à plus courte portée. L'Administration américaine attache à la conclusion d'un tel accord une très grande importance et l'Union Soviétique va naturellement s'efforcer d'exploiter cet état d'esprit pour éluder certaines difficultés. Tous mes interlocuteurs m'ont paru pleinement conscients des risques de la tactique soviétique et m'ont assuré de leur très grande vigilance sur le maintien, au cours de la négociation, des principes et des objectifs qui ont déjà fait l'objet de consultations avec les Alliés.

.../...

Madame Margaret THATCHER
Premier Ministre du Royaume-Uni

J'ai, pour ma part, tenu à exprimer, aussi bien en privé qu'en public, notre confiance à l'égard de la détermination de la présente administration à tenir le plus grand compte des intérêts européens dans une telle négociation.

J'ai exprimé trois convictions en ce qui concerne l'Europe : la dissuasion nucléaire y demeure une nécessité pour le maintien de la paix ; le couplage entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis demeure essentiel ; les pays européens doivent accroître et mieux coordonner leurs efforts de défense. A cet égard, j'ai rappelé l'importance des engagements que la France s'apprêtait à prendre dans ce domaine pour les prochaines annnées, notamment en ce qui concerne la modernisation de sa force de dissuasion nucléaire.

J'ai relevé, dans ce contexte, la fermeté avec laquelle le Président REAGAN avait réaffirmé le principe de l'exclusion des forces nucléaires françaises et britanniques du champ de la négociation soviéto-américaine : toutes assurances m'ont été données que cette position serait maintenue à l'avenir.

Compte tenu de certaines réticences qui s'étaient parfois exprimées du côté américain à l'encontre de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale, j'ai tenu à soulever ce point directement auprès du Président REAGAN lui-même.

.../...

Je lui ai notamment exliqué le sens de l'initiative de Charte sur les principes de la sécurité européenne que j'ai présentée le 2 Décembre dernier devant l'Assemblée parlementaire de l'U.E.O., et j'ai souligné à cette occasion la contribution qu'un dialogue renforcé et approfondi au sein de cette organisation apporterait à la vitalité de l'Alliance, et la meilleure sensibilisation des opinions publiques aux exigences de la sécurité qui en résulterait dans les pays concernés et ceux qui voudraient s'y joindre.

Le Président REAGAN m'a répondu que les Etats-Unis n'éprouvaient aucune réticence à l'égard de l'U.E.O., et qu'il était lui-même favorable à l'idée d'une coopération accrue dans ce cadre, estimant que les Etats-Unis, comme l'Europe, ne pouvaient qu'y gagner.

A tous mes interlocuteurs, j'ai tenu à exprimer très franchement les vives préoccupations que suscite, en Europe, la montée du protectionnisme dans une certaine partie de l'opinion publique américaine, qui trouve un écho jusqu'au Congrès, où trois projets de loi, resserrant d'une façon ou d'une autre le dispositif protectionniste américain, sont en cours de discussion.

Je me suis efforcé de les convaincre du caractère infondé des attaques portées sur le soi-disant protectionnisme de l'Europe, espace économique le plus ouvert du monde. J'ai pu constater que l'information du monde politique -hors certains membres de l'exécutif- sur la réalité de la situation actuelle

.../...

et sur le contenu et les conséquences véritables de la politique européenne, était incomplète. J'ai donc retiré de mes entretiens la conviction qu'il était nécessaire pour l'Europe et ses dirigeants d'intensifier l'effort d'information, seule façon de permettre une meilleure compréhension de la situation et des intérêts en cause de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique.

J'ai tenu à souligner la solidarité qui unit les pays de la Communauté, face à toute menace de mesures protectionnistes. Le Président REAGAN m'a confirmé qu'il continuerait à s'opposer aux offensives conduites sur ce point, et le Secrétaire au Trésor m'a assuré de la détermination de l'Administration américaine de lutter contre le protectionnisme. Il m'a indiqué que le Président userait, s'il le fallait, de son droit de veto.

Il m'a semblé nécessaire, enfin, de profiter de mes entretiens de WASHINGTON pour appeler l'attention des dirigeants américains et des membres du Congrès sur la situation actuelle du Tiers-Monde. Des raisons économiques, mais aussi morales et politiques, devaient inciter les pays occidentaux à accroître leurs efforts à mobiliser davantage leurs ressources pour remédier à la situation désespérée des pays les plus déshérités. Dans cet esprit, j'ai plaidé auprès de mes interlocuteurs pour qu'une initiative significative soit prise à cet effet, indiquant au passage quelques-unes des voies qui pourraient être, à mon avis, envisagées : renforcement des moyens des institutions multilatérales, assouplissement des modalités de rééchelonnement de la dette extérieure, effort supplémentaire des banques commerciales, réactivation des accords de produits et lutte contre la faim. Si le Président REAGAN n'a pas, sur le champ, pris position sur cette suggestion, mes interlocuteurs m'ont semblé réceptifs à cette idée, en particulier, le Secrétaire au Trésor qui a manifesté son intérêt.

.../...

Au total, cette visite m'a confirmé dans la conviction que les intérêts européens et américains, qu'il s'agisse de la sécurité ou de l'économie, étaient plus étroitement imbriqués que jamais. La profonde amitié que j'ai ressentie à WASHINGTON pour mon pays et l'Europe, en autorisant la plus grande franchise dans les entretiens que j'ai eus avec de nombreux responsables, m'a permis, je le crois, de faire mieux comprendre certaines préoccupations que nous partageons tous.

Je me réjouis d'avoir prochainement l'occasion de m'entretenir avec vous de l'ensemble de ces affaires.

Je vous prie de bien vouloir trouver ici, Madame le Premier Ministre, l'assurance de ma très haute considération,

Jacques CHIRAC

Secret & personal.

CDS 21/4

UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OTAN/NATO
1110 BRUSSELS
TELEPHONE 2426775

12

14.IV.87

Dear Charles,

There is a great deal of thrashing around going on about the response to Gorbachev, NATO strategy, the follow on to LRINF etc etc. I have, as you know, been trying to force Whitehall to focus on the issues in a timely manner. As part of that effort (& in preparation for the forthcoming mini-summit at Chevening) I have written a round up letter which you may be interested to see.

If you were to decide to put it

in the Prime Minister's Earlier box, which is not why I am sending it to you, it would be very important that she did not thrust this out to either Geoffrey Howe or George Younger. The Scots are particularly sensitive about any suggestion that one is trying to bounce them into anything. (I doubt, however, whether the PM is likely to be particularly enthused by the direction in which logic & events seem to me to be carrying us!)

Yours ever

Michael.

covering SECRETC)

13 April 1987

I enclose a copy of a letter from Ronald Reagan to the Prime Minister about George Shultz's trip to Moscow. I am not sure if it is usual for her to acknowledge letters of this nature. If it is could you please let me have an appropriate draft reply tomorrow.

(P. A. BEARPARK)

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

covering SECRET

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SOPC.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

April 13, 1987

MT.

Prime Minister 2

I have asked FCO for a draft reply

Dear Prime Minister:

Enclosed is a letter which the President has asked us to deliver to you.

With best wishes,

1 AR 13/4.

We will await the results of George Schultz visit to Moscow

Sincerely,

Raymond Seitz

R.G.H. Seitz
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

MT

Enclosure: SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
Number Ten Downing Street,
London, SW1.

US Declassified

SUBJECT CC OPS 11

MASTER

April 11, 1987

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T68A/87

— on Soviet Union / PM's visit march '87 Part 2

Dear Prime Minister:

Thank you for your recent message on your Moscow trip and for Geoffrey Howe's detailed observations when he was here on Thursday. Your talks were fascinating, and reconfirm my conviction that the Alliance's approach to East-West relations is the right one.

On the eve of George Shultz's trip to Moscow, I would like to share my thoughts on the major issues in our relations with the Soviet Union. He will take up this agenda in Moscow in greater detail and will report to the North Atlantic Council April 16 on the results of his meetings. I look forward to discussing these issues with you when we meet in Venice in June.

For all the difficulties that surround US-Soviet relations, we have seen modest progress on the agenda established at the 1985 Geneva Summit. The United States and the Soviet Union have begun a new cycle of discussions on regional issues. We are close to agreement on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers, we have concluded an agreement on space cooperation, bilateral contacts are expanding, and there has been some expansion in non-strategic trade. We have also seen some positive Soviet steps on human rights and humanitarian issues.

Developments in these areas, however, can be considered only a beginning. Concrete progress on the large issues must remain our overriding objective.

With this in mind, I remain greatly concerned over the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. What is needed is a clear political decision by the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces promptly. A lengthy withdrawal timetable and an approach to national reconciliation designed to preserve a communist-dominated regime in Kabul would only prolong the war. The United States seeks no strategic advantage in Afghanistan. We would lend political support to an agreement, consistent with UN resolutions, which brought about a speedy and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops.

There have been positive Soviet steps on human rights and humanitarian issues. I hope they are only a beginning.

SECRET

Continuing progress on cases involving divided families and separated spouses, on the release of political prisoners, and on emigration, would make an important contribution to the improvement of US-Soviet relations.

On bilateral relations, much is developing in promising directions, but my feelings are very clear on the Soviet penetration of the United States Embassy in Moscow. If this lack of prudence continues, the Soviet Union should expect to suffer the resulting discomfort and political cost equally with the United States.

A major element of our relations with the Soviet Union of course involves arms control. My point of departure is the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva in 1985 to expand common ground. I am committed to build on the advances he and I made there and last year in Reykjavik. The task now is to find ways to bridge our remaining differences.

The United States places the highest priority on achieving substantial reductions in offensive nuclear arms. I am therefore heartened that we are getting closer to agreement on deep and equitable reductions in longer-range INF missiles, in accordance with the formula that the General Secretary and I agreed on in Reykjavik.

Let me reiterate my continuing commitment to the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles. Effective verification is, of course, essential for an INF agreement. Moreover, since 1981, the U.S. has said that an INF agreement must have appropriate concurrent constraints on shorter-range INF systems. In particular, such constraints must be based on equality of rights.

There have been several signs that the Soviet position on this issue is in flux. As George Shultz indicated to Geoffrey Howe, his inclination in Moscow will be neither to accept nor reject any new Soviet proposal involving SRINF reductions, but rather to consult first with our Allies. In dealing with this issue, we are fully cognizant of Soviet conventional superiority. We must ensure that any arms control outcome enhances security and stability.

In the area of strategic offensive arms, the formula that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have developed for 50 percent reductions provides an historic opportunity to move toward a better, safer world. We should strive toward a rapid and uncomplicated achievement of such an agreement without imposing unnecessary conditions on its realization.

In the area of defense and space issues, I am prepared to sign a treaty that would commit the United States and the Soviet Union through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying operational defensive systems whose deployment is not permitted by the treaty. After 1994, we would both be able to deploy strategic defenses unless we agreed otherwise. At the same time, we would sign a treaty implementing the agreed upon 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms, with appropriate warhead sublimits. In recognition of his concerns that such sublimits would force a rapid restructuring of Soviet forces, we would agree to extend the period to complete the 50 percent reduction to seven years from the date a treaty takes effect.

I believe that these proposals can lead to rapid progress in the nuclear and space talks. As we move ahead toward reductions of nuclear forces, we must not forget the importance of addressing other potential sources of military instability, particularly the imbalances in conventional forces and chemical weapons.

Much remains to be done to make 1987 the year in which we can establish the basis for accords that would strengthen peace and security, but I am prepared to work intensively to do just that. The discussions between George Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze can prove to be an important step in this process.

Western solidarity and strength remain essential as we proceed in our efforts to strengthen the foundations on which peace depends. I count on your continued support as we move forward in this endeavor.

Sincerely,

/S/

Ron

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir P. Cradock
Mr. Ingham

GORBACHEV'S SPEECH

We do not yet have a full text. I have asked the Foreign Office to let you have an analysis next week. But you may like some brief comments.

The new or semi-new points in his speech are:

- the proposal for separate talks on the reduction and later elimination of missiles in the 500-1000 km range on the European continent;

- the fact that these negotiations would not be linked with LRINF negotiations, but could be conducted simultaneously with them;

- the proposal that there should be no increase in SRINF by either side during the talks;

- the proposal that short-range nuclear weapons (ie. under 500 km) should be covered in negotiations on conventional force reductions.

At first sight, there seems to be very little in these proposals for us. One could say that at least they show greater recognition of western fears about shorter-range systems. And they no longer make talks on these shorter-range systems dependent on conclusion of an INF agreement.

But they fail to give us the right to match Soviet SRINF systems. They fail, also, to set numerical global limits on the SS22 and SS23. Separation of negotiations on SRINF (500-1000 km) from those on LRINF would deprive the west of crucial negotiating leverage to achieve equal ceilings and a right to match: that leverage only exists in the LRINF

negotiations where the Russians are of course anxious to get rid of Cruise and Pershing II. The idea of further negotiations with the goal of achieving a zero option at another level takes us further down the road towards weakening of flexible response and of the eventual denuclearisation of Europe. The commitment not to increase SRINF would rule out conversion of Pershing IIs into Pershing Is. The proposals are also worrying in that they are a step towards what Genscher has been arguing for this last week - ie. dropping the western demand for constraints on SRINF in an INF agreement. They therefore risk opening a split in the Alliance.

I suggest that we should not rush into comment, but so far as possible hold our fire until after Shultz' visit to Moscow. But any off-the-record comments should be sceptical and unimpressed.

Gorbachev also had something to say on chemical weapons:

- he claimed that Soviet production of chemical weapons had ceased. If so, it must have been very recently indeed;

- he also said that no chemical weapons stocks were held outside Soviet territory, and that other Warsaw Pact countries did not produce or stockpile such weapons;

- he repeated what he told you, namely that the Soviet Union had built a new plant for the purpose of destroying chemical weapon stocks.

It is interesing that, despite the advance publicity, there was no proposal on withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and the GDR.

C. D. POWELL

11 April 1987

~~SLHATE~~

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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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PS/Mrs Chalker
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
~~MR BATFORD~~
MR FALL
MR FEARN

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HD/ACDD
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19.11.8

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FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 822
OF 110100Z APRIL 87
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, MODUK

MODUK FOR DACU
SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, 13-15 APRIL
SUMMARY

1. SHULTZ DEPARTS FOR MOSCOW IN POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES CLOUDED BY THE MOSCOW EMBASSY SPY SAGA AND WITH LITTLE NEW TO OFFER (AND ARGUABLY SOME BACKWARD MOVEMENT) ON ARMS CONTROL. MAKING A SUCCESS OF THE VISIT MAY BE UPHILL WORK.

DETAIL

2. SHULTZ LEAVES WASHINGTON FOR MOSCOW TOMORROW MORNING ACCOMPANIED BY A LARGE PARTY OF OFFICIALS INCLUDING ALL THE ADMINISTRATION'S KEY ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS.

3. MY HUNCH IS THAT SHULTZ'S MOOD IS DOWN BEAT AND THAT HE FEELS THAT HIS HANDS HAVE BEEN TOO FIRMLY TIED ON MAJOR ISSUES, PARTICULARLY ARMS CONTROL. PREPARATIONS FOR HIS VISIT HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN GREATLY COMPLICATED BY THE REVELATIONS OF SOVIET PENETRATION OF THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW. NOT ONLY HAVE THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES BEEN SEVERE (ALL COMMUNICATIONS WITH MOSCOW HAVE HAD TO BE HAND-CARRIED FROM FRANKFURT) BUT THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE REVELATIONS HAS ALSO BEEN DAMAGING. AS SHULTZ SAID TO YOU YESTERDAY (MY TELNO 809), THE ADMINISTRATION WILL TRY TO KEEP THE SPY SAGA AND MAJOR ASPECTS OF US/SOVIET BUSINESS IN SEPARATE COMPARTMENTS AND PREVENT THE WIDESPREAD SENSE OF ANGER AND IRRITATION HERE ABOUT SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES FROM DERAILING THE SEARCH FOR PROGRESS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN ARMS CONTROL. THIS APPROACH IS ENDORSED BY THE PRESIDENT, AND WAS A MAJOR POINT IN A SPEECH HE GAVE TODAY IN LOS ANGELES (SEE MY SECOND I.F.T.). BUT WHILE ADMINISTRATION PROFESSIONALS ARE SHRUGGING OFF THE ESPIONAGE ATTACK AS AN INEVITABLE IF REGRETTABLE (AND IN THIS CASE APPARENTLY VERY SERIOUS) FEATURE OF DOING BUSINESS WITH THE RUSSIANS, THE SPY SAGA HAS MADE EXCELLENT COPY FOR THE US PRESS AND IS JUST THE SORT OF INCIDENT THAT PROVIDES GRIST FOR THE MILLS OF THOSE ONLY TOO HAPPY TO FIND ARGUMENTS FOR BRINGING DOWN THE SHUTTERS.

4. KISSINGER AND EAGLEBURGER HAVE ALSO BEEN

SHUTTERS.

4. KISSINGER AND EAGLEBERGER HAVE ALSO BEEN AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE ARGUED PUBLICLY THAT SHULTZ SHOULD NOT VISIT MOSCOW IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THE SENATE VOTED BY A RESOUNDING MARGIN OF 70 TO 30 ON 9 APRIL FOR A NON-BINDING AMENDMENT THAT SHULTZ SHOULD NOT VISIT MOSCOW UNTIL SECURE FACILITIES HAD BEEN RE-ESTABLISHED THERE. SOME STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE DESCRIBED THE WHOLE EPISODE TO US AS A RE-RUN OF THE DANILOFF INCIDENT. WHILE ITS POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS HAVE NOT IN FACT SO FAR BEEN SO SEVERE, CONTAINING IT IS REQUIRING CONSIDERABLE EFFORT. SHULTZ IS CERTAINLY NOT THEREFORE GETTING THE SORT OF SEND OFF THAT HE MIGHT HAVE HOPED FOR THREE WEEKS AGO AND SOME COMMENTATORS ON THE VISIT CAN BE EXPECTED TO HARP ON THE THEME THAT IT IS DEMEANING FOR SHULTZ TO HAVE TO OPERATE IN MOSCOW OUT OF A CARAVAN IN THE US EMBASSY GROUNDS.

5. THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF PREPARATION FOR THE VISIT HAVE ALSO PROVED A DISAPPOINTMENT FOR SHULTZ, AS MIFT MAKES CLEAR. HE AND HIS OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN OVERRULED BY THE PRESIDENT ON ALMOST ALL ARMS CONTROL POINTS ON WHICH THEY HAD BEEN HOPING THAT SHULTZ MIGHT BE ABLE TO ADVANCE THE US POSITION WHILE IN MOSCOW. WHILE IT IS HELPFUL THAT SHULTZ WILL HAVE NOTHING TO SAY IN MOSCOW ON THE REYKJAVIK SECOND 5 YEAR PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES (WHICH IS NOW EFFECTIVELY DYING OF NEGLECT), THE ACCOMPANYING PROPOSAL FOR A REDUCTION IN THE PERIOD OF COMMITMENT NOT TO DEPLOY STRATEGIC DEFENCES FROM 10 YEARS TO A NEW PERIOD OF 7 YEARS FROM NOW (IE TO THE END OF 1994) MAY BE RECEIVED BY THE RUSSIANS AS A MAJOR US RETREAT FROM REYKJAVIK. AND THERE IS NO COMPENSATING FORWARD MOVEMENT IN OTHER US POSITIONS, FOR EXAMPLE IN START OR ON NUCLEAR TESTING. SOME OF OUR STATE DEPARTMENT CONTACTS HAVE ALSO COMPLAINED TO US PRIVATELY THAT SHULTZ IS SETTING OUT FOR MOSCOW WITHOUT CLEAR OBJECTIVES HAVING BEEN SET BY THE PRESIDENT AND WITHOUT EVEN GENERAL PRESIDENTAL GUIDANCE TO WORK FOR A SUMMIT LATER THIS YEAR OR EARLY NEXT.

6. IN SHORT, A VISIT THAT SEEMED THREE WEEKS AGO TO HOLD OUT A REAL PROSPECT FOR IMPORTANT PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND US/SOVIET RELATIONS GENERALLY IS GETTING OFF TO A FALTERING START. MUCH WILL OF COURSE DEPEND ON HOW THE RUSSIANS DECIDE TO HANDLE THE VISIT. BUT MAKING A SUCCESS OF IT MAY BE UPHILL WORK FOR SHULTZ.

ACLAND

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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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MIPT: SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, 13-15 APRIL: ARMS CONTROL
SUMMARY
1. PRESIDENT RULES IN THE PENTAGON'S FAVOUR ON MOST ARMS CONTROL POSITIONS FOR SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. IN PARTICULAR, THE PERIOD OF PROPOSED COMMITMENT TO THE ABM TREATY IS CUT FROM 10 YEARS UNTIL THE END OF 1994 (ON THE OTHER HAND, SHULTZ WILL BE SILENT ON THE US REYKJAVIK PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES).
DETAIL
2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRESIDENT IS SENDING MESSAGES TO ALLIED LEADERS ABOUT THE APPROACH HE HAS INSTRUCTED SHULTZ TO TAKE TO HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW. AND NITZE IS OF COURSE BRIEFING THE NAC IN BRUSSELS TODAY. BUT YOU MAY WISH TO HAVE THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT GIVEN TO US BY ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS OF THE POSITIONS ON ARMS CONTROL SUBJECTS THAT SHULTZ WILL BE TAKING TO MOSCOW.
3. INF
SHULTZ WILL BE TRYING TO ADVANCE THE INF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF POSITIONS IN THE US DRAFT TREATY, AND IS NOT ARMED WITH SIGNIFICANT NEW PROPOSALS. THERE IS MUCH SPECULATION ABOUT A POSSIBLE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR ZERO-ZERO SRINF. IF SUCH A PROPOSAL IS MADE, SHULTZ WILL MERELY TAKE RECEIPT OF IT WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT. COMMENT: AS SHULTZ MADE CLEAR TO YOU YESTERDAY (MY TELNO 809), HOWEVER, THE ADMINISTRATION ARE WORRIED ABOUT ANY APPARENT US HESITANCY IN ACCEPTING ANY SUCH PROPOSAL. IF IT IS MADE, WE SHALL THEREFORE PROBABLY FIND OURSELVES UNDER STRONG PRESSURE TO REACH A VERY EARLY ALLIANCE VIEW WITH THE ADMINISTRATION PROBABLY ARGUING IN FAVOUR OF ACCEPTANCE (AS LONG AS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS FOR GLOBAL ELIMINATION OR AT LEAST TIGHT CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET SRINF OUTSIDE EUROPE). SOME THOUGHT IS ALREADY BEING GIVEN IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO THE IDEA OF A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO ALLIED

DEPARTMENT TO THE IDEA OF A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO ALLIED LEADERS PRESSING FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF ANY SUCH PROPOSAL. WE MAY THEREFORE NEED TO SORT OUT OUR THINKING ON THIS ISSUE QUICKLY AND BE PREPARED TO GIVE THE EUROPEAN ALLIES A LEAD.

4. START

SHULTZ IS INSTRUCTED TO PRESS FOR A 50 PERCENT START REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT (1600 SNDVS AND 6000 WEAPONS) TO BE IMPLEMENTED OVER 7 (RATHER THAN 5) YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT. THIS REFLECTS NERVOUSNESS IN THE JCS ABOUT THEIR ABILITY ACTUALLY TO IMPLEMENT 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS OVER A 5 YEAR PERIOD. ON SUB-LIMITS, SHULTZ IS INSTRUCTED TO PRESS FOR SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE UPPER RANGE OF SUB-LIMITS PREVIOUSLY OFFERED BY THE ADMINISTRATION (4800 FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS, 3300 FOR ICBM RVS, AND 1650 FOR RVS ON PERMITTED ICBMS EXCEPT LIGHT AND MEDIUM SILO-BASED ICBMS WITH 6 RVS OR LESS). SHULTZ HAS DISCRETION TO RAISE THE SECOND SUB-LIMIT FROM 3300 TO 3600 BUT ONLY IF THE RUSSIANS ACCEPT THE OTHER TWO SUB-LIMITS. ALTHOUGH THE 3600 SUB-LIMIT WOULD APPROXIMATE, AS FAR AS ICBMS ARE CONCERNED, TO THE EARLIER SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A 60 PERCENT FORCE CONCENTRATION RULE, SHULTZ IS INSTRUCTED TO REJECT ANY RENEWED SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR THE APPLICATION OF SUCH A RULE TO SLBMS. SHULTZ IS ALSO INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT US PROPOSAL FOR A BAN ON MOBILE MISSILES AND TO MAINTAIN THE REYKJAVIK POSITION ON SLCMS (THAT THERE SHOULD BE SEPARATE LIMITS OUTSIDE THE MAIN START AGGREGATES) WITHOUT MAKING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.

5. DEFENCE AND SPACE

SHULTZ'S POSITION CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

(A) A PROPOSED COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY (EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF A MATERIAL BREACH BY THE OTHER SIDE OR FOR REASONS OF SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST) UNTIL THE END OF 1994;

(B) THE TWO PARTIES TO AGREE NOW THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS WOULD BE PERMITTED IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED;

(C) REJECTION OF ANY SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR DISCUSSION OF PERMISSIBLE/NON-PERMISSIBLE SDI-TYPE ACTIVITY UNDER THE ABM TREATY (EARLIER IDEAS - MY TELNO 654 - THAT THE ADMINISTRATION MIGHT PROPOSE SUCH A DIALOGUE AT THE ABM TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE HAVE BEEN SHOT DOWN);

(D) AS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, A PROPOSAL FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON BOTH SIDES SDI PROGRAMMES ON A YEARLY BASIS, AND A REAFFIRMATION OF THE EARLIER US OPEN LABORATORIES PROPOSAL (COMMENT: THIS IS CLEARLY AN ATTEMPT TO PICK UP THE PRIME MINISTER'S SDI TIMETABLES PROPOSAL BUT WE ARE NOT CLEAR WHETHER EXCHANGING INFORMATION ON A YEARLY BASIS WOULD MEAN THAT THE PROGRAMMES EXCHANGED WOULD COVER ONLY THE YEAR AHEAD).

6. NUCLEAR TESTING

SHULTZ IS INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION ARE ONLY PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE NOW ON IMPROVED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS FOR THE TTBT AND THE PNET WITH A VIEW TO THEIR SUBSEQUENT RATIFICATION. ALTHOUGH AN AGENDA FOR SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS/NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER NUCLEAR TESTING CONSTRAINTS COULD BE DISCUSSED WHILE IMPROVED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS ARE BEING NEGOTIATED, THERE CAN BE NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF SUCH CONSTRAINTS UNTIL THE TWO UNRATIFIED TREATIES HAVE BEEN RATIFIED AND A START REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT IS IN PLACE (THE LINKAGE TO START IS DESIGNED TO REFLECT THE LINK BETWEEN REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR STOCKPILES AND NUCLEAR TESTING CONSTRAINTS).

7. CW

SHULTZ IS BRIEFED TO ARGUE AGAINST THE IMPOSITION OF DEADLINES FOR THE COMPLETION OF A CW CONVENTION AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO POUR COLD WATER ON ANY SUGGESTION THAT A CONVENTION COULD BE COMPLETED IN 1987. HE WILL EMPHASISE THE IMPORTANCE OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON TWO ISSUES IN PARTICULAR: INITIAL DECLARATIONS AND THEIR VERIFICATION, AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION. ON THE LATTER [illegible]

ON TWO ISSUES IN PARTICULAR: INITIAL DECLARATIONS AND THEIR VERIFICATION, AND CHALLENGE INSPECTION. ON THE LATTER, SHULTZ WILL ARGUE FOR NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL BUT SAY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS WILLING IN PRINCIPLE TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE IDEAS, IF THEY ARE EQUALLY EFFECTIVE, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT THEY ARE DOUBTFUL THAT SUCH ALTERNATIVES EXIST.

8. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

SHULTZ IS BRIEFED TO STRESS THREE POINTS:

(A) THAT PROGRESS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL BECOMES MORE IMPORTANT AS NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS PROCEED:

(B) THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE STABILITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES: AND

(C) THAT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION WILL BE ESSENTIAL.

IF SHEVARDNADZE ARGUES THAT THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AMONG THE 35, SHULTZ IS BRIEFED TO SAY THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE AMONG THE STATES WHOSE FORCES ARE AT STAKE (SHULTZ IS BRIEFED TO AVOID DIRECT DISCUSSION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE 23 AND NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE 35).

9. COMMENT

THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS ON THESE POSITIONS GENERALLY REPRESENT DEFEATS FOR SHULTZ AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND VICTORIES FOR WEINBERGER AND OSD. IN PARTICULAR, STATE DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS FOR THE HANDLING OF START, DEFENCE AND SPACE, AND NUCLEAR TESTING HAVE ALL BEEN REJECTED BY THE PRESIDENT.

10. ON START, THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD ARGUED FOR DROPPING THE PROPOSED BAN ON MOBILE MISSILES AND FOR AUTHORITY FOR SHULTZ TO RAISE THE SUB-LIMIT ON ICBM RVS FROM 3300 TO 3600 WITHOUT THIS BEING CONDITIONAL ON SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE OTHER SUB-LIMITS PROPOSED BY THE ADMINISTRATION. ON DEFENCE AND SPACE, STATE HAD ARGUED THAT THE PROPOSED PERIOD OF COMMITMENT TO THE ABM TREATY (UNTIL THE END OF 1994) SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN ADDITIONAL 2-3 YEAR PERIOD OF COMMITMENT NOT TO DEPLOY STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, DURING WHICH NEGOTIATIONS ON DEPLOYMENTS WOULD BE HELD. THIS POSITION WOULD THEREFORE EFFECTIVELY HAVE MAINTAINED THE REYKJAVIK PROPOSAL FOR A 10-YEAR NO-DEPLOYMENT PERIOD. ON NUCLEAR TESTING, THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD ARGUED FOR US ACCEPTANCE OF THE OPENING OF A CONTINUOUS NEGOTIATION ON QUOTE NUCLEAR TESTING UNQUOTE, WITH CTB AS THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE, AS LONG AS THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE ISSUES WOULD BE TACKLED SEQUENTIALLY IN PRACTICE. STATE REGARD THE POSITION NOW ADOPTED BY THE PRESIDENT AS A RETREAT FROM HIS COMMITMENT TO CONGRESS ON THE EVE OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT.

11. THE GOOD NEWS IS THAT THE NEW POSITIONS DECIDED ON BY THE PRESIDENT DO NOT INCLUDE THE SECOND FIVE YEAR CONCEPT AND THE REYKJAVIK PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THIS COMPONENT OF THE US POSITION IS OF COURSE THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SHORTENING OF THE PROPOSED PERIOD OF NON-DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC DEFENCES.

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Secret

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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS 2
PS/Mrs Thatcher
PS/LADY YOUNG — MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS — MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
MR THOMAS — NPS
MR BOYD — DACU, CDI — MOD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

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IMMEDIATE

19.11.8

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 809
OF 100130Z APRIL 87
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW,
INFO PRIORITY MODUK

MODUK FOR DACU
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SHULTZ, 9 APRIL: ARMS CONTROL ISSUES
SUMMARY

SHULTZ FEELS THAT IS WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT POLITICALLY TO TURN DOWN A ZERO:ZERO OPTION ON SRINF IF OFFERED BY THE RUSSIANS, BUT CONFIRMS COMMITMENT TO TAKE DELIVERY AND CONSULT ALLIES IF IT EMERGES IN MOSCOW. SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINS EUROPEAN FEARS ON SLIPPERY SLOPE TOWARDS DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE. BRIEF EXCHANGES ON SDI/START AND CONVENTIONAL

DETAIL

2. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE SRINF ISSUE CONCERNED HIM. THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT PROPOSE DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW ON 13-15 APRIL THAT SRINF (IE. IN THE RANGE 1000 TO 500 KILOMETRES) SHOULD BE ELIMINATED. IF THEY DID, HE WOULD TAKE RECEIPT OF THE PROPOSAL AND CONSULT THE ALLIES. BUT WHAT WOULD BE THE PUBLIC AND POLITICAL REACTION IN EUROPE TO ANY HINT OF US UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A SOVIET OFFER TO ELIMINATE A CLASS OF MISSILE OF WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD OVER 100 AND THE US HAD NONE? HE IMAGINED THAT THERE WOULD BE GREAT DIFFICULTY POLITICALLY IN DEPLOYING MISSILES IN THIS CLASS. SHULTZ WAS TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THE DIFFICULTY OF ACCEPTING SUCH A ZERO:ZERO PROPOSAL REALLY WAS. THE PRIME MINISTER HERSELF HAD STRESSED, DURING HER CAMP DAVID VISIT IN NOVEMBER, THAT SOVIET SRINF POSED A SERIOUS THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE. THE BEST EXPLANATION HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO FIND FOR EUROPEAN RELUCTANCE TO CONTEMPLATE ZERO-ZERO SRINF WAS THAT THE PROSPECT OF ZERO-ZERO LRINF HAD SUDDENLY MADE PEOPLE ALIVE TO A PROBLEM (THE ABSENCE OF US SRINF SYSTEMS) THAT HAD EXISTED FOR SOME TIME. BEFORE INITIAL US LRINF DEPLOYMENTS IN 1983, NEITHER LRINF NOR SRINF HAD

BEEN BASED IN EUROPE. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE HAD BEEN BASED ON SNF BUT NOBODY HAD SPOKEN THEN OF A DENUCLEARISED EUROPE. WESTERN PUBLICS MIGHT HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING WHY NATO NOW SUDDENLY WANTED SYSTEMS IT HAD NOT BELIEVED IT NEEDED IN THE PAST.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE SRINF PROBLEM WAS A DIFFICULT ONE. THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO STAND FIRM ON NATO'S PRESENT POSITION (THAT A CEILING ON SOVIET SRINF SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT, WITH A US RIGHT TO MATCH AND IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS). SHULTZ WAS, THEREFORE, QUITE RIGHT TO SAY THAT HE WOULD DO NO MORE IN MOSCOW THAN TAKE RECEIPT OF ANY SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR SRINF ELIMINATION. EUROPEAN ANXIETY ABOUT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WAS CAUSED BY THE PROSPECT OF SRINF ELIMINATION FOLLOWING HARD ON THE HEELS OF LRINF ELIMINATION. THIS APPEARED TO REMOVE TWO LAYERS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: WHERE WOULD IT STOP? THE PROBLEM WAS COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT CUTS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES WERE ALSO ENVISAGED AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE SECOND FIVE YEARS (TO WHICH, AS SHULTZ KNEW, WE WERE OPPOSED) WAS STILL ON THE TABLE. EUROPEANS WERE BEGINNING TO FEEL THAT THE RANGE OF NUCLEAR OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO NATO TO COUNTER CONVENTIONAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK WAS BECOMING UNCOMFORTABLY LIMITED. IT LOOKED LIKE ANOTHER STEP TOWARDS A DENUCLEARISED EUROPE. MANY PEOPLE HAD BELIEVED THAT NATO NEEDED LRINF

SYSTEMS EVEN BEFORE THE SS20 WAS DEPLOYED.

4. SHULTZ SAID HE ACCEPTED THIS LAST POINT. BUT IF NATO BELIEVED THAT SRINF SYSTEMS WERE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN FLEXIBILE RESPONSE, THEN THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY SUCH SYSTEMS. THERE WAS LITTLE SIGN OF ANY SUCH WILLINGNESS AT PRESENT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE AGREED THAT FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DID NOT MEAN THAT YOU HAD TO HOLD EVERY CARD IN YOUR HAND, BUT YOU HAD TO HAVE ENOUGH TO MAKE IT CREDIBLE. SHULTZ SAID THAT IN THIS CASE WE WERE DISCARDING CLUBS, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE OBLIGED TO DISCARD SPADES.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIRM NATO POSITION ON SRINF WAS CLEARLY URGENT. MILITARY ADVICE FROM SHAPE AND THE HLG SHOULD BE OFFERED VERY SOON. DEFENCE MINISTERS MIGHT THEN BE ABLE TO CONSIDER THE MATTER AT THE SPRING NPG MEETING AND A FULL ALLIANCE POSITION ADOPTED AT THE REYKJAVIK NAC. SHULTZ AGREED. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE US COULD NEVERTHELESS BE FACED WITH AN EARLY PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM: THE BODIES POLITIC WOULD THINK THE US CRAZY TO REJECT A ZERO/ZERO OPTION ON SRINF.

START/SDI

6. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT MR GORBACHEV HAD DESCRIBED THE PRIME MINISTER'S IDEAS AS A PRACTICAL PROPOSAL AND AGREED TO LOOK AT THEM. WE HAD HOWEVER NOT IN ANY WAY SUGGESTED THAT THE US HAD AGREED THEM. THE RUSSIANS HAD SHOWN SOME INTEREST ON THIS POINT.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT WAS RIDICULOUS THAT A YEAR AFTER HALIFAX WE WERE STILL IN DISARRAY. WE MUST GET OUR ACT TOGETHER QUICKLY: IT SHOULD NOT BE TOO DIFFICULT. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD THOUGHT THEY HAD MADE PROGRESS WITH CHIRAC DURING HIS VISIT HERE. SINCE HE HAD RETURNED TO PARIS THEY WERE LESS SURE.

ACLAND

YYYY

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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS 6
PS/Mrs Chalker
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
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SIC EME
MODUK (FOR DACU NUC POL SY)

YOUR TELNO 135: NITZE BRIEFING OF NAC: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS

SUMMARY

1. ON INF, REITERATION OF POINTS PUT FORWARD IN SHULTZ'S MESSAGE TO SECRETARY OF STATE DATED 5 APRIL. ON START/SDI, NEW PROPOSALS FOCUSSING ON PRIORITY OF 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN 7 YEARS COUPLED WITH 7 NEAR NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD FROM ABM TREATY AND ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF DATA ON SDI ACTIVITIES. ALLIED SUPPORT FOR US INF NEGOTIATING POSITION. NO SUPPORT FOR FRG SUGGESTION THAT REMOVAL OF SRINF CONSTRAINTS FROM LRINF AGREEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FALLBACK POSITION. AGREEMENT THAT SRINF ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND CAREFUL PUBLIC HANDLING.

DETAIL

INF

2. IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT, NITZE (WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY GLITMAN AND THOMAS) REPEATED THE POINTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE IN THE MESSAGE FROM SHULTZ (YOUR TELNO 552). HE ADDED NOTHING NEW, BUT DID EMPHASISE IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION THE POINTS MADE IN THE FINAL SECTION OF SHULTZ' MESSAGE IE THAT IN CONSIDERING ANY ZERO-ZERO SRINF PROPOSAL THE ALLIANCE WOULD NEED TO LOOK CAREFULLY NOT ONLY AT NATO'S STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS, BUT ALSO AT THE REALISM OF IMPLEMENTING ANY US RIGHT TO MATCH. THIS WAS, HOWEVER, AS CLOSE AS HE CAME TO ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE SRINF ZERO-ZERO OPTION IS SEEN AS ATTRACTIVE IN A NUMBER OF WASHINGTON CIRCLES.

START

3. TURNING TO START ISSUES, NITZE REMINDED THE COUNCIL THAT THERE WAS AGREEMENT AT GENEVA ON THE PRINCIPLE OF 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS. SHULTZ WOULD BE TAKING TO MOSCOW A NEW PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD SPREAD THESE REDUCTIONS OVER 7 YEARS INSTEAD OF 5. THIS REFLECTED THE RESULTS OF JCS CONSIDERATION AND NITZE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD ALSO BE HAPPIER WITH A SLIGHTLY LONGER TIMETABLE. SHULTZ ALSO HOPED TO MAKE PROGRESS ON SUB-LIMITS IN MOSCOW. CONSTRAINTS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS WERE A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN ANY AGREEMENT. THE RUSSIANS HAD ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR SUCH CONSTRAINTS IN 1986 BUT HAD SINCE BACK-TRACKED. US PROPOSALS ON SUB-LIMITS WERE UNCHANGED AND WERE CONSISTANT WITH THE EARLIER SOVIET PROPOSALS. THERE WAS ALSO A NEED TO ENSURE THAT 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS APPLIED EQUALLY TO MISSILE THROW WEIGHT. THE RUSSIANS HAD PROPOSED THAT THIS COULD BE CONFIRMED BY MEANS OF A UNILATERAL STATEMENT BUT THE US POSITION WAS THAT IT HAD TO BE GUARANTEED BY QUOTE DIRECT OR INDIRECT UNQUOTE METHODS IN ANY AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ALSO HAVE TO ENSURE THAT THROW WEIGHT WOULD NOT BE INCREASED IN THE FUTURE. NITZE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT SPECIFIC START VERIFICATION IDEAS WOULD BE PUT FORWARD AT THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND AND THAT IT WAS HOPED THAT AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

DEFENCE AND SPACE

4. ON DEFENCE AND SPACE ISSUES, NITZE REMINDED THE COUNCIL THAT THE US PROPOSAL FOR A TEN YEAR NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD FROM THE ABM TREATY WAS LINKED BOTH TO A 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS OVER 5 YEARS AND TO THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES IN A SUBSEQUENT FIVE YEARS. PROGRESS HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY FAILURE TO AGREE OVER THE SECOND FIVE YEAR PERIOD AND THE US HAD NOW AGREED TO FOCUS ON THE INITIAL 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS AS QUOTE THE TOP PRIORITY FOR STRATEGIC ARMS UNQUOTE (ALTHOUGH NITZE DID SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRM THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WOULD NOT BE FORMALLY WITHDRAWN). THE US WOULD NOW PROPOSE THAT THE PERIOD FOR NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY SHOULD RUN UNTIL THE END OF 1994. IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON START REDUCTIONS AND WOULD CONTAIN PROVISION FOR UNILATERAL WITYDRAWAL BEFORE THE END OF 1994 IF THIS WAS ESSENTIAL IN SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS. THE PROPOSAL WOULD ALSO BE CONDITIONAL ON THE SOVIET UNION REDRESSING HER CURRENT VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY (WHICH NITZE SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED AS REFERRING TO THE KRASNYORSK RADAR). DURING THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD THERE WOULD BE AN ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF DATA ON PLANNED STRATEGIC DEFENCE ACTIVITY. AFTER 1994 EACH SIDE WOULD BE ABLE TO DEPLOY STRATEGIC DEFENCE SYSTEMS UNLESS THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT OTHERWISE. NITZE SAID THAT THE NEW PROPOSALS WERE CONSISTENT WITH REYKJAVIK, DEFERRED THE DIFFICULT ISSUE OF WHAT STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN AFTER THE INITIAL 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS AND ALLOWED BOTH SIDES TO CONTINUE TO EXPLORE STRATEGIC DEFENCE POSSIBILITIES.

DISCUSSION

5. IN DISCUSSION, THERE WAS UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR THE US INF NEGOTIATING POSITION. HOWEVER HANSEN (FRG) ENTERED A SLIGHT QUALIFICATION BY QUOTING FROM CHANCELLOR KOHL'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN WHICH SAID THAT THE FRG SHARED IN PRINCIPLE THE US POSITION THAT A LRINF AGREEMENT SHOULD CONTAIN CONCURRENT CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF. THE LETTER ADDED HOWEVER THAT IF THE ALLIANCE WANTED TO AVOID HAVING TO DEAL WITH A SOVIET PROPOSAL OF AN SRINF ZERO-ZERO OPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF AN LRINF AGREEMENT QUOTE NO CONSTRAINTS COULD BE A SOLUTION UNQUOTE. NO SUPPORT FOR THIS QUOTE SOLUTION UNQUOTE WAS EXPRESSED BY ANY SUBSEQUENT SPEAKERS. HANSEN ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE FRG POSITION ON SRINF REMAINED IN FAVOUR OF A COMMITMENT TO IMMEDIATE (IE NOT LATER THAN 6 MONTHS AFTER SIGNATURE OF ANY LRINF AGREEMENT) FOLLOW-ON TALKS ON SRINF WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING EQUAL

AGREEMENT) FOLLOW-ON TALKS ON SRINF WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING EQUAL CEILINGS AT A LOWER LEVEL. HANSEN ALSO EXPRESSED THE FIRM VIEW OF HIS AUTHORITIES THAT SHULTZ SHOULD NEITHER AGREE TO NOR REJECT ANY SOVIET PROPOSAL IN MOSCOW FOR A ZERO OPTION IN SRINF. SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE DETAILED ALLIANCE CONSULTATION AND IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIANCE SPOKE WITH ONE VOICE. THIS POINT WAS REITERATED BY ALL OTHER SPEAKERS WITH BERG (NORWAY) EMPHASISING THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO OVER BURDEN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON LRINF. DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS ON SRINF SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS. SMITH (CANADA) SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE NOT ATTRACTED TO CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF WHICH WOULD ALLOW EQUAL CEILINGS AT CURRENT LEVELS. THIS WOULD ONLY BE REALISTIC IF NATO WAS PREPARED TO MATCH THOSE LEVELS AND THERE WERE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES IN DOING SO. THE CANADIAN PREFERENCE WOULD THEREFORE BE FOR CEILINGS AT LOWER LEVELS WHICH WOULD BE BOTH POLITICALLY MORE ACCEPTABLE AND REDUCE THE THREAT. THE ZERO OPTION IN SRINF MIGHT BE A LONG-TERM GOAL BUT NEEDED FURTHER STUDY SMICLN CANADA WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT ITS IMPACT ON ALLIANCE SECURITY.

6. CURIEN (FRANCE), AS EXPECTED, CAME OUT FIRMLY AGAINST ANY ZERO OPTION IN SRINF SMICLN ANY SRINF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD AIM AT REDUCTION TO EQUAL LEVELS. ONLY KADIJK (BELGIUM) AND CARDI (ITALY) EXPRESSED ANY OVERT INTEREST IN A SRINF ZERO OPTION ALTHOUGH THEY BOTH EMPHASISED THAT ANY SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD NEED TO BE VERY CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE REFERRED TO THE SHAPE STUDY ON SRINF WHICH HAD JUST BEEN RECEIVED. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE'S INITIAL CONCLUSIONS WERE THAT A SRINF ZERO OPTION WOULD LEAD TO A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN NATO STRATEGY AND IN THE CONCEPT OF BURDEN SHARING. IT WOULD RAISE THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF WHETHER NATO WISHED TO CONTINUE ITS STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SUPPORTED SACEUR'S VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO ADDRESS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF MISSILE SYSTEMS FROM ZERO TO 1800KM AND THAT IN THIS CONTEXT THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE FREEZE AND RIGHT TO MATCH AT THE LOWEST LEVEL COMPATIBLE WITH NATO'S SECURITY AND STRATEGY.

7. I DREW ON THE POINTS CONTAINED IN YOUR TUR AND ADDED SUPPORT FOR THE INCREASED EMPHASIS ON 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS AS BEING FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE CAMP DAVID PRINCIPLES. I ALSO ADDED MY SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT OF AN EXCHANGE OF SDI DATA. NITZE WAS UNABLE TO ELABORATE ON THE DETAILS OF THIS BUT CONFIRMED THAT THE IDEA HAD BEEN TAKEN DIRECTLY FROM THE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER. I ALSO ADDED MY ENDORSEMENT OF THE VIEWS WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN EXPRESSED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CAREFUL PUBLIC HANDLING OF ANY SRINF PROPOSAL BY THE SOVIET UNION. I EMPHASISED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIANCE SPOKE WITH ONE VOICE ON THIS ISSUE AND THAT IF SUCH A PROPOSAL WERE MADE IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE WE SHOULD BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL NEITHER TO EXPRESS APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL OF IT BUT TO SAY THAT IT WAS A MATTER WHICH REQUIRED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. THIS LINE WAS EXPLICITLY ENDORSED BY NITZE IN HIS CONCLUDING STATEMENT.

8. FINALLY, NITZE DENIED SUGGESTIONS IN THIS MORNING'S PRESS THAT US PROPOSALS ON START/SDI REPRESENTED A TOUGHENING OF THE US NEGOTIATING POSITION. THERE WAS NO SUCH INTENTION SMICLN THE US POSITION ON KRASNYORSK WAS NOT NEW.

ALEXANDER

YYYY

UBLNAN 1774

NNNN

MR. [redacted]WELL (on return)

Lyn Parker rang about a message from Chancellor Kohl to President Reagan which apparently Kohl has copied to the PM.

The Foreign Secretary has also received a copy of the Kohl/Reagan message independently from Herr Genscher, and he has now telegraphed it around INF basing posts etc.

MEA
10 April 1987

SUBJECT
cc OPS
MASTER

Geheim

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T66A/87

Telegram
from
Herr Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
to
Her Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Filed on:
DEFENCE: Arms Control PE. 11

Dear Margaret,

Further to our earlier exchange of views, I should like to inform you that in the letter which I sent to President Reagan on 7 April 1987 I reiterated, not least in view of the forthcoming visit to Moscow by Secretary of State Shultz, my Government's position on questions arising in connection with an INF agreement.

For your information I have enclosed a copy of the letter to President Reagan.

Yours sincerely,
Helmut Kohl

Prime Minister
This is Chancellor Kohl's letter to the President. It is much better than expected, & only the last sentence causes any difficulty.

CDP
9/4.

Geheim

Geheim

SECRET

T e l e g r a m
from
Herr Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
to
His Excellency
Mr. Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear Ron,

The close trust that we have developed on security and arms control policy in recent years and the conviction that, considering the state of the Geneva negotiations and of East-West relations in general, a LRINF agreement is within reach prompts me to write to you again today and, not least in view of the important visit to Moscow by Secretary of State Shultz, reiterate my Government's position on certain aspects of the INF complex.

Ever since the start of the INF negotiations, my Government has consistently advocated the worldwide elimination of all US and Soviet LRINF. The elimination of both sides' LRINF missiles in Europe, as currently being negotiated at Geneva, would be a decisive step towards this goal. The US efforts to translate the global LRINF zero option into an agreement have our full backing.

As for INF with a range of less than 1,000 km, my Government favours follow-on negotiations aimed at reducing all of these systems to low, equal ceilings. It therefore expects the negotiating parties to give a concrete, binding pledge to enter immediately into follow-on negotiations, i.e. not later than six months after the signing of the agreement.

Geheim

Geheim

We basically subscribe to the Alliance position that an agreement devoted primarily to LRINF missiles should contain concurrent constraints on SRINF missiles.

If, during the visit to Moscow by Secretary of State Shultz, the Soviet Union were to propose a zero option for SRINF systems with ranges between 500 and 1,000 km, we would consider it right for Secretary of State Shultz, as stated in his letter of 6 April 1987 to Foreign Minister Genscher, neither to accept the proposal nor to reject it, but to ask certain questions for the sake of clarification. The matter should then be discussed in depth by the Alliance after his visit.

A zero option for SRINF missiles with ranges between 500 and 1,000 km would have a considerable impact on the security situation in Central Europe. Extensive consultations within the Alliance are thus of crucial importance to us.

In this connection I should like to repeat a thought which I expressed in my talks with Ambassador Burt on 3 April 1987: If we want to avoid having to deal with a Soviet proposal for an SRINF zero option in connection with an LRINF agreement, the renunciation of constraints might be a feasible alternative approach.

Yours sincerely
(sgd) Helmut Kohl

Geheim

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MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

~~RESIDENT~~ CLERK

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
NPS
DACU
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} MOD

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FM BONN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 300
OF 081105Z APRIL 87
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, PARIS, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 298: SRINF

SUMMARY

1. KOHL'S MESSAGE TO REAGAN HAS ISSUED. THE CONTENT WILL BE CONVEYED TO NUMBER 10.

DETAIL

2. STATE SECRETARY RUEHL (FMOD) TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT THE LETTER HAD FINALLY ISSUED. REPORTS ON ITS CONTENTS WILL ALSO BE SENT TO BASING COUNTRIES AND FRANCE. THE GERMANS' MAIN PURPOSE IS TO HEAD-OFF US ACCEPTANCE OF ZERO SRINF DOWN TO 500 KMS, AT LEAST BEFORE THERE HAS BEEN THOROUGH ALLIANCE DISCUSSION OF ANY SUCH PROPOSAL. SHULTZ MUST NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENT IN MOSCOW. RUEHL SAID THE GERMAN PREFERENCE WAS STILL THAT THERE SHOULD BE CONCURRENT CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF IN THE LRINF AGREEMENT, WITH IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO EQUAL SRINF CEILINGS AT LOW LEVELS EXPLICITLY ABOVE ZERO, COVERING SYSTEMS IN THE RANGE OF 150-1,000 KMS. KOHL'S LETTER SAYS THAT ANY ZERO OPTION DOWN TO 500 KMS WOULD HAVE ''SERIOUS EFFECTS'', BY WHICH HE MEANS NEGATIVE EFFECTS, FOR THE ALLIANCE. (IT SOUNDED AS IF THIS WORD HAD BEEN FOUGHT OVER BETWEEN THE MINISTRIES HERE.) IF THE EXISTING OBJECTIVE IS NOT ACHIEVABLE, THE GERMANS WOULD PREFER TO HAVE A TOTALLY DE-LINKED SRINF NEGOTIATION, WITH ALL OPTIONS OPEN, THEREBY AVOIDING A DOWNWARD DOMINO EFFECT OF ZERO OPTIONS.

3. KOHL'S LETTER MENTIONS THE RELEVANCE OF THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE(PACE MEYER-LANDRUT IN PARA 6 OF TUR).

4. RUEHL SAID THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WERE IN PRINCIPLE IN FAVOUR OF MODERNISING THE GERMAN PERSHING IA. BUT NO FORMAL DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN PENDING CLARIFICATION OF THE SRINF ARMS CONTROL PICTURE. THE GERMAN DECISION HUNG ON US PLANS: THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT OPEN PIB PRODUCTION LINES SOLELY FOR 72 GERMAN SYSTEMS. IN ANY CASE THE GERMANS WOULD PROBABLY NOT WANT TO BE SINGULARISED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AS HAVING THE ONLY CAPABILITY WITHIN THE 750 KM RANGE. THE ALLIANCE NEEDED TO KNOW DEFINITE US PLANS ON PERSHING II CONVERSION. RUEHL DID NOT ACCEPT THAT EUROPEAN DEPLOYMENTS OF US PERSHING IB WOULD BE POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. HE RECOGNISED THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTY, AND ALSO SAW THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT NEED BINDING COMMITMENTS IN ADVANCE FROM THE EUROPEANS. VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR PIB (OR EQUIVALENT NEW SYSTEMS) WERE OPEN, RANGING FROM PEACETIME DEPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (I.E. A SYSTEM WHICH WOULD BE TRANSPORTABLE BY AIR) TO FORWARD DEPLOYMENT IN EXISTING BASING COUNTRIES (NORTH ITALY, FRG, EVEN BELGIAN AND DUTCH BORDERS MADE SENSE). RUEHL RULED OUT DEPLOYMENT IN TURKEY FROM WHERE PIB COULD REACH THE SOVIET UNION (I.E. LRINF CIRCUMVENTION). DEPLOYMENT EXCLUSIVELY IN THE FRG WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

5. RUEHL SAID THAT THE FMOD (AS OPPOSED TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT) VIEW WAS THAT SOME ASSETS WERE NECESSARY IN THE 750 KM RANGE. HE IMPLIED THAT GENSCHER WOULD CHALLENGE THIS, BUT SAID WOERNER WOULD FIGHT THE CASE HARD. ONCE THE ALLIANCE DECIDED IN PRINCIPLE ON THE NEED FOR SUCH A CAPABILITY, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A BALANCE IN NUMBER, AS WELL AS GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION, BETWEEN GERMAN AND US SYSTEMS (I.E. IMPLICITLY THE FRG MIGHT NOT MODERNISE ALL 72 PIAS.)

BULLARD

YYYY

BPLNAN 3502

NNNN

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Nine SDI Tests Planned in 1988-89 Amid ABM Debate Over 'Exotic' Weapons

By Paul Mann

Washington—The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization plans nine major experiments through late 1989 within the orthodox reading of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, despite the Administration's advocacy of a broad interpretation of permissible ABM testing (AW&ST Mar. 16, p. 21; Mar. 2, p. 18).

Richard P. Godwin, under secretary of Defense for acquisition and the executive charged with ensuring Defense Dept. treaty compliance, outlined the planned experiments last week at a Senate Armed Services subcommittee hearing. The hearing dealt with the SDI's complex and disputed relationship with the ABM treaty (AW&ST Jan. 26, p. 22).

Godwin explained three categories of SDI testing and development that the department believes are permitted by the 1972 treaty, grouping the planned experiments accordingly. They are:

- Two "under roof" laboratory tests in Category One, conceptual design or laboratory testing. The first of these tests is called Alpha, a ground-based laser device designed to demonstrate the feasibility of high-power infrared chemical lasers for space-based applications. In association with Alpha, the SDIO will undertake Large Optics Demonstration Experiments (Lode) and the Large Advanced Mirror Program (Lamp). These will, respectively, demonstrate critical beam control and large lightweight space optics technologies, in a series of ground-based experiments simulating outer space. The second Category One experiment will involve hypervelocity railgun research, intended to validate the weapon potential of the gun itself, as well as associated miniature kill vehicle technology. The test will launch guided and unguided projectiles.
- Seven Category 2 experiments, in field testing of devices that are not ABM components, or prototypes of ABM components or otherwise capable of substituting for ABM components. Two of these will be performed at the White Sands, N. M., ABM test range. The first is Flage (flexible lightweight agile guided experiment), to research small, nonnuclear, hit-to-kill technology for a short-range, low-altitude interceptor. The second, Skylite, involves the Miracl laser, which Godwin said possesses neither the power nor the optics for atmospheric propagation at ranges useful for ABM application.

Other Category 2 tests will:

- Explore the feasibility of long wavelength infrared acquisition and tracking from an airborne platform.
- Investigate technologies to construct a network of existing surveillance and range sensors on various platforms, with the objective of achieving complete and continuous tracking of strategic ballistic missiles.
- Undertake Delta 181 and Janus experiments to gather signature data on objects at close range.
- Include an experimental space tracking and pointing program, based on technologies required for tracking and pointing of weapons, as well as for sensors with both space- and ground-based applications. "Current plans call for a shuttle and free-flier experiments over the next few years," Godwin testified.

Field Testing Guidelines

Godwin said none of the nine tests would fall in Category 3, which governs field testing of the kind of fixed land-based ABM components that constitute a threshold for application of ABM treaty provisions.

The hearing before the strategic forces and nuclear deterrence subcommittee dealt at length with how the U. S. government should interpret the legality and definitions of weapon technologies identified in recent months as candidates for an early, phased SDI deployment in the 1990s. One of these is Lockheed's ERIS (Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Interceptor System), a late midcourse interceptor scheduled for a preliminary design review in June and one element of a hypothetical three-layer antimissile defense (AW&ST Mar. 23, p. 30).

USAF Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson, director of the SDIO, testified that the ERIS system could be deployed in a fixed, land-based mode on a limited basis as a "traditional" ABM interceptor technology known in 1972.

Abrahamson acknowledged that there are many similarities between ERIS technology and that of another early ABM deployment candidate, space-based kinetic kill vehicles (KKVs). These statements immediately gave way to questions about whether either technology could be tested legally under any interpretation of the ABM treaty.

Sen. Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the Senate's most authoritative advocate of a narrow, orthodox interpretation of the treaty, took Abrahamson's statements to mean that as traditional technologies, neither ERIS nor KKVs would be technologies based on "other physical principles"—a key phrase in the treaty referring to "exotic" technologies that became known after the treaty's signing in 1972.

Technologies based on other physical principles are a crucial part of the Administration's broad interpretation, which holds that testing of such technologies is legal. But Article 5 of the treaty expressly prohibits the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems or components "which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based."

The significance of Abrahamson's statements, Nunn said, is that if both ERIS and KKVs are traditional technologies, not "other physical principles," then "even if the broad interpretation applies, which permits testing of other physical principles, then this particular system [KKV], now being looked on for possible early deployment, could not be tested under the broad interpretation, any more than it could be tested under the traditional interpretation.

"That means . . . this whole exercise we're going through in terms of broad versus traditional interpretation in all likelihood has no bearing on the question of testing the system which has been slated for early deployment."

Godwin said his office had not decided whether kinetic kill vehicles are based on other physical principles. He said he would need several weeks to render a judgment on the nature of the technology, once senior Administration policymakers settle on a definition of the phrase, now under study. He said the question of other physical principles would not be relevant to the nine SDI experiments planned for 1988-89. □

Contract Awards

Washington—The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization has awarded Raytheon Co. a four-year, $174-million contract to build a terminal imaging radar and conduct a technology validation experiment.

The terminal imaging radar will be a large phased-array X-band radar that will operate in conjunction with other elements of a terminal ballistic missile defense. Those elements include the Army/Boeing Airborne Optical Adjunct, the Army/Lockheed exoatmospheric reentry interceptor system and the Army/McDonnell Douglas high endoatmospheric defense interceptor.

Raytheon's Equipment Div., Wayland, Mass., will manage the program. Westinghouse Electric Corp. also submitted a bid.

The National Archives

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ps2/8R

SECRET

CC PC

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-270 3000

30 March 1987

Robert Culshaw Esq
Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON SW1A 2AL

Dear Robert,

OD(87)5: US/SOVIET AGREEMENT ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

The Chancellor has studied this useful paper and its attachments. He looks forward to discussing the issues covered in paragraphs 3 and 5. He would find it helpful for his officials to be kept involved in the preparation of the material which will come to Ministers.

I am copying this letter to David Norgrove (No.10), John Howe (MOD), and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Cathy Ryding

CATHY RYDING



DEFENCE

ARMS CONTROL

PT 71

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 March 1987

CDP
24/3

Dear Charles,

Arms Control: Message from President Reagan

You asked earlier today for amendments to the draft message from the Prime Minister to the President about her forthcoming Moscow visit, in the light of the latter's message which you have just received. I attach at annex two suggestions for revision, which the Foreign Secretary has approved.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

SECRET AND PERSONAL

ANNEX

Page 1, paragraph 1

Replace with: "Many thanks for your message of 24 March about arms control and my visit to Moscow, which starts [in a couple of days]. As promised, here are my thoughts on how to handle this. I look forward very much to continuing our exchanges in the light of what I learn from Gorbachev himself."

Page 4, second paragraph

Replace fourth sentence onwards with: "In line with the thinking in your most recent message, I shall try to persuade him that strategic reductions should not be held hostage to unrealistic Soviet attempts to impose new constraints in practice on the US programme. However, as you know, I believe that he will need some assurance, in the form of a sense of predictability, about the shape, scope and timescale of strategic defence programmes if you are to reach agreement on radical cuts in strategic weapons. I therefore propose to take the line with him that further discussions with your people could be useful in order to establish what both sides plan to do over the next few years.

I was delighted to hear from your message that this sort of approach seems to be logical in your view. Of course I understand that you will need to see whether it will work in practice. Nor can anyone be sure if it would be sufficient from Gorbachev's point of view. But I am sure the idea is worth exploring. Obviously there would be a good deal of detail to be sorted out, and I would certainly not intend to address that in Moscow. Nor would I want to give Gorbachev the impression that the approach has your endorsement. As I shall make clear to him, I have no wish to play a quasi-negotiating role between our closest and firmest ally and our main adversary.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 March 1987

ARMS CONTROL: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Reagan, responding to her message of 7 March about arms control. As you will see, it expresses interest in the Prime Minister's ideas for handling the linkage established by the Soviet Union between progress on START and restrictions on the SDI. However, the President is clearly anxious that the Prime Minister should not commit the United States to this approach in her disussions with Mr. Gorbachev. We shall need to take this into account in the drafting of the Prime Minister's message to the President about her forthcoming visit. You have already sent me a draft for this but I should be grateful for any suggested amendments

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

CHARLES POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET 2 (1)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

I think this gives you just enough lee-way to float the proposal with Gorbachev; but we shall have to look closely at the formulation in your speech.

May I show the message to the FCS & Defence Secretary please?

Yes CDP 23/3

O 232039Z MAR 87 ZYH
FM WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
ZEM
S E C R E T VIA CABO CHANNELS EYES ONLY
QQQQ

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No T50/87

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN.

US Declassified

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MARCH 7 MESSAGE TO ME SETTING FORTH YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE COMPLEX ARMS CONTROL ISSUES WE FACE. AS ALWAYS, I APPRECIATED BOTH YOUR SUGGESTIONS AND YOUR SUPPORT. I AGREE THAT GORBACHEVS LATEST MOVE ON INF IS A VINDICATION OF THE ALLIANCES FIRMNESS AND AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR PERSONAL ROLE IN MAINTAINING THAT FIRMNESS.

YOU ALSO SUGGESTED THAT WE ATTEMPT TO STRUCTURE THE SDI PROGRAM SO AS TO PROVIDE GORBACHEV A SENSE OF PREDICTABILITY WHICH MIGHT ALLOW HIM TO GO FORWARD WITH START REDUCTIONS. AS I UNDERSTAND YOUR THOUGHTS, THIS WOULD NOT INVOLVE NEW CONSTRAINTS. RATHER YOU WOULD FAVOR THE EXPRESSION OF EXISTING PRACTICAL LIMITS ON THE PROGRAM AS MILESTONES, THUS PROVIDING THE SOVIETS A REALISTIC TIMETABLE, WHICH, IN COMBINATION WITH AN AGREEMENT NOT TO DEPLOY FOR A FIXED PERIOD, MIGHT PROVIDE THE SOVIETS THE NECESSARY SENSE OF PREDICTABILITY.

I HAVE ASKED MY STAFF TO CONDUCT A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF YOUR SUGGESTION. WE HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY EXAMINED SUCH AN APPROACH IN DETAIL. WHILE THE LOGIC OF YOUR CONCEPT IS CLEAR, THERE MAY BE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING SUCH AN APPROACH WITHOUT UNDULY CONSTRAINING THE SDI PROGRAM, WHICH, BY ITS NATURE IS ON THE CUTTING EDGE OF TECHNOLOGY AND THUS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT. I ALSO WONDER WHETHER SUCH DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES WOULD BE EITHER NECESSARY OR SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE GORBACHEV TO ACCEPT THE START PROPOSALS YOU AND I ARE BOTH EAGER TO SEE COME TO PASS, PROPOSALS WHICH CAN AND SHOULD BE SUPPORTED ON THEIR OWN MERITS. I WOULD HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT SHOULD GORBACHEV RAISE THIS SUBJECT DURING YOUR VISIT TO MOSCOW, YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO GAIN SOME APPRECIATION OF HIS ATTITUDE WITHOUT SUGGESTING THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD NECESSARILY BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST.

I APPRECIATE YOUR KIND WORDS ON OUR APPROACH TO THE TOWER REPORT AND THE EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE SUBJECT IT ADDRESSED. I BELIEVE WE ARE BEGINNING TO PUT THAT UNFORTUNATE PROBLEM BEHIND US.

WE WELCOME YOUR OFFER TO PROVIDE US SOME THOUGHTS ON YOUR MOSCOW VISIT AND WILL BE LOOKING FORWARD TO HEARING THEM. IN THIS REGARD, I AM DELIGHTED TO HEAR THAT GEOFFREY HOWE WILL BE COMING TO WASHINGTON TO BRIEF GEORGE SHULTZ.

WARM REGARDS, RON
END TEXT
£0009

NNNN

1/1

ADVANCE COPIES 20

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/Mrs Chalker
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
NPS
DACU
CDI
MOD

IMMEDIATE

PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST

OO BRNAT
OO MOSCO
FM WASHI TO FCOLN
200406Z MAR
GRS 280

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 610
OF 200406Z MARCH 87
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW

MIPT: PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE: ABMT

1. ASKED WHY HE DISAGREED WITH SENATOR NUNN, THE PRESIDENT OPENED WITH A 1972 QUOTE BY MARSHAL GRECHKO: QUOTE (THE ABMT) IMPOSES NO LIMITATIONS ON THE PERFORMANCE, THE RESEARCH, AND EXPERIMENTAL WORK AIMED AT RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF DEFENDING THE COUNTRY AGAINST NUCLEAR MISSILE ATTACK UNQUOTE. THE FACT WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD ADOPTED A MORE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION THAN THE US. AND, AS THE PROGRAMME PROGRESSED, THE ADMINISTRATION REALISED THAT THE NARROW INTERPRETATION COULD QUOTE INTERFERE WITH, AND SET US BACK IN, WHAT WE WERE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH, AND THIS IS WHEN WE TOOK A LOOK AT THIS BROADER INTERPRETATION UNQUOTE. THE PRESIDENT THEN REFERRED TO JUDGE SOFAER'S BELIEF THAT THERE WAS LEGALLY A MORE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION.

2. ASKED WHEN THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD IMPLEMENT THE NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY, THE PRESIDENT SAID: QUOTE WE HAVEN'T MADE A DECISION BECAUSE WE ARE STILL OPERATING WITHIN THE NARROW LIMITS AND HAVE NO REASON TO GO OUTSIDE THEM AS YET, AND IT'LL BE SOME TIME BEFORE WE DO. BUT WE ARE ALL OF US STUDYING THIS AND WE HAVEN'T ARRIVED AT A DECISION OR SET A DATE YET. UNQUOTE.

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWBAN 0431

(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

INF

OD(87)5

This paper is principally for the information of your colleagues. It is familiar territory for you. But you might glance at the passages which I have underlined.

CDP

19/3

GRS 1050

UNCLASSIFIED
FM BONN [COLLAN]
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 234
OF 181730Z MARCH 87
INFO IMMEDIATE MOD UK
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL MBFR VIENNA
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL CSCE VIENNA, UKDIS GENEVA, MOSCOW

MIPT (NOT TO ALL):
KOHL'S GOVERNMENT DECLARATION: EAST/WEST DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL POINTS

SUMMARY
1. NO SURPRISES ON DEFENCE OR ARMS CONTROL. REITERATION OF RECENT GERMAN POSITION ON ZERO OPTION LRINF AND SRINF. ONLY PASSING REFERENCE TO CW. NO NUMERICAL COMMITMENT ON SIZE OF PEACETIME BUNDESWEHR. WEST MUST TEST GORBACHEV BY PUTTING HIS WORDS TO THE TEST. NEW OPENING OFFERED IN GERMAN/SOVIET RELATIONS.

DETAIL
2. THE SECTION ON EAST/WEST (INCLUDING DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY) AND INNER-GERMAN ISSUES RUNS TO ALMOST A THIRD OF KOHL'S LONG SPEECH, A PRIORITY TAKEN UP BY THE PRESS AGENCY REPORT OF THE SPEECH, WHICH HIGHLIGHTS THESE SECTIONS BEFORE REPORTING THE REST. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY.

DEFENCE/ALLIANCE ISSUES
3. CONTINUING WARSAW PACT MILITARY THREAT: REAFFIRMATION OF HARMEL APPROACH FOR ALLIANCE. NEW CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR FRG, AS FOR ALLIANCE, - THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS MAY BE CHANGED THROUGH DEEP ARMS CONTROL CUTS AND STRENGTHENED EMPHASIS ON DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

4. TASKS IN THE CURRENT LEGISLATIVE PERIOD ARE:

A) STRENGTHENING ALLIANCE DEFENCE. NO ALTERNATIVES TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WHICH, TO BE EFFECTIVE, NEEDS BALANCED CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES. THIS IN TURN GUARANTEES COUPLING. STRONG US AND OTHER ALLIED TROOPS PRESENCE ON FRG SOIL ESSENTIAL. FORWARD DEFENCE REMAINS A KEY ELEMENT.

B) FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY NECESSARY IN THE FACE OF DRASTIC ARMS CONTROL MEASURES, BUT ALSO GIVEN OTHER DEVELOPMENTS (CHANGED THREAT, NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS, CHANGED OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP)

C) MAINTAINING THE STRENGTH OF THE BUNDESWEHR, WHICH IS THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE ALLIANCE'S CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE CAPABILITY. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL ENSURE IN GOOD TIME THAT, DESPITE DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS, THE ''NECESSARY PEACETIME STRENGTH'' OF THE BUNDESWEHR, AND ITS CAPABILITY IN CRISIS AND WAR, WILL BE MAINTAINED. VOLUNTARY SERVICE MUST REMAIN ATTRACTIVE. (NB NO SPECIFIC FIGURE MENTIONED FOR PEACETIME BUNDESWEHR).

D) STRENGTHENING THE EUROPEAN PILLAR WITHIN THE ALLIANCE: NATO NEEDS A STRONG AND UNITED EUROPE WHICH CAN EXPRESS ITS INTERESTS MORE CLEARLY AND VISIBLY. THE WEU IS AN APPROPRIATE FORUM AND SHOULD BE FURTHER DEVELOPED.

5. FRIENDSHIP AND CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE US IS FUNDAMENTAL FOR EXISTENCE OF THE FRG - 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MARSHALL PLAN THIS YEAR. FRANCO/GERMAN FRIENDSHIP IS A DRIVING FORCE OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND HAS A UNIQUE INTENSITY. THIS PRIVELEGED PARTNERSHIP MUST BE FURTHER DEVELOPED. WE MUST TAKE FORWARD THE MILITARY COOPERATION ALREADY STARTED. FRANCE AND FRG MUST DEVELOP INTO THE POLITICAL CORE OF THE DEVELOPING EUROPEAN UNION. (SEE MIPT FOR PASSAGE ON UK).

INNER GERMAN RELATIONS, BERLIN

6. EMPHASIS ON CONTINUITY IN FRG POLICY (EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE GOAL OF FREE SELF-DETERMINATION FOR ALL GERMANS AND THE REUNIFICATION AND FREEDOM OF GERMANY: NO CONCESSION TO THE GDR OVER MATTERS OF CITIZENSHIP). KOHL LISTS THOSE AREAS (TRAVEL, CULTURE, TOWN-TWINNING AND YOUTH EXCHANGE) IN WHICH THERE HAVE BEEN POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS, AND OTHER AREAS (SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ENVIRONMENT) WHERE FURTHER POSITIVE STEPS ARE NECESSARY AND POSSIBLE. ONE REFERENCE TO THE GDR'S CONTRIBUTION TO WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS. NO SOLUTION TO THE GERMAN QUESTION IS POSSIBLE IN ISOLATION FROM THE WHOLE EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP. CONSEQUENTLY, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S COMMITMENT TO THE RELAXATION OF EAST/WEST TENSION IS IDENTICAL TO ITS CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO WORK FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION.

7. ON BERLIN, THE 750TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS SHOULD EMPHASISE THE UNITY OF THE CITY RATHER THAN ITS DIVISION. WARM REFERENCE TO HM THE QUEEN'S FORTHCOMING VISIT, TOGETHER WITH THOSE OF REAGAN AND MITTERAND. THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES MUST BE PRESERVED, AS ALSO THE MAINTENANCE AND INTENSIFICATION OF BERLIN'S TIES WITH THE FRG. NO EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE INVITATIONS QUESTION.

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

8. REYKJAVIK SHOWED THAT BOTH SUPERPOWERS WANT A STABLE RELATIONSHIP AND CONCRETE AGREEMENTS. THIS COULD OPEN NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL. FRG WOULD ADVOCATE A NEW US-SOVIET SUMMIT THIS YEAR. WHEN GORBACHEV SPEAKS OF A NEW THINKING, WE WILL PUT HIS WORD TO THE TEST. IF HIS POLICIES BRING THE CHANCE OF A NEW UNDERSTANDING AND NEW RESULTS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, WE SHALL SEIZE THESE. BUT WE SHALL NOT LOSE SIGHT OF REALITIES NOR CHASE AFTER ILLUSIONS.

/9.

9. GERMAN/SOVIET RELATIONS IN ALL FIELDS OFFER CONSIDERABLE UNUSED POSSIBILITIES - WE WANT TO INTENSIFY THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE, MAKE PROGRESS ON HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, SIGN CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC AGREEMENTS ... WE ARE READY TO SMOOTH THE WAY FOR BROAD-RANGING ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

10. THE CSCE PROCESS IS AN INDISPENSABLE INSTRUMENT FOR MAINTAINING PEACE, OVERCOMING THE DIVISIONS IN EUROPE AND PROMOTING COOPERATION. IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS - ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS MUST BE RELEASED, INCLUDING IN WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES.

ARMS CONTROL

11. ARMS CONTROL REMAINS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SECURITY POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. SINCE REYKJAVIK THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSALS FROM BOTH SIDES REMAIN ON THE TABLE. WE HOPE BOTH THE US AND SOVIET UNION WILL USE THIS OPPORTUNITY, THROUGH READINESS TO COMPROMISE, TO ACHIEVE RESULTS.

12. EXPLICIT SUPPORT FOR INF ZERO SOLUTION IN EUROPE. EARLY CONCLUSION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE A VISIBLE SIGN OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS, AND AN IMPORTANT IMPULSE FOR OTHER NEGOTIATIONS. SRINF REMAINS A PROBLEM. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EXPECTS THAT BOTH SUPERPOWERS SHOULD MAKE A BINDING AND CONCRETE COMMITMENT TO IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS OVER SRINF WITH THE GOAL OF REDUCING ALL THESE SYSTEMS TO A LOW LEVEL WITH EQUAL CEILINGS.

13. STRONG SUPPORT FOR 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ON SDI, BOTH SIDES IN GENEVA MUST FIND A COOPERATIVE SOLUTION TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE SECURITY NEEDS OF BOTH SIDES. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE ABMT. DRASTIC REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL INEVITABLY HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON THE NEED FOR, AND SCOPE OF, DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

14. A RELIABLY VERIFIABLE NUCLEAR TEST BAN IS AN IMPORTANT GOAL, WHICH CAN BE REALISED STEP-BY-STEP.

15. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT SHARPENS THE PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCES IN EUROPE. WE MUST WORK URGENTLY FOR A VERIFIABLE, COMPREHENSIVE AND STABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT A LOW LEVEL. THE WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY MUST BE ELIMINATED, IN PARTICULAR ITS CAPABILITY FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK AND LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE. THAT WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE. FOR THIS REASON NATO, AT FRANCO/GERMAN PROMPTING, TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL STEP-BY-STEP: MANDATE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE STARTED IN VIENNA.

16. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HOPES FOR EARLY PROGRESS IN THE CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS OVER A GLOBAL CW BAN.

BULLARD
BRLNAN 3217
EUROPEAN POLITICAL
WED

GRS 800

SECRET

SECRET
FM WASHINGTON
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 579
OF 1720042 MARCH 87
INFO PRIORITY MODUK
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO

IMMEDIATE

NO10 (VIA TUBE)

FILE COPY

MODUK FOR DUS(P) ACDS(POL/NUC), DACU
YOUR TELNO 345 AND MODUK SIGNAL 051115Z: ABOLITION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES

SUMMARY

1. JCS STUDY, COMPLETE BUT NOT YET IN THE WHITE HOUSE, PUTS AN UNAFFORDABLY HIGH PRICE-TAG ON THE ABOLITION PROPOSAL.

DETAIL

2. FROM INFORMAL CONTACTS (PLEASE PROTECT) WITH OSD WE HAVE ESTABLISHED THAT THE JCS COMPLETED THEIR STUDY ON THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES IN FEBRUARY: THAT WEINBERGER, SHULTZ AND CARLUCCI HAVE BEEN BRIEFED: BUT THAT IT HAS NOT YET BEEN FORWARDED TO THE PRESIDENT. (IKLE IS STILL TRYING TO AGREE WITH THE JCS THE TEXT OF A COVERING MEMORANDUM.)

3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE JCS CONCLUDED THAT THEY COULD NOT FULFILL THEIR REMIT (TO DEVISE A PLAN FOR A SAFE TRANSITION TO A BALLISTIC MISSILE-FREE WORLD) WITHIN THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED (IE BY 1996) ON THE RESOURCE ASSUMPTION THEY WERE GIVEN (IE A DEFENCE BUDGET RISING STEADILY BY 3 PER CENT A YEAR IN REAL TERMS). THEY CONCLUDED THAT AN ADDITIONAL DOLLARS 383 BILLION (AT FY87 PRICES) WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR INVESTMENT OVER 10 YEARS IN (A) GREATER NUMBERS OF STEALTH BOMBERS (A SECOND PRODUCTION LINE WOULD HAVE TO BE OPENED) AND STEALTH ALCMS: (B) A DEDICATED SLCM FORCE: (C) A NEW LONG RANGE SLCM: (D) THE CONVERSION OF TRIDENT SUBMARINES FOR LONG RANGE SLCMS: (E) AIR DEFENCE: (F) INVESTMENT IN SDI, AS A HEDGE AGAINST POSSIBLE SOVIET CHEATING (WHICH COULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES IN THE SECOND HALF OF ANY 10 YEAR BALLISTIC MISSILE ELIMINATION PERIOD):AND (G) CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE IMPROVEMENTS. THE ADDITIONAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE WOULD BE SPLIT ROUGHLY EQUALLY BETWEEN STRATEGIC OFFENSE (A - D), STRATEGIC DEFENCE (E AND F) AND CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE IMPROVEMENTS (G). THE ARGUMENTS ON (G) ARE APPARENTLY FAIRLY BROAD BRUSH (AND FOR EXAMPLE INCLUDE THE ASSERTION THAT THE PLANNED 600 SHIP NAVY WOULD NEED TO BE INCREASED TO 750). THE IMPRESSION GIVEN IS THAT ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FOR CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE WOULD BE EQUALLY DISTRIBUTED BETWEEN THE THREE SERVICES.

4. THE STUDY SAW THE PRINCIPAL BENEFIT OF ABOLISHING BALLISTIC MISSILES AS THE REMOVAL OF A LARGE PROPORTION OF SOVIET SYSTEMS THREATENING THE US AND NATO EUROPE. THE PRINCIPAL DISADVANTAGE WAS SEEN TO BE THE DAMAGE TO DETERRENCE IF THE RUSSIANS PERCEIVED CRUISE MISSILES AS LESS EFFECTIVE THAN BALLISTIC MISSILES FOR A RETALIATORY STRIKE (EVEN IF ALL NECESSARY WARSAW PACT TARGETS COULD IN THE US VIEW BE SATISFACTORILY COVERED WITH AIR-BREATHING SYSTEMS).

SECRET

5. OUR OSD CONTACTS SAY THAT ALL PARTS OF THE PENTAGON (UNIFORMED AND CIVILIAN) NOW WANT TO CLOSE THE BOOK ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE ELIMINATION PROPOSAL, AND CONCENTRATE INSTEAD ON THE PROPOSAL FOR 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. STATE ARE LIKELY TO AGREE. THE OUTSTANDING ISSUE IS WHETHER THE PRESIDENT AND THE WHITE HOUSE WILL ALSO AGREE.

COMMENT

6. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE CAMP DAVID QUOTE PRIORITIES UNQUOTE WILL HOLD, FOR THE JCS STUDY DOES NOT THREATEN THEM, AND NO AGENCY IS NOW ARGUING AGAINST THEM. THE JCS HAVE, AS EXPECTED, NOT COME DOWN AGAINST THE ABOLITION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES, OR - PACE TAFT-RULED IT UNVIABLE: BUT THEY HAVE GIVEN THE PROPOSAL A PRICE-TAG WHICH MAKES IT IN PRACTICE UNATTAINABLE. THE BASELINE RESOURCE ASSUMPTION OF SUSTAINED 3 PER CENT REAL GROWTH WAS ALREADY UNREALISTIC: THE ADDITIONAL DOLLARS 383 BILLION WOULD ENTAIL ALMOST DOUBLING THE ANNUAL INCREMENT. GIVEN THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL MOOD ON DEFENCE RESOURCES, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE BAKER/CARLUCCI ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT WILL BE THAT LACK OF SOVIET INTEREST IN THE ELIMINATION PROPOSAL PROVIDES THE EXCUSE TO DROP IT.

7. SINCE THE POSITION IS NOT UNSATISFACTORY, WE DO NOT RECOMMEND ANY FURTHER UK ACTION AT THIS STAGE. IF WE WANT AN OFFICIAL UK BRIEFING ON THE STUDY, WE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL IT HAS GONE TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

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ORWBAN 0352

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MODUK FOR DUS(P), ACDS (POL/NUC), DACU.

MY TELNO 548: NUNN ON ABMT

SUMMARY

1. NUNN'S ANALYSIS IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S 1972 INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT WAS NARROW: THAT THIS WAS ALSO THE SENATE'S UNDERSTANDING: AND THAT IT WAS REFLECTED IN SUBSEQUENT ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS UP TO 1985. A SHARP ATTACK ON THE SOFAER 1985 STUDY, AND A CALL FOR A NEW AGREEMENT IN GENEVA. OBVIOUS SET-BACK FOR WEINBERGER, BUT ALSO PERHAPS DAMAGING TO THE CHANCES OF A COMPROMISE DEAL ON THE HILL.

DETAIL

2. ON 12 AND 13 MARCH NUNN COMPLETED HIS ANALYSIS OF ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION. HIS THREE STATEMENTS, WEIGHTY AND MEASURED, HAVE ATTRACTED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION ON THE HILL AND IN THE PRESS.

3. THE FIRST - 11 MARCH - STATEMENT (TUR) DEALT WITH ABMT SENATE RATIFICATION AND ARGUED THAT:

(A) EXECUTIVE BRANCH WITNESSES TOLD THE SENATE THAT THE TREATY BANNED THE DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF MOBILE AND SPACE-BASED EXOTIC ABM SYSTEMS:

(B) THE KEY SENATORS UNDERSTOOD THIS: AND

(C) SOFAER'S CONTENTION THAT THE RATIFICATION RECORD QUOTE CAN BE FAIRLY READ TO SUPPORT THE BROADER INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY UNQUOTE WAS THEREFORE WRONG, AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONCLUSIONS IN THIS RESPECT QUOTE NOT CREDIBLE UNQUOTE.

NUNN MAINTAINED THAT ADMINISTRATION ASSERTIONS THAT EXECUTIVE BRANCH ASSURANCES TO THE SENATE COULD BE DISREGARDED CREATED A DIRECT CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION WITH THE CONGRESS.

4. THE 12 MARCH STATEMENT REVIEWED THE POST-'72 PRACTICE OF THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION AND CONCLUDED THAT:

(A) BOTH SIDES HAD ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NARROW INTERPRETATION:

(B) UNTIL 1985 NO ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS SUPPORTED THE BROAD INTERPRETATION: AND

(C) A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT STATEMENTS (EG THE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS FOR FYS 79-86 AND THE SDI REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FY85) UNAMBIGUOUSLY SUPPORTED THE NARROW INTERPRETATION.

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5. THE THIRD - 13 MARCH - STATEMENT COVERED THE NEGOTIATING RECORD, AND NUNN CONCLUDED THAT, IN SPITE OF SOME AMBIGUITIES, THE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE SENATE'S ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE TREATY, IE THE NARROW INTERPRETATION. NUNN CONCLUDED THAT SOFAER'S 1985 WORK ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S REINTERPRETATION WAS A QUOTE WOEFULLY INADEQUATE FOUNDATION FOR A MAJOR POLICY AND LEGAL CHANGE UNQUOTE.

6. NUNN ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT:

(A) THE ABMT NEGOTIATING RECORD SHOULD BE DECLASSIFIED, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION:

(B) THE US/SOVIET CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION SHOULD BE TASKED TO SEEK TO REMOVE AMBIGUITIES FROM THE TREATY:

(C) THE AIM IN GENEVA SHOULD BE TO CONCLUDE A NEW AGREEMENT SUPERCEDING THE ABMT AND SALT II AND RELEGATING THE BROAD VERSUS NARROW INTERPRETATION DEBATE TO ACADEMIC IRRELEVANCE: AND

(D) THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD PROVIDE AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS INDICATING WHAT NECESSARY SDI TESTING COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED WITHIN THE NARROW INTERPRETATION.

COMMENT

7. THIS WAS A POWERFUL, DETAILED AND CAREFULLY PREPARED ATTACK ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S REINTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY. THE MOST TELLING PART IS THE ANALYSIS OF THE RATIFICATION RECORD, WHERE NUNN DEMONSTRATES INTER ALIA THAT THOSE ON THE RIGHT WHO HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THE TREATY WERE PARTICULARLY UNHAPPY ABOUT THE IDEA OF BANNING MOBILE AND SPACE-BASED EXOTIC SYSTEMS, AS ADMINISTRATION WITNESSES CONFIRMED IT DID. SOFAER'S REACTION HAS BEEN TO STAND BY HIS 1985 CONCLUSIONS ON THE NEGOTIATING RECORD (ON WHICH NUNN ADMITS THAT THE EVIDENCE GOES BOTH WAYS TO SOME EXTENT) BUT TO DISTANCE HIMSELF FROM THE WORK DONE BY SUBORDINATES WHO EXAMINED THE RATIFICATION PROCEEDINGS: HE NOW SAYS THAT THEIR WORK WAS NOT PERSONALLY REVIEWED BY HIM, AND WAS INADEQUATE. PERLE HAS DEFENDED SOFAER'S WORK AND ATTACKED NUNN'S.

8. WHITE HOUSE INITIAL REACTIONS HAVE BEEN CAUTIOUS: WHILE GIVING NO HINT OF BACKING OFF THE BASIC SOFAER THESIS, SPOKESMEN HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO WELCOME NUNN'S REMARKS AND TO SAY THAT THEY WILL BE CAREFULLY STUDIED, AND TO EMPHASISE THAT SOFAER IS NOW ENGAGED IN THE FURTHER WORK (ON THE RATIFICATION DEBATE AND THE SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE OF THE TWO PARTIES) WHICH WAS COMMISSIONED LAST MONTH.

9. NUNN NOW CHAIRS THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, AND HEADS THE MOST RIGHT-WING AND ALLIANCE-MINDED CONSTITUENCY ON DEFENCE ISSUES WITHIN THE DEMOCRAT PARTY. MOREOVER HE IS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF SDI. THIS MAKES HIS HEAVY-WEIGHT ATTACK ON THE INTELLECTUAL BASIS OF THE BROAD INTERPRETATION PARTICULARLY DAMAGING TO THE ADMINISTRATION: IT CANNOT BE DISMISSED AS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. SO HIS REPORT REPRESENTS A SERIOUS SETBACK FOR THE WEINBERGER PITCH FOR EARLY TESTING WHICH WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE BROAD BUT NOT THE NARROW INTERPRETATION.

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10. BUT IT ALSO CREATES A NEW PROBLEM FOR THE BAKER/CARLUCCI SCHOOL SEARCHING (SEE TUR) FOR A COMPROMISE DEAL WITH CONGRESS WHICH WOULD SET GENEROUS SDI FUNDING AGAINST A PERIOD OF CONTINUED OBSERVANCE OF THE NARROW INTERPRETATION. NUNN MIGHT HIMSELF BE WILLING TO ARGUE FOR INCREASED SDI FUNDING ON THIS BASIS: BUT THE CHANCES MUST BE SLIM THAT MANY DEMOCRATS, AS THEY STRUGGLE TO FIND WAYS OF REDUCING THE FEDERAL DEFICIT, WILL IN EFFECT AGREE TO PAY A STIFF PRICE FOR ADMINISTRATION AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE TO COMPLY WITH THE INTERPRETATION WHICH NUNN BELIEVES - AND BELIEVES HE HAS DEMONSTRATED - IS THE ONLY LEGITIMATE ONE.

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MODUK FOR DACU, DPS, CDE PORTON DOWN
US/UK CONSULTATIONS ON CW
SUMMARY

1. FULL DISCUSSION BETWEEN FCO/MOD AND US INTER-AGENCY TEAM OF ALL CW ISSUES, INCLUDING CHALLENGE INSPECTION, SOVIET STRATEGY, AND HANDLING OF HIGH-LEVEL MOSCOW VISITS. AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES FOR CHALLENGE, AND ON NEED FOR WEST TO KEEP UP NEGOTIATING EFFORTS IN GENEVA. CONTINUING DOUBTS ABOUT SOVIET AIMS. NEW JCS ASSESSMENT OF CW RISK DUE SHORTLY.

DETAIL

2. AN FCO/MOD TEAM HELD TALKS HERE ON 13 MARCH WITH US OFFICIALS, FOLLOWING YOUR AGREEMENT WITH SHULTZ AT BERMUDA TO CONTINUE OUR CW DIALOGUE.

3. ON SOVIET TACTICS AND STRATEGY, IT WAS AGREED (THE RUSSIANS HAD SAID AS MUCH TO THE US) THAT MOSCOW HAD TAKEN A DECISION TO PRESS AHEAD IN THE CD NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS HOWEVER UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS WAS A TACTICAL GAMBIT DESIGNED SOLELY TO PREVENT US MODERNISATION THIS YEAR, WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WERE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN SECURING A PROPER BAN ON CW, OR WHETHER THEY WANTED TO SEE A BAN ACHIEVED BUT INTENDED TO LEAVE THEMSELVES ADEQUATE SCOPE FOR CHEATING. A FURTHER SOVIET REVIEW OF TACTICS COULD BE EXPECTED AT THE END OF THIS YEAR. MEANWHILE THEY WOULD MAINTAIN THEIR PRESSURE ON THE WEST OVER THE REMAINING FOUR MONTHS OF THE CD NEGOTIATIONS AND IN THE AUTUMN, AND DURING THE FORTHCOMING HIGH-LEVEL VISIT TO MOSCOW, TO RESPOND TO ALLEGED NEW SOVIET MOVES.

4. THE US SIDE SAID THEY WOULD WELCOME AN EARLY READ-OUT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. WHEN HE WENT THERE, SHULTZ COULD BE EXPECTED TO PRESS FOR CONCRETE EVIDENCE FROM THE RUSSIANS TO BACK UP THEIR RECENT HINTS OF FLEXIBILITY (INCLUDING ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION), AND TO UNDERLINE THE PROLIFERATION THREAT. HE WOULD HAVE NO NEW PROPOSALS TO MAKE.

5. ON THE ELIMINATION OF STOCKPILES, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD MADE A GENUINE MOVE TOWARDS US. HOWEVER, THEY STILL REFUSED TO GIVE THE US SATISFACTION ON BILATERAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, TO WHICH THE US ATTACHED MUCH IMPORTANCE. THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR MAINTAINING MINIMUM DETERRENTS THROUGHOUT THE DESTRUCTION PERIOD WAS ACCEPTABLE, BUT THEIR CONCEPT OF RETAINING STOCKPILES DURING THIS PERIOD WAS NOT.

6. IN DISCUSSING THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF LEAKAGE IN VERIFICATION, WE LEARNED THAT THE JCS WOULD CONCLUDE A CW RISK ASSESSMENT LATER THIS MONTH. THIS WAS LIKELY TO POINT TO A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EFFECT FROM RELATIVELY SMALL AMOUNTS OF CW. THE ASSESSMENT WOULD BE BASED ENTIRELY ON VERIFICATION FACTORS, AND NOT ON

/VIEWS

VIEWS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS. WE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SEEING THE ASSESSMENT, BUT DID NOT SECURE A US RESPONSE. US CONCERNS ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEAKAGE WERE SIMILAR TO THOSE ALREADY ENTERTAINED IN LONDON. WE DISCUSSED WITHOUT REACHING CONCLUSIONS THE ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS IN PRACTICE (UNDERLINED) OF USING LIMITED AMOUNTS OF CW COMPARED WITH OTHER WEAPONS. THE US SEEMED TO DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE THREAT FROM A SOVIET BREAKOUT CAPABILITY AND THAT FROM RETAINED STOCKPILES, AND TO BE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE FORMER.

7. ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION WE REACHED AGREEMENT WITHOUT DIFFICULTY ON A NUMBER OF PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN AN ADEQUATE VERIFICATION REGIME: THE NEED FOR IT TO PRESENT AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT, AND AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF COMPLIANCE, OUR WISH TO AVOID UNDUE THREATS TO OUR OWN SECURITY, THE CHALLENGING STATE TO BE THE JUDGE OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF SATISFACTION OFFERED BY THE CHALLENGED, THE ONUS TO BE PLACED ON THE CHALLENGED STATE TO PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE ACCESS OR AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE (IN PRACTICE SOME DEGREE OF ACCESS MIGHT BE ESSENTIAL), THE NEED NOT TO BE REQUIRED TO JUSTIFY A CHALLENGE, NOR TO IMPOSE ANY FILTER ON THE CHALLENGE MECHANISM, THE IMPORTANCE OF A PROMPT INSPECTION PROCESS, AND THE VALUE OF AN ITERATIVE INSPECTION PROCESS.

8. THE US SIDE WELCOMED THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER EXCHANGES, FOLLOWING MR YOUNGER'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK. WE EXPLAINED WHY ON THE THREE ESSENTIAL COUNTS - AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT, PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY, AND NEGOTIABILITY - WE BELIEVED CD 715 WAS THE BEST BASIS FOR A CHALLENGE REGIME. THE US SIDE REPORTED THAT NAZARKIN HAD SAID THAT, IF ARTICLE X WERE ONLY APPLIED BILATERALLY WITH THE US, IT SHOULD NOT POSE A MAJOR PROBLEM. TO THAT EXTENT, IT MIGHT NOW HAVE BECOME MORE NEGOTIABLE. THE US ALSO BELIEVED THAT THEIR IDEAS ON MANAGED ACCESS (SEE PARAGRAPH 11 BELOW) WOULD RESOLVE THE SECURITY ISSUE. AND THEY REMAINED CONVINCED THAT A BREACH OF THE TREATY BASED UPON A DENIAL OF ACCESS PROVIDED A BETTER DETERRENT THAN THE BRITISH CONCEPT OF SATISFACTION BEING DENIED TO THE CHALLENGER. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS POINT REMAINED A MATTER FOR POLITICAL JUDGEMENT.

9. IN RESPONSE WE EMPHASISED THAT UNDER OUR PROPOSAL A CHALLENGE INSPECTION AS SUCH COULD NOT BE REFUSED. ONLY DIRECT ACCESS COULD BE DENIED, AND IN THAT CASE SATISFACTION TO THE CHALLENGER WAS STILL REQUIRED. OTHERWISE A BREACH OF THE TREATY HAD BEEN COMMITTED. WE FELT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE TOWARDS THE US POSITION ON THE TIMESCALE FOR INSPECTION. WE AGREED THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD ENCOURAGE THE SWEDES IN THEIR LATEST INFORMAL PROPOSAL IN GENEVA, AND SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE STUCK TO OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS.

10. IN HANDLING THE LATEST SOVIET AMENDMENT TO CD 715, WE FELT THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SCOPE FOR PROLONGED DEBATE OVER THEIR NEW LANGUAGE, THAT WE MIGHT TEST THEM ON A SHORTENED TIMESCALE, AND THAT WE MIGHT SEE HOW THEY RESPONDED TO AN EXPLICIT MENTION IN OUR TEXT OF A BREACH BEING THE DIRECT OUTCOME OF A FAILURE TO SATISFY A CHALLENGE. WE EMPHASISED THAT THESE IDEAS REPRESENTED THINKING AT OFFICIAL LEVEL, AND THAT UK MINISTERS WOULD NEED TO BE CONSULTED.

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11. FOLLOWING THE EARLIER EXCHANGE OF PAPERS ON THE CONCEPT OF MANAGED ACCESS, WE RECEIVED AND DISCUSSED A FURTHER US PAPER APPLYING THIS CONCEPT TO THREE SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES. THE US TEAM NOTED THAT THERE WERE NO US FACILITIES TO WHICH THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO GRANT ACCESS. THEY RECOGNISED THAT SOME SECURITY RISK WAS ATTACHED TO THIS APPROACH BUT BELIEVED THAT THIS MUST BE ACCEPTED IN THE WIDER INTEREST. THEY WERE NOT HOWEVER WEDDED TO THE IDEA OF EXCLUSIONS FROM THE LIST OF ITEMS/AREAS TO BE INSPECTED. WE UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE DETAILED COMMENTS IN DUE COURSE, WHILE THE US SIDE WOULD CONTINUE TO REFINE THEIR IDEAS. THE LATTER WOULD ALSO CONSIDER HOW SUCH IDEAS MIGHT BE INCORPORATED IN A PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY, AND WHETHER TO CIRCULATE A CD WORKING PAPER ON THE ISSUE.

12. THERE WAS A USEFUL EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM OF THOSE COUNTRIES KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TO POSSESS CW WHO MIGHT NOT ACCEDE TO THE TREATY. THE US SIDE SEEMED TO ENVISAGE THAT THE DESTRUCTION OVER 10 YEARS OF THEIR OWN STOCKS WOULD ONLY BE COMPLETED WHEN ALL THOSE PARTIES WHO POSSESSED OR SEEMED READY TO POSSESS CW HAD SIGNED UP. THIS COULD BE INCORPORATED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS OF THE TREATY. WE AGREED THAT FURTHER THOUGHT MUST BE DEVOTED TO THIS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

13. WE ALSO DISCUSSED INFORMALLY THE CONCEPT OF AN INSURANCE POLICY AGAINST SOVIET CHEATING, WHEREBY US RATIFICATION OF A TREATY WOULD BE CONDITIONED, IN LANGUAGE AGREED WITH CONGRESS, ON RESUMPTION OF US PRODUCTION IN THE EVENT OF A SOVIET BREACH. STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES SEEMED ATTRACTED TO THE IDEA, BUT DOD OFFICIALS WERE SCEPTICAL ABOUT ITS LONG-TERM APPLICABILITY.

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 44/87

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER SUBJECT ce: OPS MASTER T

13 March 1987

Dear Helmut,

Thank you for your message of 6 March.

I endorse the substance of your message to President Reagan. We must of course avoid being rushed into over-hasty decisions; verification and SRINF will continue to need careful handling. But I agree that we must grasp the opportunity which Mr. Gorbachev's statement of willingness to accept long-standing allied proposals has now presented. As I have emphasised publicly, it stems from the resolve of the West to stand firm.

Like you, I am particularly concerned about the imbalance in Soviet shorter-range systems. It is essential that we obtain Soviet agreement to the constraints currently proposed - a freeze on SS22s and 23s at present levels, together with a US right to match - to ensure that an INF agreement is not undercut by new Soviet deployments at this level. I agree that it is also important that an INF agreement is followed by negotiations aimed at dealing further with LRINF and addressing the imbalance in Soviet SRINF forces. Reducing the levels of nuclear weapons will also increase the importance of eliminating conventional disparities.

NATO studies are currently in progress on the Alliance's requirements in SRINF and other areas following LRINF zero/zero in Europe. I hope this work can be completed as

quickly as possible. What the Russians are willing to offer on SRINF may also be changing - the US negotiators have had recent suggestions of this - so we shall need to watch Soviet intentions closely.

Yours sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency Dr. Helmut Kohl

CC PK

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 March 1987

Dear Charles,

INF Negotiations: Letter from Chancellor Kohl

I attach a draft reply from ~~the~~ ar-tiap Prime Minister to Chancellor Kohl's message of ~~6~~ March on INF negotiations. If the Prime Minister is content with the draft, the Secretary of State and Mr Younger will reply in similar terms to messages received from their FRG opposite numbers.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Len Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

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TO: OA2AMF Copies to:

Herr Helmut Kohl
Federal Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany

To Chancellor Kohl

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your message of 6 March.

I warmly endorse the substance of your message to President Reagan. It is time now to press ahead with the detailed drafting of an agreement on LRINF missiles. We must of course avoid being rushed into over-hasty decisions; verification and SRINF will continue to need careful handling. But I agree that we must grasp the opportunity which Mr Gorbachev's statement of willingness to accept long-standing allied proposals has now presented. As I said in the House of Commons on 3 March, it stems from the resolve of the West to stand firm.

Have emphasized publicly

Like you,

I too am particularly concerned about the imbalance in Soviet shorter-range systems. It is clearly essential that we obtain a Soviet agreement to the constraints currently proposed - a freeze on SS22s and 23s at present levels, together with a US right to match - to ensure that an INF agreement is not undercut by new Soviet deployments at this level. I agree that it is also

important that an INF agreement is followed by negotiations aimed at addressing the imbalance in Soviet SRINF forces ~~and~~ dealing further with LRINF. Reducing the levels of nuclear weapons will also increase the importance of eliminating conventional disparities.

~~I know that~~ NATO studies are currently in progress on the Alliance's requirements in SRINF and other areas following LRINF zero/zero in Europe. I hope this work can be completed as quickly as possible. What the Russians are willing to offer on SRINF may also be changing - the US negotiators have had recent suggestions of this - so we ~~will~~ should need to watch Soviet intentions closely.

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PARIS TELNO 265: ARMS CONTROL: VORONTSOV'S VISIT TO PARIS

1. THE REFERENCE IN PARA 4 OF TUR TO ''ANOTHER REYKJAVIK'' PROMPTS ME TO REVIVE THE SUGGESTION IN PARA 5 OF MY LETTER OF 22 DECEMBER TO FALL THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT BE ADVISED TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF OFFERING LONDON AS A SUMMIT STAGING-POST DURING HER MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV IN MOSCOW.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

PART 10 ends:-

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PART 11 begins:-

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