PART EIGHT

UMSKA

MT

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

East/West Relations

FOREIGN POLICY

Pt 1 : JULY 1979

Pt 8 : DECEMBER 1987

(ATTACHED FOLDER: VIDEO - GORBACHEV + NBC.)

| Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date | Referred to | Date |
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| ~~4.12.87~~ | | | | | | | |
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| ~~16.12.87~~ | | | | | | | |
| ~~12.2.88~~ | | | | | | | |
| ~~23/2/88~~ | | | | | | | |
| ~~14.3.88~~ | | | | | | | |
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| ~~20.5.88~~ | | | | | | | |
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| ~~24.9.88~~ | | | | | | | |
| ~~26.10.88~~ | | | | | | | |
| 15.11.88 | | | | | | | |

PREM 19/2173

PT 8
ENDS

Dd 839836 ; 2M 11/83 JET

PART 8 ends:-

Washington Tel No 2759 15.11.88

PART 9 begins:-

Washington Tel No 2893 2.12.88

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 150900Z FCO
TELNO 2759
OF 150430Z NOVEMBER 88
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

POSSIBLE VISIT BY GORBACHEV TO THE UNITED STATES
1. CBS CARRIED A REPORT THIS EVENING (WHICH HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN PICKED UP BY THE OTHER NETWORKS) THAT GORBACHEV WILL BE VISITING NEW YORK IN EARLY DECEMBER TO MAKE A SPEECH TO THE UN AND WILL BE MEETING PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT-ELECT BUSH THERE. LATE THIS EVENING, MEDIA REPORTS WERE ADDING THAT US GOVERNMENT SOURCES HAD CONFIRMED THE MAIN OUTLINE OF THIS REPORT.
2. THE MINISTER THEREFORE SPOKE TO MRS RIDGWAY. SHE SAID THAT SHE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO CONFIRM THE REPORTS. THE ADMINISTRATION WERE STILL WAITING FOR CONFIRMATION FROM MOSCOW. SHE UNDERTOOK TO LET US KNOW AS SOON AS THE SITUATION WAS CLEARER. A SEPARATE CONTACT IN STATE TELLS US THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ CALLED AT VERY SHORT NOTICE ON SHULTZ ON THE EVENING OF 13 NOVEMBER, THIS WAS APPARENTLY THE FIRST INDICATION THAT THE ADMINISTRATION RECEIVED OF A POSSIBLE GORBACHEV VISIT TO THE UN.
3. WE HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO LEDSKY (NSC). HE TOO SAID THAT THE DETAILS REMAINED UNCLEAR BUT THAT GORBACHEV SEEMED TO BE THINKING IN TERMS OF VISITING NEW YORK ONLY WHILE IN THE US. LEDSKY BELIEVED THAT THE DATES OF 6 AND 7 DECEMBER HAD BEEN MENTIONED, AND THAT THIS VISIT WOULD BE PART OF A WEEK OF OVERSEAS TRAVEL BY GORBACHEV.
4. WE WILL TAKE FURTHER SOUNDINGS IN THE MORNING AND WILL ENSURE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY IS BROUGHT UP TO DATE ON THEIR ARRIVAL.
5. PLEASE ADVANCE TO POWELL AND INGHAM, NO. 10.

FALL

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MVLNAN 1268

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UNCLASSIFIED
FM PARIS
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 1070
OF 290953Z OCTOBER 88
INFO PRIORITY ROME, MOSCOW, BONN
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS
INFO SAVING ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LISBON, MADRID
INFO SAVING LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE

FRANCO-ITALIAN SUMMIT: EAST/WEST RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. MITTERRAND AND DE MITA AIM TO HARMONIZE EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO THE SOVIET UNION. MITTERRAND CAUTIOUS ON IDEA OF MARSHALL PLAN FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND ARGUES OBSCURELY THAT IN BUILDING A COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE WE SHOULD FIRST CONCENTRATE ON THE STOREY CONSISTING OF THE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES.

DETAIL

2. THE ANNUAL FRANCO-ITALIAN SUMMIT TOOK PLACE AT ARLES ON 27 OCTOBER. MITTERRAND USED THE CONCLUDING PRESS CONFERENCE TO STATE SOME OF HIS CURRENT THINKING ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

3. ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RELATIONS HE REPORTEDLY DISMISSED THE IDEA OF A MARSHALL PLAN FOR THE EAST. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK GORBACHEV WAS TRYING TO SPLIT THE WEST, BUT THAT IN ANY CASE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD MATURE EXPERIENCE. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AT RHODES WOULD TRY TO HARMONIZE APPROACHES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS SHOULD BE OF MUTUAL BENEFIT. (DE MITA CALLED THIS A MITTERRAND PLAN.)

4. ON THE SOVIET IDEA OF A COMMON EUROPEAN HOME, MITTERRAND SAID, IN SUMMARY, THAT, ALTHOUGH EUROPE WAS DEFINED BY GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY, BUILDING UP THE EUROPEAN HOUSE SHOULD PROCEED STEP BY STEP. THE FOUNDATIONS, IE THE EC, WERE ALREADY LAID. THE NEXT STAGE WAS THE FIRST FLOOR, IE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE EC AND OTHER DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES, EG THE SCANDINAVIANS. IT WOULD BE ILLOGICAL TO START ON THE SECOND FLOOR, INVOLVING EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION, UNTIL THE FIRST FLOOR WAS COMPLETE. GREATER EC POLITICAL UNITY WAS ALSO NECESSARY.

5. BOTH MITTERRAND AND DE MITA STRESSED THAT EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS

HAD THE WILL TO HARMONIZE THEIR ATTITUDES AND APPROACHES TO THE SOVIET UNION. (NO APPARENT REFERENCE TO THE MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH BRITISH OPPOSITION TO THIS HAS BEEN RECEIVING PROMINENT AND SYMPATHETIC COVERAGE IN THE FRENCH PRESS.)

6. BILATERAL. THE TWO LEADERS AGREED THAT ITALY AND FRANCE WOULD IN FUTURE HOLD AN ANNUAL INTER-MINISTERIAL SEMINAR, BETWEEN SEMINARS. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED AUDIOVISUAL QUESTIONS, INCLUDING HIGH DEFINITION TELEVISION, HIGH-SPEED RAILWAYS, DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND R AND D CO-OPERATION.

FERGUSSON

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DISTRIBUTION 233

MAIN 225

EUROPEAN POLITICAL WED (-)

SAVING 8

ATHENS
BRUSSELS
COPENHAGEN
DUBLIN
LISBON
MADRID
LUXEMBOURG
THE HAGUE

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070522
MDHIAN 9437

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 2610
OF 282107Z OCTOBER 88
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDIS GENEVA
INFO PRIORITY MODUK

SIC
MODUK FOR ACDS (POL AND NUC) AND AUS (POL)
ABM TREATY VIOLATION
SUMMARY
1. NEW US/SOVIET TALKS ON KRASNOYARSK.
DETAIL
2. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE INFORMED US THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOW COME FORWARD WITH MORE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR THE FURTHER TALKS ON THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR (TEBBIT'S TELELETTER OF 14 OCTOBER TO LEVER, NOT TO ALL). THE TALKS WILL BEGIN IN GENEVA ON 31 OCTOBER, BURNS (DIRECTOR ACDA) EXPECTED TO LEAD FOR THE US SIDE.
3. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT HOWEVER MADE ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSAL ON HOW THE VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY MIGHT BE CORRECTED. THE ONLY COMMENT HAS BEEN GERASIMOV'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON 27 OCTOBER THAT THE RADAR WILL BE HANDED OVER TO THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND CONVERTED INTO A CIVILIAN SPACE RESEARCH CENTRE. THE US POSITION REMAINS THAT SUCH AN OFFER WOULD NOT MEET THE CRITERIA OF DESTROYING THE FACILITY'S POTENTIAL FOR ANTI-MISSILE DEFENCE AND ITS RAPID RESTORATION TO SUCH USE. DISMANTLEMENT OF THE RADAR AND BUILDINGS IS STILL SEEN AS THE ONLY WAY OF MEETING THESE CONCERNS. THERE IS THEREFORE CONSIDERABLE SCEPTICISM HERE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT.
4. NEVERTHELESS THE ADMINISTRATION IS READY (CONGRESSIONAL CRITICS SAY TOO READY) TO LISTEN TO THE DETAILS OF ANY SOVIET PROPOSALS, GIVEN THE POLITICAL INTEREST IN AVOIDING A SHOWDOWN AT THE END OF THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY. IT IS RELEVANT IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE PENTAGON HAVE YET TO PRODUCE THE LIST OF 'PROPORTIONATE' MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS CALLED FOR BY 1 NOVEMBER. THIS NEW MEETING PROVIDES FURTHER GROUNDS FOR EXPECTING THE ISSUE TO BE PLAYED LONG.

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DISTRIBUTION 152

MAIN 134

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MR BOYD
MR GOULDEN
MR RATFORD

ADDITIONAL 18

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CDI MOD
AUS POL MOD
ACSA (N)
DGSDIPO MOD
DACU MOD
NUC POL (SY) MOD
D DEF POL MOD
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MR NICHOLLS CAB OFFICE
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SIR P CRADOCK 2 COPIES
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An important telegram

CONFIDENTIAL

065344
MDADAN 4897

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 280900Z FCO
TELNO 2601
OF 272255Z OCTOBER 88
INFO IMMEDIATE WARSAW
INFO PRIORITY OTHER EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, MOSCOW, BONN
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO

ADVANCE COPY

US/EASTERN EUROPE
SUMMARY
1. WHITEHEAD'S UPBEAT ASSESSMENT OF TRENDS IN EASTERN EUROPE NOT GENERALLY SHARED HERE. ON POLAND, THERE IS UNEASINESS ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO THE ROUNDTABLE PROCESS, AND ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER STRIKES BEFORE LONG. NO PROSPECT OF AN EARLY SHIFT IN US POLICY ON AN IMF AGREEMENT FOR POLAND. MORE GENERALLY, THIS ADMINISTRATION LIKELY TO LEAVE TWO THOUGHTS FOR ITS SUCCESSOR: THE NEED TO GIVE EASTERN EUROPE A HIGHER PRIORITY AND TO AGREE A BROAD STRATEGY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE (MAINLY TO RESTRAIN THE GERMANS): AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DISCUSSING EASTERN EUROPE WITH THE RUSSIANS.
DETAIL
2. YOU MIGHT FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE A SUMMARY OF CURRENT THINKING ABOUT EASTERN EUROPE IN THE ADMINISTRATION, PARTICULARLY ON POLAND, IN ADVANCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT THERE.
3. NSC CONTACTS TELL US THAT WHITEHEAD REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT ON 25 OCTOBER ABOUT HIS RECENT VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE. AS IN HIS BRIEFING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (UKDEL NATO TELNO 385) HE WAS GENERALLY UPBEAT ON THE PROSPECTS. BUT AT THE SAME MEETING, JUDGE WEBSTER APPARENTLY MADE CLEAR THAT THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WERE MUCH LESS SANGUINE ABOUT THE TRENDS. WEBSTER UNDERLINED THAT ALTHOUGH MANY OF THE EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS TALKED PLAUSIBLY ABOUT REFORM, THERE WAS LITTLE ACTION. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE, MOST WORRYINGLY IN YUGOSLAVIA. EVEN IN HUNGARY, GROSZ HAD FAILED TO LIVE UP TO HIS EARLY BILLING AS A STRONG LEADER. THE SENSE OF DRIFT IN ECONOMIC REFORM WAS COUPLED WITH MOUNTING POPULAR PRESSURES FOR CHANGE, STIMULATED IN PART BY GORBACHEV'S DRIVE FOR REFORM WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION.
4. IN THE CASE OF POLAND, WEBSTER APPARENTLY TOOK THE LINE (WHICH CONTACTS IN THE EUROPEAN BUREAU AT STATE HAVE SEPARATELY ECHOED) THAT THE GOVERNMENT SEEMED NOT BE SERIOUS ABOUT PURSUING A REAL DIALOGUE WITH SOLIDARITY. THE APPOINTMENT OF RAKOWSKI HAD BEEN A SIGNIFICANT SETBACK, GIVEN HIS STRONGLY ANTI- SOLIDARITY RECORD. THE DELAY IN GETTING THE ROUNDTABLE TALKS UNDERWAY WAS INCREASING

THE PRESSURE ON WALESA FROM HIS OWN FOLLOWERS. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT WHEN THE PATIENCE OF THE YOUNGER ELEMENT WITHIN SOLIDARITY WOULD WEAR OUT, BUT THE LONGER THE STALEMATE CONTINUED THE GREATER THE PROSPECTS FOR A FURTHER WAVE OF STRIKES AND UNREST. CIA WERE NOT RULING OUT THAT THIS COULD COME BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. LEDSKY, THE SENIOR NSC OFFICIAL TRAVELLING WITH WHITEHEAD, HAS ALSO TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT HE DID NOT SHARE THE LATTER'S VIEW OF PROSPECTS IN POLAND. LEDSKY CAME AWAY WITH THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT GOVERNMENT OBDURACY COULD WELL PRODUCE MORE TROUBLE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

5. ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT US AND WESTERN POLICY SHOULD BE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE NSC TELL US THAT THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT REACHED NO NEW CONCLUSIONS. STATE ADD THAT THEY HAVE BEEN URGING BOTH SIDES IN POLAND NOT TO OVERREACT TO THE DIFFICULTIES THAT WERE BOUND TO OCCUR IN GETTING THE ROUNDTABLE TALKS STARTED. THE MAIN POLICY LEVER AVAILABLE TO THE US REMAINS A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE TOWARDS AN IMF STANDBY AGREEMENT (SBA). ON THAT, OUR CONTACTS CONFIRM THAT THE US LINE HAS NOT CHANGED SINCE BUSH'S VISIT TO POLAND IN SEPTEMBER 1987: IE THAT IT IS UP TO POLAND TO IMPLEMENT AN ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMME AND TO CONVINCE THE IMF THAT THERE IS A GOOD ECONOMIC CASE FOR AN SBA: IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THE US WOULD CONSIDER AN SBA POSITIVELY, ALWAYS PROVIDED THAT GENUINE EFFORTS AT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WERE ALSO UNDERWAY.

6. WHITEHEAD APPARENTLY TRIED TO GET THIS CHANGED IN A SLIGHTLY MORE POSITIVE DIRECTION BEFORE HIS OWN RECENT VISIT TO WARSAW, BUT FAILED. ACCORDING TO THE NSC, TREASURY SECRETARY BRADY REMAINS HIGHLY SCEPTICAL ABOUT AN SBA FOR POLAND. HE BELIEVES:

(I) THAT POLISH ECONOMIC REFORMS HAVE NOT GONE NEARLY FAR ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY AN SBA ON ECONOMIC GROUNDS

(II) THAT TO INTRODUCE A POLITICAL ELEMENT INTO THE EQUATION WOULD REQUIRE MUCH GREATER CONFIDENCE THAN AT PRESENT EXISTS THAT THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS WILL GET SOMEWHERE.

BEHIND THESE TECHNICAL CONCERNS THERE IS AN UNDERLYING WORRY (SHARED BY OTHERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION) THAT THERE WOULD BE STRONG OPPOSITION IN CONGRESS AND AMONG POLISH-AMERICAN COMMUNITY IF THE ADMINISTRATION WERE TO MAKE ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS TO JARUZELSKI IN ADVANCE OF AN AGREEMENT WITH SOLIDARITY.

7. THE OBVERSE IS THAT IF THERE WERE REAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROGRESS IN POLAND, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD QUICKLY FIND THEMSELVES UNDER PRESSURE FROM SOLIDARITY, THE CHURCH AND THE POLISH-AMERICANS TO FALL IN LINE ON AN IMF AGREEMENT. OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT, WHETHER BUSH OR DUKAKIS, WOULD BE LIKELY TO AGREE, NOT LEAST IN THE HOPE OF TURNING A FRESH PAGE IN US RELATIONS WITH POLAND. BUT AT PRESENT THAT SCENARIO IS GENERALLY

REGARDED HERE AS LESS LIKELY THAN CONTINUED STALEMATE, FOLLOWED AT SOME POINT BY A FURTHER FLARE-UP.

8. ON FUTURE US POLICY, TOWARDS THE REGION, THE NSC TELL US THAT THEY WILL BE IDENTIFYING EASTERN EUROPE IN THEIR TRANSITION PAPERS AS A PRIORITY FOR ATTENTION BY THE INCOMING ADMINISTRATION. THEY ACCEPT THAT THE REGION HAS BEEN GIVEN TOO LITTLE ATTENTION BY THE US IN RECENT YEARS. THEY ARE ALSO CONCERNED BY SIGNS OF SOME DISARRAY IN THE ALLIANCE'S APPROACH, IN PARTICULAR WHAT THEY SEE AS GERMAN ENTHUSIASM FOR NEW CREDITS. THERE IS CONCERN BOTH IN THE NSC AND IN STATE THAT SOME ALLIES WILL BE TEMPTED TO REPEAT THE MISTAKES OF THE 1970S BY EXTENDING LARGE SCALE CREDIT TO THE EAST EUROPEANS IN THE HOPE OF ENCOURAGING ECONOMIC REFORM. THE AMERCANS BELIEVE FIRMLY THAT THIS IS BACK TO FRONT, AND THAT THE WEST SHOULD HOLD OUT FOR REFORM BEFORE HELPING THE EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES TO EASE THEIR ECONOMIC DILEMMA. THEIR POSITION IS OF COURSE DICTATED PARTLY BY BUDGETARY REALITIES: THE AMERICANS HAVE FEW IF ANY FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR NEW LENDING TO EASTERN EUROPE. BUT THERE IS ALSO THE POLITICAL REALITY THAT CONGRESS AND THE EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES HERE REPRESENT A STRONG LOBBY AGAINST UNREQUITED GESTURES TOWARDS EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND, THE TRANSITION PAPERS ARE LIKELY TO SUGGEST THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION SHOULD MAKE A RENEWED EFFORT TO AGREE (PREFERABLY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE) A MORE COHERENT WESTERN APPROACH TO EASTERN EUROPE.

9. ANOTHER IDEA WHICH MAY BE BEQUEATHED TO THE INCOMING ADMINISTRATION IS RAISING EASTERN EUROPE IN THE REGIONAL ISSUES DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SHULTZ HAS APPARENTLY RESISTED THAT, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO RECOGNITION OF SOVIET HEGEMONY OVER THE REGION. BUT OTHERS IN STATE AND THE NSC BELIEVE THAT THIS CONSIDERATION HAS LESS FORCE NOW THAT THE US AND SOVIET UNION REGULARLY DISCUSS OTHER REGIONS, AND THAT IT WOULD BE LEGITIMATE TO DISCUSS EASTERN EUROPE AT A GENERAL LEVEL, GIVEN THE POTENTIAL OF A CRISIS THERE TO DERAIL US/SOVIET RELATIONS. IT WOULD NEED THE MOST CAREFUL PRESENTATION BOTH TO THE RUSSIANS AND IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE MAIN PURPOSE WOULD BE TO KEEP UP PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS TO GIVEN THE EAST EUROPEANS AS MUCH ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AS POSSIBLE IN LOOKING FOR WAYS OUT OF THEIR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. IT WOULD ALSO ENABLE THE AMERICANS TO PUT DOWN SOME MARKERS ABOUT THE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR US/SOVIET RELATIONS OF ANY SOVIET INTERVENTION IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE NSC ADDED THAT THESE IDEAS WERE BY NO MEANS FULLY FORMED AS YET, BUT THEY BELIEVE THAT THIS IS AN ISSUE WHICH THE NEW PRESIDENT SHOULD AT LEAST CONSIDER (AND DUKAKIS HAS ALREADY MADE CLEAR IN PUBLIC THAT HE WOULD DO SO).

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COMMENT
10. IT IS WIDELY ACCEPTED HERE THAT THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION WILL NEED TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO EASTERN EUROPE. BUT GIVEN THE PRESSURE ON RESOURCES, ANY EXPECTATIONS AMONG EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS OF AMERICAN LARGESSE ARE LIKELY TO BE DISAPPOINTED. DOUBTS ABOUT AN IMF AGREEMENT FOR POLAND HAVE IF ANYTHING BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THE EXPERIENCE IN YUGOSLAVIA. THE IDEA OF US/SOVIET DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE IS SEEN BY SOME HERE AS ONE CONTRIBUTION WHICH THE US ARE UNIQUELY PLACED TO MAKE TO THE TASK OF SECURING FOR THE EAST EUROPEANS AS MUCH ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AS POSSIBLE IN TACKLING THEIR PROBLEMS.
11. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED, SIMONS (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN EUR) HAS ASKED THE MINISTER TO CALL ON 31 OCTOBER TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF AN IMF AGREEMENT FOR POLAND IN THE LIGHT OF THE WORK UNDERWAY IN NATO ON A PAPER COVERING EASTERN EUROPE. WE SHALL REPORT FURTHER AFTER THAT AS NECESSARY.

ACLAND

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DISTRIBUTION ~~22~~ 21

ADVANCE ~~22~~ 21

.EAST WEST US/SOVIET RELATIONS
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/LORD GLENARTHUR
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
PS/SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
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RESIDENT CLERK
MR POWELL NO.10 DOWNING STREET
MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P) MOD
D.NUC(POL)SY MOD
DACU MOD
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RESTRICTED
FM MOSCOW
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1740
OF 261150Z OCTOBER 88
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN
INFO PRIORITY OTHER CSCE POSTS

MY TELNO 1733: SOVIET UNION/WEST GERMANY: VISIT OF KOHL: DAY TWO
SUMMARY
1. RUSSIANS AND GERMANS CONDUCTED A ROUND OF MINISTERIAL MEETINGS ENDING WITH A FURTHER MEETING WITH GORBACHEV IN PLENARY. SIX INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS ARE SIGNED.
DETAIL
2. THE SECOND DAY OF CHANCELLOR KOHL'S VISIT TO MOSCOW BEGAN WITH A MORNING SESSION WITH THE SOVIET PRIME MINISTER, RYZHKOV ON ECONOMIC AND TRADE COOPERATION. RYZHKOV RAISED THE QUESITON OF 1992. HE POINTED TO THE FACT THAT A ''UNIFIED MARKET'' WOULD SHORTLY BE EVOLVING IN EASTERN EUROPE. ACCORDING TO TASS, BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVING THE MUTUALLY PROFITABLE LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES.
3. WHILE THIS WAS GOING ON, THE GERMAN TEAM OF GENSCHER, SCHOLZ THE DEFENCE MINISTER, REISENHUBER THE MINISTER FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, TOEPFER THE MINISTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AND KIECHLE MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY HAD BILATERALS WITH THEIR OPPOSITE NUMBERS ON THE SOVIET SIDE.
4. IN THE AFTERNOON THE TWO SIDES MET AGAIN IN PLENARY. ACCORDING TO PRAVDA, GORBACHEV SPOKE WITH SATISFACITON ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET/GERMAN COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR ENERGY, MACHINE BUILDING, ELECTRONICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. HE WAS PLEASED BY THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SEND A GERMAN COSMONAUT TO THE ORBITING SPACE STATION ''MIR'' AND THE AGREEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN SIGNED TO MODERNISE 200 PLANTS IN THE FOOD SECTOR. GORBACHEV SAID THAT A NEW ERA OF SOVIET/GERMAN RELATIONS WAS OPENING UP.
5. BOTH SIDES ARE REPORTED TO HAVE ''EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL CONTACTS BETWEEN DEFENCE MINISTERS.''
6. THE FOLLOWING INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED ON 25 OCTOBER: ON ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION, A CULTURAL AGREEMENT FOR 1988-1989, ON NUCLEAR ACCIDENT NOTIFICATION, ON INCIDENTS AT SEA, ON MODERNISATION OF THE FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRY, AND ON SPACE RESEARCH.

BRAITHWAITE

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EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOVIET (-)

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COLLAR
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TO DESKBY 251000Z FCO
TELNO 1733
OF 250949Z OCTOBER 88
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, EAST BERLIN, BMG BERLIN
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, OTHER CSCE POSTS

SOVIET UNION/WEST GERMANY: VISIT OF KOHL: FIRST DAY

SUMMARY

1. KOHL AND GORBACHEV GOT DOWN TO BUSINESS STRAIGHT AWAY ON 24 OCTOBER. KOHL IMMEDIATELY RAISED KEY QUESITONS ON GERMAN UNITY AND THE SITUATION OF ETHNIC GERMANS IN THE SOVIET UNION. GORBACHEV CONCENTRATED ON PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DISARMAMENT.

DETAIL

2. CHANCELLOR KOHL ARRIVED IN MOSCOW ON THE AFTERNOON OF 24 OCTOBER. HE WENT STRAIGHT INTO A TETE-A-TETE SESSION WITH GORBACHEV. ACCORDING TO THE ACCOUNT IN PRAVDA THE RUSSIANS SPOKE MOSTLY ABOUT THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION. GORBACHEV STRESSED THAT THE EARLY PREPARATION FOR THIS VISIT HAD BEEN WORTH WHILE AND SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WOULD BE READY BY THE TIME HE RETURNED TO BONN. BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED FOR AN EARLY BEGINNING TO THE CST, BUT GORBACHEV ADDED A JIBE ABOUT NATO PLANS FOR MODERNISAITON WHICH ''CUT ACROSS THE OPPORTUNITIES OPENED UP BY THE INF TREATY.'' KOHL RAISED THE ISSUE OF ETHNIC GERMANS AND WAS TOLD THAT THE PROBLEMS ''ARE BEING SOLVED AND WILL BE SOLVED, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO PERMIT INTERFERENCE IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

3. THE TWO LEADERS SUBSEQUENTLY ADDRESSED SOME OF THE 70 PLUS BUSINESSMEN WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED KOHL TO MOSCOW. THEY EXCHANGED WARM SENTIMENTS ABOUT THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPANDING RUSSIAN/GERMAN BUSINESS.

4. THE SPEECHES AT THE KREMLIN DINNER YESTERDAY EVENING CONTAINED A DEAL OF BLUNT TALKING, MOSTLY FROM KOHL BUT ALSO, PRE-EMPTIVELY FROM GORBACHEV. GORBAHCEV SPOKE FIRST AND STRESSED THE LONG HISTORIC LINKS BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND THE GERMANS. HE SAID THERE WERE CLOSE TIES WITH WEST GERMANY BUT ADDED THAT THE LINKS WITH EAST GERMANY WERE MORE SOLID, BASED ON A COMMON SOCIAL SYSTEM AND MEMBERSHIP OF AN ALLIANCE. HE REMINDED KOHL THAT WEST GERMANY WAS THE ONLY MEMBER OF NATO WITH WHOM THE SOVIET UNION HAD A TREATY ON THE RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OF FORCE.

5. GORBACHEV SAID HE HAD TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WEST BERLIN

BECAUSE CERTAIN VOICES IN WEST GERMANY WERE SUGGESTING THAT THIS WAS THE FLY IN THE OINTMENT ''THEY SEEM TO SAY THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION 'DOES NOT YEILD' ON THIS THEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET/GERMAN RELATIONS WILL HAVE TO, AT THE VERY LEAST, SLOW DOWN. SUCH A PHRASING OF THE QUESTION .... NOT ONLY CONTRADICTS THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 1971 BUT IT IS ALSO INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS. WE ARE NOT AGAINST THE PARTICIPATION OF WEST BERLIN IN THE EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WE ARE READY TO CONSIDER ITS SPECIFIC INTERESTS IN ECONOMY AND CULTURAL LIFE. BUT ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SPECIAL STATUS OF THE CITY REMAINS UNIMPAIRED.''

6. GORBACHEV SAID HE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN SEVERAL TIMES ON THE ''GERMAN QUESTION'' RECENTLY, HE PREFERRED TO SEE IT SOLVED IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPING RELATIONS BETWEEN ALL PARTS OF WEST GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION AND BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AS A WHOLE. THE REMAINDER OF HIS SPEECH THEN DEVELOPED THE THEMES OF EAST/WEST COOPERATION AND ALSO RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH.

7. HE SAID THAT HE HAD REFINED THE IDEA OF ''A EUROPEAN REYKJAVIK'' TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF MITTERRAND'S IDEA THAT SUCH A MEETING SHOULD BE HELD WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF CST. HE MADE REFERENCE TO THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE IN A LOW-KEY, SAYING THAT THIS HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE HELSINKI PROCESS WHICH UNITES US ALL.

8. KOHL BEGAN HIS SPEECH BY REFERRING TO LETTERS HE HAD RECEIVED FORM THE PUBLIC WISHING GORBACHEV WELL BUT ALSO RAISING OTHER ISSUES. HE RECALLED THE GRIEF DONE TO THE SOVIET UNION BY TROOPS DURING THE WAR, THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT ''DEATH, SUFFERING AND DISPERSAL FROM THEIR HOMELANDS WAS THE FATE OF MILLIONS OF MY COMPATRIATES. OUR FATHERLAND AND OUR OLD CAPITAL OF BERLIN WERE DIVIDED.'' HE WELCOME THE INCREASE IN MIGRATION AND TRAVEL PERMITS GIVEN TO ETHNIC GERMANS AND SAID THAT AN EVEN GREATER NUMBER WOULD HELP DEVELOP AND STRENGTHEN TIES AND CONTACTS BETWEEN THESE PEOPLE AND THEIR RELATIVES IN THE WEST.

9. KOHL ALSO ADDRESSED THE DIVISION OF GERMANY. HE SAID THAT THE HELSINKI PROCESS WAS CALLED INTOBEING TO HEAL THE OLD WOUND OF EUROPE AND TO BRING PEOPLE CLOSER TOGETHER AND IT SHOLD THEREFORE BE POSSIBLE FOR THE GERMANS TO OVERCOME THE DIVISION OF THEIR FATHERLAND BY PEACEFUL MEANS. THIS ASPIRATION HAD BEEN STATED WHEN THE MOSCOW TREATY WAS SIGNED. HE CONTINUED ''WE KNOW THAT THE GOALS OF UNITY CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE POWERS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR GERMANY AS A WHOLE... NONE THE LESS IT REMAINS TRUE THAT THIS DIVISION IS CONTRARY TO NATURE... WE RESPECT EXISTING BORDERS BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE WANT ALL GERMANS, JUST LIKE OTHER EUROPEANS, TO BBE ABLE TO CHOOSE FREELY THEIR FATE AND TO COME TOGETHER IN CONDITIONS OF A COMMON FREEDOM.''

10. ON DISARMAMENT KOHL SAID THAT THE INF TREATY HAD ESTABLISHED TWO IMPORTANT PROPOSALS THAT WHOEVER HAD MOST ARMS SHOULD REMOVE THEM AND THAT ONLY RELIABLE VERIFICATION CREATED TRUST. ON THE CURRENT AGENDA HE REMINDED HIS HOSTS THAT NATO WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT WARSAW PACT SUPERIORITY IN SHORT RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES. HE REPEATED HIS APPEAL TO THE SOVIET UNION TO GIVE UP ITS PART OF THE ARSENAL. HE RECALLED THAT NATO HAD REDUCED THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS IN EUROPE BY 2,4000.
11. AFTER SAYING THAT THE WEST HOPED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE POSSIBILITIES CREATED BY THE PROCESS OF PERESTROIKA IN THE SOVIET UNION, KOHL DEALT ATLENGTH ABOUT THE IMPORTAQNCE OF RESPECTING HUMAN RIGTS IN DEVELOPING EAST/WEST RELATIONS.
12. AT THE END OF THE SPEECH KOHL PUT FORWARD HIS OWN PLAN TO IMPROVE COOPERATION BY INVITING 1,000 YOUNG SOVIET CITIZENS TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, OVER THREE YEARS, IN ORDER TO STUDY AND GAIN PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICAITONS.

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REFORM OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: DRAFT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
SUMMARY
1. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION AND TO THE ELECTORAL LAW ARE INTENDED TO IMPLEMENT THE PROPOSALS FOR REFORM PUT FORWARD BY GORBACHEV IN JUNE. THEY ARE A GENUINE STEP TOWARDS BETTER DEMOCRATIC CONTROL. BUT THEY ARE FULL OF LOOPHOLES.
DETAIL
2. THE DRAFT LAW ON CHANGES TO THE USSR CONSTITUTION WAS PUBLISHED ON 22 OCTOBER. IT SETS OUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES NECESSARY FOR IMPLEMENTING THE POLITICAL REFORMS PROPOSED BY GORBACHEV AT THE 19TH PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE. AS FORESHADOWED IN GORBACHEV'S SPEECH AND IN THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE, THE NEW STRUCTURE WILL COMPRISE A CONGRESS OF PEOPLES DEPUTIES WITH 2,250 MEMBERS, TWO-THIRDS ELECTED DIRECTLY AND ONE-THIRD ELECTED FROM PUBLIC ORGANISATIONS. THIS CONGRESS WOULD IN TURN ELECT FROM ITS MEMBERSHIP THE TWO CHAMBERS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET - A COUNCIL OF THE UNION AND A COUNCIL OF NATIONALITIES, EACH HAVING JUST OVER 200 SEATS. THE DRAFT LEGISLATION DEFINES THE COMPETENCE OF THESE BODIES, AND ALSO OF THE PRESIDIUM AND THE NEW PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME SOVIET. A DRAFT LAW ON THE ELECTION OF PEOPLES DEPUTIES WAS PUBLISHED ON 23 OCTOBER. THIS EXPANDS BUT APPEARS TO ADD LITTLE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
3. THE FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGE FROM A FIRST READING OF THE DRAFT LEGISLATION:
(A) THE SUPREME SOVIET WILL SIT FOR TWO SESSIONS OF BETWEEN THREE AND FOUR MONTHS EACH YEAR. THE SUPREME SOVIET IS ALSO VESTED WITH MANY FUNCTIONS WHICH PREVIOUSLY FELL TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET.
(B) THE NEW SUPREME SOVIET WILL HAVE A GREATER ROLE IN THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IT WILL HAVE THE FORMAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SETTING UP THE DEFENCE COUNCIL WHICH WILL BE CHAIRED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME SOVIET. IT WILL ALSO DECIDE ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES, ALTHOUGH THIS RIGHT WILL

DEVOLVE TO THE PRESIDIUM WHEN THE SUPREME SOVIET ITSELF IS NOT IN SESSION.

(C) THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET WILL CONSIST OF THE PRESIDENT AND FIRST DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME SOVIET, THE PRESIDENTS OF THE REPUBLICAN SUPREME SOVIET, AND OTHER EX-OFFICIO PARLIAMENTARY FIGURES. IT WILL ISSUE DECREES AND RESOLUTIONS AND FORMALLY APPOINT SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS AND DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS.

(D) THERE WILL BE A NEW COMMITTEE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPERVISION, RESPONSIBLE ONLY TO THE CONSTITUTION. ITS MEMBERSHIP WILL BE ELECTED BY THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLES DEPUTIES FROM SPECIALISTS IN THE FIELDS OF POLITICS AND LAW. ITS MEMBERS MAY NOT BE DEPUTIES OF THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLES DEPUTIES.

(E) UP TO ONE-FIFTH OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SUPREME SOVIET MAY BE CHANGED EACH YEAR. THE REPLACEMENTS WILL BE DRAWN FROM THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLES DEPUTIES BUT THE MECHANISM OF SELECTION IS NOT SPELLED OUT.

(F) THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AT REPUBLICAN LEVEL WILL MIRROR THAT AT UNION LEVEL. THE RIGHTS OF REPUBLICAN PARLIAMENTS IN RELATION TO THE CENTRE AND TO OTHER REPUBLICAN AND SUPREME SOVIETS REMAIN UNCHANGED.

4. THE DRAFT LEGISLATION IS NOW OPEN FOR ''PUBLIC DISCUSSION.'' THIS IS MEANT TO CONCLUDE BY 25 NOVEMBER. THE PROPOOSALS WILL THEN GO FOR RATIFICATION BY THE NEXT SESSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET IN NOVEMBER, THUS MAKING IT POSSIBLE TO HOLD NEW ELECTIONS IN MARCH AS PLANNED. THIS IS A TIGHT TIMETABLE AND COULD SLIP.

COMMENT

5. THE PROPOSED CHANGES SPELL OUT MUCH MORE CLEARLY THAN BEFORE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET AND ITS ATTENDANT BODIES. THEY ARE DESIGNED TO CHANGE THE SUPREME SOVIET FROM A RUBBER STAMP INTO A BODY HOLDING GENUINE LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS, AND WITH SOME REAL POWERS OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL. THE LIMITATIONS ON THE LENGTH OF TIME FOR WHICH OFFICES MAY BE HELD, AND THE PROVISIONS FOR RENEWAL, ARE MEANT TO ENSURE THAT THE GERONTOCRATS CANNOT RETURN. THE FORMAL CONTROL OVER THE DEPLOYMENT ABROAD OF SOVIET TROOPS LOOKS A BIT LIKE THE UNITED STATES WAR POWERS ACT.

6. THE PROPOSALS THUS REPRESENT A REAL STEP FORWARD, BUT THEY DO NOT AMOUNT TO A SET OF CAST IRON DEMOCRATIC GUARANTEES. THE PRESIDENT WILL, UNDER THE NEW SYSTEM, STILL HAVE THE POWER TO ACT WITHOUT THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE SUPREME SOVIET. THE COMPOSITION AND POWERS OF THE DEFENCE COUNCIL ARE SET OUT NO MORE CLEARLY THAN IN THE PAST. THERE IS PERHAPS NOT SURPRISINGLY) NO REFERENCE TO THE PARTY'S MONOPOLY OF POLITICAL POWER, NOR OF WAYS IN WHICH THIS MIGHT BE MODERATED.

7. IN SHORT, THIS IS PROGRESS. BUT THE PROOF WILL BE VERY MUCH IN THE EATING. CYNICAL RUSSIANS WILL REMEMBER THAT STALIN'S 1936

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

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PART ONE OF TWO PARTS
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 20 OCTOBER: BRIEFING BY DEPUTY SECRETARY WHITEHEAD ON VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE

SUMMARY
1. UPBEAT ASSESSMENT FROM WHITEHEAD ON PROSPECTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. SUPPORT FROM FRG AND OTHERS. UK AND FRANCE VOICE CAUTION. BUT GENERAL AGREEMENT ON POLICIES WEST SHOULD BE PURSUING.

DETAIL
2. WHITEHEAD (U S DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE) BEGAN BY STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO ALLIED CONSULTATION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA. THIS HAD BEEN HIS SIXTH AND PROBABLY LAST TRIP TO EASTERN EUROPE. HE HAD RETURN CONVINCED THAT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS WERE ALIVE AND WELL. THE PROSPECTS FOR POSITIVE CHANGE AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE WEST TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WERE BETTER THAN EVER. THE MORE COMPATIBLE THE APPROACHES OF INDIVIDUAL ALLIES, THE MORE EFFECTIVE THE WEST'S OVERALL APPROACH WOULD BE. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO THE NATO REPORT ON EASTERN EUROPE. CURRENTLY UNDER PREPARATION FOR THE DECEMBER NAC MINISTERIAL.

ROMANIA
3. CEAUSESCU CONTINUED TO DOMINATE THE SCENE AND SHOWED NO SIGN OF LOSING HIS GRIP. BILATERAL RELATIONS HAD COOLED. ROMANIA'S RECENT RENUNCIATION OF MFN STATUS HAD PROBABLY BEEN DESIGNED TO AVOID HAVING THE COUNTRY'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD HELD UP TO PUBLIC SCRUTINY AS WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED UNDER U S LAW. BUT THE U S REMAINED COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING BILATERAL RELATIONS IN SPITE, RATHER THAN BECAUSE, OF CEAUSESCU. THE ROMANIANS WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN KEEPING DIALOGUE GOING. WHITEHEAD SAID HE HAD SEEN SYSTEMATISATION AT FIRST HAND: A SHOCKING SPECTACLE, WITH WHOLE VILLAGES BEING PLOUGHED UNDER. HE HAD URGED THAT IT BE STOPPED. ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL THE ROMANIANS HAD BEEN PREDICTABLE, FOR EXAMPLE STOPPING PRIVATE CITIZENS FROM JOINING WHITEHEAD FOR A LUNCH. THEY HAD CLAIMED THAT WHEN ALL FOREIGN DEBTS HAD BEEN REPAID (POSSIBLY TWO YEARS HENCE)

STANDARDS OF LIVING WOULD RISE. THEY HAD HINTED AT POSSIBLE FLEXIBILITY AT THE CSCE.

GDR

4. BILATEAL RELATIONS HAD SLIGHTLY IMPROVED BUT STILL LACKED SUBSTANCE. HONECKER HAD BEEN KEEN TO KEEP THE EXCHANGES TO INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, BUT WHITEHEAD HAD HAD A THOROUGH EXCHANGE WITH OTHER GDR FIGURES ON KEY BILATERAL ISSUES, INCLUDING FINANCIAL CLAIMS. HE HAD ALSO SPOKEN OUT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE BERLIN WALL. THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE NEW IN THE GDR RESPONSE, BUT THE EAST GERMANS CLEARLY WANTED TO CONTINUE TALKING AND TO BE ACCEPTED AS AN IMPORTANT PLAYER AS EAST/WEST RELATIONS IMPROVED. THE LEADERSHIP WERE CLEARLY WRESTLING WITH THE PROBLEMS OF REFORM AND CONTROL, WITH THE LATTER CONTINUING TO ENJOY PRIORITY. YOUNGER PARTY MEMBERS WERE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH, BUT HONECKER REMAINED FIRMLY IN CHARGE.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

5. JAKES HAD EMPHASISED THAT RECENT PERSONNEL CHANGES WOULD BENEFIT REFORM. LIKE THE EAST GERMANS, THE CZECHS WERE ALSO KEEN NOT TO BE LEFT BEHIND AS EAST/WEST RELATIONS IMPROVED. THEY WANTED BETTER RELATIONS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES, BUT CLEARLY PREFERRED TO TALK ABOUT REFORM RATHER THAN TAKE ACTION. CHARTER 77 AND SIMILAR GROUPS WERE SHOWING MORE COURAGE AND ACTIVITY. THEY HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED CONTACT WITH PROMINENT WESTERN VISITORS.

BULGARIA

6. WHITEHEAD SAID HIS LATEST VISIT HAD CONFIRMED HIS EARLIER JUDGMENT THAT BULGARIA OFFERED POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN REFORM. ZHIVKOV WAS FIRMLY IN CONTROL BUT HAD CLEARLY GIVEN HIS ECONOMIC MANAGERS AND PLANNERS A MANDATE FOR VERY SUBSTANTIAL REFORMS TO DEREGULATE THE ECONOMY AND OPEN IT UP TO WORLD MARKETS. THE BULGARIANS HAD EMPHASISED THEIR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN POPULAR SUPPORT FOR REFORMS AND AVOID TURBULENCE BY KEEPING GNP GROWTH AND INFLATION LOW AND CONSUMPTION UP. WHITEHEAD HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH THE NEW FREEDOM IN ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING ACCORDED AT VERY LOW LEVELS, AND WITH NEW ECONOMIC MEASURES SCHEDULED FOR INTRODUCTION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1989. BUT THERE WAS STILL NO POLITICAL PROGRESS. THE AUTHORITIES HAD SAID HE WOULD BE FREE TO MEET DISSIDENTS BUT NONE OF THOSE INVITED HAD TURNED UP. HE HAD PUT THE USUAL U S CASE ON TURKISH MINORITIES.

HUNGARY

7. THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP WAS COMMITTED TO ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

REFORM. GROSZ, BERECZ AND POSZGAY HAD ALL TALKED FRANKLY OF THEIR DIFFERENCE OVER THE PACE OF REFORM AND WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO KEEP THE PARTY IN CONTROL OF THE PROCESS. BUT THEY WERE UNANIMOUSLY IN FAVOUR OF REFORM, AND HAD BEEN SPECIFIC ON THE DETAILS. GROSZ HAD CLAIMED THAT HALF HIS SUPPORTERS ACCUSED HIM OF SELLING OUT THE PARTY, THE OTHER HALF OF SELLING OUT REFORM: HE WOULD CONTINUE ON A SENSIBLE MIDDLE COURSE. ON FOREIGN POLICY, WHITEHEAD HAD TOLD THE HUNGARIANS THAT THE U S WAS IMPRESSED BY THEIR PROGRESS IN RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA AND ISRAEL AND THEIR POSSIBLE ROLE IN A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN THE GULF. THE HUNGARIANS HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE EAGER TO HAVE BOTH SOVIET AND HUNGARIAN TROOP REDUCTIONS INCLUDED IN THE FIRST RESULTS OF THE CST TALKS.

POLAND

8. WHITEHEAD SAID THE POLES WERE ON THE BRINK OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, BUT THERE WAS STILL SUSPICION AND MANOEUVRING. ALL WERE JOCKEYING FOR POSITION IN THE RUN UP TO THE ROUND TABLE. JARUZELSKI HAD BEEN LESS BITTER AND MORE RELAXED THAN ON PREVIOUS VISITS, BUT NO LESS IN CHARGE. THE POLISH AUTHORITIES HAD PLACED NO OBSTACLES TO WHITEHEAD'S MEETINGS WITH WALESA: HE HAD BEEN IN GOOD SPIRITS, APPEARING YOUNGER AND MORE SELF-CONFIDENT THAN BEFORE. HE WAS CLEARLY UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE FROM THE YOUNGER AND MORE MILITANT SOLIDARITY MEMBERS, BUT WAS COPING WELL. WHITEHEAD HAD URGED ALL THE MAIN PLAYERS TO WORK TOWARDS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM AND ANNOUNCED SOME SMALL ECONOMIC MEASURES AS CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF U S SUPPORT FOR THIS. BUT THERE REMAINED MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AND PROGRESS AT THE ROUND TABLE WAS LIKELY TO BE ERREATIC. THE PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC REFORM WERE ALSO CLOUDY. NEVERTHELESS THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE WERE VERY GREAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO GUARANTEE OF SUCCESS. ALL CONCERNED NEEDED TO EXERCISE CAUTION AND FIRMNESS.

GENERAL

9. WHITEHEAD SAID HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH ALL THE COUNTRIES HE HAD VISITED CONSIDERED THEMSELVES TO BE PART OF EUROPE AND WANTED EVEN CLOSER ASSOCIATIONS WITH THE WEST. REFORMS WERE BRINGING OUT THEIR DIFFERENT IDENTITIES MORE CLEARLY. THE ADVENT OF GORBACHEV MEANT GREATER SCOPE FOR CHANGE. THE FAILURE OF THE STALINIST SYSTEM WAS CLEAR. SOME FIGURES (CEAUSESCU, JAKES, BILAK) DENIED THIS, BUT THEY WERE ON THE WAY OUT. THE NEW GENERATION WAS TRYING TO WORK THE PROBLEM. ALL THE LEADERSHIPS WERE WILLING TO GIVE A LITTLE TO AVOID BEING LEFT BEHIND AS EAST/WEST RELATIONS PICKED UP. EACH WAS SHOWING A DEGREE OF GREATER TOLERANCE TOWARDS INDEPENDENT VIEWS. THERE WAS A DIMINISHED FEELING OF A POTENTIAL

RISK OF EXPLOSION. WHILE NO-ONE RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET INTERVENTION, FOR NOW THE RUSSIANS DID NOT WANT TO DEFINE THEIR BOTTOM LINE. RECENT CHANGES IN THE KREMLIN, STRENGTHENING GORBACHEV, HAD PUT OFF THE DAY OF A FINAL DEFINITION STILL FURTHER.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

10. WHITEHEAD SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT ALL THE ALLIES HAD SPECIFIC INTERESTS IN EACH EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY. BUT THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO THINK COLLECTIVELY ABOUT HOW BEST TO APPRAOCH THE ISSUES. IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE, INDIGENOUS ECONOMIC REFORM ALONE WOULD NOT SOLVE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PROBLEMS: THE WEST SHOULD CONSIDER EXPANDING ECONOMIC RELATIONS, NOT JUST IN THE FIELD OF TRADE AND CREDIT BUT ALSO BY ENCOURAGING DIRECT WESTERN INVESMENT. ECONOMIC REFORM WAS A POWERFUL STIMULANT TO POLITICAL CHANGE. THE WEST SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP EXCHANGES IN ALL SPHERES. THE U S WAS NOT RUNNING AFTER THE EASTERN EUROPEANS, NOR PRESSURIZING THEM. BUT HE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT WHILE THE U S WANTED BETTER RELATIONS IT WOULD HELP A GREAT DEAL TO HAVE PROGRESS ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM AND HUMAN RIGHTS. WHITEHEAD HAD STRESSED THAT THIS APPROACH ENJOYED BROAD BIPARTISAN SUPPORT IN THE U S AND WAS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE, WHOEVER WON THE FORTHCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. WHITEHEAD CONCLUDED THAT HE WAS MORE CONVINCED THAN EVER THAN EVER THAT THE EAST EUROPEANS WERE ON THE RIGHT TRACK AND THAT WESTERN VALUES AND INTERESTS COINCIDED WITH CURRENT EASTERN AIMS.

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PART ONE OF TWO

INFORMAL MEETING OF EC FOREIGN MINISTERS, YANNINA, 15-16 OCTOBER
EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND CSCE
SUMMARY

1. BROAD AGREEMENT ON ENORMITY OF TASK FACING GORBACHEV, LONG TIME-SCALE FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE, AND UNCERTAINTY OF SUCCESS. AGREEMENT ON NEED TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN GETTING DEBATE ON EG 'COMMON EUROPEAN HOME' ON WESTERN, NOT EASTERN, TERMS.

2. UK AND PORTUGAL MAKE CLEAR CONTINUING GRAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT PROPOSED MOSCOW HUMANITARIAN CONFERENCE. ALL OTHERS PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO AGREE TO CONFERENCE. MOST ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO SECURING (AND THE RUSSIANS OBSERVING) SATISFACTORY CONDITIONS. NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM AND DENMARK ARGUE THAT WE SHOULD NEGOTIATE TOUGHLY AND EXACT A HIGH PRICE.

3. POLITICAL DIRECTORS TO PREPARE A PAPER ON OUTSTANDING CSCE ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION AMONG THE TWELVE WITH A VIEW EVENTUALLY TO REACHING AN AGREED POSITION AMONG THE SIXTEEN. ALSO TO CONSIDER PREPARING A PAPER SUGGESTING WIDER SET OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO EAST/WEST RELATIONS GENERALLY.

DETAIL

4. TINDEMANS, INTRODUCING THE BELGIAN PAPER, SAID WE WERE NO LONGER IN AN AGE OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT, BUT OF MANAGING CHANGE. THE BALANCE OF ECONOMIC POWER WAS SHIFTING (US DECLINING RELATIVELY, NICS RISING). SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY WAS BECOMING LESS MILITARISTIC AND MORE DIPLOMATIC. SUCCESSFUL PERESTROIKA WAS IN OUR INTERESTS, BUT IT WOULD THROW UP NEW PROBLEMS. THE TWELVE NEEDED A DYNAMIC POLICY TO EXPLOIT THESE OPPORTUNITIES, AND TO PROMOTE CHANGE FOR THE BETTER IN THE EAST. WE SHOULD SET OUT OUR OBJECTIVES FOR AN EARLY CONCLUSION OF THE VIENNA CSCE CONFERENCE, OFFER SOME ENCOURAGING CONCLUSIONS AT RHODES AND, ABOVE ALL, EVOLVE A COMMON SET OF PRINCIPLES FOR ALL THE TWELVE TO APPLY. WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER A JOINT DECLARATION AT THE END OF THE VIENNA MEETING.

5. DUMAS AGREED: NOW WAS A GOOD TIME TO HAMMER OUT A COMMON POSITION. THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION WOULD TAKE 6-8 MONTHS TO SHAKE DOWN FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. THIS INTERVAL WOLD GIVE EUROPE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE HEADWAY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN PARIS, SHEVARDNADZE HAD EMPHASISED THE SCOPE FOR GREATER ECONOMIC COOPERATION. THE RUSSIANS ALSO WANTED TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY ON DISARMAMENT, REGIONAL QUESTIONS AND CSCE. THEY INSISTED ON A MOSCOW HUMANITARIAN CONFERENCE. WHEN MITTERRAND HAD SAID THE FRENCH COULD ACCEPT THIS, THERE HAD BEEN A VISIBLE RELAXATION OF TENSION. THE TWELVE NEEDED A COMMON POSITION ON ALL THESE ISSUES: A SHORT-TERM POLICY WHICH RESPONDED TO THE LONG-TERM PROSPECTS, AND REAFFIRMED THE TWELVE'S COLLECTIVE IDENTITY.

6. ANDREOTTI SAID HIS MOSCOW VISIT HAD SHOWN A GOOD DEAL OF CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS, EG ON REGIONAL ISSUES. ON ARMS CONTROL, GORBACHEV HAD PRESSED FOR EARLY PROGRESS ON CST, BUT HAD ARGUED THAT A DEAL ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES COULD NOT BE REACHED IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT ON CW. ON A MOSCOW CONFERENCE, THE RUSSIANS GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO ORGANISE ONE ON ALL THE RIGHT TERMS. BUT SAKHAROV HAD BEEN UNABLE TO SAY IF HE COULD LEAVE THE USSR TO PRESS HIS CASE. SAKHAROV BELIEVED THAT THE NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE WHICH GORBACHEV WAS SEEKING THROUGH THE 'COMMON HOME' MUST NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF EUROPE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US: THAT WOULD BE DANGEROUS. ANDREOTTI ADDED THAT, WITH A CHANGE OF US PRESIDENT, EAST/WEST RELATIONS WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR A WHILE. IT WAS NOT THEREFORE A GOOD TIME FOR A RETHINK. BUT AN IDEA LIKE MITTERRAND'S PROPOSAL THAT THE USSR MIGHT JOIN IN A EUREKA PROJECT MIGHT HAVE SOME VALUE AS A GESTURE.

7. GENSCHER SAID IT WAS GOOD THAT BOTH THE FRENCH AND GERMANS WERE VISITING MOSCOW: IT SHOWED THAT NO SINGLE STATE WAS IN THIS ALONE. WE WERE ALL IN IT TOGETHER. HE ENDORSED TINDEMANS' CALL FOR A DYNAMIC POLICY. OUTSIDERS REGARDED THE EC AS HAVING MORE COMMON ECONOMIC PURPOSE THAN SOMETIMES APPEARED FROM INSIDE. WE SHOULD ACHIEVE THE SAME EFFECT ON THE POLITICAL SIDE. THE RUSSIANS SAW EUROPE AS AN ATTRACTIVE, DYNAMIC AND MODERN PARTNER. THEY WERE CLEVER ENOUGH NOT TO TRY TO SEPARATE US FROM THE USA. WE HAD TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND POSITIVELY. ON THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE, CONDITIONS WERE OF COURSE IMPORTANT AS THEY WERE FOR THE CST. THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE HELD ON THE SAME TERMS AS THE TWO WHICH WOULD PRECEDE IT. AND THE MORE GENERAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS SET BY THE US MUST BE SATISFIED. THE WEST SHOULD THEN BE ABLE TO SAY 'YES, BUT.....' IF IN THREE YEARS TIME THE RUSSIANS FAILED TO MEET THESE CONDITIONS, THEN

THE WEST WOULD NOT (NOT) BE ABLE TO GO TO MOSCOW.

8. I THANKED TINDEMANS FOR THE VERY HELPFUL BELGIAN PAPER, WHICH RIGHTLY STRESSED THE ENORMITY OF THE TASK FACING GORBACHEV, AND THE VERY LONG TIME SCALE WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED TO BRING ABOUT IRREVERSIBLE CHANGE. THERE WAS MUCH COMMON GROUND AMONG THE TWELVE ON HOW TO RESPOND TO GORBACHEV. BUT WE DID DIFFER TO SOME EXTENT OVER HOW FAR WE COULD 'HELP' HIM. THE UK BELIEVED WESTERN INTERESTS - AND GORBACHEV'S OWN - WERE BEST SERVED BY OUR STANDING FIRM AND UNITED ON THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR POSITION. THE FACT WAS THAT WHILE THE RUSSIANS TALKED ABOUT THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOME, THEIR MAIN PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION TO IT WAS THE BERLIN WALL. IT WAS THE EC WHICH FOR 30 YEARS HAD ACTUALLY BEEN TRYING TO BUILD A EUROPEAN HOME BASED ON REAL COOPERATION AND SHARED VALUES.

9. GORBACHEV'S INTERNAL OBJECTIVES REQUIRED A STABLE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT. BUT, FOR ALL SHEVARDNADZE'S PROCLAMATION OF NEW THINKING, SOVIET MILITARY POWER STILL CAST ITS SHADOW OVER EUROPE. GORBACHEV HAD TO MOVE TOWARDS US, NOT VICE VERSA. WE HAD TO POINT THE WAY AND SET THE PACE. IT WAS PERFECTLY POSSIBLE TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH GORBACHEV WHILE STILL BEING FIRM WITH HIM. THE SCOPE FOR DIRECTLY 'HELPING' PERESTROIKA WAS LIMITED. BUT WE SHOULD EXPLOIT THE SOVIET DESIRE TO LEARN FROM WESTERN SUCCESS BY EXPOSING THEM TO FREE MARKETS, MANAGEMENT SKILLS, JOINT VENTURES ETC. WE SHOULD STICK TO OUR ESTABLISHED WESTERN AGENDA ON ARMS CONTROL, TRADE RELATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS ETC, AND PUT SHEVARDNADZE'S PRESENTATION OF NEW THINKING TO THE TEST IN PRACTICE.

10. AS FOR THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE, THE UK REMAINED DEEPLY SCEPTICAL. RECENT IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET PERFORMANCE, AND THE CONCESSIONS WE HAD EXTRACTED IN VIENNA, COULD NOT HIDE THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION STILL FELL FAR BEHIND ACCEPTABLE STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOUR. THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE PROPOSAL HAD EFFECTIVELY DROPPED OFF THEIR AGENDA FOR MONTHS. NOW AS THE END APPROACHED THEY WERE PILING ON THE PRESSURE ONCE MORE - A TRADITIONAL SOVIET NEGOTIATING TACTIC TO AVOID UNWELCOME CONCESSIONS. SOME PARTNERS FAVOURED AGREEING TO A MOSCOW CONFERENCE. WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD THEY WANT TO IMPOSE TO ENSURE THAT SUCH A CONFERENCE WAS NOT RUN ON SOVIET TERMS? HOW WOULD THEY EXTRACT THESE? WHAT WOULD THEY DO IF SOVIET PERFORMANCE FELL SHORT?

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FINAL PART OF TWO

11. WE WERE ALSO CONCERNED TO KEEP OTHER FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES WITHIN REASONABLE BOUNDS, AND FOCUS THEM ON CENTRAL ISSUES OF REAL IMPORTANCE WHERE THERE WAS SOME PROSPECT OF A MEETING OF MINDS. WE THEREFORE SAW LITTLE POINT IN THE PROPOSED MEETING ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, OR THE PROPOSED SCIENTIFIC FORUM.

12. VAN DEN BROEK SAID THAT HIS VIEW ON THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE WAS 'YES, BUT.....' HE FOLLOWED THE UK'S REASONING. BUT SURELY WE COULD CAPITALISE MORE ON OUR CONCERN ABOUT MOSCOW TO EXTRACT FURTHER CONCESSIONS FROM THE RUSSIANS? WE STILL HAD MAJOR OBJECTIVES TO SECURE IN OTHER BASKETS, AND SHOULD BARGAIN HARD FOR THEM. WE SHOULD ALSO IMPOSE OUR WELL-KNOWN CONDITIONS. IT WAS RIGHT TO BE SCEPTICAL ABOUT MOSCOW, BUT WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW THIS TO BLOCK PROGRESS. NOR SHOULD WE BE TOO AFRAID OF A CONFERENCE - WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT IT FOR OUR OWN PURPOSES.

13. ON THE BROADER ISSUE OF REFORM IN THE USSR, VAN DEN BROEK AGREED THAT THE TIMESCALE WAS HUGE, AND PROGRESS ALL TOO REVERSIBLE. INTERNAL OPPOSITION AND NATIONALITIES PROBLEMS MIGHT KNOCK GORBACHEV OFF COURSE. BUT OUR WORKING HYPOTHESIS SHOULD BE THAT HE MIGHT WELL SUCCEED. IT WAS NOT CLEAR THAT HE HIMSELF KNEW WHAT HE MEANT BY THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOME. COULD WE DEVELOP A FORMULA THAT PROMOTED OUR VISION OF THIS, BUT WHICH NEVERTHELESS RESPECTED THE USSR'S SECURITY CONCERNS?

14. FERNANDEZ ORDONEZ SAID THAT WHILE TWO YEARS AGO WE WERE ASKING IF GORBACHEV WAS SERIOUS, TODAY WE WERE ASKING IF HE COULD SUCCEED. WE CERTAINLY WANTED HIM TO. BUT THE RISK WAS THAT NATIONALITIES PROBLEMS WOULD PUSH HIM TO SETTLE FOR STABILITY RATHER THAN CHANGE. A CLEAR EUROPEAN POSITION WAS NEEDED. PERHAPS THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE COULD DRAW UP A LIST OF OBJECTIVES, WHILE COREPER STUDIED GUIDELINES FOR COMMON POLICIES IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE. WE WANTED A COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE - NOT

A COMMON EUROPEAN DACHA.

15. BARROSO SAID PORTUGAL REMAINED PROFOUNDLY SCEPTICAL ABOUT A MOSCOW CONFERENCE. SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE STILL FELL A LONG WAY SHORT OF WHAT WE WANTED. WE SHOULD NOT BE ASKING 'WHY NOT A CONFERENCE?' THE QUESTION SHOULD BE 'WHY A CONFERENCE?' A SERIOUS CONFERENCE OF REAL WORTH WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO STIR UP TROUBLE FOR GORBACHEV THAN TO HELP HIM.

16. POOS SAID OUR INTERESTS LAY IN SUPPORTING GORBACHEV: WE SHOULD NOT THEREFORE BE FRIGID TOWARDS HIM. WE HAD INVENTED HUMAN RIGHTS, AND WE COULD AFFORD TO BE FORTHCOMING ON THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE.

17. ELLEMAN-JENSEN AGREED WITH VAN DEN BROEK THAT WE HAD NOT YET CASHED IN OUR FULL BARGAINING POWER. WE SHOULD LET THE TWO EARLIER CONFERENCES SET THE PATTERN FOR MOSCOW. THERE WERE ADVANTAGES AS WELL AS RISKS. BUT WE HAD TO BE SURE THAT WE DEFINED CLEAR CONDITIONS AND GOT THEM FULFILLED.

18. MURPHY SAID IN THE END-GAME IRELAND COULD GO ALONG WITH A MOSCOW CONFERENCE. THE EFFECT WOULD NOT BE TO ENDORSE THE SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, BUT TO EXPOSE IT. TINDEMANS SAID THAT WE COULD AND SHOULD BE TOUGH AND DEMAND A HIGH PRICE FOR A CONFERENCE. ANDREOTTI COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BILATERAL DEALINGS WITH THE USSR AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE TWELVE. THE UK'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RUSSIANS WAS IN FACT VERY DIFFICULT AND VERY SPECIAL. THE TWELVE SHOULD NOT BEHAVE LIKE A FIRM OF SOLICITORS: WE SHOULD BE TRYING TO COME UP WITH AN INITIATIVE.

19. PAPOULIAS' INITIAL SUMMING UP MET WITH A NUMBER OF OBJECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS. IN THE END AGREEMENT APPEARED TO BE REACHED THAT:

- ON THE BASIS OF A VERY HELPFUL BELGIAN PAPER AND REPORTS BY COLLEAGUES ON RECENT CONTACTS WITH THE RUSSIANS, THERE HAD BEEN A FULL AND INTERESTING DISCUSSION OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS
- IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO INVITE THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A) TO PREPARE A PAPER ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES AT VIENNA FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NEXT MEETING WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AN AGREED WESTERN POSITION AND (B) TO CONSIDER THE PREPARATION OF A PAPER SUGGESTING A WIDER SET OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO E/W RELATIONS GENERALLY
- THE COMMISSION WOULD ALSO PRODUCE A SHORT PAPER ON THE FUTURE FRAMEWORK FOR THE COMMUNITY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CMEA COUNTRIES.

20. THE PRESIDENCY'S VERSION OF THE CONCLUSIONS (WHICH WE HAVE YET TO RECEIVE) MAY AMEND OR SUPPLEMENT THOSE ABOVE.

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


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OUR TELNOS 1700-1702: VISIT OF ITALIAN PRIME MINSTER

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SUMMARY

1. DE MITA VISITED THE SOVIET UNION ON 13-16 OCTOBER AND WAS GIVEN A BUSY PROGRAMME. A FULL DAY OF TALKS, A DAY OF TRADE AND CULTURE EVENTS AND A VISIT TO LENINGRAD. THE RUSSIANS LAY ON THE CHARM.

DETAIL

2. CHIRIACO DE MITA, THE ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER, VISITED THE SOVIET UNION ON 13-16 OCTOBER. ON 14 OCTOBER HE HAD TWO HOURS OF TALKS WITH GORBACHEV, JOINED LATTERLY BY ANDREOTTI AND SHEVARDNADZE. A PLENARY SESSION FOLLOWED, INVOLVING THE NUMEROUS MINISTERIAL TEAM, WHICH CONCENTRATED ON TRADE, ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION. DOCUMENTS WERE SIGNED ON SPACE RESEARCH, A LINE OF CREDIT AND A JOINT VENTURE. THERE FOLLOWED A KREMLIN BANQUET TO WHICH SOME OF THE 2,000 BUSINESSMEN TRAVELLING WITH DE MITA WERE INVITED.

3. ON 15 OCTOBER, DE MITA AND GORBACHEV JOINTLY OPENED THE EXHIBITION 'ITALY - 2000', THE ORIGINAL REASON FOR HIS VISIT. THE TWO LEADERS THEN TOURED THE ARENA STOPPINNG AT THE STANDS OF MAIN GROUP, (A JV PARTICIPANT) AND FIAT, WHERE THEY MET G AGNELLI. AFTER A NIGHT OF ITALIAN CULTURE AT THE BOLSHOI, THE GORBACHEVS GAVE A SUPPER AT THEIR DACHA. ON SUNDAY 16 OCTOBER THE ITALIANS WERE GIVEN A SHORT TOUR OF THE KREMLIN BEFORE THE FAREWELL CEREMONY. THEY LEFT FOR HOME AFTER A DAY'S SIGHT-SEEING IN LENINGRAD.

THE TALKS

4. OUR TURS CONTAIN THE BRIEFING GIVEN TO THE TWELVE BY BOTTAI. DE MITA TOLD THE PRESS THAT HE HAD FOUND GORBACHEV 'EVEN MORE IMPRESSIVE' THAT EXPECTED. ACCORDING TO TASS THE DISCUSSION RANGED WIDELY OVER INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND WAS MARKED BY FRANKNESS AND A DESIRE TO GET TO THE HEART OF THE ISSUES GORBACHEV SAID THAT PERESTROIKAAND NEW THINKING HAD CHANGED THE PURPOSE OF FOREIGN POLICY, INSTEAD OF THE AVOIDANCE OF WAR (WHICH LED TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION) IT WAS NOW THE BUILDING OF PEACE. COMPETITION BETWEEN STATES MEANT COMPARISONS IN THE COURSE OF WHICH EACH SIDE COULD LEARN AND BENEFIT. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE RAPID GROWTH ALONE: IN PARTNERSHIP IT WAS EASIER TO OVERCOME OBSTACLES.

5. IN A STRANGE COMMENT ON PERESTROIKA, GORBACHEV SAID ''IT IS OF COURSE A SUBJECTIVE JUDGEMENT, BUT THE QUESTION OF WHO LEADS THE COUNTRY HAS SOME IMPORTANCE.'' BUT THE CRUCIAL FACT WAS THAT THE POLICY HAD BEEN ADOPTED BY THE PEOPLE AND THE REST OF THE WORLD SHOULD ADJUST THEIR POLICIES ACCORDINGLY.

6. IN THE PLENARY SESSION, MOST ATTENTION WAS DEVOTED TO THE STATE OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ITALY IS THE SOVIET UNION'S THIRD LARGEST WESTERN PARTNER, AND HAS BEEN AN EARLY PARTICIPANT IN JOINT VENTURES. THE RUSSIANS MADE A VEILED COMPLAINT ABOUT COCOM. IN DISCUSSING SPACE RESEARCH, THE RUSSIANS SUGGESTED THE ITALIANS PARTICIPATE IN A MANNED FLIGHT. THOUGH THERE WAS TALK OF STRENGTHENING CULTURAL LINKS, IMPROVING LANGUAGE TEACHING ETC, THIS WAS PLACED IN A LONG-TERM CONTEXT.

7. GORBACHEV APPARENTLY TALKED ABOUT THE SOVIET-ITALIAN COOPERATION IN THIRD COUNTRIES. ANDREOTTI HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED THAT A PAN-EUROPEAN DIMENSION MIGHT BE ADDED TO THE NORTH-SOUTH PROCESS. THIS PROVOKED A REJOINDER FROM GORBACHEV THAT DIALOGUE HAD TO BE GENUINE. IT WAS NOT ENOUGHT FOR THE SUMMIT SEVEN TO TAKE DECISIONS ON EG THIRD WORLD DEBT AND THEN EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO FALL INTO LINE.

8. THE TASS ACCOUNT ALSO HAS GORBACHEV SAYING IT WAS TIME TO THINK ABOUT DEVELOPING CONTACTS 'ON THE MILITARY LINE', WHICH COULD BE BENEFICIAL IN TERMS OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING. BOTTAI'S BRIEFING SUGGESTED THIS WAS NOT RAISED IN TERMS.

ITALY 2000

9. AFTER OPENING THE EXHIBITION, DE MTA MADE A SPEECH IN WHICH HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT 'LOOKED WITH INTEREST AND GOODWILL ON THE SOVIET UNION'S ATTEMPT TO ACCEDE TO THE GATT, AND ITS DESIRE FOR BROADER INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION'. HE ALSO CALLED FOR GREATER ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, IN A BRIEF REPLY, RYZHKOV PRAISED EXISTING ITALIAN-SOVIET COOPERATION.

COMMENT

10. DE MITA ORIGINALLY INTENDED A VISIT SIMPLY TO OPEN ITALY 2000. THE RUSSIANS SUGGESTED THAT IT BE RAISED FIRST TO A WORKING VISIT AND THEN TO AN OFFICIAL ONE. THEY PUSHED THE BOAT OUT FOR DE MITA. GORBACHEV GAVE HIM A GOOD DEAL OF TIME, INCLUDING THEIR JOINT TOUR OF ITALY-2000. PRESS COMMENTATORS HAVE PUT THIS IN THE CONTEXT OF THICKENING TIES WITH THE WESTERN WING OF THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE. THE CHARM OFFENSIVE IS WELL UNDER WAY.

MARSHALL

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HD/DEFENCE 1
PS/MRS CHALKER 1
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE 1
HD/SEC POL D 1
MR BOYD 1
MR GOULDEN 1
MR PAYNE 1

SPEECH BY PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL DE MITA TO THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

MOSCOW, 15 OCTOBER 1988

EAST-WEST RELATIONS: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS

Academicians, dignitaries, ladies and gentlemen

I am particularly pleased, in this prestigious seat of world culture, to be able to describe the point of view on a number of major international problems of a Western people and government who are your friends in this period of great expectation and transformation animating your country.

We live in a period of profound change. In less than 50 years the world has become enriched with independent and sovereign states. But global interdependence has also been accentuated.

We have opened the way for the conquest of space and begun the nuclear era. But great problems have also arisen with regard to the earth, the environment and to ecological balances.

The wealth and well-being of a growing part of humanity have significantly increased. But the anguish of under-development and poverty has become more acute.

A dense network of communications has extended throughout the world and never before have we known so much so quickly. But ideological and religious intolerance have assumed new and disturbing aggressive forms.

/Human

Human longevity has made a great leap forward, thanks to medical progress. But new illnesses are spreading throughout the world, and the criminal traffic in drugs poses new threats to the health of peoples. Continual advances in technology and a new industrial and cultural revolution knock on our doors. But we know that the change also creates new problems and new suffering.

And we cannot forget that this era of ours, rich in changes and promises, has seen since the end of the second World War, the persistence of wars. Hundreds of wars and insurgencies of different types have caused millions of deaths, let alone destruction, suffering, the flight of refugees, the violation of basic human and civil rights. In the same period, between East and West, an armed and threatening equilibrium has seen alternating periods of cold war and of uneasy detente. The necessity and hope of the future is progressively to put an end to wars. For this, it will be necessary to go beyond the detente so far tried between East and West and to organise a new policy of common responsibility in the face of the great global problems of development and security.

To go from confrontation (whether or not cold) to joint responsibility is difficult and delicate. We know all the pre-conditions: a growing trust in each other and a growing cooperation towards common and clearly identified objectives. In this picture, the most delicate area, which I intend to discuss here with you, is that of Europe.

What is Europe? Numerous definitions have been attempted. From those merely geographical to those based on culture, religion, language and politics. Nobody in fact seems to have succeeded in covering all the aspects of this issue.

I believe that Europe should not so much be defined geographically as politically and strategically, as a point of reference in the international order. A Europe therefore - without frontiers: in which the great cultural traditions of each nation are harmonised - and certainly those of Italy and Russia represent two rich and irreplaceable elements.

Recently, your President and Secretary-General, Mikhail Gorbachev, picking up a definition linked to the Russian cultural tradition, has expressed the concept of Europe as a "Common House". I understand clearly and appreciate the positive and conciliatory sense in this of mutual understanding and collaboration. But in reality our "Common House" cannot be limited to the Europe of geography but must be extended to the two great states across the Atlantic, and in prospect to the whole world.

It is, I believe, in this global picture that our policies and objectives lie, and the most efficient means for reaching them. The problem arises here of knowing which choices to take in Western Europe and how they will be able to influence the final result, and be assisted or obstructed by the choices of other protagonists.

In Western Euorpe we put in motion many years ago a great process of integration aimed at overcoming the ancient and terrible divisions of the past, without loosening our bonds with the United States and at the same time with the firm intention of strengthening our relations with the USSR.

This process is moving forward, and rapidly in the economic field. We have taken the decision to achieve, before 1992, a true internal market without barriers between all the states of the European Community: we are now putting into effect those

/decisions

decisions already taken and discovering the necessity to go beyond, in the spirit of the Single European Act, thinking also of a European currency and a European central bank. Whatever possible compromises and delays there might be, we all envisage a decisive leap forward in the economic integration of the European Community.

New wealth is being created. According to a recent European Community study, the mere unification of the internal market should, after five or six years, bring about an increase of almost 5% in the gross internal product and a reduction of 6% in prices, besides creating around two million new jobs. This is an important new feat.

It is not yet clear if we will have at the same time a political Europe.

Yet this second objective is absolutely necessary. I will try to show two reasons for this:

- it is necessary to avoid economic integration becoming transformed into pure and simple protectionism; on the contrary, the European Community should play a decisive role in energising international development;
- it is necessary that the great economic power of the Community does not stand on the legs of a political dwarf.

Political Europe, the development of a European political entity on the basis of the European Community and of the other existing Western European institutions, is our necessary representative instrument: that which legitimises and justifies the great contribution which we are called to make for peace and development.

From another angle, such a political entity is also necessary to allow a better development, more balanced and richer, of East-West relations.

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These relations are destined to be intensified. And they are already growing in the fields of individual contacts, culture, trade, and economic cooperation. They are also undergoing an important acceleration in the political and security fields. In this regard, I want to underline the importance of the link at last established between the European Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). In particular, we believe that the beginning of direct relations between the European Community and the Soviet Union is an important new development, having been in preparation since 1975 when Aldo Moro signed the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference both in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers of Italy and as incumbent President of the Council of Ministers of the European Community. Since then, the Western European states have in fact believed that the European Community could and should play a major role in the development of East-West relations.

The important and inspired intuition of that time was to understand that three parallel and linked sectors existed (the three baskets of Helsinki). We must today continue to make progress concertedly in these three fields (security, economics, culture and human rights) even after the Vienna Conference has ended.

All this is positive. But we should not ignore also the uncertainties which could stop the process or even reverse its forward momentum.

We are perfectly conscious for example of the great force of attraction which the European Community exerts, particularly from the economic point of view, on other European countries. The pressure is growing for further enlargement of the Community. Growing likewise are relations between the Community and states with different economic systems.

/The

The progressive economic inter-penetration of Eastern and Western Europe is an irreversible trend. Interdependency is rapidly replacing the old barriers of self sufficiency. The ever more integrated world of communications and information is bringing together perceptions and aspirations, particularly of the young. Old frontiers which seemed to be of iron are revealed as cardboard.

A process of economic integration and reinforcement in Europe, if deprived of a political design, could create centrifugal tendencies. With the risk of large and unexpected imbalances, such as could violently reverse the process. We could find ourselves in the vicious circle which in the past triggered off the alternation between phases of detente and conflict.

From the point of view of Western Europe, a political "head" is also necessary for further progress on the road of reciprocal security and disarmament.

It is a question of going beyond the problem of reducing tanks or divisions of infantry. In fact, we are all today engaged in the grand task of re-thinking European security according to new formulae, which should be more defensive than offensive, less threatening than those of the present, more stable and verifiable.

This is the objective of the negotiations which must begin after the definition at Vienna of the mandate on conventional arms. The presence of such armed strength standing between East and West imposes on us the responsibility of taking far-sighted initiatives.

Our objective is to cultivate mutual trust. Only in this way can we also succeed in reducing our armaments. Reductions based on suspicion or fear can be easily by-passed, and moreover can only create a more dangerous and unstable situation, as with the

/mistrust

mistrust born from the lack of reduction in nuclear strategic arms which has accelerated research into new defensive systems.

The continuing oscillations between aspirations of disarmament which ignore or under-value the importance of maintaining defensive equilibrium, and the re-arming impulse that exaggerates the need to re-inforce one's own security unilaterally generate objective concerns for the future of detente and of East-West cooperation.

We must consider armaments also in their fundamental political context. Arms do not only have a military value. They are also an integral part of foreign policy and of the political balance. Disarmament therefore cannot be based only on the elimination or reduction of some categories of arms. It must offer us all a true alternative for security, better than the existing situation. It is therefore a question of defining a security policy which avoids unexpected oscillation between periods of disarmament and re-armament.

For this reason, Italy has always refuted the accusations of bellicosity and re-armament which met both the decision taken in 1979 to deploy Euro missiles and that taken by my government to accept the request from NATO to accommodate in Italy the logistic base of the F-16s which have to leave Spain.

Such choices have followed the clear logic of the maintenance of strategic balance and of NATO's defensive capability, and are aimed at avoiding situations in which unexpected deficiencies or strategic weaknesses might put a stop to the process of relaxation and arms control, initiating a new spiral of instability and re-armament. The agreement, concluded in Washington to eliminate Euro missiles in the East and the West, and the understandings which hopefully we will all reach together

/on

on conventional disarmament in Europe, confirm us in the correctness of this approach.

Disarmament therefore can only arise from stability, from security, from balance of forces. These are the necessary conditions for that political trust and that cooperation which alone can guarantee effective results over a long period.

There are many reasons to support a greater political cooperation between the Western European countries which are also members of NATO. It seems to us, for example, that such a road could lead more rapidly and effectively than others to the creation of that "political head" of Europe which Italy believes necessary.

From this point of view a greater integration within Western Europe is also useful in the context of better East-West relations, in passing from a period of still reversible relaxation to one of effective joint responsibility and security cooperation.

The development of a more integrated Western Europe is the best way to defeat those nationalistic tendencies which in the East as in the West could reflect fears of change in order to disturb the stability of the European political balance.

The objective must be to make Western Europe participate fully in the construction of the new system for the government of economic problems and of global security which is made necessary by the growth of interdependence. The world needs the wealth, technology, culture, ideas, and people of Western Europe at least as much as Europe needs the rest of the world. But such a contribution can be assured only if it is organised around a political system based on a common impulse, and therefore also integrated in some way.

Western Europe is not and cannot be a land to be conquered - nor is it a launching ground for new imperialistic ventures. It is however one of the places with a high concentration of political and economic power. We believe that this power must be administered and governed.

On these terms, it will be possible to think about more ambitious plans and more global objectives. Western Europe's important deadlines are, today, the economic unity which will register an unreversible step forward by 1992, and those of a growing political integration, which is one of the ambitions of the majority of European countries and which already today is evident through the many bilateral and multilateral ways.

In order to reach such objectives, there must be a context in the East West relationship which will facilitate the finding of a real military equilibrium with the elimination of the present lack of balance and which will therefore make possible a balanced, agreed and controlled reduction of the armed forces without denting the credibility of each countrys' defence strategies.

On this basis it will be possible to draw up what I have defined as the 'politics of coresponsibility' between East and West.

Academics, Authorities, Ladies and Gentlemen

It is now necessary to go even beyond the present recovery of economic relations. The Conference for Security and cooperation in Europe has laid down the general criteria, the political picture, that can and must make the growth of interdependence possible. A West European interlocutor, well integrated politically speaking and able to gather greater resources and effective working instruments, can supply the necessary substance for this process. But this also needs a big contribution from the Eastern area.

The example of the Marshall Plan is evocative as an international economic collaboration precedent. But one cannot mechanically reproduce an instrument or solution that has been used for other times and other situations.
If at all, it can be used as an indication of a more general character. During the years after the war those European countries that had accepted the Marshall Plan were able to develop a more open and less sovereign economy than in the previous years, and the process of integration commenced. So such economic aid resulted in an exponential in respect of their consistence: they were the seed from which grew the enormous economic recovery in the fifties and sixties.

An economic cooperation plan between East and West today could refer to that method: not the external imposing of lines of behaviour, decisions and development guides, but the maturity and the free

decision by the countries concerned. East European countries, the Soviet Union, must therefore propose a coherent and credible economic plan for bigger future cooperation between East and West.

Subjects like the convertability of currency, the free circulation of people, things and capital, civil rights, the reliability of law, obviously are a necessary part of the picture. Immediately after this the development of trans national economic projects becomes a necessity, projects that take full advantage of the existing synergy in the socialist community and would make possible a real cooperation between this community and the European Community and the unified internal market which we shall have after 1992.

They are deadline dates near one to the other but not impossibly so. They can be rightly aided by the West. But this aid can only be useful if it is inserted in the context of a clear, long term plan of action.

Promises evoked by such a vast collaboration are certainly not to be neglected in any sector.

On the basis of this it will be possible to work together in an attempt to end, limit or at least bring towards a solution world crisi. The re-launching of the United Nations, during the last year has indicated to us the road we must follow and reminds all of us the role played by this great institution.

But even the United Nations are destined to feel the influence of the course of East-West relations: getting stronger and acting more efficiently when such a relationship is positive, getting weaker and falling into a kind of lethargy when the relationship is negative.

To move from a state of détente to that of a growing and total co-responsibility means putting an end to these uncertainties, and giving the United Nations the continuity and the approval that are necessary.

Academics, authorietis Ladies and Gentlemen

We are living in a very particular moment, a moment of great renovation in every field. The technological culture of our times makes us press for a further effort so that the use of research is not bent towards violent ends but directed towards peaceful aims and constructive cohabitation.

I believe that a great change is possible as long as an effort is put into its' organisation.

I think that the moment has come for all that intelligence that has been put into the elaboration of war techniques and repressive institutions should now be applied to works of peace. Centuries of

history are to be pondered on in order to change the course in a way as to lead us towards a different civilisation system.
Today technology can give us a new world.
But it must be wanted and to obtain this world it must be programmed.

It is not a case of repeating a Renaissance for the élite, but of offering a new type of widespread humanism where everyone is consciously becoming masters of their own future, creators of a more healthy world which is centred on man as having inalienable rights

It is for us to be those governers, wise and responsible, with the final scope of opening the road to this new era.

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ATHENS FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY
VISIT OF ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER: TALKS WITH GORBACHEV
SUMMARY
1. ITALIANS BRIEF TWELVE ON DE MITA'S MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV. GORBACHEV CONCENTRATED ON EUROPE (ESPECIALLY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION) DISARMAMENT AND REGIONAL CONFLICT. ITALIANS SUPPORT A MOSCOW CONFERENCE, IF ALL THE WEST AGREE.
DETAIL
2. DE MITA HAS TWO HOURS OF TALKS WITH GORBACHEV ON 14 OCTOBER. ANDREOTTI WAS PRESENT FOR LATTER PART OF THESE AND MAY WELL GIVE YOU AN ACCOUNT OF IOANNINA. THIS AND MY TWO IFT DESKBY TELEGRAMS (NOT TO ALL) GIVE THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE COMMUNITY BRIEFING ON 15 OCTOBER. A FURTHER TTELEGRAM WILL GIVE MORE DETAILS ON HIS PROGRAMME, AND THE RUSSIAN ACCOUNT OF HS TALKS, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEPARTMENT.
EUROPE AND CSCE
3. THIS WAS GORBACHEV'S MAIN THEME. HE CONSTANTLY USED THE TERM ''COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE,'' BUT SAID HE WISHED TO DISPEL THE ASSUMPTION THAT THIS WAS A DEVICE TO EXCLUDE THE UNITED STATES OR CANADA.
4. GORBACHEV SPOKE OF DEVELOPING INTEGRATION WITHIN EUROPE. THE TWELVE HAD 1992 AS AN HORIZON, AND WERE ALSO PURSUING POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTEGRTION. FOR ITS PART, THE CMEA NEEDED RESTRUCTURING TO ALLOW FOR GREATER INTEGRATION. THE CMEA WOULD HOLD A MAJOR CONFERENCE ON THIS IN EARLY 1989.
5. BUT THE COMMUNITY, CMEA AND OTHER EUROPEAN STATES WOULD INEVITABLY COME CLEAR TOGETHER ECONOMICALLY AND IN TRADE. WE SHOULD NOW BE TALKING TO EACH OTHER ABOUT THIS, ABOUT HARMONISATION. IF A SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET WAS EVENTUALLY FORMED WE SHOULD NOT HAVE TO DISMANTLE THE STRUCTURES NOW BEING CREATED.
6. RECALLING THAT DE MITA WAS SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, GORBACHEV SUGGESTED HE ARRANGE A PAN-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON OUR COMMON EUROPEAN FUTURE. DE MITA DID NOT TAKE THE BAIT.
CSCE
7. THE ITALIANS SAID THEY LOOKED FORWARD TO A BALANCED OUTCOME AT

VIENNA. THE RUSSIANS AGREED THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE AND HOPED TO CONCLUDE IN NOVEMBER, PERHAPS WITH A FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING. GORBACHEV THEN MADE A SELF-ADMITTEDLY DELHPIC REMARK ABOUT CERTIAN CIRCLES TRYING TO BLOCK PROGRESS BY TALKING ABOUT FRONTIERS, WHICH THE ITALIANS INTERPRET AS A REFERENCE TO FOREIGN SUPPORT TO NATIONALIST ASPIRATIONS IN THE BALTIC STATES.

8. THE ITALIANS SAID THEY COULD FOLLOW THE FRENCH AND ACCEPT A THREE PART CDH, WITH THE THIRD CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW. BUT THEY SAID THAT A MOSCOW CONFERENCE WOULD DEPEND ON ALL THE WEST BEING ABLE TO AGREE.

9. SEE MIFTS FOR DISCUSSION OF DISARMAMENT AND REGIONAL ISSUES.

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MIPT (NOT TO ALL): VISIT OF ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER: TALKS WITH GORBACHEV: DISARMAMENT
CST
1. THE RUSSIANS HAD AGAIN REFERRED TO GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN REYKJAVIK TO DISCUSS CONVENTIONAL DISARMEMENT. GORBACHEV SAID THAT IT WOULD NATURALLY INCLUDE THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. ITS PURPOSE WOULD BE TO GIVE IMPETUS TO THE CST TALKS, WHICH SHOULD NOT BE HELD UP. IF THEY COULD BE STARTED SOON, THEN THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING COULD FOLLOW SHORTLY.
CW
2. SHEVARDNADZE SPOKE WARMLY OF HIS VISIT TO PARIS. HE ESPECIALLY WELCOMED MITTERRAND'S ENDORSEMENT OF A CONFERENCE LINKED THE 1925 PROTOCOL ON CW. HE EXPLAINED TO THE ITALIANS THAT HE SAW A CONFERENCE AS BEING A LEVER TO SPUR WORK ON A CW CONVENTION IN GENEVA.
TNF
3. SHEVARDNADZE HAD ALSO WELCOMED FRENCH STATEMENTS THAT TNF MODERNISATION MIGHT BE DELAYED FOR ONE OR TWO YEARS AND RECONSIDERED THEM.
GENERAL
4. IN THE DISCUSSION ON CW GORBACHEV HAD INTERVENED TO SAY THAT HE SAW THE THREE FIELDS OF DISARMAMENT, NUCLEAR :CHEMICAL AND CONVENTIONAL AS CLOSELY LINKED. IF NO PROGRESS COULD BE MADE QUICKLY ON CW, HE WAS DOUBTFUL THAT WE COULD DO BETTER IN THE OTHER TWO FIELDS.

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MY TWO IPTS (NOT TO ALL): VISIT OF ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER: TALKS WITH GORBACHEV: REGIONAL ISSUES

AFGHANISTAN

1. SHEVARDNADZE HAD EXPRESSED RENEWED INTEREST IN THE PRESENCE IN ROME OF THE EX-KING. HE HAD HINTED AT A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR AHIR SHAH IN THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS. SHEVARDNADZE EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE SPEED WITH WHICH THIS WAS GOING. THE RUSSIANS STILL WANTED TO WITHDRAW BY 15 FEBRUARY, BUT IF NO SOLUTION HAD BEEN REACHED THEY FORESAW ONLY A PROLONGED CONFLICT.

2. THE ITALIANS DETECTED A DIFFERENCE IN TONE BETWEEN SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV, THE LATTER BEING MORE GLOOMY. GORBACHEV HAD DWELT ON THE QUESITON OF WHETHER THE AMERICANS WERE ABIDING BY THE GENEVA ACCORDS. IF THEY WERE NOT, IT WAS AN ISSUE WHICH COULD HAVE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES.

MIDDLE EAST

3. THE RUSSIANS EXPRESSED RELIEF THAT THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO MEET BEFORE THE AMERICAN AND ISRAELI ELECTIONS. IF THE HAD ISSUED A STRONGLY WORDED DECLARATION IT COULD HAVE DAMAGED THE PEACE PROCESS

4. THE RUSSIANS SAID THAT THE PEACE PROCESS SHOULD NOT REMAIN STALLED ONCE THE ELECTIONNS WERE OVER. THE ITALIANS REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD PICK UP THE BATON WHEN THEY CHAIRED THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN NOVEMBER

5. SHEVARDNADZE SUPPORTED THE FRENCH IDEA OF HAVING A PREPARATORY COMMITTEE WORK ON THE FEASIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

ETHIOPIA

5. THE ITALIAN DETECTED A SEA-CHANGE IN THE SOVIET POSITION. THE RUSSIANS WERE NOW URGING MENGISTU TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION GIVING THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE AUTONOMY TO ERITREA.

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SHEVARDNADZE VISIT TO PARIS, 10-12 OCTOBER

SUMMARY

1. SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT MARKS VISIBLE WARMING UP OF FRANCO/SOVIET RELATIONS WILLED BY BOTH SIDES. FRENCH MOTIVES: MITTERRAND'S DESIRE TO GET BACK INTO THE ACT EARLY IN HIS SECOND TERM, WITH VISIT TO MOSCOW AND BAIKONUR ON 25/26 NOVEMBER AND GORBACHEV VISIT TO PARIS IN FIRST HALF OF 1989. FRENCH AGREEMENT NOT TO OPPOSE MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE PRICE THEY ARE WILLING TO PAY FOR THIS, AND TO REMOVE WHAT THEY BELIEVE COULD BE OBSTACLE TO OPENING OF CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS.

DETAIL

2. SHEVARDNADZE MADE A THREE DAY VISIT TO PARIS ON 10-12 OCTOBER AND HELD TALKS WITH MITTERRAND (75 MINUTES), ROCARD (WORKING LUNCH), AND DUMAS (THREE SESSIONS). THE FINANCE, INDUSTRY AND TRADE MINISTERS WERE ALSO INVOLVED IN AN INFORMAL DISCUSION OF FRANCO/SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS FOLLOWING DUMAS'S DINNER FOR SHEVARDNADZE. AS WELL AS THE PLENARIES, THERE WERE MEETINGS OF WORKING GROUPS AT OFFFICIAL LEVEL ON (1) DISARMAMENT (D'ABOVILLE/KARPOV), (2) REGIONAL PROBLEMS, (3) CULTURAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION, (4) HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS, AND (5) BILATERAL QUESTIONS.

3. AT A COMMUNITY BRIEFING, BLOT (DIRECTOR FOR EUROPE) PRESENTED SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT AS IMPORTANT AND SYMBOLIC AND SET IT IN THE CONTEXT OF A GENERAL REVITALISATION OF FRANCE'S RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. IT WAS THE FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT OF A SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SINCE 1980, A CONTRAST WITH THE RHYTHM OF THE GISCARD AND POMPIDOU YEARS. THE FRENCH WANTED TO SET THE BROAD LINES FOR POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION FOR MITTERRAND'S SECOND SEPTENNAT. THE RUSSIANS NO DOUBT SAW VALUE IN ESTABLISHING SOLID RELATIONS WITH A TEAM WHOM THEY COULD EXPECT TO LAST SOME YEARS.

4. THE MAIN POINTS ARISING FROM BLOT'S BRIEFING WERE:

(A) MITTERRAND WOULD SPEND THE FIRST DAY OF HIS 25-26 NOVEMBER VISIT (ANNOUNCED DURING SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT) IN MOSCOW, TALKING TO GORBACHEV. ON 26 NOVEMBER HE WOULD ATTEND THE LAUNCH OF A MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, WITH FRENCH COSMONAUT , AT BAIKONUR.
(B) GORBACHEV WOULD VISIT PARIS IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1989, DATES NOT YET FIXED. (THE ELYSEE HAVE TOLD US IT COULD BE APRIL/MAY.)
(C) ARMS CONTROL. SHEVARDNADZE WARMLY SUPPORTED THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE ON THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL WHICH THE FRENCH NOW EXPECT TO HOST IN JANUARY 1989. THERE WAS DISCUSSION ON HOW THIS SHOULD RELATE TO THE GENEVA CW NEGOTIATIONS.
(D) NO ATTEMPT BY SHEVARDNADZE TO PROPOSE A THIRD ZERO OPTION. NO NEW INSIGHTS FROM SHEVARDNADZE'S BRIEFING ON START AND SPACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.
(E) CST. SHEVARDNADZE AND THE FRENCH AGREED ON THE NEED TO FINISH THE VIENNA MEETING QUICKLY AND GET CST AND CSBM NEGOTIATIONS STARTED LATE THIS YEAR OR EARLY NEXT YEAR.
(F) CSCE. SHEVARDNADZE LAID GREAT STRESS ON THE SECOND BASKET AND GRUMBLED ABOUT UNITED STATES ATTITUDES TO THIS. HE MADE CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD BUY ALL THE INTER-SESSIONAL MEETINGS UNDER DISCUSSION, AND THAT SOME MUST BE HOSTED BY THE EAST.
(F) CSCE/CDH. BLOT EXPLAINED DEFENSIVELY THAT THE FRENCH POSITION HAD ''SOMEWHAT CHANGED'', WITH MITTERRAND'S TELLING SHEVARDNADZE THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT BE AN OBSTACLE TO HOLDING A HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING IN MOSCOW. THIS FOLLOWED THE CLEAR SIGNS OF A SHIFT IN THE AMERICAN APPROACH. PREVIOUSLY THE FRENCH HAD TOLD THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY WERE NOT IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST HOLDING A CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW, PROVIDED IT WERE AFTER HELSINKI FOLLOW UP MEETING IN 1992. (THIS WOULD ALLOW FOR CONTINUING REVIEW OF THE SOVIET RECORD, AND A DECISION AT HELSINKI ON WHETHER TO PROCEED.) NOW THE FRENCH WERE NO LONGER INSISTING THAT ANY MOSCOW MEETING MUST BE AFTER HELSINKI. IT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATORS TO FIND A CONSENSUS ON TIMING, WHICH MIGHT BE BEFORE OR AFTER HELSINKI: MITTERRAND HAD NOT DISCUSSED TIMING WITH SHEVARDNADZE. DUMAS IN HIS TOAST HAD GONE FURTHER IN SAYING THAT FRANCE WOULD AGREE TO A THREE PHASE CDH WITH MEETINGS AT PARIS, COPENHAGEN AND MOSCOW (BUT AGAIN ACCORDING TO BLOT WITHOUT SPECIFYING TIMING): I.E. GENEVA AS AN OPTION FOR THE THIRD MEETING HAD NOW BEEN DROPPED BY FRANCE. BLOT REACTED DEFENSIVELY TO OUR QUESTIONS WHETHER DUMAS'S FORMULATION DID NOT IN EFFECT CONCEDE THAT HE NOW ENVISAGED A MOSCOW CONFERENCE BEFORE HELSINKI.

5. BLOT ADDED THAT, IN LOOKING FOR AN APPROACH WHICH COULD RALLY THE 12 AROUND THE IDEA OF A MOSCOW MEETING, DUMAS HAD SUGGESTED TO SHEVARDNADZE THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES EXPLORE PROGRESS TOWARDS COMMON

EUROPEAN LEGAL NORMS IN HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS. (BLOT DESCRIBED THIS AS AN ''ETAT DE DROIT EUROPEEN''). FRENCH IDEAS ON THIS ARE TENTATIVE AND OBSCURE. BUT THEY HAVE IN MIND BACKING UP EXISTING CONTACTS ON HUMANITARIAN CASES BY EXCHANGES BETWEEN JURISTS DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE THE EVOLUTION OF THE RULE OF LAW IN THE SOVIET UNION: IE TO HELP TO ENTRENCH OTHERWISE REVERSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS. THE FRENCH HAVE NOT WORKED OUT THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THIS IDEA AND A MOSCOW CONFERENCE.

6. BLOT SAID THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO NEGOTIATE A CULTURAL AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR CULTURAL CENTRES IN MOSCOW AND PARIS. IN NEGOTIATING TO SECURE FREE ACCESS BY SOVIET CITIZENS THE FRENCH WOULD BUILD ON THE CLAUSE ON ACCESS IN THE ANGLO/SOVIET MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AGREED DURING MRS THATCHER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, AS DEVELOPED SUBSEQUENTLY WHEN CHIRAC WENT TO MOSCOW.

7. BLOT SAID LITTLE ABOUT THE REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS, WHICH COVERED IRAN-IRAQ, ARAB/ISRAEL, LEBANON, AND CAMBODIA. (MARTIN CHAIRED THE WORKING GROUP WHICH DISCUSSED ASIAN QUESTIONS INCLUDING CAMBODIA AND WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE MCLAREN AN ACCOUNT ON 14 OCTOBER.)

COMMENT

8. THE FRENCH ROLLED OUT THE CARPET AT SHORT NOTICE (THE VISIT WAS ADVANCED FROM LATE OCTOBER, LEAVING ONLY A WEEK TO PREPARE). ATMOSPHERICS WERE GOOD. THE VISIT WAS CONSCIOUSLY DESIGNED TO RELAUNCH FRANCO/SOVIET RELATIONS, WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MITTERRAND/GORBACHEV VISITS AS THE KEY. MITTERRAND'S STRONG DESIRE TO PRESS FORWARD WITH CST, AND THE RECENT EVOLUTION OF THE FRENCH CW POLICIES SIGNALLED IN HIS UNITED NATIONS SPEECH HAVE MADE FOR A MORE SUBSTANTIAL DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON ARMS CONTROL. DUMAS AND SHEVARDNADZE IN SEPARATE PRESS CONFERENCES CONGRATULATED THEMSELVES ON A SUCCESS.

9. AS TO THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE, MITTERRAND'S GESTURE TO THE RUSSIANS WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH PARTNERS WILL HAVE COMPLICATED THE VIENNA END GAME AND PLEASED THE RUSSIANS. IT IS CLEAR THAT MITTERRAND IS NOT BOTHERED WITH THE TIMING QUESTION (BEFORE OR AFTER HELSINKI). HE JUDGED THAT A GESTURE WAS NECESSARY AS PART OF A PACKAGE INVOLVING THE TOP LEVEL VISITS. IT WILL NOW BE FOR THE NEGOTIATORS TO SORT OUT THE DETAILS. THE LINE TAKEN BY BLOT GIVES US A LEVER TO PRESS, IF WE WISH, FOR REVERSION TO THE EARLIER FRENCH POSITION AS A COMPROMISE AROUND WHICH TO BUILD A CONSENSUS IN VIENNA.

10. I EXPECT THAT DUMAS WILL GIVE AN ACCOUNT AT IOANNINA, PUTTING THE NEW PHASE IN FRANCO/SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE WIDER CONTEXT OF DEVELOPING NEW AND STRONGER CONTACTS BETWEEN EC COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE IN THE EUROPE OF POST-1992.

11. MITTERRAND WILL BE ABLE TO BRIEF KOHL BEFORE THE LATTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW WHEN THEY MEET AT VEZELAY ON 14 OCTOBER.

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OUR TELNO 1669: VISIT OF AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR
MEETING WITH GORBACHEV
SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV ESCHEWS DIRECT COMMENT ON AUSTRIAN ASPIRATIONS TO JOIN THE EC BUT SPEAKS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PAN-EUROPEAN PROCESS) AS AN OBJECTIVE PROCESS. AN AMBER LIGHT FOR THE AUSTRIANS.

DETAIL

2. GORBACHEV RECEIVED VRANITSKY ON 11 OCTOBER. ACCORDING TO TASS THE CONVERSATION WAS DISTINGUISHED BY THE GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF EACH OTHER'S VIEWS AND POSITIONS. GORBACHEV PRAISED THE TWO COUNTRIES' ECONOMIC TIES: THEIR COOPERATION WAS A REAL SUPPORT TO PERESTROIKA.

3. THE TASS REPORT SAYS THE LEADERS DISCUSSED THE EUROPEAN PROCESS AND THE FORCES OF INTEGRATION, NOTABLY THE CREATION OF A SINGLE MARKET. GORBACHEV SAID THESE QUESTIONS REQUIRED SERIOUS STUDY. ECONOMIC INTEGRATOIN WAS AN OBJECTIVE PROCESS. IT WAS ALSO OBVIOUS THAT ECONOMIC TIES ARE WAY AHEAD OF POLITICAL COOPERATION. HOWEVER, NATIONS WHICH HAD FOUGHT FOR THEIR INDEPENDENCE WERE HARDLY GOING TO ACCEPT SOME FORM OF 'LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY.' SO THE BLEND OF ECONOMIC INTERNATIONALISAITON AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE WAS A BIG PROBLEM. FROM ANOTHER ANGLE - WHAT WOULD BEOCME OF THE COMMON EUROPEAN PROCESS IF THE WESTERN PART OF EUROPE SEALED ITSELF OFF IN ITS NEW FORM? HOW THEN TO BUILD THE EUROPEANHOUSE?

[Gorbachev has clearly read the Bruges speech]

4. GORBACHEV SAID THAT ONE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF REALITIES. THE WISH OF EVERY NATION TO PRESERVE ITS SOVEREIGNTY WAS ONE SUCH. THE INTERNATIONALISAITON OF ECONOMIC PROCESSES WAS ANOTHER. THE EXISTENCE OF EAST AND WEST EUROPE WHICH SHOULD COEXIST ON THE BASIS OF FREEDOM OF CHOICE, NON-USE OF FORCE, MUTUAL RESPECT AND USEFUL COOPERATION WAS YET ANOTHER. AND THE STRIVING OF ALL EUROPEANS TO DRAW CLOSER, TO AVE A RELIABLE FUTURE WAS ALSO A REALITY.

5. PRAVDA OF 12 OCTOBER ALSO CARRIED THE TASS REPORT OF BRANITSKY'S TALKS WITH RYZHKOV. THE TWO LEADERS TOUCHED ON THE PROBLEMS OF EC-AUSTRIANN RELATIONS. THE SOVIET SIDE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT, IN

DETERMINING TTHE WAY BY WHICH THESE COULD BE SETTLED, AUSTRIA WOULD ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE STATE TREATY AND TAKING ACOCUNT OF ITS NEUTRAL STATUS.

COMMENT

6. GORBACHEV'S REMARKS ARE ELLIPTICAL BUT SEEM TO COUNTENANCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSER ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND TTHE EC, SO LONG AS THESE DO NOT EVENTUALLY IMPINGE ON HER POLITICAL NEUTRALITY. HE DID NOT GO SO FAR IN URGING CAUTION AS RYZHKOV, NOR AS SHEVARDNADZE DID WITH MOCK.

7. THIS LOOKS LIKE AN AMBER LIGHT FOR VRANITSKY TO EXPLORE ECONOMIC THOUGH NOT POLITICAL UNION. IF THE LATTER APPEARS AN OBSTACLE TO AUSTRIAN MEMBERSHIP OF THE EC THEN THE RUSSIANS WILL NO DOUBT BLAME OVER-AMBITIOUS INTEGRAITON PLANS OF THE WEST.

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SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE
SUMMARY

1. SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE'S TALKS ON 22/23 SEPTEMBER PRODUCED NO SURPRISES. DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES LITTLE MORE THAN ROUTINE REVIEW. HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WERE AS USUAL PARAMOUNT IN SHULTZ'S MIND. DISCUSSION OF DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL (SEE MIFT) WERE MORE DETAILED, BUT NO DEFINITIVE PROGRESS MADE. EMPHASIS THROUGHOUT ON CONTINUITY AND MUTUAL DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE BILATERAL DIALOGUE THROUGH TO THE END OF THE YEAR.

DETAIL

2. RIDGWAY AND NITZE BRIEFED NATO AND OTHER MAJOR WESTERN EMBASSIES THIS EVENING, 23 SEPTEMBER, ON THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE TALKS. PARAS 4-8 BENEATH COVER REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES. THE RATHER MORE SUBSTANTIVE BRIEFING ON DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL IS IN MIFT.

3. RIDGWAY SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD BROUGHT A LETTER FOR REAGAN FROM GORBACHEV, THE MAIN THRUST OF WHICH WAS TO UNDERLINE SOVIET INTEREST IN MAINTAINING ACTIVE BILATERAL CONTACT WITH THE AMERICANS THROUGH TO THE END OF THE ADMINISTRATION. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE RUSSIANS PUTTING THE RELATIONSHIP ON HOLD. THE TALKS BETWEEN SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN CONDUCTED IN THIS SPIRIT. THEY HAD BEEN CHARACTERISED, AS RIDGWAY PUT IT, BY CONTINUITY, CONSISTENCY AND COMMITMENT. THERE HAD BEEN NO MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS: BUT SOME OF THE DISCUSSIONS, IN PARTICULAR ON ARMS CONTROL, HAD HELPED TO CLARIFY POSITIONS.

HUMAN RIGHTS

4. AS USUAL, HUMAN RIGHTS HAD BEEN UPPERMOST ON THE US AGENDA. SHULTZ HAD GONE OVER THE GROUND IN HIS USUAL FORCEFUL WAY. HE HAD FOCUSSED HARD ON ALL THE FAMILIAR

POINTS, EMPHASISING IN PARTICULAR THE UNACCEPTABLE RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET EMIGRATION, RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, JAMMING, FAMILY REUNIFICATION, AND THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONAL AND VERIFIABLE CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION TO BACK UP PROTESTATIONS OF PROGRESS. SHULTZ HAD BEEN VERY FIRM IN LAYING DOWN US EXPECTATIONS ON CSCE FOLLOW-UP. A POSSIBLE MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE HAD BEEN RAISED. THE US POSITION ON THIS HAD REMAINED UNCHANGED. SHULTZ HAD SAID NEITHER YES OR NO. HE HAD REHEARSED FIRMLY THE AREAS WHERE PROGRESS WAS NEEDED. THERE HAD BEEN NO MOVEMENT OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE ON THESE QUOTE INDICATORS UNQUOTE. US ALLIES WOULD BE BRIEFED MORE FULLY NEXT WEEK.

REGIONAL ISSUES

5. ALL REGIONAL ISSUES HAD BEEN TOUCHED ON, BUT DISCUSSIONS HAD NOT BEEN DETAILED. SHEVARDNADZE HAD PLACED GREAT EMPHASIS ON GORBACHEV'S KRASNOYARSK SPEECH, AND SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WISHED TO EXPLORE HOW BEST TO REPLACE CONFRONTATION WITH CONSULTATION ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC ISSUES. SHULTZ HAD SUGGESTED THIS SHOULD BE CARRIED FORWARD AT EXPERT LEVEL IN EARLY NOVEMBER.

6. ON AFGHANISTAN, SHEVARDNADZE HAD MADE THE USUAL DISOBLIGING NOISES ABOUT ALLEGED PAKISTANI VIOLATION OF THE ACCORD: SHULTZ HAD REJECTED THESE ALLEGATIONS, TOGETHER WITH SOVIET EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE FOUR PARTY TALKS IN NEW YORK, AND HAD COUNTERED WITH EMPHASIS ON THE OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF MEETING THE DEADLINE FOR WITHDRAWAL. RIDGWAY OFFERED NO FURTHER DETAIL.

7. SOUTHERN AFRICA HAD BEEN DEALT WITH VERY SPEEDILY. SHULTZ NEVERTHELESS HAD THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL REASONABLY POSITIVE IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE CURRENT DELICATE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. ON CAMBODIA, RIDGWAY SAID MERELY THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD UNDERLINED VIETNAMESE DETERMINATION TO WITHDRAW AS PROMISED. DISCUSSION OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS HAD BEEN NO MORE THAN A REHEARSAL OF FAMILIAR POSITIONS. RIDGWAY OFFERED NO DETAIL OF ANY DISCUSSION ON IRAN/IRAQ. ON CW, SHE NOTED THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD QUESTIONED THE US EVIDENCE ABOUT IRAQI USE, BUT HAD BEEN READY TO REAFFIRM BOTH SOVIET CONDEMNATION OF CW GENERALLY AND SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN CARRYING OUT PROMPT INVESTIGATIONS IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN THE FACTS OF SUCH USE. ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, SHULTZ HAD URGED SHEVARDNADZE TO EXPAND SOVIET CONTACTS WITH THE SOUTH, AND SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD LOOK AGAIN AT CONTACTS

WITH THE NORTH IF THE OLYMPICS PASSED WITHOUT DISTURBANCE.
BILATERAL ISSUES
8. ON BILATERAL ISSUES, THERE WAS LENGTHY DISCUSSION AT WORKING LEVEL ABOUT LIVING CONDITIONS FOR DIPLOMATS AND OTHER MATTERS CONCERNING THEIR RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES. THESE HAD AT TIMES BEEN DIFFICULT, AND DISCUSSION WOULD CONTINUE. BOTH SIDES HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN FURTHER CONTACT ON COOPERATIONS ON BASIC SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.
9. SEE MIFT.

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MIFT: SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE: ARMS CONTROL
SUMMARY
1. A LOW-KEY BRIEFING. APPARENT LACK OF DISCUSSION ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON START (THOUGH THE US MADE A STATEMENT WITH UK CONCERNS IN MIND). OTHERWISE ALL MAJOR ARMS CONTROL ISSUES DISCUSSED THOROUGHLY BY MINISTERS AND BY THE SUPPORTING WORKING GROUPS OF OFFICIALS. BUT PROGRESS LIMITED TO PNET/TTBT AND POSSIBLE SOVIET MOVEMENT ON THE MAIN CONVENTIONAL STABILITY MANDATE ISSUE. LITTLE CHANGE ON DEFENCE AND SPACE, AND NONE ON START OR ABM TREATY VIOLATIONS.
DETAIL
2. ON START, NITZE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD FAILED TO ELABORATE ON THEIR PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM START AGREEMENT ON MISSILE WARHEAD NUMBERS AND FLIGHT TESTING. SHEVARDNADZE HAD MENTIONED IT ON THE FIRST DAY ONLY IN PASSING. THE US HAD THEREFORE ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS. THE RUSSIANS SEEMED UNPREPARED AND HAD SAID THAT THEY WOULD TAKE THE POINTS BACK FOR STUDY AND REPLY SUBSEQUENTLY IN GENEVA. NITZE ADDED THET THE US HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY PROPOSITION THAT WOULD AFFECT EXISTING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION WITH ALLIES.
3. THE MAIN DISCUSSION ON START HAD BEEN ON ALCMS AND VERIFICATION OF MOBILE ICBMS - SHOULD THE US EVER CHANGE THEIR POSITION AND AGREE TO PERMIT THEM. NITZE SAID THAT THE ALCM DISCUSSIONS BECAME BOGGED DOWN BECAUSE BOTH SIDES HAD BROUGHT SEPARATE PACKAGES ON THE TWO SETS OF ISSUES OUTSTANDING (RULES FOR ATTRIBUTING WARHEADS TO HEAVY BOMBERS AND ALCM RANGES). THE RUSSIANS HAD STILL OPPOSED 10 ALCMS PER BOMBER AND HAD NOT BEEN PREPARED TO MOVE BEYOND 600KM ON THE RANGE ISSUE. NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON MOBILE ICBMS: BOTH SIDES HAD MANAGED TO AGREE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF DISPERSAL AREAS BUT HAD DISAGREED ON

THEIR PURPOSE - THE RUSSIANS ARGUING THAT EXERCISING SHOULD TAKE PLACE BEYOND THESE AREAS, THE AMERICANS INSISTING THAT IT SHOULD BE WITHIN THEM. THE RUSSIANS SAID THEY HAD TABLED IDEAS IN GENEVA ON THE REGISTRATION OF MOBILES. IT WAS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THIS WAS A RESPONSE TO US PROPOSALS FOR 'TAGGING'. THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS ON ICBM SUBLIMITS OR SLCM VERIFICATION.

4. ON DEFENCE AND SPACE, NITZE SAID THE US HAD EXPRESSED REGRET OVER THE CONTINUING SOVIET REFUSAL TO AGREE TO WORK ON A JOINT DRAFT TEXT AS A WAY OF NARROWING DIFFERENCES. THEY HAD CALLED ON THEM AGAIN TO IMPLEMENT THIS STANDARD PROCEDURE FOR MAKING PROGRESS. THEY HAD ALSO REPEATED THEIR PROPOSITION THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD OBJECT ON ABM TREATY GROUNDS TO SPACE-BASED SENSORS OF THE OTHER SIDE. THE RUSSIANS HAD EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS, BUT HAD AT LEAST AGREED TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER, WHICH SUGGESTED SOME POSSIBLE MOVEMENT. ON THE DRAFT PREDICTABILITY PROTOCOL, THE RUSSIANS HAD SAID THEY WOULD HAVE SOME RESPONSE IN GENEVA.

5. ON ABM TREATY COMPLIANCE, THE US HAD RESTATED THAT KRASNOYARSK WAS A SERIOUS VIOLATION, RAISING THE QUESTION OF MATERIAL BREECH AND RULING OUT ANY STRATEGIC ARMS TREATY UNTIL THE WHOLE STRUCTURE WAS DISMANTLED. IDEAS SUCH AS CONVERSION TO AN INTERNATIONAL SPACE RESEARCH FACILITY COULD BE CONSIDERED ONLY IF DEMOLITION CAME FIRST. SHEVARDNADZE HAD REITERATED THE 'STRONG DESIRE TO CORRECT IT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS'. BUT NOTHING HAD BEEN OFFERED ON SPECIFICS. THE AMERICANS FELT, HOWEVER, THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION MIGHT OFFER HOPE AND INTENDED TO KEEP GOING.

6. NITZE REPORTED 'GOOD PROGRESS' ON PNET AND TTBT. AMBASSADORS WOULD RETURN TO GENEVE TO TRY TO WRAP UP BOTH PROTOCOLS BY THE END OF THE YEAR. GOOD RESULTS WERE POSSIBLE, GIVEN HIGH LEVEL COMMITMENT.

7. ON THE CONVENTIONAL MANDATE TALKS, RIDGWAY SAID THAT GOOD BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN HELD, ALTHOUGH THE US STRESSED THAT THEY COULD ONLY EXCHANGE VIEWS, NOT NEGOTIATE. THEY HAD PRESSED THE RUSSIANS HARD ON THEIR DEMANDS TO EXCLUDE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, STRESSING THAT THE POSITION WAS BOTH WRONG IN LOGIC AND UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. AFTER AN UNENTHUSIASTIC INITIAL DEFENCE, THE RUSSIANS HAD COME FORWARD ON THE SECOND DAY WITH A PROPOSAL TO REPLACE FIGHTER EXCLUSION

WITH QUOTE LAND BATTLE-CAPABLE ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENTS UNQUOTE. THE US HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS LANGUAGE, BUT INDICATED THAT THIS WAS A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, ALTHOUGH THE NEW FORMULA WAS STILL NOT ACCEPTABLE. THEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION SHOULD NOW TAKE PLACE IN VIENNA.

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WARSAW PACT SUMMIT

SUMMARY

1. WARSAW PACT SUMMIT CONCLUDES WITH JOINT COMMUNIQUE, PLUS TWO ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS: DECLARATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS, CALLING FOR NEW NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE END OF 1988, AND STATEMENT ON CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS RACE FOR ENVIRONMENT. NO (NO) PROPASALS FOR SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS IN EUROPE.

DETAIL

2. POLITICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF WARSAW PACT MET IN WARSAW ON 15 AND 16 JULY. ALL DELEGATIONS WERE HEADED BY RESPECTIVE PARTY LEADERS. ADDITIONAL REPORTED PARTICIPANTS WERE : FROM BULGARIA, ATANASOV, DZUROV, MLADEWOV, STANISZEV : FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUSAK, STROUGAL, BILAK, CHNOUPEK, VACLAVIK : FROM GDR, STOPH, AXEN, KESSLER, KRENZ, MITTAG, FISCHER : FROM ROMANIA, DASCALESW, STOIAN, MILEA, TOTU : FROM HUNGARY, SZUROS, VARKOWYI, KARPATI : FROM USSR, GROMYKO, RYZKOV, SZEWARDNADZE, JAZOW, MEDVEDEV : FROM POLAND, MESSNER, CZYREK, SIWICKI, KOLODZIEJCZAK, OLECHOWSKI, KULIKOV (SUPREME COMMANDER) AND JAROSZEK (SECRETARY GENERAL OF POLITICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE) ALSO TOOK PART.

3. 2 SESSIONS ON 15 JULY WERE CHAIRED BY HONECKER AND BY JARUSELSKI. IN EVENING OF 15 JULY JARUSELSKI GAVE DINNER FOR PARTICIPANTS. IN PUBLISHED TOAST JARUZELSKI SAID KEY ISSUE WAS TO CONSOLIDATE POSITIVE DISARMAMENT TRENDS AND MAKE THEM IRREVERSIBLE. LASERS HELPED SURGEONS AND SURVEYORS, BUT WERE DANGEROUS IN HANDS OF OPPONENTS OF DETENTE. IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN HOME NEIGHBOURS SHOULD NOT KEEP PISTOLS UNDER THEIR PILLOWS. SPEAKING IN RESPONSE ON BEHALF OF ALL PARTICIPANTS CEAUSESCU (AS HOST OF NEXT WP SUMMIT) SAID THAT JOINT CONCLUSION HAD BEEN THAT PRESENT SITUATION

REMAINED FULL OF CONTRADICTIONS AND WAS SERIOUS. DESPITE POSITIVE STEPS DANGEROUS COURSE OF EVENTS HAD NOT BEEN RADICALLY CHANGED TOWARDS CO-OPERATION. ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WAS GUIDED BY NECESSITY OF NEW THINKING AND NEW APPROACH ON ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE.

4. MEETING CONCLUDED ON 16 JULY, WITH PUBLICATION OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE (SEE MY FIRST IFT) AND TWO ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS : DECLARATION ON NEGOTIATIONS ON QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE (MY SECOND IFT CONTAINS FULL TEXT) : AND STATEMENT ON CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS RACE FOR NATURAL ENVIRONMENT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF ECOLOGICAL SECURITY (MY THIRD IFT). THERE WERE NO (NO) ANNOUNCEMENTS OF, OR PROPOSALS FOR, SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM WP COUNTRIES.

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WASHINGTON TELNO 1726: VISIT OF MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV TO THE US/ALLIED MILITARY CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

SUMMARY

1. LENGTHY BUT DEFENSIVE US DEBRIEF ON AKHTROMEYEV'S VISIT. SOME FLAK FROM ALLIES ON LACK OF CONSULTATION ON US RESUMPTION OF MILITARY CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. AGREEMENT ON NEED TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON FUTURE ALLIANCE MILITARY TO MILITARY CONTACTS.

DETAIL

2. OPENING DISCUSSION, THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT AKHROMEYEV'S VISIT WAS THE FIRST OF ITS KIND AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. BUT IT WOULD NO DOUBT BE FOLLOWED BY SIMILAR VISITS INVOLVING OTHER ALLIES. THE US/SOVIET EXCHANGE PROGRAMME AGREED DURING AKHROMEYEV'S VISIT SEEMED RATHER AMBITIOUS, AT LEAST COMPARED WITH THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF CONTACT UNTIL VERY RECENTLY. WOERNER SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT THIS WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, BUT HE SAW GREAT MERIT IN TRYING TO CO-ORDINATE THE ALLIED APPROACH. IT WAS PROBABLY TOO AMBITIOUS TO AIM AT A UNIFIED ALLIED POLICY, BUT THE ALLIES SHOULD TRY TO AVOID GOING OFF IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS AND ENSURE AS AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM THAT THEY KEEP EACH OTHER WELL INFORMED.

3. INTRODUCING HIS BRIEFING, KEEL (US) SAID THAT ADMIRAL CROWE HAD INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO COME HIMSELF TO BRIEF THE NAC BUT THAT THIS HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE UNTIL NEXT WEEK: IT HAD BEEN THOUGHT BEST NOT TO DELAY THE BRIEFING. THE CROWE/AKHROMEYEV EXCHANGE, SAID KEEL, HAD BEEN THE SECOND OF THREE FORMAL MEETINGS OF TOP RANK US/SOVIET MILITARY OFFICIALS: THE FIRST HAD BEEN THE CARLUCCI/YAZOV MEETING IN BERNE (OUR TELNO 131) AND THE THIRD WOULD BE THE FORTHCOMING CARLUCCI/YAZOV MEETING IN MOSCOW IN AUGUST.

4. KEEL WENT OVER THE MAIN POINTS OF THE ITINERARY OF AKHROMEYEV'S 5 - 11 JULY VISIT. THIS HAD INCLUDED SESSIONS WITH THE JOINT

CHIEFS OF STAFF, WITH CARLUCCI, VISITS TO UNITS OF ALL THE US ARMED FORCES (INCLUDING A STATIC DISPLAY OF THE BI BOMBER) AND A CALL ON THE PRESIDENT. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE. US AIMS IN INVITING AKHROMEYEV HAD BEEN TO EXPOSE HIM TO THE US ARMED SERVICES, (THERE WAS SAID KEEL ''NO BETTER DETERRENT''): TO GET HIM ACQUAINTED WITH THE CULTURAL DIVERSITY OF THE UNITED STATES: AND TO HELP HIM UNDERSTAND THE BASIC OPENNESS AND DIVERSITY OF WESTERN DEMOCRACIES. IT HAD BEEN A HISTORIC EXCHANGE: THE FIRST FORMAL VISIT OF A SOVIET CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF SINCE WORLD WAR II. THE US HAD HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF CHANGING SOVIET BEHAVIOUR, BUT WAS CONVINCED THAT IT SHOULD PURSUE ALL AVENUES TO REDUCE TENSION. AKHROMEYEV HAD RECEIVED A COMPLETELY UNCLASSIFIED BRIEFING ON SELECTED PORTIONS OF THE US MILITARY. HE WOULD TAKE BACK AN IMPRESSION OF A CAPABLE MILITARY FORCE MANNED BY FIRST-RATE PEOPLE.

5. KEEL STRESSED THAT NEITHER AKHROMEYEV NOR CROWE WERE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO NEGOTIATE ANYTHING AND HAD NOT DONE SO. BUT THERE HAD BEEN FREE AND FRANK DISCUSSIONS COVERING THE HISTORIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, THEIR DIFFERENT POLITICAL CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS, AND MILITARY ISSUES. AS ANTICIPATED THESE HAD SHOWN UP PROFOUND DIFFERENCES OF VIEW, WHICH WOULD TAKE DECADES TO UNRAVEL, IF EVER. BOTH SIDES HAD APPROACHED THE TALKS WITH PRUDENCE AND CAUTION. BUT IN THE US VIEW THE EXERCISE HAD BEEN USEFUL IN PROMOTING UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFERENCES AND MINIMISING THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT.

6. AKHROMEYEV HAD APPEARED PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE LEVEL OF TRAINING OF US ENLISTED PERSONNEL. HE WAS MOST IMPRESSED BY US OPENNESS AND DESCRIBED WHAT HE SAW AS ''DEMOCRACY IN ACTION''. THROUGHOUT HIS TRIP, AKHROMEYEV HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO STRESS THAT HIS VISIT WAS PART OF THE CONTINUING PROCESS OF IMPROVING RELATIONS. HE ARGUED THAT THE TWO ARMED FORCES SHOULD BUILD ON THIS OPENING, FOR EXAMPLE BY SETTING UP COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS.

7. THE EXCHANGES WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAD BEEN THE MOST VIGOROUS OF THE VISIT, AND CENTRED ON MILITARY/MILITARY CONTACTS, AVOIDANCE OF DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND ARMS CONTROL. ON MILITARY/MILITARY CONTACTS THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT (WASHINGTON TELNO 1727) ON A CALENDAR OF EVENTS FOR THE NEXT TWO AND A HALF YEARS. THE SCHEDULE WAS OF A GENERAL NATURE AND MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO CHANGE. MILITARY ATTACHES ON BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN TASKED TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS.

8. ON AVOIDANCE OF DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHEN FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES WERE OPERATING CLOSE TO EACH OTHER, TALKS HAD CONCENTRATED ON TWO ISSUES: AIR INCIDENTS AND THE FEBRUARY 1988 BLACK SEA BUMPING SPISODE. BOTH HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ''CANDID EXCHANGES'. ON THE LATTER, THE RUSSIANS HAD CONTENEDED THAT THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE WAS CONTRARY TO SOVIET DOMESTIC LAW WHICH GRANTED FREE SEA PASSAGE ONLY WHEN NECESSARY. US SHIPS IN THE AREA HAD BEEN IN VIOLATION OF SOVIET LAWS WHICH SHOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE. IN REPLY, THE US HAD SAID THAT THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE WAS GUARANTEED BY CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: IN ANY CASE BUMPING A US VESSEL WAS NOT THE WAY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO SET UP A WORKING GROUP TO EXAMINE THESE TWO AREAS AND OTHER POSSIBLE CAUSES OF DANGEROUS INCIDENTS.

9. ON ARMS CONTROL THERE HAD BEEN NO NEW POSITIONS OR AGREEMENTS, BUT THE EXCHANGES HAD PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP GREATER UNDERSTANDING. AKHROMEYEV HAD INDICATED THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT SHORTLY PROVIDE IN GENEVA ALCM CAPACITIES OF BEAR H AND BLACKJACK, WHICH THEY HAD SO FAR NOT DONE. AKHROMEYEV SEEMED CONCERNED AT THE CAPABILITIES OF THE US NAVY: HE WAS LIKELY, SAID KEEL TO CONTINUE TO ARGUE FOR THE USSR TO PRESS FOR NAVAL REDUCTIONS IN THE FORTHCOMING CST NEGOTIATIONS.

10. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MIITARY DOCTRINE DURING THE COURSE OF THE VISIT. AKHROMEYEV HAD FOCUSSED ON THE ''MILITARY-TECHNICAL'' ASPECTS, WHICH HE DEFINED AS COMPRISING: THE NATURE OF THE THREAT: THE KIND OF AGGRESSION FORCES WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REPULSE: THE KIND OF ARMED FORCE NECESSARY FOR THIS: AND TRAINING METHODS. AKHROMEYEV CLAIMED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE SURROUNDED BY US MILITARY BASES AND HAD BEEN FOR 40 YEARS. THEY WERE OBLIGED BY UNITED STATES RETENTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO TRAIN FOR NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WAR. THE NEED NOW WAS TO ELIMINATE ASYMMETRIES, REDUCE MILITARY GROUPINGS AND THE POSSIBILITES OF OFFENSIVE ACTION AND DEVELOP ZONES OF REDUCED MILITARY CONCENTRATIONS. AKHROMEYEV ALSO URGED ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF LARGE SCALE FLIGHTS OF STRATEGIC OR TACTICAL AIRCRAFT.

11. AKHROMEYEV HAD CLAIMED THAT SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE WAS NOW BASED ON ''DEFENSIVE SUFFIEIENCY''. THIS MEANT MAINTENANCE OF A WAR-FIGHTING CAPACITY TO GUARENTEE STRATEGIC STABILITY AND SURE DEFENCE, BUT WITHOUT ANY OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY. IF ATTACKED, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD FIGHT DEFENSIVELY AT FIRST TO ALLOW TIME FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION. AKHROMEYEV SAID THAT WITHIN TWO TO THREE YEARS THE SOVIET UNION PLANNED TO ALTER THE POSTURE OF ITS FORCES

IN EUROPE TO MAKE THEM OF LESS CONCERN TO THE WEST. BUT SOME WESTERN FORCES ALSO WORRIED THE RUSSIANS, IN PARTICULAR THE FACT THAT THE WEST HAD 1500 MORE STRIKE AIRCRAFT THAT THE WARSAW PACT WHICH COULD CONDUCT SURPRISE ATTACKS 1000 KMS INSIDE SOVIET TERRITORY. AKHROMEYEV HAD MAINTAINED THAT UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS WERE THEREFORE UNREALISTIC: WHAT WAS REQUIRED WERE BILATERAL CUTS.

12. IN RESPONSE CROWE WENT OVER ALLIANCE STRATEGY AND PHILOSOPHY. HE ALSO STRESSED THE US VIEW THAT THE DEFENCE OF NATO, KOREA AND JAPAN WAS ALSO THE DEFENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. CROWE RAISED US CONCERNS AT THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET SUBMARINE FORCE AND STRESSED THAT WESTERN NAVIES WERE THERE TO PROTECT NATO STRATEGIC LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS: GIVING UP THIS CAPABILITY WOULD BE LIKE ASKING THE RUSSIANS TO DESTROY ALL THE RAODS FROM THE USSR TO THE GDR. CROWE WAS AT PAINS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT SPEAK FOR THE ALLIANCE ON SUCH THINGS AS DATA EXCHANGE.

13. SUMMING UP, KEEL SAID THAT THE FUTURE PROGRAMME MIGHT BE AMBITIOUS, BUT THAT IT HAD BEEN BUILT STEP BY STEP IN CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES. STEADY IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FOUR PART AGENDA HAD ENABLED SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. THE US HAD LONG HELD THAT INCREASED CONTACT WITH THE SOVIET MILITARY WOULD OFFER IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES. THE SOVIET DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN DECISION-MAKING IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IT WAS WORTH GETTING GREATER INSIGHT INTO ITS THINKING. THE US APPROACHED FUTURE MILITARY/MILITARY CONTACTS WITH SOBER BUT SUBSTANTIVE GOALS: GREATER ACCESS TO THE SOVIET DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY, AS A CHANNEL TO PUT US AND WESTERN CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET DEFENCE POLICIES DIRECTLY TO SENIOR OFFICERS, TO ENHANCE US AND ALLIED SECURITY IN PART BY DEMONSTRATING WESTERN MILITARY CAPABILITY, TO FOSTER GREATER SOVIET OPENNESS ABOUT MILITARY POLICY, TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND REDUCE CONFRONTATION, AND TO FURTHER ADVANCE ALLIANCE POSTIONS AND OBJECTIVES. AT THE SAME TIME THE US WAS ALERT TO THE DANGER OF MISREPRESENTATION AND MANIPULATION. THE US AUTHORITIES WERE AWARE OF THE EFFECT THAT SUCH VISITS COULD HAVE ON PUBLIC OPINION, IN PARTICULAR IN REDUCING THREAT PERCEPTIONS.

14. IN CONCLUSION, KEEL SAID THAT THE US WISHED TO STRESS THAT THIS DIALOGUE WOULD NOT SERVE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR EXISTING OR PLANNED NEGOTIATIONS. HE WOULD SEEK TO GIVE ALLIES AS MUCH FURTHER DETAILS AS POSSIBLE IN WRITING. THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO CONSULT AND CO-ORDINATE ON THE APPROACH TO MILITARY/ MILITARY CONTACTS.

IN PARTICULAR, THE US WOULD OFFER THE USUAL BRIEFINGS BEFORE AND AFTER THE EVENT ON THE FORTHCOMING YAZOV/CARLUCCI MEETING.

15. FOR DISCUSSION SEE MIFT.

ALEXANDER

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SIC EME

MITTERRAND ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL.

SUMMARY

1. POSITIVE TONE BUT NO SPECIFIC RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV PROPOSALS. ARGUES THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL SHOULD TAKE PRIORITY OVER NATO TNW MODERNIZATION. A MITTERRAND/GORBACHEV MEETING TO BE HELD THIS YEAR.

DETAIL

2. MITTERRAND GAVE A LIVE TELEVISION INTERVIEW ON 14 JULY, INCLUDING POSITIVE REFERENCES TO EAST/WEST RELATIONS. THE OFFICIAL TEXT IS NOT YET AVAILABLE (GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS ARE CLOSED TODAY), AND TODAY'S FINANCIAL TIMES SEEMS TO HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD MITTERRAND'S POSITION ON THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL FOR A PAN-EUROPEAN SUMMIT: IN FACT MITTERRAND CAREFULLY AVOIDED COMMENTING SPECIFICALLY ON THIS PROPOSAL. HE STRESSED HIS SUPPORT FOR A REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN CENTRAL EUROPE - QUOTE THE EAST'S FORCES ARE IN THEORY GREATLY SUPERIOR TO THE WEST'S UNQUOTE: THIS IMBALANCE MUST BE PUT RIGHT. HE SAID THAT HIS IDEAS ON THIS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED AT THE NATO SUMMIT IN BRUSSELS. NOW GORBACHEV WAS DEFENDING COMPARABLE IDEAS, AND THIS WAS TO BE WELCOMED AND ENCOURAGED. BUT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY GORBACHEV PROPOSAL WHICH DID NOT GO IN THE DIRECTION OF RESTORING A BALANCE AND WHICH WOULD LEAD TO ENDLESS, FRUITLESS DISCUSSIONS. MITTERRAND SAID THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY MEET GORBACHEV AGAIN DURING THIS YEAR.

3. DESPITE RECENT ENCOURAGING SIGNS THAT SENIOR FRENCH MILITARY AND OFFICIALS ACCEPT THE NEED FOR NATO TO KEEP UP TO DATE ITS THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES, MITTERRAND ALSO SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS SHOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE MODERNIZATION, IE STRENGTHENING (SIC), OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES.

4. IN A MESSAGE TO THE ARMED FORCES ON 13 JULY, MITTERRAND SPOKE POSITIVELY OF DIALOGUE AND OF VERIFIED DISARMAMENT BUT ALSO SAID

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THAT PEACE AND LIBERTY WERE FRAGILE AND DEMANDED CONTINUAL VIGILANCE.

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SIC A3A

MIPT: VISIT OF MARSHALL AKHROMEYEV TO THE USA

1. THE JOINT STATEMENT READS AS FOLLOWS:
QUOTE THE US CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND THE SOVIET CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS INDICATED THEIR INTENT TO PURSUE POLICIES AND ACTIONS WHICH WILL ASSIST THE ARMED FORCES OF THE US AND THE USSR IN THE AVOIDANCE OF ENGAGEMENT IN DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE VICINITY OF EACH OTHER, AND IN THE IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF SUCH ACTIVITY, SHOULD IT ARISE. TO THIS END, THE SIDES WILL ALSO ENSURE THE APPROPRIATE TRAINING AND PREPARATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ARMED FORCES.
ADDITIONALLY, THEY INDICATED THAT THEY INTEND TO ESTABLISH A US SOVIET MILITARY TO MILITARY WORKING GROUP, TO OPERATE UNDER GUIDANCE WHICH THEY SHALL PROVIDE, TO EXPLORE THE ISSUE OF DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITY IN GREATER DETAILS AND MAKE RECOMMENTATIONS.
AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE WORKING GROUP WILL REVIEW THE TWO SIDES' RESPECTIVE CAPABILITIES TO COMMUNICATE EXPEDITIOUSLY WITH ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE OTHER COUNTRY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM OCCURRING OR CONTINUING BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF THOSE MILITARY FORCES. IN ADDITION, THE WORKING GROUP WILL CONSIDER WHETHER THERE ARE TYPES OF DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITY WHICH COULD ARISE THAT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS, WHICH SHOULD BE MADE THE SUBJECT OF APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS.
THE TWO SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES ALSO INDICATED THAT THERE IS NO INTENTION ON THEIR PART TO REPLACE OR DEROGATE FROM EXISTING AGREEMENTS SUCH AS THE 1972 AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS ON AND OVER THE HIGH SEAS OR THE 1947 HUEBNER MALININ AGREEMENT ON MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS. THEIR INTENT IS SIMPLY TO IMPROVE THEIR PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP SO THAT MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE US AND USSR ARE LESS AT RESK WHEN OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF EACH OTHER. UNQUOTE
2. THE AGREED PROGRAMME OF ACTIVITIES IS:

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FALL 1988
(1) COMMANDER IN CHIEF US ARMY EUROPE - COMMANDER IN CHIEF GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES, GERMANY MEETING

WINTER 1988/89
(1) MILITARY MEDICAL EXCHANGE VISITS
(2) ARMED FORCES MUSEUM EXCHANGE VISITS

SPRING 1989
(1) WAR COLLEGE EXCHANGE VISITS
(2) US MILITARY HISTORIAN VISIT TO USSR

SUMMER 1989
(1) CHAIRMAN JCS VISIT TO USSR
(2) NAVAL SHIP EXCHANGE VISITS

FALL 1989
(1) CHIEF OF SOVIET AIR FORCE VISIT TO US
(2) US CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS VISIT TO USSR

WINTER 1989/90
(1) SOVIET MILITARY HISTORIAN VISIT TO US
(2) ARMED FORCES BAND EXCHANGE VISITS

SPRING 1990
(1) WAR COLLEGE EXCHANGE VISITS
(2) RIFLE/PISTOL SPORTS COMPETITION
(3) US ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF VISIT TO USSR

SUMMER 1990
(1) NAVAL SHIP EXCHANGE VISITS
(2) USSR NAVY CHIEF VISIT TO US

FALL 1990
(1) SOVIET GROUND FORCES COMMANDER VISIT TO US
(2) US AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF VISIT TO USSR

SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENT FOR THESE AND ANY OTHER AGREED ACTIVITIES WILL BE MADE THROUGH OUR MILITARY ATTACHES.

FALL

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PS/LORD GLENARTHUR
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR GOULDEN
MR FEARN

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SIC A3A

VISIT OF MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV, CHIEF OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF, TO THE USA (6-11 JULY)

SUMMARY

1. AKHROMEYEV'S VISIT TO THE US SEEN BY BOTH MILITARY DELEGATIONS AS PROMOTING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. BUT STATE MAKE NO SECRET OF THEIR UNHAPPINESS ABOUT THE PACE OF US/SOVIET MILITARY CONTACTS.

DETAIL

2. MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES, VISITED THE USA FROM 6-11 JULY. HIS HOST WAS ADMIRAL CROWE, CHAIRMAN OF THE US JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. AS WELL AS WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK AKHROMEYEV VISITED FORT HOOD, TEXAS: THE ALAMO AND MOUNT RUSHMORE: CROWE'S HOME STATE OF OKLAHOMA: AND THE USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT OFF NORFOLK VIRGINIA: USMC 2ND DIVISION AT CAMP LEJEUNE, NORTH CAROLINA: AND ELLSWORTH AFB, SOUTH DAKOTA (WHERE HE SAW THE B1-B)

3. AT THE END OF THE VISIT THE TWO SIDES RELEASED A JOINT STATEMENT AS WELL AS A PROGRAMME OF US/SOVIET MILITARY EXCHANGES FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS (TEXTS IN MIFT). THERE WERE TWO OFFICIAL JOINT PRESS CONFERENCES, ONE AT THE BEGINNING AND ONE AT THE END OF THE VISIT. AKHROMEYEV AND CROWE BOTH EXPRESSED THEMSELVES WELL SATISFIED WITH THE VISIT, PARTICULARLY AS A MEANS TO BETTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.

4. AS WELL AS THE EXCHANGES AND THE SUBJECTS MENTIONED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT, DISCUSSIONS INCLUDED:

(I) SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT THEIR FORCES STRUCTURE AND MILITARY BUDGET STRUCTURE WILL BE REVISED:

(II) MILITARY DOCTRINE:

(III) DISCUSSIONS (BUT NOT NEGOTIATIONS) ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS:

5. STATE (POL/MIL AND EUR) HAVE LEFT US IN NO DOUBT THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE CONSULTATION WITH THEM IN THE RUN-UP TO THE VISIT (AND ECHOES OF THE ENSUING ROW BETWEEN STATE AND THE PENTAGON

HAVE NOW REACHED THE PRESS). IN PARTICULAR STATE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE ABSENCE OF INTER-AGENCY CONSULTATION ON THE WHOLE ISSUE OF MIL/MIL CONTACTS HAS BECOME A FEATURE OF THE CARLUCCI TENURE AT THE PENTAGON. THE CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH YAZOV HAS MADE STATE UNEASY. THE AKHROMEYEV VISIT WAS BUT ANOTHER EXAMPLE. SO WAS A VISIT (WITH PRECIOUS LITTLE ADVANCE WARNING) BY A DELEGATION LED BY AIRFORCE CHIEF ALDRIDGE TO MOSCOW FROM 3-8 JULY. THERE IS A GENERAL FEELING AT STATE THAT THIS PROGRAMME OF EXCHANGES IS DEVELOPING TOO RAPIDLY AND WITH INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO RECIPROCITY. THEY ARE ALSO UNCOMFORABLY AWARE OF THE INCONSISTENCY OF SOME OF THE DETAILED PROPOSALS (EG AGREEMENT FOR SOVIET SHIPS TO VISIT THE US) WITH THE NATO GUIDELINES ON EAST/WEST CONTACTS, AND ALARMED AT HOW HARD AKHROMEYEV PUSHED FOR AGREEMENTS ON EXCHANGE VISITS AND OTHER MIL/MIL PROPOSALS. STATE HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE VAGUE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR BILATERAL MIL/MIL WORKING GROUP (WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED TO QUOTE EXPLORE THE ISSUE OF DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITY UNQUOTE), DOUBTS WHICH THE PENTAGON HAVE SO FAR FAILED TO ANSWER.

6. FOR THEIR PART, SENIOR PENTAGON OFFICIALS APPEAR TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO SOME OF STATE'S CONCERNS. WOODWORTH (DAS, OSD) TOLD US ON 12 JULY THAT AN INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP IN MIL/MIL CONTACTS HAD NOW BEEN ESTABLISHED UNDER HIS CHAIRMANSHIP TO IMPROVE COORDINATION OF FUTURE EXCHANGES KEEL WILL BE BRIEFING THE NAC ON THE AKHROMEYEV VISIT ON 15 JULY, AND WOODWORTH (WHO ADMITTED THAT THE US HAD QUOTE GOT OUT AHEAD UNQUOTE) FULLY EXPECTED THAT THE INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE US APPROACH AND THE NATO GUIDELINES WOULD BE AIRED AT THAT SESSION. NEVERTHELESS THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE LET-UP IN THE PENTAGON'S NEW FOUND ENTHUSIASM FOR CONTACTS WITH THE RUSSIANS, WITH CARLUCCI SCHEDULED TO VISIT MOSCOW FOR FURTHER TALKS WITH YAZOV AT THE END OF THIS MONTH.

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*From the Private Secretary*

30 June 1988

attached to translation

I enclose a copy of the original of Mr. Gorbachev's recent message to the Prime Minister which may be of interest to the Department (not least because of the first example, in my experience, of Mr. Gorbachev's new typewriter).

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MIPT: 9-10 JUNE: GLOBAL TRENDS

SUMMARY

1. SHULTZ AGAIN INTRODUCED A DISCUSSION ON THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY ON THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. OTHERS SHOWED SOME INTEREST.

DETAIL

2. SHULTZ CIRCULATED A BUNDLE OF MATERIAL INCLUDING TWO OF HIS OWN SPEECHES. HE SUMMARIESED HIS NOW FAMILAR VIEWS. WE LIVED IN A NEW EARA MARKED BY THE EXPLOSIVE CREATION AND SPREAD OF KNOWLEDGE. THE POWER OF IT WAS INCREASING ALL THE TIME AND ITS IMPACT INCREASED IN PARALLEL. THE OLD INDUSTRIAL AGE WAS OVER: THE STEEL MILL AND PRODUCTION LINE WERE OVERTAKEN BY THE IFNROMATION AGE. SUCCESS NOW DEPENDED ON OPENNESS: INFORMATION COULD NOT BE USED EFFECTIVELY IF IT STAYED IN THE CLOSET. THIS PROFOUNDLY AFFECTED THE NATURE OF SOCIETY. HE HAD ORIGINALLY PRESENTED THIS THESIS IN MOSCOW AS A HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION, WHICH HAD BEEN BADLY RECIEVED, BUT THE MESSAGE HAD SOAKED IN LATER. THE SMART DEVELOPING COUNTIES WERE CONCENTRATING ON EDUCATION: THE NUMBER OF INDIANS STUDYING FOR PHDS EXCEEDED ANY OTHER COUNTRY. HALF THE FOREIGN STUDENTS ENROLLED IN THE U.S. CAME FROM SOUTH AND EAST ASIA. AT THE SAME TIME TRADE AND FINANCIAL EXCHANGES WERE BECOMING GLOBALISED, LEADING TO A CONVERGENCE OF INCOMES OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD UNDERSTOOD THE PROCESS. THE SEPARATE NEW YORK AND LONDON FINANCIAL MARKETS WERE PART OF A WORLD MARKET WITH TRANSACTIONS REACHING A TRILLION DOLLARS DAILY. THIS LED TO THE CONVERGENCE OF POLICIES - GOOD IN THE CASE OF TAX REDUCTION, LESS IN THE CASE OF A DOWNWARD SPIRAL OF AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION. HE WAS LOOKING FOR A GOOD CONVERGENCE ON ALLIANCE BURDEN SHARING AS EACH FACED UP TO ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. THE WORLD WAS CHANGING FAST AND WE MUST LOOK AHEAD.

3. GENSHCER (FRG) EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE WAY IN WHICH SHULTZ HAD RAISED THE SUBJECT. IT WAS OPEN SOCIETIES WHICH WOULD BE BEST PLACED TO COPE WITH THE COMING IFNORMATION AGE. BUT THE CHOICE OF EITHER PARTICIPATION OR ISOLATION WOULD POSE A FUNDAMENTAL

CHALLENGE FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD DETERMINE WHETHER IT REMAINED A DECISIVE COUNTRY IN WORLD AFFAIRS OR NOT. MARXISM HAD ASSUMED THAT SOCIETY WAS DEFINED BY THE CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION. BUT IF THE AVAILABILTY OF INFORMATION, RAHTER THAN THE PRODUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL GOODS, WAS THE KEY TO FUTURE PROGRESS THE RUSSIANS WOULD FACE A PROBLEM OF REVOLUTIONARY PROPORTIONS FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THEIR SOCIAL SYSTEM. BY CONTRAST THE WEST WAS WELL PLACED TO ADJUST TO THE CHANGE. WE SHOULD NOT THEREFORE FEEL TOO DEFENSIVE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION.

4. PINHEIRO (PORTUGAL) SUGGESTED THAT THE CAPACITY FOR INNOVATION, RATHER THAN JUST THE AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION, WOULD BE THE KEY FACTOR. EVEN TODAY THE LIFE-SPAN OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT WAS HALF WHAT IT WAS IN THE 1970S: AND THIS TREND WOULD CONTINUE. IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION SIMPLY TO BUY IN, IF THEY WERE UNABLE TO INNOVATE THEMSELVES. THEY AND THEIR ALLIES WOULD BE LIKELY THEREFORE TO SEEK HELP FROM THE WEST OVER THE PROVISION OF MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES.

5. HERMANSSON (ICELAND) DID NOT SHARE THIS OPTIMISM. THE FACT THAT THE GLOOMY FORECASTS OF THE CLUB OF ROME HAD NOT ALL COME TRUE DID NOT MEAN THAT THERE WERE NOT FORMIDABLE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS FACING THE WORLD, SUCH AS THE OZONE LAYER AND MARINE POLLUTION. HOW MOREOVER COULD THOSE MANY COUNTRIES WITH A GDP PER HEAD OF ONLY 400-500 DOLLARS EVER HOPE TO ACHIEVE A DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING.

6. STOLTENBERG (NORWAY) ASKED WHAT WERE THE LESSONS FOR DIPLOMACY OF THE NEW INFORMATION ERA. WOULD IT NOT IN FUTURE BE LESS A MATTER OF DEALINGS BETWEEN STATES AND MORE ONE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, OR GROUPS OF STATES, AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST GROUPS? WAS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY NOT AN ILLUSTRATION OF THIS?

7. SHULTZ (US) AGREED THAT REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS WOULD BE OF INCREASING IMPORTANCE. ASEAN WAS A PRIME EXAMPLE, BUT THERE WERE MANY OTHERS EITHER IN EXISTENCE OR IN EMBRYO. WHETHER THE UN ITSELF WOULD BE A MAJOR FORCE WAS A MOOT POINT. THE ORGANISATION ITSELF WAS SO BIG AND HAD THE TRADITION OF A DEBATING SOCIETY. BUT ITS TECHNICAL BODIES DID A GOOD JOB. CW WAS AN AREA WHERE A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION EFFORT WOULD BE REQUIRED. SO WAS THE CONTROL OF BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY.

8. YOU ENDORSED THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS. THERE WAS MOREOVER AN INCREASING PATTERN OF MEETINGS BETWEEN THEM. THE WORLD OF FOREIGN MINISTERS WAS BECOMING MORE AND MORE

MULTIPOLAR. YET AT THE SAME TIME THERE WERE MORE INSTANCES IN THE WORLD OF DISORGANISATION AND CATASTROPHIC MISMANGEMENT: ETHIOPIA, THE LEBANON, ANGOLA AND KAMPUCHEA. AND THIS DEPSITE THE FAIRLY MODEST LEVEL OF RESOURCES WHICH HAD IN THE PAST BEEN ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN REASONABLE ORDER. THE SUDAN POLITICAL SERVICE HAD CONSISTED OF ONLY 44 OR SO PEOPLE. THE WEST NEEDED TO CONSIDER HOW TO SPREAD GOOD MANAGEMENT WITHOUT BEING ACCUSED OF NEO-IMPERIALISM. YOU ALSO WONDERED WHETHER IN FUTURE MINISTERS WOULD NEED PHYSICALLY TO GATHER TOGETHER FOR NATO MEETINGS OR WHETHER IT WOULD ALL BE DONE BY TELECONFERENCING.

9. SEE MIFT.

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MR BOYD
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# POLITICAL STATEMENT

1. We the Leaders of our seven countries, and the representatives of the European Community, have considered the future of East-West relations. The discussion has confirmed that our free and democratic societies will stand together in solidarity and cohesion within the framework of our existing alliances. We also reaffirmed tha nuclear deterrence and adequate conventional strength are the guarantees of peace in freedom. Equally, we confirm our belief in constructive and realistic dialogue and cooperation, including arms control, as the way to build stability between East and West.

2. In several important respects changes have taken place in relations between Western countries and the Soviet Union since we last met. This evolution has come about because the industrialized democracies have been strong and united, and because the inherent limitations of the Soviet social and economic system have forced changes in Soviet policies. Greater freedom and openness in the Soviet Union will offer opportunities to reduce mistrust and build confidence. Each of us will respond positively to any such developments.

3. We call upon the Soviet leadership to play a responsible role on issues of common concern. We welcome the beginning of the Soviet withdrawal of its occupation troops from Afghanistan. It must be total, and apply to the entire country. The Afghan people must be able to choose their government freely. Each of us confirms our willingness to make our full contribution to the efforts of the international community to ensure the return of the refugees to their homeland, their resettlement, and the reconstruction of their country. We now look to the Soviet Union to make a constructive contribution to resolving other regional conflicts as well.

4. Since our last meeting, progress has been made between the United States and the Soviet Union in agreeing to reduce arms without compromising the security of any of our countries. The INF Treaty, the direct result of Western firmness and unity, is the first Treaty ever to abolish an entire class of weapons. It sets vitally important precedents for future arms control agreements: asymmetrical reductions and intrusive verification arrangements. We now look for deep cuts in US and Soviet strategic offensive arms. We congratulate President Reagan on what he has already accomplished, along with General Secretary Gorbachev, towards this goal.

5. Nonetheless, the massive presence of Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe and the Soviet capacity to launch surprise attacks and large scale offensive operations lies at the core of the security problem in Europe. The Soviet military buildup in the Far East is equally a major source of instability in Asia. These threats must be reduced: enhanced security and stability at lower levels of forces is our goal. We seek a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons.

6. Genuine peace cannot be established solely by arms control. It must be firmly based on respect for fundamental human rights. We urge the Soviet Union to move forward in ensuring human dignity and freedoms, and to implement fully the commitments it has undertaken in the Helsinki process. Recent progress must be institutionalized, the painful barriers that divide people must come down, and the obstacles to emigration must be removed.

7. We take positive note of Eastern countries' growing interest in ending their economic isolation, for example in the establishment and development of relations with the European Community. East-West economic relations can be expanded so long as the commercial basis is sound, they are conducted within the framework of the basic principles and rules of the international trade and payments system, and are consistent with our security interests.

(French reserve on preceding section.)

8. We pay special attention to the countries in eastern Europe. We encourage them to open up their economies and societies, and to improve respect for human rights. In this context, we support the continuation and strengthening of the Helsinki process.

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If leaders wish to have text on the Middle East, paragraphs 9 and 10 are agreed.

9. We express our deep concern at the increasing instability in the Near East. The current violence in the Occupied Territories is a clear sign that the status quo is not sustainable. An early negotiated settlement to the underlying Arab/Israel dispute is essential. We declare our support for the convening of a properly structured international conference as the appropriate framework for the necessary negotiations between the parties directly concerned. In this perspective, we salute current efforts aimed at achieving a settlement, including the initiative pursued by Mr. Shultz since March. We urge the parties to cooperate fully in the search for a solution.

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10. We have pursued our consultations about the continuing war between Iraq and Iran which remains a source of profound concern to us. We reaffirm our support for Security Council Resolution 598, which was adopted unanimously. We express our warm appreciation for the efforts of the Secretary General to work for a settlement on this basis, and reiterate our determination to ensure implementation of this mandatory resolution by a follow-up resolution if compliance cannot otherwise be secured. We condemn the use of chemical weapons by either party, deplore proliferation of ballistic missiles in the region, and renew our commitment to uphold the principle of freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

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If leaders wish to have text on terrorism, paragraphs 11-15 are agreed language.

11. We strongly reaffirm our condemnation of terrorism in all its forms, including the taking of hostages. We renew our commitment to policies and measures agreed at previous Summits, in particular those against state sponsored terrorism.

12. We strongly condemn recent threats to air security, in particular the destruction of a Korean Airliner and the hijacking of a Kuwaiti Airliner. We recall the principle affirmed in previous declarations that terrorists must not go unpunished. We appeal to all countries who are not party to the international conventions on civil aviation security, in particular the Hague Convention, to accede to these conventions.

13. We express support for work currently underway in the International Civil Aviation Organization aimed at strengthening international protection against hijackings. (This includes measures to investigate future hijackings, to help countries to deal with hijackings, to strengthen security guidelines and to endorse the principle that hijacked aircraft should not be allowed to take off once they have landed, apart from exceptional circumstances.)

14. We welcome the adoption this year in Montreal and Rome of two international agreements on aviation and maritime security to enhance the safety of travellers.

15. We reaffirm our determination to continue the fight against terrorism through the application of rule of law, the policy of no concessions to terrorists and their sponsors, and international cooperation.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Since the Foreign Secretary is away, you may yourself wish to give an account of the US/Soviet Summit, & Shevardnadze's visit, & your exchange of messages with Mr. Gorbachev.

C.D.P.

CONFIDENTIAL

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bc: PC

# 10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

8 June 1988

SUBJECT cc MASTER

**US/SOVIET SUMMIT: MESSAGE FROM MR GORBACHEV**

The Prime Minister received Ambassador Grinevsky and the Soviet Ambassador in London this evening to take delivery of a personal message from Mr Gorbachev about the recent US/Soviet Summit. The text of the message is enclosed.

Ambassador Grinevsky said the message was intended as a reply to that sent by the Prime Minister to Mr Gorbachev before the Summit. He had also been asked to convey Mr Gorbachev's personal gratitude for the Prime Minister's second message following the Summit. He had been very pleased to receive that.

Ambassador Grinevsky went on to make a number of comments about the Summit, few of which added significantly to the message or to the accounts which we have already received. He put particular stress on the change which was taking place in the whole nature of Soviet/American relations. He gave the impression that a START Agreement was within reach and could, in the Soviet view, be completed before the end of President Reagan's term of office. Mr Gorbachev would be interested to know the Prime Minister's assessment of American intentions: were they ready to sign a START Agreement this year? The Prime Minister said that she thought that President Reagan would be ready to sign an agreement provided he was satisfied that it was a good one. In a further exchange about the situation in the Middle East, Ambassador Grinevsky said that the Americans had raised the need to control the spread of ballistic missile technology in the area. It had been agreed that there would be discussions between Soviet and American experts in September.

The Prime Minister picked up the reference towards the end of Mr Gorbachev's message confirming his intention to take up the invitation to visit the United Kingdom. Ambassador Grinevsky said that Mr Gorbachev would be very flexible about timing. He would welcome an early view from the Prime Minister about the new American Administration. Particularly during the inter-regnum at the turn of the year, it would be important to avoid an impression of a vacuum in East/West relations. That would be one possible time for a visit,

although it might equally be later. It was agreed that I would let the Soviet Ambassador have details of times which the Prime Minister could and could not manage so that he could then give Mr Gorbachev some indication of possible dates. The Ambassador will then come to see the Prime Minister in early July to report on the outcome of the Party Conference and convey any further thoughts about the visit (although I suspect that it may be the early Autumn before we get any clear steer on dates).

We are telling the press that the Prime Minister has received a substantive message about the Summit from Mr Gorbachev covering all the main issues raised there in some detail. We shall also say that the message confirmed Mr Gorbachev's interest in paying a visit to the United Kingdom and that dates will be discussed once the Soviet Party Conference is over.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T88/88

Pl. file
(Mr. Gorbachev's message
9 & June). CDP 9/6

Unofficial translation

SUBJECT cc MASTER
OPS

Dear Madame Thatcher,

Thank you for your detailed message.

The fact, that you found it necessary to share your views on the most important international and regional problems in advance of Soviet-American summit, only confirms our conviction, that meetings of the leaders of the USSR and the USA are of a significance far exceeding the framework of bilateral relations.

As I understand, President Reagan has already conveyed to you personally the contents of the Moscow talks, the impressions of his stay in our capital. It is quite understandable that he visited London: many European political interests are focused on this capital. On my way to Washington in December 1987 I also made a stopover in the UK for talks with you.

In addition to what I have said in public I would like, in accordance with your request, to share with you my vision of the results of the Moscow meeting. Detailed information will be conveyed to you by our special envoy. And this message is briefly about the main things, on what we consider to be a success of the Moscow meeting and what still needs new efforts and additional study. I would be greatful for your views on these matters.

I would like to mark out the following impression of my own and of my colleaques in the Soviet leadership.

Bearing in mind the whole package of the signed Soviet-American agreements, the atmosphere of the Moscow meeting, one can say that the stock of confidence in the relations between the USSR and the USA has increased. It might be very helpful for the future as far as the whole spectrum of East-West relations is concerned and it is for this end that you, Madame Prime-Minister, came out in favour of making efforts.

Much from the vestiges of the past - feelings of hostility, major and minor irritants - recede for the sake of moving forward on the principal issues of disarmament,

developing all-round international cooperation, securing a lasting peace. It is the truth in relations between the USSR and the USA, confirmed by the fourth summit in Moscow. It is the truth in relations between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, being confirmed by the develpment of our continuous political dialogue.

Our dialogue permits us to look jointly for areas where the Soviet-British interaction could bring positive results for our countries and for the whole world and make fruitful use of unique experience, accumulated in Europe, for solving complicated international problems.

Coming back to the results of the Moscow Soviet-American summit I would like to note - it went in a dynamic and constructive key and was undoubtedly useful. At the meeting new steps were made towards major agreements of a global significance. With all their importance of course, as I have already said, not all the chances have been made good use of - more could have been achieved. I agree with you that it is difficult to negotiate on vital matters against deadline. Alas, the shortage of time allowed us by the realities of the world, by history is felt sharply. It is still more gratifying to realize that for the last three years we have covered a long way, and it has been reaffirmed that the line, determined in Geneva, is correct.

The INF Treaty came into force. Due to realism, political will and common sense we managed to overcome a number of obstacles on the way towards another, even more significant milestone - the reduction by half of the USSR and USA strategic arsenals in the conditions of preserving the ABM Treaty. It is clear that in reaching progress in the strategic offensive arms issues a significant role will be played by the position of both our allies and the allies of the United States including Great Britain, which has already made a considerable contribution to concluding the INF Treaty.

Im more general terms, I must say that our dialogue with the United States is always invisibly attended by a

third partner - Europe, whose indispensable role we in the Soviet leadership take into account. We highly appreciate the efforts of Great Britain and other countries when they are aimed at constructing the common European home.

In this context the problem of conventional arms was reviewed at the Moscow meeting. This issue leads directly to the subject of "super-arming" of Europe and concerns all European states. The progress on the mandate of the new talks in Vienna is obvious. But difficulties still remain, and they can be overcome only by joint efforts, from different sides, from East and West.

Recently we succeded in making more active our interaction in banning chemical weapons. A testimony to that is the visit by Soviet experts to Porton-Down and a forthcoming visit by the British representatives to Shikhany. However as you rightly note in your message, the urgency in solving this issue is increasing. At the meeting with the US President in Moscow this question has been discussed in detail and contstructively. That atmosphere must prevail in Geneva as well.

Regional conflicts demand our constant and vigilant attention.

Here we managed to put someting into motion. The sense of responsibility and realism made possible the signing of the agreements on Afganistan. Now, as you obviously understand, it is essential to provide their consistent and strict fulfilment. We must not forget that the key question of the settlemtnt is not only the withdrawal of Soviet troops but the end of any interference from outside, the elimination of material basis of such interference as well. As far as our obligations are concerned, the result is evident - with a strict adherance to the time-table we began the withdrawal of the Soviet limited contingent. The refusal of other parties to adhere to the mutually agreed principles, attempts to undermine the Geneva agreements would have serious negative consequences. This was layed out with full frankness to the President, and in my statement at the press-conference. We count on Great Britain with its

considerable potential to promote in every possible way the respect of the spirit and the letter of the Geneva Agreements.

The experience of the settlement in Afganistan, the experience of collective interaction prompts the ways of eliminating other hotbeds of tension - in Asia and Africa, Middle East, and Persian Gulf. It is a positive fact that we understand the difficulties which arose on the way of convening the conference on the Middle East. It is true that we need energetic multilateral efforts in order that all participants would come to understanding of importance of finding the solutions at the negotiating table. I presume that your attention in this connection was drawn to my statement at the press-conference in Moscow, where I mentioned that as soon as a plenipotentiary and efficient conference on the Middle East starts its work we shall be ready to engage ourselves in the settlement of diplomatic relations with Israel. There is no doubt, you will realise, that this has been said not by chance but with due weighing.

We agree with you that every effort should be applied to prevent a dangerous development of the Iran-Iraq conflict. The situation in this region, taking into account the use of chemical weapons and missiles, remains tense. I agree with you that these aspects of the conflict concern you, us and the Americans. Searching for a settlement, one should move consistently and, in the first place, use to the utmost the potential of the Security Council Resolution 598, lead the sides to the cessation of combat actions and work on a systematic basis with Iran and Iraq. In this context a foreign military presence in the Persian Gulf, and, moreover, its build-up will move away the prospect of a settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict.

You are aware of the decision by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to cut by half before the end of this year the number of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. It is an important step on the way to a settlement which testifies not only to the stability of the situation in the country but also to the readiness of its leaders for a constructive dialogue.

Much will now depend on the reaction of the other side. We see also a possibility of a movement to a settlement in South Africa. The talks that took place in London seem to have laid a certain basis for it. The main thing is that there should be a firm guarantee for the fulfilment of the known resolutions of the UN Security Council which exclude the interference by the Republic of South Africa in Angolan affairs and provide for the obligatory granting of independence to Namibia. In this key we conducted our negotiations with President Reagan in Moscow.

In a nutshell, positive dynamics of world processes are growing. But much more remains to be done than has been done, for a world to become secure and for people to be able to live and work without fear. The Soviet leardership will continue to apply energetic efforts to it and expect the interaction with Britain, as well as with other states that are ready to work for the creation of international law and order and civilised relations in the world.

A party conference will soon take place in our country which, as you rightly note, will be a really historic event. I am closely involved in its preparation now.

In conclusion, may I thank you, Madame Prime Minister, for confirming the invitation to visit your country. This coincides with my wishes. I shall inform you as soon as the programme of my trips for the next year is defined.

Raisa Maximovna and I send you and your husband our best wishes.

With respect,

M. Gorbachev

Moscow, Kremlin
8 June, 1988

Уважаемая госпожа Тэтчер,

Благодарю Вас за содержательное послание.

Тот факт, что Вы сочли необходимым поделиться своими соображениями по наиболее важным международным и региональным проблемам накануне советско-американской встречи на высшем уровне, лишь утверждает нас в убеждении, что встречи руководителей СССР и США имеют значение, далеко выходящие за рамки двусторонних отношений.

Президент Р.Рейган, как я понимаю, уже лично рассказал Вам о содержании переговоров в Москве и о своих впечатлениях от пребывания в нашей столице. Вполне понятно, что он приезжал в Лондон: на эту столицу сфокусированы многие европейские политические интересы. И я, направляясь в Вашингтон в декабре 1987 года, останавливался в Англии для бесед с Вами.

В дополнение к тому, что я высказал публично, хочу в соответствии с переданной Вами просьбой поделиться с Вами своим видением результатов московской встречи. Детальную информацию доведет до Вас наш специальный представитель. А в этом послании коротко о главном, о том, что мы считаем удавшимся на московской встрече, а что нуждающимся в новых усилиях и дополнительной проработке. Буду признателен за Ваши суждения на сей счет.

Хотел бы выделить такое впечатление мое и моих коллег в советском руководстве. С учетом всей совокупности подписанных советско-американских соглашений, атмосферы встречи в Москве можно сказать, что запас доверия в отношениях СССР и США возрос. И это очень может пригодиться на будущее по всему спектру отношений между Востоком и Западом, к чему Вы, г-жа премьер-министр,

Ее Превосходительству
Госпоже Маргарет Тэтчер,
Премьер-министру Великобритании
г.Лондон

призывали прилагать усилия.

Многое из наследия прошлого - чувства враждебности, крупные недоразумения и мелкие шероховатости - отходит на второй план во имя движения вперед в магистральных вопросах разоружения, развития разностороннего международного сотрудничества, обеспечения устойчивого мира. Это подтверждается развитием отношений между СССР и США и, конечно, четвертой встречей в верхах в Москве. Это подтверждается развитием отношений и между СССР и Великобританией, всем ходом нашего с Вами непрерывного политического диалога.

Наш диалог позволяет совместно искать области, где советско-британское взаимодействие может принести позитивные результаты для наших стран и для всего мира, плодотворно использовать накопленный в Европе уникальный опыт решения сложных международных проблем.

Возвращаясь к итогам советско-американской встречи в Москве отмечу: она прошла в динамичном и конструктивном ключе и принесла несомненную пользу. На ней были сделаны новые шаги к крупным договоренностям глобального значения. При всей их важности, конечно же, как я уже говорил, не все шансы были использованы, - можно было достичь большего. Согласен с Вами, что трудно решать серьезнейшие проблемы в условиях цейтнота. Увы, недостаток времени, отпущенного нам реальностями мира, историей, ощущается весьма остро. Тем отраднее сознавать, что за последние три года пройден немалый путь, подтверждена на деле верность линии, определенной в Женеве.

Вступил в силу Договор по РСМД. Благодаря реализму, политической воле и здравому смыслу удалось преодолеть ряд препятствий на пути к другому, еще более важному рубежу - сокращению наполовину стратегических арсеналов СССР и США в условиях сохранения Договора по ПРО. Понятно, что в продвижении вперед в вопросах СНВ большую роль будет играть как позиция наших союзников, так и союзников Соединенных Штатов, в том числе Великобритании, уже внесшей существенный вклад в достижение Договора по РСМД.

Вообще, должен сказать, что в нашем диалоге с Соединенными Штатами всегда незримо присутствует третий партнер - Европа, незаменимую роль которой мы в советском руководстве учитываем. Высоко ценим усилия Великобритании и других стран, когда они направлены на строительство общеевропейского дома.

Под этим углом зрения на московской встрече рассматривалась проблема обычных вооружений. Она прямо выходит на тему о "сверх-вооружении" Европы и касается всех европейских государств. Есть прогресс в Вене по вопросу о мандате новых переговоров. Однако трудности все еще остаются, и преодолеть их можно лишь совместными усилиями с обеих сторон, с Востока и Запада.

В последнее время удалось активизировать взаимодействие в деле запрещения химического оружия. Свидетельство тому - поездка советских экспертов в Портон-Даун и предстоящий визит английских представителей в Шиханы. Однако, как Вы правильно отмечаете в своем послании, срочность в решении этого вопроса возрастает. На встрече с президентом США в Москве этот вопрос обсуждался подробно и конструктивно. Эта атмосфера должна преобладать и в Женеве.

Постоянного, особо бдительного внимания требуют к себе региональные конфликты.

Что-то удалось привести в движение. Ответственность и реализм позволили подписать Женевские Соглашения по Афганистану. Теперь, как Вы, очевидно, понимаете, необходимо обеспечить их последовательное и неукоснительное выполнение. Нельзя забывать, что стержневым вопросом урегулирования является не только вывод советских войск, но и прекращение любого вмешательства извне, ликвидация материальной базы такого вмешательства. Что касается наших обязательств, результат налицо - в строгом соответствии с графиком начался вывод советского ограниченного контингента. Отказ других сторон от взаимно согласованных принципов, попытки сорвать Женевские Соглашения имели бы серьезные негативные последствия. Об этом со всей прямотой было сказано президенту и в моем выступлении на пресс-конференции. Мы рассчитываем, что Великобритания, располагающая немалыми возможностями, будет всемерно способствовать уважению духа и буквы Женевских Соглашений.

Опыт афганского урегулирования, опыт коллективного взаимодействия подсказывает пути ликвидации других очагов напряженности - в Азии и Африке, на Ближнем Востоке, в Персидском Заливе. Хорошо, что мы с Вами представляем трудности, возникшие на пути созыва Ближневосточной конференции. Действительно, необходимы энергичные многосторонние усилия, чтобы участники пришли к пониманию важности поиска решений за столом переговоров. Наверное, Ваше внимание привлекло в этой связи мое заявление на пресс-конференции в Москве о том, что, когда начнется полноправная, действенная конференция по Ближнему Востоку, мы будем готовы заняться урегулированием дипломатических отношений с Израилем. Конечно, Вы понимаете, это было сказано не случайно, взвешенно.

Мы согласны с Вами в том, что нужно приложить все усилия, чтобы предотвратить опасное развитие ирано-иракского конфликта. Ситуация в этом регионе с учетом применения химического и ракетного оружия остается напряженной. Согласен с Вами, что эти аспекты конфликта заботят Вас, нас, американцев. В поисках урегулирования необходимо двигаться последовательно, в первую очередь до конца исчерпать потенциал, заложенный в резолюции 598 Совета Безопасности, выводить стороны на прекращение военных действий, на систематической основе работать с Ираном и Ираком. В этом контексте иностранное военное присутствие в Персидском Заливе, и тем более его наращивание, отдаляют перспективу урегулирования ирано-иракского конфликта.

Вам известно о решении СРВ до конца года сократить наполовину число вьетнамских войск в Кампучии. Это - важный шаг на пути урегулирования, свидетельствующий не только о стабилизации обстановки в стране, но и готовности ее руководства к конструктивному диалогу. Теперь многое будет зависеть от ответной реакции.

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предусматривающих обязательное предоставление независимости Намибии. В этом ключе мы вели переговоры в Москве с президентом Р.Рейганом.

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Раиса Максимовна и я шлем добрые пожелания Вам и Вашему супругу.

С уважением

М.Горбачев

8 июня 1988 г.

8.6.1988

Уважаемая госпожа Тэтчер,

Благодарю Вас за содержательное послание.

Тот факт, что Вы сочли необходимым поделиться своими соображениями по наиболее важным международным и региональным проблемам накануне советско-американской встречи на высшем уровне, лишь утверждает нас в убеждении, что встречи руководителей СССР и США имеют значение, далеко выходящее за рамки двусторонних отношений.

Президент Р.Рейган, как я понимаю, уже лично рассказал Вам о содержании переговоров в Москве и о своих впечатлениях от пребывания в нашей столице. Вполне понятно, что он приезжал в Лондон: на эту столицу сфокусированы многие европейские политические интересы. И я, направляясь в Вашингтон в декабре 1987 года, останавливался в Англии для бесед с Вами.

В дополнение к тому, что я высказал публично, хочу в соответствии с переданной Вами просьбой поделиться с Вами своим видением результатов московской встречи. Детальную информацию доведет до Вас наш специальный представитель. А в этом послании коротко о главном, о том, что мы считаем удавшимся на московской встрече, а что нуждающимся в новых усилиях и дополнительной проработке. Буду признателен за Ваши суждения на сей счет.

Хотел бы выделить такое впечатление мое и моих коллег в советском руководстве. С учетом всей совокупности подписанных советско-американских соглашений, атмосферы встречи в Москве можно сказать, что запас доверия в отношениях СССР и США возрос. И это очень может пригодиться на будущее по всему спектру отношений между Востоком и Западом, к чему Вы, госпожа Премьер-Министр, призывали прилагать усилия.

Многое из наследия прошлого - чувства враждебности, крупные недоразумения и мелкие шероховатости - отходит на второй план во имя движения вперед в магистральных вопросах разоружения, развития разностороннего международного сотрудничества, обеспечения устойчивого мира. Это подтверждается развитием отношений между СССР и США и, конечно, четвертой встречей в верхах в Москве. Это подтверждается развитием отношений и между СССР и Великобританией, всем ходом нашего с Вами непрерывного политического диалога.

Ее Превосходительству
госпоже Маргарет Тэтчер,
Премьер-Министру Великобритании

г.Лондон

Наш диалог позволяет совместно искать области, где советско-британское взаимодействие может принести позитивные результаты для наших стран и для всего мира, плодотворно использовать накопленный в Европе уникальный опыт решения сложных международных проблем.

Возвращаясь к итогам советско-американской встречи в Москве, отмечу: она прошла в динамичном и конструктивном ключе и принесла несомненную пользу. На ней были сделаны новые шаги к крупным договоренностям глобального значения. При всей их важности, конечно же, как я уже говорил, не все шансы были использованы, - можно было достичь большего. Согласен с Вами, что трудно решать серьезнейшие проблемы в условиях цейтнота. Увы, недостаток времени, отпущенного нам реальностями мира, историей, ощущается весьма остро. Тем отраднее сознавать, что за последние три года пройден немалый путь, подтверждена на деле верность линии, определенной в Женеве.

Вступил в силу Договор по РСМД. Благодаря реализму, политической воле и здравому смыслу удалось преодолеть ряд препятствий на пути к другому, еще более важному рубежу - сокращению наполовину стратегических арсеналов СССР и США в условиях сохранения Договора по ПРО. Понятно, что в продвижении вперед в вопросах СНВ большую роль будет играть как позиция наших союзников, так и союзников Соединенных Штатов, в том числе Великобритании, уже внесшей существенный вклад в достижение Договора по РСМД.

Вообще, должен сказать, что в нашем диалоге с Соединенными Штатами всегда незримо присутствует третий партнер - Европа, незаменимую роль которой мы в советском руководстве учитываем. Высоко ценим усилия Великобритании и других стран, когда они направлены на строительство общеевропейского дома.

Под этим углом зрения на московской встрече рассматривалась проблема обычных вооружений. Она прямо выходит на тему о "сверхвооружении" Европы и касается всех европейских государств. Есть прогресс в Вене по вопросу о мандате новых переговоров. Однако трудности все еще остаются, и преодолеть их можно лишь совместными усилиями с обеих сторон, с Востока и Запада.

В последнее время удалось активизировать взаимодействие в деле запрещения химического оружия. Свидетельство тому - поездка советских экспертов в Портон-Даун и предстоящий визит английских представителей в Шиханы. Однако, как Вы правильно отмечаете в своем послании, срочность в решении этого вопроса возрастает. На встрече с Президентом США в Москве этот вопрос обсуждался подробно и конструктивно. Эта атмосфера должна преобладать и в Женеве.

Постоянного, особо бдительного внимания требуют к себе региональные конфликты.

Что-то удалось привести в движение. Ответственность и реализм позволили подписать женевские соглашения по Афганистану. Теперь, как Вы, очевидно, понимаете, необходимо обеспечить их последовательное и неукоснительное выполнение. Нельзя забывать, что стержневым вопросом урегулирования является не только вывод советских войск, но и прекращение любого вмешательства извне, ликвидация материальной базы такого вмешательства. Что касается наших обязательств, результат налицо - в строгом соответствии с графиком начался вывод советского ограниченного контингента. Отказ других сторон от взаимно согласованных принципов, попытки сорвать женевские соглашения имели бы серьезные негативные последствия. Об этом со всей прямотой было сказано Президенту и в моем выступлении на пресс-конференции. Мы рассчитываем, что Великобритания, располагающая немалыми возможностями, будет всемерно способствовать уважению духа и буквы женевских соглашений.

Опыт афганского урегулирования, опыт коллективного взаимодействия подсказывает пути ликвидации других очагов напряженности - в Азии и Африке, на Ближнем Востоке, в Персидском заливе. Хорошо, что мы с Вами представляем трудности, возникшие на пути созыва ближневосточной конференции. Действительно, необходимы энергичные многосторонние усилия, чтобы участники пришли к пониманию важности поиска решений за столом переговоров. Наверное, Ваше внимание привлекло в этой связи мое заявление на пресс-конференции в Москве о том, что, когда начнется полноправная, действенная конференция по Ближнему Востоку, мы будем готовы заняться урегулированием дипломатических отношений с Израилем. Конечно, Вы понимаете, это было сказано не случайно, взвешенно.

Мы согласны с Вами в том, что нужно приложить все усилия, чтобы предотвратить опасное развитие ирано-иракского конфликта. Ситуация в этом регионе с учетом применения химического и ракетного оружия остается напряженной. Согласен с Вами, что эти аспекты конфликта заботят вас, нас, американцев. В поисках урегулирования необходимо двигаться последовательно, в первую очередь до конца исчерпать потенциал, заложенный в резолюции 598 Совета Безопасности, выводить стороны на прекращение военных действий, на систематической основе работать с Ираном и Ираком. В этом контексте иностранное военное присутствие в Персидском заливе, и тем более его наращивание, отдаляют перспективу урегулирования ирано-иракского конфликта.

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Раиса Максимовна и я шлем добрые пожелания Вам и Вашему супругу.

С уважением

М.ГОРБАЧЕВ

8 июня 1988 года

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MOSCOW SUMMIT: POLITBURO COMMUNIQUE

SUMMARY

1. POLITBURO ''FULLY APPROVES'' THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT. THE REPORT IS UPBEAT ON ALL MAJOR ISSUES.

DETAIL

2. THE POLITBURO OF THE CPSU MET ON 6 JUNE. AMONG OTHER BUSINESS, IT CONSIDERED THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. ACCORDING TO THE COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED IN TODAY'S PRAVDA, THE POLITBURO FULLY APPROVED GORBACHEV'S WORK AND THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE MOSCOW MEETING WAS A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL EVENT, WHOSE MAIN OUTCOME WAS A DEEPENING OF THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, EMBRACING BILATERAL ISSUES AND WORLD POLITICS. THE BASIS HAD BEEN LAID FOR THE LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND THE DIALOGUE HELPED PUT THESE ON A NORMAL, HEALTHY COURSE. THE SUMMIT RESULTS ENDORSED NEW THINKING.

ARMS CONTROL

3. THE INF TREATY WAS APPLAUDED. THE SUMMIT HAD ALSO SET DOWN THE NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES (SBLIZHENIE POSITSIY) ON ASPECTS OF START WITH OBSERVANCE OF THE ABMT, CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS, NUCLEAR TESTING, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

REGIONAL ISSUES

4. THE POLITBURO ALSO CONSIDERED THAT THE MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS HAD REVEALED POSSIBILITIES FOR US-SOVIET COOPERATION IN THE SEARCH FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS OF REGIONAL DISPUTES.

BILATERAL

5. THE REPORT NOTED THE WIDE RANGE OF BILATERAL ISSUES COVERED IN THE TALKS. THE TWO SIDES INTEND TO MAKE POSSIBLE A ''FRANK AND CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE ON HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS. THIS DIALOGUE, NATURALLY, SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTED ON A BUSINESS LIKE NON CONFRONTATIONAL BASIS, WITHOUT ANY ATTEMPTS TO INTERFERE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

COMMENT

6. AFTER THE WEEKEND (WHEN SOVIET COMMENTATORS WERE DWELLING ON THE TOUGHNESS OF THE TALKS AND THE MISSED OPPORTUNITIES IN ARMS CONTROL) THE POLITBURO HAS CHOSEN TO ACCENTUATE THE POSITIVE.

CARTLEDGE

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*From the Private Secretary*

7 June 1988

Dear Lyn.

US/SOVIET SUMMIT: SOVIET VIEWS

Mr. Kossov of the Soviet Embassy asked to see me at short notice yesterday. He handed over the enclosed note summarising the results of the US/Soviet Summit, as seen from the Soviet point of view. In amplifying - and in some cases contradicting - the note, he said that good progress had been made on the START negotiations. There was only one remaining point to be resolved on ALCMs. The Soviet side regarded the outstanding problems on strategic defence as fairly easily soluble (this cannot be reconciled with the note, but it is what he said). On mobile missiles, there had been agreement to designate restricted areas within which such missiles would be permissible in specified numbers. The only remaining issues were the size of the areas and the number of missiles, but that too was soluble. The main substantive problem remained with SLCMs. The Soviet military would never accept that they should remain entirely unrestricted and outside an agreement. It would of course be important to have effective verification measures for a START agreement but the experience with the INF agreement would be helpful in that respect. Mr. Kossov added that there had been a very good discussion of chemical weapons, the first time that this problem had been addressed seriously at a US/Soviet summit. The President had made a very firm statement of his commitment to the goal of a global ban on these weapons.

Mr. Kossov showed close interest in our assessment of whether the Americans were seriously interested in achieving a START agreement before the end of President Reagan's term of office. Their own impression was that President Reagan would like to reach an agreement but they were not sure that he would be "allowed" to do so by those around him. I said that our understanding was that the Americans were ready to continue negotiating but would not be rushed into an unsatisfactory agreement. The matter was therefore open. Mr. Kossov said that the Russians faced a real dilemma. They recognised that it might well not be welcome to a new Democrat President of the United States to have to seek ratification of a Treaty signed by his Republican predecessor. On the other hand, the historical experience was that Democratic Presidents found it very difficult to get arms control agreements through Congress at all. It would be a tragedy to lose the progress

SECRET AND PERSONAL

made under President Reagan. This pointed to a major effort to reach agreement while he was still in office.

Mr. Kossov went on to say that the Soviet Ambassador had seen Mr. Gorbachev at the end of the recent Central Committee meeting in Moscow. Mr. Gorbachev had expressed appreciation for the Prime Minister's pre-summit message and in particular for its tone. He had observed that he would certainly like to take up the Prime Minister's invitation to visit the United Kingdom before too long. It would be important to have a substantial agenda for a meeting. In reply to the Ambassador's question, Gorbachev had said that the visit might well be later this year. The Ambassador had found, however, that there were conflicting counsels in the Soviet foreign ministry where some senior officials would be reluctant to see Mr. Gorbachev come to Britain once more and would prefer him to visit other Western countries. The Ambassador proposed to revert to the matter with Mr. Gorbachev in the margins of the Party Conference at the end of June. He would then hope to see the Prime Minister in early July to report on the outcome of that Conference and consider the substance and timing of a visit. Mr. Kossov was not exact about possible dates but thought that it could be as soon as December or shortly after the turn of the year. He had noted that the Prime Minister had referred in her television interview to a visit in the spring or summer. He thought that this might be a bit late. Mr. Gorbachev might find it helpful to meet fairly soon after her visit to Washington so as to be able to get her assessment of the incoming Presidency. I said that the Prime Minister's concern was that Mr. Gorbachev should come at a moment which would be most helpful from his point of view. I thought she would certainly be prepared to see the Ambassador in July.

Mr. Kossov continued that it would be important for a visit to have substance. We should need to look for areas where it would be possible to take a step forward. One particular area was chemical weapons where there was already agreement in principle to the idea of a joint UK/Soviet statement. If this could be worked up, it could be a major feature of a summit. I said that in general these were matters to be dealt with multilaterally. I did not exclude the possibility of working out a joint statement, although it would probably have to cover areas of disagreement as well as areas of agreement.

Mr. Kossov remarked rather gloomily that <u>perestroika</u> seemed to be in considerable difficulty. The theses approved by the Central Committee for the Party Conference were rather vague and general. There were considerable economic difficulties at present. Yeltsin's interview with the BBC had caused him a storm and made life more difficult for Mr. Gorbachev, although Yeltsin himself had been elected a delegate to the party conference from the Karelia area. In his view, matters were coming to the point where a straight choice would have to be made between Ligachev and Yakovlev: they could not both survive in the leadership. A speech by Ligachev over the weekend, which he had seen on Soviet

television, made quite clear there were substantive differences between him and Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. Kossov mentioned rather wistfully the amount of economic assistance which Germany was extending to the Soviet Union in the form of credits and loans. There was an urgent need for such help at present.

Finally, Mr. Kossov referred to the Prime Minister's interview with Soviet television today. The interviewer would cover three broad areas: the Prime Minister's assessment of the recent summit and the direction of Soviet/American relations, her view of the future role of Western Europe, and her opinion of Mr. Gorbachev and his role on the world scene. The interview would be used in an evening news programme. But the comments on Mr. Gorbachev would be incorporated in a film about the Summit and his foreign policy achievements which is being prepared for the Party Conference. He hoped the Prime Minister would be able to say something helpful to Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. Kossov was very much at pain to emphasise that he had been instructed by the Ambassador to pass on these points to No. 10 in strict confidence. They should not be conveyed more widely. His remarks about the possibility of an early visit by Gorbachev may well be another case of Zamyatin paddling his own canoe and will need to be handled with care. But so long as what he is doing serves our interest, in particular in a relatively early visit by Gorbachev, I think that we should be ready to play along. I should be grateful if recipients of this letter would not refer to this exchange in their own contacts with the Russians here or in Moscow.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Central to the talks between Mr. M.Gorbachev and President R.Reagan once again were the problems of strengthening of international security, curbing the arms race and strengthening the strategic stability.

The Soviet Union came to the summit with a number of proposals embracing all aspects of this issue - nuclear and space arms, limitation of nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of them, elimination of chemical weapons, conventional armaments and forces, naval forces. Granted an adequate effort were forthcoming from the American side, a substantial progress towards agreement on all these issues could be possible. We were emphasising, that the INF treaty, the entry into force of which marked the Moscow summit, proved that only purposeful joint efforts of both sides, preparedness to take into account the considerations of a partner could secure agreements concerning the issues of stopping the arms race.

2. [redacted] which provides the grounds for continuing work on the agreement on 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons and on associated documents.

Two working papers were prepared fixing the areas of accords on the questions of mobile ICBMs and ALCMs.

[redacted] A limited number of missiles and launchers will be permited in these areas as well as a limited number of installations, used exclusively for the mobile ICBM launchers.

It was managed to widen the scope of common ground on ALCMs. Mutual understanding was achieved that all existing missiles of this kind will be considered as carrying nuclear charges.

The future conventional armed ALCMs will be distingnishable from the nuclear-armed missiles of the same kind.

Exchange of data concerning the strategic arms between the parties is a major practical step in the field of veri-

fication regime of the future treaty. Nevertheless it is worth pointing out that if the Soviet side presented data on all weapons subject to the treaty, the American side supplied to us only selected data on its strategic arms. In particular the American data does not include information concerning the heavy bombers and submarines. Data on the long-range sea-launched cruise missiles is completely missing (the USSR have submitted it).

We returned again to our proposal to have a specific agreement on observation of the decision, adopted in Washington on 10 December, 1987, on limits on SLCM deployment and on a strict and effective control over such lumits on a mutually acceptable basis. The USA, proposing nothing in the field of SLCM control, tried to defend their position, submitted earlier in the talks, suggesting that the parties should limit themselves only to unilateral non-verifiable declarations about numbers of such missiles on each sides. We do not accept this: observance of the future treaty should be based on strict verification, including on-site inspections as the Soviet position implies.

In general it could be seen that the Americans tended to try forcing upon us a one-side approach in the matters of control: a comprehensive and stricter control of the Soviet strategic arms and a rather more "sparing" one of the American weapons. We declared firmly that only a regime of control equal for both sides was acceptable. Without limits on the SLCM and a strict and effective verification with the active used on-site inspections the preparation of the 50 per cent cut in the SOW would be impossible. The problem is subject to further discussion between the USA and USSR delegations on the Geneva talks.

We consider as an important result of the START-ABM discussion firm reaffirmation by both parties of the provision that the mutually agreed draft on the text of the separate treaty on the ABM and its non-violation during an agreed period should be based on the Soviet-American declaration text of 10 December 1987.

The Soviet side made special emphasis on the organic link between carrying out the 50 per cent cut in the strategic offensive weapons and observing the ABM Treaty as it was signed in 1972.

In the context of this discussion the Americans, contrary to the agreement reached in Washington, attempted once again to secure certain "rights" for unlimited activities in outer space with the aim of establishing the viability of the so called "effective strategic defense", as well as the "right" to deploy it after an agreed period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. This amounted to one of the most substantial problems hindering the progress towards an agreement on SCW-ABL.

During the visit the agreement on mutual notification of launches of ballistic missiles was signed. It widens the scope of confidence-building measures between the Soviet Union and United States, aimed at removal of risk of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war.

3. The principal result of the discussion of the matters, concerning nuclear testing consisted in the conclusion of work on the draft agreement on joint verification experiment, which sets specific procedure for preparing and carrying out nuclear blasts on testing sites in Nevada (August this year) and Semipalatinsk (September this year). Methods of verification of the nuclear explosion yields, proposed by both countries, will be employed. The results of the experiment will be subsequently reviewed by both countries, so that an acceptable combination of verification methods (seismic and hydrodynamic) could be found for the USSR-US Threshlold Test Ban Treaty of 1974. It would open the possibility of this Treaty being ratified.

Besides, the sides agreed to expedite the preparation of a new protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty presently underway at the full-scale Soviet- American talks on nuclear testing.

4. The discussion of the chemical weapons ban was constructive and business-like. The positions put forward in the joint declaration can become a factor in speeding up the

negotiations process in Geneve, in improving the athmosphere at the talks. The fact that the United States not only confirmed the aim of the comprehensive global chemical weapons ban, but admitted at the highest level the urgency of the conclusion of the convention became an important political result of the meeting.

As a development of the Declaration of the two countries' leaders the delegations at the talks have been given specific instructions on a wide range of unresolved issues (elimination of chemical weapons and its production facilities, challenge inspections, ensuring the universal nature of the convention, etc.).

5. New large-scale proposals on reductions of troops and conventional armaments in Europe, put forward by Mr. M.S.Gorbachov during his talks with President Reagan, became a subject of the discussion in Moscow. Their essence is as follows.

At the first stage after an exchange of information on the strength of forces and armaments disbalances and asymmetries will be revealed and eliminated. For that purpose immediately after the start of the talks an examination of the basic data is to be carried out by means of on-site inspections.

At the second stage the sides will carry out a reduction of their forces approximately by 500000 men each.

At the third stage the forces of each side would attain a purely defensive nature in a way that would eliminate their capability of offensive operations.

During all stages of the talks we are ready to agree on mutual reduction of armaments of offensive nature - tactical nuclear weapons, strike aviation, tanks. Naturally, all reductions must be excersised under strict international control, including on-site inspections like creation of nuclear-free corridors which would separate the troops of both sides confronting each other, could be discussed.

Both sides expressed an understanding of the importance and necessity of a speedy agreement on the mandate of the talks in Vienna, first of all in the part concerning the determination of the subject of the talks.

SECRET AND PERSONAL 21.

PRIME MINISTER

US/SOVIET SUMMIT: SOVIET VIEWS

Mr. Kossov of the Soviet Embassy asked to see me at short notice today. He handed over the attached note describing the results of the US/Soviet Summit, as seen from the Soviet point of view. In amplifying the note, he said that good progress had been made on the START negotiations. There was only one remaining point to be resolved on ALCMs. The Soviet side regarded the outstanding problems on strategic defence as fairly easily soluble (this is surprising). On mobile missiles, there had been agreement to designate restricted areas within which such missiles would be permissible in specified numbers. The only remaining issue was the size of the areas, but that too was soluble. The main substantive problem remained with SLCMs. The Soviet military could not accept that they should remain entirely unrestricted and outside an agreement. It would of course be important to have effective verification measures for a START agreement but the experience with the INF agreement would be helpful in that respect. Mr. Kossov added that there had been a very good discussion of chemical weapons, the first time that this problem had been addressed seriously at a US/Soviet summit. The President had made a very firm statement of his commitment to the goal of a global ban on these weapons.

Mr. Kossov showed close interest in our assessment of whether the Americans were seriously interested in achieving a START agreement before the end of President Reagan's term of office. Their own impression was that President Reagan would like to reach an agreement but they were not sure that he would be "allowed" to do so by those around him. I said that our clear impression was that the Americans were ready to continue negotiating but would not be rushed into an unsatisfactory agreement. The matter was therefore open. Mr. Kossov said that the Russians faced a genuine dilemma. They recognised that it might well not be welcome to a new Democrat President of the United States to have to seek ratification of a Treaty

signed by his Republican predecessor. On the other hand, the historical experience was that Democratic Presidents found it very difficult to get arms control agreements through Congress at all. It would be a tragedy to lose the progress made under President Reagan. This pointed to a major effort to reach agreement while he was still in office.

Mr. Kossov went on to say that the Soviet Ambassador had seen Mr. Gorbachev at the end of the recent Central Committee meeting in Moscow. Mr. Gorbachev had expressed appreciation for your pre-summit message and in particular for its tone. He had observed that he would certainly like to take up your invitation to visit the United Kingdom before too long. It would be important to have a substantial agenda for a meeting. In reply to the Ambassador's question, he had said that the visit might well be later this year. The Ambassador had found, however, that there were coflicting counsels in the Soviet foreign ministry where some senior officials would be reluctant to see Mr. Gorbachev come to Britain once more and would prefer him to visit other Western countries. The Ambassador proposed to revert to the matter with Mr. Gorbachev in the margins of the Party Conference at the end of June. He would then hope to see you in early July to report on the outcome of that Conference and consider the substance and timing of a visit. Mr. Kossov was not exact about possible dates but thought that it could be as soon as December or shortly after the turn of the year. He had noted that you had referred in your television interview to a visit in the spring or summer. He thought that this might be a bit late. Mr. Gorbachev might like to see you fairly soon after your visit to Washington so as to be able to get your assessment of the incoming Presidency. I said that your only concern was that Mr. Gorbachev should come at a moment which would be most helpful from his point of view. I thought you would certainly be prepared to see the Ambassador in July.

Mr. Kossov continued that it would be important for a visit to have substance. We should need to look for areas where it would be possible to take a step forward. One particular area

was chemical weapons where there was already agreement in principle to the idea of a joint UK/Soviet statement. If this could be worked up, it could be a major feature of a summit. I said that in general these were matters to be dealt with multilaterally. But I did not exclude the possibility of working out a joint statement, although it might well have to cover areas of disagreement as well as areas of agreement.

I should add that in this whole discussion of a possible visit and the agenda for it, there may well be some element of self-promotion on Zamyatin's part. We should not take all that Mr. Kossov says at face value.

Mr. Kossov remarked rather gloomily that perestroika seemed to be in considerable difficulty. The theses approved by the Central Committee for the Party Conference were rather vague and general. There were considerable economic difficulties at present. Yeltsin's interview with the BBC had caused him a storm and made life more difficult for Mr. Gorbachev, although Yeltsin himself had been elected a delegate to the party conference from the Karelia area. In his view, matters were coming to the point where a straight choice would have to be made between Ligachev and Yakovlev: they could not both survive in the leadership. A speech by Ligachev over the weekend, which he had seen on Soviet television, made quite clear there were substantive differences between him and Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. Kossov mentioned rather wistfully the amount of economic assistance which Germany was extending to the Soviet Union in the form of credits and loans. There was an urgent need for such help at present.

Finally, Mr. Kossov referred to your interview with Soviet television tomorrow. The interviewer would cover three broad areas: your assessment of the recent summit and the direction of Soviet/American relations, your view of the future development of Western Europe, and your opinion of Mr. Gorbachev and his role on the world scene. The interview

would be used in an evening news programme. But you should also know that your comments on Mr. Gorbachev would be incorporated in a film about his foreign policy achievements which is being prepared for the Party Conference. He hoped you would be able to say something helpful to Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. Kossov was at pains to say this was all very much for No.10 only. But I think I had better give the Foreign Office an account in strict confidence. Otherwise we shall get wires crossed.

CDP

(C. D. POWELL)
6 June 1988

Central to the talks between Mr. M.Gorbachev and President R.Reagan once again were the problems of strengthening of international security, curbing the arms race and strengthening the strategic stability.

The Soviet Union came to the summit with a number of proposals embracing all aspects of this issue - nuclear and space arms, limitation of nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of them, elimination of chemical weapons, conventional armaments and forces, naval forces. Granted an adequate effort were forthcoming from the American side, a substantial progress towards agreement on all these issues could be possible. We were emphasising, that the INF treaty, the entry into force of which marked the Moscow summit, proved that only purposeful joint efforts of both sides, preparedness to take into account the considerations of a partner could secure agreements concerning the issues of stopping the arms race.

2. The talks on SOW - ABM led to further consolidation of the basis fixed in the Soviet-American statement of 10 December 1987, which provides the grounds for continuing work on the agreement on 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons and on associated documents.

Two working papers were prepared fixing the areas of accords on the questions of mobile ICBMs and ALCMs.

In particular, both sides agreed for limited areas of agreed size to be established for the mobile ICBMs. A limited number of missiles and launchers will be permited in these areas as well as a limited number of installations, used exclusively for the mobile ICBM launchers.

It was managed to widen the scope of common ground on ALCMs. Mutual understanding was achieved that all existing missiles of this kind will be considered as carrying nuclear charges.

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fication regime of the future treaty. Nevertheless it is worth pointing out that if the Soviet side presented data on all weapons subject to the treaty, the American side supplied to us only selected data on its strategic arms. In particular the American data does not include information concerning the heavy bombers and submarines. Data on the long-range sea-launched cruise missiles is completely missing (the USSR have submitted it).

We returned again to our proposal to have a specific agreement on observation of the decision, adopted in Washington on 10 December, 1987, on limits on SLCM deployment and on a strict and effective control over such lumits on a mutually acceptable basis. The USA, proposing nothing in the field of SLCM control, tried to defend their position, submitted earlier in the talks, suggesting that the parties should limit themselves only to unilateral non-verifiable declarations about numbers of such missiles on each sides. We do not accept this: observance of the future treaty should be based on strict verification, including on-site inspections as the Soviet position implies.

In general it could be seen that the Americans tended to try forcing upon us a one-side approach in the matters of control: a comprehensive and stricter control of the Soviet strategic arms and a rather more "sparing" one of the American weapons. We declared firmly that only a regime of control equal for both sides was acceptable. Without limits on the SLCM and a strict and effective verification with the active used on-site inspections the preparation of the 50 per cent cut in the SOW would be impossible. The problem is subject to further discussion between the USA and USSR delegations on the Geneva talks.

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The Soviet side made special emphasis on the organic link between carrying out the 50 per cent cut in the strategic offensive weapons and observing the ABM Treaty as it was signed in 1972.

In the context of this discussion the Americans, contrary to the agreement reached in Washington, attempted once again to secure certain "rights" for unlimited activities in outer space with the aim of establishing the viability of the so called "effective strategic defense", as well as the "right" to deploy it after an agreed period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. This amounted to one of the most substantial problems hindering the progress towards an agreement on SOW-ABM.

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3. The principal result of the discussion of the matters, concerning nuclear testing consisted in the conclusion of work on the draft agreement on joint verification experiment, which sets specific procedure for preparing and carrying out nuclear blasts on testing sites in Nevada (August this year) and Semipalatinsk (September this year). Methods of verification of the nuclear explosion yields, proposed by both countries, will be employed. The results of the experiment will be subsequently reviewed by both countries, so that an acceptable combination of verification methods (seismic and hydrodynamic) could be found for the USSR-US Threshlold Test Ban Treaty of 1974. It would open the possibility of this Treaty being ratified.

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negotiations process in Geneva, in improving the athmosphere at the talks. The fact that the United States not only confirmed the aim of the comprehensive global chemical weapons ban, but admitted at the highest level the urgency of the conclusion of the convention became an important political result of the meeting.

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5. New large-scale proposals on reductions of troops and conventional armaments in Europe, put forward by Mr. M.S.Gorbachov during his talks with President Reagan, became a subject of the discussion in Moscow. Their essence is as follows.

At the first stage after an exchange of information on the strength of forces and armaments disbalances and asymmetries will be revealed and eliminated. For that purpose immediately after the start of the talks an examination of the basic data is to be carried out by means of on-site inspections.

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At the third stage the forces of each side would attain a purely defensive nature in a way that would eliminate their capability of offensive operations.

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Both sides expressed an understanding of the importance and necessity of a speedy agreement on the mandate of the talks in Vienna, first of all in the part concerning the determination of the subject of the talks.

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c.c. PC

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UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OTAN/NATO
1110 BRUSSELS
TELEPHONE 2426775

Prime Minister

A good analysis and a necessary note of caution. But what does he want you to do? We always get to the point of 'giving a lead' but then the line goes dead & there's no indication of what practical steps he wants.

CDP 7/6

6 June 1988

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London

Dear Prime Minister,

WESTERN REACTIONS TO THE MOSCOW SUMMIT

I know, both from what you said here on 17 February and from many previous conversations, that we have very similar views about the underlying realities of East/West relations in Europe. I know therefore that you will agree with much, though not necessarily all, of what follows. I am moved none the less to write because I am concerned about one particular aspect of the rhetoric thrown up by the summit and by the events of the last several months.

(1) It has been evident for some time that this is a period of historic significance as regards the development of relations between the communist and non-communist halves of Europe. Mr Gorbachev and President Reagan have brought the post war era to a dramatic end and set in train a process which, if all goes well, will eventually produce a new European order. The time scale you set in talking to Charles Wheeler the other evening - 20 or 30 years - seems to me both accurate and salutory. (If I may say so, President Reagan was absolutely right to pay tribute to your own key role. I myself think this goes back beyond your first meeting with Mr Gorbachev to your decision, shortly after the 1983 elections and when East/West relations were close to their nadir, to open up relations with Eastern Europe and to visit Budapest.)

What is not, in my view, at all evident is, to quote your words at the Guildhall, that "the Summit has brought us closer to the more stable and peaceful relations between East and West that we all want to see". Peaceful, maybe; stable, hardly.

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I recognise, of course, that the only way to achieve enduring stability in Europe is for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to go through - one way or another - a process of radical reform: in this particular sense perestroika and glasnost do bring us closer to stability. I recognise the natural and widely held desire for more stability: several Foreign Ministers echoed here last week George Shultz's words about there now being more "continuity and consistency" in East/West relations and Genscher spoke of the American/Soviet relationship having "a new stability". I recognise, finally, that political statements cannot deal in nuances and are not always to be taken literally. (The trouble is that audiences do take them literally - the more so when the statements are saying things they want to hear.)

But all this being acknowledged, the reality is (as you implied with Charles Wheeler) that the stability "we all want to see" may well be a generation or more away. In the meantime the odds must be that in the years immediately ahead there will be periods of very considerable instability.

The reasons for this go a good deal deeper than the struggle in the Soviet Union and elsewhere between reforming activists and reactionary placemen. They are based on the fact that the Russian people - like their subject peoples inside the Soviet Union and in much of Eastern Europe - have little or no experience of operating either a national political process based on the participation of individuals or a national economy based on the enterprise of those individuals.

History, I fear, has not equipped the Russians well to escape gracefully from the incubus of state socialism: it has not equipped them at all to deal smoothly with the nationalities problem inside and outside the Soviet Union. Their political inheritance is, on the one hand, of mendacity, conspiracy and violence - within and without the government - and on the other hand of indifference or other-worldly anarchism. The acceptance of gradualness, of tolerance and of unwritten rules which is central to the stable management of change in Western societies (and which even here is far from universal) is not going to be learned overnight. The Yeltsin affair presages the sort of thing we can expect, on a larger scale, in the future.

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This does not mean that reform in the Soviet Union is a lost cause. Gorbachev obviously has more than his own great talents to rely on. His summons to Moscow in 1978 and his rapid promotion tends to confirm that, as I suggested in a letter I wrote to you from Vienna in 1983, the "men in the Kremlin" had recognised well before Brezhnev's death that the Soviet empire was "essentially bankrupt". With the benefit of hindsight one can deduce that eg Andropov knew dramatic measures were required. Gorbachev's appointment may have been a surprise, but it seems to me nonsense to suggest that the Politburo, who had seen him at work for six years, stumbled on him by accident. The vigour, indeed recklessness, with which Gorbachev is developing the logic of his reforms no doubt appals many of those who appointed him. But they knew that they were opting for a reform programme of one kind or another, an eventuality - so far as I know - no Western expert was even speculating about in 1983. That is as hopeful a thought as anything that has happened since.

If we were all wrong once we can be wrong again. But any rational analysis of the Russian and Soviet experience must suggest how improbable it is that the path of reform will be smooth. Sakharov described it the other day as dangerous. This in turn implies that the progress of the East/West relationship is going to resemble that of a roller coaster rather than that of a Rolls Royce.

The more Western leaders play down this likelihood, the more exaggerated the peaks and troughs - whenever they come - are going to be. In addition to the basic argument about the long term military and geo-strategic realities, people must be encouraged to accept that the ability of Western governments to affect what happens in Warsaw Pact countries - even on human rights - is limited; that the situation there, while more hopeful than ever before, is profoundly unpredictable and unstable; that to recognise the probability of setbacks is not to question the good intentions or the capabilities of the reformers; and that to be strong, predictable and moderate ourselves is probably the best service we can render to the cause of peaceful change. This message needs to be got across consistently rather than being turned up and down as has been the case in President Reagan's speeches in recent months.

If the message is not conveyed and accepted, it will be very difficult for the West to be strong and predictable in these critical years. There is no way of foreseeing when

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the first downward swoop of the roller coaster will occur. But if Gorbachev succeeds in delaying it for even two or three years then the challenge to the foresight of Western electorates, deprived of a visible threat, is going to be severe. In the absence of a setback, we can be confident that in this same period:

(a) there will be further major Soviet arms control initiatives (probably including headline catching unilateral reductions) on short range nuclear forces and on conventional forces;

(b) further difficulties with public opinion in every Alliance country - in some no doubt greater than in others - both on nuclear issues and on defence expenditure in general; and

(c) further awkwardness with the Americans as the new Administration, whoever its leader, struggles with changing priorities and the consequences of the dual deficit.

I have to add (and this is the part of the letter with which you may have some difficulty) that the prospects of short term euphoria; static or declining public support for our defence requirements; evolving US attitudes; and medium term instability are making it steadily more urgent that we develop, within the Alliance, a coherent Western European approach to this whole complex of problems. It is not simply, or even primarily, that we must find ways through closer cooperation to get more defence output from our resource input. It is also that in the uncertain environment ahead, Western Europe is going to need the stronger glue which a developing parallelism between our efforts in the security field and in the economic/commercial field would provide. This is increasingly accepted on the other side of the Atlantic. (I was, incidentally, told more than once on a visit I made to the United States last month, that after 1992 the Americans would "of course" expect the Europeans to take on more of the responsibility of their own defence.)

As you already know, I believe that you can do more than any other individual to accelerate the development of a positive and effective European defence identity within the Alliance. This is as much, if not more, a question of

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encouragement and support as of specifics. I hope you will take the opportunities which the UK's presidency of the WEU will offer to give a lead both on this issue and on the question of the prospects for East/West relations as a whole which has been the main subject of this letter.

Yours ever

Michael.

Michael Alexander

# 10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

4 June 1988

Dear Resident Clerk.

**US/SOVIET: MESSAGE TO MR GORBACHEV**

The Prime Minister has decided that she should send a message to Mr Gorbachev about the recent US/Soviet Summit Meeting in Moscow. I enclose a copy of a letter which she has approved. Subject to the views of the Foreign Secretary - which I should be grateful if you would obtain in the course of the day - it should be telegraphed to the Embassy in Moscow, for delivery as soon as possible. The signed original will follow in due course.

FCO 747

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Resident Clerk
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T87/88

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER Subject. cc OPS MASTOR

Dear General Secretary,

I would like to congratulate you most warmly on your successful Summit meeting with President Reagan in Moscow. Your discussions made important progress on all four of the main items of your agenda and represent a further step towards the more peaceful and stable relations between East and West that we all want to see. Most important, I think your successive meetings with President Reagan are beginning to change for the better attitudes and perceptions in each country about the other, and I am sure this will be further developed by the exchanges of young people between your two countries on which I understand you and the President have agreed.

I have received a full account from President Reagan of your meetings and also listened with great interest to your remarkable and spirited press conference. If there are any further, personal impressions of the meeting or of the way ahead which you wish to convey, I should of course be most interested to hear them.

Meanwhile, I send you my best wishes for your forthcoming Party Conference and for the success of the great reforms on which you are embarked.

Kind regards.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev

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Sent to Chequers by Mujo K

PRIME MINISTER

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

I think on reflection that you ought to send a short message to Mr Gorbachev about the Summit so that we retain an even-handed approach. There is perhaps some small risk of seeming importunate but I do not take it at all seriously.

I attach a draft which I hope is about right. He may respond by offering to send someone to brief you about his view of the Summit. Although not convenient in diary terms, I think it would nonetheless be worthwhile.

I have deliberately not repeated your invitation to him to visit Britain, since that was in your pre-Summit message and we do not want to appear over-eager.

CDP

Charles Powell

4 June 1988

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CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

I would like to congratulate you most warmly on your successful Summit meeting with President Reagan in Moscow. ~~In my judgment~~ Your discussions made important progress on all four of the main items of your agenda and represent a further step towards the more peaceful and stable relations between East and West that ~~both of us~~ we all want to see. Most important, I think your successive meetings with President Reagan are beginning to change for the better attitudes and perceptions in each country about the other, and I am sure this will be further developed by the exchanges of young people between your two countries on which I understand you and the President have agreed.

I have received a full account from President Reagan of your meetings and also listened with great interest to your remarkable and spirited press conference. If there are any further, personal impressions of the meeting or of the way ahead which you wish to convey, I should of course be most interested to hear them.

May I also add a particular word of appreciation for the very considerable contribution made to the overall atmosphere of the Summit by Mrs Gorbachev.

Charles -
I think this could upset Nancy. The last sentence was very deliberate.

Meanwhile I send you my best wishes for your forthcoming Party Conference and for the success of the great reforms on which you are embarked.

His Excellency Mr Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev

RECORD OF A BREAKFAST MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND MR GEORGE SHULTZ (0745-0900) AT 1 CARLTON GARDENS, FRIDAY 3 JUNE 1988

PRESENT

| | |
|---|---|
| Secretary of State | Mr George Shultz |
| HMA Washington | Ambassador Price, US Embassy, London |
| Sir John Fretwell | Ms Ridgway, State Department |
| Mr Galsworthy | Mr Redman, State Department Spokesman |
| Mr Meyer, News Dept | Mr Pendleton, US Embassy |
| Mr Burns, NAD | |

MOSCOW SUMMIT AND FOLLOW-UP

1. Mr Shultz explained the background to the "argument" at the end of the visit. The Secretary of State had often referred to the strategy which the West needed to pursue in dealings with the Soviet Union and which he, Shultz, had encapsulated in his 1983 testimony. The Americans did not favour operating on the basis of principles, nor linkage. It was facts which had led the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, not principles. We had to analyse each area of difficulty with the Soviet Union separately and confront them with the facts. The Americans had applied this policy in recent years and it had paid off. They were accordingly surprised when, at the first meeting with the President, Gorbachev had suggested agreeing a document with language about peaceful co-existence and peaceful international behaviour. It had taken 3 days of Ms Ridgway's time and argument to convince Soviet officials that the US was not prepared to revert to the stale language of detente and eventually "very good language" had been agreed. However, at the final session with the President, Gorbachev again tried to persuade the President to accept the original Soviet formulations. The President quietly and repeatedly refused. The Americans had noticed a stage in meetings with Gorbachev over the years where "he goes bananas over something". On this occasion, Gorbachev became enraged and continued to complain, while the President stood firm. It was clear at the departure ceremonies in St George's Hall and at Gorbachev's subsequent press conference that he was still "seething" at the President's refusal. Furthermore, Gorbachev had not yet learned that the President had "two hot buttons" - on SDI and Nicaragua - which, if pressed, evoked deeply-held views. He pressed them both and got the full treatment. Shultz hoped that Gorbachev had now finally accepted that the US was not prepared to revert to a relationship expressed in broad principles. The current stage of the US-Soviet relationship needed something more practical and sustainable. Broad principles had not stopped the Soviet Union going into Afghanistan, supplying Nicaragua and Angola with arms etc. Moreover, Shultz had noticed a pattern to Summitry. Inevitably, after a good Summit, there was a tendency for

participants to go back and demonstrate their toughness to public opinion, particularly in areas where they had failed to secure a particular objective. This is what Gorbachev was now doing. Ms Ridgway said that the interesting question was who advised Gorbachev to revert to the stale detente language in the final round of talks with the President. All the advisers with whom she had dealt had, she thought, understood the US point that such reversion would discredit everything which had been achieved by Gorbachev's policies and hark back to the Brezhnev doctrine. The acceptable language which she had finally negotiated had even been cleared with Gorbachev. Yet the old language was trotted out again at the last meeting with the President. She did not think Shevardnadze responsible, since he had not remained in the negotiations. It was reminiscent of the Gromyko approach.

2. The Secretary of State congratulated Shultz on the achievements of the Summit and the painstaking way in which he had pursued the relationship with the Soviet Union. There were bound to be peaks and troughs in the relationship and he expected some form of hiatus now after the Summit. Shultz agreed that this would indeed be the case. The Geneva negotiations would not resume until 12 July. No meetings were scheduled with Shevardnadze in July. August would be dominated by the Republican Convention and by vacations. This took the timetable to September. He thought that he would next meet Shevardnadze in Washington just in advance of the UNGA. Although US-Soviet relations would "go off track for a while", his prime objective was to create and leave a structure which the incoming US Administration could pursue. The next major stage in the relationship would be to move away from arms control to regional and human rights issues.

ANOTHER REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT: START, INF

3. He thought that Gorbachev would be amenable to another Summit provided there was a real reason. However, he could not see the START Treaty being completed this year. The Senate was "scared to death" of it and did not want to face up to the issues it posed. He would actually prefer it if the Senate were made to focus on a START Treaty: it would keep them out of other mischief in the pre-election period. There would only be progress if the Senate developed a sense of involvement.

4. Congressional consideration of the INF Treaty had caused the State Department major work. He had had to set up a separate organisation to handle it. There had been 70 appearances before Senate and Congressional committees, 3 by him. The State Department had also answered 1300 separate questions. The INF Treaty was a solid piece of work and had been virtually unassailable on the Hill. The process had been greatly facilitated by of the solidity of Allied support. The French Defence Minister's reference to the Treaty being another Munich had been quickly overcome.

SOVIET INTERNAL

5. The Secretary of State asked whether Gorbachev had seemed anxious about the forthcoming Party Conference. Shultz said, on the contrary, Gorbachev appeared very confident and had used the Summit to build up his position for the Party Conference. The US team had not detected any problem as regards Ligachev's future. Gorbachev had handled that incident well. However, that did not mean that there was no Ligachev problem. The Russians were now much more prepared to talk about internal arrangements in the Soviet Union. The theses for the forthcoming Party Conference made "stunning reading". Gorbachev was confident that his proposals would go through the Party Conference. On the mood in Moscow generally, it was perhaps a sign of the times that the turnout of Soviet representatives at the US Embassy for the President's dinner was the largest and most senior at any foreign function since at least Kruschev. The Russians had been at pains to point this out. Ms Ridgway commented that one striking aspect of Moscow was the degree of debate now under way.

AFGHANISTAN

6. Shultz saw little likelihood of the USSR changing their withdrawal plans. Withdrawal had nothing to do with the Geneva Accords but reflected the reality of the position they found themselves in. The biggest potential problem was the embarrassment of continued heavy fighting among the Afghans. The Soviet policy would probably be to push for national reconciliation and in the process highlight the magnanimity of Najib. The Secretary of State agreed that the situation looked messy for the foreseeable future. We expected the refugees to wait until they saw how things were developing in Afghanistan before returning. Shultz argued that the delay might not be as long as Westerners would expect. Already there was a return movement. Mr Whitehead (Deputy Secretary, State Department), who had spent a great deal of time in South East Asia and knew the refugee situation well, thought there was a danger of the West trying to "over-organise". Given half a chance, people who had very little would return to their original areas and try to scratch a living. The West should try to create a structure for rehabilitation and leave the returning Afghans to handle the detail. Ms Ridgway said that refugees would be greatly influenced by the traditional pattern of village leaders visiting former homelands and for the remainder of the village to be influenced by their decision whether or not to return to them. The Secretary of State and Shultz noted that this was a trend not limited to developing countries. It could be found in the US labour market and in the UK, when West Indians first began coming to Britain after the war. The Secretary of State added that this very trend among the Vietnamese was causing us an immense problem in Hong Kong.

REFUGEE PROBLEMS: HONG KONG/SRI LANKA/EASTERN EUROPE

7. Shultz said that the refugee situation in Hong Kong was a microcosm of a broader picture. There was a tremendous struggle in the US Administration at the moment on the question of what constituted a refugee and what an economic refugee. The US quota of 165,000 for this year was under impossible pressure. The Administration had taken a deliberate decision not to open the debate widely until the Summit was over, because the US could not undertake to accept refugees who might wish to leave the USSR in large numbers. It was paradoxical that there had been a great outcry in the US when the Thais began pushing the boat people back to sea. Countries of first asylum were getting tougher, partly because the willingness of countries of settlement, like the US, was declining. He foresaw a number of problems. That in South East Asia was already upon us; the US could soon face a problem of refugees leaving the USSR and Eastern Europe; and there could be chaos in Central America as people tried to flee, eg Nicaragua. The problem was no less acute in Africa but, although the numbers were huge, African refugees tended to stay within that continent. The common factor in many of these situations was that those trying to leave their countries were not refugees but leaving for economic reasons. Referring to the experience of the US as a country of sanctuary, the Secretary of State recalled the large numbers of people leaving Sri Lanka and Vietnam. The flow of Vietnamese to Hong Kong was increasing, because the Thais were turning people away. We had also not realised until recently that many Vietnamese refugees, travelling along the China coast, stopped in China for supplies etc, but were not permitted/did not want to stay there. But the basic problem about Hong Kong was that it simply did not offer a transit point to a future. We had to get this point across. Neither Hong Kong nor Britain had the ability to absorb Vietnamese refugees. Likewise, we could not absorb Sri Lankans. As a result, we had decided that we could no longer offer them refuge in this country while their cases where being heard: we now insisted that airlines returned them to their country of origin and that any attempt to seek settlement in Britain should be conducted from their home country. The FRG showed how matters could get out of hand, with something like 700,000 "refugees" applying for citizenship actually from within FRG borders.

8. In Hong Kong, there was mounting despair at the number of Vietnamese refugees arriving. The number in camps had been declining until September 1987. Since then, the numbers had gone up seven-fold, and there could be up to 25,000 in camps by autumn 1988. This had forced us to consider a change of policy, to apply a screening process at British ports of entry. This would be designed as a signal to indicate that Hong Kong simply did not offer a step to a future elsewhere. If we were able to check the inflow, we would look to our partners to help clear those in the camps. Shultz said that he was glad the Secretary of State had used partners in the plural. The Australians and Canadians had done particularly well in helping with the offtake of refugees.

CAMBODIA/VIETNAM

9. Shultz had tried over the years to demonstrate to Shevardnadze that it was in the Soviet self-interest to address the problem of Cambodia. The Soviet Union was experiencing the "limits of power" in Cambodia (and Ethiopia). On Vietnam/Cambodia, the pressure of diplomacy and economic isolation was working. The Soviet Union however would tread gently because it did not want to jeopardise its large naval base in Vietnam. After a visit to Bangkok and Hanoi, during which he was able to make the obvious comparisons, Shevardnadze now had a more realistic approach. The problem was the slow learning curve of the Vietnamese. The best way forward was pursuing the formula from the UN Security Council, embracing withdrawal of foreign forces and international guarantees. Applied to Cambodia, it would involve troop withdrawals and an attempt to rally a government around Prince Sihanouk. The international guarantees were very difficult, and the US had to be cautious about who was asked to guarantee what. He thought there was "room for manoeuvre" with the Soviet Union over Cambodia.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

10. There was also prospect of movement on Angola. However, the question of venue for the talks had to be sorted out. London was fine. If there were pressure for meetings elsewhere, these should be in Africa. The Angolans and Cubans thought that, if talks took place in Paris, they would find some sympathy from the French government, which would be helpful to them. Mr Redman reported that Mr Pik Botha was quoted as saying that, if the talks were not held in Africa, they should not be held at all. The Secretary of State asked whether the Americans saw Savimbi as an obstacle. Shultz thought that Savimbi was the key. Meetings were taking place secretly. The Americans and others had been working hard to promote contacts via Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire and these had borne some fruit. Shevardnadze agreed the approach but seemed to have difficulty in pushing things forward within the Soviet system. A solution could not be rushed. Even a 10-year deadline was "a useful play". Moreover, the reconstruction of Angola after any settlement would have wide implications. It was a very rich country, currently "in a hole". Economically, it could spring back rapidly. The Benguela Railroad was a potentially important lateral link; such an alternative transportation system could place real pressure on South Africa. The Secretary of State and Shultz agreed on the need to keep up pressure.

11. The Secretary of State said that the whole situation could be overturned if South Africa did something unwise. We must keep up pressure on South Africa to pursue the right policies and eg avoid incidents like the Sharpville Six. The result of the French election could be to tilt France towards a pro-sanctions policy. Every such tilt towards sanctions exacerbated the problems in South Africa. Yet in this country there were indications of change as eg

Church opinion became better educated in the realities of South Africa: this was beginning to diminish the ranks of the advocates of sanctions.

PHILIPPINES

12. The Secretary of State said that, for all her posturing, Mrs Aquino wanted to see the US bases staying in the Philippines: the argument seemed to be more over money. Shultz agreed. However, he cautioned that it was dangerous for her to think that words did not matter in diplomacy. The danger was that, if Mrs Aquino drummed something up, she would not be able to control it. The Secretary of State said that Mr Manglapus had made a good impression at the EC-ASEAN meeting: he sounded like an articulate American! Shultz said that he was girding himself up for a real confrontation with Manglapus. His first question would be why was Manglapus against the Philippines ? The Secretary of State cautioned that the Philippines resented the term "mini Marshall" and preferred "polysectoral aid". The UK would certainly give support to the Philippines within the EC framework. It would be modest, but the psychological impact would be important.

MIDDLE EAST

13. On the Middle East generally, Shultz said the USSR were pursuing the usual tactic of using speeches in different places to suggest flexibility but then reneging when the US accosted them directly. However, he thought the Soviet Union was genuinely concerned about the situation in the Middle East. They wanted to be sure that they would be part of any peace process that showed any hope of success but the Soviet proposals themselves had no chance of working. Overall, the USSR was now more sophisticated about its Middle East policy.

14. The Soviet Union showed extreme sensitivity about the interplay of Middle Eastern diplomacy with the nationality issue and in particular their Muslim population. (Sometimes Shevardnadze was explicit in their private conversations!) On Iran-Iraq, we needed to keep pushing. Iran's position was changing. It had suffered setbacks in the Gulf and on the battlefield. It had been humiliated in its two confrontations with the US. Syria was giving it a lot of trouble in Lebanon. Iran probably saw itself as being squeezed out of the picture there. Apart from the tension between Iran and Syria, there was the problem of Iran's relations with Hizbullah. The latter saw Iran increasingly as a "potential drag" in Lebanon. Shultz's policy would be to keep the process in being, to keep pushing and to be willing to talk to Iran if they had anything sensible to say (the US continued to receive messages through emissaries).

15. The Secretary of State had said he at been struck by Peres' forlorn posture in Brussels 2 weeks ago. He was not optimistic about the outcome of elections in Israel. If Shamir were to achieve a real majority, this would be a prescription for an explosion. He asked Shultz if there were anything more that we could do in the circumstances ?

16. Shultz said that his mind was still on the Moscow trip and he had not really focussed on what he should do during his forthcoming trip to the Middle East. It was certainly right that he should confront the Israelis with the realities but he needed also to demonstrate that the peace process existed. President Assad was absolutely no help. King Hussein wanted to help but was not able to do more: his main concern was that Shultz should pressure Shamir. Egypt on the other hand had been wonderfully helpful throughout. He would fly to Jordan on 4 June, to Israel on 5 June, to Syria on 6 June and then hold talks in Madrid on 7 June. He could not anticipate the outcome of the Arab Summit. He had it on good authority that the Algerians did not want Shultz to wind up the peace process. The Arabs could not endorse the peace process but did not want to destroy what was there. All in all, he was not looking forward to his forthcoming Middle East round. The Secretary of State commiserated.

EASTERN EUROPE

17. The Secretary of State spoke of the ferment in Eastern Europe. Shultz said that the Russians had not wanted to talk about Eastern Europe: their interest was Western Europe.

BERLIN AIR SERVICES

18. The Secretary of State recalled that UK-French proposals were on the table for sharing the Berlin routes: yet we were now faced with a US deadline of 9 June to agree a provisional US proposal envisaging a 30% increase in traffic on a route growing at only 2% a year. He pressed the US side to withdraw their deadline. Ms Ridgway foresaw a tremendous fight on this. The US had accepted an earlier British request for provisional arrangements. When they came to seek a return of the favour, they were "being stiffed". 5,000 Pan Am passengers were currently waiting to know whether or not they would be able to fly to Berlin. The Secretary of State said there was no comparison between the 2 cases. The UK had sought US agreement to a "mini arrangement". What the US was now seeking was agreement to a huge change. There was a difference in scale. Time was needed to sort out the issue and he hoped that the deadline would be withdrawn. 6 days notice was unreasonable. He proposed (with no dissent from the US side) that Messrs Braithwaite and Wallis should try to find a way forward when they met on 4 June in Toronto. Ambassador Price recalled that there was also a significant UK-US problem over charges at Heathrow.

TORONTO ECONOMIC SUMMIT

19. The Secretary of State strongly believed there should be some action on terrorism. He had nothing grandiose in mind but recalled our 4-point plan. Shultz thought it would be unforgivable if terrorism were not given suitable mention.

20. The Secretary of State argued that constant progress needed to be made on agriculture. The important thing was to keep up the momentum of gradual improvement. The US zero/2000 option militated against this. Shultz agreed on the need for continued momentum. There was a tendency for backsliding and it was good also to have an objective such as zero/2000. He quoted the Prime Minister in support of his arguments for having such objectives and sticking to them. Sir J Fretwell and HMA Washington recalled the tremendous progress made in virtually wiping out Europe's butter and milk powder mountains. The Secretary of State said it was important to find ways of encouraging momentum generally and in particular to keep hammering away at the FRG.

21. The meeting finished at 0905.

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
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PM 68

EXTRACT FROM WORLD AT ONE, FRIDAY 3
JUNE 1988

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CM.

Q. Mr. Kinnock, what did you think of the President's speech?

A. As the American correspondent said to me I came upstairs here it was vintage Reagan, snatches of chariots of fire, hope and glory, Tennison, Isiah. But nothing can take away the fact that whoever was responsible for igniting the warmer relationship, whether it was Mickhail Gorbachev or Ronald Reagan, the very least that Mr. Reagan deserves credit for is making the positive response.

Q. Do you think that this Summit has actually got somewhere?

A. Yes because it's a consolidation. It demonstrates that it can take place. And all the talk at the end despite the sprats that we understand took place, was of where to meet next time and whether it's between Ronald Reagan and Mickhail Gorbachev or Mr. Reagan's successor and the General Secretary, everybody knows it's going to happen. It's almost becoming conventional and I think that's the best news.

Q. The President was astonishingly fulsome at one point in his speech when he turned to the Prime Minister. At this hour in history Prime Minister the entire world salutes you and your gallant people and gallant nation. Do you have the impression that he's handing over the leadership of the West to Mrs. Thatcher?

A. No I don't get that impression at all. I think that the commentators we have already heard from would suggest that this is a personal relationship, that it's a way of the President saying thank you for the,I must say, fairly dedicated following that Mrs. Thatcher has provided for him at every twist and turn of American policy over the years and I think that's about what it says. Mr. Dukakis, for instance, who is well ahead in the polls takes a rather different view of the orientation of American foreign policy and I think that therefore the idea that a baton is being handed over would be rather over-stating it. I understand what the President was doing. I think it was a generous and gentlemanly thing to do. But I think that's about where it stops.

Q. Well, Mr. Reagan has come back from Moscow with the INF Treaty in his pocket. He was pretty bullish about the prospects for START and getting arms reduction down to 50 per cent and so forth. Now where does this put the Labour Party's defence policy, the unilateral disarmament policy. It looks almost as if you're being out-distanced by events.

A. Well, I think you'd be delighted to do that. And what does delight me and everybody who thinks like me is that as the first people to suggest the zero zero in Europe for instance, and as the people who said that there can be a significant reduction, even between the super powers in strategic arms, that these are now becoming feasible indeed. Many are straining with impatience well beyond the ranks of the Labour Party at the prospect of getting that reduction. So it delights us. The problem is there is a great log lying across the path of strategic arms reduction that of course is star wars which last Sunday Mr. Dukakis called a falacy and a fraud. I very strongly concur with that so does a lot of scientific and military establishments in the United States and consequently the end of Mr. Reagan, with all the gratitude that people have for his constructive responses, to his initiatives,

means, I think, the end of star wars and the real beginning of the prospects for significant strategic arms reduction.

Q. There is another log isn't there strewn across the path of nuclear disarmament, that is actually NATO itself because most members of NATO, for example, would not want to see total nuclear disarmament. What is your attitude on that?

A. I think there is a developing consensus. You see, if you go through the membership of NATO you see Canada that doesn't accept in any shape or form or anybody's ownership nuclear weapons on its soil. For instance, there is the continuing debate in Denmark. The Dutch manage to avoid getting any cruise missiles with a system of prolonging and the atmosphere and the attitude about dependence on nuclear weapons, especially in the European context is to say the least very mixed. We have now got Chancellor Kohl in West Germany demonstrating the majority view of the people of West Germany that they don't want to entertain the battlefield of nuclear weapons for much longer. So we are very genuinely , as the President himself said, in a new era. Gorbachev said it is the era of nuclear disarmament. And I think that there is sufficient flexibility amongst many of the very loyal NATO Governments to say we have got to assess the nuclear situation.

Mr. Kinnock, I am afraid we are being overtaken by time. Thank you for talking to us.

Right you are.

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MIPT: REAGAN GORBACHEV SUMMIT: SHULTZ BRIEFING OF NAC 2 JUNE: NST ISSUES.

SUMMMARY
1. SHULTZ REPORTS BUSINESS-LIKE APPROACH TO NST ISSUES IN MOSCOW. SOME PROGRESS ON DETAILS RELATING TO ALCM AND MOBILE ICBM BUT NO DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS. NO HEADWAY ON OTHER MAJOR OUTSTANDING START AND DEFENCE AND SPACE ISSUES.

DETAIL
2. SHULTZ SAID THAT WITH AKHROMEYEV LEADING THE SOVIET ARMS CONTROL WORKING GROUP, THE RUSSIANS HAD ADOPTED A BUSINESS-LIKE APPROACH TO NST DISCUSSIONS. THE MAIN FOCUS HAD BEEN ON ALCM AND MOBILE ICBM, AND JOINT PAPERS ON EACH OF THESE ISSUES HAD BEEN DEVELOPED TO LIST AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND THE MAIN ASPECTS STILL TO BE RESOLVED. PROGESS WAS MADE ON DETAILS ALTHOUGH A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF KEY ISSUES REMAINED OUTSTANDING. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN DISCUSSION OF OTHER MAJOR START ISSUES SUCH AS ICBM SUB-LIMITS AND SLCM, AND DEFENCE AND SPACE BUT HE HAD NO PROGRESS TO REPORT ON THESE. HOWEVER, SUCH DISCUSSIONS DID HELP TO LAY THE GROUND WORK FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. SHULTZ ADDED THAT BOTH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR GORBACHEV WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE A START AGREEMENT THIS YEAR BUT MUCH WORK REMAINED TO BE DONE AND IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE TO PREDICT THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCH AN OUTCOME.

3. SHULTZ CIRCULATED A FACT SHEET (COPY SENT BY FAX TO SECURITY POLICY DEPARTMENT AND DACU MOD) WHICH SET OUT DETAILS OF THE OUTCOME

OF DISCUSSIONS ON ALCM AND MOBILE ICBM. THE MAIN POINTS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE GIVEN BELOW.

ALCM

4. THE TWO SIDES SET DOWN IN A JOINT PAPER THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT WHICH HAD EMERGED FROM EARLIER MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS. THESE WERE THAT:

- ALL EXISTING LONG RANGE ALCM WILL BE CONSIDERED TO BE NUCLEAR ARMED AND FUTURE CONVENTIONAL ALCM WILL BE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM NUCLEAR ALCM.

- HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPED TO CARRY NUCLEAR ALCM WILL BE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM OTHER HEAVYBOMBERS.

- BOMBERS EQUIPED FOR NUCLEAR BOMBS AND SRAM WILL COUNT AS ONE DELIVERY VEHICLE AND ONE WAR HEAD UNDER START.

- NUCLEAR CAPABLE BOMBERS MAY BE CONVERTED TO CONVENTIONAL TASKS AND A LIMITED NUMBER OF RECONNAISSANCE, JAMMING AND TANKER AIRCRAFT CONVERTED IN THIS WAY WILL NOT COUNT AGAINST START LIMITS.

5. HOWEVER, COUNTING RULES FOR ALCM, RANGE THRESHHOLD, MEANS OF DISTINGUISHING NUCLEAR FROM NON-NUCLEAR ALCM AND ON-SITE INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS HAVE YET TO BE RESOLVED.

MOBILE ICBM

6. A SIMILAR PAPER WAS PREPARED TO LIST AGREED POINTS TOGETHER WITH THE RANGE OF REMAINING ISSUES WHICH WOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER IN GENEVA. THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT WERE:

FOR ROAD MOBILE ICBM:

- MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS TO BE CONFINED IN LIMITED NUMBERS TO RESTRICTED AREAS. LAUNCHER-ASSOCIATED STRUCTURES ALSO TO BE LIMITED WITHIN THESE AREAS.

- MOVEMENT OUTSIDE RESTRICTED AREAS FOR TRAINING, MAINTENANCE AND TESTING AND, IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES FOR EXERCISES AND OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL, TO BE ALLOWED WITH PRIOR NOTIFICATION.

- MEASURES TO ENHANCE OBSERVATION BY NTM AT RESTRICTED AREAS.

- LIMITATIONS ON NUMBER AND LOCATIONS OF NON-DEPLOYED ICBM.

FOR RAIL-MOBILE ICBM:
- LIMITED NUMBER OF RAIL GARRISONS, AND LIMITATIONS ON NUMBER OF MISSILES AND TRAINS IN EACH GARRISON. MOVEMENT OUT OF GARRISONS AND LIMITATIONS ON NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES COMPARABLE TO THOSE FOR ROAD MOBILE MISSILES.

7. THE ISSUES YET TO BE AGREED INCLUDE THE SIZE OF RESTRICTED AREAS, FACILITIES TO BE SUBJECT TO PERIMETER/PORTAL MONITORING, FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON MOBILE MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS (EG SHOULD LIQUID FUELLED SYSTEMS BE ALLOWED), THE NEED TO QUOTE TAG UNQUOTE MISSILES, OTHER VERIFICATION MEASURES ADDRESSING THE POSSIBILITY OF COVER MISSILES AND SUSPECT SITE INSPECTIONS..

ALEXANDER

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MY TELNO 939: MOSCOW SUMMIT

SUMMARY

1. US AMBASSADOR EMPHASISES IMPORTANCE OF MOSCOW MEETING IN BRINGING THE SUMMIT PROCESS TO MATURITY, DESPITED LIMITED CHARACTER OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS. US SUCCESS IN COMMUNICATING DIRECTLY WITH SOVIET PEOPLE AND IN LEGITIMISING THEIR FOUR-POINT AGENDA. A GOOD FOUNDATION FOR FURTHER NORMALISATION OF THE SUPER-POWER DIALOGUE.

DETAIL

2. MY US COLLEAGUE BRIEFED ME (AND MY FRENCH AND FRG COLLEAGUES) ON 3 JUNE ON THE REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT. ALTHOUGH HIS COMMENTS INEVITABLY DUPLICATED OR OVERLAPPED WITH SHULTZ'S NAC BRIEFING (UKDEL NATO TELS NOS 230-232) THE IMPRESSIONS OF A VERY EXPERIENCED OBSERVER OF THE SOVIET SCENE ARE NATURALLY OF VALUE AND I REPORT THEM AS AN ADDITIONAL GLOSS ON OTHER ACCOUNTS.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

3. MATLOCK SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE CONCRETE RESULTS OF THE REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT, IN TERMS OF AGREEMENTS, WERE ''NOT TRIVIAL'' THE GREATER SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEETING COULD BE SUMMARISED UNDER THREE HEADS:

(A) THE SUMMIT HAD PROVIDED THE OCCASION FOR THE MOST INTENSIVE US EFFORT TO DATE TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE SOVIET PEOPLE. IN THIS, THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THEY HAD SUCCEEDED TO AN UNEXPECTED EXTENT - REACTIONS TO THE PRESIDENT'S MOSCOW UNIVERSITY SPEECH HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING. BOTH ON THAT OCCASION AND DURING REAGAN'S VISIT TO THE WRITERS UNION, REAGAN'S ESSENTIAL HUMANITY HAD BEEN EFFECTIVELY PROJECTED AND HAD DISPELLED SOVIET PRECONCEPTIONS OF HIM AND OF HIS COUNTRY.

(B) THE MEETING HAD MARKED A FURTHER MATURING OF SUMMITRY AS A PROCESS, DEMONSTRATING THAT SUCH MEETINGS COULD BE USEFUL EVEN WITHOUT THE CENTREPIECE OF A MAJOR AGREEMENT: THIS WOULD IN ITSELF ASSIST THE FURTHER NORMALISATION AND EXPANSION FO THE US/SOVIET DIALOGUE.

(C) THE MEETING HAD MARKED FINAL SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE FOUR-POINT AGENDA (ARMS CONTRAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL ISSUES AND BILATERAL MATTERS) ON WHICH THE AMERICANS HAVE INSISTED SINCE THE GENEVA SUMMIT. THE PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN A LEAF OUT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S BOOK IN SPEAKING TO GORBACHEV WITH COMPLETE FRANKNESS BUT WITHOUT CONFRONTATION.

SOVIET TRY-ONS

4. GORBACHEV HAD PITCHED TWO FAST BALLS AT THE PRESIDENT BUT BOTH HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY DEFLECTED, TO GORBACHEV'S CHAGRIN. THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO INSERT A PASSAGE INTO THE JOINT STATEMENT WHICH RESURRECTED THE ''AGREED CODE OF CONDUCT'' LANGUAGE OF THE 1970S HAD BEEN FIRMLY RESISTED BY SHULTZ (EVEN AFTER GORBACHEV HAD OFFERED TO REMOVE A REFERENCE TO ''PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE'') ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS APPROACH TO THE SUPER-POWER RELATIONSHIP HAD ALREADY FAILED CRUCUAL TESTS, EG IN ANGOLA AND AFGHANISTAN. THE RIGHT APPROACH WAS TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO EXISTING PROBLEMS AS THEY AROSE, RATHER THAN LAYING DOWN RULES OF BEHAVIOUR WHICH COULD ONLY ENGENDER CHARGES OF BAD FAITH. OUT OF THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL AND OTHER PROBLEMS MORE GENERAL PRINCIPLES MIGHT, IN DUE COURSE, GROW BY A NATURAL PROCESS.

5. GORBACHEV HAD ALSO TRIED TO BOUNCE THE PRESIDENT INTO ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF A NEGOTIATION LEADING TO CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS OF 500,000 BY EACH ALLIANCE. THIS ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE THE AMERICANS IN BILATERAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE SUBSTANCE OF MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN FIRMALY REJECTED.

JOINT STATEMENT

6. MATLOCK ATTRIBUTED THE DESCRIPTIVE, RATHER THAN NORMATIVE, CHARACTER OF THE JOINT STATEMENT TO US CONCERN TO AVOID ANY LANGUAGE WHICH MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS A ''FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT'' WHICH WOULD BE ANATHEMA BOTH TO CONGRESS AND TO INFLUENTIAL FIGURES OUTSIDE IT (EG BRZEZINSKI). THE NEED TO AVOID ANYTHING RESEMBLING A VLADIVOSTOK - TYPE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF STRONG RESPRESENTATIONS TO THE WHITE HOUSE

IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT.

ARMS CONTROL

7. MATCLOCK DESCRIBED PROGRESS ON ALCM COUNTING AND MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION ALONG THE LINES OF PARS 4 AND 5 OF UKDEL NATO TELNO 232. THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS WHATSOEVER EITHER ON SLCMS OR ON SPACE DEFENCE. ON THE FORMER, MATLOCK SAW NO PROSPECT OF FORWARD MOVEMENT UNLESS THE RUSSIANS SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED THEIR POSITION: US DISBELIEF IN THE POSSIBILITY OF VERIFYING NUCLEAR SLCMS INCLINED THEM TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE OF A DECLARATORY SOLUTION, UNDER WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD SIMPLY ANNOUNCE ITS SLCM DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT PLANS IN ADVANCE FOR A STATED PERIOD. THE AMERICANS SAW LITTLE DANGER OF AN SLCM ARMS RACE SINCE THEIR LIMITED RANGE MADE THEM AN INADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR ICBMS, ALTHOUGH FOR GEOGRAPHICAL REASONS THIS ARGUMENT CUT LESS ICE WITH THE RUSSIANS. ON SPACE DEFENCE, THE RUSSIANS WERE STANDING PAT ON THE SACROSANCTITY OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE WASHINGTON DECLARATION, DENYING THE NEED TO REMOVE ITS AMBIGUITIES (ALTHOUGH THIS WAS ESSENTIAL IF THE SENATE WAS TO APPROVE AN EVENTUAL START AGREEMENT).

HUMAN RIGHTS

8. THE AMEICANS HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY INDICATIONS OF GENUINE MOVEMENT IN THE SOVIET APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS. FOR EXAMPLE, AN OFFICIAL OF THE SOVIET INSTITUTE OF STATE AND LAW HAD PROPOSED TO AMBASSADOR SHIFTER BILATERAL TALKS ON THE CREATION OF LEGAL SAFEGUARDS FOR INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES, AN AREA IN WHICH (AS HE PUT IT) THE SOVIET UNION ''LACKED EXPERIENCE'': THEY WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A THOROUGH STUDY OF THE LESSONS WHICH COULD BE LEARNED FROM ANGLO-SAXON LAW. SUCH A SUGGESTION, IF SERIOUSLY MEANT, WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONCEIVABLE EVEN A YEAR AGO.

BILATERAL

9. MATLOCK ATTACHED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE SCALE OF THE PROPOSED EXPANSION OF YOUTH EXCHANGES - FROM A FEW SCORE TO THOUSANDS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS: THIS COULD NOT FAIL TO HAVE A POSITIVE LONG TERM EFFECT ON EACH SUPER-POWER'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER. THE RUSSIANS HAD TRIED TO DEFLECT US PRESSURE FOR THE OPENING OF CULTURAL CENTRES IN

THE TWO CAPITALS WITH HALF-HEARTED EXCUSES ABOUT THE NEED TO ACCOMMODATE SIMILAR REQUESTS FROM EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES, ABSENCE OF SUITABLE PREMISES ETC: BUT THE TWO SIDES WERE NOW COMMITTED TO NEGOTIATING AND CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT ON THE SUBJECT WITHIN THREE YEARS.

REGIONAL ISSUES

10. MATLOCK'S BRIEFING ADDED NOTHING TO THE RELATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF UKDEL NATO'S TELEGRAM 230 AND 231.

COMMENT

11. WHILE ALLOWING FOR A NATURAL DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS TO REPRESENT THE SUMMIT AS A SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS DESPITE THE PAUCITY OF TANGILE RESULTS FROM IT, I WOULD LARGELY ENDORSE MATLOCK'S ASSESSMENT, ESPECIALLY THE POINTS IN PARA 3 ABOVE. ALTHOUGH THE SHORT-TERM PR ADVANTAGE MAY HAVE GONE TO GORBACHEV (JUST WHEN HE NEEDED IT) PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS LEFT THE SOVIET PEOPLE WITH A GOOD DEAL OF FOOD FOR THOUGHT: AND THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY ADDED TO THE HEALTH OF THE SUPER-POWER RELATIONSHIP.

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PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: COMMENTS

SUMMARY

1. A HISTORIC VISIT WITH FEW CONCRET RESULTS. BOTH SIDES EMPHASISED THE CONSOLIDATION OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP. ANOTHER PUBLIC RELATIONS SUCCESS FOR GORBACHEV, PROBABLY TIMED DELIBERATELY TO PROVIDE A BOOST IN THE RUN-UP TO HIS PARTY CONFERENCE. YET TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE RELATIVE LACK OF CONTENT AND CONTINUING DISAGREEMENTS ON MAJOR ISSUES WILL TARNISH THE APPEARANCE.

DETAIL

2. I HAVE JUST SEEN OFF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FLIGHT TO LONDON. YOU MAY LIKE TO HAVE MY FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF THE OUTCOME OF HIS VISIT. COMMENTS ON THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED ON 1 JUNE (MY TELNO 937) ARE IN MIFT (NOT TO ALL). I SHALL ALSO REPORT SEPARATELY ON GORBACHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE.

3. A CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT MUST AWAIT DETAILED DEBRIEFING BY THE AMERICANS AND APPRAISAL OF THE IMPACT OF THE MEETING HERE, IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN EUROPE. IT WOULD BE TOO FACILE TO SAY THAT THE WEEK'S OUTSTANDING FEATURE HAS BEEN THE MAGNIFICENT WEATHER AND SCENIC TELEVISION BACKDROPS, THE PRESS AND PUBLIC MAY CONCLUDE THAT THE FACT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT HAS BEEN MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN ITS CONCRETE RESULTS. THEY COULD BE RIGHT. THOUGH FAR IN THE PAST, THE PRESIDENT'S ''EVIL EMPIRE'' SPEECH HAS HAUNTED THE RUSSIANS. THEY REMAIN NERVOUS, PERHAPS UNDULY, OF THE EXTREME RIGHT IN THE USA (NERVES WHICH HAVE JANGLED DURING THE INF RATIFICATION DEBATES) AND NERVOUS ALSO OF ANY POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED CONFRONTATION WITH A MUCH STRONGER AND FITTER ADVERSARY. IF NOTHING ELSE, THEY WILL HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND OPPORTUNITIES TO MEET DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF LOCAL SOCIETY

IN A SEEMINGLY RELAXED WAY WILL FINALLY HAVE INTERRED THE IMAGE OF THE EVIL EMPIRE (GORBACHEV MORE OR LESS SAID AS MUCH IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE). THEY WILL ALSO HOPE THAT IT CEMENTS THE USSR'S STATUS AS AMERICA'S SUPERPOWER PEER (A STATUS FIRST ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE AMERICANS WHEN PRESIDENT NIXON CAME HERE IN 1973, BUT ONE WHICH THE RUSSIANS KNOW TO BE FAR FROM SECURE IN THE YEARS AHEAD).

4. CONSOLIDATION OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP HAS THEREFORE BEEN THE STRONGEST THEME TO EMERGE FROM BOTH SIDES. GORBACHEV HAS OPENLY HOPED THAT HIS VISIT HAS TAKEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE USA A LARGE STOP CLOSER TO MAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS (IN A FAVOURITE MARXIST TERM) ''IRREVERSIBLE''. BOTH LEADERS HAVE HARKED BACK TO THE WARTIME ALLIANCE, TO THE COLD WAR AND SUBSEQUENT UPS AND DOWNS. THEY HAVE GLOSSED OVER THE NIXON/BREZHNEV DETENTE AND ITS BREAKDOWN, BUT NIXON AND BREZHNEV HAVE BEEN SPECTRES AT THIS FEAST. THE NEED HAS BEEN TO SHOW THAT, THIS TIME AROUND, DETENTE WILL BE DIFFERENT AND LASTING. GORBACHEV HAS ACCORDINGLY STRESSED BOTH THE REALISM AND THE CONTINUUM OF THE PRESENT PROCESS. IN HIS WASHINGTON POST INTERVIEW, HE DESCRIBED THE PRESIDENT AS A REALIST. HE REPEATED THIS IN HIS SPEECH AT DINNER IN THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE AND IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE. GORBACHEV'S IMPLICATION WAS THAT HE HAD HELPED PRESIDENT REAGAN TO BECOME A REALIST, THAT REALISM HAD DEVELOPED DURING THEIR FOUR MEETINGS. THESE MEETINGS, AND THE SPREADING NETWORK OF CONTACTS AT FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHER LEVELS, WERE EACH BRICKS IN AN INCREASINGLY SOLID WALL. TO USE ANOTHER FAVOURITE SOVIET TERM, FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO COME HERE WITHOUT A MAJOR AGREEMENT BEING FLOURISHED OR IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BEING GLOSSED OVER, REPRESENTS ''NORMALISATION''.

5. THAT SAID, THE RESULTS (OR IN THE CASE OF REYKJAVIK, NEAR-RESULTS) HAVE BEEN LESS DRAMATIC THAN THOSE OF THE THREE PREVIOUS SUMMITS AND HAVE FALLEN SHORT OF THE MORE OPTIMISTIC PREDICTIONS. AS GORBACHEV SAID ON 1 JUNE, MORE COULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. SPECIFICALLY:

A. ARMS CONTROL: ON THE PUBLISHED EVIDENCE AT LEAST, THE SUMMIT HAS NOT PRODUCED A BREAKTHROUGH ON START. MUCH FURTHER WORK EVIDENTLY REMAINS TO BE DONE BEFORE THE 1974 THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY AND THE 1976 PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY CAN BE RATIFIED. ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES, THE SIDES HAVE FAILED TO FIND A COMPROMISE ON DUAL-CAPABLE SYSTEMS.

B. REGIONAL QUESTIONS: HOPES THAT COOPERATION IN REGIONAL QUESTIONS, PERHAPS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, MIGHT PROVIDE A CONSPICUOUS SUCCESS FOR THE SUMMIT HAVE NOT MATERIALISED. THIS IS NOT ALTOGETHER SURPRISING, AS BOTH SIDES ARE INHIBITED BY THE NEED NOT TO APPEAR TO SETTLE DISPUTES OVER THE HEADS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY INVOLVED. AS YET, THERE IS NO INDICATION WHETHER DISCUSSIONS BEHIND THE SCENES HAVE LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR FURTHER PROGRESS. GORBACHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE, AND PARTICULARLY HIS STERN WARNING ON AFGHANISTAN, SUGGESTS NOT.

C. HUMAN RIGHTS: IN PART BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF VISIBLE RESULTS ELSEWHERE, AND IN PART PRESUMABLY FOR DOMESTIC AMERICAN REASONS, HUMAN RIGHTS WERE MOVED CLOSE TO THE TOP OF THE AMERICAN AGENDA. THE RUSSIANS, AS I HAVE REPORTED, ALLOWED THEMSELVES TO BE NEEDLED BY THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS IN HELSINKI (AND PREVIOUSLY BY HIS SPRINGFIELD SPEECH). THE PRESIDENT CONTINUED TO NEEDLE THEM DURING THE VISIT BY THE BLUNT EMPHASIS OF HIS REMARKS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN DIFFERENT SPEECHES QUOTING, FOR EXAMPLE, FROM SOLZHENITSYN, AND BY THE HIGH PUBLICITY GIVEN TO HIS MEETING WITH DISSIDENTS AND REFUSENIKS. THOUGH I CANNOT JUDGE HOW THIS PLAYED IN THE UNITED STATES, OVERALL THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO EMERGE IN SURPRISINGLY GOOD SHAPE FROM THESE SKIRMISHES. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HANDLED HUMAN RIGHTS MORE ADROITLY THAN ON HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE SOVIET GIMMICK WITH A GROUP OF AMERICAN INDIANS WILL HAVE CUT MUCH ICE. BUT GORBACHEV AND OTHER SOVIET SPOKESMEN MADE SOME IMPACT WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT THE PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING WAS OUT OF DATE, THAT HE HAD TAKEN LITTLE ACCOUNT OF CHANGES UNDER WAY IN THIS COUNTRY, AND THAT HE WAS NOT FREE TO SEE FOR HIMSELF AND TO SAY WHAT HE WISHED. AS IF TO EMPHASISE THAT FREEDOM, THE RUSSIANS PRINTED VERBATIM MOST OF HIS EXCHANGES WITH REPORTERS AND PUBLISHED DESCRIPTIONS AND PICTURES OF HIS MEETINGS WITH DISSIDENTS. THEY ALSO CAME UP WITH THE OFFER OF A SEMINAR IN THE FRAMEWORK OF PARLIAMENTARY EXCHANGES, AND STRUCK A DIGNIFIED POSE IN SUGGESTING THAT HUMAN RIGHTS WAS A SUBJECT FOR SERIOUS TWO-WAY DISCUSSION (RATHER THAN, BY IMPLICATION, POINT SCORING). ALTHOUGH SIGNIFICANTLY WIDER COVERAGE IN THE SOVIET MEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS DEFINED BY THE AMERICANS IS A USEFUL POINT ON THE PRESIDENT'S SIDE, TO A LARGE EXTENT THE RUSSIANS SUCCEEDED IN MARGINALISING MANY OF THE ISSUED BY IDENTIFYING THEM WITH PEOPLE WHOM MOST RUSSIANS REGARD AS EXTREMISTS, IF NOT DISLOYAL CITIZENS.

D. BILATERAL QUESTIONS: THE TWO SIDES MANAGED TO COME UPIWITH A NUMBER OF MINOR AGREEMENTS TO SIGN, BUT SEEMED TO BE SEARCHING AROUND FOR BITS OF PAPER. GORBACHEV NARROWLY FAILED TO BOUNCE THE PRESIDENT INTO A NEW STATEMENT ON PEACEFUL COEXISTANCE, TO HIS MANIFEST ANNOYANCE. CERTAIN MOOTED BILATERAL AGREEMENTS DID NOT MATERIALISE. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS NO PROGRESS ON THE OPENING OF NEW CONSULATES. GORBACHEV WAS OPENLY DISAPPOINTED OVER TRADE AND MFN. PERHAPS THE BIGGEST BILATERAL QUESTION LEFT UNANSWERED IS WHETHER REAGAN AND GORBACHEV WILL MEET FOR A FIFTH TIME. GORBACHEV TOLD REPORTERS THAT THIS WAS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE, BUT SEEMED TO BE PINNING THE ONUS ON PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PROVIDE ENOUGH MOVEMENT ON START TO MAKE IT SO. HE HAS NOT PUT HIMSELF IN THE POSITION OF RUNNING AFTER THE PRESIDENT. HE HAS MADE CLEAR THAT HE LOOKS FORWARD TO WORKING WITH THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION, OF WHATEVER STRIPE.

BEAUTY CONTEST

6. THE RUSSIANS HAVE GONE TO GREAT LENGTHS TO MILK THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLICITY. THEIR PRESS ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN UNPRECEDENTEDLY LIBERAL. FOR THE FIRST TIME THEY ALLOWED TELEVISION COMPANIES TO TRANSMIT SIGNALS BY SATELLITE DIRECTLY THROUGH THEIR OWN EQUIPMENT. ON INTERNAL TELEVISION, GORBACHEV HAS AGAIN SHOWN UP WELL IN CONTRAST TO REAGAN. HE REPEATEDLY UPSTAGED THE PRESIDENT IN SHORT EXCHANGES WITH THE REPORTERS BEFORE WORKING SESSIONS. HE WAS IN TOTAL CONTROL OF THEIR JOINT RED SQUARE WALKABOUT. HE APPEARED NOT MERELY TO BE GUIDING BUT ALMOST PROTECTING THE PRESIDENT, AND ASSISTING HIM WITH ANSWERS. BY THIS STAGE OF THE VISIT, THE PRESIDENT WAS BEGINNING TO LOOK TIRED (UNDERSTANDABLY, AFTER AN INTENSIVE SCHEDULE). ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS ARE MORE ACCUSTOMED THAT THE WEST TO THE IMAGE OF AN AGING LEADERSHIP, GORBACHEV'S PROJECTION OF ENERGY AND DYNAMISM, AND HIS CONFIDENT DEMEANOUR, CAN ONLY HAVE DONE HIM GOOD BOTH INTERNALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY.

DOMESTIC IMPACT

7. GORBACHEV'S EXPLOITATION OF THE SUMMIT FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL ENDS MAY TURN OUT TO BE AS SIGNIFICANT AS ITS INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS. THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT HELPED TO SET HIM BACK ON TRACK DOMESTICALLY AFTER HIS ROCKY PERIOD IN NOVEMBER WHEN ELTSIN WAS SACKED. GIVEN THAT THIS SUMMIT WAS NOT TIED TO THE CONCLUSION OF A START AGREEMENT, GORBACHEV NEED NOT HAVE TIMED

IT FOR ONE MONTH BEFORE THE SPECIAL PARTY CONFERENCE. LOGIC WOULD SUGGEST THAT A LATER DATE WOULD HAVE GIVEN START A BETTER CHANCE. IF, AS I ASSUME, HIS TIMING WAS DICTATED PRIMARILY BY INTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS, HE MAY WELL HAVE MADE A SMART MOVE. AS I HAVE REPORTED ELSEWHERE, HE IS ENMESHED IN INTENSIVE INTRA-PARTY POLITICS. HE HAS LOST SOME IMPORTANT BATTLES. HE NEEDS TO DOMINATE THE PARTY CONFERENCE. THE SUMMIT HAS GIVEN A POWERFUL BOOST TO HIS IMAGE AS A STRONG AND ASSERTIVE LEADER, ACCEPTED AS SUCH BY THE WORLD. ON THE OTHER HAND, INTRA-PARTY POLITICS (AND, AWKWARDLY, ELTSIN HIMSELF) WERE MUCH IN EVIDENCE DURING THE WEEK. AND GORBACHEV IS ALREADY HAVING TO DEFEND HIMSELF AGAINST CRITICISM THAT THE SUMMIT TURNED INTO A MEDIA JAMBOREE, THAT HE FAILED TO ACHIEVE HIS DISARMAMENT OBJECTIVES, AND THAT HE GAVE REAGAN A PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO CHIDE AND PATRONISE THE SOVIET UNION.

8. ON BALANCE I THINK HE WILL BE HELPED BY THE EVIDENCE OF A REAL AND VIGOROUS DIALOGUE WITH THE AMERICANS AND BY HIS UPSTAGING OF THE PRESIDENT. FOR MOST RUSSIANS, THE DAILY SPECTACLE OF THE TWO LEADERS CHATTING ON EQUAL TERMS (AND WITH GORBACHEV FREQUENTLY GETTING THE BETTER OF THE INFORMAL EXCHANGES) WILL HAVE DONE SOMETHING TO SUGAR THE BITTER PILL OF CONTINUOUS REVELATIONS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SHORTCOMINGS AND FAILURES. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT IS PROBABLY NOT BY CHANCE THAT THE SOVIET MEDIA HAVE CARRIED SO LITTLE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MASTERLY SPEECH AT MOSCOW UNIVERSITY. IN THIS, WHILE THE PRESIDENT ACKNOWLEDGED THE CHANGES NOW TAKING PLACE IN THE (REVOLUTIONARY) SOVIET UNION, HE CONTRIVED TO STRESS THAT TODAY'S REVOLUTION, IN THE FIELD OF TECHNOLOGY, WAS GOING ON ELSEWHERE AND PASSING THE RUSSIANS BY. THIS UNDERLINES THE TENUOUSNESS OF SOVIET CLAIMS TO EQUAL STATUS FOR THE UNITED STATES, FOUNDED AS THEY ARE ON THE NARROW BASE OF NUCLEAR PARITY.

9. SEE MIFT.

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REAGAN GORBACHEV SUMMIT: SHULTZ ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS NOT COVERED IN MIPT.

MIDDLE EAST
2. SHULZ SAID HE WOULD SET OUT ON 3 JUNE FOR CAIRO, JORDAN, SYRIA AND ISRAEL. THIS WAS NOT BECAUSE SOME BIG BREAKTHROUGH WAS IN PROSPECT, BUT BECAUSE THE PROBLEM WAS IMMENSE AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP WORKING AT IT. THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO SHARE HIS VIEW THAT THE MIDDLE EAST WAS POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE. HOWEVER DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HAD NOT GOT VERY FAR. THE RUSSIANS RECOGNISED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, BUT PERSISTED IN REQUIRING PRIOR AGREEMENT ON STATUS. THEY APPEARED TO SUPPORT HIS (SHULTZ') CONTINUING TO WORK AWAY AT THE PROBLEM.

EFFECT OF REFORMS IN THE SOVIET UNION
3. IN REPLY TO MR MELLOR, SHULTZ SAID THAT GORBACHEV'S REFORMS HAD PROBABLY NOT TOUCHED THE MILITARY AND THE KGB INTERNALLY. BUT THE MILITARY SUPPORTED WHAT GORBACHEV WAS TRYING TO DO BECAUSE (AS AKHROMEYEV HAD SAID TO SHULTZ IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INF AGREEMENT) WHAT GORBACHEV WAS TRYING TO DO INVOLVED THE SURVIVAL OF THE SOVIET UNION.

MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE
4. THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT MENTIONED THIS.

EAST EUROPE

5. THE AMERICANS PREFERRED NOT TO DISCUS EASTERN EUROPE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, BECAUSE THIS MIGHT APPEAR TO ACKNOWLEDGE SOVIET HEGEMONY.

BERLIN

6. THE AMERICANS WERE HOWEVER HAPPY TO DISCUSS BERLIN. THIS WAS OF A DIFFERENT ORDER, BACAUSE OF THE FOUR POWER OCCUPATION. THE PRESIDENT HAD PUSHED HIS BERLIN INITIATIVE, WITH NO SIGN OF GIVE FROM THE RUSSIANS.

THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

7. ROBIN (FRANCE) ASKED HOW PRESIDENT REGAN COULD RECONCILE THE SENTENCE IN THE JOINT DECLARATION ABOUT THE FINAL OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH THE NEED TO MAINTAIN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. SHULTZ REPLIED THAT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE HAD KEPT THE PEACE FOR MANY YEARS, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO FOR A LONG TIME. BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT CHERNOBYL HAD MADE A DEEP IMPRESSION ON GORBACHEV, AND PRESIDENT REAGAN FELT AS A POLITICIAN THAT AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE POLITICAL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AS THE FOUNDATION OF PEACE WOULD DWINDLE. THE SOVIET ATTITUDE WAS A BLEND OF PROPAGANDA AND GUINE FEELING.

MBFR

8. AMBASSADOR SMITH (CANADA) SERVED NOTICE THAT AT MADRID HIS MINISTER WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE OF MBFR. SHULTZ DID NOT COMMENT.

9. FOR BRIEFING ON NST ISSUES, PLEASE SEE MIFT.

ALEXANDER

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


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REAGAN GORBACHEV SUMMIT: SHULTZ BRIEFING OF NAC 2 JUNE

SUMMARY

1. BRIEFING MUCH AS EXPECTED, EXCEPT FOR GORBACHEV'S TROOP REDUCTION PROPOSALS. SUMMIT DESCRIBED AS SUCCESSFUL AND WORKMANLIKE.

DETAIL

2. SHULTZ BRIEFED NAC TODAY (2 JUNE) ON OUTCOME OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. MR MELLOR REPRESENTED YOU.

3. SHULTZ DESCRIBED THE SUMMIT AS AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS. THE COHESION AND STRENGTH OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITHIN IT WERE CENTRAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL CONDUCT OF US-SOVIET BUSINESS.

MAIN CURRENTS OF SUMMIT

4. SHULTZ DESCRIBED THESE AS:

(A) THE PALPABLE FERMENT OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION, EXEMPLIFIED BY THE THESES FOR THE PARTY CONFERENCE.

(B) THE NEED TO BE CONSISTENT AND ROBUST IN REPRESENTING ONE'S OWN INTERESTS. REAGAN HAD REFUSED TO GO ALONG WITH GORBACHEV'S SUGGESTIONS FOR OUTDATED 1970 TYPE DETENTE LANGUAGE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT.

(C) CONTINUITY. THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO PASS ON TO HIS SUCCESSOR

A STABLE FRAMEWORK IN WHICH A FIRM AND REALISTINC POLITICAL DIALOGUE COULD BE CONTINUED IN GOOD TIMES AND BAD, WITHOUT ELEMENTS OF LINKAGE.

MODALITIES AND ATMOSPHERE

5. REAGAN AND GORBACHEV HAD HAD FOUR OFFICIAL DINNERS, ONE INFORMAL DINNER AND THE WALK ON RED SQUARE. DISCUSSION HAD BEEN VERY PERSONAL BUT SERIOUS. SHULTZ HAD HAD TWO FORMAL SESSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE, AND CARLUCCI HAD ACCEPTED AN INVITATION AT THIS MEETING WITH YAZOV TO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION IN AUGUST. CROWE AND AKHROMEYEV WOULD ALSO MEET IN JULY. THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE A POINT OF MEETING AS BROAD A SPECTRUM OF SOVIET SOCIETY AS POSSIBLE (WRITERS AND ARTISTS, THE DANILOV MONASTERY AND MOSCOW UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, WITH WHOM HE HAD DISCUSSED FUTURE WORLD TRENDS INCLUDING THE NEED FOR A MORE OPEN SOCIETY IN THE INFORMATION AGE.) THERE HAD BEEN NO EVIDENCE OF A SOVIET POWER STRUGGLE. GORBACHEV HAD BEEN CONFIDENT, PURPOSEFUL AND IN COMMAND.

HUMAN RIGHTS

6. THE AMERICANS HAD NOT SET OUT TO MAKE IT A HUMAN RIGHTS SUMMIT, BUT (PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE CSCE END GAME) THAT WAS WHAT HAD HAPPENED. IT WAS RIGHT TO BE SCEPTICAL OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, BUT WRONG TO SAY NOTHING WAS HAPENING. IN THE JOINT STATEMENT, THE RUSSIANS HAD GONE FURTHER ON HUMAN RIGHTS THAN IN ANY DOCUMENT HITHERTO NEGOTIATED. A NUMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASES HAD BEEN RESOLVED.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

7. GORBACHEV HAD PUSHED ON THESE. REGAN HAD REPLIED THAT THERE WAS A STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THAT RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXPORT OF MILITARY RELATED TECHNOLOGY WOULD BE CONTINUED.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

8. VARIOUS BILATERAL AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN SIGNED. OTHERS ON MARITIME SHIPPING AND BASIC SCIENCES WERE UNDER NEGOTIATION, AS WERE THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE IN THE BERING STRAITS AND THE OPENING OF CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK.

NUCLEAR TESTING

9. THE JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIEMENT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED, PROVIDING FOR ONE EXPERIMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION AND ONE IN THE US THIS SUMMER. THIS SHOULD ENABLE PROTOCOLS TO THE TWO NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES NOT YET RATIFIED TO BE COMPLETED. NOT ONLY WERE FOREIGNERS PRESENT FOR THE FIRST TIME AT THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST SITE,

BUT THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS THERE WOULD SHORTLY RISE FROM 50 TO 90. (AND VICE VERSA).

OTHER ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS

10. AFTER A NUMBER OF HITCHES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, A LAUNCH NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED. THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION AND A LOT OF PROGRESS (UNSPECIFIED) ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

11. SHULTZ DESCRIBED THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE SOVIET CSCE DELEGATION IN VIENNA AS FRUSTRATING, AND HE HAD SAID SO TO GORBACHEV. THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT DISCUSS CST WITH THE RUSSIANS A DEUX, NOR WOULD THEY DISCUSS NAVAL ACTIVITIES.

12. LATER, IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT WHEN THE TIME CAME (POSSIBLY IN A WEEK OR TWO) THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO SETTLE IN A HURRY AT VIENNA. THE WEST WOULD HAVE TO BE READY FOR THEM. GORBACHEV HAD REVIVED SOME OLD IDEAS ABOUT A DATA EXCHANGE, FOLLOWED BY THE ELIMINATION OF ASYMETRIES AND THEN A FORCE REDUCTION OF 500,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE SMICLN BUT NO FORMAL PROPOSAL HAD BEEN MADE. THE AMERICANS HAD STRESSED THE NEED TO SET UP THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS BEFORE DETAILED AND MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN. THESE SHOULD ANYWAY CONCENTRATE ON EQUIPMENT MORE THAN TROOPS.

REGIONAL ISSUES

13. SHULTZ DESCRIBED AFRICA AS THE MOST INTERESTING AREA. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS, HE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS SAW THE AFGHANISTAN ARRANGEMENT AS A PRECEDENT FOR ANGOLA (WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS, NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES). WE SHOULD NEED TO ESTABLISH WHAT WOULD BE GUARANTEED IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND BY WHOM. BUT SC 435 PROVIDED A STARTING POINT. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOIVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE A COUNTER PROPOSAL TO THE CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL PROPOSALS TABLED AT THE LONDON TALKS.

NEXT STEPS

14. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE SUMMIT COULD BE MEASURED BY THE WORK PROGRAMME AHEAD. THE DIALOGUE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND REGIONAL ISSUES WOULD CONTINUE. THERE WAS A DETERMINATION TO TRY TO FINISH START. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO RATIFY THE TWO TESTING TREATIES. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE A NEW SUMMIT IF THE START TREATY WERE READY, BUT THE PRESIDENT DID NOT WANT TO GET HOOKED ON DEADLINES. THE HARMEL BASIC DOCTRINE WAS IMPORTANT: THE ALLIANCE SHOULD LOOK TO ITS STRENGTH AND

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COHESION, AS A BASIS FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST.

15. FOR FURTHER ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS, SEE MIFT.

ALEXANDER

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MIPT: MOSCOW SUMMIT: JOINT STATEMENT

SUMMARY

1. LENGTHY BUT THIN JOINT STATEMENT. USEFUL RECORD OF THREE YEARS OF TALKS, BUT FEW NOVELTIES.

DETAIL

2. THE JOINT STATEMENT RUNS TO 16 PAGES IN THE ENGLISH TEXT, BUT IS RELATIVELY THIN ON SUBSTANCE. AS FORESEEN IN WASHINGTON TELEGRAMS 1340 AND 1341, THE TWO SIDES HAVE RECORDED THE PROGRESS MADE SINCE GENEVA. THE STATEMENT RECORDS DISAGREEMENT IN SOME AREAS. IN OTHERS PROGRESS IS LEFT FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

ARMS CONTROL: NST

3. WASHINGTON TELEGRAM 1341 AND UKDEL NATO'S 223 SET OUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S LIKELY ARMS CONTROL AGENDA AND AMBITIONS. IT APPEARS THAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN EVEN HARDER THAN THEY FEARED. NST IS ADDRESSED IN THE BODY OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, RATHER THAN SEPARATELY. THE PARAGRAPH ON DEFENCE AND SPACE IS GIVEN PROMINENCE IN THIS SECTION, PRESUMABLY AT SOVIET INSISTENCE. THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT YET PERSUADED THE RUSSIANS TO REFER TO THE AGREEMENT AS A TREATY.

4. ON SUB-LIMITS, THE STATEMENT MAKES NO REFERENCE TO THE 3300 CEILING FOR ICBM RVS: WE ASSUME THIS WAS ANOTHER AMERICAN GOAL NOT FULFILLED. MOST COUNTING RULES REMAIN FOR NEGOTIATION, BUT THE AMERICANS HAVE SECURED AGREEMENT ON GRAVITY-BOMB-CARRYING HEAVY BOMBERS COUNTING AS ONE DELIVERY VEHICLE AND ONE WARHEAD.

5. THE STATEMENT LISTS NINE AREAS WHICH START VERIFICATION MUST COVER. THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOME MOVEMENT ON DATE EXCHANGE. THERE IS NO MENTION, HOWEVER, OF THE SPECIFIC POINTS MADE IN WASHINGTON.

6. ALTHOUGH THE TWO SIDE ACHIEVED ''SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL COMMON GROUND, PARTICULARLY ON .. ALCMS AND ... THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION OF ICBMS'', THIS FALLS FAR SHORT OF AMERICAN HOPES.

NUCLEAR TESTING

7. THE STATEMENT REFLECTS THE DIFFICULTIES IDENTIFIED ON PNET AND TTBT. MUCH WILL HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL THE JVE ''HAS BEEN CONDUCTED AND ANALYSED''.

CW

8. THE FOUR PARAGRAPHS DEVOTED TO CW ARE UNEXCEPTIONAL, PROBABLY REFLECTING STRONG AMERICAN REARGUARD ACTION AGAINST SOVIET PRESSURE.

CONVENTIONAL

9. THE RUSSIANS SEEM TO HAVE TRIED TO BOUNCE THE AMERICANS INTO A BILATERAL UNDERSTANDING ON A THREE-STAGE PROPOSAL FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION BEGINNING WITH DATA EXCHANGES AND LEADING TO AGREED TROOP WITHDRAWALS. THE AMERICANS RESISTED AND THE STATEMENT MERELY WELCOMES PROGRESS SO FAR. GORBACHEV AND THE PRESIDENT GAVE THE PRESS DIFFERENT ACCOUNTS OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS. GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE HAD MADE CONCRETE PROPOSALS, BUT THE PRESIDENT SAID DISCUSSION WAS MORE TENTATIVE.

HUMAN RIGHTS

10. HUMAN RIGHTS IS TREATED SECOND, AFTER ARMS CONTROL, IN THE STATEMENT. DESPITE THE BLUNT EXCHANGES DURING THE VISIT, THE LANGUAGE IS RESTRAINED AND MODERATE, HOPING FOR SUSTAINED, CONCRETE PROGRESS AND AN EXPANSION OF THE DIALOGUE.

REGIONAL ISSUES

11. GORBACHEV TOLD THE PRESS THAT, AFTER AFGHANISTAN, IRAN/IRAQ HAD BEEN THE MAIN SUBJECT OF REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID

ANGOLA WAS DISCUSSED ''IMAGINATIVELY, SUBSTANTIALLY AND REALISTICALLY''. THE STATEMENT TALKS OF ''SERIOUS DIFFERENCES'' OVER CAUSES AND RESOLUTIONS OF SUCH PROBLEMS, BUT IT LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SIDES AGREE TO DISAGREE, AND TO CONTINUE TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS.

BILATERAL

12. THE LENGTHY SECTION IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ON BILATERAL AFFAIRS NOT ONLY RECORDS THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED DURING THE SUMMIT BUT NODS IN THE DIRECTION OF VIRTUALLY EVERY SINGLE ASPECT OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS. THE QUESTION OF CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK REMAINS UNSETTLED.

CCN: 1. USEFUL RECORD OF THREE YEARS ETC

CARTLEDGE

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MOSCOW SUMMIT: VERDICT OF THE US MEDIA

SUMMARY

1. THE MEDIA HAVE NOT YET GIVEN FINAL JUDGEMENT ON THE SUMMIT, BUT IT IS BEING WIDELY ACCLAIMED A SUCCESS FOR THE PRESIDENT.

DETAIL

2. THE US MEDIA HAVE PROVIDED HEAVY COVERAGE OF THE SUMMIT FROM MOST OF THE CONCEIVABLE ANGLES. THEY ARE ONLY NOW BEGINNING TO CONSIDER THEIR FINAL VERDICT ON THE SUBSTANCE IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESS CONFERENCES OF 1 JUNE. BUT REPORTING SO FAR, BOTH ON TELEVISION AND IN EAST COAST NEWSPAPERS, HAS BEEN ALMOST UNIVERSAL IN ITS PRAISE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PERFORMANCE. HIS SPEECHES AND HIS WALKABOUT HAVE BEEN REPORTED AS EVOKING A WARM RESPONSE IN MOSCOW QUOTE REAGAN IMPRESSES SOVIET ELITE: THE VINTAGE ACTOR GETS GREAT REVIEWS UNQUOTE (NEW YORK TIMES). QUOTE PUBLIC IMPRESSED: PRESIDENT STANDS-UP WELL TO EVERYONE UNQUOTE (WASHINGTON POST).

3. THE CONTENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECHES, ESPECIALLY THE SPEECH AT MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY, HAVE ALSO BEEN WELL RECEIVED HERE. ABC TELEVISION CHARACTERISED THE UNIVERSITY SPEECH AS QUOTE VERY IMPRESSIVE UNQUOTE AND EDITORIALS IN THE 1 JUNE EDITIONS OF THE POLITICALLY DIVERSE WASHINGTON POST, WASHINGTON TIMES AND NEW YORK TIMES WERE SIMILARLY ENTHUSIASTIC. FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES THE SPEECH QUOTE ... MAY HAVE BEEN RONALD REAGAN'S FINEST ORATORICAL HOUR ... HE WAS STIRRING IN HIS TALK OF FREE ELECTIONS AND FREE ENTERPRISE, OF AN INDEPENDENT PRESS AND AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY. PEOPLE ARE LIKELY TO REMEMBER THE DAY RONALD REAGAN EXTOLLED FREEDOM, WHILE LENIN LOOKED ON. UNQUOTE. THE WASHINGTON TIMES WAS IN NO DOUBT THAT QUOTE MR REAGAN'S ADDRESS TOUCHED ALL THE RIGHT TOPICS, FROM HUMAN RIGHTS TO REGIONAL CONFLICT, WHILE PAINTING A FULL PICTURE OF AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL GLORY UNQUOTE. AND THE WASHINGTON POST APPLAUDED THE WAY IN

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WHICH THE PRESIDENT WAS MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS QUOTE A LEADING THEME OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT AND HE IS DOING IT WITH THE RIGHT TOUCH UNQUOTE.

4. ON THE DOWN SIDE, THERE IS SOME REPLAYING OF SOVIET OFFICIAL (AND IN ONE CASE OF BRITISH PRESS) COMMENT CRITICAL OF THE PRESIDENT'S HIGH PROFILE APPROACH TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. HIS REMARKS ON AMERICAN LNDIANS AT MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY (QUOTE AWFUL UNQUOTE ACCORDING TO THE WASHINGTON POST) HAVE RILED SOME OF HIS PANDITS HERE. AN OCCASIONAL TENDENCY TO NOD OFF HAS BEEN NOTED. AND MORE CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ONE OR TWO ASSESSED MISSTATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT DURING HIS PRESS CONFERENCE MAY NOW FOLLOW.

5. BUT THE FIRST REACTIONS ARE NEVERTHELESS OVERWHELMINGLY FAVOURABLE, AND THE PRESIDENT AND HIS TEAM SHOULD ARRIVE IN LONDON CORRESPONDINGLY BUOYED UP

6. FCO PLEASE PASS TO NUMBER 10 DOWNING STREET.

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HD/DEFENCE D.
RESIDENT CLERK
MR POWELL NO.10 DOWNING STREET
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MOSCOW SUMMIT, DAY 3: 31 MAY

SUMMARY

1. THE TWO LEADERS SPENT THE MORNING TETE-A-TETE DISCUSSING BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES BEFORE GORBACHEV TOOK THE PRESIDENT ON A TOUR OF THE KREMLIN AND RED SQUARE, THAT INCLUDED ORCHESTRATED 'MEET THE PEOPLE' OPPORTUNITIES. AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED ON SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL COLLABORATION. THE PRESIDENT MET LEADING CULTURAL FIGURES AND MADE A MAJOR SPEECH AT MOSCOW UNIVERSITY. THE HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION CONTINUES TO RANKLE, BUT IN THEIR DINNER SPEECHES BOTH LEADERS PREFERRED TO DWELL ON THE PROGRESS MADE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR TAKING THIS FORWARD.

DETAIL

2. THE THIRD DAY OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT OPENED WITH MR GORBACHEV AND PRESIDENT REAGAN HAVING THEIR FOURTH SESSION OF TALKS, THIS TIME TETE-A-TETE. BILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION WAS AT THE CENTRE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS. THE RUSSIANS SAW THAT GORBACHEV RAISED THEIR EXCLUSION FROM MOST FAVOURED NATION STATUS AND THE JACKSON/VANIK AMENDMENT. GORBACHEV ALSO BRIEFED THE PRESIDENT ON THE PROGRESS OF PERESTROIKA AND THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRATIZATION. THE TETE-A-TETE SESSION RAN OVER ITS SCHEDULED TIME AND THE PLENARY SESSION WHICH SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED WAS IN FACT HELD BETWEEN SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE. THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS DISCUSSED REGIONAL ISSUES AND HEARD REPORTS FROM FOUR WORKING GROUPS.

3. YAZOV AND CARLUCCI HAD A FURTHER SEPARATE MEETING LASTING 2 1/2 HOURS IN THE AFTERNOON. THE TWO DEFENCE MINISTERS DISCUSSED VARIOUS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, INCIDENTS AT SEA, START VERIFICATION, MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE GULF WAR.

4. DAY 3 SAW THE FORMAL SIGNING OF GOVERNMENTAL AGREMENTS COVERING THE NOTIFICATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE TESTING, THE CONDUCT OF A JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT FOR MEASURING THE SIZE OF UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS, CULTURAL EXCHANGES FOR THE PERIOD OF 1989-91, FISHERIES, TRANSPORT SCIENCES, AND THE CREATION OF A JOINT SATELLITE NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEM. IN ADDITION THE TWO SIDES EXCHANGED LETTERS AND NOTES ABOUT SEARCH AND RESCUE AT SEA AND THE EXPANSION OF COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF SPACE RESEARCH AND PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.

DINNER SPEECHES

5. IN THE BANQUET SPEECHES AT SPASO HOUSE, THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS, RECALLING TIMES WHEN THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE HAD BEEN FULL OF SOVIET CITIZENS AND ALSO WHEN IT HAD BEEN SO EMPTY THAT YOU COULD HEAR THE METRO RUMBLING BELOW. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE DIFFERENCES THAT REMAINED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE PRESIDENT POINTED OUT THAT HE AND GORBACHEV HAD MADE HISTORIC PROGRESS AND HAD COMMITTED THE TWO NATIONS TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER. GORBACHEV'S WIDE-RANGING REPLY SKETCHED OUT AREAS WHERE HE SAW PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE BILATERAL COOPERATION. HE SAID THAT THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES NEEDED TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE ENTIRE WORLD. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO MORE SCIENTIFIC AND ECONOMIC EXCHANGES WITH THE UNITED STATES. ALTHOUGH HE AGREED THAT THE TALKS THIS WEEK HAD BEEN ROBUST, EACH SIDE NEEDED TO ''HAVE A REALISTIC VIEW AND TAKE ACCOUNT OF EACH OTHERS INTERESTS AND INTENTIONS. WE MUST LEARN THE DIFFICULT ART OF NOT JUST EXISTING SIDE BY SIDE, BUT OF BUILDING BRIDGES OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION''.

JOINT WALK-ABOUT

6. AFTER THE FORMAL PROGRAMME IN THE MORNING, GORBACHEV TOOK THE PRESIDENT ON A WALK-ABOUT THROUGH THE KREMLIN AND INTO RED SQUARE. THERE THE TWO LEADERS MET SMALL GROUPS OF TOURISTS AND ANSWERED THEIR QUESTIONS. AS WITH THE REAGANS' VISIT TO THE ARBAT PEDESTRIAN PRECINCT ON SUNDAY EVENING, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT ACCESS TO RED SQUARE DURING THE WALK-ABOUT WAS STRICTLY CONTROLLED. THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED THE GOOD WISHES OF A GERRYMANDERED CROSS-SECTION OF SOVIET SOCIETY, AND IN RETURN EXPRESSED HIS RESPECT FOR THE CONTRIBUTION MADE TO THE COUNTRY BY SOVIET WOMEN. THROUGHOUT THIS TOUR GORBACHEV PLAYED THE ROLE

OF AN EFFECTIVE GUIDE AND MENTOR, STEERING THE CONVERSATION AND TAKING THE LEAD IN ANSWERING QUESTIONS.

JOINT EXCHANGES WITH PRESS

7. GORBACHEV'S DYNAMICH APPROACH TO THE PRESS WAS ALSO EVIDENT IN THE BRIEF EXCHANGES WITH REPORTERS BEFORE THE DAY'S WORK BEGAN. HE ANSWERED FULLY EVEN THOSE QUESTIONS WHICH WERE PUT PRIMARILY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, WHO BY CONTRAST WAS HESITANT AND CAUTIOUS IN HIS REPLIES. IN THIS WAY GORBACHEV WAS ABLE TO PUT ARMS CONTROL TOP OF THEIR JOINT AGENDA AND ALSO LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IF THE TWO LEADERS INDULGED IN FRANK TALKING AS THEY HAD DONE IN GENEVA, THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO BREAK ANY APPARENT LOG-JAM.

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROGRAMME

WRITERS' UNION

8. THE PRESIDENT WAS INVITED TO LUNCH AT THE UNION OF WRITERS, WHERE HE MET LEADING LIGHTS OF GLASNOST IN THE ARTS, INCLUDING ZALYGIN, THE EDITOR OF NOVIY MIR, AND KURIOV, THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE FILM-MAKERS UNION. THE PRESIDENT ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO THE IMPORTANCE OF ARTISTIC FREEDOM, AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH. THE SOVIET PRESS REPORTED HIS REMARKS ONLY BRIEFLY, BUT DID INCLUDE HIS PRAISE FOR GORBACHEV AS A MAN OF INSIGHT.

MOSCOW UNIVERSITY SPEECH

9. THE SPEECH TO THE MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY WAS CLEARLY A MAJOR ELEMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAMME. HE BEGAN BY SPEAKING ABOUT THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION WHICH WAS UNDERWAY IN THE WEST. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE KEY TO THIS NEW ECONOMIC REVOLUTION WAS FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, OF INFORMATION AND OF COMMUNICATION. HE ATTACKED CENTRAL PLANNING AND THE INERTIA OF ANY BUREAUCRACY. HE DEVOTED A PARAGRAPH TO EACH OF THE MANIFESTATIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES, IN THE SCHOOLS,THE COURTS, THE UNIVERSITIES, AND THE UNIONS. HE STRESSED THAT FREEDOM WAS ACTUALLY MORE THAN THIS: ''FREEDOM IS THE RIGHT TO QUESTION AND TO CHANGE THE ESTABLISHED WAY OF DOING THINGS''.

10. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SPOKE OF THE COMMON TIES THAT BIND THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THAT AMERICANS

DID NOT SIMPLY FEEL GOODWILL TOWARDS SOVIET CITIZENS, THEY HAD MANY TIES OF KINSHIP. A FEW FAMILIES HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO VISIT THEIR RELATIVES AND THE PRESIDENT HOPED IT WOULD NOT BE TOO LONG BEFORE UKRAINIAN-AMERICANS, BALTIC-AMERICANS AND ARMENIAN-AMERICANS COULD FREELY VISIT THEIR HOMELANDS JUST AS HE, AND IRISH-AMERICAN, COULD VISIT HIS. SAYING IT WAS TIME TO REMOVE THE BARRIERS THAT KEPT PEOPLE APART, THE PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE BERLIN WALL WITH GORBACHEV. QUOTING THE POPULAR SONG WHOSE CHORUS IS ''DO THE RUSSIANS WANT A WAR?'', HE POINTED OUT THAT THE WARTIME EXPERIENCE OF THE AMERICANS, AND THEIR LOSSES, MEANT THAT THE ANSWER WAS JUST THE SAME FOR THEM.

11. THE PRESIDENT SPOKE ABOUT THE FAITH AND SELF-CONFIDENCE THAT WERE NEEDEED BY THOSE INVOLVED IN PERESTROIKA. HE REMEMBERED THAT BUTCH CASSIDY AND THE SUNDANCE KID, WHEN SURROUNDED BY A POSSE ON THE EDGE OF A CLIFF, HAD LEAPT BOLDY INTO THE UNKNOWN. HE TOLD THE STUDENTS THAT THEIR GENERATION WAS LIVING IN ONE OF THE MOST EXCITING, HOPEFUL TIMES IN SOVIET HISTORY. USING GOGOL'S FAMOUS DESCRIPTION OF RUSSIA AS A TROIKA SPEEDING JOYFULLY TOWARD A DESTINATION WHICH IS NOT YET CLEAR, HE HOPED THAT THE JOURNEY WOULD LEAD TO A BLOSSOMMING OF FREEDOM AND GLASNOST, ''LEADING TO A NEW WORLD OF RECONCILIATION, FRIENDSHIP AND PEACE''.

12. THE PRESIDENT THEN TOOK QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR. PREDICTABLY, MOST OF THESE SEEMED TO COME FROM STUDENTS WHO HAD DONE THEIR PARTY POLITICAL HOMEWORK. AFTER TWO SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS OF THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS REDUCTIONS AND THE RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS, HE WAS GRILLED ABOUT THE GUESTLIST FOR HIS RECEPTION AT SPASO HOUSE. ''WHY HAD HE INVITED A FORMER GESTAPO AGENT?'' (A SOVIET SPOKESMAN LATER EXPLAINED THAT HIS WAS AN ALLUSION TO ROSHKO, A POLICEMAN WHO HAD SERVED THE OCCUPYING POWERS DURING THE WAR.) A FURTHER QUESTION ASKED THE PRESIDENT WHY HE HAD NOT RECEIVED THE FOUR AMERICAN INDIANS WHO HAD COME TO MOSCOW TO PLEAD THEIR CASE.

13. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS PUBLISHED BRIEF ACCOUNTS OF THE UNIVERSITY MEETING, BUT HAS YET TO PRINT THE SPEECH.

MRS REAGAN

13. MRS REAGAN SPENT THE DAY IN LENINGRAD, ACCOMPANIED BY MRS GROMYKO. SHE WAS GIVEN AN EXTENSIVE TOUR OF THE HISTORICAL AND ARCHITECTURAL BEAUTIES OF THE CITY, WHICH SHE EVIDENTLY

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MOSCOW SUMMIT DAY TWO: 30 MAY

SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV EXPRESSES IRRITATION AT CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE. THE WORKING SESSIONS ARE DEVOTED TO ARMS CONTROL. THE PRESIDENT MEETS DISSIDENTS AND REFUSENIKS AT SPASO HOUSE AND VISITS THE DANILOV MONASTERY. SOVIET MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES TAKES A MUCH SHARPER TURN.

DETAIL

2. THE SECOND DAY OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT CONTINUED IN WHAT BOTH SIDES DESCRIBED AS A CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE (BUT ONE COOLED BY DIFFERENCES, OVER HUMAN RIGHTS. AT THE KREMLIN BANQUET GORBACHEV SAID FIRMLY THAT CONTACTS BETWEEN PEOPLE SHOULD BE EXPANDED 'BUT THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITHOUT INTERFERING IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, WITHOUT SERMONISING OR IMPOSING ONE'S VIEWS OR WAY OF LIFE, AND WITHOUT TURNING FAMILY OR PERSONAL PROBLEMS INTO A PRETEXT FOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN STATES'. HE QUOTED REAGAN'S OWN WORDS THAT THE ONLY WAY TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES IS TO UNDERSTAND THEM. HE WELCOMED EFFORTS MADE BY THE OUTSIDE WORLD TO UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET UNION BUT CAUTIONED THAT 'EVERYONE WHO WANTS TO DO BUSINESS WITH US WILL FIND IT USEFUL TO KNOW HOW SOVIET PEOPLE SEE THEMSELVES'. WHILE PROCLAIMING A PROGRAMME OF MORE DEMOCRACY, MORE GLASNOST' AND MORE SOCIAL JUSTICE, HE GAVE EQUAL WEITGHT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF MAN, THE INDIVIDUAL, AND SOCIETY. THE REST OF HIS SPEECH WAS TAKEN UP WITH FAMILIAR REFERENCES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INCLUDING ECONOMIC SECURITY, AND THE NUCLEAR THREAT.

3. IN REPLY THE PRESIDENT STRUCK A CONCILIATORY NOTE. HE WELCOMED THE FIRST STEPS WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN IN CUTTING NUCLEAR

ARSENALS. HE SAID THAT THE VISION OF FREEDOM AND COOPERATION ENSHRINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT REMAINED UNREALISED. NONETHELESS BOTH SIDES HAD GOT INTO THE HABIT OF LOOKING FOR AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND HAD FOUND MORE THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED.

WORKING SESSIONS

4. THE DAY'S WORKING SESSION BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS HAD BEEN DEVOTED TO QUESTIONS OF ARMS CONTROL. IN ADDITION TO THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV, THERE WERE SEPARATE SESSIONS FOR SHUTLZ AND SHEVARNADZE, AND FOR YAZOV AND CARLUCCI. IN BRIEFING THE PRESS BOTH SPOKESMEN TRIED TO EMPHASISE THOSE AREAS OF THE AGENDA ON WHICH THEIR COUNTRY HAD BEEN MORE FORTHCOMING. FITZWATER SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD AGAIN OFFERED TO SHARE THE FRUITS OF SDI RESEARCH. GERASIMOV SCOFFED AT THE THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO MUCH.

5. THE RUSSIANS CLAIM TO HAVE PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS FOR A STEP BY STEP REDUCTION IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN EUROPE, BEGINNING WITH A COMPREHENSIVE DATA EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO. CLEARLY THE KEY START ISSUES ARE PROVING DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE, ESPECIALLY SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. NONETHELESS SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN CONCLUDING AGREEMENTS ON EARLY NOTIFICATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE TEST FIRINGS AND THE CONDUCT OF A JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT.

HUMAN RIGHTS

6. THE PRESIDENT BEGAN HIS AFTERNOON BY VISITING THE DANILOV MONASTERY, THE NEWLY-RESTORED HEADQUARTERS OF THE MOSCOW PATRIARCHATE. HE SAID THAT THE FAITH OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE HAD BEEN TESTED AND TEMPERED IN THE CRUCIBLE OF HARDSHIP. AMERICANS SHARED THE HOPE THAT THE RETURN OF THE DANILOV MONASTERY WAS NOT AN END IN ITSELF BUT THE SYMBOL OF A NEW POLICY OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE THAT WOULD EXTEND TO ALL PEOPLES OF ALL FAITHS. HE SPOKE UP FOR BELIEVERS OF ALL CREEDS INCLUDING THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC AND ORTHODOX CHURCHES. HE HOPED THAT PERESTROIKA MIGHT BE ACCOMPANIED BY A 'DEEPER RESTRUCTURING, A CHANGE IN HEART, AND THAT GLASNOST' WHICH MEANS GIVING VOICE WILL ALSO LET LOOSE A NEW CHORUS OF BELIEF SINGING PRAISE TO THE GOD THAT GAVE US LIFE'. HE FINISHED HIS REMARKS WITH A LONG QUOTATION FROM ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN. ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET MEDIA, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH TOLD HIM THAT THE PEOPLE AND CHURCH WERE UNITED

IN SUPPORT FOR PERESTROIKA AND THAT MANY OF THE QUESTIONS HE HAD RAISED HAD ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED WITH THE HELP OF THE GOVERNMENT.

7. SUBSEQUENTLY THE PRESIDENT MET A SELECTED GROUP OF REFUSENIKS AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVISTS AT THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE. HE TOLD THEM THAT HE HAD ARGUED THE CASE DURING THE SUMMIT FOR FREEDOM OF RELIGION, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF TRAVEL. HE HAD RAISED THE CASES OF SOME PEOPLE WHO HAD FORMERLY WORKED ON 'SECRETS' AND CALLED FOR A RATIONAL REVIEW OF SUCH CASES. HE HAD ALSO CALLED FOR INSTRUMENTAL CHANGES TO MARK THE PROGRESS THAT HAD BEEN MADE PERMANENT.

8. THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING AT SPASO HOUSE HAS ATTRACTED SHARPLY ADVERSE COMMENT IN THE SOVIET MEDIA. THE MAIN EVENING NEWS DEVOTED 10 MINUTES (INCLUDING FILM) TO THE MEETING AND QUESTIONED WHY THE PRESIDENT HAD CHOSEN TO FIND OUT ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION FROM SUCH AN UNREPRESENTATIVE AND UNWORTHY GROUP. GRIGORYANTS WAS DESCRIBED AS A ''SPECULATOR IN FINE ART'' AND WE WERE REMINDED THAT GORBACHEV TOLD THE WASHINGTON POST THAT GRIGORYANTS RECEIVED MONEY FROM ABROAD. THERE WAS FURTHER SHARP CRITICISM OF THE LEADERS OF THE TRUST GROUP AT THE RECEPTION. THERE WAS ANOTHER HYSTERICAL COMMENTARY IN PRAVDA, WHERE IT WAS NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S GUESTS 'ADDRESSED EACH OTHER AS LADIES AND GENTLEMEN' RATHER THAN COMRADES. OTHER REPORTS INCORPORATED PERSONAL ATTACKS ON OGORODNIKOV, TIMOFEEV AND OTHERS.

9. THE VISITING CAMPAIGNERS FOR INDIAN RIGHTS CONTINUE TO ENJOY GREAT PROMINENCE ON SOVIET TV AND IN THE PRESS. THEIR ALLEGED DIFFICULTIES IN PRESENTING THEIR CASE TO THE PRESIDENT ARE BEING DIRECTLY CONTRASTED WITH HIS MEETINGS WITH SOVIET DISSIDENTS. THE ISSUE SEEMS LIKELY TO BE PLAYED BACK TO THE PRESIDENT THROUGHOUT THE SUMMIT.

EXTERNALS

10. VARIOUS EVENTS CONTINUE TO BE ARRANGED IN THE MARGINS OF THE SUMMIT, INCLUDING YET ANOTHER REUNION FOR THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN TROOPS WHO MET ON THE ELBE IN 1945. MRS PAPANDREOU, HER 'WOMEN FOR A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT' AND THE GREEK PEOPLE HAVE PRESENTED AN UGLY STATUE REPRESENTING PEACE TO THE SOVIET CULTURAL FUND. MRS GORBACHEVA RECEIVED IT ON BEHALF OF THE

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FUND. SHE THANKED THE GROUP FOR THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE SUMMIT PROCESS. MEANWHILE MRS REAGAN VISITED ONE OF THE SHOWPIECE SCHOOLS IN MOSCOW AND SANG ALONG WITH ONE OF THEIR ENGLISH CLASSES. OUR IMPRESSION IS STILL THAT THE ORDINARY MUSCOVITE IS FOLLOWING THE SUMMIT FROM A DISTANCE, ONLY NOTICING IT WHEN HIS SCHEDULE IS DISRUPTED BY ROAD CLOSURES.

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MOSCOW SUMMIT: FIRST DAY: 29 MAY

SUMMARY

1. ARRIVAL OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, WELCOMING SPEECHES AND FIRST MEETINGS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS. SOVIET EMPHASIS ON HISTORIC NATURE OF THE VISIT AND ON CONSOLIDATION OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. REFERENCES BY THE PRESIDENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS, FOLLOWING HIS HELSINKI SPEECH. SOVIET TETCHINESS APPARENT.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENT LANDED IN MOSCOW AT 2.00PM ON SUNDAY 29 MAY. IN THEIR PREPARATIONS AND THE ARRIVAL ARRANGEMENTS, OF WHICH YOU WILL HAVE SEEN EXPANSIVE COVERAGE BY OVER 5,000 VISITING JOURNALISTS FROM 63 COUNTRIES, THE RUSSIANS HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES DETERMINED NOT TO BE OUTDONE BY THE TREATMENT GIVEN TO GORBACHEV IN WASHINGTON IN DECEMBER. THEY HAVE SPRINGCLEANED THE TOWN, REPARIED ROADS, PAINTED BUILDINGS ALONG THE ROUTES THE REAGANS WILL TRAVEL, EVEN PLANTED TREES, AND HAVE BEEN BLESSED WITH GLORIOUS WEATHER. SOVIET PRESS REPORTING HAD EMPHASISED THE HISTORIC NATURE OF THE VISIT, COMING AFTER A 14 YEAR INTERVAL SINCE AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT WAS LAST IN MOSCOW, AND ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT IT MARKS A POINT IN THE TRANSITION FROM AN ERA OF MISTRUST AND CONFRONTATION TOWARDS (IN PRAVDA'S WORDS) ''MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION, TOWARDS A NUCLEAR-FREE AND JUST WORLD''.
WELCOMING SPEECHES.

3. GORBACHEV'S THEME, IN HIS BRIEF REMARKS AT THE WELCOMING CEREMONY IN THE KREMLIN, WAS THAT THE EYES OF THE WORLD WERE ON THIS MEETING, AND THAT THE OLD ANTIPATHIES AND STEREOTYPES CONNECTED WITH THE

''IMAGE OF AN ENEMY'' WERE ON THEIR WAY OUT. ON THE VERGE OF THE SECOND MILLENNIUM, HISTORY HAD CONNECTED THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES ''WITH SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FATE OF MANKIND''. THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD EXPECTED THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO GIVE A NEW IMPULSE TO ALL DIRECTIONS OF THE DIALOGUE AND TO COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO GREAT STATES.

4. SUMMARISING THE AGENDA, GORBACHEV PUT DISARMAMENT IN FIRST PLACE, CITING THE COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS RELATING TO A 50% REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.''IN CONDITIONS OF THE MAINTENANCE OF THE 1972 ABM TREATY'', THE LIQUIDATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE REDUCTION OF OLORECS AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN EUROPE, AND THE CURTAILMENT OF NUCLEAR TESTING. HE THENN REFERRED TO THE SETTLEMENT OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS, THE IMPROVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, AND TO COOPERATION IN TACKLING BACKWARDNESS, POVERTY, MASS DISEASES AND HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS. FINALLY HE SAID THOT BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD BE DISCUSSED. THE INF TREATY WAS A SYMBOL OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS ESTABLISHED IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS: BUT THE TASKS AHEAD WERE YET MORE COMPLICATED AND RESPONSIBLE. THE PRESIDENT COULD NOW SEE WITH HIS OWN EYES THE SOVIET UNION, OF WHICH HE HAD OFTEN SPOKEN IN HIS SPEECHES.

5.IN HIS REPLY, PRESIDENT REAGAN REFERRED TO THE MAJOR OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED IN THE FIRST TWO MEETINGS AT GENEVA AND REYKJAVIK, AND TO THE FORWARD MOVEMENTS REGISTERED FROM THE TIME OF GORBACHEV'S WASHINGTON VISIT. IN HIS OWN SUMMARY OF THE AGENDA, REAGAN PUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN FIRST PLACE, FOLLOWED BY REGIONAL QUESTIONS, ARMS LIMITATION AND BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE A SECOND MENTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS (IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WORK OF EXPERT GROUPS), AND ALSO LISTED SIGNATURE OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN AMONG THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SOVIET/AMERICAN DIALOGUE. (NEITHER OF THESE TWO SUBJECTS HAD RATED A MENTION FROM GORBACHEV.)

6. ON START, REAGAN SAID THAT THE DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA HAD PREPARED HUNDAREDS OF PAGES OF A JOINT DRAFT TREATY, RECORDING BOTH AGREED AREAS AND QUESTIONS WHICH STILL REMAINED TO BE RESOLOVED.

7. REAGAN PICKED OUT FOR A MENTION THE JOINT EXPERIMENT IN NUCLEAR TESTING. HE ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF INCREASING INVOLVEMENT OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN BILATERAL EXCHANGES, TO LAY A FOUNDATION FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING IN THE NEXT GENERATION. HE

WRAPPED UP HIS SUMMARY OF BILATERAL BUSINESS BY SAYING THAT ''DESPITE THE OBVIOUS AND FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES AND DESPITE THE INEVITABLE DIFFICULTIES WHICH WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED, OUR EFFORTS HAVE NOT BEEN WITHOUT RESULTS''.

8. THE PRESS MANAGED TO PUT A FEW QUESTIONS TO BOTH LEADERS, WHICH HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE SOVIET PRESS. HAVING FENDED OFF QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS FEELINGS ON SETTING FOOT IN THE EVIL EMPIRE, REAGAN WAS ASKED IF HE HAD COME TO LECTURE THE RUSSIANS ''IN THE ROLE OF A TEACHER'' ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS. HE REBUTTED THIS. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE RUSSIAN PROVERB QUOTED BY REAGAN, GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE WAS IN FAVOUR OF STEADY AND CONFIDENT FORWARD MOVEMENT, WITHOUR EXCESSIVE HASTE. HE QUOTED BACK THE PROVERB ''TRUST, BUT VERIFY''. FINALLY IN REPLY TO ANOTHER QUESTION, GORBACHEV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A FIFTH SUMMIT MEETING WAS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE.

OTHER ASPECTS

9. FOLLOWING THE EXCHANGE OF SPEECHES, REAGAN AND GORBACHEV HELD A FIRST MEETING WHICH LASTED FOR 70 MINUTES. IN A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE COMMENTING ON THIS MEETING AND THE FIRST DAY'S EVENTS, THE SOVIET SPOKESMAN, GERASIMOV, REPORTED THAT GORBACHEV HAD CONVEYED THE PROPOSAL (TRAILED IN HIS WASHINGTON POST INTERVIEW) FOR A JOINT SPACE MISSION TO MARS: REAGAN HAD AGREED TO STUDY THIS. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GERASIMOVSAID THAT THE PRESIDENT DID NOT HAVE AN ACCURATE VIEW OF THE CURRENT POSITION: HIS APPRAISAL WAS BASED ON THE PAST AND DID NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE RUSSIANS WERE AWARE OF THEIR OWN PROBLEMS AND WERE TACKLING THEM. IT DID NOT PLEASE THEM TO BE LECTURED ON THIS BY OTHERS. THERE WAS NO NEED TO INTRODUCE AN ELEMENT OF SENSATIONALISM AND PROPAGANDA. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ACCORDINGLY PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STANDING BILATERAL ''SEMINAR'' WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF PARLIAMENTARY LINKS. HUMAN RIGHTS WAS A 2-WAY STREET. WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN FITZWATER WAS ASKED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WOULD MEET A DELEGATION OF AMERICAN INDIANS WHO HAD COME TO MOSCOW FOR THE PURPOSE: AND SAID THAT THIS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BACK IN THE UNITED STATES.

10 SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE HELD THEIR FIRST WORKING SESSION, AND, AS ANTICIPATED, SET UP EXPERT GROUPS TO DEAL WITH POLITICO/ MILITARY, REGIONAL, BILATERAL, AND HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS.

11. THE DAY ALSO INCLUDED A SHOURT WALK ABOUT BY THE PRESIDENT

AND MRS REAGAN IN THE ARBAT PEDESTRIAN PRECINCT, AND A KREMLIN TOUR FOR MRS REAGAN CONDUCTED BY RAISA GORBACHEV.

12. MESSAGE OF GOODWILL HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM MANY GROUPS, INCLUDING MARGARET PAPANDRAEOU'S ''WOMVN FOR A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT'', CHURCH LEADERS AND TRADE UNIONISTS. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS PLAYED BACK COMMENTS BY LEADING POLITICIANTS AND JOURNALISTS AROUND THE WORLD, INCLUDING YOUR OWN REMARK THAT THE TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MOSCOW MEETING WILL BRING INTO OUR HOMES HOPE FOR THE FUTURE BASED ON SECURITY AND PEACE, HOPE WHICH HAS NOW A MUCH FIRMER FOOTING THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS.

COMMENT

13. THE SHARPEST NOTE ON THE FIRST DAY HAS BEEN ON THE SUBJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. INEVITABLY, THE MASSIVE VISITING PRESS CORPS HAVE BEEN SCOURING LOCAL CONTACTS TO FIND AN ANGLE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE BBC AND OTHERS WERE TIPPED OFF ABOUT A DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF THE BOLSHOI THEATRE ON 28 MAY, AND SHOWED THIS TAKING PLACE WITHOUT INTERRUPTION FROM A SMALL MILITIA CONTINGENT. REAGAN'S REMARKS BEFORE HIS ARRIVAL HERE, AND HIS FURTHER REFERENCES TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE KREMLIN, HAVE PUT TO THE TOP OF THE PRESS AGENDA THE QUESTION OF HOW FAR HE WILL LECTURE THE RUSSIANS ON THIS SUBJECT. HUMAN RIGHTS WILL RECEIVE FURTHER EMPHASIS IN REPORTING OF THE SECOND DAY OF THE VISIT, AS REAGAN IS TO MEET REFUSENIKS AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGNERS AT THE AMERICAN RESIDENCE ON THE AFTERNOON OF 30 MAY. (LEADING REFUSNIKS ARE STAGING A HUNGAR STRIKE DURING HIS VISIT.) IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF SOVIET OFFICIALDOM WILL COUNTER BY RECEIVING THE FOUR VISITING AMERICAN INDIANS.

14. THE SOVIET PRESS HAVE REACTED WITH A SENSE OF OFFENDED DIGNITY TO THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH IN HELSINKI AND HIS INTERVIEW WITH SOVIET TELEVISION. ONE COMMENTATOR (KOBYSH, IZVESTIYA 28 MAY) ASKED IF THIS WAS THE CORRECT BEHAVIOUR FOR A GUEST AND REGRETTED THAT THE PRESIDENT CONTINUED TO DEFER TO THE AMERICAN RIGHT AND TO POLICIES OF ''A POSITION OF STRENGTH.''

15. THE SUMMIT IS ALSO PUTTING INTERNAL SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE MICROSCOPE. THE PRESS HAVE BEEN CHASING PARTY FIGURES FOR INTERVIEWS, WITH SOME SUCCESS. SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY BORIS ELTSIN HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEWS WITH BOTH THE BBC AND GOOD MORNING AMERICA.

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16. IN SEPARATE TELEGRAMS I HAVE REPORTED SOVIET RATTIFICATION OF THE INF AGREEMENT, AND A SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON CAMBODIA WHICH, BY PUBLICATION ON 30 MAY, HAS POINTED UP SUMMIT DISCUSSIONS OF REGIONAL QUESTIONS. THE PRESS HAS ALSO CARRIED A DETAILED STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHICH CALLS ON ALL PARTIES TO OBSERVE THE AFGHANISTAN AGREEMENT AND CRITICIZES PAKISTAN FOR ITS FAILURE TO DO SO.

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

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MIPT: U S PRE-SUMMIT BRIEFING ON NAC, 27 MAY: NST ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY

1. MAIN U S AIM AT SUMMIT IS TO ADD TO ELEMENTS OF THE AGREEMENT IN NST NEGOTIATIONS. PRINCIPAL FOCUS TO BE ON ALCM AND MOBILE MISSILES. LITTLE NEW INFORMATION EMERGES FROM NITZE'S BRIEFING.

DETAIL

2. NITZE, WHO WAS CLEARLY TIRED AND NOT ON TOP FORM, HAD LITTLE TO ADD TO (AND IN MANY AREAS PROVIDED LESS DETAIL THAN) THAT CONTAINED IN WASHINGTON TELNO 1341. IN MOSCOW THE U S WOULD ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP THE JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT AS FAR AS POSSILE AS THE BEST WAY OF RECORDING THE DETAL OF AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. A SUMMIT STATEMENT COULD BE EXPECTED TO SUMMARISE THE MAIN ISSUES. U S EFFORTS WOULD FOCUS ON ALCM AND MOBILE MISSILES BUT PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE IN OTHER AREAS WHEREVER POSSIBLE.

3. ON ALCM, THE U S WOULD SEEK TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE DETAILED MEANS OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND COVENTIONAL MISSILES AND HEAVY BOMBERS. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR FUNCTIONALLY RELATED EXTERNAL OBSERVABLE DIFFERENCE WERE NOT IN THEMSELVES SUFFICIENT AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY. TOGETHER WITH RESTRICTIONS ON THE LOCATION OF BOMBERS AND ALCMS, THESE COULD PROVIDE A GOOD FOUNDATION FOR ACCEPTABLE METHODS OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THE U S WOULD ALSO SEEK TO REACH AGREEMENT ON ALCM COUNTING RULES AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE A COUNTING RULE OF LESS THAN 10 FOR SOVIET MISSILES PROVIDING OTHER ELEMENTS COULD BE AGREED. THE U S WOULD NOT ACCEPT SEPARATE CONSTRAINTS ON THEIR ALCM INVENTORY BEYOND THOSE IMPOSED BY THE COUNTING RULE AND SOVIET PROPOSALS THAT BOMBERS

ARMED IN FUTURE WITH CONVENTIONAL ALCM SHOULD BE COUNTED AS ONE WARHEAD UNDER A START TREATY WERE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. IF COUNTING RULES WERE AGREED, THE U S WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A REDUCTION IN THE ALCM RANGE THRESHOLD BELOW THEIR EXISTING PROPOSAL OF 1500KM.

4. ON MOBILE MISSILES, NITZE SKETCHED OUT BUT DID NOT ELABORATE ON THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED VERIFICATION PACKAGE WHICH THE U S HOPED TO DISCUSS FURTHER IN MOSCOW. THIS INCLUDED THE FAMILIAR CONCEPTS OF TAGGING, CONTINUOUS INVENTORY, LIMITED DEPLOYMENT AREAS, LIMITATIONS ON UNIQUE MISSILE-ASSOCIACTED STRUCTURES WITHIN THESE AREAS, ON-SITE INSPECTION AND ENHANCED NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THE U S WAS YET APPROACHING THE STAGE WHERE IT WOULD DROP ITS FORMAL PROPOSAL TO BAN MOBILE MISSILES.

5. ON OTHER START ISSUES, NITZE SAID THAT THE U S WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS ITS CASE FOR A 3300 SUB-LIMIT ON ICBM WARHEADS AND FOR A DECLARATORY APPROACH TO THE SLCM ISSUE. THEY WOULD ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES OVER THE NATURE OF CONSTRAINTS ON FUTURE HEAVY ICBMS IN ORDER TO ENSURE AN OUTCOME WHICH BORE EQUALLY ON BOTH SIDES. THEY WOULD ALSO HOPE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF FURTHER DATA.

6. TURNING TO DEFENCE AND SPACE, NITZE SAID THAT THE U S HOPED TO FOCUS ON FOUR ASPECTS. THEY WISHED TO GET SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE SEPARATE DEFENCE AND SPACE AGREEMENT BEING CONSIDERED AS A FORMAL TREATY. THEY WISHED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AGREEMENT FOR REASONS OF SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST. THEY HOPED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR ON A LEGALLY BINDING STATEMENT (POSSIBLY A PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT) GOVERNING EACH PARTY'S RIGHTS AFTER THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. AND FINALLY THEY HOPED TO NARROW DIFFERENCES OVER WHAT COULD BE DONE DURING THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. IN PARTICULAR THEY WOULD SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT THAT SPACE-BASED SENSORS SHOULD BE UNCONSTRAINED.

7. AS FORESHADOWED IN WASHINGTON TELNO 1341 NITZE CONFIRMED THAT THE ISSUE OF THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR WOULD BE RAISED IN MOSCOW AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD EMPHASISE THAT THE U S COULD NOT SIGN NEW ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS UNTIL THE RADAR HAD BEEN DISMANTLED. THE SOVIET UNION HAD ALREADY SAID THAT CONSTRUCTION WORK WAS BEING STOPPED BUT THIS DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH.

ALEXANDER

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SIC EMA/EME
MODUK FOR DACU.
US PRE-SUMMIT BRIEFING OF NAC, 27 MAY

SUMMARY
1. US WISH FOR FORWARD LOOKING, NOT RETROSPECTIVE SUMMIT. HOPES FOR WORTHWHILE IF UNSPECTACULAR PROGRESS ACROSS THE FOUR-PART AGENDA.

DETAIL
2. AMBASSADOR NITZE AND DEPUTY ASISTANCE SECRETARY THOMAS TODAY (27 MAY) BRIEFED THE NAC ON PROSPECTS FOR THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. NST ISSUES ARE COVERED IN MIFT.

3. THOMAS GAVE A BROAD OVERVIEW OF THE FOUR-PART AGENDA, WHICH TALLIED CLOSELY WITH THE ACCOUNT IN WASHINGTON TELNO 1340. MUCH WORK HAD GONE AHEAD ON ALL SECTIONS OF THE AGENDA SINCE THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT. THERE HAD BEEN SOME PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL, BUT NOT AS MUCH AS HOPED FOR ON NST ISSUES. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE U S SIDE WOULD BE ENCOURAGING THE RUSSIANS TO GO FURTHER. ON THE BILATERAL SIDE, SEVERAL CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS WOULD BE SIGNED. GORBACHEV WOULD HAVE AN INTEREST IN CONDUCTING SUBSTANTIVE BUSINESS AT THE SUMMIT: WHILE HE APPEARED TO RETAIN THE INITIATIVE AT HOME, AND AUTHORITY IN FOREIGN POLICY, A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT WOULD HELP BOLSTER HIS DOMESTIC AUTHORITY.

SCHEDULE
4. PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD HAVE FOUR MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV. OUTSIDE THESE THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO REACH SOVIET CITIZENS: HE WOULD MEET MEMBERS OF THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY, CULTURAL FIGURES, DISSIDNETS AND REFUSENIKS. THESE PLANS WERE CAUSING SOME FRICTION.

ARMS CONTROL
NUCLEAR TESTING

5. THOMAS SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN A GOOD DEAL OF PROGRESS SINCE NOVEMBER. THE TWO SIDES HAD INITIALLED A PLAN FOR A JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT (JVE) AT SEMIPALATINSK AND NEVADA AND EXPECTED TO SIGN A FINAL AGREEMENT AT THE SUMMIT, WITH A VIEW TO CONDUCTING A LIVE JVE IN THE SUMMER. SUCCESS THEN WOULD HELP IN MOVEMENT TOWARDS RATIFICATION OF THE TTBT.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

6. THERE WOULD BE THOROUGH DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW. PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE TOWARDS A BAN, BUT THE U S SIDE WOULD STRESS THAT MUCH WORK REMAINED TO BE DONE, PARTICULARLY IN VERIFICATION AND IN INVOLVING OTHER STATES.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

7. THE U S WOULD TELL THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO BRING THE CST MANDATE AND CSCE TALKS TO A CLOSE IN THIS CURRENT ROUND. BUT THIS DEPENDED ON A BALANCED OUTCOME AT CSCE AND ON EXCLUSION OF NUCLEAR AND DUAL CAPABLE WEAPONS FROM CST, TOGETHER WITH CST AUTONOMY FROM NNA REVIEW AND CSCE OVERSIGHT. IN CST THE U S WOULD STRESS THAT THE WEST'S AIM WAS 'EQUALITY OF OUTCOME', FOCUSSING ON WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES CAPABLE OF SURPRISE ATTACK. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR NAVAL CONSTRAINTS OR DATA EXCHANGE OUTSIDE THE NEGOTIATION, IF MADE, WOULD BE REJECTED.

HUMAN RIGHTS

8. AT THE MAY MEETING BETWEEN SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE THE RUSSIANS HAD CLAIMED THAT THEY WOULD SHORTLY BE MAKING IMPORTANT PROPOSALS AT VIENNA. THE U S WOULD URGE THEM TO DELIVER. THE RUSSIANS REMAINED TOUCHY ON HUMAN RIGHTS BUT ACCEPTED THAT IT WAS A LEGITIMATE PART OF THE BILATERAL DIALOGUE. SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE HAD IMPROVED, BUT MUCH REMAINED TO BE DONE. REALISTIC GOALS INCLUDED THE FREEING OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND RELIGION.

REGIONAL ISSUES

9. THOMAS SAID THE U S WOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF FULL SOVIET IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS ON AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING RESTRAINT ON ARMS SUPPLIES. THERE WERE SOME PROMISING SIGNS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE RECENT QUADRIPARTITE MEETING HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE: THERE WERE SIGNS THAT THE PARTIES MIGHT BE READY TO MOVE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. ON OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES (MIDDLE EAST, IRAN/IRAQ, CAMBODIA AND CENTRAL AMERICA) PROGRESS WAS DOUBTFUL. SOVIET IDEAS ON A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WERE NOT WORKABLE. THE RUSSIANS WERE STALLING ON A FOLLOW UP RESOLUTION ON IRAN/IRAQ. THE TWO SIDES CONTINUED TO DISAGREE ON ARMS SUPPLIES TO CENTRAL AMERICA.

BILATERAL ISSUES

10. THOMAS CONFIRMED THAT AROUND 6 BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WOULD BE SIGNED (HE CITED TRANSPORT, CULTURE, MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE, AND RADIO NAVIGATION). AN EXCHANGE OF CONSULATES (KIEV AND NEW YORK) WAS UNDER DISCUSSION BUT TALKS WERE UNLIKELY TO CONCLUDE AT THE SUMMIT. THE U S REMAINED COMMITED TO EXPANSION OF CO-OPERATION WHERE THIS WAS OF PRACTICAL BENEFIT TO BOTH SIDES.

11. IN ANSWER TO SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS FROM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES THOMAS SAID THAT FIFTH SUMMIT WAS NOT RULED OUT: THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROPRIATE IF AN AGREEMENT ON START COULD BE REACHED.

12. ON AFGHANISTAN, HANSEN (FRG) ASKED WHETHER THE RUSSIANS HAD RESPONDED TO THE U S REQUEST FOR MARKED MAPS OF MINED AREAS. THOMAS SAID THAT THE SOVIET REPLY HAD BEEN THAT SOVIET MINES THERE WERE OF A TYPE WHICH SELF-DESTRUCTED AFTER 3 TO 4 DAYS. THIS WAS 'NOT FULLY PLAUSIBLE': DIALGOUE CONTINUED. ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, THOMAS SAID THAT THERE WAS SO FAR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ASSESS HOW FAR THE RUSSIANS WERE HONOURING THEIR COMMITMENTS BOTH ON THE OUTFLOW OF SOVIET TROOPS AND THE INFLOW OF SUPPLIES.

13. I ASKED WHETHER THE PACE OF PROGRESS ON PNET AND TTBT HAD DIVERGED. THOMAS AGREED THAT IT HAD. IN PART THIS WAS BECAUSE THE LATTER WAS PROVING ENORMOUSLY COMPLEX. THE U S SIMPLY DID NOT HAVE THE MANPOWER TO KEEP THE TWO RUNNING IN PARALLEL.

14. ON CST AND DUAL CAPABLE WEAPONS I AND GODECHOT (FRANCE) NOTED THERE HAD APPARENTLY BEEN A RECENT COORDINATION PROBLEM IN VIENNA. THOMAS ACCEPTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A PROBLEM BUT ASSERTED THAT THIS WAS OF SOVIET ORIGIN: THE RUSSIANS HAD TOLD NATO AND WARSAW PACT ALLIES (MISLEADINGLY) THAT SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD STRUCK A DEAL. IN FACT DUAL CAPABILITY HAD NOT EVEN BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE TWO MINISTERS, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD DISCUSSED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CST AND CSCE PROCESSES. BUT THOMAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE U S FAILURE TO BRIEF ALLIES EARLY ENOUGH. ON KASHLEV'S CONTACTS WITH LEDOGAR, AND UNDERTOOK THAT THE U S WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE OVER THE HEADS OF THE ALLIES.

15. I ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET OFFER ON UNILATERAL TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THOMAS SAID THERE WAS NO INTELLIGENCE OR OFFICIAL SOVIET INDICATION TO SUPPORT THE CURRENT RUMOURS. THE MOST PREVALENT STORY SPOKE OF REMOVAL OF 150,000 TROOPS AND 7,000 TANKS. THIS WAS PLAUSIBLE: IT WOULD BE EASY TO EXECUTE AND FIT INTO

SOVIET RESTRUCTURING PLANS. IT WOULD BE HARD FOR THE ALLIES TO DEAL WITH, ESPECIALLY IF SERVED UP WITH A VERIFICATION COMPONENT. U S INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS THOUGHT SUCH AN IDEA MIGHT BE CIRCULATING IN MOSCOW BUT THAT THERE WAS A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT, WHO SOUGHT A PROPAGANDA COUP, AND THE MILITARY, WHO DID NOT WISH TO GIVE AWAY POTENTIAL LEVERAGE.

ALEXANDER

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26 May 1988

CDP 31/5

Dear Charles,

**Sunday Express**

The Foreign Secretary has been asked to contribute a leader article to the Sunday Express on 29 May. He has asked me to send you the enclosed copy of the material we have sent to the editor, in case the Prime Minister would be interested to see it.

Yours ever,

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq

PS/No 10 Downing Street

SECRETARY OF STATE'S ARTICLE FOR THE SUNDAY EXPRESS

MY HOPES FOR THE MOSCOW SUMMIT

- We have not seen a President of the United States in Moscow since 1972. For that reason alone, Mr Reagan's visit is a momentous occasion of historic signficance.

- Not surprisingly, his arrival has set off something of a bull market for shares in long-term peace and security. But we have been this way before only to see the market brought down by bears - Russian bears.

- Many of us still remember how hopes rose when in 1959 Mr Macmillan visited Moscow in his famous fur hat. Sadly, that turned out to be a false start. Our hopes rose again in the 70s when President Nixon and Mr Brezhnev exchanged visits, and the United States and Soviet Union signed some 25 agreements. Another false start. Things like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the persecution of dissidents soon put paid to what was known in those days as détente.

- People ask me whether it will be any different this time round. Is it for real, will it last? I believe that there may be grounds for genuine optimism.

- First of all, despite the presence of thousands of journalists, the Moscow Summit is not just a five day photo opportunity. It is the latest stage in almost ten years of patient and dedicated effort by the US, Britain and other NATO allies. Three beacons have guided us throughout: firmness in negotiation; the need for strong defences; determination to build trust with the East that will last.

- The results so far are plain to see. Confidence has grown. Contacts of all kinds have spread. Only last week we invited a Soviet team to look at our Chemical Defence Establishment at Porton Down. Britain will be sending its own team in July to see the Soviet Chemical Warfare Establishment at Shikhany.

Agreements have been signed, notably the INF Treaty removing worldwide all medium range nuclear rockets - leaving, incidentally, the unilateral disarmers without a leg to stand on.

- Vast credit for this goes to President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz. The Moscow Summit is the fourth in the series. George Shultz has himself had more than twenty meetings with his opposite number, Mr Shevardnadze. These occasions provide the shots of political adrenalin needed to get the experts cracking. And I can assure you that the experts need it. Some long-standing arms control negotiations have displayed as much sense of urgency and purpose as dinosaurs wrestling in mud.

- But the United States has not been alone in this effort. The NATO allies have also put their shoulders to the wheel. Look for instance at Britain's contribution.

- Over the last five years I have been to every Eastern European country and I have twice paid official visits to the Soviet Union. It was Britain which invited Mr Gorbachev to Western Europe, shortly before he took office in 1985. It was Margaret Thatcher who first spotted that this was someone with whom the West could do business. The success of her visit to Moscow last year will for long be the standard by which visits of other European statesmen are judged.

- Mr Gorbachev has, of course, had a key role also in making possible this Summit in his country's capital. Credit must be given where it is due. He has proclaimed the arrival of "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy.

- Certainly the impression that I have received from many conversations with Soviet leaders is that the whole area of foreign policy is under critical review. That is hardly surprising given the poor hand that Mr Gorbachev was dealt by his predecessors when he took over in 1985. Look at things as he must have seen them.

- A massive Soviet propaganda barrage had failed to stop the West rightly bringing in its own missiles to counter Soviet SS20 rockets targeted on the heart of Europe. Soviet lives, resources and prestige were being thrown away fruitlessly in the oppression of Afghanistan and in other ill-judged involvements in the Third World. The trampling of human rights was dragging the Soviet Union's reputation through the mud.

- Over a year ago I questioned whether "new thinking" was more style than substance - a kind of designer diplomacy with a Gorbachev label. I suggested three tests which would indicate the seriousness of the Soviet Union's new approach:

  - first, Afghanistan: would Soviet troops withdraw?

  - Second, arms control: would the Russians accept real verification measures?

  - Third, human rights: would the Russians live up to their international commitments?

- Today, as Mr Reagan arrives in Moscow, he will note with satisfaction that Western firmness and Mr Gorbachev's realism have produced progress in all three areas. Soviet troops are leaving Afghanistan. The Russians have been brought to accept tough verification provisions at the heart of the INF Treaty. There have been improvements, though still nothing like enough, in Soviet respect for human rights.

- East/West relations are on the right track. But there is still a long way to go.

- So, what I would like to see at the Moscow Summit is steady, sure, realistic progress where it matters. Towards an agreement on reducing by half the long range nuclear rockets of the super-powers, perhaps by the end of the year. Towards cutting the massive Russian superiority in conventional forces and chemical weapons. Towards limiting nuclear tests. Towards

cooperation, not confrontation, in dealing with the world's trouble spots - in Africa, the Middle East, the Gulf, South East Asia. Towards a further improvement in Soviet human rights performance.

- We shall have to wait and see whether there will be dramatic breakthroughs in any of these areas. If so, no-one will be more pleased than us. But no-one should be dismayed if progress is less striking. Regular meetings at this level are themselves a sign of the improved state of relations. We cannot, and should not, expect dramatic developments each time round.

- The plain truth is that those of us involved in handling East/West relations need the stamina and determination of the long-distance runner. Building trust will not be accomplished overnight. It is a titanic task, matching that which Mr Gorbachev has set himself in reforming the Soviet Union.

- The key to success is to take the long view. In face of the inevitable upsets and difficulties, never to lose sight of the essential - the elimination of the possibility of war between East and West.

- This week's television pictures of the Moscow Summit will no doubt be spectacular. But they will also beam into our homes hopes for a future world of peace and security: hopes more solidly based than for many a year.

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MOSCOW SUMMIT PREVIEW
SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT'S FOURTH (AND PROBABLY FINAL+ SUMMIT MEETING WCTH GORBACHEV. A FULL PROGRAMME MODELED LARGELY ON THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT PROGRAMME. MASSIVE US MEDIA INTEREST THOUGH NO EXAGGERATED PRESS EXPECTATIBNS. NO MAJOR NEW AGREEMENTS TO SIGN, THOUGH SOME BILATERAL DOCUMENTS (INCLUDING AT LEAST ONE ON NUCLEAR TESTING) WILL BE READY AND CEREMONIAL EXCHANGE OF INF TREATY RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS POSSIBLE.' PRESIDENT PRIMARILY APMING FOR A DEMONSTRATION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS OVERALL APPROACH TO US/SOVIET RELATIONS, BUT ALSO KEEN TO LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER PROGRESS BEFORE HE LEAVES THASWH TE HOUSE. XUSUAL FOUR-PART AGENDA. HOPES FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT, ESPECIALLY IN START.

DETAIL

2. FOLLOWING A DEPARTURE CEREMONY AT THE WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADORS FROM NATO AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES, PRESIDENT REAGAN LEFT WASHINGTON ON 25 MAY FOR HIS FOURTH MEETING WITH GORBACHEV IN AS MANY YEARS AND THE FIRST VISIT BY A US PRESIDENT TO THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE FORD/BREZHNEV ENCOUNTER AT VLADIVOSTOK IN 1974. AFTER FOUR NIGHTS AND A SPEECH IN HELSINKI, THE PRESIDENT ARRIVES IN MOSCOW ON 29 MAY AND LEAVES FOR LONDON ON 2 JUNE. SINCE GORBACHEV CHOSE NOT TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE WASHINGTON LAST DECEMBER, THE PRESIDENT HAS (RELUCTANTLY, WE UNDERSTAND) DECIDED TO CONFINE HIMSELF TO MOSCOW, ALTHOUGH MRS REAGAN WILL MAKE A QUICK TRIP TO LENINGRAD.

3. PRECEDENTS SET AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT WILL ALSO BE FOLLOWED IN OTHER WAYS. THE PROGRAMME IN MOSCOW REFLECTS GORBACHEV'S APPARENT WISH TO RECIPROCATE THE INTIMATE TONE SET IN WASHINGTON: THE PRESIDENT AND MRS REAGAN WILL HAVE A PRIVATE MEAL WITH THE GORBACHEVS AT THEIR DACHA, AND THERE WILL BE A VISIT TO THE BOLSHOI. THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE FOUR WORKING MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV AS WELL AS A BRIEF CEREMONIAL MEETING SOON AFTER HIS ARRIVAL (THE RUSSIANS PRESSED FOR A GOOD DEAL OF TIME FOR ONE-ON-

ONE SESSIONS BUT THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN LIMITING THE EXTENT OF THESE). IN ADDITION, THE PRESIDENT WILL DELIVER A MAJOR SPEECH AT MOSCOW UNIVERSITY, ATTEND A RECEPTION AT THE US AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE FOR A GROUP OF REFUSENIKS AND DISSIDENTS, ATTEND A MEETING WITH A CROSS-SECTION OF SOVIET CULTURAL FIGURES, AND VISIT THE DANILOV MONASTERY.

4. IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE SENATE WILL GIVE ITS CONSENT TO THE INF TREATY IN TIME FOR THERE TO BE A CEREMONIAL EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION IN MOSCOW. BUT EVEN IF THIS DOES NOT PROVE POSSIBLE, THERE WILL BE A NUMBER OF OTHER AGREEMENTS READY FOR SIGNATURE DURING THE SUMMIT AND THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO STRIKE AN UPBEAT PUBLIC TONE, TAKING PRIDE IN WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS SO FAR ON HIS WATCH, AND EXPRESSING OPTIMISM FOR THE FUTURE. THE ADMINISTRATION EXPECT THE SUMMIT TO PRODUCE A WEIGHTY JOINT STATEMENT AND (PERHAPS) A SEPARATE JOINT REPORT ON START AND (JUST POSSIBLY) OIHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

5. THE PRESIDENT WILL WISH TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE PHOTO-GENIC SETTINGS OF MOSCOW AND THE TRAPPINGS OF A STATE VISIT, AND THERE WILL BE MASSIVE MEDIA COVERAGE BACK IN THE US. BUT AS HE SETS OUT FOR MOSCOW ON WHAT WILL PROBABLY (THOUGH NOT CERTAINLY) BE HIS LAST SUMMIT MEETING WITH GORBACHEV, THE PRESIDENT MUST BE SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTED THAT SOME OF THE HIGH HOPES EXPRESSED AT THE WASHINGTON MEETING, ESPECIALLY FOR ARMS CONTROL, HAVE NOT YET BEEN FULFILLED. NOT THAT ACHIEVEMENTS SINCE THEN HAVE BEEN NEGLIGIBLE. IN PARTICULAR, SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN (A MERE GLEAM IN THE EYE IN DECEMBER) IS NOW UNDERWAY AND THE INF TREATY SEEMS CERTAIN SOON TO BE APPROVED BY THE SENATE EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT IS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFLCATION IN MOSCOW. BUT IN START, INEVITABLY STILL THE MAIN FOCUS OF INTEREST HERE, HOPES IN SOME QUARTERS IN DECEMBER OF COMPLETING A TREATY IN TIME FOR MOSCOW RAPIDLY FADED, AND THERE ARE NOW WIDESPREAD DOUBTS THAT EITHER SIDE WILL IN PRACTICE BE ABLE TO PRESS AHEAD AT THE PACE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE A TREATY BEFORE THE PRESIDENT LEAVES OFFICE GIVEN ALL THE OBSTACLES THAT STILL LIE AHEAD (MY TELNOS 1203 AND 1204). THE PRESIDENT WILL THEREFORE BE LOOKING TO USE THE SUMMIT PRIMARILY AS A DEMONSTRA-TION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS OVERALL APPROACH TO US/SOVIET AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS (NEGOTIATING FROM STRENGTH, DOING BUSINESS IN A TOUGH BUT PRAGMATIC MANNER, BEING PREPARED TO BE STEADY AND PATIENT) AND AS AN ATTEMPT TO LEAVE A LEGACY THAT WILL SHAPE THE APPROACH OF HIS SUCCESSOR.

6. BUTNTHAT IS NOT TO SAY THAO THD ADMINISTRATION HAVE GIVEN UP HOPE OF MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS IN SOME IMPORTANT AREAS. ON THE

CONTRARY, THE NOW TRADITIONAL WORKING GROUPS ARE EXPECTED TO BE WORKING ROUND THE CLOCK AND THE PRESIDENT'S TEAM IS INTENDING TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIANS ON THE FULL AGENDA, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IN HIS DEPARTURE STATEMENT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE:

(A) ARMS CONTROL PROSPECTS ARE DEALT WITH IN DEIAIL IN MIFT (NOT TO ALL). THE PRESIDENT WILL BE BRIEFED IN PARTICULAR TO TRY TO MAKE HEADWAY WITH GORBACHEV ON THE OUTSTANDING START ISSUES AND WILL BE MAKING CLEAR THAT HE IS READY TO CONTINUE WORKING AT THEM UNTIL THE END OF HIS PRESIDENCY. A FULL ACCOUNT OF PROGRESS MADE AND OF ISSUES STILL TO BE RESOLVED IS LIKELY TO EMERGE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OR, POSSIBLY, IN A SEPARATE JOINT START REPORT:

(B)# HUMAN RIGHTS WILL ONCE AGAIN BE HIGH ON THE PRESIDENT'S AGENDA, AND HE WILL PRESS FOR SOVIET MOVEMENT AT THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE. BUT HIS MAIN POINT, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, WILL BE THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE HAVE SO FAR MAINLY BEEN AT THE LEVEL OF INDIVIDUAL CASES RATHER THAN AT THE LEVEL OF PERMANENT CHANGES IN SOVIET SYSTEMS, REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES. TAKING HIS CUE FROM THE THOUSANDTH ANNIVERSARY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE SOVIET UNION (WHICH FALLS SHORTLY AFTER HIS DEPARTURE), THE PRESIDENT WILL STRESS THAT PRIORITY MUST NOW BE GIVEN TO CHANGES IN SOVIET LAW AND PRACTICE ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, POLITICAL PRISONERS AND EMIGRATION:

(C) REGIONAL ISSUES.

(I) SOUTHERN AFRICA HAS MOVED SHARPLY UP THE AGENDA AND MAY PROVE THE MAJOR ITEM OF INTEREST. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE QUADRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS (US/SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA/CUBA) AND WILL PRESS FOR A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE. AT BEST, THEY WILL BE HOPING FOR TWO THINGS FROM THE RUSSIANS: AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WOULD NOT DISCOURAGE - AND MIGHT EVEN ENCOURAGE - MOVEMENT BY LUANDA AND HAVANA TOWARDS A REALISTIC TLMETABLE FOR CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL: AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WITHIN ANGOLA. IN THE US VIEW, SOVIET SIGNALLING ON THE ANGOLAN ISSUE HAS BEEN MIXED. AT THE VERY LEAST, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE LOOKING FOR AN INDICATION THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT OBSTRUCT THE NEGOTIATIONS:

(II) THE PRESIDENT WILL RAISE THE MIDDLE EAST

PEACE PROCESS, AS PROMISED TO PERES, BUT IS UNLIKELY TO PRESS THE ISSUE HARD. US HOPES HAVE FALLEN AWAY SINCE SHULTZ'S LAST DISAPPOINTING EXCHANGE WITH SHEVARDNADZE IN MOSCOW (MY TELNO 1105):

(III) ON THE GULF AND THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DO NOT EXPECT DEVELOPMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE. THERE IS A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON IMMEDIATE TACTICS, BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US HAVE SPOKEN STRONGLY TO IRAQ ABOUT THEIR CURRENT OBSTRUCTIVE AND SELF-DEFEATING RESPONSE TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL. BUT THERE IS LITTLE SCOPE FOR PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION. THE AMERICANS REMAIN FRUSTRATED BY THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON SR 598, BUT HAVE ACCEPTED THAT EARLY MOVEMENT IS UNREALISTIC:

(IV) ON AFGHANISTAN, THERE WILL DOUBTLESS BE MUTUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT. THIS IS LIKELY TO BE TINGED BY MUTUAL WARNINGS ABOUT NON-INTERFERENCE (AND PAKISTANI COMPLIANCE) AND FULL WITHDRAWAL. BOTH SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO WATCH THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS CLOSELY, AND IN PARTICULAR FOR ANY SIGN OF BREACH IN THE FRAGILE UNDERSTANDING ON AID TO CLIENTS. BUT THERE WILL BE LITTLE SUBSTANCE TO DISCUSS AT THE SUMMIT:

(V)# ETHIOPIA WILL ALSO BE RAISED BY THE AMERICANS, IN THE HOPE OF PERSUADING THE RUSSIANS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE ETHIOPIANS TO PREVENT WIDESPREAD STARVATION IN THE MONTHS AHEAD:

(D)# BILATERAL ISSUES. A NUMBER OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WILL BE READY FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT, PROBABLY INCLUDING AGREEMENTS ON SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, TRANSPORTATION, MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE ARRANGEMENTS, AND FISHERIES. THE JOINT STATEMENT IS ALSO LIKELY TO INCLUDE A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO PROMOTING YOUTH EXCHANGES.

COMMENT

7. THE PROGRAMME IS DESIGNED TO BE FULL, BUT IT LACKS SUBSTANCE. FOR ALL THE CAREFUL (AND APPARENTLY SUCCESSFUL) BRIEFING OF THE US PRESS NOT TO EXPECT TOO MUCH BEYOND THE PROCESS ITSELF, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY STILL BE HOPING FOR SOMETHING MORE. IF SO, HE MAY COME UNDER PRESSURE FROM GORBACHEV TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO LANGUAGE ON START OR OTHER NUCLEAR ISSUES WHICH WOULD GO BEYOND THE ESTABLISHED POSITIONS AGREED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. I THINK THERE REMAINS A SLIGHT RISK OF THIS, BUT I WOULD NOT OVERSTATE IT. THE PRESIDENT WILL NO DOUBT WANT THE JOINT STATEMENT (AND ANY SEPARATE START REPORT) TO BE FORWARD AS WELL AS

BACKWARD LOOKING, AND HIS INSTINCTIVE YEARNING FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD IS NEVER FAR BELOW THE SURFACE. BUT THE US TEAM IS NOW WELL SEASONED, THE US/SOVIET AGENDA IS WELL-ESTABLISHED, AND (UNLIKE AT REYKJAVIK) THERE IS A TIGHT PROGRAMME. IN ADDITION, THE ADMINISTRATION ARE WELL SEIZED OF THE FACT THAT GORBACHEV WILL NO DOUBT BE LOOKING TO EXTRACT THE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE FROM WHAT WILL (PROBABLY) BE HIS LAST MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. ON BALANCE, THEREFORE, I DO NOT FORESS ANY UNWELCOME SURPRISES. INSTEAD, I EXPECT THAT THE EMPHASIS WILL BE ON POINTING UP AND CONSOLIDATING THE REMARKABLE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS OVER THE LAST 3 YEARS. THIS MAY THUS BE A SUMMIT RELATIVELY SHORT ON NEW SUBSTANCE.

ACLAND

YYYY

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SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

23 May 1988

SUBJECT CC MASTER OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T79/88

Dear Mr. Gorbachev.

The next few weeks are clearly going to be exceptionally busy for you, with both the US/Soviet Summit meeting and your Party Conference. Each in their way will be historic meetings and will influence the future of our continent and indeed of our world for many years to come. I send you my best wishes for a successful outcome to both. I hope that the Party Conference will take forward the great process of change and reform on which you have embarked. I admire enormously your resolve not to allow the difficulties to eclipse the opportunities.

My understanding on the Summit is that, while it should be possible to make progress on a number of arms control issues, it is too early to expect agreement on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. This seems to me realistic. It would be a mistake to negotiate on such vital matters against a deadline: and the verification arrangements must be got right from all our viewpoints. I hope, however, that progress made in the negotiations to date can be recorded. Much important work has been done and the momentum should be maintained.

On other arms control issues I am very hopeful that the US Senate will ratify the INF Agreement, thus making it possible for you to exchange instruments of ratification at

the Summit. We seem to be close to agreement in Vienna on a mandate for the talks on conventional force reductions. At the same time we should be able to record significant new commitments on human rights, in the Vienna Concluding Document. Effective world-wide action on chemical weapons becomes more urgent in view of the continued use of these weapons in the Iran/Iraq war. I am sure you are wise to approach the limitation of nuclear testing on a step-by-step basis, focussing as a first step on the explosive force of such tests.

I understand that regional issues are likely to play a major role at the Summit and this is welcome. The beginning of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is a very important step which we have wholeheartedly welcomed. The need now is for the UN to help the Afghan parties to reach agreement on interim arrangements which will allow the earliest possible return of the refugees in peace. I hope your talks with President Reagan will contribute to this.

I am encouraged by the opening of talks between Angola, Cuba, the United States and South Africa on the implementation of UN SCR 435 in Namibia and on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. I do not at all underestimate the difficulties once they get down to details, but the very fact of talking is important. For our part, we are urging the South African government to be positive and flexible. I hope you will use your great influence with the Cubans to bring them to negotiate seriously and to stop the advance of Cuban forces towards the Namibian border which risks a serious escalation in the fighting. As I have indicated in the past, I believe that a lasting solution in Angola will only come about through direct talks between the MPLA and UNITA.

I very much hope that you and the President will have time for a full discussion on the Middle East about which I am extremely concerned. The conflict between Iran and Iraq appears no nearer a solution and, in my view, will not be until the UN Security Council can agree on a follow-up to

UN SCR 498 which exerts real pressure on Iran to negotiate. I do once more urge you to unblock this and thus give the UN Secretary-General's efforts to bring the two sides together fresh impetus.

It is also important to maintain the momentum towards an international conference on the Arab-Israel problem. I am under no illusions where the main obstacle lies. But I believe that American efforts to surmount or circumvent that obstacle would be greatly advanced if the Soviet Union were to encourage the PLO to accept a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, to renounce violence and to accept Israel's right to a secure existence. I would hope that you would also consider moving towards the re-establishment of relations with Israel. These steps could have a profound influence on opinion in Israel and on the prospect for negotiations.

More generally, I am greatly alarmed by the proliferation of ballistic missile systems in the area, together with the growing readiness to resort to use of chemical weapons. This makes agreement on solutions to the fundamental problems more urgent still. Time is shorter than we thought.

I am also convinced that you can play a constructive role in persuading the Vietnamese to withdraw their troops from Cambodia and enter into negotiations with Prince Sihanouk.

Despite the dangers which I have described, I believe that the overall international outlook is more promising than for some time. May I applaud the personal contribution which you have made to that. I hope that the forthcoming Summit will achieve further positive steps.

Our invitation to you to visit the United Kingdom remains open and we hope that in the coming months we can settle on a time which would be convenient to us both for

you to take it up. In the meantime my husband joins me in sending warm regards to you and to Mrs. Gorbachev.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Mr. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev

PRIME MINISTER

Charles has shown the messages to Reagan and Gorbachev to the Foreign Office and Defence. They are entirely happy with the Reagan one which is now being despatched. They have three fairly small points on the Gorbachev one. Charles is confident they would not cause you trouble. He would like to amend the text to take account of them and despatch it by telegram to Moscow. You could then sign the top copy subsequently on Monday.

Are you content with that?

ECL
20 May 1988

PM said yes of course. COP told.

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

20 May 1988

US/SOVIET SUMMIT:
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR. GORBACHEV

Thank you for your letter of 20 May proposing three changes to the Prime Minister's message to Mr. Gorbachev. I agree the first and third amendments. For the second I propose that we say: "Agreement to deal with chemical weapons becomes more urgent ..." This papers over the crack between our various positions, but is not incompatible with the elimination of such weapons. If you can accept this change, the message may issue this evening and I will let you have a signed original on Monday.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

SECRET

15

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 May 1988

CDP 25/5

Dear Charles,

**US/Soviet Summit: Messages from the Prime Minister to President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev**

Thank you for your letter of 20 May. The Foreign Secretary is content with the message to President Reagan. He does however consider that three points in the message to Mr Gorbachev need amendment:

- the penultimate sentence of the second paragraph rules out the possibility of reaching a START agreement by the end of President Reagan's term of office. President Reagan has himself maintained publicly that he still hopes to reach an agreement by then. We would obviously not want to undercut this line. The sentence could be amended to read "I hope, however, that progress made in the negotiations to date can be recorded. Much important ...".

- The Russians would read the words "to reduce and eventually eliminate chemical weapons" (penultimate sentence of third paragraph) as a significant departure from the line the Prime Minister has taken in the past (eg the reference in her message to Gorbachev of August 1986 to "the importance the UK attaches to the abolition of chemical weapons"; her statement to Gorbachev personally last year that "chemical weapons should be banned totally"; as well as the line she has taken publicly, eg her reference in the Mansion House speech to the need to "eliminate chemical weapons"). The Foreign Secretary would prefer to say simply that "agreement to eliminate chemical weapons becomes ...".

- On nuclear testing (final sentence of third paragraph) the reference to "numbers" of such tests was an oversight on our part. The Russians have not suggested that the number of tests should be restricted. We would prefer the sentence to conclude "focussing as a first step on the explosive force of such tests".

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever, Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

20 May 1988

Dear Lyn,

**US/SOVIET SUMMIT: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR. GORBACHEV**

I enclose copies of messages which the Prime Minister has approved and signed to President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev about their forthcoming Summit. The originals will follow in due course. Subject to any comments which you have on the text, I should be grateful if the message to Mr. Gorbachev could be sent to Moscow for delivery as soon as possible. I propose to send the text to President Reagan on the direct line to the White House as soon as you notify me that the Foreign Secretary is content.

I am copying this letter and its enclosures to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Gorbachev.

The next few weeks are clearly going to be exceptionally busy for you, with both the US/Soviet Summit meeting and your Party Conference. Each in their way will be historic meetings and will influence the future of our continent and indeed of our world for many years to come. I send you my best wishes for a successful outcome to both. I hope that the Party Conference will take forward the great process of change and reform on which you have embarked. I admire enormously your resolve not to allow the difficulties to eclipse the opportunities.

My understanding on the Summit is that, while it should be possible to make progress on a number of arms control issues, it is too early to expect agreement on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. This seems to me realistic. It would be a mistake to negotiate on such vital matters against a deadline: and the verification arrangements must be got right from all our viewpoints. I hope, however, that progress made in the negotiations to date and during the remainder of President Reagan's term can be recorded in such a way as to provide a basis for taking up discussions again as rapidly as possible after a new President is installed. Much important work has been done and the momentum should be maintained.

On other arms control issues I am very hopeful that the US Senate will ratify the INF Agreement, thus making it possible for you to exchange instruments of ratification at the Summit. We seem to be close to agreement in Vienna on a mandate for the talks on conventional force reductions. At the same time we should be able to record significant new commitments on human rights, in the Vienna Concluding Document. Agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate chemical weapons becomes more urgent in view of the continued use of these weapons in the Iran/Iraq war. I am sure you are wise to approach the limitation of nuclear testing on a step-by-step basis, focussing on the numbers and explosive force of such tests.

I understand that regional issues are likely to play a major role at the Summit and this is welcome. The beginning of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is a very important step which we have wholeheartedly welcomed. The need now is for the UN to help the Afghan parties to reach agreement on interim arrangements which will allow the earliest possible return of the refugees in peace. I hope your talks with President Reagan will contribute to this.

I am encouraged by the opening of talks between Angola, Cuba, the United States and South Africa on the implementation of UN SCR 435 in Namibia and on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. I do not at all underestimate the difficulties once they get down to details, but the very fact of talking is important. For our part, we are urging the South African government to be positive and flexible. I hope you will use your great influence with the Cubans to bring them to negotiate seriously and to stop the advance of Cuban forces towards the Namibian border which risks a serious escalation in the fighting. As I have indicated in the past, I believe that a lasting solution in Angola will only come about through direct talks between the MPLA and UNITA.

I very much hope that you and the President will have time for a full discussion on the Middle East about which I

am extremely concerned. The conflict between Iran and Iraq appears no nearer a solution and, in my view, will not be until the UN Security Council can agree on a follow-up to UN SCR 498 which exerts real pressure on Iran to negotiate. I do once more urge you to unblock this and thus give the UN Secretary-General's efforts to bring the two sides together fresh impetus.

It is also important to maintain the momentum towards an international conference on the Arab-Israel problem. I am under no illusions where the main obstacle lies. But I believe that American efforts to surmount or circumvent that obstacle would be greatly advanced if the Soviet Union were to encourage the PLO to accept a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, to renounce violence and to accept Israel's right to a secure existence. I would hope that you would also consider moving towards the re-establishment of relations with Israel. These steps could have a profound influence on opinion in Israel and on the prospect for negotiations.

More generally, I am greatly alarmed by the proliferation of ballistic missile systems in the area, together with the growing readiness to resort to use of chemical weapons. This makes agreement on solutions to the fundamental problems more urgent still. Time is shorter than we thought.

I am also convinced that you can play a constructive role in persuading the Vietnamese to withdraw their troops from Cambodia and enter into negotiations with Prince Sihanouk.

Despite the dangers which I have described, I believe that the overall international outlook is more promising than for some time. May I applaud the personal contribution which you have made to that. I hope that the forthcoming Summit will achieve further positive steps.

Our invitation to you to visit the United Kingdom remains open and we hope that in the coming months we can settle on a time which would be convenient to us both for you to take it up. In the meantime my husband joins me in sending warm regards to you and to Mrs. Gorbachev.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Mr. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev

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Agreed

PRIME MINISTER

**UNITED STATES SUMMIT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN**

You have seen the draft of a message to Mr. Gorbachev about the US/Soviet Summit. I have now done the attached companion-piece to President Reagan. I have tried to make it brief and general and put it in a way which will attract his interest. It spells out in very general terms the main priorities for the Summit as you see them. I don't think there is a need for a detailed message this time.

I also attach the FCO draft which is rather different in nature.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

20 May 1988

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Agreed

PRIME MINISTER

US/SOVIET SUMMIT: MESSAGE TO MR. GORBACHEV

I attach a message from you to Mr. Gorbachev about the forthcoming US/Soviet Summit. It is very similar to the draft you saw last night which the FCO have now agreed with minor amendments. I have also modified the first paragraph to take account of your comments.

Agree to sign?

"Dear General Secretary"

C.D.?

CDP
19 May 1988

SL3BBJ

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Prime Minister

You may like to see this as work in hand. The FCO are also working on a draft.

CDP
18/5

11A

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

18 may 1988

Dear Lyn,

**US/SOVIET SUMMIT**

**MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR GORBACHEV**

I know that you are working on a draft message from the Prime Minister to Mr Gorbachev. I have also had a go at one myself and enclose the result, in case it is of any help.

yours sincerely

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Covering SECRET

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR. GORBACHEV

The next few weeks are clearly going to be exceptionally busy for you, with both the US/Soviet Summit meeting and your Party Conference. We are watching the preparations for these events with great interest, and I send you my best wishes for a successful outcome to both of them. I hope that the Party Conference will take forward the great process of change and reform on which you have embarked. I have continued to make clear publicly my support for what you are trying to achieve.

Your Ambassador has kindly briefed me on the preparatory talks for the Summit between Secretary Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze and I have also, of course, received an account from the Americans. My understanding is that, while it should be possible to make progress on a number of arms control issues, it is too early to expect agreement on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. This seems to me realistic. It would be a mistake to negotiate on such vital matters against a deadline: and the verification arrangements will be crucial and must be got right. I hope, however, that the progress made in the negotiations to date and during the remainder of President Reagan's term can be recorded in such a way as to provide a basis for taking up discussions again as rapidly as possible after a new President is installed. Much important work has been done and the momentum should be maintained.

On other arms control issues I am confident that the US Senate will ratify the INF Agreement, thus making it possible for you to exchange instruments of ratification at the Summit. We seem to be close to agreement on a mandate for the talks on conventional force reductions. The importance of reaching agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate

chemical weapons is underlined by the Iran/Iraq war. I am sure you are wise to approach the limitation of nuclear tests on a step-by-step basis. So long as there are nuclear weapons, there will be a need to test them and the scope for restraint will concern the numbers and explosive force of such tests.

I understand that regional issues are likely to play a major role at the Summit and I think this is welcome. The beginning of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is a very important step which we have publicly welcomed. The need now is for the UN to help the Afghan parties to reach agreement on interim arrangements which will allow the earliest possible return of the refugees in peace. I hope your talks with President Reagan will contribute to this.

I am encouraged by the opening of talks between Angola, Cuba, the United States and South Africa on the implementation of UN SCR 435 in Namibia and on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. I do not at all underestimate the difficulties once they get down to details, but the very fact of talking is important. For our part, we are urging the South African government to play a positive part. I hope you will use your undoubted influence with the Cubans to bring them to negotiate seriously and to discontinue the advance of Cuban forces towards the Namibian border which risks a serious escalation in the fighting. As I have told you in the past, I believe that a lasting solution in Angola will only come about through direct talks between the MPLA and UNITA. I am encouraged by recent contacts with a number of African governments to believe that this may be nearer.

I very much hope that you and the President will have time for a full discussion on the Middle East about which I am extremely concerned. The conflict between Iran and Iraq appears no nearer a solution and, in my view, will not be until the UN Security Council can agree on a follow-up to UN SCR 498 which exerts real pressure on Iran to negotiate. I do once more urge you to unblock this and thus give the UN

Secretary-General's efforts to bring the two sides together fresh impetus.

I believe it is also important to maintain the momentum of efforts to reach agreement on an international conference on the Arab-Israel problem. I am under no illusions where the main obstacle lies. But I believe that American efforts to surmount or circumvent that obstacle would be greatly advanced if the Soviet Union were to encourage the PLO to accept the concept of participating in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, to renounce violence and to accept Israel's right to exist. I would hope that you would also consider moving towards the establishment of relations with Israel. These steps could have a profound and beneficial influence on opinion in Israel and on the prospect for negotiations.

More generally, I am greatly alarmed by the proliferation of ballistic missile systems in the area. Taken with the growing readiness to resort to use of chemical weapons, this development poses enormous dangers. I hope you will discuss with President Reagan how to restrain the spread of missile technology.

Despite these dangers, I believe that the overall international outlook is more promising than for some time, with the potential for progress in many areas. I give you full credit for your personal contribution to that and hope that the forthcoming Summit will achieve further positive steps in the areas I have indicated.

Our invitation to you to visit the United Kingdom remains open and we hope that you will feel able to take it up. In the meantime my husband joins me in sending warm regards to you and to Mrs. Gorbachev.

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DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR. GORBACHEV

Mr. Dobrynin has kindly briefed me and debriefed on the results for the Party Congress.

The next few weeks are clearly going to be exceptionally busy for you, with both the US/Soviet Summit meeting and your Party Conference. We are watching the preparations for these events with great interest, and I send you my best wishes for a successful outcome to both of them. I hope that the Party Conference will take forward the great process of change and reform on which you have embarked. I have continued to make clear publicly my support for what you are trying to achieve.

Your Ambassador has kindly briefed me on the preparatory talks for the Summit between Secretary Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze and I have also, of course, received an account from the Americans. My understanding is that, while it should be possible to make progress on a number of arms control issues, it is too early to expect agreement on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. This seems to me realistic. It would be a mistake to negotiate on such vital matters against a deadline: and the verification arrangements will be crucial and must be got right. I hope, however, that the progress made in the negotiations to date and during the remainder of President Reagan's term can be recorded in such a way as to provide a basis for taking up discussions again as rapidly as possible after a new President is installed. Much important work has been done and the momentum should be maintained.

On other arms control issues I am confident that the US Senate will ratify the INF Agreement, thus making it possible for you to exchange instruments of ratification at the Summit. We seem to be close to agreement on a mandate for the talks on conventional force reductions. The importance of reaching agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate

chemical weapons is underlined by the Iran/Iraq war. I am sure you are wise to approach the limitation of nuclear testing on a step-by-step basis, ~~So long as there are nuclear weapons, there will be a need to test them and the scope for restraint will concern~~ focusing on the numbers and explosive force of such tests.

I understand that regional issues are likely to play a major role at the Summit and ~~I think~~ this is welcome. The beginning of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is a very important step which we have publicly welcomed. The need now is for the UN to help the Afghan parties to reach agreement on interim arrangements which will allow the earliest possible return of the refugees in peace. I hope your talks with President Reagan will contribute to this.

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MOSCOW SUMMIT: MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. RECOMMENDATION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SEND A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE MOSCOW SUMMIT.

DETAIL

2. I IMAGINE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WANT TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE PRESIDENT BEFORE HE LEAVES WASHINGTON ON 25 MAY FOR THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, AND WORK ON A DRAFT MESSAGE MAY ALREADY BE IN HAND. YOU MAY FIND USEFUL SOME COMMENT FROM HERE.

3. FIRST, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD WELCOME (AND POSSIBLY EXPECT) A MESSAGE OF SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT AS HE SETS OFF FOR THE FIRST VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION BY A US PRESIDENT FOR FOURTEEN YEARS. AND IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE, GIVEN THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE SEEING THE PRESIDENT IN LONDON ON HIS WAY BACK.

4. IN ADDITION TO ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT, WE NEED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE ARE ANY PITFALLS AGAINST WHICH WARNING SHOULD BE GIVEN. I DO NOT EXPECT ANOTHER REYKJAVIK, BUT THE CHANCES OF UNWELCOME SURPRISES MAY NEVERTHELESS BE A LITTLE HIGHER THAN THEY WERE AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT LAST DECEMBER. OPPONENTS OF THE INF TREATY IN THE SENATE WILL NOT, IN MY VIEW, SUCCEED IN PREVENTING RATIFICATION: BUT, DESPITE OPTIMISTIC NOISES FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THEY MAY STILL DELAY IT SUFFICIENTLY BOTH TO REMOVE A FORMAL BUT ATTRACTIVE ITEM OF BUSINESS FROM THE SUMMIT AGENDA, AND TO PUT REAGAN ON THE DEFENSIVE IN HIS TALKS WITH GORBACHEV. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRESIDENT IS RELIABLY INFORMED TO BE DISAPPOINTED ABOUT THE RECENT SLOW PROGRESS IN THE START NEGOTIATIONS: AND HE MAY PRIVATELY FIND EQUALLY DISAPPOINTING THE WORTHY BUT UNEXCITING BITS AND PIECES WHICH HIS ADVISERS ARE COBBLING TOGETHER TO FILL THE GAPS.

5. THAT IS A BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH GORBACHEV'S ADVISERS MIGHT WELL BE TEMPTED TO COME UP WITH A SURPRISE, ON WHAT WILL PROBABLY BE GORBACHEV'S LAST OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE THE PRESIDENT DIRECTLY IN ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS. THE RISK IS NOT SO MUCH THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO AN ILL-THOUGHT THROUGH FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON START, BUT THAT THE RHETORIC MIGHT GO BADLY WRONG. FOR EXAMPLE, GORBACHEV MIGHT SUGGEST A HIGH-

SOUNDING DECLARATION ON RIDDING THE WORLD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DESIGNED TO EXPLOIT THE PRESIDENT'S NOT VERY DEEPLY SUBMERGED FEELINGS ABOUT THE ISSUE AND TO INFLUENCE THE PUBLIC DEBATE DURING THE US ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND IN THE WEST MORE GENERALLY.

6. PERHAPS THE BEST ANTIDOTE WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE THE PRESIDENT TO SEE THE HISTORICAL ACHIEVEMENT NOT IN THE MOSCOW SUMMIT ITSELF, BUT IN THE AGGREGATE PRODUCT OF EIGHT YEARS OF FIRM LEADERSHIP. THE FORMULA WHICH HAS WORKED (OVER AFGHANISTAN AS WELL AS ON ARMS CONTROL), AND FOR WHICH THE PRESIDENT CAN BE GIVEN SOME CREDIT, IS BASED ON STRONG DEFENCES AND A DETERMINED BUT COOL-HEADED APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS. WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WILL COME UNDER PRESSURE OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS TO RESPOND TO GORBACHEV BY DILUTING ONE OR BOTH OF THESE TWO ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS. THE RISK FOR THE ALLIANCE WILL BE NOT TOO LITTLE DIALOGUE, BUT TOO LITTLE ATTENTION TO WHAT THE NATO SUMMIT AGREED WAS THE NECESSARY OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN: QUOTE A STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE BASED UPON AN APPROPRIATE MIX OF ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO BE KEPT UP TO DATE WHERE NECESSARY UNQUOTE.

7. A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TAKING THIS SOMEWHAT WIDER PERSPECTIVE COULD EXPRESS STRONG SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POLICIES AND UNDERLINE THE NEED BOTH TO GUARD AGAINST UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ON THE DISARMAMENT FRONT AND TO CONCENTRATE ATTENTION ON WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE TO COMPLETE THE AGENDA (INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL AND CW) AGREED WITH THE ALLIANCE FOLLOWING THE CAMP DAVID MEETING. OUR SUPPORT FOR INF RATIFICATION AND FOR A 50 PER CENT START AGREEMENT COULD HELPFULLY BE RECALLED IN THIS CONTEXT AS COULD ANOTHER POINT OF COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US: THAT THE ESSENTIAL ON START IS TO GET A GOOD TREATY, EVEN IF THAT TAKES A LITTLE LONGER.

8. THE MESSAGE MIGHT CONCLUDE BY LOOKING FORWARD TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH REAGAN IN LONDON BOTH THE CHALLENGES AND THE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH GORBACHEV WILL PRESENT TO THE ALLIANCE OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS, AS WELL AS TO HEAR THE PRESIDENTS IMPRESSIONS OF THE SITUATION IN MOSCOW.

9. THE PRESIDENT LEAVES WASHINGTON ON 25 MAY. ANY MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD THEREFORE BE DELIVERED HERE BY 24 MAY AT THE LATEST.

10. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO POWELL (NO. 10).

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16 May 1988

*From the Private Secretary*

## US/SOVIET RELATIONS

Mr. Kossov of the Soviet Embassy came to see me this afternoon to give me the Soviet account of the recent meeting between Secretary Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze. He left me with the enclosed translation of what was he described as the Soviet guidance telegram. He said that copies were not being handed over elsewhere, although extensive use is no doubt being made of the material. He made three additional points:

- the "Prime Minister's idea" that the United States and the Soviet Union should, in due course, sign a Memorandum of Understanding summarising the progress made in the START negotiations, as a basis for future work, had been very positively received in Moscow;

- the discussions in Vienna on the mandate for the negotiations on conventional forces could be brought to a successful conclusion very rapidly. A Soviet expert had told him that only two full working days were needed. It was important that they should be completed in June or July otherwise the opportunity would be lost for at least a year (because of the American Presidential elections);

- there was debate in Moscow as to whether bilateral discussions on conventional force reductions could be conducted more effectively with the UK or the FRG.

Mr. Kossov expressed interest in whether the Prime Minister would be sending Mr. Gorbachev a message in the run-up to the Summit. I said that she had not yet reached a decision on this. It would depend on her assessment of the extent to which there was something new and of substance to contribute.

Mr. Kossov said that the Soviet Ambassador was expecting a summons any moment to the Central Committee Plenum in Moscow but no word had yet come. It was evident that Mr. Gorbachev was facing real difficulties in the preparations for the Party Conference, the biggest of which were created by the

activities of the Party organisations themselves in the regions.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

1) The May round of Soviet-American talks on the foreign ministers' level was a useful and necessary stage in the dialogue between the two countries.

A thorough discussion was held of the questions concerning the preparation of the Soviet-American Summit and the documents to be signed.

2) Special attention had to be given to resolving some technical problems of verification and inspections in relation to the INF Treaty that had arisen recently. Finally the mutual concerns have been settled. The agreement includes arrangments concerning inspections on the whole territory of the site bound for inspection; measurements criteria during the inspections; technical data control; exchange of corrected data, additional photographs; procedure for presenting the notice and use of the control devices, etc. The American side assured that the USSR would be informed officially of liquidation sites for the ballistic missiles before the Treaty on INF comes into power. Under the same arrangement the American side also presented us with an official letter containing the data on the number of "Pershing-1A" missiles and launchers, which belong to the FRG but are presently on the US territory. The Americans took the obligation to provide the Soviet side with a possibility to inspect them.

The problem of the so-called "exotic weapons" based on future technology relevant to the INF Treaty was also resolved. The parties exchanged notes accordingly.

3) While discussing the START-ABM issues the parties agreed that although there is no possibility of reaching an agreement on 50-per cent cut in SOW before the summit, the progress in this field was considerable. Both parties intend to proceed with preparations to complete the treaty both before and after the Moscow summit.

So far as it is concerned, some major problems were discussed - observance of the ABM treaty, SLCMs and ALCMs, mobile IBMs, verification, including the question of data exchange. Once again we made the point of the need to find a satisfactory solution to the problem of SLCM.

As before, Mr. Shultz referred to the option of resolving the problem by means of unilateral decralitions without verification agreement. He didn't name any SLCM level acceptable to the USA. On our part we pointed out that unilateral declarations without verification option didn't lead to a real agreement. The USSR stands for strict verification measures embracing all types of SOW subject to reductions without exceptions.

The question of ALCM was discussed in detail. Some points of mutual understanding have been found, particulary concerning the problem of type-telling. At the same time there remain differencies in approach to estimating the number of the ALCM on heavy bombers. We voiced our strong objections to heavy bomber with conventional charges, not being included at all, as the Americans now insist. The American position implies that a major part of the US strategic weaponry would not be embraced by the reductions.

Concerning the molile IBM the Soviet party presented some additional considerations on verification.

In the field of basic data exchange an important progress has been made. The parties exchanged data on their respective SOW arsenal, the Soviet data including all of the components. The USA presented selected data, which did not include SLCMs.

4) The talks on the nuclear tests and chemical weapons were constructive. The parties moved their positions closer.

Discussion of the conventional forces and weapons also moved both approaches closer, in particular on the subject of the future talks. The Soviet and American delegations on the Vienna talks recieved instructions to intensify their efforts.

The Soviet side again raised the issue of limitations on naval activities. We proposed to start with expert-level consultations during which it would be possible to discuss mutual concerns, disposition of Soviet and American Navies, to search for ways of reductions of naval activities in sea areas, adjacent to Europe and of introduction of confidence-building measures in these areas. Mr. Shultz stated that the Soviet proposals will be studied.

5) Of regional issues the questions of Afghanistan, Middle East, Central America and South Africa were discussed in the most detailed manner.

On Afghanistan the Soviet side emphasized, that the main task now is total implementation of all obligations, undertaken by Pakistan, Afghanistan, as well as the Soviet Union and USA as guarantors. We invited the American side to consider seriously whether support to the most reactionary fundamentalist groupings corresponds to its own interests.

During exchange of views on the Middle East we, on our part, pointed out that certain common elements have recently appeared in the sides' approaches to this region and that on this basis we should move further in the interests of a just settlement, which would take into account interests of all parties. The Secretary of State underlined the difficulties, which the USA have faced recently in their efforts in Middle East.

Discussing the situation in Central America we proceeded from the positions of necessity to encourage peaceful process in this region, supported the dialogue between Managua and opposition, reminded that Nicaraguans for a long time have been speaking in favour of dialogue with the USA on security issues. We are in favour of mutual Soviet-US cessation of arms-supplies (with the exception of small arms) to Central America or, at least, of a moratorium on such supplies, - as an interim step.

While discussing the situation in the southern Africa the results of the recent London meeting on Angolo-Namibian issue were generally assesed in a positive way. The sides agreed to hold in the near future Soviet-American expert-level consultations on this issue.

6) Bilateral relations were considered in a very detailed manner. Particular attention was paid to the agreements now in the pipeline, on science and technology, culture, education and some other aspects.

7) Exchanging views on humanitarian questions, we put forward some fresh considerations which could allow to achieve

agreements in Vienna CSCE review meeting. These new ideas in general reflect the rolling process of democratization of the Soviet society. Mr. Shultz stated that steps along these lines could give new impetus to Vienna meeting and facilitate its meaningful conclusion.

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SHULTZ BRIEFING OF NAC: 13 MAY: NON NUCLEAR ISSUES

SUMMARY

1. SHULTZ SPEAKS OF CHALLENGE OF MANAGING A MORE PROMISING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. FURTHER EXCHANGES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND REGIONAL ISSUES. ON CSCE, SHEVARDNADZE SHOWS FLEXIBILITY SHULTZ URGES HIM TO SEND FRESH INSTRUCTIONS TO VIENNA. ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SHULTZ STRESSES NEED TO TURN PROGRESS IN PRINCIPLE INTO PRACTICAL AGREEMENTS.

DETAIL

2. OPENING HIS REPORT ON HIS 11-12 MAY MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE IN GENEVA, SHULTZ SPOKE OF THE CHALLENGE OF MANAGING AN EMERGING RELATIONSHIP WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION WHICH HELD OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF GREATER STABILITY. THE WEST SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES WHILE MAINTAINING THE NECESSARY STRENGTH AND REALISM.

3. ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND CSCE, SHULTZ RECALLED THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD AGREED AT THEIR MOSCOW MEETING ON THE NEED FOR A BALANCED OUTCOME. THE US SIDE HAD PRESSED HIM AGAIN ON THIS, INVITING HIM TO SEND FRESH INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS VIENNA TEAM. THE RUSSIANS IN MOSCOW HAD SUGGESTED THAT PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN DEFENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THAT RELIGIOUS GROUPS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO ORGANISE: THAT PRIVATE RELIGIOUS TEACHING BE PERMITTED: THAT DENONIMATIONS SHOULD BE ABLE TO PUBLISH BOOKS: THAT RELIGIOUS VISITS AND PILGRIMAGES, EVEN ABROAD, SHOULD BE PERMITTED: AND THAT RELIGIOUS BODIES SHOULD HAVE ACCESS TO THE MEDIA. THE US WANTED THIS ATTITUDE EXPRESSED IN VIENNA. ON THE CST MANDATE, THE RUSSIANS HAD FLOATED SOME INTERESTING LANGUAGE ON DUAL CAPABLE SYSTEMS: ONCE AGAIN, THE US INVITED THEM TO TABLE IT IN VIENNA.

4. ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SHULTZ SAID THAT A LOT OF PROGRESS IN PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN MADE: IT WAS NOW NECESSARY TO TRANSFORM THIS INTO PRACTICAL OPERATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

5. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE HAD ALSO REGISTERED WITH SHEVARDNADZE US CONCERN AT THE PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. IT WAS IRONIC THAT AT A TIME WHEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT WERE ELIMINATING CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF MISSILES, OTHER NATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE CHINESE, WERE DEVELOPING THESE.

6. SHULTZ SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN LIMITED TIME FOR DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES, AND ON SEVERAL SUBJECTS FAMILIAR POSITIONS WERE REHEARSED. ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, HE PAID TRIBUTE TO THE HELPFUL UK ROLE IN THE MEETINGS IN LONDON WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS, ANGOLANS AND CUBANS. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS SUPPORTING THIS PROCESS. CROCKER AND ADAMISHIN WOULD MEET BEFORE THE SUMMIT, WITH A VIEW TO POSSIBLE SUMMIT DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE.

7. ON AFGHANISTAN, THE US ASKED THE RUSSIANS TO REMOVE MINEFILEDS WHICH COULD IMPEDE THE RETURN OF REFUGEES, SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT THERE WERE NO MINES ON ROADS OR WELL USED ROUTES: AND SOVIET MINES WERE DESIGNED TO SELF-DESTRUCT AFTER A SET PERIOD. THE RUSSIANS UNDERTOOK TO CONSIDER A US REQUEST THAT THEY PROVIDE MAPS OF MINEFIELDS TO THE UN MONITORS.

8. ON ETHIOPIA, SHULTZ EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT MENGISTU WAS HOLDING UP THE FLOW OF FOOD TO FAMINE STRICKEN AREAS. SHEVARDNADZE DENIED THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM. THE US DID NOT ACCEPT THIS ANSWER, AND WOULD PURSUE THE SUBJECT.

9. SHULTZ SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE TRIED TO ENGAGE HIM IN DISCUSSION OF CYPRUS. THE US POSITION WAS THAT THIS WAS NOT A BILATERAL, OR EVEN AN EAST/WEST, ISSUE.

10. ON BILATERAL MATTERS, SHULTZ SAID THAT A NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS WERE IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT. THESE COVERED SUBJECTS SUCH AS CO-OPERATION ON BASIC SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: TRANSPORTATION: CULTURAL EXCHANGES: FISHERIES: SEARCH AND RESCUE: POLLUTION CONTROL: AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE US COASTGUARD AND THE SOVIET MARITIME AUTHORITIES.

11. IN CONCLUSION, SHULTZ SAID THAT AT THE SUMMIT A DOCUMENT WOULD BE PUBLISHED REVIEWING THE COURSE OF EVENTS SINCE THE FIRST SUMMIT

AT GENEVA IN 1985, AND SETTING OUT THE CURRENT POSITION ON KEY ISSUES. THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT WERE GOOD. SHULTZ PROPOSED TO COME TO BRUSSELS ON 2 JUNE TO BRIEF THE NAC ON THE OUTCOME. THE PRESIDENT WOULD TRAVEL DIRECT TO LONDON AND MAKE A MAJOR SPEECH ON 3 JUNE. HE WOULD ALSO MAKE SPEECHES IN THE FINLANDIA HALL IN HELSINKI BEFORE GOING TO MOSCOW, AND IN MOSCOW AT THE STATE UNIVERSITY.

12. ANDREOTTI (ITALY) WELCOMED SIGNS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY, INCLUDING IN CSCE: RECENT EVENTS IN POLAND SHOW THAT EUROPEAN STABILITY WAS STILL PRECARIOUS.

13. GENSCHER (FRG) SAID THAT THE TIMING OF THE SUMMIT ALLAYED DOUBTS ABOUT THE CONTINUING ABILITY TO FUNCTION OF THE OUTGOING US ADMINISTRATION. HE HOPED THAT THE SUMMIT WOULD LEAD TO A BALANCED OUTCOME AT VIENNA IN ORDER THAT THE CST COULD BEGIN: THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE CENTRAL TO EUROPEAN SECURITY, SINCE THEY RELATED TO THE AREA IN WHICH NATO HAD THE MOST TO DEMAND FROM THE EAST, IN VIEW OF THE LATTER'S OVERWHELMING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY. THE SUMMIT SHOULD ALSO GIVE AN IMPULSE TO THE CW NEGOTIATIONS. GENSCHER ARGUED THAT IT WAS VITAL TO ACHIEVE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS QUOTE WHILE THE SUN SHINES UNQUOTE. IT WAS WRONG TO ARGUE THAT PROGRESS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS WOULD UNDERMINE ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY. IN RECENT MONTHS, WHEN SUCH PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE, ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY HAD BEEN REINFORCED, NOT ONLY IN RESPECT OF EAST/WEST CONTACTS, BUT ALSO IN ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENCE COLLABORATION.

14. ORDONEZ (SPAIN) SPOKE OF THE NEED FOR PROGRESS AT THE SUMMIT ON THE MIDDLE EAST: PERES HAD RECENTLY TOLD HIM THAT FAILING THIS, THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION COULD BECOME DANGEROUS.

15. FOR THE UK, MR MELLOR RECALLED THAT HE HAD TOLD THE VIENNA CSCE MEETING OF THE NEED FOR A BALANCED OUTCOME, SINCE THE POLITICAL WILL IN THE WEST TO ACHIEVE ARMS CONTROL DEPENDED IN LARGE MEASURE ON OUR PERCEPTIONS OF EASTERN SOCIETIES. FAILURE TO HONOUR HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS AFFECTED OTHER AREAS. MANY EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, UNDER PRESSURE FROM THEIR PEOPLES, WERE AT A CROSSROADS. SOME (CZECHOSLOVAKIA) WERE TEMPTED TO EMPLOY STALINIST REMEDIES: OTHERS (HUNGHARY) WERE DEVELOPING THEIR PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS. NEITHER TREND SHOULD BE EXAGGERATED, BUT THE WEST SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE POSITIVE.

16. ON REGIONAL ISSUES, MR MELLOR ASSURED SHULTZ OF UK SUPPORT IN

HIS MIDDLE EAST EFFORTS: THE RUSSIANS APPEARED MORE READY TO ENGAGE IN A NON-DOCTRINAIRE MANNER. HE SHARED US CONCERN AT MISSILE PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE MAIN BRITISH CONCERN WAS OVER CRUDE MISSILES ARMED WITH CW. MR MELLOR CONCLUDED BY OFFERING GOOD WISHES FOR THE SUMMIT AND SAYING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO REGRET IF IT WERE NOT MARKED BY A DRAMATIC NEW AGREEMENT. IT WAS BETTER FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS THAT SUMMITS SHOULD NOT APPEAR AS EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS.

17. TINDEMANS (BELGIUM) ASKED ABOUT SOVIET ATTITUDES TO THE CUBAN ELEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: WHETHER THE THIRD ZERO OPTION HAD BEEN MENTIONED: ABOUT SOVIET IDEAS ON DUAL CAPABLE WEAPONS FOR CWT: AND ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE PROPGRESS MADE IN EXCHANGES ON A CW BAN.

18. ZAFIROPOULOS (GREECE) EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE IMPROVED EAST/WEST CLIMATE WOULD ASSIST PROGRESS ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE.

19. OLCAY (TURKEY) NOTED THE SOVIET WISH TO INTERNATIONALISE THE CYPRUS QUESTION, AND SPECULATED THAT THE REASON WAS THAT THE NEW LEADER IN QUOTE SOUTHERN CYPRUS UNQUOTE WAS THEIR CRONY.

20. RESPONDING TO THE QUESTIONS, SHULTZ SAID THAT HIS EXCHANGES ON REGIONAL ISSUES HAD A SPECIAL FEEL. WHEN THE SUBJECT WAS FIRST ADDRESSED, THREE YEARS AGO, THE RUSSIANS WERE VERY TOUCHY. NOW SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WAS POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH ITS INTENSITY VARIED. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, FOR EXAMPLE, MORE EXCHANGES WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS COULD BE MADE. SOME SOVIET OFFICIALS HAD REAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE DETAILS OF THE PROBLEM, BUT THIS HAD NOT YET REACHED HIGHER LEVELS, WHICH WERE STILL ADOPTING A POLITICAL POSTURE IN FAVOUR OF AN AUTHORITATIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THE RUSSIANS WERE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING THE INTRACTABLE ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION. SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS WOULD SUGGEST AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINE STATE, YET EVEN THOSE ARABS WHO ADVOCATED THIS IN PUBLIC BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE AN UNWORKABLE CATASTROPHE. OVERALL, THE MIDDLE EAST PROCESS HAD DETERIORATED IN THE LAST MONTH, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THE APPROACH OF THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS. BUT SHULTZ WOULD RETURN TO THE AREA AFTER THE SUMMIT.

21. ON ANGOLA, SHULTZ RECALLED THAT THE US POSITION HAD LONG BEEN THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD NOT TALK WITHOUT A WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS. SOME MONTHS AGO ANGOLA HAD PROMISED CUBAN WITHDRAWAL - THIS CONSTITUTED A BREAK-THROUGH WHICH WAS CONFIRMED IN LONDON. THE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE WAS NOT YET SATIFACTORY, BUT A CREDIBLE PROPOSAL

HAD BEEN MADE TO WHICH SOUTH AFRICA WOULD REPLY. PRESUMABLY THE RUSSIANS AGREED WITH THE ANGOLAN/CUBAN LINE.

22. ON DUAL CAPABILITY IN CST, SHULZ RECALLED THAT THE NATO POSITION FORESAW NO MENTION OF DUAL CAPABILITY IN THE MANDATE: ALTHOUGH THE FACT THAT A PIECE OF EQUIPMENT WAS DUAL CAPABLE DID NOT MAKE IT INELIGIBLE FOR INCLUSION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE GOING TO ACCEPT THIS POSITION: SHULTZ AHD URGED THEM TO TABLE LANGUAGE IN VIENNA.

23. ON CW, SHULTZ HAD AN INCREASING SENSE THAT THOSE INVOLVED SAW THE NEED TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE DETAIL, RATHER THAN JUST TO MAKE STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE. THE RUSSIANS HAD VOICED SOME INTERESTING IDEAS: SHULTZ HAD URGED THAT THEY PROPOSE THEM IN GENEVA. THESE INCLUDED THE SUGGESTION THAT INTERESTED STATES SHOULD DESIGNATE ONE CHEMICAL PLANT FOR SUDDEN EXPERIMENTAL INSPECTION, IN ORDER BETTER TO UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED.

24. SHULTZ ADMITTED THAT HE HAD NO CLEAR IDEAS ON HOW A BALLISTIC MISSILE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME WOULD WORK, ALTHOUGH STATES COULD AGREE NOT TO EXPORT MISSILES OR TECHNOLOGY. IF SUFFICIENT NATIONS ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF A PROBLEM, A SOLUTION COULD BE SOUGHT. THE US HAD RAISED IT WITH THE CHINESE, SUGGESTING THAT THEIR EXPORTS WERE DESTABILISING, BUT HAD RECEIVED NO SUBSTANTIVE REPLY.

25. FOR NUCLEAR ISSUES SEE MIFT..

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 15/3

14th April 1988

Thank you for Prime Minister
CDS 14/4

Dear Charles.

PROTECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST THE USE OF LASER DEVICES BY THE SOVIET UNION

In your letter of 4th April, you asked whether any devices to protect Servicemen against the effects of lasers had been developed as a result of the programme to which I referred in my letter of 31st March.

Work on the development of protective measures started in 1982 and, during the course of this year, the Army will be bringing into service, initially in BAOR, goggles designed to provide protection against lasers in the visible and near-visible wavelengths. Laser eye protection for Service air crew will follow within three years, although some personnel engaged in maritime air operations have already been provided with spectacles to counter a specific threat in a particular operating area. In addition, standards of laser protection have been specified for optical devices which are now mandatory for all new equipment or equipment undergoing mid-life up-dating. Further work will shortly be set in hand to consider the feasibility of countermeasures to the tunable or multi-wavelength laser threat that may be expected to result from the development of Soviet laser weapons.

I hope that this is helpful. I am sending a copy of this letter Mr Hall (Assessments Staff, Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

(I C F ANDREWS)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Foreign Policy Pt 8

East West Relations

SECRET UK EYES 'A'

9

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 April 1988

Dear Charles,

**Stockholm Document: UK Inspection of the Soviet Union**

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware that it is our intention to invoke the provisions of the Stockholm Document in order to mount an inspection of a military activity in the Soviet Union taking place between 8 and 13 April in the Odessa region, an area close to Turkey. We plan that the inspection will begin on 10 April. It will last up to 48 hours. The exercise concerned has been notified by the Soviet Union under the Stockholm Document as involving 3,000 airborne troops. Observers are not invited since according to the information provided the numbers fall below the observable threshold of 5,000 troops for exercises involving amphibious landings or parachute assaults.

Given the proximity of the exercise to Turkey and Turkish interest in military activities in this part of the Soviet Union, we shall be giving the Turks advance warning in strictest confidence of what we intend, probably on 6 April, and seeking diplomatic clearance for the inspection team's flight into the Soviet Union. It is possible therefore that the subject might briefly be referred to in the course of the Prime Minister's discussions in Ankara.

This will be the eighth inspection under the Stockholm Document and the second by the United Kingdom (we mounted an inspection of the GDR last September). We see the exercise of the right of inspection as making a valuable contribution to the building of confidence between East and West and to establishing on-site verification as a regular and routine part of the Stockholm process. The inspections so far have passed off in a cordial manner but the Turks have hitherto been lukewarm about them, in part because they fear that they are natural candidates for "retaliatory" inspections (they saw the Soviet inspection of Turkey last October as to some extent a response to the US inspection of the Soviet Union in August). But recent soundings taken by the Embassy in Ankara indicate that they may now be more relaxed and may indeed be contemplating inspections of their own.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin in the MOD.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

4 April 1988

**USE OF LASER DEVICES BY THE SOVIET UNION**

Thank you for your letter of 31 March describing various instances of the use of laser devices by the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister was grateful for this. She has noted that the Ministry of Defence have had a programme for several years to develop protective devices against the use of such lasers. She hopes that by this time some protection has been found. Perhaps you could let me know.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr Hall (Assessments Staff, Cabinet Office).

C.D. POWELL

Ian Andrews, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 15/3V

31st March 1988

Dear Charles,

USE OF LASER DEVICES BY THE SOVIET UNION

In your letter to Brian Hawtin of 20th March, you asked whether there was any evidence to support the assertion that the Soviet Union has used laser devices to blind American pilots. The UK has no evidence that US pilots have been permanently blinded by Soviet laser devices, although in the past few years there have been several incidents in which Soviet lasers appear to have illuminated Western military observers.

The incident of most concern took place in September 1987, when two US aircraft monitoring Soviet ICBMs some 1450km from Hawaii, were illuminated by a laser. The co-pilot of one of the aircraft suffered serious and persistent vision disruption for about 10 minutes due to an intense flash from one of the ships in the area. In an earlier incident in 1986, a US reconnaissance aircraft operating in the sea of Okhotsk was exposed to multiple flashes from a laser mounted on a Soviet Sovremenny class warship. No crew members were looking directly at the laser but estimates from video recordings of the event indicate that it was powerful enough to cause eye damage.

The Soviets have used lasers in ground engagements. In 1982 UK BRIXMIS patrols operating in the German Democratic Republic were targeted by Soviet laser rangefinders, which are more powerful than Western equivalents, causing damage to camera optics. There were no eye casualties. The Soviets are also reported to have used lasers to blind Chinese soldiers on the Sino-Soviet border and Mujahidin in the Afghan mountains, and there are reliable reports that the Iraqis have used lasers against Iranian infantry causing between 2000 and 4000 eye casualties.

But these incidents should be viewed against the background of the increasing deployment of laser devices in both WP and NATO forces. The fact that the Soviets have illuminated Western equipment and personnel does not prove intent to cause damage or injury. Such

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

incidents may well increase, affecting both Western and Soviet units, as laser devices become more widely utilised particularly in weapon aiming systems.

In summary, whilst there are no known incidents in which the Soviet forces have permanently blinded Western military personnel with lasers, they appear to have used them in a way which could have done so; but whether this was by accident or design is not clear. The Defence Intelligence Staff has consistently advised that, if illuminated by a Soviet laser, ocular damage may occur and an MOD programme to develop protective devices has been running for several years.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr Hall (Assessments Staff, Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

(I C F ANDREWS)
Private Secretary

I hope it has
by the time found
effective protection.

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MIPT: SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: ARMS CONTROL
NUCLEAR TESTING
1. THE GENERAL VERDICT HERE IS THAT THE VISIT CONFIRMED THE QUOTE STEP BACKWARDS UNQUOTE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE TAKEN SINCE THE MOSCOW MINISTERIAL IN FEBRUARY. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOW SWITCHED EMPHASIS BACK TO THE JVE, HAVING FAILED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THE VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS IN THE INTERIM IN GENEVA, AND THE AIM IS NOW TO REACH TECHNICAL AGREEMENT ON A JVE BEFORE THE NEXT MINISTERIAL IN MOSCOW IN APRIL. EVEN IF THIS IS ACHIEVED, CONDUCTING AND EVALUATING THE JVE WILL TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME THEREAFTER. THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OF THE PNET AND TTBT (OR EVEN SIGNING THE PROPOSED VERIFICATION PROTOCOL) AT THE SUMMIT IS THEREFORE NOW VIRTUALLY OUT OF THE QUESTION.
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL
2. IN CONTRAST TO THE OTHER ISSUES ON THE ARMS CONTROL AGENDA, THE RUSSIANS CAME TO WASHINGTON WITH NEW IDEAS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. THEY OPENED BY REHASHING THE DUAL CAPABILITY QUESTION, WHICH THE AMERICANS DEALT WITH RAPIDLY WITH THOMAS TAKING THE OPPORTUNITY TO REBUT EARLIER SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT SOME FORM OF COMPROMISE HAD BEEN REACHED IN MOSCOW IN FEBRUARY, AND THEREBY TO CLOSE THE GAP THAT HAD OPENED UP BETWEEN OSD AND STATE. BUT THE RUSSIANS WENT ON TO PROPOSE A TWO-PHASE DATA EXCHANGE WITH A WARSAW PACT/NATO MEETING IN MID-APRIL TO AGREE UPON CATEGORIES, AND A FOLLOW-UP SESSION IN MAY TO FILL IN THE BLANKS. THE INITIAL US REACTION WAS NON-COMMITAL BUT SUB-SEQUENTLY HARDENED AS THE AGENCIES UNITED IN OPPOSITION TO WHAT OSD TERMED A QUOTE BROCHURE WAR UNQUOTE. ASIDE FROM THE LIKELY PROPAGANDA BATTLE THAT MIGHT ENSUE FROM SUCH AN EXCHANGE (AND A COMPONENT OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS A FILLING IN OF THE OTHER SIDE'S BLANKS, AS PROPOSED BY TARASOV IN MBFR IN THE EARLY 1980S), THE AMERICANS SAW THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AS AN ATTEMPT TO EXTRACT THE STABILITY TALKS FROM THE VIENNA FOLLOW UP MEETING AND THUS DIMINISH WESTERN LEVERAGE TIME. A DATA EXCHANGE ON

THE LINES PROPOSED COULD WELL BE PRESENTED AS THE START OF THE NEGOTIATIONS PROPER, OR AT THE VERY LEAST A FIRM COMMITMENT TO AN EARLY BEGINNING (AND SHOULD THEREFORE, IN THE US VIEW, AWAIT CONSIDERATION UNTIL THE NEGOTIATIONS GET UNDERWAY).

3. THE RUSSIANS ALSO CAME UP WITH A PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON NAVAL FORCES OUTSIDE THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS. SHEVARDNADZE AND GRINEVSKY BOTH MADE A PITCH FOR A QUOTE CONFERENCE OF MAJOR MARITIME POWERS UNQUOTE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE US, UK, FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND WHICH WOULD LOOK AT THE NAVAL BALANCE OF POWER. THE US REACTION WAS SHARPLY NEGATIVE.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

4. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THIS MINISTERIAL MIRRORED THEIR APPROACH AT THE PREVIOUS SESSION IN MOSCOW. THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE APPEARED TO BE TO GET THE AMERICANS TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE AND THAT WORK SHOULD BE ACCELERATED. THE PROPOSALS FOR DATA EXCHANGE, MOCK INSPECTION, AND BILATERAL MEETINGS GOING INTO CONTINUOUS SESSION AGAIN RESURFACED. THE AMERICANS, LED BY HOLMES (STATE), AGAIN REPEATED THEIR STANDARD LINE ON THESE ISSUES. WHILE THIS SATISFIED THE PENTAGON, HOLMES CAME AWAY WITH THE FEELING THAT THE US WAS IN DANGER OF BEING PERMANENTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE ON CW IN THE BILATERAL MINISTERIALS. HENCE THE DOWNPLAYING OF CW AT THE ALLIED BRIEFINGS AND AT SHULTZ'S PRESS CONFERENCE. HOLMES IS APPARENTLY LOOKING TO HAVE SOME NEW US IDEAS TO PUT TO THE RUSSIANS AT THE NEXT MINISTERIAL IN APRIL, AND TO IMPRESS UPON THE RUSSIANS THE NEED TO INTRODUCE THEIR BILATERAL PROPOSALS INTO THE CD. THE FRONT-RUNNER FOR A US BILATERL PROPOSAL APPEARS TO BE JOINT MOCK INSPECTIONS OF CW PLANTS. BUT THE US CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION (AND THE PENTAGON) ARE LIKELY TO RESIST THIS.

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MY TELNO 784: SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: ARMS CONTROL
SUMMARY
1. LITTLE NEW ON START BUT SOME DISCUSSION OF NEW IDEAS ON DEFENCE AND SPACE INCLUDING A QUOTE PREDICTABILITY PROTOCOL UNQUOTE TO THE DEFENCE AND SPACE TREATY. A STEP BACKWARDS ON NUCLEAR TESTING. NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. STALE DISCUSSION OF CW.
DETAIL
2. OUR CONTACTS HAVE GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES DURING SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT.
START
3. THE US TEAM HINTED STRONGLY THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN ALCM RANGE LIMIT BELOW 1500 KILOMETRES AND AN ATTRIBUTION RULE OF MORE THAN 10 ALCMS PER BOMBER IF (AND ONLY IF) THE RUSSIANS AGREED THAT CONVENTIONAL ALCMS WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE TREATY. THE RUSSIANS CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR A LIMIT OF 1100 ON ALCMS, WHICH THE US REJECTED.
4. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A SUB-LIMIT OF 800 MOBILE MISSILES WAS ENTIRELY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US BUT OF INTEREST BECAUSE IT SUGGESTED THAT SOVIET FORCE PLANNING FOR THE SS24 AND SS25 WAS IN LINE WITH US INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (WHICH ARE OF A LIKELY TOTAL PROCUREMENT OF ABOUT 500 SS25S AND 300 SS24S). THE RUSSIANS PRESSED IDEAS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE QUOTE CRADLE TO GRAVE UNQUOTE VERIFICATION REGIME FOR MOBILE MISSILES, BUILDING ON SOVIET PROPOSALS ALREADY MADE IN GENEVA. THIS HAD INCLUDED PROPOSALS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION, PERIMETER AND PORTAL MONITORING, REMOTE SENSING, AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES. THE US HAD MAINTAINED THEIR POSITION THAT EVEN SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE REGIME AS THIS WOULD NOT GENERATE A SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE THAT LIMITS WERE BEING OBSERVED. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT THEY HAD BEEN HOPING THAT SHULTZ WOULD BE AUTHORISED AT THIS MEETING TO MAKE A NEW US PROPOSAL FOR LIMITS ON MOBILE MISSILES. IN THE EVENT, THIS HAD NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT, BUT SHULTZ HAD BEEN ABLE TO MAKE SOME NEW US PROPOSALS FOR THE

VERIFICATION OF MOBILE MISSILE LIMITS, WHICH OF COURSE STRONGLY IMPLIED THAT THE US WAS DEFINITELY NOW PREPARED TO DROP THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A COMPLETE BAN. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HOPE THAT THIS CAN FORMALLY BE DONE AT THE NEXT SHULTZ/ SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN APRIL. WE UNDERSTAND THAT ANY SUCH NEW PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO PERMIT BOTH RAIL-MOBILE AND ROAD-MOBILE MISSILES UNDER AN OVERALL RV LIMIT OF BETWEEN 500 AND 1000.

DEFENCE AND SPACE

5. THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD BE CONTENT TO SIGN A DEFENCE AND SPACE TREATY BASED CLOSELY ON THE DECEMBER SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT LANGUAGE AND HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE ONLY PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF A COMPLEMENTARY PREDICTABILITY PACKAGE AFTER SUCH A TREATY HAD BEEN AGREED. THE US SIDE HAD ARGUED THAT THE DECEMBER LANGUAGE NEEDED TO BE CLARIFIED AND HAD PROPOSED A PROTOCOL TO THE DEFENCE AND SPACE TREATY THAT WOULD CODIFY A VOLUNTARY QUOTE PREDICTABILITY PACKAGE UNQUOTE. ELEMENTS IN THE PACKAGE MIGHT INCLUDE AN ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF DATA ABOUT TESTING ACTIVITIES THAT LOOKED 18 MONTHS AHEAD: BRIEFINGS BY BOTH SIDES ON THEIR TESTING PROGRAMMES: AND OTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY THE AMERICANS, SUCH AS OPEN LABORATORIES AND OBSERVERS AT THE OTHER SIDE'S TESTS. THE AMERICANS HAD PROPOSED, IN ADDITION, THAT SPACE-BASED SENSORS WITH AN ABM CAPABILITY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RUN FREE (AN IDEA DISCUSSED BETWEEN CARLUCCI AND YASOV IN BERNE LAST WEEK). THE AMERICANS ARGUED THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE STABILISING AND IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. THE RUSSIANS HAD GIVEN NO SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE.

6. WE UNDERSTAND THAT, CONTRARY TO PRESS REPORTS, IT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN AGREED WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION THAT NO PROPOSAL WOULD BE PUT TO THE RUSSIANS FOR DESIGNATED TEST RANGES IN SPACE. THIS IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF IDEAS FOR FUNCTIONAL TESTING PARAMETERS PRESENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION (BAND'S LETTER OF 23 MARCH) BUT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD DECIDED THAT THE IDEA REQUIRED MORE STUDY BEFORE IT COULD BE PUT TO THE RUSSIANS. THIS ALSO APPLIED TO OTHER IDEAS IN THIS CATEGORY PRESENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION HERE, WHICH WOULD BE DESIGNED TO MAKE CLEAR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT. THE EXPECTATION HERE IS THAT AN AGREED ADMINISTRATION APPROACH MAY WELL BE FORTHCOMING IN TIME FOR SHULTZ TO PUT IDEAS TO SHEVARDNADZE WHEN THEY MEET AGAIN IN MOSCOW NEXT MONTH.

7. SEE MIFT FOR NUCLEAR TESTING, CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND CW.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 492
OF 261720Z FEBRUARY 88

Secret

Discussed on Phone. Told Sir A Acland Tel visit almost certainly not necessary.
CDS 30/3

STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR POWELL (NO 10) AND GALSWORTHY

POSSIBLE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES BY THE PRIME MINISTER

1 I HAVE BEEN THINKING SINCE MY RETURN FROM LONDON ABOUT THE ADVISABILITY OF THE PRIME MINISTER MAKING A VISIT TO WASHINGTON BEFORE THE US/SOVIET SUMMIT IN MOSCOW. I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF I SENT YOU SOME VERY PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT MEET AT THE NATO SUMMIT.

2 A VISIT MAY NOT BE ESSENTIAL. I THINK THAT THERE IS LESS RISK NOW, WITH THE CARLUCCI/SHULTZ/POWELL TRIUMVIRATE FIRMLY IN THE DRIVING SEAT, THAN ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, OF THE PRESIDENT TAKING AN UNPREDICTABLE AND UNWELCOME LINE ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES WITH THE RUSSIANS. IN THIS SENSE THERE WILL PROBABLY BE LESS NEED TO ENSURE A PERSONAL CONTACT BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUMMIT. MESSAGES MIGHT WELL SUFFICE. BUT IF THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD NEVERTHELESS LIKE TO COME, I SEE NO GREAT PROBLEM ALTHOUGH THE LIKELY PRESS REACTIONS WILL NEED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. I THINK IT IMPORTANT TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION OF A VISIT DESIGNED TO PUT THE PRESIDENT ON THE RIGHT LINES AGAIN, AND THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD ME THAT SHE WOULD WANT TO AVOID THAT. THIS WOULD ARGUE AGAINST A CAMP DAVID STYLE MEETING WHICH WOULD INVITE COMPARISONS WITH 1984 (SDI) AND 1986 (POST-REYKJAVIK). A WORKING VISIT INCLUDING DISCUSSION WITH OTHER LEADING PLAYERS HERE, WHILE AVOIDING POSSIBLE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PROBLEMS, WOULD HELP TO DISPEL ANY SUCH IMPRESSION. AND SECONDLY, FOR THE SAME REASONS, THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT LIKE TO COMBINE IT WITH SOME OTHER PUBLIC EVENT SUCH AS A SPEECH OR RECEIVING AN AWARD EITHER IN OR SOMEWHERE NEAR WASHINGTON. WE COULD PUT FORWARD IDEAS IF YOU THOUGHT THIS ATTRACTIVE.

3 WE WILL OF COURSE AIM TO MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE START AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS VERY CAREFULLY, AND WILL WARN YOU AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY IF WE SEE A NEED FOR CONSULTATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

ACLAND

No Dist.
MR GALSWORTHY/

ADD:
MR POWELL, NO10

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MIPT : SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON : ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

SUMMARY

1. ON START, US MAKE NEW PROPOSALS ON COUNTING RULES FOR ALCMS. RUSSIANS MOVE BACKWARDS ON SUB-LIMITS. NO PROGRESS ON SLCM VERIFICATION. RUSSIANS ACCEPT SEVEN YEAR PERIOD FOR START REDUCTIONS. ON DEFENCE AND SPACE, RUSSIANS WILLING TO AGREE SEVEN TO NINE YEAR NON-WITHDRAWAL COMMITMENT: BUT ARGUE THAT THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT SHOULD CONSIST OF NOTHING BEYOND THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT LANGUAGE.

DETAIL

2. NITZE SUMMARISED THE ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS AS FOLLOWS.

START

3. ALCMS. THE US HAD PROPOSED THAT CONVENTIONAL ALCMS SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRAINED IN ANY WAY. EACH HEAVY BOMBER EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR ARMED ALCMS WOULD COUNT AS 10 ALCMS (PREVIOUS US PROPOSAL WAS 6). VERIFICATION WOULD THEN FOCUS ON THE NUMBERS OF SUCH HEAVY BOMBERS. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE ON-SITE INSPECTION. NITZE ADDED THAT DESPITE OBUKHOV'S INITIAL NEGATIVE REACTION IN THE WORKING GROUP, GENERAL CHERVOV APPEARED INTERESTED IN THE IDEA. FOR THE PRESENT, THE RUSSIANS WERE STICKING TO THEIR PROPOSAL THAT EACH HEAVY BOMBER SHOULD COUNT FOR THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE ALCM LOAD (28 FOR B-52, AND 22 FOR B1B). THE DEFINITION OF LONG-RANGE WAS ALSO STILL UNRESOLVED: THE RUSSIANS WERE STICKING AT 600 KM. THE US WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER SOME MOVEMENT BELOW 1500 KM.

4. ICBM SUB-LIMITS. THE US HAD REAFFIRMED THEIR PROPOSED 3300 SUB-LIMIT ON RVS. AKHROMEEV HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT EXCEED THIS IF THERE WAS A START AGREEMENT. BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON HOW SUCH AN ASSURANCE WOULD BE RECORDED. THE RUSSIANS HAD THEN GONE BACKWARDS BY REVIVING THEIR EARLIER INSISTENCE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A PARALLEL SUB-LIMIT OF 3300 ON SLBM RVS, OR ALTERNATIVELY NO SUB-LIMITS AT ALL. NITZE COMMENTED THAT THIS ISSUE WENT TO THE HEART OF WHETHER START

REDUCTIONS WOULD BE STABILISING.

5. SLCM VERIFICATION. THE RUSSIANS HAD PROPOSED A DEMONSTRATION IN APRIL OF THEIR TECHNIQUE OF VERIFYING WHETHER WAR SHIPS CARRIED NUCLEAR SLCMS. US SCIENTISTS CONSIDERED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO USE NEUTRON GUNS WAS UNWORKABLE. GIVEN THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF SHIELDED WARHEADS, BACKGROUND RADIATION FROM NUCLEAR PROPULSION UNITS AND THE INABILITY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN NUCLEAR SLCMS AND OTHER NUCLEAR WARHEADS, THE US WERE NOT INTERESTED IN THE APRIL EXPERIMENT. BUT THEY UNDERTOOK (WITHOUT MUCH ENTHUSIASM) TO CONSIDER OTHER SOVIET IDEAS SUCH AS INSPECTORS AT PRODUCTION FACILITIES.

6. MOBILE ICBMS. THE US STUCK TO THEIR POSITION THAT IF THE SIDES COULD AGREE ON AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME, THE US WOULD CONSIDER A SUB-LIMIT. THE RUSSIANS OFFERED A SUB-LIMIT OF 800 MOBILE MISSILES, WHICH WAS PATENTLY RIDICULOUS GIVEN THAT SOVIET TRAIN-MOBILE ICBMS CARRIED 10 WARHEADS (I.E. A TOTAL OF 8000 PERMITTED RVS). THE US HAD MADE CLEAR THAT IF THERE WAS TO BE A SUB-LIMIT, THE UNIT OF COUNTING SHOULD BE WARHEADS ON MOBILE LAUNCHERS. THEY HAD PUT FORWARD SOME NEW IDEAS ON VERIFICATION, INCLUDING THE TAGGING OF MISSILES, TO PERMIT THE IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL MISSILES.

7. HEAVY ICBMS. THE RUSSIANS HAD PROPOSED THAT NEW TYPES SHOULD BE BANNED, BUT THAT FLIGHT TESTING AND MODIFICATION OF EXISTING HEAVY ICBMS WOULD BE ALLOWED. THE US HAD RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD GIVE THE RUSSIANS A MONOPOLY OF INCREASINGLY MODERN HEAVY ICBMS.

8. REDUCTIONS UNDER A START AGREEMENT. THE RUSSIANS HAD ACCEPTED THE US PROPOSAL OF A SEVEN YEAR REDUCTION PERIOD.

DEFENCE AND SPACE

9. THE RUSSIANS HAD ACCEPTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A SEPARATE AGREEMENT. IN RESPONSE TO US PRESSURE FOR A JOINT DRAFT TEXT, THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY CONSIDERED THAT THE SUBSTANCE SHOULD BE THE AGREED LANGUAGE ON THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE WITH THE MINIMUM ADDITIONS NECESSARY TO TURN THIS INTO TREATY LANGUAGE. NITZE ADDED THAT THE US COULD NOT ACCEPT THE AMBIGUITIES IN THE CURRENT TEXT. THE RUSSIANS HAD SUGGESTED THAT ONCE AN AGREEMENT ON THE LINES THEY HAD IN MIND WAS SIGNED, US CONCERNS ABOUT AMBIGUITY COULD BE ADDRESSED IN A PROTOCOL. NITZE ADDED THAT THIS WAS NOT GOOD ENOUGH.

10. ON THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD FROM THE ABM TREATY, THE RUSSIANS HAD SAID THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT A PERIOD OF 7-9 YEARS. THIS WAS CLOSE TO WHAT THE AMERICANS WERE SEEKING.

11. THE US HAD PUT FORWARD A NUMBER OF NEW IDEAS IN THE SPACE/ DEFENCE FIELD. THEY HAD TABLED A PACKAGE OF PREDICTABILITY

MEASURES, INCLUDING VISITS TO LABORATORIES, ATTENDANCE AT MISSILE LAUNCHES, AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON PROJECTED TEST PROGRAMMES. THEY HAD ALSO SUGGESTED THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD AGREE NOT TO OBJECT TO SPACE-BASED SENSORS DEPLOYED BY THE OTHER SIDE, EVEN WHERE THESE MIGHT BE RELEVANT TO ABM DEFENCE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT EARLY WARNING WAS INHERENTLY STABILISING.

CONVENTIONAL STABILITY

12. THE RUSSIANS HAD CONTINUED TO INSIST ON A REFERENCE TO DUAL- CAPABLE SYSTEMS IN THE SCOPE SECTION OF THE MANDATE. THE US HAD REAFFIRMED THE NATO POSITION, ADDING THAT THE PROPER PLACE FOR DISCUSSION WAS VIENNA.

12. MRS RIDGWAY SAID THAT IN DRAFTING THE JOINT STATEMENT (COPY WAS SENT BY BAG ON 24 MARCH) THE RUSSIANS OBJECTED TO A REFERENCE TO A QUOTE SUCCESSFUL AND BALANCED OUTCOME OF THE VIENNA MEETING. BESSMERTNYK HAD ARGUED THAT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER BALANCED OUTCOME WAS DESIRABLE HAD BECOME AN ISSUE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

13. ON NUCLEAR TESTING, NITZE ADDED NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE TO SHULTZ'S COMMENTS TO THE PRESS.

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OUR TELNO 771 : SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

SUMMARY

1. BRIEFING BY RIDGWAY AND NITZE. HARD SLOGGING ON START AND SPACE/DEFENCE ISSUES. NOTHING NEW ON AFGHANISTAN OR OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES. TWO FURTHER MINISTERIAL MEETINGS BEFORE THE SUMMIT.

DETAIL

2. MRS RIDGWAY AND NITZE BRIEFED ALLIED EMBASSIES ON 24 MARCH. THIS TELEGRAM COVERS GENERAL POINTS, AND REGIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL ISSUES. MIFT COVERS ARMS CONTROL.

3. MRS RIDGWAY SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A GRUELLING TWO DAYS, WITH MANY HOURS OF DETAILED DISCUSSIONS. ON START, THE NEGOTIATORS WERE GRAPPLING WITH THE HARD ISSUES. MAJOR PROGRESS HAD NEVER BEEN LIKELY. BUT THE MINISTERS HAD AGREED TO MEET AGAIN IN MOSCOW (21-25 APRIL) AND ONCE MORE BEFORE THE SUMMIT, POSSIBLY ON NEUTRAL GROUND.

4. THE RUSSIANS HAD UNVEILED TWO ENTIRELY NEW IDEAS IN WASHINGTON:

I) A PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF DATA ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN ADVANCE OF THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS. THE PARAMETERS FOR SUCH AN EXCHANGE TO BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN WARSAW PACT AND NATO EXPERTS AT A MEETING IN MID-APRIL, AND THE EXCHANGE ITSELF TO TAKE PLACE IN MID-MAY. SHULTZ'S INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT THE US DID NOT DISCUSS CONVENTIONAL STABILITY ISSUES BILATERALLY, AND WOULD WANT TO CONSULT THEIR ALLIES. HE ADDED THAT HIS FIRST REACTION WAS THAT THIS PROPOSAL LEAP-FROGGED OVER THE MAIN CURRENT ISSUE, WHICH WAS ACHIEVING AGREEMENT IN THE MANDATE DISCUSSIONS AT VIENNA.

II) AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONSTRAINTS ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES. SOVIET IDEAS WERE VERY VAGUE: PARTICIPANTS COULD INCLUDE THE US, SOVIET UNION, UK, FRANCE, AND QUOTE OTHERS UNQUOTE. SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS AT MURMANSK AND BELGRADE. SHULTZ RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD PASS THE IDEA ON BUT DOUBTED THAT IT WOULD BE WELCOME TO ANY OF THE NAVIES CONCERNED. SHEVARDNADZE ADDED THAT



SENT 25 MAR 88

QUOTE CDE II UNQUOTE WOULD IN ANY CASE HAVE TO CONSIDER NAVAL ACTIVITIES.

MRS RIDGWAY COMMENTED THAT THE US WERE NOT TAKING EITHER OF THESE PROPOSALS SERIOUSLY.

REGIONAL ISSUES

5. AFGHANISTAN. DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH BETWEEN MINISTERS, AND BETWEEN ARMACOST AND ADAMISHIN. SHULTZ DESCRIBED THE OUTCOME FULLY AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE (OUR TUR). THE RUSSIANS WERE CLEARLY UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE US PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM ON AID TO THE PARTIES. (ANOTHER CONTACT IN STATE TOLD US SEPARATELY THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE CLEAR IN PRIVATE THAT THEY WOULD NOT GIVE A PRIVATE ASSURANCE OF A CESSATION OF AID TO KABUL AS THE US HAD PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED, BECAUSE SUCH AN ASSURANCE WOULD IMMEDIATELY BE GIVEN TO CONGRESS AND BECOME PUBLIC. IT APPEARED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THEM IN POLITICAL TERMS TO AVOID BEING SEEN TO WRITE OFF THEIR CLIENTS IN KABUL, PARTICULARLY IF THEY WANTED NAJIB TO SURVIVE FOR A DECENT INTERVAL AFTER THEIR WITHDRAWAL). MRS RIDGWAY ADDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT: BOTH SIDES HAD SIMPLY WELCOMED CORDOVEZ'S WILLINGNESS TO WORK IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY WITH THE AFGHAN GROUPS.

6. MIDDLE EAST. AS SHULTZ HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE PRESS, FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES REMAINED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE PEACE PROCESS. BUT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP IN TOUCH. POLYAKOV HAD STAYED ON FOR A FURTHER DAY'S TALKS WITH MURPHY.

7. GULF. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE REPORTS OF THE IRAQI CW ATTACK ON HALABJA SHOULD BE FOLLOWED UP URGENTLY AT GENEVA. ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE RUSSIANS HAD AGREED UNDER PRESSURE THAT IF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ROUND OF TALKS ON 4-5 MAY WERE UNSATISFACTORY, THEY WOULD BE READY TO TAKE QUOTE STRONG ACTION UNQUOTE. BUT THEY HAD REFUSED SHULTZ'S REQUEST TO INCLUDE THIS IN THE JOINT STATEMENT. Agm1?

8. SOUTHERN AFRICA. DISCUSSED MAINLY BETWEEN CROCKER AND ADAMISHIN. THE MINISTERS HAD ONLY TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON THE SUBJECT, BUT HAD AGREED THAT EXPERTS SHOULD DISCUSS FURTHER.

9. HUMAN RIGHTS. THIS HAD BEEN THE SOLE TOPIC AT THE RESTRICTED MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HAD BEEN DISCUSSED FURTHER AT LOWER LEVELS. IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS MADE BY SHULTZ TO THE PRESS, SHEVARDNADZE HAD RAISED THE MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE, SAYING THAT IF THE AMERICANS WERE CATEGORICALLY AGAINST IT, THE SOVIET UNION COULD LIVE WITHOUT IT. THEY DID NOT WANT TO COMPETE WITH THE UK AND FRENCH PROPOSALS, AND COULD AGREED TO CONFERENCES IN LONDON AND PARIS. A MOSCOW CONFERENCE COULD TAKE PLACE LATER. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM THE MINISTER, MRS RIDGWAY SAID THAT SHE REGARDED

THIS AS ESSENTIALLY A CONTINUATION OF THE PREVIOUS SOVIET LINE ON THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE: THEY DID NOT WANT TO ABANDON THEIR PROPOSAL BUT SHE AGREED THAT THE LATEST FORMULA MIGHT REFLECT A SLIGHT CHANGE OF EMPHASIS.

BILATERAL

10. THE TWO SIDES HAD DISCUSSED RENEWAL OF THE CULTURAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT. THE US HAD TABLED DRAFT AGREEMENTS ON TRANSPORTATION AND BASIC SCIENCES. BOTH SIDES HAD ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN A FISHERIES AGREEMENT.

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OUR TELNO 744: SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: 23-25 MARCH
SUMMARY
1. AGREEMENT ON SUMMIT IN MOSCOW, 29 MAY TO 2 JUNE. SHULTZ'S PRESS CONFERENCE SUGGESTS NO BREAKTHROUGHS ON ARMS CONTROL OR AFGHANISTAN.
DETAIL
2. SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE CONCLUDED TWO FULL DAYS OF TALKS ON THE EVENING OF 23 MARCH. THE FINAL ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS RAN SEVERAL HOURS LONGER THAN PLANNED. AS A RESULT, THE BRIEFING WHICH MRS RIDGWAY AND NITZE HAD ARRANGED TO GIVE FOR ALLIED EMBASSIES THAT EVENING WAS DELAYED TWICE AND THEN POSTPONED TO 24 MARCH.
3. SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE ISSUED A JOINT COMMUNIQUE AT THE END OF THEIR TALKS. TEXT TO FOLLOW WHEN AVAILABLE. AT A LATE NIGHT PRESS CONFERENCE ON 23 MARCH SHULTZ MADE THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS:

(I) ARMS CONTROL. A GREAT DEAL OF TIME HAD BEEN SPENT ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IN THE WORKING GROUP. THE IDEA OF PRODUCING JOINT DRAFT TEXTS OF THE THREE START VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN A GOOD ONE QUOTE WE HAVE GOT EACH OF THESE TEXTS UP AND RUNNING, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE HEAVILY BRACKETED UNQUOTE. THE US HAD EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF EARLY EXCHANGES OF DATA. THERE HAD BEEN LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING START ISSUES QUOTE I CANNOT POINT TO ANY PARTICULAR OUTCOME EXCEPT THAT THROUGH THIS KIND OF DISCUSSION OUR SIDE BECOMES MORE REALISTIC ... WE HAVE PROVIDED SOME IDEAS IN MOST OF THESE AREAS AND THE SOVIETS PROVIDED IDEAS OF THEIR OWN UNQUOTE:

(II) ON DEFENCE AND SPACE, THE TWO SIDES ACCEPTED THAT THERE WOULD BE A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. THE MAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUE IN THE US VIEW WAS THE NEED TO DO MORE TO REMOVE AMBIGUITIES IN THE LANGUAGE AGREED AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT:

(III) ON NUCLEAR TESTING, IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO PROCEED IN PARALLEL WITH THE DRAFTING OF THE VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS AND WITH THE PREPARATION OF JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENTS. QUOTE WE ARE CONTENT WITH THAT, BUT IT DOES SLOW THINGS DOWN.UNQUOTE:

(IV) ON CSCE, THE US SAW SOME PROGRESS IN VIENNA ON THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS, BUT WERE NOT AT ALL PLEASED WITH THE WAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS SIDE OF THE MEETING WAS DEVELOPED. HE AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT THIS. QUOTE I HOPE THAT A RESULT MAY BE MORE MOVEMENT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SIDE IN VIENNA UNQUOTE.

(V) AFGHANISTAN: SHULTZ WELCOMED THE SOVIET INTENTION TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS, THE COMMITMENT TO FRONT-LOADING AND SHEVARDNADZE'S COMMENT THAT THEY EXPECTED ALL THEIR TROOPS TO BE OUT BY THE END OF 1988. ON THE ISSUE OF SYMMETRY, THE US HAD PROPOSED A MORATORIUM ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO RUN FROM THE PERIOD WHEN THE WITHDRAWAL BEGAN, PERHAPS INITIALLY FOR THREE MONTHS AND EXTENDABLE BEYOND THAT. SUCH A MORATORIUM WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ASSERTIONS OF LEGAL RIGHTS TO SUPPLY PARTIES BUT WOULD HELP TO PRODUCE A FRUITFUL ATMOSPHERE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF STABLE CONDITIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT FEEL ABLE TO AGREE TO THAT PROPOSAL: BUT IT REMAINED ON THE TABLE. (SHEVARDNADZE ADDED LATER AT HIS OWN PRESS CONFERENCE QUOTE I RULE IT OUT... FOR THE PRESENT UNQUOTE.) IF THIS PROPOSAL OR SOMETHING LIKE IT, WAS ACCEPTED, THE US WOULD BE PLEASED TO SIGN AS A GUARANTOR AT GENEVA,

(VI) THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: US AND SOVIET CONCEPTS OF THE ROLE OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE DIFFERED SHARPLY QUOTE IN THEIR CONCEPT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WITH AUTHORITY IS AT THE CENTRE OF THE PROCESS AND IN OURS BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ARE AT THE CENTRE OF THE PROCESS. AND MANY THINGS FOLLOW FROM THESE DIFFERENT ORIENTATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE AGREED THAT OUR EXPERTS WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH EACH OTHER UNQUOTE:

(VII) SOUTHERN AFRICA: THERE HAD BEEN USEFUL DISCUSSIONS: BUT THESE WERE NOT DETERMINATIVE IN ANY WAY,

(VIII) CENTRAL AMERICA: THE US SIDE HAD EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION CEASING THEIR MILITARY SUPPLIES TO NICARAGUA. THE RUSSIANS HAD APPEARED TO OFFER AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT TO DO SO IF THE US STOPPED SUPPLYING THE CONTRAS. SINCE US AID TO THE CONTRAS HAD NOW BEEN CUT OFF, IT WAS TIME THE RUSSIANS STOPPED SUPPLYING NICARAGUA. UNFORTUNATELY, THEIR CONCEPT HAD NOW BEEN ENLARGED TO COVER A BROAD SPREAD OF US MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE HEMISPHERE,

(IX) ON IRAN-IRAQ, THE US INTENDED TO MOVE TO A SECOND RESOLUTION AFTER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CONSULTATIONS IN EARLY APRIL QUOTE WE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY SEE FIT TO JOIN US UNQUOTE:

(X) HUMAN RIGHTS: SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WERE LOOKING AT CHANGES IN THE TREATMENT OF RELIGOUS

GROUPS AND IN VISA POLICY AND TRADE UNION RIGHTS. THE US HAD RAISED INDIVIDUAL CASES: WELCOMED PROGRESS ON GERMAN AND ARMENIAN EMIGRATION: BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT JEWISH EMIGRATION SEEMED TO HAVE REACHED A PLATEAU. SHEVARDNADZE RAISED A NUMBER OF ISSUES ABOUT THE US HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. DISCUSSIONS WOULD CONTINUE ON 24 MARCH AT A ROUND-TABLE SESSION:
(XI) BILATERAL AFFAIRS: COMMERCE SECRETARY VERITY WOULD VISIT MOSCOW IN APRIL. THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED TO ESTABLISH CULTURAL CENTRES IN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

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PRIME MINISTER

Copy ~~Also~~ filed on PM Tours: Poland: Feb 88

**US/SOVIET SUMMIT**

The dates of the US/Soviet Summit have now been set from Sunday, 29 May - Thursday, 2 June (the week of the Whitsun Recess).

This means it is likely, though not get confirmed, that President Reagan will come here on Friday, 3 June. You were planning to be at Chequers.

We shall also need to consider the implications for your visit to Poland, at present planned for 30/31 May. It will probably be best to postpone it.

CDP

**CDP**

23 March, 1988.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

20 March 1988

Dear Brian,

B/F 11

The Prime Minister was struck by the comment in paragraph 6 of UKDEL NATO Telegram No. 131 that the Soviet Union had been using laser devices to blind American pilots. Is there in fact any evidence for that assertion?

I am copying this letter to Mr. Hall (Assessments Staff, Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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Have the USSR
been using later devices.
to third parties?

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
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OF 181812Z MARCH 88
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INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST
INFO ROUTINE EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, SOFIA, WARSAW, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA
INFO ROUTINE BERNE

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CARLUCCI/YAZOV MEETING: BRIEFING OF NAC BY LEHMAN

SUMMARY

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEHMAN BRIEFS NAC ON CARLUCCI/YAZOV MEETING IN BERNE 15-17 MARCH. YAZOV OSTENTATIOUSLY FRIENDLY: PROFESSES IGNORANCE ON DETAIL: PROMISES MORE OPENNESS IN FUTURE. FURTHER BILATERAL CONTACTS ENVISAGED.

DETAIL

2. INTRODUCING LEHMAN, THE SECRETARY GENERAL NOTED THAT THE CARLUCCI/YAZOV MEETING WAS THE FIRST EVER SUCH ENCOUNTER AS A SEPARATE BILATERAL EVENT.

3. LEHMAN RECALLED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S 1985 STRASBOURG SPEECH CALLING FOR REGULAR DEFENCE CONTACTS, AND THE INVITATION FROM THE THEN SECRETARY OF DEFENCE WEINBERGER TO THE THEN SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER SOKOLOV IN SPRING ON 1986. SECRETARY CARLUCCI AND ADMIRAL CROWE. CROWE HAD MET SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF AKHROMEYEV DURING THE DECEMBER 1987 WASHINGTON SUMMIT. THE CARLUCCI/YAZOV MEETING BEGAN WITH DINNER ON 15 MARCH HOSTED BY THE SWISS MOD, AND CONTINUED WITH A SERIES OF MEETINGS ON 16 MARCH, ENDING WITH BREAKFAST ON 17 MARCH. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS BUSINESSLIKE, AND THE SOVIET SIDE WAS AT PAINS TO BE CONSISTENTLY FRIENDLY.

4. THE U S SIDE ADDRESSED THE FOUR TRADITIONAL SUBJECTS OF THE BILATERAL DIALOGUE, I.E. HUMAN RIGHTS, BILATERAL RELATIONS, ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL ISSUES, WITH EMPHASIS ON ITEMS OF DEFENCE INTEREST. YAZOV SAID HIS MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO DISPEL THE IMAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION AS AN ENEMY. HE AND GENERAL CHERVOV WERE THE MAIN SPEAKERS: ACCOMPANYING MOD OFFICERS HARDLY CONTRIBUTED.

5. THE DEFENCE-RELATED AGENDA ITEMS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN ADVANCE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, COVERING DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITY: MILITARY POLICY AND DOCTRINE: ARMS CONTROL: AND MILITARY/MILITARY CONTACTS. THE U S AIM, WHICH YAZOV ENDORSED, WAS TO DEEPEN UNDERSTANDING, BUT NOT TO SUBSTITUTE FOR EXISTING NEGOTIATING MECHANISMS.

6. ON DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITY, THE U S SIDE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER SOVIET ACTIONS WHICH ENDANGERED AMERICAN LIVES, SUCH AS HARRASSMENT OF THE MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS IN THE GDR: SHIP RAMMING IN THE BLACK SEA: THE USE OF LASER DEVICES TO BLIND PILOTS: AND DANGEROUS FLYING. IN REPLY, YAZOV COMPLAINED ABOUT U S ACTIVITIES BUT ADDED THAT DEFENCE MINISTRIES SHOULD ENFORCE EXISTING PROCEDURES: IN PARTICULAR NEITHER SIDE SHOULD OPEN FIRE. (LEHMAN COMMENTED THAT THE AMERICANS REQUESTED AND RECEIVED SOVEIT AGREEMENT TO PUBLICISE THIS POINT). YAZOV SUGGESTED REVISING EXISITING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE AMERICANS SAID THEY HAD NO INTEREST IN DOING THIS: BUT CROWE AND AKHROMEYEV COULD EXAMINE THE WHOLE PROBLEM AT A FUTURE MEETING. GENERAL OTIS (CINCUSAREUR) MIGHT ALSO MEET HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART AS HE HAD DONE AFTER THE SHOOTING OF LT COL NICHOLSON IN THE GDR IN 1985.

7. ON MILITARY POLICY/DOCTRINE, THE AMERICANS SOUGHT BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT MIGHT HAVE CHANGED IN SOVIET PRACTICE ON THE RELEASE OF DEFENCE BUDGET INFORMATION AND ON OPERATIONAL MATTERS. THE RUSSIANS REFUSED TO DISCUSS DOCTRINE IN DETAIL, SAYING ONLY THAT REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY QUOTE RELATED TO THE THREAT AND ON ARMS CONTROL SOLUTION UNQUOTE. THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT AS CLEAR ON THIS AND SIMILAR ISSUES AS THE U S SIDE HAD HOPED. THEY COULD NOT EXPLAIN HOW CURRENT, ALLEGEDLY DEFENSIVE, DOCTRINE VARIED FROM EARLIER VERSIONS, BUT CLAIMED THAT WITH TIME CHANGES WOULD BE NOTICEABLE, BOTH IN EQUIPMENT AND IN TRAINING/FIELD MANUALS WHICH WERE BEING REWRITTEN. ON MILITARY BUDGETS, YAZOV ADMITTED THAT THE OFFICIAL BUDGET DID NOT INCLUDE PROCUREMENT AND R AND D COSTS: BUT HE COULD NOT GIVE A CONSOLIDATED DEFENCE EXPENDITURE FIGURE. HE IMPLIED THAT THE U S ESTIMATE OF A GLOBAL FIGURE OF 16 PERCENT OF GNP WAS QUOTE A REASONABLE GUESS UNQUOTE.

8. LEHMAN SAID THAT YAZOV MISSED NO OPPORTUNITY TO REPEAT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT THE ENEMY, THAT THEIR DOCTRINE WAS DEFENSIVE, AND THAT MORE DETAILED INFORMATION WOULD EMERGE WITH TIME. HE PROSPOSED AN EXCHANGE OF DATA ON NATO/WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IN EUROPE. CARLUCCI REPLIED THAT

THE PROPER FORUM FOR THIS WOULD BE THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS IN VIENNA: THE U S WAS HOWEVER PREPARED TO DISCUSS U S AND SOVIET FORCES GLOBALLY.

9. TURNING TO ARMS CONTROL, LEHMAN SAID THAT CARLUCCI STRESSED THE NEED FOR A GOOD START AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED BEFORE THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, OR IF THIS WERE NOT POSSIBLE, IN 1988. BUT THE U S WAS NOT ENVISAGING ANY DEADLINES. ON SDI, CARLUCCI STRESSED THE ADVANTAGES OF PREDICTABILITY AND A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME. HE ALSO EMPHASISED THAT KRASNOYARSK WAS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE AND AN UNDOUBTED VIOLATION OF THE ABMT. THE RUSSIANS COUNTERED THAT IF THE U S DISMANTLED ITS INSTALLATION IN THULE, THEY WOULD DISMANTLE KRASNOYARSK: ALTERNATIVELY, BOTH INSTALLATIONS COULD REMAIN. THE U S REJECTED THIS LINKAGE. (LEHMAN COMMENTED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE DEFENSIVE ON THIS POINT, YAZOV DENYING PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EXISTENCE OF KRASNOYARSK, AND CHERVOV REMAINING SILENT).

10. LEHMAN SAID THAT BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT INCREASED MILITARY/MILITARY TALKS WERE DESIRABLE: BUT CARLUCCI SAID THAT SCOPE AND PACE OF SUCH CONTACTS HAD TO REMAIN DEPENDENT ON FACTORS SUCH AS THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, AND DANGEROUS SOVIET ACTIVITY. A MEASURED APPROACH WOULD BE ADOPTED. INCREASED ACCESS FOR ATTACHES, AND EXCHANGES AT DEFENCE COLLEGES MIGHT BE POSSIBLE: BUT IT WAS PREMATURE TO ENVISAGE SHIP VISITS OR EXCLUSIVELY SOCIAL CONTACT. CROW AND AKHROMEYEV WOULD CONSIDER THIS ASPECT ALSO AT THEIR MEETING LATER THIS YEAR.

11. ON REGIONAL ISSUES, LEHMAN SAID THAT YAZOV DID NOT ELABORATE ON THE CONDITIONS FOR OR THE TIMING OF WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN. ON NICARAGUA, CARLUCCI STRESSED THAT SOVIET EQUIPMENT WAS BEING USED TO INVADE A DEMOCRATIC STATE. THIS WAS DANGEROUS FOR THE REGIONAL PEACE PROCESS. YAZOV CLAIMED NOT TO BE WELL INFORMED.

12. IN CONCLUSION, LEHMAN SAID THAT YAZOV INVITED CARLUCCI TO VISIT MOSCOW.

13. LORD CARRINGTON ASKED ABOUT YAZOV'S PERSONALITY. LEHMAN SAID HE WAS VERY BRIGHT AND CONFIDENT: HE SHOWED NO ARROGANCE, AND APPEARED TO HAVE A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH JUNIOR COLLEAGUES.

14. SMITH (CANADA) ASKED WHETHER THE TWO SIDES HAD COMPARED THEIR ALERT SYSTEMS: AND WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. BOTH MIGHT BE SUITABLE SUBJECTS FOR A FUTURE MEETING. LEHMAN REPLIED THAT THE ONLY MENTION OF ALERT SYSTEMS WAS A

REFERENCE BY CARLUCCI TO A CRISIS STABILITY PROPOSAL IN THE START CONTEXT. THE AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTRES WAS BEING IMPLEMENTED. THE U S SIDE SUGGESTED NOTIFICATION OF ICBM/SLBM TESTS GOING BEYOND THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF NOTAMS. IN RESPONSE TO A SOVIET QUERY, THE U S REPLIED THAT EVEN TEST FIRINGS WHICH LANDED ON NATIONAL TERRIRORY COULD GIVE RISE TO CONCERN. ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, CARLUCCI HAD SAID THAT THE RAMMING OF SHIPS WAS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE SIGNAL. YAZOV DENIED DETAILED KNOWLEDGE.

15. BERG (NORWAY) ASKED WHETHER FORCE LEVELS AND ASYMMETRIES HAD BEEN RAISED IN THE CONTEXT OF CST. LEHMAN SAID THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH DISCUSSION OF CST. THE EXCHANGES ON DOCTRINE TOUCHED ASYMMETRIES, AND THE RUSSIANS SAID THEY WERE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON THIS, AND BY IMPLICATION ON OTHER ISSUE SUCH AS DATA AND MILITARY BUDGETS.

16. ROBIN (FRANCE) ASKED WHETHER ANY CONCLUSION WAS REACHED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS OF AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MILITARY DOCTRINE ON THE FRINGES OF THE CST: AND WHETHER THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO BE IN A HURRY OVER START. LEHMAN SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS SAID LITTLE WHICH COULD DIRECTLY BE RELATED TO OTHER MEETINGS. IT WAS CLEAR THAT FOR THEM, THE FACT OF THE MEETING WITH CARLUCCI WAS THE IMPORTANT FACTOR. THEY TRIED TO SIDE-STEP CONTROVERSY. ON START, THEY REPEATED THE OFFICIAL LINE OF WANTING A TREATY IN TIME FOR THE SUMMIT. BUT THEY ACCEPTED THAT THIS COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED. THEIR OVERALL ATTITUDE WAS RESPONSIBLE.

17. HANSEN (FRG) ASKED WHETHER THE QUESTION OF DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, OR BETWEEN KULIKOV AND SACEUR, WAS RAISED: AND WHETHER THE RUSSIANS GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF REALLY BELIEVING IN THE EXISTENCE OF A NATO THREAT. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT MILITARY/MILITARY MEETINGS RAISED QUESTIONS WHICH OUGHT TO BE CLARIFIED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WITH A VIEW TO A QUOTE MORE CONFORMIST UNQUOTE ALLIED POSITION. LEHMAN REPLIED THAT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT FEEL DIRECTLY THREATENED BY WESTERN EUROPE OR THE U S, ALTHOUGH THEY DID HAVE OTHER FEARS. BUT YAZOV ADDED THAT WHILE WESTERN FORCES EXISTED, THEY COULD NOT BUT BE A CAUSE OF CONCERN.

18. FOR THE UK, I SAID THAT HOWEVER GOOD THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE MEETING, CAUTION WAS NEEDED. ON MILITARY DOCTRINE, I RECALLED THAT THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT IN THE ALLIANCE TO WAIT FOR THE EAST TO RAISE THE SUBJECT. THE UK VIEW WAS THAT IF IT WERE TO BE DISCUSSED, WE SHOULD TIE THE EXCHANGES TO FORCE STRUCTURES AND DISPOSITIONS. ON MILITARY CONTACTS, I REFERRED TO THE POST-AFGHANISTAN GUIDELINES,

AND NOTED THAT THE U S HAD ARRANGED VARIOUS CONTACTS. DID THIS RELFECT A CHANGE IN U S POLICY? IF SO, THE ALLIANCE SHOULD DISCUSS THE SITUATION. I ALSO ASKED ABOUT YAZOV'S COMPLAINTS RELATING TO U S MILITARY ACTIVITY: AND HOW LONG IT WAS LIKELY TO TAKE THE RUSSIANS TO PRODUCE CREDIBLE DEFENCE BUDGET FIGURES, AND INDEED WHETEHR THEY WERE CAPABLE OF SUCH AN EXERCISE. LEHMAN REPLIED THAT THE MEETING WAS INTENDED AS A SERIOUS DISCUSSION. THE U S SIDE TRIED TO LINK THE EXCHANGES ON DOCTRINE TO FORCE STRUCTURES AND DISPOSITIONS. THE DATA DISCUSSED DID NOT GO BEYOND IISS FIGURES. ON MILITARY CONTACTS, CARLUCCI EMPHASISED THIER RELATIONSHIP TO THE WIDER CONTEXT, ESPECIALLY AFGHANISTAN, BUT ALSO TO EVENTS SUCH AS THE NICHOLSON SHOOTING. A STEP BY STEP APPRAOCH WAS NECESSARY: OTHER THAN THE MEETINGS OF CROWE AND POSSIBLY OTIS, NO FURTHER IMMEDIATE STEPS WERE ENVISAGED. ON THE NICHOLSON SHOOTING, YAZOV SAID THAT THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE BEFORE THIS TIME: BUT HE EXPRESSED REGRET, AND PROMISED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WHEN GENERAL CHERVOV ACCOMPANIED SHEVARDNADZE TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. LEHMAN SAID THAT YAZOV MADE NO SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS ABOUT U S ACTIVITY: BUT IN RESPONDING TO U S COMPLAINTS HE CLAIMED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BROKEN THE RULES. CARLUCCI STRESSED AGAIN THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO POLICY OF SHOOTING TO KILL AND NO RAMMING OF SHIPS. ON THE PREPARATION OF BUDGET FIGURES, THE RUSSIANS SPOKE OF A TIME SCALE OF A FEW YEARS.

19. COMMENTING, LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE CONSISTENT ON MILITARY CONTACTS. IF THERE WERE FUTURE U S/SOVIET CONTACTS, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE REST OF THE ALLIANCE TO HOLD TO THE UNDERTAKING TO AVOID THESE.

20. THUYSBAERT (BELGIUM) REFERRED TO TRADITIONAL SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO GIVE INFORMATION ON CONVENTINAL FORCES. IT WAS CURIOUS THAT THE RUSSIANS NOW SEEMED WILLING TO GIVE THIS, BUT IN A BILATERAL FRAMEWORK OUTSIDE USUAL CHANNELS. LEHMAN SAID THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN READY IN PRINCIPLE TO BE OPEN, BUT UNABLE IN PRACTICE TO DO SO SINCE THEY HAD NO RELIABLE FIGURES. HE REITEREATED THAT THEY HAD NOT GONE BEYOND IISS DATA.

21. ROBIN (FRANCE), REFERRING TO MY INTERVENTION, SAID THAT HE DID NOT SHARE THE BRITISH UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE HANDLING OF MILITARY DOCTRINE IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EAST.

ALEXANDER

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**ADVANCE COPY**

SOVIET UNION/FRG: ANNOUNCEMENT OF VISITS BY KOHL AND GORBACHEV

1. PRAVDA OF 14 MARCH ANNOUNCED THAT, FOLLOWING AGREEMENT BETWEEN GORBACHEV AND KOHL, THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR WILL PAY AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION IN THE AUTUMN OF 1988 AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU WILL PAY AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE FRG IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1989. EXACT DATES FOR THE VISITS WILL BE FIXED IN DUE COURSE.

COMMENT

2. THE DEGREE OF ADVANCE PUBLIC NOTICE FOR THESE VISITS IS MOST UNUSUAL, IF NOT UNPRECEDENTED. (IF FAR EXCEEDS THE NOTICE GIVEN OFFICIALLY IN THE SOVIET PRESS OF THE REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMITS.) THE ANNOUNCEMENT ENDS SPECULATION, AND IS A FURTHER RESTATEMENT TO THE IMPORTANCE CURRENTLY ATTACHED BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO RELATIONS WITH THE FRG. PRESUMABLY THE EARLY REFERENCE TO GORBACHEV'S RETURN TRIP IS INTENDED TO CATER FOR GERMAN SENSITIVITIES, GIVEN THAT KOHL HAS NOW AGREED TO COME HERE FIRST.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

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


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PART ONE OF TWO

MY TELNO 363: SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, 21-23 FEBRUARY.

SUMMARY

1. BRIEFING ON SHULTZ'S VISIT BY US AMBASSADOR, WHOSE CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE CLOSELY PROTECTED. AGREEMENT TO BRING FORWARD SERIOUS NEGOTIATION IN VERIFICATION, AND DATA EXCHANGE, IN START: BUT LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS IN ALCMS, MOBILE ICBMS OR SLCMS. CONTINUING DIFFERENCES ON ABMT LINKAGE. REASONABLY CONSTRUCTIVE EXCHANGES ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND CW. SOVIET PROPOSALS ON STRUCTURE OF CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATION. LENGTHY BUT STANDARD EXCHANGES ON AFGHANISTAN. CONTINUATION SOVIET EQUIVOCATION ON A FOLLOW-UP RESOLUTION TO SCR 598. SOME INTEREST IN DISCUSSION OF ANGOLA/NAMIBIA. RELATIVELY GOOD-TEMPERED EXCHANGES ON HUMAN RIGHTS. OVERALL, SOME USEFUL PROGRESS IN A NOTABLY GOOD ATMOSPHERE: BUT NO SURPRISES OR BREAKTHROUGHS.

DETAIL

2. MY US COLLEAGUE, WHOSE CONFIDENCE SHOULD PLEASE BE CLOSELY PROTECTED, HAS GIVEN MY FRENCH AND FRG COLLEAGUES AND ME THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF SHULTZ'S VISIT, THE FIRST IN THE SERIES OF PRE-SUMMIT CONSULTATIONS AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. ALTHOUGH MATLOCK'S BRIEFING MAY LARGELY OVERLAP WITH SHULTZ'S OWN BRIEFING OF THE ALLIANCE IN BRUSSELS TODAY, I REPORT IT IN FULL IN CASE IT ADDS ANYTHING NEW.

3. DURING THE COURSE OF A 48 HOUR VISIT, SHULTZ SPENT NINE HOURS WITH SHEVARDNADZE, THREE AND A HALF HOURS WITH GORBACHEV AND ONE WITH RYZHKOV. THE DISCUSSIONS COVERED THE USUAL FOUR-POINT AGENDA OF ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS

AND BILATERAL MATTERS. SHULTZ'S VERDICT ON DEPARTURE WAS THAT USEFUL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN SEVERAL AREAS ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO SURPRISES OR BREAKTHROUGHS.

ARMS CONTROL

START

4. SHULTZ'S MAIN OBJECTIVE ON THIS VISIT WAS TO PERSUADE THE RUSSIANS TO INSTRUCT THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN GENEVA TO ENGAGE IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS OF A STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY STRAIGHT AWAY, RATHER THAN LEAVING THIS MOST COMPLEX DIMENSION OF THE AGREEMENT UNTIL THE END OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS AS THEY ARE AT PRESENT INCLINED TO DO. SHULTZ ARGUED STRONGLY THAT IF THE DRAFT PROTOCOL ON VERIFICATION WERE TO BE LEFT UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT, IT WOULD GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF HAVING BEEN COBBLED TOGETHER IN A HURRY AND THAT THIS WOULD NOT HELP THE RATIFICATION PROCESS. SHULTZ THEREFORE PROPOSED THAT THIS PROTOCOL, ALONG WITH THE OTHERS, SHOULD BE READY IN DRAFT IN TIME TO BE CONSIDERED BY HIM AND SHEVARDNADZE AT THEIR MEETING IN WASHINGTON NEXT MONTH. SHEVARDNADZE EVENTUALLY AGREED TO THIS TARGET: IT IS TACITLY RECOGNISED ON THE US SIDE THAT THE DEADLINE MAY BE OVER-AMBITIOUS, BUT AT LEAST THE RUSSIANS ARE NOW COMMITTED TO IMPARTING GREATER MOMENTUM TO THIS CRUCIAL AREA OF THE NEGOTIATION. SHULTZ REGARDS THIS AS THE MAIN ACHIEVEMENT OF HIS VISIT.

5. IN THE SAME CONTEXT SHULTZ WON SOVIET AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO THE EXCHANGE OF DATA AT A MUCH EARLIER STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATION THAN WAS THE CASE WITH THE INF TREATY: IN THE LATTER CASE, PROBLEMS WERE CREATED FOR THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS BY THE FACT THAT KEY ITEMS OF SOVIET DATA WERE HANDED OVER ONLY VERY LATE IN THE DAY.

6. PROBLEMS REMAIN OVER ALCMS. NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE QUESTION OF THE NUMBER OF ALCMS WHICH, FOR COUNTING PURPOSES, SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO EACH LONG-RANGE BOMBER OF EACH TYPE: NOR OVER THE DEFINITION OF ''STRATEGIC'' IN TERMS OF RANGE - THE AMERICAN PREFERENCE IS FOR 1500 KM, THE SOVIET FOR A MUCH LESSER DISTANCE. THE WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS ON THESE POINTS NEVERTHELESS USEFULLY CLEARED AWAY SOME OF THE BRUSHWOOD WHICH COULD SAVE TIME AT GENEVA.

7. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER MOBILE ICBMS SHOULD BE ELIMINATED

(AS THE AMERICANS WISH) OR SIMPLY LIMITED (THE SOVIET PREFERENCE SINCE THEY ARE ALREADY DEPLOYING) ALSO REMAINS UNRESOLVED. THE AMERICANS NEVERTHELESS SIGNALLED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MIGHT PRODUCE NEW IDEAS ON THE VERIFICATION OF A MOBILE ICBM CEILING WHICH, IF VIABLE, MIGHT ENABLE THEM TO DROP THEIR PRESENT INSISTENCE ON A TOTAL BAN. THE AMERICANS DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL BUT LEFT THE RUSSIANS WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS PROBLEM MIGHT IN THE END BE SOLUBLE.

8. NO PROGRESS WAS REGISTERED ON SLCMS. THE SOVIET SIDE ACCEPTS THAT SLCMS WILL NOT BE COUNTED INTO A STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS TREATY BUT INSIST THAT THEY MUST NEVERTHELESS BE CONSTRAINED. THE AMERICANS HAVE NO OBJECTIONS OF PRINCIPLE TO THIS BUT CAN STILL SEE NO WAY IN WHICH SLCM NUMBERS COULD BE VERIFIED: THE RUSSIANS FAILED TO ENLARGE UPON OR SUBSTANTIATE THEIR CLAIMS TO HAVE RESOLVED THIS TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEM.

9. ON THE ABM TREATY, SHULTZ AGAIN EMPHASISED US INSISTENCE THAT PROVISIONS FOR NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABMT SHOULD BE ENSHRINED IN A SEPARATE TREATY RATHER THAN IN A PROTOCOL TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THE PERIOD OF COMMITMENT TO NON-WITHDRAWAL IS PROBABLY, IN MATLOCK'S VIEW, NEGOTIABLE AS BETWEEN THE SOVIET BID FOR TEN YEARS AND US OFFER OF SEVEN. THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM IS STILL THAT OF WHAT LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF ABM SYSTEMS SHOULD BE PERMITTED DURING WHATEVER PERIOD IS AGREED. ON THIS THE TWO SIDES STILL HAVE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT WAS AGREED AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: BUT THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THEY DETECTED SOME HINT OF MOVEMENT ON THE SOVIET SIDE DURING SHULTZ'S VISIT. THEY DO NOT REGARD THE DIFFERENCE AS UNBRIDGEABLE.

NUCLEAR TESTING

10. THE AMERICAN ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY NOW BE DISPOSED TO ACCEPT PROTOCOLS TO THE 1974 AND 1976 TREATIES ON VERIFICATION WHICH WOULD ENABLE THESE TREATIES TO BE RATIFIED. THE AMERICANS WILL INSIST ON SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE USE OF CORTEX TECHNOLOGY FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF YIELD ON THE SOVIET TESTING SITE AND EXPECT EVENTUALLY TO WIN THIS POINT.

CW

11. GORBACHEV ACCUSED THE US OF FOLLOWING THE BRITISH EXAMPLE IN LOSING ENTHUSIASM FOR A CW BAN. SHEVARDNADZE TOOK A STRONG

LINE ON US BINARY WEAPONS PRODUCTION BUT SHULTZ COUNTERATTACKED WITH EQUAL FORCE, MAINTAINING THAT IF AND WHEN THE TOTAL CW BAN WHICH BOTH THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION DESIRED WERE TO BE ACHIEVED, AMERICAN BINARIES WOULD AT ONCE BE DESTROYED. SHULTZ WAS CRITICAL OF SOVIET DATA PROVISION, URGING THAT THIS SHOULD INCLUDE MORE DETAIL AS TO THE TYPES AND LOCATIONS OF EXISTING SOVIET CW. SOVIET EXPERTS PROPOSED, DURING THE VISIT, THAT THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA SHOULD INVITE EACH PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENT TO DESIGNATE A COMMERCIAL CHEMICAL PLANT TO ACT AS A TEST BED FOR VERIFICATION PROCEDURES: THE AMERICANS UNDERTOOK TO CONSIDER THIS IDEA. (BILATERAL US/SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON CW ARE TO TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA BETWEEN 15 MARCH AND 5 APRIL).

CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS

12. SHEVARDNADZE REHEARSED AT LENGTH THE SOVIET POSITION ON DUAL-CAPABLES BUT, IN THE FACE OF SHULTZ'S ADAMANT DISMISSAL, DID NOT PRESS HIS CASE FOR A SEPARATE NEGOTIATION ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE RUSSIANS PROPOSED THAT, ONCE THE MANDATE HAD BEEN AGREED AND ADOPTED, THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS SHOULD EMBRACE THE FOUR ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT, NAMELY: DATA EXCHANGE, THE SCALE OF OVERALL REDUCTIONS, THE QUESTION OF SPECIAL CORRIDORS AND ZONES OF REDUCED FORCE CONCENTRATION AND, FINALLY, VERIFICATION AND CBMS. THE AMERICANS UNDERTOOK TO CONSIDER.

REGIONAL ISSUES

AFGHANISTAN

13. THE EXCHANGES ON AFGHANISTAN CONVINCED SHULTZ THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS TAKEN AN IRREVOCABLE DECISION TO WITHDRAW SOVIET FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN WHILE CONTINUING TO HAGGLE OVER DETAILS AND CONDITIONS. BOTH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV WERE AS SCATHING ABOUT ZIA'S POSITION AS THEY WERE DURING YOUR OWN VISIT. SHULTZ, DEFENDING PAKISTANI CONCERNS, ARGUED THAT POLITICAL CONDITIONS HAD TO BE CREATED WITHIN AFGHANISTAN WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE THE REFUGEES TO RETURN. SHULTZ ALSO PRESSED SHEVARDNADZE ON THE QUESTION OF CONTINUING SOVIET ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE KABUL REGIME ARGUING THAT THEY SHOULD CEASE AT THE SAME TIME AS US ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE RESISTANCE. VORONTSOV SAID THAT IN THAT CASE THE AMERICANS SHOULD ALSO UNDERTAKE TO CEASE ARMS SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN. OVERALL THE EXCHANGES ON AFGHANISTAN, ?

THOUGH LENGTHY, PRODUCED NO NOVELTIES.

END OF PART ONE OF TWO

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10 DOWNING STREET

NIGEL

Sir Percy Cradock telephoned with details of an incident which occured this morning at 0800 GMT involving American and Soviet Ships.

At 0800 there was an incident off the southern tip of Crimea involving an American Cruiser and an American Destroyer. Both ships have been rammed by a Soviet frigate (1 frigate to each ship).

Investigations are still continuing as to the circumstances surrounding the

incident. It is possible that the Americans were carrying out a Rights of Navigation excercise (these are carried out periodically to establish the American's rights to cruise close to soviet waters) and have accidentely strayed into Soviet Waters.

Sir P. Cradock will keep us informed of any new details.

Telephoned by PS

Amanda
12.2.88

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MR. POWELL

Sir Percy Cradock telephoned with details of an incident which occurred this morning at 0800 hours GMT. Details as follows. At 0800 hours GMT, there was an incident off the southern tip of Crimea involving an American cruiser and an American destroyer. Both ships were rammed by a Soviet frigate, that is one frigate to each ship. Investigations are still continuing as to the circumstances surrounding the incident. It is possible that the Americans were carrying out a right of navigation exercise, (these are carried out periodically to establish the American right to cruise close to Soviet waters), and may have accidentally strayed into Soviet waters. Sir Percy Cradock will keep us informed of any further details.

Sally

pp P. A. BEARPARK

12 February 1988

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MY TELNO 46: SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO BONN: SECOND DAY

SUMMARY

1. NO DATE FIXED FOR KOHL/GORBACHEV MEETING, AND NO PROGRESS ON BERLIN. THREE AGREEMENTS SIGNED. THE MEDIA DISCOUNT ''NEW CHAPTER'' RHETORIC.

DETAIL

2. THE MAIN FEATURE OF SHEVARDNADZE'S FINAL DAY IN BONN WAS TWO AND A HALF HOURS OF TALKS WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL DURING WHICH HE HANDED OVER A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM GORBACHEV ON ''BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS''. AS REGARDS KOHL'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV, IT WAS AGREED ONLY THAT SUCH A MEETING WAS NEEDED THAT A DECISION ON IT WOULD BE TAKEN DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1988. KOHL OFFERED GREATER COOPERATION IN MANAGERIAL TRAINING, MEDICAL RESEARCH AND REACTOR SAFETY. SHEVARDNADZE ALSO MET VOGEL (SPD), TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GREENS AND MINISTER-PRESIDENT SPAETH OF BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG WHO IS VISITING MOSCOW NEXT MONTH.

3. AT HIS FINAL PRESS CONFERENCE SHEVARDNADZE DESCRIBED HIS TALKS AS INTENSIVE, SUBSTANTIAL, EXTREMELY USEFUL AND SUCCESSFUL.

ARMS CONTROL

4. SHEVARDNADZE TOLD THE PRESS THAT SOVIET AND GERMAN VIEWS ON ARMS CONTROL WERE NOT ALWAYS THE SAME, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE FRG ON THE WHOLE SUPPORTED A DYNAMIC APPROACH, AND BOTH COUNTRIES WANTED TO AVOID ANY REDUCTION IN MOMENTUM. HE WAS AGAINST THE IDEA OF A PAUSE IN THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PROCESS. HE AMPLIFIED HIS COMMENTS REPORTED IN MY TELNO 47 BY STATING THAT MOSCOW WAS READY FOR ASYMMETRIC REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IF VERIFICATION MEASURES AND STARTING FIGURES COULD BE AGREED. HE ALSO SAID THAT BRITISH, FRENCH AND US FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS COULD ONLY REMAIN OUTSIDE THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD, AND

UNTIL A CERTAIN POINT IN THAT PROCESS. ON CW, THEY AGREED ON THE NEED FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON A TOTAL BAN (FURTHER DETAIL BY TELELETTER).

BERLIN

5. THE SOVIET SIDE MADE NO REPEAT NO CONCESSIONS OVER THE FULL INCLUSION OF BERLIN IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGREEMENT, CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND VISITS BY PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATIONS. NOR WOULD THEY DISCUSS THE EXPANSION OF BERLIN AIR TRANSPORT. SO SHEVARDNADZE'S REMARK TO VON WEIZSAECKER (MY TELNO 49) THAT ANYTHING NOT FORBIDDEN BY THE Q.A. IS ALLOWED HAS YET TO BEAR FRUIT.

INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION

6. IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL TO CONSIDER SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT COCOM AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES FACING GERMAN FIRMS OPERATING IN THE SOVIET UNION. GENSCHER IS SAID TO HAVE LENT HIS SUPPORT TO A ''RELAXEC
&
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&)5)O RULES. IN AN
EXCHANGE OF NOTES, THE 1978 AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION WAS EXTENDED FOR FIVE YEARS.

MISCELLANEOUS

7. THE PROTOCOL ON CONSULTATIONS WAS SIGNED AS FORESEEN (MY TELNO 37): TEXT BY BAG TO WED AND MOSCOW. AN AGREEMENT WAS ALSO SIGNED ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULATES GENERAL IN KIEV AND MUNICH BY 1 JANUARY 1989. THE GERMANS SUGGESTED A BIENNIAL ROUND TABLE TO EXTEND MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING WITH PARTICIPATION BY THIRTY SCIENTISTS, ARTISTS AND JOURNALISTS ON EACH SIDE. THE SOVIET SIDE AGREED TO CONSIDER THIS. IT WAS FURTHER AGREED THAT THE WORKING GROUP ON HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS SET UP AT THE START OF SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT SHOULD MEET ONCE OR TWICE A YEAR, AND IN ANY CASE IN MOSCOW AT THE END OF THIS YEAR TO LOOK INTO COOPERATION IN FIGHTING DRUG ABUSE AND OVER AIDS RESEARCH, AS WELL AS INDIVIDUAL HUMANITARIAN CASES.

COMMENT

8. MEDIA REACTIONS TO THE SECOND DAY OF THE VISIT ARE MUCH LESS EUPHORIC THAN YESTERDAY'S, AND THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT ARE PRIVATELY DOWNBEAT ABOUT THE OUTCOME, HAVING REGISTERED FEW SUCCESSES IN THEIR AREAS OF GREATEST INTEREST. KOHL'S PRESTIGE HAS SUFFERED A KNOCK, IN THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A FIRM AND EARLY DATE AND PLACE FOR HIS MEETING WITH GORBACHEV HAD BEEN BUILT UP AS A TOUCHSTONE OF THE

FRG'S IMPORTANCE IN SOVIET EYES. SHEVARDNADZE PLAYED HIS CARDS WELL, USING MEDIA INTEREST IN HIS VISIT TO ATTEMPT SOME WEDGEDRIVING ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, AND APPEARING TO PLACE THE FRG IN THE ROLE OF DEMANDEUR FOR A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS, DESPITE GERMAN ECONOMIC STRENGTH. AS WITH PRESIDENT VON WEIZSAECKER'S STATE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION LAST YEAR, GERMAN EXPECTATIONS WERE EXCESSIVE AND HAVE NOW BEEN PUNCTURED.

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ISLAMABAD FOR PS/LORD GLENARTHUR
WASHINGTON SUMMIT : REGIONAL ISSUES
SUMMARY
1. SOME FURTHER DETAIL ON THE DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES: CONFIRMING NO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS.
DETAIL
2. WE HAVE NOW DEBRIEFED STATE DEPARTMENT CONTACTS IN MORE DETAIL ON THE DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES AT THE SUMMIT. FOLLOWING POINTS ADD TO THOSE MADE BY SHULTZ (UKDEL NATO TELNO 403) AND KAMPELMAN (OUR TELNO 2753) LAST WEEK.
NICARAGUA
3. THE WEEKEND PRESS HAS BEEN FULL OF REPORTS THAT THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV DISCUSSED THIS BRIEFLY ON THE FINAL DAY. STATE CONTACTS CONFIRM THAT THERE WAS A SHORT EXCHANGE DURING LUNCH ON 10 DECEMBER. PRESIDENT REAGAN APPARENTLY BROUGHT THE SUBJECT UP AND PROPOSED THAT THE JOINT STATEMENT MIGHT CONTAIN A SOVIET COMMITMENT TO STOP SUPPLYING WEAPONS TO THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT. GORBACHEV COUNTERED THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO SUPPORT CONTADORA AND THE GUATEMALA AGREEMENT. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD THEN AGREE TO STOP SUPPLYING ARMS TO NICARAGUA EXCEPT SMALL ARMS AND WEAPONS FOR THE POLICE FORCE. ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR FROM THE RECORD, STATE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT GORBACHEV INTENDED THAT THIS WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A US UNDERTAKING TO STOP SUPPORTING THE CONTRAS. WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF BAKER CONFIRMED THIS INTERPRETATION ON A WEEKEND TV SHOW.
4. STATE INTEND TO FOLLOW UP THIS BRIEF AND RATHER CRYPTIC EXCHANGE WITH THE RUSSIANS AT WORKING LEVEL. BUT THEY BELIEVE THAT THE CHANCES OF A CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET RESPONSE HAS BEEN DIMINISHED BY THE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO GORBACHEV'S REMARKS.
AFGHANISTAN
5. IT HAD BEEN UPHILL WORK TO PERSUADE THE RUSSIANS TO DROP THE LINKAGE BETWEEN A WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE AND AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. IN THE WORKING GROUP, PRIMAKOV HAD ACCEPTED THIS BUT GORBACHEV HELD FIRMLY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LINKAGE IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH

THE PRESIDENT. ON THE LAST DAY, SHULTZ PRESSED GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE AGAIN ON THIS POINT. SHEVARDNADZE THEN ACCEPTED IN GORBACHEV'S PRESENCE THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO LINK THE WITHDRAWAL TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION: AND THAT THE EFFECTIVE LINK WAS BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL AND THE CESSATION OF OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE, AS SET OUT IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

6. STATE ADD THAT THE ONE NEW POINT WHICH GORBACHEV MADE WAS THAT AS SOON AS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT BEGAN, SOVIET FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD CEASE TO ENGAGE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS, EXCEPT FOR SELF DEFENCE. IT WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR HOW THE RUSSIANS WERE PROPOSING TO DEFINE THIS. BUT STATE SAW IT AS A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

7. ON THE NEXT STEPS, THE US ENCOURAGED THE SOVIET TEAM TO TALK BILATERALLY TO THE PAKISTANIS BEFORE THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND. STATE'S OVERALL IMPRESSION WAS THAT GORBACHEV'S PRIMARY CONCERN WAS TO AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE COMMITTED TO WITHDRAWAL BEFORE BEING CERTAIN OF THE SHAPE OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. AS A RESULT, NO REAL PROGRESS WAS MADE.

IRAN/IRAQ

8. GORBACHEV PRESENTED THE SOVIET POSITION IN FAMILIAR TERMS: THE POTENTIAL OF RESOLUTION 598 HAD NOT YET BEEN EXHAUSTED. UNTIL IT WAS, IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO DISCUSS A SECOND RESOLUTION. IN THE WORKING GROUP, HOWEVER PRIMAKOV ACCEPTED THAT IRAN HAD NOT SHOWN GOOD FAITH IN THE FOLLOW UP TO 598: AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PREPARED TO JOIN IN QUOTE PREPARATIONS UNQUOTE FOR A SECOND RESOLUTION. HE HAD REFUSED TO CLARIFY WHAT THIS MEANT. SHEVARDNADZE SAID SOMETHING SIMILAR TO SHULTZ IN THE CAR ON THE WAY TO THE AIRPORT (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1312).

9. STATE TELL US THAT IN THE NEXT ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS IN THE FIVE IN NEW YORK, THE US REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO QUOTE SHEVARDNADZE'S REMARK, IN THE HOPE OF PINNING THE RUSSIANS DOWN TO A PROMPT START TO WORK ON A SECOND RESOLUTION.

ARAB/ISRAEL

10. IN A VERY BRIEF EXCHANGE, GORBACHEV PUSHED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, BUT ALSO ACCEPTED THAT THERE COULD BE BILATERAL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES UNDER ITS AUSPICES. THE PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN A FAMILIAR LINE IN REPLY.

KOREA

11. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO ATTEND THE SEOUL OLYMPICS. BUT THE NORTH KOREANS HAD MADE SOME GOOD PROPOSALS. THIS ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE POLITICIZED. IN THE WORKING GROUP THE RUSSIANS HAD PUT THE CHANCES OF THEIR ATTENDING AT 95 PERCENT. THEY EXPECTED TO DECIDE IN JANUARY. THE US

HAD ALSO RAISED THE KAL AIRCRAFT INCIDENT, REFERRING TO THE INCONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF NORTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT. THE RUSSIANS HAD RESPONDED THAT THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE NORTH KOREANS WAS LIMITED: BUT THEY HAD TAKEN THE MESSAGE.

CAMBODIA

12. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL REMAINED THE KEY. THE RUSSIANS COULD PLAY A ROLE BECAUSE OF THEIR AID TO VIETNAM. GORBACHEV REFERRED TO VIETNAMESE ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD LEAVE IN 1990. POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WERE IMPORTANT: HE REFERRED TO SIHANOUK'S TALKS WITH HUN SEN AND HINTED THAT THE KHMER ROUGE ISSUE MIGHT COMPLICATE VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL. IN THE WORKING GROUP, PRIMAKOV ADDED THAT HANOI HAD A QUOTE NEW UNDERSTANDING UNQUOTE OF THE CAMBODIA PROBLEM. THE RUSSIANS AND THE VIETNAMESE WERE TALKING ABOUT CAMBODIA. STATE ADDED THAT THERE STILL APPEARED TO BE NO SENSE OF URGENCY IN THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE.

BERLIN

13. THE PRESIDENT REFERRED TO THIS BRIEFLY, SAYING THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE WALL TORN DOWN, BUT THAT IN THE MEANTIME THERE WERE SOME MODEST STEPS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO REDUCE TENSION. THE US WERE DISCUSSING THESE WITH THEIR ALLIES. HE HOPED THEY WOULD HAVE SOME PROPOSALS TO MAKE BEFORE TOO LONG. GORBACHEV DID NOT RESPOND.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

14. THERE WAS VERY LITTLE DISCUSSION OF ANGOLA. NO FURTHER LIGHT WAS SHED ON WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WERE NOW PREPARED TO PUT ANY PRESSURE ON THE ANGOLANS OR CUBANS.

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MODUK FOR DACU
OUR TELNO 2742 : WASHINGTON SUMMIT
SUMMARY
1. GENERAL VERDICT AMONG THE COMMENTATORS THAT ON THE SUBSTANCE THE SUMMIT WAS A SOLID IF UNSPECTACULAR SUCCESS AND THAT THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS IS WELCOME. BUT DISAPPOINTMENT AT LACK OF AGREEMENT ON REGIONAL ISSUES OR HUMAN RIGHTS. THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL RATING NOW RISING AGAIN: VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH THE OTHER MAIN BENEFICIARY HERE.
DETAIL
2. THE AMERICAN MEDIA HAVE SPENT THE WEEKEND DIGESTING THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT. IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH, THE TV NETWORKS WERE INCLINED TO SEE THE OUTCOME AS A DISAPPOINTMENT (HAVING CONTRIBUTED LARGELY TO RAISED EXPECTATIONS IN THE FIRST PLACE). BUT THIS HAS NOW GIVEN WAY TO A MORE MEASURED ASSESSMENT. IN GENERAL, COMMENTATORS AND EDITORIAL WRITERS AGREE THAT THE SUMMIT WAS A SUCCESS IN THAT IT MARKED NOT ONLY THE CONCLUSION OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS BUT ALSO STEADY PROGRESS ON START: AND A RETURN TO A MORE NORMAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. AT THE SAME TIME THERE IS WIDESPREAD DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE PAUCITY OF RESULTS ON REGIONAL ISSUES (PARTICULARLY AFGHANISTAN) AND HUMAN RIGHTS. MOST OBSERVERS ARE SATISFIED THAT THE PRESIDENT PUT US VIEWS ON THE RECORD IN EACH CASE. BUT SEVERAL POINT TO THE CONTRAST BETWEEN GORBACHEV'S FAILURE TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON THE SPECIFIC ISSUES AND HIS GENERALISED APPEALS FOR MORE COOPERATIVE RELATIONS. SOME PUNDITS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THIS FOCUS ON ARMS CONTROL LEFT THE SUMMIT CONCLUSIONS UNBALANCED: THAT GORBACHEV EFFECTIVELY SUCCEEDED IN HAVING THE ARMS CONTROL SUMMIT WHICH HE HAD BEEN SEEKING: AND THAT AS A RESULT THE IMPROVEMENT IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS STILL RESTS ON A NARROW BASE.
3. THERE IS ALSO UNEASE IN SOME QUARTERS (CF. KISSINGER IN THIS WEEK'S NEWSWEEK) ABOUT GORBACHEV'S MOTIVES IN PROMOTING

BETTER SOVIET/AMERICAN RELATIONS, AND CONCERN THAT THE PRESSURE OF A 1988 SUMMIT IN MOSCOW MAY LEAD THE US TO CONCEDE TOO MUCH ON START. BY CONTRAST THE INF AGREEMENT CONTINUES TO GET FAVOURABLE TREATMENT FROM ALL BUT THE EXTREME RIGHT. ON THE REACTION IN EUROPE THE WALL STREET JOURNAL AND THE WASHINGTON TIMES HAVE CARRIED ARTICLES CLAIMING THAT THERE IS DISQUIET IN WESTERN EUROPE ABOUT THE AGREEMENT. BUT THE US PRESS HAVE ALSO REPORTED STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE TREATY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN LEADERS: AND THE NEW YORK TIMES OF 14 DECEMBER GAVE A MORE TYPICAL VIEW: QUOTE EUROPE RESTS EASY AFTER THE SUMMIT UNQUOTE.

4. FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN, THE SUMMIT HAS, AS EXPECTED, PLAYED WELL IN MIDDLE AMERICA. WHITE HOUSE POLLS DURING THE SUMMIT SHOWED VERY STRONG SUPPORT FOR HIS HANDLING OF THE VISIT. A SUBSEQUENT WHITE HOUSE POLL SHOWED THAT HIS OVERALL APPROVAL RATING HAS NOW RISEN ABOVE 60 PERCENT FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE IRAN/CONTRA AFFAIR BECAME PUBLIC. THE SUMMIT AND THE INF TREATY HAVE ALSO BROUGHT INTO THE OPEN TENSIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN GROWING FOR SOME TIME BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE FAR RIGHT OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY: A DEVELOPMENT WHICH MOST COMMENTATORS FIND REASSURING.

5. ON THE HILL, THIS SUCCESSFUL EXERCISE IN PRESIDENTIAL STATESMANSHIP HAS PRODUCED (AT LEAST FOR THE SHORT TERM) A NEW BIPARTISAN SPIRIT, WHICH SHOULD ENABLE CONGRESS TO COMPLETE WORK ON THE APPROPRIATIONS BILLS BY CHRISTMAS. AS FOR THE EFFECT ON PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS, THE CONSENSUS OF THE WEEKEND PRESS IS THAT VICE PRESIDENT BUSH HAS BEEN THE MAIN BENEFICIARY, AS A RESULT OF HIS CLOSE INVOLVEMENT IN THE SUMMIT EVENTS. DOLE WAS, BY CONTRAST, MUCH LESS IN THE LIMELIGHT, AND THE DEMOCRATIC CONTENDERS WERE OF COURSE CONFINED TO THE WINGS.

ACLAND

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WASHINGTON SUMMIT: THE OUTCOME SEEN FROM MOSCOW

SUMMARY

1. THE SUMMIT ADEQUATELY MET GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. IN SUBSTANCE, HE CANNOT REASONABLY HAVE EXPECTED MORE THAN HE GOT. SOVIET PUBLIC REACTIONS, IMPORTANT TO HIM AT THIS TIME, HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORILY POSITIVE. BUT IN ORDER TO HEDGE AGAINST INF NON-RATIFICATION AND TO FOSTER AN IMAGE OF FIRM REALISM, HE HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO CAST HIS OWN ASSESSMENT OF THE OUTCOME IN SOBER TERMS.

DETAIL

2. GORBACHEV NEEDED A SUMMIT WHICH COULD BE REPRESENTED AS SUCCESSFUL, BEFORE THE END OF 1987, IN ORDER:

(A) TO CONSOLIDATE AND ENHANCE HIS AUTHORITY AT HOME AT THE OUTSET OF PERESTROIKA'S MOST DIFFICULT AND CRITICAL PHASE AND

(B) TO CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER VISIBLE STABILITY IN THE EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP, THEREBY MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR SOVIET CONSERVATIVES AND THE MILITARY TO ARGUE THAT RADICAL INTERNAL CHANGE AND UPHEAVAL COULD ENDANGER NATIONAL SECURITY.

IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES GORBACHEV HAS BEEN PREPARED, OVER THE PAST YEAR, TO MAKE A SERIES OF CONCESSIONS TO US AND WESTERN POSITIONS ON ARMS CONTROL, CULMINATING IN HIS ACCEPTANCE OF A SUMMIT AT WHICH ONLY THE INF TREATY WOULD BE SIGNED.

3. THE OUTCOME OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT ADEQUATELY MEETS GORBACHEV'S REQUIREMENTS BUT WITHOUT MUCH TO SPARE. UKDEL NATO TELNOS 403 AND 404 (RECEIVED ONLY ON 15 DECEMBER) MAKE IT CLEAR THAT RATHER MORE WAS ACHIEVED IN WASHINGTON THAN GORBACHEV IS ABLE OR WILLING TO DISCLOSE IN PUBLIC. BUT THE AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS IN THE PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS ARE NEVERTHELESS SUFFICIENTLY SUBSTANTIAL TO IMPRESS BOTH EXPERT AND GRASS-ROOTS OPINION IN THE SOVIET UNION: APART FROM THE SIGNATURE OF A TREATY WHICH IN ITSELF CONSTITUTES A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH IN ARMS CONTROL, GORBACHEV SECURED US AGREEMENT TO A LIMIT (IN THE CONTEXT OF START) ON SLCMS, SUBJECT TO SATISFACTORY VERIFICATION, AND US ACCEPTANCE OF MOBILE SYSTEMS. AGAINST THIS, GORBACHEV FAILED TO ACHIEVE THE DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY WHICH HE WOULD HAVE LIKED ON ABMT ADHERENCE: AS HE MADE CLEAR IN HIS TV ADDRESS (MY TELNO 1773) THE SDI PROGLEM REMAINS, IN THE SOVIET VIEW, UNRESOLVED. HE CANNOT HAVE EXPECTED ANY MORE THAN HE GOT ON NUCLEAR TESTING (PRE-COOKED IN GENEVA), ON CW (GIVEN CURRENT WESTERN HESITATIONS) OR ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS (NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO BILATERAL TREATMENT).

4. MORE GENERALLY, THE MERE FACT OF THE SIGNATURE OF A HISTORIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT AND THE DAILY SPECTACLE OF THE SOVIET AND US LEADERS IN BUSINESSLIKE AND AMIABLE DISCUSSION HAS, I THINK, BEEN RECEIVED BY THE SOVIET PUBLIC AT LARGE WITH RELIEF AND EVEN ENTHUSIASM. ORDINARY SOVIET PEOPLE WILL HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED TO SEE THEIR LEADER GIVING SUCH AN OBVIOUSLY GOOD ACCOUNT OF HIMSELF ON SUPPOSEDLY HOSTILE TERRITORY. THE SUMMIT HAS PROBABLY RESTORED GORBACHEV'S AUTHORITY TO ITS PRE-ELTSIN LEVEL: GIVEN THE DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES WHICH LIE AHEAD, THIS IS IMPORTANT TO HIM.

5. GORBACHEV HAD NEVERTHELESS THOUGHT IT PRUDENT TO ESCHEW SELF-CONGRATULATION AND TO DAMP DOWN ANY TENDENCIES TO EUPHORIA. HIS TV ADDRESS (LIKE HIS DEMEANOUR AT THE AIRPORT ON HIS RETURN) WAS SOBER AND RESTRAINED. THE POSSIBILITY THAT HIS OBJECTIVES MAY YET BE FRUSTRATED BY A BLOCKING THIRD ON RATIFICATION IN THE US SENATE CLEARLY WORRIES HIM AND HE IS MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE TAKES NOTHING FOR GRANTED. HE IS ALSO CONCERNED TO SHOW THAT AFTER THREE DAYS IN WASHINGTON HE IS STILL CLEAR-EYED ABOUT US REALITIES, AS HE SEES THEM, AND THAT AMERICAN HOSPITALITY HAS NOT SOFTENED HIM UP. HIS TONE OF REALISM AND FIRMNESS IS DOUBTLESS DESIGNED TO REINSURE THE UNITY AND SUPPORT OF HIS POLITBURO COLLEAGUES, WHICH WILL BE CRUCIAL DURING THE DIFFICULT MONTHS AHEAD.

6. THE FORMAL SOVIET EVALUATION OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT MUST AWAIT THE POLITBURO'S MEETING ON 17 DECEMBER: BUT I SHALL BE SURPRISED IF ITS TERMS REQUIRE MODIFICATION OF THE FOREGOING ASSESSMENT.

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MY TELNO 1767: GORBACHEV'S TV ADDRESS ON THE SUMMIT

SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV ADDRESSED THE SOVIET PEOPLE ON 14 DECEMBER. HIS SPEECH WAS SHORT, AND DELIVERED IN A SUBDUED, SOMBRE STYLE. A CLEVER PRESENTATION OF A DIFFICULT BRIEF. HE AVOIDED THE DETAIL OF THE DISCUSSIONS AND MADE MUCH OF THE ATMOSPHERICS, ESPECIALLY THE DIFFICULTIES, PROBABLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO DAMPEN PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS OF EARLY ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE WHOLE RANGE OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS. HE SAID JUST ENOUGH TO DISPEL ANY POPULAR DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER THE TRIP WAS WORTHWHILE.

DETAIL

2. GORBACHEV ADDRESSED THE NATION DURING THE MAIN EVENING NEWS BULLETIN ON 14 DECEMBER. THERE WAS NO PRE-PUBLICITY. THE SPEECH WAS SHORT BY HIS STANDARDS (AND COMPARED WITH HIS BROADCASTS POST-REYKJAVIK), BUT BY CHOOSING A SOMBRE MEASURED DELIVERY, HE MANAGED TO SPIN IT OUT TO 20 MINUTES.

3. GORBACHEV BEGAN BY EMPHASISING THE DETAILED GROUND-WORK AND CONSULTATION WHICH HAD MARKED SOVIET PREPARATION FOR THE SUMMIT, NOT JUST WITHIN THE PARTY BUT WITH THE ALLIES AND A SPECTRUM OF WORLD OPINION. ''ALL THIS ENRICHED OUR VISION OF THE PROCESSES UNDERWAY IN THE WORLD, AND GAVE ADDED CONFIDENCE THAT WE WERE GOING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IN THIS WAY, WE WENT TO WASHINGTON WITH A MANDATE FROM OUR PEOPLE, AND OUR ALLIES AND TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE ATTITUDES AND WISHES OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD''. SOVIET POSITIONS HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION IN THE POLITBURO

ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION.

ARMS CONTROL

4. GORBACHEV DEALT QUITE BRIEFLY WITH THE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. THE CONTENT AND RESULTS OF THE VISIT WERE WELL KNOWN. THE INF TREATY HAD BEEN SIGNED, ''A MAJOR EVENT IN WORLD HISTORY, A VICTORY FOR THE NEW POLITICAL THINKING''. MOST OF THE TIME IN THE TALKS HAD BEEN DEVOTED TO START. THE JOINT STATEMENT REFLECTED ''WILLINGNESS TO CUT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BY 50% WHILE OBSERVING THE ABM TREATY IN THE FORM IN WHICH IT WAS ADOPTED (''PRINYAT'') IN 1972. WE AGAIN PUT CLEARLY THE QUESTION OF THE NEED TO CONCLUDE AN EARLY AGREEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN. WE HAD A THOROUGH DISCUSSION ON LIQUIDATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND FORCES IN EUROPE. GORBACHEV WENT ON TO DEFEND THE INF TREATY AGAINST THE CHARGE THAT IT ONLY DEALT WITH 4% OF THE NUCLEAR ARSENALS: ''5% IS ENOUGH TO DESTROY THE WORLD.''

5. GORBACHEV THEN SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE ATMOSPHERE WHICH HAD ENABLED THE SIGNATURE OF THE INF TREATY. THE FIRST MOVE MUST BE FOR BOTH SIDES TO RATIFY IT. AFTER A NOD TO THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME SOVIET, HE SAID ''WE KNOW THERE IS A STRUGGLE IN THE USA OVER RATIFICATION, BUT WE ALSO KNOW THAT... THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SUPPORT THE TREATY''. HE WELCOMED PUBLIC SUPPORT FROM THE WARSAW PACT, BUT WENT ON: ''WHEN THERE IS A BREAK WITH OLD OPINIONS, OPPOSITION INEVITABLY ARISES FROM THOSE WHO ASSOCIATE THEIR POLITICAL AND MATERIAL WELL BEING WITH OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS THE OLD WAYS CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS. ONLY THREE DAYS HAVE PASSED SINCE OUR RETURN AND ALREADY CERTAIN CIRCLES IN THE WEST ARE MOBILISING TO PREVENT A CHANGE FOR THE BETTER.'' HE CITED ''COMPENSATION'' AND ALSO ATTEMPTS TO SUGGEST THAT ''THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT REMOVED OUR DIFFERENCES OVER SDI. AND ON THIS BASIS THERE ARE CALLS TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THIS PROGRAMME. I SAY BLUNTLY:-
THESE ARE DANGEROUS TENDENCIES AND SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.''

BILATERAL

6. GORBACHEV'S ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL ISSUES WAS CONFINED TO GENERALITIES. THEY HAD DISCUSSED HOW TO ARRANGE THEIR RELATIONS FOR BILATERAL AND UNIVERSAL BENEFIT.

''UNDERSTANDING OF THIS HAS GROWN IN BOTH COUNTRIES. WE SAW THIS IN OUR MEETINGS WITH POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LEADERS, WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF SCIENCE AND THE ARTS. IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WE STRESSED THE NEED TO UNDERSTAND THE NEW REALITIES AND ACT ACCORDINGLY... WE SAID THAT WE HAD NOT COME TO WASHINGTON TO INDULGE IN REPROACHES AND MUTUAL RECRIMINATIONS, WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD VERY OFTEN RESORTED TO IN THE PAST... I THINK THAT YOU ALL WILL BE INTERESTED TO LEARN WHAT THE AMERICAN REACTION WAS... I HAVE TO SAY, IF ONE TAKES A POSITION ON THE FACTS, AND DOES NOT LAPSE INTO EXAGGERATION, THEN IT IS STILL EARLY, TOO EARLY, TO TALK OF A RADICAL CHANGE IN OUR RELATIONS.''

7. AFTER THAT SOBERING JUDGEMENT GORBACHEV OFFERED SOME GROUNDS FOR HOPE. THE TALKS HAD BEEN MORE CONSTRUCTIVE THAN HITHERTO, THERE WAS A RISING TIDE OF GOOD WILL TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION IN AMERICA, AND THE RUSSIANS REGARDED AMERICA AND THE AMERICANS IN THE SAME LIGHT. HE HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT ''THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS READY TO DIVERT OUR RELATIONS TOWARDS MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND CONSTRUCTIVE MUTUAL COOPERATION...'' HE MADE PASSING REFERENCE TO THE AGREEMENTS REACHED ON SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION, CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND HUMAN CONTACTS, AND THE DISCUSSIONS OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND TRADE.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

8. IN THIS SECTION ON POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS, GORBACHEV SPOKE OF ''JOINT ACTION IN RESOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS'', WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE HAD RAISED. ''ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT MAKE MUCH PROGRESS HERE, THE DISCUSSIONS SHED MORE LIGHT AND ALLOWED US TO EXPECT THE CONTINUATION OF A DIALOGUE.''

INTERNAL

9. GORBACHEV CLOSED HIS ADDRESS WITH A REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN PERESTROIKA (LAST WORD UNDERLINED). THIS UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MODERN WORLD AND WAS A REMINDER TO ALL OF US THAT THE QUICKER PERESTROIKA (LAST WORD UNDERLINED) IS INTRODUCED, THE QUICKER THINGS WILL MOVE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. AFTER SOME WORDS OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO THOSE ENGAGED IN THE CONCRETE DECISIONS, HE THANKED THE SOVIET PEOPLE FOR THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO PERESTROIKA (LAST WORLD UNDERLINED) AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND

THE GOVERNMENT. HE VISIBLY RELAXED AS HE CAME TO THE END OF HIS SPEECH.

10. COMMENT ON THE SUMMIT OUTCOME AS SEEN FROM MOSCOW FOLLOWS.

CARTLEDGE

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WASHINGTON SUMMIT: SOVIET BRIEFING

SUMMARY

1. KARPOV BRIEFED GENSCHER ON 12 DECEMBER. SURPRISE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN TANKS.

DETAIL

2. KARPOV VISITED BONN ON 12 DECEMBER TO BRIEF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT. HE SAW GENSCHER FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS. ACCORDING TO HOLIK, HE LAID HIS MAIN EMPHASIS ON THE DIFFICULTIES THAT LIE AHEAD, NO DOUBT IN THE HOPE OF ENCOURAGING THE GERMANS TO PRESS THE AMERICANS ON THEM. SHULTZ VISITS BONN ON 15 DECEMBER.

3. KARPOV LEFT HOLIK WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT LITTLE HAD YET BEEN ACHIEVED ON START AND ABM. KARPOV SAID THE RUSSIANS KEPT COMING UP AGAINSST ''RESERVATIONS'' AND ''MYSTERIOUS ELEMENTS'' IN THE AMERICAN POSITION. THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL KEEN TO LIST WHAT WAS AND WHAT WAS NOT PERMISSABLE UNDER THE ABM TREATY. THEY WERE WILLING TO REACH AGREEMENT ON WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN AFTER THE PERIOD IN WHICH IT WOULD BE AGREED THAT THE ABM TREATY SHOULD REMAIN IN FORCE. HOLIK ASSUMED THAT IF NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THIS, THE START TREATY WOULD EXPIRE.

4. KARPOV SAID THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL HAD BEEN A HIGH PRIORITY FOR GORBACHEV IN WASHINGTON. THE RUSSIANS ENVISAGED TWO PHASES. IN THE FIRST, ASYMMETRIES WOULD BE ELIMINATED. IN THE SECOND, FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED TO A LEVEL WHERE WAR WAS NO LONGER POSSIBLE. KARPOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE WARSAW PACT WAS SUPERIOR IN TANKS (THE GERMANS HAVE TOLD THE PRESS OF THIS ADMISSION). HIS FIGURES WERE 50,000 AGAINST 30,000. HE ALSO NOTED THAT WARSAW PACT FORCES WERE SUPERIOR GENERALLY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THOUGH INFERIOR (HE CLAIMED) IN THE SOUTH. HE APPEARED TO ENVISAGE REGIONAL SOLUTIONS. KARPOV ADVOCATED A CORRIDOR IN CENTRAL EUROPE FROM WHICH

ALL WEAPONS SYSTEMS (SIC) WOULD BE REMOVED.
GENSCHER EXPLAINED WHY THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

5. KARPOV CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET AND GERMAN POSITIONS ON SNF WERE CLOSE. THE RUSSIANS CONSIDERED THESE WEAPONS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS MANDATE THOUGH THEY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY INSIST ON THIS. GENSCHER SAID THE RUSSIANS SHOULD UNILATERALLY CUT BACK THEIR SNF INVENTORY. KARPOV WOULD NOT HAVE THIS, ARGUING THAT ASYMMETRIES COULD ONLY BE DEALT WITH IN AN APPROPRIATE CONTEXT.

6. A REFERENCE BY GENSCHER TO THE SOVIET CW OVERHANG WAS ALSO REJECTED BY KARPOV, WHO CLAIMED THAT RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN STOCKS WERE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL.

7. KARPOV COMMENTED ON A ''CHANGE OF ATMOSPHERE '' AT THE PENTAGON SINCE CARLLUCCI'S ARRIVAL. YAZOV AND AKHROMEYEV HAD BEEN INVITED TO FURTHER TALKS. THE ICE HAD BEEN BROKEN.

BULLARD

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SIC
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MIPT: WASHINGTON SUMMIT: JOINT STATEMENT
1. FOLLOWING ARE THE KEY PASSAGES FROM THE LENGTHY JOINT STATEMENT. THIS OMITS INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL AND THE LIST OF BILATERAL ISSUES. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG.
ARMS CONTROL
THE INF TREATY

THE TWO LEADERS SIGNED THE TREATV BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES. THIS TREATY IS HISTORIC BOTH FOR ITS OBJECTIVE -- THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF AN ENTIRE CLASS OF U.S. AND SOVIET NUCLEAR ARMS -- AND FOR THE INNOVATIVE CHARACTER AND SCOPE OF ITS VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. THIS MUTUAL ACCOMPLISHMENT MAKES A VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO GREATER STABILITY.

NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY DISCUSSED THE NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THEY NOTED THE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD CONCLUSION OF A TREATY IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS. THEY AGREED TO INSTRUCT THEIR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA TO WORK TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE TREATY ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND ALL INTEGRAL DOCUMENTS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, PREFERABLY IN TIME FOR SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY DURING THE NEXT MEETING OF LEADERS OF STATE IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1988. RECOGNIZING THAT AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT ARE RECORDED IN DETAIL IN THE JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT, THEY AGREED TO INSTRUCT THEIR NEGOTIATORS TO ACCELERATE RESOLUTION OF ISSUES WITHIN THE JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT INCLUDING EARLY AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONS FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

IN SO DOING, THE NEGOTIATORS SHOULD BUILD UPON THE AGREEMENTS ON 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS ACHIEVED AT REYKJAVIK AS

SUBSEQUENTLY DEVELOPED AND NOW REFLECTED IN THE AGREED PORTIONS OF THE JOINT DRAFT START TREATY TEXT BEING DEVELOPED IN GENEVA INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON CEILINGS OF NO MORE THAN 1600 STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS, 6000 WARHEADS, 1540 WARHEADS ON 154 HEAVY MISSILES: THE AGREED RULE OF ACCOUNT FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND THEIR NUCLEAR ARMAMENT: AND AN AGREEMENT THAT AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTIONS THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S ICBMS AND SLBMS WILL BE REDUCED TO A LEVEL APPROXIMATELY 50-PERCENT BELOW THE EXISTING LEVEL, AND THIS LEVEL WILL NOT BE EXCEEDED BY EITHER SIDE. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WILL BE RECORDED IN A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY MANNER.

AS PRIORITY TASKS, THEY SHOULD FOCUS ON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

(A) ADDITIONAL STEPS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE REDUCTIONS ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY. THIS WILL INCLUDE A CEILING OF 4900 ON THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF ICBM PLUS SLBM WARHEADS WITHIN THE 6000 TOTAL.

(B) THE COUNTING RULES GOVERNING THE NUMBER OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR-ARMED AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (ALCMS) TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO EACH TYPE OF HEAVY BOMBER. THE DELEGATIONS SHALL DEFINE CONCRETE RULES IN THIS AREA

(C) THE COUNTING RULES WITH RESPECT TO EXISTING BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE SIDES PROCEED FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT EXISTING TYPES OF BALLISTIC MISSILES ARE DEPLOYED WITH THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS OF WARHEADS. IN THE UNITED STATES: PEACEKEEPER (MX):10, MINUTEMAN III:3, MINUTEMAN II:1, TRIDENT I:8, TRIDENT II:8, POSEIDON:10. IN THE SOVIET UNION: SS-17:4, SS-19:6, SS-18:10, SS-24:10, SS-25:1, SS-11:1, SS-13:1, SS-N-6:1, SS-N-8:1, SS-N-17:1, SS-N-18:7, SS-N-20:10 AND SS-N-23:4. PROCEDURES WILL BE DEVELOPED THAT ENABLE VERIFICATION OF THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES OF EACH SPECIFIC TYPE. IN THE EVENT EITHER SIDE CHANGES THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS DECLARED FOR A TYPE OF DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILE, THE SIDES SHALL NOTIFY EACH OTHER IN ADVANCE. THERE SHALL ALSO BE AGREEMENT ON HOW TO ACCOUNT FOR WARHEADS ON FUTURE TYPES OF BALLISTIC MISSILES COVERED BY THE TREATY ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

(D) THE SIDES SHALL FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS. SUCH LIMITATIONS WILL NOT INVOLVE COUNTING LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS WITHIN THE

6000 WARHEAD AND 1600 STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS LIMITS. THE SIDES COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH CEILINGS ON SUCH MISSILES, AND TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND EFFECTIVE METHODS OF VERIFICATION OF SUCH LIMITATIONS, WHICH COULD INCLUDE THE EMPLOYMENT OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, COOPERATIVE MEASURES AND ON-SITE INSPECTION.

(E) BUILDING UPON THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES, THE MEASURES BY WHICH THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CAN BE VERIFIED WILL, AT A MINIMUM, INCLUDE:

1. DATA EXCHANGES, TO INCLUDE DECLARATIONS BY EACH SIDE OF THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS LIMITED BY THE TREATY AND OF FACILITIES AT WHICH SUCH SYSTEMS ARE LOCATED AND APPROPRIATE NOTIFICATIONS. THESE FACILITIES WILL INCLUDE LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES FOR PRODUCTION AND FINAL ASSEMBLY, STORAGE, TESTING, AND DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS COVERED BY THIS TREATY. SUCH DECLARATIONS WILL BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE SIDES BEFORE THE TREATY IS SIGNED AND UPDATED PERIODICALLY AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE.
2. BASELINE INSPECTION TO VERIFY THE ACCURACY OF THESE DECLARATIONS PROMPTLY AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY.
3. ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF THE ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE AGREED LIMITS.
4. CONTINUOUS ON-SITE MONITORING OF THE PERIMETER AND PORTALS OF CRITICAL PRODUCTION AND SUPPORT FACILITIES TO CONFIRM THE OUTPUT OF THESE FACILITIES.
5. SHORT-NOTICE ON-SITE INSPECTION OF:
   (I) DECLARED LOCATIONS DURING THE PROCESS OF REDUCING TO AGREED
   (II) LOCATIONS WHERE SYSTEMS COVERED BY THIS TREATY REMAIN AFTER ACHIEVING THE AGREED LIMITS, AND
   (III) LOCATIONS WHERE SUCH SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN LOCATED (FORMERLY DECLARED FACILITIES).
6. THE RIGHT TO IMPLEMENT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED-UPON PROCEDURES, SHORT-NOTICE INSPECTIONS

AT LOCATIONS WHERE EITHER SIDE CONSIDERS COVERT DEPLOYMENT, PRODUCTION, STORAGE OR REPAIR OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS COULD BE OCCURRING.

7. PROVISIONS PROHIBITING THE USE OF CONCEALMENT OR OTHER ACTIVITIES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. SUCH PROVISIONS WOULD INCLUDE A BAN ON TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION AND WOULD ALLOW FOR FULL ACCESS TO ALL TELEMENTRIC INFORMATION BROADCAST DURING MISSILE FLIGHT.

8. MEASURES DESIGNED TO ENHANCE OBSERVATION OF ACTIVITIES RELATED TO REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THESE WOULD INCLUDE OPEN DISPLAYS OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS AT MISSILE BASES, BOMBER BASES, AND SUBMARINE PORTS AT LOCATIONS AND TIMES CHOSEN BY THE INSPECTING PARTY.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PREPARATION OF THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES ALSO INSTRUCTED THEIR DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD COMMIT THE SIDES TO OBSERVE THE ABM TREATY, AS SIGNED IN 1972, WHILE CONDUCTING THEIR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING AS REQUIRED, WHICH ARE PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY, AND NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY, FOR A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY SHALL BEGIN NOT LATER THAN THREE YEARS BEFORE THE END OF THE SPECIFIED PERIOD. AFTER WHICH, IN THE EVENT THE SIDES HAVE NOT AGREED OTHERWISE, EACH SIDE WILL BE FREE TO DECIDE ITS COURSE OF ACTION. SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST HAVE THE SAME LEGAL STATUS AS THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE ABM TREATY, AND OTHER SIMILAR, LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS. THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE RECORDED IN A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY MANNER. THEREFORE, THEY DIRECT THEIR DELEGATIONS TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES ON A PRIORITY BASIS.

THE SIDES SHALL DISCUSS WAYS TO ENSURE PREDICTABILITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP UNDER CONDITIONS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY, TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY REVIEWED A BROAD RANGE OF OTHER ISSUES CONCERNING ARMS LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTION. THE SIDES EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY MATTERS AND ADVANCING IN THE MAIN AREAS OF ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION THROUGH EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS THAT ENHANCE SECURITY AND STABILITY.

NUCLEAR TESTING

THE TWO LEADERS WELCOMED THE OPENING ON NOVEMBER 9, 1987, OF FULL-SCALE, STEP-BY-STEP NEGOTIATIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JOINT STATEMENT ADOPTED IN WASHINGTON ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1987, BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR:

> THE U.S. AND SOVIET SIDES HAVE AGREED TO BEGIN BEFORE DECEMBER 1, 1987, FULL-SCALE STAGE-BY-STAGE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL BE CONDUCTED IN A SINGLE FORUM. IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS THE SIDES AS THE FIRST STEP WILL AGREE UPON EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO RATIFY THE U.S.-USSR THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY OF 1974 AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY OF 1976, AND PROCEED TO NEGOTIATING FURTHER INTERMEDIATE LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING LEADING TO THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING AS PART OF AN EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT PROCESS. THIS PROCESS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WOULD PURSUE, AS THE FIRST PRIORITY, THE GOAL OF THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND, ULTIMATELY, THEIR ELIMINATION. FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE ELABORATION OF IMPROVED VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR THE U.S.-USSR TREATIES OF 1974 AND 1976 THE SIDES INTEND TO DESIGN AND CONDUCT JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENTS AT EACH OTHER'S TEST SITES. THESE VERIFICATION MEASURES WILL, TO THE EXTENT APPROPRIATE, BE USED IN FURTHER NUCLEAR TEST LIMITATION AGREEMENTS WHICH MAY SUBSEQUENTLY BE REACHED.

THE LEADERS ALSO WELCOMED THE PROMPT AGREEMENT BY THE SIDES TO EXCHANGE EXPERTS VISITS TO EACH OTHER'S NUCLEAR TESTING SITES IN JANUARY 1988 AND TO DESIGN AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO CONDUCT A JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AT EACH OTHER'S TEST SITE. THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIMENT ARE SET FORTH IN THE STATEMENT ISSUED ON DECEMBER 9, 1987, BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE LEADERS NOTED THE VALUE OF THESE AGREEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING MORE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1974 THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY AND THE 1976 PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY REAFFLRMED THE CONTINUED COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION T THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAOONS, AND IN PARTICULAR TO STRENGTHENING THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE TWO LEADERS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE ADHERENCE SINCE THEIR LAST MEETING OF ADDITIONAL PARTIES TO THE TREATY, AND CONFIRMED THEIR INTENT TO MAKE, TOGETHER WITH OTHER STATES, ADDITIONAL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE UNIVERATAL ADHERENCE TO THE

TREATY.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR SAFETY AND FOR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, UNDER FURTHER STRENGTHENED IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND APPROPRIATE EXPORT CONTROLS FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGOGY. THE LEADERS AGREED THAT BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATIONS WERE CONSTRUCTIVE AND USEFUL, AND SHOULD CONTINUE.

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

THE LEADERS WELCOMED THE SIGNING ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1987, IN WASHINGTON OF THE AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS IN THEIR CAPITALS. THE AGREEMENT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED PROMPTLY.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

THE LEADERS EXPRESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATION OF A VERIFIABLE, COMPREHENSIVE AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONSL CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION AND DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THEY WELCOMED PROGRESS TO DATE AND REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR INTENSIFIED NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD CONCLUSION OF A TRULY GLOBAL AND VERIFIABLE CONVENTION ENCOMPASSING ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS-CAPABLE STATES. THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION ARE IN FAVOR OF GREATER OPENNESS AND INTENSIFIED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

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MIPT: WASHINGTON SUMMIT: INITIAL COMMENT

SUMMARY

1. USEFUL PROGRESS ON START, BUT NO BREAKTHROUGHS, AND LITTLE MOVEMENT IN OTHER AREAS. IF CONCRETE RESULTS ARE MODEST, ATMOSPHERE HAS BEEN POSITIVE THROUGHOUT AND GORBACHEV HAS SCORED A MAJOR PUBLIC RELATIONS SUCCESS. MOSCOW SUMMIT EXPECTED IN FIRST HALF OF 1988.

DETAIL

2. SHULTZ'S BRIEFING TO THE NAC ON 11 DECEMBER WILL OF COURSE BE THE AUTHORITATIVE US ACCOUNT OF THIS WEEK'S EVENTS. BUT IN THE LIGHT OF A ROUND OF OUR CONTACTS HERE, WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON THE OUTCOME AS RECORDED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT.

ARMS CONTROL

3. THE AMERICANS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SECURING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO INSTRUCTIONS TO START NEGOTIATORS DESIGNED TO GIVE THE START NEGOTIATIONS FOCUS AND IMPETUS. THESE CONFIRM THE POINTS AGREED AT REYKJAVIK AND ADD SOME MORE NEW ONES.

4. THE MOST IMPORTANT NEW POINT OF AGREEMENT APPEARS TO BE THE SUB-LIMIT OF 4900 FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS. THE ABSENCE FROM THE JOINT STATEMENT OF ANY REFERENCE TO SEPARATE SUB-LIMITS ON ICBM (OR SLBM) RVS IS ALMOST CERTAINLY THE PRELUDE (THOUGH NOT YET FORMALLY AGREED) TO DROPPING IDEAS FOR SUCH SUB-LIMITS ALTOGETHER ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE 4900 AND 1540 SUB-LIMITS NOW AGREED ARE ADEQUATE ON THEIR OWN. ANOTHER VERY IMPORTANT NEW POINT IS THE AGREEMENT ON A COUNTING RULE FOR RVS ON EXISTING BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS AND THE DECLARATION BY BOTH SIDES IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OF THE NUMBER OF RVS CARRIED BY EACH SUCH SYSTEM. THIS RULE WILL BE COUPLED WITH APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS. IF SUCCESSFULLY FLESHED OUT (PARTICULARLY ON THE VERIFICATION SIDE) THIS ARRANGEMENT WILL OF COURSE OVERTAKE THE SALT II COUNTING RULE.

5. THE AGREED LANGUAGE ON START VERIFICATION (MOSTLY DERIVED FROM THE INF TREATY) IS CLEARLY USEFUL WHILE LEAVING ALL THE

DETAILED DIFFICULTIES STILL TO BE TACKLED. SOVIET AGREEMENT THAT THE THROW-WEIGHT LIMIT RESULTING FROM THE 50 PER CENT CUT IN AGGREGATE SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT SHOULD NOT SUBSEQUENTLY BE EXCEEDED IS ALSO A STEP FORWARD ALTHOUGH OUR CONTACTS SAY THAT THE RUSSIANS CONTINUED TO RESIST INCORPORATION OF THROW-WEIGHT PROVISIONS INTO THE TREATY ITSELF. GIVING TECHNICAL DEFINITION TO THIS PRINCIPLE WILL NO DOUBT ALSO REMAIN A VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM. ON SLCMS, THE RUSSIANS HAVE DROPPED THEIR PROPOSAL FOR CONFINING SUCH WEAPONS TO 400 DEPLOYED ON TWO IDENTIFIED CLASSES OF SUBMARINE, WHILE THE AMERICANS APPEAR TO HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO A MORE ACTIVE ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY AND VERIFY SLCM LIMITS. THE AGREEMENT TO WORK OUT COUNTING RULES FOR ALCM LOADING AMOUNTS TO LITTLE ON ITS OWN. AND THERE IS NO SIGN OF PROGRESS ON MOBILE ISSUES.

6. OUR ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS ARE REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH THIS PACKAGE OF START POINTS ALTHOUGH SOME HAVE MADE CLEAR TO US PRIVATELY THAT THEY HAD BEEN HOPING FOR SOMEWHAT MORE.

7. ON DEFENCE AND SPACE, THE AGREEMENT IS TO WORK OUT A COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY FOR A FIXED (BUT UNSPECIFIED) PERIOD AND TO OBSERVE THE TREATY QUOTE AS SIGNED IN 1972 UNQUOTE DURING THAT PERIOD WHILE PERMITTED RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING PROCEEDS. ALL OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT IT IS CLEAR FROM THIS WEEK'S EVENTS THAT REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY WILL BE EASY AND MAY BE ACHIEVED SOON. IT WILL PRESUMABLY BE IN THE 7-10 YEAR TIME-FRAME. THE AGREEMENT TO OBSERVE, DURING THIS PERIOD, THE ABM TREATY QUOTE AS SIGNED IN 1972 UNQUOTE SEEMS TO AMOUNT TO SETTING ASIDE THE ISSUE OF TREATY INTERPRETATION AND WHAT THE RULES OF THE ROAD WILL BE DURING THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE ISSUE HAS BEEN SET ASIDE FOR NOW, AND FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS SUMMIT, OR WHETHER IT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE FOR GOOD. MOST OF OUR ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT THE FORMER IS THE CASE: THE RUSSIANS SHOWED LITTLE SIGN DURING THE SUMMIT THAT THEY WERE READY TO ABANDON THEIR POSITION ON THIS POINT ALTOGETHER. ON WHAT HAPPENS AT THE END OF THE ABMT NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD, THE AMERICANS HAVE SECURED FREEDOM TO DEPLOY STRATEGIC DEFENCES IF THERE IS NO AGREEMENT TO THE CONTRARY DURING A PRECEDING DISCUSSION PERIOD OF THREE OR MORE YEARS.

8. ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, THERE IS AGREEMENT TO ACCELERATE WORK ON A MANDATE FOR THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS. OUR CONTACTS SAY THAT GORBACHEV AND HIS TEAM WERE PARTICULARLY INSISTENT ON THE NEED TO STEP UP THE PACE IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL (AND, AS IN THE PAST, TO INCLUDE SNF IN THE NEGOTIATIONS). WE MAY THEREFORE FIND AN INCREASED LEVEL OF

US PRESSURE ON THE ALLIES TO FINALISE A WESTERN PROPOSAL. ON CW, THE JOINT STATEMENT AVOIDS ANY REFERENCE TO A GLOBAL BAN. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE RUSSIANS PRESSED HARD BUT UNSUCCESSFULLY, AS EXPECTED, FOR A US COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE A CONVENTION IN 1988. ON NUCLEAR TESTING, A JOINT SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE STATEMENT (TEXT TO FOLLOW) RECORDS USEFUL PROGRESS TOWARDS A JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN IMPROVED VERIFICATION REGIME FOR THE TTBT AND PNET.

REGIONAL ISSUES

9. AS FAR AS OUR CONTACTS KNOW, THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV CONCENTRATED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE GULF. NO REAL PROGRESS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MADE ON EITHER. ON AFGHANISTAN, GORBACHEV REPEATED THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW SOVIET FORCES WITHIN A TWELVE MONTH TIME FRAME. BUT HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY ON LINKAGE TO AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, OR ON WHEN A WITHDRAWAL WOULD BEGIN. THE NSC TELL US THAT HE TRIED TO SOUND AS CO-OPERATIVE AS POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF AN OBVIOUSLY UNCO-OPERATIVE BRIEF. BUT OUR CONTACTS REMAIN PUZZLED AS TO WHY THE RUSSIANS RAISED EXPECTATIONS IN ADVANCE OF THE SUMMIT WITH HINTS (EG, VORONTSOV/ ARMACOST) OF GREATER FLEXIBILITY.

10. ON THE GULF, GORBACHEV WAS APPARENTLY EVASIVE WHEN PRESSED ON WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOW WILLING TO MOVE ON TO THE SECOND RESOLUTION. HE MAINTAINED THAT HE STILL SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS, BUT THAT NOW WAS NOT THE MOMENT FOR AN ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION, AND THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL NEEDED MORE TIME. OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED ON FAMILIAR LINES IN A WORKING GROUP LED BY PRIMAKOV AND SOLOMON.

HUMAN RIGHTS

11. WE ARE TOLD THAT GORBACHEV REACTED IN A PREDICTABLY DEFENSIVE AND PRICKLY WAY TO DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. SOME FURTHER PROGRESS NEVERTHELESS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MADE ON INDIVIDUAL CASES (EG, THE SOVIET TEAM ANNOUNCED THAT 14 FURTHER PEOPLE WERE BEING RELEASED FROM PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS). GORBACHEV HIMSELF DID NOT PRESS THE ISSUE OF THE MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE, BUT IN THE WORKING GROUP THE RUSSIANS LEFT NO DOUBT THAT THEY CONTINUED TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO IT. SEVERAL CONTACTS HAVE TOLD US THAT THE ADMINISTRATION STUCK FIRMLY TO THEIR POSITION, DESPITE SOVIET THREATS THAT THIS COULD JEOPARDISE PROGRESS ON OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

CONCLUSION

12. IT IS TOO SOON TO FORM A CONSIDERED VIEW OF HOW SUCCESSFUL THIS SUMMIT HAS BEEN. THE MEDIA (TAKING THEIR CUE FROM THE RATHER DOWNBEAT TERMS OF THE DEPARTURE STATEMENTS) INITIALLY PORTRAYED THE OUTCOME AS DISAPPOINTING. THE VICE PRESIDENT WHOM

I SAW THIS EVENING AFTER HE HAD ACCOMPANIED GORBACHEV TO THE AIRPORT, EXPECTED RATHER NEGATIVE COMMENT IN THE WEEKEND PRESS, BUT THOUGHT HIMSELF THAT THE VISIT HAD BEEN BUSINESSLIKE AND WORTHWHILE. EVEN BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS THIS EVENING, THE WHITE HOUSE WERE WORKING HARD TO PUT THINGS IN A MORE POSITIVE LIGHT, AND THE SUBSEQUENT APPEARANCE OF THE JOINT STATEMENT MAY HELP. THE OUTCOME IS NOT FAR OFF WHAT US BRIEFERS WERE PREDICTING LAST WEEK: ALTHOUGH IT INEVITABLY LOOKS MODEST WHEN SET AGAINST THE EUPHORIA WHICH SURROUNDED THE SIGNING OF THE INF TREATY ON THE FIRST DAY.

13. WHATEVER THE CONCRETE RESULTS, IN TERMS OF PUBLIC RELATIONS THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE MAN OF THE MATCH WAS GORBACHEV. THIS WAS THE AMERICAN PEOPLE'S FIRST PROLONGED EXPOSURE TO THE NEW STYLE OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP. AND GORBACHEV EXPLOITED THE OPPORTUNITY BRILLIANTLY. HE TOOK A CONSCIOUSLY HIGH PUBLIC PROFILE, ANSWERING QUESTIONS FROM JOURNALISTS AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY AND INTERSPERSING FORMAL SUMMIT EVENTS WITH UNSCRIPTED TELEVISED ADDRESSES TO GROUPS OF AMERICANS. HIS IMPASSIONED ORATORY HAS DOMINATED THE TV NETWORKS ALL WEEK: BY CONTRAST THE PRESIDENT REMAINED OUT OF THE PUBLIC EYE BETWEEN SUMMIT EVENTS, AND SHUNNED UNSCRIPTED EXCHANGES WITH THE PRESS. BUT THE GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS COME THROUGH A GRUELLING WEEK WELL, AND INITIAL POLLS SUGGEST CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FOR THE HANDLING OF THE SUMMIT. HIS TELEVISED ADDRESS WILL ALSO HAVE HELPED. IT SHOWED A LOT OF THE OLD REAGAN SKILL AND WAS A PROFESSIONAL APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE TO SUPPORT HIM OVER RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY.

ACLAND

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SIC
MODUK FOR DACU
MIPT: WASHINGTON SUMMIT: PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION
SUMMARY
1. PRESIDENT REAGAN CONCLUDES THAT THE SUMMIT WAS A CLEAR SUCCESS.
DETAIL
2. PRESIDENT REAGAN GAVE A TELEVISED ADDRESS ON THE EVENING OF 10 DECEMBER.
3. HE BEGAN BY DESCRIBING THE INF TREATY AS A LANDMARK IN POST-WAR HISTORY AND A SIGNAL OF A BROADER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN A PASSAGE DIRECTED AT THE RATIFICATION PROCESS, HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF CONGRESS ON 11 DECEMBER. HE OUTLINED THE HISTORY OF THE INF ISSUE AND SUMMARISED THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, EMPHASISING THE ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS INVOLVED AND THE STRENGTH OF THE VERIFICATION REGIME.
4. ON REGIONAL ISSUES, HE HAD SPOKEN CANDIDLY ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN/IRAQ, CAMBODIA, ANGOLA AND NICARAGUA. HE HOPED FOR REAL COOPERATION IN RESOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS. THIS WAS ESSENTIAL FOR A LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS.
5. ON HUMAN RIGHTS THERE HAD BEEN SOME VERY LIMITED MOVEMENT INCLUDING THE RESOLUTION OF A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL CASES. QUOTE THERE WERE ASSURANCES OF FUTURE, MORE SUBSTANTIAL MOVEMENT, WHICH WE HOPE TO SEE BECOME A REALITY UNQUOTE.
6. LOOKING AHEAD TO A MOSCOW SUMMIT IN 1988, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE AND GORBACHEV HAD AGREED TO RE-DOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A START TREATY AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. THAT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SDI WOULD DO MUCH TO MAKE THE WORLD SAFER. QUOTE FOR THAT REASON, I MADE IT CLEAR THAT OUR SDI PROGRAMME WILL CONTINUE, AND THAT WHEN WE HAVE A DEFENCE READY TO DEPLOY, WE WILL DO SO UNQUOTE. THEY HAD ALSO AGREED THAT AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE REDUCED, IT BECAME ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO REDRESS THE DISPARITIES IN CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

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7. SUMMING UP, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT QUOTE THIS SUMMIT WAS A CLEAR SUCCESS: WE MADE PROGRESS ON EACH ITEM IN OUR FOUR PART AGENDA UNQUOTE.

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SIC

MODUK FOR DACU
OUR TELNO 2723: WASHINGTON SUMMIT: FINAL DAY
1. THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT CONCLUDED ON 10 DECEMBER. THE FINAL DAY'S EVENTS INCLUDED A BREAKFAST GIVEN BY VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: AND A FINAL SESSION OF TALKS AT THE WHITE HOUSE, WHICH WAS DELAYED FOR 90 MINUTES TO ENABLE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO HOLD A FURTHER SESSION WITH THE ARMS CONTROL WORKING GROUP. GORBACHEV TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE AN UNSCHEDULED WALKABOUT. FOLLOWING LUNCH AND DEPARTURE STATEMENTS, GORBACHEV MET WITH US BUSINESS LEADERS AND HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH WAS LARGELY TAKEN UP WITH HIS 70 MINUTE OPENING STATEMENT. HE LATER LEFT THE US FOR EAST BERLIN.
2. MY FOUR IFTS CONTAIN:
I) TEXTS OF DEPARTURE STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GORBACHEV.
II) THE KEY PASAGES FROM THE JOINT STATEMENT.
III) SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TELEVISED ADDRESS TO THE NATION.
IV) OUR PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON THE SUMMIT.

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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
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PS/MR EGGAR
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/SEC POL D
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MODUK FOR DACU
1. ONE REAGAN/GORBACHEV SESSION DEALING WITH AFGHANISTAN, IRAN/IRAQ AND START. NEWS BLACKOUT ON SUBSTANCE REMAINS EFFECTIVE. GORBACHEV MEETS CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS.
DETAIL
2. GORBACHEV'S FIRST EVENT ON 9 DECEMBER WAS A MEETING AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY WITH NINE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS FROM BOTH HOUSES. SPEAKING TO THE PRESS LATER, CONGRESSMEN GENERALLY AGREED THAT GORBACHEV HAD PUT ON AN IMPRESSIVE DISPLAY: AS SENATOR SIMPSON PUT IT: QUOTE HE WAS VERY CORDIAL, VERY DISARMING, VERY CANDID, VERY DIRECT UNQUOTE. THE MAIN TOPICS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN INF RATIFICATION: HUMAN RIGHTS: AFGHANISTAN AND NICARAGUA (ON WHICH HOUSE SPEAKER WRIGHT APPARENTLY PRESSED GORBACHEV ON WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PREPARED TO CEASE SUPPORT FOR THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT IF CONGRESS CUT OFF AID TO THE CONTRAS: GORBACHEV APPARENTLY GAVE NO CLEAR REPLY).
3. THE MORNING'S SESSION WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AT THE WHITE HOUSE BEGAN WITH A TEN MINUTE MEETING WITH ONLY INTERPRETERS PRESENT, AT THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST. THERE WAS THEN A TWO HOUR SESSION WITH SENIOR ADVISERS. ACCORDING TO THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN, THE DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES WAS CONFINED TO AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN/IRAQ. THERE WAS ALSO SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF START IN THE LIGHT OF PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION IN THE WORKING GROUP THE PREVIOUS EVENING. ON AFGHANISTAN GORBACHEV SAID AT THE START OF THE MEETING IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE PRESS QUOTE THE FACT THAT WE ARE READY TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN IS SOMETHING THAT I HAVE SAID SOME TIME AGO. SO WHAT WE ARE GOING TO DISCUSS WILL BE MORE SPECIFIC UNQUOTE. THE PRESS SPOKESMAN ADDED LITTLE: ALTHOUGH GERASIMOV CONFIRMED THAT A TIME TABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. THE TONE OF WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ON THE AFGHANISTAN DISCUSSION HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN NOTABLY UP-BEAT AND HAS LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS LIKELY TO BE SOME

AGREED LANGUAGE ON AFGHANISTAN IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ON 10 DECEMBER.

4. MR AND MRS GORBACHEV ATTENDED A LUNCH AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT GIVEN BY THE SHULTZES. IN HIS TOAST SHULTZ QUOTED FROM LAST WEEK'S EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT THAT RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM IS A PRE-REQUISITE FOR CONFIDENCE, UNDERSTANDING AND CO-OPERATION. HE ADDED QUOTE WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS UNQUOTE. GORBACHEV IN RESPONSE EMPHASISED AGAIN THAT THE INF TREATY WAS A FIRST STEP ON THE ROAD TO THE GOAL OF A NUCLEAR FREE WORLD WHICH HE HAD PROPOSED IN JANUARY 1986. HE ADDED QUOTE WHILE MOVING CLOSER TO EACH OTHER, WE HAVE COME TO APPRECIATE EVEN MORE THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET/AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ... PEACE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH IS INHERENTLY UNSTABLE WHATEVER ANYONE MIGHT CLAIM UNQUOTE. HE CONCLUDED WITH A TRIBUTE TO THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, ADDING THE COMMENT QUOTE FOREIGN POLICY HAS CEASED TO BE A DOMAIN OF PROFESSIONALS ALONE. THE PRACTICE OF SECRET COLLUSIONS AND AGREEMENTS WHICH DECEIVE NATIONS AND DOOM THEM TO ACTIONS AND SACRIFICIES THAT ARE CONTRARY TO THEIR VITAL INTERESTS ISALSO BEING CONSIGNED TO THE PAST UNQUOTE.

5. IN THE AFTERNOON GORBACHEV CONTINUED HIS SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH US OPINION FORMERS OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT. ON THIS OCCASION HE ADDRESSED A GROUP OF PUBLISHERS AND MEDIA EXECUTIVES. LATER THIS EVENING PRESIDENT AND MRS REAGAN WILL ATTEND THE RETURN DINNER AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY.

6. THE WORKING GROUPS ARE CONTINUING TO MEET. EACH HAS SUB-DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS. THE ARMS CONTROL GROUP INTO DEFENCE AND SPACE: AND CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL, AND THE NON ARMS-CONTROL GROUP INTO REGIONAL: AND HUMAN RIGHTS/BILATERAL ISSUES.

7. THE NEWS BLACKOUT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MEETINGS CONTINUES TO BE REMARKABLY EFFECTIVE. THE PRESS HAVE LITTLE TO GET THEIR TEETH INTO. BUT THE OVERALL TONE OF THE VISIT CONTINUES TO BE VERY POSITIVE AND GORBACHEV IS, AS EXPECTED, MAKING A CONSIDERABLE IMPACT.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 December 1987

Prime Minister
You may care
to have this
CDP

Dear Charles

In attached folder

Further to our letter of 3 December I now enclose a videotape of Mr Gorbachev's interview on American television, courtesy of the NBC office here.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

SECRET

file DTS. 1

bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

2 December 1987

I enclose a copy of the President's reply to the Prime Minister's recent message about the US/Soviet Summit. As you will see, it is cast in very helpful terms.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

C D POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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


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US/SOVIET SUMMIT: GORBACHEV'S INTERVIEW WITH NBC

1. ON THE MORNING OF 1 DECEMBER TASS PUT OUT WHAT IT DESCRIBED AS THE FULL TEXT OF GORBACHEV'S INTERVIOIGITH TOM BROKAW OF NBC TV, RECORDED ON 28 NOVEMBER AND SCREENED BY NBC ON 30 NOVEMBER. THE INTERVIEW WILL BE SHOWN BY SOVIET TV ON THE EVENING OF 1 DECEMBER. THE TEXT IS PRESUMABLY AVAILABLE TO YOU. THE FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS ON POINTS OF INTEREST HERE.

2. THE INTERVIEW MOSTLY READS WELL. GORBACHEV HAD ARMED HIMSELF WITH A STRONG DEFENSIVE LINE, FOR EXAMPLE, ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND WE CAN EXPECT HIM TO BE SIMILARLY EQUIPPED FOR HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. EARLY IN THE INTERVIEW, HE SEIZED THE INITIATIVE FROM BROKAW AND RETAINED IT FOR MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION, FOR EXAMPLE REFUSING TO LET BROKAW HAVE THE LAST WORD ON SDI.

US ATTITUDES TO THE SOVIET UNION

3. GORBACHEV MADE SKILFUL USE OF THE CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED HERE FROM THE UNITED STATES ('80,000 LETTERS THIS YEAR FROM AMERICANS, THAT IS A THIRD OF ALL FOREIGN MAIL COMING INTO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE') IN ORDER TO EXPRESS A SHARED CONCERN ABOUT TENSION IN THE WORLD.

SOVIET HISTORY

4. IN A LONG PREAMBULAR STATEMENT ABOUT THE NEED FOR AMERICANS TO UNDERSTAND SOVIET HISTORY, GORBACHEV SLIPPED IN REFERENCES BOTH TO NEXT YEAR'S MILLENNIUM OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH IN RUSSIA SEMICOLON AND ALSO TO THE BALTIC STATES ON WHICH THERE HAS BEEN A SHARP REACTION HERE TO RECENT ACTION BY THE US CONGRESS TO COMMEMORATE LATVIAN 'INDEPENDENCE DAY' (18 NOVEMBER). GORBACHEV WRAPPED UP THE BALTIC STATES AMONG

THE SEVERAL NATIONS WHICH NOW MAKE UP THE SOVIET UNION, COMMENTING THAT THE PEOPLES OF THE BALTIC REGION HAD AN 'ORIGINAL' HISTORY WHICH WAS 'NOT SIMPLE BUT SUBSTANTIAL'.

ARMS CONTROL

5. ANSWERING BROKAW'S QUESTION ABOUT APPREHENSION CONCERNING THE VULNERABILITY OF WESTERN EUROPE AFTER THE INF AGREEMENT, GORBACHEV GAVE A FRANK ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF 'A CERTAIN ASYMMETRY BOTH IN FORCES AND IN ARMAMENTS' AND SAID 'WE ARE PREPARED TO ADDRESS OURSELVES TO THAT WITHOUT DELAY' AT THE NEGOTIATINV TABLE. IN A SECOND ANSWER, HE REITERATED HIS PREPAREDNESS TO TACKLE THE QUESTION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES. HE WAS NOT ASKED ABOUT CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND DID NOT TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE THE SOVIET LINE ON CW, OF WHICH WE HAVE RECENTLY HEARD MUCH. GORBACHEV DID NOT GIVE FIGURES FOR THE NUMBER OF MISSILES TO BE DESTROYED BY THE SOVIET UNION UNDER THE INF AGREEMENT. THIS HAS STILL NOT BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE SOVIET MEDIA'S REPORTING ON THE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH KARPOV HAS GIVEN THE FIGURES TO THE PRESS AND ENGLISH TASS HAS CARRIED THEM.

6. GORBACHEV SOUGHT TO DISPEL THE IDEA THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT FOR FURTHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH THE PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION, SAYING MOST EMPHATICALLY THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DO A LOT OF WORK WITH THIS ADMINISTRATION.

7. ON SDI, GORBACHEV INITIALLY CONTINUED THE RECENT SOVIET LINE THAT THE ISSUE WAS NOT SDI BUT OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ABM TREATY. HE INTENDED TO TALK ABOUT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY AND BELIEVED THAT THE QUESTION OF SDI WAS ''NOT A SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATIONS''. HOWEVER, FOLLOWING FURTHER QUESTIONS FROM HIS INTERVIEWER, GORBACHEV THEN DEPLOYED A NUMBER OF FAMILIAR SOVIET ARGUMENTS AGAINST SDI (THOUGH NOT IN THEIR SHARPEST FORM), AND OBLIQUELY SUGGESTED THAT SDI WAS ONLY SUPPORTED BY A MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THAT TO PURSUE IT WAS THEREFORE NOT DEMOCRATIC. UNDER FURTHER PRESSURE, HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ENGAGED IN BASIC SDI RESEARCH, BUT CLAIMED THAT THIS ONLY RELATED TO ASPECTS COVERED BY THE UNITED STATES SDI PROGRAMME AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT DEPLOY SUCH A SYSTEM.

AFGHANISTAN AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS

8. GORBACHEV APPEARED TO BE ON THE DEFENSIVE ON AFGHANISTAN,

AND GAVE A STANDARD, UNCONVINCING EXPLANATION OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY CONTINGENT. HIS REFERENCE TO THE DESIRE FOR AN EARLY POLITICAL SOLUTION (WHICH WAS POSSIBLE IF THAT WAS WHAT THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION SINCERELY WANTED) DID NOT BREAK NEW GROUND, AND HE DECLINED TO BE DRAWN ON THE LINE HE WOULD TAKE WITH REAGAN. HE THEN RETREATED INTO A GENERAL REMARK ABOUT REGIONAL CONFLICTS, OMITTING CAMBODIA FROM THE CONFLICTS WHICH HE LISTED. THIS IS PERHAPS SURPRISING IN VIEW OF CURRENT ACTIVITY ON THAT SUBJECT BUT MAY ALSO REFLECT THE AGENDA HE ANTICIPATES FOR HIS TALKS WITH REAGAN.

NEW THINKING AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD

9. GORBACHEV REITERATED PREVIOUS THEMES ABOUT THE NEED TO APPLY NEW THINKING TO THE POST-IMPERIAL WORLD, AND TO TACKLE SUCH MATTERS AS DEBT AND ECOLOGY. HIS STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT DICTATE THEIR VALUES OR IMPOSE THEIR WAY OF LIFE AND THEIR SOCIAL CHOICE ON OTHER COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES WAS ANOTHER REFLECTION OF GORBACHEV'S MORE COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO THIRD WORLD QUESTIONS.

BERLIN

10. GORBACHEV'S ATTEMPT TO IMPLY, PARTY BY MEANS OF A DELIBERATELY OBSCURE REFERENCE TO THE RELEVANT HISTORY, THAT THE BLAME FOR THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND THE BERLIN WALL LAY WITH THE WEST REFLECTED OLD THINKING RATHER CHAN NEW SEMICOLON AND WAS ONE OF HIS LESS DEFT COMMENTS.

HUMAN RIGHTS

11. LIKEWISE GORBACHEV'S VIGOROUS COUNTER-ATTACK ON HUMAN RIGHTS WAS VERY MUCH WHAT WE HAVE COME TO EXPECT. HE DEPLOYED SOME APPROPRIATE DETAIL RELATING TO THE UNITED STATES (ROOSEVELT'S 1944 BILL AND SO ON) IN SUPPORT OF THE WELL-WORN THESIS THAT SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS ARE BETTER PROTECTED IN THE USSR THAN IN THE WEST. HIS SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD TO LIMIT EMIGRATION TO COUNTER AMERICAN ATTEMPTS TO ORGANISE A 'BRAIN DRAIN' WAS PRETTY THIN: AND HIS CLAIM THAT ONLY STATE SECURITY REASONS ('THERE ARE NO OTHER REASONS') LAY BEHIND THE DENIAL OF EXIT VISAS TO THE REMAINING REFUSENIKS WILL NOT DEFUSE THE CAMPAIGN CURRENTLY BEING MOUNTED HERE BY THE REFUSENIKS IN ADVANCE OF THE SUMMIT - NOR, WE ASSUME , THE

PRESSURE FROM JEWISH ORGANISATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE ECONOMY

12. GORBACHEV MADE NO REVELATIONS: WAS DEFENSIVE ON FOOD SUPPLY: BUT REITERATED HIS SUPPORT FOR A COMBINATION OF PRIVATE INITIATIVE AND STATE ENTERPRISE IN AGRICULTURE. HE ALSO TOOK A CAUTIOUS LINE ON UNEMPLOYMENT AND PRICE RISES (TO BE RESOLVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SOCIALISM AND DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO AFFECT THE INCOMES OF WORKING PEOPLE) - BOTH POINTS WHICH ARE CAUSING POPULAR CONCERN HERE AT THE MOMENT.

INTERNAL POLITICS

13. A STANDARD REAFFIRMATION OF PERESTROIKA, BUT WITH THE GLOSS APPLIED CONSISTENTLY SINCE THE ELTSIN AFFAIR THAT 'WE WILL NOT JUMP OVER STAGES' OR ALLOW 'ADVVENTURISM'. WE THINK THIS IS THE FIRST REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT ELTSIN SPOKE TWICE AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENARY.

RAISA GORBACHEVA

14. IN THE LIGHT OF WESTERN PRESS COMMENT, WHICH HAS FILTERED BACK THROUGH BROADCASTS TO THE SOVIET UNION, GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE TO BROKAW'S QUESTION ABOUT HIS WIFE'S ROLE IN PUBLIC LIFE AND HER CONSPICUOUS PRESENCE ON HIS TRAVELS ('WE DISCUSS EVERYTHING') WILL BE HEARD WITH INTEREST BY THE SOVIET AUDIENCE, AND NOT NECESSARILY WITH APPROVAL. THE UNCHARACTERISTIC BREVITY OF GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE PRESUMABLY INDICATED HIS DISTASTE FOR THE QUESTION.

CARTLEDGE

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