

PART ONE

Confidential Filing

Visit of the Greek <sup>Prime Minister</sup> Leader of the Opposition,  
Mr. Andreas Papandreu.

GREECE

S  
3001

TH: OCTOBER 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>28.10.80</del>		<del>18.7.88</del>					
24.11.80		19.7.88					
<del>26.11.80</del>		<del>26.8.88</del>					
6.1.81		29.8.88					
3.11.81							
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31/8/85		ENDS					
<del>4/1/83</del>							
<del>4.10.83</del>							
13.10.83							
<del>26.11.83</del>							
28.10.83							
31.10.83							
<del>4.11.83</del>							
7.11.83							
15.11.83							
4.12.83							
<del>15.11.83</del>							
<del>17.6.88</del>							
5.7.88							

PREM 19/2212

NOTE

Briefing for the Visit of the Greek Prime Minister,  
Mr A Papandreu on 4 November 1983 is filed on  
a separate folder attached to the back of this  
file. Incorporated into file.

PART 1 ends:-

foo to COP. 8. 11 .88

PART 2 begins:-

Athens Tel No. 399. 11.9.89

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 November 1988

*Mr. Gaisman*  
*To note - you owe me one!*

*CDP*  
*8/xi*

*Dear Charles,*

Prime Minister's Meeting with Mr Papandreou

You will recall that there was some doubt about whether Mr Papandreou would still be coming to London for a working lunch and talks with the Prime Minister on 28 November.

Mr Papandreou's office has now confirmed with the Embassy in Athens that Mr Papandreou will not be able to come to Britain on that day. He has cancelled all his travel plans before the Rhodes summit in order to recuperate from his recent operation.

*Yours ever,*

*L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

*No - your 100's are diminished by one!*

*IG.*  
*9/11*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T137/88



cc: FCO  
PC  
T1

SUBJECT  
ce MASTER  
OPS

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

8 September 1988

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you very much for your letter. I send you my best wishes as you prepare for your operation. I am sure that you could not be in better hands. I shall look forward to seeing you once your health permits.

Warm regards,

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

---

His Excellency Mr. Andreas Papandreou

085



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

8 September 1988

GREEK PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister has signed the enclosed message to Mr. Papandreou. I should be grateful if you would arrange for its delivery.

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 September 1988

Dear Charles,

Health of Greek Prime Minister

The tests carried out at St Thomas' have confirmed that the Greek Prime Minister is in need of a major heart-bypass operation. The Greek Ambassador has told us that it will probably be performed on Monday 12 September by Dr Magdi Yacoub. The Prime Minister may wish to send Mr Papandreu a further message of sympathy. I enclose a draft text.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/No 10 Downing Street

DS Form 1 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Copies to:

Top Secret

His Excellency Mr Andreas

Secret

Papandreou

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

SUBJECT:

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

Thank you <sup>very much</sup> for your letter.

CAVEAT .....

I send you my best wishes as you prepare for your operation. I am sure that you could not be in better hands. I wish you a successful operation and a speedy ~~recovery~~. I shall look forward to seeing you once your health permits.

PR9AAY

Enclosures flag(s) .....

*Handwritten signature*



celc ②

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE**

August 29, 1988

SERIAL No. T132/88

SUBJECT CC  
MASTER  
OPS

Big Number  
CDP  
3578

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, FRS, MP  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Dear Prime Minister,

Please accept my warmest thanks for your letter,  
the flowers and the facilities of my movements at the  
airport. Surely when this episode is over, I shall look  
forward to having a talk with you.


at Hart

With my warmest regards,  
Sincerely yours,

*Andreas G. Papandreou*  
Andreas G. Papandreou

mf

GREECE: Visit of Mr Papandriou Oct 10



RESTRICTED



*Me Pinner  
a PC*

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

26 August 1988

*Dear Bob,*

MR. PAPANDREOU

The Prime Minister has signed the message to Mr. Papandreou of which I enclose a copy. We shall arrange to deliver it to him this morning, together with flowers, as soon as you let us know where and when the delivery should be made. As you will see, the message leaves open the possibility of a meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr. Papandreou late next week. There is no need to do anything further to stimulate this. It is now up to the Greeks to approach us with a firm proposal.

*Yours sincerely,  
C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

*Pinner*

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T128/88



Me DA  
ccfw  
Pess

SUBJECT CC MASTER  
OPS

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

26 August 1988

Dear Prime Minister,

I was very sorry to hear that you are in hospital and hope you will let me know if there is any way in which we can be of help during your stay or if you feel like a talk later on. Meanwhile, please accept my very best wishes for a speedy recovery.

Kind regards,

Yours sincerely

Nargant Datta

His Excellency Mr. Andreas Papandreou

Am

PRIME MINISTER

MR PAPANDEOU

You should be aware that Mr Papandreou is travelling incognito to London this afternoon to enter St Thomas's Hospital. He went into a Greek hospital for a check-up yesterday and, as a result, appears to require treatment for a heart condition which is best undertaken at St Thomas's Hospital. No announcement is being made about his journey here but the Greeks expect the news to become public by this evening or tomorrow morning.

We are arranging for Mr Papandreou to be met and given proper security protection. You might like to send some flowers and a message. I attach one for your signature.

My understanding is that Mr Papandreou's condition is not particularly serious and he is likely to leave St Thomas's Hospital towards the end of next week. I am sure that he would be very flattered if you were able to find a half hour for him in the latter part of next week, either at No 10 or, at the hospital. This might be a worthwhile investment of time given that Greece holds the Presidency of the EEC. Would you be ready in principle to do this, subject to his medical condition at the time?

Yes

C.D.P.

ms

C. D. POWELL  
25 August 1988

DS2AJI



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 August 1988

Mr Charles Powell  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

*Dear Charles*

- / You will have seen Athens telno 378 (copy attached) concerning the Greek Prime Minister's visit to London today for medical reasons. We are organizing security, a VIP lounge, and an official car.
- / The Prime Minister may wish to send a message. I enclose a draft text. This should be delivered to the Grosvenor House Hotel, where the party is staying under the name of Louvaris. Papandreou should be installed at the hotel by about 1700 hrs. It would be wise not to make the delivery before that.

You asked whether flowers would be appropriate. We see no difficulty over this; they could be delivered with the message.

*Yours Ever*  
*Fossell Dixon*  
for .R N Peirce

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:  
Prime Minister

Reference  
PR6ABH

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO:

Copies to:

Mr Andreas Papandreou

SUBJECT:

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

I was very sorry to hear that you are in hospital. *a hope*

*you will*

CAVEAT .....

Please let me know if there is any way in which we can be of <sup>help</sup> assistance during your stay. <sup>very</sup> Meanwhile, please accept my best wishes for a speedy recovery.

*or if you feel like a talk later on.*

*ch*

Enclosures flag(s) .....

RESTRICTED



Alie

ea

bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

19 July 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. PAPANDREOU

bc | You asked the other day whether the Prime Minister could see Mr. Papandreou and give him lunch on 28 November. The rather surprising answer is that she can. We have in mind a meeting at 1200 followed by a working lunch for three a side which would end at 1400/1415.

(CHARLES POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

ea



①

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH MR. PAPANDEOU

We have had great difficulty in finding a date in the second half of November when Mr. Papandreou could see you, in his role as President of the European Community.

The Greeks have now proposed lunch on Monday 28 November. That is quite convenient from the point of view of the European Council, which will be in Rhodes in early December. We still do not know for sure whether the State Opening will be on 22 or 29 November, although the former looks more likely. Even if it is 29 November, I suppose a lunch on 28 November is just all right (although not a dinner). But it would mean cancelling a colleagues' lunch (perhaps not too much of a deterrent).

Agree to a lunch on 28 November?

C.D.P.

y  
/ is not

C. D. POWELL

18 July 1988

PM2ACA



10 DOWNING STREET

housing at *in draw*  
BR  
28 ✓ Area



Offered  
30th  
by  
21st  
& 25 (mty  
only)



rem

ed. 4  
leave  
12000

10 DOWNING STREET

it

in FW  
an

Taylor

I don't think

we can really have

it open until we

know about the

State opening. We

shall have to go

back to her on

this.

oh

I agree. But if the Prime Minister  
wishes to leave it until after the  
State Opening he could offer 30th  
November.

14. 20/6

①

PRIME MINISTER

MR PAPANDEOU

You will recall that Mr Papandreou wants to visit London, as well as other Community capitals in November, before the European Council in Rhodes. He is very keen, for reasons of prestige, to be seen to be entertained by you to lunch, even if only a working lunch.

There are great difficulties over dates because of the uncertainty over the date of the State Opening of Parliament and also the addition of your visit to Washington in mid-November. But Tessa is moving the proposed Regional Tour on Friday 18 November to a later date which does free a lunch that day. I attach the relevant page of the forward diary. Would you be prepared to offer lunch for Mr Papandreou that day?

CD?

I think the visit should  
be after the state opening

not

C. D. POWELL  
17 June 1988

DS2AIB

Sunday 6 November  
71930 SIR GEORG SOLTI CONCERT RPH

Monday. 7 November  
1830-1930 Drinks with European Democratic Group - No.10

Tuesday 8 November  
State Visit?  
AUDIENCE  
STATE BANQUET?

Wednesday 9 November  
? Lunch for Overseas Visitor?  
pm and evening Keep free for Lord Mayor's Banquet Speech

Thursday 10 November  
pm RETURN STATE BANQUET?

Friday 11 November  
Keep free for speech

Saturday 12 November  
FINCHLEY FAIR  
REMEMBRANCE DAY SERVICE +DT ROYAL ALBERT HALL

Sunday 13 November  
REMEMBRANCE SUNDAY

Monday 14 November  
0830 Hair  
1000 Week Ahead Meeting  
1030 Diary Meeting?  
1215 Meeting of colleagues?  
1300 followed by Lunch?  
pm Keep free for speech  
? LORD MAYOR'S BANQUET GUILDHALL

Tuesday 15 November  
AUDIENCE

Thursday, 17 November  
1830-1900 LOOK IN AT LADY PORTER'S RECEPTION  
? DIPLOMATIC CORPS RECEPTION - BUCKINGHAM PALACE

Friday, 18 November

Saturday 19 November  
ADDRESS UK FEDERATION OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL  
WOMEN - LONDON

Monday 21 November

Prime Minister of Greece + CDP (or 25th)

Tuesday 22 November

?

AUDIENCE

ATTEND DINNER TO MARK LORD FORTE'S 80th BIRTHDAY  
GROSVENOR HOUSEWednesday 23 November

KEEP FREE ?

Friday 25 NovemberLunch with British Sports Association for the  
Disabled

Prime Minister of Greece + CDP (or 21st)

Monday 28 November

1100

PLANT A TREE TO MARK NATIONAL TREE WEEK

Tuesday 29 November

KEEP FREE?

AUDIENCE

Friday, 2 - Saturday 3 December

EUROPEAN COUNCIL - RHODES

Monday 5 December

Look in at Reception for NSPCC

Tuesday, 6 December

AUDIENCE

Wednesday, 7 December

am only

REGIONAL TOUR

Thursday 8 December

1700-1930

ADDRESS PER CENT CLUB

RETURN TO NO.10

Friday 9 December

FINCHLEY

Monday 12 December

pm

?Keep free

2015-2030

ATTEND DINNER GIVEN BY HRH PRINCESS ALEXANDRA FOR  
THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AND MRS. PRICE + DT -  
25 ST. JAMES'S PALACETuesday, 13 December

AUDIENCE

Wednesday 14 December

Keep free



10 DOWNING STREET

Charles

We could offer the 28th for  
a working lunch - provided the  
Pm doesn't mind cancelling  
colleagues - or a working supper  
if it is not the State Opening  
on the 29th.

However, there is an outside  
engagement at 11.00 so could  
we discuss times?

TG  
18/7

070

ECPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 July 1988

*Fessos  
Can we do this?  
ch*

*Dear Charles,*

Pre-European Council Visit by Greek Prime Minister

The Greeks have now come back to us and said that Papandreou would like to come and see the Prime Minister on the morning of 28 November. This is not of course one of the dates we have offered them. But I should be grateful to know if there is any chance.

*How ever,*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



CONFIDENTIAL



*file this  
cc 27/c*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

5 July 1988

VISIT OF MR. PAPANDREOU

I have seen a copy of Athens tel. no. 275 asking whether the Prime Minister could see Mr. Papandreou on 10 November. I am afraid that the answer is she cannot. It is Cabinet and Questions during a State Visit and shortly before the Lord Mayor's Banquet: in short, close season for any more visitors.

CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*CPW*

CONFIDENTIAL

020045  
MDADAN 2369

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM ATHENS  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 275  
OF 041053Z JULY 88  
INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, ANKARA, NICOSIA

ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TELNO 148: VISIT TO LONDON BY PAPANDREOU.

1. I HAVE PASSED THE POSSIBLE SLOTS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S DIARY TO PAPANDREOU'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER WHO TOOK NOTE. HE SAID THAT THEY WERE HAVING GREAT DIFFICULTY AT PRESENT WORKING OUT A PROGRAMME WHICH FITTED IN WITH ALL THE CAPITALS. RODOUSSAKIS SAID THAT PANGALOS HAD NOW SUGGESTED TO PAPANDREOU THAT HE SHOULD VISIT LONDON ON 10 NOVEMBER. COULD I ENQUIRE ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS WHETHER THAT DAY WOULD SUIT MRS THATCHER?

2. THE GREEKS ARE OBVIOUSLY HAVING DIARY TROUBLE. WE MAY NOT GET ANY SENSE OUT OF THEM FOR SOME TIME. BUT GRATEFUL TO KNOW IF 10 NOVEMBER WOULD SUIT THE PRIME MINISTER.

THOMAS

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

4 5

ADVANCE

4 5


HD/SED  
HD/WED

HD/NEWS DEPT

PS

MRS Chalker

NNNN



PAGE 1

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

Texts

we make  
a

Mr Powell, No 10



1. DM/TG

2. COP on

Charles

plus on 18/21<sup>st</sup> or 25<sup>th</sup> are recalled in

With the compliments of *unless you would like us to limit these further!*

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Charles

DM.  
- 22/6.

Any thoughts on this tiresome subject?

hgr.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
SW1A 2AH



? 18<sup>th</sup> Nov.  
(I have cancelled  
the Regional  
Tour for at  
least a day).

10 DOWNING STREET

Ty

Charles

Tenzo

PAPANDREOU

I don't <sup>we</sup>  
want a <sup>with</sup>

There is a <sup>much</sup> <sup>more</sup> uncertainty  
over the week 16-25 Nov.

as it is likely (but not  
yet confirmed) to be the  
State Opening that week.

We could offer late Thursday  
afternoon or early evening.

(Does he mean a dinner - which  
would be possible, but only if  
essential). Do you want a word?

Ty 14/6

CONFIDENTIAL

CCPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Tessa  
Can we help?  
am

10 June 1988

Dear Charles,

Visit of Greek Prime Minister

As I mentioned to you on the telephone you will recall that with your agreement we informed the Greeks that the Prime Minister could meet Papandreou on 21 or 25 November or offer him a working lunch on 16 November. You subsequently mentioned that the latter option would be ruled out by the Prime Minister's visit to Washington. You kindly agreed to look at the Prime Minister's diary and see whether there was any other date on which she might be able to offer Papandreou some hospitality, ideally within the window he originally indicated (16-25 November). As you will understand, it is more important to be able to offer Papandreou this possibility than that it should be on a date which he can actually accept.

Yours ever,

L. Parker

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



b v  
c pc

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

10 May 1988

Visit of the Prime Minister of Greece

We spoke about the visit of Mr. Papandreou and the difficulty for the Prime Minister of offering him a meal on 21 November. The only day which I can spot on which the Prime Minister could offer him a meal would be Wednesday 16 November, when she could manage a working lunch. You may like to explore whether the Greeks could accept this.

(CHARLES POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

A handwritten signature or initials in the bottom right corner of the page.

CONFIDENTIAL



File KA-1AAJ

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

28 April 1988

**POSSIBLE VISIT BY THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER**

Thank you for your letter of 26 April about Mr. Papandreou's intention to make a tour of European capitals between 16 and 26 November. The Prime Minister is of course ready in principle to see him then although the dates are not very easy given the Lord Mayor's Banquet and the uncertainty over the date of the State Opening of Parliament and consequently the Debate on the Address.

BF. | Subject to these uncertainties she could manage a meeting on Monday 21 November or the morning of Friday 25 November, but it would be difficult for her to offer him a meal on either day. You may like to discuss these dates with the Greeks.

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

ca



QPC ①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Andy 21  
Andy 25

26 April 1988

Rie Minister

Dear Charles,

Agree in principle to see Mr. Papandreou in November? We would

Possible visit by Greek Prime Minister

We exchanged letters in February about a possible visit by Mr Papandreou before the Greek Presidency. The Prime Minister commented that she really could not take on any more and that she did not wish to invite him then. You suggested, however, that we reconsider in a few months.

at first try to put it after we speak on it

Mr Papandreou has now told Jeremy Thomas in Athens that he intends to make a tour of European capitals between 16 and 25 November, in advance of the Rhodes Council in December (Athens telno 136 - copy enclosed).

Address. (COP) 16/4

The Foreign Secretary considers that it would be useful to have a meeting with Mr Papandreou before the European Council since we shall almost certainly need to urge him to make faster progress on Single Market issues of importance to us. If he will anyway be visiting EC capitals, it would be useful to establish dates convenient to the Prime Minister rather than awaiting a Greek proposal.

and after

If the Prime Minister agrees, I should be grateful if you would let me know which dates within the period Mr Papandreou has specified would be most suitable for the Prime Minister. We would see this as a very brief working visit, with a call on the Prime Minister and perhaps a meal. We certainly would not wish to make anything more of Mr Papandreou's presence here at that time, because of the likely imminence of the Greek general election, which he could call at any time between now and June 1989.

We could speak not

however,

*L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

A

CONFIDENTIAL

# ADVANCE COPY

114207  
MDADAN 3469

CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM ATHENS  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELNO 136  
 OF 200945Z APRIL 88  
 INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ANKARA  
 INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS

*Mr Denny*  
*See esp. para 5.*  
*Should we submit?*  
*If so, when? Now?*  
*20/4*

YOUR TELS 78 AND 79: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PAPANDEOU

1. I CALLED ON PAPANDEOU ON 20 APRIL AND DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. HE SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL TO HER AND WOULD SEND A PERSONAL REPLY.
2. HE WANTED ME TO KNOW STRAIGHT AWAY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM ON THE GREEK SIDE OVER THE COMMON POSITION FOR THE EC/TURKEY ASSOCIATION COUNCIL. BUT ON THE FOURTH PROTOCOL, GREECE COULD NOT CHANGE ITS POSITION. I SAID THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I HAD WONDERED WHETHER GREECE COULD NOT BREAK THE LINKAGES IT HAD PLACED ON THIS ISSUE AND, IN THE SPIRIT OF DAVOS, AGREE THE PROTOCOL AND THEREBY ENCOURAGE TURKEY TO MAKE ANOTHER GESTURE IN THE STEP BY STEP PROCESS. PAPANDEOU DID NOT REJECT THIS.
3. I ASKED HOW PAPANDEOU SAW THE PROSPECTS FOR OZAL'S VISIT TO ATHENS IN JUNE. HE SAID HE COULD NOT BE SURE. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE INFORMAL CONTACTS BETWEEN ATHENS AND ANKARA BEFORE THEN. HE BELIEVED OZAL WANTED TO WORK FOR DETENTE, BY CONCENTRATING ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH, IN TIME, COULD ALLOW THE DIFFICULT ISSUES TO BE TACKLED WITH A GREATER PROSPECT OF SUCCESS. BUT, AS OZAL HAD TOLD HIM IN DAVOS, THERE WERE 3 ESTABLISHMENTS IN TURKEY: THE MILITARY, THE DIPLOMATS AND THE BUSINESSMEN, AND HE COULD ONLY COUNT ON THE LAST. PAPANDEOU SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PLEASED AT THIS WEEK'S MEETING IN ATHENS OF THE TURKISH AND GREEK BUSINESSMEN. BUT HE REALLY DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO MAKE OF RECENT TURKISH MILITARY OVERFLIGHTS. HE BELIEVED THE TURKISH MILITARY WERE NOT HAPPY OVER THE DAVOS PROCESS. HE RECOGNISED THAT THERE WERE CRITICS OF THE PROCESS IN BOTH COUNTRIES. I ENCOURAGED HIM TO MAINTAIN THE STEP BY STEP MOMENTUM - HE GRINNED WHEN I SAID IT WAS RATHER AN ENGLISH WAY OF PROCEEDING.
4. TURNING TO CYPRUS, PAPANDEOU SAID HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY VASSILIOU. HE WAS LESS LEVANTINE, AND MORE INTERESTED IN RESULTS,

THAN HIS PREDECESSOR. HE BELIEVED VASSILIOU WAS READY TO TALK TO DENKTASH, THE EARLIER EXCHANGES HAD BEEN TACTICAL, AND, AFTER ALL, KYPRIANOU HAD BEEN HAPPY TO MEET DENKTASH IN THE PAST, PAPANDEOU SAID HE DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE INTERNAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. THE FIRST WAS FOR THE TWO PARTIES. THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS INVOLVED PARTICULARLY THE UN, TURKEY AND THE UK. (HE DID NOT MENTION GREECE.) HE HAD MADE A PROPOSAL ABOUT DEMILITARISATION TO OZAL, INVOLVING WITHDRAWAL OF THE TURKISH TROOPS, DISSOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD, AND UN OVERSIGHT. DEMILITARISATIONS SEEMED TO HIM THE KEY. I ASKED HOW HE SAW THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS. AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID IN HER MESSAGE, IT SEEMED ONLY REALISTIC TO GET THE NEGOTIATIONS GOING BEFORE THE TURKS COULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO WITHDRAWAL. PAPANDEOU DODGED THIS BY SAYING, SIMPLY, THAT HE WAS NOT SURE YET WHAT VASSILIOU'S VIEWS WERE ON THE SEQUENCE. BUT THEY WERE INSTALLING A HOT LINE AND THIS SHOULD IMPROVE THEIR COMMUNICATIONS. HE WAS ALSO SENDING MACHAIRITSAS, HIS FORMER DIPLOMATIC ADVISER, TO NICOSIA AS AMBASSADOR.

5. TURNING TO OTHER ISSUES, I ASKED PAPANDEOU IF HE WAS PLANNING A TOUR OF EC CAPITALS BEFORE THE RHODES COUNCIL. HE CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS AIMING TO DO SO BETWEEN 16 AND 25 NOVEMBER.

6. I SAID WE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED AT THE OUTCOME OF THE FRIGATE COMPETITION. WE COULD NOT MATCH THE GERMAN HAND-OUTS ON TANKS AND AIRCRAFT. BUT WE WERE GLAD TO SEE MARCONI HAD WON THE ASSESSMENT FOR THE LANDING CRAFT COMBAT SYSTEM, ON PRICE AND TECHNICAL MERIT. WE NATURALLY HOPED THE FINAL DECISION WOULD CONFIRM THIS. PAPANDEOU MADE A NOTE.

7. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE GROWING SIGNS OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT INTEREST BETWEEN BRITAIN AND GREECE. ROUMELIOTIS HAD TOLD HIM OF THE SUCCESS OF THE RECENT CBI CONFERENCE IN LONDON. I SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED TO HEAR THAT THE TAYLOR WOODROW BID FOR THE ACHELOOS CONTRACT WAS WELL THOUGHT OF.

8. I FINALLY ASKED HIM TO GIVE HIS BLESSING TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE NOEL-BAKER ESTATE. IT WAS TWO YEARS SINCE YOU HAD RAISED THIS WITH HIM. I OUTLINED WHAT HAD NOW BEEN AGREED IN PRINCIPLE. HE SAID IT SOUNDED FAIR AND SENSIBLE.

THOMAS

YYYY

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 November, 1983

*John Kerr*

*100-5/11  
h-a-*

Visit of the Greek Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 7 November enclosing a record of the plenary session on 4 November.

I think there is one very minor typing error on page 6. The words 'We would be talking to the Americans and the UN' which occur in the 5th line from the foot of the 6th page, should appear in the last line of the page, after the words 'move of this sort', thus forming part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's remarks. I enclose a copy of the page concerned, with the amendment side-lined.

Copies of this letter go to John Kerr (HM Treasury), Robert Lawson (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*John Kerr*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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Mr. Papandreou said he knew what we had said on UDI, including the remarks made by Mr. Heseltine in Turkey. He was pleased by the line we had taken and hoped that such intervention would remove the threat of UDI. Following the urging of the UK and others, Greece had gone along with the Secretary General's initiative. After discussion with President Kyprianou it had been agreed to support the initiative without reservations. Together with the Cyprus Government they had prepared a response which pleased the Secretary General. But Denktash had refused to go along with the Secretary General's proposal. Since then things had not been going well. The Secretary General seemed to be yielding to pressure. The previous day he had apparently called for a summit meeting between Kyprianou and Denktash without referring to preparations (Mr. Mahairitsas commented that what the Secretary General had done was remove a phrase referring to his initiative).

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said we were disturbed at some indications that UDI might be taken as an opportunity for sending additional Greek troops to Cyprus. Mr. Papandreou said that Greece was a guarantor power. They were not seeking a military confrontation with Turkey in either Cyprus or the Aegean. But their prestige was engaged. Consequently they might have to send troops. This was not to say that they would definitely do so but that they might believe it necessary to assure the security of the Greek Cypriot Community. He felt that UDI might lead to double enosis. He had always been against this. In his view neither Turkey nor Greece had any right to be in Cyprus. This was why he had put an emphasis on the need to remove Turkish troops and leave the Cypriots to solve their problem themselves. This was quite different from the question of British bases which were a matter between the UK and the Government of Cyprus. He hoped that Britain would talk to the Secretary General and the United States about the Cyprus problem and the attempts to remove references to the Secretary General's initiative.


The United States could be influential. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said he hoped that Mr. Papandreou would understand the reasons for his comment about troops. Also that we would not be taken by surprise by a move of this sort. <sup>We would be talking to the Americans and the UN.</sup> Mr. Papandreou assured

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/ him

Greece Oct 80

Visit by Mr Papandreu



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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

7 November 1983

VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE

I enclose with this letter a record of the Plenary Session which took place here at 1145 on 4 November.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Kerr (HM Treasury), Robert Lowson (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food), Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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*a master*

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. PAPANDEOU  
AT NO.10 DOWNING STREET ON 4 NOVEMBER 1983 AT 11.45 AM

Present:

The Prime Minister	Mr. Andreas Papandreou
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Mr. Gregory Varfis
Sir Julian Bullard	Mr. Nikos Kyriazides
Sir Michael Butler	Mr. Christos Mahairitsas
Mr. P.A. Rhodes	Mr. Yiannis Papanikolaou
Mr. D.H.A. Hannay	
Mr. A.J. Coles	
Dr. D.C. Wilson	

\* \* \* \* \*

EC

The Prime Minister suggested that, following the tete-a-tete session, discussions should concentrate on the Athens summit and how that meeting should reach positive conclusions. There were certain fundamental principles at stake which had been defined at Stuttgart and on which it was not possible to compromise. If these were not dealt with in advance it was important to reach agreement on them at Athens. Two key issues were the budget, where a fair system of burden sharing was essential, and legally binding financial guidelines for the Common Agricultural Policy. How did Mr. Papandreou view these problems?

After thanking the Prime Minister for inviting him to London for a meeting which he saw as an important part of the preparation for Athens, Mr. Papandreou said that nothing had really been resolved at Stuttgart. All important matters had been left for the Athens summit. If that meeting failed the consequences would be serious. Community countries would be entering an election period in which opposition parties would be highly critical of any compromises made by Governments in an endeavour to reach agreement. He hoped the Athens summit would resolve certain basic issues which were inter-related. The summit should not get involved in matters of detail.

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It should solve the political questions. One of these was that the matter of the budget and the British contribution to it had to be solved on a permanent basis. It was the Presidency's task to find an acceptable solution. If this matter was not resolved there could be no agreement on other matters. He agreed that the problem of the agricultural budget was also important. A distinction could be made between northern and Mediterranean produce. There were also the questions of own resources and enlargement. The latter was particularly significant since Gonzales now saw the Athens summit as being crucial for the negotiations on Spanish entry; he did not expect anything to come from the French Presidency. All concerned must seek compromises to make possible the survival and proper functioning of the Community. It was significant that Greece, a country with reservations about the Community, should take this view. The summit should also deal with structural funds, a matter which had been mentioned at Stuttgart but not resolved. Structural funds should be related to fundamental strategies and not just involve transfers of resources. He would like Mr. Varfis to speak on points of detail.

Mr. Varfis said the most difficult problem was the budget. It was significant that all member states now accepted that the system should be corrected and that the method for doing so should be automatic. But there were still major differences about how this should be achieved. The net contribution criterion was not acceptable to many countries. The Prime Minister intervened to say that this was a key issue for the UK on which we would not compromise. The point could not be over-emphasised. We could not accept that the two net contributors, Germany and the UK, should bow to the views of the majority. The problem must be solved before Athens.

Mr. Papandreou said that questions both of principle and practice were involved. Could there not be other ways of achieving the same practical result without using the criterion of net contributions? The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, commenting that we much appreciated the efforts already made by Mr. Varfis, said it was essential to take account not just of the VAT contributions but also customs and agricultural levies.

It was essential to take full account of all monies that went to the EC and all that was paid in return. Sir Michael Butler added that all the alternative forms of measurement proposed by the Commission or other member states were designed to reduce the size of the problem and to increase our contribution. It might be possible to use a term other than net contribution. But the problem itself could not be disguised. The Prime Minister said we could if necessary talk about 'equitable sharing'. Mr. Varfis suggested that there might be another system which gave the same result but was not based on net contribution. One possibility was that national shares of expenditure should be related not to GNP but to VAT. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said this would not take account of customs or agricultural levies. It would be related only to VAT. It was essential to have a permanent mechanism for dealing with the problem. He sensed growing agreement that the solution must be found on the revenue side. The Danish proposals failed to do this. The French proposals, however, did. Mr. Varfis agreed that the final solution was likely to be found by a correction on the revenue side. But some countries were likely to hold out against this until the last minute. The Prime Minister said that the figures published by the Commission showed clearly net contributions and net receipts. Everybody could see what they themselves provided. It was wrong that the UK should provide heavy subsidies for other countries. We accepted that we should provide some funds but the solution must be related to net contributions. This was a fundamental principle. She added that we had our own safety net proposal. But there was no need to go into detail now. Mr. Papandreou said he understood the problem and was seeking for a solution which could be accepted unanimously by member countries. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that unanimity is essential. The matter could not be decided by simple majority.

Turning to agriculture, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that there was a need for binding financial mechanisms. It was also important to have as many as possible of the smaller details settled before the Athens summit. Mr. Varfis said that most countries were agreed on voluntary measures to provide the financial guidelines. There was agreement that, if decisions were made to increase expenditure on other items, then expenditure on agriculture should increase by a lesser amount. He believed that

political agreement on procedural measures, eg that Ministers of Finance as well as Ministers of Agriculture should be involved in any decision on increasing funds, would be almost equivalent to a binding agreement. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that agreements on procedure were not enough. It was essential to have legally binding agreements. The Dutch suggestion did not go far enough. The Prime Minister added that there was an even more important issue. If there was to be any increase in own resources it was essential to know what the situation would be for the next 10 years. If there was no increase in own resources the Community would face financial constraints (Mr. Varfis commented that there would also be no enlargement).

The Prime Minister continued that, as Europe came out of recession, Community revenues would be buoyant without any increase in VAT. It was essential to realise that, unless specific funds were allocated to agriculture, other policies would suffer. We must not have a situation in which resources devoted to agriculture were increased and other programmes were not decreased with a consequent rise in overall expenditure. Mr. Papandreou said the proposal was that increases in agricultural expenditure should be lower than on other items. Sir Michael Butler commented that the key to this was the figure taken as the 'base' for agricultural expenditure. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that specific proposals were needed for specific items. But overall there must be a binding agreement. Political commitments as in 1981 were not sufficient.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary continued that what was needed from the Athens summit was agreement on a convincing and attractive set of new policies. Some of these, eg further removal of frontier restrictions on trade and sorting our air fares, did not require additional expenditure. A list of such proposals should be prepared for the Athens summit. An agreed plan for reducing lead in petrol could be on the list. It would be popular politically.

In answer to a question from the Prime Minister about the next moves by the Presidency, Mr. Varfis said he thought

the time had not yet come for concrete proposals from the Presidency on the budget. He agreed there should be a list of important points for decision at Athens which would be impressive from the point of view of public opinion. There should be a timetable for implementation. The Prime Minister commented that Copenhagen had produced a timetable but nothing had happened. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that timetable had been too general. There should be specific proposals. In addition he believed it was essential to settle the basic issues at Athens. The consequences of not doing so would be very serious. The Prime Minister added that there was a need for a fall back position if there was no agreement at Athens. With so many crises elsewhere we could not afford a crisis in the EC. Mr. Papandreou wondered if it would be sufficient to say that all agreed that the UK was carrying an unfair burden in budget contributions. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said this would not be enough. There must be firm agreements in place as a result of the Athens meeting.

#### Cyprus

Turning to other matters, the Prime Minister asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to comment on the situation in Cyprus. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said we hoped to see progress within the framework of the Secretary General's new initiative and talks between the two communities. We had been much concerned recently about Turkish Cypriot threats on UDI. We had made our views clear to the Turks and Turkish Cypriots. It was sometimes said that we were on the same side as the Greeks. Such comments could be counter-productive. We needed to remain in a position to influence both sides. The Prime Minister added that when President Kyprianou had been in London we had been concerned that negotiations between the two communities were taking so long. We had approached the UN Secretary General, asking him to take a closer interest. She understood that he had now put forward new proposals but was concerned that these were not getting far.

/ Mr. Papandreou

Mr. Papandreou said he knew what we had said on UDI, including the remarks made by Mr. Heseltine in Turkey. He was pleased by the line we had taken and hoped that such intervention would remove the threat of UDI. Following the urging of the UK and others, Greece had gone along with the Secretary General's initiative. After discussion with President Kyprianou it had been agreed to support the initiative without reservations. Together with the Cyprus Government they had prepared a response which pleased the Secretary General. But Denktash had refused to go along with the Secretary General's proposal. Since then things had not been going well. The Secretary General seemed to be yielding to pressure. The previous day he had apparently called for a summit meeting between Kyprianou and Denktash without referring to preparations (Mr. Mahairitsas commented that what the Secretary General had done was remove a phrase referring to his initiative).

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him that there would be no surprise. We should keep in touch on Cyprus through diplomatic channels.

Greece/Turkey

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked about progress in the dialogue between Greece and Turkey. Mr. Papandreou said they were prepared to have a dialogue about all matters except Cyprus. On the Aegean Greece had insisted on a moratorium in 1981. Such a moratorium now existed. There had been no recent infringement of Greek national airspace. Evren was following a policy of rapprochement on this matter. Greece was prepared to talk providing there was no question of surrendering sovereign territory. Talks had started on economic matters and tourism. The only difficult issue at present was NATO exercises in the Aegean. But this was a NATO not a bilateral matter.

Lebanon

Turning to the Lebanon the Prime Minister said reports were coming in of Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon following the bombing that morning of Israeli headquarters in southern Lebanon. Such bombing attacks were a very serious problem. Nobody had taken into account the possibility of suicide bombing raids. Mr. Papandreou said there must be a question about who had done the bombing. He was not convinced it was the Palestinians. It could be the Syrians. Greece had accepted in principle to be part of an observer force. But he would not send Greek soldiers to Lebanon (where they might get killed) unless there was agreement between those meeting at Geneva and the others involved. If there was agreement at Geneva then he was prepared to send observers. He was not optimistic about Lebanon. The problems there were intensified by outside interference from both Israel and Syria. Both intended to remain in the Lebanon. So apparently did the US. Syria had recently sent a message to the French through the Greeks. The Syrians had said that they understood the US presence in the Lebanon but not that of France. They had advised the French to withdraw.

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- 8 -

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said he had recently met with the other contributors to the MNF. Our partners were interested in reducing their contingents in the MNF by the introduction of observers. Mr. Papandreou commented that Sr. Craxi seemed more interested in sending observers than did Greece: that was because the Italians already had troops there. The Prime Minister concluded by expressing concern that the original commitment to send a force for a limited period was constantly being extended. With such international forces it was essential to lay down in advance clear guidelines on their role, a clear time limit for their presence and to have a clear command structure.

The meeting ended at 1.05 pm.

A.J.C.

4 November 1983

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Duty Clerk

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE  
PRIME MINISTER AND MR. DENIS THATCHER IN HONOUR OF HIS EXCELLENCY  
MR. ANDREAS PAPANDREOU, PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE ON FRIDAY,  
4 NOVEMBER 1983 AT 1.00 PM FOR 1.15 PM

---

The Prime Minister  
and Mr. Denis Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Andreas Papandreou

Prime Minister of Greece

Mr. Gregory Varfis

Under Secretary for Foreign  
Affairs

His Excellency the Greek Ambassador  
and Mrs. Kyriazides

Mr. Christos Mahairitsas

Head of Mr. Papandreou's  
Diplomatic Cabinet

Mr. Yiannis Papanikolaou

Economic adviser to  
Mr. Papandreou

Mr. Nicolaos Katapodis

Political Director

Her Majesty's Government

Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine, MP

Visited Greece in  
September. Mr. Papandreou  
holds the Greek Defence  
Portfolio

Rt. Hon. Norman Fowler, MP  
and Mrs. Fowler

Possible visit to Greece

Mr. Ian Stewart, MP  
and Mrs. Stewart

Rt. Hon. Lord Belstead

Labour Party

Rt. Hon. Neil Kinnock, MP

Conservative Party

Sir Bernard Braine, MP

Chairman, Anglo-Greek  
Parliamentary Group

-----  
His Grace The Lord Archbishop of Canterbury  
and Mrs. Runcie

Visit to Greece planned  
for 1984

Commerce and Industry

Rt. Hon. Earl Jellicoe  
and Countess Jellicoe

Chairman, British Overseas  
Trade Board. Chairman,  
Anglo-Hellenic League

Admiral Sir Raymond Lygo  
and Lady Lygo

Managing Director, British  
Aerospace plc



Commerce and Industry (continued)

Sir Nicholas Henderson  
and Lady Henderson

Director, Hambros Bank.  
Lady Henderson is Greek

Mr. Robert Evans  
and Mrs. Evans

Chief Executive, British Gas  
Corporation

Media

Mr. Geoffrey Owen

Editor, Financial Times

Mr. John Torode  
and Mrs. Torode

Political and industrial  
leader writer, The Guardian

Academia/Arts

Dr. J.K. Campbell  
and Mrs. Campbell

St. Antony's College, Oxford.  
Greek historian.

Mr. George Richardson  
and Mrs. Richardson

Economist. Fellow of  
St. John's College. Secretary  
to the Delegates and Chief  
Executive, Oxford University  
Press

Miss Dilys Powell

Author, and journalist.  
Book about Greece

Professor Robert Cook

Archaeologist. Chairman,  
Management Committee of  
British School at Athens

Others

Rt. Hon.

The Earl of Longford

and Lady Katherine Giles

Mr. Frank Giles  
and Lady Katherine Giles

Mr. Giles is Acting Chairman of  
Association of Property  
Owners in Greek Frontier areas

The Hon. Montague Woodhouse  
and Lady Davina Woodhouse

Distinguished soldier and  
historian of Greece. Biography  
of President Karamanlis

Sir Brooks Richards  
and Lady Richards

Former Ambassador to Greece.  
Chairman, CSM European  
Consultants

Officials

Sir Julian Bullard

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr. P.A. Rhodes

HM Ambassador, Athens

Mr. David Hannay

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

10 Downing Street

Mr. Robin Catford

Mr. John Coles

VISIT OF THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER: 4 NOVEMBER

Greek Delegation for Talks with the Prime Minister.

Mr Andreas Papandreou

Prime Minister

Mr Gregory Varfis

Under Secretary for  
Foreign Affairs  
responsible for EC  
matters.

Mr Christos Mahairitsas

Head of Papandreou's  
Diplomatic Cabinet.

Mr Yiannis Papanicolaou

Papandreou's economic  
adviser.

LUNCH FOR THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER, 4 NOVEMBER

SPEAKING NOTES

Glad to welcome you back to London, both as President of EC and as Head of Government of an important and valued friend.

Common membership of North Atlantic Alliance and of EC links our interests together both in the security and economic spheres. But bilaterally too there are close ties which stretch back even further, covering periods of peace and war. These ties range across many and varied fields: our people know and love your country from their visits in summer; we share a long and character-forming maritime tradition; many of our academics owe their livelihood to their study of your country's past (and, for that matter, her present); while Westminster has been called the mother of Parliaments, honour is due to Athens as the cradle of democracy. This itself illustrates another debt which we owe to the Greek tradition, that of language: democracy is a word of Greek invention, as are the words describing your own fields: economics and, of course, politics.

I am looking forward to visiting Greece myself in December for the Athens Summit. As we have agreed in our talks this morning, there is still much to be done by all members of the

/Community

Community working together and much to be gained for the Community as a whole. At the end of the day a negotiated package will need to reflect member states' essential requirements. Greece's rôle in the Presidency will be testing and crucial.

NATO Secretary-General: Thank you for supporting Lord Carrington.

Falklands Resolution: Please abstain. Not asking you to vote with us, only not to vote with Argentina.

INF Deployment: Greek proposal for six-month delay is harming alliance position.

EC issues: We have fundamental interests at stake at Athens and will not accept unsatisfactory compromises.

PLENARY

Athens issues: You have difficult task as Presidency. Commend your efforts so far.

Explain our requirements on future financing and CAP. Problems will be solved only by hard negotiation, not artificial compromises.

Greek Memorandum (if raised): We are participating in ad hoc group which is examining Commission proposals.

Arms Control

Arms Control: Our view of INF deployment.

British and French deterrents.

NATO: Concern at effect of Greek/  
Turkish problems on NATO.

Tornado: Hope you will purchase.

British property in frontier areas:

Parliamentary and public concern. Find  
way to resolve uncertainty and assure  
titles of ownership.

/.....



Elgin Marbles (if raised): We are considering official request and are consulting British Museum. We should not let this become political issue.

Cyprus: Against Turkish UDI. Back efforts of UN Secretary-General.

Lebanon: Position of Greek and Italian observers.

4 November 1983

Visit of Prime Minister of Greece

You should know that the Prime Minister raised with Mr. Papandreou over lunch the question of British property in Greek frontier areas. Mr. Papandreou replied to the effect that the issue was very complicated but that a decision was necessary and that an internal meeting would be held to consider it next week.

A J COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SUBJECT

File



cc: Hunt  
MOD  
Co

cc MASTER SET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 November 1983

Dear Roger,

VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE

At the start of their talks today, the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Greece had a tête-à-tête discussion. The Greek Ambassador and I were also present. The conversation lasted for forty minutes.

After welcoming Mr. Papandreou the Prime Minister said that she was grateful for the support that he had given to the appointment of Lord Carrington as Secretary General of NATO. Mr. Papandreou said that Lord Carrington was clearly the best man for the job. They had been friends for some twenty years. Mr. Luns was no longer able to carry out the task effectively.

Turning to the European Council at Athens, the Prime Minister said that Heads of Government would not be able to engage in negotiation on detailed points. So the basic elements of the package must be clarified in prior negotiation. Mr. Papandreou agreed and said that it might be necessary to interrupt the formal session at Athens for informal conversation between the participants. All his contacts showed that the December meeting would be critical. The Prime Minister agreed. President Mitterrand had made it clear to her in their last meeting that the holding of the European Elections in June meant that at least some European Governments would not be able to make concessions in the months immediately preceding the Elections. The conclusion was that matters must be settled at Athens. There would be no possibility of this unless the main principles had been established before the European Council. We were talking about fundamental change. There could not be horse-trading between the Member countries.

Mr. Papandreou said that the Presidency would make every effort during November to ensure that the major options were put to the Summit. But the net result would have to be a package. It was not possible to settle the issues individually. The Presidency was now trying to develop the positions which would be proposed to the Council.

/ The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister said that Member countries were rather far apart on the main issues. We should remain absolutely firm on certain matters including a Budget settlement based on a measurement of net contributions or fair burden sharing and on strict financial guidelines. She suggested that these matters be pursued further in the plenary session.

Mr. Papandreou said that he would see President Mitterrand on 23 November and Chancellor Kohl on 25 November. He had already met Signor Craxi and M. Mauroy. He had also discussed the issue of enlargement in Athens with the Prime Ministers of Spain and Portugal. Portugal felt that it should not be tied to the fate of Spain. The Prime Minister commented that it would be difficult to admit Portugal without Spain but we had to keep democracy alive in Portugal.

Mr. Papandreou said that Spain felt that a firm decision should be taken in Athens. Otherwise, France, because of the European Elections, would not be able to agree to a decision at any later stage. The Prime Minister said that she was rather surprised that President Mitterrand attached so much importance to the European Elections as a verdict on his Government. After all, there was some time to go even before his legislative Elections. Mr. Papandreou said that the Spanish view was that if Spain was to enter the Community the discussion of the CAP should take account of that prospect i.e. it should not be treated as a separate issue. Senor Gonzales had made it plain that if there was no basic decision on Spanish entry at Athens he would have to tell his people that Spain would not thereafter seek a relationship with the Community. This was not blackmail. The Prime Minister queried whether the agricultural issues could be settled in that timescale? Mr. Papandreou said that they could not be but what the Spaniards wanted was a decision of principle. There had been substantial progress in discussion of their problems at the level of Agriculture Ministers. There was talk of a ten-year transitional stage for Spain to adjust to the Community. This was what Mitterrand had in mind. The Prime Minister asked what precisely it was that Spain expected from the European Council? Mr. Papandreou said that they were looking for a communique which talked of Spanish entry within two years.

The Prime Minister asked what the position now was about a Spanish referendum on NATO membership? Mr. Papandreou said that the referendum had been postponed but Senor Gonzales linked membership of NATO with membership of the Community. All Spaniards, from the King to the Communist party, wanted membership of the Community. But NATO remained a divisive issue.

The Prime Minister said that the primary consideration was political. We had to keep Spain and Portugal as a democratic area. Mr. Papandreou said that his own party took the position that since the Spanish and Portuguese people wanted EC membership, this must be facilitated. But the main issue was agriculture,

The Prime Minister said that, with regard to EC discussion of the CAP, there were divergent positions at present on the meaning of a strict financial guideline. Mr. Papandreou agreed. The other problem was the British Budget problem. The Presidency would do what it could to develop a formula that was acceptable both to the United Kingdom and to the nine other Member States. The Prime Minister

said that this would be tricky. We should continue to base our position on the fundamental principles which we had made plain at Stuttgart. Mr. Papandreou commented that Stuttgart had solved nothing. The Prime Minister recalled Chancellor Kohl's forceful Chairmanship at Stuttgart and repeated that we could not compromise on our principles.

Turning to the Falklands resolution at the UN General Assembly the Prime Minister said that we did not ask Greece to vote with us but we hoped it would abstain. Mr. Papandreou replied that Greece would indeed abstain. He had supported our action over the Falklands because he was against one country trying to occupy another. Memories of Cyprus had played their part. True, Greece also supported the Argentine view that there should be a dialogue. But it would abstain on the UNGA resolution. He thought other EC countries would do the same. Italy might be the only exception but he did not know about Ireland.

The Prime Minister said that much was happening in the world. There was a considerable contrast between the amount of consultation among EC Member States and the amount of Trans-Atlantic consultation. Agreeing, Mr. Papandreou said that North America was a distant world.

The Prime Minister said that she believed that INF weapons would have to be deployed according to the agreed timetable. Parliament had debated this matter and the Government had obtained a bigger than normal majority for its position. We would therefore deploy. She did not know how Mr. Andropov would react. He had not been seen in public for two months. Mr. Papandreou said that the explanation might be the state of his health. But it was clear that the downing of the Korean airliner was a military not a political decision. The Prime Minister said that the incident revealed a bad command structure and poor rules of engagement. Mr. Papandreou observed that the aircraft had not been properly identified. The Russians were embarrassed. They had taken a long time (2½ hours) to react. The Prime Minister commented that the handling of the incident was very revealing. The only course properly open to the Soviet Union was to admit that it had made a dreadful mistake. Mr. Papandreou replied that the Russians had avoided admitting this because it would mean that someone had to pay. It would also have revealed an inadequate system of decision-making.

The Prime Minister repeated that we would proceed with deployment. It was possible that the Soviet Union might suspend negotiations but we should then strive to get them resumed. Contact with the Soviet Union was important.

Mr. Papandreou commented that Greece was a maverick on the deployment issue. Perhaps he should have done more to explain their position. He was convinced that the Soviet response to deployment would be multiple. They would install more missiles, perhaps the SS22. But they would also rapidly develop ICBMs so that the flight time to the United States was cut to ten minutes. They would either develop new weapons or change the structure of existing ones by reducing the payload and increasing the fuel capacity. These missiles would cease to be truly ballistic and would have a more horizontal trajectory.

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All this would be in response to the installation of Pershings with their short flight time to Moscow. Thus there would be considerable escalation. The Soviet Union would also try to harm relations between East and West Germany. These considerations had led him to propose a six month delay of any deployment. There was the counter argument that if the Russians were given more time they would not use the time to reach agreement. It was hard to know which policy was right.

The Prime Minister repeated that we would deploy. To falter now would be fatal. But deployment would be spread over five years. Mr. Papandreou said that when Mr. Tikhonov had visited Greece he had given the impression of an emotional reaction in the Soviet Union to the prospect of Pershing in Germany which brought back memories of the last war. The Prime Minister commented that there was quite a lot of weaponry in Germany already. Mr. Papandreou said that he found the situation frightening. As the flight time of missiles was reduced, the opportunity for political decisions would be lessened. The Prime Minister said that this was true but the whole purpose of our weapons was to deter. It was difficult to influence the Soviet Union because their system did not permit change. Mr. Papandreou agreed that the system was monolithic and ossified. Greece had certain contacts with the Russians. They had received Mr. Tikhonov. He himself had been to Moscow for Brezhnev's funeral. He also received the Soviet Ambassador though the latter was only capable of making routine speeches. Although he had no hard evidence, he felt that the military were playing an increasingly important role. Andropov's absence from the scene might be explained by ill health but it could be a question of tactics.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Kerr (HM Treasury), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office). Its contents should be brought to the knowledge only of those who need to be aware of them for operational reasons.

*you see*

*fol lola.*

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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E. R.  
PRIME MINISTER

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MR. PAPANDREOU

You have a tete-a-tete at 11 o'clock (with notetakers if you wish). At 11.30 there will be a plenary in the Cabinet Room with the following in attendance:

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary  
(who has to leave at 12.30 to make  
a speech at Chatham House)

Mr. Rhodes (our Ambassador)

Sir Julian Bullard

Mr. Hannay

Mr. Gregory Varfis  
(Under-Secretary for  
Foreign Affairs  
responsible for EC matters)

Mr. Christos Mahairitsas  
(Head of Papandreou's  
Diplomatic Cabinet)

Mr. Yiannis Papanicolaou  
(Papandreou's Economic  
Adviser)

I attach cards for the tete-a-tete and the plenary.

Papandreou wants to concentrate largely on EC issues. (He will probably be fairly well briefed and I recommend that you read the relevant briefs in full.)

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I should also draw your attention to the fact that you have had a number of messages from Mr. Francis Noel-Baker asking you to raise with Papandreou his property problems. I attach a letter from the FCO which sets out the details but contains the recommendation that you should not single out Mr. Noel-Baker's case in your talks with Mr. Papandreou. On the other hand, you probably ought to raise the case of the many British citizens who are concerned about their property in Greek frontier areas (see brief).

---

A.J.C.

3 November 1983

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 November 1983

*Dear John,*

Visit of Greek Prime Minister: 4 November

I enclose three copies of briefing prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for the Prime Minister's use in her talks with Mr Papandreou at 11 a.m. on 4 November.

*Yours  
R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

*- Ov set given  
to BI*

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Creece: Visit by Papanicolaou

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

OUT 80





VISIT OF THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER, 4 NOVEMBER

LIST OF BRIEFS

Steering Brief

- 1 Bilateral Relations
- 2 EC
  - (a) General
  - (b) Future Financing
  - (c) CAP and Structural Fund, including IMPs
  - (d) Greek Memorandum
3. European Political Cooperation
- 4 Defence and Arms Control
- 5 East/West Relations
- 6 Eastern Mediterranean
  - (a) Cyprus
  - (b) Greece/Turkey
  - (c) Lebanon
- 7 Falklands



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AGENDA

- |    |   |                |
|----|---|----------------|
| 1. | Bilateral Relations                         | Brief No. 1    |
| 2. | EC  |                |
|    | (a) General                                 | Brief No. 2(a) |
|    | (b) Future Financing                        | Brief No. 2(b) |
|    | (c) CAP Structural Fund<br>(including IMPS) | Brief No. 2(c) |
|    | (d) Greek Memorandum                        | Brief No. 2(d) |
| 3. | European Political Cooperation              | Brief No. 3    |
| 4. | Defence and Arms Control                    | Brief No. 4    |
| 5. | East/West Relations                         | Brief No. 5    |
| 6. | Eastern Mediterranean                       |                |
|    | (a) Cyprus                                  | Brief No. 6(a) |
|    | (b) Greece/Turkey                           | Brief No. 6(b) |
|    | (c) Lebanon                                 | Brief No. 6(c) |
| 7. | Falklands                                   | Brief No. 7    |

Note

No formal agenda has been agreed: but both sides have accepted that the talks should draw on the foregoing list of subjects.

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VISIT OF THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER: 4 NOVEMBER

STEERING BRIEF

Introduction

1. This is Papandreou's first working visit to the UK as Prime Minister. He came to London and called on the Prime Minister in November 1980 when leader of the Greek opposition. (He frequently recalls that visit and feels that he established a rapport with the Prime Minister.) He also attended the European Council in London in November 1981, shortly after becoming Prime Minister.

2. In the Greek tradition, Papandreou is the founder and central figure in his party. He takes all important decisions and is ruthless with subordinates who step out of line. An astute manager of publicity, his personal popularity is a key to his party's success. He can be very reasonable in private discussion but has a strong demagogic streak in public.

3. This visit follows that of the Greek Deputy Foreign Minister, Capsis, who called on the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and had talks with Baroness Young.

Programme, Agenda and Tactics

4. A copy of the programme and agenda is at Annex A. Personality notes on Mr Papandreou and his party are at Annex B. A background note on Greece is at Annex C, and basic statistics at Annex D.

5. The talks will begin with a half an hour tête à tête. The Prime Minister may like to express pleasure at Greek support for Lord Carrington's candidature for the Secretary Generalship of NATO. She could use the opportunity to press for a Greek abstention on the Argentine Falklands resolution and to express our concern at the damage which Papandreou's proposal for a 6-month delay in INF deployment is doing to the Alliance position. The Prime Minister might then speak about the danger of attempting, for the

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sake of 'success' as Presidency, to push solutions not fully acceptable to us as a major party with fundamental interests at stake. This would provide a natural lead into discussion of EC issues with full delegations.

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EC

6. Papandreou wants to concentrate on EC issues. He will also be visiting Paris and Bonn and probably other European capitals before the Athens European Council. He will be accompanied by Varfis (Minister with responsibility for European Affairs) who has been chairing meetings of the Special Council.

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7. Although the Greeks have not directed the negotiations very effectively so far, we can commend their efforts (they are new to it all). But we should emphasise that we have certain unbreakable requirements (future financing and the CAP) which can only be solved by hard negotiation and not by arbitrary compromise. Rather than trying to forge such compromises, the Greeks would do better to concentrate on generating momentum for decisions at Athens; do more to sum up the position reached in negotiation; and ensure that necessary follow-up work is done.


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8. In deciding our approach to EC questions affecting Greek national interest (eg the Greek Memorandum) we shall need to bear in mind the significant role of the Greek Presidency in handling the post-Stuttgart negotiations and should try to ensure that they maintain a broadly positive approach. Brief no 2 a (Community General Brief) relates our objectives for Athens to those of Papandreou as President of the European Council and as Greek Prime Minister. It includes a separate steering brief on EC issues.

Other

9. Papandreou's conduct of foreign policy is high-profile, self consciously independent, and tailored to a narrow perception of Greek national interests. It is intended to camouflage a lack of success in economic policy and the dropping of election pledges

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European Political Co-operation (Brief no 3)

15. We shall not wish to raise the subject of Greek performance in PoCo. If raised we should express regret at recent events and confirm our commitment to the PoCo principle.

Defence and Arms Control (Brief no 4)

16. Mr Papandreou should be told firmly of our views on INF (with which he disagrees), of our concern at the effect Greece-Turkish problems on the unity of NATO. We should refer to our continuing hopes for the sale of Tornado to Greece.

East/West Relations (Brief no 5)

17. We can compare assessments of present state of East/West relations and stress allied determination to see through INF deployment. On Poland we wish to exchange views on present state of Western thinking, and on Afghanistan to ensure a large majority for the fourth UNGA resolution.

Eastern Mediterranean

Cyprus (Brief no 6 a)

18. We should tell the Greeks that we have been active in heading off a Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence: we would not recognise a Turkish Cypriot 'state'. We should make it clear that we back the efforts of the UN Secretary General. if he is to make progress both sides in Cyprus, and their supporters, must avoid provocative moves and empty propaganda point scoring. We may need to resist attempts by Papandreou to claim that our policies on Cyprus are now identical. (They are not although they coincide on opposition to Turkish Cypriot UDI. It would undermine our position with Turks and Turkish Cypriots if it was stated authoritatively that they were).

Greece/Turkey (Brief no 6 b)

19. We should urge the Greeks to seek dialogue with the Turks, and exercise restraint in their bilateral relations.



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to leave NATO and the EC and to remove US bases from Greece. Greek attitudes to Turkey colour it all. But the Greek style has occasionally backfired, eg over the Korean airliner incident, and there are some signs of a new willingness to adapt themselves to their partners' views as a result. Outside pressure is unlikely to bring about major changes and the UK has little leverage. But we may be able to reduce Papandreou's tendency to make damaging public statements by making clear our own vital interests (eg over INF deployment and the British and French deterrents), and by emphasising that there are limits to the tolerance of Greece's partners.

10. The briefs allow for a discussion of the main current international issues. In addition we need to remonstrate about Greek behaviour in NATO and about the ownership of property in Greek frontier areas (which only Papandreou can resolve).

11. In spite of the need to be critical, it would be useful to have some positive outcome to present in public. The most appropriate areas are EC issues, and commercial relations.

#### Summary of Briefs

12. A copy of the agenda is attached at Annex A.

#### Bilateral Relations (Brief no 1)

13. We will wish to press for a solution to the Frontier property problem and encourage the development of commercial relations. If Papandreou raises the issue, we should defend our position on the Elgin Marbles

#### EC Issues (Briefs no 2 a -2 d)

14. A steering brief to cover EC issues is provided by European Community: General Brief (Brief no 2 a).

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Lebanon (Brief no 6 c )

20. We wish to explain MNF troop contributors' current thinking on the role of the force following the recent bomb attacks on American and French troops; to hear of developments concerning deployment of Greece/Italian observers; and to discuss whether there is anything more The Ten can usefully do to help promote reconciliation between Lebanese factions.

Falklands (Brief no 7)

21. We are seeking to persuade the Greeks to alter their position on the Falklands at the General Assembly, and to abstain on the draft resolution the Argentines are now circulating.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

2 November 1983

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## VISIT OF THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER, 4 NOVEMBER

Programme3 November

2.40 pm

Arrive London Heathrow, Olympic Airways Special Flight. Met by Lord Trefgarne.

4 November

11.00 am to 11.30 am

Tête-à-tête with the Prime Minister.

11.30 am to 1.00 pm

Talks with the Prime Minister. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs will attend with officials.

1.00 pm for

1.15 pm

Lunch hosted by the Prime Minister at No 10 Downing Street.

7.30 pm

Reception at the Greek Embassy.

5 November

1.00 pm

Depart London Heathrow, Olympic Airways Special Flight.

A G E N D A

- |    |   |                |
|----|---|----------------|
| 1. | Bilateral Relations                             | Brief No. 1    |
| 2. | EC  |                |
|    | (a) General                                     | Brief No. 2(a) |
|    | (b) Future Financing                            | Brief No. 2(b) |
|    | (c) CAP and Structural Fund<br>(including IMPS) | Brief No. 2(c) |
|    | (d) Greek Memorandum                            | Brief No. 2(d) |

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- |    |                                 |                |
|----|---------------------------------|----------------|
| 3. | European Political Co-operation | Brief no. 3    |
| 4. | Defence and Arms Control        | Brief No. 4    |
| 5. | East/West Relations             | Brief No. 5    |
| 6. | Eastern Mediterranean           |                |
|    | (a) Cyprus                      | Brief No. 6(a) |
|    | (b) Greece/Turkey               | Brief No. 6(b) |
|    | (c) Lebanon                     | Brief No. 6(c) |
| 7. | Falklands                       | Brief No. 7    |

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## PAPANDREOU, ANDREAS

Prime Minister, Defence Minister and leader of PASOK. Deputy for Athens A.

Born Chios 1919, the son of former Prime Minister George Papandreou. Educated at Athens College (where at the age of 15 he founded a marxist magazine called 'Start'), he studied law at the University of Athens. Fell foul of the Metaxas regime because of Trotskyist sympathies and left Greece for the United States where he served in the US Navy and subsequently pursued a distinguished career as an academic economist at Harvard, Berkeley and elsewhere from 1942 to 1960. In 1961, during a visit to Greece on a Fulbright scholarship, he established at Karamanlis' invitation, a new economic research centre in Athens, of which he became director. In 1964 he stood successfully for parliament in his father's Centre Union party. His father appointed him Minister to the Prime Minister and subsequently Deputy Minister of Coordination. In November 1964 he was obliged to resign over the award of a contract to the husband of a woman friend. In April 1965 he was reappointed Deputy Minister of Coordination. In 1965 he was alleged to be the political leader of ASPIDA, a conspiratorial group of left-wing army officers. He was thus at the centre of the controversies which allowed the intervention of the Palace and dismissal of the George Papandreou government, and led towards the military dictatorship.

Arrested on the night of the 1967 coup, he was detained until Christmas of the same year when he was granted amnesty following the intercession of President Johnson and others. After allegedly giving an undertaking not to engage in political activity abroad he was allowed to leave Greece with his wife and family in January 1968. Went to Paris and London, where he forthwith began a campaign against the regime, founding the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK). In 1968 he accepted the Swedish Government's offer of a visiting Professorship at the University of Stockholm, and in 1969 became Professor of Economics at York University in Canada.

PASOK, the radical socialist party which he formed on his return to Greece in 1974 and which inherited some of the conspiratorial methods of its predecessor PAK, did not do well in the year's election but doubled its share of the vote in 1977 to become the main opposition party and nearly doubled it again in October 1981 to win a comfortable majority with 48% of the popular vote.

Reputedly a Trotskyist in 1940, Papandreou became a liberal economist in the US, campaigning for Adlai Stevenson in 1952 and becoming a strong Kennedy supporter in later years. On his return to Greece he was on the left-wing of his father's Centre Union party. In exile he adopted an avowedly marxist approach and PASOK was initially established as a marxist (but not Leninist) party. In domestic policy his interest in decentralisation and cooperatives owes something to the Yugoslav model. In foreign policy, PASOK stood at first for non-alignment based on hostility to Turkey, distrust of the USA, rejection of Greece's identification with the West, support for a Mediterranean socialist grouping and for closer links with the Arab world and with Greece's northern neighbours in the Balkans. Since 1977 his foreign policy has moderated. His commitments to leave NATO and to withdraw from the EC, have been modified though they remain 'strategic goals'. The keynote of his foreign policy remains an appeal to Greek pride in national independence.

Before PASOK's victory in 1981, Papandreou was more moderate and rational in private than was suggested by some of his histrionic public appearances. The dominant, if not necessarily the best, public speaker in Greece, his demagogic oratory and slogan-mongering have a strong appeal to the young and less privileged. Since becoming Prime Minister he has generally made his private manner ( a reasoned, academic air) his public face too. But, as befits the author of the entry on



"Risk" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, he is a calculating tactician. His is also, amongst his associates, autocratic in manner and disinclined to forgive anyone within his circle who has challenged his authority, On the other hand, having succeeded in concentrating power in his own hands within PASOK and now in government, he is sometimes indecisive in action, and often unhappy with the performance of his subordinates. Moreover although the general principles of his political thinking have remained fairly consistent over the years, it is often difficult to judge where he stands on particular issues as he is apt to agree with any interlocutor (or to give impression of agreeing). There were doubts about his health two years ago, but he now appears much fitter.

Papandreou's character is difficult to analyse. Most people who meet him are impressed by his charm and intelligence. But his oratory can be irresponsible, and his political opponents accuse him of deviousness and ruthlessness. Ambition is probably the key; and experience has taught him realism - which suggests that the answer to the question whether the real Papandreou is the moderate or the doctrinaire is that he is neither. His actions will depend on his calculation of the balance of political forces at the given time. And at present he is well aware of the limited scope for radical, or extreme, policies.

Married (see separate entry on his wife Margaret) with 4 children. Speaks excellent English and serviceable French.



## VARFIS, GREGORY

Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (with responsibility for EC questions). Not a Deputy.

Born Athens 1927. Studied law and economics in Athens and Paris, in the latter case while working as a journalist for French radio. Worked for the OECD from 1958-63. In 1964 joined the Greek Permanent Representation to the European Communities as an economic adviser. After the fall of the dictatorship in 1974 returned to Greece to head the General Directorate for EC Affairs in the Ministry of Coordination. Resigned in 1977 in protest at the conduct of the Accession negotiations, and went over to the private sector as managing director of a building materials company. First offered his services to PASOK in 1979 and became their main expert on Community questions. Attended a Wilton Park conference in 1980.

A very able administrator with a first class grasp of the minutiae of Community business. A technocrat rather than a politician, his moderate, pro-Community line seems progressively to have swayed his more doctrinaire, less enthusiastic colleagues.

Married with two children. Good English and better French.



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NIKOS KYRIAZIDES

GREEK AMBASSADOR

Kyriazides (pronounced KEE-REE-AZ-EETH-EES) was born in Athens in 1927. Read Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Oxford, and later studied at the University of Chicago and the World Bank.

After service in the Ministry of Coordination 1949-54, he became involved in banking until the Colonels' coup in 1967 when he resigned. He subsequently became Adviser to the Cyprus Government on its relations with the EC having maintained a close interest in the Cyprus problem since 1960 when he accompanied the Greek Foreign Minister to the London Conference on Cyprus. A passionate advocate of the Greek Cypriot case.

1974-1977, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Greece and leader of the Delegation negotiating Greece's accession to the EC. Until his appointment as Ambassador in London in October 1982 he again advised the Cyprus Government, as well as many companies.

Kyriazides' appointment as Ambassador was a surprise. He was widely expected to become Governor of the Bank of Greece. Seems to be finding it difficult to find his feet in his new role. So far he has not been an effective advocate of Greek policies, and appears to be excessively suspicious of British intentions particularly in the EC and over Cyprus.

Married with two children. His son (aged 15) has just started at the City of London School. His daughter (aged 17) is still studying in Athens. Speaks impeccable English and fluent French. Interested in modern art.

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### MAHAIRITSAS, CHRISTOS

Diplomatic Adviser to the Prime Minister. MFA Special Adviser on International Law.

Born 1933, Athens. Studied law and economics at the University of Paris and the Academy of International Law at The Hague. Legal Adviser OECD 1959-66. During the dictatorship he taught public international law at the University of Athens. From 1975, special adviser to the MFA on International Law, taking part in negotiations with Turkey over air space, with the United States over the bilateral defence agreement and with NATO over re-accession to the military wing.

Though he has come under fire from Left wing critics for alleged academic association with pro-junta professors during the dictatorship period, his political roots lie in the centre and he admits to having joined the MFA in 1975 through the patronage of Mavros (qv). It is assumed that in the period before the 1981 election he kept PASOK informed unofficially of developments in the MFA.

Painstaking and discreet. Papandreou relies on his advice in matters of detail. Unmarried. Speaks excellent English and French.



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YIANNIS PAPANICOLAOU

The Prime Minister's Economic Adviser

Age 33

He studied economics at Athens and the LSE and lectured at Queen Mary College and the LSE, where his students included Papandreou's youngest son Andrikos. Papanicolaou returned to Greece before the 1981 elections at Papandreou's request and helped draft PASOK'S manifesto. A dedicated socialist he has been much involved in recent discussion between European socialist parties on a more coordinated approach to economic policy.

A pleasant interlocutor, who speaks good English.

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VISIT OF GREEK PRIME MINISTER, 4 NOVEMBER 1983

GREECE: INTERNAL

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Papandreu's PASOK (Socialist) Government came to power in October 1981 with a clear majority (172 seats out of 300), ending seven years of New Democracy (Conservative) rule. PASOK have made progress on the social front, eg by permitting civil marriage, recognising the wartime resistance (including the Communists) and carrying out educational reforms. But they have been less successful in dealing with the economic problems of high inflation, low growth and rising unemployment.
2. In October 1982 PASOK lost ground to the Communists in the municipal elections, probably because of dissatisfaction at their slow progress in implementing their left-wing manifesto (the Communists won about 23% of the vote; PASOK about 36%). The economy has remained the biggest problem. The Government were forced to introduce an incomes policy in December 1982. In January 1983 the drachma was devalued by 15.5%. In early June the Government introduced new anti-strike legislation in an attempt to curb increasing industrial unrest. There remains considerable international concern that the Greeks are not getting a grip on the economic situation, and have recently taken doctrinaire socialist measures (eg the take-over of the Heracles Cement Company).
3. Papandreu, who founded PASOK, keeps his party on a tight rein. He is ruthless with those who step out of line. All important decisions are taken by him personally.
4. Many of Pasok's election promises have had to be dropped. Full indexation of wage increases went because of the economic situation (though Papandreu has promised it again for 1984). A

/more



more pragmatic assessment of external realities has led to the dropping of pledges to withdraw from NATO and the EC. The agreement reached in September over the US bases in Greece has been hailed by PASOK as a fulfilment of its promise to remove them; but in fact it provides for continuation for 5 years. This allows the bases to remain beyond the life-time of this parliament and possibly beyond, as left-wing critics have not been slow to point out.

5. Shifts of policy on all these issues mean that Papandreou has to look for other ways of asserting his left-wing credentials. His main instrument has been a high profile foreign policy, anti-Turkish, anti-American, critical of NATO (especially over nuclear policy) and uncooperative in European Political Cooperation. Aggressive assertion of Greek national views has been popular with the electorate. But handling of some of these issues, especially the Korean Airline disaster, has also led to criticism particularly from Greece's partners, and there are some signs that this has had a salutary effect.

6. PASOK's difficulties have led to speculation in Greece about elections to coincide with the European Parliamentary elections in June 1984 (elections are otherwise due in October 1985). But Papandreou is more likely to hang on: he has a secure majority, and is not under any serious threat from the opposition Conservative New Democracy Party.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1 November 1983

Greece : Basic Statistics

1	<u>Population and Land Area</u>	<u>Greece</u>	<u>UK</u>
	(a) Land Area	131,944 km <sup>2</sup>	244,046 km <sup>2</sup>
	(b) Population (1981)	9.7m	56.0m
	(c) Population Growth Rate (1970-1980)	0.9% p.a.	0.1% p.a.
2.	<u>Economic</u>		
(i)	<u>Gross National Product</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1981</u>
	(a) Total (US\$m)	42,890	510,310
	(b) Growth Rate (1970-1980) (% p.a.)	4.6	0.4
	(c) Position in Total GNP League Table	32	5
	(d) Per Capita (US\$)	4,420	9,110
	(e) Position in Per Capita League Table	46	26
(ii)	<u>Overseas Finance</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1982</u>
	(a) <u>Exchange Rates</u>		
	against US\$	Drachma 66.803	£ 1.7505
	against £	116.939	-
	(b) <u>Balance of Payments (US\$m)</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1982</u>
	Exports	4,141	97,047
	Imports	-8,910	-93,318
	Invisibles and Transfers (net)	2,877	3,267
	Current Account	-1,892	6,996
	Capital Account	1,733	2,584
	Balancing Item	47	-6,298
	Overall Balance	-112	3,282
	(c) <u>International Reserves (US\$m)</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1982</u>
	Total Reserves	861.1	12,397
	Months of Imports Covered	0.9	1.11
(iii)	<u>Foreign Trade</u>		
	(a) <u>Main Exports 1982</u>		
	<u>Greece</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>UK</u>
	Basic Manufactures	33.9	<u>%</u>
			Machinery & Transport 32.6
			Equipment
			/Food & Live Animals

<u>Greece</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>%</u>
Food & Live Animals	20.7	Fuels	20.2
Misc. Manufactured Items	13.0	Basic Manufactures	14.3
Mineral Fuels	9.5	Chemicals	11.0
Crude Materials, excl. Fuels	7.1	Miscellaneous Manufactures	9.3

(b) Main Export Markets 1982

<u>Greece</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>%</u>
FRG	19.0	USA	13.4
Italy	8.8	FRG	9.7
USA	8.7	Netherlands	8.4
France	7.0	France	8.1
Saudi Arabia	6.4	Iceland	5.2
<u>/UK</u>	<u>4.87</u>		

(c) Main Imports 1982

<u>Greece</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>%</u>
Manufactures	68.2	Manufactures	65.1
Foodstuffs	7.7	Foodstuffs	11.3
Oil	14.7	Oil	13.0

(d) Main Import Sources 1982

<u>Greece</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>%</u>
FRG	17.0	FRG	13.0
Saudi Arabia	10.9	USA	11.7
Italy	9.2	Netherlands	7.9
Japan	8.1	France	7.5
Libya	7.1	Belg/Lux	5.0
<u>/UK</u>	<u>3.67</u>		

(e) UK Trade with Greece (US\$m)

	<u>1975</u>	<u>1982</u>
Total UK Imports	65.3	151.7
Total UK Exports	117.4	255.3
Real Growth of Exports (five years ending)	-	0.3% p.a.
Position in UK Export League Table	33	34(of 197)

(iv) Development Aid (US\$m)

(a) Reported Aid Receipts 1981

From: DAC Countries on a bilateral basis	7.1
(of which UK)	(-)
Multilateral Organisation	5.7

(b) Aid per head 1980

(i) Greece	1.3
(ii) All LDC's	-

(v) Inflation 1982 % p.a.

	<u>Greece</u>	<u>UK</u>
Consumer Price Index	21.0	8.6

/(vi) Overseas Debt

<u>(vi) Overseas Debt</u>	<u>Greece 1981 %</u>	<u>UK 1982 %</u>
(a) Debt Service Ratio	17.3	NOT AVAILABLE
(b) Overseas Debt/Exports	75.7	5.4
(c) Overseas Debt/GNP	14.8	1.8
 <u>(vii) Overseas Direct Investment 1978 £ m</u>		
(a) UK Investment in Greece (Total UK Investment Overseas)	20.3	19,214.8)
(b) Greek Investment in UK (Inward Direct Investment in UK)	0.4	10,949.2)

3. Composition of Parliament

PASOK (Socialist)	169
ND (New Democracy, Conservative)	111
KKE (Communist)	12
Others	8
	<hr style="width: 10%; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/>
	300

Last election : October 1981

Next election : by October 1985



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VISIT OF GREEK PRIME MINISTER: 4 NOVEMBER

BRIEF NO 1:

BILATERAL RELATIONS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Glad to see increasing exchange of ministerial visits. We should build up habit of consultations.

British Property

2. Cause of parliamentary and public concern here. Hope a way will soon be found to resolve uncertainty and to assure titles of ownership.

Economic and Cultural Relations

3. Scope to develop economic and commercial relations. Anglo-Greek Energy Seminar on 20/21 October was a useful step. Many British firms with much to offer. Award of a major public sector contract would be a welcome boost, eg if British Rail Engineering Ltd could find a Greek partner for rolling stock contract. NEI Parsons are interested in Megalopolis Power Station. Hope Greek government will give approval for cooperation between Steyr-Hellas and Leyland Buses.

Elgin Marbles [If Raised]

4. Official request is under consideration. Consulting British Museum who are legal owners. Share Greek desire that this should not become a political issue.

5. [If pressed on statement immediately after request] We stated HMG's position. Greek request is new factor and being considered carefully.

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## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Relations are generally friendly: close historical and personal ties. But idiosyncrasy and assertiveness since Papandreou took office, especially heresies in NATO and PoCo, have led to some strain.
2. We have had some success in increasing visits after a pause following Papandreou's election. Haralambopoulos to the UK in December 1982; Lord Belstead to Greece in January 1983 and Mr Rifkind in July; Capsis (Greek deputy Foreign Minister) to London 28 October. Increasingly regular exchanges between other ministries.

### British Property

3. A Greek Supreme Court ruling earlier this year has cast doubt on the title to ownership by foreigners of land in certain Greek 'frontier areas'. Over a thousand Britons are affected (especially in Corfu): their property is now unsellable. We have made strong representations, including to Papandreou personally. The Greeks have promised a decision on adequate new legislation soon. We still doubt that this will secure owners' titles and thus assure value of property. Need to keep up the pressure. Frank Giles (ex-Sunday Times) has mobilised an influential pressure group.

### Economic and Commercial Relations

4. Anglo-Greek trade is low and stagnant (Exports to UK £151.7m in 1982; imports £255.3m). British firms are not much interested. Main factors limiting expansion are lack of UK success in gaining major public sector contracts and worries about doctrinaire socialist policies. A success by British Rail Engineering Ltd (£150m rolling stock contracts) or NEI Parsons (£50m turbine generators for power station) could give a boost. British Rail engineering face problem of need to find a Greek partner so that they can bid for contract in which Greek Railways are showing interest.

/5. Leyland

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5. Leyland Buses have followed up the lease of 20 buses to Athens Bus Authority with proposal to assemble buses in Greece with Steyr-Hellas. If Greek government gives approval, detailed negotiations could begin with a view to start of assembly in 1984.

6. Greeks are interested in UK expertise in eg energy and pollution control fields (a joint seminar on energy took place on 20 October). Commercial spin-off hope for from this.

Elgin Marbles

7. The Greek Ambassador formally requested the return of Elgin Marbles on 12 October. He claimed that precedents existed for the return of such pieces and maintained that the Greek request was in line with UNESCO procedure. He said that the Greek Government did not want the claim to be politically acrimonious.

8. British Museum are custodians by Act of Parliament. Official reply will take account of their comments: they will not recommend their return. We should not prejudge the reply or commit ourselves to any time scale for making a reply.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1 November 1983

CONFIDENTIAL





facilitate consensus by rallying to the diametrically opposed position of the majority of Member States which are beneficiaries from the Community budget and which therefore have an obvious interest in minimising change in the budgetary system.

5. On Future Financing (Brief No 2B) the Prime Minister might emphasise that a decision on new own resources, which the Greeks want, will have to be taken at the end when we have a satisfactory settlement on the future financing of the Community and the effective control of CAP and other expenditure. It is essential that any proposal on future financing measures the real extent of the budgetary burden on the UK. Our safety net does this. We could not accept a solution based on partial measurement of the problem like the Danish convergence fund and other ideas. The Prime Minister will wish to remind Mr Papandreou that under the safety net we would remain a contributor to the Community budget. This is a major concession. Do not contest that Greece should be a major beneficiary from the Community budget; we hope Mr Papandreou will accept that the position of the UK, which is also one of the less prosperous Member States, is fair and reasonable and that he will support us.

6. On the CAP (Brief No 2C) the Greek position is unsatisfactory from our point of view. Like the UK (and Italy) the Greeks have an adverse balance on intra-Community trade on agricultural products. Logically therefore they should work with us to bring agricultural expenditure under control. But they calculate that this interest is overridden by the need, as they see it, to increase Community agricultural spending on Meidterranean products.

7. The Prime Minister will wish to stress our determination to bring agricultural spending in the Community under control by the two-pronged approach of a strict financial guideline and appropriate measures for all the main products, in

/particular...

As you said at  
Stuttgart, Ag. Ministers  
will always make an  
excessively expensive package  
each year unless they  
can say to their lobby  
that there is only so  
much extra money available.

7 particular a tough price policy and the extension of guarantee thresholds. She will wish to emphasise that there can be no question of reproducing for the Mediterranean products the mistakes which have been made for Northern products. Already an increasing percentage of CAP expenditure goes in support of Mediterranean products. The problem of surpluses, eg olive oil and wine, is likely to become acute with enlargement.

8. The Greeks have a major interest in increased Community expenditure on structural policies (Brief No 2C). If the issue is raised, the Prime Minister will wish to sound sympathetic but to point out that the Commission's ambition to double the size of the funds in real terms over the next 5 years is unrealistic given budgetary constraints. The Commission's proposal on IMPs (Brief No 2C) are extravagant. We have no interest in their being accepted by the Community. If Papandreou refers to the IMPs, the Prime Minister may wish to say that we are far from convinced of the economic justification of this expensive programme; that we see no way in which the Community can avoid extending them to Spain and Portugal; and that a coherent approach requires that the proposals should be considered in the context of the review of the Structural Funds called for by the Stuttgart European Council.

9. Papandreou will certainly raise the question of the Greek Memorandum (Brief No 2D). We have no interest in increasing Greece's already substantial benefits from the Community budget, though we should probably be prepared at the end of the day to agree to some minor benefits for Greece which would enable Papandreou to claim that his 're-negotiation' had been a success and that there was no longer any question of Greece leaving the EC. The Prime Minister might take the line that we recognise that the Stuttgart European Council called for decisions at Athens and we are participating fully in the work of the Ad Hoc Group which is examining the Commission's proposals as

they come forward.

10. Papandreou recently hosted a meeting of Mediterranean Socialist Prime Ministers at which enlargement was discussed. He may therefore raise this question with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will wish to stress our continued support for enlargement and our pleasure that the recent Community agreement on the reform of the Mediterranean Acquis has unblocked the way for negotiations to begin on the agricultural chapter. It is in our collective interests that both Spain and Portugal should be members of the Community by 1 January 1986 as they wish; French and Irish Presidencies will be crucial.

11. What they really want to see is agreement on key issues at Athens Summit. But in any event, Community should offer some hope for real progress in accession negotiations to Spain and Portugal in Athens conclusions.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

1 November 1983

VISIT OF THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER: 4 NOVEMBER 1983  
Brief No 2b)

EC ISSUES : FUTURE FINANCING

Points to Make

1. Pleased to note that some progress has been made in the negotiations but much work needs to be done if agreement is to be reached at the Athens Summit, now only one month away.
2. Recognise difficulty of role which Mr Varfis has had to play in the Presidency in trying to draw together the threads of agreement. Understand that the Presidency intend to circulate a text before the Special Council next week which will attempt to draw together the results of the discussion so far. It would be unwise to search in each and every case for the middle ground if no middle ground exists. On some issues the overall package cannot be balanced on such a basis. Would urge you not to put forward a Presidency compromise proposal on future financing at this stage. Essential that the alternative options including the UK safety net should be clearly identified and on the table for the negotiations in Athens on 4-6 December.
3. Clear that a majority in the Community want more own resources. But this is not an issue where majorities count. Must be unanimity for any decision on this. For at least two other Member States it is a decision which can only be balanced by satisfactory decisions on budget inequities and on the control of agricultural spending. What I said at Stuttgart holds good: in the context of a long term settlement of the Community's problems we would be prepared to consider an increase in own resources provided that we reached agreement on an effective control of the rate of increase of agricultural and other expenditure and provided that it was accompanied by an arrangement to ensure a fair sharing of the financial burden so that no country has to pay a share which is disproportionate to its relative national wealth.

4. Disappointed that Greece has given us little support. We do not contest that Greece should continue to be a substantial net beneficiary from the Community. But it is not acceptable that the UK, as one of the less prosperous Member States, should have to pay an excessive share of the budgetary burden. Our safety net proposal is designed to ensure a more equitable sharing of the burden by placing a maximum limit on each Member State's net contribution related to its ability to pay. We are not asking for a juste retour. The UK would remain a net contributor under the safety net. Greece would remain a major net beneficiary. The safety net limit would not be static but would rise in line with a country's absolute and relative GDP. A major advantage of the safety net is that every Member State, including those bearing the heaviest budgetary burden, would be able to look at new Community policies on their merits, thus removing a real brake on development of the Community.

5. Pleased to note that there is now increasing agreement that any solution must provide for reliefs on the revenue, rather than the expenditure side of the budget. A solution on the expenditure side would mean going back to the old system of annual refunds which the Community as a whole has already found unsatisfactory.

6. Essential that any solution to the problem of budgetary imbalances should measure the real extent of the budgetary burden on the UK and last as long and to the extent that the problem itself does. Our safety net proposal is the only proposal on the table which does this. We believe that net contributions - the method hitherto used by the Commission - is the most complete and fair measurement of the problem. For the UK that is the measure of the outflow of budgetary resources across the foreign exchanges to other member states. Quite ready to take account of non-budgetary costs as well. But UK's position would then be seen to be worse not better.

7. The Commission's proposal for modulated VAT could not provide an acceptable solution on its own since it does not attempt to

measure the problem directly. The Danish convergence fund proposal deals only with the problem of inadequate receipts and ignores that of excessive contributions. Even as amended by the French, it would not meet our other basic concerns - it would give us nothing after enlargement and only inadequate amounts before; and it would leave us at the mercy of increases in our uncorrected net contribution. It is therefore self-evident that a combination of the two - such as the Germans have proposed - will get us nowhere. Counterproductive to put forward a compromise proposal which we could not possibly accept. This would be a recipe for deadlock.

8. Concerned that the Community has not yet discharged its obligation in respect of our 1982 risk sharing refunds under the agreement of 26 October 1982. If not solved before, this problem will have to be dealt with at Athens. Also worried about possible trouble with the European Parliament and some Member States over our 1983 refunds. The text of the Stuttgart conclusions makes it perfectly clear that there was no link between our refunds and the outcome of the negotiations on future financing and I could not agree to such a link. Real risk of a confrontation at Athens if we cannot resolve these matters satisfactorily. Hope Presidency will do all they can to ensure the Community's earlier undertakings are properly fulfilled.



Essential Facts

1. As Presidency the Greeks have shown a tendency to promote the idea of a compromise between the Danish convergence fund proposal and the Commission's proposal for modulated VAT. In the process they have ignored the UK idea for a safety net because they believe that a solution based on net contributions would not be acceptable to the majority of Member States.
  
2. The Greeks are planning to put a Presidency compromise text to the November Special Council but Mr Varfis appears to have been persuaded at the Preparatory Group meeting on 26/27 October not to table a single Presidency compromise proposal on future financing at this stage since the shape of a final compromise has not yet emerged.
  
3. We wish to deter the Greeks from promoting ideas such as the Danish convergence fund proposal in the face of our strong opposition. The main point to get across the Papandreou is that we have certain unbreakable conditions if the negotiation is to succeed.
  
4. In a national capacity, the Greeks have opposed the use of net contributions on the basis of calculation. They argue that gains and losses should take account of non-budgetary factors eg trading losses. We have not opposed consideration of such a measurement but none of our other partners has shown any inclination to consider non-budgetary gains and losses in detail because they know the calculation would only enhance our case since we make a loss on agricultural and other trade outside the budget.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
1 November 1983

C

VISIT OF THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER, 4 NOVEMBER 1983

Brief No 2C

EC ISSUES : CAP AND STRUCTURAL FUNDS INCLUDING INTEGRATED  
MEDITERRANEAN PROGRAMMES (IMPS)

Points to Make

CAP

1. UK determined to achieve Stuttgart mandate of "concrete steps ... to ensure effect control of agricultural expenditure". Could only agree to consider increase in own resources if this and arrangement to ensure fair sharing of financial burden are achieved.

Strict Financial Guideline .

2. We see a legally binding strict financial guideline as the only mechanism so far proposed which is likely to ensure that agricultural decisions, not just next year but for years to come, are in line with available Community resources and wider Community purposes.

3. The guideline proposal is not an alternative to reform of the individual commodity regimes, but a spur to achieve these necessary reforms.

Scope of CAP decisions at Athens

4. The CAP package agreed at Athens must be balanced. The Council has been right to concentrate on milk and cereals in the first instance, but in recent years CAP expenditure has risen most quickly on Mediterranean products such as wine, tobacco and processed fruit and vegetables. The problems will become more acute with enlargement. Guarantee thresholds and other mechanisms to relate support to sensible levels of production should be extended to those products also.

Prices

5. Like UK, Greece is a net importer of many EC agricultural products. Presumably, then, Greeks share our desire for lower

prices for these products to help bring markets into balance, to encourage consumption and to help balance of payments.

STRUCTURAL FUNDS AND INTEGRATED MEDITERRANEAN PROGRAMMES (IMPS)  
(Defensive)

6. Structural funds are crucial to promoting Community convergence. We welcome decision at Stuttgart to examine ways of making them more effective.

7. We understand Greece's special structural problems, and have been ready to agree special terms for Greece within the framework of existing structural funds (eg Agricultural Development Programme, measures for irrigation and advisory services).

8. But we are not convinced by proposals for IMPs as currently formulated. Already very expensive. Moreover equivalent programmes for Spain and Portugal would inevitably be demanded after enlargement.

9. IMPs should be examined in the context of the review of the structural funds. IMPs very largely cover the same area as the FEOGA Guidance Section on which proposals just tabled. Illogical to deal with them separately.

## Essential Facts

### CAP

1. Greece has not played a leading role in the CAP parts of the post-Stuttgart negotiation. Her main interest has been to keep the focus on northern commodity products; to restrict the concept of guarantee thresholds to products where self-sufficiency has been achieved (in contrast to our own view that they should operate wherever economic outlets are limited); and to maintain special provisions for Mediterranean/small farmers/disadvantaged regions. The Greeks argue that an increase in own resources accompanied by the development of new Community policies would ensure that agricultural spending grew less fast than own resources. This begs the question and is not even logically correct unless the increase in own resources was on a wholly unrealistic scale.

### STRUCTURAL FUNDS

(See Brief No 2d on Greek Memorandum)

2. The Stuttgart Declaration called for proposals increasing the effectiveness of the structural funds (Regional Fund, Social Fund and Guidance Section of the EAGGF). The Commission's subsequent report on the funds did not address the key question of overlapping functions and objectives.

3. Discussion centres around:

a) IMPS

These are Commission proposals for expenditure of some 6.5 billion ecu over 6 years on designated rural areas of Greece, Italy and France. Greece will seek a commitment to IMPS at Athens, and a strict timetable for their fulfilment. We are resisting this strongly, and in very good company with other Community partners, on the grounds that the proposals are too expensive, ill-considered and overlap with the general review of Community structures. IMPS are designed in part, to protect Member States from the consequences of enlargement.

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As such, the Commission claim that Spain and Portugal will not be eligible for benefits. But it is inconceivable that they would not apply for aid under IMPs, if adopted, and there would be no rational basis for refusing them.

b) ERDF

Revised Commission proposals will be tabled very shortly. Our aim will be to remit these proposals to the Regional Policy Working Group, to press for an appropriate measure of concentration, and to establish 'combat of industrial decline' as the primary objective of ERDF.

c) FEOGA GUIDANCE SECTION

The Commission's proposals have now been tabled, and detailed discussion has begun. In general we can accept the thrust of the proposals though we are concerned about their cost implications and the elements of discrimination in favour of small farms.

4. In discussion of the structural funds we need not express outright opposition to what is proposed. Our aim is to spin out discussion and avoid decisions. Our best tactic is therefore to emphasise the failure of the Community, through no fault of ours, to get to grips with these issues; to stress the amount of work that remains to be done; and to cast doubts, implicitly, on whether the dossiers will be in any state for decisions by Heads of Government at Athens.

D

VISIT OF THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER: 4 NOVEMBER

Brief No 2(d)

EC ISSUES: GREEK MEMORANDUM

Points to Make

General

1. Recognise that Stuttgart European Council called for decisions at Athens. We are participating fully in the work of the ad hoc Group which is examining the Commission's proposals as they come forward.
2. [If appropriate] Greece is doing well out of the budget and is set to improve its position still further. The contrast with the UK position is striking.

On Infractions (if necessary)

3. Realise that Greece has had difficulties in adapting its economy post-accession, but she should make every effort to comply with her Treaty obligations. Continued failure to do so is bound to have an adverse impact on how Greece is viewed in the Community.


4. We can accept the proposed regulatory tax to phase out Greek discriminatory taxes on imports from the EC. We shall also be sympathetic to a Commission proposal to postpone the introduction of VAT; something which we note will bring substantial financial benefits to Greece.

On IMPs

5. [See separate brief 2(c)]

On the Commission Proposals in the Social and Agricultural Fields (if raised)

6. Similar considerations to those affecting the IMP proposals apply here. It is not clear how, and to what extent, these



proposals overlap with, and possibly duplicate, provisions in the existing structural funds. This needs to be clarified before decisions can be taken. It would make sense to consider these proposals in the context of the current review of the structural funds.

## Essential Facts

1. In March 1982 the Greek Government presented a memorandum to the Community in which it argued that Greek economic development required additional EC funds and an easing of EC competition rules as they applied to Greece. Papandreou is hoping to obtain substantial additional benefits for Greece from the Community's response. The Commission has proposed meeting Greek demands under three main headings: an Integrated Mediterranean Programme (IMP) for Greece; additional funds via the administration of existing instruments (ERDF, Social Fund, etc); and special supplementary programmes (eg vocational training programme, measures to improve Greek agricultural quality controls). The European Council at Stuttgart expressed recognition of the special economic and social problems faced by Greece, and invited the Council to examine the Commission's proposals "with a view to concrete decisions before the next European Council".

2. The Greek IMP is under consideration in an ad hoc Working Group set up to consider the Commission's IMPs proposal as a whole (ie including French and Italian IMPs) (see Brief No 2(c)). Not all the proposals foreshadowed by the Commission under the other two headings have yet been submitted. Of the three which have, two (social and agriculture) are making little progress in their respective specialist Working Groups, and the third (on transport) is disliked by the Greeks anyway. The cost of the proposed social measures (vocational training and a scheme for the mentally handicapped) would be 120 mecu (£72 million) over 4 years. There would be some overlap with the Regional and Social Funds. The agricultural measures would overlap with IMPs and with existing FEOGA programmes. The cost would be 44.7 mecus (£27 million) in the first year. Transport proposals would give Greece 25 mecus of projects (£15 million) out of a total Community transport infrastructure budget of only 60 mecus (£30 million).

3. As the poorest and least developed of the Ten, we accept that Greece should be a major beneficiary under the Community budget.



It would be contrary to our views on equity and economic convergence to contest this. But we have no interest in increasing these benefits substantially from their already generous level (685 mecu net benefit in 1982), particularly when to do so would affect our own budgetary position adversely (as will be the case until a budgetary mechanism is adopted on the lines of our proposed safety net), and when Greece has a poor record on fiscal and non-fiscal Treaty infractions (which affect British exporters) and is proving a difficult partner in the EC, Political Cooperation, NATO and to some extent bilaterally. The Commission is being helpful to Greece on infractions and we have gone along with this. We expect a formal proposal soon to defer Greek introduction of VAT for two years. This will mean that Greece will pay 236 mecu less to the EC budget in 1984 and 1985.

4. Our main objective therefore is to minimise the cost of the Commission's proposed programmes, and in particular to avoid any major concessions to Greece before any post-Stuttgart negotiation package is agreed (ie to avoid paying the Greeks twice over). At the same time we need to avoid stoking Greek hostility during their tenure of the Presidency when critical negotiations are in progress on the Community's future. Our tactic is to play the proposals long in the Working Groups without getting out in front of our partners. Since many of our partners have similar misgivings about the Community's response to the Greek Memorandum, this has not yet proved too difficult.

5. Greek pressure for agreement at Athens to some additional tangible benefits for Greece "as called for at Stuttgart" can be expected to mount in the run-up to the European Council. We should, however, be able to avoid any prior commitments to specific programmes, or the finance for them, on the basis that proposals will still be under discussion and not ripe for decision.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
1 November 1983



VISIT OF GREEK PRIME MINISTER: 4 NOVEMBER

BRIEF NO 3

EUROPEAN POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

POINTS TO MAKE

1. (If raised) Regret disagreements which so marred 12 September Ministerial meeting of the Ten in Athens. Welcome positive approach shown by the Greeks since then.
2. UK remain committed to ensuring continued success of Political Co-operation. Acting as a group members of the Ten have the opportunity to make an impact on events far greater than could be achieved independently. Important to sustain the progress that PoCo has already made.



#### ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Greek behaviour in Political Co-operation has improved considerably since the 12 September Ministerial meeting when disagreements over the KAL airliner incident and INF deployment severely damaged relations within the Ten and threatened to undermine the whole concept of European political co-operation.
2. The Greeks have shown signs of responding to the criticism of their behaviour from both partners and the press, and appear to be making an effort to moderate their line. In particular they agreed that the speech which they delivered at the UN General Assembly on behalf of the Ten should contain a passage 'deploring' the shooting down of the KAL airliner.
3. It remains to be seen just how long this improvement will last. The Greeks have been a source of controversy in Political Co-operation since Papandreou came to power, going against the rest of the Ten on a number of major issues (eg. Poland, Middle East). However, we have already made our concern known to them, as have our partners in the Ten, and it would be counter-productive to press the point further with Papandreou.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1 November 1983



VISIT OF THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER: 4 NOVEMBER

BRIEF NO 4

DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL

POINTS TO MAKE

CRUISE AND INF

1. Believe NATO must proceed with first deployments on schedule. Russians have stalled for four years - an extra few months before first deployments would be most unlikely to induce them to negotiate seriously. But December 1983 no deadline for negotiations and deployments could be reversed.
2. Soviet claim that British and French missiles should be included a pretext for Soviet monopoly of longer range INF missiles. Russians know that British and French missiles are strategic, as they recognised throughout SALT.

EXERCISES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

3. Graeco/Turkish problems should be resolved bilaterally. But we are concerned at impact on Alliance when they spill over and prevent important exercises from taking place. Again important to demonstrate Alliance cohesion and preparedness.

TORNADO

4. Hope my letter which Michael Heseltine delivered demonstrated the commitment of all 3 Tornado partners to successful partnership with Greece. We have worked hard to meet Greek requirement. Purchase of trilateral European aircraft would strengthen Greece's political, military and commercial and industrial/technological links with European partners.

/CDE



CDE [if raised]

5. Attach importance to CDE. Could be a factor in improving East/West relations if East prepared to negotiate seriously on concrete measures to reduce tension and danger of surprise attack. Do not expect quick results but success on mandate shows what can be achieved through Western unity and cooperation with NNA.



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

## GREECE, NATO AND INF

1. The fact that Greece's defence effort is motivated more by mistrust of NATO than of Warsaw Pact intentions makes them difficult partners in NATO. The problems have been accentuated since Papandreou came to power. The Greeks have publicly disassociated themselves from agreed NATO policy over key issues, especially INF and East/West relations. The Greek government is opposed to Pershing II and cruise missile deployments by NATO and advocates the inclusion of British and French missiles in the INF negotiations. This has been laid down by Mr Papandreou and no other Minister of the government is likely to be able to change them. In a special celebration of 2 years of Pasok Government on 18 October Papandreou said that Greece was neither for the West nor for the East.

## EXERCISES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

2. One of the main casualties of Graeco-Turkish differences has been the repeated cancellation of, or Greek withdrawal from, NATO exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean. This naturally gives rise to concern about NATO cohesion and preparedness on the southern flank.

## TORNADO FOR GREECE

3. Greece has a requirement for up to 100 new aircraft. Panavia are promoting Tornado; the main competition is from the US (F16, F18) and France (Mirage 2000). Greece may go for a split between US and European aircraft, of which the Tornado share could be 40-60 aircraft: benefit to UK £375-559m.

4. Mr Heseltine met Mr Papandréou on 2 September to sign the Anglo-Greek MOU on Equipment Collaboration and to discuss the possible sale of Tornado. He delivered a personal letter from the Prime Minister, supported by Chancellor Kohl and Signor Craxi, advocating Tornado.



5. Mr Heseltine offered the Greeks an improved financial package comprising:

- (a) the waiver of the residual government levy of 1%;
- (b) the guarantee by the 3 partner countries of 95% of the loan;
- (c) agreement that repayment could be spread over the period 1989-1997;
- (d) a fixed interest rate of 8.95% in DMs for the British element of the credit package.

We understand that Italy will offer either a fixed or floating rate, depending on Greek preference, for her relatively small element (14%) of the package. We have failed to persuade Germany to underwrite an attractive fixed rate of interest and Panavia will have to propose a variable rate for the German element of the package.

6. The Greek Deputy Foreign Minister, Capsis, told Lady Young on 28 October that a decision on Tornado would be taken in November.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
31 October 1983



VISIT OF THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER: 4 NOVEMBER 1983

BRIEF NO 5

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

POINTS TO MAKE

EAST/WEST POLITICAL

1. East/West relations depend on both substance and confidence. UK wants a more constructive relationship with Soviet Union, but cannot ignore Soviet behaviour. Soviet claims of support for "peaceful" policies not borne out by the facts, most recently KAL incident.
2. Soviet leadership's field of vision on East/West now narrowed down almost exclusively to arms control questions particularly INF. Andropov's statement of 28 September indicates realisation that it will be impossible to prevent, through appeals to Western public opinion, at least the first stage of deployment. Transparent attempt to isolate US and discredit President Reagan.
3. West must maintain united front in face of increasing Soviet pressure. Hard-headed and realistic dialogue important as a means of setting out our concerns and pressing Soviet Union to show restraint.

POLAND

Western Policy

4. Conclusions of Foreign Ministers' meeting in Athens on 12 September provide basis for development of policy and gradual resumption of contacts. We need to evaluate and



pursue coordinated and consistent long-term strategy, not event orientated, if Western influence is to be effectively exerted. Important to maintain Western coordination in our basic approach to Poland.

5. We have told Poles that a middle-ranking MFA official would be received in FCO if he were to visit London for some other purpose. Believe this to be consistent with conclusions of 12 September.

#### Rescheduling of Official Debt

6. Glad meeting in Paris on 26 October resulted in agreement to resume negotiation with the Poles and invite them to the Creditors' Group in mid-November for that purpose. Western negotiating position will require careful preparation in view of Polish attitude and likely demands for new credits.

#### AFGHANISTAN

#### UNGA 38

7. Must keep pressure on Soviet Union to withdraw its troops. Further strong UN vote and speeches essential. Vital that Ten should give co-ordinated support.

#### UN Talks

8. Pakistan committed to UN process, currently blocked by Soviet refusal to agree specific timetable for withdrawal. Should ensure Russians are blamed if talks founder.

#### Anniversary Statement

9. Ten have agreed to consider measures to mark fourth anniversary of Soviet invasion on 27 December. Value idea



of coordinated statements by EC Presidency and Member States to demonstrate continued concern and to sustain public attention.

CSCE

10. The conclusion of the Madrid conference has given a useful impulse to the CSCE process. We must continue to press the East Europeans to honour their commitments by making effective use of the Concluding Document in our diplomatic contacts.



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

## EAST/WEST POLITICAL

1. In recent weeks the Russians have been using their familiar tactic of blowing hot and cold. While the Warsaw Pact Sofia Communiqué (14 October) was calculated to emphasise Soviet "reasonableness" in the run up to the Bundestag debate, Andropov's 28 September statement and Gromyko's East Berlin speech of 17 October were more threatening. The aim was to discredit Reagan personally, and to generate pressures within Europe - in particular in the FRG over the inner German relationship. Likewise Gromyko appears to have been unyielding in his meeting with Genscher (Vienna, 14-16 October). He was particularly bitter about Soviet-US relations and President Reagan personally. This is consistent with the resentful tone which permeated his meeting with Mr Shultz in Madrid on 7 September.
2. The Greeks are the odd men out in the Community on East/West relations: they tend to take what the Russians tell them at face value, and have given public support to Soviet backed initiatives like the Balkan Nuclear Free Zone. After Andropov came to power there was a flurry of activity in Greek/Soviet contacts culminating in Tikhonov's visit to Athens on 21/24 February. There have been some lower level governmental and PASOK visits to Moscow in the course of the summer. The Soviet Union sees Greece as a country which can to some extent be manipulated to intensify strains in the Western Alliance. They have welcomed the ambiguous position taken on East/West issues by Papandreou (they will particularly have welcomed the Greek call for further postponement of INF deployment); but the Soviet press has nevertheless reported KKE dissatisfaction with the initialling of the US bases agreement, and the caution with



which Papandreou has approached the question of continued Greek membership of the EC.

3. The Soviet Union has taken care to avoid taking sides over the strained relations between Greece and Turkey. The Russians regard their relationship with Turkey as being of greater importance, in view of its proximity to the Soviet Union.

#### POLAND

4. Some developments around 22 July positive: lifting of martial law, partial amnesty, relaxation of foreign travel restrictions, withdrawal of military commissars from civilian enterprises. But new laws if implemented in full will be repressive though less so than in most other East European countries. Difficult to say that anything has really changed in sense of greater dialogue or increased cooperation between Government and governed. Church/State contacts seemed improved after Papal visit and 22 July: now renewed doubts. Authorities' vilification campaign against Walesa and Solidarity continues.

#### Western and UK Policy

5. UK Ministers have agreed our long term objective should be gradual engagement of Western influence in Poland. But important to maintain Western unity. We seek a consistent strategy for the long term not tied to day to day fluctuations. EC consensus for gradual resumption of contacts starting at technical/senior official (but not yet ministerial) level agreed at EC Foreign Ministers' meeting in Athens on 12 September.



### Greek Policy

6. The Greeks have been difficult partners in EC discussions on Poland. Despite NATO sanctions (introduced January 1982) Greek bilateral policy towards Poland has remained relatively unaffected with a generally business-as-usual relationship. They are now the leading advocates in the Ten of a general resumption of contacts/exchanges with the Poles. In talking to the Greeks we might stress the importance of Western unity in moving forward on policy towards Poland.

### Rescheduling of Polish Official Debt

7. At the meeting of Creditors' Group on 26 October agreement was at last reached to resume negotiations on rescheduling officially guaranteed debts. The Polish Finance Minister is being invited to Paris on 16-18 November for this purpose. US agreement is provisional, but expected to be given by 4 November. It is clear that negotiations themselves will be difficult as the Poles are likely to maintain that debt service capacity is exhausted.

### AFGHANISTAN

8. The General Assembly has adopted four resolutions with overwhelming majorities calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign (ie Soviet) troops from Afghanistan. This year's debate is scheduled for 14 November. The Pakistanis will again sponsor the draft resolution, but we will lend discreet lobbying support, stressing the global (ie not East/West) angle to maximise Third World support.

### UN Talks

9. Cordovez's mediation effort remains deadlocked on the crucial question of a timetable for Soviet troops



withdrawal. On 30 September, Perez de Cuellar told the Prime Minister he would press for Soviet agreement to a timetable, and would continue his efforts as long as Pakistan and the Karmal regime wished. But he is not optimistic. Informal consultations have been taking place in the margins of the General Assembly. Cordovez may return to the area this winter.

#### Anniversary Statements

10. In February the Ten's Asia Working Group recommended that suitable statements should be made by the Ten and member governments to mark the fourth anniversary of the Soviet invasion on 27 December. The Political Directors agreed subsequently to consider 'appropriate public measures', but the Greeks may try to avoid making a Community statement.

#### Greek Position

11. The Greeks have supported all four UN resolutions, but tend to play down Soviet responsibility. However, Haralambopoulos made a strong call for Soviet withdrawal in his Presidency speech to the General Assembly on 27 September.

#### CSCE/CDE

12. The Madrid CSCE Follow Up conference finally ended on 9 September. The next follow up conference will take place in Vienna in 1986. The CDE Conference starts in Stockholm on 17 January 1984 (see separate brief).

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
1 November 1983



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VISIT OF GREEK PRIME MINISTER, 4 NOVEMBER 1983

BRIEF NO 6(a)

CYPRUS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Recent developments not encouraging. We hope that both communities will co-operate fully with the Secretary General. Still hope for positive outcome from his latest ideas. Progress requires real act of will plus flexibility on both sides. Carefully prepared summit meeting between two sides looks like best way out of present impasse.
2. We have made clear to Turkish Cypriots and to Turks that we are strongly opposed to declaration of independence by Turkish Cypriots. Would not recognise a new independent government. But important that Greeks and Greek Cypriots take account of Turkish Cypriot sensitivities and do not give Denktash a pretext for unhelpful moves.
3. Introduction of Greek troops into Cyprus post-UDI /if raised/

Surprised and concerned at such a suggestion. Have you consulted Greek Cypriots? Would surely make matters worse in Cyprus and draw odium on Greece.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The Secretary General launched new ideas in August. Greek Cypriots' response, superficially at least, was reasonably positive. But Turkish Cypriots have reacted negatively and threatened to declare independence. Denktash has threatened this before. Threat more real this time, although, as a result of pressure, danger of action before 6 November Turkish elections has receded. We have made representations at Ministerial level in Ankara (Mr Heseltine) and with Denktash (Lady Young). Have asked major allies (US, French, Italians and Germans) to do the same. Most have done so.

2. The Greek Cypriots' moral position is currently strong (largely because of Turkish Cypriot ineptitude). Having instigated the UN debate in Cyprus in May, they are now showing restraint, and seem to appreciate the dangers of appearing to provoke Denktash. But the Greek Government, who are more interested in scoring propaganda victories over the Turks than the situation in Cyprus, may not exercise similar restraint. They should be left in no doubt of the dangers of the present situation, particularly of propaganda point scoring. We must resist any suggestion of joint statements on Cyprus. Our basic policies are very different, even if they converge on opposition to Turkish Cypriot independence. Any appearance of acting jointly with the Greeks would be anathema to Turks and Turkish Cypriots; it would destroy our ability to influence either.

3. Capsis, Greek Deputy Foreign Minister, suggested to Lady Young on 28 October, speaking "off the record", that Greece might use UDI as an excuse to station troops in Cyprus. He had earlier

/told

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told H M Ambassador in Athens that these ideas had been endorsed "higher up". Greece is allowed to station 950 troops in Cyprus under the 1960 Treaties and currently has 1350 men there plus about 450 officers in the Greek Cypriot National Guard. Turkey has around 17,500 troops in Northern Cyprus (650 allowed by treaty). Capsis' remarks were probably ill considered personal views. It would be worrying if Papandreo endorsed them.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

1 November 1983

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B

VISIT OF GREEK PRIME MINISTER: 4 NOVEMBER

BRIEF NO 6 (b)

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN: GREECE/TURKEY

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Concerned at continued tension and lack of dialogue.
2. Welcome successful conclusion of first round of bilateral talks on economic relations and tourism. When will next round take place?
3. We look forward to resumption of detailed dialogue and re-establishment of climate of mutual trust which is needed if any progress to be made.

Exercises

4. Concerned that disputes and problems over exercises weaken NATO. Any scope for exercising in areas that are not under dispute? Mr Capsis has floated idea that exercise arrangements should be without prejudice to positions of both sides. Do you see this as a way forward?

Lemnos [If asked position on Greek right to militarise Island]

5. Do not believe it would be helpful to take a position on this question. We see attractions in NATO practice of avoiding exercising in areas of dispute between allies. Would hope such disputes could be resolved bilaterally without causing damage to NATO's essential security.



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Relations with Turkey very strained. In addition to differences over Cyprus (see separate brief), there is a long-standing complex of disputes over Aegean matters. Specifically these are:

- (a) Airspace. Greece claims 10 miles round islands in the Aegean but the Turks only recognise 6 miles, the same as Greek territorial sea. On occasion the Turks fly into the disputed zone.
- (b) Territorial sea. The Greeks claim the right to extend their territorial sea in the Aegean to 12 miles. The Turks have made clear that this would be a casus belli. It would make the Aegean virtually a Greek lake.
- (c) Demilitarisation of islands. Although they make no claim to sovereignty, the Turks dispute the Greeks' right to militarise the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace. Greek insistence on the inclusion of the island of Lemnos in NATO exercises, despite NATO's practice of not including areas in disputes between allies, has led to the cancellation of several NATO exercises in the area. [Not for use] It is HMG's private view that the Greeks do have the right to militarise these islands. But we do not wish to take sides in the dispute.

2. A regular dialogue about these disputes was broken off by Papandreu when he came to power in October 1981. Efforts since then to restart the dialogue, including meetings of Foreign Ministers, have so far proved unsuccessful. When the two Foreign Ministers met in Paris in June this year it was agreed that twice yearly talks would be held on economic relations and tourism. The first meeting was held in Ankara between 26-28 July and although the atmosphere was cordial, any political content was carefully avoided.

/The



The Greeks have made clear they will not discuss anything which in their view compromises their sovereignty over the Aegean islands.

### Exercises

3. These disputes spill over into and seriously weaken NATO by disrupting exercises and damaging the cohesion of the southern flank. This is likely to remain a problem so long as the will is lacking on both sides to resolve differences. But we might probe Papandreou tentatively on a) possibility of holding NATO exercises in areas not in dispute and b) the idea floated by Capsis, deputy Foreign Minister, that both sides should agree that exercises should take place without prejudice to claims of either. Not certain that Turks would accept this idea. Do not therefore want to suggest any British commitment to it. Only small chance of success, since both sides see exercises as opportunities to score points; but alternative may be to cease exercising in Aegean. (See also Brief No 4 on Defence and Arms Control).

4. We take every opportunity to urge on both sides restraint and resumption of the dialogue as the best way forward. Papandreou's visit is an opportunity to reiterate to the Greeks that they should make some moves to try and re-establish some mutual confidence, lack of which has so far sabotaged all efforts to resume dialogue.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
2 November 1983

VISIT OF THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER: 4 NOVEMBER

BRIEF NO 6 (c)

LEBANON

Points to Make

1. Four foreign ministers reaffirmed commitment to MNF (Paris 27 October). No changes in mandate, size or deployment. BRITFORLEB will continue to guard meetings of ceasefire committee at request of all parties. Terrorism will not deter us as long as we can play a useful role.
2. But MNF support for Government not a blank cheque. Americans have made it clear to Gemayel that Government, as well as supporters must be prepared to make concessions at national reconciliation talks. Ten must continue to urge all parties to commit themselves to genuine reconciliation. Prospects for talks?
3. State of play on Greek/Italian observers? Naturally safety of contingents must be paramount consideration, but important to get observers in on ground to consolidate ceasefire as soon as possible.
4. (If raised). No intention by any MNF contributor to take sides or get involved in fighting. Insistence of all parties that we should guard meetings of the Ceasefire Committee demonstrates confidence in impartiality of our contingent.
5. (If raised) MNF use of RAF Akrotiri  
UK gave permission for the Italians to station aircraft at Akrotiri to support their contingent in Lebanon. A humanitarian decision taken at a difficult time in Lebanon. Italians did not in the event station aircraft and seems unlikely they will do so if ceasefire holds.

VISIT OF GREEK PRIME MINISTER: 4 NOVEMBER

BRIEF NO 6(c)

LEBANON

Essential Facts

1. The Greeks have been less happy about the role of the MNF than any other member of the Ten. Privately they are extremely critical of US policy in Lebanon. They argue strongly the Americans must accept that Syrian preponderance in the region means that the 17 May Agreement with Israel will remain a dead letter. Capsis reiterated this theme during his call on Sir G Howe on 28 October. Sir G Howe noted that account must be taken of Syria's legitimate interest in the region: The Agreement should not become an obstacle to progress. The Greeks enjoy good relations with Jumblatt who saw Papandreou during a visit to Athens 4 - 5 October.
2. MNF Foreign Ministers' meeting (Paris 27 October) produced public reaffirmation of commitment to maintain contribution despite 23 October bomb attacks. It was agreed that partners should press Lebanese factions for progress in national reconciliation talks. But there would be no joint demarches and no establishment of formal structure for planning of partners' future policy on Lebanon.
3. Reconciliation talks scheduled to open in Geneva 31 October/1 November under President Gemayel's chairmanship. All nine politicians invited are attending with the exception of Raymond Edde (a Maronite who commands some confidence among Lebanese Muslims but is probably a marginal figure). Syria and Saudi Arabia will send observers (probably foreign minister Khaddam and Ambassador to Lebanon respectively). MNF contributors agreed to monitor talks and to keep in discreet touch in Geneva. Fairbanks (new US envoy to Middle East) will be present.
4. Prospects for talks uncertain. Main difficulties will come over 17 May Agreement with Israel which many want set aside or revoked and /redistribution

redistribution of political power. Four MNF contributors and Ten agreed on need to continue to exert pressure on all participants. Americans have made clear to Gemayel that Maronite concessions are needed. Gemayel and Assad spoke (by telephone) for first time in months on 27 October. Conversation described as 'friendly'. National Salvation Front (Druze and allies) look likely to put forward reasonable ideas for institutional reform: President to remain Christian but greater power for a new Muslim-dominated Parliament elected on non-confessional basis by proportional representation. But Phalange seem prepared to make only minimum concessions. Syria professes to want talks to succeed, but scale of her demands uncertain.

5. Deployment of Greek/Italian observer force (800) seemed close before bomb attacks. Greece has reiterated agreement in principle but terms and conditions are still under discussion with Italians and Lebanese. Greeks and Italians want some UN cover. This will be fairly tenuous (probably an exchange of letters between the Greeks, Italians, and the UN Secretary-General and submission of reports to him via the Lebanese Government). Capsis expressed concern for safety of a Greek contingent; progress at Geneva would be needed before they could move in. Important to steer the Greeks to deploy.

6. Military Situation. Death toll for 23 October bomb attacks now 230 Americans, 56 French. 26 September ceasefire continues to hold despite sporadic exchanges of fire. BRITFORLEB continue to play much appreciated role in guarding daily meetings of four-party Ceasefire Committee in Trad Bank, Khalde (South Beirut), a task we may shortly share with the Italians. Committee has had some success: re-opening of Beirut Airport, exchange of prisoners, removal of roadblocks. Now working on arrangements for deployment of Greek/Italian observers.

7. Haralambopoulos told the Ten's Foreign Ministers on 22/23 October that the MFA Under-Secretary of State Mr Papoulias intended to visit Israel, Syria and Lebanon on a fact-finding mission. He appeared to take the point that this should be a Greek not Presidency mission. Mr Papoulias would usefully urge the merits of reconciliation and the withdrawal of foreign forces on all concerned.

8. Italian use of Akrotiri. Our decision in September to allow

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Italians to station up to six F104s at RAF Akrotiri upset the Cyprus Government, who are sensitive about use of the SBAs by non-NATO powers. But the Greek Government have not raised it with us.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

31 OCTOBER 1983

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VISIT OF THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER: 4 NOVEMBER

BRIEF NO 7: FALKLANDS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. After last year's events, onus is on Argentina to respond to our initiatives to improve the climate. We have made clear our wish to make progress on commercial and economic relations. Disappointing that Argentines have not responded positively to approaches by the Presidency over the past year.
2. UK position on Falklands well known. Will vote against present Argentine draft resolution or any draft that calls for negotiations. Argentine interpretation of "negotiations" is negotiations on the transfer of sovereignty. Cannot contemplate this given views of Islanders.
3. Present Argentine draft is unacceptable because
  - (a) it calls for negotiations;
  - (b) describes maintenance of colonial situations as incompatible with UN ideal of universal peace;
  - (c) implicitly critical of UK by regretting lack of progress in implementation of GA resolution 37/9;
  - (d) has new preambular paragraph which characterises sovereignty dispute as cause for grave concern to Latin American region, thus implying pro-Latin American view of dispute;
  - (e) de facto cessation of hostilities not sufficient;
  - (f) reference to "interests" of population also insufficient, must refer to "wishes".
4. Can see no justification for partners, in particular the Presidency, voting opposite to one of their number whose national interests are directly and uniquely affected. Likewise, attempts to amend resolution most unhelpful and will not do anything to help resolve underlying causes of continuing difficulties with Argentina. Expect Community partners to attach overriding importance to Community solidarity. Greek tenure of Presidency offers opportunity to get back in line with partners which even Argentina might



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understand. We are not asking you to vote with us (ie no) and directly opposite to Argentina; we are asking you not to vote with Argentina and directly opposite to us.

5. Can understand wish to encourage democratically elected government in Argentina. There are many ways of doing this and partners should not do so at expense of UK. For example, to join in statement by the Ten welcoming progress towards restoration of democratic process in Argentina.

6. Need is for fundamental reappraisal of policy towards Falklands in Buenos Aires. By voting with Argentina, partners could encourage new government to continue present course and thus set back not advance prospects for reduction of tension in South Atlantic.

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## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Our position on the Falklands has been made clear to all our partners at official level and, in the cases of France, the FRG and Italy, at Ministerial level. Recent contacts have shown a glimmer of hope that the Greeks may be moved to an abstention (under cover of their tenure of the Presidency); the abstentions of the Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg seem to be firm, and the Irish and Belgians are also inclined to abstain. Some partners may seek to use the US position as a justification for switching their vote this year.

2. The principle that partners should try to avoid voting in direct opposition to one of their number on a matter of direct importance to that partner is set out in the conclusions of the Political Committee of 17/18 May 1977, which says:

'Bearing in mind paragraphs 9(g) and 15 of the Dublin Report stating that The Nine should make every possible effort to avoid contrary votes it is emphasised that special attention should be given in this context to any draft resolution support for which would involve specific criticism of one or more partners or seriously damage their national interests. All members of The Nine should do their best to give the earliest possible warning when difficulties are likely to arise in this connection.'

3. Italy hankers after a new draft resolution that might command consensus. We do not consider it possible that the Argentines would accept a resolution that did not call for negotiations: this would be a considerable set-back for them in diplomatic terms after the adoption of GA resolution 37/9. Their aim is a slightly stronger resolution (draft attached) and an increase in the number of votes for it.

4. Elections were held in Argentina on 30 October. The General Assembly debate is due to take place in the week beginning 7 November.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 November 1983

*Jan Taha*

Greece: The Noel-Baker Estate

Thank you for your letter of 27 October enclosing copies of two messages from Mr Francis Noel-Baker about his family's problems in Greece, the background to which is set out in my letters of 28 July and 10 August to Tim Flesher. For ease of reference, I enclose copies of these and of the Prime Minister's letter of 11 August to Mr Noel-Baker. We shall be providing briefing on the problems British property overseas in general are facing in Greece for Papandreou's visit. It may, meanwhile, be helpful to let you have an up-date on the Noel-Baker case, which is sui generis.

Since my letter of 10 August, the Embassy at Athens have encouraged Mr Noel-Baker to negotiate with the Greek Government on the basis which the latter had said they were prepared to accept, i.e. Mr Noel-Baker's offer in May this year to donate the forest, which forms the major part of his estate, to Greece in exchange for a settlement of his tax liabilities. He delayed doing this until mid-October, when he instructed his lawyers to begin negotiations with Mr Papandreou's Legal Adviser, Mr Kasimatis. In doing so he instructed his lawyer to vary the terms of his original offer. This was contrary to the advice of HM Ambassador who had warned Mr Noel-Baker that his negotiating position was in fact a weak one.

On 26 October Mr Papandreou's Legal Adviser telephoned the Counsellor at the Embassy to say that Mr Noel-Baker had withdrawn his offer and was proposing to sell rather than donate the forest. He regretted that things had taken this turn, after his successful efforts to overcome what he called the 'reactions' from certain quarters to the proposed settlement, and after he had obtained Mr Papandreou's approval to the deal originally proposed by Mr Noel-Baker. So far as he was concerned 'Greek law must now take its course'. We take this to be a reference to an investigation being carried out by the Greeks into the

/Noel-Bakers' title

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
Noel-Baker's title to the forest. The Embassy are of the view that Mr Noel-Baker, in miscalculating the strength of his negotiating position, may have undone the chances of reaching a settlement with the Greek Government.

In these circumstances there is little more that the Embassy can do to help Mr Noel-Baker beyond giving normal consular assistance. The Foreign Secretary doubts whether it would be helpful, or appropriate, for the Prime Minister to single out Mr Noel-Baker's case as a specific issue to raise with Mr Papandreou during their talks on 4 November. If she were to do so, she would invite the reply that Mr Papandreou had already approved the method of solving the problem suggested by Mr Noel-Baker himself in May; and that it is Mr Noel-Baker who has changed his mind. Intervention on this individual problem would also lessen the force of representations on behalf of British owners of property in Greek frontier areas. This is a quite separate issue, affecting over a thousand British citizens, which we hope the Prime Minister will raise with Mr Papandreou. The Greeks have told us they are preparing legislation to deal with the problem; but we need to keep up the pressure on them to ensure that they do so. The Foreign Secretary therefore suggests that the Prime Minister should refer only in general terms to problems confronting British property owners. If you thought it helpful, it might be appropriate for one of the accompanying officials to be told subsequently that the Noel-Baker case was one of those which we hoped would be satisfactorily resolved.

BU | We will let you have a draft reply to Mr Noel-Baker after the Papandreou visit.

(RB Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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28 July 1983

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29/7

John Tim

Thank you for your letter of 25 July to Chris Greenwood enclosing a copy of the Hon Francis Noel-Baker's letter of 22 July to the Prime Minister about his family's problems in Greece. I attach a draft reply.

The Noel-Bakers have had a large estate on the island of Euboea since the 19th century. Since 1975 they have been negotiating with the Greek Government over its future. They have sought to have their estate expropriated in return for compensation. The Greek Government apparently intend to resolve the question as part of the general policy on large estates (an election manifesto pledged to abolish them) and have refused to make a special case of the Noel-Bakers. Progress has been slow. There is a local pressure group which campaigns for the dispossession of the Noel-Bakers.


In May 1982 the Nomarch (Prefect) of Euboea banned all commercial activity (principally tree-felling) on the estate, allegedly to preserve public order. The Noel-Bakers, with support from our Embassy at Athens, have been trying to have this ban lifted, so far without success. The Greek Government have also now reopened the question of title to the estate which the Noel-Bakers had believed to have been settled in their favour in 1978.

Our Embassy in Athens keep in close touch with the Noel-Bakers about all this, and Mr Noel-Baker is himself calling on Lady Young at the FCO at 9 am on 29 July.

[Signature]

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq  
10 Downing Street



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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10 August 1983

JS  
Mr Cook

Dear Tim,

Thank you for your letter of 29 July enclosing a copy of Mr Francis Noel-Baker's memorandum about his family's problems in Greece, the background to which is set out in Roger Bone's letter of 28 July.


The call by Mr Noel-Baker on Lady Young to which you refer was postponed from 29 July to 3 August. Mr Noel-Baker set out his grievances in much the same terms as his memorandum. He said that he would be seeking greater publicity for his case and asked for an "official demarche" to the Greek Government in his support. Lady Young told him that we would consider carefully what he had said, in consultation with our Embassy at Athens. The Charge d'Affaires in Athens, Dr Llewellyn-Smith would call on Mr Papandreou's Legal Adviser, Mr Kasimatis, on 5 August and would express our concern that the Noel-Bakers should be treated fairly and a solution to their problems found quickly.

In the event, the call by Dr Llewellyn-Smith on Mr Kasimatis was helpful. Kasimatis said that the Greeks were ready to proceed to a solution on the basis of an offer made recently by Mr Noel-Baker to donate the estate to Greece in exchange for a settlement of his tax liabilities. He thought that the details could be worked out quite quickly between the two sides' lawyers.

Lady Young's office were unable to contact Mr Noel-Baker by telephone, but we wrote to him on 5 August explaining what had happened and encouraging him to explore the Greek proposal further. We have also asked our Embassy in Athens to get in touch with the Noel-Bakers, when they return to Greece, as we understand they planned to do on 8 August.


There have been false dawns before in this complicated case, but we judge that there is a chance of this latest development offering an acceptable solution to the Noel-Bakers' problems. If not, we will have to re-examine the position.

/We have



We have read the Memorandum provided by Mr Noel-Baker. It does not seem to add anything we did not know. We do not think there have been, as Mr Noel-Baker claims, any breaches of Community Law; but such questions, and the alleged breaches of Greek law, would be for Mr Noel-Baker to test if necessary in the Greek courts. For the moment however any such action seems to have been overtaken by the other developments I have referred to.

/ I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Mr Noel-Baker's letter of 22 July.



(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq  
10 Downing Street





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

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11 August 1983

Mick 12/8

WSG 361/3
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6 AUG 1983

Dear Francis,

Thank you for your letter of 22 July about your family's problems in Greece, and for your memorandum which I received subsequently.

Since then I understand that there have been further developments of which you will be aware which may open the way to a solution to the problem which has caused you and your family so much trouble and anxiety over the last few years. I very much hope that this will prove to be the case. Meanwhile, the Embassy at Athens stand ready, as in the past, to give whatever help they properly can.

Yours sincerely  
Francis Noel-Baker

The Hon. Francis Noel-Baker



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

31 October 1983

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you and your wife for your letter of 27 October inviting Mrs. Thatcher to a reception on Friday, 4 November on the occasion of the visit of the Prime Minister of Greece to the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister much regrets that it will not be possible for her and Mr. Thatcher to accept your kind invitation on this occasion.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Monsieur Nikos Kyriazides

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


Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 October 1983

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Visit of Greek Prime Minister: 4 November

My letter of 24 October attached a suggested guest list for the Prime Minister's lunch for Mr Papandreou on 4 November. The Greeks have now told us that Mr Papandreou will not bring his Foreign Minister Mr Haralambopoulos, but that the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr Varfis (who deals with European Community matters) will come instead. His name should therefore be substituted for that of the Foreign Minister in the guest list.

There will also be another eight people in Mr Papandreou's party. Of these, we believe that at least two should be invited: Mahairitsas (Mr Papandreou's diplomatic adviser) and Katapodis (Political Director). The Embassy at Athens have suggested inviting a further three as well, if possible. If any of these Greek officials are invited, we think some senior British officials should be present too, to maintain a balance. I understand that there have been four refusals so far from the original list. This would allow us to ask three of the Greeks and one British official (without wife). I assume, however, that there may well be further refusals.

I attach a list of possible additional guests to a total of nine (including two wives who could be left out if space is a problem). If you agree, we might check with the Greeks which officials they want to choose to fill any additional places when we know how many are available.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

Mr Gregory Varfis  
[To replace  
Mr Haralambopoulos]

c/o Greek Embassy  
1a Holland Park  
W11 3TP  
(727 8040)

Under-Secretary for  
Foreign Affairs [with  
responsibility for EC  
matters]

---

Mr Christos  
Mahairitsas

c/o Greek Embassy  
1a Holland Park  
W11 3TP  
(727 8040)

Head of Mr Papandreou's  
Diplomatic Cabinet

Mr Nicolaos Katapodis

c/o Greek Embassy  
1a Holland Park  
W11 3TP  
(727 8040)

Political Director

Mr Achilles Mitsos

c/o Greek Embassy  
1a Holland Park  
W11 3TP  
(727 8040)

Special adviser to  
Mr Varfis

Sir J Bullard KCMG  
Lady Bullard

Foreign & Common-  
wealth Office  
King Charles St  
SW1  
(233 3707)

Deputy to Permanent  
Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign and Commonwealth  
Office, and Political  
Director

Mr Konstantinos Zepos

c/o Greek Embassy  
1a Holland Park  
W11 3TP  
(727 8040)

Head of Western Europe  
and American Directorate,  
Greek MFA

Mr Yiannis  
Papanikolaou

c/o Greek Embassy  
1a Holland Park  
W11 3TP  
(727 8040)

Economic adviser to  
Mr Papandreou

Mr D H A Hannay CMG  
and Mrs Hannay

Foreign & Common-  
wealth Office  
King Charles St  
SW1  
(233 6016)

Assistant Under-Secretary,  
FCO



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

28 October, 1983

Visit of Prime Minister of Greece: 4 November

Thank you for your letter of 27 October. I think that the list of subjects which you suggest could be proposed to the Greeks as the basis for the agenda on 4 November. But I doubt if the Prime Minister will wish to be bound by a formal agenda. Perhaps you would therefore make it clear to the Greeks that this is an indicative list and the Prime Minister will wish to agree with Mr. Papandreou at the start of their talks precisely which subjects they will wish to cover and in what order.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

ADONES

R. B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RB

The Ambassador

Greek Embassy

London

27 October 1983

Prime Minister.

Agree to decline?

A.J.C.  $\frac{25}{10}$

Dear Prime Minister,

Reply - Yes no

I have the honour to inform you, that, on the occasion of the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Andreas G. Papandreou's visit to the United Kingdom, I and my wife are hosting a reception at our residence, 51 Upper Brook Street, W1., on Friday, 4th November 1983 at 7.30pm.

It would be a great honour if you Prime Minister and Mr Thatcher would graciously accept an invitation to this reception.

Please accept the renewed assurance of my highest consideration

Nikos Kyriazides

Nikos Kyriazides

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, PC., MP.,  
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury,  
10 Downing Street,  
London SW1

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 October 1983

*Joe Shan*

Visit of Prime Minister of Greece: 4 November

Following the Prime Minister's agreement to two hours of talks with Mr Papandreu on 4 November, starting with half an hour tête-à-tête, I would now like to take arrangements for the meeting a stage further. If you agree, we will propose the following agenda to the Greeks:

1. Bilateral Relations
2. European Community, in particular the preparation for the Athens summit
3. Defence and arms control, including INF, NATO and arms sales
4. East/West relations
5. Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus and Lebanon
6. Falklands

We would envisage most of the meeting being devoted to EC issues. In addition, under bilateral relations we will wish to raise the problem of British property in Greece. The Greeks will probably raise the Elgin Marbles. They have also said that they want to talk about economic and commercial cooperation. Under EC issues they will no doubt wish to discuss the Greek Memorandum and the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes. Items 3-6 can be dealt with fairly briefly.

We understand that Mr Papandreu will bring with him Mr Varfis, Greek Under-Secretary for Community Affairs. We do not yet know whether Mr Haralambopoulos, the Foreign Minister will come. Mr Papandreu would presumably also wish the Greek Ambassador, Mr Kyriazides, to be present. HM Ambassador Athens will be available to attend. Perhaps we could have a word about other UK participants a little closer to the event.

/We

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



We shall provide a steering brief together with individual briefs on the specific agenda items in due course.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*See*

*Robert Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



~~Dr. P. S.~~



*[Handwritten signature]*  
26  
10

With the compliments of

*[Handwritten initials]*

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

The French have already told  
their press that Agouadon is  
coming.

The attached draft is for use  
this afternoon, subject to your

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

SW1A 2AH

*[Handwritten mark]*

*[Handwritten signature]* 24.10.

VISIT OF GREEK PRIME MINISTER, 4 NOVEMBER

DRAFT

PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE MADE AT 4.00pm, 26 OCTOBER

'Mr Andreas Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece, will pay a working visit to London on 4 November at the invitation of the Prime Minister'.

Background [May be used freely]

Programme

Mr Papandreou will have 2 hours of talks in the morning with the Prime Minister, who will then host a lunch in his honour. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs will be present at the talks. Mr Papandreou will not be seeing him separately.

Topics for discussion

Bilateral relations, EC issues and other topics of mutual interest. [If asked] Cyprus and Lebanon are likely topics.

Previous visits

Mr Papandreou visited UK in 1980 as leader of the opposition. Prime Minister visited Greece in 1980. Mr Haralambopoulos, Greek Foreign Minister, visited London in December 1982. Lord Belstead, Minister of State, FCO, visited Athens in January 1983 and Mr Capsis, Greek Deputy Foreign Minister, will visit London on 28 October. There are regular exchanges between other ministries.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ropa SED  
On 24/10.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 October, 1983

WS9027A
27 OCT 1983

(25)

John [unclear]

Visit of the Greek Prime Minister

(13)

As requested in your letter of 17 October, I enclose a draft guest list of 48 names for the Prime Minister's lunch for Mr Papandreou on 4 November.

We are pursuing separately the arrangements for the talks.

I am copying this to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*[Handwritten signature]*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

*[Handwritten signature]*  
*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

SUGGESTED GUESTS FOR LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER  
 NOVEMBER 1983 IN HONOUR OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREECE

	<u>Address</u>	<u>Reason for Invitation</u>
Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP FRS and Mr Denis Thatcher		Hosts
HE Mr Andreas Papandreou	c/o Greek Embassy 1a Holland Park London W11 3TP (727 8040)	Prime Minister of Greece
Mr Ioannis Haralambopoulos		Foreign Minister of Greece [if he comes: not yet decided]
Mr Nikos Kyriazides, and Mrs Kyriazides	c/o Greek Embassy 1a Holland Park London W11 3TP (727 8040)	Greek Ambassador

HM Government

Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP and Mrs Heseltine	Ministry of Defence Main Building Whitehall, London SW1 (218 2113)	Secretary of State for Defence. Visited Greece in September. Mr Papandreou holds the Greek Defence Portfolio.
Rt Hon Norman Fowler MP and Mrs Fowler	Alexander Fleming House Elephant & Castle London SE1 6BY (407 5522)	Secretary of State for Social Services. Possible visit to Greece.
Mr Ian Stewart MP and Mrs Stewart	HM Treasury Parliament Street London SW1P 3AG (233 3608)	Economic Secretary to the Treasury.

Reserves

Rt Hon Lord Belstead	Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Whitehall Place London SW1A 2HH (233 3750)	Minister of State. Visited Greece January 1983.
----------------------	--	---

Government Officials

P A Rhodes Esq CMG

c/o Heads of Mission  
Section, Foreign and  
Commonwealth Office  
(233 4473)

HM Ambassador, Athens.

Reserves

Sir Julian Bullard KCMG  
and Lady Bullard

Foreign and Common-  
wealth Office  
King Charles Street  
SW1  
(233 3707)

Deputy to the Permanent  
Under-Secretary of State  
and Political Director.

Dr D C Wilson and  
Mrs Wilson

Foreign and Common-  
wealth Office  
King Charles Street  
SW1  
(233 4031)

Head of Southern  
European Department.

Parliament

Rt Hon N Kinnock MP  
and Mrs Kinnock

House of Commons  
London, SW1  
(219 3000)

Leader of the  
opposition.

Rt Hon David Steel MP  
and Mrs Steel

House of Commons  
London, SW1  
(219 3000)

Leader of the Liberal  
Party.

Sir B Braine MP DL

House of Commons  
London, SW1  
(219 3000)

Chairman, Anglo-Greek  
Parliamentary Group.

Reserves

Rt Hon Roy Hattersley  
and Mrs Hattersley

House of Commons  
London, SW1  
(219 3000)

Deputy Leader of  
Labour Party.

Rt Hon Denis Healey MP  
and Mrs Healey

House of Commons  
London, SW1  
(219 3000)

Labour spokesman on  
foreign affairs, knows  
Papandreou.

David Owen MP Owen	House of Commons London, SW1 (219 3000)	Leader of SDP, former Foreign Secretary.
J Pawsey MP and Mrs Pawsey	House of Commons London, SW1 (219 3000)	Secretary, Anglo-Greek Parliamentary Group.
Sir Frederick A Warner GCVO KCMG MEP (Con) and Lady Warner	33 Moreton Place London, SW1 (828 7531)	Interested in Greek affairs.
Rt Hon Mrs Barbara Castle MEP (Lab)	Hell Corner Farm Grays Lane Ibstone High Wycombe Bucks (049 163 464)	Met Papandreou on 1980 visit.
	or	
	European Parliament UK Office 2 Queen Anne's Gate London, SW1H 9AA (222 0411)	

Commerce and Industry

Rt Hon The Earl Jellicoe DSO MC PCand Lady Philippa Jellicoe	BOTB DOT 1 Victoria Street London, SW1H OET (215 5741)	Chairman, BOTB. Chairman, Anglo-Hellenic League.
Admiral Sir Raymond Lygo KCB and Lady Pepper Lygo	BAe 100 Pall Mall London, SW1 (930 1020)	Managing Director of British Aerospace plc.
Mr Harding Bassett and Mrs Audrey Bassett	International Consultancy Services British Gas Crpn 326 High Holborn (242 0789 X3437)	Director, trying to enter Greek market.
Mr R Leigh-Pemberton and Mrs Rosemary D Pemberton	The Bank of England 1 Threadneedle St London EC2 (601 4444 X4421)	The Governor of Bank of England.

las Henderson GCMG  
Mary Henderson

Hambro's Bank Ltd  
41 Bishopsgate  
London EC2  
(588 2857)

Director, Hambro's  
Bank. Lady Henderson  
is Greek.

erves

Mr B Nicholas Preston  
and Mrs Elspeth Preston

Stone Manganese  
21-24 Bury St  
St James'  
London SW1  
(930 0491)

Member of European  
Trade Committee.

Mr P K Nanda  
and Mrs Nanda

Metal Box plc  
Queen's House  
Forbury Road  
Reading  
Berks  
(0734 581177)

Chairman, Overseas  
Division. Very large  
Greek subsidiary,  
Hellas Can.

Mr Peter Usher OBE  
and Mrs Pamela Usher

Vosper Thorneycroft  
UK Ltd  
Fareham House  
East Street  
Fareham  
Hants  
(0329 283411)

Managing Director.  
Bidding for contract  
for frigates.

Mr Peter Jamieson and  
Mrs Carol Jamieson

EMI Records (UK)  
EMI House  
20 Manchester Square  
London, W1  
(486 4488 X304)

Managing Director.  
Greek subsidiary is  
largest manufacturer  
of records and cassette  
in Greece.

Sir James Cleminson MC DL  
and Lady Helen Cleminson

Reckitt & Colman Ltd  
1 Burlington House  
Chiswick  
W11 2RW  
(994 6464 X201)

Chairman. Large  
interests in Greece.

Media

Mr John Torode  
and Mrs Torode

The Guardian  
119 Farringdon Rd  
EC1R 3ER  
(278 2332)

Political and  
industrial leader  
writer.

Mr Geoffrey D Owen  
and Mrs Owen

Financial Times  
Bracken House  
Cannon Street  
EC4 (248 800)

Editor

Robert Edwards Mrs Edwards	Sunday Mirror Holborn Circus EC1 (353 0246)	Editor	1
Mr Michael Molloy and Mrs Molloy	Daily Mirror Holborn Circus EC1 (353 0246)	Editor	
Mr Andrew Knight and Mrs Knight	The Economist 25 St James's St W1 (839 7000)	Editor	
Mr Peter Preston and Mrs Preston	The Guardian 119 Farringdon Rd EC1R 3ER (278 2332)	Editor	

Academia/Arts

Dr J K Campbell and Mrs Campbell	St Anthony's College Oxford OX2 6JF (0865 59657)	Greek historian, knows Papandreou.
Mr George B Richardson and Mrs Richardson	Oxford University Press Walton Street Oxford, OX2 6DP (0865 56767 X9)	Economist, knows Papandreou. Fellow of St John's College. Secretary to the Delegates and Chief Executive of OUP.
Professor Robert M Cook FBA	15 Wilberforce Rd Cambridge CB3 0EQ ( 0223 352863)	Archaeologist, Chairman Management Committee of British School at Athens.
Sir Peter R S Hall CBE and Lady Maria Hall	The National Theatre South Bank London SE1 (928 2033 X402)	Director, directed 'The Oresteia' at National Theatre at Epidaurus, Greece ( and TV).
Ms Dilys Powell CBE	c/o Sunday Times New Printing House Sq Grays Inn Road (837 1234 X321) <u>or</u>	Author, book about Greece, and journalist.



14 Albion Street  
Hyde Park  
London W2  
(723 9807)..

Reserves

Mr Richard Clogg  
and Mrs Mary Jo Clogg

Dept of Byzantine  
& Modern Greek  
King's College  
Strand  
London WC2R 2LS  
(836 5454)

Lecturer in modern  
Greek history.

Professor D Nicol  
and Mrs Nicol

Dept of Byzantine  
& Modern Greek  
King's College  
Strand  
London WC2R 2LS  
(836 5454 X2517)

Koraes Professor of  
modern Greek and  
Byzantine history,  
language and  
literature.

Sir Kenneth J Dover DLitt  
FRSE FBA and Lady Audrey  
Dover

Corpus Christi  
College  
Oxford  
OX1 4JF  
(0865 249431)

President of Corpus  
Christi. Classicist.

Mr David Watt  
and Mrs Watt

Royal Institute of  
International Affairs  
10 St James' Square  
London SW1  
(930 2233)

Director

Professor John Boardman  
FSA FBA and Mrs Boardman  
(for Prof. R M Cook)

Ashmolean Museum  
Oxford  
OX1 2PH  
(512657)

Lincoln Professor of  
classical archaeology  
and art.

Professor David Henderson  
and Mrs Henderson  
(for Mr Richardson)

University College  
London  
Gower St  
London WC1  
(387 7050)

Professor of political  
economy. Expert in  
international economics  
Recently appointed to  
to head Economics and  
Statistics Division  
of OECD.

Others

Most Rev and Rt Hon  
Robert Runcie

Lambeth Palace  
London  
SE1 7JU  
(928 8282)

Archbishop of Canter-  
bury. Visit to Greece  
planned 1984.

Frank Giles  
Lady Giles

42 Bloomfield Road  
London  
W19 1AM  
(286 5706)

Mr Giles is Acting  
Chairman of Association  
of Property Owners  
in Greek Frontier  
areas.

Hon Montague Woodhouse DSO  
OBE MA and Lady Davina  
Woodhouse

Willow Cottage  
Latimer  
Bucks  
(Little Chalfont  
2627)

Distinguished soldier  
and historian of Greece.  
Biography of President  
Karamanlis.

Lord Francis Longford KG PC  
and Lady Elizabeth Longford

Bernhurst  
Hurst Green  
East Sussex  
(Hurst Green 248)

Lady Longford has  
written a book on  
Byron.

or

18 Chesil Court  
Chelsea Manor St  
London SW3  
(352 7794)

Reserves

The Most Rev Methodios  
Archbishop of Thyateira  
and Great Britain

5 Craven Hill  
London W2  
(723 4787)

Head of Greek  
Orthodox Church in UK.  
[Addressed as 'Your  
Eminence'].

Sir Brooks Richards  
KCMG DSC and Lady  
Richards

The Ranger's House  
Farnham  
Surrey  
(0252 717674)

Former Ambassador  
to Greece. Chairman  
CSM European  
Consultants.

Sir David Hunt KCMG OBE  
and Lady Hunt

Old Place  
Lindfield  
West Sussex  
RH16 2HG  
(044 47 2298)

Chairman, Commonwealth  
Institute. Former  
High Commissioner to  
Cyprus.

Rt Hon Lord Caccia GCMG GCVO  
and Lady Caccia  
(for Hon Montague  
Woodhouse and Lady  
Davina Woodhouse)

1 Chester Place  
Regent's Park  
London NW1  
(935 0302)

Former Permanent  
Under-Secretary of  
State, FCO. Served  
in Athens. Attended  
40th Anniversary of  
Battle of Crete in  
1981.

Sir Steven Runciman  
A MA

Elshields  
Lockerbie  
Dumfriesshire  
(038781 280)

Greek historian.  
Chairman, Anglo-  
Hellenic League  
1951-67. Chairman,  
National Trust for  
Greece.



Le VP  
c. M. Barclay

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 October 1983

VISIT OF MR. PAPANDREOU

We discussed the time available for talks.

I think you could tell the Greeks that if Mr. Papandreou is able to arrive by 1100, the Prime Minister would welcome an half-hour tête-à-tête before the extended talks at 1130. This would then give two hours in total for the talks, followed by lunch. I hope you can persuade the Greeks that this is sufficient, because it will be extremely difficult to extend the time further.

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED



de VC

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 October 1983

Thank you for your letter of 21 October. The Prime Minister is content that no charges should be raised for Mr. Papandreou's use of two HS 125 aircraft for his visit to London.

I am copying this letter to Roger Bone (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. J. COLES

Nick Evans, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

RESTRICTED

de VC



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
 Telephone 01-~~9307022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/20

21st October 1983

*W. M.*

Prime Minister

*Content that we should fly Mr.  
 Papandreu and his party to London  
 with 2 x HS125 - free of  
 charge?*

*A.J.C. 21/10*

Dear JSM,

The Prime Minister will wish to be aware that, during Mr Heseltine's recent visit to Greece, it was suggested that we might offer Mr Papandreu the use of an RAF HS125 aircraft for his journey to London in early November. We have been trying for some time to interest the Greeks in a purchase of the HS125 and, if our offer was taken up, this would be a very useful way of demonstrating the qualities of the aircraft to them. Mr Heseltine therefore proposes to offer Mr Papandreu's office the use of two of these aircraft for their party. We shall aim to make use of the outward flights to take routine freight and passengers to Cyprus. If the Prime Minister is content no charges would be raised.

I am copying this letter to Roger Bone in the FCO.

*Yours ever*

*Michael Gram*

(N H R EVANS)

A J Coles Esq



*With the compliments of*  
**R. B. BONE**  
**THE PRIVATE SECRETARY**

*we spoke*

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE**  
**SW1A 2AH**

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 240  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM ATHENS 191115Z OCT 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO.,  
TELNO 567 OF 19 OCTOBER 1983.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 522: VISIT OF GREEK PRIME MINISTER TO LONDON

1. PAPANDREOU'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD SO FAR HEARD FROM KYRIAZIDES ONLY THAT ON 4 NOVEMBER THERE WOULD BE TALKS FOLLOWED BY LUNCH. I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE TALKS WOULD BE FOR ABOUT ONE AND A HALF HOURS. MAHAIRITSAS' RESPONSE WAS THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD THAT THE PERIOD WOULD BE SO SHORT. HE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF TWO OR TWO AND A HALF HOURS, BUT SAID THAT PAPANDREOU WAS OF COURSE WAITING TO HEAR MRS THATCHER'S WISHES.
2. MAHAIRITSAS SAID THAT PAPANDREOU HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO FLY TO LONDON ON THE AFTERNOON OF 3 NOVEMBER OR THE MORNING OF 4 NOVEMBER. IF THE TALKS WERE TO BEGIN AT ABOUT 1100 HOURS LOCAL TIME OR LATER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ARRIVE ON THE MORNING OF 4 NOVEMBER. OTHERWISE HE THOUGHT THAT PAPANDREOU WOULD PREFER TO FLY IN ON THE PREVIOUS EVENING.
3. MAHAIRITSAS AGAIN EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED BY PAPANDREOU TO HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, PARTICULARLY PRIOR TO THE ATHENS EUROPEAN COUNCIL. HE SAID THAT PAPANDREOU REGARDED HER AS ONE OF THE KEY PERSONALITIES OF THE COMMUNITY.
4. MAHAIRITSAS SAID THAT PAPANDREOU WOULD WISH TO COVER WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS COMMUNITY SUBJECTS AND BILATERAL SUBJECTS. HE EXPLAINED THAT BY THE LATTER HE MEANT ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS. PAPANDREOU HAD IN MIND POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATION IN THESE AREAS.

R H O D E S

LIMITED  
SED  
DEFENCE D  
NEWS D  
ECD (1)  
PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR JAMES

CONFIDENTIAL





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 October 1983

VISIT OF THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER

You told me that Mr. Papandreou had accepted the Prime Minister's invitation to talks and lunch on Friday, 4 November.

The Prime Minister envisages talks from 1130 until 1300 hours, followed by a lunch for 48 people. I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft guest list soon and for any suggestions which you may wish to make about the arrangements for the talks. I imagine that it will be useful to begin with a tete-a-tete (with notetakers on either side). Depending on whether Mr. Papandreou will be bringing his Foreign Minister, we should also consider whether Foreign Ministers should join the two principals at some stage and/or whether we should envisage a plenary session.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

B.R. ①  
PRIME MINISTER  

---

MR. PAPANDREOU

He has accepted your invitation to talks  
and lunch on Friday, 4 November.  

---

The best arrangement might be talks at  
11.30 followed by lunch for 48.

Agree?

A. J. C.

*Yes mb*

14 October 1983

Tessa : ~~Islington~~ engagement



B/F.

10 DOWNING STREET

~~David~~

Papandreu has accepted  
the S.O.'s invitation to talk  
and lunch on 4 November.  
Pl. keep 11.30 until 16.00  
free, pending agreement on  
details.

A.S.C. -  $\frac{13.}{10}$

CF

diary noted accordingly.



A & C. <sup>14</sup>/<sub>60</sub>  
f.a.

*With the compliments of*

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
SW1A 2AH

GRS 320  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM ATHENS 120750Z OCT 83  
TO PRIORITY F C O  
TELNO 522 OF 12 OCTOBER 1983  
INFO ROUTINE MODUK.

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT OF GREEK PRIME MINISTER TO LONDON

1. AS AGREED WITH THE ASSISTANT PRIVATE SECRETARY, I HAVE EXPLAINED TO MAHAIRITSAS THAT THE DATES PROPOSED BY PAPANDREOU ARE NOT CONVENIENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER SINCE THEY CLASH WITH THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING. I SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER COULD OFFER TALKS AND LUNCH ON 4 NOVEMBER.

2. MAHAIRITSAS TOLD ME YESTERDAY EVENING THAT 4 NOVEMBER SUITED PAPANDREOU. HE WOULD PROBABLY ARRIVE ON THE EVENING OF 3 NOVEMBER. IF THE TALKS WERE TO BEGIN AT ABOUT 11 AM ON THE MORNING OF 4 NOVEMBER HE MIGHT FLY IN EARLY ON THAT MORNING. HE WOULD IN ANY CASE LEAVE AFTER LUNCH ON 4 NOVEMBER. KYRIAZIDES IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO DISCUSS DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS.

3. WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE WAS HERE ON 2 SEPTEMBER HE TOLD ME THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO OFFER TO BRING PAPANDREOU TO LONDON IN AN RAF EXECUTIVE JET (MY TELELETTER OF 6 SEPTEMBER TO JAMES, AUSS). THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE SINCE WE HAVE FOR SOME TIME BEEN TRYING TO PERSUADE THE GREEKS TO BUY THE LATEST VERSION OF THE B.A.E. 125. I HOPE THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE THIS OFFER AND, IF SO, THAT THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE THE MOST UP TO DATE VERSION. MR HESELTINE'S SUGGESTION WAS THAT THE FLIGHT COULD BE COMBINED WITH A FLIGHT TO AND FROM CYPRUS.

R H O D E S

LIMITED  
SED  
DEFENCE D  
NEWS D  
ECD (I)  
PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/AUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
MR JAMES

CONFIDENTIAL

~~Dr. P. B.~~

with FERB.

11/2/83.



*With the compliments of*

**THE PRIVATE SECRETARY**

✓  
Could we have a word?

Spoken.

✓  
10/11/83  
D. G. P. B.

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE**

**SW1A 2AH**

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 280  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM ATHENS 041015Z OCT 83  
TO PRIORITY F C O  
TELNO 487 OF 4 OCTOBER 1983

VISIT OF GREEK PRIME MINISTER TO LONDON

1. AS AGREED, I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MAHAIRITSAS, DIPLOMATIC ADVISER TO PAPANDREOU, ABOUT DATES FOR THE LATTER'S PROPOSED VISIT TO LONDON. MAHAIRITSAS HAS JUST TOLD ME THAT PAPANDREOU IS VERY KEEN TO MEET THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE THE ATHENS COUNCIL. HE PROPOSES 21, 22 OR 23 NOVEMBER (SEMICOLON) OR POSSIBLY THE MORNING OF 24 NOVEMBER WHEN HE HAS TO BE IN BRUSSELS TO DELIVER A SPEECH IN THE EVENING. MAHAIRITSAS ADDED THAT IF IT SUITED MRS THATCHER BETTER, PAPANDREOU COULD MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE ON 25 OR 26 NOVEMBER, THOUGH HE DID NOT WISH TO INTERFERE WITH MRS THATCHER'S WEEKEND PLANS.

2. MAHAIRITSAS SAID THAT PAPANDREOU WOULD PARTICULARLY LIKE TO DISCUSS COMMUNITY MATTERS DURING HIS VISIT, BUT HE WOULD ALSO OF COURSE WISH TO COVERT M ANY BILATERAL QUESTIONS. MAHAIRITSAS ADDED THAT THE FIRTHCINMING VISIT F OF KAPSIS ON 28 OCTOBER WOULD ENABLE KAPSIS TO PREPARE THE GROUND A LITTLE.

3. I SAID THAT I WOULD PUT THE PROPOSED DFATES TO YOU AND WOULD LET MAHAIRIT SAS HAVE AN ANSWER AS SOON AS PCOIBLE.

R H O D E S

LIMITED

SED

FCD (I)

PROTOCOL D

NEWS D

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/AUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR JAMES

CONFIDENTIAL



Deve

Greece

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

2 September 1983

Thank you for your letter of 31 August about the possible visit of the Greek Prime Minister.

This is simply to confirm that the Prime Minister was content that Mr. Heseltine should speak to Mr. Papandreou in the terms set out in your letter.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

(TIM FLESHER)

R B Bone Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RM





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 August, 1983

*Dear Tim,*

Possible Visit of Greek Prime Minister

As you know, Mr Heseltine is visiting Greece from 1-2 September to promote the sale of Tornado to Greece. He will be seeing Mr Papandreou on 2 September.

We have been considering for some time the possibility of suggesting a meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr Papandreou. They have not had a formal meeting since Mr Papandreou took office in October 1981. One nearly came about at the beginning of April, when Mr Papandreou was returning from a visit to Canada and planned to pass through London. In the event his plans changed. Following this, the Ambassador at Athens asked Mr Papandreou to let him know in advance if he planned to pass through London again, in case it proved possible to arrange a meeting with the Prime Minister.

It might however be useful if Mr Heseltine were to use this opportunity of his visit to Athens this week to go rather further and say to Mr Papandreou that the Prime Minister would welcome an opportunity for a talk in London with Mr Papandreou. This might possibly help secure a favourable decision on Tornado, but the main purpose would be to talk to the Greek Prime Minister about the current international agenda, particularly the items on which the Greek performance has been so erratic.

I have not had time this evening to consult the Secretary of State. Subject to any comments he has overnight, it would be helpful to know by Friday whether the Prime Minister agrees with this suggestion. An opportunity for a meeting might for example arise when Mr Papandreou passes through London on his way back from the United Nations General Assembly.

I am copying this letter to Nick Evans in the MOD.

*Yours  
R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

T Flesher Esq  
10 Downing Street

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby  
IMMEDIATE

ZCZC  
GRS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
DESKBY  
FM FCO  
PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 CONFIDENTIAL  
4  
5  
6 FM FCO  
7 TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

*M.A. has been*  
*eg.*

9 YOUR TELNO 322: GREEK PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO LONDON  
10 1. It is now clear that pressure on the Prime Minister's  
11 time before the European Council would not permit a meeting  
12 with Mr Papandreou on 25 November. You should therefore  
13 continue to be guided by <sup>my</sup>tel 232.  
14 2. The Queen will give a lunch for participants on 26  
15 November, to which Mr Papandreou should wear a dark lounge suit.  
16 This will also be acceptable for the dinner at Number Ten that  
17 evening.

18  
19 CARRINGTON  
20 NNNN

/// 22  
// 23  
/ 24  
25

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept SED	Distribution  Standard SED ECD(E) ECD(I)
Drafted by (Block capitals) A C HUNT		
Telephone number 233 4432		
Authorised for despatch <i>Alison</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

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GR 230

CONFIDENTIAL

FM ATHENS 041640Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 322 OF 4 NOV 1981  
SAVING INFO TO UKREP BRUSSELS(FCO PSE PASS)

MIPT AND YOUR TEL 232: MY CALL ON THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER  
ON 4 NOVEMBER.

1. IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT PAPANDREOU COULD BE IN LONDON ON THE AFTERNOON OF 25 NOVEMBER. AS I WAS LEAVING, HE RAISED THE QUESTION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, SAYING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT HM THE QUEEN WOULD BE OFFERING ENTERTAINMENT, AND WOULD WELCOME GUIDANCE ON WHAT CLOTHES TO BRING. (GRATEFUL FOR SUCH GUIDANCE). HE ADDED THAT HIS TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS WERE NOT SETTLED BUT HE THOUGHT HE WOULD HAVE TO GO TO LONDON ON 25 NOVEMBER, AND IN THIS CASE COULD GO AT ANY TIME OF THE DAY. A MID-MORNING DEPARTURE WOULD GET HIM TO HEATHROW IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON. THIS REOPENS THE POSSIBILITY OF A BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, A POSSIBILITY TO WHICH I DID NOT OF COURSE REFER. WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN THAT HE WILL NOT BE OBLIGED BY PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS TO DELAY HIS DEPARTURE UNTIL EARLY ON 26 NOVEMBER BUT HE SAID THAT HE COULD FIX THE TIMING OF THE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE AND I BELIEVE THAT IF PAPANDREOU WERE OFFERED A MEETING IN THE AFTERNOON OR EVENING OF 25 NOVEMBER HE WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ADJUST HIS PARLIAMENTARY PROGRAMME TO FIT.
2. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES YOU MAY WISH TO RECONSIDER THE QUESTION OF A RECOMMENDATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR A BILATERAL MEETING WITH PAPANDREOU.

SUTHERLAND

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

STANDARD

SED  
ECD(E)  
UND

COPIES TO:

MR BENJAMIN PEP/DOT  
MR WISEMAN EEB/DOT

CONFIDENTIAL



SS  
Greece

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 November 1981

GREECE: VISIT BY MR. PAPANDREOU

The Prime Minister has seen Francis Richards' letter to me of 2 November suggesting that the Prime Minister should offer a bilateral meeting to Mr. Papandreou late on 25 November. As I have told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister did not think that she would have time for such a meeting. The proposal has, in any case, been overtaken by the news in Athens Telno. 215 of 2 November that Mr. Papandreou was unlikely to reach London until 26 November.

315

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

R

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

I am sure a meeting with  
Mr Papandreu in advance of the  
European Council meeting would be  
helpful. Arrange if a convenient time  
can be found?

2 November 1981

Paul

Have time  
no

Dear Michael,

Greece: Visit by Mr Papandreu

You will have noted from Athens telegrams that the new Greek Government seems bent on early implementation of PASOK's pledges on "socialisation" and "change" in domestic policies. But Mr Papandreu is moving much more cautiously over foreign and defence policies. On withdrawal from the European Community and NATO, PASOK's extreme positions were modified during the election campaign: Mr Papandreu's pronouncements since his appointment as Prime Minister show that he does not intend to be hurried and that he might indeed decide to remain in both organisations. Firm decisions are unlikely to have been taken by the time of the European Council meeting on 26/27 November. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that there could be a useful opportunity to influence the key decisions through discussion with Mr Papandreu at that time.

In opposition Mr Papandreu was hostile both to NATO and the Community. In press interviews since his election he has, however, spoken of the desirability of abolishing both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, seeming to imply that Greece might stay in the former until both Alliances disappear. He has postponed until next year negotiations with the United States on the future of American bases in Greece. But the indications are that he will insist on the removal of nuclear weapons and ask for NATO, or US, guarantees, of Greek territory in the Aegean: ie a guarantee against Turkey. Indeed, it is his confrontational approach towards Turkey over both the Aegean disputes and Cyprus which seems most liable to cause trouble in the short term.

/Over the

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

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Over the European Community, the PASOK bid for a referendum, on which they would recommend withdrawal, is unlikely to succeed - indeed it is not yet certain that Mr Papandreou will choose to pursue this course. He is however threatening to disregard obligations which conflict with his domestic economic policies and seems to be toying with ideas of "renegotiation". He has specifically referred to the British example. He is at best likely to prove an uncomfortable partner, and a particularly difficult one in the field of political cooperation on matters such as the Middle East, where his policy is to support the PLO.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's hope is that Mr Papandreou will attend the European Council and be exposed to the influence of the other nine Heads of Government. If he were to come, Lord Carrington would see advantage in a short bilateral meeting with the Prime Minister at which broad policy issues could be broached. Lord Carrington realises that even a 45 minutes meeting may not be easy to fit in before the Council, which is itself going to be a difficult one with a heavy agenda. And it is quite possible that other bilaterals may be necessary to help get the Council on the rails at the outset.

It would be ideal if the Prime Minister were able to offer Mr Papandreou a meeting late on 25 November (I understand that 4.30 that day might be possible). He might in that case come to London the day before the Council. A meeting on the morning of 26 November would clearly be more difficult: the possibilities would need to be reviewed along with other possible bids should Mr Papandreou suggest 26 November.

*Yours ever,*

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL [FRAME GENERAL]

DESKBY 021500Z NOV 81

FM ATHENS 021440Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 315 OF 2 NOV 81  
RPTD ROUTINE INFO UKREP BRUSSELSMY TEL 309 : GREEK PRIME MINSITER'S ATTENDANCE  
AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

1. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT TO CALL ON THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER AT 1200 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON WEDNESDAY 4 NOVEMBER, FOR WHICH IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A REPLY TO PARA 2 OF MY TUR.

2. ACCORDING TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, PAPANDEOU CURRENTLY PLANS TO LEAVE FOR LONDON EARLY ON THE MORNING OF 26 NOVEMBER. FROM 23-25 NOVEMBER HE WILL HAVE BEEN HEAVILY OCCUPIED WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE AT WHICH HE WILL PRESENT THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAMME, AT THE END OF WHICH A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE WILL BE TAKEN. THIS TIMING WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY RULE OUT A BILATERAL MEETING OR OTHER ENGAGEMENTS BEFORE THE START OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETINGS WITH THE ANGLO/GREEK PARLIAMENTARY GROUP AND/OR THE LONDON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AS SUGGESTED IN MY TELCON OF 29 OCTOBER WITH DAUNT, SED, WOULD SEEM TO BE PRECLUDED UNLESS LATE ON THE FRIDAY EVENING, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT SATURDAY ENGAGEMENTS ARE RULED OUT.

3. SEE MIFT FOR TOPICS WHICH, SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS, I WOULD PROPOSE TO COVER AT MY MEETING WITH PAPANDEOU.

4. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO KNOW THAT ON 3 NOVEMBER I SHALL BE GIVING LUNCH IN MY PRESIDENCY CAPACITY TO INTRODUCE THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER (FOTILAS) TO MY EC COLLEAGUES. IN SEEKING A MEETING WITH PAPANDEOU I MADE IT CLEAR THAT I WOULD NOT (NOT) BE SPEAKING FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

5. I ALSO HAVE FIRST MEETING WITH PROFESSOR LAZARIS SINCE HIS APPOINTMENT AS MINISTER OF COORDINATION, AT 10 A.M. LOCAL TIME ON 5 NOVEMBER.

FCO PLEASE COPY BENJAMIN P.E.P. AND WISEMAN AT DEPT OF TRADE  
REFERENCE TO PARA 5

SUTHERLAND

FRAME GENERAL  
ECD(I)

COPIES TO:-

MR BENJAMIN PEP DOT  
MR WISEMAN DOT

CONFIDENTIAL

TC  
✓



Greece

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 January 1981

Dear Caroline, in the Box  
7/1

Call on the Prime Minister by the Greek  
Leader of the Opposition

/ I enclose a letter from Mr Papandreou,  
forwarded by the Embassy in Athens,  
thanking the Prime Minister for having  
received him during his visit here last  
November.

Yours sincerely

David Wedderburn

pp (C Q G Jebb)  
Assistant Private Secretary

Ms Caroline Stephens  
10 Downing Street



① Mr. Alexade

② Box

29/12/'80

ms

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I deeply appreciate the opportunity I was given to meet and exchange views with you on matters of concern to our two countries.

Please accept my warm thanks for the hospitality you offered me during my visit.

With my best wishes for a happy 1981, I remain

Sincerely yours,

Andreas Papandreu



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 November 1980

File JS  
Copied to Master set.

Greece.

Dear Paul,

CALL BY MR. PAPANDREOU

The Leader of the Greek Opposition, Mr. Andreas Papandreou, called on the Prime Minister this morning. He was accompanied by Mr. Haralambopoulos and Mr. Ziogas.

The larger part of the conversation was devoted to a discussion of the economic situation in Greece. However, the Prime Minister took the opportunity to tell Mr. Papandreou that she hoped Greece's entry into the European Community would work well. She said that she was a great believer in cooperation among the democracies of Europe. If the European democracies were unable to work together, what chance was there for spreading the cause of democracy elsewhere? She attached particular importance to sustaining democracy in Spain and Portugal and therefore, in due course, to making a success of their entry into the Community. She thought that this broad political consideration was even more important than the economic and trading aspects.

Mr. Papandreou said that, sadly, Greece was entering the Community during a period of stress. He hoped that the Community would be prepared in future to pay more attention to regional problems. He added that his Party had grave doubts about Greece's entry because they did not think the country was ready for it. Greek bureaucracy was both antiquated and rigid and might not be able to exploit the opportunities offered by Community membership. The Prime Minister commented that the fact that this was a difficult period made it the more important that Europe should remain an area of stability. Greece would be a member of the Community during the restructuring negotiations and therefore able to argue the case on behalf of a more effective regional policy. As regards the Greek bureaucracy, the shake-up which would certainly accompany entry might be just what they needed.

In the course of a brief discussion of East/West relations, the Prime Minister commented on the need for the West to be able to negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of strength.

/Deterrence

JEF

Deterrence worked because there was a broad balance between East and West. If that balance was destroyed, it might be difficult to keep the peace. The Prime Minister said that she did not believe anyone wanted war. It should be possible to negotiate downwards, provided a position of balance was maintained. Mr. Papandreou appeared to indicate sympathy with this point of view.

*Yours ever*

*Richard Alexander*

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Greece



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

for Tuesday's box.

RMJ

24 November 1980

Dear Michael,

Greece: Call on the Prime Minister by the Leader of the  
Opposition: 26 November

/ I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister's use  
/ during Mr Papandreou's call, together with a personality  
/ note of him and his colleague, and a copy of their  
// programme, and a statistical note.

/ The Prime Minister will doubtless recall her  
meeting with Mr Papandreou and Mr Haralambopoulos in  
Athens in September (I enclose the record for ease of  
reference). During their talk Mr Papandreou made a good  
deal of NATO not giving Greece any guarantee of support  
in the event of aggression. He has since made the same point  
in public. It is dealt with in paragraph 5 of the background  
of the brief. ~

Yours via

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

GREECE: LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION, MR ANDREAS PAPANDREOU'S VISIT TO LONDON - 24-28 NOVEMBER 1980

Points to Make

1. Welcome. Our countries become EC partners soon. Several policy differences between us. All the more important to understand each other.

2. Many mutual concerns:

(a) Security: Post-Afghanistan, do you really want to give up security of defensive Alliance? Know you blame NATO for not helping Greece over junta and Turkey. But NATO countries, notably Britain, not responsible for Colonels, and kept them at arm's length. And would you really be safer vis-à-vis Turkey outside NATO? Most European socialist parties see need for NATO membership.

(b) Economic Crisis: More chance to influence world economy for the better from inside Western group, even if domestic policies differ.

(c) Future of Europe: EC a world force which cannot be ignored. We have problems. But determined to work from the inside. Hope Greece would take stock carefully after accession, without pressing prematurely for radical change. Again, socialist oppositions in the Nine favour continued membership.

(d) Relations with Third World: North/South dialogue clearly of growing importance. We find developing countries look increasingly to EC as an interlocutor, rather than to developed 'neutrals'.

NATO Reintegration

3. We welcomed it. Clear that ad hoc military arrangements do not compromise Greek sovereignty in Aegean. Turks made the major concession in lifting their veto before final agreement reached.

Greece Internal

4. Election prospects? What would be your first priorities if you won?

Essential Facts

1. Since 1974 popularity of Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) has steadily increased: now has 93 seats out of 300. But the party is a very personal one, its success largely due to charismatic personality of its founder and leader, Papandreou. Too early to predict outcome of next election, to be held before November 1981; but chances only a little lower than even that Papandreou might be the next Greek Prime Minister.

2. Papandreou's main policies in foreign affairs are:

(a) non-alignment and Greek withdrawal from NATO, which he regards as instrument of the US, and as responsible for installation of the Colonels in 1967, for building up Turkey as American 'policeman' in the Middle East, and for siding with Turkey in Greek-Turkish issues;

(b) opposition to Greek membership of the EC as an instrument of monopoly capitalism and of the multinationals. But he may now be recognising that Greece will have to work within the European Community framework, and talks of negotiating a 'special relationship';

(c) an extreme nationalist position on issues in dispute between Greece and Turkey;

(d) strengthening ties with other European socialist movements, particularly with those in Mediterranean countries. PASOK intends to join the Socialist Group in the European Parliament.

3. In domestic affairs, he

(a) seeks to appeal to under-privileged without offending lower-middle classes, small businessmen, and intelligentsia. His main attack is reserved for large-scale capital and multi-nationals. He has stated that PASOK would, on a selective basis, nationalise or 'socialise' a proportion of the 100 largest Greek companies, (excluding ship owners);

(b) PASOK's economic policies are - partly for reasons of prudence - not fully developed. However, they would include a combination of wide controls on credit expansion and monetary supply, and selective import controls;

(c) PASOK

(c) PASOK also emphasises environmental protection, decentralisation of government and the setting up of regional and local elected councils.

4. Since the Prime Minister saw Mr Papandreou in Athens in September, the most significant development has been General Roger's success in reaching agreement with Greece and Turkey on Greek reintegration into NATO. Though shown the (still confidential) interim arrangements by Mr Rallis, Mr Papandreou opposed the move heatedly in Parliament. More recently he has taken a responsible line on extreme left-wing anti-American riots in Athens.

5. Mr Papandreou says that NATO gives Greece no guarantee of support in the event of aggression. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (Annex A) could hardly be more specific: 'The Parties agree that armed attack against one or more of them... shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently agree that...each of them...will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith...such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area'. It is the unambiguous nature of this commitment which has preserved the peace of Europe for 35 years.

6. [Not for disclosure] Mr Papandreou's record in government before the 1967 coup was bad; he was opportunistic, unscrupulous and unpredictable. His private moderation contrasts with his public demagoguery. A PASOK government would make Greece an unreliable and less sympathetic partner in both EC and NATO. Internal instability would increase; indeed, there is already speculation about a further military coup. PASOK's economic policies, if fulfilled, would also harm British commercial interests. And many of the more radical ideas found in Mr Papandreou's philosophy - expounded in detail over the years - are potentially damaging to Western interests in the area. But recent moderation of some of PASOK's more radical policies (eg, towards the EC) are a step in the right direction.

7. [Not for disclosure] Mr Papandreou is visiting the UK as guest of HMG (COI Category I). One aim in inviting him was, principally through contact with a cross-section of Labour Party opinion, to expose PASOK to the social democratic mainstream of European socialist parties. (So far, his contacts had

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been largely with Mr Benn.) It is also hoped to improve personal relations between Mr Papandreou and British leaders from all sides.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
20 November 1980

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economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

**Article 3**

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

**Article 4**

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

**Article 5**

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

**Article 6<sup>1</sup>**

For the purpose of Article V an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France,<sup>2</sup> on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the

1. The definition of the territories to which Article V applies has been revised by Article II of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey (see Appendix 3).

2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council has heard a declaration by the French Representative who recalled that by the vote on self-determination on July 1, 1962, the Algerian people had pronounced itself in favour of the independence of Algeria in co-operation with France. In consequence, the President of the French Republic had on July 3, 1962, formally recognized the independence of Algeria. The result was that the 'Algerian departments of France' no longer existed as such, and that at the same time the fact that they were mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty had no longer any bearing.

Following this statement the Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

Andreas PAPANDEOU

Leader of the Opposition and leader of PASOK. Deputy for Achaia.

Born Chios 1919. Son of the former Prime Minister George Papandreu. Academic economist at Berkeley (California) and other American universities 1942-60. In 1961 during a visit to Greece on a Fulbright scholarship he formed, at Karamanlis' invitation, an economic research centre in Athens. In 1964 renounced his American citizenship and entered Parliament. Immediately appointed Minister to the Prime Minister by his father, and then Deputy Minister of Coordination. In November 1964 was obliged to resign over award of contract to husband of a woman friend. Reappointed April 1965.

Arrested during 1967 coup. Released 1968 and thereafter campaigned against junta in Paris, London and Stockholm.

PASOK, the radical socialist party he formed in 1974, lost badly in that year's elections but doubled its share of the vote in 1977 to become the main opposition party. He considers himself Marxist (not Leninist), and advocates domestic policy of decentralisation and cooperatives similar to Yugoslavs', and a non-aligned foreign policy based on hostility to America and a rejection of Greece's alignment with the West, on support for a Mediterranean socialist grouping and on closer links with the Balkans, the Arabs and the Third World generally. Committed to withdrawal from NATO, expulsion of the US bases and to recommend a 'no' vote in the referendum he proposes on EC membership. A hard liner on relations with Turkey.

American wife, and has sent two children to study in Britain. Health in some doubt recently.

Ioannis HARALAMBOPOULOS

PASOK MP since 1974 and second parliamentary spokesman. Born 1919. Professional soldier 1939-1961 (Lieutenant-Colonel); Woolwich Polytechnic 1950. Centre Union MP 1963-67.

Helped form resistance movement to Junta; arrested twice, imprisoned, tortured and exiled.

Founder member of PASOK, member of Central Committee and Executive Office. Will lead PASOK delegation to European Parliament but intends to remain Greek MP too.

Married (one son and one daughter). Speaks English and French.

VISIT OF MR ANDREAS PAPANDREOU: 24-28 NOVEMBER

24 November

1105 (ETA) Arrives Heathrow (Flt BA 561). Met and escorted to Hyde Park Hotel.

pm Call on Mr Tom King MP, Minister of State for Housing, Department of Environment.

25 November

Visit to Bracknell New Town  
Visit to Racal Communication  
Lunch  
Visit to St Antony's College  
Oxford for dinner.

26 November

1100 Meeting with Prime Minister.

1200 Meeting with Lord Privy Seal

1245 for 1300 Lunch at Admiralty House given by Lord Privy Seal

1515 Meeting with Mr M D M Franklin, Cabinet Office

Evening Visiti to Labour Party HQ for dinner.

27 November

1045 Meeting with Mr Michael Foot MP, Leader of the Labour Party

1115 Meeting with Dr David Owen MP

1145 Meeting with Mr Peter Shore MP

Lunch hosted by Sir Bernard Braine MP, Chairman of Anglo-Greek Parliamentary Group.

pm Visit to Houses of Parliament for Prime Minister's question time.

Meeting with Mr Wedgwood Benn MP

1830 Reception at the Greek Embassy.

28 November

1000 Meeting with Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

1300 Lunch at Chatham House followed by talk on 'The Foreign Policy of the Greek Opposition at 1330.

1500 BBC Bush House for interview by the BBC Greek Service.

29 November

1315 Departs for Athens (Flt BA 562).

GREECE: VITAL STATISTICS

1.	Population		9.5 million	
2.	GNP per head		£1810 (UK 2904)	
3.	GDP real growth rate		3.6% (1979 estimate)	
	Average (1975-1978)		5.5%	
4.	Employment	Total	3.5 million	
		of which: Agriculture	28%	
		Industry	30%	
		Others (mainly Services)	42%	
	Unemployment	(estimate)	2.2%	
		(ignores considerable underemployment)		
5.	Public Sector current expenditure	28.75% of GNP		
	current revenue	29.5% of GNP		
	budget deficit	100,000 million drachmas (= £1,000 million)		
6.	Trade (1979)	Exports	21.3% of GNP	
		Imports	29% of GNP	
	1979 Current Account deficit		£950 millions	
	Main Export Markets %	Main sources of Imports %		
	FRG	19.26	FRG	16.1
	Italy	9.8	Italy	10.9
	France	6.1	France	7.3
	USA	6.0	Saudi Arabia	6.1
	Saudi Arabia	5.5	USA	5.7
	UK	5.1	UK	4.9
		(£151.9m)		(£273m)
7.	Inflation rate (estimate)		23%	
8.	Composition of Parliament (seats)			
	New Democracy	176		
	PASOK (socialists)	93		
	Communists	12		
	Others	19		
	Total	300		



TRL/1097

Programme of arrangements made by the  
Central Office of Information for the  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr Andreas PAPANDEOU  
Leader of the Opposition, Leader of PASOK, and Member of Parliament for Achaia

Accompanied by:

Mr Yiannis HARALAMBOPOULOS  
Member of Parliament for Athens 'B'

Mr Michalis ZIAGAS  
Private Secretary

GREECE

24 - 29 November 1980

Accompanied by a Representative of the Central Office of Information.

Monday 24 November

ARRIVAL IN BRITAIN  
PROGRAMME DISCUSSION  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT

11.05

Arrive London, Heathrow Airport, on flight BA 561 from Athens (de Havilland Suite).

Met by Lt Col P Massey MC, representing the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and Mr William Sanford, Central Office of Information.

Accompanied in car to the Hyde Park Hotel, Knightsbridge, London SW1 (Tel 01-235 2000) where accommodation has been reserved.

13.00

Lunch at the Hyde Park Hotel with Mr Peter Scanlon, Head of Visits Section, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Mr John Crompton, Deputy Director of Overseas Visitors and Information Studies Division, Central Office of Information.

Mr Sanford will discuss the programme.

15.40

Leave hotel by car with Mr Walter Ottewill, Central Office of Information, who will accompany the visitors to appointments in London.

15.55

Arrive at the Department of the Environment, North Tower, Marsham Street, SW1.

Met by Mr J P Bradley, Overseas Visitors Unit.

16.00

Received by the Rt Hon Tom King MP, Minister for Local Government and Environmental Services, for discussion on Regional Development.

Later

Leave Marsham Street by car and return to hotel.

Tuesday 25 November

BRACKNELL NEW TOWN  
INDUSTRIAL VISIT  
DINNER - OXFORD UNIVERSITY

09.00

Leave hotel by car with Mr Sanford.

10.30

Arrive at Bracknell Social Development Offices, Broadway, Bracknell.

Met by Mrs M Johnson, Senior Social Development Officer. Briefing on the development stages of the new town, and accompanied in car for a tour of the residential and industrial areas.

11.45

Arrive at Bracknell Development Corporation, Farley Hall, Bracknell.

Met by the General Manager, Mr G J Bryan, CMG, CVO, OBE.

Tuesday 25 November Contd

- 12.20 Leave Farley Hall by car.
- 12.30 Arrive at Racal Communications and Electronics Limited, Western Road, Bracknell.
- Met by Mr E Carey, Public Relations Officer, Racal Group Services.
- Lunch as guests of the Company with senior directors.
- Later Accompanied on a tour of the factory to see range of the Company's products in communication systems.
- 16.00 Leave Bracknell by car.
- 18.00 Arrive St Antony's College, Woodstock Road, Oxford.
- Met by Dr J K Campbell, MA, Official Fellow and Senior Tutor.
- 19.00 Dine in college. Guests will include:-
- |   |  |
|---|--|
| Mr R M A Carr, MA   | Warden of St Antony's  |
| Professor E F Jackson, MA                                       | Fellow of St Antony's, and Director of the Institute of Economics and Statistics |
| Mr M C Kaser, MA  | Member of St Antony's  |
| Professor Prince Demitri Obolensky, MA Dlit FBA, FSA FR Hist S. | Professor of Russian and Balkan History, Christ Church.                          |
| Dr L Tsoukalis D Phil   | Research Fellow, European Studies, St Catherine's.                               |
| Dr R A Fletcher DSC MA D Phil                                   | Warden of Rhodes College   |
| Mr G Richardson   | Director, Oxford University Press.   |
- Later Leave Oxford by car and return to London.

Wednesday 26 November

- THE PRIME MINISTER  
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL  
LUNCHEON ENGAGEMENT  
CABINET OFFICE  
LABOUR PARTY DINNER
- 10.40 Leave hotel by car.
- 11.00 Arrive at 10 Downing Street, SW1.
- Received by the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP, The Prime Minister.



Wednesday 26 November Contd

- 11.30 Leave Downing Street by car.
- 12.00 Arrive at Foreign and Commonwealth Office, King Charles Street, SW1.  
  
Received by the Rt Hon Sir Ian Gilmour Bt. MP, Lord Privy Seal.
- 12.45 Arrive at Admiralty House, Whitehall, SW1.  
for Lunch as guests of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
13.00 Host: Sir Ian Gilmour.
- Later Leave Admiralty House by car.
- 15.15 Arrive at Cabinet Office, 70 Whitehall, SW1.  
  
Discussions on the European Community with Mr M D M Franklin CB, CMG (Room 304).
- Later Leave Whitehall in car and return to hotel.
- 19.15 Leave hotel by car.
- 19.30 Arrive L'Amico Restaurant, 44 Horseferry Road, SW1.  
for  
20.00 Met by Miss Jenny Little, International Secretary, Labour Party. Dinner with Members of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party.
- Later Leave Horseferry Road by car and return to hotel.

Thursday 27 November

- LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION  
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT  
LUNCH WITH ANGLO-GREEK PARLIAMENTARY GROUP  
HOUSE OF COMMONS GALLERY  
RECEPTION
- 09.40 Leave hotel by car.
- 10.00 Arrive at the House of Commons, Westminster, SW1.  
  
Received by the Rt Hon Michael Foot, MP, Leader of the Opposition.
- 11.15 Arrive at Norman Shaw North Building, Victoria Embankment, SW1.  
  
Discussions with the Rt Hon David Owen, Labour Member of Parliament for Plymouth, Devonport.
- 11.45 Arrive at House of Commons, Westminster, SW1.  
  
Discussion with the Rt Hon Peter Shore, Labour Member of Parliament for Tower Hamlets, Stepney and Poplar.

Thursday 27 November Contd

Later Leave Houses of Parliament by car.

12.45 Arrive at Locket's Restaurant, Marsham Street, SW1.  
for  
13.00 Lunch in the private dining room with members of the  
Anglo-Greek Parliamentary Group

Host: Sir Bernard Braine DL, Conservative Member  
of Parliament for Essex SE.

Others present will include Mr N D Sandelson, Labour  
Member of Parliament for Hillingdon, Hayes and  
Harlington, Mr A M F Palmer, Labour Member of Parliament  
for Bristol NE and Mr J Pawsey, Conservative Member of  
Parliament for Rugby.

14.15 Leave Marsham Street by car.

14.25 Arrive Houses of Parliament, Westminster, SW1 to see  
the Speaker's Procession.

14.35 Watch proceedings in the House of Commons including  
Prime Minister's Question Time from the Distinguished  
Strangers' Gallery.

16.00 Met in the Central Lobby by the Rt Hon Tony Benn,  
Labour Member of Parliament for Bristol SE.

Later Leave Westminster by car and return to hotel.

18.15 Leave hotel by car.

18.30 Arrive at 51 Upper Brook Street, W1.

Attend a Reception as guests of honour of His  
Excellency the Greek Ambassador and Madame Eustace  
Lagacos.

Later Leave Upper Brook Street by car and return to hotel.

Friday 28 November

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS  
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION

09.40 Leave hotel by car.

10.00 Arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
Ambassador's Entrance, Downing Street, SW1.

Received by the Rt Hon the Lord Carrington PC, KCMG, MC,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

10.30 Leave Downing Street by car and return to hotel.

12.45 Leave hotel by car.

Friday 28 November Contd

- 13.00 Arrive at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, St James's Square, SW1.  
Met by Mr Keith Kyle, Meetings Secretary.  
Buffet lunch with invited guests.
- 13.30 Address a meeting on "Foreign Policy of the Greek Opposition".
- 14.30 Leave St James's Square by car.
- 15.00 Arrive at British Broadcasting Corporation, Bush House, Aldwych, WC2.  
Met by Mr Paul Nathanail, Assistant Head of Southern European Service, and introduced to staff of the Service.
- Later Leave Aldwych by car and return to hotel.

Saturday 29 November

- DEPARTURE FROM BRITAIN
- 11.45 Leave hotel by car, with luggage.  
Arrive at the de Havilland suite, London, Heathrow Airport.
- 13.15 Leave London, Heathrow Airport, on flight BA 562 for Athens.

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Programme Organiser: Mr William Sanford  
Overseas Visitors and Information Studies Division  
Central Office of Information  
Hercules Road, London SE1.  
Tel: 01-928 2345, Ext 278

20 November 1980

In Confidence

TRL/1097

CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION

Note on a visit to Britain by

Mr Andreas PAPANDEOU

Leader of the Opposition, Leader of PASOK, and Deputy for Achaia.

GREECE

24-29 November 1980

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He was born in Chios in 1919 and is the son of the former Prime Minister George Papandreou. Shortly after leaving Athens College, he left Greece for the US where he served in the US forces and was an academic economist at Berkeley, California and other American universities from 1942-60. In 1961, during a visit to Greece on a Fulbright scholarship he formed, on the invitation of Karamanlis, a new economic research centre in Athens, of which he became head. In 1964 he renounced his American citizenship and stood successfully for Parliament. He was immediately appointed Minister to the Prime Minister by his father and subsequently Deputy Minister of Coordination.

Arrested on the night of the 1967 coup, he was detained until Christmas 1967 when he was granted an amnesty. In January 1968, he was allowed to leave Greece with his wife and family. He went to Paris and London, where he immediately began a campaign against the regime. In 1968 he accepted the offer by the Swedish Government of a Visiting Professorship at the University of Stockholm.

PASOK, the radical socialist party he formed in 1974, lost badly in that year's elections but doubled its share of the vote in 1977 to become the main opposition party. He considers himself a Marxist, but not a Leninist, and advocates a domestic policy of decentralisation and cooperatives similar to the Yugoslav model: and a non-aligned foreign policy based on support for a Mediterranean socialist grouping and on closer links with the Balkans, the Arabs and the Third World generally. Committed to withdrawal from NATO, expulsion of the US bases and to recommend a "no" vote in the referendum he proposes on EEC membership he also takes a hard line on relations with Turkey.

He has an American wife, Margaret, and has sent two of his children to study in Britain. He will be a guest of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office while in Britain and his programme is being arranged by the Central Office of Information. He will be accompanied by Mr Yiannis Haralambopoulos the spokesman for PASOK in Parliament and a member of the Executive Committee, and by a secretary, Mr Michalis Ziagas.

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Programme Organiser:

Mr William Sanford

Overseas Visitors and Information Studies Division

Central Office of Information

Hercules Road, London SE1

Tel: 01-928 2345 Ext 278

7 November 1980

In Confidence

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CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION

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7 November 1980

FILE

VLB

Greece

BF 22.11.80

28 October 1980

Greece: Visit of Leader of the Opposition

Thank you for your letter of 24 October and the Prime Minister would be very happy to receive Mr. Andreas Papandreou, the Leader of the PASOK, during his visit to London in November.

May I please offer you 11.00 a.m. on Wednesday, 26 November at 10 Downing Street, and we will require a brief to reach this office by close of play on Friday, 22 November.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CS

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① Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister

London SW1A 2AH

Agree that we should  
try to fit Mr Papandreu in  
for 30 minutes?

24 October 1980

Paul 27/X Yes not

Dear Michael,

Greece: visit of Leader of the Opposition

As you may recall, Mr Andreas Papandreu, the leader of PASOK, is paying a Category 1 COI visit to the United Kingdom from 24 to 28 November. He clearly enjoyed his discussion with the Prime Minister in Athens in September, and has asked if a call on her can be included in his programme.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary hopes that the Prime Minister will be prepared to receive Mr Papandreu. He is the Leader of the official Opposition in a NATO country soon to accede to the European Communities although, as the Prime Minister will clearly recall, he is unsympathetic to both organisations; with elections to be held next year he might be Prime Minister before the end of 1981.

I should be grateful to know the Prime Minister's views reasonably soon, including possible timing, if she agrees to see Mr Papandreu, as it would assist in planning the programme.

Yours GSE

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London

RESTRICTED

# Grey Scale #13



**A** 1 2 3 4 5 6 **M** 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 **B** 17 18 19



Inches 1 2 3  
Centimetres 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

## Colour Chart #13

Blue Cyan Green Yellow

