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PREM 19/2277

The Situatio... ...eland

Force levels

Public Order Situation

IRELAND

PT 1: May 1979

PT23: November 1987

PT 23

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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PREM

PART 23 ends:-

MO 19/3V

MoD to CDP 31.3.88

PART 24 begins:-

CDP to PAB 2.4.88

SECRET

AA 33

CDP ①

Prime Minister
Agree to accept the restrictions on returning fire in urban areas?
CDP 3/3

Agree with further consideration - but it seems to me that the proposed rules allow our soldiers too little protection and

A lawsuit is not likely to attack without cover.

Dear Charles

ARMING OF HELICOPTERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

In your letter of 28th March to Brian Hawtin, you expressed the Prime Minister's concern about the draft Rules of Engagement enclosed with Mr Stewart's letter of 24th March.

The military assessment is that the threat to helicopters is greater in the rural areas where helicopters frequently operate at low levels on troop-carrying and other logistic tasks. Helicopters over urban areas are generally operating at a relatively high altitude on surveillance tasks, and the threat to these operations is not therefore so great.

The identification of targets in urban areas poses considerable difficulties. This has of course always been a problem for troops operating on the ground, but it is even more difficult and, indeed, virtually impracticable, for the crew of a helicopter quickly and accurately to identify the position from where it is coming under attack in an urban environment. The military view is that in such circumstances evasive action is the only practical response and that this is likely to be effective.

In an urban environment there is also a very much higher risk of death or injury to innocent civilians when using a weapon with a wide spread of fire, such as a machine gun mounted on a helicopter. By contrast, in rural areas there is far less cover from which to mount an attack and, especially when operating at low levels, a correspondingly higher chance of being able correctly to identify the target and return fire. Thus the bar on firing at targets in urban areas stems primarily from practical considerations of returning effective fire.

The restrictions contained in the Rules of Engagement, as in the 'Yellow Card', are intended to provide the necessary certainty that Servicemen acting according to these rules will remain within the law. It is, of course, crucial for every Serviceman to know whether or not he may lawfully use lethal force in any given situation. The Yellow Card is designed as a guide to meet this need. Although it is

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

[Perhaps we should change the law]

intended to allow a margin of safety, to protect the soldier from legal action, any change in its rules without a corresponding change in the law could increase the risk that a serviceman would be acting unlawfully, thereby risking prosecution and conviction. In our view, the proposed Rules of Engagement therefore balance the individual Serviceman's right to self defence with the practicalities of the situation on the ground and the need to ensure the soldier acts within the law.

I hope that this is helpful. I am sending copies of this letter to David Watkins (Northern Ireland Office) and Michael Saunders (Law Officers' Department); and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

(I C F ANDREWS)
Private Secretary

SECRET

cc PC

PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND: REVIEW OF POLICY OPTIONS

at Hap

Following our meeting on 22 March, I agreed to circulate a paper on options for further action. I now attach two annexes, the first covering the proposals already in hand, some of which could be accelerated; and the second, new options. The first takes as far forward as possible the scope for action for existing policy. The second involves a significant shift in our approach, and would be seen as such.

Charles Powell's minute of 22 March listed various matters in our discussion and I report first on these.

BBC, ITN, and also RTE, did eventually make available to the RUC their untransmitted film of the murder of two corporals. French television also had film, some of which has been obtained, and the rest is being sought.

On the question of a united call from the church leaders, Archbishop Eames strongly supported this and undertook to organise it. He came back to me yesterday to say that, to his great disappointment, he had failed to do so and that both the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church and the Cardinal did not want a combined message, but would be addressing a message for their own denominations. I am trying to find out what has happened here, but in any case I am seeking to ensure that, even if separately, a message goes out to all their congregations.

They are already together. We cannot say what has happened.

In respect of the political parties John Hume's intervention in the House was a more forthright call for support for the RUC than any he had previously made. But I intend to continue to press him on this.

SECRET

K1784

At our meeting we discussed the immediate steps to be taken in the aftermath of the murders at Milltown cemetery and of the two corporals. The Chief Constable has already made clear that he is reviewing arrangements for the policing of funerals, but that in any case there would be firm police and Army presence on future occasions. As to the investigation into the murders, I visited on Monday the police station in Belfast where the two murder investigation teams are based, dealing respectively with the Cemetery attack and the murder of the corporals. For the first time in Northern Ireland, they are using the HOLMES computer system (Home Office Large Major Enquiry System). This is proving extremely helpful to cross check the vast amount of statements and other evidence involved. In respect of the cemetery murders, Stone is likely to plead guilty to six murders and three other attempted murders. The effort here is to discover who else may have been involved in the other murders and whether or not it was really a solo effort at the cemetery. In respect of the corporals' murder, the police now have some 140 names to be checked, of which 94 have been positively identified, and on which the RUC are determining whether the evidence on each individual is strong enough to bring charges and, if so, with what offences. They happened on the day to grab two, who the heli-tele' suggest were the ring leaders, and they have already been charged with murder. They expect to make further arrests progressively as the investigation continues.

At our recent meeting we also discussed measures to improve the chances of securing convictions in Northern Ireland courts. These I regard as absolutely critical to our fight against terrorism. Annex A sets out a number of steps that we are actively pursuing following the report of David Calcutt that I commissioned last year. They include in particular the necessary statutory provisions to cover intimate body samples and DNA profiling which I now understand could be brought in at report stage of the Criminal Justice Bill. The Annex also deals with the crucial problem of the right to silence, and a range of other points.

On measures to attack the finances of groups practising or supporting violence, I am establishing an Anti-Rackets Unit within my Department, bringing together RUC, Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise expertise. This is again an area of critical importance and I would wish to push forward as hard as possible. The Irish are showing a real interest in the evidence we have put before them of the losses to their Exchequer through smuggling and I would hope to see some close co-operation with them on this.

On cross-border security, the Anglo-Irish Conference meeting last Friday marked the resumption of contact between the Chief Constable of the RUC and Garda Commissioner. I will be keeping a close eye on developments to ensure that there is no falling-off in co-operation. Major effort has gone into deploying more effective technical facilities in the field of surveillance and intelligence, and we need to ensure that the resources are available to enhance this drive. We need also to reinforce our efforts with the Irish to persuade them to make greater use of such technical support and to give any necessary funding to make this possible. In particular we have to achieve effective and secure communications from the RUC and British Army to the Garda. We continue to offer the Irish technical and training facilities of various types and they are becoming progressively better disposed to accepting these.

On border security, we are implementing plans for a dedicated border brigade which should be operational by the early summer. I hope that this new brigade will have at its disposal the technical and other means to achieve a much tighter surveillance of border crossings.

Rules of engagement (yellow card) for the Army are of course a matter for George Younger and Patrick Mayhew. I will be happy to join him in any review which might be possible, but I think that the scope for further improvements may be very limited.

K1784

We also discussed ways of depriving terrorists of publicity. I think the best way forward here is a vigorous approach to the broadcasting authorities on the responsibilities that they have to give the most careful consideration before broadcasting any material that might have been orchestrated by terrorist organisations. I know the Home Secretary shares this concern and I would be very ready to support him in any approach to the broadcasters.

In respect of proscription and internment, I have set out the arguments in Annex B. From this you will see that if we do decide to embark on a new policy, proscription would be preferable to selective detention, but that I would not recommend it at this moment: since I believe that this would seriously disrupt my first priority, which is to bring to justice those involved in the murder of the corporals on Anderstown Road.

I am copying this minute and the attachments to Geoffrey Howe, Douglas Hurd, George Younger, Patrick Mayhew and to Sir Robin Butler

TK

31 March 1988

K1784

ANNEX A

1. Intimate Body Samples and DNA Profiling

Advances in DNA profiling enable genetic material found at the scene of the crime to be compared with samples of genetic material obtained from a suspect. If the material from the scene of the crime is sufficient in quality and quantity, the technique can virtually prove guilt or innocence. Like does not have to compare with like. The same DNA material from the same individual is contained in blood, semen, hair roots and mouth tissues.

Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act in England and Wales, the police may obtain non-intimate body samples (eg hair) by use of reasonable force if necessary. Intimate body samples (eg blood, mouth tissue) can only be taken with consent. The aim in Northern Ireland is to ensure that sample material can be obtained to permit matching DNA analysis, either through provisions equivalent to those of the England and Wales legislation or through some suitable modification of them.

One possibility would be to create an offence of refusing to comply with an order of a court to provide intimate samples, since the medical profession are unlikely to agree to take such samples without consent and by force. This may however be less than effective, and a more promising approach may be to rely on hair samples (already classed as non-intimate in England and Wales) and buccal swabs (to obtain mouth tissue), which could be defined as non-intimate in Northern Ireland, and would therefore be taken without consent by non-medically qualified people.

I would therefore propose that we use report stage of the Criminal Justice Bill to introduce new provisions enabling both intimate and non-intimate body samples to be taken in Northern Ireland.

2. An Accused Person's Refusal to Answer Questions (Right of Silence)

Two provisions were recommended by the Criminal Law Revision in its 11th Report:

i. that a court might draw adverse inferences from an accused's failure to mention under police questioning any material fact on which he subsequently relied for his defence;

ii. that once a court has accepted that there is a case to answer, the court shall be required to warn the defendant that he would be called to give evidence and that if he refused the court might draw such inferences as appear proper.

Only the first of these measures was considered for inclusion in the Criminal Justice Bill. However, it proved highly controversial and at second reading the Home Secretary announced that he did not intend to legislate on the issue in the Bill. Instead a working party has been set up which will give further consideration to the matter.

Both the CLRC recommendations would be of some use in Northern Ireland, although it would be limited since neither has effect until the accused is in court and the fundamental difficulty in the Province lies in gaining sufficient evidence to reach the stage where prosecution can be brought. The measures do not go to the heart of the problem, which is that insufficient evidence exists to bring prosecution when suspects refuse to answer all questions put to them by the police.

I acknowledge the difficulties explained by the Home Secretary at second reading, but I believe that we are now confronted with new circumstances in Northern Ireland and I will therefore wish to press for inclusion of powers in respect of both measures in the Criminal Justice Bill.

Mr David Calcutt QC, in his report, recommended that both of these measures should be enacted.

3. Admissibility of Witnesses' Written Statements

A Government amendment to Clause 21 of the Criminal Justice Bill seeks to ensure that, subject to certain safeguards, courts will admit as evidence written statements made by witnesses who subsequently refuse to give evidence in person because of the fear of intimidation. This will help the prosecuting authorities in Northern Ireland to bring more evidence against terrorist suspects than is possible at present. Corresponding provisions will be enacted in Northern Ireland by negative resolution Order in Council to be made immediately after passage of the Bill.

4. Security Forces' Power to Detain Occupants during HOuse Searches

In order to take account of a recent unhelpful ruling in the Northern Ireland court, the Police and Criminal Evidence Order will make explicit the powers of the security forces to detain the occupants of premises while those premises are being searched.

5. Evidence through Closed Circuit Television

The Criminal Justice Bill provides for witnesses outside the UK and for children in certain cases to give evidence in court by live CCTV link. The RUC see value in wider use of CCTV. It is therefore intended to use the Police and Criminal Evidence Order to widen the provisions for the general criminal law in Northern Ireland to allow

any witness, wherever he may be, to give evidence by live CCTV link if he is unwilling to give evidence in person in court.

6. Anti-Rackets Unit

A new Unit is being established in the NIO joining together representatives of all the various investigating agencies (RUC, Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise). It will have the role of co-ordinating and targetting anti-rackets activities with the aim of gathering evidence for use by the existing prosecuting authority. No legislative provision is necessary at this stage to establish the Unit.

In GB the Drug Trafficking Offences Act provides for the confiscation of the proceeds of those convicted of drug trafficking, while the Criminal Justice Bill introduces powers to confiscate the assets of those convicted of general crime. In Northern Ireland, similar provisions to both pieces of legislation will be contained in the PACE Order to be published this year. (Separate legislation is necessary because different procedures are involved under NI law). However, these provisions bite only on those who have been convicted of offences. The RUC also seek powers in terrorist cases to investigate bank accounts and to track all forms of money movements, in order to acquire evidence to assist in bringing suspects before the courts. The NIO and Home Office are working together to devise provisions to be contained in the Prevention of Terrorism Bill and freeze bank accounts on suspicion that a terrorist offence has been committed.

There is considerable cross-border smuggling activity between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland in both directions. At present, tax differentials between the UK and the Republic and EC agricultural payments make this a very lucrative activity which in the case of customs duties and revenue evasion results in a serious loss to the Irish Exchequer, with terrorist organisations creaming off a significant proportion of the profits from this unlawful

activity. A study of the scale of the problem and joint efforts required to combat it is being mounted urgently with Irish officials and representatives of the various agencies involved.

Evidence of cross-border smuggling activities collated as part of the Army surveillance of operations in border areas has been made available to Customs and Excise and RUC, and is now being actively considered. Irish Ministers have also been shown this evidence and are showing real interest in pursuing this abuse.

7. Rules of Engagement (yellow card)

The yellow card merely serves as a guide to the action that may be taken within the law. Since it has been approved by the Attorney General as an accurate reflection of the existing law, it cannot be changed as long as the law remains as it is. Any relaxation of the law would be highly contentious, particularly in the light of recent accusations that the security forces are above it. It seems unlikely that there is any half-way house between the present position (where members of the security forces are treated in the same way as civilians and the principle of "reasonable force" applies) and a wholly new approach whereby the security forces are put on the equivalent of a war-time footing by being granted an act of indemnity.

8. The Broadcasting Media

Self-regulation by the broadcasting authorities of the coverage they give to the activities of terrorists and their apologists would clearly be helpful. To legislate in this area would undoubtedly provoke the strongest resistance from the media generally and others at home and abroad. An approach by the Home Secretary, supported by NIO Ministers, to initiate discussions with the broadcasting authorities about the future basis of their coverage of terrorist-related activities, might represent the best chance of achieving a degree of voluntary restraint.

K1784

9. Length of Sentences and Remission for Terrorist Crimes

The security forces are concerned that the present system of 50% remission for convicted prisoners in Northern Ireland means that a number of hard core terrorists have been released after serving relatively short periods of custody for serious terrorist offences (5 - 8 years). Some of these immediately became actively reinvolved in terrorism. Work is in hand to establish the extent of reinvolvement; and penal policy is under active review, having regard to Government policy not to treat convicted terrorists differently than other convicted criminals in order to refute claims that they are "prisoners of war" and avoid upsetting the delicate balance within the Northern Ireland prisons.

10. Army Force Levels

Army force levels were increased in 1986; this level is being maintained. The challenge is to ensure that they can work as effectively as possible, and to this end the concept of the new Border Brigade was introduced, and this will start operating with effect from July 1st.

Annex B

1. Proscription

Proscription can be effected by Order in Northern Ireland under provisions of Section 21 of Emergency Provisions Act 1978. In GB it can be effected by Order under Section 1 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1984. An "urgent" procedure is available enabling Orders to have immediate effect, subject to subsequent approval by both Houses.

To date proscription has been used only against organisations which are actively and primarily engaged in the commission of criminal terrorists acts. These include PIRA, INLA, UVF and UFF. The effect of proscription is not retrospective and membership is not an offence unless a person "takes part in any activities" of a proscribed organisation. It is possible that a Proscription Order might be subject to judicial review.

It would be politically difficult to proscribe Sinn Fein alone. However there has been increasing recent evidence of participation in terrorist acts by the UDA as an organisation which strongly supports the case for their proscription; there is also evidence to justify proscription of Irish People's Liberation Army.

Proscription would cause problems for Sinn Fein in remaining active in local electoral politics, perhaps putting their property and funds at risk, but it would not be likely to remove them from elected office (Adams at Westminster and 50 + Councillors in Northern Ireland) if they chose to be careful in avoiding taking part in the activities of Sinn Fein and presented themselves under some other label. Nevertheless

proscription might constrain the broadcasting media from publishing the views of those who are clearly the target of a proscription Order.

Because of the electoral support (c70,000) that Sinn Fein undoubted has the Provisional movement would undoubtedly seek to take propaganda advantage of proscription, especially in the USA, by claiming that HMG were suppressing legitimate political opposition to its policies in Northern Ireland by the threat of imprisonment.

If Sinn Fein or the UDA (estimated support about 8-10,000) chose confrontation, and persisted in operating unchanged, the Government and the security forces would face severe difficulties of enforcement of proscription other than by selective charges of leaders.

Proscription would not change the Republican views and beliefs of those 70,000 or so voters who support Sinn Fein, and might reinforce them.

Proscription of related bodies is unlikely to reduce the terrorist activities of PIRA, UFF or UVF. If it led to a propaganda boost in their communities for those organisations, it might in fact lead to an increase in terrorist activity.

These are the risks, which are well recognised, and are why Merlyn Rees' decision of 1975 to de-proscribe has not been reversed. Nonetheless, I think that it is the most likely option, in the right circumstances, and why I put in hand the necessary contingency planning some months ago. I would not recommend doing it at this moment, as my first priority is to bring to justice all those involved in the corporals' murder, and proscription would create a completely new atmosphere, in which the RUC would face far greater difficulties.

K1784

2. Detention by Executive Action

The provisions for detention by executive action are contained in Section 12 and Schedule 1 of NI (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978.

The provisions are not currently in force but a procedure which is identical to that for proscription exists to bring them into force with immediate effect. Contingency plans exist for implementing detention rapidly and without warning.

In the short term detention would severely disrupt the operation and capability of all terrorist groups in Northern Ireland because both the "Godfathers" and the main operational activists would be detained. This would probably initially involve some 200 detainees, although an informal military view is it would need to be some 700 to have real effect. Detention would have a very positive effect on unionist opinion and on the morale of the security forces, and might undermine the confidence and morale of all but the hard core terrorists.

Detention would be incomparably more effective and much more widely accepted if it were implemented simultaneously in the Irish Republic where the appropriate legislation remains available to be activated. The Irish are not contemplating such a move at present.

The success of detention rests on an assumption that the community would settle down and stabilise if the major "Godfathers" and gunmen were taken out of circulation. Experience indicates that that is unlikely because detention would have a serious effect on moderate Catholic opinion in Ireland, North and South (even though loyalists would also be detained); and would risk weakening Irish co-operation in

security matters. It would undoubtedly lead to an upsurge of support for Sinn Fein and, after a period of disruption, increase the flow of terrorist recruits. Individual acts of terrorism would therefore be replaced by widespread and sustained public disorder as in the aftermath of the introduction of internment in 1971 and during the hunger strikes of 1981. Making arrests for the purpose of detention and dealing with widespread public disorder would divert the security forces from bringing terrorists to justice before the courts. Special Branch operations and the gathering of intelligence would be seriously undermined.

The re-introduction of detention would make it more difficult to claim that we were dealing with terrorism under the "ordinary" criminal law. It would be a breach of the ECHR and UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and would require notices of derogations. It would become a focus for international pro-Republican propaganda and subject to criticism in the field of human rights, particularly by the Eastern Bloc.

Finally, there is the difficulty of putting a limit on or disengaging from detention. It introduces unwelcome concepts of "amnesty" and "cease fire", attaching unjustified legitimacy to the terrorist organisations.

These are powerful reasons against launching into this option, but at the same time, I believe that there could be circumstances when it might become essential to do so. There are undoubtedly a number of key terrorists whose absence would interrupt the flow of violence, and if the Irish did it as well, the international criticism would be greatly reduced. The contingency planning on this has already been updated, but I do not recommend this option at present.

K1784

3. Identity Cards

The introduction of compulsory identity cards is not supported by the security forces who already have various means of identifying people and would not welcome the extra burden of enforcement. They do not see cards as assisting them in their operations. Legislation would be necessary to create offences for failing to produce the cards. The scheme would either have to apply to the whole of the United Kingdom or only to Northern Ireland, in which case special arrangements would be necessary for visitors from elsewhere in the Common Travel Area.

4. Police Primacy

In the light of the arrangements that have been made for the new border Brigade, a similar delegation could be made for other specified areas away from the border. But the effect of the Border Brigade arrangements have not been clearly understood by the Irish or the public and such dispositions would become increasingly contentious, especially if they were to be applied in urban areas, particularly Londonderry or Belfast. Any removal of prime responsibility for law and order from the RUC would represent (and would be perceived as) a major setback for the police and for the whole thrust of our security policy over the last 12 years. It would be presented by PIRA as a major victory. It would certainly prejudice Anglo-Irish security cooperation. And it would call into question the statutory framework of emergency provisions that has evolved in recent years which assumes the police to be clearly in the lead.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 March 1988

Anglo-Irish Conference: 25 March

The Prime Minister has read the account of the recent Anglo-Irish Conference given in your letter of 30 March and is appalled by some of the comments made by Mr. Collins showing a total lack of understanding of the requirements of security cooperation.

(CHARLES POWELL)

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

3

PRIME MINISTER

President Reagan sent you a message of sympathy about the murders at the Milltown cemetary, but there has been no mention of the subsequent killing of the two corporals. I think you should reply referring to this and reminding him gently that all killing in Northern Ireland deserves the same degree of condemnation.

Agree to sign?

CDP

C. D. POWELL

31 March 1988

CCPC

FCS/88/060

MINISTER OF STATE FOR THE ARMED FORCES

CNBJ. 31/3

Arming of Helicopters in Northern Ireland

1. I have seen your letter of 24 March, proposing new rules of engagement for helicopters in Northern Ireland.

flap

2. I am content with the proposed rules of engagement. I note that the Attorney General, when he considered them earlier, took the view that they were compatible with international law.

3. I agree that to avoid misunderstandings the Irish Government should be told about the arming of helicopters in Northern Ireland and that this would most appropriately be done via the Inter-Governmental Secretariat.

4. I am copying this minute to the Northern Ireland Secretary, the Attorney General, Sir Robin Butler and the Private Secretary at 10 Downing Street.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
31 March 1988

IRELAND : Situation PT23

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Prime Minister
This shows how far some of the Irish side still are from understanding what security cooperation means.
CDP 30/3

C D Powell Esq
Private Secretary
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

30 March 1988

I am grateful - the arrangements on the Review with the Clerk and

Dear Charles

ANGLO IRISH CONFERENCE: LONDON 25 MARCH 1988

The Conference, which had been announced by Mr King in his statement to the house on 21 March, began shortly after 10.00 am with tete a tete meetings between the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Irish Deputy Prime Minister Mr Lenihan, and between the Minister of State and the Irish Minister of State Mr Collins. There was then a discussion for an hour and a half on security matters restricted to Ministers, the Chief Constable and the Garda Commissioner and two senior officials on either side.

2. This provided the opportunity for a frank exchange focussing in particular on the threat from PIRA and cross-border measures to tackle it. Both sides agreed on the need for continuing searches for the arms brought in prior to the Eksund. The Irish side confirmed that from the pattern of finds so far it appeared that PIRA had scattered the caches away from the border, in varying quantities. The Chief Constable reported on the threat posed by the UDA in the Republic as well as Northern Ireland.

!! 3. Mr Collins reported that he had personally found a groundswell of dissatisfaction among Garda in the border divisions both about over frequent meetings with the RUC and about the use of scarce Garda resources in support of security forces operations north of the border. He wanted to ensure the Garda were deployed as effectively as possible; it was agreed that the police chiefs would review both matters.

4. Mr Lenihan raised the policing of funerals, urging a middle way that was not too heavy-handed. Mr King noted these comments and drew attention to the Chief Constable's recent statement.

5. British Ministers raised two points. They pressed the need for direct communication between the Army and the Garda (and in certain circumstances with the Irish Army); they undertook to provide a paper setting out the operational case for direct contact. Mr Collins commented that the Irish would have difficulty with such proposals.

6. The second issue was RUC presence at interviews of suspects in Garda custody. Mr Collins suggested that new legislation would be required which would be considerably more difficult to get through the Dail than the recent extradition measures. Mr King pointed to the severe public reaction that would follow if it were learned that someone suspected of being involved in the murder of Corporals Howes and Wood were arrested in the Republic but the RUC were not permitted to participate in his interrogation. Mr Lenihan took the point.

7. British Ministers raised the issues of racketeering and smuggling in the cross-border context which appeared to be causing the Republic a massive loss of revenue. They undertook to pass a paper showing the scale of smuggling and links with paramilitary organisations. Mr Collins shared concern about the funds available for the IRA from these sources; he would wish to conduct a very urgent review of the problem as soon as he received the British paper.

8. The Chief Constable urged the need for improvement in the provision of quality intelligence and other aspects of liaison. Mr Collins found it hard to accept what he took to be criticism of the Garda, stressing that the Garda and the RUC were different forces operating in different environments - they could work together but could never be made the same. In concluding this discussion, Mr King emphasised the value of frank exchanges in the Conference and the need for the police forces to work together.

9. When the Conference met in plenary Mr Lenihan proposed addressing the political and economic problems which created frustration in Northern Ireland. It was important to convince people and media that the Conference could make a political contribution. In restricted sessions they had discussed Stalker/Sampson, accompaniment of UDR patrols by the Police, extradition safeguards, the administration of justice and future political development. They should also discuss our forthcoming White Paper on Fair Employment, and robust legislation on the matter; West Belfast; and an EC contribution to the International Fund now that the British rebate question was cleared up. All these could be the themes of future meetings; they should show that the Conference was an on-going process, a regular confidential forum for political dialogue.

10. Mr King said that he had asked all his Government colleagues to look out for issues with an Irish angle. There would no doubt be mistakes, but we would try to avoid repeating recent problems. The latest example of consultation was over the demand by the RUC for RTE TV tapes, on which he had telephoned Mr Lenihan to forewarn him.

11. On the important question of confidence in the administration of justice, we seem to be stuck in a rut. The Working Party had not met for 7 months, and we seem to have become hooked on certain issues like 3 judge courts, which might not be those that caused the real public concern. He had in mind to commission some research to identify what the real issues were. It was artificial to distinguish between relations between police and public on the one hand and confidence in the administration of justice on the other. Article 6 of the Agreement (appointment to boards) was particularly important, and there had been progress, for example with the establishment of the Police Complaints Commission. Disciplinary proceedings against senior RUC officers were the responsibility of PANI, yet the Irish could hardly complain about their handling when they had failed to suggest any names for appointment to PANI.

12. Mr Lenihan said that there was feeling that the Stalker/Sampson affair was dragging on; was there a deadline for decision? Mr King said that the matter was in the hands of Mr Kelly and a team of eight, who were working flat out. It was not in his control, but he suggested to say in reply to questions that the process was 'understood to be quite advanced'.

13. Mr Lenihan referred to young offenders. Mr King said that for Secretary of State's Pleasure cases, that is for serious crimes committed under the age of 18, there was hardly any reinvolvement in crime. Mr Stanley said we would try to hand over figures to the Irish side through the Secretariat. The pattern was that there was some reinvolvement of prisoners who had completed determinate sentences, but very little reinvolvement of those who had been released after serving indeterminate sentences. When Mr Lenihan said this pointed towards more releases, Mr King said that it was unfair to criticise us for slowing down. Of course the easy cases had been released first. Those left now had been hardened, particularly by their experience in prison. Mr Collins referred to 3 Secretary of State's Pleasure cases who had served between 14 and 15 years, and asked how often their cases had been looked at. Sir John Blelloch said that the Board met frequently, and no-one's case was forgotten. Mr Stanley said that there had been no change of policy by the Life Sentence Review Board, nor on home leave for compassionate reasons, Christmas, etc. This involved, for example, letting a prisoner attend a family funeral unescorted, and on these matters Northern Ireland policy was more lenient than that in Great Britain. Mr King said that the total number of Secretary of State's Pleasure cases had fallen by more than half since 1982. He was now looking to see if anything more could be done, but would make no promises.

14. Mr King said that we shared Irish concern on West Belfast. Mr Lenihan asked if the next conference could concentrate on fair employment. Sir Kenneth Bloomfield said that there were one or two questions to be settled among officials first, and a meeting in early April might be too soon.

15 Mr King said that we would welcome more public contact between Irish and Northern Irish Ministers, for example, in education, health and agriculture - Mr Lenihan added tourism. Mr Collins suggested that three or more areas might be identified as suitable for invitation from either side for such contact, and this was agreed.

16. Mr Lenihan thanked Mr King for his co-operation over the post-mortem following the shooting at Aughnacloy, and referred to the general question of harassment at the Border. Mr King said that if the Crowley Report raised issues of this kind it could be discussed through the Conference machinery.

17. In reply to a question from Mr Lenihan about unaccompanied Army patrols Mr Stanley said that this problem applied in sensitive areas, and was largely a question of limited resources. He said that we would give the Irish detailed information about a study recently carried out, giving some statistical background. Mr Collins mentioned the sensitivity of access routes into West Belfast in this connection.

18. Concluding the plenary meeting Mr Lenihan said that the private meetings of the Ministers, and the meeting with Police Chiefs and security officials, had covered the ground well. Mr King agreed and said that we should give the Conference new impetus. We should look hard at a new agenda, as some old items had been dealt with. He said that in any public comment on today's Conference, both sides should bear in mind the sensitivity of public opinion on the day of the funeral of one of the two corporals killed in Belfast.

19. After lunch there was a discussion on the joint statement, in which the main Irish concern was to maximise the political elements and minimise the security elements. During discussion of the security paragraph, Mr Collins appeared to say that meetings of the two Police Chiefs would only be allowed during meetings of Conferences. After a sharp reaction from Mr King he eventually agreed that meetings of Police Chiefs should take place 'as necessary'; he confirmed that this formula was accepted by the Irish side as the reality, not merely as a line to take in public.

20. This was an important meeting of the Conference, aiming to chart a course of work for the coming months. Both sides shared a desire to broaden the programme and agreement was eventually reached. Along the way however Mr Collins in particular allowed his perceptions on security matters to lend emotion to his arguments. The next meeting is scheduled for mid April.

Yours sincerely

Martin Donnelly

pp **D J WATKINS**



From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

ce PC

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

30 March 1988

Dear Charles

Thank you for your letter of 18 March to David Watkins. I have attached a suggested draft letter for the Prime Minister to send to President Reagan. It thanks him for his concern, and also makes mention of the horrific events three days after the Milltown attack when Corporals Wood and Howes were brutally murdered.

I am copying this letter to Lyn Parker.

Yours

Martin

M DONNELLY

SMN10629

AVA

President Reagan

Thank you for your recent letter following the outrage at Milltown Cemetery in Belfast on 16 March. ~~It was as you say a senseless act which has been condemned by all right thinking people~~.

You will also by now, I am sure, have seen the ~~heart-rending~~ chilling TV pictures showing ~~the~~ a TV ~~barbaric~~ barbaric beating and murders of two young soldiers which also took place in West Belfast three days later. Both these events occurred at the funerals of IRA terrorists, which ~~as you know~~ have been used over the years as platforms for propaganda exercises by Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA.

~~These horrific crimes~~ They demonstrate ~~the absolute futility of~~ their terrorism ~~which~~ achieves ~~nothing at all but~~ only grief, misery and more funerals. We must remain firm in the fight against terrorism the world over & and ~~we will~~ shall continue to do everything possible to bring to Northern Ireland the peace and reconciliation which the vast majority of its people so desperately want, ~~and deserve~~.

SMN10629

Ireland. Education
pr 23

file MJ2 CEK

bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 March 1988

ARMING OF HELICOPTERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The Prime Minister has seen a copy of the Minister of State for the Armed Forces' letter of 24 March to the Foreign Secretary covering draft Rules of Engagement for opening fire from Army and RAF helicopters in Northern Ireland.

The Prime Minister has commented that it looks to her as though the Rules deprive those in helicopters of a fundamental right of self-defence under some circumstances, for instance when they are being fired on from urban areas. She wonders whether this is fair to those concerned. She further wonders when the time has come to reconsider the Yellow Card rules. I recognise this latter point raises issues which you may prefer to raise separately.

I am copying this letter to David Watkins (Northern Ireland Office), Michael Saunders (Law Officers' Department) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

I attach the relevant pages of your diary.

Saturdays in April — 16, 23 or 30 — look possible.

CDP
25/3.

Apl 16th

It looks to me as if these rules deprive those in the helicopters of a fundamental right of self-defence under some circumstances. When do we reconsider the yellow card rules? No at flap

cc PC

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

Prime Minister
Pretty restrictive rules of engagement
CDS.
20/3

SECRET

D/MIN(AF)/IS/9/4

24 March 1988

Dear Geoffrey

ARMING OF HELICOPTERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

In your Private Secretary's letter of 20 November 1987, he said that you would wish to be consulted on the Rules of Engagement (ROE) which were being drawn up following the decision to arm helicopters in Northern Ireland. These have now been prepared and in George Younger's absence abroad I enclose a copy at Annex A. The ROE have been cleared by the Legal Advisers in this Department and yours, and the Law Officers' Department has been consulted about the position in international law.

As soon as the ROE have been agreed, the Army and the RAF will proceed as necessary with the operational deployment of armed helicopters. This will be left to the discretion of the Commander Land Forces in Northern Ireland but it is important that he is given the option to do so when in his judgement he considers it prudent to do so. Training in 'live firing' from helicopters in the air will also begin at Magilligan Range upon agreement of the ROE. I understand it is the intention of the Northern Ireland Office to inform the Irish Government about all this through the Secretariat at Maryfield.

Defensive press briefing has been prepared and copies are being circulated to the Chief Information Officer in the NIO and the FCO News Desk as well as Headquarters Northern Ireland.

I should be grateful to know that you and Tom King and Patrick Mayhew, to whom I am also sending copies, are content with these proposals. I am also copying this letter to Sir Robin Butler and Charles Powell.

Yours
Ian

IAN STEWART

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP

CD Powell Esq.

SECRET

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2277 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: attachment to letter from Stewart to Howe dated 24 March 1988	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	26/4/18
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2277 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Minute from Powell to the Prime Minister dated 24 March 1988	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	26/4/18 M.M.
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Northern Ireland: BBC & ITV

The RUC have apparently obtained all the film from the BBC & ITN.

CDP

MT

N. Ireland file

See
For your tel?
JR 25/3

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 ~~2111/3~~ ~~xxxxxxxx~~ 01-218 6312

MO 19/3E

23rd March 1988

Mr Powell.
CDP 24/3.

Dear Mark,

We spoke about the issues raised by Mr Paisley during Prime Minister's Questions on 25th February. Mr Paisley referred to a bomb attack in Belfast the night before, in which two UDR soldiers were killed. He alleged that UDR soldiers had previously complained about the risks associated with a hoarding round a building site in Belfast city centre, behind which the bomb was concealed, and that their representations had been ignored. The Prime Minister told Mr Paisley that the matter was being thoroughly investigated.

I attach the letter which Mr Stewart has sent to Mr Paisley, denying the allegation. However, it is the case that the specific task which the UDR patrol was carrying out is one which is routine and therefore vulnerable to terrorist attack, and there has long been disquiet about it at all levels of the UDR. Essentially, the task is not a military one, and the Army are currently negotiating with the RUC to remove the task from the UDR.

Yours ever
Navin

(NAVIN PATEL)
Parliamentary Clerk

Mark Addison Esq
No 10 Downing Street

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/IS/1/1

23 March 1988

Dear Ian,

During Prime Minister's Questions on 25 February, you referred to the tragic incident in Belfast the night before, when two Part-Time soldiers were killed in a terrorist bomb attack. I was very sorry to learn that one of the two soldiers was a member of your own church. The Prime Minister told you that the matter was being thoroughly investigated. You also mentioned the incident during the EPA Renewal Debate later that day, and in his winding up speech on 1 March John Stanley said that I would be writing to you.

In the House you said that the UDR patrol had previously made representations to superior officers about the risks associated with the hoarding on Royal Avenue, (behind which the bomb was concealed), but that they had been ignored and told that, if they did not like the task, they should resign from the regiment.

As you will appreciate, these are very serious allegations to make about officers of the Ulster Defence Regiment and there is a risk that they could adversely affect the morale of the battalion concerned. I am sure that this was not your intention, and I have been concerned that your allegations should be thoroughly investigated. Officers, NCO and soldiers from all the companies of 7/10 UDR have been questioned in detail; particular attention has been given to the Company whose patrol was attacked on Royal Avenue; written records have also been scrutinised. I have to tell you that these investigations have produced no evidence of any complaint having been made to any officer of the battalion about the hoardings on Royal Avenue, or of any officer having dismissed soldiers' fears about security in the way you suggested. As you know, security measures are kept constantly under review, and any lessons arising from this incident will be carefully studied.

I understand that you have told Commander UDR that you had evidence on the matter, but that you have not produced it. I am afraid that, without real evidence, it is not possible to substantiate your allegations. If you are able to produce such evidence, then of course it will be investigated thoroughly.

Since your own allegations are a matter of public record, I think it only right to place my reply on public record by releasing it to the press, and to state publicly my confidence in the professional ability of all ranks of the Ulster Defence Regiment.

Yours Sincerely

Ian Stewart

IAN STEWART

Rev Ian Paisley MP

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

23 March 1988

Dear Charles,

NORTHERN IRELAND: BBC/ITV/RTE

Following the Prime Minister's meeting yesterday afternoon the Home Secretary spoke as agreed to the Chairman of the BBC, Mr Duke Hussey, and the Editor in Chief of ITN, Mr David Nicholas.

Speaking first to Mr Hussey the Home Secretary said that whatever the legal position there was a strong obligation on the broadcasting authorities to assist in bringing those responsible for Saturday's murders to justice by making available to the police any untransmitted film they held of the incident. The RUC were making good progress in their investigation but needed the film to corroborate evidence already obtained. The BBC should hand the film to the police or at least let the RUC view it to establish its evidential value. Mr Hussey said that there were some 49 seconds of untransmitted film. It had long been the BBC's policy not to release such film to the police without a court order, in order to protect staff and the ability of the Corporation to gather news in difficult circumstances like those in Northern Ireland. He would wish to consider the position with the Deputy Chairman and the Director General in the light of the Home Secretary's strong representations, and would ring back with his decision.

When Mr Hussey rang back he said that while recognising the powerful arguments to the contrary, he and his colleagues continued to take the view that it would not be right for the BBC to release the film without a court order. To do so would put the Corporation's news gatherers in very substantial difficulty across the world. They had not reached this decision lightly. Recognising the countervailing arguments they would not contest an application for a court order. But they would not volunteer the film for the reasons given earlier. The Home Secretary said that he much regretted the Corporation's decision which many would find difficult to understand.

/The Home

Charles Powell, Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

The Home Secretary put similar points to Mr Nicholas as he had done to Mr Hussey. In reply, Mr Nicholas said that ITN had no untransmitted film of the attack on the two soldiers. All the film of the attack had been shown, and the RUC had been given a copy. ITN had some untransmitted material on earlier phases of the day, but this did not involve the events surrounding the two soldiers. They had explained the position to the RUC.

Mr Nicholas made clear that in respect of the untransmitted film they would take the same attitude as the BBC. The position of the broadcasting authorities was very difficult. But they had an obligation to their staff and to the wider public interest in preserving their ability to operate in Belfast. The staff who had filmed Saturday's events had already come under considerable threat and had shown courage in smuggling away from the area the film of the events which has subsequently been shown. Following the events, ITN had sent a senior manager to Belfast to help in liaison with the police etc.

In reply the Home Secretary noted ITN's position. He was not clear of the evidential value the RUC would set on the untransmitted film ITN had of Saturday given that it did not relate to the events involving the two soldiers. Nevertheless, Mr Nicholas should be in no doubt that if the news media did have any evidence which could help the police to bring the murderers of the two soldiers to justice their duty was to bring it to the police's attention and they would face severe criticism if they insisted on requiring a court order before they would produce it.

As I mentioned to you last night, I subsequently reported these conversations to Martin Donnelly (NIO). NIO are in touch with the RUC, and officials of the NIO, Home Office and the Attorney General's Office are in contact this morning about how best, in the light of these conversations, to take matters forward.

Copies of this letter go to Tony Galsworthy (FCO), Brian Hawtin (MoD), Martin Donnelly (NIO), Michael Saunders (Attorney General's Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

P J C MAWER

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 19/3

23rd March 1988

Dear Charles,

RECEPTION OF THE BODIES OF CORPORALS WOOD AND HOWES

I am writing to confirm the names I gave you last night of the relatives expected to be present at RAF Northolt later this morning. They are as follows:

Corporal Wood

Corporal Howes

As I mentioned when we spoke, I understand that both families have suffered from the attentions of the popular press over the last few days and have been distressed by some of the media coverage; some of them may therefore prefer to observe the proceedings from the Terminal buildings. Arrangements have been made for the Prime Minister to spend some time with them in the VIP lounge if she is able to do so after the hearses have left the Apron. The families will be taken to and from Northolt accompanied by officers of the Royal Corps of Signals.

As the bearer parties march from the aircraft to the waiting hearses, they will pause in front of the VIP party and families for them to pay thei respects.

Yours ever

(I C F ANDREWS)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

(2)

Prime Minister
A good statement
BUT it does
not encourage
the Catholic faithful
to give all
information on the murders
to the police.
CDP
28/3

RECENT EVENTS IN WEST BELFAST:

THE CHALLENGE TO CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE

STATEMENT BY BISHOP CAHAL B. DALY

OF DOWN AND CONNOR

22nd March 1988

The ugly face of republican violence was unveiled before the world last Saturday in Andersonstown, just as the ugly face of loyalist violence was revealed to the world on the previous Wednesday in Milltown Cemetery. It is the republican violence which dismays Catholics most, because it was particularly brutish, and because it happened in the midst of a Catholic community in West Belfast and on the occasion of a funeral.

First I wish to offer my sympathy to the parents and relatives and friends of the two young soldiers, Corporals Derek Woods and David Howes, who were done to death in such a horrifying fashion. I offer my sympathy to Janine Whitehouse, the heart-broken fiancee of Corporal Howes. My telephone has been inundated with messages of sorrow and of sympathy to them all. All over Ireland, people are praying for them and praying that all this murdering hate may cease.

I also offer my deep sympathy to the good Catholic people of West Belfast, who have been so unjustly misrepresented to the world by the barbarous behaviour of a few. Very many Catholics have been in touch with me since Saturday, expressing their outrage and shame that such awful things could be done within our Catholic community. The Catholic people of West Belfast have already suffered more than most communities through the past twenty years. The frightful scenes of that black Saturday have inflicted on them a new and special form of pain and hurt and wrong. Many have expressed to me their sense of helplessness and near despair at the evil forces which have been released within their community and which are opposed to everything that Catholics believe and cherish.

I ask the Catholic people of West Belfast not to be discouraged. Their faith and prayer and their sheer Christian goodness will overcome this evil. Our Lord says to them:

> Do not be afraid; only have faith. (Mark 5 : 37)
>
> Courage, I am with you; do not be afraid. (Mark 6 : 50)

St. John says:

> He that is in you
> is greater than anyone who is in the world. (cfr. John 4 : 4)
>
> This is the victory that overcomes the world,
> our faith. (1 John 5 : 4).

Out of this evil good may still come, if it brings everyone to realise anew that there can be no half measures where evil is concerned. Evil must be rejected totally and unequivocally. There must be no ambivalence, no double standards, no selective indignation. The Irish Bishops said last November:

> There is no room for ambivalence. In face of the present campaigns of republican violence the choice of all Catholics is clear. It is a choice between good and evil.
>
> It is sinful to join organisations committed to violence or to remain in them. It is sinful to support such organisations or to call on others to support them. ...
>
> ...People must choose. There is no longer any room for romantic illusion. There is no excuse for thinking that the present violence in Ireland can be morally justified.
>
> In face of these recent crimes let us redouble our prayers that the Lord will remove the veil from the eyes of those who will not see and bring about in all hearts a true spirit of repentance.

The words are more relevant than ever after last week.

THE EVIL OF HATRED

IRA violence is often disguised with a mask of romantic rhetoric and militaristic mock ritual. For a ghastly half hour on Saturday, the mask slipped. The real face of IRA violence was shown, and it was horrible to see.

Behind Saturday's events there almost certainly was an element of fear of another loyalist attack like that of Milltown Cemetery a few days earlier. Then the manic force of the elemental lust to kill took over. But let us not be deceived. This was not a momentary lapse from high IRA principles and standards. People would not have taken iron bars in their hands to batter soldiers into unconsciousness, if they had not first taken hatred into their hearts. That hatred is fostered and fanned by the propaganda of the IRA and its political supporters. Hatred and murder are close akin. He that hates has already murdered his brother or sister in his heart. Our first need is to rid ourselves of all the roots of political hatred embedded in our hearts. Love, not hatred, is the only worthy motive of the struggle for justice.

THE EVIL OF MURDER

In the scenes in Andersonstown, we saw murder in all its sub-human viciousness. Most IRA murders are carefully and coldly planned in advance and carried out with scientific precision. Let us not forget that those murders are not less evil than the Andersonstown barbarity. They are actually more morally evil than Andersonstown, because they have the added moral guilt of deliberate premeditation.

Let last Saturday's events awaken us all to the brutal reality which any murder is. The greatest harm which the IRA does to the Catholic community is the spiritual harm which it does in weakening the sense of the sacredness and inviolability of human life and blunting awareness of the awfulness of murder. Particularly frightening is the effect of all this on the moral sense of children and the young. This has fearful consequences for the future of our community.

Condemnation of the IRA is not a political matter; it is a spiritual one. The IRA constitutes a grave spiritual danger for sections of the Catholic community. Our Lord said:

> Do not be afraid of those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul. (Matthew 10 : 28).

The activities of the IRA are killing the soul of those involved in it or actively supporting it.

I want to plead with the leaders of that organisation and with those who have influence over them. I want to address a direct plea to them, in the name of God and for the honour of the Irish people, to bring this killing to an end.

I want to plead with those who joined the organisation in the past for idealistic reasons and out of a passion for justice. I ask them now to have the honesty and the courage to recognise that their involvement has forced them to do and to approve of and to defend deeds which would have revolted them when they first joined. For God's sake, for Ireland's sake, let them leave the organisation now before still more grievous harm is done to their conscience and their soul and to our community and our country. Let them turn to peaceful and constructive ways of promoting justice and peace and defending human rights.

To those whom animal passion and the spirit of evil swept away on last Saturday, I say, do not ever despair of God's mercy and forgiveness; repent and turn back to God and be reconciled to Him and to the community which you have so grievously wronged.

WHAT CAN THE CATHOLIC COMMUNITY DO?

Many Catholics have been asking me over the weekend what the Catholic community can do to atone for what happened on Saturday? I offer some suggestions:

1. Prayer

   Prayer is our greatest weapon, our only sure weapon, against evil. None of us has prayed enough. Saturday's events have evoked in the whole Catholic community a renewed sense of our need for prayer. They arouse a great desire to make community reparation for the outrages committed in our midst against God's Holiness and against our own Christian witness as a community. We wish to atone for the betrayal of our faith by some in our midst. These events evoke a strong sense of the need for us to repent as a community for ways in which any of us may have failed to resist evil or may in any way have, interiorly or exteriorly, mentally or emotionally or verbally, sided in any degree with the evil of violence in past years. We feel a deep call to conversion to Christ.

I ask all Catholics to make these last weeks of Lent, and particularly Holy Week, a time of intense prayer, accompanied by fasting and self-denial. Let there be daily family prayer in all homes. Let neighbours pray in groups in one another's homes. Let prayer groups intensify their intercession. Parishes might be able to organise in their churches periods of adoration, even vigils of prayer, with groups and parish organisations sharing times of prayer between them. Our churches should be crowded on Holy Thursday, Good Friday, the Easter Vigil and Easter Sunday. Our confessionals should be thronged. Let us redeem the wickedness of the times by prayer and repentance (cfr. Ephesians 5 : 16). Let us not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good. (cfr. Romans 12 : 21).

Let us invoke the aid of the prayers of Mary, Mother of the Lord. As the disciples did in the Upper Room before Pentecost, let us be persevering in prayer with Mary, the Mother of Jesus, imploring the Lord to send His Spirit of love and peace to renew the face of our community and of our city and our whole society.

2. Palm Sunday event

Palm Sunday is appointed by the Pope as World Day of Youth. A Palm Sunday procession will take place in Belfast, Ballymena and Downpatrick at 2.30 p.m. on next Sunday. In Belfast, the procession will leave St. Paul's church, led by the Cross from last Lent's Passion Play and carrying palms; it will end with the reading of the Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ and Mass in St. Peter's Cathedral.

This procession is not reserved exclusively for young people, although it is hoped that they will attend in very large numbers. I hope that great numbers of adults will also take part, and thus help to make Palm Sunday, particularly in West Belfast, a day of earnest intercession to God to deliver us from the evil which is within our community.

3. Sharing with the disadvantaged

Catholics living in more privileged circumstances should make themselves more aware of the conditions in which their fellow-Catholics in more deprived areas live. For them, violence, with all its fearful consequences, is a daily and a nightly affliction. Unemployment fills many, and especially the young, with a sense of hopelessness and failure and resentment. After twenty years of suffering, many see no hope of a better future. Those to whom divine providence has been generous must try to find ways of sharing resources, whether of money or of time or of expertise and skill, with those who have never had a chance.

4. Ecumenical contact

Polarisation and division between the Catholic and the Protestant communities, between unionists and nationalists, have become distressingly acute. Each community is tempted to withdraw behind its own barricades, with little opportunity, and sometimes with little desire, to try to understand how the other community feels. Catholics must make new efforts to reach

out across the walls of separation and to seek opportunities of talking and praying with Protestants and standing alongside them for Christ, for he is Lord of their community as he is of ours, and there is no other name under heaven whereby any of us can be saved except his. (cfr Acts 4 : 12)

APPEAL TO POLITICIANS

Finally, I join my voice with that of so many leaders from other Churches in appealing to politicians of all parties to begin talking with one another to try to find ways of living in peace. How can politicians expect the people who elect them to live together in peace if they themselves refuse to talk to one another about peace? Whatever the long-term political aspirations of this group or that, whatever future political arrangements be ultimately agreed, Protestants and Catholics, unionists and nationalists, will always have to live together and share this land together. Either we live together in peace, or we destroy one another and ourselves in conflict.

A peaceful coexistence between unionists and nationalists is a precondition for any unionist future, just as much as it is for any nationalist future. Let unionist and nationalist politicians begin to talk together now about ways to peaceful coexistence. Let people in both communities keep insisting that their political representatives begin to talk and begin the talking now.

POLITICIANS IN BRITAIN

Politicians in Britain have their responsibilities too. After atrocities like those of last week, the Westminster Parliament takes a sudden and fevered interest in Irish affairs. With honourable exceptions, their interest is too often confined to the latest atrocity. There is little continuing concern about Ireland's problems and too little recognition of Britain's responsibility in respect of these problems. In Britain, there is little understanding in depth of Irish affairs and, as a series of disastrously ill-judged decisions since last Christmas has shown, little awareness of Irish sensitivities and rights. It is an urgent need that Anglo-Irish relations be placed once again on a firm basis of reciprocity and mutual trust. It is an urgent necessity that the government tackle the social, economic, industrial and environmental neglect which West and North Belfast have for so long suffered, and should put in place a systematic and integrated programme of overall rehabilitation, making available all the expertise and resources which a critical situation demands. We must show that there is a peaceful and constitutional way to justice, and that it works.

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND: BBC AND ITN

Mr. Hurd has spoken twice to Duke Hussey with a clear request that the BBC should turn over to the RUC any untransmitted film about the incident in Belfast on Saturday. Duke Hussey consulted both his Deputy and the Director General. In reply, he said that the BBC had 49 seconds of untransmitted material. But after the most careful consideration their conclusion was that they should not make it available without a Court Order. They believe that they would encounter substantial difficulties all round the world if they were prepared to release their material to the police without a clear legal requirement to do so. However, he could give an assurance that the BBC would not contest a Court Order.

The Home Secretary also spoke to David Nicholas of ITN. He said that ITN had in fact no untransmitted material covering the incident involving the two soldiers. They had some unrelated shots of the area taken earlier in the day. But he stressed that ITN would take exactly the same position as the BBC on the point of principle.

The RUC are now in touch with the Director of Public Prosecutions about the best way to proceed. There are problems about subpoena-ing the material: you can only do that when someone has been charged, and it is difficult to charge someone without the material. We need some quick legal thought tonight and early tomorrow morning to come up with a way to require the BBC and ITN to hand over any relevant material. This should not be an insuperable difficulty.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

22 March 1988
SLHATT

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

Prime Minister
We are letting the families know tonight that you will be at Northolt. I would not like them to learn it first from television tomorrow. Some of them may decide to attend, & we are providing cars for them.
CDP 22/3

MO 19/3V

22nd March 1988

Dear Charles,

RECEPTION OF THE BODIES OF CORPORALS WOOD AND HOWES

I promised to let you have details of the arrangements for the reception of the bodies of Corporals Wood and Howes at RAF Northolt tomorrow morning. The aircraft carrying their bodies is scheduled to halt in front of the Royal Lounge at RAF Northolt at 1015 although, if the Prime Minister is late, it will be held in the air until she has arrived. The coffins will then be received by a bearer party drawn from members of 249 Signals Squadron, Royal Signals, and transferred to civilian hearses for their onward journey by road. Corporal Wood is to be buried with full military honours in Battersea Cemetery, New Malden, after a church service at St Peter's Parish Church in his home town of Carshalton on Thursday 24th March. A service for Corporal Howes at Westerning Parish Church near Milton Keynes on Friday 25th will be followed by a private cremation.

The Defence Secretary will be represented at Northolt by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr Ian Stewart) and the senior military representative will be the Adjutant General, General Sir David Mostyn. The Signals Officer in Chief, Major General P D Alexander, and the Master of Signals, Major General J M Badcock (Ret'd) will also be present and will join the Prime Minister to observe the ceremony from in front of the Royal Lounge. The military officers present will be wearing uniform with black armbands.

At the moment, although they have been invited, we do not expect either of the families to be represented but I will let you know if there are any developments overnight. A press facility has also been offered and we expect a substantial media presence.

I should be grateful if you would let me know, if possible before 1000, if the Prime Minister is unlikely to arrive at Northolt

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

before 1015. We have made it clear to all concerned that she will have to leave by 1035 but, barring unforeseen problems, the formalities should be completed well before then.

Please let me know if you require any further information.

Yours ever

(I G F ANDREWS)
Private Secretary

MEETING RECORD:
Subject cc master.

File
cc PC

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 March 1988

Dear David,

NORTHERN IRELAND: BBC/ITV/RTE

The Prime Minister talked to the Northern Ireland Secretary and the Home Secretary this afternoon about the objections being raised by the BBC and ITN to providing film of the Millstown Cemetery murders and the abduction and murders of two British Army Corporals to the RUC. The Prime Minister noted the legal advice from the Attorney General. But it was not just a question of law, it was a question of duty. As she had said in the House earlier, if one was not on the side of justice one was on the side of terrorism. If failure to provide the film was seen to prevent the RUC from successfully mounting charges in these cases, the television companies would face a severe backlash. The Home Secretary should therefore speak immediately to the Chairman of the BBC and also to ITN to urge them to agree to make the film available. If this failed, appropriate legal steps should be considered by the RUC without delay. Any question of action under the Prevention of Terrorism Act would be a matter for the Attorney General.

It was agreed that the Home Secretary would speak to those concerned and report. Depending on the outcome, the necessary legal steps should be set in hand.

I am copying this letter to Philip Mawer (Home Office), Tony Galsworthy (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Saunders (Law Officers' Department).

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

CONFIDENTIAL

MEETING RECORD

Subject
cc master

SECRET AND PERSONAL CMO

31

Removed 22-6-88

SW2AGJ

cc/c.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 March 1988

Dear David,

NORTHERN IRELAND: POLICY OPTIONS

The Prime Minister had a meeting this afternoon to discuss options for future policy in Northern Ireland in the wake of the recent violent incidents. The Northern Ireland Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Minister of State (Armed Forces) were present.

I have recorded separately discussion of the need to ensure that the BBC and ITN make available to the RUC their untransmitted film of the abduction and murder of two British Army corporals in Belfast on 29 March.

The Prime Minister said that the recent spate of murders in Northern Ireland made it necessary to consider additional measures against those who committed and supported acts of violence.

In discussion, it was agreed that the most immediate need was for church leaders of all denominations to issue a powerful message reminding their congregations of their duty to provide every possible help and assistance to the RUC on finding those responsible for the recent murders. The letter which the Catholic Church had issued following the Eniskillen bomb was a good precedent. The aim should be to have such a message delivered from pulpits next Sunday, 27 March and repeated subsequently. Leaders of the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland should be encouraged to give similar guidance to their supporters. The Government's request for this action should be conveyed in the form of a letter to the church and political leaders concerned, so that those who declined to cooperate would be clearly and publicly identified. The Northern Ireland Secretary was asked to take action.

The meeting then turned to compiling a list of options which needed to be studied further.

In the first instance, there were measures which could be adopted within the framework of existing policy. These included:

- policing of funerals, which was already being reviewed;

- the security forces to take all necessary steps, including extensive searches in nationalist areas if necessary, to apprehend those responsible for the murder of the British army corporals;

- measures to improve the chances of securing convictions in Northern Ireland courts, drawing on the work done by Mr. David Calcutt, Q.C. Such steps might include use of DNA typing and reconsideration of how courts should interpret an accused person's refusal to answer questions;

- measures to attack the finances of groups wich practised or supported violence. Powers already existed to gain access to bank accounts in cases involving fraud or drugs, and might be extended to cases where there was suspicion of involvement in terrorism;

- further strengthening of cross-border security cooperation. The first requirement was resumption of the various training and other activities for the Irish security forces which had been in hand, but then suspended at the time of the Stalker-Sampson decision. One problem was the Irish government's lack of funds for training and operational activities on the border. Consideration should be given to finding some European source of funds;

- improved security on the border itself, in particular to stop people crossing undetected. Since anything like a permanent fence along the whole length of the border was impractical, this meant increasing reliance on technical resources. It was noted that there would be considerable financial implications;

- the instructions given to the security forces about the circumstances in which they could use their weapons (the yellow card) should be reviewed to see whether they were too restrictive.

In addition, measures going beyond present policy also had to be considered. These included:

- the banning of Sinn Fein (and possibly the UDA). The difficulty with this was that a ban could be evaded by changing the organsiations' names. But there was unlikely to be a more favourable moment to take this action;

- introduction of selective internment. Such internment would be much more effective if introduced simultaneously in the Republic, as had happened when Mr. Haughey had been Minister of Justice in the 1950s;

- introduction of identity cards in Northern Ireland to facilitate control of the movements of suspected persons;

- an increase in the numbers of the Army in Northern Ireland;

- reversal of the present doctrine of police primacy to give the Army control in security matters, at least in some cases, with the police acting in support;

- depriving terrorists of the oxygen of publicity, by introducing restrictions - preferably voluntary - on media coverage of terrorist organisations and their activities.

The Prime Minister said that the meeting had been useful in identifying possible options which now needed to be studied further before any decisions were taken. Implementation of some of them might require emergency legislation and/or additional funds, but these should not be regarded as insuperable obstacles. The Northern Ireland Office should produce a paper covering the points raised in discussion and any additional ideas. This should be available for a first discussion before Easter. The greatest discretion should be observed, and the papers should be restricted so far as possible to Ministers directly concerned and their Private Offices. The Attorney General must be involved in all future discussions.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Defence Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary and to the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

SW2AEK

PRIME MINISTER

CEREMONY AT NORTHOLT

The families have been informed that you will be present and several of them have now decided to come as well. They are:

CORPORAL WOOD

- sister
- sister
- brother in law
- father (if well enough in the morning)

CORPORAL HOWES

- father
  father's companion
  sister
  mother
  mother's present husband

The order of ceremony will be roughly as follows. The aircraft is a Hercules. It will draw up in front of the VIP Suite. You will be standing outside with Mr. Stewart, the Adjutant-General and other senior officers. Some of the family may also be there - but they are shy about the media and may prefer to watch the ceremony from inside. The aircraft doors will take some three minutes to open. Bearer parties will then bring out the coffins and march in front of you towards the hearses. They will pause directly in front of you so that you can acknowledge the coffins and the senior officers will salute. The coffins will then be placed in the hearses which will be driven away. The ceremony is likely to last at most 10 minutes. Thereafter you may like to spend some 10 minutes or so talking to the families inside the VIP Suite.

CDP

(C. D. POWELL)
22 March 1988

File

PRIME MINISTER

FUNERALS OF THE TWO BRITISH ARMY CORPORALS

I am in touch with the Ministry of Defence about the funeral arrangements for the two British Army Corporals.

The family of one of them has opted for a quiet family funeral, but the other family wants a funeral with full military honours. This will take place in New Malden, which is of course relatively easy to get to. It is not yet certain when it will be held, but Thursday and Friday are possible days.

I have asked the MOD to keep me closely informed of the arrangements, and also to obtain the advice, on a personal basis, of the Chief Officer Commanding Royal Signals whether it would be right for you to attend. The initial feeling is very much in favour.

CDP

22 March, 1988.

JD46

File
cc PL

PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND: BBC AND ITN

Mr. Hurd has spoken twice to Duke Hussey with a clear request that the BBC should turn over to the RUC any untransmitted film about the incident in Belfast on Saturday. Duke Hussey consulted both his Deputy and the Director General. In reply, he said that the BBC had 49 seconds of untransmitted material. But after the most careful consideration their conclusion was that they should not make it available without a Court Order. They believe that they would encounter substantial difficulties all round the world if they were prepared to release their material to the police without a clear legal requirement to do so. However, he could give an assurance that the BBC would not contest a Court Order.

The Home Secretary also spoke to David Nicholas of ITN. He said that ITN had in fact no untransmitted material covering the incident involving the two soldiers. They had some unrelated shots of the area taken earlier in the day. But he stressed that ITN would take exactly the same position as the BBC on the point of principle.

The RUC are now in touch with the Director of Public Prosecutions about the best way to proceed. There are problems about subpoena-ing the material: you can only do that when someone has been charged, and it is difficult to charge someone without the material. We need some quick legal thought tonight and early tomorrow morning to come up with a way to require the BBC and ITN to hand over any relevant material. This should not be an insuperable difficulty.

C. D. POWELL

22 March 1988
SLHATT

A. file on
Northern Ireland

UNTRANSMITTED FILM OF IRA FUNERAL BY BBC

Under Section 5(1) of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967, where a person has committed an arrestable offence, it is the duty of every other person, who knows or believes that the offence or some other arrestable offence has been committed and that he has information which is likely to secure, or to be of material assistance in securing, the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any person for that offence, to give that information, within a reasonable time, to a constable. If, without reasonable excuse, he fails to do so he is guilty of an offence.

Under Section 11(1) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, if a person who has information which he knows or believes might be of material assistance in securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any other person for an offence involving the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism to which the Act applies, fails without reasonable excuse to disclose that information as soon as reasonably practicable to a constable, or in Northern Ireland, to a constable or member of Her Majesty's Forces, he is guilty of an offence.

Whether the BBC are committing an offence in refusing to hand over untransmitted film will depend on what is on the film and whether a Court would regard the BBC's fear of exposing their camera crew to reprisals as a reasonable excuse for failure to disclose the information.

If the film is in Northern Ireland, it seems unlikely that the police could obtain a court order requiring the production of the film in advance of any criminal proceedings. A Working Party on the administration and enforcement of the law relating to terrorism in 1979 recommended that the Chief Constable should be given the right to apply to the Courts to require a person to deliver up to the police for their safe custody or use any photographic or other documentary evidence which he has reason to suppose may be useful in the investigation of a scheduled offence. The recommendation has not been implemented.

If the film is presently held in England, and if one concludes that an offence under Section 11 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 has been committed, an application could be made by a constable to a circuit judge under Section 9 of, and Schedule 1 to, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for an order requiring production of, or access to, the film. It is far from certain,

however, that if such an order were made, the film could then be handed over to the RUC to assist them in their investigations.

Similar difficulties with the BBC were encountered in 1980. I attach a copy of an Adjournment Debate relating to the then Attorney General's decision not to prosecute the BBC under Section 11 of the 1976 Act.

Line to Take

If the BBC have got film showing what happened which they have not transmitted, I believe they ought to let the RUC see it.

If the police want to see such information in terrible circumstances such as these, surely no decent person refuses them permission.

If they persist in refusing, I am advised that Section 11 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 may be relevant. It provides that if a person who has information which he knows or believes might be of material assistance in securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any other person for an offence involving the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism to which the Act applies, fails without reasonable excuse to disclose that information as soon as reasonably practicable, to a constable he shall be guilty of an offence. Any question of prosecution for an offence under that section would be a matter for the Attorney General, whose consent would be required.

LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT
22 March 1988

[Mr. Brittan.]

as easy as that to solve the problem, I think I can say without fear of contradiction that Conservative and Labour Governments who have had to deal with it would have seized the opportunity with open hands.

I turn next to the question of shorter sentences generally. Suggestions have been made by the right hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees), my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Drake (Miss Fookes) and others that some sort of action should be taken on a legislative basis. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has not excluded the possibility of action being taken, but he pointed to the disadvantages of such a course. They are considerable.

The right hon. Member for Leeds, South reminisced about discussion of the matter which showed that when remission had gone up to one-third there had been a compensatory effect from the courts. That is something that cannot be avoided unless we adopt the other approach of altering the maximum sentences, as opposed to dealing with matters such as remission and conditional release.

I do not believe that there is much future in attempting to reduce the maximum sentences. The reason is not just the question of public reaction to any attempt to do that. The reaction would be quite considerable, as was shown when the advisory council published its report. The reason is more fundamental than that. The existence in prison of people with sentences that are rather longer than they might necessarily have does not derive primarily from the use of the maximum of the range. It is not the case that people are being sentenced to life imprisonment, to 14 years, or whatever the maximum may be. That is not what causes the problem. Where the problem arises is a truly exceptional case, and the law must be flexible enough to deal with it. I am more optimistic than some hon. Members—but as optimistic as my hon. and learned Friends the Members for South Fylde (Mr. Gardner) and Solihull—in saying that there are signs that the message has got through and that the courts are responding.

The hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Soley) said that this proposal had been around for years. It has, but there is such a thing as an idea that comes of age and that is seen to be right. In my experience—which is not as extensive as that of many hon. Members on both sides of the House—I detect a different attitude and a development in the approach to the problem in recent months and years which gives us cause for optimism. Of course, it is too early to say, but I believe that the speeches in this debate today——

It being half-past Two o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION (ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DECISION)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[*Mr. Newton.*]

2.30 pm

Mr. Ivor Stanbrook (Orpington): There is much public concern about the behaviour of the agents of the media in relation to criminals. Journalists have interviewed escaped prisoners; Idi Amin has been televised. Such incidents arouse moral outrage on the part of the public.

Why should the media appear to be a law unto themselves? That question is particularly acute in relation to terrorism. This morning my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General defined terrorism in a way which can be summarised as "acts of violence for political ends". Terrorism thrives on publicity. Publicity is an essential element in the aims of the terrorist. It is morally wrong to consort with criminals. In relation to terrorists, is also criminal.

Section 11 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976 provides that anyone in contact with terrorists has a legal duty to inform the police.

Last year two incidents occurred in which the BBC, acting through its staff, in my opinion, broke the law. The first was a televised interview with a member of an Irish terrorist organisation who, according to the transcript of the broadcast, said

"We have murdered Airey Neave",

and explained how and why that foul deed was done.

The second incident was the filming at Carrickmore in Northern Ireland of a road block set up by the Provisional IRA.

It is common ground that the police were not informed in both cases.

The conduct of the BBC staff involved in this matter was disgraceful and, I believe, criminal. What the BBC and its apologists fail to remember is that in Northern Ireland we are fighting a vicious war in which British lives are being lost almost every day. It is a war with battles just as bitter and cruel as any during the Second World War. What would have happened during that war if the BBC, or a member of its staff, had interviewed Dr. Goebbels and asked him to explain why the Nazis thought it necessary to kill British troops or to exterminate Jews? The people responsible for such an interview would have been strung up on the nearest lamp posts. Yet there is no difference in principle from what the BBC has done in these cases.

Why has the BBC not been prosecuted? I asked my right hon. and learned Friend that question recently in a written question and on 4 July he replied that, acting within his authority, he had decided not to prosecute but that he had written to the chairman of the governors of the BBC a letter which, on 18 July, in reply to a further question from me, he refused to publish.

The matter cannot be left there. I do not believe that the difficulty in this case is insufficiency of evidence. My right hon. and learned Friend has not sought to suggest that it is. The only ground must be public policy within the guidelines laid down by a former Attorney-General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, as he then was, in this place on 29 January 1951, as reported in *Hansard* for that day, at column 681.

What public policy could justify letting the BBC off scot-free when a serious crime has been committed? If it has been let off with a caution, why are we not entitled to know? Judging from unofficial leaks that I have heard from the BBC, it seems that it has rejected any criticism of its conduct and that of its employees. Its apologists talk piously of political interference and censorship. The law must be obeyed however mighty the culprit, and that applies just as much to Granada Television as to the BBC.

It is Parliament that makes the law. We were elected to make it. It is for us to set the limits. No one elected the governors of the BBC or authorised them to define the law.

The incidents of which I speak may not be the most serious, but they are not the only ones that cause one to have worries about the way in which the BBC and members of its staff are exercising their duties. Some curious items have been broadcast, notably on the World Service, by the BBC—for example, the broadcasting of IRA songs, which leads one to suspect that some BBC staff are in active sympathy with the IRA.

Has my right hon. and learned Friend let off the BBC? If so, why? If so, what guarantee do we have that this and similar offences will not be repeated?

2.37 pm

Mr. Tom Benyon (Abingdon): I welcome this opportunity to make a brief contribution in this important debate. I believe that there are various issues which should be ventilated publicly.

My hon. Friend the Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) described the programmes which gave rise to our grave concern. I wish to confine my comments to the "Tonight" programme broadcast on 5 July 1979, which broadcast an interview with the alleged murderers of my predecessor, Airey Neave, and an employee of the BBC, Mr. David Lomax.

Soon after this broadcast I contacted the then Director-General of the BBC and expressed my objections to this interview. Sir Ian Trethowan, in a written response to my objections, stated

> "that we should remind the public of the thinking and nature and character of those people who are committed to acts of terrorism and violence."

He continued:

> "it is not enough to report the daily acts of violence in the Province. I see it as part of our duty to look at its causes and its practitioners."

I believe that in this instance the BBC made a serious error of judgment. The programme deeply distressed the late Mr. Neave's family, his friends, colleagues and constituents, and was regarded by many as a national outrage. His murder was fresh in their minds. In addition, various allegations, albeit groundless in truth and fact, were made about him which were nevertheless harmful and tasteless.

[Mr. Benyon.]

So the first charge that I press against the makers of this programme is that of appalling taste and the timing of the broadcast, which was offensive to all who heard it. I accept, however, that matters of taste are matters of opinion and a value judgment in the eye of the beholder. The counter-argument would be that the sensibilities of those I have already mentioned should be subordinated to the wider national interest as expressed in Sir Ian Trethowan's letter.

However, the BBC enjoys an unparalleled reputation as a medium concerned with the highest standards of truth, blended with balanced comment. Such a reputation carries onerous responsibilities towards the public. The public regard, and rightly so, serious programmes produced by the BBC as having weight and credibility.

In the instance of this programme, the BBC gave its cloak of status and credibility to a murderous illegal organisation which otherwise would have skulked in the shadows of obscurity to which it naturally belongs before it is brought to justice. In giving this evil organisation an opportunity to parade its corruptive argument justifying its murder in the guise of a political exposition to a massive audience, the BBC gave it assistance in terms of publicity. To these illegal gangs, wedded to murder in pursuit of their goals, publicity acts as nourishment for its crazed members and supporters, and as a seed-bed for recruits. Such publicity acts as a spur in terms of raising morale; and that can lead to further violence.

It is possible that the programme organisers breached the law in terms of the way in which they conducted the interview. I understand that they did not inform the authorities until after the event. In short, they placed their desire for a scoop before the overriding national interest which must be, unarguably, to bring those responsible for the appalling murder of Airey Neave to justice.

However, I recognise the dilemma in which the prosecuting authorities find themselves in retrospect, as to what action —if any—they should take. I am not party to all the facts surrounding this incident, nor am I a lawyer. As a layman, it would seem to me that it might be difficult to prove criminal intent on the part of those BBC authorities responsible for the programme. If a breach of the law has been committed, it could be argued that those responsible were unaware that they were acting in contravention of the law and were genuinely sustained by the belief that they were acting in the public interest. It is relatively easy to launch a prosecution but much harder to achieve a conviction in the courts in such circumstances.

Doubtless, consideration must be given as to the possible byproduct of such a prosecution. The stars of the programme, the murderers, might secure substantial quantities of gratuitous publicity for their seedy cause. Let us not forget that it was for publicity that the organisation sought the interview in the first place. Also, there is the risk that in the event of an unsuccessful prosecution the finding of "not guilty" would be translated into a victory for the murderers. The real issues might become obscured.

I see only one reason why the Attorney-General might wish to prosecute such an august body as the BBC in such circumstances, namely, if lessons had not been learnt and if there were a possibility of an encore. In that case, the Attorney-General might feel obliged to demonstrate that no one—be he never so powerful—is above the law.

I hope that lessons will have been learnt and that those responsible for the programme will not congratulate themselves. I hope that they will think most carefully before making another similar programme.

2.41 pm

Mr. Stephen Hastings (Mid-Bedfordshire): I rise briefly to support my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook), and to congratulate him on bringing this issue before the House. Concern is widespread, and growing. There is evidence of that support in the number of Conservative Members who are here to support my hon. Friend. It is not just that the programme represented an extremely repulsive error of taste among those at the highest levels of the BBC, but in addition, we are concerned that terrorism and bestial murder are being dignified beneath the cloak of some bogus media ethic.

I understand that such a programme would never be permitted in the Republic of Ireland. Not only are programmes not permitted about organisations that are proscribed in the Republic of Ireland, but in addition no programmes are permitted about organisations that are proscribed in Northern Ireland. If the Act is not man enough to cope with such a situation, and if there is no room for the only logical result, namely, a prosecution, it should be made man enough. There is no shortage of Conservative Members who are prepared to support an amendment of the Act. I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend will reassure us.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine): I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware that legislation is not a matter for an Adjournment debate.

2.43 pm

Mr. Edward Gardner (South Fylde): I should like to speak on behalf of my late colleague and friend, Mr. Airey Neave, and to express my repugnance of the type of programme which was produced on 5 July, and to which my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Mr. Benyon) has referred.

The immediate power and influence of television is unsurpassed. Therefore, that power should not be abused. It should be used responsibly.

I do not want it to be said of the BBC what Mr. Baldwin said about the press in his day—that it enjoyed the power of the harlot; power without responsibility.

I received many letters from my constituents immediately after the programme, expressing their personal dislike of, and dismay about this programme. If that is the kind of programme that emanates from the media, the reputation that Mr. Baldwin attributed to the press when he was Prime Minister will be emulated by the reputation of the people who put out programmes of this type.

2.46 pm

Mr. James Kilfedder (Down, North) *rose*——

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine): Does the hon. Member have the permission of the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) to speak in the debate?

Mr. Stanbrook: The hon. Member has my permission.

Mr. Kilfedder: I wish to place on the record once again that Ulster people were absolutely horrified by the interview to which my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) has referred. They were aghast that a national organisation such as the BBC could not only put over a programme which attacked Mr. Airey Neave, who served this country so well, but should try to undermine the security forces in Northern Ireland who are trying to keep law and order.

Like every other urban guerrilla force, the IRA thrives on publicity and welcomes an opportunity to put forward its view. The programme should be condemned and action should be taken in such circumstances.

2.47 pm

Mr. James Molyneaux (Antrim, South): I wish briefly to express a view which is not in any way designed to make political capital out of a great tragedy for the House of Commons. But I should be failing in my duty if I did not join with my Ulster colleague, the hon. Member for Down, North (Mr. Kilfedder), in saying that we condemn utterly the activities of those who were not merely alleged to have committed the crime, but who confessed to it. As on previous occasions, we express the hope—so far in vain—that a more responsible attitude will be shown by the BBC and the other organs of the media. I hope that due notice will be taken of the unanimous view expressed in the debate today.

2.48 pm

The Attorney-General (Sir Michael Havers): I am grateful for the manner in which my hon. Friends have contributed to this debate. The facts are important, so I shall summarise them briefly.

On 30 March 1979 Mr. Airey Neave was murdered in circumstances that are well known. Within a short time of the explosion that caused his death an organisation calling itself the Irish National Liberation Army claimed responsibility for the explosion. By reason of the detail provided, it was thought that the claim was true. Between March and July 1979 a BBC production team for the "Tonight" programme was attempting to contact a terrorist spokesman in Ireland, and these

[The Attorney-General.]

efforts culminated in complex arrangements for the team to meet a representative of INLA in Dublin on 3 July.

On 5 July during the "Tonight" programme the BBC television services broadcast an interview between a member of its staff and a man purporting to be a spokesman for INLA. There was widespread public revulsion as a result of this broadcast, which I shared. It was not the interview itself which might constitute an offence under section 11 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, but information received in the course of making the arrangements for it and the identity of the spokesman.

The other incident was at Carrickmore. Another BBC production team preparing an item for broadcast as part of the "Panorama" programme was in Dublin. Shortly before the team was due to leave for Belfast an anonymous telephone call was received inviting the team to go to Carrickmore in Northern Ireland where there would be something for it to film. The team went and witnessed a road block set up by suspected members of the Provisional IRA who were armed. A number of passing motorists were stopped and questioned. The team filmed and sound recorded what was happening, and members of the team could have been under no misapprehension about what was happening. Although they were aware that what they had witnessed was a criminal offence, no member of the team took steps to inform the police or the Army. They contacted the Army the following day, seeking its assistance with further filming. By that time the Army had got wind of what had happened and raised it with the team. Only then did any member of the team report any details of what had been witnessed.

Having briefly outlined the facts of each incident, I should first like to say that I profoundly disapprove of the conduct of the BBC staff directly involved, which was, in my view, deplorable. However, I could not base a decision to institute proceedings on disapproval only, however deeply felt. I had to have regard to the general circumstances of the alleged offences, the prospects of obtaining convictions and what in the long term would be in the best interests of the public.

I was satisfied that the actions of the BBC staff were of a kind that would have constituted offences under section 11 of the 1976 Act. It is worth reminding the House and perhaps the public of what that section provides:

"If a person who has information which he knows or believes might be of material assistance—

(*a*) in preventing an act of terrorism . . . or

(*b*) in securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any person for an offence involving the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism . . .

fails without reasonable excuse to disclose that information as soon as practicable . . . to a constable or . . . in Northern Ireland . . . a member of Her Majesty's forces, he shall be guilty of an offence."

A number of factors in the end made me decide against proceedings in both cases, each of which I considered individually but at the same time, and with the benefit of leading counsel's advice and the views of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

While it is not usual practice to disclose the evidence that I have before me in reaching a decision, I can point to one or two parts of it that had some influence on me. In the INLA incident—and because it involved an interview with someone who boasted of being associated with the muderers of Airey Neave it was therefore the more deplorable one—the events took place in the Dublin area, and any information that could have been passed to the United Kingdom authorities would have been of limited value. Moreover, such as would have been available was of limited value.

That could not be said of the Carrickmore incident, because there the BBC staff were witnesses to an act of terrorism. It would have been foolhardy of them to report the incident while in the immediate area, but their failure to do so later was wrong. They sought, belatedly, the advice of a BBC legal adviser, and acting on the advice given decided still not to report the matter. That advice was, in my view, unquestionably wrong. Moreover, I doubt that bad legal advice could be regarded as a reasonable excuse for failing to inform the proper authorities. Nevertheless, I took into consideration the fact that advice had been sought and given.

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It must be obvious to everyone that the BBC staff were being used by INLA and the Provisional IRA for propaganda purposes. While that makes their conduct more regrettable, one factor that I had to bear in mind—and this was pointed to in the excellent contribution by my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Mr. Benyon)—was whether by instituting proceedings, particularly if unsuccessful, I may be adding to such propaganda. I do not say that that was a major factor in reaching my decision, but it was one that I bore in mind.

Another factor that influenced me was that, by the time the papers reached me for a decision, the BBC had already taken steps to tighten control over reporting of terrorist activities in Northern Ireland. I am glad that the corporation took that step of its own accord. It reminded me of the success of my choosing to refer to the Press Council the conduct of some newspapers over the question of payment of witnesses in a recent case.

There were grounds to believe that the action that the BBC had already taken would prevent a recurrence of the conduct in question. That this would be the consequence of any action that should be taken was, to my mind, of great importance. I would add that, although neither incident could, in my view, be regarded as remotely falling into the category of proper reporting, the BBC and the press have a duty, which, apart from being dangerous, must be very difficult to perform fairly, to inform the public about Northern Ireland affairs.

Those are some of the reasons for my decision.

I was, however, determined that my decision should not be interpreted as a licence to journalists to have relationships with terrorists outside the legal restrictions which operated on all others. There is no such lience, and that must be clearly understood. Therefore, after I had decided not to prosecute, I saw the chairman of the BBC governors, Sir Michael Swann, to convey to him personally my views on the matter and the strength of my feelings. I also wanted to make certain that he understood that my decision did not imply that I took the view that conduct of the kind which had taken place could not constitute an offence. I followed this with a letter reaffirming the views that I had expressed at our meeting, making it quite clear that if similar incidents took place again I would take a stricter view of what had happened and those who participated would be on warning that, subject to the evidence and circumstances of the case, they risk criminal proceedings under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act. I trust that there will be no repetition, and I welcome the fact that the BBC has taken clear steps to prevent one. But the warning remains.

So, for the benefit of others who have not seen the correspondence, perhaps I may broadly summarise what I believe the law to be. Anyone who has contact with terrorists puts himself potentially in the position of acquiring information which would place him under a legal duty to report it as soon as possible to the proper authorities. Those involved in such contacts must consider carefully the consequences of their acts and the risk they run if they do not report quickly relevant information which has come into their possession.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at four minutes to Three o'clock.

PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND: POLICY OPTIONS

There is a meeting tomorrow to look at policy options in Northern Ireland before the Northern Ireland Office draft the paper for which you have asked. It is thus a preliminary discussion to give some general direction to the further work. The Northern Ireland Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary, and Mr. Stewart (Minister for the Armed Forces) will attend (the Defence Secretary is in the Far East). You may like a separate meeting later with security experts.

There are a number of propositions and questions below which might help guide discussion.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement should continue. To let it lapse would be a defeat for the Government and a victory for the extremists on both sides.

But within the framework of the Agreement, we need to press the Irish Government much more vigorously to get the Catholic hierarchy and the nationalist community to condemn terrorism and isolate and root out those responsible for it. This should be the main theme of future meetings.

In the immediate future, the acid test is whether the Church and the SDLP are prepared to encourage their supporters to help identify the murderers of the two soldiers.

On the political front we should consider once more the case for banning Sinn Fein (and the UDA). It will be argued that this will give the IRA a propaganda victory. But the behaviour of the Sinn Fein mob in lynching the two soldiers probably gives us as good an occasion as we shall ever get.

Another possibility to be examined is restrictions on citizens of the Irish Republic entering the UK.

On the security front there are several points which need to be looked at:

- has the moment come to give the Army primacy in all security matters, with the RUC acting in support?

- do we need make clear once and for all that we do not accept the existence of no-go areas in Belfast?

- should we go back to visible and forceful policing of IRA funerals? (This is primarily a matter for the Chief Constable.)

- should we consider re-introducing internment and trying to persuade the Irish Government to do likewise (as they did in the 1950s).

- should there be a military sweep through nationalist areas of Belfast to find those responsible for the abduction, beating and murder of the two soldiers?

- do we need to increase the numbers of the Army in Northern Ireland?

- do we need to envisage even tighter security on the border, including fencing in some parts?

- what steps are needed to make our campaign against the IRA more effective? What is their psychology and how can we exploit it?

C.D.P.

C.D. POWELL
21 March 1988

EL3CAP

TERRORIST MURDERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

With permission, Mr Speaker, I wish to make a statement on the recent killings in Northern Ireland, and especially on the murders of two soldiers in Belfast on Saturday, 19 March.

I must remind the House of the background and sequence of events during the last week in Northern Ireland. On Wednesday the funerals were held of the 3 IRA terrorists killed in Gibraltar. In spite of the very large crowds and the extremely tense situation in West Belfast, the funerals had proceeded in an orderly manner, without violence and without any paramilitary display. This was the position when a vicious attack took place at Milltown Cemetery by a loyalist gunman. In that attack 3 people attending the funeral were killed and a large number injured, of whom one remains in intensive care.

On Thursday there was the funeral of the IRA gunman shot by the Army on Monday. He was acknowledged by the IRA as one of their members. His funeral took place without disturbance and without paramilitary display.

On Friday the funeral took place of Charles McCrillen, a Catholic with no paramilitary connections, shot by the UFF; and of Thomas McErlean, one of the three killed at Milltown Cemetary. These again took place peacefully and without any breach of the law.

On Saturday the funerals of the other two killed at Milltown Cemetery took place, first that of John Murray, and second that of Kevin Brady, who was acknowledged by PIRA to be one of their members. It was at this funeral that the quite horrific events took place that have so shocked the world.

I would like to tell the House the facts as far as they can be established about these events. Just after midday on Saturday, following the funeral service at St Agnes Church, the cortege moved off along Andersonstown Road towards Milltown Cemetery. At that point a civilian car attempted to reverse away from the cortege. Despite the television coverage of the subsequent events which many Hon Members will have seen, it remains unclear how the car came to be in that position and for how long it had been on that road. What is quite clear, however, is that as it reversed away from the cortege, its way was blocked, both forward and backward, by taxis accompanying the funeral. What immediately followed is a matter of sickening visual record. A number of those in the funeral cortege immediately set upon the car with the obvious intention of pulling out the two occupants. Photographs indicate that at this point the driver of the car leaned out of his window and fired one shot in the air - the only shot which both occupants fired in the course of the attack upon them. After only a moment's pause the crowd resumed the onslaught on the car, some of them smashing at it with iron bars, and eventually succeeded in hauling out both occupants. Both men were then dragged by the crowd into an adjacent stadium, the gates were closed and it appears that a smaller group of attackers continued to assault them, stripped them and searched their clothing, subsequently threw them over a wall, and then bundled them into a black taxi which took them to a nearby piece of wasteland, where they were shot.

It subsequently emerged that the two victims were corporals in the Royal Corps of Signals. Shortly beforehand they had left a joint police and Army base in North Howard Street Mill after completing a routine maintenance task, in order to return to their unit at Lisburn. They had no reason to be in the vicinity of the funeral. This is not an approved route for soldiers who are not on operational duty at the time, and there is absolutely no question of their being involved in any way with surveillance or any other duties connected with the funeral. I am therefore unable to tell the House with any certainty why they were there.

If the most likely explanation is that they decided to take the shortest route back to their base, without appreciating the presence of the funeral, this can only be conjecture, and it will probably never be known why they were there.

Whatever the reason however nothing can conceivably justify the utterly appalling outrage that then occurred and which resulted in their deaths. The whole House will join me in extending the utmost sympathy to their families, and even more so in view of the awful television pictures of the occasion. Nor has it gone unnoticed that although they both had loaded personal protection pistols, they showed incredible restraint in only using them to fire a warning shot in the air.

In the face of this outrage and the others in the week, the first and immediate objective is to bring to justice those responsible. In respect of the Milltown cemetery attack, a man will shortly be charged with these murders, and also a number of other serious offences. In respect of the killing of the soldiers two men are already in custody. In addition a massive murder investigation is under way, in which all possible resources are involved, to identify all those responsible.

The next issue that I wish to address is that of the approach of the RUC to the conduct of these funerals. Large funerals and processions are arguably the most difficult events from a public order and terrorist threat situation that the security forces face. They have been used quite unscrupulously by paramilitaries for propaganda purposes.

The Chief Constable in determining the most appropriate method of policing any funeral, takes account of all the relevant circumstances in reaching his decision. Clearly a prime consideration has been that they should be conducted within the law and without paramilitary display. He also would have regard to the degree to which other elements would seek deliberately to exploit the presence of the police to provoke violence and disorder.

There have been suggestions made that the arrangements for the funerals were the consequence of a political directive and that there had been some interference with the operational independent responsibility of the Chief Constable. This is quite false. The Chief Constable has asked me to make quite clear that he takes full responsibility for the arrangements for the funerals, and that these were policing decisions, taken after the most careful assessment of all the relevant circumstances. I would emphasise that fully support the decisions that he took in these matters, and in which the initial outcome had clearly been successful. However, clearly the two incidents that subsequently occurred are wholly unacceptable and do require immediate review in regard to policing to be followed at any future funeral. The Chief Constable has informed me this morning that he is carrying this through as a matter of urgency.

This, I know that he will carry through this work with great integrity. But the House knows well how difficult this task is, to ensure that funerals can proceed in good order and within the law, when these are elements who have absolutely no scruples or respect for family feelings in the way in which they will exploit them.

Faced with the appalling violence of the last weeks, not only in Belfast, but with the vicious murders of Jillian Johnston in Fermanagh, and Constable Graham in the Creggan only this morning, the House may remember the words I spoke last Thursday about the desparate need to break the awful cycle of violence and retaliation and end the suffering and heartache that is achieving nothing but more misery for all. This is now urgent, and it is the time when every person with a spark of human decency must determine to give their full support to the fight against terrorism from whichever quarter it may come. The security forces will take the lead as they have done so bravely over the years, but they must have the whole hearted co-operation of everybody in the Province, in the island of Ireland, and throughout the United Kingdom, in their task. I saw this morning, Archbishop Eames, Cardinal O Fiaich, the Moderator and Secretary of the Presbyterian

Church and President of the Methodist Church, on the need for all in the Province to take their share of responsibility and to condemn violence in all its forms.

It is vital that we help the community in any way to support the fight against terrorism and in this connection we are improving significantly the confidential telephone system. Very shortly indeed we shall be supplementing the present system with a single and easily memorable freephone number usable right across the Province. I have asked the Broadcasting Authorities to publicise this number and they have agreed. This will be a valuable strengthening of the present facility, which is in fact being used by a considerable number of people in their horror at the events of Saturday.

The fight against republican terrorism must be waged also beyond the confines of Northern Ireland and particularly raises major challenges for the Government of the Republic of Ireland. A significant number of steps have been taken to help improve our cross border co-operation, and we particularly appreciate the amount of weapons and explosives that have already been recovered by the Garda. We have to keep working to improve this co-operation in our common interest of defeating terrorism, and I have this monring agreed with Mr Lenihan that there will be a further meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference this week, in which we shall be discussing cross border security co-operation, and which will be attended by Mr Lenihan and myself, as co-Chairman, by Mr Collins, the Irish Minister of Justice and my Rt Hon Friend the Minister of State and by the Chief Constable and the Commissioner of the Garda.

Mr Speaker the common phrase this weekend is that the troubles of Northern Ireland had plumbed new depths of horror. That was the phrase at Enniskillen, at Milltown Cemetery, in the Andersonstown Road on Saturday. And the truth is that there will be new depths again so long as this awful and violent campaign of terrorism and

revenge continues. It has got to stop, in the name of humanity, and if there is to be any decent future for the people of Northern Ireland, for all those living in the island of Ireland and if the evil shroud of terrorism is to be lifted from the United Kingdom as a whole.

We all have our part to play whether in actively combatting terrorism, whether working to build bridges across communities, whether in deciding we do nothing in our words or actions that can increase the tensions. We all have our part, and the duty we owe to all the tragic victims of these outrages is to play that part to the full.

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Subject

cc

SUBJECT
cc MASTER.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 March 1988

Dear David,

NORTHERN IRELAND: MURDER OF TWO BRITISH SOLDIERS

The Prime Minister spoke to the Northern Ireland Secretary and Defence Secretary on 19 March and again to the Northern Ireland Secretary today about the murder of two British army corporals in Belfast.

It was agreed that the Northern Ireland Secretary should make a statement to the House on 21 March and that the press should be informed of this.

The Prime Minister made two suggestions which the Northern Ireland Secretary undertook to consider:

- the BBC should be urged to resume giving details of the confidential telephone number in Belfast which those who wished to provide information in relation to terrorist crimes could ring. This could encourage people who had witnessed the recent murders to provide evidence;

- we should consider calling an early meeting of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference. The purpose would be to bring home to the Irish Government that the time had come for them to bring every bit of their influence to bear on the nationalist community and the catholic hierarchy in Northern Ireland to prevent any similar murders and to encourage people to come forward with evidence relating to the events of 19 March.

The Prime Minister also said that the time had come to look again at the policy options in Northern Ireland. A paper should be produced, in the first instance by the Northern Ireland Office, setting this out. But as a first step she would hold a Ministerial meeting with a number of colleagues directly involved to consider the range of options which should be studied. I shall be getting touch early next week to arrange this.

BF

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commownealth Secretary, the Defence Secretary and the Home Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

SECRET

SECRET

File

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 March 1988

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has received from President Reagan about the recent incident in Belfast.

I should be grateful for a draft reply.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Lyn Parker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

C D POWELL

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

original in Box 18/3 cc pc

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

March 18, 1988

Dear Prime Minister:

The President has asked that I send to you his personal letter on the recent killings in Belfast. I share his concern for this latest tragedy in the senseless cycle of violence in Northern Ireland.

The White House has advised us that it has no plans to release the text of the President's letter publicly, but would have no objection if you choose to do so.

Sincerely,

Charlie

Charles H. Price, II
Ambassador

Enclosure

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
Number 10 Downing Street,
London, SW1.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 37A/88

SUBJECT
cc MASTER
OPS

March 18, 1988

Dear Margaret:

It is especially painful that the joy of St. Patrick's Day should be blighted by the murderous attack on Irish mourners yesterday in Belfast. The hearts of the American people go out to the victims of this senseless act and to their families. The pain and anger of this tragic event remind us, however, of the futility of violence and retribution and of the overriding need for peace, justice and reconciliation.

Sincerely yours,

/S/

Ron

BELFAST FUNERAL

With permission, Mr Speaker, I wish to make a statement about the attack yesterday upon mourners attending the funeral in Milltown Cemetery, Belfast of the 3 terrorists killed in Gibraltar.

Before the funerals, the Roman Catholic Church, local politicians and community leaders had appealed for the occasion to be orderly and without violence. The police had made it clear that they wished this to happen, and would do all they could to assist. Against this background, and in the belief that neither the families nor the community wished to see any exploitation of the funerals for paramilitary purposes, the Chief Constable decided his dispositions accordingly. His aim was to police the whole area in a sensitive manner, and to avoid intervening in a private and solemn occasion. I would emphasise that the funerals were proceeding in a peaceful way until the attack took place.

At about 1340 hours a man on the fringe of the crowd in the cemetery opened fire with a handgun, and started to throw grenades amongst the mourners. He was identified, and as he made his retreat he threw further grenades and continued to fire. He was pursued by members of the crowd who caught him at the nearby motorway where he was

subsequently arrested by the RUC. He is at present under police guard in hospital recovering from the injuries he received at the hands of the crowd. A second man subsequently arrested by the police at his home is now helping them in their enquiries.

In the course of this vicious attack, three people were killed, and 68 injured, of whom four have been detained in hospital, one in intensive care. The House will wish to express its sympathy with the relations and friends of those killed and injured in this appalling incident.

A telephone call was made to the BBC, purporting to be from an organisation calling itself the Protestant Action Force, and claiming responsibility for the outrage, but the accuracy of this claim is not yet clear.

It was an obscenity that an occasion which, whatever its origins, should have been one for private mourning and grief was brutally and savagely interrupted by such an attack. The events of yesterday only serve to underline the total futility of violence in all its forms. The day began with a blast bomb attack by the IRA on an Army patrol, in which fortunately there were no fatalities, but in which one soldier was injured.

Even after the incident at the cemetery, and notwithstanding the professed appeals for calm, the IRA tried to launch a mortar attack on a police station in Belfast which was fortunately forestalled by the Security Forces. There was further violence last night, with hijackings and burning of vehicles, petrol bomb attacks, and a sectarian attack on some Protestant houses.

We can only be grateful that the violence of last night did not lead to still more deaths and serious injuries.

Nothing could have demonstrated more clearly that if people's thoughts are only of revenge and retaliation after any incident, then this awful cycle of killing and murder and violence will continue. And yet nothing showed more clearly the total futility of violence and that it offers nothing to any part of the community in Northern Ireland. There are likely to be funerals every day this week in Belfast at which the human suffering and sadness and heartache will be all too plain, and the ultimate tragedy for all the bereaved is that it is all to no purpose. 2,500 people have been killed in Northern Ireland in the past twenty years. We know how many of those deaths flow from terrorist action and we know that those killings have not advanced any cause whatsoever. Instead they serve only to deepen the bitterness and hatred that can divide the communities.

At this time of great emotion it is now incumbent on everybody in the Province to play their part in ending the cycle of violence and retaliation and further violence.

It is not just the politicians, the church and community leaders, crucial though their role is, but everybody in the Province who has a responsibility, to heal, and to calm and to mind what they say as much as what they do.The need once and for all to repudiate violence in speech as well as action and the determination to work positively to build a tolerant and caring society is the message that this House should send today. It is a message that does not seek to judge, to distinguish between one section of the community and another, but one that is deeply important for the future of every single person in Northern Ireland.

PRIME MINISTER

Duke Hussey has reported to Robin Butler the efforts which the BBC are making to broadcast the telephone hot-line number which people in Northern Ireland are asked to use if they have information about terrorist activities.

Duke Hussey said that some legal problems had arisen regarding the broadcast. He is urgently trying to sort these out. He hopes that the Government can avoid saying anything on this matter for the timebeing since this might make it more difficult for him to accomplish his objective - which is to get the message broadcast in some form or another.

N.L.W.

(N.L. WICKS)

14 March 1988

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MDHIAN 1787

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 659
OF 120130Z MAR 88
AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO(L), NIO(B)
INFO IMMEDIATE BTDO NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY DUBLIN

MY TELNO 644: ST PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT BY THE FRIENDS OF IRELAND

SUMMARY

1. AS PREDICTED, STATEMENT HIGHLY CRITICAL OF HMG ACROSS THE FIELD OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. BUT SOME POSITIVE FEATURES, INCLUDING A WELCOME FOR OUR PROPOSED FAIR EMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION. ANY REACTION BY HMG SHOULD BE MEASURED AND LOW-KEY.

DETAIL

2. MIPT CONTAINS THE EMBARGOED (UNTIL 17 MARCH) TEXT (WHICH WE OBTAINED LATE ON 11 MARCH FROM CONGRESSMAN FOLEY'S OFFICE) OF THE ST. PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT BY THE FRIENDS OF IRELAND WHICH IS NOW BEING CIRCULATED FOR SIGNATURE BY AS MANY MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS AS POSSIBLE. (160, A RECORD, SIGNED LAST YEAR.) THERE IS THEREFORE NO REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF AMENDING THE TEXT AT THIS STAGE.

3. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, THE STATEMENT:

(A) SIGNALS CONTINUING STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT, AND RECOGNISES THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE UNDER THE AGREEMENT IN ADDRESSING THE GRIEVANCES OF THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY:

(B) WELCOMES HMG'S PROPOSED FAIR EMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION:

(C) RECOGNISES THE IMPORTANCE OF JOB-CREATING INVESTMENT IN ENDING DISCRIMINATION: AND

(D) CONDEMNS UNEQUIVOCALLY THE QUOTE BOMB AND THE BULLET UNQUOTE, AND THOSE IN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES WHO SUPPORT TERRORISM.

4. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, HOWEVER, THE STATEMENT IS, AS SUGGESTED IN MY TUR, MUCH MORE CRITICAL OF HMG THAN IN ANY RECENT YEAR SINCE THE HUNGER STRIKES. IT:

(A) EXPRESSES DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE QUOTE SYSTEM UNQUOTE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, INCLUDING THE DIPLOCK COURTS (FREQUENTLY MENTIONED BY THE BIAGGI GROUP, BUT NEVER BEFORE BY THE FRIENDS OF IRELAND) AND THE QUOTE EMERGENCY LEGISLATION UNQUOTE:

(B) DESCRIBES THE STALKER/SAMPSON DECISION AS QUOTE INTOLERABLE UNQUOTE, EXPRESSES OUTRAGE AT THE THAIN DECISION, AND STATES THAT THOSE EVENTS AND THE AUGHNACLOY INCIDENT HAVE CREATED THE PERCEPTION THAT THE BRITISH SECURITY FORCES ARE ABOVE THE LAW:

(C) URGES HMG TO CONSIDER STEPS TO RESOLVE THE BIRMINGHAM SIX CONTROVERSY: AND

(D) USES SOME UNFORTUNATE LANGUAGE ON FAIR EMPLOYMENT, SPEAKING OF A QUOTE CURRENT INGRAINED SYSTEM OF JOB DISCRIMINATION UNQUOTE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

COMMENT

5. THE STRENGTH OF THE LANGUAGE ON STALKER/SAMPSON AND THAIN WAS PREDICTABLE. WHAT IS MORE DISAPPOINTING IS THE RANGE OF OTHER SECURITY/JUDICIAL SUBJECTS RAISED (PARTICULARLY THE BIRMINGHAM SIX), AND THE GENERALLY ILL-INFORMED AND DISTORTED WAY IN WHICH THOSE SUBJECTS ARE TREATED, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE EFFORTS WHICH WE HAVE MADE AT MINISTERIAL AND OTHER LEVELS OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS AND MONTHS TO EDUCATE THOSE ON THE HILL INTERESTED IN IRISH ISSUES IN THE REALITIES OF THESE PROBLEMS.

6. OVERALL, HOWEVER, I DOUBT WHETHER THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF THE STATEMENT WILL BE AS DAMAGING AS IT MIGHT APPEAR AT FIRST SIGHT. THE ST. PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT BY THE FRIENDS OF IRELAND, AS OPPOSED TO THAT BY THE PRESIDENT (FROM WHICH WE ARE ASSURED THAT WE HAVE NOTHING TO FEAR), DOES NOT USUALLY RECEIVE MUCH ATTENTION IN THE NATIONAL PRESS. IN ANY CASE, THE PASSAGES CRITICAL OF HMG ARE WRAPPED IN OTHERS MORE COMPLIMENTARY OF OUR EFFORTS. THE MOST SERIOUSL DAMAGE LIKELY TO BE DONE BY THE STATEMENT WILL LIE IN THE WAY IN WHICH IT IS USED SELECTIVELY BY OUR CRITICS IN THE GREENER PARTS OF THE IRISH-AMERICAN COMMUNITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MACBRIDE CAMPAIGN, IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD.

7. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND, MY PRELIMINARY VIEW IS THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO REACT PUBLICLY TO THE STATEMENT BY ISSUING ONE OF OUR OWN. TO DO SO WOULD PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF OUR CRITICS BY DRAWING FAR MORE ATTENTION TO THESE ISSUES AT A NATIONAL LEVEL THAN THEY WOULD OTHERWISE RECEIVE. AND WE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO WIN CONVINCINGLY IN THE ENSUING DEBATE ON THE VARIOUS SUBJECTS ON WHICH WE ARE CRITICISED, ON EACH OF WHICH WE WOULD BE THOUGHT TO BE ON THE DEFENSIVE AND TO HAVE LITTLE NEW TO SAY. WE SHALL, HOWEVER, NEED TO THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT THE LINE WHICH OUR SPOKESMEN, BOTH HERE AND IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, SHOULD TAKE IN RESPONDING TO THE INEVITABLE PRESS ENQUIRIES ABOUT OUR VIEW OF THE STATEMENT. WE SHALL SEND ADVICE ON THIS EARLY NEXT WEEK, BUT HERE AGAIN MY PRELIMINARY VIEW IS THAT OUR LINE SHOULD BE AS MEASURED AND LOW-KEY

PRIVATE

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH JIM MOLYNEAUX

Jim Molyneaux is coming to see you at the House tomorrow. He has asked for five minutes to discuss privately a matter unconnected with Irish politics.

C.D.P.

CDP

7 March, 1988.

PRIVATE

The National Archives

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file

JA

cc NIO
FCO
DTI
HMT
D/En.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 February 1988

Dear Sir Desmond.

Thank you for your letter of 1 February about the power station competition in Northern Ireland and the enclosed copy of your letter to Tom King on the same subject.

I know that the evaluation of the revised bids is being actively pursued and that Tom King will be making every effort to bring this matter to a conclusion as quickly as possible.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Sir Desmond Lorimer

EA

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RESTRICTED
FM DUBLIN
TO DESKBY 171600Z FCO
TELNO 67
OF 171500Z FEBRUARY 88
AND TO DESKBY 171600Z NIO(B)

MY TELNO 60: STALKER/SAMPSON/BIRMINGHAM SIX: DAIL DEBATE

SUMMARY

1. THE TAOISEACH COULD HARDLY HAVE SAID LESS. HE MAINTAINS HIS CRITICISM OF OUR ACTIONS AND IS NOTABLY TOUGH ON EXTRADITION. BUT THERE IS ALSO A STRONG ENDORSEMENT OF CROSS BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION.

2. THEMES FROM THE SPEECHES OF OPPOSITION LEADERS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A. THEY ALL DENOUNCE US: ''ASTOUNDING, PROVOCATIVE'' (DUKES) (SEMICOLON) ''OBDURATE, INTRANSIGENT AND INSENSITIVE'' (O'MALLEY) (SEMICOLON) ''A SPECIAL KIND OF ARROGANCE'' (SPRING) (SEMICOLON)

B. BUT THEY ALL ALSO ATTACK THE GOVERNMENT FOR ITS LACK OF VIGOUR IN EXPLOITING THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT. MR DUKES SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF MUDDLE. MR SPRING CALLS THE GOVERNMENT ''AMATEURISH'', AND SUGGESTS THAT MR JOHN WILSON'S INCURSION INTO SOUTH ARMAGH WAS AS INSENSITIVE AS WE WERE (SEMICOLON)

C. ALL STRONGLY ENDORSE CONTINUED CROSS BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION AND ATTACK THE TAOISEACH FOR HAVING IMPLIED THAT THIS MIGHT BE MADE A BARGAINING COUNTER (SEMICOLON)

D. ALL EXPRESS DISLIKE FOR THE PTA AND ATTACK THE TIMING OF LAST NIGHT'S ANNOUNCEMENT (SEMICOLON)

E. ALL EXPRESS PUZZLED EXASPERATION OVER EXTRADITION (SEMICOLON)

F. O'MALLEY AND SPRING SUGGEST AN EARLY SUBSTANTIVE MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS.

DETAIL

3. THE MOTION FOR DEBATE WAS THAT THE HOUSE ''TAKES NOTE OF RECENT

DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING NORTHERN IRELAND AND ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS AND RE-AFFIRMS ITS DETERMINATION TO TAKE ANY AND ALL ACTION NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE FULL USE OF THE PROCEDURES AND STRUCTURES SET UP BY THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT AND TO SECURE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE GOALS OF THAT AGREEMENT''. MORE DETAILED AND INTEMPERATE AMENDMENTS WERE TABLED BY THE PDS AND THE LABOUR PARTY.

4. THE TAOISEACH'S SPEECH WAS RESTRAINED. IT CONSPICUOUSLY LACKED ANY THREAT OF REPRISALS AGAINST US. IT WAS CAST IN THE FORM OF AN UNEMOTIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF A GRAVE SITUATION. CROSS BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION WILL CONTINUE.

5. PARTICULAR POINTS OF INTEREST IN MR HAUGHEY'S SPEECH INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

A. HE REPEATED HIS VIEW THAT OUR RESPONSE WAS UNSATISFACTORY AND THAT WE HAD REACHED ''AN IMPASSE FOR THE PRESENT ON THESE ISSUES''. BUT HE CONTINUED: ''OVERALL ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS AS SUCH ARE NOT AT AN IMPASSE. THERE CAN AND MUST BE PROGRESS'' ON OTHER MATTERS INCLUDING FAIR EMPLOYMENT (SEMICOLON)

B. OUR EXPLANATIONS OF THE UNIQUE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAD NOT SATISFIED HIM. THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT WAS NOT AN AGREEMENT WITH THE NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY BUT WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE. MATTERS OF VITAL POLITICAL IMPORTANCE COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED SIMPLY ON THE GROUND OF THE QUASI-JUDICIAL ROLE OF THE LAW OFFICER. MR HAUGHEY REPEATED THAT ''THE MATTER CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO REST AT THAT'' (SEMICOLON)

C. THE PASSAGE ON EXTRADITION WAS PARTICULARLY TOUGH. THE BRITISH ATTORNEY GENERAL HAD REFUSED TO PROVIDE ''ANY MATERIAL RELATING TO THE EVIDENCE''. MR HAUGHEY PLEDGED THAT THE PROVISION OF THE NEW ACT WOULD BE ''STRICTLY ADHERED TO AND THE SAFEGUARDS PROVIDED FOR WILL BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED''. IT WOULD NOT BE A SOLUTION TO ALLOW EXTRADITION TO REMAIN INOPERATIVE BUT EXTRADITION WILL PROCEED ''ON THE BASIS OF THE SAFEGUARDS OR NOT AT ALL''. (COMMENT. IN TAKING THIS LINE I SUSPECT THAT HE IS SEEKING TO PRE-EMPT DEMANDS FROM HIS BACKBENCHERS FOR SOMETHING WORSE) (SEMICOLON)

D. PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT. MR KING'S BRIEFING OF MR COLLINS ENSURED THAT THE TAOISEACH UNDERSTOOD IN TIME THAT THE POWERS UNDER THE ACT WOULD STILL BE RENEWED ANNUALLY. HIS OBJECTION IS TO THE ACT ITSELF: ''ITS IMPLEMENTATION HAS BEEN DISCRIMINATORY AND INSENSITIVE AND HAS CAUSED WIDESPREAD RESENTMENT AMONG LAW

ABIDING IRISH PEOPLE WHO RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY VIEW IT AS RACIST IN ITS OPERATION'' (SEMICOLON)

E. CROSS BORDER SECURITY. ''I WANT TO EMPHASISE THAT OUR DETERMINATION AND OUR RESOLVE TO DO EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO DEFEAT THE MEN OF VIOLENCE AND TO MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW WILL IN NO WAY BE LESSENED BY THE UNFORTUNATE EVENTS AND DIFFICULTIES OF RECENT WEEKS''. THESE EVENTS HAVE INEVITABLY DAMAGED CONFIDENCE, BUT EFFECTIVE CROSS BORDER SECURITY REMAINS ESSENTIAL: ''ONLY MEN OF VIOLENCE STAND TO GAIN FROM ANYTHING LESS. AS A CIVILISED STATE WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO DEFEAT THE FORCES OF TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION AND WE WILL DISCHARGE THAT RESPONSIBILITY'' (SEMICOLON)

F. HE SCRUPULOUSLY RESPECTED HIS AGREEMENT NOT TO ANTICIPATE MR KING'S STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

6. MR DUKES (FINE GAEL), IN AN OTHERWISE HELPFUL SPEECH, ADDRESSED A SERIES OF REQUESTS TO US. WE SHOULD PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WE HAVE CAUSED TENSION. WE SHOULD GIVE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO THE STALKER/SAMPSON REPORT, FULL BRIEFING UPON IT, AND A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE CROSS BORDER INCURSION OF 1982. WE MUST PRESS AHEAD WITH DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AND STRUCTURAL REFORM IN THE RUC. WE SHOULD CONSULT THE IRISH ON THE PTA. THE TWO ATTORNEYS SHOULD MEET SOON TO AGREE ON EXTRADITION PROCEDURES AND WE SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO AVOID FUTURE BORDER INCURSIONS.

7. MR DES O'MALLEY (PDS) DEPLORED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DECISION OF 25 JANUARY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RULE OF LAW (SEMICOLON) RE-AFFIRMED IRISH COMMITMENT TO THE RULE OF LAW INCLUDING CROSS BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION (SEMICOLON) STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT AND CALLED FOR PROGRESS ON A PARLIAMENTARY TIER (SEMICOLON) AND PRESSED FOR AN EARLY SUMMIT TO NORMALISE ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS.

8. MR DICK SPRING (LABOUR) DEPLORED THE PRESENT STATE OF ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS AND RECENT BRITISH DECISIONS WHICH WERE COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. HE ENDORSED CROSS BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION, CALLED FOR THE EARLY RESOLUTION OF DIFFICULTIES OVER EXTRADITION, PROPOSED AN INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IN SUPPORT OF IRISH INTERESTS AND URGED THE MORE EFFECTIVE EXPLOITATION OF THE IGC.

COMMENT

9. SO FAR, SO GOOD. SINCE WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO GIVE THE IRISH THE TEXT OF MR KING'S STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE THIS AFTERNOON, THE REST OF THE DEBATE WILL HINGE ON TWO FACTORS:

A. THE VIRULENCE OF FIANNA FAIL BACKBENCHERS (SEMICOLON)

B. THE MODERATING INFLUENCE OF MR KING'S STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT WHEN WE ARE ABLE TO BRING IT TO BEAR.

10. I WAS ABLE TO BRIEF MR DUKES AND MR O'MALLEY BEFORE THE DEBATE ON THE PTA, ON THE STATE OF PLAY ON EXTRADITION, AND ON THE TIMING OF MR KING'S STATEMENT. MR SPRING DECLINED TO TALK TO ME.

11. FURTHER REPORT AND COMMENT WILL FOLLOW.

12. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE BELL NIO(L).

FENN

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ADDITIONAL 43

NORTHERN IRELAND

NNNN

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

R18/2

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

17. February 1988

Dear Charles,

POWER STATION COMPETITION

Sir Desmond Lorimer, Chairman of Antrim Power Company Limited (APCL), has written to the Prime Minister in support of APCL's latest submission in the power station competition. The purpose of the letter is to draw to the Prime Minister's attention the positive response which APCL has made to my Secretary of State's request for revised bids, and to press for an early (and favourable) decision. He also enclosed a copy of his letter to my Secretary of State on the same subject.

Revised bids were received from Northern Ireland Electricity (NIE) and APCL on 29 January and 1 February respectively. As expected, both contenders have improved on previous submissions, with APCL claiming a 20% reduction in the net present value of its bid. The proposals are now being evaluated and we expect to receive by the end of the week Coopers and Lybrands report as to whether APCL has done enough to overtake the leading NIE proposals.

In his letter to my Secretary of State Sir Desmond Lorimer highlights some matters which he fears may not receive their due weight in the appraisal process because they are not quantifiable in present value terms. These are not new issues; they have been discussed extensively and will be taken into account in reaching final decisions. As you will see from his reply to Sir Desmond (attached) my Secretary of State has therefore not thought it necessary to enter into detailed discussion of them at this stage.

In view of his reply to Sir Desmond Lorimer, the Secretary of State considers that the Prime Minister's reply need only commend APCL's positive response to the request for a revised bid, express

continued interest in the outcome of the evaluation and acknowledge that an early decision is in the interests of all concerned. A draft reply along these lines is attached.

Copies of this letter and the draft reply go to Lyn Parker (FCO), Jonathan Taylor (Treasury), Jeremy Godfrey (DTI) and Stuart Brand (Energy).

Yours sincerely,

David Watkins

D J WATKINS

Enc

DRAFT REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO:

Sir Desmond Lorimer
Chairman
Antrim Power Company Limited
Lamont House
Purdy's Lane
BELFAST
BT8 4AX

34

February 1988

POWER STATION COMPETITION

Thank you for your letter of 1 February about the power station competition in Northern Ireland and the enclosed copy of your letter to Tom King on the same subject.

I know that the evaluation of the revised bids is being actively pursued and that Tom King will be making every effort to bring this matter to a conclusion as quickly as possible.

DMC/1892

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND

Sir Desmond Lorimer
Chairman
Antrim Power Company Limited
Lamont House
Purdy's Lane
BELFAST
BT8 4AX

February 1988

Thank you for your letter of 1 February. Peter Viggers reported to me on his meeting with you on 22 December and I am pleased that that meeting and subsequent discussion with officials proved valuable in helping you review your proposal. From the information you give in your letter, the revised proposal should be substantially more competitive than its predecessor.

I note the points you make about the evaluation process. I want to assure you, however, that the matters you mention, though they may not be reflected in present value figures, will not be overlooked in reaching final decisions. As regards the question of risk, I understand that its treatment in the evaluation of the proposals has been explained to you at meetings with DED officials and advisers. Adjustments for risk are made and, as you know, the conditions for the revised bid were substantially altered to relieve APCL of interest rate risk in respect of its senior debt finance. Turning to the advancement of the station, the

Government's conclusion, as set out to you in December, was based on the figures which you had submitted to us in 1987. These clearly failed to justify the station being built ahead of need, as the May 1986 invitation to submit proposals required. Should the evaluation now taking place show that your new proposal alters that position, I would obviously look afresh at the matter.

I am grateful for the additional effort that you have put in since the meeting with Peter Viggers on 22 December. The evaluation of the revised proposals is now proceeding urgently and I will want to see it completed as quickly as possible in the interests of all those involved in this complex but supremely important issue.

TK

DMC/1879

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CP

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON

17 February 1988

Dear Charles,

I attach a draft copy of the statement on the Royal Ulster Constabulary which my Secretary of State intends to make in the House of Commons this afternoon.

I am copying this letter to Lyn Parker (FCO), Michael Saunders (LOD), Alison Smith (Lord President's Office), Nick Sanderson (Home Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

David Watkins.

D J WATKINS

ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY:

SECRETARY OF STATE'S STATEMENT 17 FEBRUARY 1988

With permission, Mr Speaker, I wish to make a statement on matters within my area of responsibility arising from the investigations carried out by Mr Stalker and Mr Sampson.

In his statement to the House of 25 January, my Rt Hon and learned Friend the Attorney General said that the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland had concluded that having considered all the facts and information ascertained and reported by Mr Stalker and Mr Sampson, and having re-examined the original Royal Ulster Constabulary investigation files, the evidence did not warrant any further prosecutions in the two incidents in which charges of murder have already been brought, nor in the third incident at Ballynerry. He did, however, conclude that there was evidence of the commission of offences relating to perverting the course of justice, but had further concluded, on grounds of public interest, that it would not be proper to institute any criminal proceedings.

The question of further action therefore falls to be considered in the context of the question of disciplinary proceedings.

The Director of Public Prosecutions has advised the Chief Constable of the RUC of those offences in respect of which he concluded there was evidence. The Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary has today announced that the Chief Constable of Staffordshire, Mr Charles Kelly, has been appointed to consider whether disciplinary charges should be brought in the case of RUC officers of Chief Superintendent rank and below, and if so what they should be. He will be supported by an Assistant Chief Constable of his own choice. The work has already started. The Chief Constable has told me of his concern that it should be completed without delay in the interests of all concerned. The Chief Constable has also confirmed to me that he considers that any charges brought should be heard by a Chief Constable of another Force. I have made clear to the Chief Constable my own concern for these disciplinary issues to be resolved as soon as possible.

Mr Sampson also made observations on the role played by more senior officers. The Police Authority for Northern Ireland is the discipline authority for those ranks. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary, Sir Philip Myers, has therefore informed the Chairman of the Police Authority of these observations, and is making available relevant material for their attention. I have seen the Chairman who has confirmed this position to me and that these matters will now be considered by the Authority.

I shall keep the House informed of further developments on these matters.

The circumstances surrounding and following the incidents in 1982 gave rise to concern about procedures, responsibilities and control within the RUC. In the light of Mr Stalker's interim conclusions and of Mr Sampson's further comments upon them, a special inspection into these matters was carried out by Mr Charles McLachlan, one of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary, and I received his report on 25 January. I have since discussed his report with the Chief Constable.

I am most anxious that there should be a better public understanding of the two major issues involved. The McLachlan report deals with the procedures and practices that have been followed in police work in Northern Ireland arising out of anti-terrorist operations. The report essentially covers two areas: first, how the Special Branch, with its own crucially important and distinctive task, still remains an integral part of the overall force within the disciplines of mainstream policing. The House will be aware of the concerns expressed in 1982 that the Special Branch had become a 'force within a force'. The second issue is how to ensure that, notwithstanding security and other considerations, there is a proper procedure for the investigation of all serious incidents, and that full and accurate information is given to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

These questions go to the heart of the problems faced by a police force using the normal processes of the law while fighting a vicious and ruthless terrorist enemy. Intelligence is the lifeblood

of that fight. Without it the security forces are seriously handicapped. It is vital that it is protected. Even the knowledge that a source exists will almost certainly lead to his death. Knowledge of the procedures used by Special Branch and other RUC officers will not only make their task still more difficult, but will put lives at even greater risk. That is why the security forces are understandably and rightly so committed to protecting intelligence. But the lessons of these incidents show clearly that that desire must in the end not operate outside effective accountability and control.

On the question of a force within a force , Mr McLachlan's report makes it clear that while the Stalker/Sampson enquiry rightly focussed on the situation in 1982 and immediately thereafter, matters were substantially improved shortly afterwards. In 1983, at the request of the Chief Constable, a former very senior officer of the Security Service carried out a special review into certain aspects of Special Branch management and its relationship with the CID. His recommendations were implemented in full. The new rank of Senior Assistant Chief Constable was introduced for the RUC in 1984. Since then both the Special Branch and CID have answered to the same Senior Assistant Chief Constable, so that their work has been fully co-ordinated.

Special Branch operations must be conducted in secrecy but they must not be carried out without the knowledge of the RUC senior command. Mr McLachlan stresses that the regional Assistant Chief

Constables are now aware of the operations of Special Branch within their respective areas, and re-emphasises the importance of them continuing to monitor these. In addition he makes a number of specific recommendations designed to ensure the highest standard in the selection and training of members of Special Branch, the prevention of over-specialisation, and the encouragement of cross-posting both within the RUC and with other police forces and the further integration of the Branch with the other parts of the Force. In putting forward these recommendations, Mr McLachlan pays a strong tribute to the present professionalism and standards of members of Special Branch, stressing the vital part they play in combatting terrorism.

I now turn to the second major issue covered by Mr McLachlan. This concerns the vital need that serious incidents are thoroughly investigated. At the heart of this is that the policies and practices of the RUC should in future reflect the paramountcy of the CID investigations, including the need for evidence to be preserved and that no obstacle should be placed in the way of questioning of suspects and witnesses.

Mr McLachlan considers that the combined responsibility for both CID and Special Branch makes an important contribution to the proper handling of such enquiries. In addition, he now recommends that in controversial incidents involving RUC officers, the Chief Constable should consider whether an experienced Assistant Chief Constable from another force should be appointed to lead the

investigation; and that an experienced senior CID officer should attend any debriefing where firearms have been used by the RUC and people killed or injured. He also recommends improved arrangements at the scene of such incidents so that the forensic, pathology and photographic resources available are used to best effect.

In addition, however, to the specific recommendations of Mr McLachlan in this area, as my Rt Hon and learned Friend told the House on 25 January, the Director of Public Prosecutions was intending to discuss with the Chief Constable and Deputy Chief Constable of the RUC safeguards to ensure that in the future facts and information to the Director are in all respects full and accurate, whether or not any security interest is involved. The House will recognise that this is precisely the issue that I identified earlier and which has to be addressed. I can inform the House that a first meeting has already been held and that these discussions are now proceeding.

The House will note therefore the steps that have been taken and are now in progress to address these difficult issues. The Chief Constable has implemented in full the recommendations of the special review in 1983; further changes have been made subsequently, including in particular the control of both CID and Special Branch under a single senior officer; and the Chief Constable is now in discussion with the DPP on the necessary safeguards for full and accurate disclosures to the Director. I can also tell the House that the Chief Constable has confirmed to me that he has accepted in

principle all the recommendations of Mr McLachlan. I believe that these actions in combination will ensure that the circumstances which caused such concern over five years ago will not recur.

There is one further particular aspect that I should mention. Shortly before one of the incidents in 1982, two RUC officers were given approval to cross the border into the Republic of Ireland. At the meeting of the Anglo-Irish Conference yesterday, I advised Irish Ministers of the full circumstances of the officers' presence in the Republic. I emphasised that the two officers who made the crossings were in plain clothes, were unarmed and were in an unmarked car without radio. As the Chief Constable said in the statement which he issued on 7 April 1984, the crossings were made "for observation purposes only. There was no preplanned incursion nor is there any deliberate or authorised system of incursion". Nevertheless it is fully accepted that it was wrong and regrettable that two RUC officers were permitted to enter the territory of the Republic unannounced as part of an ongoing operation. It is the British Government's intention that this should not happen again and the Chief Constable for his part has undertaken to ensure that it does not; nor has it occurred since.

These incidents of 1982 and the subsequent events illustrate sharply the acutely difficult problems faced by a Parliamentary democracy and the police service in combatting the evil of terrorism. These incidents in which six lives were lost, and in which one person was seriously wounded, have already led to four

policemen being charged with murder, two more senior officers suspended, and the shadow of innuendo cast more widely over the RUC. Undoubtedly serious mistakes were made which have damaged the reputation of the RUC. This is a particular tragedy for a police force of the courage and professionalism of the RUC today who have given ample recent evidence of their commitment to protecting the whole community from violence from whatever extreme it may come, and who fully deserve the tributes that Mr Stalker, Mr Sampson and Mr McLachlan all pay to them. We owe it to them and to the whole community in Northern Ireland to ensure that these matters that I have described to the House are dealt with promptly and correctly, that the wider lessons have been fully learnt, and the necessary changes effective to ensure that such problems can never happen again.

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UKREP BRUSSELS TELNO 455 TO FCO: STALKER/SAMPSON/BIRMINGHAM SIX

SUMMARY

1. MR HAUGHEY PRESSED FOR WHAT HE COULD NOT GET BECAUSE OF HIS ANGER, AND HIS FEAR OF PRESSURE IN FIANNA FAIL. BUT HE HAS KEPT HIS OPTIONS OPEN. PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESS OPINION RECOGNISE THE DANGER OF OVER-REACTION. MUCH DEPENDS ON THE DAIL DEBATE ON 17 FEBRUARY AND THE FIANNA FAIL PARTY CONFERENCE NEXT WEEKEND. THESE CAN BE INFLUENCED BY WHAT WE SAY AT THE RESUMED IGC TOMORROW, AND BY DISCREET LOBBYING OF THE OPPOSITION.

DETAIL

2. AFTER HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, THE TAOISEACH DECLARED THAT OUR RESPONSE WAS ''TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY'' AND THAT ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS WERE ''AT AN IMPASSE ON THESE ISSUES''.

3. SOME, NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE BORDER, HAVE BEEN QUICK TO SEIZE ON THESE WORDS AS A REQUIEM MASS FOR THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT. MR HAUGHEY CHOSE HIS WORDS WITH CARE. HE REPUDIATED THE IDEA THAT HIS REPRESENTATIONS HAD BEEN ''PREREMPTORILY REJECTED''. THE IMPASSE RELATED STRICTLY TO THE ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION. ''THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT MUST REMAIN''. THE CONFERENCE MEETING ON 16 FEBRUARY MIGHT BE A ''FORMALITY'' BECAUSE HE HAD NO REASON TO EXPECT A CHANGE OF HEART, BUT IT SHOULD CERTAINLY TAKE PLACE. THE CONFERENCE HAD ''MANY IMPORTANT FUNCTIONS TO FULFIL OUTSIDE THE PRESENT AREA OF DISAGREEMENT''. CROSS BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION WAS BOUND TO BE AFFECTED BECAUSE OF THE DAMAGE TO CONFIDENCE AND TRUST: BUT HE COINED AN INTERESTING PHRASE - IT WAS THE ''QUALITY'' OF COOPERATION THAT WOULD SUFFER. THIS IS NOT A ROOT-AND-BRANCH REACTION.

4. THE COMMENTS OF OPPOSITION POLITICIANS ARE ALSO INTERESTING. ALAN DUKES FOR FINE GAEL WAS HELPFUL: ''THE BUSINESS OF INTER-

GOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS IS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS. IT IS THE TAOISEACH'S JOB TO FIND A WAY OF RESOLVING THE SITUATION. ON NO ACCOUNT SHOULD SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL POLICEMEN BE HAMPERED''. DES O'MALLEY (PDS) AGREED: ''ANY REDUCTION IN CROSS BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION IS UNWARRANTED: JUST BECAUSE THE BRITISH HAVE MADE A MISTAKE DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE SHOULD TAKE ACTION WHICH WOULD BENEFIT ONLY TERRORISTS''. DICK SPRING (LABOUR) SAID THE ENCOUNTER WAS ''DISASTROUS'' AND CRITICISED THE WAY IN WHICH IT HAD BEEN SET UP IN THE MARGIN OF A BUSY SUMMIT.

5. PRESS COMMENT HAS BEEN SIMILARLY AMBIVALENT. THE IRISH TIMES DECLARES THAT ''OBDURACY IS HER ONLY POLICY'' - BUT IT QUESTIONS THE TAOISEACH'S WISDOM IN PERSISTING AGAINST OFFICIAL ADVICE WITH DEMANDS THAT WERE BOUND TO BE REJECTED. IT WARNS AGAINST OVER-REACTION. THE IRISH INDEPENDENT BRANDS THE PRIME MINISTER AS ''INTRANSIGANT'' AND CALLS ON THE GOVERNMENT TO PRESS ITS DEMANDS. BUT IT, TOO, IS CONCERNED TO MAINTAIN ''THE CONTINUATION OF THE ANGLO-IRISH PROCESS THROUGH THE HILLSBOROUGH STRUCTURES''. ALL THE SUNDAY PAPERS REPORT A ''SECRET''VISIT TO BELFAST BY SIR PATRICK MAYHEW - IN CONNECTION WITH DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST RUC OFFICERS, REFORM OF THE DIPLOCK COURTS, OR THE SUCCESSION TO SIR BARRY SHAW. THE SUNDAY TRIBUNE INVENTS A SPRING SUMMIT TO RESTORE THE TATTERED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. ALL THE EDITORIALS ARE STRONGLY CRITICAL OF US - BUT ALL ADVISE AGAINST RETALIATION IN THE SECURITY FIELD. THE IRISH INDEPENDENT LEADS THIS MORNING WITH A STORY FROM ITS POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT THAT ''CROSS BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION WILL CONTINUE AT A HIGH LEVEL''.

6. MR HAUGHEY WAS DELIBERATELY RIDING FOR A FALL. HE KNEW IN ADVANCE THAT WE COULD NOT YIELD ON THE THREE MAIN POINTS BUT THAT OTHER MEASURES WERE UNDER DISCUSSION. HE KNEW, TOO, THAT IN RESPONSE TO IRISH REQUEST WE HAD RE-STRUCTURED THE ORDER OF MEETINGS SO THAT NEITHER THE INFORMAL MINISTERIAL MEETING IN LONDON ON 10 FEBRUARY NOR THE SUMMIT ON 12 FEBRUARY WOULD BE THE OCCASION FOR OUR DEFINITIVE RESPONSE TO IRISH VIEWS. THAT IS RESERVED FOR THE IGC ON 16 FEBRUARY. MR KING HAD MADE BOTH POINTS TO MR COLLINS AND MR BURKE. ON HIS INSTRUCTIONS I HAD STRESSED THEM TO DERMOT NALLY ON 10 FEBRUARY. I UNDERSTAND THAT MR POWELL REPEATED THEM TO NALLY AND NOEL DORR ON 11 FEBRUARY. NOTHING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID TO MR HAUGHEY COULD HAVE COME AS A SURPRISE, YET HE PERSISTED IN DEMANDING WHAT HE KNEW HE COULD NOT GET.

7. THERE ARE PROBABLY TWO REASONS FOR HIS CONDUCT. IRISH OFFICIALS TELL US THATBHE IS GRIPPED BY A DEEP PERSONAL ANGER WHICH MAKES

IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO TELL HOW HE WILL REACT. I DO NOT DOUBT IT. BUT THE ANGER IS TEMPERED BY POLITICAL CALCULATION. HAVING PINNED HIMSELF PUBLICLY TO THESE DEMANDS, HE MAY BELIEVE THAT HIS OWN PARTY WOULD NOT ACCEPT LESS THAN AN INDICATION OF MOVEMENT ON ONE OF THEM. HE FACES HIS PARTY CONFERENCE NEXT WEEKEND - THE TRADITIONAL FORUM FOR THE GREEN REPUBLICAN HEART. HE WOULD HAVE SETTLED FOR VERY LITTLE ON FRIDAY, BUT HE COULD NOT SETTLE FOR NOTHING.

8. THE KINDS OF THING THAT THE IRISH COULD DO IF THEY DECIDE TO RETALIATE HAVE BEEN USEFULLY SET OUT IN A RECENT PAPER BY RID (TO WHICH CAN NOW BE ADDED THE INDICATION THAT NOW IS NOT THE TIME FOR POLITICAL DECISIONS ON THE DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF). THEY HAVE ALREADY ATTACKED US IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. THEY COULD DO SO IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE OR EVEN AT THE UNITED NATIONS. THEY COULD BRING A CASE AGAINST US IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THEY COULD HARRY US MUCH HARDER IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE, CURTAIL SECURITY COOPERATION OR EXTRADITION, WITHHOLD SUPPORT FOR OUR MEASURES ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN EMPLOYMENT AND DAMAGE OUR INTERESTS IN THE UNITED STATES. THEY COULD TAKE A MUCH HARDER LINE ON THE ARTICLE 11 REVIEW AND THE RELATED QUESTION OF TALKS WITH THE UNIONISTS.

9. SPECULATION OVER THE WEEKEND HAS FOCUSSED ON THREE OF THESE OPTIONS:

A. SECURITY. MR HAUGHEY'S REMARKS SUGGEST THAT HE WILL NOT INTERDICT CROSS BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION, BUT THAT HE MAY DIMINISH THE MORE HIGH-PROFILE ELEMENTS IN IT, LIKE MEETINGS BETWEEN THE TWO POLICE CHIEFS AND PERHAPS ALSO THE QUADRIPARTITE GROUP.

B. EXTRADITION. THERE ARE PUBLIC CALLS - PARTICULARLY FROM FIANNA FAIL - FOR THE REPEAL OF THE EXTRADITION ACT ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM. THE TAOISEACH HAS BEEN CAUTIOUS. BUT THE IRISH COULD TAKE A TOUGHER LINE IN NEGOTIATING THE MODALITIES OF THE SAFEGUARDS ACT. THE POSITION IS COMPLICATED THIS MORNING BY WHAT APPEARS TO BE A DELIBERATE IRISH LEAK THAT EXTRADITION UNDER THE NEW LAW HAS COME TO AN EFFECTIVE STANDSTILL BECAUSE THE BRITISH ATTORNEY GENERAL ''IS REFUSING TO COMPLY WITH IRISH LEGAL REQUIREMENTS''. THERE IS NO RECOGNITION THAT WE HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR TWO WEEKS FOR OFFICIAL TALKS ON THIS PROBLEM.

C. UNIONISTS. THE PUBLIC DALLIANCE BETWEEN MR HAUGHEY AND MR MOLYNEAUX HAS RECEIVED SOME PRESS ATTENTION OVER THE WEEKEND, WITH ENCOURAGEMENT FROM MR JOHN HUME.

10. IT IS TOO SOON TO SPECULATE AMONGST THESE OPTIONS. MR HAUGHEY HAS NOT YET DECIDED. IT DEPENDS ON THE OUTCOME OF THE DEBATE IN THE DAIL, NOW SCHEDULED FOR 17 FEBRUARY, AND ON THE FIANNA FAIL ARD FHEIS AT THE END OF THE WEEK.

11. I OFFER TWO TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS AT THIS STAGE. FIRST, WE SHOULD NOT GIVE UP. WHATEVER MR HAUGHEY SAYS, THE RESUMED IGC IS NOT JUST ''A FORMALITY'': IT IS THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT OUR FORMAL RESPONSE TO THE IRISH, AND WHAT WE SAY THEN WILL AFFECT THE LINE WHICH THE TAOISEACH TAKES IN THE DAIL AND WITH HIS PARTY. MR COLLINS AND MR BURKE WILL REPORT TO A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE CABINET WHEN THEY RETURN TO DUBLIN TOMORROW NIGHT.

12. SECONDLY, I RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO BRIEF THE MAJOR OPPOSITION LEADERS - MR DUKES, MR O'MALLEY AND MR SPRING - ON WEDNESDAY MORNING BEFORE THE DEBATE. WE NEED TO EXPLAIN TO THEM WHY WE CANNOT MOVE ON THE THREE POINTS, AND TO CONVINCE THEM THAT THE THINGS WE CAN DO ARE WORTH DOING. MR DUKES HAS ALREADY OFFERED TO BE HELPFUL (MY TELEGRAM NO 39), AND ALL THREE MIGHT BE WILLING TO DISCOURAGE OVER-REACTION, THUS HELPING THE GOVERNMENT TO STAND FIRM AGAINST THE WILD MEN ON THEIR OWN BACK-BENCHES.

13. I AM TO CALL ON NOEL DORR TODAY BEFORE LEAVING OR BELFAST, AND WILL REPORT FURTHER TO MR KING.

14. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE BELL, NIO(L).

15. DUE TO HIT ON LINE HEREWITH CORRECTED PARAS 4 AND 11:

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CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 February 1988

Dear David,

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Thank you for your letter of 11 February recounting the Northern Ireland Secretary's recent meeting with Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley and suggesting that the time had come for the Prime Minister to have another meeting with Mr. Hume of the SDLP.

The Prime Minister would be happy to see Mr. Hume and we could manage 1545 on Tuesday 22 March. If this is also convenient for the Northern Ireland Secretary, I should be grateful if you would convey an invitation to Mr. Hume to meet the Prime Minister in her room at the House of Commons at that time.

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES POWELL

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

12 February 1988

Dear Sir Christopher,

OD(DIS)(88)15: "STALKER" BY JOHN STALKER

The Home Secretary has considered this attached paper in which officials recommend that no civil proceedings should be brought in respect of this book. The Home Secretary does not think it right that Mr Stalker should tell his story, but has commented that it does not follow that we should have acted to stop him. He agrees with the advice put forward by officials that no civil proceedings should be taken against Mr Stalker.

I am copying this letter to Nigel Wicks (No 10), the Private Secretaries to other members of OD(DIS), the Attorney General, the Lord Advocate and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Philip Mawer

P J C MAWER

Sir Christopher Mallaby, KCMG

CONFIDENTIAL

IRELAND: Situation.

010

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CC/C

1

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Prime Minister
Agree to see Mr. Hume?

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

11 February 1988

Yes mt

CDP
13/2.

Dear Charles,

Charles: 1545 on Tues. 22nd March – how you fix or do you want me to? TG. 15/2

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NI

Although the talks about talks with unionist leaders have been overshadowed by other events, Mr King's meeting with Molyneaux and Paisley on 26 January was of some significance. A degree of flexibility is now being shown by the Unionists that just might, despite the repercussions of the Stalker/Sampson report, open up the way to a wider political dialogue in Northern Ireland.

At the meeting on 26 January, Molyneaux and Paisley did not produce detailed proposals for devolved Government, or for the "replacement" of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. But they did give a "draft outline" of their thinking. The ideas they put forward on devolution are fairly familiar (very similar to those advanced in 1985) but do at least recognise the need to involve the minority; their idea of replacing the Agreement is not acceptable, but the Unionists do seem now to accept that some framework is required for the relationship with the Republic of Ireland, and suggested that it might apply to the whole of the UK, not merely Northern Ireland; and they have shown interest in the Review due later this year as a possible vehicle for change. Mr King reminded the Unionist leaders that the Government continues to stand by the Agreement, and is not in any sense contemplating its

replacement. He undertook to reflect on what the Unionists had said. The most important feature of their proposals is the fact that they have been put forward at all - the Unionists have been drawn into making an opening statement which might be developed into the beginning of a political dialogue involving them and other parties in Northern Ireland.

Paisley and Molyneaux offered this outline of their thinking in the expectation that it would enable Mr King to open discussions with the SDLP, on the basis that although the Unionists' ideas as they stand are far too vague they did have something to put on the table. The furious reaction of nationalists in Northern Ireland (and, of course, of opinion in the Republic of Ireland) to Stalker will make progress difficult; so will Unionist reaction to Hume's meeting with the Sinn Fein leader, Adams; but John Hume has agreed with the Secretary of State to respond positively to an invitation to him and his senior colleagues to talk to Mr King about their thoughts on devolution and on the government of Northern Ireland. Mr King will therefore be issuing an invitation shortly.

At the same time, Mr Hume has separately asked if a meeting could be arranged between himself and the Prime Minister. Mr Hume is anxious to brief the Prime Minister on nationalist reactions to the decisions on Stalker/Sampson and on the Birmingham Six. He will no doubt want to stress the extent to which nationalist confidence in the administration of justice has been shaken. But a meeting would also give the Prime Minister an opportunity to emphasise to Mr Hume that neither of these decisions in any way reduces the Government's commitment to the letter or the spirit of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and that independent decisions of the prosecuting authorities and the courts should not be taken as diminishing the Government's continuing concern that nationalists

and unionists in Northern Ireland should have confidence in the administration of justice there. She could stress to him that if the Unionists are becoming more flexible in their approach to devolution, we shall be looking for a positive response from the SDLP. And she could impress on Mr Hume the importance the Government attaches to the fair employment proposals that we currently plan to announce towards the end of February. These proposals offer one of the few issues on which nationalists will in the short term be able to see positive benefit from the Anglo-Irish process, and it is important that our proposals should be greeted by nationalists as the major advance that they are. For all these reasons Mr King sees such a meeting as a potentially valuable one from our point of view and hopes that the Prime Minister will agree to see Mr Hume.

Yours sincerely,

David Watkins.

D J WATKINS

N L WICKS TO C D POWELL

"STALKER" BY JOHN STALKER

An od(dis) paper has just been circulated recommending that no civil proceedings, ie account of profits, should be brought against this book because it would be argued:

- nearly all the information is already public;
- if it was not in the public interest for the information to be disclosed, the OSA should have been used;
- there was no reason to prevent Stalker from profiting from his memoires and other public servants including senior policemen have profited from their memoires;
- action against Stalker would be misconstrued.

For all these reasons officials recommend against civil action.
The Home Secretary is anxious to announce a decision before the weekend.

Does the PM agree no action subject to the agreement of other Ministers, particularly Attorney General?

Yes MT

N L Wicks

11 February 1988

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IRISH INTERNAL POLITICS: OPINION POLL

SUMMARY

1. OPINION POLL SHOWS FIANNA FAIL SUPPORT UP FOUR POINTS SINCE NOVEMBER, VIRTUALLY BACK TO THE POSITION IT GAINED IN THE 1987 ELECTION. PUBLIC SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE IS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL SINCE 1985. GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY ENHANCED.

DETAIL

2. AN MRBI POLL IN TODAY'S ''IRISH TIMES'' SHOWS CURRENT PARTY RATINGS, EXCLUDING 19% UNDECIDED, AT

	NOV	(NOV 1987)	(GENERAL ELECTION)
FIANNA FAIL	44%	(40%)	(44.7%)
FINE GAEL	28%	(32%)	(27.1%)
PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATS	14%	(14%)	(11.8%)
LABOUR	7%	(6%)	(6.4%)
WORKERS' PARTY	4%	(5%)	(3.8%)
OTHERS	3%	(3%)	(6.7%)

THE GOVERNMENT'S SATISFACTION RATING, AT 40%, IS THE HIGHEST IN A SERIES WHICH BEGAN IN 1985.

3. THE POLL IS WIDELY SEEN AS A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC POLICIES. ITS ROBUST POSTURE ON STALKER/SAMPSON AND BIRMINGHAM SIX WILL HAVE ENHANCED ITS POPULARITY.

4. FIANNA FAIL WILL BE DELIGHTED WITH THESE FIGURES: THE OPPOSITION,

AND ESPECIALLY FINE GAEL, WILL BE DOUBLY WARY OF PROVOKING A GOVERNMENT DEFEAT IN THE DAIL WHICH COULD LEAD TO AN EARLY ELECTION.

5. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SPECIAL FACTORS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO MAKE FIANNA FAIL TEMPER THEIR SATISFACTION WITH CAUTION. THE NUMBER OF ''DON'T KNOWS'' IS VERY HIGH AND HAS RISEN BY 2% SINCE NOVEMBER. THE AGGREGATE FIGURES, BEFORE THE ''DON'T KNOWS'' ARE EXCLUDED, SHOW FIANNA FAIL SUPPORT UP BY A LESS IMPRESSIVE 2% TO 35%. THE POLL WAS ALSO TAKEN FIVE DAYS AFTER A BUDGET WHICH APPEARED MORE NEUTRAL THAN THE IRISH ELECTORATE HAD COME TO EXPECT - BUT THAT WAS BECAUSE THE BAD NEWS IN THE SHAPE OF SPENDING CUTS WAS ANNOUNCED IN OCTOBER. WHEN THE CUTS FEED THROUGH THE ELOCTORATE MAY FEEL LESS SATISFIED. THE POLL ALSO CAME JUST AFTER THE STALKER/SAMPSON AND BIRMINGHAM SIX DECISIONS: THESE, AND THE LINGERING EFFECTS OF THE EXTRADITION SAGA, ARE LIKELY TO HAVE ATTRACTED BACK WAVERING SUPPORTERS TO FIANNA FAIL BUT WILL NOT NECESSARILY HAVE MADE THEM ANY NEW CONVERTS IN THE LONG TERM.

6. SOME COMMENTATORS THINK THAT THE RESULT WILL TEMPT MR HAUGHEY INTO A SNAP ELECTION. I DOUBT IT. THE VOTERS WOULD RESENT SUCH A MANOEUVRE AND EVEN THESE GOOD FIGURES ARE NOT GOOD ENOUGH TO SECURE AN OVERALL MAJORITY. THE EFFECT MAY BE ALMOST THE OPPOSITE. MR HAUGHEY WILL BE A LITTLE TOUGHER IN THE PARLIAMENTARY BARGAINING AND MR DUKES LESS CONFIDENT. THE POLL SEEMS LIKELY TO REINFORCE, RATHER THAN UNDERMINE, THE PRESENT PARLIAMENTARY STABILITY.

7. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO BELL, NIO(L).

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 February 1988

Dear David,

THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH DR. ALDERDICE

The Prime Minister had a talk this afternoon with Dr. Alderdice, Leader of the Alliance Party in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Secretary was also present.

Dr. Alderdice expressed concern about the security situation in Northern Ireland on two counts. The first was the threat of a renewed PIRA offensive which was widely forecast. The second concerned reactions to the Attorney General's statement on the Stalker/Sampson inquiry. There was a perception in the Nationalist community that the RUC were not subject to the normal constraints of the law. In the Unionist community and the RUC itself, on the other hand, there was a feeling that the RUC might be made scapegoats. This would have a very poor effect on RUC morale. The Prime Minister contested both perceptions. The Northern Ireland Secretary had made clear in his statement that the question of disciplinary proceedings against the members of the RUC involved in the incidents investigated by Stalker/Sampson would now be considered. Equally, she did not believe there could be any doubt among Unionists of the Government's solid support for the RUC.

In reply to the Prime Minister's question, Dr. Alderdice said that he saw devolution as offering the best, indeed the only, hope of political progress in Northern Ireland. The fact that a majority of Unionist MPs at Westminster were opposed to devolution gave a misleading impression of the views of the majority in the province. The SDLP had made a great miscalculation in their decision to boycott the Northern Ireland Assembly, as their younger members now admitted. Some way must be found of getting back to a situation in which all parties worked together. One mechanism for securing progress might be the review of the Anglo/Irish Agreement which was due this autumn. This could enable various political parties in Northern Ireland to get off the hooks on which they impaled themselves. All the parties should be asked to put forward views and if some of them refused to take part, it would show that they had no constructive ideas to offer. He hoped that the review could be carried out in a spirit of flexibility and

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constructiveness. The Prime Minister said that the review was limited to the workings of the Anglo/Irish Conference. She thought that Dr. Alderdice was putting too much weight on it as a mechanism for securing political progress. She rehearsed the history of the Government's attempts since the Anglo-Irish Agreement to have a serious dialogue with the Unionists. They were at least now talking regularly once again to the Northern Ireland Secretary about the way forward. She was not convinced that devolution was necessarily the only solution. One alternative might be a system of county councils with devolved powers. She did not think there was much more the Government could do until the parties were ready to talk seriously.

The Prime Minister spoke of her high regard for Mr. Cushnahan and of his support for the Anglo/Irish Agreement. Dr. Alderdice said that it was a tragedy that Mr. Cushnahan had left politics. But he had to feed his children. Following the demise of the Assembly, there were virtually no former Alliance Assemblymen left in politics since there was no political institution in which they could have a role, and earn a salary. The Government should quite seriously consider how it could ensure that he did not have to go the way of his predecessor. It would be a tragedy if the Alliance Party were to disappear, since it offered the best hope of reconciliation. The Prime Minister commented that Dr. Alderdice seemed to be saying that devolution offered the only way for Alliance politicians to secure a decent income. She agreed that it was a point which merited serious consideration.

The Prime Minister said that she would be ready to see Dr. Alderdice from time to time in the same way as she had met his predecessor.

I am copying this letter to Lyn Parker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

Covering CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Prime Minister
Mr. King will also be present for the meeting.
CDP
3/2.

Agreed MT

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

3 February 1988

Dear Charles

The Prime Minister has agreed to meet with Dr John Alderdice of the Alliance Party on 4 February. Dr Alderdice succeeded Mr John Cushnahan as leader of the Alliance Party in October last year. He will see the meeting with the Prime Minister as an opportunity not only to exchange views on Northern Ireland but also to assure his supporters that he will continue the Alliance Party tradition of maintaining good contacts with the Government.

The meeting should be uncontentious covering a range of issues in broad terms. Accordingly the briefing has been kept to a minimum and I attach a personality note on Dr Alderdice (Annex 1) and a background note on the general political views of the Alliance Party (Annex 2). There are however two issues of special note. First Dr Alderdice met recently with Mr Haughey and it may be useful to explore his reactions to their discussions. Second in view of the recent publicity I attach background notes and lines to take on the Stalker/Sampson Enquiry and the Birmingham Six Appeal (Annex 3).

Yours sincerely

Martin Donnelly

M E DONNELLY
PS/Secretary of State

Covering CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX 1

DR JOHN ALDERDICE - ALLIANCE PARTY LEADER

1. Joined the Alliance Party in 1978, elected to the party council in 1979, he stood unsuccessfully in the local government elections on 1981. In 1984 he joined the party executive and in the 1987 Westminster elections he polled a significant 10,000 (32%) votes against Robinson in East Belfast. Following the resignation of Cushnahan in October 1987 he defeated Seamus Close (by 117 to 77 votes) in the election for a new leader.

2. Aged 32 he was educated at Ballymena Academy and Queens University. He is married with 2 children and works as a psychiatrist at Belfast City Hospital.

Comment

3. Although he performed very well in the 1987 Westminster election Alderdice is still a relatively unknown figure outside Alliance circles and his victory over Close was rather unexpected. He is anxious to open up lines of communication with the other political parties and whilst he has some doubts about the Agreement he believes the main object should be to allay unionist fears. He has talked optimistically about a replacement or amended form of Agreement when it comes up for review in 1988, and believes that power-sharing devolution arrangements should supersede the Agreement. A young, articulate and ambitious man himself he is keen to attract new young blood to the party.

he will operate in a different way from his predecessor. He is a more analytical and less spontaneous character than Cushnahan, though he will be keen quickly to establish himself in the public eye.

Annex Donnelly / Powell 3/2/88

ANNEX 2

MEETING WITH DR JOHN ALDERDICE (ALLIANCE PARTY)
BACKGROUND NOTE

Dr Alderdice will see this meeting with the Prime Minister as of special significance in his campaign to establish his credibility as the party's new leader following earlier meetings with the Secretary of State and Mr Needham. He will probably pursue a general discussion on current problems and the prospects for political development in Northern Ireland. In brief the party's views on the main issues are as follows:

Anglo-Irish Agreement

The Alliance Party continues to give a cautious support for the Anglo-Irish Agreement and has criticised the unionist leaders for their negative reaction to it. In view of the review planned for later this year Dr Alderdice may suggest the prospects for power-sharing devolution would be enhanced if the Agreement was replaced or amended.

Political Progress

On political progress within Northern Ireland the party is publicly committed to devolution and claims to be trying to encourage fresh thinking amongst middle-ranking unionists.

Candidates' Declaration

The party supports the idea of restricting the opportunities for the democratic system to be abused by those who would use the system and at the same time advocate the use of violence for political ends.

(a) Stalker/Sampson ANNEX 3

Is the Government trying to cover up the whole affair?

The security forces are not above the law. Four police officers stood trial for murder in 1984 and were found not guilty. The depth of investigations shows the seriousness with which allegations were regarded. This is not a whitewash. The matter has been subject to a most thorough examination, and the Attorney General's statement in the House of Commons on 25 January made it clear that further information was sought by DPP(NI) on three separate occasions.

Will the Government set up a judicial inquiry?

There is no justification for a judicial inquiry. There has been a very thorough criminal investigation, and the DPP(NI), who is totally independent of Government but responsible to the Attorney General for the exercise of his legal functions, has reached his conclusions.

Will there be disciplinary proceedings against RUC officers?

Disciplinary matters could not be considered until the question of possible criminal prosecutions had been resolved.

The question of disciplinary proceedings is now being considered. Two senior RUC officers suspended in the course of the investigation are still suspended.

Disciplinary charges against Chief Officers are matters for the Police Authority. Disciplinary charges against officers of lower ranks are matters for the Chief Constable of the RUC. This of course remains hypothetical.

(b) The Birmingham Six

Will the Prime Minister intervene in view of the continuing concern about a possible miscarriage of justice?

No. Questions of guilt and innocence can only properly be determined by the courts. Our judicial system has devoted immense care and attention to this case. A full investigation and hearing has taken place. All the matters and arguments raised by the defence have been carefully studied by the Court of Appeal. The court, having heard all that evidence, has decided that it is right that the convictions should be upheld. The Home Secretary has decided that it would not be appropriate to recommend the use of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy and I see no reason to disagree with his decision.

Sir Desmond Lorimer
16/2

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 February 1988

(OIF pps)

I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Sir Desmond Lorimer, Chairman of Antrim Power Company Limited.

I should be grateful for a draft reply, to reach me by Tuesday 16 February. Please could you co-ordinate your reply with Lyn Parker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Stuart Brand (Department of Energy) to whom I am copying this letter.

Charles Powell

Martin Donnelly, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

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Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

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eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
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eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

ANTRIM POWER COMPANY LIMITED

Lamont House,
Purdy's Lane,
Belfast BT8 4AX.
Tel: 0232-491111
Telex: 747552
Fax: 0232-491007

APCL

1 February 1988

PZ
NIO

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

Dear Prime Minister,

THE PRIVATE SECTOR LIGNITE FUELLED
POWER STATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND

You will know that Peter Viggers put the Government's proposals to me on December 22nd 1987 and invited APCL to make a positive response to them by February 1st 1988.

I want you to know that APCL has indeed made a very positive response and I have pleasure in enclosing a copy of my letter of February 1st to Tom King. It is my fervent hope that the Government will now bring this long negotiation to a close, will decide in favour of the Private Sector and will instruct APCL to proceed at once.

Signed in the absence of Sir Desmond and on his behalf by W D Bell Company Secretary

Sir Desmond Lorimer

ANTRIM POWER COMPANY LIMITED

Lamont House,
Purdy's Lane,
Belfast BT8 4AX.
Tel: 0232-491111
Telex: 747552
Fax: 0232-491007

APCL

1 February 1988

The Rt. Hon. Tom King, MP
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland Office
Whitehall
London SW1A 2AS

Dear Secretary of State,

THE POWER STATION

Your letter of December 17 1987 expresses the hope that APCL will be able to make a positive response to the Government's proposals which were described to us on December 22 by Peter Viggers and which we have since had the opportunity of exploring further with your officials. These exchanges have been particularly valuable, for one thing in allowing us better to understand the complex evaluation process and the conventions which are adopted in making public/private sector comparisons and, for another, in helping us to re-shape and re-define our proposals.

APCL's proposal has been delivered to the DED today. The key figures are the lignite price which in real terms averages £8.78 per tonne at 11.3 megajoules over the 30 years, and an overall power price which, using your NPV basis, is approximately 20% lower than our proposal of August 13, 1987.

One thing that has struck us most forcefully in these exchanges is that the process of analysis and evaluation focuses on a single dimension - electricity cost over 30 years. Thus, whilst other benefits to Northern Ireland are plain for all to see - they are documented in the N.I. Economic Council's report and have frequently been referred to by yourself and Peter Viggers - they count for nothing in the evaluation. In all the number-crunching and all the crystal ball gazing about future oil and coal prices, is it not to be weighed heavily in APCL's favour:

- that we have assembled, and financed, and we are ready to go on with the biggest private sector enterprise of all time in Northern Ireland,

- that Northern Ireland can rapidly achieve both security of fuel supply and low-cost energy at a price fixed for 30 years,

- that many hundreds of new and permanent jobs can become available soon, as well as a massive boost for Northern Ireland's depressed construction industry and 1500/2000 construction jobs starting in 1990,

- that the multiplier effect of the mine and power station investment will spread rapidly to hundreds of small businesses throughout the Province,

- that this project is a unique opportunity to re-awaken the free enterprise spirit in Northern Ireland and to help the people break out of the mode of Government dependency.

I believe that APCL have demonstrated - on the numbers alone - that there is no detriment to the electricity consumer so that, adding in the value of these enormous other benefits, the Government can have great confidence in selecting the private sector lignite fired power project and in ensuring that it goes ahead as rapidly as possible. Our timetable proposes start of construction in late 1990, the first power at the end of 1993 and completion by the end of 1994.

Let me add a word about risk transfer. I was glad to hear from Peter Viggers that the Government agree that the project can have a private sector classification. I very much wonder however whether the evaluation gives sufficient weight to the huge transference of risk which APCL is accepting, nor to the enormous strength and track record of the four world-class companies - Bechtel, Hanson, GEC and BP, along with the local know-how and experience and entrepreneurship of APCL's Northern Ireland shareholders.

The aspect of the Government's proposals which gives us enormous problems is your assessment that, based on the August 13 1987 figures, there is no case for proceeding with the station in advance of need. I hope you will find that the proposals we have made today put that issue to rest. It is, I fear, too easy an assumption for Government to make that this major project, which has been brought after extensive negotiation to a tight contractual stage backed by hard agreements with international banks, can simply be put on the back burner for two years. The further out the project, the greater the risk - not least that we would all be due by that time for another General Election.

When I and some of my fellow Directors met with you in June 1986 you told us that there had to be a proper balance of interests; the Government must be seen to be assiduous in its protection of the consumer and taxpayer whilst the Company must be able to see the prospect of a proper reward for the very considerable risks involved.

We in APCL are satisfied that this proper balance has now been reached. I hope that, in light of the further evaluation, you will be equally satisifed and that your decision to proceed in the private sector can be taken and announced very soon.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to the Secretary of State for Energy, and to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.

Yours sincerely,

signed in the absence of Sir Desmond and on his behalf by W D Bell Company Secretary

Sir Desmond Lorimer
Chairman

021106
MDHIAN 5745

CONFIDENTIAL
FM DUBLIN
TO DESKBY 292000Z FCO
TELNO 28
OF 291905Z JANUARY 88
AND TO DESKBY 292000Z NIO(B)

MY TELS 25 AND 26: STALKER/SAMPSON, THE BIRMINGHAM SIX AND THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE ON 2 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. WE HAVE A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE, BUT NOT A CATASTROPHE. THE IRISH LOOK TO THE SPECIAL MEETING OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE ON 2 FEBRUARY TO RESTORE MUTUAL TRUST AND ENABLE BUSINESS AS USUAL TO RESUME. WE SHOULD DO WHAT WE CAN TO ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE.

DETAIL

2. THE IRISH REACTIONS REPORTED IN TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE WILL SEEM IN LONDON TO BE GROSSLY EXAGGERATED. THAT IS THE MEASURE OF THE GULF WHICH DIVIDES US. WE FACE THE MOST SERIOUS CRISIS IN ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS SINCE THE SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT IN NOVEMBER 1985. SOME OF IT IS EMOTIONAL AND EXPRESSED IN INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE WHICH THE IRISH WILL REGRET. THE EMOTIONAL SPASM WILL PASS. BUT THE TAOISEACH'S STATEMENT TO THE DAIL ON 28 JANUARY (MY TELNO 25) WAS CAREFULLY MEASURED AND, I AM TOLD, WAS DELIBERATELY TONED DOWN SO AS TO AVOID INFLAMING THE SITUATION AND PREJUDICING THE SPECIAL MEETING OF THE IGC ARRANGED FOR 2 FEBRUARY. THE IRISH HAVE A NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS WHICH CAN BE TREATED ON THEIR MERITS (SEE PARA 5 BELOW). THE HEART OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE FRAGILE CONFIDENCE IN US, SO CAREFULLY BUILT UP UNDER THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT, HAS BEEN DAMAGED IF NOT DESTROYED. THE IGC ON TUESDAY IS A CRUCIAL OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE THAT CONFIDENCE.

3. I SPENT TWO HOURS TODAY WITH NOEL DORR, SECRETARY, DFA, WHO TOLD ME IN PROFESSIONAL LANGUAGE OF THE TAOISEACH'S ANGER AND DISTRESS. WE HAVE DRAWN ATTENTION FROM THIS POST TO THE IMPORTANCE OF SUSTAINING MR HAUGHEY'S CONFIDENCE IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES OF DEFEATING THE IRA AND ESTABLISHING MORE HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THESE ISLANDS. THAT CONFIDENCE IS NOW IN JEOPARDY.

4. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE NEED TAKE AT FACE VALUE THE MORE APOCALYPTIC VIEWS OF POLITICIANS AND JOURNALISTS. MR PETER BARRY SUGGESTED THIS MORNING THAT THE CRISIS WAS THE GRAVEST IN THE HISTORY OF THE STATE. THAT IS SILLY. IT IS A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE TO WHICH INTEMPERATE REMARKS BY IRISH POLITICIANS ARE CONTRIBUTING. BUT IT IS RETRIEVABLE.

STALKER/SAMPSON

5. THE MAIN IRISH COMPLAINTS CAN BE LISTED AS FOLLOWS:

A. MINORITY CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND IN THE SECURITY FORCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS AN OBJECTIVE OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS AND A FEATURE OF THE AGREEMENT. IT OUGHT TO WEIGH HEAVILY IN ANY CALCULATION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST WHEN CONSIDERING THE MERITS OF PROSECUTION (SEMICOLON)

B. THE TAOISEACH FEELS THAT HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSULTED. IN FACT HE WAS NOT EVEN INFORMED. MR DORR TELLS ME THAT THE IRISH AMBASSADOR OBTAINED A COPY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STATEMENT OF 25 JANUARY FROM MR KEVIN MCNAMARA, AND THAT THE OFFICIAL COPY WAS HANDED OVER IN THE SECRETARIAT AT 5.15 PM. DORR IS AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE WERE NOT WILLING TO GIVE THEM EVEN THE ELEMENTARY COURTESY OF A HALF HOUR WARNING. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN HAS NOW DESCRIBED OUR FAILURE TO CONSULT AS A BREACH OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT (SEMICOLON)

C. HOWEVER HONOURABLE OUR INTENTIONS, THE BENEFICIARIES OF THE DECISION ARE THE PARAMILITARIES WHO ARE THE ENEMIES OF BOTH STATES ALIKE (SEMICOLON)

D. THE LONG SAGA OF STALKER/SAMPSON, ITS PECULIAR FEATURES AND ITS ABRUPT CONCLUSION WILL HAVE DONE MUCH TO UNDERMINE MINORITY CONFIDENCE IN THE RUC (SEMICOLON)

E. THE AFFAIR LEAVES IN PLACE SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE RUC AGAINST WHOM THERE IS EVIDENCE OF PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE. THIS IS BOUND, THEY SAY, TO AFFECT CROSS BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION. THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN HAS EXPLAINED THAT THIS IS NOT A THREAT BUT A FACT: ''IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO RALLY PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND IS DIFFICULT FOR THE GARDAI AND THE RUC TO HAVE THE KIND OF TRUST THAT IS ESSENTIAL AS THINGS STAND NOW''.

6. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, IRISH CONCERNS ON 2 FEBRUARY ARE LIKELY TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A. TO ESTABLISH THE BASIS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONSIDERATION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST. THERE WILL BE MUCH THAT WE CANNOT SAY FOR REASONS BOTH OF SECURITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROPRIETY. BUT THERE ARE SOME THINGS THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO SAY, EG THE CONSIDERATION INCLUDES CONCERN FOR PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND THE SECURITY FORCES. IT INCLUDES THE SAFETY OF PEOPLE'S LIVES. IT DOES NOT INCLUDE THE AVOIDANCE OF EMBARRASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE AG AND THE DPP ARE OBLIGED TO BALANCE ONE HARM AGAINST ANOTHER. THEY ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM POLITICAL PRESSURE, AND ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST AS WELL AS THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANY PROSECUTION SUCCEEDING (SEMICOLON)

B. THEY WILL ASK FOR A COPY OF THE STALKER/SAMPSON REPORTS. I ASSUME THAT WE SHALL REFUSE. IF THEY WERE GIVEN A COPY THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO KEEP IT SECRET FOR LONG. BUT I WONDER WHETHER WE COULD NOT GIVE THEM A SUMMARY OR A DESCRIPTION OF THE REPORTS, INCLUDING THE STATEMENT THAT THEY DID NOT DISCLOSE EVIDENCE OF A ''SHOOT TO KILL'' POLICY?

C. THEY WILL PRESS IN PARTICULAR FOR DISCUSSION OF THE INCURSION BY RUC SPECIAL BRANCH INTO THE REPUBLIC WHICH WAS DISCUSSED BY MY PREDECESSOR WITH THE THEN TAOISEACH ON 5 APRIL 1984 (FCO TEL 51 AND DUBLIN'S REPLY NO 152 OF 1984).

D. THEY WILL WANT TO DISCUSS WITH MR KING THE SORT OF THING WHICH HE PLANS TO SAY TO THE HOUSE IN HIS FORTHCOMING STATEMENT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION AND OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES IN THE RUC. IN DISCUSSION WITH DORR I ENCOURAGED HIM TO FOCUS MORE UPON THE FUTURE THAN THE PAST IN THE EXPECTATION THAT WE MIGHT HAVE LITTLE TO SAY ON POINTS A TO C ABOVE.

7. WHAT WE CANNOT SAY IS THAT ALL THIS IS NONE OF THEIR BUSINESS. IT IS CLEAR FROM THE HILLSBOROUGH COMMUNIQUE AND FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE THAT THEY HAVE CONSIDERED IT TO BE THEIR BUSINESS FROM THE OUTSET AND HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN ENCOURAGED TO EXPECT THAT IT WOULD IN DUE COURSE BE DISCUSSED WITH THEM. A LARGE PART OF THE IRISH HURT IS THE SENSE THAT WE HAVE SIMPLY IGNORED THEIR CONCERNS AND IF WE WISH TO RE-ESTABLISH CONFIDENCE WE MUST

NOW BE SEEN TO TAKE THEM SERIOUSLY.

BIRMINGHAM SIX

8. THE BIRMINGHAM SIX JUDGEMENT HAS RAISED THE EMOTIONAL TEMPERATURE BUT INVOLVES QUITE DIFFERENT QUESTIONS. FOR MOST BRITISH PEOPLE THE COURT OF APPEAL HAS DISPOSED OF THE MATTER. FOR MOST IRISH PEOPLE IT HAS CONFIRMED THE INABILITY OF THE BRITISH ESTABLISHMENT TO ADMIT THEIR MISTAKES. THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME HOPE OF PERSUADING IRISH OPINION OTHERWISE IF THE TWO ISSUES HAD NOT COME TOGETHER. IN THE LONG RUN I FEAR THAT THIS WILL BE A MORE DIFFICULT QUESTION FOR US EVEN THAN STALKER/SAMPSON. BUT IT DOES NOT POSE THE SAME IMMEDIATE QUESTIONS. THE IRISH ARE HOPING FOR SOME FURTHER INTERVENTION BY THE EXECUTIVE. I WARNED DORR ON THE LINES OF GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO 9 OF 28 JANUARY THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE HOME SECRETARY RECOMMENDING THE ROYAL PEROGATIVE OF MERCY TO SECURE THE MEN'S RELEASE SINCE THEIR GUILT HAD JUST BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEAL.

9. DORR TOLD ME TODAY THAT HE HAD ADVISED HIS MINISTERS AGAINST RAISING THE BIRMINGHAM SIX IN THE IGC BOTH BECAUSE THE SIX HAVE SOUGHT LEAVE TO APPEAL AND BECAUSE IT WAS MORE LIKELY TO BE RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY IF IT WAS KEPT OUT OF ANGLO-IRISH QUARRELS. THE IRISH ACCEPT THAT IT IS NOT DIRECTLY A MATTER FOR THE CONFERENCE THOUGH THEY ARGUE TORTUOUSLY THAT IT IS RELEVANT TO EXTRADITION WHICH IN TURN IS A MATTER FOR THE CONFERENCE. THEY KNOW THAT IT IS NOT PART OF MR KING'S RESPONSIBILITIES. THEY MAY MAKE A STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD BUT ARE UNLIKELY TO PURSUE THE MATTER ON TUESDAY.

OTHER MATTERS

10. THERE ARE AT LEAST TWO OTHER MAJOR ISSUES IN THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF CONFIDENCE:

A. I HOPE WE SHALL BE ABLE TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THE STATE OF PLAY ON TALKS ABOUT TALKS (MY TELNO 24)

B. WE SHOULD MOVE SWIFTLY TO RESOLVE THE CONTINUING IMPASSE ON EXTRADITION. I UNDERSTAND THAT WE MAY BE WILLING TO PROVIDE THE IRISH ATTORNEY WITH FACTS BUT NOT WITH EVIDENCE. THE TANAISTE'S LETTER OF 14 JANUARY ASKS FOR FACTS BUT NOT FOR EVIDENCE. I HOPE THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO REACH EARLY AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION

CCPC

M.L. SAUNDERS
LEGAL SECRETARY

LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE
LONDON, WC2A 2LL

29 January 1988

C D Powell Esq
Private Secretary
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
LONDON S W 1

CDP 4/1

Dear Charles,

FORTHCOMING BOOK BY MR STALKER

The Attorney General has seen a copy of Philip Mawer's letter to you of 26 January and the damage assessment commissioned from the Northern Ireland Office.

The Attorney has commented that very different considerations apply to this case than do in the Spycatcher kind of case. He has a strong disinclination to take any step to prevent publication and agrees with the views of the Home Secretary.

I am copying this letter to David Watkins, to the Private Secretaries to members of OD(DIS) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely

Michael Saunders.

M L SAUNDERS

IRELAND: Situation PT23

015340
MDHIAN 5529

RESTRICTED
FM DUBLIN
TO DESKBY 281930Z FCO
TELNO 25
OF 281830Z JANUARY 88
AND TO DESKBY 281930Z NIO(B)

MY TELNO 21: STALKER/SAMPSON: IRISH REACTIONS

SUMMARY

1. IRISH TO PRESS FOR EXPLANATION OF BASIS OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S CONSIDERATION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST. HINT OF REDUCED SECURITY COOPERATION.

DETAIL

2. THE TAOISEACH MADE A STATEMENT TO THE DAIL (TEXT FAXED TO FCO, NIO AND SECRETARIAT) ON THE STALKER/SAMPSON ENQUIRY THIS AFTERNOON. HE BEGAN BY QUOTING THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE. BUT HE CONCLUDED THAT IT ''AMOUNTED TO A BLUNT ADMISSION THAT WHILE PROSECUTIONS WERE WARRANTED THEY WERE NOT GOING TO BE TAKEN FOR REASONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY''. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT RESENTED BEING NEITHER CONSULTED NOR INFORMED ABOUT ANY ASPECT OF THE ATTORNEY'S STATEMENT. HE REHEARSED THE BACKGROUND TO THE ENQUIRY AND SAID THAT THERE WERE FOUR ELEMENTS OF CONCERN:

1) THE KILLINGS IN 1982 (SEMI-COLON)

2) TH COVERT OPERATION IN THE REPUBLIC ALLEGED BY CONSTABLE ROBINSON (SEMI-COLON)

3) THE ALLEGED PERVERSION OF JUSTICE (SEMI-COLON)

4) THE RESPONSE OF THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING THE LENGTH OF TIME WHICH ENQUIRIES HAD TAKEN, AND CULMINATING IN THE ATTORNEY'S STATEMENT.

MR HAUGHEY REGARDED CONSULTATION WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON CONSIDERATION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST AS FALLING WITHIN THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT. THE IRISH WOULD USE THE IGC TO ESTABLISH THE BASIS OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S CONSIDERATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST MATTERS.

3. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE IRISH BELIEVED WE COULD PROVIDE A

GREAT DEAL MORE INFORMATION ''BY WAY OF PUBLICATION OF THE STALKER/ SAMPSON REPORT OR OTHERWISE'' IN ORDER TO ALLAY PUBLIC UNEASE. WHILE COOPERATION AND CROSS BORDER SECURITY HAD BEEN STEADILY DEVELOPED, ''SUCH SECURITY COOPERATION CAN ONLY BE CONDUCTED IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN THE TWO POLICE FORCES''. ''THE ONLY PERSONS LIKELY TO BENEFIT ARE THE PARAMILITARIES''. ''MATTERS CANNOT BE LEFT AS THEY ARE''.

4. MR ALAN DUKES, LEADER OF FINE GAEL, AGREED THAT THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT WAS ''FAIRLY TRANSPARENT CODING'' OF THE FACT THAT WITHOUT PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN PROSECUTIONS. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS COULD EVER JUSTIFY NON-PROSECUTION WHERE THE LAW WAS BROKEN. THE IRISH SHOULD INSIST ON HAVING A SIGHT OF ALL PARTS OF THE STALKER/SAMPSON REPORT, HE BELIEVED THERE WAS A STRONG CASE FOR PUBLICATION.

5. DES O'MALLEY (PD) SAID THAT THE STATEMENT LEAVES IN PLACE IN THE RUC A CADRE OF OFFICERS WHO HAVE PERVERTED JUSTICE. MR SPRING (LABOUR) FEARED THAT WE HAD REACHED A TURNING POINT IN ANGLO-IRISH RELATION.

6. THERE WAS ALSO AN EMERGENCY DEBATE IN THE SENATE.

7. IN RADIO INTERVIEW THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, MR COLLINS, COMPLAINED THAT THE IRISH HAD BEEN TOLD AT EVERY MEETING OF THE IGC TO BE PATIENT OVER STALKER/SAMPSON, AND THE CONCLUSION HAD NOW BEEN ANNOUNCED WITHOUT EVEN PRIOR WARNING. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE AFFAIR POSED A THREAT TO CROSS-BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION: ''IT IS A DAMNABLY SERIOUS MATTER BECAUSE IT DESTROYS THE CREDIBILITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE NORTH''.

8. THERE WAS ANGER IN THE DAIL AMONGST ALL POLITICAL PARTIES. BUT THE DOMINANT NOTE WAS BEWILDERMENT THAT WE SHOULD DO SUCH A THING. THERE IS ALSO WIDESPREAD IGNORANCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE BRITISH ATTORNEY-GENERAL.

9. THE DEBATE TOOK PLACE BEFORE THE RESULT OF THE BIRMINGHAM SIX APPEAL WAS KNOWN.

10. WE ARE PROMISED A SINN FEIN DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE THE CHANCERY TOMORROW.

11. MR KING'S PARLIAMENTARY ANSWER THIS AFTERNNON IS FAIRLY

015340
MDHIAN 5529

REPORTED IN THE MEDIA TONIGHT.

12. I SHALL REPORT FURTHER.

FENN

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 147

MAIN 104

NORTHERN IRELAND
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PUSD
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RESEARCH
PLANNERS
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LEGAL ADVISERS
POD
PS
SIR J FRETWELL
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
CHIEF CLERK
MR BOYD
MISS PESTELL

ADDITIONAL 43

NORTHERN IRELAND

NNNN

The National Archives

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

file

CC PC 25

SUBJECT CC MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

NORTHERN IRELAND: SDLP/SINN FEIN CONTACTS

The Prime Minister and the Northern Ireland Secretary had some discussion yesterday of the background to contacts between the SDLP and Sinn Fein.

The meeting between John Hume and Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein was apparently the work of a Redemptorist monk, who had claimed to Hume that there was a growing support in Sinn Fein for abandoning violence. The basis of Hume's approach at the meeting was that he and Adams were both nationalists who sought Irish unity. But Sinn Fein/PIRA's campaign of violence was obsolete and counter-productive. Since the Anglo-Irish Agreement, it was clear that the only way to bring about unification was by democratic persuasion. Adams was reported (by Hume) to have expressed interest in these ideas and to have asked for them to be set down on paper. He had also suggested a wider meeting involving other senior Sinn Fein and SDLP figures. Hume had rejected the latter suggestion, but had agreed that each of them should report to their respective party colleagues and meet again. The Northern Ireland Secretary commented that RUC sources thought it was not impossible that some members of Sinn Fein were seeking an alternative way forward. There was also some evidence of a split between Adams and McGuiness, with the latter representing the hard-line PIRA commitment to violence. The Northern Ireland Secretary added that it was quite clear that the Government must not be involved in any way with these contacts. But the possibility of some evolution in Sinn Fein's thinking should not be excluded.

The Prime Minister said that she was very sceptical of Sinn Fein's motives in seeking contacts with the SDLP, and thought it unwise of Hume to have agreed to them. Sinn Fein would exploit the contacts for their own purposes. It was highly

unlikely that they were prepared to contemplate giving up violence, especially when the PIRA were known to have major stocks of new and more sophisticated weapons. If questioned in the House, she would continue to express her opposition to contacts with parties and groups which espoused violence.

C.D.?

CDP

28 January, 1988.

CONFIDENTIAL

file ECL
cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 January 1988

Dear Philip.

FORTHCOMING BOOK BY MR. STALKER

Thank you for your letter of 26 January about the forthcoming book by Mr. Stalker. The damage assessment enclosed with your letter is inevitably rather thin but I do not think the Prime Minister would dissent from the Home Secretary's view that no action should be taken before publication.

I am copying this letter to David Watkins (Northern Ireland Office), to the Private Secretaries to Ministers who are members of OD(DIS) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

(Charles Powell)

Philip Mawer, Esq.,
Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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cc PC.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

STALKER-SAMPSON REPORT

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of 26 January reporting the Irish Ambassador's call on you to express his Government's concern about the Attorney-General's statement in relation to the Stalker-Sampson Report. This matter will presumably now be pursued in the special meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference which is to be held. The Prime Minister would want us to make clear to the Irish Government at that meeting that their claim that there should have been prior consultation with them over the statement has no basis and is unacceptable. Similarly the Irish Government has no right to know what public interest considerations were taken into account by the Attorney-General.

I am copying this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and for Northern Ireland and to the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers.

CHARLES POWELL
27 January 1988

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

CDP
28/1

David Crawley
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Scotland
Dover House
Whitehall
LONDON
SW1A 2AU

27 January 1988

Dear Mr Crawley,

We are aware that there is to be a Commons debate today, initiated by the Labour Party, on Scottish devolution.

Scottish Office Ministers will wish to be aware that Mr. King held a further session of 'talks about talks' with the Unionist leaders (Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley) yesterday, and we are at a delicate stage in our efforts to bring about political progress in the Province. You will appreciate that it is particularly important, therefore, that nothing should be said in the context of a debate on devolution for Scotland which would cast doubt on the Government's objective (as stated in the Queen's Speech and the Conservative Party manifesto), of seeking devolution of responsibilities to elected representatives in Northern Ireland on a basis of widespread agreement. We would not regard it as helpful to draw analogies between Northern Ireland and the countries of Great Britain, since the history of Northern Ireland this century has been so different. We assume that your Ministers will pursue a similar line, if the issue is raised today.

I am sending copies of this note to Charles Powell and to Jon Shortridge.

Yours sincerely

Aballa.

for D J WATKINS

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

CCPC.

Prime Minister

The 'informed guess' is that Mr. Stalker's book is unlikely to contain new revelations; & that the disadvantages of demanding to see it in advance – charges of conspiring to silence Mr. Stalker – outweigh any likely gain.

Agree no action?

CDP 27/1

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

26 January 1988

Dear Charles,

FORTHCOMING BOOK BY MR STALKER

OD(DIS)(C) has considered a report that a book by Mr Stalker will be published on 8 February, with serialisation in a newspaper beginning the week before (possibly Sunday, 31 January). A damage assessment was commissioned from the Northern Ireland Office and I enclose a copy. It provides a convenient summary of the history of the relevant events.

Yes

The view of officials here and in the Northern Ireland Office is that this is not a case where the Government should consider taking action to prevent possible breaches of confidence. We have no information that Mr Stalker's book contains damaging revelations about security operations. Though there may well be criticisms in the book that his enquiry was obstructed, that is rather a different matter. Because of the stage which his enquiry had reached when he left any detailed information about security and intelligence matters must have reached Mr Stalker after his retirement, from his former colleagues, and he will be conscious that by revealing such information he puts their careers at risk. Any attempt to discover the content of the book or to obtain deletions from it would give fuel to the rumours that there is a conspiracy to silence Mr Stalker because he was getting too close to the truth during his inquiries in Northern Ireland. That is nonsense, but in present circumstances very dangerous nonsense which it is difficult to rebut as it is obviously impossible to publish Mr Sampson's report.

The Home Secretary agrees with the advice that no action should be taken and I understand that Mr King does not dissent.

I am copying this letter to David Watkins, to the Private Secretaries to Ministers who are members of OD(DIS) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Philip Mawer

P J C MAWER

C D Powell, Esq.,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MR STALKER'S BOOK

The following is an assessment by Northern Ireland Office of the likely damage if Mr John Stalker's forthcoming book includes disclosures about the two major inquiries in which he has been involved.

Background

2. In the course of three separate incidents in Co Armagh during 1982, six persons were shot dead by members of the RUC engaged in covert operations. Two of these incidents resulted in four police officers being tried for murder. During the two trials, the accused officers (who were subsequently acquitted) claimed that, following the shootings, they had been instructed by their superiors to give false information when questioned by the CID. The DPP(NI) subsequently directed the Chief Constable of the RUC to have those claims investigated. The Chief Constable decided that his proper course was to call in a senior officer from another force to conduct the inquiry (which should also include the circumstances of the fatal shooting in the third incident). On the advice of HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, he asked Mr John Stalker, then Deputy Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Constabulary, to undertake this inquiry (hereafter described as "the RUC inquiry").

3. Mr Stalker and his supporting team of detectives from Manchester submitted an interim report to the Chief Constable in 1985. When (some months later) this reached the DPP(NI), he directed that further inquiries should be made. At this point, however, Mr Stalker was removed from the investigation because he was about to be suspended from duty while allegations of misconduct on his part in Manchester were separately investigated ("the Manchester inquiry"). His place in the RUC inquiry was taken by Mr Colin Sampson, then Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, operating

with the same supporting team. Mr Sampson submitted his report to the Chief Constable and the DPP(NI) in 1987; the latter has since been considering it in consultation with the Attorney-General. Meanwhile, Mr Stalker has retired from the police service, is now earning his living in the public relations and entertainment world, and is reported to have written his memoirs.

Previous Disclosures

4. Throughout the RUC inquiry, and especially since mid-1985, there have been a great many articles about it in the press, as well as several television programmes and a complete book by Peter Taylor. Many of them have been merely speculative but others - notably in the Guardian and the Irish Times - have displayed a disconcertingly full and accurate knowledge of the facts of the three incidents and of the progress and vicissitudes of the inquiry. It has been difficult to avoid the impression that Mr Stalker and/or his erstwhile team were the source of frequent and indeed systematic leaks. Whatever their true source, the leaks have been very damaging to the credibility of the inquiry and to relations between the investigators and the RUC, but it was judged that there was no realistic prospect of pinning the responsibility for them.

5. The leaking continued after Mr Stalker was taken off the RUC inquiry (and, at that stage, started to include leaks about the Manchester inquiry as well). The likeliest explanation is that some members of the RUC inquiry team are known to have been upset by his removal from that inquiry - and by the fact that he was not allowed to return to it after his reinstatement in Manchester - and may have continued to supply him with information about the RUC inquiry and/or to leak it on his behalf.

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6. When interviewed by the media from time to time since his retirement, Mr Stalker has so far been generally circumspect in declining to give direct answers to questions about the two inquiries.

Extent of Mr Stalker's knowledge

7. This has to be largely a matter of supposition as far as NIO is concerned, because it was deliberately decided that the proper and most defensible course was that the main reports by Mr Stalker and Mr Sampson which were concerned with the possible criminal culpability of individuals should be seen only by the DPP(NI) and the Attorney General (together with the Chief Constable of the RUC) and not by NIO Ministers or officials. The only exception was a supplementary report by Mr Sampson which was concerned with the inquiry's findings regarding the internal running of the RUC and criticisms of senior officers.

8. However, given that all three of the 1982 incidents arose from covert operations, it can be safely assumed that the Stalker/Sampson investigators - including Mr Stalker himself - learned a great deal about the way in which the RUC and other agencies went about such operations, both generally and in the three particular instances. The investigators must have acquired an extensive knowledge of the techniques and procedures which are routinely employed to acquire vital intelligence about the activities and intentions of terrorist groups.

9. It appears that information of this kind was made available to the investigators more readily in the later stages of the inquiry, after Mr Sampson had taken over, than during the earlier stages. It is known that Mr Stalker, in his interim report, complained that he had not yet been given as much access to such information as he considered necessary. Nonetheless it must be assumed that his

CONFIDENTIAL

knowledge was extensive and may eventually have been not significantly less than that of the other investigators if, as seems probable, some of them continued to pass information to him about the RUC inquiry after he had been removed from it.

Effect of any disclosures in the Stalker book

10. Such was the extent and the basic accuracy of the leaking to the media while the inquiry was in progress that there are very few details of the three incidents of 1982 which are not already in the public domain. The various descriptions and reconstructions may not have been correct in every detail but many of them have been close to the mark.

11. Were Mr Stalker to repeat these details in his book, he would therefore be adding little to what is already known. The damage already caused would however be exacerbated to some extent because the information would be concentrated in a single publication rather than spread over many articles and programmes; he would be seen to be confirming its authenticity; and his own repeating of it would in all probability prompt the media to repeat it still further.

12. He might also, if he chose to, be able to impart a certain amount of new information - not so much about the three specific incidents as about the general conduct of covert operations. Any disclosures of this kind - whether accurate or not - would inevitably cause some damage.

13. Finally, he might seek to give fresh currency to the oft-repeated claim that the allegations against him of misconduct in Manchester were trumped up, at the instigation of the RUC, precisely in order to bring about his removal from the RUC inquiry because he was getting too close to the truth of what happened in

1982 (including, according to the best stories, the truth about the involvement of other agencies). Were he to repeat this claim, however, he would have to overcome the awkward conclusion in Peter Taylor's book which explicitly stated that, despite diligent ferreting, the author had been unable to find any persuasive evidence of a sinister link between the two inquiries.

Likelihood of disclosures by Mr Stalker

14. As stated above, Mr Stalker has so far been much more reticent, when interviewed since his retirement, than were the earlier unattributed reports in the media. It is of course possible that he has merely been saving up his disclosures until his book was published. But there are reasonable grounds for believing that he will continue to be very cautious about how much he should be revealing attributably. As an experienced policeman he will be aware of his potential liability under the Official Secrets Act if he discloses what he knows very well to be classified information. And he and his publishers will presumably have been mindful of the risk of incurring expensive libel actions.

15. It seems likely - though by no means certain - that his book will in itself be fairly uninformative and that he will rely more on the existing notoriety of the two inquiries in which he has been involved than on any dramatic new disclosures to achieve a good sale. The greater risk is that the mere appearance of the book will revive memories of earlier speculation about the inquiries and stimulate renewed speculation.

22 January 1988

CC PC (2)

Prime Minister
It seems to me that the Irish Government are going much too far in protesting in these terms, e in the questions they pose. They should be called to order quite ~~sharply~~ sharply.
CDP 26/1

Ref. A088/292

MR POWELL

The Irish Ambassador Mr O'Rourke, called on me this afternoon to express his concern over the Attorney General's announcement yesterday in relation to the Stalker-Sampson Report. He handed me the attached statement calling for a special meeting of the Anglo-Irish Conference.

2. The Ambassador said that he wished to express the seriousness of his Government's concern over the announcement. There had been no prior consultation with the Irish Government, and the Irish Government had not even been given a copy of the Attorney General's statement to the House of Commons before it was made.

3. The Ambassador went on to say that his Government considered that the Attorney General's statement would have serious implications in three areas. First, it would serve to undermine confidence in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland, the furthering of which was an objective under Article 8 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. He wondered whether the position of the minority community had been taken into account by the Attorney General in coming to his decision, on public interest grounds, not to prosecute policemen who, it was accepted, had sought to pervert the course of justice.

4. Secondly, the Ambassador pointed to the effect of the decision on relations between the security forces and the community. These had improved recently, in large measure because of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Attorney General's decision represented a serious set-back and would be a shot in the arm for the IRA.

NOIABT

5. Thirdly, the Ambassador said that the Irish Government would have expected to have been consulted specifically on the aspects of the Report relating to cross border security and the incursions by the RUC which had been alleged to have taken place. This question had been raised by the then Taoiseach Mr FitzGerald on 5 April 1984, but no response had been forthcoming since.

6. It followed that the Irish Government would be seeking answers to the following questions at the meeting of the Conference which it sought:

Not entitled to this for obvious reasons

a. What public interest considerations were taken into account by the Attorney General in reaching his decision?

b. Why had the Stalker-Sampson Report not been published in full, or at any rate been made available to the Irish Government?

c. Why had the Irish Government not been consulted about the incursions into its jurisdiction by the RUC?

7. I explained that I would note and pass on the Ambassador's points but, as he would recognise, had no instructions on which I could base a response. I emphasised that the decision about prosecution was taken by the Director of Public Prosecutions with the agreement of the Attorney General as a Law Officer and was not a collective decision of Government as a whole. I explained that public interest considerations influenced only the decision not to institute proceedings in respect of the evidence of the commission of offences of perverting or attempting or conspiring to pervert the course of justice or of obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty; they did not apply to the decision to make no further prosecutions in respect of the shooting incidents referred to in the statement. As regards the Ambassador's assertion that it was accepted that

there had been a conspiracy or attempt to pervert the course of justice, I referred him to the Attorney General's statement which said only that there was evidence sufficient to require consideration of whether prosecutions were required. I went on to explain that I had no doubt that the Attorney General had taken account of the public interest in its widest sense, including considerations bearing on confidence in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland. Full account had been taken of all the information in the Stalker and Sampson Reports.

8. Mr O'Rourke noted these points but said that the public would not readily perceive the distinctions between the Attorney General personally and the Government collectively in relation to this decision. The decision had done a lot of damage and was bound to have implications for Mr Haughey's personal position and the extradition issue. His Government would hope, through the medium of the Anglo-Irish Conference, to minimise the difficulties but he did not at this stage readily see how the situation could be recovered.

9. I am copying this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and for Northern Ireland, and to the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers.

T.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

26 January 1988

NOIABT

GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

The Government considered the situation arising from the statement made in the House of Commons yesterday afternoon by the British Attorney General, Sir Patrick Mayhew, in relation to the Stalker/ Sampson report.

It was decided, because of the serious implications of the statement for public confidence in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland and for cross-border security co-operation, to seek an immediate special meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference for the purpose of clarifying the issues involved.

26 January 1988

004162
MDHIAN 5054

RESTRICTED
FM DUBLIN
TO DESKBY 261100Z FCO
TELNO 18
OF 261030Z JANUARY 88
AND TO DESKBY 261100Z NIO(B)

STALKER/SAMPSON: IRISH REACTIONS

SUMMARY

1. UNIVERSAL OUTRAGE AT ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT. IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SEEK URGENT CLARIFICATION.

DETAIL

2. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESSED ''DEEP DISMAY'' OVER THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROSECUTIONS AS A RESULT OF THE STALKER/SAMPSON ENQUIRY. THEY ISSUED A STATEMENT SAYING: '' THE GOVERNMENT ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DECISION FOR PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND IN PARTICULAR FOR PUBLIC CONFIDENCE BY THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY IN THE RUC. THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE SEEKING URGENT CLARIFICATION ON TODAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT AND ON THOSE OTHER MATTERS ADDRESSED BY THIS ENQUIRY - SPECIFICALLY QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE MANAGEMENT AND STRUCTURES OF THE RUC, TO CONSTABLE ROBINSON'S INCURSION ALLEGATION, AND AS TO WHY THE REPORT SHOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED.''

3. THE LEADER OF FINE GAEL, MR DUKES, DESCRIBED THE ATTORNEY'S DECISION AS ''ASTOUNDING'' AND DEMANDED IMMEDIATE PUBLICATION OF THE STALKER/SAMPSON REPORT. THE PDS FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN, GERALDINE KENNEDY, DESCRIBED THE DECISION AS ''UNFORTUNATE AND DISILLUSIONING''. THE LEADER OF THE LABOUR PARTY, MR SPRING, CALLED THE DECISION ''EXTRAORDINARY'' AND SAID THAT THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT WOULD BE ENDANGERED IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD NOT BE PERSUADED TO CHANGE ITS MIND. THE LEADER OF THE WORKERS PARTY, MR MACGIOLLA CALLED THE DECISION ''INEXCUSABLE'' AND ''INEXPLICABLE''.

4. THE IRISH TIMES OPINES THAT THE ONLY CREDIT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS ENTITLED TO IS ''FOR THE UNABASHED, BRUTAL DECLARATION THAT SELF-INTEREST COMES FIRST .... IT IS DIFFICULT TO RECALL .... SO BRAZEN A DECLARATION BY A SENIOR FIGURE IN A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT THAT THE PROCESS OF LAW MAY BE SET TO ONE SIDE

004162
MDHIAN 5054

''IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST'' .... IF IT IS NOT QUITE AN OFFICIAL PARDON FOR MURDER IT IS AN OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT IF MURDER HAS BEEN AT WORK THEN THE CROWN DOES NOT WANT TO KNOW ABOUT IT .... THE STATEMENT WILL HAVE GIVEN THE PROVISIONALS THEIR FIRST GOOD DAY SINCE THE ENNISKILLEN MASSACRE''. THE IRISH PRESS SAYS THAT ''AT STAKE WERE THE POLITICAL BONA FIDES OF PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER .... THIS IS A COWARDLY, SHOCKING AND INDEFENSIBLE DECISION .... THE STORM OF PROTEST MAY NOT MAKE MRS THATCHER CHANGE HER MIND BUT THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT CAN SURVIVE IF SHE DOES NOT .... THE PROSPECTS FOR ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS HAVE RARELY LOOKED MORE GLOOMY''. THE IRISH INDEPENDENT AND CORK EXAMINER EDITORIALISE IN THE SAME VEIN.

STIMSON

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 148

MAIN 105

NORTHERN IRELAND
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LEGAL ADVISERS
POD
PS
SIR J FRETWELL
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
CHIEF CLERK
MR BOYD
MISS PESTELL

ADDITIONAL 43

NORTHERN IRELAND

NNNN

File Prem

(51)

MR. INGHAM

STAR ARTICLE ON THE IRA

We agreed that the Prime Minister would mention the attached letter from the Editor of the Star when she sees him next week and say that he must pass on to the police any hard evidence that he may possess.

CHARLES POWELL

22 January 1988

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

This is a very good outcome

CDP
22/1

Am very pleased with the decision the prosecuting authorities have taken. MT

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2277 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Minute and attachment from Attorney General to the Prime Minister dated 22 January 1986	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION 31	26/4/18
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

THE ALLIANCE PARTY OF NORTHERN IRELAND

Headquarters:
88 UNIVERSITY STREET,
BELFAST BT7 1HE

Telephone:
Belfast 324274

JTA/JR/P.L.

22nd January 1988

2223

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you very much for your letter of 20th January. I would like to confirm that I look forward to seeing you at 1615 on the 4th February in your room at the House.

Yours sincerely,

John Alderdice

Dr. John Alderdice
PARTY LEADER

23

Ref. A088/252

MR POWELL

CDP 22/1

Northern Ireland

In my minute of 18 January reporting a conversation with the Leader of the Opposition, I said that I would get an assessment from the Northern Ireland Office on the extent to which the matters reported by Mr Kinnock were news to us or had significance.

2. I understand that rather than putting anything on paper, the Secretary of State has said that he would like to have a word with the Prime Minister at a suitable opportunity. He may have already been in touch with your office.

3. In case I am the channel of any further communication to the Government from the Leader of the Opposition, I should be grateful if I could be present when the Secretary of State discusses this with the Prime Minister.

R.E.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

22 January 1988

IRELAND: Situation: Pt 23

SRW

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 January 1988

Dear Dr Alderdice,

Thank you for your letter. I should be very happy to see you. Unfortunately I cannot manage the dates you propose but I understand that 1615 on 4 February would be possible for you, in my room in the House. I look forward to seeing you then.

BF

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Dr. John Alderdice

SECRET

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

GR
NIT CF

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

22A

C D Powell Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

20 January 1988

Dear Charles,

In your minute of 11 January you asked for advice on the letter sent to the Prime Minister by Brian Hitchen, the Editor of the Daily Star.

The article referred to by Mr Hitchen duly appeared in the Star on 11 January. Although amended slightly from the version attached to Mr Hitchen's letter it included many of the allegations contained in the original. Briefly, the article claimed that the Provisional IRA have obtained a quantity of SAM 7 missiles which they are planning to use against major military targets including helicopter 'troopships' flying in and out of Aldergrove Airport. It said that the Provisionals have also selected an unspecified target in Cyprus and are planning to smuggle SAM 7s into Great Britain using gypsy caravans. It further claimed that a dozen IRA members, including Evelyn Glenholmes, have received training in the use of these weapons in Libya and have now returned to Ireland. All of this information is alleged to come from intelligence sources.

The Star article consists almost entirely of ill-founded speculation supported by one or two facts which are already in the public domain.

The article is a scurrilous piece of journalism, written in a deliberately sensational style, which can only be of comfort to the terrorists. At this stage, we would doubt that any of the information it contains comes from official sources. It would be perfectly possible to concoct such an article using available material and a vivid imagination. Alternatively, the journalist responsible may have been duped by someone purporting to be an intelligence officer. Nevertheless, Metropolitan Police Special Branch are trying to arrange an interview with the journalist concerned and intend to question him about his alleged sources.

I attach a short draft reply to Mr Hitchen's letter for your signature. In the circumstances, however, the Prime Minister may prefer not to issue any response at this stage but to await the outcome of the current police investigation.

Yours sincerely,

David Watkins.

D J WATKINS

DMC/1604

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER 1168

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE .....

To	Enclosures	Copies to be sent to
B Hitchen Esq The Star Newspaper Great Ancoats Street MANCHESTER M60 4HB		PS/SofS for NI.

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY PS/PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your letter of 10 January.

It is hard to see what purpose you hoped to achieve by publishing this highly speculative article. Stories of this kind can only be of comfort to the terrorists themselves. The Prime Minister has noted your willingness to co-operate with the police and assumes that you will now furnish them with the full details of how the story came to be written.

LE NUMBER 1166

SECRET – until 10am, 21.1.88.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

22

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

CDP 20/1

C D Powell Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

20 January 1988

Dear Charles,

COMBATTING TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Mr King's minute of 14 January to the Prime Minister suggested (paragraph 5) that we should be ready to issue a brief statement on the establishment of a Border Brigade at any necessary time after the Prime Minister had passed a message to Mr Haughey. We expect that news of the development in relation to border security may break shortly and the Secretary of State therefore proposes to issue the attached statement at 10.00 am tomorrow, Thursday, 21 January.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Lord President, the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Attorney General and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

David Watkins

D J WATKINS

Enc

SECRET

DMC/1606

until 10 am, 21.1.88

STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED IN FORM OF A PRESS NOTICE

Against the background of recent events, I have been reviewing with the Chief Constable and the GOC our deployment of the security forces in the Province. We have concluded the effectiveness of our response in border areas can be enhanced and that this will improve our anti-terrorist operations and patrolling in such areas.

A new brigade headquarters will therefore shortly be established to be concerned with the border areas, leaving the existing two brigades responsible for supporting the RUC in the rest of the Province.

This involves no change in current security policy in which the Chief Constable has overall responsibility and in which all operations are conducted within the law. No change in existing powers is involved. The quest for new and better ways of tackling violence and banishing the spectre of terrorism from our country is a ceaseless one, and I believe that these new arrangements for deployment will make a valuable contribution.

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 2 OF 2 COPIES

21

file

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

I have shown your minute of 18 January and accompanying Note for the Record to the Prime Minister. She is unimpressed and has no doubt that Mr Hume is being led up the garden path. She does not intend to modify the line on dealings with Sinn Fein, either by the Government or members of the House, which she has already taken in Parliament.

Charles Powell

19 January 1988

20

Ref. A088/181

MR POWELL

Northern Ireland

When I went to see Mr Kinnock this afternoon about the closed 1957 file, he took the opportunity of raising another --- matter, recorded in the attached minute. I thought that I should show this immediately to the Prime Minister. But I will also of course get an assessment from the Northern Ireland Office on the extent to which the matters reported by Mr Kinnock are news to us or have significance.

F.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

18 January 1988

Copy No 2 of 5 copies

Ref. A088/180

NOTE FOR RECORD

When I called upon the Leader of the Opposition about another subject, he said that he would also like to raise a Northern Ireland matter for me to pass on to the Prime Minister. This related to the meeting between John Hume and Gerry Adams, which had been reported in the newspapers because Hume put it there in order to prevent the press ever discovering and sensationalising it.

2. This meeting had come about as a result of the action of "intermediaries" following Enniskillen. Mr Kinnock said that he did not know definitely who "the intermediaries" were, but took them to be members of the Catholic Church.

3. At the meeting between Hume and Adams, Hume had taken the line that there was no basis for discussions between the SDLP and Sinn Fein, without the acceptance by the latter of preconditions. Mr Kinnock referred to "five principles". He did not give me the precise wording of these, which he said that he had not obtained from Hume. But their gist was recognition that the future of Northern Ireland would be settled by constitutional means; recognition that it would be determined by the will of the majority; recognition that the future of each part of Northern Ireland could be determined separately; recognition that the British forces were only in Northern Ireland because of the violence and not for "colonial purposes"; and surrender of arms.

4. A two-hour meeting had taken place between Hume and Adams at which these principles had been discussed. To Hume's surprise, Adams had not ruled out acceptance by Sinn Fein of these preconditions but had said that they would need to be discussed with his people. In consequence, a further meeting was to be arranged involving leading members of the SDLP with leading members of Sinn Fein, as well as Hume and Adams. The fact of that meeting would again be likely to appear in the newspapers.

5. Mr Kinnock said that Hume was undoubtedly reporting to the Taoiseach as well as to himself. When Hume reported on the further meeting, Mr Kinnock would make a further report to the Government. He emphasised that Hume was very sceptical of Adams and was supping with a long spoon. Mr Kinnock's immediate concern was that if the Prime Minister received a Question from Dr Paisley or another unionist about the actions of Hume in meeting Sinn Fein, her Answer should not put him too much "on the spot". He recognised that the Prime Minister would have to make her views about dealing with Sinn Fein clear, for example by saying that what Hume did was his own affair but her views on dealings with Sinn Fein were well-known. But he hoped that any statement by the Prime Minister would not make it impossible for Hume to pursue the next stage.

6. Mr Kinnock emphasised that, while the fact of the contact between Hume and Adams was known, the content of the discussion was not and, if disclosed, could be highly dangerous to both of them.

FER.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

18 January 1988

CC/C 19

ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE
LONDON, WC2A 2LL

01-936-6201

18 January 1988

The Rt Hon Tom King MP
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
Whitehall
LONDON S W 1

CDP
18/1

Dear Tom:

COMBATTING TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND

FILE WITH PAB

Thank you for your letter of ~~14~~ January (which I received on 15 January) asking for my comments on the joint note dated 18 December 1987, prepared by you and the Defence Secretary.

I conclude that from the viewpoint of Northern Ireland law the proposal in the note is entirely acceptable. I note that under the proposed scheme the existing law will remain unchanged.

In reaching my conclusion I have attached great weight to paragraph 15 of the joint note:

> '... any changes that are made in the conduct of operations will also have to be within, and consistent with, the rule of law ...'.

This means that in the discharge of their operational responsibilities the Army will remain subject to the law. That of course is essential. [It does not mean, incidentally, that the RUC must be 'in the lead overall': see paragraph 15. That is a matter for policy decision, as to which the law has nothing to say, although it would clearly be desirable for any change in previous policy to be publicly announced.]

It follows that in the following passage in paragraph 12 of the joint note -

> 'the RUC within the Zone would ultimately remain responsible through their chain of command for all police matters even when supporting the Army in anti-terrorist operations ...'

the category 'all police matters' must be accepted by the Army as including a police responsibility to investigate the conduct of individual soldiers against whom allegations of unlawful conduct may have been made.

I am entirely content with the draft letter which the Prime Minister proposes to send to Mr Haughey.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Home Secretary, the Lord President and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever,

Sam

IRELAND: Situation PT23

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 January 1988

Dear David,

COMBATTING TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The Prime Minister has seen the Northern Ireland Secretary's minute of 14 January about briefing the Irish Government on our new proposals for combatting terrorism in Northern Ireland.

The Prime Minister is prepared to send a message to Mr. Haughey. I enclose a revised version with which she is content and should be grateful if it could be telegraphed for delivery on Monday. We will try to arrange a signed original subsequently. The Prime Minister hopes that the Irish Government will not feel constrained to make any statement on the matter at all.

The Prime Minister has not commented on the public statement we would make if it became necessary, but it seems to me to be perfectly consistent with the terms of her message to Mr. Haughey. I do not think she would object to it.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Attorney General and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

SECRET

17

Prime Minister

It is thought that news of the redeployment is likely to leak very soon. Mr. King recommends that we should tell the Irish about it on Monday.

Agree to send the attached message - with my proposed amendments - to Mr. Haughey?

CDP 14/1

Agree amendments - they make the letter much more business like.

Prime Minister

Agree message goes to Mr. H as set out in this minute.

MT.

COMBATTING TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. You asked for advice on how and when we should brief the Irish Government on our new proposals for combatting terrorism in Northern Ireland.

2. I think we should do so as quickly as possible. Since they involve the movement of a number of people, they will quickly arouse interest. Our best chance of Irish support will come if we have taken them into our confidence before this is public knowledge. I believe that your suggestion of writing to Mr Haughey is the right approach, and for it to be personally delivered by our Ambassador on Monday. I am seeing Lenihan later on Monday morning and can put him in the picture, and John Stanley will subsequently brief Collins, their Minister of Justice. I enclose a draft letter. In our contacts we shall stress the importance we continue to attach to developing cross-border security co-operation and our determination that the new arrangements should make no difference to the joint programme of work which is in hand.

3. In talking to Mr Lenihan, I will take very careful account of the points Geoffrey made in his minute of 23 December. I see a lot of force in these and they need careful handling. I propose to say that the new proposals do not mean any change in our basic security policy but represent only a shift of emphasis. As for police primacy, I will point out that the Chief Constable remains in overall charge on security matters. I will make it clear that there is to be no change in the law nor any new powers for soldiers who will continue to act in support of the civil power.

But I will say that the new procedures are a response to the high level of threat on our side of the border both in the light of the Eksund affair and generally, and that they take account of the need to protect people living in the border area. The extent to which security issues are managed differently on either side of the border is a simple consequence of the different level and nature of the threat. In this connection, I have sent to the Attorney General a copy of the agreed proposals for any comments he may have on their implementation.

They should say nothing

4. There are very real sensitivities for the Irish over issues affecting the Border and the British Army, and they may well not wish to come out actively in support of our proposals. However, I hope at least we can get their private acceptance of them and the understanding that progress on cross-border security co-operation will not be affected.

5. I am afraid that I see little prospect of preventing news of these arrangements from becoming public given the very large numbers of people who must necessarily be involved in their implementation. I shall therefore be ready to issue the attached brief statement at any necessary time after your letter has reached Mr Haughey.

6. I am copying this minute to the Lord President, the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Attorney General and Sir Robin Butler.

TK

14 January 1988

CL3CKR

DRAFT LETTER FOR PM TO SEND TO MR HAUGHEY

1. As you know, I greatly valued your assurance at Copenhagen of your Government's total commitment to security cooperation against terrorism. We will continue to do all we can to support your ~~the~~ efforts. ~~you are making and are equally determined to find ways~~ to make still more effective our fight against terrorism within the substantial resources we deploy. This has been given an added urgency by the horror of Enniskillen and the issue of Libyan arms ~~shipments about which we entirely share your serious concern.~~ I am writing ~~to you~~ now to let you know of certain new arrangements that we ourselves are making. Tom King and John Stanley will shortly be talking to ~~Brian~~ Mr. Lenihan and ~~Gerry~~ Mr. Collins, and will be able to explain our plans in a little more detail.

2. Our ~~best understanding remains~~ assessment is that at least the bulk of the new terrorist weaponry and explosives has not yet reached Northern Ireland. It is vital that these weapons do not get through, particularly to the cities where their recovery would be still more difficult. ~~Together with the Chief Constable we have therefore been giving thought to strengthening the effectiveness of our response in certain vulnerable areas close to the border in order to increase our chances of inhibiting the movement of weapons and explosives or apprehending them in transit.~~ We have ~~concluded~~ that better arrangements can and should be made to

improve our anti-terrorist operations and patrolling in ~~such~~ vulnerable areas close to the border, and the Chief Constable will be asking the Army to co-ordinate these operations. ~~The~~ Overall responsibility will ~~of course~~ remain with the Chief Constable ~~and~~ there is no change in our policy of police primacy. All operations will ~~of course~~ continue to be conducted under the law, and there will be no new powers for soldiers. Our policy of accompaniment by the RUC of military patrols will be unaffected, and the prime channel of cross-border security co-operation will remain between the RUC and the Garda. ~~To enable our anti-terrorist operations in the border areas to be more effectively co-ordinated,~~ For this purpose we are reorganising the present Army structure. At the present time we have two Brigades responsible respectively for east and west of the Province ~~and with each being involved both in the cities and the rural areas,~~ and also for part of the Border. Under the new arrangements we are establishing a new Brigade Headquarters which will be concerned with the Border areas, leaving the other two Brigades responsible for supporting the RUC in the rest of the Province. ~~As the purpose of the new Brigade Headquarters could be misunderstood, I thought it most important that you know the thinking behind this decision.~~

4. I believe that these changes, together with steadily improving co-operation between our two police forces, offer a ~~real~~ better prospect of ~~dealing with the serious problem of the terrorists~~ preventing new weaponry from reaching'

to terrorists intercepting & preventing

~~new weaponry and explosives and of assisting us both to make progress towards the eradication of terrorist violence. I am sure you will agree that this must remain a top priority.~~

terrorist operations in the border areas, which is what we both want to see.

DMC/1510

WJAI/5191/BN

DRAFT

STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED IN FORM OF A PRESS NOTICE

Following recent terrorist outrages, I have been reviewing with the Chief Constable and the GOC our deployment of the security forces in the Province. We have concluded that while no overall increase in resources is required, better arrangements can and should be made to strengthen the effectiveness of our response in the border areas. We believe that this will improve our anti-terrorist operations and patrolling in such areas, and inhibit further the terrorists freedom of movement.

The Chief Constable, with my full support has asked the army to take responsibility for coordinating the anti-terrorist operations in these areas. A new brigade headquarters will therefore shortly be established to be concerned with the border areas, leaving the existing two brigades responsible for supporting the RUC in the rest of the Province.

The Chief Constable of course retains his overall responsibility, and there is no change in our policy of police primacy. All operations will continue to be conducted within the law and no change in existing powers is involved. The quest for new and better ways of tackling violence and banishing the spectre of terrorism from our country is a ceaseless one, and I believe that these new arrangements for deployment will make a real contribution.

3059

File

cc PAB

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 January 1988

Charles: Tues. 4 Feb. at 1615 in the House (Tom King has this in his diary). TL. 19/1

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the new leader of the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, asking to call on her the week after next. I assume you would want us to try to arrange this. Could you please let me know by telephone tomorrow, 15 January.

C. D. Powell

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

THE ALLIANCE PARTY OF NORTHERN IRELAND

Headquarters:
88 UNIVERSITY STREET,
BELFAST BT7 1HE

Telephone:
Belfast 324274

JTA/ER/P.L./P.M. 12/1/88

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street,
LONDON

PM

Dear Prime Minister,

As the newly elected Leader of the Alliance Party I should like to meet you to hear, at first hand, your views and vision of the future for the people of Northern Ireland.

I will be in London during the period 24th to 26th January and would very much appreciate a meeting with yourself, but would of course be prepared to come over and see you at anytime, if this were not possible.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely,

John Alderdice

Dr. John T. Alderdice
PARTY LEADER

Brian HITCHEN

~~13/1~~ 18/1

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 January 1988

Charles
How long are you prepared to wait for this?
TP 13/1

Monday or
Tue latest

NIO say it will come on Monday
TP 13/1

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the Editor of the Daily Star. I should be grateful for very early advice and a draft reply.

Charles Powell

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

Charles
Draft with S/S since yesterday. Once approved, to us — hopefully tomorrow.
TP 19/1

SECRET

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

16 cc PC (2)

010

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Prime Minister
CDP
3/1/12

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

31 December 1987

Dear Mr Powell,

As expected. Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley called on Mr King on 17 December for a further meeting in the series of "Talks about Talks". Both unionist leaders argued strongly that one further meeting should take place in the New year before we moved from the present phase of talks about talks into some other form of dialogue. Both Molyneaux and Paisley acknowledge that the present phase is nearly over, but each of them is floundering, and neither relishes the idea of having to give (as would be inevitable if these Talks came formally to an end) an account of the progress made. Paisley was anxious that the Secretary of State should hold talks with the SDLP before moving to any new stage of the dialogue with unionists. Molyneaux, on the other hand, thought that it would be best if the unionists now tabled an account of their own proposals in relation to (as opposed to mere criticisms of) the Anglo-Irish Agreement. While accepting that it would be helpful for the unionists to table a paper, Mr King said that it was important that the paper should cover the question of future administration within Northern Ireland.

It was agreed that a further meeting would take place at the end of January (it cannot be sooner because of Paisley's plans for church visits in Africa) and that this would probably be the last one of the present kind. The unionist leaders did not rule out the possibility of ending that meeting with a statement on the lines of that circulated as Annex B to my letter of 16 December to Lyn Parker.

The prospect that these talks are coming to an end may just possibly squeeze some progress out of the unionist leaders, and give us a basis on which we can mount a wider political dialogue in Northern Ireland. In these circumstances, and because the sort

of progress we expect to see has already been fairly widely understood and reported in the Irish newspapers, Mr King thinks that it would be better not to offer any written reply to the letter which Mr Molyneaux and his colleagues sent the Prime Minister on 6 November. That letter was, in any case, written just before Enniskillen, and without knowledge of the numerous developments that have occurred since; and, read literally, the letter does not ask for a reply.

I am sending copies of this letter to Lyn Parker, FCO and Trevor Woolley, Cabinet Office.

Yours sincerely

Alcall an

for **D J WATKINS**

DMC/1422

SECRET

E13CJJ 15

a/c

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 December 1987

Dear David,

COMBATTING TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The Prime Minister has considered the joint minute and paper by the Northern Ireland Secretary and the Defence Secretary proposing a greater concentration of anti-terrorist operations by the Army in the border area between Northern Ireland and the Republic, with the deployment there of an additional brigade headquarters. She has also seen the Foreign Secretary's minute of 23 December about the presentation of such a change of policy.

The Prime Minister agrees that the new arrangements described in detail in the joint minute and paper should now be implemented by the Army, in close cooperation with the RUC. She also agrees that the points in paragraphs 5, 5(bis) and 6 of the Foreign Secretary's minute need careful consideration, and that the Law Officer's views should be obtained.

The Prime Minister believes that every effort should be made to prevent news of the proposed new arrangements from becoming public, and would certainly not want to make any public statement. She accepts that we shall need to inform the Irish Government, although we should urge on them the need to preserve strict secrecy. She would be grateful for advice on how and when it is proposed to brief the Irish Government. One possibility would be for her to send a message to the Taoiseach.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Defence Secretary, the Lord President, the Home Secretary, the Attorney-General and Mr. Butler.

Yours ever,

Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

SECRET

SRWBDY

14

PRIME MINISTER

COMBATTING TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND

You earlier saw the joint minute by the Defence and Northern Ireland Secretaries proposing that the army should take over anti-terrorist operations in border areas of Northern Ireland.

The Foreign Secretary's minute (attached) draws attention to the need for very careful presentation of these proposals to the Irish government. If we get a hostile reaction from them, we risk losing their support for cross-border co-operation. Actually it would be unforgivable were this to happen: but it can be quite easily avoided if we explain frankly to them the reasons behind our change of policy and can provide the assurances that the Foreign Secretary suggests. There may be something to be said for your explaining the changes in a message to Mr. Haughey.

You commented on the earlier proposals that the recent JIC assessment that PIRA could well exist in Northern Ireland alone needed careful reflection. It is a disturbing thought. But it does not seem to me to alter the main fact that the bulk of recent PIRA operations here been conducted in the Border areas. It is here that the conditions are easier for the PIRA. So I am sure that it is right to go ahead with the new proposals.

Agree that I should now minute out, giving your approval to proceed with the new arrangements, subject to full account being taken of the points in the Foreign Secretary's minute, and asking to see the line which it is proposed to take with the Irish government?

CDP

I see no reason to make any statement about it whatsoever. Nor to tell the Taoiseach. No Cabinet was his opponents of his neighbours nor

(C. D. POWELL)

23 December 1987

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2277 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Attachment to Powell to PM dated 23 December 1987	
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

CDP

PM/87/075

PRIME MINISTER

Combatting Terrorism in Northern Ireland

1. I have seen the minute dated 18 December with CDP? from the Defence and Northern Ireland Secretaries.

2. As you know, I fully support the objective of increasing the effectiveness of our efforts to counter the Provisional IRA. The present proposals flow naturally from our meeting last July and I have no intrinsic objection to what is suggested: on the contrary.

3. We are rightly disturbed by the reversal of the downward trend in casualties and by our knowledge of the resources still available to the terrorists. (See, for example, JIC (87)(N)101). Even so, the introduction of so severe a regime after two decades without it will, as George and Tom rightly recognise, require great presentational effort, not only with the Irish, but more widely. The changes cannot be secret: indeed they must by definition be obtrusive. For this reason we must take good care to ensure full compliance with the rule of law, as well as the preservation of goodwill on the part of the Irish Government and the SDLP, and cross-border security cooperation. All of this will need careful thought, consultation and briefing.

/4.

4. If we are to achieve our objective we shall certainly need Mr Haughey's support. He is committed to the pursuit of terrorists and may be receptive. But we should not take this for granted. To lose his cooperation over cross border security would be a real reverse. We also need, of course, to bear in mind any specifically relevant commitments in the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Hillsborough Communique.

5. Points which strike me as needing consideration include:

- The appearance of reversal, in the border region, of police primacy (or so it will be said). Paragraph 8 of the Hillsborough Communique refers to the armed forces operating only in support of the civil power.

- Reversal, presumably, of the trend towards the accompaniment of army patrols by the RUC.

- The impression (once again it will be said) that "the border is being maintained by force". This may provoke moderate nationalists who are normally quite content with the status quo to adopt a position of Republican principle.

- The possible impact on the rights of civilians in the border area. Assertions that "martial law" is being imposed on the border will find an echo eg in the United States.

- The heightened difference in the management of security issues on either side of the border leading possibly to real practical difficulties.

/5.

5. The proposals rightly involve an increase in the level of covert operations. I welcome the fact that existing controls will continue. This is the importance of the point made in paragraph 15 of the Joint Note that the conduct of all operations will have to be within the rule of law. Would it not now be prudent to seek the views of the Law Officers on the implementation of the measures proposed?

6. The essential point appears to be that a hostile political reaction to our proposals in Dublin and a reluctance to support them on the Irish side of the border could leave us worse off than now. The purpose of informing the Irish Government, along the lines suggested by George and Tom, must be to secure their support for our new approach. This will be easier if we can point to concrete improvements on enhancement of the police role and accompaniment of patrols in areas other than the border and on the operations of the UDR.

7. It would be sensible for the proposals to be checked out in detail, with the above points in mind, to ensure that they can be carried forward with the best prospects of success.

8. I am copying this minute to the Lord President, the Home Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Northern Ireland Secretary, The Attorney General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
23 December 1987

SECRET

B.0334

MR POWELL

c Mr Woolley

24/12

Combatting Terrorism in Northern Ireland

The joint memorandum of 18 December by the Secretaries of State for Defence and Northern Ireland suggests a plan for the army to combat terrorism more effectively in the border area. The experts believe that the plan can inhibit the movement of terrorists to and from the Republic. This, inter alia, would inhibit the training in the Republic of terrorists from Northern Ireland. The new arrangement would also reduce the flow of explosives and weapons from the Republic to PIRA in the North, which is of particular importance in the light of our assessment that most of the arms obtained by PIRA from Libya are secreted in the Republic. But a reduction in the flow of arms from the Republic to the North would not have an early effect on the level of terrorism in the North, since there are thought to be some stocks hidden there.

2. The Northern Ireland Office and the Chief Constable initially had doubts about the idea of delegating the lead in counter-terrorist operations in the border area to the army. There is still some uneasiness. But the obvious need to do something about the haemorrhage that the border represents in counter-terrorist measures is thought to outweigh the risks.

3. The greater army presence and activity will be noticed by the population in the border areas. But the offensive operations foreseen in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the memorandum may be the most important element in the plan. The intention is that they should be of two types: surveillance and, within the army's current rules of engagement in Northern Ireland, the

use of force against terrorists. The Northern Ireland Secretary, through his Security Policy Meeting, would oversee generally this aspect of the plan as well as others. But if offensive operations involving the use of force are likely to become more frequent, political supervision will become more important. The Northern Ireland Secretary might be asked to consider the drawing up of guidelines for such operations, which he would approve and the army would thereafter follow.

4. Reactions to greater army activity in the border area will depend in part on the way the army handles civilians in the border area. If ordinary Roman Catholic people, when stopped and searched, are handled with speed and courtesy - and the same applies to travellers from the Republic - the political effects vis a vis the SDLP and the Irish Government should be slight in comparison with the counter-terrorist advantages to be gained. But if numbers of harmless travellers think they have been mistreated, accusations that there has been a reversal in the policy of police primacy will spread. The fact that the UDR will not be used in new operations in the border area will be a help in handling nationalist reactions.

5. As the two Secretaries of State say, it will be necessary to inform Irish Ministers in general terms of the planned intensification of counter-terrorist work in the border area. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is being advised to make suggestions. His officials believe, and I agree, that it should be possible to put the point across in general terms without causing serious concern in Dublin. It will be important not to give the impression that intensified cross-border co-operation against terrorism is made any less important by our new plans. There is a risk of leaks from Dublin that we are making changes. But I see no need for us to go further in response to media enquiries than the line suggested in the third paragraph of the covering minute by the two Secretaries of State.

6. Something needs to be done about the border. The plan is worth a try.

C L G Mallaby

21 December 1987



CF?

GR Treasurer

LPO

cc NIO
DTI
HMT
D/En.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

18 December 1987

Dear Sir Desmond,

Thank you for your letter of 10 November in which you outline a number of factors in favour of Antrim Power Company's proposal to construct and operate a lignite fired power station in Northern Ireland.

I understand that Tom King has now written to you and I believe that you will be meeting Peter Viggers next week. This is an important project and I hope that you will be able to respond positively to his proposals.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Sir Desmond Lorimer.

ECL

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

P A Bearpark Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

18 December 1987

Dear Andy,

ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Robin Masefield wrote to you on 10 December enclosing draft replies to letters from Lord Hanson and Sir Desmond Lorimer on the subject of the bid by Antrim Power Company Limited (APCL) to provide the next Northern Ireland power station. We later agreed to hold up the replies.

Mr King's minute to the Prime Minister of 14 December reported on his recent discussion with the Chief Secretary and his proposal in the light of that discussion to seek revised bids from APCL and Northern Ireland Electricity; and he has now also replied to letters from both Sir Desmond Lorimer and Lord Hanson, similar to those sent to the Prime Minister, advising them of the way forward (copies attached).

I attach draft replies from the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely,

David Watkins.

D J WATKINS

Encs

CONFIDENTIAL

DMC/1367

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO:

Sir Desmond Lorimer
Chairman
Antrim Power Company Limited
Lamont House
Purdys Lane
BELFAST
BT8 4AX

L04APO

December 1987

Thank you for your letter of 10 November in which you outline a number of factors in favour of Antrim Power Company's proposal to construct and operate a lignite fired power station in Northern Ireland.

I understand that Tom King has now written to you ~~about the immediate way forward~~ and I ~~understand~~ believe that you will be meeting Peter Viggers next week. ~~for a discussion of the position.~~ This is an important project and I hope that you will be able to respond positively to ~~the~~ his proposals. ~~he will be making~~.

DMC/1367

SECRET 10

PRIME MINISTER

COMBATTING TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND

You will recall that you held a meeting in July to consider ways in which the drive against terrorism in Northern Ireland could be made more effective. There have subsequently been extensive discussions between the Ministry of Defence and the Northern Ireland Office. The attached joint minute and paper is the result.

The paper proposes in effect that the army should take over all anti-terrorist operations in the border areas of Northern Ireland, with an additional brigade headquarters deployed to Northern Ireland to command them. Over time the army presence elsewhere in the province would be reduced to enable border operations to be reinforced. The effect of this will be to increase the level of forces on the border by about one-third. Their tasks will be intensive patrolling and surveillance (including technical and aerial surveillance), vehicle search operations, and additional covert operations.

The RUC are said to be content with the proposed arrangements provided that there is a very close liaison between them and the armed forces. The Chief Constable will provide an assistant chief constable to be located with the extra brigade headquarters. The RUC special branch will continue to take the lead in intelligence work in the border zone.

These recommendations are very much on the lines that you yourself wanted to see. You will probably want to give the Home and Foreign Secretaries and the Cabinet Office a day or two to consider the paper, before reaching definite conclusions. But agree that it is very much on the right lines?

C.D.P.

At first glance - yes. But I am very much aware that elsewhere in the Room is a notion that P.I.R.A. could well concentrate in N.I. alone. That is a new thought which needs time for reflection on it

Charles Powell
18 December 1987

SECRET

JA2AVY

9

cc/c

PRIME MINISTER

COMBATTING TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND

We discussed in July ways in which we might make more effective the drive against terrorism in Northern Ireland and ensure the best use of the Security Forces. We have since been discussing ways in which this might be done consistent with existing security policy. We have now reached agreement on this.

The attached paper has the support of ourselves as the respective Secretaries of State and has been discussed with and has the support of the CGS, the Chief Constable and the GOC. We propose that there should be a greater concentration of anti-terrorist operations by the Army in the area of the border; that, for this purpose, an additional brigade headquarters should be deployed; and that, within the existing overall security policy, the Army should be authorised to take the lead in the conduct of anti-terrorist operations in the border area. As the proposals are fully agreed between us, we hope that you will feel able to give them your early approval so that we may start implementing them.

We do not propose to make an announcement at this stage. In due course, when deployment becomes imminent, we shall be ready, if asked, to confirm in very general terms that an extra brigade headquarters is being established in the Province to make the best use of resources within the existing security policy.

The new measures will require sensitive handling in the Anglo-Irish context, and we will be taking an early opportunity on a confidential basis to inform the relevant Irish Ministers of these developments.

We shall be grateful for your approval to proceed. We are copying this minute and the enclosure to the Lord President, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Home Secretary and to Mr Butler.

G.Y.

GY

TK

18 December 1987

8

COMBATTING TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND

(Note by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
and the Secretary of State for Defence)

Introduction

1. During the past two years there has been a sustained increase in the Provisional IRA's activity. This has reflected new policies on the part of the Provisional leadership; more effective tactics; changes in their organisation making it more difficult to acquire intelligence; the release from prison of prominent terrorists following successful appeals in "supergrass" trials; and increasingly effective resistance to interrogation when in police custody. Deaths from terrorist, counter terrorist and sectarian attacks have already reached 92 this year, compared with 61 in 1986. The security forces have lost 27, comprising 3 regular soldiers, 8 Ulster Defence Regiment soldiers, 16 police and police reserve officers while the 65 other deaths include 12 terrorists killed by the security forces or by their own explosive devices, 7 persons with paramilitary connections killed in internal feuds and 46 other people.

2. Although these casualty figures are much lower than in the 1970s (in 1972 alone 467 people were killed, including 103 regular soldiers) it seems clear that the downward trend of the early 1980s has been halted and possibly reversed. Moreover, the situation is being contained only by much effort as well as great skill on the part of the security forces. Bombs are defused almost daily which, had they gone off, could have caused extensive casualties and damage. PIRA continues to take advantage of the inevitable vulnerability of off-duty members of the RUC and UDR; and retains its ability to switch its attack from the rural areas to the cities and back again according to where it is coming under most pressure

from the security forces. It must be expected still to attempt a spectacular attack of some sort as revenge for its heavy reverse at Loughgall - though, following the Armistice Sunday bomb outrage at Enniskillen, it will be more careful to avoid civilian casualties. There is a general threat of heightened terrorist activity in the months ahead and, if recent reports of arms shipments are correct, they have ample supplies of weapons and explosives for this purpose. Moreover the possession of a range of new weapons, and of a dangerously large quantity of the high explosive, Semtex, open up new possibilities for the terrorists.

3. We view this situation with concern. We understand and share the sense of frustration in the police and the Army - and in the unionist community - that more is not being achieved to preempt terrorist operations and to prosecute known terrorists successfully. And we agree that a more vigorous campaign against terrorism is required.

4. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has already put action in hand to intensify the drive against terrorism in three particular ways. First, in July he asked Mr David Calcutt QC to carry out an independent review to examine the possibility of changes in the criminal law and the administration of justice which would strengthen the hand of the security forces. Second, he is starting a major offensive against the racketeering, extortion and other criminal activities which now provide the main source of terrorist funds.

5. Third, an intensive effort is being made to increase the operational effectiveness of the security forces on the ground. Improved intelligence, and particularly pre-emptive intelligence, is one of the keys to the situation and everything possible is being done to exploit the Anglo-Irish Agreement to secure better cross-border cooperation in this area; a framework for cooperation

has now been established although concrete results have so far been disappointing, partly because of resource constraints on the Irish side. However, the appointment of a new Garda Commissioner together with the impact of Enniskillen, the O'Grady kidnapping and the Eksund arms shipment have combined to create a much more positive Irish approach. The major operation which was mounted in the Republic in November to find the weapons and explosives which are believed to have been shipped in during 1985-86 was politically significant but its operational effectiveness remains to be assessed. Much effort has also been devoted, in cooperation with the Irish, to finding an effective means to prevent the manufacture of home-made explosives and the prospect here looks promising.

6. The question remains whether more could yet be done to increase operational effectiveness without adversely affecting progress in other directions.

Role of the Army

7. To enable the Army's capability to be used more effectively the Ministry of Defence propose that, in order to exploit the Army's strengths and capabilities to best advantage, the Regular Army should be given delegated authority from the Chief Constable to take the lead in the conduct of anti-terrorist operations on the border. In the remainder of the Province (geographically more than 90%), the Army would operate in direct support of the RUC. The longer-term objective would still be to reduce regular Army support in selected areas away from the border to that provided by specialist troops such as bomb disposal experts. The RUC and Army command and control arrangements outside the border area would remain unchanged.

8. A Border Zone should be established in conjunction with the RUC. The extent of the Zone (which is shown for illustrative

purposes only at this stage at Annex A) would be determined by the Northern Ireland Secretary in consultation with the Defence Secretary after detailed discussion between the GOC and the Chief Constable. It is within this zone that the Army would take the lead in the conduct of anti-terrorist operations.

9. Allocation of Forces The current level of forces on the border would be increased by about one third to the equivalent of four battalions drawn from those already in the Province. An additional brigade headquarters would be deployed to Northern Ireland to command Army units and to develop and control anti-terrorist operations in the Zone. This force level could be adjusted in the light of experience and in due course it might be possible to withdraw the additional headquarters from the Province.

10. Concept of Operations Within the existing overall policy defined by the Secretary of State in the Security Policy Meeting (SPM), the Army would receive delegated authority from the Chief Constable to take the lead in operations against terrorists in the Border Zone in accordance with paragraph 12 below. The objective would be to dominate the areas by means of intensive patrolling and surveillance and well-targetted, offensive operations whenever the opportunity was presented. Intelligence would be coordinated under the lead of RUC Special Branch to identify and interdict cross-border movement by terrorists, their weapons and explosives. There would be increased surveillance of likely crossing points and, where appropriate, obstacles and other means of hindering movement could be constructed. An increased emphasis would be placed on the development and introduction of technical surveillance aids, both on the ground and in the air, and improved vehicle search equipment. Action has already been set in hand at the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment (RARDE) to explore options, but there may be a need for additional funding if the technological advances

required are to be achieved in a timely manner. It is also intended that an enhanced aerial surveillance capability will be achieved through the deployment of a replacement for the Beaver light aircraft. There would be a greater emphasis on effective vehicle search operations at border crossing points and other locations, and further investigation in conjunction with the Irish authorities of the legal and other means of controlling crossings at unauthorised points.

11. Covert operations The level of Army covert operations would be increased to enable the Army in conjunction with the RUC to take every opportunity to conduct well-targetted, offensive operations against PIRA. The tasking of covert operations would be coordinated as now under the Tasking and Coordination Group (TCG) system, to which The Border Zone Brigade commander would have access so as to ensure that all operations were jointly planned on the best available intelligence. Pre planned search and arrest operations would be approved only after consultation in the TCG, always recognising the need to protect sources of intelligence. The need for a separate TCG for the Border Zone should be decided by the Chief Constable and the GOC.

12. Command and Control The Border Brigade Commander would receive his directive from the Commander Land Forces; it would reflect both the policy laid down by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the authority delegated by the Chief Constable to the Army in respect of the Border Zone. Whilst the Brigade Commander, in close consultation with the Assistant Chief Constable appointed by the Chief Constable, would be responsible for the overall direction of all anti-terrorist operations undertaken in the Border Zone, the RUC within the Zone would ultimately remain responsible through their chain of command for all police matters even when supporting the Army in anti-terrorist operations. Covert forces, whether Army or

Police, when operating within the Border Zone would continue to be under command of their respective senior officers. Police officers of appropriate seniority would be co-located with the respective Army commanders as necessary to provide liaison and advice. The RUC would retain responsibility for cross border liaison with the Garda Siochana. The existing arrangements for contact with elected and other local representatives would remain unchanged.

13. There would be no change to present arrangements elsewhere in the Province, though it would be for the Chief Constable in consultation with the GOC to advise the Northern Ireland Secretary in due course whether any other areas lent themselves to a change in the level or direction of Army operations. The Northern Ireland Secretary would then consult the Defence Secretary.

Implications

14. The Northern Ireland Office and the Chief Constable of the RUC share the Ministry of Defence's objective of making fullest use of the Army's capabilities and have considered how it could be carried forward in a way which is consistent with present security and other policy objectives and within the existing operational policy. In this connection, it will be important to maintain cross border security cooperation under the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which must be pursued primarily through police-to-police contact.

15. Second, any changes that are made in the conduct of operations will also have to be within, and consistent with, the rule of law - under which the police are in the lead overall - which has been the basis of security policy in Northern Ireland since 1976 and was reaffirmed in the Security Policy Review of 1984.

16. Last but not least, in the wake of the Enniskillen outrage - together with the arms shipments and the O'Grady kidnapping in the

Republic - there are grounds for cautious hope that there will be a more widespread consensus of support for the security forces throughout the Northern Ireland community. It is vital that this should not be undermined but rather should be nurtured and developed. It will be important to avoid as far as possible sacrificing the sympathy of many nationalists and in particular the SDLP MPs, all of whom represent border constituencies.

17. The Northern Ireland Office and the Chief Constable see no intrinsic reason why the Ministry of Defence proposals cannot be adopted while preserving those policy objectives. It should be quite possible, within the area to be covered by the additional brigade structure, to reconcile the maintenance of essential policework with a greater emphasis on military operations, as is already being done in South Armagh with considerable success. The detailed implementation of this policy will be a matter for the SPM. The Chief Constable is ready to provide an Assistant Chief Constable to be located with the extra brigade headquarters. We have agreed that in the Border Zone the intelligence lead will continue to be taken by the RUC Special Branch within the developing joint RUC/Army intelligence system in which intelligence is shared (although there may be exceptional circumstances where the RUC Special Branch might insist that particularly sensitive information should be very tightly held.) The Ministry of Defence have also confirmed that the plan will not result in an overall reduction in Regular Army support in the Province, and that there will be no question of substituting the Ulster Defence Regiment in predominantly nationalist urban areas such as West Belfast and Londonderry West of the Foyle.

18. Within this agreed framework there are many points of detail to be worked out. That can best be undertaken by the Chief Constable and the GOC; they are ready to embark on the process, as a matter of urgency, as soon as the plan has been approved in principle.

These new security arrangements should be fully implemented within six months of a decision to proceed, although the deployment of the new Border Brigade Headquarters and re-deployment of units within the Province could start earlier.

GY TK

SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 December 1987

Dear David,

Talks with Unionists

Thank you for your letter of 16 December. The Foreign Secretary would have had serious reservations about the text at Annex A. He notes that Mr King does not now intend to use it.

If a statement is needed, the draft at Annex B is better. However the wording of the present text implies that there have already been substantive, as opposed to exploratory, bilateral discussions. The Foreign Secretary suggests that the first sentence might be revised to read "... the British Government remains willing to proceed to bilateral discussions with ...".

I note that you intend to alert the Irish to the announcement in Annex B. It would be wise in passing the text to them to make the point that the next step merely represents widening the process of exploration to the other constitutional parties and does not mean that the talks about talks have produced anything substantial.

The Foreign Secretary would be grateful to receive an account of Mr King's talks.

I am sending copies of this letter to Charles Powell (No 10), Mike Eland (Lord President's Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

D J Watkins Esq
PS/Northern Ireland Office

SECRET

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

6

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

cdp

CDP 10/xii

Lyn Parker Esq
Private Secretary
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
LONDON

16 December 1987

Dear Lyn,

TALKS WITH UNIONISTS

Mr King plans to have another meeting in the series of exploratory talks with Unionists leaders, Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley, on Thursday 17 December. Throughout these discussions the Secretary of State has made it clear that there was no question of any suspension of the Agreement, the Conference or the Secretariat, or any other device that could be represented in that way.

The Unionist position has been that there could be no more formal discussions without a suspension of the Agreement. This is the hook on which they are impaled, and from which we are trying to move them. My Secretary of State formed the view at the last meeting that they would like to move if they could. The trouble is that they are floundering around, not knowing how to move or in what direction they want to go if they were able to move. We could leave them floundering around in further discussions, getting nowhere, but that would expose us to the risk that they could choose their moment to terminate the talks on terms of their choosing, and attempt to blame us. An alternative, designed to widen the talks and to keep them on a constrictuve plane, would be to find a statement which conceded nothing on our essential position but allowed them some form of escape. Mr King had originally thought that a joint statement, following Thursday's meeting, on the lines of Annex A might suffice to provide them with such an escape route, but he now believes that a better course would be to separate the statements, for the Government to make its position clear (in terms of Annex B), and the the Unionists to state theirs. They would doubtless say that any representations they made in further discussions would be in the context of seeking an alternative to, and replacement of, the Agreement. If we were challenged on their statement, we would not contradict it, but simply say that the Government was ready to talk with constitutional parties without pre-conditions.

We have given a broad undertaking to the Irish to keep them informed of any developments from the talks with Unionists. There is really nothing to tell, but our intention is to alert them to the announcement in Annex B when it issues.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No. 10), Mike Eland (Lord President's Office) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

David Watkins

D J WATKINS

SMN1299

ANNEX A

TALKS ABOUT TALKS - POSSIBLE STATEMENT

Following informal exploratory talks with the leaders of the UUP and DUP, the British Government has decided to proceed to a further stage of a series of bilateral discussions with representatives of the main constitutional political parties on possible arrangements for the administration of Northern Ireland which might command widespread support.

The Government remains firmly committed to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, to its underlying objectives of peace, stability and reconciliation and to close co-operation with the Republic of Ireland. The Unionist parties also share these objectives, and, in the course of discussions about giving elected representatives a greater role in the administration of the Province they intend to advance alternative proposals for achieving them. The Government has made clear that progress towards devolution would have important implications for the work of the Intergovernmental Conference established under the Agreement, and for the Secretariat.

The Government has undertaken that while these discussions are in progress the Agreement will be operated sensitively.

ANNEX B

DRAFT STATEMENT

TALKS WITH THE UNIONISTS

Following informal exploratory talks with leaders of the UUP and DUP, the British Government is willing to proceed to a further stage of the bilateral discussions with representatives of the main constitutional parties on possible arrangements for the administration of Northern Ireland which might command widespread support.

The Government remains firmly committed to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, to its underlying objectives of peace, stability and reconciliation and to close co-operation with the Republic of Ireland.

PMMANG

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND

Sir Desmond Lorimer
Chairman
Antrim Power Company Limited
Lamont House
Purdys Lane
BELFAST
BT8 4AX

17 December 1987

NBPN

Dear Desmond

Thank you for your letter of 10 November on the power station project. I would have wished to reply sooner but as my consideration of the position was drawing to a close, I thought it best to delay my response until the way ahead was clear.

I have now completed my examination of the various options and have consulted with colleagues on my assessment of them and on the way in which I now propose to take the matter forward. I think it is essential that Peter Viggers should now meet with you at the earliest possible moment to advise you of our proposals, which will I believe enable final decisions on the power station to be reached in a short timescale. I remain strongly of the view that the private sector has much to offer in electricity generation in Northern Ireland provided it can be achieved without detriment to the interests of the consumer. I therefore hope that you will be able to make a positive response to them.

Mr Viggers' office will be in touch with your office to arrange a meeting as quickly as possible.

Yours

TK

DMC/1354

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND

Lord Hanson
Chairman
Hanson Trust
1 Grosvenor Place
LONDON
SW1X 7JH

17 December 1987

NBPM

Dear James,

Thank you for your letter of 11 November about the Northern Ireland power station project. My reply has been somewhat delayed, since I wished to complete my consideration of the various options before responding.

This is a complex issue which has needed thorough and careful assessment. That process has now been carried through, and having consulted with colleagues, I have come to a view on how best to take the matter forward to a conclusion. I believe that the proposals I have in mind will enable final decisions to be reached within a short timescale. I am therefore inviting Sir Desmond Lorimer to meet Peter Viggers who will advise him of our proposals and I hope that this meeting can be arranged without delay.

Yours

TK

DMC/1355

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 December 1987

Dear David,

ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 14 December about the competition for a new power station in Northern Ireland and has noted that he intends to invite both parties to make one further and final bid.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of E(A) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours,

David.

DAVID NORGROVE

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CC 8/9

Prime Minister!
This question is likely to become increasingly controversial. I have been concerned that you were not in the picture. But agree now that Mr King should proceed as he proposes, subject to colleagues? JMW 7/12

Prime Minister

ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. The purpose of this minute is to inform you and colleagues of the current position on the competition for a new power station in Northern Ireland, of the agreements which I have reached with the Chief Secretary, and of the action which I now propose to take.

2. The competition now involves three public sector proposals from Northern Ireland Electricity (Kilroot dual fired, Kilroot coal or a new lignite station) and one private sector proposal from the Antrim Power Company (APCL) for lignite. APCL is a consortium comprising Bechtel, Hanson Trust, GEC and local investors. These proposals were submitted last August and were evaluated by Coopers and Lybrand. This evaluation showed that while there was little to choose between the NIE options, all were considerably cheaper than APCL lignite (at least 18%). However our advisers, Coopers and Rothschilds, believe that there is considerable scope for further reduction in the APCL bid.

3. Obviously there are great attractions in a new major private sector investment in Northern Ireland of some £370 million which the new power station would represent coupled also with the chance to exploit the development of Northern Ireland's first major natural resources in the lignite discoveries. This is particularly true against the otherwise sombre picture in the shipbuilding and wider engineering industries in Belfast. I am therefore proposing to invite both parties to make one further and final bid, but before doing this I needed

to resolve certain matters so that I could not be accused of reopening negotiations in bad faith.

4. The Chief Secretary and I discussed these issues last week and agreed the following:

(i) that the APCL bid would be classified as a supply contract and not as a leased asset, and therefore a private sector project;

(ii) that the revised bids should be evaluated both on the methodology adopted by Coopers and Lybrand and on the Treasury methodology;

(iii) that the Chief Secretary would investigate further the position on a possible change which Treasury might be proposing in the Government's Test Discount Rate. The project is sensitive to changes in the TDR and an increase would close the gap between APCL and the NIE options. The extent to which the gap would be closed by TDR changes would be dependent on the methodology used but could be significant.

5. We also discussed whether, and if so to what extent, there should be public expenditure offsets from the NI Block in the event of a successful APCL bid. We agreed that this should be considered on its merits at the appropriate time.

6. Agreement on these matters puts me in a position to return to APCL to seek a revised bid. I would feel honour-bound to

return also to NIE. APCL should have considerable scope to reduce their bid in a number of areas. I propose to make it clear to them that currently APCL is not competitive with NIE and that they must produce very substantial savings if they are to have any chance of winning the competition. I would also intend to ask both APCL and NIE to seek a reduction in the proposed price of lignite. When the revised bids have been received and evaluated I will consult colleagues again. In the meantime I am keeping in close touch with Cecil because of the obvious implications for his important plans.

7. Copies of this letter go to Members of E(A) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

TK

14 December 1987

MO'K6991

Sir Desmond Lorimer

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

17/12

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

P A Bearpark Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

10 December 1987

B/F Thursday please.
DLV

Dear Andy,

ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Sir Desmond Lorimer, Chairman of the Antrim Power Company Limited (APCL) and Lord Hanson, whose Hanson Trust is one of APCL's promoters, have written to the Prime Minister, my Secretary of State and other Ministers about the forthcoming decision on the next tranche of electricity generating capacity in Northern Ireland. APCL is, effectively, the sole private sector contender to build and operate a new Lignite fired station. It is competing with Northern Ireland Electricity, which has put forward separate proposals for a Lignite station and for the completion of the existing Kilroot Power Station as a coal fired or a dual coal/oil fired station. The approaches by Lord Hanson and Sir Desmond Lorimer are intended to press the claims of APCL's proposal by underlining the particular advantages that would flow from the entry of a private generator into the electricity scene in Northern Ireland and from the very large private sector investment that would be involved. APCL has been pushing in recent weeks for information about progress towards a decision on the power station. Mr Peter Viggers met representatives of the company for a discussion at the beginning of November, and the Secretary of State has also written recently to Sir Desmond Lorimer.

The evaluation of the various generation options has now been completed by the consultants Coopers and Lybrand, and the Secretary of State expects to be able to inform his colleagues of the results of this evaluation shortly. In the circumstances, and since the letters from Lord Hanson and Sir Desmond Lorimer

raise no specific questions which require an answer the Secretary of State considers that the Prime Minister's response need only acknowledge in a general way the points made, give an assurance that the matter is being progressed urgently and express the Prime Minister's interest in the outcome. I attach draft replies on these lines for the Prime Minister's signature.

Lord Young, Mr Lawson and Mr Parkinson also received letters from Sir Desmond Lorimer and Lord Hanson also wrote to Lord Young. I am therefore copying this letter and the attached draft letters to their Private Secretaries.

Yours sincerely,
Robin Masefield

R C MASEFIELD

Encs

DMC/1274



DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO:

Sir Desmond Lorimer
Chairman
Antrim Power Company Limited
Lamont House
Purdy's Lane
BELFAST
BT8 4AX

Thank you for your letter of 10 November in which you outline a number of factors in favour of the Antrim Power Company's proposal to construct and operate a lignite fired power station in Northern Ireland.

I note the points you have made ~~regarding~~ about the strength and experience of the APCL consortium and I ~~acknowledge~~ certainly recognise that a private sector investment on the scale you envisaged how great would ~~represent a very significant expression of~~ confidence in Northern Ireland. ~~with important follow-on effects. I know that~~ These are points which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has very much in mind in considering the options, ~~before him~~.

This is a very major decision for Northern Ireland. ~~and one which is likely to have a long lasting influence, on the Province's economy. It is important therefore that the right conclusion is reached~~. I know that Tom King is anxious that ~~this be done~~ a conclusion should be reached as quickly as possible. ~~and that he is giving the matter his urgent attention.~~

ecu

CR

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 November 1987

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your kind letter of 26 November which was much appreciated.

(Charles Powell)

David Bryce, Esq.

JC

P.27/11 pps.

Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland

1 Southpark Terrace, Southpark Avenue, Glasgow G12 8LG
Telephone: 041-339 9164

DB/CH

26 November 1987

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON

Prime Minister,

The Grand Master, Office Bearers and members of the Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland wish to express their heartfelt appreciation of your visit to Enniskillen to attend the re-scheduled Remembrance Day Service.

We very much appreciate the bravery of you and your husband in attending the service in the very vulnerable area of Fermanagh. Also your appreciation of the importance of your visit to those who had suffered and the people of that area.

Yours Sincerely

David Bryce

DAVID BRYCE
Grand Secretary

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2277 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Letter from Parker to Howe dated 20 November 1987	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
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TEMPORARILY RETAINED	26/4/14
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

SUBJECT cc MASTER OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T209E/87

0311331

COMMENT

UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON
TELNO 313
OF 181230Z NOV 87

ENNISKILLEN BOMBING
1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO ACTING PRIME MINISTER PALMER.
2. BEGINS:
DEAR MR PALMER,
I WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MESSAGE AFTER THE BOMB OUTRAGE AT ENNISKILLEN ON REMEMBRANCE SUNDAY. YOUR SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT WERE MUCH APPRECIATED.
TRAGIC INCIDENTS LIKE THIS ONLY STRENGTHEN OUR RESOLVE TO STAND FIRM AGAINST TERRORISM.
YOURS SINCERELY
MARGARET THATCHER. ENDS.
3. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED ORIGINAL.

HOWE

YYYY
MAIN 1
NO DISTRIBUTION 0
PS 1

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 November 1987

ENNISKILLEN BOMBING

Thank you for your letter of 18 November enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to the message of sympathy on the Enniskillen bombing from the Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand. This may issue in the slightly amended form enclosed.

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
UNCLASSIFIED		IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON
TELNO
OF 181230Z NOV 87

ENNISKILLEN BOMBING

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to Acting Prime Minister Palmer.

2. Begins:

Dear Mr Palmer,

I was most grateful for your message after the bomb outrage at Enniskillen on Remembrance Sunday. Your sympathy and support were ~~warmly~~ much appreciated.

Tragic incidents like this ~~can~~ only strengthen our resolve to stand firm against terrorism.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher. Ends.

3. There will be no (no) signed original.

HOWE

YYYY

/// //

YYYY
MAIN
ADDITIONAL
NNNN

		Catchword:	
File number	Dept	Drafted by (Block capitals)	Telephone no
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials Date/time		
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

XY 48 (REV)

CCPC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 November 1987

Dear Charles,

Enniskillen Bombing

As requested in your letter of 13 November, I enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister in reply to the one received from Acting Prime Minister Palmer, together with a draft letter from yourself to the New Zealand Deputy High Commissioner.

Yours ever,

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM: C D Powell Esq

DEPARTMENT: PS/No 10

TEL. NO:

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

/

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO: Mr Roger Farrell
Deputy High Commissioner
New Zealand High Commission
New Zealand House
Haymarket
LONDON SW17 4TQ

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for forwarding to me Mr Palmer's message of sympathy after the bombing outrage in Enniskillen.

I have asked our High Commission in Wellington to transmit the attached reply to Mr Palmer.

CDP

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM: C D Powell Esq

DEPARTMENT: PS/No 10 TEL. NO:

BUILDING: ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
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Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

/

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO: Mr Roger Farrell
Deputy High Commissioner
New Zealand High Commission
New Zealand House
Haymarket
LONDON SW17 4TQ

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for forwarding to me Mr Palmer's message of sympathy after the bombing outrage in Enniskillen.

I have asked our High Commission in Wellington to transmit the attached reply to Mr Palmer.

CM

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T209/87

(41)

UNCLASSIFIED

152642
MDHOAN 3153

SUBJECT cc OPS MASTER

UNCLASSIFIED

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 18/11

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA
TELNO 330
OF 171640Z NOVEMBER 87

TOP COPY
cc DIST 2

ENNISKILLEN BOMBING

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA.

2. BEGINS

DEAR KENNETH

I WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF SUPPORT AFTER THE BOMB OUTRAGE AT ENNISKILLEN ON REMEMBRANCE SUNDAY. AT SUCH A DREADFUL MOMENT IT WAS HEARTENING TO KNOW OF THE SYMPATHY AND SOLIDARITY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF ZAMBIA.

OUR RESOLVE TO WORK TOGETHER WITH OUR IRISH NEIGHBOURS FOR REAL PEACE AND JUSTICE IN IRELAND, NORTH AND SOUTH, HAS ONLY BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THIS OUTRAGE.

YOURS SINCERELY
MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS

3. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

HOWE

MM 03/24
RECEIVED IN ADCIPHY
19 NOV 1987

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DISTRIBUTION 32

MAIN 31

LIMITED
RID
CAFD
SAFD

MR REEVE
MR MUNRO
PS/MRS CHALKER

ADDITIONAL 1

NIO

NNNN

10

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 November, 1987.

Thank you for your letter of 17 November enclosing draft replies from the Prime Minister to President Kaunda and Chancellor Kohl for their recent messages about the Enniskillen bomb. They may issue.

(C.D. Powell)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc PC.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 November

Dear Charles,

Enniskillen Bomb Outrage

// As requested in your letters of ~~11~~ 14th November, I enclose draft messages from the Prime Minister in reply to those received from President Kaunda and Chancellor Kohl, together with a draft letter from yourself to the German Ambassador.

Yours ever,

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

(Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM: Mr Powell

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

BUILDING: ROOM NO:

Reference

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

/

Enclosures flag(s) .....

TO:
His Excellency
Baron Rudiger von Wechmar
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for forwarding Chancellor Kohl's message of sympathy after the bombing outrage in Enniskillen.

I have asked our Embassy in Bonn to transmit the attached reply to Chancellor Kohl.

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
UNCLASSIFIED		IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA
TELNO
OF 121640Z NOVEMBER 87

ENNISKILLEN BOMBING

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to President Kaunda.

2. Begins

Dear Kenneth

I was most grateful for your message of support after the bomb outrage at Enniskillen on Remembrance Sunday. At such a dreadful moment it was heartening to know of the sympathy and solidarity of the Government and people of Zambia.

Our resolve to work together with our Irish neighbours for real peace and justice in Ireland, North and South, has only been strengthened by this outrage.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Ends

3. Original follows by bag.

/// // /

HOWE

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MAIN
ADDITIONAL
NNNN

		Catchword: MAIN	
File number	Dept RID	Drafted by (Block capitals) R DAVIES	Telephone no 2353
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials	Date/time	
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
UNCLASSIFIED		IMMEDIATE

<<<<

1 MAIN
2 LIMITED
3 RID
4 CAFD
5 ADDITIONAL
6 NI
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8 NNNN
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/// 31
// 32
/ 33
34

For distribution order see Page

Catchword:

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
UNCLASSIFIED		IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE BONN
TELNO
OF 121650Z NOVEMBER 87

ENNISKILLEN BOMBING

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to Chancellor Kohl.
2. BEGINS
Dear Helmut
I was most touched by your message of support after the bomb outrage at Enniskillen on Remembrance Sunday.
Tragic incidents like this can only strengthen our resolve to stand firm against terrorism.
Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher
ENDS
3. Original follows by bag.

HOWE

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YYYY
MAIN
LIMITED

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MAIN
ADDITIONAL
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		Catchword:	
File number	Dept	Drafted by (Block capitals)	Telephone no
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials	Date/time	
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
UNCLASSIFIED		IMMEDIATE

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ADDITIONAL
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For distribution order see Page	Catchword:

IRELAND : Situation PT23

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T209 c/87

SUBJECT cc MASTER
OPS.

(36)

UNCLASSIFIED

144102
MDHOAN 2985

TOP COPY
& DIST ?

UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA
TELNO 174
OF 161953Z NOVEMBER 87

ENNISKILLEN BOMB OUTRAGE
1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOTHA.
2. BEGINS
DEAR PRESIDENT BOTHA
I WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF SUPPORT AFTER THE BOMB OUTRAGE AT ENNISKILLEN. AT SUCH A DREADFUL MOMENT YOUR SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT WERE WARMLY APPRECIATED.
OUR RESOLVE TO WORK TOGETHER WITH OUR IRISH NEIGHBOURS FOR REAL PEACE AND JUSTICE IN IRELAND, NORTH AND SOUTH, HAS ONLY BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THIS OUTRAGE.
YOURS SINCERELY
MARGARET THATCHER
ENDS
3. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

HOWE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 53

MAIN 14

MINIMAL
RID
SAFD

ADDITIONAL 39

NORTHERN IRELAND

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T209Z/87

SUBJECT cc MASTER
ORS.

(35)

UNCLASSIFIED

144101
MDHOAN 2984

WLN 051/24
RECEIVED IN PRIVATE SECRETARY
17 NOV 1987
DESK OFFICER | INDEX | PS | PS/PM

TOP COPY
DIST 7

UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE MADRID
TELNO 388
OF 161948Z NOVEMBER 87

ENNISKILLEN BOMB OUTRAGE
1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO SENOR GONZALEZ.
2. BEGINS:
DEAR SENOR GONZALEZ
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF SUPPORT AFTER THE BOMB OUTRAGE AT ENNISKILLEN ON REMEMBRANCE SUNDAY. AT SUCH A MOMENT YOUR SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT WERE WARMLY APPRECIATED. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO STAND FIRM AGAINST TERRORISM, AND WILL DO SO HEARTENED BY THE SOLIDARITY YOU HAVE SHOWN.
YOURS SINCERELY
MARGARET THATCHER
P.S.
3. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

HOWE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 59

MAIN 20

MINIMAL SED
RID

ADDITIONAL 39

NI

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The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 2277 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Letter from the Attorney General to King dated 13 November 1987	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION S31	26/4/18
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

SECRET

3

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
XXXXXXX 01-218 2111/3

MO 19/3V

13th November 1987

Prime Minister
MO
CDP
16/XI

Dear Charles

ARMING OF HELICOPTERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

You will be aware that recent threat assessments have highlighted the presence of heavy machine guns, and possibly surface-to-air missiles, in PIRA's hands in Ireland.

We are concerned about the vulnerability of military helicopters deployed in Northern Ireland to attack from both weapons, and Ministers here and in the Northern Ireland Office have agreed to equip these with general purpose machine guns as soon as possible. The guns are to be fitted, and dry training with them will begin within the next few days, but they will not be deployed with live ammunition until detailed Rules of Engagement (ROE) governing their use have been drawn up.

In answer to any press enquiries, it will be stressed that the legal contraints upon the use of firearms apply to these weapons as to any other; but no comment will be offered on questions relating to operational matters.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Tony Galsworthy (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), David Watkins (Northern Ireland Office) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

John Howe

(J F HOWE)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

R. A. FARRELL

27/11

file DTS

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

1) 1/12

2) 8/12

3) 17/12

From the Private Secretary

13 November 1987

I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Mr R A Farrell, Deputy High Commissioner of New Zealand.

I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply to send to Mr Farrell. It would be helpful if this could reach us by Friday 27 November.

C D POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

010

CC/C

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

Reference:

13 November 1987

Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

I have been asked to pass on to you the following message from our Acting Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer:

"Dear Prime Minister

I was shocked and saddened to learn of the bombing at Enniskillen. I know I speak for all New Zealanders when I say that such an act of terrorism is totally abhorrent. Our sympathies go to the family and friends of those killed and injured in the bombing.

Geoffrey Palmer
Acting Prime Minister"

I know that, like me, the High Commissioner Bryce Harland, who is currently out of London, would want to associate himself closely with this message.

Yours sincerely

Roger Farrell

(R A Farrell)
Deputy High Commissioner



file Pmn

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 November 1987

ENNISKILLEN BOMB OUTRAGE

Thank you for your letter of 13 November enclosing draft replies to the messages from President Botha and the Spanish Prime Minister. These may issue (but I thought the latter was generally referred to as Senor Gonzalez).

C. D. Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

ccPC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 November 1987

Dear Charles,

Enniskillen Bomb Outrage

As requested in your letter of 10 November, // I enclose draft messages from the Prime Minister in reply to those she has received from President Botha and Prime Minister Marquez.

I am copying this letter to David Watkins in the Northern Ireland Office.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
U/C		IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
U/C

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA
TELNO
OF Z NOV 87

ENNISKILLEN BOMB OUTRAGE

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to President Botha.

2. Begins

Dear President Botha

I was most grateful for your message of support after the bomb outrage at Enniskillen. At such a dreadful moment your sympathy and support were warmly appreciated.

Our resolve to work together with our Irish neighbours for real peace and justice in Ireland, North and South, has only been strengthened by this outrage.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Ends

3. ~~Original follows by bag.~~ There will be no signed original.

HOWE

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MAIN
ADDITIONAL
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		Catchword:	
File number	Dept RID	Drafted by (Block capitals) R DAVIES	Telephone no 2354
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials Date/time		
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
U/C		IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
U/C

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE MADRID
TELNO
OF Z NOV 87

ENNISKILLEN BOMB OUTRAGE

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to Prime Minister Marquez.

2. Begins:

Dear Senor Marquez

Thank you for your message of support after the bomb outrage at Enniskillen on Remembrance Sunday. At such a moment your sympathy and support were warmly appreciated. We shall continue to stand firm against terrorism, and will do so heartened by the solidarity you have shown.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Ends.

3. ~~Original follows by bag.~~ There will be no signed original.

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		Catchword:	
File number	Dept RID	Drafted by (Block capitals) R DAVIES	Telephone no 2354
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials Date/time		
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

7/86 27081 Dd8422797 50m 1/87 3656 YFB6

IRELAND

SITUATION

PT23

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T208/87

SUBJECT cc MASTER ORS.

(31)

UNCLASSIFIED

147522
MDHOAN 3082

UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE BONN
TELNO 562
OF 121650Z NOVEMBER 87

WU 051/24
18 NOV 1987
DESK OFFICER
INDEX
PA

TOP COPY
Q DIST 2

ENNISKILLEN BOMBING

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO CHANCELLOR KOHL.
2. BEGINS
DEAR HELMUT
I WAS MOST TOUCHED BY YOUR MESSAGE OF SUPPORT AFTER THE BOMB OUTRAGE AT ENNISKILLEN ON REMEMBRANCE SUNDAY.
TRAGIC INCIDENTS LIKE THIS CAN ONLY STRENGTHEN OUR RESOLVE TO STAND FIRM AGAINST TERRORISM.
YOURS SINCERELY
MARGARET THATCHER
ENDS
3. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

HOWE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 23

MAIN 22

LIMITED WED
RID

ADDITIONAL 1

NIO

NNNN

James Molyneaux MP
26/11

FILE
DA

1) 1/12
2) 8/12
3) 10/12
4) 5/1
5) 12/1

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Ack/ 12 November 1987

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from James Molyneaux and a group of Irish MPs.

I should be grateful if you would provide a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature, to reach this office by 26 November.

(C.D. POWELL)

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

cc
I am told NIO wrote to CDP on 31/12 re this.
JR 15/1

RESTRICTED

Kb
cc Sir PC
LOG ANY

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 November 1987

ENNISKILLEN BOMB OUTRAGE

Thank you for your letter of 12 November enclosing draft replies from the Prime Minister to the recent messages from President Reagan, the Taoiseach and Mr. Hawke. All three have been approved by the Prime Minister and should issue as quickly as possible.

BP 11

I am copying this letter to David Watkins (Northern Ireland Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

Kb

cc PK

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 November 1987

Dear Charles,

Enniskillen Bomb Outrage

As requested in your letter of ~~10~~ 9 November, I enclose
/// three separate draft messages from the Prime Minister, in reply to those received from President Reagan, the Taoiseach and Mr Hawke. We have agreed them with the Northern Ireland Office.

The draft reply to Mr Haughey takes up his own point about the need to work together, while not going beyond a simple acknowledgement of his message.

I am copying this letter to David Watkins in the NIO.

Yours ever,

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
RESTRICTED		IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELNO
OF 11 Z NOV 87
INFO IMMEDIATE BIS NEW YORK

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan.

2. Begins

Dear Ron

Thank you for your message after the Enniskillen bombing. At such a moment your sympathy and support, on behalf of all the American people, were warmly appreciated. We shall continue to stand firm against terrorism, and will do so heartened by the solidarity you have shown.

Yours sincerely

Margaret

Ends.

3. ~~Original follows by bag.~~ There will be no signed original.

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LIMITED

US State Dept
Cleared for release
31/5/16
[F01322579]

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File number	Dept	Drafted by (Block capitals)	Telephone no
	RID	J DEW	2356

Catchword:

Authorised for despatch by: Initials Date/time

For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
RESTRICTED		IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
RESTRICTED

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA
TELNO
OF 11 Z NOV 87

ENNISKILLEN BOMBING

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to Mr Hawke.

2. Begins

Dear Bob

I was most grateful for your message of support after the bomb outrage at Enniskillen on Remembrance Sunday. At such a dreadful moment it was heartening to know of the sympathy and solidarity of the Government and people of Australia.

Our resolve to work together with our Irish neighbours for real peace and justice in Ireland, North and South, has only been strengthened by this outrage.

Yours sincerely

Margaret

Ends.

3. ~~Original follows by bag.~~ There will be no signed original.

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		Catchword:	
File number	Dept RID	Drafted by (Block capitals) J DEW	Telephone no 2356
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials	Date/time	
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
RESTRICTED		IMMEDIATE

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CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

ZCZC
RESTRICTED

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN
TELNO
OF 11 Z NOV 87

ENNISKILLEN BOMBING

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to the Taoiseach:

2. Begins

Dear Charlie

I was most grateful for your message after the outrage at Enniskillen on Sunday. At such a dreadful moment your sympathy and support were warmly appreciated.

I strongly agree that all our efforts must now be combined to bring the perpetrators to justice, and to work together with renewed resolve for an end to the violence which has disfigured our societies for so many years.

Yours sincerely, Margaret

Ends.

3. ~~Original follows by bag.~~ There will be no signed original.

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		Catchword:	
File number	Dept RID	Drafted by (Block capitals) J DEW	Telephone no 2356
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials	Date/time	
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

file DTS

10 DOWNING STREET NO Ack
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 November 1987

I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Baron Rudiger von Wechmar covering a telegram from Herr Helmut Kohl.

I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply for Prime Minister signature. It would be helpful if this could reach me by Wednesday 18 November.

PF

C D POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

DO

✓PC?

DER BOTSCHAFTER
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
Baron Rüdiger von Wechmar

London, 11 November 1987

Dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed telegramme from Herr Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

I am, dear Prime Minister,

Yours sincerely

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury
10 Downing Street

London SW1

SUBJECT
cc MASTER
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 207/87

Telegramm

Sehr geehrte Frau Premierminister,
liebe Margaret,

zu dem schrecklichen Bombenanschlag in der nordirischen Stadt Enniskillen, bei dem am Wochenende 11 Menschen getötet und mehr als 50 Menschen zum Teil lebensgefährlich verletzt wurden, spreche ich Ihnen und den Angehörigen der Toten und Verletzten mein aufrichtiges Beileid aus.

Dieser Terroranschlag bei einer Gedenkfeier, auf der der Toten der Weltkriege und auch der Opfer der Unruhen in Nordirland gedacht wurde, ist auch von der deutschen Bevölkerung mit Abscheu und tiefer Anteilnahme aufgenommen worden.

Ihr Helmut Kohl
Bundeskanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Translation

Dear Prime Minister, dear Margaret,

After the terrible bomb attack at Enniskillen in Northern Ireland at the weekend which resulted in 11 people being killed and more than 50 being injured, some of them very seriously, I wish to convey my heartfelt sympathy to you and to the relatives of the dead and injured.

This terrorist attack at a ceremony commemorating the dead of the two world wars and the victims of the troubles in Northern Ireland has met with feelings of abhorrence and deep sorrow among the German population.

Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Translation

Dear Prime Minister, dear Margaret,

After the terrible bomb attack at Enniskillen in Northern Ireland at the weekend which resulted in 11 people being killed and more than 30 being injured, some of them very seriously, I wish to convey my heartfelt sympathy to you and to the relatives of the dead and injured.

This terrorist attack at a ceremony commemorating the dead of the two world wars and the victims of the troubles in Northern Ireland has met with feelings of abhorrence and deep sorrow among the German population.

Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

T

File

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

NOACK

From the Private Secretary

11 November 1987

I attach a copy of a telegram the Prime Minister has received from President Kaunda of Zambia.

I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply for Prime Minister signature. It would be helpful if this could reach me by Wednesday 18 November.

C D POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 205/87

SUBJECT cc MASTER
OPS

10 NOV 1987/0817

ZCZC CLM9640 ZMA331 TXR241

GBXX CO ZALU 126

LUSAKA TLX 126/124 10 0900

Ruth

ETAT

RT. HON PRIME MINISTER

MRS MAGARET THATCHER,

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON

I HAVE LEARNT WITH A DEEP SENSE OF SHOCK OF THE DEATH OF ELEVEN PEOPLE AND SCORES OF OTHERS INJURED IN A BOMB EXPLOSION ON THE 8TH IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

PERMIT ME ON BEHALF OF THE PARTY , GOVERNMENT

COL 10 ELEVEN

PAGE 2/50

PEOPLE AND ON MY OWN BEHALF , TO EXPRESS OUR SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN.

MAY I ADD MY VOICE TO THOSE WHO HAVE ALREADY CONDEMNED THIS

COWARDLY ACT. SUCH VIOLENCE SERVES NO PURPOSE AND THE SOONER
MEASURES ARE TAKEN TO BRING SUCH VIOLENCE TO

COL I ADD MY VOICE

PAGE 3/24

AN END THE BETTER.
ONCE AGAIN PRIME MINISTER ACCEPT MY HEARTFELT CONDOLENCES
KENNETH D KAUNDA

?PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA
9TH NOVEMBER 1987

COL 9TH 1987

NNNN

'T' file JA

Not ack'd.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 November 1987

I attach a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has received from President Botha.

I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature, to reach me by Friday 13 November.

(Charles Powell)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DSS

cc: PC.

FCO for draft reply by 13 Nov.

ODZ

South African Embassy

10 November 1987

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1A 2AL

Dear Mr Powell,

I should be grateful if the enclosed text of a letter from Mr P W Botha, State President of the Republic of South Africa, to the Right Honourable the Prime Minister could be brought to her attention.

Yours sincerely,

J de Goede
MINISTER

South African Embassy

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T204/87

SUBJECT cc MASTER
OPS

10 November 1987

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister, First Lord of the
Treasury and Minister for the Civil Service
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1A 2AL

Dear Prime Minister

I learnt with dismay and a sense of outrage of the terrorist bomb attack at Enniskillen, in which so many innocent bystanders lost their lives or were injured.

On behalf of the people of South Africa who have also suffered the tragic consequences of similar indiscriminate bombings, please accept my sincere condolences.

P W BOTHA
STATE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

file OT

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 November 1987

I attach a copy of a telegram the Prime Minister has received from Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, Presidente del Gobierno de Espana.

I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply as soon as possible. No acknowledgement has been sent from this office.

BF 11

C D POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

3 Duty clerk /
1 File

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 203/87 SU

SUBJECT cc MASTER
OPS

File: IRELAND: Situation pt 23

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TXT-711
MADRID/PRESIDENCIA 10 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1.987

DE: PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO DE ESPA£A
A
EXCMA. SE£ORA MARGARET THATCHER
PRIMER MINISTRO DEL REINO UNIDO DE GRAN BRETA£A
E IRLANDA DEL NORTE
LONDRES

HONDAMENTE IMPRESIONADO POR EL TRAGICO ATENTADO TERRORISTA DE ENNISKILLEN QUE HA CAUSADO TANTAS VICTIMAS INOCENTES, LE RUEGO ACEPTE MIS SENTIMIENTOS DE PROFUNDO PESAR AL MISMO TIEMPO QUE HAGO VOTOS POR LA RECUPERACION DE LOS HERIDOS.

SABE QUE ESTAMOS TODOS EMPE£ADOS EN LA LUCHA CONTRA LA VIOLENCIA TERRORISTA Y QUE PUEDE CONTAR CON LA SOLIDARIDAD DEL GOBIERNO ESPA£OL.

FELIPE GONZALEZ MARQUEZ.

NNNN

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File

SHWBBO

a/c

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

SUBJECT

cc MASTER.

From the Private Secretary

9 November 1987

Dear David,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE NORTHERN IRELAND DELEGATION

The Prime Minister had a meeting in her room at the House this afternoon with Mr. Molyneaux, Mr. Maginnis and four representatives from the latter's constituency: Mr. James Cooper, Mr. Sammy Foster, Mr. Walter Parks and the Reverend Edwy Kille. It was a sombre, indeed rather doleful occasion.

Mr. Maginnis said that the delegation wanted to bring to the Prime Minister's attention some of the concerns felt by Protestants living in the border areas and in particular in Fermanagh. The first was a feeling that security tended to be reactive, in other words if terrorist activity fell off, so did security. There had to be a continuous policy to defeat terrorism. Mr. Maginnis handed over lists of terrorist murders committed since signature of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (copies enclosed). It was wrong to pin too much faith on to security co-operation with the Irish Republic. Anything from that source was a bonus: the basic responsibility for providing security remained with HMG. Another concern was the distaste which local councillors felt at having to work with Sinn Fein representatives on district councils. It was thoroughly objectionable that they should be able to enjoy full rights while supporting the IRA. The failure of the SDLP to support the security forces was also very discouraging. Finally, the Government should reconsider the need for selective internment. He had been encouraged by something which he thought the Northern Ireland Secretary had said in the House that afternoon. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Maginnis was reading into it more than he had heard. He should not expect any change.

Mr. Cooper suggested that the scale of the massacre in Enniskillen provided an opportunity to persuade the SDLP and the Irish government to divorce themselves completely from Sinn Fein and support the security forces. There should no longer be any ambivalence about this. At the same time, the Government should review the constraints on the security forces. He believed that the vast majority of people in Northern Ireland, including a substantial majority of the nationalist people, would support sterner action by the security forces. In general he felt that the security presence in Northern Ireland remained inadequate. He had

driven early that morning from Fermanagh to Aldergrove and had come across only one security force check-point, a mile from Aldergrove. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Cooper should remember we were not strangers to IRA violence on the mainland, although she accepted that life in the border areas in Northern Ireland was very difficult. The number of security force personnel in Northern Ireland was substantial and had been greatly increased by the present government. She wondered what Mr. Cooper meant by relaxing constraints on the security forces. As a solicitor he should understand the importance of the rule of law in a free society. Mr. Cooper, back-tracking slightly, said that he had in mind an end to 50 per cent remission of sentences for convicted terrorists and to the right of silence, together with introduction of selective internment. The Prime Minister pointed out that this had not worked in the past.

Mr. Foster gave an account of the harrowing experience of Enniskillen. He believed that extreme measures were now needed to deal with the terrorists. The Government must protect the Unionist people of Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein should be proscribed and selective internment brought back. The Prime Minister said that the Government did protect people through the security forces and was doing as much as could reasonably be expected. Although she could understand the feelings of those who were directly involved in the Enniskillen incident it would be a mistake to change policy in the heat of the moment. In contemplating any particular measure, one always had to ask whether it would really help to deal with terrorism.

Mr. Parks said that the Unionist people in Northern Ireland were suffering. They wanted to hear from the Government that something would be done. He wondered whether the security forces were deployed in the most effective possible way. He would like to see a more extensive presence which would act as a deterrent. There were many gaps along the Border where check-points ought to be established.

The Reverend Edwy Kille raised a number of more detailed points about inadequate security on the Border, claiming that barriers erected at border crossing points had been dis-assembled almost immediately by people from the Republic. In many cases the Northern Ireland authorities had been slow to react. The Prime Minister urged him to raise any detailed points with the Northern Ireland Secretary's office.

Mr. Molyneaux said that he hoped that another occasion could be found when he and the Prime Minister could discuss wider issues. The Prime Minister said that she was in principle ready for this although the existing contacts which Mr. Molyneaux was pursuing with the Northern Ireland Secretary should continue. Meanwhile she had listened carefully to all the points which the delegation had made. They would be carefully considered and specific complaints should be pursued with the Northern Ireland Office. She wanted to stress her understanding for the agony of those involved in the Enniskillen incident as well as her appreciation of the great

difficulties faced by those living in the more isolated Border areas.

I am copying this letter to Lyn Parker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to John Howe (Ministry of Defnece).

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

TERRORIST MURDERS during the 2nd year following the signing of ANGLO/EIRE AGREEMENT (15/11/86 - to date).

Date	Name	Area	Terrorist
09/12/86	Peter Bradley(30M) RC/MM (DoI received 06/12/86)	Lisburn	Prot(btd)
12/12/86	Desmond Caldwell(44M)	Castlederg	IRA(exp)
21/12/86	Thomas McCartan(32M)RC	Belfast	INLA(gsw)
09/01/87	Ivan Crawford(49M)	Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
26/01/87	George Shaw(57M)	Dungannon	IRA(gsw)
05/02/87	Tony McCloskey(32M) RC	Middletown	INLA(gsw)
09/02/87	Iris Farley(72W) (DoI received 01/01/87)	Markethill	IRA(gsw)
11/02/87	Nigel Watton(18S)	Ballymoney	UVF(gsw)
07/03/87	Thomas Maguire(19M)	Newry	INLA(gsw)
18/02/87	Michael Kearney(33M)RC	Belfast	INLA(gsw)
10/03/87	Peter Nesbitt(32S)	Belfast	IRA(exp)
13/03/87	Fergus Conlon(35M) RC	Newry	INLA(gsw)
13/03/87	John Chambers(57M)	Rostrevor	IRA(gsw)
14/03/87	Tony McCarthy(33M) RC	Belfast	INLA(gsw)
14/03/87	Gerard Steenson(29S)RC	Belfast	INLA(gsw)
21/03/87	Emmanuel Gargan(25S)RC	Belfast	INLA(gsw)
22/03/87	Barry Duffy(20S) RC	Armagh	INLA(gsw)
23/03/87	Austin Wilson(35M)	Londonderry	IRA(exp)
23/03/87	John Bennison(41M)	Londonderry	IRA(exp)
23/03/87	Leslie Jarvis(63M)	Londonderry	IRA(gsw)
30/03/87	Iain J O'Connor(23S)RC	Belfast	IRA(exp)
02/04/87	Larry Marley(41M) RC	Belfast	UVF(gsw)
03/04/87	James Oldman(39S)	Ederney	IRA(gsw)

03/04/87	George Shaw(51M)		Ballynahinch	IRA(gsw)
11/04/87	Robert McLean(44M)		Portrush	IRA(gsw)
11/04/87	Frederick Armstrong(40M)		Portrush	IRA(gsw)
12/04/87	Charles McElmurry(30M)	RC	Killeen	IRA(gsw)
18/04/87	Andrew Mason(19S)		Carnlough	IRA(b&std)
20/04/87	David Ead(28M)		Newcastle	IRA(gsw)
21/04/87	Harry Henry(52M)		Moneymore	IRA(gsw)
23/04/87	Tom Cooke(52M)		Londonderry	IRA(gsw)
25/04/87	Maurice Gibson(73M)		Killeen	IRA(exp)
25/04/87	Cicily Gibson(67M)		Killeen	IRA(exp)
25/04/87	William Graham(44M)		Pomeroy	IRA(gsw)
28/04/87	William Marchant(39M)		Belfast	IRA(gsw)
07/05/87	Gary McCartan(17S)	RC	Belfast	Prot(gsw)
08/05/87	Anthony Hughes(34M)	RC	Loughgall	IRA(gsw)
21/05/87	Ivan Anderson(47S)		Carrickmore	IRA(gsw)
22/05/87	Charles Watson(35M)		Clough	IRA(gsw)
23/05/87	Dermott Hackett(37M)	RC	Castlederg	UFF(gsw)
02/06/87	Sam McClean(41S)		Ballybofey	IRA(gsw)
04/06/87	Joseph Leach(21S)		Belfast	IRA(gsw)
12/06/87	Joseph McIlwaine(19S)		Lisburn	IRA(gsw)
15/06/87	Nathanial Cush(47M)		Belfast	IRA(exp)
23/06/87	Robert Gutherie(41M)		Belfast	IRA(gsw)
24/06/87	Emmanuel Wilson(34M)	RC	Belfast	IRA(gsw)
25/06/87	Danny O'Connor(30M)	RC	Belfast	PROT(gsw)
26/06/87	John Tracey(47M)		Belfast	IRA(gsw)
03/07/87	Edward Campbell(40M)	RC	Belfast	Prot(gsw)
07/07/87	William Reynolds(33M)		Belfast	IRA(gsw)

12/07/87	Alan McQuiston(46M)		Belfast	IRA(gsw)
19/07/87	Thomas Hewitt(22M)		Belleek	IRA(gsw)
23/07/87	Wm. Richard McGrath(46M)	RC	Belfast	IRA(gsw)
27/07/87	Norman A Kennedy(41M)		Ballymena	IRA(gsw)
09/08/87	William Cockburn(35M)		Belfast	U/K(btd)
23/08/87	Michael Power(31M)	RC	Belfast	UFF(gsw)
26/08/87	Stanley Carson(50M)		Belfast	IRA(gsw)
26/08/87	Michael Malone(35M)	RC	Belfast	IRA(gsw)
30/08/87	Winston Finlay(44M)		Magherfelt	IRA(gsw)
31/08/87	Eamon Maguire(30M)	RC	Cullaville	IRA(gsw)
09/09/87	Patrick Hamill(29M)	RC	Belfast	Prot(gsw)
09/09/87	Harry Sloan(38S)		Belfast	IRA(gsw)
17/09/87	Stephen McGrath(20S)		Belfast	IRA(gsw)
20/09/87	James Meighan(22S)	RC	Belfast	Prot(gsw)
24/09/87	Ian McKeown(37M)		Newry	IRA(gsw)
04/10/87	James McDaid(30S)	RC	Crossmaglen	IRA(gsw)
06/10/87	Thomas Dickson(35M)		Belfast	Prot(gsw)
09/10/87	F'isco Notarantonio(66M)	RC	Belfast	Prot(gsw)
08/11/87	William Mullan(M)		Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Agnes Mullan(M)		Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Kit Johnston(M)		Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Jessie Johnston(M)		Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Wesley Armstrong(M)		Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Bertha Armstrong(M)		Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Samuel Gault(M)		Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Georgina Quinton(W)		Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Ted Armstrong(M)		Enniskillen	IRA(exp)

08/11/87 John Megaw(S) Enniskillen IRA(exp)

08/11/87 Marie Wilson(20S) Enniskillen IRA(exp)

SUMMARY of TERRORIST MURDERS at 08/11/87.

79 murders = 66 by ROMAN CATHOLIC(Republican) terror groups
+ 12 by PROTESTANT(Loyalist) terror groups.
+ 1 by PERSON/S UNKNOWN.

R.Catholic victims..26 = 16 by Republicans and 10 by Loyalists.

Protestant victims..53= 50 by Republicans and 2 by Loyalists.
and 1 by Person/s Unknown

Murders by Republican terrorists = 83.5%

Murders by Loyalist terrorists = 15.2%

Murders by Person/s Unknown = 1.3%

Security Forces victims..25 = 25 by Republicans and Nil by Loyalists.

Civilian victims.....54 = 41 by Republicans and 12 by Loyalists.
and 1 by Person/s Unknown

Murders by Republicans = 100.0% of Security Forces
+ 75.9 of Civilians.

Murders by Loyalists = None of Security Forces
+ 22.2% of Civilians.

(gsw).....gunshot wound/s (exp).....explosion
(btd).....beaten to death (std).....stabbed to death

TERRORIST MURDERS IN FERMANAGH & SOUTH TYRONE
(1971 to date)

09/02/71	John Eakins(52)	Brougher TV mast	IRA
09/02/71	T George Beck(43)	Brougher TV mast	IRA
09/02/71	Harold Edgar(26)	Brougher TV mast	IRA
09/02/71	Malcolm D Henson(24)	Brougher TV mast	IRA
09/02/71	WA(Bill) Thomas(35)	Brougher TV mast	IRA
03/09/71	FW Robert P Veitch(23)	nr Kinawley	IRA
14/09/71	John Rudman(21)	Edendork	IRA
28/10/71	David F Powell(22)	nr Kinawley	IRA
07/12/71	Denis Wilson(31S)	Ballagh, Caledon	IRA
13/02/72	Thomas F McCann(19)	nr Newtownbutler	IRA
01/03/72	Thomas J Fletcher(43M)	nr Belcoo	IRA
15/03/72	Billy Logan(23S) (D o I rec.)	Coalisland	IRA
20/05/72	Harry Gillespie(32S)	nr Dungannon	IRA
02/06/72	Victor Husband(23)	nr Rosslea	IRA
02/06/72	Brian Robertson(23)	nr Rosslea	IRA
08/06/72	Samuel Donegan	nr Newtownbutler	IRA
07/08/72	Harry Creighton(27)	Magheraveely	IRA
07/08/72	Errol L Gordon	nr Lisnaskea	IRA
07/08/72	David Wynne	nr Lisnaskea	IRA
25/08/72	James H Eames(33)	nr Enniskillen	IRA
25/08/72	Alfred Johnston(32)	nr Enniskillen	IRA
28/08/72	William H Trotter	nr Newtownbutler	IRA
10/09/72	Wm A McIntyre(23)	nr Eglish	IRA
10/09/72	Douglas Richmond(21)	nr Eglish	IRA
10/09/72	Duncan McPhee(21)	nr Eglish	IRA

21/09/72	Tommy Bullock(M)		nr Aughalane	IRA
21/09/72	Emily Bullock(M)		nr Aughalane	IRA
22/10/72	Robert J Bell(22)		nr Newtownbutler	IRA
24/10/72	Michael Naan(35)	RC	nr Newtownbutler	ARMY
24/10/72	Andrew Murray(25)	RC	nr Newtownbutler	ARMY
17/11/72	Joseph Calvin(42)		Enniskillen	IRA
28/11/72	Robert Keys(55)		Belleek	IRA
15/12/72	Louis Leonard(26)	RC	Derrylin	ARMY
14/01/73	Henry Sandford(34M)		Cappagh	IRA
08/02/73	Charlie Morrison(26S)		Dungannon	IRA
17/03/73	Michael J Gay(21)		nr Castlecaulfield	IRA
27/03/73	Andrew Sommerville		nr Ballygawley	IRA
10/05/73	Franklin Caddoo(24)		nr Aughnacloy	IRA
05/06/73	David Purvis(22)		Enniskillen	IRA
05/06/73	Terence Herdman	RC	nr Clogher	IRA
18/07/73	Brian Criddle(34)		nr Clogher	IRA
05/08/73	Francis Mullen(59)	RC	nr Moy	PROT
05/08/73	B'dette Mullen(39)	RC	nr Moy	PROT
30/08/73	Ronald A Beckett		nr Tullyhommon	IRA
05/09/73	Patrick J Duffy	RC	nr Belcoo	IRA
07/09/73	Matt Lilly(54)		nr Belcoo	IRA
12/10/73	Raymond McAdam(24)	RC	nr Newtownbutler	PROT
28/10/73	Francis McCaughey (D o I rec.	RC)	nr Aughnacloy	PROT
22/11/73	Ivan Charleton(M)		nr Dungannon	IRA
22/11/73	Cyril McCaul	RC	nr Dungannon	IRA
17/01/74	Daniel Hughes(73)	RC	Cappagh	PROT
19/01/74	Cormac McCabe(42)		nr Aughnacloy	IRA

10/04/74	Geo. Saunderson(57)		nr Teemore	IRA
11/04/74	Harold Sinnamon(34)		Dungannon	IRA
11/04/74	Norman W McKenzie(25)		nr Lisnaskea	IRA
21/04/74	James Murphy(42)		Enniskillen	PROT
02/05/74	Eva Martin(28)		Clogher	IRA
07/05/74	James Devlin	RC	nr Dungannon	PROT
07/05/74	Gertie Devlin	RC	nr Dungannon	PROT
04/06/74	Fred Dick		Dungannon	IRA
10/08/74	Patrick Kelly(33)	RC	Fermanagh	PROT
23/08/74	Wm Hutchinson(29)		nr Dungannon	IRA
07/09/74	Mary Bingham(59)		Dungannon	IRA
20/11/74	Joseph Falls	RC	nr Coalisland	PROT
02/12/74	John A Maddocks		nr Gortmullan	IRA
31/01/75	Geo. Coulter(43M)		Donaghmore	IRA
07/02/75	Wm. Robson(22)		nr Kinawley	IRA
11/02/75	Chris Mein(25)		Galbally	IRA
11/04/75	Owen Boyle	RC	nr Aughnacloy	PROT
21/04/75	Michael McKenna(29)	RC	nr Castlecaulfield	PROT
21/04/75	Seamus McKenna(21)	RC	nr Castlecaulfield	PROT
21/04/75	Marian Bowen(21)	RC	nr Castlecaulfield	PROT
27/05/75	Patrick O'Reilly	RC	nr Irvinestown	PROT
01/06/75	Mgt. Eliz. Kilfedder		Garrison	IRA
02/08/75	George McCall		Moy	IRA
23/10/75	Peter McKearney	RC	nr Moy	PROT
23/10/75	Jane McKearney	RC	nr Moy	PROT
06/11/75	Stanley Irwin(26)		nr Benburb	IRA
25/11/75	Paddy Maxwell(36M)	RC	Clonavaddy	IRA

25/11/75	Sammy Clarke(45M)		Clonavaddy	IRA
22/01/76	Keiran McCann	RC	Eglish	IRA
17/03/76	James McCaughey	RC	Dungannon	PROT
17/03/76	Patrick Barnard	RC	Dungannon	PROT
17/03/76	Andy Small	RC	Dungannon	PROT
17/03/76	Joe Kelly	RC	Dungannon	PROT
23/04/76	Ronnie Crooks(M)		Annaghmore X-roads	IRA
29/04/76	Eddie Stewart		nr Greystone	IRA
03/05/76	Stanley Arthurs (D o I rec. 29/04/76)		nr Greystone	IRA
15/05/76	Thomas H Evans		nr Letterbreen	IRA
15/05/76	Francis J Kettyles		nr Letterbreen	IRA
15/05/76	Henry F Keys		nr Letterbreen	IRA
16/05/76	Kenny Nelson(S)		nr Benburb	IRA
17/05/76	Robert Dobson		Moy	IRA
17/05/76	Tommy Dobson		Moy	IRA
22/05/76	John McCambridge(S)		Bush, Dgn.	IRA
25/06/76	Alan R Ferguson		nr Garrison	IRA
17/07/76	Gordon Liddle		nr Donagh	IRA
28/10/76	Stanley Adams		nr Pomeroy	IRA
03/12/76	Joe Scott(M)		Northland Row, Dgn	IRA
09/01/77	Martin E Walsh		nr Newtownbutler	IRA
04/03/77	Rory T O'Kelly	RC	Coalisland	IRA
09/03/77	John Reid		Annaghroe, Caledon	IRA
13/03/77	Wm. D Brown		nr Donagh	IRA
25/03/77	David Graham (D o I rec.)		Coalisland	IRA
04/04/77	Sean Prendergast		nr Belleek	IRA

29/04/77	Eric Shiells		Dungannon	IRA
12/05/77	Douglas Deering		Rosslea	IRA
20/05/77	Bobby North(W)		nr Benburb	IRA
03/07/77	Denis Quinn	RC	Coalisland	IRA
06/07/77	Dave Morrow(M)		Aughnacloy	IRA
24/09/77	Bob Bloomer (D o I rec.)		Eglish, Dungannon	IRA
12/10/77	Frank Canavan	RC	nr Ballygawley	IRA
19/07/78	Mark D Carnie		Dungannon	IRA
21/08/78	Patrick Fee		nr Tullyrossmearan	IRA
15/04/79	Michael Cassidy	RC	nr Clogher	IRA
29/04/79	Sam Gibson		nr Coalisland	IRA
06/05/79	George Maughan		Lisnaskea	IRA
06/05/79	Norman Prue		Lisnaskea	IRA
19/05/79	John McClenaghan		Garrison	IRA
17/07/79	Sylvia L Crowe		Rosslea	IRA
15/10/79	Herbert G Kernaghan		Rosslea	IRA
30/10/79	Fred Irwin		Dungannon	IRA
16/12/79	Keith C Richards		nr Dungannon	IRA
16/12/79	Alan D Ayrton		nr Dungannon	IRA
16/12/79	Wm John Beck		nr Dungannon	IRA
16/12/79	Simon P Evans		nr Dungannon	IRA
22/12/79	Stanley Hazelton(M)		Co Monaghan	IRA
03/01/80	Rbt. Jas. Crilly		Newtownbutler	IRA
05/02/80	Aubrey A Abercrombie		nr Florencecourt	IRA
11/02/80	Winston Howe		Rosslea	IRA
11/02/80	Joseph Rose		Rosslea	IRA
17/04/80	Victor Morrow		nr Newtownbutler	IRA

07/07/80	Robert Latimer	Newtownbutler	IRA
27/07/80	Robert Thompson	Aughnacloy	IRA
23/09/80	Ernie Johnston	nr Rosslea	IRA
24/11/80	Norman H Donaldson	Derrygonnelly	IRA
16/04/81	Jack Donnelly	Moy	IRA
05/06/81	Ronald Graham	nr Lisnaskea	IRA
07/09/81	Stuart Montgomery(18S)	Cappagh	IRA
07/09/81	Mark Evans(21S)	Cappagh	IRA
09/11/81	Cecil Graham	Donagh	IRA
7/11/81	Silas Lyttle(M) (D o I rec. 20/09/81)	Ballygawley	IRA
17/11/81	Albert Beacom	nr Maguiresbridge	IRA
30/04/82	Martin Clifford	Belleek	IRA
09/11/82	Helen Woodhouse	Enniskillen	IRA
09/11/82	Gary Ewing	Enniskillen	IRA
02/12/82	Jim Gibson	nr Coalisland	IRA
13/02/83	Alan Price	nr Florencecourt	IRA
25/02/83	Cecil McNeill	Tullyvannon,	IRA
04/06/83	Andy Stinson	Eglish	IRA
13/07/83	Thomas Harron	nr Ballygawley	IRA
13/07/83	Oswald Neely	nr Ballygawley	IRA
13/07/83	Ronald Alexander	nr Ballygawley	IRA
13/07/83	John Roxborough	nr Ballygawley	IRA
24/10/83	Cyrus Campbell	Carnteel	IRA
13/03/84	Ronnie Funston	nr Tullyhomman	IRA
08/05/84	Jimmy Johnston	Dungannon	IRA
12/05/84	Ivan Hillen	nr Aughnacloy	IRA
18/05/84	Rbt. V Huggins	Enniskillen	IRA

18/05/84	Thos. H Agar		Enniskillen	IRA
07/09/84	Robert Bennett		Dungannon	IRA
07/09/84	Malcolm Cullen		Dungannon	IRA
08/10/84	Melvin Simpson		Dungannon	IRA
19/10/84	Fred Jackson		Tamnamore	IRA
19/10/84	Peter W Gallinmore (D o I rec. 18/05/84)		Enniskillen	IRA
01/02/85	Jimmy Graham(M)		Derrylin	IRA
03/03/85	Hugh McCormac(M)	RC	nr Enniskillen	IRA
08/04/85	Martin Love(21S)	RC	Enniskillen	Prot
21/06/85	Robert Gilliland(M)		Kinawley	IRA
20/08/85	Seamus McAvoy	RC	in Dublin	IRA

Post Anglo/Irish

07/12/85	George Gilliland(34M)		Ballygawley	IRA(gsw)
07/12/85	Wm James Clements(52M)		Ballygawley	IRA(gsw)
03/02/86	John Early(22S)	RC	Belcoo	IRA(exp)
11/02/86	Derek Breen(29M)		Maguiresbridge	IRA(gsw)
11/02/86	John McCabe(25M)	RC	Maguiresbridge	IRA(gsw)
17/05/86	David Wilson(39M)		Donaghmore	IRA(gsw)
08/07/86	John McVitty(46M)		nr Rosslea	IRA(gsw)
06/10/86	Martin Blaney(27S)		Eglish	IRA(gsw)
09/01/87	Ivan Crawford(49M)		Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
29/01/87	George Shaw(57M)		Dungannon	IRA(gsw)
02/06/87	Sam McClean(41S)		Ballybofey	IRA(gsw)
03/04/87	Jim Oldman(39S)		Ederney	IRA(gsw)
19/07/87	Thomas Hewitt(22M)		Belleek	IRA(gsw)
08/11/87	William Mullan(M)		Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Agnes Mullan(M)		Enniskillen	IRA(exp)

08/11/87	Kit Johnston(M)	Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Jessie Johnston(M)	Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Wesley Armstrong(M)	Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Bertha Armstrong(M)	Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Samuel Gault(M)	Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Georgina Quinton(W)	Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Ted Armstrong(M)	Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	John Megaw(S)	Enniskillen	IRA(exp)
08/11/87	Marie Wilson(20S)	Enniskillen	IRA(exp)

At 08 November, 1987 Convictions for Murder have been achieved:-

2 (67%) out of 3 murders by the Regular Army.

11 (50%) out of 22 murders by Protestants(Loyalists).

14 (8%) out of 169 murders by Roman Catholics(Republicans).

In 167 out of 194 terrorist murders committed in Fermanagh & South Tyrone the **ADMINISTRATION of JUSTICE** has failed.

NEXT TIME.....THINK OF THE VICTIMS.

TERRORIST MURDERS during the 1st year following the signing of the ANGLO/EIRE AGREEMENT (15/11/85 - 14/11/86 inclusive).

Date	Name		Area	Terrorist
15/11/85	David Hanson(24)		Crossmaglen	IRA(exp)
19/11/85	Robert Boyd(55)	RC	L'derry	IRA(gsw)
20/11/85	Kurt Konnig(40)	RC	L'derry	IRA(gsw)
28/11/85	Gordon Hanna(46)		Kilkeel	IRA(exp)
01/12/85	Edward Taggart(19)	RC	Divis	IRA(gsw)
07/12/85	Geo. Gilliland(34M)		Ballygawley	IRA(gsw)
07/12/85	Billy Clements(52M)		Ballygawley	IRA(gsw)
01/01/86	Andrew McCandless(38M)		Armagh City	IRA(exp)
01/01/86	Michael Williams(24M)		Armagh City	IRA(exp)
15/01/86	Victor Foster(18)		Castlederg	IRA(exp)
31/01/86	Martin Quinn(34)	RC	Whiteabbey	PROT(gsw)
03/02/86	John Early(22S)	RC	Belcoo	IRA(exp)
11/02/86	Derek Breen(29M)		Maguiresbridge	IRA(gsw)
11/02/86	John McCabe(25M)	RC	Maguiresbridge	IRA(gsw)
15/03/86	John O'Neill(25)	RC	Carrs Glen	PROT(btd)
18/03/86	David Mulley(20)		Castlewellan	IRA(exp)
26/03/86	Thomas Irwin(52M)		nr Omagh	IRA(gsw)
08/04/86	Wm. Pollock(27)		Castlederg	IRA(exp)
23/04/86	James Hazlett(54)		Newcastle	IRA(gsw)
07/05/86	Mgt. Caulfield(29M)	P/MM	Ballysillen	PROT(gsw)
06/05/86	Mark Frizzell(17S) (D o I rec. 03/05/86)		Short Strand	IRA(btd)
15/05/86	Herbert McConville(60M)		Newry	IRA(gsw)
17/05/86	David Wilson(39M)		Donaghmore	IRA(gsw)
20/05/86	Colm McKevitt(30S)	RC	Killeen	IRA(gsw)

22/05/86	L'rence Smyth(25S)	RC	Crossmaglen	IRA(exp)
22/05/86	David McBride(27S)		Crossmaglen	IRA(exp)
22/05/86	Andrew French(35S)		Crossmaglen	IRA(exp)
25/05/86	Frank Hegarty(45M)	RC	Castlederg	IRA(gsw)
28/05/86	David Brown(37M)		Kilkeel	IRA(exp)
16/06/86	T'ence McKeever(32M)	RC	nr N'hamilton	IRA(gsw)
01/07/86	Robert Hill(22S)		Drumaness	IRA(exp)
08/07/86	John McVitty(46M)		nr Rosslea	IRA(gsw)
09/07/86	Robert Bertram(20S)		Crossmaglen	IRA(exp)
09/07/86	Carl Davies(24M)		Crossmaglen	IRA(exp)
12/07/86	Brian Leonard (D o I received 10/07/86)	RC	Belfast	PAF(gsw)
16/07/86	Colum McCallan(25M) (D o I received 14/07/86)	RC	Belfast	PAF(gsw)
19/07/86	Martin Duffey(28M)	RC	Belfast	PAF(gsw)
26/07/86	Karl Blackbourne(19S)		Newry	IRA(gsw)
26/07/86	Charles Allen((37M)		Newry	IRA(gsw)
26/07/86	Peter Kilpatrick(27M)		Newry	IRA(gsw)
28/07/86	Mark Bacon(26M) (D o I received 13/07/86)		Belfast	RC(std)
30/07/86	John Kyle(40M)		Greencastle	IRA(gsw)
04/08/86	Denis Taggart(33M)		Belfast	IRA(gsw)
15/08/86	Patrick Murray(28S)	RC	Belfast	IRA(gsw)
15/08/86	Robert Coggles(31) (Body found 29/08/86)		Belfast	???(gsw)
26/08/86	Paddy McAllister(47M)	RC	Belfast	UFF(gsw)
29/08/86	Mervyn Bell(22S)		L'derry	IRA(gsw)
09/09/86	David McVeigh(40M)	RC	Newry	IRA(gsw)
12/09/86	Ken Robinson(28S)		L'derry	IRA(exp)
14/09/86	John Bingham(33M)		Belfast	IRA(gsw)

16/09/86	Raymond Mooney(33M)	RC	Belfast	PAF(gsw)
17/09/86	Joseph Webb(28S)	RC	Belfast	UVF(gsw)
06/10/86	Martin Blaney(27S)		Eglish	IRA(gsw)
11/10/86	Desmond Dobbin(42M)		Belfast	IRA(exp)
16/10/86	Terence Mullan(31?)	RC	Ballynahinch	UFF(gsw)
16/10/86	Kathleen Mullan(75M)	RC	Ballynahinch	UFF(gsw)
18/10/86	Billy Dickson(39M)		Belfast	Prot(gsw)
24/10/86	Kenneth Johnston(25M)		Magherafelt	IRA(gsw)
10/11/86	Derek Patterson(39M)		Belfast	IRA(gsw)

---

59 murders = 46 by ROMAN CATHOLIC(Republican) terror groups
+ 12 by PROTESTANT(Loyalist) terror groups
+ 1 by unknown (believed to be terrorist)

R.Catholic victims..21 = 11 by Republicans and 10 by Loyalists.

Protestant victims..38 = 35 by Republicans and 2 by Loyalists
+ 1 unknown.

Murders by Republican terrorists = 78.0%

Murders by Loyalist terrorists = 20.0%

Security Forces victims..29 = 29 by Republicans and Nil by Loyalists.

Civilian victims.....30 = 17 by Republicans and 12 by Loyalists
+ 1 unknown.

Murders by Republicans = 100.0% of Security Forces
+ 57.0% of Civilians.

Murders by Loyalists = None of Security Forces
+ 40.0% of Civilians.

(gsw).....gunshot wound/s
(exp).....explosion
(btd).....beaten to death
(std).....stabbed to death

CONFIDENTIAL

50% remission.
→ Retrospective ←
Selective internment.

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH NORTHERN IRELAND REPRESENTATIVES

You have agreed to see Jim Molyneaux and Ken McGuinness at 1615, together with four representatives of the Enniskillen area. These are:

Mr. McGuiness

- James Cooper, a solicitor and leading member of the Official Unionist Party locally;

- Sammy Foster, a local councillor who was present at the Remembrance Day ceremony and who was slightly hurt by the explosion;

- Walter Parkes, a leading British Legion representative;

- The Reverend Edwy Kille, a Church of England rector.

The Northern Ireland Secretary will also be present. He has to leave by 1645 to do television. It would be best to try to draw the meeting to a close at that point.

If only — . —

CDP 194 deaths

Security reactive — Bars for security.

Republic. —

Sinn Fein. — S.D.L.P. — acceptance of responsibility

C. D. POWELL

9 November 1987

(1) We are no stronger to lean on — Homes. — Greenfields — Horsegrass. — Bogside Bank
(2) S.D.L.P. — Unity of Purpose. — other Bank.

SLHAOQ Sinn Fein:
"Are forced to join with Post"

6,000

8,500

2½

10,000 — soldiers

BACKGROUND

ENNISKILLEN ATTACK

At 1045 hours on Sunday 8 November a bomb, believed to consist of approximately 30 lbs of explosives, detonated beside the War Memorial in Enniskillen, Co Fermanagh as people were gathering for the Remembrance service. The bomb, which exploded without warning, had been placed in an old school building part of which collapsed on the civilians waiting for the parade to the Cenotaph.

Eleven persons were killed and 63 injured including 14 children. Of the injured five are in a serious condition. Those who died were:-

Mr William Mullan (aged 73) and his wife Nessie (aged 70)
Mr Kit Johnston (aged 70) and his wife Jessie (aged 70)
Mr Wesley Armstrong (aged 63) and his wife Bertha (aged 53)
Mrs Georgina Quinton (aged 72)
Mr John Megaw (aged 68)
Mr Samuel Gault (aged 49) a retired police officer
Mr Edward Armstrong (aged 52) a member of the RUC Reserve
Miss Marie Wilson (aged 20) a nurse from the RV Hospital.

No terrorist organisation has yet claimed responsibility for this outrage which is the worst single incident since the Ballykelly Droppin Well pub bombing on 6 December 1982 when 17 people were killed.

The Provisional IRA have claimed to have left a 200 lb landmine which failed to detonate on the Keah/Pettigo road at Tullyhannon close to the border in Co Fermanagh. The bomb is alleged to have been planted to coincide with a Remembrance day service being held in that area. A follow up operation is underway but no device has so far been located. Also on Sunday evening the police stopped a car in Waring Street in the centre of Belfast and discovered a 200 lb bomb. The driver was arrested.

The deaths in Enniskillen bring the total deaths due to terrorist activity this year to 88 as compared with 56 in the same period last year.

Prepared by the NIO.
9/11

11
21
5

100016.
Lady Bulfont

: Statement.
: Expenditure
: Taxation.

R.N.

Ransom →

Ken Pogington

4 ~~tele~~ lady [illegible]

Sd. [illegible] Coupe
D.C. [illegible] Potter
Walter Parker

Mr. ~~Edwy~~ Kilke (Ch. of Schl [illegible])

Editor called: [illegible]

Mr Green.

Edwy.

[illegible]

Very careful →

2 – 4520
– 5234.

Brooks

16.15

4.15 →

Ah. Hon. Mr. Mayeaux / Pogington.

Worthy.

FILE
DA

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 November 1987

I enclose copies of the messages of condolence which the Prime Minister has received about the Enniskillen bomb incident from President Reagan, the Taoiseach, and Mr. Hawke. I should be grateful if, in consultation with the Northern Ireland Office, you could let me have draft replies, picking up any particular thoughts which you consider important.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to David Watkins (Northern Ireland Office).

(C.D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Replies required by 13 Nov.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

November 9, 1987

Dear Prime Minister:

We have been asked to deliver the enclosed message from the President.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Raymond Seitz

R.G.H. Seitz
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

Enclosure

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
Number 10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

November 8, 1947

Dear Prime Minister:

We have been asked to deliver the enclosed message from the President.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

J.G.M. Dulles
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

Enclosure

The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
Number 10 Downing Street,
London S.W.1.

010

CC PC

AMBASÁID NA hÉIREANN, LONDAIN

IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

17 Grosvenor Place
SWIX 7HR

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T201/87.

C.D. Powell, Esq.
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London SWI

SUBJECT cc MASTER
OPS

CNOOI
9/11

9 November 1987

Dear Private Secretary

Further to my telephone conversation on Sunday, 8 November with Mr David Norgrove I would now like to convey more formally the text of the message sent by the Taoiseach to the Prime Minister:

> "I want to convey to you on my own behalf and on behalf of the Irish Government my shock and revulsion at the carnage at Enniskillen today.
>
> Our heartfelt sympathy goes out to the bereaved and to the injured. All the security forces in this island must combine in an all-out effort to have the perpetrators brought to justice."

Yours sincerely

Andrew O'Rourke

Andrew O'Rourke
Ambassador.

CC PC

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T200/87.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

AUSTRALIA HOUSE
STRAND
LONDON WC2B 4LA
01-438 8220

9 November 1987

SUBJECT cc MASTER OPS

My dear Prime Minister

I have been asked to pass to you the following text of a message from the Australian Prime Minister, the Hon R J L Hawke, AC MP:

Message begins:

Dear Margaret

I was appalled to learn of the terrorist outrage at Enniskillen. I express through you the deepest sympathy of the Government and people of Australia to the relatives and friends of those killed in this callous crime and to the surviving victims.

The Australian Government strongly supports the efforts of the British and Irish Governments through the Anglo-Irish Agreement to end communal strife in Northern Ireland through reconciliation and the search for understanding. We utterly repudiate violence.

I join you in your forthright condemnation of this despicable and cowardly act.

Yours sincerely

Bob Hawke

Message ends.

Yours sincerely

Douglas McClelland

(Douglas McClelland)

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister and
First Lord of the Treasury
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

My dear Prime Minister

I have been asked to pass to you the following text of a message from the Australian Prime Minister, the Hon R G Hawke, AC MP:

Message begins:

Dear Margaret

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The Australian Government strongly supports the efforts of the British and Irish Governments through the Anglo Irish Agreement to end communal strife in Northern Ireland through reconciliation and the search for understanding. We utterly repudiate violence.

I join you in your forthright condemnation of this despicable and cowardly act.

Yours sincerely

Bob Hawke

Message ends.

Yours sincerely

(Douglas McClelland)

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister and
First Lord of the Treasury
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

CDP
9/xi

MESSAGE FROM KIM PENDLETON, POLITICAL COUNSELLOR AT THE US EMBASSY 7.50 P.M.

"The American people join you in the revulsion I know is felt throughout the United Kingdom at today's act of terrorism in Northern Ireland. We extend our deepest sympathy to the families of those who lost their lives and to those who were injured. It is a particularly cruel irony that such a deed should be done on a day of remembrance. All of us are reminded once again that terrorist outrages must not be permitted to destroy what so many throughout the world have struggled to build.

Sincerely yours,

RON"

JD54

8.11.87

SUBJECT cc MASTER OPS

November 8, 1987

Dear Margaret:

The American people join you in the revulsion I know is felt throughout the United Kingdom at today's act of terrorism in Northern Ireland. We extend our deepest sympathies to the families of those who lost their lives and to those who were injured. It is a particularly cruel irony that such a deed should be done on a Day of Remembrance. All of us are reminded once again that terrorist outrages must not be permitted to destroy what so many throughout the world have struggled to build.

Sincerely yours,

/S/

Ron

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T199/87

PRIME MINISTER

The Irish Ambassador has just called with a message to you from the Taoiseach, as follows:

> "I want to convey to you on my own behalf and on behalf of the Irish Government my shock and revulsion at the carnage at Enniskillen today. Our heartfelt sympathy goes out to the bereaved and to the injured. All the security forces in this island must combine in an all out effort to have the perpetrators brought to justice."

The Ambassador told me that the message would probably be released in Dublin later today if we were content. I was sure you would see no objection to that and I thanked him on your behalf.

Good message.

MT

DAVID NORGROVE
8 November 1987

read over telephone to NIO 19.15. 8/11/87

c AH

HOUSE OF COMMONS
WESTMINSTER
LONDON SW1A OAA

6 November 1987

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Prime Minister

We know you will share our concern over increasing terrorist activity in Northern Ireland.

Contrary to ill-founded expectations, Sinn Fein and the IRA are gaining in strength and influence, clearly demonstrated by three examples:-

[a] Sinn Fein candidates winning two seats, previously held by the Alliance Party, on Belfast City Council. Sinn Fein is now the largest non-Unionist Party on that Council.

[b] The physical pressure upon the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Londonderry where by weight of numbers the IRA forced the Church to abandon its commendable stand on IRA funerals.

[c] The sinister and frightening arms shipment, fortunately apprehended, which confirms our long held view that the IRA's role in internationsl terrorism has been grossly underestimated.

Such a role is enhanced by the unwillingness of the Republic of Ireland to act as a full partner in Europe in the fight against terrorism and implement extradition. A good neighbour is unlikely to harbour knowingly the one who robbed a neighbour's home or murdered a neighbour's husband.

It is still unacceptable that the people of Northern Ireland who have honourably played their part in the United Kingdom for centuries should be governed by a diktat involving those who seceded from the Kingdom and whose hostility to the Kingdom is demonstrated regularly.

Our hope still is that we can move to a new situation in which an alternative to the present Anglo/Irish Agreement can be agreed.

You will be aware that we are engaged in probing talks with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and his officials to secure the means of setting the Agreement to the side and to produce the conducive circumstances necessary for negotiations to take place.

Yours sincerely

JAMES H MOLYNEAUX

DR IAN R K PAISLEY

JAMES KILFEDDER

WILLIAM ROSS

PETER ROBINSON

HAROLD McCUSKER

REV WILLIAM McCREA

REV W MARTIN SMYTH

JOHN D TAYLOR

ROY BEGGS

CLIFFORD FORSYTHE

KEN MAGINNIS

A CECIL WALKER

The National Archives

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Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
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eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

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SUBJECT
ccmaster

SECRET

FILE
cc L Pres.
FCO
Cabdl
PC

1

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 November 1987

Dear David,

NORTHERN IRELAND

The Prime Minister held a meeting this morning to discuss various aspects of the Northern Ireland situation. There were present the Lord President, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Northern Ireland Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism

The meeting discussed the implications of a decision by the Irish Government to postpone ratification of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Present indications were that the Taoiseach was not prepared to face his backbenchers on this issue and would seek postponement for an undefined period, even though no decision in this sense was likely to be announced until after the second anniversary of the Anglo-Irish Agreement on 15 November. Despite this, we should not give any sign that we accepted that postponement of ratification was inevitable. Political attitudes in the Republic towards ratification were constantly shifting. Fine Gael now seemed to be moving again in favour of ratification and there was little doubt that it could be pushed through with their support and the Government's payroll vote. There were strong and effective arguments which we could deploy in favour of ratification, pointing to the fact that this would be an important contribution to Europe's campaign against terrorism (which had just had a significant success with the interception of the arms cache on the MV Eksund). Irish attitudes would be affected by a number of factors such as the outcome of the review of the case of those imprisoned for the Birmingham bomb outrage or a decision on prosecutions as a result of the Stalker-Simpson inquiry, although in practice neither of these matters was likely to be brought to a conclusion before 1 December. Of more immediate relevance was the outcome of the House of Lord's consideration of the prima facie issue which was likely to be decided on 10 November. It was very important that the Government should prevail, and this could have a useful influence on the Irish Government's decision on the ECST. A message from the Prime Minister to the Taoiseach was another possibility, but might be counter-productive if leaked, making it appear that

Mr. Haughey was acting under pressure. It was better to act through the media and at official level to leave the Irish Government in no doubt of the very serious implications of failure to ratify on 1 December as planned. We should decline any attempts by the Irish Government to involve us in discussion of damage limitation and in particular should reject the idea of a joint study of special courts in both jurisdictions by an Anglo-Irish group.

The Prime Minister concluded that there would inevitably be serious problems in the House, in Northern Ireland and in Anglo-Irish relations if ratification did not proceed as planned. We must not give the Irish government any excuses for deferral, indeed should make clear that we would be bound to react very sharply to it, as damaging to the spirit of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. In the Northern Ireland Secretary's words, we should not blink.

Political Development in Northern Ireland

There was also some discussion on the prospects for political development in Northern Ireland, on the basis of your Secretary of State's minute of 2 November.

Your Secretary of State said that considerable progress had been made, as a result of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, in eroding Sinn Fein's support and in reconciling the Nationalist community. Unionist opinion was gradually coming to terms with the fact that the Agreement was here to stay. But it still had not been possible to engage Unionist politicians in a proper dialogue. It was not healthy to have a vacuum here, particularly against the background of expected problems in the industrial and employment fields in Northern Ireland in the coming months. The talks about talks with Messrs Paisley and Molyneaux had given rise to a number of ideas, none of them very practical since they would involve what would be in effect a suspension of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The proposal in his minute of 2 November for bilateral talks with all the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland about possible forms of political development was an attempt to bring the Unionists in from the cold. The Government itself would make no specific proposals but simply hear what the parties had to say. It was quite likely that Paisley and Molyneaux would regard the offer as inadequate and break off talks altogether. Indeed this was the expectation of officials.

In a brief discussion, it was agreed that the Government's main objective over the coming months must be to hold the Anglo-Irish Agreement on course. This was more important than offering the Unionists any inducement to talk. The fact was that they did not in the end have any real alternative. The Government should not itself press any particular proposals for political development. There was no reason to think that attempts to move towards devolution would not run into precisely the same problems as in the past. All the old prejudices would re-emerge if there were to be a round-table conference. Some interest was expressed in

exploring the idea of setting up a regional tier of local government, under which the Province might have two or three regional councils. The basic purpose of talks should be to find ways to end the present non-cooperation. It was suggested that there were risks in linking the bilateral talks to review of the workings of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, provided for in Article II of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Unionists would inevitably present this as evidence of willingness on the Government's part to put the Agreement itself at issue. Any consultations would in fact have to be under the Agreement.

The Prime Minister concluded that the Northern Ireland Secretary should pursue the proposal in his minute of 2 November with caution. The priority should be to get the province safely through the various difficult issues likely to arise in the next few months. We should not take any risks to keep the Unionists in play. Nor should the Unionists at this stage be offered any role in the review of the workings of the Intergovernmental Conference which would be required in due course. Careful thought would need to be given to the framework in which such consultations should be held, to ensure that it could not be misrepresented by the Unionists. It would probably be better to set down such a framework in writing. The Northern Ireland Secretary should circulate a draft to his colleagues when the moment came.

I am copying this letter to the Mike Eland (Lord President's Office), Tony Galsworthy (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

(CHARLES POWELL)

David Watkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.