


Confidential Filing

Visit of the Norwegian Prime Minister,  
Mr. Kåre Willoch. & MRS. BRINDLAND.

NORWAY

PART 1 :

NOVEMBER 1981

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>11.11.81</del>							
<del>14.12.81</del>							
<del>23.12.81</del>							
<del>17.2.82</del>							
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<del>27.11.85</del>							
<del>29.11.85</del>							
24.2.87							
							
PART ENDS							

PREM 19/2372

- ① Briefing in yellow folders at rear of file.
- ② Briefing in folders for meeting on  
27/11/85

PART 1 ends:-

CDP TO FCO 24.2.47

PART 2 begins:-

ENG TO CDP 23.4.47



file h

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

24 February, 1987.

VISIT OF THE NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER

You told me that Mrs. Brundtland would be in the United Kingdom on UN business at the end of April and had asked to see the Prime Minister.

Blk 11

The Prime Minister would be able to see her at 3 p.m. on 27 April. I should be grateful if you would convey the invitation to this effect.

(C.D. Powell)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

h



10 DOWNING STREET

CDP 27th April.

3.00 p.m. ?

Tessa

Ed. - you please

Tessa  
24/2

give me a  
time on one  
of these days.

CDP

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF MRS. BRUNDTLAND

Mrs. Brundtland will be in the United Kingdom for an environmental meeting on 27-28 April and has asked whether she might call on you. I think it would be hard to refuse given that she was your host in Norway last September. You did not see her when she came here in November last year, but she was not actually in London.

Agree to see her briefly?

CDP

Yes of course

C. D. POWELL

20 February 1987

SLHAK



CCPC

(4)

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY  
THAMES HOUSE SOUTH  
MILLBANK LONDON SW1P 4QJ

01 211 6402

Charles Powell Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

Prime Minister

You may like  
to find time

29 November 1985

to look at  
this in due  
course.

Dear Charles

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF  
NORWAY

COD 4/xii

upstacia!

I enclose a video of the CEGB film on acid rain  
which your letter of 27 November requested. It  
runs for about 35 minutes.

Yours sincerely

Roger Levett

R LEVETT  
Private Secretary

Subject  
cc master.

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10 DOWNING STREET

File JA  
copy P [signature]

From the Private Secretary

27 November 1985

Dear Colin,

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF  
NORWAY**

The Prime Minister had a meeting in her room at the House of Commons this evening with the Norwegian Prime Minister. Mr Willoch was accompanied by Mr Udgaard, Minister in the Prime Minister's Office.

Norway Internal

The Prime Minister complimented Mr Willoch on his election success and on the healthy state of the Norwegian economy. Norway appeared to her to be a country of two house - two car - two boat - two holiday families. Mr. Willoch admitted that Norway was in good shape though perhaps not quite as good as the Prime Minister believed. There were difficulties in having a coalition government; it involved endless compromises, all of which cost money. There were also problems in the health and social security field.

Acid Rain

Mr Willoch said that the United Kingdom argument that there were scientific uncertainties about the effects of acid rain did not carry great conviction. There was no real reason to doubt that acidification of lakes and rivers was caused by SO<sup>2</sup> emissions. He regretted that the United Kingdom had not joined other European countries in agreeing to reduce emissions by 30 per cent by 1993. Although Norway's forests had not yet been touched there was a lot of concern in Norway about the dangers. There was no doubt that the United Kingdom was an important source of pollution. He felt bound to press the Prime Minister strongly to join other countries in pledging to reduce emissions. The question threatened to affect our bilateral relations.

The Prime Minister quoted figures for our performance in reducing emissions so far and questioned whether emissions were proven to be the cause of the problems in Norway. She put a number of technical questions to Mr. Willoch. The Prime Minister continued that we were aiming to reduce both SO<sup>2</sup> and NO<sup>x</sup> emissions by 30 per cent by the late 1990s. But we did not believe in subscribing to

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[Handwritten signature]



formal commitments unless we knew that we could definitely meet them. In practice our performance would probably be better than that of many countries which had made commitments.

It was agreed that Mr Willoch would let the Prime Minister have material on the technical points which she raised. Mr Udgaard mentioned the recent CEGB film which had caused great offence in Norway by seeming to dismiss the problem. The Prime Minister said that she had not seen it but would obtain a copy.

#### East/West Relations

The Prime Minister gave Mr Willoch her assessment of the recent US Soviet Summit. There were now prospects for progress in the INF negotiations and possibly also in the negotiations on chemical weapons and MBFR. The risk was that public expectations had been created which might be difficult to fulfil. Mr Willoch said that it remained to be seen whether Mr Gorbachev would continue to refuse to make progress on the reduction of nuclear weapons unless the United States compiled the Strategic Defence Initiative. There was a tendency in Norway to criticise the Strategic Defence Initiative as the main obstacle to progress.

#### Participation in SDI Research

Mr Willoch asked whether the United Kingdom would be taking part in SDI research. The Prime Minister confirmed that we would and that the Federal Republic was also intending to do so. Mr Willoch said that Norway was favourable to Eureka and would co-operate in it. The Prime Minister referred to the importance of ensuring that Eureka's activities were market-oriented.

#### EFTA

Mr Willoch said that Norway wanted to avoid the creation of a new tariff wall between Spain and Portugal and EFTA. The Community's demands on EFTA in the context of Spain and Portugal's accession were not reasonable. The Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom had some sympathy with EFTA's case.

#### European Community

The Prime Minister gave an account of recent developments in the European Community and the prospects for the Luxembourg European Council. Those who sought far-reaching changes in the Treaty would not get satisfaction, though it might be possible to agree to small amendments of no great consequence. Mr Willoch recalled the importance which Norway attached to close consultation with the Ten on political co-operation matters.

The question of a possible visit by the Prime Minister to Norway was not raised.


/I should be

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- 3 -

I should be grateful if the Department of Energy could obtain a video of the CEGB film for the Prime Minister to review.

I am copying this letter to Rachel Lomax (H.M. Treasury), Robin Young (Department of the Environment), Geoff Dart (Department of Energy), and to David Williamson (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely  


(CHARLES POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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~~PRIME MINISTER~~

CDP  
27/11/85

MEETING WITH MR. WILLOCH

I have suggested that he come with only one official, since you will be fed up with large meetings after the Anglo-German Summit.

The subjects are:-

(i) Acid Rain. The Norwegians feel strongly about this. About 10 per cent of total deposition in Norway comes from us (20 per cent in South Norway). They are upset that we wouldn't subscribe to the target of 30 per cent reduction in emissions by 1993.

The point to make is that we are honest folk who don't promise more than we are sure we can deliver. We have in fact reduced emissions a great deal already [42 per cent since 1970: 25 per cent since 1980]. In practice we shall probably do better than many who have accepted the target.

(ii) East/West relations. Views on the US/Soviet Summit.

(iii) European Community. He'll be interested in the prospects for the European Council.

(iv) EC/EFTA. The EC is (unreasonably) demanding that EFTA abolish all duties on Spanish and Portuguese imports immediately, while giving itself 7 years to do so gradually. We sympathise with the Norwegians.

(v) Your visit to Norway. They are very keen for you to go. You could probably also visit British Forces. You don't want to travel in the Easter Recess. But Whitsun or September would be possibilities.

CDP.

CDP

26 November, 1985.

JD3AFO

CC PC  
BU

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 November 1985

CDP  
27 xi

Dear Charles,

Call on the Prime Minister by Mr Kare Willoch,  
Norwegian Prime Minister: 1700 on 27 November

Given your decision to make this a smaller meeting than you had originally planned, we have had a word with the Norwegian Embassy about participation. They will alert Mr Willoch, and expect him to fall in with the Prime Minister's wishes. He is likely to be accompanied only by Mr Nils Morten Udgaard (junior Minister in the Prime Minister's office). Mr Willoch (personality note enclosed) and Mrs Thatcher last met in London in March 1982.

I enclose the briefing we had prepared in the light of your letter of 15 November. In the circumstances I think the Prime Minister need read only this letter and the brief on acid rain, but you may like to have the other briefs to hand, in case of need.

Acid Rain.

An increasingly awkward issue in an otherwise excellent and warm bilateral relationship. I enclose a telegram on the Norwegian reaction to a recent CEEB film on the subject. Marine life has virtually disappeared from the inland waters of southern Norway. The Norwegians regard this as an environmental disaster and blame the UK for a major contribution to the problem. During her visit to Norway on 14 and 15 November Lady Young was present for the ceremonial felling of the Christmas tree sent by Oslo every year since 1947 for Trafalgar Square, against a background of a demonstration against pollution from Britain. The Norwegian Environment Minister, Mrs Surlien, told Lady Young that the Norwegian Government was under great pressure to take the issue up with the UK. The Prime Minister may wish to tell Mr Willoch that we take the problem seriously, that we have already significantly reduced our sulphur emissions and intend to reduce them further, but were unwilling to join other countries in a commitment to reduce emissions by 30% by 1993 in case we were unable to meet this.

/ Possible



Possible Visit by the Prime Minister to Norway

Mr Willoch issued an invitation when he visited London in 1982. Senior Norwegians have privately expressed regret that the Prime Minister has not yet found time for a visit. Next September might be a possible time, when the Norwegian summer holiday period would have ended but parliaments would not yet be in session. In addition to talks with Mr Willoch, the Prime Minister might consider visiting NATO's AFNORTH (Allied Forces North) HQ just outside Oslo. CINCNORTH at that point will be General Sir Geoffrey Howlett. If she were prepared to go to Stavanger, too, there might be a possibility of formally opening BP's Ulla field, which is due to come on stream in 1986, ahead of schedule. This possibility has not yet been discussed with BP.

Norway Internal

In the election in Norway on 9 September Mr Willoch's Conservative-led coalition was returned to power. But its majority over the opposition parties was reduced to one. A background brief is enclosed with HM Ambassador's despatch on the elections.

East/West and Arms Control

The Norwegians were worried when Soviet naval exercises held this summer penetrated further into the Norwegian Sea than previously. They are particularly concerned that Soviet short-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) are not included in any current arms control negotiations. This matter is to be discussed in NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG); we regard the limitation of long-range intermediate nuclear forces (LRINF) as the priority. Mr Willoch attended President Reagan's briefing of the North Atlantic Council on 21 November. He will wish to exchange views with the Prime Minister about the implications of the US/Soviet Summit for East/West relations and the Geneva talks. The Prime Minister might stress to Mr Willoch that Alliance cohesion has been a significant factor in bringing the Russians to the negotiating table and that it is essential for this now to be maintained. On SDI, the Norwegian coalition is divided. Norway has said that she will not participate in military aspects of SDI research. At the Geneva arms talks the Norwegians would probably favour an agreement that linked reductions in strategic weapons with an end to the development, testing and deployment of space weapons.

European Community

Although many Norwegians, including Mr Willoch, would like to see Norway in the European Community, a further referendum on the issue would not be politically practical in the medium term. Mr Willoch will value the Prime Minister's views on the

/Intergovernmental

[or in  
Whitman  
review]



Intergovernmental Conference, moves to European Union and the completion of the internal market. Above all, the Norwegians are interested in developments in European Political Cooperation. They are kept well informed of discussions in EPC by the Presidency and the Danes. We also brief them regularly. The Norwegians favour improved European defence cooperation but they want to be able to contribute and fear exclusion from important fora. This was apparent when Western European Union was revitalised.

#### EC/EFTA

The EFTA countries are concerned about one particular effect of the terms of the Enlargement Adaptation Protocols. The problem, essentially, is that the Community is asking the EFTA countries to abolish all duties on imports of Spanish industrial products from the date of accession. This contrasts with the seven years which Spain will have to phase out her duties on imports from EFTA, and which the Community itself will have to phase out duties on imports from Spain. EFTA countries regard this as unfair. Mr Willoch may mention the problem. If so, the Prime Minister might say that we have sympathy for the EFTA viewpoint but note that EFTANs will gain advantages in access to the Spanish market. The Commission has, in fact, proposed a tariff standstill in the first two months of 1986 to allow further discussion of the problem.

#### European Technological Cooperation

Norway is keen to be involved as much as possible in European Technological Cooperation. They have approached the Commission about negotiating a framework agreement. They will participate in Eureka. A collaborative venture between Norway's Norsk Data and the French firm Matra announced in July was presented as the first project in the Eureka scheme. The Norwegians will be interested in how we see this developing. Norway is about to become a full member of the European Space Agency.

*Yours ever,*

*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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FM OSLO

TO DESKBY 251530Z FCO

TELNO 178

OF 251415Z NOVEMBER 85

INFO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM

INFO ROUTINE HELSINKI, COPENHAGEN

MY TELECON WITH MISS MCINTOSH (MAED): CEGB FILM ON ACID RAIN

## SUMMARY

1. NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT CONTENT OF CEGB FILM AND FAILURE OF FILM MAKERS TO INFORM NORWEGIAN AUTHORITIES WHEN PARTS OF IT WERE SHOT IN NORWAY. POSSIBILITY THAT MR WILLOCH MAY MENTION IT TO PRIME MINISTER ON 27 NOVEMBER.

## DETAIL

2. I WAS SUMMONED TO THE MFA TODAY BY THE AUS FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND HANDED A NOTE VERBALE, TO WHICH WAS APPENDED COMMENTS BY THE NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND BY INDEPENDENT SCIENTISTS (FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG).

3. THE NOTE STATES THAT THE NORWEGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITIES HAD NOTED THE CEGB FILM WITH REGRET SINCE ITS INTENTION APPEARED TO BE TO MINIMIZE THE EVIDENCE OF RESEARCH ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACID PRECIPITATION. FURTHERMORE THOSE PARTS OF IT SHOT IN NORWAY WERE FILMED WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE NORWEGIAN AUTHORITIES. THE MFA SHARED THESE CONCERNS AND DID NOT REGARD THE FILM AS A HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE ENVIRONMENT.

4. THE APPENDED COMMENTS BY THE NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT DESCRIBE THE CEGB AS "THE SPEARHEAD OF THE INTERNAL BRITISH STRUGGLE NOT TO COMMIT THE COUNTRY TO REDUCTIONS OF SULPHUR EMISSIONS". THE FILM WAS A PARTISAN REPRESENTATION OF THE CEGB'S POINT OF VIEW AND THE NORWEGIAN AUTHORITIES HAD VERY STRONG OBJECTIONS TO IT. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT AN ORGANISATION "SO CLOSELY TIED TO THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES" HAS MADE PART OF A FILM ON A TOPIC OF SUCH SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE NORWAY/UK RELATIONSHIP IN SOUTHERN NORWAY WITHOUT ANY NOTIFICATION TO THE NORWEGIAN AUTHORITIES. THE APPENDIX GOES ON TO "REFUTE ABSOLUTELY" THE FILM'S THESIS AND TO ASSERT THAT ITS CLAIMS ARE CONTRARY TO THE VIEWS OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF SCIENTISTS.

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/5.

5. I TOLD DIETZ THAT IT WAS WRONG TO CHARACTERISE THE CEGB AS AN ORGANISATION "CLOSELY TIED TO THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES". THE GOVERNMENT HAD ONLY LIMITED POWERS OVER THE CEGB. IT WAS FREE TO OPERATE ON A COMMERCIAL BASIS AND THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT INTERVENE IN ITS AFFAIRS EXCEPT AS REGARDS BROAD FINANCIAL CONTROL. AS MR GOODLAD HAD SAID IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 30 OCTOBER, THE CEGB WAS FREE TO ISSUE ANY RELEVANT PUBLICITY MATERIAL CONSISTENT WITH ITS STATUTORY POWERS AND DUTIES. WE DID NOT REGARD CEGB PUBLICITY AS A MATTER FOR THE GOVERNMENT. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I HAD SOME SYMPATHY FOR NORWEGIAN VIEWS ABOUT THE CONTENT OF THE FILM BUT IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THOSE WHO TOOK PART HAD SIGNED "RELEASE FORMS" WHICH GAVE THE FILM COMPANY CONTROL OVER THE USE IT MADE OF THEIR MATERIAL. IF THIS WAS SO, THE GROUNDS FOR THE COMPLAINT THAT THE MATERIAL OF A SWEDISH SCIENTIST (HULTBERG) HAD BEEN MISUSED IN THE FILM (A POINT MENTIONED IN THE APPENDIX TO THE NORWEGIAN NOTE) SEEMED WEAK.

6. DIETZ SAID THAT WHILE HE DID NOT THINK THAT MR WILLOCH (WHO IS SEEING THE FILM TODAY) WOULD MENTION IT WHEN HE CALLS ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON 27 NOVEMBER, THE NORWEGIAN AUTHORITIES HAD THOUGHT THEIR VIEWS SHOULD BE CONVEYED BEFORE THIS MEETING TOOK PLACE. THE NORWEGIAN MINISTER OF THE ENVIRONMENT WOULD BE ANSWERING A QUESTION ABOUT THE FILM IN THE STARTING ON 27 NOVEMBER AND WOULD SAY THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON THE FILM HAD BEEN MADE KNOWN TO THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE A LITTLE SURPRISED IF MR WILLOCH MENTIONED THE FILM TO THE PRIME MINISTER SINCE MRS SURLIEN HAD NOT REFERRED TO IT WHEN SHE MET LADY YOUNG ON 14 NOVEMBER. THE NORWEGIAN MINISTER OF THE ENVIRONMENT HAD, AFTER ALL, BEEN AWARE OF IT FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. HOWEVER, I WOULD OF COURSE TRANSMIT NORWEGIAN VIEWS ON THE FILM TO MY GOVERNMENT AND THESE WOULD BE TREATED WITH APPROPRIATE SERIOUSNESS. DIETZ COMMENTED THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CEGB WHICH I HAD DESCRIBED, HE SUPPOSED THAT WE WOULD FIND IT POSSIBLE TO CONVEY NORWEGIAN FEELINGS ABOUT THE FILM, AND THE WAY IN WHICH IT HAD BEEN MADE, TO THE CEGB.

LOGAN

LIMITED  
MRED  
WED  
MR. O'NEILL

COPY TO : PS No 10.

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FILE

DA



CP

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 November 1985

**CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE NORWEGIAN  
PRIME MINISTER**

Thank you for your letter of 15 November about Mr. Willoch's visit.

I agree with the agenda and participation you propose.

(Charles Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

CDP / Fire ah

Please see FCO letter to  
you of 15.11.85 (at flap)

The Foreign office now  
say that the Foreign  
Secretary will be unable  
to attend the meeting  
with Mr Willoch as he  
already has an engagement.  
However the Foreign office  
would still like Sir  
William Bentley to attend  
the meeting.

Amanda  
18.11.85.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 November 1985

*Dear Charles,*

Call on the Prime Minister by Mr Kåre Willoch, Norwegian Prime Minister, 27 November

In your letter of 4 October you confirmed that the Prime Minister would see Mr Willoch for a talk on 27 November, when Mr Willoch is in London in connection with the Norwegian Export Council's London Week. The call will take place at 1630.

We have been in touch with the Norwegian Embassy about an agenda and propose the following:

East/West and Arms Control Issues  
(including outcome of US/Soviet summit;  
Geneva talks; SDI)

European Issues  
(including proposals for movement towards European  
Union; developments in European Political  
Cooperation; Inter-governmental Conference; WEU)

European Technological Cooperation  
(including EUREKA).

Bilateral Issues  
(possible visit to Norway by Mrs Thatcher;  
acid rain)

If the Prime Minister is content, we shall provide briefing on these points.

Mr Willoch would like to be accompanied at the talk by the following:

Mr Nils Udgaard, Head of Prime Minister's Private Office

Mr Kjeld Vibe, Secretary General, Norwegian Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs

Mr Rolf Busch, Norwegian Ambassador.

On the UK side, the Foreign Secretary would like to attend the meeting, if the Prime Minister agrees. We suggest that Sir William Bentley, HM Ambassador in Oslo, who is at present in the UK on leave, should also be present.

*Yours ever,  
Colin Budd*

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

(C R Budd)

NORWAY: VISITS of NORWEGIAN PM: NOV 81



Confidential OK CR  
Can we manage this by switching meeting times?  
CDP

GRS 70

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FM OSLO  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 155  
OF 091349Z OCTOBER 85

FCO TELNO 95 : POSSIBLE VISIT BY MR WILLOCH

1. MR WILLOCH IS MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION AND WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO CALL ON HER AT 1700 HOURS ON 27 NOVEMBER. HOWEVER BECAUSE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT ENGAGEMENTS THAT EVENING, HE WOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF THE MEETING COULD BE BROUGHT FORWARD TO 1630 IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. GRATEFUL FOR EARLY INSTRUCTIONS.

LOGAN

LIMITED

WED  
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MAES  
NEWS D  
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PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
MR DEREK THOMAS.

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file

EC



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

4 October 1985

**POSSIBLE VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM BY THE  
NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER**

Thank you for your letter of 1 October about the possible visit to the United Kingdom of the Norwegian Prime Minister.

BF 11  
The dates in question are very difficult for the Prime Minister and she simply cannot offer Mr. Willoch a lunch or dinner. She would however be able to see him at 1700 hours on 27 November for a talk, in the course of which she would be ready to mention the possibility of her visiting Norway in the course of next year.

I should be grateful if this suggestion of a meeting could be conveyed to Mr. Willoch by HM Ambassador in Oslo. I do not think a letter from the Prime Minister is really necessary with so little to say.

(Charles Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

AR

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 October 1985

The diary is very difficult, with the CTU speed at this time. I see no way you can give him a meal, but we might squeeze in a 45 minute meeting.

We must offer him a meal.

Agree? CDD 2/A.

Dear Charles,

Possible Visit to the UK of Norwegian Prime Minister:  
November 1985

Our Ambassador in Oslo has reported that the Norwegian Prime Minister, Mr Kare Willoch, is likely to come to London in the last week of November in connection with the Norwegian Export Council's London Week. We understand that Mr Willoch plans to be in London from 26 to 29 November. His main engagement would be a speech to Norwegian bankers at a dinner on 27 November (the Prime Minister will be engaged in talks with Chancellor Kohl until mid-afternoon on that day).

Mr Willoch's Conservative-led coalition government was returned to office following the election held in Norway on 9 September. Mr Willoch paid an official visit to Britain in March 1982 when he had talks with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and a number of other Ministers. He subsequently invited the Prime Minister to visit Norway but, as you know, it has not so far proved possible for her to do so.

Sir William Bentley has reported that senior Norwegians have privately expressed to him their regret that the Prime Minister has not yet visited Norway and an article to this effect appeared recently in a Norwegian newspaper. We do not believe that an early visit to Norway by the Prime Minister is a high priority, though it would be worth considering for 1987. But a meeting with Mr Willoch in London would demonstrate that we take Norway seriously as a trading partner and NATO ally. The Foreign Secretary therefore hopes that the Prime Minister might be prepared to see him. She may also like to consider offering him a meal.

I enclose a draft letter which the Prime Minister might send to Mr Willoch. It is couched in tentative terms, reflecting the fact that Mr Willoch has not yet made a final decision on his trip to London (though we believe that the

/strong

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strong probability is that he will come). The letter also leaves open the question of timing and whether the Prime Minister would wish to offer any hospitality. If the Prime Minister agrees, these points could be pursued as necessary once we have confirmation of Mr Willoch's plans.

*Yours ever,*

*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Mr Kåre Willoch  
Prime Minister of Norway

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Sir William Bentley tells me that you are planning a visit to London in November in connection with the Norwegian Export Council's London Week from 26-29 November.

CAVEAT.....

If you are able to come to London at that time, I hope very much that it will be possible for us to meet. [ If our respective engagements permit, I should like to entertain you to a meal at No 10. ]

Once your plans are clearer perhaps our officials could explore what might be possible.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

*Norway*

Attached is an advance copy of a despatch from HM Ambassador Oslo concerning the visit to the United Kingdom by the Norwegian Prime Minister, Mr Kåre Willoch, on 10 March. The despatch will be printed as a Diplomatic Report in due course.

*N.A.  
AR 22.  
4*

## Distribution:

No 10  
Private Secretary  
PS/Chancellor  
PS/Secretary of State for Defence  
PS/Secretary of State for Energy  
PS/Secretary of State for Trade  
PS/Mr Hurd  
PS/Mr Marten  
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Mr Bullard  
Mr Goodison  
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ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT - 10 MARCH 1982

S U M M A R Y

1. A successful visit by the Norwegian Prime Minister, the first in a decade. Mr Willoch's satisfaction at wide-ranging talks with the Prime Minister, yourself, and other senior Ministers. Mr Willoch detected signs of more optimism about the British economy. (paras 1-2)
2. A useful exchange of views on the state of the NATO Alliance, Turkey and El Salvador gave an opportunity to urge that comments on the two latter issues should not be allowed to weaken the cohesion of NATO. This point was reflected in Mr Willoch's subsequent public comments. Less satisfactory was the persistence of the Norwegian view that it would be difficult to leave out of account the British and French nuclear deterrents in future arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. (paras 3-4)
3. Mr Willoch seemed satisfied with assurances that we understood Norway's wish for closer contact with the Community and believed in informal and regular discussions about political cooperation. (para 5)
4. Discussions on Poland did not lead to any new conclusions. (para 6)
5. In exchanges of view with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the differing impact of falling oil prices on Britain and Norway was highlighted. Mr Willoch was, however, even more preoccupied by high interest rates in the United States. (para 7)
6. Discussion on defence issues centred on the effect of the replacement of our nuclear deterrent on our overall defence budget. Mr Willoch generally robust on ideas for a Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, while not discounting the possibility of future trouble for his Administration. (para 8)
7. In general discussions on energy it was indicated that Britain was interested in purchasing gas at a suitable price.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,  
OSLO.

31 March 1982

The Right Honourable  
The Lord Carrington KCMG MC

FCO

My Lord

ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT - 10 MARCH 1982

Mr Kåre Willoch's visit to the United Kingdom on 10 March 1982 was the first to be undertaken officially by a Norwegian Head of Government for a decade, a curiously sparse record. It was therefore doubly appropriate that the Prime Minister should have issued the invitation to Mr Willoch when congratulating him on taking office at the head of the first solely Conservative Administration in Norway for over 50 years.

2. I enclose the programme arranged for Mr Willoch and his party, Mr Kjell Colding, State Secretary in the Prime Minister's office, Mr Tom Vraalsen, Director General of Political Affairs, and Mr Erik Selmer, Director General of Economic Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The fact that Mr Willoch was able to have discussions with the Prime Minister and no less than ten members of Her Majesty's Government in the course of 24 hours undoubtedly gave him considerable satisfaction, not least because of Ministers' readiness to respond freely to a wide range of questions. I have heard that Mr Willoch was altogether very pleased at the way he was received. The blend of informality and  
/ceremony

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ceremony, highlighted by the tête à tête with Mrs Thatcher and the working lunch at No 10, undoubtedly suited the Norwegian style. While it was unfortunate that London was locked in a bus and underground strike, the Norwegian party took away an impression of our ability to circumvent traffic obstacles without obtrusive sirens and flashing lights, so enabling talks with you, My Lord, to start on time. Most important, as Mr Willoch commented to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he was able to detect a cautious air of greater optimism about the British economy than when he had visited the United Kingdom in his party capacity last June. Mr Willoch is very conscious that a successful outcome to HM Government's economic policy would have a very beneficial impact in Western Europe but that it is being watched closely by his domestic opponents for signs of failure; and it was perhaps to mark the fact that his Government's economic ideas are in some respects closer to those of the German Social Democrats that he chose to pay an official visit to Bonn first.

3. Four international political topics were in the forefront of Mr Willoch's mind and were discussed extensively with the Prime Minister and in part during the talks with you. These were the state of the NATO Alliance coupled with the future of disarmament negotiations, Turkey, El Salvador and, less prominently than I had expected, Norwegian relations with the Community.

4. It was I submit most valuable to use this opportunity to stress the need to keep the efforts of the Turkish Government in perspective and to refrain from harassing them in a way which

/might



might endanger NATO's eastern flank. Mr Willoch also listened attentively to the assessment of the complex situation in El Salvador and the grounds for concern about Eastern Bloc intervention. His comments on these subjects in subsequent interviews with Norwegian television and radio were carefully balanced and he stressed that one must not allow differences of view on such issues to weaken the cohesion of NATO. It was, therefore, useful for him to be assured of the importance we attach to a worthwhile declaration at the NATO Summit in June and to fixing a date for the beginning of the START talks. The least satisfactory point in the visit was the persistence of the Norwegian view in the face of counter arguments by yourself and later, Mr Hurd that, while they recognised that the British and French nuclear deterrents were not an appropriate subject for the INF negotiations, they questioned whether the Russians did not have a point in seeking to take account of these systems in the START talks. We will need to continue to deploy our arguments on this question, dwelling perhaps particularly on the danger that any arrangement between the United States and the Soviet Union which did not give the United States parity would be turned down by Congress.

5. As regards relations with the Community, Mr Willoch seemed content with the Prime Minister's assurance that we understood Norway's wish for closer contact, believed that discussions about political cooperation should take place informally and regularly and that we would be happy to try to help. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs no doubt realise that in many instances it is up to the

/Norwegian



Norwegian Embassies in Community capitals to be more diligent in asking the right questions. However, the subject is likely to preoccupy the Norwegian Government increasingly, and is complicated by signs that some Norwegians who were formerly cool about the Community unfortunately now look for closer ties within Europe simply from a desire to offset United States policies of which they are critical.

6. Discussions on Poland were, I thought, rather one-sided in that Mr Willoch did not dissent from any of the points which the Prime Minister and you, My Lord, made, but stressed that he was reluctant to go too far down the path of sanctions and wished to avoid strong rhetoric. He drew the lesson that it was necessary to work in concert and not to adopt unilateral steps, but looking at the Norwegian record they are now rather far down the list as regards steps, unilateral or otherwise.

7. The call on the Chancellor of the Exchequer was timely immediately following Budget Day and a significant fall in North Sea oil prices. Both then and in later discussion with the Prime Minister, the different impact of such prices on Britain and on Norway was highlighted. Though Mr Willoch agreed that the major problem was the slow tempo of economic activity in other industrial countries which could be helped by generally lower oil prices, it is becoming increasingly clear that diminished oil revenues are making a nasty hole in the Norwegian budget. Even so, Mr Willoch's concern seemed directed more to knowing whether Britain was able to bring pressure to bear on the United States Government to persuade

/them



them to reduce their interest rates; he will undoubtedly have noted carefully the Chancellor's response, that we were doing what we could by private persuasion, but that criticism in public risked provoking a back-lash in the United States.

8. Again, timing was helpful for discussion of Anglo-Norwegian defence issues, first, because it had just been confirmed that the two amphibious landing ships, so important for marine reinforcement in North Norway, had been reprieved from the defence cuts; and, secondly, because on the eve of his statement to the House, the Secretary of State for Defence was in a position to reply in detail to Mr Willoch's questions about the impact of Trident 5 on our defence budget. As expected, Mr Willoch showed that he wanted no truck with ideas for a Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, but that he could not discount the possibility of this causing more trouble for his Administration in the future. It was no doubt partly with this point in mind that he was anxious lest the cost of replacing our nuclear deterrent might have an adverse impact on conventional defence expenditure affecting the Northern Flank. Mr Pattie had an opportunity at dinner that night to revert again to the possibility of selling Rapier for the defence of the northern airfields.

9. In the discussions on energy, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Energy indicated for the first time our specific interest in securing further gas from Norway, in particular from the Sleipner field, if the price were right, and reverted to the possibility for Norwegian gas to reach the

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Continent of Europe via the United Kingdom. However, Mr Willoch declined to be drawn beyond saying that any purchase would be a matter for a commercial arrangement. There are already signs that Statoil are testing out prospective customers, where we are likely to face competition with Continental buyers and perhaps between BGC and other British companies.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to HM Representatives at Copenhagen, Helsinki, Stockholm, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL Brussels and Washington.

I am My Lord  
Yours faithfully

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Gillian Brown', written in dark ink.

Gillian Brown

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PROGRAMME

VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY MR KARE WILLOCH, PRIME MINISTER OF THE KINGDOM OF NORWAY, 10-11 MARCH 1982

Wednesday 10 March

- 0925 Arrival Heathrow. Met by Special Representative of Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir John Stow.
- 1030 Talks with Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KCMG MC at Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- 1105 Talks with Chancellor of the Exchequer, The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe MP.
- 1200 Talks with the Prime Minister, The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP. Starting with a tête à tête, followed by discussions and lunch at No 10 in which Secretary of State for Energy, The Rt Hon Nigel Lawson MP and Minister of State at Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Hon Douglas Hurd MP, took part.
- 1450 Talks with Secretary of State for Defence, The Rt Hon John Nott MP. Guard of honour, Household Division.
- 1530 Interview with Norwegian Radio and Television, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- 1600 Talks with Secretary of State for Energy, The Rt Hon Nigel Lawson MP.
- 1700 Press conference, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Commercial Section.
- 1900 Arrival Royal Garden Hotel.
- 1915 Private reception for Norwegian Embassy staff at Norwegian Ambassador's Residence.
- 2000 Dinner given by the Norwegian Ambassador, Mr Busch.

The Secretary of State for Trade, The Rt Hon John Biffen MP, The Paymaster-General, The Rt Hon Cecil Parkinson MP, Minister of State at the Department of Energy, Mr Hamish Gray MP, Minister of State for Overseas Development, The Rt Hon Neil Marten MP, and Parliamentary Under Secretary for Defence Procurement, Mr Geoffrey Pattie MP, were guests on this occasion.

/Thursday



Thursday 11 March

0900

Departure from Hotel for Heathrow, where Sir John Stow  
bad farewell.

SUBJECT.



Norway  
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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

10 DOWNING STREET

SERIAL No. T 54/82

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 March 1982

Dear Mr. Willoch,

✓ c. Harker set  
opt.

Thank you for your letter of 18 March.  
I too felt that our meeting was very useful.  
I welcome the close co-operation between our  
two countries, and look forward to seeing you  
at the NATO Summit in June.

Yours sincerely,

MT

His Excellency Mr. Kare Willoch

Jul

SUBJECT



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 49 8/82

THE ROYAL NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT

THE PRIME MINISTER

rec. Harstad sek  
gr.

Oslo, March 18, 1982

*Dear Prime Minister!*

I would like to, upon my return to Oslo, to send you my most sincere thanks and expressions of gratitude for the kind invitation which made it possible for me to pay an official visit to London.

I do feel that the frank and open exchanges of views which I had the opportunity to have with you personally and with several of your Cabinet colleagues, were most interesting and useful. I see our discussions as a good and practical basis for the further cooperation between our two countries and peoples, which extend into almost every field of human contact.

I am looking very much forward to seeing you again at the NATO Summit meeting in Bonn in June.

Thanking you again

*Yours sincerely*  
*Kåre Willoch*  
Kåre Willoch

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister of The United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

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Norway

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 March 1982

*[Handwritten mark]*

Prime Minister

*You expressed interest in this. The information looks to me too insubstantial for public use.*

*A.F.C. 15/2*

Dear John,

*A.F.C. 27/3*

You asked about the Norwegian Prime Minister's reference to Nicaraguan Government atrocities against the Indians and his surprise at the lack of publicity. You may find a little background helpful.

*h.a.*

During the period of British expansion in the Caribbean in the last century, what amounted to an unofficial British protectorate grew up along the East (Miskito) Coast of Nicaragua. The population had little in common with the Spanish-speaking inhabitants of the Western (Pacific) Coast of Nicaragua. After the British Government formally gave up all claim to the Miskito Coast, the people of the area were left to develop on their own by the rulers of Nicaragua based in Managua close to the Pacific Coast. However, following the overthrow of President Somoza in 1979, the Sandinista Government decided to place a greater emphasis on the development of the region. Port facilities were developed to cope with a greater flow of shipping from Cuba. The influx of Cuban advisers to the area created much friction among the local population.

This resulted in riots which were put down brutally by the Sandinista authorities. A number of local leaders were arrested and imprisoned. In consequence many Miskito Indians moved across the northern boundary of Nicaragua into Honduras, where they had made contact with groups of members of the National Guard of the defeated President Somoza. Several raids, possibly involving Miskito Indians, were made into Nicaraguan territory in 1981, resulting in the deaths of some Cuban advisers and casualties among the Nicaraguan forces.

In January this year the Nicaraguan Government decided to resettle those Miskito Indians living close to the Honduran border further into the interior of Nicaragua ostensibly to protect them from these raids. Some 9,000 have been moved so far and the villages they once occupied destroyed. We do not know how many Indians were killed resisting these moves but almost certainly some deaths occurred. We have seen no evidence, however, to verify recent claims made by the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Mrs Kirkpatrick, that many thousands were killed. It seems unlikely that the casualty rate should be so high but the area is remote and the Nicaraguan

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Government do not encourage visits to it. It is therefore hard to know exactly what is happening there.

Considerable publicity has been given to this in the press, mainly in the US but also here. Secretary Haig is reported to have produced photographs which purported to show Miskito corpses but it has subsequently been claimed that these pictures were in fact of Sandinista guerrillas killed by President Somoza's forces before the 1979 revolution. There is a danger that the US Administration may have exaggerated their claims.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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FILE Norway TMP

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 March 1982

Dear Francis,

Visit of Prime Minister of Norway

The Prime Minister of Norway called on the Prime Minister at noon today.

The first half-hour of their talks was conducted on a tete-a-tete basis, with only myself and Mr. Colding from Mr. Willoch's office present. I enclose a record of the discussion but should be grateful if you would circulate it only to those who have a strict need to know about the content of the conversation.

At 12.30 the talks were broadened to include other participants on both sides and the conversation continued over a working lunch which ended at 2.30. The second enclosure to this letter is a record of that part of the conversation.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Julian West (Department of Energy), David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and John Rhodes (Department of Trade).

Yours ever  
John Colding

F.N. Richards, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SUBJECT

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
PRIME MINISTER OF NORWAY AT 1200 HOURS ON 10 MARCH, 1982  
AT 10 DOWNING STREET.

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Present

Prime Minister

Mr. Willoch

Mr. Coles

Mr. Colding

In welcoming Mr. Willoch, the Prime Minister said that we sensed that a different era had begun in Norway. We wished to take the opportunity to develop close co-operation. Mr. Willoch said that he was very grateful for his welcome. He would appreciate the Prime Minister's views on political prospects in Britain. If the next elections produced a Labour Party victory, many people in Norway would be very disappointed. The Prime Minister explained that it was not necessary to hold elections until May, 1984. On taking office, the Government had faced a major task of putting right what had long been wrong. It had been necessary to have two or three firm budgets. It would have been easier to implement the Government's ideas had there not been a world recession. To understand this, it was necessary only to note the situation in Germany which, despite its efficient economy and its absorption of potentially unemployed people in conscripted armed forces, still had 2 million unemployed. It had taken 18 months to turn the situation round in Britain. But progress was now quickening. Productivity rose strikingly last year. We had controlled unit labour costs better than almost any other country. The recent fall in the price of oil was healthy for industrial costs. We could also probably look forward now to a little expansion in world trade. British industry was poised to take advantage of this situation. Our exports and our balance of payments were healthy. We expected inflation to come down further. All this had been achieved without injecting rigidities into the economy through an artificial prices and incomes policy. Thus, the fall in inflation was genuine. There was of course the problem of unemployment. It was vital that interest rates should continue to fall. That depended partly on American, partly on domestic policies. But there had been a fundamental change of attitude in Britain. And the Government's policies would bear fruits in the next year or two. The recent Budget had been welcomed by a united Conservative Party.

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/Mr. Willoch

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- 2 -

Mr. Willoch asked whether the Party was also united on other matters, for example, defence and foreign policy. The Prime Minister explained that there was a certain amount of internal debate about membership of the European Community. But there was no problem with regard to the independent nuclear deterrent and its modernisation. Some would like more expenditure on defence but we already spent about 5½% of GDP on this sector and we were maintaining our commitment to NATO to increase our contribution by 15% over five years.

Mr. Willoch asked whether the British Government were exerting pressure on the United States in respect of economic policy. The Prime Minister replied that we did not do so publicly. The Americans were staunch friends and we preferred, where there were differences, to discuss them privately. We had to recognise that one reason for their high interest rates was their defence expenditure - and that was undertaken partly for European benefit. In reply to a question, the Prime Minister said that there was a general recognition in Britain that the future of Europe was linked to that of the United States.

Taking up an earlier remark, Mr. Willoch agreed that the reduction in oil prices would have a favourable impact on the world economy. But it would of course reduce Norway's revenues. However, Norway's main problems were inflation, which had reached nearly 14% last year, and a lack of competitiveness. A substantial increase in unemployment would be an even more serious problem because Norway had been conditioned, since the War, to expect full employment. A substantial part of Norwegian industry now had profit margins which were far too low. Trade union activity under previous administrations had forced a re-distribution of wealth from profits to wages. However, the fall in the price of oil might help the Government in its efforts to persuade the Nation that it was important to maintain the competitiveness of industry, particularly those areas of industry which were unrelated to oil.

The conversation ended at 1230 when the two Prime Ministers joined their delegations for formal talks.

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
PRIME MINISTER OF NORWAY AT 1230 HOURS ON 10 MARCH, 1982  
AT 10 DOWNING STREET.

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Present

Prime Minister	Mr. Willoch
The Rt. Hon. Nigel Lawson, M.P.	Mr. Colding
The Hon. Douglas Hurd, M.P.	Mr. Vraalson
Dame Gillian Brown	Mr. Selmer
Mr. John Coles	Mr. Busch

The Prime Minister briefly described the areas covered in her tete-a-tete talks with Mr. Willoch and then opened a discussion of energy questions. She asked what policy Norway followed on depletion rates. Mr. Willoch said that his policy was cautious. Too large an income from oil created inflationary pressures. Resources had to be conserved for future generations. Moreover, a small country could not move too fast without encountering serious technical problems. On the other hand, it was necessary to consider the wider obligation to Europe as a whole. Norway was moving ahead with investment in new oil fields. The Prime Minister stressed the British interest in acquiring Norwegian gas. Mr. Lawson commented that there was a gas shortage and that we were indeed interested in principle in purchasing gas from Norway. Mr. Willoch noted the point and said that it would be a matter for commercial arrangement.

Mr. Lawson said that he had heard of a large new Norwegian find in the Arctic. Mr. Willoch confirmed that there was a good possibility of gas in the new area but it was a little premature to pronounce on its size. There were similar tentative possibilities of large finds off the Western coast of Norway.

Mr. Willoch said that it was in some ways surprising that Germany and France had not resorted to Norwegian gas rather than proceed with the controversial project for a pipeline to the Soviet Union. Mr. Lawson commented that another possibility would be for Norwegian gas to reach the continent of Europe via the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister said that we had little doubt that the controversial pipeline project would go ahead. Mr. Willoch observed that the next round of discussions with the Americans on this matter would be interesting. But the project was not wholly

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negative. It might be sensible, given future energy projections, to take some gas from the Soviet Union rather than deplete one's own resources. The Germans argued that the extent of their dependence on the Soviet Union would be negligible. The pipeline might make them dependent on the Russians to the extent of 30% of their gas supplies but this would represent no more than 5% of their total energy requirements. The Americans had probably overplayed their hand. Nevertheless, the pipeline was distinctly convenient for the Soviet Union. It would provide the hard currency which they needed so critically.

The Prime Minister commented that the Norwegian response to events in Poland had been firm. Mr. Willoch agreed that their political reaction had been strong but he was reluctant to go too far down the path of sanctions. The Prime Minister suggested that it was more a matter of giving signals to the Soviet Union than of adopting real sanctions. Our own experience suggested that it was hard to impose effective sanctions on ordinary trade though there was more scope for action on high technology. The Americans felt very strongly that the export of such technology, for example in the electronics field, helped the Russians militarily as well as in the civil field. Mr. Willoch said he understood that point but strong rhetoric was damaging because the Russians knew we would not live up to it. It was particularly worrying for the Germans. The Prime Minister agreed - the Germans lived a bus ride away from tyranny. Nevertheless, the Polish situation was very significant. It had been brought about by a genuine popular movement. In retrospect, the appointment of a Polish Pope had perhaps more significance than people appreciated at the time. Mr. Hurd suggested that the Polish movement would last longer precisely because it came from the people. The Prime Minister agreed. She regarded events in Poland as the beginning of the end of the Communist system though the process would take time. Mr. Willoch agreed that it was necessary for the West to follow the Polish situation intensively. But instead of applying pressure on the Soviet Union we seemed to have developed rifts in our own ranks. The Prime Minister commented that the liberty that allowed us to unite in defence

/contained

contained also the liberty to disagree. Mr. Willoch said that the lesson to be drawn was that of the necessity to work in concert and not to adopt unilateral steps. Mr. Hurd commented that, given US Governmental methods, periodic disarray was inevitable. But this could be followed by an attempt to unite attitudes, a process which was happening now. The Prime Minister said that she was personally very glad that President Reagan and Mr. Haig had given a clear lead over Poland.

Mr. Willoch commented that there were other difficult issues in Transatlantic relations, for example El Salvador. This was not a question on which Norway was well informed. The Prime Minister observed that left-wing elements were mounting a typical propaganda effort on El Salvador. We should counter this by emphasising the atrocities committed by the guerilla movement. She was pleased to note that Mr. Weinberger, in a recent speech, had made the point that if Communism became entrenched in central America, the efforts which the Americans would have to make to contain it would lessen their capacity to give help elsewhere in the world. Mr. Willoch questioned whether the United States were perhaps not misguided. Was it not wrong to consider such matters as El Salvador as East/West conflicts? The Prime Minister said she had no doubt that the Communist guerilla movement in that country was fuelled by Nicaragua and Cuba and was active elsewhere in the Caribbean. In that sense it was an East/West issue and it would be foolish not to recognise that. Guatemala was also becoming a serious problem. There was of course the question of how best to handle the situation. There might be some value in the Mexican initiative. But we should not forget Duarte was originally elected on a land reform programme - he was in no sense a right-winger. The point which often escaped public opinion was that American economic aid to El Salvador was three times as great as its military aid. Mr. Hurd said that the media tended to concentrate on the military situation. But he was sure the United States realised that there could not be a military solution. It was a mistake not to counter-attack the critics who portrayed US policy in the area as exclusively military. British public opinion knew little about El Salvador but it was becoming a

popular slogan. We should search for counter slogans, e.g. Afghanistan in respect of which there would shortly be certain activities in connection with "Afghanistan Day".

Mr. Willoch agreed that the portrayal of the El Salvador problem by the media was certainly misleading. And the facts about US economic aid were not well known. Mr. Lawson observed that the problem arose from the role of television. Violence was visual; aid was not. The Russians were largely able to keep television out of Afghanistan but it was free to operate in El Salvador. The Prime Minister said that we had been criticised for deciding to send observers to the El Salvador elections. But we believed that it was better to try to hold elections than let the fighting continue. It was very significant that the Pope had supported the sending of observers. Mr. Willoch asked whether it was not possible to bring Nicaragua to a neutral position through a policy of extensive US economic aid. Mr. Hurd said that the Americans believed that the situation had gone too far; though the Germans saw some scope for such an approach.

The participants in the talks then adjourned for a working lunch at which they were joined by Mr. Walters.

In a brief reference to arms control matters, the Prime Minister said that the tone for the West had been set by President Reagan's zero option speech and Chancellor Schmidt's clear decision that missile deployment would go ahead in 1983 if the Arms Limitation Talks had not proved successful. Mr. Willoch said that he was sure that this was the right approach; it was the only way to get concessions from the Soviet Union.

Mr. Willoch said that the concept of a nuclear free zone had caused some difficulty in Norway. It was a vague idea and he did not know what it meant. So far he had successfully discouraged it. He had been helped by the Arms Control Negotiations in Geneva but he was sure that the issue would be revived in Norway. Mr. Lawson asked what attitude was taken by the

/Norwegian

Norwegian public towards this idea. Mr. Willoch replied that this rather depended on the question put. If a person was asked whether he supported a nuclear free zone, he said, not surprisingly, yes. The issue had been expected to be a big one in the election campaign but in the event it had not been. This was partly because people found it difficult to understand the idea and also because they discovered that the Russians favoured it. The Prime Minister said that the issue could become dangerous because left-wing movements were totally dedicated in their propaganda. Mr. Willoch said that he did not think the nuclear free zone idea was just a matter of propaganda. It responded to a deep wish to escape from reality. The Prime Minister observed that one of the skills of Russian propaganda was to devise themes which made a superficial appeal to people.

Mr. Hurd said it was essential to make clear in the Arms Control Negotiations that we were determined to seek disarmament. Mr. Willoch said that in Norway it was necessary to explain the unreliability of Soviet guarantees in this field. The Swedish submarine incident had been helpful to him in that respect.

In response to Mr. Willoch's question, the Prime Minister then gave her impressions of the situation in Northern Ireland and likely developments following the Irish elections.

Mr. Willoch then raised the question of Turkey. The Prime Minister said that the most important point was that Turkey must be kept in NATO as part of the defences of the free world. Mr. Hurd commented that there was a problem in the Council of Europe. We believed that if Turkey was pushed too far in that body, it would find it necessary to leave and the consequences of its departure could be very serious. Mr. Willoch appeared to question whether this risk really existed. There was a good deal of criticism of the Turkish situation in Norway, partly because the Turks had taken action against trade unionists and had therefore united Labour Parties throughout Europe. Mr. Hurd said that there had long been

breaches of human rights in Turkey. But this was not a case of a democracy which had suddenly gone to pieces. The situation preceding the military takeover had been anything but democratic. Just because Turkey was temporarily under military rule its critics had seized upon human rights issues. But this was intellectually dishonest.

After lunch Mr. Willoch raised briefly with the Prime Minister the question of contact between Norway and the Ten EC Member states on political co-operation matters. The Prime Minister said that we understood Norway's wish for closer contact. We believed discussion of political co-operation matters should take place informally and regularly. We should be happy to try to help.

A.J.C.

10 March 1982





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 March 1982

Dear John.

Anglo-Norwegian Summit: 10 March

At the Prime Minister's briefing meeting today it was suggested that some speaking notes would be useful in case the Prime Minister wished to respond to any speech Mr Willoch might make.

/ I attach some suitable notes on which the Prime Minister  
/ might draw. I also attach CVs on the Norwegians who will be accompanying Mr Willoch. Mr Willoch's CV is attached to the briefing material already circulated by the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



SPEECH NOTES FOR USE AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR MR WILLOCH:  
10 MARCH

1. The first 'summit' in the United Kingdom for ten years, but this is a sign of the great warmth of relationship between Norway and the UK, not the reverse; there is very close contact between the two countries at all levels and few subjects on which we do not see eye to eye.
  
2. There are strong historical links between Norway and the UK. We are the closest of allies and the best of friends. We share values of freedom and democracy.
  
3. We have not always been on the same side. In the 9th and 10th Centuries Norsemen were greatly feared in Britain and with good reason, but people are now also coming to realise the contribution which Norsemen made to commerce and art. And in the days of Napoleon we again found ourselves in opposite camps.
  
4. But more recent memories are of close links between our peoples during the last war. The help that we were able to give to the Norwegian Resistance was given most willingly and Norwegian resolve during those dark days is still much admired. Now of course we are NATO partners standing together to preserve the security of the Western world. British Forces train in Norway to fight in Norway for our joint defence.
  
5. The new dimension in our relations is of course energy. Here there is a unique cooperation between nations. The joint development for the first time ever of three oil and gas fields which straddle the offshore boundary between us are examples of a continuing process of consultation and cooperation which covers almost every aspect of offshore activities. Without such close links we would be unable so well to exploit the essential resources of the North Sea. We can be proud of what we have jointly achieved but the tragedy of the Alexander Keilland rig shows the dangers to be faced.



6. We have always been great trading partners. By 1900 more Norwegian shipping was trading with Britain than with any other country, even Norway itself. Today Britain is Norway's most important trading customer. We appreciate your goods and will redouble our own efforts to persuade you to buy our products in return. We must also collaborate wherever we can in developing the industries of our nations.

7. Glad to mark the close links between our countries by this meeting of Prime Ministers. The friendship and harmony of our talks today have mirrored the feelings between our two peoples. We face challenges in both the international political and economic situation. We can best meet them by continuing the close cooperation between our nations and peoples.



COLDING, Kjell

State Secretary (for external affairs) in the Office of the Norwegian Prime Minister since October 1981.

Born 1931 in Oslo.

Studied law. Joined Norwegian Diplomatic Service, 1956. Served in Helsinki, 1958-60, and Ottawa, 1961-63. Returned to MFA, 1964. State Secretary at MFA, 1970-71 (under non-Socialist coalition government). Returned to career service and served in Stockholm, 1971-74. Assistant Under Secretary in Political Department, 1975-77. Inspector with personal rank of Ambassador, 1977-79. Subsequently Deputy Under Secretary supervising press and cultural work.

Has been a member of the Disarmament Committee (1976-77).

It is known that Mr Willoch approached at least one other person before appointing Ambassador Colding as one of the three State Secretaries in his Office. But the appointment is a success. Colding, helped by his earlier experience as State Secretary at the Foreign Ministry, has taken naturally to his new job, and has taken opportunities to express publicly sound views on security matters and other policy questions of importance to us. He is a polished and practical person, who speaks excellent English.

Married.



VRAALSEN Tom Eric

1. Political Director in MFA since January 1981.
2. Born 26 January 1936. Educated at Technical High School in Århus (Denmark). Graduated in 1960.  
Joined Foreign Service in 1961, served in Oslo (1961-1962), Peking (1962-1963), Cairo (1964-1967). First Secretary later Counsellor at MFA (1967-1969), Peking again (1969-1970), Far East and Indonesia (1970-1971). Head of Department in Political Section (1971-1975), Minister-Counsellor to United Nations Delegation (1975-1978). Special Advisor to the Foreign Minister on United Nations Security Council matters (1978-1980).
3. Tom Vraalsen is also an activist in the Centre Party and currently holds a senior position as Chairman of the Oslo Branch. If, as is possible, the Centre Party are given the post of foreign minister in any new coalition it is possible that Tom Vraalsen would be nominated State Secretary replacing Johan Jørgen Holst. It is, however, considered unlikely that Tom Vraalsen would leave the MFA to occupy any other post in the coalition should State Secretary/MFA not be available to his Party.



SELMER, Erik Christian

Deputy Under Secretary in charge of Economics Depts, MFA,  
since October 1981

Born 1 April 1931

Graduated from Kaufmann University in Cologne 1956. Attached to Norwegian Export Council in Bonn 1956-57. Joined MFA 1962. Member of Norwegian Permanent Delegation to EFTA, UN and other international bodies in Geneva 1964-67. First Secretary, later Counsellor, Norwegian Permanent Delegation to NATO 1970-74. Minister, Permanent Delegation to EFTA, UN and other international bodies 1975-79. Assistant Under Secretary, Planning, 1979, and AUS supervising International Economic Depts, 1980.

Succeeded Eivinn Berg as Deputy Under Secretary in charge of Economic Depts when Berg was appointed State Secretary in October 1981.

A large, friendly man. Speaks good English.

Married.

PRIME MINISTER

Anglo/Norwegian Talks

We have agreed with the Norwegians that:

a) The talks will begin at 1200 with 15 minutes tete-a-tete conversation between you and Mr. Willoch, accompanied only by Private Secretaries.

b) The talks will be extended at 1215. On our side I have arranged for the Secretary of State for Energy, Douglas Hurd, Mr. Bullard and Dame Gillian Brown (our Ambassador in Oslo) to be present.

Mr. Willoch will be accompanied by Mr. Colding (State Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office), Mr. Vraalson (MFA), Mr. Selmer (MFA) and Mr. Busch (the new Norwegian Ambassador in London).

The talks will be followed by a working lunch (guest list separately). In case you want to say a few words after lunch, I attach some speaking notes.

A. J. C.

9 March 1982

Anglo-Norwegian Briefing Meeting  
12 noon: Tuesday, 9 March

Those attending are as follows:-

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

Secretary of State for Defence

Secretary of State for Trade

Secretary of State for Energy

Sir Michael Palliser

Sir Frank Cooper

Sir Donald Maitland

Mr. Knighton, Department of Trade

~~Professor T. Burns~~

Dame Gillian Brown, Ambassador to Norway





3/10

b.c. C.S.

Sub

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 March 1982

VISIT OF THE NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER

You asked me yesterday how the Prime Minister wished to structure her talks with Mr. Willoch on 10 March. You told me later that the Norwegians had suggested that the talk should begin with 15 minutes of tete-a-tete discussion.

This latter suggestion is acceptable though the Prime Minister proposes to be accompanied by a Private Secretary and would have no objection if Mr. Willoch wished to have one member of his delegation present as well. For the rest of the talks the Prime Minister would be grateful if an FCO Minister, the Secretary of State for Energy, Mr. Bullard and HM Ambassador (Oslo) could accompany her (i.e. from 1215 onwards). Perhaps you would arrange for these plans to be discussed with the Norwegians. I should be grateful to know in due course who they propose to bring to the talks.

I confirm that no speaking notes will be needed for the working lunch.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Energy.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

R



Norway

10 DOWNING STREET

MR. COLES

Dame Gillian Brown, the  
Ambassador to Norway will be  
attending the briefing meeting  
at No. 10 on Monday.

*el.*

3 March 1982

PRIME MINISTER

Visit of the Norwegian Prime Minister

Mr. Willoch visits London on 10 March. You have agreed to hold an hour's talks with him, followed by a small working lunch. We need to settle who will attend the talks (the Norwegians are asking). I do not think we need have a large team on our side because he is having separate meetings with the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor, Defence and Energy Secretaries. You will also have plenty of support at the working lunch. But as the agreed list of subjects for discussion (attached) includes some fairly technical matters, I suggest that you are supported at the talks by an FCO Minister (probably Mr. Hurd), Mr. Bullard and myself.

Agree?

+ Energy Sec.  
 A.S.C.

*ms*

3 March 1982

ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT: 10 MARCH

List of Subjects for Discussion

1. Western Security
  - (a) the NATO Alliance and Summit
  - (b) nuclear matters including INF and START: public attitudes
  - (c) Anglo-Norwegian defence relations
  - (d) Nordic security issues, including Svalbard and NNWFZ
2. International Political Issues
  - (a) Poland
  - (b) East/West relations
  - (c) CSCE
3. The Soviet Union
  - (a) Norway's bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union
  - (b) future developments in the Soviet Union
4. The Norwegian relationship with the EC and political cooperation
5. Energy
6. Trade
7. The International Economic Situation

file

08  
Norway

MR. WRIGHT

CABINET OFFICE

BRIEFING MEETING FOR VISIT OF NORWEGIAN PRIME  
MINISTER: 10 MARCH 1982

---

Thank you for your minute of 1 March to John Coles, reference A07669. The Prime Minister is content with the arrangements you propose for this briefing meeting.

W. F. S. RICKETT

2 March 1982

610  
Ref: A07669

MR. COLES

Prime Minister 1

Content with these  
proposed arrangements?

Yes  
mt

LW  
1/3

Briefing Meeting for Visit of Norwegian Prime Minister:  
10th March 1982

In the light of the agenda for this visit and following discussion with the Departments concerned, I should be grateful for your agreement to the following being invited to attend the Prime Minister's briefing meeting at 4.00 pm on Monday, 8th March.

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary  
Secretary of State for Defence  
Secretary of State for Trade  
Secretary of State for Energy

and also the following officials:


Sir Michael Palliser  
Sir Frank Cooper  
Sir Donald Maitland  
Mr. Knighton, Department of Trade  
Professor Terry Burns

2. Lord Carrington is almost certain to be 15 minutes late, since he will have been representing the Prime Minister at the Commonwealth Day Service in Westminster Abbey.

3. Mr. Biffen would like to attend the briefing because of his particular interest in Norway (which he visited recently) rather than because trade questions are likely to loom large on 10th March.

4. I am proposing that Professor Burns attend because Mr. Willoch will be meeting him as part of the official programme.

mt



D.J. Wright

1st March, 1982

010  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

f.c.  
100  $\frac{3}{3}$

Cabinet Office,  
70 Whitehall,  
London SW1

25th February, 1982

PS(82) 3

Dear Private Secretary,

Anglo-Norwegian Summit: 10th March 1982

This letter sets out the briefing arrangements for the visit of the Norwegian Prime Minister on 10th March.

The objectives for the visit, as approved by the Prime Minister, are at Annex A. The list of briefs to be prepared, with an indication of Departmental responsibility, is at Annex B. Instructions on format are at Annexes C and D. Those preparing briefs should note carefully the details on the format of briefs set out in Annex C, particularly (b) on the structure of briefs.

70 copies of each brief should be sent to the Cabinet Office as soon as they are ready, and should in any event arrive no later than midday on Friday 5th March. They should be addressed to Mr. W. Ewing in Committee Section, who should be consulted (tel. no. 233 7628) about any technical points arising.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Sir Michael Palliser, Sir Douglas Wass, Sir Frank Cooper, Sir Brian Cubbon, Sir Donald Maitland, Sir Brian Hayes, Mr. Michael Franklin and Mr. Robin Ibbs, and to John Coles at No. 10.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) D.J. WRIGHT

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ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT  
10 MARCH 1982

UNITED KINGDOM OBJECTIVES

Primary

1. To ensure that the Norwegian Government maintains its robust support for NATO including the Alliance's nuclear policies and avoids unhelpful initiatives, such as the Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.
2. To encourage the Norwegians to stand firm towards the Soviet Union and to reassure them of British support in their bilateral dealings with the Russians.
3. To secure Norwegian (and through them, Nordic) support for British international objectives generally.
4. To keep Norway's policies closely in line with those of the Ten without giving Norway the impression that she can enjoy the benefits of membership for which she is not paying.
5. To strengthen the already close relationship in the exploitation and security of energy resources.
6. To seek information about economic developments in Norway and other plans for the future of gas and oil industries; to prepare the ground for the United Kingdom to explore opportunities in the Norwegian market.

Subsidiary

7. To establish an effective working relationship with Mr Willoch, building on the close friendship that exists between the United Kingdom and Norway.
8. To exchange views on the international economic and commercial situation.



PROBABLE NORWEGIAN OBJECTIVES

Primary

1. To emphasise the importance the Norwegians attach to their relations with the United Kingdom.
2. To explain Norway's approach to Western security and, in particular, the INF negotiations and START, including domestic attitudes to nuclear weapons.
3. To promote the Norwegian objective of getting as close as possible to the EC without joining it and participating as fully as possible in the process of political co-operation.
4. To examine the state of East-West relations, especially Poland, and the implications for the CSCE process.
5. To explain Norway's bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and to compare notes on likely future developments there.
6. To hear about developments in the British economy and to discuss the economic and trade policy outlook in Europe.

Subsidiary

7. To ensure that the United Kingdom remains Norway's largest export market.
8. To stress the importance of the British contribution to Norway's direct defence.
9. To discuss the possible relationship between economic recession and social unrest.
10. To emphasise Norway's concern to protect its fishing interests in negotiations with the EC.

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT  
10 MARCH 1982

<u>XMV (82)</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
1.	Steering Brief	FCO (WED)	as appropriate
2.	Security Issues		
	(a) NATO including Summit	FCO (Defence Department)	MOD
	(b) Arms control and dis- armament, including INF, START and public attitudes	FCO (Defence Department)	FCO (ACDD, WED) MOD
	(c) Anglo-Norwegian defence issues, including oil rig security	MOD	FCO (Defence Department, WED, MAED)
	(d) Nordic security issues, including Svalbard and NNWFZ	FCO (WED/ Defence Department)	MOD
3.	The Soviet Union		
	(a) Norway's relations with the Soviet Union	FCO (WED)	FCO (EESD)
	(b) Future developments in the Soviet Union	FCO (EESD)	
4.	Poland	FCO (EESD)	Trade
5.	East/West Relations	FCO (EESD)	CSCE Unit
6.	CSCE	CSCE Unit	FCO (Defence Department)
7.	International Political Issues		
	(a) Afghanistan	FCO (SAD)	
	(b) Middle East	FCO (NENAD)	FCO (MED)
	(c) Southern Africa/Namibia	FCO (SAfD)	
	(d) Turkey	FCO (SED)	FCO (WED)

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<u>XMV(82)</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
8.	Economic Matters		
	(a) United Kingdom economy	Treasury	
	(b) International economic questions	Treasury	FCO (ESID/ERD) MAFF
9.	Trade Matters		
	(a) International trade issues	Trade	FCO (TRED)
	(b) Opportunities for Anglo-Norwegian trade	Trade	FCO (TRED) Energy MOD MAFF
10.	Energy: Current co-operation and opportunities for the future	Energy	FCO (ESSD)
11.	Norwegian Relations with the EC and Political Co-operation		
	(a) EC/Norway )	FCO (ECD(E))	FCO (WED) Trade
	(b) EC/Political Co-operation )		
12.	Fisheries	MAFF	FCO (ECD(I))
13.	Norway Internal Situation		
	(a) Political	FCO (WED)	
	(b) Economic	Treasury	
14.	The Relationship between Economic Recession and Social Unrest	Home Office	as appropriate

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## ANNEX C

### INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT FORMAT

All briefs should be laid out in the same way with a top page in accordance with the specimen layout at Annex D. Those preparing briefs should pay particular attention to ensuring that the following instructions are fully observed:

#### Content

- (a) Briefs should be concise. Each brief should if possible be no more than four sides long.
- (b) The main body of each brief should comprise two sections, a concise list of Points to Make, followed by a factual Background section which distinguishes clearly between information which can be freely used and information which should not be disclosed.
- (c) Briefs should be complete and self-contained with all the information required on that particular subject. Briefs should not be divided into separate self-contained sub-sections.

#### Layout

- (d) Briefs should be typed in double spacing, using both sides of the paper. Pages should be numbered at the foot of each page.
- (e) As shown in the specimen at Annex D, the top page only of each brief should contain the following details: the symbol and number of the brief in the top left-hand corner (e.g. XMV(82) 10) with the date of production below; a copy number in red at the top right-hand corner; the visit heading; the title of the brief (in capitals) and the name of the Department responsible.
- (f) At the foot of the last page and on the left-hand side, briefs should bear the name of the originating Government Department and the date of origin.

#### Reproduction

- (g) Briefs should be reproduced throughout on white paper, with each page bearing a security classification at top and bottom (as in Annex D). Care should be taken that the reproduction method employed results in clear readable copies.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- (h) It is important that on arrival at the Cabinet Office, briefs should be complete in all detail - collated, stapled and copy numbered and ready for immediate circulation.

Updating

- (i) If late developments require a brief to be amended or updated, an addendum should be prepared. It should be set out in the form described at (e) above, with the brief number (e.g. XMV(82) 10 Addendum) and title to which it relates at the top of the front page. The Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet should be informed when an addendum is in preparation. Revised briefs and corrigenda should be similarly treated.
- (j) Additions to the list of briefs in Annex B require the authorisation of the Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet.

CLASSIFICATION

ANNEX D

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

XMV(82) Serial Number as specified in Annex B

COPY NO. in red

Date

ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT  
10 MARCH 1982

Leave 1½"  
margin

SUBJECT Insert subject in capitals

Brief by name of originating Department, eg Foreign and Commonwealth Office

---

At the foot of the last page:-  
left-hand side

Originating Government Department, eg Foreign and Commonwealth Office or Department of Industry, not a subordinate section or division

Date of origin

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

*file*

BK

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Anglo-Norwegian Summit: 10 March 1982

Thank you for your minute of 22 February. The Prime Minister agrees that the list of subjects for discussion in Annex A to your minute may be given to the Norwegians.

*B/F*  
It will be helpful if, as you suggest, briefs reach me on Friday 5 March.

A J COLES

24 February 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime MinisterContent that we give the  
Norwegians the list of topics

at Annex A?

A.J.C. 23.2

Ref. A07579

MR COLESAnglo-Norwegian Summit: 10 March 1982

Following the success of the Conservative Party in the Norwegian General Election last September, the Prime Minister invited the new Norwegian Prime Minister, Mr Kare Willoch, to make an early visit to the United Kingdom. The visit is to take place on 10 March.

2. Mr Willoch is in the United Kingdom for only one day. He will have an hour's talks with the Prime Minister, followed by a small working lunch. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is in touch with you separately about a suggested guest list for the lunch. Meetings between Mr Willoch and a number of other Ministers are being arranged. A list of these is also being submitted separately to No 10. The Norwegian Ambassador is giving a dinner in Mr Willoch's honour and has invited a number of Ministers and MPs including Mr Biffen, Mr Marten, Mr Pattie, Mr Parkinson and Mr Hannam. The proposed programme for the visit is at Annex D.

3. The Norwegians do not wish to propose a formal agenda. They have, however, suggested a number of topics for discussion and have said that they would welcome an indication of the subjects we are likely to raise. If the Prime Minister is content we would propose to let them have a copy of the list of subjects for discussion at Annex A. This includes the Norwegian suggestions. At Annex B is an assessment of British and Norwegian objectives for the visit. At Annex C is a suggested list of briefs. The briefs will be co-ordinated in the normal way by the Cabinet Office.

4. The list of topics for discussion is too long to be covered at a short meeting between the Prime Ministers. It reflects the range of points to be covered during the visit as a whole, including the working lunch and the calls on individual Ministers.





5. The Norwegians value their traditionally close relations with the United Kingdom. They regard us as a nation with whom they can share their problems and receive advice. Mr Willoch has made visits to London and Bonn his first overseas priorities. He can be expected to be receptive to our point of view. His visit should thus provide a good opportunity to influence the Norwegians on political and security issues, and at the same time to promote United Kingdom interests in the trade and energy fields.

6. If you agree, I will arrange for the briefs to reach you on Friday 5 March. This will allow the Prime Minister time to study them over the weekend before the briefing meeting on Monday 8 March.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

22 February 1982

ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT: 10 MARCH

List of Subjects for Discussion

1. Western Security
  - (a) the NATO Alliance and Summit
  - (b) nuclear matters including INF and START: public attitudes
  - (c) Anglo-Norwegian defence relations
  - (d) Nordic security issues, including Svalbard and NNWFZ
2. International Political Issues
  - (a) Poland
  - (b) East/West relations
  - (c) CSCE
3. The Soviet Union
  - (a) Norway's bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union
  - (b) future developments in the Soviet Union
4. The Norwegian relationship with the EC and political cooperation
5. Energy
6. Trade
7. The International Economic Situation

ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT  
10 MARCH 1982

UNITED KINGDOM OBJECTIVES

Primary

1. To ensure that the Norwegian Government maintains its robust support for NATO including the Alliance's nuclear policies and avoids unhelpful initiatives, such as the Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.
2. To encourage the Norwegians to stand firm towards the Soviet Union and to reassure them of British support in their bilateral dealings with the Russians.
3. To secure Norwegian (and through them, Nordic) support for British international objectives generally.
4. To keep Norway's policies closely in line with those of the Ten without giving Norway the impression that she can enjoy the benefits of membership for which she is not paying.
5. To strengthen the already close relationship in the exploitation and security of energy resources.
6. To seek information about economic developments in Norway and other plans for the future of gas and oil industries; to prepare the ground for the United Kingdom to explore opportunities in the Norwegian market.

Subsidiary

7. To establish an effective working relationship with Mr Willoch, building on the close friendship that exists between the United Kingdom and Norway.
8. To exchange views on the international economic and commercial situation.

# CONFIDENTIAL

## PROBABLE NORWEGIAN OBJECTIVES

### Primary

1. To emphasise the importance the Norwegians attach to their relations with the United Kingdom.
2. To explain Norway's approach to Western security and, in particular, the INF negotiations and START, including domestic attitudes to nuclear weapons.
3. To promote the Norwegian objective of getting as close as possible to the EC without joining it and participating as fully as possible in the process of political co-operation.
4. To examine the state of East-West relations, especially Poland, and the implications for the CSCE process.
5. To explain Norway's bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and to compare notes on likely future developments there.
6. To hear about developments in the British economy and to discuss the economic and trade policy outlook in Europe.

### Subsidiary

7. To ensure that the United Kingdom remains Norway's largest export market.
8. To stress the importance of the British contribution to Norway's direct defence.
9. To discuss the possible relationship between economic recession and social unrest.
10. To emphasise Norway's concern to protect its fishing interests in negotiations with the EC.

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ANNEX C

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT  
10 MARCH 1982

	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
1.	Steering Brief	FCO (WED)	as appropriate
2.	Security Issues		
	(a) NATO including Summit	FCO (Defence Department)	MOD
	(b) Arms control and disarmament, including INF, START and public attitudes	FCO (Defence Department)	FCO (ACDD, WED) MOD
	(c) Anglo-Norwegian defence issues, including oil rig security	MOD	FCO (Defence Department, WED, MAED)
	(d) Nordic security issues, including Svalbard and NNWFZ	FCO (WED/Defence Department)	MOD
3.	The Soviet Union		
	(a) Norway's relations with the Soviet Union	FCO (WED)	FCO (EESD)
	(b) Future developments in the Soviet Union	FCO (EESD)	
4.	Poland	FCO (EESD)	Trade
5.	East/West Relations	FCO (EESD)	CSCE Unit
6.	CSCE	CSCE Unit	FCO (Defence Department)
7.	International Political Issues		
	(a) Afghanistan	FCO (SAD)	
	(b) Middle East	FCO (NENAD)	FCO (MED)
	(c) Southern Africa/Namibia	FCO (SAfD)	
	(d) Turkey	FCO (SED)	FCO (WED)

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	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
8.	<b>Economic Matters</b>		
	(a) United Kingdom economy	H M Treasury	
	(b) International economic questions	H M Treasury	FCO (ESID/ERD) MAFF
9.	<b>Trade Matters</b>		
	(a) International trade issues	Trade	FCO (TRED)
	(b) Opportunities for Anglo-Norwegian trade	Trade	FCO (TRED) Energy MOD MAFF
10.	<b>Energy: Current co-operation and opportunities for the future</b>	Energy	FCO (ESSD)
11.	<b>Norwegian Relations with the EC and Political Co-operation</b>		
	(a) EC/Norway )	FCO (ECD(E))	FCO (WED) Trade
	(b) EC/Political Co-operation )		
12.	<b>Fisheries</b>	MAFF	FCO (ECD(I))
13.	<b>Norway Internal Situation</b>		
	(a) Political	FCO (WED)	
	(b) Economic	H M Treasury	
14.	<b>The Relationship between Economic Recession and Social Unrest</b>	Home Office	as appropriate

# CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX D

PROPOSED PROGRAMME FOR MR WILLOCH'S VISIT  
TO THE UNITED KINGDOM : 10 MARCH 1982

0900 Arrive Heathrow

1030 Meeting with Lord Carrington

1115 Meeting with the Chancellor of the Exchequer  
or Chief Secretary

1200 Talks with Prime Minister

1300 Working lunch for 12 given by the Prime Minister

1500 Meeting with Mr Nott, Secretary of State  
for Defence

1530 Meeting with Mr Burns, Chief Economic Adviser

1615 Meeting with Mr Lawson, Secretary of State  
for Energy

1700 Press Conference at Norwegian Embassy

Evening Dinner given by Norwegian Ambassador

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A07579

MR COLES

Anglo-Norwegian Summit: 10 March 1982

Following the success of the Conservative Party in the Norwegian General Election last September, the Prime Minister invited the new Norwegian Prime Minister, Mr Kare Willoch, to make an early visit to the United Kingdom. The visit is to take place on 10 March.

2. Mr Willoch is in the United Kingdom for only one day. He will have an hour's talks with the Prime Minister, followed by a small working lunch. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is in touch with you separately about a suggested guest list for the lunch. Meetings between Mr Willoch and a number of other Ministers are being arranged. A list of these is also being submitted separately to No 10. The Norwegian Ambassador is giving a dinner in Mr Willoch's honour and has invited a number of Ministers and MPs including Mr Biffen, Mr Marten, Mr Pattie, Mr Parkinson and Mr Hannam. The proposed programme for the visit is at Annex D.

3. The Norwegians do not wish to propose a formal agenda. They have, however, suggested a number of topics for discussion and have said that they would welcome an indication of the subjects we are likely to raise. If the Prime Minister is content we would propose to let them have a copy of the list of subjects for discussion at Annex A. This includes the Norwegian suggestions. At Annex B is an assessment of British and Norwegian objectives for the visit. At Annex C is a suggested list of briefs. The briefs will be co-ordinated in the normal way by the Cabinet Office.

4. The list of topics for discussion is too long to be covered at a short meeting between the Prime Ministers. It reflects the range of points to be covered during the visit as a whole, including the working lunch and the calls on individual Ministers.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG



5. The Norwegians value their traditionally close relations with the United Kingdom. They regard us as a nation with whom they can share their problems and receive advice. Mr Willoch has made visits to London and Bonn his first overseas priorities. He can be expected to be receptive to our point of view. His visit should thus provide a good opportunity to influence the Norwegians on political and security issues, and at the same time to promote United Kingdom interests in the trade and energy fields.

6. If you agree, I will arrange for the briefs to reach you on Friday 5 March. This will allow the Prime Minister time to study them over the weekend before the briefing meeting on Monday 8 March.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

22 February 1982

ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT: 10 MARCH

List of Subjects for Discussion

1. Western Security
  - (a) the NATO Alliance and Summit
  - (b) nuclear matters including INF and START: public attitudes
  - (c) Anglo-Norwegian defence relations
  - (d) Nordic security issues, including Svalbard and NNWFZ
2. International Political Issues
  - (a) Poland
  - (b) East/West relations
  - (c) CSCE
3. The Soviet Union
  - (a) Norway's bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union
  - (b) future developments in the Soviet Union
4. The Norwegian relationship with the EC and political cooperation
5. Energy
6. Trade
7. The International Economic Situation

ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT  
10 MARCH 1982

UNITED KINGDOM OBJECTIVES

Primary

1. To ensure that the Norwegian Government maintains its robust support for NATO including the Alliance's nuclear policies and avoids unhelpful initiatives, such as the Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.
2. To encourage the Norwegians to stand firm towards the Soviet Union and to reassure them of British support in their bilateral dealings with the Russians.
3. To secure Norwegian (and through them, Nordic) support for British international objectives generally.
4. To keep Norway's policies closely in line with those of the Ten without giving Norway the impression that she can enjoy the benefits of membership for which she is not paying.
5. To strengthen the already close relationship in the exploitation and security of energy resources.
6. To seek information about economic developments in Norway and other plans for the future of gas and oil industries; to prepare the ground for the United Kingdom to explore opportunities in the Norwegian market.

Subsidiary

7. To establish an effective working relationship with Mr Willoch, building on the close friendship that exists between the United Kingdom and Norway.
8. To exchange views on the international economic and commercial situation.

# CONFIDENTIAL

## PROBABLE NORWEGIAN OBJECTIVES

### Primary

1. To emphasise the importance the Norwegians attach to their relations with the United Kingdom.
2. To explain Norway's approach to Western security and, in particular, the INF negotiations and START, including domestic attitudes to nuclear weapons.
3. To promote the Norwegian objective of getting as close as possible to the EC without joining it and participating as fully as possible in the process of political co-operation.
4. To examine the state of East-West relations, especially Poland, and the implications for the CSCE process.
5. To explain Norway's bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and to compare notes on likely future developments there.
6. To hear about developments in the British economy and to discuss the economic and trade policy outlook in Europe.

### Subsidiary

7. To ensure that the United Kingdom remains Norway's largest export market.
8. To stress the importance of the British contribution to Norway's direct defence.
9. To discuss the possible relationship between economic recession and social unrest.
10. To emphasise Norway's concern to protect its fishing interests in negotiations with the EC.

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ANNEX C

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT  
10 MARCH 1982

	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
1.	Steering Brief	FCO (WED)	as appropriate
2.	Security Issues		
	(a) NATO including Summit	FCO (Defence Department)	MOD
	(b) Arms control and disarmament, including INF, START and public attitudes	FCO (Defence Department)	FCO (ACDD, WED) MOD
	(c) Anglo-Norwegian defence issues, including oil rig security	MOD	FCO (Defence Department, WED, MAED)
	(d) Nordic security issues, including Svalbard and NNWFZ	FCO (WED/Defence Department)	MOD
3.	The Soviet Union		
	(a) Norway's relations with the Soviet Union	FCO (WED)	FCO (EESD)
	(b) Future developments in the Soviet Union	FCO (EESD)	
4.	Poland	FCO (EESD)	Trade
5.	East/West Relations	FCO (EESD)	CSCE Unit
6.	CSCE	CSCE Unit	FCO (Defence Department)
7.	International Political Issues		
	(a) Afghanistan	FCO (SAD)	
	(b) Middle East	FCO (NENAD)	FCO (MED)
	(c) Southern Africa/Namibia	FCO (SAFD)	
	(d) Turkey	FCO (SED)	FCO (WED)

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	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
8.	<b>Economic Matters</b>		
	(a) <b>United Kingdom economy</b>	<b>H M Treasury</b>	
	(b) <b>International economic questions</b>	<b>H M Treasury</b>	<b>FCO (ESID/ERD) MAFF</b>
9.	<b>Trade Matters</b>		
	(a) <b>International trade issues</b>	<b>Trade</b>	<b>FCO (TRED)</b>
	(b) <b>Opportunities for Anglo-Norwegian trade</b>	<b>Trade</b>	<b>FCO (TRED) Energy MOD MAFF</b>
10.	<b>Energy: Current co-operation and opportunities for the future</b>	<b>Energy</b>	<b>FCO (ESSD)</b>
11.	<b>Norwegian Relations with the EC and Political Co-operation</b>		
	(a) <b>EC/Norway</b> )	<b>FCO (ECD(E))</b>	<b>FCO (WED) Trade</b>
	(b) <b>EC/Political Co-operation</b> )		
12.	<b>Fisheries</b>	<b>MAFF</b>	<b>FCO (ECD(I))</b>
13.	<b>Norway Internal Situation</b>		
	(a) <b>Political</b>	<b>FCO (WED)</b>	
	(b) <b>Economic</b>	<b>H M Treasury</b>	
14.	<b>The Relationship between Economic Recession and Social Unrest</b>	<b>Home Office</b>	<b>as appropriate</b>

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ANNEX D

PROPOSED PROGRAMME FOR MR WILLOCH'S VISIT  
TO THE UNITED KINGDOM : 10 MARCH 1982

0900 Arrive Heathrow

1030 Meeting with Lord Carrington

1115 Meeting with the Chancellor of the Exchequer  
or Chief Secretary

1200 Talks with Prime Minister

1300 Working lunch for 12 given by the Prime Minister

1500 Meeting with Mr Nott, Secretary of State  
for Defence

1530 Meeting with Mr Burns, Chief Economic Adviser

1615 Meeting with Mr Lawson, Secretary of State  
for Energy

1700 Press Conference at Norwegian Embassy

Evening Dinner given by Norwegian Ambassador

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Sir Brian Hayes, K.C.B.  
Permanent Secretary

Norway  
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food  
Whitehall Place  
London, SW1A 2HH

17 February 1982

Dear Robert,

ANGLO-NORWEGIAN AND ANGLO-GERMAN SUMMITS

I have seen copies of Michael Palliser's letters of 10 and 11 February about these two Summits.

My Minister has in fact just invited Mr Thor Listau, the Norwegian Minister of Fisheries, to the UK later in the year - possibly in June. With this on the stocks, it seems unlikely that the Norwegians will press for a detailed discussion of fisheries questions at the Summit.

On the details of the briefing for the Anglo-Norwegian Summit, I understand that it has been agreed with FCO that it will be easiest on this occasion if MAFF takes the lead in preparing the fisheries brief. In addition, may I ask that we have the opportunity to comment on brief 8b (international economic questions) and brief 9 (trade and opportunities for improvement).

I have no comments on the papers for the Anglo-German Summit.

Copies go to Michael Palliser and the other recipients of his letters.

Yours ever,  
Brian  
BRIAN HAYES

Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO  
Cabinet Office  
70 Whitehall  
London  
SW1A 2AS





MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE  
FISHERIES AND FOOD

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS  
OF  
SIR BRIAN HAYES KCB

*t.a.*  
*15.*  
*1/2*

*with AJC —*

WHITEHALL PLACE  
LONDON SW1A 2HH

17 February, 1982

Visit by the Norwegian Prime Minister:

10 March

Thank you for your letter of 12 February. I think you may take it that the Prime Minister is content with the Proposals for Mr Willoch's programme.

RECORDED

5

F N Richards, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

NORWAY



DEPARTMENT OF TRADE  
1 VICTORIA STREET  
LONDON SW1H 0ET

TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01 215 3785  
SWITCHBOARD 01 215 7877

From the Permanent Secretary  
M. D. M. Franklin, CB CMG

16 February 1982

D J Wright Esq  
Cabinet Office  
70 Whitehall  
London SW1

cc PS/Sir M Palliser  
PS/Sir D Wass  
PS/Sir B Hayes  
PS/Sir F Cooper  
PS/Sir P Carey  
PS/Sir D Maitland  
PS/Sir B Cubbon  
Mr C A Whitmore

Dear David,

ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT, 10 MARCH 1982

Sir Michael Palliser copied to my Permanent Secretary his letter of 10 February to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Although my Secretary of State will be meeting the Norwegian Prime Minister only at dinner, Mr Willoch is a former Minister of Commerce and Norway a country particularly anxious to see satisfactory multilateral solutions found to current world trade problems. Objective 2 in Annex B to Sir Michael's letter might therefore well read

"To exchange views on the international economic and commercial situation",

and Norwegian objective 6 in Annex C

"... and to discuss the economic and trade policy outlook in Europe".

Accordingly, we should like to divide our brief 9 on Trade Questions into two parts:

- (a) International trade issues
- (b) Opportunities for Anglo-Norwegian trade.

Lastly, we should be grateful if the Foreign Office would consult the Department of Trade about brief 4 on Poland and brief 11(a) on Community-Norwegian relations.

I am copying this to Andrew Burns at the Foreign Office and to the private secretaries of all those others who had copies of Sir Michael Palliser's letter.

Yours ever,  
Jonathan

J PHILLIPS  
Private Secretary

RESTRICTED



2pps  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 February 1982

Dear John,

Visit by the Norwegian Prime Minister:  
10 March

The Prime Minister has invited Mr Kåre Willoch to visit the United Kingdom on 10 March. He will have talks with the Prime Minister at 1200 followed by a working lunch.

/ We have been considering Mr Willoch's programme for the rest of his day in London and I attach the current proposals. If the Prime Minister agrees we shall proceed on this basis.

/ I also attach a suggested guest list for the working lunch. The Prime Minister will wish to know that the Norwegian Ambassador is giving a dinner for Mr Willoch in the evening and we understand that Mr Biffen, Mr Marten, Mr Pattie, Mr Parkinson and Mr Hannam have accepted invitations. The proposed guest list for lunch has been drawn up so as not to duplicate the Ambassador's dinner but does not take into account Mr Willoch's expressed wish to discuss extensively economic matters while he is in London.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

PROPOSED PROGRAMME FOR MR WILLOCH'S VISIT TO THE  
UNITED KINGDOM : 10 MARCH 1982

0900 Arrive Heathrow

1030 Meeting with Lord Carrington

1115 Meeting with Chancellor of the Exchequer or  
Chief Secretary

1200 Talks with Prime Minister

1300 Working lunch for 12 hosted by Prime Minister

1500 Meeting with Mr Nott, Secretary of State for  
Defence

1530 Meeting with Mr Burns, Chief Economic Adviser

1615 Meeting with Mr Lawson, Secretary of State for  
Energy

1700 Press Conference at Norwegian Embassy

Evening Dinner hosted by Norwegian Ambassador

LIST OF SUGGESTED GUESTS

FOR

WORKING LUNCH

FOR THE NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER, MR KÅRE WILLOCH

10 MARCH 1982

Full name, title and Decorations	Address	Reason for invitation
1 The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP		
2 His Excellency Mr Kåre Willoch, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Norway	c/o Royal Norwegian Embassy 25 Belgrave Square London SW1X 8QO	
3 Private Secretary to Mr Willoch	"	
4 Mr Kjell Colding, State Secretary, Mr Willoch's Office	"	
5 His Excellency Mr Rolf Trygve Busch	"	Assumes post of Norwegian Ambassador in London at beginning of March
6 The Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP	Foreign and Commonwealth Office	Lord Carrington is already committed to a visit by the Tunisian Foreign Minister: The LPS is overseas.
<u>Reserve</u> The Lord Trefgarne	"	
7 The Rt Hon Nigel Lawson MP	D/Energy	There are close relations in the energy field. Mr Willoch is calling on Mr Lawson in the afternoon.
8 The Rt Hon Leon Brittan QC MP	HM Treasury	Mr Willoch has asked to meet Treasury Ministers. He will see the Chancellor in the morning.
<u>Reserves</u> The Rt Hon Patrick Jenkin MP	D/Industry	
The Rt Hon John Nott MP	Ministry of Defence	
9 Her Excellency Dame Gillian Brown DCVO CMG	HM Embassy, Oslo	

Full name, title and Decorations	Address	Reason for invitation
10 Mr Julian Bullard CMG	Foreign and Commonwealth Office	Political Director and Deputy Under Secretary responsible for Norway
11 Professor Alan Walters	c/o No 10	Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister. Mr Willoch is an economist and has asked to meet HMG's economic advisers.
12 Private Secretary to the Prime Minister		



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 February 1982

Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO  
CABINET OFFICE*See below,*

## ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT: 10 MARCH

1. Following the success of the Conservative Party in the Norwegian General Election last September, the Prime Minister invited the new Norwegian Prime Minister, Mr Kare Willoch, to make an early visit to the United Kingdom. The date 10 March has been agreed.
2. Mr Willoch is in the United Kingdom for only one day. He will have an hour's talks with the Prime Minister, followed by a small working lunch. A suggested guest list for the lunch is being forwarded separately to No 10. Meetings between Mr Willoch and a number of other Ministers are being provisionally arranged and the list of these too is being submitted to No 10. The Norwegian Ambassador is giving a dinner in Mr Willoch's honour and has invited a number of Ministers and MPs including Mr Biffen, Mr Marten, Mr Pattie, Mr Parkinson and Mr Hannam. The proposed programme for the visit is at Annex E.
3. The Norwegians do not wish to propose a formal agenda. They have however suggested a number of topics for discussion and have said that they would welcome an indication of the subjects we are likely to raise. I propose therefore to let them have a copy of the list of subjects for discussion at Annex A once this has been agreed: this includes the Norwegian suggestions. At Annexes B and C are assessments of British and Norwegian objectives for the visit. At Annex D is a suggested list of briefs. Given the number of Ministers who may be involved, I suggest that the briefs be coordinated in the normal way by the Cabinet Office.

/4.





4. The list of topics for discussion is too long to be covered at a short meeting between the Prime Ministers. It is however intended to reflect points to be covered during the visit as a whole, including the working lunch and the calls on individual Ministers.

5. The Norwegians value their traditionally close relations with the United Kingdom. They regard us as a nation with whom they can share their problems and receive advice. Mr Willoch has made visits to London and Bonn his first overseas priorities. He can be expected to be receptive to our point of view. His visit should thus provide a good opportunity to influence the Norwegians on political and security issues, and at the same time to promote United Kingdom interests in the trade and energy fields.

*T. W. C.*

*Michael Palliser*

Michael Palliser

cc: Sir Douglas Wass GCB  
HM TREASURY

Sir Brian Hayes KCB  
MAFF

Sir Frank Cooper GCB CMG  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE


M D M Franklin Esq CB CMG  
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE

Sir Peter Carey KCB  
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY

Sir Donald Maitland GCMG OBE  
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Sir Brian Cubbon KCB  
HOME OFFICE

C A Whitmore Esq  
10 DOWNING STREET



ANNEX A

ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT: 10 MARCH

List of Subjects for Discussion

1. Western Security
  - (a) the NATO Alliance and Summit
  - (b) nuclear matters including INF and START: public attitudes
  - (c) Anglo-Norwegian defence relations
  - (d) Nordic security issues, including Svalbard and NNWFZ
2. International Political Issues
  - (a) Poland
  - (b) East/West relations
  - (c) CSCE
3. The Soviet Union
  - (a) Norway's bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union
  - (b) future developments in the Soviet Union
4. The Norwegian relationship with the EC and political cooperation
5. Energy
6. Trade
7. The International Economic Situation

ANNEX B

ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT: 10 MARCH

Primary United Kingdom Objectives

1. To ensure that the Norwegian Government maintains its robust support for NATO including the Alliance's nuclear policies and avoids unhelpful initiatives, such as the Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.
2. To encourage the Norwegians to stand firm towards the Soviet Union and to reassure them of British support in their bilateral dealings with the Russians.
3. To secure Norwegian (and through them, Nordic) support for British international objectives generally.
4. To keep Norway's policies closely in line with those of the Ten without giving Norway the impression that she can enjoy the benefits of membership for which she is not paying.
5. To strengthen the already close relationship in the exploitation and security of energy resources.
6. To seek information about economic developments in Norway and other plans for the future of gas and oil industries; to prepare the ground for the UK to explore opportunities in the Norwegian market.

/Subsidiary

Subsidiary United Kingdom Objectives

1. To establish an effective working relationship with Mr Willoch, building on the close friendship that exists between the UK and Norway.
2. To exchange views on the international economic situation.

ANGLO/NORWEGIAN SUMMIT : 10 MARCH

Likely Primary Norwegian Objectives

1. To emphasise the importance the Norwegians attach to their relations with the United Kingdom.
2. To explain Norway's approach to Western security and, in particular, the INF negotiations and START, including domestic attitudes to nuclear weapons.
3. To promote the Norwegian objective of getting as close as possible to the EC without joining it and participating as fully as possible in the process of political cooperation.
4. To examine the state of East-West relations, especially Poland, and the implications for the CSCE process.
5. To explain Norway's bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and to compare notes on likely future developments there.
6. To hear about developments in the British economy and to discuss the economic outlook in Europe.

Likely Subsidiary Norwegian Objectives

1. To ensure that the United Kingdom remains Norway's largest export market.

2. To stress the importance of the British contribution to Norway's direct defence.

3. To discuss the possible relationship between economic recession and social unrest.

4. To emphasise Norway's concern to protect its fishing interests in negotiations with the EC.

## ANGLO-NORWEGIAN SUMMIT : 10 MARCH

Proposed List of Briefs

	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In Consultation With</u>
1. Steering Brief	FCO (WED)	as appropriate
2. Security Issues		
(a) NATO including Summit	FCO (Defence Department)	Ministry of Defence
(b) arms control and disarmament, including INF, START and public attitudes	FCO (Defence Dept)	FCO (ACDD, WED) Ministry of Defence
(c) Anglo/Norwegian defence issues including oil rig security	Ministry of Defence	FCO (Defence Dept, WED, MAED)
(d) Nordic security issues, including Svalbard and NNWFZ	FCO (WED/Defence Dept)	MOD
3. The Soviet Union		
(a) Norway's relations with the Soviet Union	FCO (WED)	FCO (EESD)
(b) future developments in the Soviet Union	FCO (EESD)	
4. Poland	FCO (EESD)	
5. East/West Relations	FCO (EESD)	CSCE Unit

- |     |   |              |  |
|-----|---|--------------|--|
| 6.  | CSCE  | CSCE Unit    | FCO (Defence Dept)                               |
| 7.  | International Political Issues  |              |  |
|     | (a) Afghanistan   | FCO (SAD)    |  |
|     | (b) Middle East   | FCO (NENAD)  | FCO (MED)  |
|     | (c) Southern Africa/<br>Namibia                                       | FCO (SAfD)   |  |
|     | (d) Turkey  | FCO (SED)    | FCO (WED)  |
| 8.  | Economic Matters  |              |  |
|     | (a) UK economy  | HM Treasury  |  |
|     | (b) International<br>economic<br>questions                            | HM Treasury  | FCO (ESID/ERD)                                   |
| 9.  | Trade and<br>Opportunities for<br>Improvement                         | D of Trade   | FCO (TRED)<br>D of Energy<br>Ministry of Defence |
| 10. | Energy: Current<br>Cooperation and<br>Opportunities for<br>the Future | D of Energy  | FCO (ESSD)                                       |
| 11. | Norwegian relations with the EC and political cooperation             |              |  |
|     | (a) EC/Norway )   | FCO (ECD(E)) | FCO (WED)  |
|     | (b) EC/Political )  |              |  |
|     | Cooperation )   |              |  |
| 12. | Fisheries   | FCO (ECD(I)) | MAFF   |
| 13. | Norway Internal Situation   |              |  |
|     | (a) political   | FCO (WED)    |  |
|     | (b) economic  | HM Treasury  |  |



14. The Relationship  
Between Economic  
Recession and Social  
Unrest

Home Office

As appropriate

PROPOSED PROGRAMME FOR MR WILLOCH'S VISIT  
TO THE UNITED KINGDOM : 10 MARCH 1982

0900 Arrive Heathrow

1030 Meeting with Lord Carrington

1115 Meeting with the Chancellor of the Exchequer  
or Chief Secretary

1200 Talks with Prime Minister

1300 Working lunch for 12 given by the Prime Minister

1500 Meeting with Mr Nott, Secretary of State  
for Defence

1530 Meeting with Mr Burns, Chief Economic Adviser

1615 Meeting with Mr Lawson, Secretary of State  
for Energy

1700 Press Conference at Norwegian Embassy

Evening Dinner given by Norwegian Ambassador

cc Miss C Stephens  
Mrs S Goodchild

23 December, 1981

Norwegian Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 22 December.  
The Prime Minister agrees to give Mr Willoch a  
working lunch on 10 March, preceded by talks at  
1200 hrs. I should be grateful for a draft guest  
list for the lunch in due course.

A. J. COLES

F N Richards, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 December 1981

Yes  
noPrime MinisterAgree to talks and working lunch  
on 10 March?

A.F.C. 22/12

Dear John,

Invitation to the Norwegian Prime Minister to Visit the UK

In Michael Alexander's letter of 11 November he said that the Prime Minister was content that Mr Willoch should be invited to visit the UK next year.

Mr Willoch has now proposed a 1½ - 2 day visit in February or March. I understand that the Prime Minister would be able to see Mr Willoch at 1200 on 10 March and to give a working lunch for him afterwards. I should be grateful for confirmation.

Lord Carrington will unfortunately not be available to see Mr Willoch on 10 March because of the visit that day of the Tunisian Foreign Minister. However, he would propose to give a dinner for Mr Willoch on 9 March.

Yours ever.

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

Norway

MR. COLES

cc. Mrs. Goodchild

The Foreign Office have asked if the Prime Minister could have talks and entertain to lunch the Norwegian Prime Minister on Wednesday, 10 March. A letter from the FCO is on its way.

ES.

Caroline  
When is the European Council?

14 December 1981

Mr. Coles Mr. 21/12 file Coles  
March 29/30

ES. 15/12

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vb

Norway

b

11 November 1981

Invitation to the Norwegian Prime  
Minister to visit the United Kingdom

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 6 November. She is content that an invitation should be issued to Mr. Willoch to visit this country next year.

MODBA

F.N. Richards, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Wanted that his personal 6 November 1981  
 invitation (to a Conservative Head of  
 Govt) should be used?

Ans - 9/11

Yes  
 no

Dear Michael,

Invitation to the Norwegian Prime Minister to Visit the  
 United Kingdom

The Prime Minister approved a message to Mr Kåre Willoch on his taking office as Norwegian Prime Minister which contained an invitation to make an early visit to the United Kingdom. The agreement for the invitation was set out in FCO telno 207 to Melbourne, of which a copy is attached for ease of reference. Lord Carrington has since arranged to receive Mr Stray, the new Foreign Minister, on 10 November.

See also  
 Norway: Feb 81  
 fit

The Ambassador in Oslo is seeing Mr Willoch on 10 November and the question of the visit may come up.

Lord Carrington supports the proposal that Mr Willoch should be invited to pay an early visit to the United Kingdom. We have close relations with the Norwegians in a number of areas, notably energy and defence, and it will be important to influence the policies of the new conservative government. I should be grateful, therefore, if you could indicate approximately when the Prime Minister might like to receive Mr Willoch in London. It would be helpful if the Ambassador could, for example, tell him that the Prime Minister hopes he will be able to visit the UK during the first part of next year.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
 10 Downing Street

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(36)

CONFIDENTIAL  
 DESKBY 052230Z  
 FM FCO 051818Z OCT 81  
 TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL MELBOURNE  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 207 OF 5 OCTOBER  
 AND TO PRIORITY OSLO.

FOLLOWING FOR PS.

NEW NORWEGIAN GOVERNEMENT.

WRY 01412		
RECEIVED - REGISTRY NO. 13		
7 OCT 1981		
DESK OFFICER	REGISTRY	
INDEX	PA	Action Taken
	✓	MS

FOR COPY

33

1. A NEW CONSERVATIVE MINORITY GOVERNMENT TAKES OFFICE IN NORWAY ON 13 OCTOBER, WITH MR WILLOCH AS PRIME MINISTER AND MR STRAY AS MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE DEPARTMENT SUPPORTS HM AMBASSADOR OSLO'S RECOMMENDATION (OSLO TELNO 150) THAT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES BE SENT FROM MRS THATCHER AND LORD CARRINGTON RESPECTIVELY.

2. FOLLOWING TEXTS ARE PROPOSED:

(A) TO MR WILLOCH

'MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR TAKING OFFICE AS PRIME MINISTER OF NORWAY. OUR COUNTRIES HAVE A GREAT DEAL IN COMMON, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO BOTH CLOSER AND MORE FRUITFUL RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO PAY AN EARLY VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.'

(B) TO MR STRAY

'MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR APPOINTMENT AS MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING THE HABITS OF CLOSE COOPERATION WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES IN SO MANY FIELDS, AND TRUST THAT WE SHALL SOON HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET'

3. BACKGROUND.


THE LAST ANGLO-NORWEGIAN VISIT AT PRIME MINISTERIAL LEVEL WAS MR CALLAGHAN'S VISIT TO NORWAY IN 1977. MR WILLOCH VISITED THE UK WITH A CONSERVATIVE GROUP IN JUNE AND MET LORD CARRINGTON. HE WOULD NO DOUBT APPRECIATE AN EARLY INVITATION TO RETURN TO THE UK AS PRIME MINISTER AND OUR VERY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH NORWAY IN THE DEFENCE AND ENERGY FIELDS WOULD WARRANT SUCH A VISIT. IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS LORD CARRINGTON WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A BILATERAL WITH MR STRAY IN THE MARGINS OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING IN DECEMBER.

CARRINGTON  
 LIMITED  
 WED  
 DEFENCE  
 ENSASD  
 PS  
 PS/MRS

PS/PUS  
 MR BULLHARD  
 MR FERBUSSON

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