

PREM 19/2386

Pt 2

Confidential Filing

Prime Minister's Visit to Poland

2-4 November.

POLAND

Part 1: Mar 88

PART 2: Nov 88

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>5-11-88</del>							
<del>7-11-88</del>							
<del>8-11-88</del>							
<del>10-11-88</del>							
<del>11-11-88</del>							
<del>5-12-88</del>							
6-12-88							

PREM 19/2386



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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 December 1988

Dear Mrs.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND:  
COMMEMORATION OF THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE  
OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Thank you for your letter of 16 December suggesting three ways in which we could be associated with the commemoration in Poland of the 50th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Second World War: an exchange of ships' visits, attendance by a tri-Service party at the official Polish commemoration, and the historical seminar. The Prime Minister thinks that, provided we do all three, that would be sufficient.

Yours sincerely,  
C. D. Powell

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Edm



Prime Minister

Agree with these three *etc*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

associated *interfering* *etc*

16 December 1988

to anniversary?

Dear Charles,

*Yours* *CDP*  
*16/12*

Prime Minister's Visit to Poland: Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Second World War

*at Head*  
In your letter of 5 December, you conveyed the Prime Minister's view that we should not refuse to be associated with the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War. We agree. What we in fact proposed (my letter to you of 5 December) was that we should have an exchange of ships' visits with the Poles in the spring rather than for the anniversary (which the MOD would find difficult to fit in anyway); and look at other ways of observing the anniversary of the War.

1

The MOD are investigating the possibility of sending a tri-Service wreath-laying party and/or a guard of honour to represent HM Forces at the official Polish commemoration of the anniversary. This seems an excellent idea to us; it would provide a ceremonial presence without superfluous speeches.

2

We also need a more substantial event. During the Prime Minister's final round of talks with General Jaruzelski on 4 November, he mentioned the idea of a conference or seminar to mark the anniversary. We are considering a historical seminar. This could be a worthwhile academic exercise as well as a good symbolic gesture.

3


We are asking the Ambassador in Warsaw to call on the MFA next week to discuss follow-up to the Prime Minister's visit. If you agree, he will put the idea of a seminar to the Poles, while agreeing to an exchange of ships' visits in the spring. When the MOD have decided on their representation at the official ceremony, we can put this to the Poles as well.

*Yours ever,* *L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

Bland: Pm's visit  
Pt 2



10/11/1888

(Unofficial translation)

ms

Prime Minister  
CDP  
16/xii

Dear Prime Minister,

May I thank you for the letters which you have so kindly directed to me following your visit to Poland. I have read them with great care.

I should particularly like to thank you for the friendly words about our country spoken from the rostrum of the British Parliament. We would like to interpret them as a corroboration of the intention to move forward all-round cooperation between Britain and Poland.

In the course of your visit to our country you have had an opportunity to take a broad view of current Polish realities. To me it seems to be of considerable importance. Poland is going through profound and rapid transformations of rather historic magnitude.

Our recent predicaments ought not to blurr that.

The Polish people highly appreciated your call on the Westerplatte peninsula. I am pleased that on behalf of the United Kingdom you have declared the readiness for a common probing in connection with the upcoming 50th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II.

There is many a noble page in the past of our two countries and peoples. By the same token, we should to be quite far-sighted as far as future is concerned. I am firmly convinced that mutual Polish-British endeavours may become a meaningful factor for stability and a durable process of détente in Europe.

I highly value your invitation to continue the talks which we so promisingly opened in Warsaw.

Substantial progress in cooperation between our two countries, to which I am looking forward, might well become a solid platform for another fruitful meeting of ours.

Please accept my best regards and greetings.

Sincerely yours

(Signed: Wojciech Jaruzelski)



SECRETARIAT OF STATE

No. 230432

FROM THE VATICAN, 6th December 1988

(2)

*Die Minster*

*CDD 20/12*

*20/12*

Dear Prime Minister,

In the name of His Holiness Pope John Paul II I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of 10th November 1988 concerning your visit to Poland.

*Aap.*

His Holiness is grateful for your kind words in his regard, and he has noted with interest your description of the visit and the impressions which you gathered during your stay. In thanking you for your thoughtfulness he assures you once more of a remembrance in his prayers.

I avail myself of the occasion to renew the assurance of my highest consideration.

*f. R. Kard. Lewicki*  
Secretary of State

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, P.C.  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1A 2AA



POLAND : Pu Touss Pte.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

R27/12

BA

MO 6/18/3E

6th December 1988


Dear Dominic

6/12

POLAND

We were contacted some time ago by the Number 10 Duty Clerks seeking figures for total British killed in World War II. Our answer, 357,116 was met with a response to the effect that this was very low. We were subsequently asked for the total casualties (ie killed, wounded and prisoners). The answer to this was over 900,000.

The reason for rehearsing all this is merely that the attached extract from the Prime Ministers speech in Poland quotes the higher figure in the (incorrect) context of British killed. There is clearly nothing that can be done about this, and hopefully nobody else will spot this and challenge it publicly. But I thought I should record the discrepancy to prevent it being repeated.

*John*  
*even*  
  
(S McCARTHY)  
Private Secretary

Dominic Morris Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

## DINNER SPEECH BY MRS THATCHER

Warsaw home service 2200 gmt 3 Nov 88

Text of broadcast excerpts from Mrs Thatcher's speech, in English with Polish translation superimposed (passages in square brackets added from a version of the speech issued by PAP in English at 2237 gmt)

Gen Jaruzelski, Prime Minister Rakowski, your excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, today I laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw. Tomorrow you, General Jaruzelski, and I together will lay a wreath at the monument at Westerplatte, where the first shots of the second world war were fired. Many of the names on our monuments - Narvik, Tobruk, Monte Cassino and others - call forth particular memories in Great Britain, memories of British and Poles lives lost. Memories of brotherhood, memories of heroic deeds. They remind us how, after the attack on Poland by Nazi Germany, Great Britain joined in the war for freedom for Poland and Europe. Both our countries took part in this war in Europe, from its very earliest until the last. This was a war in which a million British people lost their lives, and at least six million people in Poland lost their lives.

[The Polish government came to London to continue the fight for freedom.

One pilot in eight fighting the Battle of Britain in 1940 was Polish - and, like the British pilots alongside whom they fought, they bore heavy casualties.

We remember, too, the desperate courage of the Warsaw Uprising, against overwhelming odds: and the heroism displayed by British and allied pilots who risked - and often lost - their lives to drop them supplies.

On Remembrance Sunday, in just over a week's time, representatives from the Polish Home Army will once again march proudly alongside their British comrades-in-arms at the Cenotaph in London, in an act of remembrance for all those who gave their lives.]

Nothing is capable of creating stronger links between nations than participation in this type of mutual experience.

[Now, nearly 50 years since Britain gave its historic pledge to fight if Poland was attacked, it is with a profound sense of history and a deep wish that neither of our countries should ever again have to suffer the agonies of war, that I pay this first ever visit by a British Minister to Poland.

Of course, the links between Britain and Poland started long before the second world war.

Two of the more colourful characters in British history - King Canute and Bonnie Prince Charlie - were half-Polish.

For two hundred years there was a large English - and even larger Scottish - population in Gdansk.

The first steam-powered factory in Poland was set up with British help and produced pianos - one of which was owned by Chopin.

Our histories have intermingled in curious ways over many centuries. And I hope that we can recreate those varied contacts in the new climate in Europe today.]

Britain is proud of its history as a nation. So is Poland - and with good reason. In the mid-16th century you were Europe's largest state.

Throughout the whole period of partition and even dismemberment you kept your national spirit alive.

[I recall the moving story of Pope John Paul II on a visit to Poland in 1980. He took a little girl in his arms and asked her where Poland was. When she looked bewildered, he placed his hand gently over her heart and said: "Poland is here".]

The names of your great leaders - King Casimir, Jan Sobieski, Tadeusz Kosciuszko - shine out from the pages of Europe's history.

[We think of Poland's remarkable contribution to science with Copernicus, to literature with Joseph Conrad and Czeslaw Milosz, to music through such great names as Chopin, Paderewski and Rubinstein - all of world renown.]

One thinks, too, of the unbreakable spirit of the Polish people as they set about rebuilding Warsaw to its former glory from the ashes and devastation of the second world war.

Two lessons stand out from this past: Poland's irrepressible sense of nationhood, which survived through centuries of turmoil to regain a national home; and, at the same time, Poland's indisputable place in the mainstream of Europe and its affairs.

For us, Warsaw, Prague and Budapest are just as much great European cities as London, Paris and Rome. Your roots lie as deep in the soil and the history of Europe as do ours.

[President Gorbachev has spoken of building a common European house. But the only wall so far erected is the Berlin Wall, which divides and separates. As so often when one wants to build a new house, you have to start by knocking a few walls down.

We want to see the barriers which have divided Europe for the last 40 years dismantled, so that Poland and other East European countries can once again share fully in Europe's culture, Europe's freedom and Europe's justice - treasures which sprang from Christendom, were developed through a rule of law and found their expression in democracy.]

You will find in Britain and Europe a great readiness for more contacts of every sort, together with a wish to see the peoples of Eastern Europe play a much fuller part in the life of Europe as a whole.

That is why we are keen to expand economic and trade links between the countries of the European Community and of Eastern Europe.

That is also why we welcome the bold and courageous reforms being undertaken by Secretary Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, and earnestly hope that he will succeed.

You yourself have described it, Gen Jaruzelski, as an historic wave of change, and I share that view.

[You will recall the words of Brutus in Shakespeare's "Julius Caesar":

"There is a tide in the affairs of men,  
which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune,  
omitted, all the voyage of their life  
is bound in shallows and in miseries.  
On such a full sea are we now afloat,  
and we must take the current when it serves,  
or lose our ventures."

Gen Jaruzelski, we must take that tide at the flood and not lose our ventures. But we need real changes if our hopes are to be realised, changes which go to the root cause of the hostility

and confrontation which has fractured Europe since the second world war.

We hope that very soon agreement will be reached at the meeting in Vienna which will allow talks on conventional security in Europe to begin. That will enable us to tackle the substantial imbalance of conventional forces which is heavily in favour of the Warsaw Pact. For those talks to succeed we shall need to be frank with each other, frank about the numbers of troops and weapons on each side - a frankness which was never achieved by the Warsaw Pact in the earlier and unsuccessful talks on mutual and balanced force reductions.

We also need to remove from Europe - from the world indeed - the threat of chemical weapons, in which the Warsaw Pact countries have a vast preponderance.

Above all, we need to see that the basic human rights enshrined in the Helsinki accords - signed by 35 nations, including all the Warsaw Pact countries and the countries of the NATO alliance - are genuinely and fully respected.

When contemplating closer relations with other countries, we judge them by how they treat their own citizens. We shall not reach the trust and confidence we need for full-hearted co-operation until those rights are entrenched and observed as part of the way of life of the countries of Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union, [and] until all enjoy freedom under the law, a law which applies not only to those who are governed but to those who govern as well. It is both a moral and a practical matter.

In modern societies, success depends on openness and free discussion. Suppress those things, and you are unable to respond to the need for change. We in the West could never have achieved our great technological advance without them.

Change has been very much the theme of my talks with you today, Gen Jaruzelski, and with Prime Minister Rakowski. Tomorrow I shall have the opportunity to hear the views of Solidarity and its leaders as well.

Reform is never easy or free from painful consequences. But we have to ask ourselves: what would be the cost of failing to carry through change and reform? Would not the consequences be even more painful and more prolonged?

In a smaller way, we faced this problem in Britain in 1979. But the British people rejected the path of economic decline. They knew that the problems would not go away merely because we refused to face them.

People are prepared to endure hardship and difficulty when they believe that the result will be a better life for them and their children, when they know that they are fully involved in decisions, and when they are convinced that what they are doing is right.]

We in Britain now have one of the fastest growing and most successful economies in Europe because we were prepared to face up to difficult choices and make difficult decisions.

You told me today about your plans for economic reform, that you want to remove the restrictions which restrain individual and collective initiative, and that you want to offer greater incentives and reduce the influence of bureaucracy. That is good news. But one of the lessons of the world since 1945 is that greater prosperity comes to those nations which have greater freedom - the USA, Western Europe and now Japan.

Experience teaches us that you will only achieve higher growth, release enterprise, spur people to greater effort and obtain their full-hearted commitment to reform when people have the dignity and enjoyment of personal and political freedom. [Then they have the freedom of expression, freedom of association, the right to form free and independent trade unions and fulfilment of all the other obligations of the Helsinki accords.]

But experience also teaches us that freedom incurs responsibility, responsibility for greater effort, for accepting the hardships and dislocation which are inevitably associated with far-reaching change, for making the necessary commitment to restore the nation's prosperity. Freedom and responsibility go hand in hand. Those who seek one must be prepared to offer the other.

[That is why it is so vital there should be a real dialogue with representatives of all sections of society, including Solidarity.

People have to be involved in decisions about the way forward. They must have the freedom to choose. The chances are that they will then make the right choices.

Only the government and people of Poland herself can provide the commitment, resolve and perseverance to break through to success.

But when that happens, when that great day comes, you will find your friends ready, not just to stand and cheer, but to help in practical ways: by supporting a programme with the IMF, by offering credits, by rescheduling debts, by encouraging investment, by establishing joint ventures and by increasing contacts of every sort between our governments and peoples.]

Gen Jaruzelski, Prime Minister Rakowski, Britain cares deeply about Poland and its people. We passionately want you to succeed. We know the glories as well as the tragedies of your past. We welcome among us many of your fellow countrymen and are deeply grateful for their contribution to our national life. We admire the indomitable spirit of the Polish people.

We thank you for inviting me to make this visit, for the warm reception which I have received and the excellent programme which has been arranged.

I ask you to join me in raising your glasses to the future, peace, prosperity and fulfilment of the Polish people and to friendship between our two countries.

(A1)

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bcp

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

5 December 1988

**PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND:  
REMAINS OF GENERAL SIKORSKI**

Thank you for your letter of 5 December with its reminder of the exact position of General Sikorski's remains. I agree that you should confirm that the Prime Minister's statement of 7 March 1988 remains valid.

(CHARLES POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'A' or a similar stylized mark.



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

5 December 1988

*Dear Lyn,*

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND: FOLLOW-UP

Thank you for your letter of 5 December about action to follow up the Prime Minister's visit to Poland. I have discussed this with the Prime Minister who has three comments:

- The Prime Minister thinks we are wrong to refuse to be associated with the 50th Anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War and would like this reconsidered. She does not think German nervousness about the occasion sufficient reason to dismiss the Polish invitation.
- You say that the action being taken on visas "should" result in a speedier service in 1989. The Prime Minister has commented that it is "must" not "should". In the light of the advice from the Home Office before her visit, she gave the clearest possible assurance that there would be a significant improvement in the processing of visa applications and that must be honoured.
- The Prime Minister has belatedly confessed that she did issue an oral invitation to Mr Rakowski at the foot of the aircraft steps immediately before departure. I am afraid this is the first I have heard of it. But it remains the case that she would prefer to see General Jaruzelski come here before Mr Rakowski.

Otherwise, the Prime Minister is content with what is proposed in your letter.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (HM Treasury), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry), Tom Jeffery (Department of Education and Science) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,*  
  
C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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K4



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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5 December 1988

*ccfc*  
*(1)*

*ms*  
Dear Charles,

*2. Minister*  
*content?*

*CFD 576.*

Prime Minister's Visit to Poland: Follow-Up

Thank you for your letter of 6 November. You may like to know what progress we are making in following up the points you raised.

(i) We are planning political consultations in London in January or February, with the Polish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kulski. We see them as the major feature in the follow-up to the Prime Minister's visit, and they will cover the whole range of bilateral and international issues and set the framework for subsequent talks on specific areas.

(ii) Political/military talks are planned for April or May 1989. These should meet General Jaruzelski's suggestion of bilateral talks between defence experts. Our team will include FCO and MOD representatives.

(iii) We intend to propose talks between policy planners, if possible in the first half of 1989, at which to discuss in greater depth some of the issues covered during the political consultations.

(iv) The Poles proposed talks on UN issues earlier this year. Because UN subjects are not normally covered during political consultations, we are inviting the Polish experts concerned to London in July or September.

(v) Event to mark the anniversary of the Second World War. The Poles have proposed informally that a Royal Navy warship should visit Westerplatte on the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of war, 1 September 1989. The main problem with this is that the anniversary celebrations might well be an occasion for anti-German rhetoric. We know that the West Germans are nervous about the anniversary. Moreover, the Polish version of the beginning of the Second World War glosses over the Nazi-Soviet Pact. We have already told the Poles informally that we have difficulty with these dates.

/When

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*This is a pity. Please reconsider.*



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When they put the proposal formally, we intend to suggest instead that the Dartmouth Training Squadron visit Poland during their deployment in the Baltic in May-June next year. (The Poles have also proposed informally that their flagship, the Warszawa, should visit London in May with the Chief of Naval Staff. We have told them we will accept this). Meanwhile, we are investigating the possibilities for some joint commemoration of the outbreak of war which would avoid the propaganda pitfalls.

(vi) Visas. It is unfortunate that a 15% increase in Polish visa applications, coupled with difficulties in recruiting staff in Warsaw earlier this year, caused delays in issuing visas. Priority was however maintained for business and official travellers and the overall position has now improved. Modifications to procedures have been introduced. A new direct high-speed communications facility is now working smoothly after early technical difficulties. A pilot computer project is under way. Temporary extra staff are in place. Further staff reinforcements are being planned for next year to cope with the further substantial increase in applications we can expect in the light of the liberalisation of Polish passport regulations, and the customary summer surge. All this should result in a speedier service across the board in 1989. There are no unusual requirements in relation to private visit applications from Poland. Clearly however there will still be security considerations which have to be taken into account.

Musk

(vii) Exchanges of teachers and schoolchildren. This is for the DES, but we will encourage such exchanges as a way of increasing contacts outside the framework of government.

(viii) Management training. On 3 November Mr Waldegrave outlined to the visiting Polish Minister of Culture, Mr Krawczuk, the offer which was set out in the Prime Minister's brief. Mr Krawczuk promised to pass this on to Mr Rakowski on his return to Warsaw. Professor Michael Thomas of the University of Strathclyde, whom the British Council chose to conduct a consultancy report on the shape of the eventual programme, has already made a visit to Poland and will be returning for a more detailed study-tour in January.

/(ix)

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(ix) IMF and Paris Club. We propose to stress in our bilateral dealings with the Poles that the onus will be on them to convince the IMF mission during technical negotiations, and subsequently the IMF Board, that they are serious about implementing the economic and political reforms necessary to meet IMF performance targets. Creditors will need to be satisfied that the programme is being adhered to, and that Poland is in a position to service further debt, before they could consider providing new credits. We can play a part by convincing the US and others that the success of an IMF programme in the Polish situation must depend on political as well as economic liberalisation.

General Jaruzelski's request for our assistance within the Paris Club does not arise until Poland comes to the Club for rescheduling, when we shall be ready, and shall urge others, to go on rescheduling to the extent necessary to meet genuine Polish needs within Paris Club terms.

(x) Return visits. The Prime Minister has already invited Jaruzelski to visit London if his travels bring him near the UK. The Poles are likely to pursue this suggestion energetically, and we assume the Prime Minister would be content to see him in London some time in 1989. We are unclear about the Prime Minister's intentions with respect to Rakowski. No invitation was issued to him either during the visit or in the Prime Minister's thank-you letter. The Polish Ambassador maintains however that the Prime Minister sent a message containing an invitation as she left Warsaw on her flight home. We are not aware of such a message, and would be grateful to know whether anything was in fact said.

*Yes orally at 10.30 5/4/89*

If you are content with the above, we will ask Mr Barrett to seek an early call on the Polish Foreign Minister to propose dates for the political consultations and outline an programme of further bilateral contacts

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (HM Treasury), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry), Tom Jeffery (Department of Education and Science) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever, L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

POLAND: P.M. Vant RT2



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*cc/c*



*2 letters*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 December 1988

*Dear Charles,*

Prime Minister's Visit to Poland: Remains of General Sikorski

There is one matter we need to clear up which was not mentioned in your letter of 6 November on follow-up.

During the press conference at the end of her visit, and during her interview with Polish TV, the Prime Minister was asked about the return of General Sikorski's remains to Poland. In her replies (attached) she said that she recollected that Sikorski's close relatives did not consent to the removal; and that there were differences of view both in Poland and in the Polish community in the UK. She undertook to check on the relatives' wishes.

The Prime Minister is of course right about the differences of view. But Sikorski's closest relative, his wife (now deceased), stated in 1970 that she wished his ashes to be moved to Poland. If you agree, we will tell anyone who follows this up that the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons on 7 March 1988 (attached) remains valid. We will add that we will continue to review the issue and that, as the Prime Minister said in her interview with Polish TV, the time may one day come when the ashes will be returned. If asked specifically about Mrs Sikorski's views, we propose to confirm the facts and add that this was taken into account when the Prime Minister made her March statement.

I am copying this letter to Philip Mawer (Home Office).

*Yours ever,*

*L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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TRANSCRIPT B: PM - INTERVIEW - POLISH TV - 4 NOVEMBER 1988

INTERVIEWER:

Prime Minister, Poles may be divided politically but there is one topic all of us are united on - the Government, the Church and even former Solidarity leaders: we want (General Sikorski) back in Poland. He belongs here.

Can you contribute something positive, taking it as not a topic to play political football with?

PRIME MINISTER: future of our countries and for the whole world, but we do not play politics with that topic. We have been asked before. My recollection is that the nearest relative does not consent to the remains being moved and I believe that there are still some differences in Poland about it, so the time is not now, but the time may one day come and I understand how important it is to you.

INTERVIEWER:

Prime Minister, at the end of our conversation, you are now more familiar with our country after this visit. You met people from the Government side, you met leaders of the Church, you met members of the Opposition, you met common men on the street. Knowing our country, knowing our economic situation, knowing our geographical and political situation, would you accept the job of the Prime Minister of Poland?

-10-

QUESTION:

I was in London this year. I saw a very interesting place, the London Docklands, but what do you think about changes in Britain's economy during the last decade?

PRIME MINISTER:

There have been great changes in Britain's economy. The standard of living is very much greater. We are going into about our eighth year of growth. Things are growing very fast at the moment, perhaps a little too fast, because inflation has been rising again. At the moment, as you know, it is nearly 6 percent which is too high, and we will have to take steps to get it down, and because we have been growing so fast we have been importing too much and the steps we have taken to get inflation down will also help to get that deficit down.

But the growth is going well. Very high investment in British industry and in British commerce and all British services, so it is going well. I think it has had a good government for some time!

QUESTION:

Prime Minister, you said twice that it is premature to transfer the remains of General Sikorski (phon) to Poland, but as you know, a large part of Polish society as well as the Polish Authority and the Pope and the Church in Poland expressed the wish many times, also in London. Are you going to change your position after this visit to Poland?

PM - PRESS CONFERENCE - WARSAW, POLAND - 4 NOVEMBER 1988

-11-

PRIME MINISTER:

When we are asked about this, we do two things: we enquire from the closest living relatives what are their wishes - and those obviously count a great deal - and my recollection is that comparatively recently when we enquired, that they did not wish there to be a transfer and I will check that again. And we also understand that there is some difference of view in Poland or in the Polish community, and we took that into account.

So it is not a decision which necessarily endures for ever. It is one which we do re-examine from time to time in the way which I have indicated.

We understand, obviously, why many people wish those remains to be transferred.

QUESTION:

Prime Minister, what emerged in practical terms from your second session of talks with General Jaruzelski and linked with that, if Poland should succeed in coming to an accommodation with the International Monetary Fund, will that lead to Britain immediately opening up new credits and joint ventures or will that depend on political advance as well, such as the recognition of Solidarity?

proposal	Date of publication
Suffolk: Closure of Little Bealings Primary School.	19 January 1987
Suffolk: Closure of Caarsfield CE Primary School.	19 January 1987
Barnet: Establish Hasmoncan Preparatory School as a Voluntary Aided School.	12 February 1987
Berkshire: Change of character of St. Bernards Convent School from single-sex to co-educational.	25 March 1987
Devon: Amalgamation of Colyton Grammar and Axminster Secondary Schools.	3 April 1987
Hertfordshire: Amalgamation of Bishop Hatfield Secondary School and Hatfield School.	3 April 1987
Hertfordshire: Amalgamation of Marshalwick and Wheathampstead Secondary Schools.	3 April 1987
Hertfordshire: Amalgamation of Margaret Dane and Hadham Hall Secondary Schools.	10 April 1987
Staffordshire: Reorganisation of Secondary Schools in Burntwood.	30 April 1987
Shropshire: Closure of Ightfield CE Primary School.	20 May 1987
Shropshire: Closure of Acton Burnell CE Primary School.	20 May 1987
Lancashire: Closure of Preston Talbot RC Primary School.	8 June 1987
Oxfordshire: Amalgamation of St. Blaise CE Primary and Milton Heights Primary Schools.	11 June 1987
Kent: Closure of Highfield Secondary and amalgamation of Warren Woods Boys and Girls Schools.	12 June 1987
Merton: Reorganisation of Country, Primary, Middle and Secondary Schools.	12 June 1987
Hampshire: Closure of Weyhill CE Primary School.	19 June 1987
Dorset: Enlargement of St. Mary's RC Combined School.	3 July 1987
Lancashire: Establishment of a new sixth form centre and change of age-range of Blackpool Collegiate and Blackpool Greenlands High Schools.	17 July 1987
Hampshire: Amalgamation of Hill and Richard Taunton Sixth Form Colleges.	30 July 1987
Staffordshire: Rationalisation of Primary Education in Stoke-on-Trent.	30 July 1987
Staffordshire: Rationalisation of Secondary Schools in Stoke-on-Trent.	30 July 1987
Somerset: Closure of Chilcompton Infants, Chilcompton Juniors and Stratton-on-the-Fosse CE Primary Schools and establishment of a new CE Primary School.	7 August 1987
Wiltshire: Amalgamation of Westmead Infant and Junior Schools.	7 August 1987
Hampshire: Change age-range of Purbrook Park County Secondary School.	24 August 1987

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29  
PRIME MINISTER

## Security (Trade Unions)

Mr. Dalyell: To ask the Prime Minister what consideration has been given to banning trade unions from the Defence Intelligence Service.

The Prime Minister: None.

Mr. Dalyell: To ask the Prime Minister what is Her Majesty's Government's policy towards trade union membership in those sections of (a) the Home Office, (b) the Ministry of Defence and (c) the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office which deal with security matters or which handle highly classified information; and if she will make a statement.

The Prime Minister: Apart from members of the Ministry of Defence Police, civil servants in these Departments are free to join trades unions irrespective of whether they deal with security matters or handle classified information.

## Psychological Warfare

Mr. Livingstone: To ask the Prime Minister how many civil servants were trained in psychological warfare in each year from 1972 to 1987 in England, in the United States of America, or in both.

The Prime Minister: One civil servant received two weeks' training in England in 1983. Records are not available before 1982.

## Security Services (Northern Ireland)

Mr. Livingstone: To ask the Prime Minister which Minister was responsible for the security services in Northern Ireland (a) from 1974 to 1979 and (b) from 1979 to the current date.

The Prime Minister: The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is responsible for all aspects of security policy in Northern Ireland. The position before 1979 is not a matter for me.

## General Sikorski

Mr. Alfred Morris: To ask the Prime Minister if she has received any representations about the repatriation to Poland of the remains of General Sikorski; what reply she has made; and if she will make a statement.

The Prime Minister: Representations have been received from various quarters both in Britain and in Poland. The Polish Foreign Minister raised with me last December the long-standing desire of the Polish authorities that the remains of General Sikorski be transferred to Poland. I told him that this was a delicate and difficult matter which divided the Polish people, and that the time had not yet come when we could agree to the transfer.

## NHS Review

Mr. Fatchett: To ask the Prime Minister if, further to her reply at 1 March, *Official Report*, column 813, she will list those district health authorities which, as part of the Government's National Health Service review, had told her that they are satisfied with their current level of funding.

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman will be aware from press reports and in other ways that many district health authorities have budgeted effectively within the resources allocated to them, and have provided full and comprehensive health care to those needing it. Since the review was announced a large number of submissions have been received dealing with the experiences of many health authorities. It would not, however, be appropriate to publish information which may have been given in confidence.

POLAND - Poczta Polska RTZ





CONFIDENTIAL

*Denny*

Prime Minister's  
Visit to Poland

THE PRIME MINISTER said that her visit to Poland the preceding week had been a fascinating experience. General Jaruzelski had made it clear that she would be free to follow her own programme. No obstacles had been placed, for example, in the <sup>way</sup> of her visit to Gdansk or to the Church of the murdered Polish priest, Father Popieluszko, She had met the Polish Solidarity leader, Mr Lech Walesa, and a group of independents. She had been given an enormous welcome by the Polish people: 50,000 had turned out to meet her at Gdansk. Singing by packed congregations in the Solidarity church at Gdansk and in the church of Father Popieluszko, including <sup>at Gdansk</sup> of the second Polish national anthem, had been moving moments. It was clear that the Polish people hated communism.

That it had been possible for her to witness all this was a great advance. She had nevertheless had to walk something of a tightrope throughout the visit in her talks with the Polish Government on the one hand and with the Solidarity organisation on the other. Solidarity was much more than just a trade union: it was the focus of opposition to the Government and to communism. It was ironic that the Polish Government should be

CONFIDENTIAL

inviting Solidarity to sit down with them at a round table for talks, while declining to recognise them as a legal organisation. Mr Walesa himself was a very interesting and articulate man with a gift for expressing his political points well in ordinary language but neither he nor his team of advisers seemed to have a clear idea of their agenda for round table talks, beyond the <sup>such</sup> generalities ~~such~~ as trying to get the Polish Government to accept the need for a pluralistic society. She had therefore pressed Mr Walesa to devise a clear and precise agenda of demands of which it would be hard for the Polish Government to refuse, starting with the requirement that Solidarity should be recognised as legal. Mr Walesa had told her that Solidarity was insulted by the <sup>MRU</sup> ~~decision~~ to close the Lenin shipyard which they regarded not as an economic, but as a political, decision. ~~Coming in conjunction with the invitation to the round table it was little more than an insult.~~

She had <sup>not</sup> found General Jaruzelski not sinister, <sup>he was in fact</sup> and quite easy to get on with. She had told him that as a politician he could not afford to ignore the groundswell of opinion which Solidarity

represented; and that rather than face strikes he would do better to legalise Solidarity, thus providing a proper outlet for dissenting views. He had made the point, which churchmen had confirmed to her separately, that there were extremist groups also associated<sup>ing</sup> with the Solidarity cause who fomented trouble and caused some of the strikes by intimidation. It was clear to her that General Jaruzelski, who had a good relationship with the President of the Soviet Union, Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, was trying to do something for Poland. He had said that he was trying to follow some of Britain's economic policies. The difficulty was that, as in the Soviet Union, they were looking for the fruits of economic freedom without having to pay the price of the political freedoms that went with this. It had been clear to her, for example, from her talks with independents who knew about agriculture, that although 80 per cent of Polish agriculture was uncollectivised and remained in the hands of small peasants or yeoman<sup>e</sup> farmers, these people were not free. They could not sell their land, or make purchases without permits, and they could not easily obtain equipment and were subjected to all manner of constraints.

The United Kingdom's position in Poland was not as well established as <sup>that of</sup> some other countries. This was partly still a legacy of the war, despite British help at the time of the Warsaw uprising (she had unveiled a memorial <sup>there</sup> ~~there~~ to Royal Air Force pilots), and <sup>of</sup> the sense that Britain had let Poland down at Yalta. Thus while the Government's robust stance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was admired, there was some leeway to make up. General Jaruzelski had said that English was no longer the second language in Poland. Germany was present in greater force, and the Italians were not far behind.

In a brief discussion, it was noted that the Prime Minister's visit to Poland had been very successful but that the outlook for the Polish economy was very gloomy. The difficulty was that even if the Polish Government were to identify and implement the right economic measures, these in current circumstances would be likely to lead Solidarity to go on strike again. ) Whilst agreement to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme would make it possible for the United Kingdom to help over such matters as debt

The latter  
for their part  
needed to  
understand  
that longer  
freedom  
what had  
in hand  
with  
longer  
responsibilities

rescheduling, the Polish Government still seemed a long way from that point. Poland still owed Britain money in respect of the abortive experiment over the Ursus tractor factory. There was no point in throwing good money after bad. Nevertheless every sensible opportunity should be taken to open matters up between Britain and Poland, such as the offer to take 200 management trainees, visits, management consultancies and trade on a firm-to-firm basis consistent with commercial prudence. It would be right to try to respond to General Jaruzelski's evident wish for a closer relationship with Britain. Legalising Solidarity and the engagement of genuine talks with them in the round table process might justify some British support for Poland at the IMF.

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COPY TO NO 10 AT REQUEST OF WED

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY TO NO 10 AT REQUEST OF WED

FM HOLY SEE

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 064

OF 111545Z NOVEMBER 88

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 26 : PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE POPE

1. I GAVE THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO ARCHBISHOP CASSIDY THIS MORNING. ARCHBISHOP COLASUONNO WAS ALSO PRESENT. I ALSO BRIEFED THEM ON THE BASIS OF WARSAW TELEGRAMS NOS 671 AND 672. I HAD NOT RECEIVED WARSAW TELEGRAM NO 680 IN TIME.

2. CASSIDY UNDERTOOK TO PASS THE LETTER ON TO THE POPE TODAY. HE EXPECTED THAT THERE WOULD BE A WRITTEN REPLY FROM THE POPE WHEN THE SIGNED ORIGINAL OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER HAD BEEN RECEIVED.

3. CASSIDY AND COLASUONNO THOUGHT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT HAD BEEN A CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS. THEY PARTICULARLY APPRECIATED THE PRIME MINISTER'S INSISTENCE, IN HER CONVERSATION WITH RAKOWSKI ON THE NEED TO BE CLEAR AS TO PRECISELY HOW HIS ECONOMIC REFORMS WERE TO BE INTRODUCED. THEY DOUBTED WHETHER EITHER GOVERNMENT OR OPPOSITION WERE YET READY FOR A ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION.

4. I ASKED IF THEY THOUGHT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WAS UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR OTHER EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. COLASUONNO'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT, SO LONG AS JARUZELSKI MAINTAINED HIS PRESENT POLICIES, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT (NOT) TRY TO INTERFERE. HE NOTED HOWEVER THAT THE HUNGARIAN AUTHORITIES HAD JUST ANNOUNCED PLANS TO AUTHORIZE OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS IN ADDITION TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THIS COULD HAVE PROFOUND EFFECTS IN POLAND.

5. COLASUONNO WILL BE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA NEXT WEEK. I WILL THEREFORE BRIEF TAURAN, THE UNDER SECRETARY IN THE COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS OF THE CHURCH, ON THE BASIS OF WARSAW TELNO 680 NOW RECEIVED.

6. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE VATICAN IS DEEPLY GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONSULTATION WITH THE POPE BEFORE AND AFTER HER VISIT. I HOPE THAT THIS WILL LEAD TO AN EVEN GREATER WILLINGNESS TO KEEP US INFORMED OF ALL MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST.

BROADLEY

YYYY

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HD/INFO		1
MAIN	51	
LIMITED		6
WED		9
EED		6
PROTOCOL DEPT		7
INFO DEPT		11
RESEARCH DEPT		1
PS		7



Le 6

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

11 <sup>NOV.</sup> December 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND

I enclose the signed copy of the Prime Minister's further message to General Jaruzelski, together with the text of her written statement to the House. I should be grateful if they could be telegraphed to Warsaw for delivery.

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T172/88



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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 November 1988

Dear General Jaruzelski

I should like you to know that I reported fully to Cabinet on 10 November on my visit to Poland. My colleagues in the Government very much welcomed the visit and expressed great interest in the outcome, underlining the special place which Poland has for Britain. Cabinet was unanimous in believing that we should strengthen Britain's links with Poland and offer every encouragement in the tasks of reform and reconciliation which you described to me.

I enclose the text of a Statement which I made to the House of Commons on the outcome of the visit. May I also say that, should your travels bring you close to the United Kingdom, I very much hope that you will take the opportunity to visit London, so that we may continue our discussions.

With every good wish

Yours sincerely

Rafael Deliber

His Excellency General Wojciech Jaruzelski

6



Friday 11th November 1988

(Answered by the Prime Minister on Friday 11th November)

UNSTARRED      Sir Peter Blaker: To ask the Prime Minister,  
No. 185          if she will make a statement on her recent visit  
to Poland.

**THE PRIME MINISTER**

I visited Poland on 2-4 November and had very full and useful talks with General Jaruzelski and with Prime Minister Rakowski. In Warsaw I met Cardinal Glemp and a large number of representatives of independent political groups. I also laid wreaths at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and the grave of Father Popieluzsko. I unveiled a memorial to allied airmen who flew many sorties to drop supplies to the people of Warsaw during the Warsaw uprising.

I subsequently travelled to Gdansk, where General Jaruzelski and I laid a wreath at the Westerplatte Monument, marking the outbreak of the Second World War. While in Gdansk, I placed flowers at the shipyard workers memorial and met Mr Lech Walesa, the President of Solidarity, together with other members of the Solidarity leadership.

I am most grateful to the Polish Government for enabling me to carry out such a full and varied programme, and to meet spokesmen for so many different political points of view.

General Jaruzelski and Mr Rakowski informed me of the reforms being introduced in the Polish economy. They also expressed the hope that Round Table meetings with representatives of opposition groups would soon be possible. They wished to see closer relations between Poland and Britain, and hoped for British help in overcoming Poland's foreign indebtedness. Our talks also covered East/West relations and other international issues.

Leaders of the various independent political groups explained to me their views on the way forward. Mr Walesa indicated that Solidarity would be ready to take part in Round Table discussions with the Government on the basis of good faith and fairness, and stressed the importance of legalisation of Solidarity.

I told General Jaruzelski that there was a very great interest and sympathy for Poland in this country. We shared the hope for closer contacts and were ready to support economic reform in practical ways. At the same time I stressed that economic reform could not, in our view, succeed unless accompanied by steps to give people greater political freedom. Such freedom would incur greater responsibility. I believed that the international community would be ready to provide help once such reforms were introduced and an agreement with the IMF was in place.

This was an extremely interesting and valuable visit which I hope will lead to increased contacts in future and put Britain's relations with Poland on a firmer and more positive basis.

RESTRICTED



*Reu*

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

10 November 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND

I attach a revised answer to the Question from Sir Peter Blaker asking the Prime Minister to make a statement on her visit to Poland. I should be grateful for any comments by 1830 hours this evening.

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

## STATEMENT ON POLAND

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This was an extremely interesting and valuable visit which I hope will lead to increased contacts in future and put Britain's relations with Poland on a firmer and more positive basis.

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*file*  
~~PM 2 AGH~~  
PM 51

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

10 November 1988

*Dear Stephen,*

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND

The Prime Minister reported at some length to Cabinet this morning on her visit to Poland. She has subsequently decided that she would wish to send a further message to General Jaruzelski on the lines of the draft enclosed with this letter. She would also send him the text of the written Statement about the visit which she is to make tomorrow.

I should be grateful for any comments or observations as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,*  
*C. D. Powell*  
C. D. Powell

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

I should like you to know that I reported fully to Cabinet on 10 November on my visit to Poland. My colleagues in the Government very much welcomed the visit and expressed great interest in the outcome, underlining the special place which Poland has for Britain. Cabinet was unanimous in believing that we should strengthen Britain's links with Poland and offer every encouragement in the tasks of reform and reconciliation which you described to me.

I enclose the text of a Statement which I made to the House of Commons on the outcome of the visit. May I also say that, should your travels bring you close to the United Kingdom, I very much hope that you will take the opportunity to visit London, so that we may continue our discussions.

His Excellency General Wojciech Jaruzelski



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

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His Excellency General Wojciech Jaruzelski



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*file DS*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

10 November 1988

MESSAGE TO THE POPE

I enclose the Prime Minister's message to the Pope about Poland. I should be grateful if it could be despatched as soon as possible.

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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file 40  
ccfco

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 November 1988

Your Holiness,

I was most grateful for Your Holiness' great kindness and consideration in replying so promptly and so fully to my request for advice in advance of my visit to Poland. I was much strengthened in all my meetings and contacts there by knowing your views.

I was also most grateful to Cardinal Glemp whom I met on the very first evening of my visit. He gave me a very full account of the Church's role, together with a shrewd and realistic appreciation of the political difficulties in Poland. I was encouraged by his hopes that something positive could be achieved.

I subsequently had a number of meetings with both General Jaruzelski and Prime Minister Rakowski, and talks with a wide range of representatives of opposition opinion. I paid a very moving visit to Gdansk, where I was impressed by the strength of support for Solidarity and its aspirations. I was also struck by the moderation and common sense of Mr. Walesa and others in the Solidarity leadership, and by the order and cheerfulness of the enthusiastic crowds in Gdansk and at St. Stanislaw Kostka's Church. To the Polish authorities' credit, they put no obstacles in the way of any of these meetings.

DS

I returned from Poland convinced that Solidarity is a force that cannot be denied, and greatly impressed by its leaders' commitment to peaceful discussion. I conveyed this assessment frankly to General Jaruzelski at the end of my visit: and in all my contacts I urged the importance of finding a basis for dialogue between government and opposition, on the basis of good faith and fairness. The situation is indeed very difficult and painful, but I think all sides genuinely want to talk and find a way through. I pray that they will succeed.

May I once again thank Your Holiness for your wise counsel.


Your  
low spirited leadership is so vital  
to the brave people of Poland.

With warm regards,

Your sincerely

Raymond Shannon

His Holiness Pope John Paul II



From the Chairman

Sir David Orr MC LLD

Promoting cultural, educational  
and technical co-operation between  
Britain and other countries

10 Spring Gardens  
London SW1A 2BN  
Telephone 01-930 8466  
Telex 8952201 BRICON G

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

9 November 1988

*Dear Prime Minister*

Congratulations on such a successful visit to Poland. I am sure that the reverberations will be felt for a long time to come!

In your busy programme it was good of you to find time to visit the Council. We have had very enthusiastic despatches from Richard Alford. Your visit has raised morale enormously. It will enhance the Council's fine reputation in Warsaw.

We are even more enthused by the increase in the Grant-in-Aid which we have been awarded through the FCO - with your encouragement I know. I can assure you that the additional resources will be productively applied. We have plenty of scope for new activities which will further improve Britain's relations abroad. Thank you for all your support.

*Yours sincerely*  
*David Orr*

The British Council



CONFIDENTIAL

*ccp*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 November 1988

*Dear Charles,*

Prime Minister's visit to Poland: Message to the Pope

We spoke about a message from the Prime Minister to the Pope, following up the Prime Minister's request for his advice before her visit to Poland. *— into CCP.*

/ I attach a draft. If agreed, we would send the message by telegram with the request that our Ambassador pass it on.

*Yours,  
Stephen Wall*

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

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In Confidence

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO HIS HOLINESS THE POPE.

[over page]

I was most grateful for Your Holiness's advice in advance of my visit to Poland last week, relayed through our Ambassador on 31 October. It was kind of you to give such a full and speedy response to my message.

I had a very interesting meeting with Cardinal Glemp on 2 November. It was particularly helpful to

have the benefit of his wisdom and experience so early in my visit. I was encouraged by his realistic appreciation of the political difficulties in Poland and his hopes that something positive could be achieved.

I had full and frank discussions with General Jaruzelski and Prime Minister Rakowski, and talks with a wide range of representatives of opposition opinion. I paid a very moving visit to Gdansk, where I was impressed by the strength of support for Solidarity and its aspirations. I was also struck by the moderation and common sense of Mr Walesa and others in the Solidarity leadership, and by the order and cheerfulness of the enthusiastic crowds in Gdansk and at St Stanislaw Kostka's Church.

I returned from Poland convinced that Solidarity is a force that cannot be denied, and greatly impressed by its leaders' commitment to peaceful

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PRIVACY MARKING

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In Confidence

I conveyed this assessment <sup>faithfully</sup> <sup>to</sup> <sup>you</sup> <sup>at</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>end</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>my</sup> <sup>visit</sup>:

discussion. I hope I was able to show General Jaruzelski the strength of these impressions. I also hope I was able to demonstrate to him my unshakeable belief that good faith and genuine dialogue with Solidarity and with other trends in Polish opinion - <sup>is the</sup> <sup>only</sup> <sup>way</sup> <sup>forward</sup> - is the only way forward. I shall now watch developments with close interest and in the fervent hope that my message of freedom plus responsibility will have encouraged all sides to work towards a better life for the people of Poland.

<sup>is</sup> <sup>not</sup> <sup>talk</sup> <sup>a</sup> <sup>find</sup> <sup>a</sup> <sup>way</sup> <sup>through</sup>. I <sup>pray</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>they</sup> <sup>will</sup> <sup>hurry</sup>.

May I <sup>once</sup> <sup>again</sup> <sup>thank</sup> <sup>you</sup> <sup>for</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>advice</sup> <sup>and</sup> <sup>encouragement</sup> <sup>you</sup> <sup>have</sup> <sup>given</sup> <sup>me</sup> <sup>in</sup> <sup>your</sup> <sup>wide</sup> <sup>counsel</sup>.




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SENSITIVE  
RESTRICTED  
UNCLASSIFIED

I was most grateful ~~to you for~~  
Helene's <sup>great kindness</sup> consideration in reply to  
promptly & so fully to my request  
for advice in advance of my visit to  
Poland. I ~~felt~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~felt~~ <sup>much</sup> ~~greatly~~ <sup>appreciated</sup>  
in all my meetings & ~~contact~~ <sup>contacts</sup>  
with ~~the~~ ~~knowledge~~ ~~of~~ ~~you~~ ~~knowing~~  
your views.

**A** The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract details:	
<i>Meseltine to Sankowski dated 9 November 1988</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>21/3/2016</i> <i>G. Gray</i>
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DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .  
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.

This should be an indication of what the extract is,

eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.

Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

**A** The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>2386/1</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details:  <i>Messtine to Walexa dated 9 November 1988</i>	
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 November 1988

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CDP  
VA.

Dear Charles,

Act PT1.

Thank you for your letter of 31 October, enclosing one from Roger Maggs about the work of the Christian Samaritan Foundation in Poland.

The information Mr Maggs sent in was very interesting, but our Eastern European Department do not feel there is anything further we can usefully say to him at the moment. We have sent the papers to Warsaw, with the request that they keep an eye out for the Foundation in case there is anything we can do to help. I am sure the Embassy will already know about the Foundation: certainly the names mentioned in the Daily Mail article which Mr Maggs enclosed include some of the Embassy's well-established contacts.

Yours ever,

L Parker

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

POLAND: PA's Unit PTZ

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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: GENERAL IMPRESSIONS

SUMMARY

1. THE PRIME MINISTER VISITED POLAND FROM 2 TO 4 NOVEMBER. SHE HAD NINETY MINUTES OF TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER RAKOWSKI (HER OFFICIAL HOST) AND TWO SESSIONS WITH GENERAL JARUZELSKI (NEARLY THREE HOURS ON 3 NOVEMBER, FORTY-FIVE MINUTES ON 4 NOVEMBER) WHO ALSO MADE AN UNANNOUNCED APPEARANCE AT THE AIRPORT TO SAY FAREWELL TO HER. THE OFFICIAL PART OF HER PROGRAMME INCLUDED WREATH-LAYING AT THE TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER AT WARSAW, AT WESTERPLATTE IN GDANSK AND AT A NEW MEMORIAL TO AN RAF CREW IN WARSAW. IN THE PRIVATE PROGRAMME SHE SAW CARDINAL GLEMP AND TWO GROUPS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF UNOFFICIAL OPINION IN WARSAW, WHILE IN GDANSK SHE MET WALESA AND HIS SENIOR ADVISERS AND LAID FLOWERS ON THE MEMORIAL TO SHIPYARD WORKERS SHOT IN THE 1970 RIOTS. SHE ALSO GAVE AN INTERVIEW TO POLISH TV AND A PRESS CONFERENCE AS WELL AS SEEING BRITISH TV. DETAILED RECORDS OF THE VARIOUS MEETINGS HAVE EITHER ALREADY BEEN DESPATCHED OR WILL FOLLOW. THIS TELEGRAM CONTAINS A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE VISIT WITH SOME IMPRESSIONS.

DETAIL

2. THE VISIT, THE FIRST EVER BY A BRITISH PRIME MINISTER, WAS SUCCESSFUL AND GAVE HER EXTENSIVE OPPORTUNITIES:

A) TO PUT THE CASE FOR THE LINK BETWEEN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM SEMICOLON

B) TO GAUGE THE PRIORITIES OF THE POLISH LEADERSHIP AND THE PROSPECTS FOR REFORM SEMICOLON

C) TO SEE THE STRENGTH OF THE FORCES RALLIED UNDER THE BANNER OF SOLIDARITY SEMICOLON

D) TO URGE THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENT AND SOLIDARITY TO TALK ON A BASIS OF FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH.

3. THERE WAS MASSIVE COVERAGE IN THE POLISH MEDIA BOTH BEFORE AND DURING THE VISIT. THIS REFLECTED GENUINE POLISH PLEASURE AND INTEREST IN HAVING THE PRIME MINISTER HERE. FOR THE LEADERSHIP IT

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WAS ALSO HOW THEY TRIED TO USE HER AUTHORITY FOR THEIR OWN ENDS. POLISH MEDIA TREATMENT THUS PLAYED UP THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF HER MESSAGE WHILE SUPPRESSING THE POLITICAL. A SIMILAR DISTORTION MEANT THAT THE PRIVATE PROGRAMME WAS VIRTUALLY IGNORED BY POLISH TV AND PRESS: THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY THE BRIEFEST OF REFERENCES IN THE NEWSPAPERS (THOUGH IN THEMSELVES THESE REPRESENT A BREAK THROUGH) TO THE MEETING WITH WALESA AND THE LAYING OF FLOWERS AT THE SHIPYARD WORKERS' MEMORIAL. THE SITUATION WAS FURTHER POINTED UP WHEN, VIRTUALLY ON THE EVE OF THE VISIT, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THE EARLY LIQUIDATION OF THE LENIN SHIPYARD IN GDANSK, THE BIRTHPLACE OF SOLIDARITY, AND ATTEMPTED TO PORTRAY AS AN ECONOMIC DECISION WHICH WAS CRUCIALLY POLITICAL. THIS WAS A BLATANT ATTEMPT TO WRONG-FOOT THE PRIME MINISTER BY FORCING HER IN A DELICATE SITUATION TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC AND THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF HER MESSAGE.

4. THIS CHALLENGE WAS MET BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT GENERAL JARUZELSKI'S DINNER. THE SPEECH, PUBLISHED IN FULL IN THE POLISH PRESS, SET OUT STRONGLY THE VIEW THAT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION, THE RIGHT TO FORM FREE AND INDEPENDENT TRADE UNIONS AND A REAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL SECTIONS OF SOCIETY, INCLUDING SOLIDARITY, REPRESENTED THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE A SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION TO THE POLISH PROBLEMS. IN GDANSK WALESA AND HIS SENIOR SOLIDARITY COLLEAGUES, EXPRESSING PLEASURE AT THE CONTENTS OF HER SPEECH, EXPLAINED WHY THEY DOUBTED THE GENUINENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFER OF ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS. THEY BASED THEIR MISTRUST ON PAST EXPERIENCE, FEAR THAT THEY WOULD BE DRAWN INTO AN ENDLESS SERIES OF FRUITLESS DISCUSSIONS AND THE BAD FAITH IMPLICIT IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CLOSURE OF THE SHIPYARD BEFORE THE ROUND TABLE COULD BEGIN. THIS WAS WHY THE LEGALISATION OF SOLIDARITY - PUTTING IT BEYOND THE REACH OF ARBITRARY DECISIONS BY A PARTY OF GOVERNMENT - WAS TO THEM ESSENTIAL IF THE GOVERNMENT WAS TO PROVE ITS GOOD FAITH. NEVERTHELESS, WALESA SEEMED NOT TO EXCLUDE AGREEMENT TO ROUND TABLE TALKS IF SOLIDARITY COULD PARTICIPATE AS OF RIGHT AND NOT ON A BASIS DETERMINED BY THE GOVERNMENT. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT PROVIDED THE OFFER OF ROUND TABLE TALKS WAS IN GOOD FAITH, THERE COULD BE ADVANTAGE IN GETTING A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE UNDER WAY.

5. THE SENSE OF MODERATION AND REASONABLENESS GIVEN BY WALESA IN HIS PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND OVER LUNCH WITH HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES WAS POWERFULLY REINFORCED BY CROWDS OF PEOPLE OF ALL AGES PRESENT AND CHEERING WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER

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LAI D FLOWERS AT THE SHIPYARD WORKERS' MEMORIAL IN GDANSK AND EARLIER ON FATHER POPIELUSZKO'S GRAVE IN WARSAW, AND IN ST BRYGIDA'S CHURCH IN GDANSK. THESE WERE PEOPLE OF ALL AGES, ORDERLY, GOOD HUMOURED, CHANTING SOLIDARITY SLOGANS AND SINGING A PATRIOTIC HYMN. I BELIEVE THE PRIME MINISTER WAS GREATLY IMPRESSED BY THIS ABUNDANT PROOF OF WIDE SUPPORT FOR SOLIDARITY'S ASPIRATIONS AS A FORCE THAT COULD NOT BE DENIED. BUT WHEN SHE RELAYED HER IMPRESSIONS TO JARUZELSKI IN THEIR FINAL MEETING IN WARSAW HE COUNTERED WITH A TOUGH ATTACK ON SOLIDARITY. IN 1981 THEIR ACTIONS HAD LED TO TENSION THAT HAD BEEN DANGEROUS NOT TO JUST POLAND ALONE. HE SAW SOLIDARITY AS A SOURCE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY IN POLAND. POLISH OPINION POLLS INDICATED SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC REFORM AS THE WAY AHEAD. RATHER CHILLINGLY, RAKOWSKI HAD EARLIER TOLD ME IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION OVER LUNCH THAT HE HATED EVERYONE IN POLAND WHO THOUGHT THINGS COULD BE CHANGED BY POLITICAL METHODS.

6. THE TALKS WITH RAKOWSKI FOCUSED MAINLY ON ECONOMIC MATTERS. OUTLINING HIS PROGRAMME OF REFORM, RAKOWSKI SAID THAT HE HAD TO EXPECT STRIKES AND DEMONSTRATIONS AS RECONSTRUCTION WENT AHEAD. HE WAS PREPARED TO TOUGH THESE OUT. THE POLISH DEBT PROBLEM WAS MENTIONED ONLY BRIEFLY. RAKOWSKI SPOKE OF THE NEED TO CREATE A BREATHING SPACE FOR THE POLISH ECONOMY TO RESPOND TO HIS NEW MEASURES. OVER LUNCH HE PRESSED HARD FOR HELP OVER RESCHEDULING POLISH DEBT. THE PRIME MINISTER REMINDED HIM OF THE NEED FOR SOUND INVESTMENT AND OF THE IMPORTANCE OF REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF ON AN ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME. THE SAME NOTE WAS ALSO STRUCK IN HER SPEECH AT GENERAL JARUZELSKI'S DINNER WHEN, LOOKING FORWARD TO THE DAY WHEN DIALOGUE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY HAS CREATED THE CLIMATE FOR RIGHT CHOICES TO BE MADE, SHE SAID THAT POLAND'S FRIENDS WOULD SUPPORT AN IMF PROGRAMME AND BE READY TO RESCHEDULE DEBTS, EXTEND CREDITS AND INVEST IN POLAND.

#### SOME CONCLUSIONS

7. I BELIEVE THAT THE POLISH AUTHORITIES WERE PLEASED BY THE COURSE OF THE VISIT (THOUGH THEY WILL HAVE DISLIKED HER SPEECH AND THE SOLIDARITY DEMONSTRATIONS). RAKOWSKI AND THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER SAID AS MUCH TO ME AT THE AIRPORT ON 4 NOVEMBER. AS USUAL, THEY WILL MAKE SELECTIVE USE OF IT FOR THEIR OWN INTERNAL PURPOSES. ON THE EVIDENCE OF THE VISIT THEY REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THEY CAN MAKE ECONOMIC PROGRESS WITHOUT MAKING SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL OR SOCIAL CONCESSIONS AND THAT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CAN BE ACHIEVED BY CONSULTATION RATHER THAN BY RE-DEFINING THE LIMITS OF STATE AND

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PARTY POWERS. UNLESS RAKOWSKI'S HONEYMOON PERIOD IS LONGER AND MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS, THIS IS WHERE THE GREATEST RISK TO STABILITY LIES.

8. MEANWHILE, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS NOW EXTENDED THE RANGE OF PEOPLE HERE WHO HAVE HEARD THE MESSAGE OF THE NECESSITY TO LINK POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. THERE IS NOW A WIDER BASIS FOR DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES BETWEEN BRITAIN AND POLAND. AND UNTIL THE MESSAGE SINKS IN AND IS ACTED ON, THOSE IN SOLIDARITY AND ELSEWHERE PRESSING FOR THAT REFORM WILL BE ENCOURAGED BY HER VISIT AS A POWERFUL DEMONSTRATION OF BRITISH INVESTMENT IN THEIR CAUSE.

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*Mike P...*

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FOCUS  
MONTAN 0945

From the Private Secretary

7 November 1988

**PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND**

The Department may find it helpful to have the enclosed memorandum about Solidarity's aims given to me in Gdansk by Janush@nyskiewicz

C. D. Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*[Handwritten signature]*

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Pro memoria

1. Any political thinking about Poland must firmly rest on appreciation of Polish social and national aspirations for independence, freedom, democracy, rule of law safeguarded by independent judiciary and rational economic order. Every realistic approach to Polish problems must take these aspirations as an important political factor.

2. There is a strong feeling that culturally and, first of all economically the country is on a steep sliding slope. The best illustration is the situation in housing - the waiting time for a flat is over 20 years and is still rising.

This is why the economic reform is of paramount importance. "Solidarity" formulated a program<sup>me</sup> of economic reforms in 1981, 1985 and 1987. The essence of "Solidarity" proposals is depolitization of the economy which means scrapping the system of so called "nomenklatura" and equal rights and opportunities to all kinds of enterprises including private ones. Demonopolization, market mechanisms, independence of enterprises are other fundamental factors of "Solidarity" proposals.

The government declared a will to introduce some changes going in the right direction but so far nothing of importance has been really implemented, whereas the situation requires quick and determined action. However, there is no chance of solving the crisis in Poland without obtaining public support for the reform. The condition for the authorities being able to obtain public support in the reforming and restructuring the economy is that human rights will be respected and that participation of the society in economic decisions and public life will be institutionalized.

Recently there was a period of hope that the genuine dialogue can begun in the form of "round table talks". When it became clear that "Solidarity" will not accept the extension of the system of ~~privileges~~ political privileges to the leadership of the opposition and the union instead of changing the mechanisms of our public life by offering a choice in form of new independent associations and, first of all, relegalization of "Solidarity", the authorities stalled the preliminary talks. Closing for purely political reasons the Lenin's Shipyard in Gdansk showed once more the lack of political will for negotiations and compromise. Creation by the authorities the atmosphere of good will by ending reprisals and suspending the closure of the shipyard is a prerequisite to the resumption of the necessary dialogue.

3. Maintaining the situation and delaying the reform results in the deepening of the crisis: the growth of the technological gap, the fall in ~~the~~ exports, ~~the~~ slackening the ties with the West and the increase in our economic dependence on the USSR. Increasing economic and social tensions in Poland will become a factor adversely affecting global East-



West relations as well as an evolution of the situation in the dependent countries of the Eastern bloc.

4. ~~Thus~~ Western ~~and~~ economic aid can be <sup>of</sup> crucial importance for the future of Poland, provided it will help the reform what means that it will be directed to the reformed enterprises and branches of the industry. Therefore, the development of Western economic ties with Poland should be gradual and conditioned to the ~~process~~ progress in economic reforms as well as in the democratization process in the country. Joint ventures can play an important role as well as direct contacts between enterprises. Restructuring of the repayment of Polish debts and possibility of obtaining new credits could be an important factor stimulating the economic reform. In this domain the British government could influence the policy of the IMF and the World Bank and support rescheduling the servicing of Polish debts for 20 years and granting new credits to support the export oriented investment in the fully reformed branches of the Polish economy. The same stand could be adopted in discussions in the Paris Club.

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*From the Private Secretary*

NOV  
~~7 October 1988~~

File X16  
C-82 PC  
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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND

I left with the Embassy copies of my records of the Prime Minister's two meetings with Rakowski, the meeting with Cardinal Glemp and the meetings with the Independents and Walesa's Brains Trust. I should be grateful if the department would now send them copies of the records of the two meetings with Jaruzelski and the meeting with Solidarity.

CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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File RB

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From the Private Secretary


6 November 1988

Dear Lynn,

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND

I enclose the Prime Minister's thank you letters for her visit to Poland. I should be grateful if you could send them to the Embassy in Warsaw for onward transmission. You may like to send the texts of those to Jaruzelski, Rakowski and Walesa by telegram.

You will note in the message to Jaruzelski reference to a possible visit to Britain 'one day'. The Prime Minister feels that she cannot in courtesy do less than mention the possibility of an eventual visit. She does not intend to follow it up for some considerable time. She does not want to invite Rakowski.

Yours sincerely,  
  
CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

6 November 1988

From the Private Secretary

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND

As you will see from my records of the Prime Minister's talks in Poland, there are a number of points which need to be followed up:

- General Jaruzelski's suggestion of bilateral talks between defence experts;
- his proposal for bilateral discussions on wider East/West issues;
- the possibility of an event to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the beginning of the Second World War. This would have to be looked at very carefully to prevent it becoming just a propaganda occasion;
- the Prime Minister's undertaking, repeated on Polish television, that we would take action to reduce delays and ease restrictions on visas for Poles;
- her references to willingness to increase exchanges of teachers and schoolchildren;
- our offer of help with managerial training;
- how we should respond to General Jaruzelski's request that we use our influence to help Poland's negotiations with the IMF and the Paris Club (largely covered by the Prime Minister's speech in Poland);
- a possible visit by General Jaruzelski.

I think the Prime Minister would welcome advice on how these issues are to be taken forward.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (H.M. Treasury), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry), Tom Jeffery (Department of Education and Science) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Poles apart: The workers' summer triumphs at Gdansk (centre) have turned to a renewed power struggle between Lech Walesa and Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski

# Iron Lady in the eye of Poland's gathering storm

MRS THATCHER can hardly have imagined, when she agreed to be the first British Prime Minister to visit Poland, that she would be dragged into a bitter dispute, with matters apparently designed to be brought to a head on the very day of her arrival. A happily ceremonial and historic occasion at Gdansk has been turned into the focal point of an internal conflict, with Government and opposition locking antlers over its every detail.

She is, after all, a Polish heroine. She is the first to have admitted probable Soviet responsibility for the Katyn massacre. Her Minister, Malcolm Rifkind, was the first to lay a wreath at the grave of Father Jerzy Popieluszko after his murder by the secret police. The Poles do not know it yet, but her Government is the first to have allowed veterans of the Polish armed forces, who fought under British command, to march as a unit in the Remembrance Day ceremony.

These are things that matter to the Poles, brought up as they were on accounts of how we betrayed them in September, 1939 and at Yalta. She has made Britain, once again, one of Poland's favourite countries. And now, quite unexpectedly, the Communist Government has caught her on the wrong foot.

On Friday Lech Walesa and his friends are due to entertain the British Prime Minister to lunch. Unless Gdansk is in turmoil, Mrs Thatcher will wish to maintain her schedule, joining Mr Walesa in laying a wreath at a memorial, actually in the shipyard, to workers shot by the Communist police in 1970. But how can Solidarity react to Monday's announcement other than with turmoil?

The idea that Poland's economic reformers just happened to single out the Gdansk shipyard for immediate closure for purely economic reasons, not because it is the Solidarity movement's cradle and its leader's workplace, is hardly credible. Ninety per cent of its work is done for the Soviet Union, and its viability depends on little more than the exchange rate between the rouble and the zloty.

However, if they hit back with an immediate strike request support from other key enterprises, as they have in the past, the way will be open for the Government to wade in with the security forces, as it did six

Mrs Thatcher has become a Polish heroine, but the announcement of the closure of the Gdansk shipyards for 'Thatcherite' reasons has turned a historic visit into a focal point for unrest. NICHOLAS BETHELL reports

months ago, invoking the example of Mrs Thatcher's action against Mr Scargill and advising her at the same time, of course, to cancel her visit.

Friday's lunch has been a matter of hard negotiation between Whitehall and Warsaw. The Polish side never objected to a meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr Walesa; all important Western visitors see him. The rule, though, is that it takes place discreetly in Warsaw in the visitor's embassy. Vice-President Bush and many others have done it this way, with low profile.

Mrs Thatcher's visit will be different. If Friday goes ahead as scheduled, enormous crowds will greet her as she makes her way from the shipyard memorial, with its emotional memories, to St Bridget's Church, a rallying point for the whole Solidarity movement. Thousands will be anxious for a glimpse of the person they call "Our Iron Lady". It will be a chance to express frustration at their poverty and lack of national independence as well as admiration for someone who seems to understand.

It was under Mr Mieczyslaw Rakowski's predecessor as Prime Minister that the concession was made to include Gdansk in Mrs Thatcher's schedule. Otherwise, it was implied, there might be no visit at all, no opportunity for the Polish Government to use her as a stamp of authority on their own "Thatcherite" programme of reform, and no chance of enlisting her help over the rescheduling of debts and advances of further credit.

Solidarity believes Monday's announcement reflects the new premier's dislike of the bargain. Since he was appointed, and during negotiations over the visit's postponement from mid-October, he has been chipping away at the Gdansk schedule. This latest move seems his last

attempt to take the steam out of Friday's pro-Solidarity demonstration.

"Mr Rakowski is a personal enemy of Solidarity and there are two reasons for the timing of his decision," says Broneslaw Geremek, one of Mr Walesa's main political advisers. "The first is to embarrass Mrs Thatcher by appearing to copy her anti-trade union policies. The second is to disrupt the Gdansk visit by causing outrage in the shipyard."

The Polish Communist party may be small, enjoying at most 10 per cent support, but it has the power and years of experience in political manoeuvre. All Mr Walesa has is popularity. He will lose this if he falls into the trap of assuming part responsibility for a programme of reform he cannot influence decisively.

Shipbuilding, his own industry, is a prime example. Western governments as well as the IMF and the World Bank have often quoted over-manning in heavy industry as one of nettles that must be grasped before support for the Polish economy can be made available. Other conditions include phasing out food subsidies and widening wage differentials, as well as wage restraint and price increases. It is a gloomy prospect.

WHEN HE talks about the need for "pluralism", Mr Rakowski has it in mind that Solidarity should help sell the programme of austerity to the workers. Mr Walesa could then be relegated and might gain the trappings of power or influence, but at the expense of his popularity.

"There are hints that the Government might allow the opposition 40 per cent of seats in Parliament," says Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Solidarity's spokesman who will be interpreting when Mrs Thatcher meets Mr Walesa. "It would not be a free election, though. Our candidates would have to join a list with the Commu-

nists, on an agreed platform. We would be made part of the establishment. Opposition would disappear." Mr Onyszkiewicz has already served one term of imprisonment this year, for giving information to the BBC, and he is today under investigation by the public prosecutor for speaking at a United States Congress hearing on human rights. Poland's future looks grimmer than it has for years.

A few weeks ago, when the Government agreed to hold round-table talks with the opposition, it seemed that a way could be found out of the political and economic mess. At that time it seemed possible that Poland could be rescued on the basis of a "tripod" of support. The Government would relegalise and co-operate with the independent trade unions, so providing an economic justification for further Western credit and investment in profit-making light industry.

Poles in both political camps have seen Mrs Thatcher as a key figure on the western side and she has made it clear that, while she will not back anything like a "Marshall Plan", as first put forward by Solidarity supporters early this year, she would be in favour of credits and joint ventures — in the context of political and economic reform. It may be tempting for her to leave Communist Poland to "stew in its own juice" as a terrible example of socialism's consequences, but she will not do this. Apart from humanitarian considerations, Europe's stability will be at risk if the Polish workers, in their despair, turn to violence.

Without concealing her pro-Solidarity sympathies, she has given the Polish Government every possible help. So has Mr Walesa, who used his authority to bring strikes to an end some weeks ago, despite protests from younger and more militant workers, so exposing himself to political risk. However, if a tripod is to be stable, it needs three points of support, not just two.

By the provocative timing of his closure of the Gdansk shipyard and by his constant attempts to disrupt Mrs Thatcher's visit to the people in Gdansk whom she admires and supports, Mr Rakowski is showing a dangerous lack of responsibility for his country's and all Europe's future.

□ Lord Bethell is MEP for London North-West and a writer on Eastern Europe.

# Putting the case against commuting to

comes from employers themselves.

ne employers still follow traditional line of missing women's fecundity split loyalties, but the later companies know that cannot manage without men, even if that means giving their family responsibilities on board as well. Far being muddle-headed anthropists, these employers have found that a one person approach to employment actually works.

a conference on The Family and the Workplace, controller of personnel at Times Television, a loudly proclaimed equal opportunities employer, pointed "The provision of child-assistance makes good business sense, sustains a stable and effective workforce, reduces training and

recruitment costs, and provides a return on investment."

The great question is, what childcare assistance? A new book produced by the Working Mothers Association, called *The Employers' Guide to Childcare*, is an optimistic, positive attempt to focus employers' minds on the practicalities of employing women — or men — with family responsibilities. It does this not only by setting out some theoretical ideas, but by drawing on its own researches into what companies actually do.

No-one has yet explained, for example, why banks, which suffer from the stuffiest and most traditional of images, should be the most forward-looking when it comes to balancing work and home. It was banks who started flexitime, and it is

banks who are pioneering career breaks for employees.

The National Westminster Bank's re-entry scheme allows employees with senior management potential to take a break of up to five years, and be retrained on their return. Barclays Bank allows each parent a two-year break for each child, and British Gas is following NatWest by trying out its own Skills Retention Scheme.

If more women knew that their companies would support them through the difficult years of early childhood,

and guarantee them their job back, I suspect that more couples would be happy to budget for child-raising time. The alternative, which is working with the help of childcare, is so grim for many women that it is hardly surprising that so many fail to return from maternity leave.

I am not at all sure that the perennially vaunted solution of the workplace crèche is the best answer. Now that the employers' subsidy of workplace nurseries is taxable, it may no longer be the cheapest solution, and I sometimes

wonder if it is the most humane.

Why should babies commute? And isn't there something a little over-regimented in the sight of toddlers packed down for their obligatory rest, or of a room full of babies crying for their mothers? Although there are some notably successful workplace nurseries, expectant mothers should know that there are invariably more campaigns for crèches at any given time than there are crèches to go round.

Too many mothers find these facts out too late, and the Working Mothers Association thinks that employers could do far more to help prepare expectant mothers for the realities of working motherhood than they do. It is in their own interest.

## CHANGING TIMES

Lesley Garner



McCartney with son James



John Hurt with Sunflowers



# These photos warrant exhibition at the V & A?

Linda McCartney  
Prints  
the  
week.  
arts



Picture  
by  
John  
Swannell

ing because it gives her control over the entire process. And it is fun. "Although I use a basic, simple method, it actually took me a long time to master it. Sun Printing is a case of trial and error and I have experimented with different papers and exposure times.

"I have used artificial light as well as sunlight to create the image and I have attempted different effects with all sorts of mixtures of salts and minerals."

She buys the salts and minerals in an ordinary chemist's shop and does most of the work at home. "It is a very domestic operation. I mix the salts in the bath and wash the prints in the sink. Then I dry them with a hair-drier and iron them flat. It is something the kids can enjoy and it is easy to understand."

McCartney uses her photography to support the causes which concern her and she has become increasingly involved in animal welfare, conservation of the environment and children's causes.

I remember walking with her round the wards at Great Ormond Street, when the *Wishing Well Appeal* was being launched. In the Chapel was a book where parents who had crept away to be alone would write their prayers after leav-

brief marriage, and Mary, Stella and James. "One of my favourite pictures is of James painting a clown's face on Paul," she says.

The verdict of the professionals and her peer group is now anxiously awaited.

□ The exhibition coincides with a book on Linda McCartney's *Sun Prints*, which is to be published by Barrie and Jenkins on November 10.

The images in the book will be on view at the Link gallery in the Victoria and Albert Museum from November 9 to 25.

the exhibitions' "futures" shows subjects ranging from The Art of Death in England to Scandinavian Ceramics. The museum says that virtually all require sponsorship confirms that few have had problems in attracting the necessary money.

any believe that in recent years the V & A has become increasingly exciting and lively. Attendances have gone up, and although some are concerned at what they consider to be a disastrous change of direction in the marketing of the museum has, I believe, made it more accessible to many more people.

strokes used in the treatment of the paper.

The photographs are an idiosyncratic collection of images; still life, family pictures, portraits, landscapes and scenes which have just caught the photographer's eye. Their strength is in their warmth and perception and the nostalgic quality of the method which has been used.

I first came across the technique when I worked with Linda McCartney on a project for the Council for the Protection of Rural England. She photographed the headland at Fairlight to the East of Hastings where there was a plan to drill for oil on a cliff high above

Only a few will ever possess



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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 November 1988

Dear Jgn.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH SOLIDARITY LEADERS IN  
GDANSK ON 4 NOVEMBER

The Prime Minister met leaders of the Solidarity movement in Gdansk on 4 November. The first part of the meeting was with Mr. Lech Walesa, Professor Geremek and Dr. Onyszkiewicz. The discussion subsequently continued over lunch with other senior Solidarity advisers as well as Father Jankowski and the Bishop of Gdansk.

The Prime Minister opened the discussion by saying she would like to hear Mr. Walesa's view of the situation in Poland. These matters were always more complicated than they seemed from outside. In her talks with the Polish Government, she had said that Solidarity was more than a trade union, it was an expression of opinion and opposition in a country where there was no other means of expressing political views. It was a great movement which could not be ignored or denied. Whether legal or not, it was a fact of life.

Mr. Walesa said that he was glad the Prime Minister understood Solidarity's struggle. Solidarity would prefer to be just an ordinary trade union. But in the Polish system it had to take up wider economic and political issues which could not be aired in any other way. Solidarity knew perfectly well that it could not fight the present Government or replace it. There were clear limits on how far it could go. Its most important demand was for equality before the law. Solidarity wanted to be a legal organisation which would be consulted as of right rather than being invited to take part in round table talks as some sort of favour. Such favours could always be withdrawn when it no longer suited the Government. Solidarity had been tricked by the Government too many times in the past. The only real solution was for the Government to give them the freedom which would enable them to start to work with will, conviction and commitment to rebuild Poland. He wanted to add that Poland was worth helping and should be helped. The main effort must come from the Polish people themselves but they needed the assistance of other governments as well.

The Prime Minister said that she understood that

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Solidarity wanted to talk to the Government but on the basis that it was a legal movement with a right to be consulted. She wondered how they intended to respond to the Government's recent invitation to round table discussions. Mr. Walesa said that the present system was rotten. It had made Poland bankrupt and this in turn was slowing down the economic progress of Europe. You could not have a society based on coercion. Solidarity's fight was for freedom in economic, social and political matters. This was the challenge of the era. Mr. Gorbachev could not be another Stalin even if he wished to be. The question was whether greater freedom came through evolution, as Solidarity wanted, or revolution. Revolution brought only painful losses and at the end of the day one still had to find solutions. The Communist system was finished. The only question was how to get out of it. Solidarity believed that economic reform was the best way forward. Solutions to other problems would emerge as a result of that. They knew that economic reform required difficult decisions including the closure of firms making a loss. But such decisions must be reached on the basis of genuine economic criteria. The closure of the Lenin shipyards could have been accepted in due course, but there was no justification for selecting it to be the first industrial enterprise to be closed. Even the management did not believe that closure was justified.

The Prime Minister said she understood Solidarity's desire for greater fairness. The crucial question was how to get from where they were now to where they wanted to be. All sides in Poland talked of reconciliation. There must be a way forward. When there were differences, it was best to get together to discuss them. If she understood correctly, Solidarity were prepared to talk if their legitimacy was recognised. Mr. Walesa said that they were not even that ambitious at the first stage. All they asked was that the agreed objective of talks should be pluralism, not socialist pluralism but just pluralism. Discussions could then concentrate on how to bring it about. Provided Solidarity knew that the goal was pluralism, other things could be decided later. But they would not be bought off. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Rakowski had spoken of power sharing. She had replied that it was more important to limit the powers of government and give them back to people.

The Prime Minister continued that she had tried to put herself in Mr. Walesa's position and asked how she would avoid being wrong-footed. What would people say if he refused the Government's invitation to talk? She could understand that he would want some assurances as a basis for talks, but it was important always to underline Solidarity's willingness to talk. Solidarity should also prepare a detailed agenda and supporting papers, so that there were concrete proposals on the table.

Mr. Walesa said that with hindsight, Solidarity had lost in 1980. The Communist system always needed a scapegoat. As long as Solidarity was fighting, it could be tolerated. But once it started putting forward a positive programme it began to be a real threat to the Communist



Party. The Government's approach to the round table discussions was to get Solidarity to turn out its pockets in advance. It also wanted to put limits on what could be discussed and who could represent Solidarity. Neither of these demands were acceptable. But solutions had to be found. His response to the Government would be to say that Solidarity wanted round table talks, but the Government should not do things in the way they announced the closure of the Lenin shipyard. He knew that difficult decisions had to be faced and they could be accepted if based on genuine economic criteria. The Prime Minister asked how Solidarity could get its points across to the Government. Mr. Walesa pointed to the ceiling and said that all its meetings were bugged so there was no problem.

The discussion continued over lunch when Mr. Walesa was joined by representatives of the Solidarity leadership and its senior advisers. Mr. Walesa said that Solidarity believed Poland should be ready to try all the various possible remedies for its economic problems which had already been proved in the West. But they wanted Poles to be treated on an equal footing with other European countries. They were not interested in receiving gifts.

Professor Geremek then invited Mr. Mazowiecki to comment on the philosophy of the round table discussions. Mr. Mazowiecki said that the round table proposal was a direct result of social pressure. During the last forty years, all change in Poland had arisen from social pressures. Solidarity did not wish to say no all the time. Their long term goal was a fully independent Poland, with a place in the European community of nations. But they were prepared to go slowly. The round table proposal had seemed at first a chance of escape from the stalemate of recent years. After Mr. Walesa's meeting on 16 September with General Kiszczak, Solidarity had received the impression that for the first time the authorities recognised that appearances would not do. However, since then, there had been an unbroken attack on Solidarity in the press and the media. Solidarity thought somebody had been trying to undermine the talks. Then had come the provocative decision on the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk. This was taken on political grounds and undermined the credibility of the authorities' declared readiness for further reforms. Now was a very difficult moment. But Solidarity knew it must not respond in a confrontational way. They were ready to talk about most things, but not the future of Solidarity itself.

The Prime Minister asked if Solidarity's view was that the round table was only a ploy. She wondered what people in Poland would think if Mr. Walesa accepted the latest offer to attend the round table, or conversely declined it. Mr. Walesa said that Solidarity's experience was discouraging. Talks with the authorities on the Church Agricultural Foundation had lasted over five years and produced no real result. The authorities wanted talks with no concluding point. Solidarity recognised the need for compromise. But the terms had to be right and they could

not ignore possible reactions among their supporters. The Prime Minister asked what the alternative to talks would be. Mr. Walesa replied that Solidarity did not wish to humiliate the Government, and were ready to offer face-saving formulations. There must be compromise, otherwise society would "switch on the afterburners". They did not want anarchy. Indeed, if the Government reached the point of collapse, he would even join the Communist Party himself to shore it up! He admitted that in some areas the authorities had recently begun to move in the right direction. But they only moved under pressure. Solidarity could not wait for two hundred years.

The Prime Minister said that she understood Solidarity's desire for pluralism. She came from a pluralist society. But Solidarity could not achieve this in the short term. However, Solidarity could not be ignored or rejected. They had done so much. Her anxiety was that Solidarity should never put themselves in the wrong and so damage their reputation. The next step needed very careful thought. That response to the Polish Government should be very skilfully drafted. Mr. Walesa said that the lunch in which the Prime Minister was participating was in itself a great help. When the Prime Minister had left, he would write to General Kieszczyk confirming Solidarity's readiness to begin talks in a climate of hope and goodwill. Solidarity wanted the round table and wanted to create a climate of goodwill and hope. He added that he would not accept interference by the authorities in Solidarity's delegation. He had yet to discuss with his colleagues the terms of his reply, but he believed his voice would carry some weight in their discussions. Solidarity would get the Government to the table. The only question was when. The Prime Minister commented that Solidarity had a very strong hand to play. They had the conviction and knew in which direction they wished to go. It was worthwhile taking small steps.

Mr. Walesa said that Solidarity could not and would not try to change the Government. But they had to force the authorities to take them seriously and start talks. Mr. Merkel said that Solidarity's number one problem was obtaining legalisation as a trade union. The Prime Minister said that, legal or not, they had been asked to go to the round table. This was a paradox. It was also paradoxical that the authorities had provided transport and security for her meeting with Mr. Walesa. Dr. Onyszkiewicz said this was true, but Solidarity required legalisation because only when they were a legally existing union could they be sure of the right to talk to the Government, so obliging the authorities to take account of their views for the longer term. Solidarity's current invitation to the round table was made to look like a privilege. The Prime Minister said that the invitation to the round table was more than that. It acknowledged that Solidarity was a force which could not be ignored. Mr. Walesa commented that the authorities were prepared to talk to Solidarity but at the same time wished to reduce their power and their credibility.

Professor Geremek said that Solidarity had put four points to the round table: legalisation of Solidarity, the reduction of the nomenklatura system in the economy, a new law on freedom of association, and a genuinely independent judiciary. The Prime Minister, noting these, asked whether an independent judiciary could not naturally evolve through the courage of individual judges, prepared to stand up for the rule of law. Mr. Mazowiecki explained the difficulty in Poland where judges who did not toe the line were removed or did not receive sensitive cases to handle. Mr. Walesa said that the longer the system lasted the more corrupt it became. Higher civilisations should develop more freedom. Poland was being offered materialism, but there was nothing of any material worth on offer. The problem was how to escape from this situation in a peaceful way. The major task was to achieve pluralism.

The Prime Minister then asked Mr. Walesa what he would like her to say to General Jaruzelski when she saw him later that day, and to the press. She suggested that she should say she had a most interesting meeting with the Solidarity leadership, and been impressed by the enormous crowds of people who had gathered. Solidarity was a great power in the land and could not be ignored. They had a good deal of sympathy with the democratic political system from which she came and which provided an outlet for an opposition to make its views known. She would say that Solidarity felt deeply that their position was not properly recognised. They knew the direction in which they wanted to go, by clear, steady steps in an evolutionary way, but steps which acknowledged their importance. It was for Solidarity to decide how to reply to the invitation to enter the round table talks. But it was clear that Solidarity needed an assurance that any talks would take place in good faith and would be genuine.

Professor Geremek said that the Prime Minister's summary was excellent. But he asked her to add legalisation of Solidarity as an essential requirement. De facto recognition was not enough. Legalisation opened up the possibility of further evolution and gave a guarantee that they would not be cheated again. The Prime Minister noted this. She would also say publicly that when she had agreed to visit Poland she had explained to the Polish authorities that there were certain things she had wished to do. The fact that she had been allowed to do them all was a step forward.

Dr. Kurakowska said that the strength of Solidarity was partly because it had played a major role in changing the way Polish people thought. Before Solidarity, there was no real attempt to think independently. But now people were thinking more and more independently. She hoped that the fight for the right to free association would be won.


At this point Mr. Walesa made a short speech of thanks to the Prime Minister, to which the Prime Minister replied. Mr. Walesa, Father Jankowski and others then presented the

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Prime Minister with gifts and the party left to visit St. Brygida's Church before leaving Gdansk.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (H.M. Treasury), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,  


CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Subject cc Master

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 November 1988

Dear Lyr.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH GENERAL JARUZELSKI  
IN WARSAW ON 4 NOVEMBER

The Prime Minister had a final round of talks with General Jaruzelski after returning to Warsaw from Gdansk on 4 November. General Jaruzelski was again accompanied by the Polish Foreign Minister and officials.

General Jaruzelski began by saying that people in Gdansk had been most impressed by the Prime Minister's visit. He was grateful to her for agreeing to lay a wreath at the monument at Westerplatte. Next year would be the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War and he wondered whether it might not be an idea to mark it in some special way, perhaps a conference or a seminar. He would like to hear the Prime Minister's impressions from her visit.

The Prime Minister said that she had found her visit to Gdansk moving. She had learned so much and understood so much. She was grateful to General Jaruzelski for putting no obstacle in her way. She had much appreciated his decision to join her in laying a wreath at Westerplatte. She had been greatly impressed by the old town of Gdansk. It was almost impossible to conceive how people had summoned up the courage and spirit to reconstruct it from the terrible devastation of the Second World War. The people of Gdansk had given her a very warm reception as she walked through the old quarter to the City Hall.

The Prime Minister continued that she had subsequently gone to meet Mr Walesa and other Solidarity leaders. There had been huge crowds but they were very orderly, peaceful and cheerful and made up of people of all ages. She had talked at length to Mr Walesa and his advisers. If she had to sum up what they had said, the strongest emotion that came through was their resentment that Solidarity was illegal. They had considerable achievements to their credit. They wanted to take part in the life of the country and in restoring Poland's economy. They were willing to talk. But they did not like the notion that the invitation to attend round table discussions was a favour or privilege which could be withdrawn

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at any moment at the Government's whim. They wanted to be treated as a legal organisation which had a right to be consulted. They had talked a great deal about a plural society and political system. They recognised this was only a long term aim and she had encouraged them to focus on immediate steps. She had also posed the question, what was the alternative to dialogue. Solidarity were fairly upset about the timing and manner of the decision to close the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk. They recognised that there were considerable problems with the yard and in her view might have accepted closure had the matter been handled differently. As it was, they were convinced that the decision was a political one. She had found it difficult to draw them out on a specific agenda for round table talks. Her understanding was that they would meet later in the day to decide how to reply to the Government's latest invitation to talks. She felt they wanted to talk but needed an assurance that the talks would be genuine and in good faith and that they would be treated fairly. In short they would probably say yes but attach riders to their acceptance. She had not found Walesa or the others bitter although they claimed to have been let down by the Government many times in the past. She had been impressed by their commitment to peaceful discussion and their moderation.

General Jaruzelski said that, before dealing with these points, he would like to revert to one of the broader issues he had raised with the Prime Minister the previous day. He had read her Bruges speech and found it impressive. He had been particularly interested by her insistence that Europe extended beyond the bounds of the European Community. He would like to see Britain and Poland play a role in bridging the gap between the two parts of Europe. He hoped that relations could develop in that direction as a result of her visit. He could declare with great sincerity that this was Poland's intention.

Turning to Poland's domestic affairs, he could acknowledge that the Prime Minister had an interest in Poland's stability. He also wanted Poland to be a stable country and a constructive element in Europe. He wanted to accomplish the reforms which he and Prime Minister Rakowski had outlined, drawing on Britain's experience as well. He was convinced this was the only way for Poland and did not want more disappointments. He was 65, he had covered a long hard road and was now nearer the other side. He had no desire for more honours or decorations. His only objective was the good of Poland. If he talked about reconciliation, it was because he saw it as the most important objective. But Poland's affairs were very complex and the difficulties would only be solved if all sections of society were willing to act responsibly. There were certain realities which could not be denied. Solidarity had been a legal organisation, indeed it had virtually ruled Poland. But it had wanted to be the only ruler. It had sought a monopoly of power. To be made a legal organisation once more, it must demonstrate responsibility. Poland had to restore its economy. That would mean redundancies, tough measures to curb inflation and so on. But


there was no indication that Solidarity was willing to call on people to tighten their belts and work. Solidarity went far beyond the normal concept of a trade union. It had its own political goals. The Government were ready to discuss a model for de-politicised trade unions in Poland, in which a major role would of course be played by Solidarity. But he wondered whether Solidarity itself would be satisfied with this, given its political ambitions. He agreed with the Pope who had said that Solidarity should be treated as an idea. One possible course might be to form a new body which embraced Solidarity's ideas and included Walesa himself, but not all those associated with him. General Jaruzelski continued that Poland's recovery was gravely hampered by strikes. These were organised by a very small minority of workers. They imposed their views by pressure, picketing and even by violence. The same people who had cheered the Prime Minister earlier in the day at Gdansk had a short while previously carried banners reading "hang the Communists". If this continued, Poland would descend once more into anarchy. This was one reason why the Government insisted that the Solidarity delegation at round table talks should not include the extreme element.

General Jaruzelski said that the Prime Minister had referred to the closure of the Lenin shipyard. Contrary to Solidarity's assertion this had not been a political decision. Other closures would follow, indeed closure of a major steel works in Poznan was imminent. He had talked to a number of workers from the Lenin shipyards that morning in Gdansk. They had told him that the decision to close the yard was painful but not unexpected. Indeed it had been a surprise to them that the yard had been kept open so long. This suggested that Solidarity were misrepresenting the views of the people who actually worked in the yard. He hoped they were not using the decision to close it as a pretext for blocking the round table talks. The Prime Minister should not be misled into thinking that Solidarity had universal support in Poland. No doubt she had been impressed by large crowds which had turned out to welcome her in Gdansk. But then one million people had gone on to the streets for Mr Gorbachev. Opinion polls indicated that support for the Polish Government had risen sharply. He wanted to reassure the Prime Minister once more that he was sincere in seeking a platform for reconciliation. Changes would be made both in the Party and the Government, and the more calm there was, the further he would be able to go. He wanted to have round table talks. But their purpose must be to reach conclusions on the basis of discussion. Solidarity wanted agreement on the results before the discussion started. Poland could only advance by consensus. In spite of all, he was optimistic. He would follow the Prime Minister's example and keep his nerve through difficult times.

The Prime Minister said that she had fought strikes and insisted that people must be able to go to work even during a strike. She knew what it was like to restructure an economy. She had respect for what General Jaruzelski was trying to achieve. She had told him frankly how the prospects seemed to her, based on the discussions she had held and her own experience. Only he could decide what to do. But her views

had been offered in friendship and from a desire to see Poland restored. She could only say that she did not believe that Solidarity could be ignored, indeed that an attempt to ignore them would court disaster. She agreed with General Jaruzelski on the need to work to overcome divisions in Europe. She would consider on her return how this might be taken further and how Britain should respond on other matters which General Jaruzelski had raised with her, including the idea of an event to mark the 50th anniversary of the start of the last War. General Jaruzelski said that the Prime Minister's visit had created a bridgehead for future results. He had a better understanding of her policies and objectives. That had been valuable, indeed inspiring. He hoped she would be ready to use her great influence for Poland's benefit.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (HM Treasury), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Your sincerely,*  


Charles Powell

Lyn Parker Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Subject as Master

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 November 1988

Dear Lynn,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH GENERAL JARUZELSKI

The Prime Minister had a meeting with General Jaruzelski this afternoon lasting some three hours. General Jaruzelski was accompanied by the Polish Foreign Minister, the Polish Ambassador in London and two other officials. H.M. Ambassador, Warsaw was also present.

The Prime Minister opened by saying that she was very grateful to General Jaruzelski for letting her see and hear such a wide variety of people. She had long wanted to come to Poland. Her visit was taking place at a very difficult juncture for the country. But it also came at a very exciting moment in East/West relations. She admired what Mr. Gorbachev was doing in the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister continued that she had held two meetings with Mr. Rakowski in which they had talked very freely. The Polish Government clearly faced considerable problems with the economy, but that was always true when you embarked on major change. People had high expectations and wanted immediate results.

General Jaruzelski then spoke for the next one and three quarter hours. He was very pleased the Prime Minister had come to Poland. It could prove to be an historic visit, matching those of General de Gaulle and Chancellor Brandt in their time, given the current state of East/West relations and the prominent role played by the Prime Minister. But the outcome of the visit should serve the interests of both countries. Poland had strong links with the Soviet Union. The reasons for these was not so much ideological or political as reasons of state. For centuries, Poland had been sandwiched between more powerful countries to the East and to the West. She had at last found a home within secure borders, which were guaranteed by Soviet power. He personally enjoyed very close relations with the Soviet leaders, especially Mr. Gorbachev, who, incidentally, always spoke of the Prime Minister with the greatest respect and sympathy.

General Jaruzelski continued that Poland had embarked on a process of reform and renewal well ahead of most other Socialist countries, but was now part of a broader current of reform sweeping Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In

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this context, Poland also wished to expand her relations with Western countries. She now enjoyed good relations with Italy and Austria. Relations with the United States were also improving, though not yet enough. Polish/German relations were of particular importance, but still well below the level Poland desired. It would soon be the 50th Anniversary of the beginning of the Second World War. He hoped it could be an occasion to close that particular chapter. Germany was a particularly important trading partner for Poland, with two-way trade at least three times as great as with the United Kingdom.

Turning to international issues, General Jaruzelski said that Poland had a particular interest in arms control. The Polish Government hoped the Vienna talks could be brought to a conclusion in November. That would require agreement to hold follow-up meetings on human rights in Paris, Copenhagen and eventually Moscow. He was in no doubt that human rights could usefully be discussed in Moscow without any inhibitions. He regretted that some of the proposals put forward by the United Kingdom in Vienna had not been taken up, for instance those on school exchanges. In the field of conventional arms control, the key was to find ways to make both the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries feel more secure. Parity alone was not the answer. More emphasis should be put on removing the capacity for surprise attack and on giving the forces of both Alliances a purely defensive posture. This should be reflected in the deployment of forces and in their training. The plan which he had put forward for greater stability in Central Europe had many of these elements. He would readily admit that the Eastern countries had been unforthcoming on some of these issues over the years. For instance, they had not been ready to accept reductions in conventional forces, had rejected extension of the area to be covered by such reductions to the Urals and had been unco-operative about verification. All these obstacles were now being removed. But the most important task of all was to create confidence. On this, he supported Mr. Gorbachev's proposal for a European Reykjavik. He would also favour more extensive bilateral meetings to discuss security issues. For instance, there might be a meeting of British and Polish defence experts. Such talks could help create greater clarity about differing doctrines of defence and a better understanding of the respective strengths of opposing military forces. Some countries put the emphasis on ground forces, others gave more weight to air forces. Some had conscript armies, others had professional forces. All these factors needed to be balanced out.

General Jaruzelski continued that bilateral relations also needed new stimulus. Contacts had been rebuilt after the painful collapse of the early 1980s. He was grateful to the Prime Minister for having seen the former Polish Foreign Minister when he visited the United Kingdom. The Polish Minister of Education had just paid a successful visit to Britain and had returned keen to promote exchanges of teachers and students. He was sorry that we had responded negatively to Polish ideas for training managers (sic).

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Economic co-operation was also important. The Prime Minister might look a bit suspicious at the mention of this and think that Poland was sticking out a hand. He could understand that she would wish to take both political and economic considerations into account in responding to a request for help in this area. But he hoped she would also take a long-term view.

General Jaruzelski said that he would like to explain the present situation in Poland against the background of the country's history. One had to understand how much tragedy Poland had gone through to appreciate how much she now valued her independence. For instance, forty per cent of Poland's industrial assets had been lost in World War Two and over six million people killed. Since the War, they had embarked on the huge task of rebuilding the country. There was no doubt that administrative rigours had been imposed to achieve this, which had reached the point of terror. Moreover, Poland had been slow to accept modern ideas. By making the state responsible for distributing and allocating everything, the system had discouraged people from making any effort or showing any initiative. He recalled some words the Prime Minister had spoken in 1979 to the effect that she could not promise anything to anyone except that everyone would be rewarded for more effort. That was the direction Poland now wanted to go. The imposition of martial law had been a step backwards but necessary in the circumstances. Subsequently Poland had not reached all its targets. To some extent this was the fault of Western sanctions. But the Poles had also been responsible for their own errors and inconsistencies. They had been too sluggish in trying to reform the economy. This was not to say that the period 1982/7 had been wasted. National income had increased by 5 per cent a year and large sums had been paid in interest on Poland's foreign debts. All this was despite a reduction of working time of some 18 per cent. At the same time some absurd social provisions had been introduced under pressure from the trade unions, such as three-year maternity leave and early retirement for miners. There were problems with inflation and with housing. There had also been a miscalculation over the pace of price reform. It was now clear that this had to be spread over a longer timescale. Despite these difficulties Poland was now entering a more radical stage of reform and would be bold in its search for ways to increase efficiency and initiative. He very much hoped Mr. Rakowski would stick to his commitment to introduce greater economic efficiency.

General Jaruzelski said that economic reform must be matched by political progress. The Government had embarked on a process of renewal and democratisation. In many respects Poland was advanced in its democracy. There was a constitutional tribunal which could overrule government decisions. There was a Parliamentary ombudsman. There was extensive democracy in the workplace. There was also the issue of the round table. He would prefer to discuss that in greater detail the following day, after the Prime Minister's visit to Gdansk, so that she would have an overall picture. He hoped that she would then share her

thoughts with him. For the time being, he would say only that the round table was not a tactical move. It went back to a proposal which he himself had originally made in 1981 but Solidarity had turned down at the time. The Polish Government was prepared to sit and discuss any topic. For instance they would talk about political and constitutional matters and how to find a place for opposition in the political system. They would discuss ways to get politics out of the trade unions and the trade unions out of politics. In this context, he had been much impressed by the trade union reforms carried through in the United Kingdom. The Government would also discuss economic reform. But the round table would lead nowhere if Solidarity always stuck to its maximalist demands. He had often urged Walesa to free himself from adventurism. But the truth was the extremists in Solidarity now had more influence than Walesa himself. Despite all this, he believed that a solution would eventually be reached. Indeed, it was vital for Poland that it should be. But it must not be an artificial agreement which simply created new problems.

General Jaruzelski continued that he did not want to impose any particular view of the Polish situation on the Prime Minister. He knew that she was listening to the views of others too. Solidarity tended to be idealistic about its own role and gave the impression that all good was on its side. But he also had to think of the interests of the Polish State. Poland's history meant that the interests of the State had to take priority. He knew that the Prime Minister had firm views on all these matters including human rights. Indeed, he had read the speech which she intended to make at dinner and had redrafted his own in consequence. But equally he was confident that she would arrive at an objective view of the situation in Poland. He hoped that she would be able to use her immense prestige to help Poland secure assistance in overcoming its economic problems and in establishing better bilateral economic co-operation. There had been some unhappy experiences in this latter field over the URSUS tractor factory and a PVC plant, on both of which Poland has suffered heavy losses.

General Jaruzelski apologised for speaking at such length. But he had wanted to explain the situation to the Prime Minister as fully as possible. She enjoyed great prestige and great affection in Poland and he believed her visit could have very great importance for the country. He wanted to emphasise once more that his commitment to democracy was not a tactical matter. Poland had found to its cost that failure to implement democratic rules ended in disaster. But democracy like the universal values represented in the Helsinki Accords, had to be adapted to the specific conditions of Poland.

The Prime Minister thanked General Jaruzelski for his very full account of developments in Poland and on the world scene. She would start by commenting on the international aspects. We shared the wish for an early end to the Vienna talks, but were sceptical whether a human rights conference in Moscow would be appropriate. While there had been

progress in the Soviet Union in implementing the Helsinki Accords, it was not yet sufficient to warrant agreement to a conference in Moscow. Conventional stability talks were important, but would only succeed if there was much greater frankness on the part of the Warsaw Pact about the strength and deployment of their forces than had been the case in the MBFR talks. Geographical differences also had to be taken into account, in particular the vast hinterland for reinforcement enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact, while NATO's reinforcements had to come across the Atlantic and the Channel. We attached very great importance to negotiations on chemical weapons which had proliferated alarmingly. The Warsaw Pact enjoyed a heavy preponderance in these weapons. The main guarantee of Europe's security would remain the nuclear deterrent: she saw no scope for further reductions in nuclear weapons in Europe at this stage.

The Prime Minister continued that she would like next to address some of the broader political and economic issues raised by General Jaruzelski. It was quite evident that the centrally-planned economies had failed, most of all because of their inability to respond to change. Marx had assumed that people would conform to economic laws. But human beings simply were not like that. If you denied them the right to take their own decisions, they would not act responsibly. It simply was not possible for any Government to arrogate to itself the power to plan an economic system from the centre. Socialism with its system of controls just did not work. Mr. Gorbachev had come to realise this in the Soviet Union. Of course there were people who were comfortable with socialism because it relieved them of the need to take decisions for themselves and gave great power to corporate bodies such as trade unions. She had set out to change all that in Britain in 1979, by abolishing controls, privatising state-owned companies, spreading ownership among people, giving incentives to greater effort by reducing the tax burden, and leaving managers to take their own decisions. The result had been a tremendous shake out and the difficulties had been much quicker to emerge than the positive results. It took time for people to get used once more to taking responsibility. But greater freedom had worked and enterprise had come back. That was why the British economy was now successful. The key was to give responsibility back to individual people.

The Prime Minister continued that the same thinking had inspired the Government's trade union reforms. The purpose of these had been to give individual trade unionists more power at the expense of union bosses. They were able to decide for themselves whether their interests would really be served by going on strike. This greater freedom for individual trade union members had been an essential part of Britain's economic recovery. She noted in parentheses that General Jaruzelski had said in his interview with The Guardian that Britain's trade unions were not truly independent because they were controlled by the Labour Party. Actually it was the other way round. But there was another aspect, which was a crucial difference between Britain and Poland: people in Britain did not have to rely

on trade unions to express their political views. They were able to decide whether or not to support the Government's policies in free elections. If they did not like those policies, they could change the Government. In Poland, trade unions, including Solidarity, seemed to be the only means of political expression for people who opposed the Government. While that lasted, she did not see how economic reform could succeed because people would use strikes as a political weapon in default of any other means of pursuing their political objectives.

The Prime Minister continued that she was very grateful to General Jaruzelski for enabling her to meet representatives of every shade of opinion in Poland. She had not come to create problems or to interfere in Poland's business. She could only say what had worked for Britain. But she welcomed the Polish Government's decision to offer round table talks with other groups. It was always best to talk and discuss and she hoped that Solidarity would accept the invitation. When she had visited Father Popieluszko's church earlier in the day, she had felt the power of the Solidarity movement. As a politician, her instinct told her that power could not be denied. As an organisation, Solidarity was outside her experience but it obviously had a cohesion and a strength which meant it must be given a role. She would let General Jaruzelski have further reflections after she had met the Solidarity leadership the following day. She could assure him she would be as supportive of dialogue in talking to them as she was in talking to the Polish Government. She held to the maxim that an empty chair does not talk. There was another point. She had heard Mr. Rakowski say that he was willing to discuss power sharing. With respect, that would not deal with the real problem. It was not a question of sharing power but of taking powers away from government and giving them back to ordinary people to exercise for themselves. General Jaruzelski wanted to go in the same direction as Mr. Gorbachev but had the advantage in Poland of people who could remember what a free enterprise economy was like and who had experience of owning their own land. That was a great blessing. She had seen for herself the tremendous achievements of the Polish people in re-constructing Warsaw after the terrible damage done during the Second World War. A nation which had the spirit to do that must be able to overcome present problems. We wanted to see Poland succeed.

The Prime Minister said that she would also comment on bilateral relations. Poland had a special place for Britain. For us it was different to other East European countries. It was partly history, in particular the experiences of the Second World War. It was partly the fact that we had a large number of Polish people who were excellent members of the community and also very good Conservatives (General Jaruzelski permitted himself a wintery smile). She was sorry to learn that our relations were now less substantial than those of Germany. There was a certain irony in that in the light of history. As to economic help, once Poland was able to reach agreement with the IMF, that

would unlock the door to further financial assistance, including re-scheduling of debts. We would be ready in principle to use our influence helpfully with the IMF provided we could be sure that economic reform would be durable, and for that further political reform was essential. There seemed to have been some misunderstanding about help with management training: we were very ready to offer such help and the details could be discussed. There were also other practical steps which could be taken in our relations. She had described these to Mr. Rakowski.

General Jaruzelski thanked the Prime Minister for her remarks. He had been fascinated by what she said. He would make a few brief comments. First, it was important to remember that the East needed a sense of security no less than the West. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had suffered terribly in World War Two and this had made a deep psychological impact. While the West tended to talk in terms of the map which showed Western Europe as a relatively small appendage to the great land mass of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union itself tended to look at the globe and feel itself surrounded. Secondly, he disliked the emphasis which the Prime Minister put on deterrence because it pre-supposed that the other side was a potential aggressor. It was time to give up the philosophy of enmity. We were doomed to live alongside each other and should concentrate more on common problems such as ecology rather than the military threat. Thirdly, it could not be said that Communism was a social system which had failed. There was its role in achieving victory in the war against Hitler. There was the Soviet presence in space. There was its outstanding record in basic science. In retrospect, it was a great pity that Lennin's new Economic Policy had not been continued: if it had been, the Soviet Union would have been much more advanced now. Lastly, one should never forget that societies and economies moved in cycles. Capitalism was certainly resurgent at the moment but had not always been so. The role of individual leaders had great importance. If it had not been for the Prime Minister's strength of character and determination, Britain might well still be languishing.

Summing up their discussion, he would like to say that he had found it refreshing and helpful. He thought Poland could learn a lot from the United Kingdom's experience. He wished the Prime Minister well for her visit to Gdansk. There might be attempts to exploit it. He recalled her undertaking in her letter to him not to add further complications to Poland's existing difficulties.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (H.M. Treasury), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*your diary,*  
*Charles Powell*  
CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Subject as Master



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as in PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 November 1988

Dear Lynn,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF THE CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL

The Prime Minister met members of the Consultative Council at the Sejm in Warsaw on 3 November. Thirteen members of the Council were present (out of a total of nearly sixty) but only seven of these spoke. The Prime Minister was greeted by Professor Secomski who invited Professor Legatowicz, a Catholic, to introduce the Council.

Professor Legatowicz said the Consultative Council was an unconventional institution, composed of people invited personally by General Jaruzelski. It was intended to broaden the base of the advice available to the General. Among its members were many people who had not previously taken any part in public life. Two-thirds of members did not belong to any political party. The Council was very broadly based therefore, although it was true that at the time of its formation some people had refused to join it. The Council held only plenary meetings, at which there were no taboo subjects, and no constraints of time. The purpose of their meetings was to present General Jaruzelski with their views and the views of those whom they represented. The General always sat through meetings. Members could be confident that points raised would get a response. Finally, Professor Legatowicz said that it had been clear from the start that the Council was not a closed body. There had been no changes yet, although there was a suggestion that the Council could be transformed into a Council of National Reconciliation. But this lay in the future and awaited a broader national consensus. Professor Secomski added that the Council had been important in opening up the political process in Poland. Its role now was to broaden the dialogue and try to draw in Solidarity, representatives of the official unions, and the church.

The Prime Minister asked on what subjects the Council had given advice, and why. Professor Skubiszewski said that meetings were concerned with three types of subjects: those proposed by General Jaruzelski, those of specific interest to members, and those put forward in correspondence between members and the public. The advantage of the Council was that views could be expressed direct to General Jaruzelski and through him to the Government. The Council had discussed various social problems: economic reform, the environment, emigration of young people, and would soon discuss international problems. Professor Secomski commented that subjects were usually general in nature.



Professor Maciszewski said that the Council's decisions were taken by consensus. Perhaps this was an excess of democracy, but Poland had not had enough democracy in the past. Moreover, he was one of only two Communist Party members of the group meeting the Prime Minister. The others belonged to the "constructive opposition" or even to the opposition unqualified by an adjective. Professor Szczepanski said the Council mostly composed of Professors, preoccupied by analysis of facts. The information they provided to General Jaruzelski was factual and was therefore sometimes unpleasant for him. Professor Gleysztor said another quality of the Council was that its proceedings were published in 40,000 copies without any censorship. Professor Sila-Nowicki said he viewed the Council as a platform for free expression, and a reflection of the greatly increased freedom of speech in Poland. The Prime Minister commented that she found the Council easier to understand described in this way than as a platform for tendering advice. The meeting then broke up as the Prime Minister had to leave for her meeting with General Jaruzelski.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (H.M. Treasury), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,*  
*C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 November 1988

Dear Lynn,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE  
POLISH PRIME MINISTER IN WARSAW ON THURSDAY 3 NOVEMBER

The Prime Minister had a further meeting with the Polish Prime Minister in Warsaw on the morning of 3 November. Mr. Rakowski was accompanied by Mr. Olechowski, Foreign Minister, Mr. Wojtik, Secretary of State for Foreign and Economic Co-operation, Mr. Gertych, Polish Ambassador in London and Mr. Duchowski of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. H.M. Ambassador, Warsaw was also present.

Mr. Rakowski asked whether there were any points the Prime Minister wished to raise as a result of their discussion the previous evening. The Prime Minister said that one point had arisen during her subsequent discussion with Independents about agriculture, and that was the degree of state control over agriculture. Far from being genuinely private, it seemed there were rigid controls over both inputs and the sale of products. Mr. Rakowski said that agriculture had distinctive characteristics in Poland which marked it out from other socialist countries. It was not collectivised. Instead there were an enormous number of small farms below five hectares, and at least one million farmers were also in industry. To make farming profitable, these small farms had to be restructured into larger units. But the economic conditions had to be right and that meant it would be a very slow process. Mr. Rakowski continued that the Government recognised the key importance of agriculture. Steps had already been taken to guarantee farmers their rights of ownership. This had already produced results. Indeed over the last eight years agriculture had been the only sector of the Polish economy which had steadily improved, with increased investment in farm buildings and machinery. There were indeed controls over the procurement of agricultural produce for sale. But as from 1 January 1989 this monopoly would be lifted. The Government had also decided on measures to close the gap between rural incomes and those of workers in cities. These steps would lead to enormous change in conditions in the Polish countryside.

The Prime Minister said that, all the same, there seemed to be no incentive for people to work their land more efficiently, particularly if there was a rigid state control over inputs such as the purchase of machinery and fertilisers. Mr. Rakowski gave a detailed account of the experience of his cousin, who now

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farmed the family's land of some sixty hectares. He had two tractors, a Fiat car, a colour television and a suite of Yugoslav furniture. He had recently added an annex to the house with central heating. It had taken him ten years - only ten years - to make it. His main complaints were the poor quality of machinery available and the lack of spare parts. His relative success was not uncharacteristic. The number of tractors had more than doubled over the last seven years and a great deal of progress had been made. Of course Polish agriculture was still far behind that of Western Europe. But it could not be changed at a stroke. The Prime Minister said that the answer lay in prices. If the price was right, the farmer would produce for the market. Mr. Rakowski conceded this: there had been a free market in fruit, vegetables and flowers for years and it worked perfectly well. His aim was to extend the free market to all agricultural produce and leave supply and demand to determine the price. Agriculture must be the priority. One consequence of this was the need to persuade the heavy industry barons to expand production of tractors, machinery and fertilisers to meet farmers' needs. Unfortunately, there was still a lot of old fashioned thinking in Poland which said that the economy would be strong only if heavy industry was strong.

Mr. Rakowski said that he would like to take up something which the Prime Minister had said the day before. She had asked how the Polish Government could achieve its objectives if it did not have the support of the people. Certainly they did not have total support. Equally he hoped the Prime Minister did not believe the caricature whereby the unfortunate, lonely government was on one side and the people of Poland on the other. If that was true, his government would last no time at all. In reality, the economic record of the last few years, including payment of some \$12 billion of interest on foreign debt, showed that people were working. The Government were conducting intensive polling to track the national mood. He had been pleased to receive a poll the previous evening which showed that his approval rating as Prime Minister had gone up from 37 to 53 per cent in recent weeks. That showed a healthy basis of support. It depended very largely on a single factor, namely the belief that he was committed to improve economic conditions. The Prime Minister said that she did not want to disappoint Mr. Rakowski but she was not very impressed by the polls. If he was taking the really difficult decisions, then his popularity would be plummeting. The changes needed for the long-term produced short-term hardships. In her own case in the United Kingdom, the most difficult years had been between 1979 and 1981. The polls had been frightful. But she had ignored them and pressed on with the right policies, and they had begun to pay off after three or four years. The only poll she minded about was the one which took place every five years in a general election.

The Prime Minister said that she would like to hear more about the Government's plans for economic reform. Mr. Rakowski said the Government needed time. There were many difficulties in the economy. For instance there was a shortage of labour. There were also absurdities in social policy, such as 3-year maternity leave for women and early retirement at 43 for miners. All these problems had to be tackled. He knew full well that he would face strikes and demonstrations if he persisted with rationalisation. But there was no alternative. He thought

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there were lessons to be learnt from the trade union reforms in the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister cautioned Mr. Rakowski to remember that there was a crucial difference between the British and Polish situation: in Britain trade union members had an alternative outlet for political activity, in Poland they did not.

The Prime Minister said there were a number of practical issues which she would like to mention briefly. We were ready to help with management training if the Polish Government would find that helpful. The offer did not imply any criticism but was intended to be helpful. Mr. Rakowski - who appeared not to understand the Prime Minister's offer - said that many Polish managers were receiving training in the West and learning to be independent. The Prime Minister continued that we would also like to see more exchanges of teachers and pupils to spread contacts between Britain and Poland more widely. In the same spirit, we would be taking steps to speed up the system of issuing visas. Mr. Rakowski welcomed these two proposals. For his part, he would welcome a stronger British presence in Poland. There were historic links. But English was rapidly being replaced by German, and German industry enjoyed a considerably better reputation in Poland. The most useful way in which Britain could help Poland was over her foreign debt. This was a noose round Poland's neck and restricted the options for economic reform. He hoped the Prime Minister would use her prestige to establish a favourable climate for Poland in the Paris Club and at the IMF. Poland desperately needed some breathing space. The Prime Minister said that agreement with the IMF was the vital step which would unlock a great deal of other help.

The Prime Minister urged Mr. Rakowski to cheer up. She had faced many difficulties in the first years of her first term of office but had come through them. We wanted Poland to make the necessary breakthrough. Mr. Rakowski said that he was optimistic. He believed that the round table dialogue would take place despite all the difficulties. He also had tremendous faith in the Polish people. Poland would get through.

Over lunch later, both Mr. Rakowski and Mr. Olechowski pressed the Prime Minister hard for help over rescheduling of Poland's debt. The Prime Minister insisted that agreement on the IMF was the essential first step. That would unlock many doors. There was also some further discussions of the prospects for the round table. Mr. Rakowski claimed that the Government had sent Mr. Walesa various concrete proposals for the agenda. They awaited a reply. He added that the Government were ready for power-sharing. The Prime Minister said that she did not think power-sharing the right concept. The key question was whether the Government and party were prepared to relinquish their power over large areas of national life and restore them to the people.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (H M Treasury), Shirley Stagg (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*you diary,*  
*C.D. Powell*  
C.D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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cc LRK

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 November 1988

New sign

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF  
WALESA'S BRAINS TRUST

The Prime Minister met members of Walesa's Brains Trust in the Ambassador's Residence in Warsaw on 3 November. The members of Walesa's Brains Trust present were Professor Andrzej Stelmachowski, Mr. Jan Josef Lipski, Mr. Marcin Krol, Mrs. Janina Zakrzewska, Mr. Jacek Czaputowicz and Mr. Stefan Bratkowski.

The Prime Minister began by saying how glad she was to be in Poland, and how grateful she was that so many people had given up time to see her. She had only ever known a system of freedom under the rule of law impartially applied. She was therefore very interested in how Poland might make the transition to such a system. She had met already people who said the round table process was dead. How did her guests today see the prospects? It seemed to her to be not so much a question of seeking power-sharing as limiting the power of government.

Professor Stelmachowski said that Poland enjoyed today the best international climate since the war, which offered the potential to enlarge the area of freedom. The opposition did not want to share power. Society was pulverised. It was important to start at the bottom, and the first requirement was for freedom of association. The problem was that the authorities feared the emergence of an organisation as powerful as Solidarity had been in 1980. Therefore a trade union must be only a trade union. It could only be this if there was real freedom of association for others. Of course the government required certain guarantees. But society was pluralistic and its structures must be pluralistic. The government still believed that economic reform could be introduced without society's support. This was a mistake and could lead to conflict. In Professor Stelmachowski's view the spirit of the time was one of conciliation.

Mr. Bratkowski was unhappy about the term opposition, since he regarded himself as simply fighting for the rights of citizenship. The country was in a mess. The economy, as the Prime Minister knew, was appallingly run. He cited the example of the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk which was forty-fifth in the list of five hundred largest enterprises in Poland, exporting 75 per cent of its production. The fact that it suffered from a negative added value arose purely because of a false exchange rate implied

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in calculating the value of the rouble against the dollar. Mr. Krol, endorsing this, said the opposition could not share power, and propositions so far made by the authorities had been totally false. If, like him, you had been anti-socialist all your life you could not participate in a Communist system. The purpose of the round table talks had been to create the possibility of sharing power. The opposition were ready to accept responsibility. But co-optation into the system was totally undemocratic. It was true that there had been some liberalisation in the last seven years, in allowing wider expression of views. But this did not amount to democracy. Indeed, he had not observed a single real step towards democratisation. Structural changes were essential and the authorities must give up a large share of their power, especially in the economy.

Mr. Czaputowicz wished to talk about Europe. On the one hand Western Europe was aiming at integration, and on the other there were the beginnings of integration in Eastern Europe. This had been clear from Gorbachev's visit to Poland earlier this year. For example, he wanted to create 200 joint Polish-Soviet enterprises, an extremely dangerous prospect for Poland. The need was to overcome the divisions in Europe not to promote them. On another point, Mr. Czaputowicz criticised the decision by the Presidents of West European Parliaments to accept the invitation from the President of the Polish Parliament to participate in a conference in Warsaw in November. It implied that East European Parliaments were similar to those in the West. This was simply not the case. Lastly, Mr. Czaputowicz said that young people were very radical. There had been a change of mood recently, exemplified by the current boycott of military training classes in universities.

Mr. Lipski confirmed that the opposition did not wish to take over power. But without social control, no reform was possible. This was particularly true in a system where political criteria always had priority. The Lenin Shipyard decision exemplified this. The Prime Minister asked what Mr. Lipski meant by social control. He replied that a parliamentary system would serve this purpose. But in Poland what was called a Parliament was not a Parliament at all. It could become a more useful instrument of control if reformed so that candidates could be put forward by genuine organisations. Lastly Mr Lipski asked what means should be employed to carry out economic reform. Experience to date showed the capacity of the present system for wasting everything. Only far-reaching democratisation could ensure economic reform. In this context he attached great importance to effective social insurance to avoid social conflict at times of economic hardship.

Finally, Mrs. Zakrzewska spoke, as a representative of the Polish Helsinki Committee. She recalled the Prime Minister's opening words about the freedom under the rule of law impartially applied. The Helsinki Committee had been founded in 1982 but it was important to understand why it continued to operate after the lifting of martial law. This was because Poles did not enjoy freedom under the rule of law. It was true that there were greater areas of freedom now. But these were not based on law. Rather, they were arbitrarily assigned and could be as easily withdrawn. Her Committee's struggle was for a law equal for all citizens and a law which would be obeyed.

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At this point the meeting had, unfortunately, to be broken off as the Prime Minister was already late for her next appointment, a meeting with the Consultative Council.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (H.M. Treasury), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,*  
*Charles Powell*

(CHARLES POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Subject cc Master

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file  
cc Sir/C

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 November 1988

Dear Mrs,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH POLISH INDEPENDENTS  
WEDNESDAY 2 NOVEMBER

The Prime Minister met a number of members of independent organisations on the first evening of her visit to Poland, at the Ambassador's Residence in Warsaw. Those present were Professor Dzielski, Mr. Paszynski, Professor Trzeciakowski, Professor Bender, Mr. Janowski and Professor Findeisen.

The Prime Minister said how interested she was to have the opportunity to meet her guests and wanted to hear from them about development in Poland and the prospects. Mr. Gorbachev had realised that a centralised economy did not work. But it was very difficult to move from a centrally planned system to a freer one.

Professor Trzeciakowski said the Party would never accept this change. Reform meant de-politicisation of the economy in which 900,000 jobs for Party members would be lost. It would be very difficult to convince people to give up this privilege. It might be easier to convince the Army and police who did not share these vested interests. The decision on the Lenin Shipyard revealed the essence of the problem. The hardliners were not prepared to leave the field to economists who wished to de-politicise the economy. It was essential to find a compromise with the military.

Professor Dzielski said he represented a group of conservative anti-Communists, who had been inspired by the Prime Minister and President Reagan. They were not in the main body of the Polish opposition but were trying to develop a constructive anti-Communism. For them, it was not important who governed, but that changes occurred. Their approach was "soft confrontation", forcing change but leaving the authorities a way to escape. Economic freedoms came before political freedoms. The military and police were interested in economic freedoms which might save them from the consequences of economic collapse. The opposition should understand the right of the authorities to survive. The Prime Minister commented that an opposition could only become the government if it was united. She agreed that government should withdraw from many areas of decision-taking. In a sophisticated society this required a majority of people to believe the time was right for this change.

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Professor Findeisen described the situation of young people who saw no prospects. Mr. Gorbachev could involve Soviet youth, but it was much harder in Poland. Many of their brightest young people were emigrating. Political freedoms were essential to give young people the chance to take part in public life. At present they were blocked by the nomenklatura which required political approval for appointments from the lowest level upwards. If nothing changed, Poland would lose its young people twice over: both those who emigrated and those who wished to do so. The Prime Minister commented that it was important to change the system altogether not simply to create conditions in which young people could replace older ones within the existing system.

Professor Bender said Poland did not have a real political or economic life. Within the establishment, there was no real political opposition, as he well knew from his role as an independent Catholic Deputy in the Sejm.

Mr. Janowski stressed the importance of agriculture as the foundation on which a free enterprise economy could be built. For the first time since the War, the Polish Government had acknowledged agriculture as posing the most important tasks for the economy. But there was a chance that the authorities were merely using agriculture, not addressing the real problems which were causing food shortages. Eighty per cent of expenditure on agriculture went to the State sector which occupied twenty per cent of the land, and of three million private farmers half had neither horse nor tractor. Many of those who had tractors, could not get the equipment or spare parts for them. The fact that agriculture functioned at all was due to the resolve of the farming community, the toughest class in Poland. The authorities had to give political and economic guarantees if agriculture were really to develop. The Prime Minister said she could not see why guarantees were necessary to those who owned their land. Mr. Janowski said that might apply in Britain, but not in Poland, where farmers were uncertain that tomorrow the land would still be theirs. The authorities controlled so much, from the price of produce to the distribution of tractors. In practice there were limits on ownership.

Mr. Paszynski described the position of the private sector which had survived the latest economic crisis in a better condition than the State sector. It could be seen everywhere outside of the heavy industries, for example in light industry and food processing. Professor Bender said that the best examples of private enterprise were the production of flowers and vegetables. Professor Trzeciakowski said that even these sectors were subject to influence by the State which controlled the supply of fertilisers.

The Prime Minister asked how the process of change could be set in hand. She could not accept that change was impossible. After years of being told that socialism was inevitable, it was now clear that it was the death of socialism that was inevitable. Professor Trzeciakowski said the number one problem was the political one. He himself had refused the post of Vice-Premier in Mr. Rakowski's new government. The younger generation was fed up with the non-violent approach of Solidarity. People were deeply disillusioned about the round table talks after the purely

political decision to liquidate the Lenin Shipyard. It had killed the round table. He and his colleagues had been preparing proposals for reform of the economy including privatisation, de-monopolisation and changes of priorities. But the Party hardliners had won. The Prime Minister said that she understood exactly why Professor Trzeciakowski had refused the post of Vice Premier. She believed firmly in peaceful change and the importance of winning the intellectual arguments.

Professor Trzeciakowski said there were one or two bright spots, such as the Church Agricultural Foundation. Professor Findeisen said that institutions such as this gave young people hope. But it was difficult to have hopes in a society where, for example, boy scouts could not go to church in their uniforms. The Prime Minister said this was absurd. She exhorted her Polish guests to keep hope alive.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (H.M. Treasury), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry), Shirley Stagg (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*you directly.*  
*Charles Powell*

(CHARLES POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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WARSAW FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY

OUR TELNO 2628: US/POLAND

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NOW GIVEN US A COPY OF THE MESSAGE FROM SHULTZ TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER FORESHADOWED IN TUR, WHICH WAS DELIVERED IN WARSAW ON 2 NOVEMBER.

2. AFTER REFERRING TO SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH OLECHOWSKI AT THE UN IN SEPTEMBER, THE KEY PASSAGE IN THE MESSAGE READS:

QUOTE IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR SEPTEMBER DISCUSSION, I ALSO WANTED YOU TO HAVE MY PERSONAL VIEW. THE UNITED STATES TAKES THE PROCESS OF POLAND'S NATIONAL RECONCILIATION VERY SERIOUSLY. YOU ARE MORE AWARE THAN I OF THE HISTORIC POTENTIAL OF THE QUOTE ROUNDTABLE UNQUOTE TALKS. AS JOHN WHITEHEAD SAID WHILE IN WARSAW, RESULTS FROM THIS PROCESS WILL CLEARLY HAVE A PROFOUNDLY POSITIVE EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS.

THE RECENT DIFFICULTIES IN PROCEEDING TOWARD MEANINGFUL QUOTE ROUNDTABLE UNQUOTE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE SUGGESTED TO SOME THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS NO LONGER COMMITTED TO THE PROCESS. I HOPE AND TRUST THESE SUGGESTIONS ARE MISTAKEN. IT WOULD BE A GREAT LOSS -- TO POLAND AND TO OUR RELATIONS -- IF SUCH A RARE AND HOPEFUL OPPORTUNITY WERE MISSED.

WE SHARE THE GOOD WILL THAT THE DEPUTY SECRETARY FOUND IN ALL HIS TALKS IN WARSAW AND GDANSK, AND ARE DISTURBED THAT THE OPTIMISM OF TWO SHORT WEEKS AGO SEEMS TO BE DISAPPEARING. I BELIEVE THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES CAN FIND THE STRENGTH, CREATIVITY AND PERSEVERANCE NEEDED TO PROCEED DOWN THE ROAD OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION FOR POLAND. I WISH YOU WELL AS YOU TAKE THE NEXT CHALLENGING, HISTORIC STEPS FORWARD. UNQUOTE

ACLAND

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ORWBAN 3806

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~~CHARLES~~ <sup>seen by NCH</sup>

This has only just arrived,  
I thought you should be  
aware.

Prime Minister

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FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM POWELL

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT MEETING WITH CARDINAL GLEMP

THE PRIME MINISTER HAD A TALK ON THE FIRST EVENING OF HER VISIT TO POLAND WITH CARDINAL GLEMP AT THE ARCHBISHOP'S PALACE IN WARSAW. CARDINAL GLEMP WAS ACCOMPANIED BY BISHOP DABROWSKI. H.M. AMBASSADOR, WARSAW WAS ALSO PRESENT.

THE PRIME MINISTER BEGAN BY SAYING THAT POLAND WAS VERY SPECIAL, IT COULD NOT BE COMPARED TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY. SHE WAS VERY PLEASED

TO BE PAYING A VISIT AND WOULD WELCOME THE CARDINAL'S ADVICE ON HOW SHE WOULD DEAL WITH THE VERY TRICKY ISSUES POSED BY THE PRESENT SITUATION IN POLAND. CARDINAL GLEMP REFERRED TO THE VERY WARM FEELINGS IN POLAND TOWARDS BRITAIN. THERE WERE MANY POLISH FAMILIES LIVING THERE AS WELL AS MEMORIES OF THE WAR. AFTER THE WAR, THE CHURCH IN POLAND HAD BEEN FORCED TO COME TO TERMS WITH A DIFFERENT REALITY, THAT OF COMMUNISM. THE CHURCH DID NOT BELONG TO ANY POLITICAL GROUP. IT HAD TO SUPPORT THE INTERESTS OF THE ENTIRE POLISH NATION. ITS MOST IMPORTANT TASK WAS TO CULTIVATE MORAL ATTITUDES, PARTICULARLY A SENSE OF GOOD AND EVIL. THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM HAD DONE MUCH DAMAGE IN THIS RESPECT. IT HAD TORN DOWN CHRISTIANITY AND PUT NOTHING IN ITS PLACE. IT WAS LEFT TO THE CHURCH TO PRESERVE AND DEVELOP FUNDAMENTAL VALUES SUCH AS RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY.

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT SHE UNDERSTOOD THE VERY IMPORTANT ROLE PLAYED BY THE CHURCH. SHE ALSO APPRECIATED THAT POLAND HAD TO SORT OUT ITS OWN PROBLEMS. THE MAIN PROBLEM SEEMED TO HER THE ABSENCE OF ANY ACT OF POLITICAL CONSENT IN THE LATTER. ALTHOUGH SOLIDARITY WAS REFERRED TO AS A TRADE UNION, ITS MAIN FUNCTION WAS IN FACT TO EXPRESS DIFFERENT POLITICAL VIEWS TO THOSE OF THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE NO OTHER CHANNELS FOR THIS EXISTED. CARDINAL GLEMP AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SORT OUT WHAT SOLIDARITY STOOD FOR. HE BELIEVED THAT ITS ASPIRATIONS WERE POSITIVE AND IN "THIS EVIL SYSTEM" THEY STROVE FOR GOOD. CERTAINLY THEY WERE MORE THAN JUST A TRADE UNION. UNFORTUNATELY THEY WERE ALSO FULL OF PEOPLE WHO PURSUED THEIR OWN PRIVATE GOALS. THERE WERE GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN THEM AND THE GOVERNMENT. BUT HE HOPED THAT REASON WOULD PREVAIL.

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT SHE REALISED SHE WAS TREADING ON EGGSHELLS BY PAYING HER VISIT TO POLAND AT SUCH A DIFFICULT TIME. THERE WAS NO WAY SHE COULD LET DOWN THE HOPES OF PEOPLE WHO WANTED GREATER FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS. EQUALLY THERE WAS NO WAY SHE COULD INTERFERE IN POLAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. ALL SHE COULD DO WAS DRAW ON OUR OWN EXPERIENCE IN BRITAIN AND ON THE CHRISTIAN FAITH. CLEARLY, THERE WAS A VERY DEEP WISH AMONG PEOPLE IN POLAND TO HAVE A BIGGER SAY IN HOW THEIR LIVES WERE RUN, WITH MORE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. SHE HOPED THAT BY SEEING SOLIDARITY

SHE WOULD AT LEAST ENCOURAGE THEM NOT TO LOSE HEART. AT THE SAME TIME, SHE COULD UNDERSTAND THEIR PESSIMISM: IT WAS HARD TO DETECT A REAL WILL ON THE PART OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TO FIND A WAY THROUGH IN THE PROPOSED ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS.

CARDINAL GLEMP SAID THAT THESE WERE INDEED VERY DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX PROBLEMS. IN THE SITUATION WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER DESCRIBED, THE CHURCH WAS AN INDEPENDENT FORCE. IT SOUGHT TO DIMINISH EMOTIONS AND TENSIONS. SOMETIMES IT SYMPATHISED WITH ONE SIDE, SOMETIMES WITH THE OTHER. IT REMAINED NEUTRAL IN THE SENSE OF NOT ENGAGING IN POLITICAL STRUGGLE. BUT IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW, THERE WERE GOOD PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING SOME PROGRESS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. HE BELIEVED THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT COULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN THIS RESPECT. IT WOULD ENCOURAGE THOSE WHO BELIEVED IN FREEDOM AND IT WOULD HELP THE POLISH GOVERNMENT OVER ITS SENSE OF ISOLATION. HE BELIEVED THE POLISH PEOPLE WOULD RESPOND WELL TO THE SIGN OF FRIENDSHIP WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT REPRESENTED.

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID SHE WELL UNDERSTOOD THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SITUATION. THE MESSAGE WHICH SHE WOULD SEEK TO CONVEY WAS THAT YOU COULD NOT HAVE SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC CHANGE WITHOUT GIVING PEOPLE MORE PERSONAL LIBERTY. CARDINAL GLEMP SAID THERE HAD BEEN SOME PROGRESS BOTH IN THE DIRECTION OF MORE PERSONAL FREEDOM AND MORE ECONOMIC FREEDOM. BUT POLAND HAD TO LEARN HOW TO PROCEED DEMOCRATICALLY. EXTREMISTS ON BOTH SIDES DID NOT WANT THIS. NONETHELESS HE HOPED FOR DEVELOPMENTS IN A POSITIVE DIRECTION. THE RISK HE SAW IN THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS THAT A ROUND TABLE DIALOGUE COULD DIVIDE THE OPPOSITION, WITH SOME ACCUSING OTHERS AND COLLABORATING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OR BECOMING ITS INSTRUMENT. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO BE ENTIRELY CYNICAL ABOUT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT OR BELIEVE THAT IT COULD NOT GENUINELY WORK FOR THE GOOD OF THE NATION. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID SHE REMAINED CONVINCED THAT THE NUB OF THE PROBLEM WAS THE LACK OF ANY MECHANISM FOR REAL DEBATE OR TRANSFER OF POWER BY DEMOCRATIC MEANS. CARDINAL GLEMP INTERJECTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS ABSOLUTELY RIGHT. THE PRIME MINISTER CONTINUED THAT THIS MEANT THAT IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO GET FROM THE PRESENT SYSTEM TO SOMETHING BETTER, AND COMPARATIVELY LITTLE THAT ANY OUTSIDE COUNTRY COULD DO THE HELP. WE COULD OFFER PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE SUCH AS MANAGEMENT TRAINING AND GREATER EXCHANGES BETWEEN TEACHERS AND STUDENTS. ONCE THERE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM, THE WEST WOULD BE READY TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL HELP. BUT HER GREATEST CONCERN OF ALL REMAINED TO SHOW THAT WE WERE NOT LETTING DOWN PEOPLE WHO HAD FOUGHT COURAGEOUSLY FOR FREEDOM UNDER VERY DIFFICULT CONDITIONS. SHE WOULD TRY TO STEER HER WAY THROUGH THESE CONFLICTING DEMANDS.

THE MEETING ENDED WITH SOME DISCUSSION OF CARDINAL GLEMP'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. THE PRIME MINISTER REFERRED TO THE ADVICE SHE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE 03 031943 =8'858, @ 09)-, @ 094 2&8:£ '£3 2-' =346 @4-53%UL.

I AM COPYING THIS LETTER TO ALEX ALLAN (H.M. TREASURY), BRIAN HAWTIN (MINISTRY OF DEFENCE) AND TREVOR WOOLLEY (CABINET OFFICE).

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FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM POWELL

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE POLISH PRIME MINISTER  
WEDNESDAY 2 NOVEMBER

THE PRIME MINISTER HAD A TALK WITH THE POLISH PRIME MINISTER SHORTLY AFTER HER ARRIVAL IN WARSAW ON THE EVENING OF 2 NOVEMBER. MR. RAKOWSKI WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHER OFFICIALS. H. M. AMBASSADOR WARSAW WAS ALSO PRESENT.

MR. RAKOWSKI WELCOMED THE PRIME MINISTER. HER VISIT WAS SEEN IN POLAND AS A VERY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT. HE BELIEVED THEIR TALKS WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE. HE FOUND IN LIFE THAT ONE EITHER TOOK TO SOMEONE STRAIGHTAWAY OR DID NOT. HE ALREADY FELT ALL THE BARRIERS FALL AWAY WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE APPROACHED THE MEETING WITH DUE HUMILITY. MRS. THATCHER HAD BEEN PRIME MINISTER OF A VERY IMPORTANT COUNTRY FOR NEARLY TEN YEARS. HE HAD BEEN PRIME MINISTER OF POLAND FOR A MATTER OF WEEKS. INDEED, THIS WAS HIS FIRST ENCOUNTER IN THAT CAPACITY WITH A FOREIGN PRIME MINISTER.

MR. RAKOWSKI CONTINUED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO USE THE TIME TO TELL THE PRIME MINISTER SOMETHING ABOUT THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND ITS POLICIES. THERE HAD BEEN INTERESTING DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND SINCE THE DRAMATIC EVENTS OF 1980. THE HIGH EMOTIONS OF THAT TIME HAD GIVEN WAY TO A CALMER APPROACH. PASSIONS HAD COOLED AND PEOPLE WERE NOW MORE OBJECTIVE. IDEOLOGY HAD ITS PLACE. BUT THE MAIN ISSUE WAS POLAND, ITS PRESENT AND ITS FUTURE. THERE HAD TO BE GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. HE BELIEVED THIS WAS NOW CLOSER THAN THREE YEARS AGO. THE OTHER MAIN TASK WAS TO DEAL WITH THE EFFECTS OF THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISIS AND INVIGORATE THE ECONOMY. THE ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HE HAD PROPOSED COULD HELP ACHIEVE BOTH THESE OBJECTIVES. BUT IT DID NOT MATTER SO MUCH WHO SAT ROUND THE TABLE AS WHAT WAS ON THE TABLE IN EVERY HOME IN POLAND. IN SAYING THAT, HE WAS NOT DISPARAGING THE USEFULNESS OF A DISCUSSION WITH THE VARIOUS POLITICAL FORCES TO FIND A PLATFORM FOR RECONCILIATION. INDEED, HE WOULD BE PUTTING OUT A STATEMENT LATER IN THE EVENING SAYING THAT HE REMAINED COMMITTED TO ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS AND LISTING WHAT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THEM. THE LIST WOULD INCLUDE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRADE UNION MOVEMENT WHICH WOULD DRAW ON THE EXPERIENCE OF ALL THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF TRADE UNIONISM WHICH HAD EMERGED IN POLAND IN RECENT YEARS. THAT MUST, OF COURSE, INCLUDE SOLIDARITY.

MR. RAKOWSKI CONTINUED THAT, NEVERTHELESS, THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK WAS THE ECONOMY. THERE HAD BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF TALK ABOUT ECONOMIC REFORM. BUT NO-ONE HAD ACTUALLY DONE MUCH. THE ESSENCE WAS TO REVITALISE THE ECONOMY, TO PUT THINGS WHICH HAD BEEN STOOD ON THEIR HEADS BACK ON THEIR FEET. AFTER THE WAR POLAND HAD ADOPTED THE STALINIST CONCEPT OF SOCIALISM WHICH GAVE A DOMINANT ROLE IN EVERY AREA TO THE STATE. HIS APPROACH WAS VERY DIFFERENT. HE WANTED THE STATE TO DISTURB PEOPLE AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE. HE WAS GLAD TO SEE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVIEW WITH POLITYKA

THAT SHE AGREED. PEOPLE HAD COME TO DEPEND ON THE STATE FOR EVERYTHING. MANAGERS WERE COMFORTABLE WITH THE SYSTEM WHICH TOLD THEM WHAT TO DO. BY RATIONALISING, YOU ELIMINATED PEOPLE'S SENSE OF SECURITY. THE FIRST TASK WAS TO CHANGE PEOPLE'S MIND-SET, TO PERSUADE THEM TO TAKE RISKS. IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO BREAK UP MONOPOLIES, TO ESTABLISH HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF SMALL BUSINESSES AND TO CONVERT A PART OF THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY TO CIVILIAN PURPOSES. HE WAS UNDER NO ILLUSIONS SEMI COLON ALL THIS WOULD TAKE A GENERATION TO ACHIEVE.

MR. RAKOWSKI CONTINUED THAT THE LATEST STEP IN THIS PROCESS WAS THE DECISION TO CLOSE THE LENIN SHIPYARD IN GDANSK. FATHER JANKOWSKI HAD SAID THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW A MARXIST COULD CLOSE DOWN THE LENIN SHIPYARD. THAT WAS A TYPICAL POLISH APPROACH. THE POLES WERE VERY FOND OF DEBATING. EVERY POLE IN THE COUNTRY HAD HIS OWN PLAN FOR REFORM OF THE ECONOMY. AS A CONSEQUENCE, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS. THE FACT WAS THAT CLOSURE OF THE SHIPYARD SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE YEARS AGO. PRODUCTION WAS DOWN AND THERE WERE OTHER SHIPYARDS WHICH WORKED BETTER. THE DECISION HAD NOT BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST SOLIDARITY. IT WAS NOT A POLITICAL DECISION. EVEN IF THE SHIPYARD WAS CLOSED, ITS NAME AND ITS ASSOCIATION WITH SOLIDARITY WOULD REMAIN A PART OF POLAND'S HISTORY. HE HAD BEEN PLEASANTLY SURPRISED BY MR. WALESA'S RESPONSE. HE HAD EXPECTED MR. WALESA TO CALL A STRIKE. INSTEAD, HIS APPROACH HAD BEEN TO SAY THAT THE LENIN SHIPYARD WAS NOT AN INEFFICIENT PLANT AND THAT THE WORKFORCE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT BY NOW WORKING WELL. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME FOR MANY YEARS THAT HE HAD HEARD ANYONE IN POLAND SPEAK OF WORKING WELL. IT WOULD SOON BECOME APPARENT THAT CLOSURE OF THE LENIN SHIPYARD WAS ONLY THE FIRST STEP. CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE BIGGEST STEEL MILLS IN THE COUNTRY WOULD BE ANNOUNCED VERY SHORTLY. THERE WAS NO WAY THE POLISH ECONOMY COULD BE HEALTHY WHEN HUGE SUBSIDIES WERE NEEDED FOR THE MAIN INDUSTRIES. LOSS-MAKING ENTERPRISES SIMPLY HAD TO BE CLOSED OR THE POLISH ECONOMY WOULD PERISH. HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT HE WAS ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED TO RATIONALISATION AS THE ONLY WAY TO EXTRICATE POLAND FROM A CRISIS. POLAND'S GREAT WEAKNESS HISTORICALLY HAD BEEN LACK OF CONSISTENCY. HE WAS DETERMINED TO CHANGE THAT.

THE PRIME MINISTER COMMENTED THAT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAD EMBARKED ON THE MOST DIFFICULT TASK OF ALL, THAT OF GOING FROM A CENTRALISED ECONOMY TO A SYSTEM BASED ON PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND COMPETITION. MR. RAKOWSKI HAD DESCRIBED THE AIM BUT HAD GIVEN NO INDICATION AS TO HOW HE ACTUALLY PROPOSED TO GET FROM ONE TO THE OTHER. AT LEAST THERE WAS SOME EXPERIENCE OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR. IT WAS NOT JUST A MATTER OF CHANGING ECONOMIC POLICIES. THERE HAD TO BE PERSONAL, POLITICAL AND SPIRITUAL CHANGE. UNDER COMMUNISM, PEOPLE WERE LIKE BIRDS IN A CAGE: ONCE YOU OPENED THE DOOR, THEY WERE AFRAID TO GO OUT. THE VITAL TASK FACING THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WAS TO TAKE THE POLISH PEOPLE WITH THEM IN MAKING CHANGES SEMI COLON AND THE PROBLEM THERE WAS THE LACK OF ANY POLITICAL MECHANISM FOR CONSULTING THEM AND ALLOWING THEM TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS. THIS WAS WHAT SHE MEANT IN SAYING THAT ECONOMIC REFORM COULD ONLY WORK IF ACCOMPANIED BY POLITICAL REFORM. SHE THOUGHT THAT MR. GORBACHEV UNDERSTOOD THIS IN THE SOVIET UNION, AT LEAST UP TO A POINT.

THE PRIME MINISTER CONTINUED THAT THE DIFFICULTIES FACING THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WERE IMMENSE AND WOULD PROBABLY GET WORSE BEFORE THEY GOT BETTER. SHE HAD BEEN FACED WITH DIFFICULT DECISIONS, ALTHOUGH ON A SMALLER SCALE, IN 1979, BUT HAD PERSEVERED. THE GREAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HERE SITUATION THEN AND MR. RAKOWSKI'S NOW AS THAT SHE HAD BEEN DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED TO CARRY OUT CHANGE AND TWICE SUBSEQUENTLY RE-ELECTED. SHE HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONVINCE PEOPLE OF THE NEED FOR CHANGE AND REFORM. THE POLISH GOVERNMENT MUST CONSULT ITS PEOPLE AND OBTAIN THEIR WILLING CONSENT TO REFORM. IT DID NOT MATTER WHAT SHAPE THE TABLE WAS, BUT THEY MUST SIT AT IT WITH SOLIDARITY AND OTHER OPPOSITION GROUPS AND EXPLAIN AND PERSUADE. INDEED SUCH A PROCESS OF CONSULTATION SHOULD GO ON ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. THEY MUST ALSO WORK OUT HOW THEY PROPOSED TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES THAT MR. RAKOWSKI HAD DESCRIBED TO HER. SHE WAS IN THE HABIT OF SAYING TO PEOPLE: DO NOT TELL ME WHAT TO DO, TELL ME HOW TO DO IT. THAT WOULD BE GOOD ADVICE FOR MR. RAKOWSKI TO FOLLOW UP.

THE DISCUSSION HAD TO CONCLUDE AT THIS POINT SO THAT THE PRIME MINISTER COULD LEAVE FOR HER MEETING WITH CARDINAL GLEMP.

I AM COPYING THIS LETTER TO ALEX ALLAN (H.M. TREASURY), BRIAN HAWTIN (MINISTRY OF DEFENCE), NEIL THORNTON (DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY) AND TREVOR WOOLLEY (CABINET OFFICE).

BARRETT

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 November 1988

SUBJECT CE MASTER

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE POLISH PRIME MINISTER

WEDNESDAY 2 NOVEMBER

The Prime Minister had a talk with the Polish Prime Minister shortly after her arrival in Warsaw on the evening of 2 November. Mr. Rakowski was accompanied by the Polish Foreign Minister and other officials. H.M. Ambassador Warsaw was also present.

Mr. Rakowski welcomed the Prime Minister. Her visit was seen in Poland as a very important development. He believed their talks would be productive. He found in life that one either took to someone straightaway or did not. He already felt all the barriers fall away with the Prime Minister. He approached the meeting with due humility. Mrs. Thatcher had been Prime Minister of a very important country for nearly ten years. He had been Prime Minister of Poland for a matter of weeks. Indeed, this was his first encounter in that capacity with a foreign Prime Minister.

Mr. Rakowski continued that he would like to use the time to tell the Prime Minister something about the new government and its policies. There had been interesting developments in Poland since the dramatic events of 1980. The high emotions of that time had given way to a calmer approach. Passions had cooled and people were now more objective. Ideology had its place. But the main issue was Poland, its present and its future. There had to be genuine national reconciliation. He believed this was now closer than three years ago. The other main task was to deal with the effects of the economic and political crisis and invigorate the economy. The round table discussions which he had proposed could help achieve both these objectives. But it did not matter so much who sat round the table as what was on the table in every home in Poland. In saying that, he was not disparaging the usefulness of a discussion with the various political forces to find a platform for reconciliation. Indeed, he would be putting out a statement later in the evening saying that he remained committed to round table discussions and listing what should be discussed in them. The list would include development of a trade union movement which would draw on the experience of all the different forms of trade unionism which had emerged in Poland in recent years. That must, of course, include Solidarity.

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Head of Chancery  
(Warsaw)

Mr. Rakowski continued that, nonetheless, the most important task was the economy. There had been a great deal of talk about economic reform. But no-one had actually done much. The essence was to revitalise the economy, to put things which had been stood on their heads back on their feet. After the war Poland had adopted the Stalinist concept of socialism which gave a dominant role in every area to the State. His approach was very different. He wanted the State to disturb people as little as possible. He was glad to see from the Prime Minister's interview with Polityka that she agreed. People had come to depend on the State for everything. Managers were comfortable with the system which told them what to do. By rationalising, you eliminated people's sense of security. The first task was to change people's mind-set, to persuade them to take risks. It was also necessary to break up monopolies, to establish hundreds of thousands of small businesses and to convert a part of the defence industry to civilian purposes. He was under no illusions; all this would take a generation to achieve.

Mr. Rakowski continued that the latest step in this process was the decision to close the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk. Father Jankowski had said that he could not understand how a Marxist could close down the Lenin Shipyard. That was a typical Polish approach. The Poles were very fond of debating. Every Pole in the country had his own plan for reform of the economy. As a consequence, it was difficult to achieve consensus. The fact was that closure of the Shipyard should have been done years ago. Production was down and there were other shipyards which worked better. The decision had not been directed against Solidarity. It was not a political decision. Even if the shipyard was closed, its name and its association with Solidarity would remain a part of Poland's history. He had been pleasantly surprised by Mr. Walesa's response. He had expected Mr. Walesa to call a strike. Instead, his approach had been to say that the Lenin shipyard was not an inefficient plant and that the workforce should demonstrate that by now working well. It was the first time for many years that he had heard anyone in Poland speak of working well. It would soon become apparent that closure of the Lenin shipyard was only the first step. Closure of one of the biggest steel mills in the country would be announced very shortly. There was no way the Polish economy could be healthy when huge subsidies were needed for the main industries. Loss-making enterprises simply had to be closed or the Polish economy would perish. He wanted to make clear that he was absolutely committed to rationalisation as the only way to extricate Poland from a crisis. Poland's great weakness historically had been lack of consistency. He was determined to change that.

The Prime Minister commented that the Polish government had embarked on the most difficult task of all, that of going from a centralised economy to a system based on private enterprise and competition. Mr. Rakowski had described the aim but had given no indication as to how he actually proposed to get from one to the other. At least there was some experience of private enterprise in the agricultural sector. It was not just a matter of changing economic policies. There had to be personal, political and spiritual change. Under Communism, people were like birds in a cage: once you opened the door, they were afraid to go out. The vital task facing the Polish government was to take the Polish



people with them in making changes; and the problem there was the lack of any political mechanism for consulting them and allowing them to express their views. This was what she meant in saying that economic reform could only work if accompanied by political reform. She thought that Mr. Gorbachev understood this in the Soviet Union, at least up to a point.

The Prime Minister continued that the difficulties facing the Polish government were immense and would probably get worse before they got better. She had been faced with difficult decisions, although on a smaller scale, in 1979, but had persevered. The great difference between her situation then and Mr. Rakowski's now was that she had been democratically elected to carry out change and twice subsequently re-elected. She had been able to convince people of the need for change and reform. The Polish government must consult its people and obtain their willing consent to reform. It did not matter what shape the table was, but they must sit at it with Solidarity and other opposition groups and explain and persuade. Indeed such a process of consultation should go on all over the country. They must also work out how they proposed to achieve the objectives that Mr. Rakowski had described to her. She was in the habit of saying to people: do not tell me what to do, tell me how to do it. That would be good advice for Mr. Rakowski to follow too.

The discussion had to conclude at this point so that the Prime Minister could leave for her meeting with Cardinal Glemp.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (H.M. Treasury), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 November 1988

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*SUBJECT CC MASTER*

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH CARDINAL GLEMP

The Prime Minister had a talk on the first evening of her visit to Poland with Cardinal Glemp at the Archbishop's Palace in Warsaw. Cardinal Glemp was accompanied by Bishop Dabrowski. H.M. Ambassador, Warsaw was also present.

The Prime Minister began by saying that Poland was very special, it could not be compared to any other country. She was very pleased to be paying a visit and would welcome the Cardinal's advice on how she should deal with the very tricky issues posed by the present situation in Poland. Cardinal Glemp referred to the very warm feelings in Poland towards Britain. There were many Polish families living there as well as memories of the War. After the War, the Church in Poland had been forced to come to terms with a different reality, that of Communism. The Church did not belong to any political group. It had to support the interests of the entire Polish nation. Its most important task was to cultivate moral attitudes, particularly a sense of good and evil. The Communist system had done much damage in this respect. It had torn down Christianity and put nothing in its place. It was left to the Church to preserve and develop fundamental values such as respect for human dignity.

The Prime Minister said that she understood the very important role played by the Church. She also appreciated that Poland had to sort out its own problems. The main problem seemed to her the absence of any mechanism through which to do so. The crucial difference between the western democracies and Communist systems was the absence of any act of political consent in the latter. Although Solidarity was referred to as a trade union, its main function was in fact to express different political views to those of the Government because no other channels for this existed. Cardinal Glemp agreed that it was important to sort out what Solidarity stood for. He believed that its aspirations were positive and in "this evil system" they strove for good. Certainly they were more than just a trade union. Unfortunately they were also full of people who pursued their own private goals. There were great difficulties in the way of dialogue between them and the Government. But he hoped that reason would prevail.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The Prime Minister said that she realised she was treading on eggshells by paying her visit to Poland at such a difficult time. There was no way she could let down the hopes of people who wanted greater freedom and human rights. Equally there was no way she could interfere in Poland's internal affairs. All she could do was draw on our own experience in Britain and on the Christian faith. Clearly, there was a very deep wish among people in Poland to have a bigger say in how their lives were run, with more freedom of expression. She hoped that by seeing Solidarity she would at least encourage them not to lose heart. At the same time, she could understand their pessimism: it was hard to detect a real will on the part of the Polish Government to find a way through in the proposed Round Table discussions.

Cardinal Glemp said that these were indeed very difficult and complex problems. In the situation which the Prime Minister described, the Church was an independent force. It sought to diminish emotions and tensions. Sometimes it sympathised with one side, sometimes with the other. It remained neutral in the sense of not engaging in political struggle. But in his personal view, there were good prospects for achieving some progress in the present situation. He believed the Prime Minister's visit could be very helpful in this respect. It would encourage those who believed in freedom and it would help the Polish Government over its sense of isolation. He believed the Polish people would respond well to the sign of friendship which the Prime Minister's visit represented.

The Prime Minister said she well understood the sensitivity of the situation. The message which she would seek to convey was that you could not have successful economic change without giving people more personal liberty. Cardinal Glemp said there had been some progress both in the direction of more personal freedom and more economic freedom. But Poland had to learn how to proceed democratically. Extremists on both sides did not want this. Nonetheless he hoped for developments in a positive direction. The risk he saw in the present situation was that a Round Table dialogue could divide the opposition, with some accusing others and collaborating with the Government or becoming its instrument. It would be wrong to be entirely cynical about the Polish Government or believe that it could not genuinely work for the good of the nation. The Prime Minister said she remained convinced that the nub of the problem was the lack of any mechanism for real debate or transfer of power by democratic means. Cardinal Glemp interjected that the Prime Minister was absolutely right. The Prime Minister continued that this meant that it was very difficult to get from the present system to something better, and comparatively little that any outside country could do to help. We could offer practical assistance such as management training and greater exchanges between teachers and students. Once there had been successful economic and political reform, the West would be ready to provide financial help. But her greatest concern of all remained to show that we were not letting down people who had fought courageously for freedom under very difficult conditions. She would try to steer her way through these conflicting demands.

The meeting ended with some discussion of Cardinal Glemp's forthcoming visit to Australia and New Zealand. The Prime Minister referred to the advice she had received from the Pope before visiting Poland for which she was very grateful.

CONFIDENTIAL

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (H.M. Treasury),  
Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet  
Office).

C.D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. POWELL

I wondered if the Prime Minister would send a letter on the lines of the attached to those opposition figures whom she met at the Residence this afternoon. This would be a nice gesture given that the meeting was broken off rather abruptly.

We could of course also send letters to the independents whom she met yesterday.

NIGEL THORPE

3 November 1988

LetterMEETING WITH MEMBERS OF WALESZA'S BRAINS TRUSTProcedure

- 1500 The Ambassador will introduce you to the six Polish guests in the first floor reception area of his residence. A press pool will be present for the opening of the meeting. The Ambassador will start the meeting by inviting each guest in turn very briefly to introduce himself and the area of his interests.
- 1540 Meeting ends.

Background

In his preparations for the current negotiations with the Polish authorities Lech Walesa has taken advice from a large group of independent intellectuals ("the alternative Consultative Council"), not all of whom are active Solidarity supporters. From this group those invited are:

- Professor Andrzej Stelmachowski (STELL-MACK-QEE-SKI): Chairman of the Warsaw Catholic Intellectuals Club and the principal intermediary between Walesa and the Polish authorities
- Jan Jozef Lipski: author and founder of KOR (Workers' Defence Committee) and of Polish Socialist Party (PPS) in 1987
- Marcin Krol (KROOL): editor of "Res Publica" magazine. Historian and political scientist
- Janina Zakrzewska (ZACK-SHEV-SKA): Professor of Law, Member of independent Polish Helsinki monitorship committee
- Jacek Czaputowicz (CHAP-ODT-Q-VEECH): leading activist in "Freedom and Peace" opposition group with a young following
- Stefan Bratkowski (BRAT-KOFE-SKI): journalist and head of the independent journalists union disbanded at the time of Martial Law

This meeting forms part of "the private programme".

FOR THE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION OF

Prime Minister

MR THORPE

AND

MR MATHEWSON

CDF  
2/xi

SITUATION IN LENIN SHIPYARD, GDANSK

1. At 0900 2 November a rally of between 8-9,000 workers (workforce of almost 11,000) was held in front of the Rector's Building in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk. The following resolution was adopted;

"We the shipyard workers strongly protest against the Government's decision to close the Gdansk Shipyard. The closure of a workplace which is the symbol of the August Accord and of Solidarity is an exclusively political decision, as the shipyard's financial situation is currently good. The future of the Gdansk Shipyard cannot be decided without the agreement of the workforce. We will defend our shipyard."

2. The Vice Chairman of the official union (OTZZ) organisation in the shipyard, and the shipyard's Director Towlinski, also signed the resolution. Representatives of the shipyard party committee attended the rally and apparently expressed support for the terms of the resolution. Towlinski who addressed the rally, defended the shipyard's record and argued that the decision to close it was not economically well-founded. Lech Walesa also addressed the rally. He described the Government's decision to close the shipyard as a political one, and a mistake. After the rally, workers dispersed peacefully and returned to work.

3. At a press conference following the rally Walesa said that Solidarity had managed to stop those who wanted to take immediate strike action. At his demand, all the workers had returned to work. Walesa added that he had discussed the situation with the official unionists at a meeting preceding the rally. They had agreed on joint action. If there was no solution by next Tuesday (8 November) a further rally would be held at which they would decide what action to take. They were prepared to defend the shipyard through strike

action. Asked about his meeting with Mrs Thatcher, Walesa said that she was best known in Poland for her foreign policy, which was popular. As regards her domestic policy, she was not always fair towards trade unions. Solidarity was prepared to protest whenever international conventions on trade unions were broken. But he would meet the "external" (i.e. foreign policy) not "internal" (i.e. domestic policy) Mrs Thatcher. Together they would defend human rights. On the round table, Walesa said that it had lost all meaning. The decision to close the shipyard was political provocation. Solidarity had not broken off the talks. But the authorities' action threatened reconciliation, and threatened the round table.

Comment

4. Opposition commentators in Gdansk are claiming that the resolution is a significant coup for Solidarity, uniting workers, official unionists, Solidarity and the Director in a common cause to oppose closure of the shipyard. The OPZZ and Director Towlinski were of course careful not to associate themselves with Solidarity itself, and they may later come under pressure to distance themselves from the terms of the resolution. But the decisive show of support on all sides in opposing closure will be unwelcome to the authorities. The mood at the rally (the largest in the shipyard since 1980) was apparently very tense, and participants were extremely critical of the Government, in particular Prime Minister Rakowski.

5. Solidarity representatives in Gdansk believe that there will be no strike action here in the next few days, and that attempts to provoke such action can be overcome. But they do not rule out the possibility of future strikes, either in the shipyard itself or organised in other workplaces to protest against the authorities' decision.

PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES

2 November 1988



qr?



not  
a MCB

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

2 November 1988

Dear Julian,

Thank you very much for your letter of 31 October about my visit to Poland. As always it was very helpful to have the benefit of your wisdom. It looks likely to be an exciting visit!

Yours  
Julian

The Right Honourable Julian Amery, M.P.

6

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CONFIDENTIAL  
FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON  
TO PRIORITY WARSAW  
TELNO MISC 428  
OF 021605Z NOVEMBER 88

FOLLOWING FOR CHARLES POWELL, PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY  
FROM BEARPARK

IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE ORIGINAL WHETHER LORD JELlicoe'S LETTER  
OF 26 OCTOBER TO THE PRIME MINISTER WAS SEEN BY YOU BEFORE SHE LEFT.  
JUST TO BE ON THE SAFE SIDE THE TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:

DEAR MARGARET,  
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 6 OCTOBER EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT MY  
INITIATIVE OPPOSITE THE POLES WITH REGARD TO THE PVC COMPLEX AT  
WLOCLAWEK, WHICH WAS BUILT BY COSTAIN AND DAVY, WOULD PRODUCE A  
MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT.

I FEEL THAT I SHOULD LET YOU KNOW IN VIEW OF YOUR IMPENDING VISIT  
TO POLAND THAT THESE HOPES HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTING AS THE CLIENTS'  
ONLY RESPONSE TO MY SUGGESTIONS (WHICH THE POLISH MINISTRY CONCERNED  
WAS DISPOSED TO LOOK AT FAVOURABLY) WAS TO REITERATE THEIR DEMANDS  
FOR FINANCIAL COMPENSATION WHICH HAVE NEITHER FACTUAL NOR CONTRACTUAL  
JUSTIFICATION.

MY PROPOSAL INVOLVED SOME RELATIVELY SMALL EXTRA COSTS TO THE POLES  
WHICH WOULD HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED THE PRODUCTION AND REVENUE  
OF THE PLANT AND THEREFORE MADE PERFECTLY GOOD BUSINESS SENSE.  
IT CAN THEREFORE BE CONCLUDED FROM THEIR DECISION THAT INTERNAL  
POLITICAL PROBLEMS DOMINATE THE THINKING OF THE MANAGEMENT TO THE  
EXCLUSION OF COMMERCIAL COMMON SENSE. INDEED THIS SITUATION MAY WELL  
BE A MICROCOSM OF THE PRESENT POLISH SICKNESS.

THE POLES OWE US NO MONEY AND WE OWE THEM NO OBLIGATIONS. HOWEVER,  
WE REGRET NOT FINDING A SOLUTION TO THEIR PROBLEMS DESPITE CONTINUOUS  
EFFORTS OVER THE YEARS.

ON A HAPPIER NOTE I HAVE TO SAY THAT THE MANAGEMENT OF THE CHEMICAL  
PLANT WHICH DAVY BUILT AT KEDZIERZYN HAVE A TOTALLY DIFFERENT  
ATTITUDE, RUN AN EXTREMELY EFFICIENT OPERATION AND ARE LOOKING FOR  
FURTHER ASSISTANCE FROM US IN EXPANDING THEIR PRODUCTION.

I UNDERSTAND ALSO THAT COSTAIN HAVE SIMILAR EXPERIENCE WITH PLANTS  
IN OTHER PARTS OF POLAND. PERHAPS THIS IS A NEW FACE OF POLAND OF  
WHICH PERHAPS WE SHALL SEE MORE IN THE FUTURE.

WITH SINCERE GOOD WISHES, YOURS EVER, GEORGE.

LETTER ENDS, I HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED.



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

2 November 1988

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 26 October. Unless something has gone wrong with our filing system here - and I do not deny the possibility - it would seem the letter was delayed in transmission. And I have therefore taken the precaution of sending a copy of your letter by telegram to Charles Powell who is with the Prime Minister en route to Poland.

P. A. BEARPARK

The Rt. Hon. Earl Jellicoe, K.B.E., D.S.O.,  
M.C.

A handwritten signature in the bottom right corner of the page.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Mr Charles Powell  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
London  
SW1

2 November 1988

*Dear Charles,*

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND: MUSICIANS  
AND WRITERS

You asked for the names of well-known  
Polish writers and musicians to whom the  
Prime Minister could refer during her  
television interview. I attach a brief  
list.

*Yours etc*

*Christopher*

C Hulse  
Eastern European  
Department

POLISH MUSICIANS AND WRITERS

Musicians:

Chopin, Paderewski, Rubenstein (mentioned in speech).

Contemporary composers

and conductors:

Penderecki (PENDERETSKY)

Lutoslawski (LOOTOSWAVSKY)

The works of both are performed in the UK and are available on records.

Jazz: Important Polish contribution to both modern and traditional jazz, well known in the West.

Folk dance: Well known Mazowsze (MAZOVSH) group.

Literature

Writers: Joseph Conrad, lived in Britain, famous sea-faring novels, wrote in both Polish and English (mentioned in speech).

Czeslaw Milosz (CHESWAV MIWOSH), a Nobel Prize winner; lives in the US, poet and perceptive essayist on Polish intellectual life (mentioned in speech).

Zbigniew Herbert (Z-BIGNIEV), lyrical poet, translated and published in UK; a "soft" opposition figure.

Ryszard Kapuscinski (RYSHART KAP-OOSH-CHINSKY), well known writer, living in Poland, whose novel "Caesar" was translated and adapted into a successful play in the West, known in English as "The Emperor" (taken to Warsaw by the British Council in 1987).

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FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TO AIRBORNE 001 FLASH

BT

UNCLAS

FOLLOWING FROM BEARPARK NO 10

FOR CHARLES POWELL, AIRBORNE

DETAILS OF POLISH AIR CRASH STILL SKETCHY. PLANE IS SAID TO BE TYPE ANTONOV 24 (RUSSIAN BUILT) BELONGING TO LOT AIRWAYS. IT CAME DOWN AT RZESZOW SOME 140 MILES SOUTH SOUTH EAST OF WARSAW AND 80 ODD MILES EAST OF KRAKOW. SIXTEEN PEOPLE ARE THOUGHT TO BE DEAD OUT OF A TOTAL OF 29, BUT NONE OF THESE FIGURES FINALLY CONFIRMED. PLANE WAS ON INTERNAL FLIGHT FROM WARSAW.

GRS 0080

NNNN



Mr Powell

FROM: N J Thorpe  
DATE: 2 November 1988

Ambassador

## PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: MEETING WITH WALESA

1. I went to see Professor Geremek, Walesa's close advisor who lives in Warsaw, this morning. As agreed, I told him that, in the worst case, if the authorities refuse to permit the Prime Minister to meet Walesa in Gdansk because of a strike or other sensitive development in the Lenin shipyard, we would propose to the Prime Minister that she should invite Walesa and some of his colleagues to Warsaw for a meeting here. The timing would be tight, but given even a few hours notice it would be possible to arrange this.

2. Geremek said that a decision on whether or not to hold a strike in the shipyard would be taken today. There was the possibility of sympathy action in Katowice, in the coalmines, as well. He did not know how this would go. He fully recognised that a strike in the shipyard would make it impossible for the Prime Minister to lay flowers at the shipyard Workers Memorial. There remained the possibility of still meeting Walesa at Saint Brygida's church. But that would be a centre for advisors, press and others concerned with the strike and was likely to be ringed by police. In such circumstances he thought Walesa would probably agree to come to Warsaw. But only on condition that the Prime Minister did not go to Gdansk anyway, and carry out the wreath laying at Westerplatte. I said I thought it out of the question that she would go to Gdansk if she could not see Walesa there.

3. The situation should be clearer later today, possibly before the Prime Minister arrives. In the event of a strike in the Lenin shipyard I recommend that you put the following course of action to the Prime Minister:

- (i) leave it to the authorities to make the first move.
- (ii) if the authorities indeed say that the private part of the programme in Gdansk must be modified or scrapped because of a strike, argue for the retention of the meeting at Saint Brygida's.

/(iii)





- (iii) if that fails, argue for a meeting with Walesa in Gdansk but well away from the shipyard. The ideal place would be the residence of the Bishop of Gdansk, Bishop Gocłowski, which is in the north of Gdansk about ten minutes drive from the Hevelius Hotel.
- (iv) make clear that if the Prime Minister cannot meet Walesa in Gdansk, then the whole programme there would fall away.

I think the strongest proposal to advance may well be a meeting at Bishop Gocłowski's residence. The symbolism of having visited Gdansk would be retained; and we know from earlier contacts with Walesa and Geremek that a meeting there would be very acceptable to them.

N Thorpe

N J Thorpe

Some important contingency planning. I endorse these recommendations, recognizing however that circumstances may make it necessary to alter them. We must, I think, do all possible to retain the meeting with Walesa.

J. J. [unclear]

FROM: H of C  
DATE: 2 November 1988

Mr Powell

This weakens the case  
for an 'unscripted' address  
to the speaker.

cc: Mr Mathewson  
Mr Saville

Ambassador

LENIN SHIPYARD: NO STRIKE SITUATION

1. According to both the BBC office and Reuters in Warsaw, the situation in the Lenin shipyard is as follows.
2. Walesa went to the shipyard at 0730 hrs this morning. He went straight to the office of the official (OPZZ) trade union, where he offered to cooperate in the struggle to save the yard. He then went to see the Director, Towinski. Subsequently, a rally of employees took place which Szablewski, Solidarity Committee Chairman in the yard, described as the biggest rally since 1980 involving between 8,000 and 10,000 people. The rally adopted a resolution drafted by Solidarity and agreed by the official unions. It says that the decision to liquidate the yard is political, not justified on economic grounds. The Director supports this view. The official unions will defend the yard. There is apparently a plan to save the shipyard.
3. Afterwards, the workforce returned to work. Walesa said that Solidarity did not want strikes - the nation must fight for the Lenin shipyard, not the shipyard workers themselves. He added that they had all managed to sing in one chorus, and would fight together. Many enterprises throughout Poland were anxious to fight for the yard. Nobody could let the authorities take away the birth place of Solidarity. Solidarity would do everything to avoid strikes. They wanted reform, but reforms which had been discussed and not imposed.
4. It is worth recording a statement made by Jaruzelski to the British media today in which he said that he hoped Mrs Thatcher would not interfere in Poland's internal affairs, but would allow Poland to take its own decisions in the sovereign manner.

N Thorpe

N J Thorpe

**MIUSZ KORWIN-MIKKE**

Dom: 10-40-01 }  
Home: 10-10-91 } wew. 108  
79-30-01 } ext.

05-420 Józefów, ul. Wiślana 2  
Biuro: 41-08-77 ul. Stęplńska 6/8 m 42  
Office: 00-739 Warszawa

Her Excellence  
Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister of the HBM's Governement  
b/c

Madam,

I am very content to welcome You to the Polish soil!

Your presence here is the source of deep satisfaction of all the Conservatives & National Liberals (in Polish we say: "konserwatywny liberał" - but in the modern English it is a contradiction) for ten years fighting for the return of Normality. For ten long years we were maintaining both in the official and in the underground press (there are now more than twenty underground pro-free-market publishing Houses in Poland!) that "what is necessary - is possible". Now the fruit is already ripe.

We are cordially hated by the vast majority of the <SOLIDARITY> Opposition - because we are unmasking their socialist sympathies. We are also hated by the Administration - as we are the most principal foes of the bureaucratic way of ruling. The Governement - I suppose - privately likes us, but it feels obliged to suppress us somehow because it is still pretending that it is building the Socialism - and we are demolishing this myth.

We are not the favourites of the Western officials, who are usually statist - nor of the Western journalist. They like turmoils, strikes and sensations - not the simple, uninteresting truths; and they are usually welfarestatists in their hearts. No ~~ann~~ouncement condemning strikes by the independent groups will be published by the "Radio Free Europe" or even BBC.

But we have the most precious support of the Silent Majority, who is now disillusioned about the <SOLIDARITY> and afraid of its leftist inclinations - but does not trust the Authorities, because they never denounced the Socialism. We also have the <sup>n</sup>wid of History in our sails. And thus, with the God's help - we won, I think!

No Member of the Movement for the Realpolitik (founded formally on Nov. 14th '87) was invited by the HBM's Embassy. I think almost everybody You will meet in Poland is more or less Socialist. But there are noble exceptions. Dr. Mirosław Dzielski and Dr. Gabriel Janowski, though they are not the Members of the RPR and perhaps will be somewhat politically restrained - will be able to give You a good view of the Polish political situation, which is very complicated.

I wish You a fruitful sojourn in Poland

Let the Capitalism Flourish in our Countries!

Very Truly Yours,

Warsaw, Nov. 2nd, 88



**SOLIDARNOŚĆ**

Translation file

Your Excellency Mrs. Prime Minister!

We, the workers of the shipbuilding industry, are proud and happy to welcome you, Mrs. Thatcher, to Gdańsk. We are particularly grateful to you for your coming to Gdańsk, which is the cradle of the "Solidarity" independent trade union.

We thank you cordially for your talks with our Chairman Mr. Lech Wałęsa and other Solidarity members, since you expressed in this way your support to all people ill-treated and persecuted by the communist regime in Poland.


Your visit may be conducive to the final legalization for our "Solidarity" trade union by the Polish government. Any government should serve its people and must not force its hand in case when this is at odds with absolute majority of the citizens. All Polish people long for freedom which they were stripped off by signing the Yalta Agreement.

We require cancellation of the Yalta Agreement where our fate was decided without us and, to make things worse, the Agreement was concluded with Stalin - one of the greatest tyrants in the history of mankind - who has been condemned even by his own people.

We do hope that you will undertake some measures to finally compensate for the wrong which has been done to our nation. We wish you Mrs. Prime Minister from the bottom of our hearts further success in governing your Great Nation and in your aspiration for development of alliance between nations.

Gdańsk Shipyard  
Independent Trade Union  
"Solidarity"

File on our  
stand file  
(see over)



PRIME MINISTER

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Notes on the assistance given to redundant mineworkers, steelworkers, and shipbuilders in the UK are attached. There is also a supplementary note on the assistance given by the Department of Employment.

Bull points are as follows:

- lump sums of up to £35,000;
- specific re-training to meet local needs;
- provision of loans to start up new businesses;
- make up pay to compensate people taking lower paid employment;
- unemployment benefit of up to £52.75 per week.

The official exchange rate for the Polish Zloti is 2434 = £1, but I am told that the black market rate runs into thousands. I suspect that most Polish workers have some idea of what sterling is worth, and if anything may have an exaggerated view of its value because of black market transactions within Poland. But UK costs you may want to bear in mind for use in examples are colour TVs at £200, good suits at £100, and a choice of new cars available immediately at £4,000 to £5,000. The first example may be the most telling as I understand that a colour TV in Poland, when it is available, costs the equivalent of eleven months' average wages. This compares with one month's unemployment benefit in the UK.

---

PAB

P. A. BEARPARK

1 November 1988

UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT

- Basic entitlement: £32.75p per week, plus £20.20p additional payment for an adult dependent. *payable for 1 year*
- Could also be entitled to Income Support, but this would depend on personal circumstances (As mining and shipbuilding industries' redundancy schemes provide quite substantial compensation, this is unlikely).
- Redundancy payments received would not affect entitlement to UB payable.
- "Payment in lieu of notice" would affect entitlement to UB: UB would either be disallowed by the independent adjudicating officer for the period during which "payment in lieu of notice" was being received, or if UB had already been paid he would review the claim and benefit already awarded and decide whether any of the UB should be repaid.

## EMPLOYMENT SERVICE - COUNSELLING ETC

1. Pre-redundancy Counselling and skills assessment are assumed to be the responsibility of the employer/employer's personnel division, unless the employer does not have the facilities. If not ES can provide.
  
2. Employment Service (ES) offers
  - an Information Centre, staffed by ES personnel and containing a library of employment and training information;
  
  - on-site vacancy displays;
  
  - an employer-run Jobclub: the ES provides relevant manuals and hand-outs, and trains one or more of the employer's staff to become Jobclub leader. The employer would provide space and facilities ie a room, telephones, paper, typewriters etc. It would not be classified as an official Jobclub and would not attract additional government finance;
  
  - counselling and presentations by claimant advisers on UB entitlement and the local labour market;
  
  - arrangements for on-site presentations by the Small Firms Service to talk about self-employment, EAS, franchising etc.

(All these measures are "tailored" by ES regions to meet local needs).



the department for Enterprise

## REDUNDANCIES IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY

During much of the 1980s, there has been a considerable reduction in the levels of employment in the steel industry. British Steel, for example, employed 166,000 employees in March 1980 compared to 52,000 in March 1988, though a small number of these were transferred to the private sector.

2. The redundancies were ameliorated to some extent by the ISERBS Scheme for redundant steelworkers and the creation of British Steel (Industry) Limited, a subsidiary of British Steel which aimed to bring employment to former steel areas.

### Iron and Steel Employees Re-adaptation Benefits Scheme (ISERBS)

3. ISERBS is a statutory scheme jointly financed by DTI and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Under this, benefits are paid to steelworkers who lose their jobs as a result of permanent capacity reductions in the iron and steel industry.

4. Depending on their age and circumstances, former steelworkers may be eligible for a variety of benefits. In summary these are:

- (a) a weekly payment during up to 52 week unemployment (104 weeks for those over 55 years old);
- (b) the option of taking a lump sum paid into a pension scheme (for the over 55s);
- (c) weekly benefit while undergoing up to 52 weeks of approved training;
- (d) "make-up" pay, to compensate workers who take up lower paid employment.

5. Since the Scheme's inception in 1974, over 107,000 former steelworkers have registered for ISERBS benefits. The ECSC contributes approximately 40% of benefits paid and to date the Government has received about £163 million from the ECSC towards this. Of this, approximately 76% was in respect of former BSC employees and 24% former private sector employees.

### British Steel (Industry) Limited

6. BS(I) is a wholly owned subsidiary of British Steel with the task of creating new employment in areas of the UK affected by steel closures. Established in its present form in 1978, BS(I) operates in 19 Opportunity Areas and has been involved in the creation of 65,000 jobs. Although funded in its early years by

GRRABH



**dti**

the department for Enterprise

BSC, the Company has since 1983/84 been entirely self-supporting and has been able to finance its operations from interest on loans made to businesses and from rents received from its 9 managed workshop complexes.

7. BS(I) is regarded as having been very successful and its example has been followed by the setting up of British Coal (Enterprise) Limited and British Shipbuilders (Enterprise) Limited, though the latter is now defunct. BS(I) is expected to continue in its present form after British Steel is privatised later this year.

IMM

GRRABH

CONFIDENTIAL

TO :

- 1. Dr Pelling, EM6/A *MP*
- 2. Mr Hardbattle, PB

- cc PS/SoS
- PS/CDL
- PS/Mr Atkins
- Mr Williams
- Mr Benjamin, EM
- Mr Coates, EM6

FROM :

M L Seilek  
 EM6/A  
 Room 269  
 Ashdown House  
 215 6714

1 November 1988

BRITISH SHIPBUILDERS : BRIEFING FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

As requested, I attach a background note for the Prime Minister covering help for redundant shipbuilding employees and assistance to shipbuilding closure areas.

The final para of the note refers to the setting up of possible new enterprise agency in the event of closure of North East Shipbuilders Ltd at Sunderland, on the assumption that a statement will be made on this on Thursday 3 November. If it is not, no public reference can be made to any such agency.



M L SELLEK



CONFIDENTIAL

HELP FOR SHIPBUILDING CLOSURE AREAS

a) Redundancy Payments

Within British Shipbuilders, the personal effect of the large number of redundancies made since nationalisation (a total of 48,000 job losses) has been cushioned by enhanced redundancy payments over and above the statutory provision. Up to 1986, this was in the form of direct payments from Government under the Shipbuilding Redundancy Payments Scheme. This provided a lump-sum payment on redundancy and additional weekly income support for up to two years thereafter. The cost to HMG was a little over £200 million. Since 1986, BS have been operating their own redundancy scheme (indirectly funded by Government). This provides an enhanced lump-sum payment on redundancy, based on the individual's length of service. This scheme provides an average redundancy payment of some £11,000 per employee at current rates, against a statutory entitlement of around £2,000 per person.

Rape?

b) Remedial Help for Shipbuilding Closure Areas

Shipbuilding areas have benefited for a number of years under various EC schemes. Assistance under these was directed primarily at infrastructure programmes in the areas concerned and the building of small factory units (under the European Regional development Fund). A new EC programme - RENAVAL - is about to come into being which will offer similar help in specified shipbuilding closure areas, but offering additionally more focused help for small firms and retraining of redundant shipbuilding workers.

In conjunction with the earlier EC programmes, and prompted by BS's 1986 restructuring programme (loss of 3,500 jobs), the Government set up a new body to assist in a more specific form the redundant shipbuilding workers. This was British Shipbuilders Enterprise Ltd. Its primary role was in the counselling and retraining of the people concerned, but it also had some 'enterprise' function in advising on and assisting small business development in the areas concerned. By the end of its life in December 1987, over half the people BSEL had assisted were in new employment. The cost was £6m.

[In the event of closure of North East Shipbuilders Ltd at Sunderland (possible statement on 3 November), a new enterprise company is envisaged. As with the original BSEL this would provide a training and counselling service, but would additionally offer a much wider 'enterprise' function (including the provision of new factories).]



## PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND

### TREATMENT OF REDUNDANT MINeworkERS IN THE UK

1. All redundancies from British Coal have been voluntary. When a pit has closed the men affected have always been offered alternative jobs within the industry.
2. Redundancy terms are exceptionally generous, providing up to about £35,000 including statutory lump sum and cash in lieu of concessionary fuel, depending on age and length of service.
3. British Coal's Job And Career Change Scheme (JACCS) provides training and counselling for former British Coal employees with the aim of helping them back into employment. 'Job shops' have been set up to match individuals' skills to local job vacancies. Where there are local skill shortages, specific retraining is provided to meet these needs.
4. British Coal Enterprise helps to create new employment in mining areas by assisting companies wishing either to move to coalfields or to start new businesses there. This is achieved by providing loans which would not be available from other lenders, and by managing workshops in which fledgling businesses can develop.

JP03

1. 11. 68

POLAND

PM 105 p<sup>v</sup> 2



10 DOWNING STREET

BRITISH SHIPBUILDERS

EMPLOYMENT

35000  
prisoners

1. WHEN NATIONALISED IN  
JULY 1977

- Total BS = 87,300

- NESL = 7,520

2. NOW

- Total BS = 4,103

- NESL = 2,023

(of whom 1/2  
are currently  
laid off)

RESTRICTED

076664  
MDHIAN 9774

RESTRICTED  
FM WARSAW  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 647  
OF 011040Z NOVEMBER 88

1977 - 87,000  
1988 - 4,000

MY TELNO 642: LENIN SHIPYARD, GDANSK

SUMMARY

1. BRIEF ECONOMIC PROFILE OF LENIN SHIPYARD, BASED ON OFFICIAL FIGURES AVAILABLE, SHOWS SHIPYARD IN VERY WEAK ECONOMIC POSITION. BUT COMPARISONS SUGGEST IT IS NOT A CLEAR WORST-OFFENDER. IMPLIES DECISION TO SINGLE OUT LENIN SHIPYARD POLITICALLY NOT ECONOMICALLY MOTIVATED.

DETAIL

2. LENIN SHIPYARD IN GDANSK IS ONE OF POLAND'S THREE LARGEST SHIPYARDS, ALONG WITH THE WARSKI SHIPYARD IN SZCZECIN AND KOMUNA PARYSKA SHIPYARD IN GDYNIA. FOLLOWING PROFILE IS BASED ON AVAILABLE OFFICIAL FIGURES:

EMPLOYMENT: 11,000 WORKERS  
(WARSKI 8,000  
KOMUNA PARYSKA 7,800)

GROSS TONNAGE PRODUCTION 1987: 71,000  
(WARSKI 88,000  
KOMUNA PARYSKA 174,000)

TOTAL VALUE OF FIXED ASSETS 1988:  
68.3 BILLION ZLOTYS

CURRENT DEBT TO SUPPLIERS: AROUND 9 BILLION ZLOTYS, WITH  
AROUND 28 BILLION ZLOTYS BANK CREDITS

LEVEL OF SUBSIDIES 1987:  
5.6 BILLION ZLOTYS  
(KOMUNA PARYSKA 11.6 BILLION ZLOTYS)

LEVEL OF LOSSES 1987: 1.7 BILLION ZLOTYS  
(KOMUNA PARYSKA 8.9 BILLION ZLOTYS)

PAGE 1  
RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

076664  
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SALES YIELD PER ZLOTY INVESTED 1987:

1.01 ZLOTY

(WARSKI 1.57 ZLOTY

KOMUNA PARYSKA 0.97 ZLOTY

HUTA KATOWICE STEELWORKS 0.64 ZLOTY)

PRODUCTION 1987: 9 SHIPS (OF WHICH 6 EXPORTED - 4 TO SOVIET UNION)

(WARSKI 12 SHIPS - 9 OF WHICH TO SOVIET UNION)

(KOMUNA PARYSKA 9)

PRODUCTION TARGET 1988: 11 SHIPS

ORDER BOOK INCLUDES 29,000 TON BULK CARRIER, 11,500 TON R-O-R VESSEL, 2 COLD STORAGE VESSELS AND A NUMBER OF FISHING AND TIMBER VESSELS.

3. THE WHOLE POLISH SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY IS IN A VERY BAD STATE. PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO THE LENIN SHIPYARD ARE A SHORTAGE OF SKILLED LABOUR (LABOUR FROM THE FAR EAST HAS BEEN USED) AND OVER-INVESTMENT IN FIXED ASSETS (IN 1987 FIXED ASSETS WERE BETWEEN 55 - 60% UNDER-USED) AND AN EXCEPTIONALLY LONG SHIPBUILDING CYCLE. SINCE THE STRIKES AT THE SHIPYARD IN MAY THERE HAS BEEN INCREASED PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE SHIPYARD'S ECONOMIC FUTURE, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITIES OF SPLITTING IT UP, RESTRUCTURING PRODUCTION OR INCORPORATING IT INTO OTHER ENTERPRISES. THE SHIPYARD WAS PROBABLY ALREADY ON THE LIST OF 300 LEAST PROFITABLE ENTERPRISES WHICH THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY PROMISED TO SUBJECT TO SCRUTINY. AN INDUSTRY COMMISSION ESTABLISHED IN JUNE TO REVIEW THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY ASSESSED THE LENIN AND KOMUNA PARYSKA SHIPYARDS AS THE LEAST EFFICIENT AND CONSIDERED THE LENIN SHIPYARD TO BE IN A SLIGHTLY WORSE POSITION BECAUSE ITS FIXED ASSETS WERE OLDER. THE SHIPYARD UNDERTOOK A PROGRAMME OF RESTRUCTURING ON THE BASIS OF THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS, AIMED AT REDUCING THE LEVEL OF FIXED ASSETS.

COMMENT

4. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OTHER RELIABLE INFORMATION WE MUST USE THE OFFICIAL FIGURES AS THE BASIS FOR OUR JUDGEMENTS. ACCORDING TO THESE, THE LENIN SHIPYARD IS UNDOUBTEDLY IN A VERY WEAK ECONOMIC POSITION WITH HIGH SUBSIDIES, LOW SALES YIELD AND A POOR RECORD ON MEETING PRODUCTION TARGETS. BUT MANY OTHER MAJOR ENTERPRISES SUFFER FROM THE SAME PROBLEMS AND IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THE LENIN



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076664  
MDHIAN 9774

SHIPYARD IS THE WORST OFFENDER. CERTAINLY IN THE SHIPBUILDING SECTOR IT SEEMS VERY DOUBTFUL THAT THE LENIN SHIPYARD IS A BETTER TARGET FOR LIQUIDATION THAN THE KOMUNA PARYSKA SHIPYARD IN GDYNIA. ALL THIS LENDS WEIGHT TO THE VIEW THAT THE LENIN SHIPYARD WAS SINGLED OUT FOR POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC REASONS. THERE IS A PARTY AS WELL AS SOLIDARITY DIMENSION: THE LIQUIDATION OF THE LENIN SHIPYARD MAY BE DESIGNED TO DIMINISH PARTY OPPOSITION TO SUBSEQUENT CLOSURE OF OTHER HEAVY INDUSTRY PLANTS, IF, AS THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS, THESE ARE TO FOLLOW.

5. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO JUDGE POPULAR REACTIONS. BUT ONE FACTOR WHICH WILL ENTER INTO THESE IS THAT THE POLISH SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN A MAJOR SUPPLIER TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE AUTHORITIES WILL HAVE TO EXPLAIN WHY THIS HAS BEEN SUCH AN UNPROFITABLE BUSINESS.

BARRETT

YYYY

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
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EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC

MR P J WESTON CAB OFF

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no



TE SECRETARY

*CPR*



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HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE  
LONDON SW1H 9AT

1 November 1988

*Dear Charles,*

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND:  
VISAS

..... I am sorry to add to the briefing for the Prime Minister's visit, but you may like to have with you the attached background note from our Immigration & Nationality Department on the visa position for Poles, which complements that which you have already received from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

I am copying this to Lyn Parker (FCO).

*yours truly  
Nick*

N C SANDERSON

Charles Powell, Esq.

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## VISAS FOR POLAND

### BACKGROUND NOTE

#### The problem

1. The number of visitors from Poland to the UK has been increasing substantially in recent years, by 20% since 1984 to over 46,000 last year. As a result the procedure for considering and granting visas including security and immigration checks has been put under increasing strain. This has resulted in increasingly frequent delays often beyond the period of 14 days which is that established between the UK and Poland as the norm.

#### Current position

2. The Home Office, the Security Service and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office have become increasingly aware of how unsatisfactory the former arrangements were, particularly since they were designed for a much lower level of traffic. Moreover, with the moves towards greater freedom of travel throughout Eastern Europe, it was likely that even greater numbers of East Europeans, including Poles, would be seeking to travel to this country, thereby causing even greater delays.

3. The Home Office, the Security Service and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office have therefore established a working party of officials, which is shortly to report to Ministers with the objective of devising new procedures which provide a quicker service to bona fide Polish visitors while at the same time protecting our security and immigration interests. As far as immigration interests are concerned, we have already introduced new procedures which have, over the last two months, reduced by 90% the number of visa applications which have to be referred to the Immigration Department. The issue of which applications are required to be referred for security purposes remains under discussion.

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4. The issue of the visa service to Eastern Europe has been under consideration by the Select Committee on Trade & Industry which is likely to produce a report urging streamline procedures, especially for businessmen.

5. The Prime Minister might also like to be aware that we have recently introduced new arrangements for dealing with East European visitors at our ports under which procedures previously used on a blanket basis for all East Europeans are being applied more selectively and, we believe, more effectively against particular categories of visitors identified by the Security Service for particular attention. These new procedures represent a more effective use of both Immigration Service and Security Service resources as well as enabling bona fide East European visitors to be dealt with by immigration control much more quickly.

VR7-60



ELIZABETH HOUSE  
YORK ROAD  
LONDON SE1 7PH  
01-934 9000

Charles Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

November 1988

*Dear Charles*

Thank you for your letter of <sup>11ap.</sup> 30 October. I attach for you some briefing on educational issues for the Prime Minister's forthcoming trip to Poland.

*Yours ever,*

*Tom*

T B JEFFERY  
Private Secretary

## EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS WITH POLAND

1. Under the auspices of the Central Bureau for Educational Visits and Exchanges, exchange arrangements embrace teacher and pupil exchanges.

### Teacher Exchanges

2. The best prospect is for developing perhaps ten short (three week) study visits which need not be language-based, and where each teacher might pursue a particular topic within, for example, a European studies context. There would be funding implications arising from teachers' air fares and from the need for supply cover during their absence abroad.

3. Arrangements are in place with Hungary and Bulgaria under which they pay for UK teachers to spend a year teaching, through the medium of English, English language, Physics, Mathematics or Biology. There is currently no such programme with Poland but the existence of specialist English language schools in Poland clearly provides potential for developing one, involving perhaps six teachers in the first instance. Expenses are normally borne by the host Government, though some modest administrative costs would fall to be met within the UK.

4. Each year, some 10-15 teachers from UK attend a UNESCO-sponsored course on Polish culture, history and language. The medium of teaching is English and the UK teachers tend to be international or European studies specialists.

### Pupil Exchange

5. For some years now, UNESCO has sponsored "language camps" in Poland. Currently, three teams of ten teachers and ten sixth form pupils visit Poland in the second half of July to teach English to Polish pupils aged 15-17. The competition from Polish pupils to attend these courses is intense: selection is by ability and is thus mainly from the specialist English language schools. The entire course is conducted in English. The scheme is also over-subscribed amongst sixth formers in UK and would thus be capable of extension, to perhaps 5 or 6 teams of ten

teachers and ten sixth formers. The one caveat is that it is important the sixth formers are properly supervised and monitored by teachers, amongst whom pressure to take part is currently less intense. The UK team pay their own fare, with a £50 subsidy from the Youth Exchange Centre (see also below). Board and lodging in Poland is provided free of charge.

6. It must be acknowledged that pupil exchanges with Poland would be a low priority for almost all schools at present: an equivalent invitation from the Central Bureau in respect of exchanges with Hungary produced a nil response. It might be possible to develop say six pilots involving a careful selection of European studies courses with exchanges, of perhaps 15-20 pupils in each direction, closely related to specific aspects of the curriculum. These might subsequently be capable of extension though the numbers involved would never be large. These pilots would need specific funding through the Central Bureau.

#### Youth Exchange Centre (YEC)

7. In 1987/8 nine reciprocal exchanges were funded under YEC auspices involving some 150 young people in each direction; already in the financial year 1988/9, five exchanges have occurred involving 120 young people in each direction. The final figure is expected to be ten exchanges in 1988/9, involving 240 young people in each direction; with expansion to twenty exchanges, involving some 500 young people in each direction, in 1989/90. The YEC also fund higher education exchanges; 5 in 1987/8 involving some 50 students in each direction; and 5 already in 1988/9, involving a similar number of students. The final 1988/9 figure is expected to be eight exchanges (80 students in each direction) with expansion to twelve exchanges (120 students in each direction) in 1989/90.

8. The British Embassy has agreed to issue free visas to Polish young people taking part in YEC-sponsored exchanges.

International Relations Department

1 November 1988

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH PROFESSOR JACEK FISIAK  
(OBE) MINISTER OF NATIONAL EDUCATION, POLAND, 28 OCTOBER 1988

Professor Fisiak explained that he had been in post for some 14 days. His previous position had been Vice Chancellor of Poznan University. He was retaining his chair of English at that university while serving as Minister of National Education. He told the Secretary of State that he had written a grammar of Middle English (published by OUP); had visited this country 45 times; and had taught at University College, London and at the University of California. He was fluent in well-nigh perfectly accented English. He said that he was highly prejudiced in favour of this country.

Professor Fisiak said that he was determined radically to increase education exchanges between Britain and Poland. One of his first decisions Minister of Education had been to make English language study obligatory for university students of Maths and Physics. While Russian was the only obligatory language in the school system, there were, in each Poland's 49 provinces, schools specialising in English and teaching much of their curriculum through the medium of the English language.

Professor Fisiak said that Polish students in teacher training studying to teach Russian, German and French already visited the USSR, East Germany and France. He hoped that a similar scheme might be established with this country. He also hoped that teacher exchanges - which Mr Payne confirmed were little developed at present - might be instituted. Professor Fisiak also hoped that a substantial school exchange scheme might be put in place. The Speaker of House of Commons had recently visited Poland and had offered to set up an exchange programme with a secondary school in his constituency. Professor Fisiak proposed that a scheme for exchanging 1,000 pupils each way should be developed. English pupils would be accommodated in private Polish homes. The Poles would pay the travel cost of their pupils coming to England. In response, the Secretary of State said that he

would like to give very serious consideration to Professor Fisiak's proposal. He thought that the target of 1,000 pupils moving each way might be a little ambitious but would like to see some exchanges taking place in the summer of 1989. The Polish Ambassador said that his Embassy had a list of English schools with which contact had already been made. The Secretary of State suggested that the list might form a basis for next summer's proposed exchanges. Professor Fisiak strongly implied but did not insist that the exchanges should take place during the summer vacation which, in Poland, starts at the beginning of July.

Professor Fisiak then described the following areas in which he hoped cooperation could be significantly developed:



- i. University Exchanges. Professor Fisiak said that there were already a substantial number of University Exchanges between Poland and Britain, naming, in this country, the Universities of Sussex, Bristol, Strathclyde and UCL. He said that he would like to see the development of joint degrees between British and Polish Universities, with joint appointments of staff. On his present visit, he had been to Cranfield and arranged for 10 biotechnologists to go to Poland.
- ii. The Polish Language. Professor Fisiak said that there were only two lectures in Polish in the UK. He would like to see that figure increase to 5. The Poles were happy to contribute to the costs.
- iii. Handicapped Children. Professor Fisiak said that he would be happy to invite 50 teachers of Handicapped Children to visit Poland.
- iv. History and Geography Textbooks. Professor Fisiak said that there had been a meeting in 1984 to discuss the content of History and Geography Textbooks and that there would be another such meeting in 1989. He would like to see more teaching about England in Poland and more teaching about Poland in this country. He hoped that cooperation in the production of textbooks could be encouraged.
- v. Computers in Schools. Professor Fisiak said that the introduction of computers into schools was one of his highest priorities. He took pride in having introduced information technology into Poznan University. He said that the Poles had already bought a large number of IBM machines. They had been able to do so with Polish currency. They were now building their own secondary school computers. In response, the Secretary of State urged Professor Fisiak to make contact with experts in this country, particularly Acorn.

## THE BRITISH COUNCIL IN POLAND

NOTE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: NOVEMBER 1988

### 1. AIMS

To meet the high demand in Poland for contact with Britain and British ideas, in particular

- to improve the teaching of English at secondary and university level;
- to provide access to British books and periodicals;
- to promote collaboration in science, technology and medicine, particularly through establishing links between research teams;
- to provide examples of the best in British performing and visual arts.

### 2. BACKGROUND

The Council has worked in Poland since 1938 and so celebrates its 50th anniversary this year. The formal framework for its operation is provided by the Anglo-Polish Cultural Convention signed in 1978. It allows greater flexibility than similar agreements with other East European countries; in Poland the Council is not restricted by the fixed, rigid pattern of quotas of exchanges typical of work elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. The office in Warsaw, known locally as the British Institute, is the Council's biggest in East Europe: it has recently been refurbished and extended to enlarge the library and to incorporate a purpose-built cinema and exhibition area. Poland is the only Soviet bloc country where Council staff are non-diplomatic and are allowed to operate independently of the Embassy. The budget for 1988/89 is £1,640,000, almost all from government grant. (This includes the cost of HQ services.)

### 3. PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES

- English Studies Support. This programme accounts for 45% of the Representation's activity and works through the Polish education system to improve the quality and effectiveness of the teaching of English language and literature. In five university towns, the Council has set up English Language Centres or "studia", at Polish request, for teaching English to Polish academic staff who need the language for research and conference purposes. The studium model has been pioneered in Poland and the Council is now looking to extend it to other parts of East Europe. The Council also funds six English lecturers in Polish universities.


- Books and Libraries. The Council's library in Warsaw is open access with a large and heavily-used loan and reference stock. There is extraordinarily high demand for British books and periodicals in Poland. The Council focuses on meeting the needs of academics, professionals, teachers and students and provides access to British data-bases carrying scientific and medical information as well as bibliographies. Outside Warsaw, the Council stocks three British Reading Rooms in key university towns, which are open to all comers: running costs and staffing are met by the universities. A fourth Reading Room opens in November 1988 in Lodz and there is demand for more to open in other provincial towns.

- Interchange. 550 professional visits between Poland and Britain take place every year on a cost-sharing basis. These are mainly in science and technology and English language and range from short-term stays to full postgraduate scholarships and academic links between institutes and research teams. Opportunity to provide management training for Polish industry and commerce has recently arisen. This has important implications for British exports; the Council will be giving high priority to developing work in this sector. As a first step, the Council, with the FCO and the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade, is setting up a seminar on export marketing with British experts and Polish exporters.

- Arts. Few countries are more receptive than Poland to arts events. If suitably selected they offer a window on to an open society. They are used to demonstrate British excellence to a wide audience and develop contacts between artists and teachers. In addition to public performances, British companies and artists often undertake workshops and masterclasses for Polish students: these have attracted large numbers in Warsaw and outside the capital. The English Stage Company's recent productions of 'The Recruiting Officer' and 'Our Country's Good' will be presented at the Warsaw International Theatre Meeting in November. Also in November a British film week, of contemporary films, will be held in Warsaw.

#### 4. STAFF

Representative - Richard Alford, OBE.  
4 other London staff and 34 local staff.



R1111  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 November 1988  
R. Smith

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 26 October, covering a further letter from Sir Bernard Braine MP about Mr Brian Wrobel's proposal for a British-Polish seminar on human rights.

Sir Bernard deals with the possible pitfalls outlined in the Prime Minister's letter to him of 4 October. On the first of these, he is probably right to say that the Polish authorities would be less likely to refuse passports if the Prime Minister endorsed the seminar, especially following the granting of a passport to Dr Onyskiewicz (about whose case we had protested to the authorities following representations from Sir Bernard). There are of course other possible problems. The Polish authorities will know of Mr Wrobel from his ill-fated attempt to organise a human rights seminar in Warsaw in November 1987 through official Polish channels. On that occasion the Poles involved refused to discuss the subject although it had been the stated objective of the meeting. This failure is one reason why Mr Wrobel has sought Parliamentary - and the Prime Minister's - support this time.

The Polish authorities may now be less inclined to object to a seminar on this subject following the successful conference on human rights organised by Solidarity in Krakow in August (which James Moorhouse MEP attended and reported to the Prime Minister in his letter of 19 September).

Overall this idea seems to be taking satisfactory shape, and the Prime Minister may feel it justifies her support in principle and is worth mentioning to the Poles during her visit. If so, she might say that she understands that the Parliamentary Human Rights Group in Britain are planning a British-Polish seminar on human rights in Oxford next April as the first step to establishing a regular non-governmental dialogue on the subject. They hope to invite about six Poles. The Prime Minister might say that, although this would be a completely non-governmental project, she considers it worthwhile



and hopes that the Polish authorities will also give it their support. She might add that she was impressed by the open debate at the human rights conference in Krakow, and that she would like to think that bilateral contacts on human rights could continue in that vein. She would certainly hope that the authorities would put no difficulties in the way of the British proposal.

/ I attach a draft reply to Sir Bernard.


*Yours ever,*

*L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/No 10 Downing Street

# SOLIDARITY WITH



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Tel. (0562) 823911.

SwS American Office: COMMITTEE IN SUPPORT OF  
SOLIDARNOŚĆ,  
5502 FLEET AVE., CLEVELAND,  
OHIO 44105; USA;  
Tel. (216) 662 0932.

SwS West Berlin Office: KAZIMIERZ MICHALCZYK,  
PALLASSTR. 6A, 1000 BERLIN 30;  
Tel. (30) 215 6282.

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street, London SW1

1 November 1988

*Dear Prime Minister,*

Enclosed please find a letter addressed to you by leaders of democratic opposition in Poland. The letter was telephoned through to our office in London with a request that we translate it and deliver it to you.

I hope that it will assist you in judging the situation in Poland during your visit in that country and I enclose our best wishes for your visit.

*Yours sincerely*

Tadeusz Jarski  
Chairman.

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP  
Prime Minister HM Government  
10 Downing Street, London SW1

Dear Prime Minister,

We wish to inform you that in May 1987 a Conference of an Independence-Seeking Parties and Organisations (PPION) was formed in Warsaw. We represent that part of the political opposition in Poland which puts as its objective the regaining of independence by Poland and the restoration to Poles of such citizens' rights as are those which are an everyday matter in the country, the Government of which you lead. We wish to make decisions on matters concerning our lives, elect our representatives to our parliament and influence the actions of our government towards cooperation between free and sovereign nations of Europe.

**Democratisation** and a dosing of freedoms, which the communists can always revoke does not suffice for Poland. Poland needs **democracy**, and free elections, in which all parties and political groupings will have equal rights in canvassing for the votes of the electorate, and the electors will have a free choice of programmes and candidates. A democratic parliament would sanction the formation of the government, would determine the political system in the country and the principles of both domestic and foreign policies.

These aspirations are not only an internal affair of Poland. They are also important for the future of all Europe which paid for its 44 years of peace with the enslavement of nations living East of the Elbe river. There is a threat that the tension growing in that part of Europe will change into an open regional conflict. It is therefore in the interest of the West that changes occur in Central Europe, which will fulfil the independence aspirations of nations subjugated by communism. An independent Poland, governed by a democratically formed government would be a stabilising factor and a guarantee of security.

We observe meetings of democratic countries leaders and the communist dictators with disquiet. We remember that such meetings between the leaders of Great Britain and the United States with Stalin gave birth to the shameful Yalta Agreement. We cannot rid ourselves of concern now when you, Prime Minister, plan to meet General Jaruzelski, who is responsible for the policy of repression brought about by his Martial Law and who is head of the Party, the rule of which led Poland to poverty and regression, and who again threatens to use force against the people of his country.

We hope that we in our craving for freedom and democracy will find an ally in the person of the Prime Minister of Her Majesty's Government.

We also expect that such economic assistance as may be offered will be directed to the development of private enterprise and not used to reinforce the rule of communist bureaucrats.

We also expect that cooperation will develop between British political parties - and particularly the Conservative Party - and the independent political organisations in Poland.

We wish you, Prime Minister, a fruitful visit in our country and much progress in the process of removing the divisions in Europe.

**Conference of Independence-Seeking Parties and Organisations (PPION):**

Liberal Democrats Organisation "Independence"

"Self-Determination" Organisation

"Freedom, Justice, Independence" Organisation

Polish Independence Party

Political Movement "Liberation"

Union of Democrats

Warsaw, 26 October 1988



CONFIDENTIAL

1 November 1988

*Dear Charles,*

Prime Minister's Visit to Poland: Possible Trouble in Gdansk

We cannot yet judge the likelihood of demonstrations or security problems in Gdansk as a result of the Polish Government's announcement of the decision to close the Lenin Shipyard. But we need to consider what circumstances might require the Prime Minister to consider cancelling her visit to Gdansk, or how we might react if the Polish authorities try to cancel it. Any final decisions will of course have to be made on the spot in the light of the latest information.

Walesa has said Solidarity will "defend" the shipyard and support efforts by the Workers' Council to restore its economic health. He has not called for strikes or demonstrations, but these are quite possible as disgruntled workers return to work after the 1 November holiday. All precedents suggest that such action would be entirely peaceful unless the security police responded with force, though that cannot of course be guaranteed. There is nothing to suggest that for their part Solidarity would wish to do anything to embarrass the Prime Minister - on the contrary.

If serious police violence is used at any stage before or during the Prime Minister's visit to Poland, we assume she will wish to cancel or terminate it. It would clearly be inappropriate for her to hold talks with a regime currently using violence to suppress peaceful expression of workers' grievances. If, against all precedent, the demonstrators themselves turned violent, and it appeared to the Prime Minister's security advisers that it would not be safe for her to visit Gdansk, then I imagine she would want to terminate the visit rather than prolonging her stay in Warsaw.

The main problem arises if the Polish authorities seek to use peaceful demonstrations, which do not threaten the Prime Minister's safety, as grounds to cancel her visit to Gdansk. I imagine the Prime Minister would wish to resist such efforts. Her best form of defence might be attack. We suggest that she tackle the problem in her first meeting with Rakowski. Depending on the current circumstances she might make some or all of the following points:

- She is greatly looking forward to her visit to Gdansk; essential part of programme;

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- Understands there may be strikes/demonstrations;
- Not concerned about this; used to crowds (cf Australia); confident protesters in Gdansk will not be hostile to her personally; her security advisers happy for her to go;
- (if suggested) cannot accept cancellation; would undermine part of purpose of visit; attach importance to Westerplatte as well as to rest of programme in Gdansk;
- Rakowski will understand she cannot continue with visit if police use violence in Gdansk; public opinion in UK would be outraged.

The Poles could come up with a whole range of ploys designed to circumscribe the Prime Minister's programme. They might provoke incidents in Gdansk in order to secure cancellation of the visit. They might close off the centre of the city allegedly for security reasons. They might close off the square outside the Lenin Shipyard, to prevent the Prime Minister laying flowers - in which case she could insist that at least she and the media be allowed through. They could offer to fly Walesa (and possibly other Solidarity lunch-guests) to Warsaw so that the Prime Minister could have her meeting with them without going to Gdansk - a proposal unlikely to be acceptable to Solidarity if Gdansk is otherwise calm, and which the Prime Minister would no doubt wish to reject. We cannot plan for all eventualities, and I suggest the Prime Minister tackle any such problems as they arise in the light of advice from the Ambassador on the spot.

It is clear that some elements in Poland, particularly in the Party and the security forces, do not welcome the Prime Minister's visit and would be happy to see it cancelled or less than successful. In these circumstances some hiccup is quite likely. But we are convinced that the vast majority of Poles - like Solidarity - are delighted that she is going and will do all they can to make her visit a success.

I am copying this letter to Trevor Woolley.

*Yours ever,*

*L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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TELNO 646  
OF 010915Z NOVEMBER 88

*Not the right message  
- but we will do a*

*In my country  
we have clear  
ways of expressing  
political freedom - through  
debates in Parliament where  
the Government and*

MY TELNDS 642 AND MY TELNO DF 311600Z OCTOBER  
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: CLOSURE OF LENIN SHIPYARD

1. THE ANNOUNCEMENT ON 31 OCTOBER OF THE CLOSURE OF THE SHIPYARD IS CAREFULLY TIMED. IT CATCHES THE POLISH WORKFORCE DISPERSED FOR THE 1 NOVEMBER HOLIDAY. MORE IMPORTANTLY, ITS TIMING IN RELATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT HAS NO DOUBT BEEN CAREFULLY, PROBABLY CYNICALLY, CALCULATED IN ORDER TO:

*Paris  
Opposition  
All Polish  
can be  
checked  
in public  
and different  
views articulated*

- (A) PUT THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE SPOT BY TRYING TO MAKE HER CHOOSE BETWEEN SUPPORTING ECONOMIC RATIONALITY AND SUPPORTING SOLIDARITY:
- (B) TO CUT OFF SOLIDARITY FROM ITS BIRTHPLACE, STILL A SOURCE OF CONSIDERABLE SYMBOLIC AND PRACTICAL STRENGTH TO THE MOVEMENT.

2. I CANNOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE WILL BE A THREAT OR DEMONSTRATION IN GDANSK THAT COULD CALL IN QUESTION AT LEAST THAT PART OF THE VISIT. THIS IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE BECAUSE THE SHIPYARD WORKERS MEMORIAL IS RIGHT OUTSIDE THE LENIN SHIPYARD GATES. IF SO, WE SHALL HAVE TO DEAL WITH THIS IN LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME. MEANWHILE, WE ARE TRYING TO FIND OUT THROUGH OUR CONTACTS WHETHER ANY DEMONSTRATION, SIT-IN ETC IS LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE DURING THE VISIT.

*Government  
has to carry  
majority in  
Parliament for  
its policies  
and economic  
direction.*

3. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CLOSURE OF THE SHIPYARD, A KNOWN BUT BY NO MEANS THE WORST LOSS-MAKER IN POLISH INDUSTRY, IS NO DOUBT ALSO AN ATTEMPT TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND SOLIDARITY. THE POLISH LEADERSHIP MAY MAKE MUCH OF WHAT THEY WILL PORTRAY AS A NECESSARY AND BRAVE ATTEMPT TO COME TO GRIPS WITH ECONOMIC REALITIES.

4. THE MATTER WILL CERTAINLY AFFECT ALSO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH SOLIDARITY AND MAY DIMINATE THE MEDIA EVENTS. IN THIS SITUATION THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO GO FOR THE HIGH GROUND AT AN EARLIER STAGE. THIS COULD BE DONE BY INCLUDING SOMETHING ON THE FOLLOWING LINES AS A LAST MINUTE ADDITION TO HER SPEECH AT JARUZELSKI'S DINNER:

*It is where  
there is no*

BEGINS:

AS YOUR GUEST IT IS NOT FOR ME TO SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THE SPECIFIC DECISION TO CLOSE THE LENIN SHIPYARD IN GDANSK. HOWEVER IT IS

*Political freedom  
that the task is  
of ~~open~~ political  
talk to the  
people. However because*

there is no forum for open debate, then  
only ~~course~~ <sup>method</sup> of political expression is through strikes)

So the economic condition of any enterprise is really  
not economic but political. And everyone  
knows it. Yes every country can, will & does

get economic difficulties - but we can cope with them  
as we have in restructuring the steel industry & dealing with  
our shipbuilding industry - through redundancy pay - some for  
a few thousand pounds to  $0.000/30,000$  per man. And

then payments accompanied by a lot of measures to  
help set up new enterprises, provide new training, help find other  
jobs.

CLEAR TO ME THAT IT IS THE SORT OF DECISION WHICH WILL WORK ONLY IF IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND SUPPORTED BY THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE. THIS IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF THOSE AFFECTED BELIEVE THAT ECONOMIC DECISIONS ARE ACCOMPANIED BY POLITICAL REFORMS WHICH GIVE THEM A FULL OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS AND TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE COUNTRY.

ENDS

BARRETT

YYYY

ADVANCE	7	
PS		1
PS/MRS CHALKER		1
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE		1
HD/EED		1
HD/SOVIET DEPT		1
HD/PROTOCL DEPT		1
HD/NEWS DEPT		1
MAIN	46	
LIMITED		6
EED		6
SOVIET DEPT		5
PROTOCOL DEPT		7
NEWS DEPT		9
PS		7
PS/MRS CHALKER		1
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE		1
PS/PUS		1
PS/SIR J FRETWELL		1
MR RATFORD		2
WAHPAN 1000		

PS/NO 10 DWNG ST.

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# The Democratic Opposition in Poland.

## An appeal for support

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
*By Ryszard Czarnecki*

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### Introduction

I would like to challenge some of the cosy perceptions which have sprung up in response to 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' and to try and make friends and allies for the inevitable battle ahead. Friends and allies joined by a common intellectual link, a common ideological link, but most of all, by common interests not only in survival but in ultimate victory over a common adversary.

The imposition of Martial Law in Poland 1981, the suffocation of the Solidarity movement, brutal suppression of strikes and street demonstrations, arrests and internment of many thousands of people, made a strong impression on the minds of the, then, students and teenage school children. The tanks in the streets, the killings of the Wujek miners, doors to apartments being smashed down with crowbars – all influenced the outlook and behaviour of young Poles.



upon pop music – particularly rock. "Let them enjoy music, not politics" – seems to be the idea. But that is merely a defensive move – young Poles are no longer required to be communists as long as they do not actively oppose the authorities.

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### Independent Polish student unions

The suppression of the freedoms won in the 1980-81 period triggered off the strongest resistance among students. The equivalent of Solidarity among students was the Independent Students' Union (NZZ). This was the first independent organisation in Poland to be formally outlawed after the imposition of Martial Law. Whilst Solidarity, for instance, was at first said to be only "suspended", the Independent Students' Union was forcibly dissolved within the first three weeks of Martial Law.

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### The sacrifices of the young

The widespread resistance movement, determined but nonviolent, which sprang up as the result of Martial Law was primarily based on young people. They were the section of the society most willing to suffer sacrifices and were therefore the section most viciously repressed by the authorities.

It was primarily young people who risked arrests, imprisonment and beatings not to mention expulsion from universities or dismissal from work for their participation in underground printing, distribution of independent publications, courier work, the provision of welfare to the families of prisoners and, of course, the organisation of demonstrations. The communist authorities themselves admit that the present day youth are for them a "lost generation".

Therefore the authorities have made efforts, if not to woo the young generation, which they accept to be an impossible task, at least to neutralise it politically. To this end the mass media featured hitherto frowned

After the dissolution of the NZZ, hitherto relatively weak self-governing student bodies quickly became the bastions of independence on the campuses. They were active until 1985 when new, repressive legislation replaced the relatively liberal act on higher education introduced during the Solidarity era. The new law abolished the self-governing bodies and forced the dismissal of a large number of prominent academics.

Worldwide pressure on the communist authorities resulted in a so-called "amnesty" in 1986 and the NZZ burst out into life once more. The NZZ had survived only at two academic centres, Wroclaw and Krakow, but 1986 and 1987 witnessed its rapid reactivation at other universities. In January 1987 an unprecedented event in Eastern Europe occurred: a clandestine national conference of a students union. A National Executive was elected and a manifesto adopted in which the country's independence from communist subjugation was declared the paramount goal.

Currently the NZS publishes some 40 underground periodicals, runs its own underground radio stations, publishes books in underground publishing houses, organises campaigns in defence of political prisoners in Poland, campaigns for the autonomy of the universities, and undertakes a number of other day-to-day activities which in the West are taken for granted but in Poland have to be conducted underground.

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### Other parts of the Polish opposition

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In addition to the NZS there are a number of other youth movements and organisations opposed to communist rule. Particularly active are organisations for secondary school pupils. In some cities such as Gdansk and Wroclaw almost every school boasts its own underground periodical. Besides these there are self-education study groups whose participants study the uncensored history of Poland and Polish literature.

Another active movement is that of "Wolnosc i Pokoj" (Freedom & Peace), members of which refuse to do their national service in the communist army or to take the military oath which contains assertions of loyalty to the communist system and a pledge of loyalty to the Soviet Army. Surely, an unprecedented declaration of subservience in the contemporary world.

Many members of the movement have been sentenced to long prison terms and many more are constantly harassed by the communist authorities. I am very pleased that just recently the communist parliament in Poland formally removed the pledge of loyalty to the Soviet army from the Polish military oath. Before anyone acclaims this as yet another achievement of 'glasnost' I would like to ascribe it to the determination and courage of the young people of Poland.

Many young people gather around the Catholic Church, which in Poland holds religious, moral, social and political authority. The Church provides a vast spectrum of opportunities for political involvement with considerable beneficial effects on the whole of Polish society.

Much publicity was recently gained by an indescribable body calling itself "The Orange Alternative". This is a group of people given to organising various happenings, particularly in the city of Wroclaw. These happenings are seen by the authorities, with more than little justification, as events ridiculing the communist system and the hardships it imposes on the population. Recently members of the group solemnly distributed sheets of toilet paper to passers-by who, to a man, were painfully aware that this is an extremely scarce commodity in Poland, or for that matter any communist country.

On the communist-invented Women's Day (8 March) they distributed equally scarce sanitary towels and whispered to the beneficiaries that they shouldn't be downhearted because Karl Marx herself was a bearded woman in disguise. The communist police didn't know how to handle this phenomenon especially as one of the happenings was organised to honour and cherish the communist security forces under the slogan

"Everyone can be a secret policeman". The public were invited to stop each other in the street and demand the production of identity documents. When the real secret policemen arrived to deal with the situation, the developments which followed would have exceeded the wildest expectations of Marx himself – Groucho Marx that is.



*Mayday 1988 – A tough plainclothes policeman sprays a Solidarity supporter with a hand held teargas dispenser & beats him with a rubber truncheon outside Warsaw's St. Stanislaw Kosta Church, Warsaw.*

The public take kindly to these antics and when at Christmas members of the Orange Alternative dressed as Father Christmas got arrested for distributing sweets, (another scarcity) to children, large crowds chanted "Free the Santa Clauses!" and laughed at the sheepish looking policemen. Whatever their political significance, the imaginative activities of that organisation bring some colour into the drabness of day-to-day life in communist Poland.

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### Polish Youth

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This does not mean that every young person in Poland is involved in political activity against the regime. As in any other country the youth in Poland can be broadly divided into several categories:

We have our proportion of *drop-outs*. Those who try to escape the reality of life through involvement in exotic subcultures, drugs or alcohol. The difference perhaps is that the reasons for this escapism are often directly political.

We have our proportion of *conformists* who try and make the best of what is a miserable reality by trying to keep in step without too much of a moral compromise.

We have something that you have not. We have *collaborators* who actively join forces with the evil regime and draw benefits from supporting it at the expense of the rest of us.

We have *positivists* who work for changes within the system but do not believe that it can be challenged and replaced.

And we have the *rebels* who do not believe that the system is reformable, who do not believe that it is sustainable, who know that it will fight back but are prepared to challenge it and suffer if necessary in the

process because they are convinced that even greater sacrifices and suffering will have to be endured if the challenge is not mounted or does not succeed.

The Independent Students' Union as an organisation embraces that last body of opinion. We are not hot-headed, trigger happy revolutionaries. Neither are we an army of self-sacrificing kamikaze. The views we represent are those of people who either directly or indirectly, personally or through their families and friends, have experienced more 'perestroikas' and 'glasnosts' and detentes than we care to remember. We have a collective history and a collective memory of hopes raised and dashed, of agreements made and broken, of broken bones, broken heads, broken lives. Please forgive us if we view the recent enthusiasm created by yet another package of communist promises with scepticism.

We were brought up from the cradle reading between the lines, looking for deeds, not words, deliveries, not promises. You read about appeasement, about "Peace in our time" in your history books. We still tend the graves of those who died as the result of that "peace". You, or perhaps not you, but many in the West see communism and the red empire as something exotic and far away. I know that it took me less than two hours to confront what I know of Mr Gorbachov's 'glasnost' and his 'perestroika' with what people here think it is and represents for the future of all of us – both you and us.

### **The glasnost fraud**

You should know that glasnost is not for ever, that its object is to strengthen the communist system, not to weaken it. That its success would mean a more dangerous Soviet Union and not a more cuddly neighbour.

In his truly excellent speech at the Guildhall, President Reagan spoke of his determination to pursue human rights in the Soviet Bloc as part and parcel of disarmament negotiations. He drew much applause for his firmness and his decisiveness. But let us examine in detail the objectives he outlined: freedom of speech, freedom of artistic expression, freedom of travel and freedom of worship. All very important freedoms.

But all of these freedoms can be withdrawn at a stroke when there is no freedom to elect, to monitor, and above all to replace those who have it in their power to grant or withdraw other freedoms from their fellow-citizens.

And that freedom cannot be achieved by the individual nations constituting the Soviet Empire without the most fundamental freedom of all – a nation's right to self-determination.

What is currently seen as 'ethnic unrest' in the Soviet Union, what is interpreted as 'nationalism' in

Poland, in Hungary and Czechoslovakia is the popular demand for each nation's right to choose its own political system, its own leadership, its own economic priorities, and its own cultural development. To choose at will its friends, its allies and for that matter its enemies.

When so many people in the West falsely hope that the communist menace is a menace no more we must examine the real reasons for the developments in the Soviet Union.

There is no change of ideology nor of the long-term objectives of the Soviet regime. Mr Gorbachov's speeches do not contain any such offers. In fact the Soviet system is in what the communists hope are temporary economic and thus military difficulties. It cannot sustain the arms race at the present level, and so it hopes to obtain a breathing space by a combination of a reduction in the West's defence efforts and a healthy injection of Western finance and technology into the ailing Soviet economy. In exchange, it offers intangible returns which can be withdrawn much more rapidly than most in the West imagine.

### **No peace without democracy**

We believe that the only long term assurance for peaceful coexistence between East and West is the rapid construction of durable institutions of public control in the communist countries. This must be done now, while the systems are weak enough to accept such demands. And this is where your interests and ours coincide, because we young Poles don't wish to be turned into cannon fodder to fight or intimidate you for the sake of the very system and the very ideology which we find alien, hostile and inhuman.


And we believe you owe it to yourselves to help us at this stage when real change is just about possible. It was too early yesterday, it may be too late tomorrow, but today we have a chance – both you and us.

Are you bold enough to take it?

The involvement of Polish youth in the campaign for the democratisation of life in Poland and ultimately for national independence takes many forms. We act with the profound conviction that one day our country will be free and will form a part of a united Europe. A Europe without wars and without the terrorism fuelled by totalitarian systems.

Polish youth are no longer influenced by socialist ideas. A great political awakening of Polish society has taken place. People have sought out the appropriate blueprints in Polish history – but also contemporary Western ideologies.

The imposition of Martial Law in Poland in 1981 brought with it the ideological and political death of the Left in Poland. Every kind of Left. That in power and that in the illegal opposition. Society, forcibly fed for 40



*Warsaw Airport – Gorbachev reviews guard of honour with General Jaruzelski at beginning of his official visit in July 1988.*

years and more with leftist phrases and slogans, turned about and went its own way.

Backs were turned on both the official practice and the leftist opposition utopia. The beginning of Martial Law heralded an enormous renaissance of the Right in Polish political life. It is particularly noticeable among young people, and in academic circles, but also among the country's intellectual elite. Western classics were rediscovered: Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Michael Novak, Guy Sorman.

No-one except the party propagandists expresses any faith in the effectiveness of Gorbachev's new deal. What is needed is real democratisation, real reforms, real change. But these must not rely only on switching management teams – we need to change the system itself.

The party hacks who live off it are the last people to want to see that happen.

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### The role of the West

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It is for the West, for its political leaders, particularly those of Britain and USA, to take an active role to achieve change in the Eastern bloc. In their own interest. In the interest of stability and for the sake of the mutual benefits of increased commerce and cultural intercourse. Last, but not least, for the sake of being able to build hospitals rather than gunship helicopters, schools rather than missile silos. And that is possible only when both sides are in the position to trust each other. That in turn is possible only when both sides are governed by reasonable, democratically elected leaders. Then there will be not two sides but one.

The West should:

- 1 Defend human rights – not only in retrospect – though undoubtedly the defence of political prisoners is a clear moral obligation – but to actively by demanding insistently that the Polish Government respects international pacts and conventions which it freely signed and ratified.
- 2 Foster free market forces in the communist countries using the influence of East-West trade. In this field Poland is probably the most fertile ground. The primary need is to develop viable long-term private initiatives which break down the communist economic monopoly.
3. Expand cultural, scientific and information exchange, particularly with independent circles and with democratic opposition movements in Poland. (This proviso is very important. The British Foreign Office currently runs a so-called Sponsored Visitors Programme which seems to cater exclusively for communist propagandists who are invited to this country to be luxuriously wined, dined and entertained at the expense of the British tax payer).

The wide range of the opposition, extending far beyond the circles of converted and semi-converted marxists, should be recognised, identified and nurtured by all who profess to offer more than mere lip service to the cause of democracy in Eastern Europe. By the same token encouragement and support, including material support should be provided to what are now inaccurately called pro-Solidarity organisations in the West. These are the people who can rightly be called experts in the field of human rights in Eastern Europe.

***RYSZARD CZARNECKI***, 25, is a modern history graduate of the University of Wroclaw. He is one of the leaders of the Independent Students' Union in Poland and has been delegated as its official representative in the West.

To help the Polish Democratic Opposition, please contact: Solidarity with Solidarity, 7 Quintin Avenue, London SW20 8LD Tel. 01-673 445



Charles

1/11/88

For your information Richard  
Alexander spoke to me yesterday.  
His Poles are excited by the  
possibility that the PM might be  
asked to consider returning to  
General Sikorski's remains to  
Poland (He is buried I think in  
Newark)

Mark

PART 1 ends:-

CDP to FCO 31-10-88

PART 2 begins:-

MLB to CDP 1-11-88

