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3002

PREM 19/2387



PART 9

Confidential filing.

UK / Polish Relations

Internal Situation


Economic Assistance

POLAND.

Part 1 : August 1979

Part 9 : October 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>2-10-82</del>		6.7.83		<del>2.1.87</del>			
<del>23-10-82</del>		<del>13.7.83</del>		13.1.87			
<del>1.11.82</del>		14/9/83		<del>22-2-87</del>			
16.11.82		<del>28/9/83</del>		<del>22.4.87</del>			
<del>23.11.82</del>		7/10/83		8.5.87			
<del>25.11.82</del>		4.5.84		5.8.87			
<del>3-12-82</del>		24.5.84		10.11.87			
<del>7.12.82</del>		21.7.84		18.11.87			
<del>10.12.82</del>		23.10.84		26-1-88			
<del>14.12.82</del>		12.11.84					
15.12.82		<del>27.11.84</del>					
16.12.82		27-1-85					
24.12.82		6.3.85					
31.12.82		<del>11.3.85</del>					
<del>17.1.83</del>		21.5.85					
4.2.83		<del>1.10.85</del>					
<del>15.2.83</del>		22.10.85					
<del>26.2.83</del>		6.11.85					
3.3.83		8.11.85					
<del>28.3.83</del>		3.12.85					
17.6.83		13.12.85					
<del>21.6.83</del>		<del>2-1-86</del>					
23.6.83		<del>4.2.86</del>					
4.7.83		10.2.86					



PREM 19/2387



PART 9 ends:-

CLG MALLABY to CDP 26/1/88

PART 10 begins:-

PS/DTE to CDP 9/2/88







070  
B.023

MR. POWELL

CDI  
27/1



cepc

Poland

A well-known Polish journalist and long-standing reformer, Gustav Gottesman, has devised an economic restart plan, inspired by the Marshall Plan, for Poland. He is working with Lord Bethell and Mr Robert Rhodes James MP, whom he expects to put the plan shortly to the Prime Minister as "the Thatcher Plan". He approached me on 25 January through the British journalist, Neal Ascherson.

2. Gottesman said that the plan would be for \$9-10 billion to be provided to Poland over three years by EC countries, the World Bank, the IMF and Japan and with the blessing of the Pope and President Reagan. The money would be spent on preventing the economic collapse which otherwise was certain in Poland, by a programme of housing construction, a boost to Poland's pharmaceutical industry, increased agricultural output through better supplies of fertilisers and pesticides, a boost to the food processing industry with a view to high value exports, and other investments.


3. The case made for such a plan is that without it Poland's economy will collapse within the next several years, bringing an end to the degree of political pluralism left behind by the Solidarity period and to the regime's efforts to introduce serious economic reform. Such a plan, it is argued, would open the eventual prospect of Poland repaying part of her debts, which otherwise she could never do. Politically, a major demonstration of Western interest in Poland would go a long way to breaching the post-war division of Europe. Through a say in the use of the money in Poland, the West would be able to ensure efficiency in expenditure and to influence events in



Poland. Although the Soviet Union would dislike the plan, it would feel unable to oppose it openly, since that would open the question of major Soviet aid to Poland.

4. Ideas of this kind have been put forward before. The novelty is partly that it appears that politicians in this country are this time taking a direct interest. I have recorded what was said to me in case the FCO wish to start considering the matter before the formal proposal arrives.

5. I am sending a copy of this minute to Tony Galsworthy in the FCO.



C L G Mallaby

26 January 1988



From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

CCPC



HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE  
LONDON SW1H 9AT

20 November 1987

Dear Charles,

COP  
20ki

REMAINS OF GENERAL SIKORSKI

The Home Secretary has seen Lyn Parker's letters to you of 6 and 18 November about the removal of General Sikorski's remains to Poland. He agrees with the Foreign Secretary's advice that the Prime Minister should advise the Polish Foreign Minister, when they meet on 8 December, that we could not agree to the removal of General Sikorski's remains, although we do not rule out a transfer for all time.

I am copying this letter to Lyn Parker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

*John Pincus*

*Philip Law*

P J C MAWER

Charles Powell, Esq

CONFIDENTIAL



Standard: Int. Ser. Pr. 9.







Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 November 1987

Prime Minister

COP  
10/11

Dear Charles,

Remains of General Sikorski

In your letter of 9 November <sup>at 10.15</sup> about removal of the remains of General Sikorski to Poland, you asked about the views of General Sikorski's family.

The evidence available is that the family would not, in fact, be opposed to removal of the remains. At the time of the Polish application for removal in 1981, it was established that General Sikorski's widow was in favour by the time she died in 1972. There is no surviving direct relative. Other relatives whose opinion is on record in the period since 1981 (the husband of a foster-sister of Madame Sikorska, and a son-in-law) were not opposed to removal, provided the remains went to the Wawel Cathedral in Krakow as the Polish authorities proposed. (This is in contrast to the case of the nineteenth-century Hungarian General Meszaros, who is also buried here. The Hungarian authorities have at times pressed for the remains of General Meszaros to be returned to Hungary. The family are strongly opposed. The Prime Minister may remember being briefed about this before her visit to Hungary in 1984, though I understand this was not in fact raised with her on that occasion.)


Yours ever,

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



Poland: Pels PT9







bc: PC

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

9 November 1987

REMAINS OF GENERAL SIKORSKI

Thank you for your letter of 6 November about the representations which the Prime Minister is likely to receive from the Polish Foreign Minister in December about removal of the remains of General Sikorski from the United Kingdom to Poland. The Prime Minister agrees that the correct course is to tell Mr. Orzechowski that we are not ready to transfer Sikorski's remains, although we do not rule it out for all time. She is strengthened in this by her recollection that General Sikorski's family are strongly opposed to the transfer to Poland, which she thinks should be cited as an additional reason. Perhaps you could confirm this.

I am copying this letter to Philip Mawer (Home Office).

OTJ

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



cc PC  
①



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 November 1987

Agree to tell the  
Polish Foreign Minister in

December that we are not ready  
to transfer Sikorski's remains to Poland,  
Dear Charles, although we do not rule  
it out for all time?

Remains of General Sikorski

CCP 6/Ki

I seem to remember  
that the family objects  
to the transfer  
to Poland.  
That is  
an added  
reason for  
saying no  
at all

When the Polish Foreign Minister, Orzechowski, calls on the Prime Minister on 8 December, he is certain to press for removal of the remains of General Sikorski from Newark Cemetery to Poland. The Prime Minister may wish to consider in advance what line should be taken with Orzechowski about this.

The background is that the Poles made a formal request in 1981 for the removal of General Sikorski's remains. Ministers decided to turn this down. Their decision was reflected in a reply given by the then Home Secretary in the House on 30 June 1981 (copy enclosed). The Poles have since raised the matter again several times, including in 1983, and earlier this year when Mr Renton visited Warsaw. After the latest request, they were told that Ministers had considered the matter carefully, but saw no basis at present for a change in the earlier decision.

In returning to this subject with Mr Renton in February, Orzechowski drew attention to a resolution by the Polish war-time Government in 1943, which called for the remains to be transferred to an independent Poland. He said that if the remains were not transferred, this would be tantamount to a statement that Poland was "neither free nor independent", and that this would be unacceptable. He is likely to argue strongly in December that, if the Prime Minister goes to Poland next year, this would be an ideal moment to transfer the remains. (It is just possible that he may say that, unless the Government agrees to a transfer, the Polish authorities might not agree to a visit by the Prime Minister to Poland. But we consider it unlikely that the Poles would press such a condition).

To transfer the remains would please the Polish authorities, and a substantial number of non-official Poles (including sections of the Polish Church). But the Foreign Secretary considers that it is not a step which should be taken at present. The Prime Minister's visit itself, despite the

That would  
save me a  
visit!

/attention





attention she would no doubt wish to give to human rights, would be a major step towards more normal and productive Polish official relations with the West. This is of course partly why Jaruzelski is so keen that she should go. To agree to transfer Sikorski's remains would be seen in some quarters as inconsistent with the still unsatisfactory state of political and human rights in Poland. It would cause strong criticism among sections of the Polish emigre community (although there would also be some who would applaud it). It is relevant that Lech Walesa told our Ambassador in Warsaw in March that, in his view, the time was not yet right for the remains to be transferred. He hoped that in his lifetime conditions would justify such a step. But it was important that people properly representative of Polish society should be able to take part in the celebrations. At present, that was not possible.

The Foreign Secretary recommends that Orzechowski be told that removal of the remains is not ruled out for all time, but that it would be a major step which in present circumstances would tend to divide rather than to reconcile Poles, and which we therefore do not wish to take. If the Prime Minister agrees with this, and subject to the Home Secretary's views, he believes that she should herself give Orzechowski this response, perhaps adding that the Polish authorities ought not to be under any misapprehension about HMG's position either now or during any visit by the Prime Minister to Poland in 1988.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Philip Mawer at the Home Office.

Yours ever,

*L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/No 10 Downing Street



Ferries (Offences)

Mr. Arthur Lewis asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many persons have been charged and how many convicted, for offences on board ferries sailing to or from United Kingdom ports in the last year for which figures are available; and if he will specify in each case the nature of the offence.

Mr. Mayhew: The information requested is not available because information collected centrally on court proceedings does not generally indicate the circumstances or the location of the offence. The data available for 1979 on offences of drunkenness on board ships, not necessarily ferries, are given in the following table.

*Defendants proceeded against and found guilty of offences relating to drunkenness on board ships*

England and Wales 1979	Number of defendants	
	Proceeded against	Found guilty
Person being drunk on board a passenger steamer and refusing to leave such a steamer at a place at which he can conveniently do so when requested*	2	2
Seaman under the influence of drink or drugs while on duty†	5	3

\* Section 287(b) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894

† Section 28 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1970.

Police (Firearms)

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many police forces have set up special firearms units; and if he will make a statement on this practice.

Mr. Mayhew: All police forces have a proportion of officers especially trained in the use of firearms. Many have specialist units consisting of officers who have additional training, including the tactical use of weapons, in handling major incidents where such skills are required.

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what percentage of policemen receive weapons training; and what forms this takes.

Mr. Mayhew: It is for individual chief officers of police to decide how many police officers should be trained in the use of firearms and what form this training should take. Figures are not held centrally and could not be obtained without disproportionate cost.

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will give details of those incidents in which police guns have been fired in each year from 1976, to date.

Mr. Mayhew: The details are as follows:

Year and Force	Injuries/Deaths
1976	Nil
1977	
Derbyshire Constabulary	1 death
Metropolitan Police	—
Metropolitan Police	—
Hampshire	1 injury

THE 1981  
PARLIAMENTARY  
ANSWER (FOR  
EASY REFERENCE)

1978  
Metropolitan Police  
Metropolitan Police  
Cumbria Constabulary

1979  
Essex Police  
West Midlands Police  
Metropolitan Police

1980  
West Midlands Police  
West Mercia Constabulary  
West Yorkshire Police

Metropolitan Police  
Metropolitan Police  
Metropolitan Police  
Metropolitan Police  
Metropolitan Police  
Metropolitan Police

1 death  
1 injury  
1 injury  
1 injury (spike off)  
1 injury  
1 injury  
1 injury

In addition, firearms were used on a number of occasions to destroy injured or dangerous animals.

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what percentage of policemen on average takes out arms daily.

Mr. Mayhew: Figures are not held centrally of the number of policemen who are issued with firearms and this information could not be obtained without disproportionate cost.

Boundary Commission for England (Proposals)

Mr. Marks asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will list the 1981 electorates of the proposed constituencies provisionally recommended by the Boundary Commission for England in its current review for the county of Greater Manchester.

Mr. Mayhew: We are obtaining this information and will publish it in the *Official Report*.

Sex Offenders

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many sex offenders now held in prison are receiving suitable specialist treatment.

Mr. Mayhew: This information is not held centrally and could only be obtained at disproportionate cost.

Remains of General Sikorski

Mr. Churchill asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he has received an application for a licence authorising the removal of the remains of the late General Sikorski; what decision he has reached; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Whitelaw: I have received an application for a licence to remove the remains of General Sikorski, with the suggestion that the removal should be linked with the anniversary of his death on 4 July. Under section 25 of the Burial Act 1857 it is an offence, subject to exceptions, to remove any interred human remains without the licence of the Home Secretary and subject to such precautions as he may prescribe.

I have given full and careful consideration to all the issues involved in this case. I am unconvinced at the present time that the relevant criteria for meeting the



application have yet been satisfied. I do not therefore propose to grant a licence to enable the remains of General Sikorski to be returned to Poland by 4 July. The applicant and the Polish Government are being informed of this.

## AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD

### Capital Grants and Subsidies

**Mr. Morgan** asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what is the approximate amount of money currently due to farmers in England by way of approved capital grant and subsidy payments but unpaid by reason of the civil servants' pay dispute.

**Mr. Peter Walker:** As at 19 June the figure was approximately £10.7 million.

### Turkeys

**Mr. Peter Mills** asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food whether, in view of the loss of confidence in the turkey industry, his Department has estimated the number of turkey chicks that will be gassed in 1981.

**Mr. Buchanan-Smith:** No. Turkey poults are generally hatched to meet specific orders and I expect these basic arrangements to continue.

**Mr. Peter Mills** asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1) what is the total yearly consumption of turkey meat in the United Kingdom;

(2) what is the total yearly production of turkey meat in the United Kingdom.

**Mr. Buchanan-Smith:** The latest figures of United Kingdom estimated production and of consumption based on this, net imports and increases in stocks in 1980, are as follows:

1980	
	(tonnes)
Production	122,000
plus imports	+ 9,275
minus exports	- 1,806
minus net increase in cold store stocks	- 5,650
Apparent consumption	123,819

### Beef, Veal and Pork (Intervention Stocks)

**Mr. Best** asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will state the current levels of intervention stocks held by the EEC of beef, veal and pork, expressed in terms of days of consumption, using the latest figures available.

**Mr. Buchanan-Smith:** Stocks of beef held by member States at recent dates were the equivalent of about 11½ days consumption. The European Community does not hold veal or pork in public intervention storage.

### Butter, Cheese and Skimmed Milk Powder (Intervention Stocks)

**Mr. Charles Morrison** asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will state, using the latest figures available, the current levels of intervention

stocks of the European Community of butter, cheese and skimmed milk powder, expressed in terms of days of consumption.

**Mr. Buchanan-Smith:** Community stocks of butter and skimmed milk powder in public intervention stores on 25 June were equivalent to approximately five days and 47 days consumption respectively. There is no cheese in public intervention stores at present.

### Rabies

**Mr. McQuarrie** asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1) if, in view of the fact that rabies on the European continent shows no signs of abating with a consequent danger of an increase in importing domestic animals during the holiday season, he will issue special instructions to officials, port employees and the local marine organisations to ensure that the public are warned of the dangers of the disease;

(2) if he will list in the *Official Report* the number of animals affected with rabies which have been intercepted at United Kingdom ports and airports in the years 1979 and 1980; and if he will indicate the country of origin of these animals;

(3) what resources are available for producing information and advice to domestic animal owners in the event of an outbreak of rabies in the United Kingdom;

(4) what steps are being taken by his Department to check the entry of animals into the United Kingdom which may be suffering from rabies; and if he will make a statement.

**Mr. Wiggin:** To minimise the risk of importing rabies into this country, the Government apply stringent import controls, supplemented by a continuous rabies awareness campaign. We have recently re-emphasised the need for all officials, port employees, marine organisations and the general public to maintain their customary vigilance through the holiday season.

We are satisfied that, if a rabies outbreak were to occur anywhere in this country, we have the means to deal quickly and effectively with it. Detailed information and advice have already been prepared for domestic animal owners for immediate release in the event of an outbreak.

The Government's policy on import controls and on dealing with an outbreak are set out in more detail in the publication "Rabies: Prevention and Control" which has been placed in the Library of the House and which is distributed widely around the country.

There have been no cases of animals infected with rabies in the United Kingdom since the present import controls were introduced in 1974, nor have any infected animals been intercepted at ports and airports.

## INDUSTRY

### Naval Dockyards

**Mr. Skeet** asked the Secretary of State for Industry, how many naval and other dockyards there are in the United Kingdom; and what is the number actually in

**Mr. Michael Marshall:** There are 50 dockyards in the United Kingdom. The study dockyards published in August 1980 as a document estimated that, in addition,

are  
the  
the



*cc/c*



HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE  
LONDON SW1H 9AT

*can  
6/8*

5 August 1987

*Dear Colonel Wozniak,*

*Will request if required*

Thank you for your letter of 16 July addressed to the Prime Minister. I have been asked to reply.

As you know, in 1981 an application was made to the Home Secretary for General Sikorski's remains (they are not ashes) to be removed from Newark Cemetery for burial in the Wawel Crypt at Krakow. The application was supported by the Polish Government. In an answer on 30 June 1981 to a question in Parliament from Mr Winston Churchill MP, the then Home Secretary, Mr Whitelaw, explained that he had decided not to grant the application.

I am afraid that you have been misinformed about the view of the Prime Minister. It is not the case that Mrs Thatcher agreed to give permission for the removal of General Sikorski's remains.

At the time of the application in 1981 the Government received protests against removal of the remains from a large number of Polish organisations and individuals in the UK. The Government is aware that this issue remains of great significance for all Poles. If any action were taken to move the remains of General Sikorski, British Ministers would wish this to heal divisions rather than provoke new controversy. Their view, in all the circumstances, is that there is no basis at present for a change in the decision taken in 1981.

You say that for 45 years General Sikorski's grave has been "completely neglected". In fact the vault in Newark Cemetery is maintained, like other Polish graves there, by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. I understand that it is in good condition.

*Yours sincerely,*

*P J C Mawer*

P J C MAWER



SUBJECT CC MASTER  
OPS

UNCLASSIFIED - DESKBY 100830Z

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OCMIAN 3228  
UNCLASSIFIED  
DD 100830Z WARSA  
FM FCOLN TO WARSA  
091600Z MAY  
GRS 133

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T85/87

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM FCO  
TO DESKBY 100830Z WARSAW  
TELNO 160  
OF 091600Z MAY 87  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELECON RESIDENT CLERK/SMYTH: POLIOSH AIR CRASH: MESSAGE TO  
PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY FROM PRIME MINISTER  
TO PRESIDENT JARUZELSKI.

BEGINS: I HAVE HEARD ABOUT THE CRASH WHICH HAS OCCURRED IN  
POLAND TODAY. WITH DREADFUL LOSS OF LIFE. I UNDERSTAND THAT MANY  
OF THOSE ON BOARD WERE POLISH. I SEND MY DEEPEST SYMPATHIES TO THE  
FAMILIES OF ALL THOSE WHO HAVE LOST RELATIVES IN THIS TERRIBLE  
ACCIDENT. ENDS.

2. A SIMILAR MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

HOWE

OCMIAN 3228

LIMITED

EED

NEWS D

NAD

PS

PS/MR RENTON

MR THOMAS

MR RATFORD

MR HEARN

COPIES TO:

PS/HO. 10 DOWNING ST

- PS/PUS



10 DOWNING STREET

Dear Resident Clerk,

Aircraft crash in Poland

As agreed with David Norgrove, I enclose approved texts of messages from the Prime Minister for onward transmission. Would you please add the appropriate 'bops & tails'.

I understand that you are confirming whether General Jaruzelski is the appropriate recipient of a message to Poland.

Would you kindly let me have copies of the telegrams once they are despatched.

Yours sincerely,

Julie Bowers

Duty Clerk

9.5.87



SUBJECT CC MASTER  
OPS

UNCLASSIFIED - DESKBY 092000Z

53227 - 1

OCMIAN 3227  
UNCLASSIFIED  
DD 092000Z WASHI  
FM FCOLN TO WASHI  
091600Z MAY  
GRS 140

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 184187

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM FCO  
TO DESKBY 092000Z WASHINGTON  
TELNO 720  
OF 091600Z MAY 87  
INFO IMMEDIATE WARSAW

TELECON RESIDENT CLERK/WOODLEY: POLISH AIR CRASH: MESSAGE TO  
PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER

1. POLISH MFA HAVE CONFIRMED THAT ABOUT 100 U.S. CITIZENS DIED IN  
TODAY'S AIR CRASH.

2. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY FROM PRIME MINISTER  
TO PRESIDENT REAGAN:

BEGINS: I UNDERSTAND THAT MANY OF THOSE WHO LOST THEIR LIVES IN  
THE AIR CRASH IN POLAND TODAY WERE AMERICAN. I SEND MY HEARTFELT  
SYMPATHIES TO THE FAMILIES OF ALL THOSE WHO HAVE LOST RELATIVES IN  
THIS TERRIBLE ACCIDENT. ENDS.

3. A SIMILAR MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT TO PRESIDENT JARUZELSKI.

HOWE

OCMIAN 3227

LIMITED

EED

NEWS D

NAD

PS

PS/MR RENTON

MR THOMAS

MR RATFORD

MR FEARN

PS/PUS

COPIES TO:

PS/NO. 10 DOWNING ST



PRIME MINISTER

AIRCRAFT CRASH IN POLAND

We have heard from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw that there were 172 passengers on the aeroplane of whom 63 were Polish and the rest were mainly Americans. So I suggest two messages:

*Agreed*  
1. **To President Reagan:** "I understand that many of those who lost their lives in the air crash in Poland today were American. I send my heartfelt sympathies to the families of all those who have lost relatives in this terrible accident."

2. **To General Jaruzelski** (but the Foreign Office will confirm that he is the correct person to send it to before the message goes off): "I have heard about the air crash which has occurred in Poland today, with dreadful loss of life. I understand that many of those on board were Polish. I send my deepest sympathies to the families of all those who have lost relatives in this terrible accident."

*Yes*  
*agreed*  
Agree these messages?  
*nt*

DAVID NORGROVE

9 May 1987



B.P.

PM has seen

**PRIME MINISTER**

There has been an air crash in Poland - 183 people dead. It was a Soviet built 'plane but we don't yet know the nationality of the passengers. It was a chartered flight on its way to New York and as soon as we know the nationality of the passengers a draft message of sympathy will be prepared for your approval.

Liz

ECL

8 May 1987



From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

*cc PL*



CONFIDENTIAL

HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE  
LONDON SW1H 9AT

21 April 1987

*Dear Charles.*

*CDP  
22/4.*

GENERAL SIKORSKI'S REMAINS

*at trap*

In his letter of 23 February to you about relations with Poland, Tony Galsworthy drew attention to the approach made by the Polish Foreign Minister to Mr Renton during his visit to Poland, re-opening the question of the return to Poland of the remains of General Sikorski. We have considered this issue and Mr Hogg and Mr Renton have agreed that nothing should be done to re-open the matter.

I am copying this letter to Tony Galsworthy.

*Car.*  
*S W Boys Smith*

S W BOYS SMITH

C D Powell, Esq.,

CONFIDENTIAL



POLAND: relations PT9





EL3872

bc P. c



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

23 February 1987

*From the Private Secretary*

**RELATIONS WITH POLAND**

Thank you for your letter of 23 February conveying the Foreign Secretary's views on our relations with Poland. The Prime Minister agrees generally with the Foreign Secretary's analysis and proposals although she would not at this stage wish to commit herself to a visit to Poland in 1988. She recognises that the level of meetings has a particular symbolic importance in dealing with Communist countries, and is prepared exceptionally to see the Polish Foreign Minister provided that he comes in the second half of this year (which means after the summer break). She hopes that no more proposals for her to see visiting Foreign Ministers will be put forward in 1987.

You are right to assume that the Prime Minister will want to be consulted about our response to the Polish request for the return of the remains of General Sikorski.

CHARLES POWELL

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



PRIME MINISTER

RELATIONS WITH POLAND

The Foreign Secretary has written about relations with Poland. He notes a considerable improvement in the internal situation with the release last September of all political detainees and the appointment of an Ombudsman. He reports that Mr Renton paid a successful visit earlier this month in which he was able to meet church and Solidarity representatives and attend a service at the church of Father Popieluszko. In the light of this the Foreign Secretary recommends that we should now think of giving our relations with Poland more substance, bearing in mind that President Reagan has just lifted remaining economic sanctions against Poland. He hopes that you will consider visiting Poland in the latter half of 1988. Meanwhile, he wants to invite the Polish Foreign Minister here: but on past form he won't come unless promised a meeting with you.

You will not want to commit yourself to a visit in 1988 though I would think that Poland rates fairly high for an eventual visit. As regard a meeting with the Polish Foreign Minister we are in a bit of a quandary. We have been fighting hard to observe the principle that you do not automatically see visiting Foreign Ministers. But we recently broke that rule for the Spaniard and you have now agreed to see the Turk. If we add the Pole, it will soon be possible to drive a coach and horses through our own rule. On the other hand, these matters are accorded great symbolic importance in dealing with Communist countries and we do not want to erect a road-block in the way of improvement in relations if we decide that goal is worth pursuing. Rather reluctantly therefore, I conclude by asking you to agree to see the Polish Foreign Minister provided it is not before the autumn. Agree?

CDP

Charles Powell

23 February 1987

Yes [initials]



CG/PC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 February 1987

*Dean Charles,*

Relations with Poland

Following the Foreign Secretary's visit to Warsaw in 1985, we invited the Polish Foreign Minister, Orzechowski, to visit London in April last year. He accepted, but later "postponed" the visit because we did not envisage a call on the Prime Minister. We provided briefing on this episode in our note for Prime Minister's question time on 8 April 1986 (copy attached).

*on PM's int'l commitments Dec 83*

In your letter of 17 December 1985 to Len Appleyard, you included the Polish Foreign Minister among visitors whom the Prime Minister would not wish to see in 1986. In discussion of Orzechowski's programme, we made it clear to the Poles that the Prime Minister does not normally see visiting Foreign Ministers. (She did see the then Polish Foreign Minister in 1981. But circumstances in Poland were of course different at that time). It is also relevant that at the time Orzechowski was due to come, the Poles were holding about 200 political prisoners. We made clear to them that improvements in our relations would be related to progress towards internal reconciliation.

The situation in Poland has since improved. Last July, Jaruzelski introduced measures to promote reconciliation, including a clemency law which led to the release in September of all political detainees (except for about 20 people against whom there are also criminal charges). Although new forms of pressure on the opposition (fines, and confiscation of vehicles for distributing illegal literature) have since been introduced, the Poles have made it clear that they no longer wish to hold political prisoners. This is welcome, as are the recent establishment of a Social Consultative Council including independent representatives (although not the main members of Solidarity), and the decision to appoint an Ombudsman. These improvements are partly due to international pressure, including representations by the member states of the European Community, largely at UK initiative, in January and July of last year.

Against this background, Mr Renton visited Poland from 5-8 February, to see the situation on the ground and assess how we might try to keep the Poles moving in the right direction (including towards effective economic reform). We made it a





condition of the visit that he should be able to meet representatives of the opposition. Polish acceptance of this was a further positive sign; their refusal to agree to such meetings since the Foreign Secretary's meeting with members of Solidarity in Warsaw in 1985 had in effect prevented any NATO Foreign Affairs Minister from travelling to Poland in the meantime.

Mr Renton had a full programme, including a meeting with Czyrek, a member of the Politburo. He saw Cardinal Glemp, and representatives of Solidarity, including Bjuak. He attended a service at the church of Father Popieluszko. The Polish authorities made no complaint. He gave interviews to Polish TV, press and radio, which were relayed without serious distortion.

In view of these limited but welcome signs of progress, the Foreign Secretary feels it would now be right to give our relations with Poland rather more substance. The Americans have just taken a step in this direction by announcing on 19 February that they will lift their remaining economic sanctions against Poland. Once the Prime Minister has been to Moscow, Sir Geoffrey Howe feels that an upgrading in our relations with Poland, a country with which the UK has specially strong historical and emotional links and which, despite the crushing of Solidarity, remains less repressive in most respects than the rest of Eastern Europe, would be the logical next step in the Government's approach to East/West relations. He recommends that the Prime Minister should herself consider visiting Poland in the longer term, perhaps in the latter part of 1988 if the improvements there are maintained. In the meantime, he would like to get Orzechowski to London. Unfortunately, it is clear that Orzechowski will not come to unless he is promised a courtesy call on the Prime Minister. In the last year he has been received by the Heads of Government of the FRG, Austria and Belgium. In the circumstances, I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister would be willing, in principle, to agree to see Orzechowski, probably towards the end of this year.

On a separate subject, the Prime Minister may wish to be aware that, while Mr Renton was in Warsaw, the Polish Foreign Minister asked once again for the remains of General Sikorski (leader of the free Polish Forces during the war) to be returned to Poland from Newark Cemetery. The Prime Minister was kept informed during consideration of the

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last application, which was refused by the then Home Secretary in 1981. We are considering, with the Home Office, how to handle this further request. I assume that the Prime Minister will again wish to be kept informed.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office).

*Yours ever,*

*Tony Galsworthy*

(A C Galsworthy)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL





Pm: Pm's lat'u counteracts Dec 1983



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He K  
cpc.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

13 January 1987

Request for a Meeting with the Prime  
Minister from Mr. Moczulski

Thank you for your letter of 12 January with advice about the request for a call on the Prime Minister by Mr. Moczulski. I have explained to Mr. Garztecki that this will not be possible.

(CHARLES POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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CCPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 January 1987

Dear Male,

Request for Meeting by Prime Minister with Moczulski

In your letter of 2 January you sought advice on a possible call on the Prime Minister by Mr Moczulski, the leader of the Confederation for an Independent Poland, who is currently in Britain for a heart operation.

As Mr Garztecki told you, Mr Moczulski has spent the last six years or so in prison and this has at least partly contributed to his present ill health. The Prime Minister may also wish to be aware that Moczulski was given a passport to visit Britain for medical treatment after an intervention, on purely humanitarian grounds, with the Polish authorities in Warsaw by our Ambassador, Mr Barder, as well as the approach by Sir Bernard Braine (during the recent IPU visit) to which Mr Garztecki referred.

However, it is our strong view, shared by our Ambassador, that it would be wrong to agree to a meeting between Mrs Thatcher and Mr Moczulski. First, his party is not so much liberal/conservative as conservative/nationalist, tending towards extremist views. There have been traces of anti-semitism in the past, though it is unclear how far they remain. The party falls outside the mainstream of Polish opposition with which we maintain contact, does not have close links with Solidarity, and has minimal public support within Poland.

Secondly, there are bilateral factors to take into account. Mr Moczulski has been brought here by the Polish Government in Exile and his operation is being paid for by them. We do not recognise the Government in Exile and have no contacts with it. Mr Moczulski's party also explicitly espouses a break with the Soviet Union and, though we and many within Poland might sympathise with their aspirations, it is not our policy to provide open support for them. Solidarity, for example, is much more circumspect in its public positions.

/We

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We consider that the above arguments apply equally to the idea of a meeting between Mr Moczulski and any other senior member of the Conservative Party. There is also the risk that if, a few weeks after pressing for a passport for Mr Moczulski on humanitarian grounds, we are seen by the Poles as making political capital out of his visit, our influence could be reduced in future cases where we may need to intervene privately with the Polish authorities on behalf of particular dissidents.

The Prime Minister should be aware that Mr Renton will be visiting Poland in early February. We shall not be proposing, however, that he meet members of the Confederation for an Independent Poland. But he will, as part of our general policy of "critical dialogue" with the Poles, have *Solidarity* contact with a wide spread of Polish opinion, including the Church. The Foreign Secretary believes that this is likely to be the best way of sustaining the Government's standing in the eyes of the important Polish community in this country.

*Yours sincerely,*

*L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

Mark Addison Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

2 January 1987

Mr. Garztecki, at least at one time of Solidarity's Information Office in London, rang me this afternoon to ask if the Prime Minister would be prepared to see a Mr. Moczulski. Mr. Moczulski is, I understand, the Chairman of the Confederation for an Independent Poland, one of the two main "underground parties", as I was informed by Mr. Garztecki. Mr. Moczulski's party is in the Liberal/Conservative tradition. He is in the UK for a month or so, primarily for a heart operation. Over the next week or so he is having tests. He is then likely to be in hospital/ convalescing for two weeks, and expects to be undertaking speaking engagements a week or so after that. Mr. Garztecki said that Mr. Moczulski had only recently been released from prison where he had spent most of the last six years and where conditions had been very bad, contributing to his ill health. Mr. Moczulski was now free as a result of representations made by the delegation led by Sir Bernard Braine who recently visited Poland. Mr. Garztecki's assessment was that Mr. Moczulski was a person of similar stature to Mrs. Ratushinskaya and he hoped the Prime Minister would agree to see him for at least a short meeting, including a photo call. If the Prime Minister could not see him he suggested that it might be appropriate for a senior member of the Conservative Party to do so instead.

I note from our files that the last time Mr. Garztecki dealt with us, about a request for the Prime Minister to see Lech Walesa, the arrangements came to a sticky end, and Mr. Garztecki subsequently found his accreditation as Solidarity's London representative withdrawn. He did not refer to that episode when he spoke to me, though he did mention that he had had dealings with the office before. He did not claim to be Solidarity's representative in London, though he gave two telephone numbers, one of which he said was the Solidarity office (767 0393) and the other was "another office" (730 6402). It may be, in any case, that Mr. Moczulski has nothing to do with Solidarity anyway.

I know Charles would be grateful for your advice on Mr. Garztecki's request, as soon as possible please.

(MARK ADDISON)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



CCPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 February 1986

CDP  
10/2.

Dear Charles,

Solidarity

In your letter of 6 November you said that the Prime Minister had decided to agree to the request by Mr Garztecki, of Solidarity's Information Office, that the Director of their Brussels Office (Mr Milewski) should call on her. I understand that a date was later agreed, but that the call was then postponed at Mr Garztecki's request.

Our Embassy at Brussels have now been told by Mr Milewski that the request for a call was made without his knowledge, or that of Lech Walesa. Mr Walesa is reported to have been displeased at this lack of consultation. Perhaps for reasons of pique, though ostensibly for financial reasons, he has now withdrawn Mr Garztecki's authority to act as Solidarity's representative in London.

In the circumstances the request for a call on the Prime Minister seems unlikely to be renewed.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

C R Budd  
(Private Secretary)C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street



POLAND

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London W1A 0AX

RELATIONS

PT 9







10 DOWNING STREET

Chelles - to see.

Liz Hall, who I know from  
Dept of Employment, and who  
is now the letters Attaché in  
Brussels, sent me etc attached  
for information.

I suspected some awkwardness  
between the London & Brussels  
offices, but it seems there has  
been a major rift between  
Walker & Landon, leaving Milenskin  
looking silly. No prospect of  
a meeting for us, at this stage.  
MBA 4/2



**British Embassy**

Britannia House rue Joseph II 28 1040 Brussels

Telephone (02) 217 90 00

Telex 22703

A SMITH Esq  
 International Labour Adviser  
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference E/POL/1/F

Date 30 January 1986.

Dear Adrian,

NSZZ SOLIDARNOSC

1. I saw Milewski this week as part of my normal, if infrequent, contact. He was rather more depressed than usual because of domestic staffing problems - he has lost his Polish Canadian assistant at New Year (Grace Krupa) which left him with no French speaker. However the usual sources of aid are rallying round : the Belgian Christian unions have seconded someone to him full-time, also the ICFTU has helped, and he is expecting a new young man to arrive from the Polish Community Association in Britain.

2. Otherwise there was little new. He spoke about the reorganisation of underground Solidarność which it seems badly needed, especially since the arrest of Bogdan Lis. Rather than each cell operating independently there will now be greater national co-ordination under individual Praesidium members who have shared out responsibilities under Walesa. Otherwise he covered ground with which you will already be acquainted : Solidarnosc's gradualism is working; money is a big problem; anxiety about the West's apparant fear of Soviet arrogance; necessity to curb the more militant supporters; concern about control of a spontaneous uprising likely if the growing economic recession in Poland bites as deeply as forecast, or if spontaneous excitement were to be generated by a major change in Soviet policy eg withdrawal from Afghanistan. He does not expect the government to imprison Walesa following the trial.

3. One concrete new item emerged : there are discussions now underway for affiliation to the ETUC but Solidarnosc will not make an application if, as is likely, the German DGB (and others) remain opposed because of Ostpolitik. The DGB President is currently President of the ETUC. Milewski spoke bitterly about lack of general support from the DGB. I am told the TUC

/ stance



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- 2 -

stance on affiliation is neutral. Milewski would very much like to have the respectability of ETUC affiliation but realises he mustn't make waves. The American AFL-CIO are not keen to see Solidarnosc involved with the ETUC but would not withdraw their support (75% of the funds) because of it.

4. The London office of Solidarnosc was closed at the end of the year because of financial problems. The Paris and Stockholm offices are also in difficulty but Milewski was specifically directed to close London. The Director Garatcelsky (que ry spelling) remains as editor of the Solidarnosc news sheet but contacts have been told that he is no longer an official spokesman. Milewski is in touch with the main supporters of the London office, CPSA, EEPTU and NALGO, who will continue their funding through him.

5. Although finance was a genuine reason for closing the office it seems that it was done at that moment because of Walesa's fury over the proposed call on the Prime Minister about which I spoke to EED last week. The attempt to set up that meeting was entirely Garatcelsky's own doing with no consultation, let alone instructions, from Walesa or Milewski. He did it apparantly because Milewski saw President Reagan and thought he could gain some glory by arranging a call on Mrs Thatcher (Milewski's words). Garatcelsky thus either ignored or was ignorant of the contact between Walesa and others and the Warsaw Embassy. Walesa was furious because Garatcelsky's action appeared to undermine and diminish his own position and his contact with HMA (with which he had been quite content and grateful).

6. Whether or not one can believe Milewski's innocence it is clear that Walesa now wants to ensure tighter control and better management of Solidarnosc's foreign contacts. Milewski's discomforture was very evident, as was his anxiety that the incident should not have soured relations with the UK. He obviously wants to be able to reassure Walesa.

7. No doubt EED will let me know if any follow up is needed, but a formal request to see the Prime Minister is not on the cards. Walesa seems to prefer to build on his contact with our Warsaw post.

Yours sincerely,

Liz

Elizabeth HALL

cc : EED  
J Dimond - DE  
LA Bonn



In my opinion, the impact of the Warsaw meeting will greatly depend on the moral support which you, Mrs. Prime Minister, whose deep concern for the cause of peace is generally known, could offer. Therefore, I am taking the liberty of asking you to lend your support to the intellectuals' meeting in Warsaw to discuss a peaceful future of the world by sending a message or greetings to our Congress and its participants. This would both stimulate the Congress in achieving its objectives and greatly promote the cause of peace, while the noble voice of the Congress' participants would win invaluable encouragement.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to you, Mrs. Prime Minister, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Professor Bogdan Suchodolski  
Chairman of the Polish Organising  
Committee of the Congress of  
Intellectuals in Defence of the  
World's Peaceful Future.

Warsaw, 30th December, 1985."





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 January 1986

Dear Charles,

*Handwritten note:*  
Please tell the FCO  
with I agree with  
no message should be  
sent. COP 2/1.

Poland: Congress of Intellectuals for a Peaceful Future,  
Warsaw, January 1986

The Polish Ambassador has delivered the enclosed message from the organisers, asking the Prime Minister for a message to the participants in this Congress, which opens on 16 January.

The meeting has been organised ostensibly by non-governmental bodies in Poland, but is in fact an initiative of the government. Prominent among the organisers are members of the Polish affiliate of the World Peace Council. The agenda contains the usual topics which provide opportunities for Soviet style "peace" propaganda. About 30 prominent British personalities have been invited. We understand that so far only two scientists (Dr Rotblat and Dorothy Hodgkin) and Alan Sillitoe, the novelist, have accepted.

The Congress is presented as a contribution to the United Nations International Year of Peace (IYP) and has the approval of the Secretary General, although the UN is not directly involved in the organisation.

We do not think it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to send a message. Provided you agree, we will let the organisers know through the Polish Embassy in London that no message will be forthcoming.

*Yours ever,*  
*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



"The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Prime Minister

As Chairman of the Polish Organising Committee of the Congress of Intellectuals in Defence of the World's Peaceful Future to be held in Warsaw between 16-19 January, 1986, I have the honour to inform you that the Polish intellectuals organising the Congress intend to make a most substantial contribution to the task of the building of world peace through a dialogue with their colleagues from every continent. We are expecting to welcome in Warsaw over three hundred eminent representatives of the world of culture and learning from all parts of our globe. Sharing their highest concern for the future of mankind and for the safeguarding of its existence and progress, they will assemble to discuss the most effective ways of eliminating or diminishing threats to peace, security, natural environment, and to cultural and civilisational values which are determining the complex shape of our present reality.

People in every country, who want to live and work in peace and have their future guaranteed, look with hope to politicians to take steps preventing the catastrophe of a war. It is for this reason that the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva has been welcomed with satisfaction and hope everywhere. But the "Geneva spirit" and the efforts of politicians require reinforcement and dissemination. Therefore, given the present dramatic situation of world peace, the firm voice of intellectuals must not be missing, since they are aware more than anyone else of the importance of peace and the ultimate destruction that a nuclear war could bring.

We, Poles, mindful of how important the 1948 Congress of Intellectuals in Wroclaw had been for the anti-war movement have acknowledged it as our debt and obligation to invite again to our country in January, 1986, men of science and culture from all over the world. In this way we intend to contribute to the inauguration of the International Year of Peace proclaimed by the UN, and create a framework within which outstanding intellectuals from many countries could add their important voice to the discussion about the most essential question of the contemporary world - the question of peace.





BIURO KOORDYNACYJNE NSZZ «SOLIDARNOŚĆ» ZA GRANICĄ  
COORDINATING OFFICE ABROAD OF NSZZ «SOLIDARNOŚĆ»  
BUREAU DE COORDINATION À L'ÉTRANGER DE NSZZ «SOLIDARNOŚĆ»

9, avenue Joyeuse Entrée, 1040 Bruxelles, Belgique

Brussels, 13 December 1985

*CDP to see  
MBA 10/12*

Mr. Mark Addison  
Personal Secretary  
Prime Minister's Office  
10 Downing Street  
London, England

Dear Mr. Addison:

This letter is to confirm our telephone conversation of this afternoon.

As agreed, immediately upon receipt of instructions from Lech Walesa, I will contact you in order to request that the Prime Minister receive the NSZZ "Solidarnosc" delegation accompanied by a TUC representative.

Thank you for your help and understanding in resolving my difficulty. With best wishes for the holiday season, I am

Sincerely yours,

Jerzy Milewski  
Director


IV.GB/9

Mailing address :  
B.P. 112  
1040 Brussels, Belgium  
tel. 02/230.24.65  
230.24.84  
tlx 24464 sol bk b

Paris office :  
5, rue Mayran  
75009 Paris, France  
tel. 01/285.23.29

Bank : CGER  
21, rue Archimède  
1040 Brussels, Belgium  
account :  
GDKZ «SOLIDARNOŚĆ» 001-1129179-78





1980 - 1986 ...



## **NSZZ «SOLIDARNOŚĆ»,**

the independent and self-governing Polish trade union, was born in August 1980. Spontaneous worker strikes swept through the country, leading to formal Agreements between the strikers and the government that resulted in the formation of a 10-million strong union organisation. For the next 16 months, workers in Poland enjoyed a freedom unprecedented during the previous 35 years — until 13 December 1981, when the authorities of Poland declared a state of war and suspended all the activities of NSZZ «Solidarność». The Union was delgalised nine months later in October 1982.

Despite the formal banning, it remains today a vital workers organisation struggling for human and trade union rights. The Union is headed uninterruptedly by its President, Lech Walesa. The Temporary Coordinating Commission (TKK), formed on 22 April 1982, is the Union's executive in the underground. Together they comprise the national leadership of NSZZ «Solidarność» in Poland.

Though deprived of a legal existence, NSZZ «Solidarność» continues to :

- organise local industrial actions by workers in individual enterprises aimed at increasing wages to compensate for inflation
- maintain an organisational structure capable of launching a coordinated general strike and/or public demonstrations aimed at forcing the authorities to resign from their repressive policies
- pay out union benefits to members from dues clandestinely collected at the workplace
- provide material aid to imprisoned union members and their families : the number of activists under arrest has steadily risen, reaching over 300 at the end of 1985
- provide legal aid and other forms of assistance to tens of thousands of workers subjected to dismissals, blacklisting, discrimination at work and other repressions because of trade union activities

- sponsor and organise self-education workshops on issues ranging from labor and human rights to Polish history
- maintain a flourishing information network that includes union press, Radio «Solidarność» and independent journals; it also publishes and distributes a variety of books banned by the authorities.

## **COORDINATING OFFICE ABROAD OF NSZZ «SOLIDARNOŚĆ»**

is the only agency of the Union outside of Poland. It was established on 1 July 1982 by the TKK. The Office is authorised to represent NSZZ «Solidarność» outside of Poland and acts as the international office of the Union's national leadership. Based in Brussels, it has a division in Paris and branches in London, Stockholm and Toronto. The Office is accredited with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the World Confederation of Labor (WCL). These organisations and their affiliates finance its activities and provide it with organisational and legal assistance.

The Coordinating Office Abroad clandestinely sends over \$ 350,000 US annually to NSZZ «Solidarność» in Poland, collected through trade union and private donations. This aid is transmitted into Poland in the form of cash and materials such as

- printing machines, duplicators, paper and ink
- photographic equipment including cameras and film
- electronic parts for Radio «Solidarność»
- communications equipment
- video equipment
- uncensored books and publications

An estimated one million dollars would actually be necessary to cover the Union's most pressing needs each year.

## **YOU CAN HELP NSZZ «SOLIDARNOŚĆ» BY**

- sending letters and petitions to the authorities of Poland protesting the imprisonment of union activists and demanding their prompt release
- initiating resolutions, statements and financial contributions inside your union in support of NSZZ «Solidarność»
- adopting, together with co-workers, a political prisoner and maintaining contact with his/her family
- organising discussion groups and inviting speakers to address the labor situation in Poland
- making a private donation to help finance NSZZ «Solidarność» activities
- taking part in marches and other actions in support of Polish workers.

*Information and publications about NSZZ «Solidarność» can be obtained from the*

Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ «Solidarność»  
9, ave. Joyeuse Entrée  
1040 Brussels, Belgium  
telephone : 32/2/230.24.65  
32/2/230.24.84

*Donations for NSZZ «Solidarność» can be made to*

Bank CGER in Brussels  
account no. 001-1129179-78  
or US dollar account no.  
005-4335080-45 (010-13)



MR. POWELL

SOLIDARITY

We were waiting to hear from Solidarity who they would be bringing to the meeting next Wednesday at 1000 hours. Mr. Garztecki of the London office made the initial contact with me, but it was clear from a telephone call I had last week that Mr. Milewski, Director of the Solidarity Co-ordinating Office abroad, who is based in Brussels, is the key figure.

Mr. Milewski rang me today to ask that the meeting be postponed. I gather that he is waiting for instructions from his President, Mr. Walesa, and these have not yet got through to him. I said that this would cause us no difficulty, and that we would wait for Mr. Milewski to get in touch when they were in a position to fix a date for the meeting.

MBA

Mark Addison

13 December 1985

BEMBG

CF told  
Have inform FWO  
FWO hints  
office of the  
postponement  
CDP  
13/12







NOTE FOR THE RECORD

**SOLIDARITY**

Mr. Garztecki rang me today. He asked if we had yet heard from his senior colleague at the Solidarity office in Brussels. I said as far as I knew we had not. He said the Brussels office would be getting in touch with us shortly, since they would be taking the lead on making arrangements for the meeting. He would ask them to contact us before the end of the week.

He said it was difficult to discuss some of what he had wanted to say over the telephone. But he did mention that they wished to present to the Prime Minister at the meeting a message from Mr. Walesa. It seemed, however, that their first attempt had failed because their courier had been intercepted. I did not comment on this.

MEA

Mark Addison

3 December 1985

BEMBFI



Thanks you. Please bring forward on 11 December  
cc: Mrs. Ryder  
S/Ki

MR. POWELL

cc: Mrs. Ryder

SOLIDARITY

I have spoken to Mr. Garztecki, and arranged for three representatives from Solidarity to see the Prime Minister for half an hour on 18 December at 1000 hours.

*Cancelled*

He thinks it likely that the group will consist of, as well as Mr. Garztecki himself, Kate Lozinska and Sir Bernard Braine MP. Apparently Sir Bernard has helped them a great deal in the past.

*Knowledge ↑*

I asked if they would keep the meeting to as small a group as possible until much closer to 18 December and Mr. Garztecki said he would be happy to do so.

Action for now lies with them. They are to let us know exactly who will be coming. When they do so, you will wish to have a word with Mr. Garztecki and the Press Office about announcements and publicity.

Mark Addison

Mark Addison

~~GR CF~~  
Meeting folder pl. Mad  
17/12  
135  
*Cancelled*

8 November 1985





Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 November 1985

Do you accept  
FCO advice that you  
should not see a  
Solidarity delegation?

CDD 5/xi

No

Dear Manc,

Solidarity

Thank you for your letter of 22 October about the request by Mr Garztecki of the Polish Solidarity Information Office in London for a meeting with the Prime Minister.

It is certainly true that Solidarity receives a psychological boost when its representatives abroad are received by Western Ministers. This, and an eye to his domestic constituency, is probably why President Reagan saw the Director of Solidarity's Brussels Office on 21 October. The Americans, like the French, have not restored a dialogue with the Polish Government at Ministerial level since the ending of martial law, and do not therefore have contacts with Solidarity at this level inside Poland itself.

In our case both the Foreign Secretary and Mr Rifkind have met representatives of Solidarity in Poland, and our Ambassador had a three-hour meeting with Lech Walesa in Gdansk on 16 October. We think that this type of contact, judged in the wider context of our overall policy towards Poland, is the most effective method of showing sympathy and concern for Solidarity. It has left General Jaruzelski in no doubt of our views, and of our intention to maintain a dialogue with the Opposition in Poland as well as with the authorities.

Our policy towards the Polish Government, like that of our European Community partners, differs in some respects from US policy. We seek a critical but constructive dialogue, while the Americans prefer to remain aloof and castigate the Poles from a distance. For the Prime Minister now to follow President Reagan in meeting Solidarity would only irritate the Poles to no useful purpose and could make it more difficult to maintain our dialogue with them.

We therefore recommend against the Prime Minister receiving a delegation. In replying to Mr Garztecki you might suggest that he should maintain his existing contact with the government through the Foreign Office.

Your wvs,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

Mark Addison Esq  
10 Downing Street



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SKW



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

6 November 1985

**SOLIDARITY**

The Prime Minister has considered the arguments set out in your letter of 5 November against her seeing a delegation from Solidarity but is not convinced by them. We therefore propose to go ahead and arrange a meeting with a delegation in due course.



(C. D. POWELL)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED



POLAND  
RELATIONS  
P9 9





SRWAJO

Mr. Marek Garztecki,  
Director,  
Polish Solidarity Information  
Office,  
c/o CPSA Headquarters,  
215 Balham High Road,  
SW17 7PQ.  
tel: 767 0393



10 DOWNING STREET

22 October 1985

From the Private Secretary

1. ul.  
ch  
2 Wed 18/12 @ 10.00 am  
2 hrs.

The Director of the Polish Solidarity Information office in London, Mr. Marek Garztecki, has been in touch with this office seeking an opportunity for Solidarity spokesmen to meet the Prime Minister in the near future.

He told me that Solidarity spokesmen had met Monsieur Mitterrand this year and last, that a meeting had also taken place with Mr. Mulroney and that the Director of Solidarity's Brussels office (their chief foreign spokesman) had met President Reagan yesterday. Mr. Garztecki referred to repressive measures which he said the Government had taken in connection with the recent elections in Poland. He understood the pressures on the Prime Minister's time and the limited immediate practical impact any meeting could have. He accepted that Solidarity representatives were in touch with Mr. Rifkind but he thought a meeting with the Prime Minister, even a short one, could provide a very important psychological boost for Solidarity and help make clear to the Polish Government that the West did not accept that they spoke for all Poles.

He envisaged that the meeting might consist of three or four on their side, including, apart from himself, the Director of Solidarity's Brussels office, and Kate Lozinska (President of the CPSA) as a British representative.

I should be grateful for your advice on this request.

- Sir Bernard Braine
- Garztecki
- Kate Lozinska

- Wales saw Bill Anderson. No do this. Here is no

(MARK ADDISON)

Mark. 1/2 hrs.  
The PM has agreed  
to do this. Here is no  
hurry. A date is  
needed (Jenny) in  
five. Maximum of 3 people.  
K CD

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.





AMBASADA POLSKIEJ RZECZY POSPOLITEJ LUDOWIEJ

No. WMr. 11-63/85

The Embassy of the Polish People's Republic presents its compliments to the Protocol Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to request that the enclosed message from General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic, be submitted to the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP.

The Embassy of the Polish People's Republic avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Protocol Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurance of its highest consideration, *Up*



London, 30th September, 1985.

Enc. 1.



File

DSG



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

1 October 1985

I enclose a copy of a note from the Polish Embassy conveying a message to the Prime Minister from Mr. Jaruzelski, despatched while he was over-flying the United Kingdom. You will no doubt let me know if you think a reply is essential.

DSG 11

FLO say no reply necessary

Charles Powell

Peter Ricketts Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

EA





10 DOWNING STREET

ce Master

From the Private Secretary

31 May 1985

Dear Colin,

Mr. Robert Maxwell came to see the Prime Minister today to report on his recent visit to Poland. He had seen General Jaruzelski for four hours, two hours of which were tête à tête without interpreters. He had, therefore, been able to go into a number of matters in considerable detail.

He described General Jaruzelski's background. He was a patriot, not a tool of the Soviet Union. He had come from a middle-class background and had been arrested by the Russians around 1941 and sent to the Gulag in Siberia. He was released in 1943 under an agreement with General Sikorski and allowed to join the Army. He had subsequently risen to the rank of four-star General and had been called to lead his country when civilian government failed.

Mr. Maxwell thought there was a significant opportunity to improve relations with the Poles. General Jaruzelski had been upset that the Prime Minister had chosen to make her opening to Eastern Europe through Hungary rather than Poland. He had let it be known that if an invitation to visit Britain were extended he would "give it very positive consideration". Mr. Maxwell thought that Poland, with a population of 35 million, was a major country and that the West should avoid actions which drove it into the arms of the Russians.

Mr. Maxwell also believed that there were significant opportunities for greater trade. He first raised the question of a £6 million ECGD credit for the Costain's PVC project which had been frozen. He believed that if it were reactivated it would be extremely well received by the Poles and provide a powerful signal at small cost. If a decision could be taken quickly, it would provide a favourable background for Lord Jellicoe's forthcoming visit.

Secondly, he said there were a number of other areas for increased trade. The Germans had sent a high level representative to Poland and had been given a list of 32 projects in which their participation was sought. A similar list of 17 projects in which the UK might be involved was being made available today to our Ambassador in Warsaw. Mr. Maxwell hoped this initiative could be followed up. The Poles would very much welcome a visit by a group of UK businessmen. He added that he had impressed upon the Poles the need to put forward realistic projects which would

881



SUBJECT  
LE OPS  
Master.

(UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION)

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 168 D/85

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister of Her Majesty's Government of  
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and  
Northern Ireland.

Dear Mrs. Prime Minister,

Flying over the territory of the United Kingdom of Great  
Britain and Northern Ireland, I have the honour to extend to  
you personally and to the British people the very best wishes.

I would like at the same time to express the hope that  
the relations between Poland and Great Britain will continue to  
develop for the benefit of our two nations and in the  
interest of co-operation on the European continent.

Wojciech Jaruzelski,  
Chairman of the Council of Ministers  
of the Polish People's Republic.



CONFIDENTIAL

improve Poland's export potential in the short to medium term and to avoid grandiose schemes.

The Prime Minister agreed, without commitment, to consider these proposals. She would be grateful if the Minister for Trade could quickly examine the proposal on the £6 million credit and she would like to be kept informed of what view is reached. She told Mr. Maxwell that Poland had great difficulties in meeting its liabilities (Mr. Maxwell had earlier commented that General Jaruzelski recognised the need to meet interest payments but acknowledged the difficulty in meeting repayments of principal). The Prime Minister also noted that the goods Poland wished to export were often sold at very low prices and caused difficulties in UK markets.

Mr. Maxwell said General Jaruzelski was keen to improve relations with the US but had been hurt by the fact that the US had not responded to a note he had sent. General Jaruzelski was considering suggesting that the US should send an Ambassador to Poland while low level discussions on normalising relations were conducted in Vienna. Mr. Maxwell had pointed out that it was illogical to appoint an Ambassador but to conduct discussions through a different channel. The Prime Minister noted that the Polish Church provided a way in which the US and Europe could help Poland outside normal diplomatic channels. Mr. Maxwell said General Jaruzelski suspected the Polish Church had political objectives.

The discussion then turned to the Polish economy. Mr. Maxwell said that so long as the authorities attempted to provide every person with a job, the economy would lack flexibility. He had urged General Jaruzelski to accept 2 per cent unemployment but while General Jaruzelski was keen to modernise the Polish economy he was reluctant to adopt this suggestion. The idea that every person had a right to a job was a fundamental part of Communist doctrine and any retreat from this would be regarded as ideological deviation.

I am copying this letter to John Mogg (Department of Trade and Industry), Matthew Cocks (Minister for Trade's Office) and Rachel Lomax (HM Treasury).

*Your sincerely*

*Andrew Turnbull*

(ANDREW TURNBULL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH MR. MAXWELL: POLAND

Lord Jellicoe has just seen Mr. Maxwell who reported on what appears to have been a long and detailed discussion with General Jaruzelski. Mr. Maxwell believes there is a basis for talking with the General, and that it is politically desirable for the UK to use this opportunity.

He may make the following points:-

I. It would make a substantial difference if Britain could reinstate the £6 million credit for the Costains project which is currently stalled. Lord Jellicoe agrees that a gesture of this kind might be worth while.

II. Poland has recently produced a shopping list of major projects for the Germans to consider. The Poles are keen to produce a similar shopping list for Britain which would rapidly expand Poland's exports enabling it to service the debt. General Jaruzelski apparently recognised that Poland has no prospect of repaying the principal on its loss, but would aim at least to meet the interest.

III. Nothing would please General Jaruzelski more than if the Prime Minister were to visit Poland. He was put out that the Prime Minister chose to go to Hungary first. If invited to Britain, he would accept.

Duty Clerk

pp Andrew Turnbull.

30 May, 1985.

CONFIDENTIAL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 May 1985

Dear Tim,

Mr Robert Maxwell

You asked us to let you have a note about Mr Robert Maxwell, who will be seeing the Prime Minister on 31 May about his recent visit to Poland.

Mr Maxwell interviewed General Jaruzelski in Warsaw on 26 May in preparation for another volume in his "Leaders of the World" series (in recent months he has also interviewed Kadar and Zhivkov). We have had subsequent contact with Mr Maxwell in Warsaw and London. He was clearly impressed with Jaruzelski. He believes that Jaruzelski is a patriot doing his best for Poland, and that the West should be careful not to drive him further into the arms of the Russians. Mr Maxwell also sees good commercial opportunities in Poland. When he calls on the Prime Minister, Mr Maxwell is likely to advocate more commercial involvement with Poland and an invitation to General Jaruzelski to visit Britain.

Trade with Poland is over-shadowed by the Polish debt crisis. While we welcome trade and commercial activity on a cash basis, we are unable to grant or guarantee any new credit until Poland signs the Rescheduling Agreement and begins to repay its existing debt. Even then the sums available would be strictly limited - perhaps £20 million short-term credit.

We do not think an invitation to Jaruzelski to visit Britain would be appropriate. Although Martial Law has been lifted and there was a general amnesty for political prisoners last summer, some repressive measures have since been reintroduced and the number of political prisoners has grown. Despite the Foreign Secretary's visit to Warsaw last month, our relations with Poland are difficult and unsettled. An invitation to Jaruzelski would appear to signal to the Polish people that we approved of him and his regime.

/There





There have been recent reports that Jaruzelski is losing touch with the reality of the Polish situation, working excessively long hours and confining himself to a small group of advisers. It would be interesting to have Mr Maxwell's views on whether Jaruzelski appears in touch and whether he has a long-term strategy. Mr Maxwell might also be able to offer some views on Jaruzelski's relations with the Soviet Union and the sort of pressures and advice to which he is subjected by Moscow.

Mr Maxwell also indicated to us that he may take the opportunity of his meeting with the Prime Minister to have a word about football violence. He is the Chairman of Oxford United, who won promotion to Division I this season.

*Yours Sincerely,  
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq  
10 Downing Street



SUBJECT

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hite

DG2AEE



CCFCO  
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DTI  
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(bcc PC)

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 March 1985

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T45/85**

Dear Ron,

Thank you for your letter of 25 February about the Polish Catholic Church Agriculture Scheme. I agree with you that it is an imaginative scheme, and I have considered carefully whether we should contribute to it. Since receiving your letter I have reviewed all the arguments once again. But my conclusion remains that the proposal presents us with a number of very real problems, and I remain unconvinced that it would be right for us to become involved.

My doubts relate first as to whether the Church has, or could find, the managers to run the Scheme or whether the result would simply be that the State would become the ultimate beneficiary of the inflow of funds and equipment. I see a real risk that it will be the latter. I do not think that either of us want that.

Moreover, although the Polish Church is at present only seeking 28 million dollars for a pilot project, the main Scheme is very much more ambitious and would demand much greater inputs from the West (the figure of 1.8 billion dollars has been mentioned). I recognise that a contribution to the pilot project would entail no formal commitment to the main Scheme. But it would be of little value on its own, and would inevitably raise expectations that, if the pilot phase were successful, further finance would be available for the main Scheme. I really do not see how a commitment on the scale envisaged for that could be met. But to demonstrate



**POLAND**

Mr Maxwell may suggest that there are big export opportunities in Poland. So there may be - but the Poles cannot afford to pay for them. There is a high risk that Poland will default on past debts later in the year. Jarulselski himself apparently told Maxwell that Poland could only afford to pay interest on its debts, not to repay the principle. (Even this seems optimistic.) The Paris Club negotiations are still on a knife-edge. Meanwhile, Ministers have agreed with the Chancellor's proposal (10 May) that no rescue operation should be attempted and no new credits offered. If a debt settlement can be reached this autumn, we could resume a very limited amount of short-term credit - say £20m. This would be enough to finish off the (Costain) plastics plant which Lord Jellicoe discussed with Mr Maxwell, but not the Ursus (Massey Ferguson) plant. For comparison, the FRG's loudly-trumpeted offer of credit actually came down to 100m DM short-term, again only if a debt agreement is signed.




that the Scheme could work and then do nothing to implement it would surely be more damaging than doing nothing at all.

There is the further consideration for us that, although we have a very substantial aid programme (£1.174 billion in 1984/5), the funds are already committed to high priority projects; and against the background of reductions in other public expenditure we cannot find additional funds to divert to this area. For similar reasons we do not think that it would be right for the European Community to make a commitment to this scheme at a time when most people feel very strongly that all available Community aid funds should be used to relieve famine in Africa and for development projects in the Third World.

Sir Geoffrey Howe had the chance to discuss this with the Polish Primate, Cardinal Glemp, on 4 March. The Cardinal said that there were strong social reasons for starting the Scheme, but also admitted the difficulties. It was not clear whether the Polish Government would give its approval, and the Soviet Union was clearly concerned about the implications. Moreover, the Polish Church itself had certain doubts about the Scheme in its present form.

In the light of all these factors, we have decided against making any national contribution to the Scheme. We have also told our Community partners that we are opposed to a Community contribution as such, but that if they feel strongly enough about the merits of the Scheme, the right course is for them to make national contributions to it. We would of course agree to the Ten giving their political support to such individual efforts.

I am sorry to have to give you a negative reply but can assure you that I do so only after further very careful consideration in response to your request.



The President of the United States of America



CSC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 March 1985

*Dear Charles,*Polish Church Agricultural Scheme

I sent you on 27 February President Reagan's letter of 25 February to the Prime Minister urging British support for the Polish Church Agricultural Scheme. I now enclose a draft reply to the President.

Your letter of 27 November 1984 recorded the Prime Minister's view that the Community should not contribute to the Scheme. We have made it clear to our partners that we cannot agree to a Community contribution. We have impressed on other member states the inappropriateness of Community involvement in an exercise of this kind and have drawn attention to the political and economic weaknesses in the Scheme, as outlined in the draft reply to President Reagan. Most of our partners continue to favour a Community contribution. We shall continue to block agreement in the Council.

Arguments within Poland between the Church and State about the arrangements for the Scheme continue, and the Polish Government may well in the end be unable to clear the ideological hurdle of permitting it to go ahead. If it does go ahead, it is possible that the European Parliament might seek to inscribe some limited funds for the Scheme in the 1985 budget. But the Parliament has other priorities within its available margin, and it is not certain that it will seek to do so. If it did, there would be difficulty in mustering the qualified majority against which would be needed to block such a proposal in the Budget Council. We shall cross that bridge when and if we come to it.

The Secretary of State saw Cardinal Glemp on 4 March. The Cardinal raised the question of the Scheme and made some points about it which are incorporated in the draft reply to President Reagan. The Secretary of State explained the UK position.

/I am



CONFIDENTIAL



I am copying this letter to Private Secretaries to the Chancellor, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Minister for Overseas Development and to Richard Hatfield in the Cabinet Office, together with a copy of President Reagan's letter of 25 February.

*Yours ever,*

*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of 25 February about the Polish Catholic Church Agriculture Scheme. I agree with you that it is an imaginative scheme, and I have considered carefully whether we should contribute to it. The proposal does, however, present us with a number of very real problems, and I remain unconvinced that it would be right for us to become involved.

Although the Polish Church is at present only seeking 28 million dollars for a pilot project, the main Scheme is very much more ambitious and would demand much greater inputs from the West (the figure of 1.8 billion dollars has been mentioned). We do not see how a commitment of this kind could possibly be met. I recognise that a contribution to the pilot project would entail no formal commitment to the main Scheme. But it would be of little value on its own, and would inevitably raise expectations that, if the pilot phase were successful, further finance would be available for the main Scheme. To demonstrate that the Scheme could work and then do nothing to implement it would surely be more damaging than doing nothing at all.

/We

Enclosures—flag(s).....



We also have considerable doubts as to whether the Church has, or could find, the managers to run the Scheme and to ensure that the State did not become the ultimate beneficiary of the inflow of funds and equipment.

Finally, the fact must be faced that the funds we have for development projects are limited and already committed. It would be extremely difficult for us to justify a heavy outlay by the <sup>European</sup> Community on a scheme of this kind at a time when most people feel very strongly that all available Community aid funds should be used to relieve famine in Africa and for development projects in the Third World.

all  
Geoffrey Howe had the chance to discuss this with the Polish Primate, Cardinal Glemp, when they met on 4 March. The Cardinal said that there were strong social reasons for starting the Scheme. But he admitted the difficulties. It was not clear whether the Polish Government would give its approval, and the Soviet Union was clearly concerned about the implications. Moreover, the Polish Church itself had certain doubts about the Scheme in its present form: it had been given much too much publicity, and would probably need to be slimmed down if it were to be made effective.

In the light of all these factors, we have decided against any national contribution to the Scheme and have told our Community partners that we are opposed to a Community contribution as such. We believe that those European countries who feel strongly enough about the merits of the Scheme should make national contributions, and we have made clear to them that we can agree to the Ten giving their political support to such individual efforts.

CDP..





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 February 1985

Dear Charles,

Polish Church Agriculture Scheme

/ I enclose a letter from President Reagan to the Prime Minister about this Scheme. It was delivered to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office today by Mr Ed Derwinski, a Counsellor at the State Department who is in London to discuss East European affairs.

We shall let you have a draft reply to the President shortly.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

BF1  
C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



As long as the Church fails to achieve the 28 million dollar pilot project goal, the Polish Government has an excuse to delay a final decision on the Church plan. A contribution from the Community would force the regime to allow the Church to proceed or explain to its people why it turned down badly needed western assistance for food production.

I understand and share many of your reservations about this project, particularly its potential long-term cost. We have made clear to the Polish Church officials that development of the program beyond the pilot project phase would have to be gradual and that we ourselves have made no commitment to any additional funding. We would not expect any such commitment from the Community either.

I am convinced that western support for the pilot project phase is in the overall western interest, and I urge you to withdraw the opposition of your Government to a pledge from the European Community to the Polish Church's initiative.

I have asked Secretary Shultz to dispatch one of his senior advisors to London to discuss this issue further with your foreign office.

Sincerely,

Ron

P.S. It was great to see you here in our city. Nancy sends her regards & from both of us

The Right Honorable G. Davis.  
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister  
London



PRIME MINISTER'S

Prime Minister (2)

Subject

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T36D/85

A draft reply is being prepared. It will restate our strong reservations about this project.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 25, 1985

CDP  
2/2  
ms  
ccHastie  
OPS

Dear Margaret:

I am writing to broach an issue that we did not have the opportunity to discuss during our meeting last week.

As you are aware, the Polish Catholic Church is seeking western support for its plan to funnel private and official western assistance to private Polish farmers through a foundation controlled by the Church. The Church is confident that western contributions to the Church program would not be a substitute for Polish budget expenditures on agriculture.

The United States Congress has appropriated 10 million dollars for the pilot phase of the Church's plan, and the National Catholic Churches in the United States and Europe are expected to contribute another 8 million dollars. The Polish Church is asking the European Community to contribute the final 10 million dollars needed for the 28 million dollar pilot project phase. I understand that your government has declined either to make a national contribution to the program or to permit a contribution from the Community budget.

In our view, the Church's initiative would serve a key western objective in Poland and Eastern Europe by giving an unprecedented role in economic resource allocation to an essentially private entity. The pilot phase of the initiative represents a modest test of what is really a revolutionary concept in Eastern Europe.

US Declassified



PRIME MINISTER

POLISH CHURCH AGRICULTURAL SCHEME

The Polish Church has devised a scheme to aid private agriculture in Poland. It starts with some relatively cheap pilot projects. But the full scheme would cost US \$1.8 billion, or probably much more.

President Reagan supports the scheme and is trying to get Congress to provide \$10 million for the pilot project with the possibility of further support subsequently.

There is strong support in the Community for a contribution to the pilot project, without commitment to contribute to the full scheme. Our share would be between £600,000 and £1.2 million.

- A Geoffrey Howe thinks it would be very damaging politically to hold out against a Community contribution to a scheme which is regarded as desirable by both sides of the Atlantic. But he hasn't got any money, anyway doesn't think the aid budget is appropriate (since Poland is not a developing country) and wants a British contribution charged to PES programme 2.7 'contributions to the EC'.
- B The Chancellor is completely opposed. He argues that once the Community contributes to a pilot project, it will get hooked on supporting the main follow-on programme (which could cost us £15 million a year). He finds the case for supporting the Scheme unpersuasive on its merits, with a risk that any money will indirectly benefit the Polish State. He suggests that private contributions are more appropriate. If the Foreign Secretary thinks the political case overwhelming, then he must find the money from within his programmes.





(Vc2ABT)

bc PC.

10 DOWNING STREET

27 November 1984

*From the Private Secretary*

POLISH CHURCH AGRICULTURAL SCHEME

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign Secretary's minute of 12 November to the Chancellor and the Chancellor's reply of 26 November.

The Prime Minister finds the Chancellor's arguments convincing. She takes the view that it should be for individual Member States to decide whether or not they wish to contribute to the scheme, and does not think that a Community contribution is necessary. She recognises that this will cause some dissension within the Community but does not regard this as insupportable. She notes that the Americans have particular reasons for contributing to this sort of scheme, given the large population in the United States of Polish origin. She agrees with the Chancellor that if Sir Geoffrey Howe regards the arguments for a Community contribution as overwhelming, the funds for the UK share should be found from within the FCO programme.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Minister for Overseas Development and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

C.D. POWELL

C.R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

BM.





ccp

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street. SW1P 3AG  
01-233 3000

FOREIGN SECRETARY

**POLISH AGRICULTURAL SCHEME**

Thank you for your minute of 12 November. As you recognise, although the initial cost to the UK of supporting this scheme would only be some £1½ million, once the Community has committed itself to supporting the pilot project, there will be the strongest pressures on it to support the main follow-on programme. I understand that the estimated cost of the main programme is put at \$1.8 billion. Realistically therefore we must assume that agreement to the pilot scheme will commit us to supporting a programme which will ultimately cost us some £15 million a year for a considerable period.

2. On merits, I find the case for supporting the scheme unpersuasive. I recognise that it is politically desirable that the Polish Church should continue its historic role as a source of authority and influence independent of the Jaruzelski regime. But there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that this will not be the case, even in the absence of Western or Community support for this scheme. Nor is there any reason to believe that Western financial support will make any difference to the attitudes or behaviour of Polish peasant farmers towards their government. I can see no benefit to the UK taxpayers commensurate with the probable burden of £15 million a year or even with the lower initial figure.

3. Indeed I see a number of powerful objections to proceeding as you propose. First, there is no certainty that funds donated to the Polish Church Agricultural Scheme would in the end go to benefit private sector agriculture in Poland. There have been recent press reports that the Polish government are considering imposing a tax on any goods imported under the scheme. We could therefore end up directly subsidising the Polish Treasury. But, even if the Jaruzelski regime dropped the idea of a tax, the economic effect of transferring the resources to Poland will be the same. It will enable the Jaruzelski regime to reduce its own investment in agriculture and thus free both resources and hard currency to be



The Chancellor's arguments are cogent. And there doesn't have to be a Community contribution: individual member states are free to contribute nationally. There will be a nasty little row in the Community but nothing unsustainable. The Americans have different reasons to contribute because of their own large Polish population.

Agree with the Chancellor?

Yes not

C.D.P.

26 November 1984





diverted to other purposes such as defence and internal security. That seems poor economics and worse strategy.

4. Second, this is by any criterion development aid (quite different from the humanitarian emergency relief given in 1981). But Poland is not an aid-worthy country. There is no evidence that such aid is needed - Polish agriculture has turned round quite sharply in the last two years and there is now no question of serious hardship from food shortages. Moreover Western governments have already given a lot of involuntary help to the Polish economy since 1981, by acquiescing in a de facto moratorium which may shortly be turned into a formal Paris Club debt consolidation. There is no case for additional help.

5. Finally, I do not understand how we could justify providing additional money of this order to Eastern Europe, when there has been such criticism of the adequacy of our aid efforts to Ethiopia and when we have successfully held out against any increase in our contribution to the EDF under Lome III.

6. On merits I can therefore see no case for the UK taxpayer contributing to this scheme. When discussions resume in Brussels, I suggest our position should be that any assistance from the West to this scheme should take the form of private charity or national donations, where appropriate, but that we should make clear that the UK does not propose to contribute either nationally or through the Community.

7. At all events, I could certainly not agree to make additional resources available for this venture. If therefore you believe that the political case for participation is overwhelming, I must insist that the UK share - of both the pilot project and the full scheme - is borne entirely on FCO/ODA programmes and met from within the substantial allocations for them which we have just agreed.

8. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Minister for Overseas Development and Sir Robert Armstrong.

N.L.


(N.L.)

26 November 1984



Poland PT9

Relating



26 NOV 1984



CCPC



FCS/84/295

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERPolish Church Agricultural Scheme

1. We have to decide whether or not to support an EC financial contribution to the Polish Church's scheme to aid private agriculture in Poland. Up till now, we have avoided expressing an opinion, but this is becoming untenable.

2. Our policy towards Eastern Europe seeks peaceful, evolutionary change. One means of achieving this is to identify and encourage those unique features that make East European countries different from the Soviet Union and from one another. The obvious targets for encouragement in Poland are:

- (a) private agriculture, which accounts for nearly 80% of farming land;
- (b) the strength and status of the Catholic church (to which 98% of the population belong).

3. The Church have been considering since 1982 a scheme to aid private sector agriculture, which would be designed to increase output while improving social and technical infrastructure in rural areas. They intend to initiate ten pilot projects, costing some \$28 million, in 1984/85 - and, if these are successful, to extend the scheme on a country wide basis. The Polish Government, whose policies tend to discriminate against the private sector, are less than keen, but have been forced reluctantly to go along with the scheme.

4. This is a bold and imaginative venture, which on political grounds deserves Western sympathy. President Reagan strongly supports it. In a speech on 17 August, he undertook to ask Congress for \$10 million for the pilot programme, and promised to follow the progress of the pilot projects to see /whether





whether there should be additional support. Within the Community, the German Government have taken the lead in promoting the scheme: Genscher has taken a personal interest and invested a good deal of political capital in arguing for an EC contribution. Following general discussions at the September 1983 and January 1984 Foreign Affairs Councils, the Commission prepared a detailed and on the whole favourable technical assessment of the pilot projects. The Political Committee recommended on 11/12 October that the EC should support the scheme, on the grounds that it could make an important contribution to the normalisation of conditions in Poland, and that if sufficient funds could not be raised, the credibility of both the Church and the EC's foreign policy would be at stake.

5. While agreeing with this political assessment, we have insisted that the practical problems of financing it should first be addressed by budgetary experts. We have declined to comment on the principle of EC funds being made available until that important step had been taken. But we are now alone in this. All other member states favour the scheme, want the Community to contribute and are calling for a Commission proposal. The Commission, recognising that there is no headroom in 1985, are seeking endorsement of the principle of an EC contribution before making a proposal on how the contribution is to be financed. Meanwhile, as a result of a resolution tabled by a British MEP, the Parliament's Budgets Committee on 31 October voted an amendment to provide 5 mecu for the Polish scheme in Title 9 of the 1985 draft budget. The financial implications are set out more fully in Annex A.

6. The political cost of continuing to baulk at Community participation would be heavy. The UK would be identified as the Member State preventing (or unsuccessfully seeking to prevent) a Community contribution to the encouragement of private enterprise in Poland and the enhancement of the role of the Polish Church (particularly undesirable in the light of /international





international interest focussed on the murder of Father Popieluszko). We would have done so for the sake of a sum others would regard as small, and by holding up an initiative which - in the view of our partners on both sides of the Atlantic - the West should be supporting in the Western interest. This would cut across our general policy on East/West relations, and would be extremely difficult to explain to our own public opinion.

7. I have not so far discussed the handling of the financial side of all this. But you will, I think, appreciate the extreme political difficulties that would arise if the UK alone was now to declare itself unable to go alone with the consensus among our partners (which is endorsed by the United States) in favour of a Community financial contribution for the pilot project. On this basis we should have to be ready to accept provision in the 1985 budget, if the European Parliament in the week beginning 12 November endorses the Budget Committee's amendment. If we followed this course, we should naturally require specific agreement - which is not in dispute - that a financial contribution to the pilot project would be without prejudice to any contribution to the full scheme, and would constitute no precedent for the Community's treatment of other East European countries.

8. I turn finally to the question of how our share of the contribution could be financed. Judging both by the Budget Committee's resolution and precedent, it is likely to be entered under Title 9 of the EC budget. This would make it analogous to the humanitarian aid to Poland agreed by the EC in 1982. It was then agreed that, although Article 950 expenditure was normally attributed to the Aid Programme, it would be wrong to charge the UK share to the ODA budget. The Treasury similarly agreed in 1976 that the most appropriate place for the UK share of EC food aid to developed countries was under PES programme 2.7 - 'contributions to the EEC'.





9. Your officials have argued that these precedents are not valid for the present case on the grounds that they were respectively humanitarian and food aid. In my view the cases are very similar. Poland is not a developing country and any contribution we make to it could not be reported internationally as development aid. We are being criticised for using money from within the Aid Programme for emergency relief in Ethiopia: this criticism is quite unjustified, but we should find it impossible politically to defend using our Aid Programme for expenditure in what is not a developing country. Nor, of course, could the cost be borne on the FCO Diplomatic Wing budget, in which is, as you know, the opposite of any spare capacity.

10. In the circumstances I have described, I hope you will feel able to agree that we should accept an EC financial contribution, of the kind I have described, with attribution to PES 2.7.

11. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Minister for Overseas Development, and Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE



ANNEX A (Revised)

The Commission have not so far made any proposal about the size of the EC's contribution, but have informally suggested a sum equivalent to that contributed by the Americans (\$10 million) over two years. It has been suggested that some of this should be met by private sources. The European Parliament proposal is for 5 mecu in 1985 - which suggests that the sponsors are thinking in terms of a contribution of 10 mecu (47.2 million) over two years, and might expect that the \$2.8 million needed to bring the figure up to the American level would come from private sources. At 21%, our share of the 1985 provision would be approximately \* £620,000 and of 10 mecu over two years would be £1,240,000. Everybody in the Community is quite clear, and it would be a specific condition of an EC financial contribution to the pilot projects, that there would be no commitment to the full scheme. But were the full scheme to follow, there is no denying that there will be those arguing for a further and more substantial EC contribution over a longer period of time. This can only be speculative at this point but the figures already quoted (\$1.8 billion) look wholly unrealistic.



**EETC**

East European Trade Council 25 Victoria Street, London, SW1H 0EX Telephone: 01-222 7622

Chairman: The Rt. Hon. Lord Shackleton, K.G., P.C., O.B.E.

Executive Secretary: A. R. B. Hore, M.B.E.

Telex: 298681 COM SER G

Our Ref: 8.08

23rd October, 1984.

Charles Powell, Esq.,  
Private Secretary to the  
Prime Minister (Overseas Affairs),  
10 Downing Street,  
London S.W.1.

CDP  
24/X.

Dear Mr. Powell.

Lord Shackleton promised to let you have a copy of our verbatim note on his discussion with the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw last month, together with a copy of our report on Lord Shackleton's visit as a whole. I have the pleasure to enclose copies of both documents accordingly.

yours sincerely,  
A. R. B. Hore

A. R. B. Hore



Tuesday 4 September

4. MEETING WITH MINISTER STEFAN OLSZOWSKI, MINISTRY OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Present:	<u>British side</u>	<u>Polish side</u>
	Lord Shackleton	Minister Olszowski
	Mr Cooper	Mr Staniszewski
	Mr Edmonds	Mr Gorajewski
	Mr Hore	
	Mrs Booth	
	Ambassador	
	Mr Jenkins	
	Miss Moore	

Olsz. I am very glad to welcome your whole group to Warsaw. I view your visit as a symptom of the development of Polish/British relations. So far these have had their positive side but their drawbacks as well. We would be very willing to go back to relations as they were in the seventies. This is not because our cabinet is so attached to the period of the seventies; on the contrary it is because we think the development of these relations is very necessary both for Poland and Great Britain. Ambassador Staniszewski was witness to the following situation. Two days ago we had a meeting of Ambassadors who came home on holiday. And of course Ambassadors love to boast about their attainments. So our Ambassador to the German Federal Republic quoted figures which were reached in trade between Poland the FGR, of which he was very proud and very happy. And I concluded at that moment that our trade with the FGR is four times as large as our trade with the UK - Ambassador Staniszewski, you see, had to show his pity! But at the same time these relations in trade are greater than, for example, those with Czechoslovakia or the GDR. Maybe this is a somewhat difficult area, it is true. But the conclusion which we draw from this is that as relations with the Western countries are at the moment it will take a very major effort to develop trade to the point where



the situation becomes a balanced one. Now the question is, "with whom should we do it?". With France, a very nice partner? But we know she is very capricious. Then I would suggest it should be with Great Britain. But apart from Lord Shackleton and the Ambassador no one is willing. So I suggest we shall have to search for some other allies in Great Britain itself. But seriously speaking, for political reasons too we should try to do our best to develop relations with other countries. I would be very much obliged if your Lordship would deliver this to the Prime Minister.

You have only been here for a few days but I think that now you have already have a picture of our methods in Poland and how we are. Generally speaking what I wanted to say was that we do indeed have a lot of difficult problems. But the trend towards stabilisation is unquestionable and there is no doubt that that trend will be strengthened. But of course no one can say that other problems are not possible, such as rioting in the streets. What is most important though, as I see it, is that the atmosphere of good working relations in places of work should reappear. And the conviction has prevailed that strikes can hardly do any good, and even that strikes are unable to do any good at all. To have something it is necessary to work. And this idea is now very much seen among the working class in rural areas and among the so-called intelligentsia. Will this conviction stay for ever? - probably not. But at least for some years to come and in my view that is worth quite a lot. This, no doubt about it, will enable us to straighten out our economy and to give it proper dynamic development. In my view Western Europe should show its interest in Poland becoming a stable country of peace and quiet. Maybe the United States have applied some other optics to Polish matters. But of course the American attitude towards Poland is different; they view Poland only as an instrument. On the other hand for Europe a stabilised Poland is a guarantee of peace and Poland is no small country - 37m people and appropriate economic and cultural potential. Of course we would be very glad if we



could really start developing our relations with Western Europe and if our leading partner could be the UK we should be very pleased, because otherwise the leader would be a different country. Whether relations will develop, I suppose this is an objective fact: it is unquestionable that they will. Since I know that you have voiced yourself to be against sanctions, that you are a prominent promoter of cooperation, it is obvious why I am turning to you. This is the spirit in which I would like to welcome you once again and I would like to add that I am welcoming you in place of our Prime Minister, who is on leave, as well as on behalf of other representatives of our state. I am sorry that at the beginning I have been too talkative!

Lord S. Thank you very much. It is a pleasure and an honour to be received by the Foreign Secretary. The Ambassador assured me it would be a pleasure to have such an amiable host. May I also introduce my team.....

Minister, you said you would like to restore the situation as it was in the seventies without in fact going back to the seventies. I may say that many of us here and many members of my Council have never wavered in our attitude towards Poland. It is interesting to contrast a little bit the situation with regard to the United States. There is of course an election going on there and the sooner that is over the better for all of us. I speak not as a member of the British Government but as an independent figure. I have good relations with the Prime Minister although I belong to a different political party and I will try to convey some of what you have said to the Prime Minister. But it is of course much more in British than in American consciousness that yesterday was the anniversary of the day we entered into the war together with Poland. And some of us as old as myself actually served with the Polish armed forces. Furthermore if we had wanted to forget Poland His Excellency the Ambassador would never have let us! I would like to say that the Polish Embassy in London does a very good job for your country.



Olsz. We will put this in Ambassador Staniszewski's records!

Lord S. And I will collect the usual fee!

Mr. Krolak and his colleagues are well known to us and we certainly appreciate the difficulties and the agonies of the decisions you have had to take in Poland. We are well aware that your problems remain. There was a very balanced account in the paper today about your application to join the IMF. Britain has of course always supported Poland's application and will continue to do so although, as Dr. Timar, Head of the National Bank in Hungary, said, it is not entirely comfortable having the IMF telling you what to do. We found this in England, too. On the one hand you can blame your troubles on the IMF, but on the other hand you can be accused to selling your country to Western capitalists! We have had all this controversy in England, I may say twice. Still I think the British will continue to lend support in every way possible and there is certainly official goodwill. Though I speak unofficially I have no doubt that my friends in the Foreign Office do wish to see improved relations and continued support and we find this when we talk to officials. Whether we should ask His Excellency to come to London to say to Mr. Scargill "strikes do no good", I'm not sure!

Olsz. I suppose I would have to pay an official visit to the UK then.....

Lord S. Well, it would be very nice. We have had distinguished Polish ministers and I hope there will be improvement in these exchanges.

So far as our visit is concerned, it has been very well arranged by the Chamber of Foreign Trade and by the Embassy in London and the Embassy here. We certainly bring the unanimous goodwill of our Council and would wish also in return to extend our greetings to your Prime Minister. But I think as regards this meeting we have no particular problems, or indeed any complaints. We have talked very



freely with ministers and others and we have a full and interesting day ahead. My own company in Britain is Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation, from which I am retired but still associated, and I am going to visit a plant installed at Miasteczko, near Katowice, for which we supplied the process. So I shall be interested to make comparisons. It is a fairly polluting kind of plant, as we have found in England.

Olsz. You will be hearing very great complaints about the pollution from that plant. Unfortunately medical examination of lead in that area shows that many children are suffering from leukemia.

Lord S. Perhaps I shouldn't go! It is in this area of cooperation generally between Poland and Britain, where the technology of anti-pollution is concerned, that we have been talking to the Minister of Metallurgy here.

Then we go to Krakow - this is the second objective of our trip - and then a visit to Zakopane, and home. Certainly we are hopeful, without being over-optimistic. We hope that the re-scheduling of the government debt will be agreed fairly soon and certainly on the trade side it is encouraging that after the Federal Republic we are your second biggest European customer. A difficulty we have to explain to our friends in Poland and elsewhere is that the British are only slowly coming to realise that they are Europeans! But I would hope, if only for the sake of your Ambassador in London, that we shall continue to improve this situation. I like to think also that although our role is the development of trade both ways - the EETC is both for export and import - we have a political purpose as well. Indeed I am convinced that we are politically valuable. It is not often I have the opportunity of speaking at such length to a foreign minister. When I was a minister in Lord Wilson's first government I had Mr. George Brown as my foreign secretary at one time. He would not have been as patient!



If there is anything of a critical or helpful kind that His Excellency would like to say we would be very grateful to hear it. We are very glad to hear that the Wloclawek arrangement has now been agreed between the parties just recently and we hope that progress will be made. Thank you very much indeed.

Olsz. I would like to thank you, first of all for your greetings to our Prime Minister which I will very urgently pass on to him. Secondly, thank you for the intention which you have voiced concerning our entry into the IMF, particularly since you were kind enough to mention some details - I have some liking for detail. Probably it is not the best quality for a minister, because on the whole foreign ministers ought to deal only with very general topics and a wise minister does just that. But unfortunately I very often mix myself up in details and the end is always an unfortunate one for me! But willynilly what can I do?

I would greatly encourage you to see Miasteczko. Not only that particular plant but the region as a whole calls for some assistance. And part of the misfortune for that region is connected with that plant. There were even some ideas about closing down the plant but we simply could not afford to do so because such a plant is very much needed. But if it were possible to do something to limit the air pollution from the plant in that area then this would be a very great achievement. If such a limitation of pollution were to be achieved I suggest that the United Kingdom and British technologists, your Council and your Lordship would really deserve great merit - and here I am being very serious.

I was pleased to hear about the progress made at Wloclawek and particularly glad because I come from Wloclawek myself! I will be presenting it in Wloclawek as my own achievement! Of course there will be abuse on my side but what can I do? In politics such things happen! British technology is



well respected here and British engineers who used to work here have left good memories - and a number of children too, I suppose, which is proof of the vitality of both nations! Of course it is very important now to finish the PVC plant in Wloclawek. Another detail concerns Ursus, in other words Massey-Ferguson. I am speaking directly because I also worked rather intensively on that matter in the seventies. Thus, as noted, at the beginning of the eighties a certain prolapsing operation occurred which resulted in certain delays to the project. Nevertheless this summer the first tractors have been built in that plant according to Massey-Ferguson licence. In fact I shall be going to the Ursus plant tomorrow and probably will also be speaking about it. In the meantime the credit lines have been frozen. I know that these cannot be resumed automatically. Nevertheless it would be very useful if negotiations on the possible re-opening of credit facilities could resume, because that plant has very good prospects. I suggest that its full operation would also make a major contribution to the level of our trade, and would therefore help us to service our debts. In other words I would wish to impress these matters on you.

Lord S. Thank you very much. First of all, the question of pollution. My own experience in industry - I am still the Chairman of a big aluminium smelter which is not so polluting but we do put out fluoride which can be damaging - is that the plant is blamed for all the pollution in the area. A big factor in the improvement of both plants has been the better management and better discipline and in our case we have been able to reduce the number of staff with the help of the union, who realise the importance of the survival of the plant economically. We now have a better operating discipline in the plant, the quality of the workers is better as some of the less good ones have taken redundancy. And this is not meant to be an excuse for the process because certainly in Avonmouth where our plant was built there were design faults and some of the plant was put up too quickly. Perhaps His Excellency will



forgive me this small lecture. I am not really an industrialist any more than he is a banker but I have had to earn my living in industry - it's more profitable in England than being a minister! On the subject of the Massey-Ferguson Ursus plant, I have heard a lot and I think the Ambassador knows very much more than I do about it. I did speak to the Massey-Ferguson representative over here yesterday and he seems to be very realistic and is certainly assuming that sooner or later the problem will be solved.

Amb. On the Wloclawek plant, there was a meeting last week in Manchester and representation from the British side has come back to Poland now. So I hope there will be a good excuse to drink a glass of champagne in about two weeks' time. I should be delighted to invite the Minister in his Wloclawek capacity...

Olsz. Thank you, I'll be there if it's after 1.00 p.m.!

Amb. As regards Ursus, this is a larger and more complicated question. A representative from Massey-Ferguson came here yesterday and discussions are continuing. We hope that progress can be made. We certainly recognise the importance of the Ursus plant for the Polish economy and there is no shortage of willingness from any of the British partners to continue cooperation with their Polish opposite numbers. The Minister started off by mentioning some statistics and the Minister will have the impression that Ambassadors only like talking trade statistics. But I think there are some important differences between your trade with the Federal Republic and your trade with us, in particular in the first months of this year when your exports to us have increased by 61%, which I think is higher than any increase with any other part of the world. Ours has increased by a modest 8%. This means that at the end of the year that Poland should have a \$100m surplus in her trade with us, which gives lots of possibilities for buying things from Massey-Ferguson!



Lord S. May I mention a matter of great personal interest to me? That is Poland's involvement in the Antarctic Treaty. It is extremely valuable - although I am an Arctic and not an Antarctic explorer - and the Antarctic is one part of the world where the cold war has never been fought. The Antarctic Treaty is due for renewal in 1991 and we recognise that Poland is a full consultative member of the Antarctic Treaty. Even the Argentine cooperates in the Antarctic although if we had not defeated them in the Falklands the Antarctic Treaty might also have been in danger. Everybody in Britain is now bored with the Falklands and I have to come to Poland to find someone to talk to about it! In this I am a supporter of Mrs. Thatcher!

Olsz. As regards our participation in the Antarctic Treaty, we will maintain our position as it is.

Thank you, and I wish you a good stay.

5. MEETING WITH PROFESSOR WLADYSLAW BAKA, OFFICE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM.

Present:	<u>British side</u>	<u>Polish side</u>
	Lord Shackleton	Minister Baka
	Mr Cooper	Mr Kozerski
	Mr Edmonds	
	Mr Hore	
	Mrs Booth	
	Ambassador	
	Mr Jenkins	
	Miss Moore	

Baka I am sorry for a small misunderstanding which took place at the beginning. Everywhere we have temporary difficulties. Again I am sorry - please forgive me.

I would like to establish the details of this meeting.



IN CONFIDENCE

**EETC**

P O L A N D

REPORT ON THE CHAIRMAN'S VISIT TO POLAND

2 - 8 September, 1984



## R E P O R T

- (i) The Chairman, accompanied by Mr. J. N. Cooper, Mr. R. H. G. Edmonds, the Executive Secretary and Mrs. Booth, visited Poland from 2nd - 8th September on behalf of the EETC, the unusually large delegation serving to underline the importance which the Council attaches to British/Polish trade.
- (ii) The programme (details attached) prepared by the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade, our official host, under the watchful eye of the British Embassy, included a visit to southern Poland (Katowice, a lead-zinc smelter at Miasteczko Slaskie, Krakow and Zakopane) and although we could profitably have spent more time at some of our meetings in Warsaw the programme was entirely satisfactory, including as it did calls on four full Ministers and a number of other senior Polish authorities.
- (iii) Notes on our meetings are also attached. The atmosphere throughout was frank and friendly and was notable for the openness with which the Polish side was prepared to discuss economic and social problems and also for lack of criticism. The most serious criticism we encountered (apart from an expression of regret that British participation in the maritime exhibition, "Baltexpo", was not stronger) came from a Vice-Minister of Mining and Power, Mr. Eugeniusz Ciszak, at our meeting with the Voivod (Governor) of Katowice who maintained that the NCB Chairman, Mr. McGregor, had somewhat abruptly reversed an earlier decision to accept an invitation to visit Poland. Whatever the true facts may have been - it was not clear, for example, whether this had happened before or after the coal strike began - we believe this should be investigated especially as, Polish disappointment apart, the interests of at least one British company in the mining equipment field may have been adversely affected as a result and even our Embassy had not been informed of the circumstances.
- (iv) Being by far the most significant British visit to Poland since the imposition of sanctions, the Poles clearly attached particular importance to Lord Shackleton's presence but in no way did they try to take advantage of the situation or to place him in an embarrassing position and Lord Shackleton for his part made it quite clear that he was not at any time speaking for HM Government. There can be no doubt that the Poles are anxious to see a restoration of normal relations with the West and would like to see Britain leading the way. They appeared to accept that a mutually satisfactory outcome to the Paris Club negotiations was an essential concomitant to the restoration of normal relationships and their desire to be accepted as IMF members once more is, we believe, quite genuine notwithstanding some press reports to the contrary.
- (v) The Ambassador, for whose support we cannot speak too highly and who attended all our meetings save that with NOT, has already



described the timing of the visit as "impeccable", falling as it did at a moment when official Western sentiment is softening and shortly before the re-instatement of the Joint Commission's meetings (next meeting, Warsaw, 22nd - 24th October). It was satisfactory to learn that the UK is ahead of West Germany and France in this (but not the Austrians or Italians) and it is to be hoped that the advantage which we believe we have gained will not be too much offset by Herr Genscher's planned visit to Poland early in November.

- (vi) We did not expect to find many new opportunities for trade with Poland and the mixture is likely to remain very much as before. Nonetheless, there does appear to be scope for new business on the technological side, especially as regards pollution control - industrial pollution is clearly a big problem - and energy efficiency. On the whole the country does seem to be slowly pulling itself together both economically and socially and the economic reforms could have the desired effect. Trade continues to increase with Polish exports to Britain, mostly coal, up 61% this year and the mood of cautious optimism which we encountered - and reflected - is we believe well founded, allowing always for the vagaries of the Polish temperament. We would certainly wish to encourage further demonstrations of goodwill and to support fresh trade promotional activity such as, for example, the proposed London Chamber of Commerce mission to Poland next year.
- (vii) In conclusion we owe a very special debt of gratitude to the Ambassador and to Mr. Jenkins, First Secretary (Commercial), for their highly professional support and guidance throughout our stay. Their innumerable services, their many kindnesses, their generosity and hospitality were greatly appreciated by us all - and without them this visit could not possibly have been the success we believe it was.
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P R O G R A M M E

Sunday, 2nd September

- 15.25 Main party arrived Warsaw Airport. Met by HM Ambassador, Mr. R. T. Jenkins, Mr. J. Szopa and Mr. J. Zelislawski (Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade).
- 18.30 Informal working supper at the Residence.

Monday, 3rd September

- 09.00 Call on Mr. T. Nestorowicz, Minister of Foreign Trade.
- 10.30 Call on Mr. J. Maciejewicz, Minister of Metallurgy & Machine Industry.
- 11.45 Call on Mr. J. Szopa, Vice-President, Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade.
- 13.00 Lunch hosted by Mr. Szopa at Wilanow.
- 16.00 Interview with Mr. M. Jaranowski, Foreign Editor of "Polityka Import-Eksport".
- 18.00 Reception to meet British businessmen hosted by Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins.

Tuesday, 4th September

- 09.00 Call on Mr. S. Olszowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- 10.00 Call on Professor W. Baka, Minister, Plenipotentiary for Economic Reform.
- 11.00 Call on Mr. S. Dlugosz, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission.
- 12.00 Call on Mr. K. Glazewski, President, Bank Handlowy.
- 13.00 Lunch hosted by Mr. Glazewski at the Forum Hotel.
- 15.00 Call on Professor J. Tymowski, Honorary President, Chief Technical Organisation (NOT).
- 17.30 Press conference at the Residence.
- 19.30 Dinner hosted by HM Ambassador.



Wednesday, 5th September

- 08.15 Left Warsaw by car for Katowice.  
11.30 Call on General R. Paszkowski, Voivod of Katowice.  
14.00 Arrived Huta Cynku Miasteczko Slaskie for meeting  
(approx) with Mr. J. Makiela, Managing Director, followed by  
tour of plant and lunch.  
Later Arrived Holiday Inn, Krakow.

Thursday, 6th September

- a.m. Sightseeing in Krakow including visits to Wawel and  
Czartoryski Collection.  
p.m. Drove to Hotel Kasprowy, Zakopane.

Friday, 7th September

- a.m./  
p.m. Sightseeing in and around Zakopane.  
18.30 Lord Shackleton, the Ambassador and Mr. Jenkins returned  
to Warsaw by car.

Saturday, 8th September

- 10.30 Meeting at the Residence with Polish Antarctic experts  
(Professor Roman Teisseyre and Professor Guterch).  
12.15 Interview with Polish Television.  
13.00 Informal lunch at the Residence.  
16.00 Main party left Warsaw Airport for Heathrow.  
(approx)
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NOTES ON MEETINGS

1. Ministry of Foreign Trade: Minister T. Nestorowicz

This, our first meeting, was also one of the best. Held in an inner room too small to seat any of the Minister's officials apart from his interpreter, the mood was warm and friendly and the exchanges full and frank throughout the hour long discussion.

Mr. Nestorowicz made no secret of Poland's economic problems, which he maintained had been exacerbated by the withdrawal of Western credits. They included inflation and shortages of industrial supplies but, he said, the internal market was improving slowly, albeit too slowly for the taste of ordinary people. However it was better to proceed with caution than to "get out of breath", as had happened in the 1970s. He recognised the importance of achieving a satisfactory outcome to the Paris debt talks, pointing out that without knowing the terms of settlement it was difficult to prepare the next Five Year Plan, but whatever happened the emphasis would be placed on increasing Polish exports since without new credits it was only by means of increased exports that Poland's debts could be paid and imports increased. A \$0.5 billion trade surplus with Western countries had been achieved in 1983 and, with exports to non-CMEA countries amounting to \$6bn against imports of \$5bn, a \$1bn surplus should be achieved this year - money which would be put towards debt repayments. Unfortunately Poland's application to join the IMF had now become a political issue.

As regards trade with other CMEA countries the Minister said that with the exception of the USSR, with whom the imbalance amounted to about 4 billion roubles and was still growing, trade was more or less in balance. Polish/Soviet trade relationships were a controversial subject but it was not true, as at least one hostile observer had suggested, that Poland was falling into the arms of the Soviet Union - it was more a matter of trading with those who wanted to trade with Poland.

Trade with Britain was inhibited by lack of finance, on which so much depended - the Ursus project was a case in point. Nevertheless the Minister was pleased that the UK was now Poland's second most important Western trading partner and he insisted that he was very much in favour of developing further cooperation with Western countries provided there were no political strings attached. The Polish side, he admitted, was partly to blame for the delays in the Ursus project and the problems surrounding the Wloclawek PVC plant, which was nearing completion, were "not so severe now". As to future prospects, Mr. Nestorowicz mentioned electronics, the modernisation of the shipyards, light industry and the machine tool industry as areas worthy of consideration. There was also a need to modernise the car manufacturing industry, exports of cars having dropped dramatically. His welcome for the re-instatement of the Joint Commission - during which future prospects could be defined more distinctly - was tinged with regret that it was to be conducted at a lower level than hitherto.



Thanking the Minister for his very thorough review Lord Shackleton made it clear that his team appreciated the difficulties which Poland had experienced and pointed out that Britain had never opposed Poland's application to join the I.M.F. although membership was not always a comfortable experience. He recalled that a number of British companies had remained firmly loyal to Poland even at the worst of times and, as the Ambassador pointed out, the wish to continue to collaborate in the Ursus and Wloclawek projects remained undiminished. Lord Shackleton, who emphasised at all our meetings that he was not a Government spokesman, also referred, inter alia, to the leadership of the Joint Commission, pointing out that the leader of the British team, Mr Corley, was a very senior Civil Servant.

Other matters discussed included the establishment of technical information offices in Warsaw (in respect of which the Minister said that a particular British company's problems would be re-examined), the economic reforms - the policy of decentralisation would be maintained in spite of some criticism - and countertrade, "for which there was a place in Polish enterprises". Mr. Nestorowicz also hoped that the Sejm would pass new legislation relating to joint ventures with Western companies, although there was some opposition to this.

2. Ministry of Metallurgy & Machine Industry: Minister J. Maciejewicz

The main talking point of general interest at this meeting, the mood of which, like all the others, was frank and friendly, was the Ursus project in respect of which both Massey-Ferguson's and the Government's eagerness to complete the project, albeit on a reduced scale, was again emphasised.

Predictably Vice-Minister Kuczynski, who was also present and who handled this part of the discussion, stressed the harm that had been done by the freeze on credit which had cost the Polish side dearly. Now, he said, "we are eagerly awaiting the decision of the British Government to re-open the credit channels", adding that he wished to see the project completed "but only in accordance with the conditions under which the contract was signed". He added that the Ministry of Foreign Trade had granted Ursus the right to run its own foreign trading affairs, meaning that Agromet would no longer be responsible for this. The Ambassador said that he had nothing to add to what he had said at an earlier meeting, noting that discussions with Massey-Ferguson were taking place in Warsaw concurrently.

Otherwise, Minister Maciejewicz said, British/Polish cooperation was running very smoothly. Institutes and research stations in the non-ferrous metallurgy and steel sectors were corresponding with their British partners, representatives of technical bodies attended scientific conferences in each other's countries and a number of Polish engineers and scientists were members of British institutions. Cooperation in these areas was very important and it was important, too, to encourage cooperation with NOT. As regards Ursus, he was anxious to see this problem resolved and production got under way.

Other matters discussed included the problem of pollution control (which was the responsibility of another ministerial office outside this Ministry's responsibility) and the increasing cost of recovering deep mined coal, which was leading to an increased reliance on lignite.



3. Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade: Vice-President J. Szopa

Mr. Szopa, our official host and standing in for his President, Mr. Karski who, we were told, had broken his arm in an accident, received us with a carefully prepared welcoming speech. The meeting, which was followed by a delightfully relaxed and informal lunch at Wilanow, consisted mainly of Mr Szopa's speech, which indifferent interpretation made seem all the longer, during the course of which he echoed Minister Nestorowicz's account of the difficulties being faced by the Polish economy and the need to restore normal relationships including the unblocking of credits, which should lead to further opportunities for new business. He praised the EETC's sympathetic attitude towards British/Polish commercial relations - the Council and the Polish Chamber had always got on well together - and regretted only that there was no official British participation in Baltexpo, in regard to which Mr. Cooper suggested that the London Chamber of Commerce should perhaps look into the possibility of organising a joint venture stand at the next exhibition.

Mr. Zelislawski, Deputy Director of the Chamber's Foreign Relations Department, welcomed this adding that the Polish Chamber looked forward to the possibility of receiving a trade mission - it should be a big group - from the London Chamber next year. Consideration ought, in his view, also to be given to the possibility of staging technical symposia.

4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Minister S. Olszowski

To the extent that our visit was designed to demonstrate goodwill towards Poland this was the most important of all our calls and was conducted by both sides with marked good humour and wit.

During the course of his welcoming remarks - and he welcomed Lord Shackleton on behalf of the Prime Minister, who was on leave - Minister Olszowski, who looks about twenty years older than his age (53), pleaded for a return to the good relations which Poland had enjoyed with Western countries in the 1970s arguing strongly in favour of Britain, both politically and economically, leading the way. Knowing Lord Shackleton's stand against sanctions he wished to appeal to him personally to help to achieve this and to pass this message on to Mrs. Thatcher. "Otherwise", he said, "the leader would be a different country" (meaning West Germany, with whom Polish trade turnover was already four times that of Great Britain, and certainly not France, whom the Minister dismissed as being "very capricious"). Speaking very frankly Mr. Olszowski emphasised the importance to Europe as a whole of stability in Poland: he believed this was slowly being achieved, although there could still be hiccups such as rioting in the streets. However it was increasingly being accepted that strikes and disturbances did no one any good and the need to work was being increasingly recognised by people in rural areas and among "the so-called intelligentsia" although, he added with disarming frankness, this new mood would probably not last forever! The U.S. seemed to look at things differently and to view Poland as



"an instrument", but a stable and peaceful country really was of paramount importance to all.

In the course of his reply Lord Shackleton said that many on the British side had never wavered in their attitude towards Poland. He would certainly try to convey the Minister's message to the Prime Minister and he could not help contrasting the British attitude with that of the United States, currently in the throes of a Presidential election, pointing out that it was of course much more in British than in American consciousness that the previous day had marked the 45th anniversary of the day Britain entered into the war together with Poland. He also pointed out Britain's support for Poland's application to join the IMF and complimented Ambassador Staniszewski, who was among those present, on the excellent job he was doing for his country.

Other matters raised during the course of the wide-ranging discussion that followed included the visit to the lead-zinc smelter at Miasteczko Slaskie, where the Minister said there were serious pollution problems, the importance of reaching agreement soon as regards the re-scheduling of government debt and the Wloclawek and Ursus projects.

As regards Miasteczko, the Minister said there had even been talk of closing the plant because of the pollution problem and if British technologists could do something to combat pollution this would be a very great achievement. Coming from Wloclawek himself he was particularly pleased to note that progress was being made in respect of the PVC plant and it would of course be of very great help if the credit facilities in respect of Ursus were to be resumed. The plant had considerable export-earning potential which would help to relieve the debt problem.

Lord Shackleton also touched on Polish involvement in the Antarctic Treaty, which was due for renewal in 1991. The Minister said that here Poland would maintain her position as a full consultative member of the Treaty.

#### 5. Office for Economic Reform: Minister W. Baka

It was a pity that this meeting could not have lasted longer than the forty-five minutes or so that it did. Professor Baka, exuding cheerful confidence, gave us a very full and lucid account of the economic reform movement, its achievements and its aspirations, but by the time he had come to the end of his interesting dissertation there was not a moment left for questioning or discussion.

The Polish economy, Professor Baka said, had undergone substantial change, a forced change, over the past four years thanks to the reform movement. Thus at a time of severe supply shortages Enterprises had been thrown in at the deep end and given their



own autonomy, one of the most important achievements so far. The reform movement had begun in 1982, most of the new machinery had been introduced in 1983 and the process was continuing this year. Things were still in transformation but the new mechanisms were gaining ground and although the necessary legislation had been completed the country was still at the beginning of the road in terms of changing people's mental attitudes.

Improvements in the pricing system was one of the reform movement's central features and involved bringing prices of raw materials and basic products more into line with world prices than ever before. Here the adjustment of coal prices had been a particular problem having regard to the importance of coal to the economy as a whole, but a foundation for the rational management of the economy had now been created. The tax system had also become more important, particularly indirect taxation as an instrument of control where products were in short supply, and the credit system now had a more important part to play too. Loss-making Enterprises could no longer depend on state subsidies to cover their insolvency and they could now be declared bankrupt. The Banks had so far warned that some 300 Enterprises stood in danger of bankruptcy or insolvency and the management of six of them had been taken over, two having actually been declared bankrupt. A "microscopic" proportion of the whole, Professor Baka admitted, but the psychological effect was considerable.

Progress had also been made in the foreign trade sector and some 440 licences had been granted to new Enterprises - both publicly and privately owned - allowing them to engage in foreign trade. This did not however "change in any way the role of state control and monopoly of foreign trade". It was for the Ministry of Foreign Trade to grant these concessions and Enterprises could challenge the Ministry's decisions in the courts - indeed some Enterprises had already done so. Some 2,000 Enterprises, about a third of the whole, now had foreign exchange retention accounts allowing them to keep up to 30% of their export earnings in special accounts: more than \$1 billion had so far been accumulated in this way and this money, Professor Baka thought, was being spent sensibly.

One of the aims was to influence the direction of Enterprises' activities but without directives. Here a system of government contracts had been introduced whereby Enterprises, including foreign Enterprises operating in Poland, could bid against Government tenders, contracts being awarded to those quoting the most competitive terms. The successful tenderer gained access to materials that were in short supply and also enjoyed favourable tax treatment. This system worked but the Government was anxious not to overplay its hand for fear of spoiling the effect.

Professor Baka went on to declare himself to be an optimist for the future. So far the results had been good. Both the statistics and opinion polls had shown that his optimistic forecasts had been correct. Thus, whilst for 1983 a 3% increase in output had been planned, productivity had actually risen by 8% and national income had risen 6% against a planned 3.5% only. This tendency was continuing - already productivity was up 5% this year against a 4.5% forecast and he hoped to achieve 5.5% at least by the end of



the year - all this without any increase in employment. A revolutionary new wages system had been introduced as well under which the state now defined minimum wages only, wage bonuses being left to the Enterprises thus providing new work incentives.

In conclusion Professor Baka said that the economic reform movement had not yet come to an end. It was an enormous venture and there could be no guarantee that it would end in success - ultimate success would depend on fundamental changes in mentality - and there could be no doubt that considerable problems lay ahead in applying this vast social experiment, an experiment that was not made any easier by negative external economic factors.

6. The Planning Commission: Deputy Chairman S. Dlugosz

Again time was not on our side and it was a pity that we did not have longer in which to try to break down Mr. Dlugosz's somewhat hawkish approach, which was surprising bearing in mind his many friends in Britain. His general attitude was defensive and a touch censorious and, although more of his old friendly self at the Ambassador's dinner that evening, he was not disposed towards pointing the way to possible new fields for British/Polish co-operation.

Much of what Mr. Dlugosz had to say turned on the emphasis now being placed on developing relationships with other CMEA countries and particularly the importance of the Soviet Union as a market for Polish exports where, as was the case in other Socialist markets, Poland was under considerable pressure to improve the quality of her exports. When it came to trade with the West Mr. Dlugosz implied that it was a case of once bitten, twice shy, and unfortunately there could be no return to the situation that had existed in the seventies. In fact, he recalled, Poland had already been bitten twice, bearing in mind the decision to stop Western credits in 1946, and m.f.n. treatment had also been withdrawn. Poland would have to shape her trade relations with the West with a lot of care now but this did not mean that further trade development with the West was excluded. It was a matter of being more cautious in the future.

As regards future Plans, Mr. Dlugosz said that he could not say anything about the next Five Year Plan since everything was under internal discussion and even the main objectives were not yet known. The One Year Plan for 1985 would be "very realistic" involving a cut in investment; expenditure would probably amount to between 97%-98% of this year's. Foreign trade, especially exports, would be given a very high priority (+ 4.5% over 1984's performance planned) and the aim was to increase national income by 3.2% and industrial production by about 4% at least.

After investment Mr. Dlugosz listed salaries, inflation, labour



efficiency and prices as the country's most important problems. General Jaruzelski had achieved much in persuading people that prices had to move upwards after thirty years of theory that prices were fixed. Now the need was to bring down inflation: in 1983 inflation had stood at over 100%, this year it would probably be between 17% and 20% and next year it was hoped to reduce it to 10%, although whether that target would be achieved remained to be seen. It short, whilst Poland was still faced with a number of social and economic problems the trend was in the right direction - the next step would be the General Election which would probably be held next Spring.

Asked by Lord Shackleton about the wages system and areas of potential growth in exports to Britain and to the West, Mr. Dlugosz expressed reservations as to the effectiveness of the new wages laws; it was too early to tell whether it would produce the desired result but at least the authorities were alive to the problems of jobs and labour productivity and he hoped they would be dealt with effectively. He believed the country had sufficient domestic resources to obviate the need to import raw materials such as copper and sulphur and it was hoped to achieve a balance in food imports/exports by the second half of the eighties, thus releasing money to finance other imports. Grain imports had been reduced substantially this year and it was hoped to make further cuts in 1985. Poland could not compete with the West in consumer goods so the emphasis would have to be on machinery and "highly processed" goods. The policy of reducing imports of machinery and equipment from the West would probably be continued.

7. Bank Handlowy: President K. Glazewski

Meetings with CMEA bankers are usually more relaxed and sophisticated than with most other East European authorities and this meeting was no exception to the rule.

Mr. Glazewski made it quite clear during the course of a short general discussion before lunch that Poland wished to pursue her application for membership of the IMF which, although distinct from the Paris Club negotiations, was to some extent inter-related, Mr. Dutkiewicz commenting that the IMF might make the settlement of the Paris Club negotiations a condition of membership. New credit facilities were essential to increased exports - the amount was not as important at present as resolving the problem with Western governments - and of course IMF membership would enhance Poland's status in the eyes of the commercial banks. The Bank was only indirectly involved in the Paris Club negotiations but would nevertheless be very glad to see agreement reached as soon as possible.

Insofar as the settlement reached with the commercial banks in August was concerned, Mr. Glazewski said that the Bank Handlowy was completely satisfied. Long-term credit facilities apart, he would now welcome a return to normal banking relationships. Relationships with British banks, he added, varied - "with some we have very good relations, with others things remain the same".



Mr. Glazewski also confirmed that the system of retention accounts, of which Professor Baka had spoken earlier, was working well, adding that it was intended to extend the system to give Enterprises even more incentive to export. Exporting Enterprises of course often needed credit to finance their imports of materials and the Bank was interested in inviting Western banks to help in extending such credit facilities, the interest being paid out of Enterprises' retention quotas.

8. Chief Technical Organisation (NOT): Honorary President, Professor J. Tymowski

Although this meeting lasted an appreciable time, much of which was taken up with accounts of the Polish Association of Agricultural Engineers & Technicians' relationships with the Polish Ministry of Agriculture and other bodies, Polish non-ferrous metals and district heating in Warsaw, little arose from the discussion calling for mention in this Report.

NOT, which is a federation of scientific and technical associations similar to MTESZ in Hungary, is nevertheless an important body and Professor Tymowski, who can best be described as a delightful old gentleman of the old school, received us with the greatest possible courtesy and consideration. NOT has worked closely with the London Chamber of Commerce in staging Technical Events in the past and Professor Tymowski suggested at one stage that a joint meeting on automation should be organised. NOT was, he said, very interested in robotics and flexible manufacturing.

A paper describing NOT's composition and objectives was presented to us.

9. Voivod of Katowice: General R. Paszkowski

The Polish Voivods, comparable to French Préfets, are men of considerable power and influence in their localities and this interesting and unusual meeting came as an unexpected bonus to our programme. General Paszkowski, a striking-looking airforce officer in full military dress, received us with great dignity and the useful discussion that followed was enhanced by the presence, among others, of Mr. E. Ciszak, Vice-Minister of Mining & Power, who is based in Katowice.

Following General Paszkowski's words of welcome to "the industrial heart of Poland", during the course of which he spoke of industrial pollution, which is a serious problem, water shortages, the need for more residential appartments and problems of communication, two specific points emerged from the ensuing conversation relating to (i) British interest in building a metro system for Katowice, and (ii) the Polish coalmining industry's relationships with the NCB.



As regards the metro the Ambassador spoke of the ability of Metrotec, a group of British companies involved in mass transit design and equipment supply, to build the most up-to-date metro system in the world, expressing the hope that a delegation of experts who were planning a visit to Britain to study the matter would in fact come. The Voivod said that the system being planned was based on surface railway transportation but he was nevertheless aware of British expertise: whether or not the delegation visited Britain would depend on a decision as to whether or not a new system was to be provided for in the investment programme. If the decision were to be postponed the visit would have to be postponed, too. [Note: It was learned subsequently that a Polish team is planning to visit the UK in November at a date to be agreed].

Mr. Ciszak spoke more in sorrow than in anger about the deterioration in relations with the NCB, saying that whereas co-operation both at official and working levels had been very good hitherto things were no longer as they were and unfortunately an invitation to Mr. McGregor to visit Poland, which he had accepted, had subsequently been turned down without a satisfactory explanation. Mr. Ciszak implied that this had happened before the British coal strike had started and in registering his disappointment said that the Polish side would still like to get back to the good relationships that had existed in the past; however it was up to the British side to make the next move. The Ambassador said that this conversation would be reported to the NCB.

10. Visit to Huta Cynku Miasteczko

This is a large lead/zinc smelter at Miasteczko Slaskie, employing 3,000 people some forty minutes' drive north of Katowice, using Imperial Smelting Processes (ISP) technology. The Director, Mr. J. Makiela, talked freely about the plant, which we toured, and its problems emphasising how much he valued the British connection and indicating that he would welcome further cooperation.

He told us that the plant, consisting of three production lines, was not working to full capacity because it was operating on domestic concentrates only coming from an area 60km from Katowice. The plant's basic products were zinc and lead and it was Poland's only producer of refined lead for use in battery manufacture. By-products included sulphur and cadmium. The plant operated on a continuous three-shift system and the workers enjoyed a number of privileges such as additional holidays and free medical treatment. Illness was not a serious problem although clearly there were difficulties as regards dust pollution. Tests on lead levels in the blood among the local population had so far been inconclusive.



Over lunch Mr. Makiela expressed concern about a rumour that the London Metal Exchange intended to deal in electrolytic zinc only in future and would no longer handle refined zinc - a rumour subsequently found to be correct.

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Prime Minister  
21.7.84

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 360 OF 21 JULY  
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO  
AND TO PRIORITY MOSCOW, EAST BERLIN, SOFIA, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST,  
PRAGUE, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS

POLAND - AMNESTY

1. SUMMARY: THE POLISH SEJM PASSED THE NEW AMNESTY LAW ON THE MORNING OF 21 JULY. AS FAR AS WE CAN JUDGE FROM THE FULL TEXT WHICH WE HAVE JUST OBTAINED (AND WHICH CARRY EXTENSIVE REFERENCES TO OTHER LEGISLATION) IT IS AS FAR REACHING AS FORECAST IN MY TEL NO 357. PERPETRATORS OF ALL POLITICAL CRIMES ARE TO BE PARDONED, CONDITIONAL ONLY ON NOT COMMITTING NEW SIMILAR OFFENCES BEFORE THE END OF 1986. SENTENCES WILL BE ANNULLED OR REDUCED IN THE CASE OF MANY CRIMINAL OFFENDERS.

2. DETAIL: THE SEJM PASSED THE AMNESTY BILL DURING A BRIEF WORKING SESSION ON THE MORNING OF 21 JULY. THE BILL WAS PRESENTED BY A MEMBER OF THE SEJM COMMISSION FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, EUGENIA KAMPAROWA. THE CHAIRMAN CALLED A VOTE WITHOUT ANY DEBATE. IT WAS PASSED BY 365 VOTES IN FAVOUR TO FOUR AGAINST WITH EIGHT ABSTENTIONS.

3. IN HER PRESENTATION, MRS KAMPAROWA SAID THAT PRON'S CALL FOR AN AMNESTY MET THE HOPE AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE NATION. IN DECIDING ON THE PRINCIPLES AND EXTENT OF THE AMNESTY, THE COUNCIL OF STATE HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE PROGRESS IN THE NORMALISATION OF LIFE IN POLAND, INCLUDING INCREASED PRODUCTION, TRADE UNION ACTIVITY AND THE LOCAL ELECTION RESULTS.



4. RECALLING THE RESULTS OF THE AMNESTY LAW IN 1983 WHICH HAD IN DIFFERENT WAYS BENEFITTED SOME 2,700 PEOPLE, MRS KAMPAROWA SAID THAT TODAY'S AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL OFFENDERS, WHICH TOOK ACCOUNT OF ALL OFFENCES COMMITTED BEFORE 21 JULY 1984, WAS MUCH FURTHER REACHING. IT APPLIED NOT ONLY TO STRIKERS AND DEMONSTRATORS BUT ALSO TO PEOPLE WHOSE ACTIVITIES HAD AIMED AT THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF POLAND'S POLITICAL SYSTEM. CLEMENCY WOULD APPLY TO ALL SENTENCES FOR POLITICAL OFFENCES, REGARDLESS OF LENGTH, AND INCLUDING THOSE ALREADY HALVED UNDER THE 1983 AMNESTY LAW. ALL LEGAL PROCEEDINGS NOW IN PROGRESS WOULD BE STOPPED. THE ONLY EXCLUSIONS WOULD BE HIGH TREASON, ESPIONAGE AND SABOTAGE.

5. ALL PEOPLE WHO HAD COMMITTED POLITICAL CRIMES, EVEN IF UNKNOWN TO THE AUTHORITIES, HAD UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 1984 TO COME FORWARD AND REPORT TO THE INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITIES OR TO THE POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD. (THIS PROVISION WAS ALSO AVAILABLE, IN MORE LIMITED FORM, TO PERPETRATORS OF CRIMINAL ACTS.)

6. THE AMNESTY WOULD ALSO APPLY TO COMMON CRIMES COMMITTED BEFORE 21 JULY 1984, INCLUDING TAX AND MILITARY OFFENCES. SENTENCES OF UP TO TWO YEARS WOULD BE REMITTED, AND UP TO THREE YEARS HALVED. EXCEPTIONS INCLUDED CAUSING DEATH OR INJURY THROUGH DRUNKENNESS, BRIBERY, EXTORTION AND PROFITEERING. MRS KAMPAROWA EXPLAINED THAT THE AMNESTY APPLIED TO CUSTODIAL SENTENCES ONLY AND HAD NO EFFECT ON FINES, DEPRIVATION OF PUBLIC RIGHTS COMPENSATION ETC.

7. MRS KAMPAROWA DREW ATTENTION TO A PROVISION OF THE BILL WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE DROPPING OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL OF STATE FOR ACTS COMMITTED PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL IN MARCH 1982.

8. THE AMNESTY IN INDIVIDUAL CASES WOULD BE REVOKED IF ANYONE WHO HAD BENEFITTED FROM IT COMMITTED A SIMILAR OFFENCE BEFORE 31 DECEMBER 1986, AND THE OLD CHARGE OR CUSTODIAL SENTENCE WOULD BE RENEWED.

9. THE LAW ENVISAGED THAT THE PROCESS OF FREEING PRISONERS WOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE LAW'S COMING INTO EFFECT.

10. COMMENT IN WIFT.

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Prime Minister

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
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 361 OF 21 JULY

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO

AND TO PRIORITY MOSCOW, EAST BERLIN, SOFIA, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, PRAGUE, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS

MIPT: POLAND - THE AMNESTY

1. THE AMNESTY BILL PASSED TODAY SHOULD RESULT IN THERE BEING NO POLITICAL PRISONERS LEFT IN CUSTODY OR UNDER INVESTIGATION IN POLAND. IT IS MADE CONDITIONAL ON CONTINUED GOOD BEHAVIOUR UNTIL THE END OF 1986 AND IT REMAINS UNCERTAIN HOW FAR THE KOR LEADERS WHO WERE ON TRIAL WILL REFRAIN FROM GIVING THE AUTHORITIES PRETEXT TO REARREST THEM DURING THE NEXT TWO AND A HALF YEARS. IT IS ALSO SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE SOLIDARITY LEADERS STILL UNDERGROUND, E.G. BUJAK, WILL GIVE THEMSELVES UP BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

2. THE AMNESTY HAS FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST, CUT THE GROUND FROM UNDER THE FEET OF THE OPPOSITION. WALESZA NO DOUBT RECOGNISED THIS POSSIBILITY IN HIS COMMENT TO WESTERN NEWS AGENCIES THAT THE AMNESTY COULD BE A GREAT STEP FORWARD IN SOCIAL RECONCILIATION BUT EQUALLY THE PRISONS COULD BE FULL AGAIN IN A FEW MONTHS. CHURCH AND OPPOSITION CIRCLES CLAIM THAT MANY PEOPLE CONVICTED OR UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR WHAT THE AUTHORITIES REGARD AS CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ARE IN FACT POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. THE AMNESTY'S LIMITATIONS WITH REGARD TO CRIMINALS COULD MEAN THAT A FEW PRISONERS REGARDED BY THE OPPOSITION AND MANY CHURCH FIGURES AS POLITICAL DO NOT BENEFIT FROM IT IN FULL.

3. THE MECHANICS OF THE AMNESTY PROCESS ARE NOT YET CLEAR BUT IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT IT WILL BE UP TO THE RELEVANT INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITIES AND COURTS TO IMPLEMENT IT BOTH IN THESE CASES (INCLUDING THE KOR FOUR) WHERE A TRIAL HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED, AND WHERE SENTANCE HAS BEEN PASSED.



4. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE KOR FOUR WILL BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT THE AMNESTY IN THEIR OWN CASES. ARTICLE 1 OF THE AMNESTY LAW PARDONS OFFENCES UNDER ARTICLES 123, 132 AND 133 OF THE PENAL CODE WHICH INCLUDE ACTIVITIES QUOTE AIMED AT THE OVERTHROW OF THE STATE UNQUOTE. THIS SEEMS TO REFER SPECIFICALLY TO THEM. ON THE BASIS OF THEIR RECENT DEMANDS FOR A TRIAL, AS PUBLISHED IN THE WESTERN PRESS, IT IS QUESTIONABLE IF THE KOR FOUR WILL WELCOME THE AMNESTY (THOUGH THEY CAN SCARCELY REFUSE TO BE PUT OUT ON THE STREET). IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE SEVEN LEADING SOLIDARITY PRISONERS AWAITING THE TRIAL WILL NOW ALSO BE RELEASED.

5. AS FORESEEN IN MY TEL NO 357, THE FIGURES FROM THE GIEREK ERA, NOTABLY FORMER PRIME MINISTER JAROSIEWICZ, WILL ALSO BENEFIT FROM THE AMNESTY, AS THEIR ALLEGED ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION WILL NOT BE PURSUED.

6. JARUZELSKI MUST FEEL HE COULD HARDLY HAVE GONE MUCH FURTHER IN MEETING DEMANDS FOR A RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. HE WILL NO DOUBT FEEL JUSTIFIED IN EXPECTING AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE AT AN EARLY DATE FROM THE WEST OVER ENDING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, GRANTING FRESH CREDITS AND IMF MEMBERSHIP. PARADOXICALLY, THE AMNESTY HAS PUT THE GOVERNMENT AND PARTICULARLY THE HARD-LINERS IN A STRONG POSITION TO CALL FOR TOUGH AND QUICK PUNISHMENTS OF ALL FUTURE OFFENDERS. THERE WILL ALSO BE SEEN TO BE A STRONGER CASE FOR THE DETENTION OF NEW POLITICAL PRISONERS FOR INVESTIGATION OF NEW QUOTE CRIMES UNQUOTE COMMITTED AFTER 21 JULY 1984.

7. THE SOVIET UNION MAY ALSO FEEL THAT AFTER THIS SHOW OF CONCILIATION THEY ARE ABLE TO INSIST ON A STRONGER LINE AGAINST DISSIDENCE HENCEFORTH. TIKHOROV, THE ONLY NON-POLE TO SPEAK AT THE SEJM GALA SESSION TODAY, CONCENTRATED ON A STANDARD RESUME OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICIES WITH THE MINIMUM REFERENCE TO THE INTERNAL POLISH SCENE. TODAY'S TRIBUNA LUDU ALSO PUBLISHES AN ARTICLE BY JARUZELSKI COINED IN MORE FULSOME TERMS THAN USED ON POLISH - SOVIET RELATIONS.

8. IN JARUZELSKI'S SPEECH TO THE GALA SESSIONS THE SENTENCES WHICH ATTRACTED THE LONGEST APPLAUSE WERE QUOTE THOSE WHO REPEAT ILLEGAL ACTIONS WILL BE JUDGED SEVERELY. THERE WILL BE NO RETURN TO ANARCHY UNQUOTE. JARUZELSKI CLEARLY MEANS WHAT HE SAYS AND APPEARS TO HAVE THE POWER TO IMPLEMENT IT.

MORGAN

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cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 May 1984

Thank you for your letter of 22 May about our trade and commercial relations with Poland. The Prime Minister has noted its contents.

A. J. COLES

Martin Bond, Esq.,  
Department of Trade and Industry.





DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY  
1-19 VICTORIA STREET  
LONDON SW1H 0ET

Prime Minister.

Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215) 5144  
GTN 215) 5144  
(Switchboard) 215 7877

From the Minister for Trade

A. & C. 27/5

John Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

mt

22 May 1984

Dear John

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware of plans which this Department has for a limited re-opening of our official trade and commercial relations with Poland.

Following the introduction of martial law in December 1981, and in line with the statement made in the Commons on 5 February 1982 by the Lord Privy Seal\* on measures to be taken by HMG in response to this, no meetings of the UK/Polish Joint Commission (JC) have taken place. (The function of the JC is to review economic, industrial and technical co-operation between the two countries). It was also recognised that in the absence of credit for new investment there would in any case be little to discuss at such meetings.

Since then martial law has been lifted and there appear to be good prospects of Poland reaching agreement with its Western creditors on the rescheduling of its official debt.

There is considerable evidence that other Western countries, including our EC partners, are now resuming trade dialogues or partial joint commissions with the Poles at official level. If we lag behind we may not retain our market share, which is second only to the Federal Republic's among Western countries.

Our plan is limited to having a JC meeting with the Poles in October or November at official level only. The last two JCs were led by Ministers but in line with our Western partners we would consider it premature to go beyond the official level this year.

\* Copy attached





My Minister is content with this approach and the FCO are also in favour. I am sending a copy of this letter to Peter Ricketts.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Martin Bond*

MARTIN BOND  
Assistant Private Secretary to the  
Minister for Trade (PAUL CHANNON)



Subsequently the European Court of Human Rights granted three extensions, totalling just over two months, for the submission of the Government's memorial to enable it to complete its researches and drafting. The present Administration have not asked for any other extensions of time or for any adjournment or postponements of hearings.

**Mr. Grylls** asked the Lord Privy Seal whether any extensions of time or adjournments have been requested by Her Majesty's Government in relation to the claims that have been brought against the Government by, amongst others, Vosper Limited under the European Convention on Human Rights arising out of the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977; how many requests have been made; and if he will specify the reasons for those requests being made.

**Mr. Humphrey Atkins:** The Government have made two requests to extend the time limit for submitting their observations on the admissibility and merits of the six original applications raising issues connected with the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977. The first time limit expired at the end of October 1981 and the second at the end of January 1982. These six applications, and three more similar ones recently notified to the Government, raise exceedingly complicated and difficult issues which have to be co-ordinated in each of the cases.

#### Poland

**Sir Anthony Kershaw** asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will make a statement on the outcome of the allied consultations on Poland in the North Atlantic Council on 3 February.

**Mr. Humphrey Atkins:** In her reply to the hon. Member for Huntingdonshire (Mr. Major) on 4 February, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister explained the position reached in discussion in the North Atlantic Council following the declaration issued by NATO Foreign Ministers on 11 January. The Prime Minister stated that at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 3 February, it was agreed to pursue and as necessary strengthen actions along the lines set out in the 11 January declaration. She undertook to give the House details as soon as possible of the measures being taken by Her Majesty's Government. These measures are as follows.

With respect to Poland, Her Majesty's Government:

- (i) have imposed travel restrictions on Polish diplomats and certain other official Polish representatives in London and Glasgow;
- (ii) will ensure that their relations with the military régime in Poland reflect the abnormal nature of the present situation;
- (iii) have increased BBC broadcasts in the Polish language to Poland;
- (iv) will give financial or other assistance to help co-ordinate the efforts of those voluntary and Church agencies in Britain which are providing humanitarian aid to Poland;
- (v) have agreed with other Western official creditors that the question of rescheduling of Poland's 1982 official debt should, for the time being, be held in suspense;
- (vi) have placed in abeyance existing officially guaranteed credits to Poland subject to safe guarding the interests of British firms having legal binding contractual obligations;
- (vii) will not for the present make available any new credits for Poland;
- (viii) have agreed with our Community partners that there should be no further sales of European Community food at special prices to Poland. Funds that would have been made available for this purpose will now be diverted to the provision of humanitarian aid through the voluntary

agencies and Church agencies. As a result of this decision, there is up to 35 mecu (approximately £19 million) available for this purpose of which the Commission is putting forward a proposal for the early allocation of 8 mecu (approximately £4.5 million).

- With respect to the Soviet Union Her Majesty's Government:
- (i) have imposed additional restrictions on the travel of Soviet officials based in the United Kingdom;
  - (ii) will reduce the level of activity under four Anglo-Soviet technical cooperation agreements, in the fields of medicine and public health, environmental protection, agricultural research and atomic energy;
  - (iii) have introduced a licensing system which covers Soviet factory ships transshipping fish caught in United Kingdom waters;
  - (iv) have given notice that they intend to re-negotiate the terms of the Anglo/Soviet Treaty on Merchant Navigation;
  - (v) are exploring with Community partners the possibility of reclassifying the Soviet Union within the OECD export credit consensus (on which we expect early agreement in the Community) and of trade policy measures regarding Soviet exports to the Community.

#### Visa Application (USSR)

**Mr. Marks** asked the Lord Privy Seal what was the total number of entry visa requests received from Union of Soviet Socialist Republics citizens during 1981; how many were for academic purposes; how many were refused; and what were the main reasons for refusals.

**Mr. Richard Luce** [pursuant to his reply, 28 January 1982, c. 407]: A total of 8,583 visa requests were made by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics citizens in 1981. Of these 1,265 were made by persons coming to this country for academic purposes and to attend conferences. The total number of visa requests refused was 124 and over 90 per cent. of the refusals were because the applications were not supported by sponsors in this country.

## ENERGY

### British National Oil Corporation

**Mr. Rowlands** asked the Secretary of State for Energy whether he will list the advisers and consultants appointed by the Government and the British National Oil Corporation to prepare the privatisation of the corporation's oil equity interests; what has been paid in fees to date; what proportion has been paid by Her Majesty's Government; and what future commitments have been made in respect of, for example, success fees and underwriting.

**Mr. Gray:** My Department is being advised on the privatisation of the British National Oil Corporation's equity oil interests by S. G. Warburg & Co., Ltd. and by Freshfields. I understand from BNOC that its principal advisers on the Government's proposals for privatisation as on other matters are N. M. Rothschild & Sons Ltd. and Herbert Smith & Co., Ltd. My Department has paid no fees to date in connection with the privatisation of BNOC's equity oil interests and no commitment has been given in respect of success fees or underwriting fees. Fees paid by BNOC are a matter for the corporation.

## EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

### School Buildings (Lead-free Paint)

**Mr. Skinner** asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science if he will now undertake a nation-wide survey



Discussed with the Prime Minister. Agreed that the message alone should go.

Mr. Fairman informed and will handle. A.S.C. 5/5

①

Think we are keeping too sensitive, I see no

PRIME MINISTER

Federation of Poles in Great Britain

Reason why  
Richard P. H. H. H.  
should not go. mb

The above organisation is holding an International Conference in London from 9-12 May. The main objective is said to be to extend political as well as material help to Poland.

The organisers have asked that you should designate a representative of Her Majesty's Government to attend. Sir Bernard Braine has written to support this request.

The Foreign Secretary's advice is that it would be wrong to send a British Minister to this event. There are likely to be attacks on the Polish Government and a British Government representative on the platform would become associated with them. We cannot ~~currently~~ maintain diplomatic relations with a foreign Government and at the same time overtly associate ourselves with attempts, however praiseworthy, to oppose that Government.

However, the Foreign Office believe that you could reasonably send a message to the Conference. Would you be prepared to send a message on the lines of the attached draft?

A. J. Cole.

4 May 1984



EARLY DAY MOTION: NO 682

POLITICAL PRISONERS IN POLAND

Line to Take

1. The Government shares the concern expressed in the Motion about political prisoners in Poland. We are monitoring developments closely. In our contacts with the Polish authorities we continue to call for the release of political detainees.

HMG's Policy Towards Poland

2. Relations with Poland are still influenced by developments since the imposition of martial law in 1981. Our objective is the resumption of a more normal relationship, but this depends on the situation in Poland. We look to the Polish authorities to honour their undertakings on national reconciliation.

Solidarity

3. Lasting political and economic stability in Poland depends on genuine dialogue and co-operation between the government and all sections of Polish society.

Western Sanctions

4. Certain measures against Poland remain in force, such as denial of credit. These are kept under review in the light of developments in Poland. We co-ordinate policy with our partners and allies.

Polish Church Scheme to Aid Private Agriculture

5. We are following project's progress with interest. At request of Ten, European Commission currently looking at scheme. (If pressed). Premature to make financial or other commitment.



CONFIDENTIAL



cc DTI JR

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

7 December 1983

FREE POST FOR POLAND

Thank you for your letter of 5 December.

The Prime Minister accepts the arguments against introducing a free parcel post service to Poland over the pre-Christmas period.

I am copying this letter to Neil McMillan in the Department of Trade and Industry.

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JR





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Para Minutes:

5 December 1983

The FCO advise against a free post for Poland on much the same grounds as previously.

No other West European nation is proposing to introduce or reintroduce such a scheme. Only the Swiss scheme remains, until March 1984. Contact with this line?

Yes  
no

See John

Free Post for Poland

You mentioned before your departure to CHOGM that the Prime Minister would like advice on whether present circumstances merited favourable reconsideration of the proposal for a free parcel post service to Poland over the pre-Christmas period.

6/12

We have consulted the Department of Trade and Industry who are the lead Department on this subject. Our conclusion is that there is no case for introducing such an arrangement. The technical, financial and other problems arising from a free post concession, as set out in my letters of 27 January and 17 March this year to Tim Flesher, are all still valid.

will request another copy if required

We remain unconvinced that a free post would be a particularly effective form of aid to Poland and it is clear that it would be very expensive. We have already provided significant financial assistance to Community Aid programmes to Poland which are continuing (the European Parliament only recently approved the provision of a further £10 million for this purpose). We continue to regard this as the main channel for our assistance.

The Post Office view remains that the need to operate profitable services prevents them from offering concessionary rates for parcels to Poland or for any other aid purpose. They say it is impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy what the response would be in the UK if such a concession were introduced. On the evidence of the earlier experience of the German and Italian postal administrations there could be a dramatic increase in the flow of parcels. In the case of Germany, the volume rose from 200,000 to 1.9 million parcels a month, while in Italy numbers increased from 4,500 to 200,000 for a three month period. There is no evidence of any current groundswell of UK opinion in favour of such a concession, but nevertheless both the number and

/weight





weight of parcels to Poland could be expected to rise significantly, especially if public sympathies were to be aroused by a press campaign drawing attention to the service. It would be difficult to ensure that the arrangement was not abused. Indeed the Swedes earlier told us in confidence that one reason for terminating their scheme was a belief that it was being exploited for commercial and other non-aid purposes.

On the basis of recent traffic flows, the Post Office have calculated that a two-month scheme could lead to a loss of revenue of about £2 million in a Spring/Summer period rising to some 2.6 million over a Christmas period. Without a clear indication of the volumes to be carried however such estimates could be widely inaccurate. Apart from the direct loss of revenue, operating costs would also rise given the special treatment and checking needed. Should there be heavy demand, then additional storage space and transport would be needed, along with extra overtime working, so further pushing up the cost to the Corporation. We understand that the 7 month scheme operated by the German Post Office in 1982 cost some £47 m.

Apart from these direct financial considerations, the Post Office are also worried about precedent in that a concession of this kind for Poland could open the floodgates to other requests for equally deserving cases. As you know, it is Government policy that nationalised industries such as the Post Office should operate commercially without subsidy. Should a precedent be created whereby the Government indicates that it is prepared to reimburse the Corporation for revenue lost in the possible furtherance of a scheme for essentially political ends then the door would be open to further claims and ground already won in the battle for efficiency in the nationalised industries put in jeopardy.

Our enquiries of other West European countries (EC partners, Sweden, Austria and Switzerland) confirm that, excepting Switzerland, none have recently introduced or have plans to introduce concessionary postal arrangements for Poland. Of those who temporarily introduced such schemes in 1982 (Sweden, FRG, Italy and Luxembourg) none are proposing to repeat the exercise. Several countries cited high costs and technical difficulties as the major factors in their reluctance to approve such schemes.

The Swiss have operated a limited free post facility for Poland since January 1982. It is scheduled to end in March 1984. Poland is apparently not prepared to accept parcels from Switzerland for free postal delivery in Poland and the facility is therefore limited within Switzerland

/to





to private individuals' parcels for Poland addressed to the Swiss offices of the Red Cross and Caritas. The latter organisations periodically deliver the parcels' contents by road to religious organisations in Poland.

Political and social developments in Poland during the year have not in our view altered the position. The political situation in Poland has somewhat improved. Martial law was lifted in July and a substantial number of prisoners benefitted from an amnesty including some detained for political reasons. Economically, the position is no worse than it was last year. Though the economy as a whole is still depressed, the slow recovery which began in the middle of last year, has continued, if somewhat patchily. The material situation of the Polish population has not significantly deteriorated since we looked at this question earlier in the year. Whilst the economic situation is therefore still far from satisfactory, there are no new factors to support a case for introducing the exceptional procedure of a free post for Poland.

The proposal for a free post for Poland was the subject of a House of Commons debate on 9 May 1983 on a motion proposed by Viscount Cranborne (Hansard columns 707-718). Mr Butcher, Under Secretary of State for Industry, replying for the Government, left open the possibility that we might look again at the question. We and the Department of Trade and Industry have kept this matter under review but we are both agreed that there is no case for revising our earlier position.

I am copying this letter to Neil McMillan in the Department of Trade and Industry.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'R B Bone', written in a cursive style.

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



Pennsylvania Int. Lit.  
Pr 9



55 DEC 1988





CONFIDENTIAL

He



CC HO

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

23 September 1983

General Sikorski

Thank you for your letter to John Coles of 20 September. The Prime Minister is content for H.M. Ambassador in Warsaw to reply to the Polish War Veterans' Organisation in the terms you suggest.

I am copying this letter to Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office).

**W. F. S. RICKETT**

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

MR





Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

At the end of August, the Polish War Veterans Organisation wrote to you calling for the return of General Sikorski's remains to Poland (Flag A).

20 September 1983

The FCO recommend that His Ambassador in Warsaw to write to the organisation as at B declining to meet their request.

Agree?

Yes  No   
Dear John,

WM  
20/9

General Sikorski

attached

In Roger Bone's letter of 31 August he promised to write again with our recommendations for handling the recent approach from the Polish War Veterans' Organisation requesting the transfer to Poland of the remains of General Sikorski.

As you may recall, the Home Secretary in 1981 considered a formal application from a Major Kycia (described as the brother-in-law and executor of the late Madame Helena Skikorska, General Skiroski's widow) for a licence under Section 25 of the Burial Act 1857 to enable the remains of General Sikorski to be transferred to Poland from Newark Cemetery for reburial in the Cathedral Crypt at Krakow.

Although the technical requirements for such a removal were in the main satisfactorily fulfilled, the Home Secretary, having consulted domestic opinion in Britain including the views of the Polish emigre community, concluded that it was not then appropriate to grant a removal licence. The Poles were so informed. His decision was made public in his reply to Mr Winston Churchill's question in the House on 30 June 1981 (copy enclosed). That reply left open the possibility that the matter could be reconsidered at some future date.

There were no further developments until April this year when during a call on FCO officials the Polish Ambassador said that he had been instructed to seek once again HMG's consent to the removal of the General's remains to Poland.

/In mid-May





In mid-May the Head of Eastern European and Soviet Department informed the Counsellor at the Polish Embassy here that the latest Polish request had been noted and the reasons for raising it at that time carefully examined. However the Home Secretary regarded the 1981 application by Major Kycia as concluded. He would not be prepared to reconsider the case unless a fresh formal application were made (such applications are normally entertained only from the next of kin or executor but applications by foreign governments have been considered). It would be for the Polish authorities to decide whether to make such an application. The outcome would depend on consideration of all relevant factors.

Mr Broomfield added the following remarks on a personal basis. The question of removing General Sikorski's remains to Poland could not be divorced from other aspects of UK/Polish relations. There were strong feelings in the UK about Polish developments; the sentiments aroused by Major Kycia's application in 1981 were still live and had in fact increased. There was therefore little likelihood that a decision would be favourable to the Polish request. For this reason he urged that the Poles reconsider their position and withdraw their request. Public opinion would not understand approval against the background of martial law and the suppression of civil rights in Poland.

No more was heard of the matter until receipt of the letter of 4 August to the Prime Minister from the President of the Polish War Veterans.

Subject to your agreement we think the best way of responding to the War Veterans' approach would be for the Ambassador in Warsaw to reply to Colonel Sikorski on the Prime Minister's behalf. We have consulted the Home Office on the terms of such a response. I enclose the text of our jointly agreed reply.

Despite the lifting of martial law in Poland in July this year it seems most unlikely that the Home Secretary would today reach a different decision from that which he took in 1981. Domestic opinion in the United Kingdom, including that in the Polish emigre community, will if anything have hardened in the last two years against the removal of the General's remains to Poland. Our reply has therefore been drafted to seek to discourage so far as possible the Poles from deciding to submit a fresh formal application (which could only result in another refusal decision leading to a further round of recriminations).

/If you



## Ferries (Offences)

Mr. Arthur Lewis asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many persons have been charged and how many convicted, for offences on board ferries sailing to or from United Kingdom ports in the last year for which figures are available; and if he will specify in each case the nature of the offence.

Mr. Mayhew: The information requested is not available because information collected centrally on court proceedings does not generally indicate the circumstances or the location of the offence. The data available for 1979 on offences of drunkenness on board ships, not necessarily ferries, are given in the following table.

*Defendants proceeded against and found guilty of offences relating to drunkenness on board ships*

England and Wales 1979	Number of defendants	
	Proceeded against	Found guilty
Offence		
Person being drunk on board a passenger steamer and refusing to leave such a steamer at a place at which he can conveniently do so when requested*	2	2
Seaman under the influence of drink or drugs while on duty†	5	3

\* Section 287(b) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894

† Section 28 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1970.

## Police (Firearms)

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many police forces have set up special firearms units; and if he will make a statement on this practice.

Mr. Mayhew: All police forces have a proportion of officers especially trained in the use of firearms. Many have specialist units consisting of officers who have additional training, including the tactical use of weapons, in handling major incidents where such skills are required.

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what percentage of policemen receive weapons training; and what forms this takes.

Mr. Mayhew: It is for individual chief officers of police to decide how many police officers should be trained in the use of firearms and what form this training should take. Figures are not held centrally and could not be obtained without disproportionate cost.

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will give details of those incidents in which police guns have been fired in each year from 1976, to date.

Mr. Mayhew: The details are as follows:

Year and Force	Injuries/Deaths
1976	Nil
1977	
Derbyshire Constabulary	1 death
Metropolitan Police	—
Metropolitan Police	—
Hampshire	1 injury

## Year and Force

1978

Metropolitan Police  
Metropolitan Police  
Cumbria Constabulary

1 death  
—  
1 death

1979

Essex Police  
West Midlands Police  
Metropolitan Police

1 death  
—  
—

1980

West Midlands Police  
West Mercia Constabulary  
West Yorkshire Police

1 death  
1 injury  
1 injury  
1 injury (police officer)

Metropolitan Police  
Metropolitan Police  
Metropolitan Police  
Metropolitan Police  
Metropolitan Police  
Metropolitan Police

—  
1 injury  
—  
1 injury  
—  
—

In addition, firearms were used on a number of occasions to destroy injured or dangerous animals.

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what percentage of policemen on average takes out arms daily.

Mr. Mayhew: Figures are not held centrally of the number of policemen who are issued with firearms and this information could not be obtained without disproportionate cost.

## Boundary Commission for England (Proposals)

Mr. Marks asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will list the 1981 electorates of the proposed constituencies provisionally recommended by the Boundary Commission for England in its current review for the county of Greater Manchester.

Mr. Mayhew: We are obtaining this information and will publish it in the *Official Report*.

## Sex Offenders

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many sex offenders now held in prison are receiving suitable specialist treatment.

Mr. Mayhew: This information is not held centrally and could only be obtained at disproportionate cost.

## Remains of General Sikorski

Mr. Churchill asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he has received an application for a licence authorising the removal of the remains of the late General Sikorski; what decision he has reached; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Whitelaw: I have received an application for a licence to remove the remains of General Sikorski, with the suggestion that the removal should be linked with the anniversary of his death on 4 July. Under section 25 of the Burial Act 1857 it is an offence, subject to exceptions, to remove any interred human remains without the licence of the Home Secretary and subject to such precautions as he may prescribe.

I have given full and careful consideration to all the issues involved in this case. I am unconvinced at the present time that the relevant criteria for meeting the



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If you agree to this course of action and the terms of the draft reply, we would propose (in liaison with your press office) to answer press enquiries on the lines of the proposed reply from the Ambassador to Colonel Sokorski. The Poles have already made public both Sokorski's approach to the Prime Minister and the fact that the Polish Ambassador raised the subject with the FCO earlier this year.

I am copying this letter to Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office).

*Yours ever*  
*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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Application have yet been satisfied. I do not therefore propose to grant a licence to enable the remains of General Sikorski to be returned to Poland by 4 July. The applicant and the Polish Government are being informed of this.

## AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD

### Capital Grants and Subsidies

**Mr. Morgan** asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what is the approximate amount of money currently due to farmers in England by way of approved capital grant and subsidy payments but unpaid by reason of the civil servants' pay dispute.

**Mr. Peter Walker:** As at 19 June the figure was approximately £10.7 million.

### Turkeys

**Mr. Peter Mills** asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food whether, in view of the loss of confidence in the turkey industry, his Department has estimated the number of turkey chicks that will be gassed in 1981.

**Mr. Buchanan-Smith:** No. Turkey poults are generally hatched to meet specific orders and I expect these basic arrangements to continue.

**Mr. Peter Mills** asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1) what is the total yearly consumption of turkey meat in the United Kingdom;

(2) what is the total yearly production of turkey meat in the United Kingdom.

**Mr. Buchanan-Smith:** The latest figures of United Kingdom estimated production and of consumption based on this, net imports and increases in stocks in 1980, are as follows:

	1980	(tonnes)
Production	122,000	
plus imports	+ 9,275	
minus exports	- 1,806	

stocks of the European Economic Community of butter, cheese and skimmed milk powder, expressed in terms of days of consumption.

**Mr. Buchanan-Smith:** Community stocks of butter and skimmed milk powder in public intervention stores on 25 June were equivalent to approximately five days and 43 days consumption respectively. There is no cheese in public intervention stores at present.

### Rabies

**Mr. McQuarrie** asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1) if, in view of the fact that rabies on the European continent shows no signs of abating with a consequent danger of an increase in importing domestic animals during the holiday season, he will issue special instructions to officials, port employees and the local marine organisations to ensure that the public are warned of the dangers of the disease;

(2) if he will list in the *Official Report* the number of animals affected with rabies which have been intercepted at United Kingdom ports and airports in the years 1979 and 1980; and if he will indicate the country of origin of these animals;

(3) what resources are available for producing information and advice to domestic animal owners in the event of an outbreak of rabies in the United Kingdom;

(4) what steps are being taken by his Department to check the entry of animals into the United Kingdom which may be suffering from rabies; and if he will make a statement.

**Mr. Wiggin:** To minimise the risk of importing rabies into this country, the Government apply stringent import controls, supplemented by a continuous rabies awareness campaign. We have recently re-emphasised the need for all officials, port employees, marine organisations and the general public to maintain their customary vigilance through the holiday season.

We are satisfied that, if a rabies outbreak were to occur anywhere in this country, we have the means to deal quickly and effectively with it. Detailed information and advice have already been prepared for domestic animal owners for immediate release in the event of an outbreak.



**DRAFT:** minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

**TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+

**FROM:** H M Ambassador

Reference

**DEPARTMENT:**

**TEL. NO:**

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION**

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

**TO:** Col Wlodzimierz Sokorski  
 President of the Executive  
 Board of the Association  
 of Fighters for Freedom and  
 Democracy  
 Warsaw.

Your Reference

Copies to:

**PRIVACY MARKING**

.....In Confidence

**CAVEAT**.....

**SUBJECT:**

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 4 August which was forwarded to her through the Polish Embassy in London about the removal of General Sikorski's remains to Poland. Mrs Thatcher has asked me to reply.

I fully concur with your remarks about General Sikorski. He was not only a great Polish patriot but also a staunch wartime ally. As Sir Winston Churchill told the House of Commons in July 1943, the General 'was a man of remarkable pre-eminence, both as a statesman and a soldier' ...

'he was the symbol and the embodiment of that spirit which has borne the Polish nation through centuries of sorrow and is unquenchable by agony ...'. He made a substantial contribution to the wartime cooperation and alliance between Britain and Poland and was held in high esteem by the British people.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

As you may know, Mr Whitelaw, the then Home Secretary, in 1981 gave careful consideration to a formal application from Major Kycia (acting as Madame Sikorska's executor)

/for



for a licence to remove General Sikorski's remains from Newark Cemetery for reburial in the Cathedral Crypt in Krakow. The Home Secretary carefully examined and took into account all the relevant factors and circumstances prevailing at the time. Mr Whitelaw however concluded that the relevant criteria for agreeing to the application for a licence had not yet been satisfied. He therefore decided that he could not grant the application. The Home Secretary's decision was conveyed both to Major Kycia and to the Polish Government.

The Polish Embassy in London raised the matter again with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office earlier this year. The Embassy were subsequently informed that the Home Secretary regarded the 1981 application for a licence as concluded. That remains the Home Secretary's view. Whether the situation has changed to an extent now to make it advisable or appropriate to reopen this question must be a matter for those who <sup>have been</sup> ~~are~~ directly concerned with the case to judge. But as I am sure you will understand, any change from the decision taken by the Home Secretary in 1981 must depend on his being satisfied that there had been some material change in the circumstances of the case in question.



Unofficial translation

Warsaw, August 4th, 1983

The Right Hon. Margaret THATCHER, M.P.  
Prime Minister of the Government of the  
United Kingdom of Great Britain  
and Northern Ireland  
10 Downing Street  
L o n d o n

Madame Prime Minister,

The Presidium of the Executive Board of Association of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy, on behalf of 750,000 of its members and with the support of all Polish people kindly requests the consent of Her Majesty's Government for transferring the ashes of General Władysław Sikorski to Poland, which was also the will and desire of the General and his family.

General Sikorski is one of the most famous sons of the Polish soil, devoted to Poland throughout his life. He enjoys an immense popularity, recognition and deep esteem by the whole Polish nation.

General Sikorski served Poland well. He was the exponent of national and social aspiration of the Polish nation, particularly during the difficult and tragic period following the Nazi invasion of Poland. His activity outside our country, mainly in the United Kingdom, was conducted in the name and in Poland's interest.



It is regrettable and inexplicable that until today the ashes of the General have not rested in Poland.

In recognition of the great historic merits of General Sikorski, the authorities of the Polish People's Republic and the Episcopate of Poland have decided to place the urn with his ashes in St. Leonard's Crypt of the Cathedral in the Wawel, the Castle of Polish Kings in Cracow. It is the place most deserved and worthy of his merits to lay his ashes. This is also the desire of the whole Polish nation awaiting the moment when St. Leonard's Crypt will not be empty any more.

The Presidium of the Executive Board of the Association of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy cherishes hope that H.M. Government shall not be guided by temporary political considerations and shall take into account the above-mentioned circumstances as well as the fact that General Władysław Sikorski in his service for Poland cooperated with H.M. Government and the Command of Armed Forces during the war.

I remain, Yours faithfully,

Colonel (Ret.) Włodzimierz Sokorski  
President of the Executive Board of the  
Association of Fighters for Freedom  
and Democracy



## Ferries (Offences)

Mr. Arthur Lewis asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many persons have been charged and how many convicted, for offences on board ferries sailing to or from United Kingdom ports in the last year for which figures are available; and if he will specify in each case the nature of the offence.

Mr. Mayhew: The information requested is not available because information collected centrally on court proceedings does not generally indicate the circumstances or the location of the offence. The data available for 1979 on offences of drunkenness on board ships, not necessarily ferries, are given in the following table.

*Defendants proceeded against and found guilty of offences relating to drunkenness on board ships*

England and Wales 1979	Number of defendants	
	Proceeded against	Found guilty
Person being drunk on board a passenger steamer and refusing to leave such a steamer at a place at which he can conveniently do so when requested*	2	2
Seaman under the influence of drink or drugs while on duty†	5	3

\* Section 287(b) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894

† Section 28 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1970.

## Police (Firearms)

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many police forces have set up special firearms units; and if he will make a statement on this practice.

Mr. Mayhew: All police forces have a proportion of officers especially trained in the use of firearms. Many have specialist units consisting of officers who have additional training, including the tactical use of weapons, in handling major incidents where such skills are required.

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what percentage of policemen receive weapons training; and what forms this takes.

Mr. Mayhew: It is for individual chief officers of police to decide how many police officers should be trained in the use of firearms and what form this training should take. Figures are not held centrally and could not be obtained without disproportionate cost.

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will give details of those incidents in which police guns have been fired in each year from 1976, to date.

Mr. Mayhew: The details are as follows:

Year and Force	Injuries	Deaths
1976	—	Nil
1977		
Derbyshire Constabulary	1 death	—
Metropolitan Police	—	—
Metropolitan Police	—	—
Hampshire	1 injury	—

## Year and Force

## Injuries Deaths

1978		
Metropolitan Police	—	1 death
Metropolitan Police	—	—
Cumbria Constabulary	—	1 death
1979		
Essex Police	—	1 death
West Midlands Police	—	—
Metropolitan Police	—	—
1980		
West Midlands Police	—	1 death
West Mercia Constabulary	—	1 injury
West Yorkshire Police	—	1 injury
	1 injury (police officer)	—
Metropolitan Police	—	1 injury
Metropolitan Police	—	—
Metropolitan Police	—	1 injury
Metropolitan Police	—	—
Metropolitan Police	—	—

In addition, firearms were used on a number of occasions to destroy injured or dangerous animals.

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what percentage of policemen on average takes out arms daily.

Mr. Mayhew: Figures are not held centrally of the number of policemen who are issued with firearms and this information could not be obtained without disproportionate cost.

## Boundary Commission for England (Proposals)

Mr. Marks asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will list the 1981 electorates of the proposed constituencies provisionally recommended by the Boundary Commission for England in its current review for the county of Greater Manchester.

Mr. Mayhew: We are obtaining this information and will publish it in the *Official Report*.

## Sex Offenders

Mrs. Renée Short asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many sex offenders now held in prison are receiving suitable specialist treatment.

Mr. Mayhew: This information is not held centrally and could only be obtained at disproportionate cost.

## Remains of General Sikorski

Mr. Churchill asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he has received an application for a licence authorising the removal of the remains of the late General Sikorski; what decision he has reached; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Whitelaw: I have received an application for a licence to remove the remains of General Sikorski, with the suggestion that the removal should be linked with the anniversary of his death on 4 July. Under section 25 of the Burial Act 1857 it is an offence, subject to exceptions, to remove any interred human remains without the licence of the Home Secretary and subject to such precautions as he may prescribe.

I have given full and careful consideration to all the issues involved in this case. I am unconvinced at the present time that the relevant criteria for meeting the



Application have yet been satisfied. I do not therefore propose to grant a licence to enable the remains of General Gosciniński to be returned to Poland by 4 July. The applicant and the Polish Government are being informed of this.

## AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD

### Capital Grants and Subsidies

Mr. Morgan asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what is the approximate amount of money currently due to farmers in England by way of approved capital grant and subsidy payments but unpaid by reason of the civil servants' pay dispute.

Mr. Peter Walker: As at 19 June the figure was approximately £10.7 million.

### Turkeys

Mr. Peter Mills asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food whether, in view of the loss of confidence in the turkey industry, his Department has estimated the number of turkey chicks that will be gassed in 1981.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: No. Turkey poults are generally hatched to meet specific orders and I expect these basic arrangements to continue.

Mr. Peter Mills asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1) what is the total yearly consumption of turkey meat in the United Kingdom;

(2) what is the total yearly production of turkey meat in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: The latest figures of United Kingdom estimated production and of consumption-based on this, net imports and increases in stocks in 1980, are as follows:

1980	
	(tonnes)
Production	122,000
plus imports	+ 9,275
minus exports	- 1,806
minus net increase in cold store stocks	- 5,650
Apparent consumption	123,819

### Beef, Veal and Pork (Intervention Stocks)

Mr. Best asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will state the current levels of intervention stocks held by the EEC of beef, veal and pork, expressed in terms of days of consumption, using the latest figures available.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: Stocks of beef held by member States at recent dates were the equivalent of about 11½ days consumption. The European Community does not hold veal or pork in public intervention storage.

### Butter, Cheese and Skimmed Milk Powder (Intervention Stocks)

Mr. Charles Morrison asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will state, using the latest figures available, the current levels of intervention

stocks of the European Economic Community of butter, cheese and skimmed milk powder, expressed in terms of days of consumption.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: Community stocks of butter and skimmed milk powder in public intervention stores on 25 June were equivalent to approximately five days and 43 days consumption respectively. There is no cheese in public intervention stores at present.

### Rabies

Mr. McQuarrie asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1) if, in view of the fact that rabies on the European continent shows no signs of abating with a consequent danger of an increase in importing domestic animals during the holiday season, he will issue special instructions to officials, port employees and the local marine organisations to ensure that the public are warned of the dangers of the disease;

(2) if he will list in the *Official Report* the number of animals affected with rabies which have been intercepted at United Kingdom ports and airports in the years 1979 and 1980; and if he will indicate the country of origin of these animals;

(3) what resources are available for producing information and advice to domestic animal owners in the event of an outbreak of rabies in the United Kingdom;

(4) what steps are being taken by his Department to check the entry of animals into the United Kingdom which may be suffering from rabies; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Wiggin: To minimise the risk of importing rabies into this country, the Government apply stringent import controls, supplemented by a continuous rabies awareness campaign. We have recently re-emphasised the need for all officials, port employees, marine organisations and the general public to maintain their customary vigilance through the holiday season.

We are satisfied that, if a rabies outbreak were to occur anywhere in this country, we have the means to deal quickly and effectively with it. Detailed information and advice have already been prepared for domestic animal owners for immediate release in the event of an outbreak.

The Government's policy on import controls and on dealing with an outbreak are set out in more detail in the publication "Rabies—Prevention and Control" which has been placed in the Library of the House and which is distributed widely around the country.

There have been no cases of animals infected with rabies in the United Kingdom since the present import controls were introduced in 1974, nor have any infected animals been intercepted at ports and airports.

## INDUSTRY

### Naval Dockyards

Mr. Skeet asked the Secretary of State for Industry, how many naval and other dockyards there are in the United Kingdom; and what is the number actually in use.

Mr. Michael Marshall: There are four Royal dockyards in the United Kingdom. The study on the Royal dockyards published in August 1980 as a consultative document estimated that, in addition, there are eight



9/9. cc Press Office



GR  
x was not attached

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 August, 1983

Jew Tim,

Await file advice on handling.

R 2/9

General Sikorski

Your press Office has told our News Department of requests received from journalists for comments on claims by the Polish media that a letter has been sent to the Prime Minister by the Polish Veterans Organisation requesting the transfer to Poland of the remains of General Sikorski.

X/

I attach a copy of a note from the Polish Embassy enclosing the letter from the Veterans Organisation. Although dated 24 August this was received in the FCO only on 30 August. I also attach a copy of the line which our News Department is taking in response to enquiries: it is similar to what we have said, by agreement with the Home Office, on past occasions.

I shall write again shortly with recommendations about the handling of this communication.

*[Handwritten signature]*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

T Flesher Esq  
10 Downing Street



PC Press office

No. HR 26-5-83

The Embassy of the Polish People's Republic presents its compliments to the Protocol Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to request it to convey the enclosed letter of Colonel Wlodzimierz Sokorski, President of the Executive Board of the Association of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy, to the Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The Embassy of the Polish People's Republic avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Protocol Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurance of its highest consideration.

London, 24th August, 1983

Enc. 1.





# ZWIĄZEK BOJOWNIKÓW O WOLNOŚĆ I DEMOKRACJĘ

Odznaczony Orderem Budowniczych Polski Ludowej

Stowarzyszenie Wyższej Użyteczności

ZARZĄD GŁÓWNY

L. dz. 13/ZG / SG I 83

00-461 Warszawa, dnia 4 sierpnia 1983 r.

W odpowiedzi prosimy powołać się  
na naszą liczbę dziennika

Aleje Ujazdowskie Nr 6a tel. 29-32-81

The Right Hon. Margaret THATCHER, M.P.  
Premier Rządu Zjednoczonego Królestwa  
Wielkiej Brytanii i Irlandii Północnej

L o n d o n

10 Downing Street

Szanowna Pani Premier,

Prezydium Zarządu Głównego Związku Bojowników o Wolność i Demokrację, w imieniu 750 tysięcy swoich członków i z poparciem całego społeczeństwa polskiego, zwraca się do Rządu Jej Królewskiej Mości z uprzejmą prośbą o wyrażenie zgody na przeniesienie do Polski prochów generała broni Władysława Sikorskiego. Było to także wolą i życzeniem Generała oraz jego rodziny.

Gen. Władysław Sikorski jest jednym z najsłynniejszych synów polskiej ziemi, związany z Polską całym swoim życiem. Cieszy się on ogromną popularnością, uznaniem i czią całego społeczeństwa polskiego.

Gen. W. Sikorski całe swoje życie poświęcił wiernej służbie dla Polski. Był on wyrazicielem narodowych i społecznych aspiracji narodu polskiego, szczególnie w tym trudnym i tragicznym okresie po inwazji Niemiec hitlerowskich na Polskę. Jego działalność poza krajem, w tym głównie w Zjednoczonym Królestwie Wielkiej Brytanii i Irlandii Północnej, prowadzona była w imieniu i w interesie Polski.

Jest rzeczą przykrą i niezrozumiałą, że dotąd prochy Generała nie spoczywają na terenie Polski.

W uznaniu wielkich historycznych zasług gen. Władysława Sikorskiego, władze Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej i Episkopat Polski ustaliły umieszczenie urny z jego prochami w krypcie Św. Leonarda Katedry Zamku Królów Polskich na Wawelu w Krakowie. Jest to najbardziej godne




i właściwe dla jego zasług miejsce do złożenia prochów. Jest to także powszechne życzenie całego narodu polskiego, oczekującego momentu, w którym krypta Św. Leonarda przestanie być pusta.

Prezydium Zarządu Głównego Związku Bojowników o Wolność i Demokrację ma nadzieję, że Rząd Jej Królewskiej Mości nie będzie się kierował doraźnymi względami politycznymi i weźmie pod uwagę podane wyżej okoliczności, jak również i to, że gen. broni Władysław Sikorski służąc Polsce, współdziałał z Rządem i Dowództwem Sił Zbrojnych Jego Królewskiej Mości w okresie wojny.

Pozostaję z poważaniem,

Prezes Zarządu Głównego  
Związku Bojowników o Wolność i Demokrację

  
/plk rez. Włodzimierz SOKORSKI/



## GENERAL SIKORSKI

The Polish Embassy in London have forwarded to the FCO a letter from the President of the Executive Board of the Association of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy in Poland, addressed to the Prime Minister, requesting the British Government's consent to the transfer of the remains of the late General Sikorski to Poland. The letter has been forwarded to the Prime Minister's office. A reply will be sent in due course.

Did the Polish Ambassador approach the FCO on this subject in April?

This approach was made. The Ambassador was told that before any decision could be taken on any request for the remains to be removed to Poland a formal application to the Home Secretary would be required. No such application was received.

When was the last formal application? What was the response?

In 1981. As the then Home Secretary said in a written Parliamentary answer on 30 June 1981, he was



unconvinced at that time that the relevant criteria for **DSR 11C**  
meeting the application had yet been satisfied.

Has anything happened since then which might lead to a different decision being made now?

The latest Polish communication has only just been received, ~~It~~ it will receive consideration. It would be inappropriate to speculate on the possible outcome of any renewed formal application to the Home Secretary.



ADVANCE COPIES

+21

IMMEDIATE ADVANCE COPY

PS  
 PS/MR RIFKIND  
 PS/PUS  
 MR EVANS  
~~MR JAMES~~  
 MR JAMES  
 MR THOMAS  
 MR HANNAY  
 HD/EESD  
 HD/ECD(E)  
 HD/WED  
 HD/ESID  
 HD/ERD  
 HD/NEWS D  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF

MR CAREY, HM TREASURY  
 MS HARDING, ECGD  
 MR BRENNAN, CABINET OFFICE  
 MR POWNALL, CRE4 DOT  
 MR LOEHNIS, B/ENGLAND  
 MR COLES, NO.10 DOWNING STREET  
 MR D COLVIN, CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 150016Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2601 OF 14 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, WARSAW

MY TELNO 2584: POLISH RESCHEDULING

1. I RAISED THIS WITH JUDGE CLARK IN THE WHITE HOUSE YESTERDAY. I INFORMED HIM OF THE COLLECTIVE DECISION OF COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED WITH THE RESCHEDULING OF POLISH OFFICIAL DEBTS AND SAID I HOPED THEREFORE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD FOLLOW SUIT AT LEAST TO THE EXTENT OF AGREEING IN PRINCIPLE TO PROCEED WITH THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE POLISH AUTHORITIES. AS IT WAS, THE POLES WERE ENJOYING MORATORIUM ON THEIR DEBTS WHICH IT DID NOT SEEM TO BE IN THE WESTERN INTEREST TO ALLOW TO CONTINUE. JUDGE CLARK TOOK NOTE.

2. WE HAVE NOW HAD CONFIRMATION FROM THE NSC THAT THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE ACCEPTED THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S RECOMMENDATION IN MY TUR. NSC STAFF EMPHASISED TO US HOWEVER THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND A FORMAL STEP TOWARDS RESCHEDULING



~~STAFF EMPHASISED TO US HOWEVER THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND A FORMAL STEP TOWARDS RESCHEDULING POLISH DEBTS AT THIS TIME. A LINK WITH THE KAL INCIDENT WOULD INEVITABLY BE DRAWN.~~

3. COMMENT. THIS INDICATES THAT, IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED IN PARIS TOMORROW ON THE BASIS OFFERED BY THE AMERICANS, EXTREME CARE WILL BE NEEDED IN PRESS BRIEFING. ANY ATTEMPT TO REPRESENT THE OUTCOME AS A POLITICAL CONCESSION TO THE POLES OR AS BINDING THE UNITED STATES TO MOVE ON TO FORMAL RESCHEDULING NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE HERE.

4. STATE DEPARTMENT TELL US THAT THE INITIAL CONTACTS WITH THE GERMANS (MY TELNO 2588) WENT REASONABLY WELL. THE FRENCH SIMPLY TOOK NOTE. AMONG THE LEADING NEUTRALS, THE SWISS SHOWED INITIAL ANNOYANCE AT AMERICAN INTRODUCTION OF POLITICAL FACTORS, BUT LATER INDICATED THAT THEY MIGHT JUST BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE US POSITION.

WRIGHT

NNNN





FCS/83/128

LCC AP

N. B. D. N.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY

A. S. C. 13/7

UK Projects in Poland

K. A.

1. Thank you for your letter of 30 June.
2. I can agree to the course of action which you propose. I believe it is compatible with the overall approach to policy towards Poland outlined in my minute to the Prime Minister (of 5 July).
3. When presenting the decision to the Poles, it will be, I think, tactically important to avoid the impression that we wish to sever all project links with Poland or imply that our motivation is more political than commercial. For these reasons it will be helpful to differentiate between the 2 projects, as you suggest, and to be rather less discouraging about PVC than URSUS. By the same token it might be better for the decision to be conveyed to the Poles by means of a low key approach from your Department's officials rather than at Ministerial level. I think it would also be helpful if your officials could keep in touch with ours about timing.
4. I am copying this minute to OD colleagues and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

13 July, 1983



Poland relations Pt 9

13 JUL 1983

12 1 2 3  
4 5  
6 7 8 9



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HL

cc. MASTER



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 July 1983

Poland: Pope's visit

When the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary called on the Prime Minister this afternoon there was some discussion of his minute of 5 July on the above subject.

Following the discussion the Prime Minister indicated that she entirely agreed that our main priority at the present time was to move as rapidly as possible, with our partners, to a re-scheduling of Poland's official debts. She further agrees that other possible measures such as a progressive resumption of political contacts should be left to a later stage. Mrs. Thatcher asked, in that connection, whether the proposal to develop our cultural and information programmes (paragraph 8 of Sir Geoffrey Howe's minute) was consistent with this policy. The Foreign Secretary explained that what he had in mind was the maintenance and perhaps some intensification of our existing programmes which were specifically designed to foster direct contacts with the Polish people and to avoid activities which conferred prestige on the Polish Government. The Prime Minister said that she was content to agree to the proposal on this basis.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of other members of OD, the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PM/83/46

PRIME MINISTERPrime Minister

Subject to colleagues, contact  
with the approach?

A.J.C. 5/7

Poland: The Pope's Visit

1. Following the visit of the Pope, I have looked again at our policy towards Poland. You may find it helpful if I set down briefly where we now stand and the steps we may shortly take with our partners and allies.
2. The reverberations of the Pope's visit will be felt for some time both within and outside Poland. Nevertheless few immediate changes in the political situation seem likely. The possibility of an anticlimax, with unpredictable consequences for the national mood in Poland, seems high. What the Pope has done has been to expose clearly again the fundamental problem of post-war Poland. The people have never been prepared to accept the regime imposed on them by the Russians. The Church has always been the focus of their national aspirations for independence and liberty.
3. In reviewing our policy, I have taken account of the overriding need to maintain Alliance unity both in fact and in public and of the constraints imposed by the highly uncertain political situation in Poland. Against this background, I see little justification for any immediate major shift in our policy towards Poland. At the same time, I have had in view the desirability of a gradual re-engagement of Western influence there to counteract Soviet pressures and to help to steer events in a more liberal direction. Such a policy would not be tied to day to day fluctuations in Poland but would aim to make maximum use of available opportunities to influence developments in that country in the longer term.
4. I therefore believe our main priority now is to move as rapidly as possible, with our partners, to a rescheduling of Poland's official debts, leaving a consideration of other possible measures such as a progressive resumption of political contacts, to a later stage. As you know, it has been my





consistent view that our refusal to reschedule Poland's debts, although initially a useful political signal, has now become a sanction against ourselves. It has allowed the Poles de facto 100% official rescheduling and thus given the Commercial Banks preferential treatment in their rescheduling negotiations both last year and this.

5. Many of our partners share our view that the Pope's visit will have given great moral encouragement to the Polish people and created a potential for reform which the Polish Government should be urged to pursue. The Americans believe we should now indicate to the Poles confidentially our willingness in principle to reschedule their debts. We would describe this as a measure we intended to take in the expectation that some further improvements, particularly the release of the vast majority of political prisoners, would be forthcoming in the near future. The US have made it clear to their Allies, however, that unless these improvements do occur, the US will be unable in practice to resume rescheduling talks. We have told the Americans that while we are prepared to go along with their approach, we believe that rescheduling (without commitment to new credits) is desirable on its own merits and should proceed in any case. If, therefore, the Americans do not feel able to resume rescheduling when Western Creditor Governments meet at the end of July, we should have to reconsider our position and consult our partners urgently.

6. These questions will be discussed further in the North Atlantic Council later this week when the views of our partners may become clearer. Some, but notably the French, have reservations about approaching the Poles before real improvements have taken place in Poland; others would be prepared to give the Poles a signal but see difficulty in any major shifts of policy (apart from rescheduling) at this time. Our aim will be to support the US wish for an early approach to the Poles by Allies, and possibly also by the Ten in the interests of getting rescheduling talks





under way. We shall, however, remind the Americans of the importance of maintaining the unity of the Western Creditors Group and we will seek to elucidate the views of the French, who chair this Group. We shall also try to establish with the US and others an agreed definition of 'the vast majority' of political prisoners that we wish to see released.

7. Following the outcome of discussion this week, we shall be in a better position to assess the likely development of our overall policy towards Poland in the next few months. Much will depend upon whether the Polish authorities will agree to further relaxation, possibly at the time of their National Day on 22 July. I will see that OD colleagues are kept informed and consulted as necessary.

8. Meanwhile, we will continue our policy of maintaining public and private pressure upon the Polish authorities.

We shall maintain our support for humanitarian aid to Poland: a further proposal for 14 MECU (£8 million approx) is now under consideration in the Community. We shall also develop our cultural and information programmes. In this way, we will seek to maintain our links with the Polish people and show our support for the principles for which they are striving.

9. I am copying this minute to colleagues in OD, the Home Secretary, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

5 July, 1983

*Contract Party*



CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

HL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

4 July 1983

cc: HO  
LCO  
FCO  
HMT  
LRO's Office  
MOD.  
LPSO  
CDL  
CO

UK projects in Poland

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend your Secretary of State's letter of 30 June to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

Subject to the views of her other OD colleagues, the Prime Minister agrees with the proposals in paragraph 3 and 4 of Mr. Parkinson's letter.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A. J. COLES

Jonathan Spencer, Esq.,  
Department of Trade and Industry.

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SH



CC/DP  
①



DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

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JF3728

Secretary of State for Trade & Industry

30 June 1983

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The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP  
Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1A 2AL

Prime Minister

Agree, subject to collapse?

A.C. 1/2.

*Dear Geoffrey,*

Yes no

UK PROJECTS IN POLAND

When Arthur Cockfield minuted the Prime Minister on 11 January, following your predecessor's reassessment of our policy towards Poland under continuing martial law, he said that there would shortly be a review of the position on the two remaining major projects being undertaken by British firms and affected by the suspension of credits. This has now been completed. The circumstances of the two projects are different and I have set ... out the main considerations in the attached annex.

2 In neither case do I feel that we would be justified in making more credit available now or in giving the Poles any assurance about finance in the foreseeable future. But it seems best to avoid finally closing the door in a way which might damage our firms' interests by forcing their withdrawal from the projects (although they may of course decide to withdraw on their own account). It is also necessary to take some account of our wider trade interests; our exports to Poland held up surprisingly well at £133m last year (£175m in 1981) and are continuing to do reasonably well this year, with most sales being for cash. We must still hope that eventually it will be possible to return to our normal trading relationship.

PVC Plant Wloclawek

3 This project is near completion and the British contractors as well as the Poles want to see it finished. I suggest we tell the Poles that we are prepared, without commitment, to take account of the PVC plant in any future negotiations on official





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debt, subject to there being a satisfactory basis for our contractors continuing to work on site. This gesture would help to preserve a climate in which our firms could get on with their work and then get out with the minimum dispute and delay. It would, I believe, give no hostages to fortune and might be seen by the Poles as going some way towards meeting their request for reimbursement of their cash payments.

#### URSUS Tractor Factory

4 There is still a long way to go both to complete the main factory and the plants feeding it; on the original plans our financial exposure would have to be increased by at least another £130m. This is clearly not practicable so I think we should say that we are not at present prepared to enter into any new credit agreement for the project; we find it difficult to see Poland being capable of undertaking any such liability for a long time. Nevertheless if rescheduling of official debt were to be agreed, we would then be prepared to discuss whether a new basis could be found for a modified project not requiring very large amounts of convertible currency.

5 I therefore intend, unless colleagues disagree, to proceed along the lines set out in the third and fourth paragraphs above. I am copying this letter to members of OD and Sir Robert Armstrong.

*James East,*  
*Lead.*

Encl





## UK PROJECTS IN POLAND

## PVC PLANT, WŁOCZAWEK

1 This £220m project (part of a £500m complex) is about 95% complete and would cost about £10m to finish. In June 1982 colleagues decided that the balance of ECGD guaranteed credit, about £7.2m, should be released subject to the Poles paying the £6.4m interest instalments due in January and July. The Poles did not agree to this, but after some pressure decided to find the hard currency needed (some £2m) to enable work to continue in 1982. Work is proceeding month by month on the same cash payment basis this year. The Poles have asked that their expenditure should be reimbursed from the frozen credit balance when "things get back to normal", presumably meaning when discussions recommence on the rescheduling of official debt, but they have not made this a condition for continuing to provide funds themselves.

2 Both the Polish Government and the main UK contractors (Petrocarbon Developments Ltd - PDL) are anxious to complete the project, although matters are currently complicated by a commercial dispute between the parties. If the Poles saw the prospects of reimbursement for their expenditure as being not too distant, this would very probably facilitate the most speedy completion of the work with the minimum of claims and counter-claims to be resolved. The present hand-to-mouth system is far from satisfactory from a business point of view. On the other hand, conclusion of a rescheduling agreement does not normally involve the provision of additional credit; the country concerned would first be expected to show that the arrangement was being honoured and to achieve a measure of economic recovery. Moreover the present state of the Polish economy falls a long way short of warranting the provision of any new credit.

## URSUS TRACTOR FACTORY

3 HMG undertook to support this project in 1974. It involves the construction of facilities for the production of Massey Ferguson Perkins (MFP) type tractors and engines in Poland and is only about half complete; 1986 is now probably the earliest finishing date. The original loan of £127m for the project has effectively been committed and a supplementary sterling loan, in which there remained some £26m, ceased to be available on 31 March 1978. \$191m remain frozen in a separate dollar loan but a new supplemental agreement with the Poles would be needed to reactivate this.

4 In 1981 colleagues agreed that £30m should be provided from the dollar loan to enable work to continue as planned in 1982. At that time it was estimated that the project would require another £130m, including interest, to finish. However the imposition of martial law in December 1981 prevented a new supplemental loan agreement being signed and release of the £30m was thereby blocked. In order primarily to safeguard MFP's position colleagues agreed





that £6.8m remaining at that time in the original loan should be made available for 1982.

5 The Poles are seeking \$40m in credit to enable work to go forward in 1983 and MFP want to continue. The company's overall position is weak and it wants the revenues from the work on URSUS and sales of components. The Poles also want to carry on because of the importance of modern tractors for their ailing agriculture industry but seem unlikely to be able to find the hard currency needed themselves and have hinted at the possibility of "some other solution". They may have in mind asking the Czechs or the Russians to take the project over if we fail to provide the credit for which they have asked. MFP seems likely to have to withdraw from the project if all further credit is denied.

6 We do not wish to bring about a situation whereby MFP would be forced to withdraw. This could well involve them in costly arbitration; it would deny them as well as other British companies much needed work, and have a damaging long term effect on our bilateral commercial relations.


7 On the other hand, there are strong arguments against releasing any further credit as this would simply add to the volume of officially guaranteed debt which will eventually need to be rescheduled and which would take a very long time to recover (if paid at all). Furthermore the Poles have effectively enjoyed a 100% moratorium on officially guaranteed debts for 1982 and to date in 1983. They have also not met their obligations to pay interest on 1981 debts which were refinanced and rescheduled. They ought therefore to be in a position to provide some funds for a project they regard as having priority.

8 Since MFP have received their fees up to the end of October this year it is not essential from their point of view for a decision to be taken now. Also about £3.0m remains to be drawn under existing approved contracts; some work could therefore continue on the project even though no new credit is provided. Although the prospects look unpromising at present, the possibility cannot be entirely excluded of a change to a more liberal attitude by the Polish Government, perhaps following a successful outcome to the current visit by the Pope leading to the ending of martial law. This could lead Western Governments to modify the measures which we took in 1982 and to resume negotiations on rescheduling official debt. The Americans, who have been the leading objectors to debt negotiations are now reviewing their position. Against this background there are advantages in delaying any irrevocable decisions for as long as possible.



Poland,  
Poleton, P79

1 JUL 1983





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MR. COLES

JIC BUSINESS

of Sir Anthony Parsons

Prime Minister

The JIC dealt with a long agenda this morning, of which the most significant items were:

a. The PLO

The experts all agree that the situation is fluid, and future developments unpredictable. Beyond that, there are some - who believe that Arafat is finished, and it is only a matter of time before he is replaced; and there others - including the FCO - who believe that the Syrians would prefer to see Arafat soldier on, provided that he can be made more compliant, and the PLOs policies more convergent with their own. No-one doubts that the Syrians are determined to exert greater control over the PLO in the future, and it remains to be seen when and how this will be achieved.

b. Poland

It is too soon to draw any firm conclusions about the way forward in Poland following the Pope's visit. To some extent the regime, the Church and the people of Poland all have reasons for regarding the visit as a success. What is not clear is whether it will eventually result in a real push towards reconciliation. We shall have to wait to observe any practical consequences, but the intelligence community is pessimistic.

c. Belize/Guatemala

The threat to Belize from Guatemala has receded at least temporarily, due in part to President Rios Montt's apparent sincerity in seeking to solve the dispute by peaceful means, and in part to the improved dialogue between the Guatemalan armed forces and British Forces Belize. The JIC continue to believe that no significant military action would be launched against Belize while the British garrison remained, although there is the risk of smaller scale incursions. If Rios Montt were overthrown his successor would be likely to be more intransigent and bellicose on Guatemala's dispute with Belize.



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GRS 550

CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY

FM WARSAW 221015Z JUN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 438 OF 22 JUNE 1983

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, HOLY SEE  
INFO ROUTINE EAST BERLIN, BELGRADE, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, SOFIA,  
PRAGUE, PARIS, BONN, STOCKHOLM, HELSINKI, UKDEL CSCE, UKMIS  
NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA, UKREP BRUSSELS, MODUK.

**THE POPE'S VISIT TO POLAND**

1. THE POPE'S VISIT IS NOT YET OVER, BUT BARRING ANY UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE TOMORROW, I SEE THE LIKELY BALANCE SHEET FOR THE REGIME AS FOLLOWS:

**INTERNAL AFFAIRS**

**2. BENEFITS:**

(A) THE FACT THAT THE VISIT PASSED SMOOTHLY AND WITH DIGNITY (SEMICOLON)

(B) THE POPE'S MEETING WITH GENERAL JARUZELSKI ACCORDED IN THE EYES OF THE AUTHORITIES THE POPE'S SEAL OF INTERNATIONAL RESPECTABILITY (SEMICOLON)

(C) THE OVERTLY ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS DURING THE VISIT ATTRACTED SYMPATHETIC APPLAUSE FROM THE CROWDS, BUT WERE COMPARATIVELY MINOR AFFAIRS AND WERE DISPERSED WITHOUT VIOLENCE.

**3. DISADVANTAGES:**

(A) THE STRENGTH OF THE CHURCH IN POLAND WAS MASSIVELY DEMONSTRATED. THE GATHERINGS WERE LARGER EVEN THAN IN 1979. AT LEAST SOME OF THE PEOPLE WENT TO THE GATHERINGS TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE AUTHORITIES (SEMICOLON)

(B) THE POPE STRONGLY DEFENDED THE RIGHTS OF WORKERS TO FORM GENUINELY INDEPENDENT TRADE UNIONS AND MADE REPEATED REFERENCES TO SOLIDARITY (SEMICOLON)

(C) THE POPE SPOKE OUT IN SUPPORT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND LAMENTED THE HUMILIATION AND DISAPPOINTMENT INFLICTED BY MARTIAL LAW (SEMICOLON)

(D) HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT CONSIDER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT DIALOGUE BETWEEN RULERS AND RULED IN POLAND, AND THREW DOUBT ON THE MORAL LEGITIMACY OF THE GOVERNMENT SINCE THEY DID NOT SERVE THE PEOPLE (SEMICOLON)

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(E) THE GOVERNMENT FELT IT HAD TO AGREE THAT THE POPE COULD MEET WALESZA, EVEN THOUGH HE IS DELAYING DOING SO UNTIL THE END OF HIS VISIT.

#### INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

4. THE POPE WENT OUT OF HIS WAY, WHICH HE NEED NOT HAVE DONE, TO EMPHASISE THE NEED FOR POLAND TO REBUILD ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE MADE, ON THE OTHER HAND, NO DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE REGIME HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE POPE'S VISIT TO THE FORMER GERMAN TERRITORIES IN SILESIA IN THEIR CURRENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST ALLEGED WEST GERMAN "REVANCHISM".

#### THE FUTURE

5. THE "PEACEFUL AND DIGNIFIED" VISIT WHICH ALL SIDES SOUGHT APPEARS SO FAR TO HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. THE HUGE CROWDS WHO GATHERED TO HEAR THE POPE, WHETHER FOR PURELY RELIGIOUS REASONS OR TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEIR SYMPATHY DOES NOT LIE WITH THE AUTHORITIES, WERE DELIGHTED BY WHAT THE POPE SAID. JARUZELSKI'S POSITION, HOWEVER, DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN WEAKENED BY THE VISIT, AND IT IS OPEN TO HIM TO PROCEED ON WHATEVER PATH HE CONSIDERS EXPEDIENT. HE CAN ABOLISH MARTIAL LAW AND CONTINUE WITH THE GRADUAL PROCESS OF CLEMENCY IN HIS OWN TIME, WITHOUT GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS DOING THIS UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE POPE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE OBLIGED TO TAKE A HARDER LINE IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT POLAND IS STILL IN HIS CONTROL. HE MAY FIND IT OF VALUE, IN HIS FUTURE DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, TO HAVE BEHIND HIM SUCH A MASSIVE DEMONSTRATION OF POLISH POPULAR FEELING, WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT HE IS THE ONLY COMMUNIST LEADER WHO CAN RIDE THE TIGER.

6. THE POLISH PEOPLE WILL HAVE BEEN COMFORTED BY THE POPE'S WORDS, IN PARTICULAR HIS SYMPATHY OVER THE DIFFICULT TIMES THAT POLAND IS GOING THROUGH. NEVERTHELESS IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WILL BE GALVANISED BY THE VISIT TO TAKE STRONGER STEPS AGAINST THE REGIME NOR TO WORK ANY HARDER FOR IT.

7. SO WHAT CHANGES WILL THERE NOW BE IN POLAND AFTER THE VISIT?  
I SUSPECT PRECIOUS FEW.

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Prime Minister

It looks more and more as

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though the Solid government have miscalculated. The papal visit will do nothing for them - and much for their opponents.

MR 27/6  
MT

GRS 700  
RESTRICTED  
FM WARSAW 210930Z JUN 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 435 OF 21 JUNE 1983  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, HOLY SEE.  
INFO ROUTINE EAST BERLIN, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, BELGRADE, PRAGUE,  
SOFIA, PARIS, BONN, STOCKHOLM, HELSINKI, UKMIS GENEVA, UKDEL  
CSCE, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS, MODUK.

**POPE'S VISIT: DAY FIVE**

1. ON 20 JUNE THE POPE FLEW BY HELICOPTER FROM CZESTOCHOWA TO POZNAN TO CELEBRATE MASS AT 1000AM. HE WAS GIVEN A ROUSING WELCOME BY HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE IN FINE WEATHER IN THE CITY'S CULTURE AND RECREATION PARK. DURING THE SERVICE HE BEATIFIED A POLISH BORN NUN, MOTHER URSULA LEDOCHOWSKA.
2. AFTER REFERRING IN HIS HOMILY TO THE RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE HISTORY OF POZNAN AND NEARBY GNIEZNO, THE POPE WENT ON TO SPEAK OF THE TRADITIONAL LINK WITH THE LAND, AND THE NEED TO MAINTAIN LIVING STANDARDS OF RURAL WORKERS AND RESIST THE PRESSURES OF URBANISATION. HE RECALLED A SPEECH CARDINAL WYSZYNSKI HAD MADE TO RURAL SOLIDARITY IN APRIL 1981 WHICH WARNED AGAINST NEGLECT OF THE SOIL. 'WHEN WE GET MORE CLOSELY ACQUAINTED WITH THE ENORMOUS SPIRITUAL, MORAL AND SOCIAL POWER OF THE COUNTRYSIDE, WE SEE HOW JUST IS THE FIGHT FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS.....HOW WELL FOUNDED IS THE REASON FOR RESPECTING THOSE RIGHTS WHICH DERIVE FROM THE FACT OF POSSESSING THE LAND.' THE REFERENCE TO RURAL SOLIDARITY BROUGHT A WARM RESPONSE FROM THE CROWD. (THE POPE'S ENDORSEMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF AGRICULTURAL LAND IS, HOWEVER, IN KEEPING WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S OWN PRESENT POLICIES ON THIS SUBJECT.)
3. THE POPE ALSO SAID THAT FOR 'VARIOUS REASONS CONNECTED WITH THE MORE REMOTE AND MORE RECENT PAST' HE WISHED TO PAY HOMAGE AT THE TWIN CROSS MONUMENT IN THE CENTRE OF POZNAN WHERE AN EARLIER MONUMENT TO POLAND'S RECOVERY OF INDEPENDENCE HAD BEEN DESTROYED DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. (THE NEW MONUMENT WAS BUILT IN 1981 AT THE INSTIGATION OF SOLIDARITY TO THE VICTIMS OF THE 1956 POZNAN RIOTS.)
4. MEMBERS OF THIS EMBASSY WHO ATTENDED THE MASS REPORT THAT THE CROWD WAS WELL ORDERED AND ENTHUSIASTIC. CHURCH MARSHALS WERE MORE IN EVIDENCE THAN THE MILICJA. THERE WERE SOME SOLIDARITY BANNERS IN THE CROWD. MY STAFF DID NOT SEE THIS, BUT WE HAVE HEARD REPORTS OF AN ATTEMPT BY SOLIDARITY SUPPORTERS TO MARCH TO THE MONUMENT AFTER THE SERVICE. REPORTS ALSO STATE THAT THE POPE WAS ADVISED NOT TO VISIT THE MONUMENT HIMSELF AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED.

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ESKBY 171400Z STUTTGART

GRS 741

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DESKBY 171400Z

FM FCO 171228Z JUN 83

TO IMMEDIATE STUTTGART

TELEGRAM NUMBER 12 OF 17 JUNE

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY AT REQUEST OF EESD WAS RECEIVED FROM WARSAW TELEGRAM NO 425 OF 17 JUNE

FM WARSAW 170905Z JUN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 425 OF 17 JUNE 1983

AND TO PRIORITY: UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, HOLY SEE  
INFO ROUTINE: EAST BERLIN, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST,  
SOFIA, PRAGUE, PARIS, BONN, STOCKHOLM, HELSINKI, UKDEL CSCE,  
UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA, UKREP BRUSSELS, MODUK

POLAND : PAPAL VISIT - FIRST DAY

1. VIRTUALLY THE WHOLE POPULATION OF WARSAW TURNED OUT TO WELCOME THE POPE.

THE STREETS BETWEEN THE AIRPORT AND THE CATHEDRAL IN THE OLD TOWN WERE LINED BY CROWDS SEVERAL RANKS DEEP FOR HOURS BEFOREHAND. LARGE NUMBERS OF CHURCH MARSHALLS WERE ON HAND ALTERNATING WITH MILICJA WHO WERE LARGELY UNARMED. THE TOWN AUTHORITIES AND THE CHURCH HAD WORKED HARD TO DECORATE THE ROUTE WITH BUNTING AND FLAGS, AND WAITING CROWDS LINED THE ROUTE WITH FLOWERS.

2. IN HIS ADDRESS AT THE AIRPORT, THE POPE THANKED JABLONSKI AND GLEMP FOR THEIR ADDRESSES OF WELCOME AND EXPRESSED HIS FEELINGS ON HIS RETURN TO POLAND. THE PART OF HIS ADDRESS WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE GREATEST CHEER WAS A STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO VISIT ALL THE SICK, IMPRISONED AND SUFFERING, BUT ASKED THEM TO BE CLOSE TO HIM IN SPIRIT AND TO SUSTAIN HIM 'AS THEY ALWAYS DO'. HE SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED MANY LETTERS BEARING WITNESS TO THIS, ESPECIALLY IN THE RECENT PERIOD. THIS WAS INTERPRETED BY THE CROWD AS A



5. IN THE AFTERNOON THE POPE FLEW BY HELICOPTER TO KATOWICE IN SOUTHERN POLAND, WHERE HE CELEBRATED MASS TO A CROWD OF WELL OVER A MILLION PEOPLE AT THE AIRPORT. DESPITE TORRENTIAL THUNDER STORMS AND CHAOTIC CONDITIONS (MEMBERS OF THIS EMBASSY HAD TO WALK FOR THREE HOURS TO REACH THE AREA), HE WAS GIVEN A ROUSING RECEPTION. HIS HOMILY WAS ON THE THEME OF HIS PAPAL ENCYCLICAL, LABOREM EXERCENS, THAT WORK WAS MAN'S FUNDAMENTAL VOCATION ON EARTH. 'WORK WAS AT THE HEART OF ALL SOCIAL LIFE (SEMICOLON) THROUGH IT JUSTICE AND SOCIAL LOVE ARE FORMED, IF THE WORKING SECTOR IS GOVERNED BY A JUST, MORAL ORDER. BUT IF THIS ORDER IS MISSING, INJUSTICE TAKES THE PLACE OF JUSTICE AND LOVE IS REPLACED BY HATRED''.

6. HE RECALLED THAT THE ENTIRE WORLD HAD FOLLOWED AND CONTINUES TO FOLLOW WITH EMOTION THE EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE IN POLAND BEFORE DECEMBER 1981.

7. THE POPE THEN SPOKE DIRECTLY ON WORKERS' RIGHTS AND TRADE UNIONS. HE QUOTED HIS ENCYCLICAL :

'THE EXPERIENCE OF HISTORY HAD TAUGHT THAT TRADE UNIONS WERE AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF SOCIAL LIFE.' HE RECALLED WHAT CARDINAL WYSZYNSKI HAD SAID: 'IT IS A QUESTION OF A PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO FREE ASSOCIATION. IT IS NOT A RIGHT CONCEDED BY SOMEBODY SINCE IT IS A PROPERLY INNATE RIGHT. HENCE THIS RIGHT IS NOT GIVEN TO US BY THE STATE. THE STATE HAS THE OBLIGATION ONLY TO PROTECT AND GUARD IT SO IT IS NOT VIOLATED. THIS RIGHT IS GIVEN BY THE CREATOR WHO MADE MAN AND SOCIAL BEING....IT WAS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I SPOKE IN JANUARY 1981 DURING AN AUDIENCE GRANTED TO THE DELEGATION OF SOLIDARITY ACCOMPANIED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR PERMANENT WORKING CONTACTS WITH THE HOLY SEE.'

8. COMMENT

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THE AUTHORITIES AT KATOWICE WERE EVIDENTLY SET ON DETERRING TROUBLE. MY CONSUL REPORTED SEEING PLAIN-CLOTHES MEN IN THE CROWD, WHO WERE NOT CHURCH MARSHALS, REMOVING A SOLIDARITY BANNER FROM A GIRL TO THE ANNOYANCE OF THE CROWD AROUND. THE WEATHER AND THE MUD MAY ALSO HAVE DAMPENED THE SPIRITS OF ANY WOULD BE DEMONSTRATORS AT KATOWICE, AND WE HAVE HEARD NO REPORTS OF ANY DEMONSTRATIONS THERE. NEVERTHELESS, THE GOVERNMENT WILL SEE HIS HOMILY AS THE MOST WORRYING THAT THE POPE HAS MADE SO FAR. HIS DIRECT REFERENCES TO RURAL SOLIDARITY AT POZNAN AND TO SOLIDARITY AT KATOWICE SHOW THE POPE BECOMING EVEN MORE OUTSPOKEN AS HIS TOUR PROGRESSES.

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BRIEF COMMENT ON TV AND IN THE PRESS TO THE EFFECT THAT A SMALL GROUP OF PEOPLE HAD ATTEMPTED TO PROVOKE THE SECURITY FORCES INTO TAKING ACTION AGAINST THEM BUT THAT THE ATTEMPT HAD FAILED.

5. COMMENT

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THE POPE IS CLEARLY NOT GOING TO PULL ANY PUNCHES WHILE HE IS HERE.

6. THE SIZE OF THE DEMONSTRATION CAME AS A SURPRISE TO EVERYBODY. GENERAL EXPECTATION HERE HAD BEEN THAT ANY DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD BE LIMITED IN SCOPE. WE HAVE HEARD FROM SOLIDARITY SOURCES THAT IT WAS ENTIRELY SPONTANEOUS, AND THAT THE LACK OF RESPONSE FROM THE SECURITY FORCES MAY ENCOURAGE FURTHER ONES. GENERAL JARUZELSKI WILL BE CONCERNED TO SEE WHETHER THIS DEMONSTRATION SETS THE TONE OF THE VISIT. IT COULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE SECURITY FORCES TO CONTROL GROUPS OF THE SIZE THAT WILL BE GATHERING HERE OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. ANY ATTEMPT TO DO SO WOULD SEVERELY DISRUPT THE CAREFULLY PLANNED IMAGE OF A POLAND RETURNING TO NORMAL. THE UNDERGROUND WILL BE DELIGHTED AT SUCH SPONTANEOUS PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION OF SUPPORT FOR SOLIDARITY IN SPITE OF THEIR URGINGS TO REMAIN PEACEFUL DURING THE PAPAL VISIT.

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REFERENCE TO THOSE IMPRISONED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF MARTIAL LAW. PEOPLE LINING THE STREETS LISTENED TO HIS ADDRESS ON TRANSISTOR RADIOS AND THE CHEERS COULD BE HEARD ALL OVER WARSAW. EVEN AMONGST THE, NO DOUBT, CAREFULLY SELECTED CROWD AT THE AIRPORT I SAW A SOLIDARITY BANNER.

3. AT ST JOHN'S CATHEDRAL THE POPE DELIVERED A HOMILY ABOUT THE 600TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BLACK MADONNA AT CZESTOCHOWA DURING WHICH HE MADE AN EMOTIONAL TRIBUTE TO THE LATE CARDINAL WYSZYNSKI, WHOSE FUNERAL HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO ATTEND SINCE HE WAS RECOVERING FROM THE ATTACK ON HIS OWN LIFE. THE POPE COMMENTED THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE HAD SPARED WYSZYNSKI THE SAD EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DATE OF 13 DECEMBER 1981 (IE MARTIAL LAW). HIS HOMILY ALSO CONTAINED A STRONG DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR THOSE WHO WERE CURRENTLY SUFFERING IN POLAND. THE POPE SAID "TOGETHER WITH ALL MY COMPATRIOTS ESPECIALLY WITH THOSE WHO ARE MOST ACCUTELY TASTING THE BITTERNESS OF DISAPPOINTMENT, HUMILIATION, SUFFERING, OF BEING DEPRIVED OF THEIR FREEDOM, OF BEING WRONGED, OF HAVING THEIR DIGNITY TRAMPLED UPON, I STAND BENEATH THE CROSS OF CHRIST TO CELEBRATE ON POLISH SOIL THE EXTRAORDINARY JUBILEE OF THE YEAR OF REDEMPTION".

4. THE OLD TOWN WAS CORDONED OFF DURING THE AFTERNOON TO THE IRRITATION OF MANY PEOPLE WHO DID NOT HAVE TICKETS TO THE MASS AT ST JOHN'S CATHEDRAL AND WISHED TO LISTEN TO THE POPE'S ADDRESS ON LOUDSPEAKERS. AFTER THE MASS, APPARENTLY INSPIRED BY THE APPEARANCE OF A GROUP OF PEOPLE CARRYING A "SOLIDARNOSC-GDANSK" BANNER, THE CROWD STARTED TO SHOUT "SOLIDARNOSC" AND "THE POPE IS WITH US". THE CROWD RAPIDLY GREW IN SIZE AND, ACCORDING TO SOME REPORTS, BECAME ONE OF THE LARGEST PRO-SOLIDARITY DEMONSTRATIONS SEEN IN WARSAW SINCE MARTIAL LAW. THE SECURITY FORCES MADE NO EFFORT TO INTERVENE AND THE ONLY OFFICIAL REFERENCE TO THE DEMONSTRATION WAS A



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FM WARSAW 281430Z MAR 83

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 208 OF 28 MARCH 1983

INFO ROUTINE: WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, HOLY SEE,  
UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING: BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, SOFIA, EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE,  
BELGRADE

TALK WITH CARDINAL GLEMP:

1. I CALLED ON CARDINAL GLEMP TODAY AND HAD A LONG TALK.
2. I ASKED HIM IF HE THOUGHT IT WAS NOW CERTAIN THAT THE POPE WOULD COME. HE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT CERTAIN, BUT THE CHANCES SEEMED GOOD. IF HE DID NOT COME, IT WOULD BE A CATASTROPHE.
3. I ASKED HIM WHO WAS OPPOSED TO THE POPE'S VISIT. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE SOME ELEMENTS IN THE PARTY WHO WERE AGAINST IT. BUT GENERAL JARUZELSKI SEEMED HONEST IN HIS DETERMINATION TO GO AHEAD WITH IT. THERE WERE ALSO SOME ELEMENTS IN THE OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE VISIT. BUT THESE WERE NOT SIGNIFICANT.
4. I ASKED HIM WHETHER THE CHURCH WERE GIVING THE REGIME A BIG PRESENT. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD CERTAINLY OBTAIN SOME ADVANTAGES FROM THE VISIT. IT SHOULD MAKE THEIR POSITION A LITTLE FIRMER IN POPULAR ESTEEM. BUT THERE WOULD BE DIFFICULTIES ALSO. THE POPE WOULD TALK OF LIBERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER THINGS WHICH WOULD BE UNPALATABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT.
5. I ASKED HIM WHETHER THE VISIT WOULD CALM THE POLISH PEOPLE. HE REPLIED VIGOROUSLY THAT THE INTENTION WAS NOT TO CALM OR TO TRANQUILLISE. THE CHURCH WAS NOT A SORT OF POLICE. THE PURPOSE WAS TO GIVE A NEW IMPULSE AND A SENSE OF HOPE TO THE PEOPLE.
6. WE DISCUSSED THE NATURE OF THE OPPOSITION. HE SAID IT WAS A WIDE SPECTRUM. ON ONE SIDE THERE WAS THE UNDERGROUND MOVEMENT. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS NO LONGER OF MUCH SIGNIFICANCE. BUT THERE WAS A MUCH LARGER GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO HAD ALL KINDS OF CRITICISMS OF THE GOVT. THE ISSUE OF PRISONERS WAS VERY IMPORTANT. HE HOPED THE GOVERNMENT WOULD LET OUT SOME PEOPLE BEFORE THE POPE'S VISIT. HE DID NOT EXPECT A GENERAL AMNESTY. THE DIFFICULTY IN SOME CASES WAS THAT THE PRISONERS WOULD NOT ASK TO BE RELEASED. HE WAS HOPING THAT FAMILIES AND FACTORIES WOULD BE ABLE TO PUT IN REQUESTS FOR PRISONERS' RELEASE, THUS SKIRTING THE QUESTION OF INDIVIDUAL REFUSALS TO ASK FOR CLEMENCY.

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7. ON PRON, HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT DISMISS IT OUT OF HAND. IT MIGHT BE AN ORGANISATION WHICH, IN A LIMITED WAY, COULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO OPENING UP SOCIAL LIFE IN THE COUNTRY. IT DEPENDED ON HOW MUCH THE PARTY WOULD TRY TO USE IT AS AN INSTRUMENT AND ON THE QUALITY OF PEOPLE IT ATTRACTED. THE CHURCH WOULD NOT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH IT DIRECTLY, BUT WOULD WATCH CAREFULLY TO SEE WHETHER IT GATHERED WEIGHT.

8. I SAID THAT I HAD HEARD THAT THERE WAS SOME OPPOSITION WITHIN THE CHURCH TO THE VISIT ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE REGIME. CARDINAL GLEMP SAID THAT THERE WAS A LITTLE OPPOSITION AMONG SOME CATHOLIC INTELLECTUALS AND AMONG A FEW OF THE POLITICALISED CLERGY. BUT THE EPISCOPATE, THE MASS OF THE CLERGY, MOST OF THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE PEOPLE WERE PROFOUNDLY IN FAVOUR.

9. HE SAW NO EARLY SOLUTION TO THE ECONOMIC SITUATION WHICH WAS DISASTROUS. THERE WAS STILL A VERY BAD ATMOSPHERE IN THE FACTORIES, WITH SABOTAGE AND GO-SLOWS. I SAID THAT I KNEW THE POSITION OF THE CHURCH ON WESTERN ECONOMIC MEASURES BUT I HOPED HE REALISED THAT EVEN IF POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WEST AND POLAND WERE TO BECOME MORE NORMAL THE DIFFICULTIES OF OBTAINING CREDIT WOULD STILL BE IMMENSE. HE SAID THAT THE CHURCH WELL UNDERSTOOD THE COMPLEXITY OF THIS SITUATION AND THE DEGREE OF HUMANITARIAN AID WHICH WAS BEING GIVEN. WE DISCUSSED ECONOMIC REFORM. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS OBSTRUCTIVENESS INSIDE THE PARTY TO REFORM. HE MENTIONED OBODOWSKI AS A MAN WHO WANTED TO KEEP THE PARTY'S HAND FIRMLY ON DECISIONS.

10. I SAID THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE WEST. BUT I UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE LIFTED UNTIL AFTER THE POPE'S VISIT. HE NODDED AND SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WAS SO. HE AGREED WITH ME THAT THE PRESENT TRADE UNION PROPOSALS WERE NOT GETTING VERY FAR AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE WIDENED. HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME MOVE IN THE GOVERNMENT A FEW DAYS AGO TO WIDEN THE TRADE UNION STRUCTURES FROM THE INDIVIDUAL FACTORY. THIS MIGHT BE A POSITIVE SIGN.

11. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 1. HE SAID THAT HE WAS AND HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE SOME FORM OF POPULAR DEMONSTRATIONS ON MAY 1 AND MAY 13.

12. I SAID THAT WE LIKED RACING IN BRITAIN, AND THAT I HOPED HE WOULDN'T MIND MY SAYING THAT I THOUGHT HE WAS PUTTING MONEY ON THE JARUZELSKI HORSE. HE LAUGHED AND SAID THAT THERE WAS AN ELEMENT OF TRUTH IN THIS. FOR THE MOMENT, HE DID NOT SEE THAT JARUZELSKI HAD ANY RIVALS, THOUGH HE BELIEVED THAT SOME OF HIS CLOSEST COLLEAGUES WERE BEING GOT AT, HE MENTIONED RAKOWSKI KISZCZAK AND BARCIKOWSKI. BUT JARUZELSKI WAS FIRMLY IN CHARGE.



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HE THOUGHT THAT THE GENERAL HAD PROBABLY OBTAINED SOME FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE FROM ANDROPOV AS REGARDS THE CHURCH. HE HAD HEARD THAT ANDROPOV WAS COMPARITIVELY OPEN-MINDED. WE WOULD SEE. JARUZELSKI HAD SOME UNDERSTANDING OF THE CHURCH, HAVING BEEN EDUCATED AS A CHILD IN A CATHOLIC SCHOOL. BUT ALL THIS WAS OF COURSE LIMITED AND SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED. THE CHURCH HAD TO WORK WITHIN A CERTAIN KIND OF SYSTEM AND WAS NOT ATTRACTED BY ILLUSIONS.

## COMMENT

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13. GLEMP SPOKE MORE FREELY THAN USUAL. APART FROM THE POPE'S VISIT, I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HIS MAIN WORRY WAS THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY AND ITS EFFECT ON THE ORDINARY PEOPLE. HE IMPLIED CLEARLY THAT JARUZELSKI WAS ABOUT AS GOOD A MAN TO DEAL WITH AT PRESENT AS THE CHURCH COULD EXPECT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

JAMES

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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# CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

File

089  
Poland

21 March 1983

Thank you for your letter of 17 March about the question of a free post for Poland. The Prime Minister was interested to see the information contained in your letter and in particular that of the cost of the West German scheme which seems remarkably high. Mrs. Thatcher has agreed that we should continue to decline requests for a free post to Poland.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Steve Nicklen (Department of Industry).

Timothy Flesher

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 March 1983

Prime Minister:

Content with this  
line? The arguments  
seem convincing.

17/18/3

Free Post for Poland

In his letter of 27 January, John Holmes set out the background and relevant considerations concerning a possible free post for Poland. In view of the continuing public interest in this issue and new information that we have received, you may like to have a further report on where matters now stand.

Since January the lobby pressing for a free post has kept up its efforts both in Parliament and in the Press. In a letter to the Times of 8 February, Viscount Cranborne and other signatories urged support for their Early Day Motion (No 224) on this subject and called upon the Government to make available the necessary subsidy to the Post Office to introduce this concession. As a result of the Times letter we and the Department of Industry have received large numbers of letters from MPs and members of the public. Our replies have closely followed the terms of those sent by the Prime Minister at the beginning of February to Lord Home, the Duke of Norfolk and others.

In response to requests from MPs and the public, we have made further enquiries about the extent and scope of free post schemes in other Western European countries. Our findings have largely confirmed our earlier impression that this has not been a widespread or a prolonged practice. Sweden, the FRG, Italy and Luxembourg had free parcel posts to Poland in 1982 for periods of 9 months, 7 months, 3 months and 8 weeks respectively. As far as we can discover none of these countries has firm plans to reintroduce their schemes. Although discussion continues in Italy, we understand from the Italian Government that the free post service is not likely to be brought back at the present time.

Elsewhere, none of our other Community partners appear to have introduced a free post to Poland or intend to do so. The Dutch, Danish, Belgian and French Governments have told us that proposals for such have been rejected on budgetary and/or technical grounds. Switzerland maintains a free post service for parcels addressed to the International Charity, Caritas, for onward forwarding to Poland but this concession operates only on parcels within Switzerland. Austria has no free post scheme of any kind to Poland.

/We have





?!?

We have also received further details about the cost of the free post schemes. Figures from the FRG Post Office (obtained recently via our own Post Office) reveal that the German scheme cost some DM 175 million (approximately £47 million) for the 7 month period and not the very much lower figure of £500,000 given to us previously by the Federal Foreign Ministry. Figures similarly obtained from the Italian Post Office show that the latter's 3 month scheme cost in the region of 1.5 billion lire (approximately £700,000). In both cases, the flow of parcels to Poland dramatically increased during the period of operation of the schemes: in Germany from 200,000 to 1.9 million parcels a month and in Italy from 4,500 parcels in the 3 month period immediately before the scheme to a total of 200,000 parcels during the 3 months duration of the scheme.

The Post Office believe that the evidence of the German and Italian schemes confirms their view that this would be an expensive concession. Although difficult to predict what the overall reponse in the UK to the introduction of such a scheme would be, the German and Italian experiences suggest that the numbers and weight of parcels to Poland would significantly increase. On this basis, the Post Office have calculated that a 2 month scheme would mean a loss of revenue in the region of £2 million in the Spring/Summer rising to some £2.6 million if operated over the Christmas period (November/December). Apart from this financial commitment, operating costs would rise given the special treatment and checking needed.

Against this background, the arguments against embarking on a scheme of this kind would seem to remain valid. We have contributed both nationally and through the European Community to the provision of humanitarian aid programmes to Poland and these are continuing through to April or possibly even May. Following further recent allocations by the Commission, Community aid funds to Poland since December 1981 now total 27 MECU (approximately £15 million) and UK Charities continue to receive a significant share. The Commission are currently considering what further existing resources may be available for aid to Poland but it cannot be excluded that we may soon be called upon to provide additional national funds to back a further EC contribution. It is worth bearing in mind that Poland is not a very poor country.

Apart from financial considerations, there remain also questions of precedent and whether this would be an appropriate method of providing aid. The Post Office continue to believe that a concession of this kind for Poland would open the floodgates to other requests for equally deserving causes. At the same time they believe it would be difficult to ensure that a free post was not

/used





used for purposes other than aid. The Swedes have told us in confidence that one reason for terminating their scheme (in defiance of public opinion in Sweden) was their belief that it was being exploited for commercial and other purposes rather than for aid.

In the circumstances therefore we and the Department of Industry propose to continue to decline requests for a free post to Poland, to point to the channels for transmission of aid to Poland that already exist and the Government's contribution to these. If specifically asked about the likely cost of a UK scheme, we shall indicate that taking the German and Italian experiences into account, the Post Office estimate it could amount to at least £2 - £2.6 million for a two month period depending on the season of the year.

I am copying this letter to David Saunders in the Department of Industry.

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq  
10 Downing Street



Poland



The P.N. has already  
agreed with the Home  
Secretary's policy.

HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

N. S. P. N.

3 March 1983

A.J.C. 4/3.

*Dee John*

The Home Secretary has seen your letter of 28 February about Poles. He has now written to Sir Bernard Braine.

The Home Secretary has also seen Mr Rifkind's comment that it might be better to make an exception for the Poles here and agree to grant refugee status to all Poles in the UK since the imposition of martial law but has commented that he could not agree to this. To begin with, few of the Poles here since martial law could properly be described as refugees as defined in the United Nations convention. They could not show that if they were returned to Poland they would have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Those that can show such a well-founded fear and have applied are being recognised as refugees but our experience indicates that most of the remainder are people who are unhappy about the direction events are taking in their own country and are concerned that their prolonged absence might create difficulties with the authorities if and when they return. Their concern is understandable but it does not make them refugees. We suspect also that in some cases the real motive for seeking exceptional treatment is that of seeking a better life in the west and has little to do with fear of return. The number of applications for refugee status in this country is growing rapidly and many countries are involved. We have to apply the refugee criteria very strictly and granting refugee recognition to Poles who are clearly not refugees would undoubtedly cause problems for us in other areas.

The Home Secretary would also be opposed to granting these people indefinite leave to remain exceptionally and outside the Immigration Rules. That would presuppose that all the Poles in this country since martial law wish to settle here but our experience in similar situations in the past is that many people who are caught in this country when there is upheaval in their own simply wish to stay on here until they feel able to return. Many of the Polish nationals in this country when martial law was imposed have already returned to Poland without any encouragement on our part and this drift back to Poland will no doubt continue. The grant of indefinite leave to remain in this country would not be helpful to those Polish citizens who wish to return to Poland in due course and it is relevant that we have been informed that the UK/Europe Committee of the British Refugee Council is writing to us to argue for the granting of 12 month extensions of stay

/as in

J E Holmes, Esq



as in the case of Iranians but against the grant of indefinite leave to remain. That, as you know, is the course that the Home Secretary has already adopted.

Above all the grant of indefinite leave to remain to all Polish nationals here since martial law would create an unfortunate precedent in other areas. As you know, there are much larger numbers of Iranian asylum-seekers in this country and most who do not qualify for asylum are now being allowed to remain exceptionally outside the Immigration Rules. We face similar problems with, for example, Lebanese, Ugandans and some Central Americans; and we know from bitter experience that other nationalities could be added to the list tomorrow. In all these cases there are pressure groups who want to see the people concerned allowed to remain here indefinitely even if they do not qualify as refugees but this pressure must be firmly resisted if we are to maintain the strict immigration control to which the Government is committed. If we were now to announce that all Polish nationals here since martial law were to be allowed to remain indefinitely it would be very difficult to resist these other pressures, particularly since the internal situation in a country like Iran is a good deal worse than in Poland and generosity here could and would be prayed against us in the general immigration context.

The Home Secretary remains of the view that the grant of 12 months exceptional extension of stay together with refugee recognition in appropriate cases represents a humanitarian response to the problem while minimising the implications for our immigration policy in other areas.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No. 10), Jane Swift (Treasury), Roger Bright (Environment) and David Clark (DHSS).

Yours sincerely  
John Coles

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QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

3 March 1983

Dear Bernard

Thank you for your letter of 3 February about Polish nationals. For convenience, I will seek to answer your questions in the order in which you raise them.

As you know, shortly after the declaration of martial law in Poland on 13 December 1981, I gave an undertaking that "... under present circumstances no Polish national will be required to return to Poland against his will". I am happy to confirm that we continue to recognise the special problems faced by Polish citizens who found themselves caught up in the events of December 1981 and I do not consider that the lifting of certain restrictions in Poland late last year justifies any change in our policy towards these people.

You may recall that, when our Polish policy of exceptional leave to remain was introduced, the normal period of extension was two months and that in April 1982 this was increased to six months. The current extensions will expire from about April of this year and I have decided that a further extension of stay should be granted. This extension will be for a twelve month period as you suggest.

There must, by now, be very few cases where a person who has applied in time for exceptional leave to remain is still subject to conditions restricting employment. If any are known to the organisations with which you are in contact, you might wish to suggest that they approach the Immigration and Nationality Department by letter asking that the case - or cases - be reviewed.

As to the question of speeding up refugee and asylum applications, the Refugee Unit at Croydon experienced a 70% increase in applications in 1982 as compared with the previous year. With severe staffing constraints, delays are bound to occur and I am afraid that, if priority has to be given to one application or one nationality over another, it will - and should - go to nationals of countries who are not protected by a general policy of non-returnability such as Poles presently enjoy. That being said, I hope that the backlog of Polish applications will soon be cleared.

We gave very careful thought before announcing the criteria for admission of Poles from Austria. Because of commitments to other groups of refugees such as the Vietnamese, and the Government's general policies for containing expenditure in the public sector - which I am sure you fully endorse - we considered it essential to limit the offer to refugees in the internationally accepted definition of that word and to ensure that accommodation and realistic sponsorship were available for them. It seemed that the

/existence of

Sir Bernard Braine, DL, MP



existence of family, educational or language ties with this country would be the best means of ensuring this. I acknowledge that the criteria are strict but I do not see how they could be relaxed without substantially increasing the financial burden or heightening the housing difficulties we know already exist. Our Embassy in Vienna reports that there have been fewer than 100 enquiries from Poles about re-settlement in the United Kingdom. Of these, only a proportion have resulted in applications, not all of which have fulfilled the criteria. To date, applications in respect of seven persons have been approved and in respect of five have been refused.

Ex-detainees still in Poland raise different issues from those Poles who are seeking re-settlement from Austria. You know, I think, that we took the view that our willingness to receive detainees from Poland should not be used by the Polish authorities to achieve the exile of their most troublesome compatriots. While I agree with you that there is still the element of enforced departure, the freeing of Polish detainees at least allows them to make known their own intentions to representatives of potential re-settlement States and permits the latter to make a more balanced assessment of the wishes of the individual concerned. We have some applications for re-settlement in the United Kingdom and I would hope to make an announcement in Parliament in the next few days about a programme for re-settlement.

If you would now like to table a question, as you suggest, to give me the opportunity to announce further exceptional extensions of stay for Poles now in the United Kingdom and the acceptance of some Polish ex-detainees in this country, I should be glad to discuss with you what would be the most appropriate time to do so. I should tell you, however, that I would have to make clear in the same Answer that we intend in future to draw a distinction between those Polish citizens who have remained in this country since the declaration of martial law and those who are now seeking visas for temporary visits to the United Kingdom. While I can agree to continue general exceptional treatment for the former (who found themselves outside Poland at the critical time as it were for reasons beyond their own control) it would not be appropriate to extend the same arrangements to all new Polish visitors. The Polish authorities have relaxed their restrictions on foreign visits and the numbers of Poles now coming to this country are increasing. In accordance with practice laid down in the Immigration Rules, Polish visitors (like other visitors) will only be granted visas if the visa issuing officer is satisfied that the applicant intends to return to Poland at the end of his or her visit; and the applicant normally gives an undertaking to this effect. I intend to say therefore in my announcement that from now on new Polish visitors would be expected to return to Poland at the end of their visit although applications from any afraid to return would be examined sympathetically on an individual basis. Our policy towards new Polish visitors will then be consistent with our policy towards Eastern European nationals generally.

/I hope



I hope that this will reassure you that the Government is anxious to do what it can to help those Poles who have sought to remain in this country since the imposition of martial law or who have been detained by the military authorities in Poland. But we do have to look at these matters in the context of our general immigration policies where every concession for one nationality is eagerly claimed as a precedent for other concessions; and any concessions may in due course end up in increased settlement figures. I should be grateful if you would let me know if you wish to put down a question on this subject so that the arrangements can be made.

Yours  
Lester.



010

CONFIDENTIAL

*Island*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 February 1983

*JH*  
*25/2*

*Dear Sir,*

Poles

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has seen the texts of the proposed reply to Sir Bernard Braine and the draft written answer on returnability of Poles enclosed with your letter of 23 February to John Coles.

Mr Pym has no objection to the Home Secretary proceeding as he proposes. However he has asked that the Home Secretary should be aware that Mr Rifkind has commented as follows: 'At some stage we are going to have to decide what is to happen to the Poles here and at best the course of action proposed by the Home Secretary will only deter such a decision for 12 months. In a year's time we are going to be faced with the same problem. It might therefore be politically better to make an exception for the Poles here and agree to grant refugee status to all Poles in the UK since the imposition of martial law'.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10), Jane Swift (Treasury), Roger Bright (Environment) and David Clark (DHSS).

*Yours ever*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

*John Holmes*

C J Walters Esq  
Private Secretary  
Home Office

CONFIDENTIAL



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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

28 February 1983

Thank you for your letter of 23 February about the non-returnability of Poles. The Prime Minister agrees with the line the Home Secretary proposes to take and with the draft Parliamentary reply attached to your letter.

I am sending a copy of this to Roger Bone (FCO), Jane Swift (HM Treasury), Roger Bright (Department of the Environment) and David Clark (DHSS).

Timothy Flesher

Colin Walters, Esq.,  
Home Office.

da



Prime Minister

*This seems sensible*

*A.F.C. 25/2*

HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT



*C. Mr. Nicholl.*

23 February 1983

*Dee John*

*[Handwritten mark]*

POLES

You told me that the Prime Minister would wish to consider our proposed change of policy over the non-returnability of Poles before any announcement is made.

The announcement which the Home Secretary proposes to make covers three categories of Poles: those who were here on visits when martial law was imposed and who have been allowed to remain here since then; ex-detainees in Poland seeking resettlement in the West; and the increasing number of Polish citizens now coming to this country for short private visits.

The Home Secretary fully recognises the special difficulties faced by those Polish citizens who found themselves outside Poland at the time when martial law was imposed in December 1981. He proposes to announce that Polish citizens who have remained in this country since then and who have currently been granted a six month extension of stay should be given a further 12 months extension from April onwards. The undertaking that none of these people will be returned to Poland against their will still stands and it is open to those who wish to do so to make an application for refugee status or asylum which will be considered sympathetically.

The Home Secretary also proposes to announce that the United Kingdom has decided to accept a number of Poles who were detained under martial law provisions and who have decided of their own free will to seek resettlement outside Poland. Our capacity to take on additional refugee commitments is limited but our allies are now accepting small numbers of ex-detainees and are anxious that the United Kingdom should play a part, accepting that our contribution also will be small. The attached draft statement sets out the proposed criteria to be applied to applications.

The Home Secretary intends to maintain the principle that no Polish citizen now here who may be at risk from the authorities there should be required to return. However, since the regime has relaxed its restrictions on foreign travel, many hundreds of Polish visitors now come here each month and the numbers are on the increase. In addition, we know that Polish cruise liners will resume their calls at United Kingdom ports in the Spring. Polish visitors, like any other visitors, are admitted to this country on the understanding that they will return at the end of their visit and it would be very damaging to our immigration control if all Poles now coming here, unlike visitors from any other country inside or outside the Soviet bloc, were entitled to benefit from a policy of general non-returnability regardless of their individual circumstances. If a general policy of non-returnability continues to apply to new Polish arrivals we should have to continue to scrutinise visa applications with great care which causes delays and has its own political difficulties: but even so, there would still be a significant



## DRAFT PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION AND ANSWER

".... To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement about Polish nationals in the United Kingdom and ex-detainees seeking to enter the United Kingdom for resettlement"

## DRAFT REPLY

The Government decided in December 1981 that Polish citizens who were in the United Kingdom when martial law was imposed should be allowed, exceptionally, to remain in this country for a limited period which has since been renewed; and none has been required to return, whatever his or her circumstances or background. Any Polish citizen who is currently enjoying an exceptional extension of stay in this country and who still does not wish to return to Poland will on application be granted a further extension of stay for a period of 12 months, with no restriction on employment. Applications by Polish citizens <sup>in the U.K.</sup> for refugee status or asylum are being considered sympathetically.

It would not be right to extend <sup>the same</sup> exceptional treatment to new Polish visitors regardless of their individual circumstances. Under the Immigration Rules, a visa for a visit is only granted if the entry clearance officer is satisfied that the applicant intends to return at the end of his or her visit. Polish citizens coming to the United Kingdom on private visits on or after today will therefore be expected to return to Poland in the normal way. Applications from those who wish to remain here because they are afraid to return will however be sympathetically considered on an individual basis. The same arrangements apply to all Eastern European nationals.

The Government has also decided that it should play a part, together with our partners and allies, in the resettlement outside Poland of those



risk that an increasing number of Poles who have no special claims would be allowed to establish themselves in this country. Although cases when exceptional treatment has been granted do not show up immediately in the settlement figures, experience shows that if exceptional treatment is given for any length of time, there is pressure to grant its beneficiaries settlement at some stage, as happened with the Cypriots last year. The Home Secretary therefore proposes to make it clear that from henceforth Polish visitors coming to this country who have no cause to fear persecution from the Polish authorities will be expected to return to Poland at the end of their visit but applications from those who say they are afraid to return will be sympathetically considered on an individual basis.

..... I attach a copy of the reply which the Home Secretary proposes to send to Sir Bernard Braine, together with the text of an Arranged Written Parliamentary Question and Answer.

I am copying this letter to Roger Bone (FCO), Jane Swift (Treasury), Roger Bright (Environment) and David Clark (DHSS).

I should be grateful to have any comments as soon as possible.

*Carver*  
*John Walters*

C. J. WALTERS

John Coles, Esq.



E.R.

Poles who were, until recently, detained under martial law provisions and who have decided of their own free will to seek resettlement outside Poland. We are prepared to consider applications from ex-detainees for whom the U.K. is, by ties of family, education or language, the most appropriate country of resettlement and who are personally acceptable. In considering applications, one of the factors to be taken into account will be the availability of accommodation in this country. A number of applications are already under consideration.



AFT LETTER

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE .....

TO	ENCLOSURES	COPIES TO BE SENT TO
Sir Bernard Braine DL MP House of Commons LONDON SW1A 0AA  (FULL POSTAL ADDRESS)		S of S Foreign & Commonwealth Office  (FULL ADDRESSES, IF NECESSARY)

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY Mr Whitelaw  
 (NAME OF SIGNATORY)

Thank you for your letter of 3 February about Polish nationals. For convenience, I will seek to answer your questions in the order in which you raise them.

As you know, shortly after the declaration of martial law in Poland on 13 December 1981, I gave an undertaking that ".... under present circumstances no Polish national will be required to return to Poland against his will". I am happy to confirm that we continue to recognise the special problems faced by Polish citizens who found themselves caught up in the events of December 1981 and I do not consider that the lifting of certain restrictions in Poland late last year justifies any change in our policy towards these people.

You may recall that, when our Polish policy of exceptional leave to remain was introduced, the normal period of extension

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word and to ensure that accommodation and realistic sponsorship were available for them. It seemed that the existence of family, educational or language ties with this country would be the best means of ensuring this. I acknowledge that the criteria are strict but I do not see how they could be relaxed without substantially increasing the financial burden or heightening the housing difficulties we know already exist. Our Embassy in Vienna reports that there have been fewer than 100 enquiries from Poles about re-settlement in the United Kingdom. Of these, only a proportion have resulted in applications, not all of which have fulfilled the criteria. To date, applications in respect of seven persons have been approved and in respect of five have been refused.

Ex-detainees still in Poland raise different issues from those Poles who are seeking re-settlement from Austria. You know, I think, that we took the view that our willingness to receive detainees from Poland should not be used by the Polish authorities to achieve the exile of their most troublesome compatriots. While I agree with you that there is still the element of enforced departure, the freeing of Polish detainees at least allows them to make known their own intentions to representatives of potential re-settlement States and permits the latter to make a more balanced assessment of the wishes of the individual concerned. We have some applications for re-settlement in the United Kingdom and I would hope to make an announcement in Parliament in the next few days about a programme for re-settlement.

If you would now like to table a question, as you suggest, to give me the opportunity to announce further exceptional extensions of stay for Poles now in the United Kingdom and the acceptance of some Polish ex-detainees in this country, I should be glad to discuss with you what would be the most appropriate time to



was two months and that in April 1982 this was increased to six months. The current extensions will expire from about April of this year and I have decided that a further extension of stay should be granted. This extension will be for a twelve month period as you suggest.

There must, by now, be very few cases where a person who has applied in time for exceptional leave to remain is still subject to conditions restricting employment. If any are known to the organisations with which you are in contact, you might wish to suggest that they approach the Immigration and Nationality Department by letter asking that the case - or cases - be reviewed.

As to the question of speeding up refugee and asylum applications, the Refugee Unit at Croydon experienced a 70% increase in applications in 1982 as compared with the previous year. With severe staffing constraints, delays are bound to occur and I am afraid that, if priority has to be given to one application or one nationality over another, it will - and should - go to nationals of countries who are not protected by a general policy of non-return ability such as Poles presently enjoy. That being said, I hope that the backlog of Polish applications will soon be cleared.

We gave very careful thought before announcing the criteria for admission of Poles from Austria. Because of commitments to other groups of refugees such as the Vietnamese, and the Government's general policies for containing expenditure in the public sector - which I am sure you fully endorse - we considered it essential to limit the offer to refugees in the internationally accepted definition of that





Poland

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

Colin Walters Esq.  
Private Secretary  
Secretary of State  
Home Office  
Queen Anne's Gate  
London SW1H 9AT

15 February 1983

*Dear Colin,*

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
POLISH REFUGEES

*h.a.*

Thank you for sending John Gieve a copy of your letter of 9 February to John Holmes.

The Chief Secretary is in agreement with the Home Secretary's proposals in his letter of 21 December to Mr Heseltine for a limited programme for the reception of Solidarity ex-detainees.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (FCO), David Edmonds (Environment), Tim Flesher (No 10) and David Clark (DHSS).

*Yours sincerely*  


MISS J M SWIFT  
Assistant Private Secretary



do so. I should tell you, however, that I would have to make clear in the same Answer that we intend in future to draw a distinction between those Polish citizens who have remained in this country since the declaration of martial law and those who are now seeking visas for temporary visits to the United Kingdom. While I can agree to continue general exceptional treatment for the former who found themselves outside Poland at the critical time as it <sup>was</sup> for reasons beyond their own control) it would not be appropriate to extend the same arrangements to all new Polish visitors. The Polish authorities have relaxed their restrictions on foreign visits and the numbers of Poles now coming to this country are increasing. In accordance with practice laid down in the Immigration Rules, Polish visitors (like other visitors) will only be granted visas if the visa issuing officer is satisfied that the applicant intends to return to Poland at the end of his or her visit; and the applicant normally gives an undertaking to this effect. I intend to say therefore in my announcement that from now on new Polish visitors would be expected to return to Poland at the end of their visit although applications from any afraid to return would be examined sympathetically on an individual basis. Our policy towards new Polish visitors will then be consistent with our policy towards Eastern European nationals generally.

I hope that this will reassure you that Government is anxious to do what it can to help those Poles who have sought to remain in this country since the imposition of martial law or who have been detained by the military authorities in Poland. But we do have to look at these matters in the context of our general immigration policies where every concession for one nationality is eagerly claimed as a precedent for other concessions; and any concessions may in due course end up in increased settlement figures. I should be grateful if you would let me know if you wish to put down a question on this subject so that the arrangements can be made.



*Boland*



*BF*

*I have asked the Home Office to set out the issue in a letter while the P.N. case is.*

HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE  
LONDON SW1H 9AT

9 February 1983

*A.J.C. 17/2.*

*Dear John*

POLES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

*attached*  
*please request.*  
*10/2.*

*will request is required,*

The Home Secretary was grateful for the Foreign Secretary's minute of 7 January conveying his agreement to the proposal to end the policy of non-returnability for Poles arriving in the United Kingdom for a temporary purpose following an announcement to be made shortly.

.....

The Home Secretary has now received a letter from Sir Bernard Braine (copy attached) about the Government's policy with respect to Poles generally. He would like to respond to Sir Bernard quickly on the question of a limited programme for the reception of Solidarity ex-detainees (his letter of 21 December to the Secretary of State for the Environment). This assumes that the agreement of the Chief Secretary will be forthcoming shortly. However, he feels it necessary, in order to give Sir Bernard the full picture, to tell him at the same time of his intention to end the policy of non-returnability. Officials here will be in touch with yours on the terms of a letter to Sir Bernard covering both these points, together with a draft Arranged Question (which Sir Bernard might be invited to table) and Answer.

The Home Secretary would be grateful to know that the Foreign Secretary is in general agreement that he should respond to Sir Bernard within the next few days, on the lines I have described.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Edmonds (Environment) and John Gieve (Treasury); and for information to Tim Flesher (No.10) and David Clark (DHSS).

*Love sincerely*  
*C. J. Walters*

C. J. WALTERS

John Holmes, Esq.



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N. S. P. R.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

We await a minute to  
the P. R. from the Home Office,  
which they have promised.

14 February, 1983

A.T.C. 1/2

b-a.

Poles in the United Kingdom

Thank you for your letter of 9 February to John Holmes about the announcement of our decision to end the policy of non-returnability of Poles now visiting the United Kingdom.

The questions Sir Bernard Braine raises in his letter to the Home Secretary do indeed cover the whole field of our policy towards Polish refugees. None of them are particularly easy.

As far as the question of non-returnability of Poles on short term visas is concerned, Mr Pym still thinks that this will be a difficult issue to present publicly. The situation in Poland has not shown any very marked improvement since the suspension of martial law which might in itself help to justify an announcement of our decision at this time. There is in addition the question, which Sir B Braine raises, of the increased Parliamentary and public concern about the position of the 1,500 Poles who were in the UK at the time of martial law and who have been given exceptional leave to remain here. Finally we would wish to know that the Chief Secretary is in agreement to the programme for Solidarity ex detainees.

For all these reasons Mr Pym would prefer officials to work up rapidly the text of a reply to Sir B Braine so that Ministers would have a better idea of the balance and likely public effect of all the elements, before final decisions are taken.

I hope you can agree to proceed on this basis. FCO officials will be ready to co-operate over such a draft as a matter of urgency. I would hope therefore that this would lead to no undue delay.

I am copying this letter to David Edmonds (Environment), John Gieve (Treasury), David Clark (DHSS) and to Tim Flesher (No 10).

*[Handwritten signature]*  
(R B Bone)

Private Secretary



Patent Internal Structure No 9



14 FEB 1983



9 Feb



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA



*To discuss  
urgently*  
*By de Wille -*

3rd February, 1983.

Mr Soden ✓  
for advice pl  
cc Mr Gilheppre ✓  
Mr Hyde  
Mrs Clarke  
Mr Mower.

As you are aware, the situation of Polish refugees in our country has recently received considerable public attention. In particular, the following questions are being raised -

- (i) Is it still the declared policy of HM Government that none of these refugees will be forced, against their will, to return to Poland?
- (ii) Is it possible to grant these unfortunate people permission to stay in this country as long as they wish, perhaps even by extending their visas to one year, renewable annually?
- (iii) Could permission to stay here be automatically linked with permission to undertake gainful employment?
- (iv) Is it possible to speed up the present, extremely slow procedure of processing the applications for a permanent refugee status or political asylum?
- (v) Can something be done to relax the present, highly restrictive conditions for the admission of Polish refugees from Austria, to announce how many of them have already been admitted and how many have asked to be allowed to come to Britain?
- (vi) What is the Government's policy with regard to the admission of those Poles who are virtually being forced by the Warsaw authorities to leave Poland and who wish to settle here?



As Chairman of the British "Solidarity with Poland" Campaign, I am being inundated with queries of this kind. Your authoritative, prompt reply would be greatly appreciated and would be most helpful in dealing with rumours which, I suspect, often originate from hostile sources.

If it would help I would be prepared to put down a parliamentary question to enable you to reply.


 Mr. L.

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Pt 9

110 FEB 1983







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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 January, 1983.

Poland: Martial Law

The Prime Minister has noted without comment your Secretary of State's minute of 11 January.

A. J. COLES

John Rhodes, Esq.,  
Department of Trade.

A handwritten signature or set of initials, possibly 'JR', written in dark ink.



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GRS 700

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WARSAW 171705Z JAN 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 039 OF 17TH JANUARY 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE: UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS,  
BONN (FOR SIR J BULLARD)

ROUTINE: PARIS, WASHINGTON, ROME

MA

OLECHOWSKI ON ANGLO-POLISH RELATIONS

1. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OLECHOWSKI CALLED ME TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TODAY AND SAID THAT THERE WERE THOSE IN THE MINISTRY WHO BELIEVED THAT BRITAIN COULD PLAY A ROLE IN THE GRADUAL EVOLUTION TOWARDS MORE NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WEST AND POLAND. AT PRESENT CONTACT BETWEEN POLAND AND ITALY WAS NIL. THE POLES AND THE FRENCH WERE MUTUALLY FED UP WITH EACH OTHER AND THE FRENCH SEEMED TO BE ENTIRELY BESOTTED ABOUT WALESIA. POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS WERE AT A LOW EBB. HE UNDERSTOOD THERE WERE TWO IMPORTANT MULTILATERAL MEETINGS COMING UP IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS, AN EC MINISTERIAL MEETING ON 21/22 JANUARY AND A NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING SOME 10 DAYS LATER.

2. HE HOPED THAT THE DECLARATIONS AND COMMUNIQES AFTER THESE MEETINGS COULD AVOID BEING TOTALLY NEGATIVE. HE DID NOT EXPECT TOO MUCH. BUT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE SOMETHING IF THE COMMUNITY AND ALLIANCE WERE TO EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE RATE OF PROGRESS BUT RECOGNISE ALL THE SAME THAT SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE LAST MONTH IN POLAND. IT WOULD NOT HELP IF THE COMMUNIQES WERE TO REFER BACK TO THE NATO STATEMENT OF JANUARY LAST YEAR, NOR WOULD IT HELP IF EVERYTHING WAS DISMISSED AS SO MUCH FACADE AND RUBBISH.

3. ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, COULD WE NOT TAKE SOME MODEST STEPS FORWARD, E.G. VISIT OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, BILATERAL TALKS AT THE LEVEL OF SENIOR OFFICIALS (HE MENTIONED DIRECTOR OF A DEPARTMENT, WHICH IS IN POLISH TERMS THE EQUIVALENT OF AN ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY)? THE POLES WERE ALSO SUGGESTING TO SOME OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THAT THEY MIGHT SEND HERE SOME IMPORTANT FIGURES IN SCIENCE AND CULTURE. HE WOULD BE QUITE FRANK. POLAND WANTED A SLOW RETURN TO MORE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

4. I SAID I TOOK NOTE OF WHAT HE HAD TO SAY AND THAT I WOULD OF COURSE COMMUNICATE IT TO MY GOVERNMENT. HE KNEW THE DIFFICULTIES. THE BEGINNING OF A DIALOGUE WOULD BECOME MORE POSSIBLE IF EVENTS EVOLVED IN A LIBERAL DIRECTION IN POLAND. HE SAID THAT THEY WERE SO EVOLVING.

5. IN THIS CONTEXT, I SAID THAT SOME RECENT ACTIONS LIKE THE DIFFICULTIES CAUSED TO THE EMPLOYEES OF THE POLISH NEWS BULLETIN AND THE EXPULSION OF KEVIN RUANE, THE BBC CORRESPONDENT, HAD NOT

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/ HELPED.



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HELPED. OLECHOWSKI SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS AWARE, THE DIFFICULTIES OVER THE RENEWAL OF WORK PERMITS FOR PNB EMPLOYEES WOULD BE REMOVED. I SAID THAT THERE WERE STILL 5 POLISH EMPLOYEES WHO WERE NOT IN RECEIPT OF WORK PERMITS (AND ONE BRITISH EMPLOYEE WHO HAD BEEN TOLD TO LEAVE.) THREE OF THE POLES WERE LONG-STANDING EMPLOYEES, 2 WERE MORE RECENT. AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, THEY HAD STILL NOT RECEIVED THEIR WORK PERMITS THIS MORNING. HE SAID HE WOULD CERTAINLY LOOK AGAIN INTO THE QUESTION BUT WAS SURE THAT IT WOULD BE RESOLVED POSITIVELY.

6. AS FOR THE BBC, OLECHOWSKI INSISTED THAT KEVIN <sup>RUANE</sup>~~RUTUE~~ HAD NOT BEEN EXPELLED. HE HOPED THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO RETURN. BUT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT FOUND THE PROGRAMME TWO WEEKS IN WINTER VERY OBJECTIONABLE. COULD NOT THE BBC DO SOMETHING TO RESTORE A BALANCE?

SURELY THEY COULD FIND SOMETHING POSITIVE TO SAY ABOUT RECENT EVENTS IN POLAND AS WELL AS CRITICISM. THE POLES WANTED TO PUT AN END TO THEIR DIFFICULTIES WITH THE BBC. THEY WERE ONLY LOOKING FOR SOME SORT OF GESTURE.

7. FINALLY, I SAID THAT THE POLES REALLY SHOULD LOOK TO THEIR LONG TERM INTERESTS ON THE WAY THEY WERE DEALING WITH SOME OF THE PROBLEMS FACING WESTERN EMBASSIES IN WARSAW. I HAD SPOKEN OF THOSE WHICH CONCERNED MY OWN COUNTRY. BUT HE WAS WELL AWARE THAT THERE WERE WIDER ASPECTS TO THIS WHOLE QUESTION. IT WOULD NOT HELP THE IMAGE OF POLAND IF THERE WAS NO CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THEIR CLAIMS AND THEIR ACTIONS. OLECHOWSKI SAID THERE MIGHT BE ZIG-ZAGS BUT THE GENERAL DIRECTION WAS CLEAR.

JAMES

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## POLAND SPECIAL

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AP 2



PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

DF  
12/1

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POLAND : MARTIAL LAW

I agree generally with the view in France Pym's minute PM/82/11 of 23 December that it is too soon to take any action which could be read as approval of the Polish Government's recent measures.

But one of our own measures, continued refusal to resume negotiations on rescheduling officially guaranteed debt, is harming us more than the Poles. They are currently benefiting from 100% de facto debt relief. I accept that we and the other 15 major creditor nations must maintain a united front on this question but it is not in our interest that this state of affairs should continue. I hope that it will be possible to persuade our partners at the forthcoming creditors' meeting that negotiations should now be allowed to resume.

Another of our 5 February 1982 measures, the suspension of existing credit, continues to affect our remaining projects in Poland, the Wloclawek PVC plant and the URSUS tractor factory, with serious implications for the British companies involved. We shall shortly be reviewing the current position with regard to each of these.

I am copying this to colleagues in OD, the Home Secretary, the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Secretary of State for Industry and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Department of Trade  
1 Victoria Street  
London  
SW1

A.C.  
11.1.83  
LORD COCKFIELD




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UK relations







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M Woodison  
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NEWS

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HOME SECRETARY

Poles in the United Kingdom

1. In my minute of 24 September I undertook to give a definitive response to your letter of 7 September when I had had an opportunity to consult our partners and allies and elicit their reactions to your proposals to end our policy on non-returnability.
  
2. These consultations are now complete. I am therefore writing to confirm that I would have no objection in principle to the course of action proposed.
  
3. This will however be a very difficult issue to present publicly. I am particularly concerned that a change of policy in the near future would be considered as part of our reaction to the recent modest relaxation in martial law. This would be a most unfortunate impression to create. I very much hope, therefore, that you will agree to delay an announcement for a further month or so, perhaps until March, in the hope that the timing might by then be a little more propitious.
  
4. Whenever the announcement is made, I hope that we can make clear that this decision relates solely to the practical operation of our immigration policy and is unrelated to our response to the suspension of martial law. I think we should in any case emphasise that the effect of this change will be to apply the same treatment in future to visitors from Poland as already applies to others, including other East Europeans.

/5. In your





5. In your letter you also raised the position of Poles at present permitted to stay here on the basis of the temporary renewal of their visas. I believe that it would be inappropriate for us to withdraw the protection we have already afforded to Poles already in this country until such time as martial law is finally lifted and we are convinced that they would not be at risk in returning to their own country. I hope therefore that you can agree to a further extension of the visas for this group of Poles, on the understanding that the position will be reviewed once martial law is officially lifted.

*FP*

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

7 January 1983



POLAND : Relations : R 9



*Poland.*

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*mf*

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FM WARSAW 311540Z DEC 82  
TO PRIORITY F C O  
TELNO 1154 OF 31ST DECEMBER 1982  
INFO ROUTINE: WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO AND MOSCOW

US/POLISH RELATIONS

1. THE US AMBASSADOR TOLD ME THAT HE HAD ALSO TALKED TO WIEJACZ, THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, LAST NIGHT ABOUT THE ABOVE. WIEJACZ TOLD HIM THAT GENERAL JARUZELSKI HAD BEEN STUNG TO THE QUICK BY WEINDERGER'S REMARKS ('A RUSSIAN IN POLISH UNIFORM') WIEJACZ ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION COULD NOT MAKE SOME GESTURE TOWARDS JARUZELSKI IN ORDER TO PREVENT RELATIONS FROM FURTHER DETERIORATING. THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HAD SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT VERY LIKELY. WIEJACZ SEEMED TO DRAW SOME COMFORT FROM A POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET/AMERICAN RELATIONS.

2. MEEHAN TOLD ME THAT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS GETTING UNPLEASANT FOR THE EMBASSY IN WARSAW. THIRTY-SEVEN POLISH EMPLOYEES HAD HAD THEIR WORK CARDS WITHDRAWN AND POLICE HAD BEEN MOUNTED OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY, PREVENTING ANY EMPLOYEE ENTERING WITHOUT A WORK CARD. MANY OF THE POLISH EMPLOYEES WERE NOW THOROUGHLY SCARED.

3. A CURIOUS INCIDENT HAD TAKEN PLACE YESTERDAY WHEN TWO POLISH SOLDIERS CARRYING AK47 GUNS, FULLY LOADED, HAD COME OVER THE EMBASSY FENCE. THEY WERE SPOTTED BY THE TELEVISION ALARM SYSTEM AND IMMEDIATELY DISARMED BY THE MARINES. THE PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT HAD THIS MORNING CALLED IN A MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AND APOLOGISED FOR THE INCIDENT, EXPLAINING THAT WITH THE PETTY CRIME INCREASES OVER THE PERIOD OF CHRISTMAS AND THE NEW YEAR, SOLDIERS HAD BEEN BROUGHT IN FROM THE PROVINCES. THEY HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY INSTRUCTED IN SOME CASES ABOUT THEIR DUTIES. MEEHAN WAS NOT INCLINED TO REJECT THIS EXPLANATION OUT OF HAND.

4. MEEHAN HAD TALKED OVER THESE AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES WITH THE HEAD OF PROTOCOL, WHO SEEMED TO THINK THAT THINGS WOULD IMPROVE IN THE NEW YEAR.

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/S. FOUR



*Prime Minister*<sup>2</sup>  
*See*  
*WR*  
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FM WARSAW 311205Z DEC 82  
TO PRIORITY F C O  
TELNO 1153 OF 31ST DECEMBER 1982  
INFO PRIORITY: UKDEL NATO  
INFO ROUTINE: WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, Bonn, UKNIS GENEVA AND  
UKDEL CSCE  
INFO SAVING: EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, MODUK, SOFIA, DUCHAREST,  
BELGRADE, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, UKNIS NEW YORK AND UKREP BRUSSELS

DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WIEJACZ ON POLISH SOVIET RELATIONS AND  
POLISH RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

1. WHEN I SAW DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WEIJACZ AT A RECEPTION  
YESTERDAY, I ASKED HIM WHAT IMPRESSION HE HAD OF ANDROPOV AND THE  
NEW SOVIET ADMINISTRATION. CHOOSING HIS WORDS CAREFULLY, HE SAID  
THAT HE COULD TELL ME THAT THE CONVERSATION EARLIER THIS MONTH IN  
MOSCOW BETWEEN ANDROPOV AND JARUZELSKI HAD LASTED FOR THREE HOURS.  
ANDROPOV HAD SHOWN GREAT UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE  
POLISH SITUATION AND JARUZELSKI HAD TOLD HIS COLLABORATORS THAT HE  
WAS VERY PLEASED WITH THE WAY HE HAD BEEN RECEIVED AND BY THE  
CONTENTS OF HIS DISCUSSION. WIEJACZ SAID THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN  
A DEUX AND THAT HE HAD NOT SEEN THE RECORD OF THE DISCUSSION.  
VERY FEW PEOPLE INDEED WOULD HAVE DONE. BUT THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT  
THE SATISFACTION ON THE POLISH SIDE. HE ADDED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE  
WAS NOW DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IT HAD BEEN UNDER BREZHNEV. ANDROPOV  
HAD MORE GRIP AND WAS MORE FLEXIBLE.

2. AT THIS POINT WE WERE JOINED BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AND  
WIEJACZ MUSED ABOUT THE GENERAL STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN POLAND  
AND THE WEST. BOTH THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AND I EMPHASISED THAT THE  
REACTIONS OF THE WEST WOULD DEPEND UPON EVOLUTION OF EVENTS IN  
POLAND. WIEJACZ SAID THAT THE WEST WAS STILL OVER-REACTING TO THE  
POLISH SITUATION AND THIS MEANT THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KEEP ON A  
MODERATE COURSE. WE SHOULD BE AWARE THAT MANY OF THE POLISH PEOPLE  
IN POWER HAD NO VERY SOPHISTICATED KNOWLEDGE OF THE WEST AND THAT  
IT WAS QUITE A JOB TO PREVENT THEIR REACTION AT TIMES FROM BEING  
RATHER PRIMITIVE. THEY DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE WERE MAKING SO MUCH  
OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF POLAND.

3. I SAID THAT HE HAD TO RECKON WITH THE EXTRA-ORDINARY INTEREST  
THAT POLAND STILL AROUSED IN THE WORLD, WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF  
PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST AND WITH THE REACTIONS OF WESTERN LEADERS  
ELECTED BY THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. WHETHER HE LIKED IT OR NOT, OUR  
LEADERS TENDED TO SAY "WHAT DO THE POLISH PEOPLE FEEL ABOUT THIS?  
HOW DOES THIS AFFECT THE POLISH PEOPLE?" HE SHOOK HIS HEAD AND  
SAID "WHO KNOWS EXACTLY WHAT THE POLISH PEOPLE THINK. WHO KNOWS  
WHAT ANY PEOPLE THINK. IF THE POLISH PEOPLE WERE GIVEN FREE REIN, YOU



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5. FOUR OF THE SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE PNB (JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN PRESS BULLETIN) ARE STILL UNABLE TO GAIN ACCESS TO THEIR WORK ON THE US EMBASSY PREMISES. THE HEAD OF CHANCERY, ON MY INSTRUCTIONS, CALLED ON THE DIRECTOR OF THE PRESS DEPARTMENT OF THE MFA TODAY AND ASKED WHY IMPEDIMENTS WERE BEING PLACED IN THE WAY OF THE OPERATION OF THE PNB WHEN I HAD BEEN GIVEN ASSURANCES BY MR OLECHOWSKI (MY TELNO 1141 NOT TO ALL) THAT THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO THE OPERATION OF THE PNB. KOHOREWICZ, WHO APPEARED TO ACCEPT THE DESIRABILITY OF ENDING THESE IMPEDIMENTS, AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER URGENTLY AND UNDERTOOK TO REPLY EARLY NEXT WEEK.

JAMES

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KNOW AGAINST WHOM THEY WOULD TURN THEIR MOST VIOLENT CRITICISM. THAT WOULD BE AN IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION FOR EVERYONE AND HIGHLY DE-STABILISING.''

4. WIEJACZ SAID THAT THERE WERE STILL CONSTRUCTIVE MINDED PEOPLE IN POLISH ADMINISTRATION WHO HOPED THAT POLAND COULD RETURN TO HER PREVIOUS ROLE AS A MODERATING INFLUENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND HE VERY MUCH HOPED THE DAY WOULD COME SOON WHEN THE WEST SAW A CERTAIN INTEREST IN POLAND BEING ABLE TO PLAY THIS ROLE AGAIN. HE RECOGNISED THAT IT MUST SEEM ALMOST NAIVE TO SUGGEST THAT POLAND COULD SPEAK WITH ANY AUTHORITY FROM HER PRESENT POSITION OF WEAKNESS. BUT THEY HAD IDEAS AND THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF THE WEST WAS NOT ALWAYS HELPFUL TOWARDS THOSE WHO WANTED TO MOVE TOWARDS A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE.

5. I SAID THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT STEP THEY COULD NOW TAKE WOULD BE TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW COMPLETELY. IT WOULD BE WISE IF THE POLISH AUTHORITIES THOUGHT IN TERMS OF A STEP-BY-STEP REPAIRING OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE WEST IN THE MEANTIME TRIED TO DIMINISH MINOR SOURCES OF IRRITATION. IT WOULD ALL TAKE TIME.

6. I HAVE REPORTED THIS AT SOME LENGTH SINCE I HAVE FOUND WIEJACZ THE MOST RELIABLE AND SENSIBLE OF THE POLISH MINISTERS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

JAMES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FM WARSAW 301515Z DEC 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 1151 OF 30TH DECEMBER 1982

INFO PRIORITY: WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO,  
UKMIS GENEVA AND UKDEL CSCE

INFO SAVING: EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, MODUK, SOFIA BUCHAREST,  
BELGRADE, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKREP BRUSSELS

CALL ON ARCHBISHOP GLEMP

1. I CALLED TODAY ON ARCHBISHOP GLEMP, I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY CANON MOSSMAN, THE VISITING EMBASSY CHAPLAIN, WHO TOOK WITH HIM A LETTER FROM THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY.

2. ARCHBISHOP GLEMP RECEIVED US WARMLY AND WAS CLEARLY TOUCHED BY THE GOOD WISHES FROM THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AS CONVEYED BY CANON MOSSMAN. HE THANKED THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND THE BRITISH PEOPLE FOR THE HELP WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN TO POLAND. HE SAID HE WAS IMPRESSED AND SURPRISED BY THE DURABILITY OF THE SUPPORT WHICH POLAND HAD RECEIVED FROM THE WEST.

3. I ASKED HOW HE SAW THE GENERAL SITUATION. HE SAID THERE WAS NO GROWTH OF CONFIDENCE IN THE REGIME BY THE PEOPLE. BUT IT HAD TO BE RECOGNISED THAT THE REGIME ITSELF HAD LITTLE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE. HE THOUGHT THE POPE'S VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE AND THAT THE CHURCH WOULD NOT MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS. HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER MARTIAL LAW WOULD BE LIFTED BEFORE THE POPE'S VISIT. HE AGREED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD VACILLATED BETWEEN LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING IT. FOR TWO WEEKS THERE WAS UNCERTAINTY. HE THOUGHT THAT A MIXTURE OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PRESSURES HAD RESULTED IN THE GOVERNMENT NOT TAKING RISKS. OF COURSE THIS GOVERNMENT CALLED THEMSELVES SOCIALIST, BUT IF THEY HAD BEEN REALLY SOCIALIST, THEY WOULD HAVE KNOWN WHAT TO DO FOR THE PEOPLE. BUT THEY WERE NOT. (I DID NOT COMMENT).

4. I ASKED ABOUT THOSE STILL IN PRISON FOR OFFENCES UNDER MARTIAL LAW. DID HE HAVE ANY IDEA HOW MANY THERE WERE? HE SAID THAT FIGURES VARIED FROM 8,000 AT THE MOST TO 1,600. THE TRUE FIGURE WAS PROBABLY SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE TWO. HE SAID THE CHURCH WAS TRYING TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF YOUNG PEOPLE, WOMEN AND THOSE WITH FAMILIES. THEY WERE ALSO TRYING TO GET PEOPLE MADE 'POLITICAL' PRISONERS WHERE THIS WAS JUSTIFIED RATHER THAN CRIMINAL OFFENDERS. IN GENERAL, THE CHURCH WOULD STRIVE FOR PEACE WITHIN POLISH SOCIETY AND FAVOUR HARD WORK. WORK WAS ESSENTIAL TO THE WELL-BEING OF POLAND.

5. I ASKED HIM WHETHER THE AUTHORITIES CLAIM THAT THINGS WERE GETTING BETTER ECONOMICALLY WAS JUSTIFIED. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A SMALL IMPROVEMENT. SOME ELEMENTS OF ECONOMIC REFORM

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FM WARSAW 241125Z DEC 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1143 OF 24TH DECEMBER 1982

INFO ROUTINE: WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS GENEVA AND UKDEL CSCE

INFO SAVING: EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, BONN, PARIS, UKMIS NY, UKREP BRUSSELS AND MODUK

POLAND:

1. THE MAIN HEADLINE IN TODAY'S PRESS WAS THE MEETING BETWEEN ANDROPOV AND JARUZELSKI IN MOSCOW ON 23 DECEMBER WITH A PICTURE OF THE TWO LEADERS, AFONE, FACING EACH OTHER ACROSS A TABLE IN THE KREMLIN. JARUZELSKI TOLD JOURNALISTS AT THE AIRPORT ON HIS RETURN TO WARSAW THAT THE VISIT HAD BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL AND USEFUL. HE REFERRED TO THE ''KINDNESS'' SHOWN BY THE SOVIET PARTY AND STATE LEADERSHIP TOWARDS POLISH PROBLEMS AND SAID THERE WAS A FULL CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON ALL ISSUES DISCUSSED.

2. THE GOVERNMENT PRESIDUM MET YESTERDAY, CHAIRED BY RAKOWSKI, AND ARE REPORTED TO HAVE DISCUSSED THE CURRENT SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE STATE OF PREPARATION OF THE REGULATIONS THAT WILL BE IN FORCE DURING THE SUSPENSION OF MARTIAL LAW.

3. TODAY'S PRESS ALSO REPORTS THAT POLAND'S REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UN HANDED A NOTE TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, INFORMING HIM OF THE SUSPENSION OF MARTIAL LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EARLIER NOTIFICATION OF THE SUSPENSION OF SOME PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS.

4. THE 1983 POLISH-SOVIET TRADE PROTOCOL WAS SIGNED BY THE RESPECTIVE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN TRADE IN MOSCOW ON 23 DECEMBER. AS REPORTED IN THE POLISH PRESS POLAND WILL HAVE A DEFICIT OF ROUBLES 1 BILLION IN TRADE WITH THE USSR NEXT YEAR.

( COMMENT: THIS IS SIGNIFICANTLY SMALLER THAN THE 1981 DEFICIT AND LESS THAN THAT PLANNED FOR 1982.)

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/ POLISH



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HAD SUBSTANCE AND SHOULD BE SUPPORTED. HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE RECENT DEBATES IN THE SEJM. (WHICH I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY BY SAVINGRAM). BUT HIS EXPERTS TOLD HIM THAT MARCH, APRIL AND MAY OF NEXT YEAR WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT MONTHS FOR THE PEOPLE AND THAT THERE WOULD BE SEVERE SHORTAGES OF MEAT AND FATS ESPECIALLY.

6. ON CHURCH/STATE RELATIONS, HE SAID THAT THERE WAS TALK BUT NO UNDERSTANDING. THE CHURCH WOULD BE CONTENT IF THE AUTHORITIES DID NOT OPENLY ATTACK THEM. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD TRIED TO GET HIM TO APPEAR ON TELEVISION BUT HE HAD REFUSED.

7. ON THE NEW TRADE UNIONS, HE THOUGHT THAT AS TIME WENT ON MORE WORKERS WOULD JOIN - THOUGH THE CHURCH WOULD NOT INVOLVE ITSELF DIRECTLY IN THIS MATTER.

8. COMMENT. I FOUND ARCHBISHOP GLEMP IN CONFIDENT FORM. HE WAS, AS ALWAYS, DIRECT AND CLEAR. HE BELIEVES THAT THE POPE'S VISIT WILL BE A VERY GREAT EVENT BUT I DETECTED MUCH UNCERTAINTY HOW IT WOULD GO AND HOW THE AUTHORITIES WOULD TRY TO HANDLE IT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

JAMES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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POLISH IMPORTS WILL RISE BY ABOUT 12 PER CENT, WHILST EXPORTS WILL INCREASE BY 17 PER CENT. THE SOVIET UNION WILL MAINTAIN SUPPLIES OF CRUDE OIL AND OIL PRODUCTS TO POLAND IN 1983 AT ABOUT CURRENT LEVELS.

5. THE POLISH AUTHORITIES HAVE MANAGED TO PROVIDE MORE GOODS IN THE SHOPS THIS CHRISTMAS THAN FOR THE PAST 2 YEARS. THIS PROBABLY REFLECTS BOTH HIGHER PRICES, AND BETTER DISTRIBUTION OF WHAT IS AVAILABLE.

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FM WARSAW 240900Z DEC 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 1142 OF 24TH DECEMBER 1982

INFO ROUTINE: WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN,  
UKMIS GENEVA, CSCE MADRID

INFO SAVING: EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST,  
BUDAPEST, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK AND UKREP  
BRUSSELS

MIPT ( NOT TO ALL )

OLECHOWSKI ON THE POLISH SITUATION

1. AFTER OUR DISCUSSION ON THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF THE POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, OLECHOWSKI CALLED MY ATTENTION TO THE RELEASE OF ALL THE INTERNEES EXCEPT 7. HE HOPED THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT IMMEDIATELY ASSUME THAT THE 7 WERE GOING TO BE JUDGED ON PHONEY LEGAL PROCEDURES. THERE WERE REAL JUDICIAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED AND IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR POLAND'S CRITICS AT LEAST TO BE PATIENT BEFORE THEY CAME TO CONCLUSIONS.
2. HE WOULD REPEAT TO ME HIS PERSONAL CONVICTION THAT IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATISATION IN POLAND WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL THE FINAL LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW. AT THE SAME TIME POLAND WOULD HAVE TO PRESERVE THE SOCIALIST NATURE OF THE STATE. BUT THE LEADERS RECOGNISED THAT WITHOUT MOVEMENT TOWARDS DEMOCRACY, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE BULK OF THE POLISH PEOPLE. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER SUCH ORGANISATIONS AS PRON WOULD WORK BUT HE BELIEVED THAT THE GENERAL DIRECTION WAS NOW INEVITABLE. I SAID THAT THIS WAS ALL VERY WELL BUT THE POLISH GOVT. COULD NOT EXPECT THE WEST NECESSARILY TO APPROVE POLICIES WHICH SEEMED TO GIVE WITH ONE HAND AND TO TIE DOWN THE WORKERS WITH THE OTHER IN A MORE SPECIFIC AND REPRESSIVE WAY THAN BEFORE. HE EXCLAIMED THAT POLAND HAD TO KEEP SOME DISCIPLINE IN CERTAIN SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY. SURELY WE IN THE WEST RECOGNISED THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY.
3. HE THEN SAID THAT HE WAS SURPRISED AT THE GENERALLY NEGATIVE REACTION OF WESTERN LEADERS TO MR ANDROPOV'S PROPOSALS ON MISSILE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE. DID WE NOT THINK EVEN IF WE COULD NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO KEEP OPEN A DIALOGUE? THE POLES OF COURSE HAD A PARTICULAR INTEREST OF THEIR OWN. FOR POLAND TO GET OUT OF HER PRESENT MESS, THE BEGINNINGS OF AN EAST-WEST DIALOGUE WERE ESSENTIAL.
4. I SAID THAT I HAD NOT BEEN PRIVY TO THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSALS AND I ONLY KNEW WHAT I HAD READ IN THE PRESS. BUT IT WAS

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/ SURELY



SURELY ONE OF THE CARDINAL FEATURES OF SERIOUS DIPLOMACY THAT IF ONE WANTED NEGOTIATIONS ONE DID NOT START WITH PROPAGANDA DECLARATIONS INTENDED TO DRAW IMMEDIATE PUBLIC RESPONSE, WITH THE OBVIOUS MOTIVE OF PLACING WESTERN LEADERS IN DIFFICULT SITUATIONS VIS A VIS PUBLIC OPINION IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES. IF THE SOVIET UNION WAS INTERESTED IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATION, THE RIGHT TACTIC WOULD SURELY HAVE BEEN TO SOUND OUT THE WEST IN A MORE INDIRECT AND DISCREET WAY. THEIR METHODS RENDERED THEIR INTENTIONS IMMEDIATELY SUSPECT. BUT NO DOUBT ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT WOULD BE MOST CAREFULLY SCRUTINISED.

5. OLECHOWSKI DID NOT ARGUE WITH THIS BUT SAID THAT EVEN IF THERE WERE SOME SMALL ELEMENT THAT COULD BE BUILT ON IN ANDROPOV'S OFFER, THE WEST SHOULD NOT BE TOTALLY NEGATIVE. I SAID THAT I DID NOT SEE THAT A DIALOGUE COULD START UNLESS THERE WAS SOME GENUINE BASIS FOR TRUST.

THIS IS ALMOST THE FIRST TIME THAT I HAVE HEARD ANY DISCUSSION OF EAST-WEST MATTERS FROM THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR MONTHS. HITHERTO DISCUSSION HAS ALWAYS BEEN EXCLUSIVELY ABOUT POLAND. NO DOUBT JARUZELSKI'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION MAY HAVE COLOURED OLECHOWSKI'S REMARKS. BUT HE WAS CAREFUL TO SAY THAT POLAND'S AMBITIONS WERE TO RETURN TO BEING A CATALYST IN EUROPEAN DETENTE, EVEN WHILE HE RECOGNISED AT PRESENT HER INTERNAL SITUATION WAS FAR TOO WEAK TO WARRANT SUCH A ROLE.

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FM WARSAW 240835Z DEC 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 1141 OF 24TH DECEMBER 1982

POLISH NEWS BULLETIN

1. IN AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR I CALLED, TODAY, ON THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, OLECHOWSKI, TO COMPLAIN ABOUT CERTAIN ACTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THE POLISH STAFF OF THE POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, A JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN EMBASSY TRANSLATION SERVICE, PROVIDING DAILY TRANSLATIONS OF ARTICLES FROM THE POLISH PRESS AND WIDELY DISTRIBUTED OR SOLD AMONG THE FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY IN WARSAW. I TOLD OLECHOWSKI THAT I REGRETTED THAT THE POLISH STAFF HAD BEEN INTIMIDATED AND HAD BEEN WARNED NOT TO WORK FOR THE PNB AND HAD BEEN TOLD NOT TO INFORM US. THERE HAD BEEN CASES OF SLASHED TYRES, AN ATTEMPTED BURGLARY, PRESSURE ON ONE OF THE STAFF HOLDING A BRITISH PASSPORT TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, INTERFERENCE WITH TELEPHONES.
2. I SAID THE PNB WAS A SERVICE TO THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE AND WAS A VALUABLE SOURCE OF INFORMATION TO FOREIGNERS ABOUT POLAND AND THAT WE HOPED THESE UNFRIENDLY ACTIVITIES, FROM WHATEVER SOURCES THEY MIGHT COME, WOULD CEASE.
3. OLECHOWSKI SAID THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD OF THESE ACTIVITIES. HE WANTED TO SAY FIRST OF ALL THAT THE PNB'S OPERATIONS IN POLAND, OF MANY YEARS STANDING, WERE PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE POLISH AUTHORITIES. THERE HAD BEEN ONE OR TWO CASES WHERE CRITICAL COMMENT HAD BEEN INSERTED INTO THE BULLETIN. BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS HAD BEEN MADE KNOWN TO THE EDITORS, HAD CEASED, AND IT WAS NO LONGER A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONSEQUENCE.
4. HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE QUESTION OF INTIMIDATION. THE INFLUENCE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COULD NOT REACH EVERYWHERE. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS THE TRUTH OF THESE ALLEGATIONS BUT HE WOULD CERTAINLY DO WHAT HE COULD TO SEE THAT INTIMIDATORY ACTIVITIES CEASED.

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5. THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, IN WHOSE EMBASSY THE PNB (JOINTLY FINANCED) LODGES, HAD ASKED, IN PARALLEL, TO SEE WIEJACZ, THE DEPUTY MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR US AFFAIRS AND HAD BEEN TOLD THAT HE WOULD NOT BE RECEIVED AT THAT LEVEL AND THE EMBASSY SHOULD MAKE ITS DEMARCHE AT A LOWER LEVEL. I SAID TO OLECHOWSKI THAT WHILE THE POLISH AUTHORITIES MIGHT WISH TO DIFFERENTIATE THEIR ATTITUDES BETWEEN THE US AND THE UK AT THE PRESENT TIME, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THEY SHOULD REMEMBER THAT THIS WAS AN ANGLO-AMERICAN JOINT ENTERPRISE AND THAT MY DEMARCHE SHOULD BE SEEN IN THIS CONTEXT. HE MADE NO COMMENT EXCEPT TO SAY THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE GUIDELINES FOR THE ENTERPRISE WAS BRITISH AND THAT THE POLES WERE CONTENT WITH ITS GENERAL OPERATION.

6. MIFT CONTAINS OLECHOWSKI'S REMARKS ON THE GENERAL SITUATION IN POLAND.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 December 1982

Dear Sir,

This is simply to record that the Prime Minister has seen and noted the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 23 December about the steps we will be taking with our Allies and partners following the vote in the Polish Parliament to suspend martial law.

Yours ever  
Tim F

Timothy Flesher

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

da





The actual situation, however, is less promising when measured either against our hopes or against the Polish authorities' declared intentions in the immediate aftermath of the imposition of martial law, which were to continue on the path of reform and renewal. The overall human rights situation in Poland is probably better than in most other Eastern European countries, but that is small comfort.

5. The key question will be how these latest measures are put into effect. In the NATO communique of 10 December, we stated that the actions of the Polish authorities would be judged by their practical effects. The next steps in the Ten and NATO will be to review and assess the measures. This will take some time, and we may well have to wait weeks or months for the final lifting of martial law itself. Until these assessments are completed, I do not think there can be any question of lifting our national measures which were announced in the House on 5 February. To do so would, in my opinion, send quite the wrong sort of signal to both the Russians and the Poles. Equally, I do not think that any of us at the end of this year need any reminding of the importance of Alliance consultation and co-ordination over measures on Poland.

6. I know that a number of colleagues in OD had hoped that we might be able to move faster than this. I hope they will appreciate the reasons why we cannot. I will, of course, see that they are kept informed and consulted as necessary.

/7. I am





PM/82/111

PRIME MINISTER

Pine Murta

M

TJ

23/12

Poland: Martial Law

1. In the light of the vote in the Polish Parliament on 18 December to suspend martial law on 31 December, you may find it helpful if I set out briefly where we now stand, and the next steps we will be taking with our Allies and partners.
2. The measures entering into force on 31 December will remove the overwhelming majority of the martial law restrictions imposed on 13 December 1981. But certain features of martial law have already become permanent while others (such as trade union organisation and activity, including the right to strike, the running of the economy and censorship) will remain covered by new legislation or regulations which, at first sight, appear as stringent as the martial law restrictions they replaced.
3. It remains to be seen how many of the 200 or so original detainees will be released, and whether an amnesty will be offered to those serving sentences for offences committed during the period of martial law. The temporary re-arrest of Lech Walesa on 16 December, to stop him speaking at a ceremony to commemorate those killed in the 1970 disturbances, shows that the Polish authorities are determined to prevent any chance of opposition gaining momentum again.
4. In formal terms, therefore, we are faced by a situation in which the Poles have moved some way towards fulfilling the Western criteria set out in the NATO Declaration of 11 January.

/The actual



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7. I am sending copies of this minute to colleagues in OD, the Home Secretary, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'FP', with a horizontal line underneath.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

23 December 1982

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Poland

A 4/12



QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

21 Decemb 1982

Dear Michael

P 8

You wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 9th August about the criteria for accepting the transfer to this country of a limited number of Poles from Poland and emphasised the need for the strict application of the accommodation criterion. You also referred to the Immigration Rules which had been strengthened in this respect.

Our policy in respect of Poles wishing to leave Poland has been closely coordinated with our partners in the Ten and Nato. Some of our partners including the United States, Canada and West Germany are already taking significant numbers of ex-detainees and we are under increasing pressure to give an indication of our willingness to accept a share, however small, of those ex-detainees who seek resettlement outside Poland. Although the housing question has not yet been entirely resolved I do not think we can delay an announcement any further.

As you will be aware, the criteria under consideration were first drawn up in respect of those Poles who had been recognised as refugees by the Austrian authorities and whose status was in effect being transferred to the United Kingdom. In those circumstances, it was possible to stipulate general conditions relating to sponsorship and accommodation and to expect these to be enforceable until the transfer of responsibility was completed and our full obligation towards the refugees came into effect.

The case of Poles in Poland is however different from that of Poles in Austria. In this instance, the United Kingdom would be the first State for the purposes of recognition as refugees and the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees would therefore come into full effect. In the context of housing and State benefits, the Convention binds the receiving state to accord treatment no less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances as regards housing and the same as is accorded to our nationals as regards public relief. It follows accordingly that it would be in conflict with our obligations under the Convention to stipulate the same criteria in regard to accommodation and sponsorship as we did for the Poles from Austria.

I propose to maintain the essence of the other criteria stipulated for the Poles in Austria - that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution, that by ties of family, education and language the United Kingdom is the most appropriate country of asylum

/and that

The Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine, M.P.

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
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and that he or she is personally acceptable for settlement. But in place of specific accommodation criteria we would issue instructions that enquiries prior to the grant of entry clearance should go into the candidates' prospect of obtaining accommodation without the need to receive local authority housing in the United Kingdom. Provision of housing accommodation would be a factor which would count towards entry. We could not of course hope to enforce any undertakings given before arrival here.

We would thus seek to minimise any additional burden on local authorities by selecting ex-detainees with ties with this country, and by selecting wherever possible those who already have promises of housing whether from private sources, housing associations or local authorities. The indications from Austria are that we are now most unlikely to find any large number of Poles qualifying for entry from that country (we have received only a few applications to date) and we would not, I suggest, be committing ourselves to a large scale exercise for Poland by adopting the course I have outlined. So far we have received only 75 applications and while we have not yet carried out sponsorship checks it is already clear that 61 of the applicants would fail on other grounds, mainly because they have not established a well-founded fear of persecution. Of the remainder, 10 applications (totalling 31 individuals) would succeed in that the applicants would qualify as refugees and have ties with this country and four applications have not yet been examined. However, as an additional safeguard I would propose that we review the situation if and when the total number of ex-detainees accepted from Poland reached 100.

I hope you can agree that we should adopt a flexible approach to the housing issue so that we can make the positive response on ex-detainees, however modest, that our partners expect of us.

Copies of this letter go to the Prime Minister, the Chief Secretary and the Secretary of State for Social Services.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'M. J. ...' followed by a large flourish and the name 'L. M. ...' below it.

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


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 PRIORITY: WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKMIS GENEVA AND UKDEL  
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ARREST OF WALESA

1. WE HAVE NOT GOT FULL DETAILS BUT ACCORDING TO CORRESPONDENTS' REPORTS, WALESA WAS ARRESTED LATE THIS MORNING AND TAKEN INTO CUSTODY. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT CHARGES HAVE BEEN PREFERRED AGAINST HIM OR FOR HOW LONG HE IS LIKELY TO BE HELD. WE HAD HEARD THAT THE CORRESPONDENT OF THE FINANCIAL TIMES AMONG OTHERS WAS ALSO DETAINED, BUT HE HAS NOW BEEN RELEASED.

2. WALESA WAS PLANNING TO MAKE A SPEECH AND COPIES OF THE TEXTS HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO CORRESPONDENTS. WE HAVE THE FULL TEXT



2. WALESA WAS PLANNING TO MAKE A SPEECH AND COPIES OF THE TEXTS HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO CORRESPONDENTS. WE HAVE THE FULL TEXT WHICH WE WILL BE SENDING BY BAG.

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3. THOUGH COINED IN GENERAL TERMS, IT WAS PROBABLY HIGHLY OBJECTIONABLE TO THE AUTHORITIES. IT SAID THAT VICTORY WOULD COME TO THE WORKERS. NO-ONE SHOULD LOSE HOPE. THE POLES WERE NOT THE SAME PEOPLE AS BEFORE AUGUST 1980. THEY NOW NEEDED MORE TIME AND OTHER METHODS. HE REMINDED THE PEOPLE OF WHAT THE POPE HAD SAID ABOUT RENEWAL AND INNER FREEDOM. THE GREAT POPULAR MOVEMENT WOULD NOW SPLIT INTO SEVERAL STREAMS BUT THEY SHOULD REMAIN FAITHFUL TO THEIR IDEALS, IDEALS OF AUGUST 1980. ONE STREAM COULD BE UNIONS. ANOTHER SELF GOVERNMENT IN THE ENTERPRISES. ANOTHER WOULD WORK THROUGH THE INTELLECTUALS AND WOULD BE THE MOUTHPIECE OF THE PEOPLE. THERE WOULD ALSO BE INDEPENDENT ORGANISATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF YOUTH WHERE YOUTH WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEAK ITS MIND. THE YOUNG MUST NOT LIVE AMONG LIES. THE POLES ACCEPTED POLITICAL REALITIES AND THEY WERE NOT OVERTHROWING AUTHORITY. LET THE POLISH PEOPLE NOT TURN FROM PEACEFULLY PURSUING THEIR AIMS.

JAMES

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FM WARSAW 151130Z DEC 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1120 OF 15 DECEMBER 1982

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS GENEVA,  
UKDEL CSCE.

INFO SAVING EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST,  
BUDAPEST, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, PARIS, BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
UKREP BRUSSELS, MODUK.

*mf*

US/POLISH RELATIONS

1. THE POLISH AUTHORITIES HAVE ANNOUNCED VARIOUS RESTRICTIONS ON OFFICIAL AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN POLAND. THESE WERE FORESHADOWED BY JARUZELSKI IN HIS SPEECH ON 3 DECEMBER IF US "INTERFERENCE" IN POLISH AFFAIRS CONTINUED.

2. A POLISH GOVERNMENT COMMUNIQUE OF 14 DECEMBER CITES EXAMPLES OF US GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF POLAND, INCLUDING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT AND THE SENATE RESOLUTION OF 10 DECEMBER, PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT FOR THE PERIOD OF 1 JUNE TO 30 NOVEMBER 1982, AND THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF "VOICE OF AMERICA" AND "RADIO FREE EUROPE".

3. THE COMMUNIQUE ADDS THAT THE US GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY ITSELF IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES AND HAS LIMITED THE POLISH CULTURAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL SERVICES HAVE "REPEATEDLY ABUSED SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL COOPERATION FOR THE PURPOSES OF PENETRATION AND SUBVERSION".

4. THE COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCES THAT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN THE FOLLOWING STEPS:-

(I) ALL FORMS OF SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL COOPERATION WITH THE US INFORMATION AGENCY AND ALL OTHER US FEDERAL AGENCIES WHICH ENGAGE IN ANTI-POLISH ACTIVITY WILL BE STOPPED.

(11) A SPECIAL PROCEDURE WILL BE INTRODUCED TO CONSIDER INVITATIONS AND GRANTS CONNECTED WITH THOSE AREAS OF SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE WHICH WILL CONTINUE.

(111) THE ISSUE OF VISAS TO ANY REPRESENTATIVE OR EMPLOYEES OF THE US INFORMATION AGENCY AND ITS BRANCHES IS SUSPENDED.

(1V) ALL VISA APPLICATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES WILL BE CONSIDERED WITH AN EYE TO THE INTERESTS AND SECURITY OF THE STATE.

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/COMMENT



COMMENT

5. THESE MEASURES ARE LINKED BY THE POLES TO THE CRITICAL STATEMENTS MADE BY THE US ADMINISTRATION BEGINNING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH OF 10 DECEMBER. IT IS THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT SPOKE BEFORE THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S EXPECTED ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SUSPENSION OF MARTIAL LAW AND ALSO WHAT THE POLISH AUTHORITIES REGARD AS THE HIGHLY PROVOCATIVE TONE OF AMERICAN CRITICISM THAT APPEARS TO HAVE LED TO THESE HOSTILE MEASURES. I THINK ONE CAN HARDLY DENY THAT THE STYLE OF SOME RECENT AMERICAN COMMENTS, AT LEAST AS SEEN FROM HERE, HAS BEEN ILL-CONSIDERED AND INEPT, WHATEVER DEPTH OF POPULAR FEELING ABOUT POLAND IN THE UNITED STATES THEY MAY REFLECT. THE STATEMENT BY M. WEINBURGER THAT JARUZELSKI WAS A RUSSIAN GENERAL IN POLISH UNIFORM SEEMS PARTICULARLY TO HAVE WOUNDED POLISH SUSCEPTIBILITIES, EVEN SOMETIMES OF THOSE OPPOSED TO THE REGIME. SUCH STATEMENTS ARE ALSO A GIFT TO THE POLISH PROPAGANDA MACHINE WHICH IS EVER READY TO ATTRIBUTE POLAND'S DIFFICULTIES TO HER FOREIGN ENEMIES. THE BALANCED COMMENTS THAT YOU YOURSELF MADE IN BRUSSELS ON 13 DECEMBER CARRY WEIGHT AND INFLUENCE WITH THE POLISH AUTHORITIES.

6. I AM MUCH CONCERNED THAT THE POLES SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT ANY DIFFERENCE OF STYLE OR APPROACH AMONG MEMBERS OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, AND I AM IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH MY US COLLEAGUE. HE IS ALREADY IN A DIFFICULT POSITION BECAUSE OF THE PERSONAL CRITICISM LEVELLED AT HIM BY JARUZELSKI. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE POLES MAY TRY TO TURN TO BRITAIN IN THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES IN ENGLISH. I THINK WE SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT SEEMING TO SUPPLANT THE AMERICANS, ALTHOUGH I IMAGINE THAT LACK OF RESOURCES WILL IN ANY CASE PREVENT OUR TAKING UP VERY MUCH OF WHAT THE POLES HAVE TORN FROM THE GRASP OF THE AMERICANS.  
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 MR GOODISON  
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 TELNO 1117 OF 14TH DECEMBER 1982  
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO  
 PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL CSCE AND UKMIS GENEVA  
 SAVING : EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST,  
 HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, PARIS, BONN, UKMIS NY, UKREP BRUSSELS AND MODUK

POLAND - SUSPENSION OF MARTIAL LAW: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT:

1. IT MAY BE HELPFUL IN ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN POLAND, FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT MARTIAL LAW WILL BE SUSPENDED AND MANY OF ITS RESTRICTIONS RELAXED ON 31 DECEMBER, TO GIVE A BRIEF IMPRESSION OF HOW MUCH OF THE ORIGINAL FABRIC OF MARTIAL LAW NOW REMAINS.

2. MANY OF THE MOST OPPRESSIVE ASPECTS OF MARTIAL LAW, AS FAR AS THE ORDINARY CITIZEN WAS CONCERNED, HAD ALREADY BEEN REMOVED, SOME OF THEM MANY MONTHS AGO. THE CURFEW, THE CLOSURE OF THE



~~AS THE ORDINARY CITIZEN WAS CONCERNED, HAD ALREADY BEEN REMOVED, SOME OF THEM MANY MONTHS AGO. THE CURFEW, THE CLOSURE OF THE BORDERS, THE CUTTING OF TELEPHONE AND TELEX LINKS, ROAD BLOCKS AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNAL TRAVEL AND THE SUSPENSION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO PROGRAMMES AND MANY ORGANS OF THE PRESS ARE ALREADY FAIRLY DISTANT MEMORIES.~~

3. A NUMBER OF REGULATIONS AFFECTING CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE LIBERTIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL WILL BE ENDED WITH THE SUSPENSION OF MARTIAL LAW ON 31 DECEMBER, ALTHOUGH THIS IS OFTEN CONDITIONAL ON OTHER LAWS AND THERE ARE SEVERAL EXCEPTIONS. INTERNMENT WILL END, ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE 190 REMAINING INTERNEES MAY FACE CHARGES. THE OVERT CENSORSHIP OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND MAIL, BUT NOT CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS, WILL END SEMI COLON THE RIGHT TO HOLD GATHERINGS WILL BE RESTORED, AND THERE WILL BE A REDUCTION IN THE USE OF MILITARY COURTS AND SUMMARY PROCEDURES, AND AN END TO THE MILITARISATION OF FACTORIES (ALTHOUGH SOME WORKERS' RIGHTS, EG TO CHANGE JOBS, REMAIN SUSPENDED).

4. CERTAIN FEATURES OF MARTIAL LAW HAVE NOW BECOME PERMANENT. MANY ORGANISATIONS AT FIRST SUSPENDED UNDER MARTIAL LAW, MOST IMPORTANTLY SOLIDARITY, HAVE SINCE BEEN ABOLISHED. THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IS HEAVILY LIMITED BY THE NEW TRADE UNION LAW, AND STRIKES WILL CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVELY BANNED FOR A FURTHER YEAR FROM 1 JANUARY 1983. OTHER FEATURES OF MARTIAL LAW MAY ALSO BECOME PART OF CIVIL LAW IN THE LEGISLATION EXPECTED FROM THE SEJM BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, EG A NEW NEWSPAPER LAW AND NEW LAWS ON CENSORSHIP.

5. VERY ROUGHLY, ONE COULD SAY THAT ABOUT (THREE QUARTERS) OF THE APPARATUS OF MARTIAL LAW WILL HAVE BEEN DISMANTLED BY 31 JANUARY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY HOW MANY OF THE WEAPONS OF INTIMIDATION WHICH EXISTED UNDER THE FULL PANOPLY OF MARTIAL LAW WILL CONTINUE AFTER ITS SUSPENSION. THIS WILL TAKE TIME TO ASSESS. THE REGIME CLEARLY STILL HAS MANY WAYS OF BLACKMAILING THE POPULATION. BUT THEY HAD THOSE BEFORE AUGUST 1980 AS WELL.

6. MY PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SUSPENSION OF MARTIAL LAW (TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE EARLIER RELAXATIONS) MAY BE REGARDED AS A SIGNIFICANT STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN POLAND THAT ARE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. THIS IS PARTICULARLY SO IF ONE RETURNS TO THE ASSUMPTION THAT POLAND SHOULD BE JUDGED BY CRITERIA SIMILAR TO THOSE WE APPLY TO OTHER EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. (INDEED, IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT EVEN UNDER THE RIGOURS OF MARTIAL LAW IT WAS A MUCH FREER PLACE THAN ROUMANIA) CONSTRAINTS REMAIN: THE MAIN BEING ULTIMATE ARMY CONTROL.



~~EVEN UNDER THE RIGOURS OF MARTIAL LAW IT WAS A MUCH FREER PLACE THAN ROUMANIA) CONSTRAINTS REMAIN: THE MAIN BEING ULTIMATE ARMY CONTROL.~~  
BUT THERE IS A POWER VACUUM WITH THE PARTIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PARTY AND IT IS ARGUABLE THAT THE WEST HAS AN INTEREST TO SEE THE CONTINUED DEMORALISATION OF THE PARTY AND A CONTINUATION OF THE PROCESS WHEREBY THE STATE TAKES MORE RESPONSIBILITIES AWAY FROM THE PARTY. JARUZELSKI AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE CLEARLY DETERMINED NOT TO TAKE MANY RISKS BUT THEY HAVE ALL THE SAME TAKEN SOME. THEY SEEM UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT THEY HAVE MUCH POPULAR SUPPORT. EVEN THE PARTY DAILY, TRYBUNA LUDU, REFERS TODAY TO THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF DIVISIONS AND DISTRUST IN THE COUNTRY, AND ZYCIE WARSZAWY OPENLY ADMITS THAT IT IS STILL A LONG WAY TOWARDS UNIVERSAL TRUST IN THE AUTHORITIES AND TO THE WILL TO COOPERATE WITH THEM. BUT THERE DOES SEEM TO BE SOME EFFORT TO MAINTAIN OR CREATE THE BEGINNINGS OF DIALOGUE, EVEN THOUGH THIS IS INTENDED TO SERVE THE PURPOSES OF THE AUTHORITIES.

7. IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE REACTIONS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE. THOSE TO WHOM WE HAVE TALKED SEEM CURIOUSLY INDIFFERENT, REFLECTING NO DOUBT THE CREDIBILITY GAP THAT STILL EXISTS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE AND THEIR RULERS. BUT THERE HAVE BEEN NO POPULAR DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE MOOD IN GENERAL SEEMS CALM, AND BEST EXPRESSED BY A SHRUG OF THE SHOULDERS. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SEE WHY PEOPLE SHOULD BE OTHER THAN SCEPTICAL.

8. I THINK THE WEST SHOULD NOW BE READY TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SOME IMPORTANT CONSTRAINTS HAVE BEEN LIFTED AND THAT THE FURTHER MOVES TOWARDS A COMPLETE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW THAT CAN BE EXPECTED WILL LEAD TO A MORE SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSE ON OUR PART. IN THE MEANTIME, I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT IT WAS RIGHT FOR THE ALLIANCE TO CONSIDER MOVES TOWARDS MODEST INCREASES IN POLITICAL CONTACTS AT THE WORKING LEVEL, EG BY SENIOR OFFICIALS AND/OR JUNIOR MINISTERS. TALKS WITH THE POLES ON OFFICIAL DEBT RE-SCHEDULING ARE PRESUMABLY MORE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF US OPPOSITION. BUT I SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT THE TIME HAD NOW COME FOR US TO HAVE ANOTHER GO AT ENCOURAGING THE ALLIANCE TO START THIS PROCESS, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT COULD BE IN OUR OWN INTEREST AS WELL AS THAT OF THE POLES. IT ALSO SEEMS TIME NOW TO CONSIDER IMAMEICLMOOCMMMOVNG SOME OF THE CULTURAL LINKS WITH THE WEST BY WHICH SO MANY POLES SET GREAT STORE. I BELIEVE THIS WILL HELP TO KEEP THE INTELLIGENTSIA FROM TURNING THEIR FACE TO THE WALL. THIS IS ALSO VERY MUCH IN THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST.



FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

JAMES







~~AND THE PERSONAL SECURITY OF CITIZENS WOULD BE MAINTAINED.~~  
DETAILED PROPOSALS WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE SEJM.

- (III) IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO JUMP STRAIGHT INTO FULL NORMALISATION. POLAND MUST GO STEP BY STEP. ONE THING WAS CERTAIN. THERE WOULD BE NO ANARCHY.
- (IIII) THE ARMY'S FUNCTION WOULD CHANGE. THE ROLE OF COMMISSARS WOULD SHRINK. BUT THE ARMY HAD DONE A GOOD SERVICE TO THE NATION. WRON REMAINS THE GUARANTOR OF SAFE TRANSITION FROM SUSPENSION TO THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW.
- (IV) POLAND WAS LIVING IN A TIME OF HEIGHTENED TENSION. THEY HAD SURVIVED BOYCOTT, RESTRICTION AND ADVERSE PROPAGANDA. THE DESTINY OF POLAND WOULD BE DECIDED ON THE VISTULA AND NOT ELSEWHERE.
- (V) A NEW PERIOD WAS BEGINNING IN THE LIFE OF POLAND. THE STATE MUST BE SAVED FROM DISINTEGRATION. POLAND COULD EXPECT THE REBIRTH OF INDEPENDENT, SELF-GOVERNED TRADE UNIONS. THEY WOULD GAIN THE HIGH POSITION THEY DESERVED.
- (VI) ON THE ECONOMY, THE MECHANISMS OF ECONOMIC REFORM WOULD BE CHANGED ON THE BASIS OF EXPERIENCE. SELF-MANAGEMENT WOULD FINALLY TAKE SHAPE. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TRY TO PREVENT RAMPANT INFLATION, WASTE, AND MIS-MANAGEMENT. POLAND WOULD STRUGGLE AGAINST SPECULATION, BRIBERY, TAX FRAUDS.
- (VII) THERE WAS STILL MUCH DOUBT AND BITTERNESS AMONG POLES. THEY WOULD NEED TIME. NEXT YEAR THE FIRST CONGRESS OF THE PATRIOTIC MOVEMENT OF NATIONAL REBIRTH OF POLAND WOULD MEET. IT WOULD HAVE A PROGRAMME. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PATIENT WITH HUMAN DOUBTS. THOSE WHO WERE STILL WANDERING IN THE BLIND CORRIDOR OF THE UNDERGROUND NOW HAD A CHANCE TO EMERGE.
- (VIII) INTERNMENT WOULD CEASE. A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PEOPLE WOULD BE PARDONED.
- (IX) MORE SENSATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS WERE PROBABLY EXPECTED. BUT IT WAS BETTER THAT POLAND PROCEEDED WITH PRUDENCE.



COMMENT

2. THE SPEECH WAS DELIVERED IN GENERAL JARUZELSKI'S USUAL UNCHARISMATIC STYLE, READING OWLISHLY FROM A TEXT IN UNIFORM. BY POLISH STANDARDS IT IS COUCHED IN UNDOGMATIC LANGUAGE AND CONTAINS AN APPEAL TO PATRIOTISM, IT IS REALISTIC AND HARD. THERE IS NOT MUCH CONSOLATION FOR THE WORKERS. NOR DOES IT HOLD OUT ANY SPECIFIC PROMISES ABOUT LIFTING MARTIAL LAW UNLESS THERE IS NO TROUBLE AHEAD. NO DATE IS ANNOUNCED (WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE IDEA OF TERMINATING MARTIAL LAW IN JULY HAS BEEN DROPPED). THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF SELF SATISFACTION IN THE OPENING PART OF THE SPEECH AT THE WAY THE GOVERNMENT HAS HANDLED THE LAST YEAR.

3. IT IS STILL PUZZLING WHY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO HAVE MOVED FROM THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW TO SUSPENSION. THERE MAY BE A NUMBER OF FACTORS INVOLVED : ABSENCE OF RISK, SOVIET PRESSURE, PRESSURES INSIDE THE PARTY OR THE ARMY, THE FEELING THAT IT IS STILL PREMATURE TO OPEN THE GATES TOO WIDE BEFORE THE POPE'S VISIT AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL THE DETERMINATION OF THE ARMY TO HOLD ON TO A ROLE IN THE COUNTRY. JARUZELSKI'S SPEECH CONTAINS FEW REFERENCES TO THE ROLE OF THE PARTY. THERE WAS ONE IMPORTANT REFERENCE TO THE CHURCH. THE GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT THE PEOPLE REMAIN ON PROBATION AND THE MONTHS AHEAD ARE SEEN AS A TRIAL PERIOD. IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE IF THE SEJM REVEALS ANY DIVERGENCE IN THIS CAUTIOUS STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH. I DOUBT WHETHER IT WILL.

JAMES

BT




NNNN



Poland

POLAND ADVANCE COPIES 30

PS  
 PS/MR RIFKIND  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR J BULLARD  
 MR EVANS  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR J C THOMAS  
 MR GILLMORE  
 MR GOODISON  
 HD/EESD (ALLOCATED)  
 HD/TRED  
 HD/UND  
 HD/DEF DEPT  
 HD/PUSD (2)  
 HD/WED  
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 HD/INFORMATION DEPT  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~



NO 10 DOWNING ST  
 ASSESSMENT STAFF, CABINET OFFICE  
 MR FRANKLIN )  
 MR CAINES ) OT/DOT  
 MR CORLEY )  
 MR POWNALL )  
 MR HANCOCK ) CABINET OFFICE  
 MISS LAMBERT )

GR 166

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM MOSCOW 071622Z DECEMBER 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 830 OF 7 DECEMBER

AND TO PRIORITY WARSAW AND UKDEL NATO

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING UKDEL CSCE MADRID , PARIS , BONN , UKMIS GENEVA.

WARSAW TELNO 1086 : MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND.

IMMEDIATE

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GRS 789

CONFIDENTIAL

DESRBY UKDEL NATO AND COPENHAGEN 030800Z

FM FCO 021630Z DEC 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 313 OF 2 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE COPENHAGEN

INFO PRIORITY WARSAW, MOSCOW, EUROPEAN AND NATO POSTS, UKDEL MADRID, UKMIS NEW YORK,

SAVING BUDAPEST : PRAGUE : BUCHAREST : SOFIA : BELGRADE : EAST BERLIN : VIENNA : STOCKHOLM : UKMIS GENEVA : UKDEL STRASBOURG AND REYKJAVIK

CONFIDENTIAL  
IMMEDIATE

*Poland*

*ms*

MY TELNO 304: POLAND

1. THE POLES HAVE CONFIRMED TO US THEIR INTENTION TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW ON 13 DECEMBER AND TO RELEASE THEREAFTER ALL DETAINEES EXCEPT THOSE SPECIFICALLY CHARGED (MY TELNO 647). THE CONDITIONS FOR THIS ACTION (THE AGREEMENT OF THE SEJM AND CALM IN POLAND) SEEM LIKELY TO BE MET GIVEN THE SOLIDARITY UNDERGROUND'S DECISION TO CALL OFF THE PROTEST ACTION PLANNED FOR 13 DECEMBER AND THE MODERATE ATTITUDE OF THE CHURCH AND WALESIA.

2. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND WE HAVE ASSESSED AT OFFICIAL LEVEL OUR AIMS AND OBJECTIVES FOR THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING NEXT MONTH ON HOW AND IN WHAT TERMS WE AND OUR PARTNERS AND ALLIES SHOULD RESPOND TO THE POLISH MOVES.

AIMS

3. OUR AIMS WILL BE TO PERSUADE PARTNERS AND ALLIES:-

(I) TO FOCUS ON THE FACT THAT THE 13 DECEMBER MOVES, IF IMPLEMENTED, WILL, IN NAME AT LEAST, GO A CONSIDERABLE WAY TOWARDS MEETING THE WEST'S THREE CRITERIA.

(II) TO CONSIDER WHETHER WE CAN REALISTICALLY EXPECT TO ACHIEVE FULL SATISFACTION ON THE THREE WESTERN DEMANDS AS PRESENTLY FORMULATED.

(III) TO ADDRESS M. CHEYSSON'S QUESTION: IF WE DO NOT ADJUST OUR MEASURES AFTER 13 DECEMBER, WHEN WOULD IT BE APPROPRIATE TO DO SO?

(IV) TO AGREE THAT, IF THE MEASURES ADOPTED ON 13 DECEMBER ARE IMPLEMENTED, AND IF THEY LEAD TO A REAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION, WE SHOULD RESPOND FLEXIBLY IN RECOGNITION OF THIS IMPROVEMENT AND IN THE HOPE OF ENCOURAGING FURTHER RELAXATIONS.

(V) THAT AN OUTLINE TIMETABLE FOR FURTHER JOINT CONSIDERATION OF THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE DECIDED.

LD



1. THE POLISH EMBASSY HERE VOLUNTEERED TO US ON 7 DECEMBER THAT MARTIAL LAW WILL BE SUSPENDED FOLLOWING THE SEJM SESSION ON 13 DECEMBER AND ABOLISHED ON POLAND'S NATIONAL DAY, 22 JULY 1983. THIS SUGGESTS THAT GUIDANCE HAS ISSUED FROM WARSAW AND THAT OLECHOWSKI'S REMARKS TO MR JAMES REFLECT A FINAL DECISION. OUR INFORMANT ADDED THAT THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD REFERRED TO IN JARUZELSKI'S SPEECH AT JASTRZEBIE ( WARSAW TELNO 1077) WOULD PERMIT THE AUTHORITIES FLEXIBILITY OF ACTION IN THE APPROACH TO THE DATE OF ABOLITION ; THUS MILITARISATION OF THE FACTORIES WOULD BE LIFTED ON 13 DECEMBER IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE PACE OF ECONOMIC REFORM , BUT COULD BE REIMPOSED LOCALLY AS CONDITIONS DICTATED.

2. F C O PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

SUTHERLAND

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7. YOU SHOULD BE GUIDED AT THE PRESENT SAGE BY THE FOREGOING IN ANY DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT, BUT NOT (NOT) TAKE A PROMINENT LINE. OTHER NATO AND COMMUNITY POSTS MAY SIMILARLY MAKE USE OF THESE POINTS IF ASKED, BUT SHOULD NOT (NOT) GIVE THEM PARTICULAR PROMINENCE.

MUST BE LEFT TO DEVELOP AT ITS OWN PACE, AS WE BELIEVE IT WILL DO AS THE EVIDENCE ACCUMULATES AND SINKS IN.

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82NR/REGD AT 030805Z JB/KZ

CC PARA 6.

OUR OVERRIDING AIM IN THIS EXERCISE WILL BE TO MAINTAIN ALLIED UNITY. ANY MOVES BOTH WITHIN THE TEN AND IN NATO MUST BE BY CONSENSUS.

SENT AT 030806Z JB



4. IN OUR VIEW, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETINGS SHOULD:

- (A) ISSUE STATEMENTS ON POLAND WHICH:
- (I) RECALL THE WESTERN POSITION AS SET OUT IN THE 4 AND 11 JANUARY DECLARATIONS.
  - (II) ACKNOWLEDGE AND/OR WELCOME THOSE MOVES WHICH THE REGIME IN WARSAW HAS MADE OR ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION OF MAKING SOON.
  - (III) EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THESE WILL LEAD TO GENUINE IMPROVEMENTS IN POLAND.
  - (IV) RESERVE THE WESTERN SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE UNTIL THE EFFECT OF THESE MOVES CAN BE ASSESSED.
- (B) AGREE TO HOLD REVIEW MEETINGS (OF THE TEN AND NATO/JL IN LATE JANUARY TO JUDGE THE EFFECT OF THE 13 DECEMBER MOVES AND THE POPULAR REACTION WITHIN POLAND AGAINST THE 4 AND 11 JANUARY DECLARATIONS, AND IN THE LIGHT OF THIS TO CONSIDER WHETHER ADJUSTMENTS TO THE MEASURES TAKEN FOLLOWING THE 11 JANUARY DECLARATION MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE. (THE QUESTION OF RENEWAL OF THE QRS ON SOVIET EXPORTS WILL NEED TO BE CONSIDERED AT THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL ON 13-14 DECEMBER.)
- (C) AGREE HOW WE SHOULD JUDGE POLISH ACTIONS AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH RELAXATIONS ARE GENUINE.
- (D) (IF APPROPRIATE) INDICATE THAT POSSIBLE AREAS FOR ADJUSTMENT OF POLICY MIGHT, AS DISCUSSED IN NATO EARLIER IN THE YEAR, CONCENTRATE ON A GRADUATED AND CONTROLLED RESUMPTION OF POLITICAL CONTACTS AND DEBT RESCHEDULING NEGOTIATIONS.

LANGUAGE

5. MIFT GIVES DETAILS OF POSSIBLE ELEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN STATEMENTS OR COMMUNIQUES ON POLAND BOTH FOR THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING. THEY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT DISCUSSIONS ON 26 NOVEMBER IN THE EAST EUROPEAN WORKING GROUP OF THE TEN.

COMMENT

6. OUR OVERRIDING AIM IN THIS EXERCISE WILL BE TO MAINTAIN <sup>ALLIED</sup> ~~UNITY~~ <sup>UNITY. ANY MOVES BOTH WITHIN THE TEN</sup> AND IN NATO MUST BE BY CONSENSUS. WE RECOGNISE THAT JUDGING THE GENUINENESS OF ANY POLISH MOVES ON 13 DECEMBER WILL NOT BE EASY.

IF THE MOVES FORECAST FOR 13 DECEMBER ARE IMPLEMENTED, AND IF THEY LEAD TO TANGIBLE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SITUATION IN POLAND, WE HOPE THE WEST WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY AND IMAGINATIVELY BY SENDING A POSITIVE SIGNAL, BOTH TO KEEP JARUZELSKI ON HIS PRESENT COURSE AND ALSO TO AVOID POLAND TURNING STILL FURTHER TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION.

ACTIONS



CONFIDENTIAL

SKBY UKDEL NATO 030800Z

DESKBY COPENHAGEN 030800Z

FM FCO 021844Z DEC 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 314 OF 2 DECEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE COPENHAGEN

INFO PRIORITY WARSAW, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK

YORK, UKDEL MADRID, EUROPEAN AND NATO POSTS

INFO SAVING BUDAPEST PRAGUE BUCHAREST SOFIA, BELGRADE, EAST

BERLIN, VIENNA, STOCKHOLM, UKMIS GENEVA, UKDEL STRASBOURG,

REYKJAVIK

MIPT : POLAND : PUBLIC STATEMENTS

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE ELEMENTS WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE REFLECTED IN ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, OR BY NATO MINISTERS.

2. EC PARTNERS/NATO MINISTERS

A WISH TO STRESS THEIR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP LINKS WITH THE POLISH PEOPLE:

B RECALL THE COMMUNIQUE OF 4 JANUARY 1982 OR THE NATO DECLARATION OF 11 JANUARY

(ANY REFERENCE TO THE THREE CRITERIA TO BE INSERTED IN A RETROSPECTIVE CONTEXT):

C NOTE THAT THE RELEASE OF LECH WALESIA AND THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S EXPRESSED INTENTION TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW ON 13 DECEMBER ARE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS, BUT NOTE ALSO THAT SOLIDARITY HAS BEEN DISSOLVED CONTRARY TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S EXPRESSED INTENTION TO PURSUE A POLICY OF RECONCILIATION:

D WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE SITUATION CLOSELY, PARTICULARLY ON HOW THE POLISH GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO IMPLEMENT ITS PROMISE OF LIFTING MARTIAL LAW:

E DRAW TO THE ATTENTION OF THE POLISH AUTHORITIES THE FACT THAT IN THIS REGARD THEIR ACTIONS WILL BE JUDGED BY THEIR EFFECTS:

F REITERATE THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT THE POLISH AUTHORITIES WILL FULFIL THEIR PROMISE TO RETURN TO PATH OF RENEWAL AND REFORM:

G HOPE THAT THE SITUATION WILL DEVELOP IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE TEN/NATO TO RESUME AND DEVELOP THE KIND OF RELATIONSHIP WHICH THEY WOULD WISH TO HAVE WITH POLAND AND THE POLISH PEOPLE.

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CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE *mf*

FM 00 021553Z DEC 82

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2108 OF 2 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS

ROUTINE ALL OTHER NATO POSTS

POLAND

1. MCCORMACK (COUNSELLOR, US EMBASSY) INFORMED US THIS MORNING THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL MAKE A STATEMENT ON POLAND SHORTLY BEFORE OR ON 13 DECEMBER. IT WILL WELCOME THE RELEASE OF WALESZA BUT MAKE CLEAR THAT NORMAL RELATIONS WITH POLAND DEPEND UPON SUBSTANTIAL STEPS BEING TAKEN TOWARDS GENUINE RECONCILIATION IN POLAND, INCLUDING FULFILMENT OF THE THREE NATO CRITERIA. THE US WAS REQUESTING THAT HEADS OF OTHER NATO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD CONSIDER MAKING SIMILAR STATEMENTS IN EARLY DECEMBER.

2. WE WELCOMED THIS ADVANCE INDICATION OF AMERICAN INTENTIONS BUT ASKED FOR A MORE PRECISE INDICATION OF WHEN IT WAS ENVISAGED THAT THE STATEMENT WOULD BE MADE. FOR OUR PART, OUR INTENTION HAD BEEN AND REMAINED TO BASE ANY NATIONAL STATEMENTS ON WHATEVER LINE MIGHT BE WORKED OUT IN NATO IN THE RUN-UP TO OR AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING ON 9/10 DECEMBER, ONE OF WHOSE MAIN TASKS AS WE SAW IT WAS TO SEND THE RIGHT SIGNAL TO THE POLES. WE DID NOT INTEND TO MAKE ANY NATIONAL STATEMENTS BEFORE 9/10 DECEMBER AND HOPED THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT DO SO EITHER. OUR DELEGATION IN NATO HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CARRY THE WORK FORWARD THERE.

3. ON SUBSTANCE WE INDICATED THAT WHILE WE HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE FORMULATION CONCERNING THE RELEASE OF WALESZA AND THE CALL FOR RECONCILIATION WE DID NOT, AS WE HAD ALREADY MADE CLEAR, THINK THAT REPETITION OF THE THREE DEMANDS AS SUCH WAS ANY LONGER SUFFICIENT TO ACHIEVE WESTERN AIMS.

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SENT AT 03/1306Z F C



*Poland*

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POLAND ADVANCE COPIES

PS  
 PS/MR RIFKIND  
~~PS/PUS~~  
 SIR J BULLARD  
 MR EVANS  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR J C THOMAS  
~~MR GILLMORE~~  
 MR GOODISON  
 HD/EESD (ALLOCATED)  
 HD/TRED  
 HD/UND  
 HD/DEF DEPT  
 HD/PUSD (2)  
 HD/WED  
 HD/ECD(E)  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
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~~HD/CONS FM UNIT~~  
 HD/INFORMATION DEPT  
 RESIDENT CLERK

NO 10 DOWNING ST  
 ASSESSMENT STAFF, CABINET OFFICE  
 MR FRANKLIN )  
 MR CAINES ) OT/DOT  
 MR CORLEY )  
 MR POWNALL )  
 MR HANCOCK )  
 MISS LAMBERT ) CABINET OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

GRS 650  
 CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM PARIS 251900Z NOV 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1133 OF 25 NOVEMBER 1982  
 INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON BONN UKDEL NATO WARSAW

MEETING BETWEEN THE PUS AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE QUAI: POLAND

1. DURING HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY THIS MORNING, THE PUS ASKED HOW THE FRENCH VIEWED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND.
2. DURFOURCQ (DIRECTOR FOR EUROPE) SAID THAT DEVELOPMENTS SHOULD BE EXAMINED AGAINST THE THREE CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY THE WEST AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR:
  - (A) RELEASE OF DETAINEES. RELEASE OF WALESZA HAD BEEN AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL ACT WITH REGARD TO BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION. THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN THE RISK OF RELEASING HIM BECAUSE IT FELT IT COULD LIMIT HIS FUTURE ACTION. IT HAD SUCCEEDED IN THIS. FOR THE REST SOME 1,000 PEOPLE REMAINED IN DETENTION AND ANOTHER 3-4,000 HAD BEEN ARRESTED OR IMPRISONED. SO THIS CONDITION HAD NOT BEEN FULFILLED (SEMI-COLON)
  - (B) DIALOGUE WITH THE CHURCH AND SOLIDARITY. THE POLISH AUTHORITIES HAD UNDERTAKEN A LIMITED DIALOGUE WITH THE CHURCH. THE CHURCH HAD



HAD UNDERTAKEN A LIMITED DIALOGUE WITH THE CHURCH. THE CHURCH HAD OPTED FOR STABILISATION, AND ENTERTAINED SOME HOPES THAT CATHOLICS MIGHT BE ASSOCIATED IN THE EXERCISE OF POWER. THERE WAS OF COURSE NO DIALOGUE WITH SOLIDARITY, BUT THE GOVERNMENT DID HAVE CERTAIN CONTACTS WITH EX-MEMBERS OF THE MOVEMENT (SEMI-COLON)

(C) A LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW. THIS SEEMED LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE AROUND 13 DECEMBER, BUT MARTIAL LAW WOULD PROBABLY BE REPLACED BY MEASURES WITH EQUIVALENT EFFECT. A RELEASE OF DETAINEES AND A PARDON FOR SOME OF THOSE IN PRISON WAS ALSO POSSIBLE.

FUNDAMENTALLY JARUZELSKI'S POLICY OF NORMALISATION BY STEALTH WAS VERY FIRM. AT THE MOMENT THERE WAS NO REASON FOR THE WEST TO MODIFY ITS POSITION AT ALL.

3. GUTMANN ADDED THAT JARUZELSKI WAS CLEARLY NOT GOING TO RE-ESTABLISH THE SYSTEM WHICH HAD OBTAINED BEFORE 13 DECEMBER 1981. THE POLISH PEOPLE WOULD RESIST, BUT NOT IN A SPECTACULAR WAY. THE WEST COULD NOT IGNORE APPARENT NORMALISATION, BUT SHOULD NOT BE ACCOMPLICE TO JARUZELSKI'S HYPOCRISY. THE FACT THAT MANY DETAINEES REMAINED LED HIM TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE THREE CONDITIONS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. IF THERE WERE FURTHER POLISH GESTURES TO THE WEST IT MIGHT HOWEVER BE NECESSARY TO TRY TO "GLOBALISE" THE CONDITIONS.

4. THE PUS AGREED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS COMPLEX. AFTER MID-DECEMBER IT WAS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT CERTAIN OF THE THREE CONDITIONS WOULD BE MET, OR THAT ALL THE CONDITIONS WOULD BE MET IN PART. THE WEST HAD TO DECIDE HOW TO REACT AND BE READY TO DO SO QUICKLY.

5. PAYE (ECONOMIC DIRECTOR) RAISED THE PROBLEM OF THE RESCHEDULING OF GUARANTEED DEBT. IF THE WEST DID NOT RESCHEDULE, THIS AMOUNTED TO A MORATORIUM. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO CONSIDER GRANTING SUPPLEMENTARY CREDITS, FOR EXAMPLE FOR NEW PURCHASES OF CEREALS, IF THE THREE CONDITIONS WERE NOT FULFILLED. BOTH THE GRANTING OF NEW CREDITS AND RESCHEDULING GAVE THE WEST IMPORTANT MEANS OF PRESSURE UPON POLAND.

6. EVANS SAID THAT THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR RE-SCHEDULING WAS STRONG, EVEN IF POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS WEIGHED AGAINST. AT PRESENT THE POLES WERE NOT PAYING INTEREST ON THEIR DEBTS, BUT THE WEST HAD NO RECOURSE. WESTERN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD CONSIDER HOW TO CHANGE THE SITUATION SO THAT THEY DID HAVE RECOURSE. THE LONG-TERM PROBLEM WAS WHETHER THE POLISH ECONOMY COULD BE REVIVED TO THE POINT WHERE LONG TERM DEBT COULD BE REPAYED: THIS WAS OPEN TO QUESTION.

7. GUTMANN STRESSED THE ABSURDITY OF A POSITION WHERE RESCHEDULING WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE WEST AND NOT THE POLES. HE RECALLED THAT THE WEST HAD TAKEN SANCTIONS AGAINST POLAND IN RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION A YEAR AGO. NOW THE WEST WANTED TO KNOW HOW TO



THAT THE WEST AHD TAKEN SANCTIONS AGAINST POLAND IN RIGHTEOUS  
INDIGNATION A YEAR AGO. NOW THE WEST WANTED TO KNOW HOW TO  
LIFT SANCTIONS WITHOUT LOSING FACE. HE AGREED THAT POLITICAL  
DIRECTORS OF THE COMMUNITY COUNTRIES SHOULD BEGIN TO CONSIDER  
WHAT STATEMENT SHOULD BE MADE BY THE COMMUNITY IN THE EVENT THAT  
FURTHER LIBERALISATION MEASURES WERE ANNOUNCED BY THE POLISH  
GOVERNMENT IN MID-DECEMBER. HE CONCLUDED THAT THE WESTERN  
COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT GET STUCK ON INTERPRETING THE DETAIL OF  
THE THREE CONDITIONS BUT SHOULD MAINTAIN THEM GLOBALLY. THE WEST  
SHOULD MAINTAIN MORAL AND POLITICAL PREEURE ON POLAND, THOUGH  
WITHOUT ANY HOPE OF A VERY SUBSTANTIAL RETURN. THE PUS AGREED  
WITH THIS SUMMING UP.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT RECD AT 25/2005Z AB/IA



Poland

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GRS 500

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FM WARSAW 161530Z NOV 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1051 OF 16 NOVEMBER 1982

INFO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS GENEVA, UKDEL CSCE MADRID.  
INFO SAVING EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST,  
BUDAPEST, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, BONN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
UKREP BRUSSELS, MODUK.

POLAND

1. AT A MEETING OF NATO AMBASSADORS IN WARSAW THIS MORNING, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE POLISH AUTHORITIES HAD EMERGED STRONGER FROM THE EVENTS OF 10 NOVEMBER AND THE DECISION TO RELEASE WALESA, AND THAT MORE MEASURES CALCULATED TO APPEAL TO THE POLISH PEOPLE, SUCH AS THE RELEASE OF OTHER INTERNEES, A POSSIBLE AMNESTY FOR THOSE CONVICTED UNDER MARTIAL LAW REGULATIONS AND THE LIFTING OR SUSPENSION OF MARTIAL LAW ITSELF, COULD BE EXPECTED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR.

2. ALTHOUGH THE AUTHORITIES HAD JUDGED A HEAVY POLICE AND MILITARY PRESENCE NECESSARY IN FACTORIES ON 10 NOVEMBER TO DISCOURAGE STRIKE ACTION, THE FACT THAT FEW STRIKES HAD TAKEN PLACE AND THAT STREET DEMONSTRATIONS HAD DRAWN MUCH LESS SUPPORT THAN THOSE IN THE TWO PRECEDING MONTHS WERE JUDGED BY NATO AMBASSADORS TO REPRESENT A CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND TO DEMONSTRATE THE FURTHER WEAKENING OF UNDERGROUND SOLIDARITY. IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE WAS STILL A GREAT DEAL THAT WAS UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE BACKGROUND TO WALESA'S RELEASE AND THE MOTIVES FOR IT. THE DECISION TO RELEASE HIM HAD PRESUMABLY BEEN TAKEN BEFORE 10 NOVEMBER, EVEN THOUGH IT COULD NO DOUBT HAVE BEEN RESCINDED IF MATTERS HAD GONE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT ON THAT DAY. WALESA'S RELEASE COULD STILL BE A CONSIDERABLE GAMBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE US CHARGE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS STILL ENVISAGED THE POSSIBILITY OF WALESA BEING RECEIVED BY THE PRIMATE, TRAVELLING TO ROME TO SEE THE POPE AND EVEN OF A MEETING BETWEEN HIM AND JARUZELSKI. MOST OF THE OTHER NATO AMBASSADORS, HOWEVER, ASSUMED THAT THE AUTHORITIES DID NOT ENVISAGE WALESA PLAYING A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE FUTURE AND THAT THEY HOPED THAT HE WOULD BECOME A LESS IMPORTANT FIGURE OUT OF DETENTION THAN INSIDE IT. IT WAS NOTED THAT WALESA'S INITIAL REMARKS AFTER HIS RELEASE, INSISTING THAT HE HAD MADE NO COMPROMISES DURING HIS DETENTION OR IN ORDER TO SECURE HIS RELEASE WERE SHREWD AND NOT THOSE OF A MAN BROKEN BY ISOLATION IN 11 MONTHS DETENTION. WALESA MIGHT STILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO RE-ESTABLISH HIS POSITION VIS-A-VIS UNDERGROUND SOLIDARITY OR AMONG REMAINING INTERNEES WHOSE VIEWS HAD BEEN MORE RIGID THAN HIS EVEN BEFORE 13 DECEMBER 1981.



# RESTRICTED

3. DESPITE THE INCREASED CONFIDENCE THAT THE AUTHORITIES APPEAR TO BE SHOWING AND THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER EARLY STEPS TO SUSPEND OR AT LEAST MODIFY MARTIAL LAW AND RELEASE MORE INTERNEES, ALL NATO AMBASSADORS AGREED THAT MOST OF THE POLISH PEOPLE REMAINED DEEPLY SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE NEW TRADE UNIONS WERE ATTRACTING REMARKABLY LITTLE SUPPORT FROM THE WORK FORCE, AND THE ECONOMIC SITUATION SHOWED FEW SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT. WHILE THEREFORE THERE SEEMED REASONABLE PROSPECTS THAT THE THREE NATO CRITERIA WOULD BE MET WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS (APART FROM THE ABOLITION OF SOLIDARITY), THIS SHOULD BE INTERPRETED MORE IN TERMS OF THE SUCCESS OF THE REPRESSIVE MEASURES BY THE AUTHORITIES DURING THE PAST YEAR, RATHER THAN ANY GENUINE CHANGE OF HEART OR DESIRE TO SEEK A GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING

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FROM UKMIS GENEVA 121525Z NOV 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 560 OF 12 NOVEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, ROUTINE OTTAWA, BONN, CANBERRA  
INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL  
MADRID, WARSAW

*mf*

MY TELNO 557: ILO AND POLAND

1. AS EXPECTED, THE WORKERS' GROUP DECIDED AT THEIR MEETING LAST NIGHT TO PUSH FOR THE EARLY ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY (CE)
2. HOWEVER, AND SURPRISINGLY, THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE (FAC) DECIDED THIS MORNING TO RECOMMEND TO THE GOVERNING BODY THAT A DECISION ON WHETHER TO SET UP A CE OR NOT BE POSTPONED UNTIL THE FEBRUARY/MARCH SESSION. APPARENTLY THIS WAS DUE TO PRESSURE FROM THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS IN THE FAC (NOTABLY ARGENTINA) AND ALSO TO THE FAC OBJECTING TO A GROUP TRYING TO IMPOSE ITS WILL ON THE COMMITTEE. THE NEWS OF WALESA'S IMPENDING RELEASE MAY HAVE HAD SOME BEARING TOO.
3. THE WORKERS' GROUP ARE TO MEET TOMORROW, 13 NOVEMBER, TO REASSESS THEIR POSITION AND DECIDE WHETHER TO FIGHT AGAINST THE FAC RECOMMENDATION. IMEC OF COURSE WILL STILL MEET ON 16 NOVEMBER.
4. FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

AND PLEASE PASS TO ROBINSON, DEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

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FM PARIS 121710Z NOV 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1074 OF 12 NOVEMBER 1982  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA AND WASHINGTON  
INFO ROUTINE OTTAWA BONN AND CANBERRA  
INFO SAVING TO UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL MADRID  
AND WARSAW

MY TEL NO 1071 AND UKMIS GENEVA TEL NO 557: HLO AND POLAND

1. WE TODAY DISCUSSED THE MATTER FURTHER WITH RICHARD, HEAD OF THE EAST EUROPEAN AND SOVIET DEPARTMENT AT THE QUARTERS.
2. HE SAID THAT THE LATEST INDICATIONS FROM GENEVA WERE THAT THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE (FAC) WAS MOVING AWAY FROM THE IDEA OF THE IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY (CE). THE POLES SEEMED TO HAVE DEPLOYED WITH SOME SUCCESS THE ARGUMENT THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CE WOULD BE OPEN TO ATTACK BY THE SOVIET UNION AS INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF POLAND. HIS LATEST INFORMATION WAS THAT THE FAC WAS NOW INCLINED TO RESTRICT ITS RECOMMENDATION TO THE NOTION THAT A QUESTIONNAIRE ON TRADE UNION RIGHTS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT.
3. RICHARD SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THIS DEVELOPMENT HE WAS NOW DISPOSED TO RECOMMEND TO HIS MINISTER THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT HOLD OUT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CE BUT GO ALONG INSTEAD WITH THE LESS FAR-REACHING RECOMMENDATION OF THE FAC. THIS WOULD DEMONSTRATE THE HLO'S CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN POLAND WHILE STILL ALLOWING ALL POSSIBLE FORMS OF PRESSURE TO BE APPLIED. RICHARD ASSUMED THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE IMMINENT FREEDING OF WALESA HAD BEEN A FACTOR INFLUENCING THE FAC TOWARDS MODERATION.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVINGS TO ALL

FRETWELL



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GRS 350

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FM WARSAW 121000Z NOV 82


TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1042 OF 12 NOVEMBER 1982

REPEATED TO (FOR INFO) PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN.

SAVING TO (FOR INFO) EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, MODUK, SOFIA, BUCHAREST, BELGRADE, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS.

## THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN POLAND



1. BEFORE RETURNING TO THE UK I THOUGHT YOU MIGHT LIKE TO HAVE MY VIEW ON THE SITUATION HERE.

2. NOVEMBER 10 WAS A FLOP FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SOLIDARITY. THE GOVERNMENT ARE FEELING BUCKED BY THE FEEBLE REACTION TO THE CALL FOR STRIKES IN THE FACTORIES AND THE DEMONSTRATIONS WERE EASILY DISPERSED. THEY ARE ALSO VERY PLEASED AT THE AGREEMENT REACHED WITH THE CHURCH. THE VISIT OF THE POPE HAS STYMIED A LOT OF OPPOSITION AND HAS PROVIDED AN EXPECTATION FOR A PEOPLE BEREFT OF IT. I DETECT THE HAND OF THE POPE VERY MUCH IN THE DECLARATIONS OF ARCHBISHOP GLEMP ON HIS RETURN TO FROM ROME AND IN HIS MEETING WITH GENERAL JARUZELSKI (WHICH WAS ARRANGED AT GLEMP'S REQUEST). I THINK THAT THE RELEASE OF WALESA MAY FORM PART OF THE SAME PROCESS. MY EXPECTATION IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL DECLARE THE END OF MARTIAL LAW BY DECEMBER 20 AND THE RELEASE OF MOST OF THE DETAINEES BEFORE CHRISTMAS. THIS TIMETABLE COULD BE UPSET BY MAJOR DISTURBANCES BUT THESE SEEM UNLIKELY.

3. THIS WILL MEAN THAT THE THE THREE CRITERIA OF THE WEST MAY BE FULFILLED NEXT MONTH, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE DIALOGUE WITH SOLIDARITY AS SUCH. WALESA'S FUTURE IS UNCERTAIN. THERE ARE THOSE WHO THINK HE MAY RETURN TO PRIVATE LIFE. BUT I WOULD NOT EXCLUDE HIM BEING DRAWN INTO SOME KIND OF DISCUSSION WITH THE GOVERNMENT ON TRADE UNION QUESTIONS.

4. IF THINGS TURN OUT THIS WAY, NATO WILL NEED TO RESPOND. I HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT FURTHER THOUGHT WILL BE GIVEN TO RENEWING THE IDEAS WHICH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN PARTICULAR HAVE BEEN EXAMINING AND PUTTING FORWARD FOR A REALISTIC EVALUATION OF OUR LONG TERM POLICY TOWARDS POLAND, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEX OF THE DEATH OF BREZHNEV AND THE NEW POSSIBILITIES THIS MAY AFFORD THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION TO MODIFY ITS STANCE ON EAST-WEST

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RELATIONS GENERALLY AND TOWARDS POLAND IN PARTICULAR. IT WOULD NOT SUPRISE ME IF THE UNITED STATES IN DUE COURSE WERE TO MAKE A VOLTE FACE ON POLAND WHICH WILL LEAVE THE REST OF THE ALLIANCE CLUTCHING HER COAT TAILS.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING.

JAMES

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FM WARSAW 111700Z NOV 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1041 OF 11 NOVEMBER 1982

REPEATED (INFO) UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW.

MIPT

1. ACCORDING TO A PAP COMMUNIQUE RELEASED THIS AFTERNOON, THE GOVERNMENT HAVE ORDERED THE RELEASE OF LECH WALESA7 THE DECISION WAS REPORTEDLY TAKEN AFTER WALES A SENT A LRTTER TO JARUZELSKI IN WHICH HE PROPOSED A MEETING FOR A "SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF MATTERS OF INTEREST." HE ADDED THAT GIVEN GOOD WILL, A SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND. THE LETTER WAS SIGNED "CORPORAL WALES A".

2. INTERIOR MINISTER KISZEZAK SUBSEQUENTLY SAW WALES A AND DISCUSSED WITH HIM THE PROPOSAL IN THE LETTER. HE THEN ORDERED WALES A'S RELEASE.

JAMES



Poland.



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From the Private Secretary

26 October, 1982

Polish Debt Rescheduling

The Prime Minister has seen the minute of 22 October from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and has commented: "To do nothing is to reschedule".

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A. J. COLES

R. B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



IMMEDIATE

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FM WARSAW 111625Z NOV 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1340 OF 11 NOVEMBER 19  
REPEATEE (INFO) UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONNGN MOSCOW.

RAKOWSKI'S V WS O

IN A CONVERSATION I HAD WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER RAKOWSKI  
TODAY (REPORTED IN FULL IN SAVING TEL.) HE IMPLIED THAT THE GOVT.  
HOPES TO FULFIL THE WEST'S CRITERIA, EXCEPT FOR THE DIALOGUE  
WITH SOLIDARITY, BEFORE CHRISTMAS. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE  
POSSIBILTY OF OTHER "PRESENTS", PERHAPS MEANING THE RELEASE  
OF WALESA NOW ANNOUNCED BY THE GOVT. (SEE MIFT).

JAMES

NNNN



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5. The unity of the Creditors' Group will of course come under increasing pressure the longer the Americans refuse to negotiate with the Poles. Some creditors may already be thinking in terms of reaching a separate agreement with the Poles. If this emerges from next week's meeting, we shall then have to consider what our reaction should be.

6. I am copying this minute to members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*FP*

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

22 October 1982

CONFIDENTIAL





FCS/82/167

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

*So do nothing  
is to reschedule  
and*

*Prime Minister (2)*

*Ms 22/10*

Polish Debt Rescheduling

1. Thank you for your minute of 11 October, in which you proposed that, at the meeting of Poland's Western Creditors in Paris on 25/26 October, our officials should continue to press the case for the resumption of rescheduling talks.
2. As you know, I am in sympathy with the arguments you advance in favour of resuming rescheduling talks. I agree that the present situation confers a financial benefit upon the Poles, and, like you, I would hope that when Western countries do ultimately decide to resume talks with the Poles this move could be presented as an attempt on our part to call them to account, rather than as a concession.
3. However, I see little prospect of any change in the US position particularly in the light of the recent measures taken by the Polish authorities against Solidarity and the death of a demonstrator in the subsequent disturbances. Recent contacts with the French and the Germans suggest that they probably also oppose the resumption of talks with the Poles at the present time. We are at odds with the Americans on a number of issues, most notably the Siberian pipeline. I would prefer not to add to those by pressing now for rescheduling, particularly when we are not in step with our major European allies.
4. Moreover, the UK has traditionally been one of the main advocates of the principle that debt rescheduling should take place on a multilateral basis. It would seem inadvisable for us to press too hard the case for resuming talks at a time when to do so would be likely only to increase the risk of a split within the Creditors' Group. While I would not, therefore, see any objection to our representative at the meeting putting the case for the resumption of talks, drawing on the arguments you have outlined, I would hope that we could agree to keep a fairly low profile and allow other countries to make the running.



Poland, UK/Polish Relations, A8



5 2 OCT 1982



*M*

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GRS 90

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FM WARSAW 230949Z OCT 82

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 992 OF 22 OCT 82

REPEATED INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS GENEVA.

INFO SAVING TO EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, SOFIA, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM, PARIS, BONN, UKMIS NEWYORK, UKREP BRUSSELS AND MODUK

**POLAND**

1. EYE WITNESSES IN WARSAW HAVE SEEN MARSHAL KULIKOV OF THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS THE GDR AND ROMANIAN CHIEFS OF STAFF HERE THIS WEEK. WE BELIEVE THAT THEY MAY BE TAKING PART IN A WARSAW PCT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING IN PREPARATION FOR A FORTHCOMING MEETING OF WARSAW PACT DEFENCE MINISTERS.

JAMES

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FM WARSAW 211052Z OCT 82  
TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 986 OF 21 OCT 82  
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, UKDEL NATO.

1. THE FRENCH EMBASSY HERE HAVE REPORTED TO US AND OTHER WESTERN EMBASSIES IN CONFIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN UNDER INTENSE HARASSMENT OVER THE LAST FORTNIGHT. A NUMBER OF EMBASSY HOUSES HAVE BEEN BROKEN INTO, IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MAKE IT PLAIN THAT THESE HAVE NOT BEEN ORDINARY BURGLARIES. SEVEN CARS HAVE EITHER BEEN BROKEN INTO, OR HAD THEIR LOCKS DESTROYED BY THE INSERTION OF SMALL PIECES OF METAL. PAINT HAS BEEN SPRAYED ON CARS IN THE FRENCH CULTURAL INSTITUTE AND THE CHANCERY BUILDING. THE EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED A TELEPHONE MESSAGE INFORMING THEM THAT A CHILD ATTENDING THE FRENCH SCHOOL MIGHT BE TAKEN AS A HOSTAGE.

2. THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THIS HARASSMENT MAY HAVE BEEN A CRUDE REACTION BY THE POLISH SECURITY AUTHORITIES TO RECENT SPEECHES BY MITTERRAND AND MAUROY CONDEMNING THE DE-LEGALISATION OF SOLIDARITY.

JAMES

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
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