

PART 3

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CONFIDENTIAL Final 6

PM'S MEETINGS WITH ARAB  
LEAGUE DELEGATIONS

PRIME MINISTER

PART 1 AUGUST 1980

PART 3 APRIL 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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21.7.83							
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PREM 19/2403





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 March 1988

Dear Charles

Ria Nisio

CDP

16/3.

Arab League Committee of Seven

The Foreign Secretary gave lunch to the Delegation from the Arab League Committee of Seven today. He made clear that the Prime Minister was sorry not to have seen the Delegation, owing to other commitments on Budget day.

The Delegation members spoke carefully, and without over-stating their case. Klibi introduced discussion, by spelling out the terms of the Arab League mandate in familiar terms. He argued for complete Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination (including setting up an independent state on Palestinian soil, with its capital in Jerusalem), and an International Conference with power to act effectively and to bring about a peace in accordance with international law. He also laid emphasis on the active participation of the Five Permanent Members in the Conference.

Walid Khalidi, in a dignified presentation, set out PLO views (and clearly had a mandate to do so). He said that the PLO would accept SCR 242 and 338, and negotiate with Israel in an international conference; that the PLO would accept a transitional period, provided that it was under a UN or international aegis; and that the PLO had instructed those in the Occupied Territories to refrain from using firearms. As evidence of the success of this last point he instanced the casualty figures: over a thousand killed and injured on the Palestinian side since December, against no single Israeli death. He noted the contrast with those killed in the 1946/47 terrorism at the end of our mandate: 169 British, 44 Israeli deaths, reflecting the armed violence of the resistance at that time. Khalidi also expressed scepticism over the willingness of the Israeli Labour Party to negotiate seriously. Most useful was his recognition that the US had a vital role to play and his welcome for US re-engagement in the peace process.

The Iraqi and Jordanian Foreign Ministers had little new to add. In reply the Foreign Secretary stressed the importance of the Arab side responding to the US initiative in such a way as not to stifle it at birth. He also noted Khalidi's assurance that the PLO were restraining their people from the use of firearms: it was vital that their

/cause



cause should not be set back by resort of that kind of violence. Finally he urged the Arab side not at this stage to create difficulties over the format or composition of an international conference: the important thing was to get the peace process under way.

It was notable that the Arab side spoke with one voice. The Foreign Secretary believes that, intellectually at least, they understand the need not to be seen to bring down the US initiative

We are telegraphing a fuller record to interested posts.

*Yours ever*

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'R N Culshaw', with a stylized flourish at the end.

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street





File M  
CCPC

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 March 1988

Dear Robert,

ARAB LEAGUE COMMITTEE OF SEVEN

BF. || Thank you for your letter of 10 March about the proposed visit to London of the Arab League Committee of Seven. The Prime Minister would in principle be ready to see the Committee if they press to see her. I deduce from your letter that they will be here on 15 March. That, of course, is a very bad day for the Prime Minister since it is Budget Day. I should be grateful if you would let me know very urgently how long the delegation are here: but I have to warn you that it may not be practicable for the Prime Minister to see them at all on that day.

Yours sincerely,  
Chris Powell

C. D. POWELL

R. N. Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SH



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 March 1988

*Dear Charles*

*Prime Minister*

*Agree to see  
the delegation?  
You normally do.*

Arab League Committee of Seven

*at flap*

Your letter of 7 March recorded agreement to the inclusion of Walid Khalidi in the delegation to London and the Arab League Committee of Seven.

*CSO  
10/3*

The Committee was established in January to follow through Arab League activity on the situation in the Occupied Territories and the peace process. Its members are Algeria (Presidency), Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and the PLO; plus Klibi, the Secretary-General of the Arab League.

*Yes  
no*

The Committee of Seven are sending delegations to the capitals of the five Permanent Members: ours will comprise Klibi; the Jordanian and Iraqi Foreign Ministers; and Khalidi. This is a good team.

The Jordanian is an established friend of the UK; the Iraqi was a good host to Mr Mellor on his recent visit, and there are positive developments (including the release of John Smith) in the bilateral relationship to follow up; Khalidi is a useful interlocutor, with no formal PLO associations; even Klibi has some ceremonial status in the Arab world. The Foreign Secretary is giving the delegation lunch on 15 March.

The Arab League delegations are to see President Mitterand and Monsieur Chirac in Paris on 16 March. Mr Shultz has offered a meeting in Washington on 11 March. We have no firm details yet of the level at which the delegation will be received in Moscow and Peking. In addition, Herr Genscher plans to visit Algiers for an EC Presidency/C7 Presidency meeting.

The delegation to London would welcome a meeting with the Prime Minister. Our advice is that we should at least match the level of reception given in other capitals. In view of the French example and the quality of the delegation, the Prime Minister may think it a reasonable use of her time to receive them for a brief call. In addition to its presentational value, this would help keep the Arabs on board with the current US proposals. The Prime Minister could also

/press





press the case for a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation  
in negotiations and stress the need to avoid any escalation  
of the violence in the area.

*Yours ever*

A handwritten signature in blue ink, which appears to read 'R N Culshaw', is written above the typed name.

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER, Arab  
Delegation

At 3





ve v  
c R

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

7 March 1988

Arab League Delegation

You asked me whether it would be right to agree that Walid Khalidi should be included in an Arab League delegation as Palestinian representative. This is to confirm that I agree that there would be no objection to this.

(CHARLES POWELL)

R.N. Culshaw, Esq., MVO,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

Another of the interminable Arab League delegations is heading towards London and hoping to see you. Irrespective of whether it is you or the Foreign Secretary whom they see, they are suggesting that the delegation should include a non-PLO Palestinian. The person they have in mind is Walid Khalidi, who is in fact an American of Palestinian origin. You have met him before and he has had lunch with The Queen.

I assume that you would have no objection to his being included in the delegation?

CDP

Agreed met

CDP

4 March 1988

SUBJECT

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SRWATO

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

9 July 1987

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH A DELEGATION  
FROM THE ARAB LEAGUE

The Prime Minister received a delegation from the Arab League this afternoon. The delegation was led by the Foreign Minister of Jordan and comprised the Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations, the Special Adviser to the Tunisian Foreign Minister, the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia in London and the Arab League representative in London. The Foreign Secretary and Sir David Miers were also present.

Mr. Taher Masri spoke of the strong and committed leadership shown by the United Kingdom in the international affairs. The members of the Arab League hoped that this would be deployed to support moves to end the Iran/Iraq war. The war had lasted over seven years and cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and a leading country in the European Community, Britain was particularly well placed to help reach a solution. Recent developments in the Gulf had shown how dangerous the situation could become. Iraq for its part had done everything possible to achieve a settlement and was ready to accept any form of mediation. But, Iran had failed to respond. What was needed now was pressure on Iran to bring it to negotiations. The Arab countries were not seeking Iran's defeat, only readiness to negotiate. The Foreign Secretary had explained the United Kingdom's position to the delegation earlier in the day and they were grateful for the action which we were taking in the Security Council. They hoped that we would stand firm until a satisfactory conclusion was reached.

The Prime Minister said there could be no doubt of the United Kingdom's desire to see an end to the war which had already lasted longer than the Second World War. We had taken a leading part in recent Security Council discussions, with the aim of agreeing a resolution which would convey a clear message to Iran that the war must end. If Iran did not comply with such a resolution, we were ready to consider an arms embargo. Good progress had been made among the five permanent members and the Security Council were now in agreement on the

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first resolution, although some work remained to be done on the arms embargo. This could prove more difficult. The Chinese, for instance, had assured us that they were not supplying Silkworm to Iran. This was patently untrue.

Mr. Kittani reported signs that the Iranians were perturbed by developments in the Security Council and, for the first time, compelled to take international pressure for a settlement seriously. They were making contacts with the non-aligned countries, in particular India, and with the Soviet Union to try to block a resolution. This made it all the more important to persist with the current efforts. He was grateful for the active role played by the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister interjected that she had been very surprised by earlier allegations that the United Kingdom was dragging its feet in the Security Council. Mr. Kittani said that there had been a misunderstanding. He continued that there were even signs that Iran might attend the Security Council meeting this time. Iranian tactics were likely to be to try to dismantle the package and deal with all issues except ending the war. It was vital that Iran should be brought to accept the principle of a peaceful settlement.

The Saudi Ambassador recalled King Fahd's remarks during his meeting with the Prime Minister in March about the risks of a widening of the conflict, which would drag in the super-powers. There was now a real danger that this prediction would be borne out. The Foreign Secretary suggested that, in parallel with moves in the Security Council, efforts should be made to diminish attacks on ships in the Gulf. These involved the highest risk of widening the conflict. Mr. Kittani said that it was vital to exert pressure against Iran's oil exports. The more oil she could sell, the more arms she would buy. It must be made as difficult as possible for Iran to continue the war.

The Prime Minister said that the prospect for securing a satisfactory Security Council resolution next week or the week after seemed good. We would continue to do all we could to achieve that objective. She would be discussing the situation in the Gulf with President Reagan next week. Mr. Taher Masri said it was gratifying to find the United Kingdom and the Arab League thinking on very much the same lines. He would reflect this in comments to the press. It would be helpful if the Prime Minister were able to make some of the same points publicly when she was in Washington. It was a hopeful sign that the five permanent members of the Security Council were able to act together on such a difficult issue.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Robert Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

You have agreed to see a delegation from the Arab League tomorrow. The delegation is led by the Jordanian Foreign Minister who will be accompanied by the Iraqi Ambassador at the United Nations, the Special Adviser to the Tunisian Foreign Minister, the Saudi Ambassador in London and the Arab League representative in London.

The purpose of the Arab League delegation's call is to discuss Iran/Iraq. We earlier got the reputation in the Arab World as rather dragging our feet at the United Nations on Iran/Iraq. This impression has now largely been corrected. But your meeting will be a useful chance to lay that particular story finally to rest. It will also be an opportunity to get over our view that a mandatory resolution and arms embargo are not all that is required. We also need to be working for an end to attacks on shipping.

You might start by saying that you were sorry that it was impossible to receive the delegation in May because of the election. You are glad to welcome them now and to be able to reassure them formally that the United Kingdom is in full support of a mandatory Security Council resolution calling for an end to the Iran/Iraq war, and that we are prepared to impose an arms embargo if necessary. We would be ready to see a resolution tabled very soon, even though further work needs to be done on the details of an arms embargo. We ourselves already apply a strict defence sales policy in the area and an arms embargo would in practice make very little difference to our policy. The delegation will be aware of our general policy on sanctions and know that we are not prepared to consider trade and financial sanctions. But in any case we believe an arms embargo would be effective. You will be discussing these matters with President Reagan next week.



You might go on to say that, in parallel, we would like to see diplomatic activity stepped up to try to achieve some more modest aims. For instance, it would be useful to confirm the moratorium on attacks on civilian targets, to stop the use of chemical weapons and to work towards a moratorium on attacks on shipping. The last in particular would be a major contribution to reducing tension in the Gulf.

I do not think that you need to go into any greater detail. The delegation will be having a separate meeting with the Foreign Secretary and will look to you only to give a general blessing to our policy. I do not think there is much to be gained from raising other issues such as an international conference on Arab/Israel with this particular group.

CDP

Charles Powell

8 July 1987

cc: PK  
cc: Blup

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 July 1987

Dear Charles

Iran/Iraq : Visit by Arab League Delegations

Your letter of 6 July confirmed that the Prime Minister would receive the Arab League delegation at 1745 on Thursday 9 July. The Foreign Secretary will also attend the meeting, accompanied by Sir David Miers.

Apart from Taher El Masri, the Jordanian Foreign Minister, the Arab League delegation will comprise Ismak Kittani, the Iraqi Ambassador at the UN, Zuhair Shilli, Special Adviser to the Tunisian Foreign Minister and Sheikh Nasser Almanqour, the Saudi Ambassador in London. They will be accompanied by Mr Mouqaddam, the Arab League Representative in London.

I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister, plus the text of the Prime Minister's recent letter to President Reagan on Iran/Iraq.

James Snow

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/No 10 Downing Street





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CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION: 9 JULY

IRAN/IRAQ

Our Objectives

To show that we are working hard in New York to obtain a mandatory Resolution, and are willing to impose an arms embargo in due course if necessary.

Our Argument

- Regret it was impossible to receive delegation in May because of the Election.
- Delegation will be aware of terms of the draft Resolution prepared by Permanent Members. Significant achievement that 5 have worked so closely on this. Draft has been discussed with UNSG and non-Permanent members: generally content but a few suggested amendments.
- Particularly important that US and Soviet Union continue to consult closely.
- Pressure from US to have Resolution tabled very soon. We have no objection, but are convinced that further work needs to be done on next steps, including monitoring of ceasefire and enforcement measures if necessary. How do Arab League see next steps?
- The only practical follow-up measure is an arms embargo against recalcitrant party. We would support this - against Iran, Iraq, or both. Present defence sales policy very strict; UN embargo would probably make little practical difference.
- A mandatory Resolution followed, say, by an arms embargo on Iran would demonstrate serious international concern. But remain concerned that this or other measures would have little practical effect in bringing conflict to an end. How can we achieve this?



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- Should we not at the same time be pressing for more modest but achievable aims? Need to consolidate moratorium on attacks on civilian targets; stop use of CW; and reduce tension in the Gulf.
- Present high level tension in Gulf in no-one's interests. Great dangers of Superpower competition and of confrontations with Iran. Subversion rather than attacks on shipping surely major Iranian threat to Gulf States?
- Should we not work towards moratorium on attacks on shipping? Are Iraqi attacks on shuttle tankers an effective pressure on Iran? Iranians appear to be exporting as much as OPEC quota allows.

#### Their Objectives

To press for early tabling of mandatory Resolution, and an early follow-up sanctions Resolution, embracing an arms embargo against Iran, and perhaps further sanctions (financial, oil embargo).

#### Our Response

- Playing most constructive rôle; but cannot rush such matters; must be right.
- Position on trade and financial sanctions well known; see major difficulties with such sanctions in this case. OPEC members might have difficulty with notion of oil embargo.

#### Tactical Arguments

- Concerned by suggestions from Arabs that UK unhelpful in New York. Completely wrong. We initiated consultations amongst the Five.
- Must look for progress to end conflict, not just activity for its own sake.

Middle East Department

8 July 1987

MELAQY (2)

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


Background

1. Stimulated by the Americans (whose aim is to curry favour with the Gulf States post Irangate), the Arab League sent delegations to the capitals of Security Council Members in April and May pressing for "effective implementation" of UNSCR 582 (non-mandatory), if necessary by mandatory action. The Jordanian-led visit to London in May had to be postponed because of the General Election.
2. The Arab League were originally dissatisfied with an apparent lack of UK activity in New York, and what they perceived as our lack of enthusiasm for mandatory UN action. Recent indications are that Iraq and the other Arabs are now well content with our position.
- A 3. The US are pressing for tabling of the first draft mandatory UN Resolution next week, even if there is not agreement on follow-up measures. Shultz intends to go to New York for the vote; Scheverdnadze is hesitating. It is envisaged that Iran will reject or fail to comply with the Resolution, and that possibly after some delay, a mandatory Resolution imposing an arms embargo on Iran could be proposed. It is not clear that this would be passed: the Russians and Chinese might well indulge in private diplomacy with Iran and possibly veto the sanctions Resolution.
4. The US want an early Resolution to reassure Congress over the protection of Kuwaiti tankers. We remain very concerned at the ramifications of this ill thought through policy, and wish to see pressure put on Iraq to reduce attacks on shipping and on Kuwait to lower the profile of its support for Iraq, thus removing the rationale for Iranian attacks on shipping.

Middle East Department  
8 July 1987

# **A** The National Archives

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IRAN/IRAQ WAR: VISIT TO LONDON BY AN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION:

9 JULY 1987

A delegation from the Arab League, led by the Foreign Minister of Jordan, are today visiting London, at their request, to discuss the Iran/Iraq conflict. Similar delegations have visited the capitals of the other Permanent Members of the Security Council. They are having talks and lunch with the Foreign Secretary and are meeting the Prime Minister later this afternoon.

In the talks, the British Government are emphasising their deep concern about the Iran/Iraq conflict. Hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost. Immense damage has been caused to the countries concerned. The stability of the region is seriously threatened, and there is a threat to freedom of navigation,

A peaceful settlement must be found soon.

That is why Britain and the other four Permanent Members of the Security Council have been consulting closely in recent months on ways of making progress. The aim is to bring home to Iran and Iraq the need to stop fighting and to start talking. The UN Secretary General continues to have a critical part to play and Britain is encouraging him to remain active. Britain has also been active in promoting efforts being made in the Security Council to agree a mandatory resolution calling for a ceasefire, cessation of all military activity, withdrawal to internationally recognised boundaries and exchange of prisoners of war. We are additionally making clear to the Arab League Delegation that Britain is prepared to support an arms embargo against any party which refuses to comply with the terms of the Resolution.

At the same time, a special effort is needed to call a halt to attacks on shipping in the Gulf. The parties should refrain from actions which add to the dangerous spiral of attack and counter-attack. Britain, through the Armilla Patrol, will continue to play its part in protecting British shipping in the Gulf. But the main responsibility for removing the causes of tension in this important international waterway lies with Iran and Iraq.

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

6 July 1987

IRAN/IRAQ

BP  
Thank you for your letter of 6 July proposing that the Prime Minister should receive an Arab League delegation on 9 July. The Prime Minister could do so at 1745 that day. I should be grateful for a brief by 1600 hours on 8 July.

(Charles Powell)

R.N. Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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*copy*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 July 1987

*Dear Charles*

*CDP*

*FILGO LETTER ON  
IRAN (LONDON)  
PT10*  
Iran/Iraq

*1745 G.D.  
(see file with letter  
for F.C.S. letter)*

Thank you for your letter of 2 July to Tony Galsworthy.

The Jordanian Foreign Minister has accepted our invitation for the Arab League delegation to visit London on 9 July. The Foreign Secretary will be receiving the delegation at noon, and will then give them lunch. The Prime Minister has kindly agreed to see the delegation for half an hour. Various times in the afternoon of 9 July were discussed by telephone at the end of last week. We should be grateful, if this remains convenient, if the Prime Minister could receive the group at 1745, or failing that at 1900; the Foreign Secretary would accompany them.

I shall inform you as soon as possible of the names of those attending the meeting. The Jordanian Foreign Minister has said that he intends to restrict numbers to four.

I am writing separately about the Prime Minister's reply to President Reagan's message on Iran/Iraq.

*Yours ever*

*Adrian (signature)*

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary


C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 July 1986

Dear Robert,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL  
OF THE ARAB LEAGUE

The Prime Minister saw the Secretary General of the Arab League this morning. Mr. Klibi was accompanied by the Deputy Secretary General, Adnan Omran and two other officials. Mr. Renton was also present.

Iran/Iraq

Mr. Klibi said that further efforts were needed to resolve the dispute between Iran and Iraq. The European Community could make a major contribution to this in two ways: by urging countries with good relations with Iran to press the Iranian Government to agree to negotiations; and by deciding not to sell any weapons to Iran. The seven-man Arab League mission had found general support amongst the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for ending the war by negotiations within the framework of international law. The Arab League hoped that the United Kingdom would, during its Presidency, put this issue high on the agenda.

The Prime Minister said that, much as the Community would like to be instrumental in bringing the Iran/Iraq war to an end, she had to say candidly that she saw no prospect of this. The war could be ended only if there was sufficient political will on Iran's part. There was no evidence for this. Without it, no outside party could have influence. We were not dealing with a regime which was guided by reason. She could not, therefore, offer any hope of a useful contribution by the Twelve at present.

Mr. Klibi agreed that there were few grounds for hope. But the Arab countries believed that the sinews of war for Iran were finance and weapons. Iran's ability to prosecute the war could be greatly restricted by refusal to buy its oil and to sell weapons. The Prime Minister recalled that she had told the Arab League delegation that the United Kingdom was restricting the sale of weapons which would

sfw



prolong the war to either side. She wished that countries such as Syria, Libya and North Korea would show similar restraint. Mr. Klibi said that Libya could be left out of account since it was not supplying any weapons to Iran and Syria was too poor. The main conduit for Soviet weapons was through North Korea. The Arab States had let the Soviet Union know their views. He repeated his hope that the United Kingdom would ensure that Iran/Iraq was discussed at an early meeting of European Foreign Ministers. The Prime Minister said that Foreign Ministers would no doubt discuss it in the course of their regular sessions. But we had to face the facts. Timing was all important in launching diplomatic initiative and it was clear that the time was not right for a European initiative to bring the Iran/Iraq war to an end. We should save our efforts for a more propitious moment. Mr. Klibi thanked the Prime Minister for her positive attitude. He was confident that she would choose the right moment to take action.

#### Arab/Israel

The Prime Minister gave a brief account of the main elements in the Middle East situation. The essential point was that no new peace initiative stood much chance of success until after the United States Congressional elections in November. We had, therefore, to focus on the period after that. Mr Peres would still be a considerable force in the Israeli Government even if he was no longer Prime Minister by then. Her visit to Israel had been a useful experience. It was clear that the Israelis knew that the current situation in the Occupied Territories could not continue indefinitely not least because it was incompatible with their own democratic principles. In the short term, efforts should focus on improving conditions on the West Bank and in Gaza. She had had a most interesting and constructive meeting with Palestinians in East Jerusalem to discuss these problems.

Mr. Klibi said that the Prime Minister's visit to Israel had been followed with close interest in the Arab world and much appreciated. In particular, her statements that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza could only be temporary, that Israel's security could not be guaranteed unless the legitimate rights of the Palestinians were recognised and that Israel was inconsistent in demanding self-determination for herself while denying it to others had been well received. He recalled that the basic Arab position was set out in the Fez Declaration, which had followed upon the Venice Declaration. This showed that the Arabs had taken account of European views. The Arab Governments remained committed to a peaceful solution which provided security and peace for all countries in the area and recognised the right of all the people to self-determination. He agreed with the Prime Minister that Mr. Peres was more progressive than his predecessors. He attached particular significance to Mr. Peres' statement at a recent party conference in which he had used the phrase "the Palestinian people". This had been the first time that any Israeli leader had used this phrase. The next step was



for Israel to recognise the Palestinians' legitimate rights. Only when this matter of principle had been resolved would negotiations be worthwhile. Mr. Klibi continued that the Prime Minister's statement in Israel about the PLO had caused some concern. The Palestinian people had chosen the PLO to represent them and it was not for outsiders to gainsay their choices. Moreover the PLO had demonstrated its wish to adopt peaceful solutions.

The Prime Minister recalled that during her visit to Jordan in October last year, she had tried to encourage the PLO to follow the course of peaceful negotiations but her initiative had failed. She now doubted whether the PLO would ever, as a whole, bring itself to renounce terrorism and accept UN Security Council Resolution 242. Mr. Klibi recalled that it was difficult for the PLO to accept 242 because it dealt with the Palestinian issue as only a refugee problem. It was unreasonable to expect a people to give up its rights. He also wished to stress that the PLO had rejected terrorism through Yasser Arafat's statement in Cairo. There was a difficult and dividing line between terrorism and the legal right of a people to resist occupation.

At this point, the Prime Minister proposed that Mr. Klibi should continue his discussions with Mr. Renton.

The meeting ended at 1015 hours.

Yours sincerely  
Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

Robert Culshaw, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE

You have to endure a courtesy call tomorrow from the egregious M. Klibi. You will not want to protract it unnecessarily. He is to call separately on Mr. Renton and all matters of detail can be delegated to him.

I suggest that you give him a rather general but discreet account of the main subject of your discussions during your visit to Israel and meeting with King Hussein, that is the situation on the West Bank. You might stress in particular your discussion with the Palestinian leaders whom you met there, and the points which you made in your main speech in Israel.

You might also seek M. Klibi's assessment of the Iran/Iraq war and the prospects for a negotiated solution.

You will want to be rather firm with him on the subject of terrorism and the record of some Arab Governments in continuing to harbour terrorists.

He may press you on whether the United Kingdom Presidency of the Community will be an occasion for fresh initiative in the Middle East. You will want to discourage any expectations on this score. We shall work quietly and persistently behind the scenes for progress, particularly on the West Bank and in providing increased European assistance for the West Bank. But we do not envisage any grand initiative or new European statement.

CDD  
MT  
C D POWELL

7 July 1986

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B/Up



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 July 1986

*Dear Charles*

Call by the Secretary-General of the Arab League

/  
/ In your letter of 12 May 1986 you conveyed the Prime Minister's agreement to see Mr Klibi: I now enclose a brief and a personality note for the courtesy call on 8 July.

\*always

It is normal for Mr Klibi to call on the incoming Presidency and there is useful ground to cover on this occasion. The Arab League reacted unhelpfully both to the US attack on Libya and the Tokyo Summit Declaration on terrorism. Tiresome as Mr Klibi often is, he wields a certain influence in Arab affairs, and his calls in London will provide a good opportunity at the outset of our Presidency to attempt to allay any misconceptions about our approach to Middle East problems. It will be important to stress that our determination to take a firm line against terrorism does not lessen our commitment to promote a just settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute which safeguards Palestinian, as well as Israeli, rights.

Sir Geoffrey Howe expects that Mr Klibi's courtesy call on the Prime Minister will centre on the key regional conflicts and terrorism. If Mr Klibi wishes to talk in detail about the prospects for reviving the Euro Arab dialogue, and in particular holding a Ministerial Troika meeting, he can do so when he calls separately on Mr Renton.

We have stressed to Mr Klibi that he should not bring more than one accompanying official with him for the call on the Prime Minister. This will probably be Dr Adnan Al Amad, Director of the Arab League's London office or Klibi's deputy Adnan Omran former Syrian Ambassador to London. Past experience is, however, not entirely encouraging and you may wish to make contingency arrangements to divert additional hangers-on into an ante-room while the call takes place.

*Yours ever*

*R N Culshaw*

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

( R N Culshaw )  
Private Secretary

ps : as agreed, Mr Renton will attend the call. RM

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE  
ARAB LEAGUE: 8 JULY: 9.30

Points to Make

- Attach great importance to close relations with Arab countries. Welcome this opportunity to meet: you will have further discussion with Timothy Renton. Know that he will be talking to you about continuing dialogue with the Arab League.
  
- Determined to do what we can to promote solution of Arab/Israel dispute. No doubt of urgency and of risks of stagnation. In close touch with both sides and looking actively for ways to help. But no clear ways forward so far.
  
- Terrorism. Cooperation essential. No one immune from threat (as clear from Lebanon). Range of measures agreed at Tokyo and by the Twelve reflect our concern. Hope this is shared widely and that other governments will take similar action.
  
- Iran/Iraq. Share Arab League objective: earliest possible end to conflict. Intend to encourage our partners to focus closely on issues.
  
- Lebanon. Appalled by continuing violence. Concern reiterated by Foreign Ministers at European Council. No peace unless Lebanon communities themselves can agree. What is Arab League doing to promote this? Continue to urge complete Israeli withdrawal and enhanced role for UNIFIL.
  
- [If raised] Libya. US action fully justified to pre-empt planned attacks. Conclusive evidence of Libyan state sponsorship of Terrorism.



MEMORANDUM ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE: 8 JULY: 9.30

Background

The Arab League

1. A personality note on Mr Klibi is attached. He last visited London as a member of a delegation which called on the Prime Minister in May 1985 to discuss Iran/Iraq.
2. Recent Arab League diplomatic activity has centred on unsuccessful efforts to convene an Arab Summit. The League Secretariat reacted sharply to the US attack on Libya, and strongly criticised the Tokyo Summit Declaration for indicating support of the US action, bias towards Israel and alleged confusion of terrorism with legitimate liberation struggle.
3. The Director of the League's London office, Dr Al Amad, wrote to the Prime Minister on 20 May to express concern about the "Sun" cartoon on "Arab Pigs". The Prime Minister's reply to him was printed in full on the front page of Al Sharq Al Awsat, the London-based Arabic newspaper, and appears to have allayed Arab concern about the Government's views.

Arab/Israel

4. The League Secretariat is active in Arab/Israel affairs, particularly summitry, but ineffectual. In its public pronouncements (of which there are many) it keeps to pan-Arab positions, such as those agreed at Fez. The influence of the Syrian Deputy Secretary General, Adnan Omran, is strong. Mr Klibi has long called for a more active European approach to the issues (most recently in his messages to the Prime Minister and Secretary of State on the occasion of HM The Queen's Official Birthday, to which replies were sent on standard lines).

Terrorism (and proposal for Euro-Arab Dialogue Ministerial Troika)  
Iran/Iraq

5. Following the US attack on Libya the Dutch Presidency stepped up their efforts to arrange a Ministerial Troika meeting with the Arab League in the context of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. The Arabs would wish to have an open agenda and there are a number of obstacles to be overcome relating to the possibility of a communique (favoured by Arabs: Europeans opposed to any but the most formal text recording that the meeting took place). We favour greater dialogue with moderate Arabs and believe that bilateral contacts are the best way of pursuing this, but a Troika meeting could also be of some value.

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Iran/Iraq

6. Our objective is not to raise Arab hopes of an EC peace initiative on the conflict. The last approach to UK was on 13 May 1985, when Klibi and others saw the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Both reassured Klibi of our and EC continued support of the UN Secretary General. Arab concern about arms supplies to Iran remains high. Our policy is clear: no defence goods which will prolong or exacerbate conflict. Libya, Syria and Soviet bloc countries are the main suppliers of arms to Iran.

Lebanon

7. Intermittent fighting in West Beirut between AMAL and Palestinians (fuelled by efforts of pro-Arafat Palestinians to rebuild infrastructure). Lebanese Army having some success in containing the situation. EC Foreign Ministers issued a statement at the European Council deploring continuing violence, especially around the Palestinian camps. Hizballah gaining ground in West Beirut. No unity on Christian side either. Syrians insist they will not intervene militarily to impose a solution in Lebanon. Continued violence in the South and attacks on the Israeli "security zone".

8. UNIFIL mandate renewed for 3 months on 18 April. French pressed for 3 months rather than 6 in hope of concentrating minds on UNIFIL's problems. Russians and East Europeans supported for first time. Russians to pay assessed contribution (but probably not



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appears). Israelis still wary of cooperating. UNSG expected to recommend 6 months renewal in July.

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Personality Note

KLIBI, CHEDLI

Tunisian, Secretary General of the League of Arab States since May 1979. Re-elected for a further five year term in March 1984.

Deputy in Tunisian National Assembly and Mayor of Carthage since 1964. Member of the Political Bureau of the Destour Socialist party since January 1968.

Born at Tunis in 1925. Studied in Tunis and Paris, specialising in philosophy and Arabic literature. Formerly a professor at the Ecole Normale Superieure, also carried on journalistic activities. Held a succession of Ministerial posts dealing with cultural affairs and information from 1972 until November 1973. Designated against his will as Ambassador to Cairo in December 1973 and in fact avoided going there. Appointed Director of the Presidential Cabinet with the rank of Minister in 1974. Minister of Culture in December 1976 and of Information in September 1978. A champion of the use of Arabic in Tunisia.

A superficially unimpressive personality, he has worked hard to make the Secretariat General in Tunis effective, following Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League in 1979. Has pretensions to Pan-Arab Foreign Minister status and is something of an empire-builder. Reasonably well-disposed towards Britain and a regular visitor. His characteristically Tunisian moderation is influenced by his need to maintain his acceptability to the hardliners in the League.

Married. Three children.





JA  
bc pc

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

12 May 1986

**CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE**

Thank you for your letter of 9 May,  
proposing that the Prime Minister should  
see Mr. Klibi.

The Prime Minister can see him from  
0930-1000 on Tuesday 8 July.

(Charles Powell)

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

do

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~~Culshaw~~  
Sorry - but she has  
to do it. Can we  
find  $\frac{1}{2}$  hr please  
CDP

CC  
①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

9 May 1986

CDP  
9.30-10.00  
TUE 8 July  
CR

Prime Minister  
Agree to see  
him?  
CDP 9/5

Dear Charles,

Yes not

Call on the Prime Minister by Secretary-General of the Arab League

It has become established practice for the Secretary-General of the Arab League to visit the capital of the EC country holding the Presidency during the first month of that Presidency, and we have been warned that a request to visit London is in the offing.

Mr Klibi is, as you know, an uninspiring interlocutor. But Sir Geoffrey Howe believes it would be right to take the initiative and issue an invitation soon in order to demonstrate our interest in maintaining a dialogue with respected Arab interlocutors. He is conscious that the Prime Minister's visit to Israel, coming in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis and at a time when we may well be at loggerheads with Syria also, could result in our moderate Arab friends looking for some reassurance of our basic even-handedness in the Arab/Israel dispute. An invitation to Klibi could therefore be timely.

Sir Geoffrey Howe accordingly intends shortly to invite Mr Klibi to come to London for talks in early July. He proposes to offer a meeting of one hour on either 7, 9 or 10 July. Mr Klibi would also expect to call on the Prime Minister as on past visits: an invitation without a brief courtesy call on Mrs Thatcher would be seen as scornful of the League's status and risk undoing the positive effect of the visit. Mr Klibi last called on the Prime Minister on 13 May 1985 as part of an Arab League delegation.

I would be grateful to know if the Prime Minister can agree to receive Mr Klibi for a brief courtesy call and, if so, whether the proposed timing would be convenient.

Yours ever

*(Signature)*

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street



GR 500

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MOSCOW 290455Z MAY 85

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 748 OF 29TH MAY 85

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, AMMAN, SANAA, KUWAIT,  
TUNIS, RABAT.

MY TELNO 735 (NOT TO ALL) : ARAB LEAGUE MISSION : IRAN/IRAQ :  
LEBANON : MIDDLE EAST

1. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS REPORTED THE ARRIVAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE MISSION ON 26 MAY. IN THE EVENT IT CONSISTS OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF IRAQ, NORTH YEMEN AND JORDAN. WHEN THEY WERE RECEIVED BY GROMYKO ON 22 MAY THEY WERE AUGMENTED BY THE AMBASSADORS OF KUWAIT, MOROCCO AND TUNISIA. THE TALKS WERE DESCRIBED AS TAKING PLACE IN A "FRANK AND FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE".
2. THE PRESS REPORT OF THE MISSION'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO SUGGESTS THAT HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY. HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE "AFFIRMED THE UNCHANGING COURSE" OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE WAR SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO AN END. IT DAMAGED THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES AND THE CAUSE OF ARAB UNITY AGAINST ISRAELI AGGRESSION SUPPORTED BY THE US. THE USSR WAS DOING EVERYTHING IT COULD. GROMYKO ALSO NOTED THAT THE "IMPERIALIST POWERS" SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO USE THE SITUATION TO JUSTIFY INTERFERENCE IN THE AREA.
3. THE DISCUSSION ALSO COVERED THE MIDDLE EAST AS A WHOLE. GROMYKO REPEATED SOVIET INSISTENCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. ANY SEPARATE DEALS WOULD LEAD THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM INTO A BLIND ALLEY. THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION IS RECORDED AS PLACING A HIGH VALUE ON THE "PRINCIPLED LINE" OF THE SOVIET UNION AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S UNWAVERING SUPPORT AGAINST ISRAELI AGGRESSION.
4. IZVESTIA OF 27 MAY PUBLISHED A TASS REPORT FROM BAGHDAD DESCRIBING STALEMATE IN THE WAR AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A MILITARY SOLUTION. IRAQ HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL THAT IT WAS READY FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. IT WAS IRAN WHICH HAD NOT AGREED. THE WAR WAS BEING STIRRED UP BY "THE IMPERIALISTS" WHO WERE PUTTING A SPOKE IN THE WHEEL OF THE SEARCH FOR PEACE BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT WHICH IRAN/IRAQ PEACE WOULD HAVE BOTH ON

OIL PRICES AND ON THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT WHICH WOULD COME FROM THESE TWO IMPORTANT COUNTRIES BEING AT PEACE.

5. THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD A SEPARATE MEETING WITH GROMYKO ON 27 MAY. HE HANDED OVER A MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN TO GORBACHEV. GROMYKO IS REPORTED TO HAVE UNDERLINED THE SHARPLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO ATTEMPTS TO REACH A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT BY ANY FORM OF SEPARATE AGREEMENTS.

6. THE ARAB LEAGUE MISSION ALSO BRIEFLY TOUCHED ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. GROMYKO IS REPORTED TO HAVE CALLED FOR AN END TO THE ARAB BLOODSHED. THE REPORT OF GROMYKO'S REMARKS MAKES NO MENTION OF ISRAELI RESPONSIBILITY. PRAVDA OF 25 MAY HOWEVER REPORTS A STATEMENT BY THE "COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES OF THE ARAB EAST" CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND EVACUATION OF THE WOUNDED. THE STATEMENT DESCRIBES THE FIGHTING AS DIVERTING ATTENTION FROM ISRAELI CRIMES IN THE SOUTH AND THE FIGHT AGAINST ISRAELI AND AMERICAN IMPERIALISM AND ALSO AS DIVERTING ENERGIES FROM EFFORTS TO STOP A PLOT TO REACH AGREEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE BASIS OF CAMP DAVID, THE REAGAN PLAN AND THE PLO/JORDAN AGREEMENT.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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FM MOSCOW 241030Z MAY 85

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 735 OF 24 MAY

INFO PRIORITY : BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, AMMAN, ALGERIA,  
KUWAIT, JEDDA, TUNIS, SANA'A.

ARAB LEAGUE MISSION: IRAN/IRAQ WAR

1. THE ARAB LEAGUE MISSION VISITING SELECTED CAPITALS IN SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT WILL ARRIVE IN MOSCOW ON SUNDAY 26 MAY. NIKIFOROV THE SOVIET HEAD OF PROTOCOL TOLD ME ON 23 MAY THAT THE PROGRAMME FOR THE VISIT HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE AND IT WAS STILL NOT CERTAIN WHO WOULD BE COMING. UT I UNDERSTAND FROM HIM AND ARAB SOURCES THAT, ON THE MOSCOW LEG, THE MISSION WILL INCLUDE AT LEAST THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF JORDAN AND KUWAIT WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM TUNISIA, IRAQ, NORTH YEMEN AND SAUDI ARABIA. THE JORDANIANS TELL US THAT ALGERIA IS ALSO COMING, BUT THE ALGERIANS HAVE NOT CONFIRMED THIS. SO FAR ALL THAT IS KNOWN IS THAT MEETINGS WILL BE HELD WITH GROMYKO. THERE IS NO WORD OF A POSSIBLE CALL ON GORBACHEV.

2. ACCORDING TO ARAB SOURCES THE MISSION WILL BE SEEKING TO APPLY PRESSURE TO THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE MORE ACTIVE STEPS TO PREVENT WEAPONS REACHING IRAN THROUGH NORTH KOREA, SYRIA AND LIBYA. SOME ARAB SOURCES HAVE SPECULATED THAT ALL APPEARANCES AND STATEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY, THE RUSSIANS MAY BE REASONABLY CONTENT TO SEE THE WAR CONTINUE SO LONG AS IT DOES NOT ESCALATE TOO SHARPLY, PARTLY ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO BRING IT TO AN END AT PRESENT WITHOUT DAMAGE TO SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE PARTIES AND PARTLY FOR FEAR THAT IF THE WAR ENDED IRAN MIGHT TAKE A MORE STRIDENTLY ANTI-SOVIET POSITION OVER AFGHANISTAN AND EVEN CONSIDER MILITANT ACTION AMONG SHI-ITE MOSLEMS IN THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF.

3. I DO NOT ATTACH TOO MUCH CREDENCE TO THE LATTER VIEW. I THINK THE RUSSIAN WISH FOR AN END TO THE WAR IS GENUINE ENOUGH BUT IT IS TRUE THAT THEY FACE A DILEMMA IN LOOKING FOR WAYS OF INFLUENCING THINGS IN THAT DIRECTION.

4. THE JORDANIANS WILL HAVE SI-LATERAL MEETINGS DURING THE VISIT TO DISCUSS THE P.L.O./JORDAN AGREEMENT.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

I had lunch with Mr. Dennis Walters, MP, on 13 May. I have twice made excuses to avoid this, but succumbed the third time when he said that he had some specific points of follow-up to his meeting with the Prime Minister at which I was present.

2. Mr. Walters began by saying that the Prime Minister allowed her judgement on Middle Eastern matters to be overridden by her constituency interest. I suggested that even the Arab press had given up this particular canard.

3. Mr. Walters cited as evidence the Prime Minister's recent decision to over-rule a strong recommendation from the Foreign Office that Mr. Luce should meet Yasser Arafat in Tunis. I said that there had not been a strong recommendation, only a rather tepid one. Anyway, it was plainly not the moment to change policy on Ministerial contacts with the PLO, when a delicate discussion of how the Palestinian element of a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation for negotiations with Israel was being discussed.

4. Mr. Walters asked whether the Prime Minister might in due course agree to Ministerial contacts with the PLO. He had noticed that the Prime Minister had at their meeting described Arafat as 'moderate'. I said that the conditions on which Ministerial contact would be allowed had been plainly stated. It seemed that some of them at least might soon be met. There was no point in handing out the sugar lump before the dog had jumped through the hoop. Mr. Walters saw a risk that, if we held out for too long, the PLO would back away from the Hussein/Arafat agreement and put itself under the protection of the extremists. I said that the Prime Minister was conscious of this risk. It was a matter calling for fine judgement. But the PLO remained



inconsistent in what they said about peace and Israel's right to existence.

5. Mr. Walters asked why the Prime Minister was not ready to take a line more independent of the Americans. I said that she recognised that no peace efforts would succeed without the full participation and commitment of the Americans. But she spoke up firmly for further American efforts in private.

6. Mr. Walters evinced some interest in forthcoming visits of Arab leaders. I mentioned the Sultan of Oman and possibly King Hussein.

CR!

14 May, 1985.

Dennis Walter H.P.  
Arab League.



892410

File



cc: Sir P. Cradock

10 DOWNING STREET

cc MASTER SET

From the Private Secretary

13 May 1985

Dear Peter,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH AN ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION ON  
13 MAY AT 1730 HOURS

The Prime Minister met a delegation from the Arab League Follow Up Committee on the Iran-Iraq conflict this evening. The delegation was led by the Secretary General of the Arab League, M. Klibi. Only two Foreign Ministers were present: Mr. Tariq Aziz of Iraq and Mr. Caïd Essebsi of Tunisia. Other Governments were represented by their Ambassadors in London. There were another five people present on the Arab side. I do not know who they were and doubt that they had any business to be there. The Foreign Secretary and Mr. Egerton were also present.

M. Klibi opened by expressing the Arab League's condolences on the fire at the Bradford City Football Ground. The Prime Minister thanked him for this.

M. Klibi explained that the Arab League Follow Up Committee had been established to make all diplomatic efforts to bring to an end the Iran-Iraq war. He appreciated that the war was a cause of anxiety to the United Kingdom and wished to praise the positions adopted by Her Majesty's Government either directly or through the European Community. The war was now well into its fifth year and was a source of great frustration and concern to the Arab people because of the destruction which it was wreaking. This was why the Arab League states had spared no effort to reach a solution. He wished to recall in particular the mediation efforts of Algeria and of the Gulf States. Unfortunately these efforts had failed, as had those of the Islamic nations, the non-aligned nations and the United Nations. The reason for this failure was that Iran had continued to insist on acceptance of its unrealistic and unreasonable conditions for peace. For instance, they demanded that those responsible for starting the war should be put on trial, and were seeking the removal of the Head of State of Iraq.

M. Klibi continued that Iraq was ready to accept a peaceful settlement on honourable terms. The Arab League

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states believed that the international community had a moral obligation to help achieve this. The United Nations had taken an interest but had failed to deal with the conflict in its global context. The time had come for influential countries, and in particular the permanent members of the Security Council, to take speedy and decisive measures to end the war. There was a grave risk that the conflict would spread to other countries of the Gulf, which God forbid. Because of its close links with the Gulf states, the United Kingdom would be particularly alert to this danger. There was a further risk that the conflict might develop from being a bilateral one into an international conflict through the intervention of foreign powers.

M. Klibi continued that the United Kingdom, as a close friend of the Arab states, should take a leading role in efforts to bring about peace. While the Arab League appreciated the United Kingdom's positive stand, they would like to see this further strengthened. In particular, they would like to see the United Kingdom express even greater anxiety about the consequences of continuation of the war. They would also wish to see the European Community take a practical initiative. The European Community might think in terms of forming a joint delegation to take a positive role in the process of seeking a settlement. In addition, the five permanent members of the Security Council should call for a ceasefire and agree upon measures to guarantee its observance. The Security Council should issue a call for a ceasefire on all fronts by a fixed date. At the same time, it should announce measures and sanctions to be taken against those who did not respect the ceasefire. He believed that such a statement by the Security Council would have an enormous impact on the Iranian people. Wars were not fought with weapons alone: morale was also important. The Iranian people would feel isolated if the Security Council were to act as he proposed. Finally, he believed that the United Nations should think of calling upon its members not to sell arms to Iran if Iran failed to heed the ceasefire call.

M. Klibi concluded that an end to the war would produce great benefits. The reconstruction process would require enormous efforts at rebuilding over a long period in which the European Community could have a great part. The Arab League therefore hoped that the United Kingdom would join fully in efforts to bring peace, prosperity and security back to the area.

The Prime Minister said that she well understood the Arab League's total frustration with the present position. Britain felt it too. However much Britain or the European Community or the United Nations tried to get through to Iran, none of us seemed to be able to have any effect upon the present Government. Britain recognised and supported Iraq's wish for a conclusion to the war. We agreed that Iran's terms were totally unrealistic and impossible to concede. Some months ago there had been a lull in the war and we hoped that Iran had drawn the conclusion that the slaughter must end. This had proved to be mistaken.



The Prime Minister continued that we had hoped that Iran would find it difficult to secure the supply of the weapons it needed. Because she knew that there was some concern in Iraq about the United Kingdom's arms exports to Iran, she had called for precise figures and details. A very small number of orders had been left over from before the revolution. These included a fleet support vessel, and two unarmed support vessels built under pre-revolutionary contracts and paid for before the revolution. We had delayed and delayed the supply of these, but in the end had had no alternative but to let them go. The figures showed that we had exported probably only about £9 million worth of defence equipment to Iran since the beginning of the Gulf conflict, although the figure might be as high as £12 million. We had exported more than ten times as much to Iraq. She wished to stress that the United Kingdom did not intend to enter into new contracts for the supply of ships, marine engines, hovercraft or other advanced equipment to Iran. It was also a fact that we had lost a great deal of business in Iran, not only in the arms field. She had wanted to set the record straight on this. Unfortunately, Iran was still getting arms through Libya and North Korea: she hoped that Arab states could act to prevent this.

The Prime Minister continued that Britain would do all it could to assist the peace process. We were prominent in contributing to United Nations peace-keeping forces, notably in Cyprus. We had participated in the Multi-National Force in Lebanon. We had helped clear Libyan mines from the Red Sea. We maintained the Armilla Patrol. She mentioned these matters to assure the delegation that Britain did not just talk but made an active contribution, even at great cost to ourselves.

The Prime Minister concluded that she would like to assure the delegation that Britain would continue to work in the Security Council for a peaceful solution and would not enter into any new contracts for the sale of advanced equipment with Iran because we shared the Arab League's desire to end the conflict. We would take account of what M. Klibi had said and do the best we could to help. She was happy to have had this opportunity to hear Arab views at first hand.

Mr. Tariq Aziz thanked the Prime Minister on behalf of the delegation, both for seeing them and for her encouraging words. He agreed completely with what she had said about relations between Iraq and the United Kingdom in the military field. He welcomed this as confirming a long tradition of friendship. Iraq had reciprocated when Saddam Hussein had received our new Ambassador in Baghdad. Iraq had carried out all its obligations in respect of international law and of peace and security in the region. He noticed that when the war became critical there was a sharp increase in the international community's attention to it. But as soon as hostilities declined, so did public attention. He would like to see the efforts of the international community to secure peace increase, particularly by applying pressure to Iran. As a final

point, he hoped that all friendly states would concentrate, not on transient and partial aspects of the conflict, but on the fundamental requirement for an end to hostilities in conformity with the United Nations Charter, thus helping to establish a legal and honourable basis for peace.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

*yours sincerely,  
Charles Powell*

Charles Powell

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



PS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/EUS

VIA DEREK THOMAS

MR FERGUSSON

MR BERTON

ED/ED

ED/GENAD

ED/IND

ED/IND

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RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No. 10 DOWNING ST (2)

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FM BAGHDAD 121400Z MAY 85

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 309 OF 12 MAY 85,

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, TEHRAN, DTI(OT4), E C C D, AND  
MODUK (FOR DIA).

MY TELNO 302 : IRAN/IRAQ : IRAQI VIEW OF BRITISH 'NEUTRALITY'.

SUMMARY.

1. RAMADHAN EXPRESSES IRAQI LEADERSHIP'S VIEWS ON BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CONFLICT: A COMPLAINT OF BIAS TOWARDS AGGRESSIVE IRAN AGAINST PEACE-SEEKING IRAQ. IMPLICIT WARNING GIVEN THAT OUR ECONOMIC POSITION COULD SUFFER AS A RESULT. OPPORTUNITY OF TARIQ AZIZ'S VISIT ON 12/13 MAY SHOULD BE SEIZED TO CONTINUE TO EXPLAIN OUR POSITION IN THIS DISPUTE.

DETAIL.

2. AS PART OF MY INTRODUCTORY CALLS, I SPENT HALF-AN-HOUR THIS MORNING (12 MAY) WITH TAHA YASIN RAMADHAN, FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND C IN C OF THE POPULAR ARMY. HE HAS A REPUTATION FOR BEING TOUGH AND HE CERTAINLY PULLED NO PUNCHES, BUT WE PARTED ON RELATIVELY GOOD TERMS.

3. AS HE IS THE ECONOMIC OVERLORD, I ASKED WHETHER HE SHARED MY VIEW THAT OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WERE ON A GOOD BASIS. HE AGREED ENTIRELY, SAYING IN FACT OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WERE EXCELLENT. THE LEADERSHIP WERE PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH THE RENEWAL OF THE LINE OF CREDIT. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD TWO LISTS OF FIRMS WHICH HAD WORKED IN IRAQ: ONE OF THOSE FIRMS WHICH WERE PREPARED TO STICK WITH IRAQ AND HELP IT THROUGH THE DIFFICULT PERIOD OF THE WAR AND THE OTHER OF FIRMS WHICH HAD PULLED OUT. IRAQ WOULD TAKE THE DIFFERENT STANDS OF THE FIRMS INTO CONSIDERATION.



THE WAR WAS OVER AND DEVELOPMENT WAS RESUMED AT THE PREVIOUS RATE. HE AGREED WITH MY COMMENT THAT MANY BRITISH FIRMS WERE STILL ACTIVE IN IRAQ, BUT SAID IRAQ WOULD ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POLITICAL ATTITUDE OF THE COUNTRIES FROM WHICH THE FIRMS CAME. IN THIS REGARD HE HAD TO SAY, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE LEADERSHIP, THAT OUR POLITICAL RELATIONS WERE NOT ON THE SAME SOUND BASIS.

4. HE SAID THAT THE LEADERSHIP BELIEVED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM, AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HAD A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DOING EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO SUPPORT IRAQ IN ITS QUEST FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT WITH IRAN. UNFORTUNATELY IT DID NOT SEEM THAT THE UK WANTED PEACE; ON THE CONTRARY IT WANTED THE WAR TO CONTINUE. THIS WAS THE ONLY POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION IRAQ COULD PUT ON OUR ATTITUDE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERALLY. WE SPOKE OF NEUTRALITY IN THE DISPUTE BUT WE CONTINUED TO HELP IRAN, WHICH MAINTAINED ITS AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF CONTINUING THE WAR, INSTEAD OF SUPPORTING IRAQ, WHICH ONLY SOUGHT PEACE. FOR EXAMPLE, WE CONCERNED OURSELVES ABOUT THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WHILE LOSING SIGHT OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVE WHICH WAS TO BRING ABOUT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. IN ANY CASE, IF BRITAIN WERE TOMORROW ATTACKED BY ONE OF ITS NEIGHBOURS WOULD IT NOT USE EVERY MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL TO DEFEND ITSELF? THE IRANIANS HAD ATTEMPTED TO CUT BASRA OFF FROM IRAQ AND IRAQ HAD FELT OBLIGED TO DEFEND ITSELF BY EVERY MEANS AVAILABLE. IRAQ'S ACTIONS WERE MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE TO END THE WAR AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

5. RAMADHAN CONTINUED THAT HE RECALLED WITH PLEASURE HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN OCTOBER 1983 AND HAD BELIEVED THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD REACHED A GOOD UNDERSTANDING. HOWEVER, THE LEADERSHIP HAD NOTICED NO SUBSEQUENT CHANGE IN BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS IRAQ. IRAQ HAD NOT FORGOTTEN AND WOULD NOT FORGET THE EFFORTS BRITAIN HAD MADE TO PREVENT FRANCE FROM DELIVERING THE SUPER-ETENDARDS. IRAQIS COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY BRITAIN SHOULD ATTEMPT TO PREVENT IT FROM OBTAINING THE ARMS NEEDED TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AN END.

6. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT SHARE HIS VIEW OF BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CONFLICT. WE, LIKE OTHER COUNTRIES, WERE CONCERNED THAT THE WAR SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO AN END AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. OUR EFFORTS IN NEW YORK HAD BEEN DIRECTED TOWARDS THIS END AND I BELIEVED THAT THE IRAQI DELEGATION THERE APPRECIATED THOSE EFFORTS. RAMADHAN INTERJECTED THAT OUR ATTITUDE THERE HAD CERTAINLY SHOWN SOME IMPROVEMENT IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS. I SAID THAT THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP COULD HARDLY EXPECT BRITAIN NOT TO HAVE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH IRAN. HE WOULD APPRECIATE THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR US TO UNDERSTAND AND INTERPRET EVENTS THERE. RAMADHAN INTERJECTED THAT THE BRITISH UNDERSTOOD THE IRANIANS BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE. I ALSO NOTED THAT MANY ARAB COUNTRIES MAINTAINED THEIR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP FOR THE SAME REASONS. RAMADHAN SAID THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT US TO CUT RELATIONS WITH IRAN BUT LOOKED TO BRITAIN FOR A MORE CORRECT EVALUATION OF IRAQ'S PEACEFUL INTENTIONS AND IRAN'S AGGRESSIVE ONES AND TO ACT ACCORDINGLY.

7. AS TIME WAS RUNNING OUT, I SAID THAT I WAS PLEASED TO HAVE THIS DIRECT ACCOUNT OF THE LEADERSHIP'S VIEWS, EVEN THOUGH I DID NOT SHARE THEIR ASSESSMENT. I REITERATED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT



AS THE PRESIDENT SAID, TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE AND HOPED THAT THE FORTHCOMING VISITS BY THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INFORMATION AND CULTURE, HEALTH AND TRADE WOULD ALL CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS A BETTER POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. I ADDED THAT MUCH OF THE CREDIT FOR OUR GOOD ECONOMIC RELATIONS WAS DUE TO AL-MUFTI, IRAQI CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE IRAQ/UK FINANCIAL SUB-COMMITTEE, AND EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT GOOD ECONOMIC RELATIONS SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS SEPARATE FROM GOOD POLITICAL RELATIONS. OUR LINE OF CREDIT SHOULD BE SEEN AS A SYMBOL OF OUR CONFIDENCE IN AND SUPPORT OF IRAQ. RAMADHAN CONCURRED BUT STRESSED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF IRAQI FEELING ON BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CONFLICT.

COMMENT.

B. EVEN THOUGH HE DID NOT GO INTO SPECIFICS, THIS WAS THE clearest expression I have encountered so far of the present Iraqi attitude towards Britain. Ramadhan was evidently speaking to a brief from the Ba'ath Party leadership. IT HAS TO BE TAKEN THEREFORE AS A SERIOUS REFLECTION OF THE LEADERSHIP'S VIEW THAT IF WE, AS MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, DO NOT PUT FIRST THE QUEST FOR A CEASE-FIRE LEADING TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS IRAQ WHICH IS BEING INTRANSIGENT, AND IF WE GIVE EQUAL WEIGHT TO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE DISPUTE, PARTICULARLY CW, WE SHALL CONTINUE TO INCUR IRAQI DISSATISFACTION WHICH WILL SPILL OVER INTO THE AREA OF OUR ECONOMIC PROSPECTS HERE. (I UNDERSTAND THE IRAQIS HAVE MADE SUCH THREATS BEFORE). I HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO REITERATE TO TARIQ AZIZ THE CAREFUL AND MODERATE WAY WE HAVE USED AND ARE USING OUR INFLUENCE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND TO IMPRESS ON HIM THAT WE DESIRE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AS MUCH AS IRAQ.

CLARK

BT

NNNN

THESE ARE SOME OF THE FIRMS WHICH WERE PREPARED TO STICK WITH IRAQ AND HELP IT THROUGH THE DIFFICULT PERIOD OF

ceh



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 May, 1985

Dear Charles,

Visit of Arab League Delegation: 13 May

I enclose briefing for the call on the Prime Minister by a delegation from the seven-man Arab League Follow-up Committee on the Iran/Iraq conflict, which has been arranged for 1730 hours on Monday 13 May. Before calling on the Prime Minister, the delegation will call on Sir Geoffrey Howe, and in the evening Mr Hurd will host a dinner for the delegation at Lancaster House. Mr Luce will attend.

The delegation will be headed by the Arab League Secretary-General, Mr Chadli Klibi, who will probably (see below) be accompanied by two Foreign Ministers from the seven-man Committee, the Iraqi Foreign Minister (Mr Tariq Aziz) and the Tunisian Foreign Minister (Mr Cald Essebsi). Those Foreign Ministers who are unable to attend have instructed their Ambassadors in London to represent them at the meetings. Although we have tried to discourage this in our contacts with the Arab League, the Ambassadors attach considerable importance to attending the meeting with the Prime Minister: but the party will be kept to that.

There is still some doubt over whether the Iraqi will in fact arrive. He is terrified of attack by Iraqi dissidents and our refusal to tolerate his bodyguards carrying arms here may lead him to decide at the last moment not to come. We are in frequent touch with the Iraqi Embassy, and will let you know as soon as the position is clear. The aims of the delegation's visits to the capitals of Permanent Members of the Security Council seem to be twofold. First, to press for tougher action in the UN Security Council to bring about a settlement of the Iran/Iraq conflict; secondly, to discourage countries from supplying any military items to Iran. The response to these points is covered in detail in the briefing. Our main aim is to impress upon the delegation that the UK wishes to see a speedy and honourable settlement of the conflict and will continue to play a constructive role to that end. We will not supply any equipment to Iran which might prolong or exacerbate the conflict, and wish other suppliers would exercise similar restraint.





If the Prime Minister agrees, Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr Egerton will attend the meeting on Monday. An interpreter (Mr Leslie McLoughlin) will also be present, as Mr Klibi will make his presentation in Arabic.

*Yours ever,  
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

IRAN/IRAQ: ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER ON  
13 MAY

OUR OBJECTIVES

- (a) to make clear our desire to see the earliest possible end to the Gulf conflict.
- (b) to refute any criticism of the UK's role at the UN, or over our commercial relations and very limited defence sales relations with Iran.

ARGUMENTS TO USE

- (a) quiet diplomacy being pursued by the UN Secretary-General offers the best way forward. Our representative at New York out to help as much as possible.
- (b) our commercial interests in Iran in no way diminish our determination to work for an early end to the conflict.
- (c) our neutrality in the conflict, and toehold in Iran, gives us weight which some other Western countries do not have.

TACTICAL ARGUMENTS

- (a) We have publicly recognised Iraq's stated willingness to end the conflict.
- (b) We have not extended any credit to Iran, as we of course have done to Iraq.
- (c) Our aim at the UN is to find practical ways of bringing about a comprehensive settlement, making the best use of UN machinery.

THEIR OBJECTIVES

- (a) to call for greater pro-Iraqi activity by the UK in the UN Security Council.





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- (b) to press for greater recognition by members of UN Security Council of Iraq's willingness to accept a peaceful settlement, and of Iran's obstructive refusal to talk about a settlement.
- (c) accordingly to press for further isolation of Iran and a halt to all UK supplies of military equipment to Iran. Additionally, to press us not to have any commercial dealings (including oil purchases) at all with Iran.
- (d) possibly to criticise hostility by the British media and in particular the BBC Arabic service towards Iraq.

OUR RESPONSE

- (a) the UK has supported all moves in the Security Council aimed at reducing the scope of the conflict and bringing it to the earliest possible end.
- (b) further isolation of Iran might make the Iranians more intransigent. Our limited contacts with the Iranians are used to urge moderation. Experience elsewhere has shown that sanctions are not effective.
- (c) we supply no defence equipment to either Iran or Iraq which might significantly prolong or exacerbate the conflict. We have, however, supplied overwhelmingly more defence equipment to Iraq than we have to Iran. Our limited releases of equipment to Iran have been in settlement of long-standing contracts, and their volume greatly exaggerated.
- (d) Our Ambassador in Baghdad has reported Iraqi complaints about BBC Arabic Service coverage of Iraq. If you have specific examples of alleged bias you should take it up directly with the BBC, preferably through your Ambassador in London.

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BACKGROUNDThe Follow-Up Committee

1. Formed March 1984 (includes Foreign Ministers of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco and the Yemen Arab Republic, plus the Arab League Secretary-General).
2. In January 1985 the Committee decided to send delegation to Security Council Permanent Members and EC Presidency. Delegation has so far visited Paris, Rome and Peking and will visit Moscow and Washington shortly. The purpose appears to be to stress the need for the Security Council to play a more active role, and to put pressure on those countries supplying defence equipment to Iran.

Recent Activity at the UN

3. During his visits to Tehran and Baghdad (7-9 April) the Secretary-General put a set of proposals to both sides, and although no breakthrough was achieved, both sides agreed that the proposals could serve as a basis for further discussion. On 25 April, the Security Council issued a statement condemning the use of CW and reiterating support for the Secretary-General's continuing efforts.
4. Iraq insists the UN should concentrate on achieving a comprehensive settlement to the conflict. Iran seeks to limit the scope of the conflict to the land war.

Recent EC Activity

5. The Iraqis are reported to have taken exception to the statement on Iran-Iraq released by Foreign Ministers of the Ten at Luxembourg on 29 April, on the grounds that it ran contrary to the Iraqi position. This is nonsense; the statement (copy attached) is finely balanced.



UK/Iraq Bilateral

6. HM Ambassador in Baghdad has recently reported Iraqi criticism of UK media handling of Iraq, particularly by the BBC Arabic Service. These criticisms are probably exaggerated and should be resolved by closer dialogue between the Iraqis and the BBC.

7. ECGD provided £250m of medium-term credit to Iraq following the visit of Iraqi Prime Minister to UK in October 1983. A further £250m was agreed in October 1984. No similar facilities are provided for Iran.

UK/Iran Trade

8. UK exports to Iran in 1984 totalled £703m. Imports from Iran were £368m. UK oil companies (BP and Shell) imported 1,184,000 tonnes (24,000bpd) of Iranian crude. HMG has no control over British oil companies' purchases which are part of their international operations.

PRESS LINE

Discussions concentrated on recent developments in the Gulf conflict. Both the UK and the Arab League Delegation shared the desire to see the earliest possible end to the conflict. Both sides agreed that the UN Secretary-General should be encouraged to follow up his mediation efforts, and that the UN Security Council should continue to play an active role.



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 FM LUXENBOURG 291931Z APR 85  
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER B5 OF 29 APRIL

INFO ROUTINE BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, ROME, DUBLIN, PARIS,  
 BONN, ATHENS, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL  
 NATO, UKNIS NEW YORK, OSLO, DAMASCUS, ACAIRO, TUNIS,  
 AMMAN, JEDDA, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, MISCAT, ABU DHABI, RABAT,  
 SANAA, BAGHDAD, KARTOUM, DUBAI, ALGIERS, DOHA, BAHRAIN, ADEN,  
 KUWAIT, MOGADISHU, <sup>INFO SAVING</sup> UKDEL STRASBOURG, ANKARA, LISBON, MADRID,  
 TOKYO, WELLINGTON, OTTAWA, MEXICO CITY, BERNE.

M.I.P.T.

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: MEETING OF MINISTERS: LUXEMBOURG:  
 29 APRIL.

TEXTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE  
 TEN ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

1. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

THE TEN MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN  
 A CLOSE INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY  
 WELCOMED RECENT MOVES TOWARDS A REACTIVATION OF THE NEGOTIATING  
 PROCESS IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI  
 CONFLICT, NOTABLY IN THE JORDAN/PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT REACHED ON  
 11 FEBRUARY AT THE INITIATIVE OF KING HUSSEIN, WHICH CONTAINED  
 A COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
 UN RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.  
 IN THE VIEW OF THE TEN THIS REPRESENTS A CONSTRUCTIVE STEP  
 FORWARD. THEY ALSO WELCOMED THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY THE  
 PRESIDENT OF EGYPT.

THE TEN CONSIDER THAT THESE IMPORTANT INITIATIVES REFLECT  
 A DESIRE FOR MOVEMENT TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THIS  
 DESERVES ENCOURAGEMENT AND A POSITIVE RESPONSE.

THEY CONFIRM THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A  
 JUST AND LASTING SOLUTION CALLS FOR THE PARTICIPATION AND  
 THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED. THE TEN  
 CONSIDER THAT NO EFFORT SHOULD BE SPARED TO MAINTAIN AND  
 STRENGTHEN THE PRESENT MOVEMENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO  
 FACILITATE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT.

THE TEN RECONFIRM THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A  
 COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST  
 QUESTION ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES WHICH THEY HAVE  
 STATED MANY TIMES IN THE PAST AND TO WHICH THEY CONTINUE TO  
 ADHERE.

IN



IN PARTICULAR, THEY RECALL THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES IN THE REGION, INCLUDING ISRAEL, TO EXISTENCE AND SECURITY, THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION, WITH ALL THAT THIS IMPLIES. WITH REGARD TO THE ASSOCIATION OF THE PLO WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE TEN REFER TO THEIR WELL-KNOWN POSITIONS. IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, THE TEN, BOTH COLLECTIVELY AND INDIVIDUALLY, WILL WORK TO PROMOTE THE RECONCILIATION OF THE VARIOUS POSITIONS.

## 2. LEBANON

THE TEN CONTINUE TO VIEW WITH CONCERN THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND IN PARTICULAR ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE SOUTH, WHICH CONTINUES TO BE SUBJECTED TO UNJUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF VIOLENCE. FOLLOWING THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES, THEY LOOK FOR THE EARLY, ORDERLY AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THOSE FORCES FROM THAT REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, AS WELL AS OF THOSE OTHER FORCES WHICH ARE NOT THERE AT THE REQUEST OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THE TEN CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT APPROPRIATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BE REACHED BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE GOVERNMENTS.

THE TEN APPEAL TO ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, BOTH WITHIN LEBANON AND OUTSIDE, TO ACT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO FACILITATE THE PROCESS OF RESTORING THE SOVEREIGNTY, UNITY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON, A PROCESS WHICH HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY COMPROMISED BY THE RECENT WORSENING OF THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION. THE TEN REAFFIRM THEIR SUPPORT FOR UNIFIL. THE TEN CALL ON ALL PARTIES TO RESPECT UNIFIL'S ROLE, AVOIDING ALL INCIDENTS, CO-OPERATING FULLY WITH THE FORCE AND ENSURING THE SAFETY OF ITS PERSONNEL.

THEY ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE SUFFERING OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE AND AT THE KIDNAPPINGS INVOLVING FOREIGN NATIONALS.

## 3. IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT

THE TEN VIEW WITH UTMOST CONCERN THE AGGRAVATION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. THE ESCALATION IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES AGAINST CIVILIAN TARGETS IS A SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT. THE CONTINUED LOSSES OF LIFE AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, THE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE ECONOMY OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND THE PERMANENT RISK OF AN EXTENSION OF THE HOSTILITIES MAKE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT MORE NECESSARY AND PRESSING THAN EVER. RECALLING THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE RECENT STATEMENTS OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, WHICH THEY SUPPORT, THE TEN URGE IRAN AND IRAQ TO AGREE UPON AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND TO START A NEGOTIATING PROCESS WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WHICH IS HONOURABLE AND ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES.

IN THE MEANTIME, THE TEN CALL AGAIN UPON IRAQ AND IRAN TO COMPLY WITH THE COMMITMENTS MADE UNDER THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED IN JUNE 1984, UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, TO REFRAIN FROM BOMBING CIVILIAN TARGETS. THE TEN DRAW THE ATTENTION OF BOTH COUNTRIES TO THE PROFOUND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS RAISED BY THIS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CONFLICT, SUCH AS THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR. THEY CONDEMN THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WHEREVER AND WHENEVER IT OCCURS. THE TEN EMPHASIZE THAT THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, AND THE OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, MUST BE FULLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY RESPECTED.

#### SUDAN

THE TEN CONSIDERED THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION IN SUDAN.

THEY WELCOME THE UNDERTAKING GIVEN BY THE NEW SUDANESE LEADERS TO CONTINUE A POLICY OF EFFECTIVE NON-ALIGNMENT AND TO SEEK A POSITION OF AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE IN ORDER TO CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY IN THE AREA. THE TEN HOPE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN WILL SOLVE THE COUNTRY'S SERIOUS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS. THE TEN APPEAL TO ALL POLITICAL FORCES IN SUDAN TO START A DIALOGUE WITH A VIEW TO RECONCILIATION THROUGHOUT ITS TERRITORY.

TURNING TO THE VERY SERIOUS ECONOMIC SITUATION, WHICH HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY DROUGHT, THE TEN EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE TO CONTINUE AND STEP UP DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION WITH AN EMERGENCY AID TO SUDAN.

FCO PASS SAVING UKREL STRASBOURG, ANKARA, LISBON, MADRID, TOKYO, WELLINGTON, OTTAWA, MEXICO CITY, BERNE.

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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PS/MR LUCE

PS/IPS

MR FERGUSSON

MR DEREK THOMAS

MREGERTON

MR RENWICK





Taviz Aziz Hag

## DEFENCE SALES TO IRAN AND IRAQ

Tunna

## POINTS TO MAKE

R. Kesselsia

1. We will supply no equipment that will significantly enhance the capability of Iran to prolong or exacerbate the conflict.

2. We have in any case supplied overwhelmingly more defence equipment to Iraq than to Iran since the conflict began.

Kharg and the Yarrow Ships (If pressed)

3. The release of these vessels represents no more than a settlement of contracts outstanding since before the Iranian Revolution. They are unarmed, and have no role in the present conflict.

## BACKGROUND

1. From tables compiled on the basis of the statistics available to Export Licensing Branch DTI, it is certain that at least £8.7 million of defence equipment was exported to Iran from the beginning of the Gulf conflict (September 1980) until the end of 1984. A further £4 million may also have been exported. It is certain that at least £184 million was exported to Iraq and a further £202 million may also have been exported.

2. These figures show that we probably supplied 20 times as much equipment to Iraq as to Iran between 1980 and 1984. As we cannot be absolutely certain we have adopted the formula "we have supplied overwhelmingly more defence equipment to Iraq than to Iran."

3. Iraq and her allies have often criticised the UK decision to complete and release 3 ships originally ordered by the Shah's government:

(i) The Kharg - a fleet support vessel completed and paid for by the Iranians before the Revolution. It was prevented from leaving Tyneside because of the US hostage crisis. It is unarmed and will have no role to play in the conflict with Iraq. It left the UK in October 1984.

(ii) The Yarrow Ships - 2 unarmed support vessels built under pre-Revolutionary contracts with no role to play in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. Particularly suited for a disaster relief role with extensive medical facilities. One left the UK in April 1985 the other is due to early in May.

Examples of equipment turned down for Iran

4. We have so far avoided giving specific details to either Iraq or Iran of equipment we have refused to supply to the other. However, as a result of restrictions on the supply of defence equipment to Iran and Iraq (in particular to Iran), British companies have lost much valuable business. If necessary, the Delegation can be reassured that the UK will enter into no new contracts for the supply of ships, marine engines, hovercraft or other advanced equipment.

*No arms dealings.  
Black Panther.  
Dan 10/11/84  
Negotiate others - New  
Security*



SALES OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAN (£ Cost)

	Definitely Sent	Not Known Whether Sent Or Not	Definitely Not Sent	Temporary Export/ Demonstration	Total
1980/ 81	1,257,496	831,731	-	-	2,089,227
1982	1,823,976	331,302	100,483,200	-	102,638,478
1983	1,709,138	2,129,413	9,530,000	385,960	13,754,511
1984	3,943,003*	830,139	1,355,216	87,479	6,215,837
Total	8,733,613	4,122,585	111,368,416	473,439	124,698,053

\* of which £3,663,770 for one large contract for radios

Conclusion

A total of £8.7 m has definitely been exported to Iran since the beginning of the conflict. A further £4.1 m have been exported but export licence applications have not been returned. The maximum possible total is therefore £12.9 m.

SALES OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ (£ Cost)

	Definitely Sent	Not Known Whether Sent Or Not	Temporary Export Demonstration	Total
Sept 1980	17,288,101	2,935,887		20,223,988
1981	56,643,589	68,031,853	647,218	125,322,660
1982	89,493,954	51,430,246		140,924,200
1983	19,169,777	35,068,345		54,238,122
1984	2,111,383	45,438,101		47,549,484
Total	184,706,804	202,904,432	647,218	388,258,454

Conclusion

A minimum of £184m has been exported to Iraq since the beginning of the conflict, in addition to a certain amount for which licence applications were not returned.



PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

You agreed to the Foreign Secretary's recommendation to see the Arab League "Follow-Up Committee" on the Iraq/Iran war, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia.

It now turns out that at most there will be two Foreign Ministers and probably only one (Tunisia). All the rest will be Ambassadors in London.

This is disgraceful and there are strong grounds for you to cancel the appointment (they will in any case see Sir Geoffrey Howe). If six Foreign Ministers who asked for an appointment fail to do you the courtesy of turning up, you would be thoroughly justified in declining to see the rump delegation. They will make a great fuss: but they will be at fault.

The only thing which gives me pause is that you will be seeing the Board of Deputies of British Jews immediately beforehand. If you now cancel the Arabs, however justifiably, there will be a hullabaloo about your favouring Israel.

If you do go ahead and see them, some stern words would be in order.

Discuss with Foreign Secretary on Monday morning?

C.D.P.

Perhaps I can see the  
Fon. but that's do him up,  
& no-one else - other than Klubi.  
not

Charles Powell  
10 May 1985

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 April 1985

Dear Peter,

xrf

Iran/Iraq: Arab League Initiative

Thank you for your letter of 2 April about the visit to London of the Follow-Up Committee.

BF || The Prime Minister agrees to meet the Committee on 13 May at 1730 for half an hour.

Yours sincerely  
Charles Powell

Charles Powell

• Peter Ricketts Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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① COP  
EETC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 April, 1985

Prime Minister

Agree to

see them for  
half-an-hour?COP  
2/4

Dear Charles,

Yes or

Iran/Iraq: Arab League Initiative

Following their meeting in Baghdad in March 1984 the Arab League established a "Follow Up Committee" consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. The Follow Up Committee has been mandated to call on the Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers of Security Council Permanent Member Countries to discuss the Iran/Iraq conflict. The Delegation are also to call on the EC Commission and Argentina (who are thought to be supplying arms to Iran).

The Arab League Delegation visited Paris on 12 March and Italy on 14 March and were received by President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Craxi. They are pursuing appointments in other Security Council capitals and we understand that the Chinese have agreed to receive them at a senior level. The Americans have agreed to a visit but are resisting the idea that the Delegation should be received by the President.

The Foreign Secretary has agreed to meet the delegation on 13 May. The Arab League were originally told that a meeting with the Prime Minister was unlikely because her programme was very crowded. M. Klibi has now come back to our Ambassador, arguing strongly that the delegation could not carry out its mandate without calling on the Prime Minister, if only for the briefest meeting, and could not agree to a visit to London without such an appointment being arranged.

This apparently trivial impasse could damage relations with an important group of Arab countries because of what they might see as our failure to take seriously their concern about the Iran/Iraq conflict - and thus risk real damage to our political and commercial interests in the Arab world. Mr Coles in Amman has commented that the Jordanians are intensely interested in the war and would welcome reception of the Delegation by the Prime Minister.

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/Given



Given the current escalation in the fighting and the intense diplomatic activity at the United Nations (the Secretary-General is currently in Riyadh and looking for common ground between the parties), we do not want to create the wrong impression amongst the Arab states or the League. Although little new is likely to emerge from a meeting with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary therefore recommends that the Prime Minister should offer M. Klibi and his team a courtesy call of up to thirty minutes on 13 May. If a date later in the month were more convenient to the Prime Minister, the visitors would no doubt settle for that.

*Yours ever,*  
*Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

23 January 1985

Dear Secretary-General.

I am most grateful for your expression of goodwill on the occasion of the New Year, and your kind gift of dates.

I very much share your hopes that we shall see a new effort towards peace by all concerned in the coming year. I can assure you that the British Government will continue with our partners in the European Community to encourage and support constructive moves by the parties directly involved towards negotiated solutions of the problems of the Middle East.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

M. Chedli Klibi

BM

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 January, 1985

Dear Charles,

Letter to the Prime Minister from the Secretary-General of  
the Arab League

I enclose a letter of 2 January from Mr Chedli Klibi to the Prime Minister, in which he conveys New Year greetings and expresses his hopes for greater effort to be made towards peace, with particular reference to the Middle East. He also sent a box of dates: because of the difficulty of forwarding it to London, this was disposed of by our Embassy in Tunis.

I enclose a suggested draft acknowledgement for the Prime Minister's signature.

Yours ever,  
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: M. Chedli Klibi  
Secretary General of the  
League of Arab States

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

I am most grateful for your expression of goodwill on the occasion of the New Year, and your kind gift of dates.

CAVEAT.....

I very much share your hopes that we shall see a new effort towards peace by all concerned in the coming year. I can assure you that the British Government will continue with our partners in the European Community to encourage and support constructive moves by the parties directly involved towards negotiated solutions of the problems of the Middle East.

*With best wishes.  
C.D.*

Enclosures—flag(s).....

3/0008

2 - JAN. 1985

19

تونس في



جامعة الدول العربية

الأمين العام

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

It gives me pleasure to convey to Your Excellency, on behalf of the League of Arab States, my best greetings for the New Year.

I would like, on this occasion, to express the hope that this new year will bring with it a more dynamic move in favour of world peace and security. Based on law and justice, such a move should be aimed to bolster the sovereignty of States, guarantee the respect of human rights and do away once and for all with racism and racial segregation - so many objectives as are wholly consistent with the long-held ideals and values of the people of Great Britain.

In more specific terms, may I take this opportunity to nurture the hope that a truly serious effort will be exerted during the year 1985 in order to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in conformity with international law, put Lebanon in a position to exercise freely its full and entire sovereignty and secure a rapid end to the Iraq-Iran war.

You can be assured, Madam Prime Minister, that the League of Arab States will spare no conceivable effort to bring its contribution to any constructive action likely to help solve international problems, reduce tensions between States, favour disarmament and resolve as best as possible and for the benefit of all peoples on earth





جامعة الدول العربية

- 2 -

the economic crisis which affects a large part of our planet.

As I form my best wishes for your personal health and happiness as well as for the continued prosperity of the British people, please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
Chedli KLIBI

Secretary General  
League of Arab States

Her Excellency,  
Mrs. Margaret THATCHER  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
LONDON



File ECL

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

22 June 1984

Thank you for sending us the attached draft message to Mr Klebi in reply to his telegram to the Prime Minister.

I am content with the draft suggested.

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Ray, Draft attached



22/6  
Ray

*With the compliments of*

**THE PRIVATE SECRETARY**

Charles OK OK  
Agree to send  
message to Mr. Klebi, via FCO,  
as draft below?

Ray  
22/6.

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
SW1A 2AH**

21 JUN 1974/1815

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TUNIS TELEX 154/148 216/7 21/6 1535

ETATPRIORITY

HER EX~~CEL~~ EXCELLENCY MRS MARGARET THATCHER  
PRIME MINISTER  
LONDON GREAT BRITAIN

ON THE OCCASION OF BRITAIN'S NATIONAL ~~BY \*# DATTX~~ DAY I AM  
HONOURED TO ~~CONVEY~~ CONVEY TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THE ~~BRITIX~~  
BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS  
AND BEST WISHES

I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EMPHASIZE THE ARAB  
NATIONS DESIRE TO TO STRENGTHEN COOPERATION AND ~~FRIENDSHIP~~  
FRIENDSHIP TIES WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM

WHILE WE LOOK FORWARD TO A MORE ACTIVE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION  
TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WE

~~WPEXX~~ EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT YOUR COUNTRY WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS  
TO SECURE A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THAT REGION

AS I RENEW MY WISHES FOR YOUR EXCELLENCY'S AND ~~XXX~~ PERSONAL  
HEALTH AND HAPPINESS AND ~~QEXX~~ FOR THE INCREASED PROSPERITY AND  
PROGRESS OF THE FRIENDLY PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN PLEASE ACCEPT  
YOUR EXCELLENCY THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGH CONSIDERATION

~~GHEDL~~ \*# GHEDLI KLIRI SECRETARY GENERAL LEAGUE OF  
ARAB STATES

COL ETAT PRIORITY <

British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

Telegram for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

British TELI



File No. ....  
 Department .....  
 Drafted by .....  
 (Block Capitals) .....  
 Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD  
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification
UNCLASSIFIED
Precedence
ROUTINE
DESKBY .....Z

FOR  
 COMMS. DEPT.  
 USE

Despatched (Date) .....  
 (Time) .....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....  
 (Security Class.)..... (Caveat).....  
 (Codeword)..... (Privacy marking).....  
 (Deskby).....Z

TO ROUTINE (precedence) (post) Tel. No. .... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO.....

INFO SAVING.....

distribution:-

[TEXT]  
 QUEEN'S OFFICIAL BIRTHDAY  
 1. The Prime Minister has received a message of congratulations and good wishes from ..... on the occasion of HM The Queen's Official Birthday.  
 2. I should be grateful if you would transmit the following message from the Prime Minister to ....  
 BEGINS: I am most grateful for your kind message of congratulations and good wishes on the occasion of the Official Birthday of Her Majesty The Queen.  
 I take this opportunity to send you my own best wishes. ENDS.  
 HOWE

copies to:-



10 DOWNING STREET

Duty ~~Out~~ - GR.

Tel. of congratulations  
on Queen's Birthday.

No doubt there will  
be several. Pl. let me  
have them all together.

Chris

Charles

To date there have been  
no more similar congratulations.

Kay

20/6/84

Kay

M. asks FCW to  
reconnect with people  
are welded. Probably a good  
thing can





21/6.

Chased FCO for  
something today 22/6.

10 DOWNING STREET

Mr. C. Brammer

Chris

We spoke. You kindly agreed  
to let Charles Powell have  
appropriate draft replies to the  
attached. Please address envelope  
Many thanks. to me.

*Kay.*

KAY DOVER

20 June 1984

Queen's Birthday Messages  
from PM of Tunis and the  
to CP 22/6 President of Dominica.

to CP 20/6 Cheddi KLISI, Secy General,  
League of Arab States.



TRP.

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 February 1984

*Dear Peter,*

CALL BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE  
ARAB LEAGUE

---

Mr. Klibi called on the Prime Minister at 0930 today. I enclose a record of the conversation.

*Yours ever*

*Joh. G. G.*

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

*HU*



SUBJECT

de M. Klibi

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AT 0930 HOURS ON FRIDAY 17 FEBRUARY AT 10 DOWNING STREET

Present:

- |                |                             |
|----------------|-----------------------------|
| Prime Minister | Mr. Klibi                   |
| Mr. Coles      | Mr. Omran                   |
| Interpreter    | Other Arab League officials |

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. Klibi said that he was glad to meet the Prime Minister for the third time. In the present circumstances of the Arab world he felt that Britain had a role to play. Our decision to withdraw the British contingent from the Multi-National Force in the Lebanon had been noted and he was not opposed to it. It was to be hoped that the eight-point plan that had been prepared with Saudi assistance would be accepted by all. So far, President Reagan did not appear to be opposed to it. The hope was that it would set in train a process of national reconciliation in the Lebanon and allow that country to find stability and identity. He hoped that the United Kingdom would maintain its support for these efforts.

The Prime Minister explained that she had initially been reluctant to contribute to the MNF because our forces were so stretched but in response to the urgings of the Lebanese Foreign Minister she had agreed to send in a token force. This had been welcomed by the Lebanese people and the British contingent had never become a target. But in the end it had been unable to fulfil its role. The danger of an attempt to close the Shuweifat Gap had given us further food for thought since our contingent was located nearby. So we had moved our contingent to RFA RELIANT and a proportion of it would stay there until the situation was clarified. We had always hoped that a UN force would replace the MNF and would have to see how that idea developed.

/ She had

CONFIDENTIAL



She had considered with interest the eight-point plan which really amounted to a set of eight objectives. It defined the what but not the how. It might be a way of circumventing the 17 May Agreement. Our wish was that Lebanon should continue as a sovereign, independent country.

Mr. Klibi said that the British contingent had behaved very well in the Lebanon and had been respected by all. He was grateful for that help. He had no direct contact with Saudi Arabia or Syria about the eight-point plan but believed there would be an important meeting today in Damascus between President Assad and the Saudi Foreign Minister. He hoped that the Saudis had considered how to implement the plan. They could not do so without United States help because Israel had the power to obstruct implementation. Syria would also have to accept it and implement it. But he believed that the plan responded to all the demands which had been made. Further experience of the Lebanon meant that one could not be too optimistic. The Prime Minister commented that the existence of the eight principles offered new hope at a time of pessimism. This was psychologically important. But the point relating to the withdrawal of foreign troops was itself a very big affair.

Mr. Klibi said that Lebanon could not be entirely free until the basic Palestinian problem had been resolved. He had been grateful for the Prime Minister's letter of 16 December. He recalled that the Arab Committee of 7 had visited the Prime Minister to present the Arab peace plan agreed at Fez. Her reaction then had been positive. But in the West generally the plan had not provoked the interest which it should have. It was a decisive turning point in Arab attitudes to the conflict. For the first time the Arabs had been unanimous in proposing peace to Israel based on peaceful co-existence of all countries in the area and the right of self-determination for the Palestinians.

In her letter the Prime Minister appeared to have reproached the Arab countries for not completely accepting the Reagan plan.

/ The Prime



The Prime Minister showed Mr. Klibi the sentence in her letter which stated that it was a matter of great regret that Israel had rejected the proposals put forward by President Reagan and that King Hussein and the PLO had been unable to agree upon a joint approach to negotiations. She agreed that the underlying Arab/Israeli dispute had to be tackled. We had welcomed the Fez initiative and recognised its significance even though the plan contained one or two points with which we did not wholly agree.

Mr. Klibi said he noted these remarks with satisfaction. What he had said about the Prime Minister's letter was based on an inaccurate summary with which he had been provided that morning. The right to self-determination was the key to peace. He had been glad to hear from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on 15 February that he would consider efforts leading to an initiative, perhaps by the Ten EC Member States, which would give more than theoretical content to Palestinian rights. It was important to convince the United States of this and thus help it to avoid other tragic errors in the area.

He wished to raise the question of the Iraq/Iran conflict. It had lasted too long, was deadly in nature and had shaken the economies of the countries concerned. It could have serious repercussions for other Arab states and there was a danger that the war would develop into a confrontation between the two super powers.

Iraq had agreed to open negotiations in accordance with international law. It remained to convince the other country involved but he feared that Khomeini and his people were not positive to argument.

Efforts should be made to prevent the supply of arms to the region. He hoped the Prime Minister would consider how the United Kingdom, Europe and the West could make a serious contribution to stopping these hostilities. He was concerned about Israel's role in providing arms and certain support which could have a decisive effect.

/ The Prime



The Prime Minister said that she was seriously concerned about the situation. We followed a neutral policy and did not supply lethal equipment, though we had released to Iran two support ships which had been paid for before the war began. Had Mr. Klibi said to Qadhafi or to North Korea what he had just said to her?

The war was being fought with great ruthlessness. She would have thought that the numbers of young men killed on both sides would have been enough to bring them to the peace table.

The problem was to get both sides to accept the good offices of the UN Secretary General. What could be done to persuade Iran in this direction?

Mr. Klibi said that there were three possible courses. First, we should seek to control the supply of arms. Control would be imperfect but the effort must be made. Second, he was not very keen on UN mediation which had not brought positive results but could another kind of mediation be devised?

The Prime Minister said that we understood that Iran had accepted the Secretary-General's proposal for a two-pronged UN motion but that Iraq had rejected this. Mr. Klibi said he would be astonished if Iraq refused mediation. He would make contact with the Iraqis.

The Prime Minister explained that, according to her information, Iraq had appeared to reject the latest proposal of 13 February though it was true that the Iraqi permanent representative in New York had later denied this. It appeared that clarification was necessary.

Mr. Klibi then said that the third course open to us was to apply moral pressure, especially on Iran. Could the European Council at its next summit issue a statement on the war? - even Iran could not ignore moral pressure of this kind.

The Prime Minister said that President Mitterrand would be in the Chair at the European Council but we would give thought



CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

to the matter.

The discussion ended at 1010.

A.J.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 February 1984

Dear John,

Call on the Prime Minister by the Secretary-General of the Arab League: 9.30 am on 17 February

Mr Chedli Klibi, Secretary-General of the Arab League, is to call on the Prime Minister at 9.30 am tomorrow for half an hour. He proposes to be accompanied by his deputy, Mr Adnan Omran (a former Syrian Ambassador to London). I attach briefing for the Prime Minister on the Middle East, covering Arab/Israel, Iran/Iraq and Lebanon, and a personality note on Mr Klibi.

Mr Klibi is calling on Sir Geoffrey Howe this afternoon. He is a regular visitor and has called on the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State's predecessors on a number of occasions. He is in regular touch with (although has little influence with) Arab leaders, and may go to Damascus directly after his visit to London.

Klibi wrote to the Prime Minister on 22 November asking the Europeans to help break the deadlock over Arab/Israel. The Prime Minister replied on 16 December (both letters are annexed to the brief).

Klibi prefers to speak in French; we have arranged French interpretation (Mrs Dennis) for the meeting.

Yours ever,  
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE  
ARAB LEAGUE, MR CHEDLI KLIBI: 9.30 AM ON 17 FEBRUARY

BRIEF: MIDDLE EAST

POINTS TO MAKE

ARAB/ISRAEL

1. Some positive developments - Arafat's meeting with President Mubarak, Egyptian readmission to the Islamic Conference Organisation, prospect of resumed Arafat/Hussein talks - momentum must be maintained. Arab support for Hussein/Arafat talks crucial. UK/Ten committed to continuing active diplomacy in support of a negotiated settlement. (I hope my letter to you of 16 December and Sir G Howe's recent visit to the region reaffirmed this.)

LEBANON

2. Objectives remain a stable independent Lebanon. Will maintain our support for President Gemayel. Urgent need to restore stability in Beirut, resume search for reconciliation.

3. Formula must be found to get around 17 May Agreement. Syrian concerns must be addressed but Syria cannot expect to dictate events in Lebanon. Can Arab League help encourage compromise?

IRAN/IRAQ

4. The War. UK remains impartial; keen to see early end to conflict. Concerned at recent attacks on civilian targets by both sides.

5. Can Arab League persuade Iraqis to accept Secretary-General's proposal for a 2-pronged UN Mission? [On 13 February rejected by Iraq and accepted by Iran.]

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CONFIDENTIAL

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The Arab League is composed of 20 Arab nations (Egypt's membership having been suspended after Camp David), and the PLO. Its main function is to draw together the Arab states in political and economic unity. Its last 'annual' summit meeting at Fez in September 1982 produced the Arab Fez plan on the Palestinian problem implicitly recognising Israel's right to exist. The next Arab Summit, originally scheduled for 31 March, has been postponed indefinitely, apparently at Saudi prompting, because of present Arab disunity. It may also have been delayed to give Arafat and Hussein the chance to come to the Summit meeting with a joint plan for negotiations with Israel.

ARAB/ISRAEL

2. Despite some positive developments - Arafat's meeting with Mubarak in December, Egyptian readmission to the Islamic Conference Organisation in January and Arafat's intention to visit Amman later this month - fundamental problems remain. Arafat's own position is still uncertain and important differences exist even between those elements of the PLO not dominated by Syria. The Palestine National Council ('parliament') which Arafat had hoped to convene in February to confirm his leadership, has been postponed for two or three months, probably to give Arafat time to win over important minority PLO groups. If Arafat resumes his dialogue with Hussein - he says he will go to Amman when Hussein returns there after his present stop-over in London - he may find that he has too restricted a mandate for the talks to succeed. Hussein himself is likely to be cautious and his first concern must be the security of Jordan and his regime. Syria is totally opposed to a Hussein/Arafat initiative and Israel will have nothing to do with Arafat.

/3.

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CONFIDENTIAL

3. Klibi wrote to the Prime Minister on 22 November last year (Annex A) asking her to urge the Ten to launch 'a bold international initiative' on the Middle East at the European Council meeting in Athens from 4-6 December 1983. In her reply of 16 December (Annex B) the Prime Minister explained that although the meeting had been entirely taken up with Community matters, the UK remained committed to the search for a negotiated settlement to the Arab/Israel dispute. Klibi told HMA Tunis that he deeply appreciated the terms in which the Prime Minister's letter was cast. Klibi may however need reminding that, ready as the Europeans are to do what we can to help, it must be for the parties themselves to make the running in the peace process.

LEBANON

4. SITREP (Annex C) on recent military/political developments.

5. The Arab League is not directly involved with the crisis in Lebanon, but Klibi is likely to argue that the 17 May Agreement should be scrapped and that Israel should withdraw her forces unconditionally in accordance with Security Council resolutions. Klibi has also criticised US shelling of Syrian/Druze positions. The Lebanese Government has asked Klibi to arrange a new session of Lebanese/Saudi/Syrian negotiations, but he is dubious about being able to do so.

IRAN/IRAQ

6. The War. After a lull in fighting Iraq has launched missile attacks against a number of Iranian towns. Iran has in turn shelled Basra, and other Iraqi towns and has mounted a land attack in Kurdistan. Iran is likely to mount a major offensive further south in the near future. A dangerous period ahead, particularly if Iraqi reaction to a successful Iranian push involves attacks on Iranian oil installations and shipping. Iran's moves

/unpredictable

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

unpredictable but threat to close Straits of Hormuz remains (recently reiterated by Iranian President). We remain in close touch with Americans and contingency preparations continue (Omani request for increased readiness of UK mine counter measures forces and general message of support to Shaikh Zaid (UAE)).

7. Mediation. The most hopeful prospect continues to be mediation by the UN Secretary-General. He has proposed a two-pronged mission, to update the report of an earlier Mission of Enquiry into civilian casualties and to explore the positions of both Governments. This has been accepted by Iran; we hope that the Iraqis will reconsider their initial refusal and HM Ambassador Baghdad and UKMIS New York are following this up.

CONFIDENTIAL



see (91)

Annex A

(92)

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جمهورية تونس العربية

الأمين العام

Mrs. Prime Minister,

It is for me a pleasure and an honour, on the eve of the European summit, to call your kind attention to the Middle East problem which, as Your Excellency is well aware, is going now through a painful and a dangerous stage. WE would therefore greatly appreciate if this issue could receive careful consideration on the part of the E.E.C. leaders, meeting in Athens, and would lead to a joint declaration reaffirming the clear determination of Europe to contribute to a peace-settlement.

It is only normal that the Mideast, which is so close geographically to Europe and so vital for its economy, should be, for your Community, a question of great concern. The E.E.C. has already made an important step by recognizing the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. Yet, this step has not been followed by any practical move, in addition, by equating Israeli security with Palestinian rights, it did not reflect, even, at that time, the reality of the situation. Today, the irrelevance of such a linkage is all the more obvious, after the invasion of Lebanon, the military occupation of the Southern part of this country and the illegal buildup of colonial settlements in the occupied territories. This linkage is today all the more irrelevant after the annexation by Israel of Al Qods and the Golan Heights, and its systematic pursuit of such policies as starkly violate international law and stand in the way of any peace-initiative, whether originating from the Arab side, the United Nations, Europe or even its U.S. ally.

The E.E.C. leaders are now well aware that Israeli security can hardly be said to be under threat and that Israel has more than the necessary means to checkmate all Arab forces put together, let alone the systematic backing it gets from the U.S. and its nuclear capability. In fact, what is in danger is the security of the Arab States, in particular those of the Near East, who are living under the constant threat of a new aggression. What is even more in danger is the Palestinian people, a people dispossessed of its homeland, exposed to daily persecution, and denied, persistently, its most basic right to self-determination. This is why any further European support to Israel would only contribute to more intransigence and more obstination on the part of Israel to pursue the same policies of hegemony and aggression.

On the other hand, it would be fitting that the Ten E.E.C.-countries set up the real parallelism that the reality of the situation imposes. The PLO and all the Arab States proclaimed in Fez their willingness to participate in finding a comprehensive, negotiated solution to the Mideast crisis while, Israël, as I have already pointed out, continues to reject any peace-plans. The Young Plan, the Rogers Plan, the Reagan Plan, not to mention the Arab Fez Plan.

The aggressor and the aggressed cannot be put on an equal footing. I believe the moment has come for the European Community to fully realise the dangers of this situation, to overcome a too often biased vision of what it believes to be the interests of Israel and to apply



whatever pressures necessary on Israel so that it will renounce its illusory concept of "Eretz Israel" and come round to the only possible solution, i.e., coexistence with a Palestinian state to be established on retrieved occupied territories. Only in this way can there be an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In view of the daunting difficulties now facing the PLO, it might be highly tempting to bet on the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, which is at the core of the conflict. This would mean driving the Palestinians to despair which, you are all certainly aware, is the worst counsellor for frustrated peoples. It is this despair which explains the PLO's present internal struggles. In fact, it is because of Israel's violent and aggressive response to the peaceful discourse of Yasser Arafat that the enemies of the Palestinian leader are now fighting him with obstination and perhaps an apparent credibility.

There can be no doubt - and the European leaders quickly realised this - that the division and, perhaps, fragmentation of the Palestinian movement can only lead the region into unpredictable turmoil, weakening thus any chances for a peaceful settlement.

I am convinced, Mrs. Prime Minister, that under such circumstances, you will spare no possible effort to avert the impending danger. The solution can only come through a bold international initiative - and we believe the E.E.C. has the proper means for that - that would restore Palestinian hope and confidence in international law and, ultimately, put an end to their ordeal.

In conclusion let me express the hope that the E.E.C.-summit will adopt, through a new joint declaration, the position which will properly reflect its concern for world peace and the defense of law and justice. Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Chedli KLIBI

Secretary General  
League of Arab States

Her Excellency  
Mrs Margaret THATCHER  
Prime Minister of Great Britain  
LONDON  
(Great Britain)





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Annex B  
12/11/83  
disposal file

16 December 1983

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OS  
Mr. Foster  
D

Dear Mr. Klibi

I am grateful to you for your letter of 22 November in which you let me have your views on the present situation in the Middle East.

Although the meeting of the European Council in Athens earlier this month was entirely taken up with Community business and there was no discussion of the Middle East, I would like to take this opportunity to assure you that the British Government remains deeply committed to the search for a just and lasting peace settlement. I fully share your concern at the dangers arising from the present stagnation in the peace process. It is a matter of great regret that Israel rejected the proposals put forward by President Reagan on 1 September, 1982 and that King Hussein and the Palestine Liberation Organisation were unable in April to agree a joint approach to negotiations. We all still face the challenge of reconciling Israel's right to exist within secure and recognised borders with the right of the Palestinian people to determine their own future. Otherwise there can be no hope of ending the sufferings of the Palestinians and eliminating the causes of instability and tension in the region. In co-operation with our European partners we shall continue to do whatever we can to assist the parties directly concerned to take the steps necessary towards the peace which we all earnestly desire.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

Monsieur Chedli Klibi

MR CHEDLI KLIBI'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER : 16 FEBRUARY

IRAN/IRAQ : UP-DATE

Iranian Offensive

1. There are reports this morning of what the Iranians claim is the first phase of the expected major new offensive: Val Fajr V. Tehran Radio claims a major attack between Mehran and Dehloran, in the central area north Al Amarah. The Iranian objective is probably one of the main Bahgdad-Basra roads. There are strong Iraqi forces in the area. The attack may be a forerunner of a second thrust further south.

Mediation

2. The Iraqi Permanent Representative at the United Nations informed the UK Deputy Permanent Representative on 15 February that the Iraqi reaction to the UN Secretary-General's proposed two-pronged mission did not amount to rejection of the proposal. The Iraqis are probably urgently reconsidering their response, in the light of the damage that rejection of the mission would do to their position at the UN. We are urging them to accept the mission. The Iranians have already responded positively.

Middle East Department  
16 February 1984



Personality Note

KLIBI, CHEDLI

Tunisian, Secretary General of the League of Arab States since May 1979.

Deputy in Tunisian National Assembly and Mayor of Carthage since 1964. Member of the Political Bureau of the Destour Socialist party since January 1968.

Born at Tunis in 1925. Studied in Tunis and Paris, specialising in philosophy and Arabic literature. Formerly a professor at the Ecole Normale Superieure, also carried on journalistic activities. Held a succession of Ministerial posts dealing with cultural affairs and information from 1972 until November 1973. Designated against his will as Ambassador to Cairo in December 1973 and in fact avoided going there. Appointed Director of the Presidential Cabinet with the rank of Minister in 1974. Minister of Culture in December 1976 and of Information in September 1978. A champion of the use of Arabic in Tunisia.

A superficially unimpressive personality, he has worked hard to make the Secretariat General in Tunis effective, following Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League in 1979. Has pretensions to Pan-Arab Foreign Minister status and is something of an empire-builder. Reasonably well-disposed towards Britain, his characteristically Tunisian moderation is influenced by his need to maintain his acceptability to the hardliners in the League.

Married. Three children.

LEBANON: SITREP 15 FEBRUARY

Military developments

1. Beirut. Following the major fighting of 3-7 February both East and West Beirut are much calmer, with occasional minor clashes along the 'Green Line' dividing East (Christian) and West (Muslim) Beirut. The Lebanese Army (LAF) have been expelled from almost all parts of West Beirut, where the leader of the Shia Militia Amal, Mr Berri, has emerged as de facto civilian and military commander. The Christian Phalange have claimed that Palestinian fighters have reinfiltreated Beirut and helped the Druze and Amal in the recent fighting.
2. Outside Beirut, there has been some fierce fighting since 13 February between the Druze and LAF. Despite artillery support and raids by Lebanese Airforce Hunters (in action for the first time since September 1983), the LAF have lost control of some positions on the Shouf mountain ridge south-east of Beirut and of the area round Khalde to the south of the airport. The Druze have therefore tightened their hold on Beirut and further demoralized the LAF.
3. On 15 February the Israelis deployed elements of two armoured brigades north of the Awali river as far as Damour where there are reports of fighting with Amal/Druze forces. The Israeli aim is presumably to relieve pressure on the LAF in Khalde. Three Katyusha rockets were fired from Southern Lebanon into the Israeli border town of Metullah on 9 February, provoking an Israeli air strike on alleged Palestinian positions in Bhamdoun (east of Beirut) on 10 February. The Israeli Cabinet is considering a plan for a further partial Israeli withdrawal, possibly to the Zahrani River south of Sidon.
4. MNF The Americans have decided that redeployment of US Marines off shore will be completed within 30 days and that US naval firepower will continue to be used as necessary in retaliation for any shelling of Beirut by Syrians/Druze. A US destroyer responded to and succeeded in stopping Druze shelling of US positions on 14 February. The French and Italians have said that they will maintain a presence in Beirut until the UN can take over, /though the



though the Italians intend to reduce their contingent (1400 men), leaving only enough men to guard the Palestinian refugee camps.

#### Political Developments

5. President Gemayel announced on 13 February a new 28 point plan outlining detailed administrative and political changes which he hopes to present officially at a resumed national reconciliation conference in Geneva. This is unlikely to be accepted by his opponents: Walid Jumblatt (Druze) has pressed for President Gemayel's resignation, and Berri (Amal), has suggested that the Lebanese Parliament should pass a constitutional amendment shortening President Gemayel's term of office and calling new Presidential elections in summer 1984. Both are concentrating for the time being on consolidating their hold on West Beirut. They may be prepared to allow Gemayel to stay on if he is prepared to make genuine concessions. The Syrians have not so far endorsed calls for Gemayel's resignation, but are still insisting on abrogation of the 17 May Agreement as a pre-condition of any resumption of the reconciliation process. Two former Lebanese Prime Ministers (Takiyeddin Solh and Selim Al-Hoss) who might be asked to lead a new government were in Damascus on 9/10 February, together with ex-President Franjieh and another ex-Prime Minister Rashid Karame (both members of the National Salvation Front). Gemayel met Franjieh on 14 February and is reportedly engaged in "secret diplomacy" with the Syrians and Saudis. The Saudi mediator Hariri is in Beirut and there are reports, so far unconfirmed, of an 8-point Saudi peace plan which includes renunciation by Gemayel of the 17 May Agreement and a new power-sharing arrangement. Rumsfeld has returned to Washington and is due to go to Israel on 15 February.

6. The 17 May Agreement is still a major sticking point: the US remain unwilling to abandon it (although they have told us that they would continue to support Gemayel if he felt obliged to do so), and appear convinced that heavy shelling of Syrian positions has been helpful in persuading Syria to be flexible. The Israelis have warned against abrogation of the 17 May Agreement, hinting that this would mean some Israeli forces remaining in South Lebanon indefinitely.

UN Forces

7. The French are pursuing their initiative to replace the MNF by a UN force. Their draft resolution will be discussed by the Security Council on 16 February but is likely to founder on Soviet/Syrian demands that the MNF, including naval forces, should withdraw entirely and refrain from further "interference" in Lebanon. The US, while not opposed in principle to wider UN involvement, do not want this confined to replacing the MNF in Beirut. The Italians would like a UN presence to take over guarding of Palestinian refugee camps in their sector. President Gemayel is only likely to accept a UN force if there is no prospect of maintaining an MNF presence. We have suggested more modest steps: better use of the 50 UN observers in Beirut to guard crossing points between East and West Beirut or other important installations, despatch of a Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the area, and expanded use of UNIFIL to cover a further Israeli withdrawal in Southern Lebanon. The Soviet Union have not so far objected to these proposals, though President Gemayel and other Lebanese dislike the idea of UN-manned crossing points which might consecrate the redivision of the city.



bcc Caroline Ryder HL

26 January 1984

Secretary-General of the Arab League

Thank you for your letter of 24 January.  
The Prime Minister could see Mr. Klibi for  
30 minutes at 1715 on 16 February.

JOHN COLES

Now 9.30 on 17 Feb

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



RESTRICTED



Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Marginal. Do you  
want to see him for 30  
minutes at 1515 on 16

London SW1A 2AH

24 January 1984

February:

A.D.C.  $\frac{25}{1}$ .

Yes - mb

Dear John,

Secretary-General of the Arab League

Sir Geoffrey Howe has agreed to receive Mr Chedli Klibi, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, in London at 3 pm on 16 February. Mr Klibi has also asked whether the Prime Minister would be able to see him.

Mr Klibi has previously called on the Prime Minister on a number of occasions, and she will know that he is somewhat uninspiring. However, he is in constant touch with Arab leaders, and will play a prominent role in the run-up to the Arab Summit planned for 31 March. His influence is limited, but, such as it is, he uses it as a force for moderation. His visit to London comes at a time of important developments as moderate Arabs seek to breathe new life into the peace process. As Sir Geoffrey heard during his Middle East tour earlier this month, the moderates are looking to the Europeans to use their influence more actively. Recently fears have been expressed that the Ten have retreated from the position set out in the Venice Declaration. It would therefore be useful to put Klibi right on this. If the Prime Minister did not see him on this visit it might be taken as a signal of declining interest on our part. Sir Geoffrey therefore recommends that the Prime Minister agree to a short courtesy call by Mr Klibi on 16 February.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

5 August 1983

Syria - Supply of IR18 Thermal Imager

The Prime Minister was grateful for your Secretary of State's minute of 29 July. She has also seen the letter from John Holmes to John Coles of 3 August.

Mrs. Thatcher agrees that the earliest date for supply of the IR18 Imager to Syria should be 1987, and that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should arrange for this decision to be presented to the Syrians in the way that he considers best. She also agrees that the IR18 should be supplied to India from 1984.

She has noted that your officials will communicate these decisions to Barr & Stroud.

I am copying this to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

**W. F. S. RICKETT**

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

*fy*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 August 1983

*Dear John,*

*with ER*  
In his minute of 29 July the Secretary of State for Defence said that he had decided that the earliest date for the supply of the IRI8 Therman IMager to Syria must be 1987.

There is no doubt that the decision will be badly received by the Syrians, especially after the long delay. It will be an irritant in our bilateral relations and reduce the chances, such as they are, of our engaging the Syrians in a dialogue. But the Syrian response to the signature of the Israel/Lebanon agreement in May has been consistently negative and President Assad has been unresponsive to overtures by both the Americans and the Ten. Sir Geoffrey Howe agrees with Mr Heseltine that it would be wrong under these circumstances to supply Syria with equipment which could have an immediate impact on the front line capability of her forces. He is content with the decision that the earliest date for the supply of IR18 to Syria should be 1987.

If the Prime Minister is also content with this decision, Sir Geoffrey Howe will wish FCO officials to consider with the MOD how best to present the decision to the Syrians.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever**John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street




Pm: Arab League Delegation

#3

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520



5 AUG 1983

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MO 26/9/4

PRIME MINISTERSYRIA - SUPPLY OF IR18 THERMAL IMAGER

Mr Coles' letter of 21<sup>st</sup> April asked for a more detailed assessment of the security implications of delivering the Barr & Stroud IR18 Thermal Imager to the Syrians in 1985. I am sorry for the delay in replying which was due in part to the General Election but also to my wish to consider once again all the factors having a bearing on the supply of this equipment to Syria, including those arising out of a meeting of my officials with the top management of Barr & Stroud.

2. IR18 is a compact, lightweight, high performance thermal imager capable of seeing by day or night independent of ambient light levels. It can be used for surveillance, detection and weapon control by ground, sea or air forces. It can equally have a civil application for shipping or aircraft or in firefighting. The device was developed as a private venture by Barr & Stroud but incorporates a detector, developed by the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment, Malvern, which will enter service with British Forces in 1984-85 as part of an entirely different equipment manufactured by another company. The technology of the detector is very advanced. The few military sales made to date have all been for evaluation purposes and have been to NATO countries, Sweden and Switzerland. Civil sales, likewise small in number, have included NATO countries, South Korea and Thailand.

3. The main security objection to the sale of IR18 to Syria is that there is no doubt that the Soviets would quickly obtain samples, and this would result in a substantial risk to the capability of all our three Services, together with an increase in the capability of the Warsaw Pact forces.

Prime Minister:

Agree, subject

to the news of

the Foreign &amp; Commonwealth

Secretary?  
(now attached).

JH

1/8





4. As far as is known the Soviet Union does not have any equipment in service fitted with a thermal imager, and it is assessed that British infra-red technology is up to 2 years ahead of equivalent US technology and up to 5 years in advance of that of the USSR. Access to IR18 would also assist the Warsaw Pact to develop counter-measures against UK imagers involving the detection, disruption and destruction of thermal devices. It is considered that Russia will have either mastered IR imaging by 1987 or decided to adopt alternative technology.

5. The Defence Intelligence Service rates Syria as an area of maximum security risk as regards UK technical data. There are currently 5000 Soviet military personnel in Syria (the highest number in any third world country), 3500 of whom are attached to the Syrian Armed Forces to advise on and maintain the Soviet equipment supplied over the last few years, and any one of whom is a potential intelligence link. There are no signs that Syria intends to abandon its close liaison with the USSR.

6. In pressing their case for agreement to the early supply of IR18 to Syria, Barr and Stroud have made much of the argument that much information on the technology employed in IR18 is freely available in the scientific press. While this is undoubtedly true, it is not in itself sufficient to enable the Soviet Union to develop and produce a thermal imager of the capability of the IR18 system. Had they been able to, we believe they would have had something in service by now. In order to understand the technology to a point where they can produce an equipment like the IR18 system the Soviet Union needs physical access to the equipment. Given the large number of Soviet advisers in Syria, this would occur very quickly once Barr & Stroud were allowed to go ahead with the proposed sale.

7. Moreover, I cannot believe that we would wish to consider supplying to this area equipment which would have such an immediate impact on front-line capability until the political situation is



a good deal more stable. The Americans have pressed us strongly not to supply the equipment to Syria because of the effect of doing so on the military situation in the Middle East.

8. This has proved an unusually difficult issue to resolve since our perception of the threat has changed since the prospect of a sale first arose. Earlier in the year we considered that a delivery date of 1985 reflected a reasonable compromise between the commercial and security factors involved. However, having reviewed the matter further I have decided that the earliest date for supply of IR18 to Syria must be 1987.

9. I have however been concerned about the impact of this decision on the firm which has invested considerable effort in the IR18 and which in the absence of a British forces' order needs a sizeable overseas contract to give their equipment "marketing credibility". Syria will clearly not provide the springboard they are seeking in the near future. Barr & Stroud believe, however, that they have good prospects of selling the IR18 to India and, having taken account of the security factors, I have decided to authorise the supply of the IR18 to India from 1984, not 1985 as had been stipulated previously. I believe that this decision will go a long way to softening the blow of my decision on Syria.

10. I am copying this letter to Geoffrey Howe. Provided you and he are content with my decision, the FCO will arrange for our Ambassador in Damascus to inform the Syrian Foreign Minister. My people will be in touch with Barr & Stroud. A copy also goes to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence  
29th July 1983



PM: PM's meeting with ARAB League Delegation ●  
Pt 3.

11 AUG 1955





bc: Sir A. Parsons

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

B/11

21 April 1983

SYRIA - SUPPLY OF IR18 THERMAL IMAGER

I enclose a copy of a letter from John Holmes recording the view of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, with which I believe your Ministers are in agreement, that we should tell the Syrians that we are now prepared to agree to supply this equipment, with deliveries commencing in 1985.

Before putting this to the Prime Minister, it will be useful to have a rather more detailed assessment of the security implications of delivering this equipment to the Syrians in 1985. I take it that we must assume that any such equipment given to the Syrians will readily become available to the Soviet Union. This is a point to which the Prime Minister is likely to attach particular importance, and it would therefore be helpful to have your considered assessment of the security aspects.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

ALCOLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

4




MR. COLES

SYRIA - SUPPLY OF IR18 THERMAL IMAGER

I cannot say that I am entirely happy about John Holmes' letter to you of 20 April. The plain fact is that to let the Syrians have military equipment is precisely the same as delivering it to the Soviet Union. We should, therefore, be one hundred percent sure that there would be no security implication even if we held up delivery until 1985.

If this were an important sale which indicated that the Syrians might be disposed to release themselves from the Soviet grip, a marginal risk might be worth taking. But it is not. Hence, the argumentation in the last paragraph of John Holmes' letter is unconvincing to say the least. In a military sense, Syria has already turned completely to the Soviet Union. To describe their policies on Arab/Israel as "hardly helpful" is a gross understatement. All that a continued refusal on our part will do is provoke further sporadic badgering from Khaddam. Surely we can live with that.



A.D. PARSONS  
20 April 1983

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not put to PM. cc RJ ①



Prime Minister

This equipment is a tank sight which provides night vision.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agree that we should tell Syria we will supply it, beginning in 1985?

20 April 1983

A.S.C. <sup>20</sup>/<sub>4</sub>

Dear Idun,

Syria - Supply of IR18 Thermal Imager

In your letter of 18 March you reported a conversation between Mr Khaddam, the Syrian Foreign Minister, and the Prime Minister, during the recent Arab League visit. Mr Khaddam had raised the question of the supply to Syria of thermal imaging equipment which the UK had at one stage agreed to provide but since refused (he also raised it with Mr Pym). You asked for the background and advice on how a reply should be sent to Mr Khaddam. I am sorry that it has taken some time for us and the MOD to look into this.

The IR18 Thermal Imager incorporates very advanced technology which could be jeopardised by a sale to Syria, a country considered to present an extremely high risk of compromise to the Soviet Union. Over the last two years increased awareness in the West of the importance of such technology has led to a more restrictive attitude on the part of the Ministry of Defence. As a result it has been necessary to be less forthcoming on some of the high risk items than in the past.

As a result of this high-level approach by the Syrians the matter has again been considered by MOD Ministers. They have now agreed that a sale may proceed, on condition that no deliveries be made before 1985. This timetable is necessary to protect the lead which it is assessed the UK currently has over the Soviet Union in infra-red technology (some five years, but MOD are prepared to agree to 1985). This is unlikely to be welcomed by the Syrians or by Barr and Stroud, the manufacturer; but MOD are not prepared to permit any further relaxation of their position.

In the light of this revised MOD view, Mr Pym believes that we should now tell the Syrians that we are prepared to agree to supply, with deliveries commencing in 1985. This would be helpful in terms of our relations with Syria and our aim of preventing them from turning completely to the Soviet Union. Their current

/policies

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policies on Arab/Israel are hardly helpful but they will not be improved by further isolation. As far as replying to Khaddam is concerned, Mr Pym thinks that this would be best done through our Ambassador. Apart from anything else, this would give him a (rare) opportunity to see Khaddam.

Yours ever  
*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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PM: Meetings with Arab  
League Pt 3

1981

1981



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HL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

18 April 1983

Contacts with the PLO

Thank you for your letter of 15 April. I have informed the Prime Minister that Mr. Hurd will be meeting Mr. Qaddumi later this week in Tunis. Mrs. Thatcher has noted this fact.

JC

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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24



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1983

Prime Minister

To note.

A.J.C.  $\frac{15}{4}$

Dear Sir,

Contacts with the PLO

In your letter of 19 January, you informed us of the Prime Minister's agreement that Arafat should be told that we could envisage a meeting between Mr Hurd and Qaddumi in a foreign capital either at the same time as the Arab League Delegation visit to London or after that visit.

We informed Arafat, and a number of Arab leaders concerned with the Arab League visit, of this proposal at the time. As you know, Mr Pym said, in response to a question during his press conference in Riyadh, that such a meeting was possible. The PLO have now asked for a meeting between Mr Hurd and Qaddumi during Mr Hurd's visit to Tunis (on bilateral business) from 20 - 22 April. We have agreed, and are making arrangements for the meeting.

Your ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

J E Holmes

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



PM. 142

Arab Kazer Sebata




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PART 3 begins:-

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