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CONFIDENTIAL FILING

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO
NATO, FEBRUARY 1988

PM TOURS

SEPTEMBER 1987

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cc Flo.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 February, 1988.

Dear Michael

Thank you very much indeed for making the arrangements for my visit to NATO and SHAPE, and in particular for the very useful lunch discussion with Peter Carrington, General Galvin and others. As you know, I left Brussels somewhat concerned about the prospects for the Summit, a concern not lessened by Chancellor Kohl's visit to Washington and the apparent readiness of the Americans to settle for modest objectives and language on modernisation of nuclear weapons. It would be interesting to know whether General Galvin regards the language now proposed as enough.

It was very good to see Traute again and please thank her for the delicious lunch — superb .

I look forward to seeing you both next week.

Yours ever

Raymond

Sir Michael Alexander, K.C.M.G.

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

JD
file

THE PRIME MINISTER

18 February 1988

Dear Peter,

Thank you very much for arranging for me to have a discussion with the North Atlantic Council yesterday. I thought it best to be direct with them, probably more so than they are used to. But it seems to me that we must flush out the real issues and not let them take refuge behind verbiage.

The most useful part was the opportunity to talk to you about the prospects for the Summit. The difficulties over agreeing a Declaration are obviously greater than I thought, and it is going to call for a major effort to get something worthwhile. I hope you will let me know direct if you think there is anything particular that I can do to help, such as a message to some of the other Heads of Government.

I look forward to seeing you again at the Summit.

Yours
Laurie

Raymond

The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington, KG, CH, GCMG, MC.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



JB
Lee

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

18 February 1988

Dear General Galvin,


Thank you very much for inviting me to visit SHAPE yesterday. I found it a highly valuable and instructive visit, and would be grateful if you would pass on my gratitude to all the members of your staff involved. I hope that my visit will serve to underline the tremendous importance which we attach to NATO and to maintaining its strength.

I particularly appreciated the opportunity to continue our talks and to get a clear idea of what you would like to see come out of the forthcoming Summit. We will do our best for you.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

General Galvin

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>2448/1</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

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MR. INGHAM

PRIME MINISTER

PRESS ARRANGEMENTS FOR YOUR VISIT TO NATO AND SHAPE, 17 FEBRUARY

You will be met at Abelag military airport by Michael Alexander.

There are no press facilities there.

At NATO Headquarters you will be met at the steps to the main entrance by Lord Carrington. He will introduce you, inside the lobby, to his deputy Marchella Guidi (Italian); Chairman of the Military Committee, General Altenburg (German) and the Senior Permanent Representative, Osman Olcay (Turkish). The press will be present and will expect you to pose briefly with Lord Carrington before you proceed further inside the building.

Michael Alexander will take you to his office for private briefing before introducing you to a number of the British delegation staff. A private NATO photographer will be present to cover some of the introductions.

Michael Alexander will then take you to call on Lord Carrington. Charles will also be present. No press.

Afterwards Lord Carrington and Michael Alexander will lead you to Conference Room One for a meeting of the North Atlantic Council of Permanent Representatives. On arrival you will be taken around the table and introduced to each Permanent Representative, in alphabetical order. A pool of cameramen and photographers will be present for the introductions and then for a further three minutes before business formally begins.

At the end of the Council meeting you will have 10 minutes to gather your thoughts in an adjoining private room before the press conference.

The press conference will be held in the main NATO press theatre. Forty-five minutes has been allocated. There is an option to use the last 10-15 minutes for one TV and one radio interview if desired.

After lunch with Michael Alexander you will be taken to SHAPE by helicopter. General Galvin will be at the lunch and in the helicopter with you. You will be met on arrival by the Deputy


Allied Commander, General Sir John Akehurst, and the British Military Representative, Air Commodore Osborn.

General Galvin will introduce you to the other national military representatives and escort you to the steps to view a guard of honour in front of the main building. You will then be invited to inspect the guard of honour which will consist of a representative from each NATO nation. Press will be present for the whole ceremony.

Afterwards General Galvin will introduce you to some of the senior staff. You will also have the opportunity, if you choose, to pause and say a few words as you pass by a group of SHAPE children before entering the building.

General Galvin will then lead you upstairs where you will have a brief opportunity to freshen up before a briefing session by senior SHAPE officers. The session will consist of a series of short briefings on current issues rather than an overall briefing. In addition to General Galvin and General Akehurst, it will be attended by General Reed (American Chief of Staff), General Einler (German Deputy Saceur), Min Gelber (American Political Adviser) and Vice Admiral Rosso (Italian Deputy Chief of Staff).

You will leave from Chevres military airfield. There will be no press facilities there.



MICHAEL BATES
PRESS OFFICE
15 February 1988

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PRIME MINISTER

cc Mr. Ingham

VISIT TO NATO AND SHAPE: 17 FEBRUARY

You are to pay a visit on Wednesday to NATO HQ in Brussels and SHAPE in Mons. The programme is as follows:

0725 Depart Northolt by HS125
0925 Arrive Brussels
0930 Visit UK Delegation to NATO
0955-1025 Meeting with Lord Carrington
1030-1150 Address to NATO Council
(Permanent Representatives +2, i.e. a total of some 50/60 people) followed by discussion
1200-1245 Press Conference and TV interviews
1315 Lunch given by Michael Alexander (attended by Lord Carrington, General Galvin and the three major military commanders)
1445 Depart by helicopter for SHAPE with General Galvin
1510 Arrive SHAPE. Inspect Guard of Honour (front rank only) and meet senior staff
1530 Briefing and discussion in SACEUR's office (see attached note)
1700 Depart SHAPE by helicopter
1715 Take-off from Chievres Air Base by HS125
1720 Arrive Northolt

The main purposes of the visit are:

- to underline and draw attention to NATO's importance;
- to prepare the ground for a successful NATO Summit (and discuss the handling of it with Lord Carrington);
- to set out British views on current defence and arms control issues;

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- to consult with senior NATO officials and military commanders.

The main themes to which you want to draw attention are covered in the draft speech which I have given you separately. As well as using this in the NATO Council, you will want to draw upon it in your press conference and TV interviews (and Bernard should also be able to use it in briefing the press). Your theme will be that Gorbachev's charm offensive must not blind us to the need to maintain the link between Europe and the United States through NATO, to keep our defences strong and to modernise and update NATO's weapons including its nuclear weapons. You will also want to counter suggestions that Britain is not giving a strong lead in developing the European pillar of NATO. What is needed most is practical action to draw those countries who are not members of the integrated military structure into closer military co-operation with NATO. You have advanced major proposals for this - to the French - which you want to see followed up: but all within a broad US/European framework.

C.D.P.

(C.D. POWELL)

12 February 1988

DCAAGO

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cell
GR



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 February 1988

GD
17/2

20
Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's visit to SHAPE: 17 February

/ I enclose a programme giving full details of the Prime Minister's visit to SHAPE on the afternoon of Wednesday 17 February.

Yours ever,

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
 Telephone 01-~~3307622~~ 218 2111/3

MO 25/3/4L

11th February 1988

COP 13/2

Dear Charles,

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NATO

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 9th February to Lyn Parker enclosing speaking notes for the Prime Minister to use during her visit to NATO. These have been discussed between officials here and in the FCO, and I understand that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's office will be letting you have some suggested amendments, with which we agree, covering a number of points, notably on the passages dealing with burdensharing and negotiations on SNF. *at flap*

We for our part have three amendments to suggest, which in turn have been agreed with FCO officials, as follows:

- a. Page 5, 4th turet. Amend second sentence to read, "from time to time alternative strategies are canvassed such as returning to the 'tripwire' theory of deterrence or, more recently, adopting a nuclear warfighting posture" (NATO already has a capability to engage in nuclear warfighting, but has chosen not to interpret flexible response in this way).
- b. Page 6, first turet. The NPG is currently conducting studies into the force adjustments necessary as a result of the INF agreement; it would be preferable for the Prime Minister not to commit herself, in advance, to advocating a particular outcome. Lance modernisation is a separate issue and we do not yet know what system is likely to be available as a replacement. We would therefore prefer to avoid the specific references and amend to read: "the need to maintain the credibility of the nuclear deterrent in the wake of the INF Agreement means that we must push ahead with ensuring that our remaining nuclear forces are deployed to best effect and timely decisions taken to modernise them where necessary. You cannot deter with an inadequate or out of date deterrent". Delete last two sentences.

Charles Powell Esq
 10 Downing Street



c. Page 7, second turet. This does not quite reflect the Prime Minister's letter to President Mitterrand, which did not suggest French exercises on the Central Front (these already take place). Amend second sentence to read: "I have recently put some proposals to President Mitterrand about ways in which France could be more closely associated with our collective defence arrangements so that NATO Commanders could take greater account of French forces in their plans; for example more active involvement in the forward defence of FRG. We ourselves have for some time had contingency plans with France for the use of their ports and airfields for deploying British reinforcements to FRG; and I have suggested that we now hold live exercises to test these plans".

I am copying this letter to Lyn Parker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Your sincerely,
Brian Hawtin

(B R HAWTIN)
Private Secretary

Pm Tours. Nato visit..

SEP 87



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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

File SM
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From the Private Secretary

9 February 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NATO

It has been agreed that, during her visit to NATO, the Prime Minister will address the North Atlantic Council. I enclose a copy of some speaking notes which the Prime Minister has elected to work on. She is generally content with them but wants to think over some of the issues. In the meantime it would be helpful to have comments from you and the MOD and from Sir Michael Alexander. I should be grateful if you would send him a copy. If it were possible to let me have comments in Brussels by the end of the week that would enable me to let the Prime Minister have a clean text for the weekend.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence).

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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ADDRESS TO NATO COUNCILWHY I HAVE COME

- Come here as a passionate believer in the NATO Alliance and its vital role in defending freedom;
- want my visit and the forthcoming NATO Summit to underline the Alliance's continuing importance;
- that Summit should give our own people and the world a clear message of confidence and determination;
- fitting that the Summit should take place in the final year of a United States Presidency which done more than any other both to strengthen the West's defences and to make a start on reducing the burden of arms. Particular tribute to President Reagan, to Casper Weinberger (whom we have honoured and whom I am told is known in Washington as Knight-Cap) and to General Rogers;
- also wanted to come while Lord Carrington still here and thank him for the remarkable job he has done as Secretary-General;

THE PROBLEMS FACING NATO

- have no hesitation in defining the most difficult problem facing NATO as the new-look Soviet style under Mr Gorbachev;
- in one sense he is what we have always sought. A Soviet leader who wants to reduce the burden of military spending on the Soviet economy, and allow the Soviet citizen more freedom and more choice;
- and indeed there is much that we can and should welcome. Having probably spent more time talking to him than anyone else in the West, I believe that he is genuinely

seeking change in the Soviet Union and deserves our support in his bold and courageous reform policies. If they add even a little to the sum total of human freedom, that must be good;

- whatever our thoughts about what he is doing at home we must as an Alliance come to a clear judgement of his objectives abroad. We have to remind ourselves that we are dealing with a convinced and committed communist. Moreover, we must not mistake flexibility and opportunism for change in substance. The fact is that Soviet external policies continue to pose a serious challenge to us, indeed in some ways a more serious challenge than before;
- the long term aim to change the balance of power - the so-called correlation of forces - in Soviet favour has not altered. The central objective remains to establish a dominant influence over Western Europe. The means to this end are Soviet military power, a power vastly in excess of what is needed for defensive purposes, and the use of that power to exert steady politico/military pressure. Coupled with that comes a diplomacy which is more flexible and seductive than in the past, but which is directed to the same long term goals - the separation of the United States from Western Europe, the dissolution of Alliance unity and the lowering of Alliance defences. A denuclearised Europe facing Soviet conventional strength - for that is what he seeks - would be in a position of fatal inferiority;
- at the same time the Soviet Union is succeeding in producing an image of reasonableness, of desire to reduce tensions, of willingness to rid the world of nuclear weapons, which is having a telling effect on opinion in the West. The Russian bear was easier to deal with when it looked like a bear and sounded like a bear. The natural desires of free societies are turned against them - their aspirations for peace, their hope for arms

reductions, their revulsion from the concept of permanent struggle with another society - all these are exploited in order to restrict opportunity and sell one-sided arms control agreements which erode our security;

- the risk is that, unless we constantly and convincingly remind our people of the dangers in the face of this new and more sophisticated Soviet approach, they will come to believe that the risk from the East has receded and that NATO has served its purpose and that we can relax our guard;
- there are two further aspects of the situation facing NATO which I want to underline;
- first, while the main threat to our security continues to come in Europe - and after all it is only Europe which is exposed to the threat of invasion - no-one is going to invade the United States or the Soviet Union - we cannot neglect the challenge to Western interests outside the NATO area. Here we must expect a continuing Soviet policy of opportunism. This is bound to raise the question whether we can really continue - as NATO - to act as though the world outside the NATO area as strictly defined - does not exist;
- second, I have spoken of the continuing threat that we face from Soviet power. We should not forget the dangers which we could face from instability in Eastern Europe. There can be no doubt that a crisis threatens in Eastern Europe. There have already been signs of unrest in some of the countries. The East European economies are in disrepair (even Hungary, normally quoted as a relative success story, has the highest indebtedness in the world). People are increasingly alienated from Communism and the Communist system. At the same time, perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union are likely to encourage dissent in Eastern Europe. This is a potentially explosive mixture which must be of great concern to the

Soviet Union. If an explosion comes, I have no doubt that the Soviet Union will intervene directly and militarily to suppress it. But that would spell the end of Mr Gorbachev's experiment in the Soviet Union;

- that in turn could lead to a return to more threatening and aggressive Soviet policies towards the West. It is a reminder that, as we contemplate arms control negotiations, we need always to bear in mind the possibility that the Soviet Union could quickly revert to more hostile and aggressive policies. We must not reduce our defences in such a way that we leave ourselves vulnerable to such a development.

HOW NATO SHOULD RESPOND

- my conclusion is that NATO now faces a much more complex situation and one in which the political unity and resolve of the Alliance is as important as its military strength;
- on the political level, we need to remember that NATO was created not just to prevent a Soviet invasion of Western Europe but to create an organic link between Europe and the United States. Our first priority must be to preserve that link. It will require that Congress and the Administration continue to recognise that the United States' own security depends on Europe remaining free. It will require Europe to recognise that the burdens of defending the free world which the United States has shouldered for over 40 years - for which we are deeply grateful - continue to grow. The continued commitment of the United States to Europe will depend on how far we in Europe demonstrate willingness to bear a fair share of those burdens, both in Europe itself and outside the NATO area. Many of us are, for instance, present in the Gulf. But we shall need to do more than that. I would observe that Britain has troops - in garrisons, giving training, on loan - in over 30 countries round the world;

- second, we must continue to convince our people of the need to maintain strong defences. The INF agreement gives us a telling argument: it showed that the best way to achieve balanced reductions in arms is for NATO to keep its defences strong and to show firmness and resolve;

- but it also requires difficult choices particularly when it comes to spending on defence. I am proud to say that our defence spending in Britain has increased by over 20 per cent in real terms since 1979, even though it has now flattened out. But overall one has to admit that the record of NATO's members has been uneven.

- third, as part of maintaining strong defence, we need to ensure that NATO continues to hold the technological edge over the Warsaw Pact. That is one reason why I believe the SDI research programme is vital and I hope it will be pursued by the next American Administration;

- fourth, we must maintain NATO's strategy of flexible response. From time to time alternative strategies are canvassed such as moving to the "tripwire" theory of deterrence or, more recently, developing a nuclear war-fighting capability. None of these are realistic. But flexible response must be credible, which means we must retain the full range of capabilities needed to sustain it;

- in particular, we shall always need a nuclear element. There will never be enough money - or for that matter enough space - in Western Europe for a conventional capability adequate to defend ourselves against the Soviet threat. Dreams of a nuclear-free world are just that: dreams. We need to remind those who talk about the risks of the nuclear deterrent of the risks of failure to

deter;

- the need to maintain the credibility of the nuclear deterrent means that we must push ahead with the modernisation of NATO's nuclear weapons in the wake of the INF agreement. You cannot deter with an inadequate or out-of-date deterrent. That to my mind will mean more dual-capable aircraft in Europe, commitment of some United States SLCMs to SACEUR and modernisation of LANCE. Those decisions should be taken soon;

- fifth, while seeking improved East/West relations, we must set ourselves very clear objectives in arms control negotiations and not allow ourselves to get swept along on a tide of self-serving Soviet proposals. In the first place, there are the negotiations for 50 per cent reductions in United States and Soviet nuclear weapons. The implications for our security of a START agreement go far beyond those of the INF agreement. It must be a good agreement rather than one negotiated to meet a deadline. Particular care will be needed on verification, and on any limits on the United States submarine-launched deterrent. These negotiations will not of course affect the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent which we are modernising with Trident;

- it is my clear view that NATO should not embark on any new negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe before substantive results have been achieved in the chemical and conventional weapons' negotiations. I have no doubt that the Russians would seek to enlarge any negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe to bring in NATO's dual-capable aircraft, to further their goal of a denuclearised Europe;

- and sixth, we need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Any steps to strengthen co-operation in Europe should be set in the framework of strengthening NATO rather than creating alternative structures and

institutions which might in the longer-term undermine it. That is the spirit in which we approach the efforts being made to strengthen WEU, although we are disappointed that there is still not agreement to site its institutions where they could be most effective, that is alongside NATO here in Brussels. We also support the work of the Independent European Programme Group to achieve cost-effective collaboration in equipment procurement. That is going to be ever more vital if the taxpayers in all our countries are going to get real value for money for what they contribute to defence;

- finally, I hope that those countries which are not members of NATO's integrated military structure will find ways to increase their practical military co-operation with the rest of us. I have recently put some proposals to President Mitterrand - suggesting for instance that French forces might be deployed to exercise with other NATO forces on the central front, that we should exercise our reinforcement plans through the Channel ports and French airfields and allow NATO commanders to take account of French forces in making their plans. I very much hope that these ideas will be followed up and bear fruit;

CONCLUSION

- now that sets out my thoughts on the situation confronting NATO as we approach our first Summit for six years. I have been quite blunt but that is my way. I look forward to a discussion in which I hope you will be no less direct. Our aim must be to ensure that Summit sends out the right message: a message of unity, confidence and strength.

NATO Document

The NATO document which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of NATO and as the originators they reserve ownership of the documents they issue. NATO documents are, therefore, not public records even when they are kept in UK government records. When released they will be available in the NATO Archives in Brussels.

Document Reference: 20/50/SHGCP/88

Document Title: Visit to SHAPE by the Rt Honourable Margaret Thatcher FRS, MP, The British Prime Minister, on 17 February 1988.

Document Date: 8 February 1988

Destruction Date: 2 June 2016

Signed


J. Gray

Date

2/6/2016

PREM Records Team

WELCOMING CEREMONY
(Fine Weather)




ROPES
NATO, SHAPE AND NATIONAL FLAGS - XXX

A - PRIME MINISTER
B - SACEUR
C - HONOUR GUARD
COMMANDER

1 POSITION ON ARRIVAL
2 POSITION DURING REVIEW


WELCOME CEREMONY INCLEMENT WEATHER PROGRAM



**NOTE: Additional media area
on balcony**

CURTAINS

FLAGS



MR INGHAM

MR POWELL

ACDRE OSBORN

MR BATES

MGEN PATTEE

MIN GELBER

AMB ALEXANDER

GEN EIMLER

GEN GALVIN

MRS THATCHER

GEN AKEHURST

GEN REED


VADM ROSSO

BRIEFERS
VADM GRAYDON
MGEN DELIEGE
ACDRE WILLIS
BGEN BROICHER


(Briefer)

RADM WEATHERALL

SCREENS



CONFIDENTIAL

MR POWELL 

8 February 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S ADDRESS TO THE NATO COUNCIL

The draft is fine, but it leaves the impression at one or two points, eg the second paragraph of page 2 and the second paragraph on page 3, that the most acute challenge to us comes out of area. I do not think this is the case. The Russians would not, of course, fail to pick up an easy trick in the Third World if it was offered to them; but they are currently very cautious and insofar as their policy has changed in these territories it has changed in the direction of softening. For example, in Angola they are rather reluctantly making up Angolan losses in arms but are tilting more in the direction of a negotiated settlement. In South Africa they may be discouraging the ANC from violence. Against this, they are pursuing steadily and more skilfully their long term aims in Western Europe. This is the area of real threat. If Western Europe were to fall under pre-dominant Soviet influence the game would be lost.

I have suggested one or two changes, mainly to meet the above points.


PERCY CRADOCK

CONFIDENTIAL

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DS2AFD
file

bc = PC

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT TO NATO

When you visit NATO on 17 February, you are to attend a meeting of the NATO Council (the Permanent Representatives) chaired by Lord Carrington. The idea is that you should speak to them for 15/20 minutes and there should be 30/40 minutes of discussion.

I attach a letter to you from Michael Alexander in which he sets out the background. He also encloses a draft speaking note for you to use at the meeting.

It may provide all that you need. But I doubt that you will actually want to read out a speech. I have therefore prepared an alternative introduction in note form, including a number of your views which are not reflected in Michael's note.

It would be helpful to have an idea of what further work you would like done on this.

C D POWELL

6 February 1988

DS2AFD

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ADDRESS TO NATO COUNCIL

WHY I HAVE COME

- Come here as a passionate believer in the NATO Alliance and its vital role in defending freedom;
- want my visit and the forthcoming NATO Summit to underline the Alliance's continuing importance;
- that Summit should give our own people and the world a clear message of confidence and determination;
- fitting that the Summit should take place in the final year of a United States Presidency which done more than any other both to strengthen the West's defences and to make a start on reducing the burden of arms. Particular tribute to President Reagan, to Casper Weinberger (whom we have honoured and whom I am told is known in Washington as Knight-Cap) and to General Rogers;
- also wanted to come while Lord Carrington still here and thank him for the remarkable job he has done as Secretary-General;

THE PROBLEMS FACING NATO

- have no hesitation in defining the most difficult problem facing NATO as the new-look Soviet style under Mr Gorbachev;
- in one sense he is what we have always sought. A Soviet leader who wanted to reduce the burden of military spending on the Soviet economy, allow more freedom, consign to history the absurd doctrine of the inevitable triumph of communism;
- and indeed there is much that we can and should welcome. Having probably spent more time talking to him than

anyone else in the West, I believe that he is genuinely seeking change in the Soviet Union and deserves our support in his bold and courageous reform policies. If they add even a little to the sum total of human freedom, that must be good;

- but we have to remind ourselves that we are dealing with a convinced and committed Communist. Moreover, we must not mistake flexibility and opportunism for change in substance. The fact is that Soviet external policies continue to pose a serious challenge to us, indeed in some ways a more serious challenge than before, in Ethiopia and Angola, in Central America, in the Middle East and in South East Asia;
- at the same time the Soviet Union is succeeding in projecting an image of reasonableness, of desire to reduce tensions, of willingness to rid the world of nuclear weapons, which is having a telling effect on opinion in the West. The Russian bear was easier to deal with when it looked like a bear and sounded like a bear;
- but the threat amounts of course to much more than just a more attractive gloss on Soviet policies. It comes first from the reality of Soviet military power and the readiness to use it worldwide. It comes from continuing subversion. It comes from a determination to use political and psychological pressures to separate the United States from Europe. It comes from their determination to exploit the natural desire of free societies to disarm in order to pressure us into accepting one-sided arms control agreements which would undermine our defences. I have in mind their objective of the denuclearisation of Europe;
- the risk is that, unless we constantly and convincingly remind our people of the dangers in the face of this new and more sophisticated Soviet approach, they will come to believe that the risk from the East has receded and that

NATO has served its purpose and that we can relax our guard;

- there are two further aspects of the situation facing NATO which I want to underline;

- first, while the main threat to our security continues to come in Europe - and after all it is only Europe which is exposed to the threat of invasion: no-one is going to invade the United States or the Soviet Union - more and more we can expect direct challenges to Western interests outside the NATO area. This is bound to raise the question whether we can really continue - as NATO - to act as though the world outside the NATO area as strictly defined does not exist;

- second, I have spoken of the continuing threat that we face from Soviet power. We should not forget the dangers which we could face from instability in Eastern Europe. There can be no doubt that a crisis threatens in Eastern Europe. There have already been signs of unrest in some of the countries. The East European economies are in disrepair (even Hungary, normally quoted as a relative success story, has the highest indebtedness in the world). People are increasingly alienated from Communism and the Communist system. At the same time, perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union are likely to encourage dissent in Eastern Europe. This is a potentially explosive mixture which must be of great concern to the Soviet Union. If an explosion comes, I have no doubt that the Soviet Union will intervene directly and militarily to suppress it. But that would spell the end of Mr Gorbachev's experiment in the Soviet Union. It could lead to a return to more threatening and aggressive Soviet policies towards the West. That is a danger which we must guard against in our approach to any proposal to reduce our defences;

HOW NATO SHOULD RESPOND

- my conclusion is that NATO now faces a much more complex situation and one in which the political unity and resolve of the Alliance is as important as its military strength;

- on the political level, we need to remember that NATO was created not just to prevent a Soviet invasion of Western Europe but to create an organic link between Europe and the United States. Our first priority must be to preserve that link. It will require that Congress and the Administration continue to recognise that the United States' own security depends on Europe remaining free. It will require Europe to recognise that the burdens of defending the free world which the United States has shouldered for over 40 years - for which we are deeply grateful - continue to grow. The continued commitment of the United States to Europe will depend on how far we in Europe demonstrate willingness to bear a fair share of those burdens, both in Europe itself and outside the NATO area. Many of us are, for instance, present in the Gulf. But we shall need to do more than that. I would observe that Britain has troops - in garrisons, giving training, on loan - in over 30 countries round the world;

- second, we must continue to convince our people of the need to maintain strong defences. The INF agreement gives us a telling argument: it showed that the best way to achieve balanced reductions in arms is for NATO to keep its defences strong and to show firmness and resolve;

- but it also requires difficult choices particularly when it comes to spending on defence. I am proud to say that our defence spending in Britain has increased by over 20 per cent in real terms since 1979, even though it has now flattened out. The United States has been exemplary.

Elsewhere in NATO the record is, to say the least, uneven;

- third, as part of maintaining strong defence, we need to ensure that NATO continues to hold the technological edge over the Warsaw Pact. That is one reason why I believe the SDI research programme is vital and I hope it will be pursued by the next American Administration;
- fourth, we must maintain NATO's strategy of flexible response. From time to time alternative strategies are canvassed such as moving to the "tripwire" theory of deterrence or, more recently, developing a nuclear war-fighting capability. None of these are realistic. But flexible response must be credible, which means we must retain the full range of capabilities needed to sustain it;
- in particular, we shall always need a nuclear element. There will never be enough money - or for that matter enough space - in Western Europe for a conventional capability adequate to defend ourselves against the Soviet threat. Dreams of a nuclear-free world are just that: dreams. We need to remind those who talk about the risks of the nuclear deterrent of the risks of failure to deter;
- the need to maintain the credibility of the nuclear deterrent means that we must push ahead with the modernisation of NATO's nuclear weapons in the wake of the INF agreement. You cannot deter with an inadequate or out-of-date deterrent. That to my mind will mean more dual-capable aircraft in Europe, commitment of some United States SLCMs to SACEUR and modernisation of LANCE. Those decisions should be taken soon;
- fifth, while seeking improved East/West relations, we must set ourselves very clear objectives in arms control negotiations and not allow ourselves to get swept along

on a tide of self-serving Soviet proposals. In the first place, there are the negotiations for 50 per cent reductions in United States and Soviet nuclear weapons. The implications for our security of a START agreement go far beyond those of the INF agreement. It must be a good agreement rather than one negotiated to meet a deadline. Particular care will be needed on verification, and on any limits on the United States submarine-launched deterrent. These negotiations will not of course affect the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent which we are modernising with Trident;

- it is my clear view that NATO should not embark on any new negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe before substantive results have been achieved in the chemical and conventional weapons' negotiations. I have no doubt that the Russians would seek to enlarge any negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe to bring in NATO's dual-capable aircraft, to further their goal of a denuclearised Europe;
- and sixth, we need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Any steps to strengthen co-operation in Europe should be set in the framework of strengthening NATO rather than creating alternative structures and institutions which might in the longer-term undermine it. That is the spirit in which we approach the efforts being made to strengthen WEU, although we are disappointed that there is still not agreement to site its institutions where they could be most effective, that is alongside NATO here in Brussels. We also support the work of the Independent European Programme Group to achieve cost-effective collaboration in equipment procurement. That is going to be ever more vital if the taxpayers in all our countries are going to get real value for money for what they contribute to defence;
- finally, I hope that those countries which are not members of NATO's integrated military structure will find

ways to increase their practical military co-operation with the rest of us. I have recently put some proposals to President Mitterrand - suggesting for instance that French forces might be deployed to exercise with other NATO forces on the central front, that we should exercise our reinforcement plans through the Channel ports and French airfields and allow NATO commanders to take account of French forces in making their plans. I very much hope that these ideas will be followed up and bear fruit;

CONCLUSION

- now that sets out my thoughts on the situation confronting NATO as we approach our first Summit for six years. I have been quite blunt but that is my way. I look forward to a discussion in which I hope you will be no less direct. Our aim must be to ensure that Summit sends out the right message: a message of unity, confidence and strength.

cc PE
✓ GR.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 January 1988

JG
1988 to 20

GM.

flap.

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's visit to NATO: 17 February 1988

Please refer to my letter of 18 January setting out the draft programme for the Prime Minister's visit to NATO on 17 February.

Based on this, the following is the timetable for the departure from and return to the United Kingdom (all times local, UK = GMT, Belgium = GMT + 1).

- 0725 Depart RAF Northolt by HS 125
- 0925 Arrive Brussels Abelag
- 1715 Depart Chevres Airfield
- 1720 Arrive RAF Northolt

rows ever,
L Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

PM TOURS NATO Sept 87

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



FBI
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289 (33)

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 January 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NATO: 17 FEBRUARY

Thank you for your letter of 18 January with a draft programme for the Prime Minister's visit to NATO on 17 February. This is fine. The Prime Minister will not on this occasion want to call on the Belgian Prime Minister, and hopes that he will understand. She will in any case see him at the European Council a few days beforehand.

I can confirm that the Prime Minister would not wish to address the Annual Symposium of the NATO Defence College in Rome in May.

I am copying this letter to Ian Andrews (Ministry of Defence).

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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dg

cc/c



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 January 1988

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Visit to NATO: 17 February

Thank you for your letter of 13 January. In the light of your comments, the programme now looks as follows:

0925	Arrive Abelag Airfield. Drive to NATO Headquarters
0930-0950	Visit UK Delegation
0955-1025	Tete-a-tete with Lord Carrington
1030-1150	Discussion in Council with Permanent Representatives
1200-1245	Press Conference and TV interviews
1255	Leave NATO Headquarters for
1315	Lunch given by Sir M Alexander (proposed guest list attached)
1445	Leave with SACEUR for
1510	SHAPE
1515-1520	Honour Guard
1525-1645	Briefing and discussion with SACEUR and his staff
1650-1710	Tete-a-tete meeting with SACEUR
1715	Depart Chevres Airfield for UK

A HS 125 has been reserved for the visit.

The bilateral Embassy in Brussels have advised that the Belgian Government would normally look to a Head of Government visiting one of the international organisations in Brussels to include a bilateral call in his or her programme. Martens is, however, at present only a caretaker Prime Minister, and a new Government seems unlikely to be in place by 17 February. In these circumstances, and given the shortage of time in the programme, the Prime Minister may prefer not to make a bilateral call. If so, we shall prepare the ground carefully with the Belgians.

/The visit

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The visit to NATO in February and the probable NATO Summit in March will give the Prime Minister two good opportunities for presenting publicly our views on the Alliance and on East/West relations. We understand that the NATO Defence College in Rome are considering inviting her to address their annual symposium on 9/10 May. The Embassy in Rome do not believe that this event would justify Prime Ministerial participation unless Mrs Thatcher were seeking another opportunity of the same kind. Unless I hear otherwise from you, we shall assume that this is not the case.


I am copying this letter to Ian Andrews (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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GUEST LIST FOR LUNCH

Host

The Prime Minister

Private Secretary

Secretary General

Chairman of the Military Committee


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
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PM TOOLS: NATO, Sep 87...



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8/w
cpc

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 December 1987

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NATO

Just to say that I have checked with the Prime Minister and she does wish to go ahead with her visit to NATO on 17 February despite the decision to hold an additional European Council on 11/12 February.

I am copying this letter to Lyn Parker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

(C. D. POWELL)

Michael Alexander, Esq., C.M.G.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'R' or 'P', located in the bottom right corner of the page.

PRIME MINISTER

VISITS TO EUROPE

You agreed some time ago to pay a one day visit to NATO on 17 February. As you know, Michael Alexander is very keen that you should do this, particularly before Lord Carrington retires.

It now seems likely that we shall have a European Council in Brussels on 11/12 February which is rather close to the dates proposed for the NATO visit. I hope, nonetheless, that you will still be prepared to go ahead with it. Agree?

CDP

[Handwritten signature]

C D POWELL

8 December 1987

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Alc DAS
cc: PC
TESSA
JANICE

From the Private Secretary

11 October 1987

POSSIBLE VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER TO NATO

Thank you for your letter of 5 October suggesting the outline programme for the Prime Minister's visit to NATO Headquarters and to SHAPE on 17 February. These seem very much on the right lines and planning should go ahead on this basis.

C D POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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DTS

CCPC
①

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 October 1987

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister
Contact with
a programme on
the lines?Possible Visit by Prime Minister to NATO

Thank you for your letter of 28 September.

Michael Alexander has now checked with Lord Carrington and General Galvin whether a visit to NATO Headquarters and to SHAPE on 17 February would suit them. They have confirmed that it would.

He has suggested the following outline programme:

- 77
- am. Visit to NATO HQ to include 30 minutes with the Secretary General, 60-75 minutes in Council session, 10 minutes meeting the Permanent Representatives personally and 30 minutes in the delegation.
 - Lunch at Michael Alexander's house at Hoeilaart followed by:
 - helicopter flight to SHAPE and return to the UK.

As regards lunch at Hoeilaart, which lies on the direct route from NATO Headquarters to SHAPE, Lord Carrington and Michael Alexander think that the most convenient and useful format would be that adopted for a recent visit by the Prince of Wales: a working lunch which he would host and which would be attended by the Prime Minister, Lord Carrington, General Galvin, General Altenberg (Chairman of the NATO Military Committee) and a Private Secretary. It would be invidious to invite some, but not all, of the Permanent Representatives, and Michael Alexander believes the Prime Minister would have a more useful conversation if they are omitted. General Galvin would be able to offer helicopter space to the Prime Minister and a Private Secretary for the journey from Hoeilaart to Mons after lunch, if this would be logistically helpful.

I should be grateful to know whether this outline programme would suit the Prime Minister.

Yours ever,
L Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street


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b/k

PM TOURS

VISIT TO

NATO

9/6



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See SH

bc P.C.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 September 1987

Dear Sir,

**POSSIBLE VISIT BY THE PRIME MINISTER
TO NATO**

Thank you for your letter of 25 September about a possible visit by the Prime Minister to NATO in February next year. The Prime Minister is willing in principle to pay such a visit and has no objection to Michael Alexander discussing it informally with Lord Carrington. I should warn you that the Prime Minister could not do Wednesday 24 February but we have pencilled in Wednesday 17 February.

Yours sincerely
Chris Powell

C D POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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dg

①

cc/c



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 September 1987

Prime Minister

Dear Charles,

Agree to a visit to NATO on a Wednesday in February? (It would be difficult in diary terms)

Possible Visit by the Prime Minister to NATO

We have now been able to consult Michael Alexander about the idea in your letter of 31 July that the Prime Minister should pay an official visit to NATO.

His view is that such a visit would be a valuable demonstration of Britain's commitment to the Alliance. As such, its usefulness would not be lessened if there were a summit of NATO countries before a Reagan/Gorbachev meeting: the purpose of that would be to demonstrate the solidarity of the Alliance as a whole.

On timing a visit to NATO would be best before, say, the end of February, since Lord Carrington's final months in office will be heavily occupied with farewell engagements. From UKDel NATO's point of view, a visit in mid or late February would be ideal. A visit on a Wednesday would fit best into NATO's weekly timetable.

Before making specific proposals about the ingredients of a visit, Michael Alexander would like to discuss it informally with Lord Carrington. Unless you would wish the first approach to Lord Carrington to come from No 10, he would be happy to raise it with the Secretary-General, who may also have views on timing.

Yours ever,

L Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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