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3002

PREM 19/2530/1

PART TWO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Confidential Filing

Prime Minister's visit to the  
Soviet Union 28 March - 1  
April 1987 - Policy.

SOVIET

UNION

Part 1: January 1987

Part 2: April 1987

NB: main Briefs & CDP folder in separate box  
Briefing cards inside front cover

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>3.4.87</del>							
<del>7.4.87</del>							
<del>8.4.87</del>							
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<del>25.6.87</del>							
<del>26.6.87</del>							
<p>PREM 19/2530</p>							
<p>PT2 ENDS</p>							

NB: Questions briefing folder filed on:  
PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECHES & BROADCASTS:  
Soviet TV interview: March 1987

● PART 2 ends:-

CDP to C' 26. 6. 87

PART 3 begins:-

fco to CDP. 19.4.89

NOTE FOR TOP OF FILE

Any subsequent correspondence on policy (especially arms control) discussed during this visit, should be filed on the appropriate subject file.


Annotate notes to say that earlier papers are on this file.

If unsure, ask myself or Amanda.

Julie

9.4.87.

**A** The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>2530</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details:  <i>Letter from Powell dated          26 June 1987, with enclosure.</i>	
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
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
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6 июня 1987 года

Дорогая премьер-министр,  
не так давно я узнал, что  
во время пребывания в Москве  
Вы защитили дело воссоедине-  
ния моей семьи перед М. Гор-  
бачёвым и сделали это с  
присущим Вам умением и  
тактом. Я хотел бы ска-  
зать, как глубоко я благо-  
дарен за этот акт, который

я рассматриваю как выра-  
жение солидарности, верности,  
помощи другу и сострада-  
ния — неизменных замечатель-  
ных качеств британской  
нации.

Вы поддержали и укрепили  
мою надежду вернуть  
детей и жену. Я могу от-  
платить за этот великодуш-  
ный жест только дальней-

шей работой по укреплению безопасности и независимости Великобритании.

Я вижу в этом также залог того, что однажды, даст Бог, свобода вернётся и народу России.

Во время Вашего пребывания в СССР я следил за каждым Вашим выступлением и высказывался

и я могу выразить только  
искреннее восхищение тем,  
чего Вы сумели добиться.

Этот урок политической и  
религиозной свободы, демокра-  
тии, человеческого достоин-  
ства, который Вы препо-  
дали и правителям, и  
управляемым, является бес-  
прецедентным в 70-летней  
истории коммунистической

тиранчи.

В качестве маленького  
символа моей благодарности  
прилагаю сувенир, который,  
надеюсь, напомнит Вам  
о Вашей весьма успешной  
поездке.

Желаю удачи во всех  
Ваших начинаниях, Ваш  
верный друг и искренне Ваш

О. Юрневский

P.S. В связи с итогами  
выборов хочу горячо  
поздравить Вас с заме-  
гательной, заслуженной и  
логичной победой.



6 June

Dear Prime Minister

Not very long ago I heard that you had raised with M Gorbachev the question of reuniting my family and that this was done with your characteristic skill and tact. I should like to say that I am deeply grateful for an action which seems to me to be an expression of solidarity, loyalty, friendship and compassion - the great and enduring qualities of the British nation.

What you did has sustained and strengthened my hope that my wife and children will be restored to me. I can only repay this generous gesture by continuing to work to promote the security and independence of Great Britain. I see in this too a pledge that one day, God willing, freedom will be restored to the people of Russia.

I followed all your speeches and statements while you were in the USSR and I would like to express my sincere admiration for what you were able to achieve. The lesson in freedom, democracy, human dignity and independence of mind which you gave both rulers and ruled has no precedent in all the seventy years of communist tyranny.

As a small token of my gratitude, I enclose a souvenir which will, I hope, remind you of your very successful visit.

As one who is for ever in your debt, I wish you success in all you undertake.

Yours sincerely

O GORDIYEVSKIY

PS Following the election results, I should like to congratulate you most warmly on a splendid, well-deserved and entirely logical victory.

MR POWELL

CDP  
24/6

24 June 1987

IMPRESSIONS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

1. The Prime Minister may be interested to see the attached comment on her Moscow visit from a young Soviet intellectual. He is Alexei Yanshin, the son of Academician A. L. Yanshin, a distinguished Soviet geologist. The letter is to Mr F. W. Dunning, Curator of the National Geological Museum, whom young Yanshin escorted during a meeting of the International Geological Congress in Moscow in 1984. He has continued writing since.

2. Elsewhere in the letter Yanshin speaks about "fantastic changes in the internal life of my country". But he goes on to admit that the standard of living is not rising, indeed he suggests that it is falling for some.

u  
s

PERCY CRADOCK

She was very rational and humanic. Now I often can see ladies dressed and hair-cutted a-la M.T. And at last - the main idea of the whole story. It's of no importance who is she indeed - she fulfilled a great job - she change the attitude to U.K. - not in common it's not considered that U.K. is a country with no face and only a political echo, mirror of U.S.A. Now we suppose - the U.K. is a very interesting country, original, with normal residents, with normal leaders, and the problem is in finding of common tongue.

Well, another one idea of the letter - to inform you that I exist,

This letter is very bad - illeteral, dirty, but if I'll try to change smth ~~am~~ I'm afraid, ... well you know what am I afraid of.

I'm waiting for Alex Aleysha, he should be in Moscow in the end of May. I'm lucky to have opportunity for our meeting!

Thank you for attention!

With best wishes,  
Sincerely yours



With great thanks for your lessons of life. It seems to me I become cleverer while writing you. You can rise people. A

Surely, I want to say about my impressions <sup>(2)</sup> on your Prime-minister visit. It was a real shock of impressions. I remember very good your story about your meeting with Prime Minister, your attitude to the "iron lady". But you should take into account the absolute unreadiness of mass media to the foreign political leader. We usually see them in our press as stupid, ugly persons, who usually prefer to spend their time in psychiatric clinics and like hobby from time <sup>like</sup> to time play in a political theatre.

And suddenly she arrived - normal, clever and attractive. The apogee of her visit was the interview to Soviet TV, when 3 huge, fat political commentators (all - male) attacked her. They, the cleverest ones, were untactful, nonprofessional, simply rude. They interpreted her words terribly, so I even can't find words to describe it. Poor political boys were obliged a week later to describe their behavior on a TV, because it was a lot of letters with critics. In the Soviet TV hit-parade that program (with M.T.) got the first place. Near my work Izvestiya Newspaper Publishers is situated. They exhibited photos of M.T., Gorbachev, - simple photos, which were published in newspapers, but large, during 2 weeks a huge crowd was standing in front the windows, ~~pop~~ crowd was so expressed, that in a moment discussions started. The main idea was - oh, ye, oh, ye !!!!!!! etc.

I don't want to discuss the personality of your Prime Minister, but I can say, that she acted extremely professional, very attractive and even sincerely (may be only on the face).



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 May 1987

*Iran Charles*

*CCP  
27/5*

Letter to the Prime Minister from  
General Prem Tinsulanonda, Prime Minister of Thailand

/ I attach a letter from General Prem Tinsulanonda, Prime Minister of Thailand, replying to the Prime Minister's letter of 6 April.

The Thais are obviously very appreciative that the Prime Minister mentioned the Cambodian problem during her visit to Moscow, and the letter reflects the healthy state of UK-Thai relations following Sir Geoffrey Howe's visit to Thailand in April.

Unfortunately as Thai Foreign Minister, ACM Siddhi, found out at first hand during his visit to Moscow earlier this month, there has been no indication of a change in Soviet thinking on Cambodia.

We do not think that any reply to General Prem's letter is called for.

*50000*

*Adnan (na)*



(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

SOVIET UNION : PM's visit : Pt 2

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2JH



C/F  
For you, I think.  
JD  
2/15



BM2 BFK

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

20 May 1987

*From the Private Secretary*

Thank you for letting me see your note about follow-up to the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow. I thought it was generally very helpful and inventive.

I would be very cautious about the Soviet proposal to hold a Conference on human rights in Moscow. There are some who argue that we in the West could turn this proposal to our advantage by demanding that the Russians release political prisoners, allow them to attend the Conference etc. I am much more sceptical. The Russians have a way of sliding out of their obligations or fulfilling them fleetingly before slipping back to old standards and practice. Moreover, it seems to me that it would debase the whole concept of human rights for Western representatives to attend a Conference on the subject in the Soviet Union, when their record is so abysmal. It just feels wrong, like holding a convention of Rabbis in Mecca. The Prime Minister did not actually discuss this particular proposal with Mr. Gorbachev. Had she done so, I believe that she would have followed more or less the line line of thought above.

I agree that it is very important to pursue the opportunities in Anglo-Soviet trade and an excellent idea to get George Jellicoe along for a discussion. He is deeply involved.

You mention cultural exchanges. This is another important area. The mandarins i/c reside in Cultural Relations Department of the FCO. I imagine they will need all the help they can get in expanding such exchanges and making them into something worthwhile.

One final area, which you do not directly mention but which seems to me very important, is the establishment of links with the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. This is not strictly a job for us bureaucrats, since we deal with the Ministries. The Labour Party have their contacts on a party net. I would have thought there was a strong case for the CPS to establish some sort of line to the International Department. It currently has a very important role in Soviet foreign and security

57

policy making. If you decide to pursue this idea, please do not attribute it to me.

I should be grateful if you could treat this letter as personal.

(CHARLES POWELL)

Laurence Kelly, Esq.



SUBJECT

CC MASTER  
OPS



Prime Minister  
COP 2715 (2)

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. TSQAA/87

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER  
GOVERNMENT HOUSE  
BANGKOK, THAILAND.

12 May B.E. 2530 (1987)

Dear Prime Minister,

I wish to express my heartfelt thanks for your gracious message of 6 April 1987. I can hardly describe the sense of indebtedness I felt on learning of what you have done for us in Moscow, fulfilling your kind promise made to me earlier in March. Long remembered will be this great service which you performed for the cause of peace in Kampuchea - with its far-reaching implications not only on Thailand's security but also on the stability of Southeast Asia and world peace as a whole.

True, there was no perceptible movement on the part of the Soviet leadership. But, to their liking or not, a watershed has been reached. The Soviet Union must not be allowed to continue hiding behind a wall of feigned innocence, denying their part in the perpetuation of the Kampuchean tragedy and expediently disowning their influence on their proxy, Vietnam. Coming from a world leader of your stature, so forcefully stating the case, it could not have failed to sharpen Mr. Gorbachev's awareness of what the world expects of them and of the urgent need to find a negotiated solution to the Kampuchean problem.

Through your action, the Soviet leadership now knows that the international community possesses the will and the resolve to confront the Soviet Union with their due responsibility. As you well noted, we can only keep up the pressure on them.

/ At our ....


The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher M.P.  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW 1A 2AA

At our March meeting in London, you told me "Thailand will find in Britain a good ally". What you did in Moscow for the sake of peace in Southeast Asia proves the reality of those very words. Of course, I appreciated the opportunity of expressing such deeply felt sentiment and gratitude through Sir Geoffrey Howe during his most successful visit to Thailand three weeks ago.

With warmest personal regards and best wishes for every future success,

Yours sincerely,

General



(Prem Tinsulanonda)  
Prime Minister of Thailand

7 follow up

From: Laurence Kelly

FOLLOW-UP ACTION BY CPS TO HELP THE PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWING  
HER SOVIET VISIT.

- 1 More than a month has elapsed since Mrs Thatcher's spectacular success during her visit to the USSR. ✓
- 2 It is notoriously difficult to keep up the goodwill and euphoria engendered during the visit, especially by those not actually present and reading between the lines after the event. ✓
- 3 CPS should concern itself with the themes which contributions by experts might help to develop. The obvious place from which to identify such themes are from the transcripts of her speeches and those of Mr Gorbachev. ✓
- 4 There are important areas of policy which the CPS are unable to 'second guess' which are best left to professionals with the power and responsibility to deal with them: eg the Americans on arms control.

Mr Gorbachev's speech at the Kremlin on March 30 1987

There are a few useful suggestions made during his speech which could be worked upon as possibly acceptable themes for further Anglo Soviet collaboration.

- 1 The Anglo Soviet wartime alliance. An enormous weight of Soviet propaganda films are put out every year about their glorious role in defeating the Germans. It might be suggested that in choosing themes about the last war for films and TV, more emphasis might be given to the Anglo-Soviet wartime alliance, and a whole new generation of Soviet young be taught about the wartime conferences between Churchill and Stalin and the quantity of material aid given to the Soviet military machine during the war. ✓  
US aid ✓

Mr Gorbachev also came up with the offer to host in Moscow:

"A representative humanitarian forum, .... which could

/effectively

effectively contribute to the European process. What strikes us, however, is that as soon as we proposed that we discuss human rights in a serious and business like manner, and compare in an atmosphere of reciprocal openness the actual conditions of life in our country and in the capitalist countries, the West has seemingly begun to get nervous and is once again seeking to confine the examination of the whole problem to discussing just two or three personal cases, while shying away from looking into all the remaining issues."

It would be of great interest to know what the views of Sir Brian Cartledge are on this and whether or not the Prime Minister discussed the matter further with Mr Gorbachev (we ought to check this with Mr Charles Powell) and whether or not she views this whole idea as another major public relations exercise by Mr. Gorbachev where they would call all the tunes, and set the agenda, and there would be no mileage in it for British interests. We could drum up some very severe conditions under which this could be pursued.

*copy from  
Robby  
Robby*

2. Another major point that arose during the Kremlin speeches, was the Prime Minister's hope to expand Anglo-Soviet trade:

"Today, we had turned to bilateral matters and in particular trade. I have agreed with Prime Minister Ryzhkov this morning that we should work together to achieve by 1990 a volume of 2.5 billion roubles in our bilateral trade. This will entail each side achieving an increase of £350-400 million over their present export level. To this end, Mr Ryzhkov handed me a list of export and import opportunities. As you know, British companies have signed some important contracts and letters of intent in recent days."

*Copy from  
Commerce  
Supt*

The Anglo-Soviet Chamber of Commerce have no doubt followed this up actively since the Prime Minister's visit and we ought to get up-to-date and discover what the shopping list boils down to and what important contracts have been signed by British companies and what Letters of Intent exist. I suggest very strongly that we ask Lord Jellicoe to attend our meeting and brief us as he was in Moscow with the PM and would therefore have his finger on the subject.

Other topics were raised by Mr Gorbachev. He rejected the proposition that the Socialist economy did not work. The CPS could contact Soviet economists working in the UK to update the present view about this. He also welcomed the theme of 'peaceful' competition 'between our two economic systems.'

Mrs Thatcher's speech at the Kremlin, March 30, 1987

Of serious themes developed by our Prime Minister, there are three:

- 1 The Prime Minister strongly believes in expanding Soviet-British dialogue by the exchange of people. The mandarin guardians of UK-Soviet exchanges are:
  - a) The FCO (Cultural Relations department).
  - b) The GB-USSR Society - and doubtless they have been working overtime on this theme and we should get an update of the state of play and their views on the matter.
  - c) One of the major problems in expanding the exchange of Soviet and British students is that on the Soviet side they always want to send scientists and do not take advantage of the British University places ie in the Humanities. There must be a mandarin in the DoE in charge of cultural exchanges, and I suggest we get the facts from him.

Another major theme from the PM is that we have a general input to offer into Mr Gorbachev's 'perestroika'. Mr Gorbachev wishes to improve the Soviet living standards and the PM thinks that provided he produces a system of incentives, we have plenty to offer to developing this society.

Again there is excellent scope for UK students of Soviet economy to work up further suggestions on how to broaden freedom of choice in the Soviet economic system. See Mr Smiley's article in a recent Daily Telegraph.

Another major plea by the PM is to broaden Mr Gorbachev's 'glasnost' as interpreted to mean 'open society'. There could be no harm in our continuing to request greater freedom of speech, worship, movement and exchange of ideas. Specific suggestions?

In this context the sale of Western magazines and publications in Moscow, Leningrad and other major Russian cities should remain a top priority. It is relevant to remember that the Union of Soviet Writers is in grave disarray as to how to follow the policy of openness, and signs are that Mr Gorbachev's policies are by no means winning over Soviet establishment at all ranks. There is also a rather interesting dialogue to be pursued with Mr Arbatov. Please see the attached press cutting, which shows that the Prime Minister's arguments on nuclear deterrent for the last 40 years are not accepted, and some future work on this can be usefully done to shoot down the arguments.

1) Keep the tea one to  
nikes for 40 years

2) regional peace

At one stage,



SPARKLING: Raisa Gorbachev shares the smiles and the spotlight with her husband Mikhail and their guest

# Bewitched, bothered and bewildered . . .

NOBODY in Moscow doubts that the visit of the British prime minister was a useful and important political event — both for bilateral relations and in the larger international context.

It has helped to broaden the East-West political dialogue and to further the exchange of views on major issues of East-West relations, regional conflicts and disarmament. It has contributed to a clearer understanding on both sides. The agreements signed are of considerable value.

It was also good that Mrs Thatcher saw with her own eyes today's Soviet Union and heard directly about both our plans and our problems. And, last but not least, I would hope that she has picked up at least a few things from the discussions on the main subject of our time — the problem of nuclear weapons — even though the exchanges were rather heated at times.

As for Soviet citizens' impressions of the prime minister, they seemed rather ambiguous. Some people who mostly just watched her appearances (and Soviet television did give her a lot of publicity), without caring much about the sense of what she was saying, must have formed a very favourable opinion.

A Soviet lady told me admiringly: "I love her. She does look good, as if looking good has become her profession."

Other people not only

## ● The view from Moscow by central committee member GEORGIY ARBATOV

admired her manners and looks but also tried to understand the message of her speeches published in Soviet newspapers and broadcast on television. My impression is that they were baffled by some of the thoughts of our distinguished British guest — and, where nuclear weapons are concerned, even appalled.

According to Mrs Thatcher, nuclear weapons have kept the peace for four decades. Well, well.

First, it remains to be proven that it is due to nuclear weapons that there has not been a war in Europe since 1945. Why then was there no war in Europe for 40 years prior to 1914? Because of machine guns? And, after all, what magic do nuclear weapons possess that have turned them into peace-keepers? Are chemical and biological arms less horrible?

Even a conventional war in Europe would be Europe's "final solution" because the continent is saturated with nuclear power stations and storage depots with oil and toxic chemicals. If there is need for fear to ensure peace, that can be provided without nuclear arms. More and more people understand that peace built on fear is not only very expensive but will sooner or later fall apart.

Second, if the prime minister professes such a sacred

belief in nuclear weapons, why does she speak of peace in Europe only? According to her logic, in order to achieve a lasting peace in less stable regions — Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, South and North Africa, Iran, Syria, Libya — everybody out there should be in even greater need of nuclear weapons than Europeans.

Would Mrs Thatcher feel more secure in a world where everybody had a bomb, even if it was meant for peace? Her discourses on other military matters were similarly naive. For instance, on SDI and on the military balance: in trying to prove that there is a Soviet superiority she was more than selective, choosing not to notice nuclear warheads, strategic bombers, cruise missiles and other such things where advantages are clearly on the West's side.

Older people with good memories took Mrs Thatcher's military ideas with a sense of déjà vu. It all sounded remarkably like the 1940s and 1950s. But what could be accepted at that time as an innocent delusion, has by now turned into super-dangerous ignorance or negligence.

I don't want to suggest bad intentions here. But, knowing how intensively the issues of security and nuclear weapons have been discussed in Brit-

ain and the rest of the world for the past 10 to 15 years, one is simply amazed: how did the head of a major nuclear power manage to hear nothing and ignore everything? I caught myself wondering: does it follow that there was no real dialogue on problems of security and disarmament during Mrs Thatcher's visit to Moscow? I don't think it does.

We have to wait and see. Perhaps some British Conservatives' views may be modified. And the public discussion on nuclear weapons and security, undoubtedly stimulated by her visit, may turn out to be quite useful — all the more so since there is a lot of new and important business to attend to in foreign policy.

The American Secretary of State, George Shultz, is coming to Moscow in the near future, followed by a delegation of US Congressmen headed by the speaker, Jim Wright. It is seriously hoped that these meetings will help remove the obstacles to an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). And if we manage to conclude an INF treaty that may touch off a chain of other events as a result of which the world would be a safer and more attractive place to live in.

I assure Britain that the Soviet leadership is doing and will continue to do its best so that history will move in such a direction.



<u>Company</u>	<u>Project</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>UK content</u>
Courtaulds	Acrylic Plant refurbishment project.	Saratov	£20m.
Rieter Scragg	Textile Plant Refurbishment	Klin	£10.5m
GEC	Paint spraying robots	Gorki	£2.5m (initial order)
Taylor Woodrow	Refurbishment of 3 textile plants	Talinn, Riga and Minsk	£20m
	Contract initialled and under news embargo*		
John Brown	Polypropylene Plant	Budyennovsk	£100m.
	Letter of intent		
GEC/Simon Carves	'Gem 80' Programmable logic controller plant.	Yerevan	£250m.
	Total of signed business	£53m.	
	Initialled contract	£100m	
	Letter of intent	£250m	
	Grand total	<u>£403m</u>	

F on Rosead  
sent file



FILE  
B

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

1 May 1987

Many thanks for your letter. The visit to the Soviet Union was indeed interesting and the Prime Minister remains extremely grateful for all your help in preparing for it.

I have received Charles Dick's letter about the implications of removing short range missiles and shall be replying to it with my thoughts.

With best wishes,

(Charles Powell)

Chris Donnelly, Esq.

GA

as from: Soviet Studies, RMA Sandhurst

Hatherden 322

OLD PLOUGH FARM  
WILDHERN  
ANDOVER  
HANTS SP11 0JE

Charles Powell Esq  
10 Downing St.

27. 4. 87

Dear Charles,


I hope that Moscow was as enjoyable as it was successful. Judging by the Soviet press coverage - particularly the PM's speech in full + referring to the UK as a "major western power"; - the Russians attach particular importance to the visit.

For the last 3 weeks I have been in China, & have consequently not been keeping an eye on recent arms control proposals. However, my colleagues here, & we have just finished an updating session. Our specialist on conventional operations, Charles Dick, noted that in western press reports on proposals to remove short range missiles there has been no comment about the impact that this would have on our future ability to deliver advanced conventional weapons.

As this is his area of special responsibility within our team, I have asked him to write to you directly with the relevant technical details, just in case this point has fallen through the net

with best wishes

Chris





Rice Minister  
CD 28/4

(a)

FROM  
NICHOLAS  
BETHELL

TELEPHONE  
01-402-6877

73 SUSSEX SQUARE  
LONDON W2 2SS

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

27th April 1987

Dear Margaret,

at trap PT1

I just thought I should let you know that I spent most of yesterday with Dr Anatoli Koryagin in Lucerne, Switzerland, where he will be spending the next few months after leaving the Soviet Union last Friday. He particularly asked me to thank you for the letter that you addressed to him on March 31st.

For some strange reason your letter was delivered to the Koryagins' flat in Kharkov only last Thursday morning, a few minutes before the whole family left to catch a train to Moscow and a flight to Zurich the following day. We may, I suppose, speculate on the reasons why it took the Soviet postal services 23 days to convey your letter from Moscow to Kharkov.

Nevertheless Dr Koryagin was, he said, extremely touched by your letter and he will be replying to you as soon as possible. I have written something about him which should appear in The Times tomorrow.

I hope that you will also allow me to say, as I mentioned to Charles Powell, that I thought your trip to Moscow went fantastically well. I have already heard a fair amount of positive feedback from your television interview and I am delighted that you emphasised, as did Dr Orlov, the link between Soviet human rights performances and East-West relations generally, including multilateral disarmament.

Agreements on arms reduction can, it is true, make war less likely, but lasting peace requires the building of confidence between the Soviet Union and the West. And before we feel fully confident of Soviet goodwill, their human rights record must be made considerably better.


Thank you again for allowing Dr Orlov and me to come and see you before your visit. I send you my best wishes for the weeks ahead.

Yours ever,

Nicholas

Lord Bethell

SOVIET UNION: PM TOURS 'PTZ'



СОВЕТСКИЙ СОЮЗ

ПОЧТА СССР

СОВЕТСКИЙ СОЮЗ



①



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Prime Minister

Yes  
LSnellens  
not

Thanks on Agree that the  
Foreign Secretary should  
send out this letter to  
Government back-benchers?  
All Whips and the 1922  
Committee are keen. I think  
it's rather good. CDD  
2/4

You may find it useful in dealing with enquiries to have a summary of the results of the Moscow visit.

This was the first working visit to Moscow by a British Prime Minister since 1975. It is the culmination of several years of sustained effort by this Government to strengthen contacts between East and West, and to improve British-Soviet relations. The Prime Minister's visit to Hungary in 1984, her talks with Mr Gorbachev in London before he became Soviet leader, and my own visits to East European countries were part of this process.

Our objective is to build the greater mutual understanding and trust which are fundamental to a more stable and more secure East-West relationship. Openness and honesty are the only basis on which viable and verifiable arms control agreements can be built.

This visit has enabled us to get across to Soviet leaders, as well as the Soviet public, the genuinely peaceful intentions of this country, and our concerns about Soviet activities at home and abroad. The Prime Minister's 1 1/2 hours with Mr Gorbachev provided for the most candid and coherent exchanges on nearly every aspect of the East/West relationship that have ever taken place between a Soviet leader and the head of a Western Government. And her appearance on Soviet TV, as well as reports in the press, enabled her to convey Western views with frankness to hundreds of millions of Soviet citizens. *(complete)*

These achievements alone would have made the visit a notable success. But there are also other specific results:

- agreement on the need to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe, with constraints on shorter-range weapons, and follow-on negotiations to deal with them; though agreement still has to be reached on equal ceilings for these shorter-range systems (ie the important principle of a US right to match);
- agreement on the need for strict verification;
- agreement on the importance of pressing ahead for a world-wide ban on chemical weapons;



- 2 -



- agreement that there should be early negotiations on reductions in conventional forces;
- agreement that progress should be made stage by stage, with clearly defined priorities;
- agreement by Mr Gorbachev to consider the Prime Minister's proposals for establishing greater predictability over programmes for developing strategic defences, including SDI;
- agreement on an improved 'Hotline' between No 10 and the Kremlin;
- a Space Agreement strengthening collaboration between UK universities and the Soviet Space Research Institute, including co-operation on a mission to Phobos, a moon of the planet Mars;
- resolution of longstanding difficulties over embassy sites in London and Moscow;
- an agreement on Co-operation in Information, Culture, and Education to improve human contact and the flow of ideas: it includes encouragement of TV and radio companies to arrange joint discussion programmes, links between papers, an undertaking to ensure free receipt of each other's broadcasts, and exchanges of home visits for secondary school pupils;
- commercial contracts worth some £400 m, which were either hastened by the visit or secured through active intervention during its course.

We were able to appreciate Mr Gorbachev's seriousness about the important changes going on in the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister made it clear that we welcome the steps taken. The meetings with Dr Sakharov and Mr Begun underlined our hope to see full compliance with the human rights obligations of the Helsinki Agreement. Mr Gorbachev agreed to consider positively the specific cases we raised.

These are valuable and worthwhile achievements from what proved to be an historic visit. They demonstrate the enhanced respect for Britain under this Government, and the sincerity of our belief that truth and freedom are better guarantees of peace than fearfulness and surrender.

GEOFFREY HOWE







10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

23 April 1987

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH REFUSENIKS  
IN MOSCOW: DOCUMENTS**

Thank you for your letter of 23 April on the handling of various documents relating to refuseniks. I agree that Sir Bryan Cartledge should reply on the Prime Minister's behalf to the various letters in the terms which you suggest. I do not think there is any need for me to see all the letters and would be grateful if the Embassy in Moscow would forward only those where there are exceptional circumstances.

(Charles Powell)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

OTS



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 April 1987

Dear Charles,

The Prime Minister's meeting with  
Refuseniks in Moscow : documents

*at trap*  
You have received a copy of Kate Horner's letter of 2 April to Ken Neill in Soviet Department enclosing various documents which were passed to the Foreign Secretary at the end of the Prime Minister's meeting in Moscow with representatives of the refusenik community.

I enclose one further document which has come to us subsequently. This is a letter from three scientist members of the Nadgorny family. One of them had wanted to pass the letter to the Prime Minister at the Institute of Crystallography, where he works. He was not able to do so because of obstruction by the KGB, but he succeeded in passing the letter to a representative of the British Press, who subsequently gave it to us.

If you agree, we will ask Sir Bryan Cartledge to send appropriately tailored replies on behalf of the Prime Minister to this and the other letters which were handed over. He would thank them for the points which they have made and say that these have been carefully noted by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. He would then add that the Prime Minister will continue to do all she can to help the refusenik community, and that the Government will press for increased emigration both bilaterally and in the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna.

Since the Nadgornys' letter touches on British-Soviet scientific contacts, we have sent a copy to the President of the Royal Society. In this case, Sir Bryan would say that we have brought the points in it to the attention of the Royal Society.

We understand that some further letters are still arriving at the Embassy addressed to the Prime Minister. Do you wish to see all of these? If not, we will instruct Sir Bryan to reply on the Prime Minister's behalf, and forward them only where the content exceptionally merits this.

*Yours ever,* *Lyn Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

Moscow  
March 30, 1987

Prime Minister of Great Britain  
Margaret Thatcher

General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the CPSV

Mikhail S. Gorbachev

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

Dear Mr Gorbachev,

In connection with the British-Soviet summit we would like to draw your attention to the fate of refusenik scientists and their families who for many years have been trying to get permission to leave for Israel. We took the liberty of writing this letter because our family of the three physicists worked at the Soviet Academy of Sciences and we are well aware of the present situation.

As a rule after applying to the authorities for exit visas, a scientist's position takes a turn for the worse. Some people lose their jobs, some are transferred to a lower position, the others are prohibited to attend conferences or seminars, etc. At any rate, the sphere of professional activity of such scientists either drastically narrows or tends to zero. ( Unfortunately, our family can serve as an example illustrating this situation: Prof. Edward Nadgornyi, a former Head of Department, was demoted, his wife Nina Nadgornaya was fired, and their son Boris Nadgornyi was not allowed to do any scientific research). So it seems the professional experience of refusenik scientists is not needed in the Soviet Union and they are actually not used. On the other hand, the emigration of scientists is negligible. How can it be? It could have seemed that scientists who do not work are not of any value for Soviet State.

But unfortunately another point of view exists. It boils down to the fact that such scientist may do much to the advantage of the scientific and industrial development of foreign countries. For a scientist-applicant, at least this point is decisive when the scientist's reference is presented to the emigration authorities. Evidently this point contradicts the very essence of science, since science should favour progress of all mankind. We disagree with the attempts to consider science as "ours" and "theirs" - any science should be international. That is why the situation with Soviet refusenik scientists is a question of grave concern of the whole world scientific community.

In most cases an official reason for refusal boils down to their participation in some "classified research" or it is less intelligible and sounds as a "general knowledge". But, of course, it can not serve as an excuse when a "waiting" time of 5 years is considered "normal" and many refusenik scientists, such as S. Alber, Ya. Alpert, I. Brai-lovskaya, A. Ioffe, A. Lerner, V. Soifer and some others have been permanently refused for 10-15 years or even more. It is very hard to imagine nowadays, when scientific progress is so fast that scientific achievements are aging just before our eyes, that such long terms could exist for the Soviet refusenik scientists. All this could have been, at least partly, justified if the whole thing had concerned people who dealt directly with some projects of building up military science and technology. But this is not the case with refusenik scientists. As a rule, they dealt with fundamental science and could only be indirectly involved in some secret work, and just because almost all

scientific branches are connected now with the applied problems. We believe that in many cases the refusal in connection with the involvement in classified research is used only as a pretext to prevent a scientist from leaving the country. But in any case the practice of establishing whether there is some involvement or not is very imperfect. As a rule, only formal considerations are enough to give a refusal. According to these considerations, almost any applied scientific activity could be regarded as military-oriented. Refusenik scientists are there in a position without any rights, for they do not have any opportunity to contradict the decision in essence, though the existence of classified information is the fact that should be established in court. At the present time this fact is established completely arbitrarily and, more than that, anonymously. This creates almost unlimited opportunities for different abuse, settling scores and just plain mistakes, which can deprive refusenik scientists of many years of normal life and work.

We appeal to you to assist changing practice concerning refusenik scientists and promote positive solutions of their cases. It is the Soviet scientists and namely the Academy of Sciences of the USSR who should be held responsible for the decisions on the "classified matters" of their colleagues-refuseniks, and the latter should be given an opportunity to defend their point of view.

We hope that the discussion of this problem in the British and Soviet scientific communities could be helpful, taking into account the fact that British-Soviet scientific contacts are of long standing at all levels, and particularly between the Royal Society and the Soviet Academy. We also hope the solution of this problem in the spirit of radical democratic changes in the Soviet Union will lead to a further improvement of relations between the two countries.

Yours faithfully

Prof. Edward M. Nadgornyi *E. Nadgornyi*

Nina M. Nadgornaya *N. Nadgornaya*

Boris E. Nadgornyi *B. Nadgornyi*

Moscow, Bol. Spasskaya 32 apt. I71, I29010  
Tel. 280- 0035

Dear Madam,

I made an attempt of handing this letter to you when you visited the Institute of Crystallography (I am an employee of this Institute) but failed to do so for I was locked in the room with a KGB guard outside. The messenger knows more detail.

Your faithfully  
B. Nagy

31.03.87

SOVIET UNION : PM'S VIEW PT2



CONFIDENTIAL



cc pc

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

PO 14/1 +

The Rt Hon Paul Channon MP  
 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry  
 Department of Trade and Industry  
 1 - 19 Victoria Street  
 London  
 SW1H 0ET

14<sup>TH</sup> April 1987

*Dear Paul,*

**DTI/ECGD SUPPORT FOR JOHN BROWN CONTRACT: USSR**

Thank you for your letter of 3 April <sup>at flap</sup> setting out the concessions agreed for DTI and ECGD support to John Brown in order that they could compete for the polypropylene contract in the USSR. I am delighted that John Brown were successful in securing the contract.

In discussing the concessions which were to be offered to John Brown, we both accepted the need to ensure that they should be ring-fenced to the maximum possible. I acknowledge the efforts you have made on this score, although I remain very concerned about the possible repercussions of the precedents we have set. I also agree that we should encourage the Russians to consider credit financing in low interest rate currencies. I hope that you will be able to encourage companies trading with Russia to press this as in their own, as well as our, interests.

I agree with the conditions you propose for ring-fencing the reductions in the ECGD risk premium and the TTC premium. The 30 per cent reduction in the risk premium should be extended to Courtaulds Davy and Simon Carves only if the contracts are financed in US dollars or ECU and the conditions in your sub-paragraph (b) are fully met. This concession will, in accordance with the terms of that paragraph, relate to contracts which those three companies sign before 3 July. I also agree that in order to qualify for an overall reduction in the TTC premium it would be reasonable to extend the concession only to contracts signed before the end of last week.



## CONFIDENTIAL

My officials have discussed further with yours the way in which the reduction in the ECGD premium should be reflected in the Trading Account, against the background of our shared objective of ring-fencing this concession and of ensuring that the arrangements are properly accounted for and accurately reflect what has been done. In the light of these discussions, I am reluctantly prepared on this occasion to acquiesce in your proposal that the Trading Account should be credited both with the amount of ECGD's premium received from the exporter and with an amount notionally diverted from savings in the public expenditure provision. Given the need to reconcile the Trading Account with the Vote Account, there will need to be an adequate note in the accounts explaining the decision taken. This note will need to be agreed with my officials.

However, I continue to find this an unsatisfactory way of accounting for the transactions involved and I hope we can agree not to adopt it on future occasions. What was just about acceptable on a one-off basis i.e. for Guangdong is increasingly unacceptable with extended use. We now have a position where ECGD's Trading Account is being credited with funds which do not accrue as a result of their trading operations but as a result of Ministers' decisions to provide a covert subsidy from public funds. If this course was to be proposed again (and I hope not), I believe it is important that you seek proper Parliamentary authority. In other words further proposals would have to come to Ministers either as a clear decision to set aside ECGD's Trading Account objectives or as a decision to seek Parliamentary authority for expenditure from Votes to subsidise the Trading Account.

I am copying this letter to members of E(A) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours,  
JH

JOHN MacGREGOR



*Secretary of State*

*eh*

From: Derek Thomas  
13 APR 1987

Date: 10 April 1987

CONFIDENTIAL

11 12 1  
10 2  
9 3  
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7 6 5

Private Secretary

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: KOSSOV'S CALL ON MR POWELL

1. I was interested to read Mr Thorpe's submission of 8 April. I have two additional comments.
2. Kossov is Zamyatin's blue-eyed boy at present. He was also, incidentally, one of only two people in the Soviet Embassy whom Suslov trusted. He is unusually articulate and free-speaking, for a Soviet official. He has also been recently promoted and moved to deal with arms control subjects in the Soviet Embassy. It was Kossov who telephoned to ask for our interpreter's record of the restricted discussion in Moscow. I suspect that what all this adds up to is that Zamyatin is now using him to try to establish a privileged line to No 10. I do not see great harm in this, provided we are kept in touch.
3. My other comment is that, as Mr Thorpe says, Gorbachev's reported wish to retain his "special relationship" with the Prime Minister is no doubt intended to be both flattering and wedge-driving. But we should not discount the possibility that it is also genuine. He clearly enjoyed arguing, with no holds barred, with a Western political leader of the Prime Minister's quality. He may also have felt he learned something. I agree with Mr Thorpe's conclusion that we should remain cautious about Soviet attempts to build up a special relationship, but not to the point of discouraging the Prime Minister from maintaining it.

*This might be shared with C.P. Derek Thomas.*

Derek Thomas

cc  
PS/Mr Renton  
PS/PUS  
Mr Boyd  
Mr Fall  
Mr Ratford  
Defence Dept  
Mr Brinkley

*cc (personal)  
Mr Powell, No 10.  
D 15/4.*

ADVANCE COPIES

26

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS / Mrs CHALKER  
PS / LADY YOUNG

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

PS/MR RENTON

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)

PS/PUS

NPS

MR THOMAS

DACU

MR BOYD

CDI

MOD

MR RATFORD

MR FALL

MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT

HD/ACDD

HD/SOVIET DEPT

PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST

RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

19.11.8

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 808

OF 101240Z APRIL 87

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW

ADVANCE COPY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SHULTZ, 9 APRIL: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

SUMMARY

1. ACCOUNT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. SHULTZ INTERESTED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS ON WHETHER GORBACHEV MIGHT BE TRYING TO CHANGE THE SOVIET SYSTEM AS OPPOSED TO MAKING IT WORK BETTER, AND IN HER IMPRESSIONS AND THOSE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF OTHER SOVIET LEADERS.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND HE HAD RETURNED FROM MOSCOW WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT GORBACHEV WAS GENUINELY TRYING TO MAKE CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION. GORBACHEV MIGHT BELIEVE THAT IMPLEMENTING INTERNAL REFORMS REQUIRED A TOLERABLE LEVEL OF STABILITY IN EXTERNAL RELATIONS. IF SO, WE SHOULD NOT STAND IN HIS WAY. THAT SAID, IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE A LONG HAUL, AS SHULTZ HAD NOTED IN HIS UCLA SPEECH IN SEPTEMBER 1984. THE RUSSIANS WOULD CONTINUE TO MISBEHAVE (THE SOVIET ESPIONAGE ATTACK ON THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW WAS A CURRENT CASE IN POINT) AND GORBACHEV WAS CLEARLY DETERMINED TO ADVANCE SOVIET INTERESTS. BUT WHEN PROBLEMS AROSE, IT WAS NECESSARY PATIENTLY TO WORK FOR THEIR RESOLUTION AND NOT PULL DOWN THE SHUTTERS ON EFFORTS TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS GENERALLY. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THIS LAST POINT. THE SOVIET ESPIONAGE ATTACK AGAINST THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAD CREATED STRONG POLITICAL PRESSURES ON HIM TO CANCEL HIS VISIT TO

CREATED STRONG POLITICAL PRESSURES ON HIM TO CANCEL HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW. BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED THAT HE SHOULD GO AHEAD.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT MUCH OF THE SUCCESS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW HAD DERIVED FROM HER ABILITY TO BE PROFOUNDLY CRITICAL OF SOVIET POLICIES AND THE SOVIET SYSTEM, AND NOT TO COMPROMISE ON IMPORTANT ATSSUES, WHILE BUILDING A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH GORBACHEV. GORBACHEV HAD BEEN PREPARED TO LISTEN CAREFULLY TO WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID AND TO RESPOND IN A GIVE AND TAKE MANNER. THE UNCENSORED BROADCAST OF HER TV INTERVIEW, THE ENTHUSIASM WITH WHICH CROWDS HAD GREETED HER DURING HER WALKABOUTS, AND THE LACK OF SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT HER MEETINGS WITH SAKHAROV AND OTHER DISSIDENTS HAD BEEN REMARKABLE.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ESTABLISHED SOME POINTS OF AGREEMENT WITH GORBACHEV. THESE HAD INCLUDED AGREEMENT ON AN ARMS CONTROL AGENDA INCORPORATING THE CAMP DAVID PRIORITIES. BUT THERE HAD ALSO BEEN MANY POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE ON THE LEGITIMACY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (SHULTZ WONDERED HOW GORBACHEV COULD REALLY BELIEVE DETERRENCE WAS ILLEGITIMATE GIVEN THE SIZE OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES).

5. SHULTZ ASKED WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER THOUGHT THAT GORBACHEV WAS TRYING TO MAKE AN UNWORKABLE SYSTEM WORK BETTER OR WHETHER HE MIGHT ACTUALLY BE TRYING TO CHANGE THE SYSTEM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT GORBACHEV HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS BEGINNING TO SEE THE WEAKNESSES OF THE SYSTEM (HE HAD TALKED OF DEVELOPING A SYSTEM OF PAYMENT FOR HEALTH CARE). BUT

RADICAL MEASURES OF REFORM WERE NOT YET ACTUAATLY BELNG CARRIED OUT. GORBACHEV'S FOCUS SEEMED TO BE LARGELY POLITICAL RATHER THAN ECONOMIC, IN CONTRAST TO THE APPROACHES OF THE HUNGARIAN AND CHINESE LEADERSHIPS. GORBACHEV TENDED TO TAKE A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH (HIS PLENUM SPEECH HAD BEEN VERY MUCH IN THIS MOULD) BUT MANY OF HIS PERCEPTIONS OF THE WORLD SEEMED TO BE BASED ON SOVIET MYTHOLOGY. FOR EXAMPLE, HE CLAIMED TO BELIEVE THE CIA PLOT THEORY OF THE KAL SHOOTDOWN. IT WAS HARD TO KNOW WHETHER HE REALLY SAW THINGS IN THIS WAY.

5. SHULTZ ASKED WHETHER OTHER SOVIET LEADERS, FOR EXAMPLE RYZHKOV, SHEVARDNADZE AND DOBRYNIN RESEMBLED GORBACHEV. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT RYZHKOV APPEARED TO SHARE SOME OF GORBACHEV'S OPEN-MINDNESS BUT WAS MORE LIKELY TO COME UP WITH STOCK ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT SUBJECTS OF WHICH HE HAD LITTLE EXPERIENCE, PARTICULARLY FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS. SHEVARDNADZE HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION, DURING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S EIGHT HOURS OF TALKS WITH HIM IN MOSCOW, OF BEING OPEN, RELAXED, AND THOUGHTFUL. HE SEEMED TO BE ENGAGED IN A GENUINE PROCESS OF RE-EXAMINING SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND ASKING WHETHER SOVIET OBJECTIVES WERE THE RIGHT ONES AND WERE BEING PURSUED IN THE RIGHT WAY. DOBRYNIN HAD NOT PLAYED ANY SIGNIFICANT PART IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

6. SHULTZ WONDERED WHETHER HE MIGHT FIND, DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW ON 13-15 APRIL, THAT HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS WERE AS INTERESTED IN TRYING TO PERSUADE HIM GENERALLY OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW DRIVE FOR REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION AS IN GOING THROUGH A DETAILED BUSINESS AGENDA. HE HAD TOLD THE RUSSIANS THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO DEVOTE A PART OF HIS VISIT TO A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF BROAD POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC ISSUES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM BANGKOK  
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
 TELNO 239  
 OF 100630Z APRIL 87

YOUR TEL NO 195 : PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE  
 SOVIET UNION

1. THE THAI PRIME MINISTER, GENERAL PREM THINSULANONDA, INVITED ME TO CALL ON HIM THIS MORNING (10 APRIL), TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE TO HIM IN TUR.
2. PREM ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO THE PRIME MINISTER HIS GRATEFUL THANKS, BOTH ON HIS OWN BEHALF AS WELL AS ON BEHALF OF THE THAI PEOPLE, FOR THE ACTION WHICH MRS THATCHER HAD TAKEN IN MOSCOW IN RAISING WITH GORBACHEV OUR CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA. HE HAD FOR SOME TIME BEEN AT A LOSS TO KNOW HOW BEST TO SECURE MOVEMENT OVER THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE. NOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS AT LEAST PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT THE PROBLEM, HE AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE. HE FELT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT HAD HELPED TO OPEN THE WAY AND WHEN HIS FOREIGN MINISTER VISITED MOSCOW NEXT MONTH, ACM SHIDDHAWOULD BE ABLE TO PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER.
3. PREM WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE SIMILAR OVERTURES IN MOSCOW. HE WOULD BE TALKING TO US AMBASSADOR BROWN ABOUT THIS ON BROWN'S RETURN FROM WASHINGTON (IN ABOUT 6 WEEKS' TIME). HE HAVE MENTIONED THIS TO THE US CHARGE HERE, WHO HAS TOLD ME THAT SHULTZ HAS SAID ON US TELEVISION THAT HE WILL BE RAISING CAMBODIA DURING HIS TALKS IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK.
4. PREM SAID THAT HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING SIR GEOFFREY HOWE ON 22 APRIL. BECAUSE HE WOULD BE FACING A NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE IN PARLIAMENT THAT DAY, HE ASKED THAT THE MEETING BE PUT FORWARD TO 0815. THIS HAS BEEN INCORPORATED IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PROGRAMME.

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 PS/MR RENTON  
 PS/PUS  
 MR GILLMORE  
 MR McLAREN

COPIES TO:  
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FILE  
DA



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

10 April 1987

I enclose for your records a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Mrs. Gorbachev. You might like to send a copy to HM Ambassador in Moscow.

(Charles Powell)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

807

Уважаемая госпожа Тэтчер,

Благодарю Вас за любезное письмо. Немного времени отделяет нас от Вашего визита в Советский Союз. Пока еще не в полной мере, не со всей определенностью проявились его последствия. Думаем, что беседы, встречи - официальные и за пределами протокола, - состоявшиеся в Москве и Тбилиси, имеют огромную значимость, выходящую за рамки советско-британских отношений.

Надеюсь, что эта поездка дала Вам возможность почувствовать искреннее стремление советских людей к миру и добрым отношениям с Великобританией.

Мне было очень приятно вновь встретиться с Вами, побеседовать, поближе узнать Вас.

Хочу еще раз поблагодарить за переданные Вами сувениры, которые доставили мне удовольствие. Они - прекрасные свидетельства богатых традиций духовной культуры Британии и ее народа.

Так же как и Вы, будем думать о будущем, о новых встречах.

С наилучшими пожеланиями Вам и Вашему супругу

*Р. Горбачева*

Р. Горбачева

" 8 " апреля 1987 года

Unofficial translation

MRS.MARGARET THATCHER,  
PRIME-MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN,  
10 DOWNING STREET,  
LONDON

Dear Mrs.Thatcher,

Thank you for your kind letter. Only a little time separates us from your visit to the Soviet Union. Its consequences have not yet been displayed to the full quite definitely. We believe that talks and meetings - both official and those outside protocol, - which took place in Moscow and Tbilisi, are of great significance, surpassing the framework of Soviet-British relations.

I hope that this visit gave an opportunity to feel sincere aspirations of the Soviet people for peace and good relations with Great Britain.

I was very pleased to meet you again, to talk and to get to know you closer.

I would like to thank you once again for the souvenirs which have given me much pleasure. They are a splendid evidence of rich traditions of the spiritual culture of Britain and of its people.

We, as well as you, will think about future, about new meetings.

With best wishes to you and to your husband.

R.Gorbacheva

8 April 1987



**CONFIDENTIAL**

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FM CAIRO

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 182

OF 091300Z APRIL 87

INFOR ROUTINE ABU DHABI, AMMAN, JERUSALEM, KUWAIT

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, RIYADH, TEL AVIV, TUNIS, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 117 (NOT TO ALL): EGYPT/MIDDLE EAST

SUMMARY

1. MUBARAK THANKS THE PRIME MINISTER FOR HER MESSAGE, CONGRATULATES HER ON THE SUCCESS OF HER VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMENTS ON RECENT MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS.

DETAIL

2. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK ON 9 APRIL. HE DID NOT READ THE TEXT WHILE I WAS WITH HIM, BUT SAID HE HAD FOLLOWED VERY CLOSELY THE PRESS REPORTS ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION. IN HIS VIEW GORBACHEV BELONGED TO A NEW GENERATION AND WAS AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT TYPE OF LEADER FROM ANY OF HIS PREDECESSORS. HE CONGRATULATED MRS THATCHER ON THE OUTSTANDING SUCCESS OF HER VISIT AND THANKED HER FOR REPLYING PROMPTLY TO HIS MESSAGE.

PLO

3. I DREW PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT YOU HAD UNDERLINED TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING THAT THE SEARCH FOR UNIYT WITHIN THE PLO DID NOT BREAK WHAT REMAINED OF THE BRIDGE BETWEEN THE PLO AND KING HUSSEIN. THIS LED THE PRESIDENT TO COMMENT ON THE PRESENT DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PLO. MUBARAK SAID THAT HE HAD FOR SOME TIME BEEN PUTTING THE MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON ARAFAT TO RECOGNISE THE TWO UN RESOLUTIONS IN ADVANCE OF A MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE. HE HAD TOLD ARAFAT AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT HE WAS IN REAL DANGER OF MISSING THE BUS, AS THE PALESTINIANS HAD DONE SO OFTEN PREVIOUSLY, IF HE COULD NOT BRING HIMSELF TO DO THIS. HOWEVER THE FACTIONAL FIGHTING GOING ON WITHIN THE PLO AURGUED BADLY AND THERE MUST BE A REAL DANGER THAT THE PLO WOULD END BY EXCLUDING THEMSELVES FROM AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AND THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD CHOOSE OTHER REPRESENTATIVES TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE. IN SPITE OF THE PLO'S SHORTCOMINGS (AND THE PRESIDENT HAD SOME VERY UNCOMPLIMENTARY COMMENTS TO MAKE ABOUT STATEMENTS BY ABU JIHAD AND ABU IYAD IN RECENT DAYS) ARAFAT REMAINED THE MOST MODERATE OF THE PLO LEADERS: HE WOULD MAINTAIN HIS EFFORTS TO BRING HIM ALONG, HOWEVER HOPELESS THE TASK SOMETIMES SEEMED.

-1-

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/LISA

## LIBYA

4. MUBARAK SAID HE BELIEVED THAT EVENTS IN CHAD WOULD IN DUE COURSE BRING ABOUT QADHAFI'S DOWNFALL: CHAD WAS HIS VIETNAM. EGYPT HAD GIVEN ALL THE HELP SHE COULD TO CHAD AND HAD ENCOURAGED THE AMERICANS TO DO THE SAME: HE CLAIMED THAT AT THE TIME OF THE US BOMBING OF TRIPOLI: HE HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT THIS WAS NOT THE WAY TO TOPPLE QADHAFI AND THAT THEY WOULD DO BETTER BY HELPING THE CHADIANS WITH MILITARY SUPPLIES. MUBARAK THOUGHT THAT THE CASUALTIES SUFFERED BY THE LIBYAN ARMED FORCES IN CHAD HAD CAUSED WIDESPREAD RESENTMENT WITHIN LIBYA AND THAT THIS WAS INCREASINGLY MAKING ITSELF FELT, ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT OF COURSE TELL HOW LONG IT WOULD BE BEFORE QADHAFI FELL.

## EGYPT/SOVIET UNION

5. MUBARAK WAS EVIDENTLY WELL PLEASED BY THE LATEST ROUND GYPTIAN ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS (SEE INNES' TELELETTER OF 9 APRIL). HE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD ORIGINALLY REQUESTED 2 PER CENT RATE OF INTEREST, BUT BY PERSISTING THE EGYPTIANS HAD EVENTUALLY PERSUADED THEM TO WAIVE INTEREST PAYMENTS FOR A LONG PERIOD.

## US MILITARY DEBT

6. IN CONTRAST, NO SOLUTION WAS YET IN SIGHT TO THE PROBLEM OF THE HIGH INTEREST RATES ON EGYPT'S MILITARY DEBT TO THE US. HE HAD REPEATEDLY TOLD THE AMERICANS OF THE NEED TO FIND A SOLUTION WHICH DID NOT IMPOSE AN UNBEARABLE BURDEN ON EGYPT, WHOSE STABILITY WAS VITAL FOR THE WHOLE AREA. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC IF THE MISTAKES MADE IN THE 1950S BY THE WORLD BANK IN WITHDRAWING AID FOR THE HIGH DAM WERE TO BE REPEATED IN A DIFFERENT FORM.

7. MUBARAK SAID HE HAD APPROACHED A NUMBER OF GULF STATES (HE MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR ABU DHABI AND SAUDI ARABIA) TO SEE WHETHER THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE OVER THE DEBT AT A MUCH LOWER RATE OF INTEREST, FOR EXAMPLE 4 PER CENT. THE RESPONSE HAD NOT BEEN ENTIRELY NEGATIVE: BUT MOST OF THEIR FUNDS WERE LODGED IN US BANKS IN ANY CASE AND SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD NEED US AGREEMENT.

8. MUBARAK SAID THAT AT ONE POINT HE HAD POINTED OUT TO THE AMERICANS THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE UNDERSTANDING BEING SHOWN BY THE RUSSIANS AND THE DIFFICULTIES THE US WERE CREATING FOR EGYPT.. IT WAS AGAINST THE AMERICANS' OWN INTEREST THAT EGYPT SHOULD BE BURDENED WITH THIS EXCESSIVELY HIGH RATE OF INTEREST AT A TIME WHEN SHE FACED SO MANY OTHER ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES.

-2-  
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1a.

9. I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY MUBARAK'S COMMENTS ON THE RECENT EGYPTIAN ELECTIONS.

AURWICK

CCN: PARA 3 LINE 19: MAKE ABOUT STATEMENTS BY ETC ..

URWICK

YYYY

CCHPAN 8760

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MR SLATER  
MR RATFORD  
MR LONG  
MR MACINNES  
MR BARRINGTON  
CHIEF CLERK

-3-  
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*W.P.C.*

*(2)*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 April 1987

*Dear Charles,*

*ms*

*Die Minister  
Much more  
work is needed*

*on this  
CDP 9/4.*

Follow-Up to the Prime Minister's visit to the Soviet Union

When this subject was discussed on 6 April, the Foreign Secretary undertook to send some further thoughts on the subject of follow-up to the Prime Minister's visit. I am therefore enclosing a short paper, prepared by officials, setting out the main elements in the future bilateral programme and some preliminary thoughts on how we might build on the visit.

We are working on the more detailed paper requested in your letter of 3 April. We have consulted the Embassy and will be also contacting Whitehall Departments and non-governmental organisations with an interest in Anglo-Soviet relations. As the enclosed paper makes clear, we have already been in contact with the Great Britain-USSR Association, the main channel for our non-official contacts with the Soviet Union.

We also need to exchange views with the Russians. The Soviet Embassy have told us that they are engaged in a similar follow-up exercise and would welcome an opportunity to exchange views.

*Yours ever,  
L Parker*

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary



## Follow-Up to Prime Minister's Visit to the Soviet Union

### A. High Level Visits

1. Invitations have been issued to Gorbachev and Ryzhkov. We should aim to get one to the UK next year. A second best would be Dobrynin. We should try to ensure a really senior inward visitor (Politburo or Secretariat) to the UK each year. We should also aim to get Marchuk (Academy of Sciences) here before long. He has an outstanding invitation from the Royal Society. We might also consider inviting Cherkesia, the Prime Minister's host in Tbilisi.
2. Shevardnadze confirmed his invitation to the Foreign Secretary; he will aim to go in the autumn.

### B. Inter-Governmental Cooperation

3. Our businessmen should aim to strike quickly over further contacts while the iron is hot. Two forthcoming meetings should help continue to engage high level Soviet interest-Industrial Economic Review Meeting, in London on 27 April, which will review trade and the long term economic programme in preparation for the Joint Commission; and the Joint Commission itself, in Moscow during the first week of June, which Alan Clark from the DTI will attend.
4. Shevardnadze showed some real interest in developing expert talks on health cooperation, eg alcoholism, AIDS, during the discussions in Moscow. He also accepted our suggestion for expert talks on drugs. We will ensure these points are carried through. We will be trawling Whitehall for other new areas of potential cooperation. The environment is one potential area. There is already a wide ranging programme of cooperation on agriculture and energy following the visits to Moscow by Peter Walker and Michael Jopling.



C. Information and Culture

5. We are considering ways to build on the useful facilitating clauses in the Memorandum of Understanding signed during the visit. We are writing to all interested bodies (eg the British Council) drawing their attention to the agreement and suggesting they use it to prompt contacts with their Soviet opposite numbers. We will be concentrating in particular on the provisions for exchanges of school children; colloquia and round tables; and closer contacts between television and broadcasting organisations. We have already spoken to the Great Britain-USSR Association who showed considerable enthusiasm at the possibilities opened up by the Memorandum. If they come up with new and worthwhile projects, we may need to look at the resources available to them. They are the main channel for our non-official contacts with Soviet organisations.

6. The Memorandum sets up a programme of annual lectures. We need to identify and approach a British lecturer.

D. Political Follow-Up

7. We are drawing up a wide ranging programme for bilateral consultations at official level with the Soviet MFA for the coming year. We hope to agree this with them soon.

SOVIET UNION: PM's Visit

Pt 2





CDD

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

I am not sure  
you actually had  
time to read the  
letter. There are  
some quite important  
points in it - if  
you have time.

CDD  
9/4.

ms



PRIME MINISTER

YOUR VISIT TO MOSCOW

I attach a copy of a letter which I have sent to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about a conversation I had this morning with Mr. Kossov of the Soviet Embassy about your visit to Moscow. It contains a number of points of interest.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

8 April 1987

*[Handwritten signature]*

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

8 April 1987

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

I should record that Mr Kossov of the Soviet Embassy came to see me this morning, ostensibly to hand over some photographs of the Prime Minister's visit to the Soviet Union. He took the opportunity to add a number of comments about the visit.

Mr Kossov said that his Ambassador had called on Mr Gorbachev shortly before returning to London. He had found Mr Gorbachev very well satisfied with the Prime Minister's visit, despite the vigorous nature of their exchanges. He thought that their talks had very usefully clarified their respective points of view and had identified possibilities for progress, particularly on the INF negotiations. Mr Gorbachev wanted to retain his "special relationship" with the Prime Minister. It would be important to build on the achievements of the visit.

Mr Kossov said that the Prime Minister's thank you letter to Mr Gorbachev conveying the Cabinet's assessment of the results of her visit had been very timely. It had arrived in Moscow while the Politburo discussion was still in progress and had been well received. His understanding was that it had affected the nature of the Politburo's own published conclusions.

Mr Kossov said that when he and his Ambassador had arrived in Moscow before the visit, they had found senior Soviet officials very exercised about the Prime Minister's Torquay speech. This had been given a rather exaggerated slant by Tass, which had brought it to the notice of the Soviet leadership. There had been lively debate about how the Soviet Union should respond, which explained Mr Gorbachev's comments at the opening of his talks with the Prime Minister. Mr Gorbachev's speech at the Kremlin dinner had been intended as a riposte to the Torquay speech rather than to the Prime Minister's own speech in Moscow.

Mr Kossov went on to raise a number of arms control points. He claimed that the main Soviet objection to the way in which the Prime Minister formulated her views on the

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importance of nuclear deterrence was that it would only encourage third countries to acquire nuclear weapons. I said that the Prime Minister's point was that it would always be essential for the major powers to retain nuclear weapons against the eventuality that other, less responsible countries, would acquire them.

Mr Kossov commented that there had been useful progress in the Prime Minister's talks with Mr Gorbachev on INF. There was now debate in Moscow as to whether the Prime Minister's point about the Western right to match Soviet shorter-range systems could not best be met by a zero-zero solution for these systems as well. The matter might be raised in the talks with Secretary Shultz next week. I recalled that the Prime Minister had stressed that the West had to be able to retain some weapons in these categories to offset Soviet conventional and chemical superiority.

Mr Kossov said that the Prime Minister's ideas on predictability of strategic defence research had been very carefully noted. He enquired whether they had been agreed with the Americans in advance. I said that the Americans had been informed shortly before the Prime Minister's visit but had not given their agreement. Mr Kossov said that the Soviet Union could not break the link between SDI and START. But if it were possible to make some progress on the lines indicated by the Prime Minister, this could enable a start to be made towards the goal of 50 per cent reductions in strategic nuclear weapons.

I said that we were sorry to hear that Mr Gorbachev was indisposed. Mr Kossov was evidently amused and said that he had rarely seen a man look more healthy than Mr Gorbachev last week. Although he had no information, he assumed the postponement of Mr Gorbachev's visit to Czechoslovakia might be because of difficulties over the proposals which he intended to announce there affecting both conventional forces and shorter range nuclear weapons. Another reason might be the need for Mr Gorbachev to be directly involved in the preparations for Mr Shultz's visit to Moscow next week. It was not to be excluded that some Soviet positions would be revised in the light of the talks with the Prime Minister. This could cause some difficulties which Mr. Gorbachev himself would have to sort out.

I am not able to judge how far Kossov is simply speculating or has information on any of these points. But his comments are certainly of some interest.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C D POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*lee*

PRIME MINISTER

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CHARLES POWELL

8 April 1987

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

8 April 1987

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cc HOD  
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Prof Griffiths  
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**PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW**

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I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C D POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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File 2/6  
a/s/lc

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

7 April 1987

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET  
UNION: INTERPRETER'S NOTES

I enclose some notes which Richard Pollock, who interpreted for the Prime Minister during her visit to the Soviet Union, has sent me. They serve as a useful addition to the formal records and you will wish to let Soviet Department and Research Department see them as well as Sir Bryan Cartledge in Moscow. I do not think they need to go much more widely than that.

CHARLES POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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2/6

MR. POWELL

Prime Minister's Talks in USSR: 28 March/1 April 1987

Observations by interpreter

1. Preface

- (i) It is assumed that No. 10 will decide distribution. The typing is therefore deliberately left to No. 10.
- (ii) It is assumed that the Private Secretary's record - where available - will have been read. Additional comment/observations only here.
- (iii) Occasions referred to:
  - (a) Visit to the Bolshoi Ballet
  - (b) Restricted Talks (Mr Gorbachev)
  - (c) Formal Dinner (Mr Gorbachev)
  - (d) Formal Talks (Mr Ryzhkov)
  - (e) Private Dinner
  - (f) Leave-taking in Kremlin
- (iv) Perspective: The impressionistic nature of some of the following comments is shaped by experience of other bilateral discussions over a number of years [including visits by the Foreign Affairs Committee (July 1985) and Lord Whitelaw's IPU Delegation (May/June 1986), and - in UK - the December 1984 Gorbachev meeting in Parliament, and the further visit by a Supreme Soviet Delegation under Zagladin in February 1987 (talks with FAC)].

2. Visit to Bolshoi Ballet

Conversation in box limited, and "small talk". Uspensky covering Gorbachev/PM, Pollock covering PM/Mrs Gorbachev. Hosts had not expected/realised two Acts being merged before Interval. At Interval, brief chat on merits of Tchaikovsky/Mozart and formative influence on Gorbachev's tastes - then to dining-room, assuming "the others will find us" [but it needed 5+ minutes for that]. Meal talk relaxed the atmosphere. Mrs Gorbachev recalling visit to UK (inter alia), and expressed sympathy with Channon family. Cordial conversation perhaps caused time-factor to be forgotten. Second half of performance some 30+ minutes after first - audience had apparently been literally 'in the dark' for 5 minutes. Hosts more relaxed in second half and parting conversation "Look forward to tomorrow" [both Gorbachev and PM].

3. Restricted Talks

- (a) Gorbachev looking fitter (tanned) than recent photos/TV: effects of known 'working holiday'?
- (b) Gorbachev at start seemed keyed up, sitting back somewhat tensely, hands clasped across his midriff - notes on table between him and PM. Note-taker to his right, higher round table. Uspensky at left-end, Pollock at right-end of long



seat on which photographs of the two principals had been taken. Powell on Pollock's right, separately seated. PM to right of Powell, slightly forward, opposite Gorbachev on other side of table with elongated lateral flower vase in middle.

- (c) Gorbachev's voice extremely low/quiet for c. first 15 minutes (cf. Ryzhkov's at opening of formal talks in same room - St. Katharine's Hall - the next morning). "I was not sure what we should start with ..."
- (d) At no time was there a proposed time-allocation or thematic overview, as a "shaper" of the talking to come. By ultimate end of the restricted talks (cl845), a number of subjects (on which the press would be expecting a report) had not been ventilated in any detail. It was noticeable how ready Gorbachev was to agree/shape formulations for the press - often on topics that had been scarcely broached (not that that evidenced a wish by Gorbachev to suppress their discussion).
- (e) Despite the wide range of emotions - from animated concern to flippancy - evinced by Gorbachev, he never unleashed the acrimony of which he had shown himself capable in December 1984, when answering Norman St. John Stevas (18.12.84 Grand Committee Room, Palace of Westminster) on human rights (especially religion).
- (f) At cl250, Gorbachev said we have by no means covered everything - perhaps we need another hour. Not clear from his words that he meant deferring lunch - could have been alluding to the envisaged continuation at 4.00 pm, prior to the proposed plenary c5.15 pm. Translation a little off-beam and encouraged the PM's perception that we should keep going/put off lunch, with Gorbachev's ready agreement.
- (g) Change of location after lunch due to re-setting of furniture for plenary in St. Katharine's Hall, expected c5.15pm.
- (h) Curious that Gorbachev went on for c65 minutes in his opening post-lunch remarks (including translation). Was he genuinely unmindful of the time-factor? The lack of shape/timing in the pre-lunch session suggests he might have been, and there is some evidence of general garrulousness by nature. But just possible he was aware that it was better to be "off the record" in restricted talks all day, than "on the record" - and witnessed - at a plenary. As has been commented since, Gorbachev made only one public statement during the visit - perhaps thereby laying himself less open to internal criticism.
- (i) There may be a merit for the future in having the Soviet interpreter deliver more frequently. A considerable amount of mood - hence 'fine tuning' of the meaning - is in jeopardy, and avoidable demands made on the hearer's imagination and reactions, where, say 5 minutes of varying emotion is then interpreted, sometimes more slowly and without the same register of moods/subtlety of nuance.

A gentle request at the outset, to this effect, would serve the purpose - if it was deemed appropriate to do so. It would not cause offence, and would have the benefits (a) of reining-in Gorbachev's loquacity, (b) keeping the PM more in touch with his mood (thus bringing the two personalities into closer rapport), and (c) requiring the PM to memorise less before responding and so enabling her more developed and frequent interventions on specific points as they arose.

It was noticeable that Ryzhkov, Cherkasia - indeed, most other interlocuters on the Soviet side - paused more frequently for interpretation. This facilitates a productive 'meeting of minds' and perception of intentions/atmosphere.

- (j) There was a perceptible 'blur' in the way Gorbachev expressed himself on the supposed sequential nature of (a) an INF agreement being reached, and (b) the withdrawal of shorter range missiles in GDR and Czechoslovakia. On two occasions the phrasing was such as could be compatible with both events happening non-sequentially (ie preparing the ground for a possible shift in the phased approach reflected in the 28 February statement). While it is possible this was loose speaking on Gorbachev's part, as he has been known to change his position this might have been a conscious, more flexible formulation. [You recall he said it will be possible to watch those GDR/Czech missiles being destroyed.]
- (k) At the end of one long post-prandial utterance, Gorbachev said something (as I reported at our evening de-brief) which was not translated - and yet to me sounded to be a cry from the heart:- "Peace will be good for you, it will be good for me, it will be good for mankind". The use of the word "me" was unusual and arguably a mark of frankness. The PM's reply came in promptly, so that it was inappropriate to interrupt with further R-E translation: also the logical flow was unaffected by the point.

#### 4. Formal Dinner

[Since conversation only, and informal, note-taking for interpreting not effected - hence no detailed record available.] [Deliberate record-keeping would possibly cause offence.]

The fact that the speeches preceded the meal had both merit and demerit - though possibly more merit. They were 'got out of the way', thus facilitating subsequent informality. However, their content - as was inevitable since they were prepared well in advance - was not really a reflection of the mood of the two principals' conversation, either during the day, or during the evening (subsequently). Possibly the speeches contained (as was only natural) elements which would subsequently preoccupy/affect the hearer [perhaps negatively].

While the ensuing conversation was coloured, as earlier in the day, by personal cordiality, it was perhaps more contentious (perhaps due to points in the speeches) than might have been anticipated. It did appear that Gorbachev was less relaxed than usual and concerned to score points. It was also a little surprising that Mrs Gorbachev, seated on the PM's right (Gorbachev being on the PM's left), seemed keen - albeit perhaps in light-hearted vein - to resuscitate the 'arms control' themes which had had a very thorough ventilation earlier in the day. Gorbachev at moments 'bridled' more than he had during the day, and somewhat surprisingly said at the end of the meal that he was beginning to think it would be easier to talk to the Americans than to the PM. (This is a note which Arbatov has been sounding since the PM left USSR - though probably reflecting, as he does, the 'older', less constructive/less optimistic 'school'). It is noticeable that when crossed - or possibly tired - Gorbachev seems to lean to the views of his more circumspect advisers. [However, he did warn mysteriously that "something special" would be announced next day.] This somewhat sour tone on which to allow the meal to end was surprising. Moreover, the next day, Ryzhkov chose to continue the 'areas-of-disagreement-on-arms-control' theme at the opening to what was expected to be a session on matters economic, etc., not broached the previous day. Have they a "negative" lobby which they have to keep happy at the moment - not least when talking 'on the record'?

5. Formal Talks (Ryzhkov)

Ryzhkov had a prepared text in front of him - which possibly did not include the querulous 'arms control' and 'empire of evil' themes on which he (rather surprisingly) harped initially.

Ryzhkov began in the same noticeably quiet voice which Gorbachev had adopted early in the restricted talks (also in St. Katharine's Hall) the previous day.

Ryzhkov more deliberate in utterance - choosing his words and pausing more frequently for interpretation - than Gorbachev. A much more typical Soviet bureaucrat, dignified in appearance rather than intellectually distinguished.

Again, no advance announcement of themes or proposed apportioning of time, so as to optimise discussion.

Usual - though one might have thought inappropriate - reproaches on non-competitiveness of British goods/tenders.

The 'something special', foreshadowed at the formal dinner by Gorbachev, was the rather sudden announcement of firm bilateral trade-turnover targets to 1990 and beyond (plus Soviet 'shopping-list', in English). Then - 'the negative side', as Ryzhkov put it - came a sizeable list, in Russian, of regretted (COCOM) embargoes.

This discussion also concluded somewhat abruptly, precluding the promised/requested exegesis on 'perestroika', etc, prior to the signing of documents in the Vladimir Hall.

The overall atmosphere of this meeting was more stable in its cordiality, though more superficial (perforce) in its discussion, than the previous day's discussions.

The signing ceremony was to further stabilise the cordiality/up-beat tone of the overall proceedings.

6. Private Dinner

Gorbachev and Mrs Gorbachev showed guests various rooms in a building rich in historical associations (more recently, with Litvinov, Churchill, Stalin, Eden, Molotov). Discussion (only) of the merits of dancing - prior to the meal.

Once in dining-room Gorbachev pointed out picture on wall, whose narrow bright central strip of sunshine in an otherwise 'grey' landscape he adjudged symbolic and characteristic of the previous day's frank talks. (Mrs Gorbachev had to get up from the table to see, owing to short-sightedness.)

Gorbachev again dominating the conversation - surprising that he scarcely ever invites even his principal guest's views. But reasonable (in quantity) and cordial (in quality) participation proved possible.

Ryzhkov quite forthcoming with comments - though not especially informative - on public health, education, cultural features of Soviet society, and on economic planning within the process of 'perestroika'.

Mrs Gorbachev in very chirpy form, though unaware of the problems posed by conversing through an ongoing interpretation! It is noticeable that in every situation - here and elsewhere - she addressed her husband by the comparatively formal 'Mikhail Sergeevich' (i.e. first name and patronymic) mode of address. This would serve to enhance both his public 'gravitas' and her own.

The fireside chat was at several separate tables, with the Soviet interpreter being allocated to the Gorbachevs and the Prime Minister.

Parting greetings were very natural and noticeably more cordial than after the Formal Dinner the previous evening.

7. Leave-taking in Kremlin

Very significant for Mrs Gorbachev's presence - and no-one else's - with Gorbachev. Suggestive not only of their sincere personal commitment to the relationship (and Gorbachev's valuation of it) with the PM - but possibly too of Gorbachev's increasing confidence in his own position. [It will be interesting to see whether the 'video-of-Mrs-Gorbachev' concern mentioned subsequently in our press causes her to be given a less visible profile - few ways of monitoring, except on satellite TV.]

Gorbachev spoke of his sadness at saying goodbye and of the Soviet Union's readiness to cooperate with UK. PM said we are not only ready, but happy, to cooperate.

No doubt whatever of the strength of friendship and respect those few minutes/words/facial expressions attested towards the PM and the United Kingdom - and the intention to do all possible to build thereon.

A final observation:

The Gorbachev we saw during this visit had not lost any of the assurance or intellectual verve most recently evidenced to UK eyes during Lord Whitelaw's talks in the Kremlin, 26-27 May 1986. There were more signs that he recognised something could yet go wrong with his plans and hopes. In the restricted talks he indicated that perestroika would take 5-7 years (not defining exactly what he envisaged as achievement required, however). At the Bolshoi supper he indicated that perestroika though not easy of attainment was more feasible than the elimination of Russians' love of (ie excessive) drink - indeed he deemed that impossible. On arms control his line seems to devise what he believes are 'fair' proposals, try them out (on his interlocuter), but - if rebuffed - not to sulk, but to be willing to think again and possibly modify the proposal. Witness 28 February. He can change his mind, and needs to be allowed to do so - one may suggest - without loss of face.

R.P.

6 April 1987

VSCAFD

PM's TALKS IN USSR: 28 March / 1 April 1987

Observations by interpreter

SCAFF

1. Preface

- (i) It is assumed that No. 10 will decide distribution. The typing is therefore deliberately left to No. 10.
- (ii) It is assumed that the Private Secretary's record — where available — will have been read. Additional comment/observations only here.
- (iii) Occasions referred to:-
- (a) Visit to the Bolshoi Ballet
  - (b) Restricted Talks (Mr Gorbachev)
  - (c) Formal Dinner (Mr Gorbachev)
  - (d) Formal Talks (Mr Ryzhkov)
  - (e) Private Dinner
  - (f) Leave-taking in Kremlin
- (iv) Perspective: The impressionistic nature of some of the following comments is ~~shaped~~ by experience of other bilateral discussions over a number of years [including visits by the Foreign Affairs Committee (July 1985) and Lord Whitelaw's IPU Delegation (May/June 1984), and — in UK — the December 1984 Gorbachev meeting in Parliament, and the further visit by a Supreme Soviet Delegation under Zagladin in February 1987 (talks with FAC)].

2. Visit to Bolshoi Ballet

Conversation in box limited, and 'small talk'. Uspensky covering Gorbachev/PM, Pollock covering PM/Mrs Gorbachev. Hosts had not expected/realised two Acts being merged before interval. At interval, brief chat on merits of Tchaikovsky/Mozart & formative influence on G.'s tastes — then to dining-room, assuming "the others will find us" [but it needed 5+ minutes for that]. Meal talk relaxed the atmosphere. Mrs G. recalling visit to UK (inter alia), and expressed sympathy with Channon family. Cordial conversation perhaps caused time-factor to be forgotten. Second half of performance some 30+ minutes after first — audience had apparently been literally 'in the dark' for 5 minutes. Hosts more relaxed in 2nd half and parting conversation.

- 1 -

"Look forward to tomorrow" [both G & PM].

- 2 -

Restricted Talks

- a) G. looking fitter (tanned) than recent photos/TV: effects of known/holiday? <sup>(working?)</sup>
- b) G. at start seemed keyed up, sitting back somewhat tensely, hands clasped across his midriff — aster on table between him & PM. Note-taker to his right, higher round table. Uspensky at left-end, Pollock at right-end of long seat on which photographs of the two principals had been taken. Powell on Pollock's right, separately seated. PM to right of Powell, slightly forward, opposite G. on other side of table with elongated lateral flower vase in middle.
- c) G.'s voice extremely low/quiet for c. first 15 minutes (cf. Ryzhkov's at opening of formal talks in same room — St Katharine's Hall — the next morning). "I was not sure what we should start with..."
- d) At no time was there a proposed time-allocation or thematic overview, as a 'shaper' of the talking to come. By ultimate end of the restricted talks (c. 18.45), a number of subjects (on which the press would be expecting a report) had not been ventilated in any detail. It was noticeable how ready G. was to agree/shape formulations for the press — often on topics that had been scarcely broached (nor that that evidenced a wish <sup>by G.</sup> to suppress their discussion).
- e) Despite the wide range of emotions — from animated concern to flippancy — evinced by G., he never unleashed the acrimony of which he had shown himself capable in Dec. '84, when answering Norman St John-Stevan (18/12/84 Grand Committee Room) <sup>(P. of Warwick)</sup> on human rights (esp. religion).
- f) At c. 12.50, G. said we have by no means covered everything — perhaps we need another hour. Not clear from his words that he meant deferring lunch — could have been alluding to the envisaged continuation at 4.00 p.m., prior to the proposed plenary c. 5.15 p.m. Translation a little off-beam and encouraged the PM's perception that we should keep going/put off lunch w. G.'s ready agreement.
- g) Change of location after lunch due to re-setting of furniture for plenary in St Katharine's Hall, expected c. 5.15 p.m.
- h) Curious that G. went on for c. 65 minutes in his opening post-lunch remarks (including translation), like he genuinely unworldly of the time-factor? The lack of shape/timing in the pre-lunch session suggests he might have been, and there is some evidence of general garrulousness by nature. But just possible he was aware that it was better to be "off the record" in restricted talks all day, than "on the record" — and witnessed — at a plenary. As has been commented since, G. made only 1 public statement during the visit — perhaps thereby laying himself less open to internal criticism.

- 3 -

j) There may be a merit for the future in having the Soviet interpreter deliver more frequently. A considerable amount of mood — hence 'fine tuning' of the meaning — is in jeopardy, and avoidable demands made on the hearer's imagination and reactions, where, say 5 minutes of varying emotion is then interpreted, ~~by~~ sometimes more slowly and without the same register of moods/subtlety of nuance.

A gentle request at the outset, to this effect, would serve the purpose ~ if it was deemed appropriate to do so. It would not cause offence, and would have the benefits (a) of remaining in G.'s locusts, (b) keeping the PM more in touch with his mood (thus bringing the two personalities into closer rapport), and (c) requiring the PM to memorise <sup>before responding,</sup> less, and so enabling her more developed and frequent interventions on specific points as they arose.

It was noticeable that Ryzhkov, Cherkasia — indeed most other interlocutors on the Soviet side — paused more frequently for interpretation. This facilitates a ~~rather~~ production 'meeting of minds', and perception of intentions/atmosphere.

j k) There was a perceptible 'blur' in the way G. expressed himself on the supposed sequential nature of a) an INF agreement being reached, and b) the withdrawal of shorter range missiles in GDR and Czechoslovakia. On two occasions ~~the~~ phrasing was such as could be comparable with both events happening <sup>non-sequentially</sup> ~~sequentially~~ (i.e. preparing the ground for a possible shift in the phrased approach, reflected in the 28 February statement). While it is possible this was loose speaking on G.'s part, as he has been known to change his position, this might have been a conscious, more flexible formulation. [You recall he said it will be possible to watch how GDR/Czech missiles being destroyed].

k) At the end of one long post-prandial utterance, G. ~~was~~ said something (as I reported at our evening de-brief) which was not translated — and yet to me sounded to be a cry from the heart: — ~~“I need”~~ “Peace will be good for you, it will be good for me, it will be good for us”. The use of the word “me” was unusual and <sup>apparently</sup> a mark of frankness. The PM's reply ~~came~~ came in promptly, so that it was inappropriate to interrupt with further R→E translation: also the logical flow was unaffected by the point.



- 4 -

4. Formal Dinner

[Since conversation only, and informal, note-taking for interpreting not effected — hence no detailed record available.] [Deliberate record-keeping would possibly cause offence.]

The fact that the speeches preceded the meal had both merit and demerit — tho' possibly more merit. They were 'got out of the way', thus facilitating subsequent informality. However, their content — as was inevitable since they were prepared well in advance — was not really a reflection of the mood of the two principals' conversation either during the day, or during the evening (subsequently). Possibly the speeches contained (as was only natural) elements which would subsequently preoccupy/affect the hearer [perhaps negatively].

While the ensuing conversation was coloured, as earlier in the day, by personal cordiality, it was perhaps more contentious (perhaps due to points in the speeches) than might have been anticipated. It did appear that G. was less relaxed than usual and concerned to score points. It was also a little surprising that Mrs G., seated on the PM's right (G. being on the PM's left), seemed keen <sup>albeit</sup> perhaps in light-hearted vein — to resuscitate the ~~disagreement~~ 'arms control' theme which had had a very thorough ventilation earlier in the day. G. at moments ~~became more~~ 'bridled' more than he had during the day, and <sup>somewhat</sup> surprisingly ~~finally~~ said at the end of the meal that he was beginning to think it would be easier to talk to the Americans than to the PM. (This is a ~~theme~~ <sup>note</sup> which Arbatov has been sounding since the PM left USSR — tho' probably reflecting, as he does, the 'older', less constructive/optimistic school). It is noticeable that when crossed — or possibly ~~for~~ tired — G. seems to lean to the ~~sceptical~~ <sup>more</sup> views of his more circumspect advisors. [However, he did warn mysteriously that something special would be <sup>announced next day.</sup> ~~It was surprising.~~ This somewhat sour tone on which to allow the meal to end was surprising. Moreover, the next day, Ryzhkov chose to continue the 'areas of disagreement — on — arms — control' theme at the opening to what was expected to be a session <sup>on</sup> ~~about~~ matters economic etc, not broached the previous day. Have they a "negative" lobby which they have to keep <sup>at the moment</sup> ~~happy~~ <sup>not least</sup> ~~happy~~ <sup>especially</sup> when talking 'on the record'?

-5-

5 Formal Talks (Ryzhkov)

Ryzhkov had a prepared text in front of him — which possibly did not include the querulous 'arms control' and 'empire of evil' themes on which he (rather surprisingly) harped initially.

R. began in the same noticeably quiet voice which G. had adopted early in the restricted talks (also in St Katherine's Hall) the previous day.

R. more deliberate in utterance — choosing his words and pausing more frequently for interpretation — than G. A much more typical Soviet bureaucrat, dignified in appearance rather than intellectually distinguished.

Again, no advance announcement of themes or proposed apportioning of time, so as to ~~not~~ optimize discussion.

Usual — though one might have thought inappropriate — the reproaches on non-competitiveness of British goods/tenders.

The 'something special', foreshadowed at the formal dinner by G., was the rather sudden announcement of firm bilateral trade-turnover targets for 1990 and beyond (plus Soviet 'shopping-list', in English). Then — 'the negative side', as R. put it — came a sizeable list, in Russian, of regretted (COCOM) embargoes.

This discussion also concluded somewhat abruptly, preceding the promised/requested exegesis on 'perestroika', etc., prior to the signing of documents in the Vladimir Hall.

The overall atmosphere of this week was more stable ~~and~~ with cordiality, though more superficial (perhaps) in its discussions than the previous day's discussions.

The signing ceremony was to further stabilize the cordiality/up-beat tone of the overall proceedings.

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6 Private Dinner

G. & Mrs G. showed guests various rooms in a building rich in historical associations (more recently, with Litvinov, Churchill, Stalin, Eden, Molotov). Discussion (only) of the merits of dancing — prior to the meal.

Once in dining-room, G. pointed out picture on wall, whose narrow bright central strip of sunshine in an otherwise 'grey' landscape he adjudged symbolic and characteristic of the previous day's Frank Falks. (Mrs G. had to get up from the table to see, owing to short-sightedness).

G. again dominating the conversation — surprising that he scarcely ever invites even his principal guest's views. But reasonable (in quantity) and cordial (in quality) participation ~~allowed~~ <sup>allowed</sup> ~~provided~~ <sup>provided</sup> ~~possible~~ <sup>possible</sup>.

Ryzhkov quite forthcoming with comments — tho' not especially informative — on ~~free~~ public health, education, cultural features of Soviet society, and on ~~the budgetary situation~~ <sup>economic planning</sup> within the process of 'perestroika'.

Mrs G. in very chirpy form, though unaware of the problems posed by conversing through an ongoing interpretation! It is noticeable that in every ~~situation~~ <sup>situation</sup> — here and elsewhere — she addressed her husband by the comparatively formal 'Mikhail Sergeevich' (i.e. first name and patronymic) mode of address. This would surely enhance both his public 'gravitas' and her own.

The <sup>fire</sup> fireside chat was on several separate tables, with the Soviet interpreters being allocated to the Gorbachev and the Prime Minister.

Parting greetings were very natural and noticeably more ~~cordial~~ cordial than after the Formal Dinner the previous evening.

-7-

7. Leave-taking in Kremlin

Very significant for Mrs G.'s presence — and no one else's — with G. Suggestion not only of their sincere personal commitment to the relationship (and G.'s valuation of it) with the P.M. — but possibly too of G.'s increasing confidence in his own position [It will be interesting to see whether the 'video-of-Mrs-G' concern mentioned subsequently in our press causes her to be given a less visible profile — few ways of monitoring, except on satellite TV].

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No doubt whatever of the strength of friendship and respect those few minutes/words/facial expressions attested towards the P.M. and the United Kingdom — and the intention to do all possible to build thereon.

A final observation:

The G. we saw during this visit had not lost any of the assurance or intellectual verve most recently evidenced to UK eyes during hard Whitelaw's talks in the Kremlin, 26-27 May 1986. There were more signs that he recognised something could yet go wrong with his plans and hopes. In the resumed talks he indicated that perestroika would take 5-7 years (not defining exactly what he envisaged as achievement required, however). At the Bolshoi supper he indicated that perestroika, tho' not easy of attainment, was more feasible than the elimination of Russians' love of (i.e. excessive) drink — indeed he deemed that impossible. On the arms control his line seems to derive <sup>what he believes are 'fair'</sup> proposals, try them out (on his interlocutor), but — if rebuffed — not to sulk, but to be willing to think again and possibly modify the proposal. Witness 28 February. He can change his mind & needs to be allowed to do so — one may suggest — without loss of face.

R.P.

filed  
from



SUBJECT  
CC MASTER  
OPS

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

6 April 1987

THE PRIME MINISTER

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T64/87

Dear Mr. President-

Thank you for your message of good wishes and sound advice in advance of my recent visit to Moscow.

In the event I was not able to have any detailed discussion of Middle Eastern developments with Mr. Gorbachev, as I had hoped to do, although we did agree on the importance of finding peaceful solutions to regional conflicts.

However, Sir Geoffrey Howe did have a long talk with Mr. Shevardnadze. He found him quite realistic in assessing the way forward. He accepted that more work was needed before even a preparatory conference could be convened although he had no firm ideas on how this work should be approached. He emphasised however that this preparatory work must get under way.

I share your hope that contacts between the Soviet Union and Israel will help to narrow the gap between the parties and to clear the path towards an international conference. The Soviet leaders made it clear to us that they expected preparatory work for a conference to include Israel and that in the course of it bilateral contacts between the Soviet Union and Israel could take place. I am encouraged by the subsequent reports of Soviet movement on the questions of consular exchanges with Israel and of Jewish emigration.

In your message you stressed the importance of the Jordanian/Palestinian agreement of February 1985 and drew attention to the unfortunate consequences if the PLO were to abrogate it. I entirely agree that such a step by the PLO would make it even more difficult to draw them back in to the peace process. Sir Geoffrey Howe argued in Moscow that it was essential to see that the search for PLO unity did not break the fragile bridge between the PLO and King Hussein.

I know that you are concerned, as we are, about the situation in Beirut. We have just announced additional humanitarian aid of £550,000 to the ICRC and UNRWA to support their relief work in Lebanon. We are continuing to do what we can to encourage those concerned to allow access to the Palestinian camps, and suggested to the Soviet leaders that they should use their influence with Syria to the same end.

Y  
ours sincerely

Raymond Habibe

His Excellency Mohamed Hosni Mubarak



File SKW

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

6 April 1987

I enclose a message from the Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of Thailand about her recent visit to Moscow. I should be grateful if the text could be telegraphed to Bangkok for delivery.

(C. D. POWELL)

Robert Culshaw, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RM

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T62/87



Filed on: SOVIET UNION  
SPM's Visit 28 March -  
1 April Pt. 2.

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 April 1987

SUBJECT: a OPS  
MASTER.

Dear Prime Minister,

When we met in London last month, I promised to raise the problem of Cambodia during my visit to Moscow.

I did indeed make clear to Mr Gorbachev our deep concern about Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Sir Geoffrey Howe also discussed the matter at greater length with Mr Shevardnadze, and will be happy to give you and your colleagues a personal account when he comes to Bangkok later this month.

We both pointed out to the Russians that their support for Vietnam only reinforced international apprehensions about Soviet policies worldwide. The Russians said that they were reluctant to exert any pressure on the Vietnamese to withdraw because such pressure would be ineffective. They argued that a solution to the Cambodian problem could not be achieved overnight, that responsibility for a solution ultimately rested with the countries in the region and that the process progress of achieving a national consensus in Cambodia would have to start before Vietnamese troops left and continue after they had gone. The Russians claimed to have gained the impression that some outlines of a peaceful settlement acceptable to ASEAN and the countries of Indo-China were emerging.



I fear that the Soviet attitude was entirely predictable. There was no movement, but at least they were prepared to discuss the subject. We can only keep up the pressure on them and on the Vietnamese to take the steps necessary for a solution.

I should be happy for you to share this information with your ASEAN colleagues but I should be grateful if, beyond that, you could treat it in strict confidence.

Yours sincerely

Rajendra Prasad

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His Excellency General Prem Tinsulanonda



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

6 April 1987

**PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION**

Thank you for your very useful notes which, fortunately, coincide very well with my record and add to it in many useful ways. I will show them to the Prime Minister once they are typed.

I have also passed to her your kind letter for which I know she will be grateful. She has already written to you but I think to your Bradford address so it may not reach you for some time.

May I add a personal word of thanks for your absolutely splendid contribution to the success of the visit. It made all the difference to have someone who could do the interpreting in a way which conveyed not only the meaning but the feeling and the mood so brilliantly. It was a virtuoso performance - as well as making you an instant T.V. star.

I was interested to hear about the possibility of a Personal Chair at Bradford. Do let me know privately if you think we can help in any particular way.

On reflection I am enclosing a copy of the Prime Minister's letter in case the other one does not reach you for a while.

C D POWELL

Richard Pollock, Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL



FILE  
DAS  
BF

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 April 1987

Dear Tony,

FOLLOW-UP TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S  
VISIT TO MOSCOW

On  
UK/Soviet  
relations  
file

LBF//

This was discussed briefly between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary this evening. The Foreign Secretary said that he would be letting the Prime Minister have a full note on the subject.

Yours sincerely,  
*C D Powell*

C D POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*dg*



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

6 April 1987

**PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION:  
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK**

I enclose a signed version of the Prime Minister's message to President Mubarak about her visit to the Soviet Union. I am afraid that it issued too late for the best wishes for today's elections to be included. I should be grateful if the text could be telegraphed to Cairo for delivery today.

(C. D. POWELL)

Robert Culshaw, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 April 1987

*Dear Mr. President,*

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In your message you stressed the importance of the Jordanian/Palestinian agreement of February 1985 and drew attention to the unfortunate consequences if the PLO were to abrogate it. I entirely agree that such a step by the PLO would make it even more difficult to draw them back in to the peace process. Sir Geoffrey Howe argued in Moscow that it was essential to see that the search for PLO unity did not break the fragile bridge between the PLO and King Hussein.

I know that you are concerned, as we are, about the situation in Beirut. We have just announced additional humanitarian aid of £550,000 to the ICRC and UNRWA to support their relief work in Lebanon. We are continuing to do what we can to encourage those concerned to allow access to the Palestinian camps, and suggested to the Soviet leaders that they should use their influence with Syria to the same end.

May I take this opportunity to send you my very best wishes for a successful outcome to the election to the People's Assembly on 6 April. Your efforts to foster democracy in Egypt will, I am sure, contribute immensely to meeting the political and economic challenges which your Government will face in the coming months.

*Yours sincerely*

*Margaret Thatcher*

His Excellency Mohamed Hosni Mubarak



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 April 1987

Dear Andy

COP  
MCW  
Does this require any action?  
2/4  
2/4

I have been asked to forward to you the attached telex which was sent to our Soviet Department by Keston College.

The telex contains a message to the Prime Minister from The Christian-Ecumenists' Group in Moscow.

Yours Sincerely

Rossell Dixon



(R K Dixon)

Assistant Private Secretary

P A Bearpark Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

Post Office and Comptroller's Office

London, Ontario





297711 PRDRME G  
897684 KESCOL G

1400

ATTN HELEN RAWLINS, SOVIET UNION HUMAN RIGHTS DESK

KESTON COLLEGE/1 APRIL 1987

''MOSCOW CHRISTIANS APPEAL TO MARGARET THATCHER''

AN UNOFFICIAL CHRISTIAN ECUMENICAL GROUP IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS APPEALED TO MARGARET THATCHER TO INTERCEDE WITH THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES ON BEHALF OF TWO CATHOLIC PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE. HAVING NO MEANS OF APPROACHING MRS THATCHER PERSONALLY, THEY HAVE DICTATED THEIR APPEAL OVER THE TELEPHONE TO A FRIEND IN THE WEST.

''TO MRS MARGARET THATCHER, PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN.

ON 8 FEBRUARY 1984, CHRISTIAN ECUMENIST ALEXANDER RIGA WAS ARRESTED IN HIS MOSCOW FLAT. HE WAS CHARGED UNDER THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RSFSR: 190-3 (ORGANISATION OF, OR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN, GROUP ACTION WHICH DISRUPTS PUBLIC ORDER) 227 (INFRINGEMENT OF THE PERSON AND RIGHTS OF CITIZENS UNDER THE GUISE OF PERFORMING RELIGIOUS RITUALS) AND ANTI-SOVIET PROPAGANDA. AFTER THREE PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATIONS RIGA WAS DIAGNOSED AS SUFFERING FROM ''SLUGGISH'' (''VYALOTEKUSHCHAYA'') OR LATENT SCHIZOPHRENIA, A DIAGNOSIS WHICH WAS SIGNED BY THE CHIEF DOCTOR OF THE KASCHENKO PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL, MORKOVKIN.

UNTIL NOVEMBER 1985 RIGA WAS HELD IN THE BUTYRSKAYA PRISON IN MOSCOW AND THEN, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VERDICT PASSED BY THE COURT, FORCIBLY INCARCERATED IN THE BLAGOVESHCHENSK SPECIAL PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL, WHERE HE HAS REMAINED FROM JANUARY 1986 UNTIL MARCH 1987. ALL THIS TIME, RIGA'S LIFE AND HEALTH HAS BEEN UNDER VERY REAL THREAT, FOR HE SUFFERS FROM CONGENITAL HEART DISEASE, AND THE DRUGS BEING FORCED ON HIM HAVE ALREADY BROUGHT HIM CLOSE TO DEATH ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.

HE HAS JUST BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE REPUBLICAN PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL IN THE LATVIAN CAPITAL, RIGA, FOR FURTHER ENFORCED PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT.

ALEXANDER RIGA'S FRIENDS AND FELLOW-BELIEVERS APPEAL TO YOU TO INTERCEDE FOR HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE.

ALEXANDER RIGA WAS NOT THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE CHRISTIAN-ECUMENISTS' GROUP TO SUFFER REPRESSION. ON 19 SEPTEMBER 1983, SOFIA BELYAK WAS ARRESTED IN THE TOWN OF ZHITOMIR ON CHARGES OF BEING A MEMBER OF THE GROUP, AND OF TAKING PART IN PRODUCTION OF THE GROUP'S SAMIZDAT JOURNAL ''PRIZYV'' (THE CALLING). SHE WAS TRIED UNDER ARTICLES 190-3 AND 227 (SEE ABOVE) AND SENTENCED TO FIVE YEARS' DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY TO BE FOLLOWED BY FIVE YEARS' INTERNAL EXILE. TO THIS DAY SHE IS DOING FORCED LABOUR ON AGRICULTURAL SITES AT DNEPRODZERZHINSK IN THE DNEPROPETROVSK REGION.

50-YEAR OLD CATHOLIC PRIEST FR IOSIF SWIDNICKI IS ALSO IMPRISONED FOR HIS ACTIVE MISSIONARY WORK AND CONNECTION WITH THE CHRISTIAN-ECUMENISTS' GROUP. HE WAS TRIED IN 1985 ON CHARGES OF ANTI-SOVIET SLANDER (ART. 190-1 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RSFSR) AND SENTENCED TO THREE YEARS' DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY.

IT IS OUR SINCERE HOPE THAT YOU MAY BE ABLE TO DO SOMETHING TO HELP THESE PEOPLE.

IN THE NAME OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST WE APPEAL FOR YOUR INTERCESSION ON BEHALF OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS.

THE CHRISTIAN-ECUMENISTS' GROUP  
MOSCOW, 30 MARCH 1987.''

THE FOLLOWING IS ADDED TO THIS APPEAL:

''WE WISH TO ADD OUR SUPPORT TO THE APPEAL OF THE CHRISTIAN ECUMENICAL GROUP:

SERGEI GRIGORYANTS, RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN  
ALEXANDER OGORODNIKOV, RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN  
MIKHAIL KOPOT, PENTECOSTAL CHRISTIAN  
PYOTR GRIGALCHIK, PENTECOSTAL CHRISTIAN  
L. POLUNINA, PENTECOSTAL CHRISTIAN  
V. CHERTOVSKOY, PENTECOSTAL CHRISTIAN.''

NOTE TO EDITORS: GRIGORYANTS, OGORODNIKOV AND CHERTOVSKOY ARE AMONG THE RECENTLY RELEASED POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE USSR.

-----  
FURTHER RELEASES IN USSR:

IN ADDITION TO THE NEWLY REPORTED RELEASES OF LITHUANIAN CATHOLIC PRIEST FR SIGITAS TAMKEVICIUS, ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN MIKHAIL BOMBIN, UNREGISTERED BAPTIST VLADIMIR KHAILO (RELEASED FROM PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL) AND FELLOW UNREGISTERED BAPTIST ANDREI WOLF, INCLUDED IN KESTON COLLEGE'S LIST OF YESTERDAY (31 MARCH), THE FOLLOWING RELEASES OF UNREGISTERED BAPTISTS ARE TO BE ADDED:

ULYANA GERMANYUK, WHO IS DANGEROUSLY ILL  
YEGOR WOLF, TRIED WITH HIS BROTHER ANDREI  
IVAN STEFFEN, TRIED WITH THE WOLF BROTHERS  
PAVEL ZINCHENKO

NEWS HAS ALSO REACHED KESTON COLLEGE OF THE TRANSFER OF RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN LEONID BORODIN FROM CAMP IN PERM TO MOSCOW'S LEFORTOVO PRISON IN MARCH. HIS FRIENDS ARE HOPING THIS IS A SIGN THAT HE WILL BE RELEASED.

++++

297711 PRDRME G  
897684 KESCOL G

PRIME MINISTER

He re  
cpc

VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK

President Mubarak sent you a message shortly before your visit to the Soviet Union setting out the main current issues in the Middle East and asking you to do what you could to persuade the Soviet Union to be positive.

In the event, you were not able to have any detailed discussion with Mr. Gorbachev about the Middle East although the Foreign Secretary had quite a full talk with Mr. Shevardnadze.

I think it would nonetheless be appropriate for you to reply to President Mubarak's message. I attach a draft. Agree to sign?

CHARLES POWELL

3 April 1987

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 April 1987

*Don Carlos*

*CDP 3/4*

Arab/Israel: Message from President Mubarak

/ In my letter of 27 March, I undertook to provide a draft reply from the Prime Minister, after the Moscow visit, to the "oral message" addressed to her by President Mubarak of Egypt (Dr al-Baz's original text now enclosed).

/ I now enclose a draft message in the form of a telegram for transmission to Cairo if the Prime Minister is content. The draft mentions Egypt's Assembly elections on 6 April, and should therefore be sent before or during the weekend.

*James - Grew*

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification	Caveat	Precedence
CONFIDENTIAL		DESKBY 041200Z

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TO DESKBY 041200Z CAIRO  
TELNO  
OF  
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, AMMAN, TEL AVIV

*HE Mohamed Hosni Mubarak*

*NY4AMX*

9  
10  
11 YOUR TELNO 152: ~~PRIME MINISTER'S~~ MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK  
12 1. Please convey the following reply from the Prime Minister to  
13 President Mubarak's message:  
14 BEGINS  
15 ~~I~~ write to thank you for your message of good wishes and sound  
16 advice in advance of my recent visit to Moscow.  
17 *In the end I was not able to have any detailed*  
18 ~~I did indeed take the opportunity to urge Mr Gorbachev to~~  
19 ~~demonstrate his commitment to making a constructive contribution~~  
20 ~~to the vital search for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in~~  
21 ~~the Middle East. He told me that he accepted the need to seek~~  
22 ~~peaceful solutions to regional conflicts. Geoffrey Howe also~~  
23 ~~discussed the conflict in depth with Mr Shevardnadze. He~~  
24 ~~found his quite realistic in assessing the way forward.~~  
25 We found our interlocutors seized of the ~~urgently~~ *need* with which a  
26 solution, ~~must be sought,~~ and realistic in their assessment of the  
27 best way in which they could work with other interested parties  
28 towards this common goal. They accepted that more work was needed  
29 before even a preparatory conference could be convened *although he* but had no



YYYY  
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ADDITIONAL  
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Catchword: firm	
File number	Dept
	NENAD
Drafted by (Block capitals)	Telephone no
A F GOULTY	270 2458
Authorised for	Initials Date/time
despatch by:	
For COD use only	Comcen reference
Telegram number	Processed by

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Caveat	Precedence <b>DESKBY</b>
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<<<<

1 firm ideas on how this work should be approached. <sup>He</sup> They emphasised  
2 however that this preparatory work must get under way.

3  
4 I share your hope that ~~the~~ contacts between the Soviet Union and  
5 Israel will help to narrow the gap between the parties and to  
6 clear the path towards an international conference. The Soviet  
7 leaders made it clear to us that they expected preparatory work  
8 for a conference to include Israel and that in the course of it  
9 bilateral contacts between the Soviet Union and Israel could take  
10 place. I am encouraged by the subsequent reports of Soviet move-  
11 ment on the questions of consular exchanges with Israel and of  
12 Jewish emigration.

13  
14 In your message you stressed the importance of the Jordanian/  
15 Palestinian agreement of February 1985 and drew attention to the  
16 unfortunate consequences if the PLO were to abrogate it. I  
17 entirely agree that such a step by the PLO would make it <sup>even</sup> more  
18 difficult to draw them <sup>back</sup> in to the peace process. <sup>Sir Jeffrey Howe</sup> We argued in  
19 Moscow that it was essential to see that the search for PLO unity  
20 did not break the fragile bridge between the PLO and King Hussein.  
21 ~~The Soviet leaders made no direct reply.~~

22  
23 I welcome your dialogue with the US Administration on an inter-  
24 national conference. <sup>in Washington next week</sup> Geoffrey Howe will be giving George Shultz  
25 ~~next week~~ <sup>Americans</sup> an account of our talks in Moscow: <sup>we</sup> and will <sup>continue to</sup> encourage <sup>him</sup> him  
26 to look actively for ways to take matters forward.

27  
28 I know that you are concerned, as we are, about the situation in  
29 Beirut. We have just announced additional humanitarian aid of  
30 pounds 550,000 to the ICRC and UNRWA to support their relief work  
31 in Lebanon. We are continuing to do what we can to encourage  
32 those concerned to allow access to the <sup>Palestinian</sup> camps, and suggested to the  
33 Soviet leaders that they should use their influence with Syria to  
34 the same end.

For distribution order see Page

Catchword: May

# OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Caveat	Precedence <b>DESKBY</b>
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<<<<

1	May I take this opportunity to send you my very best wishes for a
2	successful outcome to the election to the People's Assembly on 6
3	April. Your efforts to foster democracy in Egypt will, I am sure,
4	contribute immensely to meeting the political and economic
5	challenges which your Government will face in the coming months.
6	<b>ENDS</b>
7	
8	<b>HOWE</b>
9	
10	
11	<b>YYYY</b>
12	<b>MAIN</b>
13	<b>LIMITED</b>
14	<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>
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16	<b>ADDITIONAL</b>
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31	<b>///</b>
32	<b>//</b>
33	<b>/</b>
34	

For distribution order see Page	Catchword:
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Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY  
1-19 VICTORIA STREET  
LONDON SW1H 0ET

Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215 5422

GTN 215

(Switchboard) 01-215 7877

CONFIDENTIAL

3 April 1987

The Rt Hon John MacGregor OBE MP  
Chief Secretary to the Treasury  
HM Treasury  
Parliament Street  
LONDON  
SW1P 3AG

CDP  
3/4

Dear John.

**DTI/ECGD SUPPORT FOR JOHN BROWN CONTRACT : USSR**

This is to confirm our agreement on DTI/ECGD support to John Brown for the polypropylene contract they are negotiating in the USSR in the light of telegrams from Moscow urging further HMG help. In view of the Prime Minister's on the spot assessment we agreed that the concessions requested in Moscow telegram 065 might be made exceptionally to help John Brown reduce their contract price in order to take this opportunity of securing an important contract in the USSR. I am pleased to report that we have heard that they have indeed won this contract.

We also agreed that it would be important to ring-fence these concessions as much as possible and I set out my decisions below. However, I also consider that it is important that, with our eye to future trade possibilities, we should encourage the Soviet side to consider UK credits financed in currencies other than Sterling. I am pleased therefore that the Russians have opted for US dollar financing, which should also reduce our future subsidy bill.

Following our conversation the following concessions were offered to John Brown subject to the conditions described.

(a) DTI technology development grant

The Department has offered support of up to \$1 million under the Science and Technology Act as a contribution towards John Brown's

JF4ATA



CONFIDENTIAL

costs on 13 possible areas of research and technology development associated with this project. This offer is subject to the company satisfying the Department that the proposed eligible costs required to generate support of \$1 million comply with the innovation criteria and that this support is deducted from the company's price.

(b) Reduction in ECGD buyer credit premium

It was agreed to offer John Brown the same (30 per cent) reduction in ECGD risk premium for a US dollar financing operation as had been offered for an ECU deal and on the same conditions. i.e:

- (i) the contract has to be signed within 3 months;
- (ii) the exporter has to make a price cut of at least double the amount of ECGD premium reduction; and
- (iii) he has to agree that our accountants may inspect his books to ensure against excess profits and to treat this concession as confidential.

Our preliminary estimates of the cost of interest makeup for a US dollar deal suggests that the saving would be of the same order or slightly more than for ECUs. We will let your officials have the final calculations here. The total amount of the premium reduction is estimated at \$1.2m and we envisage that this concession would also be extended to the three other firms (Courtauld, Davy and Simon Carves) to whom the ECU concession was offered on the above terms, but only if it is requested by the companies concerned.

(c) Concessions on ECGD Tender to Contract (TTC) Scheme

We agreed that we would allow concessions here to the amount requested by John Brown (i.e \$1,114,000) but in order to ring-fence them more effectively I agreed that this should be done by means of a special reduction in the TTC premium rather than in the form requested by John Brown which would set a precedent less easy to defend. In particular I consider that it would be unwise to agree to waive the normal 1 per cent first loss requirement which is an essential feature of the TTC Scheme. However we could agree to accept for TTC purposes that the signature of a document falling short of a final contract, but nevertheless representing an irrevocable commitment binding us on both sides, would suffice to enable them to sell dollars forward and thus curtail their exchange fluctuation risk. Thus the horizon of risk is shorter than usual, and as the award of the contract was made during the Prime






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
Minister's visit the risks of the Soviet buyer reneging on the deal subsequently have also been reduced. In my view these special factors justified the premium concession that we have offered and this combination of circumstances is less likely to occur in future. There is only one other case where this question may arise. We have just learned that Davy will be putting in their final bid for the £400m polyester fibre plant on Monday and it is probable that they will seek a similar concession for Deutsche mark or Dollar finance. As a contract awarded next week would also be attributed to the Prime Minister's visit, I consider that we would have to concede this if requested by Davy.

There is one matter which has still to be settled: this concerns the accounting treatment which will be applied to the reduction in ECGD Buyer Credit premium if the business is won. I hope that this question can be settled at official level, my own views are set out in the letter my Private Office sent to your's yesterday. I would be most disturbed at the precedent if the ECGD Trading Account were to be penalized by our decisions. I will of course discuss again with you if necessary.

I am copying this letter to members of E(A), Alan Clark and Sir Robert Armstrong.

  
PAUL CHANNON

JF4ATA





University of  
BRADFORD

**The Modern Languages Centre**

Bradford West Yorkshire BD7 1DP  
telex 51309 UNIBFD G  
☎ 0274 733466 ext 6218

From: Richard W.W. Pollock.

Address (7th to 24th April):

Charles Powell, Esq.,  
Private Secretary,  
10 Downing Street,  
London SW 1.

c/o Dr and Mrs P. Grensted,  
Corrie Lodge,  
Torridon,  
By Achnasheen,  
Ross-shire, IV22 2HA.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 April 1987.

*Dear Charles*

Prime Minister's visit to the USSR

I am writing as promised to enclose my observations - inevitably of a miscellaneous nature - additional to your own record of the Prime Minister's visit to the Soviet Union. Perhaps you could kindly confirm their safe receipt.

In the interests of both promptness and confidentiality, I leave the typing and distribution to your decision. I hope the notes are of some use. I have a feeling that Gorbachev's "blur" on the sequential nature of LRINF and withdrawal of missiles from the GDR and Czechoslovakia could betoken a shift - already made or imminent - in his thinking since his publicised 'Statement' of 28 February 1987. See p.3, section (k), of my notes.

It was a great delight and privilege to accompany the Prime Minister. I enclose a personal note of thanks and congratulations, which I should be grateful if you would pass to her, please.

You may be interested to know I am being considered for the award of a Personal Chair at my University (this was entirely unrelated to my then imminent work for the Prime Minister - of which scarcely anyone, not even my children, was told in advance). I was invited (encouraging!) to make a submission in March, and so am about to do so. I am hoping it will go well, and that my work for the Prime Minister - which I hope met with her approval - will be a positive influence on the arbiters' decision.

I am deeply grateful for your kindness on the trip. You deserve congratulations on your major part in its success. *All good wishes, Yours ever - Richard*

GRS 250

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FM MOSCOW  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELNO 570  
OF 030500Z APRIL 87

MS

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO SOVIET UNION: SOVIET PRESS COVERAGE

SUMMARY

1. EXTENSIVE FACTUAL COVERAGE CONTINUED IN IZVESTIYA OF 1 APRIL AND PRAVDA OF 2 APRIL. MAIN FEATURES WERE FRONT PAGE PHOTOGRAPHS OF FAREWELL CEREMONY.

DETAIL

2. THE FRONT PAGE OF IZVESTIYA ON 1 APRIL AND PRAVDA OF 2 APRIL CONTAINED FULL BUT FACTUAL ACCOUNTS OF THE FAREWELL CEREMONY. PRAVDA GAVE DETAILS OF THE BRITISH PROGRAMME. IZVESTIYA REPORTED THE TALKS WITH RYZHKOV AT SOME LENGTH.

3. REFERRING TO THE RESTRICTED DINNER, IZVESTIYA'S FRONT PAGE ALSO MENTIONED SEPARATELY THAT GORBACHEV AND RYZHKOV ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR WIVES HAD MET 'MARGARET THATCHER' IN INFORMAL SURROUNDINGS.

4. IZVESTIYA ALSO CONTAINED DETAILS OF THE OPENING OF THE BRITISH/SOVIET CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND VISIT TO THE INSTITUTE OF CRYSTALOGRAPHY. IT ALSO PUBLISHED THE TEXTS OF THE MOU ON CULTURE INFORMATION AND EDUCATION AND THE AGREEMENT ON SPACE COOPERATION.

5. PRAVDA'S LONDON CORRESPONDENT MASLENNIKOV HAD A SMALL PIECE REPORTING THE POSITIVE REACTION TO THE VISIT FROM THE BRITISH PRESS.

6. THIS WEEK'S MOSCOW NEWS ALSO HAS A REPORT OF THE VISIT WRITTEN BEFORE THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. IT INCLUDES A WARMER PHOTOGRAPH OF THE PRIME MINISTER WITH GORBACHEV BEFORE THE TALKS AND THE ONLY PHOTOGRAPH WE HAVE YET SEEN IN THE SOVIET PRESS OF THE PRIME MINISTER LIGHTING A CANDLE IN ZAGORSK.

7. ON PAST FORM WE DO NOT EXPECT SOVIET PRESS COMMENT ON THE VISIT UNTIL THE WEEKEND.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

MXHPAN 9028

NNNN

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS  
LIMITED

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DEFENCE D.  
RESEARCH DEPT.  
PLANNING STAFF  
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PROTOCOL DEPT.  
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PS/MR RENTON  
PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR DEKREK THOMAS  
CHIEF CLERK  
MR BOYD  
MR MUNRO  
MR GILLMORE  
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MR RENWICK

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 April 1987

Dear Charles,

Proposed Message to the Thai Prime Minister on Cambodia

When General Prem, the Thai Prime Minister, called on the Prime Minister on 12 March he stressed the importance of concentrating international attention on the Cambodian problem and the need to work for a solution. The Prime Minister indicated that she would raise Cambodia with Mr Gorbachev when she visited Moscow. General Prem was clearly pleased with this undertaking.

The Prime Minister did raise Cambodia with Mr Gorbachev and the Foreign Secretary also discussed Cambodia at length with Mr Shevardnadze. It would help our relations with the Thais if the Prime Minister were now to send a short personal message to General Prem to confirm that she had fulfilled her undertaking to him.

/ I enclose a draft, the last sentence of which is intended to discourage the Thais from revealing publicly the details of what the Soviet leaders said to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

TO: HE General Prem Tinsulanonda  
Prime Minister of the Kingdom  
of Thailand

Copies to:

*TG* *(initials)*  
*u*

SUBJECT:

When we met in London last month, I ~~said that~~  
<sup>to</sup> ~~I would~~ raise the problem of Cambodia during  
my visit to Moscow.

*promised*

I did indeed make clear to Mr Gorbachev our  
deep concern about Soviet support for the Vietnamese  
occupation of Cambodia. <sup>Sir</sup> Geoffrey Howe also  
discussed ~~Cambodia~~ <sup>the matter</sup> at greater length with  
Mr Shevardnadze, <sup>and</sup> ~~Sir Geoffrey~~ will be happy  
to give you and your colleagues a personal account  
when he comes to Bangkok later this month.

*DRAFT*

We <sup>pointed</sup> ~~pointed~~ out to the Russians that their support  
for Vietnam <sup>only</sup> ~~served to~~ reinforced international  
apprehensions about Soviet policies worldwide.

The Russians said that they were reluctant to  
exert any pressure on the Vietnamese to withdraw  
because such pressure would be ineffective.

They argued that a solution to the Cambodian  
problem could not be achieved overnight, that  
responsibility for a solution ultimately rested  
with the countries in the region and that the  
progress of achieving a national consensus in

/Cambodia

Enclosures flag(s) .....

Cambodia would have to start before Vietnamese troops left and continue after they had gone. The Russians claimed to have gained the impression that some outlines of a peaceful settlement acceptable to ASEAN and the countries of Indo-China were emerging.

I think <sup>few</sup> you will agree that the Soviet attitude was entirely predictable. There was no movement, but at least they were prepared to discuss the subject. ~~I am sure that it is right to keep up the pressure on them and on the Vietnamese to take concrete steps towards a solution.~~ <sup>We can only</sup> <sup>the necessary for</sup>

I should be happy for you to share this information with your ASEAN colleagues but I should be grateful if, beyond that, you could treat it in <sup>strict</sup> confidence.

CU





PRIME MINISTER

VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK

President Mubarak sent you a message shortly before your visit to the Soviet Union setting out the main current issues in the Middle East and asking you to do what you could to persuade the Soviet Union to be positive.

In the event, you were not able to have any detailed discussion with Mr. Gorbachev about the Middle East although the Foreign Secretary had quite a full talk with Mr. Shevardnadze.

I think it would nonetheless be appropriate for you to reply to President Mubarak's message. I attach a draft. Agree to sign?

CDP

CHARLES POWELL

3 April 1987

SUBJECT  
cc master  
ops.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 61A/87  
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031330Z APR  
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FM FCO  
TO FLASH BONN  
TELNO 211  
OF 031330Z APRIL 87  
AND TO FLASH PARIS, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE ROME  
INFO DESKBY 031430Z WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW : MESSAGES TO EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KOHL, MITTERRAND, MARTENS, LUBBERS AND CRAXI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TODAY. NO (REPEAT NO) SIGNED ORIGINALS WILL FOLLOW.
2. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MESSAGES TO KOHL AND MITTERRAND, WHICH SHOULD BE HEADED QUOTE DEAR HELMUT UNQUOTE AND QUOTE DEAR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND UNQUOTE, THE MESSAGES SHOULD BE HEADED QUOTE DEAR PRIME MINISTER UNQUOTE. THE ENDING SHOULD BE QUOTE WITH BEST WISHES, YOURS SINCERELY, MARGARET THATCHER UNQUOTE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MESSAGE TO KOHL, ON WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER'S SURNAME SHOULD BE OMITTED.

BEGINS. I WANTED TO LET YOU HAVE STRAIGHT AWAY MY IMPRESSIONS

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FROM MY VISIT TO MOSCOW. SIR GEOFFREY HOWE WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE HIS EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT THIS WEEKEND AT CORSENDONK. OUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT NATO BRIEFED HIS COLLEAGUES YESTERDAY.

(FOR MITTERRAND AND KOHL ONLY : IT WAS IMMENSELY USEFUL TO HAVE DISCUSSED THE VISIT WITH YOU A FEW DAYS BEFOREHAND. I WAS ABLE TO SPEAK TO GORBACHEV IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT MY MESSAGE REFLECTED THE VERY LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN US ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL.)

(FOR MARTENS, LUBBERS AND CRAXI ONLY: IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO BE ABLE TO SPEAK TO GORBACHEV IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT MY MESSAGE REFLECTED THE BROAD CONSENSUS AMONG THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL.)

(FOR ALL:) MY VERY EXTENSIVE TALKS WITH GORBACHEV EXTENDING OVER SOME TWELVE HOURS COVERED THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENTS ON REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND A BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR WIDE CONSEQUENCES: GORBACHEV'S PROGRAMME OF RESTRUCTURING OF SOVIET SOCIETY AND THE SOVIET ECONOMY: REGIONAL PROBLEMS: AND HUMAN RIGHTS. THEY WERE VERY FRANK. I THINK THAT WILL HAVE DONE GOOD.

I WANTED TO MAKE MY OWN ASSESSMENT OF HOW SERIOUS GORBACHEV IS ABOUT INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING. ON THE CLEAR EVIDENCE OF OUR TALKS, HE IS SERIOUS AND DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH HIS PLANS. AND I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT IS IN OUR INTERESTS THAT HE SHOULD SUCCEED, WHICH WILL HELP TO MAKE POSSIBLE A MORE OPEN AND STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

ON ARMS CONTROL, WE AGREED THAT PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO AN AGREEMENT ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WITH STRICT VERIFICATION, WITH CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS AND WITH IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS TO DEAL MORE FULLY WITH SHORTER

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RANGE SYSTEMS. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER ACCEPT THAT THE WEST SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO MATCH SOVIET SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS. NOR DID WE AGREE ON THE SYSTEMS WHICH SHOULD BE COVERED IN THE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS.. BUT I MADE CLEAR TO GORBACHEV THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS NOT PREPARED TO SEE THE SOVIET UNION HAVE A MONOPOLY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. WE ALSO AGREED THAT PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO NEGOTIATING A BAN ON ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS (GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD BROADLY ACCEPT OUR APPROACH) AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE EARLY NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. ON THIS LATTER POINT, I TRIED TO CONVEY CLEARLY TO HIM THE EXTENT OF THE THREAT WHICH WE IN WESTERN EUROPE PERCEIVE FROM THE SOVIET UNION'S PREPONDERANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND WEAPONS. I EXPRESSED OUR SUPPORT FOR A 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. GORBACHEV MADE CLEAR HIS VIEW THAT THIS WAS LINKED TO AGREEMENT ON SDI. I MADE A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS FOR ACHIEVING GREATER PREDICTABILITY IN THIS FIELD, INCLUDING A TIMETABLE FOR RESEARCH, WHICH GORBACHEV WILL CONSIDER.

I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFERENCES REMAINING BETWEEN US ON THESE MATTERS, OR UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF NUCLEAR DETERRANCE. BUT IT WAS CLEAR FROM OUR TALKS THAT WE DO AGREE THAT PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL REQUIRES A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH WITH CLEARLY IDENTIFIED PRIORITIES, AND THAT WE ARE LARGELY IN AGREEMENT ON WHAT THOSE PRIORITIES SHALL BE.

IN DISCUSSING REGIONAL PROBLEMS, I EXPLAINED TO MR GORBACHEV CANDIDLY THE REASONS FOR WESTERN APPREHENSION ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES AND INTENTIONS. I SAID THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM COULD SUPPORT THE CREATION OF A NEUTRAL, NON-ALLIGNED AFGHANISTAN AND HAD INDEED PRESENTED PROPOSALS FOR THIS (ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STATES) AS LONG AGO AS 1980. BUT THIS COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED UNTIL THE SOVIET OCCUPATION WAS ENDED AND ELECTIONS HELD. IN ADDITION, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE HELD EXTENSIVE AND VERY USEFUL TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE ON A WIDE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE MIDDLE EAST

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AND IRAN/IRAQ.

ON HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS, I WELCOMED THE STEPS WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN, WHILE EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT MORE PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE AND DISSIDENTS WOULD BE RELEASED AND JEWS ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY IF THEY WISH TO DO SO. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED ALL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES VERY CAREFULLY AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DEAL WITH THEM ATTENTIVELY, WITH POSITIVE RESULTS WHERE POSSIBLE. I TOLD HIM OF OUR WELCOME FOR HIS POLICIES OF OPENNESS, RESTRUCTURING AND DEMOCRATISATION. AS I MADE CLEAR, WE ARE LOOKING FOR DEEDS, NOT WORDS. BUT I BELIEVE HIS ENDEAVOURS POINT THE WAY TO THE GREATER TRUST AND CONFIDENCE WHICH WILL BE NEEDED IF WE ARE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL.

IT WAS A MOVING AND STRIKING TESTIMONY TO CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION TO BE ABLE TO MEET DR SAKHAROV FOR LUNCH AT OUR EMBASSY AND TO MEET ALSO A SMALL GROUP OF BRAVE JEWISH REFUSENIKS. I WAS ALSO ABLE TO GIVE A LONG TELEVISION INTERVIEW, WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY WENT OUT IN FULL, IN WHICH I MADE SOME EXPLICIT COMMENTS ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES. IT WAS A CHANCE TO BRING THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW TO A MUCH WIDER AUDIENCE THAN NORMALLY HEARS IT. THE RESPONSE OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE ON MY WALKABOUTS IN MOSCOW, ZAGORSK AND TBILISI WAS REMARKABLE AND TESTIFIES TO THEIR YEARNING FOR CONTACT WITH THE WEST.

MY VISIT TOOK PLACE AT A MOST INTERESTING AND CRUCIAL MOMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO WELCOME AND ENCOURAGE THE COURSE ON WHICH GORBACHEV HAS EMBARKED. OUR POLITICAL SYSTEMS WILL REMAIN VERY DIFFERENT AND WE SHALL CONTINUE TO HOLD WIDELY DIVERGENT VIEWS ON MANY INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. BUT WE WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS THESE DIFFERENCES FRANKLY IN A SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP.

I FOUND THE VISIT FASCINATING AND ON THE WHOLE ENCOURAGING.

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(FOR MITTERRAND ONLY: AS YOU KNOW, I WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO  
DISCUSS THESE ISSUES WITH M CHIRAC WHEN WE MEET ON 26 APRIL.)  
ENDS.

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PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR THOMAS

MR BOYD

MR RATFORD

MR FALL

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PS/MR YOUNGER MOD

MR MALLABY CABINET OFFICE.



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 April 1987

**PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION  
MESSAGES TO EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT**

Thank you for your letter of 2 April with which you enclosed draft messages from the Prime Minister to a number of European Heads of Government.

BF // I have slightly revised these and enclose a composite message which, with minor variations, could go to all the heads of government concerned. I should be grateful if it could be despatched as soon as possible with instructions that it be delivered in the capitals concerned in the course of today.

The appropriate headings are "Dear President Mitterrand"; "Dear Prime Minister" for the others with the exception of Chancellor Kohl which should be "Dear Helmut". The endings should be "With best wishes, Yours Sincerely, Margaret Thatcher" (except in the case of Chancellor Kohl when it should just be "Margaret").

(Charles Powell)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND/-  
CHANCELLOR KOHL/MR MARTENS/MR LUBBERS/MR CRAXI

I wanted to let you have straight away my impressions from my visit to Moscow. Sir Geoffrey Howe will be able to give his European Community colleagues a more detailed account this weekend at Corsendonk. Our Permanent Representative at NATO briefed his colleagues yesterday.

[For Mitterrand and Kohl: It was immensely useful to have discussed the visit with you a few days beforehand. I was able to speak to Gorbachev in the knowledge that my message reflected the very large measure of agreement between us on East/West relations and arms control.]

[For Martens/Lubbers/Craxi: It was very important to be able to speak to Gorbachev in the knowledge that my message reflected the broad consensus among the West European countries on East/West relations and arms control].

My very extensive talks with Gorbachev extending over some twelve hours covered the prospects for agreements on reductions in nuclear and conventional weapons and a ban on chemical weapons; the fundamental differences between our two political systems and their wide consequences; Gorbachev's programme of restructuring of Soviet society and the Soviet economy; regional problems; and human rights. They were very frank. I think that will have done good.

I wanted to make my own assessment of how serious Gorbachev is about internal political and economic restructuring. On the clear evidence of our talks, he is serious and determined to press ahead with his plans. And I have no doubt that it is in our interests that he should succeed, which will help to make possible a more open and stable relationship between East and West.

On arms control, we agreed that priority should be given to an agreement on intermediate range nuclear weapons, with strict



verification, with constraints on shorter range systems and with immediate follow-on negotiations to deal more fully with shorter range systems. He did not, however, accept that the West should have a right to match Soviet shorter range systems. Nor did we agree on the systems which should be covered in the follow-on negotiations. But I made clear to Gorbachev that the United Kingdom was not prepared to see the Soviet Union have a monopoly of nuclear weapons in Europe. We also agreed that priority should be given to negotiating a ban on all chemical weapons (Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union could broadly accept our approach) and that there should be early negotiations on reductions in conventional forces. On this latter point, I tried to convey clearly to him the extent of the threat which we in Western Europe perceive from the Soviet Union's preponderance in conventional forces and weapons. I expressed our support for a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons. Gorbachev made clear his view that this was linked to agreement on SDI. I made a number of proposals for achieving greater predictability in this field, including a timetable for research, which Gorbachev will consider.

I do not underestimate the differences remaining between us on these matters, or upon the fundamental philosophy of nuclear deterrence. But it was clear from our talks that we do agree that progress on arms control requires a step-by-step approach with clearly identified priorities, and that we are largely in agreement on what those priorities shall be.

In discussing regional problems, I explained to Mr Gorbachev candidly the reasons for Western apprehensions about Soviet policies and intentions. I said that the United Kingdom could support the creation of a neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan and had indeed presented proposals for this (on behalf of the European Community states) as long ago as 1980. But this could not be achieved until the Soviet occupation was ended and elections held. In addition, Sir Geoffrey Howe held extensive and very useful talks with Shevardnadze on a wide

range of international problems, including in particular the Middle East and Iran/Iraq.

On human rights problems, I welcomed the steps which had already been taken, while expressing the hope that more prisoners of conscience and dissidents would be released and Jews allowed to leave the country if they wish to do so. Gorbachev said that the Soviet government considered all humanitarian issues very carefully and would continue to deal with them attentively, with positive results where possible. I told him of our welcome for his policies of openness, restructuring and democratisation. As I made clear, we are looking for deeds, not words. But I believe his endeavours point the way to the greater trust and confidence which will be needed if we are to reach agreement on arms control.

It was a moving and striking testimony to change in the Soviet Union to be able to meet Dr Sakharov for lunch at our Embassy and to meet also a small group of brave Jewish refuseniks. I was also able to give a long television interview, which subsequently went out in full, in which I made some explicit comments about Soviet policies. It was a chance to bring the Western point of view to a much wider audience than normally hears it. The response of the Russian people on my walkabouts in Moscow, Zagorsk and Tbilisi was remarkable and testifies to their yearning for contact with the West.

My visit took place at a most interesting and crucial moment in the development of the Soviet Union. I firmly believe that it is in our interest to welcome and encourage the course on which Gorbachev has embarked. Our political systems will remain very different and we shall continue to hold widely divergent views on many international problems. But we were able to discuss these differences frankly in a spirit of friendship.

I found the visit fascinating and on the whole encouraging.

CONFIDENTIAL



JKR  
ck

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

3 April 1987

Prime Minister's visit to the Soviet Union:  
Follow up

The Prime Minister attaches very great importance to our following up her visit to Moscow in practical ways, covering all fields of our relations. I think she would welcome it if the Foreign Secretary were able to bring forward a paper as soon as practicable with proposals for this, which would of course need to be prepared in consultation with his principal colleagues. The Prime Minister may mention this at her bilateral with the Foreign Secretary on Monday. But you may wish to be giving preliminary thought to it before then, if indeed you are not already doing so.

I am copying this letter to Timothy Walker (Department of Trade and Industry).

(CHARLES POWELL)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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BRITISH EMBASSY  
MOSCOW

2 April 1987

Ken Neill Esq  
Soviet Department

*Dear Ken*

PRIME MINISTER'S BREAKFAST WITH REFUSENIKS: DOCUMENTS

1. The substance of the Prime Minister's meeting with refuseniks has been reported by telegram. At the end of the meeting, the Beguns and Mrs Ioffe took their opportunity to pass over to the Secretary of State a number of appeals and statements by various members of the refusenik community.
2. At the Secretary of State's request I enclose all the documents for further consideration, together with as many translations as time permitted me to prepare. I would be very grateful if you would, exceptionally, arrange for further copying of the documents as necessary, to copy addressees.
3. Attached are:
  - a) A statement by Iosif Begun
  - b) A letter to the Prime Minister from 10 refusenik women, headed by Marta Badashinskaya (and including Rosa Ioffe who attended the breakfast).
  - c) A copy of a statement to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet signed by 9 refusenik women, again including Rosa Ioffe. (The three did not make clear if this had actually been sent to the Presidium).
  - d) A copy of an open letter to Ryzhkov and Itchak Shamir (not translated) signed by a large group of refuseniks.
  - e) Letters in English to the Prime Minister from various refuseniks.

*Yours ever,  
Kate*

Miss K S J Horner

cc C D Powell Esq, PS/10 Downing St  
PS/Secretary of State  
PS/Mr Renton  
CSCE Unit  
P S Roland Esq, RD(SS)

*My words to Prime Minister M. Thatcher  
(if I would be able to speak to her).*

Последний визит в Москву Премьер-министра Великобритании г-жи М. Тэтчер проходит в особое время. В СССР проводятся перемены, цель которых, как официально объявлено, установление более открытого демократического общества. Можно давать этим переменам разную оценку, но они происходят. Так, приглашение еврейского активиста на встречу с Премьер-министром Великобритании в английское посольство в Москве сегодня можно сопоставить с тем, что 15 лет назад тот же активист в группе других еврейских активистов был подвергнут превентивному аресту на все время визита в Москву Президента США. Но еврейская проблема в СССР остается по-прежнему острой, ее перемены до сих пор не коснулись.

Наибольшую остроту имеет проблема репатриации в Израиль. Власти в СССР отказываются признать за евреями священное право возвращения на родину предков и трактуют ее лишь в рамках воссоединения семей. На этой основе тысячам и тысячам отказывают в воссоединении со своим народом, а введенный недавно закон об эмиграции делает невозможным для большинства советских евреев само обращение за разрешением о выезде. Для отказа в выезде используются различные как правило надуманные предлоги, как например пресловутая секретность. Многие тысячи еврейских семей разлучены с детьми или родителями, подчас по десять и более лет.

Другая проблема связана с положением еврейской культуры в СССР. В этой стране, где живут миллионы евреев, нет еврейских школ, не издаются учебные пособия по языку, истории, национальной культуре. Советские евреи лишены всего, что составляет основу духовной жизни народа. В большинстве советских городов нет синагог. Народ, давший миру Книгу Книг, не имеет в СССР возможности изучать язык Библии. Следствием всего этого является национальная деградация советского еврейства.

Право национальной группы на сохранение своей самобытности, также как и право на репатриацию на землю предков, относится к фундаментальным правам человека. Реализация национальных прав советских евреев может, поэтому, служить своего рода индикатором истинности провозглашенных в Советском Союзе демократических преобразований. Я расцениваю лестное для меня приглашение Премьер-министра г-жи М. Тэтчер как свидетельство того, что правительство и народ Великобритании проявляют особый интерес к положению советских евреев. Озабоченность нашими проблемами отражает, без сомнения, глубокие исторические связи между еврейским и английским народами. Я вместе со своими друзьями по борьбе за права советских евреев хочу выразить г-же М. Тэтчер нашу глубокую признательность за поддержку наших национальных чаяний.

*Joseph Ruz*  
1. Apr. 1987.

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

MY WORDS TO PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER (If I would be able to speak to her). JOSEPH BEGUN

The present visit to Moscow of the Prime Minister of Great Britain Mrs Margaret Thatcher is taking place at a special time. In the USSR changes are taking place, whose goal, according to official announcements, is the establishment of a more open democratic society. One can assess these changes in various ways, but they are taking place. Thus the invitation of a Jewish activist to a meeting with the Prime Minister of Great Britain in the British Embassy in Moscow today should be compared with the fact that 15 years ago the same activist, in a group of other Jewish activists, was subjected to preventative arrest for the entire duration of a visit to Moscow by the President of the USA. But the Jewish problem in the USSR remains, as before, acute, the changes have not yet reached it.

The most acute of all is the problem of repatriation to Israel. The Soviet authorities refuse to acknowledge the sacred right of Jews to return to the Motherland of their ancestors and interpret it solely within the boundaries of reunification of families. On this basis thousands and thousands [of people] are refused reunification with their own people while the law on emigration recently introduced makes it impossible for the majority of Soviet Jews even to apply for permission to leave. Various pretexts, on the whole deliberate ones, are used for refusal of exit, for example, the notorious "possession of State secrets". Many thousands of Jewish families are parted from their children or parents sometimes for 10 or more years.

Another problem is connected with the position of Jewish culture in the USSR. In this country where millions of Jews live there are no Jewish schools, school textbooks on the language, history and national culture are not published.

/Soviet Jews

Soviet Jews are deprived of everything which makes up the basis of their spiritual life as a people. In the majority of Soviet towns there is no Synagogue. The people who gave the world the Book of Books does not have the opportunity in the USSR to study the language of the Bible. The result of all of this is the national degradation of Soviet Jewry.

The right of a national group to conserve its own identity like the right to repatriation to the country of their ancestors belongs to the fundamental rights of man. The realisation of national rights of Soviet Jews can therefore be taken as a kind of indicator of the sincerity of the democratic transformations proclaimed in the Soviet Union. I regard the flattering invitation to meet the Prime Minister Mrs Margaret Thatcher as evidence of the fact that the Government and people of Great Britain are showing particular interest in the situation of Soviet Jews. This concern with our problems without doubt reflects the deep historical links between the Jewish and British peoples. Together with my friends in the struggle for the rights of Soviet Jews I wish to express to Mrs Margaret Thatcher our deep appreciation for the support of our longings for nationhood.

Госпоже Маргарет Тэтчер  
Премьер-Министру  
Великобритании

31 марта 1987 г.

Уважаемая госпожа Тэтчер,

Каждая из подписавших это письмо уже много лет добивается возможности выехать вместе с семьей в Израиль. Мы признательны Вам за интерес к нашим проблемам и за помощь и поддержку, которые мы неизменно получаем от многих лиц и организаций в Вашей стране. Тепло человеческого участия неизменно поддерживает нас все эти годы.

Мы хотим надеяться, что начавшиеся перемены в жизни Советского общества коснутся и нас, отказников. Эту надежду вселяет в нас освобождение многих наших товарищей, томившихся в лагерях и тюрьмах. Хочется верить, что и оставшиеся тоже скоро выйдут на свободу.

Мы пользуемся случаем, чтобы обратить Ваше внимание на наиболее существенный, с нашей точки зрения, аспект проблемы, именно, отсутствие каких-либо сдвигов в делах лиц, которым отказывают в разрешении на выезд из страны по соображениям государственной безопасности. Известное заявление М.С. Горбачева о 5-10-летнем сроке ожидания для лиц такого рода до сих пор никак не реализуется на практике - сроки ожидания не известны и во многих случаях превышают все разумные пределы. Часто людям отказывают в связи с "режимом родственников", порой даже умерших, дети наследуют режимные отказы родителей и не могут самостоятельно даже ходатайствовать о выезде.

Мы связываем с Вашим визитом надежду на улучшение отношений между странами и людьми, без которого невозможно движение вперед по пути прогресса и доверия. И может быть мы и наши семьи и семьи сотен наших друзей получим, наконец, возможность поселиться там, где мы хотим и вернуться к нормальной жизни, из которой мы насильственно исключены в течение многих долгих лет. С искренним уважением

Марта Балашинская  
Елена Дубянская  
Инна Иоффе  
Роза Иоффе  
Елена Клоц  
Марина Романовская  
Виктория Хасина  
Оксана Холмянская  
Татьяна Улановская  
Римма Якир



UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Mrs Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister  
Great Britain

31 March 1987

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

Each of the women who have signed this letter has been trying for many years to obtain permission to depart with her family for Israel. We are grateful to you for the interest in our problems and for the help and support which we constantly receive from many people and organisations in your country. The warmth of human involvement has unfailingly supported us all these years.

We would like to hope that the changes which have begun in the life of Soviet society will also affect us, the Refuseniks. This hope is inspired in us by the release of many of our comrades who have been suffering in camps and prisons. We would like to believe that those who still remain there will also emigrate to freedom. We are taking this opportunity to draw your attention to what is from our point of view the most essential aspect of our problem, ie the absence of any progress in the cases of those who are refused permission to leave the country for reasons of State security. The well-known statement of M S Gorbachev about the 5-10-year waiting period for such people has not so far been put into practice in any way - waiting periods are not made known and in many cases exceed all reasonable boundaries. People are often refused [exit] in connection with the regulations on family relationship, sometimes even those who have died, children inherit the refusals given to their parents and cannot even petition for exit on their own behalf.

We link our hopes for the improvement of relations between countries and peoples with your visit; without this improvement movement on the path of progress and confidence is impossible. And perhaps we and our families and the families of hundreds of our friends will at last receive the opportunity

/to move

Letter Contd

(2)

to move to where we want and to return to normal life from which we have been forcibly excluded for many long years.

With sincere appreciation

Marta Badashinskaya  
Elena Dubianskaya  
Inna Ioffe  
Rosa Ioffe  
Elena Ioffe  
Marina Romanovskaya  
Viktoriya Khassina  
Oksana Kholmianskaya  
Tatyana Ulanovskaya

Заявление

Мы, нижеподписавшиеся, обращаемся к вам в связи с чрезвычайно тяжелым положением в семье Фаины Львовны и Наума Израилевича Коган. В 1975 г. они впервые обратились с ходатайством о выезде на постоянное жительство в Израиль, куда ранее переехал их сын. С тех пор им систематически отказывают в разрешении по "режимным соображениям", якобы связанным с прежней работой Н.И. Когана.

Между тем, Коганы – два глубоких тяжело больных и совершенно одиноких старика. Науму Израилевичу 78 лет. Он страдает застарелой стенокардией, язвой желудка, воспалением простаты. Он совершенно слеп на один глаз и едва видит другим. Фаине Львовне около 70 лет. Она страдает тяжелой бронхиальной астмой, сахарным диабетом, стенокардией и болезнью почек. Но самое страшное – она уже два года больна миеломой (один из видов рака крови) и прикована к постели.

Неужели правительство такой могучей державы, как Советский Союз, может всерьез утверждать, что выезд двух совершенно одиноких здесь и тяжело больных стариков может угрожать безопасности страны?

Трагизм ситуации в этой семье сейчас достиг высшей точки: не удастся, несмотря на все усилия врачей, вывести Ф.Л. Коган хотя бы на кратковременную ремиссию. В организме идут необратимые злокачественные процессы, а это может означать, что ее дни сочтены. Поэтому мы настоятельно призываем вас, с учетом всего сказанного, немедленно разрешить выезд семье Коган.

Прошло около 16 лет, как Наум Израилевич вышел на пенсию по старости, а это достаточный срок для снятия любого режима, учитывая нынешние темпы развития науки и техники. Гуманность и милосердие украшают любую власть. Мы очень надеемся быть услышанными именно теперь, когда руководство СССР призывает положить конец формализму и бюрократизму в решении больших и малых дел и людских судеб. Мы хотели бы верить, что будет положен конец бюрократическому садизму чиновников ОВИРА'а, которые имели жестокость подтвердить отказ семье Коган 25. 03. 1987. Преступно отказывать им в праве хотя бы умереть на руках сына.

Елена Сейдель  
Аркадий Май  
Юлия Ратнер  
Леонид Бялый  
Роза Иоффе

Эмма Ландсман  
Людмила Лившиц  
Наталья Розенштейн  
Римма Якир

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

To the Presidium of Supreme Soviet, USSR

STATEMENT

We the undersigned appeal to you in connection with the exceedingly grave situation of the family of Faina L'vovna and Naum Izrailevich Kogan. In 1975 they petitioned for the first time for departure to permanent residence in Israel where their son had gone earlier. Since that time they have systematically been refused "for reasons of security" allegedly connected with Naum Izrailevich Kogan's previous work.

It is appropriate to say that the Kogans are two extremely seriously ill and very solitary old people. Naum Izrailevich is 78. He suffers from a chronic heart condition, a stomach ulcer and inflamed prostate. He is completely blind in one eye and can hardly see out of the other. Faina L'vovna is almost 70. She has severe bronchial asthma, diabetes and heart and lung complaints. But the worst thing is that she has suffered for two years with Mieloma (a kind of cancer of the blood) and she is bedridden.

Surely, the Government of a great power such as the Soviet Union cannot seriously maintain that the departure of two old people who are completely alone here and seriously ill can threaten the security of the country?

The tragedy of this family's situation has reached a climax now: despite all the efforts of doctors it is not possible to give Faina L'vovna even a temporary remission. Her body is undergoing irreversible malignant processes and this may mean that her days are numbered. For this reason we urgently call on you, taking into account all that we have said to grant permission to leave immediately to the Kogan family.

16 years have passed since Naum Izrailevich retired and that is a sufficient period to lift any security restrictions considering the present pace of development of science and

/technology

technology. Humanity and compassion enhance any power. We hope fervently for a hearing now that the leadership of the USSR is calling for an end to formalism and bureaucratism in the resolution of large and small questions and the fates of individuals. We would like to believe that there will be an end to the bureaucratic sadism of the officials of OVIR who had the cruelty to confirm the refusal to the Kogan family on 25 March 1987. It is criminal to refuse them the right at least to die in the arms of their son.

Elena Seidel  
Arkady Mai  
Yulia Ratner  
Leonid Byaly  
Roza Ioffe

Emma Landsman  
Lyudmila Lifshitz  
Natalya Rosenshtein  
Rimma Yakir

Главе правительства СССР Рыжкову Н.П.  
Главе правительства Израиля Ицхаку Шамиру

### Глубокоуважаемые главы правительств!

В последние 15 лет вопрос о выезде евреев из СССР в большей или меньшей степени неизменно привлекал к себе пристальное внимание политических и общественных кругов многих стран мира. При этом в качестве критерия удовлетворительного состояния выезда евреев из СССР часто предлагаются количественные показатели. Называются при этом цифры 40 000, 100 000, 400 000 человек. С другой стороны на протяжении последних лет мы были свидетелями откровенного выкупа /или попыток выкупа/ отдельных семей и лиц, производимых по спискам и пресобам государственных деятелей и общественных организаций Запада.

Мы полагаем, что ни один из этих путей не является подлинным решением вопроса. Удовлетворительное решение проблемы выезда евреев в Израиль должно включать следующие элементы:

1. Каждый еврей должен обладать правом и возможностью выехать в Израиль, не объясняя причин принятого им решения, и вне зависимости от наличия родственников в Израиле.

2. При отказе в выезде по режимным соображениям, отказ должен быть сформулирован в письменном виде, с указанием органа для обжалования и точных сроков действия ограничений на выезд из СССР. После окончания срока ограничений виза выдаётся автоматически.

3. СССР должен выдать разрешения на выезд в Израиль всем узникам Сиона, находящимся в СССР, а также в кратчайшие сроки пересмотреть дела отказников со сроком отказа 10 и более лет.

Нам представляется, что в настоящее время, когда с одной стороны в общественной жизни советского общества происходят положительные преобразования, а с другой стороны намечаются контакты между СССР и Израилем, такое решение практически возможно.

Как известно, в настоящее время выезд евреев из СССР осуществляется в рамках постановления Совета Министров СССР от 28 августа 1986г. №1064, которое ограничивает возможность выезда рамками воссоединения семьи, причём правом на возбуждение ходатайства обладают лишь лица, имеющие за границей ближайших родственников /муж, жена, дети, брат, сестра/.

Вместе с тем пункт 30 этого постановления предусматривает изменение процедуры при наличии двустороннего договора между СССР и другими странами.

Мы полагаем, что практически осуществление наших предложений могло бы иметь место в рамках некоего специального соглашения о репатриации евреев между СССР и Израилем.

Предлагая рассмотреть возможность заключения такого соглашения мы исходим из того, что Советский Союз в принципе признаёт идею репатриации и практически применял её, например, в отношении греков, испанцев и поляков.

Подобное соглашение позволит осуществить действительную репатриацию евреев в Израиль, а в качестве технического средства осуществления такого соглашения могли бы послужить прямой авиарейс Москва-Тель-Авив или паромная линия Одесса-Хайфа.

Мы обращаемся к вам, уважаемые главы правительств, с просьбой внимательно рассмотреть наши предложения и предпринять необходимые шаги к их осуществлению.

В. Бравловский, И. Бегун, Л. Бельзевский, Г. Гейшес, А. Зеличёнок,  
С. Зубко, В. Кислик, Ф. Кочубиевский, Я. Леви, Е. Лейн, В. Лифшиц,  
О. Локшин, А. Магидович, И. Нудель, А. Парицкий, В. Слелак, К. Фридман,  
А. Хелмянский, В. Цукерман, Б. Чернебыльский, С. Ширман, Л. Эльберт,  
А. Якир, Ф. Беренштейн, Н. Ратнер-Магарик, Т. Эдельштейн, Н. Фрадкова.

DEAR Mrs.THATCHER !

We know about Your big work in the human rights problem in the USSR and particular in the problem of jewish emigration from here and we are very grateful to You for whatever You've been doing for us.

Among many problems in this field there is one, which doesn't connect with security of USSR. And sovjet authorities could solve it easy. It is very important problem for the future - the emigration of young religious families to Israel from USSR.

And we ask You to put attention in Your contacts with sovjet leaders on this problem.



PROBLEM OF EMIGRATION TO ISRAEL FROM USSR  
**YOUNG RELIGIOUS FAMILIES**

We, young religious families from different towns of Caucasus ,  
insist on our legitimate right - to go to Israel.

We wrote letters to General Secretary of CPSU m-r Gorbatchev about  
our desire to make an aliya to devote ourselves to G-d in Israel, to  
fulfil Commandments, which can be done only in Erez Israel, to take  
active part in the life of Jewish State.

We wish to learn our children in Jewish way of life and mentality.  
Normal jewish life for us is imporsible without studying Judaism and Hebrew.

We see forward severe contradictions in mentality our families  
and schools here and it will cause a greit stress for our children  
in the nearest future.

We cant supply enough our families with cosher food and we have  
many problems to keep our rules - Shabbat, Holydais and so on.

As the religious beliefs are among the most important human rights  
and human life motivations WE INSIST THAT SOVJET OFFICIALS MUST REGARD  
THEM AS A VALID REASON FOR EMIGRATION as reunating of families.

Signed by


Palanker Dmitrij, Irina and Yevgenij - Yerevan, pr. Octemberjyna, 36, apt. 195  
tel. 58-33-09

Vaistuch Anaida, Otary -- Tbilisy, ul. Dadiani 22.

Fejgin Alexandr, Davitashvily Ljna - Tbilisy, Gldany 3 microrayon, corpus 4  
apt. 77.

Kopeikis Boris, Isacova Ljuba - Baku, ul. Neftepererabotchikov, 81 apt. 131

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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: ITALIAN PRESS REACTIONS

SUMMARY

1. THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT RECEIVED DETAILED COVERAGE IN THE ITALIAN PRESS. ADMIRATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S AUTHORITATIVE PERFORMANCE AND THE RECEPTION GIVEN TO HER, BUT SOME DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE TALKS DID NOT PRODUCE MORE PROGRESS ON DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT.

DETAIL

2. ALL ITALIAN NEWSPAPERS, AND TV NEWS BULLETINS, CARRIED FULL REPORTS DAILY FROM MOSCOW OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT. THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AND PRESS CONFERENCE AND COMMENTS BY OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN FROM THE KREMLIN AND THE BRITISH PARTY WERE REPORTED FULLY AND ACCURATELY. BUT PREOCCUPATION WITH INTERNAL ITALIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS PUSHED THE STORY ONTO THE INSIDE PAGES AND LEFT LITTLE ROOM FOR EDITORIAL COMMENT.

3. REPORTS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH GORBACHEV ON 30 MARCH WERE PRESENTED IN OVER DRAMATIC TERMS. THE FRANK EXCHANGES WERE DESCRIBED IN MOST ITALIAN NEWSPAPERS AS TENSE AND ANIMATED, LEADING TO A HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE. THE ATMOSPHERE ON 31 MARCH HOWEVER WAS DESCRIBED AS WARMER. GREAT INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH SACHAROV AND HER TV INTERVIEW AS EXAMPLES OF THE PROGRESS TOWARDS OPENESS MADE UNDER GORBACHEV. MOST PAPERS EXPRESSED RESPECT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERFORMANCE IN HER TELEVISION INTERVIEW.

/4

4. IN ROUND-UP ARTICLES ON 2 APRIL LA STAMPA PAID TRIBUTE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S CLARITY OF EXPRESSION AND HER MASTERY OF THE SUBJECTS UNDER DISCUSSION. IT ALSO DESCRIBED THE RECEPTION GIVEN TO HER AS EXCEPTIONAL, A REFLECTION ON THE FACT THAT SHE IS CURRENTLY SEEN AS AN UNDOUBTED "LEADER" WITHIN THE WESTERN WORLD. IL TEMPO COMMENTED THAT WHILE THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERFORMANCE WILL HAVE DISAPPOINTED THOSE WHO HOPED FOR RECONCILIATION AND CONCRETE PROGRESS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS IT WILL HAVE DONE HER NO HARM IN THE EYES OF BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION.

BRIDGES

YYYY

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*From the Private Secretary*

2 April 1987

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: MEETING WITH  
THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENCE OF PEACE

I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's meeting with the Soviet Committee for the Defence of Peace in Moscow on 30 March.

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CB

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND REPRESENTATIVES  
OF THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENCE OF PEACE, ON MONDAY 30 MARCH 1987  
1987 AT 0900.

Those present were:

Mr. Borovik, Chairman of the Committee	The Prime Minister
Miss Ulanova, Prima Ballerina and Vice Chairman of the Committee	Sir Geoffrey Howe
Mr. Karpov, First Secretary of the Union of Writers	Mr. C. D. Powell
Dr. Ilyin, Vice President of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences	Mr. Pollock (Interpreter)
Mr. Chetirev, Director of the Ordzhonikidze Machine Tool Factory	Mr. Hemans (British Embassy)

Mr. Borovik introduced the delegation. He and Mr. Karpov presented the Prime Minister with their latest books. They had both recently been awarded a state prize for literature. Miss Ulanova said that she would have presented a book too had she known that it would be appropriate.

Mr. Borovik said that he wanted the meeting to be informal. He had not brought a petition. He welcomed the Prime Minister to the Soviet Union. The first visit at this level in 12 years was significant. On behalf of the Committee which was the most representative organisation in the Soviet Union he said that the question of most concern was nuclear disarmament. The Committee did not understand how it was possible to believe that nuclear weapons were a positive feature guaranteeing peace. They had not prevented conventional war. The balance of terror was a waste of resources and a humiliation for mankind. Even if nuclear weapons were a guarantee of peace there would be no need to increase them further or put them in space. The Committee supported the Soviet Government's INF proposals and the separation of British and French weapons from the main dialogue. Public opinion tended not to agree. British weapons were pointed at the Soviet Union. They were to be increased eight-fold which was a stimulant to the arms race. The UK seemed to be a major obstacle to nuclear disarmament. High nuclear expenditure took away resources from other essentials like the environment and energy. Within a few decades our environment would be a serious threat to

to the continuation of life on earth. Dr. Ilyin supported this with reference to his work with Professor Roberts on the effects of a nuclear exchange. 2½ billion people would die in a 10,000 megaton exchange compared to 4 billion killed in 15,000 wars over 5,000 years. Chernobyl, the effects of which he was in charge of investigating, was an example of what could happen.

Mr. Borovik said that there was a false impression in Western Europe of the Soviet Union, which was not totalitarian and its people did not think in stereotypes. He criticised those in the UK who said that it was necessary to speak to the Soviet Union from a position of strength, and that this had brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. For 70 years this tactic had failed. Churchill who had advocated it, had himself changed his view later in life. 'New thinking' was needed. In 1987 'if you want peace prepare for war' was an outdated concept.

Mr. Karpov criticised the Western media for reporting everything about the Soviet Union with a 'built-in minus sign'. Emigres who had a negative attitude anyway were in great measure responsible for this. Not everything was perfect in the Soviet Union. But the West never saw the other side.

Mr. Borovik said that those with a professional hatred of the Soviet Union were received in high places in Britain. We needed other sources of information as well. He asked the Prime Minister to look carefully at what the Soviet Union was doing during her visit and help Britain in general to get a truer picture. The current restructuring programme was a revolutionary development directed at improving the quality of life. That could not hurt anyone.

In reply the Prime Minister said that the aim should be to prevent all war not only nuclear. Conventional war was not as some thought an acceptable alternative. Both Britain, which had stood alone against Hitler for two years, and the Soviet Union knew how terrible conventional war was. Conventional weapons had never prevented



conventional war. Nuclear weapons were a very great deterrent. Not so many were needed, but deterrence was essential. A war in a situation where nuclear weapons had been eliminated would lead to a race to get them back which would be far more dangerous than maintaining an effective deterrent. The British deterrent was being upgraded by two and a half times. Since Polaris was introduced Soviet warheads had been increased by five times. Even if strategic missiles were reduced by 50 per cent, and assuming the introduction of Trident, British weapons would be a smaller percentage of Soviet weapons than they were in 1970. The image of the Soviet Union of which Mr. Borovik had spoken was determined by reality. The Helsinki Final Act confirmed the right of people to leave their countries. This was not the case in the Soviet Union. In Britain we enjoyed the four great freedoms of the Atlantic Charter, freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear. Britain was excited about current developments in the Soviet Union. Increasing personal freedoms were a great help towards arms control agreements. Those who kept their promises to their citizens were more likely to keep their promises to others. As Dr. Sakharov had said an open society was the greatest guarantee of trust. Britain as an open society could be trusted. As NATO had always said, its weapons would never be used except against an attack. Peace did not come from the simple wish for it but from positive measures to protect security. As to negotiating from a position of strength, the West had begged the Soviet Union to remove the SS20s and they had only agreed to do so when Western INF was deployed.

Mr. Borovik said nuclear weapons had not prevented Vietnam, Korea, the Middle East, Iran/Iraq, Afghanistan, the Falklands, Libya or Grenada. The Prime Minister contrasted Grenada when the United States had left and free elections had been held, with Afghanistan.

The meeting ended at 0945.

~~Mr Powell,~~  
Noto.



*With the compliments of*

**THE PRIVATE SECRETARY**

Charles

This is the document  
you discussed with Tony  
last night.

John 2/4.

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
SW1A 2AH**

## PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

### Briefing Notes

- Visit confirmation of correctness of Thatcher-Howe post-1983 policy. Decided then long haul for creation of contacts/understanding. Efforts now paying off.
- In PM's case, some 11 hours of contacts (7 talks, 2 + 2 dinners). Key was exposure of Gorbachev to sustained, comprehensive, candid exposition of Western views on socialism/democracy, arms control, Soviet interference in Third World.
- Sharp private and public divergences. Gorbachev spoke as true believer in system, resentful of Western reactions to Soviet reform. Atmosphere remained cordial throughout: what Ambassador called "the most candid and coherent exchanges on nearly every aspect of the East/West relationship that have ever taken place between a Soviet leader and the Head of a Western Government".
- Public response also important. Mrs Thatcher able to convey views with some frankness to 100s of millions on Soviet TV. Response of crowds in streets (eg Tbilisi) moving.
- Prime Minister addressed main questions of ideology, arms control. In 8 hours with Shevardnadze, I reviewed wide agenda of regional issues. Invited to pay further visit later this year.

### BILATERAL

- In bilateral relations, signed 4 agreements (space, Hotline, Embassy Site, OU on Information and Culture).  
MOU should help open doors of glasnost further. Annual lecture; home visits for schoolchildren; endorse end of jamming ; more cultural contacts; "telebridges" etc.
- Added drugs to list of subjects for bilateral expert talks; they added alcoholism
- In trade, some substantial contracts signed: about £400 million worth of business. Agreed aim at volume of trade of 2.5 billion roubles by 1990.

## ARMS CONTROL

- Agreement progress in arms control requires step by step approach with clear priorities.
- No agreement - indeed public argument - on nuclear deterrence. Gorbachev must now understand logic of our beliefs.
- Agreement that priority should be given to INF agreement, with strict verification, constraints on shorter range systems, immediate follow on negotiations to deal with these systems. PM insisted on right to match Soviet shorter range systems.
- Agreement also on priority for ban on CW. Gorbachev willing broadly to accept UK approach.
- On START/SDI, Gorbachev very firm on the link - but interested in PM's proposals for establishing greater predictability over programmes for defensive development.
- Agreement that there should be early negotiations on conventional reductions.

## HUMAN RIGHTS

- Human Rights: PM and I raised in general and specific terms. Welcomed steps already taken. Pressed for compliance with Helsinki Final Act. Handed over lists. Sakharov lunch; Refusenik breakfast. Gorbachev said individual cases would be considered carefully, with positive results where possible.

## REGIONAL

- Afghanistan: Made clear we would help in achieving settlement based on neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan, but this required early withdrawal of Soviet forces.
- Middle East: Shevardnadze pressed need for action, but accepted that overhasty convening of international conference or preparatory conference could be dangerous. I suggested nudging process forward; stressed need to maintain PLO-Hussein link.
- Substantial exchange also with Shevardnadze on CSCE; Iran-Iraq; Cambodia-Vietnam; Sino-Soviet Relations; Korea.

- In sum, visit
  - promoted trade and bilateral contacts
  - clarified way forward on arms control;
  - contributed to understanding of each other's policies eg on regional issues
  - Enabled us to appreciate the important changes going on in the Soviet Union - perestroika etc - and Gorbachev's seriousness about them
  - On this, PM made clear that we welcome the changes. Policies of openness, restructuring, democratization point way to greater trust and confidence needed for arms control agreements.



de MT  
cfc.



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 April 1987

Dear Tony,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE  
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Page 8 of the note of the Prime Minister's meeting with the Soviet Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr Ryzhkov, recorded that Mr Ryzhkov handed to the Prime Minister a list of import and export opportunities although this was what the interpreter recorded. It now appears that the two pieces of paper handed over were copies of a list of those which the Soviet Union was ready to export to Britain. There was and is no Soviet import opportunities list. I am attaching a copy of the Soviet export list.

Two other small points on the record:-

1. I should have inserted the initials of the Soviet team. For that purpose I enclose a new first page of the record. *amended JB 3.4.87*
2. On page 3, paragraph beginning "After confirming", it should say towards the end "The Soviet Union had by far the largest stockpile of modern chemical [not nuclear as in the record] weapons."

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Alex Allan (HM Treasury), Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office) and H.M. Ambassador (Moscow).

*his only*  
*Nigel Wicks*

N.L. Wicks

A.C. Galsworthy. Esq., CMG.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

## L I S T

of Soviet Goods Offered for Additional Supplies  
to the United Kingdom

Description of goods	Unit of measurement	1990
Total:	million roubles	350-370
<u>Machinery and equipment</u>		<u>65-70</u>
including:		
- metal-cutting machine-tools and pressing and forging equipment	"-	4.5-5.0
- bearings	"-	1.3-1.5
- passenger cars	thou. pieces	15-20
- helicopters	pieces	3
Engineering household goods		
including:		
- domestic refrigerators	thou. pieces	28-30
- domestic timepieces, inclu- ding movements	"-	3000-3200
- TV sets	"-	25-30
<u>Commodities and finished goods</u>	million roubles	<u>285-300</u>
including:		
Chemicals		
- methanol	thou. tons	50-60
- ammonia	"-	70-90
- orthoxylene	"-	19-20
- urea	"-	13-15
Crude oil	"-	1000-1100
Oil products	"-	800-900
Non-ferrous metals		
including:		
copper	"-	35-40
nickel	"-	6.5-7.0
aluminium	"-	40-45
Ferrous metals rolled products	"-	13
Pig iron	"-	20
Fur-skins	million roubles	12-15
Other goods, including mass consumer goods	"-	30-50



1

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION  
MESSAGES TO EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

I attach a draft of a message which we could telegraph tomorrow to a number of European Heads of Government about your visit to the Soviet Union.

Agree to the message?

CDP


Lizceller Thankyou

CDP

2 April 1987

ms

# A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>2530</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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OF 020520Z APRIL 87

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~~Mr Powell~~ NO 10 DST

Mr SEYMOUR DTI


Mr LONGRIGG SOVD

FOR POWELL, NO. 10 FROM CHASE

DTI FOR SEYMOUR

FCO FOR LONGRIGG, SOVIET DEPT

JOHN BROWN POLYESTER PLANT



1. YUSHKIN, GENERAL DIRECTOR, TECHMASHIMPORT, WILL BE INFORMING JAPANESE AND ITALIAN COMPETITORS THAT JOHN BROWN HAVE WON CONTRACT AT 1600 HRS MOSCOW TIME TODAY. HE IS ANXIOUS THAT FINAL PRICE OF PROJECT SHOULD NOT BE MENTIONED, AS IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT HE ACCEPTED JOHN BROWN'S BID WHICH WAS HIGHER THAN COMPETITION.

2. WE THEREFORE AGREED THAT THE CONTRACT SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED AS PART OF A PACKAGE AND THAT THE EMBARGO WOULD BE LIFTED AT 1300 HRS LONDON TIME. HE WAS CONTENT THAT THE PROJECT MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE FOLLOWING LINES: "DURING THE PERIOD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, CONTRACTS AND A LETTER OF INTENT TO A TOTAL VALUE OF POUNDS 403 MILLION WERE CONCLUDED. THESE INCLUDED THE MAJOR JOHN BROWN CONTRACT TO BUILD A POLYPROPYLENE PLANT AT BUDYONNOVSK, THE GEC SIMON CARVES PROJECT TO BUILD A LOGIC PROCESS CONTROLLER PRODUCTION PLANT AT YEREVAN, THE REFURBISHMENT OF 3 TEXTILE PLANTS BY TAYLOR WOODROW AND ANOTHER BY RIETER SCRAGG."

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

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FM BONN

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 279

OF 021105Z APRIL 87

AND TO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PARIS, WASHINGTON, BMG BERLIN, EAST BERLIN

AND TO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING OTHER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POSTS

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: GERMAN PRESS COMMENT

SUMMARY

1. EXTENSIVE COVERAGE AND COMMENT OVER 3 DAYS. EMPHASIS AS MUCH ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES AS ON DISARMAMENT; ALSO ON THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR GORBACHEV.

DETAIL

2. THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT HAS RECEIVED EXTENSIVE FRONT PAGE COVERAGE AND EDITORIAL COMMENT FOR THE PAST 3 DAYS, AS WELL AS SUBSTANTIAL REPORTS ON RADIO AND TV. COMMENT HAS FOCUSED ON THE LINK MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER BETWEEN RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS. HER APPROACH, ONE LEADING ARTICLE SAID TODAY, HAD BEEN AN EXAMPLE TO ALL WESTERN POLITICIANS. SHE DID NOT LEAVE OUT ANY ISSUES AND SHE DID NOT MINCE WORDS. ANY WHO THOUGHT THAT SUCH FRANKNESS WOULD ANNOY KREMLIN LEADERS HAD BEEN PROVED WRONG. THERE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN A GREATER CONTRAST WITH WHAT WEST GERMAN VISITORS TO MOSCOW USUALLY BRING BACK WITH THEM. AS THE SPOKESMAN FOR EUROPE, SAID ANOTHER ARTICLE, SHE HAD PRESENTED GOOD ARGUMENTS AND REPRESENTED NATO'S POSITION BRILLIANTLY.

3. ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, COMMENT FOCUSED ON THE FACT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT RESTRICT HER VISIT TO GOVERNMENT AND OFFICIAL CIRCLES IN THE KREMLIN. IT WAS REMARKABLE THAT SHE MET SACHAROV AND BEGUN.

4. THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR GORBACHEV, MARKED BY FRIENDLY MANNERS AND FRANK SPEECH, WAS NOTED AS HELPING TO ENSURE UNUSUALLY WIDE COVERAGE OF THE VISIT IN THE SOVIET MEDIA, INCLUDING THE PRINTING IN PRAVDA OF THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH ON 30 MARCH.

- 1 -

15.

GRS 170

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FM MADRID

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELNO 225

OF 020645Z APRIL 87

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDAS GENEVA, UKDEL NATO

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: SPANISH PRESS COVERAGE *mt*

SUMMARY

1. COVERAGE OF THE VISIT IN SPANISH PRESS AND TV HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE. COVERAGE LARGELY FACTUAL, GIVING POSITIVE IMPRESSION OF VISIT. ONE EDITORIAL CRITICAL OF UK POLICY ON ZERO OPTION.

DETAIL

2. COVERAGE IN THE SPANISH PRESS AND TV DURING THIS WEEK HAS BEEN PROMINENT. THE IMPRESSION GIVEN IN MOST PRESS ARTICLES FROM MOSCOW HAS BEEN OF A UNIQUE VISIT MARKED BY FRANK EXCHANGES, THOUGH WITH DIFFERENCES REMAINING OVER ARMS CONTROL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND AFGHANISTAN.

3. ON 1 APRIL EL PAIS (INDEPENDENT, LARGEST SELLING NATIONAL DAILY) DEVOTED ALMOST TWO FULL PAGES TO THE VISIT, ONE GIVING AN OVERVIEW AND ONE ON THE SAKHAROV LUNCH. EL PAIS ALSO CARRIED AN EDITORIAL ON THE VISIT WHICH NOTED MRS THATCHER'S FIRMNESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPREHENSION OF CURRENT CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE BULK OF THE EDITORIAL WAS DEVOTED TO EUROPEAN AND US ATTITUDES TO THE ZERO OPTION AND CONTAINED CRITICISMS OF THE UK AND FRENCH ATTITUDES TO THE ZERO OPTION. IT CONCLUDED BY SUPPORTING THE DELORS PROPOSAL FOR A COMMUNITY POSITION.

GORDON LENNOX

FCO PASS ALL

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REPEATED AS REQUESTED

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS  
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 April 1987

CH

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Visit: Message to European Leaders

The Prime Minister may wish to send messages about her Moscow visit to President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl and the Belgian, Dutch and Italian Prime Ministers, following up her meetings with the first two and messages to the other three before the visit.

/ I enclose a draft message, which could be sent to each of them with the minor variations indicated.


Yours ever,

L Parker

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

2 April 1987

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION:  
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I enclose, for the Foreign Secretary and Permanent Under Secretary only, the message about her visit to the Soviet Union which the Prime Minister sent to President Reagan last night on her return.

CHARLES POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

GRS 2000

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326

MY TELNO 523 : PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH GORBACHEV ON 30/31  
MARCH

SUMMARY

1. NEARLY SEVEN HOURS OF TALKS ON 30 MARCH, WITH ONLY NOTE-TAKERS AND INTERPRETERS PRESENT (PLUS TWO HOURS OF DISCUSSION OVER DINNER) DOMINATED BY ARMS CONTROL BUT ALSO EXPLORING THE ROOTS OF EAST/WEST DIFFERENCES, THE NATURE OF THE CAPITALIST AND SOCIALIST SYSTEMS, GORBACHEV'S PROGRAMME OF 'RESTRUCTURING', REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS. THE VIGOUR OF THE EXCHANGES LEFT THE WARMTH OF THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP UNIMPAIRED.

2. AS REPORTED IN MY TUR, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD NEARLY 2 HOURS (INCLUDING TALKS DURING DINNER) WITH GORBACHEV ON 30 MARCH. TODAY, 31 MARCH, ENDED WITH

MUSUA SMALL INFORMAL DINNER PARTY WHICH PROVIDED THE OCCASION FOR A FURTHER 2 HOURS OF GENERAL DISCUSSION. EXCEPT ON THE LAST OCCASION, WHICH WAS ENTIRELY RELAXED, THE TALKS WERE SPECIFIC, VIGOROUS AND OFTEN HEATED. A REMARKABLE FEATURE OF THE VISIT HAS BEEN THE COMBINATION OF AN EXCELLENT ATMOSPHERE AND PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE HARD-HITTING EXPRESSION OF WIDELY DIVERGENT VIEWS. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE MAIN POINTS WHICH AROSE.

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

3. THE PRIME MINISTER SPELT OUT WITH TOTAL CANDOUR THE REASONS FOR WESTERN APPREHENSIONS CONCERNING SOVIET POLICIES AND INTENTIONS. THESE INCLUDED NOT ONLY SPECIFIC MOMENTS OF HISTORIC EXPERIENCE (HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AFGHANISTAN) BUT ALSO THE MORE GENERAL FACTOR OF THE SOVIET GOAL OF SPREADING COMMUNISM WORLD WIDE. THE WEST RECOGNISED AND WELCOMED GORBACHEV'S COMMITMENT TO INTERNAL REFORM BUT STILL AWAITED SIGNS OF CHANGE IN SOVIET EXTERNAL POLICIES. SOVIET BEHAVIOUR IN SOUTH YEMEN, ETHIOPIA, MOZAMBIQUE, ANGOLA, NICARAGUA AND VIETNAM/CAMBODIA REINFORCED THESE APPREHENSIONS. THE WEST GAVE AID, THE SOVIET UNION ONLY ARMS.

4. GORBACHEV DENIED THAT THE IMPOSITION OF COMMUNISM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD HAD EVER BEEN A SOVIET GOAL: THE PRIME MINISTER'S

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THINKING

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THINKING HAD NOT MOVED BEYOND THE 1940'S AND 1950'S. THE MARXIST VIEW OF HISTORY WAS NO MORE THAN A SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT; THEORY, NOT POLICY. THE CHANGES, PARTICULARLY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, IN WHICH THE WEST ALWAYS SOUGHT TO FIND THE HAND OF THE SOVIET UNION IN FACT RESULTED FROM OBJECTIVE FACTORS INCLUDING OPPRESSION AND POVERTY. EVERY COUNTRY HAD THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE ITS PATH, WHETHER CAPITALIST, DEMOCRATIC OR SOCIALIST. THE SOVIET UNION NATURALLY SYMPATHISED WITH THOSE CLOSEST TO ITS OWN SYSTEM, JUST AS THE WEST DID.

5. IN A SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE ON THE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH DIFFERENTIATED SOVIET SOCIALISM FROM WESTERN DEMOCRACY, GORBACHEV CLAIMED THAT BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY HAD DEVELOPED A MECHANISM WHICH OPERATED 'AS EXQUISITELY AS A BALLET' FOR FOOLING PEOPLE ABOUT WHO REALLY CONTROLLED THE LEVERS OF POWER IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES. DISPARITIES OF INCOME WHICH WERE COMMON IN THE UK WOULD BE INTOLERABLE IN SOVIET SOCIETY WHICH, EQUALLY, COULD NEVER TOLERATE 3 1/2 MILLION UNEMPLOYED. FREEDOM SHOULD INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO WORK, THE RIGHT TO QUALITY IN HOUSING AND EDUCATION, THE RIGHT TO BE PROPERLY REPRESENTED AND THE RIGHT NOT TO BE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST ON GROUNDS OF RACE. THE PRIME MINISTER RETORTED THAT ONCE TOTAL STATE CONTROL OVER A SOCIETY HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF ESCAPE THROUGH CHANGE. EXPERIENCE SHOWED THAT COUNTRIES WITH FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS WERE MORE LIKELY TO BE FREE AND OPEN. THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM HAD SHOWN THAT IT COULD DISTRIBUTE FAR GREATER BENEFITS TO ORDINARY PEOPLE THAN COULD SOCIALISM. BUT THE WEST HAD NO DESIRE TO UNDERMINE THE SOVIET SYSTEM ALTHOUGH AN EXTENSION OF PERSONAL LIBERTIES WAS DESIRABLE. SHE AND GORBACHEV AGREED THAT DISCUSSIONS AT THIS LEVEL OF FRANKNESS WERE VALUABLE AND A STARTING POINT FOR CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS.

ARMS CONTROL  
INF

6. THE PRIME MINISTER WELCOMED GORBACHEV'S ABANDONMENT OF THE UNNECESSARY LINK BETWEEN AN INF AGREEMENT AND PROGRESS ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, WHILE POINTING OUT THAT THE INF PROBLEM NEED NEVER HAVE ARISEN IF THE SOVIET UNION HAD WITHDRAWN ITS SS20S, MANY YEARS AGO, AS THE WEST HAD ASKED. ALTHOUGH THE UK'S STRONG PREFERENCE WAS FOR A GLOBAL ZERO-OPTION, A ZERO-OPTION IN EUROPE WAS ACCEPTABLE PROVIDED THAT AN AGREEMENT INCLUDED CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF, WHICH COULD REACH LARGE AREAS OF WESTERN EUROPE, AND PROVISION FOR EQUAL CEILINGS ON SRINF WITH A WESTERN RIGHT TO MATCH SOVIET LEVELS. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO ELIMINATE INF IN EUROPE, TO FREEZE SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS AND TO WORK OUT A FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT ON SHORT-RANGE MISSILES. THIS WAS THE PROPOSITION WHICH HAD BEEN PUT TO THE US AT REYKJAVIK, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS WERE NOW DENYING IT. THE SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS WHICH, AS HE HAD SAID PUBLICLY, THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, SHOULD BE DESTROYED

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"IN FRONT OF TELEVISION CAMERAS". ANOTHER PROBLEM WAS THE APPARENT WESTERN INTENTION OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF MISSILES UNDER THE GUISE OF MAKING REDUCTIONS E.G. BY CONVERTING PERSHING IIS INTO PERSHING I'S. IF THE WEST BEHAVED IN THIS WAY, HE WOULD DEMAND THAT NATO'S DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NEGOTIATION. THE PRIME MINISTER ARGUED THAT THE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT-RANGE MISSILES WOULD ALSO HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE: UNLIKE EITHER THE SOVIET UNION OR THE US, WESTERN EUROPE LIVED UNDER THE THREAT OF CONVENTIONAL WAR AND NEEDED THE DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ENSURE ITS SECURITY. IN A LONG EXCHANGE ON THE VALIDITY OF THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, THE PRIME MINISTER AND GORBACHEV ENERGETICALLY DEPLOYED THE ARGUMENTS CONTAINED IN THEIR RESPECTIVE SPEECHES AT THE OFFICIAL DINNER ON THE EVENING OF 30 MARCH.

## STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS

7. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR REDUCTION OF 50% IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE TWO SUPER-POWERS. THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT UNDERMINING DETERRENCE. GORBACHEV SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH AT REYKJAVIK THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEY HAD SUBSEQUENTLY ACCEPTED THAT A START COULD BE MADE BY 50% REDUCTIONS AND THAT, RATHER THAN LOSING THE WAY IN ENDLESS SUB-LIMITS, THESE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE IN EACH LEG OF THE STRATEGIC TRIAD. HE CLAIMED THAT SHULTZ HAD ALSO ACCEPTED THIS.

## SDI

8. GORBACHEV ADMITTED THAT IN MAKING, AT REYKJAVIK, AN INF AGREEMENT PART OF A PACKAGE APPROACH, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD INTENDED TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON SDI. GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE WAS WORRIED BY SDI, WHILE CLAIMING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE A RESPONSE (UNSPECIFIED) TO IT. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NEVER BREAK THE LINK BETWEEN SDI CONSTRAINTS AND STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER POINTED OUT THAT THE SDI DID NOT EXIST AND NOBODY KNEW IF IT WOULD BE FEASIBLE: BUT IT WAS PERFECTLY SENSIBLE TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN ORDER TO FIND OUT. SHE UNDERSTOOD THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR SOME PREDICTABILITY IN THIS AREA. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE A MEANS OF SETTING OUT THE PROPOSED ACTIVITIES OF BOTH SIDES, LINKING THIS WITH AN UNDERTAKING NOT TO DEPLOY SDI FOR A FIXED PERIOD. THIS SHOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO DE-COUPLE THE START NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE QUESTION OF SDI CONSTRAINTS. GORBACHEV COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS AN INTERESTING, PRACTICAL, PROPOSAL: BUT THERE COULD ONLY BE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS IF THERE WERE GUARANTEES AGAINST AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE. PERHAPS COUNTRIES SHOULD BEGIN TO DEFEND OUTER SPACE ABOVE THEIR TERRITORIES AS THEY DEFENDED THEIR AIR SPACE.

## CONVENTIONAL FORCES

# Confidential

9. RESPONDING TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S ASSERTION THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE NEEDED TO REDUCE THE SOVIET PREPONDERANCE IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, GORBACHEV CLAIMED THAT IISS FIGURES SHOWED THAT THERE WAS PARITY, OR NEAR PARITY, IN THE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS OF THE TWO ALLIANCES. NATO HAD NOT RESPONDED TO THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THE IISS FIGURES WERE SERIOUSLY FLAWED AND TOOK NO ACCOUNT OF GEOGRAPHY. PAST SOVIET BEHAVIOUR JUSTIFIED WESTERN EUROPEAN FEARS OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL MIGHT.

CW

10. THE PRIME MINISTER POINTED OUT THAT THE UK HAD DESTROYED ALL ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE LATE 1950S, WHEREAS THE SOVIET UNION HAD DEVELOPED A HUGE STOCKPILE AND WAS NOW ENGAGED IN FURTHER MODERNISATION. CHEMICAL WEAPONS SHOULD BE BANNED TOTALLY, ALTHOUGH VERIFICATION WOULD BE DIFFICULT. THE UK HAD PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS TO FACILITATE A BAN. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO COOPERATE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD TAKEN A FIRM DECISION TO ELIMINATE CW AND HAD EVEN BUILT A PLANT TO HANDLE THEIR DESTRUCTION.

AFGHANISTAN

11. GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ASTONISHED TO SEE A RECENT STATEMENT BY THE LEADER OF AN AFGHAN "TERRORIST GROUP" TO THE EFFECT THAT AS SOON AS ALL SOVIET TROOPS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN, ALL COLLABORATORS WITH THE PRESENT REGIME WOULD BE DESTROYED: THIS HAD BEEN SAID IN THE PRESENCE OF A BRITISH MINISTER, WHO HAD ENDORSED IT. THE US CLEARLY DID NOT WISH TO SEE SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN WHICH WOULD ALLOW IT TO BECOME A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATE. THE SOVIET UNION NEVERTHELESS WISHED TO WITHDRAW. THE PRIME MINISTER REPLIED THAT IT WAS A GREAT PITY THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD INVADDED AFGHANISTAN IN THE FIRST PLACE. THE UK SUPPORTED THE CREATION OF A NEUTRAL, NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN AND HAD PRESENTED PROPOSALS FOR THIS AS LONG AGO AS 1980. BUT THIS COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED UNTIL THE SOVIET OCCUPATION WAS ENDED AND ELECTIONS HELD (AS THE UK HAD DONE IN RHODESIA). SHE RECOGNISED ALL THE DIFFICULTIES BUT URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE THE PLUNGE.

ENDS PART 1

GRS: 500 PART II

"PERESTROIKA"

12. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THERE WAS BROAD SUPPORT FOR HIS DOMESTIC POLICIES AMONG THE INTELLIGENTSIA AND WORKING CLASS, ALTHOUGH THOSE WHO WERE PERFECTLY COMFORTABLE WITHOUT "RESTRUCTURING" WERE A PROBLEM. A WIDE DEBATE WAS UNDER WAY WITHIN SOVIET

<sup>-4-</sup>  
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/SOCIETY

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SOCIETY: THE WORKERS WERE KEEN TO END A SITUATION IN WHICH THEY RECEIVED WAGES FOR MAKING INFERIOR PRODUCTS AND THEY SUPPORTED THE DRIVE FOR IMPROVED QUALITY. THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT WOULD BE COMPLETELY REFORMED, SWITCHING FROM ADMINISTRATIVE TO ECONOMIC METHODS. MEANWHILE, HE FOUND THAT HE WAS CRITICISED FROM THE LEFT FOR BEING TOO SLOW, FROM THE RIGHT FOR BEING TOO QUICK AND FROM OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION FOR NOT GOING FAR ENOUGH, I.E. CHANGING THE SYSTEM. AFTER OUTLINING THE MAIN FEATURES OF HIS ECONOMIC REFORM, GORBACHEV SAID THAT A PARTICULAR PRIORITY WAS TO COMBAT "THE IMPORT DISEASE": THIS MEANT THAT MOST INVESTMENT WAS BEING CHANNELLED TO THE MACHINE-BUILDING AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES. ACHIEVEMENTS TO DATE HAD COME FROM BETTER DISCIPLINE AND ORGANISATION: BUT THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM HAD SCARCELY BEEN TOUCHED. PEOPLE HAD TO BE GIVEN TIME TO ADAPT. THE TASK NOW WAS TO CONCENTRATE ON IMPLEMENTING WHAT HAD ALREADY BEEN MAPPED OUT, RATHER THAN COMING UP WITH MORE NEW IDEAS. THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD COME BACK IN TWO OR THREE YEARS TIME AND LOOK AT PROGRESS.

## HUMAN RIGHTS

13. DENYING GORBACHEV'S ACCUSATION THAT SHE SEEMED TO SEE EVERYTHING CONNECTED WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS BLACK, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT SHE WAS IN FACT MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION THAN SHE HAD EVER BEEN. THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH GORBACHEV HAD SET IN TRAIN WOULD BENEFIT NOT ONLY HIS OWN COUNTRY BUT WOULD ALSO ENGENDER GREATER TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ON THE PART OF OTHERS. SHE UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTIES BUT HOPED THAT GORBACHEV WOULD PERSIST AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT MORE PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE AND DISSIDENTS WOULD BE RELEASED. THERE WERE MANY MORE WHO WOULD LIKE PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION. THE JEWISH COMMUNITY SHOULD BE BETTER TREATED AND JEWS ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY IF THEY WISHED TO DO SO. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED ALL HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS VERY ATTENTIVELY AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DEAL WITH THEM WITH EVEN MORE CARE. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD ENTERED INTO SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS AT HELSINKI: SHE WAS ONLY ASKING THAT THEY SHOULD BE OBSERVED. GORBACHEV REPEATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ALREADY CONSIDERING WITH THE UTMOST CARE QUESTIONS OF EXIT VISAS AND REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES: IN THE MAJORITY OF CASES A POSITIVE DECISION WAS REACHED, WITH ONLY A

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FEW EXCEPTIONS FOR WHICH THERE WERE GOOD REASONS. THE PRIME MINISTER POINTED OUT THAT THE WAY IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION TREATED ITS OWN PEOPLE WAS A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN HOW RELATIONS WITH IT WERE REGARDED BY THE WEST AND IN THE PROSPECTS FOR REACHING AGREEMENTS.

14. SEE TIFT

CARTLEDGE

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SOVIET DEPT

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INFO PRIORITY EAST EUROPEAN POSTS

TO: [unclear]	
GRS 027/7	
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- 3 APR 1987	
INDEX	REGISTRY
	Action Taken

MIPT: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

1. THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT STILL HAS ONE DAY (IN GEORGIA) TO GO: BUT IT IS ALREADY CLEAR THAT IT HAS BEEN A REMARKABLE, AND PROBABLY UNIQUE, EVENT BOTH IN UK/SOVIET RELATIONS AND IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AS A WHOLE. THIS IS NOT BECAUSE IT HAS PRODUCED A BREAKTHROUGH IN ANY CURRENT AREA OF EAST/WEST NEGOTIATION: OR BECAUSE IT HAS PRODUCED BILATERAL AGREEMENTS, USEFUL THOUGH THOSE (ON SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION IN SPACE, UPGRADING THE HOT-LINE, EXPANDING CULTURAL AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES AND ON EMBASSY SITES) SHOULD PROVE TO BE. IT IS, RATHER, BECAUSE THE VISIT HAS BEEN THE OCCASION FOR MORE CANDID AND COHERENT EXCHANGES ON NEARLY ALL ASPECTS OF THE EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP THAN HAVE, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, EVER TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN A SOVIET LEADER AND THE HEAD OF A WESTERN GOVERNMENT. AS THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD THE PRESS, SHE COULD NOT REMEMBER EVER HAVING SPENT SO MUCH TIME IN DISCUSSION WITH ANOTHER WORLD LEADER.

2. A NOTABLE FACTOR OF THE VISIT HAS BEEN THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ITS ATMOSPHERE, IN TERMS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S RELATIONS BOTH WITH GORBACHEV HIMSELF AND WITH THE SOVIET PEOPLE AT LARGE AND ITS SUBSTANCE. ALTHOUGH WIDELY DIVERGENT VIEWS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED, BOTH IN PRIVATE AND - IN SPEECHES, ON SOVIET TV AND TO THE WORLD PRESS - IN PUBLIC WITH PROBABLY UNPRECEDENTED FRANKNESS AND VIGOUR, THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP IS AT LEAST AS WARM, IF NOT WARMER, AT THE END OF THE VISIT THAN IT WAS AT ITS OUTSET: WHILE PUBLIC INTEREST IN AND ENTHUSIASM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER EXCEEDS ANYTHING WHICH I CAN RECALL DURING A VISIT BY A FOREIGN STATESMAN. AT A SMALL PRIVATE DINNER PARTY - IN ITSELF, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, WITHOUT PRECEDENT - ON 31 MARCH, GORBACHEV JOVIALY DESCRIBED HIS TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AS HAVING BEEN 'TEMPESTUOUS BUT WITH GREAT CLARITY'.

3. THE VISIT'S IMPORTANCE LIES IN THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN EXPOSED TO A MORE COMPREHENSIVE, RATIONAL AND TOTALLY UNFUDGED EXPOSITION OF CENTRAL WESTERN VIEWPOINTS THAN, PROBABLY, IT HAS EVER ENCOUNTERED. THE TALKS REVEALED THAT, HOWEVER INTELLIGENT AND SOPHISTICATED GORBACHEV AND HIS SENIOR COLLEAGUES MAY BE BY COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS GENERATIONS OF SOVIET LEADERS, THEY STILL HARBOUR AN EXTRAORDINARY DEGREE OF MISCONCEPTION AND MISINFORMATION ABOUT WESTERN LIFE AND VALUES: IF THERE WERE EVER DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER GORBACHEV IS A 'BELIEVER',

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THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM HAVE DISPELLED THEM. THE SAME APPLIES A FORTIORE TO RYZHKOV. DISPELLING THESE MISCONCEPTIONS AND REPLACING THEM WITH A LESS DISTORTED VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL REALITIES WILL BE A LONG BUT IMPORTANT TASK. TO THIS, THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS HAD HERE - WHILE CONTAINING A CERTAIN ELEMENT OF SHOCK TREATMENT - HAVE MADE AN INVALUABLE BEGINNING. IN THE LONGER TERM, AS THE FULL SIGNIFICANCE OF KEY POINTS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESENTATION GRADUALLY SINKS IN, THE EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP CAN ONLY BENEFIT. THE VISIT HAS BROUGHT A GUST OF FRESH AIR INTO BOTH THE EAST/WEST AND OUR BILATERAL DIALOGUE. THE TRADITIONAL FLANNEL IN WHICH BASIC DISAGREEMENTS HAVE ON SO MANY OCCASIONS BEEN WRAPPED UP HAS BEEN REMOVED: BOTH SIDES NOW KNOW MUCH MORE CLEARLY WHERE THE OTHER STANDS.

4. BILATERALLY, THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CULTURE, INFORMATION AND EDUCATION IS MUCH MORE SPECIFIC THAN ANY SIMILAR DOCUMENT TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS HITHERTO SUBSCRIBED, AT LEAST WITH A WESTERN COUNTRY, AND PROVIDES A GOOD INSTRUMENT WITH WHICH TO HOLD OPEN THE WINDOW OF 'GLASNOST'. OF MORE IMMEDIATE IMPORTANCE ARE THE COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, AMOUNTING TO CLOSE ON £400 MILLION, WHICH WERE EITHER HASTENED ALONG BY THE PROSPECT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT OR - IN THE CASE OF JOHN BROWN'S CONTRACT, SIGNED LATE ON 31 MARCH - WERE SECURED THROUGH ACTIVE INTERVENTION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

5. A MORE CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT WILL FOLLOW WHEN WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DIGEST THE IMPACT OF THE VISIT, EG FROM MEDIA COMMENT WHEN IT IS OVER, AND THE FULL RANGE OF SOVIET REACTIONS TO IT.

CARTLEDGE

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MXHPAN 8946

FCO / WHITEHALL (PR LICE)

SOVIET D.

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SUBJECT  
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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 58/87

CAB/WTE 001

O 012310Z APR 87  
FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
BT  
S E C R E T  
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

DEAR RON,

I HAVE JUST GOT BACK FROM MY VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND WANT TO LET YOU KNOW STRAIGHTAWAY HOW IT WENT. GEOFFREY HOWE WILL BE GIVING GEORGE SHULTZ A DETAILED ACCOUNT NEXT WEEK.

I FOUND MR. GORBACHEV IN VERY VIGOROUS AND ROBUST FORM. ALTHOUGH IT IS ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO TELL IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE GAVE EVERY APPEARANCE OF BEING FULLY IN CHARGE, WITHOUT ANY NEED TO CONSULT HIS COLLEAGUES. HE SPOKE WITH THE UTMOST CONFIDENCE AND ASSURANCE. IT WAS NOTICEABLE HOW RYZHKOV DEFERRED TO HIM. DESPITE SOME CONTROVERSY OVER HIS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING PLANS, I WOULD SAY THAT HE IS VERY FIRMLY IN THE SADDLE.

I WAS VERY STRUCK BY THE PROMINENT ROLE WHICH MRS. GORBACHEV PLAYED IN THE VISIT. BOTH OF THEM WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO BE GOOD HOSTS. WE ENDED WITH A VERY INFORMAL SUPPER PARTY ATTENDED ONLY BY MR AND MRS RYZHKOV AT WHICH WE TALKED VERY FREELY.

GORBACHEV IS DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH HIS PLANS FOR INTERNAL REFORM. HE APPEARS TO REALISE THAT IT WILL TAKE TIME TO GET RESULTS IN THE ECONOMY; HE SPOKE OF 5-7 YEARS BEING NEEDED. HE TALKS ABOUT HIS AIMS WITH ALMOST MESSIANIC FERVOUR. AT OUR PRIVATE SUPPER HE SPECULATED FREELY ABOUT SUCH LONG-TERM IDEAS AS PAYING PEOPLE MORE AND THEN CHARGING THEM SOMETHING FOR SERVICES LIKE HEALTH AND EDUCATION. HE TALKS ABOUT THE NEED FOR INCENTIVES. HE CLEARLY RECOGNISES WHAT A POOR STATE THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS IN. BUT SOME OF HIS IDEAS APPEAR SIMPLISTIC. ONE CANNOT YET SEE QUITE HOW THEY WILL DELIVER INCREASING PROSPERITY ON THE SCALE HE WANTS AND NEEDS. I DOUBT THAT HE IS READY TO TAKE THE SORT OF STEPS NEEDED FOR REALLY FUNDAMENTAL REFORM. EVEN SO, I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO ENCOURAGE HIM, ESPECIALLY IN HIS ENDEAVOURS TO CREATE A MUCH MORE OPEN SOCIETY.

MY TALKS WITH GORBACHEV LASTED SOME 12 HOURS. HE HIMSELF DESCRIBED THEM AS HAVING BEEN SOMEWHAT TURBULENT BUT HAVING GREAT CLARITY. WHAT STRUCK ME MOST WAS THAT, HOWEVER SOPHISTICATED GORBACHEV AND HIS SENIOR COLLEAGUES MAY BE BY COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS GENERATIONS OF SOVIET LEADERS, THEY STILL HARBOUR AN EXTRAORDINARY DEGREE OF MISCONCEPTION AND MISINFORMATION ABOUT WESTERN LIFE AND VALUES. IF EVER I HAD ANY DOUBTS WHETHER GORBACHEV IS A TRUE 'BELIEVER' IN THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM, MY TALKS WITH HIM DISPELLED THEM. I TRIED TO SHOW HIM A LESS DISTORTED VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL REALITIES, SPELLING OUT WITH COMPLETE CANDOUR THE REASONS FOR THE WEST'S APPREHENSIONS ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES AND INTENTIONS. I TOLD HIM THAT WHILE WE WELCOMED HIS COMMITMENT TO INTERNAL REFORM, WE STILL AWAITED SIGNS OF CHANGE IN SOVIET EXTERNAL POLICIES...HE DID AT LEAST CLAIM THAT THE AIM OF EXTENDING COMMUNIST DOMINATION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WAS ONLY A SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT OF NO PRACTICAL RELEVANCE TO SOVIET POLICIES.

ON ARMS CONTROL I ENDURED A LONG LAMENT ABOUT HOW THE WEST RESPONDED TO SOVIET INITIATIVES BY CREATING NEW LINKAGES AND CONDITIONS. BUT I BELIEVE THAT I WAS ABLE TO MOVE HIM TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE IN PRACTICE OF THE STEP BY STEP APPROACH WHICH WE AGREED AT CAMP DAVID LAST YEAR. HE IS KEEN TO COMPLETE AN INF AGREEMENT AND ACCEPTS THAT IT MUST INCLUDE CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS, ALTHOUGH HE IS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT A WESTERN RIGHT TO MATCH SOVIET LEVELS (WHICH I SAID WAS A KEY POINT). HE ALSO OBJECTS TO THE PLANS TO DOWNGRADE PERSHING IIS TO PERSHING IS. HE PROFESSED WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW THE SS22S AND SS23S FROM EUROPE AND 'DESTROY THEM IN FRONT OF THE TELEVISION CAMERAS.' HE ACCEPTS THAT THERE SHOULD BE IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT-RANGE WEAPONS, BUT INSISTS THAT THESE SHOULD INCLUDE U S FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS, INCLUDING THE DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. I REMINDED HIM THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD FAR MORE AIRCRAFT IN THIS CATEGORY. HIS AIM IS PATENTLY THE DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE. I LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT THAT I WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THIS.

THESE ARE POINTS WHICH YOUR NEGOTIATIONS WILL HAVE TO PURSUE IN GENEVA. BUT HE SEEMS GENUINELY ANXIOUS TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT WHICH HE CAN PRESENT AS A CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENT FOR HIS NEW APPROACH. I WOULD THINK THAT THERE IS A PRETTY REASONABLE PROSPECT OF GETTING SUCH AN AGREEMENT WHICH MEETS OUR REQUIREMENTS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR.

HE ALSO SEEMS READY TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ALTHOUGH I REALISE THAT THIS MAY IN PART BE TACTICAL BECAUSE OF SOVIET FEARS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL RESUME PRODUCTION OF SUCH WEAPONS. BUT HE WAS VERY MUCH TOUGHER ON THE LINK BETWEEN START AND SDI. I PUT TO HIM MY IDEAS ON GREATER PREDICTABILITY. HE DESCRIBED THEM AS AN INTERESTING, PRACTICAL PROPOSAL BUT GAVE NO SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY. ALTHOUGH HE SUBSCRIBES TO THE NEED FOR EARLY NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS HE TRIES TO DENY THAT THERE IS AN IMBALANCE IN THE SOVIET UNION'S FAVOUR. THIS DOES NOT AUGUR WELL FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS.

I DETECTED LITTLE SIGN OF NEW THINKING ON AFGHANISTAN. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE CLEARLY MUCH EXERCISED ABOUT THE PROBLEM AND ARE THRASHING AROUND LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT. BUT THEY ARE STILL NOT READY TO ACCEPT THAT THE PRESENT REGIME IS NOT AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION.

HE OBJECTED STRONGLY TO MY RAISING HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT NEVERTHELESS GAVE SOME QUITE USEFUL ASSURANCES ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUAL CASES. MY FEELING IS THAT WE SHALL SEE SOME PROGRESS, ALBEIT SLOW, ON THIS FRONT. THE VISIT WAS VERY WELL WORTHWHILE ON AT LEAST THREE COUNTS:

- GORBACHEV NEEDS TO BE TOLD IN PLAIN, UNVARNISHED TERMS WHAT THE WESTERN VIEWPOINT IS. AND HE WAS. IT WAS INTERESTING THAT HE DID NOT ALLOW MY FRANKNESS TO AFFECT OUR PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP. I WAS ALSO ABLE TO GET OUR POINT OF VIEW ACROSS TO A MUCH WIDER AUDIENCE ON SOVIET TELEVISION. I WAS INTERVIEWED FOR SOME 50 MINUTES AND EVERY WORD WAS TRANSMITTED, EVEN THOUGH I MADE SOME VERY EXPLICIT COMMENTS ABOUTH THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THEIR POLICIES.

- WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN SUPPORTING HIS REFORM POLICIES, EVEN IF THEIR RESULTS ARE MODEST. AS SAKHAROV HAS SAID, AN OPEN SOCIETY IS SAFER FOR ITS NEIGHBOURS. WE SHOULD PUSH GORBACHEV TO RECOGNISE THAT.

- THE RESPONSE OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE WAS REMARKABLE ON MY WALKABOUTS IN MOSCOW, ZAGORSK AND TBILISI. THERE IS CLEARLY A DEEP LONGING FOR CONTACT WITH THE WEST. WE SHOULD TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT GLASNOST TO MAKE OURSELVES AND OUR SOCIETIES BETTER KNOWN TO THEM.

I HOPE THAT YOU WILL HOLD THIS INFORMATION CLOSELY. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS MORE FULLY WITH YOU WHEN WE NEXT MEET.

WARM REGARDS,  
YOURS, MARGARET.

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PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Dear Ron,

I have just got back from my visit to the Soviet Union and want to let you know straightaway how it went. Geoffrey Howe will be giving George Shultz a detailed account next week.

I found Mr. Gorbachev in very vigorous and robust form. Although it is always difficult to tell in the Soviet system, he gave every appearance of being fully in charge, without any need to consult his colleagues. He spoke with the utmost confidence and assurance. It was noticeable how Ryzhkov deferred to him. Despite some controversy over his reform and restructuring plans, I would say that he is very firmly in the saddle.

I was very struck by the prominent role which Mrs. Gorbachev played in the visit. Both of them went to great lengths to be good hosts. We ended with a very informal supper party attended only by Mr and Mrs Ryzhkov at which we talked very freely.

Gorbachev is determined to press ahead with his plans for internal reform. He appears to realise that it will take time to get results in the economy: he spoke of 5-7 years being needed. He talks about his aims with almost messianic fervour. At our private supper he speculated freely about such long-term ideas as paying people more and then charging them something for services like health and education. He talks about the need for incentives. He clearly recognises what a poor state the Soviet economy is in. But some of his ideas appear simplistic. One cannot yet see quite how they will deliver increasing prosperity on the scale he wants and needs. I doubt that he is ready to take the sort of steps needed for really fundamental reform. Even so, I am firmly convinced that it is in our interest to encourage him, especially in his endeavours to create a much more open society.

My talks with Gorbachev lasted some 12 hours. He himself described them as having been somewhat turbulent but having great clarity. What

SECRET

struck me most was that, however sophisticated Gorbachev and his senior colleagues may be by comparison with previous generations of Soviet leaders, they still harbour an extraordinary degree of misconception and misinformation about Western life and values. If ever I had any doubts whether Gorbachev is a <sup>true</sup> "believer", my talks with him dispelled them. I tried to show him a less distorted view of international realities, spelling out with complete candour the reasons for the West's apprehensions about Soviet policies and intentions. // I told him that while we welcomed his commitment to internal reform, we still awaited signs of change in Soviet external policies. // He did at least claim that the aim of extending Communist domination throughout the world was only a scientific concept of <sup>no</sup> ~~the~~ practical relevance to Soviet policies.

in The Communist System

On arms control I endured a long lament about how the West responded to Soviet initiatives by creating new linkages and conditions. But I believe that I was able to move him towards acceptance in practice of the step by step approach which we agreed at Camp David last year. He is keen to complete an INF agreement and accepts that it must include constraints on shorter-range systems, although he is not prepared to accept a Western right to match Soviet levels (which I said was a key point). He also objects to the plans to downgrade Pershing IIs to Pershing Is. He professed willingness to withdraw the SS22s and SS23s from Europe and <sup>h</sup> "destroy them in front of the television cameras." He accepts that there should be immediate follow-on negotiations on short-range weapons, but insists that these should include US forward-based systems, including the dual-capable aircraft. I reminded him that the Soviet Union had far more aircraft in this category. His aim is patently the denuclearisation of Europe. I left him in no doubt that I would never accept this.

These are points which your negotiations will have to pursue in Geneva. But he seems genuinely anxious to have an agreement which he can present as a concrete achievement for his new approach. I would think that there is a pretty reasonable prospect of getting such an agreement which meets our requirements by the end of this year.

He also seems ready to make progress towards agreement on chemical weapons, although I realise that this may in part be tactical because of Soviet fears that the United States will resume production of such weapons. But he was very much tougher on the link between START and SDI. I put to him my ideas on greater predictability. He described them as an interesting, practical proposal but gave no sign X of flexibility. Although he subscribes to the need for early negotiations to reduce conventional weapons he tries to deny that there is an imbalance in the Soviet Union's favour. This does not augur well for serious discussions.

I detected little sign of new thinking on Afghanistan. He and his colleagues are clearly much exercised about the problem and are thrashing around looking for a way out. But they are still not ready to accept that the present regime is not an adequate basis for political reconciliation.

He objected strongly to my raising human rights, but nevertheless gave some quite useful assurances about the treatment of individual cases. My feeling is that we shall see some progress, albeit slow, on this front. // The visit was very well worthwhile on at least three counts:

- Gorbachev needs to be told in plain, unvarnished terms what the Western viewpoint is. And he was. It was interesting that he did not allow my frankness to affect our personal relationship. I was also able to get our point of view across to a much wider audience on Soviet television. I was interviewed for some 50 minutes and every word was transmitted, even though I made some very explicit comments about the Soviet system and their policies.
- we have an interest in supporting his reform policies, even if their results are modest. As Sakharov has said, an open society is safer for its neighbours. We should push Gorbachev to recognise that.
- the response of the Russian people was remarkable on my walkabouts in Moscow, Zagorsk and Tbilisi. There is clearly a deep longing for contact with the West. We should take every opportunity to exploit glasnost to make ourselves and

SECRET

- 4 -

our societies better known to them.

I hope that you will hold this information closely. I look forward to discussing these matters more fully with you when we next meet.

Warm regards,

Yours, Margaret

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Mr Addison

*With the compliments of*

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Lyn Parkes

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

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FOLLOWING FOR SOVIET DEPARTMENT

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: CALL ON RYZHKOV: RECORD

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE TO WICKS, PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, NO. 10 DOWNING STREET FROM HEMANS

1. FOR COMPLETENESS YOU SHOULD INSERT INITIALS OF SOVIET TEAM. THEY ARE N I RYZHKOV, B L TOLSTYKH, V M KAMENTSEV, B I ARISTOV, A G KOVALEV, L M ZAMYATIN, E P GOUSSAROV (NOTE SPELLING).
2. RATHER MORE IMPORTANTLY ON PAGE 3 WHAT MR RYZHKOV ACTUALLY HANDED TO THE PRIME MINISTER TURNED OUT TO BE TWO COPIES OF A LIST OF GOODS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO EXPORT, REPEAT EXPORT, TO BRITAIN. THERE WAS AND IS NO SOVIET IMPORT OPPORTUNITIES LIST.
3. ON PAGE 3, PARAGRAPH BEGINNING 'AFTER CONFIRMING' REFERS TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS. TOWARDS THE END IT READS 'THE SOVIET UNION HAD BY FAR THE LARGEST STOCKPILE OF MODERN NUCLEAR WEAPONS'. SHOULD THIS NOT BE 'MODERN CHEMICAL WEAPONS'?

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

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CSP

De You - Hub/Thru

Sec - Reaps & Repls

Soviet D.

16-00 →  
{Nat Gibbons}

Mr. Paul -  
Inwd. / MT.

Res. Arb.  
See Dept - Desk 4 Dedip.

CAMBODIA/VIETNAM


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~~DR WILSON~~  
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 HD/FED  
 HD/SOVIET DEPT  
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 HD/DEFENCE DEPT  
 HD/NEWS DEPT

D I O CABINET OFFICE (2)

PS/NO.10 DOWNING STREET

RESIDENT CLERK

7.11.85



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FM MOSCOW

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 542

OF 010645Z MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PEKING, HANOI, ASEAN POSTS

*Summary only.*

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): SECRETARY OF STATE'S DINNER WITH SHEVARDNAZE,  
 31 MARCH: CAMBODIA

## SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY OF STATE PRESSES SOVIET UNION TO EXERT INFLUENCE  
 IN VIETNAM TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA. SHEVARDNAZE MAINTAINS  
 SOVIET UNION COULD NOT DO THIS EFFECTIVELY EVEN IF IT WANTED TO,  
 BUT CLAIMS TO SEE SIGNS OF A POTENTIAL SETTLEMENT EMERGING.

## DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE CHINESE HAD MADE IT  
 CLEAR THAT THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA WAS THE MAIN  
 OBSTACLE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS. HE COULD NOT  
 UNDERSTAND WHAT THE RUSSIANS GAINED FROM IT. THEIR SUPPORT FOR  
 VIETNAM WAS COSTING THEM ENORMOUS SUMS: IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO  
 SEE A MORE SETTLED FUTURE FOR CAMBODIA WITHOUT A VIETNAMESE  
 WITHDRAWAL. WHY COULD THE RUSSIANS NOT EXERT MORE INFLUENCE  
 ON VIETNAM?

3. SHEVARDNAZE SAID THAT HE HAD HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS  
 DURING HIS RECENT TOUR TO AUSTRALIA, ASEAN COUNTRIES AND  
 INDONESIA. HE ADDED A LITTLE ACIDLY THAT THE AUSTRALIANS HAD  
 BEEN MORE INTERESTED IN PERESTROIKA THAN CAMBODIA. (HE ALSO  
 ADDED IN PARENTHESES THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY IMPRESSED WITH  
 AUSTRALIA).

4. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THERE WAS LITTLE THE SOVIET UNION  
 COULD DO TO INFLUENCE VIETNAM. IT WAS NOT AS SIMPLE AS WE AND THE  
 CHINESE MAINTAINED. THE VIETNAMESE HAD COMMITMENTS TO CAMBODIA.  
 THE SOVIET UNION HAD FOR HISTORICAL REASONS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP  
 WITH VIETNAM, BUT THEY CERTAINLY COULD NOT AFFORD THE LUXURY OF  
 PRESSURING THEM, AND EVEN IF THEY DID IT WOULD BE UNEFFECTIVE.  
 THE VIETNAMESE MADE UP THEIR OWN MINDS, AS THE AMERICANS HAD  
 FOUND OUT. THE VIETNAMESE DID NOT WANT TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS.

THE SOVIET UNION HAD FOR HISTORICAL REASONS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM, BUT THEY CERTAINLY COULD NOT AFFORD THE LUXURY OF PRESSURING THEM, AND EVEN IF THEY DID IT WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE. THE VIETNAMESE MADE UP THEIR OWN MINDS, AS THE AMERICANS HAD FOUND OUT. THE VIETNAMESE DID NOT WANT TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS. THE CAMBODIAN LEADERSHIP WERE READY TO MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL ACCORD AND WERE READY TO COOPERATE WITH THE OPPOSITION GROUPS, INCLUDING Sihanouk, BUT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF POL POT. THE LATTER POINT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE: THE MUSEUM OF POL POT CRIMES WHICH HE HAD SEEN IN CAMBODIA MADE ANYTHING THE NAZIS HAD DONE IN EUROPE LOOK LIKE CHILD'S PLAY.

5. HE MIGHT BE OVER-OPTIMISTIC, BUT HE HAD DERIVED AN IMPRESSION IN INDONESIA, THAILAND AND HINDO-CHINA THAT THERE WERE SOME OUTLINES EMERGING OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WHICH BOTH ASEAN AND THE HINDO-CHINESE COULD SUPPORT. NOT EVERYONE HAD AN INTEREST IN SUPPORTING THIS, AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE WITH THE PROCESS. THE PROCESS OF ACHIEVING A NATIONAL CONSENSUS WOULD HAVE TO START BEFORE VIETNAMESE TROOPS LEFT, AND CONTINUE AFTER THEY HAD GONE.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE WERE ENGAGED IN SEVERAL WAYS. THE CONTINUING ECONOMIC FAILURE OF VIETNAM LED TO REFUGEES ARRIVING IN HONG KONG. WE ALSO BECAME INVOLVED IN THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ON THE THAI BORDER. AND AS PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WE HAD A STRONG INTEREST IN REMOVING THE CAUSE OF THIS FESTERING SORE. WE HAD NO BRIEF FOR POL POT. CAMBODIA NEEDED TO FIND ITS OWN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, WHICH THE PRESENCE OF VIETNAMESE FORCES MADE MORE DIFFICULT. HE COULD SEE THE SOVIET INTEREST IN VIETNAM, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE CAM RANH BASE, WHICH HE COULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE RUSSIANS WISHED TO KEEP. BUT THE COST TO THE SOVIET UNION OF SUPPORTING THE VIETNAMESE ECONOMY, AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA LOOKED TO US DISPROPORTIONATE.

7. SHEVARDNAZDE ROSE STRONGLY TO THE MENTION OF CAM RANH, SAYING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS SURROUNDED BY FOREIGN BASES AND COULD SURELY HAVE JUST ONE OF ITS OWN. HE CONTINUED THAT THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION COULD NOT BE SOLVED OVERNIGHT. THE REASONS FOR THE IMPOVERISHED VIETNAMESE ECONOMY WERE WELL KNOWN TO EVERYONE. WE SHOULD ESTABLISH A BETTER DIALOGUE WITH HANOI. BUT IN THE END THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM COULD ONLY BE RESOLVED BY THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION.

8. IN A RATHER REPETITIVE DISCUSSION THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO THE LONG HISTORY OF THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT, AND REPEATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WITH ITS CLOSE INVOLVEMENT IN THE AREA OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO BRING SOME INFLUENCE TO BEAR. SHEVARDNAZDE CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN THAT THIS WAS NOT PRACTICAL POLITICS: THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO MORE INFLUENCE VIETNAM THAT WE COULD INFLUENCE SOUTH AFRICA, IN SPITE OF OUR CLOSE TIES WITH THAT COUNTRY. OUTSIDE POWERS COULD ONLY HELP THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION TO REACH AGREEMENT AMONG THEMSELVES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT RAISED THIS ISSUE PURELY IN ORDER TO BE CRITICAL OF THE SOVIET UNION, BUT IN AN EFFORT TO FIND SOME COMMON PERCEPTION OF A HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM WHICH HAD GONE ON FAR TOO LONG. HE WOULD LIKE TO COME BACK TO IT ON ANOTHER OCCASION, AND MEANWHILE LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS OWN VISIT TO THE REGION.

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

## SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE

1. SHEVARDNADZE GAVE SMALL WORKING DINNER FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN PARALLEL WITH GORBACHEV'S RESTRICTED DINNER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. REGIONAL AGENDA COMPLETED, WITH DISCUSSION OF SINO/SOVIET, THE TWO KOREAS, VIETNAM/CAMBODIA, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ON THE SUBCONTINENT, AND AFGHANISTAN (FOR WHICH SEE MY 5 LIFTS, COPIED TO VARIOUS POSTS). LITTLE GAVE ON SUBSTANCE BUT CANDID AND SERIOUS EXCHANGES. SHEVARDNADZE'S INVITATION TO SECRETARY OF STATE TO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION CONFIRMED AND ACCEPTED. NO DATES DISCUSSED.
2. SHEVARDNADZE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT DISCUSSIONS OVER TWO DAYS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD BEEN INTENSIVE AND INTERESTING. THERE WERE WIDE DIVERGENCES BUT COMMON INTERESTS HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED. THE SERIES OF FOREIGN MINISTER MEETINGS MUST CONTINUE. A CALM AND PRODUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN CREATED IN WHICH DIFFICULT ISSUES COULD BE ADDRESSED.
3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED WHEN HE BECAME FOREIGN SECRETARY THE PRIME MINISTER AND HE HAD SET AS THEIR MOST IMPORTANT TASK THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THERE WERE STILL LARGE DIFFERENCES, SOME DUE TO FAILURE TO SEE THE TRUTH ABOUT THE OTHER SIDE, OTHERS MORE SERIOUS THAN THAT. BUT THEY HAD MADE A START IN LOOKING FOR COMMON GROUND.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOOK ADVANTAGE OF CONCLUDING COURTESIES TO ASK FOR SOVIET HELP IN ARRANGING THE STUDY VISIT TO SIBERIA OF AN EXPERT IN THE MIGRATORY HABITS OF BEWICK SWANS. HE ASKED ALSO / THAT

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THAT FAVOURABLE CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO A REQUEST BY THE  
BRITISH NATIONAL RAILWAY MUSEUM FOR AN ANTIQUE SOVIET LOCOMOTIVE.  
SHEVARDNADZE AGREED TO LOOK INTO THESE REQUESTS, WHICH THE EMBASSY  
WILL FOLLOW UP.

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PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/MRS CHALKER  
PS/PUS  
MR THOMAS  
CHIEF CLERK  
MR BOYD  
MR MUNRO  
MR GILLMORE  
MR RATFORD  
MR FALL  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
MR BARRINGTON

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 541

OF 010630Z APRIL 87

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, SEOUL, TOKYO, PEKING

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): SECRETARY OF STATE'S DINNER WITH SHEVARDNADZE,  
31 MARCH: KOREA

## SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY OF STATE DELIVERS PRESIDENT CHUN'S MESSAGE. SHEVARDNADZE UNRECEPTIVE ON JOINT ENTRY TO UN, SUGGESTS PROGRESS ON DIALOGUE AND JOINT STAGING OF OLYMPIC GAMES. SHEVARDNADZE APPARENTLY SEEKING TO PERSUADE HIMSELF THAT NORTH KOREA WHOLY TO FOLLOW SOUTH KOREA ECONOMICALLY.

## DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ENCOURAGING THE TWO KOREAS TO DEVELOP BETTER RELATIONS. THE SOUTH KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO HAD RECENTLY BEEN IN LONDON, HAD ASKED US TO CONVEY A MESSAGE FROM THE SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENT THAT SOUTH KOREA WISHED TO HAVE BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE NORTH, AND A SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS ON THE OLYMPIC GAMES. THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT THAT THE BEST PROSPECT WOULD BE TO FIND A WAY FOR BOTH SOUTH AND NORTH TO ENTER THE UN AT THE SAME TIME. HE WISHED US TO CONVEY HIS WISH FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE NORTH. FOR OUR PART, ALTHOUGH WE WERE FAR DISTANT, WE HAD A CLOSE INTEREST IN RESOLVING THIS POSSIBLE SOURCE OF TENSION.

3. SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT SOVIET CONTACTS WITH NORTH KOREA WERE FAIRLY CLOSE, THOUGH THEY HAD FEW WITH THE SOUTH. THE NORTH KOREAN OBJECTIVE REMAINED REUNIFICATION. THEY WERE PREPARED FOR DIALOGUE, AND HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT A MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS WAS IMMINENT TO DISCUSS THE RAFT OF PROBLEMS WHICH HAD ACCUMULATED. THE NORTH KOREANS THOUGHT THAT FOR BOTH COUNTRIES TO ENTER THE UN WOULD PERPETUATE THE PRESENT DIVISION. THE RUSSIANS HAD SOME SYMPATHY WITH THIS POINT OF VIEW. HE THOUGHT THAT AN ARRANGEMENT FOR JOINT STAGING OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES BY THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH SOME EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN PYONGYANG MIGHT BE HELPFUL. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE UK COULD SUPPORT THIS IDEA, AS MANY OTHERS ALREADY DID. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THIS GOING ON. IT WOULD BE A NICE CHANGE IF SPORT FOR ONCE DIMINISHED INTERNATIONAL TENSION RATHER THAN INCREASING IT.

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4. SHEVARDNADZE MAINTAINED THAT THE PRESENCE OF US TROOPS WAS A SERIOUS OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF RECONCILIATION. SOUTH KOREA HAD A LARGER POPULATION THAN THE NORTH AND MUCH LARGER ARMED FORCES, AS WELL AS A STRONG ECONOMY. THE NORTH WAS WEAKER IN POPULATION, TROOP NUMBERS AND EQUIPMENT. THERE WAS NO REASON FOR A CONTINUING US PRESENCE OF 40,000 MEN AND BASES. IF THEY WENT THE TWO KOREAS MIGHT FIND COMMON GROUND. IN PRACTICE HE THOUGHT THERE WAS LITTLE PROSPECT OF THIS. THE BEST WAY FORWARD IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE MIGHT BE A JOINT EFFORT ON THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND THE PROMOTION OF HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THINGS LOOKED VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BORDER. WHEN HE HAD VISITED PAN JUM JOM, HE HAD FELT THE COLD WAR AS NEVER BEFORE. THE SOUTH KOREANS WANTED US TROOPS TO STAY BECAUSE OF THEIR VIVID MEMORIES OF INVASION FROM THE NORTH, WHICH HAD LED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO THE INTRODUCTION OF UN TROOPS. BUT HE WOULD CONVEY THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE SOUTH KOREANS.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED ON THE PROSPERITY OF SOUTH KOREA. SHEVARDNADZE AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPRESSIVE. HOWEVER HE HAD RECENTLY VISITED NORTH KOREA AFTER A 15 YEAR GAP AND SAW SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS THERE AS WELL. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT THEY HAD TO SPEND SO MUCH ON ARMS WHICH COULD BE BETTER SPENT ELSEWHERE. NORTH KOREA DID NOT HAVE THE BENEFIT OF US TAXPAYERS MONEY, OR EXPENDITURE BY FOREIGN TROOPS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED ON SOVIET ARMS SUPPLIES TO NORTH KOREA, TO WHICH SHEVARDNADZE RESPONDED THAT THE NORTH KOREANS HAD TO PAY IN FULL FOR THEM.

7. SUMMING UP, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT A STEP BY STEP APPROACH SEEMED RIGHT. THERE WAS UNLIKELY TO BE SWEEPING CHANGE OVERNIGHT. JUST HAVING A HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO WAS ALREADY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD DENG XIAOPING SPECULATE ABOUT THE USE OF HIS ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS IN RELATION TO KOREA. THIS MIGHT BE EASIER TO STATE THAN ACHIEVE. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE DID NOT RULE IT OUT. BUT ONLY THE KOREANS THEMSELVES COULD REACH AGREEMENT. HE ADVISED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO VISIT NORTH KOREA. THE SECRETARY OF

/STATE



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STATE SAID HURRIEDLY THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD  
OF THIS.

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OF 011530Z APRIL 87

AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO, NO 10

(FCO FOR LONGRIGG, SOVIET DEPT)

FOR SEYMOUR FROM CHASE

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE LIST OF SOVIET GOODS OFFERED FOR EXPORT TO THE UK WHICH WAS HANDED OVER TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE SOURCE OF THE CALL ON CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS RYZHKOV YESTERDAY:

DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	UNIT OF MEASUREMENT	1990
TOTAL:	MILLION ROUBLES	350-370
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT		65-70
INCLUDING:		
- METAL-CUTTING MACHINE TOOLS AND PRESSING AND FORGING EQUIPMENT	---	4.5-5.0
- BEARINGS	---	1.3-1.5
- PASSENGER CARS	THOU PIECES	15-20
- HELICOPTERS	PIECES	3
ENGINEERING HOUSEHOLD GOODS		
INCLUDING:		
- DOMESTIC REFRIGERATORS	THOU PIECES	28-30
- DOMESTIC TIMEPIECES, INCLUDING MOVEMENTS	---	3000-3200
- TV SETS	---	25-30

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(x4)

INCLUDING:

CHEMICALS

- METHANOL

THOU TONS

50-60

- AMMONIA

---

70-90

- ORTHOXYLENE

---

19-20

- UREA

---

13-15

CRUDE OIL

---

1000-1100

OIL PRODUCTS

---

800-900

NON-FERROUS METALS

INCLUDING:

COPPER

---

35-40

NICKEL

---

6.5-7.0

ALUMINIUM

---

40-45

FERROUS METALS ROLLED PRODUCTS

---

13

PIG IRON

---

20

FUR-SKINS

MILLION ROUBLES

12/15

OTHER GOODS, INCLUDING MASS

CONSUMER GOODS

---

30-50

2. THE PURPOSE OF THIS LIST IS TO INDICATE HOW MR GORBACHEV'S TARGET OF 40-50 PERCENT INCREASE IN TRADE TURNOVER IS TO BE MET BY 1990. THERE WAS NO, REPEAT NO, CORRESPONDING LIST OF UK EXPORT GOODS OF INTEREST TO THE SOVIET UNION, ALTHOUGH WE HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM THE TRANSLATOR THAT THERE WAS ALSO A LIST OF POTENTIAL EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UK. WE HAVE HAD IT NOW CONFIRMED BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT THERE WAS ONLY THE LIST OF SOVIET GOODS TO BE HANDED OVER.

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THE QUOTE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THE JEWISH CHRONICLE

The plight of the Jewish people has never been far from my thoughts during this remarkable visit to Moscow.

I have welcomed the steps which the Soviet authorities have taken to release those imprisoned for their beliefs and to allow those who wish to leave the country to do so. Basing myself on the obligations accepted by the Soviet Union under the Helsinki Final Act, I have urged the Soviet leadership to continue and accelerate this process.

The Foreign Secretary also handed to Mr. Shevardnadze on Monday lists of more than 130 people who have been denied exit visas or wish to be reunited with their families. Mr. Gorbachev told me individual cases would continue to be dealt with with care and attention and with positive results where possible. I regard this as a key to achieving greater trust and confidence between our two nations.

This morning I have had breakfast with three Jews - Mr. and Mrs. Iosif Begun and Mrs. Rosa Ioffe. I have learnt first hand from them the problems they have faced with courage and fortitude - problems which I hope will soon be alleviated and ended for all Jews in the Soviet Union.



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

1 April 1987

*Dear Mr. Dobrynin,*

I much enjoyed our conversation at the splendid dinner in the fabulous surroundings on Monday evening. The dinner was really an unforgettable occasion.

I promised to send you a copy of the English text of the Prime Minister's speech. This I now enclose.

*Yours sincerely*

*Nigel Wicks*

N L WICKS

Mr. A. F. Dobrynin

*Handed to Embassy to deliver*



FILE  
DA  
ccFO

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

1 April 1987

*Dear Mrs. Pylyshova,*

I am taking the opportunity of my visit to Moscow to reply to the letter which you have written to me and which was published in Izvestia on 27 March.

I am glad that you have written so frankly. I think it important that the peoples of East and West should understand each other's point of view clearly.

I agree wholeheartedly with much that you say in your letter. It is indeed the business of Governments to help to create a better life for their people in peace, security and freedom and in a healthy and prosperous environment. I know that this is the aim of the present Soviet leadership as it is the aim of the Government which I lead. The discussions which I am having this week in Moscow are precisely directed at these objectives and at, as you put it, a warming of international relations and in particular Anglo/Soviet relations. Although it would be wrong to expect too much too quickly, I think that the Soviet leadership and I have made progress along the right road.

I am disturbed, however, at what you say about the United States. I know the American people and their Government well. There is certainly no question of the US "aspiring to war" or thinking of "dropping their stockpile of nuclear weapons on the heads of humanity". We in the West want peace, and a healthy and mutually beneficial relationship with the Soviet Union. The

arms race about which you write so critically has come into being, not because of the ill-will of one side or the other but because of a tragic lack of trust and confidence between us. We must now work carefully and methodically to build that trust and that confidence and to ensure that at each stage the security of both sides is maintained at a steadily reducing level of armaments. I am working for achievable step by step progress, and I hope that as our dialogue with the Soviet leadership develops we shall have the support of the Soviet people, as we work towards those goals which you and I clearly share.

Thank you for writing to me. I send you my best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Margarita Dalida

Mrs. Margarita Pylchikova

PART 1 ends:-

NLW to FCO (mtg. record) 31.3.87

PART 2 begins:-

Pm to Mrs Pyichikova 1.4.87



Grey Scale #13



**A** 1 2 3 4 5 6 **M** 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 **B** 17 18 19

